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STUI
THE LIBRARY
of
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
Toronto
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THL
W 0 K K S
OP
PRESIDENT EDWARDS,
IN FOUR VOLUMES.
A REPRINT OF THE WORCESTER EDITION,
WITH
YALUABLE ADDITIONS AND A COPIOUS GENERAL INDEX
TO WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME, HAS BEEN ADDED, AT GREAT EXPENSE,
A COMPLETE INDEX OF SCRIPTURE TEXTS
EIGHTH EDITION IN FOUR VOLUMES.
VOL. II
CONTAINING
I. Inquiry into the Freedom of the
Will.
II. Dissertation concerning the end
for which God created the
World.
HI. Dissertation on the Nature of
True Virtue.
IV. Doctrine ofOriginalSin defended.
V. Miscellaneous Observations con-
cerning the Divine Decrees in
general and election in par-
TICULAR.
VI. Remarks on Efficacious Grace.
VII. Observations concerning Faith.
*!.Ul<
NEW YORK:
LEAVITT AND COMPANY,
No. 191 Broadway.
1851.
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1851
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CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.
L A CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY INTO THE PREVAILING NO-
TIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Page
TART I. Wherein are explained and stated various terms and things belong-
ing to the subject of the ensuing Discourse . . . . 1
Sect. i. Concerning the Nature of the Will . . . . . ib.
ii. Concerning the Determination of the Will . . . . .3
in. Concerning the meaning of the terms. Necessity, Impossibility, Inability,
&c, and of Contjngence . . . . . 8
iv. Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability . . 13
v. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency . . .17
PART II. Wherein it is considered, whether there is or can be any such sort of
Freedom of Will, as that wherein Arminians place the essence of the Lib-
erty of all Moral Agents ; and whether any such thing ever was or can be
conceived of . . . . . . . . .20
Sect. i. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty
of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power . . . ib.
ii. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered . 22
in. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to
pass without a Cause of its existence .... 26
iv. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the
nature of the soul . 30
t. Showing1, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed
to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of
Arminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian
writers are obliged to talk inconsistently . . . . .32
vi. Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent
in the view of the mind . . . . . . .35
vn. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference . 39
vin. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all'Necessity 45
ix. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Under-
standing . . . . . ... . .43
x. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives : with partic-
ular observations of the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and
reasonings about the Freedom of the Will . . . . .52
xi. The evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral
Agents . . . . . . . . " . 61
xii. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, in-
consistent with such a Contingence of those volitions as is without all Ne-
cessity ... . . . . . . . 73
xiii. Wliether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with
, any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as
to overthrow Arminian Liberty . . . . . .81
PART III. Wherein is inquired, whether any such Liberty of Will as Arminians
hold be necessary to Moral Agency. Virtue and vice, Praise and Dis-
praise, &c. . . . . . . . .83
Sect. i. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy . ib,
ii. The Acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ necessarily noly,
yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, &c. . . .86
IV CONTENTS.
hi. The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen man in gen-
eral, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with Blamewor-
thiness . . . . . •;.-.. . . 94
iv. Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability
to obey ......... 99
v. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in
the non-performance of things in themselves good, particularly considered 105
vi. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly incon-
sistent with it ; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, in-
consistent with Arminian notions of Liberty and moral Agency . 1 10
vn. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence of Mo-
tive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions . . 1 15
PART IV. Wherein the chief grounds of the reasonings of Arminians, in sup-
port and defence of the forementioned notions of Liberty, Moral Agency,
&c, and against the opposite doctrine, are considered . . 119
Sect. i. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and
acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature . . . ib.
n. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of Action,
and Agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of
the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c. . . 122
III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose
those tilings which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame . 127
iv. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to
suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward
and Punishment •••..... 131
v. Objections, that this scheme of Necessity renders all Means and Endeavors
for avoiding Sin, or obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain, and to no pur-
pose ; and that it makes men no more than mere machines, in affairs of
morality and religion, answered ...... 136
vi. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintain-
ed, that it agrees with the Stoical doctrine of Fate, and the opinions of Mr.
Hobbes ••••..... 140
vn. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will . 142
fin. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions
considered ••••..... 147
ix. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained'
that it makes God the author of Sin ...... 155
x. Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World . 165
xi. Of a supposed Inconsistence between these principles and God's morai
character ...... m iqq
XII. Of a supposed tendency of these principles to Atheism and Licentious^
nes!, • . • • 169
xiii. Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvin-
istic doctrine is supposed, that it is metaphysical and abstruse . . 171
The Conclusion ...... 177
Remarks on the Essays on the Principles .of Morality and Natural Religion'
in a Letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland . . . 183
II. DISSERTATION ON THE END FOR WHICH GOD CREATED T*HE
WORLD.
Introduction— Explanation of terms
CHAP. I. What Reason dictates concerning this affair '.
Sect. i. The general dictates of reason .
11. What Reason supposes
hi. How God regards himself .
iv. Some objections considered ....
:'HAP. II. What may be learned from the Holy Scriptures
Sect. 1. Scripture makes God his last end
11. Concerning a just method of arguing
in. Particular texts of Scripture . \
iv. God created the world for his name, &c. \
v. Communication of good to the creature . [
193
199
ib
204
ib.
ib.
222
ib.
ib.
226
236
242
CONTENTS.
vi. What is meant by the glory of God, &c.
vii. God's last end is but one
246
III. A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE.
CHAP. I. Concerning the essence of true virtue
II. How love respects different beings .
III. Concerning the secondary beauty .
IV. Of self-love and its influence
V. Natural conscience, and the moral sense
VI. Of particular instincts of nature
VII. The reasons of many mistakes
VIII. Whether virtue be founded in sentiment
. 261
. 266
. 271
. 277
. 285
. 291
. 290
. 305
IV.
THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN
DEFENDED.
re
The author's Preface .....
PART. I. Evidences of Original Sin from Facts and Events
Chap. i. The Evidence of the Doctrine from Facts
Sect. i. All men tend to sin and ruin .
ii. Universal sin proves a sinful propensity .
in. This tendency most corrupt and pernicious
iv. All men sin immediately, &c.
v. All have more sin than virtue
vi. Men's proneness to extreme stupidity, &c.
vii. Generality of mankind, wicked .
vin. Great means used to oppose wickedness
ix. Several evasions considered
Chap. ii. Arguments from universal Mortality .
PART. II. Proofs of the Doctrine from particular parts of Scriptui
Chap. i. Observations on the three first Chapters of Genesis
Sect. i. Concerning Adam's original righteousness .
ii. Death threatened to our first parents
in. Adam a federal head, &c.
Chap. ii. Observations on Texts, chiefly of the Old Testament, &c.
m. Observations on Texts, principally in the New Testament
Sect. i. Observations on John iii. 6. .
ii. Observations on Rom. iii. 9-24. ....
in. Observations on Rom. v. 6-10, Eph. ii. 3. &c. .
Chap. iv. Containing observations on Rom. v. 12. &c, .
Sect. i. Remarks on Dr. Taylor's way of explaining this text
ii. The true scope of Rom. v. 12, &c.
PART III. Evidence of the Doctrine from Redemption by Christ
Chap. i. Proofs from Redemption by Christ
ii. Proof from Application of Redemption
PART. IV. Containing Answers to Objections
Chap. i. The Objection from the Nature of Sin
ii. God not the Author of Sin .
in. The Imputation of Adam's Sin stated
iv. Several other Objections answered .
307
309
ib.
ib-
317
322
326
329
334
341
348
361
372
381
ib.
ib.
390
399
405
413
ib.
419
425
434
ib.
451
461
ib.
466
473
ib.
476
ib.
495
V. MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS.
Concerning the Divine Decrees in general, and Election in particular
Concerning Efficacious Grace . .
Observations Concerning Faith . .
513
547
601
A CAEEFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY
INTO THE
MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS
OP THAT
FREEDOM OE THE WILL,
WHICH IS
SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, REWARD
AM) PUNISHMENT. PRAISE AND BLAME.
Rom. ii. 16. It is not of him that willkth.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
PART I.
WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO THE
SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE.
SECTION I.
Concerning the Nature of the Will.
It may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to
define or describe the Will ; this word being generally as well understood as
any other words we can use to explain it : and so perhaps it would be, had not
philosophers, metaphysicians and polemic divines brought the matter into ob-
scurity by the things they have said of it. But since it is so, I think it may be
of some use, and will tend to the greater clearness in the following discourse,
to say a few things concerning it.
And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysical refining)
is plainly, that by which the mind chooses any thing. The faculty of the Will
is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing
an act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.
If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to say, that it is that by
which the soul either chooses or refuses ; I am content with it : though I think
that it is enough to say, it is that by which the soul chooses : for in°every act
of Will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another ; it chooses
something rather than the contrary, or rather than the want or non-existence of that
thing. So in every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing
refused ; the positive and the negative are set before the mind for its choice,
and it chooses the negative ; and the mind's making its choice in that case is
properly the act of the Will; the Will's determining between the two is a vol-
untary determining ; but that is the same thing as making a choice. So that
whatever names we call the act of the Will by, choosing, refusing, approving,
disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing,
commanding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, a being pleased or displeased
with ; all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act voluntarily,
is evermore to act electively.
Mr. Locke* says, " the Will signifies nothing but a power or ability to pre-
fer or choose." And in the foregoing page says, " the word preferring seems
best to express the act of volition j" but adds, that " it does it not precisely ;
__ * Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197.
Vol. II. 1
2 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
for (says he) though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say ne
ever wills it V9 But the instance he mentions does not prove that there is any
thing else in willing, but merely preferring : for it should be considered what is
the next and immediate object of the Will, with respect to a man's walking, or
any other external action ; which is not being removed from one place to another ;
on the earth, or through the air ; these are remoter objects of preference ; but
such or such an immediate exertion of himself. The thing nextly chosen 01
preferred when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place
where he would be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in
order to it. And his willing such an alteration in his body in the present mo-
ment, is nothing else but his choosing or preferring such an alteration in his
body at such a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance of it. And
God has so made and established the human nature, the soul being united to a
body in proper state, that the soul preferring or choosing such an immediate ex-
ertion or alteration of the body, such an alteration instantaneously follows.
There is nothing else in the actions of my mind, that I am conscious of while I
walk, but only my preferring or choosing, through successive moments, that
there should be such alterations of my external sensations and motions ; together
with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be so ; having ever found by
experience, that on such an immediate preference, such sensations and motions
do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise. But it is not so in the case of
flying : though a man may be said remotely to choose or prefer flying ; yet he
does not choose or prefer, incline to or desire, under circumstances in view, any
immediate exertion of the members of his body in order to it ; because he has no
expectation that he should obtain the desired end by any such exertion ; and he
does not prefer or incline to any bodily exertion or effort under this apprehended
circumstance, of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully distinguish
the proper objects of the several acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and
such like instances, that there is any difference between volition and preference ;
or that a man's choosing, liking best, or being best pleased with a thing, are not
the same with his willing that thing ; as they seem to be according to those
general and more natural notions of men, according to which language is formed.
Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to do
thus or thus ; and a man's doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the
same thing in common speech.
Mr. Locke* says, " the Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire ; which
in the very- same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our
Wills set us upon. A man (says he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use
persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may
not prevail on him. In this case it is plain the Will and Desire run counter." I
do not suppose, that Will and Desire are words of precisely the same significa-
tion : W'ill seems to be a word of a more general signification, extending to things
present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present
situation and posture, suppose, sitting still, or having my eyes open, and so may
will it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever
be properly said to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills any thing
contrary to his desires, or desires any thing contrary to his Will The foremen-
tioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces, does not prove that he ever does.
He may, on some consideration or other, will to utter speeches which have a
tendency to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not persuade
.him : but yet his Will and Desire do not run counter. The thing which he wills,
* Human Understanding, vol. i. p. 203, 204.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 3
the very same he desires ; and he does not will a thing, and desire the contrary
in any particular. In this instance, it is not carefully observed, what is the thing
willed, and what is the thing desired : if it were, it would be found that Will and
Desire do not clash in the least. The thing willed on some consideration, is to
utter such words ; and certainly, the same consideration, so influences him, that
he does not desire the contrary : all things considered, he chooses to utter such
words, and does not desire not to utter them. And so as to the thing which Mr.
Locke speaks of as desired, viz., that the words, though they tend to persuade,
should not be effectual to that end ; his Will is not contrary to this ; he does not
will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he
desires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, it should
be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing, or with
respect to the very same object of Will or Desire : but here the objects are two ;
and in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Desire agree. And it is no
wonder that they should not agree in difFerent things, however little distinguished
they are in their nature. The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Desire
agree with Desire, m difFerent things. As in this very instance which Mr. Locke
mentions, a person may, on some consideration, desire to use persuasions, and
at the same time may desire they may not prevail ; but yet nobody will say,
that Desire runs counter to Desire ; or that this proves that Desire is perfectly
a distinct thing from Desire. — The like might be observed of the other instance
Mr. Locke produces, of a man's desiring to be eased of pain, &c.
But not to dwell any longer on this, whether Desire and Will and whether
Preference and Volition be precisely the same things or no; yet, I trust it will
be allowed by all, that in every act of Will there is an act of choice ; that in
every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul,
whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with
respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth
of the Will, there is some preponderation of the mind or inclination, one way
rather than another ; and the soul had rather have or do one thing than another,
or than not have or do that thing ; and that there, where there is absolutely no
preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.
SECTION II.
Concerning the Determination of the Will.
By determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be
intended, causing that the act of the Will or choice should be thus, and not
otherwise : and the Will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some
action or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object.
As when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion
of the body to be such a way, or in such a direction, rather than another.
To talk of the determination of the Will, supposes an effect, which must
have a cause. If the Will be determined, there is a determiner. This must be
supposed to be intended even by them that say, the Will determines itself. If
it be so, the Will is both determiner and determined ; it is a cause that acts and
produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action.
With respect to that grand inquiry, What determines the Will 1 it would be
very tedious and unnecessary at present to enumerate and examine *11 the various
opinions which have been advanced concerning this matter; nor is it needful
4 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
that I should enter into a particular disquisition of all points debated in disputes
on that question, whether the Will always follows the last dictate of the under-
standing. It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, it is that motive, which,
as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will.
But it may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning in this.
By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the
mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly.
Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind ;
and, when it is so, all together are as it were one complex motive. And when
I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that
operates to induce to a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength
of one thing alone, or of many together.
Whatever is a motive, in this sense, must be something that is extant in the
view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can
induce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is per-
ceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly
unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all.
It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold
of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.
And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly
called a motive, excitement or inducement to a perceiving, willing agent, has
some sort and degree of tendency or advantage to move or excite the Will, pre-
vious to the effect, or to the act of the Will excited. This previous tendency ot
the motive is what I call the strength of the motive. That motive which has a
less degree of previous advantage or tendency to move the Will, or that appears
less inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a weaker motive.
On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears
concerning it to the understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of pre-
vious tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the strongest
motive. And in this sense, I suppose the Will is always determined by the
strongest motive.
Things that exist in the view of the mind have their strength, tendency or
advantage to move or excite its Will, from many things appertaining to the
nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of
the mind that views, and the degree and manner of its view ; of which it would
perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But so much I think may be
determined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever is perceived
or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and
influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as good ; nor
has it any tendency to invite or engage the election of the soul in any further
degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that things
that appear have a tendency by the appearance they make, to engage the mind
to elect them, some other way than by their appearing eligible to it ; which is
absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some sense, that the Will alwavs is
as the greatest apparent good is. For the right understanding of this, two
things must be well and distinctly observed.
1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term good; namely, as of
the same import with agreeable. To appear good to the mind, as I use the
phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind. Cer-
tainly nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to engage its
inclination and choice, considered as evil or disagreeable ; nor, indeed, as indiffer-
ent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 5
inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the notion of that which suits
the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and
engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's view, suits it best, and pleases it
most ; and in that sense, is the greatest apparent good : to say otherwise, is
little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction.
The word good, in this sense, includes in its signification, the removal or
avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy. It is agreeable
and pleasing to avoid what is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have uneasi-
ness removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke supposes determines
the Will. For when he speaks of uneasiness as determining the Will, he must
be understood as supposing that the end or aim which governs in the volition or
act of preference, is the avoiding or. removal of that uneasiness ; and that is the
same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable.
2. When I say, the Will is as the greatest apparent good is, or (as I have
explained it) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears
most agreeable ; it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless
objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition ;
and not some object that the act of Will has not an immediate, but only an
indirect and remote respect to. Many acts of volition have some remote relation
to an object, that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen.
Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choose whether
to drink it or no ; the proper and immediate objects, about which his present
volition is conversant, and between which his choice now decides, are his own
acts, in drinking the liquor, or letting it alone ; and this will certainly be done
according to what, in the present view of his mind, taken in the whole of it, is
most agreeable to him. If he chooses or wills to drink it, and not to let it
alone ; then this action, as it stands in the view of his mind, with all that be-
longs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and pleasing than letting it
alone.
But the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely, and
between which his choice may determine more indirectly, are the present plea-
sure the man expects by drinking, and the future misery which he judges will
be the consequence of it : he may judge that this future misery when it comes,
will be more disagreeable and unpleasant, than refraining from drinking now
would be. But these two things are not the proper objects that the act of
volition spoken of is nextly conversant about. For the act of Will spoken of
is concerning present drinking or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then
drinking is the proper object of the act of his Will ; and drinking, on some
account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he
chooses to refrain, then refraining is the immediate object of his Will, and is
most pleasing to him. If in the choice he makes in the case, he prefers a
present pleasure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater when it
comes; then a lesser present pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a
greater advantage at a distance. If, on the contrary, a future advantage is
preferred, then that appears most agreeable, and suits him best. And so still
the present volition is as the greatest apparent good at present is.
1 have rather chosen to express myself thus, that the Will always is as the
greatest apparent good, or, as what appears most agreeable, is, than to. say that
the Wil. is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most
agreeable ; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and
the mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly
distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be
6 FREEDOM OF THE WILI,
said, that the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence and fruit of
the mind's volition or choice, is determined by that which appears most "agreea-
ble, than that the preference or choice itself is ; but that the act of volition itsell
is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which
causes it to appear most agreeable. I say, in or about the mind's view of the
object, because what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is no1
only what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view, anc
the state and circumstances of the mind that views. Particularly to enumerate
all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objects of volition, which have
influence in their appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no
small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is not necessary to my
present purpose. I shall therefore only mention some things in general.
I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable, is the ap-
parent nature and circumstances of the object. And there are various things of
this sort, that have a hand in rendering the object more or less agreeable ; as,
1. That which appears in the object, which renders it beautiful and plea-
sant, or deformed and irksome to the mind ; viewing it as it is in itself.
2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or the
consequence of it. Such concomitants and consequences being viewed as cir-
cumstances of the object, are to be considered as belonging to it, and as it were
parts of it ; as it stands in the mind's view, as a proposed object cf choice.
3. The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that appears, with respect
to distance of time ; being either nearer or farther off. It is a thing in itself
agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily ; and disagreeable to have it
delayed ; so that if there be two equal degrees of pleasure set in the mind's view,
and all other things are equal, but only one is beheld as near, and the other far
off; the nearer will appear most agreeable, and so will be chosen. Because,
though the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in them-
selves, yet not as viewed in their circumstances; one of them having the
additional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness.
II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of an object of choice,
as it stands in the mind's view, is the manner of the view. If the object be
something which appears connected with future pleasure, not only will the
degree of apparent pleasure have influence, but also the manner of the view,
especially in two respects.
I With respect to the degree of judgment, or firmness of assent, with which
the mind judges the pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have
a certain happiness, than an uncertain one ; and a pleasure viewed as more
probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind, than that
which is viewed as less probable.
2. With respect to the degree of the idea of the future pleasure. WTith re-
gard to things which are the subject of our thoughts, either past, present, or
future, we have much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than
others ; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively and strong. Thus the ideas
we have of sensible things by immediate sensation, are usually much more lively
than those we have by mere imagination, or by contemplation of them when
absent. My idea of the sun, when I look upon it, is more vivid than when I
only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit, is usually
stronger when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes the
ideas we have of things by contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than
at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the plea-
sure which is to be enjoyeo m eating some sort of food that he loves, than at
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 7
another. Now the degree, or strength of the idea or sense that men have of
future good or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite
choice or volition. When of two kinds of future pleasure, which the mind
considers of, and are presented for choice, both are supposed exactly equal by
the judgment, and both equally certain, and all other things are equal, but only
one of them is what the mind has a far more lively sense of, than of the other ;
this- has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind, and move
the Will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleasure it has a
strong and lively sense of, than that which it has only a faint idea of. The view
of the former is attended with the strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness
attends the want of it ; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness
removed, and its appetite gratified. And if several future enjoyments are
presented together, as competitors for the choice of the mind, some of them
judged to be greater, and Others less ; the mind also having a greater sense and
more lively idea of the good of some of them, and of others a less ; and some
are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others ; and those enjoy-
ments that appear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so in
others ; in this case, all other things being equal, the agreeableness of a proposed
object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of
good supposed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty
of that good, and the degree of the view or sense, or liveliness of the idea the
mind has of that good ; because all together concur to constitute the degree in
which the object appears at present agreeable ; and accordingly volition will
be determined.
I might further observe, the state of the mind that views a proposed object
of choice, is another thing that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeable-
ness of that object ; the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or
that has been introduced and established by education, example, custom, or some
other means ; or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion.
That object which appears agreeable to one, does not so to another. And the
same object does not always appear alike agreeable, to the same person, at
different times. It is most agreeable to some men, to follow their reason ; and
to others, to follow their appetites : to some men it is more agreeable to deny a
vicious inclination, than to gratify it ; others it suits best to gratify the vilest
appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men than others, to counteract a
former resolution. In these respects, and many others which might be men-
tioned, different things will be most agreeable to different persons ; and not only
so, but to the same persons at different times.
But possibly it is needless and improper, to mention the frame and state ol
the mind, as a distinct ground of the agreeableness of objects from the other
two mentioned before, viz., the apparent nature and circumstances of the
objects viewed, and the manner of the view ; perhaps if we strictly consider the
matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the
agreeableness of objects, any other way than as it makes the objects themselves
appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain
attending them ; and as it occasions the manner of the view to be different,
causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness to be more or
less lively.
However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that
can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent, good is, in the manner
which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that
which at that time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of
8 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
that decision of the mind, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all things con-
sidered. If the immediate objects of the Will are a man's own actions, then
those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most
agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he wills to walk. If it
be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to
speak, then he chooses to speak : if it suits him best to keep silence, then he
chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate
of the sense and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily,
and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most
agreeable to them. To say, that they do what they please, or what pleases
them, but yet do not do what is agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say
they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure ; and that is to say, tha'
they do what they please, and yet do not do what they please.
It appears from these things, that in some sense, the Will always follows
the last dictate of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken
in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension,
and no? merely what is called reason or judgment. If by the dictate of the
understanding is meant what reason declares to be best or most for the person's
happiness, taking in the whole of his duration, it is not true, that the Will always
follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite
a different matter from things appearing now most agreeable j all things being
put together which pertain to the mind's present perceptions, apprehensions or
ideas, in any respect. Although that dictate of reason, when it takes place, is
one thing that is put into the scales, and is to be considered as a thing that has
concern in the compound influence which moves and induces the Will ; and is
one thing that is to be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance
of good which the Will always follows ; either as having its influence added
to other things, or subducted from them. When it concurs with other things,
then its weight is added to them, as put into the same scale ; but when it
is against them, it is as a weight in the opposite scale, where it resists the
influence of other things : yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater
weight, and so the act of the Will is determined in opposition to it.
The things which I have said, may, I hope, serve in some measure, to illus-
trate and confirm the position I laid down in the beginning of this section, viz.,
that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, or by that view of
the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition.
But whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists
the strength of motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the
position itself; which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is the thing
of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse : and the truth of it,
I hope, will appear with great clearness, before I have finished what I have to
say on the subject of human liberty.
SECTION III
Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c, and
of Contingence.
The words necessary, impossible, &c, are abundantly used in controversies
about Free Will and moral agency ; and therefore the sense in which thev are
should be clearly understood.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 9
Here I might say, that a thing is then said to be necessary, when it must be
and cannot be otherwise. But this would not properly be a definition of Neces-
sity, or an explanation of the word, any more than if 1 explained the word musty
by there being a necessity. The words must, can, and cannot, need explication,
as much as the words necessary and impossible ; excepting that the former are
words that children commonly use, and know something of the meaning of earlier
than the latter.
The word necessary, as used in common speech, is a relative term ; and
relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of the thing spoken
of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it. That is necessary,
in the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will be, notwithstand-
ing all supposable opposition. To - say, that a thing is necessary, is the same
thing as to say, that it is impossible it should not be : but the word impossible
is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power exerted to
bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient for the effect ; as the word unable is
relative, and has relation to ability or endeavor which is insufficient ; and as the
word irresistible is relative, and has always reference to resistance which is
made, or may be made to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insuf-
ficient to withstand the power or hinder the effect. The common notion of
necessity and impossibility implies something that frustrates endeavor or desire.
Here several things are to be noted.
1. Things are said to be necessary in general, which are or will be notwith-
standing any supposable opposition from us or others, or from whatever quarter.
But things are said to be necessary to us, which are or will be notwithstanding
all opposition supposable in the case from us. The same may be observed of
the word imposs-ible, and other such like terms.
2. These terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c, do especially belong
to the controversy about liberty and moral agency, as used in the latter of the
two senses now mentioned, viz., as necessary or impossible to us, and with rela-
tion to any supposable opposition or endeavor of ours.
3. As the word JYecessity in its vulgar and common use, is relative, and
has always reference to some supposable insufficient opposition ; so when we
speak of any thing as necessary to us, it is with relation to some supposable
opposition of our Wills, or some voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the con-
trary ; for we do not properly make opposition to an event, any otherwise than
as we voluntarily oppose it. Things are said to be what must be, or necessarily
are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavor the
contrary, or try to prevent or remove their existence : but such opposition of
ours always either consists in, or implies, opposition of our Wills.
It is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vulgarly used, are
used and accepted in this manner. A thing is said to be necessary, when we
cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is said to be impossible
to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavor
it ; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek it ; but all our desires and
endeavors are, or would be vain. And that is said to be irresistible, which
overcomes all our opposition, resistance, and endeavors to the contrary. And
we are said to be unable to do a thing, when our supposable desires and endeav-
ors to do it are insufficient.
We are accustomed, in the common use of language, to apply and under-
stand these phrases in this sense ; we grow up with such a habit ; which by
the daily use of these terms, in such a sense, from our childhood, becomes fixed
and settled ; so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire and endeavor
Vol. II. 2
J.0 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, and naturally excited in our
minds, whenever we hear the words used. Such ideas, and these words, are
so united and associated, that they unavoidably go together ; one suggests the
other, and carries the other with it, and never can be separated as long as we
live. And if we use the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we
are exceeding circumspect and wary, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar
use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner : this habit-
ual connection of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and
discourses, wherein we pretend to use these terms in that manner, as terms of art
4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these terms necessary ',
impossible, irresistible, unable, &c, are used in cases wherein no opposition, or
insufficient will or endeavor, is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very
nature of the supposed case itself excludes and denies any such opposition, will
or endeavor, these terms are then not used in their proper signification, but
quite beside their use in common speech. The reason is manifest ; namely, that
in such cases we cannot use the words with reference to a supposable oppo-
sition, will or endeavor. And therefore, if any man uses these terms in such
cases, he either uses them nonsensically, or in some new sense, diverse from their
original and proper meaning. As for instance ; if a man should affirm after
this manner, that it is necessary for a man, and what must be, that a man
should choose virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue to
vice ; and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be other-
wise than that he should have this choice, so long as this choice continues ; such
a man wTould use the terms must, irresistible, &c, with perfect insignificance
and nonsense ; or in some new sense, diverse from their common use ; which is
with reference, as has been observed, to supposable opposition, unwillingness
and resistance ; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes and denies any
such thing : for the case supposed is that of being willing and choosing.
5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms necessary, impossible,
&c, are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse
from their common use and original signification : for they apply them to many
cases in which no opposition is supposed or supposable. Thus they use them
with respect to God's existence before the creation of the world, when there
was no other being but He : so with regard to many of the dispositions ano
acts of the Divine Being, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness,
hating sin, &c. So they apply these terms to many cases of the inclinations
and actions of created intelligent beings, angels and men ; wherein all oppo-
sition of the Will is shut out and denied, in the very supposition of the case.
Metaphysical or Philosophical Necessity is nothing different from their
".ertainty. I speak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty
that is in things themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the know-
ledge of them ; or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the
proposition which affirms them.
What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical Necessity, namely,
that by which a thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwise, fails
of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts : first, the words can, or
cannot, need explanation as much as the word Necessity ; and the former may
as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one
asked us what we mean, when we say, a thing cannot but be, wTe might explain
ourselves by saying, we mean, it must necessarily be so ; as well as explain
Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And secondly,
this definition is liable to the forementioned great inconvenience : the words
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 11
cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or
that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken of ; to which, as I have now
observed, the word Necessity, as used by philosophers, has no reference.
Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connec-
tion between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition,
which affirms something to be true. When there is such a connection, then
the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense ;
whether any opposition, or contrary effort be supposed, or supposable in the
case, or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms
the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act or circumstance, have a
full and certain connection, then the existence or being of that thing is said to
be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word Necessity,
in the following discourse, when I endeavor to prove that Necessity is not incon-
sistent with liberty.
The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms existence of
something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connection several ways.
(1.) They may have a full and perfect connection in and of themselves;
because it may imply a contradiction, or gross absurdity, to suppose them
not connected. Thus many things are necessary in their own nature. So
the eternal existence of being, generally considered, is necessary in itself; because
it would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny the existence of being in
general, or to say there was absolute and universal nothing ; and is as it were
the sum of all contradictions ; as might be shown, if this were a proper place
for it. So God's infinity, and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary
in its own nature, that two and two should be four ; and it is necessary, that all
right lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference should be
equal. It is necessary, fit and suitable, that men should do to others, as they
would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphysical and mathe-
matical truths are necessary in themselves ; the subject and predicate of the
proposition which affirms them, are perfectly connected of themselves.
(2.) The connection of the subject and predicate of a proposition which
affirms the existence of something, may be fixed and made certain, because the
existence of that thing is already come to pass ; and either now is, or has been ;
and so has as it were made sure of existence. And therefore, the proposition
which affirms present and past existence of it, may by this means be made
certain, and necessarily and unalterably true. The past event has fixed and
decided the matter, as to its existence ; and has made it impossible but that
existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is
already come to pass, is now become necessary ; it is become impossible it
should be otherwise than true, that such a thing has been.
(3.) The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to
be, may have a real and certain connection consequentially ; and so the
existence of the thing may be consequentially necessary ; as it may be surely
and firmly connected with something else, that is necessary in one of the former
respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is
absolutely necessary in its own nature, or with something which has already
received and made sure of existence. This Necessity lies in, or may be explained
by the connection of two or more propositions one with another. Things which
are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary
themselves, by a Necessity of consequence.
And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will
hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in
12 FREEDOM OP THE WILL.
this last way. Their existence is not necessary in itself; for if so, they always
would have existed. Nor is their existence become necessary by being made
sure, by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only way that any thing
that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connection with
something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is, or
has been°; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. And
this also is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from
eternity, could, be necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass
necessarily ; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any
thino- whatsoever that ever has had, or will have a beginning, has come into
being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the
Necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the Will.
It may be of some use in these controversies, further to observe concerning
metaphysical Necessity, that (agreeably to the distinction before observed of
Necessity, as vulgarly understood) things that exist may be said to be necessary,
either with a general or particular Necessity. The existence of a thing may be said
to be necessary with a general Necessity, when all things whatsoever being
considered, there is a foundation for certainty of its existence ; or when in the
most general and universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the
proposition, which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible con-
nection.
An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be necessary with a
particular necessity, or with regard to a particular person, thing, or time, when
nothing that can be taken into consideration, in or about that person, thing, or
time, alters the case at all, as to the certainty of that event, or the existence of
that thing ; or can be of any account at all, in determining the infallibility of
the connection of the subject and predicate in the proposition which affirms the
existence of the thing ; so that it is all one, as to that person, or thing, at least at
that time, as if the existence were necessary with a Necessity that is most
universal and absolute. Thus there are many things that happen to particular
persons, which they have no hand in, and in the existence of which no will of
theirs has any concern, at least at that time ; which, whether they are necessary
or not, with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with
regard to any volition of theirs at that time ; as they prevent all acts of the
will about the affair. I shall have occasion to apply this observation to parti-
cular instances in the following discourse. Whether the same things that are
necessary with a particular Necessity, be not also necessary with a general
Necessity, may be a matter of future consideration. Let that be as it will, it
alters not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of Necessity.
These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the terms necessary and
necessity, as terms of art, and as often used by metaphysicians, and controversial
writers in divinity, in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than their
original meaning in common language, which was before explained.
What has been said to show the meaning of the terms necessary and neces-
sity, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms impossible and
impossibility. For there is no difference, but only the latter are negative, and
the former positive. Impossibility is the same as negative Necessity, or a
Necessity that a thing should not be. And it is used as a term of art in a like
diversity from the original and vulgar meaning with Necessity.
The same may be observed concerning the words unable and inability. It
has been observed, that these terms, in their original and common use, have
relation to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient for
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 13
the bringing to pass the thing willed and endeavored. But as these terms are
often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about
free will, they are used in a quite different, and far more extensive sense, and are
applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavor for the bringing of the thing
to pass, is or can be supposed, but is actually denied and excluded in the nature
of the case.
As the words necessary, impossible, unable, &c, are used by polemic
writers, in a sense diverse from their common signification, the like has hap-
pened to the term contingent. Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come
to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its
connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course
of things, is not discerned ; and so is what we have no means of the foresight of.
And especially is any thing said to be contingent or accidental with regard to
is, when any thing comes to pass that we are concerned in, as occasions or
subjects, without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope.
But the word contingent is abundantly used in a very different sense ; not
for that whose connection with the series of things we cannot discern, so as to
foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground
or reason, with which its existence has any fixed and certain connection.
SECTION IV.
Of the Distinction of Natural and Moral Necessity, and Inability.
That Necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible con-
nection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as
intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural
Necessity.
I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper and
perfect distinction ; but shall only explain how these two sorts of Necessity are
understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they are used in the
following discourse.
The phrase, moral Necessity, is used variously ; sometimes it is used for a
Necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under Necessity, when he
is under bonds of duty and conscience, which he cannot be discharged from. So
the word Necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest.
Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that apparent connection of things,
which is the ground of moral evidence ; and so is distinguished from absolute
Necessity, or that sure connection of things, that is a foundation for infallible
certainty. In this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the same as that high
degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy, and be relied upon
by mankind, in their conduct and behavior in the world, as they would consult
their own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of society.
And sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of connection and
consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination,
or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these,
and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense, that I use the
phrase, moral JVecessity, in the following discourse.
By natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men are
under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are
called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral
14 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
motives and inducements. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, are the
subjects of particular sensations by Necessity ; they feel pain when their bodies
are wounded ; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when
their eyes are opened ; so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as
soon as the terms are understood ; as that two and two make four, that black is
not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another ; so by a natural
Necessity men's bodies move downwrards, when there is nothing to support
them.
But here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds of
Necessity.
1. Moral Necessity may be as absolute, as natural Necessity. That is, the
effect maybe as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary
effect is with its natural cause. Whether the Will in every case is necessarily
determined by the strongest motive, or whether the Will ever makes any
resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination,
or not ; if that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny,
bu"- that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented,
may be so powerful, that the act of the Will may be certainly and indissolubly
connected therewith. When motives or previous biases are very strong, all
will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And if they
were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more
were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the
difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it ; *br this
plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to nave to sur-
mount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite ; and so goes not beyond certain
limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with
twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the
degrees of difficulty ; yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or a hundred, or
a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be
wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed,
that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connection between moral
causes and effects ; so this only is what I call by the name of moral Necessity.
2. W7hen I use this distinction of moral and natural Necessity, I would not
be understood to suppose, that if any thing comes to pass by the former kind of
Necessity, the nature of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter.
I do not mean to determine, that when a moral habit or motive is so strong,
that the act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the nature of
things. But these are the names that these two kinds of Necessity have usually
been called by ; and they must be distinguished by some names or other j for
there is a distinction or difference between them, that is very important in its
consequences ; which difference does not lie so much in the nature of the con-
nection, as in the two terms connected. The cause with which the effect is
connected, is of a particular kind, viz., that which is of moral nature ; either
some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understand-
ing. And the effect is also of a particular kind ; being likewise of a moral
nature; consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul or voluntary
action.
I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural, in distinction from moral
necessity, is so called, because mere nature, as the word is vulgarly used, is
concerned, without any thing of choice. The word nature is often used in
opposition to choice ; not because nature has indeed never any hand in our
choice ; but this probably comes to pass by means that we first get our notion
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 15
of nature from that discernible and obvious course of events, which we observe
in many things that our choice has no concern in ; and especially in the material
world ; which, in very many parts of it, we easily perceive to be in a settled
course ; the stated order and manner of succession being very apparent. But
where we do not readily discern the rule and connection, (though there be a
connection, according to an established law, truly taking place,) we signify the
manner of event by some other name. Even in many things which are seen in
the material and inanimate world, which do not discernibly and obviously come
to pass according to any settled course, men do not call the manner of the event
by the name of nature, but by such names as accident, chance, contingence, &c.
So men make a distinction between nature and choice ; as though they were
completely and universally distinct. . Whereas, I suppose none will deny but
that choice, in many cases, arises from nature, as truly as other events. But
the dependence and connection between acts of volition or choice, and their
causes, according to established laws, is not so sensible and obvious. And we
observe that choice is as it were a new principle of motion and action, different
from that established law and order of things which is most obvious, that is
seen especially in corporeal and sensible things ; and also the choice often
interposes, interrupts and alters the chain of events in these external objects,
and causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone, and left
to go on according to the laws of motion among themselves. Hence it is
spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely distinct from nature, and
properly set in opposition to it. Names being commonly given to things,
according to what is most obvious, and is suggested by what appears to the
senses without reflection and research.
3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the
name of moral Necessity, the word Necessity is not used according to the
original design and meaning of the word ; for, as was observed before, such
terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c, in common speech, and their most
proper sense, are always relative; having reference to some supposable
voluntary opposition or endeavor, that is insufficient. But no such opposition,
or contrary will and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity ;
which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not
admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd
to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself, in its present act ; or the
present choice to be opposite to, and resisting present choice ; as absurd as it is
to talk of two contrary motions, in the same moving body, at the same time.
And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial whether an
opposing or resisting will can overcome this Necessity.
What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain
what is intended by natural and moral Inability. We are said to be naturally
unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most com-
monly called nature does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or
obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of understanding, con-
stitution of body, or external objects. Moral Inability consists not in any of
these things ; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary
inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act
of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these
may be resolved into one ; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability
consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to
will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary
motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination,
16 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the
influence of such views.
To give some instances of this moral Inability. A woman of great honor and
chastity may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of
great love and duty to his parents, may be unable to be willing to kill his father.
A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in
the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his
lust. A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear
taking of strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevo-
lent acts to an ememy, or to desire his prosperity ; yea, some may be so under the
power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most
worthy of their esteem and affection. A strong habit of virtue, and a great de-
gree of holiness may cause a moral Inability to love wickedness in general, may
render a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things ; or to
choose a wicked life, and prefer it to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a
great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love
and choose holiness ; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy
being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good.
Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral Inability, viz., of
that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional.
By a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all
exercises or acts of will of that nature or kind, through a fixed and habitual in-
clination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination.
Thus a very ill natured man may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence, as
another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts ; and a man, whose heart
is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert such and such grateful
acts, through that stated defect of a grateful inclination. By particular and
occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the will or heart to a particular
act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements pre-
sented to the view of the understanding, on this occasion. If it be so, that the
will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an
Inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does ; it not being possible,
in any case, that the will should, at present, go against the motive which has
now, all things considered, the greatest strength and advantage to excite and
induce it. The former of these kinds of moral Inability, consisting in that which
is stated, habitual and general, is most commonly called by the name of Inability,
because the word Inability, in its most proper and original signification, has
•espect to some stated defect.
And this especially obtains the name of Inability also upon another account :
1 before observed, that the word Inability in its original and most common use,
is a relative term ; and has respect to will and endeavor, as supposable in the
case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and endeavored. Now
there may be more of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts
which arise from a fixed and strong habit, than others that arise only from
transient occasions and causes. Indeed will and endeavor against, or diverse
from present acts of the will, are in no case supposable, whether those acts be
occasional or habitual ; for that would be to suppose the will, at present, to be
otherwise than, at present, it is. But yet there may be will and endeavor against
future acts of the will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a
distance. It is no contradiction to suppose that the acts of the will at one time,
may be against the acts of the will at another time ; and there may be desires
and endeavors to prevent or excite future acts of the will ; but such desires and
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 17
endeavors are, in many cases, rendered insufficient and vain, through fixedness of
habit : when the occasion returns, the strength of habit overcomes, and baffles
all such opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miserable slavery and
b( ndage to a strong habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an altera-
tion with respect to such future acts as are only occasional and transient ; because
the occasion or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoid-
ed. On this account, the moral Inability that attends fixed habits, especially
obtains the name of Inability. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly
resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits ; so reason may resist
present acts of the will, and its resistance be insufficient ; and this is more com-
monly the case also, when the acts arise from strong habit.
But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that
the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The
word signifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to
such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to
which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, ac-
cording to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be ever so
malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his
neighbor kindness ; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be ever so strong, cannot
keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has
a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election : and a man
cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will.
It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform those external actions which
are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be easily performed, if
the act of the will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot
perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the will, it is in some
respect more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will
themselves ; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he
cannot if he will : for to say so, is a downright contradiction : it is to say, he
cannot will, if he does will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy
for a man to do the thing it he will, but the very willing is the doing ; when
once he has willed, the thing is performed ; and nothing else remains to be done.
Therefore, in these things to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or
ability, is not just ; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being
willing. There are faculties of mind, and capacity of nature, and every thing
else sufficient, but a disposition : nothing is wanting but a will.
SECTION V.
Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency.
The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty, in com-
mon speech, is power, opportunity or advantage, that any one has, to do as he
pleases. Or in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in
the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he wills.* And the contrary
to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person'k being hindered or unable
to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do others ise.
* I say not only doing, but conducting ; because a voluntary forbearing to do, sitting still, keeping
silence, &c, are instances of persons' conduct, about which Liberty is exe i ised ; though they are not
so properly called doing.
Vol. II. 3
18 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word Liberty, in the
ordinary use of language ; as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and
is unprejudiced, will deny ; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither
Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but
that which has such a faculty, power or property, as is called will. For that
which is possessed of no such thing as will, cannot have any power or opportunity
of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor
be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or
the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense ; it
we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words.
For the will itself is not an agent that has a will : the power of choosing itself,
has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition or choice
is the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the
Liberty of doing according to his will, is the agent or doer who is possessed of
the will ; and not the will which he is possessed of. We say with propriety,
that a bird let loose has power and Liberty to fly ; but not that the bird's power
of flying has a power and Liberty of flying. To be free is the property of an
agent, who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant,
bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of men or persons ;
and not the properties of properties.
There are two things that are contrary to this which is called Liberty in com-
mon speech. One is constraint ; the same is otherwise called force, compulsion,
and coaction ; which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to
his will. The other is restraint ; which is his being hindered, and not having
power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the
subject of these things. I need say the less on this head, Mr. Locke having set
the same thing forth, with so great clearness, in his Essay on the Human Under-
standing.
But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called
Liberty ; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he
will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it ; without taking into
the meaning of the word anything of the cause or original of that choice; or at
all considering how the person came to have such a volition ; whether it was
caused by some external motive or internal habitual bias ; whether it was determin-
ed by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause ;
whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connect-
ed. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able,
and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will,
the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion
of freedom.
What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by Liberty,
according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary
acceptation of the word : but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians and
others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different signification. These
several things belong to their notion of Liberty. 1. That it consists in a self-
determining power in the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself,
and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions ; so as not to be de-
pendent in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by
any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their notion
of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition, be in equilibrio. 3. Con-
tingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it ; not in the common
acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 19
all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground or
reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much to consist
in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real
freedom, how much soever he may be at Liberty to act according to his will.
A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral
quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense,
virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral
faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthi-
ness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment ; and a capacity which an agent
has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited
to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the
moral faculty.
The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the
earth, in wrarming it, and causing it to bring forth its fruits ; but it is not
a moral Agent. Its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire
that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in
its operation ; but is not a moral Agent. What it does is not faulty or sinful,
or deserving of any punishment. The brute creatures are not moral Agents.
The actions of some of them are very profitable and pleasant ; others are very
hurtful j yet, seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not
act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and
reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by
moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous ; nor are they
properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do, as moral
Agents are for their faults or good deeds.
Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the
moral Agency of a ruler and a subject. I call it circumstantial, because it lies
only in the difference of moral inducements they are capable of being influenced
by, arising from the difference of circumstances. A ruler, acting, in that capa-
city only, is not capable of being influenced by a moral law, and its sanctions
of threatenings and promises, rewards and punishments, as the subject is ; though
both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore
the moral agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler
towards his creatures, and never as a subject, differs in that respect from the
moral Agency of created intelligent beings. God's actions, and particularly
those which are to be attributed to him as moral governor, are morally good in
the highest degree. They are most perfectly holy and righteous ; and we must
conceive of Hun as influenced in the highest degree, by that which, above all
others, is properly a moral inducement, viz., the moral good which He sees in
such and such things : and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a moral
Agent, the source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule of all
virtue and moral good ; though by reason of his being supreme over all, it is not
possible He should be under the influence of law or command, promises or threat-
enings, rewards or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential qualities
of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection ; such asunder-
standing, to perceive the difference between moral good and evil ; a capacity
of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are
praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment ; and also a capacity
of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according
to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in
the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very much consist that image
of God wherein he made man, (which we read of Gen. i. 26, 27, and chapter
20 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ix. 6,) by which God distinguishes man from the beasts, viz., in those faculties
and principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very
much consists the natural image of God ; as his spiritual and moral image,
wherein man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency, that ne was
endowed with.
PART II
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SUCH SORT OF
FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE
LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS J AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR
CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.
SECTION I.
Showing the manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will,
consisting in the Will's Self-determining Power.
Having taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed,
concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in
controversies, concerning human Liberty, and particularly observed what
Liberty is, according to the common language and general apprehension of
mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians ; I pro-
ceed to consider the Arminian notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the
supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being
capable of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or counsel, praise
or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments ; or whether that
which has been described, as the thing meant by Liberty in common speech,
be not sufficient, and the only Liberty which makes or can make any one a
moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things. In this Part, I shall
consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable, as that Freedom of
Will which Arminians insist on; and shall inquire, whether any such sort
of Liberty be necessary to moral agency, &c, in the next Part.
And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a self-determining Power in the
Will ; wherein, according to the Arminians, does most essentially consist the
Will's Freedom ; and shall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly absurd,
and a manifest inconsistence, to suppose that the Will itself determines all the
free acts of the Will.
Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such phrases and ways of
speaking as the Will's determining itself; because actions are to be ascribed to
agents, and not properly to the powers of agents ; which improper way oi
speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion, as Mr. Locke observes.
But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they speak of the Will's determin-
ing itself, do by the Will mean the soul willing. I shall take it for granted,
that when they speak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean the soul in the
exercise of a power of willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 21
their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and
plainest absurdity. In all cases when we speak of the powers or principles of
acting, as doing such things, we mean that the agents which have these Powers
of acting, do them in the exercise of those Powers. So when we say, valor
fights courageously, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valor fights
courageously. When we say, love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person
loving seeks that object. When we say, the understanding discerns, we mean
the soul in the exercise of that faculty. So when it is said, the Will decides or
determines, the meaning must be, that the person in the exercise of a Power of
willing and choosing, or the soul acting voluntarily, determines.
Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts, the soul determines
all the free acts of the Will in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing ;
or which is the same thing, it determines them of choice ; it determines its own
acts by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines the Will, then choice
orders and determines the choice; and acts of choice are subject to the decision,
and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will
determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by
a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the
Will or choice be also a free act, then by these principles, in this act too, the
Will is self-determined ; that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the soul
voluntarily chooses ; or, which is the same thing, it is an act determined still
by a preceding act of the Will, choosing that. And the like may again be
observed of the last mentioned act, which brings us directly to a contradiction ;
for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train,
directing and determining the rest ; or a free act of the Will, before the first
free act of the Will. Or else we must come at last to an act of the Will,
determining the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not self-determined, and
so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom ; but if the first act in the train,
determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free j as
is manifest at first view, but shall be demonstrated presently.
If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body and determines
and commands their motions and actions, does also govern itself, and determine
its own motions and actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even
by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet
shall move, by an act of volition or choice ; and there is no other way of the
Will's determining, directing or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever
the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if it has itself
under its command, and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does
it the same way that it determines other things which are under its command.
So that if the freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has itself and its own
actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined
by itself, it will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent
volition, directing and commanding that ; and if that directing volition be also
free, in that also the. Will is determined ; that is to say, that directing volition
tS determined by another going before that, and so on, until we come to the
first volition in the whole series ; and if that first volition be free, and the Will
self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that,
which is a contradiction ; because by the supposition, it can have none before
it to direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But if that first volition
is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not de-
termined by the Will, and so is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom,
which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if that first act of the Will,
22 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
which determines and fixes the- subsequent acts, be not free, none of the follow-
ing acts, which are determined by it, can be free. If we suppose there are five
acts in the train, the fifth and last determined by the fourth, and the fourth by
the third, the third by the second, and the second by the first ; if the first is not
determined by the Will, and so not free, then none of them are truly determined
by the Will ; that is, that each of them is as it is, and not otherwise, is not first
owing to the Will, but to the determination of the first in the series, which is
not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in the
determination of. And this being that which decides what the rest shall be,
and determines their existence ; therefore the first determination of their exist-
ence is not from the Will. The case is just the same, if instead of a chain of
five acts of the Will, we should suppose a succession of ten, or a hundred, or
ten thousand. If the first act be not free, being determined by something out
of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the
next, and so on ; they are none of them free, but all originally depend on, and
are determined by some cause out of the Will ; and so all freedom in the case is
excluded, and no act of the Will can be free, according to this notion of free-
dom. If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand links, so connected,
that if the first link moves, it will move the next, and that the next, and so the
whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion,
by the motion of the first link, and that is moved by something else. In this
case, though all the links but one, are moved by other parts of the same chain ;
yet it appears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from
any self- moving or self-determining power in the chain, any more than if every
link were immediately moved by something that did not belong to the chain. 11
the Will be not free in the first act, which causes the next, then neither is it free
in the next, which is caused by that first act ; for though indeed the Will
caused it, yet it did not cause it freely, because the preceding act, by which it
was caused, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the second act,
so neither can it be in the third, which is caused by that; because in like
manner, that third was determined by an act of the Will that was not free. And
so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next ; and how long
soever the succession of acts is, it is all one. If the first on which the whole
chain depends, and which determines all the rest, be not a free act, the Will is
not free in causing or determining any one of those acts, because the act by
which it determines them all, is not a free act, an<J therefore the Will is no more
free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at all. Thus, this
Arminian notion of Liberty of the Will, consisting in the Will's self-determin-
ation, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world.
SECTION II.
Several supposed ways of Evading the foregoing Reasoning, considered.
If to evade the force of what has been observed, it should be said, that
when the Arminians speak of the Will's determining its own acts, they do not
mean that the Will determines its acts by any preceding act, or that one act of
the Will determines another ; but only that the faculty or power of Will, or
the soul in the use of that power, determines its own volitions ; and that it does
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 23
it without any act going before the act determined ; such an evasion would be
full of gross absurdity. — I confess, it is an evasion of my own inventing, and I
do not know but I should wrong the Jirminians, in supposing that any of them
would make use of it. But it being as good a one as I can invent, I would
observe upon it a few things.
First. If the faculty or power of the Will determines an act of volition, or
the soul in the use or exercise of that power, determines it, that is the same
thing as for the soul to determine volition by an act of the Will. For an
exercise of the power of Will, and an act of that power, are the same thing.
Therefore to say, that the power of Will, or the soul in the use or exercise of
that power, determines volition, without an act of Will preceding the volition
determined, is a contradiction.
Secondly. If a power of Will determines the act of the Will, then a power
of choosing determines it. For, as was before observed, in every act of Will,
there is a choice, and a power of willing is a power of choosing. But if a
power of choosing determines the act of volition, it determines it by choosing it.
For it is most absurd to say, that a power of choosing determines one thing
rather than another, without choosing any thing. But if a power of choosing
determines volition by choosing it, then here is the act of volition determined by
an antecedent choice, choosing that volition.
Thirdly. To say, the faculty, or the soul, determines its own volitions, but
not by any act, is a contradiction. Because, for the soul to direct, decide, or
determine any thing, is to act ; and this is supposed ; for the soul is here spoken
of as being a cause in this affair, bringing something to pass, or doing some-
thing ; or which is the same thing, exerting itself in order to an effect, which
effect is the determination of volition, or the particular kind and manner of an
act of Will. But certainly this exertion or action is not the same with the
effect, in order to the production of which it is exerted, but must be something
prior to it.
Again. The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the Will, speak of
a certain sovereignty in the Will, whereby it has power to determine its own
volitions. And therefore the determination of volition must itself be an act of
the Will ; for otherwise it can be no exercise of that supposed power and
sovereignty.
Again. If the Will determine itself, then either the Will is active in de-
termining its volitions, or it is not. If it be active in it, then the determination
is an act of the Will ; and so there is one act of the Will determining another
But if the Will is not active in the determination, then how does it exercise any
liberty in it ? These gentlemen suppose that the thing wherein the Will ex-
ercises liberty, is in its determining its own acts. But how can this be, if it be
not active in determining ? Certainly the Will, or the soul, cannot exercise
any liberty in that wherein it doth not act, or wherein it doth not exercise
itself. So that if either part of this dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty,
consisting in self-determining power, is overthrown. If there be an act of the
Will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the Will is
determined by another ; and so we have the absurdity of every free act, even the
very first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act or exercise
of the Will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised in determin-
ing them. From whence it follows, that no liberty consists in the Will's
power to determine its owTn acts ; or, which is the same thing, that there is no
such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining power of the Will.
If it should be said, that although it be true, if the soul determines its own
24 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
volitions, it must be active in so doing, and the determination itself must be an
act ; yet there is no need of supposing this act to be prior to the volition de-
termined ; but the Will or soul determines the act of the Will in willing ; it
determines its own volition, in the very act of volition ; it directs and limits the
act of the Will, causing it to be so and not otherwise, in exerting the act,
without any preceding act to exert that. If any should say after this manner,
they must mean one of these two things : either, 1. That the determining act,
though it be before the act determined in the order of nature, yet is not before
it in order of time. Or, 2. That the determining act is not before the act
determined, either in the order of time or nature, nor is truly distinct from it ;
but that the soul's determining the act of volition is the same thing with its
exerting the act of volition ; the mind's exerting such a particular act, is its
causing and determining the act. Or, 3. That volition has no cause, and is no
effect ; but comes into existence, with such a particular determination, without
any ground or reason of its existence and determination. I shall consider these
distinctly.
1. If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is not before the act
determined in order of time, it will not help the case at all, though it should be
allowed. If it be before the" determined act in the order of nature, being the
cause or ground of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct from it,
and independent of it, as if it were before in the order of time. As the cause
of the particular motion of a natural body in a certain direction, may have no
distance as to time, yet cannot be the same with the motion effected by it, but
must be as distinct from it as any other cause that is before its effect in the order
of time ; as the architect is distinct from the house which he builds, or the
father distinct from the son which he begets. And if the act of the Will de-
termining be distinct from the act determined, and before it in the order of
nature, then we can go back from one to another, till we come to the first in
the series, which has no act of the Will before it in the order of nature, de-
termining it ; and consequently is an act not determined by the Will, and so not
a free act, in this notion of freedom. And this being the act which determines
all the rest, none of them are free acts. As when there is a chain of many
links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand ; all the rest
may follow and be moved at the same instant, without any distance of time ;
but yet the motion of one link is before that of another in the order of nature ;
the last is moved by the next, and so till we come to the first ; which not
being moved by any other, but by something distinct from the whole chain,
this as much proves that no part is moved by any self-moving power in the
chain, as if the motion of one link followed that of another in the order of time.
2. If any should say, that the determining act is not before the determined
act, either in order of time, or of nature, nor is distinct from it ; but that the
exertion of the act is the determination of the act ; that for the soul to exert a
particular volition, is for it to cause and determine that act of volition ; I would
on this observe, that the thing in question seems to be forgotten or kept out of
sight, in darkness and unintelligibleness of speech ; unless such an objector would
mean to contradict himself. The very act of volition itself is doubtless a deter-
mination of mind ; i. e. it is the mind's drawing up a conclusion, or coming to
a choice between two things or more, proposed to it. But determining among
external objects of choice, is not the same with determining the act of choice itself,
among various possible acts of choice. The question is, what influences, directs,
or determines the mind or Will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does 1
Or what is the cause, ground or reason, why it concludes thus, and not other-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 25
wise ? Now it must be answered, according to the Arminian notion of freedom,
that the Will influences, orders and determines itself thus to act. And if it does,
I say, it must be by some antecedent act. To say, it is caused, influenced and
determined by something, and yet not determined by any thing antecedent, either
in order of time or of nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant
by a thing's being prior in the order of nature, that it is some way the cause or
reason of the thing, with respect to which it is said to be prior.
If the particular act or exertion of Will, which comes into existence, be any
thing properly determined at all, then it has some cause of its existing, and of
its existing in such a particular determinate manner, and not another ; some cause,
whose influence decides the matter ; which cause is distinct from the effect, and
prior to it. But to say, that the Will or mind orders, influences and determines
itself to exert such an act as it does, by the very exertion itself, is to make the
exertion both cause and effect ; or the exerting such an act, to be a cause of
the exertion of such an act. For the question is, What is the cause and reason
of the soul's exerting such an act ? To which the answer is, the soul exerts
such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this, the exertion must be
prior in the order of nature to itself, and distinct from itself.
3. If the meaning be, that the soul's exertion of such a particular act of Will,
is a thing that comes to pass of itself, without any cause ; and that there is abso-
lutely no ground or reason of the soul's being determined to exert such a volition,
and make such a choice rather than another, I say, if this be the meaning of
Arminians, when they contend so earnestly for the Will's determining its own
acts, and for liberty of Will consisting in self-determining power ; they do nothing
but confound themselves and others with words without meaning. In the ques-
tion, What determines the Will ? and in their answer, that the Will determines
itself, and in all the dispute about it, it seems to be taken for granted, that
something determines the Will ; and the controversy on this head is not, whether
any thing at all determines it, or whether its determination has any cause or
foundation at all ; but where the foundation of it is, whether in the Will itself,
or somewhere else. But if the thing intended be what is above-mentioned, then
all comes to this, that nothing at all determines the Will ; volition having abso-
lutely no cause or foundation of its existence, either within or without. There
is a great noise made about self-determining power, as the source of all free acts
of the Will ; but when the matter comes to be explained, the meaning is, that
no power at all is the source of these acts, neither self-determining power, nor
any other, but they arise from nothing ; no cause, no power, no influence being
at all concerned in the matter.
However, this very thing, even that the free acts of the Will are events which
come to pass without a cause, is certainly implied in the Arminian notion of
liberty of Will ; though it be very inconsistent with many other things in their
scheme, and repugnant to some things implied in their notion of liberty. Their
opinion implies, that the particular determination of volition is without any cause ;
because they hold the free acts of the Will to be contingent events ; and con-
tingence is essential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those things
which have a prior ground and reason of their particular existence, a cause which
antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to be just as they are,
do not happen contingently. If something foregoing, by a causal influence and
connection, determines and fixes precisely their coming to pass, and the manner
of it, then it does not remain a contingent thing whether they shall come to pass
or no.
And because it is a question, in many respects, very important in this con-
Vol. II. 4
26 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
troversy about the freedom of Will, whether the free acts of the Will are events
which come to pass without a cause, I shall be particular in examining this point
m the two following sections.
SECTION III
Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without
a Cause of its existence.
Before I enter on any argument on this subject, I would explain how I would
be understood, when I use the word Cause in this discourse : since, for want of
a better word, I shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive,
than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is often used in so restrained
a sense as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency or influence to
produce a thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no
such positive productive influence ; which yet are Causes in that respect, that
they have truly the nature of a ground or reason why some things are, rather than
others ; or why they are as they are, rather than otherwise. Thus the absence
of the sun in the night, is not the Cause of the falling of the dew at that time, in
the same manner as its beams are the Cause of the ascending of the vapors in the
day time ; and its withdrawment in the winter, is not in the same manner tht
Cause of the freezing of the waters, as its approach in the spring is the Cause oi
their thawing. But yet the withdrawment or absence of the sun is an antece-
dent, with which these effects in the night and winter are connected, and on
which they depend ; and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why
they come to pass at that time, rather than at other times ; though the absence
of the sun is nothing positive, nor has any positive influence.
It may be further observed, that when I speak of connection of Causes and
Effects, I have respect to moral Causes, as well as those that are called natural
in distinction from them. Moral Causes may be Causes in as proper a sense, as
any causes whatsoever ; may have as real an influence, and may as truly be the
ground and reason of an Event's coming to pass.
Therefore I sometimes use the word Cause, in this inquiry, to signify any
antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event,
either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it
is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not ;
or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise ; or, in other words, any antecedent
with which a consequent Event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason
why the proposition which affirms that Event, is true ; whether it has any posi-
tive influence or not. And in agreeableness to this, I sometimes use the
word Effect for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an
occasion than a Cause, most properly speaking.
I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may cut off occa-
sion, from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against some things
which I may say concerning the dependence of all things which come to pass, on
some Cause, and their connection with their Cause.
Having thus explained what I mean by Cause, I assert that nothing ever
comes to pass without a Cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity,
and must be unchangeable ; but as to all things that begin to be, they are not
self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation -of their existence without
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 27
themselves ; that whatsoever begins to be which before was not, must have a Cause
why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural
sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foun-
dation of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, presenter to come.
And this dictate of common sense equally respects substances and modes, or
things and the manner and circumstances of things. Thus, if we see a body
which has hitherto been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and begin to move,
we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some Cause or reason of this
new mode of existence, as of the existence of a body itself which had hitherto
not existed. And so if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain direction,
should suddenly change the direction of its motion ; or if it should put off its old
figure, and take a new one ; or change its color : the beginning of these new
modes is a new Event, and the mind of mankind necessarily supposes that there
is some Cause or reason of them.
If this grand principle of common sense be taken away, all arguing from
effects to Causes ceaseth, and so all knowledge of any existence, besides what we
have by the most direct and immediate intuition. Particularly all our proof of
the being of God ceases : we argue His being from our own being and the being
of other things, which we are sensible once were not, but have begun to be ; and
from the being of the world, with all its constituent parts, and the manner of their
existence ; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own nature,
and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But if things, not
in themselves necessary, may begin to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain.
Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of things no foundation
for the knowledge of the Being of God without any evidence of it from His works.
I do suppose there is a great absurdity in the nature of things simply considered,
in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying Being in general, and
supposing an eternal, absolute, universal nothing ; and therefore that here would
be foundation of intuitive evidence that it cannot be ; and that eternal, infinite,
most perfect Being must be ; if we had strength and comprehension of mind
'sufficient, to have a clear idea of general and universal Being, or, which is the
same thing, of the infinite, eternal, most perfect Divine Nature and Essence.
But then we should not properly come to the knowledge of the Being of God
by arguing ; but our evidence would be intuitive : we should see it, as we see
other things that are necessary in themselves, the contraries of which are in their
own nature absurd and contradictory ; as we see that twice two is four ; and as
we see that a circle has no angles. If we had as clear an idea of universal in-
finite entity, as we have of these other things, I suppose we should most intuitively
see the absurdity of supposing such Being not to be ; should immediately see
there is no room for the question, whether it is possible that Being, in the most
general abstracted notion of it, should not be. But we have not that strength
and extent of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive independent manner;
but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of the Being of God, is that
which the apostle speaks of, Rom. i. 20. " The invisible things of Him, from
the creation of the world, are clearly seen ; being understood by the tilings that
are made ; even his eternal power and Godhead." We first ascend, and prove
a 'posteriori, or from effects, that there must be an eternal Cause ; and then
secondly, prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be neces-
sarily existent ; and then thirdly, from the proved necessity of his existence, we
may descend, and prove many of his perfections a -priori*
* To the inquirer after truth it may here be recommended, as a matter of some consequence, to keep
in mind the precise difference between an argument a priori and one a posteriori, a distinction of consid-
28 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
But if once this grand principle of common sense be given up, that what is
not necessary in itself, must have a Cause ; and we begin to maintain, that things
may come into existence, and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of
themselves without any Cause ; all our means of ascending in our arguing from
the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God, is cut off
at one blow. In this case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the
Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their being,
their order, beauty and use. For if things may come into existence without any
Cause at all, then they doubtless may without any Cause answerable to the effect.
Our minds do alike naturally suppose and determine both these things ; namely,
that what begins to be has a Cause, and also that it has a Cause proportionable
and agreeable to the effect. The same principle which leads us to determine,
that there cannot be any thing coming to pass without a Cause, leads us to de-
termine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the Cause.
Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to pass without a
Cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we should be
without evidence of the existence of any thing whatsoever, but our own imme-
diately present ideas and consciousness* For we have no way to prove any
thing else, but by arguing from effects to causes : from the ideas now immediately
in view, we argue other things not immediately in view : from sensations now
excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the Causes of these
sensations ; and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, which
they depend on, as effects on Causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves,
or any thing else, by memory ; only as we argue, that the ideas, which are
now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas and sensations. — We
immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in
our minds. We perceive or know other things only by means of these, as neces-
sarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be
without Causes, all this necessary connection and dependence is dissolved, and so
all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity nor difficulty in
supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a
Cause ; then there is no absurdity nor difficulty in supposing the same of mil-
lions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, still is nothing, or no
difficulty, nothing multiplied by nothing, does not increase the sum.
And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing, of the acts of the
Will coming to pass without a Cause, it is the case in fact, that millions of
millions of Events are continually coming into existence contingently, without
any cause or reason why they do so, all over the world, every day and hour,
through all ages. So it is in a constant succession, in every moral agent. This
contingency, this efficient nothing, this effectual No Cause, is always ready at
hand, to produce this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as
he has occasion.
erable use, as well as of long standing, among divines, metaphysicians, and logical writers. An argument
from either of these, when legitimately applied, may amount to a demonstration, when used, for instance,
relatively to the being and perfections of God ; but the one should be confined to the existence of Deity,
while the other is applicable to his perfections. By the argument a posteriori we rise from the effect to the
cause, from the stream to the fountain, from what is posterior to what is prior ; in other words, from what
is contingent to what is absolute, from number to unity ; that is, from the manifestation of God to his ex-
istence. By the argument a priori we descend from the cause to the effect, from the fountain to the stream,
from what is prior to what is posterior ; that is, from the necessary existence of God we safely infer
certain properties and perfections. To attempt a demonstration of the existence of a first cause, or the
Being of God, a priori, would be most absurd ; for it would be an attempt to prove a prior ground or cause
of existence of a first cause ; or, that there is some cause before the very first. The argument a priori,
therefore, is not applicable to prove the divine existence. For this end, the argument a posteriori alone is
legitimate ; and its conclusiveness rests on the axiom, that " there can be no effect without a cause." The
absurdity of denying this axiom is abundantly demonstrated by our author. W.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 29
If it were so, that things only of one kind, viz., acts of the Will, seemed to come
to pass of themselves ; but those of this sort in general came into being thus ; and
it were an event that was continual, and that happened in a course, wherever
were capable subjects of such events ; this very thing would demonstrate that
there was some Cause of them, which made such a difference between this Event
and others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For contingence
is blind, and does not pick and choose for a particular sort of events. Nothing
has no choice. This No Cause, which causes no existence, cannot cause the
existence which comes to pass, to be of one particular sort only, distinguished
from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out of the heavens,
even water, and that this comes so often, so constantly and plentifully, all over
the world, in all ages, shows that there is some Cause or reason of the falling of
water out of the heavens ; and that something besides mere contingence has a
hand in the matter.
If we should suppose nonentity to be about to bring forth ; and things were
coming into existence, without any Cause or antecedent, on which the existence,
or kind, or manner of existence depends ; or which could at all determine whe-
ther the things should be stones, or stars, or beasts, or angels, or human bodies,
or souls, or only some new motion or figure in natural bodies, or some new
sensations in animals, or new ideas in the human understanding, or new volitions
in the Will ; or any thing else of all the infinite number of possibles ; then
certainly it would not be expected, although many million of millions of things
are coming into existence in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that
they should all be only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus in all
ages, and that this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass where
there is room for them, or a subject capable of them, and that constantly, when-
ever there is occasion for them.
If any should imagine, there is something in the sort of Event that renders
it possible for it to come into existence without a Cause, and should say, that
the free acts of the Will are existences of an exceeding different nature from
other things ; by reason of which they may come into existence without any
previous ground or reason of it, though other things cannot ; if they make this
objection in good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting
themselves ; for they would be giving an account of some ground of the exist-
ence of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground
of its existence. Therefore I would observe, that the particular nature of exist-
ence, be it ever so diverse from others, can lay no foundation for that thing's
coming into existence without a Cause ; because to suppose this, would be to
suppose the particular nature of existence to be a thing prior to the existence ;
and so a thing which makes way for existence, with such a circumstance,
namely, without a cause or reason of existence. But that which in any respect
makes way for a thing's coming into being, or for any manner or circumstance
of its first existence, must be prior to the existence. The distinguished nature of
the effect, which is something belonging to the effect, cannot have influence
backward, to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called volition,
can do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too
late for its influence ; for then the thing has made sure of existence already,
without its help.
So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the
Will should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul,
or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into
existence without a Cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect as
30 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
a Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we know but that many
other sorts of effects may do so too ? It is not the particular kind of effect that
makes the absurdity of supposing it has been without a Cause, but something
which is common to all things that ever begin to be, viz., that they are not self-
existent, or necessary in the nature of things.
SECTION IV
Whether Volition can arise without a Cause through the Activity of the Nature of
the Soul.
The author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the.
Creatures, in answer to that objection against his doctrine of a self-determining
power in the Will, (p. 68, 69, ) " That nothing is, or comes to pass, without a
sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than another,"
allows that it is thus in corporeal things, which are, properly and philosophically
speaking, passive beings ; but denies that it is thus in spirits, which are beings
of an active nature, who have the spring of action within themselves, and can
determine themselves. By which it is plainly supposed, that such an event as
an act of the Will, may come to pass in a spirit, without a sufficient reason why
it comes to pass, or why it is after this manner, rather than another; by reason
of the activity of the nature of a spirit. — But certainly this author, in this
matter, must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,
1. The objection or difficulty proposed by this author, seems to be forgotten
in his answer or solution. The very difficulty, as he himself proposes it, is this :
How an event can come to pass without a sufficient reason why it is, or why it
is in this manner rather than another 1 Instead of solving this difficulty, or
answering this question with regard to Volition, as he proposes, he forgets him-
self, and answers another question quite diverse, and wholly inconsistent with
this, viz., What is a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner
rather than another 1 And he assigns the active being's own determination as
the Cause, and a Cause sufficient for the effect ; and leaves all the difficulty
unresolved, and the question unanswered, which yet returns, even, how the
soul's own determination, which he speaks of, came to exist, and to be what it
was without a Cause ? The activity of the soul may enable it to be the Cause
of effects, but it does not at all enable or help it to be the subject of effects which
have no Cause, which is the thing this author supposes concerning acts of the
Will. Activity of nature will no more enable a being to produce effects, and
determine the manner of their existence, within itself, without a Cause, than out
of itself, in some other being. But if an active being should, through its activity,
produce and determine an effect in some external object, how absurd would it be
to say, that the effect was produced without a Cause !
2. The question is not so much, how a spirit endowed with activity comes
to act, as why it exerts such an act, and not another ; or why it acts with such
a particular determination : if activity of nature be the Cause why a spirit (the
soul of man for instance) acts, and does not lie still ; yet that alone is not the
Cause why its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined. Active
nature is a general thing ; it is an ability or tendency of nature to action, gen-
erally taken ; which may be a Cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is
given; but this alone cannot be a sufficient Cause why the soul exerts such ;
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 31
particular act, at such a time, rather than others. In order to this, there must
be something besides a general tendency to action ; there must also be a
particular tendency to that individual action. If it should be asked, why the
soul of man uses its activity in such a manner as it does, and it should be
answered, that the soul uses its activity thus, rather than otherwise, because it
has activity, would such an answer satisfy a rational man 1 Would it not rather
be looked upon as a very impertinent one ?
3. An active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but what are
consequent upon his acting. He produces nothing by his activity, any other
way than by the exercise of his activity, and so nothing but the fruits of its
exercise j he brings nothing to pass by a dormant activity. But the exercise
of his activity is action ; and so his action, or exercise of his activity, must be
prior to the effects of his activity. If an active being produces an effect in
another being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit
of his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the effect of it
must follow. So it must be, with equal reason, if the active being is his own
object, and his activity is conversant about himself, to produce and determine
some effect in himself; still the exercise of his activity must go before the
effect, which he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore his activity
cannot be the Cause of the determination of the first action, or exercise of
activity itself, whence the effects of activity arise, for that would imply a con-
tradiction ; it would be to say, the first exercise of activity is before the first
exercise of activity, and is the Cause of it.
4. That the soul, though an active substance, cannot diversify its own acts,
but by first acting ; or be a determining Cause of different acts, or any different
effects, sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another, any other way than in
consequence of its own diverse acts, is manifest by this ; that if so, then the
same Cause, the same causal power, force or influence, without variation in any
respect, would produce different effects at different times. For the same sub-
stance of the soul before it acts, and the same active nature of the soul before
it is exerted, i. e. before in the order of nature, would be the Cause of different
effects, viz., different Volitions at different times. But the substance of the soul
before it acts, and its active nature before it is exerted, are the same without
variation. For it is some act that makes the first variation in the Cause, as to
any causal exertion, force, or influence. But if it be so, that the soul has no
different causality, or diverse causal force or influence, in producing these diverse
effects ; then it is evident, that the soul has no influence, no hand in the diversity
of the effect ; and that the difference of the effect cannot be owing to any thing
in the soul; or, which is the same thing, the soul does not determine the
diversity of the effect ; which is contrary to to the supposition. It is true, the
substance of the soul before it acts, and before there is any difference in that
respect, may be in a different state and circumstance ; but those whom I oppose,
will not allow the different circumstances of the soul to be the determining
Causes of the acts of the Will, as being contrary to their notion of self-determin-
ation and self-motion.
5. Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no acts of the soul,
strictly speaking, but free Volitions; then it will follow, that the soul is an active
being in nothing further than it is a voluntary or elective being ; and whenever
it produces effects actively, it produces effects voluntarily and clectively. But
to produce effects thus, is the same thing as to produce effects in consequence of,
and according to its own choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not by
its activity produce all its own acts of Will or choice themselves ; for this,
32 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
by the supposition, is to produce all its free acts of choice voluntarily and elec-
lively, or in consequence of its own free acts of choice, which brings the matter
directly to the forementioned contradiction, of a free act of choice before the
first free act of choice. According to these gentlemen's own notion of action,
if there arises in the mind a Volition without a free act of the Will or choice to
determine and produce it, the mind is not the active, voluntary Cause of that
Volition, because it does not arise from, nor is regulated by choice or design.
And therefore it cannot be, that the mind should be the active, voluntary, de-
termining Cause of the first and leading Volition that relates to the affair. The
mind's being a designing Cause, only enables it to produce effects in consequence
of its design ; it will not enable it to be the designing Cause of all its own
designs. The mind's being an elective Cause, will only enable it to produce
effects in consequence of its elections, and according to them; but cannot
enable it to be the elective Cause of all its own elections ; because that supposes
an election before the first election. So the mind's being an active Cause
enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own acts, but cannot enable
it to be the determining Cause of all its own acts ; for that is still in the same
manner a contradiction ; as it supposes a determining act conversant about the
first act, and prior to it, having a causal influence on its existence, and manner
of existence.
I can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the soul's having power
to cause and determine its own Volitions, as a being to whom God has given
a power of action, but this ; that God has given power to the soul, sometimes
at least, to excite Volitions at its pleasure, or according as it chooses. And
this certainly supposes, in all such cases, a choice preceding all Volitions which
are thus caused, even the first of them; which runs into the forementioned
great absurdity.
Therefore the activity of the nature of the soul affords no relief from the
difficulties which the notion of a self-determining power in the Will is attended
with, nor will it help, in the least, its absurdities and inconsistencies.
SECTION V.
Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true,
they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian liberty ;
and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian writers are obliged to talk
inconsistently.
What was last observed in the preceding section may show, not only that
the active nature of the soul cannot be a reason why an act of the Will is, or
why it is in this manner, rather than another ; but also that if it could be so,
and it could be proved that Volitions are contingent events, in that sense, that
their being and manner of being is not fixed or determined by any cause, or
any thing antecedent; it would not at all serve the purpose of the Arminians,
to establish the freedom of the Will, according to their notion of its freedom as
consisting in the Will's determination of itself ; which supposes every free act
of the Will to be determined by some act of the Will going before to determine
it; inasmuch as for the Will to determine a thing, is the same as for the soul
to determine a thing by Willing ; and there is no way that the Will can de-
termine an act of the Will, but by willing that act of the Will ; or, which is
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 33
the same thing, choosing it. So that here must be two acts of the Will in the
case, one going before another, one conversant about the other, and the latter
the object of the former, and chosen by the former. If the Will does not cause
and determine the act by choice, it does not cause or determine it at all ; for
that which is not determined by choice, is not determined voluntarily or willingly :
and to say, that the Will determines something which the soul does not determine
willingly, is as much as to say, that something is done by the Will, which the
soul doth not with its Will.
So that if Arminian liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's determining
its own acts, be maintained, the old absurdity and contradiction must be main-
tained, that every free act of the Will is caused and determined by a foregoing
free act of Will ; which doth not consist with the free acts arising without
any cause, and being so contingent, as not to be fixed by any thing foregoing.
So that this evasion must be given up, as not at all relieving, and as that which,
instead of supporting this sort of liberty, directly destroys it.
And if it should be supposed, that the soul determines its own acts of Will
some other way, than by a foregoing act of Will; still it will not help the
cause of their liberty of Will. If it determines them by an act of the under-
standing, or some other power, then the Will does not determine itself; and so
the self-determining power of the Will is given up. And what liberty is there
exercised according to their own opinion of liberty, by the soul's being deter-
mined by something besides its own choice ? The acts of the Will, it is true,
may be directed, and effectually determined and fixed ; but it is not done by the
soul's own will and pleasure : there is no exercise at all of choice or Will in
producing the effect : and if Will and choice are not exercised in it, how is the
liberty of the Will exercised in it ?
So that let Arminians turn which way they please with their notion of
liberty, consisting in the Will's determining its own acts, their notion destroys
itself. If they hold every free act of Will to be determined by the soul's own
free choice, or foregoing free act of Will ; foregoing, either in the order of
time, or nature ; it implies that gross contradiction, that the first free act be-
longing to the affair, is determined by a free act which is before it. Or if they
say, that the free acts of the Will are determined by some other act of the soul,
and not an act of Will or choice ; this also destroys their notion of liberty,
consisting in the acts of the Will being determined by the Will itself ; or if
they hold that the acts of the Will are determined by nothing at all that is prior
to them, but that they are contingent in that sense, that they are determined
and fixed by no cause at all ; this also destroys their notion of liberty, consist-
ing in the Will's determining its own acts.
This being the true state of the Arminian notion of liberty, it hence comes
to pass, that the writers that defend it are forced into gross inconsistencies, in
what they say upon this subject To instance in Dr. Whitby ; he, in his dis-
course on the freedom of the Will,* opposes the opinion of the Calvinists, who
place man's liberty only in a power of doing what he will, as that wherein they
plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he himself mentions the very same
notion of liberty, as the dictate of the sense and common reason of mankind, and
a rule laid down by the light of nature, viz., that liberty is a power of acting
from ourselves, or doing what we wiLL.f This is indeed, as he says, a thing
agreeable to the sense and common reason of mankind ; and therefore it is not
so much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowledges it against himself :
* In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 350, 351, 352. t Ibid. p. 325, 326.
Vol. n. 5
34 FREEDOM OF THE WILL
for if liberty does not consist in this, what else can be devised that it should con-
sist in 1 If it be said, as Dr. Whitby elsewhere insists, that it does not only
consist in liberty of doing what we will, but also a liberty of willing without
necessity ; still the question returns, what does that liberty of willing without
necessity consist in, but in a power of willing as we please, without being im-
peded by a contrary necessity ? Or in other words, a liberty for the soul in
its willing to act according to its own choice 1 Yea, this very thing the same
author seems to allow, and suppose again and again, in the use he makes of
sayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus he cites the words
of Origen, which he produces as a testimony on his side : * The soul acts by her
own choice, and it is free for her to incline to whatever 'part she will. And those
words of Justin Martyr : f The doctrine of the Christians is this, that nothing
is done or suffered according to fate, but that every man doth good or evil according
to his own free choice. And from Eusebius these words : % If fate be establish-
ed, philosophy and piety are overthrown. All these things depending upon the
necessity introduced by the stars, and not upon meditation and exercise proceed-
ing from our own free choice. And again, the words of Maccarius : § God,
to preserve the liberty of marts Will, suffered their bodies to die, that it might
be in their choice to turn to good or evil. They who are acted by the Holy
Spirit, are not held under any necessity, but have liberty to turn themselves, and
do what they will in this life.
Thus, the doctor in effect comes into that very notion of liberty, which the
Calvinists have ; which he at the same time condemns, as agreeing with the
opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely, the soul's acting by its own choice, men's doing
good or evil according to their own free choice, their being in that exercise which
proceeds from their own free choice, having it in their choice to turn to good or
evil, and doing what they will. So that if men exercise this liberty in the acts
of the Will themselves, it must be in exerting acts of Will as they will, or ac-
cording to their own free choice ; or exerting acts of Will that proceed from
their choice. And if it be so, then let every one judge whether this does not
suppose a free choice going before the free act of Will, or whether an act
of choice does not go before that act of the Will which proceeds from it. — And if
it be thus with all free acts of the Will, then let every one judge, whether it will
not follow that there is a free choice or Will going before the first free act of
the Will exerted in the case. And then let every one judge, whether this be
not a contradiction. And finally, let every one judge whether in the scheme of
these writers there be any possibility of avoiding these absurdities.
If liberty consists, as Dr. Whitby himself says, in a man's doing what he
will ; and a man exercises this liberty, not only in external actions, but in the
acts of the Will themselves ; then so far as liberty is exercised in the latter, it
consists in willing what he wills : and if any say so, one of these two things must
be meant, either, 1. That a man has power to Will, as he does Will ; because
what he Wills, he Wills ; and therefore has power to Will what he has power
to Will. If this be their meaning, then this mighty controversy about freedom
of the Will and self- determining power, comes wholly to nothing ; all that is
contended for being no more than this, that the mind of man does what it does,
and is the subject of what it is the subject of, or that what is, is ; wherein none
has any controversy with them. Or, 2. The meaning must be, that a man has
power to Will as he pleases or chooses to Will ; that is, he has power by one
act of choice, to choose another ; by an antecedent act of Will to choose a con-
• In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 342. t Ibid. p. 360. % Ibid. p. 36a $ Ibid. p. 369, 370
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 35
sequent act ; and therein to execute his own choice. And if this be their
meaning, it is nothing but shuffling with those they dispute with, and baffling
their own reason. For still the question returns, wherein lies man's liberty in
that antecedent act of Will which chose the consequent act 1 The answer,
according to the same principles, must be, that his liberty in this also lies in his
willing as he would, or as he chose, or agreeably to another act of choice pre-
ceding that. And so the question returns in infinitum and the like answer must
be made in infinitum. In order to support their opinion, there must be no
beginning, but free acts of Will must have been chosen by foregoing free acts
of Will in the soul of every man, without beginning ; and so before he had a
being, from all eternity.
SECTION VI.
Concerning the Will's determining in Things which are perfectly indifferent in the
View of the Mind.
A great argument for self-determining power, is the supposed experience
we universally have of an ability to determine our Wills, in cases wherein no
prevailing motive is presented : the Will (as is supposed) has its choice to make
between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the view of the mind ;
and the Will is apparently altogether indifferent ; and yet we find no difficulty
in coming to a choice ; the Will can instantly determine itself to one, by a sove-
reign power which it has over itself, without being moved by any preponderating
inducement.
Thus the forementioned author of an Essay on the Freedom of the Will, &c,
p. 25, 26, 27, supposes, " That there are many instances, wherein the Will is
determined neither by present uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent good,
nor by the last dictate of the understanding, nor by any thing else, but merely by
itself as a sovereign, self-determining power of the soul ; and that the soul does
not will this or that action, in some cases, by any other influence but because it
will. Thus (says he) I can turn my face to the South, or the North ; I can
point with my finger upward, or downward. And thus, in some cases, the Will
determines itself in a very sovereign manner, because it will, without a reason
borrowed from the understanding ; and hereby it discovers its own perfect power
of choice, rising from within itself, and free from all influence or restraint of any
kind." And in pages 66, 70, and 73, 74, this author very expressly supposes
the Will in many cases to be determined by no motive at all, but to act altogether
without motive, or ground of preference. — Here I would observe,
1. The very supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and over-
throws itself. For the thing supposed, wherein this grand argument consists,
is, that among several things the Will actually chooses one before another, at
the same time that it is perfectly indifferent ; which is the very same thing as to
say, the mind has a preference, at the same time that it has no preference. What
is meant cannot be, that the mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice,
or until it has a preference : or, which is the same thing, that the mind is indiffer-
ent until it comes to be not indifferent : for certainly this author did not think
he had a controversy with any person in supposing this. And then it is nothing
to his purpose, that the mind which chooses, was indifferent once ; unless it
chooses, remaining indifferent ; for otherwise, it does not choose at all in that
36 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
case of indifference, concerning which is all the question. Besides, it appears
in fact, that the thing which this author supposes, is not that the Will chooses
one thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chooses ; but
also is indifferent when it chooses ; and that its being otherwise than indifferent is
not until afterwards, in consequence of its choice ; that the chosen thing's ap-
pearing preferable and more agreeable than another, arises from its choice already
made. His words are, (p. 30,) " Where the objects which are proposed, appear
equally fit or good, the Will is left without a guide or director ; and therefore
must take its own choice by its own determination ; it being properly a self-
determining power. And in such cases the Will does as it were make a good
to itself by its own choice, i. e. creates its own pleasure or delight in this self-
chosen good. Even as a man by seizing upon a spot of unoccupied land, in an
uninhabited country, makes it his own possession and property, and as such
rejoices in it. Where things were indifferent before, the Will finds nothing to
make them more agreeable,, considered merely in themselves ; but the pleasure
it feels arising from its own choice, and its perseverance therein. We love
many things we have chosen, and purely because we chose them."
This is as much as to say, that we first begin to prefer many things, now
ceasing any longer to be indifferent with respect to them, purely because we
have preferred and chosen them before. These things must needs be spoken
inconsiderately by this author. Choice or preference cannot be before itself in
the same instance, either in the order of time or nature : it cannot be the founda-
tion of itself, or the fruit or consequence of itself. The very act of choosing one
thing rather than another, is preferring that thing, and that is setting a higher
value on that thing. But that the mind sets a higher value on one thing than
another, is not, in the first place, the fruit of its setting a higher value on that
thing.
This author says, p. 36, " The Will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the
Will may determine itself to choose one or the other." And again, in the same
page, " I am entirely indifferent to either ; and yet my Will may determine
itself to choose." And again, " Which I shall choose must be determined by
the mere act of my Will." If the choice is determined by a mere act of Will,
then the choice is determined by a mere act of choice. And concerning this
matter, viz., that the act of the Will itself is determined by an act of choice,
this writer is express, in page 72. Speaking of the case, where there is no
superior fitness in objects presented, he has these words : " There it must act by
its own choice, and determine itself as it pleases." Where it is supposed that
the very determination, which is the ground and spring of the Will's act, is an
act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more agreeable and the mind
better pleased in it than another ; and this preference and superior pleasedness
is the ground of all it does in the case. And if so, the mind is not indifferent
when it determines itself, but had rather do one thing than another, had rather
determine itself one way than another. And therefore the Will does not act at all
in indifference ; not so much as in the first step it takes, or the first rise and
beginning of its acting. If it be possible for the understanding to act in indif-
ference, yet to be sure the Will never does ; because the Will's beginning to act
is the very same thing as its beginning to choose or prefer. And if in the very
first act of the WTill, the mind prefers something, then the idea of that thing
preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in the mind ; or, which is
the same thing, the idea of it has a prevailing influence on the Will. So that
this wholly destroys the thing supposed, viz., that the mind can, by a sove-
reign power, choose one of two or more things, which in the view of the mind
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 37
are, in every respect, perfectly equal, one of which does not at all preponderate,
nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above another.
So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability of the Will to
choose one of two or more things, concerning which it is perfectly indifferent,
does at the same time, in effect, deny the thing he supposes, and allows and
asserts the point he endeavors to overthrow ; even that the Will, in choosing,
is subject to no prevailing influence of the idea, or view of the thing chosen.
And indeed it is impossible to offer this argument without overthrowing it ; the
thing supposed in it being inconsistent with itself, and that which denies itself.
To suppose the Will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, either to
determine itself, or to do any thing else, is to assert that the mind chooses without
choosing. To say that when it is- indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say
that it can follow its pleasure when it has no pleasure to follow. And therefore
if there be any difficulty in the instances of two cakes, two eggs, &c, which are
exactly alike, one as good as another ; concerning which this author supposes
the mind in fact has a choice, and so in effect supposes that it has a preference ;
it as much concerned himself to solve the difficulty, as it does those whom he
opposes. For if these instances prove any thing to his purpose, they prove that
a man chooses without choice. And yet this is not to his purpose ; because
if this is what he asserts, his own words are as much against him, and do as
much contradict him, as the words of those he disputes against can do.
2. There is no great difficulty in showing, in such instances as are alleged,
not only that it must needs be so, that the mind must be influenced in its choice,
by something that has a preponderating influence upon it, but also how it is so.
A little attention to our own experience, and a distinct consideration of the acts
of our own minds, in such cases, will be sufficient to clear up the matter.
Thus, supposing I have a chess-board before me ; and because I am required
by a superior, or desired by a friend, or to make some experiment concerning
my own ability and liberty, or on some other consideration, I am determined to
touch some one of the spots or squares on the board with my finger ; not being
limited or directed in the first proposal, or my own first purpose, which is general,
to any one in particular ; and there being nothing in the squares, in themselves
considered, that recommends any one of all the sixty-four, more than another :
in this case, my mind determines to give itself up to what is vulgarly called
accident,* by determining to touch that square which happens to be most in view,
which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or which happens to be then
most in my mind, or which I shall be directed to by some other such like accident.
— Here are several steps of the mind's proceeding (though all may be done as
it were in a moment) ; the first step is its general determination that it will touch
one of the squares. The next step is another general determination to give itself
up to accident, in some certain way ; as to touch that which shall be most in
the eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like accident. The third
and last step is a particular determination to touch a certain individual spot,
even that square, which, by that sort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has
actually offered itself beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none of these
several steps does the mind proceed in absolute indifference, but in each of them
is influenced by a preponderating inducement. So it is in the first step ; the
mind's general determination to touch one of the sixty-four spots : the mind is
* I have elsewhere observed what that is which is vulgarly called accident ; that it is nothing akin to
the Arminian metaphysical notion of contingence, something not connected with any thing foregoing ; but
that it is something that comes to pass in the course of things, in some affair that men are concerned in<
Unforeseen, and not owing to their design.
38 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
not absolutely indifferent whether it does so or no ; it is induced to it, for the sake
of making some experiment, or by the desire of a friend, or some other motive
that prevails. So it is in the second step, the mind's determining to give itself
up to accident, by touching that which shall be most in the eye, or the idea of
which shall be most prevalent in the mind, &c. The mind is not absolutely
indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule or no ; but chooses it because it ap-
pears at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to fulfil the
general purpose aforesaid. And so it is in the third and last step, it is determin-
ing to touch that individual spot which actually does prevail in the mind's view.
The mind is not indifferent concerning this ; but is influenced by a prevailing
inducement and reason ; which is, that this is a prosecution of the preceding
determination, which appeared requisite, and was fixed before in the second step.
Accident will ever serve a man, without hindering him a moment, in such a
case. It will always be so among a number of objects in view, one will prevail
in the eye, or in idea beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear
sunshine, many objects strike the eye at once, and innumerable images may be
at once painted in it by the rays of light ; but the attention of the mind is not
equal to several of them at once ; or if it be, it does not continue so for any time.
And so it is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general : several ideas are
not in equal strength in the mind's view and notice at once ; or at least, do
not remain so for any sensible continuance. There is nothing in the world more
constantly varying, than the ideas of the mind : they do not remain precisely
in the same state for the least perceivable space of time ; as is evident by this,
that all perceivable time is judged and perceived by the mind only by the suc-
cession or the successive changes of its own ideas : therefore while the views or
perceptions of the mind remain precisely in the same state, there is no perceivable
space or length of time, because no sensible succession.
As the acts of the Will, in each step of the forementioned procedure, do not
come to pass without a particular cause, every act is owing to a prevailing in-
ducement ; so the accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the
unsearchable course of things, to which the mind yields itself, and by which it is
guided, is not any thing that comes to pass without a cause ; and the mind, in
determining to be guided by it, is not determined by something that has no cause ;
any more than if it determined to be guided by a lot, or the casting of a die.
For though the die's falling in such a manner be accidental to him that casts it,
yet none will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it does. The invol-
untary changes in the succession of our ideas, though the causes may not be
observed, have as much a cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that
float in the air, or the continual, infinitely various, successive changes of the
unevennesses on the surface of the water.
There are two things especially, which are probably the occasions of confu-
sion in the minds of those who insist upon it, that the Will acts in a proper
indifference, and without being moved by any inducement, in its determination
in such cases as have been mentioned.
1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it
distinctly in view. The question they dispute about, is, Whether the mind be
indifferent about the objects presented, one of which is to be taken, touched,
pointed to, &c, as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas
the question to be considered, is, Whether the person be indifferent with respect
to his own actions ; whether he does not, on some consideration or other, prefer
one act with respect to these objects before another. The mind in its determi-
nation and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conversant
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 39
about the objects presented ; but the acts to be done concerning these objects.
The objects may appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any
choice between them : but the next act of the Will being about the external
actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c, these may not appear equal, and
one action may properly be chosen before another. In each step of the mind's
progress, the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly and improp-
erly, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons than any preference
of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects.
There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does ever properly choose
one of the objects before another ; either before it has taken, or afterwards.
Indeed the man chooses to take or touch one rather than another ; but not
because it chooses the thing taken,- or touched ; but from foreign considerations.
The case may be so, that of two things offered, a man may, for certain reasons,
choose and prefer the taking of that which he undervalues, and choose to
neglect to take that which his mind prefers. In such a case, choosing the
*hing taken, and choosing to take, are diverse ; and so they are in a case where
the things presented are equal in the mind's esteem, and neither of them
preferred. All that fact makes evident, is, that the mind chooses one action
rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring, in order
to be to their purpose, ought to be to prove that the mind chooses ihe action in
perfect indifference, with respect to that action ; and not to prove that the
mind chooses the action in perfect indifference with respect to the object ; which
is very possible, and yet the Will not act without prevalent inducement, and
proper preponderation.
2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this matter, seems to be,
not distinguishing between a general indifference, or an indifference with respect
to what is to be done in a more distant and general view of it, and a particular
indifference, or an indifference with respect to the next immediate act, viewed
with its particular and present circumstances. A man may be perfectly indif-
ferent with respect to his own actions, in the former respect ; and yet not in the
latter. Thus, in the foregoing instance of touching one of the squares of a
chessboard ; when it is first proposed that I should touch one of them, I may
be perfectly indifferent which I touch ; because as yet I view the matter
remotely and generally, being but in the first step of the mind's progress in the
affair. But yet, when I am actually come to the last step, and the very next
thing to be determined is which is to be touched, having already determined
that I will touch that which happens to be most in my eye or mind, and my
mind being now fixed on a particular one, the act of touching that, considered
thus immediately, and in these particular present circumstances, is not what my
mind is absolutely indifferent about.
SECTION VII.
Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.
What has been said in the foregoing section, has a tendency in some
measure to evince the absurdity of the opinion of such as place Liberty in
Indifference, or in that equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent
determination or bias, and left hitherto free from any prepossessing inclination
40 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
to one side or the other; that so the determination of the Will to either side
may be entirely from itself, and that it may be owing only to its own power,
and that sovereignty which it has over itself, that it goes this way rather than
that.*
Birc inasmuch as this has been of such long standing, and has been so
generally received, and so much insisted on by Pelagians, Semipelagians, Jesuits,
Socinians, Arminians and others, it may deserve a more full consideration.
And therefore I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough inquiry
into this notion.
Now, lest some should suppose that I do not understand those that place
Liberty in Indifference, or should charge me with misrepresenting their opinion,
I would signify, that I am sensible, there are some, who, when they talk of the
Liberty of the Will as consisting in Indifference, express themselves as though
they would not be understood of the Indifference of the inclination or tendency
of the Will, but of, I know not what, Indifference of the soul's power of willing;
or that the Will, with respect to its power or ability to choose, is indifferent,
can go either way indifferently, either to the right hand or left, either act or
forbear to act, one as well as the other. However, this seems to be a refining
only of some particular writers, and newly invented, and which will by no
means consist with the manner of expression used by the defenders of Liberty
of Indifference in general. And I wish such refiners would thoroughly consider,
whether they distinctly know their own meaning, when they make a distinction
between Indifference of the soul as to its power or ability of willing or choosing,
and the soul's Indifference as to the preference or choice itself ; and whether
they do not deceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct mean-
ing. The Indifference of the soul as to its ability or power to Will, must be
the same thing as the Indifference of the state of the power or faculty of the
Will, or the Indifference of the state which the soul itself, which has that power
or faculty, hitherto remains in, as to the exercise of that power, in the choice
it shall by and by make.
But not to insist any longer on the abstruseness and inexplicableness of this
distinction ; let what will be supposed concerning the meaning of those that
make use of it, thus much must at least be intended by Arminians when they
talk of Indifference as essential to Liberty of Will, if they intend any thing, in
any respect to their purpose, viz., that it is such an Indifference as leaves the
Will not determined already ; but free from, and vacant of predetermination, so
far, that there may be room for the exercise of the self-determining power of
the Will ; and that the Will's freedom consists in, or depends upon this vacancy
and opportunity that is left for the Will itself to be the determiner of the act
that is to be the free act.
And here I would observe in the first place, that to make out this scheme
of Liberty, the Indifference must be perfect and absolute ; there must be a per-
* Dr. Whitby, and some other Arminians, make a distinction of different kinds of freedom ; one of
God, and perfect spirits above ; another of persons in a state of trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to
consist with necessity ; the latter he holds to be without necessity : and this latter he supposes to be
requisite to our being the subjects of praise or dispraise, rewards or punishments, precepts and prohibi-
tions, promises and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a covenant treaty. And to this freedom
he supposes Indifference to be requisite. In his Discourse on the five Points, p. 299, 300, he says, " It is
a freedom (speaking of a freedom not only from coaction, but from necessity) requisite, as we conceive,
to render us capable of trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy of praise or dispraise, and our
persons of rewards or punishments." And in the next page, speaking of the same matter, he says,
'* Excellent to this purpose, are the words of Mr. Thorndike : We say not that Indifference is requisite to all
freedom, but to the freedom of man alone in this state of travail and projicience : the ground of which is God's
tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcilement to fallen man, together with those precepts and prv
hibitions, those promises and threats, those exhortations and dehortations, it is enforced with."
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 41
feet freedom from all antecedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the
Will be already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself, then
its inclination is not wholly owing to itself : if when two opposites are proposed
to the soul for its choice, the proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state
of Indifference, then it is not found in a state of Liberty for mere self-deter-
mination.— The least degree of antecedent bias must be inconsistent with their
notion of -Liberty. For so long as prior inclination possesses the Will, and is
not removed, it binds the Will, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will
should act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the Will.
To suppose otherwise, would be the same thing as to suppose, that the Will is
inclined contrary to its present prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is
inclined to. That which the Will chooses and prefers, that, all things con-
sidered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impossible for the Will
to choose contrary to its own remaining and present preponderating inclination,
as it is to prefer contrary to its own present preference, or choose contrary to its
own present choice. The Will, therefore, so long as it is under the influence
of an old preponderating inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free act, or
any act that shall now be an act of self-determination. The act which is a
self-determined free act, must be an act which the Will determines in the pos-
session and use of such a Liberty, as consists in a freedom from every thing,
which, if it were there, would make it impossible that the Will, at that time,
should be otherwise than that way to which it tends.
If any one should say, there is no need that the Indifference should be
perfect ; but although a former inclination and preference still remain, yet, if it
be nol very strong and violent, possibly the strength of the Will may oppose
and overcome it : — this is grossly absurd ; for the strength of the Will, let it be
ever so great, does not enable it to act one way, and not the contrary way,
both at the same time. It gives it no such sovereignty and command, as to
cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose contrary
to its own present choice.
Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent preponderation of the
Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the Will can be at liberty to de-
termine itself the contrary way. And if the Will determines itself the same
way, it is not a free determination, because the Will is not wholly at Liberty in
so doing : its determination is not altogether from itself, but it was partly de-
termined before, in its prior inclination ; and all the freedom the Will exercises in
the case, is in an increase of inclination wrhich it gives itself, over and above
what it had by the foregoing bias ; so much is from itself, and so much is from
perfect Indifference. For though the Will had a previous tendency that way,
yet as to that additional degree of inclination, it had no tendency. Therefore
the previous tendency is of no consideration, with respect to the act wherein
the Will is free. So that it comes to the same thing which was said at first,
that as to the act of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be perfect
Indifference, or equilibrium.
To illustrate this ; if we should suppose a sovereign, self-moving power in
a natural body, but that the body is in motion already, by an antecedent bias ;
for instance, gravitation towards the centre of the earth ; and has one degree
of motion already, by virtue of that previous tendency ; but by its self-moving
power it adds one degree more to its motion, and moves so much more swiftly
towards the centre of the earth than it would do by its gravity only : it is
evident, that all that is owing to a self-moving power in this case, is the ad-
ditional degree of motion ; and that the other degree of motion which it had
Vol. II. 6
42 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
from gravity, is of no consideration in the case, does not help the effect of the
free self-moving power in the least ; the effect is just the same, as if the body
had received from itself one degree of motion from a state of perfect rest. So
if we should suppose a self-moving power given to the scale of a balance, which
has a weight of one degree beyond the opposite scale ; and we ascribe to it an
ability to add to itself another degree of force the same way, by its self-moving
power ; this is just the same thing as to ascribe to it a power to give itself one
degree of preponderation from a perfect equilibrium ; and so much power as
the scale has to give itself an overbalance from a perfect equipoise, so much self-
moving self-preponderating power it has, and no more. So that its free power
this way is always to be measured from perfect equilibrium.
I need say no more to prove, that if Indifference be essential to Liberty, it
must be perfect Indifference ; and that so far as the Will is destitute of this,
so far it is destitute of that freedom by which it is its own master, and in a
capacity of being its own determiner, without being in the least passive, or
subject to the power and sway of something else, in its motions and deter-
minations.
Having observed these things, let us now try whether this notion of the
Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference and equilibrium, and the Will's self-
determination in such a state be not absurd and inconsistent.
And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth ; that every
free act is done in a state of freedom, and not after such a state. If an act of
the Will be an act wherein the soul is free, it must be exerted in a state of
freedom, and in the time of freedom. It will not suffice, that the act immedi-
ately follows a state of Liberty ; but Liberty must yet continue, and coexist
with the act ; the soul remaining in possession of Liberty. Because that is the
notion of a free act of the soul, even an act wherein the soul uses or exercises
Liberty. But if the soul is not, in the very time of the act, in the possession of
Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the use of it.
Now the question is, whether ever the soul of man puts forth an act of
Will, while it yet remains in a state of Liberty, in that notion of a state of
Liberty, viz., as implying a state of Indifference, or whether the soul ever exerts
an act of choice or preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfect
equilibrium, not inclining one way more than another. The very putting of
the question is sufficient to show the absurdity of the affirmative answer; for
how ridiculous would it be for any body to insist, that the soul chooses one thing
before another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly indifferent with
respect to each ! This is the same thing as to say, the soul prefers one
thing to another, at the very same time that it has no preference. Choice and
preference can no more be in a state of Indifference, than motion can be in a
state of rest, or than the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state
of equilibrium. Motion may be the next moment after rest ; but cannot co-
exist with it, in any, even the least part of it. So choice may be immediately
after a state of Indifference, but has no coexistence with it ; even the very
beginning of it is not in a state of Indifference. And therefore if this be
Liberty, no act of the Will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state of
Liberty, or in the time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty are so far from agree-
ing together, and being essential one to another, that they are contrary one
to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion
and rest, light and darkness, or life and death. So that the Will does not
so much as begin to act in the time of such Liberty ; freedom is perfectly
at an end, and has ceased to be, at the first moment of action ; and therefore
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 43
Liberty cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a denom-
ination, or any part of it, any more than if it had ceased to be twenty years
before the action began. The moment that Liberty ceases to be, it ceases
to be a qualification of any thing. If light and darkness succeed one another
instantaneously, light qualifies nothing after it is gone out, to make any
thing lightsome or bright, any more at the first moment of perfect darkness,
than months or years after. Life denominates nothing vital at the first moment
of perfect death. So freedom, if it consists in, or implies Indifference, can
denominate nothing free, at the first moment of preference or preponderation.
Therefore it it is manifest, that no Liberty of which the soul is possessed, or
ever uses, in any of its acts of volition, consists in Indifference ; and that the
opinion of such as suppose, that Indifference belongs to the very essence of
Liberty, is in the highest degree absurd and contradictory.
If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing is nothing but trick
and delusion ; and to evade the reasoning, should say, that the thing wherein
the Will exercises its Liberty, is not in the act of choice or preponderation itself,
but in determining itself to a certain choice or preference ; that the act of the
Will wherein it is free, and uses its own sovereignty, consists in its causing or
determining the change or transition from a state of Indifference to a certain
preference, or determining to give a certain turn to the balance, which has
hitherto been even ; and that this act the Will exerts in a state of Liberty, or
while the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect master of itself. — I say,
if any one chooses to express his notion of Liberty after this, or some such
manner, let us see if he can make out his matters any better than before.
What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect equilibri-
um, without preference, determines to change itself from that state, and excite
in itself a certain choice or preference. Now let us see whether this does not
come to the same absurdity we had before. If it be so, that the Will, while it
yet remains perfectly indifferent, determines to put itself out of that state, and
give itself a certain preponderation ; then I would inquire, whether the soul does
not determine this of choice ; or whether the Will's coming to a determination to
do so, be not the same thing as the soul's coming to a choice to do so. If the
soul does not determine this of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does
not determine it voluntarily. And if the soul does not determine it voluntarily,
or of its own Will, then in what sense does its Will determine it ? And if the
Will does not determine it, then how is the Liberty of the Will exercised in the
determination 1 What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those deter-
minations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not voluntary, and
wherein the Will is not concerned ? — But if it be allowed, that this determina-
tion is an act of choice, and it be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains
in a state of perfect Indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state, and to
turn itself one way ; then the soul is already come to a choice, and chooses
that way. And so we have the very same absurdity which we had before.
Here is the soul in a state of choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the
same time : the soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state of
perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more than the other. — And
indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the absurdity in the
obscurity of expression, is more nonsensical, and increases the inconsistence.
To say, the free act of the Will, or the act which the Will exerts in a state of
freedom and Indifference, does not imply preference in it, but is what the Will
does in order to causing or producing a preference, is as much as to say, the
soul chooses (for to Will and to choose are the same thing) without choice, and
44 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
prefers without preference in order to cause or produce the beginning of a
preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is exerted
without choice, in order to produce itself.
If any, to evade these things, should own, that a state of Liberty, and a
state of Indifference are not the same thing, and that the former may be without
the latter ; but should say, that Indifference is still essential to the freedom of
an act of Will, in some sort, namely, as it is necessary to go immediately before
it ; it being essential to the freedom of an act of Will that it should directly and
immediately arise out of a state of Indifference : still this will not help the cause
of Arminifln Liberty, or make it consistent with itself. For if the act springs
immediately out of a state of Indifference, then it does not arise from antecedent
choice or preference. But if the act arises directly out of a state of Indifference,
without any intervening choice to choose and determine it, then the act not being
determined by choice, is not determined by the Will ; the mind exercises no
free choice in the affair, and free choice and free Will have no hand in the
determination of the act. Which is entirely inconsistent with their notion of
the freedom of Volition.
If any should suppose, that these difficulties and absurdities may be avoided,
by saying that the Liberty of the mind consists in a power to suspend the act
of the Will, and -so to keep it in a state of Indifference, until there has been
opportunity for consideration ; and so shall say that, however Indifference is
not essential to Liberty in such a manner, that the mind must make its choice in
a state of Indifference, which is an inconsistency, or that the act of Will must
spring immediately out of Indifference ; yet Indifference may be essential to the
Liberty of acts of the Will in this respect, viz., that Liberty consists in a Power
of the mind to forbear or suspend the act of Volition, and keep the mind in a
state of Indifference for the present, until there has been opportunity for proper
deliberation : I say, if any one imagines that this helps the matter, it is a great
mistake : it reconciles no inconsistency, and relieves no difficulty with which the
affair is attended. — For here the following things must be observed :
1. That this suspending of Volition, if there be properly any such thing, is
itself an act of Volition. If the mind determines to suspend its act, it deter-
mines it voluntarily ; it chooses, on some consideration, to suspend it. And
this choice or determination, is an act of the Will : and indeed it is supposed to
be so in the very hypothesis ; for it is supposed that the Liberty of the Will
consists in its Power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the
Will exercises its Liberty. But how can the Will exercise Liberty in it, if it
be not an act of the Will 1 The Liberty of the Will is not exercised in any
thing but what the Will does.
2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an act of the Will, but it
is supposed to be the only free act of the Will ; because it is said, that this is the
thing wherein the Liberty of the Will consists. — Now if this be so, then this is
all the act of Will that we have to consider in this controversy, about the Liberty
of Will, and in our inquiries, wherein the Liberty of man consists. And now
the foremen tioned difficulties remain : the former question returns upon us, viz.,
Wherein consists the freedom of the Will in those acts wherein it is free ?
And if this act of determining a suspension be the only act in which the
Will is free, then wherein consists the Will's freedom with respect to this
act of suspension ? And how is Indifference essential to this act ? The
answer must be, according to what is supposed in the evasion under consideration,
that the Liberty of the Will in this act of suspension, consists in a Power to
suspend even this act, until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 45
But this will oe to plunge directly into the grossest nonsense : for it is the act
of suspension itself that we are speaking of ; and there is no room for a space
of deliberation and suspension in order to determine whether we will suspend or
no. For that supposes, that even suspension itself may be deferred : which is
absurd ; for the very deferring the determination of suspension to consider
whether we will suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the
space of suspension, to consider, whether to suspend, the act is ipso facto sus-
pended. There is no medium between suspending to act, and immediately acting ;
and therefore no possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one moment.
And besides, this is attended with ridiculous absurdity another way : for
now it is come to that, that Liberty consists wholly in the mind's having Power
to suspend its determination whether to suspend or no ; that there may be time
for consideration, whether it be best to suspend. And if Liberty consists in this
only, then this is the Liberty under consideration. We have to inquire now, how
Liberty with respect to this act of suspending a determination of suspension,
consists in Indifference, or how Indifference is essential to it. The answer, ac-
cording to the hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it consists in a Power of
suspending even this last mentioned act, to have time to consider whether to
suspend that And then the same difficulties and inquiries return over again
with respect to that ; and so on for ever. Which if it would show any thing,
would show only that there is no such thing as a free act. It drives the exercise
of freedom back in infinitum ; and that is to drive it out of the world.
And besides all this, there is a delusion, and a latent gross contradiction in
the affair another way ; inasmuch as in explaining how, or in what respect
the Will is free with regard to a particular act of Volition, it is said that its
Liberty consists in a Power to determine to suspend that act, which places Lib-
erty not in that act of Volition which the inquiry is about, but altogether in another
antecedent act. Which contradicts the thing supposed in both the question and
answer. The question is, wherein consists the mind's Liberty in any particular
act of Volition ? And the answer, in pretending to show wherein lies the mind's
Liberty in that act, in effect says, it does not lie in that act, but in another, viz.,
a Volition to suspend that act And therefore the answer is both contradictory,
and altogether impertinent and beside the purpose. For it does not show
wherein the Liberty of the Will consists in the act in question j instead of that,
it supposes it does not consist in that act, but in another distinct from it, even a
Volition to suspend that act, and take time to consider it. And no account is
pretended to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein
this answer supposes the Liberty of the mind indeed consists, viz., the act of
suspension, or of determining the suspension.
On the whole, it is exceedingly manifest, that the Liberty of the mind does
not consist in Indifference, and that Indifference is not essential or necessary to
it, or belonging to it, as the Arminians suppose ; that opinion being full of
absurdity and self-contradiction.
SECTION VIII.
Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity.
It is a thing chiefly insisted on by Arminians, in this controversy, as a thing
most important and essential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the
46 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Will, are contingent events ; understanding contingence as opposite, not only to
constraint, but to all necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this
matter. And,
1. I would inquire, whether there is, or can be any such thing, as a volition
which is contingent in such a sense, as not only to come to pass without any
Necessity of constraint or coaction, but also without a Necessity of consequence,
or an infallible connection with any thing foregoing.
2. Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause of Liberty.
I. I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever does, or can come
to pass, in this manner, contingently.
And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that nothing
can ever come to pass without a cause, or reason why it exists in this manner
rather than another ; and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to
the acts of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the
acts of the Will are never contingent, or without necessity in the sense spoken
of; inasmuch as those things which have a cause, or reason of their existence,
must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following considerations.
1. For an event to have a cause and ground of its existence, and yet not to
be connected with its cause, is an inconsistence. For if the event be not con-
nected with the cause, it is not dependent on the cause ; its existence is as it
were loose from its influence, and may attend it or may not ; it being a mere
contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause, or not :
and that is the same thing as not to be dependent on it. And to say the event
is not dependent on its cause is absurd : it is the same thing as to say, it is not
its cause, nor the event the effect of it : for dependence on the influence of a
cause is the very notion of an effect. If there be no such relation between one
thing and another, consisting in the connection and dependence of one thing on
the influence of another, then it is certain there is no such relation between them
as is signified by the terms cause and effect. So far as an event is dependent on
a cause and connected with it, so much causality is there in the case, and no
more. The cause does, or brings to pass no more in any event, than it is dependent
on it. If we say the connection and dependence is not total, but partial, and
that the effect, though it has some connection and dependence, yet it is not en-
tirely dependent on it ; that is the same thing as to say, that not all that is in
the event is an effect of that cause, but that only a part of it arises from thence,
and part some other way.
2. If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their
causes, then it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without
any cause, contrary to the supposition. For if there be any event which was
not necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under such circumstances,
then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the
cause, or no ; it might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the
same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why
did it follow rather than not follow ? There is no cause or reason of this.
Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it is, viz., the fol-
lowing of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not necessarily
connected. If there be not a necessary connection of the effect on any thing
antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause,
and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every respect in the same
state of circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange
phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow,
in another, not 1 It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 47
any cause or ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence
of things, and state of the world that is absolutely without a cause ; which is
contrary to the supposition, and contrary to what has been before demonstrated.
3. To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their
existence, that yet are not necessarily connected with their cause, which is to
suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause. Thus if the effect
be not necessarily connected with the cause, with its influence and influential
circumstances ; then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible and supposable,
that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence, under the same circum-
stances, and yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any
instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not
sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have done
it. And yet, by the supposition, in another instance, the same cause, with
perfectly the same influence, and when all circumstances which have any influence,
were the same, it was followed with the effect. By which it is manifest, that
the effect in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause,
but must come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that the in-
fluence of the cause was not sufficient to produce the effect. And if it was not
sufficient to produce it, then the production of it could not be owing to that
influence, but must be owing to something else, or owing to nothing. And if
the effect be not owing to the influence of the cause, then it is not the cause,
which brings us to the contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which is the
ground and reason of the existence of a thing, and at the same time is not the
ground and reason of its existence, nor is sufficient to be so.
If the matter be not already so plain as to render any further reasoning upon
it impertinent, I would say, that that which seems to be the cause in the sup-
posed case, can be no cause ; its power and influence having, on a full trial,
proved insufficient to produce such an effect : and if it be not sufficient to produce
it, then it does not produce it. To say otherwise, is to say, there is power to do
that which there is not power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power
exerted and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the effect be
actually produced at one time ; these things all concurring, will produce the
effect at all times. And so we may turn it the other way ; that which proves
not sufficient at one time, cannot be sufficient at another, with precisely the same
influential circumstances. And therefore if the effect follows, it is not owing
to that cause ; unless the different time be a circumstance which has influence :
but that is contrary to the supposition ; for it is supposed that all circumstances
that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to suppose the
time to be the cause ; which is contrary to the supposition of the other thing's
being the cause. But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evi-
dent that it is as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to produce
the effect at one time, and not at another ; as to say, that it is sufficient to produce
the effect at a certain time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at
the same time.
On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has a necessary con-
nection with its cause, or with that which is the true ground and reason of its
existence. And therefore if there be no event without a cause, as was proved
before, then no event whatsoever is contingent in the manner, that Jlrminians
suppose the free acts of the Will to be contingent
48 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
SECTION IX.
Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.
It is manifest, that the acts of the Will are none of them contingent in such
a sense as to be without all necessity, or so as not to be necessary with a neces-
sity of consequence and Connection ; because every act of the Will is some way
connected with the Understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good is, in
the manner which has already been explained ; namely, that the soul always
wills or chooses that which, in the present view of the mind, considered in the
whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Because,
as was observed before, nothing is more evident than that, when men act volun-
tarily, and do what they please, then they do what appears most agreeable to
them j and to say otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not
choose what appears to suit them best, or what seems most pleasing to them ;
or that they do not choose what they prefer. Which brings the matter to a
contradiction.
As it is very evident in itself, that the acts of the Will have some Connec-
tion with the dictates or views of the Understanding, so this is allowed by some of
the chief of the Arminian writers ; particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel
Clark. Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy to the doctrine of necessity, allows the
same thing. In his Christian Philosophy, (p. 196,) he with much approbation
cites another philosopher, as of the same mind, in these words : " No man (says an
excellent philosopher) sets himself about any thing, but upon some view or other,
which serves him for a reason for what he does ; and whatsoever faculties he
employs, the Understanding, with such light as it has, well or ill formed, con-
stantly leads ; and by that light, true or false, all her operative powers are direct-
ed. The Will itself, how absolute and incontrollable soever it may be thought,
never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the Understanding. Temples have
their sacred images ; and we see what influence they have always had over a
great part of mankind ; but in truth, the ideas and images in men's minds are
the invisible powers that constantly govern them ; and to these they all pay
universally a ready submission."
But whether this be in a just consistence with themselves, and their own
notions of liberty, I desire may now be impartially considered.
Dr. Whitby plainly supposes, that the acts and determinations of the Will
always follow the Understanding's apprehension or view of the greatest good to
be obtained, or evil to be avoided ; or, in other words, that the determinations of
the Will constantly and infallibly follow these two things in the Understanding :
1. The degree of good to be obtained, and evil to be avoided, proposed to the
Understanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken notice of by it. 2. The
degree of the Understanding's view, notice or apprehension of that good or evil;
which is increased by attention and consideration. That this is an opinion he
is exceeding peremptory in (as he is in every opinion which he maintains in his
controversy with the Calvinists), with disdain of the contrary opinion as absurd
and self-contradictory, will appear by the following words of his, in his Discourse
on the Five Points.*
" Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the Understanding to perceive,
is evidence proposed, and apprehended, considered or adverted to : for nothing
* Second Edit. p. 211, 212, 213.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 49
^lse can be requisite to make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again,
what makes the Will choose, is something approved by the Understanding ; and
consequently appearing to the soul as good. — And whatsoever it refuseth, is
something represented by the Understanding, and so appearing to the Will, as
evil. Whence all that God requires of us is and can be only this ; to refuse the
evil, and choose the good. Wherefore, to say that evidence proposed, appre-
hended and considered, is not sufficient to make the Understanding approve ; or
that the greatest good proposed, the greatest evil threatened, when equally
believed and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good
and refuse the evil, is in effect to say, that which alone doth move the Will to
choose or to refuse, is not sufficient to engage it so to do ; which being contradictory
to itself, must of necessity be false. Be it then so, that we naturally have an
aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gospel ; that only can make us in-
disposed to attend to them, but cannot hinder our conviction, when we do
apprehend them, and attend to them. Be it, that there is also a renitency to the
good we are to choose ; that only can indispose us to believe it is, and to approve
it as our chiefest good. Be it, that we are prone to the evil that we should
decline ; that only can render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst
of evils. But yet, what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still
be chosen ; and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we do
continue under that conviction, be refused by us. It therefore can be only
requisite, in order to these ends, that the Good Spirit should so illuminate our
Understandings, that we, attending to, and considering what lies before us, should
apprehend, and be convinced of our duty ; and that the blessings of the gospel
should be so propounded to us, as that we may discern them to be our chiefest
good ; and the miseries it threaten eth, so as we may be convinced that they are
the worst of evils ; that we may choose the one, and refuse the other. "
Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is asserted, that the
greatest good proposed, and the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed
and reflected on, is sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good and refuse
the evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to choose or to refuse ; and
that it is contradictory to itself, to suppose otherwise ; and therefore must of neces-
sity be false ; and then what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will
still be chosen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we
continue under that conviction, be refused by us. — Nothing could have been said
more to the purpose, fully to signify and declare, that the determinations of the Will
must evermore follow the illumination, conviction and notice of the Understanding,
with regard to the greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree
of good and evil understood, and the degree of Understanding, notice and con-
viction of that proposed good and evil ; and that it is thus necessarily, and can
be otherwise in no instance : because it is asserted, that it implies a contradiction,
to suppose it ever to be otherwise.
I am sensible the Doctor's aim in these assertions is against the Calvinists ;
to show, in opposition to them, that there is no need of any physical operation of
the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good choice,
but that God's operation and assistance is only moral, suggesting ideas to the
Understanding ; which he supposes to be enough, if those ideas are attended to,
infallibly to obtain the end. But whatever his design was, nothing can more
directly and fully prove, that every determination of the Will, in choosing and
refusing, is necessary ; directly contrary to his own notion of the liberty of the
Will. For if the determination of the Will, evermore, in this manner, follows
the light, conviction and view of the Understanding, concerning the greatest
Vol. II. 7
50 FREEDOM OF THE WILL
good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a contra-
diction to suppose otherwise ; then it is necessarily so, the Will necessarily
follows this light or view of the Understanding, and not only in some of its acts, but
in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the Will does not determine itself
in any one of its own acts; but all its acts, every act of choice and refusal depends
on, and is necessarily connected with some antecedent cause ; which cause is not
the Will itself, nor any act of its own, nor any thing pertaining to that faculty,
but something belonging to another faculty, whose acts go before the Will, in
all its acts, and govern and determine them.
Here, if it should be replied, that although it be true, that, according to the
Doctor, the final determination of the Will always depends upon, and is infallibly
connected with the Understanding's conviction, and notice of the greatest good ;
yet the acts of the Will are not necessary ; because that conviction and notice
of the Understanding- is first dependent on a preceding act of the Will, in deter-
mining to attend to, and take notice of the evidence exhibited j by which means
the mind obtains that degree of conviction, which is sufficient and effectual to
determine the consequent and ultimate choice of the Will ; and that the Will,
with regard to that preceding act, whereby it determines whether to attend or
no, is not necessary ; and that in this, the liberty of the Will consists, that when
God holds forth sufficient objective light, the Will is at liberty whether to com-
mand the attention of the mind to it
Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such a reply as this. For
that preceding act of the Will, in determining to attend and consider, still is an
act of the Will (it is so to be sure, if the liberty of the Will consists in it, as is
supposed) ; and if it be an act of the Will, it is an act of choice or refusal. And
therefore, if what the Doctor asserts be true, it is determined by some antecedent
light in the Understanding concerning the greatest apparent good or evil. For
he asserts, it is that light which alone doth move the Will to choose or refuse.
And therefore the Will must be moved by that in choosing to attend to the
objective light afforded in order to another consequent act of choice ; so that
this act is no less necessary than the other. And if we suppose another act of
the Will, still preceding both these mentioned, to determine both, still that also
must be an act of the Will, and an act of choice ; and so must, by the same
principles, be infallibly determined by some certain degree of light in the
Understanding concerning the greatest good. And let us suppose as many acts
of the Will, one preceding another, as we please, yet they are every one of them
necessarily determined by a certain degree of light in the Understanding, con-
cerning the geatest and most eligible good in that case; and so, not one of them
free according to Dr. Whitby's notion of freedom. — And if it be said, the reason
why men do not attend to light held forth, is because of ill habits contracted by
evil acts committed before, whereby their minds are indisposed to attend to, and
consider the truth held forth to them by God, the difficulty is not at all avoided :
still the question returns, What determined the Will in those preceding evil acts ?
It must, by Dr. Whitby's principles, still be the view of the Understanding
concerning the greatest good and evil. If this view of the Understanding be
that alone which doth move the Will to choose or refuse, as the Doctor asserts,
then every act of choice or refusal, from a man's first existence, is moved and
determined by this view ; and this view of the Understanding, exciting and
governing the act, must be before the act : and therefore the Will is necessarily
determined, in every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause
beside the Will, and a cause that does not proceed from, or depend on any act
of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abolishes the Doctor's whole scheme
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 51
of liberty of Will ; and he at one stroke, has cut the sinews of all his arguments
from the goodness, righteousness, faithfulness and sincerity of God in his com-
mands, promises, threatenings, calls, invitations, expostulations ; which he makes
use of, under the heads of reprobation, election, universal redemption, sufficient
and effectual grace, and the freedom of the Will of man ; and has enervated and
made vain all those exclamations against the doctrine of the Calviniits, as
charging God with manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hypocrisy, falla-
ciousness, and cruelty ; which he has over, and over, and over again, numberless
times in his book.
Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of
God,* to evade the argument to prove the necessity of volition, from its neces-
sary Connection with the last dictate of the Understanding, supposes the latter
not to be diverse from the act of the Will itself. But if it be so, it will not alter
the case as to the evidence of the necessity of the act of the Will. If the dictate
of the Understanding be the very same with the determination of the Will or
choice, as Dr. Clark supposes, then this determination is no fruit or effect of
choice : and if so, no liberty of choice has any hand in it ; as to volition or
choice, it is necessary ; that is, choice cannot prevent it. If the last dictate of
the Understanding be the same with the determination of volition itself, then the
existence of that determination must be necessary as to volition ; inasmuch as
volition can have no opportunity to determine whether it shall exist or no, it
having existence already before volition has opportunity to determine any thing.
It is itself the very rise and existence of volition. But a thing after it exists, has
no opportunity to determine as to its own existence ; it is too late for that.
If liberty consists in that which Arminians suppose, viz., in the Will's de-
termining its own acts, having free opportunity, and being without all neces-
sity ; this is the same as to say, that liberty consists in the soul's having power
and opportunity to have what determinations of the Will it pleases or chooses.
And if the determinations of the Will, and the last dictates of the Understanding,
be the same thing, then liberty consists in the mind's having power to have what
dictates of the Understanding it pleases, having opportunity to choose its own
dictates of Understanding. But this is absurd ; for it is to make the determina-
tion of choice prior to the dictate of the Understanding, and the ground of it,
which cannot consist with the dictate of Understanding's being the determina-
tion of choice itself.
There is no way to do in this case, but only to recur to the old absurdity of
one determination before another, and the cause of it ; and another before that,
determining that ; and so on in infinitum. If the last dictate of the Under-
standing be the determination of the Will itself, and the soul be free with regard
to that dictate, in the Arminian notion of freedom ; then the soul, before that
dictate of its Understanding exists, voluntarily and according to its own choice
determines, in every case, what that dictate of the Understanding shall be ;
otherwise, that dictate, as to the Will, is necessary, and the acts determined by
it must also be necessary. So that there is a determination of the mind prior to
that dictate of the Understanding ; an act of choice going before it, choosing
and determining what that dictate of the Understanding shall be : and this pre-
ceding act of choice, being a free act of Will, must also be the same with another
last dictate of the Understanding : and if the mind also be free in that dictate
of Understanding, that must be determined still by another ; and so on for ever-
Besides, if the dictate of the Understanding, and determination of. the Will.
* Edition VI. p. 93.
52 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
be the same, this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes them the
same. Whether they be the same or no, 1 will not now dispute ; but only
would observe, that if it be so, and the Arminian notion of liberty consists in a
self-determining power in the Understanding, free of all necessity ; being
independent, undetermined by any thing prior to its own acts and determinations;
and the more the Understanding is thus independent, and sovereign over its own
determinations, the more free. By this therefore the freedom of the soul, as a
moral agent, must consist in the independence of the Understanding on any
evidence or appearance of things, or any thing whatsoever, that stands forth to
the view of the mind, prior to the Understanding's determination. And what a
sort of liberty is this ! consisting in an ability, freedom and easiness of judging,
either according to evidence, or against it ; having a sovereign command over
itself at all times, to judge, either agreeably or disagreeably to what is plainly
exhibited to its own view. Certainly it is no liberty that renders persons the
proper subjects of persuasive reasoning, arguments, expostulations, and such
like moral means and inducements. The use of which with mankind is a main
argument of the Arminians, to defend their notion of liberty without all neces-
sity. For according to this, the more free men are, the less they are under the
government of such means, less subject to the power of evidence and reason,
and more independent of their influence, in their determinations.
And whether the Understanding and Will are the same or no, as Dr. Clark
seems to suppose, yet, in order to maintain the Arminian notion of liberty without
necessity, the free Will must not be determined by the Understanding, nor neces-
sarily connected with the Understanding ; and the further from such connection,
the greater the freedom. And when the liberty is full and complete, the determina-
tions of the Will have no connection at all with the dictates of the Understand-
ing. And if so, in vain are all the applications to the Understanding, in order
to induce to any free virtuous act ; and so in vain are all instructions, counsels,
invitations, expostulations, and all arguments and persuasives whatsoever ; for
these are but applications to the Understanding, and a clear and lively exhibition
of the objects of choice to the mind's view. But if, after all, the Will must be
self-determined, and independent of the Understanding, to what purpose are
things thus represented to the Understanding, in order to determine the choice ?
SECTION X.
Volition necessarily connected with the Influence of Motives ; with particular Ob-
servations on the great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's Assertions and Reasonings,
about the Freedom of the Will.
That every act of the Will has some cause, and consequently (by what has
been already proved) has a necessary connection with its cause, and so is neces-
sary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every
act of the Will whatsoever is excited by some Motive : which is manifest,
because, if the Will or mind, in willing and choosing after the manner that it
does, is excited so to do by no motive or inducement, then it has no end which
it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it aims at nothing, and seeks
nothing. And if it seek nothing, then it does not go after any thing or exert
any inclination or preference towards any thing : which brings the matter to a
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 53
contradiction ; because for the mind to Will something, and for it to go after
something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same thing.
But if every act of the Will is excited by a Motive, then that Motive is the
cause of the act of the Will. If the acts of the Will are excited by motives,
then Motives are the causes of their being excited ; or, which is the same thing,
the cause of their being put forth into act and existence. And if so, the
existence of the acts of the Will is properly the effect of their motives. Mo-
tives do nothing as Motives or inducements, but by their influence ; and so
much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the
notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of another
thing.
And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives, then they are
necessarily connected with their Motives. — Every effect and event being, as
proved before, necessarily connected with that, which is the proper ground and
reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition is necessary, and is not
from any self-determining power in the Will : the volition, which is caused by
previous Motive and inducement, is not caused by the Will exercising a sove-
reign power over itself, to determine, cause and excite volitions in itself. This
is not consistent with the Will's acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium,
to determine itself to a preference ; for the way in which Motives operate, is
by biasing the Will, and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one
way.
Here it may be proper to observe, that Mr. Chubb, in his Collection of
Tracts on various subjects, has advanced a scheme of liberty, which is greatly
divided against itself, and thoroughly subversive of itself ; and that many ways.
1. He is abundant in asserting, that the Will, in all its acts, is influenced
by Motive and excitement ; and that this is the previous ground and reason of
all its acts, and that it is never otherwise in any instance. He says (p. 262),
" No action can take place without some motive to excite it." And in page
263, " Volition cannot take place without some previous reason or Motive to
induce it." And in page 310, "Action would not take place without some
reason or Motive to induce it ; it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty
would be exerted without some previous reason to dispose the mind to action."
So also page 257. And he speaks of these things, as what we may be ab-
solutely certain of, and which are the foundation, the only foundation we have
of a certainty of the moral perfections of God. Page 252, 253, 254, 255, 261,
262, 263, 264
And yet at the same time, by his scheme, the influence of Motives upon us
to excite to action, and to be actually a ground of volition, is consequent on the
volition or choice of the mind. For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all
free actions, before the mind is the subject of those volitions, which Motives
excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it will comply with the Motive,
which presents itself in view, or not ; and when various Motives are presented,
it chooses which it will yield to, and which it will reject. So page 256,
" Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting agreeably with, or
contrary to, any Motive that presents.". Page 257, "Every man is at liberty
to act, or refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of these
Motives considered singly, would excite him to. Man has power, and is as
much at liberty to reject the Motive that does prevail, as he has power, and is
at liberty to reject those Motives that do not." And so, page 310, 311, " In
order to constitute a moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act,
or to refrain from acting, upon such moral Motives as he pleases." And to the
54 ' FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
like purpose in many other places. — According to these things, the Will acta
first, and chooses or refuses to comply with the Motive, that is presented, before
it falls under its prevailing influence : and it is first determined by the mind's
pleasure or choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by
them.
Now, how can these things hang together ? How can the mind first act,
and by its act of volition and choice determine what Motive shall be the ground
and reason of its volition and choice ? For this supposes the choice is already
made, before the Motive has its effect ; and that the volition is already exerted
before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the ground of the volition ; and
makes the prevailing of the Motive, the consequence of the volition, which yet it
is the ground of. If the mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and
to yield to its excitement, it does not need to yield to it after this : for the thing
is effected already, that the Motive would excite to, and the Will is beforehand
with the excitement ; and the excitement comes in too late, and is needless and
in vain afterwards. If the mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which
invites to a thing, that implies, and in fact is a choosing the thing invited
to ; and the very act of choice is before the influence of the Motive which
induces, and is the ground of the choice ; the son is beforehand with the father
that begets him : the choice is supposed to be the ground of that influence of
the Motive, which very influence is supposed to be the ground of the choice. —
And so vice versa, the choice is supposed to be the consequence of the influence
of the Motive, which influence of the Motive is the consequence of that very
choice.
And besides, if the Will acts first towards the Motive before it falls under its
influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and choose,
be the fruit and consequence of its act and choice, then how is the Motive a
previous ground and reason of the act and choice, so that in the nature of the
thing, volition cannot take place without some previous reason and motive to
induce it; and that this act is consequent upon, and follows the Motive?
Which things Mr. Chubb often asserts, as of certain and undoubted truth. —
So that the very same Motive is both previous and consequent, both before and
after, both the ground and fruit of the very same thing !
II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconsistent notion of the Will's first act-
ing towards the Motive, choosing whether it will comply with it, in order to its
becoming a ground of the Will's acting, before any act of volition can take
place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and excitements to the action of the
Will the passive ground or reason of that action : which is a remarkable
phrase ; than which I presume there is none more unintelligible, and void of
distinct and consistent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas
Aquinas. When he represents the Motive to action or volition as passive, he
must mean — passive in that affair, or passive with respect to that action which
he speaks of; otherwise it is nothing to his purpose, or relating to the design
of his argument : he must mean (if that can be called a meaning), that the
Motive to volition, is first acted upon or towards by the volition, choosing to
yield to it, making it a ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence
from thence ; and so to make it a previous ground of its own excitation and
existence. Which is the same absurdity as if one should say, that the soul of
man, or any other thing, should, previous to its existence, choose what cause it
would come into existence by, and should act upon its cause, to fetch influence
from thence, to bring it into being ; and so its cause should be a passive ground
of its existence !
FREEDOM OF THE WIL^. 55
Mr. Chubb does very plainly suppose Motive or excitement to be the ground
Df the being of volition. He speaks of it as the ground or reason of the
exertion of an act of the Will, p. 391, and 392, and expressly says, that
volition cannot take place without some previous ground or Motive to induce to
it, p. 363. And he speaks of the act as from the Motive, and from the in-
fluence of the Motive, p. 352, and from the influence that the Motive has on the
man for the Production of an action, p. 3 17. Certainly there is no need of multi-
plying words about this ; it is easily judged, whether Motive can be the ground
of volition's being exerted and taking place, so that the very production of it is
from the influence of the Motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes the ground
of the volition, is passive, or acted upon by the volition. But this I will say,
that a man, who insists so much on, clearness of meaning in others, and is so
much in blaming their confusion and inconsistence, ought, if he was able, to
have explained his meaning in this phrase of passive ground of action, so as to
show it not to be confused and inconsistent.
If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb, when he speaks of Motive as a pas-
sive ground of action, does not mean passive with regard to that volition which
it is the ground of, but some other antecedent volition, (though his purpose and
argument, and whole discourse, will by no means allow of such a supposition,)
yet it would not help the matter in the least. For, (1.) If we suppose there to
be an act of volition or choice, by which the soul chooses to yield to the invita-
tion of a Motive to another volition, by which the soul chooses something else ;
both these supposed volitions are in effect the very same. A volition, or choosing
to yield to the force of a Motive inviting to choose something, comes to just the
same thing as choosing the thing, which the Motive invites to, as I observed before.
So that here can be no room to help the matter, by a distinction of two volitions.
(2.) If the Motive be passive with respect, not to the same volition that the Motive
excites to, but one truly distinct and prior ; yet, by Mr. Chubb, that prior volition
cannot take place, without a Motive or excitement, as a previous ground of its
existence. For he insists, that it is absurd to suppose any volition should take
place without some previous Motive to induce it. So that at last it comes to just
the same absurdity : for if every volition must have a previous Motive, then the
very first in the whole series must be excited by a previous Motive ; and yet the
Motive to that first volition is passive ; but cannot be passive with regard to
another antecedent volition, because by the supposition, it is the very first :
therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must be so with regard
to that very volition that it is the ground of, and that is excited by it.
III. Though Mr. Chubb asserts, as above, that every volition has some
Motive, and that in the nature of the thing, no volition can take place without
some Motive to induce it ; yet he asserts, that volition does not always follow
the strongest Motive; or, in other words, is not governed by any superior
strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond Motives to the contrary, previous
to the volition itself. His own words, p. 258, are as follow : " Though with
regard to physical causes, that which is strongest always prevails, yet it is
otherwise with regard to moral causes. Of these, sometimes the stronger,
sometimes the weaker, prevails. And the ground of this difference is evident,
namely, that what we call moral causes, strictly speaking, are no causes at all,
but barely passive reasons of, or excitements to the action, or to the refraining
from acting: which excitements we have power, or are at liberty to comply
with or reject, as I have showed above." And so throughout the paragraph,
he, m a variety of phrases, insists, that the Will is not always determined by the
strongest Motive, unless by strongest we preposterously mean actually prevail-
66 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ing in the event ; which is not in the Motive, but in the Will ; so that the Will
is not always determined by the Motive, which is strongest, by any strength
previous to the volition itself. And he elsewhere does abundantly assert, that
the Will is determined by no superior strength or advantage, that Motives have,
from any constitution or state of things, or any circumstances whatsoever, pre-
vious to the actual determination of the Will. And indeed his whole discourse
on human liberty implies it, his whole scheme is founded upon it.
But these things cannot stand together. — There is such a thing as a diversity
of strength in Motives to choice previous to the choice itself. Mr. Chubb him
self supposes, that they do previously invite, induce, excite, and dispose the mind
to action. This implies, that they have something in themselves that is inviting,
some tendency to induce and dispose to volition previous to volition itself. And
if they have in themselves this nature and tendency, doubtless they have it in
certain limited degrees, which are capable of diversity ; and some have it in
greater degrees, others in less ; and they that have most of this tendency, con-
sidered with all their nature and circumstances, previous to volition, are the
strongest Motives ; and those that have least, are the weakest Motives.
Now if volition sometimes does not follow the Motive which is strongest, or
has most previous tendency or advantage, all things considered, to induce or
excite it, but follows the weakest, or that which as it stands previously in the
mind's view, has least tendency to induce it ; herein the Will apparently acts
wholly without Motive, without any' previous reason to dispose the mind to it,
contrary to what the same author supposes. The act, wherein the Will must
proceed without a previous Motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the weakest
Motive. For how absurd is it to say, the mind sees previous reason in the
Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other ; and at the same time to suppose,
that there is nothing in the Motive, in its nature, state, or any circumstances of
it whatsoever, as it stands in the previous view of the mind, that gives it any
preference ; but on the contrary, the other Motive that stands in competition
with it, in all these respects, has most belonging to it, that is inviting and mov-
ing, and has most of a tendency to choice and preference. This is certainly as
much as to say, there is previous ground and reason in the Motive, for the act
of preference, and yet no previous reason for it. By the supposition, as to all
that is in the two rival Motives, which tends to preference, previous to the act
of preference, it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly in the other : be-
cause appearing superior strength, and all appearing preferableness is in that ;
and yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that the act of preference is from previous ground
and reason in the Motive which is preferred. But are these things consistent ?
Can there be previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet
no previous tendency in it to that event 1 If one thing follow another, without
any previous tendency to its following, then I should think it very plain, that it
follows it without any manner of previous reason, why it should follow.
Yea, in this case, Mr. Chubb supposes, that the event follows an antecedent
or a previous thing, as the ground of its existence, not only that has no tendency
to it, but a contrary tendency. The event is the preference, which the mind
gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the previous view of the
mind ; the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two rival
Motives conjunctly ; in which previous view of the mind, all the preferableness,
or previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the other side, or in the
contrary Motive ; and all the unworthiness of preference, and so previous ten-
dency to comparative neglect, rejection or undervaluing, is on that side which is
preferred and yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be the previous
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 57
ground, or reason of this act of preference, exciting it, and disposing the mind
to it. Which, I leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it
be not, then it is not absurd to say, that the previous tendency of an antecedent
to a consequent, is the ground and reason why that consequent does not follow ;
and the want of a previous tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the con-
trary, is the true ground and reason why that event does follow.
An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts
with reference to two or more things that are compared, and stand in competi-
tion in the mind's view. If the mind in this comparative act, prefers that which
appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts absolutely without
Motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man
has the offer of two sorts of food, both which he finds an appetite to, but has a
stronger appetite to one than the other ; and there be no circumstances or ex-
citements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the
other, but merely his appetite : if in the choice he makes between them, he
chooses that, which he has the least appetite to, and refuses that, to which he has
the strongest appetite, this is a choice made absolutely without previous Motive,
excitement, reason or temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all
appetite to either : because his volition in this case is a comparative act,
attending and following a comparative view of the food, which he chooses,
viewing it as related to, and compared with the other sort of food, in which view
his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous
ground and Motive. And if there be any principle in man, from whence an act
of choice may arise after this manner, from the same principle, volition may
arise wholly without Motive on either side. If the mind in its volition can go
beyond Motive then it can go without Motive: for when it is beyond the
Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and
bo without Motive. If volition goes beyond the strength and tendency of
Motive, and especially if it goes against its tendency, this demonstrates the
independence of volition or Motive. And if so, no reason can be given for
what Mr. Chubb so often asserts, even that in the nature of things volition
cannot take place without a Motive to induce it.
If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or activity of nature,
in such a manner, that when equal weights are put into the scales, its agency
could enable it to cause that scale to descend, wjiich has the least weight, and
so to raise the greater weight ; this would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of
the balance does not depend on weights in the scales, at least as much as if the
balance should move itself, when there is no weight in either scale. And the
activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the greater
weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is no
weight at all.
Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Will cannot stir at all without some Motive ;
and also supposes, that if there be a Motive to one thing, and none to the con-
trary, volition will infallibly follow that Motive. — This is virtually to suppose
an entire dependence of the Will on Motives : if it were not wholly dependent
on them, it could surely help itself a little without them, or help itself a little
against a Motive, without help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive.
And yet his supposing that the Will, when it has before it various opposite
Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its own influence from them, and
neglect the strongest, and follow the weakest, supposes it to be wholly indepen-
dent on Motives.
It further appears, on Mr. Chubb's supposition, that volition must be withoi*
Vol. II. 8
58 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
any previous ground in any Motive, thus : if it be, as he supposes, that the Will
is not determined by any previous superior strength of the Motive, but determines
and chooses its own Motive, then when the rival Motives are exactly equal in
strength and tendency to induce, in all respects, it may follow either ; and may
in such a case, sometimes follow one, and sometimes the other. — And if so, this
diversity which appears between the acts of the Will, is plainly without previous
ground in either of the Motives ; for all that is previously in the Motives, is
supposed precisely and perfectly the same, without any diversity whatsoever.
Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent, cannot be the
ground and reason of diversity in the consequent. Perfect identity in the ground
cannot be the reason why it is not followed with the same consequence. Ano
therefore the source of this diversity of consequence must be sought for else-
where.
And lastly, it may be observed, that however Mr. Chubb does much insist
that no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it, which pre-
viously disposes the mind to it ; yet, as he also insists that the mind, without
reference to any previous superior strength of Motives, picks and chooses for its
Motive to follow ; he himself herein plainly supposes, that with regard to the
mind's preference of one Motive before another it is not the Motive that disposes
the Will, but the Will disposes itself to follow the Motive.
IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly inconsistent with agency ;
and that to suppose a being to be an agent in that which is necessary, is a plain
contradiction. P. 311, and throughout his discourses on the subject of liberty,
he supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency or freedom ; and that to
suppose otherwise, is to make liberty and necessity, action and passion, the same
thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no action, strictly speaking,
but volition ; and that as to the effects of volition in body or mind, in themselves
considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the effects
of an act that is not necessary.
And yet, according to him, volition itself is the effect of volition ; yea, every
act of free volition : and therefore every act of free volition must, by what has
now been observed from him, be necessary. — That every act of free volition is itself
the effect of volition, is abundantly supposed by him. In p. 341, he says, " If a
man is such a creature as I have proved him to be, that is, if he has in him a power
or liberty of doing either good or evil, and either of these is the subject of his own
free choice, so that he might, if he had pleased, have chosen and done the con-
trary." Here he supposes, all that is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice ;
and so that his good or evil choice itself, is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in
these words, he might, if he had pleased, have chosen the contrary. So in p. 356,
" Though it be highly reasonable, that a man should always choose the greater
good — yet he may if he please, choose otherwise." Which is the same thing as if
he had said, he may, if he chooses, choose otherwise." And then he goes on —
" that is, he may, if he pleases, choose what is good for himself," &c. And again
in the same page, " The Will is not confined by the understanding, to any par-
ticular sort of good, whether greater or less ; but is at liberty to choose what kind
of good it pleases" — If there be any meaning in the last words, the meaning
must be this, that the Will is at liberty to choose what kind of good it chooses to
choose ; supposing the act of choice itself determined by an antecedent choice.
The liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a man's having power to move his
body agreeably to an antecedent act of choice, but to use or exert the faculties
of his soul. Thus, in p. 379, speaking of the faculties of his mind, he says,
" Man has power, and is at liberty to neglect these faculties, to use them aright,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 59
or to abuse them, as he pleases." And that he supposes an act of choice, or
exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to those acts thus
chosen, directing, commanding and producing the chosen acts, and even the acts
of choice themselves, is very plain in p. 283, " He can command his actions ;
and herein consists his liberty ; he can give or deny himself that pleasure as he
pleases." And p. 377, " If the actions of men are not the produce of a free
choice, or election, but spring from a necessity of nature, he cannot in reason be
the object of reward or punishment on their account. Whereas, if action in man,
whether good or evil, is the produce of Will or free choice ; so that a man in
either case, had it in his power, and was at liberty to have chosen the contrary,
he is the proper object of reward or punishment, according as he chooses to be-
have himself." Here, in these last words, he speaks of liberty of choosing,
according as he chooses. So that the behavior which he speaks of as subject
to his choice, is his choosing itself, as well as his external conduct consequent
upon it. And therefore it is evident, he means not only external actions, but the
acts of choice themselves, when he speaks of all free actions, as the produce of
free choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he says in p. 372, 373.
Now these things imply a twofold great absurdity and inconsistence.
1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free act of choice is
commanded by, and is the produce of free choice, is to suppose the first free act of
choice belonging to the case, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man ex-
erted, to be the produce of an antecedent act of choice. But I hope I need not
labor at all to convince my readers, that it is an absurdity to say, the very first
act is the produce of another act that went before it.
2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. Chubb insists, that every free act
of choice were the produce or the effect of a free act of choice ; yet even then,
according to his principles, no one act of choice would be free, but every one
necessary ; because, every act of choice being the effect of a foregoing act, every
act would be necessarily connected with that foregoing cause. For Mr. Chubb
himself says, p. 389, " When the self-moving power is exerted, it becomes the
necessary cause of its effects." So that his notion of a free act, that is rewardable
or punishable, is a heap of contradictions. It is a free act, and yet, by his own
notion of freedom, is necessary ; and therefore by him it is a contradiction to
suppose it to be free. According to him, every free act is the produce of a free
act ; so that there must be an infinite number of free acts in succession, without
any beginning, in an agent that has a beginning. And therefore here is an infi-
nite number of free acts, every one of them free ; and yet not one of them free,
but every act in the whole infinite chain a necessary effect. All the acts are
rewardable or punishable, and yet the agent cannot, in reason, be the object of
reward or punishment, on account of any one of these actions. He is active in
them all, and passive in none ; yet active in none, but passive in all, &c.
V. Mr. Chubb does most strenuously deny, that Motives are causes of the
acts of the Will ; or that the moving principle in man is moved, or caused to be
exerted by Motives. — His words, pages 388 and 389, are, " If the moving prin-
ciple in man is moved, or caused to be exerted, by something external to man,
which all Motives are, then it would not be a self-moving principle, seeing it
would be moved by a principle external to itself. And to say, that a self-moving
principle is moved, or caused to be exerted, by a cause external to itself, is ab-
surd and a contradiction," &c. And in the next page, it is particularly and
largely insisted, that motives are causes in no case, that they are merely passive
in the production vf action, and have no causality in the production of it ; no
causality, to be the cause of the exertion of the Will.
60 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Now I desire it may be considered, how this can possibly consist with what
he sa\s in other places. Let it be noted here,
1. Mr. Chubb abundantly speaks of Motives as excitements of the acts of
the Will ; and says, that Motives do excite volition, and induce it, and that they
are necessary to this end ; that in the reason and nature of things, volition can-
not take place without Motives to excite it. But now, if Motives excite the Will,
they move it ; and yet he says, it is absurd to say, the Will is moved by Motives
And again (if language is of any significancy at all), if Motives excite volition,
then they are the cause of its being excited ; and to cause volition to be excited,
is to cause it to be put forth or exerted. Yea, Mr. Chubb says himself, p. 317
Motive is necessary to the exertion of the active faculty. To excite, is positively
to do something ; and certainly that which does something, is the cause of the
thing done by it. To create, is to cause to be created ; to make, is to cause to
be made ; to kill, is to cause to be killed ; to quicken, is to cause to be quicken-
ed ; and to excite, is to cause to be excited. To excite, is to be a cause, in the most
proper sense, not merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence by positive
influence. The notion of exciting, is exerting influence to cause the effect to
arise or come forth into existence.
\ 2. Mr. Chubb himself, page 317, speaks of Motives as the ground and
reason of action by influence, and by prevailing influence. Now, what can
be meant by a cause, but something that is the ground and reason of a thing by
its influence, an influence that is prevalent and so effectual ?
3. This author not only speaks of Motives as the ground and reason of action,
by prevailing influence ; but expressly of their influence as prevailing for the
production of an action, in the same page 317 : which makes the inconsistency
still more palpable and notorious. The production of an effect is certainly the
causing of an effect ; and productive influence is causal influence, if any thing is ;
and that which has this influence prevalently, so as thereby to become the ground
of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause.
This influence, Mr. Chubb says, Motives have to produce an action ; and yet,
he says, it is absurd and a contradiction, to say they are causes.
4. In the same page, he once and again speaks of Motives as disposing the
agent to action, by their influence. His words are these : " As Motive, which
takes place in the understanding, and is the product of intelligence, is necessary
to action, that is, to the exertion of the active faculty, because that faculty
would not be exerted without some previous reason to dispose the mind to
action ; so from hence it plainly appears, that when a man is said to be disposed
to one action rather than another, this properly signifies the prevailing influ-
ence that one Motive has upon a man for the production of an action, or for
the being at rest, before all other Motives, for the production of the contrary. —
For as Motive is the ground and reason of any action, so the Motive that prevails,
disposes the agent to the performance of that action."
Now, if Motives dispose the mind to action, then they cause the mind to be
disposed ; and to cause the mind to be disposed is to cause it to be willing ; and
to cause it to be willing is to cause it to Will ; and that is the same thing as to be
the cause of an act of the Will. And yet this same Mr. Chubb holds it to be
absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause of the act of the Will.
And if we compare these things together, we have here again a whole heap of
inconsistencies. Motives are the previous ground and reason of the acts of the
Will ; yea, the necessary ground and reason of their exertion, without which
they will not be exerted, and cannot, in the nature of things, take place ; and they
do excite these acts of the Will, and do this by aprevailing influence ; yea, an influ-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 61
ence which prevails for the production of the act of the Will, and for the disposing
of the mind to it ; and yet it is absurd to suppose Motive to be a cause of an act of the
Will, or that a principle of Will is moved or caused to be exerted by it, or that it
has any causality in the production of it, or any causality to be the cause of the
exertion of the Will.
A due consideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the
strange inconsistencies which the notion of liberty, consisting in the Will's power
of self-determination void of all necessity, united with that dictate of common
sense, that there can be no volition without a Motive, drove him into, may be
sufficient to convince us, that it is utterly impossible ever to make that notion of
liberty consistent with the influence of Motives in volition. And as it is in a
manner self-evident, that there can be no act of Will, choice, or preference of
the mind, without some Motive or inducement, something in the mind's view,
which it aims at, seeks, inclines to, and goes after ; so it is most manifest, there
is no such liberty in the universe as Arminians insist on ; nor any such thing pos-
sible, or conceivable.
SECTION XI
The Evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.
That the acts of the Wills of moral agents are not contingent events, in that
sense, as to be without all necessity, appears by God's certain foreknowledge of
such events.
In handling this argument, I would in the first place prove, that God has a
certain foreknowledge of the voluntary acts of moral agents ; and secondly,
show the consequence, or how it follows from hence, that the volitions of moral
agents are not contingent, so as to be without necessity of connection and con-
sequence.
First, I am to prove, that God has an absolute and certain foreknowledge
of the free actions of moral agents.
One would think, it should be wholly needless to enter on such an argument
with any that profess themselves Christians : but so it is ; God's certain fore-
knowledge of the free acts of moral agents, is denied by some that pretend to
believe the Scriptures to be the word of God ; and especially of late. I therefore
shall consider the evidence of such a prescience in the Most High, as fully as the
designed limits of this essay will admit of ; supposing myself herein to have to
do with such as own the truth of the Bible.
Arg. I. My first argument shall be taken from God's prediction of such events.
Here I would, in the first place, lay down these two things as axioms.
( 1.) If God does not foreknow, he cannot foretell such events ; that is, he
cannot peremptorily and certainly foretell them. If God has no more than an
uncertain guess concerning events of this kind, then he can declare no more than
an uncertain guess. Positively to foretell, is to profess to foreknow, or to declare
positive foreknowledge.
(2.) If God does not certainly foreknow the future volitions of moral agents,
then neither can he certainly foreknow those events which are consequent and
dependent on these volitions. The existence of the one depending on the exist-
ence of the other ; the knowledge of the existence of the one depends on the
52 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
knowledge of the existence of the other ; and the one cannot be more certain
than the other.
Therefore, how many, how great and how extensive soever the consequences
of the volitions of moral agents may be ; though they should extend to an
alteration of the state of things through the universe, and should be continued
in a series of successive events to all eternity, and should in the progress of things
branch forth into an infinite number of series, each of them going on in an endless
line or chain of events ; God must be as ignorant of all these consequences, as
he is of the volitions whence they take their rise : all these events, and the whole
state of things depending on them, how important, extensive and vast soever,
must be hid from him.
These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny, I now proceed to
observe the following things.
1. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and vices, their wicked-
ness and good practice, things rewardable and punishable, have often been foretold
by God. Pharaoh's moral conduct, in refusing to obey God's command, in letting
his people go, was foretold. God says to Moses, Exod. iii. 19, " I am sure,
that the king of Egypt will not let you go." Here God professes not only to
guess at, but to know Pharaoh's future disobedience. In chap. vii. 4, God says,
but Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt,
&c. And chap. ix. 30, Moses says to Pharaoh, as for thee, and thy servantst 1
know that ye mill not fear the Lord. See also chap. xi. 9 The moral conduct
of Josiah, by name, in his zealously exerting himself in opposition to idolatry,
in particular acts of his, was foretold above three hundred years before he was
born and the prophecy sealed by a miracle, and renewed and confirmed by the
words of a second prophet, as what surely would not fail, 1 Kings xiii. 1 — 6, 32.
This prophecy was also in effect a prediction of the moral conduct of the people,
in upholding their schismatical and idolatrous worship until that time, and the
idolatry of those priests of the high places, which it is foretold Josiah should offer
upon that altar of Bethel. — Micaiah foretold the foolish and sinful conduct of
Ahab, in refusing to hearken to the word of the Lord by him, and choosing rather
to hearken to the false prophets, in going to Ramoth Gilead to his ruin, 1 Kings
xxi. 20 — 22. The moral conduct of Hazael was foretold, in that cruelty he
should be guilty of ; on which Hazael says, What, is thy servant a dog, that he
should do this thing ! The prophet speaks of the event as what he knew, and
not what he conjectured, 2 Kings viii. 12. / know the evil that thou wilt do
unto the children of Israel : Thou wilt dash their children, and rip up their wo-
men with child. The moral conduct of Cyrus is foretold, long before he had a
being, in his mercy to God's people, and regard to the true God, in turning the
captivity of the Jews, and promoting the building of the Temple, Isaiah xliv. 28,
xlv. 13. Compare 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22, 23, and Ezra i. 1 — 4. How many in-
stances of the moral conduct of the Kings of the North and South, particular
instances of the wicked behavior of the Kings of Syria and Egypt, are foretold
in the xith chapter of Daniel ? Their corruption, violence, robbery, treachery
and lies. And particularly, how much is foretold of the horrid wickedness of
Antiochus Epiphanes, called there a vile person, instead of Epiphanes, or illus-
trious. In that chapter, and also in chap. viii. verses 9, 14, 23, to the end, are
foretold his flattery, deceit and lies, his having his heart set to do mischief, and
set against the holy covenant, his destroying and treading under foot the holy
people, in a marvellous manner, his having indignation against the holy covenant,
setting his heart against it, and conspiring against it, his polluting the sanctua-
ry of strength, treading it underfoot, taking away the daily sacrifice, and placing
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 63
the abomination that maketh desolate ; his great pride, magnifying himself
against God, and uttering marvellous blasphemies against him, until God in
indignation should destroy him. Withal, the moral conduct of the Jews, on
occasion of his persecution, is predicted. It is foretold, that he shoidd corrupt
many by flatteries, chap. xi. 32 — 34. But that others should behave with a glo-
rious constancy and fortitude in opposition to him, ver. 32. And that some good
men should fall and repent, ver. 35. Christ foretold Peter's sin, in denying his
Lord, with its circumstances, in a peremptory manner. And so that great sin
of Judas, in betraying his master, and its dreadful and eternal punishment in hell,
was foretold in the like positive manner, Matth. xxvi. 21 — 25, and parallel places
in the other Evangelists.
2. Many events have been foretold by God, which were consequent and
dependent on the moral conduct of particular persons, and were accomplished,
either by their virtuous or vicious actions. — Thus, the children of Israel's going
down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham, Gen. xv., which was
brought about by the wickedness of Joseph's brethren in selling him, and the
wickedness of Joseph's mistress, and his own signal virtue in resisting her temp-
tation. The accomplishment of the thing prefigured in Joseph's dream, depended
on the same moral conduct. Jotham's parable and prophecy, Judges ix. 15 — 20,
was accomplished by the wicked conduct of Abimelech, and the men of Shechem.
The prophecies against the house of Eli, 1 Sam. chap. ii. and iii., were accom-
plished by the wickedness of Doeg the Edomite, in accusing the priests ; and
the great impiety, and extreme cruelty of Saul in destroying the priests at Nob,
1 Sam. xxii. Nathan's prophecy against David, 2 Sam. xii. 11, 12, was fulfilled
by the horrible wickedness of Absalom, in rebelling against his father, seeking
his life and lying with his concubines in the sight of the sun. The prophecy
against Solomon, 1 Kings xi. 11 — 13, was fulfilled by Jeroboam's rebellion and
usurpation, which are spoken of as his wickedness, 2 Chron. xiii. 5, 6, compare
verse 18. The prophecy against Jeroboam's family, 1 Kings xiv., was fulfilled
by the conspiracy, treason, and cruel murders of Baasha, 1 Kings xv. 27, &c.
The predictions of the prophet Jehu against the house of Baasha, 1 Kings xvi.
at the beginning, were fulfilled by the treason and parricide of Zimri, 1 Kings
xvi. 9, 13, 20.
3. How often has God foretold the future moral conduct of nations and peo-
ple, of numbers, bodies, and successions of men ; with God's judicial proceedings,
and many other events consequent and dependent on their virtues and vices ;
which could not be foreknown, if the volitions of men, wherein they acted as
moral agents, had not been foreseen ? The future cruelty of the Egyptians in
oppressing Israel, and God's judging and punishing them for it, was foretold long
before it came to pass, Gen. xv. 13, 14. The continuance of the iniquity of the
Amorites, and the increase of it until it should be full, and they ripe for destruc-
tion, was foretold above four hundred years beforehand, Gen. xv. 16, Acts vii.
6, 7. The prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem, and the land of Judah,
were absolute, 2 Kings xx. 17 — 19, chap. xxii. 15 to the end. It was foretold
in Hezekiah's time, and was abundantly insisted on in the book of the prophet
Isaiah, who wrote nothing after Hezekiah's days. It was foretold in Josiah's
time, in the beginning of a great reformation, 2 Kings xxii. And it is manifest
by innumerable things in the predictions of the prophets, relating to this event,
its time, its circumstances, its continuance and end ; the return from the captivity,
the restoration of the temple, city and land, and many circumstances and conse-
quences of that ; I say, these show plainly, that the prophecies of this great
event were absolute. And yet this event was connected with, and dependent on
64 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
two things in men's moral conduct : First, the injurious rapine and violence of
the king of Babylon and his people, as the efficient cause ; which God often
speaks of as what he highly resented, and would severely punish ; and 2dly,
the final obstinacy of the Jews. That great event is often spoken of as suspend-
ed on this, Jer. iv. 1, and v. 1, vii. 1 — 7, xi. 1 — 6, xvii. 24 to the end, xxv. 1 — 7,
xxvi. 1 — 8, 13, and xxxviii. 17, 18. Therefore this destruction and captivity
could not be foreknown, unless such a moral conduct of the Chaldeans and
Jews had been foreknown. And then it was foretold, that the people should
be finally obstinate, to the destruction and utter desolation of the city and land,
Isa. vi. 9—11, Jer. i. 18, 19, vii. 27—29, Ezek. iii. 7, and xxiv. 13, 14.
The final obstinacy of those Jews who were left in the land of Israel, in their
idolatry and rejection of the true God was foretold, by God, and the prediction
confirmed with an oath, Jer. xliv. 26, 27. And God tells the people, Isa. xlviii.
3, 4 — 8, that he had predicted those things which should be consequent on their
treachery and obstinacy, because he knew they would be obstinate, and that he
had declared these things beforehand for their conviction of his being the only true
God, &c.
The destruction of Babylon, with many of the circumstances of it, was fore-
told, as the judgment of God for the exceeding pride and haughtiness of the
heads of that monarchy, Nebuchadnezzar and his successors, and their wickedly
destroying other nations, and particularly for their exalting themselves against
the true God and his people, before any of these monarchs had a being ; Isa.
chap. xiii. xiv. xlvii, compare Hab. ii. 5 to the end, and Jer. chap. i. and li.
That Babylon's destruction was to be a recompense, according to the works of
their ovm hands, appears by Jer. xxv. 14. The immorality which the people
of Babylon, and particularly her princes and great men, were guilty of, that very
night that the city was destroyed, their revelling and drunkenness at Belshaz-
zar's idolatrous feasts, was foretold, Jer. li. 39, 57.
The return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity is often very particularly
foretold with many circumstances, and the promises of it are very peremptory,
Jer. xxxi. 35—40, and xxxii. 6 — 15, 41—44, and xxxiii. 24 — 26. And the
very time of their return was prefixed, Jer. xxv. 11 — 12, and xxix. 10 — 11,
2 Chron. xxxvi. 21, Ezek. iv. 6, and Dan. ix. 2. And yet the prophecies represent
their return as consequent on their repentance. And their repentance itself is
very expressly and particularly foretold, Jer. xxix. 12, 13, 14, xxxi. 8, 9, 18 —
31, 1. 4, 5, Ezek. vi. 8, 9, 10, vii. 16, xiv. 22, 23, and xx. 43, 44.
It was foretold under the Old Testament, that the Messiah should suffer
greatly through the malice and cruelty of men ; as is largely and fully set forth,
Psal. xxii., applied to Christ in the New Testament, Matth. xxvii. 35, 43, Luke
xxiii. 34, John xix. 24, Heb. ii. 12. And likewise in Psal. lxix., which, it is
also evident by the New Testament, is spoken of Christ ; John ii. 17, xv. 25,
&c. and Rom. xv. 3, Matth. xxvii. 34, 48, Mark xv. 23, John xix. 29.
The same thing is also foretold, Isa. liii. and 1. 6, and Mic. v. 1. This cruelty
of men was their sin, and what they acted as moral agents. It was foretold,
that there should be an union of Heathen and Jewish rulers against Christ, Psal
ii. 1, 2, compared with Acts iv. 25 — 28. It was foretold, that the Jews should
generally reject and despise the Messiah, Isa. xlix. 5, 6, 7, and liii. 1—3, Psal.
xxii. 6, 7, and lxix. 4, 8, 19, 20. And it was foretold, that the body of that
nation should be rejected in the Messiah's days, from being God's people, for
their obstinacy in sin; Isa. xlix. 4 — 7, and viii. 14, 15, 16, compared with
Rom. ix. 33, and Isa. lxv. at the beginning, compared with Rom. x. 20, 21.
It was foretold, that Christ should be rejected by the chief priests and rulers
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 65
among the Jews, Psal. cxviii. 22, compared with Matth. xxi. 42, Acts iv. 11,
1 Pet. ii. 4, 7.
Christ himself foretold his being delivered into the hands of the elders, chief
priests and scribes, and his being cruelly treated by them, and condemned to
death ; and that he, by them, should be delivered to the Gentiles ; and that
he should be mocked and scourged and crucified, (Matth. xvi. 21, andxx. 17 —
19, Luke ix. 22, John viii. 28,) and that the people should be concerned in,
and consenting to his death, (Luke xx. 13 — 18,) especially the inhabitants of
Jerusalem, Luke xiii. 33 — 35. He foretold, that the disciples should all be
offended because of him that night that he was betrayed, and should forsake
huu, Matth. xxvi. 31, John xvi. 32. He foretold, that he should be rejected
of that generation, even the body of the people, and that they should continue
obstinate, to their ruin, Matth. xii. 45, xxi. 33 — 42, and xxii. 1 — 7, Luke
xiv. 16, 21, 24, xvii. 25, xix. 14, 27, 41—44, xx. 13—18.
As it was foretold in both Old Testament and New, that the Jews should
reject the Messiah, so it was foretold that the Gentiles should receive Him, and
so be admitted to the privileges of God's people ; in places too many to be now
particularly mentioned. It was foretold in the Old Testament, that the Jews
should envy the Gentiles on this account, Deut. xxxii. 21, compared with
Rom. x. 19. Christ himself often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the
true religion, and become his followers and people, Matth. viii. 10, 1 1, 12,
xxi. 41 — 43, and xxii. 8 — 10, Luke xiii 28, xiv. 16 — 24, and xx. 16, John
x. 16. He also foretold the Jews' envy of the Gentiles on this occasion, Matth.
xx. 12 — 16, Luke xv. 26 to the end. He foretold, that they should continue
in this opposition and envy, and should manifest it in cruel persecutions of his
followers, to their utter destruction, Matth. xxi. 33 — 42, xxii. 6, and xxiii. 34
— 39, Luke xi. 49 — 51. The Jews' obstinacy is also foretold, Acts xxii. 18.
Christ often foretold the great persecutions his followers should meet with, both
from Jews and Gentiles ; Matth. x. 16—18, 21, 22, 34—36, and xxiv. 9,
Mark xiii. 9, Luke x. 3, xii. 11, 49—53, and xxi. 12, 16, 17, John xv. 18
— 21, and xvi. 1 — 4. He foretold the martyrdom of particular persons, Matth.
xx. 23. John xiii. 36, and xxi. 18, 19, 22. He foretold the great success ol
the Gospel in the city of Samaria, as near approaching ; which afterwards was
fulfilled by the preaching of Philip, John iv. 35 — 38. He foretold the rising
of many deceivers after his departure, Matth. xxiv. 4, 5, 11, and the apostasy
of many of his professed followers, Matth. xxiv. 10 — 12.
The persecutions, which the Apostle Paul was to meet with in the world,
were foretold, Acts ix. 16, xx. 23, and xxi. 11. The apostle says to the
Christian Ephesians, Acts xx. 29, 30, / know that after my departure shall
grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock ; also of your own
selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after
them. The apostle says, He knew this ; but he did not know it, if God did not
know the future actions of moral agents.
4. Unless God foreknows the future actions of moral agents, all the prophe-
cies we have in Scripture concerning the great Antichristian apostasy ; the rise,
reign, wicked qualities, and deeds of the man of sin, and his instruments and
adherents ; the extent and long continuance of his dominion, his influence on the
minds of princes and others, to corrupt them, and draw them away to idolatry,
and other foul vices ; his great and cruel persecutions ; the behavior of the saints
under these great temptations, &c. &c. I say, unless the volitions of moral agents
are foreseen, all these prophecies are uttered without knowing the things foretold.
The predictions relating to this great apostasy are all of a moral nature, relat-
Vol. II. 9
66 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ing to men's virtues and vices, and their exercises, fruits and consequences, and
events depending on them ; and are very particular ; and most of them often
repeated, with many precise characteristics, descriptions, and limitations of qual-
ities, conduct, influence, effects, extent, duration, periodsv circumstances, final
issue, &c, which it would be tedious to mention particularly. And to suppose,
that all these are predicted by God, without any certain knowledge of the future
moral behavior of free Agents, would be to the utmost degree absurd.
5. Unless God foreknows the future acts of men's wills, and their behavior as
moral Agents, all those great things which are foretold both in the Old Testa-
ment and the New, concerning the erection, establishment and universal extent
of the kingdom of the Messiah, were predicted and promised while God was in
ignorance whether any of these things would come to pass or no, and did but
guess at them. For that kingdom is not of this world, it does not consist in things
external, but is within men, and consists in the dominion of virtue in their hearts,
in righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost ; and in these things
made manifest in practice, to the praise and glory of God. The Messiah came
to save men from their sins, and deliver them from their spiritual enemies ; " that
they might serve him in righteousness and holiness before him : He gave himself
for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a pecu-
liar people, zealous of good works." And therefore his success consists in
gaining men's hearts to virtue, in their being made God's willing people in the
day of his power. His conquest of his enemies consists in his victory over men's
corruptions and vices. And such a victory, and such a dominion is often ex-
pressly foretold : that his kingdom should fill the earth ; that all people, na':ons
and languages should serve and obey him ; and so that all nations should go up
to the mountain of the house of the Lord, that he might teach them his ways,
and that they might walk in his paths ; and that all men should be drawn to
Christ, and the earth be full of the knowledge of the Lord (by which, in. the style
of Scripture, is meant true virtue and religion) as the waters cover the seas; that
God's law should be put into men's inward parts, and written in their hearts ;
and that God's people should be all righteous, &c. &c.
A very great part of the prophecies of the Old Testament is taken up in such
predictions as these. And here I would observe, that the prophecies of the uni-
versal prevalence of the kingdom of the Messiah, and true religion of Jesus
Christ, are delivered in the most peremptory manner, and confirmed by the oath
of God, Isa. xlv. 22 to the end, "Look to me and be ye saved, all the ends of
the earth ; for I am God, and there is none else* I have sworn by myself, the
word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return, that unto
Me every knee shall bow ; and every tongue shall swear. Surely, shall one
say, in the Lord have I righteousness and strength ; even to Him shall men come,"
&c. But here this peremptory declaration, and great oath of the Most High, are
delivered with such mighty solemnity, to things which God did not know, if he
did not certainly foresee the volitions of moral agents.
And all the predictions of Christ and his apostles, to the like purpose, must
be without knowledge ; as those of our Saviour comparing the kingdom of God
to a grain of mustard seed, growing exceeding great, from a small beginning ;
and to leaven, hid in three measures of meal, until the whole was leavened, &c.
And the prophecies in the epistles concerning the restoration of the nation of the
Jews to the true church of God, and the bringing in the fulness of the Gentiles;
and the prophecies in all the Revelation concerning the glorious change in the
moral state of the world of mankind, attending the destruction of Antichrist, the
kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ ;
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 67
and its being granted to the church to be arrayed in that fine linen, white and
clean, which is the righteousness of saints, &c.
Corol. 1. Hence that great promise and oath of God to Abraham, Isaac and
Jacob, so much celebrated in Scripture, both in the Old Testament and New,
namely, That in their seed all the nations and families of the earth should be
blessed, must have been made on uncertainties, if God does not certainly foreknow
the volitions of moral agents. For the fulfilment of this promise consists in that
success of Christ in the work of redemption, and that setting up of his spiritual
kingdom over the nations of the world, which has been spoken of. Men are
blessed in Christ no otherwise than as they are brought to acknowledge Him,
trust in him, love and serve Him, as is represented and predicted in Psal. lxxii. 1 1,
" All kings shall fall down before Him ; all nations shall serve Him."" With
verse 17, " Men shall be blessed in Him ; all nations shall call Him blessed."
This oath to Jacob and Abraham is fulfilled in subduing men's iniquities; as is im-
plied in that of the prophet Micah, chap. vii. 19, 20.
Corol. 2. Hence also it appears, that the first gospel promise that ever was
made to mankind, that great prediction of the salvation of the Messiah, and His
victory over Satan, made to our first parents, Gen. iii. 15, if there be no certain
prescience of the volitions of moral agents, must have had no better foundation
than conjecture. For Christ's victory over Satan consists in men's being saved
from sin, and in the victory of virtue and holiness, over that vice and wicked-
ness, which Satan, by his temptation has introduced, and wherein his kingdom
consists.
6. If it be so, that God has not a prescience of the future actions of moral
agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of Scripture in general are without
foreknowledge. For Scripture prophecies, almost all of them, if not universally
without any exception, are either predictions of the actings and behavior of moral
agents, or of events depending on them, or some way connected with them ;
judicial dispensations, judgments on men for their wickedness, or rewards of vir-
tue and righteousness, remarkable manifestations of favor to the righteous or
manifestations of sovereign mercy to sinners, forgiving their iniquities, and mag-
nifying the riches of divine Grace ; or dispensations of Providence, in some
respect or other, relating to the conduct of the subjects of God's moral government,
wisely adapted thereto ; either providing for what should be in a future state of
things, through the volitions and voluntary actions of moral agents, or consequent
upon them, and regulated and ordered according to them. So that all events
that are foretold, are either moral events, or other events which are connected
with, and accommodated to moral events.
That the predictions of Scripture in general must be without knowledge, if
God does not foresee the volitions of men, will further appi if it be considered,
that almost all events belonging to the future state of the w 'of kind, the
changes and revolutions which come to pass in empires, kin0 .oms and nations,
and all societies, depend innumerable ways on the acts of men's Wills: yea, on
an innumerable multitude of millions of millions of volitions of mankind. Such
is the state and course of things in the world of mankind, that one single event,
which appears in itself exceeding inconsiderable, may, in the progress and series
of things, occasion a succession of the greatest and most important and extensive
events; causing the state of mankind to be vastly different from what it would
otherwise have been, for all succeeding generations.
For instance, the coming into existence of those particular men, who have
been the great conquerors of the world, which, under God, have had the main
hand in all the consequent state of the world, in all after ages ; such as Nebu-
68 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
chadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Caesar, &c, undoubtedly depended
on many millions of acts of the Will, which followed, and were occasioned one
by another, in their parents. And perhaps most of these volitions depended on
millions of volitions of hundreds and thousands of others, their contemporaries ol
the same generation ; and most of these on millions of millions of volitions of
others in preceding generations. As we go back, still the number of volitions,
which were some way the occasion of the event, multiply as the branches of a
river, until they come at last, as it were, to an infinite number. This will not
seem strange to any one who well considers the matter ; if we recollect what
philosophers tell us of the innumerable multitudes of those things which are, as
it were, the principia, or stamina vitce, concerned in generation ; the animalcula
in semine masculo, and the ova in the womb of the female ; the impregnation,
or animating of one of these in distinction from all the rest, must depend on things
infinitely minute, relating to the time and circumstances of the act of the parents,
the state of their bodies, &c, which must depend on innumerable foregoing cir-
cumstances and occurrences ; which must depend, infinite ways, on foregoing
acts of their Wills ; which are occasioned by innumerable things that happen in
the course of their lives, in which their own, and their neighbor's behavior, must
have a hand, an infinite number of ways. And as the volitions of others must
be so many ways concerned in the conception and birth of such men ; so, no
less, in their preservation, and circumstances of life, their particular determinations
and actions, on which the great revolutions they were the occasions of, depended.
As, for instance, when the conspirators in Persia, against the Magi, were consult-
ing about a succession to the empire, it came into the mind of one of them, to
propose, that he whose horse neighed first, when they came together the next
morning, should be king. Now such a thing's coming into his mind, might de-
pend on innumerable incidents, wherein the volitions of mankind had been con-
cerned. But, in consequence of this accident, Darius, the son of Histaspes, was
king. And if this had not been, probably his successor would not have been
the same, and all the circumstances of the Persian empire might have been far
otherwise. And then perhaps Alexander might never have conquered that em-
pire. And then probably the circumstances of the world, in all succeeding ages,
might have been vastly otherwise. I might further instance in many other
occurrences ; such as those on which depended Alexander's preservation, in the
many critical junctures of his life, wherein a small trifle would have turned the
scale against him ; and the preservation and success of the Roman people, in the
infancy of their kingdom and commonwealth, and afterwards ; which all the
succeeding changes in their state, and the mighty revolutions that afterwards
came to pass in the habitable world, depended upon. But these hints may be
sufficient for every discerning considerate person, to convince him, that the whole
state of the world of mankind, in all ages, and the very being of every person who
has ever lived in it, in every age, since the times of the ancient prophets, has de-
pended on more volitions, or acts of the Wills of men, than there are sands on
the sea shore.
And therefore, unless God does most exactly and perfectly foresee the future
acts of men's Wills, all the predictions which he ever uttered concerning David,
Hezekiah, Josiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander; concerning the four
monarchies, and the revolutions in them ; and concerning all the wars, commo-
tions, victories, prosperities and calamities, of any of the kingdoms, nations or
communities of the world, have all been without knowledge.
So that, according to this notion of God's not foreseeing the volitions and
free actions of men, God could foresee nothing appertaining to the state of the
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 69
world of mankind in future ages ; not so much as the being of one person that
should live in it ; and could foreknow no events, but only such as He would
bring to pass himself by the extraordinary interposition of his immediate power ;
or things which should come to pass in the natural material world, by the laws
of motion, and course of nature, wherein that is independent on the actions or
works of mankind ; that is, as he might, like a very able mathematician and
astronomer, with great exactness calculate the revolutions of the heavenly
bodies, and the greater wheels of the machine of the external creation.
And if we closely consider the matter, there will appear reason to convince us,
that he could not, with any absolute certainty, foresee even these. As to the first,
namely, things done by the immediate and extraordinary interposition of God's
power, these cannot be foreseen, unless it can be foreseen when there shall be
occasion for such extraordinary interposition. And that cannot be foreseen,
unless the state of the moral world can be foreseen. For whenever God thus
interposes, it is with regard to the state of the moral world, requiring such divine
interposition. Thus God could not certainly foresee the universal deluge, the
calling of Abraham, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on
Egypt, and Israel's redemption out of it, the expelling the seven nations of
Canaan, and the bringing Israel into that land ; for these all are represented as
connected with things belonging to the state of the moral world. Nor can God
foreknow the most proper and convenient time of the day of judgment and gen-
eral conflagration ; for that chiefly depends on the course and state of things in
the moral world. •
Nor, secondly, can we on this supposition reasonably think, that God can
certainly foresee what things shall come to pass, in the course of things, in the
natural and material world, even those which, in an ordinary state of things,
might be calculated by a good astronomer. For the moral world is the end of
the natural world ; and the course of things in the former, is undoubtedly sub-
ordinate to God's designs with respect to the latter. Therefore he has seen
cause, from regard to the state of things in the moral world, extraordinarily to
interpose, to interrupt and lay an arrest on the course of things in the natural
world ; and even in the greater wheels of its motion ; even so as to stop the
sun in its course. And unless he can foresee the volitions of men, and so know
something of the future state of the moral world, he cannot know but that he
may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner, as ever he had ;
nor can he foresee how, or when he shall have occasion thus to interpose.
Corol. 1. It appears from the things which have been observed, that unless
God foresees the volitions of moral agents, that cannot be true which is observed
by the Apostle James, Acts xv. 18, " Known unto God are all his works from
the beginning of the world."
Corol. 2. It appears from what has been observed, that unless God fore-
knows the volitions of moral agents, all the prophecies of Scripture have no
better foundation than mere conjecture ; and that, in most instances, a conjecture
which must have the utmost uncertainty ; depending on an innumerable, and,
as it were, infinite multitude of volitions, which are all, even to God, uncertain
events : however, these prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and
very many of them in the most positive manner, with asseverations ; and some
of them with the most solemn oaths.
Corol. 3. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if this notion
of God's ignorance of future volitions be true, in vain did Christ say (after
uttering many great and important predictions, concerning God's moral king-
70 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
dom, and things depending on men's moral actions), Matthew xxi\ 35,
" Heaven and earth shall pass away ; but my word shall not pass away."
Corol. 4. From the same notion of God's ignorance, it would follow, that
m vain has God Himself often spoke of the predictions of his word, as evidences
of his Foreknowledge ; and so as evidences of that which is his prerogative as
GOD, and his peculiar glory, greatly distinguishing Him from all other beings;
as in Isa. xli. 22 — 26, xliii. 9, 10, xliv. 8, xlv. 2 i, xlvi. 10, and xlviii. 14.
Aug. II. If God does not foreknow the volitions of moral agents, then he did
not foreknow the fall of man, nor of angels, and so could not foreknow the great
things which are consequent on these events ; such as his sending his Son into
the world to die for sinners, and all things pertaining to the great work of
redemption ; all the things which were done for four thousand years before
Christ came, to prepare the way for it ; and the incarnation, life, death, resur-
rection and ascension of Christ ; and the setting Him at the head of the uni-
verse, as King of heaven and earth, angels and men ; and the setting up his
church and kingdom in this world, and appointing Him the Judge of the
world ; and all that Satan should do in the world in opposition to the kingdom
of Christ : and the great transactions of the day of judgment, that men and
devils shall be the subjects of, and angels concerned in ; they are all what God
was ignorant of before the fall. And if so, the following scriptures, and others
like them, must be without any meaning, or contrary to truth. Eph. i. 4,
" According as he hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world."
1 Pet. i. 20, " Who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world."
2 Tim. i. 9, " Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling ; not
according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was
given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." So, Eph. iii. 11 (speaking
of the wisdom of God in the work of redemption), " According to the eternal
purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus." Tit. i. 2, " In hope of eternal
life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began." Rom. viii.
29, " W7hom he did foreknow, them he also did predestinate," &c. 1 Pet. i. 2,
" Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.'"
If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor the redemption by Jesus Christ,
nor the volitions of man since the fall ; then he did not foreknow the saints in
any sense ; neither as particular persons, nor as societies or nations ; either by
election, or mere foresight of their virtue or good works ; or any foresight of
any thing about them relating to their salvation ; or any benefit they have by
Christ, or any manner of concern of theirs with a Redeemer.
Arg. III. On the supposition of God's ignorance of the future volitions of
free agents, it w^ill follow,*that God must in many cases truly repent what he
has done, so as properly to wish he had done otherwise : by reason that the
event of things, in those affairs which are most important, viz., the affairs of his
:noral kingdom, being uncertain and contingent, often happens quite otherwise
than he was aware beforehand. And there would be reason to understand, that
in the most literal sense, in Gen. vi. 6, " It repented the Lord, that he had made
man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." And that, 1 Sam. xv. 11,
contrary to that, Numb, xxiii. 19, " God is not the Son of man, that He should
repent." And, 1 Sam. xv. 29, " Also the strength of Israel will not lie, nor
repent ; for He is not a man that he should repent." Yea, from this notion it
would follow, that God is liable to repent and be grieved at his heart, in a
literal sense, continually ; and is always exposed to an infinite number of real
disappointments in his governing the world ; and to manifold, constant, great
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 71
perplexity and vexation ; but this is not very consistent with his title of God
over all, blessed forever more ; which represents Him as possessed of perfect,
constant and uninterrupted tranquillity and felicity, as God over the universe, and
in his management of the affairs of the world, as supreme and universal Ruler.
See Rom. i. 25, ix. 5, 2 Cor. xi. 31, 1 Tim. vi. 15.
Arg. IV. It will also follow from this notion, that as God is liable to be
continually repenting what he has done ; so he must be exposed to be con-
stantly changing his mind ahd intentions, as to his future conduct ; altering his
measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projec-
tions. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme, namely, such
as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken,
through want of foresight ; and he- must be continually putting his system to
rights, as it gets out of order through the contingence of the actions of moral
agents ; he must be a Being, who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must
necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance,
and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever ; for this plain reason, that
his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those
tilings which are to him contingent and uncertain. In such a situation, he must
have little else to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectify-
ing his disjointed frame and disordered movements ; in the best manner the case
will allow. The Supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and
miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made and has
the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief import-
ance, which, hereafter shall befall his system ; which, if he did but know, he
might make seasonable provision for. In many cases, there may be very
great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and
disposing things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and exten-
sive influence, and endless consequence to the universe; which he may see
afterwards, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known before-
hand, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the
power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes and actions, thus to
disappoint God, break his measures, make Him continually to change his mind,
subject him to vexation, and bring him into confusion.
But how do these things consist with reason, or with the word of God ?
Which represents, that all God's works, all that he has ever to do, the whole
scheme and series of his operations, are from the beginning perfectly in his
view ; and declares, that whatever devices and designs " are in the hearts of
men, the counsel of the Lord is that which shall stand, and the thoughts of his
heart to all generations," Prov. xix. 21, Psal. xxxiii. 10, 11, " And that which
the Lord of Hosts hath purposed, none shall disannul," Isa. xiv. 27. And that
he cannot be frustrated in one design or thought, Job xlii. 2. " And that which
God doth, it shall be forever, that nothing can be put to it, or taken from it,"
Eccl. iii. 14. The stability and perpetuity of God's counsels are expressly
spoken of as connected with the foreknowledge of God, Isa. xlvi. 10, " Declar-
ing the end from the beginning, and from ancient times, the things that are not
yet done ; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." — And
how are these things consistent with what the Scripture says of God's immuta-
bility, which represents Him as " without variableness, or shadow of turning ;"
and speaks of Him most particularly as unchangeable with regard to his pur-
poses, Mai. iii. 6, "I am the Lord; I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob
are not consumed," Exod. iii. 14, i am that i am, Job xxiii. 13, 14, " He is in
72 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
one mind ; and who can turn Him ? And what his soul desireth, even that he
doth : for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me."
Arg. V. If this notion of God's ignorance of the future volitions of moral
agents be thoroughly considered in its consequences, it will appear to follow from
it, that God, after he had made the world, was liable to be wholly frustrated
of his end in the creation of it; and so has been, in like manner, liable to be
frustrated of his end in all the great works he hath wrought. It is manifest,
the moral world is the end of the natural : the rest of the creation is but a house
which God hath built, with furniture, for moral agents : and the good or bad
state of the moral world depends on the improvement they make of their natural
agency, and so depends on their volitions. And therefore, if these cannot be
foreseen by God, because they are contingent, and subject to no kind of neces-
sity, then the affairs of the moral world are liable to go wrong, to any assignable
degree ; yea, liable to be utterly ruined. As on this scheme, it may well be
supposed to be literally said, when mankind, by the abuse of their moral
agency, became very corrupt before the flood, " that the Lord repented that he
had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at his heart ;" so, when He
made the universe, He did not know but that he might be so disappointed in it,
that it might grieve Him at his heart that he had made it. It actually proved,
that all mankind became sinful, and a very great part of the angels apostatized :
and how could God know beforehand, that all of them would not ? And how
could God know but that all mankind, notwithstanding means used to reclaim them,
being still left to the freedom of their own Will, would continue in their apostasy,
and grow worse and worse, as they of the old world before the flood did 1
According to the scheme I am endeavoring to confute, neither the fall of
men or angels, could be foreseen, and God must be greatly disappointed in these
events ; and so the grand scheme and contrivance for our redemption, and de-
stroying the works of the devil, by the Messiah, and all the great things God
has done in the prosecution of these designs, must be only the fruits of his own
disappointment, and contrivances of his to mend and patch up, as well as he
could, his system, which originally was all very good, and perfectly beautiful ;
but was marred, broken and confounded by the free Will of angels and men.
And still he must be liable to be totally disappointed a second time : He could
not know, that He should have his desired success, in the incarnation, life, death,
resurrection and exaltation of his only begotten Son, and other great works
accomplished to restore the state of things : He could not know, after all,
whether there would actually be any tolerable measure of restoration ; for this
depended on the free Will of man. There has been a general great apostasy
of almost all the Christian world, to that which was worse than heathenism ;
which continued for many ages. And how could God without foreseeing men's
volitions, know whether ever Christendom would return from this apostasy ? And
which way could He tell beforehand how soon it would begin ? The apostle
says, it began to work in his time ; and how could it be known how far it
would proceed in that age 1 Yea, how could it be known that the gospel,
which was not effectual for the reformation of the Jews, would ever be effectual
for the turning of the heathen nations from their heathen apostasy, which they
had been confirmed in for so many ages?
It is represented often in Scripture, that God, who made the world for
Himself, and created it for his pleasure, would infallibly obtain his end in the
creation, and in all his works ; that as all things are of Him, so would all be to
Him ; and that in the final issue of things, it would appear that He is thefrsU
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 73
and the last, Rev. xx. 6, " And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and
Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last." But these things
are not consistent with God's being so liable to be disappointed in all his works,
nor indeed with his failing of his end in any thing that he has undertaken or
done.
SECTION XII.
God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Volitions of moral Agents, inconsistent
with such a Contingence of those Volitions as is without all Necessity.
Having proved that God has a certain and infallible prescience of the act of
the Will of moral agents, I come now, in the second place, to show the conse-
quence ; to show how it follows from hence, that these events are necessary,
with a Necessity of connection or consequence.
The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had opportunity to observe,
deny this consequence ; and affirm, that if such Foreknowledge be allowed, it
is no evidence of any Necessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this
matter may be particularly and thoroughly inquired into. I cannot but think
that, on particular and full consideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether
it be indeed so or not.
In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the fol-
lowing things.
I. It is very evident, with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and
indissolubly connected with something which already hath or has had existence,
the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted :
1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in things
which are past, their past existence is now necessary : having already made
sure of existence, it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect :
it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that that thing has
existed.
2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of
free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already
has, and long ago had, existence ; and so, now its existence is necessary ; it is
now utterly impossible to be otherwise than that this Foreknowledge should be,
or should have been.
3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected
with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that pro-
position whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is
necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise, would be a con-
tradiction : it would be in effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble,
and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, whose existence is indissolubly
connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not neces-
sary, then it may possibly not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection
of its existence. — Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.
4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible Fore-
knowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is
a certain infallible and indissoluble connection between those events and that
Foreknowledge ; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those events
Vol. II. 10
74 FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
are necessary events ; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that*
whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.
To say the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connection
of the event with that Foreknowledge is not indissoluble, but dissoluble and
fallible, is very absurd. To affirm it, would be the same thing as to affirm that
there is no necessary connection between a proposition's being infallibly known
to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonstrable, that
if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is necessary;
or, in other words, that it is impossible but the event should come to pass. For
if it be not impossible but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but
that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be
true. But how absurd is that, on the supposition that there is now an infallible
knowledge (i. e. knowledge which it is impossible should fail) that it is true.
There is this absurdity in it, that it is not impossible but that there now should
be no truth in that proposition which is now infallibly known to be true.
II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is
contingent, and without all necessity, may be proved thus ; it is impossible for
a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without evidence. To suppose
otherwise, implies a contradiction : because, for a thing to be certainly known
to any understanding, is for it to be evident to that understanding : and for a
thing to be evident to any understanding, is the same thing as for that understand-
ing to see evidence of it : 'but no understanding, created or uncreated, can see
evidence where there is none : for that is the same thing as to see that to be
which is not. And therefore, if there be any truth which is absolutely without
evidence, that truth is absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a con-
tradiction to suppose that it is known.
But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all
necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely without evidence. If
there be any evidence of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either self-evidence
or proof; for there can be no other sort of evidence but one of these two : an
evident thing must be either evident in itself or evident in something else ; that
is, evident by connection with something else. But a future thing, whose ex-
istence is without all necessity, can have neither of these sorts of evidence. It
cannot be self-evident ; for if it be, it may be now known, by what is now to be
seen in the thing itself; either its present existence, or the necessity of its nature :
but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing
jnas no present existence to be seen, and also that it is not of such a nature as to be
necessarily existent for the future : so that its future existence is not self-
evident. And, secondly, neither is there any proof or evidence in any thing else,
or evidence of connection with something else that is evident; for this is also
contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, that there is now nothing existent,
with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected. For such
a connection destroys its contingence, and supposes necessity. Thus it is demon-
strated, that there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the
future existence of that event, which is contingent, without all necessity (if any
such event there be), neither self-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing
in reality is not evident ; and so cannot be seen to be evident, or, which is the
same thing, cannot be known.
Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five thousand seven hun-
dred and sixty years ago there was no other being but the Divine Being ; and
then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing
into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form ; all in absolute
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 75
contingence, without any concern of God, or any other cause, in the matter ;
without any manner of ground or reason of its existence ; or any dependence
upon, or connection at all with, any thing foregoing : I say, that if this be
supposed, there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no
evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself ; for the thing itself as yet was not.
And there was no evidence of it to be seen in any thing else ; for evidence in
something else, is connection with something else : but such connection is con-
trary to the supposition. There was no evidence before, that this thing would
happen ; for, by the supposition, there was no reason why it should happen,
rather than something else, or rather than nothing. And if so, then all things
before were exactly equal, and the same with respect to that and other possible
things ; there was no preponderation,, no superior weight or value ; and there-
fore nothing that could be of any weight or value to determine any understand-
ing. The thing was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely unknowable-
An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency,
and makes no advance, to a discerning any signs or evidences of it, let it be
increased never so much ; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the
strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which
is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds and darkness ; but
it has no tendency to enable to discern evidence where there is none. If the
sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will
enable to see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease : yet it has
no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence which is not ; but,
on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty that
there is none.
III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary
events ; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that
they may not come to pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows
them, and knows all things, is to suppose God's knowledge to be inconsistent
with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows
that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so con-
tingent that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with
itself; or that one thing that he knows, is utterly inconsistent with another
thing that he knows. It is the same thing as to say, he now knows a propo-
sition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent
uncertain truth. If a future volition is so without all necessity, that there is
nothing hinders but that it may not be, then the proposition which asserts its
future existence, is so uncertain, that there is nothing hinders but that the truth
of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things, he knows this proposition
to be thus uncertain. And that is inconsistent with his knowing that it is
infallibly true, and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If
the thing be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contingent,
if he views things as they are. If the event be not necessary, then it is possible
it may never be : and if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may
possibly never be ; and that is to know that the proposition which affirms its
existence, may possibly not be true ; and that is to know that the truth of it is
uncertain ; which surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth.
If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without all necessity, then it is
no argument of perfection of knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily
that they will be ; but, on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake,
because it would argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which
in its own nature, and all things considered, is uncertain and contingent To
76 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
say, in such a case, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events
which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous ; as much so, as to say that God may
know contradictions to be true, for aught we know, or that he may know a
thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain, though we
cannot conceive how ; because he has ways of knowing, which we cannot
comprehend.
Corol. 1. From what has been observed, it is evident that the absolute
decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any
necessity of the event which follows from such decrees, than the absolute Fore-
knowledge of God. Because the connection between the event and certain
Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble as between the event and an abso-
lute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree should
not agree together, than that the event and absolute knowledge should disagree.
The connection between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by
the supposition ; because it is supposed, that the certainty and infallibility of
the knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be
increased ; and therefore the connection between the knowledge and the thing
known, cannot be increased ; so that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge,
it does not at all increase the connection, or make it more infallible and indisso-
luble. If it were not so, the certainty of knowledge might be increased by the
addition of a decree ; which is contrary to the supposition, which is, that the
knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree.
There is as much of an impossibility but that the things which are infallibly
foreknown should be, or (which is the same thing) as great a necessity of their
future existence, as if the event were already written down, and was known
and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the most
indissoluble and perfect connection possible between the writing and the thing
written. In such a case, it would be as impossible the event should fail of ex-
istence, as if it had existed already ; and a decree cannot make an event surer or
more necessary than this.
And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been proved
there is, then necessity of connection and consequence is not at all inconsistent
with any liberty which man or any other creature enjoys. And from hence it
may be inferred, that absolute decrees of God, which do not at all increase the
necessity, are not at all inconsistent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any
such account, as that they make the event decreed necessary and render it utterly
impossible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are
inconsistent with man's liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of pro-
bation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any
necessity which absolute decrees infer.
Dr. Whitby supposes that there is a great difference between God's Fore-
knowledge, and his decrees, with regard to necessity of future events. In his
" Discourse on the Five Points," p. 474, &c, he says, " God's prescience has
no influence at all on our actions. — Should God, (says he,) by immediate revela-
tion, give me the knowledge of the event of any man's state or actions, would
my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions ? Surely none at
all — our knowledge doth not effect the things we know, to make them more
certain, or more future, than they would be without it. Now, Foreknowledge
in God is knowledge. As therefore knowledge has no influence on things that
are, so neither has Foreknowledge on things that shall be. And, consequently,
the Foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or
diminish that freedom. Whereas God's decree of election is powerful and
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 77
active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means as shall
unfrustrably produce the end. Hence God's prescience renders no actions
necessary." And to this purpose, p. 473, he cites Origen, where he says,
" God's prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the
cause of God's prescience that they will be :" and Le Blanc, where he says,
* This is the truest resolution of this difficulty, that prescience is not the cause
that things are future ; but their being future is the cause they are foreseen."
In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his " Demonstration of the Being and Attributes
of God," pp. 95—99. And the author of the " Freedom of Will in God and
the Creature," speaking to the like purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents
'' Foreknowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make them
necessary, than afterknowledge," or to that purpose.
To all which I would say, that what is said about knowledge, its not having
influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to the purpose,
nor does it in the least affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether prescience be
the thing that makes the event necessary or no, it alters not the case. Infallible
Foreknowledge may 'prove the Necessity of the event foreknown, and yet not be
the thing which causes the Necessity. If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this
proves the event known to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible but that
the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or some other
way, if there be any other way ; because, as was said before, it is absurd to say,
that a proposition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may
possibly prove not true.
The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this ; that, inasmuch
as certain Foreknowledge does not cause an event to be necessary, as a decree
does ; therefore it does not prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there
is no force in this arguing : for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing
can prove, or be an evidence of a thing's being necessary, but that which has a
causal influence to make it so. But this can never be maintained. If certain
Foreknowledge of the future existing of an event, be not the thing which first
makes it impossible that it should fail of existence ; yet it may, and certainly
does, demonstrate that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that impossi-
bility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect, of this impos-
sibility, it may prove that there is such an impossibility, as much as if it were
the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the
cause to the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly fore-
known, cannot fail, whether that impossibility arise from the Foreknowledge,
or is prior to it. It is as evident, as it is possible any thing should be, that it is
impossible a thing which is infallibly known to be true, should prove not to be
true : therefore there is a Necessity connected with such knowledge ; whether
the knowledge be the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the cause of the
knowledge.
All certain knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or afterknowledge,
or concomitant knowledge, proves the thing known now to be necessary, by
some means or other ; or proves that it is impossible it should now be other-
wise than true. I freely allow that Foreknowledge does not prove a thing to
be necessary any more than afterknowledge : but then afterknowledge, which is
certain and infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the pro-
position known should be true. Certain afterknowledge, proves that it is now,
in the time of the knowledge, by some means or other, become impossible but
that the proposition, which predicates past existence on the event, should be
true. And so does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the time of the
78 FREEDOM OF THE WIH.
knowledge, it is, by some means or other, become impossible but that the pro-
position, which predicates future existence on the event, should be true. The
Necessity of the truth of the propositions, consisting in the present impossibility
of the nonexistence of the event affirmed, in both cases, is the immediate ground
of the certainty of the knowledge ; there can be no certainty of knowledge
without it.
There must be a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly
known, or (which is the same thing) known to be certain. For certainty of
knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in
the things themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a certainty
in things to be a ground of certainty of knowledge, and to render things capa-
ble of being known to be certain. — And this is nothing but the Necessity of
the truth known, or its being impossible but that it should be true ; or, in other
words, the firm and infallible connection between the subject and predicate of
the proposition that contains that truth. All certainty of knowledge consists
in the view of the firmness of that connection. So God's certain Foreknow-
ledge of the future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indissolu-
ble connection of the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its fu-
ture existence. The subject is that possible event ; the predicate is its future
existing : ' but if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that
event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly
knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may
possibly never be, then He sees a firm connection between a subject and predi-
cate that are not firmly connected ; which is a contradiction.
I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, That mere knowledge does not
affect the thing known, to make it more certain or more future. But yet, I
say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already, both future and certain ;
i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of futurity, supposes futurity ; and a cer-
tain knowledge of futurity, supposes certain futurity, antecedent to that certain
knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to cer-
tainty of knowledge, than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove
true ; or (which is the same thing) the Necessity of the event.
I would observe one thing further concerning this matter ; it is this ; that
if it be as those forementioned writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is
not the cause, but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown ; this is so
far from showing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the Necessity of the
existence of that event, that it rather shows the contrary the more plainly. Be-
cause it shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as
if it had already been ; inasmuch as in effect it actually exists already ; its fu-
ture existence has already had actual influence, and efficiency, and has pro-
duced an effect, viz., Prescience : the effect exists already ; and as the effect
supposes the cause, is connected with the cause, and depends entirely upon it,
therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already.
The effect is as firm as possible, it having already the possession of existence,
and made sure of it. But the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause,
ground and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the foundation.
To illustrate this matter, let us suppose the appearances and images of
things in a glass; for instance, a reflecting telescope to be the real effects
of heavenly bodies (at a distance, and out of sight) which they resemble: if
it be so, then as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence,
and it is become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise than
that they have existed ; so they, being the true effects of the heavenly bodies
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 79
they resemble, this proves the existing of those heavenly bodies to be as
real, infallible, firm and necessary, as the existing of these effects ; the one
being connected with, and wholly depending on the other. Now let us sup-
pose future existences some way or other to have influence back, to produce
effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass,
a thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages ; but yet that
these images are real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent
on, and connected with them as their cause ; these effects and images, having
already had actual existence, rendering that matter of their existing perfectly
firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise ; this proves in like
manner, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things, which are
their causes, is also equally sure, firm and necessary ; and that it is alike im-
possible but that they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects
have. And if, instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects
to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind, which have existed there
from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connect-
ed with their cause, the case is not altered.
Another thing which has been said by some Arminians to take off the
force of what is urged from God's Prescience, against the contingence of the
volitions of moral agents, is to this purpose : " That when we talk of Fore-
knowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking ; and that
although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect knowledge of all events
from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as before and after in God,
but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession."
To this I answer,
1. It has been already shown, that all certain knowledge proves the Ne-
cessity of the truth known ; whether it be before, after, or at the same time.
Though it be true, that there is no succession in God's knowledge, and the
manner of his knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know con-
cerning it, that there is no event, past, present, or to come, that God is ever
uncertain of: he never is, never was, and never will be without infallible
knowledge of it : he always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible.
And as he always sees things just as they are in truth ; hence there never is in
reality any thing contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen
never to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no Foreknowledge in God, it is
because those things, which are future to us, are as present to God, as if they
already had existence : and that is as much as to say, that future events are
always in God's view as evident, clear, and necessary, as if they already were.
If there never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present with
God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to
fail of existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to pass.
God's viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably as that there is no
succession in his ideas or judgment does not hinder but that there is properly
now, in the mind of God, a certain and perfect knowledge of moral actions of
men, which to us are a hundred years hence : yea the objection supposes this ,
and therefore it certainly does not hinder but that, by the foregoing arguments,
it is now impossible these moral actions should not come to pass.
We know, that God knows the future voluntary actions of men in such a
sense beforehand, as that he is able particularly to declare, and foretell them,
and write them, or cause them to be written down in a book, as He often has
done; and that therefore the necessary connection which there is between
God's knowledge and the event known, does as much prove the event to be
80 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
necessary beforehand, as if the Divine Knowledge were in the same sense be-
fore the event, as the prediction or writing is. If the knowledge be infallible,
then the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible ; that is, there is
an infallible connection between that written prediction and the event. And if
so, then it is impossible it should ever be otherwise, than that that prediction
and the event should agree : and this is the same thing as to say, it is impossi-
ble but that the event should come to pass : and this is the same as to say that
its coming to pass is necessary. — So that it is manifest, that there being no
proper succession in God's mind, makes no alteration as to the Necessity of the
existence of the events which God knows. Yea,
2. This is so far from weakening the proof, which has been given of
the impossibility of the not coming to pass of future events known, as that it
establishes that, wherein the strength of the foregoing arguments consists,
and shows the clearness of the evidence. For,
(1.) The very reason why God's knowledge is without succession, is
because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of clearness
and certainty : all things, whether past, present, or to come, being viewed
with equal evidence and fulness; future things being seen with as much
clearness, as if they were present ; the view is always in absolute perfection ;
and absolute constant perfection admits of no alteration, and so no succession ;
the actual existence of the thing known, does not at all increase, or add to
the clearness or certainty of the thing known: God calls the things that
are not as though they were ; they are all one to him as if they had al
ready existed. But herein consists the strength of the demonstration before
given, of the impossibility of the not existing of those things, whose existence
God knows; that it is as impossible they should fail of existence, as if they
existed already. This objection, instead of weakening this argument, sets it
in the clearest and strongest light; for it supposes it to be so indeed, that
the existence of future events is in God's view so much as if it already had
been, that when they come actually to exist, it makes not the least altera-
tion or variation in his view or knowledge of them.
(2.) The objection is founded on the immutability of God's knowledge :
for it is the immutability of knowledge which makes his knowledge to be with-
out succession. But this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I in-
sist on, viz., that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of exist-
ence. For if that were possible, then it would be possible for there to be a
change in God's knowledge and view of things. For if the known event should
fail of existence, and not come into being as God expected, then God would
see it, and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake ; and thus
there would be change and succession in his knowledge. But as God is immu-
table, and so it is utterly impossible that his view should be changed ; so it is, for
the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not exist : and
that is to be impossible in the highest degree : and therefore the contrary is ne-
cessary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be
changed, by the succession of time ; who comprehends all things, from eternity
to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view ; so that his whole eter-
nal duration is vitce interminabilis, tota, simul, et perfecta possessio.
On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no geometrical theorem
or proposition whatsoever, more capable of strict demonstration, than that God'a
certain prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a con-
tingence of these events, as is without all Necessity ; and so is inconsistent with
the Arminian notion of liberty.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 81
Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists, concerning the absolute
decrees of God, does not at all infer any more fatality in things, than will
demonstrably follow from the doctrine of most Jirminian divines, who ac-
knowledge God's omniscience, and universal prescience. Therefore all objec-
tions they make against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as implying Hobbes'
doctrine of Necessity, or the stoical doctrine of fate, lie no more against the
doctrine of Calvinists, than their own doctrine : and therefore it doth not be-
come those divines, to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists, on this
account.
Corol. 3. Hence all arguing from Necessity, against the doctrine of the
inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation, and the
commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against the Calvinistic doc-
trine of efficacious grace ; I say, all arguings of Jirminians (such of them
as own God's omniscience) against these things, on this ground, that these doc-
trines, though they do not suppose men to be under any constraint or coaction,
yet suppose them under Necessity, with respect to their moral actions, and those
things which are required of them in order to their acceptance with God ; and
their arguing against the Necessity of men's volitions, taken from the reasona-
bleness of God's commands, promises, and threatenings, and the sincerity of
his counsels and invitations ; and all objections against any doctrines of the
Calvinists as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer Ne-
cessity ; I say, all these arguments and objections must fall to the ground,
and be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them ; being main-
tained in an inconsistence with themselves, and in like manner levelled against
their own doctrine, as against the doctrine of the Calvinists.
SECTION XIII
Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with any thing
antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Ar-
minian Liberty.
Every act of the Will has a cause, or it has not. If it has a cause, then,
according to what has already been demonstrated, it is not contingent, but ne-
cessary ; the effect being necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause ;
and that let the cause be what it will. If the cause is the Will itself, by ante-
cedent acts choosing and determining ; still the determined and caused act
must be a necessary effect. The act, that is the determined effect of the fore-
going act which is its cause, cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause ; but
must be wholly subject to its determination and command, as much as the mo-
tions of the hands and feet. The consequent commanded acts of the Will are
as passive and as necessary, with respect to the antecedent determining acts as
the parts of the body are to the volitions which determine and command them.
And therefore if all the free acts of the Will are thus, if they are all determin-
ed effects, determined by the Will itself, that is, determined by antecedent
choice, then they are all necessary ; they are all subject to, and decisively fixed
by the foregoing act, which is their cause : yea, even the determining act itself;
for that must be determined and fixed by another act, preceding that, if it be a
free and voluntary act ; and so must be necessary. So that by this all the free
acts of the Will are necessary, and cannot be free unless they are necessary •
Vol. II. 11
82 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
because they cannot be free, according to the Arminian notion of freedom,
unless they are determined by the Will ; which is to be determined by antece-
dent choice ; which being their cause, proves them necessary. And yet they
say, Necessity is utterly inconsistent with Liberty. So that, by their scheme,
the acts of the Will cannot be free unless they are necessary, and yet cannot
be free if they be necessary !
But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, and it be affirmed that the
free acts of the Will have no cause, and are connected with nothing whatsoever
that goes before them and determines them, in order to maintain their proper
and absolute contingence, and this should be allowed to be possible ; still it
will not serve their turn. For if the volition come to pass by perfect contin-
gence, and without any cause at all, then it is certain, no act of the Will, no
prior act of the soul was the cause, no determination or choice of the soul, had
any hand in it. The Will, or the soul, was indeed the subject of what happen-
ed to it accidentally, but was not the cause. The Will is not active in causing
or determining, but purely the passive subject ; at least, according to their no-
tion of action and passion. In this case, contingence does as much prevent
the determination of the Will, as a proper cause ; and as to the Will, it was
necessary, and could be no otherwise. For to suppose that it could have
been otherwise, if the Will or soul had pleased, is to suppose that the
act is dependent on some prior act of choice or pleasure ; contrary to
what is now supposed : it is to suppose that it might have been otherwise,
if its cause had made it or ordered it otherwise. But this does not agree to its
having no cause or orderer at all. That must be necessary as to~ the soul,
which is dependent on no free act of the soul : but that which is without a
cause, is dependent on no free act of the soul : because, by the supposition, it
is dependent on nothing, and is connected with nothing. In such a case, the
soul is necessarily subjected to what accident brings to pass, from time to time,
as much as the earth, that is inactive, is necessarily subjected to what falls
upon it. But this does not consist with the Arminian notion of Liberty, which
is the Will's power of determining itself in its own acts, and being wholly ac-
tive in it, without passiveness, and without being subject to Necessity. — Thus
Contingence belongs to the Arminian notion of Liberty, and yet is inconsistent
with it.
I would here observe, that the author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will,
in God and the Creature, page 76, 77, says as follows : " The word Chance
always means something done without design. Chance and design stand in
direct opposition to each other : and chance can never be properly applied to
acts of the will, which is the spring of all design, and which designs to choose
whatsoever it doth choose, whether there be any superior fitness in the thing
which it chooses, or no ; and it designs to determine itself to one thing, where
two things, perfectly equal, are proposed, merely because it will." But herein
appears a very great inadvertence in this author. For, if the Will be the spring
of all design, as he says, then certainly it is not always the effect of design ;
and the acts of the Will themselves must sometimes come to pass, when they
do not spring from design ; and consequently come to pass by chance, accord-
ing to his own definition of chance. And if the Will designs to choose whatsoever
it does choose, and designs to determine itself, as he says, then it designs to de-
termine all its designs. Which carries us back from one design to a foregoing
design determining that, and to another determining that ; and so on in infini-
tum. The very first design must be the effect of foregoing design, or else it
must be by chance, in his notion of it
» FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 83
Here another alternative may be proposed, relating to the connection of the
acts of the Will with something foregoing that is their cause, not much unlike
to the other ; which is this ; either human liberty is such, that it may well
stand with volitions being necessarily connected with the views of the under-
standing, and so is consistent with Necessity ; or it is inconsistent with, and
contrary to, such a connection and Necessity. The former is directly subversive
of the Arminian notion of liberty, consisting in freedom from all Necessity.
And if the latter be chosen, and it be said that liberty is inconsistent with any
such necessary connection of volition with foregoing views of the understanding,
it consisting m freedom from any such Necessity of the Will as that would im-
ply ; then the liberty of the soul consists (in part at least) in freedom from re-
straint, limitation and government, in its actings, by the understanding, and in
liberty and liableness to act contrary to the understanding's views and dictates ;
and consequently the more the soul has of this disengagedness, in its acting, the
more liberty. Now let it be considered what this brings the noble principle of
human liberty to, particularly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection,
viz., a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at random, with-
out the least connection with, or restraint or government by, any dictate of rea-
son, or any thing whatsoever apprehended, considered or viewed by the under-
standing ; as being inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of the
Will over its own determinations. The notion mankind have conceived of
liberty, is some> dignity or privilege, something worth claiming., But what
dignity or privilege is there, in being given up to such a wild contingence as
this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently and unreasona-
bly, and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or
were as destitute of perception, as the smoke that is driven by the wind !
PART III.
WHEREIN IS INQUIRED, WHETHER ANY SUCH LIBERTY OF WILL AS ARMINIANS HOLD, BE
NECESSARY TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, PRAISE AND DISPRAISE, ETC.
SECTION I.
God's Moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy.
Having considered the fast thing that was proposed to be inquired into,
relating to that freedom of Will which Arminians maintain ; namely, Whether
any such thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, or be conceived of; I come
now to the second thing proposed to be the subject of inquiry, viz., Whether any
such kind of liberty be requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and
blame, reward and punishment, &c.
I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and agency of the
Supreme moral agent, and fountain of all agency and virtue.
Dr. Whitby, in his discourses on the Five Points, p. 14, says, " If all human
actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names ; we being capable
of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise ; for who can blame a person
84 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. •
for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only
for what he could not avoid V9 To the like purpose he speaks in places innu-
merable ; especially in his discourse on the Freedom of the Will ; constantly
maintaining, that a freedom not only from coaction, but necessity, is absolutely
requisite, in order to actions being either worthy of blame, or deserving of praise.
And to this agrees, as is well known, the current doctrine of Arminian writers,
who, in general, hold, that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment,
nothing to be commended or blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr
Whitby, p. 300, allows, that God is without this freedom ; and Arminians, so
far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally acknowledge that God is
* necessarily holy, and his Will necessarily determined to that which is good.
So that putting these things together, the infinitely holy God, who used
always to be esteemed by God's people not only virtuous, but a Being in whom
is all possible virtue, and every virtue in the most absolute purity and perfection,
and in infinitely greater brightness and amiableness than in any creature ; the
most perfect pattern of virtue, and the fountain from whom all others' virtue is
as beams from the sun ; and who has been supposed to be, on the account of
his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honored,
admired, commended, extolled and praised, than any creature : and He, who is
thus everywhere represented in Scripture ; I say, this Being, according to this
notion of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians, has no virtue at all : virtue, when
ascribed to him, is but an empty name j and he is deserving of no commenda-
tion or praise : because he is under necessity. He cannot avoid being holy
and good as he is ; therefore no thanks to him for it. It seems, the holiness,
justice, faithfulness, &c, of the Most High, must not be accounted to be of the
nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not deny, that
these things in God are good ; but then we must understand them, that they are
no more virtuous, or of the nature of any thing commendable, than the good
that is in any other being that is not a moral agent ; as the brightness of the
sun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but not virtuous, because these
properties are necessary to these bodies, and not the fruit of self-determining
power.
There needs no other confutation of this notion of God's not being virtuous
or praiseworthy, to Christians acquainted with the Bible, but only stating and
particularly representing it. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is
represented as in every respect, in the highest manner virtuous, and supremely
praiseworthy, would be endless, and is altogether needless to such as have been
Drought up in the light of the gospel.
It were to be wished, that Dr. Whitby, and other divines of the same sort,
had explained themselves, when they have asserted, that that which is necessary,
is not deserving of praise ; at the same time that they have owned God's per-
fection to be necessary, and so in effect representing God as not deserving praise.
Certainly, if their words have any meaning at all, by praise, they must mean
the exercise or testimony of some sort of esteem, respect and honorable regard.
And will they then say, that men are worthy of that esteem, respect and honor
for their virtue, small and imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of, for
his infinite righteousness, holiness and goodness ? If so, it must be, because of
some sort of peculiar excellency in the virtuous man, which is his prerogative,
wherein he really has the preference ; some dignity, that is entirely distinguished
from any excellency, amiableness, or honorableness in God : not in imperfection
and dependence, but in pre-eminence : which therefore he does not receive from
God, nor is God the fountain or pattern of it ; nor can God, in that respect, stand
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 85
in competition with him, as the object of honor and regard ; but man may claim
a peculiar esteem, commendation and glory, that God can have no pretension
to. Yea, God has no right, by virtue of his necessary holiness, to intermeddle
with that grateful respect and praise due to the virtuous man, who chooses
virtue, in the exercise of a freedom ad utrumque ; any more than a precious
stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful.
And if it be so, let it be explained what that peculiar respect is, that is due
to the virtuous man, which differs in nature and kind, in some way of pre-emi-
nence from all that is due to God. What is the name or description of that
peculiar affection 1 Is it esteem, love, admiration, honor, praise or gratitude 1
The Scripture everywhere represents God as the highest object of all these :
there we read of the soul's magnifying the Lord, of loving Him with all the
heart, with all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength ; admiring
Him, and his righteous acts, or greatly regarding them, as marvellous and won-
derful; honoring, glorifying, exalting, extolling, blessing, thanking and praising
Him ; giving unto Him all the glory of the good which is done or received,
rather than unto men; that no flesh should glory in his presence; but that He
should be regarded as the Being to whom all glory is due. What then is that
respect ? What passion, affection or exercise is it, that Arminians call praise,
diverse from all these things, which men are worthy of for their virtue, and which
God is not worthy of, in any degree ?
If that necessity which attends God's moral perfections and actions, be as
inconsistent with a being worthy of praise as a necessity of coaction ; as is plainly
implied in, or inferred from Dr. Whitby's discourse ; then why should we thank
God for his goodness, any more than if he were forced to be good, or any more
than we should thank one of our fellow creatures who did us good, not freely,
and of good will, or from any kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion,, or
extrinsical necessity 1 Arminians suppose, that God is necessarily a good and
gracious Being : for this they make the ground of some of their main arguments
against many doctrines maintained by Calvinists ; they say, these are certainly
false, and it is impossible they should be true, because they are not consist-
ent with the goodness of God. This supposes, that it is impossible but that God
should be good : for if it be possible that he should be otherwise, then that
impossibility of the truth of these doctrines ceases, according to their own
argument.
That virtue in God is not, in the most proper sense, rewardable, is not for
want of merit in his moral perfections and actions, sufficient to deserve rewards
from his creatures ; but because he is infinitely above all capacity of. receiving
any reward or benefit from the creature : He is already infinitely and unchangea-
bly happy, and we cannot be profitable unto him. But still he is worthy of our
supreme benevolence for his virtue ; and would be worthy of our beneficence,
which is the fruit and expression of benevolence, if our goodness could extend
to him. If God deserves to be thanked and praised for his goodness, he would,
for the same reason, deserve that we should also requite his kindness, if that
wefe possible. What shall I render to the Lord for all his benefits ? is the
natural language of thankfulness ; and so far as in us lies, it is our duty to
recompense God's goodness, and render again according to benefits received.
And that we might have opportunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude
to God, as beneficence, notwithstanding his being infinitely above our reach :
He has appointed others to be his receivers, and to stand in his stead, as the
objects of our beneficence ; such are especially our indigent brethren.
86 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
SECTION II.
The Acts of the Will of the human Soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet truly
virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, &c.
I have already considered how Dr. Whitby insists upon it, that a freedom,
not only from coaction, but necessity, is requisite either to virtue or vice, praise
or dispraise, reward or 'punishment. He also insists on the same freedom as
absolutely requisite to a person's being the subject of a law, of precepts or
prohibitions ; in the book before mentioned, (p. 301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341,
342, 347, 361, 373, 410.) And of promises and threatenings, (p. 298, 301,
305, 311, 339, 340, 363.) And as requisite to a state of trial, (p. 297, &c.)
Now therefore, with an eye to these things, I would inquire into the moral
conduct and practice of our Lord Jesus Christ, which he exhibited in his human
nature here, in his state of humiliation. And first, I would show, that his holy
behavior was necessary ; or that it was impossible it should be otherwise, than
that he should behave himself holily, and that he should be perfectly holy in each
individual act of his life. And secondly, that his holy behavior was properly
of the nature of virtue and was worthy of prgise ; and that he was the subject
of law, precepts or commands, promises and rewards ; and that he was in a state
.of trial.
I. It was impossible, that the acts of the Will of the human soul of Christ
should, in any instance, degree or circumstance, be otherwise than holy, and
agreeable to God's nature and will. The following things make this evident.
1. God had promised so effectually to preserve and uphold Him by his Spirit,
under all his temptations, that he could not fail of reaching the end for which he
came into the world ; which he would have failed of, had he fallen into sin.
We have such a promise, Isa. xlii. 1, 2, 3, 4, " Behold my Servant, whom I
uphold ; mine Elect, in whom my soul delighteth : I have put my Spirit upon
him : He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles : He shall not cry, nor lift
up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street. He shall bring forth judgment
unto truth. He shall not fail nor be discouraged, till He have set judgment in
the earth ; and the isles shall wait for his law." This promise of Christ's hav-
ing God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and lifting up his voice, &c,
relates to the time of Christ's appearance on earth ; as is manifest from the nature
of the promise, and also the application of it in the New Testament, Matthew
xii. 18. And the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by God's Spirit,
that he should be preserved from sin ; particularly from pride and vainglory, and
from being overcome by any of the temptations he should be under to affect the
glory of this world, the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applause and praise of
men : and that he should be so upheld, that he should by no means fail of ob-
taining the end of his coming into the world, of bringing forth judgment unto
victory, and establishing his kingdom of grace in the earth. And in the follow-
ing verses, this promise is confirmed, with the greatest imaginable solemnity.
" Thus saith the Lokd, he that created the heavens, and stretched them out : He
that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it : He that givetb
breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein : I the Lord
have called Thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand ; and will keep thee
and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles, to opec
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 87
the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in
darkness out of the prison house. I am Jehovah, that is my name," &c.
Very parallel with these promises is that, Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9, which also has an
apparent respect to the time of Christ's humiliation on earth. " Thus saith the
Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth,
to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers ; kings shall see and
arise, princes also shall worship ; because of the Lord that is faithful, and the
Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose Thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an ac-
ceptable time have 1 heard Thee ; in a day of salvation have I helped Thee ;
and I will preserve Thee, and give Thee for a covenant of the people, to establish
the earth," &c.
And in Isa. 1. 5 — 9, we have the Messiah expressing his assurance, that God
would help Him, by so opening his ear, or inclining his heart to God's com-
mandments that He should not be rebellious, but should persevere, and not
apostatize, or turn his back ; that through God's help, He should be immovable,
in a way of obedience, under the great trials of reproach and suffering he should
meet with ; setting his face like a flint : so that he knew, he should not be
ashamed, or frustrated in his design, and finally should be approved and justified,
as having done his work faithfully. " The Lord hath opened mine ear ; so that
I was not rebellious, neither turned away my back : I gave my back to the
smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair ; I hid not my face
from shame and spitting. For the Lord God will help me ; therefore shall I not
be confounded ; therefore have 1 set my face as a flint, and I know that I shall
not be ashamed. He is near that justifieth me : who will contend with me 1
Let us stand together. Who is mine adversary 1 Let him come near to me.
Behold the Lord God will help me ; who is he that shall condemn me ? Lo,
they shall all wax old as a garment, the moth shall eat them up."
2. The same thing is evident from all the promises which God made to the
Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom and success, in his office and character of
a Mediator : which glory could not have been obtained, if his holiness had failed,
and he had been guilty of sin. God's absolute promise of any thing, makes the
things promised necessary, and their failing to take place absolutely impossible :
and, in like manner, it makes those things necessary, on which the things pro-
mised depend, and without which they cannot take effect. Therefore it appears,
that it was utterly impossible that Christ's holiness should fail, from such absolute
promises as those, Psal. ex. 4, " The Lord hath sworn, and will not repent,
Thou art a Priest forever, after the order of Melchizedeck." And from every
other promise in that psalm, contained in each verse of it. And Psal. ii. 7, 8,
" I will declare the decree : the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son, this
day have I begotten Thee : a&k of me, and I will give Thee the Heathen for thine
inheritance, &c." Psal. xlv. 3, 4, &c, Gird thy sword on thy thigh, 0 most
Mighty, with thy Glory and thy Majesty ; and in thy Majesty ride prosperously."
And so every thing that is said from thence to the end of the psalm. And those
promises, Isa. lii. 13, 14, 15, and liii. 10, 11, 12. And all those promises which
God makes to the Messiah, of success, dominion and glory in the character of
Redeemer, in Isa. chap. xlix.
3. It was often promised to the Church of God of old, for their comfort, that
God would give them a righteous, sinless Saviour. Jer. xxiii. 5, 6, " Behold,
the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise up unto David a righteous Branch;
and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in
the earth. In his days shall Judah be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely. And
thib is the name whereby He shall be called, the Lord our Righteousness." So,
88 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Jer. xxxiii. 15, " I will cause the Branch of Righteousness to grow up unto
David ; and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land." Isa. ix.
6, 7, " For unto us a child is born ; upon the throne of David and upon his
kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and justice, from hence-
forth, even forever : the zeal of the Lord of Hosts will do this." Chap. xi. at
the beginning, " There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a
branch shall grow out of his roots ; and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon
him — the spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord : — with righteousness
shall He judge the poor, and reprove with equity : — Righteousness shall be the
girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins." Chap. lii. 13, " My
servant shall deal prudently." Chap. liii. 9, " Because He had done no violence,
neither was any deceit in his mouth." If it be impossible that these promises:
should fail, and it be easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one
jot or tittle of these promises of God to pass away, then it was impossible that
Christ should commit any sin. Christ himself signified, that it was impossible
but that the things which were spoken concerning Him, should be fulfilled.
Luke xxiv. 44, " That all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the
law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms concerning Me." " Matth.
xxvi. 54, " But how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be ?"
Mark. xiv. 49, " But the Scriptures must be fulfilled." And so the apostle,
Acts i. 16, " This Scripture must needs have been fulfilled."
4. All the promises, which were made to the Church of old, of the Messiah as a
future Saviour, from that made to our first parents in paradise, to that which was
delivered by the prophet Malachi, show it to be impossible that Christ should
not have persevered in perfect holiness. The ancient predictions given to God's
church of the Messiah as a Saviour, were of the nature of promises ; as is evi-
dent by the predictions themselves, and the manner of delivering them. But
they are expressly, and very often called promises in the New Testament j as in
Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73, Acts xiii. 32, 33, Rom. i. 1, 2, 3, and chap. xv. 8,
Heb. vi. 13, &c. These promises were often made with great solemnity, and
confirmed with an oath ; as in Gen. xxii. 16, 17, 18, " By myself have I sworn,
saith the Lord, that in blessing, I will bless thee, and in multiplying, I will mul-
tiply thy seed, as the stars of heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea shore.
— And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." Compare Luke
i. 72, 73, and Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16. The apostle in Heb. vi. 17, 18, speaking of
this promise to Abraham, says, " Wherein God, willing more abundantly to show
to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath ;
that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might
have strong consolation." — In which words, the necessity of the accomplishment,
or (which is the same thing) the impossibility of the contrary, is fully declared.
So God confirmed the promise of the great salvation of the Messiah, made to
David, by an oath ; Psal. lxxxix. 3, 4, " I have made a covenant with my
chosen, I have sworn unto David my servant ; thy seed will I establish forever,
and build up thy throne to all generations." There is nothing that is so abun-
dantly set forth in Scripture, as sure and irrefragable, as this promise and oath to
David. See Psalm lxxxix. 34, 35, 36, 2 Sam. xxiii. 5, Isa. lv. 3, Acts ii. 29,
30, and xiii. 34. The Scripture expressly speaks of it as utterly impossible that
this promise and oath to David, concerning the everlasting dominion of the Mes-
siah of his seed, should fail. Jer. xxxiii. 15, &c, " In those days, and at that
time, I will cause the Branch of Righteousness to grow up unto David. — For
thus saith the Lord, David shall never want a Man to sit upon the throne of the
House of Israel." Ver. 20, 21, "If you can break my covenant of the day,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 89
and my covenant of the night, and that there should not be day and night in their
season ; then may also my covenant be broken with David my servant, that he
should not have a son to reign upon his throne." So in verse 25, 26. — Thus
abundant is the Scripture in representing how impossible it was, that the promises
made of old concerning the great salvation and kingdom of the Messiah should
fail ; which implies, that it was impossible that this Messiah, the second Adam,
the promised seed of Abraham, and of David, should fall from his integrity, as the
first Adam did.
5. All the promises that were made to the church of God under the Old
Testament, of the great enlargement of the church, and advancement of her
glory, in the days of the gospel, after the coming of the Messiah ; the increase
of her light, liberty, holiness, joy, triumph over her enemies, &c, of which so
great a part of the 01$ Testament consists ; which are repeated so often, are so
variously exhibited, so frequently introduced with great pomp and solemnity, and
are so abundantly sealed with typical and symbolical representations : I say, all
these promises imply, that the Messiah should perfect the work of redemption ;
and this implies, that he should persevere in the work, which the Father had
appointed him, being in all things conformed to his Will. These promises were
often confirmed by an oath. (See Isa. liv. 9, with the context; chap. lxii. 8.)
And it is represented as utterly impossible that these promises should fail. (Isa.
xlix. 15, with the context ; chap. liv. 10, with the context ; chap. li. 4—8 ;
chap. xl. 8, with the context.) And therefore it was impossible that the Mes-
siah should fail, or commit sin.
6. It was impossible that the Messiah should fail of persevering in integrity
and holiness, as the first Adam did, because this would have been inconsistent
with the promises, which God made to the blessed Virgin, his mother, and to her
husband ; implying, that He should save his people from their sins, that God
would give him the throne of his Father David, that He should reign over the
kouse of Jacob forever ; and that of his kingdom there should be no end. These
promises were sure, and it was impossible they should fail. — And therefore the
Virgin Mary, in trusting fully to them, acted reasonably, having an immovable
foundation of her faith ; as Elizabeth observes, Luke i. 45, " And blessed is
she that believeth ; for there shall be a performance of those things, which were
told her from the Lord."
7. That it should have been possible that Christ should sin, and so fail in the
work of our redemption, does not consist with the eternal purpose and decree of
God, revealed in the Scriptures, that He would provide salvation for fallen man
in and by Jesus Christ, and that salvation should be offered to sinners through
the preaching of the gospel. Such an absolute decree as this, Armi.iians do not
deny. — Thus much at least (out of all controversy) is implied in such Scriptures,
as 1 Cor. ii. 7, Eph. i. 4, 5, and chap. iii. 9, 10, 11, 1 Pet. i. 19, 20. Such
an absolute decree as this, Arminians allow to be signified in these texts. And
the Arminians' election of nations and societies, and general election of the
Christian Church, and conditional election of particular persons, imply this.
God could not decree before the foundation of the world, to save all that should
believe in, and obey Christ, unless he had absolutely decreed, that salvation
should be provided, and effectually wrought out by Christ. And since (as the
Arminians themselves strenuously maintain) a decree of God infers necessity ;
hence it became necessary, that Christ should persevere, and actually work out
salvation for us, and that he should not fail by the commission of sin.
8. That it should have been possible for Christ's holiness to fail, is not con-
sistent with what God promised to his Son, before all ages. For, that salvation
Vol II 12
90 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
should be offered to men through Christ, and bestowed on all his faithful
followers, is what is at least implied in that certain and infallible promise spo-
ken of by the apostle, Tit. i. 2, " In hope of eternal life ; which God, that
cannot lie, promised before the world began." This does not seem to be
controverted by Arminians.*
9. That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his Father's Will,
is inconsistent with the promise made to the Father by the Son, by the Logos
that was with the Father from the beginning, before he took the human nature :
as may be seen in Psal. xl. 6, 7, 8 (compared with the Apostle's interpretation,
Heb. x. 5 — 9), " Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire ; mine ears hast
thou opened [or boredj ; burnt-offering and sin-offering thou hast not required.
Then said I, Lo, I come : in the volume of the book it is written of me, I
delight to do thy Will, O my God, and thy law is within my heart." Where
is a manifest allusion to the covenant, which the willing servant, who loved
his master's service, made with his master, to be his servant forever, on the day
wherein he had his ear bored ; which covenant was probably inserted in the
public records, called the Volume of the Book, by the judges, who were called
to lake cognizance of the transaction ; Exod. xxi. If the Logos, who was with
the Father, before the world, and who made the world, thus engaged in cov-
enant to do the Will of the Father in the human nature, and the promise was
as it were recorded, that it might be made sure, doubtless it was impossible that
it should fail ; and so it was impossible that Christ should fail of doing the Will
of the Father in the human nature.
10. If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the Will of his
Father, and so to have failed of effectually working out redemption for sinners,
then the salvation of all the saints, who were saved from the beginning of the
world, to the death of Christ, was not built on a firm foundation. The Messiah,
•and the redemption which he was to work out by his obedience unto death,
was the foundation of the salvation of all the posterity of fallen man, that ever
were saved. Therefore, if when the Old Testament saints had the pardon of
their sins, and the favor of God promised them, and salvation bestowed upon
them, still it was possible that the Messiah, when he came, might commit sin,
then all this was on a foundation that was not firm and stable, but liable to
fail ; something which it was possible might never be. God did as it were
trust to what his Son had engaged and promised to do in future time ; and de-
pended so much upon it, that He proceeded actually to save men on the account
of it, as though it had been already done. But this trust and dependence of
God, on the supposition of Christ's being liable to fail of doing his Will, was
leaning on a staff that was weak, and might possibly break. — The saints of old
trusted in the promises of a future redemption to be wrought out and completed
by the Messiah, and built their comfort upon it : Abraham saw Christ's day
and rejoiced ; and he and the other Patriarchs died in the faith of the promise
of it. — (Heb. xi. 13.) But on this supposition, their faith and their comfort,
and their salvation, was built on a movable, fallible foundation ; Christ was
not to them a tried stone, a sure foundation : as in Isa. xxviii. 16. David en-
tirely rested on the covenant of God with him, concerning the future glorious
dominion and salvation of the Messiah, of his seed ; and says it was all his sal-
vation, and all his desire : and comforts himself that this covenant was an
" everlasting covenant, ordered in all things and sure," 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. But
if Christ's virtue might fail, he was mistaken : His great comfort was not built
so sure as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the determinations of
* See Dr. Whitby on the Five Points, p. 48, 49, 5<X
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 91
the Free Will of Christ's human Soul ; which was subject to no necessity, and
might be determined either one way or the other. Also the dependence of
those, who looked for redemption in Jerusalem, and waited for the consolation
of Israel, (Luke ii. 25 and 38,) and the confidence of the disciples of Jesus, who
forsook all and followed Him, that they might enjoy the benefits of his future
kingdom, were built on a sandy foundation.
11. The man Christ Jesus, before he had finished his course of obedience,
and while in the midst of temptation and trials, was abundant in positively pre-
dicting his own future glory in his kingdom, and the enlargement of his church,
the salvation of the Gentiles through him, &c, and in promises of blessings he
would bestow on his true disciples in his future kingdom ; on which promises
he required the full dependence of his disciples, (John xiv.,) But the disciples
would have had no ground for such dependence, if Christ had been liable to
fail in his work : and Christ Himself would have been guilty of presumption,
in so abounding in peremptory promises of great things, which depended on a
mere contingence, viz., the determinations of his Free Will, consisting in
a freedom ad utrumque, to either sin or holiness, standing in indifference,
and incident, in thousands of future instances, to go either one way or the
other.
Thus it is evident, that it was impossible that the Acts of the Will of the
human soul of Christ should be otherwise than holy, and conformed to the Will
of the Father ; or, in other words, they were necessarily so conformed.
I have been the longer in the proof of this matter, it being a thing denied
by some of the greatest Arminians, by Episcopius in particular ; and because
I look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy
between Calvinists and Arminians, concerning the necessity of such a freedom
of Will as is insisted on by the latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, com-
mand or prohibition, promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or
dispraise, merit or demerit. I now therefore proceed,
II. To consider whether Christ, in his holy behavior on earth, was not
thus a moral agent, subject to commands, promises, &c.
Dr. Whitby very often speaks of what he calls a freedom ad utrumlibet,
without necessity, as requisite to law and commands ; and speaks of necessity
as entirely inconsistent with injunctions and prohibitions. But yet we read of
Christ's being the subject of the commands of his Father, John x. 18, and xv.
10. And Christ tells us, that every thing he said, or did, was in compliance
with commandments he had received of the Father ; John xii. 49, 50, and xiv.
31. And we often read of Christ's obedience to his Father's commands, Rom.
v. 19, Phil. ii. 8, Heb. v. 8.
The forementioned writer represents promises offered as motives to persons
to do their duty, or a being moved and induced by promises, as utterly incon-
sistent with a state wherein persons have not a liberty ad utrumlibet, but are
necessarily determined to one. (See particularly, p. 297, 311.) But the
thing which this writer asserts, is demonstrably false, if the Christian religion
be true. If there be any truth in Christianity or the holy Scriptures, the man
Christ Jesus had his Will infallibly, unalterably and unfrustrably determined to
good, and that alone ; but yet he had promises of glorious rewards made to
Him, on condition of his persevering in, and perfecting the work which God
had appointed Him; Isa. liii. 10, 11, 12, Psal. ii. and ex., Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9,
In Luke xxii. 28, 29, Christ says to his disciples, " Ye are they which have
continued with me in my temptations ; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as
my Father hath appointed unto me." The word most properly signifies to
92 FREEDOM OF THE WIL^.
appoint by covenant or promise. The plain meaning of Christ's words is this :
" As you have partook of my temptations and trials, and have been steadfast, and
have overcome, I promise to make you partakers of my reward, and to give
you a kingdom ; as the Father has promised me a kingdom for continuing
steadfast, and overcoming in those trials." And the words are well explained
by those in Rev. iii. 21, "To him that overcometh, will 1 grant to sit with me
in my throne ; even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in
his throne." And Christ had not only promises of glorious success and rewards
made to his obedience and sufferings, but the Scriptures plainly represent him
as using these promises for motives and inducements to obey and suffer ; and
particularly that promise of a kingdom which the Father had appointed Him,
or sitting with the Father in his throne ; as in Heb. xii. 1, 2, " Let us lay
aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run
with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus, the Author and
finisher of our faith ; who, for the joy that was set before Him, endured the
cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of
God."
And how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert, that the holy
and excellent temper and behavior of Jesus Christ, and that obedience which he
performed under such great trials, was not virtuous or praiseworthy; because
his Will was not free ad utrumque, to either holiness or sin, but was unalterably
determined to one ; that upon this account there is no virtue at all, in all Christ's
humility, meekness, patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the
world, heavenly-mindedness, submission to the will of God, perfect obedience to
his commands, (though he was obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,)
his great compassion to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind, his
faithfulness to God and man, under such great trials ; his praying for his ene-
mies, even when nailing him to the cross ; that virtue, when applied to these
things, is but an empty name ; that there was no merit in any of these things ;
that is, that Christ was worthy of nothing at all on account of them, worthy of
no reward, no praise, no honor, or respect from God or man ; because his Will
was not indifferent, and free, either to these things, or the contrary ; but under
stlch a strong inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it
impossible that he should choose the contrary ; that upon this account (to use
Dr. Whitby's language) it would be sensibly unreasonable that the human nature
should be rewarded for any of these things.
According to this doctrine, that creature who is evidently set forth in Scrip-
ture as the^r^ born of every creature, as having in all things the pre-eminence,
and as the highest of all creatures in virtue, honor, and worthiness of esteem,
praise and glory, on the account of his virtue, is less worthy of reward or praise,
than the very least of saints ; yea, no more worthy than a clock or mere
machine, that is purely passive, and moved by natural necessity.
If we judge by Scriptural representations of things, we have reason to
suppose, that Christ took upon him our nature, and dwelt with us in this world,
in a suffering state, not only to satisfy for our sins, but that He, being in our
nature and circumstances, and under our trials, might be our most fit and proper
example, leader and captain, in the exercise of glorious and victorious virtue,
and might be a visible instance of the glorious end and reward of it ; that wt
might see in Him the beauty, amiableness, and true honor and glory, and ex-
ceeding benefit, of that virtue, which it is proper for us human beings to prac-
tise ; and might thereby learn, and be animated, to seek the like glory and
honor, and to obtain the like glorious reward. See Heb. ii. 9 — 14, with v 8,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 93
9, and xii. 1, 2, 3, John xv. 10, Rom. viii. 17, 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12, 1 Pet.
ii. 19, 20, and iv. 13. But if there was nothing of any virtue or merit, or
worthiness of any reward, glory, praise or commendation at all, in all that he
did, because it was all necessary, and he could not help it ; then how is here
any thing so proper to animate and excite us, free creatures, by patient contin-
uance in well doing, to seek for honor, glory, and immortality ?
God speaks of Himself as peculiarly well pleased with the righteousness of
this servant of his. Isa. xlii. 2 1, " The Lord is well pleased for his righteous-
ness' sake." The sacrifices of old are spoken of as a sweet savor to God, but
the obedience of Christ as far more acceptable than they. Psal. xl. 6, 7,
" Sacrifice and offering Thou didst not desire : mine ear hast Thou opened"
[as thy servant performing willing obedience] ; " burnt-offering and sin-offering
hast thou not required. Then said I, Lo, I come" [as a servant that cheerfully
answers the calls of his master] : " I delight to do thy will, O my God, yea, thy
law is within mine heart." Matth. xvii. 5, " This is my beloved Son, in whom
I am well pleased." And Christ tells us expressly, that the Father loves him
for that wonderful instance of his obedience, his voluntary yielding himself to
death, in compliance with the Father's command. John x. 17, 18, " There-
fore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life : no man taketh it
from me ; but I lay it down of myself. — This commandment received I of my
Father."
And if there was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death, if it was not
worthy of praise, and of the most glorious rewards, the heavenly hosts were
exceedingly mistaken, by the account that is given of them, in Rev. v. 8 — 12 :
" The four beasts and the four and twenty elders fell down before the Lamb,
having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odors. And they
sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the
seals thereof; for thou wast slain. — And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many
angels round about the throne, and the beasts, and the elders, and the number
of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands,
saying with a loud voice, " Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power
and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing."
Christ speaks of the eternal life which he was to receive, as the reward of his
obedience to the Father's commandments. John xii. 49, 50, " I have not
spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, He gave me a commandment
what I should say, and what I should speak ; and I know that his commandment
is life everlasting : whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father said unto me,
so I speak," God promises to divide him a portion with the great, &c. for his
being his righteous servant, for his glorious virtue under such great trials and
sufferings. Isa. liii. 11, 12, "He shall see the travail of his soul and be sat-
isfied : by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many ; for he shall
bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and
he shall divide the spoil with the strong, because he hath poured out his soul
unto death." The Scriptures represent God as rewarding him far above all his
other servants. Phil. ii. 7, 8, 9, " He took on him the form of a servant,
and was made in the likeness of men : and being found in fashion as a man, he
humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross;
wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every
name." Psal. xlv. 7, " Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness ;
therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy
fellows.
There is no room to pretend, that the glorious benefits bestowed in conse-
94 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
quence of Christ's obedience, are not properly of the nature of a reward.
What is a reward, in the most proper sense, but a benefit bestowed in conse-
quence of something morally excellent in quality or behavior, in testimony of
well pleasedness in that moral excellency, and respect and favor on that
account ? If we consider the nature of a reward most strictly, and make the
utmost of it, and add to the things contained in this description, proper merit
or worthiness, and the bestowment of the benefit in consequence of a promise ;
still it will be found, there is nothing belonging to it, but that the Scripture is
most express as to its belonging* to the glory bestowed on Christ, after his
sufferings ; as appears from what has been already observed : there was a glo-
rious benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally excellent, being
called Righteousness and Obedience ; there was great favor, love and well
pleasedness, for this righteousness and obedience, in the bestower ; there was
proper merit, or worthiness of the benefit, in the obedience ; it was bestowed in
fulfilment of promises made to that obedience ; and was bestowed therefore, or
because he had performed that obedience.
I may add to all these things, that Jesus Christ, while here in the flesh, was
manifestly in a state of trial. The last Adam, as Christ is called, Rom. v. 14,
1 Cor. xv. 45, taking on Him the human nature, and so the form of a servant,
and being under the law, to stand and act for us, was put into a state of trial,
as the first Adam was. — Dr. Whitby mentions these three things as evidences
of persons being in a state of trial (on the Five Points, p. 298, 299), namely,
their afflictions being spoken of as their trials or temptations, their being the
subjects of promises, and their being exposed to Satan's temptations. But
Christ was apparently the subject of each of these. Concerning promises made
to him, I have spoken already. The difficulties and afflictions he met with in
the course of his obedience, are called his temptations or trials." Luke xxii.
28, " Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations [or trials].99
Heb. ii. 18, " For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted [or tried],
He is able to succor them that are tempted." And chap. iv. 15, " We have
not an high priest, which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities ;
but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." And as to his
being tempted by Satan, it is what none will dispute.
SECTION III.
The Case of such as are given up of God to Sin, and of fallen Man in general, proves
moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with blameworthiness.
Dr. Whitby asserts freedom, not only from coaction, but Necessity, to be
essential to any thing deserving the name of Sin, and to an action's being cul-
pable, in these words (Discourse on the Five Points, edit. iii. p. 348) : "If
they be thus necessitated, then neither their sins of omission or commission
could deserve that name ; it being essential to the nature of Sin, according to
St. Austin's definition, that it be an action a quo liberum est abstinere. Three
things seem plainly necessary to make an action or omission culpable. 1.
That it be in our power to perform or forbear it; for, as Origen, and all the
Fathers say, no man is blameworthy for not doing what he could not do."
And elsewhere the Doctor insists, that " when any do evil of Necessity, what
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 95
they do us no vice, that they are guilty of no fault,* are worthy of no blame,
dispraise,t or dishonor,! but are unblamable.'^
If these things are true, in Dr. Whitby's sense of Necessity, they will prove
all such to be blameless, who are given up of God to sin, in what they commit
after they are thus given up. That there is such a thing as men's being judicially
given up to sin is certain, it the Scripture rightly informs us ; such a thing being
often there spoken of; as in Psal. lxxxi. 12, " So I gave them up to their own
hearts' lust, and they walked in their own counsels." Acts vii. 42, " Then
God turned, and gave them up to worship the host of heaven." Rom. i. 24,
" Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleann ess, 'through the lusts of their
own hearts, to dishonor their own bodies between themselves." Ver. 26, " For
this cause God gave them up to vile affections." Ver. 28, " And even as
they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a
reprobate mind, to do those things that are not convenient."
It is needless to stand particularly to inquire, what God's giving men up to
then own hearts' lusts signifies : it is sufficient to observe, that hereby is cer-
tainly meant God's so ordering or disposing things, in some respect or other,
either by doing or forbearing to do, as that the consequence should be men's
continuing in their sins. So much as men are given up to, so much is the con-
sequence of their being given up, whether that be less or more. If God does
not order things so, by action or permission, that sin will be the consequence,
then the event proves that they are not given up to that consequence. If good
be the consequence, instead of evil, then God's mercy is to be acknowledged
in that good ; which mercy must be contrary to God's judgment in giving up
to evil. If the event must prove, that they are given up to evil as the conse-
quence, then the persons, who are the subjects of this judgment, must be the
subjects of such an event, and so the event is necessary.
If not only coaction, but all Necessity, will prove men blameless, then Judas
was blameless, after Christ had given him over, and had already declared his
certain damnation, and that he should verily betray him. He was guilty of no sin
in betraying his master, on this supposition ; though his so doing is spoken of by
Christ as the most aggravated sin, more heinous than the sin of Pilate in cru-
cifying him. And the Jews in Egypt, in Jeremiah's time, were guilty of no
sin, in their not worshipping the true God, after God had sworn by his great
name, that his name should be no more named in the mouth of any man of Ju-
dah, in all the land of Egypt Jer. xliv. 26.
Dr. Whitby (Discourse on Five Points, p. 302, 303) denies, that men, in
this world, are ever so given up by God to sin, that their Wills should be necessa-
rily determined to evil ; though he owns, that hereby it may become exceeding
difficult for men to do good, having a strong bent, and powerful inclination, to
what is evil. — But if we should allow the case to be just as he represents, the
judgment of giving up to sin will no better agree with his notions of that lib-
erty, which is essential to praise or blame, than if we should suppose it to
render the avoiding of Sin impossible. For if an impossibility of avoiding Sin
wholly excuses a man ; then, for the same reason, its being difficult to avoid it,
excuses him in part ; and this just in proportion to the degree of difficulty. — If
the influence of moral impossibility or inability be the same, to excuse persons
in not doing, or not avoiding any thing, as that of natural inability (which is
supposed), then undoubtedly, in like manner, moral difficulty has the same in-
fluence to excuse with natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural impossi-
* Discourse on the Five Points, p. 347, 360, 377. t 303, 326, 329, and many other pi
* 371. $ 304, 361
96 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
bility wholly excuses, and also that natural difficulty excuses in part, and makes
the act or omission less blamable in proportion to the difficulty. All natural
difficulty according to the plainest dictate of the light of nature, excuses in
some degree, so that the neglect is not so blamable, as if there had been no
difficulty in the case : and so the greater the difficulty is, still the more excusa-
ble, in proportion to the increase of the difficulty. And as natural impossibility
wholly excuses and excludes all blame, so the nearer the difficulty approaches
to impossibility, still the nearer a person is to blamelessness in proportion to
that approach. And if the case of moral impossibility or necessity, be just the
same with natural necessity or coaction, as to influence to excuse a neglect,
then also, for the same reason, the case of natural difficulty, does not differ in
influence, to excuse a neglect, from moral difficulty, arising from a strong bias
or bent to evil, such as Dr. Whitby owns in the case of those that are given
up to their own hearts' lusts. So that the fault of such persons must be lessened,
in proportion to the difficulty, and approach to impossibility. If ten degrees
of moral difficulty make the action quite impossible, and so wholly excuse, then
if there be nine degrees of difficulty, the person is in great part excused, and is
nine degrees in ten less blameworthy, than if there had been no difficulty at all :
and he has but one degree of blameworthiness. The reason is plain on Armin-
ian principles, viz., because as difficulty by antecedent bent and bias on the Will,
is increased, liberty of indifference, and self-determination in the Will, is
diminished ; so much hinderance and impediment is there, in the way of the
WilFs acting freely, by mere self-determination. And if ten degrees of such
hinderance take away all such liberty, then nine degrees take away nine parts
in ten, and leave but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but one
degree of blamableness, cceteris paribus, in the neglect ; the man being no
further blamable in what he does, or neglects, than he has liberty in that affair :
for blame or praise (say they) arises wholly from a good use or abuse of
liberty.
From all which it follows, that a strong bent and bias one way, and diffi-
culty of going the contrary, never causes a person to be at all more exposed to
sin, or any thing blamable : because, as the difficulty is increased, so much the
less is required and expected. Though in one respect, exposedness to sin or
fault is increased, viz., by an increase of exposedness to the evil action or omis-
sion ; yet it is diminished in another respect, to balance it ; namely, as the sin-
fulness or blamableness of the action or omission is diminished in the same
proportion. So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposedness to guilt or
blame, is left just as it was.
To illustrate this, let us suppose a scale of a balance to be intelligent, and a
free agent, and indued with a self-moving power, by virtue of which it could act
and produce effects to a certain degree, ex. gr. to move itself up or down with
a force equal to a weight of ten pounds ; and that it might therefore be requir-
ed of it, in ordinary circumstances, to move itself down with that force ; for
which it has power and full liberty, and therefore would be blameworthy if it
failed of it. But then let us suppose a weight of ten pounds to be put in the
opposite scale, which in force entirely counterbalances its self-moving power,
and so renders it impossible for it to move down at all ; this therefore wholly
excuses it from any such motion. But if we suppose there to be only nine
pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its motion not impossible, but yet more
difficult : so that it can now only move down with the force of one pound : but
however this is all that is required of it under these circumstances ; it is wholly
excused from nine parts of its motion : and if the scaie, under these circumstan-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 97
cpf, neglects to move, and remains at rest, all that it will be blamed for, will be
its neglect of that one tenth part of its motion ; which it had as much liberty
and advantage for, as in usual circumstances it has for the greater motion, which
in such a case would be required. So that this new difficulty, does not at all
increase its exposedness to any thing blameworthy.
And thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of a man's duty, or
proclivity to sin, through a being given up to hardness of heart, or indeed by any
other means whatsoever, is an inconsistence, according to Dr. Whitby's notions
of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praise. The avoiding sin and blame, and
the doing what is virtuous and praiseworthy, must be always equally easy.
Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue, sin, &c, led him into another
great inconsistence. He abundantly insists, that necessity is inconsistent with
the nature of sin or fault. He says in the forementioned treatise, p. 14, " Who
can blame a person for doing what he could not help V And p. 15, " It
being sensibly unjust, to punish any man for doing that which was never in his
power to avoid." And in p. 341, to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the
Fathers, saying, " Why doth God command, if man hath not free Will and
power to obey w 'And again in the same and the next page, " Who will not
cry out, that it is folly to command him, that hath not liberty to do what is
commanded ; and that it is unjust to condemn him, that has it not in his power
to do what is required Vl And in p. 373, he cites another saying : " A law is
given to him that can turn to both parts, i. e. obey or transgress it : but no law
can be against him who is bound by nature."
And yet. the same Dr. Whitby asserts, that fallen man is not able to per-
form perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has these words : " The nature of Adam
had power to continue innocent, and without sin ; whereas it is certain our na-
ture never had." — But if we have not power to continue innocent and with-
out sin, then sin is inconsistent with Necessity, and we may be sinful in that
which we have not power to avoid ; and these things cannot be true which he
asserts elsewhere, namely, " That if we be necessitated, neither sins of omission
nor commission, would deserve that name," (p. 348.) If we have it not in our
power to be innocent, then we have it not in our power to to be blameless : and
if so, we are under a necessity of being blameworthy. — And how does this con-
sist with what he so often asserts, that necessity is inconsistent with blame or
praise 1 If we have it not in our power to perform perfect obedience, to
all the commands of God, then we are under a necessity of breaking some
commands, in some degree ; having no power to perform so much as is com-
manded. And if so, why does he cry out of the unreasonableness and folly of
commanding beyond what men have power to do ?
And Arminians in general are very inconsistent with themselves in what
they say of the inability of fallen Man in this respect. They strenuously main-
tain, that it would be unjust in God, to require any thing of us beyond our pre-
sent power and ability to perform ; and also hold, that we are now unable to
perform perfect obedience, and that Christ died to satisfy for the imperfections
of our obedience, and has made way, that our imperfect obedience might be
accepted instead of perfect : wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves
into the grossest inconsistence. For (as I have observed elsewhere), " they hold,
that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolished that rigorous constitution or law,
that they were under originally; and instead of it, has introduced a more inilrt
constitution, and put as under a new law, which requires no more than imper-
fect sincere obedience, in compliance with our poor, infirm, impotent circum-
stances since the fall."
Vol II. 13
98 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Now, how can these things be made consistent ? I would ask, what law
these imperfections of our obedience are a breach of ? If they are a breach of
no law that we were ever under, then they are not sins. And if they be not
sins, what need of Christ's dying to satisfy for them ? But if they are sins, and
the breach of some law, what law is it ? They cannot be a breach of their
new law ; for that requires no other than imperfect obedience, or obedience with
imperfections : and therefore to have obedience attended with imperfections, is
no breach of it ; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot be a breach of
their old law ; for that, they say, is entirely abolished ; and we never were under
it. They say, it would not be just in God to require of us perfect obedience, be-
cause it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or to punish us
for failing of it. And therefore, by their own scheme, the imperfections of our
obedience do not deserve to be punished. What need therefore of Christ's dy-
ing, to satisfy for them ? What need of his suffering to satisfy for that which
is no fault, and ' in its own nature deserves no suffering ? What need of
Christ's dying, to purchase, that our imperfect obedience should be accepted,
when, according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other
obedience than imperfect should be required 1 What need'of Christ's dying to
make way for God's accepting such an obedience, as it would be unjust in him
not to accept 1 Is there any need of Christ's dying, to prevail with God not to
do unrighteously ? If it be said, that Christ died to so satisfy that old law for
us, that so we might not be under it, but that there might be room for our being
under a more mild law : still I would inquire, what need of Christ's dying, that
we might not be under a law , which (by their principles) it would be in itself
unjust that we should be under, whether Christ had died or no , because, in our
present state, we are not able to keep it ?
So the Arminians are inconsistent with themselves, not only in what they
say of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone for those imperfections, which
we cannot avoid, but also in what they say of the grace of God, granted to
enable men to perform the sincere obedience of the new law. " I grant (says Dr.
Stebbing*), indeed, that by reason of original sin, we are utterly disabled for the
performance of the condition, without new grace from God. But I say then, .
that he gives such grace to all of us, by which the performance of the condition
is truly possible : and upon this ground he may, and doth most righteously re-
quire it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to speak properly, by grace he must mean,
that assistance which is of grace, or of free favor and kindness. But yet in
the same place he speaks of it as very unreasonable, unjust and cruel, for God
to acquire that, as the condition of pardon, that is become impossible by origi-
nal Sin. If it be so, what grace is there in giving assistance and ability to per-
form the condition of pardon 1 Or why is that called by the name of grace,
that is an absolute debt, which God is bound to bestow, and which it would be
unjust and cruel in Him to withhold, seeing he requires that, as the condition of
pardon, which we cannot perform without it
* Treatise of the Operations of the Spirit, second edition, p. 112, 113.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 99
SECTION IV
Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.
It being so much insisted on by Arminian writers, that necessity is inconsis-
tent with Law or Command, and particularly, that it is absurd to suppose God by
his command should require that of men which they are unable to do ; not
allowing in this case for any difference that there is between natural and moral
Inability ; I would therefore now particularly consider this matter.
And, for the greater clearness, I would distinctly lay down the following
things.
I. The Will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of the
Will, is thp proper object of precept or Command. That is, such or such a state
or acts of men's Wills, is in many cases, properly required of them by Command ;
and not those alterations in the state of their bodies or minds only that are the
consequences of volition. This is most manifest : for it is the soul only that is
properly and directly the subject of precepts or commands; that only being ca-
pable of receiving or perceiving commands. The motions or state of the body
are matter of command, only as they are subject to the soul, and connected with
its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most
direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any command, but the
faculty of the Will ; and it is by this faculty only, that the soul can directly dis-
obey, or refuse compliance ; for the very notions of consenting, yielding,
accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, &c, are, according to the meaning of
the terms, nothing but certain acts of the Will. Obedience, in the primary
nature of it, is the submitting and yielding of the Will of one to the Will of
another. Disobedience is the not consenting, not complying of the Will of the
commanded to the manifested Will of the commander. Other acts that are not
the acts of the Will, as certain motions of the body and alterations in the soul,
are obedience or disobedience only indirectly as they are connected with the
state or acts of the Will, according to an established law of nature. So that it
is manifest, the Will itself may be required, and the being of a good Will is the
most proper, direct and immediate subject of command ; and if this cannot be
prescribed or required by command or precept, nothing can ; for other things can
be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good
Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the Will, or a series of acts, one follow-
ing another, and one the effect of another, the first and determining act is properly
the subject of command, and not the consequent acts only, which are dependent
upon it. Yea, it is this more especially, which is that which command or pre-
cept has a proper respect to ; because it is this act that determines the whole
affair : in this act the obedience or disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner ; the
consequent acts being all subject to it, and governed and determined by it. This
determining, governing act must be the proper subject of precept, or none.
Corol. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if there be any
sort of act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts of the Will or acts of
choice in the case directing and determining what the acts of the Will shall be ;
that act or exertion of the soul cannot properly be subject to command or pre-
cept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately oi
remotely. Such acts cannot be subject to commands directly, because they are
100 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
no acts of the Will ; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the Will,
determining and giving rise to all its acts : they not being acts of the Will, there
can be in them no consent to, or compliance with, any command. Neither can
they be subject to command or precept, indirectly ox remotely ; for they are not
so much as the effects or consequences of the Will, being prior to all its acts. So
that if there be any obedience in that original act of the soui, determining all
volitions, it is an act of obedience wherein the Will has no concern at all ; it
preceding every act of Will. And therefore, if the soul either obeys or disobeys
in this act, it is wholly involuntarily ; there is no willing obedience or rebellion,
no compliance or opposition of the Will in the affair : and what sort of obedience
or rebellion is this 1
And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the Will consisting in the
soul's determining its own acts of Will, instead of being essential to moral agency,
and to men's being the subjects of moral government is utterly inconsistent with
it. For if the soul determines all its acts of Will, it is therein subject to no
command or moral government, as has been now observed ; because its original
determining act is no act of Will or choice, it being prior, by the supposition,
to every act of Will. And the soul cannot be the subject of command in the
act of the Will itself which depends on the foregoing determining act, and is
determined by it ; inasmuch as this is necessary, being the necessary consequence
and effect of that prior determining act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the
man be a subject of command or government in his external actions ; because
these are all necessary, being the necessary effects of the acts of the Will them-
selves. So that mankind, according to this scheme, are subjects of command
or moral government in nothing ; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded,
and no room for virtue or vice in the world.
So that it is the Arminian scheme, and not the scheme of the Calvinists, that
is utterly inconsistent with moral government, and with the use of laws, precepts,
prohibitions, promises or threatenings. Neither is there any way whatsoever
to make their principles consist with these things. For if it be said, that there
is no prior determining act of the soul, preceding the acts of the Will, but that
volitions are events that come to pass by pure accident, without any determining
cause, this is most palpably inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts ; for
nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and regulate per-
fect accident ; which, by the supposition of its being pure accident, is in no case
regulated by any thing preceding ; but happens, this way or that, perfectly by
chance, without any cause or rule. The perfect uselessness of laws and precepts
also follows from the Arminian notion of indifference, as essential to that lib-
erty, which is requisite to virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to bind to one
side ; and the end of commands is to turn the Will one way ; and therefore
they are of no use, unless they turn or bias the Will that way. But if liberty
consists in indifference, then their biassing the Will one way only, destroys lib-
erty ; as it puts the Will out of equilibrium. So that the Will, having a bias,
through the influence of binding law, laid upon it, is not wholly left to itself, to
determine itself which way it will, without influence from without.
II. Having shown that the Will itself, especially in those acts, which are
original, leading and determining in any case, is the proper subject of precept
and command, and not only those alterations in the body, &c, which are the
effects of the Will ; I now proceed, in the second place, to observe that the very
opposition or defect of the Will itself, in that act, which is its original and deter-
mining act in the case ; I say the Will's opposition in this act to a thing proposed
or commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a moral Inability to that thing :
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 101
or, in other words, whenever a command requires a certain state or act of the
Will, and the person commanded, notwithstanding the command and the circum-
stances under which it is exhibited, still finds his Will opposite or wanting, in
that, belonging to its state or acts, which is original and determining in the
affair, that man is morally unable to obey that command.
This is manifest from what was observed in the first part, concerning the
nature of moral Inability, as distinguished from natural ; where it was observed,
that a man may then be said to be morally unable to do a thing, when he is
under the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination, or has a want of in-
clination, under such circumstances and views. It is also evident, from what
has been before proved, that the Will is always, and in every individual act,
necessarily determined by the strongest motive ; and so is always unable to go
against the motive, which, all things considered, has now the greatest strength
and advantage to move the Will.— But not further to insist on these things, the
truth of the position now laid down, viz., that when the Will is opposite to, or,
fading of a compliance with a thing in its original, determining inclination or
act. it is not able to comply, appears by the consideration of these two things.
1. The Will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or inclination,
and when actually under the influence of it, is not able to exert itself to the con-
trary, to make an alteration, in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable
to change itself : and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to incline to
change itself. Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise : for
that would be at present to choose something diverse from what is at present
chosen. If the Will, all things now considered, inclines or chooses to go that
way, then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go the other way, and so
cannot choose to be made to go the other way. To suppose that the mind is now
sincerely inclined to change itself to a different inclination, is to suppose the mind
is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined. The Will may oppose
some future remote act that it is exposed to, but not its own present act.
2. A s it is impossible that the Will should comply with the thing commanded,
with respect to its leading act, by any act of its own, in the time of that diverse
or opposite leading and original act, or after it has actually come under the in-
fluence of that determining choice or inclination ; so it is impossible it should be
determined to a compliance by any foregoing act ; for, by the very supposition,
there is no foregoing act ; the opposite or noncomplying act being that act which
is original and determining in the case. Therefore it must be so, that if this
first determining act be found noncomplying, on the proposal of the command,
the mind is morally unable to obey. For to suppose it to be able to obey, is to
suppose it to be able to determine and cause its first determining act to be other-
wise, and that it has power better to govern and regulate its first governing and
regulating act, which is absurd ; for it is to suppose a prior act of the Will,
determining its first determining act ; that is, an act prior to the first, and lead-
ing and governing the original and governing act of all ; which is a contra-
diction.
Here if it should be said, that although the mind has not any ability to Will
contrary to what it does Will, in the original and leading act of the Will, be-
cause there is supposed to be no prior act to determine and order it otherwise,
and the Will cannot immediately change itself, because it cannot at present
incline to a change ; yet the mind has an ability for the present to forbear to
proceed to action, and to take time for deliberation ; which may be an occasion
of the change of the inclination,
J answer, (1.) In this objection that seems to be forgotten which was ob-
102 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
served before, viz., that the determining to take the matter into consideration, i&
itself an act of the Will ; and if this be all the act wherein the mind exercises
ability and freedom, then this, by the supposition, must be all that can be com-
manded or required by precept. And if this act be the commanded act, then all
that has been observed concerning the commanded act of the Will remains true,
that the very want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) WTe are
speaking concerning the first and leading act of the Will in the case, or about
the affair ; and if a determining to deliberate, or on the contrary, to proceed
immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading act ; or whether it
be or no, if there be another act before it, which determines that ; or whatever
be the original and leading act ; still the foregoing proof stands good, that the
noncompliance of the leading act implies moral Inability to comply.
If it should be objected, that these things make all moral Inability equal,
and suppose men morally unable to Will otherwise than they actually do Will,
in all cases, and equally so in every instance :
In answer to this objection, I desire two things may be observed. First,
That if by being equally unable, be meant as really unable ; then, so far as the
Inability is merely moral, it is true, the Will, in every instance, acts by moral
necessity and is morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and properly in one
case as another ; as I humbly conceive has been perfectly and abundantly
demonstrated by what has been said in the preceding part^f this Essay. But
yet, in some respect, the Inability may be said to be greater in some instances
than others ; though the man may be truly unable (if moral Inability can truly
be called Inability), yet he may be further from being able to do some things
than others. As it is in things, which men are naturally unable to do. — A per-
son, whose strength is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of one hundred
pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten
thousands pounds ; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter weight
than the former ; and so, according to common use of speech, has a greater In-
ability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is truly morally unable to
choose contrary to a present inclination, which in the least degree prevails ; or,
contrary to that motive, which, all things considered, has strength and advantage
now to move the Will, in the least degree, superior to all other motives in view ;
but yet he is further from ability to resist a very strong habit, and a violent and
deeply rooted inclination, or a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength.
And again, the Inability may, in some respects, be called greater in some instan-
ces than others, as it may be more general and extensive to all acts of that kind
So men may be said to be unable in a different sense, and to be further from
moral ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than
they who have only that Inability which is occasional and particular* Thus
in cases of natural Inability ; he that is born blind may be said to be unable to
see, in a different manner, and is, in some respects, further from being able to
see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient cloud or mist.
And besides, that which was observed in the first part of this discourse, con-
cerning the Inability which attends a strong and settled habit, should be here
remembered, viz., that fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability,
by which it is distinguished from occasional volition, namely, that endeavors to
avoid future volitions of that kind, which are agreeable to such a habit, much
more frequently and commonly prove vain and insufficient. For though it is
impossible there should be any true, sincere desires and endeavors against a
* See this distinction of moral Inability explained in Part I. Sect. IV,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 103
present volition or choice, yet there may be against volitions of that kind, when
viewed at a distance. A person may desire and use means to prevent future
exercises of a certain inclination; and, in order to it, may wish the habit might
be removed ; but his desires and endeavors may be ineffectual. The man may
be said in some sense to be unable ; yea, even as the word unable is a relative
term, and has relation to ineffectual endeavors ; yet not with regard to present,
but remote endeavors.
Secondly, It must be borne in mind, according to what was observed before,
that indeed no Inability whatsoever, which is merely moral, is properly called by
the name of Inability ; and that in the strictest propriety of speech, a man may
be said to have a thing in his power, if he has it at his election ; and he cannot
be said to be unable to do a thing, when he can, if he now pleases, or whenever
he has a proper, direct and immediate desire for it. As to those desires and en-
deavors, that may be against the exercises of a strong habit, with regard to which
men may be said to be unable to avoid those exercises, they are remote desires
and endeavors in two respects. First, as to time ; they are never against pres-
ent volitions, but only against volitions of such a kind, when viewed at a distance.
Secondly, as to their nature ; these opposite desires are not directly and properly
against the habit and inclination itself, or the volitions in which it is exercised ;
for these, sin themselves considered, are agreeable ; but against something else,
that attends them, or is their consequence ; the opposition of the mind is level-
led entirely against this ; the inclination or volitions themselves are not at all
opposed directly, and for their own sake; but only indirectly and remotely on
the account of something alien and foreign.
III. Though the opposition of the Will itself, or the very want of Will to
a thing commanded, implies a moral Inability to that thing ; yet, if it be, as
has been already shown, that the being of a good state or act of Will, is a
thing most properly required by command ; then, in some cases, such a state
or act of Will may properly be required, which at present is not, and which
may also be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore those things may
properly be commanded, which men have a moral Inability for.
Such a state, or act of the Will, may be required by command, as does not
already exist. For if that volition only may be commanded to be which already
is, there could be no use of precept ; commands in all cases would be perfectly
vain and impertinent. And not only may such a Will be required, as is want-
ing before the command is given, but also such as may possibly be wanting
afterwards ; such as the exhibition of the command may not be effectual to
produce or excite. — Otherwise, no such things as disobedience to a proper and
rightful command is possible in any case ; and there is no case supposable or
possible, wherein there can be an inexcusable or faulty disobedience ; which
Arminiam cannot affirm consistently with their principles : for this makes obe-
dience to just and proper commands always necessary, and Disobedience im-
possible. And so the Arminian would overthrow himself, yielding the very
point we are upon, which he so strenuously denies, viz., that law and command
are consistent with necessity.
If merely that Inability will excuse disobedience, which is implied in the
opposition or defect of inclination, remaining after the command is exhibited,
then wickedness always carries that in it which excuses it. It is evermore so,
that by how much the more wickedness there is in a man's heart, by so much
is his inclination to evil the stronger, and by so much the more, therefore, has
he of moral Inability to the good required. His moral Inability, consisting in
the strength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickedness
104 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
consists ; and yet, according to Arminian principles, it must be a thing incon-
sistent with wickedness ; and by how much the more he has of it, by so much
is he the further from wickedness.
Therefore, on the whole, it is manifest, that moral Inability alone (which
consists in disinclination) never renders any thing improperly the subject matter
of precept or command, and never can excuse any person in disobedience, or
want of conformity to a command
Natural Inability, arising from the want of natural capacity, or external
hinderance (which alone is properly called Inability), without doubt wholly
excuses, or makes a thing improperly the matter of command. If men are ex-
cused from doing or acting any good thing, supposed to be commanded, it must
be through some defect or obstacle that is not in the Will itself, but extrinsic to
it ; either in the capacity of understanding, or body, or outward circumstances.
Here two or three things may be observed :
1. As to spiritual duties or acts, or any good thing in the state or immanent
acts of the Will itself, or of the affections (which are only certain modes of the
exercise of the Will), if persons are justly excused, it must be through want of
capacity in the natural faculty of understanding. Thus the same spiritual duties,
or holy affections and exercises of heart, cannot be required of men, as may
be of angels ; the capacity of understanding being so much inferior. So men
cannot be required to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no op-
portunity to see, 01 hear of, or come to the knowledge of, in any way agreeable
to the natural state and capacity of the human understanding. But the in-
sufficiency of motives will not excuse ; unless their being insufficient arises not
from the moral state of the Will or inclination itself, but from the state of the
natural understanding. The great kindness and generosity of another may be
a motive insufficient to excite gratitude in the person, that receives the kind-
ness, through his vile and ungrateful temper : in this case, the insufficiency of
the motive arises from the state of the Will or inclination of heart, and does
not at all excuse. But if this generosity is not sufficient to excite gratitude,
being unknown, there being no means of information adequate to the state and
measure of the person's faculties, this insufficiency is attended with a natural
Inability which entirely excuses.
2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which
do not consist in the immanent acts or state of the Will itself, but are supposed
to be required as effects of the Will ; I say, in such supposed effects of the Will,
in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding ; that Ina-
bility, and that only excuses, which consists in want of connection between
them and the Will. If the Will fully complies, and the proposed effect does
not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition,
the man is perfectly excused ; he has a natural Inability to the thing required.
For the Will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and imme-
diately required by Command ; and other things only indirectly, as connected
with the Will. If, therefore, there be a full compliance of Will, the person has
done his duty ; and if other things do not prove to be connected with his vo-
lition, that is not owing to him.
3. Both these kinds of natural Inability that have been mentioned, and
so all Inability that excuses, may be resolved into one thing, namely, want oi
natural capacity or strength ; either capacity of understanding, or external
strength. For when there are external defects and obstacles, they would be
no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations of understanding
and strength.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 105
Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability, may properly be
the matter of precept or command, then they may also of invitation and coun-
sel. Commands and invitations come very much to the same thing ; the differ-
ence is only circumstantial : commands are as much a manifestation of the Will
of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much testimonies of expectation ot
compliance. The difference between them lies in nothing that touches the
affair in hand. The main difference between command and invitation consists in
the enforcement of the Will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it
is his kindness, the goodness which his Will arises from : in the former it is his
authority. But whatever be the ground of the Will of -him that speaks, or the
enforcement of what he says, yet, seeing neither his Will nor expectation is
any more testified in the one case than the other ; therefore a person's being
known to be morally unable to do the thing to which he is directed by Invita-
tion, is no more an evidence of insincerity in him that directs in manifesting
either a Will, or expectation which he has not, than his being known to be
morally unable to do what he is directed to by command. So that all this grand
objection of Arminians against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in
Christ, or to perform other spiritual gospel duties, from the sincerity of God's
counsels and invitations, must be without force.
SECTION V
That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the Non-
performance of Things in themselves good, particularly considered.
It is what is much insisted on by many, that some men, though they are not
able to perform spiritual duties, such as repentance of sin, love of God, a cordial
acceptance of Christ as exhibited and offered in the gospel, &c, yet they may
sincerely desire and endeavor these things ; and therefore must be excused ; it
being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things, which they
sincerely desire and endeavor to do, but cannot do.
Concerning this matter, the following things may be observed :
1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake and gross absurdity ; even
that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of love, accept-
ance, choice, rejection, &c, consisting in the exercise of the Will itself, or in
the disposition and inclination of the heart ; and yet not be able to perform or
exert them. This is absurd, because it is absurd to suppose that a man should
directly, properly and sincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the same
time is contrary to his inclination : for that is to suppose him not to be inclined
to that, to which he is inclined. If a man, in the state and acts of his Will and
inclination, does properly and directly fall in with those duties, he therein per-
forms them : for the duties themselves consist in that very thing ; they consist
in the state and acts of the Will being so formed and directed. If the soul properly
and sincerely falls in with a certain proposed act of Will or choice, the soul therein
makes that choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in with a pro-
posed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to move in that direction.
2. That which is called a desire and willingness for those inward duties, in
such as do not perform them, has respect to these duties only indirectly and re-
motely, and is improperly represented as a willingness for them ; not only
because (as was observed before) it respects those good volitions only in a
Vol. II 14
106 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
distant view, and with respect to future time ; but also because evermore, not
these things themselves, but something else, that is alien and foreign, is the ob-
ject that terminates these volitions and desires.
A drunkard, who continues in his drunkenness, being under the power of a
love, and violent appetite to strong drink, and without any love to virtue ; but
being also extremely covetous and close, and very much exercised and grieved
at the diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may in a sort desire the
virtue of temperance ; and though his present Will is to gratify his extravagant
appetite, yet he may wish he had a heart to forbear future acts of intemperance,
and forsake his excesses, through an unwillingness to part with his money :
but still he goes on with his drunkenness ; his wishes and endeavors are insuffi-
cient and ineffectual : such a man has no proper, direct, sincere willingness to
forsake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it : for he acts volunta-
rily in continuing to drink to excess : his desire is very improperly called a
willingness to be temperate ; it is no true desire of that virtue ; for it is not
that virtue, that terminates his wishes ; nor have they any direct respect to it.
It is only the saving his money, and avoiding poverty, that terminates and ex-
hausts the whole strength of his desire. The virture of temperance is regarded
only very indirectly and improperly, even as a necessary means of gratifying the
vice of covetousness.
So a man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love to God
and Jesus Christ, but, on the contrary, being very profanely and carnally in-
clined, has the greatest distaste of the things of religion, and enmity against them ;
yet being of a family, that from one generation to another, have most of them
died, in youth, of an hereditary consumption ; and so having little hope of living
long ; and having been instructed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ,
and gratitude for his death and sufferings, in order to his salvation from eternal
misery ; if under these circumstances he should, through fear of eternal torments,
wish he had such a disposition : but his profane and carnal heart remaining, he
continues still in his habitual distaste of, and enmity to God and religion, and
wholly without any exercise of that love and gratitude (as doubtless the very
devils themselves, notwithstanding all the devilishness of their temper, would
wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell) : in this case,
there is no sincere willingness to love Christ snd choose him as his chief good :
these holy dispositions and exercises are not at all the direct object of the Will •
they truly share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul ; but all is ter-
minated on deliverance from torment : and these graces and pious volitions,
notwithstanding this forced consent, are looked upon as undesirable ; as when
a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors, to save his life. — From these things
it appears,
3. That this indirect willingness which has been spoken of, is not that exer-
cise of the Will which the command requires ; but is entirely a different one ;
being a volition of a different nature, and terminated altogether on different ob-
jects ; wholly falling short of that virtue of Will, which the command has
respect to.
4. This other volition, which has only some indirect concern with the duty
required, cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself, which is command-
ed ; being not the thing which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly
destitute of the virtue which the command seeks.
Further to illustrate this matter. — If a child has a most excellent father, that
has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has every way
in the highest degree merited his love and dutiful regard, being withal ver)
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 107
wealthy ; but the son is of so vile a disposition, that he inveterately hates his
father ; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin,
by bringing him finally to poverty and abject circumstances, through his father's
disinheriting him, or otherwise ; which is exceeding cross to his avarice and
ambition ; he therefore wishes it were otherwise : but yet, remaining under the
invincible power of his vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in his
settled hatred of his father. Now, if such a son's indirect willingness to have
love and honor towards his father, at all acquits or excuses before God, for his
failing of actually exercising these dispositions towards him, which God requires,
it must be on one of these accounts. (1.) Either that it answers and fulfils the
command. But this it does not by the supposition ; because the thing com-
manded is love and honor to his worthy, parent. If the command be proper and
just, as is supposed, then it obliges to the thing commanded ; and so nothing else
but that can answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be at least, because there
is that virtue or goodness in his indirect willingness, that is equivalent to the
virtue required ; and so balances or countervails it, and makes up for the want
of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition. The willingness the son has
merely from regard to money and honor, has no goodness in it, to countervail
the want of the pious filial respect required.
Sincerity and reality, in that indirect willingness which has been spoken of,
does not make it the better. That which is real and hearty is often called sin-
cere ; whether it be in virtue or vice. Some persons are sincerely bad ; others
are sincerely good ; and others may be sincere and hearty in things, which are
in their own nature indifferent ; as a man may be sincerely desirous of eating
when he is hungry. But a being sincere, hearty and in good earnest, is no vir-
tue, unless it be in a thing that is virtuous. A man may be sincere and hearty
in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out,
and besought Christ not to torment them, it was no mere pretence ; they were
very hearty in their desires not to be tormented ; but this did not make their
Will or desires virtuous. — And if men have sincere desires, which are in their
kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for the want of any required
virtue.
And as a man's being sincere in such an indirect desire or willingness to do
his duty, as has been mentioned, cannot excuse for the want of performance ;
so it is with endeavors arising from such a willingness. The endeavors can have
no more goodness in them, than the Will which they are the effect and ex-
pression of. And, therefore, however sincere and real, and however great a
person's endeavors are ; yea, though they should be to the utmost of his ability ;
unless the Will which they proceed from be truly good and virtuous, they can
be of no avail, influence or weight to any purpose whatsoever, in a moral sense
or respect. That which is not truly virtuous, in God's sight, is looked upon, by
him, as good for nothing ; and so can be of no value, weight or influence in his
account, to recommend, satisfy, excuse or make up for any moral defect. For
nothing can counterbalance evil, but good. If evil be in one scale, and we put
a great deal into the other, sincere and earnest desires, and many and great en-
deavors ; yet, if there be no real goodness in all, there is no weight in it ; and
so it does nothing towards balancing the real weight, which is in the opposite
scale. It is only like the subtracting a thousand noughts from before a real
number, which leaves the sum just as it was.
Indeed such endeavors may have a negatively good influence. Those things,
which have no positive virtue have no positive moral influence ; yet they may be an
occasion of persons avoiding some positive evils. As if a man were in the water
108 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
with a neighbor, that he had ill will to, who could not swim, holding him by his
hand ; which neighbor was much in debt to him ; and should be tempted to let
him sink and drown ; but should refuse to comply with the temptation ; not
from love to his neighbor, but from the love of money, and because by his drown-
ing he should lose his debt ; that which he does in preserving his neighbor from
drowning, is nothing good in the sight of God ; yet hereby he avoids the greater
guilt that would have been contracted, if he had designedly let his neighbor sink
and perish. But when Arminians, in their disputes with Calvinists, insist so
much on sincere desires and endeavors, as what must excuse men, must be ac-
cepted of God, &c, it is manifest they have respect to some positive moral
weight or influence of those desires and endeavors. Accepting, justifying or
excusing on the account of sincere honest endeavors (as they are called), and
men's doing what they can, &c, has relation to some moral value, something
that is accepted as good, and as such, countervailing some defect.
But there is a great and unknown deceit arising from the ambiguity of the
phrase, sincere endeavors. Indeed there is a vast indistinctness and unnxedness
in most, or at least very many of the terms used to express things pertaining to
moral and spiritual matters. Whence arise innumerable mistakes, strong preju-
dices, inextricable confusion, and endless controversy.
The word sincere, is most commonly used to signify something that is good :
men are habituated to understand by it the same as honest and upright ; which
terms excite an idea of some good thing in the strictest and highest sense ; good in
the sight of him, who sees not only the outward appearance, but the heart. And,
therefore, men think that if a person be sincere, he will certainly be accepted.
If it be said that any one is sincere in his endeavors, this suggests to men's minds
as much, as that his heart and Will is good, that there is no defect of duty, as to
virtuous inclination ; he honestly and uprightly desires and endeavors to do as he
\s required ; and this leads them to suppose, that it would be very hard and un-
reasonable to punish him, only because he is unsuccessful in his endeavors, the
thing endeavored being beyond his power. — Whereas it ought to be observed,
that the word sincere has these different significations :
1. Sincerity, as the word is sometimes used, signifies no more than reality
of Will and endeavor, with respect to any thing that is professed or pretended ;
without any consideration of the nature of the principle or aim, whence this real
Will and true endeavor arises. If a man has some real desire to obtain a thing,
either direct or indirect, or does really endeavor after a thing, he is said sincerely to
desire or endeavor it ; without any consideration of the goodness or virtuousness of
the principle he acts from, or any excellency or worthiness of the end he acts for.
Thus a man who is kind to his neighbor's wife, who is sick and languishing, and
very helpful in her case, makes a show of desiring and endeavoring her restora-
tion to health and vigor ; and not only makes such a show, but there is a reality
in his pretence, he does heartily and earnestly desire to have her health restored,
and uses his true and utmost endeavors for it ; he is said sincerely to desire and
endeavor it ; because he does so truly or really ; though perhaps the principle
he acts from, is no other than a vile and scandalous passion ; having lived in
adultery with her, he earnestly desires to have her health and vigor restored, that
he may return to his criminal pleasures with her. Or,
2. By sincerity is meant, not merely a reality of Will and endeavor of some
sort or other, and from some consideration or other, but a virtuous sincerity.
That is, that in the performance of those particular acts, that are the matter of
virtue or duty, there be not only the matter, but the form and essence of virtue,
consisting in the aim that governs the act, and the principle exercised in it.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 109
There is not only the reality of the act, that is as it were the body of the duty ;
but also the soul, which should properly belong to such a body. In this sense,
a man is said to be sincere, when he acts with a pure intention ; not from
sinister views, or by-ends : he not only in reality desires and seeks the thing
to be done, or qualification to be obtained, for some end or other ; but he wills
the thing directly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed ; the virtue of the
thing is properly the object of the Will.
In the former sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition to a mere
pretence, and show of the particular thing to be done or exhibited, without any
real desire or endeavor at all. In the latter sense, a man is said to be sincere,
in opposition to that show of virtue there is in merely doing the matter of duty,
without the reality of the virtue itself in the soul, and the essence of it, which
there is a show of. A man may be sincere in the former sense, and yet in the
latter be in the sight of God, who searches the heart, a vile hypocrite.
In the latter kind of sincerity only, is there any thing truly valuable or ac-
ceptable in the sight of God. And this is the thing, which in Scripture is
called sincerity, uprightness, integrity, truth in the inward parts, and a being
of a perfect heart. And if there be such a sincerity, and such a degree of it as
there ought to be, and there be any thing further that the man is not able to
perform, or which does not prove to be connected with his sincere desires and
endeavors, the man is wholly excused and acquitted in the sight of God ; his
Will shall surely be accepted for his deed ; and such a sincere Will and en-
deavor is all that in strictness is required of him, by any command of God.
But as to the other kind of sincerity' of desires and endeavors, it having no vir-
tue in it (as was observed before), can be of no avail before God, in any case,
to recommend, satisfy, or excuse, and has no positive moral weight or influence
whatsoever.
Cowl. 1. Hence it may be inferred, that nothing in the reason and nature
of things appears, from the consideration of any moral weight of that former
kind of sincerity, which has been spoken of, at all obliging us to believe, or
leading us to suppose, that God has made any positive promises of salvation,
or grace, or any saving assistance, or any spiritual benefit whatsoever, to any
desires, prayers, endeavors, striving or obedience of those, who hitherto have no
true virtue or holiness in their hearts ; though we should suppose all the sin-
cerity, and the utmost degree of endeavor, that is possible to be in a person
without holiness.
Some object against God's requiring, as the condition of salvation, those
holy exercises, which are the result of a supernatural renovation : such as a
supreme respect to Christ, love to God, loving holiness for its own sake, &c,
that these inward dispositions and exercises are above men's power, as they
are by nature ; and therefore that we may conclude, that when men are brought
to be sincere in their endeavors, and do as well as they can, they are accepted ',
and that this must be all that God requires, in order to men's being received as
the objects of his favor, and must be what God has appointed as the condition
of salvation. Concerning which, I would observe, that in such a manner of
speaking of men's being accepted, because they are sincere, and do as well as
they can, there is evidently a supposition of some virtue, some degree of that
which is truly good ; though it does not go so far as were to be wished. For
if men do what they can, unless their so doing be from some good principle,
disposition, or exercise of heart, some virtuous inclination or act of the Will ;
their so doing what they can, is in some respects not a whit better than if they
did nothing. In such a case, there is no more positive moral goodness in a
110 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
man's doing what he can, than in a windmill's doing what it can ; because the
action does no more proceed from virtue ; and there is nothing in such sincerity
of endeavor, or doing what we can, that should render it any more a proper or
fit recommendation to positive favor and acceptance, or the condition of any
reward or actual benefit, than doing nothing ; for both the one and the other
are alike nothing, as to any true moral weight or value.
CoroL 2. Hence also it follows, that there is nothing that appears in the
reason and nature of things, which can justly lead us to determine, that God
will certainly give the necessary means of salvation, or some way or other be-
stow true holiness and eternal life on those Heathen, who are sincere (in the
sense above explained) in their endeavors to find out the Will of the Deity,
and to please him, according to their light, that they may escape his future
displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness in the future state through his
favor.
SECTION VI.
Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent
with it ; and all, either virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations, inconsistent with
Arminian Notions of Liberty and moral Agency.
To suppose such a freedom of Will, as Arminians talk of, to be requisite
to virtue and vice, is many ways contrary to common sense.
If indifference belongs to liberty of Will, as Arminians suppose, and it be
essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of liberty, as they
also suppose ; it will follow, that it is essential to a virtuous action, that it be
performed in a state of indifference ; and if it be performed in a state of indiffer-
ence, then doubtless it must be performed in the time of indifference. And so
it will follow, that in order to the virtuousness of an act, the heart must be in-
different in the time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent and
cold the heart is with relation to the act which is performed, so much the better ;
because the act is performed with so much the greater liberty. But is this
agreeable to the light of nature ? Is it agreeable to the notions, which man-
kind, in all ages, have of virtue, that it lies in that, which is contrary to in-
difference, even in the tendency and inclination of the heart to virtuous action ;
and that the stronger the inclination, and so the further from indifference, the
more virtuous the heart, and so much more praiseworthy the act which proceeds
from it ?
If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that
there may be an act of Will in a state of indifference ; for instance, this act,
viz., the Will's determining to put itself out of a state of indifference, and give
itself a preponderation one way, then it would follow, on Arminian principles,
that this act or determination of the Will is that alone wherein virtue consists,
because this only is performed, while the mind remains in a state of indifference,
and so in a state of liberty : for when once the mind is put out of its equilib-
rium, it is no longer in such a state ; and therefore all the acts, which follow
afterwards, proceeding from bias, can have the nature neither of virtue nor vice.
Or if the thing, which the Will can do, while yet in a state of indifference, and
so of liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to take the matter into
consideration, then this determination is that alone wherein virtue consists, and
FREEDOM OP THE WILL. U\
not proceeding to action after the scale is turned by consideration. So that it
will follow, from these principles, that all that is done after the mind, by any
means, is once out of its equilibrium and already possessed by an inclination,
and arising from that inclination, has nothing of the nature of virtue or vice,
and is worthy of neither blame nor praise. But how plainly contrary is this
to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of sincerely vir-
tuous actions ? Which is, that they are actions, which proceed from a heart
well disposed and inclined ; and the stronger, and the more fixed and determin-
ed the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of virtue, and so the
more of the truth and reality of it. But if there be any acts, which are done
in a state of equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect indifference and
coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition
in the heart ; and, consequently, according to common sense, have no sincere
foodness in them, having no virtue of heart in them. To have a virtuous
eart, is to have a heart that favors virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one
perfectly cold and indifferent about it.
And besides, the actions that are done in a state of indifference, or that arise
immediately out of such a state, cannot be virtuous, because, by the supposition,
they are not determined by any preceding choice. For if there be preceding
choice, then choice intervenes between the act and the state of indifference ;
which is contrary to the supposition of the act's arising immediately out of in-
difference. But those acts which are not determined by preceding choice, can-
not be virtuous or vicious by Arminian principles, because they are not deter-
mined by the Will. • So that neither one way, nor the other, can any actions be
virtuous or vicious, according to Arminian principles. If the action be deter-
mined by a preceding act of choice, it cannot be virtuous ; because the action is
not done in a state of indifference, nor does immediately arise from such a state;
and so is not done in a state of liberty. If the action be not determined by a
preceding act of choice, then it cannot be virtuous ; because then the Will is
not self-determined in it. So that it is made certain, that neither virtue nor vice
can ever find any place in the universe.
Moreover, that it is necessary to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a
state of indifference, under a notion of that being a state of liberty, is contrary
to common sense ; as it is a dictate of common sense, that indifference itself, in
many cases, is vicious, and so to a high degree. As if when I see my neigh-
bor or near friend, and one who has in the highest degree merited of me, in ex-
treme distress, and ready to perish, I find an indifference in my heart with res-
pect to any thing proposed to be done, which I can easily do, for his relief. So
if it should be proposed to me to blaspheme God, or kill my father, or do num-
berless other things, which might be mentioned, the being indifferent, for a mo-
ment, would be highly vicious and vile.
And it may be further observed, that to suppose this liberty of indifference
is essential to virtue and vice, destroys the great difference of degrees of {he
guilt of different crimes, and takes away the heinousness of the most flagitious,
horrid iniquities ; such as adultery, bestiality, murder, perjury, blasphemy, &c.
For, according to these principles, there is no harm at all in having the mind in
a state of perfect indifference with respect to these crimes : nay, it is absolutely
necessary in order to any virtue in avoiding them, or vice in doing them. But
for the mind to be in a state of indifference with respect to them, is to be next
door to doing them : it is then infinitely near to choosing, and so committing
the fact : for equilibrium is the next step to a degree of preponderation ; and
one, even the least degree of preponderation (all things considered), is choice.
112 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
And not only so, but for the Will to be in a state of perfect equilibrium with
respect to such crimes, is for the mind to be in such a state, as to be full as
likely to choose them as to refuse them, to do them as to omit them. And if
our minds must be in such a state, wherein it is as near to choosing as refusing,
and wherein it must of necessity, according to the nature of things, be as likely
to commit them, as to refrain from them ; where is the exceeding heinousness
of choosing and committing them ? If there be no harm in often being in such
a state, wherein the probability of doing and forbearing are exactly equal, there
being an equilibrium, and no more tendency to one than the other ; then, ac-
cording to the nature and laws of such a contingence, it may be expected, as
an inevitable consequence of such a disposition of things, that we should choose
them as often as reject them : that it should generally so fall out is necessary,
as equality in the effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the
cause, or of the antecedent state of things from which the effect arises. Why
then should we be so exceedingly to blame, if it does so fall out ?
It is many ways apparent, that the Arminian scheme of liberty is utterly
inconsistent with the being of any such things as either virtuous or vicious ha-
bits or dispositions. If liberty of indifference be essential to moral agency, then
there can be no virtue in any habitual inclinations of the heart ; which are con-
trary to indifference, and imply in their nature the very destruction and exclu-
sion of it. They suppose nothing can be virtuous, in which no liberty is exer-
cised ; but how absurd is it to talk of exercising indifference under bias and
preponderation !
And if self-determining power in the Will be necessary to moral agency,
praise, blame, &c, then nothing done by the Will can be any further praise or
blameworthy, than so far as the Will is moved, swayed and determined by itself,
and the scales turned by the sovereign power the Will has over itself. And there-
fore the Will must not be put out of its balance already, the preponderation
must not be determined and effected beforehand; and so the self-determining act
anticipated. Thus it appears another way, that habitual bias is inconsistent
with that liberty, which Arminians suppose to be necessary to virtue or vice ;
and so it follows, that habitual bias itself cannot be either virtuous or vicious.
The same thing follows from their doctrine concerning the inconsistence ot
necessity with liberty, praise, dispraise, &c. None will deny, that bias and in-
clination may be so strong as to be invincible, and leave no possibility of the
Will's determining contrary to it ; and so be attended with necessity. This
Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Will of God, Angels, and glorified Saints,
with respect to good ; and the Will of Devils with respect to evil. Therefore
if necessity be inconsistent with liberty ; then, when fixed inclination is to such
a degree of strength, it utterly excludes all virtue, vice, praise or blame. And
if so, then the nearer habits are to this strength, the more do they impede lib-
erty, and so diminish praise and blame. If very strong habits destroy liberty,
the less ones proportionably hinder it, according to their degree of strength.
And therefore it will follow, that then is the act most virtuous or vicious, when
performed without any inclination or habitual bias at all ; because it is then
performed with most liberty.
Every prepossessing, fixed bias on the mind, brings a degree of moral ina-
bility for the contrary; because so far as the mind is biassed and prepossessed
so much hmderance is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral inability be
inconsistent with moral agency, or the nature of virtue and vice, then, so far as
there is any such thing as evil disposition of heart, or habitual depravity of in-
clination; whether covetousness, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else; so
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 113
much the more excusable persons are ; so much the less have their evil acts of
this kind the nature of vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent disposi-
tions and inclinations they have, so much are they the less virtuous.
It is evident that no habitual disposition of heart, whether it be to a greater
or less degree, can be in any degree virtuous or vicious ; or the actions which
proceed from them at all praise or blameworthy. — Because, though we should
suppose the habit not to be of such strength, as wholly to take away all moral
ability and self-determining power ; or hinder but that, although the act be part-
ly from bias, yet it may be in part from self-determination ; yet in this case, all
that is from antecedent bias must be set aside, as of no consideration ; and in
estimating the degree of virtue or vice, no more must be considered than what
arises from self-determining power, without any influence of that bias, because
liberty is exercised in no more ; so that all that is the exercise of habitual in-
clination, is thrown away, as not belonging to the morality of the action. By
which it appears, that no exercise of these habits, let them be stronger or
weaker, can ever have any thing of the nature of either virtue or vice.
Here if any one should say, that notwithstanding all these things, there may
be the nature of virtue and vice in habits of the mind ; because these habits
may be the effects of those acts, wherein the mind exercised liberty ; that how-
ever the forementioned reasons will prove that no habits, which are natural, or
that are born or created with us can be either virtuous or vicious ; yet they will
not prove this of habits, which have been acquired and established by repeated
free acts.
To such an objector I would say, that this evasion will not at all help the
matter. For if freedom of Will be essential to the very nature of virtue and
vice, then there is no virtue or vice, but only in that very thing, wherein this
liberty is exercised. If a man in one or more things, that he does, exer-
cises liberty, and then by those acts is brought into such circumstances, that
his Liberty ceases, and there follows a long series of acts or events that come to
pass necessarily ; those consequent acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable
or punishable ; but only the free acts that established this necessity ; for in
them alone was the man free. The following effects, that are necessary, have
no more of the nature of virtue or vice, than health or sickness of body have pro-
perly the nature of virtue or vice, being the effects of a course of free acts of
temperance or intemperance ; or than the good qualities of a clock are of the
nature of virtue, which are the effects of free acts of the artificer ; or the good-
ness and sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral virtues, being the
effects of the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If liberty be absolutely
requisite to the morality of actions and necessity wholly inconsistent with
it, as Arminians greatly insist ; then no necessary effects whatsoever, let
the cause be ever so good or bad, can be virtuous or vicious ; but the virtue* or
vice must be only in the free cause. Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby supposes,
the necessity that attends the good and evil habits of the saints in heaven, and
damned in hell, which are the consequence of their free acts in their state of
probation, are not rewardable or punishable.
On the whole, it appears, that if the notions of Arminians concerning lib-
erty and moral agency be true, it will follow, that there is no virtue in any
such habits or qualities as humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, gen-
erosity, heavenly-mindedness ; nothing at all praiseworthy in loving Christ
above father and mother, wife and children, or our own lives ; or in delight in
holiness, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, love to enemies, univer-
sal benevolence to mankind : and on the other hand, there is nothing at all
Vol. II. 15
114
FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Ticious, or worthy of dispraise, in the most sordid, beastly, malignant, devilish
dispositions; in being ungrateful, profane, habitually hating God and things
sacred and holy ; or in being most treacherous, envious, and cruel towards men.
For all these things are dispositions and inclinations of the heart. And in
short there is no such thing as any virtuous or vicious quality of mind ; no
such thin* as inherent virtue and holiness, or vice and sm : and the stronger
those habTts or dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the
further they are from being so indeed ; the more violent men's lusts are, the
more fixed their pride, envy, ingratitude and maliciousness, still the further are
thev from being blameworthy. If there be a man that by his own repeated
acts or by any other means, is come to be of the most hellish disposition, des-
perately inclined to treat his neighbors with injuriousness, contempt and
malignity : the further they should be from any disposition to be angry with him,
or in the least to blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a person, who
is of a most excellent spirit, strongly inclining him to the most amiable actions,
admirably meek, benevolent, &c, so much is he further from any thing reward-
able or commendable. On which principles, the man Jesus Christ was very far
from being praiseworthy for those acts of holiness and kindness, which he
performed, these propensities being strong in his heart. And above all, the
infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely remote from any thing commenda-
ble, his good inclinations being infinitely strong, and He, therefore, at the
utmost possible distance from being at liberty. And in all cases, the stronger
the inclinations of any are to virtue, and the more they love it, the less virtuous
they are ; and the more they love wickedness, the less vicious. — Whether these
things are agreeable to Scripture, let every Christian, and every man who has
read the Bible, judge : and whether they are agreeable to common sense, let
every one judge, that has human understanding in exercise.
And, if we pursue these principles, we shall find that virtue and vice are
wholly excluded out of the world ; and that there never was, nor ever can be
any such thing as one or the other ; either in God, angels, or men. No pro-
pensity, disposition or habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has been shown ;
because they, so far as they take place, destroy the freedom of the Will, the
foundation of all moral agency, and exclude all capacity of either virtue or vice.
— And if habits and dispositions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither
can the exercise of these dispositions be so ; for the exercise of bias is not the
exercise oifree self- determining Will, and so there is no exercise of liberty in
it. Consequently, no man is virtuous or vicious, either in being well or ill dis-
posed, nor in acting from a good or bad disposition. And whether this bias or
disposition, be habitual or not, if it exists but a moment before the act of Will,
which is the effect of it, it alters not the case, as to the necessity of the efFect
Or if there be no previous disposition at all, either habitual or occasional, that
determines the act, then it is not choice that determines it : it is therefore a
contingence, that happens to the man, arising from nothing in him ; and is ne-
cessary, as to any inclination or choice of his ; and, therefore, cannot make him
either the better or worse, any more than a tree is better than other trees,
because it oftener happens to be lit upon by a swan or nightingale ; or a rock
more vicious than other rocks, because rattlesnakes have happened oftener to
crawl over it. So that there is no virtue nor vice in good or bad dispositions,
either fixed or transient ; nor any virtue or vice in acting from any good or
bad previous inclination ; nor yet any virtue or vice, in acting wholly without
any previous inclination. Where then shall we find room for virtue or vice ?
CI
FREEDOM 01 THE WILL. 115
SECTION VII
Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence of Motive and In-
ducement, in either virtuous or vicious Actions.
As Arminian notions of that liberty, which is essential to virtue or vice,
are inconsistent with common sense, in their being inconsistent with all virtuous
and vicious habits and dispositions ; so they are no less so in their inconsistency
with all influence of motives in moral actions.
It is equally against those notions of liberty of Will, whether there be,
previous to the act of choice, a preponderancy of the inclination, or a prepon-
derancy of those circumstances, which have a tendency to move the inclination.
And, indeed, it comes to just the same thing ; to say, the circumstances of the
mind are such as tend to sway and turn its inclination one way, is the same
thing as to say, the inclination of the mind, as under such circumstances, tends
that way.
Or if any think it most proper to say, that motives do alter the inclination,
and give a new bias to the mind, it will not alter the case, as to the present
argument. For if motives operate bygiving the mind an inclination, then they
operate by destroying the mind's indifference, and laying it under a bias. But
to do this, is to destroy the Arminian freedom : it is not to leave the Will to its
own self-determination, but to bring it into subjection to the power of something
extrinsic, which operates upon it, sways and determines it, previous to its own
determination. So that what is done from motive, cannot be either virtuous or
vicious. And besides, if the acts of the Will are excited by motives, those mo-
tives are the causes of those acts of the Will ; which makes the acts of the Will
necessary ; as effects necessarily follow the efficiency of the cause. And if the
influence and power of the motive causes the volition, then the influence of the
motive determines volition, and volition does not determine itself; and so is not
free, in the sense of Arminian a (as has been largely shown already), and con-
sequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious.
The supposition, which has already been taken notice of as an insufficient
evasion in other cases, would be, in like manner, impertinently alleged in this
case ; namely, the supposition that liberty consists in a power of suspending
action for the present, in order to deliberation. If it should be said, though it
be true, that the Will is under a necessity of finally following the strongest
motive ; yet it may, for the present, forbear to act upon the motive presented,
till there has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it, and compare its real
weight with the merit of other motives. I answer as follows :
Here again, it must be remembered, that if determining thus to suspend and
consider, be that act of the Will, wherein alone liberty is exercised, then in this
all virtue and vice must consist; and the acts that follow this consideration, and
are the effects of it, being necessary; are no more virtuous or vicious than some
good or bad events, which happen when men are fast asleep, and are the con-
sequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore, I would here
observe two things :
1. To suppose, that all virtue and vice, jn every case, consists in determining,
whether to take time for consideration or not, is not agreeable to common sense.
For, according to such a supposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder
116 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
sodomy, blasphemy, &c, do not at all consist in the horrid nature of the things
themselves, but only in the neglect of thorough consideration before they were
perpetrated, which brings their viciousness to a small matter, and makes all
crimes equal. If it be said, that neglect of consideration, when such heinous
evils are proposed to choice, is worse than in other cases : I answer, this is
inconsistent, as it supposes the very thing to be, which, at the same time, is
supposed not to be ; it supposes all moral evil, all viciousness and heinousness.
does not consist merely in the want of consideration. It supposes some crimes
in themselves, in their own nature, to be more heinous than others, antecedent to
consideration or inconsideration, which lays the person under a previous obliga-
tion to consider in some cases more than others.
2. If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consisted only in the
act of the Will, whereby it determines whether to consider or no, it would not
alter the case in the least, as to the present argument. For still in this act of the
Will on this determination, it is induced by some motive, and necessarily follows
the strongest motive ; and so is necessary, even in that act wherein alone it is
either virtuous or vicious.
One thing more I would observe, concerning the inconsistence of Arminian
notions of moral agency with the influence of motives. — I suppose none will
deny, that it is possible for motives to be set before the mind so powerful, and
exhibited in so strong a light, and under so advantageous circumstances, as fo be
invincible ; and such as the mind cannot but yield to. In this case, Jirminians
will doubtless say, liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if motives are exhibited
with half so much power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength, and
go half-way towards destroying it. If a thousand degrees of motive abolish all
liberty, then five hundred take it half away. If one degree of the influence of
motive does not at all infringe or diminish liberty, then no more do two degrees;
for nothing doubled, is still .nothing. And if two degrees do not diminish the
Will's liberty, no more do four, eight, sixteen, or six thousand. For nothing
multiplied ever so much, comes to but nothing. If there be nothing in the
nature of motive or moral suasion, that is at all opposite to liberty, then the
greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty. But if there be any thing in the nature
of the thing, that is against liberty, then the least degree of it hurts it in some
degree ; and consequently hurts and diminishes virtue. If invincible motives,
to that action which is good, take away all the freedom of the act, and so all
the virtue of it ; then the more forcible the motives are, so much the worse, so
much the' less virtue ; and the weaker the motives are, the better for the cause
of virtue ; and none is best of all.
Now let it be considered, whether these things are agreeable to common
sense. If it should be allowed, that there are some instances wherein the soul
chooses without any motive, what virtue can there be in such a choice 1 I am
sure, there is no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made for no good
end ; for it is for no end at all. If it were for any end, the view of the end
would be the motive exciting to the act ; and if the act be for no good end, and
so from no good aim, then there is no good intention in it ; and, therefore,
according to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the
motion of the smoke, which is driven to and fro by the wind without any aim
or end in the thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor why and where-
fore, it is moved.
Corol. 1. By these things it ajjpears, that the argument against the Calvin-
tsts, taken from the use of counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations,
&c, so much insisted on by Jirminians, is truly against themselves. For these
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 117
things can operate no other way to any good effect, than as in them is exhibited
motive and inducement, tending to excite and determine the acts of the Will.
But it follows, on their principles, that the acts of Will excited by such causes,
cannot be virtuous ; because so far as they are from these, they are not from
the Will's self-determining power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth
the while to offer any arguments to persuade men to any virtuous volition or
voluntary action ; it is in vain to set before them the wisdom and amiableness
of ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly of ways of vice. This notion of
liberty and moral agency frustrates all endeavors to draw men to virtue by
instruction or persuasion, precept or example : for though these things may
induce men to what is materially virtuous, yet at the same time they take away
the form of virtue, because they destroy liberty ; as they, by their own power,
put the Will out of its equilibrium, determine and turn the scale, and take the
work of self-determining power out of its hands. And the clearer the instruc-
tions are that are given, the more powerful the arguments that are used, and
the more moving the persuasions or examples, the more likely they are to
frustrate their own design ; because they have so much the greater tendency to
put the Will out of its balance, to hinder its freedom of self-determination ; and
so to exclude the very form of virtue, and the essence of whatsoever is praise-
worthy.
So it clearly follows, from these principles, that God has no hand in any
man's virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by a physical or moral influence ;
that none of the moral methods He uses with men to promote virtue in the
world, have tendency to the attainment of that end ; that all the instructions,
which he has given to men, from the beginning of the world to this day, by
prophets, apostles, or by his Son Jesus Christ ; that all his counsels, invitations,
promises, threatenings, warnings and expostulations; that all means he has
used with men, in ordinances, or providences ; yea, all influences of his Spirit,
ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency to excite any one virtuous act
of the mind, *or to promote any thing morally good or commendable, in any
respect. For there is no way that these or any other means can promote virtue,
but one of these three. Either ( 1,) by a physical operation on the heart. But
all effects that are wrought in men this way, have no virtue in them, by the
concurring voice of all Arminians. Or, (2,) morally, by exhibiting motives to
the understanding, to excite good acts in the Will. But it has been demon-
strated, that volitions, which are excited by motives, are necessary, and not
excited by a self-moving power ; and therefore, by their principles, there is no
virtue in them. Or, (3,) by merely giving the Will an opportunity to deter-
mine itself concerning the objects proposed, either to choose or reject, by its
own uncaused, unmoved, uninfluenced self-determination. And if this be all,
then all those means do no more to promote virtue than vice : for they do
nothing but give the Will opportunity to determine itself either way, either
to good or bad, without laying it under any bias to either : and so there is
really as much of an opportunity given to determine in favor of evil, as of
good.
Thus that horrid blasphemous consequence will certainly follow from the
Arminian doctrine, which they charge on others ; namely, that God acts an
inconsistent part in using so many counsels, warnings, invitations, entreaties, &c.
with sinners, to induce them to forsake sin and turn to the ways of virtue : and
that all are insincere and fallacious. It will follow, from their doctrine, that
God does these things when he knows, at the same time that they have no
manner of tendency to promote the effect he seems to aim at ; yea, knows that
118 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
if they have any influence, this very influence will be inconsistent with such an ef-
fect, and will prevent it. But what an imputation of insincerity would this
fix on Him, who is infinitely holy and true !— So that theirs is the doctrine,
which, if pursued in its consequences, does horribly reflect on the Most High,
and fix on Him the charge of hypocrisy ; and not the doctrine of the Calvinists ;
according to their frequent, and vehement exclamations and invectives.
Corol 2. From what has been observed in this section, it again appears,
that Arminian principles and notions, when fairly examined and pursued in
their demonstrable consequences, do evidently shut all virtue out of the world,
and make it impossible that there should ever be any such thing, in any case ;
or that any such thing should ever be conceived of. For, by these principles, the
very notion of virtue or vice implies absurdity and contradiction. — I or it is
absurd in itself, and contrary to common sense, to suppose a virtuous act of mind
without any good intention or aim ; and, by their principles, it is absurd to suppose
a virtuous act with a good intention or aim ; for to act for an end, is to act from a
motive. So that if we rely on these principles, there can be no virtuous act
with a good design and end ; and it is self-evident, there can be none without :
consequently there can be no virtuous act at all.
Corol. 3. It is manifest, that Arminian notions of moral agency, and the
being of a faculty of Will, cannot consist together ; and that if there be any
such thing as either a virtuous or vicious act it cannot be an act of the Will ;
no Will can be at all concerned in it. For that act which is performed without
inclination, without motive, without end, must be performed without any con-
cern of the Will. To suppose an act of the Will without these, implies a
contradiction. If the soul in its act has no motive or end ; then, in that act (as
was observed before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts no inclination
to any thing ; and this implies, that in that act it desires nothing, and chooses
nothing ; so that there is no act of choice in the case : and that is as much as
to say, there is no act of Will in the case. Which very effectually shuts all
vicious and virtuous acts out of the universe ; inasmuch as, according to this,
there can be no vicious or virtuous act wherein the Will is concerned ; and ac-
cording to the plainest dictates of reason, and the light of nature, and also the
principles of Arminians themselves, there can be no virtuous or vicious act
wherein the Will is not concerned. And therefore there is no room for any
virtuous or vicious acts at all.
Corol. 4. If none of the moral actions of intelligent beings are influenced
by either previous inclination or motive, another strange thing will follow; and
this is, that God not only cannot foreknow any of the future moral actions of his
creatures, but he can make no conjecture, can give no probable guess concerning
them. For all conjecture, in things of this nature, must depend on some dis-
cerning or apprehension of these two things, previous disposition and motive,
which, as has been observed, Arminian notions of moral agency, in their real
Consequence, altogether exclude.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 1 19
PART IV.
WHEREIN THE CHIE* GROUNDS OF THE REASONINGS OF ARMINIAlra, M atJrt m i *ND
DEFENCE OF THE FOREMENTIONED NOTIONS OF LIBERTY, taOKuL aGENGY, c/C,
AND AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED.
SECTION I
The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of Dispositions of the Hean\ and Acts of the WiL
lies not in their Cause, but their Nature.
One main foundation of the reasons which are brought to establish the
forementioned notions of liberty, virtue, vice, &c, is a supposition, that the vir-
tuousness of the dispositions, or acts of the Will, consists, not in the nature of
these dispositions or acts, but wholly in the origin or cause of them : so that if the
disposition of the mind, or act of the Will, be ever so good, yet if the cause of
the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is nothing virtuous or praiseworthy
in it ; and, on the contrary, if the Will, in its inclination or acts, be ever so
bad, yet, unless it arises from something that is our vice or fault, there is nothing
vicious or blameworthy in it. Hence their grand objection and pretended
demonstration, or self-evidence, against any virtue and commend ableness, or
vice and blameworthiness, of those habits or acts of the Will, which are not
from some virtuous or vicious determination of the Will itself.
Now if this matter be well considered, it will appear to be altogether a mis-
take, yea, a gross absurdity ; and that it is most certain, that if there be any
such things as a virtuous or vicious disposition, or volition of mind, the virtuous-
ness or viciousness of them consists, not in the origin or cause of these things,
but in the nature of them.
If the essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or
fault, does not lie in the nature of the dispositions or acts of mind, which are
said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no-
where at all. Thus for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of Will lies not in the
nature of the act, but the cause ; so that its being of a bad nature will not make
it at all our fault, unless it arises from some faulty determination of ours, as
its cause, or something in us that is our fault : then, for the same reason neither
can the viciousness of that cause lie in the nature of the thing itself, but in its
cause : that evil determination of ours is not our fault, merely because it is of
a bad nature, unless it arises from some cause in us that is our fault. And when
we are come to this higher cause, still the reason of the thing holds good ;
though this cause be of a bad nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that ac-
count, unless it arises from something faulty in us. Nor yet can blameworthiness
lie in the nature of this cause, but in the cause of that. And thus we must
drive faultiness back from step to step, from a lower cause to a higher, in infini-
tum : and that is thoroughly to banish it from the world, and to allow it no
possibility of existence anywhere in the universality of things. On these prin-
ciples, vice, or moral evil, cannot consist in any thing that is an effect ; because
fault does not consist in the nature of things, but in their cause ; as well as be-
cause effects are necessary, being unavoidably connected with their cause :
therefore the cause only is to blame. And so it follows, that faultiness can lie
|20 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
only in that cause, which M a cause only, and no effect 01 any thing. Nor yet
can it lie in this ; for then it must lie in the nature of the thing itsell ; not in its
beincr from any determination of ours, nor any thing faulty in us which is the
cause, nor indeed from any cause at all ; for, by the supposition, it is no effect,
and has no cause. And thus, he that will maintain, it is not the nature of habits
or acts of Will that makes them virtuous or faulty, but the cause, must immedi-
ately run himself out of his own assertion ; and in maintaining it, will insensibly
contradict and deny it. . . .
This is certain, that if effects are vicious and faulty, not trom their nature, 01
from any thing inherent in them, but because they are from a bad cause, it must
be on account of the badness of the cause and so on account of the nature of the
cause : a bad effect in the Will must be bad, because the cause is bad, or of an
evil nature, or has badness as a quality inherent in it : and a good effect in the
Will must be good, by reason of the goodness of the cause, or its being of a good
kind and nature. And if this be what is meant, the very supposition of fault and
praise lying not in the nature of the thing, but the cause, contradicts itself, and
does at least resolve the essence of virtue and vice into the nature of things, and
supposes it originally to consist in that. — And if a caviller has a mind to run
from the absurdity, by saying, " No, the fault of the thing, which is the cause, lies
not in this, that the cause itself is of an evil nature, but that the cause is evil in
that sense, that it is from another bad cause." Still the absurdity will follow
him ; for, if so, then the cause before charged is at once acquitted, and all the
blame must be laid to the higher cause, and must consist in that's being evil or
of an evil nature. So now, we are come again to lay the blame of the thing
blameworthy, to the nature of the thing, and not to the cause. And if any is so
foolish as to go higher still, and ascend from step to step, till he is come to that,
which is the first cause concerned in the whole affair, and will say, all the blame
lies in that ; then, at last, he must be forced to own, that the faultiness of the
thing, which he supposes alone blameworthy, lies wholly in the nature of the
thing, and not in the original or cause of it ; for the supposition is that it has
no original, it is determined by no act of ours, is caused by nothing faulty in us,
being absolutely without any cause. And so the race is at an end, but the evader
is taken in his flight.
It is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that moral evil, with its
desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill deservings, consists in a
certain deformity in the nature of certain dispositions of the heart, and acts ot
the Will ; and not in the deformity of something else, diverse from the very thing
:'tself, which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the cause of it. W7hich would
oe absurd, because that would be to suppose a thing, that is innocent and not
wil, is truly evil and faulty, because another thing is evil. It implies a contra-
liction ; for it would be to suppose the very thing, which is morally evil and
Nameworthy, is innocent and not blameworthy ; but that something else, which
.s its cause, is only to blame. To say, that vice does not consist in the thing
which is vicious, but in its cause, is the same as to say, that vice does not consist
in vice, but in that which produces it.
It is true, a cause may be to blame, for being the cause of vice : it may be
wickedness in the cause, that it produces wickedness. But it would imply a
contradiction, to suppose that these two are the same individual wickedness. The
wicked act of the cause in producing wickedness, is one wickedness ; and the
wickedness produced, if there be any produced, is another. And therefore, the
wickedness of the latter loes not lie in the former, but is distinct from it ; anc1
the wickedness of both lies in the evil nature of the things, which are wicked
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 121
The thing, which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves punishment ;
which is but the expression of hatred. And that, which renders virtue lovely,
is the same with that, on the account of which, it is fit to receive praise and re-
ward ; which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But that which makes
vice hateful, is its hateful nature ; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its
amiable nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that is inherent in that good
or evil Will, which is the soul of virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it)
which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise, according to
the common sense of mankind. If the cause or occasion of the rise of a hate-
ful disposition or act of Will, be also hateful ; suppose another antecedent evil
Will ; that is entirely another sin, and deserves punishment by itself, under a
distinct consideration. There is worthiness of dispraise in the nature of an evil
volition, and not wholly in some foregoing act, which is its cause ; otherwise
the evil volition, which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than sickness, or
some other natural calamity, which arises from a cause morally evil.
Thus, for instance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy of dispraise, according
to common sense ; not because something as bad, or worse than ingratitude, was
the cause that produced it ; but because it is hateful in itself, by its own inherent
deformity. So the love of virtue is amiable, and worthy of praise, not merely
because something else went before this love of virtue in our minds, which caused
it to take place there ; for instance, our own choice ; we choose to love virtue,
and, by some method or other, wrought ourselves into the love of it ; but because
of the amiableriess and condecency of such a disposition and inclination of heart.
If that was the case, that we did choose to love virtue, and so produced that love
in ourselves, this choice itself could be no otherwise amiable or praiseworthy,
than as love to virtue, or some other amiable inclination, was exercised and im-
plied in it. If that choice was amiable at all, it must be so on account of some
amiable quality in the nature of the choice. If we chose to love virtue, not in
love to virtue, or any thing that was good, and exercised no sort of good dispo-
sition in the choice, the choice itself was not virtuous, nor worthy of any praise,
according to common sense, because the choice was not of a good nature.
It may not be improper here to take notice of something said by an author,
that has lately made a mighty noise in America. " A necessary holiness (says
he*) is no holiness. Adam could not be originally created in righteousness and
true holiness, because he must choose to be righteous, before he could be righteous.
And therefore he must exist, he must be created, yea, must exercise thought and
reflection, before he was righteous.,, There is much more to the same effect in
that place, and also in p. 437, 438, 439, 440. If these things are so, it will
certainly follow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no righteous choice ;
there is no righteousness or holiness in it ; because no choosing to be righteous
goes before it. For he plainly speaks of choosing to be righteous, as what must
go before righteousness : and that which follows the choice, being the effect of
the choice, cannot be righteousness or holiness : for an effect is a thing necessary,
and cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its cause ; and therefore is un-
avoidably dependent upon the cause : and he says, a necessary holiness is no
holiness. So that neither can a choice of righteousness be righteousness or holi-
ness, nor can any thing that is consequent on that choice, and the effect of it, be
righteousness or holiness ; nor can any thing that is without choice, be righteous-
ness or holiness. So that by his scheme, all righteousness and holiness is at once
shut out of the world, and no door left open, by which it can ever possibly enter
into the world.
* Scrip. Doc. of Original Sin 180, 3d Edit.
Vol. II. 16
122 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
I suppose, the way that men came to entertain this absurd, inconsistent
notion, with respect to internal inclinations and volitions themselves (or notions
that imply it), viz., that the essence of their moral good or evil lies not in their
nature, but their cause ; was, that it is indeed a very plain dictate of common
sense, that it is so with respect to all outward actions, and sensible motions of
the body ; that the moral good or evil of them does not lie at all in the motions
themselves ; which, taken by themselves, are nothing of a moral nature ; and
the essence of all the moral good or evil that concerns them, lies in those inter-
nal dispositions and volitions, which are the cause of them. Now, being always
used to determine this, without hesitation or dispute, concerning external actions ;
which are the things, that in the common use of language are signified by such
phrases as men's actions, or their doings ; hence, when they came to speak of
volitions, and internal exercises of their inclinations, under the same denomina-
tion of their actions, or what they do, they unwarily determined the case must also
be the same with these, as with external actions ; not considering the vast
difference in the nature of the case.
If any shall still object and say, why is it not necessary that the cause should
be considered, in order to determine whether any thing be worthy of blame or
praise? Is it agreeable to reason and common sense, that a man is to be
praised or blamed for that, which he is not the cause or author of, and has no
hand in 1
I answer, such phrases as being the cause, being the author, having a hand,
and the like, are ambiguous. They are most vulgarly understood for being the
designing, voluntary cause, or cause by antecedent choice ; and it is most cer-
tain that men are not, in this sense, the causes or authors of the first act of their
Wills, in any case ; as certain as any thing is, or ever can be ; for nothing can
be more certain, than that a thing is not before it is, nor a thing of the same kind
before the first thing of that kind ; and so no choice before the first choice. As
the phrase, being the author, may be understood, not of being the producer by an
antecedent act of Will ; but as a person may be said to be the author of the act
of Will itself, by his being the immediate agent, or the being that is acting,
or in exercise in that act ; if the phrase of being the author, is used to signify
this, then doubtless common sense requires men's being the authors of their own
acts of Will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise, on
account of them. And common sense teaches, that they must be the authors of
external actions, in the former sense, namely, their being the causes of them by
an act of Will or choice, in order to their being justly blamed or praised ; but
it teaches no such thing with respect to the acts of the Will themselves. But
this may appear more manifest by the things which will be observed in the fol-
lowing section.
SECTION II
The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency,
which seems to be generally entertained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine
concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.
One thing that is made very much a ground of argument and supposed
demonstration by Arminians, in defence of the forementioned principles, concern-
ing moral agency, virtue, vice, &c, is their metaphysical notion of agency and
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 123
action. They say, unless the soul has a self-determining power, it has no power
of action ; if its volitions be not caused by itself, but are excited and determined
by some extrinsic cause, they cannot be the soul's own acts ; and that the soul
cannot be active, but must be wholly passive, in those effects which it is the sub-
ject of necessarily, and not from its own free determination.
Mr. Chubb lays the foundation of his scheme of liberty, and of his arguments
to support it, very much in this position, that man is an agent, and capable of
action. Which doubtless is true ; but self-determination belongs to his notion of
action, and is the very essence of it. Whence he infers, that it is impossible for
a man to act and be acted upon, in the same thing, at the same time ; and that
nothing, that is an action, can be the effect of the action of another ; and he
insists, that a necessary agent, or an agent that is necessarily determined to act,
is a plain contradiction.
But those are a precarious sort of demonstrations, which men build on the
meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a word ; especially when that meaning is
abstruse, inconsistent, and entirely diverse from the original sense of the word in
common speech.
That the meaning of the word action, as Mr. Chubb and many others use it,
is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent, is manifest, because it belongs to their
notion of an action, that it is something wherein is no passion or passiveness ;
that is (according to their sense of passiveness), it is under the power, influence
or action of no cause. And this implies, that action has no cause, and is no
effect ; for to be an effect implies passiveness, or the being subject to the power
and action of its cause. And yet they hold, that the mind's action is the effect
of its own determination, yea, the mind's free and voluntary determination ;
which is the same with free choice. So that action is the effect of something
preceding, even a preceding act of choice ; and consequently, in this effect the
mind is passive, subject to the power and action of the preceding cause, which
is the foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be active. So that here we
have this contradiction, that action is always the effect of foregoing* choice ;
and therefore cannot be action ; because it is passive to the power of that
preceding causal choice; and the mind cannot be active and passive in
the same thing, at the same time. Again, they say, necessity is utterly
inconsistent with action, and a necessary action is a contradiction ; and so
their notion of action implies contingence, and excludes all necessity. And
therefore, their notion of action implies, that it has no necessary dependence or
connection with any thing foregoing ; for such a dependence or connection ex-
cludes contingence, and implies necessity. And yet their notion of action implies
necessity, and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot be contingent. For
they suppose, that whatever is properly called action, must be determined by
the Will and free choice ; and this is as much as to say, that it must be neces-
sary, being dependent upon, and determined by something foregoing ; namely,
a foregoing act of choice. Again, it belongs to their notion of action, of that
which is a proper and mere act, that it is the beginning of motion, or of exer-
tion of power ; but yet it is implied in their notion of action, that it is not
the beginning of motion or exertion of power, but is consequent and dependent
on a preceding exertion of power, viz., the power of Will and choice ; for they
say there is no proper action but what is freely chosen ; or, which is the same
thing, determined by a foregoing act of free choice. But if any of them shall
see cause to deny this, and say they hold no such thing as that every action is
chosen or determined by a foregoing choice ; but that the very first exertion of
Will only, undetermined by any preceding act, is properly called action ; the*
124 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
I say, such a man's notion of action implies necessity ; for what the mind is the
subject of, without the determination of its own previous choice, it is the subject
of necessarily, as to any hand that free choice has in the affair, and without
any ability the mind has to prevent it, by any Will or election of its ow;n:
because by the supposition it precludes all previous acts of the Will or choice
in the case, which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this other way,
implied in their notion of act, that it is both necessary and not necessary.
Again, it belongs to their notion of an act, that it is no effect of a predetermin-
ing bias or preponderation, but springs immediately out of indifference ; and this
implies, that it cannot be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing preponder-
ation : if it be not habitual, but occasional, yet if it causes the act, it is truly
previous, efficacious and determining. And yet, at the same time, it is essential
to their notion of an act, that it is what the agent is the author of freely and
voluntarily, and that is, by previous choice and design.
So that, according to their notion of an act, considered with regard to its
consequences, these following things are all essential to it, viz., that it should
be necessary, and not necessary ; that it should be from a cause, and no cause ;
that it should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit of choice and
design ; that it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet conse-
quent on previous exertion ; that it should be before it is j that it should spring
immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of prepon-
deration ; that it should be self-originated, and also have its original from some-
thing else ; that it is what the mind causes itself, of its own Will, and can
produce or prevent, according to its choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind
has no power to prevent, it precluding all previous choice in the affair.
So that an act, according to their metaphysical notion of it, is something of
which there is no idea : it is nothing but a confusion of the mind, excited by
words without any distinct meaning, and is an absolute nonentity ; and that in
two respects : ( 1,) there is nothing in the world that ever was, is, or can be, to
answer the things which must belong to its description, according to what they
suppose to be essential to it ; and (2,) there neither is, nor ever was, nor can
be, any notion or idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it. For if
we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways destroy itself. But it
is impossible any idea or notion should subsist in the mind, whose very nature
and essence, which constitutes it, destroys it. If some learned philosopher, who
had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made
m his travels, should say, " He had been in Terra del Fuego, and there had seen
an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself,
and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it had an appetite, and was
hungry before it had a being ; that his master, who led him, and governed him
at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him where he
pleased ; that when he moved, he always took a step before the first step ; that
he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost ; and this, though
he had neither head nor tail :" it would be no imprudence at all, to tell such a
traveller, though a learned man, that he himself had no notion or idea of such
an animal, as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.
As the forementioned notion of action is very inconsistent, so it is wholly
diverse from the original meaning of the wTord. The more usual signification
of it, in vulgar speech, seems to be some motion, or exertion of power, that is
voluntary, or that is the effect of the Will; and is used in the same sense as
doing ; and most commonly it is used to signify outward actions. So thinking
is often distinguished from acting ; and desiring and willing, from doing.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 125
Besides this more usual and proper signification of the word action, there are
other ways in which the word is used, that are less proper, which yet have place
in common speech. Oftentimes it is used to signify some motion or alteration
in inanimate things, with relation to some object and effect. So the spring of a
watch is said to act upon the chain and wheels ; the sun-beams, to act upon
plants and trees; and the fire, to act upon wood. Sometimes the word is used
to signify motions, alterations, and exertions of power, which are seen in corpo-
real things, considered absolutely ; especially when these motions seem to arise
from some internal cause which is hidden ; so that they have a greater resem-
blance of those motions of our bodies, which are the effects of internal volition,
or invisible exertions of Will. So the fermentation of liquor, the operations of
the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are called the action of these things. And
sometimes the word action is used to signify the exercise of thought, or of Will
and inclination : so meditating, loving, hating, inclining, disinclining, choosing
and refusing, may be sometimes called acting ; though more rarely (unless it
be by philosophers and metaphysicians) jthan in any of the other senses.
But the word is never used in vulgar speech in that sense which Arminian
divir.es use it in, namely, for the self-determinate exercise of the Will, or an
exertion of the soul that arises without any necessary connection, with any thing
foregoing. If a man does something voluntarily, or as the effect of his choice,
then in trie most proper sense, and as the word is most originally and commonly
used, he is said to act : but whether that choice or volition be self-determined,
or no, whether it be connected with foregoing habitual bias, whether it be the
certain effect of the strongest motive, or some extrinsic cause, never comes into
consideration in the meaning of the word.
And if the word Action is arbitrarily used by some men otherwise, to suit
some scheme of metaphysics or morality, no argument can reasonably be found-
ed on such a use of this term, to prove any thing but their own pleasure. For
divines and philosophers strenuously to urge such arguments, as though they
were sufficient to support and demonstrate a whole scheme of moral philosophy
and divinity, is certainly to erect a mighty edifice on the sand, or rather on a
shadow. And though it may now perhaps, through custom, have become
natural for them to use the word in this sense (if that may be called a sense or
meaning, which is inconsistent with itself), yet this does not prove, that it is
agreeable to the natural notions men have of things, or that there can be any
thing in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And though they
appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are so far from experiencing
any suoh thing, that it is impossible for them to have any conception of it.
If it should be objected, that action and passion are doubtless words of a
contrary signification ; but to suppose that the agent, in its action, is under the
power and influence of something extrinsic, is to confound action and passion,
and make them the same thing :
I answer, that action and passion are doubtless, as they are sometimes used,
words of opposite signification ; but not as signifying opposite existences, but
only opposite relations. The words cause and effect, are terms of opposite sig-
nification ; but, nevertheless, if I assert, that the same thing may, at the same
time, in different respects and relations, be both came and effect, this will not
prove that I confound the terms. The soul may be both active and passive in
the same thing in different respects ; active with relation to one thing, and
•passive with relation to another. The word passion, when set in opposition to
action, or rather activeness, is merely a relative term ; it signifies no effect or
cause, nor any proper existence ; but is the same with passiveness, or a being
126 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
passive, or a being acted upon by some thing. Which is a mere relation ot a
thing to some power or force exerted by some cause, producing some effect in
it, or upon it. And action, when set properly in opposition to passion or pas-
s-iveness, is no real existence; it is not the same with an action, but is a mere
relation : it is the activeness of something on another thing, being the opposite
relation to the other, viz., a relation of power, or force, exerted by some cause
towards another thing, which is the subject of the effect of that power. Indeed,
the word action, is frequently used to signify something not merely relative, but
more absolute, and a real existence ; as when we say an action ; when the word
is not used transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or
mind, without any relation to any object or effect : and as used thus, it is not
properly the opposite of passion ; which ordinarily signifies nothing absolute, but
merely the relation of being acted upon. And therefore, if the word action be
used in the like relative sense, then action and passion are only two contrary
relations. And it is no absurdity to suppose, that contrary relations may belong
to the same thing, at the same time, with respect to different things. So to
suppose, that there are acts of the soul by which a man voluntarily moves, and
acts upon objects, and produces effects, which yet themselves are effects of
something else, and wherein the soul itself is the object of something acting
upon, and influencing that, does not confound action and passion. The words
may nevertheless be properly of opposite signification : there may be as true
and real a difference between acting and being caused to act, though we should
suppose the soul to be both in the same volition, as there is between living and
being quickened or made to live. It is no more a contradiction to suppose that
action may be the effect of some other cause, besides the agent, or being that
acts, than to suppose, that life may be the effect of some other cause, besides
the being that lives, in whom life is caused to be.
The thing which has led men into this inconsistent notion of action, when
applied to volition, as though it were essential to this internal action, that the
agent should be self-determined in it, and that the Will should be the cause of
it, was probably this ; that according to the sense of mankind, and the common
use of language, it is so with respect to men's external actions ; which are
originally, and according to the vulgar use and most proper sense of the word,
called actions. Men in these are self-directed, self-determined, and their Wills
are the cause of the motions of their bodies, and the external things that are
done ; so that unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the action be
determined by their antecedent volition, it is no action or doing of theirs.
Hence some metaphysicians have been led unwarily, but absurdly, to suppose the
same concerning volition itself, that that also must be determined by the Will ;
which is to be determined by antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is ;
not considering the contradiction it implies.
But it is very evident, that in the metaphysical distinction between action
and passion (though long since become common and the general vogue), due
care has not been taken to conform language to the nature of things, or to
any distinct, clear ideas. As it is in innumerable other philosophical, meta-
physical terms, used in these disputes ; which has occasioned inexpressible diffi-
culty, contention, error and confusion.
And thus probably it came to be thought, that necessity was inconsistent
with action, as these terms are applied to volition. First, these terms action
and nexessity, are changed from their original meaning, as signifying external,
voluntary action and constraint (in which meaning they are evidently incon-
sistent), to signify quite other things, viz., volition itself, and certainty of exist-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 127
ence. And when the change of signification is made, care is not taken to
make proper allowances and abatements for the difference of sense ; but still
the same things are unwarily attributed to action and necessity, in the new
meaning of the words, which plainly belonged to them in their first sense ; and
on this ground, maxims are established without any real foundation, as though
they were the most certain truths, and the most evident dictates of reason.
But however strenuously it is maintained, that what is necessary cannot be
properly called action, and that a necessary action is a contradiction, yet it is
probable there are few Arminian divines, who, if thoroughly tried, would stand
to these principles. They will allow that God is, in the highest sense, an
active being, and the highest fountain of life and action ; and they would not
probably deny, that those, that are called God's acts of righteousness, holiness
and faithfulness, are truly and properly God's acts, and God is really a holy
agent in them ; and yet, I trust, they will not deny, that God necessarily acts
justly and faithfully, and that it is impossible for Him to act unrighteously and
unholily.
SECTION III.
The Reasons why some think it contrary to Common Sense, to suppose those Things
which are necessary, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.
It is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is contrary
to common sense, and the natural notions and apprehensions of mankind, to
suppose otherwise than that necessity (making no distinction between natural
and moral necessity) is inconsistent with virtue and vice, praise and blame,
reward and punishment. And their arguments from hence have been greatly
triumphed in ; and have been not a little perplexing to many, who have been
friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures ; it has seemed
to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the notions men
commonly have of justice and equity. And the true, reasons of it seem to be
these that follow.
I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, that natural necessity
is wholly inconsistent with just praise or blame. If men do things which in
themselves are very good, fit to be brought to pass, and very happy effects,
properly against their Wills, and cannot help it ; or do them from a necessity
that is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no concern or con-
nection ; then it is a plain dictate of common sense, that it is none of their
virtue, nor any moral good in them ; and that they are not worthy to be re-
warded or praised, esteemed or loved on that account. And, on the other hand,
that if, from like necessity, they do those things which in themselves are very
unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they cannot help it ; the neces-
sity is such, that it is all one whether they will them or no ; and the reason
why they are done, is from necessity only, and not from their Wills ; it is a
very plain dictate of common sense, that they are not at all to blame ; there is
no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done ; nor are they, who are
thus necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in the least dis-
respected, on that account.
In like manner, if things, in themselves good and desirable, are absolutely
impossible, with a natural impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches,
that this wholly and perfectly excuses persons in their not doing them.
128 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
And it is also a plain dictate of common sense, that if the doing things, in
themselves good, or avoiding things, in themselves evil, is not absolutely im-
possible, with such a natural impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural
difficulty ; that is, a difficulty prior to, and not at all consisting in Will and
inclination itself, and which would remain the same, let the inclination be what
it will ; then a person's neglect or omission is excused in some measure, though
not wholly ; his sin is less aggravated, than if the thing to be clone were easy%
And if, instead of difficulty and hinderance, there be a contrary natural propen-
sity in the state of things, to the thing to be done, or the effect to be brought to
pass, abstracted from any consideration of the inclination of the heart; though
the propensity be not so great as to amount to a natural necessity ; yet being
some approach to it, so that the doing the good thing be very much from this
natural tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good inclination ;
then it is a dictate of common sense, that there is so much the less virtue in
what is done ; and so it is less praiseworthy and rewardable. The reason is
easy, viz., because such a natural propensity or tendency is an approach to
natural necessity ; and the greater the propensity, still so much the nearer is
the approach to necessity. And, therefore, as natural necessity takes away
or shuts out all virtue, so this propensity approaches to an abolition of virtue ;
that is, it diminishes it. And, on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the state
of things, is an approach to natural impossibility. And as the latter, when it
is complete and absolute, wholly takes away blame ; so such difficulty takes
away some blame, or diminishes blame ; and makes the thing done to be less
worthy of punishment.
II. Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, must, can't, can't help
ti, can't avoid it, necessary, unable, impossible, unavoidable, irresistible, &c, use
them to signify a necessity of constraint or restraint, a natural necessity or im-
possibility ; or some necessity that the Will has nothing to do in ; which may
be whether men will or no ; and which may be supposed to be just the same,
let men's inclinations and desires be what they will. Such terms in their origi-
nal use, I suppose, among all nations, are relative ; carrying in their significa-
tion (as was before observed) a reference or respect to some contrary Will, de-
sire or endeavor, which, it is supposed, is, or may be, in the case. All men
find, and begin to find in early childhood, that there are innumerable things
that cannot be done, which they desire to do ; and innumerable things which
they are averse to, that must be, they cannot avoid them, they will be, whether
they choose them or no. It is to express this necessity, which men so soon
and so often find, and which so greatly and so early affects them in innumera-
ble cases, that such terms and phrases are first formed ; and it is to signify such
a necessity, that they are first used, and that they are most constantly used, in
the common affairs of life ; and not to signify any such metaphysical, specula-
tive and abstract notion, as that connection in the nature or course of things,
which is between the subject and predicate of a proposition, and which is the
foundation of the certain truth of that proposition, to signify which, they, who
employ themselves in philosophical inquiries into the first origin and metaphysi-
cal relations and dependencies of things, have borrowed these terms, for want
of others. But we grow up from our cradles in a use of such terms and phrases
entirely different from this, and carrying a sense exceeding diverse from that,
in which they are commonly used in the controversy between Arminians and
Calvinists. And it being, as was said before, a dictate of the universal sense
of mankind, evident to us as soon as we begin to think, that the necessity sig-
nified by these terms, in the sense in which we first learn them, does excuse
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 129
persons and free them from all fault or blame ; hence our idea of excusableness
or faultiness is tied to these terms and phrases by a strong habit, which is begun
in childhood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows up with us, ana is
strengthened by constant use and custom, the connection growing stronger and
stronger. ,
The habitual connection, which is in men's minds between blamelessness and
those forementioned terms, must, cannot, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoid-
able, fyc, becomes very strong ; because, as soon as ever men begin to use
reason and speech, they have occasion to excuse themselves, from the natural
necessity signified by these terms, in numerous instances — / can't do it, — / coidd
not help it. — And all mankind have constant and daily occasion to use such
phrases in this sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the concerns
of life, with respect to disappointments, and things that happen, which concern
and affect ourselves and others, that are hurtful, or disagreeable to us or them, or
things desirable, that we or others fail of.
That a being accustomed to a union of different ideas, from early childhood,
makes the habitual connection exceeding strong, as though such connection were
owing to nature, is manifest in innumerable instances. It is altogether by such
an habitual connection of ideas, that men judge of the bigness or distance of the
objects of sight, from their appearance. Thus it is owing to such a connection
early established, and growing up with a person, that he judges a mountain, which
he sees at ten miles distance, to be bigger than his nose, or further off than the
end of it. Having been used so long to join a considerable distance and magni-
tude with such an appearance, men imagine it is by a dictate of natural sense :
whereas, it would be quite otherwise with one that had his eyes newly opened,
who had been born blind ; he would have the same visible appearance, but
natural sense would dictate no such thing, concerning the magnitude or distance
of what appeared.
III. When men, after they have been so habituated to connect ideas of inno-
cency or blamelessness with such terms, that the union seems to be the effect oi
mere nature, come to hear the same terms used, and learn to use them themselves
in the forementioned new and metaphysical sense, to signify quite another sort
of necessity, which has no such kind of relation to a contrary supposable Will
and endeavor ; the notion of plain and manifest blamelessness, by this means,
is, by a strong prejudice, insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case to which
it by no means belongs ; the change of the use of the terms, to a signification
which is very diverse, not being taken notice of, or adverted to. And there are
several reasons, why it is not.
1. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very distinct and clear in
their meaning ; few use them in a fixed, determined sense. On the contrary,
their meaning is very vague and confused. Which is what commonly happens
to the words used to signify things intellectual and moral, and to express what
Mr. Locke calls mixed modes. If men had a clear and distinct understanding of
what is intended by these metaphysical terms, they would be able more easily
to compare them with their original and common sense ; and so would not be so
easily led into delusion by words of this sort.
2. The change of the signification of the terms is the more insensible, be-
cause the things signified, though indeed very different, yet do in some generals
agree. In necessity, that which is vulgarly so called, there is a strong connec-
tion between the thing said to be necessary, and something antecedent to it, in
the order of nature ; so there is also in philosophical necessity. And though in
both kinds of necessity, the connection cannot be called by that name, with re-
Vol. II. 17
l3o FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
lation to an opposite Will or endeavor, to which it is superior ; which is the
case in vulvar necessity ; yet in both, the connection is prior to Will and en-
deavor, and so, in some respect, superior. In both kinds of necessity, there is a
foundation for some certainty of the proposition, that affirms the event. The
terms used being the same, and the things signified agreeing in these and some
other general circumstances, and the expressions, as used by philosophers being
not well defined, and so of obscure and loose signification ; hence persons are not
aware of the great difference ; and the notions of innocence or faultiness, which
were so strongly associated with them, and were strictly united in their minds,
ever since they can remember, remain united with them still, as if the union were
altogether natural and necessary ; and they that go about to make a separation,
seem to them to do great violence even to nature itself.
IV. Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcile it with reason, that
men should be blamed for that which is necessary with a moral necessity (which,
as was observed before, is a species of philosophical necessity), is, that for want
of due consideration, men inwardly entertain that apprehension, that this neces-
sity may be against men's Wills and sincere endeavors. They go away with
that notion, that men may truly will, and wish, and strive, that it may be other-
wise, but that invincible necessity stands in the way. And many think thus
concerning themselves : some, that are wicked men, think they wish that they
were good, that they loved God and holiness ; but yet do not find tha+ their
wishes produce the effect. — The reasons why men think thus, are as fellows .
(1.) They find what may be called an indirect willingness to have abetter Will,
in the manner before observed. For it is impossible, and a contradiction to sup-
pose the Will to be directly and properly against itself. And they do not
consider, that this indirect willingness is entirely a different thing from properly
willing the thing that is the duty and virtue required ; and that there is no virtue
in that sort of willingness which they have. They do not consider, that the
volitions, which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the
Will at all against the moral evil of not loving God ; but only some disagreeable
consequences. But the making the requisite distinction requires more care of
reflection and thought, than most men are used to. And men, through a preju-
dice in their own favor, are disposed to think well of their own desires and
dispositions, and to account them good and virtuous, though their respect to
virtue be only indirect and remote, and it is nothing at all that is virtuous that
truly excites or terminates their inclinations. (2.) Another thing, that insensi-
bly leads and beguiles men into a supposition that this moral necessity 01
impossibility is, or may be against men's Wills and true endeavors, is the deri-
vation and formation of the terms themselves, that are often used to express it,
which is such as seems directly to point to, and holds this forth. Such words,
for instance, as unable, unavoidable, impossible, irresistible ; wThich carry a plain
reference to a supposable power exerted, endeavors used, resistance made, in
opposition to the necessity ; and the persons that hear them, not considering nor
suspecting but that they are used in their proper sense ; that sense'being there-
fore understood, there does naturally, and as it were necessarily, arise in their
minds a supposition, that it may be so indeed, that true desires and endeavors
may take place, but that invincible necessity stands in the way, and renders them
vain and to no effect.
V. Anothe' thing, which makes persons more ready to suppose it to be con-
trary to reason, that men should be exposed to the punishments threatened to
sin, for doing those things which are morally necessary, or not doing those things
morally impossible, is, that imagination strengthens the argument, and adds
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 131
greatly to the power and influence of the seeming reasons against it, from the
greatness of that punishment. To allow that they may be justly exposed to a
small punishment, would not be so difficult. Whereas, if there were any good
reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of reason, that such necessity was
inconsistent with faultiness, or just punishment, the demonstration would be
equally certain with respect to a small punishment, or any punishment at all, as
a very great one ; but it is not equally easy to the imagination. They that
argue against the justice of damning men for those things that are thus neces-
sary, seem to make their argument the stronger, by setting forth the greatness
of the punishment in strong expressions ; — that a man should be cast into eter-
nal burnings, that he should be made to fry in hell to all eternity for those things
which he had no power to avoid, and was under a fatal, unfrustrable, invincible
necessity of doing.
SECTION IV.
It is agreeable to Common Sense, and the Natural Notions of Mankind, to suppose
moral Neceosity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment.
Whether the reasons that have been given, why it appears difficult to some
persons, to reconcile with common sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or
punishing, those things which are morally necessary, are thought satisfactory or
not ; yet it most evidently appears, by the following things, that if this matter
be rightly understood, setting aside all delusion arising from the impropriety
and ambiguity of terms, this is not at all inconsistent with the natural apprehen-
sions of mankind, and that sense of things which is found everywhere in the
common people ; who are furthest from having their thoughts perverted from
their natural channel, by metaphysical and philosophical subtilties ; but, on the
contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the very voice and dictate of, this natural
and vulgar sense.
I. This will appear, if we consider what the vulgar notion of blame-
worthiness is. The idea which the common people, through all ages and nations,
have of faultiness, I suppose to be plainly this ; a person's being or doing wrong,
with his own will and pleasure ; containing these two things : 1. His doing
wrong when he does as he pleases. 2. His pleasure being wrong. Or, in
other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their notion ; a person's having
his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart. And this is the sum total of
the matter.
The common people do not ascend up in their reflections and abstractions to
the metaphysical sources, relations and dependencies of things, in order to form
their notion of faultiness or blameworthiness. They do not wait till they have
decided by their refinings, what first determines the Will ; whether it be deter-
mined by something extrinsic, or intrinsic ; whether volition determines volition,
or whether the understanding determines the Will ; whether there be any such
thing as metaphysicians mean by contingence (if they have any meaning) ;
whether there be a sort of a strange, unaccountable sovereignty in the Will, in
the exercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all it« own
sovereign acts. They do not take any pail of their notion of fault or blame
from the resolution of any such questions. If this were the case, there are mul-
132 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
titudes, yea, the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety-nine out
of a thousand, would live and die, without having any such notion, as that of
fault, ever entering into their heads, or without so much as once having any
conception that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing.
To be sure, it would be a long time before men came to have such notions.
Whereas it is manifest, they are some of the first notions that appear m chil-
dren ; who discover, as soon as they can think, or speak, or act at all as rational
creatures, a sense of desert. And, certainly, in forming their notion of it, they
make no use of metaphysics. All the ground they go upon, consists in these two
tMngs ; experience, and a natural sensation of a certain fitness or agreeableness,
which there is in uniting such moral evil as is above described, viz., a being or
doing wrong with the Will, and resentment in others, and pain inflicted on the
person in whom this moral evil is. Which natural sense is what we call by
the name of conscience.
It is true, the common people and children, in their notion of a faulty act 01
deed, of any person, do suppose that it is the person's own act and deed. But
this is all that belongs to what they understand by a thing's being a person's
own deed or action ; even that it is something done by him of choice. That
some exercise or motion should begin of itself, does not belong to their notion
of an action, or doing. If so, it would belong to their notion of it, that it is
something, which is the cause of its own beginning ; and that is as much as to
say, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their notion of an action some
motion or exercise, that begins accidentally, without any cause or reason ; for
that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common sense, namely, that every-
thing that begins to be, has some cause or reason why it is.
The common people, in their notion of a faulty or praiseworthy deed or wort
done by any one, do suppose, that the man does it in the exercise of liberty.
But then their notion of liberty is only a person's having opportunity of doing
as he pleases. They have no notion of liberty consisting in the Will's first
acting, and so causing its own acts ; and determining, and so causing its own
determinations ; or choosing, and so causing its own choice. Such a notion ot
liberty is what none have, but those that have darkened their own minds with
confused, metaphysical speculation, and abstruse and ambiguous terms. If a
man is not restrained from acting as his Will determines, or constrained to act
otherwise ; then he has liberty, according to common notions of liberty, without
/aking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the determinations of a
man's free Will being the effects of the determinations of his free Will. Noi
have men commonly any notion of freedom consisting in indifference. For if
so, then it would be agreeable to their notion, that the greater indifference men
act with, the more freedom they act with ; whereas, the reverse is true. He
that in acting, proceeds with the fullest inclination, does what he does with the
greatest freedom, according to common sense. And so far is it from being
agreeable to common sense, that such liberty as consists in indifference is requi-
site to praise or blame, that on the contrary, the dictate of every man's natural
sense through the world is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his
acting good or evil, and the more he does either with or without full and strong
inclination, the more is he to be esteemed or abhorred, commended or con-
demned.
H. If it were inconsistent with the common sense of mankind, that men
should be either to be blamed or commended in any volitions, they have, or fail
of, in case of moral necessity or impossibility ; then it would surely also be
agreeable to the same sense and reason of mankind, that the nearer the case
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 133
approaches to such a moral necessity or impossibility, either through a strong
antecedent moral propensity, on the one hand,* or a great antecedent opposition
and difficulty on the other, the nearer does it approach to a being neither blama-
ble nor commendable ; so that acts exerted with such preceding propensity,
would be worthy of proportionably less praise ; and when omitted, the act
being attended with such difficulty, the omission would be worthy of* the less
blame. It is so, as was observed before, with natural necessity and impossi-
bility, propensity and difficulty ; as it is a plain dictate of the sense of all man-
kind, that natural necessity and impossibility take away all blame and praise ;
and therefore, that the nearer the approach is to these, through previous pro-
pensity or difficulty, so praise and blame are proportionably diminished. And if
it were as much a dictate of common sense, that moral necessity of doing, or
impossibility of avoiding, takes away all praise and blame, a£ that natural
necessity or impossibility does this ; then, by a perfect parity of reason, it would
be as much the dictate of common sense, that an approach to moral necessity
of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, diminishes praise and blame, as that an
approach to natural necessity and impossibility does so. It is equally the voice
of common sense, that persons are excusable in part, in neglecting things diffi-
cult against their Wills, as that they are excusable wholly in neglecting things
impossible against their Wills. And if it made no difference whether the impos-
sibility were natural and against the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with
regard to excusableness ; so neither would it make any difference, whether
the difficulty, or approach to necessity be natural against the Will, or moral,
lying in the propensity of the Will.
But it is apparent, that the reverse of these things is true. If there be an
approach to a moral necessity in a man's exertion of good acts of Will, they
being the exercise of a strong propensity to good, and a very powerful love to
virtue ; it is so far from being the dictate of common sense, that he is less vir-
tuous, and the less to be esteemed, loved and praised ; that it is agreeable to
the natural notions of all mankind, that he is so much the better man, worthy
of greater respect, and higher commendation. And the stronger the inclination
is, and the nearer it approaches to necessity in that respect ; or to impossibility
of neglecting the virtuous act, or of doing a vicious one, still the more virtuous,
and worthy of higher commendation. And, on the other hand, if a man exerts
evil acts of mind ; as, for instance, acts of pride or malice from a rooted and
strong habit, or principle of haughtiness and maliciousness, and a violent pro-
pensity of heart to such acts ; according to the natural sense of all men, he is
so far from being the less hateful and blamable on that account, that he is so
much the more worthy to be detested and condemned, by all that observe him.
Moreover, it is manifest that it is no part of the notion, which mankind com-
monly have of a blamable or praiseworthy act of the Will, that it is an act
which is not determined by an antecedent bias or motive, but by the sovereign
power of the Will itself ; because, if so, the greater hand such causes have in
determining any acts of the Will, so much the less virtuous or vicious would
they be accounted ; and the less hand, the more virtuous or vicious. WThereas,
the reverse is true : men do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy,
for the agent's being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good mo-
tive, but the more. And if good inclination or motive, has but little influence
in determining the agent, they do not think his act so much the more virtuous,
* It is here argued, on supposition that not all propensity implies moral necessity, but only some very
high degree ; which none will deny.
!34 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
but the hss. And so concerning evil acts, which are determined by eul mo-
tives or inclinations. .,,.-.. • i L j • ^
Yea if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the
hearts of men, by nature itself (which, it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in in-
numerable cases), yet it is not commonly supposed, that men are worthy of no
praise or dispraise for such dispositions; although what is natural, is undoubt-
U\y necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the Will whatsoever. Thus,
for instance, if a man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition,
and is supposed to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate
of the common sense and apprehension cf men, that such dispositions are no
vices or moral evils, or that such persons are not worthy of disesteem, odium and
dishonor ; or that the proud or malicious acts which flow from such natural dis-
positions, are .worthy of no resentment. Yea, such vile natural dispositions,
and the strength of them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation
of the wicked acts, that come from such a fountain, than an extenuation of
them. Its being natural for men to act thus, is often observed by men in the
height of their indignation : they will say, " It is his very nature : he is of a
vilenatural temper : it is as natural to him to act so as it is to breathe j he can-
not help serving the devil," &c. But it is not thus with regard to hurtful, mis-
chievous things" that any are the subjects or occasions of, by a natural necessity,
against their inclinations. In such a case, the necessity, by the common voice
of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse. Thus it is very plain, that com-
mon sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to
the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and desert of
men's actions.
And these dictates of men's minds are so natural and necessary, that it may
be very much doubted whether the Arminians themselves have ever got rid of
them ; yea, their greatest doctors, that have gone furthest in defence of their
metaphysical notions of liberty, and have brought their arguments to their great-
est strength, and, as they suppose, to a demonstration, against the consistence of
virtue and vice with any necessity ; it is to be questioned, whether there is so
much as one of them, but that, if he suffered very much from the injurious acts
of a man, under the power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of tem-
per, would not, from the forementioned natural sense of mind, resent it far other-
wise, than if as great sufferings came upon him from the wind that blows, and
fire that burns by natural necessity ; and otherwise than he would, if he suffered
as much from the conduct of a man perfectly delirious ; yea, though he first
brought his distraction upon him some way by his own fault.
Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make between natural and
moral necessity, as though it were altogether impertinent in this controversy :
" That which is necessary, say they, is necessary ; it is that which must be, and
cannot be prevented. And that which is impossible, is impossible, and cannot
be done ; and therefore, none can be to blame for not doing it." And such
comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk, who has
lost his legs, and condemning and punishing him for not obeying ; inviting and
calling upon a man, who is shut up in a strong prison, to come forth, &c. But,
in these things, Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common sense deter-
mine whether there be not a great difference between those twro cases ; the one,
that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast into prison ; and after
he has lain there a while, the king comes to him, calls him to come forth to him,
and tells him, that if he will do so, and will fall down before him, and humbly
beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven, and set at liberty, and also be areatly en-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 135
riched and advanced to honor ; the prisoner heartily repents of the folly and
wickedness of his offence against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase
himself, and accept of the king's offer ; but is confined by strong walls, with
gates of brass, and bars of iron. The other case is, that of a man who is of a
very unreasonable spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful disposition, and, more-
over, has been brought up in traitorous principles, and has his heart possessed
with an extreme and inveterate enmity to his lawful sovereign ; and for his re-
bellion is 'cast into prison, and lies long there, loaden with heavy chains, and in
miserable circumstances. At length the compassionate prince comes to the pris-
on, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prison doors to be set wide open ;
calls to him, and tells him, if he will come forth to him, and fall down before
him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his forgiveness,
he shall be forgiven, set at liberty, and set in a place of great dignity and profit
in his court. But he is so stout and stomachful, and full of haughty malignity,
that he cannot be willing to accept the offer : his rooted, strong pride and ma-
lice have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart;
the opposition of his heart has the mastery over him, having an influence on his
mind far superior to the king's grace and condescension, and to all his kind of-
fers and promises. Now, is it agreeable to common sense to assert and stand
to it, that there is no difference between these two cases, as to any worthiness
of blame in the prisoners ; because, forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and
the required act in each case is impossible 1 It is true, a man's evil dispositions
may be as strong and immovable as the bars of a castle. But who cannot see,
that when a man, in the latter case, is said to be unable to obey the command,
the expression is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally and in
common speech ? And that it may properly be said to be in the rebel's power
to come out of prison, seeing he can easily do it if he pleases; though by reason
of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it
should please him 1
Upon the whole, I presume there is no person of good understanding, who
impartially considers the things which have been observed, but will allow, that
it is not evident, from the dictates of the common sense, or natural notions of
mankind, that moral necessity is inconsistent with praise and blame. And
therefore, if the Arminians would prove any such inconsistency, it must be by
some philosophical and metaphysical arguments, and not common sense.
There is a grand illusion in the pretended demonstration of Arminians from
common sense. The main strength of all these demonstrations lies in that pre-
judice, that arises through the insensible change of the use and meaning of such
terms as liberty, able, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, invincible, ac-
tion, &c, from their original and vulgar sense, to a metaphysical sense, entirely
diverse, and the strong connection of the ideas of blamelessness, &c, with some
of these terms, by a habit contracted and established, while these terms were
used in their first meaning. This prejudice and delusion is the foundation of all
those positions, they lay down as maxims, by which most of the scriptures, which
they allege in this controversy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous
demonstrations from Scripture and reason depend. From .this secret delusion
and prejudice they have almost all their advantages; it is the strength of their
bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of all
the right they have to treat their neighbors in so assuming a manner, and to in-
sult others, perhaps as wise and good as themselves, as weak bigots, men that
dwell in the dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately shutting their
eyes against the noonday light, enemies to common sense, maintaining the first
136 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
born of absurdities, &c. &c. But perhaps an impartial consideration of the things,
which have been observer in the preceding parts of this inquiry, may enable the
lovers of truth better to judge, whose doctrine is indeed absurd, abstruse, self
contra' I id or y, and inconsistent with common sense, and many ways repugnant
to the universal dictates of the reason of mankind.
Corol. From things which have been observed, it will follow, that it is
agreeable to common sense to suppose, that the glorified saints have not their
freedom at all diminished, in any respect ; and that God himself has the highest
possible freedom, according to the true and proper meaning of the term ; and
that he is, in the highest possible respect, an agent, and active in the exercise of
his infinite holiness ; though he acts therein, in the highest degree, necessarily ;
and his actions of this kind are in the highest, most absolutely perfect manner,
virtuous and praiseworthy j and are so, for that very reason, because they are
most perfectly necessary.
SECTION V.
Concerning those Objections, that this Scheme of Necessity renders all Means and
Endeavors for the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain and
to no purpose ; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in Affairs
of Morality and Religion.
Arminians say, if it be so, that sin and virtue come to pass by a necessity
consisting in a sure connection of Causes and effects, antecedents and consequents,
it can never be worth the while to use any means or endeavors to obtain the
one, and avoid the other ; seeing no endeavors can alter the futurity of the
event, which is become necessary by a connection already established.
But I desire, that this matter may be fully considered ; and that it may be
examined with a thorough strictness, whether it will follow that endeavors and
means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on
the supposition of such a connection of antecedents and consequents, than if the
contrary be supposed.
For endeavors to be in vain, is for them not to be successful ; that is to say,
for them not eventually to be the means of the thing aimed at, wThich cannot be,
but in one of these two ways ; either, first : that although the means are used,
yet the event aimed at does not follow ; or, secondly, if the event does follow,
it is not because of the means, or from any connection or dependence of the event
on the means : the event would have come to pass, as well without the means as
with them. If either of these two things are the case, then the means are not
properly successful, and are truly in vain. The successfulness or unsuccessfulness
of means, in order to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain, consists in
those means being connected, or not connected with the effect, in such a man-
ner as this, viz., that the effect is with the means, and not without them ; or
that the being of the effect is, on the one hand, connected with the means, and
the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the want of the
means. If there be such a connection as this between means and end, the
means are not in vain. The more there is of such a connection, the further they
are from being in vain \ and the less of such a connection, the more they are in
rain.
Now, therefore, the Question to be answered (in order to determine, whether
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. , 137
it follows from this doctrine of the necessary connection between foregoing
things, and consequent ones, that means used in order to any effect, are more in
vain than they would be otherwise) is, whether it follows from it, that there is
less of the forementioned connection between means and effect ; that is, whether,
on the supposition of there being a real and true connection between antecedent
things and consequent ones, there must be less of a connection between means
and effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed connection between
antecedent things and consequent ones ; and the very stating of this question is
sufficient to answer it. It must appear to every one that will open his eyes,
that this question cannot be affirmed, without the grossest absurdity and incon-
sistence. Means are foregoing things, and effects are following things ; and if
there were no connection between foregoing things and following ones, there
could be no connection between means and end ; and so all means would be wholly
vain and fruitless. For it is by virtue of some connection only, that they become
successful : it is some connection observed, or revealed, or otherwise known, be-
tween antecedent things and following ones, that is, what directs in the choice
of means. And if there were no such thing as an established connection, there
could be no choice as to means ; one thing would have no more tendency to an effect,
than another ; there would be no such thing as tendency in the case. All those things
which are successful means of other things, do therein prove connected antece-
dents of them; and therefore to assert, that a fixed connection between
antecedents and consequents makes means vain and useless, or stands in the way
to hinder the connection between means and end, is just as ridiculous as to say,
that a connection between antecedents and consequents stands in the way to
hinder a connection between antecedents and consequents.
Nor can any supposed connection of the succession or train of antecedents
and consequents, from the very beginning of all things, the connection being
made already sure and necessary, either by established laws of nature, or by
these together with a decree of sovereign immediate interpositions of divine pow-
er, on such and such occasions, or any other way (if any other there be) ; I say,
no such necessary connection of a series of antecedents and consequents can in
the least tend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the series ;
and so may be some of those antecedents which are connected with the conse-
quents we aim at, in the established course of things. Endeavors which we
use, are things that exist ; and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of
events ; all the parts of which chain are supposed to be connected ; and so
endeavors are supposed to be connected with some effects, or some consequent
things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events they
are connected with, may be those which we aim at, and which we choose, be-
cause we judge them most likely to have a connection with those events, from
the established order and course of things which we observe, or from something
in divine revelation.
Let us suppose a real and sure connection between a man's having his eyes
open in the clear day-light, with good organs of sight, and seeing ; so that seeing is
connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his
eyes ; and also the like connection between such a man's attempting to open his
eyes, and his actually doing it. The supposed established connection between
these antecedents and consequents, let the connection be ever so sure and ne-
cessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in such circumstances
to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing ; his aiming at that event, and
the use of the means, being the effect of his Will, does not break the connec-
tion, or hinder the success.
Vol. IL 18
138 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the
necessity of events by a certainty of connection and consequence : on the con-
trary it is truly forcible against the Arminian doctrine of contingence and self-
determination ; which is inconsistent with such a connection. If there be no
connection between those events, wherein virtue and vice consist, and any thing
antecedent • then there is no connection between these events and any means or
endeavors used in order to them ; and if so, then those means must be vain.
The less there is of connection between foregoing things and following ones, so
much the less there is between means and end, endeavors and success ; and in
the same proportion are means and endeavors ineffectual and vain.
It will follow from Arminian principles, that there is no connection between
virtue or vice, and any foregoing event or thing ; or, in other words, that the
determination of the existence of virtue or vice does not in the least depend on
the influence of any thing that comes to pass antecedently, from which the
determination of its existence is, as its cause, means, or ground ; because, so
far as it is so, it is not from self-determination ; and, therefore, so far there is
nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And so it follows, that virtue and vice
are not in any degree, dependent upon, or connected with, any foregoing event
or existence, as its cause, ground, or means. And if so, then all foregoing
means must be totally vain.
Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any consistence with the Arminian
scheme, be any reasonable ground of so much as a conjecture concerning the
consequence of any means and endeavors, in order to escaping vice or obtaining
virtue, or any choice or preference of means, as having a greater probability of
success by some than others ; either from any natural connection or dependence
of the end on the means, or through any divine constitution, or revealed way of
God's bestowing or bringing to pass these things, in consequence of any means,
endeavors, prayers or deeds. Conjecture, in this latter case, depends on a sup-
position, that God himself is the giver, or determining cause of the events
sought ; but if they depend on self-determination, then God is not the determin-
ing or disposing author of them ; and if these things are not of his disposal,
then no conjecture can be made, from any revelation he has given, concerning
any way or method of his disposal of them.
Yea, on these principles, it will not only follow, that men cannot have any
reasonable ground of judgment or conjecture, that their means and endeavors to
obtain virtue or avoid vice, will be successful, but they may be sure, they will
not ; they may be certain, that they will be vain ; and that if ever the thing,
which they seek, comes to pass, it will not be at all owing to the means they
use. For means and endeavors can have no effect, in order to obtain the end,
but in one of these two ways; either, (1,) through a natural tendency and
influence, to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts, either by caus-
ing the disposition of the heart to be more in favor of such acts, or by bringing
the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements ; or, (2,) by
putting persons more in the way of God's bestowment of the benefit. But
neithei of these can be the case. Not the latter ; for, as has been just now
observed, it does not consist with the Arminian notion of self-determination,
which they suppose essential to virtue, that God should be the bestower, or
( which is the same thing) the determining, disposing author of virtue. Not the
former, for natural influence and tendency supposes causality and connection ;
and that supposes necessity of event, which is inconsistent with Arminian
liberty. A tendency of means, by biasing the heart in favor of virtue, or by
bringing the Will under the influence and power of motives in its determina-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 139
tions, are both inconsistent with Arminian liberty of Will, consisting in indif-
ference, and sovereign self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.
But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the doctrine ot
necessity, which has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage a total
neglect of all endeavors as vain ; the following things may be considered.
The question is not, whether men may not thus improve this doctrine : we
know that many true and wholesome doctrines are abused ; but, whether the
doctrine gives any just occasion for such an improvement ; or whether, on the
supposition of the truth of the doctrine, such a use of it would not be unreason-
able ? If any shall affirm, that it would not, but that the very nature of the
doctrine is such as gives just occasion for it, it must be on this supposition,
namely, that such an invariable necessity of all things already settled, must
render the interposition of ajl means, endeavors, conclusions or actions of ours,
in order to the obtaining any future end whatsoever, perfectly insignificant ;
because they cannot in the least alter or vary the course and series of things, in
any event or circumstance ; all being already fixed unalterably by necessity ;
and that therefore it is folly, for men to use any means for any end ; but their
wisdom, to save themselves the trouble of endeavors, and take their ease. No
person can draw such an inference from this doctrine, and come to such a con-
clusion, without contradicting himself, and going counter to the very principles
he pretends to act upon ; for he comes to a conclusion, and takes a course, in
order to an end, even his ease, or the saving himself from trouble ; he seeks
something future, and uses means in order to a future thing, even in his drawing
up that conclusion, that he will seek nothing, and use no means in order to any
thing in future ; he seeks his future ease, and the benefit and comfort of indo-
lence. If prior necessity, that determines all things, makes vain all actions or
conclusions ol ours, in order to any thing future ; then it makes vain all conclu-
sions and conduct of ours, in order to our future ease. The measure of our ease,
with the time, manner, and every circumstance of it, is already fixed, by all-
determining necessity, as much as any thing else. If he says within himself,
" What future happiness or misery I shall have, is already, in effect, determined
by the necessary course and connection of things ; therefore, I will save myself
the trouble of labor and diligence, which cannot add to my determined degree
of happiness, or diminish my misery ; but will take my ease, and will enjoy the
comfort of sloth and negligence." Such a man contradicts himself; he says,
the measure of his future happiness and misery is already fixed, and he will not
try to diminish the one, nor add to the other ; but yet, in his very conclusion, he
contradicts this ; for, he takes up this conclusion, to add to his future happiness,
by the ease and comfort of his negligence ; and to diminish his future trouble
and misery, by saving himself the trouble of using means and taking pains.
Therefore persons cannot reasonably make this improvement of the doctrine
of necessity, that they will go into a voluntary negligence of means for their
own happiness. For the principles they must go upon in order to this, are in-
consistent with their making any improvement at all of the doctrine ; for to
make some improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to some volun-
tary conclusion in regard to their own conduct, with some view or aim ; but
this, as has been shown, is inconsistent with the principles they pretend to act
upon. In short, the principles are such as cannot be acted upon, in any respect,
consistently. And, therefore, in every pretence of acting upon them, or making
any improvement of them, there is a self-contradiction.
As to that objection against the doctrine, which I have endeavored to prove,
that it makes men no more than mere machines ; I would say, that not with-
140 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
standing this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly and unspeakably differait from
a mere machine, in that he has reason and understanding, and has a faculty of
Will, and so is capable of volition or choice ; and in that, his Will is guided
by the dictates or views of his understanding ; and in that his external actions
and behavior, and, in many respects, also his thoughts, and the exercises of his
mind, are subject to his Will; so that he has liberty to act according to his
choice, and do what he pleases ; and by means of these things, is capable of
moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations aud actions as, according to the
common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love and reward ; or,
on the contrary, of disesteem, detestation, indignation and punishment.
In these things is all the difference from mere machines, as to liberty and
agency, that would be any perfection, dignity or privilege, in any respect ; all
the difference that can be desired, and all that can V^e conceived of; and indeed
all that the pretensions of the Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced
often to explain themselves (though their explications overthrow and abolish
the things asserted, and pretended to be explained) ; for they are forced to ex-
plain a self-determining power of Will, by a power in the soul, to determine as
it chooses or Wills ; which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power
of choosing, and in many instances, can do as he chooses. Which is quite a
different thing from that contradiction, his having power of choosing his first
act of choice in the case.
Or, if their scheme makes any other difference than this, between men and
machines, it is for the worse ; it is so far from supposing men to have a dignity
and privilege above machines, that it makes the manner of their being deter-
mined still more unhappy. Whereas, machines are guided by an understanding
cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or owner ; the Will of man is left to
the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind contingence.
SECTION VI.
Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, thai it
agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.
When Calvinists oppose the Arminian notion of the freedom of Will, and
contingence of volition, and insist that there are no acts of the Will, nor any
other events whatsoever, but what are attended with some kind of necessity ;
their opposers cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoics in their doc-
trine of fate, and with Mr Hobbes in his opinion of necessity.
It would not be worth while to take notice of so impertinent an objection,
had it not been urged by some of the chief Arminian writers. There were
many important truths maintained by the ancient Greek and Roman philoso-
phers, and especially the Stoics, that are never the worse for being held by
them. The Stoic philosophers, by the general agreement of Christians, and
even by Arminian divines, were the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous of all
the heathen philosophers ; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest
to Christianity of any of their sects. How frequently are the sayings of these
philosophers, in many of the writings and sermons, even of Arminian divines,
produced, not as arguments of the falseness of the doctrines which they delivered,
but as a confirmation of some of the greatest truths of the Christian religion,
relating to the unity and perfections of the Godhead, a future state, the duty and
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 141
happiness of mankind, &c, as observing how the light of nature and reason, in
the wisest and best of the heathens, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel
of Jesus Christ.
And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that although he alleges
the agreement of the Stoics with us, wherein he supposes they maintained the
like doctrine with us, as an argument against the truth of our doctrine ; yet,
this very Dr. Whitby alleges the agreement of the Stoics with the Arminians,
wherein he supposes they taught the same doctrine with them, as an argument
for the truth of their doctrine.* So that, when the Stoics agree with them, this
(it seems) is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a confutation of ours, as
showing that our opinions are contrary to the natural sense and common reason
of mankind : nevertheless, when the Stoics agree with us, it argues no such
thing in our favor ; but, on the contrary, is a great argument against us, and
shows our doctrine to be heathenish.
It is observed by some Calvinistic writers, that the Ar minions symbolize
with the Stoics, in some of those doctrines wherein they are opposed by the
Calvinists ; particularly in their denying an original, innate, total corruption
and depravity of heart ; and in what they held of man's ability to make him-
self truly virtuous and conformed to God ; and in some other doctrines.
It may be further observed, it is certainly no better objection against our
doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects, with the doctrine of the ancient Stoic
philosophers, than it is against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees,
in some respects, with the opinion of the very worst of the heathen philoso-
phers, the followers of Epicurus, that father of atheism and licentiousness, and
with the doctrine of the Sadducees and Jesuits.
I am not much concerned to -know precisely, what the ancient Stoic phi-
losophers held concerning fate, in order to determine what is truth j as though
it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them.
It seems, that they differed among themselves ; and probably the doctrine of
fate as maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But what-
ever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any
liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a fate. If
they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal
lotions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice, I
disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated that the scheme I main-
tain is no such scheme. If the Stoics, by fate, meant any thing of such a
nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of the advantage and benefit of
the use of means and endeavors, or makes it less worth the while for men to
desire, and seek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness consists ; I
hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than
any other scheme whatsoever ; and by no means so much as the Arminian
scheme of contingence ; as has been shown. If they held any such doctrine
of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can
be any perfection, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing 'desirable, in any
respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is possible
or conceivable ; 1 embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine
of fate, as is inconsistent with the world's being in all things subject to the dis-
posal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides, not as the soul of the world,
but as the Sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all things by proper will,
choice and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, with
* Whitby on the Five Points, Edit. III. p. 325, 326, 327
142 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
out subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influ-
ence of any thing before, above or without himself, I wholly renounce any such
doctrine.
As to Mr. Hobbes' maintaining the same doctrine concerning necessity, I
confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it will,
we need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely
because it was once held by some bad man. This great truth, that Jesus is the
Son of God, was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a
loud voice by the devil. If truth is so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth,
or written by the pen of some ill-minded mischievous man, that it must never be
received, we shall never know, when we hold any of the most precious and
evident truths by a sure tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of
this truth, that is to be lamented ; but the truth is not to be thought worthy of
rejection on that account. It is common for the corruptions of the hearts of
evil men to abuse the best things to vile purposes.
I might also take notice of its having been observed, that the Arminians
agree with Mr. Hobbes in many more things than the Calvinists.* As, in what
he is said to hold concerning original sin, in denying the necessity of super-
natural illumination, in denying infused grace, in denying the doctrine of justifi-
cation by faith 'alone, and other thmgs.
SECTION VII.
Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.
Some may possibly object against what has been supposed of the absurdu
and inconsistence of a self-determining power in the Will, and the impossibility
of its being otherwise, than that the Will should be determined in every case
by some motive, and by a motive which (as it stands in the view of the under-
standing) is of superior strength to any appearing on the other side ; that if
these things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will. of created minds,
but the Will of God himself is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning
which, says the author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and in
the Creature, pages 85, 86, " What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our
ideas of the dominion of God 1 Does it not destroy the glory of his liberty of
choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the
world, that most free, and sovereign Agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom 'f
Does it not seem to make him a kind of mechanical medium of fate, and intro-
duce Mr. Hobbes' doctrine of fatality and necessity, into all things that God
hath to do with 1 Does it not seem to represent the blessed God, as a Being
of vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency, but still to leave him
without a Will to choose among all the objects within his view 1 In short, it
seems to make the blessed God a sort of Almighty Minister of Fate, under its
universal and supreme influence ; as it was the professed sentiment of some of
the ancients, that fate was above the gods."
This is declaiming, rather than arguing ; and an application to men's
imaginations and prejudices, rather than to mere reason. But I would calmly
endeavor to consider, whether there be any reason in this frightful representa-
• Dr. Gill, in his answer to Dr. Whitby, Vol. III. p, 183, &C
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 143
tion. But before I enter upon a particular consideration of the matter, I would
observe this ; that it is reasonable to suppose, it should be'.jrruch more difficult
to express or conceive things according to exact metaphysical truth, relating
to the nature and manner of the existence of things in the Divine Understand-
ing and Will, and the operation of these faculties (if I may so call them) of
.he Divine Mind, than in the human mind ; which is infinitely more within
our view, and nearer to a proportion to the measure of our comprehension, and
more commensurate to the use and import of human speech. Language is in-
deed very deficient, in regard of terms, to express precise truth concerning our
own "minds, and their faculties and operations. Words were first formed to
express external things ; and those that are applied to express things internal
and spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense.
Whence they are, most of them, attended with a great deal of ambiguity and
unfixedness in their signification, occasioning innumerable doubts, difficulties
and confusions, in inquiries and controversies, about things of this nature. But
language is much less adapted to express things in the mind of the incompre-
hensible Deity, precisely as they are.
We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of the nature of our
own souls. And notwithstanding all the progress which has been made, in
past and present ages, in this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphysics,
as it relates to these things, is brought to greater perfection than once it was ;
yet, here is still work enough left for future inquiries and researches, and room
for progress still to be made, for many ages and generations. But we had
need to be infinitely able metaphysicians, to conceive with clearness, according
to strict, proper and perfect truth, concerning the nature of the Divine Essence,
and the modes of the action and operation of the powers of the Divine Mind.
And it may be noted particularly, that though we are obliged to conceive of
Borne things in God as consequent and dependent on others, and of some things
pertaining to the Divine Nature and Will as the foundation of others, and so
before others in the order of nature ; as, we must conceive of the knowledge and
holiness of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happiness \ the perfection
of his understanding, as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees ; the
holiness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determinations. And
yet, when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, fundamental
and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-exist-
ent, independent, of perfect and absolute simplicity and immutability, and the
first cause of all things ; doubtless there must be less propriety in such represen-
tations, than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded,
and liable to perpetual mutation and succession.
Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the forementioned
author's exclamation, about the necessary determination of God's Will, in all
things, by what he sees to be fittest and best.
That all the seeming force of such objections and exclamations must arise
from an imagination, that there is some sort of privilege or dignity in being
without such a moral necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than
always choose what is wisest and best ; as- though there were some disadvan-
tage, meanness and subjection, in such a necessity ; a thing by which the Will
was confined, kept under, and held in servitude by something, which, as it were,
maintained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that
held God fast, and that he could, by no means, deliver himself from. Whereas,
this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dis-
honor to a being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner,
144 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
from the necessary perfection of his own nature. This argues no imperfection,
inferiority or dependence, nor any want of dignity, privilege or ascendency.*
It is not inconsistent with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God.
The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleases him ;
whereby He doth according to his Will in the armies of Heaven, and amongst the
inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What dost
thou ? — The following things belong to the sovereignty of God, viz. : 1. Su-
preme, universal, and infinite Power, whereby he is able to do what he pleases,
without control, without any confinement of that power, without any subjection,
in the least measure, to any other power ; and so without any hinderance or
restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accom-
plish his Will ; and without any dependence of his power on any other power,
from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any need of : so
far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is absolutely depen-
dent on him. 2. That He has supreme authority, absolute and most perfect
right to do what he wills, without subjection to any superior authority, or any
derivation of an authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct indepen-
dent authority, either superior, equal, or inferior ; he being the head of all
dominion, and fountain of all authority ; and also without restraint by any obli-
gation, implying either subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation.
3. That his Will is supreme, underived, and independent on any thing without
Himself; being in every thing determined by his own counsel, having no other rule
but his own wisdom ; his Will not being subject to, or restrained by the Will of
any other, and other Wills being perfectly subject to his. 4. That his Wisdom,
which determines his Will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient and in-
dependent ; so that it may be said, as in Isa. xl. 14, With whom took He
* " It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Supreme Cause cannot be free, be -
cause he must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's
purpose ; for this is a necessity, not of nature and of fate, but of fitness and wisdom ; a necessity consis-
tent with the greatest freedom, and most perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such
an unalterable rectitude of Will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act
foolishly." Clark's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. Edit. 6, p. 64.
" Though God is a most perfect free agent, yet he cannot but do what is best and wisest on the whole.
The reason is evident ; because perfect wisdom and goodness are as steady and certain principles of
action, as necessity itself ; and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with the most perfect liberty,
can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act con-
trary to the necessity by which it is acted ; it being as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for
infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would
be in nature, for absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect. There was, indeed, no ne-
cessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at
all, because he is, in Himself, infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was also, no necessity in nature,
that he should preserve and continue things in being, after they were created ; because he would be self
sufficient without their continuance, as he was before their creation. But it was fit, and wise, and good,
that Infinite Wisdom should manifest, arid Infinite Goodness communicate itself ; and therefore it was
necessary, in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made at such a time,
and continued so long, and indeed with various perfections in such degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and
Goodness saw it best and wisest that they should." Ibid. p. 112, 113.
"Tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result
of a fair examination. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very im-
provement, and benefit of it. 'Tis not an abridgment, 'tis the end and use of our liberty ; and the further
we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indiffer-
ence in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its
choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would
be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will,
would be an imperfection on the other side. 'Tis as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of
preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the Will :
and the more certain such determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by
any thing but the last result, of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not
tree. The very end of our freedom being that we might attain the good we choose ; and, therefore, every
man is brought under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing
oy his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do ; else he would be under the determination
ol some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's Will, in every determi-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 145
counsel ? And who instructed Him and taught Him in the path of judgment,
and taught Him knowledge, and showed Him the way of understanding ? — There
is no other Divine Sovereignty but this, and this is properly absolute sovereignty ;
no other is desirable, nor would any other be honorable, or happy, and indeed,
there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the
Divine Sovereignty, that God's Will is determined by his own infinite all-suffi-
cient wisdom in every thing ; and in nqthing is either directed by any inferior
wisdom, or by no wisdom ; whereby it would become senseless arbitrariness,
determining and acting without reason, design or end.
If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every thing by supreme wis-
dom, then it is in every thing necessarily determined to that which is most wise.
And, certainly, it would be a disadvantage and indignity to be otherwise. For
if the Divine Will was not necessarily determined to that, which in every case
is wisest and best, it must be subject to some degree of undesigning contingence ;
and so in the same degree liable to evil. To suppose the Divine Will liable to
be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind contin-
gence, which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intelligent dictate whatsoever
(if any such thing were possible), would certainly argue a great degree of im-
perfection and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a disad-
vantage for the Divine Will to be attended with this moral necessity, then the
more free from it, and the more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage.
And, consequently, to be perfectly free from the direction of understanding, and
universally and entirely left to senseless, unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely
at random, would be the supreme glory.
It no more argues any dependence of God's Will, that his supremely wise voli-
tion is necessary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is
necessary. If it be something too low, for the Supreme Being to have his Will
nation, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have,
at the same time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts, before any
other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other, unless he can have, and
not have it, will, and not will it, at the same time ; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted. If we
look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge,
that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we ; and yet we have no reason to
think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we
are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himselt
cannot choose what is not good. The freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what
is best. But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask, would any one be a change
ling, because he is less determined by wise determination, than a wise man ? Is it worth the name of
freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self? If to break
loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us
from doing or choosing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only free men. Yet
I think, nobody would choose to be mad, for the sake of such libertv, but he that is mad already." Locke,
Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit. 7, p. 215, 216.
" This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always, and eternally will, accord-
ing to his infinite comprehension of things ; that is, must will all things that are wisest and best to be
done. There is no getting free of this consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be
capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing
otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite knowledge
must direct the Will without error. Here then, is the origin of moral necessity; and that is really, ol
freedom. Perhaps it may be said, when the Divine Will is determined, from the consideration of the
eternal aptitude of things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impelled, if that
were possible. But it is unskilfulness, to suppose this an objection. The great principle is once es-
tablished, viz., that the Divine Will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead
of being physically impelled ; and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the
more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be. It is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being,
whose Will and power are constantly, immutably, determined by the consideration of what is wisest and
best , instead of a surd Being, with power, but without discerning and reason. It is the beauty of this
necessity, that it is strong as fate itself, with all the advantage of reason and goodness. It is strange, to
see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise ;
when a man is allowed still the perfecter being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined by
reason and truth." Inquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul Edit. 3, Vol. II. p. 403, 404.
Vol II. 19
±46 FREEDOM OF THE WILL
determined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every case, to will in the
highest degree holily and happily ; then why is it not also something too low,
for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his
infinite happiness determined by necessity ? It is no more to God's dishonor,
to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And if neither of them be
to his dishonor, then it is not to his dishonor necessarily to act holily and wisely
And if it be not dishonorable to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest
possible degree, no more is it mean and dishonorable, necessarily to act holily
and wisely in the highest possible degree ; or, which is the same thing, to do
that, in every case, which, above all other things, is wisest and best.
The reason, why it is not dishonorable to be necessarily most holy, is, be-
cause holiness in itself is an excellent and honorable thing. For the same
reason, it is no dishonor to be necessarily most wise, and, in every case, to act
most wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest of all ; for wisdom is also in
itself excellent and honorable.
The forementioned author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will, &c,
as has been observed, represents that doctrine of the Divine Will's being in every
thing necessarily determined by superior fitness, as making the blessed God a
kind of Almighty Minister and mechanical medium of fate J and he insists, pages
93, 94, that this moral necessity and impossibility is, in effect, the same thing
with physical and natural necessity and impossibility : and in p. 54, 55, he says,
" The scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by the under-
standing, and the understanding by the appearance of things, seems to take away
the true nature of vice and virtue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest
of vices, seem rather to be matters of fate and necessity, flowing naturally and
necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and present situation of persons
and things ; for this existence and situation necessarily makes such an appear-
ance to the mind ; from this appearance flows a necessary perception and
judgment, concerning these things ; this judgment, necessarily determines the
Will ; and thus, by this chain of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose
their nature, and become natural ideas, and necessary things, instead of moral
and free actions."
And yet this same author allows, p. 30, 31, that a perfectly wise being will
constantly and certainly choose what is most fit ; and says, p. 102, 103, " I
grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such antecedent
superior fitness of things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it ;
and, particularly ;in all his judicial proceedings as a Governor, and distributer ol
rewards and punishments." Yea, he says expressly, p. 42, " That it is not
possible for God to act otherwise, than according to this fitness and goodness
in things."
So that according to this author, putting these several passages of his Essay
together, there is no virtue, nor any thing of a moral nature, in the most sublime
and glorious acts and exercises of God's holiness, justice, and faithfulness ; and
he never does any thing which is in itself supremely worthy, and, above all
other things, fit and excellent, but only as a kind of mechanical medium of fate ;
and in what he does as the Judge and moral Governor of the world, he exercises
no moral excellency ; exercising no freedom in these things, because he acts by
moral necessity, which is. in effect, the same with physical or natural necessity ;
and, therefore, he only acts by an Hobistical fatality ; as a Being indeed of vast
understanding, as well as power and efficiency (as he said before), but without a
Will to choose, being a kind of Almighty Minister of fate, acting under its su-
preme influence. For he allows, that in all these things . God's Will is determined
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 14?
constantly and certainty by a superior fitness, and that it is not possible for him
to act otherwise. And if these things are so, what glory or praise belongs to
God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wise and excellent
course, in any one instance ? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and alsc
the common sense of mankind, it does not, in the least, derogate from the honor
of any being, that through the moral perfection of his nature, he necessarily act?
with supreme wisdom and holiness ; but on the contrary, his praise is the great-
er ; herein consists the height of his glory.
The same author, p. 56, supposes, that herein appears the excellent
character of a wise and good man, that though he can choose contrary to the fit-
ness of things, yet he does not ; but suffers himself to be directed by fitness ; and
that, in this conduct, he imitates the blessed God. And yet, he supposes it is
contrariwise with the blessed God ; not that he suffers himself to be directed by
fitness, when he can choose contrary to the fitness of things, but that- he cannot
choose contrary to the fitness of things ; as .he says, p. 42, that it is not possi-
ble for God to act otherwise than according to this fitness, where there is any
fitness or goodness in things. Yea, he supposes, p. 31, that if a man were
perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly
determined by the fitness of things.
One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this section ; and that is,
that if it derogates nothing from the glory of God, to be necessarily determined
by superior fitness in some things, then neither does it to be thus determined in
all things : from any thing in the nature of such necessity, as at all detracting
from God's freedom, independence, absolute supremacy, or any dignity or glory
of his nature, state or manner of acting ; or as implying any infirmity, restraint,
or subjection. And if the thing be such as well consists with God's glory, and
has nothing tending to detract from it ; then we need not be afraid of ascribing
it to God in too many things, lest thereby we should detract from God's glory
too much.
SECTION VIII.
Some further Objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions considered.
The author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly
wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is
a superior fitness and goodness in things ; and that it is not possible for him to
do otherwise. So that it is in effect confessed, that in those things where there
is any real preferableness, it is no dishonor, nothing in any respect unworthy oi
God, for him to act from necessity ; notwithstanding all that can be objected
from the agreement of such a necessity, with the fate of the Stoics, and the
necessity, maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it
were so, that in all the different things, among which God chooses, there were
evermore a superior fitness, or preferableness on one side, then it would be no
dishonor, or any thing, in any respect, unwrorthy, or unbecoming of God, for
his Will to be necessarily determined in every thing. And if this be allowed,
it is a giving up entirely the argument, from the unsuitableness of such a neces-
sity to the liberty, supremacy, independence and glory of the Divine Being :
and a resting the whole weight of the affair on the decision of another point
wholly diverse ; viz., whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible
things, which are in God's view, and may be considered as capable objects ol
148 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
his choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one thing above another
This is denied by this author ; who supposes, that in many instances, betweer
two or more possible things, which come within the view of the divine mind,
there is a perfect indifference and equality, as to fitness or tendency to attain
any good end which God can have in view, or to answer any of his designs.
Now, therefore, I would consider whether this be evident.
The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged,
that in many instances, we must suppose there is absolutely no difference be-
tween various possible objects of choice, wThich God has in view : and (2,) that
the difference between many things is so inconsiderable, or of such a nature,
that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any consequence ; or to
suppose that any of God's wise designs would not be answered in one way as
well as the other. Therefore,
I. The first thing to be considered is, whether there are any instances
wherein there is a perfect likeness, and absolutely no difference, between differ-
ent objects of choice, that are proposed to the Divine Understanding ?
And here, in the first place, it may be worthy to be considered, whether the
contradiction there is in the terms of the question proposed, does not give reason
to suspect, that there is an inconsistence in the thing supposed. It is inquired,
whether different objects of choice may not be absolutely without difference ?
If they are absolutely without difference, then how are they different objects of
choice ? If there be absolutely no difference, in any respect, then there is no
variety or distinction ; for distinction is only by some difference. And if there
be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then there is no opportunity for
variety of choice, or difference of determination. For that determination of a
thing, which is not different in any respect, is not a different determination, but
the same. That this is no quibble, may appear more fully anon.
The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in some instances, chooses to
do one thing rather than another, where the things themselves are perfectly
without difference, are two.
1. That the various parts of infinite time and space, absolutely considered,
are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from another ; and that therefore,
when God determined to create the worlcWin such a part of infinite duration and
space, rather than others, he determined and preferred, among various objects,
between which there was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference.
Answ. This objection supposes an infinite length of time before the world
was created, distinguished by successive parts, properly and truly so ; or a suc-
cession of limited and unmeasurable periods of time, following one another, in
an infinitely long series ; which must needs be a groundless imagination. The
eternal duration which was before the world, being only the eternity of God's
existence ; which is nothing else but his immediate, perfect and invariable pos-
session of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once : Vita intermin-
abilis, tota, simul et perfeda possessio. Which is so generally allowed, that I
need not stand to demonstrate it.*
* "If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any mutation or succession, of one thing
to another, would appear to be also removed. Abstract succession in eternity is scarce to be understood.
w hat is it that succeeds ? One minute to another, perhaps, velut unda supervenit undam. But when we
imagine this, we fancy that the minutes are things separately existing. This is the common notion : and
yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time is nothing but the existence of created successive beings, and eternity
the necessary existence of the Deity. Therefore, if this necessary being hath no change or succession in his
nature, his existence must of course be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double oversight in this case ;
nrst, we nnd succession in the necessary nature and existence of the Deity himself; which is wrong, if the
reasoning above be conclu&ive. And then we ascribe this succession to eternity, considered abstractedly
irom the Eternal Being ; and suppose it, one knows not w hat, a thing subsisting by itself, and flowing one
minute alter another. This is the work of pure imagination, and contrary to the reality of things. Hence the
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 149
So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the crea-
tion of an infinite length, breadth and depth, truly and properly distinguished
into different measurable parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in
an infinite series. Which notion of absolute and infinite space is doubtless as
unreasonable, as that now mentioned, of absolute and infinite duration. It is as
improper to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguish-
ed by a series of miles and leagues, one beyond another ; as that the infinite
duration of God is distinguished by months and years, one after another. A
diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain periods, is as conceivable,
and does as naturally obtrude itself on our imagination, in one case as the
other ; and there is equal reason in each case, to suppose that our imagination
deceives us. It is equally improper to talk of months and years of the Divine
Existence, and railesquares of Deity ; and we equally deceive ourselves, when
we talk of the world's being differently fixed with respect to either of these
sorts of measures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the world
might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of
infinity ; or, that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity ;
and all arguments and objections, which are built on the imaginations we are
apt to have of infinite extension or duration, are buildings founded on shadows,
or castles in the air.
2. The second argument, to prove that the Most High wills one thing
vather than another, without any superior fitness or preferableness in the thing
preferred, is God's actually placing in different parts of the world, particles, or
atoms of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The forementioned author
says, p. 78, &c, " If one would descend to the minute specific particles, of
which different bodies are composed, we should see abundant reason to believe,
that there are thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which are
perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct determination to the Will
of God, where to place them." He there instances in particles of water^ of
which there are such immense numbers, which compose the rivers and oceans
of this world ; and the infinite myriads of the luminous and fiery particles, which
compose the body of the sun ; so many, that it wTould be very unreasonable to
suppose no two of them should be exactly equal and alike.
Answ. ( 1.) To this I answer : that as we must suppose matter to be infinitely
divisible, it is very unlikely, that any two, of all these particles, are exactly
equal and alike ; so unlikely, that it is a thousand to one, yea, an infinite num-
ber to one, but it is otherwise ; and that although we should allow a great simi-
larity between the different particles of water and fire, as to their general nature
and figure ; and however small we suppose those particles to be, it is infinitely
unlikely, that any two of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and quan-
tity of matter. If we should suppose a great many globes of the same nature
with the globe of the earth, it would be very strange, if there were any two of
them that had exactly the same number of particles of dust and water in them.
common metaphorical expressions : time runs apace, let us lay hold on the present minute, and the like. The
philosophers themselves mislead us by their illustrations. They compare eternity to the motion of a point
running on forever, and making a traceless infinite line. Here the point is supposed a thing actually
subsisting, representing the present minute ; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it ; that is,
they ascribe motion to a mere nonentity, to illustrate to us a successive eternity, made up of finite suc-
cessive parts. If once we allow an all perfect mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite
comprehension of all things, always (and allow it we must) the distinction of past and future vanishes
with respect to such a mind. — In a word, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or existence
of the Deity will appear to be Vita interminabilis, tota,simul et perfecta possessio ; how much soever this
may have been a paradox hitherto." Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Vol. II. p. 409, 410
411. Edit. III. ^ W
150 FREEDOM 01 THE WILL.
But infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light should have just the
same quantity of matter. For a particle of light, according to the doctrine of
the infinite divisibility of matter, is composed of infinitely more assignable parts,
than there are particles of dust and water in the globe of the earth. And as it
is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these particles should be equal ; so it is,
that they should be alike in other respects ; to instance in the configuration of
their surfaces. If there were very many globes, of the nature of the earth, it
would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the same number o(
particles of dust, water and stone, in their surfaces, and all posited exactly alike,
one with respect to another, without any difference, in any part discernible
either by the naked eye or microscope ; but infinitely less strange, than that two
particles of light should be perfectly of the same figure. For there are infinitely
more assignable real parts on the surface of a particle of light than there are
particles of dust, water and stone, on the surface of the terrestrial globe.
Answ. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two particles, or atoms of
matter, perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed indifferent parts of the
creation ; as I will not deny it to be possible for God to make two bodies per-
fectly alike, and put them in different places ; yet it will not follow, that two
different or distinct acts or effects of the Divine Power have exactly the same
fitness for the same ends. For these two different bodies are not different or
distinct in any other respects than those wherein they differ : they are two
in no other respects than those wherein there is a difference. If they are
perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then they can be distinguished, or
be distinct, only in those things which are called circumstances ; as place, time,
rest, motion, or some other present or past circumstances or relations. For
it is difference only that constitutes distinction. If God makes two bodies, in
themselves every way equal and alike, and agreeing perfectly in all other cir-
cumstances and relations, but only their place ; then in this only is there any
distinction or duplicity. The figure is the same, the measure is the same, the
solidity and resistance are the same, and every thing the same only the place.
Therefore what the Will of God determines, is this, namely, that there should
be the same figure, the same extension, the same resistance, &c, in two differ-
ent places. And for this determination he has some reason. There is some
end, for which such a determination and act has a peculiar fitness, above all
other acts. Here is no one thing determined without an end, and no one thing
without a fitness for that end, superior to any thing else. If it be the pleasure
of God to cause the same resistance, and the same figure, to be in two different
places and situations, we can no more justly argue from it, that here must be
some determination or act of God's Will that is wholly without motive or end,
than we can argue, that whenever, in any case it is a man's Will to speak the
same words, or make the same sounds at two different times ; there must be
some determination or act of his Will, without any motive or end. The differ-
ence of place, in the former case, proves no more than the difference of time
does in the other. If any one should say, with regard to the former case, that
there must be something determined without an end, viz., that of those two sim-
ilar bodies, this in particular should be made in this place, and the other in the
other, and should inquire, why the Creator did not make them in a transposition,
when both are alike, and each would equally have suited either place ? The
inquiry supposes something that is not true, namely, that the two bodies differ
and are distinct in other respects besides their place. So that with this distinc-
tion inherent in them, they might, in their first creation, have been transposed,
and each might have begun its existence in the place of the other.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 151
Let us, for clearness sake, suppose, that God had, at the beginning, made
two globes, each of an inch diameter, both perfect spheres, and perfectly solid,
without pores, and perfectly alike in every respect, and placed them near one to
another, one towards the right hand, and the other towards the left, without any
difference as to time, motion or rest, past or present, or any circumstance, but
only their place ; and the question should be asked, why God in their creation
placed them so : why that which is made on the right hand, was not made on the
left, and vice versa ? Let it be well considered, whether there be any sense in
such a question ; and whether the inquiry does not suppose something false and
absurd. Let it be considered, what the Creator must have done otherwise than
he did, what diffi rent act of Will or power he must have exerted, in order to
the thing proposed. All that could have been done, would have been to have
made two spheres perfectly alike, in the same places where he has made them,
without any difference of the things made, either in themselves or in any cir-
cumstance ; so that the whole effect would have been without any difference,
and therefore, just the same. By the supposition, the two spheres are different
in no other respect but their place ; and therefore in other respects they are the
same. Each has the same roundness ; it is not a distinct rotundity, in any
other respect but its situation. There are also the same dimensions, differing in
nothing but their place. And so of their resistance, and every thing else that
belongs to them.
Here, if any chooses to say, " that there is a difference in another respect,
viz., that they are not NUMERICALLY the same ; that it is thus with all the
qualities that belong to them ; that it is confessed they are, in some respects, the
same ; that is, they are both exactly alike ; but yet numerically they differ.
Thus the roundness of one is not the same numerical individual roundness with
that of the other." Let this be supposed ; then the question about the deter-
mination of the Divine Will in the affair, is, Why did God will, that this indivi-
dual roundness should be at the right hand, and the other individual roundness
at the left ? Why did he not make them in a contrary position ? Let any
rational person consider, whether such questions be not words without a mean-
ing, as much as if God should see fit for some ends, to cause the same sounds to
be repeated, or made at two different times ; the sounds being perfectly the
same in every respect, but only one was a minute after the other ; and it should
be asked upon it, why did God cause these sounds, numerically different, to suc-
ceed one the other in such a manner ? Why did he not make that individual
sound, which was in the first minute, to be in the second 1 And the individual
sound of the last minute to be in the first ? These inquiries would be even ridi-
culous ; as, I think, every person must see, at once, in the case proposed of two
sounds, being only the same repeated, absolutely without any difference, but that
one circumstance of time. If the Most High sees it will answer some good end,
that the same sound should be made by lightning at two distinct times, and
therefore wills that it should be so, must it needs therefore be, that herein there
is some act of God's Will without any motive or end ? God saw fit often, at
distinct times, and on different occasions, to say the very same words to Moses,
namely, those, I am Jehovah. And would it not be unreasonable to infer, as a
certain consequence, from this, that here must be some act or acts of the Divine
Will, in determining and disposing these words exactly alike, at different times,
wholly without aim or inducement 1 But it would be no more unreasonable
than to say, that there must be an act of God's without any inducement, if he
sees it best, and, for some reasons, determines that there shall be the same resis-
tance, the same dimensions, and the same figure, in several distinct places.
152 FREEDOM OF THE WILL
If, in the instance of the two spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed possible
that God might have made them in a contrary position ; that which is made at
the right hand being made at the left; then I ask, whether it is not evidently
equally possible, if God had made but one of them, and that in the place of the
right hand globe, that he might have made that numerically different from what
it is, and numerically different from what he did make it, though perfectly
alike, and in the same place; and at the same time, and in every respect,
in the same circumstances and relations ? Namely, whether he might not
have made it numerically the same with that which he has now made
at the left hand, and so have left that which is now created at the right
hand, in a state of nonexistence ? And, if so, whether it would not have
been possible to have made one in that place, perfectly like these, and yet
numerically differing from both 1 And let it be considered, whether, from this
notion of a numerical difference in bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which
numerical difference is something inherent in the bodies themselves, and diverse
from the difference of place or time, or any circumstance whatsoever ; it will
not follow, that there is an infinite number of numerically different possible
bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chooses, by a self-determining power,
when he goes about to create bodies.
Therefore let us put the case thus : supposing that God, in the beginning,
had created but one perfectly solid sphere, in a certain place ; and it should be
inquired, Why God created that individual sphere, in that place, at that time 1
And why he did not create another sphere, perfectly like it, but numerically
different, in the same place, at the same time ? Or why he chose to brino- into
being there, that very body, rather than any of the infinite number of other
bodies, perfectly like it ; either of which he could have made there as well, and
would have answered his end as well ? Why he caused to exist, at that place
and time, that individual roundness, rather than any other of the infinite number
of individual rotundities just like it 1 Why that individual resistance, rather than
any other of the; infinite number of possible resistances just like it ? And it
might as reasonably be asked, Why, when God first caused it to thunder, he
caused that individual sound then to be made, and not another just like it ?
Why did he make choice of this very sound, and reject all the infinite number
of other possible sounds just like it, but numerically differing from it, and all
differing one from another ? I think, every body must be sensible of the absur-
dity and nonsense of what is supposed in such inquiries. And, if we calmly
attend to the matter, we shall be convinced, that all such kind of objections as
I am answering, are founded on nothing but the imperfection of our manner of
conceiving things, and the obscureness of language, and great want of clearness
and precision in the signification of terms.
If any shall find fault with this reasoning, that it is going a great length in
metaphysical niceties and subtilties, I answer, the objection which they are in reply
to, is a metaphysical subtilty, and must be treated according to the nature of it*
II. Another thing alleged is, that innumerable things which are determined
by the Divine Will, and chosen and done by God rather than others, differ from
those that are not chosen in so inconsiderable a manner, that it would be un-
reasonable to suppose the difference to be of any consequence, or that there is
any superior fitness or goodness, that God can have respect to in the deter-
mination.
. * " ^V",6" to havf reC0UISe to subtilties, in raising difficulties, and then complain, that they shouK
be taken oft by minutely examining these subtilties, is a strange kind of procedure." Nature of tht
Human Soul, Vol. II. page 331.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 153
To which I answer ; it is impossible for us to determine, with any certainty
or evidence, that because the difference is very small, and appears to us of no
consideration, therefore there is absolutely no superior goodness, and no valuable
end, which can be proposed by the Creator and Governor of the world, in
ordering such a difference. The forementioned author mentions many instances.
One is, there being one atom in the whole universe more or less. But I think,
it would be unreasonable to suppose, that God made one atom in vain, or
without any end or motive. He made not one atom, but what was a work
of his Almighty power, as much as the whole globe of the earth, and requires
as much of a constant exertion of Almighty power to uphold it; and was
made and is upheld understandingly, and on design, as much as if no other
had been made but that. And it would be as unreasonable to suppose, that
he made it without any thing really aimed at in so doing, as much as to suppose,
that he made the planet Jupiter without aim or design.
It is possible, that the most minute effects of the Creator's power, the small-
est assignable difference between the things which God has made, may be
attended, in the whole series of events, and the whole compass and extent of
their influence, with very great and important consequences. If the laws of
motion and gravitation, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, hold universally, there
is not one atom, nor the least assignable part of an atom, but what has influence,
every moment, throughout the whole material universe, to cause every part to
be otherwise than it would be, if it were not for that particular corporeal exist-
ence. And however the effect is insensible for the present, yet it may, in length
of time, become great and important.
To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the same way, in straight
lines, perfectly parallel one to another ; but to be diverted from this parallel
course, and drawn one from another, as much as might be by the attraction of
an atom, at the distance of one of the furthest of the fixed stars from the earth ;
these bodies being turned out of the lines of their parallel motion, will, by de-
grees, get further and further distant, one from the other ; and though the dis-
tance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may become veiy
great. So the revolution of a planet round the sun being retarded or accel-
erated, and the orbit of its revolution made greater or less, and more or less
elliptical, and so its periodical time longer or shorter, no more than may be by
the influence of the least atom, might, in length of time, perform a whole revo-
lution sooner or later than otherwise it w^ould have done ; which might make a
vast alteration with regard to millions of important events. So the influence of
the least particle may, for aught we know, have such effect on something in the
constitution of some human body, as to cause another thought to arise in the
mind at a certain time, than otherwise would have been ; which, in length of
time (yea, and that not very great), might occasion a vast alteration through
the whole world of mankind. And so innumerable other ways might be men-
tioned, wherein the least assignable alteration may possibly be attended with
great consequences.
Another argument, which the forementioned author brings against a neces-
sary determination of the Divine Will, by a superior fitness, is, that such doctrine
derogates from the freeness of God's grace and goodness, in choosing the objects
of his favor and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to thankfulness for
special benefits. Page 89, &c.
In answer to this objection, I would observe,
1 That it derogates no more from the goodness of God, to suppose the
exercise of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wisdom, than to
Vol. II. 20
154 FREEDOM OF THE WILL
suppose it determined by chance, and that his favors are bestowed altogether at
random, his Will being determined by nothing but perfect accident, without
any end or design whatsoever ; which must be the case, as has been demon-
strated, if volition be not determined by a prevailing motive. That which is
owing to perfect contingence, wherein neither previous inducement, nor antece-
dent choice has any hand, is not owing more to goodness or benevolence, than
that which is owing to the influence of a wise end.
2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that determines the Will of God,
in the choice of the objects of his favors, be any moral quality in the object,
recommending that object to his benevolence above others, his choosing that
object is not so great a manifestation of the freeness and sovereignty of his grace,
as if it were otherwise. But there is no necessity of supposing this, in order to
our supposing that he has some wise end in view, in determining to bestow his
favors on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish between the merit
of the object of God's favor, or a moral qualification of the object attracting that
favor and recommending to it, and the natural fitness of such a determination of the
act of God's goodness, to answer some wise designs of his own, some end in the
view of God's omniscience. It is God's own act, that is the proper and immedi-
ate object of his volition.
3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some instances, God acts from
wise designs in determining the particular subjects of his favors. None will say,
I presume, that when God distinguishes, by his bounty, particular societies or
persons, He never, in any instance, exercises any wisdom in so doing, aiming
at some happy consequence. And, if it be not denied to be so in some instances,
then I would inquire, whether, in these instances, God's goodness is less mani-
fested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end at all ? And whether the
subjects have less cause of thankfulness ? And if so, who shall be thankful for
the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of
the distinction's being made without an end ? How shall it be known when
God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not ? It is very manifest, with
respect to the Apostle Paul, that God had wise ends in choosing him to be a
Christian and an Apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c. The Apostle him-
self mentions one end. 1 Tim.i.15, 16, Christ Jesus came into the world to save
sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit,for this cause T obtained mercy, that in
me first, Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them
who should hereafter believe on Him to life everlasting. But yet the Apostle
never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of Divine Grace in
his election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me to observe,
4. Our supposing such a moral necessity in the acts of God's Will, as has
been spoken of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God's
grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favor, that, in many instances,
this moral necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great degree of it.
God may choose this object rather than another, as having a superior fitness to
answer the ends, designs and inclinations of his goodness ; being more sinful,
and so more miserable and necessitous than others ; the inclinations of Infinite
Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God's
sending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly answered, in the ex-
ercises of mercy towards such an object, rather than another.
One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on the
head of the necessity of the acts of God's Will ; and that is, that something-
much more like a servile subjection of the Divine Being to fatal necessity, will
follow from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which they oppose
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 155
For they (at least most of them) suppose, with respect to all events that hap-
pen in the moral world, depending on the volitions of moral agents, which are
the most important events of the universe, to which all others are subordinate ;
I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge
of them, antecedent to any purposes or decrees of his, about them. And if so,
they have a fixed certain futurity, prior to any designs or volitions of his, and
independent on them, and to which his volitions must be subject, as he would
wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things in the
moral world. So that here, instead of a moral necessity of God's Will, arising
from, or consisting in, the infinite perfection and blessedness of the Divine Being,
we have a fixed unalterable state of things, properly distinct from the perfect
nature of the Divine Mind, and the state of the Divine Will and Design, and en-
tirely independent on these things, and, which they have no hand in, because they
are prior to them ; and which God's Will is truly subject to, he being obliged to
conform or accommodate himself to it, in all his purposes and decrees, and in every
thing he does in his disposals and government of the world ; the moral world being
the end of the natural ; so that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that state
of the moral world which consists in, or depends upon, the acts and state of the wills
of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition from eternity. Such a subjection
to necessity as this, would truly argue an inferiority and servitude, that would
be unworthy the Supreme Being ; and is much more agreeable to the notion
which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the gods, than that moral ne-
cessity of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant
to the absolute sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of his
Will ; and really subjects the Will of the Most High, to the Will of his crea-
tures, and brings him into dependence upon them.
SECTION IX.
Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it
makes God the Author of Sin.
It is urged by Arminians, that the doctrine of the necessity of men's voli-
tk ns, or their necessary connection with antecedent events and circumstances,
makes the first cause, and supreme orderer of all things, the author of sin ; in
that he has so constituted the state and course of things, that sinful volitions
become necessary, in consequence of his disposal. Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse
on the Freedom of the Will,* cites one of the ancients, as on his side, declaring
that this opinion of the necessity of the Will " absolves sinners, as doing nothing
of their own accord which was evil, and would cast all the blame of all the
wickedness committed in the world, upon God, and upon his Providence, if that
were admitted by the assertors of this fate ; whether he himself did necessitate
them to do these things, or ordered matters so, that they should be constrained
to do them by some other cause." And the doctor says, in another place,f " In
the nature of the thing, and in the opinion of philosophers, -causa deficiens, in
rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efflcientem reducenda est. In things neces-
sary, the deficient cause must be reduced to the efficient. And in this case the
reason is evident ; because the not doing what is required, or not avoiding what
is forbidden, being a defect, must follow from the position of the necessary
cause of that deficiency."
* On the Five Points, p. 361 t Ibid, p. 486.
156 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Concerning this, I would observe the following things.
I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing peculiar to this
scheme ; it is no difficulty or disadvantage, wherein it is distinguished from the
scheme of Arminians ; and, therefore, not reasonably objected by them.
Dr. Whitby supposes, that if sin necessarily follows from God's withholding as-
sistance, or if that assistance be not given, which is absolutely necessary to the
avoiding of evil ; then, in the nature of the thing, God must be as properly the
author of that evil, as if he were the efficient cause of it. From whence, according
to what he himself says of the devils and damned spirits, God must be the proper
author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness : he must be the efficient cause of
the great pride,of the devils, and of their perfect malignity against God, Christ, his
saints, and all that is good, and of the insatiable cruelty of their disposition. For
he allows, that God has so forsaken them, and does so withhold his assistance
from them, that they are incapacitated for doing good, and determined only tc
evil.* Our doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of men's sin in
this world, no more, and in no other sense, than his doctrine, in its consequence,
makes God the author of the hellish pride and malice of the devils. And doubt-
less the latter is as odious an effect as the former.
Again, if it will follow at all, that God is the author of sin, from what has
been supposed of a sure and infallible connection between antecedents and con-
sequents, it will follow because of this, viz., that for God to be the author or
orderer of those things which, he knows beforehand, will infallibly be attended
with such a consequence, is the same thing, in effect, as for him to be the author
of that consequence. But, if this be so, this is a difficulty which equally attends
the doctrine of Arminians themselves ; at least, of those of them who allow
God's certain foreknowledge of all events. For on the supposition of such a
foreknowledge, this is the case with respect to every sin that is committed : God
knew, that if he ordered and brought to pass such and such events, such sins
would infallibly follow. As for instance*, God certainly foreknew, long before
Judas was born, that if he ordered things so, that there should be such a man
born, at such a time, and at such a place, and that his life should be preserved,
and that he should, in Divine Providence, be led into acquaintance with Jesus ;
and that his heart should be so influenced by God's Spirit or Providence, as to
be inclined to be a follower of Christ ; and that he should be one of those twelve,
which should be chosen constantly to attend him as his family ; and that his
health should be preserved, so that he should go up to Jerusalem, at the last
passover in Christ's life ; and if it should be so ordered, that Judas should see
Christ's kind treatment of the woman which anointed him at Bethany, and have
that reproof from Christ, which he had at that time, and see and hear other
things, which excited his enmity against his Master, and that if other circumstan-
ces should be ordered, as they were ordered ; it would be what would most
certainly and infallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would
soon after hang himself, and die impenitent, and be sent to hell, for his horrid
wickedness.
Therefore, this supposed difficulty ought not to be brought as an objection
against the scheme Which has been maintained, as disagreeing with the Arminian
scheme, seeing it is no difficulty owing to such disagreement ; but a difficulty
wherein the Arminians share with us. That must be unreasonably made an
objection against our differing from them, which we should not escape or avoid
at all by agreeing with them.
And therefore I would observe,
» On the Five Points, p. 302, 305.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 157
II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God the author of sin, ought
distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, The author of sin. I know
the phrase, as it is commonly used, signifies something very ill. If by the author
of sin, be meant the sinner, the agent, or actor of sin, or the doer of a wicked
thing ; so it would be a reproach and blasphemy, to suppose God to be the
author of sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the author of sin ; reject-
ing such an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred ;
and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down. But
if, by the author of sin, is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin ; and, at
the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy,
and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted or not hindered,
will most certainly and infallibly follow : I say, if this be all that is meant, by
being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin (though I
dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry
another sense) it is no reproach for the Most High to be thus the author of sin.
This is not to be the actor of sin, but, on the contrary, of holiness. What God
doth herein, is holy ; and a glorious exercise of the infinite excellency of his na-
ture. And, I do not deny, that God's being thus the author of sin, follows from
what I have laid down ; and, I assert, that it equally follows from the doctrine
which is maintained by most of the Arminian divines.
That it is most certainly so, that God is in such a manner the disposer and
orderer of sin, is evident, if any credit is to be given to the Scripture ; as well as
becausfe it is impossible, in the nature of things, to be otherwise. In such a man-
ner God ordered the obstinacy of Pharaoh, in his refusing to obey God's com-
mands, to let the people go. Exod. iv. 21, " I will harden his heart, that he
shall not let the people go." Chap. vii. 2 — 5, " Aaron thy brother shall speak
unto Pharaoh, that he send the children of Israel out of his land. And I
will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land
of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay mine hand
upon Egypt, by great judgments," &c. Chap. ix. 12, "And the Lord hardened
the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had spoken
unto Moses." Chap. x. 1, 2, " And the Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pha-
raoh ; for I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants, that I might
show these signs before him, and that thou mayest tell it in the ears of thy son,
and thy son's son, what things I have wrought in Egypt, and my signs which
I have done amongst them, that ye may know that I am the Lord." Chap: xiv.
4, " And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after them : and
I will be honored upon Pharaoh, and upon all his Host." Verse 8, " And the
Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh King of Egypt, and he pursued after the
Children of Israel." And it is certain, that in such a manner, God, for wise
and good ends, ordered that event, Joseph's being sold into Egypt, by his breth-
ren. Gen. xlv. 5, " Now, therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves,
that ye sold me hither ; for God did send me before you to preserve life."
Verse 7, 8, " God sent me before you to preserve you a posterity in the earth,
and to save your lives by a great deliverance : so now it was not you, that sent
me hither, but God." Psal. cv. 17, ".He sent a man before them, even Joseph,
who was sold for a servant." It is certain, that thus God ordered the sin and
folly of Sihon King of the Amorites, in refusing to let the people of Israel pass
by him peaceably. Deut. ii. 30, " But Sihon King of Heshbon would not let us
pass by him ; for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart ob-
stinate, that he might deliver him into thine hand." It is certain, that God thus
ordered the sin and folly of the Kings of Canaan, that they attempted not tc
158 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
make peace with Israel, but with a stupid boldness and obstinacy, set themselves
violently to oppose them and their God. Josh. xi. 20, " For it was of the Lord,
to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he
might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favor ; but that he
might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses." It is evident, that thus
God ordered the treacherous rebellion of Zedekiah against the King of Babylon.
Jer. lii. 3, " For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem,
and Judah, until he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled
against the King of Babylon." So 2 Kings xxiv. 20. And it is exceeding
manifest, that God thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous ravages of Nebu-
chadnezzar, in spoiling and ruining the nations round about. Jer. xxv. 9,
" Behold, I will send and take all the families of the north, saith the Lord, and
Nebuchadnezzar, my servant, and will bring them against this land, and against
all the nations round about ; and wrill utterly destroy them, and make them an
astonishment, and a hissing, and perpetual desolations." Chap, xliii. 10, 11,
" I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant ; and
I will set his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and he shall spread his
royal pavilion over them. And when he cometh, he shall smite the land ot
Egypt, and deliver such as are for death to death, and such as are for captivity
to captivity, and such as are for the sword to the sword." Thus God represents
himself as sending for Nebuchadnezzar, and taking of him and his armies, and
bringing him against the nations, which were to be destroyed by him, to that
very end, that he might utterly destroy them, and make them desolate ; ' and as
appointing the work that he should do, so particularly, that the very persons
were designated that he should kill with the sword, and those that should be kill-
ed with famine and pestilence, and those that should be carried into captivity ;
and that in doing all these things, he should act as his servant ; by which, less
cannot be intended, than that he should serve his purposes and designs. And
in Jer. xxvii. 4, 5, 6, God declares, how he would cause him thus to serve his
designs, viz., by bringing this to pass in his sovereign disposal, as the great
Possessor and Governor of the universe, that disposes all things just as pleases
him. " Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel ; I have made the earth,
the man and the beast, that are upon the ground, by my great power, and my
stretched out arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me ; and
now I have given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, my servant,
and the beasts of the field have I given also to serve him." And Nebuchad-
nezzar is spoken of as doing these things, by having his arms strengthened by
God, and having God's sword put into his hands, for this end.' Ezek. xxx. 24,
25, 26. Yea, God speaks of his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations, and
cruelly destroying all sorts, without distinction of sex or age, as the weapon in
God's hand, and the instrument of his indignation, which God makes use of to
fulfil his own purposes, and execute his own vengeance. Jer. li. 20, &c, " Thou
art my battle-axe, and weapons of war : for with thee will I break in pieces the
nations, and with thee will I destroy kingdoms, and with thee will I break in
pieces the horse and his rider, and with thee will I break in pieces the chariot
and his rider ; with thee also will I break in pieces man and woman, and with
thee will I break in pieces old and young, and with thee will I break in pieces
the young man and the maid," &c. It is represented, that the designs of Nebuchad-
nezzar and those that destroyed Jerusalem, never could have been accomplished,
had not God determined them, as well as they. Lam. iii. 37, " Who is he that
saith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord commandeth it not V And yet the
king of Babylon's thus destroying the nations, and especially the Jews, is spo-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 159
ken of as his great wickedness, for which God finally destroyed him. Isa. xiv.
4, 5, 6, 12, Hab. ii. 5 — 12, and Jer. chap. 1. and li. It is most manifest, that
God, to serve his own designs, providentially ordered Shimei's cursing David.
2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11, "The Lord hath said unto him, Curse David. — Let him
curse, for the Lord hath bidden him."
It is certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious and glorious ends,
ordered the fact which they committed, who were concerned in Christ's death ;
and that therein they did but fulfil God's designs. As, I trust, no Christian will
deny it was the design of God that Christ should be crucified, and that for this
end, he came into the world. It is very manifest by many Scriptures, that the
whole affair of Christ's crucifixion, with its circumstances, and the treachery of
Judas, that made way for it, was ordered in God's Providence, in pursuance of
his purpose ; notwithstanding the violence that is used with those plain Scriptures,
to obscure and pervert the sense of them. Acts ii. 23, " Him being delivered,
by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God,* ye have taken, and with
wicked hands, have crucified and slain." Luke xxii.21-2,f" But behold the hand
of him that betrayeth me, is with me on the table ; and truly the Son of man
goeth, as it was determined." Acts iv. 27, 28, " For of a truth, against thy
holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with
the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do what-
soever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. Acts iii. 17, 18,
" And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your
rulers ; but these things, which God before had showed by the mouth of all his
prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled." So that what these mur-
derers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to pass or ordered, and
that by which he fulfilled his own word.
In Rev. xvii. 17, the agreeing of the kings of the earth to give their king-
dom to the beast, though it was a very wicked thing in them, is spoken of as a
fulfilling of God's Will, and what God had put into their hearts to do. It is
manifest that God sometimes permits sin to be committed, and at the same time
orders things so, that if he permits the fact, it will come to pass, because, on
some accounts, he sees it needful and of importance, that it should come to pass.
Matth. xviii. 7, " It must needs be, that offences come ; but wo to that man by
whom the offence cometh." With 1 Cor. xi. 19, " For there must also be
heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest
among you."
Thus it is certain and demonstrable from the Holy Scriptures, as well as the
nature of things; and the principles of Arminians, that God permits sin, and at
the same time, so orders things, in his Providence, that it certainly and infallibly
will come to pass, in consequence of his permission.
I proceed to observe in the next place,
III. That there is a great difference between God's being concerned thus,
by his permission, in an event and act, which, in the inherent subject and agent
of it, is sin (though the event will certainly follow on his permission), and his
being concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act of sin ; or between
* u Grotiu3, as well as Beza, observes, prognosis must here signify decree ; and Eisner has shown
that it has that signification, in approved Greek, writers. And it is certain ekdotos signifies one given up
into the hands of an enemy." Dodd. in hoc.
+ " As this passage is not liable to the ambiguities, which some have apprehended in Acts ii. 23, and
it. 28, (which yet seem on the whole to be parallel to it, in their most natural construction), I look upon
it as an evident proof, that these things are, in the language of Scripture, said to be determined or de-
creed (or exactly bounded and marked out by God as the word orizo most naturally signifies), which he
Bees in fact will happen, in consequence of his volitions, without any necessitating agency ; as well as
those events, of which he is properly the Author." Dodd. in TjOC.
160 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
his being the Orderer of its certain existence, by not hindering it, under certain
circumstances, and his being the proper Actor or Author of it, by a positive
agency or efficiency. And this, notwithstanding what Dr. Whitby offers about
a saying of philosophers, that causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam pet
se efficitntem reducenda est. As there is a vast difference between the sun's
being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and
brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence ; and its
being the occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its motion, whereby
it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the
latter kind of events ; but it is not the proper cause, efficient or producer of
them; though they are necessarily consequent on that motion binder such cir-
cumstances ; no more is any action of the Divine Being the cause of the evil
of men's Wills. If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it would
be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat ; and then
something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness
of nature in the sun ; and it might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is dark
and cold, and that its beams are black and frosty. But from its being the cause
no otherwise than by its departure, no such thing can be inferred, but the con-
trary ; it may justly be argued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and
darkness are found to be the consequences of its withdrawment : and the more
constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with, and confined to its
absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and
heat. So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence
of the Most High, but, on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action
and energy, and, under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want
of his influence ; this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation evil, or
has any thing of the nature of evil, but, on the contrary, that He and his agency
are altogether good and holy, and that He is the fountain of all holiness. It
would be strange arguing, indeed, because men never' commit sin, but only when
God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin, when he does so, that there-
fore their sin is not from themselves but from God ; and so, that God must be a
sinful Being ; as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark
when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present, that therefore
all darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must needs be black.
IV. It properly belongs to the Supreme and Absolute Governor of the
universe, to order all important events within his dominion, by his wisdom ; but
the events in the moral world are of the most important kind, such as the moral
actions of intelligent creatures, and their consequences.
These events will be ordered by something. They will either be dispose^
by wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance ; that is, they will be disposed
by blind and undesigning causes, if that were possible, and could be called a
disposal. Is it not better, that the good and evil which happens in God's
world, should be ordered, regulated, bounded and determined by the good
pleasure of an infinitely wTise Being, who perfectly comprehends within his
understanding and constant view, the universality of things, in all their extent
and duration, and sees all the influence of every event, with respect to every
individual thing and circumstance, throughout the grand system, and the whole
of the eternal series of consequences ; than to leave these things to fall out by
chance, and to be determined by those causes which have no understanding or
aim ? Doubtless, in these important events, there is a better and a worse, as
to the time, subject, place, manner and circumstances of their coming to pass,
with regard to their influence on the state and course of things. And if there be,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 161
it is certainly best that they should be determined to that time, place, &c, which
is best. And therefore it is in its own nature fit, that wisdom, and not chance,
should order these things. So that it belongs to the Being who is the possessor
of Infinite Wisdom, and is the Creator and Owner of the whole system of
created existences, and has the care of all ; I say, it belongs to him to take care
of this matter ; and he would not do what is proper for him, if he should neglect
it. And it is so far from being unholy in him to undertake this affair, that it
would rather have been unholy to neglect it, as it would have been a neglect-
ing what fitly appertains to him ; and so it would have been a very unfit and
unsuitable neglect.
Therefore the sovereignty of God doubtless extends to this matter ; especial-
ly considering, that if it should be supposed to be otherwise, and God should
leave men's volitions, and all moral events, to the determination and disposition
of blind and unmeaning causes, or they should be left to happen perfectly
without a cause ; this would be no more consistent with liberty, in any notion
of it, and particularly not in the Arminian notion of it, than if these events were
subject to the disposal of Divine Providence, and the Will of man were deter-
mined by circumstances which are ordered and disposed by Divine Wisdom ; as
appears by what has been already observed. But it is evident, that such a
providential disposing and determining men's moral actions, though it infers a
moral necessity of those actions, yet it does not in the least infringe the real
liberty of mankind; the only liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary
to moral agency, which, as has been demonstrated, is not inconsistent with such
necessity.
On the whole, it is manifest, that God may be, in the manner which has
been described, the Orderer and Disposer of that event, which, in the inherent
subject and agent, is moral evil ; and yet His so doing may be no moral evil.
He may will the disposal of such an event, and its coming to pass for good ends,
and his Will not be an immoral or sinful Will, but a perfectly holy Will. And
he may actually, in his Providence, so dispose and permit things, that the event
may be certainly and infallibly connected with such disposal and permission,
and his act therein not be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy act. Sin
may be an evil thing, and yet that there should be such a disposal and permis-
sion, as that it should come to pass, may be a good thing. This is no contra-
diction or inconsistence. Joseph's brethren selling him into Egypt, consider it
only as it was acted by them, and with respect to their views and aims, which
were evil, was a very bad thing ; but it was a good thing, as it was an event
of God's ordering, and considered with respect to his views and aims, which
were good. Gen. 1. 20, " As for you, ye thought evil against me ; but God
meant it unto good." So the crucifixion of Christ, if we consider only those
things which belong to the event as it proceeded from his murderers, and are
comprehended within the compass of the affair considered as their act, their
principles, dispositions, views and aims; so it was one of the most heinous
things that ever was done, in many respects the most horrid of all acts : but
consider it, as it was willed and ordered of God, in the extent of his designs and
views, it was the most admirable and glorious of all events, and God's willing
the event, was the most holy volition of God that ever was made known to men ;
and God's act in ordering it was a divine act, which, above all others, manifests
the moral excellency of the Divine Being.
The consideration of these things may help us to a sufficient answer to the
cavils of Arminians, concerning what has been supposed by many Calvinists, of
a distinction between a secret and revealed will of God, and their diversity one
Vol. II. 21
162 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
from the other, supposing that the Calvinists herein ascribe inconsistent "Wills to
the Most High ; which is without any foundation. God's secret and revealed
Will, or in other words, his disposing and preceptive Will may be diverse, and
exercised in dissimilar acts, the one in disapproving and opposing, the other in
willing and determining, without any inconsistence. Because, although these
dissimilar exercises of the Divine Will may, in some respects, relate to the same
things, yet, in strictness, they have different and contrary objects, the one evil,
and the other good. Thus, for instance, the crucifixion of Christ was a thing
contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of God, because, as it was viewed
and done by his malignant murderers, it was a thing infinitely contrary to
the holy nature of God, and so necessarily contrary to the holy inclination of
his heart revealed in his law. Yet this does not at all hinder but that the cru-
cifixion of Christ, considered with all those glorious consequences, which were
within the view of the Divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and therefore
might appear to God to be, a glorious event, and consequently be agreeable to
his Will, though this Will may be secret, i. e., not revealed in God's law. And
thus considered, the crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good. If the secret
exercises of God's Will were of a kind that is dissimilar, and contrary to his re-
vealed Will, respecting the same, or like objects ; if the objects of both were
good, or both evil ; then, indeed, to ascribe contrary kinds of volition or
inclination to God, respecting these objects, would be to ascribe an inconsistent
Will to God ; but to ascribe to him different and opposite exercises of heart,
respecting different objects, and objects contrary one to another, is so far from
supposing God's Will to be inconsistent with itself, that it cannot be supposed
consistent with itself any other way. For any being to have a Will of choice
respecting good, and at the same time a Will of rejection and refusal respecting
evil, is to be very consistent ; but the contrary, viz., to have the same Will
towards these contrary objects, and to choose and love both good and evil, at
the same time, is to be very inconsistent.
There is no inconsistence in supposing, that God may hate a thing as it is
in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his Will it should
come to pass, considering all consequences. 1 believe, there is no person of
good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible
it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence, and all
consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as
moral evil in the world.* And if so, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely
* Here are worthy to be observed some passages of a late noted writer, of our nation, that nobody
who is acquainted with him, will suspect to be very favorable to Calvinism. " It is difficult," says he,
" to handle the necessity of evil in such a manner, as not to stumble such as are not above being alarmed
at propositions which have an uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the mat-
ter, they will find, that consistently with the »nlimited power of the Supreme Cause, it may be said, that
in the best ordered system, evils must have place." Turnbull'a Principles of Moral Philosophy, p. 327,
328. He is there speaking of moral evils, as may be seen.
Again the same author, in his second vol., entitled Christian Philosophy, p. 35, has these words : " If the
Author and Governor of all things be infinitely perfect, then whatever is, is right ; of all possible systems
he hath chosen the best ; and consequently, there is no absolute evil in the universe. This being the case,
all the seeming imperfections or evils in it are such only in a partial view ; and with respect to the whole
system, they are goods."
Ibid. p. 37. " WhenceJhen comes evil ? is the question that hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Got-
dian knot in philosophy. And indeed, if we own the existence of evil in the world in an absolute sense,
we diametrically contradict what hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any evil in the sys-
tem that is not good in respect to the whole, then is the whole not good, but evil, or at best, very imper-
fect ; and an author must be as his workmanship is : as is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution
of this difficulty is at hand : that there is no evil in the universe. What ! Are there no pains, no im-
perfections ? Is there no misery, no vice in the world ? Or are not these evils ? Evils indeed they are ;
that is, those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful and abominable ; but
tney are not evil or mischievous with respect to the whole."
Ibid. p. 42. " But He is, at the same time, said to create evil, darkness, confusion, and yet to do no
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 163
wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose that there should be
such a thing. And, if so, then such a choice is not an evil, but a wise and holy
choice. And if so, then that Providence which is agreeable to such a choice,
is a wise and holy Providence. Men do will sin as sin, and so are the authors
and actors of it. They love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God does
not will sin as sin, or for the sake of any thing evil ; though it be his pleasure
so to order things, that, He permitting, sin will come to pass, for the sake of
the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to
order things so that evil should come to pass, for the sake of the contrary good,
is no argument that He does not hate evil, as evil ; and if so, then it is no rea-
son why he may not reasonably forbid evil, as evil, and punish it as such.
The Arminians themselves must be obliged, whether they will or no, to allow
a distinction of God's Will, amounting to just the same thing that Calvinists in-
tend by their distinction of a secret and revealed Will. They must allow a
distinction of those things whiph God thinks best should be, considering all cir-
cumstances and consequences, and so are agreeable to his disposing Will, and
those things which he loves, and are agreeable to his nature, in themselves con-
sidered. Who is there that will dare to say, that the hellish pride, malice and
cruelty of devils are agreeable to God, and what He likes and approves ? And
yet, I trust, there is no Christian divine but what will allow, that it is agreeable
to God's Will so to order and dispose things concerning them, so to leave them
to themselves, and give them up to their own wickedness, that this perfect
wickedness should be a necessary consequence. Besure Dr. Whitby's words
do plainly suppose and allow it.*
The following things may be laid down as maxims of plain truth, and indis-
putable evidence.
1. That God is a perfectly happy Being, in the most absolute and highest
sense possible.
2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from every thing that is
contrary to happiness, and so, that in strict propriety of speech, there is no such
thing as any pain, grief, or trouble in God.
3. When any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed, and
things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is the less pleased or has less plea-
sure, his pleasure and happiness is diminished, and he suffers what is disagreea-
ble to him, or is the subject of something that is of a nature contrary to joy and
Happiness, even pain and grief.f
From this last axiom, it follows, that if no distinction is to be admitted be-
tween God's hatred of sin, and his Will with respect to the event and existence
of sin, as the all-wise Determiner of all events, under the view of all consequen-
ces through the whole compass and series of things ; I say, then it certainly fol-
lows, that the coming to pass of every individual act of sin is truly, all things
considered, contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really crossed in it ; and
evil, but to be the Author of good only. He is called " the Fatner of lights, the Author of every perfect
and good gift, with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning," who "tempteth no man, but
giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not." And yet by the prophet Isaias, He is introduced saying
of Himself, " I form light, and create darkness ; I make peace, and create evil : I, the Lord, do all these
things." What is the meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the Lord delightcth in goodness,
and, as the Scripture speaks, evil is his strange work ? He intends and pursues the universal good of his
creation ; and the evil which happens, is not permitted for its own sake, or through any pleasure in evil,
but because it is requisite to the greater good pursued."
* Whitby on the Five Poi^s, Edit. 2, p. 300, 305, 309. x
t Certainly it is not loss absurd and unreasonable, to talk of God's Will and desires being truly and
properly crossed, without his suffering any uneasiness, or any thing grievous or disagreeable, than it is to
talk of something that may be called a revealed Will, which may, in some respect, be different from a
secret purpose ; which purpose may be fulfilled, when the other is opposed.
164 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
this in proportion as He hates it. And as God's hatred of sin is infinite, by reason
of the infinite contrariety of his holy nature to sin ; so his Will is infinitely
crossed, in every act of sin that happens. Which is as much as to say, He en-
dures that which is infinitely disagreeable to him, by means of every act of sin
that He sees committed. And therefore, as appears by the preceding positions,
He endures truly and really, infinite grief or pain from every sin. And so He
must be infinitely crossed, and suffer infinite pain, every day, in millions of mil-
lions of instances : He must continually be the subject of an immense number
of real, and truly infinitely great crosses and vexations. Which would be to
make him infinitely the most miserable of all beings. %
If any objector should say ; all that these things amount to, is, that God
may do evil that good may come ; which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in
men ; and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral per-
fections of God ; I answer, that for God to dispose and permit evil, in the
manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil* that good may come ; for it
is not to do evil at all. — In order to a thing's being morally evil, there must be
one of these tilings belonging to it : either it must be a thing unfit and unsuit-
able in its own nature ; or it must have a bad tendency ; or it must proceed
from an evil disposition, and be done for an evil end. But neither of these
things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting such events, as the
immoral acts of creatures, for good ends. (1.) It is not unfit in its own nature,
that He should do so. For it is in its own nature fit, that infinite wisdom, and
not blind chance, should dispose moral good and evil in the world. And it is
fit, that the Being who has infinite wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner and Su-
preme Governor of the world, should take care of that matter. And, therefore,
there is no unfitness, or unsuitableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so
immoral, for any other beings to go about to order this affair ; because they are
not possessed of a wisdom, that in any manner fits them for it ; and, in othei
respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this affair ; nor does if belong to them,
they not being the owners and lords of the universe.
We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good man knew with
absolute certainty, it would be best, all things considered, that there should be
such a thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be contrary to his wisdom
and goodness, for him to choose that it should be so. It is no evil desire, to
desire good, and to desire that which, all things considered, is best. And it is
no unwise choice, to choose that that should be, which it is best should be ; and
to choose the existence of that thing concerning which this is known, viz., that
it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be
chosen. On the contrary, it would be a plain defect in wisdom and goodness,
for him not to choose it. And the reason why he might not order it, it he were
able, would not be because he might not desire it, but only the ordering of that
matter does not belong to him. But it is no harm for Him who is, by right
and in the greatest propriety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order every
thing in such a manner, as it would be a point of wisdom in Him to choose that
they should be ordered. If it would be a plain defect of wisdom and good-
ness in a Being, not to choose that that should be, which He certainly knows it
would, all things considered, be best should be (as was but now observed), then
it must be impossible for a Being who has no defect of wisdom and go'odness, to
do otherwise than choose it should be ; and that, for this very reason, because
He is perfectly wise and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and
goodness for him to choose that it should be, and the ordering of all things
supremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite wisdom
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 165
and goodness, to order that it should be. If the choice is good, the ordering and
disposing things according to that choice must also be good. It can be no
harm in one to whom it belongs to do his Will in the armies of heaven, and
amongst the inhabitants of the earth, to execute a good volition. If his Will be
good, and the object of his Will be, all things considered, good and best, then
the choosing or willing it, is not willing evil that good may come. And if so, then
his ordering, according to that Will, is not doing evil, that good may come.
2. It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus to order and
permit that moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass. For that it
is of good tendency, is the very thing supposed in the point now in question.
Christ's crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in them that perpetrated it, was of
most glorious tendency as permitted and ordered of God.
3. Nor is there any need of supposing it proceeds from any evil disposition
or aim ; for by the supposition, what is aimed at is good, and good is the actual
issue, in the final result of things.
SECTION X.
Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World.
The things, which have already been offered, may serve to obviate or clear
many of the objections which might be raised concerning sin's first coming into
the world ; as though it would follow from the doctrine maintained, that God
must be the author of the first sin, through his so disposing things, that it should
necessarily follow from his permission, that the sinful act should be committed,
&c. I need not, therefore, stand to repeat what has been said already, about
such a necessity's not proving God to be the author of sin, in any ill sense, or
in ^iny such sense as to infringe any liberty of man, concerned in his moral
agency, or capacity of blame, guilt and punishment.
But, if it should nevertheless be said, supposing the case so, that God, when
ne had made man, might so order his circumstances, that from these circum-
stances, together with his withholding further assistance and divine influence,
his sin would infallibly follow, why might not God as well have first made man
with a fixed prevailing principle of sin in his heart ? I answer,
I. It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appear in the world, it
should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such,
and should appear so to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the ef-
ficient or fountain. But this could not have been, if man had been made at
first with sin in his heart ; nor unless the abiding principle and habit of sin
were first introduced by an evil act of the creature. If sin had not arisen from
the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible, that it did
not arise from God, as the positive cause, and real source of it. — But it would
require room that cannot here be allowed, fully to consider all the difficulties which
have been started, concerning the first entrance of sin into the world. And
therefore,
II. I would observe, that objections against the doctrine that has been laid
down, in opposition to the Arminian notion of liberty, from these difficulties,
are altogether impertinent ; because no additional difficulty is incurred, by ad-
hering to a scheme in this manner differing from theirs, and none would be
removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining theirs. Nothing that
166 FREEDOM OF THE WILL
the Arminians say, about the contingency or self-determining power of r.ian's
will, can serve to explain, with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition oi
mankind could take place, and man be justly charged with the blame of it. To
say, the Will was self-determined, or determined by free choice, in that sinful
volition ; which is to say, that the first sinful volition was determined by a
foregoing sinful volition ; is no solution of the difficulty. It is an odd way of
solving difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To say, two and two
make nine ; or, that a child begat his father, solves no difficulty : no more does
it, to say, the first sinful act of choice was before the first sinful act of choice, and
chose and determined it, and brought it to pass. Nor is it any better solution, to say,
the first sinful volition chose, determined and produced itself; which is to say, it
was before it was. Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the difficulty
to say, the first sinful volition arose accidentally, without any cause at all ; any
more than it will solve that difficult question, How the world could be made out of
nothing ? to say, it came into being out of nothing, without any cause ; as has
been already observed. And if we should allow that that could be, that the first
evil volition should arise by perfect accident, without any cause ; it would relieve
no difficulty, about God's laying the blame of it to man. For how was man to blame
for perfect accident, which had no cause, and which therefore, he (to be sure)
was not the cause of, anymore than if it came by some external cause ? — Such so-
lutions are no better, than if some person, going about to solve some of the
strange mathematical paradoxes, about infinitely great and small quantities ;
as, that some infinitely great quantities are infinitely greater than some other
infinitely great quantities ; and also that some infinitely small quantities, are
infinitely less than others, which yet are infinitely little ; in order to a solution,
should say, that mankind have been under a mistake, in supposing a greater
quantity to exceed a smaller ; and that a hundred, multiplied by ten, makes but
a single unit.
SECTION XI.
Of a supposed Inconsistence of these Principles with God's moral Character.
The things which have been already observed, may be sufficient to answer
most of the objections, and silence the great exclamations of Jirminians against
Ihe Calvinists, from the supposed inconsistence of Calvinistic principles with
the moral perfections of God, as exercised in his government of mankind. The
consistence of such a doctrine of necessity as has been maintained, with the
fitness and reasonableness of God's commands, promises and threa' enings, re-
wards and punishments, has been particularly considered ; the cavils of our
opponents, as though our doctrine of necessity made God the author of sin.
have been answered ; and also their objection against these principles, as in-
consistent with God's sincerity, in his counsels, invitations and persuasions, has
been already obviated, in what has been observed respecting the consistence of
what Calvinists suppose, concerning the secret and revealed Will of God : by
that it appears, there is no repugnance in supposing it may be the secret Will
of God, that his ordination and permission of events should be such, that it
shall be a certain consequence, that a thing never will come to pass ; which
yet it is man's duty to do, and so God's preceptive Will that he should do ;
and 'his is the same thing as to say, God may sincerely command and lequire
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 167
him to do it. And if he may be sincere in commanding him, he may, for the
same reason, be sincere in counselling, inviting and using persuasions with him
to do it. Counsels and invitations are manifestations of God's preceptive Will,
or of what God loves, and what is in itself, and as man's act, agreeable to his
heart ; and not of his disposing Will, and what he chooses as a part of his own
infinite scheme of things. It has been particularly shown, Part III. Sect. IV.
that such a necessity as has been maintained, is not inconsistent with the pro-
priety and fitness of' divine commands ; and for the same reason, not inconsis-
tent with the sincerity of invitations and counsels, in the Corollary at the end
of the Section. Yea, it hath been shown, Part III. Sect. VII. Corol. 1, that
this objection of Arminians, concerning the sincerity and use of divine exhor-
tations, invitations and counsels, is demonstrably against themselves.
Notwithstanding, I would further observe, that the difficulty of reconciling
the sincerity of counsels, invitations and persuasions with such an antecedent
known fixedness of all events, as has been supposed, is not peculiar to this
scheme, as distinguished from that of the generality of Arminians, which ac-
knowledges the absolute foreknowledge of God ; and therefore, it would be
unreasonably brought as an objection against my differing from them. The
main seeming difficulty in the case is this ; that God, in counselling, inviting
md persuading, makes a show of aiming at, seeking and using endeavors for
the thing exhorted and persuaded to ; whereas, it is impossible for any intelli-
gent being truly to seek, or use endeavors for a thing, which he at the same
time knows, most perfectly, will not come to pass ; and that it is absurd to sup-
pose, he makes the obtaining of a thing his end, in his calls and counsels, which
he, at the same time, infallibly knows will not be obtained by these means.
Now, if God knows this, in the utmost certainty and perfection, the way by
which he comes by this knowledge makes no difference. If he knows it is by
the necessity which he sees in things, or by some other means ; it alters not
the case. But it is in effect allowed by Arminians themselves, that God's in-
viting and persuading men to do things, which he at the same time, certainly
knows will not be done, is no evidence of insincerity : because they allow, that
God has a certain foreknowledge of all men's sinful actions and omissions.
And as this is thus implicitly allowed by most Arminians, so all that pretend
to own the Scriptures to be the word of God, must be constrained to allow it-
God commanded and counselled Pharaoh to let his people go, and used argu-
ments and persuasions to induce him to it ; he laid before him arguments taken
from his infinite greatness and almighty power, (Exod. vii. 16,) and forewarn-
ed him of the fatal consequences of his refusal, from time to time. (Chap. viii.
1, 2, 20, 21, Chap. ix. 1—5, 13—17, and x. 3, 6.) He commanded Moses,
and the elders of Israel, to go and beseech Pharaoh to let the people go ; and
at the same time told them, he knew surely that he would not comply with
it. Exod. iii. 18, 19, " And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel,
unto the king of Egypt, and you shall say unto him ; the Lord God of the He-
brews hath met with us ; and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days' jour-
ney into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God ; and, I
am sure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go.'' So our blessed Saviour,
the evening wherein he was betrayed, knew that Peter would shamefully deny
him, before the morning ; for he declares it to him with asseverations, to show
the certainty of it ; and tells the disciples, that all of them should be offended
because of him that night; Matth. xxvi. 31 — 35, Luke xxii. 31 — 34, John
xiii. 38, John xvi. 32. And yet it was their duty to avoid these things ; they
were very sinful things, which God had forbidden, and which it was their duty
168 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
to watch and pray against ; and they were obliged to do so from the counsels
and persuasions Christ used with them, at that very time, so to do j Matt, xxvl
41, " Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation." So that what-
ever difliculty there can be in this matter, it can be no objection against any
principles which have been maintained in opposition to the principles of Armi
nians ; nor does it any more concern me to remove the difficulty, than it does
them, or indeed all, that call themselves Christians, and acknowledge the divine
authority of the Scriptures.— Nevertheless, this matter may possibly (God allow
ing) be more particularly and largely considered, in some future discourse, on
the doctrine of predestination.
But I would here observe, that however the defenders of that notion of lib-
erty of Will, which I have opposed, exclaim against the doctrine of Calvinists,
as tending to bring men into doubts concerning the moral perfections of God ;
it is their scheme, and not the scheme of Calvinists, that indeed is justly chargea-
ble with this. For it is one of the most fundamental points of their scheme of
things, that a freedom of Will, consisting in self-determination, without all
necessity, is essential to moral agency. This is the same thing as to say, that
such a determination of the will, without all necessity, must be in all intelligent
beings, in those things, wherein they are moral agents, or in their moral acts ;
and from this it will follow, that God's Will is not necessarily determined, in
any thing he does, as a moral agent, or in any of his acts that are t)f a moral
nature. So that in all things, wherein he acts holily, justly and truly, he does
not act necessarily ; or his Will is not necessarily determined, to act holily and
justly ; because, if it were necessarily determined, he would not be a moral
agent in thus acting. His Will would be attended with necessity, which, they
say, is inconsistent with moral agency. " He can act no otherwise : he is at
no liberty in the affair ; he is determined by unavoidable, invincible necessity ;
therefore such agency is no moral agency, yea, no agency at all, properly
speaking. A necessary agent is no agent ; he being passive, and subject to
necessity, what he does is no act of his, but an effect of a necessity prior to any
act of his."
This is agreeable to their manner of arguing. Now then what is become of
all our proof of the moral perfections of God 1 How can we prove, that God
certainly will, in any one instance, do that which is just and holy ; seeing his
Will is determined in the matter by no necessity 1 Wre have no other way of
proving that any thing certainly will be, but only by the necessity of the event.
Where we can see no necessity but that the thing may be, or may not be, there we
are unavoidably left at a loss. We have no other way properly and truly to
demonstrate the moral perfections of God, but the way that Mr. Chubb proves
them in p. 252, 261, 262, 263, of his Tracts, viz., that God must necessarily per-
fectly know, what is most worthy and valuable in itself, which, in the nature of
things, is best and fittest to be done. And as this is most eligible in itself, He,
being omniscient, must see it to be so : and being both omniscient and self-suffi-
cient, cannot have any temptation to reject it, and so must necessarily will that
which is best. And thus, by this necessity of the determination of God's Will
to what is good and best, we demonstrably establish God's moral character.
Corol. From things which have been observed, it appears that most of
the arguments from. Scripture which Arminians make use of to support their
scheme, are no other than begging the question. For in these arguments, they
determine, in the first place, that w'thout such a freedom of Will as they hold,
men cannot be proper moral agents, nor the subjects of command, counsel, per-
suasion, invitation, promises, threatening^, expostulations, rewards and punish-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 169
ments : and that without such freedom it is to no purpose for men to take any
care, or use any diligence, endeavors or means, in order to their avoiding sin,
or becoming holy, escaping punishment or obtaining happiness ; and having
supposed these things, which are grand things in question in the debate, then
they heap up Scriptures, containing commands, counsels, calls, warnings, per-
suasions, expostulations, promises and threatenings ; (as doubtless they may
find enough such ; the Bible is confessedly full of them, from the beginning to
the end ;) and then they glory, how full the Scripture is on their side, how many
more texts there are that evidently favor their scheme, than such as seem to
favor the contrary. But let them first make manifest the things in question,
which they suppose and take for granted, and show them to be consistent with
themselves, and produce clear evidence of their truth, and they have gained
their point, as all will confess, without bringing one Scripture. For none de-
nies, that there are commands, counsels, promises, threatenings, &c, in the Bible.
But* unless they do these things, their multiplying such texts of Scripture is in-
significant and vain.
It may further be observed, that such Scriptures as they bring are really
against them, and not for them. As it has been demonstrated, that it is their
scheme, and not ours, that is inconsistent with the use of motives and persua-
sives, or any moral means whatsoever, to induce men to the practice of virtue,
or abstaining from wickedness : their principles, and not ours, are repugnant to
moral agency, and inconsistent with moral government, with law or precept,
with the nature of virtue or vice, reward or punishment, and with every thing
whatsoever of a moral nature, either on the part of the moral governor, or in
the state, actions or conduct of the subject.
SECTION XII.
Of a supposed Tendency of these principles to Atheism and Licentiousness.
If any object against what has been maintained, that it tends to Atheism, I
know not on what grounds such an objection can be raised, unless it be that
some Atheists have held a- doctrine of necessity which they suppose to be like
this. But if it be so, I am persuaded the Arminians would not look upon it
just, that their notion of freedom and contingence should be charged with a
tendency to 'all the errors that ever any embraced, who have held such opinions.
The Stoic philosophers, whom the Calvinists are charged with agreeing with,
were no Atheists, but the greatest Theists and nearest akin to Christians in
their opinions concerning the unity and the perfections of the Godhead, of all the
heathen philosophers. And Epicurus, that chief Father of Atheism, maintained
no such doctrine of necessity, but was the greatest maintainer of contingence.
The doctrine of necessity, which supposes a necessary connection of all
events, on some antecedent ground and reason of their existence, is the only
medium we have to prove the being of God. And the contrary doctrine of con-
tingence, even as maintained by Arminians, (which certainly implies or infers,
that events may come into existence, or begin to be, without dependence on
any thing foregoing, as their cause, ground or reason,) takes away all proof of
the being of God ; which proof is summarily expressed by the apostle, in Rora.
i. 20. And this is a tendency to Atheism with a witness. So that, indeed, it
is the doctrine of Arminians, and not of the Calvinists, that is justly charged
Vol. II. 22
170 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
with a tendency to Atheism ; it being built on a foundation that is the uttei
subversion of every demonstrative argument for the proof of a Deity, as has
been shown, Part II. Sec. 3.
And whereas it has often been said, that the Calvinistic doctrine of necessi-
ty saps the foundations of all religion and virtue, and tends to the greatest licen-
tiousness of practice : this objection is built on the pretence, that our doctrine
renders vain all means and endeavors, in order to be virtuous and religious.
Which pretence has been already particularly considered in the 5th Section of
this Part ; where it has been demonstrated, that this doctrine has no such ten-
dency ; but that such a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary doc-
trine ; inasmuch as the notion of contingence, which their doctrine implies, in
its certain consequences, overthrows all connection, in every degree, between
endeavor and event, means and end.
And besides, if many other things which have been observed to belong to
the Arminian doctrine, or to be plain consequences of it, be considered, there
will appear just reason to suppose that it is that which must rather tend to
licentiousness. Their doctrine excuses all evil inclinations, which men find to
oe natural ; because in such inclinations, they are not self-determined, as such
inclinations are not owing to any choice or determination of their own Wills.
Which leads men wholly to justify themselves in all their wicked actions, so
far as natural inclination has a hand in determining their Wills to the com-
mission of them. Yea, these notions, which suppose moral necessity and ina-
bility to be inconsistent with blame or moral obligation, will directly lead men
to justify the vilest acts and practices, from the strength of their wicked incli-
nations of all sorts ; strong inclinations inducing a moral necessity ; yea to
excuse every degree of evil inclination, so far as this has evidently prevailed,
and been the thing which has determined their Wills ; because, so far as ante-
cedent inclination determined the Will, so far the Will was without liberty of
indifference and self-determination. Which, at last, will come to this, that
men will justify themselves in #11 the wickedness they commit. It has been
observed already, that this scheme of things does exceedingly diminish the guilt
of sin, and the difference between the greatest and smallest offences ;* and if it
be pursued in its consequences, it leaves room for no such thing, as either vir-
tue or vice, blame or praise in the world.f And then again how naturally does
this notion of the sovereign, self-determining power of the Will, in all things, vir-
tuous or vicious, and whatsoever deserves either reward or punishment, tend to
encourage men to put off the work of religion and virtue, and turning from sin
to God ; it being that which they have a sovereign power to determine them-
selves to, just when they please ; or if not, they are wholly excusable in going
on in sin, because of their inability to do any other.
If it should be said, that the tendency of this doctrine of necessity to licen-
tiousness, appears by the improvement many at this day actually make of it, to
justify themselves in their dissolute courses ; I will not deny that some men do
unreasonably abuse this doctrine, as they do many other things which are true
and excellent in their own nature ; but I deny that this proves the doctrine it-
self has any tendency to licentiousness. I think the tendency of doctrines, by
what now apppears in the world, and in our nation in particular, may much
more justly be argued from the general effect which has been seen to attend
the prevailing of the principles of Arminians and the contrary principles ; as
* !&!! "J' Se,rl- 6; + Part IIL Sect- 6- Ibid- Sect 7- Part 1V- Sect. 1. Part III. Sect. 3. Cirol.
. after the first Head.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 171
both have had their turn of general prevalence in our nation. If it be indeed,
as is pretended, that Calvinistic doctrines undermine the very foundation of all
religion and morality, and enervate and disannul all rational motives to holy and
virtuous practice ; and that the contrary doctrines give the inducements to vir-
tue and goodness their proper force, and exhibit religion in a rational light,
tending to recommend it to the reason of mankind, and enforce it in a manner
that is agreeable to their natural notions of things : I say, if it be thus, it is remark-
able that virtue and religious practice should prevail most, when the former doc-
trines, so inconsistent with it, prevailed almost universally ; and that ever since
the latter doctrines, so happily agreeing with it, and of so proper and excellent
a tendency to promote it, have been gradually prevailing, vice, profaneness
luxury and wickedness of all sorts, and contempt of all religion, and of every
kind of seriousness and strictness of conversation, should proportionably pre-
vail ; and that these things should thus accompany one another, and rise and
prevail one with another, now for a whole age together. It is remarkable that
this happy remedy (discovered by the free inquiries and superior sense and wis-
dom of this age) against the pernicious effects of Calvinism, so inconsistent
with religion, and tending so much to banish all virtue from the earth, should,
on so long a trial, be attended with no good effect, but that the consequence
should be the reverse of amendment ; that in proportion as the remedy takes
place, and is thoroughly applied, so the disease should prevail, and the very
same dismal effect take place, to the highest degree, which Calvinistic doc-
trines are supposed to have so great a tendency to, even the banishing of reli-
gion and virtue, and the prevailing of unbounded licentiousness of manners. If
these things are truly so, they are very remarkable, and matter of very curious
speculation.
SECTION XIII.
Concerning that Objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is
supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruse.
It has often been objected against the defenders of Calvinistic principles,
that in their reasonings they run into nice, scholastic distinctions, and abstruse,
metaphysical subtilties, and set these in opposition to common sense. And it
is possible, that after the former manner it may be alleged against the reasoning
by which I have endeavored to confute the Arminian scheme of liberty and
moral agency, that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. Concerning this I
would observe the following things.
I. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is
metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics, it is a
very impertinent objection ; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dis-
pute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, it is as frivolous to inquire
what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in ; and
for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him
his arguments are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him his arguments
could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The
question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, logic, or mathematics,
Latin, French, English or Mohawk 1 But whether the reasoning be good, and
the arguments truly conclusive ? The foregoing arguments are no more met-
172 FREEDOM OF THE WILL
aphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove then; doc-
trine of transubstantiation ; alleging it is inconsistent with the notion of corpo-
real identity that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. It is by
metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove that the rational soul is not
corporeal ; that lead or sand cannot think ; that thoughts are not square or
round, or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being
of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their clear and demon-
strative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is by metaphysics only,
that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable ;
that he is not ignorant or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be
unjust, and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And.
indeed, we have no strict demonstration of any thing, excepting mathematical
truths, but by metaphysics. We can have no proof that is properly demon
strative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his
creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies
or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality
and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing my arguments
should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear,
distinct and determinate meaning of the terms I use, should be insisted on ; but.
?et not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet,
metaphysical,
II. If the reasoning which has been made use of, be in some sense meta-
physical, it will not follow that therefore it must needs be abstruse, unintelligi-
ble, and akin to the jargon of the schools. I humbly conceive the foregoing
reasoning, at least as to those things which are most material belonging to it,
depends on no abstruse definitions or distinctions, or terms without a meaning,
or of very ambiguous and undetermined signification, or any points of such ab-
straction and subtilty, as tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds
and darkness. There is no high degree of refinement and abstruse speculation,
in determining that a thing is not before it is, and so cannot be the cause of
itself; or that the first act of free* choice, has not another act of free choice go-
ing before that, to excite or direct it, or in determining, that no choice is made,
whjle the mind remains in a state of absolute indifference ; that preference and
equilibrium never coexist ; and that therefore no choice is made in a state of
liberty, consisting in indifference ; and that so far as the Will is determined by
motives, exhibited and operating previous to the act of the Will, so far it is not
determined *by the act of the Will itself; that nothing can begin to be, which
before was not, without a cause, or some antecedent ground or reason, why it
then begins to be ; that effects depend on their causes, and are connected with
them ; that virtue is not the worse, nor sin the better for the strength of incli-
nation with which it is practised, and the difficulty which thence arises of doing
otherwise ; that when it is already infallibly known, that the thing will be, it
is not a thing contingent whether it will ever be or no ; or that it can be truly said,
notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it should be, but it either may be, or
may not be. And the like might be observed of many other things which be-
long to the foregoing reasoning.
If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing reasoning is nothing but
metaphysical sophistry; and that it must be so, that the seeming force of the
arguments all depends on some fallacy and wile that is hid in the obscurity
which always attends a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and refinement ;
and shall be ready to say, " Here is indeed something that tends to confound the
mind, but not to satisfy it ; for, who can ever be truly satisfied in it, that men
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 173
are fitly blamed or commended, punished or rewarded for those volitions which
are not from themselves, and of whose existence they are not the causes ? Men
may refine as much as they please, and advance their abstract notions, and make
out a thousand seeming contradictions, to puzzle our understandings ; yet there
can be no satisfaction in such doctrine as this ; the natural sense of the mind of
man will always resist it."* I humbly conceive, that such an objector, if he has
capacity and humility and calmness of spirit, and sufficient impartiality,
thoroughly to examine himself, will find that he knows not really what he would
be at ; and that indeed, his difficulty is nothing but a mere prejudice, from an
inadvertent customary use of words, in a meaning that is not clearly under-
stood, nor carefully reflected upon. Let the objector reflect again, if he has
candor and patience enough, and does not scorn to be at the trouble of close
attention in the affair. He would have a man's volition be from himself. Let
it be from himself, most primarily and originally of any way conceivable; that
is, from his own choice : how will that help the matter, as to his being justly
blamed or praised, unless that choice itself be blame or praiseworthy ? And how
is the choice itself (an ill choice, for instance) blameworthy, according to these
principles, unless that be from himself too, in the same manner ; that is, from his
own choice ? But the original and first determining choice in the affair is not
from his choice ; his choice is not the cause of it. And if it be from himself
some other way, and not from his choice, surely that will not help the matter ;
if it be not from himself of choice, then it is not from himself voluntarily ; and
if so, he is surely no more to blame, than if it were not from himself at all. It
is a vanity, to pretend it is a sufficient answer to this, to say, that it is nothing
but metaphysical refinement and subtilty, and so attended with obscurity and
S uncertainty.
If it be the natural sense of our minds, that what is blameworthy in a man
must be from himself, then it doubtless is also, that it must be from something
* A certain noted author of the present age says, the arguments for necessity are nothing but quibbling,
or logomachy, using words without a meaning, or begging the questwn. I do not know what kind of necessity
any authors, he may have reference to, are advocates for; or wnether they have managed their arguments
well, or ill. As to the arguments I have made use of, if they are quibbles they may be shown to be so :
juch knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid open.
If this be fairly done, with respect to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon, I shall have just occai
sion, for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my argumentations. I am willing my proofs
should be thoroughly examined ; and if there be nothing but begging the question, or mere logomachy, or
dispute of words, let it be made manifest, and shown how the seeming strength of the argument depends
on my using words without a meaning, or arises from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words
in an indeterminate and unsteady manner ; and that the weight of my reasons rests mainly on such a
foundation ; and then, I shall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and thank the man that has
done the kind part, or shall be justly exposed for my obstinacy.
The same author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls logomachy and sophistry, to
experience. A person can experience only what passes in his own mind. But yet, as we may well suppose,
that all men have the same human faculties ; so a man may well argue, from his own experience to that
of others, in things that show the nature of those faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then
one has as good right to allege his experience, as another. As to my own experience, J find, that in
innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body, in many respects, instantaneously
follow the acts of my Will concerning those motions ; and that my Will has some command of my
thoughts ; and that the acts of my Will are my own, i. e., that they are acts of my Will, the volitions of
my own mind ; or, in other words, that what I will, I will. Which, £ presume, is the sum of what others
experience in this affair. But as to finding by experience, that my Will is originally determined by
itself; or that, my Will first choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows ;
and that this is the first rise of the determination of my Will in any affair ; or that any volition rises in
my mind contingently ; I declare, I know nothing in myself, by experience, of this nature ; and nothing
that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any such thing, or gives me any more
reason to suppose or suspect any such thing, than to suppose that my volitions existed twenty years before
they existed. It is true, I find myself possessed of my volitions, before I can see the effectual power of
any cause to produce them (for the power and efficacy of the causfe is not seen but by the effect), and this,
for aught I know, may make some imagine, that volition has no cause, or that it produces itself. But 1
have no more reason from hence to determine any such thing, than I have to determine that I gave myself
my own being, or that I came into being accidentally without a cause, because I first found myself pos-
sessed of being, before I had knowledge of a cause of my being.
17^ FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
bad in himself, a bad choice, or bad disposition. But then our natural sense is,
that this bad choice or disposition is evil in itself, and the man blameworthy for
it, on its own account, without taking into our notion of its blameworthiness,
another bad choice, or disposition going before this, from whence this arises ;
for that is a ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate contradiction,
which our natural sense of blameworthiness has nothing to do with, and never
comes into the mind, nor is supposed in the judgment we naturally make of the
affair. As was demonstrated before, natural sense does not place the moral evil
of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them, but the nature of them. An
evil thing's being from a man, or from something antecedent in him, is not
essential to the original notion we have of blameworthiness ; but it is its being
the choice of the heart ; as appears by this, that if a thing be from us, and nol
from our choice, it has not the nature of blameworthiness or ill desert, accord
ing to our natural sense. When a thing is from a man, in that sense, that it i:
from his Will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his Will is in it : so far%
as the Will is in it, blame is in it, and no further. Neither do we go any
further in our notion of blame, to inquire whether the bad Will be from a baa
Will : there is no consideration of the original of that bad Will ; because, ac-
cording to our natural apprehension, blame originally consists in it. Therefore
a thing's being from a man, is a secondary consideration, in the notion of blame
or ill desert. Because those things, in our external actions, are most properly
said to be from us, which are from our choice ; and no other external actions,
but those that are from us, as because we are in them, i. e., our Wills are in
them ; not so much because they are from some property of ours, as because
they are our properties.
However, all these external actions being truly from us, as their cause ,
and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and in the common affairs of life, to
speak of men's actions and conduct that we see, and that affect human society,
as deserving ill or well, as worthy of blame or praise ; hence it is come to pass,
that philosophers have incautiously taken all their measures of good and evil,
praise and blame, from the dictates of common sense, about these overt acts of
men ; to the running of every thing into the most lamentable and dreadful con-
fusion.
And, therefore, I observe,
III. It is so far from being true (whatever may be pretended) that the proof
of the doctrine which has been maintained, depends on certain abstruse, unin-
telligible, metaphysical terms and notions; and that the Arminian scheme,
without needing such clouds and darkness for its defence, is supported by the
plain dictates of common sense ; that the very reverse is most certainly true, and
that to a great degree. It is fact, that they, and not we, have confounded
things with metaphysical, unintelligible notions and phrases ; and have drawn
them from the light of plain truth, into the gross darkness of abstruse, metaphy-
sical propositions, and words without a meaning. Their pretended demonstra-
tions depend very much on such unintelligible, metaphysical phrases, as self-
determination, and sovereignty of the Will ; and the metaphysical sense they
put on such terms, as necessity, contingency, action, agency, &c, quite diverse
from their meaning as used in common speech ; and which, as they use them,
are without any consistent meaning or any manner of distinct, consistent ideas ;
as far from it as any of the abstruse terms and perplexed phrases of the peripa-
tetic philosophers or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the cant of
the wildest fanatics. Yea, we may be bold to say, these metaphysical terms,
on which they build so much, are what they use without knowing what they
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 175
mean themselves ; they are pure metaphysical sounds, without any ideas what-
soever in their minds to answer them ; inasmuch as it has been demonstrated,
that there cannot be any notion in the mind consistent with these expressions,
as they pretend to explain them ; because their explanations destroy themselves.
No such notions as imply self-contradiction, and self-abolition, and this a great
many ways, can subsist in the mind ; as there can be no idea of a whole which
is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension without dimensions, or of an
effect which is before its cause. — Arminians improve these terms, as terms of
art, and in their metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things
which are contrary to common sense, in ^high degree. Thus, instead of the
plain, vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face of
the earth, and in all ages, have ; consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases ;
they have introduced a new, strange liberty, consisting in indifference, contin-
gence, and self-determination ; by which, they involve themselves and others in
great obscurity, and manifold gross inconsistence. So, instead of placing virtue
and vice, as common sense places them very much, in fixed bias and inclination,
and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more established inclination ; these,
through their refinings and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty consisting in
indifference, to be essential to all virtue and vice. So they have reasoned
themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions, but metaphysical confusion, into
many principles about moral agency, blame, praise, reward and punishment,
which are, as has been shown, exceeding contrary to the common sense of
mankind ; and perhaps to their own sense, which governs them in common life.
CONCLUSION
Whether the things which have been alleged, are liable to any tolerable
answer in the way of calm, intelligible and strict reasoning, I must leave others
to judge ; but I am sensible they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not un-
likely that some, who value themselves on the supposed rational and generous
principles of the modern, fashionable divinity, will have their indignation and
disdain raised at the sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are
pretended to be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read, or of
so much notice as to say much about it, they may probably renew the usual ex-
clamations, with additional vehemence and contempt, about the fate of the hea-
then, Hobbes' necessity, and making men mere machines ; accumulating the ter-
rible epjjhets of fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable, irresistible, &c, and it may be,
with the addition of horrid and blasphemous ; and perhaps much skill may be
used to set forth things, which have been said, in colors which shall be shocking
to the imaginations, and moving to the passions of those, who have either too
little capacity, or too much confidence of the opinions they have imbibed, and
contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect
examination.* Or difficulties may be started and insisted on, which do not be-
long to the controversy ; because, let them be more or less real, and hard to be
resolved, they are not what are owing to any thing distinguishing of this scheme
from that of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished by re-
nouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or some particular things
may be picked out, which they may think will sound harshest in the ears of the
generality ; and these may be glossed and descanted on, with tart and contemp-
tuous words ; and from thence, the whole treated with triumph and insult.
It is easy to see, how the decision of most of the points in controversy, be-
tween Calvinists and Arminians, depends on the determination of this grand
article concerning the freedom of the Will, requisite to moral agency ; and that by
clearing and establishing the Calvinistic doctrine in this point, the chief argu-
ments are obviated, by which Arminian doctrines in general are supported, and
the contrary doctrines demonstratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest,
that God's moral government over mankind, his treating them as moral
agents, making them the objects of his commands, counsels, calls, warnings,
expostulations, promises, threatenings, rewards and punishments, is not inconsis-
tent with a determining disposal of all events, of every kind, throughout the
* A writer of the present age, whom I have several times had occasion to mention, speaks once and again
of those who hold the doctrine of necessity, as scarcely worthy of the name of philosophers. — I do not know,
whether he has respect to any particular notion of necessity, that some may have maintained ; and, if so,
what doctrine of necessity it is that he means. — Whether I am worthy of the name of a philosopher, or
not, would be a question little to the present purpose. If any, and ever so many, should deny it, 1 should
not think it worth the while to enter into a dispute on that question. Though at the same time I might
expect some better answer should be given to the arguments brought for the truth of the doctrine I main-
tain ; and I might further reasonably desire, that it might be considered, whether it does not become those,
who are truly worthy of the name of philosophers, to be sensible, that there is a difference between argu-
ment and contempt; yea, and a difference between the contemptibleness of the person that argues, and the
inconclusiveness of the arguments he offers.
CONCLUSION. 177
universe, in his providence ; either by positive efficiency, or permission. Indeed,
such an universal, determining Providence infers some kind of necessity of all
events, such a necessity as implies an infallible, previous fixedness of the futurity
of the event ; but no other necessity of moral events, or volitions of intelligent
agents, is needful in order to this, than moral necessity ; which does as much
ascertain the futurity of the event, as any other necessity. But, as has been de-
monstrated, such a necessity is not at all repugnant to moral agency, and a rea-
sonable use of commands, calls, rewards, punishments, &c. Yea, not only are
objections of this kind against the doctrine of an universal determining Provi-
dence, removed by what has been said, but the truth of such a doctrine is
demonstrated.
As it has been demonstrated, that the futurity of all future events is established
by previous necessity, either natural or moral ; so it is manifest that the Sove-
reign Creator and Disposer of the world has ordered this necessity, by ordering his
own conduct, either in designedly acting or forbearing to act. For, as the being
of the world is from God, so trfe circumstances in which it had its being at first,
both negative and positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these ways ; and all
the necessary consequences of these circumstances, must be ordered by him. And
God's active and positive interpositions, after the world was created, and the con-
sequence of these interpositions ; also every instance of his forbearing to interpose,
and the sure consequences of this forbearance, must all be determined according to
his pleasure. And therefore every event, which \s the consequence of any thing
whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing or circumstance,
either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be
ordered of God ; either by a designed efficiency and interposition, or a designed
forbearing to operate or interpose. But, as has been proved, all events what-
soever are necessarily connected with something foregoing, either positive or
negative, which is the ground of their existence : it follows, therefore, that the
whole series of events is thus connected with something in the state of things,
either positive or negative, which is original in the series ; i. e. something which
is connected with nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate conduct,
either his acting or forbearing to act. From whence it follows, that as God
designedly orders his own conduct, and its connected consequences, it must ne-
cessarily be, that he designedly orders all things.
The things which have% been said, obviate some of the chief objections of
Arminians against the Calvinistic doctrine of the total depravity and corruption
of man's nature, whereby his heart is wholly under the power of sin, and he is
utterly unable, without the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to love God,
believe in Christ, or do any thing that is truly good and acceptable in God's
sight. For the main objection against this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with
the freedom of man's Will, consisting in indifference and self-determining power ;
because it supposes man to be under a necessity of sinning, and that God requires
things of him in order to his avoiding eternal damnation, which he is unable to
do ; and that this doctrine is wholly inconsistent with the sincerity of counsels,
invitations, &c. Now, this doctrine supposes 710 other necessity of sinning, than
a moral necessity ; which, as has been shown, does not at all excuse sin ; and
supposes no other inability to obey any command, or perform any duty, even the
most spiritual and exalted, but a moral inability, which, as has been proved,
does not excuse persons in the nonperformance of any good thing, or make them
not to be the proper objects of commands, counsels and invitations. And more-
over, it has been shown that there is not, and never can be, either in existence,
or so much as in idea, any such freedom of will, consisting in indifference and
Vol. II 23
178 CONCLUSION.
self-determination, for the sake of which, this doctrine of original sin is cast out ;
and that no such freedom is necessary, in order to the nature of sin, and a just
desert of punishment.
The things which have been observed, do also take off the main objections
of Arminians against the doctrine of efficacious grace ; and at the same time
prove the grace of God in a sinner's conversion (if there be any grace or divine
influence in the affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irresistible too, if by irresisti-
ble is meant that which is attended with a moral necessity, which it is impossible
should ever be violated by any resistance. The main objection of Arminians
agamst this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their self-determining freedom
of Will ; and that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue, that it should be wrought
in the heart by the determining efficacy and power of another, instead of its
being owing to a self-moving power ; that in that case, the good which is wrought,
would not be our virtue, but rather God's virtue ; because it is not the person
in whom it is wrought, that is the determining author of it, but God that
wrought it in him. But the things, which are the foundation of these objections,
have been considered ; and it has been demonstrated that the liberty of moral
agents does not consist in self-determining power, and that there is no need of
any such liberty in order to the nature of virtue, nor does it at all hinder but that
the state or act of the Will may be the virtue of the subject, though it be not
from self-determination, but the determination of an extrinsic cause ; even so as
to cause the event to be morally necessary to the subject of it. And as it has
been proved, that nothing in the state or acts of the Will of man is contingent ;
but that, on the contrary, every event of this kind is necessary, by a moral ne-
cessity ; and as it has also been now demonstrated, that the doctrine of an uni-
versal determining Providence, follows from that doctrine of necessity which
was proved before ; and so that God does decisively, in his Providence, order
all the volitions of moral agents, either by positive influence or permission ; and
it being allowed, on all hands, that what God does in the affair of man's vir-
tuous volitions, whether it be more or less, is by some positive influence, and
not by mere permission, as in the affair of a sinful volition ; if we put these things
together^ it will follow, that God's assistance or influence, must be determining
and decisive, or must be attended with a moral necessity of the event ; and so,
that God gives virtue, holiness and conversion to sinneis, by an influence which
determines the effect, in such a manner, that the effect will infallibly follow by
a moral necessity ; which is what Calvinists mean by efficacious and irresistible
grace.
The things which have been said, do likewise answer the chief objections
against the doctrine of God's universal and absolute decree, and afford infalli-
ble proof of this doctrine ; and of the doctrine of absolute, eternal, personal elec-
tion in particular. The main objections against these doctrines are, that they
infer a necessity of the volitions of moral agents, and of the future, moral state
and acts of men, and so are not consistent with those eternal rewards and pun-
ishments, which are connected with conversion and impenitence ; nor can be
made to agree with the reasonableness and sincerity of the precepts, calls, ,
counsels, warnings and expostulations of the word of God : or with the various
methods and means of grace, which God uses with sinners, to bring them to
repentance ; and the whole of that moral government, which God exercises
towards mankind ; and that they infer an inconsistence between the secret, and
revealed Will of God, and make God the author of sin. But all these things
have been obviated in the preceding discourse. And the certain truth of these
doctrines, concerning God's eternal purposes, will follow from what was just
CONCLUSION. 179
now observed concerning GocTs universal Providence ; how it infallibly follows
from what has been proved, that God orders all events j and the volitions of
moral agents amongst others by such a decisive disposal, that the events are
infallibly connected with his disposal. For if God disposes all events, so that
the infallible existence of the events is decided by his Providence, then he,
doubtless, thus orders and decides things knowingly and on design. God does
not do what he does, nor order what he orders, accidentally or, unawares ; either
without or beside his intention. And if there be a foregoing design, of doing
and ordering as he does, this is the same with a purpose or decree. And as it,
has been shown that nothing is new to God in any respect, but all things are
perfectly and equally in his view from eternity ; hence it will follow, that his
designs or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on any new views or
appearances, but are all eternal purposes. And as it has been now shown, how
the doctrine of determining, efficacious grace certainly follows from things
proved in the foregoing discourse ; hence will necessarily follow the doctrine of
'particular, eternal, absolute election. For if men are made true saints, no other-
wise than as God makes them so, and distinguishes them from others, by an
efficacious power and influence of his, that decides and fixes the event ; and God
thus makes some saints, and not others, on design or purpose, and (as has been
now observed) no designs of God are new ; it follows, that God thus distinguish-
ed from others, all that ever become true saints, by his eternal design or decree.
I might also show how God's certain foreknowledge must suppose an absolute
decree, and how such a decree can be proved to a demonstration from it ; but,
that this discourse may not be lengthened out too much, that must be omitted
for the present.
From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in some
sense may be said to die for all, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, the
whole world by his death ; yet there must be something particular in the design
jf his death, with respect to such as he intended should actually be saved there-
by. As appears by what has been now shown, God has the actual salvation or
redemption of a certain number in his proper, absolute design, and of a certain
number only ; and therefore such a design only can be prosecuted in any thing
God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of
the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a design
with respect to no other, most strictly speaking : for it is impossible that God
should prosecute any other design than only such as he has ; he certainly does
not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a design that he
has not. And, indeed, such a particularity and limitation of redemption will
as infallibly follow, from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, as from that of
the decree. For it is as impossible, in strictness of speech, that God should
prosecute a design, or aim at a thing, which He at the same time most perfectly
knows will not be accomplished, as that he should use endeavors for that which
is beside his decree.
By the things which have been proved, are obviated some of the main ob-
jections against the doctrine of the infallible and necessary perseverance of saints,
and some of the main foundations Of this doctrine are established. The main
prejudices of Arminians against this doctrine seem to be these. They suppose
such a necessary, infallible perseverance to be repugnant to the freedom of the
Will ; that it must be owing to man's own self-determining power, that hejirst
becomes virtuous and holy ; and so, in like manner, it must be left a thing con-
tingent, to be determined by the same freedom of Will, whether he will perse-
vere in virtue and holiness ; and that otherwise his continuing steadfast in faitb
ISO CONCLUSION.
and obedience would not be his virtue, or at all praiseworthy and rewardable,
nor could his perseverance be properly the matter of divine commands, coun-
sels and promises, nor his apostasy be properly threatened, and men warned
against it. Whereas we find all these things in Scripture : there we find
steadfastness and perseverance in true Christianity, represented as the virtue of
the saints, spoken of as praiseworthy in them, and glorious rewards promised to
it ; and also find that God makes it the subject of his commands, counsels and
promises ; and the contrary, of threatenings and warnings. But the foundation
of these objections has been removed, in its being shown that moral necessity
and infallible certainty of events is not inconsistent with these things ; and that
as to freedom of Will, lying in the power of the Will to determine itself, there
neither is any such thing, nor any need of it, in order to virtue, reward, com-
mands, counsels, &c.
And as the doctrines of efficacious grace and absolute election do certainly
follow from things which have been proved in the preceding discourse ; so some
of the main foundations of the doctrine of perseverance, are thereby established.
If the beginning of true faith and holiness, and a man's becoming a true saint
at first, does not depend on the self-determining power of the Will, but on the
determining, efficacious grace of God ; it may well be argued, that it is so also
with respect to men's being continued saints, or persevering in faith and holiness.
The conversion of a sinner being not owing to a man's self-determination, but to
God's determination and eternal election, which is absolute and depending on
the sovereign W7ill of God, and not on the free Will of man ; as is evident from
what has been said ; and it being very evident from the Scriptures, that the
eternal election which there is of saints to faith and holiness, is also an election
of them to eternal salvation. Hence their appointment to salvation must also
be absolute, and not depending on their contingent, self-determining Will. From
all which it follows, that it is absolutely fixed in God's decree, that all true
saints shall persevere to actual eternal salvation.
But I must leave all these things to the consideration of the fair and im-
partial reader ; and when he has maturely weighed them, I would propose it
to his consideration, whether many of the first reformers, and others that suc-
ceeded them, whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his church, and
greatest instruments of their deliverance from error and darkness, and of the
support of the cause of piety among them, have not been injured in the con-
tempt with which they have been treated by many late writers, for their teach-
ing and maintaining such doctrines as are commonly called Calvinistic. In-
deed, some of these new writers, at the same time that they have represented
the doctrines of these ancient and eminent divines as in the highest degree ri-
diculous, and contrary to common sense, in an ostentation of a very generous
charity, have allowed that they were honest, well-meaning men ; yea, it may
be, some of them, as though it were in great condescension and compassion to
them, have allowed that they did pretty well for the day in which they lived,
and considering the great disadvantages they labored under ; when at the same
time, their manner of speaking has naturally and plainly suggested to the minds
of their readers, that they were persons, who, through the lowness of their
genius, and greatness of the bigotry with which their minds were shackled and
thoughts confined, living in the gloomy caves of superstition, fondly embraced,
and demurely and zealously taught the most absurd, silly, and monstrous opin-
ions, worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen possessed of that noble
and generous freedom of thought, which happily prevails in this age of light
and inquiry. When, indeed, such is the case, that we might, if so disposed,
CONCLUSION. 181
speak as big words as they, and on far better grounds. And really all the Jlr-
minians on earth might be challenged, without arrogance or vanity, to make
these principles of theirs, wherein they mainly differ from their fathers, whom
they so much despise, consistent with common sense ; yea, and perhaps to pro-
duce any doctrine ever embraced by the blindest bigot of the church of Rome,
or the most ignorant Mussulman or extravagant enthusiast, that might be re-
duced to more demonstrable inconsistencies, and repugnancies to common sense,
and to themselves ; though their inconsistencies indeed may not lie so deep, or
be so artfully veiled by a deceitful ambiguity of words, and an indeterminate
signification of phrases. I will not deny, that these gentlemen, many of them,
are men of great abilities, and have been helped to higher attainments in phi-
losophy, than those ancient divines, and have done great service to the church
of God in some respects ; but I humbly conceive that their differing from their
fathers with such magisterial assurance, in these points in divinity, must be
owing to some other cause than superior wisdom.
It may also be worthy of consideration, whether the great alteration, which
has been made in the state of things in our nation, and some other parts of the
Protestant world, in this and the past age, by the exploding so generally Cal-
vinistic doctrines, that is so often spoken of as worthy to be greatly rejoiced in
by the friends of truth, learning and virtue, as an instance of the great increase of
light in the Christian church; I say, it may be worthy to be considered, whether
this be indeed a happy change, owing to any such cause as an increase of true
knowledge and understanding in things of religion; or whether there is not
reason to fear, that it may be owing to some worse cause.
And I desire it may >e considered, whether the boldness of some writers
may not be worthy to be reflected on, who have not scrupled to say, that if
these and those things are true (which yet appear to be the demonstrable dic-
tates of reason, as well as the certain dictates of the mouth of the Most High),
then God is unjust and cruel, and guilty of manifest deceit and double dealing,
and the like. Yea, some have gone so far, as confidently to assert, that if any
book which pretends to be Scripture, teaches such doctrines, that alone is suffi-
cient warrant for mankind to reject it, as what cannot be the word of God. —
Some, who have not gone so far, have said, that if the Scripture seems to teach
any such doctrines, so contrary to reason, we are obliged to find out some other
interpretation of those texts, where such doctrines seem to be exhibited. Others
express themselves yet more modestly : they express a tenderness and religious
fear, lest they should receive and teach any thing that should seem to reflect on
God's moral character, or be a disparagement to his methods of administration,
in his moral government ; and therefore express themselves as not daring to
embrace some doctrines, though they seem to be delivered in Scripture, accord-
ing to the more obvious and natural construction of the words. But indeed it
would show a truer modesty and humility, if they would more entirely rely on
God's wisdom and discerning, who knows infinitely better than we, what it
agreeable to his own perfections, and never intended to leave these matters to
the decision of the wisdom and discerning of men ; but by his own unerring
instruction, to determine for us what the truth is ; knowing how little our judg-
ment is to be depended on, and how extremely prone vain and blind men are
to err in such matters.
The truth of the case is, that if the Scripture plainly taught the opposite
doctrines, to those that are so much stumbled at, viz., the Arminian doctrine
of free Will, and others depending thereon, it would be the greatest of all diffi-
culties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its containing any,
182 CONCLUSION.
even the most mysterious of those doctrines of the first reformers, which our late
free-thinkers have so superciliously exploded. — Indeed, it is a glorious argu-
ment of the divinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach such doctrines, which
in one age and another, through the blindness of men's minds, and strong pre-
judices of their hearts, are rejected, as most absurd and unreasonable, by the
wise and great men of the world ; which yet, when they are most carefully
and strictly examined, appear to be exactly agreeable to the most demonstra-
ble, certain and natural dictates of reason. By such things it appears, that the
foolishness of God is wiser than men, and God does as is said in 1 Cor. i. 19, 20 :
" For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise ; I will bring to no-
thing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise ? Where is the
scribe ? Where is the disputer of this world ? Hath not God made foolish the
wisdom of this world ?" And as it used to be in time past, so it is probable, it
will be in time to come, as it is there written, in verses 27, 28, 29 : " But God
hath chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise ; and God
hath chosen the weak things of the world, to confound the things that are
mighty ; and base things of the world, the things which are despised, hath God
chosen : yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are ; that
no flesh should glory in his presence." Amen.
REMARKS
on the essays on the principles of morality and natural religion, in a letter
to a minister of the church of scotland.
Reverend Sir :
The intimations you have given me of the use which has, by some, been
made of what I have written on the Freedom of the Will, &c., to vindicate what
is said on the subject of liberty and necessity, by the author of the Essays on the
Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, has occasioned my reading tv;s
author's essay on that subject, with particular care and attention. And I think
it must be evident to every one, that has read both his Essay and my Inquiry,
that our schemes are exceeding reverse from each other. The wide difference
appears particularly in the following things.
This author supposes, that such a necessity takes place with respect to all
men's actions, as is inconsistent with liberty,* and plainly denies that men have
any liberty in acting. Thus in p. 168, after he had been speaking of the
necessity of our determinations, as connected with motives, he concludes with
saying, " In short, if inotives are not under our power or direction, which is
confessedly the fact, we can at bottom have no liberty." Whereas, I
have abundantly expressed it as my mind, that man, in his moral actions, has
true liberty ; and that the moral necessity, which universally takes place, is not
in the least inconsistent with any thing that is properly called liberty, and with the
utmost liberty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or be conceived of.f
I find that some are apt to think, that in that kind of moral necessity of men's
volitions, which I suppose to be universal, at least some degree of liberty is
denied ; that though it be true I allow a sort of liberty, yet those who maintain
a self-determining power in the Will, and a liberty of contingence and indiffer-
ence, hold a higher sort of freedom than I do ; but I think this is certainly a
great mistake.
Liberty, as I have explained it, in p. 17, and other places, is the power,
opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases, or conducting in
any respect, according to his pleasure; without considering how his pleasure
comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable, and, I think, has been demonstrated,
that no necessity of men's volitions that I maintain, is inconsistent with this
liberty ; and I think it is impossible for any one to rise higher in his conceptions
of liberty than this : if any imagine they desire higher, and that they conceive of
a higher and greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude themselves
with confused ambiguous words, instead of ideas. If any one should here say,
" Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of con-
ducting in any respect as he pleases, viz., a liberty of choosing as he pleases."
Such a one, if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own instance.
For, is not choosing as he pleases, conducting, in some respect, according to his
pleasure, and still without determining how he came by that pleasure ? If he
• P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.
i Inquiry, p. 17—20. 100, 101. 151—156, 163, 167, 177, 178-182.
184 REMARKS.
says, " Yes, I came by that pleasure by my own choioe." If he be a man of
common sense, by this time he will see his own absurdity ; for he must needs
see that his notion or conception, even of this liberty, does not contain any
judgment or conception, how he comes by that choice, which first determines
his pleasure, or which originally fixed his own will respecting the affair. Or if
any shall say, " That a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his
own choice, but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any choice, prefer-
ence, or inclination of his own, but by a determination arising contingently out
of a state of absolute indifference ;" this is not rising higher in his conception
of liberty ; as such a determination of the Will would not be a voluntary deter-
mination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of doing something not
according to his own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion of it, than
he that places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If there
were a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its choice or according
to its pleasure, what advantage would it give 1 And what liberty, worth con-
lending for, would be exercised in it ? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or
Epicurean, can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty, than the notion of it
which I have explained : which notion is apparently, perfectly consistent with
the whole of that necessity of men's actions, which I suppose takes place. And
I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form
a higher imagination of liberty ; let them talk of sovereignty of the Will, self-
•determining power, self-motion, self-direction, arbitrary decision, liberty ad
utrumvis, power of choosing differently in given cases, &c. &c, as long as they
will. It is apparent that these men, in their strenuous affirmation and dispute
about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something they have
no conception of, substituting a number of confused, unmeaning words, instead
of things, and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain
what they would have : they never can answer the challenge.
The author of the Essays, through his whole Essay on Liberty and Necessity,
goes on the supposition, that, in order to the being of real liberty, a man must
have a freedom that is opposed to moral necessity; and yet he supposes, p. 175,
that " such a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting without and
against motives, a power of acting without any view, purpose or design, and
even of acting in contradiction to our own desires and aversions, and to all our
principles of action ; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational
nature. Now, who ever imagined such a liberty as this, a higher sort or degree
of freedom, than a liberty of following one's own views and purposes, and
acting agreeable to his own inclinations and passions '! Who will ever reason-
ably suppose that liberty, which is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a
rational nature, to be a kind of liberty above that which is consistent with the
nature of a rational, intelligent, designing agent ?
The author of the Essays seems to suppose such a necessity to take place, as
is inconsistent with some supposable power of arbitrary choice ;* or that there is
some liberty conceivable, whereby men's own actions might be more properly
in their power, -f and by which events might be more dependent on ourselves ; %
contrary to what I suppose to be evident in my Inquiry.^ What way can be
imagined, of our actions being more m our power, from ourselves, or dependent
on ourselves, than their being from our power to fulfil our own choice, to act
from our own inclination, pursue our own views, and execute our own designs ?
Certainly, to be able to act thus, is as properly having our actions in our power,
*■ P. 169. f P. 191, 195, 197, 206. t P. 183. $ P. 181, 182.
I
REMARKS. 185
and dependent on ourselves, as a being liable to be the subjects of acts and
events, contingently and fortuitously, without desire, view, purpose or design, or
any principle of action within ourselves ; as we must be according to this author's
own declared sense, if our actions are performed with that liberty that is opposed
to moral necessity.
This author seems everywhere to suppose, that necessity, most properly so
called, attends all men's actions ; and that the terms necessary, unavoidable, im-
ossible, &c, are equally applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity.
n p. 173, he says, " The idea of necessary and unavoidable, equally agrees,
both to moral and physical necessity." And in p. 184, " All things that fall
out in the natural and moral world are alike necessary." P. 174, " This inclina-
tion and choice is unavoidably caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In
this lies the necessity of our actions, that, in such circumstances, it was impossible
we could act otherwise." He often expresses himself in like manner elsewhere,
speaking in strong terms of men's actions as unavoidable, what they cannot
forbear, having no power over their own actions, the order of them being un-
alterably fixed and inseparably linked together, &c*
On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connection between an-
tecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts
of men's Wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of neces-
sity improperly ; and that all such terms as must, cannot, impossible, unable, ir-
resistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c, when applied here, are not applied in their
proper signification, and are either used nonsensically, and with perfect insignifi-
cance, or in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning, and
their use in common speech ; and, that such a necessity as attends the acts of
men's Wills, is more properly called certainty, than necessity ; it being no other
than the certain connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition
which affirms their existence.
Agreeably to what is observed in my Inquiry, I think it is evidently owing
to a strong prejudice in persons' minds, arising from an insensible, habitual
perversion and misapplication of such like terms as necessary, impossible,
unable, unavoidable, invincible, &c, that they are ready to think, that to suppose
a certain connection of men's volitions, without any foregoing motives or incli-
nations, or any preceding moral influence whatsoever, is truly and properly to
suppose such a strong, irrefragable chain of causes and effects, as stands in the
way of, and makes utterly vain, opposite desires and endeavors, like immovable
and impenetrable mountains of brass ; and impedes our liberty like walls of
adamant, gates of brass, and bars of iron : whereas, all such representations
suggest ideas as far from the truth, as the east is from the west. Nothing that I
maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from
doing, and even willing and choosing as they please, with full freedom ; yea,
with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could
possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to
endeavor to make some persons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to
believe it ; for if it be demonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains,
which has been long fixed by the use of the terms necessary, must, cannot, im-
possible, &c. ; the association with these terms of certain ideas, inconsistent with
liberty, is not broken ; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it , as a thing
that has been long bent and grown stiff*, if it be straightened, will return to
its former curvity again and again.
• P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 399, 205, 206.
Vol. II. 24
186 x REMARKS.
The author of the Essays most manifestly supposes that if men had the
truth concerning the real necessity of all their actions clearly in view, they
would not appear to themselves, or one another, as at all praiseworthy or cul-
pable, or under any moral obligation, or accountable for their actions ;* which
supposes, that men are not to be blamed or praised for any of their actions, and
are not under any obligations, nor are truly accountable for any thing they do,
by reason of this necessity ; which is very contrary to what I have endeavored
to prove, throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I humbly conceive it is
there shown, that this is so far from the truth, that the moral necessity of men's
actions7, which truly take place, is requisite to the being of virtue and vice, or
any thing praiseworthy or culpable : that the liberty of indifference and contin-
gence, which is advanced in opposition to that necessity, is inconsistent with the
being of these ; as it would suppose that men are not determined in what they
do, by any virtuous or vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions
or aims whatsoever ; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting. And is it
not remarkable, that this author should suppose, that, in order to men's actions
truly having any desert, they must be performed without any view, purpose,
design, or desire, or any principle of action, or any thing agreeable to a rational
nature ? As it will appear that he does, if we compare p, 206, 207, with p. 175.
The author of the Essays supposes, that God has deeply implanted in man's
nature, a strong and invincible apprehension or feeling, as he calls it, of a lib-
erty and contingence, of his own actions, opposite to that necessity which truly
attends them ; and which in truth does not agree with real fact,f is not agreea-
ble to strict, philosophic truth,J is contradictory to the truth of things,§ and
which truth contradicts,|| not tallying with the real plan ;( and that therefore
such feelings are deceitful,** are in reality of the delusive kind.j+ He speaks
of them as a wise delusion,JJ as nice, artificial feelings, merely that conscience
may have a commanding power ;§§ meaning plainly, that these feelings are a
cunning artifice of the Author of Nature, to make men believe they are free,
when they are not.|||| He supposes that, by these feelings, the moral world has
a disguised appearance.U1T And other things of this kind he says. He sup-
poses that all self-approbation, and all remorse of conscience, all commendation
or condemnation of ourselves or others, all sense of desert, and all that is con-
nected with this way of thinking, all the ideas which at present are suggested
by the words ought, should, arise from this delusion, and would entirely vanish
without it.*f
All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly insisted on and endeavor-
ed to demonstrate in my Inquiry, where I have largely shown that it is agreeable
to the natural sense of mankind, that the moral necessity or certainty that
attends men's actions, is consistent with praise and blame, reward, and punish-
ment ;*% and that it is agreeable to our natural notions, that moral evil, with
its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill-deservings, consists in a
certain deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart, and not
in the evil of something else, diverse from these, supposed to be their cause or
occasion.*^
I might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in the world of man-
kind, who is conscious to a sense or feeling, naturally and deeply rooted in kii
mind, that in order to a man's performing any action that is praise or blame
* P. 207, 209, and otherplaces. t P. 200. *P.152. § P. 183. IIP. 186. 1TP.20{
•• P. 203, 204, 211. ft P. 183.» P. 209. §§ P. 211. Illl P. 153. TNT 214. *t P. 160, i94
199, 205, 206, 209. *t Inquiry, Part IV. Sect. 4, throughout. *§ Idem, Bart IV. S«rt 1
throughout, and p. 174, 175.
REMARKS. ' 187
worthy, he must exercise a liberty that implies and signifies a power of acting
without any motive, view, design, desire or principle of action ? For such a
liberty, this author supposes that must be which is opposed to moral necessity,
as I have already observed once and again. Supposing a man should actually
do good, independent of desire, aim, inducement, principle or end, is it a dictate
of invincible, natural sense, that his act is more meritorious or praiseworthy,
than if he had performed it for some good end, and had been governed in it by
good principles and motives ? And so I might ask on the contrary, with respect
to evil actions.*
The author of the Essays supposes that the liberty without necessity, which
we have a natural feeling of, implies contingence ; and speaking of this contin-
gence, he sometimes calls it by the name of chance. And it is evident that his
notion of it, or rather what he says about it, implies things happening loosely,
fortuitously, by accident, and without a cause* Now I conceive the slightest re-
flection may be sufficient to satisfy any one that such a contingence of men's
actions, according to our natural sense, is so far from being essential to the moral-
ity or merit of those actions, that it would destroy it ; and that, on the contrary,
the dependence of our actions on such causes as inward inclinations, incitements
and ends, is essential to the being of it. Natural sense teaches men, when they
see any thing done by others of a good or evil tendency, to inquire what their
intention was ; what principles and views they were moved by, in order to
judge how far they are to be justified or condemned ; and not to determine, that
in order to their being approved or blamed at all, the action must be performed
altogether fortuitously, proceeding from nothing, arising from no cause. Con-
cerning this matter I have fully expressed my mind in the Inquiry.
If the liberty which we have a natural sense of as necessary to desert,
consists in the mind's self-determination, without being determined by previous
inclination or motive, then indifference is essential to it, yea, absolute indifference,
as is observed in my Inquiry. But men naturally have no notion of any such
liberty as this, as essential to the morality, or demerit of their actions ; but, on
the contrary, such a liberty, if it were possible, would be inconsistent with our
natural notions of desert, as is largely shown in the Inquiry. If it be agreeable
to natural sense, that men must be indifferent in determining their own actions,
then, according to the same, the more they are determined by inclination,
either good or bad, the less they have of desert. The more good actions
are performed from good dispositions, the less praiseworthy ; and the more evil
deeds are from evil dispositions, the less culpable ; and in general, the more
men's actions are from their hearts, the less they are to be commended or con-
demned ; which all must know is very contrary to natural sense.
Moral necessity is owing to the power and government of the inclination of
the heart, either habitual or occasional, excited by motive ; but according to nat-
ural and common sense, the more a man does any thing with full inclination of
heart, the more is it to be charged to his account for his condemnation if it be
an ill action, and the more to be ascribed to him for his praise, if t be good.
If the mind were determined to evil actions by contingence, from a state of
indifference, then either there would be no fault in them, or else the fault would
be in being so perfectly indifferent, that the mind was equally liable to a bad
or good determination. And if this influence be liberty, then the very essence
of the blame or fault would lie in the liberty itself, or the wickedness would,
primarily and summarily, lie in being a free agent If there were no fault in
• See this matter illustrated in my Inquiry, Part IV. Sect. 4. t P. 156—159, 177, 178, 181, 183—185.
188 REMARKS.
being indifferent, then there would be no fault in the determination's being
agreeable to such a state of indifference ; that is, there could no fault be rea-
sonably found with this, viz., that opposite determinations actually happen to
take place indifferently sometimes good and sometimes bad, as contingence
governs and decides. And if it be a fault to be indifferent to good and evil,
then such indifference is no indifference to good and evil,. but is a determination
to evil, or to a fault ; and such an indifferent disposition would be an evil, faulty
disposition, tendency or determination of mind. So inconsistent are these no-
tions of liberty, as essential to praise or blame.
The author of the Essays supposes men's natural, delusive sense of a liberty
of contingence, to be in truth, the foundation of all the labor, care and industry of
mankind ;* and that if men's practical ideas had been formed on the plan of
universal necessity, the ignava ratio, the inactive doctrine of the Stoics, would
have folloujed ; and that there would have been no room for forethought about
futurity, or any sort of industry and care ;f plainly implying, that in this case
men would see and know that all their industry and care signified nothing, was
in vain and to no ^purpose, or of no benefit ; events being fixed in an irrefraga-
ble chain, and not at all depending on their care and endeavor ; as he explains
himself, particularly m the instance of men's use of means to prolong life ;{
not only very contrary to what I largely maintain in my Inquiry, but also very
inconsistently with his own scheme, in what he supposes of the ends for which
God has so deeply implanted this deceitful feeling in man's nature ; in which
he manifestly supposes men's care and industry not to be in vain and of no ben-
efit, but of great use, yea, of absolute necessity, in order to the obtaining the
most important ends and necessary purposes of human life, and to fulfil the ends
of action to the best advantage, as he largely declares.^ Now, how shall these
things be reconciled ? That if men had a clear view of real truth, they would
see that there was no room for their care and industry, because they would see
it to be in vain, and of no benefit ; and yet that God, by having a clear view of
real truth, sees that their being excited to care and industry, will be of excel-
lent use to mankind, and greatly for the benefit of the world, yea, absolutely
necessary in order to it ; and that therefore the great wisdom and goodness oi
God to men appears, in artfully contriving to put them on care and industry
for their good, which good could not be obtained without them ; and yet both
these things are maintained at once, and in the same sentences and words by
this author. The very reason he gives, why God has put this deceitful feeling
into men, contradicts and destroys itself. That God in his great goodness to
men gave them such a deceitful feeling, because it was very useful and neces-
sary for them, and greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care and industry
for their own good, which care and industry is useful and necessary to that end ;
and yet the very thing that this great benefit of care and industry is given as a
reason for, is God's deceiving men in this very point, in making them think
their care and industry to be of great benefit to them, when indeed it is of none
at all ; and if they saw the real truth, they would see all their endeavors to be
wholly useless, that there was no room for them, and that the event does not at
all depend upon them.H
And besides, what this author says plainly implies (as appears by what has
been already observed), that it is necessary men should be deceived, by being
made to believe that future events are contingent, and their own future actions
free, with such a freedom, as signifies that their actions are not the fruit of their
* P. 184. 1 P. 189. t P. 184. 185. § P. 188—192, and in many other places. IT *> 188, 189, &<x
REMARKS. 189
own desires or designs, but altogether contingent, fortuitous, and without a
cause. But how should a notion of liberty, consisting in accident or loose
chance, encourage care and industry 1 I should think it would rather entirely
discourage every thing of this nature. For surely, if our actions do not depend
on our desires and designs, then they do not depend on our endeavors, flowing
from our desires and designs. This autnor himself seems to suppose, that if
men had, indeed, such a liberty of contingence, it would render all endeavors
to determine or move men's future volitions vain ; he says, that in this case to
exhort, to instruct, to promise, or to threaten, would be to no purpose. Why 1
Because (as he himself gives the reason), then our Will would be capricious and
arbitrary, and we should be thrown loose altogether, and our arbitrary power
could do us good or ill only by accident. But if such a loose, fortuitous state
would render vain other endeavors upon us, for the same reason would it make
useless our endeavors on ourselves ; for events that are truly contingent and
accidental, and altogether loose from, and independent of, all foregoing causes,
are independent on every foregoing cause within ourselves, as well as in others.
I suppose that it is so far from being true, that our minds are naturally pos-
sessed with a notion of such liberty as this, so strongly that it is impossible to
root it out ; that indeed men have no such notion of liberty at all, and that it is
utterly impossible, by any means whatsoever, to implant or introduce such a
notion into the mind. As no such notions as imply self-contradiction and self-
abolition can subsisj in the mind, as I have shown in my Inquiry, I think a ma-
ture, sensible consideration of the matter, sufficient to satisfy any one, that even
the greatest and most learned advocates themselves for liberty of indifference
and self-determination, have no such notion ; and that indeed they mean some-
thing wholly inconsistent with, and directly subversive of, what they strenuous-
ly affirm, and earnestly contend for. By man's having a power of determining
his own Will, they plainly mean a power of determining his Will, as he pleases,
or as he chooses ; which supposes that the mind has a choice, prior to its going
about to confirm any action or determination to it. And if they mean that they
determine even the original or prime choice, by their own pleasure or choice, as
the thing that causes and directs it ; I scruple not most boldly to affirm, that
they speak they know not what, and that of which they have no manner of
idea, because no such contradictory notion can come into, or have a moment's
subsistence in the mind of any man living, as an original or first choice being
caused, or brought into being, by choice. After all, they say they have no
higher or other conception of liberty, than that vulgar notion of it, which I con-
tend for, viz., a man's having power or opportunity to do as he chooses ; or if
they had a notion that every act of choice was determined by choice, yet it
would destroy their notion of the contingence of choice ; for then no one act of
choice would arise contingently, or from a state of indifference, but every indi-
vidual act, in all the series, would arise from foregoing bias or preference, and
from a cause predetermining and fixing its existence, which introduces at once
such a chain of causes and effects, each preceding link decisively fixing the fol-
lowing, as they would by all means avoid.
And such kind of delusion and self-contradiction as this, does not arise in
men's minds by nature ; it is not owing to any natural feeling which God has
strongly fixed in the mind and nature of man ; but to false philosophy, and
strong prejudice, from a deceitful abuse of words. It is artificial, not in the
sense of the author of the Essays, supposing it to be a deceitful artifice of God ;
but artificial as opposed to natural, and as owing to an artificial, deceitful man-
agement of terms, to darken and confound the mind. Men have no such
190 REMARKS.
thing when they first begin to exercise reason ; but must have a great deal of
time to blind themselves, with metaphysical confusion, before they can embrace,
and rest in such definitions of liberty as are given, and imagine they understand
them.
Qn the whole, I humbly conceive, that whosoever will give himself the
trouble of weighing what I have offered to consideration in my Inquiry, must be
sensible, that such a moral necessity of men's actions as I maintain, is not at all
inconsistent with any liberty that any creature has, or can have, as a free, ac-
countable, moral agent, and subject of moral government ; and that this moral
necessity is so far from being inconsistent with praise and blame, and the bene
fit and use of men's own care and labor, that, on the contrary, it implies the
very ground and reason, why men's actions are to be ascribed to them as their
own, in that manner as to infer desert, praise and blame, approbation and re-
morse of conscience, reward and punishment ; and that it establishes the moral
system of the universe, and God's moral government, in every respect, with
the proper use of motives, exhortations, commands, counsels, promises, and
threatenings ; and the use and benefit of endeavors, care and industry ; and
that therefore there is no need that the strict philosophic truth should be at all
concealed from men ; no danger in contemplation and profound discovery in
these things. So far from this, that the truth in this matter is of vast impor-
tance, and extremely needful to be known ; and that the more clearly and per-
fectly the real fact is known, and the more constantly it is in* view, the better ;
and particularly, that the clear and full knowledge of that, which is the true
system of the universe, in these respects, would greatly establish the doctrines
which teach the true Christian scheme of Divine Administration in the city of
God, and the gospel of Jesus Christ, in its most important articles ; and that
these things never can be well established, and the opposite errors, so subver-
sive of the whole gospel, which at this day so greatly and generally prevail, be
well confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained, answered, till
these points are settled. While this is not done, it is, to me, beyond doubt, that
the friends of those great gospel truths will but poorly maintain their controver-
sy with the adversaries of those truths. They will be obliged often to dodge,
shuffle, hide, and turn their backs : and the latter will have a strong fort, from
whence they never can be driven, and weapons to use, which those whom they
oppose will find no shield to screen themselves from ; and they will always
puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends of sound doctrine, and glory and
vaunt themselves in their advantage over them ; and carry their affairs with a
high hand, as they have done already for a long time past. i
I conclude, sir, with asking your pardon for troubling you with so much said
in vindication of myself from the imputation of advancing a scheme of necessi-
ty, of a like nature with that of the author of the Essays on the Principles of
Morality and Natural Religion. Considering that what I have said is not only
in vindication of myself, but, as I think, of the most important articles of moral
philosophy and religion ; I trust in what I know of your candor, that you will
excuse,
Your' obliged friend and brother,
JONATHAN EDWARDS.
Stockbridge, July 25, 1757.
DISSERTATION
CONCERNING
THE END FOR WHICH GOD CREATED THE WORLD.
DISSERTATION
CONCERNING THE END FOR WHICH GOD CREATED THE
WORLD.
INTRODUCTION.
CONTAINING EXPLANATIONS OF TERMS, AND GENERAL POSITIONS.
To avoid all confusion in our inquiries and reasonings, concerning the end
for which God created the world, a distinction should be observed between the
chief end for which an agent or efficient exerts any act and performs any work,
and the ultimate end. These two phrases are not always precisely of the same
signification : and though the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every
ultimate end is not always a chief end.
A chief end is opposite to an inferior end : an ultimate end is opposite to a
subordinate end. A subordinate end is something that an agent seeks and aims
at in what he does ; but yet does not seek it, or regard it at all upon its own
account, but wholly on the account of a further end, or in order to some other
thing, which it is considered as a means of. Thus, when a man that goes a
journey to obtain a medicine to cure him of some disease, and restore his health,
the obtaining that medicine is his subordinate end ; because it is not an end
that he seeks for itself, or values at all upon its own account, but wholly as
a means of a further end, viz., his health. Separate the medicine from that
further end, and it is esteemed good for nothiug ; nor is it at all desired.
An ultimate end is that which the agent seeks in what he does, for its own
sake : that he has respect to, as what he loves, values and takes pleasure in on
its own account, and not merely as a means of a further end. As when a man
loves the taste of some particular sort of fruit, and is at pains and cost to ob-
tain it, for the sake of the pleasure of that taste, which he values upon its own
account, as he loves his own pleasure ; and not merely for the sake of any
other good, which he supposes his enjoying that pleasure will be the means of.
Some ends are subordinate ends, not only as they are subordinated to an
ultimate end, but also to another end that is itself but a subordinate end : yea,
there may be a succession or chain of many subordinate ends, one dependent
on another — one sought for another : the first for the next, and that for the
sake of the next to that, and so on in a long series before you come to any
thing, that the agent aims at and seeks for its own sake : as when a man sells
a garment to get money — to buy tools — to till his land — to obtain a crop — to
supply him with food — to gratify the appetite. And he seeks to gratify his
appetite, on its own account, as what is grateful in itself. Here the end of his
selling his garment, is to get money ; but getting money is only a subordinate
end : it is not only subordinate to the last end, his gratifying his appetite ; but
to a nearer end, viz., his buying husbandry tools ; and bis obtaining these, is
194 END IN CREATION.
only a subordinate end, being only for the sake of tilling land ; and the tillage
of land is an end not sought on its own account, but for the sake of the crop to
be produced ; and the crop produced is not an ultimate end, or an end sought
for itself, but only for the sake of making bread ; and the having bread, is not
sought on its own account, but for the sake of gratifying the appetite.
Here the gratifying the appetite, is called the ultimate end ; because it is
the last in the chain, where a man's aim and pursuit stops and rests, obtaining
iu that, the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which
his desire terminates and rests, it being something valued on its own account,
then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or shorter ; yea, if
there be but one link or one step that he takes before he comes to this end.
As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the sake of the
pleasure of the taste, without aiming ast any thing further. So that an end
which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate and his ultimate end ;
his next and his last end. That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and
not for :he sake of a further end, is an ultimate end ; it is ultimate or last, as
it has no other beyond it, for whose sake it is, it being for the sake of itself :
so that here the aim of the agent stops and rests (without going further), being
come to the good which he esteems a recompense of its pursuit for its own
value.
Here it is to be noted that a thing sought, may have the nature of an ultimate,
and also of a subordinate end ; as it may be sought partly on its own account,
and partly for the sake of a further end. Thus a man in what he does, may
seek the love and respect of a particular person, partly on its own account, be-
cause it is in itself agreeable to men to be the objects of others' esteem and love :
and partly, because he hopes, through the friendship of that person to have his
assistance in other affairs ; and so to be put under advantage for the obtaining
further ends.
A chief end or highest end, which is opposite not properly to a subordi-
nate end, but to an inferior end, is something diverse from an ultimate end. The
chief end is an end that is most valued ; and therefore most sought after by the
agent in what he does. It is evident, that to be an end more valued than another
end, is not exactly the same thing as to be an end valued ultimately, or for its
own sake. This will appear, if it be considered,
1. That two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief
ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the
same work or acts, and yet one valued more highly and sought more than
another : thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoy-
ments, both which may be agreeable to him in themselves considered, and so
both may be what he values on their own account and seeks for their own sake ;
and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other ; and so be what he
sets his heart chiefly upon, and seeks most after in his going a journey. Thus
a man may go a journey partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride
that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a teles-
cope, or some new invented and extraordinary optic glass : both may be ends
he seeks in his journey, and the one not properly subordinate or in order to an-
other. One may not depend on another, and therefore both may be ultimate
ends ; but yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the
benefit of the optic glass, his inferior end. The former may be what he sets his
heart vastly most upon, and so be properly the chief end of his journey.
2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, because some subordinate
ends may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends. Thus for
END IN CREATION. 195
instance, a man may aim at these two things in his going a journey ; one may
be to visit his friends, and another to receive a great estate, or a large sum of
money that lies ready for him at the place to which he is going. The latter,
viz., his receiving the sum of money, may be but a subordinate end : he may not
value the silver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleasure, grati-
fication, and honor ; that is the ultimate end, and not the money, which is valued
only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be
what is more valued, and so a higher end of his journey, than the pleasure of
seeing his friends ; though the latter is what is valued on its own account, and
to is an ultimate end.
But here several things may be noted :
First. That when it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued
th?n some ultimate ends, it is not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more
valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is subordinate ; because a sub-
ordinate end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end : for that
reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is valued and sought, not for its
own sake, or its own value, but only in subordination to a further end, or for the
sake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a subordinate end may
be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to, but
is independent of it, and does not belong to that series, or chain of ends. Thus
for instance : if a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as
an ultimate end, or because he has any value for the silver and gold for their own
sake, but only for the value of the pleasure and honor that the money may be a
means of. In this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz., his having
the money, should be more valued by him than the pleasure and honor for which
he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than
the end, when he has no value for the means but for the sake of the end, of which
it is the means : but yet he may value the money, though but a subordinate end,
more than some other ultimate end, to which it is not subordinate, and with
which it has no connection. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly
visit ; which was one end of his journey.
Secondly. Not only is a subordinate end never superior to that ultimate end,
to which it is subordinate; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but)
superior to its subordinate end, and more valued by the agent ; unless it be
when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate : so that he has no
other means by which to obtain his last end, and also is looked upon as certain-
ly connected with it — then the subordinate end may be as much valued as the
last end ; because the last end, in such a case, does altogether depend upon,
and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant
woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in
the garden of a particular friend of hers, at a distance ; and she goes a journey
to go to her friend's house or garden, to obtain that fruit — the ultimate end of
her journey, is to gratify that strong appetite : the obtaining that fruit, is the
subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified
by no other means than the obtaining that fruit ; and that it will certainly be
gratified if she obtains it, then she will value the fruit as much as she values the
gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so : if she be doubt-
ful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not value it equally
with the gratification of her appetite itself ; or if there be some other fruit that
she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part ; which she can ob-
tain without such inconvenience or trouble as shall countervail the gratification ;
which is in effect frustrating her of her last end, because her last end is the
196 END IN CREATION.
pleasure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that shall countervail, and
in effect destroy it Or if it be so, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this
fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it-
then her value for her last end will be divided between these several ingredient*
as so many subordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the last end
Hence it rarely happens among mankind, that a subordinate end is equally
valued with its last end ; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on
one single uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means :
therefore, men's last ends are commonly their highest ends.
Thirdly. If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and
there be a great variety of operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as
his supreme end : for in such a case, every other end but that one, is an end to
that end ; and therefore no other end can be superior to it. Because, as was
observed before, a subordinate end is never more valued, than the end to which
it is subordinate.
Moreover, the subordinate effects, events, or things brought to pass, which
iJl are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards the ob-
taining the one last end, are very various ; and therefore, by what has been
now observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued, more than any one of the
particular means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may
more fully appear in the sequel.
From what has been said, to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the
following things may be observed concerning ultimate ends in the sense explained.
Fourthly. Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which
he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination
of nature ; and is agreeable to him in itself, and not merely for the sake of
something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same may be
said, of avoiding of that which is in itself painful or disagreeable : for the avoid-
ing of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing
in mind the meaning of the terms. By last end being meant, that which is
regarded and sought by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its own sake;
* subordinate that which is sought only for the sake of something else.
Fifthly. From hence it will follow, that if an agent in his works has in view
more things than one that will be brought to pass by what he does, that are
agreeable to him, considered in themselves, or what he loves and delights in on
their own account — then he must have more things than one that he regards as
his last ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent seeks,
as the consequence of what he does that is agreeable to him, on its own account,
then there can be but one last end which he has in all his actions and operations.
But only here a distinction must be observed of things which may be
said to be agreeable to an agent, in themselves considered, in two senses. (1.)
What is in itself grateful to an agent, and valued and loved on its own account,
simply and absolutely considered, and is so universally and originally, antece-
dent to, and independent of all conditions, or any supposition of particular cases
and circumstances. And (2.) What may be said to be in itself agreeable to
an agent, hypothetically and consequentially : or, on supposition or condition
of such and such circumstances, or on the happening of such a particular case.
Thus, for instance : a man may originally love society. An inclination to so-
ciety may be implanted in his very nature : and society may be agreeable to
him antecedent to all presupposed cases and circumstances : and this may cause
him to seek a family. And the comfort of society may be originally his last
end, in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order and
END IN CREATION. 197
mutual justice and friendship in his family, may be agreeable to him, and what
he delights in for their sake ; and therefore these things may be his last end in
many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they
were not his original end with respect to his family. The justice and peace of
a family, was not properly his last end before he had a family, that induced
him to seek a family, but consequentially. Arid the case being pat of his hav-
ing a family, then these things wherein the good order and beauty of a family
consist, become his last end in many things he does in such circumstances. In
like manner we must suppose that God, before he created the world, had some
good in view, as a consequence of the world's existence, that was originally
agreeable to him in itself considered, that inclined him to create the world, or
bring the universe, with various intelligent creatures, into existence in such a
manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and such and such
intelligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances,
then a wise, just regulation of them was agreeable to God, in itself considered.
And God's love of justice, and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a
case to induce God to deal justly with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice
in him towards them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing, that God's
love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what
originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings ; and
so to order the occasion of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's
nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary disagreeable, as there
is occasion, the subject being supposed, and the occasion given : but we must
suppose something else that should incline him to create the subjects or order
the occasion.
So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination
to fulfil his promises to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to
create the world ; nor could such a fulfilment of his promises to his creatures,
be his last end, in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is crea-
ted, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himself by promise
to them, then that disposition which is called his faithfulness may move him in his
providential disposals towards them : and this may be the end of many of God's
works of providence, even the exercise of his faithfulness in fulfilling his promises;
and may be in the lower sense his last end. Because faithfulness and truth must be
supposed to be "what is in itself amiable to God, and what he delights in for
its own sake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence,
which are ultimate ends in a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the
creation.
So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends ; one of which may be
called an original, and independent ultimate end ; the other consequential and
dependent. For it is evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate
ends : because, though their being agreeable to the agent, or the agent's desire
of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and
occasion ; yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and
amiable in themselves. We may suppose, that to a righteous being, the doing
justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itself,
and is loved for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end :
and yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may
be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.
Therefore, I make a distinction between an end that in this manner is con-
sequential, and a subordinate end.
It may be observed, that when I speak of God's ultimate end in the creation
198 END IN CREATION.
of the world, in the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense,
viz., the original ultimate end.
Sixthly. It may be further observed, that the original ultimate end or ends
of the creation of the world is alone that which induces God to give the occa-
sion for consequential ends, by the first creation of the world, and the original
disposal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extensive and univer-
sal it is. That which God had primarily in view in creating, and the original
ordination of the world, must be constantly kept in view, and have a governing
influence in all God's works, or with respect to every thing that he does towards
his creatures. And therefore,
Seventhly. If we use the phrase ultimate end in this highest sense, then the
same that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we suppose but one
such end, must be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every
thing he does either in creation or providence. But we must suppose that in the
use, which God puts the creatures to that he hath made, he must evermore have
a regard to the end, for which he has made them. But if we take ultimate end
in the other lower sense, God may sometimes have regard to those things as ulti-
mate ends, in particular works of providence, which could not in any proper
sense be his last end in creating the world.
Eighthly. On the other hand, whatever appears to be God's ultimate end in
any sense, of his works of providence in general, that must be the ultimate end
of the work of creation itself. For though it be so that God may act for an end,
that is an ultimate end in a lower sense, in some of his works of providence,
which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world ; yet this doth not
take place with regard to the works of providence in general. But we may
justly look upon whatsoever has the nature of an ultimate end of God's works of
providence in general, that the same is also an ultimate end of the creation of the
world ; for God's works of providence in general, are the same with the general
use that he puts the world to that he has made. And we may well argue from
what we see of the general use which God makes of the world, to the general
end for which he designed the world. Though there may be some things that
are ends of particular works of providence, that were not the last end of the
creation, which are in themselves grateful to God in such particular emergent
cirumstances ; and so are last ends in an inferior sense ; yet this is only in cer-
tain cases, or particular occasions. But if they are last ends of God's proceed-
ings in the use of the world in general, this shows that his making them last
ends does not depend on particular cases and circumstances, but the nature of
things in general, and his general design in the being and constitution of the
universe.
Ninthly. If there be but one thing that is originally, and independent on any
future supposed cases, agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the
world, then there can be but one last end of God's work, in this highest sense :
but if there are various things, properly diverse one from another, that are, ab-
solutely and independently on the supposition of any future given cases, agreeable
to the divine Being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world,
then there were several ultimate ends of the creation, in that highest sense
CHAPTER I.
WHEREIN IS CONSIDERED, WHAT REASON TEACHES CONCERNING THIS AFFAIR.
SECTION I.
SOME THINGS OBSERVED IN GENERAL, WHICH REASON DICTATES.
Having observed these things, which are proper to be taken notice of, to prevent con-
fusion in discourses on this subject, 1 now proceed to consider what may, and whai
may not be supposed to be God's ultimate end in the creation of the world.
And in the first place, I would observe some things which reason seems to
dictate in this matter. Indeed, this affair seems properly to be an affair of
divine revelation. In order to be determined what was aimed at, or designed in
the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe which we behold, it becomes
us to attend to and rely on what he has told us, who was the architect that built
it. He best knows his own heart, and what his own ends and designs were in
the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be supposed that man-
kind, who, while destitute of revelation, by the utmost improvements of their
own reason, and advances in science and philosophy, could come to no clear and
established determination who the author of the world was, would ever have
obtained any tolerable settled judgment of the end which the author of it pro-
posed to himself in so vast, complicated and wonderful a work of his hands. And
though it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, which has
been in the world as a light shining in a dark place, has been the occasion of
great improvement of their faculties, has taught men how to use their reason :
(in which regard, notwithstanding the nobleness and excellency of the faculties
which God had given them, they seemed to be in themselves almost helpless :)
and though mankind now, through the long, continual assistance they have had
by this divine light, have come to attainments in the habitual exercise of reason,
which are far beyond what otherwise they would have arrived to ; yet I confess
it would be relying too much on reason, to determine the affair of God's last end
in the creation of the world, only by our own reason, or without being herein
principally guided by divine revelation, since God has given a revelation contain-
ing instructions concerning this matter. Nevertheless, as in the disputes and
wranglings which have been about this matter, those objections, which have
chiefly been made use of against what I think the Scriptures have truly revealed,
have been from the pretended^ dictates of reason — I would in the first place
soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed concern-
ing this affair ; and then proceed to consider what light divine revelation givea
us in it.
200 END IN CREATION.
As to the first of these, viz., what seems in itself rational to be supposed con-
cerning this matter, I think the following things appear to be the dictates oi
reason :
1. That no notion of God's last end in the creation of the world is agreea-
ble to reason, which would truly imply or infer any indigence, insufficiency and
mutability in God ; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any
part of his perfection or happiness. Because it is evident, by both Scripture and
reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious
and happy ; that he stands in no need of, cannot be profited by, or receive any
thing from the creature ; or be truly hurt, or be the subject of any sufferings, or im-
pair of his glory and felicity from any other being. I need not stand to produce
the proofs of God's being such a one, it being so universally allowed and main-
tained by such as call themselves Christians. The notion of God's creating the
world in order to receive any thing properly from the creature, is not only con-
trary to the nature of God, but inconsistent with the notion of creation j which
implies a being's receiving its existence, and all that belongs to its being, out
of nothing. And this implies the most perfect, absolute, and universal deriva-
tion and dependence. Now, if the creature receives its all from God entirely
and perfectly, how is it possible that it should have any thing to add to God, to
make him in any respect more than he was before, and so the Creator become
dependent on the creature ?
2. Whatsoever is good and valuable in itself, is worthy that God should
value for itself, and on its own account ; or which is the same thing, value it
with an ultimate value or respect. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately
sought by God, or made the last end of his action and operation, if it be a thing
of such a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine opera-
tion. For it may be supposed that some things, which are valuable and excel-
lent in themselves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine ope-
ration ; because they do not remain to be attained ; but their existence in all
possible respects, must be conceived of prior to any divine operation. Thus
God's existence and infinite perfection, though infinitely valuable in themselves,
and infinitely valued by God, yet cannot be supposed to be the end of any
divine operation. For we cannot conceive of them as in any respect conse-
quent on any works of God : but whatever is in itself valuable, absolutely so,
and that is capable of being sought and attained, is worthy to be made a last
end of the divine operation. Therefore.
3. Whatever that be which is in itself most valuable, and was so originally,
prior to the creation of the world, and which is attainable by the creation, if
there be any thing which was superior in value to all others, that must be
worthy to be God's last end in the creation ; and also worthy to be his highest
end. In consequence of this, it will follow,
4. That if God himself be in any respect properly capable of being his own
end in the creation of the world, then it is reasonable to suppose that he had
respect to himself as his last and highest end in this work ; because he is worthy
in himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and best of beings. All things
else, with regard to worthiness, importance and excellence, are perfectly as
nothing in comparison of him. And, therefore, if God esteems, values, and has
respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily
have the greatest respect to himself. It would be against the perfection of his
nature, his wisdom, holiness, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is disposed to do
ever}- thing that is fit to be done, to suppose otherwise. At least a great part
of the moral rectitude of the heart of God, whereby he is disposed to every thing
END IN CREATION. 201
that is fit, suitable and amiable in itself, consists in his having infinitely the
highest regard to that which is in itself infinitely highest and best : yea, it is in
this that it seems chiefly to consist. The moral rectitude of God's heart must
consist in a proper and due respect of his heart to things that are objects of
moral respect ; that is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and rela-
tions. And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being
to whom most is due; yea, infinitely most, and in effect all. For God is
infinitely the most worthy of regard. The worthiness of others is as nothing to
his : so that to him belongs all possible respect. To him belongs the whole of
the respect that any moral agent, either God, or any intelligent being is capable
of. To him belongs all the heart. Therefore, if moral rectitude of heart con-
sists in paying the respect or regard of the heart which is due, or which fitness
and suitableness requires, fitness requires infinitely the greatest regard to be.paid
to God ; and the denying supreme regard here, would be a conduct infinitely
the most unfit. Therefore a proper regard to this Being, is what the fitness of
regard does infinitely most consist in. Hence it will follow — That the moral
rectitude and fitness of the disposition, inclination or affection of God's heart,
does chiefly consist in a respect or regard to himself infinitely above his regard
to all other beings : or, in other words, his holiness consists in this.
And if it be thus fit that God should have a supreme regard to himself, then
it is fit that this supreme regard should appear, in those things by which he
makes himself known, or by his word and works ; i. e., in what he says, and in
what he does. If it be an infinitely amiable thing in God, that he should have
a supreme regard to himself, then it is an amiable thing that he should act as
having a chief regard to himself; or act in such a manner, as to show that he
has such a regard ; that what is highest in God's heart, may be highest in his
actions and conduct. And if it was God's intention, as there is great reason to
think it was, that his works should exhibit an image of himself their author,
that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and
afford a proper representation of his divine excellencies, and especially his
moral excellence, consisting in the disposition of his heart; then it is reason-
able to suppose that his works are so wrought as to show this supreme respect
to himself, wherein his moral excellency does primarily consist.
When we are considering with ourselves, what would be most fit and pro-
per for God to have a chief respect to, in his proceedings in general, with
regard to the universality of things, it may help us to judge of the matter with
the greater ease and satisfaction to consider, what we can suppose would be
judged and determined by some third being of perfect wisdom and rectitude,
neither the Creator nor one of the creatures, that should be perfectly indifferent
and disinterested. Or if we make the supposition, that wisdom itself, or infinitely
wise justice and rectitude were a distinct, disinterested person, whose office it
was to determine how things shall be most fitly and properly ordered in the
whole system, or kingdom of existence, including king and subjects, God and
his creatures ; and upon a view of the whole, to decide what regard should
prevail and govern in all proceedings. Now such a judge, in adjusting the
proper measures and kinds of regard that every part of existence is to have,
would weigh things in an even balance ; taking care, that greater, or more ex-
istence should have a greater share than less, that a greater part of the whole
should be more looked at and respected than the lesser, in proportion (other
things being equal) to the measure of existence, that the more excellent should
be more regarded than the less excellent : so that the degree of regard should
always be in a proportion, compounded of the proportion of existence, and pro-
Vol. II. 26
202 END IN CREATION.
portion of excellence, or according to the degree of greatness and goodness,
considered conjunctly. Such an arbiter, iff considering the system of created
intelligent beings by itself, would determine that the system in general, consist-
ing of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater share
of regard, than only one individual. For however considerable some of the
individuals might be, so that they might be much greater and better and have a
greater share of the sum total of existence and excellence than another indivi-
dual, yet no one exceeds others so much as to countervail ail the rest of the
system. And if this judge consider not only the system of created beings, but
the system of being in general, comprehending the sum total of universal exist-
ence, both Creator and creature ; still every part must be considered according
to its weight and importance, or the measure it has of existence and excellence.
To determine then, what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator,
and all his creatures taken together, both must be as it were put in the balance ;
the Supreme Being, with all in him that is great, considerable and excellent,
is to be estimated and compared with all that is to be found in the whole crea-
tion ; and according as the former is found to outweigh, in such proportion is
he to have a greater share of regard. And in this case, as the whole system of
created beings in comparison of the Creator, would be found as the light dust of
the balance (which is taken no notice of by him that weighs), and as nothing
and vanity ; so the arbiter must determine accordingly with respect to the
degree in which God should be regarded by all intelligent existence, and the
degree in which he should be regarded in all that is done through the whole
universal system ; in all actions and proceedings, determinations and effects
whatever, whether creating, preserving, using, disposing, changing, or destroy-
ing. And as the Creator is infinite, and has all possible existence, perfection
and excellence, so he must have all possible regard. As he is every way the
first and supreme, and as his excellency is in all respects the supreme beauty and
glory, the original good, and fountain of all good ; so he must have in all
respects the supreme regard. And as he is God over all, to whom all are pro-
perly subordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as supreme head
with absolute and universal dominion ; so it is fit that he should be so regarded
by all and in all proceedings and effects through the whole system : that this
universality of things in their whole compass and series should look to him, and
respect him in such a manner as that respect to him should reign over all respect
to other things, and that regard to creatures should universally be subordinate
and subject
When I speak of regard to be thus adjusted in the universal system, or sum
total of existence, I mean the regard of the sum total ; not only the regard of
individual creatures, or all creatures, but of all intelligent existence, created, and
uncreated. For it is fit that the regard of the Creator should be proportioned to
the worthiness of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus we must
conclude such an arbiter, as I have supposed, would determine in this business,
being about to decide how matters should proceed most fitly, properly, and
according to the nature of things. He would therefore determine that the whole
universe, including all creatures, animate and inanimate, in all its actings, pro-
ceedings, revolutions, and entire series of events, should proceed from a regard
and with a view, to God, as the supreme and last end of all : that every wheel,
both great and small, in all its rotations, should move with a constant, invaria-
ble regard to him as the ultimate end of all ; as perfectly and uniformly, as if
the whole system were animated and directed by one common soul ; or, as if
such an ar^ter as I have before supposed, one possessed of perfect wisdom and
END IN CREATION. 203
rectitude, became the common soul of the universe, and actuated and governed
it in all its motions.
Thus I have gone upon the supposition of a third person, neither creator nor
creature, but a disinterested person stepping in to judge of the concerns of both,
and state what is most fit and proper between them. The thing supposed is
impossible ; but the case is nevertheless just the same as to what is most fit and
suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to
the greatest fitness, in his proceedings, and he knows what the greatest fitness
is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person to direct him. As
therefore there is no third being, beside God and the created system, nor can
be, so there is no need of any, seeing God himself is possessed of that perfect
discernment and rectitude which have been supposed. It belongs to him as
supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom and rectitude, to state all rules and
measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of God are infinite,
and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose be-
cause they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third person that
is disinterested. For being interested unfits a person to be arbiter or judge,
no otherwise than as interested tends to blind and mislead his judgment, or in-
cline him to act contrary to it. But that God should be in danger of either, is
contrary to the supposition of his being possessed of discerning and justice
absolutely perfect. And as there must be some supreme judge of fitness and
propriety in the universality of things, as otherwise there could be no order nor
regularity, it therefore belongs to God whose are all things, who is perfectly fit
for this office, and who alone is so to state all things, according to the most
perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct per-
son. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done.
I should think that these things might incline us to suppose that God has
not forgot himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world ;
but that he has so stated these ends (however he is self-sufficient, immutable,
and independent) as therein plainly to show a supreme regard to himself.
Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, must be considered after-
wards, as also what may be objected against this view of things.
5. Whatsoever is good, amiable and valuable in itself, absolutely and origi-
nally, which facts and events show that God aimed at in the creation of the
world, must be supposed to be regarded, or aimed at by God ultimately, or as
an ultimate end of creation. For we must suppose from the perfection of God's
nature, that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in itself, simply and absolutely
considered, God values simply for itself ; it is agreeable to him absolutely on
ts own account, because God's judgment and esteem are according to truth.
He values and loves things, accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and
loved. But if God values a thing simply, and absolutely, for itself, and on its
own account, then it is the ultimate object of his value ; he does not value it
merely for the sake of a farther end to be attained by it. For to suppose that
he values it only for some farther end, is in direct contradiction to the present
supposition, which is, that he values it absolutely, and for itself. Hence it most
clearly follows, that if that which God values ultimately and for itself, appears
in fact and experience, to be what he seeks by any thing he does, he must re-
gard it as an ultimate end. And therefore if he seeks it in creating the world,
or any part of the world, it is an ultimate end of the work of creation. Having
got thus far, we may now proceed a step further, and assert,
6. Whatsoever thing is actually the effect or consequence of the creation
of the world, which is simply and absolutely good and valuable in itself, that
204 END IN CREATION.
thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world. We see that it is a good
that God aimed at by the creation of the world ; because he has actually at-
tained it by that means. This is an evidence that he intended to attain, or
aimed at it. For we may justly infer what God, intends, by what he actually
does ; because he does nothing inadvertently, or without design. But whatever
God intends to attain from a value for it ; or in other words, whatever he aims
at in his actions and works, that he values ; he seeks that thing in those acts and
works. Because, for an agent to intend to attain something he values by means
he uses, is the same thing as to seek it by those means. And this is the same
as to make that thing his end in those means. Now it being by the supposition
what God values ultimately, it must, therefore, by the preceding position, be
aimed at by God as an ultimate end of creating the world.
SECTION II.
Some farther observations concerning those things which reason leads us to suppose
God aimed at in the creation of the world, showing particularly what things that
are absolutely good, are actually the consequence of the creation of the world.
From what was last observed it seems to be the most proper and just way
of proceeding, as we would see what light reason will give us respecting the
particular end or ends God had ultimately in view in the creation of the world ;
to consider what thing or things, are actually the effect or consequence of the
creation of the world, that are simply and originally valuable in themselves.
And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entering' on any tedious
metaphysical inquiries wherein fitness, amiableness, or valuableness consists ; or
what that is in the nature of some things, which is properly the foundation of a
worthiness of being loved and esteemed on their own account. In this I must
at present refer what I say to the sense and dictates of the reader's mind, on se-
date and calm reflection. I proceed to observe,
1. It seems a thing in itself fit, proper and desirable, that the glorious attri-
butes of God, which consist in a sufficiency to certain acts and effects, should
be exerted in the production of such effects, as might manifest the infinite power,
wisdom, righteousness, goodness, &c, which are in God. If the world had not
been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The power
of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must for ever
have been dormant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and pru-
dence would have had no exercise in any wise contrivance, any prudent proceed-
ing or disposal of things ; for there would have been no objects of contrivance
or disposal. The same might be observed of God's justice, goodness and truth.
Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he possessed these attributes,
if they had never been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then if the attri-
butes which consist in a sufficiency for correspondent effects, are in themselves
excellent, the exercise of them must likewise be excellent. If it be an ex-
cellent thing that there should be a sufficiency for a certain kind of action or
operation, the excellency of such a sufficiency must consist in its relation to this
kind of operation or effect ; but that could not be, unless the operation itself
were excellent. A sufficiency for any act or work is no farther valuable, than
the work or effect is valuable.* As God therefore esteems these attributes
* As we must coiiCeive of things, the end and perfection of these attributes does as it were consist
Ji their exercise : " The end of wisdom (says Mr. G. Tennent, in his Sermon at the opening of the Pre?-
END IN CREATION. 205
themselves valuable, and delights in them ; so it is natural to suppose that he
delights in their proper exercise and expression. For the same reason that he
esteems his own sufficiency wisely to contrive and dispose effects, he also will
esteem the wise contrivance and disposition itself. And for the same reason, as he
delights in his own disposition to do justly, and to dispose of things according to
truth and just proportion ; so he must delight in such a righteous disposal itself.
2. It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections
of God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen by
other beings besides himself. If it be fit, that God's power and wisdom, &c,
should be exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant,
then it seems proper that these exercises should appear, and not be totally hid-
den and unknown. For if they are, it will be just the same as to the above
purpose, as if they were not. God as^perfectly knew himself and his perfec-
tions, had as perfect an idea of the exercises and effects they were sufficient for,
antecedently to any such actual operations of them, as since. If therefore it be
nevertheless a thing in itself valuable, and worthy to be desired, that these glo-
rious perfections be actually expressed and exhibited in their correspondent
effects ; then it seems also, that the knowledge of these perfections, and the ex-
pressions and discoveries that are made of them, is a thing valuable in itself ab-
solutely considered ; and that it is desirable that this knowledge should exist.
As God's perfections are things in themselves excellent, so the expression of
them in their proper acts and fruits is excellent ; and the knowledge of these
excellent perfections, and of these glorious expressions of them, is an excellent
thing, the existence of which is in itself valuable and desirable. It is a thing
infinitely good in itself that God's glory should be known by a glorious society
of created beings. And that there should be in them an increasing knowledge
of God to all eternity, is an existence, a reality infinitely worthy to be, and
worthy to be valued and regarded by him, to whom it belongs to order that to
be, which, of all things possible, is fittest and best. If existence is more worthy
than defect and nonentity, and if any created existence is in itself worthy to be,
then knowledge or understanding is a thing worthy to be ; and if any know-
ledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, viz., that of God and his glo-
ry. The existence of the created universe consists as much in it as in any
thing : yea, this knowledge is one of the highest, most real and substantial
parts of all created existence, most remote from nonentity and defect.
S. As it is a thing valuable and desirable in itself that God's glory should be
seeu and known, so when known, it seems equally reasonable and fit, it should
be valued and esteemed, loved and delighted in, answerably to its dignity.
There is no more reason to esteem it a fit and suitable thing that God's glory
should be known,, or that there should be an idea in the understanding corres-
ponding unto the glorious object, than that there should be a corresponding dis-
position or affection in the will. If the perfection itself be excellent, the know-
ledge of it is excellent, and so is the esteem and love of it excellent. *And as
it is fit that God should love and esteem his own excellence, it is also fit that
he should value and esteem the love of his excellency. For if it becomes any
being greatly to value another, then it becomes him to love to have him valued
and esteemed : and if it becomes a being highly to value himself, it is fit that
he should love to have himself valued and esteemed. If the idea of God's per-
byte< irjt J arch of Philadelphia) is design ; the end of power is action ; the end of goodness is doing gooH,
To svjT,csr! these perfections not to be exerted, would be to represent them as insignificant. Of what
use would God's wisdom be, if it had nothing to design or direct? To what purpose his almightiness.
if it never brought any thing to pass ? And of what avail his goodness, if it never did any good V
206 END IN CREATION.
fection in the understanding be valuable, then the love of the heart seems to be
more especially valuable, as moral beauty especially consists in the disposition
and affection of the heart.
4. As there is an infinite fulness of all possible good in God, a fulness ol
every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness ; ant
as this fulness is capable of communication or emanation ad extra ; so it seem*
a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communicated or flow
forth, that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams
that this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fulness, pour
forth light all around — and as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this,
in the Divine Being, must be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent dispo-
sition, such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it ; so
far as the communication or external stream may be looked upon as any thing
oesides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good.
And if the fulness of good that is in the fountain, is in itself excellent and wor-
thy to exist, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increase, repe-
tition or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exist. Thus it is fit,
since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should
shine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and understanding ; and as
there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence and beauty, so it should
flow out in communicated holiness. And that as there is an infinite fulness of
joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain
flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun.
From this view it appears another way to be a thing in itself valuable, that
there should be such things as the knowledge of God's glory in other beings,
and a high esteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it; — this
appears, I say, in another way, viz., as these things are but the emanations of
God's own knowledge, holiness and joy.
Thus it appears reasonable to suppose, that it was what God had respect to
as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite
fulness of good ; or rather it was his last end, that there might be a glorious
and abundant emanation of his infinite fulness of good ad extra, or without him-
self; and the disposition to communicate himself, or diffuse his own fulness,*
which we must conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature,
was what moved him to create the world. But here, as much as possible to
avoid confusion, I observe, that there is some impropriety in saying that a
disposition in God to communicate himself to the creature, moved him to create
the world. For though the diffusive disposition in the nature of God, that
moved him to create the world, doubtless inclines him to communicate himself
to the creature, when the creature exists; yet this cannot be all: because an incli-
nation in God to communicate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the
existence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that
excited God to give creatures existence, was rather a communicative disposi-
tion in general, or a disposition in, the fulness of the divinity to flow out
and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a
tree to diffuse and send forth its sap and life, is doubtless the reason of the
communication of its sap and life to its buds, leaves and fruits, after these
exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so
* I shall often use the phrase God's fulness, as signifying and comprehending all the good which is in
God natural and moral, either excellence or happiness ; partly because I know of no better phrase to be
used in this general meaning; and partly because I am led here to by some of the inspired writers, partic-
ularly the apostle Paul, who often uses the phrase in this sense.
END IN CREATION. 207
properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to communi-
cate itself, or diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore, to speak more
strictly according to truth, we may suppose, that a disposition in God, as an
original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness , was
what excited him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed
at by him as a last end of the creation.
SECTION III.
Wherein it is considered how, on the supposition of God°s making the forementioned
things his last end, he manifests a supreme and ultimate regard to himself in all his
works.
In the last section I observed some things, which are actually the conse-
quence of the creation of the world, which seem absolutely valuable in them-
selves, and so worthy to be made God's last end in this work. I now proceed
to inquire, how God's making such things as these his last end is consistent
with his making himself his last end, or his manifesting an ultimate respect to
himself in his acts and works. Because this is a thing I have observed as
agreeable to the dictates of reason, that in all his proceedings he should set
himself highest — therefore I would endeavor to show with respect to each of
the forementioned things, that God, in making them his end, makes himself
his end, so as in all to show a supreme and ultimate respect to himself; and
how his infinite love to himself and delight in himself, will naturally cause him
to value and delight in these things : or rather, how a value to these things is
implied in his love to himself, or value of that infinite fulness of good that is in
himself.
Now with regard to the first of the particulars mentioned above, viz., God's
regard to the exercise and expression of those attributes of his nature, in their
proper operations and effects, which consist in a sufficiency for these operations,
it is not hard to conceive that God's regard to himself, and value for his own
perfections, should cause him to value these exercises and expressions of his
perfections ; and that a love to them will dispose him to love their exhibition
and exertment : inasmuch as their excellency consists in their relation to use,
exercise and operation ; as the excellency of wisdom consists in its relation to,
and sufficiency for, wise designs and effects. God's love to himself, and his
own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that, which is the use, end
and operation of these attributes. If one highly esteem and delight in the vir-
tues of a friend, as wisdom, justice, &c, that have relation to action, this will
make him delight in the exercise and genuine effects of these virtues : so if God
both esteem, and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he cannot but value
and delight in the expressions and genuine effects of them. So that in delight-
ing in the expressions of his perfections, he manifests a delight in his own per-
fections themselves: or in other words, he manifests a delight in himself; and
in making these expressions of his own perfections his end, he makes himself
his end.
And with respect to the second and third particulars, the matter is no less
plain. For he that loves any being, and has a disposition highly to prize, and
greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, must, from the same disposition,
be well pleased to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, esteemed and
prized by others. He that loves and approves any being or thing, he naturally
208 END IN CREATION.
loves and approves the love and approbation of that thing, and is opposite to
the disapprobation and contempt of it. Thus it is when one loves another, and
highly prizes the virtues of a friend. And thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit
that the other should be beloved, and his qualification prized. And therefore
thus it will necessarily be, if a being loves himself and highly prizes his own
excellencies : and thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit he should thus love him-
self, and prize his own valuable qualities. That is, it is fit that he should take
delight in his own excellencies being seen, acknowledged, esteemed, and de-
lighted in. This is implied in a love to himself and his own perfections. And
in seeking this, and making this his end, he seeks himself, and makes himself
his end.
And with respect to the fourth and last particular, viz., God's being disposed
to an abundant communication, and glorious emanation of that infinite fulness
of good which he possesses in himself; as of his own knowledge, excellency,
and happiness, in the manner which he does ; if we thoroughly and properly
consider the matter, it will appear, that herein also God makes himself his end, in
such a sense, as plainly to manifest and testify a supreme and ultimate regard
to himself.
Merely in this disposition to diffuse himself, or to cause an emanation of his
glory and fulness, which is prior to the existence of any other being, and is to
be considered as the inciting cause of creation, or giving existence to other
beings, God cannot so properly be said to make the creature his end, as himself
— for the creature is not as yet considered as existing. This disposition or
desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in intention
and foresight. For it is a disposition that is the original ground of the existence
of the creature ; and even of the future intended and foreseen existence of the
creature. — God's love, or benevolence, as it respects the creature, may be taken
either in a larger, or stricter sense. In a larger sense it may signify nothing
diverse from that good disposition in his nature to communicate of his own ful-
ness in general ; as his knowledge, his holiness, and happiness ; and to give
creatures existence in order to it. This may be called benevolence or love,,
because it is the same good disposition that is exercised in love ; it is the very
fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the most proper
sense ; and it has the same general tendency and effect in the creature's well-
being. — But yet this cannot have any particular present or future created
existence for its object ; because it is prior to any such object, and the very
source of the futurition of the existence of it. Nor is it really diverse from God's
love to himself; as will more clearly appear afterwards.
But God's love may be taken more strictly, for this general disposition to
communicate good, as directed to particular objects. Love, in the most strict
and proper sense, presupposes the existence of the object beloved, at least in
idea and expectation, and represented to the mind as future. God did not love
angels in the strictest sense, but in consequence of his intending to create them,
and so having an idea of future existing angels. Therefore his love to them
was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevo-
lence strictly taken, presupposes an existing object, as much as pity, a miserable,
suffering object.
This propensity in God to diffuse himself, may be considered as a propensity
to himself diffused ; or to his own glory existing in its emanation. A respect to
himself, or an infinite propensity to, and delight in his own glory, is that which
causes him to incline to its being abundantly diffused, and to delight in the em-
anation of it. Thus that nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, shoots
END IN CREATION. 209
out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a disposition that terminates
in its own complete self. And so the disposition in the sun to shine, or abun-
dantly to diffuse its fulness, warmth and brightness, is only a tendency to its
most glorious and complete state. So God looks on the communication of
himself, and the emanation of the infinite glory and good that are in himself to
belong to the fulness and completeness of himself ; as though he were not in
his most complete and glorious state without it. Thus the church of Christ
(toward whom, and in whom are the emanations of his glory and communica-
tions of his fulness) is called the fulness of Christ : as though he were not in
his complete state without her, as Adam was in a defective state without Eve.
And the church is called the glory of Christ, as the woman is the glory of the
man, 1 Cor. xi. 7. Isaiah xlvi. 13, " I will place salvation in Zion, for Israel
my glory." Very remarkable is that place, John xii. 23, 24, " And Jesus
answered them, saying, The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glori-
fied. Verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and
die, it abideth alone ; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit." He had res-
pect herein, to the blessed fruits of Christ's death, in the conversion, salvation,
and eternal happiness and holiness of those that should be redeemed by him.
This consequence of his death he calls his glory ; and his obtaining, this fruit he
calls his being glorified ; as the flourishing beautiful produce of a corn of wheat
sown in the ground is its glory. Without this he is alone as Adam was before
Eve was created ; but from him by his death proceeds a glorious offspring, in
which he is communicated, that is, his fulness and glory : as from Adam in his
deep sleep proceeds the woman, a beautiful companion to fill his emptiness, and
relieve his solitariness. By Christ's death, his fulness is abundantly diffused in
many streams ; and expressed in the beauty and glory of a great multitude of
his spiritual offspring. — Indeed, after the creatures are intended to be created,
God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to these creatures,
in the strictest sense, in his dealings with, and works about them. His exer-
cising his goodness, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may
be the spring of all God's proceedings through the universe, as being now the
determined way of gratifying his general inclination to diffuse himself. Here
God's acting for himself, or making himself his last end, and his acting for their
sake, are not to be set in opposition, or to be considered as the opposite parts of
a disjunction. They are rather to be considered as coinciding one with the other,
and implied one in the other. But yet God is to be considered as first and
original in his regard ; and the creature is the object of God's regard conse-
quentially, and by implication as it were comprehended in God ; as shall be more
particularly observed presently.
But how God's value for and delight in the emanations of his fulness in
the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fulness of good there is
in himself, and the supreme respect and regard he has for himself; and that in
making these emanations of himself his end, he does ultimately make himself
his end in creation, will more clearly appear by considering more particularly
the nature and circumstances of these communications of God's fulness which
are made, and which we have reason, either from the nature of things or the
word of God, to suppose shall be made.
One part of that divine fulness which is communicated is the divine know-
ledge. That communicated knowledge which must be supposed to pertain to
God's last end in creating the world, is the creature's knowledge of him. For
this is the end of all other knowledge ; and even the faculty of understanding
would be vain without this. And this knowledge is most properly a communi-
Vol. II. 27
210 END IN CREATION.
cation of God's infinite knowledge, which primarily consists in the knowledge
of himself. God, in making this his end, makes himself his end. This know-
ledge in the creature, is but a conformity to God. It is the image of God's own
knowledge of himself. It is a participation of the same. It is as much the
same as it is possible for that to be, which is infinitely less in degree : as par-
ticular beams of the sun communicated, arc the light and glory of the sun
in part.
Besides, God's perfections, or his glory, is the object of this knowledge, or
the thing known ; so that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is seen.
As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge ; he must
delight in every thing of that nature : as he delights in his own light, he must
delight in every beam of that light : and as he highly values his own excel-
lency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested, and so glorified.
Another thing wherein the emanation of divine fulness that is, and will be
made in consequence of the creation of the world, is the communication of vir-
tue and holiness to the creature. This is a communication of God's holiness ;
so that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency ; which is
properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own
beauty, he must necessarily delight in the creature's holiness ; which is a con-
formity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brightness of a jewel, held in
the sun's beams, is a participation or derivation of the sun's brightness, though
immensely less in degree. — And then it must be considered wherein this holi-
ness in the creature consists ; viz., in love, which is the comprehension of all
true virtue ; and primarily in love to God, which is exercised in a high es-
teem of God, admiration of his perfections, complacency in them, and praise of
them. All which things are nothing else but the heart's exalting, magnifying,
or glorifying God ; which, as I showed before, God necessarily approves of, and
is pleased with, as he loves himself, and values the glory of his own nature.
Another part of God's fulness which he communicates, is his happiness.
This happiness consists in enjoying and rejoicing in himself; and so does also
the creature's happiness. It is, as has been observed of the other, a participa-
tion of what is in God ; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it.
The happiness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God ; by which also
God is magnified and exalted : joy, or the exulting of the heart in God's glory,
is one thing that belongs to praise — so that God is all in all, with respect to
each part of that communication of the divine fulness which is made to the
creature. What is communicated is divine, or something of God J and each
communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is there-
by conformed to God, and united to him, and that in proportion as the com-
munication is greater or less. And the communication itself, is no other, in
the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honor, exaltation and praise ol
God consists.
And it is farther to be considered, that the thing which God aimed at in the
creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that
-communication of himself, which he intended throughout all eternity. And if
we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine
good, it will more clearly show how in making this his end, God testifies a su-
preme respect to himself, and makes himself his end. There are many reasons to
think that what God has in view, in an increasing communication of himself
throughout eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in
him. And it is to be considered that the more those divine communications increase
in the creature, the more it becomes one with God ; for so much the more is it
END IN CREATION. 211
united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the
union with him becomes more firm and close, and at the same time the creature
becomes more and more conformed to God. The image is more and more per-
fect, and so the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to
an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has
a comprehensive prospect of the increasing union and conformity through eternity,
it must be an infinitely strict and perfect nearness, conformity and oneness. For
it will forever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union
which there is between the Father and the Son ; so that in the eyes of God, who
perfectly sees the whole of it, in its infinite progress and increase, it must come
to an eminent fulfilment of Christ's request, in John xvii. 23, " That they all
may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one
in us, I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." In
this view, those elect creatures which must be looked upon as the end of all the
rest of the creation, considered with respect to the whole of their eternal dura-
tion, and as such made God's end, must be viewed as being, as it were, one with
God. They were respected as brought home to him, united with him, center-
ing most perfectly in him, and as it were swallowed up in him ; so that his res-
pect to them finally coincides and becomes one and the same with respect to
himself. The interest of the creature, is, as it were, God's own interest, in pro-
portion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the interest of a
man's family is looked upon as the same with his own interest ; because of the
relation they stand in to him ; his propriety in them, and their strict union with
him. But consider God's elect creatures with respect to their eternal duration,
so they are infinitely dearer to God, than a man's family is to him. What has
been said, shows that as all things are from God as their first cause and foun-
tain ; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer and nearer
to him through all eternity : which argues that he who is their first cause is
their last end.
SECTION IV.
Some objections considered which may be made against the reasonableness of what
has been said of God's making himself his last end.
Objection 1. Some may object against what has been said, as inconsistent
\nth God's absolute independence and immutability, particularly the represen-
tation that has been made, as though God were inclined to a communication oi
his fulness and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and
complete state. It may be thought that this does not well consist with God's
being self-existent from all eternity, absolutely perfect in himself, in the posses-
sion of infinite and independent good. And that in general, to suppose that
God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he
aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcilable with his
being happy, perfectly and infinitely happy in himself. If it could be supposed that
God needed any thing ; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to
him ; or that they could be profitable to him ; it might be fit, that God should
make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world ;
and there would be some reason and ground for the preceding discourse. But
"seeing that God is above all need and' all capacity of being added to and ad-
212 END IN CREATION.
vanced, made better and happier in any respect ; to what purpose should God
make himself his end ; or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his
works ? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things
with a view to obtain what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was
so from all eternity ; and therefore cannot now possibly need, nor with any
color of reason be supposed to seek 1
Answer 1. Many have wrong notions of God's happiness, as resulting from
his absolute self-sufficience, independence, and immutability. Though it be
true, that God's glory and happiness are in and of himself, are infinite and can-
not be added to, unchangeable, for the whole and every part of which he is
perfectly independent of the creature ; yet it does not hence follow, nor is it
true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleasure or happiness, in any of
his acts or communications relative to the creature ; or effects he produces in
them ; or in any thing he sees in the creature's qualifications, dispositions, actions
and state. God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing
the happy state of the creature ; yet this may not be different from his delight
in himself ; being a delight in his own infinite goodness ; or the exercise of that
glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and communicate himself, and so grati-
fying this inclination of his own heart. This delight which God has in his
creature's happiness, cannot properly be said to be what God receives from
the creature. For it is only the effect of his own work in, and communications
to the creature, in making it, and admitting it to a participation of his fulness.
As the sun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and shines
only by a participation of its brightness.
With respect also to the creature's holiness : God may have a proper de-
light and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclina-
tion, to communicate of his own excellent fulness. God may delight with true
and great pleasure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communica-
tion of his own beauty, an expression and manifestation of his own loveliness.
And this is so far from being an instance of his happiness not being in and from
himself, that it is an evidence that he is happy in himself, or delights and has
pleasure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleasure in the expression of his
own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he does not delight in his own
beauty ; that he hath not his happiness and enjoyment in his own beauty and
perfection. So that if we suppose God has real pleasure and happiness in the
holy love and praise of his saints, as the image and communication of his own
holiness, it is not properly any pleasure distinct from the pleasure he has in him-
self ; but is truly an instance of it.
And with respect to God*s being glorified in this respect, that those perfec-
tions wherein his glory consists, are exercised and expressed in their proper and
corresponding effects ; as his wisdom in wise designs and well contrived works
— his power in great effects — his justice in acts of righteousness — his goodness
in communicating happiness ; and so his showing forth the glory of his own
nature, in its being exercised, exhibited, communicated, known, and esteemed ;
his having delight herein does not argue that his pleasure or happiness is not in
himself, and his own glory ; but the contrary. This is the necessary consequence
of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and
effulgence of it.
Nor do any of these things argue any dependence in God on the creature
for happiness. Though he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and hap-
piness ; yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature.
For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely
END IN CREATION. 213
from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they
add to him. His rejoicing therein, is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his
own glory expressed in those acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's
joy is dependent on nothing besides his own act, which he exerts with an abso-
lute and independent power. And yet, in some sense it can be truly said that
God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his
creatures. Because God would be less happy, if he was less good : or if he had
not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse
of his own fulness. And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to
be hindered in the exercise of his goodness, and his other perfections in their
proper effects. But he has complete happiness, because he has these perfections,
and cannot be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects.
And this surely is not thus, because he is dependent ; but because he is indepen-
dent on any other that should hinder him.
From this view it appears, that nothing that has been said is in the least incon-
sistent with those expressions in the Scripture that signify that man cannot be
profitable to God ; that he receives nothing of us by any of our wisdom and
righteousness. For these expressions plainly mean no more than that God is
absolutely independent of us ; that we have nothing of our own, no stock from
whence we can give to God ; and that no part of his happiness originates from
man.
From what has been said it appears, that the pleasure that God hath in
those things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleasure in diffusing and
communicating to the creature, than in receiving from the creature. Surely, it
is no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate of his
infinite fulness. It is no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain,
that it is inclined to overflow. — Another thing signified by these ^expressions of
Scripture is, that nothing that is from the creature, adds to or alters God's hap-
piness, as though it were changeable either by increase or diminution. Nor
does any thing that has been advanced in the least suppose or infer that it does,
or is it in the least inconsistent with the eternity, and most absolute immutability
of God's pleasure and happiness. — For though these communications of God,
these exercises, operations, effects and expressions of his glorious perfections,
which God rejoices in, are in time ; yet his joy in them is without beginning or
change. They were always equally present in the divine mind. He beheld
them with equal clearness, certainty and fulness in every respect, as he doth now.
They were always equally present ; as with him there is no variableness or suc-
cession. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent
and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally,
absolutely perfect, unchangeable and independent. It cannot be added to or
diminished by the power or will of any creature ; nor is in the least dependent
on any thing mutable or contingent.
2. If any are not satisfied with the preceding answer, but still insist on the
objection ; let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's
last end in creatingthe world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objec-
tion in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in
creating the world, then there was something, in some respect future, that he
aimed at, and designed to bring to pass by -creating the world : something that
was agreeable to his inclination or will ; let that be his own glory, or the happi-
ness of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be something that God seeks as
agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accomplishment of it he is gratified. If
the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thine; grate-
214 END IN CREATION.
ful to him (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will),
then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then according to
the argument of the objection, how can he have any thing future to desire or
seek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably satisfied in himself?
What can remain for him to take any delight in or to. be further gratified by,
whose eternal and unchangeable. delight is in himself as his own complete ob-
ject of enjoyment ? Thus the objector will be pressed with his own objection ;
let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think
he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above.
It may therefore be proper here to observe, that let what will be God's last
end, that, he must have a real and proper pleasure in : whatever be the proper
object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either grateful to him in
itself; or for something else for which he wills it : and so is his further end.
But whatever is God's last end, that he wills for its own sake ; as grateful to
him in itself; or, which is the same thing, it is that which he. truly delights
in; or in which he has some degree of true and proper pleasure. Otherwise
we must deny any such thing as will in God with respect to any thing brought
to pass in time ; and so must deny his work of creation, or any work of his
providence to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reason to suppose that
God's works in creating and governing the world, are properly the fruits of
his will, as of his understanding. And if there be any such thing at all, as what
we mean by acts of will in God ; then he is not indifferent whether his will be
fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and
pleased in the fulfilment of his will : or, which is the same thing, he has a
pleasure in it. And if he has a real pleasure in attaining his end, then the
attainment of it belongs to his happiness. That in which God's delight 01
pleasure in any* measure consists, his happiness in some measure consists. To
suppose that God has pleasure in things, that are brought to pass in time, only
figuratively and metaphorically ; is to suppose that he exercises will about,
these things, and makes them his end only metaphorically.
3. The doctrine that makes God's creatures and not himself, to be his last
end, is a doctrine the farthest from having a favorable aspect on God's absolute
self-sufticience and independence. It far less agrees therewith than the doctrine
against which this is objected. For we must conceive of the efficient as de-
pending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end, in his desires, aims, actions
and pursuits ; so that he fails in all his desires, actions and pursuits, if he fails
of his end. — Now if God himself be his last end, then in his dependence on his
end, he depends on nothing but himself. If all things be of him, and to him,
and he the first and the last, this shows him to be all in all : he is all to himself.
He goes not out of himself in what he seeks ; but his desires and pursuits as
they originate from, so they terminate in himself; and he is dependent on none
but himself in the beginning or end of any of his exercises or operations. But
if not himself, but the creature, be his last end, then as he depends on his last
end, he is in some sort dependent on the creature.
Objection 2. Some may object, that to suppose that God makes himself
his highest and last end, is dishonorable to him ; as it in effect supposes, that
God does every thing from a selfish spirit. Selfishness is looked upon as mean
and sordid in the creature ; unbecoming and even hateful in such a worm of the
dust as man. We should look upon a man as of a base and contemptible charac-
ter, that should in every thing he did, be governed by selfish principles ; should
make his private interest his governing aim in all his conduct in life. How far
then should we be from attributing any such thing to the Supreme Being, the
END IN CREATION. 215
blessed anl only potentate . Does it not become us to ascribe to him, the most
noble and generous dispositions ; and those qualities that are the most remote
from every thing that is private, narrow and sordid ?
Answer 1. Such an objection must arise from a very ignorant or inconsider-
ate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity. If by selfish-
ness be meant, a disposition in any being to regard himself; this is no otherwise
vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude ; and so the public
weal is of greater value than his particular interest. Among created beings one
single person must be looked upon as inconsiderable in comparison of the gen-
erality ; and so his interest as of little importance compared with the interest
of the whole system : therefore in them, a disposition to prefer self, as if it
were more than all, Is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account
than as it is a disposition that does not agree with the nature of things ; and
that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in any one to forego
his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy
the name of generosity than it is a treating things according to their true value ;
a prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted ; an expression of a dis-
position to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in itself.
But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent that all other beings are as noth-
ing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and less than nothing, and
vanity in comparison of his ; and God be omniscient, and infallible, and perfect-
ly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable being ; then it is fit that his
heart should be agreeable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion
of things, and agreeable to this infallible and all comprehending understand-
ing which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views
them ; and so it is fit and suitable that he should value himself infinitely more
than his creatures.
2. In created beings, a regard to self-interest may properly be set in oppo-
sition to the public welfare; because the private interest of one person may be
inconsistent with the public good ; at least it may be so in the apprehension of
that person. That, which this person looks upon as his interest may interfere
with, or oppose the general good. Hence his private interest may be regarded
and pursued in opposition to the public. But this cannot be with respect to the
Supreme Being, the author and head of the whole system, on whom all abso-
lutely depend ; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole. It is more
absurd to suppose that his interest should be opposite to the interest of the uni-
versal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart, and vitals of the natural
body, should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that
God, who is ommiscient, should apprehend the matter thus, viz., his interest, as
being inconsistent with the good and interest of the whole.
3. God's seeking himself in the creation of the world, in the manner which
has been supposed, is so far from being inconsistent with the good of his crea-
tures, or any possibility of being so ; that it is a kind of regard to himself that
inclines him to seek the good of his creatures. It is a regard to himself that
disposes him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight in his
own internal fulness and glory, that disposes him to an abundant effusion and
emanation of that glory. The same disposition, that inclines him to delight in
his glory, causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions and communica-
tions of it. This is a natural conclusion. If there were 'any person of such a
taste and disposition of mind, that the brightness and light of the sun seemed
unlovely to him, he would be willing that the sun's brightness and light should
be retained within itself: but they, that delight in it, to whom it appears lovely
216 END IN CREATION.
and glorious, will esteem it an amiable and glorious thing to have it diffused
and communicated through the world.
Here by the way it may be properly considered, whether some writers are
not chargeable with inconsistence in this respect, viz., that whereas they speak
against the doctrine of God's making himself his own highest and last end, as
though this were an ignoble selfishness in God ; when indeed he only is fit to be
made the highest end, by himself and all other beings ; inasmuch as he is the
highest Being, and infinitely greater and more worthy than all others. — Yet
with regard to creatures who are infinitely less worthy of supreme and ultimate
regard, they (in effect at least) suppose that they necessarily at all times seek
their own happiness, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their most virtu-
ous actions : and that this principle, regulated by wisdom and prudence, as
leading to that which is their true and highest happiness, is the foundation of all
virtue and every thing that is morally good and excellent in them.
Objection 3. To what has been supposed, that God makes himself his end
in this way, viz., in seeking that his glory and excellent perfection should be
known, esteemed, loved and delighted in by his creatures, it may be objected,
that this seems unworthy of God. It is considered as below a truly great man,
to be much influenced in his conduct, by a desire of popular applause. The
notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be esteemed but a low end,
to be aimed at by a prince or philosopher, in any great and noble enterprise.
How much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works,
e. g., the creation of the vast universe, out of regard to the notice and admira-
tion of worms of the dust : that the displays of his magnificence may be gazed
at, and applauded by those who are infinitely more beneath .him, than the
meanest rabble, are beneath the greatest prince or philosopher.
This objection is spacious. It hath a show of argument : but it will appear
to be nothing but a show — if we consider,
1. Whether or no it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is
excellent and valuable in itself, and so to take pleasure in its existence.
It seems not liable to any doubt, that there could be nothing future, or no
future existence worthy to be desired or sought by God, and so worthy to be
made his end, if no future existence was valuable and worthy to be brought to
effect. * If when the world was not, there was any possible future thing fit and
valuable in itself, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the esteem and
love of it must be so. Understanding and will are the highest kind of created
existence. And if they be valuable, it must be in their exercise. But the
highest and most excellent kind of their exercise, is in some actual knowledge
and exercise of will. And certainly the most excellent actual knowledge and
will, that can be in the creature, is the knowledge and the love of God. And
the most true, excellent knowledge of God is the knowledge of his glory or
moral excellence, and the most excellent exercise of the will consists in esteem
and love, and a delight in his glory. If any created existence is in itself worthy
to be, or any thing that ever was future is worthy of existence, such a communi-
cation of divine fulness, such an emanation and expression of the divine glory is
worthy of existence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exist,
then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world.
And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy
to be God's end in creation.
If God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted
in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded
by him ; for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain, let it be con-
END IN CREATION. 217
sidered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly
value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do so, we
shall approve of and like others' esteem of them j and shall disapprove and
dislike the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are
worthy that we should thus approve others' esteem, and disapprove their con-
tempt of them. And the case is the same with respect to any being's own
qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them,
he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, and dis-
like their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed
by the being who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be
proportionally approved and regarded. I desire it may be considered, whether
it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt of himself. If not, but
on the contrary, it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there
is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love, esteem and
honor of himself.
The matter may be also cleared, by considering what it would become us
to approve and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e. g., our
nation or country. It becomes us to love our country, and therefore it becomes
us to value the just honor of our country. But the same that it becomes us to
value and desire for a friend, and the same that it becomes us to desire and seek
for the community, the same does it become God to value and seek for himself;
i. e., on supposition it becomes God to love himself as well as it does men to
love a friend or the public ; which I think has been before proved.
Here are two things that ought particularly to be adverted to. 1. That in
God, the love of himself, and the love of the public are not to be distinguished,
as in man, because God's being, as it were, comprehends all. His existence,
being infinite, must be equivalent to universal existence. And for the same
reason that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to
himself must be so likewise. 2. In God, the love of what is fit and decent, or
the love of virtue, cannot be a distinct thing from the love of himself. Be-
cause the love of God is that wherein all virtue and holiness does primarily and
chiefly consist, and God's own holiness must primarily consist in the love of
himself, as was before observed. And if God's holiness consists in love to him-
self, then it will imply an approbation of, and pleasedness with the esteem and
love of him in others ; for a being that loves himself, necessarily loves love to
himself. If holiness in God consist chiefly in love to himself, holiness in the
creature must chiefly consist in love to him. And if God loves holiness in him-
self, he must love it in the creature.
Virtue, by such of the late philosophers as seem to be in chief repute, is
placed in public affection or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue
lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue itself is virtuous no otherwise than
as it is implied in, or arises trom this public affection, or extensive benevolence
of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he necessarily loves love to
the public.
Now, therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest
sense, be the same thing with benevolence to the Divine Being, who is in effect
universal being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous,
than as it is implied in or arises from love to the Divine Being. Consequently
God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himself; and is virtuous no
otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God's virtuous dis-
position, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into
the same thing with love to himself. And consequently whereinsoever he
Vol. II. ^ 28
218 END IN CREATION.
makes virtue his end, he makes himself his end. — In fine, God, being as it were,
an all comprehending Being, all his moral perfections, as his holiness, justice,
grace and benevolence are some way or other to be resolved into a supreme and
infinite regard to himself; and if so it will be easy to suppose that it becomes
him to make himself his supreme and last end in his works.
I would here observe by the way, that if any insist that it becomes God to
love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a
manner as not to love it from regard to himself, and that it supposeth too much
selfishness to suppose that all God's delight in virtue is to be resolved into delight
in himself: this will contradict a former objection against God's taking plea-
sure in communications of himself, viz., that inasmuch as God is perfectly inde-
pendent and self-sufficient, therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in
the enjoyment of himself. For in the present objection it is insisted that it be-
comes God to have some pleasure, love or delight in virtue distinct from his
delight in himself. So that if the same persons make both objections, they
must be inconsistent with themselves.
2. In answer to the objection we are upon, as to God's creatures whose
esteem and love he seeks, being infinitely inferior to God as nothing and vanity ;
I would observe that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which in
itself is fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be
infinite grace and condescension in it, yet these are not unworthy of God, but
infinitely to his honor and glory.
They who insist that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his crea-
tion of the world ; but that all that he had any ultimate regard to was the hap-
piness of his creatures ; and suppose that he made his creatures, and not himself,
his last end, do it under a color of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence
and love to his creatures. — But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly
values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as
they suppose ; they are not consistent with themselves in supposing that God
has so little value for their love and esteem. For as the nature of love, es-
pecially great love, causes him that loves to value the esteem of the person
beloved ; so that God should take pleasure in the creature's just love and es-
teem will follow both from God's love to himself and his love to his creatures.
If he esteem and love himself, he must approve of esteem and love to himself,
and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he must
value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem, because he loves not
because he needs them.
3. As to what is alleged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed
in their conduct and achievements by a regard to the applause of the popu-
lace ; I would observe, what makes their applause to be worthy of so little re-
gard, is their ignorance, giddiness and injustice. The applause of the multi-
tude very frequently is not founded on any just view and understanding of
things, but on humor, mistake, folly and unreasonable affections. Such applause
is truly worthy to be disregarded. But it is not beneath a man of the greatest
dignity and wisdom, to value the wise and just esteem of others, however infe-
rior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind,
would show a haughty and mean spirit. It is such an esteem in his creatures
only, that God hath any regard to : for it is such an esteem only that is fit and
amiable in itself.
Objection 4. To suppose that God makes himself his ultimate end in the
creation of the world derogates from the freeness of his goodness, in his benefi-
cence to his creatures ; and from their obligations to gratitude for the good
END IN CREATION. 219
communicated. For if God, in communicating his fulness, makes himself and
.iot the creatures, his end ; then what good he does, he does for himself, and
iot for them ; for his own sake, and not theirs.
Answer. God and the creature, in this affair of the emanation of the divine
fulness, are not properly set in opposition, or made the opposite parts of a dis-
junction. Nor ought God's glory and the creature's good to be spoken of as if
they were properly and entirely distinct, as they are in the objection. This
supposeth, that God's having respect to his glory, and the communication of
good to his creatures, are things altogether different : That God's communica-
ting his fulness for himself, and his doing it for them, are things standing in a
proper disjunction and opposition. Whereas if we were capable of having
more full and perfect views of God and divine things, which are so much above
us, it is probable it would appear very clear to us, that the matter is quite other-
wise ; and that these things, instead of appearing entirely distinct, are implied
one in the other. That God, in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of his
creatures. Because the emanation of his glory (which he seeks and delights in,
as he delights in himself and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated
excellency and happiness of his creatures. And that in communicating his ful-
ness for them, he does it for himself. Because their good, which he seeks, is so
much in union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excel-
lency and happiness is nothing but the emanation and expression of God's glory.
God, in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself, and in seeking him-
self, i. e. himself diffused and expressed (which he delights in, as he delights in his
own beauty and fulness), he seeks their glory and happiness.
This will the better appear, if we consider the degree and manner in wThich
he aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness in his creating the world ;
viz., the degree and manner of the creature's glory and happiness during the
whole of the designed eternal duration of the world he was about to create ;
which is in greater and greater nearness and strictness of union with himself,
and greater and greater communion and participation with him in his own glo-
ry and happiness, in constant progression, throughout all eternity. As the
creature's good was viewed in this manner when God made the world for it,
viz., with respect to the whole of the eternal duration of it, and the eternally
progressive union and communion with him ; so the creature must be viewed
as in infinite strict union with himself. In this view it appears that God's re-
spect to the creature in the whole, unites with his respect to himself. Both re-
fards are like two lines which seem at the beginning to be separate, but aim
nally to meet in one, both being directed to the same centre. And as to the
good of the creature itself, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progres-
sion, it must be viewed as infinite ; and so not only being some communication
of God's glory, but as coming nearer and nearer to the same thing in its infi-
nite fulness. The nearer any thing comes to infinite, the nearer it comes to an
identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite,
it cannot be viewed as a distinct thing from God's own infinite glory.
The apostle's discourse of the great love of Christ to men, Eph. v. 25, to
the end, leads us thus to think of the love of Christ to his church, as coinciding
with his love to himself, by virtue of the strict union of the church with him.
Thus, " Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and gave
himself for it, that he might present it to himself a glorious church. So ought
men to love their wives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth
himself, even as the Lord the church ; for we are members of his body, of his
flesh, and of his bones."
220 END IN CREATION.
Now I apprehend that there is nothing in this manner of God's seeking the
good of the creatures, or in his disposition to communicate of his own fulness
to them, that at all derogates from the excellence of it, or the creature's obli-
gation.
God's disposition to communicate good, or to cause his own infinite fulness
to flow forth, is not the less properly called God's goodness, because the good
that he communicates, is something of himself; a communication of his own
*lory, and what he delights in as he delights in his own glory. The creature
iias no less benefit by it j neither has such a disposition less of a direct tendency
to the creature's benefit ; or the less of a tendency to love to the creature, when
the creature comes to exist. Nor is this disposition in God to communicate of
and diffuse his own good, the less excellent, because it is implied in his love
and regard to himself. For his love to himself does not imply it any other-
wise, than as it implies a love to whatever is worthy and excellent. The ema-
nation of God's glory, is in itself worthy and excellent, and so God delights in
it j and his delight in this excellent thing, is implied in his love to himself, or
his own fulness ; because that is the fountain, and so the sum and comprehen-
sion of every thing that is excellent. And the matter standing thus, it is evi-
dent that these things cannot derogate from the excellency of this disposition
in God, to an emanation of his own fulness, or communication of good to the
creature.
Nor does God's inclination to communicate good in this manner, i. e. from
regard to himself, or delight in his own glory, at all diminish the freeness of
his beneficence in this communication. This will appear, if we consider particu-
larly in what ways doing good to others from self-love, may be inconsistent with
the freeness of beneficence. And I conceive there are only these two ways :
1. When any does good to another from confined self-love, that is opposite
to a general benevolence. This kind of self-love is properly called selfishness.
In some sense, the most benevolent, generous person in the world, seeks his
own happiness in doing good to others, because he places his happiness in their
good. His mind is so enlarged as to take them, as it were, into himself. Thus,
when they are happy, he feels it, he partakes with them, and is happy in their
happiness. This is so far from being inconsistent with the freeness of benefi-
cence, that on the contrary, free benevolence and kindness consists in it. The
most free beneficence that can be in men, is doing good, not from a confined
selfishness, but from a disposition to general benevolence, or love to beings in
general.
But now, with respect to the Divine Being, there is no such thing as such
confined selfishness in him, or a love to himself, opposite to general benevo-
lence. It is impossible, because he comprehends all entity, and all excellence
in his own essence. The first Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect,
Being in general ; and comprehends universal existence, as was observed be-
fore. God, in his benevolence to his creatures, cannot have his heart enlarged
in such a manner as to take in beings that he finds, who are originally out of
himself, distinct and independent. This cannot be in an infinite being, who
exists alone from eternity. But he, from his goodness, as it were enlarges
himself in a more excellent and divine manner. This is by communicating and
diffusing himself; and so instead of finding, making objects of his benevolence ;
not by taking into himself what he finds distinct from himself, and so partak-
ing of their good, and being happy in them, but by flowing forth, and express-
ing himself in them, and making them to partake of him, and rejoicing in him-
self expressed in them, nnd communicated to them.
END IN CREATION. 221
2. Another thing, in doing good to others from self-love, that derogates from
the freeness of the goodness, is doing good to others from dependence on them
for the good we need or desire ; which dependence obliges. So that in our
beneficence we are not self-moved; but as it were constrained by something
without ourselves. But it has been particularly shown already, that God's
making himself his end, in the manner that has been spoken of, argues no de-
pendence, but is consistent with absolute independence and self-sufficience.
And I would here observe, that there is something in that disposition in God
to communicate goodness, which shows him to be independent and self-moved
in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of crea-
tures. Creatures, even the most gracious of them, are not so independent and
self-moved* in their goodness, but that in all the exercises of it, they are excited
by some object that they find ; something appearing good, or in some respect
worthy of regard, presents itself, and moves their kindness. But God, being
all and alone, is absolutely self-moved. The exercises of his communicative dis-
position are absolutely from within himself, not finding any thing, or any object
to excite them or draw them forth ; but all that is good and worthy in the
object, and the very being of the object, proceeding from the overflowing of his
fulness.
These things show that the supposition of God's making himself his last
end, in the manner spoken of, does not at all diminish the creature's obligation
to gratitude, for communications of good it receives. For if it lessen its obliga-
tion, it must be on one of the following accounts. Either, that the creature has not
so much benefit by it, or that the disposition it flows from is not proper goodness,
not having so direct a tendency to the creature's benefit, or that the disposition
is not so virtuous and excellent in its kind, or that the beneficence is not so free.
But it has been observed that none of these things take place, with regard to
that disposition, which has been supposed to have excited God to create the
world.
I confess there is a degree of indistinctness and obscurity in the close con-
sideration of such subjects, and a great imperfection in the expressions we use
concerning them, arising unavoidably from the infinite sublimity of the subject,
and the incomprehensibleness of those things that are divine. Hence revela-
tion is the surest guide in these matters, and what that teaches shall in the next
place be considered. Nevertheless, the endeavors used to discover what the
voice of reason is, so far as it can go, may serve to prepare the way, by obvia-
ting cavils insisted on by many ; and to satisfy us that what the Word of God
says of the matter, is not unreasonable, and thus prepare our minds for a more
full acquiescence in the instructions it gives, according to the more natural and
genuine sense of words and expressions, we find often used there concerning
this subject
222 END IN CREATION.
CHAPTER II.
WHEREIN IT IS INQUIRED, WHAT IS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE HOLY SCRIPTURES
CONCERNING GOD'S LAST END IN THE CREATION OF THE WORLD.
SECTION I.
The Scriptures represent God as making himself his own last end in the creation of
the world.
It is manifest, that the Scriptures speak, on all occasions, as though God
made, himself his end in all his works ; and as though the same Being, who is
the first cause of all things, were the supreme and last end of all things. Thus
in Isa. xliv. 6, " Thus saith the Lord, the King of Israel, and his Redeemer the
Lord of Hosts, I am the first, I also am the last, and besides me there is no God."
Chap, xlviii. 12, " I am the first, and I am the last." Rev. i. 8, " I am Alpha and
Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and was, and
which is to come, the Almighty." Verse 11, "I am Alpha and Omega, the
first and the last." Verse 17, " I am the first and the last." Chap. xxi. 6,
" And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the
end." Chap. xxii. 13, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end,
the first and the last."
And when God is so often spoken of as the last as well as the first, and the
end as well as the beginning, what is meant (or at least implied) is, that as he
is the first efficient cause and fountain from whence all things originate ; so he
is the last final cause for which they are made ; the final term to which they all
tend in their ultimate issue. This seems to be the most natural import of these
expressions ; and is confirmed by other parallel passages ; as Rom. xi. 36,
" For of him, and through him, and to him are all things." Col. i. 16, " For
by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visi-
ble and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or
powers ; all things were created by him, and for him." Heb. ii. 10, " For it be-
came him, by whom are all things, and for whom are all things." In Prov. xvi.
4, it is said expressly, " The Lord hath made all things for himself."
And the manner is observable, in which God is said to be the last, to whom,
and for whom are all things. It is evidently spoken of as a meet and suitable
thing, a branch of his glory ; a meet prerogative of the great, infinite and eter-
nal Being ; a thing becoming the dignity of him who is infinitely above all other
beings ; from whom all things are, and by whom they consist, and in compari-
son with whom, all other things are as nothing.
SECTION II.
Wherein some positions are advanced concerning a just method of arguing in this
affair, from what we find in holy Scriptures.
We have seen that the Scriptures speak of the creation of the world as being
for God, as its end. What remains therefore to be inquired into, is, Which way
do the Scriptures represent God as making himself his end?
END IN CREATION. 223
It is evident that God does not make his existence or being the end of the
creation ; nor can he be supposed to do so without great absurdity. His being
and existence cannot be conceived of but as prior to any of God's acts or de-
signs ; they must be presupposed as the ground of them. Therefore it cannot
be in this way that God makes himself the end of his creating the world. He
cannot create the world to the end that he may have existence ; or may have
such attributes and perfections, and such an essence. Nor do the Scriptures give
the least intimation of any such thing. Therefore, what divine effect, or what
it is in relation to God, that is the thing which the Scripture teacheth us to be
the end he aimed at in his works of creation, in designing of which, he makes
himself his end.
In order to a right understanding of the Scripture doctrine, and drawing just
inferences from what we find said in the word of God relative to this matter ;
so to open the way to a true and definitive answer to the above inquiry, I would
lay down the following positions.
Position 1. That which appears to be spoken of as God's ultimate end in
his works of providence in general, we may justly suppose to be his last end in
the work of creation. — This appears from what was observed before (under the
fifth particular of the introduction) which I need not now repeat.
Position 2. When any thing appears by the Scripture to be the /ast end of
some of the works of God, which thing appears, in fact, to be the result, not
only of this work, but of God's works in general ; and although it be not
mentioned as the end of those works, but only of some of them, yet being
actually the result of other works as well as that, and nothing appears peculiar,
in the nature of the case, that renders it a fit, and beautiful and valuable result
of those particular works, more than of the rest ; but it appears with equal rea-
son desirable and valuable in the case of all works, of which it is spoken in
the word of God as (and seen in fact to be) the effect; we may justly infer,
that thing to be the last end of those other works also. For we must suppose
it to be on account of the valuableness of the effect, that it is made the end of
those works which it is expressly spoken of as the end ; and this effect, by the
supposition, being equally, and in like manner the result of the work, and of
the same value, it is but reasonable to suppose, that it is the end of the work,
of which it is naturally the consequence, in one case as well as in another.
Position 3. The ultimate end of God's creating the world, being also (as
was before observed) the last end of all God's works of providence, and that
in the highest sense, and being above all other things important, we may well
presume that this end will be chiefly insisted on in the word of God, in the ac-
count it gives of God's designs and ends in his works of providence — and there-
fore, if there be any particular thing, that we find more frequently mentioned in
Scripture as God's ultimate aim in his works of providence, than any thing else,
this is a presumption that this is the supreme and ultimate end of God's works in
general, and so the end of the work of creation.
Position 4. That which appears from the word of God to be his last end
with respect to the moral world, or God's last end in the creation and disposal
of the intelligent part of the system, and in the moral government of the
world, that is God's last end in the work of creation in general. Because it is
evident, from the constitution of the world itself, as well as from the word of
God, that the moral part is the end of all the rest of the creation. The inani-
mate unintelligent part is made for the rational as much as a house is prepared
for the inhabitant. And it is evident also from reason and the word of Grod,
that it is with regard to what is moral in them, or for the sake of some moral
224 END IN CREATION.
good in them, that moral agents are made and the world made for them. But
it is further evident that whatsoever is the last end of that part of creation that
is the end of all the rest, and for which all the rest of the world was made,
must be the last end of the whole. If all the other parts of a watch are made
for the hand of the watch, to move that aright, and for a due and proper
regulation of that, then it will follow, that the last end of the hand, is the last
end of the whole machine.
Position 5. That, which appears from the Scripture to be God's last end in
the chief work or works of his providence, we may well determine is God's last
end in creating the world. For as was observed, we may justly infer the end
of a thing from the use of it. We may justly infer the end of a clock, a chariot,
a ship, or water, engine from the main use to which it is applied. But God's pro-
vidence is his use of the world he has made. And if there be any work or
works of providence that are evidently God's main work or works, herein
appears and consists the main use that God makes of the creation. — From these
two last positions we may infer the next, viz.
Position 6. Whatever appears by the Scriptures to be God's last end in his
main work or works of providence towards the moral world, that we justly infer
to be the last end of the creation of the world. Because, as was just now ob-
served, the moral world is the chief part of the creation and the end of the rest ;
and God's last end in creating that part of the world, must be his last end in
the creation of the whole. And it appears by the last position, that the end of
God's main work or works of providence towards them, or the main use he puts
them to, shows the last end for which he has made them ; and consequently the
main end for which he has made the whole world.
Position 7. That which divine revelation shows to be God's last end with
respect to that part of the moral world which are good, or which are according
to his mind, or such as he would have them be ; I say that which is God's last
end with respect to these (i. e. his last end in their being, and in their being
good), this we must suppose to be the last end of God's creating the world.
For it has been already shown that God's last end in the moral part of creation
must be the end of the whole. But his end in that part of the moral world that
are good, must be the last end for which he has made the moral world in gen-
eral. For therein consists the goodness of a thing, viz., in its fitness to answer
its end : or, at least this must be goodness in the eyes of the author of that
thing. For goodness in his eyes is its agreeableness to his mind. But an
agreeableness to his mind in what he makes for some end or use, must be an
agreeableness or fitness to that end. For his end in this case is his mind. That
which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind with respect to that
thing. And therefore they are good moral agents, who are fitted for the end
for which God has made moral agents : as they are good machines, instruments
and utensils that are fitted to the end they are designed for. And consequently
that which is the chief end to which in being good they are fitted, that is the
chief end of utensils. So that which is the chief end to which good created
moral agents in being good are fitted, this is the chief end of moral agents, or
the moral part of the creation ; and consequently of the creation in general.
Position 8. That, which the word of God requires the intelligent and moral
part of the world to seek as their main end, or to have respect to in that they
do, and regulate all their conduct by, as their ultimate and highest end, that we
have reason to suppose is the last end for which God has made them ; and con*
sequently, by position fourth, the last end for which he has made the whole
world. A main difference between the intelligent and moral parts, and the rest
END IN CREATION. 225
of the world, lies in this, that the former are capable of knowing their Creator,
and the end for which he made them, and capable of actively complying with
his design in their creation and promoting it ; while other creatures cannot pro-
mote the design of their creation, only passively and eventually. And seeing
they are capable of knowing the end for which their author has made them,
it is doubtless their duty to fall in with it. Their wills ought to comply with the
will of the Creator in this respect, in mainly seeking the same as their last end
which God mainly seeks as their last end. This must be the law of nature and
reason with respect to them. And we must suppose that God's revealed law,
and the law of nature agree ; and that his will, as a lawgiver, must agree with
his will as a Creator. Therefore we justly infer, that the same thing which
God's revealed law requires intelligent creatures to seek as their last and
greatest end, that God their Creator has made their last end, and so the end of
the creation of the world.
Position 9. We may well suppose that what seems in holy Scripture from
time to time to be spoken of as the main end of the goodness of the good part
of the moral world, so that the respect and relation their virtue or goodness has
to that end, is what chiefly makes it valuable and desirable ; I say, we may
well suppose that to be the thing which is God's last end in the creation of the
moral world ; and so by position fourth, of the whole world. For the end of
the goodness of a thing, is the end of the thing. Herein, it was observed before,
must consist the goodness or valuablencss of any thing in the eyes of him that
made it for his use, viz., its being good for that use, or good with respect to the
end for which he made it.
Position 10. That which persons who are described in Scripture as approved
saints, and set forth as examples of piety, sought as their last and highest end
in the things which they did, and which are mentioned as parts of their holy con-
versation, or instances of their good and approved behavior ; that we must sup-
pose, was what they ought to seek as their last end ; and consequently by the
preceding position was the same with God's last end in the creation of the
world.
Position 11. That which appears by the word of God to be that end or
event, in the desire of which, the souls of the good parts of the moral world, es-
pecially of the best, and in their best frames, do most naturally and directly
exercise their goodness in, and in expressing of their desire of this event or end.
they do most properly and directly express their respect to God ; we may, I
say, well suppose, that event or end to be the chief and ultimate end of a
spirit of piety and goodness, and God's chief end in making the moral world,
and so the whole world. For doubtless the most direct and natural desire and
tendency of a spirit of true goodness in the good and best part of the moral
world is to the chief end of goodness, and so the chief end of the creation of the
moral world. And in what else can the spirit of true respect and friendship to
God be expressed by way of desire, than desires of the same end, which God
himself chiefly and ultimately desires and seeks in making them and all other
things 1
Position 12. Since the holy Scriptures teach us that Jesus Christ is the
head of the moral world, and especially of all the good part of it ; the chief of
God's servants, appointed to be the head of his saints and angels, and set forth as
the chief and most perfect pattern and example of goodness ; we majr well sup-
pose by the foregoing positions, that what he sought as his last end, was God's
last end in the creation of the world.
Vou II 29
226 END IN CREATION.
SECTION III.
Particular texts of Scripture, that show that God's glory is an ultimate End of the
Creation.
What God says in Isa. xlviii. 1 1 , naturally leads us to suppose, that the way
in which God makes himself his end in his work or works which he does for his
own sake, is in making his glory his end. " For my own sake, even for my
own sake will 1 do it. For how should my name be polluted ? and I will not
give my glory to another." Which is as much as to say, I will obtain my end,
I will not forego my glory : another shall not take this prize from me. It is
pretty evident here, that God's name and his glory, which seems to intend the
same thing (as shall be observed more particularly afterwards), are spoken of
as his last end in the great work mentioned, not as an inferior, subordinate end,
subservient to the interest of others. The words are emphatical. The emphasis
and repetition constrain us to understand that what God does, is ultimately for
his own sake : ■ For my own sake, even for my own sake will I do it."
So the words of the apostle, in Rom. xi. 36, naturally lead us to suppose
that the way in which all things are to God, is in being for his glory. " For
of him, and through him, and to him are all things ; to whom be glory forever
and ever. Amen." In the preceding context, the apostle observes the mar-
vellous disposals of divine wisdom, for causing all things to be to him in their
final issue and result, as they are from him at first, and governed by him. His
discourse shows how God contrived and brought this to pass in his disposition
of things, viz., by setting up the kingdom of Christ in the world ; leaving the
Jews, and calling the Gentiles ; and in what he would hereafter do in bringing
in the Jews with the fulness of the Gentiles ; with the circumstances of these
wonderful works, so as greatly to show his justice and his goodness, magnify his
grace, and manifest the sovereignty and freeness of it, and the absolute depend-
ence of all on him — and then in the four last verses, breaks out into a most
pathetic, rapturous exclamation, expressing his great admiration of the depth
of divine wisdom in the steps he takes for the attaining his end, and causing all
things to be to him ; and finally, he expresses a joyful consent to God's excel-
lent design in all to glorify himself, in saying, " to him be glory forever ;" as
much as to say, as all things are so wonderfully ordered for his glory, so let
him have the glory of all, forevermore.
2. The glory of God is spoken of in holy Scripture as the last end for which
that part of the moral world that are good were made. Thus in Isaiah xliii. 6,
7, " I will say to the North, give up, and to the South, keep not back. — Bring
my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth, even every one
that is called by my name ; for I have created him for my glory, I have formed
him, yea, I have made him." Isaiah lx. 21, "Thy people also shall be all
righteous. They shall inherit the land forever ; the branch of my planting, the
work of my hand, that I may be glorified." Chap, lxl 3, " That they may be
called trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that he might be glorified."
In the$e places we see that the glory of God is spoken of as the end of God's
saints, the end for which he makes them, i. e. either gives them being, or gives
them a being as saints, or both. It is said that God has made and formed them
to be his sons and daughters, for his own glory ; that they are trees of his
planting, the work of his hands, as trees of righteousness, that he might be
END IN CREATION. 227
glorified. And if we consider the words, especially as taken with the context
in each of the places, it will appear quite unnatural to suppose that God's glory-
is here spoken of only as an end inferior and subordinate to the happiness of
God's people ; or as a prediction that God would create, form and plant them
that he might be glorified, that so God's people might be happy. On the con-
trary, if we take the places with the context, they will appear rather as promises
of making God's people happy, that God therein might he glorified. So is
that in chapter xliii., as we shall see plainly if we take the whole that is said
from the beginning of the chapter. It is wholly a promise of a future, great,
and wonderful work of God's power and grace, delivering his people from all
misery, and making them exceeding happy ; and then the end of all, or the
sum of God's design in all, is declared to be God's own glory. " I have re-
deemed thee, I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine. I will be with thee.
When thou walkest through the fire thou shalt not be burnt, nor the flame kindle
upon thee — thou art precious and honorable in my sight. I will give men for
thee, and people for thy life. Fear not, I am with thee. I will bring my sons
from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth ; every one that is call-
ed by my n ame, for I have created him for my glory."
So it plainly is, chapter lx. 21. The whole chapter is made up of nothing
but promises of future, exceeding happiness to God's church. But for brevity's
sake, let us take only the two preceding verses. " The sun shall be no more
thy light by day, neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee ;
but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory.
Thy sun shall no more go down, neither shall thy moon withdraw itself; for
the Lord shall be thine everlasting light ; and the days of thy mourning shall
be ended. Thy people also shall be all righteous ; they shall inherit the land
forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hands," and then the end
of all is added, " that Imight be glorified." All the preceding promises are
plainly mentioned as so many parts or constituents of the great and exceeding
happiness of God's people ; and God's glory is mentioned rather as God's end,
or the sum of his design in this happiness, than this happiness as the end of this
glory. Just in like manner is the promise in the third verse of the next chap-
ter. " To appoint to them that mourn in Zion, to give to them beauty for ashes,
the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness,
that they might be called trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord,
that he might be glorified." The work of God promised to be effected, is plainly
an accomplishment of the joy, gladness and happiness of God's people, instead
of their mourning and sorrow ; and the end in which the work issues, or that in
which God's design in this work is obtained and summed up, is his glory. This
proves by the seventh position, that God's glory is the end of the creation.
The same thing may be argued from Jer. xiii. 11:" For as a girdle cleaveth
to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of
Israel, and the whole house of Judah, saith the Lord ; that they might be unto
rae for a people, and for a name, and for a praise, and for a glory, but they
would not hear." That is, God sought to make them to be his own holy peo-
ple ; or, as the apostle expresses it, his peculiar people, zealous of good works ;
that so they might be a glory to him, as girdles were used in those days for
ornament and beauty, and as badges of dignity and honor.* Which is agreea-
ble to the places observed before, that speak of the church as the glory of Christ.
Now when God speaks of himself, as seeking a peculiar and holy people
for himself, to be for his glory and honor, as a man that seeks an ornament and
* See verse 9, and also Isaiah i;i. 24, xxii. 21, and xxiii. 10. 2 Sara, xviii. 11. Exod.xxviii. 8,
228 END IN CREATION.
bado-e of he nor tor his glory, it is not natural to understand it merely of a subor-
dinate end, as though God had no respect to himself in it, but only the good of
others. If so, the comparison would not be natural ; for men are commonly
wont to seek their own glory and honor in adorning themselves, and dignifying
themselves with badges of honor, out of respect to themselves.
The same doctrine seems to be taught, Eph. i. 5, 6. " Having predestinated
us to the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, unto himself, according to the
good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace."
The same may be argued from Isaiah xliv. 23, " For the Lord hath redeemed
Jacob, he hath glorified himself in Israel." And chapter xlix. 3, " Thou art
my servant Jacob, in whom I will be glorified." John xvii. 10, " And all mine
are thine, and thine are mine, and I am glorified in them." 2 Thess. i. 10,
" When he shall come to be glorified in his saints." Verses 11, 12, " Where-
fore also we pray always for you, that our God would count you worthy of his
calling, and fulfil all the good pleasure of his goodness, and the work of faith
with power ; that the name of our Lord Jesus may be glorified in you, and ye
in him, according to the grace of God and our Lord Jesus Christ."
3. The Scripture speaks from time to time of God's glory, as though it were
his ultimate end of the goodness of the moral part of the creation; and that end,
in a respect and relation to which chiefly it is, that the value or worth of their
virtue consists. As in Phil. i. 10, 11, " That ye may approve things that are
excellent, that ye may be sincere, and without offence till the day of Christ :
being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are by Jesus Christ, unto the
glory and praise of God." Here the apostle shows how the fruits of righteous-
ness in them are valuable and how they answer their end, viz., in being " by
Jesus Christ to the praise and glory of God." John xv. 8, " Herein is my
Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit." Signifying that by this means it is,
that the °reat end of religion is to be answered. And in 1 Peter iv. 11, the
apostle directs the Christians to regulate all their religious performances, with
reference to that one end. " If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God.
If any man minister, let him do it as of the ability which God giveth, that God
in all things may be glorified ; to whom be praise and dominion forever and
ever. Amen." And from time to time, embracing and practising true religion,
and repenting of sin, and turning to holiness, is expressed by glorifying God,
as though that were the sum and end of the whole matter. Rev. xi. 13, " And
in the earthquake were slain of men seven thousand ; and the remnant were
affrighted, and gave glory to the God of heaven." So, Rev. xiv. 6, 7, " And
I saw another angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to
preach to them that dwell on the earth ; — saying, with a loud voice, fear God,
and give glory to him." As though this were the sum and end of that virtue
and religion, which was the grand design of preaching the gospel everywhere
through the world. Rev. xvi. 9, "And repented not, to give him glory."
Which is as much as to say, they did not forsake their sins and turn to true re-
ligion, that God might receive that which is the great end he seeks, in the
religion he requires of men. See to the same purpose, Psalm xxii. 21 — 23,
Isa. lxvi. 19, xxiv. 15, xxv. 3, Jer. xiii. 15, 16, Dan. v. 23, Rom. xv. 5, 6.
And as the exercise of true religion and virtue in Christians is summarily
expressed by their glorifying God ; so when the good influence of this on others,
as bringing them by the example to turn to the ways and practice of true good-
ness, is spoken of, it is expressed in the same manner. Matth. v. 16, " Let
your light so shine before men, that others seeing- your good works, may glo-
rify your Father which is in heaven." 1. Pet. ii. 12, " Having your conver-
END IN CREATION. 229
sation honest among the Gentiles, that whereas they speak evil against you as
evil doers, they may by your good works which they behold, glorify God in the
day of visitation."
That the ultimate end of moral goodness, or righteousness, is answered in
God's glory being attained, is supposed in the objection which the apostle
makes, or supposes some will make, in Rom. iii. 7 : " For if the truth of God
hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why am I judged as a sin-
ner V i. e., seeing the great end of righteousness is answered by my sin, in
God's being glorified, why is my sin condemned and punished ; and why is
not my vice equivalent to virtue ?
And the glory of God is spoken of as that wherein consists the value and
end of particular graces ; as of faith. Rom. iv. 20 ; " He staggered not at the
promise of God through unbelief, but was strong in faith, giving glory to
God." Phil. ii. 11, "That every tongue should confess that Jesus is the
Lord, to the glory of God the Father/' Of repentance, Josh. vi. 19, " Give,
I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto him."
Of Charity ; 2 Cor. viii. 19, " With this grace, which is administered by us, to
the glory of the same Lord, and declaration of your ready mind." Thanks-
giving and praise ; Luke vii. 18, " There are not found that returned to give
glory to God, save this stranger." Psalm 1. 23, " Whoso offereth praise glo-
rifieth me, and to him that ordereth his conversation aright, wrill I show the
salvation of God." Concerning which last place it may be observed, God here
seems to say this to such as abounded in their sacrifices and outward ceremonies
of religion, as taking it for granted, and as what they knew already, and sup-
posed in their religious performances, that the end of all religion was to glorify
God. They supposed they did this in the best manner, in offering a multitude
of sacrifices (see the preceding part of the Psalm). But here God corrects this
mistake, and informs that this grand end of religion is not attained this way, but
m offering the more spiritual sacrifices of praise and a holy conversation.
In fine, the words of the apostle in 1 Cor. vi. 20, are worthy of particular
notice : " Ye are not your own, for ye are bought with a price ; therefore glorify
God in your body, and in your spirit, which are his." Here not only is glorify-
ing God spoken of, as what summarily comprehends the end of that religion
and service of God, which is the end of Christ's redeeming us ; but here I
would further remark this, that the apostle in this place urges, that inasmuch
as we are not our own, but bought for God, that we might be his ; therefore
we ought not to act as if we were our own, but as God's ; and should not use
the members of our bodies, or faculties of our souls for ourselves,. as making
ourselves our end, but for God, as making him our end. And he expresses
the way in which we are to make God our end, viz., in making his glory our
end : " Therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are his."
Here it cannot be pretended, that though Christians are indeed required to
make God's glory their end ; yet it is but as a subordinate end, as subservient
to their own happiness, as a higher end ; for then in. acting chiefly and ulti-
mately for their own selves, they would use themselves more as their own, than
as God's ; which is directly contrary to the design of the apostle's exhortation,
and the argument he is upon ; which is, that we should give ourselves, as it
were, away from ourselves to God, and use ourselves as his, and not our own,
acting for his sake, and not our own sakes. Thus it is evident by Position 9,
that the glory of God rs the last end for which he created the world.
4. There are some things in the word of God, that lead us to suppose that
it requires of men, that they should desire and seek God's glory, as their high-
230 END IN CREATION.
est and last end in what they do. As particularly the passage last mentioned.
This appears from what has been just now observed upon it. The same may
be argued from 1 Cor. x. 30 : " Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatso-
ever ye do, do all to the glory of God." And 1 Pet iv. 11, " That God in all
things may be glorified ;" which was mentioned before. And it may be argued
that Christ requires his followers should desire and seek God's glory in the first
place, and above all things else, from that prayer which he gave his disciples, as
the pattern and rule for the direction of his followers in their prayers. The first
petition of which is, " Hallowed be thy name." Which in Scripture language
is the same with " glorified be thy name ;" as is manifest from Lev. x. 3, Ezek.
xxviii. 22, and many other places. Now our last and highest end is doubtless
what should be first in our desires, and consequently first in our prayers ; and there-
fore we may argue, that since Christ directs that God's glory should be first in
our prayers, therefore this is our last end. This is further confirmed by the conclu-
sion of the Lord's prayer, " For thine is the kingdom, the power and glory."
Which, as it stands in connection with the rest of the prayer, implies that we
desire and ask all these things, which are mentioned in each petition, with a sub-
ordination, and in subservience to the dominion and glory of God ; in which all
our desires ultimately terminate, as their last end. God's glory and dominion
are the two first things mentioned in the prayer, and are the subject of the first
half of the prayer ; and they are the two last things mentioned in the same
prayer, in its conclusion : and God's glory is the Alpha and Omega in the prayer.
From these things We may argue, according to Position 8, that God's glorv-
is the last end of the creation.
5. The glory of God appears, by the account given in the word of God, to
be that end or event, in the earnest desires of which, and in their delight in
which, the best part of the moral world, and when in their best frames, do most
naturally express the direct tendency of the spirit of true goodness, and give
vent to the virtuous and pious affections of their heart, and » do most properly
and directly testify their supreme respect to their Creator. This is the way in
which the holy apostles, from time to time, gave vent to the ardent exercises of
their piety, and expressed and breathed forth their regard to the Supreme Beinr/;.
Rom. xi. 36, " To whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." Chap. xvi. f.7,
rf To God only wise, be glory, through Jesus Christ, forever. Amen." Gai. i.
4, 5, " Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from this pres-
ent evil world, acording to the will of God and our Father, to whom be giory
foiever and ever. Amen." 2 Tim. iv. 18, " And the Lord shall deliver me
from every jevil work, and wrill preserve me to his heavenly kingdom ; to whom
be glory forever and ever. Amen." Eph. iii. 21, " Unto him be glory in the
church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end." Heb. xiii. 21,
" Through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." Phil. iv.
20, " Now unto God and our Father, be glory forever and ever. Amen." 2
Pet. iii. 18, " To him be glory both now and forever. Amen." Jude 25,
" To the only wise God our Saviour, be glory and majesty, dominion and power,
both now and ever. Amen." Rev. i. 5, 6, " Unto him that loved us &c. — to
him be glory and dominion forever and ever. Amen." It was in this way that
holy David, the sweet Psalmist of Israel, vented the ardent tendencies and desires
of his pious heart. 1 Chron. xvi. 28, 29, " Give unto the Loud, ye kindreds of
the people, give unto the Lord glory and strength ; give unto the Lord the
glory due unto his name." We have much the same expressions again, Psa).
xxix. 1, 2, and lxix. 7, 8. See also, Psal. lvii. 5, lxxii. 18, 19, cxv. 1. So the
whole church of God, through all parts of the earth. Isa. xlii. 10 — 12. In
END IN CREATION. 231
like manner the saints and angels in heaven express the piety of their hearts.
Rev. iv. 9, 11, and v. 11—14, and vii. 12. This is the event that the hearts
of the seraphim especially exult in, as appears by Isa. vi. 2, 3, " Above it stood
the seraphim. And one cried unto another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the
Lord of Hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." So at the birth of Christ,
Luke ii. 14, " Glory to God in the highest," &c.
It is manifest that these holy persons in earth and heaven, in thus express-
ing their desires of the glory of God, have respect to it, not merely as a subordi-
nate end, or merely for the sake of something else; but as that which they look
upon in itself valuable, and in the highest degree so. It would be absurd to
say, that in these ardent exclamations, they are only giving vent to their vehement
benevolence to their fellow creatures, and expressing their earnest desires that
God might be glorified, that so his subjects may be made happy by the means.
It is evident it is not so much love, either to themselves, or fellow creatures,
which they express, as their exalted and supreme regard to the most high and
infinitely glorious Being. When the church says, " Not unto us, not unto us, 0
Jehovah, but to thy name give glory," it would be absurd to say, that she only
desires that God may have glory, as a necessary or convenient means of their
own advancement and felicity. From these things it appears, by the eleventh
position, that God's glory is the end of the creation.
6. The Scripture leads us to suppose, that Christ sought God's glory, as his
highest and last end. John vii. 18, " He that speaketh of himself, seeketh his
own glory ; but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and
no unrighteousness is in him." When Christ says, he did not seek his own
glory, we cannot reasonably understand him, that he had no regard to his own
glory, even the glory of the human nature ; for the glory of that nature was part
of the reward promised him, and of the joy set before him. But we must un-
derstand him, that this was not his ultimate aim ; it was not the end that chiefly
governed his conduct ; and therefore when, in opposition to this, in the latter
part of the sentence, he says, " But he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the
same is true," &c, it is natural from the antithesis to understand him, that this
was his ultimate aim, his supreme governing end. John xii. 27, 28, " Now
is my soul troubled, and what shall I say ? Father, save me from this hour :
but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name." Christ
was now going to Jerusalem, and expected in a few days there to be crucified ,
and the prospect of his last sufferings, in this near approach, was very terrible
to him. Under this distress of mind, in so terrible a view, he supports himself
with a prospect of what would be the consequence of his sufferings, viz., God's
glory. Now, it is the end that supports the agent in any difficult work that
he undertakes, and above all others, his ultimate and supreme end. For this is
above all others valuable in his eyes ; and so, sufficient to countervail the diffi-
culty of the means. That is, the end, which is in itself agreeable and sweet to
him, which ultimately terminates his desires, is the centre of rest and support ;
and so must be the fountain and sum of all the delight and comfort he has in his
prospects, with respect to his work. Now Christ has his soul straitened and
distressed with a view of that which was infinitely the most difficult part of his
work, which was just at hand. Now certainly if his mind seeks support in the
conflict from a view of his end, it must most naturally repair to the highest end,
which is the proper fountain of all support in this case. We may well suppose,
that when his soul conflicts with the appearance of the most extreme difficulties,
it would resort for support to the idea of his supreme and ultimate end, the foun-
tain of all the support and comfort he has in the means, or the work. The same
END IN CREATION.
thing, viz., Christ's seeding the glory of God as his ultimate end, is manifest by
what Christ says, when he comes yet nearer to the hour of his last sufferings, in
that remarkable prayer, the last he ever made with his disciples, on the evening
before his crucifixion ; wherein he expresses the sum of his aims and desires. His
first words are, " Father, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may
glorify thee." As this is his first request, we may suppose it to be his supreme
request and desire, and what he ultimately aimed at in all. If we consider what
follows to the end, all the rest that is said in the prayer, seems to be but an ampli-
fication of this great request.
On the whole, I think it is pretty manifest, that Jesus Christ soughx
the glory of God as his highest and last end ; and that therefore, by position
twelfth, this was God's last end in the creation of the world.
7. It is manifest from Scripture, that God's glory is the last end of that great
work of providence, the work of redemption by Jesus Christ. This is manifest
from what is just now observed, of its being the end ultimately sought by Jesus
Christ the Redeemer. And if we further consider the texts mentioned in the
proof of that, and take notice of the context, it will be very evident, that it was
what Christ sought as his last end, in that great work which he came into the
world upon, viz., to procure redemption for his people. It is manifest that Christ
professes in John vii. 18, that he did not seek his own glory in what he did, but
the glory of him that sent him. He means that he did not seek his own glory,
but the glory of him that sent him, in the work of his ministry ; the work he
performed, and which he came into the world to perform, and which his Fathei
sent him to work out, which is the work of redemption. And with respect .to
that text, John xii. 27, 28, it has been already observed, that Christ comforted
himself in the view of the extreme difficulty of his work, which was the work
of redemption, in the prospect of that which he had respect to, and rejoiced in,
as the highest, ultimate and most valuable excellent end of that work, which he
set his heart upon, and delighted most in. And in the answer that the Father
made him from heaven at that time, in the latter part of the same verse, " I have
both glorified it, and will glorify it again," the meaning plainly is, that God had
glorified his name in what Christ had done, in the work he sent him upon, and
would glorify it again, and to a greater degree, in what he should further do,
and in the success thereof. Christ shows that he, understood it thus, in what he
says upon it, when the people took notice of it, wondering at the voice ; some
saying, that it thundered, others, that an angel spake to him. Christ says,
" This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes." And then he says
(exulting in the prospect of this glorious end and success), " Now is the judgment
of this world ; now is the prince of this world cast out, and I, if I be lifted up
from the earth, will draw all men unto me." In the success of the same work
of redemption, he places his own glory, as was observed before, in these words,
in the 23d and 24th verses of the same chapter : " The hour is come, that the
Son of Man should be glorified. Verily, verily I say unto you, except a corn of
wheat fall into the ground, it abideth alone ; but if it die, it bringeth forth much
fruit."
So it is manifest that when he seeks his own and his Father's glory, in that
prayer, John xvii. (which, it has been observed, he then seeks as his last end),
he seeks it as the end of that great work he came into the world upon, which
he is now about to finish in his death. What follows through the whole pray-
er, plainly shows this ; and particularly the 4th and 5th verses. " I have
glorified thee on the earth : I have finished the work which thou gavest me to
do. And now, 0 Father, glorify thou me with thine own self." Here it is
END IN CREATION. 233
pretty plain that declaring to his Father, that he had glorified him on earth, and
finished the work God gave him to do, meant that he had finished the work
which God gave him to do for this end, viz., that he might be glorified He
had now finished that foundation that he came into the world to lay for his
glory. He had laid a foundation for his Father's obtaining his will, and the
utmost that he designed. By which it is manifest, that God's glory was the
utmost of his design, or his ultimate end in this great work.
And it is manifest by John xiii. 31, 32, that the glory of the Father, and his
own glory, are what Christ exulted in, in the prospect of his approaching suf-
ferings, when Judas was gone out to betray him, as the end his heart was main-
ly set upon, and supremely delighted in. " Therefore when he was gone out,
Jesus said, Now is the Son of Man glorified, and God is glorified in him. If
God be glorified in him, God shall also glorify him in himself, and shall straight-
way glorify him."
That the glory of God is the highest and last end of the work of redemption,
is confirmed by the song of the angels at Christ's birth. Luke ii. 14, " Glory
to God in the highest, and on earth, peace and good will towards men." It
must be supposed that they knew what was God's last end in sending Christ into
the world : and that in their rejoicing on the occasion of his incarnation, their
minds would be most taken up with, and would most rejoice in that which was
most valuable and glorious in it ; which must consist in 'its relation to that
which was its chief and ultimate end. And we may further suppose, that the
thing which chiefly engaged their minds, as what was most glorious and joyful
in the affair, is what would be first expressed in that song which was to express
the sentiments of their minds, and exultation of their hearts.
The glory of the Father and the Son is spoken of as the end of the work of
redemption, in Phil. ii. 6 — 11, very much in the same manner as in John xii.
23, 28, and xiii. 31, 32, and xvii. 1, 4, 5, " Who being in the form of God,
made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and
was made in the likeness of men ; and being found in fashion as a man, he hum-
bled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross :
wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, &c, that
at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, and every tongue confess, that
Jesus is the Lord, to the glory of God the Father" So God's glory, or the
praise of his glory, is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Eph.
i. 3, &c, " Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath
blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ : according
as he hath chosen us in him. — Having predestinated us to the adoption of chil-
dren— to the praise of the glory of his grace." And in the continuance of the
same discourse concerning the redemption of Christ, in what follows in the
same chapter, God's glory is once and again mentioned as the great end of all.
Several things belonging to that great redemption are mentioned in the following
verses ; such as God's great wisdom in it, verse 8. The clearness of light grant-
ed through Christ, verse 9. God's gathering together in one, all things in
heaven and earth in Christ, verse 10. God's giving the Christians that were
first converted to the Christian faith from among the Jews, an interest in this
great redemption, verse 11. Then the great end is added, verse 12. "That
we should be to the praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ." And then
is mentioned the bestowing of the same great salvation on the Gentiles, in its
beginning or first fruits in the world, and in the completing it in another
world, in the two next verses. And then the same great end is added again :
" In whom ye also trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel oi
Vol. II. 30
234 END IN CREATION. '-
your salvation; in whom also, after that ye believed, ye were sealed with the
Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemp-
tion of the purchased possession, unto the praise of his glory" The same
thing is expressed much in the same manner, in 2 Cor. iv. 14, 15, " He which
raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise up us also by Jesus, and shall present us
with you. For all things are for your sake, that the abundance of grace might
through the thanksgiving of many, redound to the glory of God."
The same is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption in the Old Tes-
tament. Psal. lxxix. 9, " Help us, 0 God of our salvation, for the glory of thy
name ; deliver us and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake." So in the
prophecies of the redemption of Jesus Christ. Isa. xliv. 23, " Sing, 0 ye hea-
vens ; for the Lord hath done it ; shout, ye lower parts of the earth : break forth
into singing, ye mountains, 0 forest, and every tree therein ; for the Lord hath
redeemed Jacob, and glorified himself in Israel." Thus the works of creation
are called upon to rejoice at the attaining of the same end, by the redemption of
God's people, that the angels rejoiced at, when Christ was born. See also
chap, xlviii. 10, 11, and xliv. 3.
Thus it is evident that the glory of God is the ultimate end of the work of
redemption, — which is the chief work of providence towards the moral world,
as is abundantly manifest from Scripture : the whole universe being put in sub-
jection to Jesus Chpist ; all heaven and earth, angels and men being subject to
nim, as executing this office ; and put under him to that end, that all things may
be ordered by him, in subservience to the great designs of his redemption ; all
power, as he says, being given to him, in heaven and in earth, that he may give
eternal life to as many as the Father has given him ; and he, being exalted far
above all principality, and power, and might and dominion, and made head over
all things to the church. The angels being put in subjection to him, that he
may employ them all as ministering spirits, for the good of them that shall be
the heirs of his salvation ; and all things being so governed by their Redeemer
, for them that all things are theirs, whether things present or things to come ;
and all God's works of providence in the' moral government of the world, which
we have an account of in Scripture history, or that are foretold in Scripture pro-
phecy, being evidently subordinate to the great purposes and ends of this great
work. And besides, the wTork of redemption is that work, by which good men
are, as it were, created, or brought into being, as good men, or as restored to
holiness and happiness. The work of redemption is a new creation, according
to Scripture representation, whereby men are brought into a new existence, or
are made new creatures.
From these things it follows, according to the 5th, 6th and 7th positions,
that the glory of God is the last end of the creation of .the world.
8. The Scripture leads us to suppose, that God's glory is his last end in his
moral government of the world in general. This has been already shown
concerning several things that belong to God's moral government of the world.
As particularly, in the work of redemption, the chief of all his dispensations,
in his moral government of the world. And I have also observed it, with
respect to the duty which God requires of the subjects of his moral government,
in requiring them to seek his glory as their last end. And this is actually the
last end of the moral goodness required of them ; the end which gives their
moral goodness its chief value. And also, that it is what that person which
God has set at the head of the moral world, as its chief governor, even Jesus
Christ, seeks as his chief end. And it has been shown, that it is the chief end
for which that part of the moral world which are good, are made, or have theii
END IN CREATION. 235
existence as good. * now further observe, that this is the end of the establish-
ment of the public worship and ordinances of God among mankind. Hag.
i. 8, " Go up to the mountain, and bring wood, and build the house ; and I will
take pleasure in it, and I will be GLoniFiDE,saith the Loan." This is spoken of
as the end of God's promises of rewards, and of their fulfilment. 2 Cor. i. 20,
" For all the promises of God in him are yea, and in him amen, to the glory
of God by us." And this is spoken of as the end of the execution of God's
threatenings, in the punishment of sin. Num. xiv. 20 — 23, U And the Loud
said, I have pardoned according to thy word. But as truly as I live, all the
earth shall be filled with the glory of Jehovah. Because all these men, &c. —
Surely they shall not see the land." The glory of Jehovah is evidently here
spoken of, as that which he had regard to, as his highest and ultimate end ;
which, therefore, he could not fail of ; but must take place everywhere, and in
every case, through all parts of his dominion, whatever became of men. And
whatever abatements might be made, as to judgments deserved ; and whatever
changes might be made in the course of God's proceedings, from compassion to
sinners ; yet the attaining of God's glory was an end, which being ultimate and
supreme, must in no case whatsoever give place. This is spoken of as the end
of God's executing judgments on his enemies in this world. Exod. xiv. 17, 18,
" And I will get me honor (Ikhabhedha, I will be glorified) upon Pharaoh, and
upon all his host," &c. Ezek. xxviii. 22, " Thus saith the Lord God, Behold
I am against thee, O Zion, and I will be glorified in the midst of thee : and
they shall know that I am the Lord, when I shall have executed judgments in
her, and shall be sanctified in her." So Ezek. xxxix. 13, " Yea, all the
people of the land shall bury them : and it shall be to them a renown, the day
that I shall be glorified, saith the Lord God."
And this is spoken of as the end, both of the executions of wrath, and in
the glorious exercises of mercy, in the misery and happiness of another world.
Rom. ix. 22, 23, " What if God, willing to show his wrath, and make his
power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to
destruction ; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the
vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory." And this is spoken
of as the end of the day of judgment, which is the time appointed for the
highest exercises of God's authority as moral governor of the world ; and is, as
it were, the day of the consummation of God's moral government, with respect
to all his subjects in heaven, earth and hell. 2 Thess. i. 9, 10, " Who shall
be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and
from the glory of his power ; when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and
to be admired in all them that believe." Then his glory shall be obtained, with
respect both to saints and sinners.
From these things it is manifest by the fourth position, that God's glory is
the ultimate end of the creation of the world.
9. It appears from what has been already observed, that the glory of God is
spoken of in Scripture as the last end of many of God's works ; and it is plain
that this thing is in fact the issue and result of the works of God's common
providence, and of the creation of the world. Let us take God's glory in what
sense soever, consistent with its being something brought to pass, or a good at-
tained by any work of God, certainly it is the consequence of these works ; and
besides it is expressly so spoken of in Scripture. This is implied in Psalm viii. 1,
wherein are celebrated the works of creation ; the heavens being the works of
God's fingers ; the moon and the stars being ordained by God, and God's making
man a little lower than the angels, &c. The first verse is, " 0 Lord, our Lord,
236 END IN CREATION.
how excellent is thy name in all the earth ! Who hast set thy glory above the
heavens," or upon the heavens. By name and glory, very much the same
thing is intended here as in many other places, as shall be particularly shown
afterwards. So the Psalm concludes as it began : " O Lord, our Lord, how
excellent is thy name in all the earth !" So in Psalm cxlviii., after a particular
mention of the works of creation, enumeratingthem in order, the Psalmist says,
verse 13, " Let them praise the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excel-
lent, his glory is above the earth and the heaven." And in Psalm civ. 31, after
a very particular, orderly, and magnificent representation of God's works of
creation and common providence, it is said, " The glory of the Lord shall endure
forever ; the Lord shall rejoice in his works." Here God's glory is spoken of
as the grand result and blessed consequence of all these works, which God values,
and on account of which he rejoices in these works. And this is one thing
doubtless implied in the song of the seraphim, Isaiah vi. 3 : " Holy, holy, holy
is the Lord of Hosts ! The whole earth is full of his glory."
The glory of God, in being the result and consequence of those works of
providence that have been mentioned, is in fact the consequence of the creation.
The good attained in the use of a thing made for use, is the result of the making
of that thing, as the signifying the time of day, when actually attained by the
use of a watch, is the consequence of the making of the watch. So that it is
apparent that the glory of God is a thing that is actually the result and con-
sequence of the creation of the world. And from what has been already observed,
it appears, that it is what God seeks as good, valuable and excellent in itself.
And I presume, none will pretend that there is any thing peculiar in the nature
of the case, rendering it a thing valuable in some of the instances wherein it
takes place, and not in others ; or that the glory of God, though indeed an
effect of all God's works, is an exceeding desirable effect of some of them ; but
of others a worthless and insignificant effect. God's glory therefore, must be a
desirable, valuable consequence of the work of creation. Yea, it is expressly
spoken of in Psalm civ. 3, (as was observed), as an effect, on account of which,
God rejoices and takes pleasure in the works of creation.
Therefore it is manifest by Position 3d, that the glory of God is an ultimate
end in the creation of the world.
SECTION IV
Places of Scripture that lead us to suppose, that God created, the World for his Name,
to make his perfections known, and that he made it for his Praise.
Here I shall first take notice of some passages of Scripture, that speak of
God's name as being made God's end, or the object of his regard, and the re-
gard of his virtuous and holy, intelligent creatures, much in the same manner
as has been observed of God's glory.
As particularly, God's name is in like manner spoken of, as the end of his
acts of goodness towards the good part of the moral world, and of his works
of mercy and salvation towards his people. As 1 Sam. xii. 22, " The Lord
will not forsake his people, for his great name's sake." Psalm xxiii. 3, " He
restoreth my soul, he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness, for his name's
sake." Psalm xxxi. 3, " For thy name's sake, lead me and guide me." Psalm
END IN CREATION. 237
cix. 21, " But do thou for me for thy name's sake." The forgiveness of
sin in particular, is often spoken of as being for God's name's sake. 1 John
li. 12, " I write unto you, little children, because your sins are forgiven you for
his name's sake." Psalm xxv. 11, " For thy name's sake, 0 Lord, pardon mine
iniquity, for it is great." Psalm lxxix. 9, " Help us, 0 God of our salvation,
for the glory of thy name, and deliver us, and purge away our sins, for thy
name's sake." Jer. xiv. 7, " O Lord, though our iniquities testify against us,
do thou it for thy name's sake."
These things seem to show, that the salvation of Christ is for God's name's
sake. Leading and guiding in the way of safety and happiness, restoring the
soul, the forgiveness of sin, and that help, deliverance and salvation, that is
consequent thereon, is for God's name. And here it is observable, that those
two great temporal salvations of God's people, the redemption from Egypt,
and that from Babylon, that are often represented as figures and similitudes of
the redemption of Christ, are frequently spoken of as being wrought for God's
name's sake. So is that great work of God, in delivering his people from
Egypt, carrying them through the wilderness to their rest in Canaan. 2 Sam.
vii. 23, " And what one nation in the earth is like thy people, even like Israel,
whom God went to redeem for a people to himself, and to make him a name."
Psalm cvi. 8, " Nevertheless he saved them for his name's sake." Isaiah lxiii.
12, " That led them by the right hand of Moses, with his glorious arm, divid-
ing the waters before them, to make himself an everlasting name." In Ezek.
xx. God, rehearsing the various parts of this wonderful work, adds from time to
time, " I wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted before the
heathen," as in ver. 9, 14, 22. See also Josh. vii. 8, 9, Dan. ix. 15. So is
the redemption from the Babylonish captivity. Isaiah xlviii. 9, 10, " For my
name's sake, will I defer mine anger. For mine own sake, even for mine own
sake will I do it, for how should my name be polluted 1" In Ezek. xxxvi. 21,
22, 23, the reason is given for God's mercy in restoring Israel : " But I had
pity for my holy name. Thus saith the Lord, I do not this for your sakes,
0 house of Israel, but for my holy name's sake ; and I will sanctify my great
name, which was profaned among the heathen." And chap, xxxix. 25, " There-
fore thus saith the Lord God, Now will I bring again the captivity of Jacob,
and have mercy upon the whole house of Israel, and will be jealous for my
holy name." Daniel prays that God would forgive his people, and show them
mercy for his own sake, Dan. ix. 19.
When God from time to time speaks of showing mercy, and exercising
goodness, and promoting his people's happiness for his name's sake, we cannot
understand it as of a merely subordinate end. How absurd would it be to say,
■ hat he promotes their happiness for his name's sake, in subordination to their
good ; and that his name may be exalted only for their sakes, as a means of
promoting their happiness ; especially when such expressions as these are used :
" For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it, for how should my
name be polluted V and " Not for your sakes do I this, but for my holy
name's sake."
Again, it is represented as though God's people had their existence, at least
as God's people, for God's name's sake. God's redeeming or purchasing them,
that they might be his people, for his name, implies this. As in that passage
mentioned before, 2 Sam. vii. 23, " Thy people Israel, whom God went to re-
deem for a people to himself, and to make him a name." So God's making
them a people for his name, is implied in Jer. xiii. 11, " For as the girdle cleaveth
to the loins of a man. so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of
238 END IN CREATION.
Israel, &c, that they may be unto me for a people, and for a name." Acts
xv. 14, " Simeon hath declared how God at the first did visit the Gentiles, to
take out of them a people for his name."
This also is spoken of as the end of the virtue and religion, and holy behavior
of the saints. Rom. i. 5, " By whom we have received grace and apostleship,
for obedience to the faith among all nations for his name." Matth. xix. 29,
"Every one that forsaketh houses or brethren, &c, for my name's sake,
shall receive an hundred fold, and shall inherit everlasting life." 3 John 7,
" Because that for his name's sake they went forth, taking nothing of the Gen-
tiles." Rev. ii. 3, " And hast borne, and hast patience, and for my name's
sake hast labored, and hast not fainted."
And we find that holy persons express their desire of this, and their joy in
it, in the same manner as in the glory of God. 2 Sam. vii. 26, " Let thy name
be magnified forever." Psalm lxxvi. 1, " In Judah is God known : his name
is great in Israel." Psalm cxlviii. 13, " Let them praise the name of the Lord ;
for his name alone is excellent! His glory is above the earth and heaven."
Psalm cxxxv. 13, " Thy name, O Lord, endureth forever, and thy memorial
throughout all generations." Isaiah xii. 4, " Declare his doings among the
people, make mention that his name is exalted."
' The judgments God executes on the wicked, are spoken of as being for the
sake of his name, in like manner as for his glory. Exod. ix. 16, " And in very
deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power, and
that my name may be declared throughout all the earth." Neh. ix. 10, " And
showedst signs and wonders upon Pharaoh, and all his servants, and on all the
people of his land ; for thou knewest that they dealt proudly against them ; so
didst thou get thee a name as at this day."
And this is spoken of as a consequence of the works of creation, in like
manner as God's glory. Psalm viii. 1, " O Lord, how excellent is thy name in
all the earth ! Who hast set thy glory above the heavens." And then at the
conclusion of the observations on the works of creation, the Psalm ends thus,
verse 9, " O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth !" So
Psalm cxlviii. 13, after a particular mention of the various works of creation,
" Let them praise the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent in all
the earth, his glory is above the earth and the heaven."
So we find manifestation, or making known God's perfections, his greatness
and excellency, is spoken of very much in the same manner as God's glory.
There are several Scriptures which would lead us to suppose this to be the
great thing that God sought of the moral world, and the end aimed at in the
moral agents, which he had created, wherein they are to be active in answering
their end. This seems implied in that argument God's people sometimes made
use of, in deprecating a state of death and destruction; that in such a state, they
cannot know or make known the glorious excellency of God. Psalm lxxxviii.
18, 19, " Shall thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave, or thy faithfulness
in destruction ? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark, and thy righteous-
ness in the land of forgetfulness V So Psalm xxx. 9, Isaiah xxxviii. 18, 19
The argument seems to be this : Why should we perish ? And how shall thine
end, for which thou hast made us, be obtained in a state of destruction, in which
thy glory cannot be known or declared ?
This is spoken of as the end of the good part of the moral world, or the end
of God's people, in the same manner as the glory of God. Isaiah xliii. 21,
" This people have I formed for myself, they shall show forth my praise"
1 Peter ii. 9, " But ye are a chosen generation, *a royal priesthood, a holy
END EST CREATION. 239
nation, a peculiar people, that ye should show forth the praises of him, who hath
called you out of darkness into marvellous light."
And this seems to be represented as the ihing wherein the value and proper
fruit and end of their virtue appear. Isaiah lx. 6 — speaking of the conversion
of the Gentile nations to true religion — " They shall come and show forth
the praises of the Lord." Isaiah lxvi. 19, " I will send unto the nations
and to the isles afar off, that have not heard my fame, neither have seen my
glory ; and they shall declare my glory among the Gentiles."
And this seems by Scripture representations to be the end, in the desires of
which, and delight in which appear the proper tendency and rest of true virtue,
and holy dispositions, much in the same manner as the glory of God. 1 Chron.
xvi. 8, " Make known his deeds among the people." Ver. 23, 24, " Show forth
from day to day thy salvation. Declare his glory among the heathen." See
also, Psalm ix. 1, 11, 14, and xix. 1, and xxvi. 7, and Txxi. 18, and lxxv. 9,
and lxxvi. 1, and lxxix. 13, and xcvi. 2, 3, and ci. 1, and cvii. 22, and cxviii.
17, and cxlv. 6, 11, 12, Isaiah xlii. 12, and lxiv. 1, 2, Jer. 1. 10.
This seems to be spoken of as a great end of the acts of God's moral govern-
ment ; particularly the great judgments he executes for sin. Exod. ix. 16,
" And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, to show in thee my
power, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." Dan.
iv. 17, " This matter is by the decree of the watchers, &c., to the intent that
the living may know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and
giveth it to whomsoever he will ; and setteth up over it the basest of men."
But places to this purpose are too numerous to be particularly recited.
This is also spoken of as a great end of God's works of favor and mercy to
his people. 2 Kings xix. 19, " Now, therefore, O Lord our God, I beseech
thee, save thou us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may /mow
that thou art the Lord God, even thou only." 1 Kings viii. 59, 60, " that
he maintain the cause of his servant, and the cause of his people Israel at all
times, as the matter shall require, that all the people of the earth may know that
the Lord is God, and that there is none else."
This is spoken of as the end of the eternal damnation of the wicked, and
also the eternal happiness of the righteous. Rom. ix. 22, 23, " What if God,
willing to show his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much
long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction ; and that he might
make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy which he hath afore
prepared unto glory ?"
This is spoken of from time to time, as a great end of the miracles which
God wrought. See Exod. vii. 17, and viii. 10, and x. 2. Deut. xxix. 5, 6.
Ezek. xxh\ 27.
This is spoken of as a great end of ordinances. Exod. xxix. 44, 45, 46,
" And I will sanctify the tabernacle of the congregation ; I will sanctify also
both Aaron and his sons, to minister to me in the priest's office. And I will
dwell among the children of Israel, and will be their God. And they shall
know that I am the Lord their God," &c. Chap. xxxi. 13, " Verily my Sab-
baths shall ye keep ; for it is a sign between me and you, throughout your gen-
erations; that ye may know that I am the Lord that doth sanctify you." We
have again almost the same words, Ezek. xx. 12, 20.
This is spoken of as a great end of the redemption out of Egypt. Psalm
cvi. 8, " Nevertheless he saved them for his name's sake, that he might make his
mighty power to be known" See also Exod. vii. 5, and Deut. iv. 34, 35. And
also of the redemption from the Babylonish captivity. Ezek. xx. 34 — 38,
240 END IN CREATION.
" And I will bring you out from the people, and will gather you out of the
countries whither ye are scattered. -And I will bring you into the wilder-
ness of the people ; and there I will plead with you as I pleaded with your
fathers in the wilderness of the land of Egypt. -And I will bring you into
the bond of the covenant. And I will purge out the rebels and ye shall
know that I am the Lord." Verse 42, " And ye shall know that I am the Lord,
when I shall bring you into the land of Israel." Verse 44, " And ye shall know
that I am the Lord, when I have wrought with you for my name's salce." See
also chap, xxviii. 25, 26, and xxxvi. 11, and xxxvii. 6 — 13.
This is also spoken of as a great end of the work of redemption of Jesus
Christ : both of the purchase of redemption by Christ, and the application of
redemption. Rom. iii. 25, 26, " Whom God had set forth to be a propitiation
through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness. To declare, I say, at
this time his righteousness ; that he might be just, and the justifier of him that
believeth in Jesus/' Eph. ii. 4 — 7, " But God who is rich in mercy, &c. That
he might show the exceeding riches of his grace, in his kindness towards us
through Jesus Christ." Chap. iii. 8 — 10, " To- preach among the Gentiles the
unsearchable riches of Christ, and to make all men see what is the fellowship
of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God,
who created all things by Jesus Christ : to the intent that now unto the princi-
palities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by the church the mani-
fold wisdom of God." Psal. xxii. 21, 22, " Save me from the lion's mouth. I
will declare thy name unto my brethren : in the midst of the congregation will
I praise thee," compared with Heb. ii. 12, and John xvii. 26. lsa. lxiv. 1, 2, " 0
that thou wouldest rend the heavens to make thy name known to thine ad-
versaries."
And it is spoken of as the end of that great actual salvation, which should
follow Christ's purchase of salvation, both among Jews and Gentiles. Isa.
xlix. 22, 23, " I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles and they shall bring
thy sons in their arms -and kings shall be thy nursing fathers and thou
shalt know that I am the Lord." See also, Ezek. xvi. 62, and xxix. 21, and
xxxiv. 27, and xxxvi. 38, and xxxix. 28, 29. Joel iii. 17.
This is spoken of as the end of God's common providence* Job xxxvii. 6,
7, " For he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth. Likewise to the small
rain, and to the great rain of his strength. He sealeth up the hand of every man,
that all men may know his work."
It is spoken of as the end of the day of judgment, that grand consummation
of God's moral government of the world, and the day for the bringing all things
to their designed ultimate issue. It is called " The day of the revelation of the
righteous judgment of God," Rom. ii. 5.
And the declaration, or openly manifesting God's excellency is spoken of
as the actual, happy consequence and effect of the work of creation. Psal. xix.
at the beginning, " The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament
showeth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, night unto night show-
eth knowledge. In them hath he placed a tabernacle for the sun, which is as a
bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run his
race," &c.
In like manner, there are many Scriptures that speak of God's praise,
in many of the forementioned respects, just in the same manner as of his name
and glory.
This is spoken of as the end of the being of God's people, in the same manner.
Jer. xiii. 11, " For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused
END IN CREATION. 241
to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel, and the whole house of Judah,
saith the Lord ; that they might be unto me for a name, and for a praise, and
fox a glory."
It is spoken of as the end of the moral world. Matth. xxi. 16, u Out of the
mouth of babes and sucklings hast thou perfected praise." That is, so hast thou
in thy sovereignty and wisdom ordered it, that thou shouldest obtain the great
end for which intelligent creatures are made, more especially from some of them
that are in themselves weak, or inferior and more insufficient. Compare Psal.
viii. 1, 2.
And the same thing that was observed before concerning the making known
God's excellency, may also be observed concerning God's praise. That it is
made use of as an argument in deprecating a state of destruction, that in such a
state this end cannot be answered ; in such a manner as seems to imply its being
an ultimate end, that God had made man for. Psal. lxxxviii. 10, " Shall the
dead arise and praise thee ? Shall thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave ?
Shall thy wonders be known in the dark V Psal. xxx. 9, " What profit is there
in my blood ? When I go down to the pit, shall the dust praise thee ? Shall it
declare thy truth ?" Psal. cxv. 17, 18, " The dead praise not the Lord, neither
any that go down into silence ; but we will bless the Lord, from this time forth
and forevermore. Praise ye the Lord" Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19, " For the grave
cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee ; they that go down into the
pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living, he shall praise thee"
It is spoken of as the end of the virtue of God's people, in like manner as is
God's glory. Phil. i. 11, " Being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which
are by Jesus Christ to the praise and glory of God."
It is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption. In the first chapter
of Eph., where that work in the various parts of it is particularly insisted on and
set forth in its exceeding glory, this is mentioned from time to time as the great
end of all, that it should be "to the praise of his glory. (As in verses 6, 12, 14.)
By which we may doubtless understand much the same thing, with that which
in Phil. i. 11, is expressed, " his praise and glory." Agreeable to this, Jacob's
fourth son, from whom the Messiah the great Redeemer was to proceed, by the
spirit of prophecy, or the special direction of God's providence, was called praise,
with reference to this happy consequence, and glorious end of that great redemp-
tion, this Messiah, one of his posterity, was to work out.
This in the Old Testament is spoken of as the end of the forgiveness of the
sin of God's people, and their salvation, in the same manner as is God's name
and ^lory. Isa. xlviii. 9, 10, 11, " For my name's sake will I defer mine anger,
and for my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off. Behold I have
refined thee, for mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it ; for how
should my name be polluted ? And my glory will I not give to another." Jer.
xxxiii. 8, 9, "And I will cleanse them from all their iniquity and I will
pardon all their iniquities. And it shall be to me a name of joy, a praise, and
an honor."
And that the holy part of the moral world, do express desires of this, and
delight in it, as the end which holy principles in them tend to, reach after, and
rest fn, in their highest exercises, just in the same manner as the glory of God,
is abundantly manifest. It would be endless to enumerate particular places
wherein this appears ; wherein the saints declare this, by expressing their earn-
est desires of God's praise ; calling on all nations, and all beings in heaven and
earth to praise him ; in a rapturous manner calling on one another, crying, " Hal-
lelujah, praise ye the Lord, praise him forever." Expressing their resolutions
Vol. II 31
242 END IN CREATION.
to praise him as long as they live, through all generations, and forever; decid-
ing how good, how pleasant and comely the praise of God is, &c.
And it is manifest that God's praise is the desirable and glorious consequence
and effect of all the works of creation, by such places as these : Psalm cxlv.
5 — 10, and cxlviii. throughout, and ciii. 19 — 22.
SECTION V
Place3 of Scripture from whence it may be argued, that communications of good to
the Creature, was one thing which God had in view, as an Ultimate End of the
Creation of the World.
1. According to the Scripture, communicating good to the creatures, is what
is in itself pleasing to God ; and that this is not merely subordinately agreeable,
and esteemed valuable on account of its relation to a further end, as it is in exe-
cuting justice in punishing the sins of men; which God is inclined to as fit and
necessary in certain cases, and on the account of good ends attained by it ; but
what God is inclined to on its own account, and what he delights in simply and
ultimately. For though God is sometimes in Scripture spoken of as taking pleas-
ure in punishing men's sins, Deut. xxviii. 63, " The Lord will rejoice over you,
to destroy you ;" Ezek. v. 13, " Then shall mine anger be accomplished, and
1 will cause my fury to rest upon them, and 1 will be comforted ;" yet God is
often spoken of as exercising goodness and showing mercy, with delight, in a
manner quite different, and opposite to that of his executing wrath. For the latter
is spoken of as what God proceeds to do with backwardness and reluctance ; the
misery of the creature being not agreeable to him on its own account. Neh.
ix. 17, " That thou art a God ready to pardon, gracious and merciful, slow to
anger, and of great loving-kindness.'' Psal. ciii. 8, " The Lord is merciful, and
gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy." Psal. cxlv. 8, " The Lord
is gracious and full of compassion, slow to anger, and of great mercy." We
have again almost the same words, Jonah iv. 2, Mic. vii. 10, " Who is a God
like thee, that pardoneth iniquity, &c. He retaineth not his anger forever, be-
cause he delighteth in mercy." Ezek. xviii. 32, " I have no pleasure in the
death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God ; wherefore turn yourselves, and live
ye." Lam. hi. 33, " He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of
men." Ezek. xxxiii. 11, " As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure
in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live :
Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, 0 house of Israel V*
2 Pet. iii. 9, " Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to
repentance."
2. The' work of redemption wrought out by Jesus Christ, is spoken of in
such a manner as being from the grace and love of God to men, that does not
well consist with his seeking a communication of good to them, only subordi-
nately, i. e., not at all from any inclination to their good directly, or delight in
giving happiness to them, simply and ultimately considered ; but only indif ectly,
and wholly from a regard to something entirely diverse, which it is a means of.
Such expressions as that in John iii. 16, carry another idea : " God so loved
the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him,
should not perish, but have everlasting life." And 1 John iv. 9. 10, " In this
was manifested the love of God towards us, because that God sent his only be-
END IN CREATION. 243
gotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love ;
not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be a propitiation
for our sins." So Eph. ii. 4, " But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great
love wherewith he loved us," &c. But if indeed this was only from love to
something else, and a regard to a further end, entirely diverse from our good ;
then all the love is truly terminated in that, its ultimate object ! And God's
love consists in regard towards that ; and therein is God's love, and therein if
his love manifested, strictly and properly speaking, and not in that he loved us.
or exercised such high regard towards us. For if our good be not at all regard-
ed ultimately, but only subordinately, then our good or interest is, in itself con-
sidered, nothing in God's regard or love : God's respect is all terminated upon,
and swallowed up in something diverse, which is the end, and not in the means.
So the Scripture everywhere represents concerning Christ, as though the
great things that he did and suffered, were in the most direct and proper sense,
from exceeding love to us ; and not as one may show kindness to a person, to
whose interest, simply and in itself considered, he is entirely indifferent, only as
it may be a means of promoting the interest of another (that is indeed directly
regarded) which is connected with it. Thus the Apostle Paul represents the
matter, Gal. ii. 20, " Who loved me, and gave himself for me." Eph. v. 25,
" Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved the church, and gave himself
for it." And Christ himself, John xvii. 19, " For their sakes I sanctify myself."
And the Scripture represents Christ as resting in the salvation and glory of his
people, when obtained, as in what he ultimately sought, as having therein
reached the goal at the end of his race ; obtained the prize he aimed at ; enjoy-
ing the travail of his soul, in which he is satisfied, as the recompense of his labors
and extreme agonies. Isa. liii. 10, 11, " When thou shalt make his soul an of-
fering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure
of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul,
and shall be satisfied ; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many,
for he shall bear their iniquities." He sees the travail of his soul, in seeing his
seed, the children brought forth in the issue of his travail. This implies that
Christ has his delight, most truly and properly, in obtaining the salvation of his
church, not merely as a means conducing to the thing which terminates his de-
light and joy ; but as what he rejoices and is satisfied in, most directly and pro-
perly ; as do those Scriptures, which represent him as rejoicing in his obtaining
this fruit of his labor and purchase, as the bridegroom, when he obtains his bride.
Isa. lxii. 5, " As the bridegroom rejoices over the bride, so shall thy God rejoice
over thee." And how emphatical and strong to the purpose, are the expres-
sions in Zeph. iii. 17, " The Lord thy God in the midst of thee is mighty ; he
will save, he will rejoice over thee with joy ; he will rest in his love, he will re-
joice over thee with singing." The same thing may be argued from Prov. viii.
30, 31, " Then was I by him, as one brought up with him ; and I was daily his
delight, rejoicing always before him ; rejoicing in the habitable part of his
earth, and my delights were with the sons of men." And from those places
that speak of the saints as God's portion, his jewels and peculiar treasure. These
things are abundantly confirmed by what is related, John xii. 23 — 32. But
the particular consideration of what may be observed to the present purpose, in
that passage of Scripture, may be referred to the next section.
3. The communications of divine goodness, particularly forgiveness of sin,
and salvation, are here spoken of from time to time, as being for God's goodness'
sake, and for his mercy's sake, just in the same manner as they are spoken of,
as being for God's name's sake, in places observed before. Psal. xxv, 7 " Re-
244 END IN CREATION.
member not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions : according to thy mer-
cy remember thou me, for thy goodness* sake, 0 Lord." In the 11th verse the
Psalmist says, " For thy name's sate, 0 Lord, pardon mine iniquity." Neh.
IX. 31, " Nevertheless, for thy great mercy \s sake, thou hast not utterly con-
sumed them, nor forsaken them ; for thou art a gracious and a merciful God."
Psal. vi. 4, " Return, 0 Lord, deliver my soul : O save me for thy mercy's
sake." Psal. xxxi. 16, " Make thy face to shine upon thy servant : save me
for thy mercy's sake" Psal. xliv. 26, " Arise for our help ; redeem us for
thy mercy's sake." And here it may be observed, after what a remarkable
manner God speaks of his love to the children of Israel in the wilderness, as
though his love were for love's sake, and his goodness were its own end and
motive. Deut. vii. 7, 8, " The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose
you because ye were more in number than any people, for ye were the fewest
of all people ; but because the Lord loved you"
4. That the government of the world in all parts of it, is for the good of such
as are to be the eternal subjects of God's goodness, is implied in what the Scrip-
ture teaches us of Christ's being set at God's right hand, made king of angels
and men ; set at the head of the universe, having all power given him in heaven
and earth to that end, that he may promote their happiness ; being made head
over ali things to the church, and having the government of the whole creation
for their good.* Christ mentions it (Mark ii. 28) as the reason why the
Son of Man is made Lord of the Sabbath, that " the Sabbath was made for man."
And if so, we may in like manner argue, that all things were made for man,
that the Son of Man is made Lord of all things.
5. That God uses the whole creation, in his whole government of it, for the
good of his people, is most elegantly represented in Deut. xxxiii. 26 : " There is
none like the God of Jeshurun, who rideth on the heavens in thine help, and in
his excellency on the sky." The whole universe is a machine, which God hath
made for his own use, to be his chariot for him to ride in ; as is represented in
Ezekiel's vision. In this chariot, God's seat or throne is heaven, where he sits,
who uses, and governs, and rides in this chariot, Ezek. i. 22, 26, 27, 28. The
inferior part of the creation, this visible universe, subject to such continual
changes and revolutions, are the wheels of the chariot, under the place of the
seat of him who rides in this chariot. God's providence in the constant revo-
lutions, and alterations, and successive events, is represented by the motion of
the wheels of the chariot, by the spirit of him who sits in his throne on the
heavens, or above the firmament. - Moses tells us for whose sake it is that God
moves the wheels of this chariot, or rides in it sitting in his heavenly seat ; and
to what end he is making his progress, or goes his appointed journey in it, viz.,
the salvation of his people.
6. God's judgments on the wicked in this world, and also their eternal dam-
nation in the world to come, are spoken of as being for the happiness of God's
people. So are his judgments on them in this world. Isaiah xliri. 3, 4, " For
I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour. I gave Egypt
for thy ransom, Ethiopia and Seba for thee. Since thou hast been precious in
my sight, thou hast been honorable, and I have loved thee ; therefore will I
give men for thee, and people for thy life." So the works of God's vindictive
justice and wrath, are spoken of as works of mercy to his people, Psalm cxxxvi.
10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20. And so is their eternal damnation in another world.
Rom. ix. 22, 23, " What if God, willing to show his wrath and make his power
* Eph. i. 20—23. John. xvii. 2. Matth. xi. 27, and xxviii. 18, 19. John iii. 35.
i
END IN CREATION. 245
known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to de-
struction ; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels
of mercy, which he had afore prepared Unto glory i" Here it is evident the last
verse comes in, in connection with the foregoing, as giving another reason of the
destruction of the wicked, viz., the showing the riches of his glory on the vessels
of mercy ; in higher degrees of their glory and happiness, in an advancement of
their relish of their own enjoyments and greater sense of their value, and of
God's free grace in the bestowment.
7. It seems to argue that God's goodness to them who are to be the eternal
subjects of his goodness, is the end of the creation, that the whole creation, in
all parts of it, and all God's disposals of it, is spoken of as theirs. 1 Cor. iii.
22, 23, " A]] things are yours ; whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the
world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come, all are yours." The
terms are very universal ; and both works of creation and providence are men-
tioned ; and it is manifestly the design of the apostle to be understood of every
work of God whatsoever. Now, how can we understand this any otherwise,
than that all things are for their benefit ; and that God made and uses all for
their good ?
8. All God's works, both his works of creation and providence, are repre-
sented as works of goodness or mercy to his people in Psal. cxxxvi. His won-
derful works in general : verse 4, " To him who alone doth great wonders ; for
his mercy endureth forever." The works of creation in all parts of it : verses
5 — 9, " To him that by wisdom made the heavens, for his mercy endureth for-
ever. To him that stretched out the earth above the waters, for his mercy en-
dureth forever. To him that made great lights, for his mercy endureth forever.
The sun to rule by day, for his mercy endureth forever. The moon and stars to
rule by night, for his mercy endureth forever." And God's works of providence,
in the following part of the Psalm.
9. That expression in the blessed sentence pronounced on the righteous at
the day of judgment, " Inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the founda-
tion of the world," seems to hold forth as much, as that the eternal expressions
and fruits of God's goodness to them, was God's end in creating the world, and
in his providential disposals ever since the creation : that God, in all his works,
in laying the foundation of the world, and ever since the foundation of it, had
been preparing this kingdom and glory for them.
« 10. Agreeable to this, the good of men is spoken of as an ultimate end of
the virtue of the moral world. Rom. xiii. 8, 9, 10, " He that loveth another
hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shall
not kill, &c. — And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly compre-
hended in this saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love worketh
no ill to his neighbor ; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law.''' Gal. v. 14,
" All the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, Thou shalt love thy neigh-
bor as thyself." James ii. 8, " If ye fulfil the royal law according to the
Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, thou shalt do well."
If the good of the creature be one end of God in all things he does ; and so
be one end of all things that he requires moral agents to do ; and an end they
should have respect to in all that they do, and which they should regulate all
parts of their conduct by ; these things may be easily explained ; but otherwise
it seems difficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghost should thus express
himself from time to time. The Scripture represents it to be the spirit of all
true saints, to prefer the welfare of God's people to their chief joy. And this
<vas the spirit of Moses and the prophets of old ; and the good of God's church
246 END IN CREATION.
was an end they regulate: all their conduct by. And so it was with the apos-
tles. 2 Cor. iv. 15, "For all things are for your sakes." 2 Tim. ii. 10, " I
endure all things for the elect's sake, that they may also obtain the salvation
which is in Christ Jesus, with eternal glory." And the Scriptures represent as
though every Christian shculd in all things he does be employed for the good of
God's church, as each particular member of the body is, in all things, employed
for the good of the body. Rom. xii. 4, 5, &c. Eph. iv. 15, 16. 1 Cor. xii.
12, 25, to the end ; together with the whole of the next chapter. To this end
the Scripture teaches us the angels are continually employed, Heb. i. 14.
SECTION VI.
Wherein it is considered what is meant by the Glory of God, and the name of God in
Scripture, when spoken of as God's end in his works.
Having thus considered what things are spoken of in the holy Scriptures, as
the ends of God's works ; and in such a manner as justly to lead us to suppose,
they were the ends which God had ultimately in view, in the creation of the
world : I now proceed particularly to inquire concerning some of these things,
what they are, and how the terms are to be understood.
I begin first, with the glory of God.
And here I might observe, that the phrase, the glory of God, is sometimes
manifestly used to signify the second person in the Trinity. But it is not neces-
sary at this time to consider that matter, or stand to prove it from particular
passages of Scripture. Omitting this, therefore, I proceed to observe concerning
the Hebrew word Cabhodh, which is the word most commonly used in the Old
Testament where we have the word glory in the English Bible. The root
which it comes from is either the verb Cabhadh, which signifies to be heavy, or
make heavy, or from the adjective Cabhedh, which signifies heavy or weighty.
These, as seems pretty manifest, are the primary significations of these words,
though they have also other meanings, which seem to be derivative. The noun
Cobhedh signifies gravity, heaviness, greatness, and abundance. Of very many
places it will be sufficient to name a few. Prov. xxvii. 3. 2 Sam. xiv. 26.
1 Kings. xii. 11. Psalm xxxviii. 4. Isaiah xxx. 27. And as the weight of
bodies arises from two things, viz., solidity or density, or specific gravity, as it
is called, and their magnitude ; so we find the word Cabhedh used to signify
dense, as in Exod. xix. 16. Gnanatz Cobhedh, a dense cloud. And it is very
often used for great. Isaiah xxxii. 2. Gen. v. 9. 1 Kings x. 2. 2 Kings
vi. 14, and xviii. 17. Isaiah xxxvi. 2, and other places.
The word Cabhodh, which is commonly translated glory, is used in such a
manner as might be expected from this signification of the words from whence
it comes. Sometimes it is used to signify what is internal, what is within the
being or person, inherent in the subject, or what is in the possession of the per-
son ; and sometimes for emanation, exhibition or communication of this internal
glory ; and sometimes for the knowledge or sense, or effect of these, in those
who behold it, to whom the exhibition or communication is made ; or an ex-
pression of this knowledge, or sense, or effect. And here I would note, that
agreeable to the use of the word Cabhodh, in the Old Testament, is that of the
word Doxa in the new. For, as the word Cabhodh is generally translated by
Doxa in the Septuagint ; so it is apparent, that this word is designed to be used
to signify the same thing in the New Testament, with Cabhodh in the Old
END IN CREATION. 247
This might be abundantly proved by comparing particulai places of the Old
Testament ; but probably it will not be denied.
I therefore proceed particularly to consider these words, with regard to their
use in Scripture, in each of the forementioned ways.
1. As to internal glory. When the word is used to signify what is within,
inherent, or in the possession of the subject, it very commonly signifies excellency,
or great valuableness, dignity, or worthiness, or regard. This, according to the
Hebrew idiom, is, as it were, the weight of a thing, as that by which it is heavy ;
as to be light, is to be worthless, without value, contemptible. Numb. xxi. 5,
" This light bread." 1 Sam. xviii. 23, " Seemeth it a light thing." Judges
ix. 4, " Light persons," i. e. worthless, vain, vile persons. So Zeph. iii. 4. To
set light is to despise, 2 Sam. xix. 43. Belshazzar's vileness in the sight of
God, is represented by his being Tekel, weighed in the balances and found light,
Dan. v. 27. And as the weight of a thing arises from these two things, its
magnitude, and its specific gravity conjunctly, so the word glory is very com-
monly used to signify the excellency of a person or thing, as consisting either
in greatness, or in beauty, or as it were, preciousness, or in both conjunctly ; as
will abundantly appear by Exod. xvi. 7, and xxviii. 2, 40, and iii. 8, and many
other places.
Sometimes that internal, great, and excellent good, which is called glory, is
rather in possession than inherent. Any one may be called heavy, that possesses
an abundance ; and he that is empty and destitute, may be called light. Thus
we find riches is sometimes called glory. Gen. xxxi. 1, " And of that which
was our fathers, hath he gotten ail this glory." Esth. v. 11, " Haman told
them of the glory of his riches." Psal. xlix. 16, 17, " Be not afraid, when one is
made rich, when the glory of his house is increased. For when he dieth, he
shall carry nothing away, his glory shall not descend after him." Nah. ii. 9,
" Take ye the spoil of silver, take the spoil of gold ; for there is none end of the
store and glory out of the pleasant furniture."
And it is often put for a great height of happiness and prosperity, and
fulness of good in general. Gen. xlv. 13, " You shall tell my father of all my
glory in Egypt." Job xix. 9, " He hath stript me of my glory." Isaiah x. 3,
" Where will you leave your glory V Verse 10, " Therefore shall the Lord of
Hosts send among his fat ones leanness, and under his glory shall he kindle a
burning, like the burning of a fire." Isaiah xvii. 3, 4, " The kingdom shall
cease from Damascus, and the remnant of Syria ; they shall be as the glory of
the children of Israel. And in that day it shall come to pass, that the glory of
Jacob shall be made thin, and the fatness of his flesh shall be made lean."
Isaiah xxi. 16," And all the glory of Kedar shall fail." Isaiah Ixi. 6, "Ye
shall eat the riches of the Gentiles, and in their glory shall ye boast yourselves."
Chap. lxvi. 11, 12, " That ye may milk out and be delighted with the abund-
ance of her glory. 1 will extend peace to her like a river, and the glory of
the Gentiles like a flowing stream." Hos. ix. 11, "As for Ephraim, their
glory shall fly away as a bird." Matth. iv. 8, " Showeth him all the kingdoms
of the world, and the glory of them." Luke xxiv. 26, " Ought not Christ to
have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory ?" John xvii. 27, " And
the glory which thou gavest me, have I given them." Rom. v. 2, " And rejoice
in hope of the glory of God." Chap. viii. 18, " The sufferings of ,this present
time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in
us." See also chap. ii. 7, 10, and iii. 23, and ix. 23. 1 Cor. ii. 7, " The hid-
den wisdom which God ordained before the world, unto our glory." 2 Cor. iv.
17, " Worketh out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of
248 END IN CREATION.
glory." Eph. i. 18, " And what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in
the saints." 1 Pet. iv. 13, " But rejoice, inasmuch as ye are made partakers of
Christ's sufferings ; that when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad also
with exceeding joy." Chap. i. 8, " Ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of
glory." See also Colos. i. 27, and iii. 4, and many other places.
2. The word glory is used in Scripture often to express the exhibition, emana-
tion, or communication of the internal glory. Hence it often signifies a visible
exhibition of glory ; as in an effulgence or shining brightness, by an emanation
of beams of light. Thus the brightness of the sun, and moon, and stars is
called their glory in 1 Cor. xv. 41. But in particular, the word is very often
thus used, when applied to God and Christ. As in Ezek. i. 28, " As the
appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the ap-
pearance of the brightness round about. This was the appearance of the
likeness of the glory of the Lord." And chap. x. 4, " Then the glory of the
Lord went up from the cherub, and stood over the threshold of the house, and
the house was filled with the cloud, and the court was full of the brightness of
the Lord's glory." Isaiah vi. 1, 2, 3, " I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne
high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphim.
And one cried to another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts, the
whole earth is full of his glory ;" compared with John xii. 4, " These things
said Esaias, when he saw his glory and spake of him." Ezek. xliii. 2, " And
behold, the glory of the God of Israel came from the way of the east — and the
earth skined with his glory." Isaiah xxiv. 23, " Then the moon shall be con
founded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount
Zion, and in Jerusalem, and before his ancients gloriously." Isaiah lx. 1, 2,
" Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee.
For behold, the darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people ;
but the Lord shall arise upon thee, and his glory shall be seen upon thee."
Together with verse 19 : " The sun shall be no more thy light by day, neithei
for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee ; but the Lord shall be unto
thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory." Luke ii. 9, " The glory of
the Lord shone round about them." Acts xxii. 11, "And when I could not
see, for the glory of that light." In 2 Cor. iii. 7, the shining of Moses's face
is called the glory of his countenance. And to this Christ's glory is compared,
verse 18, " But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the
Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory." And so chap,
iv. 4 : " Lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of
God, should shine unto them." ■ Verse 6, " For God, who commanded the light
to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the know-
ledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Heb. i. 3, " Who is
the brightness of his glory." The Apostle Peter, speaking of that emanation
of exceeding brightness, from the bright cloud that overshadowed the disciples,
in the mount of transfiguration, and of the shining of Christ's face at that time,
says, 2 Pet. i. 17, "For he received from* God the Father, honor and glory,
when thece came such a voice to him from the excellent glory, This is my be-
loved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Rev. xviii. 1, " Another angel came
down from heaven, having great power, and the earth was lightened with his
glory." Rev. xxi. 1 1, "Having the glory of God, and her light was like unto
a stone most precious, like a jasper stone, clear as crystal." Verse 23, " And
the city had no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in it ; for the glory
of God did lighten it." So the word for a visible effulgence or emanation of
END IN CREATION. 249
light in the places to be seen in Exod. xvi. 12, and xxiv. 16, 17, 23, and xl. 34,
35, and many other places.
The word glory, as applied to God or Christ, sometimes evidently signifies
the communications of God's fulness, and means much the same thing with
God's abundant and exceeding goodness and grace. So Eph. iii. 16, " That he
would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with
might by his Spirit in the inner man." The expression, " According to the
riches of his glory," is apparently equivalent to that in the same epistle, chap,
i. 7, "According to the riches of his grace." And chap. ii. 7, "The ex-
ceeding riches of his grace in his kindness towards us, through Christ Jesus."
In like manner is the word glory used in Phil. iv. 19, " But my God shall supply
all your need, according to his riches in glory, by Christ Jesus." And Rom. ix.
23, " And that he might make known the riches of his glory, on the vessels of
mercy." In this, and the foregoing verse, the apostle speaks of God's making
known two things, his great wrath, and his rich grace. The former, on the
vessels of wrath, verse 22. The latter, which he calls the riches of his glory,
on the vessels of mercy, verse 23. So when Moses says, " I beseech thee show
me thy glory;" God, granting his request, makes answer, " I will make all my
goodness to pass before thee." Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19.*
What we find in John xii. 23 — 32, is worthy of particular notice in this
place. The words and behavior of Christ, which we have an account of here,
argue two things.
1. That the happiness and salvation of men, was an end that Christ ultimate-
ly aimed at in the labors and sufferings he went through for our redemption,
(and consequently, by what has been before observed, an ultimate end of the
work of creation.) The very same things which were observed before in this
passage [Chapter 2d, Section 3d) concerning God's glory, are equally, and in
the same manner observable, concerning the salvation of men. As it was there
observed, that Christ in the great conflict of his soul, in the view of the near
approach of the most extreme difficulties which attended his undertaking, com-
forts himself in a certain prospect of obtaining the end he had chiefly in view.
It was observed that the glory of God is therefore mentioned and dwelt upon by
him, as what his soul supported itself and rested in, as this great end. And at
the same time, and exactly in the same manner, is the salvation of men men-
tioned and insisted on, as the end of these great labors and sufferings, which
satisfied his soul, in the prospect of undergoing them. Compare the 23d and
24th verses; and also the 28th and 29th verses ; verse 31, and 32. And,
2. The glory of God, and the emanations and fruits of his grace in man's
salvation, are so spoken of by Christ on this occasion in just the same manner,
that it would be quite unnatural, to understand him as speaking of two distinct
things. Such is the connection, that what he says of the latter must most
naturally be understood as exegetical of the former. He first speaks of his own
glory and the glory of his Father, as the great end that should be obtained by
what he is about to suffer ; and then explains and amplifies what he says on this
in what he expresses of the salvation of men that shall be obtained by it. Thus
* Dr. Goodwin observes (Vol. I. of his works, Part 2d page 166), that riches of grace are called riches
oi glory in Scripture. " The Scripture," says he, " speaks of riches of glory in Eph. iii. 16, ' That he
would grant you according to the riches of his glory ;' yet eminently mercy is there intended : for it is
that which God bestows, and which the apostle there prayeth for. And he calls his mercy there his glory,
as elsewhere he doth, as being the most eminent excellency in God. That in Rom. ix. 22, 23, compared, is
observable. In the 22d verse, where the apostle speak s of God's making known the power of his wrath, saith
he, * God willing to show his wrath, and make his power known.' But in verse 23d, when he comes to
speak of mercy, he saith, • That he might make known the riches of his glory, on the vessels of mercy ' ■
Vol. U. 32
250 END IN CREATION.
in the 23d verse he says, " The hour is come that the Son of Man should be
glorified." And in what next follows, he evidently shows how he was *o be
glorified, or wherein his glory consisted : " Verily, verily I say unto you, except
a corn of wheat fall into the ground, and die, it abideth alone ; but if it die,
it bringeth forth much fruit." As much fruit is the glory of the seed, so is the
multitude of redeemed ones, which should spring from his death, his glory.*
So concerning the glory of his Father, in the 27th, and following verses : u Now
is my soul troubled, and what shall I say 1 Father, save me from this hour. But
for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name. Then came
there a voice from heaven, saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it
again." In an assurance of this, which this voice declared, Christ was greatly
comforted, and his soul .even exulted under the view of his approaching sufferings.
And what this glory was, in which Christ's soul was so comforted on this occasion,'
his own words which he then spake, plainly show. When the people said it
thundered, and others said an angel spake to him, then Christ explains the matter
to them, and tells them what this voice meant. Verses 30 — 32, " Jesus answered
and said, This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes. Now is the judg-
ment of this world ; now shall the prince of this world be cast out. And I, if
I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." By this behavior,
and these speeches of our Redeemer, it appears that the expressions of divine
grace, in the sanctification and happiness of the redeemed, are especially that
glory of his, and his Father, which was the joy that was set before him, for
which he endured the cross, and despised the shame; and that this glory, es-
pecially, was the end of the travail of his soul, in obtaining which end he was
satisfied, agreeable to Isa. liii. 10, 1 1.
This is agreeable to what has been just observed, of God's glory being so
often represented by an effulgence, or emanation, or communication of light,
from a luminary or fountain of light. What can be thought of, that so natural-
ly and aptly represents the emanation of the internal glory of God ; or the flow-
ing forth, and abundant communication of that infinite fulness of good that is in
God ? Light is very often in Scripture put for comfort, joy, happiness, and for
good in general.f
Again the word glory, as applied to God in Scripture, implies the view or
knowledge of God's excellency. The exhibition of glory, is to the view of be-
holders. The manifestation of glory, the emanation or effulgence of brightness,
has relation to the eye. Light or brightness is a quality that has relation to the
sense of seeing : we see the luminary by its light. And knowledge is often
expressed in Scripture by light. The word glory very often in Scripture signi-
fies or implies honor, as any one may soon see by casting his eye on a concord-
ance.! But honor implies the knowledge of the dignity and excellency of him
who hath the honor. And this is often more especially signified by the word
glory, when applied to God. Num. xiv. 21, " But as truly as I live, all the
earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord," i. e., all the earth shall see the
manifestations I will make of my perfect holiness and hatred of sin, and so of
* Here may be remembered what was before observed of the church's being so often spoken of as the
glory and fulness of Christ.
+ Isa. vi. 3, " Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." In the ori-
ginal, " His glory is the fulness of the whole earth ;" which signifies much more than the words of the
translation. God's glory, consisting especially in his holiness, is that, in the sight or communications of
which, man's fulness, i. e., his holiness and happ'ness, consists. By God's glory here, there seems to be
respect to that train, or those effulgent beams that filled the temple : these beams signifying God's glory
shining forth, and communicated. This effulgence or communication is the fulness of all intelligent
creatures, who have no fulness of their own.
% See particularly Heb. iii. 3.
END IN CREATION. ' 251
my infinite excellence. This appears by the context. So Ezek. xxxix. 21 —
23, " And I will set my glory among the heathen, and all the heathen shall
see my judgment that I have executed, and my hand that I have laid upon them.
So the house of Israel shall know that I am the Lord their God. And the hea-
then shall know, that the house of Israel went into captivity for their iniquity."
And it is manifest in many places, where we read of God's glorifying himself,
or of his being glorified, that one thing directly intended is, a manifesting or
making known his divine greatness and excellency.
Again, glory, as the word is used in Scripture, often signifies or implies
praise. This appears from what was observed before, that glory very often sig-
nifies honor, which is much the same thing with praise, viz., high esteem and
respect of heart, and the expression and testimony of it in words and actions.
And it is manifest that the words glory and praise, are often used as equivalent
expressions in Scripture. Psal. 1. 23, " Whoso offereth praise, glorifieth me."
Psal. xxii. 23, " Ye that fear the Lord, praise him ; all ye seed of Israel, glori-
fy him." Isa. xlii. 8, " My glory I will not give unto another, nor my praise to
graven images." Verse 12, " Let them give glory unto the Lord, and declare
his praise in the islands." Isa. xlviii. 9 — 11, " For my name's sake will I
defer mine anger ; for my praise will 1 refrain for thee. — For mine own sake
will I do it ; for, I will not give my glory unto another." Jer. xiii. 11, " That
they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praise, and for a
glory." Eph. i. 6, " To the praise of the glory of his grace." Verse 12, " To
the praise of his glory." So verse 14. The phrase is apparently equivalent to
that, Phil. i. 11, " Which are by Jesus Christ unto the praise and glory of God."
2 Cor. iv. 15, " That the abundant grace might, through the thanksgiving of
many, redound to the glory of God.*'
It is manifest the praise of God, as the phrase is used in Scripture, implies
the high esteem and love of the heart, exalting thoughts of God, and compla-
cence in his excellence and perfection. This must be so manifest to every one
acquainted with the Scripture, that there seems to be no need to refer to parti-
cular places.
It also implies joy in God, or rejoicing in his perfections, as is manifest by
Psal. xxxiii. 2, " Rejoice in the Lord, 0 ye righteous, for praise is comely for the
upright." How often do we read of singing praise ? But singing is commonly
an expression of joy. It is called making a joyful noise, Psal. lxvi. 1, 2, and
xcvi. 4, 5. And as it is often used, it implies gratitude or love to God for his
benefits to us. Psal. xxx. 12, and many other places.
Having thus considered what is implied in the phrase, the glory of God, as
we find it used in Scripture ; I proceed" to inquire what is meant by the name of
God.
And I observe that it is manifest that God's name and his glory, at least
very often, signify the same thing in Scripture. As it has been observed con-
cerning the glory of God, that it sometimes signifies the second person in the
Trinity ; the same might be shown of the name of God, if it were needful in this
place. But that the name and glory of God are often equipollent expressions,
is manifest by Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19. When Moses says, M I beseech thee, show
me thy glory," and God grants his request, he says, " I will proclaim the name
of the Lord before thee." Psal. viii. 1, " 0 Lord, how excellent is thy name in
all the earth ! Who hast set thy glory above the heavens." Psal. lxxix. 9,
" Help us, O God of our salvation, for the glory of thy name ; and, deliver us,
and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake." Psal. cii. 15, " So the heathen
shall fear the name of the Lord ; and all the kings of the earth, thy glory."
252 END IN CREATION.
Psal. cxlviii. 13, " His name alone is excellent, and his glory is aboT e the earth
and heaven." Isa. xlviii. 9, " For my name's sake will I defer mine anger,
and for my praise will I refrain for thee." Verse 11, " For mine own sake, even
for mine own sake will I do it ; for how should my name be polluted ? And I
will not give my glory unto another." Isa. xlix. 19, " They shall fear the name
of the Lord from the west, and his glory from the rising of the sun." Jer. xiii.
11, " That they might be unto me for a name, and for a praise, and for a gloiy."
As glory often implies the manifestation, publication and knowledge of excel-
lency, and the honor that any one has in the world ; so it is evident does name.
Gen. xi. 4, " Let us make us a name." Deut. xxvi. 19, " And to make thee
high above all nations, in praise, in name, and in honor." See 2 Sam. vii. 9,
and many other places.
So it is evident that by name is sometimes meant much the same thing as
praise, by several places which have been just mentioned, as Isa. xlviii. 9, Jer.
xiii. 11, Deut. xxvi. 19 ; and also by Jer. xxxiii. 9, " And it shall be unto me
for a name, a praise and an honor, before all the nations of the earth, which
shall hear of all the good I do unto them." Zeph. iii. 20, " I will make you a
name and a praise among all people of the earth.'1
And it seems that the expression or exhibition of God's goodness is espe-
cially called his name, in Exod. xxxiii. 19 : "I will make all my goodness pass
before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee." And chap.
xxxiv. 5 — 7, " And the Lord descended in the cloud, and stood with him
there, and proclaimed the name of the Lord. And the Lord passed by before
him, and proclaimed the Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merciful, long-suffer-
ing and abundant in goodness and truth ; keeping mercy for thousands," &c.
And the same illustrious brightness and effulgence in the pillar of cloud,
that appeared in the wilderness, and dwelt above the mercy-seat in the taber-
nacle and temple (or rather the spiritual divine brightness and effulgence repre-
sented by it), which is so often called the glory of the Lord, is also often called
the name of the Lord. Because God's glory was to dwell in the tabernacle,
therefore he promises, Exod. xxix. 43, " There will I meet with the children
of Israel, and the tabernacle shall be sanctified by my glory." And the temple
was called the house of God's glory, Isa. lx. 7. In like manner, the name of
God is said to dwell in the sanctuary. Thus we often read of the place, that
God chose to put his name there ; or (as it is in the Hebrew) to cause his name
to inhabit there. So it is sometimes rendered by our translators. As Deut.
xii. 11, "Then there shall be a place which the Lord your God shall choose
to cause his name to dwell there." And the temple is often spoken of as built
for God's name. And in Psal. lxxiv. 7,. the temple is called the dwelling-place
of God's name. The mercy seat in the temple was called the throne of God's
name or glory : Jer. xiv. 21, " Do not abhor us ; for thy name's sake, do not dis-
grace the throne of thy glory." Here God's name and his glory, seem to be
spoken of as the same.
SECTION VII.
Showing that the Ultimate End of the Creation of the World, is but one, and what
that one End is.
From what has been observed in the last section, it appears, that however
tne last end of the creation is spoken of in Scripture under various denomina-
END IN CREATION. 253
tions ; yet if the whole of what is said relating to this affair, be duly weighed,
and one part compared with another, we shall have reason to think, that the
design of the Spirit of God does not seem to be to represent God's ultimate end
as manifold, but as one. For though it be signified by various names, yet they
appear not to be names of different things, but various names involving each
other in their meaning ; either different names of the same thing, or names of
several parts of one whole, or of the same whole viewed in various lights, or
in its different respects and relations. For it appears that all that is ever spo-
ken of in the Scripture as an ultimate end of God's works, is included in that
one phrase, the glory of God ; which is the name by which the last end of
God's works is most commonly called, in Scripture ; and seems to be the name
which most aptly signifies the thing.
The thing signified by that name, the glory of God, when spoken of as the
supreme and ultimate end of the work of creation, and of all God's works, is
the emanation and true external expression of God's internal glory and fulness ;
meaning by his fulness, what has already been explained. Or, in other words,
God's internal glory extant, in a true and just exhibition, or external existence
of it. It is confessed that there is a degree of obscurity in these definitions ;
but perhaps an obscurity which is unavoidable, through the imperfection of
language, and words being less fitted to express things of so sublime a nature.
And therefore the thing may possibly be better understood, by using many
words and a variety of expressions, by a particular consideration of it, as it
were by parts, than by any short definition.
There is included in this, the exercise of God's perfections to produce a
proper effect, in opposition to their lying eternally dormant and ineffectual ; as
his power being eternally without any act or fruit of that power ; his wisdom
eternally ineffectual in any wise production, or prudent disposal of any thing,
&c. The manifestation of his internal glory to created understandings. The
communication of the infinite fulness of God to the creature. The creature's
high esteem of God, love to God, and complacence and joy in God, and the proper
exercises and expressions of these.
These at first view may appear to be entirely distinct things : but if we more
closely consider the matter, they will all appear to be one thing, in a variety of
views and relations. They are all but the emanation of God's glory ; or the
excellent brightness and fulness of the Divinity diffused, overflowing, and as it
were, enlarged ; or, in one word, existing ad extra. God's exercising his per-
fection to produce a proper effect, is not distinct from the emanation or commu-
nication of his fulness ; for this is the effect, viz., his fulness communicated, and
the producing this effect is the communication of his fulness ; and there is noth-
ing in this effectual exerting of God's perfection, but the emanation of God's
internal glory. The emanation or communication is of the internal glory or
fulness of God as it is. Now God's internal glory, as it is in God, is either in
his understanding or will. The glory or fulness of his understanding, is his
knowledge. The internal glory and fulness of God, which we must conceive
of as having its special seat in his will, is his holiness and happiness. The
whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these three things, viz., his infinite
knowledge ; his infinite virtue or holiness, and his infinite joy and happiness.
Indeed there are a great many attributes in God, according to our way of con-
ceiving or talking of them , but all may be reduced to these, or to the degree,
circumstances and relations of these. We have no conception of God's power,
different from the degree of these things, with a certain relation of them to effects.
God's infinity is not so properly a distinct kind of good in God, but only ex-
254 END IN CREATION.
pi esses the degree of the good there is in him. So God's eternity is not a distinct
good ; but is the duration of good. His immutability is still the same good,
with a negation of change. So that, as I said, the fulness of the Godhead is the
fulness of his understanding, consisting in his knowledge, and the fulness of his
will, consisting in his virtue and happiness. And therefore the eternal glory of
God consists in the communication of these. The communication of his knowledge
is chiefly in giving the knowledge of himself ; for this is the knowledge in which
the fulness of God's understanding chiefly consists. And thus we see how the
manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and their seeing and
knowing it, is not distinct from an emanation or communication of God's fulness,
but clearly implied in it. Again, the communication of God's virtue or holiness
is principally in communicating the love of himself, (which appears by what has
before been observed.) And thus we see how, not only the creature's seeing and
knowing God's excellence, but also supremely esteeming and loving him, belongs
to the communication of God's fulness. And the communication of God's joy
and happiness, consists chiefly in communicating to the creature, that happiness
and joy, which consists in rejoicing in God, and in his glorious excellency ; for
in such joy God's own happiness does principally consist. And in these things,
viz., in knowing God's excellency, loving God for it, and rejoicing in it ; and
in the exercise and expression of these, consists God's honor and praise ; so that
these are clearly implied in that glory of God, which consists in the emanation
of his internal glory. And though we suppose all these things, which seem in>
be so various, are signified by that glory, which the Scripture speaks of as the
last end of all God's works ; yet it is manifest there is no greater, and no other
variety in it, than in the internal and essential glory of God itself. God's inter-
nal glory is partly in his understanding, and partly in his will. And this internal
glory, as seated in the will of God, implies both his holiness and his happiness ;
both are evidently God's glory, according to the use of the phrase. So that as
God's external glory is only the emanation of his internal glory, this variety
necessarily follows. And again, it hence appears that here there is no other
variety or distinction, but what necessarily arises from the distinct faculties of
the creature, to which the communication is made, as created in the image of
God ; even as having these two faculties of understanding and will. God com-
municates himself to the understanding of the creature, in giving him the know-
ledge of his glory ; and to the will of the creature, in giving him holiness,
consisting primarily in the love of God ; and in giving the creature happiness,
chiefly consisting in joy in God. These are the sum of that emanation of divine
fulness, called in Scripture the glory of God. The first part of this glory is
called truth, the latter, grace. John i. 14, " We beheld his glory, the glory as
of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."
Thus we see that the great and last end of God's works which is so variously
expressed in Scripture, is indeed but one ; and this one end is most properly and
comprehensively called, the glory of God ; by which name it is most commonly
called in Scripture : and is fitly compared to an effulgence or emanation of light
from a luminary, by which this glory of God is abundantly represented in Scrip-
ture. Light is the external expression, exhibition and manifestation of the
excellency of the luminary, of the sun for instance : it is the abundant, exten-
sive emanation and communication of the fulness of the sun to innumerable beings
that partake of it. It is by this that the sun itself is seen, and his glory beheld,
and all other things are discovered ; it is by a participation of this communica-
tion from the sun, that surrounding objects receive all their lustre, beauty and
brightness. It is by this that all nature is quickened and receives life, comfort
END IN CREATION. 255
and joy. Light is abundantly used in Scripture to represent and signify these
three things, knowledge, holiness and happiness. It is used to signify know-
ledge, or that manifestation and evidence by which knowledge is received,
Psalm xix. 8, and cxix. 105, 130. Prov. vi. 23. Isaiah viii. 20, and ix. 2,
and xxix. 18. Dan. v. 1 1. Eph. v. 13, " But all things that are reproved
are made manifest by the light ; for whatsoever doth make manifest, is light."
And in other places of the New Testament innumerable.
It is used to signify virtue or moral good, Job xxv. 5, and other places. And
it is abundantly used to signify comfort, joy and happiness, Esth. viii. 16, Job
xviii. 18, and many other places.
What has been said may be sufficient to show how those things which are
spoken of in Scripture as ultimate ends of God's works, though they may seem
at first view to be distinct, are all plainly to be reduced to this one thing, viz.,
God's internal glory or fulness extant externally, or existing in its emanation.
And though God in seeking this end, seeks the creature's good ; yet therein ap-
pears his supreme regard to himself.
The emanation or communication of the divine fulness, consisting in the
knowledge of God, love to God, and joy in God, has relation indeed both to God,
and the creature ; but it has relation to God as its fountain, as it is an emanation
from God ; and as the communication itself, or thing communicated, is something
divine, something of God, something of his internal fulness, as the water in the
stream is something of the fountain, and as the beams of the sun, are something
of the sun. And again, they have relation to God, as they have respect to him
as their object ; for the knowledge communicated is the knowledge of God ;
and so God is the object of the knowledge, and the love communicated is the
love of God ; so God is the object of that love, and the happiness communicated
is joy in God ; and so he is the object of the joy communicated. In the crea-
ture's knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, the glory of
God is both exhibited and acknowledged ; his fulness is received and returned.
Here is both an emanation and remanation. The refulgence shines upon and
into the creature, and is reflected back to the luminary. The beams of glory
come from God, and are something of God, and are refunded back again to their
original. So that the whole is of God, and in God, and to God, and God is the
beginning, middle and end in this affair.
And though it be true that God has respect to the creature in these things ;
yet his respect to himself and to the creature in this matter, are not properly to
be looked upon, as a double and divided respect of God's heart. What has
been said in Chap. I. Sect. 3, 4, may be sufficient to show this. Nevertheless,
it may not be amiss here briefly to say a few things ; though they are mostly
implied in what has been said already.
When God was about to create the world, he had respect to that emanation
of his glory, which is actually the consequence of the creation, just as it is with
regard to all that belongs to it, both with regard to its. relation to himself, and
the creature. He had regard to it, as an emanation from himself, and a com-
munication of himself, and as the thing communicated, in its nature returned to
himself, as its final term. And he had regard to it also, as the emanation was
to the creature, and as the thing communicated was in the creature, as its sub-
ject. And God had regard to it in this manner, as he had a supreme regard to
himself, and value for his own infinite, internal glory. It was this value for
himself that caused him to value and seek that his » internal glory should flow
forth from himself. It was from his value for his glorious perfections of wis-
dom and righteousness, &c, that he valued the proper exercise and effect of
256 END IN CREATION.
these perfections, in wise and righteous acts and effects. It was from his in
finite value for his internal glory and fulness, that he valued the thing itself,
which is communicated, which is something of the same, extant in the creature.
Thus, because he infinitely values his own glory, consisting in the knowledge of
himself, love to himself, and complacence and joy in himself; he therefore val-
ued the image, communication or participation of these, in the creature. And
it is because he values himself, that he delights in the knowledge, and love, and
joy of the creature ; as being himself the object of this knowledge, love and
complacence. For it is the necessary consequence of the true esteem and love
of any person or being (suppose a son or friend) that we should approve and
value others' esteem of the same object, and disapprove and dislike the contrary.
For the same reason is it the consequence of a being's esteem and love of him-
self, that he should approve of others' esteem and love of himself.
Thus it is easy to conceive, how God should seek the good of the creature,
consisting in the creature's knowledge and holiness, and even his happiness,
from a supreme regard to himself; as his happiness arises from that which is
an image and participation of God's own beauty ; and consists in the creature's
exercising a supreme regard to God, and complacence in him ; in beholding
God's glory, in esteeming and loving it, and rejoicing in it, and in his exercis-
ing and testifying love and supreme respect to God ; which is the same thing
with the creature's exalting God as his chief good, and making him his su-
preme end.
And though the emanation of God's fulness which God intended in the
creation, and which actually is the consequence of it, is to the creature as its
object, and the creature is the subject of the fulness communicated, and is the
creature's good ; and was also regarded as such, when God sought it as the
end of his works ; yet it does not necessarily follow, that even in so doing, he
did not make himself his end. It comes to the same thing. God's respect to
the creature's good, and his respect to himself, is not a divided respect ; but
both are united in one, as the happiness of the creature aimed at, is happiness
in union with himself. The creature is no further happy with this happiness
which God makes his ultimate end, than he becomes one with God. The more
happiness the greater the union : when the happiness is perfect, the union is
Eerfect. And as the happiness will be increasing to eternity, the union will
ecome more and more strict and perfect ; nearer and more like to that be-
tween God the Father, and the Son ; who are so united, that their interest is
perfectly one. If the happiness of the creature be considered as it will be, in
the whole of the creature's eternal duration, with all the infinity of its progress,
and infinite increase of nearness and union to God ; in this view the creature
must be looked upon as united to God in an infinite strictness.
If God has respect to something in the creature, which he views as of ever-
lasting duration, and as rising higher and higher through that infinite duration,
and that not with constantly diminishing (but perhaps an increasing) celerity;
then he has respect to it, as in the whole, of infinite height, though there never
will be any particular time, when it can be said already to have come to such
a height.
Let the most perfect union with God be represented by something at an
infinite height above us ; and the eternally increasing union of the saints with
God, by something that is ascending constantly towards that infinite height,
moving upwards with a given velocity, and that is to continue thus to move to all
eternity. God, who views the whole of this eternally increasing height, views
it as an infinite height. And if he has respect to it, and makes it his end, as in
END IN CREATION. 257
the whole of it, he has respect to it as an infinite height, though the time will
never come when it can be said it has already arrived at this infinite height.
God aims at that which the motion or progression which he causes, aims at,
or tends to. If there be many things supposed to be so made and appointed,
that by a constant and eternal motion, they all tend to a certain centre ; then
it appears that he who made them, and is the cause of their motion, aimed at
that centre, that term of their motion, to which they eternally tend, and are
eternally, as it were, striving after. And if God be this centre, then God aimed
at himself. And herein it appears, that as he is the first author of their being
and motion, so he is the last end, the final term, to which is their ultimate ten-
dency and aim.
We may judge of the end that the Creator aimed at, in the being, nature
and tendency he gives the creature, by the mark or term which they constantly
aim at in their tendency and eternal progress ; though the time will never come,
when it can be said it is attained to, in the most absolutely perfect manner.
But if strictness of union to God be viewed as thus infinitely exalted, then
the creature must be regarded as infinitely, nearly, and closely united to God.
And viewed thus, their interest must be viewed as one with God's interest, and
so is not regarded properly with a disjunct and separate, but an undivided res-
pect. And as to any difficulty of reconciling God's not making the .creature
his ultimate end, with a respect properly distinct from a respect to himself, with
his benevolence and free grace, and the creature's obligation to gratitude, the
reader must be referred to Chap. I. Sec. 4, Object. 4, where this objection has
been considered and answered at large.
If by reason of the strictness of the union of a man and his family, their
interest may be looked upon as one, how much more one is the interest of Christ
and his church (whose first union in heaven is unspeakably more perfect and
exalted than that of an earthly father and his family), if they be considered with
regard to their eternal and increasing union ! Doubtless it may justly be es-
teemed as so much one, that it may be supposed to be aimed at and -sought, not
with a distinct and separate, but an undivided respect.
It is certain that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, was the
good that would be the consequence of the creation, in the whole continuance
of the thing created.
It is no solid objection against God's aiming at an infinitely perfect union of
the creature with himself, that the particular time will never come when it can
be said, the union is now infinitely perfect. God aims at satisfying justice in the
eternal damnation of sinners ; which will be satisfied by their damnation, con-
sidered no otherwise than with regard to its eternal duration. But yet there
never will come that particular moment, when it can be said, that now justice is
satisfied. But if this does not satisfy our modern freethinkers, who do not like
the talk about satisfying justice with an infinite punishment ; I suppose it will
not be denied by any, that God, in glorifying the saints in heaven with 'eternal
felicity, aims to satisfy his infinite grace or benevolence, by the bestowment of
a good infinitely valuable, because eternal ; and yet there never will come the
moment, when it can be said, that now this infinitely valuable good has been
actually bestowed.
Vol. H 33
^
D I S S E R T A T I O JN
ON THE
NATURE OF VIRTUE
<l
THE
NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE.
CHAPTER I.
Showing wherein the Essence of true Virtue consists.
Whatever controversies and variety of opinions there are about the nature
of virtue, yet all (excepting some skeptics, who deny any real difference between
virtue and vice) mean by it, something beautiful, or rather some kind of beauty,
or excellency. — It is not all beauty, that is called virtue ; for instance, not the
beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow : but some beauty belong-
ing to Beings that have perception and will. — It is not all beauty of mankind,
that is called virtue ; for instance, not the external beauty of the countenance,
or shape, gracefulness of motion, or harmony of voice : but it is a beauty that
has its original seat in the mind. — But yet perhaps not every thing that may be
called a beauty of mind, is properly called virtue. There is a beauty of under-
standing and speculation. There is something in the ideas and conceptions of
great philosophers and statesmen, that may be called beautiful ; which is a dif-
ferent thing from what is most commonly meant by virtue. But virtue is the
beauty* of those qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a moral nature, i. e.,
such as are attended with desert or worthiness of praise, or blame. Things of
this sort, it is generally agreed, so far as I know, are not any thing belonging
merely to speculation ; but to the disposition and mill, or (to use a general
word, I suppose commonly well understood) the heart. Therefore I suppose, I
shall not depart from the common opinion, when I say, that virtue is the beauty
of the qualities and exercises of the heart, or those actions which proceed from
them. So that when it is inquired, What is the nature of true virtue ? — this is
the same as to inquire, what that is which renders any habit, disposition, or ex-
ercise of the heart truly beautiful. I use the phrase true virtue, and speak of
things truly beautiful, because I suppose it wTill generally be allowed, that
there is a distinction to be made between some things which are truly
virtuous, and others which only seem to be virtuous, through a partial and
imperfect view of things: that some actions and dispositions appear beau-
tiful, if considered partially and superficially, or with regard to some things
belonging to them, and in some of their circumstances and tendencies, which
would appear otherwise in a more extensive and comprehensive view, wherein
they are seen clearly in their whole nature and the extent of their connections
in the universality of things. — There is a general and a particular beauty. By
a particular beauty, I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when con-
sidered only with regard to its connection with, and tendency to some particular
things within a limited, and, as it were, a private sphere. And a general beauty
* It is to be questioned whether it would not be more correct to say that virtue consists in those ac".«
of the mind in themselves ; beauty properly denoting their quality. — Editor.
262 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly, com-
prehensively and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connections
with every thing it stands related to. The former may be without and against
the latter. As, a few notes in a tune, taken only by themselves, and in their
relation to one another, may be harmonious 5 which when considered with
respect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire series of sounds they are con-
nected with, may be very discordant and disagreeable. — (Of which more after-
wards.)— That only, therefore, is what I mean by true virtue, which is that,
belonging to the heart of an intelligent Being, that is beautiful by a general
beauty, or beautiful in a comprehensive view as it is in itself, and as related to
every thing that it stands in connection with. And therefore when we are
inquiring concerning the nature of true virtue, viz., wherein this true and gen-
eral beauty of the heart does most essentially consist — this is my answer to the
inquiry :
True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general.
Or perhaps to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity and union
of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good
will.
The things which were before observed of the nature of true virtue, naturally
lead us to such a notion of it. If it has its seat in the heart, and is the general
goodness and beauty of the disposition and exercise of that, in the most compre-
hensive view, considered with regard to its universal tendency, and as related
to every thing that it stands in connection with ; what can it consist in, but a
consent and good will to Being in general ? — Beauty does not consist in discord
and dissent, but in consent and agreement. And if every intelligent Being is
some way related to Being in general, and is a part of the universal system of
existence ; and so stands in connection with the whole ; what can its general
and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the great whole ?
If any such thing can be supposed as a union of heart to some particular
Being, or number of Beings, disposing it to benevolence to a private circle or
system of Beings, which are but a small part of the whole ; not implying a
tendency to a union with the great system, and not at all inconsistent with
enmity towards Being in general ; this I suppose not to be of the nature of true
virtue : although it may in some respects be good, and may appear beautiful in
a confined and contracted view of things. — But of this more afterwards.
It is abundantly plain by the holy Scriptures, and generally allowed, not
only by Christian divines, but by the more considerable deists, that virtue most
essentially consists in love. And I suppose, it is owned by the most considera-
ble writers, to consist in general love of benevolence, or kind affection : though
it seems to me, the meaning of some in this affair is not sufficiently explained,
which perhaps occasions some error or confusion in discourses on this subject.
When I say, true virtue consists in love to Being in general, I shall not be
likely to be understood, that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the
nature of true virtue, but what has Being in general, or the great system of
universal existence, for its direct and immediate object : so that no exercise of
love or kind affection to any one particular Being, that is but a small part of this
whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue. But, that the nature of true
virtue consists in a disposition to benevolence towards Being in general.
Though, from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular Beings,
as objects are presented and occasions arise. No wonder, that he who is of a
generally benevolent disposition, should be more disposed than another to have
his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular persons, whom he is
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 263
acquainted and conversant with, and from whom arise the greatest and most
frequent occasions for exciting his benevolent temper. But my meaning is, that
no affections towards particular persons or Beings are of the nature of true virtue,
out such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or
frame of mind, wherein consists a disposition to love Being in general.
And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers, that when I
speak of an intelligent Being's having a heart united and benevolently disposed
rft Being in general, I thereby mean intelligent Being in general. Not inani-
mate things, or Beings that have no perception or will, which are not properly
capable objects of benevolence.
Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of com-
placence. Love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any
Being, which causes it to incline to its well being, or disposes it to desire and
take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, it is agreeable to the com-
mon opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propen-
sity : but that there may be such a thing as benevolence, or a disposition to the
welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful ; unless mere existence be
accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in the Divine Being is gen-
erally supposed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to
their existence : so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty,
rather than they the foundation of God's benevolence ; as it is supposed that it
is God's goodness which moved him to give them both Being and beauty. So
that if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to Being, which is
exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's virtue is so
extended as to include a propensity, not only to Being actually existing, and
actually beautiful, but to possible Being, so as to incline him to give Being,
beauty and happiness. But not now to insist particularly on this. What I
would have observed at present, is, that it must be allowed, benevolence doth
not necessarily presuppose beauty in its object.
What is commonly called love of complacence, presupposes beauty. For it
is no other than delight in beauty ; or complacence in the person or Being belov-
ed for his beauty.
If virtue be the beauty of an intelligent Being, and virtue consists in love,
then it is a plain inconsistence, to suppose that virtue primarily consists in any
love to its object for its beauty ; either in a love of complacence, which is de-
light in a Being for his beauty, or in a love of benevolence, that has the beauty
of its object for its foundation. For that would be to suppose, that the beauty
of intelligent beings primarily consists in love to beauty ; or, that their virtue
first of all consists in their love to virtue. Which is an inconsistence, and going
in a circle. Because it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or first
motive of that love wherein virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first
virtue consists ; or, it supposes the first virtue to be the consequence and effect
of virtue. So that virtue is originally the foundation and exciting cause of the
very beginning or first Being of virtue. WThich makes the first virtue, both the
ground, and the consequence, both cause and effect of itself.* Doubtless virtue
primarily consists in something else besides any effect or consequence of virtue.
If virtue consists primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the
love of virtue : so that virtue must consist in the love of the love of virtue.
* Mr. E.'s idea here appears to be that virtue must exist prior to the existence of any virtuous object
on which it can complaisantly terminate. This is undoubtedly true with respect to the duty. But this
does not appear inconsistent with the supposition that the first act of virtue in a creature may be delight
»n virtue as it is in God.— Ed.
264 4 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
And if it be inquired, w/jat that virtue is, which virtue consists in the love of the
love of, it must be answered, it is the love of virtue. So that there must be the
love of the love of the love of virtue, and so on in infinitum. For there is no
end' of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning, or foundation.
For it is without beginning and hangs on nothing.
Therefore if the essence of virtue or beauty of mind lies in love, or a dispo-
sition to love, it must primarily consist in something different both from com-
placence, which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has
the beauty of its object for its foundation. Because it is absurd, to say that vir-
tue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself. For this makes virtue
primarily prior to itself.
Nor can virtue primarily consist in gratitude ; or one Being's benevolence
to another for his benevolence to him. Because this implies the same inconsis-
tence. For it supposes a benevolence prior to gratitude, that is the cause of
gratitude. Therefore the first benevolence, or that benevolence which has
none prior to it, cannot be gratitude.
Therefore there is room left for no other conclusion than that the primary
object of virtuous love is Being, simply considered ; or, that true virtue primarily
consists, not in love to any particular Beings, because of their virtue or beauty,
nor in gratitude, because they love us ; but in a propensity and union of heart
to Being simply considered ; exciting absolute benevolence (if I may so call it)
to Being in general. — I say, true virtue primarily consists in this. For 1 am far
from asserting that there is no true virtue in any other love than this absolute
benevolence. But I would express what appears to me to be the truth on this
subject, in the following particulars.
The^r^ object of a virtuous benevolence is Being, simply considered : and
if Being, simply considered, be its object, then Being in general is its object ; and
the tiling it has an ultimate propensity to, is the highest good of Being in gene-
ral. And it will seek the good of every individual Being unless it be conceiv-
ed as not consistent with the highest good of Being in general. In which case
the good of a particular Being, or some Beings, may be given up for the sake of
the highest good of Being in general. And particularly if there be any Being
that is looked upon as statedly and irreclaimably opposite and an enemy to Be-
ing in general, then consent and adherence to Being in general will induce the
truly virtuous heart to forsake that Being, and to oppose it.
And further, if Being, simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtu-
ous benevolence, then that Being who has most of Being, or has the greatest
share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such a Being is exhibited
to our faculties or set in our view, will have the greatest share of the propensity
and benevolent affection of the heart. I say, other things being equal, especially
because there is a secondary object of virtuous benevolence, that I shall take
notice of presently. Which is one thing that must be considered as the ground
or motive to a purely virtuous benevolence. Pure benevolence in its first exer-
cise is nothing else but Being's uniting consent, or propensity to Being ; appearing
true and pure by its extending to Being in general, and inclining to the general
highest good, and to each Being, whose welfare is consistent with the highest
general good, in proportion to the degree of existence* understood, other things
being equal.
* I say, in proportion to the degree of existence, because one Being may have more existence than an
other, as he may be greater than another. That which is great, has more existence, and is further from
nothing, than that which is little. One Being may have every thing positive belonging to it, or every thing
which goes to its positive existence (in opposition to defect) in a higher degree than another; 01 a
greater capacity and power, greater understanding, every faculty and every positive quality in a higher
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 265
The second object of a virtuous propensity of heart is benevolent Being. A
secondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence itself m its object.
When any one under the influence of general benevolence, sees another Being
possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and
draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having existence : because so
far as the Being beloved has love to Being in general, so far his own Being
is, as it were, enlarged, extends to, and in some sort comprehends, Being in
general : and therefore he that is governed by love to Being in general must of
necessity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to
him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general existence, that his
own heart is extended and united to, and so looks on its interest as its owrf. It
is because his heart is thus united to Being in general, that he looks on a benev-
olent propensity to Being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty of the
Being in whom it is ; an excellency, that renders him worthy of esteem, com-
placence, and the greater good will.
But several things may be noted more particularly concerning thjs secondary
ground of a truly virtuous love.
1. That loving a Being on this ground necessarily arises from pure benev-
olence to Being in general, and comes to the same thing. For he that has a
simple and pure good will to general entity or existence, must love that temper
mothers, that agrees and conspires with itself. A spirit of consent to Being must
agree with consent to Being. That which truly and sincerely seeks the good of
others, must approve of, and love, that which joins with him in seeking the good
of others.
2. This which has been now mentioned as a secondary ground of virtuous
love, is the thing wherein true moral or spiritual beauty primarily consists. Yea,
spiritual beauty consists wholly in this, and the various qualities and exercises
of mind which proceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from
these internal qualities and exercises. And in these things consists all true
virtue, viz., in this love of Being, and the qualities and acts which arise
from it.
3. As all spiritual beauty lies in these virtuous principles and acts, so it is
primarily on this account they are beautiful, viz., that they imply consent and
union with Being in general. This is the primary and most essential Beauty ol
every thing that can justly be called by the name of virtue, or is any moral ex-
cellency in the eye of one that has a perfect view of things. I say, the prima-
ry and most essential beauty — because there is a secondary and inferior sort oi
beauty ; which I shall take notice of afterwards.
4. This spiritual beauty, that is but a secondary ground of a virtuous benev-
olence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, but complacence, and is the primary
ground of the latter ; that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous. Love to
us in particular, and kindness received, may be a secondary ground. But this is
the primary objective foundation of it.
5. It must be noted, that the degree of the amiableness or valuableness of
true virtue, primarily consisting in consent and a benevolent propensity of heart
to Being in general, in the eyes of one that is influenced by such a spirit, is not
in the simple proportion of the degree of benevolent affection seen, but in a
proportion compounded of the greatness of the benevolent Being or the degree
of Being and the degree of benevolence. One that loves Being in general, will
necessarily value good will to Being in general, wherever he sees it. But if he
degree. An archangel must be supposed to have more existence, and to be every way further removed
from nonentity, than a worm, or &flea.
Vol. II. 34
266 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
the same benevolence in two Beings, he will value it more in two, than in
one only. Because it is a greater thing, more favorable to Being in general, to
have two Beings to favor it, than only one of them. For there is more Being
that favors Being : both together having more Being than one alone. So, if
one Being be as great as two, has as much existence as both together, and has
the same degree of general benevolence, it is more favorable to Being in gen-
eral than if there were general benevolence in a Being that had but half that share
of existence. As a large quantity of gold, with the same degree of preciousness,
i. e. with the same excellent quality of matter, is more valuable than a small
quantity of the same metal.
6. It is impossible that any one should truly relish this beauty, consisting in
general benevolence, who has not that temper himself. I have observed, that if
any Being is possessed of such a temper, he will unavoidably be pleased with
the same temper in another. And it may in like manner be demonstrated, that
it is such a spirit, and nothing else, which will relish such a spirit. For if a
Being, destitute of benevolence, should love benevolence to Being in general, it
would prize and seek that which it had no value for. Because to love an inclina-
tion to the good of Being in general, would imply a loving and prizing the good of
Being in general. For how should one love and value a disposition to a thing, or a
tendency to promote a thing, and for that very reason, because it tends to promote
it — when the thing itself is what he is regardless of, and has no value for, no*
desires to have promoted.
CHAPTER II.
Showing how that Love, wherein true Virtue consists, respects the Divine Being and
created Beings.
From what has been said, it is evident, that true virtue must chiefly consist
in love to God ; the Being of Beings, infinitely the greatest and best of Beings.
This appears, whether we consider the primary or secondary ground of virtuous
love. It was observed, that the first objective ground of that love wherein true
virtue consists, is Being, simply considered : and as a necessary consequence of
this, that Being who has the most of Being, or the greatest share of universal
existence, has proportion ably the greatest share of virtuous benevolence, so far
as such a Being is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being
equal. But God has infinitely the greatest share of existence, or is infinitely the
greatest Being. So that all other Being, even that of all created things what-
soever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the Divine
Being.
And if we consider the secondary ground of love, viz., beauty, or moral ex-
cellency, the same thing will appear. For as God is infinitely the greatest
Being, so he is allowed to be infinitely the most beautiful and excellent : and all
the beauty to be found diffused throughout the whole creation, is but the reflection of
the diffused beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulness of brightness and
glory. God's beauty is infinitely more valuable than that of all other Beings,
upon both those accounts mentioned, viz., the degree of his virtue, and the great-
ness of the Being possessed of this virtue. And God has sufficiently exhibited
himself, in his Being, his infinite greatness and excellency : and has given us
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 267
faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly discovering immense superiority to
all other Beings, in these respects. Therefore he that has true virtue, consisting
in benevolence to Being in general, and in that complacence in virtue, or moral
beauty, and benevolence to virtuous Being, must necessarily have a supreme love
to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true virtue must radi-
cally and essentially, and as it were summarily, consist in this. Because God
is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other Being, but he is
the head of the universal system of existence ; the foundation and fountain of
all Being and all Beauty ; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all
is most absolutely and perfectly dependent ; of whom and through whom, and to
whom is all Being and all perfection ; and whose Being and beauty is as it
were the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellence : much more
than the sun is the fountain and summary comprehension of all the light and
brightness of the day.
If it should be objected, that virtue consists primarily in benevolence, but
that our fellow creatures, and not God, seem to be the most proper object of our
benevolence ; inasmuch as our goodness extendeth not to God, and we cannot
be profitable to him. — To this I answer :
1. A benevolent propensity of heart is exercised not only in seeking to
promote the happiness of the Being, towards whom it is exercised, but also in
rejoicing in his happiness. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not
only excite endeavors to requite the kindness we receive, by equally benefiting
our benefactor, but also if he be above any need of us, or we have nothing to
bestow, and are unable to repay his kindness, it will dispose us to rejoice in his
prosperity.
2. Though we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of
our own, independently; yet we may be instruments of promoting his glory, in
which he takes a true and proper delight. [As was shown at large in the trea-
tise, on God's end in creating the world, Chapter I. Sect. 4 \ whither I must
refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.]
Whatever influence such an objection may seem to have on the minds of
some, yet is there any that owns the Being of a God, who will deny that any
love or benevolent affection, is due to God, and proper to be exercised towards
him ? If no benevolence is to be exercised towards God, because we cannot
profit him, then for the same reason, neither is gratitude to be exercised towards
him for his benefits to us ; because we cannot requite him. But where is the
man, who believes a God and a providence, that will say this ?
There seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this res-
pect, that they do not wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of their schemes
of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason
to suspect they esteem it a less important and a subordinate part of true morality ;
and insist on benevolence to the created system in such a manner as would
naturally lead one to suppose, they look upon that as by far the most important
and essential thing. But why should this be ? If true virtue consists partly in a
respect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If true morality requires
that we should have some regard, some benevolent affection to our Creator, as
well as to his creatures, then doubtless it requires the first regard to be paid to
him ; and that he be every way the supreme object of our benevolence. If his
being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, does not
hinder but that nevertheless he is the proper object of our love, then it does not
hinder that he should be loved according to his dignity, or according to the de-
gree in which he has those things wherein worthiness of regard consists so far
268 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
as we are capable of it. But this worthiness none will deny consists in these
two things, greatness and moral goodness. And those that own a God, do not
deny that he infinitely exceeds all other Beings in these. If the Deity is to be
looked upon as within that system of Beings which properly terminates our be-
nevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the
head of the system, and the chief 'part of it; if it be proper to call him apart,
who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom and without
whom all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence. And therefore
certainly, unless we will be atheists, we must allow that true virtue does prima-
rily and most essentially consist in a supreme love to God ; and that where this
is wanting there can be no true virtue.
But this being a matter of the highest importance, I shall say something
further to make it plain, that love to God is most essential to true virtue ; and
that no benevolence whatsoever to other Beings can be of the nature of true
virtue, without it.
And therefore let it be supposed, that some Beings, by natural instinct, 01
by some other means, have a determination of mind to union and benevolence
to a particular person, or private system* which is but a small part of the uni-
versal system of Being : and that this disposition or determination of mind is
independent on, or not subordinate to benevolence, to Being in general. Such
a determination, disposition, or affection of mind is not of the nature of true virtue.
This is allowed by all with regard to self-love ; in which, good will is con-
fined to one single person only. And there are the same reasons, why any
other private affection or good will, though extending to a society of persons,
independent of, and unsubordinate to, benevolence to the universality, should not
be esteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithstanding it extends to a number of
persons, which taken together are more than a single person, yet the whole falls
infinitely shorty of the universality of existence ; and if put in the scales with
it, has no greater proportion to it than a single person.
However, it may not be amiss more particularly to consider the reasons why
private affections, or good will limited to a particular circle of Beings, falling
infinitely short of the whole existence, and not dependent upon it, nor subordi-
nate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
1. Such a private affection, detached from general benevolence and indepen-
dent on it, as the case may be, will be against general benevolence, or of a
contrary tendency ; and will set a person against general existence, and make
him an enemy to it. — As it is with selfishness, or when a man is governed by a
regard to his own private interest, independent of regard to the public good,
such a temper exposes a man to act the part of an enemy to the public. As, in
every case wherein his private interest seems to clash with the public ; or in all
those cases wherein such things are presented to his view, that suit his personal
appetites or private inclinations, but are inconsistent with the good of the public.
On which account a selfish, contracted, narrow spirit is generally abhorred, and
is esteemed base and sordid. — But if a man's affection takes in half a dozen more,
and his regards extend so far beyond his own single person as to take in his chil-
dren and family ; or if it reaches further still, to a longer circle, but falls infi-
nitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of Being in general ; his
* It may be here noted, that when hereafter I use such a phrase as private system of Beings, or others
similar, I thereby intend any system or society of Beings that contains but a small part of the great system
comprehending the universality of existence. I think, that may well be called ^private system, which is
but an infinitely small part of this great whole we stand related to.# I therefore also call that affection,
private affection, which is limited to so narrow a circle ; and that general affection or benevolence which
has Being in general for its object.
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 269
private affection exposes him to the same thing, viz., to pursue the interest of
its particular object in opposition to general existence ; which is certainly con-
trary to the tendency of true virtue ; yea, directly contrary to the main and most
essential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and
tendency is good. For the chief and most essential good that is in virtue, is its
favoring Being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited
system had in itself the essential nature of virtue, it would be impossible, that
it should in any circumstance whatsoever have a tendency and inclination di-
rectly contrary to that wherein the essence of virtue chiefly consists.
2. Private affection, if not subordinate to general affection, is not only liable,
as the case may be, to issue in enmity to Being in general, but has a tendency to
it as the case certainly is, and must necessarily be. For he that is influenced
by private affection, not subordinate to regard to Being in general, sets up its
particular or limited object above Being in general ; and this most naturally
tends to enmity against the latter, which is by right the great supreme, ruling,
and absolutely sovereign object of our regard. Even as the setting up another
prince as supreme in any kingdom, distinct from the lawful sovereign, naturally
tends to enmity against the lawful sovereign. Wherever it is sufficiently pub-
lished, that the supreme, infinite, and all comprehending Being requires a su-
preme regard to himself; and insists upon it, that our respect to him should uni-
versally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be subordinate to it, and this
under the pain of his displeasure (as we must suppose it is in the world of intel-
ligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world) ; then a con-
sciousness of our having chosen and set up another prince to rule over us, and
subjected our hearts to him, and continuing in such an act, must unavoidably
excite enmity, and fix us in a stated opposition to the Supreme Being. This
demonstrates, that affection to a private society or system, independent on gene-
ral benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For this would \e ab-
surd, that it has the nature and essence of true virtue, and yet at the same time
has a tendency opposite to true virtue. ;
3. Not only would affection to a private system, unsubordinate to regard to
Being in general, have a tendency to opposition to the supreme object of vir-
tuous affection, as its effect and consequence, but would become itself an oppo-
sition to that object. Considered by itself in its nature, detached from its effects,
it is an instance of great opposition to the rightful supreme object of our respect.
For it exalts its private object above the other great and infinite object ; and sets
that up as supreme, in opposition to this. It puts down Being in general, which
is infinitely superior in itself and infinitely more important, in an inferior place ;
yea, subjects the supreme general object to this private infinitely inferior object ;
which is to treat it with great contempt, and truly to act in oppositon to it, and
to act in opposition to the true order of things, and in opposition to that which
is infinitely the supreme interest ; making this supreme and infinitely impor-
tant interest, as far as in us lies, to be subject to, and dependent on, an interest
infinitely inferior. This is to act against it, and to act the part of an enemy to
it. He that takes a subject, and exalts him above his prince, sets him as su-
preme instead of the prince, and treats his prince wholly as a subject, therein
acts the part of an enemy to his prince.
From these things, I think, it is manifest, that no affection limited to any
private system, not dependent on, nor subordinate to Being in general, can be
of the nature of true virtue ; and this, whatever the private system be, let it be
more or less extensive, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals,
so long as it contains an infinitely little part of universal existence, and so bears
270 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
10 proportion to the great all comprehending system. — And consequently, that
10 affection whatsoever to any creature, or any system of created Beings, which
s not dependent on, nor subordinate to a propensity or union of the heart to God,
the supreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue.
From hence also it is evident, that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the di-
vine mind, must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and
friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons
in the Godhead, or that infinitely strong propensity there is in these divine per-
sons one to another. There is no need of multiplying words, to prove that it
must be thus, on a supposition that virtue, in its most essential nature, consists in
benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards Being in general ; and so
flowing out to particular Beings, in a greater or less degree, according to the
measure of existence and beauty which they are possessed of. — It will also fol-
low from the foregoing things, that God's goodness and love to created Beings,
is derived from, and subordinate to his love to himself. [In what manner it is
so, I have endeavoured in some measure to explain in the preceding discourse of
God's end in creating the World.']
With respect to the manner in which a virtuous love in created Beings, one
to another, is dependent on, and derived from love to God, this will appear by
a proper consideration of what has been said ; that it is sufficient to render love
to any created Being virtuous, if it arise from the temper of mind wherein con-
sists a disposition to love God supremely. Because it appears from what has
been already observed, all that love to particular Beings, which is the fruit of
a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, is virtuous love. But, as
has been remarked, a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, and
a temper or disposition to love God supremely, are in effect the same thing.
Therefore, if love to a created Being comes from that temper or propensity of
the heart, it is virtuous. — However, every particular exercise of love to a crea-
ture may not sensibly arise from any exercise of love to God, or an explicit
consideration of any similitude, conformity, union or relation to God, in the
creature beloved.
The most proper evidence of love to a created Being, its arising from that
temper of mind wherein consists a supreme propensity of heart to God, seems
to be the agreeableness of the kind and degree of our love to God's end in our
creation and in the creation of all things, and the coincidence of the exercises
of our love, in their manner, order, and measure, with the manner, in which
God himself exercises love to the creature, in the creation and government of
the world, and the way in which God, as the first cause and supreme disposer
of all things, has respect to the creature's happiness, in subordination to him-
self as his own supreme end. For the true virtue of created Beings is doubt-
less their highest excellency, and their true goodness, and that by which they
are especially agreeable to the mind of their Creator. — But the true goodness
of a thing (as was observed before) must be its agreeableness to its end, or its
fitness to answer the design for which it was made. Or, at least, this must be
its goodness in the eyes of the workmen. — Therefore they are good moral agents
whose temper of mind or propensity of heart is agreeable to the end for which
God made moral agents. But, as has been shown, the last end for which God
has made moral agents, must be the last end for which God has made all things;
it being evident, that the. moral world is the end of the rest of the world ; the
inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world,
as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitants.
By these things it appears, that a truly virtuous mind, being, as it were,
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 271
;inder the sovereign dominion of love to God, does above all things seek the
glory of God, and makes this his supreme, governing, and ultimate end ; con-
sisting in the expression of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the
manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and the communications
of the infinite fulness of God to the creature ; in the creature's highest esteem
of God, love to God, and joy in God, and in the proper exercises and expres-
sions of these. — And so far as a virtuous mind exercises true virtue in benevo-
lence to created Beings, it chiefly seeks the good of the creature, consisting in
its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its union with God, and con-
formity to him, love to him, and joy in him. — And that temper or disposition
of heart, that consent, union, or propensity of mind to Being in general, which
appears chiefly in such exercises, is virtue, truly so called ; or in other words,
true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection but this is
of the nature of true virtue.
Corollary. Hence if appears, that those schemes of religion or moral philo-
sophy, which, however well in some respects they may treat of benevolence
to mankind, and other virtues depending on it, yet have not a supreme regard
to God, and love to him, laid in the foundation, and all other virtues handled
in a connection with this, and in a subordination to this, are not true schemes
of philosophy, but are fundamentally and essentially defective. And whatever
other benevolence or generosity towards mankind, and other virtues, or moral
qualifications which go by that name, any are possessed of, that are not attend-
ed with a love to God which is altogether above them, and to which they are
subordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature
of true virtue or religion in them. — And it may be asserted in general that
nothing is of the nature of true virtue in which God is not the first and the
last ; or which, with regard to their exercises in general, have not their first
foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory,
and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the
supreme end.
CHAPTER III.
Concerning the Secondary and Inferior kind of Beauty.
Though this which has been spoken of, alone, is justly esteemed the true
beauty of moral agents, or spiritual Beings ; this alone being what would ap-
pear beautiful in them, upon a clear and comprehensive view of things ; and
therefore alone is the moral amiableness of Beings that have understanding and
will in the eyes of him that perfectly sees all things as they are ; yet there are
other qualities, other sensations, propensities and affections of mind, and princi-
ples of action, that often obtain the epithet of virtuous, and by many are sup-
posed to have the nature of true virtue ; which are entirely of a distinct nature
from this, and have nothing of that kind ; and therefore are erroneously con-
founded with real virtue — as may particularly and fully appear from things
which will be observed in this and the following chapters.
That consent, agreement, or union of Being to Being, which has been
spoken of, viz., the union or propensity of minds to mental or spiritual existence,
may be called the highest, and first, or primary beauty that is to be found
among things that exist : being the proper and peculiar beauty of spiritual
272 " THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
and moral Beings, which are the highest and first part of the universal system,
for whose sake all the rest has existence. Yet there is another inferior, second-
ary beauty, which is some image of this, and which is not peculiar to spiritual
Beings, but is found even in inanimate things ; which consists in a mutual con-
sent and agreement of different things in form, manner, quantity, and visible
end or design ; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity,
symmetry, proportion, harmony, &c. Such is the mutual agreement of the
various sides of a square, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such
is, as it were, the mutual consent of the different parts of the periphery of a
circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the corresponding parts of an ellipsis.
Such is the agreement of the colors, figures, dimensions and distances of the
different spots on the chess board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece
of chints, or brocade. — Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of
a human body, or countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and
agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune. This is the same that Mr.
Hutcheson, in his treatise on -beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of
variety. Which is no other than the consent or agreement of different things,
in form, quantity, &c. He observes, that the greater the variety is, in equal
uniformity, the greater the beauty. Which is no more than to say, the more
there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And
the reason of that is, because it is more considerable to have many things con-
sent one with another, than a few only.
The beauty which consists in the visible fitness of a thing to its use and
unity of design, is not a distinct sort of beauty from this. For it is to be ob-
served, that one thing which contributes to the beauty of the agreement and
proportion of various things, is their relation one to another ; which connects
them, and introduces them together into view and consideration, and whereby
one suggests the other to the mind, and the mind is led to compare them, and
so to expect and desire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pil-
lars, as they may happen to be found in different places, is not an equal degree
of beauty, as that uniformity in so many pillars in the corresponding parts of
the same building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another.
The answerableness of a thing to its use is only the proportion, fitness, and agree-
ing of a cause or means to a visibly designed effect, and so an effect suggested
to the mind by the idea of the means. This kind of beauty is not entirely differ-
ent from that beauty which there is in fitting a mortise to its tenon. Only
when the beauty consists in xinity of design, or the adaptedness of a variety of
things to promote one intended effect, in which all conspire, as the various
parts of an ingenious complicated machine, there is a double beauty, as there
is a twofold agreement and conformity. First, there is the agreement of the
various parts to the designed end. Secondly, through this, viz. the designed
end or effect, all the various particulars agree one with another, as the general
medium of their union, whereby they being united in this third, they thereby
are all united one to another.
The reason, or at least one reason why God has made this kind of mutual
consent and agreement of things beautiful and grateful to those intelligent Be-
ings that perceive it, probably is, that there is in it some image of the true,
spiritual, original beauty which has been spoken of ; consisting in Being's con-
sent to Being, or the union of minds or spiritual Beings in a mutual propensity
and affection of heart. The other is an image of this, because by that uniform-
ity, diverse things become as it were one, as it is in this cordial union. And it
pleases God to observe analogy in his works, as is manifest in fact in innumer-
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 273
able instances ; and especially to establish inferior things in an analogy to su-
perior. Thus, in how many instances has he formed brutes in analogy to the
nature of mankind ? And plants in analogy to animals with respect to the man-
ner of their generation, nutrition, &c. And so he has constituted the external
world in an analogy to things in the spiritual world, in numberless instances ;
as might be shown, if it were necessary, and here were proper place and room
for it. — Why such analogy in God's works pleases him, it is not needful now to
inquire. It is sufficient that he makes an agreement or consent of different
things, in their form, manner, measure, &c, to appear beautiful, because here
is some image of a higher kind of agreement and consent of spiritual Beings.
It has pleased him to establish a law of nature, by virtue of which the uniform-
ity and mutual correspondence of a beautiful plant, and the respect which the
various parts of a regular building seem to have one to another, and theii
agreement and union, and the consent or concord of the various notes of a me-
lodious tune, should appear beautiful ; because therein is some image of the
consent of mind, of the different members of a society or system of intelligent
Beings, sweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart — And here, by the
way, I would further observe, probably it is with regard to this image or resem-
blance, which secondary beauty has of true spiritual beauty, that God has so
constituted nature, that the presenting of this inferior beauty, especially in those
kinds of it which have the greatest resemblance of the primary beauty, as the
harmony of sounds, and the beauties of nature, have a tendency to assist those
whose hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to dispose them
to the exercises of divine love, and enliven in them a sense of spiritual beauty.
From what has been said we may see, that there are two sorts of agree-
ment or consent of one thing to another. (1.) There is a cordial agreement;
that consists in concord and union of mind and heart ; which, if not attended
(viewing things in general) with more discord than concord, is true virtue, and
the original or primary beauty, which is the only true moral beauty. (2.)
There is a natural union or agreement ; which, though some image of the other,
is entirely a distinct thing ; the will, disposition, or affection of the heart hav-
ing no concern in it, but consisting only in uniformity and consent of nature,
form, quantity, &c. (as before described), wherein lies an inferior secondary sort
of beauty, which may, in distinction from the other, be called natural beauty. —
This may be sufficient to let the reader know how I shall hereafter use the
phrases of cordial, and natural agreement ; and moral, spiritual, divine, and
primary original beauty, and secondary, or natural beauty.
Concerning this latter, inferior kind of beauty, the following things may be
observed :
1. The cause why secondary beauty is grateful to men, is only a law of
nature, which God has fixed, or an instinct he has given to mankind ; and not
their perception of the same thing which God is pleased to have regard to, as
the ground or rule by which he has established such a law of nature. — This ap-
pears in two things.
(1.) That which God has respect to, as the rule or ground of this law of
nature he has given us, whereby things having a secondary beauty are made
grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and proportion, in measure, form,
&c. But in many instances persons that are gratified, and have their minds
affected, in presenting this beauty, do not reflect on that particular agreement
and proportion which, according to the law of nature, is the ground and rule of
beauty m the case, yea, are ignorant of it. Thus, a man may be pleased with
the harmony of the notes in a tune, and yet know nothing of that proportion or
Vol. TI. 35
274 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
adjustment of the notes which by the law of nature is the ground of the melody.
He knows not, that the vibratipns in one note regularly coincide with the
"vibrations in another ; that the vibrations of a note coincide in time with two
vibrations of its octave ; and that two vibrations of a note coincide with three of
its fifth, &c. Yea, he may not know, that there are vibrations of the air in the
case, or any corresponding motions in the organs of hearing, in the auditory
nerve, or animal spirits. — So, a man may be affected and pleased with a beau-
tiful proportion of the features in a face, and yet not know what that proportion
is, or what measures, quantities, and distances it consists in.
In this a sensation of secondary beauty differs from a sensation of primary
and spiritual beauty, consisting in a spiritual union and agreement. What
makes the latter grateful, is perceiving the union itself. It is the immediate
view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, that is pleasing to the vir-
tuous mind.
(2.) As was observed before, God, in establishing such a law that mutual
natural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c, should appear
beautiful or grateful to men, seems to have had regard to the image and resem-
blance there is in such a natural agreement, of that spiritual cordial agreement,
wherein original beauty consists, as one reason why he established such a law.
But it is not any reflection upon, or perception of, such a resemblance of this to
spiritual beauty, that is the reason why such a form or state of objects appears
beautiful to men : but their sensation of pleasure, on a view of this secondary
beauty, is immediately owing to the law God has established, or the instinct he
has given.
2. Another thing observable concerning this kind of beauty, is, that it
affects the mind more (other things being equal) when taken notice of in objects
which are of considerable importance, than in little trivial matters. Thus the
symmetry of the parts of a human body, or countenance, affects the mind more
than the beauty of a flower. So, the beauty of the solar system, more than as
great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions
of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the same proportions in some
little slight compositions, made to please children.
3. It may be observed (which was hinted before) that not only uniformity
and proportion, &c, of different things is requisite in order to this inferior beau-
ty, but some relation or connection of the things thus agreeing one with another.
As, the uniformity or likeness of a number of pillars, scattered hither and thith-
er, does not constitute beauty, or at least by no means in an equal degree as
uniformity in pillars connected in the same building, in parts that have relation
one to another. So, if we see things unlike, and very disproportioned, in dis-
tant places, which have no relation to each other, this excites no such idea
of deformity, as disagreement and inequality or disproportion in things related
and connected : and the nearer the relation, and the stricter the connection, so
much the greater and more disgustful is the deformity, consisting in their dis-
agreement.
4. This secondary kind of beauty, consisting in uniformity and proportion,
not only takes place in material and external things, but also in things imma-
terial ; and is, in very many things, plain and sensible in the latter, as well as
the former : and when it is so, there is no reason why it should not be grateful to
them that behold it, in these as well as the other, by virtue of the same sense,
or the same determination of mind to be gratified with uniformity and proportion.
If uniformity and proportion be the things that affect, and appear agreeable to,
this sense of beauty, then why should not uniformity and proportion affect the same
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 275
sense in immaterial things as well as material, if there he equal capacity of dis-
cerning it in both ? And indeed more in spiritual things (cater is paribus), as these
are more important than things merely external and material.
This is not only reasonable to be supposed, but it is evident in fact, m num-
berless instances. There is a beauty of order in society, besides what consists in
benevolence, or can be referred to it, which is of the secondary kind. As, when
the different members of society have all their appointed office, place and station,
according to their several capacities and talents, and every one keeps his place,
and continues in his proper business. In this there is a beauty, not of a different
kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of skilful arcfc'tecture,
where the strong pillars are set in their proper place, the pilasters in a place fit
for them, the square pieces of marble in the pavement, in a place suitable for
them, the panels in the walls and partitions in their proper places, the cornices
in places proper for them, &c. As the agreement of a variety in one common
design, of the parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one instance of
that regularity, which belongs to the secondary kind of beauty, so there is the
same kind of beauty in immaterial things, in what is called wisdom, consisting
in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one gen-
eral purpose : which is a distinct thing from the goodness of that general pur-
pose, as being useful and benevolent.
So there is a beauty in the virtue called justice, which consists in the agree-
ment of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner
and measure : and therefore is the very same sort of beauty with that uniformity
and proportion, which is observable in those external and material things that
are esteemed beautiful. There is a natural agreement and adaptedness of things
that have relation one to another, and a harmonious corresponding of one thing
to another : that he who from his will does evil to others, should receive ev3
from the will of others, or from the will of him or them whose business it is to
take care of the injured, and to act in their behalf : and that he should suffer
evil m •proportion to the evil of his doings. Things are in natural regularity
and mutual agreement, not in a metaphorical but literal sense, when he whose
heart opposes the general system, should have the hearts of that system, or the
heart of the head and ruler of the system, against him : and that in consequence,
he should receive evil in proportion to the evil tendency of the opposition of his
heart. — So, there is a like agreement in nature and measure, when he that
loves, has the proper returns of love ; when he that from his heart promotes
the good of another, has his good promoted by the other ; as there is a kind of
justice in a becoming gratitude.
Indeed most of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered, will be found
to partake of the nature of justice. There is some natural agreement of one
thing to another ; some adaptedness of the agent to the object ; some answera-
bleness of the act to the occasion ; some equality and proportion in things of a
similar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative
duties ; duties of children to parents, and of parents to children ; duties of hus-
bands and wives ; duties of rulers and subjects ; duties of friendship and good
neighborhood : and all duties that we owe to God, our Creator, preserver, and
benefactor ; and all duties whatsoever, considered as required by God, and as
branches of our duty to him, and also considered as what are to be performed
with a regard to Christ, as acts of obedience to his precepts, and as testimonies
of respect to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues and
temper of mind he has exercised towards us, and the benefits we have or hope
for therefrom.
276 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
It is this secondary kind of beauty, which belongs to the virtues and duties
required of us, that Mr. Wollaston seems to have had in his eye, when he resolved
all virtue into an agreement of inclinations, volitions and actions with truth. He
evidently has respect to the justice there is in the virtues and duties that are
proper to be in one Being towards another ; which consists in one Being's ex-
pressing such affections and using such a conduct towards another, as hath a
natural agreement and proportion to what is in them, and what we receive from
them ; which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its
ground, object and occasion, as that which is between a true proposition and
the thing spoken of in it.
But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous
dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uniformity or similarity of
various things, viz., the union of heart to Being in general, or to God the Being
of Beings, which appears in those virtues ; and which those virtues, when true,
are the various expressions or effects of. — Benevolence to Being in general, or
to Being simply considered, is entirely a distinct thing from uniformity in the
midst of variety, and is a superior kind of beauty.
It is true, that benevolence to Being in general, when a person hath it, will
naturally incline him to justice, or proportion in the exercises of it. He that
loves Being, simply considered, will naturally (as was observed before), other
things being equal, love particular Beings, in a proportion compounded of the
degree of Being, and the degree of virtue or benevolence to Being, which they
have. And that is to love Beings in proportion to their dignity. For the
dignity of any Being consists in those two things. Respect to Being, in this
pronortion, is the first and most general kind of justice; which will produce all
the subordinate kinds. So that, after benevolence to Being in general exists,
the proportion which is observed in objects, may be the cause of the proportion
of benevolence to those objects : but no proportion is the cause or ground of the
existence of such a thing as benevolence to Being. The tendency of objects to
excite that degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree of
Being, &c, is the consequence of the existence of benevolence ; and not the
ground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies, one to another, by mutual attrac-
tion, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the consequence of the Being of
*ich a thing as mutual attraction ; and not attraction the effect of proportion.
By this it appears, that just affections and acts have a beauty in them, dis-
tinct from, and superior to, the uniformity and equality there is in them ; for which,
he that has a truly virtuous temper, relishes and delights in them. And that is
the expression and manifestation there is in them of benevolence to Being in
general. — And besides this, there is the agreement of justice to the will and
command of God ; and also something in the tendency and consequences of
justice, that is agreeable to general benevolence, viz., as in many respects it
tends to the glory of God, and the general good. Which tendency also makes
it beautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of general benevo-
lence to produce justice, also the tendency of justice to produce effects agreeable
to general benevolence, both render justice pleasing to a virtuous mind. And it
is on these accounts chiefly, that justice is grateful to a virtuous taste, or a truly
benevolent heait. But, though it be true, there is that in the uniformity and
proportion there is in justice, which is grateful to a benevolent heart, as this
uniformity and proportion tends to the general good ; yet that is no argument,
that there is no other beauty in it but its agreeing with benevolence. For so
the external regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, as
it is profitable, and tends to the general good ; but that is no argument, that
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 277
there is no other sort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion, but only
its suiting benevolence by tending to the general good.
5. From all that has been observed concerning this secondary kind of beauty,
it appears that that disposition or sense of the mind, which consists in determin-
ation of mind to approve and be pleased with this beauty, considered simply and
by itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is entirely a different thing
from a truly virtuous taste. For it has been shown, that this kind of beauty is
entirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material
or immaterial things. And therefore it will follow, that a taste of this kind of
beauty is entirely a different thing from a taste of true virtue. Who will affirm,
that a disposition to approve of the harmony of-good music, or the beauty of a
square, or equilateral triangle, is the same with true holiness, or a truly virtuous
disposition of mind ! It is a relish of uniformity and proportion, that determines
the mind to approve these things. And if this be all, there is no need of any
thing higher, or of any thing in any respect diverse, to determine the mind to
approve and be pleased with equal uniformity and proportion among spiritual
things which are equally discerned. It is virtuous to love true virtue, as that
denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue, for the
heart to be pleased with that which is entirely distinct from it.
Though it be true, there is some analogy in it to spiritual and virtuous
beauty, as much as material things can have analogy to things spiritual (on
which they can have no more than a shadow), yet, as has been observed, men
do not approve it because of any such analogy perceived.
And not only reason, but experience plainly shows, that men's approbation
of this sort of beauty, does not spring from any virtuous temper, and has no
connection with virtue. For, otherwise, men's delight in the beauty of squares,
and cubes, and regular polygons, in the regularity of buildings, and the beauti-
ful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increase in proportion to men's
virtue ; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or
holy men ; but would be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious
and lewd. It is evident in fact, that a relish of these things does not depend on
general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any Being whatsoever, any
more than a man's loving the taste of honey, or his being pleased with the
smell of a rose. A taste of this inferior beauty in things immaterial, is one
thing which has been mistaken by some moralists, for a true virtuous principle,
implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind.
CHAPTER IV.
Of Self-Love, and its various Influence, to cause Love to others, or the contrary.
Many assert, that all love arises from self-love. In order to determine this
point, it should be clearly ascertained what is meant by self-love.
Self-love, I think, is generally defined — a man's love of his own happiness.
Which is short, and may be thought very plain : but indeed is an ambiguous
definition, as the pronoun his own., is equivocal, and liable to be taken in two
very different senses. For a man's own happiness may either be taken univer-
sally, for all the happiness and pleasure which the mind is in any regard the
gubject of, or whatever is grateful and pleasing to men ; or it may be taken for
278 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
the pleasure a man takes in his own proper, private, and separate good. — And
so, self-love may be taken two ways.
1. Self-love may be taken for the same as his loving whatsoever is grateful
or pleasing to him. Which comes only to this, that self-love is a man's liking,
and being suited and pleased in that which he likes, and which pleases him ;
or, that it is a man's loving what he loves. For whatever a man loves, that
thing is gratefui anc? pleasing to him; whether tha : be his own peculiar happi-
ness, or the happiness of others. And if this be all that they mean by self-love,
no wonder they suppose that all love may be resolved into self-love. For it is
undoubtedly true, that whatever a man loves, his love may be resolved into his
loving what he loves — if that be proper speaking. If by self-love is meant
nothing else but a man's loving what is grateful or pleasing to him, and being
averse to what is disagreeable, this is calling that self-love, which is only a
general capacity of loving, or hating ; or a capacity of being either pleased or
displeased; which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will.
For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable
to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is
capable of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and
chooses, is grateful to him ; whatever that be, whether it be his own private
good, the good of his neighbors, or the glory of God. And so far as it is
grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, or hap-
piness.
But if this be what is meant by self-love, there is an impropriety and absur-
dity even in the putting of the question, Whether all our love, or our love to
each particular object of our love, does not arise from self-love ? For
that would be the same as to inquire, Whether the reason why our love is fixed
on such and such particular objects, is not, that we have a capacity of loving
some things ? This may be a general reason why men love or hate any thing
at all ; and therein differ from stones and trees, which love nothing, and hate
nothing. But it can never be a reason why men's love is placed on such and
such objects. That a man, in general, loves and is pleased with happiness, or
(which is the same thing) has a capacity of enjoying happiness, cannot be the
reason why such and such things become his happiness : as for instance, why
the good of his neighbor, or the happiness and glory of God, is grateful and
pleasing to him, and so becomes a part of his happiness.
Or if what they mean, who say that all love comes from self-love, be not,
that our loving such and such particular persons and things, arises from our love
to happiness in general, but from a love to love our own happiness, which con-
sists in these objects ; so the reason why we love benevolence to our friends, or
neighbors, is, because we love our happiness, consisting in their happiness,
which we take pleasure in ; — still the notion is absurd. For here the effect is
made the cause of that, of which it is the effect : our happiness, consisting in
the happiness of the person beloved, is made the cause of our love to that
person. Whereas, the truth plainly is, that our love to the person is the cause
of our delighting, or being happy in his happiness. How comes our happiness
to consist in the happiness of such as we love, but by our hearts being first
united to them in affection, so that we, as it were, look on them as ourselves,
and so on their happiness as our own ?
Men who have benevolence to others, have pleasure when they see others'
happiness, because seeing their happiness gratifies some inclination that was in
their hearts before. — They before inclined to their happiness ; which was by
benevolence or good will ; and therefore when they see their happiness, their
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 279
inclination is suited, and they are pleased. But the Being of inclinations and
appetites is prior to any pleasure in gratifying these appetites.
2. Self-love, as the phrase is used in common speech, most commonly sig-
nifies a man's regard to his confined private self, or love to himself with respect
to his private interest.
By private interest I mean that which most immediately consists in those
pleasures, or pains, that are personal. For there is a comfort, and a grief, that
some have in others' pleasures or pains ; which are in others originally, but are
derived to them, or in some measure become theirs, by virtue of a benevolent
union of heart with others. And there are other pleasures and pains that are
originally our own, and not what we .have by such a participation with others.
Which consist in preceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain personal inclina-
tions implanted in our nature ; such as the sensitive appetites and aversions.
Such also is the disposition or the determination of the mind to be pleased with
external beauty, and with all inferior secondary beauty, consisting in uniformity,
proportion, &c, whether in things external or internal, and to dislike the con-
trary deformity. Such also is the natural disposition in men to be pleased in a
perception of their being the objects of the honor and love of others, and dis-
pleased with others' hatred and contempt. For pleasures and uneasinesses of this
kind are doubtless as much owing to an immediate determination of the mind
by a fixed law of our nature, as any of the pleasures or pains of external sense.
And these pleasures are properly of the private and personal kind ; being not
by any participation of the happiness or sorrow of others, through benevolence.
It is evidently mere self-love, that appears in this disposition. It is easy to see,
that a man's love to himself will make him love love to himself, and hate ha-
tred to himself. And as God has constituted our nature, self-love is exercised
in no one disposition more than in this. Men, probably, are capable of much
more pleasure and pain through this determination of the mind, than by any
other personal inclination, or aversion, whatsoever. Though perhaps wre do
not so very often see instances of extreme suffering by this means, as by some
others, yet we often see evidences of men's dreading the contempt of others
more than death ; and by such instances many conceive something what men
would suffer, if universally hated and despised ; and many reasonably infer some-
thing of the greatness of the misery, that wTould arise under a sense of universal
abhorrence, in a great view of intelligent Being in general, or in a clear view of
the Deity, as incomprehensibly and immensely great, so that all other Beings
are as nothing and vanity — together with a sense of his immediate continual
presence, and an infinite concern with him and dependence upon him — and living
constantly in the midst of most clear and strong evidences and manifestations
of his hatred and contempt and wrath.
But to return. — These things may be sufficient to explain what I mean by
private interest ; in regard to which, self-love, most properly so called, is imme-
diately exercised.
And here I would observe, that if we take self-love in this sense, so love to
some others may truly be the effect of self-love ; i. e., according to the common
method and order, which is maintained in the laws of nature. For no created
thing has power to produce an effect any otherwise than by virtue of the laws
of nature. Thus that a man should love those that are of his party, when there
are different parties contending one with another ; and that are warmly engaged
on his side, and promote his interest — this is the natural consequence of a private
self-love. Indeed there is no metaphysical necessity, in the nature of things,
that because a man loves himself, and regards his own interest, he therefore
280 THE NATURE CF VIRTUE.
should love those that love him, and promote his interest ; i. e., to suppose it to
be otherwise, implies no contradiction. It will not follow from any absolute
metaphysical necessity, that because bodies have solidity, cohesion, and gravita-
tion towards the centre of the earth, therefore a weight suspended on the beam
of a balance should have greater power to counterbalance a weight on the other
side, when at a distance from the fulcrum, than when it is near. It implies no
contradiction, that it should be otherwise : but only as it contradicts that beau-
tiful proportion and harmony, which the author of nature observes in the laws
of nature he has established. Neither is there any absolute necessity, the
contrary implying a contradiction, that because there is an internal mutual attrac-
tion of the parts of the earth, or any other sphere, whereby the whole becomes one
solid coherent body, therefore other bodies that are around it, should also be
attracted by it, and those that are nearest, be attracted most. But according to
the order and proportion generally observed in the laws of nature, one of these
effects is connected with the other, so that it is justly looked upon as the same
power of attraction in the globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth
towards its centre, with that which attracts the parts of the earth themselves
one to another ; only exerted under different circumstances. By a like order
of nature, a man's love to those that love him, is no more than a certain ex-
pression or effect of self-love. No other principle is needful in order to the effect,
if nothing intervenes to countervail the natural tendency of self-love. Therefore
there is no more true virtue in a man's thus loving his friends merely from self-
love, than there is in self-love itself, the principle from whence it proceeds. So,
a man's being disposed to hate those that hate him, or to resent injuries done
him, arises from self-love in like manner as the loving those that love us, and
being thankful for kindness shown us.
But it is said by some, that it is apparent, there is some other principle con-
cerned in exciting the passions of gratitude and anger, besides self-love, viz., a
moral sense, or sense of moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of
all mankind to approve of, and be pleased with virtue, and to disapprove of vice,
and behold it with displicence ; and that their seeing or supposing this moral
beauty or deformity, in the kindness of a benefactor, or opposition of an adver-
sary, is the occasion of these affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwise, why
are not these affections excited in us towards inanimate things, that do us good,
or hurt ? Why do we not experience gratitude to a garden, or fruitful field 1
And why are we not angry with a tempest, or blasting mildew, or an overflow-
ing stream 1 We are very differently affected towards those that do us good
from the virtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than
towards things that hurt or help us, which are destitute of reason and will.
Now concerning this, I would make several remarks.
1. Those who thus argue, that gratitude and anger cannot proceed from self-
love, might argue in the same way, and with equal reason, that neither can
these affections arise from love to others ; which is contrary to their own scheme
They say that the reason why we are affected with gratitude and anger
towards men, rather than things without life, is moral sense ; which they say, is
the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public,
which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind. But now I might say, accord-
ing to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to
others, or love to the public, or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public af-
fection. For how differently are we affected towards those that do good or hurt
to the public from understanding and will, and from a general public spirit, or
public motive. — I say, how differently affected are we towards these, from what
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 281
we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the clouds, that do good to
the public by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreshing showers ; or
mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public, by destroying
the fruits of the earth ? Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove
that gratitude and anger cannot arise from the united influence of self-love, and
public love, or moral sense arising from the public affection. For, if so, why
are we not affected towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious
both to us and the public, in the same manner as to them that are profitable or
hurtful to both on choice and design, and from benevolence, or malice ?
2. On the supposition of its being indeed so, that men love those who love
them, and are angry with those who hate them, from the natural influence of
self-love ; it is not at all strange that the author of nature, who observes order,
uniformity and harmony in establishing its laws, should so order that it should
be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently towards ex-
ceedingly different objects ; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself
in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love, without sense
or will, and in another manner towards Beings which we look upon as having
understanding and will, like ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our favor,
and promoting our interest from love to us. No wonder, seeing we love our-
selves, that it should be natural to us to extend something of that same kind of
love which we have for ourselves, to them who are the same kind of Beings as
ourselves, and comply with the inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the
same sort of love towards us.
3. If we should allow that to be universal, that in gratitude and anger there
is the exercise of some kind of moral sense (as it is granted, there is something
that may be so called). All the moral sense, that is essential to those affections,
is a sense of Desert ; which is to be referred to that sense of justice, before
spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that secondary kind of beauty, that
lies in uniformity and proportion : which solves all the difficulty in the objection.
— This, or some appearance of it to a narrow private view, indeed attends all
anger and gratitude. Others' love and kindness to us, or their ill will and inju-
riousness, appears to us to deserve our love, or our resentment. Or, in other
words, it seems to us no other than just, that as they love us, and do us good,
we also should love them, and do them good. And so it seems just, that when
others' hearts oppose us, and they from their hearts do us hurt, our hearts should
oppose them, and that we should desire they themselves may suffer in like man-
ner as we have suffered ; i. e., there appears to us to be a natural agreement,
proportion, and adjustment between these things. Which is indeed a kind of
moral sense or sense of a beauty in moral things. But as was before shown, it
is a moral sense* of a secondary kind, and is entirely different from a sense or
relish of the original essential beauty of true virtue ; and may be without any
principle of true virtue in the heart. Therefore doubtless it is a great mistake in
any to suppose, all that moral sense which appears and is exercised in a sense of
desert, is the same thing as a love of virtue, or a disposition and determination
of mind to be pleased with true virtuous beauty, consisting in public benevolence.
Which may be further confirmed, if it be considered that even with respect to a
sense of justice or desert, consisting in uniformity [and agreement between
others' actions towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way of well doing,
or of ill doing] it is not absolutely necessary to the being of these passions of
gratitude and anger, that there should be any notion of justice in them, in any
public or general view of things ; — as will appear by what shall be next
observed.
Vol. II. 36
j^^ THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
4 Those authors who hold that that moral sense which is natural to all mankind,
consists in a natural relish of the beauty of virtue, and so arises from a principle
of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all^they hold that true
virtue consists in public benevolence. Therefore, if the affections of gratitude
and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as they suppose, then these af-
fections imply some delight in the public good, and an aversion of the mind to
public evil. And if this were so, then every time any man feels anger for oppo-
sition he meets with, or gratitude for any favor, there must be at least a supposi-
tion of a tendency to public injury in that opposition, and a tendency to public
benefit in the favor that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being
true ? As, in such instances as these, which, I presume, none will deny to be
possible, or unlike to any thing that happens among mankind. A ship's crew
enter into a conspiracy against the master, to murder him, and run away with
the ship and turn pirates ; but before they bring their matters to a ripeness for
execution, one of them repents and opens the whole design ; whereupon the rest
are apprehended and brought to justice. The crew are enraged with him
that has betrayed them, and earnestly seek opportunity to revenge tnemselves
upon him. — And for an instance of gratitude, a gang of robbers that have long
infested the neighboring country, have a particular house whither they resort,
and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty or prey, and hold
their consultations for carrying on their pernicious designs. The magistrates and
officers of the country, after many fruitless endeavors to discover their secret
haunt and place of resort, at length by some means are well informed where it
is, and are prepared with sufficient force to surprise them, and seize them all,
at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed when they understand they will
all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the offi-
cers with their bands are approaching, some person is so kind to these robbers
as to give them notice of their danger, so as just to give them opportunity to
escape. They are thankful to him, and give him a handful of money for his
kindness. — Now in such instances, I think it is plain, that there is no supposition
of a public injury in that which is the occasion of their anger ; yea, they know
the contrary. Nor is there any supposition of public good in that which excites
their gratitude ; neither has public benevolence, or moral sense, consisting in a
determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in
the affair. And though there be some affection, besides a sense of uniformity and
proportion, that has influence in such anger and gratitude, it is not public affec-
tion or benevolence, but private affection ; yea, that affection which is to the
highest degree private, consisting in a man's love of his own person.
5. The passion of anger, in particular, seems to have been unluckily chosen
as a medium to prove a sense and determination to delight in virtue, consisting
in benevolence, natural to all mankind.
For, if that moral sense which is exercised in anger, were that which arose
from a benevolent temper of heart, being no other than a sense 01 relish of the
beauty of benevolence, one would think a disposition to anger should increase,
at least in some proportion, as a man had more of a sweet, benign, and benevo-
lent temper ; which seems something disagreeable to reason, as well as contrary
to experience, which shows that the less men have of benevolence, and the more
they have of a contrary temper, the more are they disposed to anger and deep
resentment of injuries.
And though gratitude be that which many speak of as a certain noble princi-
ple of virtue, which God has implanted in the hearts of all mankind ; and
though it be true, there is a gratitude, that is truly virtuous, and the want of
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 283
ratitude or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues an abominable
epravity of heart (as I may have particular occasion to show afterwards) yet,
I think what has been observed, may serve to convince such as impartially
consider it, not only that not all anger, or hating those who hate us, but also
that not all gratitude, or loving those who love us, arises from a truly virtuous
benevolence of heart.
Another sort of affections, which may be properly referred to self-love, as
their source, and which might be expected to be the fruit of it, according to the
general analogy of nature's laws, are affections to such as are near to us by the
ties of nature ; that we look upon as those whose Beings we have been the
occasions of, and that we have a very peculiar propriety in, and whose cifcum-
stances, even from the first beginning of their existence, do many ways lead
them, as it were, necessarily, to a high esteem of us, and to treat us with great
dependence, submission and compliance ; and whom the constitution of the world
makes to be united in interest, and accordingly to act as one in innumerable
affairs, with a communion in each other's affections, desires, cares, friendships,
enmities, and pursuits. Which is the cause of men's affection to their children.
And in like manner self-love will also beget in a man some degree of affections,
towards others, with whom he has connection in any degree parallel. As to the
opinion of those that ascribe the natural affection there is between parents and
children, to a particular instinct of nature, I shall take notice of it afterwards.
And as men may love persons and things from self-love, so may love to
qualities and characters arise from the same source. Some represent as though
there were need of a great degree of metaphysical refining to make it out, that men
approve of others from self-love, whom they hear of at a distance, or read of in
history, or see represented on the stage, from whom they expect no profit or
advantage. But perhaps it is not considered, that what we approve of in the
first place is the character, and from the character we approve the person ; and
is it a strange thing, that men should, from self-love, like a temper or character
which in its nature and tendency falls in with the nature and tendency of self-
love j and which, we know by experience and self-evidence, without metaphys-
ical refining, in the general, tends to men's pleasure and benefit ? And on the
contrary, should dislike what they see tends to men's pain and misery 1 Is there
need of a great degree of subtilty and abstraction, to make it out, that a child,
which has heard and seen much, strongly to fix an idea of the pernicious deadly
nature of the rattlesnake, should have aversion to that species or form, from
self-love ; so as to have a degree of this aversion and disgust excited by seeing
even the picture of that animal ? And that from the same self-love it should be
pleased and entertained with a lively figure and representation of some pleasant
fruit which it has often tasted the sweetness of? Or, with the image of
some bird, which it has always been told, is innocent, and whose pleasant sing-
ing it has often been entertained with ? Though the child neither fears being
bitten by the picture of the snake, nor expects to eat of the painted fruit, or to
hear the figure of the bird sing. I suppose none will think it difficult to allow,
that such an approbation or disgust of a child may be accounted for from its
natural delight in the pleasures of taste and hearing, and its aversion to pain and
death, through self-love, together with the habitual connection of these agreeable
or terrible ideas with the form and qualities of these objects, the ideas of which
are impressed on the mind of the child by their images.
And where is the difficulty of allowing, that a child or man may hate the
general character of a spiteful and malicious man, for the like reason, as he
hates the general nature of a serpent ; knowing, from reasoi instruction and
e84 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
experience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind, as well as spite or
poison in a serpent 1 And if a man may, from self-love, disapprove the vices
of malice, envy, and others of that sort, which naturally tend to the hurt of
mankind, why may he not from the same principle approve the contrary virtue*
of meekness, peaceableness, benevolence, charity, generosity, justice, and the
social virtues in general ; which he as easily and clearly knows, naturally tend
to the good of mankind ?
It is undoubtedly true that some have a love to these virtues from a higher
principle. But yet I think it as certainly true that there is generally in man-
kind a sort of approbation of them, which arises from self love.
Besides what has been already said, the same thing further appears from
this ; that men commonly are most affected towards, and do most highly ap-
prove, those virtues which agree with their interest most, according to their va-
rious conditions in life. We see that persons of low condition are especially
enamored with a condescending, accessible, affable temper in the great ; not
only in those whose condescension has been exercised towards themselves ; but
they will be peculiarly taken with such a character when they have accounts of
it from others, or when they meet with it in history or even in romance. The
poor will most highly approve and commend liberality. The weaker sex, who
especially need assistance and protection, will peculiarly esteem and applaud
fortitude and generosity in those of the other sex, they read or hear of, or have
represented to them on a stage.
As I think it plain from what has been observed, that men may approve
and be disposed to commend- a benevolent temper, from self-love, so the higher
the degree of benevolence is, the more may they approve of it. Which will
account for some kind of approbation, from this principle, even of love to ene-
mies, viz., as a man's loving his enemies is an evidence of a high degree of be-
nevolence of temper ; — the degree of it appearing from the obstacles it over-
comes.
And it may be here observed, that the consideration of the tendency and in-
fluence of self-love may show, how men in general may approve of justice from
another ground, besides that approbation of the secondary beauty there is in
uniformity and proportion, which is natural to all. Men from their infancy see
the necessity of it, not only that it is necessary for others, or for human society ;
but they find the necessity of it for themselves, in instances that continually
occur ; which tends to prejudice them in its favor, and to fix an habitual appro-
bation of it from self-love.
And again, that forementioned approbation of justice and desert arising from
a sense of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion, will have a kind of
reflex, and indirect influence to cause men to approve benevolence, and disap-
prove malice ; as men see that he who hates and injures others, deserves to be
hated and punished, and that he who is benevolent, and loves others, and does
them good, deserves himself also to be loved and rewarded by others, as they
see the natural congruity or agreement and mutual adaptedness of these things.
And having always seen this, malevolence becomes habitually connected in the
mind with the idea of being hated and punished, which is disagreeable to self-
love ; and the idea of benevolence is habitually connected and associated with
the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to self-love.
And by virtue of this association of ideas, benevolence itself becomes grateful,
and the contrary displeasing.
Some vices may become in a degree odious by the influence of self-love,
through an habitual connection of ideas of contempt with it ; contempt beir-o
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 285
what self-love abhors. So it may often be with drunkenness, gluttony, sottish-
ness, cowardice, sloth, niggardliness. The idea of contempt becomes associated
with the idea of such vices, both because we are used to observe that those
things are commonly objects of contempt, and also find that they excite con-
tempt, in ourselves. — Some of them appear marks of littleness, i. e., of small
abilities, and weakness of mind, and insufficiency for any considerable effects
among mankind. — By others, men's influence is contracted into a narrow sphere,
and by such means persons become of less importance, and more insignificant
among mankind. And things of little importance are naturally little accounted
of. - And some of these ill qualities are such as mankind find it their interest to
treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human society.
There are no particular moral virtues whatsoever, but what in some or
other of these ways, and most of them in several of these ways, come to have
some kind of approbation from self-love, without the influence of a truly vir-
tuous principle ; nor any particular vices, but what by the same means meet
with some disapprobation.
This kind of approbation and dislike, through the joint influence of self-love
and association of ideas, is in very many vastly heightened by education ; as this
is the means of a strong, close, and almost irrefragable association, in innumer-
able instances, of ideas which have no connection any other way than by edu-
cation ; and of greatly strengthening that association, or connection, which
persons are led into by other means ; as any one wTould be convinced, perhaps
more effectually than in most other ways, if they had opportunity of any con-
siderable acquaintance with American savages and their children.
CHAPTER V.
Of Natural Conscience, and the Moral Sense.
There is yet another disposition or principle, of great importance, natural
to mankind ; which, if we consider the consistence and harmony of nature's
laws, may also be looked upon as in some sort arising from self-love, or self-
union : and that is a disposition in man to be uneasy in a consciousness of being
inconsistent with himself, and as it were, against himself, in his own actions. This
appears particularly in the inclination of the mind to be uneasy in the con-
sciousness of doing that to others, which he should be angry with them for do-
ing to him, if they were in his case, and he in theirs ; or, of forbearing to do
that to them, which he would be displeased with them for neglecting to do to
him.
I have observed from time to time, that in pure love to others (i. e. love not
arising from self-love) there is a union of the heart with others ; a kind of en-
largement of the mind, whereby it so extends itself as to take others into a man's
self : and therefore it implies a disposition to feel, to desire, and to act as though
others were one with ourselves. So, self-love implies an inclination to feel and
act as one with ourselves ; which naturally renders a sensible inconsistence with
ourselves, and self-opposition, in what we ourselves choose and do, to be un-
easy to the mind ; which will cause uneasiness of mind to be the consequence
of a malevolent and unjust behavior towards others, and a kind of disapproba-
tion of acts of this nature, and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to
another, which we should be angry with him for doing to us, and to 1 ate a prr
286 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
son for doing that to us, which we should incline to, and insist on doing to him,
if we were exactly in the same case, is to disagree with ourselves, and contra-
dict ourselves. It would be, for ourselves both to choose and adhere to, and
yet to refuse and utterly reject, as it were the very same thing. No wonder,
this is contrary to nature. No wonder, that such a self-opposition, and inward
war with a man's self, naturally begets unquietness, and raises disturbance ic
his mind.
A thus approving of actions, because we therein act as in agreement with
ourselves, or as one with ourselves — and a thus disapproving and being uneasy
in the consciousness of disagreeing and being inconsistent with ourselves in
what we do — is quite a different thing from approving or disapproving actions
because in them we agree and are united with Being in general ; which is lov-
ing or hating actions from a sense of the primary beauty of true virtue, and
odiousness of sin. — The former of these principles is private : the latter is pub-
lic and truly benevolent in the highest sense. The former (i. e. an inclination
to agree with ourselves) is a natural principle : but the latter (i. e. an agree-
ment or union of heart to the great system, and to God, the head of it, who is
all in all in it) is a divine principle.
In that uneasiness now mentioned, consists very much of that inward trouble
men have from reflections of conscience : and when they are free from this un-
easiness, and are conscious to themselves, that in what they have acted towards
others, they have done the same which they should have expected from them in
the same case, then they have what is called peace of conscience, with respect
to these actions. — And there is also an approbation of conscience, of the conduct
of others towards ourselves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or punished
by them, and are conscious to ourselves that if we were in their case, and they
in ours, we should in like manner blame, condemn, and punish them. And thus
men's consciences may justify God's anger and condemnation. When they
have the ideas of God's greatness, their relation to him, the benefits they have
received from him, the manifestations he has made of his will to them, &c,
strongly impressed on their minds, a consciousness is excited within them of
those resentments, which would be occasioned in themselves by an injurious
treatment in any wise parallel.
There is such a consciousness as this oftentimes within men, implied in the
thoughts and views of the mind, which perhaps on reflection they could hardly
give an account of. Unless men's consciences are greatly stupined, it is natu-
rally and necessarily suggested ; and does habitually, spontaneously, instanta-
neously, and as it were insensibly arise in the mind. And the more so for this
reason, viz., that we have not, nor never had from our infancy, any other way
to conceive of any thing which other persons act or suffer, or of any thing
about intelligent, moral agents, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what
we ourselves are conscious of in the acts, passions, sensations, volitions, &c,
which we have found in our own minds ; and by putting the ideas which we
obtain by this means, in the place of another ; or as it were substituting our-
selves in their place. Thus, we have no conception in any degree, what under-
standing, perception, love, pleasure, pain, or desire are in others, but by putting
ourselves as it were in their stead, or transferring the ideas we obtain of such
things in our own minds by consciousness, into their place ; making such an
alteration, as to degree and circumstances, as what we observe of them requires.
It is thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others, which are all men-
tal, and not corporeal things ; and every thing that we conceive of belonging
to others, more than shape, size, complexion, situation, and motion of their
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 287
bodies. And this is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas
of any perception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any
notion what understanding or volition, love or hatred are, either in created spirits
or in God, if we had never experienced what understanding and volition, love and
hatred, are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by consciousness, we
can add degrees, and deny limits, and remove changeableness and other imper-
fections, and ascribe them to God. Which is the only way we come to be ca-
pable of conceiving of any thing in the Deity.
But though it be so, that men in thinking of others do, as it were, put them-
selves in their place, they do it so naturally, or rather habitually, instantaneously
and without set purpose, that they do it insensibly, and can scarce give any
account of it, and many would think strange if they were told of it. So it may
be in men's substituting themselves in others' place in such exercises of con-
science as have been spoken of ; and the former substitution leads to the latter,
in one whose conscience is not greatly stupified. For in all his thoughts of the
other person, in whatever he apprehends or conceives of his moral conduct to
others or to himself, if it be in loving or hating him, approving or condemning
him, rewarding or punishing him, he necessarily as it were puts himself in his
stead, for the forementioned reason ; and therefore the more naturally, easily
and quietly sees whether he, being in his place, should approve or condemn, be
angry or pleased as he is.
Natural conscience consists in these two things :
1. In that which has now been spoken of : that disposition to approve or
disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a deter-
mination of the mind to be easy, or uneasy, in a consciousness of our being
consistent, or inconsistent with ourselves. Hereby we have a disposition to ap-
prove our own treatment of another, when we are conscious to ourselves that
we treat him so as we should expect to be treated by him, were he in our case
and we in his ; and to disapprove of our own treatment of another, when we are
conscious that we should be displeased, with the like treatment from him, if we
were in his case. So we in our consciences approve of another's treatment of
us, if we are conscious to ourselves, that if we were in his case, and he in ours,
we should think it just to treat him as he treats us ; and disapprove his treatment
of us, when we are conscious that we should think it unjust, if we were in
his case. Thus men's consciences approve or disapprove the sentence of their
judge, by which they are acquitted or condemned. — But this is not all that is in
natural conscience. Besides this approving or disapproving from uneasiness as
being inconsistent with ourselves, there is another thing that must precede it, and
be the foundation of it. As for instance, when my conscience disapproves my
own treatment of another, being conscious to myself that were I in his case, I
should be displeased and angry with him for so treating me, the question might
be asked, But what would be the ground of that supposed disapprobation, dis-
pleasure and anger, which I am conscious would be in me in that case 1 — That
disapprobation must be on some other grounds. Therefore,
2. The other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation of
natural conscience, is the sense of desert, which was spoken of before ; consist-
ing, as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between
malevolence or injury, and resentment and punishment ; or between loving and
being loved, between showing kindness and being rewarded, &c. Both these
kinds of approving or disapproving concur in the approbation or disapprobation
of conscience ; the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's conscience
disapproves of his treatment of his neighbor, in the first place he is conscious
288 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
that if he were in his neighbor's stead, he should resent such treatment, from a
sense of justice, or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treat-
ment and resentment and punishment, as before explained. And then in the
next place he perceives, that therefore he is not consistent with himself, in doing
what he himself should resent in that case ; and hence disapproves it, as being
naturally averse to opposition to himself.
Approbation and disapprobation of conscience, in the sense now explained,
will extend to all virtue and vice ; to every thing whatsoever that is morally
good or evil, in a mind which does not confine its view to a private sphere, but
will take things in general into its consideration, and is free from speculative
error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be resolved into love to others,
either God or creatures, so men easily see the uniformity and natural agreement
there is between loving others, and being accepted and favored by others. And
all vice, sin, or moral evil, summarily consisting in the want of this love to others,
or in the contrary, viz., hatred or malevolence, so men easily see the natural
agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by
them and suffering ill by them, or from him that acts for all and has the care of
the whole system. And as this sense of equality and natural agreement extends
to all moral good and evil, so this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the
other kind of approbation and disapprobation, which is grounded upon it, arising
from an aversion to self-inconsistence and opposition. For in all cases of benevo-
lence or the contrary towards others, we are capable of putting ourselves in the
place of others, and are naturally led to do it, and so of reflecting, or being con-
scious to ourselves, how we should like or dislike such treatment from others.
Thus natural conscience, if the understanding be properly enlightened, and errors
and blinding stupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God,
and is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article.
And thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this natural conscience
that has been described, extends to true virtue, consisting in union of heart to
Being in general, and supreme love to God. For, although it sees not, or rather
does not taste its primary and essential beauty, i. e., it tastes no sweetness in
benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, or loves it not for Being in
general's sake (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that), yet this
natural conscience, common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity,
equality and justice, which there is in it, and the demerit which is seen in the
contrary, consisting in the natural agreement between the contrary and being
hated of Being in general. Men by natural conscience may see the justice (01
natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God ;
and the justice there is in being his that has made us, and being willingly so,
which is the same as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in
the manner of our Being, as we are for t)ur Being itself, and in the conformity
of our will to his will, on whose will we are universally and most perfectly de-
pendent ; and also the justice there is in our supreme love to God, from his
goodness — the natural agreement there is between our having supreme respect
to him who exercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well
being.— Besides that disagreement and discord appears worse to natural sense
(as was observed before) in things nearly related and of great importance ; and
therefore it must appear very ill, as it respects the infinite Being, and in that
infinitely great relation which there is between the Creator and his creatures.
And it is easy to conceive how that sense which is in natural conscience, should
see the desert of punishment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, viz.,
opposition and enmity to Being in general. For, this is only to see the natural
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 289
agreement there is between opposing Being in general, and being opposed by-
Being in general ; with a consciousness how that if we were infinitely great, we
should expect to be regarded according to our greatness, and should proportion-
ably resent contempt. Thus natural conscience, if well informed, will approve
of true virtue, and will disapprove and condemn the want of it, and opposition
to it ; and yet without seeing the true beauty of it. Yea, if men's consciences
were fully enlightened, if they were delivered from being confined to a private
sphere, and brought to view and consider things in general, and delivered from
being stupified by sensual objects and appetites, as they will be at the day of judg-
ment, they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevo-
lence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, and subordinate
to it. For they must see that consent to Being in general, and supreme respect
to the Being of Beings, is most just ; and that every thing which is inconsistent
with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want of it, is unjust, and deserves
the opposition of universal existence.
Thus has God established and ordered, that this principle of natural conscience,
which, though it implies no such thing as actual benevolence to Being in gen-
eral, nor any delight in such a principle, simply considered, and so implies no
truly spiritual sense or virtuous taste, yet should approve and condemn the same
things that are approved and condemned by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste.
That moral sense which is natural to mankind, so far as it is disinterested
and not founded in association of ideas, is the same with this natural conscience
that has been described. The sense of moral good and evil, and that disposi-
tion to approve virtue and disapprove vice, which men have by natural con-
science, is that moral sense, so much insisted on in the writings of many of late :
a misunderstanding of which seems to have been the thing that has misled those
moralists who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world
of mankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in a benev-
olent temper, naturally implanted in the minds of all men. Some of the argu-
ments made use of by these writers, do indeed prove that there is a moral sense
or taste, universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-love. Though
I humbly conceive, there is some confusion in their discourses on the subject,
and not a proper distinction observed in the instances of men's approbation of
virtue, which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpose, being in-
stances of that approbation of virtue, that was described, which arises from self-
love. But other instances prove that there is a moral taste, or sense ot moral
good and evil, natural to all, which does not properly arise from self-love. Yet
I conceive there are no instances of this kind which may not be referred to natu-
ral conscience, and particularly to that which I have observed to be primary in
the approbation of natural conscience, viz., a sense of desert and approbation oi
that natural agreement there is, in manner and measure, in justice. But I think
it is plain from what has been said, that neither this or any thing else wherein
consists the sense of moral good and evil which there is in natural conscience,
is of the nature of a truly virtuous taste, or determination of mind to relish and
delight in the essential beauty of true virtue, arising from a virtuous benevolence
of heart.
But it further appears from this. If the approbation of conscience were the
same with the approbation of the inclination, of the heart, or the natural dispo-
sition and determination of the mind, to love and be pleased with virtue, ihen
approbation and condemnation of conscience would always be in proportion to
the virtuous temper of the mind ; or rather the degree would be just the same. Ip
that person who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore, the testim ay
Vol. II. 37
290 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
of conscience in favor of virtue would be equally full : but he that had but little,
would have as little a degree of the testimony of conscience for virtue, and against
vice. But I think the case is evidently otherwise. Some men, through the
strength of vice in their hearts, will go on in sin against clearer light and
stronger convictions of conscience, than others. If conscience's approving duty
and disapproving sin, were the same thing as the exercise of a virtuous princi-
ple of the heart, in loving duty and hating sin, then remorse of conscience will
be the same thing as repentance ; and just in the same degree as the sinner feels
remorse of conscience for sin, in the same degree is his heart turned from the
love of sin to the hatred of it, inasmuch as they are the very same thing.
Christians have the greatest reason to believe, from the Scriptures, that in
the future day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, when sinners
shall be called to answer before their judge, and all their wickedness in all its
aggravations, brought forth and clearly manifested in the perfect light of that
day, and God will reprove them and set their sins in order before them, their con-
sciences will be greatly awakened and convinced, their mouths will be stopped,
all stupidity of conscience will be at an end, and conscience will have its full
exercise : and therefore their consciences will approve the dreadful sentence of
the judge against them, and seeing that they have deserved so great a punish-
ment, will join with the judge in condemning them. And this, according to the
notion I am opposing, would be the same thing as their being brought to the
fullest repentance ; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate sin and love
holiness ; and virtue or holiness of heart in them will be brought to the most
full and perfect exercise. But how much otherwise, have we reason to suppose,
it will then be ? viz., that the sin and wickedness of their heart will come to
its highest dominion and completest exercise ; that they shall be wholly left ot
God, and given up to their wickedness, even as the devils are ! When God has
done waiting on sinners, and his Spirit done striving with them, he will not re-
strain their wickedness, as he does now. But sin shall then rage in their hearts,
as a fire no longer restrained or kept under. It is proper for a judge when he
condemns a criminal, to endeavor so to set his guilt before him as to convince
his conscience of the justice of the sentence. This the Almighty will do effect-
ually, and do to perfection, so as most thoroughly to awaken and convince the
conscience. But if natural conscience, and the disposition of the heart to be
pleased with virtue, were the same, then at the same time that the conscience
was brought to its perfect exercise, the heart would be made perfectly holy ; or,
would have the exercise of true virtue and holiness in perfect benevolence of
temper. But instead of this, their wickedness will then be brought to perfec-
tion, and wicked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be sent away
as cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels.
But supposing natural conscience to be what has been described, all these
difficulties and absurdities are wholly avoided. Sinners, when they see the
greatness of the Being, whom they have lived in contempt of, and in rebellion
and opposition to, and have clearly set before them their obligations to him, as
their Creator, preserver, benefactor, &c, together with the degree in which they
have acted as enemies to him, may have a clear sense of the desert of their sin,
consisting in the natural agreement there is between such contempt and oppo-
sition of such a Being, and his despising and opposing them ; between their
being and acting as so great enemies to such a God, and their suffering the
dreadful consequences of his being and acting as their great enemy : and
their being conscious within themselves of the degree of anger, which would
naturally arise in their own hearts in such a case if they were in the place and
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 291
state of their judge. In order to these things there is no need of a virtuous
benevolent temper, relishing and delighting m benevolence, and loathing the
contrary. The conscience may see the natural agreement between opposing
and being opposed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevo-
lence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view of
the beauty of his holiness. These things have no necessary dependence one on
the other.
CHAP'TER VI.
Of particular Instincts of Nature, which in seme respects resemble Virtue.
There are various dispositions and inclinations natural to men, which depend
on particular laws of nature, determining their minds to certain affections and
actions towards particular objects ; which laws seem to be established chiefly
for the preservation of mankind, though not only for this, but also for their
comfortably subsisting in the world. "Which dispositions may be called instincts.
Some of these instincts respect only ourselves personally ; such are many of
our natural appetites and aversions. Some of them are not wholly persona],
but more social, and extend to others j such are the mutual inclinations between
the sexes, &c. — Some of these dispositions are more external and sensitive ;
such are some of our natural inclinations that are personal — as those that relate
to meat and drink. And of this sort also are some dispositions that are more
social, and in some respects extend to others ; as, the more sensitive inclinations
of the sexes towards each other. Besides these instincts of the sensitive kind,
there are others that are more internal and mental ; consisting in affections of the
mind, which mankind naturally exercise towards some of their fellow creatures,
or in some cases towards men in general. Some of these instincts that are
mental and social, are what may be called kind affections ; as having something
in them of benevolence, or a resemblance of it. And others are of a different
sort, having something in them that carries an angry appearance ; such as the
passion of jealousy between the sexes, especially in the male towards the
female.
It is only the former of these two last mentioned sorts, that it is to my pur-
pose to consider in this place, viz., those natural instincts which appear in
benevolent affections, or which have the appearance of benevolence, and so in
some respects resemble virtue. These I shall therefore consider; and shall
endeavor to show that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue.
That kind of affection which is exercised towards those who are near one to
another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children,
called natural affection, is by many referred to instinct. I have already consi-
dered this sort of love as an affection that arises from self-love ; and in that
view, and in that supposition have shown, it cannot be of the nature of true
virtue. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be referred
to a particular instinct of nature, than to self-love, as its cause, 1 shall not think
it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opinion, both are true,
viz., that natural affection is owing to natural instinct, and also that it arises from
self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of
nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self.
love ; because, though it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as
292 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
according to the order and harmony everywhere observed among the laws of
nature, is connected with, and follows from self-love, as was shown before.
However, it is not necessary to my present purpose, to insist on this. For if it
be so, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is
not properly to be ascribed to self-love, as its cause, in any respect, but is to be
esteemed an affection arising from a particular independent instinct of nature,
which the Creator in his wisdom has implanted in men for the preservation and
well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
For it has been observed, and I numbly conceive, proved before (Chap. II.),
that if any Being or Beings have by natural instinct, or any other means, a
determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to some particular per-
sons, or private system, however large that system may be, or however great a
number of individuals it may contain, so long as it contains but an infinitely
sm#U part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great and
universal system — such limited private benevolence, not arising from, nor being
subordinate to benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of true
virtue.
However, it may not be amiss briefly to observe now, that it is evident to a
demonstration, those affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from these
two things.
First, That they do not arise from a principle of virtue. — A principle of
virtue, I think, is owned by the most considerable of late writers on morality to
be general benevolence or public affection : and I think it has been proved to
be union of heart to Being simply considered ; which implies a disposition to
benevolence to Being in general. Now by the supposition, the affections we
are speaking of do not arise from this principle ; and that, whether we suppose
they arise from self-love, or from particular instincts ; because either of those
sources is diverse from a principle of general benevolence. And,
Secondly, These private affections, if they do not arise from general bene-
volence, and they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no ten-
dency to produce it. This appears from what has been observed : for being not
dependent on it, their detached and unsubordinate operation rather tends to,
and implies opposition to Being in general, than general benevolence ; as every
one sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same rea-
sons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of univer-
sal existence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a
single person. Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections
which do not arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue,
as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
For the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if persons
by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very
large, or to the country or nation in general, of which they are a part, or the
public community they belong to, though it be as large as the Roman empire
was of old, yea, if there could be an instinct or other cause determining a person
to benevolence towards he whole world of mankind, or even all created sensi-
ble natures throughout, tne universe, exclusive of union of heart to general ex-
istence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which disposes
to a supreme regard to him, nor subordinate to such divine love, it cannot be of
the nature of true virtue.
If what is called natural affection, arises from a particular natural instinct,
so, much more indisputably does that mutual affection which naturally arises
between the sexes. I agree with Hutchesori and Hume in this, that there is a
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 293
foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the sexes, that are truly
diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and do not properly arise from
any such inclination. There is doubtless a disposition both to a mutual benevo-
lence and mutual complacence, that are not naturally and necessarily connected
with any sensitive desires. But yet it is manifest such affections as are limited
to opposite sexes, are from a particular instinct, thus directing and limiting
them ; and not arising from a principle of general benevolence ; for this has
no tendency to any such limitation. And though these affections do not properly
arise from the sensitive desires which are between the sexes, yet they are im-
planted by the Author of nature chiefly for the same purpose, viz., the preser-
vation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make persons willing to
forsake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where
they were born and brought up, for the sake of a stated union with a companion
of the other sex, and to dispose to that union in bearing and going through with
that series of labors, anxieties, and pains requisite to the Being, support and
education of a family of children. Though not only for these ends, but partly
also for the comfort of mankind as united in a marriage relation. But 1 sup-
pose, few (if any) will deny, that the peculiar natural dispositions there are to
mutual affection between the sexes, arise from an instinct or particular law of
nature. And therefore it is manifest from what has been said already, that those
natural dispositions cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, implanted in men
for like purposes with other instincts, is that pity which is natural to mankind,
when they see others in great distress. It is acknowledged, that such an affec-
tion is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which -is
general and natural, is owing to a particular instinct, and is not of the nature
of true virtue. I am far from saying, that there is no such thing as a truly vir-
tuous pity among mankind. For 1 am far from thinking, that all the pity or
mercy which is anywhere to be found among them, arises merely from natural
instinct, or, that none is to be found, which arises from that truly virtuous divine
principle of general benevolence to sensitive Beings. Yet at the same time I
think, this is not the case with all pity, or with that disposition to pity which is
natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to say, this does not
arise from general benevolence, nor is it truly of the nature of benevolence, or
properly called by that name.
If all that uneasiness on the sight of others' extreme distress, which we call
pity, were properly of the nature of benevolence, then they who are the subjects
of this passion, must needs be in a degree of uneasiness in being sensible of the
total want of happiness, of all such as they would be disposed to pity in ex-
treme distress. For that certainly is the most direct tendency and operation of
benevolence or good will, to desire the happiness of its object. But now this
is not the case universally, where men are disposed to exercise pity. There
are many men, with whom that is the case in respect to some others in the
world, that it would not be the occasion of their being sensibly affected with
any uneasiness, to know they were dead (yea men who are not inflenced by the
consideration of a future state, but view death as only a cessation of all sensi-
bility, and consequently an end of all happiness), who yet would have been
moved with pity towards the same persons, if they had seen them under some
very extreme anguish. Some men would be moved with pity by seeing a brute
creature under extreme and long torments, who yet suffer no uneasiness in
knowing that many thousands of them every day cease to live, and so have an
end put to all their pleasure, at butchers' shambles in great cities. It is the
294 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
nature of true benevolence to desire and rejoice in the prosperity and pleasure
of the object of it ; and that, in some proportion to its degree of prevalence.
But persons may greatly pity those that are in extreme pain, whose positive
pleasure they may stiJl be very indifferent about. In this case a man may be
much moved and affected with uneasiness, who yet would be affected with no
sensible joy in seeing signs of the same person's or Being's enjoyment of very
high degrees of pleasure.
Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may consist with true
malevolence, or with such ill will as shall cause men not only not to desire the
positive happiness of another, but even to desire his calamity. They may pity
such a one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man may have
true malevolence towards another, desiring no positive good for him, but evil ;
and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he
sees the person whom he thus hates, in misery far beyond his ill will, he may
then pity him ; because then the natural instinct begins to operate. For malev-
olence will not overcome the natural instinct, inclining to pity others in ex-
treme calamity, any further than it goes, or to the limits of the degree of misery
it wishes to its object. Men may pity others under exquisite torment, when
yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their prosperity. And some
men have such a grudge against one or another, that they would be far from
being uneasy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when
this is the case with them, it is manifest that their heart is void of benevolence
towards such persons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the same
time they are capable of pitying even these very persons, if they should see
them under a degree of misery very much disproportion ed to their ill will.
These things may convince us that natural pity is of a nature very different
from true virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevo-
lence ; but is owing to a particular instinct, which the Creator has implanted
in mankind, for the same purposes as most other instincts, viz., chiefly for the
preservation of mankind, though not exclusive of their well being. The giv-
ing of this instinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an instance of his love of
the world of mankind, and an evidence that though the world be so sinful, it
is not God's design to make it a world of punishment ; and therefore has
many ways made a merciful provision for men's relief in extreme calamities :
and among others has given mankind in general a disposition to pity ; the
natural exercises whereof extend beyond those whom we are in a near connec-
tion with, especially in case of great calamity ; because commonly in such cases
men stand in need of the help of others besides their near friends, and because
commonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief, tend to men's
destruction. This may be given as the reason why men are so made by the
Author of nature, that they have no instinct inclining as much to rejoice
at the sight of others' great prosperity and pleasure, as to be grieved at their
extreme calamity, viz., because they do not stand in equal necessity of such an
instinct as that in order to their preservation. But if pure benevolence were
the source of natural pity, doubtless it would operate to as great a degree in
congratulation, in cases of others' great prosperity, as in compassion towards
them in great misery.
The instincts God has given to mankind in this wTorld, which in some re-
spects resemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreeable to the state that God
designed mankind for here, where he intends their preservation, and comforta-
ble subsistence. But in the world of punishment, where the state of the wick-
ed inhabitants will be exceeding different, and God will have none of these
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 295
merciful designs to answer, there, we have great reason to think, will bt no
such thing as a disposition to pity, in any case ; as also there will be no
natural affection toward near relations, and no mutual affection between oppo-
site sexes.
To conclude what I have to say on the natural instinct disposing men to
pity others in misery, I would observe, that this is a source of a kind of abhor-
rence in men of some vices, as cruelty and oppression ; and so, of a sort of ap-
probation of the contrary virtues, humanity, mercy, &c. Which aversion and
approbation, however, so far as they arise from this cause only, are not from a
principle of true virtue.
CHAPTER VII
The Reasons why those things that have been mentioned, which have not the
Essence of Virtue, have yet by many been mistaken for True Virtue.
Thk first reason that may be given of this, is, that although they have not
the specific and distinguishing nature and essence of virtue, yet they have some-
thing that belongs to the general nature of virtue. — The general nature of true
virtue is love. It is expressed both in love of benevolence and complacence ;
but primarily in benevolence to persons and Beings, and consequently and se-
condarily in complacence in virtue — as has been shown. There is something
of the general nature of virtue in those natural affections and principles that
have been mentioned, in both those respects.
In many of these natural affections there is something of the appearance of
love to persons. In some of them there appears the tendency and effect of
benevolence, in part. Others have truly a sort of benevolence in them, though
it be a private benevolence, and in several respects falls short of the extent of
true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object.
The last mentioned passion, natural to mankind in their present state, viz.,
that of pity to others in distress, though not properly of the nature of love, as
has been demonstrated, yet has partly the same influence and effect with benevo-
lence. One effect of true benevolence is to cause persons to be uneasy, when
the objects of it are in distress, and to desire their relief. And natural pity has
the same effect.
Natural gratitude, though in every instance wherein it appears it is not
properly called love, because persons may be moved with a degree of gratitude
towards persons on certain occasions, whom they have no real and proper
friendship for, as in the instance of Saul towards David, once and again, after
David's sparing his life, when he had so fair an opportunity to kill him : yet it
has the same or like operation and effect with friendship, in part, for a season,
and with regard to so 'much of the welfare of its object, as appears a deserved
requital of kindness received. And in other instances it may have a more gen-
eral and abiding influence, so as more properly to be called by the name of love.
So that many times men from natural gratitude do really with a sort of benevo-
lence love those who love them. From this, together with some other natural
principles, men may love their near friends, love their own party, love their
country, &c.
The natural disposition there is to mutual affection between the sexes, often
operates by what may properly be called love. There is oftentimes truly a
kind both of benevolence and complacence. As there also is between parents
and children.
296 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
Thus these things have something of the general nature of virtue, which
is love ;* and especially the thing last mentioned has something of a love of
benevolence. What they are essentially defective in, is, that they are private in
their nature, they do not arise from any temper of benevolence to Being in
oreneral, nor have they a tendency to any such effect in their operation. But
yet agreeing with virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within their
own private sphere, i. e., they appear beautiful if we confine our views to that
private system, and while we shut all other things they stand in any relation to
out of our consideration. If that private system contained the sum of universal
existence, then their benevolence would have true beauty ; or, in other words,
would be beautiful, all things considered ; but now it is not so. These private
systems are so far from containing the sum of universal Being, or comprehend-
ing all existence wmich we stand related to, that it contains but an infinitely small
part of it. The reason why men are so ready to take these private affections
for true virtue, is the narrowness of their views ; and above all, that they are so
ready to leave the Divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their
consideration, or to regard him in their thoughts, as though he were not pro-
perly belonging to the system of real existence, but as a kind of shadowy,
imaginary Being. And though most men allow that there is a God, yet in their
ordinary view of things, his Being is not apt to come into the account, and to
have the influence and effect of a real existence, as it is with other Beings wmich
they soa, and are conversant with by their external senses. In their views of
beauty and deformity, and in the inward sensations of displicence and approba-
tion which rise in their minds, it is not a thing natural to them to be under the
influence of a view of the Deity, as part of the system, and as the head of the
system, and he who is all in all, in comparison of whom all the rest is nothing,
and with regard to whom all other things are to be viewed, and their minds to
be accordingly impressed and affected.
Yea, we are apt, through the narrowmess of our views, in judging of the
beauty of affections and actions to limit our consideration to only a small part
of the created system. — When private affections extend themselves to a con-
siderable number, we are very ready to look upon them as truly virtuous, and
accordingly to applaud them highly. Thus it is with respect to love to a large
party, or a man's love to his country. For though his private system contains
but a small part even of the world of mankind, yet being a considerable number,
through the contracted limits of the mind and the narrowness of his views, they
are ready to fill his mind and engross his sight, and to seem as if they were all.
Hence among the Romans love to their country was the highest virtue ; though
this affection of theirs, so much extolled among them, was employed as it were
for the destruction of the rest of the world of mankind. The larger the num-
ber is, that private affection extends to, the more apt men are, through the nar-
rowness of their sight, to mistake it for true virtue ; because then the private
system appears to have more of the image of the universal system. Whereas,
when the circle it extends to, is very small, it is not so apt to be looked upon
as virtuous, or not so virtuous. As, a man's love to his own children
And this is the reason why self-love is by nobody mistaken for true virtue.
For though there be something of the general nature of virtue in this, as here is
love and good will, yet the object is so private, the limits so narrow, that it by
no means engrosses the view ; unless it be of the person himself, who, through
* It claims to be considewd, whether these things can be of the nature of virtue, even accord) n* ^
the distinctions the author h^s made.— Ed.
THE NATURE OF VIRrUE. 297
the gieatness of his pride, may imagine himself as it were all. The minds of
men are large enough to take in a vastly greater extent ; and though self-love
is far from being useless in the world, yea, it is exceeding necessary to socie-
ty, besides its directly and greatly seeking the good of one, yet every body sees
that if it be not subordinate to, and regulated by, another more extensive prin-
ciple, it may make a man a common enemy to the system he is related to. And
though this is as true of any other private affection, notwithstanding its extent
may be to a system that contains thousands of individuals, and those private
systems bear no greater proportion to the whole of universal existence, than one
alone, yet they bear a greater proportion to the extent, to the view and compre-
hension of men's minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were «//,
or at least as some resemblance of the universal system.
Thus I have observed how many of these natural principles, which have
been spoken of, resemble virtue in its primary operation, which is benevolence.
Many of them also have a resemblance of it in its secondary operation, which is
its approbation of and complacence in virtue itself. Several kinds of approba-
tion of virtue have been taken notice of, as common to mankind, which are not
of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, consisting in a sense and relish of
the essential beauty of virtue, consisting in a Being's cordial union to Being in
general, from a spirit of love to Being in general. As particularly, the appro-
bation of conscience, from a sense of the inferior and secondary beauty which
there is in virtue, consisting in uniformity, and from a sense of desert, consisting
in a sense of the natural agreement of loving and being beloved, showing kind-
ness and receving kindness. So from the same principle, there is a disapproba-
tion of vice, from a natural opposition to deformity and disproportion, and a
sense of evil desert, or the natural agreement there is between hating and being
hated, opposing and being opposed, &c, together with a painful sensation na-
turally arising in a sense of self-opposition and inconsistence. Approbation of
conscience is the more readily mistaken for a truly virtuous approbation, be-
cause by the wise constitution of the great Governor of the world (as was observ-
ed), when conscience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with
the latter fully and exactly, as to the object approved, though not as to the
ground and reason of approving. It approves all virtue, and condemns all vice.
It approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that is against it, or that
falls short of it ; as was shown before. And indeed natural conscience is im-
planted in all mankind, there to be as it were in God's stead, and to be an inter-
nal judge or rule to all, whereby to distinguish right and wrong.
It has also been observed, how that virtue, consisting in benevolence, is
approved, and vice, consisting in ill-will, is disliked, from the influence of self-
love, together with association of ideas, in the same manner as men dislike
those qualities in things without life or reason, with which they have always
connected the ideas of hurtfulness, malignancy, perniciousness ; but like those
things with which they habitually connect the ideas of profit, pleasantness,
comfortableness, &c. This sort of approbation or liking of virtue, and dislike
cl vice, is easily mistaken for true virtue, not only because those things are ap-
proved by it that have the nature of virtue, and the things disliked have the
nature of vice, but because here is much resemblance of virtuous approbation,
it being complacence from love ; the difference only lying in this, that it is not
from love to Being in general, but from self-love.
There is also, as has been shown, a liking of some virtues, and dislike of
some vices, from the influence of the natural instinct of pity. This, men are
apt to mistake for the exercise of true virtue on many accounts. Here is not
Vol. II. 38
298 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
only a kind of complacence, and the objects of complacence are what have the
nature of virtue, and the virtues indeed very amiable, such as humanity, mercy,
tenderness of heart, &c, and the contrary very odious ; but besides, the appro-
bation is not merely from self-love, but from compassion, an affection that re-
spects others, and resembles benevolence, as has been shown.
Another reason why the things which have been mentioned are mistaken
for true virtue, is, that there is indeed a true negative moral goodness in them.
By a negative moral goodness, I mean the negation or absence of true moral
evil. — They have this negative moral goodness, because a being without them
would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. Thus, the exercise of
natural conscience in such and such degrees, wherein appears such a measure
of an awakening or sensibility of conscience, though it be not of the nature of
real positive virtue or true moral goodness, yet has a negative moral goodness ;
because in the present state of things, it is an evidence of the absence of that
higher degree of wickedness, which causes great insensibility or stupidity of
conscience. For sin, as was observed, is not only against a spiritual and divine
sense of virtue, but is also against the dictates of that moral sense which is in
natural conscience. No wonder, that this sense being long opposed and often
conquered, grows weaker. All sin has its source from selfishness, or from self-
love, not subordinate to regard to Being in general. And natural conscience
chiefly consists in a sense of desert, or the natural agreement between sin and
misery. But if self were indeed all, and so more considerable than all the
world besides, there would be no ill desert in his regarding himself above all,
and making all other interests give place to private interest. And no wonder
that men by long acting from the selfish principle, and by being habituated to
treat themselves as if they were all, increase in pride, and come as it were nat-
urally to look on themselves as all, and so to lose entirely the sense of ill desert
in their making all other interests give place to their own. — And no wonder
that men by often repeating acts of sin, without punishment, or any visible ap-
pearance of approaching punishment, have less and less sense of the connection
of sin with punishment. That sense which an awakened conscience has of the
desert of sin, consists chiefly in a sense of its desert of resentment of the Deity,
the fountain and head of universal existence. But no wonder that by a long
continued worldly and sensual life, men more and more lose all sense of the
Deity, who is a spiritual and invisible Being. The mind being long involved
in, and engrossed by sensitive objects, becomes sensual in all its operations, and
excludes all views and impressions of. spiritual objects, and is unfit for their
contemplation. Thus the conscience and general benevolence are entirely
different principles, and sense of conscience differs from the holy complacence
of a benevolent and trufy virtuous heart. Yet wickedness may, by long habit-
ual exercise, greatly diminish a sense of conscience. So that there may be
negative moral goodness, in sensibility of conscience, as it may be an argument
of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causeth stupidity of
conscience. .
So with respect to natural gratitude, though there may be no virtue merely
in loving them that love us, yet the contrary may be an evidence of a great de-
gree of depravity, as it may argue a higher degree of selfishness, so that a man
is come to look upon himself as all, and others as nothing, and so their respect
and kindness as nothing. Thus an increase of pride diminishes gratitude. — So
does sensuality, or the increase of sensual appetites, and coming more and more
under the power and impresssion of sensible objects, tends by degrees to make
tfce mind insensible to any thing else ; and those appetites take up the whole
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 299
soul , and through habit and custom the water is all drawn out of other chan-
nels, in which it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one channel.
In like manner natural affection and natural pity, though not of the nature
of virtue, yet may be diminished greatly by the increase of those two principles
of pride and sensuality, and as the consequence of this, being habitually disposed
to envy, malice, &c. These lusts when they prevail to a high degree may
overcome and diminish the exercise of those natural principles : even as they
often overcome and diminish common prudence in a man, as to seeking his own
private interest, in point of health, wealth or honor, and yet no one will think
it proves that a man's being cunning, in seeking Ins own personal and tempo-
ral interest, has any thing of the nature and essence of true virtue.
Another reason why these natural principles and affections are mistaken for
true virtue, is, that in several respects they have the same effect which true vir-
tue tends to ; especially in these two ways :
1. The present state of the world is so ordered and constituted by the wis-
dom and goodness of its supreme Ruler, that these natural principles for the most
part tend to the good of the world of mankind. So do natural pity, gratitude,
parental affection, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of general benev-
olence, which seeks and tends to the general good. But this is no proof that
these natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For self-love is a prin-
ciple that is exceeding useful and necessary in the world of mankind. So are
the natural appetites of hunger and thirst, &c. But yet nobody will assert,
that these have the nature of true virtue.
2. These principles have a like effect with true virtue in this respect, that
they tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedness.
So, natural affection, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep
us from acts of injustice towards these persons : which would be real wicked-
ness. Pity preserves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil.
Natural conscience tends to restrain sin in general, in the present state of the
world. But neither can this prove these principles themselves to be of the na-
ture of true virtue. For so is this present state of mankind ordered by a mer-
ciful God, that men's self-love does in innumerable respects restrain from acts
of true wickedness ; and not only so, but puts men upon seeking true virtue ;
yet is not itself true virtue, but is the source of all the wickedness that is in the
world.
Another reason why these inferior affections, especially some of them, are
accounted virtuous, js, that there are affections of the same denomination, which
are truly virtuous. — Thus, for instance, there is a truly virtuous pity, or a com-
passion to others under affliction or misery from general benevolence. Pure
benevolence would be sufficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there
were no particular instinct, or any other principle determining the mind there-
to. It is easy to see how benevolence, which seeks another's good, should
cause us to desire his deliverance from evil. And this is a source of pity far
more extensive than the other. It excites compassion in cases that are over-
looked by natural instinct. And even in those cases to which instinct extends,
it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its
operations. And when this is the case, the pity which is exercised may be
called a virtuous compassion. So there is a virtuous gratitude, or a gratitude
that arises not only from self-love, but from a superior principle of disinterested
general benevolence. As it is manifest, that when we receive kindness from
such as we love already, we are more disposed to gratitude, and disposed to
greater degrees of it than when the mind is destitute of any such friendly pre-
300 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
possession. Therefore, when the superior principle of virtuous love has a gov-
erning hand, and regulates the affair, it may be called a virtuous gratitude.
So there is a virtuous love of justice, arising from pure benevolence to Being in
general, as that naturally and necessarily inclines the heart, that every particulai
Being should have such a share of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity,
consisting in the degree of its Being, and the degree of its virtue. Which is
entirely diverse from an apprehension of justice, from a sense of the beauty ol
uniformity in variety : as has been particularly shown already. And so it is
easy to see how there may be a virtuous sense of desert different from what is
natural and common. And so a virtuous conscientiousness or a sanctified con-
science. And as when natural affections have their operations mixed with the
influence of virtuous benevolence, and are directed and determined hereby, they
may be called virtuous, so there may be a virtuous love of parents to children,
and between other near relatives, a virtuous love of our town, or country, or
nation. Yea, and a virtuous love between the sexes, as there may be the in-
fluence of virtue mingled with instinct, and virtue may govern with regard to
the particular manner of its operation, and may guide it to such ends as are
agreeable to the great ends and purposes of true virtue.
Genuine virtue prevents that increase of the habits of pride and sensuality,
which tend to overbear and greatly diminish the exercises of the forementioned
useful and necessary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevo-
lence softens and sweetens the mind, and makes it more susceptible of the pro-
per influence and exercise of the gentler natural instincts, and directs every one
into its proper channel, and determines the exercise to the proper manner and
measure, and guides all to the best purposes.
CHAPTER VIII
In what respects Virtue or moral good is founded in Sentiment; and how far it is
founded in the Reason and Nature of things.
That which is called virtue, is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or
quality that is observed in things. That form or quality is called beautiful to
any one beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itself agreeable
or comely to him, or the view or idea of which is immediately pleasant to the
mind. I say agreeable in itself, and immediately pleasant, to distinguish it
from things which in themselves are not agreeable nor pleasant, but either in-
different or disagreeable, which yet appear eligible and agreeable indirectly for
something else that is the consequence of them, or with which they are con-
nected. Such a kind of indirect agreeableness or eligibleness in things, not for
themselves, but for something else, is not what is called beauty. But when a
form or quality appears lovely, pleasing and delightful in itself, then it is called
beautiful ; and this agreeableness or gratefulness of the idea is what is called
beauty. It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or
sensation of beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea
called beautiful ; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences,
or other things that it stands connected with ; any more than tasting the sweet-
ness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on
connections and consequences. And this manner of being affected with the im-
mediate presence of the beautiful idea depends not, therefore, on any reason in *a
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 301
about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful
or not ; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are so made that such an
idea, as soon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.
Therefore, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm virtue is founded
in sentiment, and not in reason, that they who see the beauty there is in true
virtue, do not perceive it by argumentation on its connections and consequences,
but by the frame of their own minds, or a certain spiritual sense given them of
God, whereby they immediately perceive pleasure in the presence of the idea
of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contempla-
tion of this object, this is certainly true.
But if thereby is meant, that the frame of mind, or inward sense given them
by God, whereby the mind is disposed to delight in the idea or view of true
virtue, is given arbitrarily, so that if he had pleased he might have given a
contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well
with the necessary nature of things, this I think is not true.
Virtue, as I have observed, consists in the cordial consent or union of Being
to Being in general. And as has also been observed, that frame of mind,
whereby it is disposed to relish anil be pleased with the view of this, is benevo-
lence or union of heart itself to Being in general, or a universally benevolent
frame of mind : because he whose temper is to love Being in general, therein
must have a disposition to approve and be pleased with the love to Being in
general. — Therefore now the question is, whether God, in giving this temper
to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves Being in general, acts so arbi-
trarily, that there is nothing in the necessary nature of things to hinder but that
a contrary temper might have agreed or consisted as well with that nature oi
things as this ?
And in the first place I observe, that to assert this, would be a plain absur-
dity, and contrary to the very supposition. — For here it is supposed, that virtue
:n its very essence consists in agreement or consent of Being to Being. Now
certainly agreement itself to Being in general must necessarily agree better with
general existence, than opposition and contrariety to it.
I observe, secondly, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind,
gives that which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper
and nature. For, as has been often observed, God himself is in effect Being in
general ; and without all doubt it is in itself full necessary, and impossible it
should be otherwise, that God should agree with himself, be united with himself
or love himself: and therefore, when he gives the same temper to his creatures,
this is more agreeable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper : yea,
the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.
Let it be noted, thirdly, by this temper only can created Beings be united to,
and agree with one another. This appears, because it consists in consent and
union to Being in general ; which implies agreement and union with every par-
ticular Being, except such as are opposite to Being in general, or excepting such
cases wherein union with them is by some means inconsistent with union with
general existence. But certainly if any particular created Being were of a
temper to oppose Being in general, that would infer the most universal and great-
est possible discord, not only of creatures with their Creator, but of created
Beings one with another.
Fourthly, I observe, there is no other temper but this, that a man can have,
and agree with himself or be without self-inconsistence, i. e., without having
some inclinations and relishes repugnant to others. And that for these reasons.
Every Being that has understanding and will, necessarily loves happiness. For,
302 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
to suppose any Being not to bye happiness, would be to suppose he did not love
what was agreeable to him ; which is a contradiction : or at least would imply,
that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is the same as to say, that
he has no such thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every Being
who has a faculty of will must of necessity have an inclination to happiness.
And therefore, if he be consistent with himself, and has not some inclinations
repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations whereby Beings desire
the happiness of Being in general, and must be against a disposition to the
misery of Being in general : because otherwise he would approve of opposition
to his own happiness. For, if a temper inclined to the misery of Being in
general prevailed universally, it is apparent, it w7ould tend to universal misery.
But he that loves a tendency to universal misery, in effect loves a tendency to
his own misery, and as he necessarily hates his own misery, he has then one in-
clination repugnant to another. And besides it necessarily follows from self-love,
that men love to be loved by others ; because in this others' love agrees with their
own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they would in effect
love the hatred of themselves ; and so would be inconsistent with themselves,
having one natural inclination contrary to another.
These things may help us to understand why that spiritual and divine sense,
by which those that are truly virtuous and holy, perceive the excellency of true
virtue, is in the sacred Scriptures called by the name of light, knowledge, un-
derstanding, &c. If this divine sense were a thing arbitrarily given without
any foundation in the nature of things, it would not properly be called by such
names. For, if there were no correspondence or agreement in such a sense with
the nature of things any more than there would have been in a diverse or con-
trary sense, the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect be said
to be a knowledge or perception of any thing besides what was in our own
minds. For this idea would be no representation of any thing without. But
since it is otherwise, since it is agreeable in the respects aborementioned, to the
nature of things, and especially since it is the representation and image of the
moral perfection and excellency of the Divine Being, hereby we have a perception
of that moral excellency, of wThich we could have no true idea without it. And
it being so, hereby persons have that true knowledge of God, which greatly
enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and does (as
might be shown, if it were necessary to the main purpose of this discourse) in
many respects assist persons to a right understanding of things in general, to
understand which our faculties were chiefly given us, and which do chiefly
concern our interest ; and assists us to see the nature of them, and the truth of
them, in their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this spiritual sense, and
the prevalence of those dispositions that are contrary to it, tend to darken and
distract the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confound men's understandings.
And as to that moral sense, common to mankind, which there is in natural
conscience, neither can this be truly said to be no more than a sentiment ar-
bitrarily given by the Creator, without any relation to the necessary nature of
things : but is established in an agreement with the nature of things ; so as no
sense of mind that can be supposed, of a contrary nature and tendency could be.
This will appear by these two things :
1. This moral sense, if the understanding be well informed, and be exer-
cised at liberty, and in an extensive manner, without being restrained to a private
sphere, approves the very same things which a spiritual and divine sense ap-
proves ; and those things only : though not on the same grounds, nor with the
same kind of approbation. Therefore, as that divine sense has been already
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 303
shown to be agreeable to the necessary nature of things, so this inferior moral sense,
being so far correspondent to that, must also so far agree with the nature of things.
2. It has been shown, that this moral sense consists in approving the uni-
formity and natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that
by the supposition it is agreeable to the nature of things. For therein it consists,
viz., a disposition of mind to consent to, or like, the agreement of the nature of
things, or the agreement of the nature and form of one thing with another. And
certainly such a temper of mind as likes the agreement of things to the nature of
things, is more agreeable to the nature of things than an opposite temper of mind.
Here it may be observed : — As the use of language is for mankind to express
their sentiments or ideas to each other, so that those terms in language, by
which things of a moral nature are signified, are to express those moral senti-
ments or ideas that are common to mankind ; therefore it is, that moral sense
which is in natural conscience, that chiefly governs the use of language among
mankind, and is the mind's rule of language In these matters among mankind ;
it is indeed the genera] natural rule which God has given to all men, whereby to
judge of moral good and evil. By such words, right and wrong, good and evil,
when used in a moral sense, is meant in common speech that which deserves
praise or blame, respect or resentment. But as has been often observed, man-
kind in general have a sense of desert, by this natural moral sense.
Therefore here may arise a question, which may deserve to be considered
viz., seeing it is thus, that sentiment among mankind is the rule of language^'
as to what is called by the name of good and evil, worthy and unworthy ; and it
is apparent, that sentiment, at least as to many particulars, by some means or
other is different in different persons, in different nations ; that being thought to
deserve praise by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame ; how
therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determined
by the nature of things, but by the sentiments of men with relation to the nature
of things ?
In order to the answering this question with clearness, it may be divided
into two, viz., Whether men's sentiments of moral good and evil are not arbi-
trary, or rather casual and accidental 1 And, whether the way of their using
words in what they call good and evil, is not arbitrary, without respect to any
common sentiment in all, conformed to the nature of things ?
As to the first, I would observe, that the general disposition or sense of mind
exercised in a sense of desert of esteem or resentment, may be the same in all ;
though as to particular objects and occasions with regard to which it is exer-
cised, it may be very various in different men or bodies of men, through the
partiality or error that may attend the view or attention of the mind. In all,
a notion of desert of love, or resentment, may consist in the same thing, in gen-
eral, viz., a suitableness, or natural uniformity and agreement between the
affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others some
way concerned ; or the natural agreement between love (or something that
some way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love ; a natural
agreement between treating well, and being well treated ; the natural agree-
ment between hating (or something that some way partakes of the nature of
hatred) and being hated, &c. I say, this general notion of desert may be the
same ; and yet occasions and objects through variety of apprehensions about
these occasions and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed,
by reason of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various ; and
example, custom, education, and association may have a hand in this, in ways
innumerable. But it is needless to dwell long Dn this, since things which have
304 THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
been said by others (Mr. Hutcheson in particular) may abundantly show, that
the differences which are to be found among different persons and nations, con-
cerning moral good and evil, are not inconsistent with a general moral sense,
common to all mankind.
Nor, secondly, is the use of the words, good and evil, right and wrong,
when used in a moral sense, altogether unfixed and arbitrary, according to the
variety of notions, opinions, and views, that occasion the forementioned variety
• of sentiment. For though the signification of words is determined by use, yet
that which governs in the use of terms is general or common use. And man-
kind, in what they would signify by terms, are obliged to aim at a consistent
use ; because it is easily found that the end of language, which is to be a common
medium of manifesting ideas and sentiments, cannot be obtained any other way
than by a consistent use of words ; both that men should be consistent with
themselves, and one with another, in the use of them. But men cannot call any
thing right or wrong, worthy or ill deserving, consistently, any other way than
by calling things so, which truly deserve praise or blame, i. e., things, wherein (all
things considered) there is most .uniformity in connecting with them praise or
blame. There is no other way that they can use these terms consistently with
themselves. Thus, if thieves or traitors may be angry with informers, that
bring them to justice, and call their behavior by odious names, yet herein they
are inconsistent with themselves ; because, when they put themselves in the
place of those that have injured them, they approve the same things they con-
demn. And therefore such are capable of being convinced, that they apply
these odious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that prosecutes an
ambitious design of universal empire, by subduing other nations with fire and
sword, may affix terms that signify the highest degrees of virtue, to the conduct
of such as show the most engaged, stable, resolute spirit in this affair, and do mos<
of this bloody work. But yet they are capable of being convinced, that they use
these terms inconsistently, and abuse language in it, and so having their moutht
stopped. And not only will men use such words inconsistently with themselves
but also with one another, by using them any otherwise than to signify trut
merit or ill deserving, as before explained. For there is no way else, wherein
men have any notion of good or ill desert, that mankind in general can agree
in. Mankind in general seem to suppose some general standard or foundation
in nature for a universal consistence in the use of the terms whereby they ex-
press moral good and evil ; which none can depart from but through error and
mistake. This is evidently supposed in all disputes they may have one with
another, about right and wrong ; and in all endeavors used to evince or prove
that any thing is either good or evil, in a moral sense.
THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE
or
ORIGINAL SIN
DEFENDED:
EVIDENCES OF ITS TRUTH PRODUCED,
AND
ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY ANSWERED
CONTAINING IN PARTICULAR,
A REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS AND ARGUINGS OF DR. JOHN TAYLOR, IN HIS BOOK,
ENTITLED, "THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN PROPOSED
TO FREE AND CANDH) EXAMINATION, ETC."
Matth. ix. 12. " They that be whole, need not a Physician ; but they that are sick."
Et haec non tantum ad Peccatores referenda est ; quia in omnibus Maledictionibus primi Hominis,
omnes ejus Generationes conveniunt.... R. Sal. Jarchi.
Propter Concupiscentiam, innatam Cordi humano, dicitur, In Iniquitate genitus sum ; atque Sensus est,
ouod a Nativitate implantatum sit Cordi humano Jetzer harang Figmentum malum....
Aden Ezra.
....Ad Mores Natura recurrit
Damnatos, fixa et mutari nescia....
....Dociles, imitandis
1 urpibus et pravis omne» sumus... Joy.
Vol. n. 39
ADVERTISEMENT,
FOE THE TREATISE ON ORIGINAL SIN.
When the page is referred to in this manner, p. 40, p. 50, without mentioning the book, thereby is t<
be understood such a book in Dr. Taylor's Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin. S intends the Supplement.
When the word Key is used to signify the book referred to, thereby is to be understood Dr. Taylors Key
to the Apostolic Writings. This mark [S] with figures or a number annexed, signifies such a sec-
tion or paragi v/fc m his Key. When after mentioning Preface to Par. on Epist. to Romans, there is
subjoined p. 145, 47, or the like, thereby is intended Page and Paragraph, page 145, Paragraph 47. The
references suit the London Editions of Dr. Taylor's books, printed about the year 1760.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
The following Discourse is intended, not merely as an answer to any par-
ticular Book written against the Doctrine of Original Sin, but as a general
Defence of that great important Doctrine. Nevertheless, I have in this De-
fence taken notice of the main things said against this Doctrine, by such of the
more noted opposers of it, as I have had opportunity to read ; particularly those
two late Writers, Dr. Turnbull and Dr. Taylor of Norwich ; but especially
the latter, in what he has published in those two Books of his, the first entitled
" The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin proposed to free and candid Exami-
nation ;" the other, his " Key to the Apostolic Writings, with a Paraphrase and
Notes on the Epistle to the Romans." I have closely attended to Dr. Taylor's
" Piece on Original Sin" in all its Parts, and have endeavored that no one
thing there said, of any consequence in this Controversy, should pass unnoticed,
or that any thing which has the appearamce of an Argument, in opposition to
this Doctrine, should be left unanswered. I look on the Doctrine as of great
Importance ; which every body will doubtless own it is, if it be true. For, if
the case be such indeed, that all Mankind are by Nature in a state of total
Ruin, both with respect to the moral Evil they are the subjects of, and the
afflictive Evil they are exposed to, the one as the consequence and punishment
of the other, then doubtless the great Salvation by Christ stands in direct Re-
lation to this Ruin, as the remedy to the disease ; and the whole Gospel, or
Doctrine of Salvation, must suppose it ; and all real belief, or true notion of
that Gospel, must be built upon it. Therefore, as I think the Doctrine is most
certainly both true and important, I hope, my attempting a Vindication of it,
will be candidly interpreted ; and that what I have done towards its defence,
will be impartially considered, by all that will give themselves the trouble to
read the ensuing Discourse ; in which it is designed to examine every thing
material throughout the Doctor's whole Book, and many things in that other
Book of Dr. Taylor's containing his Key and exposition on Romans ; as also
many things written in opposition to this Doctrine by some other modern Au-
thors. And moreover, my discourse being not only intended for an Answer to
Dr. Taylor, and other opposers of the Doctrine of Original Sin, but (as was
Dbserved above) for a general defence of that Doctrine ; producing the evidence
of the truth of the Doctrine, as well as answering objections made against it —
considering these things, I say, I hope this attempt of mine will not be thought
needless', nor be altogether useless, notwithstanding other publications on this
subject.
I would also hope, that the extensiveness of the plan of the following trea-
tise will excuse the length of it. And that when it is considered, how much
was absolutely requisite to the full executing of a design formed on sueh a
plan ; how much has been written against the Doctrine of Original Sin, and
with what plausibility ; and how strong the prejudices of many are in favor
of what is said in opposition to this Doctrine ; and that it cannot be expected,
any thing short of a full consideration of almost eve^y argument advanced by
30$ PREFACE
the main opposers, especially by this late and specious Writer, Dr Taylor,
will satisfy many readers ; and also, how much must unavoidably be said in
order to a full handling of the arguments in defence of the Doctrine ; and how
important the Doctrine must be, if true ; I say, when such circumstances as
these are considered, I trust, the length of the following discourse will not be
thought to exceed what the case really required. However, this must be left
to the Judgment of the intelligent and candid Reader.
Stockbridge, May 26, 1757
DOCTRINE
OF
ORIGINAL SIN
DEFENDED.
PART I.
WHEREIN ARE CONSIDERED SOME EVIDENCES OF ORIGINAL SIN FROM FACTS AND EVENTS,
AS FOUND BY OBSERVATION AND EXPERIENCE, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIONS
AND TESTIMONIES OF HOLY SCRIPTURE, AND THE CONFESSION AND ASSERTIONS OF
OPPOSERS.
CHAPTER I
THE EVIDENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN FROM WHAT APPEARS IN FACT OF THE SINFULNESS OF
MANKIND.
SECTION I.
All Mankind do constantly, in all Ages, without Fail in any one Instance, run into that
moral Evil, which is, in Effect, their own utter and eternal Perdition, in a total Pri-
vation of God's Favor, and Suffering of his Vengeance and Wrath.
Bv Original Sin, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is
meant the innate, sinful depravity of the heart. But yet, when the doctrine of
Original Sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, as to include
not only the depravity of nature, but the imputation of Adam's first Sin ; or in
other words, the liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine
judgment, to partake of the punishment of that Sin. So far as I know, most of
those who have held one of these, have maintained the other ; and most of those
who have opposed one have opposed the other ; both are opposed by the author
chiefly attended to in the following discourse, in his book against Original Sin :
and it may perhaps appear in our future consideration of the subject, that they
are closely connected, and that the arguments which prove the one, establish the
other, and that there are no more difficulties attending the allowing of one than
the other.
I shall, in the first place, consider this doctrine more especially with regard
to the corruption of nature ; and as we treat of this, the other will naturally
come into consideration, in the prosecution of the discourse, as connected
with it.
As all moral qualities, all principles either of virtue or vice, lie in the dispo-
sition of the heart, I shall consider whether we have any evidence, that the heart
of man is naturally of a corrupt and evil disposition. This is strenuously denied
by many late writers, who are enemies to the doctrine of Original Sin ; and
particularly by Dr. Taylor.
310 ORIGINAL SIN.
The way we come by the idea of any such thing as disposition or tendency,
is by observing what is constant or general in event ; especially under a great
variety of circumstances ; and above all, when the effect or event continues the
same through great and various opposition, much and manifold force and means
used to the contrary not prevailing to hinder the effect. I do not know, that
such a prevalence of effects is denied to be an evidence of prevailing tendency
in causes and agents ; or that it is expressly denied by the opposers of the doc-
trine of Original Sin, that if, in the course of events, it universally or generally
proves that mankind are actually corrupt, this would be an evidence of a prior,
corrupt propensity in the world of mankind ; whatever may be said by some
which, if.taken with its plain consequences, may seem to imply a denial of this ;
which may be considered afterwards. — But by many the fact is denied j that is,
it is denied, that corruption and moral evil are commonly prevalent in the world :
on the contrary, it is insisted on, that good preponderates, and that virtue has
the ascendant.
To this purpose Dr. Turnbull says,* " With regard to the prevalence of
vice in the world, men are apt to let their imagination run out upon all the rob-
beries, piracies, murders, perjuries, frauds, massacres, assassinations they have
either heard of, or read in history ; thence concluding all mankind to be very
wicked. As if a court of justice was a proper place to make an estimate of the
morals of mankind, or a hospital of the healthfulness of a climate. But ought
they not to consider, that the number of honest citizens and farmers far surpasses
that of all sorts of criminals in any state, and that the innocent and kind actions
of even criminals themselves surpass their crimes in numbers ; that it is the rarity
of crimes, in comparison of innocent or good actions, which engages our atten-
tion to them, and makes them to be recorded in history ; while honest, generous,
domestic actions are overlooked, only because they are so common ? As one
great danger, or one month's sickness shall become a frequently repeated story
during a long life of health and safety. — Let not the vices of mankind be multi-
plied or magnified. Let us make a fair estimate of human life, and set over
against the shocking, the astonishing instances of barbarity and wickedness that
have been perpetrated in any age, not only the exceeding generous and brave
actions with which history shines, but the prevailing innocency, good nature,
industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind at all times ;
and we shall not find reason to cry out, as objectors against Providence dp on
this occasion, that all men are vastly corrupt, and that there is hardly any such
thing as virtue in the world. Upon a fair computation, the fact does indeed
come out, that very great villanies have been very uncommon in all ages, and
looked upon as monstrous ; so general is the sense and esteem of virtue." It
seems to be with a like view that Dr. Taylor says, " We must not take the
measure of our health and enjoyments from a lazar house, nor of our understand-
ing from bedlam, nor of our morals from a gaol."
With respect to the propriety and pertinence of such a representation of
things, and its force as to the consequence designed, I hope we shall be better
able to judge, am1 in some measure to determine, whether the natural disposition •
of the hearts of mankind be corrupt or not, when the things which follow have
been considered.
But for the greater clearness, it may be proper here to premise one considera-
tion, that is of great importance in this controversy, and is very much overlooked
by the opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin in their disputing against it ;
which is this :
* Moral Philosophy, p. 289, 290.
ORIGINAL SIN. 311
That is to be looked upon as the true tendency of the natural or innate dis-
position of man's heart, which appears to be its tendency, when we consider
things as they are in themselves, or in their own nature, without the interposi-
tion of divine grace. Thus, that state of man's nature, that disposition of the
mind, is to be looked upon as evil and pernicious, which, as it is in itself, tends
to extremely pernicious consequences, and would certainly end therein, were it
not that the free mercy and kindness of God interposes to prevent that issue. It
would be very strange if any should argue, that there is no evil tendency in the
case, because the mere favor and compassion of the Most High may step in and
oppose the tendency, and prevent the sad effect tended to. Particularly, if there
be any thing in the nature of man, whereby he has a universal, unfailing ten-
dency to that moral evil, which, according to the real nature and true demerit
of things, as they are in themselves, implies his utter ruin, that must be looked
upon as an evil tendency or propensity ; however divine grace may interpose,
to save him from deserved ruin, and to overrule things to ,an issue contrary to
that which they tend to of themselves. Grace is a sovereign thing, exercised
according to the good pleasure of God, bringing good out of evil. The effect
of it belongs not to the nature of things themselves, that otherwise have an ill
tendency, any more than the remedy belongs to the disease ; but is something
altogether independent on it, introduced to oppose the natural tendency, and
reverse the course of things. But the event that things tend to, according to
their own demerit, and according to divine justice, that is the event which they
tend to in their own nature, as Dr. Taylor's own words fully imply. " God
alone (says he) can declare whether he will pardon or punish the ungodliness
and unrighteousness of mankind, which is in its own nature punishable." Noth-
ing is more precisely according to the truth of things, than divine justice : it
weighs things in an even balance : it views and estimates things no otherwise
than they are truly in their own nature. Therefore undoubtedly that which im-
plies a tendency to ruin, according to the estimate of divine justice, does indeed
imply such a tendency in its own nature.
And then it must be remembered that it is a moral depravity we are speak-
ing of; and therefore when we are considering whether such depravity do not
appear by a tendency to a bad effect or issue, it is a moral tendency to such an
issue, that is the thing to be taken into the account. A moral tendency or in-
fluence is by desert. Then may it be said, man's nature or state is attended
with a pernicious or destructive tendency, in a moral sense, when it tends to
that which deserves misery and destruction. And therefore it equally shows
the moral depravity of the nature of mankind in their present state, whether
that nature be universally attended with an effectual tendency to destructive
vengeance actually executed, or to their deserving misery and ruin, or their just
exposedness to destruction, however that fatal consequence may be prevented
by grace, or whatever the actual event be.
One thing more is to be observed here, viz., that the topic mainly insisted
on by the opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin, is the justice of God ; both
in their objections against the imputation cf Adam's sin, and also against its be-
ing so ordered, that men should come into the world with a corrupt and ruined
nature, without having merited the displeasure of their Creator by any personal
fault. But the latter is not repugnant to God's justice, if men can be, and actu-
ally are, born into the world with a tendency to sin, and to misery and ruin for
their sin, which actually will be the consequence, unless mere grace steps in and
prevents it. If this be allowed, the argument from justice is given up ; for it is
to suppose that their liableness to misery and ruin comes in a way of justice ;
312 , ORIGINAL SIN.
otherwise there would be no need of the interposition of divine grace to 6ave
them. Justice alone would be sufficient security, if exercised, without grace.
It is all one in this dispute about what is just and righteous, whether men are
born in a miserable state, by a tendency to ruin, which actually follows, and that
justly ; or whether they are born in such a state as tends to a desert of ruin,
which might justly follow, and would actually follow, did not grace prevent.
For the controversy is not, what grace will do, but what justice might do.
I have been the more particular on this head, because it enervates many of
the reasonings and conclusions by which Dr. Taylor makes out his scheme ; in
which he argues from that state which mankind are in by divine grace, yea,
which he himself supposes to be by divine grace, and yet not making any allow-
ance for this, he from hence draws conclusions against what others suppose of
the deplorable and ruined state mankind are in by the fall. He often speaks of
death and affliction as coming on Adam's posterity in consequence of his sin ;
and in pages 20, 21„and many other places, he supposes that these things come
in consequence of his sin, not as a punishment or a calamity, but as a benefit.
But in page 23, he supposes these things would be a great calamity and mise-
ry, if it were not for the resurrection ; which resurrection he there, and in the fol-
lowing pages, and in many other places, speaks of as being by Christ ; and of-
ten speaks of it as being by the grace of God in Christ.
In pages 63, 64, speaking of our being subjected to sorrow, labor and death,
in consequence of Adam's sin, he represents these as evils that are reversed and
turned into advantages, and that we are delivered from through grace in Christ.
And in pages 65 — 67, he speaks of God's thus turning death into an advantage
through grace in Christ, as what vindicates the justice of God in bringing death
by Adam.
In pages 152, 156, it is one thing which he alleges against this proposition
of the assembly of divines, that we are by nature bondslaves to Satan ; that
God hath been providing from the beginning of the world to this day, various
means and dispensations, to preserve and rescue mankind ft om the devil.
In pages 168 — 170, one thing alleged in answer to that objection against
his doctrine, that we are in worse circumstances than Adam, is, the happy cir-
cumstances we are under by the provision and means furnished through free
grace in Christ.
In page 228, among other things which he says, in answering that argu-
ment against his doctrine, and brought to show men have corruption by nature,
viz., that there is a law in our members — bringing us into captivity to the
law of sin and death, spoken of in Rom. vii., he allows that the case of those
who are under a law threatening death for every sin (which law he elsewhere
says, shows us the natural and proper demerit of sin, and is perfectly consonant
to everlasting truth and righteousness), must be quite deplorable, if they have no
relief from the mercy of the lawgiver.
In pages 90 — 93, S., in opposition to what is supposed of the miserable
state mankind are brought into by Adam's sin, one thing he alleges, is, The
noble designs of love, manifested by advancing a new and happy dispensation,
founded on the obedience and righteousness of the Son of God ; and that
although by Adam we are subjected to death, yet in this dispensation a
resurrection is provided ; and that Adam's posterity are under a mild dispensa-
tion of grace, &c.
In page 112, S., he vindicates God's dealings with Adam, in placing him aJ
first under the rigor of law, to transgress and die (which, as he expresses it, was
putting his happiness on afoot extremely danger ous), by say ing, that as God had
ORIGINAL SIN. 313
before determined in his own breast, so he immediately established his covenant
upon a quite different bottom, namely, upon grace.
In pages 122, 123, S., against what R. R. says, that God forsook man
when he fell, and that mankind after Adam's sin were born without divine
favor, &c, he alleges among other things, Christ's coming to be the propitiation
for the sins of the whole world. And the riches of God's mercy in giving the
promise of a Redeemer to destroy the works of the devil. That he caught his
sinning, falling creature in the arms of his grace.
In his note on Rom. v. 20, p. 297, 298, he says as follows : " The law, I
conceive, is not a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in
our present state ; or it doth not seem congruous to the goodness of God, to
afford us no other way of salvation but by Taw, which, if we once transgress,
we are ruined forever. For who then from the beginning of the world could
be saved 1 And therefore it seems to me that the law was not absolutely in-
tended to be a rule for obtaining life, even to Adam in Paradise. Grace was
the dispensation God intended mankind should be under ; and therefore Christ
was foreordained before the foundation of the world."
There are various other passages in this author's writings of the like kind.
Some of his arguments and conclusions to this effect, in order to be made good,
must, depend on such a supposition as this: That God's dispensations of grace
are rectifications or amendments of his foregoing constitutions and proceedings,
which were merely legal ; as though the dispensations of grace, which succeed
those of mere law, implied an acknowledgment, that the preceding, legal con-
stitution would be unjust, if left as it was, or at least, very hard dealing with
mankind ; and that the other were of the nature of a satisfaction to his creatures,
for former injuries or hard treatment ; so that put together, the injury with the
satisfaction, the legal and injurious dispensation, taken with the following good
dispensation, which our author calls grace, and the unfairness or improper
severity of the former, amended by the goodness of the latter, both together
made up one righteous dispensation.
The reader is desired to bear in mind that which I have said concerning the
interposition of divine grace, its not altering the nature of things, as they are in
themselves ; and accordingly, when I speak of such and such an evil tendency
of things, belonging to the present nature and state of mankind, understand me
to mean their tendency as they are in themselves, abstracted from any considera-
tion of that remedy the sovereign and infinite grace of God has provided.
Having premised these things, I now proceed to say,
That mankind are all naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail,
with this consequence or issue : that they universally run themselves into that
which is, in effect, their own utter, eternal perdition, as being finally accursed of
God, and the subjects of his remediless wrath through sin.
From which I infer that the natural state of the mind of man, is attended
with a propensity of nature, which is prevalent and effectual, to such an issue ;
and that therefore their nature is corrupt and depraved with a moral depravity,
that amounts to and implies their utter undoing.
Here I would first consider the truth of the proposition ; and then would
show the certainty of the consequences which I infer from it. If both can be
clearly and certainly proved, then, I trust, none will deny but that the doctrine
of original depravity is evident, and so the falseness of Dr. Taylor's scheme de-
monstrated ; the greatest part of whose book, called " The Scripture Doctrine
of Original Sin," &c, is against the doctrine of innate depravity. In page 107,
S., he speaks of the conveyance of a corrupt and sinful nature to Adam's pos-
Vol II 40
314 ORIGINAL SIN.
t
terity as the grand point to be proved by the maintainers of the Doctrine of
Original Sin.
In order to demonstrate what is asserted in the proposition laid down, there
is need only that these two things should be made manifest : one is this fact,
that all mankind come into the world in such a state, as without fail comes to
this issue, namely, the universal commission of sin ; or that every one who
comes to act in the world as a moral agent, is, in a greater or less degree, guilty
of sin. The other is, that all sin deserves and exposes to utter and eternal de-
struction, under God's wrath and curse ; and would end in it, were it not for
the interposition of divine grace to prevent the effect. Both which can be
abundantly demonstrated to be agreeable to the word of God, and to Dr. Tay-
lor's own doctrine.
That every one of mankind, at least of them that are capable of acting as
moral agents, are guilty of sin (not now taking it for granted that they come
guilty into the world) is a thing most clearly and abundantly evident from the
holy Scriptures. 1 Kings viii. 46, " If any man sin against thee ; for there is
no man that sinneth not." Eccl. vii. 20, " There is not a just man upon earth
that doeth good, and sinneth not." Job ix. 2, 3, " I know it is so of a truth
(i. e., as Bildad had just before said, that God would not cast away a perfect man,
&c), but how should man be just with God I If he will contend with him, he
cannot answer him one of a thousand." To the like purpose, Psalm cxliii. 2,
" Enter not mto judgment with thy servant ; for in thy sight shall no man living
be justified." So the words of the apostle (in which he has apparent reference
to those of the Psalmist), Rom. iii. 19, 20, " That every mouth may be stopped,
and all the world become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the
law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight ; for by the law is the know-
ledge of sin." So Gal. ii. 16, and 1 John i. 7 — 10, "If we walk in the light,
the blood of Christ cleanseth us from all sin. If we say that we have no sin,
we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is
faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.
If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in
us." As in this place, so in innumerable other places, confession and repent-
ance of sin are spoken of, as duties proper for all ; as also prayer to God for
pardon of sin ; and forgiveness of those that injure us, from that motive, that
we hope to be forgiven of God. Universal guilt of sin might also be demonstrated
from the appointment, and the declared use and end of the ancient sacrifices ;
and also from the ransom, which every one that was numbered in Israel, was
directed to pay, to make atonement for his soul, Exod. xxx. 11 — 16. All are
represented, not only as being sinful, but as having great and manifold iniquity,
Job ix. 2, 3, James iii. 1 , 2.
There are many scriptures which both declare the universal sinfulness of
mankind, and also that all sin deserves and justly exposes to everlasting destruc-
tion, under the wrath and curse of God ; and so demonstrate both parts of the
proposition J have laid down. To which purpose that in Gal. iii. 10, is exceed-
ing full : " For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse ;
for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are
written in the book of the law, to do them." How manifestly is it implied in
the apostle's meaning here, that there is no man but what fails in some instances
of doing all things that are written in the book of the law, and therefore as
many as have their dependence on their fulfilling the law, are under that curse
which is pronounced on them that do fail of it ? And here the apostle infers
in the next verse, that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God ;
ORIGINAL SIN. , 315
as he had said before in the preceding chapter, verse 16, " By the works of
the law shall no flesh be justified '." The apostle shows us that he understands,
that by this place which he cites from Deuteronomy, the Scripture hath con-
cluded, or shut up, all under sin, as in chap. iii. 22. So that here we are plainly
taught, both that every one of mankind is a sinner, and that every sinner is
under the curse of God.
To the like purpose is that, Rom. iv. 14, and also 2 Cor. iii. 6, 7, 9, where
the law is called the letter that kills, the ministration of death, and the minis-
tration of condemnation. The wrath, condemnation and death, which is threat-
ened in the law to all its transgressors, its final perdition, the second death,
eternal ruin, as is very plain, and is confessed. And this punishment which
the law threatens for every sin, is a just punishment, being what every sin
truly deserves ; God's law being a righteous law, and the sentence of it a right-
eous sentence.
All these things are what Dr. Taylor himself confesses and asserts. He
says that the law of God requires perfect obedience. (Note on Rom. vli. 6, p,
308), " God can never require imperfect obedience, or by his holy law allow us
to be guilty of any one sin, how small soever. And if the law, as a rule of duty,
were in any respect abolished, then we might in some respects transgress the
law, and yet not be guilty of sin. The moral law, or law of nature, is the truth,
everlasting, unchangeable, and therefore, as such, can never be abrogated. On
the contrary, our Lord Jesus Christ has promulgated it anew under the gospel,
fuller and clearer than it was in the Mosaical constitution, or anywhere else ;
having added to its precepts the sanction of his own divine authority." And
many things which he says, imply that all mankind do in some degree trans-
gress the law. In page 229, speaking of what may be gathered from Rom.
vii. and viii., he says, " We are apt, in a world full of temptation, to be deceiv-
ed, and drawn into sin by bodily appetites, &c. And the case of those who are
under a law threatening death to every sin, must be quite deplorable, if they
have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver."
But this is very fully declared in what he says in his note on Rom. v. 20,
page 297. His words are as follows : " Indeed, as a rule of action prescribing
our duty, it (the law) always was, and always must be a rule ordained for ob-
taining life ; but not as a rule of justification, not as it subjects to death for
every transgression. For if it could in its utmost rigor have given us life, then,
as the apostle argues, it would have been against the promises of God. For if
there had been a law, in the strict and rigorous sense of law, which could have
made us live, verily justification should have been by the law. But he supposes,
no such law was ever given ; and therefore there is need and room enough
for the promises of grace; or as he argues, Gal. ii. 21, it would have frustrated,
or rendered useless the grace of God. For if justification came by the law,
then truly Christ is dead in vain, then he died to accomplish what was, or might
have been effected by law itself without his death. Certainly the law was not
brought in among the Jews to be a rule of justification, or to recover them out
of a state of death, and to procure life by their sinless obedience to it ; for in
this, as well as in another respect, it was weak, not in itself, but through the
weakness of our flesh, Rom. viii. 3. The law, I conceive, is not a dispensation
suitable to the infirmity of human nature in our present state ; or it doth not
seem congruous to the goodness of God to afford us no other way of salvation,
but by law, which, if we once transgress, we are ruined forever. For who then,
from the beginning of the world, could be saved ?"• How clear and express are
316 ORIGINAL SIN.
these things, that no one of rrankind, from the beginning of the world, can
over be justified by law, because every one transgresses it ?*
And here also we see, Dr. Taylor declares, that by the law, men are sen-
tenced to everlasting ruin for one transgression. To the like purpose he often
expresses himself. So p. 207, " The law requireth the most extensive obedi-
ence, discovering sin in all its branches. It gives sin a deadly force, subjecting
every transgression to the penalty of death ; and yet supplieth neither help nor
hope to the sinner, but leaveth him under the power, of sin and sentence of
death." In p. 213, he speaks of the law as " extending to lust and irregular
desires, and to every branch and principle of sin ; and even to its latent prin-
ciples, and minutest branches." Again (Note on Rom. vii. 6, p. 308), " to
every sin, how small soever." And when he speaks of the law subjecting
every transgression to the penalty of death, he means eternal death, as he from
time to time explains the matter. In p. 212, he speaks of the law " in the con-
demning power of it, as binding us in everlasting chains." In p. 120. S., he
says, " that death which is the wages of sin, is the second death ;" and this p.
78, he explains of " final perdition." In his Key, p. 107, § 296, he says, " The
curse of the law subjected men for every transgression to eternal death" So
in Note on Rom. v. 20, p. 291, " The law of Moses subjected those who were
under it to death, meaning by death eternal death." These are his words.
He also supposes, that this sentence of the law, thus subjecting men for
every, even the least sin, and every minutest branch and latent principle of sin,
to so dreadful a punishment, is just and righteous, agreeable to truth and the
nature of things, or to the natural demerits of sin. This he is very full in. Thus
in p. 186, P., * It was sin (says he) which subjected us to death by the law,
justly threatening sin with death. Which law was given us, that sin might
appear ; might be set forth in its proper colors ; when we saw it subjected us
to death-by a law perfectly holy, just and good ; that sin by the commandment,
by the law, might be represented what it really is, an exceeding great and
deadly evil." So in note on Rom. v. 20, p. 299, " The law or ministration of
death, as it subjects to death for every transgression, is still of use to show the
natural and proper demerit of sin." Ibid. p. 292, " The language of the law,
dying thou shalt die, is to be understood of the demerit of the transgression,
that which it deserves." Ibid. p. 298, " The law was added," saith Mr. Locke,
on the place, " because the Israelites, the posterity of Abraham, were transgress-
ors as well as other men, to show them their sins, and the punishment and
death, which in strict justice they incurred by them. And this appears to be a true
comment on Rom. vii. 13. — Sin, by virtue of the law, subjected you to death
for this end, that sin, working death in us, by that which is holy, just, and good,
perfectly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness. — Consequently every
sin is in strict justice deserving of wrath and punishment ; and the law in its
rigor was given to the Jews, to set home this awful truth upon their con-
sciences, to show them the evil and pernicious nature of sin ; and that, being con-
scious they had broke the law of God, this might convince them of the great
need they had of the favor of the lawgiver, and oblige them, by faith in his
goodness, to fly to his mercy, for pardon and salvation."
If the law be holy, just, and good, a constitution perfectly agreeable to
God's holiness, justice, and goodness ; then he might have put it exactly in ex-
* I am sensible, these things are quite inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, of " sufficient pow-
er in all mankind constantly to do the whole duty which God requires of them," without a necessity of
breaking God's law in any degree, (p. 63—68, G.) But, I hope, the reader will not think me accounta-
ble for his inconsistences.
ORIGINAL SIN 317
ecution, agreeably to all these his perfections. Our author himself says, p. 133,
S., " How that constitution, which establishes a law, the making of which is
inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, and the executing of it incon-
sistent with his holiness, can be a righteous constitution, I confess, is quite be-
yond my comprehension."
Now the reader is left to judge, whether it be not most plainly and fully
agreeable to Dr. Taylor's own doctrine, that there never was any one person
from the beginning of the world, who came to act in the world as a moral
agent, and that it is not to be hoped there ever will be any, but what is a sinner
or transgressor of the law of God ; and that therefore this proves to be the
issue and event of things, with respect to all mankind in all ages, that, by the
natural and proper demerit of their own sinfulness, and in the judgment of the
law of God, which is perfectly consonant to truth, and exhibits things in their
true colors, they are the proper subjects of the curse of God, eternal death, and
everlasting ruin ; which must be the actual consequence, unless the grace or
favor of the lawgiver interpose, and mercy prevail for their pardon and salva-
tion. The reader has seen also how agreeable this is to the doctrine of the holy
Scripture.
And if so, and what has been observed concerning the interposition of di-
vine grace be remembered, namely, that this alters not the nature of things as
they are in themselves, and that it does not in the least affect the state of the
controversy we are upon, concerning the true nature and tendency of the state
that mankind come into the world in, whether grace prevents the fatal effect or
no ; I say, if these things are considered, I trust, none will deny, that the pro-
position that was laid down, is fully proved, as agreeable to the word of God,
and Dr. Taylor's own words ; viz., that mankind are all naturally in such a
state, as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue, that they uni-
versally are the subjects of that guilt and sinfulness, which is, in effect, their
utter and eternal ruin, being cast wholly out of the favor of God, and subjected
to his everlasting wrath and curse.
SECTION II.
It follows from the Proposition proved in the foregoing Section, that all Mankind are
under the influence of a prevailing effectual Tendency in their Nature, to that Sin
and Wickedness, which implies their utter and eternal ruin.
The proposition laid down being proved, the consequence of it remains to
be made out, viz., that the mind of man has a natural tendency or propensity to
that event, which has been shown universally and infallibly to take place (if
this be not sufficiently evident of itself, without proof), and that this is a corrupt
or depraved propensity.
I shall here consider the former part of this consequence, namely, whether
such a universal, constant, infallible event is truly a proof of the being of any
tendency or propensity to that event ; leaving the evil and corrupt nature of
such a propensity to be considered afterwards.
If any should say, they do not think that its being a thing universal and in-
fallible in event, that mankind commit some sin, is a proof of a prevailing ten-
dency to sin ; because they do not only sin, but also do good, and perhaps
more good than evil ; let them remember, that the question at present is not,
how much sin there is a tendency to ; but whether there be a prevailing pro-
318 ORIGINAL SIR.
pensity to that issue, which it is allowed all men do actually come to, that all
fail of keeping the law perfectly ; whether there be not a tendency to such im-
perfection of obedience as always without fail comes to pass ; to that degree
of sinfulness, at least, which all fall into ; and so to that utter ruin, which that
sinfulness implies and infers. Whether an effectual propensity to this be worth
the name of depravity, because of the good that may be supposed to balance it,
shall be considered by and by. If it were so, that all mankind, in all nations
and ages, were at least one day in their lives deprived of the use of their rea-
son, and run raving mad ; or that all, even every individual person, once cut
their own throats, or put out their own eyes; it might be an evidence of some
tendency in the nature or natural state of mankind to such an event ; though
they might exercise reason many more days than they were distracted, and «
were kind to, and tender of themselves oftener than they mortally and cruelly
wounded themselves.
To determine whether the unfailing constancy of the above named event be
an evident of tendency, let it be considered, what can be meant by tendency,
but a prevailing liableness or exposedness to such or such an event. Wherein
consists the notion of any such thing, but some stated prevalence or prepondera-
tion in the nature or state of causes or occasions, that is followed by, and so
proves to be effectual to, a stated prevalence or commonness of any particular
kind of effect % Or, something in the permanent state of things, concerned in
bringing a certain sort of event to pass, which is a foundation for the constancy,
or strongly prevailing probability of such an event ? If we mean this by ten-
dency (as I know not what else can be meant by it, but this, or something like
this), then it is manifest, that where we see a stated prevalence of any kind of
effect or event, there is a tendency to that effect in the nature and state of its
causes. A common and steady effect shows, that there is somewhere a preponder-
ation, a prevailing exposedness or liableness in the state of things, to what comes
so steadily to pass. The natural dictate of reason shows, that where there is
an effect, there is a cause, and a cause sufficient for the effect; because, if it were
not sufficient, it would not be effectual ; and that therefore, where there is a
stated prevalence of the effect, there is a stated prevalence in the cause : a steady
effect argues a steady cause. We obtain a notion of such a thing as tendency,
no other way than by observation; and we can observe nothing but events;
and it is the commonness or constancy of events that gives us a notion of ten-
dency in all cases. Thus we judge of tendencies in the natural world. Thus
we judge of the tendencies or propensities of nature in minerals, vegetables,
animals, rational and irrational creatures. A notion of a stated tendency, or
fixed propensity, is not obtained by observing only a single event. A stated
preponderation in the cause or occasion, is argued only by a stated prevalence
of the effect. If a die be once thrown, and it falls on a particular side, we do
not argue from hence, that that side is the heaviest : but if it be thrown with-
out skill or care, many thousands or millions of times going, and constantly
falls on the same side, we have not the least doubt in our minds, but that there
is something of propensity in the case, by superior weight of that side, or in
some other respect. How ridiculous would he make himself, who should ear-
nestly dispute against any tendency in the state of things to cold in the winter,
or heat in the summer ; or should stand to it, that although it often happened that
water quenched fire, yet there was no tendency in it to such an effect.
In the case we are upon, the human nature, as existing in such an immense
diversity of persons and circumstances, and never failing in any one instance, of
coming to that issue, viz., that sinfulness, which implies extreme misery and
ORIGINAL SIN. 319
eternal ruin, is as the die often cast. For it alters not the case in the least, as
to the evidence of U ndency, whether the subject of the constant event be an
individual, or a nature and kind. Thus, if there be a succession of trees of the
same sort, proceeding one from another, from the beginning of the world, grow-
ing in all countries, soils, and climates, and otherwise in (as it were) an infinite
variety of circumstances, all bearing ill fruit ; it as much proves the nature and
tendency of the kind, as if it were only one individual tree, that had remained
from the beginning of the world, had often been transplanted into different soils,
&c, and had continued to bear only bad fruit. So, if there were a particular
family, which, from generation to generation, and through every remove to in-
numerable different countries, and places of abode, all died of a consumption,
or all run distracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an evidence
of the tendency of something in the nature or constitution of that race, as it
would be of the tendency of something in the nature or state of an individual,
if some one person had lived all that time, and some remarkable event had often
appeared in him, which he had been the agent or subject of from year to year,
and from age to age, continually and without fail.*
Here may be observed the weakness of that objection, made against the
validity of the argument for a fixed propensity to sin, from the constancy and
universality of the event, that Adam sinned in one instance, without a fixed
propensity. Without doubt a single event is an evidence, that there was some
cause or occasion of that event ; but the thing we are speaking of, is & fixed
cause. Propensity is a stated, continued thing. We justly argue, that a stated
effect must have a stated cause ; and truly observe, that we obtain the notion
of tendency, or stated preponderation in causes, no other way than by observing
a stated prevalence of a particular kind of effect. But who ever argues a
fixed propensity from a single event ? And is it not strange arguing, that be-
cause an event wrhich once comes to pass, does not prove any stated tendency,
therefore the unfailing constancy of an event is an evidence of no such thing ?
But because Dr. Taylor makes so much of this objection, from Adam's sinning
without a propensity, I shall hereafter consider it more particularly, in the be-
ginning of the 9th Section of this Chapter ; where will also be considered what
is objected from the fall of the angels.
Thus a propensity, attending the present nature or natural state of mankind,
eternally to ruin themselves by sin, may certainly be inferred from apparent and
acknowledged facts. And I would now observe further, that not only does this
follow from facts that are acknowledged by Dr. Taylor, but the things he asserts,
the expressions and words which he uses, do plainly imply that all mankind
have such a propensity ; yea, one of the highest kind, a propensity that is
invincible, or a tendency which really amounts to a fixed, constant, unfailing
necessity. There is a plain confession of a propensity or proneness to sin, p. 143 :
" Man, who drinketh in iniquity like water, who is attended with so many sen-
sual appetites, and so apt to indulge them." And again, p. 228, " we are very
apt, in a world full of temptation, to be deceived, and drawn into sin by bodily
appetites." If we are very apt or prone to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites,
and sinfully to indulge them, and very apt or prone to yield to temptation to sin,
then we are prone to sin ; for to yield to temptation to sin is sinful. In the
same page he represents, that on this account, and on account of the conse-
quences of this, the case of those who are under a law, threatening death for
every sin, must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the
lawgiver. Which implies, that their case is hopeless, as to an escape from
death, the punishment of sin, by any other means than God's mercy. And that
320 ORIGINAL SIN.
implies, that there is such an aptness to yield to temptation to sin, that it is hope-
less that any of mankind should wholly avoid it. But he speaks of it elsewhere,
over and over, as truly impossible, or what cannot be ; as in the words which
were cited in the last Section, from his note on Rom. v. 20, where he repeated-
ly speaks of the law, which subjects us to death for every transgression, as what
cannot give life ; and represents that " if God offered us no other way of salva-
tion, no man from the beginning of the work! could be saved." In the same
place he, with approbation, cites Mr. Locke's words, in which, speaking of the
Israelites, he says, " all endeavors after righteousness were lost labor, since any
one slip forfeited life, and it was impossible for them to expect aught but death."
Our author speaks of it as impossible for the law requiring sinless obedience, to
give life, not that the law was weak in itself, but through the weakness of our
Jlesh. Therefore he says, he conceives the Law not to be a dispensation suitable
to the infirmity of the human nature in its present state. These things amount
to a full confession, that the proneness in men to sin, and to a demerit of, and
just exposedness to eternal ruin by sin, is universally invincible, or, which is the
same thing, amounts to absolute, invincible necessity ; which surely is the high-
est kind of tendency or propensity ; and that not the less for his laying this
propensity to our infirmity or weakness, which may seem to intimate some defect,
rather than any thing positive : and it is agreeable to the sentiments of the best
divines, that all sin originally comes from a defective or privative cause. But
sin does not cease to be sin, or a thing not justly exposing to eternal ruin (as
implied in Dr. Taylor's own words) for arising from infirmity or defect ; noi
does any invincible propensity to sin, cease to be a propensity to such demerit
of eternal ruin, because the proneness arises from such a cause.
It is manifest, that this tendency which has been proved, does not consist in
any particular external circumstances, that some or many are in, peculiarly
tempting or influencing their minds ; but is inherent, and is seated in that nature
which is common to all mankind, which they carry with them wherever they
go, and still remains the same, however circumstances may differ. For it is
implied in what has been proved, and shown to be confessed, that the same
event comes to pass in all circumstances, that any of mankind ever are, or can
be under in the world. In God's sight no man living can be justified ; but all
are sinners, and exposed to condemnation. This is true of persons of all con-
stitutions, capacities, conditions, manners, opinions and educations ; in all coun-
tries, climates, nations and ages ; and through all the mighty changes and
revolutions, which have come to pass in the habitable world.
We have the same evidence, that the propensity in this case lies in the
nature of the subject, and does not arise from any particular circumstances, as
we have in any case whatsoever ; which is only by the effects appearing to be
the same in all changes of time and place, and under all varieties of circum-
stances. It is in this way only we judge, that any propensities, which we ob-
serve in mankind, are such as are seated in their nature, in all other cases. It
is thus we judge of the mutual propensity betwixt the sexes, or of the disposi-
tions which are exercised in any of the natural passions or appetites, that they
truly belong to the nature of man ; because they are observed in mankind in
general, through all countries, nations, and ages, and in all conditions.
If any should say, though it be evident that there is a tendency, in the state
of things to this general event, that all mankind should fail of perfect obedi-
ence, and should sin, and incur a demerit of eternal ruin ; and also that this
tendency does not lie in any distinguishing circumstances of any particular peo-
ple, person, or age ; yet it may not lie in man's nature, but in the general con-
ORIGINAL SIN. 321
stitution and frame of this world, into wfrich men are born ; though the nature
of man may be good, without any evil propensity inherent in it ; yet the nature
and universal state of this earthly world may be such as to be full of so many
and strong temptations everywhere, and of such a powerful influence on such
a creature as man, dwelling in so infirm a body, &c, that the result of the
whole may be a strong and infallible tendency in such a state of things, to the
sin and eternal ruin of every one of mankind.
To this I would reply, that such an evasion will not at all avail to the pur-
pose of those whom I oppose in this controversy. It alters not the case as to
this question, whether man is not a creature that in his present state is depraved
and ruined by propensities to sin. If any creature be of such a nature that it
proves evil in its proper place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in
the universe, it is of an evil nature. That part of the system is not good, which
is not good in its place in the system ; and those inherent qualities of that part
of the system, which are not good, but corrupt, in that place, are justly looked
upon as evil inherent qualities. That propensity is truly esteemed to belong to
the nature of any being, or to be inherent in it, that is the necessary conse-
quence of its nature, considered together with its proper situation in the uni-
versal system of existence, w*hether that propensity be good or bad. It is the
nature of a stone to be heavy ; but yet, if it were placed, as it might be, at a
distance from this world, it would have no such quality. But seeing a stone is
of such a nature, that it will have this quality or tendency, in its proper place,
here in this world, where God has made it, it is properly looked upon as a pro-
pensity belonging to its nature : and if it be a good propensity here in its pro-
per place, then it is a good quality of its nature ; but if it be contrariwise, it is
an evil natural quality. So, if mankind are of such a nature, that they have
a universal, effectual tendency to sin and ruin in this world, where God has
made and placed them, this is to be looked upon as a pernicious tendency be-
longing to their nature. There is, perhaps, scarce any such thing in beings not
independent and self-existent, as any power or tendency, but what has some
dependence on other beings, which they stand in some connection with, in the uni-
versal system of existence : propensities are no propensities, any otherwise, than
as taken with their objects. Thus it is with the tendencies observed in natural
bodies, such as gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c. And thus it is wTith the
propensities observed in the various kinds of animals ; and thus it is writh most
of the propensities in created spirits.
It may further be observed, that it is exactly the same thing, as to the con-
troversy concerning an agreeableness with God's moral perfections of such a
disposal of things, that man should come into the world in a depraved, ruined
state, by a propensity to sin and ruin ; whether God has so ordered it, that this
propensity should lie in his nature considered alone, or with relation to its situa-
tion in the universe, and its connection with other parts of the system to which
the Creator has united it ; which is as much of God's ordering, as man's nature
itself, most simply considered.
Dr. Taylor (p. 188, 189), speaking of the attempt of some to solve the
difficulty of God's being the author of our nature, and yet that our nature is
polluted, by supposing that God makes the soul pure, but unites it to a polluted
body (or a body so made, as tends to pollute the soul), he cries out of it as
weak and insufficient, and too gross to be admitted. " For (says he), who infu-
sed the soul into the body ? And if it is polluted by being infused into the
body, who is the author and cause of its pollution ? And who created the
body," &c. But is not the case iust the same, as to those who suppose that
Vol. II 41
322 ORIGINAL SIN
God made the soul pure, and places it in a polluted world, or a world tending
by its natural state in which it is made, to pollute the soul, or to have such an
influence upon it, that it shall without fail be polluted with sin, and eternally
ruined ? Here, may not I also cry out, on as good grounds as Dr. Taylor, Who
placed the soul here in this world 1 And if the world be polluted, or so con-
stituted as naturally and infallibly to pollute the soul with sin, who is the caus<
of this pollution ? And who created the world 1
Though in the place now cited, Dr. Taylor so insists upon it, that God must
be answerable for the pollution of the soul, if he has infused or put the soul
into a body that tends to pollute it ; yet this is the very thing which he himself
supposes to be the fact, with respect to the soul's being created by God, in such
a body as it is, and in such a world as it is ; in a place which I have already
had occasion to observe, where he says, " We are apt, in a world full of temp-
tation, to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites." And if so, according to his
way of reason, God must be the author and cause of this aptness to be drawn
into sin. Again, page 143, we have these words, " Who drinketh in iniquity
like water 1 Who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so apt- to
indulge them ?" In these words our author in effect says the individual thing
that he cries out of as so gross, viz., the tendency of the body, as God has made
it, to pollute the soul which he has infused into it. These sensual appetites,
which incline the soul, or make it apt to a sinful indulgence, are either from
the body which God hath made, or otherwise a proneness to sinful indulgence
is immediately and originally seated in the soul itself, which will not mend the
matter for Dr. Taylor.
I would here lastly observe, that our author insists upon it, page 42, S., that
this lower world where we dwell, in its present state, " is as it was, when, upon
a review, God pronounced it, and all its furniture, very good. And that the
present form and furniture of the earth is full of God's riches, mercy and good-
ness, and of the most evident tokens of his love and bounty to the inhabitants."
[f so, there can be no room for such an evasion of the evidences from fact, of
the universal, infallible tendency of man's nature to sin and eternal perdition,
as that the tendency there is to this issue, does not lie in man's nature, but in
the general constitution and frame of this earthly world, which God hath made
to be the habitation of mankind.
SECTION III
That Propensity, which has been proved to be in the nature ot all mankind, must be
a very evil, depraved and pernicious Propensity ; making it manifest, that the soul
of man, as it is by nature, is in a corrupt, fallen and ruined state ; which is the other
part of the consequence, drawn from the proposition laid down in the first Section.
The question to be considered, in order to determine whether man's nature
is not depraved and ruined, is not, whether he is not inclined to perform as
many good deeds as bad ones ; but which of these two he preponderates to, in the
frame of his heart, and state of his nature, a state of innocence and righteousness,
and favor with God ; or a state of sin, guiltiness, and abhorrence in the sight of
God. Persevering sinless righteousness, or else the guilt of sin, is the alterna-
tive, on the decision of which depends (as is confessed), according to the nature
and truth of things, as they are in themselves, and according to the rule of right,
and of perfect justice, man's being approved and accepted of his Maker, and
ORIGINAL SIN. 323
eternally blessed as good ; or his being rejected, thrown away, and cursed as
bad. And therefore the determination of the tendency of man's heart and na-
ture, with respect to these terms, is that which is to be looked at, in order to de-
termine whether his nature is good or evil, pure or corrupt, sound or ruined.
If such be man's nature, and state of his heart, that he has an infallibly effec-
tual propensity to the latter of those terms ; then it is wholly impertinent to talk
of the innocent and kind actions, even of criminals themselves , surpassing their
crimes in numbers, and of the prevailing innocence, good nature, industry, feli-
city, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind. Let never so many
thousands or millions of acts of honesty, good nature, &c, be supposed; yet, by
the supposition, there is an unfailing propensity to such moral evil, as in its
dreadful consequences infinitely outweighs all effects or consequences of any
supposed good. Surely that tendency, which, in effect, is an infallible tendency
to eternal destruction, is an infinitely dreadful and pernicious tendency ; and
that nature and frame of mind, which implies such a tendency, must be an infi-
nitely dreadful and pernicious frame of mind. It would be much more absurd
to suppose that such a state of nature is good, or not bad, under a notion of
men's doing more honest and kind things than evil ones ; than to say, the state
of that ship is good to cross the Atlantic Ocean in, that is such as cannot hold
together through the voyage, but will infallibly founder and sink by the way ;
under a notion that it may probably go great part of the way before it sinks, or
that it will proceed and sail above water more hours than it will be in sinking :
or to pronounce that road a good road to go to such a place, the greater part of
which is plain and safe, though some parts of it are dangerous, and certainly
fatal to them that travel in it ; or to call that a good propensity, which is an in-
flexible inclination to travel in such a way.
A propensity to that sin which brings God's eternal wrath and curse (which
has been proved to belong to the nature of man) is evil, not only as it is cala-
mitous and sorrowful, ending in great natural evil, but as it is odious and de-
testable : for by the supposition, it tends to that moral evil, by which the subject
becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable, as such, to be condemned, and
utterly rejected, and cursed by him. This also makes it evident, that the state
which it has been proved mankind are in, is a corrupt state in a moral sense,
that it is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the law of God, which is the rule of
moral rectitude and goodness. That tendency which is opposite to that which
the moral law requires and insists upon, and prone to that which the moral law
utterly forbids, and eternally condemns the subject for, is doubtless a corrupt ten-
dency, in a moral sense.
So that this depravity is both odious, and also pernicious, fatal and destruc-
tive, in the highest sense, as inevitably tending to that which implies man's eter-
nal ruin ; it shows that man, as he is by nature, is in a deplorable and undone
state, in the highest sense. And this proves that men do not come into the
world perfectly innocent in the sight of God, and without any just exposedness
to his displeasure. For the being by nature in a lost and ruined state, in the
highest sense, is not consistent with being by nature in a state of favor with
God.
But if any should still insist on a notion of men's good deeds exceeding theii
bad ones, and that, seeing the good that is in men is more than countervails the
evil, they cannot be properly denominated evil ; all persons and things being
most properly denominated from that which prevails, and has the ascendant in
them, I would say further, that,
I presume it will be allowed, that if there is in man's nature a tendency to
324 ORIGINAL SLN.
guilt and ill desert, in a vast overbalance to virtue and merit ; or a propensity
to that sin, the evil and demerit of which is so great, that the value and merit
that is in him, or in all the virtuous acts that ever he performs, are as nothing to
it ; then truly the nature of man may be said to be corrupt and evil.
That this is the true case, may be demonstrated by what is evident of the
infinite heinousness of sin against God, from the nature of things. The heinous-
ness of this must rise in some proportion to the obligation we are under to re-
gard the Divine Being ; and that must be in some proportion to his worthiness
of regard ; which doubtless is infinitely beyond the worthiness of any of our fel-
low creatures. But the merit of our respect or obedience to God is not infinite.
The merit of respect to any being does not increase, but is rather diminished,
in proportion to the obligations we are under in strict justice to pay him that
respect. There is no great merit in paying a debt we owe, and by the highest
possible obligations in strict justice are obliged to pay, but there is great deme-
rit in refusing to pay it. That on such accounts as these there is an infinite de-
merit in all sin against God, which must therefore immensely outweigh all the
merit which can be supposed to be in our virtue, I think, is capable of full de-
monstration ; and that the futility of the objections which some have made
against the argument, might most plainly be demonstrated. But I shall omit a
particular consideration of the evidence of this matter from the nature of things,
as I study brevity, and lest any should cry out, Metaphysics ! as the manner ot
some is, when any argument is handled against any tenet they are fond of, with
a close and exact consideration of the nature of things. And this is not so ne-
cessary in the present case, inasmuch as the point asserted, namely, that he who
commits any one sin, has guilt and ill desert, which is so great, that the value
and merit of all the good which it is possible he should do in his whole life, is
as nothing to it ; I say this point is not only evident by metaphysics, but is
plainly demonstrated by what has been shown to be fact, with respect to God's
own constitutions and dispensations towards mankind ; as particularly by this,
that whatever acts of virtue and obedience a man performs, yet if he trespasses
in one point, is guilty of any the least sin, he, according to the law of God, and
so according to the exact truth of things, and the proper demerit of sin, is ex-
posed to be wholly cast out of favor with God, and subjected to his curse, to be
utterly and eternally destroyed. This has been proved, and shown to be the
doctrine which Dr. Taylor abundantly teaches. But how can it be agreeable
to the nature of things, and exactly consonants to everlasting truth and right-
eousness, thus to deal with a creature for the least sinful act, though he should
perform ever so many thousands of honest and virtuous acts, to countervail the
evil of that sin 1 Or how can it be agreeable to the exact truth and real deme-
rit of things, thus wholly to cast off the deficient creature, without any regard
to the merit of all his good deeds, unless that be in truth the case, that the value
and merit of all those good actions, bear no proportion to the heinousness of the
least sin t If it were not so, one would think, that however the offending per-
son might have some proper punishment, yet, seeing there is so much virtue to
lay in the balance against the guilt, it would be agreeable to the nature of
things, that he should find some favor, and not be altogether rejected, and made
the subject of perfect and eternal destruction ; and thus no account at all be
made of all his virtue, so much as to procure him the least relief or hope. How
can such a constitution represent sin in its proper colors, and according to its
true nature and desert (as Dr. Taylor says it does), unless this be its true nature,
that it is so bad, that even in the least instance it perfectly swallows up all the
value of the sinner's supposed good deeds, let them be ever so many. So that this
ORIGINAL SIN. 325
matter is not left to our metaphysics or philosophy ; the great Lawgiver, and
infallible Judge of the universe, has clearly decided it, in. the revelation he has
made of what is agreeable to exact truth, justice, and the nature of things, in
his revealed law, or rule of righteousness.
He that in any respect or degree is a transgressor of God's law, is a wicked
man, yea, wholly wicked in the eye of the law ; all his goodness being esteem-
ed nothing, having no account made of it, when taken together with his wick-
edness. And therefore, without any regard to his righteousness, he is, by the
sentence of the law, and so by the voice of truth and justice, to be treated as
worthy to be rejected, abhorred, and cursed forever ; and must be so, unless
grace interposes, to cover his transgression. But men are really, in themselves,
what they are in the eye of the law, and by the voice of strict equity and jus-
tice ; however they may be looked upon, and treated by infinite and unmerited
mercy.
So that, on the whole, it appears, all mankind have an infallibly effectual
propensity to that moral evil, which infinitely outweighs the value of all the
good that can be in them ; and have such a disposition of heart, that the cer-
tain consequence of it is, their being in the eye of perfect truth and righteous-
ness, wicked men. And I leave all to judge, whether such a disposition be not
in the eye of truth a depraved disposition.
Agreeably to these things, the Scripture represents all mankind, not only as
having guilt, but immense guilt, which they can have no merit or worthiness to
countervail. Such is the representation we have in Matth. xviii. 21, to the end.
There, on Peter's inquiring, How often his brother should trespass against him,
and he forgive him, whether until seven times ; Christ replies, J say not unto
thee, until seven times, but until seventy times seven; apparently meaning,
that he should esteem no number of offences too many, and no degree of
injury it is possible our neighbor should be guilty of towards us, too great to be
forgiven. For which this reason is given in the parable there following, that,
if ever we obtain forgiveness and favor with God, he must pardon that guilt and
injury towards his majesty, which is immensely greater than the greatest inju-
ries that ever men are guilty of one towards another, yea, than the sum of all
their injuries put together, let them be ever so many, and ever so great ; so that
the latter would be but as a hundred pence to ten thousand talents, which im-
mense debt we owe to God, and have nothing to pay ; which implies, that we
have no merit to countervail any part of our guilt. And this must be, because
if all that may be called virtue in us, be compared with our ill desert, it is in the
sight of God as nothing to it. The parable is not to represent Peter's case in
particular, but that of all who then were, or ever should be, Christ's disciples.
It appears by the conclusion of the discourse, So likewise shall my heavenly
Father do, if ye, from your hearts, forgive not every one his brother their tres-
passes.
Therefore how absurd must it be for Christians to object against the depravity
of man's nature, a greater number of innocent and kind actions, than of crimes ;
and to talk of a prevailing innocency, good nature, industry and cheerfulness of
the greater part of mankind ? Infinitely more absurd, than it would be to in-
sist that the domestic of a prince was not a bad servant, because though some-
times he contemned and affronted his master to a great degree, yet he did not
spit in his master's face so often as he performed acts of service ; or, than it
would be to affirm, that his spouse was a good wife to him, because, although she
committed adultery, and that with the slaves and scoundrels sometimes, yet she
did not do this so often as she did the duties of a wife. These notions would be
326 ORIGINAL SIN.
absurd, because the crimes are too heinous to be atoned for by many honest
actions of the servant or spouse of the prince ; there being a vast disproportion
between tne merit of the one, and the ill desert of the other ; but in no measure
so great, nay infinitely less, than that between the demerit of our offences against
God, and the value of our acts of obedience.
Thus I have gone through with my first argument ; having shown the evi-
dence of the truth of the proposition I laid down, at first, and proved its conse-
quence. But there are many other things, that manifest a very corrupt tendency
or disposition in man's nature, in his present state, which I shall take notice of in
the following Sections.
SECTION IV.
The depravity of Nature appears by a propensity in all to Sin immediately, as soon as
they are capable of it, and to Sin continually and progressively ; and also by tha
remains of Sin in the best of Men.
The great depravity of man's nature appears, not only in that they univer-
sally commit sin, who spend any long time in the world, but in that men are
naturally so prone to sin, that none ever fail of immediately transgressing
God's law, and so of bringing infinite guilt on themselves, and exposing them-
selves to eternal perdition, as soon as they are capable of it.
The Scriptures are so very express in it, that all mankind, all flesh, all tht
world, every man living, are guilty of sin; that it must at least be understood,
every one that is come to be capable of being active in duty to God, or sin
against him, is guilty of sin. There are multitudes in the world who have but
very lately begun to exert their faculties, as moral agents ; and so are but just
entered on their state of trial, as acting for themselves. There are many thou-
sands constantly in the world, who have not lived one month, or week, or day
since they have arrived to any period that can be assigned from their birth to
twenty years of age. And if there be not a strong propensity in man's nature
to sin, that should, as it were, hurry them on to speedy transgression, and they
have no guilt previous to their personal sinning, what should hinder, but that
there might always be a great number of such as act for themselves on the
stage of the world, and are answerable for themselves to God, who have hith-
erto kept themselves free from sin, and have perfectly obeyed God's law, and
so are righteous in God's sight, with the righteousness of the law ; and if they
should be called out of the world without any longer trial (as great numbers
die at all periods of life) would be justified by the deeds of the law ? And how
then can it be true, that in God's sight no man living can be justified, that no
man can be just with God, and that by the deeds of the law no flesh can be jus-
tified, because by the law is the knowledge of Sin ? And what should hinder but
that there may always be many in the world, who are capable subjects of instruc-
tion and counsel, and of prayer to God, for whom the calls of God's word to
repentance and to seek pardon through the blood of Christ, and to forgive others
their injuries, because they need that God should forgive them, would not be
proper ; and for whom the Lord's prayer is not suitable, wherein Christ directs
all his followers to pray, that God would forgive their sins, as they forgive
those that trespass against them ?
If there are any in the world, though but lately become capable of acting
for themselves, as subjects of the law of God, who are perfectly free from sin,
ORIGINAL SIN. 327
such are most likely to be found among the children of Christian parents, who
give them the most pious education, and set them the best examples ; and there-
fore such would never be so likely to be found in any part or age of the world,
as in the primitive Christian church, in the first age of Christianity (the age of
the church's greatest purity) so long after Christianity had been established,
that there had been time for great numbers of children to be born, and educated
by those primitive Christians. It was in that age, and in such a part of that
age, that the Apostle John wrote his first epistle to the Christians that
then were. But if there was then a number of them come to understanding,
who were perfectly free from sin, why does he write as he does ? 1 John i. 8 —
10, " If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not
in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and
to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we
make him a liar, and the truth is not in us."
If any should object, that this is an overstraining of things; and that it sup-
poses a greater niceness and exactness than is observed in Scripture representations
and expressions, to infer from these expressions, that all men sin immediately as
soon as ever they are capable of it. To this I would say, that I think the argu-
ments used are truly solid, and do really and justly conclude, either that men are
born guilty, and so are chargeable with sin before they come to act for them-
selves, or else commit sin immediately, without the least time intervening, after
they are capable of understanding their obligation to God, and reflecting on
themselves ; and that the Scripture clearly determines, there is not one such
person in the world, free from sin. But whether this be a straining things up
to too great an exactness, or not ; yet I suppose, none that do not entirely set
aside the sense of such Scriptures as have been mentioned, and deny those prop-
ositions which Dr. Taylor himself allows to be contained in some of them, will
deny they prove, that no considerable time passes after men are capable of acting
for themselves, as the subjects of Qod's law, before they are guilty of sin ; be-
cause if the time were considerable, it would be great enough to deserve to be
taken notice of, as an exception to such universal propositions, as, In thy sight
shall no man living be justified, &c. And if this be allowed, that men are so
prone to sin, that in fact all mankind do sin, as it were, immediately, after they
come to be capable of it, or fail not to sin so soon, that no considerable time passes
before they run into transgression against God ; it does not much alter the case,
as to the present argument. If the time of freedom from sin be so small, as not
to be worthy of notice in the forementioned universal propositions of Scripture,
it is also so small, as not to be worthy of notice in the present argument.
Again, the reality and greatness of the depravity of man's nature appears in
this, that he has a prevailing propensity to be continually sinning against God.
What has been observed above, will clearly prove this. That same disposition
of nature, which is an effectual propensity to immediate sin, amounts to a pro-
pensity to continual sin. For a being prone to continual sinning, is nothing but
a proneness to immediate sin continued. Such appears to be the tendency of
nature to sin, that as soon as ever man is capable, it causes him immediately to
sin, without suffering any considerable time to pass without sin. And therefore,
if the same propensity be continued undiminished, there will be an equal tendency
to immediate sinning again, without any considerable time passing. And so
the same will always be a disposition still immediately to sin, with as little time
passing without sin afterwards, as at first. The only reason that can be given
why sinning must be immediate at first, is that the disposition is so great, that
it will not suffer any considerable time to pass without sin ; and therefore, the
328 ORIGINAL SIN.
same disposition being continued in equal degree, without some new restraint,
or contrary tendency, it will still equally tend to the same effect. , And though
it is true, the propensity may be diminished, or have restraints laid upon it, by
gracious disposals of Providence, or merciful influences of God's spirit ; yet
this is not owing to nature. That strong propensity of nature, by which men
are so prone to immediate sinning at first, has no tendency in itself to a dimi-
nution ; but rather to an increase ; as the continued exercise of an evil dispo-
sition, in repeated actual sins, tends to strengthen it more and more ; agree-
able to that observation of Dr. Taylor's, p. 228, " We are apt to be drawn
into sin by bodily appetites, and when once we are under the government of
these appetites, it is at least exceeding difficult, if not impracticable, to recover
ourselves, by the mere force of reason." The increase of Strength of disposi-
tion in such a case, is as in a falling body, the strength of its tendency to
descend is continually increased, so long as its motion is continued. Not only a
constant commission of sin, but a constant increase in the habits and practice of
wickedness, is the true tendency of man's depraved nature, if unrestrained by
divine grace ; as the true tendency of the nature of a heavy body, if obstacles
are removed, is not only to fall with a continued motion, but with a constantly
increasing motion. And we see, that increasing iniquity is actually the conse-
quence of natural depravity, in most men, notwithstanding all the restraints they
have. Dispositions to evil are commonly much stronger in adult persons, than
in children, when they first begin to act in the world as rational creatures.
If sin be such a thing all Dr. Taylor represents it, p. 69, " A thing of an
odious and destructive nature, the corruption and ruin of our nature, and infi-
nitely hateful to God ;" then such a propensity to continual and increasing sin,
must be a very evil disposition. And if we may judge of the perniciousness of
an inclination of nature, by the evil of the effect it naturally tends to, the pro-
pensity of man's nature must be evil indeed ; for the soul being immortal, Dr.
Taylor acknowledges, p. 94, S., it will follow from what has been observed above,
that man has a natural disposition to one of these two things ; either to an in-
crease of wickedness without end, or till wickedness comes to be so great, that
the capacity of his nature will not allow it to be greater. This being what his
wickedness will come to by its natural tendency, if divine grace does not pre-
vent, it may as truly be said to be the effect which man's natural corruption
tends to, as that an acorn in a proper soil, truly tends by its nature to become a
great tree.
Again, that sin which is remaining in the hearts of the best men on earth,
makes it evident, that man's nature is corrupt, as he comes into the world. A
remaining depravity of heart in the greatest saints, may be argued from the sins
of most of those who are set forth in Scripture as the most eminent instances
and examples of virtue and piety ; and is also manifest from this, that the
Scripture represents all God's children as standing in need of chastisement.
Heb. xii. 6— -8, " For whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth ; and scourgeth
every son whom he receiveth. What son is he, whom the father chasteneth
not i If ye are without chastisement, then are ye bastards, and not sons." But
this is directly and fully asserted in some places ; as in that forementioned,
Eccles. vii. 20, " There is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and
sinneth not." Which is as much as to say, there is no man on earth, that is so
just, as to have attained to such a degree of righteousness, as not to commit any
sin. Yea, the Apostle James speaks of all Christians as often sinning, or com-
mitting many sins ; even in that primitive age of the Christian church, an age
distinguished from all others by eminent attainments in holiness ; James iii. 2,
ORIGINAL SIN. 329
" In many things we all offend." And that there is pollution in the hearts of
all, as the remainder of moral filth that was there antecedent to all attempts or
means for purification, is very plainly declared, in Prov. xx. 9, " Who can say,
I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin V9
According to Dr. Taylor, men come into the world wholly free from sinful
propensities. And if so, it appears from what has been already said, there
would be nothing to hinder, but that many, without being better than they are by
nature, might perfectly avoid the commission of sin. But much more might this
be the case with men after they had, by care, diligence, and good practice, attained
those positive habits of virtue, whereby they are at a much greater distance from
sin, than they were naturally ; which- this writer supposes to be the case with
many good men. But since the Scripture teaches us, that the best men in the
world do often commit sin, and have remaining pollution of heart, this makes it
abundantly evident, that men, when they are no otherwise than they were by na-
ture, without any of those virtuous attainments, have a sinful depravity ; yea,
must have great corruption of nature.
SECTION V.
The depravity of Nature appears, in that the general Consequence of the State and
Tendency of Man's Nature is a much greater Degree of Sin, than Righteousness ;
not only with respect to Value and Demerit, but Matter and Quantity.
I have before shown, that there is a propensity in man's nature to that
sin, which in heinousness and ill desert immensely outweighs all the value and
merit of any supposed good, that may be in him, or that he can do. I now
proceed to say further, that such is man's nature, in his present state, that it
tends to this lamentable effect; that there should at all times, through the
course of his life, be at least much more sin than righteousness, not only as to
weight and value, but as to matter and measure ; more disagreement of heart
and practice from the law of God, and from the law of nature and reason, than
agreement and conformity.
The law of God is the rule of right, as Dr. Taylor often calls it : it is the
measure of virtue and sin : so much agreement as there is with this rule, so
much is there of rectitude, righteousness, or true virtue, and no more ; and so
much disagreement as there is with this rule, so much sin is there.
Having premised this, the following things may be here observed.
I. The degree of disagreement from this rule of light is to be determined,
not only by the degree of distance from it in excess, but also in defect ; or in
other words, not only in positive transgression, or doing what is forbidden, but
also in withholding what is required. The Divine Lawgiver does as much pro-
hibit the one as the other, and does as much charge the latter as a sinful breach
of his law, exposing to his eternal wrath and curse, as the former. Thus at the
day of judgment, as described Matth. xxv., the wicked are condemned as
cursed to everlasting fire, for their sin in defect and omission : I was an hungered,
and ye gave me no meat, &c. And tl)e case is thus, not only when the defect
is in word or behavior, but in the inward temper and exercise of the mind. 1
Cor. xvi.'22, " If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema
Maranatlra." Dr. Taylor, speaking of the sentence and punishment of the
wicked (Matth. xxv. 41, 46), says, p. 159, "It was manifestly for want of
benevolence, love and compassion to their fellow creatures, that they were
Vol. II 42
330 ORIGINAL SIN
condemned." And elsewhere, as was observed before, he says, that the law ot
God extends to the latent principles of sin to forbid them, and to condemn to
eternal destruction for them. And if so, it doubtless also extends to the inward
principles of holiness, to require them, and in like manner to condemn for the
want of them.
II. The sum of our duty to God, required in his law, is love to God; taking
love in a large sense, for the true regard of our hearts to God, implying esteem,
honor, benevolence, gratitude, complacence, &c. This is not only very plain by
the Scripture, but it is evident in itself- The sum of what the law of God requires,
is doubtless obedience to that law : no law can require more than that it
be obeyed. But it is manifest, that obedience to God is nothing, any otherwise
than as a testimony of the respect of our hearts to God : without the heart, man's
external acts are no more than the motions of the limbs of a wooden image,
have no more of the nature of either sin or righteousness. It must therefore
needs be so, that love to God, or the respect of the heart, must be the sum of
the duty required towards God in his law.
III. It therefore appears from the premises, that whosoever withholds more
of that love or respect of heart from God, which his law requires, than he affords,
has more sin than righteousness. Not only he that has less divine love, than
passions and affections which are opposite ; but also he that does not love God
half so much as he ought, or has reason to do, has justly more wrong than right
imputed to him ; according to the law of God, and the law of reason, he has
more irregularity than rectitude, with regard to the law of love. The sinful dis-
respect or unrespectfulness of his heart to God, is greater than his respect to him.
But what considerate person is there, even among the more virtuous part of
mankind, but what would be ashamed to say, and profess before God or men, that
he loves God half so much as he ought to do ; or that he exercises one half of
that esteem, honor and gratitude towards God, which would be altogether be-
coming him ; considering what God is, and what great manifestations he has
made of his transcendent excellency and goodness, and what benefits he receives
from him ? And if few or none of the best of men can with reason and truth
make even such a profession, how far from it must the generality of mankind be ?
The chief and most fundamental of all the commands of the moral law,
requires us " to love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and with all our souls,
with all our strength, and all our mind ;" that is plainly, with all that is within
us, or to the utmost capacity of our nature ; all that belongs to, or is compre-
hended within the utmost extent or capacity of our heart and soul, and mind
and strength, is required. God is in himself worthy of infinitely greater love,
than any creature can exercise towards him : he is worthy of love equal to his
perfections, which are infinite : God loves himself with no greater love than he
is worthy of, when he loves himself infinitely ; but we can give God no more
than we have. Therefore, if we give him so much, if we love him to the utmost
extent of the faculties of our nature, we are excused ; but when what is pro-
posed, is only that we should love him as much as our capacity will allow, this
excuse of want of capacity ceases, and obligation takes hold of us ; and we are
doubtless obliged to love God to the utmost of what is possible for us, with such
faculties, and such opportunities and advantages to know God, as we have.
And it is evidently implied in this great commandment of the law, that our love
to God should be so great, as to have the most absolute possession of all the
soul, and the perfect government of all the principles and springs of action that
are in our nature.
Though it is .not easy, precisely to fix the limits of man's capacity, as to
ORIGINAL SIN. 331
love .to God ; yet in general we may determine, that his capacity of love is co-
extended with his capacity of knowledge ; the exercise of the understanding
opens the way for the exercise of the other faculty. Now, though we cannot
have any proper positive understanding of God's infinite excellency ; yet the
capacity of the human understanding is very great, and may be extended far.
It is needless to dispute, how far man's knowledge may be said to be strictly
comprehensive of things that are very great, as of the extent of the expanse of
the heavens, or of the dimensions of the globe of the earth, and of such a great
number, as of the many millions of its inhabitants. The word comprehensive
seems to be ambiguous. But doubtless we are capable of some proper positive
understanding of the greatness of these things, in comparison of other things
that we know, as unspeakably exceeding them. We are capable of some clear
understanding of the greatness or considerableness of a whole nation ; or of the
whole world of mankind, as vastly exceeding that of a particular person or
family. We can positively understand that the whole globe of the earth is
vastly greater than a particular hill or mountain. And can have some good
positive apprehension of the starry heavens, as so greatly exceeding the globe
of the earth, that the latter is as it were nothing to it. So the human faculties
are capable of a real and clear understanding of the greatness, glory and good-
ness of God, and of our dependence upon him, from the manifestations which
God has made of himself to mankind, as being beyond all expression above
that of the most excellent human friend, or earthly object. And so we are
capable of an esteem and love to God, which shall be proportionable, and as
much exceeding that which we have to any creature.
These things may help us to form some judgment, how vastly the generality
of mankind fall below their duty, with respect to love to God ; yea, how far
they are from coming halfway to that height of love, which is agreeable to the
rule of right. Surely if our esteem of God, desires after him, and delight in
him, were such as become us, considering the things forementioned, they would
exceed our regard to other things as the heavens are high above the earth, and
would swallow up all other affections like a deluge. But how far, how exceed-
ing far, are the generality of the world from any appearance of being influenced
and governed by such a degree of divine love as this !
If we consider the love of God, with respect to that one kind of exercise
of it, namely, gratitude, how far indeed do the generality of mankind come
short of the rule of right and reason in this ! If we consider how various, in-
numerable, and vast the benefits are we receive from God, and how infinitely
great and wonderful that grace of his is, which is revealed and offered to them
that live under the gospel, in that eternal salvation which is procured by God's
giving his only begotten Son to die for sinners ; and also how unworthy we are
all, deserving (as Dr. Taylor confesses) eternal perdition under God's wrath and
curse ; how great is the gratitude that would become us, who are the subjects
of so many and great benefits, and have such grace towards poor, sinful, lost
mankind set before us in so affecting a manner, as in the extreme sufferings of
the Son of God, being carried through those pains by a love stronger than death,
a love that conquered those mighty agonies, a love whose length, and breadth,
and depth, and height, passes knowledge 1 But oh ! What poor returns ! How
little the gratitude ! How low, how cold and inconstant the affection in the best,
compared with the obligation ! And what then shall be said of the gratitude
of the generality 1 Or rather, who can express the ingratitude ?
If it were so, that the greater part of them that are called Christians,
were no enemies to Christ in heart and practice, were not governed by principles
332 ORIGINAL SIN.
opposite to him and his gospel, but had some real love and gratitude ; yet it
their love falls vastly short of the obligation or occasion given, they are guilty
of shameful and odious ingratitude. As when a man has been the subject of
some instance of transcendent generosity, whereby he has been relieved from the
most extreme calamity, and brought into very opulent, honorable, and happy
circumstances, by a benefactor of excellent character ; and yet expresses no
more gratitude on such an occasion than would be requisite for some kindness
comparatively infinitely small, he may justly fall under the imputation of vile
unthankfulness, and of much more ingratitude than gratitude ; though he may have
no ill will to his benefactor, or no positive affection of mind contrary to thank-
fulness and benevolence. What is odious in him is his defect, whereby he falls #
so vastly below his duty.
Dr. Turnbull abundantly insists, that the forces of the affections naturally in
man are well proportioned; and often puts a question to this purpose: How
man's nature could have been better constituted in this respect 1 How the af-
fections of his heart could have been better proportioned ? I will now mention
one instance, out of many that might be mentioned :
Man, if his heart were not depraved, might have had a disposition to grati
tude to God for his goodness, in proportion to his disposition to anger toward*
men for their injuries. When I say in proportion, I mean considering the great-
ness and number of favors and injuries, and the degree in which the one and
the other are unmerited, and the benefit received by the former, and the damage
sustained by the latter. Is there not an apparent and vast difference and in-
equality in the dispositions to these two kinds of affection, in the generality of
both old and young, adult persons and little children ? How ready is resent-
ment for injuries received from men ! And how easily is it raised in most, at
least to an equality with the desert ! And is it so with respect to gratitude for
benefits received from God, in any degree of comparison 1 Dr. Turnbull pleads
for the natural disposition to anger for injuries, as being good and useful ; but
surely gratitude to God, if we were inclined to it, would be at least as good and
useful as the other.
How far the generality of mankind are from their duty with respect to love
to God, will further appear, if we consider that we are obliged not only to love
him with a love of gratitude for benefits received ; but true love to God prima-
rily consists in a supreme regard to him for what he is in himself. The tendency
of true virtue is to treat every thing as it is, and according to its nature. And
if we regard the Most High according to the infinite dignity and glory of his
nature, we shall esteem and love him with all our heart and soul, and to the
utmost of the capacity of our nature, on this account ; and not primarily because
he has promoted our interest. If God be infinitely excellent in himself, then he
is infinitely lovely on that account, or in other words, infinitely worthy to be
loved. And doubtless, if he be worthy to be loved for this, then he ought to be
loved for this. And it is manifest there can be no true love to him, if he be
not loved for what he is in himself. For if we love him not for his own sake,
but for something else, then our love is not terminated on him, but on something
else, as its ultimate object. That is no true value for infinite worth, which im-
plies no value for that worthiness in itself considered, but only on the account
of something foreign. Our esteem of God is fundamentally defective, if it be
not primarily for the excellency of iris nature, which is the foundation of all that
is valuable in him in any respect. If we love not God because he is what he
is, but only because he is profitable to us, in truth we love him not at all ; if we
seem to love him, our love is not to him, but to something else.
ORIGINAL SIN. 333
And now I must leave it to every one to judge for himself, from his own
opportunities of observation and information concerning mankind, how little
there is of this disinterested love to God, this pure divine affection, in the world.
How very little indeed in comparison of other affections altogether diverse, which
perpetually urge, actuate and govern mankind, and keep the world, through all
nations and ages, in a continual agitation and commotion ! This is an evidence
of a horrid contempt of God, reigning in the world of mankind. It would
justly be esteemed a great instance of disrespect and contempt of a prince, if
one of his subjects, when he came into his house, should set him below his
meanest slave. But in setting the Infinite Jehovah below earthly objects and
enjoyments, men degrade him below those things, between which and him there
is an infinitely greater distance, than between the highest earthly potentate, and
the most abject of mortals. Such a conduct as the generality of men are guilty
of towards God, continually and through all ages, in innumerable respects,
would be accounted the most vile, contemptuous treatment of a fellow creature
of distinguished dignity. Particularly men's treatment of the offers God makes
of himself to them as their Friend, their Father, their God, and everlasting por-
tion ; their treatment of the exhibitions he has made of his unmeasurable love,
and the boundless riches of his grace in Christ, attended with earnest repeated
calls, counsels, expostulations and entreaties, as also of the most dreadful threat-
enings of his eternal displeasure and vengeance.
Before I finish this Section, it may be proper to say something in reply to an
objection, some may be ready to make against the force of that argument, which
has been used to prove that men in general have more sin than righteousness,
namely, that they do not come half way to that degree of love to God, which
becomes them, and is their duty.
The objection is this : that the argument seems to prove too much, in that
it will prove, that even good men themselves have more sin than holiness, which
also has been supposed. But if this were true, it would follow that sin is the
prevalent principle even in good men, and that it is the principle which has the
predominancy in the heart and practice of the truly pious, which is plainly
contrary to the word of God.
I answer, if it be indeed so, that there is more sin, consisting in defect of
required holiness, than there is of holiness in good men in this world ; yet it
will not follow that sin has the chief government of their heart and practice, for
two reasons.
1. They may love God more than other things, and yet there may not be so
much love, as there is want of due love ; or in other words, they may love God
more than the world, and therefore the love of God may be predominant, and
yet may not love God near half so much as they ought to do. This need not
be esteemed a paradox : a person may love a father, or some great friend and
benefactor, of a very excellent character, more than some other object, a thou-
sand times less worthy of his esteem and affection, and yet love him ten times
less than he ought ; and so be chargeable, all things considered, with a deficien-
cy in respect and gratitude, that is very unbecoming and hateful. If love to
God prevails above the love of other things, then virtue will prevail above evil
affections, or positive principles of sin ; by which principles it is, that sin has a
positive power and influence. For evil affections radically consist in inordinate
love to other things besides God ; and therefore, virtue prevailing beyond these,
will have the governing influence. The predominance of the love of God in
the hearts of good men, is more from the nature of the object loved, and the
nature of the principle of true love, than the degree of the principle. The ob-
334 ORIGINAL SIN.
ject is one of supreme loveliness ; immensely above all other objects in worthi-
ness of regard ; and it is by such a transcendent excellency, that he is God, and
worthy to be regarded and adored as God ; and he that truly loves God, loves
him as God : true love acknowledges him to be God, or to be divinely and
supremely excellent ; and must arise from some knowledge, sense, and convic-
tion of his worthiness of supreme respect ; and though the sense and view
of it may be very imperfect, and the love that arises from it in like manner im-
perfect ; yet if there be any realizing view of such divine excellency, it must
cause the heart to respect God above all.
2. Another reason, why a principle of holiness maintains the dominion in
the hearts of good men, is the nature of the covenant of grace, and the promises
of that covenant, on which true Christian virtue relies, and which engage
God's strength and assistance to be on its side, and to help it against the enemy,
that it may not be overcome. The just live by faith. Holiness in the Chris-
tian, or his spiritual life, is maintained, as it has respect by faith to its author
and finisher ; and derives strength and efficacy from the divine fountain, and
by this means overcomes. For, as the apostle says, This is the victory that over-
comes the world, even our faith. It is our faith in him who has promised,
never to leave nor forsake his people, and not to forsake the work of his own
hands, nor suffer his people to be tempted above their ability, and that his grace
shall be sufficient for them, and that his strength shall be made perfect in weak-
ness, and that where he has begun a good work he will carry it on to the day
of Christ.
SECTION VI.
The Corruption of Man's Nature appears by its Tendency, in its present State, to an
extreme degree of Folly and Stupidity in Matters of Religion.
It appears, that man's nature is greatly depraved, by an apparent proneness
to an exceeding stupidity and sottishness in those things wherein his duty and
main interest are chiefly concerned.
I shall instance in two things, viz., men's proneness to idolatry ; and so gen-
eral and great a disregard of eternal things, as appears in them that live under
the light of the gospel.
It is manifest, that man's nature in its present state is attended with a great
propensity to forsake the acknowledgment and worship of the true God, and to
fall into the most stupid idolatry. This has been sufficiently proved by known
fact, on abundant trial : inasmuch as the world of mankind in general (except-
ing one small people, miraculously delivered and preserved) through all nations,
in all parts of the world, ages after ages, continued without the knowledge and
worship of the true God, and overwhelmed in gross idolatry, without the least
appearance or prospect of its recovering itself from so great blindness, or re-
turning from its brutish principles and customs, till delivered by divine grace.
In order to the most just arguing from fact, concerning the tendency of man's
nature, as that is in itself, it should be inquired what the event has been, where
nature has been left to itself, to operate according to its own tendency, with least
opposition made to it by any thing supernatural ; rather than in exempt places,
where the infinite power and grace of God have interposed, a»d extraordinary
means have been used to stem the current, and bring men to true religion and
virtue. As to the means by which God's people of old, in the line of Abraham,
ORIGINAL SIN. 335
were delivered and preserved from idolatry, they were miraculous, and of mere
grace : notwithstanding which, they were often relapsing into the notions and
ways of the heathen ; and when they had backslidden, never were recovered,
but by divine gracious interposition. And as to the means by which many
Gentile nations have been delivered since the days of the gospel, they are such
as have been wholly owing to most wonderful, miraculous, and infinite grace.
God was under no obligation to bestow on the heathen world greater advan-
tages than they had in the ages of their gross darkness ; as appears by the
fact, that God actually did not, for so long a time, bestow greater advantages.
Dr. Taylor himself observes {Key, p. 1), " That in about four hundred
years after the flood, the generality of mankind were fallen into idolatry." And
thus it was everywhere through the world, excepting among that people that
was saved and preserved by a constant series of miracles, through a variety of
countries, nations, and climates, great enough ; and through excessive changes,
revolutions, and ages, numerous enough, to be a sufficient trial of what man-
kind are prone to, if there be any such thing as a sufficient trial.
That men should forsake the true God for idols, is an evidence of the most
astonishing folly and stupidity, by God's own testimony, Jer. ii. 12, 13 : " Be
astonished, 0 ye heavens, at this, and be ye horribly afraid, be ye very deso-
late, saith the Lord : for my people have committed two evils ; they have
forsaken me, the fountain of living waters, and have hewed out to themselves
cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water." And that mankind in gen-
eral did thus, so soon after the flood, was from the evil propensity of their hearts,
and because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge ; as is evident by
Rom. i. 28. And the universality of the effect shows that the cause was uni-
versal, and not any thing belonging to the particular circumstances of one, or
only some nations or ages, but something belonging to that nature that is com-
mon to all nations, and that remains the same through all ages. And what
other cause could this great effect possibly arise from, but a depraved disposi-
tion, natural to all mankind 1 It could not arise from want of a sufficient capa-
city or means of knowlege. This is in effect confessed on all hands. Dr.
Turnbull {Christian Philosophy, p. 21) says as follows: "The existence of
one infinitely powerful, wise, and good mind, the author, creator, upholder, and
governor of all things, is a truth that lies plain and obvious to all that will but
think." And (ibid. p. 245), " Moral knowledge, which is the most important
of all knowledge, may easily be acquired by all men." And again (ibid. p.
292), " Every man by himself, if he would duly employ his mind in the con-
templation of the works of God about him, or in the examination of his own
frame, might make very great progress in the knowledge of the wisdom and
goodness of God. This all men, generally speaking, might do, with very little
assistance ; for they have all sufficient abilities for thus employing their minds,
and have all sufficient time for it." Mr. Locke says {Human Understanding, p.
4, Chap. iv. p. 242, Edit. 11), " Our own existence, and the sensible parts of
the universe, offer proofs of a Deity so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that
I deem it impossible for a considerate man to withstand them. For I judge it
as certain and clear a truth, as can anywhere be delivered, that the invisible
things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood
by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." And Dr.
Tayloi himself (in p. 78) says, " The light given to all ages and nations
of the world, is sufficient for the knowledge and practice of their duty."
And in p. Ill, 112, citing those words of the apostle, Rom. ii. 14, 15, says,
" This clearly supposes that the Gentiles, who were then in the world, might
336 t ORIGINAL SIN.
have done the things contained in the law by nature, or their natural power."
And in one of the next sentences, he says, " The apostle in Rom. i. 19 — 21,
affirms that the Gentiles had light sufficient to have seen God's eternal power
and Godhead, in the works of creation ; and that the reason why they did not
glorify him as God, was because they became vain in their imaginations, and
had darkened their foolish heart ; so that they were without excuse." And
in his paraphrase on those verses in the 1st of Romans he speaks of the " very
heathens, that were without a written revelation, as having that clear and evi-
dent discovery of God's being and perfections, that they are inexcusable in not
glorifying him suitably to his excellent nature, and as the author of their being-
and enjoyments." And in p. 146, S., he says, " God affords every man suffi
cient light to know his duty." If all ages and nations of the world have sufficient
light for the knowledge of God, and their duty to him, then even such nations
and ages, in which the most brutish ignorance and barbarity prevailed, had suffi-
cient light, if they had had but a disposition to improve it ; and then much more
those of the heathen, which were more knowing and polished, and in ages where-
in arts and learning had made greatest advances. But even in such nations and
ages, there was no advance made towards true religion ; as Dr. Winder observes
(History of Knowledge, Vol. II. p. 336) in the following words : " The Pagan
religion degenerated into greater absurdity, the further it proceeded ; and it
prevailed in all its height of absurdity, when the Pagan nations were polished
to the height. Though they set out with the talents of reason, and had solid
foundations of information to build upon, it in fact proved, that with all their
strengthened faculties, and growing powers of reason, the edifice of religion rose
in the most absurd deformities and dispositions, and gradually went on in the
most irrational, disproportioned, incongruous systems, of which the most easy
dictates of reason would have demonstrated the absurdity. They were contrary
to all just calculations in moral mathematics." He observes, " That their gross-
est abominations first began in Egypt, where was an ostentation of the greatest
progress in learning and science ; and they never renounced clearly any of their
abominations, or openly returned to the worship of the one true God, the Crea-
tor of all things, and to the original, genuine sentiments of the highest and most
venerable antiquity. The Pagan religion continued in this deep state of corrup-
tion to the last. The Pagan philosophers, and inquisitive men, made great
improvements in many sciences, and even in morality itself; yet the inveterate
absurdities of Pagan idolatry remained without remedy. Every temple smoked
with incense to the sun and moon, and other inanimate material luminaries, and
earthly elements, to Jupiter, Juno, Mars and Venus, &c, the patrons and exam-
ples of almost every vice. Hecatombs bled on the altars of a thousand gods ;
as mad superstitions inspired. And this was not the disgrace of our ignorant,
untaught northern countries only ; but even at Mens itself, the infamy reigned,
and circulated through all Greeee ; and finally prevailed, amidst all their learn-
ing and politeness, under the Ptolemys in Egypt, and the Ceesars at Rome.
Now if the knowledge of the Pagan world, in religion, proceeded no further
than this ; if they retained all their deities, even the most absurd of them their
deified beasts, and deified men, even to the last breath of Pagan power ; we may
justly ascribe the great improvements in the world, on the subject of religion,
to divine revelation, either vouchsafed in the beginning when this knowledge
was competently clear and copious ; or at the death oi Paganism, when this
light shone forth in its consummate lustre at the coming of Christ."
Dr. Taylor often speaks of the idolatry of the heathen world, as great
wickedness, in which they were wholly inexcusable ; and yet often speaks of their
ORIGINAL SIN. 337
case as remediless, and of them as being dead in sin, and unable to recover
themselves. And if so, and yet, according to his own doctrine, every age, and
every nation, and every man, had sufficient light afforded, to know God, and
to know and do their whole duty to him ; then their inability to deliver them-
selves must be a moral inability, consisting in a desperate depravity, and most
evil disposition of heart.
And if there had not been sufficient trial of the propensity of the hearts of
mankind, through all those ages that passed from Abraham to Christ, the trial
has been continued down to this day, in all those vast regions of the face of
the earth, that have remained without any effects of the light of the gospel ;
and the dismal effect continues everywhere unvaried. How was it with that
multitude of nations inhabiting south and north America ? What appearance
was there, when the Europeans first came hither, of their being recovered, or
recovering in any degree, from the grossest ignorance, delusions, and most
stupid Paganism 1 And how is it at this day, in those parts of Africa and
Asia, into which the light of the gospel has not penetrated ?
This strong and universally prevalent disposition of mankind to idolatry,
of which there has been such great trial, and so notorious and vast proof, m
fact, is a most glaring evidence of the exceeding depravity of the human nature ;
as it is a propensity, in the utmost degree, contrary to the highest end, the
main business, and chief happiness of mankind, consisting in the knowledge,
service, and enjoyment of the living God, the Creator and Governor of the
world ; in the highest degree contrary to that for which mainly God gave
mankind more understanding than the beasts of the earth, and made them wiser
than the fowls of heaven ; which was, that they might be capable of the
knowledge of God ; and in the highest degree contrary to the first and greatest
commandment of the moral law, that we should have no other gods before Je-
hovah, and that we should love and adore him with all our heart, soul, mind,
and strength. The Scriptures are abundant in representing the idolatry of the
heathen world, as their exceeding wickedness, and their most brutish stupidity.
They worship and trust in idols, are said to be like the lifeless statues they wor-
ship, like mere senseless stocks and stones, Ps. cxv. 4 — 8, and cxxxv. 15 — 18.
A second instance of the natural stupidity of the minds of mankind, that I
shall observe, is, that great disregard of their own eternal interests, which ap-
pears so remarkably, so generally among them that live under the gospel.
As Mr. Locke observes (Human Understanding, Vol. I. p. 207), " Were
the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation, great-
er or less to the understanding, it could never get loose from the infinite, eternal
joys of heaven, once proposed, and considered as possible ; the external condi-
tion of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches or honor,
or any other worldly pleasure, which we can propose to ourselves ; though we
should grant these the more probable to be obtained." Again (p. 228, 229),
" He that will not be so far a rational creature, as to reflect seriously upon in-
finite happiness and misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that
use of his understanding he should. The rewards and punishments of another
life, which the Almighty has established, as the enforcements of his laws, are of
weight enough to determine the choice, against whatsoever pleasure or pain
this life can show. WThen the eternal state is considered but in its bare possi-
bility, which nobody can make any doubt of, he that will allow exquisite and
endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here, and
the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge
very much amiss, if he does not conclude that a virtuous life, with the certain
Vol. H. 43
338 ORIGINAL SIN.
expectation of everlasting bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious
one, with the fear of that dreadful state of misery, which it is very possible
may overtake the guilty, or at least the terrible, uncertain hope of annihilation.
This is evidently so ; though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and
the vicious continual pleasure ; which yet is for the most part quite otherwise,
and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present pos-
session : nay, all things rightly considered, have I think even the worst part
here. But when infinite happiness is put in one scale, against infinite misery
in the other ; if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the
best that the wicked man can attain to, if he be in the right ; who can, with-
out madness run the venture ? Who in his wits would choose to come within
a possibility of infinite misery 1 Which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be
got by that hazard : whereas, on the other side, the sober man ventures no-
thing, against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes to pass.
That disposition of mind which is a propensity to act contrary to reason is
a depraved disposition. It is not because the faculty of reason, which God has
given to mankind, is not sufficient fully to discover to them, that forty, sixty, or
a hundred years, is as nothing in comparison of eternity, infinitely less than a
second of time to a hundred years, that the greatest worldly prosperity and
pleasure is not treated with most perfect disregard, in all cases where there is
any degree of competition of earthly things, with salvation from exquisite, eter-
nal misery, and the enjoyment of everlasting glory and felicity ; as certainly it
would be, if men acted according to reason. But is it a matter of doubt or con-
troversy, whether men in general do not show a strong disposition to act far
otherwise, from their infancy, till death is in a sensible approach ? In things
that concern men's temporal interest, they easily discern the difference between
things of a long and short continuance. It is no hard matter to convince men
of the difference between a being admitted to the accommodations and enter-
tainments of a convenient, beautiful, well furnished habitation, and to partake
of the provisions and produce of a plentiful estate for a day or a night, and
having all given to them, and settled upon them as their own, to possess as long
as they live, and to be theirs, and their heirs' forever. Tnere would be no need
of men's preaching sermons, and spending their strength and life, to convince
men of the difference. Men know how to adjust things in their dealings and
contracts one with another, according to the length of time in which any
thing agreed for is to be used or enjoyed. In temporal affairs, men are sen-
sible that it concerns them to provide for future time, as well as for the pre-
sent. Thus common prudence teaches them to take care in summer to lay up
for. winter ; yea, to provide a fund, and get a solid estate, whence they may be
supplied for a long time to come. And not only so, but they are willing and
forward to spend and be spent, to provide that which will stand their children
in stead, after they are dead ; though it be quite uncertain, who shall use and
enjoy what they lay up, after they have left the world; and if their children
should have the comfort of it, as they desire, they will not partake with them m
that comfort, or have any more a portion in any thing under the sun. In things
which relate to men's temporal interest, they seem very sensible of the uncer-
tainty of life, especially of the lives of others ; and to make answerable provi-
sion for the security of their worldly interest, that no considerable part of it
may rest only on so uncertain a foundation, as the life of a neighbor or friend.
Common discretion leads men to take good care that their outward posses-
sions be well secured by a good and firm title. In worldly concerns men are
discerning of their opportunities, and careful to improve them before they are
ORIGINAL SIN. 339
past. The husbandman is careful to plough his ground and sow his seed in the
proper season, otherwise he knows he cannot expect a crop ; and when the
harvest is come, he will not sleep away the time : for he knows, if he does so, the
crop will soon be lost. How careful and eagle eyed is the merchant to observe
and improve his opportunities and advantages to enrich himself! How apt are
men to be alarmed at the appearance of danger to their worldly estate, or any
thing that remarkably threatens great loss or danger to their outward interest !
And how will they bestir themselves in such a case, if possible to avoid the
threatened calamity ! In things purely secular, and not of a moral or spiritual
nature, men easily receive conviction by past experience, when any thing, on
repeated trial, proves unprofitable or prejudicial, and are ready to take warning
by what they have found themselves, and also by the experience of their neigh-
bors and forefathers.
But if we consider how men generally conduct themselves in things on
which their well being does infinitely more depend, how vast is the diversity !
In these things how cold, lifeless and dilatory ! With what difficulty are a few
of multitudes excited to any tolerable degree of care and diligence, by the in-
numerable means used with men to make them wise for themselves ! And
when some vigilance and activity is excited, how apt is it to die away, like a
mere force against a natural tendency ! What need of a constant repetition of
admonitions and counsels, to keep the heart from falling asleep ! How many
objections are made ! And how are difficulties magnified ! And how soon is
the mind discouraged ! How many arguments, and often renewed, and vari-
ously and elaborately enforced, do men stand in need of, to convince them of
things that are self-evident ! As that things which are eternal, are infinitely
more important than things temporal, and the like. And after all, how very
few are convinced effectually, or in such a manner as to induce to a practical
preference of eternal things ! How senseless are men to the necessity of im-
proving their time to provide for futurity, as to their spiritual interest, and their
welfare in another world ! Though it be an endless futurity, and though it be
their own personal, infinitely important good, after they are dead, that is to be
cared for, and not the good of their children, which they shall have no share in.
Though men are so sensible of the uncertainty of their neighbors' lives, when
any considerable part of their estates depends on the continuance of them j how
stupidly senseless do they seem to be of the uncertainty of their own lives, when
their preservation from immensely great, remediless, and endless misery, is risk-
ed by a present delay, through a dependence on future opportunity ! What
a dreadful venture will men carelessly and boldly run, and repeat and multiply,
with regard to their eternal salvation, who are very careful to have every thing
in a deed or bond firm, and without a flaw ! How negligent are they of their
special advantages and opportunities for their soul's good ! How hardly awa-
kened by the most evident and imminent dangers, threatening eternal destruc-
tion, yea, though put in mind of them, and much pains taken to point them
forth, show them plainly, and fully to represent them, if possible to engage their
attention to them ! How are they like the horse, that boldly rushes into the
battle ! How hardly are men convinced by their own frequent and abundant
experience, of the unsatisfactory nature of earthly things, and the instability of
their own hearts in their good frames and intentions ! And how hardly con-
vinced by their own observation, and the experience of all past generations, of
the uncertainty of life, and its enjoyments ! Psalm xlix. 11, &c, " Their in-
ward thought is, that their houses shall continue forever. — Nevertheless, man
being in honor, abideth not : he is like the beasts that perish. This their way
340 ORIGINAL SIN.
is their folly, yet their posterity approve their sayings. Like sheep are they
laid in the grave."
In these things, men that are prudent for their temporal interest, act as if
they were bereft of reason : * They have eyes, and see not ; ears, and heai not ;
neither do they understand : they are like the horse and mule, that have no un-
derstanding" Jer. viii. 7, " The stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed
times ; and the turtle, and the crane, and the swallow, observe the time of their
coming ; but my people know not the judgment of the Lord."
These things are often mentioned in Scripture, as evidences of extreme folly
and stupidity, wherein men act the part of enemies to themselves, as though they
loved their own ruin, Prov. viii. 36 ; " Laying wait for their own blood," Prov.
i. 18. And how can these things be accounted for, but by supposing a most
wretched depravity of nature ? Why otherwise should not men be as wise for
themselves in spiritual and eternal things, as in temporal ? All Christians will
confess that man's faculty of reason was given him chiefly to enable him to un-
derstand the former, wherein his main interest, and true happiness consists. This
faculty would therefore undoubtedly be every way as fit for the understanding
of them, as the latter, if not depraved. The reason why these are understood,
and not the other, is not that such things as have been mentioned, belonging to
men's spiritual, eternal interest, are more obscure and abstruse in their own
nature. For instance, the difference between long and short, the need of provi-
ding for futurity, the importance of improving proper opportunities, and of hav-
ing good security, and a sure foundation, in affairs wherein our interest is great-
ly concerned, &c, these things are as plain in themselves in religious matters,
as in other matters. And we have far greater means to' assist us to be wise for
ourselves in eternal, than in temporal things. We have the abundant instruc-
tion of perfect and infinite wisdom itself, to lead and conduct us in the paths of
righteousness, so that we may not err. And the reasons of things are most
clearly, variously, and abundantly set before us in the word of God ; which is
adapted to the faculties of mankind, tending greatly to enlighten and convince
the mind : whereas we have no such excellent and perfect rules to instruct and
direct us in things pertaining to our temporal interest, nor any thing to be com-
pared to it.
H any should say, it is true, if men gave full credit to what they are told
concerning eternal things, and these appeared to them as real and certain things,
it would be an evidence of a sort of madness in them, that they show no greater
regard to them in practice ; but there is reason to think this is not the case ; the
things of another world being unseen things, appear to men as things of a very
doubtful nature, and attended with great uncertainty. In answer, I would
observe, agreeably to what has been cited from Mr. Locke, though eternal
things were considered in their bare possibility, if men acted rationally, they
would infinitely outweigh all temporal things in their influence on their hearts.
And I would also observe, that the supposing eternal things not to be fully be-
lieved, at least by them who enjoy the light of the gospel, does not weaken, but
rather strengthen the argument for the depravity of nature. For the eternal
world being what God had chiefly in view in the creation of men, and the
things of this world being made to be wholly subordinate to the other, man's
state here being only a state of probation, preparation, and progression, with
respect to the future state, and so eternal things being in effect men's all, their
whole concern ; to understand and know which, it chiefly wTas, that they had
understanding given them ; and it concerning them infinitely more to know the
truth of eternal things than any other, as all that are not infidels will own ;
ORIGINAL SIN. 341
therefore we may undoubtedly conclude, that if men have not respect to them
as real and certain things, it cannot be for want of sufficient evidence of their
truth, to induce them so to regard them ; especially as to them that live under
that light, which God has appointed as the most proper exhibition of the nature
and evidence of these things ; but it must be from a dreadful stupidity of mind,
occasioning a sottish insensibility of their truth and importance, when manifested
by the clearest evidence.
SECTION VII.
That man's nature is corrupt, appears in that vastly the greater part of mankind, in
all ages, have been wicked Men.
The depravity of man's nature appears, not only in its propensity to sin in
some degree, which renders a man an evil or wicked man in the eye of the law,
and strict justice, as was before shown ; but it is so corrupt, that its depravity
either shows that men are, or tends to make them to be, of such an evil charac-
ter, as shall denominate them wicked men, according to the tenor of the cove-
nant of grace.
This may be argued from several things which have been already observed ;
as from a tendency to continual sin, a tendency to much greater degrees of sin
than righteousness, and from the general extreme stupidity of mankind. But
yet the present state of man's nature, as implying or tending to a wicked char-
acter, may be worthy to be more particularly considered, and directly proved.
And in general, this appears in that there have been so very few in the world,
from age to age, ever since the world has stood, that have been of any other
character.
It is abundantly evident in Scripture, and is what I suppose none that call
themselves Christians will deny, that the whole world is divided into good and
bad, and that all mankind at the day of judgment will either be approved as
righteous, or condemned as wicked ; eittier glorified as children of the kingdom,
or cast into a furnace of fire, as children of the wicked one.
I need not stand to show what things belong to the character of such as
shall hereafter be accepted as righteous, according to the word of God. It may
be sufficient for my present purpose, to observe what Dr. Taylor himself speaks
of, as belonging essentially to the character of such. In p. 203, he says, " This
is infallibly the character of true Christians, and what is essential to such, that
they have really mortified the flesh with its lusts ; they are dead to sin, and live
no longer therein ; the old man is crucified, and the body of sin destroyed ; they
yield themselves to God, as those that are alive from the dead, and their mem-
bers as instruments of righteousness to God, and as servants of righteousness to
holiness." There is more to the like purpose in the two next pages. In p. 228, he
says, " Whatsoever is evil and corrupt in us, we ought to condemn ; not so, as it
shall still remain in us, that we may always be condemning it, but that we
may speedily reform, and be effectually delivered from it ; otherwise certainly
we do not come up to the character of the true disciples of Christ."
In page 248, he says, " Unless God's favor be preferred before all other
enjoyments whatsoever, unless there be a delight in the worship of God, and in
converse with him, unless every appetite be brought into subjection to reason
and truth, and unless there be a kind and benevolent disposition towards our
342 ORIGINAL SIN.
fellow creatures, how can the mind be fit to dwell with God, in his house and
family, to do him service in his kingdom, and to promote the happiness of any
part of his creation Vs And in his Key, § 286, pages 101, 102, &c., showing
there, what it is to be a true Christian, he says among other things, " That he is
one who has such a sense and persuasion of the love of God in Christ, that he
devotes his life to the honor and service of God, in hope of eternal glory And
that to the character of a true Christian, it is absolutely necessary that he diligently
study the things that are freely given him of God, viz., his election, regeneration,
&c, that he may gain a just knowledge of those inestimable privileges, may
taste that the Lord is gracious, and rejoice in the gospel salvation, as his great-
est happiness and joy. It is necessary that he work these blessings on his heart,
till they become a vital principle, producing in him the love of God, engaging
him to all cheerful obedience to his will, giving him a proper dignity and eleva-
tion of soul, raising him above the best and worst of this world, carrying his
heart into heaven, and fixing his affections and regards upon his everlasting
inheritance, and the crown of glory laid up for him there. Thus he is armed
against all the temptations and trials resulting from any pleasure or pain, hopes
or fears, gain or loss, in the present world. None of these things move him
from a faithful discharge of any part of his duty, or from a firm attachment to
truth and righteousness ; neither counts he his very life dear to him, that he may
do the will of God, and finish his course with joy. In a sense of the love of
God in Christ, he maintains daily communion with God, by reading and medi-
tating on his word. In a sense of his own infirmity, and the readiness of the
divine favor to succor him, he daily addresses the throne of grace, for the re-
newal of spiritual strength, in assurance of obtaining it, through the one Media-
tor Christ Jesus. Enlightened and directed by the heavenly doctrine of the
gospel," &c.#
Now I leave it to be judged by every one that has any degree of impartiality,
whether there be not sufficient grounds to think, from what appears everywhere,
that it is but a very small part indeed, of the many myriads and millions which
overspread this globe, who are of a character that in any wise answers these
descriptions. However, Dr. Taylor insists that all nations, and every man on
the face of the earth, have light and means sufficient to do the whole will of
God, even they that live in the grossest darkness of paganism.
Dr. Taylor in answer to arguments of this kind, very impertinently from time
to time objects, that we are no judges of the viciousness of men's characters,
nor are able to decide in what degree they are virtuous or vicious. As though
we could have no- good grounds to judge, that any thing appertaining to the
qualities or properties of the mind, which is invisible, is general or prevailing
among a multitude or collective body, unless we can determine how it is with
each individual. I think I have sufficient reason, from what I know and have
heard of the American Indians, to judge, that there are not many good philoso-
phers among them; though the thoughts of their hearts, and the ideas and
knowledge they have in their minds, are things invisible ; and though I have
never seen so much as a thousandth part of the Indians ; and with respect to
most of them, should not be able to pronounce peremptorily concerning any one,
that he was not very knowing in the nature of things, if all should singly pass
before me. And Dr. Taylor himself seems to be sensible of the falseness of his
own conclusions, that he so often urges against others ; if we may judge by his
practice, and the liberties he takes, in judging of a multitude himself. He, it
* What Dr. Tumbull says of the character of a good man, is also worthy to be observed, Christian
Philosophy, p. 86, 258, 259, 288, 375, 376, 409, 410.
ORIGINAL SIN. 343
seems, is sensible that i man may have good grounds to judge, that wickedness
of character is general in a collective body ; because he openly does it himself.
(Key, p. 102.) After declaring the things which belong to the character of a
true Christian, he judges of the generality of Christians, that they have cast off
these things, that they are a people that do err in their hearts, and have not known
God's ways. P. 259, he judges that the generality of Christians are the most
wicked of all mankind; when he thinks it will throw some disgrace on the
opinion of such as he opposes. The like we have from time to time in other
places, as in p. 168, p. 258. Key, p. 127, 128.
But if men are not sufficient judges, whether there are few of the world of
mankind but what are wicked, yet doubtless God is sufficient, and his judgment,
often declared in his word, determines the matter. Matth. vii. 13, 14, "Enter ye
in at the strait gate ; for wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leadeth to
destruction, and many there be that go in thereat : because strait is the gate, and
narrow is the way that leadeth to life, and few there be that find it." It is mani-
fest, that here Christ is not only describing the state of things, as it was
at that day, and does not mention the comparative smallness of the number
of them that are saved, as a consequence of the peculiar perverseness of
that people, and of that generation ; but as a consequence of the general cir-
cumstances of the way to life, and the way to destruction, the broadness
of the one, and the narrowness of the other. In the straitness of the gate,
&c, 1 suppose none will deny, that Christ has respect to the strictness of those
rules, which he had insisted on in the preceding sermon, and. which render
the way to life very difficult to mankind. But certainly these amiable rules
would not be difficult, were they not contrary to the natural inclinations of
men's hearts ; and they would not be contrary to those inclinations, were these
not depraved. Consequently the wideness of the gate, and broadness of the way,
that leads to destruction, in consequence of which many go in thereat, must imply
the agreeableness of this way to men's natural inclinations. The like reason is
given by Christ, why few are saved. Luke xiii. 23, 24, " Then said one unto
him, Lord, are there few saved 1 And he said unto them, Strive to enter in at
the strait gate : for many, I say unto you, shall seek to enter in, and shall not
be able." That there are generally but few good men in the world, even among
them that have those most distinguishing and glorious advantages for it, which
they are favored with, that live under the gospel, is evident by that saying of our
Lord, from time to time in his mouth, many are called, but few are chosen. And
if there are but few among these, how few, how very few indeed, must persons
of this character be, compared with the whole world of mankind 1 The exceed-
ing smallness of the number of true saints, compared with the whole wrorld,
appears by the representations often made of them as distinguished from the
world ; in which they are spoken of as called and chosen out of the world, re-
deemed from the earth, redeemed from among men ; as being those that are of
God, while the whole world lieth in wickedness, and the like. And if we look
into the Old Testament, we shall find the same testimony given. Prov. xx. 6,
" Most men will proclaim every one his own goodness : but a faithful man who
can find V By a faithful man, as the phrase is used in Scripture, is intended
much the same as a sincere, upright, or truly good man ; as in Psal. xii. 1, and
xxxi. 23, and ci. 6, and other places. Again, Eccl. vii. 25 — 29, " I applied
mine heart to know, and to search, and to find out wisdom, and the reason of
things, and to know the wickedness of folly, even of foolishness and madness :
and I find more bitter than death, the woman whose heart is snares, &c. — Be-
hold, this have I found, saith the preacher, counting one by one, to find out the
344 ORIGINAL SIN.
accoant, which yet my soul seeketh, but I find not : one man among a thousand
have I found ; but a woman among all these have I not found. Lo, this only
have 1 found, that God made man upright ; but they have sought out many in-
ventions." Solomon here signifies, that when he set himself diligently to find
out the account or proportion of true wisdom, or thorough uprightness among
men, the result was, that he found it to be but as one to a thousand, &c. Dr.
Taylor on this place, p. 184, says, " The wise man in the context, is inquiring
into the corruption and depravity of mankind, of the men and women, that lived
in his time." As though what he said represented nothing of the state of things
in the world in general, but only in his time. But does Dr. Taylor or any body
else, suppose this only to be the design of that book, to represent the vanity and
evil of the world in that time, and to show that all was vanity and vexation of
spirit in Solomon's day 3 ( Which day truly we have reason to think, was a
day of the greatest smiles of heaven on that nation, that ever had been on any
nation from the foundation of the world.) Not only does the subject and argu-
ment of the whole book show it to be otherwise ; but also the declared design
of the book in the first chapter ; where the world is represented as very much
the same, as to the vanity and evil it is full of, from age to age, making little
or no progress, after all its revolutions and restless motions, labors and pursuits,
like the sea, that has all the rivers constantly emptying themselves into it, from
age to age, and yet is never the fuller. As to that place, Prov. xx. 6, " A faith-
ful man, who can find V There is no more reason to suppose that the wise
man has respect only to his time, in these words, than in those immediately pre-
ceding, Counsel in the heart of a man is like deep waters ; but a man of under-
standing will draw it out. Or in the words next following, The just man walketh
in his integrity : his children are blessed after him. Or in any other Proverb
in the whole book. And if it were so, that Solomon in these things meant only to
describe his own times, it would not at all weaken the argument. For, if we ob-
serve the history of the Old Testament, there is reason to think there never was any
time from Joshua to the captivity, wherein wickedness was more restrained, and
virtue and religion more encouraged and promoted, than in David's and Solo-
mon's times. And if there was so little true piety in that nation that was the
only people of God under heaven, even in their very best times, what may we
suppose concerning the world in general, take one time with another 1
Notwithstanding what some authors advance concerning the prevalence of
virtue, honesty, good neighborhood, cheerfulness, &c, in the world ; Solomon,
whom we may justly esteem as wise and just an observer of human nature, and
the state of the world of mankind, as most in these days (besides, Christians
ought to remember, that he wrote by divine inspiration), judged the world to be
so full of wickedness, that it was better never to be born, than to be born to live
only in such a world. Eccles. iv. at the beginning : " So I returned and con-
sidered all the oppressions that are done under the sun ; and behold, the tears of
such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter : and on the side of their
oppressors there was power ; but they had no comforter. Wherefore, I praised
the dead, which are already dead, more than the living, which are yet alive.
Yea, better is he than both they, which hath not yet been ; who hath not seen
the evil work that is done under the sun." Surely it will not be said that Solo-
mon has only respect to his times here too, when he speaks of the oppressions of
them that were in power ; since he himself, and others appointed by him, and
wholly under his control, were the men that were in power in that land, and in
almost all the neighboring countries.
The same inspired writer says, Eccles. ix. 3, " The heart of the sons of men
ORIGINAL SIN. 345
is full of evil ; and madness is in their heart while they live ; and after that they
go to the dead." If these general expressions are to be understood only of
some, and those the less part, when in general, truth, honesty, good nature,
&c, govern the world, why are such general expressions from time to time used 1
Why does not this wise and noble, and great souled Prince express himself in a
more generous and benevolent strain, as well as more agreeable to truth, and
say, Wisdom is in the hearts of the sons of men while they live, &c. — instead
of leaving in his writings so many sly, ill-natured suggestions, which pour such
contempt on the human nature, and tend so much to excite mutual jealousy and
malevolence, to taint the minds of mankind through all generations after him ?
If we consider the various successive parts and periods of the duration of
the world, it will, if possible, be yet more evident, that vastly the greater part
of mankind have, in all ages, been of a wicked character. The short accounts
we have of Adam and his family are such as lead us to suppose, that far the
greatest part of his posterity in his lifetime, yea, in the former part of his life,
were wicked. It appears, that his eldest son, Cain, was a very wicked man,
who slew his righteous brother Abel. And Adam lived a hundred and thirty
years before Seth wTas born ; and by that time, we may suppose, his posterity
began to be considerably numerous : when he was born, his mother called his name
Seth ; for God, said she, hath appointed me another seed instead of Abel.
Which naturally suggests this to our thoughts ; that of all her seed then existing,
none were of any such note for religion and virtue, as that their parents could
have any great comfort in them, or expectation from them on that account.
And by the brief history we have, it looks as if (however there might be some
intervals of a revival of religion, yet), in the general, mankind grew more and
more corrupt till the flood. It is signified, that when men began to multiply on
the face of the ear//i,wickedness prevailed exceedingly, Gen. vi. at the beginning.
And that before God appeared to Noah, to command him to build the Ark, one
hundred and twenty years before the flood, the world had long continued obsti-
nate in great and general wickedness, and the disease was become inveterate.
The expressions we have in the 3d, 5th, and 6th verses of that chapter suggests as
much : " And the Lord said, My Spirit shall not always strive with man ; and
God saw, that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that every
imagination of the thought of his heart was evil, only evil continually ; and it
repented the Lord, that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his
heart." And by that time, all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth, v.
12. And as Dr. Taylor himself observes, p. 122, " Mankind were universally
debauched into lust, sensuality, rapine, and injustice."
And with respect to the period after the flood, to the calling of Abraham ;
Dr. Taylor says, as has been already observed, that in about four hundred years
after the flood, the generality of mankind were fallen into idolatry ; which was
before the passing away of one generation ; or before all they were dead, that
came out of the Ark. And it cannot be thought, the world sunk into that so
general and extreme degree of corruption, all at once ; but that they had been
gradually growing more and more corrupt ; though it is true, it must be by very
swift degrees (however soon we may suppose they began), to get to that pass
in one age.
And as to the period from the calling of Abraham to the coming of Christ,
Dr. Taylor justly observes as follows (Key, p. 133) : " If we reckon from the
call of Abraham to the coming of Christ, the Jewish dispensation continued
one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one years ; during which period, the
other families and nations of the earth, not only lay out of God's peculiar kins:-
Vol. II. 44
346 ORIGINAL SIN.
dom, but also lived in idolatry, great ignorance, and wickedness." And with
regard to that one only exempt family or nation of the Israelites, it is evident
that wickedness was the generally prevailing character among them, from age
to age. If we consider how it was with Jacob's family, the behavior of Reu-
ben with his father's concubine, the behavior of Judah with Tamar, the conduct
of Jacob's sons in general (though Simeon and Levi were#leading) towards the
Shechemites, the behavior of Joseph's ten brethren in their cruel treatment of
him ; we cannot think, that the character of true piety belonged to many of
them, according to Dr. Taylor's own notion of such a character ; though it be
true, they might afterwards repent. And with respect to the time the children
of Israel were in Egypt ; the Scripture, speaking of them in general, or as a
collective body, often represents them as complying with the abominable idola-
tries of the country.* And as to that generation which went out of Egypt, and
wandered in the wilderness, they are abundantly represented as extremely and
almost universally wicked, perverse, and children of divine wrath. And after
Joshua's death, the Scripture is very express, that wickedness was the prevail-
ing character in the nation, from age to age. So it was till Samuel's time.
1 Sam. viii. 7, 8, " They have rejected me, that I should not reign over them ;
according to all their works which they have done, since the day that I brought
them out of Egypt, unto this day." Yea, so it was till Jeremiah and Ezekiel's
time. Jer. xxxii. 30, 31, " For the children of Israel, and the children of Judah,
have only done evil before me from their youth ; for the children of Israel have
only provoked me to anger with the work of their hands, saith the Lord : for
this city hath been to me a provocation of mine anger, and of my fury, from the
day they built it, even unto this day." (Compare chap. v. 21, 23, and chap,
vii. 25 — 27.) So Ezek. ii. 3, 4, " I send thee to the children of Israel, to a re-
bellious nation, that hath rebelled against me, they and their fathers have
transgressed against me, even unto this very day : for they are impudent children,
and stiff-hearted." And it appears by the discourse of Stephen (Acts vii.) that this
was generally the case with that nation, from their first rise, even to the days
of the apostles. After his summary rehearsal of the instances of their perverse-
ness from the very time of their selling Joseph into Egypt, he concludes (verses
51 — 53), " Ye stiff-necked, and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always
' resist the Holy Ghost. As your fathers did, so do ye. Which of the prophets
have not your fathers persecuted 1 And they have slain them which showed
before of the coming of that just one, of whom ye have been now the betrayers
and murderers : who have received the law by the disposition of angels, and have
not kept it."
Thus it appears, that wickedness was the generally prevailing character in
all the nations of mankind, till Christ came. And so also it appears to have been
since his coming to this day. So in the age of the apostles ; though then,
among those that were converted to Christianity, were great numbers of persons
eminent for piety ; yet this was not the case with the greater part of the world,
or the greater part of any one nation in it. There was a great number of persons
of a truly pious character in the latter part of the apostolic age, when multi-
tudes of converts had been made, and Christianity was as yet in its primitive
purity. But what says the Apostle John of the church of God at that time, as
compared with the rest of the world? 1 John v. 19, " We know that we are
of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness." And after Christianity
came to prevail, to that degree, that Christians had the upper hand in nations
* Levit. xvii. 7. Josh. v. 9, and xxiv. 14. Ezek. xx. 7, 8, and xxiii. 8.
ORIGINAL SIN. 347
and civil communities, still the greater part of mankind remained in their old
heathen state ; which Dr. Taylor speaks of as a state of great ignorance and
wickedness. And besides, this is noted in all ecclesiastical history, that as the
Christians gained in power and secular advantages, true piety declined, and cor-
ruption and wickedness prevailed among them. And as to the state of the
Christian world, since Christianity began to be established by human laws, wick-
edness for the most part has greatly prevailed ; as is very notorious, and is im-
plied in what Dr. Taylor himself says. He, in giving an account how the
doctrine of Original Sin came to prevail among Christians, says, p. 167, S.,
" That the Christian religion was very early and grievously corrupted, by dream-
ing, ignorant, superstitious monks." In p. 259, he says, " The generality of
Christians have embraced this persuasion concerning Original Sin; and the
consequence has been, that the generality of Christians have been the most
wicked, lewd, bloody, and treacherous of all mankind."
Thus, a view of the several successive periods of the past duration of the world,
from the beginning to this day, shows, that wickedness has ever been exceed-
ing prevalent, and has had vastly the superiority in the world. And Dr. Tay-
lor himself in effect owns that it has been so ever since Adam first turned into
the way of transgression, p. 168. " It is certain (says he) the moral circum-
stances of mankind, since the time Adam first turned into the way of transgres-
sion, have been very different from a state of innocence. So far as we can
judge from history, or what we know at present, the greatest part of mankind
have been, and still are very corrupt, though not equally so in every age and
place." And lower in the same page, he speaks of Adam's 'posterity, as hav-
ing sunk themselves into the most lamentable degrees of ignorance, superstition,
idolatry, injustice, debauchery, &c.
These things clearly determine the point, concerning the tendency of man's
nature to wickedness, if we may be allowed to proceed according to such rules
and methods of reasoning, as are universally made use of, and never denied, or
doubted to be good and sure, in experimental philosophy ;* or may reason
from experience and facts, in that manner which common sense leads all man-
kind to in other cases. If experience and trial will evince any thing at all
concerning the natural disposition of the hearts of mankind, one would think
the experience of so many ages, as have elapsed since the beginning of the
world, and the trial as it were made by hundreds of different nations together,
for so long a time, should be sufficient to convince all, that wickedness is agree-
able to the nature of mankind in its present state.
Here, to strengthen the argument, if there were any need of it, I might ob-
serve some further evidences than those which have been already mentioned,
not only of the extent and generality of the prevalence of wickedness in the
world, but of the height to which it has risen, and the degree in which it has
reigned. Among innumerable things which show this, I shall now only ob-
serve this, viz., the degree in which mankind have from age to age been hurt-
ful one to another. Many kinds of brute animals are esteemed very noxious
and destructive, many of them very fierce, voracious, and many very poisonous,
and the destroying of them has always been looked upon as a public benefit ;
but have not mankind been a thousand times as hurtful and destructive as any
one of them, yea, as all the noxious beasts, birds, fishes, and reptiles in the
* Dr. Turnbull, though so great an enemy to the doctrine of the Depravity of Nature, yet greatly in-
sists upon it, that the experimental method of reasoning ought to be gone into in moral matters, and
things pertaining to the human nature, and should chiefly be relied upon, in moral, as well ns naturU
ohilosophy. See Introd. to Mor. Phil.
348 ORIGINAL SIN.
earth, air, and water, put together, at least of all kinds of animals that are visi-
ble 1 ' And no creature can be found anywhere so destructive of its own kind
as mankind are. All others for the most part are harmless and peaceable,
with reo-ard to their own species. Where one wolf is destroyed by another
wolf, one viper by another, probably a thousand of mankind are destroyed by
those of their own species. Well, therefore, might our blessed Lord say, when
sending forth his disciples into the world, Matt. x. 16, 17, Behold, I send you
forth as sheep in the midst of wolves ; — but beware of men. As much as to
say, I send you forth as sheep among wolves. But why do I say, wolves 1 I
send you forth into the wide world of men, that are far more hurtful and per-
nicious, and that you had much more need to beware of, than wolves.
1 It would be strange indeed, that this should be the state of the world of
mankind, the chief of the lower creation, distinguished above all by reason, to
that end 'that they might be capable of religion, which summarily consists in
love if men, as they come into the world, are in their nature innocent and
harmless, undepraved, and perfectly free from all evil propensities.
SECTION VIII
The native Depravity of Mankind appears, in that there has been so little good effect
of so manifold and great means used to promote Virtue in the World.
The evidence of the native corruption of mankind, appears much more
glaring, when it is considered that the world has been so generally, so con-
stantly, and so exceedingly corrupt, notwithstanding the various, great and con-
tinual means, that have been used to restrain men from sin, and promote virtue
and true religion among them. '
Dr. Taylor supposes all that sorrow and death, which came on mankind, in
consequence of Adam's sin, was brought on them by God, in great favor to
them ; as a benevolent Father, exercising a wholesome discipline towards his
children, to restrain them from sin, by increasing the vanity of all earthly things,
to abate their force to tempt and delude ; to induce them to be moderate in gra-
tifying the appetite^ of the body ; to mortify pride and ambition ; and that men
rm>ht always have before their eyes a striking demonstration, that sin is infin-
itely hateful to God, by a sight of that, than which nothing is more proper to
give them the utmost abhorrence of iniquity, and to fix in their minds a sense of
the dreadful consequences of sin, &c. &c. And in general, that they do not
come as punishments, but purely as means to keep men from vice, and to make
them better. If it be so, surely they are great means indeed. Here is a mighty
alteration : mankind, once so easy and happy, healthful, vigorous and beautiful,
rich in all the pleasant and abundant blessings of Paradise, now turned out,
destitute, weak, and decaying, into a wide, barren world, yielding briers and
thorns, instead of the delightful growth and sweet fruit of the garden of Eden,
to wear out life in sorrow and toil, on the ground cursed for his sake ; and at
last, either through long languishment and lingering decay, or severe pain and
acute disease, to expire and turn to putrefaction and dust. If these are only
used as medicines, to prevent and to cure the diseases of the mind, they are
sharp medicines indeed, especially death j which, to use Hezekiah's represen-
tation, is, as it were, breaking all his bones: and one would think, should be
very effectual, if the subject had no depravity, no evil and contrary bias, to
ORIGINAL SIN. 349
resist and hinder a proper effect ; especially in the old world, when the thing
which was the first occasion of this terrible alteration, this severity of means,
was fresh in memory, Adam continuing alive near two thirds of the time that
passed before the flood ; so that a very great part of those that were alive till
the flood, might have opportunity of seeing and conversing with him, and hear-
ing from his mouth, not only an account of his fall, and the introduction of the
awful consequences of it, but also of his first finding himself in existence in the
new created world, and of the creation of Eve, and the things which passed be-
tween him and his Creator in Paradise.
But what was the success of these great means, to restrain men from sin,
and induce them to virtue 1 Did they prove sufficient ? Instead of this, the
world soon grew exceeding corrupt, till it came to that, to use our author's own
words, that mankind were universally debauched into lust, sensuality, rapine, and
injustice.
Then God used further means : he sent Noah, a preacher of righteousness,
to warn the world of the universal destruction which would come upon them by
a flood of waters, if they went on in sin. Which warning he delivered with
these circumstances, tending to strike their minds, and command their attention;
that he immediately went about building that vast structure of the ark, in which
he must employ a great number of hands, and probably spend all he had in the
world, to save himself and his family. And under these uncommon means God
waited upon them one hundred and twenty years ; but all to no effect. The
whole world, for aught appears, continued obstinate, and absolutely incorrigible ;
so that nothing remained to be done with them, but utterly to destroy the inha-
bitants of the earth, and to begin a new world from that single family who had
distinguished themselves by their virtue, that from them might be propagated a
new and purer race. Accordingly this was done ; and the inhabitants of this
new world, of Noah's posterity, had these new and extraordinary means to
restrain sin, and to excite to virtue, in addition to the toil, sorrow, and common
mortality, which the world had been subjected to before, in consequence of
Adam's sin, viz., that God had newly testified his dreadful displeasure for sin,
in destroying the many millions of mankind, all at one blow, old and young,
men, women and children, without pity on any for all the dismal shrieks and
cries which the world was filled with ; when they themselves, the remaining
family, were so wonderfully distinguished by God's preserving goodness, that
they might be a holy seed, being delivered from the corrupting examples of the
old world, and being all the offspring of a living parent, whose pious instructions
and counsels they had, to enforce these things upon them, to prevent sin, and
engage them to their duty. And these inhabitants of the new earth, must for a
long time, have before their eyes many evident, and as it were, fresh and strik-
ing effects and signs of that universal destruction, to be a continual, affecting
admonition to them. And besides all this, God now shortened the life of man,
to about one half of what it used to be. The shortening man's life, Dr. Tay-
lor says, page 68, " was, that the wild range of ambition and lust might be
brought into narrow bounds, and have less opportunity of doing mischief ; and
that death, being still nearer to our view, might be a more powerful motive to
regard less the things of a transitory world, and to attend more to the rules of
truth and wisdom."
And now let us observe the consequence. These new and extraordinary
means in addition to the former, were so far from proving sufficient, that the
new world degenerated, and became corrupt by such swift degrees, that, as Dr.
Taylor observes, mankind in general were sunk into idolatry in about four hun-
350 ORIGINAL SIN
dred years after the flood, and so in about fifty years after Noah's death. They
became so wicked and brutish, as to forsake the true God, and turn to the wor-
ship of inanimate creatures.
When things were come to this dreadful pass, God was pleased, for a remedy,
to introduce a new and wonderful dispensation ; separating a particular family
and people from all the rest of the world, by a series of most astcnishing mira-
cles, done in the open view of the world, and fixing their dwelling, as it were
in the midst of the earth, between Asia, Europe and Africa, and in the midst of
those nations which were most considerable and famous for power, knowledge,
and arts, that God might, in an extraordinary manner, dwell among that people,
in visible tokens of his presence, manifesting himself there, and from thence to
the world, by a course cf great and miraculous operations and effects for many
ages ; that that people might be holy to God, and as a kingdom of priests, and
might stand as a city on a hill, to be a light to the world ; withal, gradually
shortening man's life, till it was brought to be but about one twelfth part of
what it used to be before the flood ; and so, according to Dr. Taylor, vastly
cutting off and diminishing his temptations to sin, and increasing his excitements
to holiness. And now let us consider what the success of these means was,
both as to the Gentile world, and the nation of Israel.
Dr. Taylor justly observes {Key, p. 24, § 75), " The Jewish dispensation
had respect to the nations of the world, to spread the knowledge and obedience
of God in the earth ; and was established for the benefit of all mankind." But
how unsuccessful were these means, and all other means used with the heathen
nations, so long as this dispensation lasted ! Abraham was a person noted in
all the principal nations that were then in the world ; as in Egypt, and the
eastern monarchies : God made his name famous, by his wonderful, distinguish-
ing dispensations towards him, particularly by so miraculously subduing before
him and his trained servants, those armies of the four eastern kings. This great
work of the most high God, Possessor of heaven and earth, was greatly taken
notice of by Melchizedeck, and one would think, should have been sufficient to
have awakened the attention and consideration of all the nations in that part of
the world, and to have led them to the knowledge and worship of the only true
God ; especially if considered in conjunction with that miraculous and most
terrible destruction of Sodom, and all the cities of the plain, for their wickedness,
with Lot's miraculous deliverance, which doubtless were facts, that in their day
were much famed abroad in the world. But there is not the least appearance,
in any accounts we have, of any considerable good effect. On the contrary,
those nations which were most in the way of observing and being affected with
these things, even the nations of Canaan, grew worse and worse, till their
iniquity came to the full, in Joshua's time. And the posterity of Lot, that saint
so wonderfully distinguished, soon became some of the most gross idolaters ; as
they appear to have been in Moses' time. See Numb. xxv. Yea, and the far
greater part even of Abraham's posterity, the children of Ishmael, Ziman, Jok-
shan, Medan, Midian, Ishbak and Shuah, and Esau, soon forgot the true God,
and fell off to heathenism.
Great things were done in the sight of the nations of the world, tending to
awaken them, and lead them to the knowledge and obedience of the true God,
in Jacob's and Joseph's time ; in that God did miraculously, by the hand of Jo-
seph, preserve from perishing by famine, as it were the whole world, as appears
by Gen. xli. 56, 57. Agreeably to which, the name that Pharaoh gave to Joseph,
Zaphnatk Paaneah, as is said, in the Egyptian language signifies Saviour of the
World But there does not appear to have been any good abiding effect of this \
ORIGINAL SIN. 351
no, not so much as in the nation of the Egyptians (which seems to have been the
chief of all the heathen nations at that day), who had these great works of Jeho-
vah in their most immediate view ; on the contrary, they grew worse and worse,
and seem to be far more gross in their idolatries and ignorance of the true God,
and every way more wicked, and ripe for ruin, when Moses was sent to Pha-
raoh, than they were in Joseph's time.
After this, in Moses' and Joshua's time, the great God was pleased to man-
ifest himself in a series of the most astonishing miracles, for about fifty years
together, wrought in the most public manner, in Egypt, in the wilderness, and
in Canaan, in the view, as it were, of the whole world ; miracles by which the
»vorld was shaken, the whole frame of the visible creation, earth, seas and rivers,
ilie atmosphere, the clouds, sun, moon and stars were affected ; miracles, greatly
ttnding to convince the nations of the world, of the vanity of their false gods,
shuwing Jehovah to be infinitely above them, in the thing wherein they dealt
mctet proudly, and exhibiting God's awful displeasure at the wickedness of the
Heathen world. And these things are expressly spoken of as one end of these
great miracles, in Exod. ix. 14, Numb. xiv. 21, Josh. iv. 23, 24, and other pla-
ces. However, no reformation followed these things ; but, by the Scripture
account, the nations which had them most in view, were dreadfully hardened,
stupidly itfjusing all conviction and reformation, and obstinately went on in an
opposition to the living God, to their own destruction.
After this, God did from time to time very publicly manifest himself to the
nations of the world, by wonderful works, wrought in the time of the Judges,
of a like tendtncy with those already mentioned. Particularly in so miracu-
lously destroying, by the hand of Gideon, almost the whole of that vast army of
the Midianites, Amalekites, and all the Children of the East, consisting of about
135,000 men, Judges vii. 12, and viii. 10. But no reformation followed this,
or the other great works of God, wrought in the times of Deborah and Barak,
Jephtha and Sampson.
After these things, God used new, and in some respects much greater means
with the heathen world, to bring them to the knowledge and service of the true
God, in the days of David and Solomon. He raised up David, a man after his
own heart, a most fervent worshipper of the true God,, and zealous hater of idols,
and subdued before him almost all the nations between Egypt and Euphrates ;
often miraculously assisting him in his battles with his enemies ; and he con-
firmed Solomon, his son, in the full and quiet possession of that great empire, for
about forty years; and made hun the wisest, richest, most magnificent, and every
way the greatest monarch that ever had been in the world ; and by far the most
famous, and of greatest name among the nations ; especially for his wisdom, and
things concerning the name of his God ; particularly the temple he built, which
was exceeding magnificent, that it might be of fame and glory throughout all
lands ; 1 Chron. xxii. 5. And we are told, that there came of all people to
hear the wisdom of Solomon, from all the kings of the earth ; 1 Kings iv. 34,
and x. 24. And the Scripture informs us, that these great things were done,
that the " nations in far countries might hear of God's great name, and of his
outstretched arm ; that all the people of the earth might fear him, as well as
his people Israel : and that all the people of the earth might know, that the
Lord was God, and that there was none else." 1 Kings viii. 41 — 43, 60.
But still there is no appearance of any considerable abiding effect, with regard
to any one heathen nation.
After this, before the captivity in Babylon, many great things were done in
the sight of the Gentile nations, very much tending to enlighten, affect, and
352 ORIGINAL SIN.
persuade them : as, God's destroying the army of the Ethiopians of a thousand
thousand, before Asa ; Elijah's and Elisha's miracles ; especially Elijah's mi-
raculously confounding Baal's prophets and worshippers ; Elisha's healing Naa-
man, the king of Syria's prime minister, and the miraculous victories obtained
through Elisha's prayers, over the Syrians, Moabites and Edomites ; the mira-
culous destruction of the vast united army of the children of Moab, Ammon and
Edom, at Jehoshaphat's prayer (2 Chron. xx.) j Jonah's preaching at Nine-
veh, together with the miracle of his deliverance from the whale's belly ; which
was published and well attested, as a sign to confirm his preaching ; but more
especially that great work of God in destroying Sennacherib's army by an angel,
for his contempt of the God of Israel, as if he had been no more than the gods
of the heathen.
When all these things proved ineffectual, God took a new method with the
heathen world, and used, in some respects, much greater means to convince and
reclaim them, than ever before. In the first place, his people the Jews were
removed to Babylon, the head and heart of the heathen world (Chaldea having
been very much the fountain of idolatry), to carry thither the revelations which
God had made of himself, contained in the sacred writings ; and there to bear
their testimony against idolatry ; as some of them, particularly Daniel, Shad-
rach, Meshach and Abednego, did, in a very open manner before the king and
the greatest men of the empire, with such circumstances as made their testimo-
ny very famous in the world ; God confirming it with great miracles, which
were published through the empire, by order of its monarch, as the mighty
works of the God of Israel, showing him to be above all gods : Daniel, that
great prophet, at the same time being exalted to be governor of all the wise
men of Babylon, and one of the chief officers of Nebuchadnezzar's court.
After this, God raised up Cyrus to destroy Babylon, for its obstinate con-
tempt of the true God, and injuriousness towards his people ; according to the
prophecies of Isaiah, speaking of him by name, instructing him concerning the
nature and dominion of the true God (Isa. xlv.); which prophecies were pro-
bably shown to him, whereby he was induced to publish his testimony concern-
ing the God of Israel, as the God. (Ezra i. 2, 3.) Daniel, about the same time,
being advanced to be prime minister of state in the new empire, erected under
Darius, did in that place appear openly as a worshipper of the God of Israel,
and him alone ; God confirming his testimony for him, before the king and all
the grandees of his kingdom, by preserving him in the den of lions ; whereby
Darius was induced to publish to all people, nations and languages, that dwelt
in all the earth, his testimony, that the God of Israel was the living God, and
steadfast forever, &c.
When, after the destruction of Babylon, some of the Jews returned to their
own land, multitudes never returned, but were dispersed abroad through many
parts of the vast Persian empire ; as appears by the book of Esther. And many
of them afterwards, as good histories inform, were removed into the more west-
ern parts of the world ; and so were dispersed as it were all over the heathen
world, having the Holy Scriptures with them, and Synagogues everywhere, for
the worship of the true God. And so it continued to be, to the days of Christ
and his apostles ; as appears by the Acts of the Apostles. Thus that light, which
God had given them, was in the providence of God carried abroad into all parts
of the world : so that now they had far greater advantages, to come to the
knowledge of the truth, in matters of religion, if they had been disposed to
improve their advantages.
And besides all these things, from about Cyrus's time, learning and philoso*
ORIGINAL SIN. 353
phy increased, ai;d was carried to a great height. God raised up a number of
men of prodigious genius, to instruct others, and improve their reason and under-
standing in the nature of things ; and philosophic knowledge, having gone on
to increase for several ages, seemed to be got to its height before Christ came,
or about that time.
And now let it be considered what was the effect of all these things ; instead
of a reformation, or any appearance or prospect of it, the heathen world in gen-
eral rather grew worse. As Dr. Winder observes, " The inveterate absurdities
of Pagan idolatry continued without remedy, and increased, as arts and learning
increased ; and paganism prevailed in all its height of absurdity, when Pagan
nations were polished to the height, and in the most polite cities and countries ;
and thus continued to the last breath of Pagan power." And so it was with
respect to wickedness in general, as well as idolatry ; as appears by what the
Apostle Paul observes in Rom. i. Dr. Taylor, speaking of the time when the
gospel scheme was introduced (Key, § 289), says, " The moral and religious
state of the heathen was very deplorable, being generally sunk into great igno-
rance, gross idolatry, and abominable vice." Abominable vices prevailed, not
only among the common people, but even among their philosophers themselves,
yea, some of the chief of them, and of greatest genius ; so Dr. Taylor himself
observes, as to that detestable vice of Sodomy, which they commonly and openly
allowed and practised without shame. See Dr. Taylor's note on Rom. i. 27.
Having thus considered the state of the heathen world, with regard to the
effect of means used for its reformation, during the Jewish dispensation, from the
first foundation of it in Abraham's time ; let us now consider how it was with
that people themselves, that were distinguished with the peculiar privileges of
that dispensation. The means used with the heathen nations were great ; but
they were small, if compared with those used with the Israelites. The advan-
tages by which that people were distinguished, are represented in Scripture as
vastly above all parallel, in passages which Dr. Taylor takes notice of. (Key,
§ 54.) And he reckons these privileges among those which he calls antecedent
blessings, consisting in motives to virtue and obedience ; and says (Key, § 66),
" That this was the very end and design of the dispensation of God's extraordi-
nary favors to the Jews, viz., to engage them to-duty and obedience, or that it
was a scheme for promoting virtue, is clear beyond dispute, from every part
of the Old Testament." Nevertheless, as has been already shown, the generality
of that people, through all the successive periods of that dispensation, were men
of a wicked character. But it will be more abundantly manifest, how strong
the natural bias to iniquity appeared to be among that people, by considering
more particularly how things were with them from time to time.
Notwithstanding the great things God had done in the times of Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob, to separate them and their posterity from the idolatrous world,
that they might be a holy people to himself ; yet in about two hundred years
after Jacob's death, and in less than one hundred and fifty years after the death
of Joseph, and while some were alive that had seen Joseph, the people had in
a great measure lost the true religion, and were apace conforming to the heathen
world : when, for a remedy, and the more effectually to alienate them from
idols, and engage them to the God of their fathers, God appeared to bring them
out from among the Egyptians, and separate them from the heathen world, and
to reveal himself in his glory and majesty, in so affecting and astonishing a man-
ner, as tended most deeply and durably to impress their minds ; that they might
never forsake him more. But so perverse were they, that they murmured even
in the midst of the miracles that God wrought for them in Egypt, and murmured
Vol. II. 45
354 ORIGINAL SIN.
at the Red Sea, in a few days after God had brought them out with such a mighty
hand. When he had led them through the sea, they sang his praise, but soon
forgot his works. Before they got to Mount Sinai, they openly manifested their
fjerverseness from time to time j so that God says of them, Exod. xvi. 28, " How
ono- refuse ye to keep my commandments, and my laws V Afterwards they
murmured again at Rephidim.
In about two months after they came out of Egypt, they came to Mount
Sinai, where God entered into a most solemn covenant with the people, that
they should be a holy people unto him, with such astonishing manifestations of
his power, majesty and holiness, as were altogether unparalleled ; as God puts
the people in mind, Deut. iv. 32 — 34 : " For ask now of the days that are past,
which were before thee, since the day that God created man upon the earth ;
and ask from one side of heaven unto the other, whether there has been any such
thing as this great thing is, or hath been heard like it. Did ever people hear
the voice of God, speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard, and
live 1 Or hath God assayed to take him a nation from the midst of another
nation," &c. And these great things were to that end, to impress their minds
with such a conviction and sense of divine truth, and their obligations to their
duty, that they might never forget them ; as God says, Exod. xix. 9, " Lo, I
come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with
thee, and believe thee forever." But what was the effect of all 1 Why, it was
not more than two or three months, before that people, there, under that very
mountain, returned to their old Egyptian idolatry, and were singing and dancing
before a golden calf, which they had set up to worship. And after such awful
manifestations as there were of God's displeasure for that sin, and so much done
to bring them to repentance, and confirm them in obedience, it was but a few
months before they came to that violence of spirit, in open rebellion against God,
that with the utmost vehemence they declared their resolution to follow God no
longer, but to make them a captain to return into Egypt. And thus they went
on in ways of perverse opposition to the Most High, from time to time, repeating
their open acts of rebellion, in the ,midst of continued, astonishing miracles, till
that generation was destroyed. And though the following generation seems to
have been the best that ever was in Israel, yet, notwithstanding their good exam-
ple, and notwithstanding all the wonders of God's power and love to that peo-
ple in Joshua's time, how soon did that people degenerate, and begin to forsake
God, and join with the heathen in their idolatries, till God, by severe means,
and by sending prophets and judges, extraordinarily influenced from above, re-
claimed them ! But when they were brought to some reformation by such
means, they soon fell away again into the practice of idolatry ; and so from time
to time, from one age to another ; and nothing proved effectual for any abiding
reformation.
After things had gone on thus for several hundred years, God used new
methods with his people, in two respects : First, he raised up a great prophet,
under whom a number of young men were trained up in schools, that from among
them there might be a constant succession of great prophets in Israel, of such as
God should choose ; which seems to have been continued for more than five
hundred years. Secondly, God raised up a great king, David, one eminent for
wisdom, piety, and fortitude, to subdue all their heathen neighbors, who used to
be such a snaro to them ; and to confirm, adorn and perfect the institutions of
his public worship ; and by him to make a more full revelation of the great
salvation, and future glorious kingdom of the Messiah. And after him, raised
up his son, Solomon, the wisest and greatest prince that ever was on earth, more
ORIGINAL SIN. 355
fully to settle and establish those things which his father David had begun, con-
cerning the public worship of God in Israel, and to build a glorious temple for
the honor of Jehovah, and the institutions of his worship, and to instruct the
neighbor nations in true wisdom and religion. But as to the success of these
new and extraordinary means ; if we take Dr. Taylor for our expositor of Scrip-
ture, the nation must be extremely corrupt in David's time ; for he supposes, he
has respect to his own times, in those wroids, Psal. xiv. 2, 3, " The Lord looked
down from heaven, to see if there were any that did understand, and seek God ;
they are all gone aside ; they are together become filthy ; there is none that
doeth good ; no, not one."' But whether Dr. Taylor be in the right in this, or
not, yet if we consider what appeared in Israel, in Absalom's and Sheba's re-
bellion, we shall not see cause to think, that the greater part of the nation at
that day were men of true wisdom and piety. As to Solomon's time, Dr. Taylor
supposes, as has been already observed, that Solomon speaks of his owTn times,
when he says, he had found but one in a thousand that was a thoroughly upright
man. However, it appears, that all those great means used to promote and
establish virtue and true religion, in Samuel's, David's and Solomon's times,
were so far from having any general, abiding good effect in Israel, that Solo-
mon himself, with all his wisdom, and notwithstanding the unparalleled favors
of God to him, had his mind corrupted, so as openly to tolerate idolatry in the
land, and greatly to provoke God against him. And as soon as he was dead,
ten tribes of the twelve forsook the true worship of God, and instead of it, open-
ly established the like idolatry, that the people fell into at Mount Sinai, when
they made the golden calf ; and continued finally obstinate in this apostasy,
notwithstanding all means that could be used with them by the prophets, whom
God sent, one after another, to reprove, counsel and warn them, for about two
hundred and fifty years ; especially those two great prophets, Elijah and Elisha.
Of all the kings that reigned over them, there was not so much as one but what
was of a wicked character. And at last it came to that, that their case seemed
utterly desperate ; so that nothing remained to be done with them, but to re-
move them out of God's sight. Thus the Scripture represents the matter,
2 Kings xvii.
And as to the other two tribes ; though their kings were always of the family
of David, and they were favored in many respects far beyond their brethren, yet
they were generally very corrupt ; their kings were most of them wicked men,
and their other magistrates, and priests and people, were generally agreed in
the corruption. Thus the matter is represented in the Scripture history, and
the books of the prophets. And when they had seen how God had cast off the
ten tribes, instead of taking warning, they made themselves vastly more vile
than ever the others had done ; as appears by 2 Kings xvii. 18, 19, Ezek.
xvi. 46, 47, 51. God indeed waited longer upon them, for his servant David's
sake, and for Jerusalem's sake, that he had chosen ; and used more extraordi-
nary means with them ; especially by those great prophets, Isaiah and Jeremiah,
but to no effect : so that at last it came to this, as the prophets represent the
matter, that they were like a body universally and desperately diseased and cor-
rupted, that would admit of no cure, the whole head sick, and the whole heart
faint, &c.
Things being come to that pass, God took this method wTith them : he ut-
terly destroyed their city and land, and the temple which he had among them,
made thorough work in purging the land of them ; as when a man empties a
dish, wipes it, and turns it upside down ; Or when a vessel is cast into ajiercefire,
till itsflthiness is thoroughly burnt out. 2 Kings xxi. 13. Ezek. Chap. xxiv.
356 ORIGINAL SIN
They were carried into captivity, and there left till that wicked generation was
dead, and those old rebels were purged out ; that afterwards the land might be.
resettled with a more pure generation.
After the return from the captivity, and God had built the Jewish church
again in their own land, by a series of wonderful providences ; yet they cor-
rupted themselves again, to so great a degree, that the transgressors were come
tb the full again in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes ; as the matter is represent-
ed in the prophecy of Daniel, Dan. viii. 23. And then God made them the sub-
jects of a dispensation, little, if any thing, less terrible than that which had been
in Nebuchadnezzar's days. And after God had again delivered them, and
restored the state of religion among them, by the instrumentality of the Macca-
bees, they degenerated again ; so that when Christ came, they were arrived to
that extreme degree of corruption, which is represented in the accounts given
by the evangelists.
It may be observed here in general, that the Jews, though so vastly distin-
guished with advantages, means and motives to holiness, yet are represented
as coming, from time to time, to that degree of corruption and guilt, that they
were more wicked in the sight of God, than the very worst of the Heathen.
As, of old, God sware by his life, that the wickedness of Sodom was small, com-
pared with that of the Jews. Ezek. xvi. 47, 48, &c, also chap. v. 5— 10. So
Christ, speaking of the Jews in his time, represents them as having much greater
guilt than the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, or even Sodom and Gomorrah.
But we are now come to the time when the grandest scene was displayed,
that ever was opened on earth. After all other schemes had been so long and
so thoroughly tried, and had so greatly failed of success, both among Jews and
Gentiles ; that wonderful dispensation was at length introduced, which was
the greatest scheme for the suppressing and restraining iniquity among man-
kind, that ever infinite wisdom and mercy contrived, even the glorious gospel
of Jesus Christ. " A new dispensation of grace was erected (to use Dr. Tay-
lor's own wards, p. 239, 240) for the more certain and effectual sanctification
of mankind, into the image of God ; the delivering them from the sin and
wickedness, into which they might fall, or were already fallen ; to redeem them
from all iniquity, and bring them to the knowledge and obedience of God."
In whatever high and exalted terms the Scripture speaks of the means and
motives which the Jews enjoyed of old ; yet their privileges are represented as
having no glory, in comparison of the advantages of the gospel. Dr. Tay-
lor's words in p. 233, are worthy to be here repeated : " Even the Heathen
(says he) knew God, and might have glorified him as God ; but under the
glorious light of the gospel, we have very clear ideas of the divine perfections,
and particularly of the love of God as our Father, and as the God and Father
of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. We see our duty in the utmost extent,
and the most cogent reasons to perform it : we have eternity opened to us, even
an endless state of honor and felicity, the reward of virtuous actions, and the
Spirit of God promised for our direction and assistance. And all this may and
ought to be applied to the purifying our minds, and the perfecting of holiness.
And to those happy advantages we are born, for which we are bound for ever
to praise and magnify the rich grace of God in the Redeemer." And he else-
where says* " The gospel constitution is a scheme the most perfect and effect-
ual for restoring true religion, and promoting virtue and happiness, that evei
fhe world has yet seen." Andf admirably adapted to enlighten our minds,
* Key, § 167. f Note on Rom. i. 18.
ORIGINAL SIN. 357
and sanctify our hearts ; and * never were motives so divine and powerful pro-
posed, to induce us to the practice of all virtue and goodness.
And yet even these means have been ineffectual upon the far greater part of
them with whom they have been used ; of the many that have been called, few
have been chosen.
As to the Jews, God's ancient people, with whom they were used in th*-
first place, and used long by Christ and his apostles, the generality of them
rejected Christ and his gospel, with extreme pertinaciousness of spirit. They
not only went on still in that career of corruption which had been increasing
from the time of the Maccabees ; but Christ's coming, and his doctrine and
miracles, and the preaching of his followers, and the glorious things that attend-
ed the same, were the occasion, through their perverse misimprovement, of an
infinite increase of their wickedness. They crucified the Lord of Glory with
the utmost malice and cruelty, and persecuted his followers ; they pleased not
God, and were contrary to all men ; and went on to grow worse and worse,
till they filled up the measure of their sin, and wrath came upon them to the
uttermost ; and they were destroyed, and cast out of God's sight, with un-
speakably greater tokens of the divine abhorrence and indignation, than in the
days of Nebuchadnezzar. The bigger part of the whole nation were slain, and
the rest were scattered abroad through the earth, in the most abject and forlorn
circumstances. And in the same spirit of unbelief and malice against Christ
and the gospel, and in their miserable, dispersed circumstances, do they remain
to this day.
And as to the Gentile nations, though there was a glorious success of the
gospel amongst them in the apostles' days, yet probably not one in ten of those
that had the gospel preached to them, embraced it. The powers of the world
were set against it, and persecuted it with insatiable malignity. And among the
professors of Christianity, there presently appeared in many a disposition to
corruption, and to abuse the gospel unto the service of pride and licentiousness.
And the apostles, in their days, foretold a grand apostasy of the Christian
world, which should continue many ages, and observed that there appeared a
disposition to such an apostasy, among professing Christians, even in that day.
2 Thess. ii. 7. And the greater part of the ages which have now elapsed, have
been spent in the duration of that grand and general apostasy, under which the
Christian world, as it is called, has been transformed into that which has. been
vastly more deformed, more dishonorable and hateful to God, and repugnant to
true virtue, than the state of the Heathen world before ; which is agreeable to
the prophetical descriptions given of it by the Holy Spirit.
In these latter ages of the Christian church, God has raised up a great num-
ber of great and good men, to bear testimony against the corruptions of the
church of Rome, and by their means introduced that light into the world, by
which, in a short time, at least one third part of Europe was delivered from the
more gross enormities of Antichrist ; which was attended at first with a great
reformation as to vital and practical religion. But how is the gold soon be-
come dim ! To what a pass are things come in Protestant countries at this
day, and in our nation in particular ! To what a prodigious height has a
deluge of infidelity, profaneness, luxury, debauchery and wickedness of every
kind, arisen ! The poor savage Americans are mere babes and fools (if I may
so speak), as to proficiency in wickedness, in comparison of multitudes that the
Christian world throngs with. Dr. Taylor himself, as was before observed,
*Pref. to Par. tm Rom. pages 145, 47.
358 ORIGINAL SIN.
represents that the generality of Christians have been the most wicked, lewd^
bloody, find treacherous of all mankind ; and says {Key, § 388), " The wicked-
ness of the Christian world renders it so much like the Heathen, that the good
effects of our change to Christianity are but little seen."
And with respect to the dreadful corruption of the present day, it is to be
considered, besides the advantages already mentioned, that great advances in
learning and philosophic knowledge have been made in the present and past
century, giving great advantage for a proper and enlarged exercise of our ra-
tional powers, and for our seeing the bright manifestation of God's perfections
in his works. And it is to be observed, that the means and inducements to vir-
tue, which this age enjoys, are in addition to most of those which were men-
tioned before as given of old, and among other things, in addition to the short-
ening of man's life to seventy or eighty years, from near a thousand. And
with regard to this, I would observe, that as the case now is in Christendom,
take one with another of them that ever come to years of discretion, their life
is not more than forty or forty-five years ; which is but about the twentieth
part of what it once was ; and not so much in great cities, places where pro-
faneness, sensuality and debauchery commonly prevail to the greatest degree.
Dr. Taylor {Key, § 1) truly observes, that God has, from the beginning,
exercised wonderful and infinite wisdom, in the methods he has, from age to
age, made use of to oppose vice, cure corruption, and promote virtue in the
world, and introduced several schemes to that end. It is indeed remarkable,
how many schemes and methods were tried of old, both before and after the
flood ; how many were used in the times of the Old Testament, both with Jews
and Heathens, and how ineffectual all these ancient methods proved for four
hundred years together, till God introduced that grand dispensation for the re-
deeming men from all iniquity, and purifying them to himself, a people zealous
of good works, which the Scripture represents as the subject of the admiration
of angels. But even this has now so long proved ineffectual with respect to the
generality, that Dr. Taylor thinks there is need of a new dispensation ; the present
light of the gospel being insufficient for the full reformation of the Christian
world, by reason of its corruptions (Note on Rom. i. 27) ; and yet all these
things, according to him, without any natural bias to the contrary ; no stream
of natural inclination or propensity at all, to oppose inducements to goodness ;
no native opposition of heart, to withstand those gracious means, which God
has ever used with mankind, from the beginning of the world to this day, any
more than there was in the heart of Adam, the moment God created him in
perfect innocence.
Surely Dr. Taylor's scheme is attended with strange paradoxes ! And that
his mysterious tenets may appear in a true light, it must be observed, at the
same time while he supposes these means, even the very greatest and best of
them, to have proved so ineffectual, that help from them, as to any general re-
formation, is to be despaired of ; yet he maintains that all mankind, even the
Heathen in all parts of the world, yea, every single person in it (which mift
include every Indian in America, before the Europeans came hither; and every
inhabitant of the unknown parts of Africa and Terra Australis), has ability,
light and means sufficient to do their whole duty; yea (as many passages in
his writings plainly suppose), to perform perfect obedience to God's law, without
the least degree of vice or iniquity.*
But I must not omit to observe : — Dr. Taylor supposes that the reason why
• Seep. 259,63,64, 72, S.
ORIGINAL SIN 359
the gospel dispensation has been so ineffectual, is, that it has been greatly mis-
understood and perverted. In Key, § 389, he says, " Wrong representations of
the scheme of the gospel have greatly obscured the glory of divine grace, and
contributed much to the corruption of its professors. Such doctrines have been
almost universally taught and received, as quite subvert it. Mistaken notions
about nature, grace, election and reprobation, justification, regeneration, redemp-
tion, calling, adoption, &c, have quite taken away the very ground of the
Christian life."
But how came the gospel to be so universally and exceedingly misunderstood 1
Is it because it is in itself so very dark and unintelligible, and not adapted to the
apprehension of the human faculties ?, If so, how is the possession of such an
obscure and unintelligible thing, so unspeakable and glorious an advantage 1
Or is it because of the native blindness, corruption and superstition of mankind ?
But this is giving up the thing in question, and allowing a great depravity of nature.
And Dr. Taylor speaks of the gospel as far otherwise than dark and unintelligi-
ble ; he represents it as exhibiting the clearest and most glorious light, to de-
liver the world from darkness, and bring them into marvellous light. He speaks
of the light which the Jews had, under the Mosaic dispensation, as vastly
exceeding the light of nature, which the Heathen enjoyed : and yet he supposes
that even the latter was so clear as to be sufficient to lead men to the knowledge
of God, and their whole duty to him. And he speaks of the light of the gospel
as vastly exceeding the light of the Old Testament. He says of the apostle Paul
in particular, " That he wrote with great perspicuity ; that he takes great care
to explain every part of his subject ; that he has left no part of it unexplained
and unguarded, and that never wTas an author more exact and cautious in this."*
Is it not strange, therefore, that the Christian world, without any native depravi-
ty to prejudice and darken their minds, should be so blind in the midst of such
glaring light, as to be all, or the generality, agreed, from age to age, so essen-
tially to misunderstand that which is made so very plain ?
Dr. Taylor says, p. 1G7, S., " It is my persuasion that the Christian religion
was very early and grievously corrupted, by dreaming, ignorant, superstitious
monks, too conceited to be satisfied with plain gospel, and has long remained
in that deplorable state." But how came the whole Christian world, without
any blinding depravity, to hearken to these ignorant, foolish men, rather than
unto wiser and better teachers ? Especially, when the latter had plain gospel
on their side, and the doctrines of the other were (as our author supposes) so
very contrary, not only to the plain gospel, but to men's reason and common
sense ! Or were all the teachers of the Christian church nothing, but a parcel
of ignorant dreamers ? If so, this is very strange indeed, unless mankind na-
turally love darkness, rather than light, seeing in all parts of the Christian world
there was so great a multitude of those in the work of the ministry, who had
the gospel in their hands, and whose whole business it was to study and teach
it, and therefore had infinitely greater advantages to become truly wise, than the
Heathen philosophers. But if it did happen so, by some strange and incon-
ceivable means, that notwithstanding all these glorious advantages, all the
teachers of the Christian church through the world, without any native evil
propensity, very early became silly dreamers, and also in their dreaming, gen-
erally stumbled on the same individual, monstrous opinions, and so the world
might be blinded for a while ; yet why did they not hearken to that "wise and
great man, Pelagius, and others like him, when he plainly held forth the truth
* Pre/, to Par. on Rom. p. 146, 48.
360 ORIGINAL SIN.
to the Christian world ! Especially seeing his instructions were so agreeable to
the plain doctrines, and the brght and clear light of the gospel of Christ, and
also so agreeable to the plainest dictates of the common sense and understanding
of all mankind : but the other so repugnant to it, that (according to our author)
if they were true, it would prove understanding to be no understanding, and the
Word of God to be no rule of truth, nor at all to be relied upon, and God to be a
Being worthy of no regard!
And besides, if the ineffectualness of the gospel to restrain sin and promote
virtue, be owing to the general prevalence of these doctrines, which are sup-
posed to be so absurd and contrary to the gospel, here is this further to be ac-
counted for, namely, why, since there has been so great an increase of light in
religious matters (as must be supposed on Dr. Taylor's scheme) in this and the
last age, and these monstrous doctrines of Original Sin, Election, Reprobation,
Justification, Regeneration, &c, have been so much exploded, especially in our
nation, there has been no reformation attending this great advancement of light
and truth ; but on the contrary, vice, and every thing that is opposite to practi-
cal Christianity, has gone on to increase, with such a prodigious celerity, as to
become like an overflowing deluge, threatening, unless God mercifully inter-
pose, speedily to swallow up all that is left of what is virtuous and praise-
worthy.
Many other things might have been mentioned under this head, of the means
which mankind have had to restrain vice, and promote virtue ; such as wicked-
ness being many ways contrary to men's temporal interest and comfort in this
world, and their having continually before their eyes so many instances of per-
sons made miserable by their vices ; the restraints of human laws, without which
men cannot live in society ; the judgments of God brought on men for their
wickedness, with which history abounds, and the providential rewards of virtue,
and innumerable particular means that God has used from age to age to curb
the wickedness of mankind, which I have omitted. But there would be no
end of a particular enumeration of such things. Enough has been said. They
that will not be convinced by the instances which have been mentioned, probably
would not be convinced, if the world had stood a thousand times so long, and we
had the most authentic and certain accounts of means having been used from the
beginning, in a thousand times greater variety, and new dispensations had been
introduced, after others had been tried in vain, ever so often, and still to little effect
He that will not be convinced by a thousand good witnesses, it is not likely that
he would be convinced by a thousand thousand. The proofs that have been
extant in the world, from trial and fact, of the depravity of man's nature, are
inexpressible, and as it were infinite, beyond the representation of all compari-
son and similitude. If there were a piece of ground, which abounded with
briers and thorns, or some poisonous plant, and all mankind had used their en-
deavors, for a thousand years together, to suppress that evil growth, and to bring
that ground by manure and cultivation, planting and sowing, to produce better
fruit, but all in vain, it would still be overrun with the same noxious growth ; it
would not be a proof, that such a produce was agreeable to the nature of that
soil, in any wise to be compared to that which is given in divine providence,
that wickedness is a produce agreeable to the nature of the field of the world of
mankind ; which has had means used with it, that have been so various, great
and wonderful, contrived by the unsearchable and boundless wisdom of God ,
medicines procured with infinite expense, exhibited with so vast an apparatus ;
so marvellous a succession of dispensations, introduced one after another, dis-
playing an incomprehensible length and breadth, depth and height, of divine
ORIGINAL SIN. 361
wisdom, love, and power, and every perfection of the Godhead, to the eternal
admiration of the principalities and powers in heavenly places.
SECTION IX.
Several Evasions of the Arguments for the Depravity of Nature, from trial and events,
, considered.
Evasion 1. Dr. Taylor says, p. 231, 232, " Adam's nature, it is allow-
ed, was very far from being sinful; yet he sinned. And therefore, the common
doctrine of Original Sin, is no more necessary to account for the sin that has
been, or is in the world, than it is to account for Adam's sin." Again, p. 52 —
54, S.9 &c, " If we allow mankind to be as wicked as R. R. has represented
them to be ; and suppose that there is not one upon earth that is truly righteous,
and without sin, and that some are very enormous sinners, yet it will not thence
follow, that they are naturally corrupt. For, if sinful action infers a nature
originally corrupt, then, whereas Adam (according to them that hold the
doctrine of Original Sin) committed the most heinous and aggravated sin,
that ever was committed in the world ; for, according to them, he had
greater light than any other man in the world, to know his duty, and greater
power than any other man to fulfil it, and was under greater obligations than
any other man to obedience ; .he sinned, when he knew he was the representa-
tive of millions, and that the happy or miserable state of all mankind, depended
on his conduct ; which never was, nor can be, the case of any other man in the
world : then, I say, it will follow, that his nature was originally corrupt, &c.
Thus their argument from the wickedness of mankind, to prove a sinful and
corrupt nature, must inevitably and irrecoverably fall to the ground ; which will
appear more abundantly, if we take in the case of the angels, who in numbers
sinned, and kept not their first estate, though created with a nature superior to
Adam's." Again, p. 145, S., " When it is inquired, how it comes to pass that
our appetites and passions are now so irregular and strong, as that not one per-
son has resisted them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent ? If this be the
case, if such as make the inquiry will tell the world, how it came to pass that
Adam's appetites and passions were so irregular and strong, that he did not re-
sist them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent, when, upon their principles, he
was far more able to have resisted them ; I also will tell them how it comes to
pass, that his posterity does not resist them. Sin doth not alter its nature, by its
being general ; and flierefore how far soever it spreads, it must come upon all
just as it came upon Adam."
These things are delivered with much assurance. But is there any reason in
such a way of talking ? One thing implied in it, and the main thing, if any
thing at all to the purpose, is, that because an effect's being general, does not
alter the nature of the effect, therefore nothing more can be argued concerning
the cause, from its happening constantly, and in the most steady manner, than
from its happening but once. But how contrary is this to reason ! If such a
case should happen, that a person, through the deceitful persuasions of a pre-
tended friend, once takes an unwholesome and poisonous draught, of a liquor he
had no inclination to before ; but after he has once taken of it, he be observed
to act as one that has an insatiable, incurable thirst after more of the same, in
his constant practice, and acts often repeated, and obstinately continued in as
long as he lives, against all possible arguments and endeavors used to dissuade
Vol. II. 46
362 ORIGINAL SIN.
him from it ; and we should from hence argue a fixed inclination, and begin to
suspect that this is the nature and operation of the poison, to produce such an
inclination, or that this strong propensity is some way the consequence of the
first draught in such a case, could it be said with good reason, that a fixed pro-
pensity can no more be argued from his consequent constant practice, than from
his first draught ? Or, if we suppose a young man, no otherwise than soberly
inclined, and enticed by wicked companions, should drink to excess, until he had
got a habit of excessive drinking, and should come under the power of a greedy
appetite after strong drink, so that drunkenness should become a common and
constant practice with him ; and some observer, arguing from this his general
practice, should say, " It must needs be that this young man has a fixed inclina-
tion to that sin ; otherwise, how should it come to pass that he should make
such a trade of if?" And another, ridiculing the weakness of his arguing,
should reply, " Do you tell me how it came to pass, that he was guilty of that
sin the first time, without a fixed inclination, and I will tell you how he is guilty
of it so generally without a fixed inclination. Sin does not alter its nature by
being general ; and therefore, how common soever it becomes, it must come at
all times by the same means that it came at first." I leave it to every one to
judge, who would be chargeable with weak arguing in such a case.
It is true, as was observed before, there is no effect without some cause, oc-
casion, ground or reason of that effect, and some cause answerable to the effect.
But certainly it will not follow from thence, that a transient effect requires a
permanent cause, or a fixed influence or propensity. An effect's happening once,
though the effect may be great, yea, though it may come to pass on the same
occasion in many subjects at the same time, will not prove any fixed propensity,
or permanent influence. It is true, it proves an influence great and extensive,
answerable to the effect, once exerted, or once effectual ; but it proves nothing
in the cause fixed or constant. If a particular tree, or a great number of trees
standing together, have blasted fruit on their branches at a particular season,
yea, if the fruit be very much blasted, and entirely spoiled, it is evident that
something was the occasion of such an effect at that time ; but this alone does not
prove the nature of the tree to be bad. But if it be observed, that those trees,
and all other trees of the kind, wherever planted, and in all soils, countries,
climates and seasons, and however cultivated and managed, still bear ill fruit,
from year to year, and in all ages, it is a good evidence of the evil nature of the
tree ; and if the fruit, at all these times, and in all these cases, be very bad, it
proves the nature of the tree to be very bad ; and if we argue in like manner
from what appears among men, it is easy to determine, whether the universal
sinfulness of mankind, and their all sinning immediately, as soon as capable of
it, and all sinning continually, and generally being of a wicked character, at all
times," in all ages, and all places, and under all possible circumstances, against
means and motives inexpressibly manifold and great, and in the utmost conceiv-
able variety, be from a permanent, internal, great cause.
If the voice of common sense were attended to, and heard, there would be
no occasion for labor in multiplying arguments and instances to show, that one
act does not prove a fixed inclination ; but that constant practice and pursuit
do. We see that it is in fact agreeable to the reason of all mankind, to argue
fixed principles, tempers, and prevailing inclinations, from repeated and contin-
ued actions, though the actions are voluntary, and performed of choice ; and
thus to judge of the tempers and inclinations of persons, ages, sexes, tribes and
nations. But is it the manner of men to conclude, that whatever they see others
once do, thej have a fixed, abiding inclination to do ? Yea, there may be sev
ORIGINAL SIN. 363
eral acts seen, and yet they not taken as good evidence of an established pro-
pensity ; nay, though attended with that circumstance, that one act, or those
several acts, are followed with such constant practice, as afterwards evidences
fixed disposition. As for example, there may be several instances of a man's
drinking some spirituous liquor, and they be no sign of a fixed inclination to
that liquor ; but these acts may be introductory to a settled habit or propensity,
which may be made very manifest afterwards by constant practice.
From these things it is plain, that what -is alleged concerning the first sin
of Acktm, and of the angels, without a previous, fixed disposition to sin, cannot
in the least injure or weaken the arguments, which have been brought to prove
a fixed propensity to sin in mankind in, their present state. The thing which
the permanence of the cause has been argued from, is the permanence of the
effect. And that the permanent cause consists in an internal, fixed propensity,
and not any particular, external circumstances, has been argued from the effects
being the same, through a vast variety and change of circumstances. Which
things do not take place with respect to the first act of sin that Adam or the
angels were guilty of ; which first acts, considered in themselves, were no per-
manent, continued effects. And though a great number of the angels sinned,
and the effect on that account was the greater, and more extensive ; yet this
extent of the effect is a very different thing from that permanence, or settled
continuance of the effect, which is supposed to show a permanent cause, or fixed
influence or propensity. Neither was there any trial of a vast variety of cir-
cumstances attending a permanent effect, to show the fixed cause to be internal,
consisting in a settled disposition of nature, in the instances objected. And
however great the sin of Adam, or of the angels was, and however great means^
motives, and obligations they sinned against ; whatever may be thence argued
concerning the transient cause, occasion, or temptation, as being very subtle,
remarkably tending to deceive and seduce, or otherwise great ; yet it argues
nothing of any settled disposition, or fixed cause at all, either great or small ;
the effect both in the angels and our first parents, being in itself transient, and
for aught appears, happening in each of them under one system or coincidence
of influential circumstances.
The general continued wickedness of mankind, against such means and mo-
tives, proves each of these things, viz., that the cause is fixed, and that the fixed
cause is internal, in man's nature, and also that it is very powerful. It proves
Hie first, namely, that the cause is fixed, because the effect is so abiding, through,
so many changes. It proves the second, that is, that the fixed cause is internal,
because the circumstances are so various : the variety of means and motives is
one thing that is to be referred to the head of variety of circumstances ; and
they are that kind of circumstances, which above all others proves this ; for they
are such circumstances as cannot possibly cause the effect, being most opposite
to the effect in their tendency. And it proves the third, viz., the greatness of
the internal cause, or the powerfulness of the propensity ; because the means
which have opposed its influence, have been so great, and yet have been statedly
overcome.
But here I may observe by the way, that with regard to the motives and
obligations which our first fathers sinned against, it is not reasonably alleged,
that he sinned when he knew his sin would have destructive consequences to all
his posterity, and might, in process of time, pave the whole globe with skvlls,
&c. Seeing it is so ovident, by the plain account the Scripture gives us of the
temptatioh which prevailed with our first parents to commit that sin, that it was
so contrived by the snbtilty of the tempter, as first to blind and deceive them as
364 ORIGINAL SIN.
to that matter, and to make them believe that their disobedience should be fol-
lowed with no destruction or calamity at all to themselves (and therefore not to
their posterity), but on the contrary, with a great increase and advancement of
dignity and happiness.
Evasion 2. Let the wickedness of the world be ever so general and great,
there is no necessity of supposing any depravity of nature to be the cause ; man's
own free will is cause sufficient. Let mankind be more or less corrupt, they
make themselves corrupt by their own free choice. This, Dr. Taylor abundantly
insists upon, in many parts of his book.*
But I would ask, how it comes to pass that mankind so universally agree in
this evil exercise of their free will ? If their wills are in the first place as free
to good as evil, what is it to be ascribed to, that the world of mankind, consist-
ino- of so many millions, in so many successive generations, without consulta-
tion, all agree to exercise their freedom in favor of evil ? If there be no natural
tendency or preponderation in the case, then there is as good a chance for the
will's being determined to good as evil. If the cause is indifferent, why is not
the effect in some measure indifferent ? If the balance be no heavier at one end
'than the other, why does it perpetually, and, as it were, infinitely, preponderate
one way ? How comes it to pass, that the free will of mankind has been deter-
mined to evil, in like manner before the flood, and after the flood ; under the
law, and under the gospel ; and among both Jews and Gentiles, under the Old
Testament ; and since that, among Christians, Jews, Mahometans ; among Pa-
pists and Protestants ; in those nations where civility, politeness, arts, and
learning most prevail, and among the Negroes and Hottentots in Africa, the
Tartars in Asia, and Indians in America, towards both poles, and on every side
jf the globe ; in greatest cities and obscurest villages ; in palaces and in huts,
wigwams and cells under ground ? Is it enough to reply, it happens so, that
men everywhere, and at all times, choose thus to determine their own wills,
and so to make themselves sinful, as soon as ever they are capable of it, and to
sin constantly as long as they live, and universally to choose never to come up
half way to their duty ?
As has been often observed, a steady effect requires a steady cause ; but free
will, without any previous propensity to influence its determinations, is no per-
manent cause ; nothing can be conceived of, further from it : for the very notion
of freedom of will, consisting in self-determining power, implies contingence :
and if the will is free in that sense, that it is perfectly free from any government
of previous inclination, its freedom must imply the most absolute and perfect
contingence ; and surely nothing can be conceived of, more unfixed than that.
The notion of liberty of will, in this sense, implies perfect freedom from every
thing that should previously fix, bind or determine it ; that it may be left to be
fixed and determined wholly by itself : therefore its determinations must be pre-
\ iously altogether unfixed. And can that which is so unfixed, so contingent,
be a cause sufficient to account for an effect, in such a manner, and to such a
degree, permanent, fixed and constant ?
When men see only one particular person, going on in a certain course with
great constancy, against all manner of means to dissuade him, do they judge this
to be no argument of any fixed disposition of mind, because he, being free, may
determine to do so, if he will, without any such disposition ? Or if they see a
nation or people that differ greatly from other nations, in such and such instan-
ces of their constant conduct, as though their tempers and inclinations were
* Pages 257, 258, 52, 53, S., and many other places,
ORIGINAL SIN. 365
very diverse, and any should deny it to be from any such cause, and should say,
we cannot judge at all of the temper or disposition of any nation or people, by
any thing observable in their constant practice or behavior, because they have
all free will, and therefore may all choose to act so, if they please, without any
thing in their temper or inclination to bias them ; would such an account of
such effects be satisfying to the reason of mankind ? But infinitely further
would it be from satisfying a considerate mind, to account for the constant and
universal sinfulness of mankind, by saying, that the will of all mankind is free,
and therefore all mankind may, if they please, make themselves wicked : they
are free when they first begin to act as moral agents, and therefore all may, if
they please, begin to sin as soon as they begin to act : they are free as long as
they continue to act in the world, and therefore they may all commit sin con-
tinually, if they will : men of all nations are free, and therefore all nations may
act alike in these respects, if they please (though some do not know how other
nations do act). Men of high and low condition, learned and ignorant, are free,
and therefore they may agree in acting wickedly, if they please (though they
do not consult together). Men in all ages are free, and therefore men in one
age may all agree with men in every other age in wickedness, if they please
(though they do not know how men in other ages have acted), &c. &c. Let
every one judge whether such an account of things can satisfy reason.
Evasion 3. It is said by many of the opposers of the doctrine of Original
Sin, that the corruption of the world of mankind may be owing, not to a de-
praved nature, but to bad example. And I think we must understand Dr. Tay-
lor as having respect to the powerful influence of bad instruction and example,
when he says, p. 1 18, " The Gentiles, in their heathen state, when incorporated
into the body of the Gentile world, were without strength, unable to help or
recover themselves." And in several other places to the like purpose. If there
was no depravity of nature, what else could there be but bad instruction and
example, to hinder the heathen world, as a collective body (for as such Dr.
Taylor speaks of them, as may be seen p. 117, 118), from emerging out of their
corruption, on the rise of each new generation 1 As to their bad instruction,
our author insists upon it, that the heathen, notwithstanding all their disadvan-
tages, had sufficient light to know God, and do their whole duty to him, as we
have observed from time to time. Therefore it must be chiefly bad example,
that we must suppose, according to him, rendered their case helpless.
Now concerning this way of accounting for the corruption of the world, by
the influence of bad example, I would observe the following things :
1. It is accounting for the thing by the thing itself. It is accounting for
the corruption of the world by the corruption of theVorld. For, that bad ex-
amples are general all over the world to be followed by others, and have been
so from the beginning, is only an instance, or rather a description of that cor-
ruption of the world which is to be accounted for. If mankind are naturally
no more inclined to evil than good, then how comes there to be so many more
bad examples than good ones, in all ages ? And if there are not, how come
the bad examples that are set, to be so much more followed than the good ? If
the propensity of man's nature be not to evil, how comes the current of general
example, everywhere, and at all times, to be so much to evil ? And when op-
position has been made by good examples, how comes it to pass that it has had
so little effect to stem the stream of general wicked practice ?
I think from the brief account the Scripture gives us of the behavior of the
first parents of mankind, the expressions of their faith and hope in God's mercy
revealed to them, we have reason to suppose, that before ever they had any
366 ORIGINAL SIN.
children, they repented, and were pardoned, and became truly pious. So that
God planted the world at first with a noble vine ; and at the beginning of the
generations of mankind, he set the stream of example the right way. And we
see, that children are more apt to follow the example of their parents, than of
any others ; especially in early youth, their forming time, when those habits are
contracted, which abide by them all their days. And besides, Adam's children
had no other examples to follow, but those of their parents. How therefore
came the stream so soon to turn, and to proceed the contrary way, with so violent a
current ? Then, when mankind became so universally and desperately corrupt, as
not to be fit to live on earth any longer, and the world was everywhere full of bad
examples, God destroyed them all at once, but only righteous Noah, and his family,
to remove those bad examples, and that the world of mankind might be planted
a^ain with good example, and the stream again turned, the right way : how
therefore came it to pass, that Noah's posterity did not follow his good example,
especially when they had such extraordinary things to enforce his example, but so
generally, even in his lifetime, became so exceeding corrupt ? One would think, the
first generations at least, while all lived together as one family, under Noah, their
venerable father, might have followed his good example ; and if they had done so,
then, when the earth came to be divided in Peleg's time, the heads of the several
families would have set out their particular colonies with good examples, and the
stream would have been turned the right way in all the various divisions, colonies,
and nations of the world. But we see verily the fact was, that in about fifty
years after Noah's death, the world in general was overrun with dreadful cor-
ruption ; so that all virtue and goodness were like soon to perish from among
mankind, unless something extraordinary should be done to prevent it.
Then, for a remedy, God separated Abraham and his family from all the
rest of the world, that they might be delivered from the influence of bad exam-
ple, that, in his posterity, he might have a holy seed. Thus God again planted'
a noble trine ; Abraham, Isaac and Jacob being eminently pious. But how
soon did their posterity degenerate, till true religion was like to be swallowed
up ! We see how desperately, and almost universally corrupt they were, when
God brought them out of Egypt, and led them in the wilderness.
Then God was pleased, before he planted his people in Canaan, to destroy
that perverse generation in the wilderness, that he might plant them there a
noble vine, wholly a right seed, and set them out with good example, in the land
where they were to have their settled abode, Jer. ii. 21. It is evident, that the
generation which came with Joshua into Canaan, was an excellent generation,
by innumerable things said of them.* But how soon did that people, neverthe-
less, become the degenerate plant of a strange vine!
And when the nation had a long time proved themselves desperately and
incurably corrupt, God destroyed them, and spnt them into captivity, till the old
rebels were dead and purged out, to deliver their children from their evil ex-
ample ; and when the following generation were purified as in a furnace, Cod
planted then again, in the land of Israel, a noble vine, and set them out with
good example ; which yet was not followed by their posterity.
When again the corruption was become inveterate and desperate, the
Christian church was planted by a glorious outpouring of the Spirit of God,
causing true virtue and piety to be exemplified in the first age of the church of
Christ, far beyond whatever had been on earth before ; and the Christian church
* See Jer. ii. 2, 3. Psal. lxviii. 14. Josh. xxii. 2, and xxiii. 8. Deut. iv. 3, 4. Hos. xi. 1, and is. 10.
Judges ii. 7, 17, 22, and many other places.
ORIGINAL SIN. 367
was planted a noble vine. But that primitive good example has not prevailed,
to cause virtue to be generally and steadfastly maintained in the Christian
world : to how great a degree it has been otherwise, has already been observed.
After many ages of general and dreadful apostasy, God was pleased to erect
the Protestant church, as separated from the more corrupt part of Christendom ;
and true piety flourished very much in it at first ; God planted it a noble vine :
but, notwithstanding the good examples of the first reformers, what a melancholy
pass is the Protestant world come to at this day !
When England grew very corrupt, God brought over a number of pious
persons, and planted them in New England, and this land was planted with a
noble vine. But how is the gold become dim ! How greatly have we forsaken
the pious examples of our fathers !
So prone have mankind always proved themselves to degeneracy, and bent
to backsliding. Which shows plainly their natural propensity ; and that when
good has revived, and been promoted among men, it has been by some divine
interposition, to oppose the natural current ; the fruit of some extraordinary means,
the efficacy of which has soon been overcome by constant, natural bias, and the
effect of good example presently lost, and evil has regained and maintained the
dominion : like a heavy body, wThich may by some great power be caused to
ascend, against its nature, a little while, but soon goes back again towards the
centre, to which it naturally and constantly tends.
So that evil example will in no wise account for the corruption of mankind,
without supposing a natural proneness to sin: The tendency of example alone
will not account for general wicked practice, as consequent on good example.
And if the influence of bad exainple is a reason of some of the wickedness
that is in the world, that alone will not account for man's becoming worse than
the example set, and degenerating more and more, and growing worse and
worse, which has been the manner of mankind.
2. There has been given to the world an example of virtue, which, wTere it
not for a dreadful depravity of nature, would have influence on them that live
under the gospel, far beyond all other examples ; and that is, the example of
Jesus Christ.
God, who knew the human nature, and how apt men are to be influenced
by example, has made answerable provision. His infinite wisdom has contrived
that we should have set before us the most amiable and perfect example, in such
circumstances, as should have the greatest tendency to influence all the princi-
ples of man's nature, but his corruption. Men are apt to be moved by the
example of others like themselves, or in their own nature ; therefore this exam-
ple was given in our nature. Men are ready to follow the example of the great
and honorable ; and this example, though it was of one in our nature, yet it was
of one infinitely higher and more honorable than kings or angels. A people
are apt to follow the example of their prince : this is the example of that glo-
rious person, who stands in a peculiar relation to Christians, as their Lord and
King, the Supreme Head of the church ; and not only so, but the King of kings,
Supreme Head of the Universe, and head over all things to the church. Chil-
dren are apt to follow the example of their parents : this is the example of the
Author of our Being, and one who is in a peculiar and extraordinary manner
our Father, as he is the Author of our Holy and happy Being ; besides his being
the Creator of the world, and everlasting Father of the Universe. Men are
very apt to follow the example of their friends : the example of Christ is of
one that is infinitely our greatest friend, standing in the most endearing relations
of our Brother, Redeemer, Spiritual Head and Husband ; whose grace and love
368 ORIGINAL SIN.
expressed to us, transcends all other love and friendship, as much as heaven is
higher than the earth. And then the virtues and acts of his example -/ere
exhibited to us in the most endearing and engaging circumstances thav can
possibly be conceived of: his obedience and submission to God, his humility,
meekness, patience, charity, self-denial, &c, being exercised and expressed in a
work of infinite grace, love, condescension, and beneficence to us ; and had all
their highest expressions in his laying down his life for us, and meekly, patiently,
and cheerfully undergoing such extreme and unutterable suffering, for our eter-
nal salvation. Men are peculiarly apt to follow the example of such as they
have great benefits from : but it is utterly impossible to conceive of greater
benefits, that we could have by the virtues of any person, than we have by the
virtuous acts of Christ; who depend upon being thereby saved from eternal
destruction, and brought to inconceivable, immortal glory at God's right hand.
Surely if it were not for an extreme corruption of the heart of men, such an ex-
ample would have that strong influence on the heart, that would as it were
swallow up the power of all the evil and hateful examples of a generation of
vipers.
3. The influence of bad example, without corruption of nature, will not
account for children's universally committing sin as soon as capable of it ; which,
I think, is a fact that has been made evident by the Scripture. It will not ac-
count for this, in the children of eminently pious parents ; the first examples
that are set in their view, being very good ; which, as has been observed, was
especially the case of many children in Christian families in the apostles' days,
when the apostle John supposes that every individual person had sin to repent of,
and confess to God.
4. What Dr. Taylor supposes to have been fact, with respect to a great part
of mankind, cannot consistently be accounted for from the influence of bad ex-
ample, viz., the state of the Heathen world, which he supposes, considered as
a collective body, was helpless, dead in sin, and unable to recover itself. Not
evil example alone, no, nor as united with evil instruction, can be supposed a
sufficient reason why every new generation that arose among them, should not
be able to emerge from the idolatry and wickedness of their ancestors, in any
consistence with his scheme. The ill example of ancestors could have no power
to oblige them to sin, any other way than as a strong temptation. But Dr.
Taylor himself says, p. 72, S.9 " To suppose men's temptations to be superior
to their powers, will impeach the goodness and justice of God, who appoints
every man's trial." And as to bad instructions, as was observed before, he
supposes that they all, yea every individual person, had light sufficient to know
God, and do their whole duty. And if each one could do this for himself, then
surely they might all be agreed in it through the power of free will, as well
as the whole world be agreed in corruption by the same power.
Evasion 4. Some modern opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin, do thus
account for the general prevalence of wickedness, viz., that in a course of nature
our senses grow up first, and the animal passions get the start of reason. So
Dr. Turnljull says,* " Sensitive objects first affect us, and inasmuch as reason is
a principle, which, in the nature of things, must be advanced to strength and
vigor, by gradual cultivation, and these objects are continually assailing and
soliciting us ; so, unless a very happy education prevents, our sensitive appetites
must have become very strong, before reason can have force enough to call them
to an account, and assume authority over them." From hence Dr. Turnbull
supposes it comes to pass,f " That though some few may, through the influence
* See Moral Philosophy, p. 279, and Christian Philosophy, p. 274. f Christian Philosophy, p. 282, 283.
ORIGINAL SIN. 369
of virtuous example, be said to be sanctified from the womb, so liberal, so gen-
erous, so virtuous, so truly noble is their cast of mind ; yet, generally speaking,
the whole world lieth in such wickedness, that, with respect to the far greater part
of mankind, the study of virtue is beginning to reform, and is a severe struggle
against bad habits, early contracted, and deeply rooted ; it is therefore putting
on an old, inveterate, corrupt nature, and putting on a new form and temper ; i
is moulding ourselves anew ; it is a being born again, and becoming as children
And how few are there in the world who escape its pollutions, so as not to be early
m that class, or to be among the righteous that need no repentance !"
Dr. Taylor, though he is not so explicit, seems to hint at the same thing,
p. 192 : " It is by slow degrees (says he) that children come to the use of under-
standing ; the animal passions being for some years the governing part of their
constitution. And therefore, though they may be froward and apt to displease
us, yet how far this is sin in them, we are not capable of judging. But it may suf-
fice to say, that it is the will of God that children should have appetites and
passions to regulate and restrain, that he hath given parents instructions and
commands to discipline and inform their minds, that if parents first learned true
wisdom for themselves, and then endeavored to bring up their children in the
way of virtue, there would be less wickedness in the world."
Concerning these things I would observe, that such a scheme is attended
with the very same difficulties, which they that advance it would avoid ; liable
to the same objections, which they make against God's ordering it so that men
should be brought into being with a prevailing propensity to sin. For this
scheme supposes, the author of nature has so ordered things, that men should
come into being as moral ,agents, that is, should first have existence in a state
and capacity of moral agency, under a prevailing propensity to sin. For that
strength, which sensitive appetites .and animal passions come to by their habit-
ual exercise, before persons come to the exercise of their rational powers, amounts
to a strong propensity to sin, when they first come to the exercise of those ration-
al powers, by the supposition : because this is given as a reason why the scale
is turned for sin among mankind, and why, generally speaking, the whole
world lies in wickedness, and the study of virtue is a severe struggle against bad
habits, early contracted, and deeply rooted. These deeply rooted habits must
imply a tendency to sin ; otherwise they could not account for that which they
are brought to account for, namely, prevailing wickedness in the world ; for
that cause cannot account for an effect, which is supposed to have no tendency
to that effect. And this tendency which is supposed, is altogether equivalent to
a natural tendency : it is as necessary to the subject. For it is supposed to be
brought on the person who is the subject of it, when he has no power to with-
stand or oppose it : the habit, as Dr. Turnbull says, becoming very strong, before
reason can have force enough to call the passions to account, or assume authority
over them. And it is supposed, that this necessity, by which men become sub-
ject to this propensity to sin, is from the ordering and disposal of the author of
nature ; and therefore must be as much from his hand, and as much without the
hand of the person himself, as if he were first brought into being with such a
propensity. Moreover, it is supposed that the effect, which the tendency is to,
is truly wickedness. For it is alleged as a cause or reason why the whole world
lies in wickedness, and why all but a very few are first in the class of the wick-
ed, and not among the righteous, that need no repentance. If they need repen-
tance, what they are guilty of is truly and properly wickedness, or moral evil ;
for certainly men need no repentance for that which is no sin, or blamable evil.
If it be so, that, as a consequence of this propensity, the world lies in wickedness.
Vol. II 47
370 ORIGINAL SIN.
and the far greater part are of a wicked character, without doubt, the far greater
part go to eternal perdition ; for death does not pick and choose for men of a
righteous character only. And certainly that is an evil, corrupt state of things
which naturally tends to, and issues in that consequence, that as it were the whole
world lies and lives in wickedness, and dies in wickedness, and perishes eternally.
And this, by the supposition, is a state of things, wholly of the ordering of the
author of nature, before mankind are capable of having any hand in the affair.
And is this any relief to the difficulties, which these writers object against the
doctrine of natural depravity ?
And I might here also observe, that this way of accounting for the wicked-
ness of the world, amounts to just the same thing with that solution of man's
depravity, which was mentioned before, that Dr. Taylor cries out of as too gross
to be admitted (p. 188, 189), viz., God's creating the soul pure, and putting
it into such a body, as naturally tends to pollute it. For this scheme supposes,
that God creates the soul pure, and puts it into a body, and into such a state in
that body, that the natural consequence is a strong propensity to sin, as soon as
the soul is capable of sinning.
Dr. Turnbull seems to suppose, that the matter could not have been ordered
otherwise, consistent with the nature of things, than that animal passions should
be so aforehand with reason, as that the consequence should be that which has
been mentioned ; because reason is a faculty of such a nature, that it can have
strength and vigor no otherwise than by exercise and culture.* But can there
be any force in this ? Is there any thing in nature, to make it impossible, but
that the superior principle of man's nature should be so proportioned to the in-
ferior, as to prevent such a dreadful consequence, as the moral and natural ruin,
and eternal perdition of the far greater part of mankind 1 Could not those
superior principles be in vastly greater strength at first, and yet be capable of
endless improvement 1 And what should hinder its being so ordered by the
Creator, that they should improve by vastly swifter degrees than they do ? If
we are Christians we must be forced to allow it to be possible in the nature of
things, that the principles of human nature should be so balanced, that the conse-
quence should be no propensity to sin, in the first beginning of a capacity of
moral agency ; because we must own, that it was so in fact in Adam, when first
created, and also in the man Christ Jesus ; though the faculties of the latter
were such as ^rew by culture and improvement, so that he increased in wisdom
as he grew in stature.
Evasion 5. Seeing men in this world are in a state of trial, it is fit that their
virtue should meet with trials, and consequently that it should have opposition
and temptation to overcome ; not only from without, but from within, in the
animal passions and appetites we have to struggle with ; that by the conflict
and victory our virtue may be refined and established. Agreeably to this, Dr.
Taylor (p. 253) says, " Without a right use and application of our powers,
were the> naturally ever so perfect, we could not be judged fit to enter into the
kingdom of God. This gives a good reason why we are now in a state of trial
and temptation, viz., to prove and discipline our minds, to season our virtue, and
to fit us for the kingdom of God ; for which, in the judgment of infinite wisdom,
we cannot be qualified, but by overcoming our present temptations." And in
p. 78, £., he says, " We are upon trial, and it is the will of our Father that
our constitution should be attended with various passions and appetites, as well
as our outward condition with vaiious temptations." He says the like in sev-
* Mor.Phil.p.311.
ORIGINAL SIN. 371
eral other places. To the same purpose very often Dr. Turnbull, particularly
Christian Philosophy, p. 310, " What merit (says he) except from combat?
What virtue without the encounter of such enemies, such temptations as arise
both from within and from abroad ? To be virtuous, is to prefer the pleasures
of virtue, to those which come into competition with it, and vice holds forth to
tempt us ; and to dare to adhere to truth and goodness, whatever pains and hard-
ships it may cost. There must therefore, in order to the formation and trial, in
order to the very being of virtue, be pleasures of a certain kind to make tempta-
tions to vice."
In reply to these things I would say, either the state of temptation, which is
supposed to be ordered for men's trial, amounts on the whole to a prevailing
tendency to that state of general wickedness and ruin, which has been proved
to take place, or it does not. If it does not amount to a tendency to such an
effect, then how does it account for it ? When it is inquired, by what cause
such an effect should come to pass, is it not absurd to allege a cause, which is
owned at the same time to have no tendency to such an effect ? Which is as
much as to confess, that it will not account for it. I think it has been demon-
strated, that this effect must be owing to some prevailing tendency. If the
other part of the dilemma be taken, and it be said, that this state of things does
imply a prevailing tendency to that effect, which has been proved, viz., that all
mankind, without the exception of so much as one, sin against God, to their
own deserved and just, eternal ruin ; and not only so, but sin thus immediately,
as soon as capable of it, and sin continually, and have more sin than virtue, and
have guilt that infinitely outweighs the value of all the goodness any ever have,
and that the generality of the world in all ages are extremely stupid and foolish,
and of a wicked character, and actually perish for ever ; I say, if the state of
temptation implies a natural tendency to such an effect as this, it is a very
evil, corrupt, and dreadful state of things, as has been already largely
shown.
Besides, such a state has a tendency to defeat its own supposed end, which
is to refine, ripen, and perfect virtue in mankind, and so to fit men for the great-
er eternal happiness and glory : whereas, the effect it tends to, is the reverse of
this, viz., general, eternal infamy and ruin, in all generations. It is supposed,
that men's virtue must have passions and appetites to struggle with, in order to
have the glory and reward of victory ; but the consequence is, a prevailing, con-
tinual and generally effectual tendency, not to men's victory over evil appetites
and passions, and the glorious reward of that victory, but to the victory of evil
appetites and lusts over men, and utterly and eternally destroying them. If
a trial of virtue be requisite, yet the question is, whence comes so general a fail-
ing in the trial, if there be no depravity of nature ? If conflict and war be neces-
sary, yet surely there is no necessity that there should be more cowards than good
soldiers ; unless it be necessary that men should be overcome and destroyed :
especially it is not necessary that the whole world as it vere should lie in wick-
edness, and so lie and die in cowardice.
I might also here observe, that Dr. Turnbull is not very consistent in sup-
posing, that combat with temptation is requisite to the very being of virtue. For
I think it clearly follows from his own notion of virtue, that virtue must have a
being prior to any virtuous or praiseworthy combat with temptation. For, by
his principles, all virtue lies in good affection, and no actions can be virtuous, but
what proceed from good affection.* Therefore, surely the combat itself can have
* Christian Philosophy, p. 113— 115.
372 ORIGINAL SIN.
no virtue in it unless it proceeds from virtuous affection ; and therefore virtue
must have an existence before the combat, and be the cause of it.
CHAPTER II.
Universal Mortality proves Original Sin ; particularly the Death of Infants, with its
various circumstances.
The universal reign of death, over persons of all ages indiscriminately, with
the awful circumstances and attendants of death, proves that men come sinful
into the world.
It is needless here particularly to inquire, whether God has not a sovereign
right to set bounds to the lives of his own creatures, be they sinful or not ; and
as he gives life, so to take it away when he pleases ? Or how far God has a
right to bring extreme suffering and calamity on an innocent moral agent ? For
death, with the pains and agonies with which it is usually brought on, is not
merely a limiting of existence, but is a most terrible calamity ; and to such a
creatute as man, capable of conceiving of immortality, and made with so earn-
est a desire after it, and capable of foresight and of reflection on approaching
death, and that has such an extreme dread of it, is a calamity above all others
terrible, to such as are able to reflect upon it. I say, it is needless, elaborately
to consider, whether God may not, consistent with his perfections, by absolute
sovereignty, bring so great a calamity on mankind when perfectly innocent
It is sufficient, if we have good evidence from Scripture, that it is not agreeable
to God's manner of dealing with mankind so to do.
It is manifest, that mankind were not originally subjected to this calamity :
God brought it on them afterwards, on occasion of man's sin, at a time of the
manifestation of God's great displeasure for sin, and by a denunciation and sen-
tence pronounced by him, as acting the part of a judge, as Dr. Taylor often
confesses. Sin entered into the world, and death by sin, as the apostle says.
Which certainly leads us to suppose, that this affair was ordered of God, not
merely by the sovereignty of a Creator, but by the righteousness of a judge.
And the Scripture everywhere speaks of all great afflictions and calamities,
which God in his providence brings on mankind, as testimonies of his displeas-
ure for sin, in the subject of those calamities ; excepting those sufferings which
are to atone for the sins of others. He ever taught his people to look on such
calamities as his rod, the rod of his anger, his frowns, the hidings of his face in
displeasure. Hence such calamities are in Scripture so often called by the name
of judgments, being what God brings on men as a judge, executing a righteous
sentence for transgression : yea, they are often called by the name of wrath,
especially calamities consisting or issuing in death.* And hence also is that
which Dr. Taylor would have us take so much notice of, that sometimes, in the
Scripture, calamity and suffering is called by such names as sin, iniquity, being
guilty, &c, which is evidently by a metonymy of the cause for the effect. It
is not likely, that in the language in use of old among God's people, calamity or
suffering would have been called even by the names of sin and guilt, if it had
been so far from having any connection with sin, that even death itself, which is
always spoken of as the most terrible of calamities, i? not so much as any sign
* See Levit. x. 6. Numb. i. 53, and xvih. 5, Josh. ix. 20. 2 Chron. xxiv. 18, and xix. 2, 10, and
xxvii. 13, and xxxii. 25. Ezra vii. 23. Neh. xiii. 18. Zech vii. 12, and many other places.
ORIGINAL SIN. 373
of the sinfulness of the subject, or any testimony of God's displeasure for an\
guilt of his, as Dr. Taylor supposes.
Death is spoken of in Scripture as the chief of calamities, the most extreme
and terrible of all those natural evils, which come on mankind in this world.
Deadly destruction is spoken of as the most terrible destruction, 1 Sam. v. 11 •
deadly sorrow, as the most extreme sorrow, Isa. xvii. 11, Matth. xxvi. 38;
and deadly enemies, as the most bitter and terrible enemies, Psal. xvii. 9. The
extremity of Christ's sufferings is represented by his suffering unto death, Phil,
ii. 8, and other places. Hence the greatest testimonies of God's anger for
the sins of men in this world, have been by inflicting death : as on the sinners
of the old world, on the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, on Onan, Phara-
oh, and the Egyptians, Nabab and Abihu, Korah and his company, and the rest
of the rebels in the wilderness, on the wicked inhabitants of Canaan, on Hophni
and Phinehas, Ananias and Sapphira, the unbelieving Jews, upon whom wrath
came to the uttermost, in the time of the last destruction of Jerusalem. This
calamity is often spoken of as in a peculiar manner the fruit of the guilt of sin.
Exod. xxviii. 43, " That they bear not iniquity and die." Levit. xxii. 9, " Lest
they bear sin for it and die." So Numb, xviii. 22, compared with Levit. x. 1, 2.
The very lig"ht of nature, or tradition from ancient revelation, led the heathen
to conceive of death as in a peculiar manner an evidence of divine vengeance.
Thus we have an account. Acts xxviii. 4, that when the barbarians saw the
venomous beast hang on PauVs hand, they said among themselves, No doubt this
man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the seas, yet vengeance suffer-
eth not to live.
Calamities that are very small in comparison of the universal, temporal de-
struction of the whole world of mankind by death, are spoken of as manifest
indications of God's great displeasure for the sinfulness of the subject ; such as
the destruction of particular cities, countries, or numbers of men, by war or pes-
tilence. Deut. xxix. 24, " All nations shall say, Wherefore hath the Lord done
thus unto this land ? What meaneth the heat of this great anger V9 Here
compare Deut. xxxii. 30, 1 Kings ix. 8, and Jer. xxii. 8, 9. These calamities,
thus spoken of as plain testimonies of God's great anger, consisted only in has-
tening on that death, which otherwise, by God's disposal, would most certainly
have come in a short time. Now the taking off of thirty or forty years from sev-
enty or eighty (if we should suppose it to be so much, one with another, in the
time of these extraordinary judgments), is but a small matter, in comparison of
God's first making man mortal, cutting off his hoped for immortality, subjecting
him to inevitable death, which his nature so exceedingly dreads ; and after-
wards shortening his life further, by cutting off more than eight hundred years
of it ; so bringing it to be less than a twelfth part of what it was in the first ages
of the world. Besides that innumerable multitudes in the common course of
things, without any extraordinary judgment, die in youth, in childhood, and
infancy. Therefore how inconsiderable a thing is the additional or hastened
destruction, that is brought on a particular city or country by war, compared
with that universal havoc which death makes of the whole race of mankind,
from generation to generation, without distinction of sex, age, quality, or con-
dition, with all the infinitely various, dismal circumstances, torments, and ago-
nies, which attend the death of old and young, adult person? and little infants ?
If those particular and comparatively trivial calamities, extending perhaps not to
more than the thousandth part of the men of one generation, are clear eviden-
ces of God's great anger ; certainly this universal, vast destruction, by which
the whole world in all generations is swallowed up, as by a flood, that nothing
374 ORIGINAL SIN.
can resist, must be a most glaring manifestation of God's angei for the sinfulness of
mankind. Yea, the Scripture is express in it, that it is so. Psal. xc. 3, &c, " Thou
turnest man to destruction, and say est, Return, ye children of men. — Thou earliest
them away as with a flood : they are as a sleep : in the morning they are like grass
which groweth up ; in the morning itflourisheth and groweth up ; in the evening it
is cut down and withereth. For we are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath
are we troubled. Thou hast set our iniquities before thee, our secret sins in the light
of thy countenance. For all our days are passed away in thy wrath : we spend
our years as a tale that is told. The days of our years are threescore years and ten ;
and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labor and
sorrow ; for it is soon cut off, and we fly away. Who knoweth the power of thine
anger T According to thy fear, so is thy wrath. So teach us to number our
days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom." How plain and full is this
testimony, that the general mortality of mankind is an evidence of God's anger
for the sin of those who are the subjects of such a dispensation !
Abimelech speaks of it as a thing which he had reason to conclude from
God's nature and perfection, that he would not slay a righteous nation. Gen.
xx. 4. By righteous evidently meaning innocent. And if so, much less uill
God slay a righteous world (consisting of so many nations — repeating the great
slaughter in every generation), or subject the whole world of mankind to death,
when they are considered as innocent, as Dr. Taylor supposes. We have from
time to time in Scripture such phrases as worthy of death, and guilty of death ;
but certainly the righteous Judge of all the earth will not bring death on thou-
sands of millions, not only that are not worthy of death, but are worthy of no
punishment.
Dr. Taylor from time to time speaks of affliction and death as a great bene-
fit, as they increase the vanity of all earthly things, and fend to excite sober
reflections, and to induce us to be moderate in gratifying the appetites of the
body, and to mortify pride and ambition, &c* To this I would say,
1. It is not denied but God may see it needful for mankind in their present
state, that they should be mortal, and subject to outward afflictions, to restrain
their lusts, and mortify their pride and ambition, &c. But then is it not an evi-
dence of man's depravity that it is so ? Is it not an evidence of distemper of
mind, yea, strong disease, when man stands in need of such sharp medicines,
such severe and terrible means to restrain his lusts, keep down his pride, and
make him willing to be obedient to God ? It must be because of a corrupt and
ungrateful heart, if the riches of God's bounty, in bestowing life and prosperity,
and things comfortable and pleasant, will not engage the heart to God, and to
virtue, and childlike love and obedience, but that he must always have the rod
held over him, and be often chastised, and held under the apprehensions of
death, to keep him from running wild in pride, contempt and rebellion, ungrate-
fully using the blessings dealt forth from God's hand, in sinning against him, and
serving his enemies. If man has no natural disingenuity of heart, it must be a
mysterious thing indeed, that the sweet blessings of God's bounty have not as
powerful an influence to restrain him from sinning against God, as terrible af-
flictions. If any thing can be a proof of a perverse and vile disposition, this
must be a proof of it, that men should be most apt to forget and despise God,
when his providence is most kind ; and that they should need to have God chas-
tise them with great severity, and even to kill them, to keep them in order. If
we were as much disposed to gratitude to God for his benefits, as we are to anger
♦Pages 21, 67, and other places.
ORIGINAL SIN. 375
al our fellow creatures for injuries, as we must be (so far as I can see) if we
are not of a depraved heart, the sweetness of the divine bounty, if continued in
life, and the height of every enjoyment that is pleasant to innocent human
nature, would be as powerful incentives to a proper regard to God, tending as
much to promote religion and virtue, as to have the world filled with calamity,
and to have God (to use the language of Hezekiah, Isaiah xxxviii. 13, describ-
ing death and its agonies) as a lion, breaking all our bones, and from day even
to night, making an end of us.
Dr. Taylor himself, p. 252, says, " That our first parents before the fall
were placed in a condition proper to engage their gratitude, love and obedi-
ence." Which is as much as to say, proper to engage them to the exercise
and practice of all religion. And if the paradisaical state was proper to engage
to all religion and duty, and men still come into the world with hearts as good
as the two first of the species, why is it not proper to engage them to it still ?
What need of so vastly changing man's state, depriving him of all those bless-
ings, and instead of them allotting to him a world full of briers and thorns,
affliction, calamity and death, to engage him to it ? The taking away of life,
and all those pleasant enjoyments man had at first, by a permanent constitution,
would be no stated benefit to mankind, unless there was a stated disposition in
them to abuse such blessings. The taking them away is supposed to be a
benefit under the notion of their being things that tend to lead men to sin ; but
they would have no such tendency, at least in a stated manner, unless there
was in men a fixed tendency to make that unreasonable misimprovement of
them. Such a temper of mind as amounts to a disposition to make such a
misimprovement of blessings of that kind, is often spoken of in Scripture, as
most astonishingly vile and perverse. So concerning Israel's abusing the bless-
ings of Canaan, that land flowing with milk and honey ; their ingratitude in
it is spoken of by the prophets, as enough to astonish all heaven and earth,
and as more than brutish stupidity and vileness. Jer. ii. 7, " I brought them
into a plentiful country, to eat the fruit thereof, and the goodness thereof. But
when ye entered, ye defiled my land," &c See the following verses, especial-
ly verse 12, " Be astonished, 0 ye heavens, at this." So Isaiah i. 2 — 4, " Hear,
O heavens, and give ear, 0 earth ; I have nourished and brought up children,
and they have rebelled against me. The ox knoweth his owfcer, and the ass
his master's crib, but my people doth not know, Israel doth not consider. Ah,
sinful nation ! A people laden with iniquity, a seed of evil doers, children that
are corrupters." Compare Deut. xxxii. 6—19. If it showed so great de-
pravity, to be disposed thus to abuse the blessings of so fruitful and pleasant
a land as Canaan, surely it would be an evidence of a no less astonishing
corruption, to be inclined to abuse the blessings of Eden, and the garden of
God there.
2. If death be brought on mankind only as a benefit, and in that mannei
which Dr. Taylor mentions, viz., to mortify or moderate their carnal appetites
and affections, wean them from the world, excite them to sober reflections, and
lead them to the fear and obedience of God, &c, is it not strange that it should
fall so heavy on infants, who are not capable of making any such improvement
of it ; so that many more of mankind suffer death in infancy, than in any other
equal part of the age of man ? Our author sometimes hints, that the death of
infants may be for the good of parents, and those that are adult, and maybe for
the correction and punishment of the sins of parents: but hath God any need of
such methods to add to parents' afflictions ? Are there not ways enough that
he might increase their trouble, without destroying the lives of such multitudes
376 ORIGINAL SIN.
of those that are perfectly innocent, and have in no respect any sin belonging
to them ; on whom death comes at an age, when not only the subjects are not
capable of any reflection or making any improvement of it, either in the suffer-
ing or expectation of it ; but also at an age, when parents and friends, who
alone can make a good improvement, and whom Dr. Taylor supposes alone to
be punished by it, suffer least by being bereaved of them ; though the infants
themselves sometimes suffer to great extremity ?
3. To suppose, as Dr. Taylor does, that death is brought on mankind in
consequence of Adam's sin, not at all as a calamity, but only as a favor and
benefit, is contrary to the doctrine of the gospel, which teaches that when
Christ, as the second Adam, comes to remove and destroy that death which
came by the first Adam, he finds it not as a friend, but an enemy. 1 Cor. xv. 22,
" For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive ;" with verses 25
and 26, " For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The
last enemy that shall be destroyed, is death."
Dr. Taylor urges that the afflictions which mankind are subjected to, and
particularly their common mortality, are represented in Scripture as the chastise*
ments of our heavenly Father ; and therefore are designed for our spiritual good,
and consequently are not of the nature of punishments. So in p. 68, 69, 38,
39, S.
Though I think the thing asserted far from being true, viz., that the Scripture
represents the afflictions of mankind in general, and particularly their common
mortality, as the chastisements of an heavenly Father, yet it is needless to stand
to dispute that matter ; for if it be so, it will be no argument that the affliction*
and death of mankind are not evidences of their sinfulness. Those would be
strange chastisements from the hand of a wise and good father, which are
wholly for nothing ; especially such severe chastisements as to break the child's
bones, when at the same time the father does not suppose any guilt, fault or
offence in any respect belonging to the child ; but it is chastised in this terrible
manner, only for fear that it will be faulty hereafter. I say, these would be a
strange sort of chastisements ; yea, though he should be able to make it up to
the child afterwards. Dr. Taylor tells of representations made by the whole
current of Scripture : I am certain it is not agreeable to the current of Scripture,
to represent divine, fatherly chastisements after this manner. It is true, that the
Scripture supposes such chastenings to be the fruit of God's goodness ; yet at
the same time it evermore represents them as being for the sin of the subject,
and as evidences of the divine displeasure for its sinfulness. Thus the apostle
in 1 Cor. xi. 30 — 32, speaks of God's chastening his people by mortal sickness,
for their good, that they might not be condemned with the world, and yet signifies
that it was for their sin ; for this cause many are weak and sickly among you,
md many sleep : that is, for the profaneness and sinful disorder before men-
tioned. So Elihu, Job xxxiii. 16, &c, speaks of the same chastening by sick-
ness, as for men's good, to withdraw man from his sinful purpose, and to hide
pride from man, and keep back his soul from the pit ; that therefore God chas-
tens man with pain on his bed, and the multitude of his bones with strong pain.
But these chastenings are for his sins, as appears by what follows, verse 28,
where it is observed, that when God by this means has brought men to repent,
and burnt Ty confess their sins, he delivers them. Again, the same Elihu,
speaking of the unfailing love of God to the righteous, even when he chastens
them, and they are bound in fetters, and holden in cords of affliction, chapter
xxxvi. 7, &c, yet speaks of these chastenings as being for their sins : verse. 9,
" Then he showeth them thel* work, and their transgressions, that they have
ORIGINAL SIN. 377
exceeded." So David, Psalm xxx., speaks of God's chastening by sore afflic-
tions, as being for his good, and issuing joyfully ; and yet being the fruit of
God's anger for his sin : verse 5, " God's anger endureth but for a moment,"
&o. Compare Psalm cxix. 67, 71, 75. God's fatherly chastisements, are spoken
of as being for sin. 2 Sam. vii. 14, 15, " I will be his father, and he shall be
my son. If he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and
with the stripes of the children of men, but my mercy shall not depart away
from him." So the prophet Jeremiah speaks of the great affliction that God's
people of the young generation suffered in the time of the captivity, as being
for their good. Lam. iii. 25, &c. But yet these chastisements are spoken of
as being for their sin, see especially verses 39, 40. So Christ says, Rev. iii. 19,
u As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten." But the words following show
that these chastenings from love, are for sin that should be repented of : " Be
zealous, therefore, and repent." And though Christ tells us, they are blessed
that are persecuted for righteousness' sake, and have reason to rejoice and be
exceeding glad ; yet even the persecution of God's people, as ordered in divine
providence, are spoken of as divine chastenings for sin, like the just corrections of
a father, when the children deserve them, Heb. xii. The apostle, there speak-
ing to the Christians concerning the persecutions which they suffered, calls their
sufferings by the name of divine rebukes, which implies testifying against a
fault ; and that they may not be discouraged, puts them in mind, that whom
the Lord loves he chastens, and scourgeth every son that he receiveth. It is also
very plain, that the persecutions of God's people, as they are from the dispo-
sing hand of God, are chastisements for sin, from 1 Pet. iv. 17, 18, compared
with Prov. xi. 31. See also Psalm lxix. 4 — 9.
If divine chastisements in general are certain evidences that the subjects are
not wholly without sin, some way belonging to them, then in a peculiar manner
is death so, for these reasons :
1. Because slaying or delivering to death, is often spoken of as in general
a more awful thing than the chastisements that are endured in this life. So
Psalm cxviii. 17, 18, " I shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the
Lord. The Lord hath chastened me sore, but he hath not given me over unto
death. " So the Psalmist, in Psalm Ixxxviii. 15, setting forth the extremity of
his affliction, represents it by this, that it was next to death. " I am afflicted,
and ready to die : while I suffer thy terrors, I am distracted." So David, 1
Sam. xx. 3. So God's tenderness towards persons under chastisements, is from
time to time set forth by that, that he did not proceed so far as to make an end
of them by death, as in Psalm lxxviii. 38, 39, Psalm ciii. 9, with verses 14, 15,
Psalm xxx. 2, 3, 9, and Job xxxiii. 22, 23, 24. So we have God's people
often praying, when under great affliction, that God would not proceed to this,
as being the greatest extremity. Psalm xiii. 3, " Consider, and hear me, O Lord
my God : lighten mine eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death." So Job x. 9,
Psalm vi. 1 — 5, Ixxxviii. 9, 10, 11, and cxliii. 7.
Especially may death be looked upon as the most extreme of all temporal
sufferings, when attended with such dreadful circumstances, and extreme pains,
as those with which Providence sometimes brings it on infants, as on the chil-
dren that were offered up to Moloch, and some other idols, who were tormented
to death in burning brass. Dr. Taylor says, p. 83, 128, &, " The Lord of all
being can never want time, and place, and power, to compensate abundantly
any sufferings infants now undergo in subserviency to his good providence."
But there are no bounds to such a license, in evading evidences from fact. It
might as well be said, that there is not and cannot be any such thing as evidence,
Vol. II. 48
378 ORIGINAL SIN.
from events of God's displeasure, which is most contrary to the whole current
of Scripture, as may appear in part from things which have been observed.
This gentleman might as well go further still, and say that God may cast guilt-
less persons into hellfire, to remain there in the most unutterable torments foi
ages of ages (which bear no greater proportion to eternity than a quarter of an
hour), and if he does so, it is no evidence of God's displeasure, because he can
never want time, place, and power, abundantly to compensate their sufferings
afterwards. If it be so, it is not to the purpose, as long as the Scripture does so
abundantly teach us to look on great calamities and sufferings which God brings
on men, especially death, as marks of his displeasure for sin, and for sin belong-
ing to them that suffer.
2. Another thing which may well lead us to suppose death, in a peculiar
manner, above all other temporal sufferings, intended as a testimony of God's dis-
pleasure for sin, is, that death is a thing attended with that awful appearance,
that gloomy and terrible aspect, that naturally suggests to our minds God's aw-
ful displeasure. Which is a thing that Dr. Taylor himself takes particular notice
of, page 69, speaking of death : " Herein," says he, " have we before our eyes
a striking demonstration that sin is infinitely hateful to God, and the corruption
and ruin of our nature. Nothing is more proper than such a sight to give us the
utmost abhorrence of all iniquity," &c. Now if death be no testimony of God's
displeasure for sin, no evidence that the subject is looked upon, by him who inflicts
it, as any other than perfectly innocent, free from all manner of imputation of
guilt, and treated only as an object of favor, is it not strange, that God should
annex to it such affecting appearances of his hatred and anger for sin, more than
to other chastisements ? Which yet the Scripture teaches "us are always for sin.
These gloomy and striking manifestations of God's hatred of sin attending death,
are equivalent to awful frowns of God attending the stroke of his hand. If we
should see a wise and just father chastising his child, mixing terrible frowns
with severe strokes, we should justly argue, that the father considered his child
as having something in him displeasing to him, and that he did not thus treat
his child only under a notion of mortifying him, and preventing his being faulty
hereafter, and making it up to him afterwards, when he had been perfectly in
nocent, and without fault, either of action or disposition thereto.
We may well argue from these things, that infants are not looked upon by
God as sinless, but that they are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terri-
ble evil comes so heavily on mankind in infancy. But besides these things,
which are observable concerning the mortality of infants in general, there are
some particular cases of the death of infants, which the Scripture sets before us,
that are attended with circumstances, in a particular manner giving evidences of
the sinfulness of such, and their just exposedness to divine wrath. As parti-
cularly,
The destroying of the infants in Sodom, and the neighboring cities ; which
cities, destroyed in so extraordinary, miraculous, and awful a manner, are set
forth as a signal example, of God's dreadful vengeance for sin, to the world in
all generations ; agreeable to that of the apostle, Jude, verse 7. God did not
reprove, but manifestly countenanced Abraham, when he said, with respect to
the destruction of Sodom, (Gen. xviii. '23, 25), " Wilt thou destroy the right-
eous with the wicked ? — That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay
the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked,
that be far from thee. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right ?" Abra-
ham's words imply that God would not destroy the innocent with the guilty.
"We may well understand innocent as included in the word righteous, according
ORIGINAL SIN 379
to the language usual in Scripture, in speaking of such cases of judgment and
punishment ; as is plain in Gen. xx. 4. Exod. xxiii. 7. Deut. xxv. 1. 2 Sam.
iv. 11. 2 Chron. vi. 33, and Prov. xviii. 5. Eliphaz says, Job iv. 7, " Who
ever perished, being innocent ? Or where were the righteous cut off?" We
see what great care God took that Lot should not be involved in that des-
truction. He was miraculously rescued by angels, sent on purpose ; who laid
hold on him, and brought him, and set him without the gates of the city ; and
told him that they could do nothing till he was out of the way. Gen. xix. 22.
And not only was he thus miraculously delivered, but his two wicked daughters
for his sake. The whole affair, both the destruction, and the rescue of them
that escaped, was miraculous ; and God could as easily have delivered the in-
fants which were in those cities. And if they had been without sin, their per-
fect innocency, one should think, would have plepded much more strongly for
them, than those lewd women's relation to Lot pleaded for them. When in
such a case, we must suppose these infants much further from deserving to be
involved in that destruction, than even Lot himself. To say here, that God
could make it up to those infants in another world, must be an insufficient
reply. For so he could as easily have made it up to Lot, or to ten or fifty
righteous, if they had been destroyed in the same fire : nevertheless it is plainly
signified, that this would not have been agreeable to the wise and holy pro-
ceedings of the judge of all the earth.
Since God declared, that if there had been found but ten righteous in Sodom,
he would have spared the whole city for their sake, may we not well suppose,
if infants are perfectly innocent, that he would have spared the old world, in
which there were, without doubt, many hundred thousand infants, and in gene-
ral one in every family, whose perfect innocence pleaded for its preservation 1
Especially when such vast care was taken to save Noah and his family (some
of whom, one at least, seem to have been none of the best), that they might
not be involved in that destruction. If the perfect sinlessness of infants had
been a notion entertained among the people of God of old, in the ages next fol-
lowing the flood, handed down from Noah and his children, who well knew
that vast multitudes of infants perished in the flood, is it likely that Eliphaz,
who lived within a few generations of Shem and Noah, would have said to
Job, as he does in that forementioned, Job iv. 7, " Who ever perished being
innocent? And when were the righteous cutoff?" Especially since in the
same discourse (chap. v. 1.) he appeals to the tradition of the ancients for a con-
firmation of this very point ; as he also does in chap. xv. 7 — 10, and xxii. 15, 16
In which last place he mentions that very thing, the destruction of the wicked
by the flood, as an instance of that perishing of the wicked, which he supposes
to be peculiar to them, for Job's conviction ; in which the wicked were cut
down out of time, their foundation being overflown with a flood. Where it is
also observable, that he speaks of such an untimeliness of death as they suffered
by the flood, as one evidence of guilt ; as he also does, chap. xv. 32, 33, " It
shall be accomplished before his time ; and his branch shall not be green."
But those that were destroyed by the flood in infancy, above all the rest, were
cut down out of time ; when instead of living above nine hundred years, ac-
cording to the common period of man's life, many were cut down before they
were one year old.
And when God executed vengeance on the ancient inhabitants of Canaan,
not only did he not spare their cities and families for the sake of the infants
that were therein, nor take any care that they should not be involved in the
destruction ; but often with particular care repeated his express commands,
380 ORIGINAL SIN.
that their infants should not be spared, but should be utteily destroyed, without
any pity ; while Rahab the harlot (who had been far from innocence, though
she expressed her faith in entertaining, and safely dismissing the spies) was pre
served, and all her friends for her sake. And when God executed his wrath on
the Egyptians, by slaying their first born, though the children of Israel, who
were most of them wicked men, as was before shown, were wonderfully spared
by the destroying angel, yet such first born of the Egyptians as were infants,
were not spared. They not only were not rescued by the angel, and no miracle
wrought to save them (as was observed in the case of the infants of Sodom)
but the angel destroyed them by his own immediate hand, and a miracle was
wrought to kill them.
Here, not to stay to be particular concerning the command by Moses res-
pecting the destruction of the infants of the Midianites, Num. xxxi. 17 ; and
that given to Saul to destroy all the infants of the Amalekites, 1 Sam. xv. 3 :
and what is said concerning Edom, Psalm cxxxvii. 9, " Happy shall he be that
taketh, and dasheth thy little ones against the stones ;" I proceed to take notice
of something remarkable concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, represented
in Ezek. ix., when command was given to them, that had charge over the city, to
destroy the inhabitants, verses 1 — 8. And this reason is given for it, that their
iniquity required it, and it was a just recompense of their sin, verses 9, 10. And
God at the same time was most particular and exact in his care that such should
by no means be involved in the slaughter, as had proved by their behavior, that
they were not partakers in the abominations of the city. Command was given
to the angel to go through the city, and set a mark upon their foreheads, and
the destroying angel had a strict charge not to come near any man, on whom
was the mark ; yet the infants were not marked, nor a word said of sparing
them : on the contrary, infants were expressly mentioned as those that should
be utterly destroyed, without pity, verse 5, 6, " Go through the city, and smite :
let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and young, both
maids and little children ; but come not near, any man upon whom is the mark."
And if any should suspect that such instances as these were peculiar to a
more severe dispensation, under the Old Testament, let us consider a remarka-
ble instance in the days of the glorious gospel of the grace of God ; even the
last destruction of Jerusalem ; which was far more terrible, and with greater
testimonies of God's wrath and indignation, than the destruction of Sodom, or of
Jerusalem in Nebuchadnezzar's time, or any thing that ever had happened to
any city or people, from the beginning of the world to that time : agreeable to
Matt. xxiv. 21, and Luke xxi, 22, 23. But at that time particular care was
taken to distinguish and deliver God's people, as was foretold Dan. xii. 1.
And we have in the New Testament a particular account of the care Christ
took for the preservation of his followers : he gave them a sign, by which they
might know when the desolation of the city was nigh, that they that were in
Jerusalem night flee to the mountains, and escape. And as history gives ac-
count, the Christians followed the directions given, and escaped to a place in
the mountains called Pella, and were preserved. Yet no care was taken to
preserve the infants of the city, in general ; but, according to the prediction of
that event, they were involved with others in that great destruction ; so heavi-
ly did the calamity fall upon them, that those words were verified, Luke xxiii.
29, " Behold the days are coming, in which they shall say, Blessed are the bar-
ren, and the womb that never bare, and the paps which never gave suck."
And that prophecy in Deut. xxxii. 21 — 25, which has undoubtedly special
respect to this very time, and is so applied by the best commentators : " 1 will
ORIGINAL SIN. 381
provoke them t<t> jealousy, with those that are not a people ; for a fire is kin-
dled in mine anger ; and it shall burn to the lowest hell. I will heap mischiefs
upon them : I will spend mine arrows upon them. They shall be burnt with
hunger, and devoured with burning heat, and bitter destruction. The sword
without, and terror within, shall destroy both the young man, and the virgin,
the suckling also, with the man of gray hairs." And it appears by the history
)f that destruction, that at that time was a remarkable fulfilment of that in Deut.
xxviii. 53 — 57, concerning parents' eating their children in the siege; and the
tender and delicate woman eating her new-born child. And here it must be re-
membered, that these very destructions of that city and land are spoken of in
those places forementioned, as clear evidences of God's wrath, to all nations
which shall behold them. And if so, they were evidences of God's wrath
towards infants ; who, equally with the rest, were the subjects of the destruc-
tion. If a particular kind or rank of persons, which made a very considerable
part of the inhabitants, were from time to time partakers of the overthrow,
without any distinction made in divine providence, and yet this was no evidence
at all of God's displeasure with any of them ; then a being the subject of such
a calamity could not be an evidence of God's wrath against any of the inhabi-
tants, to the reason of all nations, or any nation, or so much as one person.
PART II.
CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON PARTICULAR PARTS OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURE, WHICH
PROVE THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.
CHAPTER I
OBSERVATIONS RELATING TO THINGS CONTAINED IN THE THREE FIRST CHAPTERS OF
GENESIS, WITH REFERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.
SECTION I.
Concerning Original Righteouness ; and whether our first Parents were created with
Righteousness, or moral rectitude of Heart ?
The doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the creation of our first parents
with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connection, in several respects,
with the doctrine of Original Sin. Dr. Taylor was sensible of this ; and ac-
cordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against Original sin.
And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the first place remove this
author's main objection against this doctrine, and then show how the doctrine
may be inferred from the account which Moses gives us, in the three first chap-
ters of Genesis.
Dr. Taylor's grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly
insists on, is this : that it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that
382 ORIGINAL SIN.
it should be concreated with any person ; because, if so, it must be by an act
of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence ; and that mo-
ral virtue, in its very nature implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent,
without which it cannot be virtue and holiness : that a necessary holiness is no
holiness. So p. 180, where he observes, " That Adam must exist, he must be
created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous."
See also p. 250, 251. In 'p. 161. S., he says, "To say, that God not only en-
dowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover that righteous-
ness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the
same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with
the ver\ nature of righteousness." And in like manner Dr. Turnbull in
many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue, that
it be owing to our own choice, and diligent culture.
With respect to this, I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue
quite inconsistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of man-
kind ; and also inconsistent with Dr. Taylor's own notions of virtue. There-
fore if it be truly so, that to affirm that to be virtue or holiness, which is not
the fruit of preceding thought, reflection and choice, is to affirm a contradiction,
I shall show plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise is a contradiction to himself.
In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature of things, as judged
of by the common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of the minds
of men in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice
is virtuous, but the good choice itself, from whence that effect proceeds ; yea,
and not only so, but also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection
of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the gen-
eral notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that
actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed ; and so
that the act of choosing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it pro-
ceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes,
that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice ; and
that therefore it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection
and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first,
before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice ?
There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which
proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some
animal appetite ; and therefore a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good
act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the
stream which proceeds from it. '
The following things in Mr. Hutcheson's inquiry concerning moral good
and evil, are evidently agreeable to the nature of things, and the voice of hu-
man sense and reason. Section II. p. 132, 133, " Every action which we
apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to flow from some
affections towards sensitive natures. And whatever we call virtue or vice, is
either some such affection, or some action consequent upon it. All the actions
counted religious in any country, are supposed by those who count them so, to
flow from some affections towards the Deity ; and whatever we call social vir-
tue, we still suppose to flow from affections towards our fellow creatures. Pru-
dence, if it is only employed in promoting private interest, is never imagined to
be a virtue." In these things Dr. Turnbull expressly agrees with Mr. Hutche-
son, who is his admired author.*
* Moral Philosophy p, 112—115, p. 142, et alih passim.
ORIGINAL SIN. 383
If a virtuous disposition or affection is before acts that proceed from it then
they are before those virtuous acts of choice which proceed from it. And
therefore there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should
be the effect of choice : and so no such supposed necessity can be a good ob-
jection against such a disposition's being natural, or from a kind of instinct,
implanted in the mind in its creation. Agreeable to what Mr. Hutcheson says
[Ibid. Section III. p. 196, 197) : " I know not," says he, " for what reason some
will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct or passions. But
how do they help themselves 1 They say, virtue arises from reason. What is
reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end ? The ultimate end
proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this
certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another in-
stinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of vir-
tue, as the instinct towards private happiness ? If it be said, that actions from
instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as
strongly against the actions which flow from self-love."
And if we consider what Dr. Taylor declares as his own notion of the essence,
of virtue, we shall find, what he so confidently and often affirms, of its being essen-
tial to all virtue, that it should follow choice and proceed from it, is no less repug-
nant to that, than it is to the nature of things, and the general notions of mankind.
For it is his notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson's, that the essence of virtue lies
in good affection, and particularly in benevolence or love ; as he very fully de-
clares in these words in his Key,* " That the word that signifies goodness and mer-
cy should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we con-
sider that love is the fulfilling of the law. Goodness, according to the sense of
Scripture, and the nature of things, includes all moral rectitude , which, I reckon,
may every part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into this single
principle." If it be so indeed, then certainly no act whatsoever can have moral
rectitude, but what proceeds from this principle. And consequently no act of
volition or choice can have any moral rectitude, that takes place before this
principle exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection
and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the
fruit of preceding choice. This brings his scheme to an evident contradiction.
For no act of choice can be virtuous but what proceeds from a principle of be-
nevolence or love ; for he insists that all genuine, moral rectitude, in every part
of it, is resolved into this single principle ; and yet the principle of benevolence
itself cannot be virtuous, unless it proceeds from choice, for he affirms, that
nothing can have the nature of virtue but wrhat comes from choice. So that
virtuous love, as the principle of all virtue, must go before virtuous choice, and
be the principle or spring of it; and yet virtuous choice must go before
virtuous benevolence, and be the spring of that. If a virtuous act of choice
goes before a principle of benevolence, and produces it, then this virtuous
act is something distinct from that principle which follows it, and is its effect.
So that here is at least one part of virtue, yea, the spring and source of all
virtue, viz., a virtuous choice, that cannot be resolved into that single principle
of love.
Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. Taylor, p. 128, says, " The cause
of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth ; or which pro-
ceedeth from it :" and so he argues, that if the effect be bad, the cause alone is
sinful. According to which reasoning,* when the effect is good, the cause alone
* Marginal Note annexed to % 358.
384 ORIGINAL SIN.
is righteous or virtuous : to the cause is to be ascribed all the praise of the good
effect it produceth. And by the same reasoning it will follow, that if, as Dr.
Taylor says, Adam must choose to be righteous, before he was righteous, and if
it be essential to the nature of righteousness or moral rectitude, that it be the
effect of choice, and hence a principle of benevolence cannot have moral recti-
tude, unless it proceeds from choice ; then not to the principle of benevolence,
which is the effect, but to the foregoing choice alone is to be ascribed all the
virtue or righteousness that is in the case. And so, instead of all moral rectitude
in every part of it, being resolved into that single principle of benevolence, no
moral rectitude, in any part of it, is to be resolved into that principle ; but all
is to be resolved into the foregoing choice, which is the cause.
But yet it follows from these inconsistent principles, that there is no moral
rectitude or virtue in that first act of choice, that is the cause of all consequent
virtue. This follows two ways : 1. Because every part of virtue lies in the
benevolent principle, which is the effect, and therefore no part of it can lie in
the cause. 2. The choice of virtue, as to the first act at least, can have no
virtue or righteousness at all, because it does not proceed from any foregoing
choice. For Dr. Taylor insists that a man must first have reflection and choice,
before he can have righteousness, and that it is essential to holiness that it pro-
ceed from choice. So that the first choice of holiness, which holiness proceeds
from, can have no virtue at all, because by the supposition it does not proceed
from choice, being the first choice. Hence if it be essential to holiness, that it
proceeds from choice, it must proceed from an unholy choice ; unless the first
holy choice can be before itself, or there be a virtuous act of choice before that
which is first of all.
And with respect to Adam, let us consider how, upon Dr. Taylor's principles,
it was not possible he ever should have any such thing as righteousness, by any
means at all. In the state wherein God created him, he could have no such
thing as love to God, or any love or benevolence in his heart. For if so, there
would have been original righteousness ; there would have been genuine moral
rectitude : nothing would have been wanting ; for our author says, True, gen-
uine, moral rectitude, in every part of it, is to be resolved into this single princi-
ple. But if he were wholly without any such thing as love to God, or any
virtuous love, how should he come by virtue ? The answer doubtless will be,
by act of choice : he must first choose to be virtuous. But what if he did choose
to be virtuous ? It could not be from love to God, or any virtuous principle,
that he chose it ; for, by the supposition, he has no such principle in his heart :
and if he chooses it without such a principle, still, according to this author, there
is no virtue in his choice ; for all virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that
single principle of love. Or will he say, there may be produced in the heart a
virtuous benevolence by an act or acts of choice, that are not virtuous 1 But
this does not consist with what he implicitly asserts, that to the cause ajone is to
be ascribed what is in the effect. So that there is no way that can possibly be
devised, in consistence with Dr. Taylor's scheme, in which Adam ever could have
any righteousness, or could ever either obtain any principle of virtue, or per-
form any one virtuous act.
These confused, inconsistent assertions, concerning virtue and moral rectitude,
arise from the absurd notions in vogue, concerning Freedom of Will, as if it
consisted in the will's self-determining power, supposed to be necessary to moral
agency, virtue and vice. The absurdities of which, with the grounds of these
errors, and what the truth is respecting these matters, with the evidences of it,
I have, according to my ability, fully and largely considered, in my Inquiry on
ORIGINAL SIN. 385
that subject ; to which I must refer the reader, who desires further satisfaction,
and is willing to give himself the trouble of reading that discourse.
Having considered this great argument, and pretended demonstration of Dr.
Taylor's against original righteousness ; I proceed to the proofs of the doctrine.
And in the first place, I would consider, whether there be not evidence of it in
the three first chapters of Genesis : or, whether the history there delivered, does
not lead us to suppose, that our first parents were created in a state of moral
rectitude and holiness.
I. This history leads us to suppose, Adam's sin, with relations to the forbid-
den fruit, was the first sin he committed. Which could not have been, had he
not always, till then, been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment of
his existence, and consequently, created, or brought into existence righteous. In
a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly
innocent, as to be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there can
no more be any medium between sin and righteousness, or between a being right
and being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium between straight
and crooked, in a natural sense. Adam was brought into existence capable of
acting immediately, as a moral agent, and therefore he was immediately under
a rule of right action : he was obliged as soon as he existed to act right. And
if he was obliged to act right as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then
to be inclined to act right. Dr. Taylor says, p. 166, S., "Adam could
not sin without a sinful inclination."* And just for the same reason he could
not do right, without an inclination to right action. And as he was obliged to
act right from the first moment of his existence, and did do so till he sinned in
the affair of the forbidden fruit, he must have an inclination or disposition of
heart to do right the first moment of his existence; and that is the same as to
be created or brought into existence, with an inclination to right action, or which
is the same thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of heart.
Here it will be in vain to say, it is true that it was Adam's duty to have a
good disposition or inclination, as soon as it was possible to be obtained, in the
nature of things ; but as it could not be without time to establish such a habit,
which requires antecedent thought, reflection, and repeated right action ; there-
fore all that Adam could be obliged to in the first place, was to reflect and con-
sider things in a right manner, and apply himself to right action, in order to ob-
tain a right disposition. For this supposes, that even this reflection and consid-
eration, which he was obliged to, was right action. Surely he was obliged to
it no otherwise than as a thing that was right ; and therefore he must have an
inclination to this right action immediately, before he could perform those first
right actions. And as the inclination to them should be right, the principle or
disposition from which he performed even these actions, must be good ; other-
wise the actions would not be right in the sight of him who looks at the heart ;
nor would they answer the man's obligations, or be a doing his duty, if he had
done them for some sinister end, and not from a regard to God and his duty. There-
fore there must be a regard to God and his duty implanted in him at his first exist-
ence ; otherwise it is certain he would have done nothing from a regard to God
and his duty ; no, not so much as to reflect and consider, and try to obtain such a
disposition. The very supposition of a disposition to right action being first ob-
tained by repeated right action, is grossly inconsistent with itself; for it supposes
a course of right action, before there is a disposition to perform any right action.
* This is doubtless true ; for although there was no natural, sinful inclination in Adam, yet an incli-
nation to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit, was forgotten in him by the delusion and error he was led
Into, and this inclination to eat the forbidden fruit, must precede his actual eating.
Vol II 49
386 ORIGINAL SIN.
These are no invented quibbles or sophisms. If God expected of Adam any
obedience or duty to him at all, when he first made him, whether it was in re-
flecting, considering, or any way exerting the faculties he had given him, then
God expected he should immediately exercise love and regard to him. For how
could it be expected, that Adam should have a strict and perfect regard to God's
commands and authority, and his duty to him, when he had no love nor regard
to him in his heart, nor could it be expected he should have any ? If Adam
fronr the beginning did his duty to God, and had more respect to the will of his
Creator than to other things, and as much respect to him as he ought to have ;
then from the beginning he had a supreme and perfect respect and love to God ;
and if so, he was created with such a principle. There is no avoiding the con-
sequence. Not only external duties, but internal duties, such as summarily
consist in love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he existed, if
any duty at all was required. For it is most apparently absurd, to talk of a spir-
itual being, with the faculties of understanding and will, being required to per-
form external duties, without internal. Dr. Taylor himself observes, that love
is the fulfilling of the law, and that all moral rectitude, even every part of it, must
be resolved into that single principle. Therefore, if any morally right act at all,
reflection, consideration, or any thing else, was required of Adam immediately
on his first existence, and was performed as required ; then he must, the first
moment of his existence, have his heart possessed of that principle of divine
love ; which implies the whole of moral rectitude in every part of it, according
to our author's own doctrine ; and so the whole of moral rectitude or righteous-
ness must begin with his existence ; which is the thing taught in the doctrine
of Original Righteousness.
And let us consider how it could be otherwise, than that Adam was always,
in every moment of his existence, obliged to exercise such regard or respect of
heart towards every object or thing, as was agreeable to the apparent merit of
that object. For instance, would it not at any time have been a becoming thing
in Adam, on the exhibition to his mind of God's infinite goodness to him, for
him to have exercised answerable gratitude, and the contrary have been unbe-
coming and odious ? And if something had been presented to Adam's view,
transcendently amiable in itself, as for instance, the glorious perfection of the
divine nature, would it not have become him to love, relish and delight in it ?
Would not such an object have merited this ? And if the view of an object so ami-
able in itself did not affect his mind with complacence, would it not, according to
the plain dictates of our understanding, have shown an unbecoming temper
of mind ?
To say that he had not had time, by culture, to form and establish a good
disposition or relish, is not what would have taken off the disagreeableness and
odiousness of the temper. And if there had been never so much time, I do not
see how it could be expected he should improve it aright, in order to obtain a
good disposition, if he had not already some good disposition to engage him
to it.
That belonging to the will and disposition of the heart, which is in itself
either odious or amiable, unbecoming or decent, always would have been Adam's
virtue or sin, in any moment of his existence ; if there be any such thing as vir-
tue or vice, by which nothing can be meant, but that in our moral disposition and
behavior, which is becoming or unbecoming, amiable or odious.
Human nature must be created with some dispositions ; a disposition to relish
some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and
disagreeable ; otherwise it must be without any such thing as inclination or
ORIGINAL SIN. 387
will : it must be perfectly indifferent, without preference, without choice or
aversion towards any thing as agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any
concreated dispositions at all, they must be either right or WTong, either agree-
able or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had at first the highest
relish of those things that were most excellent and beautiful, a disposition to
have the quickest and highest delight in those things that were most worthy of
it, then his dispositions were morally right and amiable, and never can be decent
and excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those
things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious
And it is evident there can be no medium between these.
II. This notion of Adam's being created without a principle of holiness ir.
his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. Taylor's scheme, is inconsistent with what
the history, in the beginning of Genesis, leads us to suppose of the great favore
and smiles of heaven, which Adam enjoyed while he remained in innocency.
The Mosaic account suggests to us that till Adam sinned he was in happy cir-
cumstances, surrounded with testimonies and fruits of God's favor. This is
implicitly owned by Dr. Taylor, when he says, page 252, " That in the dispen-
sation our first parents were under before the fall, they were placed in a condi-
tion proper to engage their gratitude, love and obedience." But it will follow
on our author's principles, that Adam, while in innocency, was placed in far
worse circumstances than he was in after his disobedience, and infinitely worse
than his posterity are in ; under unspeakably greater disadvantages for the
avoiding of sin, and the performance of duty. For by his doctrine, Adam's
posterity come into the world with their hearts as free from any propensity to
sin as he, and he wras made as destitute of any propensity to righteousness
as they ; and yet God, in favor to them, does great things to restrain them frorr
sin, and excite them to virtue, which he never did for Adam in innocency, bu.
laid him, in the highest degree, under contrary disadvantages.
God, as an instance of his great favor, and fatherly love to man, since the
fall, has denied him the ease and pleasures of Paradise, which gratified and
allured his senses, and bodily appetites ; that he might diminish his temptations
to sin. And as a still greater means to restrain from sin, and promote virtue, has
subjected him to labor, toil and sorrow in the world ; and not only so, but as a
means to promote his spiritual and eternal good far beyond this, has doomed him
to death : and when all this was found insufficient, he, in further prosecution of
the designs of his love, shortened men's lives exceedingly, made them twelve or
thirteen times shorter than in the first ages. And yet this, with all the innumer-
able calamities, which God in great favor to mankind has brought on the world,
whereby their temptations are so vastly cut short, and the means and induce-
ments to virtue heaped one upon another, to so great a degree, all have proved
insufficient, now for so many thousand years together, to restrain from wicked-
ness in any considerable degree ; innocent human nature, all along, coming into
the world with the same purity and harmless dispositions that our first parents
had in Paradise. What vast disadvantages indeed then must Adam and Eve
have been in, that had no more in their nature to keep them from sin, or incline
them to virtue, than their posterity, and yet were without all those additional
and extraordinary means ! Not only without such exceeding great means as
we now have, when our lives are made so very short, but having vastly less ad-
vantages than their antediluvian posterity, who to prevent their being wicked,
and to make them good, had so much labor and toil, sweat and sorrow, briers
and thorns, with a body gradually decaying and returning to the dust ; when
our first parents had the extreme disadvantage of being placed in the midst of
388 ORIGINAL SIN.
so many and exceeding great temptations, not only without toil or sorrow, pain
or disease, to humble and mortify them, and a sentence of death to wean them
from the world, but in the midst of the most exquisite and alluring sensitive de-
lights, the reverse in every respect, and to the highest degree, of that most
gracious state of requisite means, and great advantages, which mankind now
enjoy ! If mankind now under these vast restraints, and great advantages, are
not restrained from general, and as it were universal wickedness, how could it
be expected that Adam and Eve, created with no better hearts than men bring
into the world now, and destitute of all these advantages, and in the midst of
all contrary disadvantages, should escape it ?
These things are not agreeable to Moses' account ; which represents a hap-
py state of peculiar favors and blessings before the fall, and the curse coming
afterwards ; but according to this scheme, the curse was before the fall, and
the great favors and testimonies of love followed the apostasy. And the curse
before the fall must be a curse with a witness, being to so high a degree the
reverse of such means, means so necessary for such a creature as innocent man,
and in all their multitude and fulness proving too little. Paradise therefore
must be a mere delusion ! There was indeed a great show of favor, in placing
man in the midst of such delights. But this delightful garden it seems, with
all its beauty and sweetness, was in its real tendency worse than the apples of
So~dom : it was but a mere bait (God forbid the blasphemy) the more effectu-
ally enticing by its beauty and deliciousness, to Adam's eternal ruin ; which
might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing that he was the first man
that ever existed, having no superiority of capacity to his posterity, and wholly
without the advantage of the observations, experiences, and improvements of
preceding generations, which his posterity have.
I proceed now to take notice of an additional proof of the doctrine we are
upon, from another part of the holy Scripture. A very clear text for original
righteousness is that in Eccles. vii. 29, " Lo, this only have I found, that God
made man upright ; but they have sought out many inventions."
It is an observation of no weight which Dr. Taylor makes on this text,
that the word man is commonly used to signify mankind in general, or man-
kind collectively taken. It is true it often signifies the species of mankind ; but
then it is used to signify the species, with regard to its duration and succession
from its beginning, as well as with regard to its extent. The English word
mankind is used to signify the species : but what if it be so ? Would it be an
improper or unintelligible way of speaking, to say, that when God first made
mankind, he placed them in a pleasant paradise (meaning in their first parents),
but now thev live in the midst of briers and thorns ? And it is certain, that to
speak of God's making mankind in such a meaning, viz., his giving the species
an existence in their first parents, at the creation of the world, is agreeable to
the Scripture use of such an expresssion. As in Deut. iv. 32, " Since the day
that God created man upon the earth." Job xx. 4, " Knowest thou not this of
old, since man was placed upon the earth." Isa. xlv. 12, " I have made the
earth, and created man upon it : I, even my hands, have stretched out the heav-
ens." Jer*. xxvii. 5, " I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are
upon the ground, by my great power." All these texts speak of God's making
man, by the word man, signifying the species of mankind ; and yet they all
plainly have respect to God's making man at first, when God made the earth
and stretched out the heavens, and created the first parents of mankind. In all
these places the same word Adam is used, as here in Ecclesiastes ; and in the
last of them, used with he emphaticwn, as it is here; though Dr. Taylor omits
ORIGINAL SIN. 389
it, when he tells us, he gives us a catalogue of all the places in Sciipturc
where the word is used. And it argues nothing to the doctor's purpose, that
the pronoun they is used. They have sought out many inventions. Which is
properly applied to the species, which God made at first upright : God having
begun the species with more than one, and it being continued in a multitude.
As Christ speaks of the two sexes, in the relation of man and wife, as continued
in successive generations. Matth. xix. 4, " He that made them at the begin-
ning, made them male and female ;" having reference to Adam and Eve.
No less impertinent, and also very unfair, is his criticism on the word jas-
har, translated upright. Because the word sometimes signifies right, he would
from thence infer, that it does not properly signify a moral rectitude, even
when used to express the character of moral agents. He might as well insist,
that the English word upright, sometimes, and in its most original meaning,
signifies right up, or in an erect posture, therefore it does not properly signify
any moral character, when applied to moral agents ; and indeed less unreason-
ably ; for it is known, that in the Hebrew language, in a peculiar manner,
most words used to signify moral and spiritual things, are taken from things
external and natural. The word jashar is used, as applied to moral agents, or
to the words and actions of such (if I have not misieckoned*), about a hun-
dred and ten times in Scripture ; and about a hundred of them, without all dis-
pute, to signify virtue, or moral rectitude (though Dr. Taylor is pleased to say,
the word does not generally signify a moral character), and for the most part it
signifies true virtue, or virtue in such a sense, as distinguishes it from all false
appearances of virtue, or what is only virtue in some respects, but not truly so
in the sight of God. It is used at least eighty times in this sense : and scarce
any word can be found in the Hebrew language more significant of this. It is
thus used copstantly in Solomon's writings (where it is often found), when used
to express a character or property of moral agents. And it is beyond all con-
troversy, that he uses it in this place, in the 7th of Ecelesiastes, to signify a mo-
ral rectitude, or character of real virtue and integrity. For the wise man, in
this context, is speaking of men with respect to their moral character, inquiring
into the corruption and depravity of mankind ( as is confessed p. 184), and he
here declares, he had not found more than one among a thousand of the right
stamp, truly and thoroughly virtuous and upright ; which appeared a strange
thing ! But in this text he clears God, and lays the blame on man : man was
not made thus at first. He was made of the right stamp, altogether good in
his kind (as all other things were), truly and thoroughly virtuous, as he ought
to be ; but they have sought out many inventions. Which last expression sig-
nifies things sinful, or morally evil ; as is confessed, p. 185. And this expres-
sion, used to signify those moral evils he found in man,which he sets in opposi-
tion to the uprightness man was made in, shows, that by uprightness he means
the most true.and sincere goodness. The word rendered inventions, most natu-
rally and aptly signifies the subtle devices, and crooked and deceitful ways of
hypocrites, wherein they are of a character contrary to men of simplicity and
godly sincerity ; who, though wise in that which is good, are simple concerning
evil. Thus the same wise man, in Prov. xii. 2, sets a truly good man in oppo-
sition to a man of wicked devices, whom God will condemn. Solomon had
occasion to observe many who put on an artful disguise and fair show of good-
ness ; but on searching thoroughly, he found very few truly upright. As he says,
Prov. xx. 6, " Most men will proclaim every one his own goodness : but a
* Making use of Buxford's Concordance, which, according to the author's professed design, directs t<»
all the places where the word is used.
390 ORIGINAL SIN.
faithful man wLo can find V So that it is exceeding- plain, that by uprightness,
in this place in Ecclesiastes, Solomon means true moral goodness.
What our author urges concerning many inventions being spoken of,
whereas Adam's eating the forbidden fruit was but one invention, is of as little
weight as the rest of what he says on this text. For the many lusts and cor-
ruption^ of mankind, appearing in innumerable ways of sinning, are all the
consequence of that sin. The great corruption men are fallen into by the orig-
inal apostasy, appears in the multitude of wicked ways they are inclined to.
And therefore these are properly mentioned as the fruits and evidences of the
greatness of that apostasy and corruption.
SECTION II .
Concerning the kind of Death, threatened to our first Parents, if they should eat of the
Forbidden Fruit.
•
Dr. Taylor, in his observations on the three first chapters of Genesis, says,
p. 7, " The threatening to man, in case of transgression was, that he should
surely die. Death is the losing of life. Death is opposed to life, and must be
understood according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed. Now
the death here threatened can, with any certainty, be opposed only to the life
God gave Adam, when he created him, verse 7. Any thing besides this, must
be pure conjecture, without solid foundation."
To this I would say, it is true, death is opposed to life, and must be understood
according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed : but does it therefore
follow, that nothing can be meant by it but the loss of life ? Misery is opposed
to happiness, and sorrow is in Scripture often opposed to joy ; but can we con-
clude from thence, that nothing is meant in Scripture by sorrow, but the loss of
joy ? Or that there is no more in misery, than the loss or absence of happiness ?
And if it be so, that the death threatened to Adam can, with certainty, be op-
posed only to the life given to Adam, when God created him ; I think, a state
of perfect, perpetual and hopeless misery is properly opposed to that state
Adam was in, when God created him. For I suppose it will not be denied, that
the life Adam had, was truly a happy life ; happy in perfect innocency, in the
favor of his Maker, surrounded with the happy fruits and testimonies of his love :
and I think it has been proved, that he also was happy in a state of perfect right-
eousness. And nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreeable to a very com-
mon acceptation of the word life, in Scripture, that it be understood as signify-
ing a state of excellent and happy existence. Now that which is most opposite
to that life and state Adam was created in, is a state of total, confirmed wicked-
ness, and perfect hopeless misery, under the divine displeasure and curse ; not
excluding temporal death, or the destruction of the body, as an introduction
to it.
And besides, that which is much more evident, than any thing Dr. Taylor
says on this head, is this, viz., that the death, which was to come on Adam, as
the punishment of his disobedience, was opposed to that life, wThich he would
have had as the reward of his obedience in case he had not sinned. Obedience
and disobedience are contraries : and the threatenings and promises, that are
sanctions of a law, are set in direct opposition : and the promised rewards and
threatened punishments, are what are most properly taken as each other's oppo-
sites. But none will deny, that the life which would have been Adam's reward,
ORIGINAL SIN. 391
it he had persisted in obedience, was eternal life. And therefore we argue
justly, that the death which stands opposed to that life (Dr. Taylor himself being
judge, p. 120, S ,) is manifestly eternal death, a death widely different from the
death we now die — to use his own words. If Adam, for his persevering obedience,
was to have had everlasting life and happiness, in perfect holiness, union with
his Maker, and enjoyment of his favor, and this was the life which was to be
confirmed by the tree of life ; then doubtless the death threatened in case of dis-
obedience, which stands in direct opposition to this, was a being given over to
everlasting wickedness and misery, in separation from God, and in enduring his
wrath.
And it may with the greatest reason be supposed, that when God first made
mankind, and made known to them the methods of his moral government to-
wards them, in the revelation he made of himself to the natural head of the whole
species ; and let him know, that obedience to him was expected as his duty ;
and enforced this duty with the sanction of a threatened punishment, called by
the name of death ; I say, we may with the greatest reason suppose in such a
case, that by death was meant the same death which God esteemed to be the
most proper punishment of the sin of mankind, and which he speaks of under
that name, throughout the Scripture, as the proper wages of the sin of man, and
was always from the beginning understood to be so in the church of God. It
would be strange indeed, if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange,
if when the law of God was first given, and enforced by the threatening of a
punishment, nothing at all had been mentioned of that great punishment, ever
spoken of under the name of death (in the revelations which he has given to
mankind from age to age), as the proper punishment of the sin of mankind. And
it would be no less strange, if when the punishment which was mentioned and
threatened on that occasion, was called by the same name, even death, yet we
must not understand it to mean the same thing, but something infinitely diverse,
and infinitely more inconsiderable.
But now let us consider what that death is, which the Scripture ever speaks
of as the proper wages of the sin of mankind, and is spoken of as such by God's
saints in all ages of the church, from the first beginning of a written revelation,
to the conclusion of it. I will begin with the New Testament. When the
Apostle Paul says, Rom. vi. 23, the wages of sin is death, Dr. Taylor tells us,
p. 120. S., that " this means eternal death, the second death, a death widely dif-
ferent from the death we now die." The same apostle speaks of death as the
proper punishment due for sin, in Rom. vii. 5, and chap. viii. 13, 2 Cor. iii. 7,
1 Cor. xv. 56. . In all which places, Dr. Taylor himself supposes the apostle
to intend eternal death* And when the Apostle James speaks of death as the
proper reward, fruit, and end of sin, Jam. i. 15, " Sin when it is finished
bringeth forth death," it is manifest that our author supposes eternal destruc-
tion to be meant.f And the Apostle John, agreeable to Dr. Taylor's sense, speaks
of the second death as that which sin unrepented of will bring all men to at
last. Rev. ii. 11, xx. 6, 14, and xxi. 8. In the same sense the Apostle John
uses the word in his 1st epistle, chap. iii. 14, " We know, that we have passed
from death to life, because we love the brethren : he that hateth his brother,
abideth in death.
In the same manner Christ used the word from time to time when he was
on earth, and spake concerning the punishment and issue of sin. John v.
* See p. 78. Note on Rom. vii. 5, and Note on verse 6. Note on Rom. v. 20. Note on Rom. vij. 8.
t By comparing what he says, p. 126, with what he often says of that death and destruction which
is the demerit and end of personal sin which he says is the second death, or eternal destruction.
392 ORIGINAL SIN.
24, " He that heareth my word, and believeth, &c, hath everlasting life ; and
shall not come into condemnation ; but is passed from death to life." Where,
according to Dr. Taylor' own way of arguing, it cannot be the death which we
now die, that Christ speaks of, but eternal death, because it is set in opposition
.0 everlasting life. John vi. 50, " This is the bread which cometh down from
.leaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die." Chap. viii. 51, " Verily,
verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying, he shall never see death"
Chap. xi. 26, " And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die."
In which places it is plain Christ does not mean that believers shall never see
temporal death. See also Matth. x. 28, and Luke x. 28. In like manner, the
word was commonly used by the prophets of old, when they spake of death as
the proper end and recompense of sin. So, abundantly by the Prophet Ezekiel.
Ezek. iii. 18, " When I say unto the wicked man, thou shalt surely die." In
the original it is, Dying thou shalt die. The same form of expression,
which God used in the threatening to Adam. We have the same words again,
chap, xxxiii. 18. In chap, xviii. 4, it is said, The soul that sinneth, it shall die. To
the like purpose are chap. iii. 19, 20, and xviii. 4, 9, 13, 17—21, 24, 26, 28,
chap, xxxiii. 8, 9, 12, 14, 19. And that temporal death is not meant in these
places is plain, because it is promised most absolutely, that the righteous shall
not die the death spoken of. Chap, xviii. 21, He shall surely live, he shall
not die. So verses 9, 17, 19, and 22, and chap. iii. 21. And it is evident the
Prophet Jeremiah uses the word in the same sense. Jer. xxxi. 30, Every one
shall die for his own iniquity. And the same death is spoken of by the Pro-
phet Isaiah. Isai. xi. 4, With the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.
See also chap. lxvi. 16, with verse 24. Solomon, who we must suppose was
thoroughly acquainted with the sense in which the word was used by the wise,
and by the ancients, continually speaks of death as the proper fruit, issue, and
recompense of sin, using the word only in this sense. Prov. xi. 19, As right-
eousness tendeth to life, so he that pursueth evil, pursueth it to his own death.
So chap. v. 5, 6, 23, vii. 27, viii. 36, ix. 18, x. 21, xi. 19, xiv. 12, xv. 10, xviii.
21, xix. 16, xxi. 16, and xxiii. 13, 14. In these places he cannot mean
temporal death, for he often speaks of it as a punishment of the wicked, wherein
the righteous shall certainly be distinguished from them ; as in Prov. xii. 28,
In the way of righteousness is life, and in the pathway thereof is no death.
So in chap. x. 2, xi. 4, xiii. 14, xiv. 27", god many other places. But we find
this same wise man observes, that as to temporal death, and temporal events in
general, there is no distinction, but that they happen alike to good and bad.
Eccl. ii. 14, 15, 16, viii. 14, and ix. 2, 3. His words are remarkable in Eccl.
vii. 15, " There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a
wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness." So we find David, in
the Book of Psalms, uses the word death in the same sense, when he speaks of
it as the proper wages and issue of sin. Psal. xxxiv. 21, " Evil shall slay
the wicked." He speaks of it as a certain thing, Psal. cxxxix. 19, " Surely
thou wilt slay the wicked, 0 God." And he speaks of it as a thing wherein
the wicked are distinguished from the righteous. Psalm lxix. 28, " Let them
be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written with the righteous."
And thus we find the word death used in the Pentateuch, or Books of Moses ;
in which part of the Scripture it is, that we have the account of the threatening
of death to Adam. WThen death, in these books, is spoken of as the proper fruit,
and appointed reward of sin, it is to be understood of eternal death. So Deut.
xxx. 15, " See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and
evil." Verse 19, " I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that
ORIGINAL SIN. 393
1 have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing." The life that if
spoken of here, is doubtless the same that is spoken of in Levit. xviii. 5, " Ye
shall therefore keep my statutes and my judgments, which if a man do, he shall
live in them." This the apostle understands of eternal life, as is plain by Rom.
x. 5, and Gal. iii. 12. But that the death threatened for sin in the law of Moses,
meant eternal death, is what Dr. Taylor abundantly declares. So in his Note
on Rom. v. 20, Par. p. 291, " Such a constitution the law of Moses was, sub-
jecting those who were under it to death for every transgression : meaning by
death eternal death" These are his words. The like he asserts in many other
places. When it is said, in the place now mentioned, J have set before thee life
and death, blessing and cursing, without doubt, the same blessing and cursing
is meant which God had already set before them with such solemnity, in the
27th and 28th chapters, where we have the sum of the curses in those last
words of the 27th chapter, " Cursed is every one, which confirmeth not all the
words of this law to do them." "Which the apostle speaks of as a threatening
of eternal death, and with him Dr. Taylor himself.* In this sense also Job and
his friends spake of death, as the wages and end of sin, who lived before any
written revelation, and had their religion and their phraseology about the things
of religion from the ancients.
If any should insist upon it as an objection, against supposing that death
was intended to signify eternal death in the threatening to Adam, that this use
of the word is figurative ; I reply, that though this should be allowed, yet it is
by no means so figurative as many other phrases used in the history contained in
these three chapters ; as when it is said, God said, Let there be light : God said,
Let there be a jirmanent, &c, as though God spake such words with a voice.
So when it is said, God called the light, day : God called the firmament, heaven,
&c. : God rested on the seventh day ; as though he had been weary, and then
rested. And when it is said, They heard the voice of God walking ; as though
the Deity had two feet, and took steps on the ground. Dr. Taylor supposes,
that when it is said of Adam and Eve, " Their eyes were, opened, and they saw
that they wrere naked ;" by the wrord naked is meant a state of guilt ; page 12.
"Which sense of the word naked, is much further from the common use of the
word, than the supposed sense of the word death. So this author supposes the
promise concerning the seed of the woman's bruising the serpent's head, while
the serpent should bruise his heel, is to be understood of" the Messiah's destroy-
ing the power and sovereignty of the Devil, and receiving some slight hurt
from him ;" pages 15, 16. Which makes the sentence full of figures, vastly
more beside the common use of words. And why might not God deliver
threatenings to our first parents in figurative expressions, as well as promises ?
Many other strong figures are used in these chapters.
But indeed, there is no necessity of supposing the word death, or
the Hebrew word so translated, if ^ used in the manner that has been
supposed, to have been figurative at all. It does not appear but that this
word, in its true and proper meaning, might signify perfect misery, and
sensible destruction, though the word was also applied to signify something
more external and visible. There are many words in our language, such as
heart, sense, discovery, conception, light, and many others, which are applied
to signify external things, as that muscular part of the body called heart ;
external feeling, called sense; the sight of the bodily eye, called view ; the
finding of a thing by its being uncovered, called discovery ; the first beginning
* Note on Rom. v. 20. Par. p. 291—299.
Vol. II. 50
394 ORIGINAL SIN.
of the fetus in the womb, called conception ; and the rays of the sun, called
light : yet these words do as truly and properly signify other things of a more
spiritual, internal nature, as those: such as the disposition, affection, percep-
tion, and thought of the mind, and manifestation and evidence to the soul.
Common use, which governs the propriety of language, makes the latter things
to be as much signified by those words, in their proper meaning, as the former.
It is especially common in the Hebrew, and I suppose, other oriental languages,
that the same word that signifies something external, does no less properly and
usually signify something more spiritual. So the Hebrew words used for breath,
have such a double signification : Neshama signifies both breath and the soul,
and the latter as commonly as the former. Ruach is used for breath or wind,
but yet more commonly signifies spirit. Nephesh is used for breath, but yet
more commonly signifies soul. So the word lebh, heart, no less properly signi-
fies the soul, especially with regard to the will and affections, than that part of
the body so called. The word shalom, which we render peace, no less properly
signifies prosperity and happiness, than mutual agreement. The word transla-
ted life, signifies the natural life of the body, and also the perfect and happy
sfate of sensible, active being, and the latter as properly as the former. So the
word death signifies destruction, as to outward sensibility, activity and enjoyment ;
but it has most evidently another signification, which, in the Hebrew tongue, is
no less proper, viz., perfect, sensible, hopeless ruin and misery.
It is therefore wholly without reason urged, that death properly signifies
only the loss of this present life ; and that therefore nothing else was meant by
that death which was threatened for eating the forbidden fruit. Nor does it at
all appear but that Adam, who, from what God said concerning the seed of the
woman, that was so very figurative, could understand, that relief was promised as
to the death which was threatened (as Dr. Taylor himself supposes), understood
the death that was threatened in the more important sense ; especially seeing
temporal death, as it is originally, and in itself, is evermore, excepting as
changed by divine grace, an introduction or entrance into that gloomy, dismal
state of misery, which is shadowed forth by the dark and awful circumstances
of this death, naturally suggesting to the mind the most dreadful state of hope-
less, sensible ruin.
As to that objection which some have made, that the phrase, dying thou shalt
die, is several times used in the Books of Moses, to signify temporal death, it
can be of no force : for it has been shown already, that the same phrase Ls
sometimes used in Scripture to signify eternal death, in instances much more
parallel with this. But indeed nothing can be certainly argued concerning the
nature of the thing intended, from its being expressed in such a manner. For
it is evident that such repetitions of a word in the Hebrew language, are no
more than an emphasis upon a word in the more modern languages, to signify
the great degree of a thing, the importance of it, or the certainty of it, &c.
When we would signify and impress these, we commonly put an emphasis on
our words : instead of this, the Hebrews, when they would express a thing
strongly, repeated or doubled the word, the more to impress the mind of the
hearer ; as may be plain to every one in the least conversant with the Hebrew
Bible. The repetition in the threatening to Adam, therefore, only implies the
solemnity and importance of the threatening. But God may denounce either
eternal or temporal death with peremptoriness and solemnity, and nothing can
certainly be inferred concerning the nature of the thing threatened, because it
is threatened with emphasis, more than this, that the threatening is much to be
regarded. Though it be true, that it might in an especial manner be expected
ORIGINAL SIN. 395
that a threatening of eternal death would be denounced with great emphasis,
such a threatening being infinitely important, and to be regarded above all others.
SECTION III.
Wherein it is inquired, whether there be any thing in the history of the three first
chapters of Genesis, which should lead us to suppose that God, in his constitution
with Adam, dealt with mankind in general, as included in their first father, and that
the threatening of death, in case he should eat the forbidden fruit, had respect not
only to him, but his posterity ?
Dr. Taylor, rehearsing that threatening to Adam, Thou shalt surely die, and
giving us his paraphrase of it, p. 7, 8, concludes thus : " Observe, here is not
one word relating to Adam's posterity." But it may be observed in opposition
to this, that there is scarcely one word that we have an account of, which God
ever said to Adam or Eve, but what does manifestly include their posterity in
the meaning and design of it. There is as much of a word said about Adam's
posterity in that threatening, as there is in those words of God to Adam and
Eve, Gen. i. 28, " Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and sub-
due it ;" and as much in events, to lead us to suppose Adam's posterity to be
included. There is as much of a word of his posterity in that threatening, as
in those words, verse 29, " Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed —
and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed," &c. Even when
God was about to create Adam, what he said on that occasion, had not respect
only to Adam, but to his posterity. Gen. i. 26, " Let us make man in our image,
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea," &c. And, what is more
remarkable, there is as much of a word said about Adam's posterity in the
threatening of death, as there is in that sentence, Gen. iii. 19, " Unto dust shalt
thou return." Which Dr. Taylor himself supposes to be a sentence pronounced
for the execution of that very threatening, " Thou shalt surely die ;" and which
sentence he himself also often speaks of as including Adam's posterity ; and
what is much more remarkable still, is a sentence which Dr. Taylor himself of-
ten speaks of, as including his posterity as a sentence of condemnation, as a judicial
sentence, and a sentence which God pronounced with regard to Adam's 'poster-
ity, acting the part of a Judge, and as such condemning them to temporal death.
Though he is therein utterly inconsistent with himself, inasmuch as he at the
same time abundantly insists, that death is not brought on Adam's posterity in
consequence of his sin, at all as a punishment ; but merely by the gracious dis-
posal of a Father, bestowing a benefit of the highest nature upon tfoem.*
But I shall show that I do not in any of these things falsely charge, or mis-
represent Dr. Taylor. He speaks of the sentence in chap. iii. 19, as pro-
nounced in pursuance of the threatening in the former chapter, in these words,
pages 17, 18, " The sentence upon man, verses 17, 18, 19, first affects the
earth, upon which he was to subsist : the ground should be incumbered with
many noxious weeds, and the tillage of it more toilsome ; which would oblige
the man to procure a sustenance by hard labor, till he should die, and drop
into the ground, from whence he was taken. Thus death entered by sin into
the world, and man became mortal,! according to the threatening in the former
► Page 27, £\
t The subsequent part of the quotation, the reader will ttl, meet with in the third edition of Dr. Tay.
lor, but in the second of 1741.
396 ORIGINAL SIN.
chapter." Now, if mankind becomes mortal, and must die, according to the
threatening in the former chapter, then doubtless the threatening in the former
chapter, Thou shalt die, had respect not only to Adam, but to mankind, and in-
cluded Adam's posterity. Yea, and Dr. Taylor is express in it, and very often
so, that the sentence concerning dropping into the ground, or returning to the
dust, did include Adam's posterity. So, page 20, speaking there of that sentence.
" Observe (says he), that we their posterity are in fact subjected to the afflic-
tion and mortality, here by sentence inflicted upon our first parents."Page 42, Note.
But yet men through that long tract, were all subject to death, therefore they
must be included in the sentence." The same he affirms in innumerable other
places, some of which I shall have occasion to mention presently.
The sentence which is founded on the threatening, and, as Dr. Taylor says,
according to the threatening, extends to as many as were included in the threat-
ening, and to no more. If the sentence be upon a collective subject, infinitely
(as it were), the greatest part of which were not included in the threatening,
nor were ever threatened at all by any threatening whatsoever, then certainly
this sentence is not according to the threatening, nor built upon it. If the sen-
tence be according to the threatening, then we may justly explain the threaten-
ing by the sentence ; and if we find the sentence spoken to the same person, to
whom the threatening was spoken, and spoken in the second person singular,
in like manner with the threatening, and founded on the threatening, and ac-
cording to the threatening : and if »we find the sentence includes Adam's pos-
terity, then we may certainly infer, that so did the threatening ; and hence,
that both the threatening and sentence were delivered to Adam as the public
head and representative of his posterity.
And we may also further infer from it, in another respect directly contrary
to Dr. Taylor's doctrine, that the sentence which included Adam's posterity, was
to death, as a 'punishment to that posterity, as well as to Adam himself. For a
sentence pronounced in execution of a threatening, is to a punishment. Threat-
enings are of punishments. Neither God nor man are wont to threaten others
with favors and benefits.
But lest any of this author's admirers should stand to it, that it may very
properly be said, God threatened mankind with bestowing great kindness upon
them, I would observe, that Dr. Taylor often speaks of this sentence as pro-
nounced by God on all mankind as condemning them, speaks of it as a sentence
of condemnation judicially pronounced, or a sentence which God pronounced on
all mankind acting as their judge, and in a judicial proceeding. Which he
affirms in multitudes of places. In p. 20, speaking of this sentence, which he
there says, subjects us, Adam's and Eve's posterity, to affliction and mortality,
he calls it a judicial act of condemnation. "The judicial act of condemnation
(says he) clearly implies, a taking him to pieces, and turning him to the ground
from whence he was taken." And p. 28, 29, Note, " In all the Scripture from
one end to the other, there is recorded but one judgment to condemnation, which
came upon all men, and that is, Gen. iii. 17 — 19, Dust thou art," &c. P. 40,
speaking of the same, he says, " all men are brought under condemnation." Tn
p. 27, 28, " By judgment, judgment to condemnation, it appeareth evidently to
me, he (Paul) means the being adjudged to the forementioned death; he means
the sentence of death, of a general mortality, pronounced upon mankind, in con-
sequence of Adam's first transgression. And the condemnation inflicted by the
judgment of God, answereth to, and is in effect the same thing with being dead."
P. 30, " The many, that is mankind, were subject to death by the judicial act
of God." P. 31, " Being made sinners, may very well signify, being adjudged,
ORIGINAL SIN. 397
or condemned to death. For the Hebrew word, &c, signifies to make one a
sinner by a judicial sentence, or to condemn." P. 178, Par. on Rom. v. 19,
" Upon the account of one man's disobedience, mankind were judicially consti-
tuted sinners ; that is, subjected to death, by the sentence of God the judge."
And there are many other places where he repeats the same thing. And it is
pretty remarkable, that in p. 48, 49, immediately after citing Prov. xvii. 15,
" He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, are both an
abomination to the Lord ;" and when he is careful in citing these words to put
us in mind, that it is meant of a judicial act; yet in the very next words he
supposes that God himself does so, since he constantly supposes that Adam's
posterity, whom God condemns, are innocent. His words are these, " From all
this it followeth, that as the judgment, that passed upon all men to condemna-
tion, is death's coming upon all men by the judicial act of God, upon occasion
of Adam's transgression : so," &c. And it is very remarkable, that in p. 3, 4,
7, S., he insists, " That in Scripture no action is said to be imputed, reckoned,
or accounted to any person for righteousness or CONDEMNATION, but the
proper act and deed of that person." And yet he thus continually affirms, that
all mankind are made sinners by a judicial act of God the Judge, even to con-
demnation, and judicially constituted sinners, and so subjected to a judicial sen-
tence of condemnation, on occasion of Adam's sin; and all according to the
threatening denounced to Adam, thou shalt surely die: though he supposes
Adam's posterity were not included in the threatening, and are looked upon as
perfectly innocent, and treated wholly as such.
I am sensible Dr. Taylor does not run into all this inconsistence, only through
oversight and blundering ; but that he is driven to it, to make out his matters
in his evasion of that noted paragraph in the 5th chapter of Romans ; especially
those three sentences, ver. 16, " The judgment was by one to condemnation."
Ver. 18, " By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation ;"
and ver. 19, " By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." And I
am also sensible of what he offers to salve the inconvenience, viz., " That if the
threatening had immediately been executed on Adam, he would have had no
posterity ; and that so far the possible existence of Adam's posterity fell under
the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the judge, to be disposed of as
he should think fit : and that this is the ground of the judgment to condemna-
tion, coming upon all men."* But this is trifling, to a great degree : for,
1. Suffering death, and failing of possible existence, are entirely different
things. If there had never been any such thing as sin committed, there would
have been infinite numbers of possible beings, which would have failed of ex-
istence, by God's appointment. God has appointed not to bring into existence
numberless possible worlds, each replenished with innumerable possible inhabit-
ants. But is this equivalent to God's appointing them all to suffer death ?
2. Our author represents, that by Jldam's sin, the possible existence of his
posterity fell into the hands of the judge, to be disposed of as he should think fit
But there was no need of any sin of Adam's, or any body's else, in order to their
being brought into God's hands in this respect. The future possible existence
of all created beings, is in God's hands, antecedently to the existence of any sin.
And therefore by God's sovereign appointment, infinite numbers of possible be-
ings, without any relation to Adam, or any other sinning being, do fail of their
possible existence. And if Adam had never sinned, yet it would be unreason-
able to suppose, but that innumerable multitudes of his possible posterity, would
* Pages 90, 91, 95.
398 ORIGINAL SIN.
have failed of existence by God's disposal. For will any be so unreasonable as
to imagine, that God would, and must have brought into existence as many of
his posterity as it was possible should be, if he had not sinned ? Or that in that
case, it would not have been possible, that any other persons of his posterity
should ever have existed, than those individual persons, who now actually fall
under that sentence of suffering death, and returning to the dust ?
3. We have many accounts in Scripture, which imply the actual failing of
the possible existence of innumerable multitudes of Adam's posterity, yea, ot
many more than ever come into existence. As of the possible posterity of Abel,
the possible posterity of all them that were destroyed by the flood ; and the pos-
sible posterity of the innumerable multitudes which we read of in Scripture, de-
stroyed by sword, pestilence, &c. And if the threatening to Adam reached his
posterity, in no other respect than this, that they were liable to be deprived by it of
their possible existence, then these instances are much more properly a fulfilment
of that threatening, than the suffering of death by such as actually come into
existence ; and so is that which is most properly the judgment to condemnation,
executed by the sentence of the judge, proceeding on the foot of that threatening.
But where do we ever find this so represented in Scripture 1 We read of multi-
tudes cut off for their personal sins, who thereby failed of their possible posterity.
And these are mentioned as God's judgments on them, and effects of God's
condemnation of them : but when are they ever spoken of as God's judicially
proceeding against, and condemning their possible posterity ?
4. Dr. Taylor, in what he says concerning this matter, speaks of the threat-
ening of the law delivered to Adam, which the possible existence of his posterity
fell under, as the ground of the judgment to condemnation coming upon all men.
But herein he is exceeding inconsistent with himself; for he affirms in a place
forecited, that the Scripture never speaks of any sentence of condemnation
coming upon all men, but that sentence in the third of Genesis, concerning
man's turning to dust. But according to him, the threatening of the law deliv-
ered to Adam, could not be the ground of that sentence ; for he greatly insists
upon it, that that law was entirely abrogated before that sentence was pro-
nounced, that this law at that time was not in being, had no existence to have
any such influence, as might procure a sentence of death ; and that therefore
this sentence was introduced entirely on another foot, viz., on the foot of a new
dispensation of grace. The reader may see this matter strenuously urged, and
particularly argued by him, p. 113 — 220, S. So that this sentence could not,
according to him, have the threatening of that law for its ground, as he sup-
poses ; for it never stood upon that ground. It could not be called a judgment
of condemnation under any such view ; for it could not be viewed under circum-
stances under which it never existed.
5. If it be as our author supposes, that the sentence of death on all men
comes under the notion of a judgment to condemnation by this means, viz., that
the threatening to Adam was in some respects the ground of it ; then it also
comes under the notion of a punishment : for threatenings annexed to breaches
of laws, are to punishments ; and a judgment of condemnation to the thing
threatened, must be to punishment ; and the thing condemned to, must have as
much the notion of a punishment, as the sentence has the notion of a judgment
to condemnation. But this, Dr. Taylor wholly denies : he denies that the death
sentenced to, comes as any punishment at all, but insists that it comes only as
a favor and benefit, and a fruit of fatherly love to Adam's posterity, respected,
not as guilty, but wholly innocent. So that his scheme will not admit of its
coming under the notion of a sentence to condemnation in any respect whatso-
ORIGINAL SIN 399
ever. Our author's supposition, that the possible existence of Adam's posterity
comes under the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the judge, and is
the ground of the condemnation of all men to death, implies, that death, by this
sentence, is appointed to mankind as an evil, at least negatively so ; as it is a
privation of good : for he manifestly speaks of a nonexistence as a negative
evil. But herein he is inconsistent with himself: for he continually insists, that
mankind are subjected to death only as a benefit, as has been before shown. Ac-
cording to him, death is not appointed to mankind as a negative evil, as any
cessation of existence, as any cessation or even diminution of good ; but on the
contrary, as a means of a more happy existence, and a great increase of good.
So that this evasion or salvo of Dr. Taylor's, is so far from helping the matter,
or salving the inconsistence, that it increases it.
And that the constitution or law, with the threatening of death annexed,
which was given to Adam, was to him as the head of mankind, and to his posterity
as included in him, not only follows from some of our author's own assertions,
and the plain and full declarations of the apostle, in the fifth of Romans (of
which more afterwards), which drove Dr. Taylor into such gross inconsistencies :
but the account given in the three first chapters of Genesis, directly and inevita-
bly leads us to such a conclusion.
Though the sentence, Gen. iii. 19, Unto dust thou shalt return, be not of
equal extent with the threatening in the foregoing chapter, or an execution of
the main curse of the law therein denounced ; for, that it should have been so,
would have been inconsistent with the intimations of mercy just before given :
yet it is plain, this sentence is in pursuance of that threatening, being to some-
thing that was included in it. The words of the sentence were delivered to the
same person, with the words of the threatening, and in the same manner, in like
singular terms, as much without any express mention of his posterity : and yet
it manifestly appears by the consequence, as well as all circumstances, that his
posterity were included in the words of the sentence; as is confessed on all
hands. And as the words were apparently delivered in the form of the sen-
tence of a judge, condemning for something that he was displeased with, and
ought to be condemned, viz. sin ; and as the sentence to him and his posterity
was but one, dooming to the same suffering, under the same circumstances, both
the one and the other sentenced in the same words, spoken but once, and imme-
diately to but one person, we hence justly infer, that it was the same thing to
both ; and not as Dr. Taylor suggests, p. 67, a sentence to a proper punishment
to Adam, but a mere promise of favor to his posterity.
Indeed, sometimes our author seems to suppose, that God meant the thing
denounced in this sentence, as a favor both to Adam and his posterity.* But to
his posterity, or mankind in general, who are the main subject, he ever insists,
that it was purely intended as a favor. And therefore one would have thought
the sentence should have been delivered, with manifestations and appearances of
favor, and not of anger. How could Adam understand it as a promise of great
favor, considering the manner and circumstances of the denunciation ? How
could he think, that God would go about to delude him, by clothing himself
with garments of vengeance, using words of displeasure and rebuke, setting forth
the heinousness of his crime, attended with cherubims and a flaming sword ;
when all that he meant was only higher testimonies of favor, than he had before
in a state of innocence, and to manifest fatherly love and kindness, in promises
of great blessings ? If this was the case, God's words to Adam must be under-
* Pages 25, 45, 46, S.
400 ORIGINAL SIN.
stood thus : " Because thou hast done so wickedly, hast hearkened unto the
voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying,
Thou shalt not eat of it ; therefore I will be more kind to thee than I was in thy
state of innocence, and do now appoint for thee the following great favors :
Cursed be the ground for thy sake" &c. And thus Adam must understand
what was said, unless any will say (and God forbid that any should be so blas-
phemous) that God clothed himself with appearances of displeasure, to deceive
Adam, and make him believe the contrary of what he intended, and lead him
to expect a dismal train of evil on his posterity, contrary to all reason and jus-
tice, implying the most horribly unrighteous treatment of millions of perfectly
innocent creatures. It is certain there is not the least appearance in what God
said, or the manner of it, as Moses gives us the account, of any other, than that
God was now testifying displeasure, condemning the subject of the sentence he
was pronouncing, as justly exposed to punishment for sin, and for that sin which
he mentions.
When God was pronouncing this sentence, Adam doubtless understood, that
God had respect to his posterity, as well as himself, though God spake wholly
in the second person singular, " Because thou hast eaten — In sorrow shalt thou
eat — Unto the dust shalt thou return." But he had as much reason to under-
stand God as having respect to his posterity, when he directed his speech to
him in like manner in the threatening, Thou shalt surely die. The sentence
plainly refers to the threatening, and results from it. The threatening says, If
thou eat thou shalt die : the sentence says, Because thou hast eaten, thou shalt die.
And Moses, who wrote the account, had no reason to doubt but that the affair
would be thus understood by his readers ; for such a way of speaking was well
understood in those days : the history he gives us of the origin of things,
abounds with it. Such a manner of speaking to the first of the kind, or heads
of the race, having respect to the progeny, is not only used in almost every
thing that God said to Adam and Eve, but even in what he said to the very
birds and fishes, Gen. i. 22 ; and also in what he said afterwards to Noah, Gen.
ix., and to Shem, Ham and Japheth, and Canaan, Gen. ix. 25 — 27. So in
promises made to Abraham, in which God directed his speech to him, and
spake in the second person singular, from time to time, but meant chiefly his
posterity : " To thee will I give this land. In thee shall all the families of the
earth be blessed," &c. &c. And in what is said of Ishmael, as of his person,
but meant chiefly of his posterity, Gen xvi. 12, and xvii. 20. And so in what
Isaac said to Esau and Jacob, in his blessing ; in which he spake to them in the
second person singular, but meant chiefly their posterity. And so for the most
part in the promises made to Isaac and Jacob, and in Jacob's blessing of
Ephraim and Manasseh, and of his twelve sons.
But I shall take notice ot on** or two things further, showing that Adam's
posterity were included in God's establishment with him, and the threatening
denounced for his sin ; and thai the calamities which come upon them in con-
sequence of his sin, are brought on them as punishments.
This is evident from the curse on the ground ; which, if it be any curse at all,
comes equally on Adam's posterity with himself. And if it be a curse, then
against whomsoever it is designed and on whomsoever it terminates, it comes
as a punishment, and not- as a blessing, so far as it comes in consequence of
that sentence.
Dr. Taylor, page 19, says, " A curse is pronounced upon the ground, but
no curse upon the woman and the man." And in pages 45, 46, S., he insists
that the ground only was cursed, and not the man j just as though a curse
ORIGINAL SIN. 401
could terminate on lifeless, senseless earth ! To understand this curse otherwise
than as terminating upon man through the ground, would be as senseless as to
suppose the meaning to be, The ground shall be punished and shall be miserable
for thy sake Our author interprets the curse on the ground, of its being in-
cumbered with noxious weeds ; but would these weeds have been any curse on
the ground, if there had been no inhabitants, or if the inhabitants had been of
such a nature, that these weeds would not have been noxious, but useful to
them ? It is said, Deut. xxviii. 17, " Cursed shall be thy basket, and thy store ;"
and would he not be thought to talk very ridiculously, who should say, " Here
is a curse upon the basket, but not a word of any curse upon the owner ; and
therefore we have no reason at all to look upon it as any punishment upon him,
or any testimony of God's displeasure towards him." How plain is it, that
when lifeless things, which are not capable of either benefit or suffering, are
said to be cursed or blessed with regard to sensible beings, that use or possess
these things or have connection with them, the meaning must be, that these
sensible beings are cursed or blessed in the other, or with respect to them ! In
Exod. xxiii. 25, it is said, " He shall bless thy bread and thy water." And I
suppose, never any body yet proceeded to such a degree of subtilty in distin-
guishing, as to say, " Here is a blessing on the bread and the water, which
went into the possessors' mouths, but no blessing on them." To make such a
distinction with regard to the curse God pronounced on the ground, would in
some respects be more unreasonable, because God is express in explaining the
matter, declaring that it was for marts sake, expressly referring this curse to
him, as being with respect to him, and for the sake of his guilt, and as consist-
ing in the sorrow and suffering he should have from it, " In sorrow shalt thou
eat of it. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee." So that God's own
words tell us where the curse terminates. The words are parallel with those
in Deut. xxviii. 16, but only more plain and explicit, " Cursed shalt thou be in
the field," or in the ground.
If this part of the sentence was pronounced under no notion of any curse or
punishment at all upon mankind, but on the contrary, as making an alteration
in the ground, that should be for the better, as to them ; that instead of the
sweet, but tempting, pernicious fruits of paradise, it might produce wholesome
fruits, more for the health of the soul ; that it might bring forth thorns and
thistles, as excellent medicines, to prevent or cure moral distempers, diseases
which would issue in eternal death ; I say, if what was pronounced was under
this notion, then it was a blessing on the ground, and not a curse ; and it might
more properly have been said, " Blessed shall the ground be for thy sake. I
will make a happy change of it, that it may be a habitation more fit for a crea-
ture so infirm, and so apt to be overcome with temptation, as thou art."
The event makes it evident, that in pronouncing this curse, God had as
much respect to Adam's posterity, as to himself : and so it was understood by
his pious posterity before the flood ; as appears by what Lamech, the father of
Noah, says, Gen. v. 29, " And he called his name Noah, saying, This same
shall comfort us concerning our work, and the toil of our hands, because of the
ground which the Lord hath cursed"
Another thing which argues, that Adam's posterity were included in the
threatening of death, and that our first parents understood, when fallen, that the
tempter, in persuading them to eat the forbidden fruit, had aimed at the pun-
ishment and ruin of both them and their posterity, and had procured it, is
Adam's immediately giving his wife that new name, Eve, or Life, on the prom-
ise or intimation of the disappointment and overthrow of the tempter in that
Vol. II. 51
402 ORIGINAL SIN.
matter, by her seed, which Adam understood to be by his procuring life, not
only for themselves, but for many of their posterity, and thereby delivering
them from that death and ruin which the serpent had brought upon them.
Those that should be thus delivered, and obtain life, Adam calls the living ;
and because he observed, by what God had said, that deliverance and life were
to be by the seed of the woman, he therefore remarks that she is the mother
of all living, and thereupon gives her a new name, calls her Chavah, life.
Gen. iii. 20.
There is a great deal of evidence, that this is the occasion of Adam's giving
his wife her new name. This was her new honor, and the greatest honor, at
least in her present state, that the Redeemer was to be of her seed. New
names were wont to be given for something that was the person's peculiar hon-
or. So it was with regard to the new names of Abraham, Sarah, and Israel.
Dr. Taylor himself observes,* that they who are saved by Christ, are called the
livers, bi £o)vzeg, 2 Cor. iv. 1 1, the living, or they that live. So we find in the
Old Testament, the righteous are called by the name of the living, Psalm lxix.
28, " Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written with
the righteous." If what Adam meant by her being the mother of all living,
was only her being the mother of mankind, and gave her the name life upon
that account ; it were much the most likely that he would have given her this
name at first, when God first united them, under that blessing, " Be fruitful and
multiply," and when he had a prospect of her being the mother of mankind in
a state of immortality, living indeed, living, and never dying. But that Adam
should at that time give her only the name of Isha, and then immediately on
that melancholy change, by their coming under the sentence of death, with all
their posterity, having now a new, awful prospect of her being the mother of
nothing but a dying race, all from generation to generation turning to dust,
through her folly ; I say, that immediately on this, he should change her name
into life, calling her now the mother of all living, is perfectly unaccountable.
Besides, it is manifest that it was not her being the mother of all mankind, or
her relation as a mother, which she stood in to her posterity, but the quality of
those she was to be the mother of. which was tl;e thing Adam had in view, in
giving his wife this new name ; as appears by the name itself, which signifies
life. And if it had been only a natural and mortal life which he had in view,
this was nothing distinguishing of her posterity from the brutes ; for the very
same name of living ones, or living things, is given from time to time in this
Book of Genesis to them ; as in chap. i. 21, 24, 28, ii. 19, vi. 19, vii. 23, viii.
I, and many other places in the Bible. And besides, if by life the quality of
her posterity was not meant, there was nothing in it to distinguish her from
Adam ; for thus she was no more the mother of all living, than he was the fa-
ther of all living ; and she could no more properly be called by the name of
life on any such account, than he ; but names are given for distinction.
Doubtless Adam took notice of something distinguishing concerning her, that
occasioned his giving her this new name. And I think it is exceeding natural
to suppose, that as Adam had given her her first name from the manner of her
creation, so he gave her her new name from redemption, and as it were,
new creation, through the Redeemer, of her seed ; and that he should give her
this name from that which comforted him, with respect to the curse that God
had pronounced on him and the earth, as Lamech named Noah, Gen. v. 29
u Saying, This same shall comfort us concerning our work, and toil of our
* Note annexed to f 287.
ORIGINAL SIN. 403
hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed." Accordingly he
gave her this new name, not at her first creation, but immediately after* the
promise of a Redeemer, of her seed. See Gen. iii. 15 — 20.
Now as to the consequence which I infer from Adam's giving his wife this
name, on the intimation which God had given, that Satan should by her seed
be overthrown and disappointed, as to his malicious design, in that deed of his
which God then spake of, viz., his tempting the woman. Adam infers from
it, that great numbers of mankind should be saved, whom he calls the living ;
they should be saved from the effects of this malicious design of the old serpent,
and from that ruin which he had brought upon them by tempting their first
parents to sin ; and so the serpent would be, with respect to them, disappoint-
ed and overthrown in his design. But how is any death or ruin, or indeed any
calamity at all, brought upon their posterity by Satan's malice in that tempta-
tion, if instead of that, all the death and sorrow that was consequent, was the
fruit of God's fatherly love, and not Satan's malice, and was an instance of
God's free and sovereign favor, such favor as Satan could not possibly foresee ?
And if multitudes of Eve's posterity are saved, from either spiritual or temporal
death, by a Redeemer, of her seed, how is that any disappointment of Satan's
design in tempting our first parents ? How came he to have any such thing in
view, as the death of Adam's and Eve's posterity, by tempting them to sin, or
any expectation that their death would be the consequence, unless he knew
that they were included in the threatening ?
Some have objected against Adam's posterity's being included in the threat-
ening delivered to Adam, that the threatening itself was inconsistent with his
having any posterity ; it being that he should die on the day that he sinned.
To this I answer, that the threatening was not inconsistent with his having
posterity, on two accounts.
Those words, " In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," accord-
ing to the use of such like expressions among the Hebrews, do not signify im-
mediate death, or that the execution shall be within twenty -four hours from the
commission of the fact ; nor did God, by those words, limit himself as to the time
of executing the threatened punishment, but that was still left to God's pleas-
ure. Such a phrase, according to the idiom of the Hebrew tongue, signifies no
more than these two things :
1. A real connection between the sin and the punishment. So Ezek. xxxiii.
12, 13, " The righteousness of the righteous shall not deliver him in the day of
his transgression. As for the wickedness of the wicked, he shall not fall there-
by in the day that he turneth from his wickedness ; neither shall the righteous
be able to live in the day that he sinneth ; but for his iniquity that he hath com-
mitted, he shall die for it." Here it is said, that in the day he sinneth, he shall
not be able to live, but he shall die ; not signifying the time when death shall
be executed upon him, but the connection between his sin and death ; such tf
connection as in our present common use of language is signified by the adverb
of time, when ; as if one should say, " According to the laws of our nation, so long
as a man behaves himself as a good subject, he may live ; but when he turns
rebel, he must die :" not signifying the hour, day or month in which he must
be executed, but only the connection between his crime and death.
2. Another thing which seems to be signified by such an expression, is, that
Adam should be exposed to death for one transgression, without waiting on
him to try him the second time. If he eat of that tree, he should immediately
fall under condemnation, though afterwards he might abstain ever so strictly. In
this respect the words are much of the same force with those words of Solomon
404 ORIGINAL SIX.
to Shimei, 1 Kings ii. 37, " For it shall be that on the day that thou goest out,
and passest over the brook Kidron, thou shalt know for certain, that thou shaU
surely die" Not meaning that he should certainly be executed on that day,
but that he should be assuredly liable to death for the first offence, and that he
should not have another trial to see whether he would go over the brook Kidron
a second time.
And then besides :
II. If the words had implied that Adam should die that very day, within
twenty- four or twelve hours, or that moment that he transgressed, yet it will by
no means follow, that God obliged himself to execute the punishment in its
utmost extent on that day. The sentence was in great part executed immediate-
ly : he then died spiritually : he lost his innocence and original righteousness,
and the favor of God ; a dismal alteration was made in his soul, by the loss of
that holy, divine principle, which was in the highest sense the life of the soul.
In this he was truly ruined and undone that very day, becoming corrupt, miser-
able and helpless. And I think it has been shown that such a spiritual death
was one great thing implied in the threatening. And the alteration then made
in his body and external state, was the beginning of temporal death. Grievous,
external calamity is called by the name of death in Scripture ; Exod. x. 17, " En-
treat the Lord that he may take away this death." Not only was Adam's soul
ruined that day, but his body was ruined : it lost its beauty and vigor, and be-
came a poor, dull, decaying, dying thing. And besides all this, Adam was that
day undone in a more dreadful sense : he immediately fell under the curse of
the law, and condemnation to eternal perdition. In the language of Scripture,
he is dead, that is, in a state of condemnation to death ; even as our author often
explains this language in his exposition upon Romans. In Scripture language,
he that believes in Christ, immediately receives life. He passes at that time from
death to life, and thenceforward (to use the Apostle John's phrase) " has eternal
life abiding in him." But yet he does not then receive eternal life in its highest com-
pletion ; he has but the beginning of it, and receives it in a vastly greater degree at
death ; but the proper time for the complete fulness is not till the day of judgment.
When the angels sinned, their punishment was immediately executed in a degree ;
but their full punishment is not until the end of the world. And there is nothing
in God's threatening to Adam that bound him to execute his full punishment at
once, nor any thing which determines that he should have no posterity. The law
or constitution which God established and declared, determined that if he sinned,
and had posterity, he and they should die ; but there was no constitution determin-
ing concerning the actual being of his posterity in this case ; what posterity he
should have, how many, or whether any at all. All these things God had re-
served in his own power : the law and its sanction intermeddled not with the
matter.
It may be proper in this place also to take some notice of that objection of
Dr. Taylor's, against Adam's being supposed to be a federal head for his posterity,
that it gives him greater honor than Christ, as it supposes that all his posterity
would have had eternal life by his obedience, if he had stood ; and so a greater
number would have had the benefit of his obedience, than are saved by Christ.*
I think a veiy little consideration is sufficient to show that there is no weight in
this objection ; for the benefit of Christ's merits may nevertheless be vastly be-
yond that which would have been by the obedience of Adam. For those that
are saved by Christ, are not merely advanced to happiness by his merits, but are
* Page 120, &c, &
ORIGINAL SIN. 405
saved from the infinitely dreadful effects of Adam's sin, and many from immense
guilt, pollution and misery, by personal sins ; also brought to a holy and happy
state, as it were through infinite obstacles, and are exalted to a far greater de-
gree of dignity, felicity and glory, than would have been due for Adam's obe-
dience, for aught I know, many thousand times so great. And there is enough
in the gospel dispensation, clearly to manifest the sufficiency of Christ's merits
for such effects in all mankind. And how great the number will be, that shall
actually be the subjects of them, or how great a proportion of the whole race,
considering the vast success of the gospel, that shall be in that future, extraor-
dinary and glorious season, often spoken of, none can tell. And the honor of
these two federal heads arises not so much from what was proposed to each for
his trial, as from their success, and the good actually obtained, and also the man-
ner of obtaining. Christ obtains the benefits men have through him by proper
merit of condignity, and a true purchase by an equivalent ; which would not have
been the case with Adam, if he had obeyed.
I have now particularly considered the account which Moses gives us in the
beginning of the Bible, of our first parents, and God's dealings with them, the con-
stitution he established with them, their transgression, and what followed. And
on the whole, if we consider the manner in which God apparently speaks to
Adam from time to time ; and particularly, if we consider how plainly and un-
deniably his posterity are included in the sentence of death pronounced on Adam
after his fall, founded on the foregoing threatening ; and consider the curse de-
nounced on the ground for his sake, and for his and his posterity's sorrow : and
also consider what is evidently the occasion of his giving his wife the new name
of Eve, and his meaning in it, and withal consider apparent fact in constant and
universal events, with relation to the state of our first parents, and their posterity
from that time forward, through all ages of the world ; I cannot but think, it
must appear to every impartial person, that Moses' account does, with sufficient
evidence, lead all mankind, to whom iris account is communicated, to understand,
that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with him as a public person, and
as the head of the human species, and had respect to his posterity, as included
in him : and that this history is given by divine direction, in the beginning of the
first written revelation, to exhibit to our view the origin of the present, sinful,
miserable state of mankind, that we might see what that was, which first gave
occasion for all those consequent, wonderful dispensations of divine mercy and
grace towards mankind, which arc the great subject of the Scriptures, both of the
Old and New Testament : and that these things are not obscurely and doubtfully
pointed forth, but delivered in a plain account of things, which easily and natur-
ally exhibits them to our understandings.
And by what follows in this discourse, we may have, in some measure, op-
portunity to see how other things in the Holy Scripture agree with what has been
now observed from the three first chapters of Genesis.
CHAPTER II
Observations on other parts of the Holy Scriptures, chiefly in the Old Testament that
prove the doctrine of Original Sin.
Original depravity may well be argued, from wickedness being often spoken
°f in Scripture, as a thing belonging to the race of mankind, and as if it were a
406 ORIGINAL SIN.
property of the species. So in Psal. xiv. 2, 3, " The Lord looked down from
heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand
and seek God. They are all gone aside ; they are together become filthy :
there is none that doeth good ; no, not one." The like we have again, Psal.
liii. 2, 3. Dr. Taylor says, p. 104, 105, " The Holy Spirit does not mean this
of every individual ; because in the very same psalm, he speaks of some that
were righteous ; ver. 5, God is in the generation of the righteous:' But how
little is this observation to the purpose ! For who ever supposed, that no un-
righteous men were ever changed by divine grace, and afterwards made right-
eous ? The Psalmist is speaking of what men are as they are the children of
men, born of the corrupt race ; and not as born of God, whereby they come to
be the children of God, and of the generation of the righteous. The Apostle
Paul cites this place in Rom. hi. 10, 11, 12, to prove the universal corruption
of mankind ; but yet in the same chapter he supposes these same persons here
spoken of as wicked, may become righteous, through the righteousness and grace
of God.
So wickedness is spoken of in other places in the Book of Psalms, as a thing
that belongs to men, as of the human race, as sons of men. Thus in Psal. iv. 2,
" 0 ye sons of men, how long will ye turn my glory into shame 1 How long
will ye love vanity Vs &c. Psal. lvii. 4, " I lie among them that are set on fire.
even the sons of men, whose teeth are spears and arrows, and their tongue a
sharp sword." Psal. lviii. 1, 2, " Do ye indeed speak righteousness. 0 congre-
gation 1 Do ye judge uprightly, 0 ye sons of men ? Yea, in heart ye work
wickedness ; ye weigh out the violence of your hands in the earth." Our au-
thor, mentioning these places, says, p. 105, Note, " There was a strong part}
in Israel disaffected to David's person and government, and sometimes he choosett
to denote them by the sons or children of men." But it would have been worti
his while to have inquired, Why the Psalmist should choose to denote the. wick-
edest and worse men in Israel by this name ? Why he should choose thus tc
disgrace the human race, as if the compellation of sons of men most properl)
belonged to such as were of the vilest character, and as if all the sons of men,
even every one of them, were of such a character, and none of them did good ;
no, not one ? Is it not strange, that the righteous should not be thought worthy
to be called sons of men, and ranked with that noble race of beings, who are
born into the world wholly right and innocent ! It is a good, easy, and natural
reason, why he chooseth to call the wicked, sons of men, as a proper name for
them, that by being of the sons of men, or of the corrupt, ruined race of mankind,
they come by their depravity. And the Psalmist himself leads us to this very
reason, Psal. lviii. at the beginning : " Do ye judge uprightly, O ye sons of
men ? Yea, in heart ye work wickedness, ye weigh out the violence of your
hands. The wicked are estranged from the womb," &c, of which I shall speak
more by and by. .
Agreeable to these places is Prov. xxi. 8, " The way of man is froward and
strange ; but as for the pure, his work is right." He that is perverse in his
walk, is here called by the name of man, as distinguished from the pure : which
I think is absolutely unaccountable, if all mankind by nature are pure, and per-
fectly innocent, and all such as are froward and strange in their ways, therein
depart from the native purity of all mankind. The words naturally lead us to
suppose the contrary ; that depravity and perverseness properly belong to man-
kind as they are naturally, and that a being made pure, is by an after-work, by
which some are delivered from native pollution, and distinguished from man-
kind in general; which is perfectly agreeable to the representation in Rev. xiv.
ORIGINAL SIN. 407
4, where we have an account of a number that were not defiled, but were pure, and
followed the Lamb ; of whom it is said, These were redeemed from among men.
To these things agree Jer. xvii. 5, 9. In ver. 5, it is said, " Cursed is he
that trusteth in man'' And in ver. 9, this reason is given, " The heart is de-
ceitful above all things, and desperately wicked ; who can know it ?" What
heart is this so wicked and deceitful ? Why, evidently the heart of him, whom,
it was said before, we must not trust ; and that is man. It alters not the case,
as to the present argument, whether the deceitfulness of the heart here spoken
of, be its deceitfulness to the man himself, or to others. So Eccl. ix. 3, " Mad-
ness is in the heart of the sons of men, while they live." And those words of
Christ to Peter, Matth. xvi. 23, " Get thee behind me, Satan, for thou savorest
not the things that be of God, but the things that be of 'men" Signifying
plainly, that to be carnal and vain, and opposite to what is spiritual and divine,
is what properly belongs to men in their present state. The same thing is sup-
posed in that of the apostle, 1 Cor. hi. 3, " For ye are yet carnal. For where-
as there is among you envying and strife, are ye not carnal, and walk as men ?"
And that in Hos. vi. 7, " But they like men, have transgressed the covenant."
To these places may be added Matth. vii. 11, " If ye, being evil, know how to
five good gifts." Jam. iv. 5, " Do ye think that the Scripture saith in vain,
he spirit that dwelleth in us, lusteth to envy ?" 1 Pet. iv. 2, " That he no
longer should live the rest of his time in the lusts of men, but to the will of God."
Yet above all, that in Job xv. 16, " How much more abominable and filthy is
man, who drinketh iniquity like water ?" Of which more presently.
Now what account can be given of these things, on Dr. Taylor's scheme ?
How strange is it, that we should have such descriptions, all over the Bible, of
man, and the sons of men / Why should man be so continually spoken of as evil,
carnal, perverse, deceitful, and desperately wTicked, if all men are by nature as
perfectly innocent, and free from any propensity to evil, as Adam was the first
moment of his creation, all made right, as our author would have us understand,
Eccl. vii. 29 ? Why, on the contrary, is it not said, at least as often, and with
equal reason, that the heart of man is right and pure ; that the way of man is
innocent and holy ; and that he who savors true virtue and wisdom, savors the
things that be of men ? Yea, and why might it not as well have been said, The
Lord looked down from heaven on the sons of men, to see if there were any that
did understand, and did seek after God ; and they were all right, altogether pure,
there was none inclined to do wickedness, no not one?
Of the like import with the texts mentioned are those which represent wick-
edness as what properly belongs to the world ; and that they who are other-
wise, are saved from the world, and called out of it. As John vii. 7, " The
world cannot hate you ; but me it hateth ; because I testify of it, that the works
thereof are evil." Chap. viii. 23, " Ye are of this world : I am not of this
world" Chap. xiv. 17, " The Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive ;
because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him : but ye know him." Chap.
xv. 18, 19, " If the world hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated
you. If ye were of the world, the world would love its own : but because ye
are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world
hateth you." Rev. xiv. 3, 4, " These are they which were redeemed from the
earth — redeemed from among men." John xvii. 9, " I pray not for the world,
but for them which thou hast given me." Ver. 14, " 1 have given them thy
word ; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even
as I am not of the world." 1 John iii. 13, " Marvel not, my brethren, if the
world hate you." Chap. iv. 5, " They are of the world, therefore speak they of
408 ORIGINAL SIN.
the world, and the world heareth them." Chap. v. 19, " We are of God, and
the whole world lieth in wickedness." It is evident, that in these places, by
the world is meant the world of mankind ; not the habitation, but the inhabit-
ants : for it is the world spoken of as loving, hating, doing evil works, speak-
ing, hearing, &c.
It shows the same thing, that wickedness is often spoken of as being man's
own, in contradistinction from virtue and holiness. So men's lusts are often
called their own heart's lusts, and their practising wickedness is called walking
in their own ways, walking in their own counsels, in the imagination of their own
heart, and in the sight of their own eyes, according to their own devices, &c.
These things denote wickedness to be a quality belonging properly to the char-
acter and nature of mankind in their present state : as, when Christ would
represent that lying is remarkably the character and the very nature of the devil
in his oresent state, he expresses it thus, John viii. 44, " When he speaketh a
lie, he speaketh of his own : for he is a liar, and the father of it."
And that wickedness belongs to the nature of mankind in their present state,
may be argued from those places which speak of mankind as being wicked in
their childhood, or from their childhood. So, that in Prov. xxii. 15, " Foolish-
ness is bound in the heart of a child ; but the rod of correction shall drive it
far from him." Nothing is more manifest, than that the wise man in this book
continually uses the word folly, or foolishness, for wickedness : and that this is
what he means in this place, the words themselves do show : for the rod of cor-
rection is proper to drive away no other foolishness, than that which is of a
moral nature. The word rendered bound, signifies, as is observed in Pool's Sy-
nopsis, a close and firm union. The same word is used in chap. vi. 21, " Bind
them continually upon thy heart." And chap. vii. 3, " Bind them upon thy
fingers, write them upon the table of thine heart." To the like purpose is
chap. iii. 3, and Deut. xi. 18, where this word is used. The same verb is used,
1 Sam. xviii. 1, u The soul of Jonathan was knit (or bound) to the soul of David,
and Jonathan loved him as his own soul." But how comes wickedness to be
so firmly bound, and strongly fixed, in the hearts of children, if it be not there
naturally 1 They having had no time firmly to fix habits of sin, by long cus-
tom in actual wickedness, as those that have lived many years in the world.
The same thing is signified in that noted place, Gen. viii. 21, "For the
imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." It alters not the case,
whether it be translated for or though the imagination of man's heart is evil from
his youth, as Dr. Taylor would have it ; still the words suppose it to be so as
is said. The word translated youth, signifies the whole of the former part of the age
of man, which commences from the beginning of life. The word, in its deriva-
tion, has reference to the birth or beginning of existence. It comes from Nagjiar,
which signifies to shake off, as a tree shakes off its ripe fruit, or a plant its seed :
the birth of children being commonly represented by a tree's yielding fruit, or
a plant's yielding seed. So that the word here translated youth, comprehends
not only what we in English most commonly call the time of youth, but also
childhood and infancy, and is very often used to signify these latter. A word
of the same root is used to signify a young child, or a little child, in the follow-
ing places; 1 Sam. 1. 24, 25, 27; 1 Kings iii. 7, and xi. 17 ; 2 Kings ii. 23 ;
Job xxxiii. 25; Prov. xxii. 6, xxiii. 13, and xxix. 21; Isai. x. 19, xi. 6, and
lxv. 20 ; Hos. xi. 1. The same word is used to signify an infant, in Exod. ii.
6, and x. 9 ; Judg. xiii. 5, 7, 8, 24 ; 1 Sam. i. 22, and iv 21 ; 2 Kings v. 14 ;
Isai. vii. 16j and viii. 4.
Dr. Taylor says, p. 124, Note, that he * conceives, from the youth, is a
ORIGINAL SIN. 409
phrase signifying the greatness or long duration of a thing." But if by long du-
ration he means any thing else than what is literally expressed, viz., from the
beginning of life, he has no reason to conceive so ; neither has what he offers,
so much as the shadow of a reason for his conception. There is no appearance
in the words of the two or three texts he mentions, of their meaning any thing-
else than what is most literally signified. And it is certain, that what he sug-
gests is not the ordinary import of such a phrase among the Hebrews : but
that thereby is meant from the beginning, or early time of life, or existence ;
as may be seen in the places following, where the same word in the Hebrew
is used, as in this place in the 8th of Genesis. 1 Sam. xii. 2, " I am old, and
gray headed — and I have walked before you from my childhood unto this day ;"
where the original word is the same. Psal, lxxi. 5, 6, " Thou art my trust from
my youth : by thee have I been holden up from the womb. Thou art he that
took me out of my mother's bowels." Ver. 17, 18, " 0 God, thou hast taught
me from my youth ; and hitherto have I declared thy wondrous works : now
also, when I am old and gray headed, forsake me not." Psal. cxxix. 1, 2,
" Many a time have they afflicted me from, my youth, may Israel now say :
many a time have they afflicted me from my youth ; yet they have not pre-
vailed against me." Isai. xlvii 12, " Stand now with the multitude of thy sor-
ceries, wherein thou hast labored, from thy youth" So ver. 15, and 2 Sam.
xix. 7, " That will be worse unto thee, than all the evil that befel thee,'y*rom.
thy youth until now." Jer. iii. 24, 25, " Shame hath devoured the labor of our
fathers,/rom our youth. We have sinned against the 'Lord our God from our
youth, even to this day." So Gen. xlvi. 34; Job xxxi. 18 ; Jer. xxxii. 30, and
xlviii. 11 ; Ezek. iv. 14; Zech. xiii. 5.
And it is to be observed, that according to the manner of the Hebrew lan-
guage, when it is said, such a thing has been from youth, or the first part of
existence, the phrase, is to be understood as including that first time of existence.
So, Josh. vi. 21, " They utterly destroyed all, from the young to the old" (so
it is in the Hebrew), i. e. including both. So Gen. xix. 4, and Esther iii. 13.
And as mankind are represented in Scripture, as being of a wicked heart
from their youth, so in other places they are spoken of as being thus fvm the
womb. Psal. lviii. 3, " The wicked are estranged from the womb : they go
astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies." It is observable, that the Psalm-
ist mentions this as what belongs to the wicked, as the sons of men : For, these
are the preceding words : " Do ye judge uprightly, O ye sons of men ? Yea, in
heart ye work wickedness." (A phrase of the like import with that in Gen. viii.
21. The imagination, or operation, as it might have been rendered, of his
heart is evil.) Then it follows, The wicked are estranged from the womb, &c.
The next verse is, Their 'poison is like the poison of a serpent. It is so remark-
ably, as the very nature of a serpent is poison : serpents are poisonous as soon
as they come into the world : they derive a poisonous nature by their genera-
tion. Dr. Taylor, p. 134, 135, says, " It is evident that this is a scriptural fig-
urative way of aggravating wickedness on the one hand, and of signifying
early and settled habits of virtue on the other, to speak of it as being from the
womb." And as a probable instance of the latter, he cites that in Isai. xlix. 1,
" The Lord hath called me from the womb ; from the bowels of my mother he
made mention of my name." But I apprehend, that in order to seeing this to be
either evident or probable, a man must have eyes peculiarly affected. I humbly
conceive that such phrases as that in the 49th of Isaiah, of God's calling the
prophet/rowi the womb, are evidently not of the import which he supposes ;
but mean truly from the beginning of existence, and are manifestly of like sig-
Vol II. 52
410 ORIGINAL SIN-
nification with that which is said of the prophet Jeremiah, Jer. i. 5, " Before 1
formed thee in the belly I knew thee : before thou Lamest out of the womb, I
sanctified thee, and ordained thee a prophet unto the nations." Which surely
means something else besides a high degree of virtue : it plainly signifies that
he was, from his first existence, set apart by God for a prophet. And it would
be as unreasonable to understand it otherwise, as to suppose the angel meant
any other than that Samson was set apart to be a Nazarite from the beginning
of his life, when he says to his mother, " Behold, thou shalt conceive and bear a
son : and now drink no wine, nor strong drink, &c. For the child shall be a
Nazarite to God, from the womb, to the day of his death." By these instances it
is plain, that the phrase, from the womb, as the other, from the youth, as used
in Scripture, properly signifies from the beginning of life.
Very remarkable is that place, Job xv. 14, 15, 16, " What is man, that
he should be clean ? And he that is born of a woman, that he should be
righteous ? Behold, he putteth no trust in his saints : yea, the heavens are not
clean in his sight ! How much more abominable and filthy is man, which
drinketh iniquity like water !" And no less remarkable is our author's method
of managing it. The sixteenth verse expresses an exceeding degree of wicked-
ness, in as plain and emphatical terms, almost, as can be invented ; every
word representing this in the strongest manner : " How much more abominable
and filthy is man, that drinketh iniquity like water !" I cannot now recollect
where we have a sentence equal to it in the whole Bible, for an emphatical,
lively and strong representation of great wickedness of heart. Any one of the
words, as such words are used in Scripture, would represent great wickedness :
If it had been only said, " How much more abominable is man !'' Or, " How
much more filthy is man !" Or, " Man that drinketh iniquity." But all these
are accumulated with the addition of — like water — the further to represent the
boldness or greediness of men in wickedness ; though iniquity be the most dead-
ly poison, yet men drink it as boldly as they drink water, are as familiar with it
as with their common drink, and drink it with like greediness, as he that is
thirsty drinks water. That boldness and eagerness in persecuting the saints, by
which the great degree of the depravity of man's heart often appears, is repre-
sented thus, Psal. xiv. 4, " Have the workers of iniquity no knowledge, who eat
up my people as they eat bread ?" And the greatest eagerness of thirst is rep-
resented by thirsting as an animal thirsts after water, Psalm xlii. 1.
Now let us see the soft, easy, light manner, in which Dr. Taylor treats this
place, p. 143 : " How much more abominable and filthy is man, in comparison
of the divine purity, who drinketh iniquity like water ! Who is attended
with so manv sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them. You see the ar-
gument, man, in his present weak and fleshly state, cannot be clean before God.
Why so 1 Because he is conceived and born in sin, by reason of Adam's sin ?
No such thing. But because, if the purest creatures are not pure, in comparison
of God, much less a being subject to so many infirmities, as a mortal man.
Which is a demonstration to me, not only that Job and his friends did not in-
tend to establish the doctrine we are now examining, but that they were wholly
strangers to it." Thus this author endeavors to reconcile this text with his doc-
trine of the perfect, native innocence of mankind ; in which we have a nota-
ble specimen of his demonstrations, as well as of that great impartiality and
fairness in examining and expounding the Scripture, which he makes so often a
profession of.
In this place we are not only told how wicked man's heart is, but also how
men come by such wickedness ; even by being of the race of mankind, by ordi-
ORIGINAL SIN. 411
nary generation. " What is man, that he should be clean ? And he that is born
of a woman, that he should be righteous V9 Our author, pages 141, 142, rep-
resents man's being born of a woman, as a periphrasis, to signify man ; and
that there is no design in the words to give a reason, why man is not clean and
righteous. But the case is most evidently otherwise, if we may interpret the
Book of Job by itself : it is most plain, that man's being born of a woman is
given as a reason of his not being clean, chap. xiv. 14 : " "Who can bring a
clean thing out of an unclean V9 Job is speaking there expressly of man being
born of a woman, as appears in verse 1. And here how plain is it, that this is
given as a reason of man's not being clean ? Concerning this Dr. Taylor "
says, " That this has no respect to any moral uncleanness, but only common
frailty," &c. But how evidently is this also otherwise ? "When that uncleanness,
which a man has by being born of a woman, is expressly explained of unright-
eousness, in the next chapter at verse 14, " What is man that he should be clean 1
And he that is born of a woman, that he should be righteous V9 And also in
chap. xxv. 4, " How then can man be justified with God? And how can he be
clean that is born of a woman V9 It is a moral cleanness Bildad is speaking of,
which a man needs in order to being justified. His design is, to convince Job
of his moral impurity, and from thence of God's righteousness in his severe
judgments upon him ; and not of his natural frailty.
And without doubt, David has respect to this same way of derivation of
wickedness of heart, when he says, Psalm li. 5, " Behold, I was shapen in ini-
quity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." It alters not the case as to the
argument we are upon, whether the word translated conceive, signifies conceive,
or nurse ; wrhich latter our author takes so much pains to prove : for when he
has done all, he speaks of it as a just translation of the words to render them
thus : "I was born in iniquity, and in sin did my mother nurse me," page 135.
If it is owned that man is born in sin, it is not worth the while to dispute whether
it is expressly asserted that he is conceived in sin. But Dr. Taylor after his
manner insists, that such expressions, as being born in sin, being transgressors
from the womb, and the like, are only phrases figuratively to denote aggrava-
tion and high degree of wickedness. But the contrary has been already de-
monstrated, from many plain Scripture instances. Nor is one instance produced,
in which there is any evidence that such a phrase is used in such a manner. A
poetical sentence out of Virgil's iEneids, has here been produced, and made
much of by some, as parallel with this, in what Dido says to iEneas in these
lines:
Nee tibi diva parens, generis nee Dardanus auctor,
Perfide : Sed duris genuit te cautibus horrens
Caucasus, hyrcanajque admorunt ubera tygres.
In which she tells iEneas, that not a goddess was his mother, nor Anchises his
father ; but that he had been brought forth by a horrid, rocky mountain, and
nursed at the dugs of tigers, to represent the greatness of his cruelty to her. But
how unlike and unparallel is this ! Nothing could be more natural than for a
woman, overpowered with the passion of love, and distracted with raging jeal-
ousy and disappointment, thinking herself treated with brutish perfidy and cru-
elty, by a lover, whose highest fame had been his being the son of a goddess, to
aggravate his inhumanity and hardheartedness with this, that his behavior was
not worthy the son of a goddess, nor becoming one whose father was an illustri-
ous prince ; and that he acted more as if he had been brought forth by hard,
unrelenting rocks, and had sucked the dugs of tigers. But what is there in the
412 ORIGINAL SIN.
case of David parallel, or at all in like manner leading him to speak of himself
as born in sin, in any such sense ? He is not speaking himself, nor any one else
speaking to him, of any excellent and divine father and mother, that he was born
of; nor is there any appearance of his aggravating his sin by its being unworthy
of his high birth. There is nothing else visible in David's case, to lead him to
take notice of his being born in sin, but only his having such experience of the
continuance and power of indwelling sin, after so long a time, and so many
great means to engage him to holiness ; which showed that sin was inbred, and
,mhis very nature.
Dr. Taylor often objects to these and other texts, brought by divines to prove
Original Sin, that there is no mention made in them of Adam, nor of his sin. He
cries out, " Here is not the least mention or intimation of Adam, or any ill effects
of his sin upon us. — Here is not one word, not the least hint of Adam, or any
consequences of his sin," &c. &c* Hesays,f " If Job and his friends had known
and believed the doctrine of a corrupt nature, derived from Adam's sin only,
they ought in reason and truth to have given this as the true and only reason of
the human imperfection and uncleanness they mention." But these objections
and exclamations are made no less impertinently, than they are frequently. It
is no more a proof, that corruption of nature did not come by Adam's sin, be-
cause many times when it is mentioned, Adam's sin i3 not expressly mentioned
as the cause of it, than that death did not come by Adam's sin (as Dr. Taylor
says it did) because though death, as incident to mankind, is mentioned so often
in the Old Testament, and by our Saviour in his discourses, yet Adam's sin is
not once expressly mentioned, after the three first chapters of Genesis, anywhere
in all the Old Testament, or the four evangelists, as the occasion of it.
What Christian has there ever been, that believed the moral corruption of
the nature of mankind, who ever doubted that it came that way, which the
apostle speaks of, when he says, " By one man sin entered into the world, ?nd
death by sin V* Nor indeed have they any more reason to doubt of it, than to
doubt of the whole history of our first parents, because Adam's name is so
rarely mentioned, on any occasion in Scripture, after that first account of him
and Eve's never at all ; and because we have no more any express mention 0/
the particular manner, in which mankind were first brought into being, eithe/
with respect to the creation of Adam or Eve. It is sufficient, that the abiding
most visible effects of these things, remain in the view of mankind in all ages
and are often spoken of in Scripture ; and that the particular manner of theii
being introduced, is once plainly set forth in the beginning of the Bible, in that
history which gives us an account of the origin of all things. And doubtless it
was expected, by the great author of the Bible, that the account in the three
first chapters of Genesis should be taken as a plain account of the introduction
of both natural and moral evil into the world, as it has been shown to be so in-
deed. The history of Adam's sin, with its circumstances, God's threatening,
and the sentence pronounced upon him after his transgression, and the immediate
consequences, consisting in so vast an alteration in his state, and the state of the
world, which abides still, with respect to all his posterity, do most directly and
sufficiently lead to an understanding of the rise of calamity, sin and death, in this
sinful, miserable world.
It is fit we all should know, that it does not become us to tell the Most High,
how often he shall particularly explain and give the reason of any doctrine which
he teaches, in order'to our believing what he says. If he has at all given us
• Pages 5, 64, 96, 97, 98, 102, 108, 112, 118, 120, 122, 127, 128, 136, 142, 143, 149, 152, 155, 229. t 142
ORl'-LNAL OH. 413
evidence that it is a doctrine agreeable to his mud, it becomes us to receive it
with full credit and submission ; and not sullenly to reject it, because our
notions and humors are not suited in the manner, and number of times, of his
particularly explaining it to us. How often is pardon of sins promised in the
Old Testament to repenting and returning sinners? How many hundred limes
is God's special favor there promised to the sincerely righteous, without any
express mention of these benefits being through Christ 1 Would it therefore be
becoming us to say, that, inasmuch as our dependence on Christ for these benefits,
is a doctrine, which, if true, is of such importance, God ought expressly to have
mentioned Christ's merits as the reason and ground of the benefits, if he knew
they were the ground of them, and should have plainly declared it sooner, and
more frequently, if ever he expected we should believe him, when he did tell
us of it ? How often is vengeance and misery threatened in the Old Testament
to the wicked, without any clear and express signification of any such thing in-
tended, as that everlasting fire, where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth, in
another world, which Christ so often speaks of as the punishment appointed for
all the wicked ? Would it now become a Christian, to object and say, that if
God really meant any such thing, he ought in reason and truth to have declared
it plainly and fully ; and not to have been so silent about a matter of such vast
importance to all mankind, for four thousand years together ?
CHAPTER III
OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS OTHER PLACES OF SCRIPTURE, PRINCIPALLY OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT, PROVING THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.
SECTION I
Observations on John iii. 6, in connection with some other passages in the New
Testament
Those words of Christ, giving a reason to Nicodemus, why we must be born
again, John iii. 6, " That which is born of the flesh, is flesh ; and that which is
born of the Spirit, is spirit ;" have not, without good reason, been produced by
divines, as a proof of the doctrine of original sin ; supposing, that by flesh here
is meant the human nature in a debased and corrupt state. Yet Dr. Taylor, p. 144,
thus explains these words, That which is born of the flesh, is flesh : " That
which is born by natural descent and propagation, is a man, consisting of body
and soul, or the mere constitution and powers of a man in their natural state."
But the constant use of these terms, flesh and spirit, in other parts of the New
Testament, when thus set in opposition one to another, and the latter said to be
produced by the Spirit of God, as here, and when speaking of the same thing,
which Christ is here speaking of to Nicodemus, viz., the requisite 'qualifications
to salvation, will fully vindicate the sense of our divines. Thus in the 7th and
8th chapters of Romans, where these terms flesh and spirit (gccq£ and nvev/ia)
are abundantly repeated, and set in opposition, as here. So, chap. vii. 14 : The
414 ORIGINAL SIN.
law is spiritual (nvEVfianxog), but I am carnal (aaQxixog), sold under sin. He
cannot only mean, "lama man, consisting of body and soul, and having the
powers of a man." Ver. 18, " I know that in me, that is,in my flesh, dwelleth
no good thing." He does not mean to condemn his frame, as consisting of
body and soul; and to assert, that in his human constitution, with the powers of a
man, dwells no good thing. And when he says in the last verse of the chapter,
" With the mind, I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of
sin ;" he cannot mean, " I myself serve the law of God ; but with my innocent
human constitution, as having the powers of a man, 1 serve the law of sin" And
when he says in the next words in the beginning of the 8th chapter, " There is
no condemnation to them, that walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit ;"
and ver. 4, " The righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us, who walk not after
the flesli^" he cannot mean, "There is no condemnation to them that walk not
according to the powers of a man," &c. And when he says, ver. 5 and 6,
" They that are after the flesh, do mind the things of the flesh ; and to be car-
nally minded is death ;" he does not intend, " They that are according to the
human constitution, and the powers of a man, do mind the things of the human
constitution and powers ; and to mind these, is death." And when he says, ver.
7 and 8, " The carnal (or fleshly) mind is enmity against God, and is not subject
to the law of God, neither indeed can be ; so that they that are in the flesh,
cannot please God ;" he cannot mean, that, " to mind the things which are
agreeable to the powers and constitution of a man" (who, as our author says,
is constituted or made right), " is enmity against God ; and that a mind which is
agreeable to this right human constitution, as God hath made it, is not subject
to the law of God, nor indeed can be ; and that they who are according to such
a constitution, cannot please God." And when it is said, ver. 9, " Ye are not
in the flesh, but in the spirit;" the apostle cannot mean, "Ye are not in the
human nature, as constituted of body and soul, and with the powers of a man"
It is most manifest, that by theflesh here, the apostle means some nature that is
corrupt, and of an evil tendency, and directly opposite to the law, and holy
nature of God ; so that to be, and walk according to it, and to have a mind con-
formed to it, is to be an utter enemy to God and his law, in a perfect inconsist-
ence with being subject to God, and pleasing God ; and in a sure and infallible
tendency to death, and utter destruction. And it is plain, that here by being and
walking after, or according to the flesh, is meant the same thing as i>eing and
walking according to a corrupt and sinful nature ; and to be and walk according
to the spirit, is to be and walk according to a holy and divine nature, or principle :
and to be carnally minded, is the same as being viciously and corruptly minded ;
and to be spiritually minded, is to be of a virtuous and holy disposition.
When Christ says, John iii. 6, " That which is born of the flesh, is flesh,"
he represents theflesh not merely as a quality ; for it would be incongruous, to
speak of a quality as a thing born : it is a person, or man, that is born, There-
fore man, as in his whole nature corrupt, is called flesh : which is agreeable tc
other Scripture representations, where the corrupt nature is called the old man,
the body of sin, and the body of death. Agreeable to this are those represen-
tations in the 7th and 8th chapters of Romans : there flesh is figuratively repre-
sented as a person, according to the apostle's manner, observed by Mr. Locke,
and after him by Dr. Taylor, who takes notice, that the apostle, in the 6th and
7th of Romans, represents sin as a person ; and that he figuratively distino-uish-
es in himself two persons ; speaking of flesh as his person. For I know matin
me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. And it may be observed, that
in the 8th chapter he still continues thi* representation, speaking of the flesh
ORIGINAL SIN. 415
as a person : and accordingly in the 6th and 7th verses, speaks of the mind of the
flesh, cpQovrjfia actQxog, and of the mind of the spirit, ypovrjpa nvevpajog, as if
the flesh and spirit were two opposite persons, each having a mind contrary to
the mind of the other. Dr. Taylor interprets this mind of the flesh, and mind of
the spirit, as though the flesh and the spirit were here spoken of as the different
objects, about which the mind spoken of is conversant. Which is plainly beside
the apostle's sense ; who speaks of the flesh and spirit as the subjects and agents,
in which the mind spoken of is ; and not the objects about which it acts. We
have the same phrase, again, ver. 27 : He that searcheth the hearts, knoweth
what is the mind of the spirit, yoovrifia nvevparog ; the mind of the spiritual
nature in the saints being the same with the mind of the Spirit of God himself,
who imparts and actuates that spiritual nature ; here the spirit is the subject and
agent, and not the object. The same apostle in like manner uses the word vovg,
in Col. ii. 18, Vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind, vno tov voog trig actQxog avtov,
by the mind of his flesh. And this agent so often called flesh, represented by
the apostle, as altogether evil, without any good thing dwelling in it, or belong-
ing to it ; yea, perfectly contrary to God and his law, and tending only to
death and ruin, and directly opposite to the spirit, is what Christ speaks of
to Nicodemus as born in the first birth, as giving a reason why there is a necessity
of a new birth, in order to a better production.
One thing is particularly observable in that discourse of the apostle, in
the 7th and 8th of Romans, in which he so often uses the term flesh, as opposite
to spirit, which, as well as many other things in his discourse, makes it plain,
that by flesh he means something in itself corrupt and sinful, and that is, that
he expressly calls it sinful flesh, Rom. viii. 3. It is manifest, that by sinful
flesh he means the same thing with that flesh spoken of in the immediately
foregoing and following words, and in all the context : and that when it is said,
Christ was made in the likeness of sinful flesh, the expression is equipollent
with those that speak of Christ as made sin, and made a curse for us.
Flesh and spirit are opposed to one another in Gal. v. in the same manner
as in the 8th of Romans : and there, hy flesh cannot be meant only the human
nature of body and soul, or the mere constitution and powers of a man, as in its
natural state, innocent and right. In the 16th verse the apostle says, " Walk
in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh :" where the flesh is
spoken of as a thing of an evil inclination, desire or lust. But this is more
strongly signified in the next words : " For the flesh lusteth against the spirit,
and the spirit against the flesh ; and these are contrary the one to the other."
W7hat could have been said more plainly, to show that what the apostle means
by flesh, is something very evil in its nature, and an irreconcilable enemy
to all goodness 1 And it may be observed, that in these words, and those that
follow, the apostle still figuratively represents the flesh as a person or agent,
desiring, acting, having lusts, and performing works. And by works of the flesh,
and fruits of the spirit, which are opposed to each other, from ver. 19, to the
end, are plainly meant the same as works of a sinful nature, and fruits of a holy,
renewed nature. Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these :
adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred,
variance, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, &c. But the fruit of the spirit is
love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, &c. The apostle, by flesh,
does not mean any thing that is innocent and good in itself, that only needs to
be restrained, and kept in proper bounds ; but something altogether evil, which
is to be destroyed, and not merely restrained. 1 Cor. v. 5, " To deliver such a
one to Satan, for the destruction of the flesh." We must have no mercy on it ;
416 ORIGINAL SIN.
we cannot be too cruel to it ; it must even be crucified'' Gal. v. 24, " They that
are Christ's, have crucified the. flesh, with the affections and lusts."
The apostle John, the same apostle that writes the account of what Christ
said to Nicodemus, by the spirit means the same thing as a new, divine, and
holy nature, exerting itself in a principle of divine love, which is the sum of all
Christian holiness. 1 John iii. 23, 24, " And that we should love one another,
as he gave us commandment ; and he that keepeth his commandments, dwelleth
in him, and he in him : and hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the spirit
that he hath given us." With chap. iv. 12, 13, " If we love one another, God
dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us : hereby know we, that we dwell in
him, because he hath given us of his spirit" The spiritual principle in us be-
ing as it were communicated of the Spirit of God to us.
And as by nvEv^ia is meant a holy nature, so by the epithet, mevfiazixog,
spiritual, is meant the same as truly virtuous and holy. Gal. vi. 1, " Ye that
are spiritual, restore such a one in the spirit of meekness." The apostle refers
to what he had just said, in the end of the foregoing chapter, where he had
mentioned meekness, as a fruit of the spirit. And so by carnal, or fleshly,
GaQxixog, is meant the same as sinful. Rom. vii. 14, " The law is spiritual (i. e.
holy), but I am carnal, sold under sin."
And it is evident, that by flesh, as the word is used in the New Testament,
and opposed to spirit, when speaking of the qualifications for eternal salvation,
is not meant only what is now vulgarly called the sins of the flesh, consisting in
inordinate appetites of the body, and their indulgence ; but the whole body
of sin, implying those lusts that are most subtle, and furthest from any relation
to the body ; such as pride, malice, envy, &c. When the works of the flesh
are enumerated, Gal. v. 19, 20, 21, they are vices of the latter kind chiefly
that are mentioned ; idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath,
strife, seditions, heresies, envyings. So, pride of heart is the effect or operation
of the flesh. Col. ii. 1, 8, " Vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind :" in the Greek,
by the mind of the flesh. So, pride, envying, strife and division, are spoken of
as works of the flesh, 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4, " For ye are yet carnal (aaQxixo, fleshly).
For whereas there is envying, and strife, and division, are ye not carnal, and
walk as men ? For while one saith, I am of Paul, and another, 1 am of Apollos,
are ye not carnal ?" Such kind of lusts do not depend on the body, or exter-
nal senses ; for the devil himself has them in the highest degree, who has not,
nor ever had, any body or external senses to gratify.
Here, if it should be inquired, how corruption or depravity in general, or the
nature of man as corrupt and sinful, came to be caWedflesh ; and not only that
corruption which consists in inordinate bodily appetites, I think, what the apos-
tle says in the last cited place, Are ye not carnal, and walk as men ? leads us
to the true reason. It is because a corrupt and sinful nature is what properly
belongs to mankind, or the race of Adam, as they are in themselves, and as they
are by nature. The word flesh is often used in both Old Testament and New,
to signify mankind in their present state. To enumerate all the places, would
be very tedious ; I shall therefore only mention a few places in the New Testa-
ment. Matth. xxiv. 22, " Except those days should be shortened, no flesh
should be saved." Luke iii. 6, " AW flesh shall see the salvation of God."
John xvii. 2, " Thou hast given him power over all flesh." See also Acts ii.
17, Rom. iii. 20, 1 Cor. i. 29, Gal. ii. 16. Man's nature, being left to itself,
forsaken of the Spirit of God, as it was when man fell, and consequently forsa-
ken of divine and holy principles, of itself became exceeding corrupt, utterly
depraved and ruined : and so the word flesh, which signifies man, came to be
ORIGINAL SIN. 417
used to signify man as he is in himself, in his natural state, debased, corrupt and
ruined : and on the other hand, the word spirit came to be used to signify a divine
and holy principle, or new nature ; because that is not of man, but of God, by the
indwelling and vital influence of his Spirit. And thus to be corrupt, and to be
carnal, or fleshly, and to walk as men, are the same thing with the apostle. And
so in other parts of the Scripture, to savor the things that be of men, and to savor
things which are corrupt, are the same ; and sons of men, and wicked men, also
are the same, as was observed before. And on the other hand, to savor the
things that be of God, and to receive the things of the Spirit of God, are phrases
that signify as much as relishing and embracing true holiness or divine virtue.
All these things confirm what we have supposed to be Christ's meaning, in
saying, " That which is born of the flesh, is flesh ; and that which is born of the
Spirit, is spirit." His speech implies, that what is born in the first birth of man,
is nothing but man as he is of himself, without any thing divine in him ; de-
praved, debased, sinful, ruined man, utterly unfit to enter into the kingdom of
God, and incapable of the spiritual, divine happiness of that kingdom : but that
which is born in the new birth, of the Spirit of God, is a spiritual principle, and
holy and divine nature, meet for the divine and heavenly kingdom. It is a con-
firmation that this is the true meaning, that it is not only evidently agreeable to the
constant language of the Spirit of Christ in the New Testament ; but the words
understood in this sense, contain the proper and true reason, why a man must
be born again, in order to enter into the kingdom of God ; the reason that is
given everywhere in other parts of the Scripture for the necessity of a renova-
tion, a change of mind, a new heart, &c, in order to salvation : to give a reason
of which to Nicodemus, is plainly Christ's design in the words which have been
insisted on.
Before I proceed, I would observe one thing as a corollary from what has
been said.
Coroll. If by flesh and spirit, when spoken of in the New Testament, and
opposed to each other, in discourses on the necessary qualifications for salvation,
we are to understand what has been now supposed, it will not only follow, that
men by nature are corrupt, but wholly corrupt, without any good thing. If by
flesh is meant man's nature, as he receives it in his first birth, then therein dwell-
eth no good thing ; as appears by Rom. vii. 18. It is wholly opposite to God,
and to subjection to his law, as appears by Rom. viii. 7, 8. It is directly con-
trary to true holiness, and wholly opposes it, and holiness is opposite to that ;
as appears by Gal. v. 17. So long as men are in their natural state, they not
only have no good thing, but it is impossible they should have or do any good
thing ; as appears by Rom. viii. 8. There is nothing in their nature, as they
have it by the first birth, whence should arise any true subjection to God ; as
appears by Rom. viii. 7. If there were any thing truly good in the flesh, or in
man's nature, or natural disposition, under a moral view, then it should only be
amended ; but the Scripture represents as though we were to be enemies to it,
and were to seek nothing short of its entire destruction, as has been observed.
And elsewhere the apostle directs not to the amending of the old man, but put-
ting it off, and putting on the new man ; and seeks not to have the body of death
made better, but to be delivered from it, and says, " That if any man be in Christ,
he is a new creature (which doubtless means the same as a man new born) old
things are (not amended) but passed away, and all things are become new."
But this will be further evident, if we particularly consider the apostle's dis-
course in the latter part of the second chapter of 1 Cor. and the beginning of the
third. There the apostle speaks of the natural man, and the spiritual man ,
Vol. II. 53
418 ORIGINAL SIN.
where natural and spiritual are opposed just in the same manner, as I have ob-
served carnal and spiritual often are." In chap. ii. 14, 15, he says, " The
natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God : for they are foolish-
ness unto him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned-
But he that is spiritual, judgeth all things." And not only does the apostle here
oppose natural and spiritual, just as he elsewhere does carnal and spiritual, but
his following discourse evidently shows, that he means the very same distinction,
the same two distinct and opposite things. For immediately on his thus speak-
ing of the difference between the natural and the spiritual man, he turns to the
Corinthians, in the first words of the next chapter, connected with this, and says,
" And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal."
Referring manifestly to what he- had been saying, in the immediately preceding
discourse, about spiritual and natural men, and evidently using the word carnal,
as synonymous with natural. By which it is put out of all reasonable dispute,
that the apostle by natural men means the same as men in that carnal, sinful
state, that they are in by their first birth : notwithstanding all the glosses and
criticisms, by which modern writers have endeavored to palm upon us another
sense of this phrase ; and so to deprive us of the clear instruction the apostle
gives in that 14th verse, concerning the sinful, miserable state of man by nature.
Dr. Taylor says, by xpvxwog, is meant the animal man, the man who maketh
sense and appetite the law of his action. If he aims to limit the meaning of
the word to external sense, and bodily appetite, his meaning is certainly not the
apostle's. For the apostle in his sense includes the more spiritual vices of envy,
strife, &c, as appears by the four first verses of the next chapter ; where, as 1
have observed, he substitutes the word carnal in the place of ipvxixog. So the
Apostle Jude uses the word in like manner, opposing it to spiritual, or having
the spirit, ver. 19, " These are they that separate themselves, sensual (\pvyixoi),
not having the spirit." The vices he had been just speaking of, were chiefly of
the more spiritual kind. Ver. 16, " These are murmurers, complainers, walk-
ing after their own lusts; and their mouth speaketh great swelling words,
having men's persons in admiration, because of advantage." The vices men-
tioned are much of the same kind with those of the Corinthians, for which he
calls them carnal, envying, strife and divisions, and saying, lam of Paul, and
lof Apollos ; and being puffed up for one against another. We have the same
word again, Jam. hi. 14, 15, " If ye have bitter envying and strife, glory not,
and lie not against the truth : this wisdom descendeth not from above, but is
earthly, sensual (yvxiMj) and devilish ;" where also the vices the apostle speaks
of are of the more spiritual kind.
So that on the whole, there is sufficient reason to understand the apostle,
when he speaks of the natural man in that 1 Cor. ii. 14, as meaning man in his
native, corrupt state. And his words represent him as totally corrupt, wholly
a stranger and enemy to true virtue or holiness, and things appertaining to it,
which it appears are commonly intended in the New Testament by things spir-
itual, and are doubtless here meant by things of the Spirit of God. These words
also represent that it is impossible man should be otherwise, while in his natu-
ral state. The expressions are very strong : the natural man receiveth not the
things of the Spirit of God, is not susceptible of things of that kind, neither can
he know them, can have no true sense or relish of them, or notion of their real
nature and true excellency, because they are spiritualty discerned : they are not
discerned by means of any principle in nature, but altogether by a principle that
is divine, something introduced by the grace of God's Holy Spirit, which is
above all that is natural. The words are in a considerable degree parallel with
ORIGINAL SIN. • 419
those of our Saviour, John xiv. 16, 17, " He shall give you the Spirit of Truth
whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him ;
but ye know him, for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you."
SECTION II.
Observations on Romans iii. 9 — 24.
If the Scriptures represent all mankind as wicked in their first state, before
they are made partakers of the benefits of Christ's redemption, then they are
wicked by nature ; for doubtless men's first state is their native state, or the
state they come into the world in. But the Scriptures do thus represent all
mankind.
Before I mention particular texts to this purpose, I would observe that it
alters not the case as to the argument in hand, whether we suppose these texts
speak directly of infants, or only of such as are capable of some understanding, so
as to understand something of their own duty and state. For if it be so with
all mankind, that as soon as ever they are capable of reflecting and knowing
their own moral state, they find themselves wicked, this proves that they are
wicked by nature ; either born wicked, or born with an infallible disposition
to be wicked as soon as possible, if there be any difference between these, and
either of them will prove men to be born exceedingly depraved. I have before
proved, that a native propensity to sin certainly follows from many things said
in the Scripture of mankind ; but what I intend now, is something more direct,
to prove by direct Scripture testimony, that all mankind, in their first state, are
really of a wicked character.
To this purpose is exceeding full, express and abundant, that passage of the
apostle, in Rom. iii., beginning with the 9th verse to the end of the 24th ; which
I shall set down at large, distinguishing the universal terms which are here so
often repeated by a distinct character. The apostle, having in the first chapter,
verses 16, 17, laid down his proposition, that none can be saved in any other
way than through the righteousness of God, by faith in Jesus Christ, proceeds
to prove this point, by showing particularly that all are in themselves wicked,
and without any righteousness of their own. First he insists on the wickedness
of the Gentiles, in the first chapter, and next, on the wickedness of the Jews, in
the second chapter. And then in this place, he comes to sum up the matter, and
draw the conclusion in the words following : " What then, are we better than
they ? No, in no wise ; for we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that
they are all under sin ; as it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one ;
there is none that understandeth ; there is none that seeketh after God ; they
are all gone out of the way ; they are together become unprofitable ; there is
none that doth good, no not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre ; with their
tongues they have used deceit ; the poison of asps is under their lips ; whose
mouth is full of cursing and bitterness ; their feet are swift to shed blood ; des-
truction and misery are in their ways, and the way of peace they have not
known ; there is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we know that what-
soever things the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law, that every
mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God.
Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight ; i
for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness of God
without the law, is manifest, being witnessed by the law and the prophets ;
420 ORIGINAL SIN.
even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all, and
upon all them that believe : for there is no difference. For all have sinned', and
come short of the glory of God. Being justified freely by his grace, through
the redemption which is in Jesus Christ."
Here the thing which I would prove, viz., that mankind in their first state,
before they are interested in the benefits of Christ's redemption, are universally
wicked, is declared with the utmost possible fulness and precision. So that if
here this matter be not set forth plainly, expressly, and fully, it must be because
no words can do it, and it is not in the power of language, or any manner of
terms and phrases, however contrived and heaped up one upon another, deter-
minately to signify any such thing.
Dr. Taylor, to take off the force of the whole, would have us to understand,
pages 104 — 107, that these passages, quoted from the Psalms, and other parts
of the Old Testament, do not speak of all mankind, nor of all the Jews j but
only of them of whom they were true. He observes, there were many that
were innocent and righteous ; though there were also many, a strong party,
that were wicked, corrupt, &c, of whom these texts were to be understood.
Concerning which I would observe the following things :
1. According to this, the universality of the terms that are found in these
places, which the apostle cites from the Old Testament, to prove that all the
world, both Jews and Gentiles, are under sin, is nothing to his purpose. The
apostle uses universal terms in his proposition, and in his conclusion, that all are
under sin, that every mouth is stopped, all the world guilty — that by the
deeds of the law no flesh can be justified. And he chooses out a number of uni-
versal sayings or clauses out of the Old Testament, to confirm this univeisality ;
as, " There is none righteous, no, not one : they are all gone out of the way :
there is none that understandeth," &c. But yet the universality of these expres-
sions is nothing to this purpose, because the universal terms found in them have
indeed no reference to any such universality as this the apostle speaks of, nor any
thing akin to it ; they mean no universality, either in the collective sense, or per-
sonal sense ; no universality of the nations of the world, or of particular persons
in those nations, or in any one nation in the world : " but only of those of
whom they are true." That is, there are none of them righteous, of whom it is
true that they are not righteous, no, not one ; there are none that understand,
of whom it is true, that they understand not : they are all gone out of the way,
of whom it is true, that they are gone out of the way, &c. Or if these expres-
sions are to be understood concerning that strong party in Israel, in David's and
Solomon's days, and in the prophets' days, they are to be understood of them
universally. And what is that to the apostle's purpose ? How does such a
universality of wickedness as this — that all were wicked in Israel, who were
wicked ; or that there was a particular evil party, all of which were wicked,
confirm that universality which the apostle would prove, viz., that all Jews and
Gentiles, and the whole world, were wicked, and every mouth stopped, and that
no flesh could be justified by their, own righteousness.
Here nothing can be said to abate the nonsense but this, that the apostle
would convince the Jews that they were capable of being wicked, as well as
other nations ; and to prove it, he mentions some texts, which show that
there was a wicked party in Israel a thousand years ago j and that as to the uni-
versal terms which happened to be in these texts, the apostle had no respect to
these ; but his reciting them is as it were accidental, they happened to be in
some texts which speak of an evil party in Israel, and the apostle cites them
as they are, not because they are any more to his purpose for the universal
ORIGINAL SIN. 421
terms, which happen to be in them. But let the reader look on the words of
the apostle, and observe the violence of such a supposition. Particularly let
the words of the 9th and 10th verses, and their connection, be observed : " All
are under sin : as it is written, There is none righteous ; no, not one." How
plain is it, that the apostle cites that latter universal clause out of the 14th
Psalm, to confirm the preceding universal words of his own proposition ? A nil
yet it will follow from the things which Dr. Taylor supposes, that the universa-
lity of the terms in the last words, there is none righteous ; no, not one, hath
no relation at all to that universality he speaks of in the preceding clause, to
which they are joined, all are under sin, and is no more a confirmation of it,
than if the words were thus : " There are some, or there are many in Israel,
that are not righteous."
2. To suppose the apostle's design in citing these passages, was only to
prove to the Jews, that of old there was a considerable number of their nation
that were wicked men, is to suppose him to have gone about to prove what
none of the Jews denied, or made the least doubt of. Even the Pharisees, the
most self-righteous sect of them, who went furthest in glorying in the distinc-
tion of their nation from other nations, as a holy people, knew it and owned it :
they openly confessed that their forefathers killed the prophets, Matth. xxiii.
29 — 31. And if the apostle's design had been only to refresh their memories,
to put them in mind of the ancient wickedness of their nation, to lead to reflec-
tion on themselves as guilty of the like wickedness (as Stephen does, Acts vii.),
what need had the apostle to go so far about to prove this ; gathering up many
sentences here and there, which prove that their Scriptures did speak of some,
as wicked men, and then in the next place, to prove that the wicked men spoken
of must be of the nation of the Jews, by this argument, " That what things
soever the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law," or that whatso-
ever the books of the Old Testament said, it must be understood of that people
that had the Old Testament 1 "What need had the apostle of such an ambages
or fetch as this, to prove to the Jews, that there had been many of their nation
in some of the ancient ages, which were wicked men ; when the Old Testament
was full of passages that asserted this expressly, not only of a strong party,
but of the nation in general 1 How much more would it have been to such a
purpose, to have put them in mind of the wickedness of the people in general,
in worshipping the golden calf, and the unbelief, murmuring, and perverseness
of the whole congregation in the wilderness, for forty years, as Stephen does !
Which things he had no need to prove to be spoken of their nation, by any
such indirect argument, as that, " Whatsoever things the law saith, it saith to
them that are under the law."
3. It would have been impertinent to the apostle's purpose, even as our
author understands his purpose, for him to have gone about to convince the
Jews that there had been a strong party of bad men in David's, Solomon's and
the prophets' times. For Dr. Taylor supposes, the apostle's aim is to prove the
great corruption of both Jews and Gentiles at that day, when Christ came into
the world.*
In order more fully to evade the clear and abundant testimonies to the doc-
trine of Original Sin, contained in this part of the Holy Scripture, our author
says, " The apostle is here speaking of bodies of people, of Jews and Gentiles
in a collective sense, as two great bodies into which mankind are divided ;
speaking of them in their collective capacity, and not with respect to particular
* See Key, § 307, 310.
422 ORIGINAL SIN.
persons ; that the apostle's design is to prove, neither of these two great col-
lective bodies, in their collective sense, can be justified by law, because both
were corrupt ; and so that no more is implied, than that the generality of both
were wicked."*
On this I observe,
(1.) That this supposed sense disagrees extremely with the terms and lan-
guage which the apostle here makes use of. For according to this, we must
understand, either,
First, That the apostle means no universality at all, but only the far greater
part. But if the words which the apostle uses, do not most fully and determin-
ately signify a universality, no wTords ever used in the Bible are sufficient to
do it. I might challenge any man to produce any one paragraph in the Scrip-
ture, from the beginning to the end, where there is such a repetition and accu-
mulation of terms, so strongly and emphatically and carefully, to express the
most perfect and absolute universality, or any place to be compared to it.
What instance is there in the Scripture, or indeed any other writing, when the
meaning is only the much greater part, where this meaning is signified in such
a manner, by repeating such expressions, " They are all — they are all — they
are all — together — every one — all the world," joined to multiplied negative
terms, to show the universality to be without exception, saying, " There is no
flesh — there is none — there is none — there is none — there is none, four times
over ; besides the addition of " No, not one — no, not one," once and again !
Or, secondly, if any universality at all be allowed, it is only of the collective
bodies spoken of; and these collective bodies but two, as Dr. Taylor reckons
them, viz., the Jewish nation, and the Gentile world ; supposing the apostle is
here representing each of these parts of mankind as being wicked. But is this
the way of men's using language, when speaking of but two things, to express
themselves in universal terms of such a sort, and in such a manner, and when
they mean no more than that the thing affirmed is predicated of both of them ?
If a man, speaking of his two feet as both lame, should say, " All my feet are
lame, they are all lame, all together are become weak : none of my feet are
strong, none of them are sound, no, not one ;" would not he be thought to be
lame in his understanding, as well as his feet ? When the apostle says, that
every mouth may be stopped, must we suppose, that he speaks only of these two
great collective bodies, figuratively ascribing to each of them a mouth, and
means that these two mouths are stopped !
And besides, according to our author's own interpretation, the universal
terms used in these texts cited from the Old Testament, have no respect to those
two great collective bodies, nor indeed to either of them, but to some in Israel,
a particular disaffected party in that one nation, which was made up of wicked
men. So that his interpretation is every way absurd and inconsistent.
(2.) If the apostle is speaking only of the wickedness or guilt of great col-
lective bodies, then it will follow, that also the justification he here treats of, is
no other than the justification of such collective bodies. For they are the same
he speaks of as guilty and wicked, that he argues cannot be justified by the
works of the law, by reason of their being wicked. Otherwise his argument is
wholly disannulled. If the guilt he speaks of be only of collective bodies, then
what he argues from that guilt, must be only that collective bodies cannot be
justified by the works of the law, having no respect to the justification of par-
ticular persons. And indeed, this is Dr. Taylor's declared opinion. He sup-
* Pages 102, 104, 117, 119, 120, and Note on Rom. iii. 10—19.
ORIGINAL SIN. 423
poses the apostle here, and in other parts of this epistle, is speaking of men's
justification considered only as in their collective capacity* But the contrary
is most manifest. The 26th and 28th verses of this third chapter cannot, with-
out the utmost violence, be understood otherwise than of the justification of par-
ticular persons. " That he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth
in Jesus. Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith, without the
deeds of the law." So chap. iv. 5, " But to him that worketh not, but believeth
on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness." And
what the apostle cites in the 6th, 7th and 8th verses from the Book of Psalms,
evidently shows that he is speaking of the justification of particular persons.
* Even as David also describeth the. blessedness of the man unto whom God
imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities
are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." David says these things in the 32d
Psalm, with a special respect to his own particular case ; there expressing the
great distress he was in, while under a sense of the guilt of his personal sin,
and the great joy he had when God forgave him.
And then, it is very plain in that paragraph of the 3d chapter which we
have been upon, that it is the justification of particular persons that the apostle
speaks of, by that place in the Old Testament which he refers to in ver. 20,
I Therefore by the deeds of the law, there shall no flesh be justified in his sight."
He refers to that in Psal. cxliii. 2, * Enter not into judgment with thy servant ;
for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." Here the Psalmist is not
speaking of the justification of a nation, as a collective body, or of one of the
two parts of the world, but of a particular man. And it is further manifest,
that the apostle is here speaking of personal justification, inasmuch as this place
is evidently parallel with that, Gal. iii. 10, 11, " For as many as are of the
works of the law are under the curse : for it is written, Cursed is every one that
continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them.
But that no man is justified by the works of the law, is evident ; for the just
shall live by faith." It is plain, that this place is parallel with that in the 3d of
Romans, not only as the thing asserted is the same, and the argument by which
it is proved here, is the same as there, viz., that all are guilty, and exposed to
be condemned by the law : but the same saying of the Old Testament is cited
here in the beginning of this discourse in Galatians, chap. ii. 16. And many
other things demonstrate, that the apostle is speaking of the same justification
in both places, which I omit for brevity's sake.
And besides all these things, our author's interpretation makes the apostle's
argument wholly void another way. The apostle is speaking of a certain sub-
ject, which cannot be justified by the works of the law ; and his argument is,
that that same subject is guilty, and is condemned by the law. If he means,
that one subject, suppose a collective body or bodies, cannot be justified by the
law, because another subject, another collective body is condemned by the law,
it is plain, the argument would be quite vain and impertinent. Yet thus the
argument must stand according to Dr. Taylor's interpretation. The collective
bodies, which he supposes are spoken of as wicked, and condemned by the law,
considered as in their collective capacity, are those two, the Jewish nation, and
the Heathen world : but the collective body which he supposes the apostle
speaks of as justified without the deeds of the law, is neither of these, but the
Christian church, or body of believers ; which is a new collective body, a new
creature, and a new man (according to our author's understanding of such
* See note on Rom. iii. 10—19, chap, v, 11, and ix. 30, 31.
424 ORIGINAL SIN
phrases) which never had* L.iy existence before it was justified, and therefore
never was wicked or condemned, unless it was with regard to the individuals of
which it was constituted ; and it does not appear, according to our author's
scheme, that these individuals had before been generally wicked. For accord-
ing to him, there was a number both among the Jews and Gentiles, that were
righteous before. And how does it appear, but that the comparatively few
Jews and Gentiles, of which this new created collective body was constituted,
were chiefly of the best of each 1
So that in every view, this author's way of explaining this passage in the
third of Romans, appears vain and absurd. And so clearly and fully has the
apostle expressed himself, that it is doubtless impossible to invent any other
sense to put upon his words, than that which will imply, that all mankind, even
every individual of the whole race, but their Redeemer himself, are in their first
original state, corrupt ^ind wicked.
Before I leave this passage of the apostle, it may be proper to observe, that
it not only is a most clear and full testimony to the native depravity of mankind,
but also plainly declares that natural depravity to be total and exceeding great,
(t is the apostle's manifest design in these citations from the Old Testament, to
show these three things. 1. That all mankind are by nature corrupt. 2. That
pvery one is altogether corrupt, and, as it were, depraved in every part. 3.
That they are in every part corrupt in an exceeding degree. With respect to
the second of these, that every one is wholly, and, as it were, in every part
corrupt, it is plain the apostle chooses out, and puts together those particular
passages of the Old Testament, wherein most of those members of the body are
mentioned, that are the soul's chief instruments or organs of external action.
The hands (implicitly) in those expressions, They are together become unprofit-
able, There is none that doth good. The throat, tongue, lips and mouth, the or-
gans of speech, in those words ; " Their throat is an open sepulchre : with
their tongues they have used deceit : the poison of asps is under their lips ;
whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness." The feet in those words, ver. 15,
" Their feet are swift to shed blood." These things together signify, that man
is, as it were, all over corrupt in every part. And not only is the total corrup-
tion thus intimated by enumerating the several parts, but by denying of all
good ; any true understanding or spiritual knowledge, any virtuous action, or
so much as truly virtuous desire, or seeking after God. There is none that
understandeth : there is none that seeketh after God : there is none that doth
good ; the way of peace have they not knovm. And in general, by denying all
true piety or religion in men in their first state, ver. 18, " There is no fear of
God before their eyes." The expressions also are evidently chosen to denote a
most extreme and desperate wickedness of heart. An exceeding depravity is
ascribed to every part : to the throat, the scent of an open sepulchre ; to the tongue
and lips, deceit, and the poison of asps ; to the mouth, cursing and bitterness ;
of their feet it is said, they are swift to shed blood : and with regard to the
whole man, it is said, destruction and misery are in their ways. The represen-
tation is very strong of each of these things, viz., that all mankind are cor-
rupt ; that every one is wholly and altogether corrupt ; and also extremely and
desperately corrupt. And it is plain, it is not accidental, that we have here
such a collection of such strong expressions, so emphatically signifying these
things; but that they are chosen of the apostle on design, as being directly and
fully to his purpose ; which purpose appears in all his discourse in the whole of
this chapter and indeed from the beginning of the epistle.
ORIGINAL SIN. 42b
SECTION III.
Observations on Romans v. 6 — 10, and Ephesians ii. 3, with the Context, and Ro-
mans vii.
Another passage of this apostle in the same epistle to the Romans, which
shows that all that are made partakers of the benefits of Christ's redemption, are
in their first state wicked, and desperately wicked, is that, chap. v. 6 — 10, u For
when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly.
For scarcely for a righteous man will one die ; yet peradventure for a good
man, some would even dare to die. But God commendeth his love towards us,
in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being
now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. For if
while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his
Son ; much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life."
Here all that Christ died for, and that are saved by him, are spoken of as
being in their first state sinners, ungodly, enemies to God, exposed to divine
wrath, and without strength, without ability to help themselves, or deliver their
souls from this miserable state.
Dr. Taylor says, The apostle here speaks of the Gentiles only in their hea-
then state, in contradistinction to the Jews ; and that not of particular persons
among the heathen Gentiles, or as to the state they were in personally ; but
only of the Gentiles collectively taken, or of the miserable state of that great
collective body, the heathen world : and that these appellations, sinners, un-
godly, enemies, &c, were names by which the apostles in their writings were
wont to signify and distinguish the heathen world, in opposition to the Jews ;
and that in this sense these appellations are to be taken in their epistles, and in
this place in particular.* And it is observable, that this way of interpreting
these phrases in the apostolic writings, is become fashionable with many late
writers ; whereby they not only evade several clear testimonies to the doctrine
of original sin, but make void great part of the New Testament ; on which
account it deserves the more particular consideration.
It is allowed to have been long common and customary among the Jews,
in Christ's and the apostle's days, especially those of the sect of the Pharisees,
in their pride and confidence in their privileges, as the peculiar people of God,
to exalt themselves exceedingly above other nations, and greatly to despise the
Gentiles, and call them by such names as sinners, enemies, dogs, &c, as notes
of distinction from themselves, whom they accounted in general (excepting the
publicans, and the notoriously profligate) as the friends, special favorites, and
children of God ; because they were the children of Abraham, were circumcis-
ed, and had the law of Moses, as their peculiar privilege, and as a wall of par-
tition between them and the Gentiles.
But it is very remarkable, that a Christian divine, who has studied the New
Testament, and the epistle to the Romans in particular, so diligently as Dr.
Taylor, should be strong in an imagination, that the apostles of Jesus Christ
should so far countenance, and do so much to cherish these self-exalting, un-
charitable dispositions and notions of the Jews, which gave rise to such a cus-
tom, as to fall in with that custom, and adopt that language of their pride and
* Pages 114—120. See also Dr. Taylor's Paraph, and Notes on the place.
Vol. II. 54
426 ORIGINAL SIN.
contempt ; and especially that the Apostle Paul should do it. It is a m&st un-
reasonable im agination on many accounts.
1. The Whole gospel dispensation is calculated entirely to overthrow and abol-
ish every thing to which this self-distinguishing, self-exalting language of the
Jews was owing. It was calculated wholly to exclude such boasting, and to de-
stroy that pride and self-righteousness that were the causes of it ; it was calculated
to abolish the enmity, and break down the partition wall between Jews and Gen-
tiles, and of twain to make one new man, so making peace ; to destroy all dis-
positions in nations and particular persons to despise one another, or to say one
to another, Stand by thyself, come not near to me ; for I am holier than thou ;
and to establish the contrary principles of humility, mutual esteem, honor and
love, and universal union, in the most firm and perfect manner.
2. Christ, when on earth, set himself, through the course of his ministry, to
militate against this pharisaical spirit, practice, and language of the Jews ; ap-
pearing in such representations, names, and epithets, so customary among
them ; by which they showed so much contempt of the Gentiles, publicans,
and such as were openly lewd and vicious, and so exalted themselves above
them ; calling them sinners and enemies, and themselves holy and God's
children ; not allowing the Gentile to be their neighbor, &c. He condemned
the Pharisees for not esteeming themselves sinners, as well as the publicans ;
trusting in themselves that they were righteous, and despising others. He mili-
tated against these things in his own treatment of some Gentiles, publicans,
and others, whom they called sinners, and in what he said on those occasions*
He opposed these notions and manners of the Jews in his parables,! and
in his instructions to his disciples how to treat the unbelieving Jews ;| and in
what he says to Nicodemus about the necessity of a new birth, even for the
Jews, as well as the unclean Gentiles, with regard to their proselytism, which
some of the Jews looked upon as a new birth : and in opposition to their no-
tions of their being the children of God, because the children of Abraham, but
the Gentiles by nature sinners and children of wrath, he tells them that even
they were children of the devil.\\
3. Though we should suppose the apostles not to have been thoroughly
brought off from such notions, manners and language of the Jews, till after
Christ's ascension ; yet after the pouring out of the Spirit on the day of pente-
cost, or at least, after the calling of the Gentiles, begun in the conversion of
Cornelius, they were fully indoctrinated in this matter, and effectually taught
no longer to call the Gentiles unclean, as a note of distinction from the Jews,
Acts x. 28, which was before any of the apostolic epistles were written.
4. Of all the apostles, none were more perfectly instructed in this matter,
and none so abundant in instructing others in it, as Paul, the great Apostle of
the Gentiles. He had abundance to do in this matter : none of the apostles had
so much occasion to exert themselves against the forementioned notions and lan-
guage of the Jews, in opposition to Jewish teachers, and judaizing Christians,
* Matth. viii. 5—13. Chap. ix. 9—13. Chap. xi. 19—24. Chap. xv. 21—28. Luke vii. 37, to the
end. Chap. xvii. 12 — 19. Chap. xix. 1 — 10. John iv. 9, &c. ver. 39, &c. Compare Luke x. 29, &c.
+ Matth. xxi. 28—32. Chap. xxii. 1—10. Luke xiv. 16—24. Compare Luke xiii. 28, 29, 30,
t Matth. x. 14, 15. II John viii. 33—44.
It may also be observed, that John the Baptist greatly contradicted the Jews' opinion of themselves,
as being a holy people, and accepted of God, because they were the children of Abraham, and on that
account better than the heathen, whom they called sinners, enemies, unclean, &c, in baptizing the Jews
as a polluted people, and sinners, as the Jews used to baptize proselytes from among the heathen ; call-
ing them to repentance as sinners, saying, " Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to
our father ; for I say unto you, that Grdis able, of these stones, to raise up children unto Abraham ;"
and teaching the Pharisees, that instead of their being a holy generation, and children of God, as thev
called themselves, they were a generation of vipers.
ORIGINAL SIN. 427
that strove to keep up the separation wall between Jews and Gentiles, and to
exalt the former, and set the latter at nought.
5. This apostle does especially strive in this matter in his epistle to the
Romans, above all his other writings ; exerting himself in a most elaborate
manner, and with his utmost skill and power, to bring the Jewish Christians off
from every thing of this kind ; endeavoring by all means that there might no
longer be in them any remains of these old notions they had been educated in,
of such a great distinction between Jews and Gentiles, as were expressed in the
names they used to distinguish them by, calling the Jews holy, children of Abra-
ham, friends and children of God ; but the Gentiles sinners, unclean, enemies,
and the like. He makes it almost his whole business, from the beginning of
the epistle, to this passage in the 5th chapter, which we are upon, to convince
them that there was no ground for any such distinction, and to prove that in
common, both Jews and Gentiles, all were desperately wicked, and none right-
eous ; no, not one. He tells them, chap. iii. 9, that the Jews were by no means
better than the Gentiles ; and (in what follows in that chapter) that there was
no difference between Jews and Gentiles ; and represents all as without strength,
or any sufficiency of their own in the affair of justification and redemption : and
in the continuation of the same discourse, in the 4th chapter, teaches that all that
were justified by Christ, were in themselves ungodly ; and that being the children
of Abraham was not peculiar to the Jews. In this 5th chapter, still in continu-
ation of the same discourse, on the same subject and argument of justification
through Christ, and by faith in him, he speaks of Christ's dying for the ungodly
and sinners, and those that were without strength or sufficiency for their own
salvation, as he had done all long before. But now, it seems, the apostle by
sinners and ungodly must not be understood according as he used these words
before ; but must be supposed to mean only the Gentiles as distinguished from
the Jews ; adopting the language of these self-righteous, self-exalting, disdain-
ful, judaizing teachers, whom he was with all his might opposing ; countenancing
the very same thing in them, which he had been from the beginning of the
epistle discountenancing and endeavoring to discourage, and utterly to abolish,
with all his art and strength.
One reason why the Jews looked on themselves better than the Gentiles, and
called themselves holy, and the Gentiles sinners, was, that they had the law of
Moses. They made their boast of the law. But the apostle shows them, that
this was so far from making them better, that it condemned them, and was an
occasion of their being sinners, in a higher degree, and more aggravated manner,
and more effectually and dreadfully dead in, and by sin, chap. vii. 4 — 13, agree-
able to those words of Christ, John v. 45.
It cannot be justly objected here, that this apostle did indeed use this lan-
fuage, and call the Gentiles sinners, in contradistinction to the Jews, in what
e said to Peter, which he himself gives an account of in Gal. ii. 15, 16, " We
who are Jews by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles, knowing that a man
is not justified by the works of the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ." It is true
that the apostle here refers to this distinction, as what was usually made by the
self-righteous Jews, between themselves and the Gentiles, but not in such a
manner as to adopt or favor it ; but on the contrary, so as plainly to show hk
disapprobation of it ; q.d., " Though we were born Jews, and by nature are
of that people which are wont to make their boast of the law, expecting to be
justified by it, and trust in themselves that they are righteous, despising others,
calling the Gentiles sinners, in distinction from themselves; yet we, being
now instructed in the gospel of Christ, know better. We now know that
428 ORIGINAL SIN
a man is not justified by the works of the law ; that we are all justified only
by faith in Christ, in whom there is no difference, no distinction of Greek or
Gentile and Jew, but all are one in Christ Jesus." And this is the very thing
he there speaks of, which he blamed Peter for ; that by his withdrawing and
separating himself from the Gentiles, refusing to eat with them, &c, he had
countenanced this self-exalting, self-distinguishing, separating spirit and custom
of the Jews, whereby they treated the Gentiles, as in a distinguishing manner,
sinners and unclean, and not fit to come near them who were a holy people.
6. The words themselves of the apostle in this place, show plainly, that he
here uses the word sinners, not as signifying Gentiles, in opposition to Jews,
but as denoting the morally evil, in opposition to such as are righteous or good :
because this latter opposition or distinction between sinners and righteous is
here expressed in plain terms : " Scarcely for a righteous man will one die ;
yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die ; but God com-
mended his love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for
us." By righteous men are doubtless meant the same that are meant by such
a phrase, throughout this apostle's writings, and throughout the New Testament,
and throughout the Bible. Will any one pretend, that by the righteous man,
whom men would scarcely die for, and by the good man, that perhaps some
might even dare to die for, is meant a Jew ? Dr. Taylor himself does not ex-;'
plain it so, in his exposition of this epistle, and therefore is not very consistent
with himself, in supposing that in the other part of the distinction the apostle
means Gentiles, as distinguished from the Jews. The apostle himself had been
laboring abundantly, in the preceding part of the epistle, to prove that the Jews
were sinners in this sense, namely, in opposition to righteous ; that all had
sinned, that all were under sm, and therefore could not be justified, could not be
accepted as righteous by their own righteousness.
7. Another thing which makes it evident that the apostle, when he speaks
in this place of the sinners and enemies which Christ died for, does not mean
only the Gentiles, is that he includes himself among them, saying, while we
were sinners, and when we were enemies.
Our author from time to time says, " The apostle, though he speaks only of
the Gentiles in their Heathen state, yet puts himself with them, because he was the
apostle of the Gentiles." But this is very violent and unreasonable. There is
no more sense in it than there would be in a father's ranking himself among his
children, when speaking to his children of the benefits they have by being be-
gotten by himself, and saying, We children — or in a physician's ranking him-
self with his patients, when talking to them of their diseases and cure, saying,
We sick folks. — Paul being the apostle of the Gentiles, to save them from their
Heathenism, is so far from being a reason for him to reckon himself among the
Heathen, that on the contrary, it is the very thing that would render it in a
peculiar manner unnatural and absurd for him so to do. Because, as the apostle
of the Gentiles, he appears as their healer and deliverer from Heathenism ; and
therefore in that capacity does in a peculiar manner appear in his distinction
from the Heathen, and in opposition to the state of Heathenism. For it is by
the most opposite qualities only, that he is fitted to be an apostle of. the Hea-
then, and recoverer from Heathenism. As the clear light of the sun is the thing
which makes it a proper restorative from darkness ; and therefore the sun's being
spoken of as such a remedy, none would suppose to be a good reason why it should
be ranked with darkness, or among dark things. And besides (which makes
this supposition of Dr. Taylor's appear more violent), the apostle in this epistle,
does expressly rank himself with the Jews, when he speaks of them as distin-
ORIGINAL SIN. 429
guished from the Gentiles, as in chapter iii. 9, " What then ? Are we better
than they ?" That is, are we Jews better than the Gentiles ?
It cannot justly be alleged in opposition to this, that the Apostle Peter puts
himself with the heathen, 1 Pet. iv. 3 : " For the time past of our life may suffice
us to have wrought the will of the Gentiles ; when we walked in lasciviousness,
lusts, excess of wine, revellings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries. For
the Apostle Peter (who by the way was not an apostle of the Gentiles) here
does not speak of himself as one of the Heathen, but as one of the church of
Christ in general, made up of those that had been Jews, Proselytes, and Hea-
thens, who were now all one body, of which body he was a member. It is this
society therefore, and not the Gentiles, that he refers to in the pronoun us. He is
speaking of the wickedness that the members of this body or society had lived
in before their conversion; not that every member had lived in all those
vices here mentioned, but some in one, others in another. Very parallel
with that of the Apostle Paul to Titus, chapter iii. 3, " For we ourselves also
(i. e. we of the Christian church) were sometimes foolish, disobedient, de-
ceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures (some one lust and pleasure, others
another), living in malice, envy, hateful and hating one another," &c. There is
nothing in this, but what is very natural. That the apostle, speaking to the
Christian church, and o/*that church, confessing its former sins, should speak of
himself as one of that society, and yet mention some sins that he personally had
not been guilty of, and among others, Heathenish idolatry, is quite a different
thing from what it would have been for the apostle, expressly distinguishing those
of the Christians which had been Heathen, from those which had been Jews,
to have ranked himself with the former, though he was truly of the latter.
If a minister in some congregation in England, speaking in a sermon of the
sins of the nation, being himself of the nation, should say, " We have greatly
corrupted ourselves, and provoked God by our deism, blasphemy, profane swear-
ing, lascivousness, venality," &c, speaking in the first person plural, though he
himself never had been a deist, and perhaps none of his hearers, and they might
also have been generally free from other sins he mentioned ; yet there would be
nothing unnatural in his thus expressing himself. But it would be a quite dif-
ferent thing, if one part of the British dominions, suppose our king's American
dominions, had universally apostatized from Christianity to deism, and had long
been in such a state, and if one that had been born and brought up in England
among Christians, the country being universally Christian, should be sent among
them to show them the folly and great evil of deism, and convert them to
Christianity ; and this missionary, when making a distinction between English
Christians, and these deists, should rank himself with the latter, and say, " We
American deists, we foolish, blind, infidels," &c, this indeed would be very un-
natural and absurd.
Another passage of the apostle, to the like purpose with that which we have
been considering in the 5th of Romans, is that in Eph. ii. 3, "And were by na-
ture children of wrath, even as others." This remains a plain testimony to the
doctrine of Original Sin, as held by those that used to be called orthodox Chris-
tians, after all the pains and art used to torture and pervert it. This doctrine is
here not only plainly and fully taught, but abundantly so, if we take the words
with the context, where Christians are once and again represented as being, in
their first state, dead in sins, and as quickened and raised up from such a state of
death, in a most marvellous display of free and rich grace and love, and exceed-
ing greatness of the power of God, &c.
With respect to those words, tji*ev rexva cpvoet oqyrig, We were by nature
430 ORIGINAL SIN.
children of wrath, Dr. Taylor says, pages 112— 114, "The apostle means no
more by this, than truly or really children of wrath ; using a metaphorical ex-
pression, borrowed from the word that is used to signify a true and genuine child
of a family, in distinction from one that is a child only by adoption." In which
it is owned, that the proper sense of the phrase is, being a child by nature, in
the same sense as a child by birth or natural generation ; but only he supposes
that here the word is used metaphorically. The instance he produces as parallel,
to confirm his supposed metaphorical sense of the phrase, as meaning only truly,
really, or properly children of wrath, viz., the Apostle Paul's calling Timothy
his own son in the faith, yvqoiov texvov, is so far from confirming his sense, that
it is rather directly against it. For doubtless the apostle uses the word yvr^iov
in its original signification here, meaning his begotten son, yvrjawg being the ad-
jective from yovtj, offspring, or the verb yervaw, to beget ; as much as to say,
Timothy, my begotten son in the faith ; only allowing for the two ways of being
begotten, spoken of in the New Testament, one natural, and the other spiritual ;
one being the first generation, the other regeneration ; the one a being begotten as
to the human nature, the other a being begotten in the faith, begotten in Christ,
or as to one's Christianity. The apostle expressly signifies which of these he
means in this place, Timothy my begotten son in the faith, in the same man-
ner as he says to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. iv. 15, " In Christ Jesus I have begot-
ten you through the gospel." To say the apostle uses the word cpvaei, in Eph
ii. 3, only as signifying real, true, and proper, is a most arbitrary interpretation,
having nothing to warrant it in the whole Bible. The word cpvcig is nowhere
used in this sense in the New Testament.*
Another thing which our author alleges to evade the force of this, is
that the word rendered nature, sometimes signifies habit contracted by custom,
or an acquired nature. But this is not the proper meaning of the word. And
it is plain the word in its common use, in the New Testament, signifies what we
properly express in English by the word nature. There is but one place
where there can be the least pretext for supposing in can be used otherwise ;
and that is 1 Cor. xi. 14, " Doth not even nature itself teach you, that if a man
have long hair, it is a shame unto him V9 And even here there is, I think, no
manner of reason for understanding nature otherwise than in the proper sense.
The emphasis used, avtq tj yvaig, nature itself, shows that the apostle does not
mean custom., but nature in the proper sense. It is true, it was long custom, that
made having the head covered a token of subjection, and a feminine habit or ap-
pearance ; as it is custom that makes any outward action or word a sign or
signification of any thing : but nature itself, nature in its proper sense, teaches
that it is a shame for a man to appear with the established signs of the female
sex, and with significations of inferiority, &c. As nature itself shows it to be a
shame for a father to bow down or kneel to his own child or servant, or for
men to bow to an idol, because bowing down is by custom an established token
or sign of subjection and submission ; such a sight, therefore, would be unnatural,
shocking to a man's very nature. So nature would teach that it is a shame for
a woman to use such and such lascivious words or gestures, though it be custom,
that establishes the unclean signification of those gestures and sounds.
It is particularly unnatural and unreasonable, to understand the phrase,
rexva (pvcEt, in this place, any otherwise than in the proper sense, on the follow-
ing accounts.
1. It may be observed that both the words rexva and cpvaig, in their original
* The falowiug are all the other places where the word is used, Rom. i. 26, ii. 14, 27, xi. 21, 24, thrice
in that Terse. 1 Cor. xi. 14. Gal. ii. 15, iv. 8. James iii. 1, twice in that verse, and 2 Pet. i. 4.
ORIGINAL SIN. 431
signification, have reference to the birth or generation. So the word cpvaig,
which comes from cpvco, which signifies to beget, or bring forth young, or to put
forth, or bud forth as a plant that brings forth young buds and branches. And
so the word zexvov comes from tixzco, which signifies to bring forth children
2. As though the apostle took care by the word used here, to signify what
we are by birth, he changes the word he used before for children. In the pre-
ceding verse he used vim, speaking of the children of disobedience ; but here
rexva, which is a word derived, as was now observed, from toctco, to bring forth
a child, and more properly signifies a begotten or born child.
3. It is natural to suppose that the apostle here speaks in opposition to the
pride of some, especially the Jews (for, the church in Ephesus was made up
partly of Jews, as well as the church in Rome), who exalted themselves in the
privileges they had by birth, because they were born the children of Abraham,
and were Jews by nature, cpvoei lovdatoi, as the phrase is, Gal. ii. 15. In oppo-
sition to this proud conceit, he teaches the Jews, that notwithstanding this, they
were by nature children of wrath, even as others, i. e. as well as the Gentiles,
which the Jews had been taught to look upon as sinners, and out of favor with
God by nature, and born children of wrath.
4. It is more plain, that the apostle uses the word nature in its proper sense
here, because he sets what they were by nature, in opposition to what they are
by grace. In this verse, the apostle shows what they are by nature, viz., chil-
dren of wrath ; and in the following verses he shows how very different their
state is by grace, saying, verse 5, By grace ye are saved, repeating it again
verse 8, By grace ye are saved. But if by being children of wrath by nature,
were meant no more than only their being really and truly children of wrath,
as Dr. Taylor supposes, there would be no opposition in the signification of these
phrases ; for in this sense they were by nature in a state of salvation, as much
as by nature children of wrath ; for they were truly, really, and properly in a
state of salvation.
If we take these wTords with the context, the whole abundantly proves that
by nature we are totally corrupt, without any good thing in us. For if we
allow the plain scope of the place, without attempting to hide it, by extreme
violence used with the apostle's words and expressions, the design here is strong-
ly to establish this point ; that what Christians have that is good in them, or m
their state, is in no part of it naturally in themselves, or from themselves, but is
wholly from divine grace, all the gift of God, and his workmanship, the effect
of his power, and free and wonderful love : none of our good works are prima-
rily from ourselves, but with respect to them all, we are God's workmanship,
created unto good works, as it were out of nothing : not so much as faith itself,
the first principle of good works in Christians, is of themselves, but that is the
gift of God.
Therefore the apostle compares the work of God, in forming Christians to
true virtue and holiness, not only to a new creation, but a resurrection, or raising
from the dead, ver. 1, " You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses
and sins." And again, ver. 5, " Even when we were dead in sins, hath quick-
ened us together with Christ." In speaking of Christians being quickened with
Christ, the apostle has reference to what he had said before, in the latter part
of the foregoing chapter, of God's manifesting the exceeding greatness of his
power towards Christian converts in their conversion, agreeable to the operation
of his mighty power, when he raised Christ from the dead. So that it is plain
by every thing in this discourse, the apostle would signify, that by nature we have
no goodness ; but are as destitute of it as a dead corpse is of life : and that all
432 ORIGINAL SIN.
goodness, all good works, and faith the principal of all, are perfectly the gift of
God's grace, and the work of his great, almighty, and exceeding excellent pow-
er. I think, there can be need of nothing but reading the chapter, and minding
what is read, to convince all who have common understanding, of this ; what-
ever any of the most subtle critics have done, or ever can do, to twist, rack,
perplex, and pervert the words and phrases here used.
Dr. Taylor here again insists, that the apostle speaks only of the Gentiles in
their heathen state, when he speaks of those that were dead in sin, and by
nature children of wrath ; and that though he seems to include himself among
these, saying, " We were by nature children of wrath, we were dead in sins ;"
yet he only puts himself among them because he was the apostle of the Gentiles.
The gross absurdity of which may appear from what was said before. But
besides the things which have been already observed, there are some things
which make it peculiarly unreasonable to understand it so here. It is true, the
greater part of the church of Ephesus had been heathens, and therefore the
apostle often has reference to their heathen state, in this epistle. But the words
in this chap. ii. 3, plainly show, that he means himself and other Jews in dis-
tinction from the Gentiles ; for the distinction is fully expressed. After he had
told the Ephesians, who had been generally heathen, that they had been dead
in sin, and had walked according to the course of this world, &c, ver. 1 and 2,
he makes a distinction, and says, " Among whom we also had our conversation,
&c, and were by nature children of wrath, even as others" Here first he
changes the person ; whereas, before he had spoken in the second person, " Ye
were dead — Ye in time past walked," &c. Nowr he changes style, and uses
the first person, in a most manifest distinction, " Among whom we also" that
is, we Jews, as well as ye Gentiles : not only changing the person, but adding
a particle of distinction, also ; which would be nonsense,, if he meant the same
without distinction. And besides all this, more fully to express the distinction,
the apostle further adds a pronoun of distinction : " We also, even as others"
or, we as well as others : most evidently having respect to the notions, so gene-
rally entertained by the Jews, of their being much better than the Gentiles, in
being Jews by nature, children of Abraham, and children of God ; when they
supposed the Gentiles to be utterly cast off, as born aliens, and by nature chil-
dren of wrath : in opposition to this, the apostle says, " We Jews, after all
our glorying in our distinction, were by nature children of wrath as well as the
rest of the world." And a yet further evidence, that the apostle here means to
include the Jews, and even himself, is the universal term he uses, " Among
whom also we all had our conversation," &c Though wickedness was supposed
by the Jews to be the course of this world, as to the generality of mankind,
yet they supposed themselves an exempt people, at least the Pharisees, and the
devout observers of the law of Moses, and traditions of the elders ; whatever
might be thought of publicans and harlots. But in opposition to this, the apos-
tle asserts, that they all were no better by nature than others, but were to be
reckoned among the children of disobedience, and children of wrath.
And then besides, if the apostle chooses to put himself among the Gentiles,
because he was the apostle of the Gentiles, I would ask, why does he not do so
in the 1 1th verse of the same chapter, where he speaks of their Gentile state
expressly 1 Remember that ye being in time past Gentiles in the flesh. Why
does he here make a distinction between the Gentiles and himself ? Why did
he not say, Let us remember, that we being in times past Gentiles ? And why
does the same apostle, even universally, make the same distinction, speaking
either in the second or third person, and never in the first, where he expressly
ORIGINAL SIN 433
speaks of the Gentilisra of those that he wrote to ; or speaks of them with refer-
ence to their distinction from the Jews ? So everywhere in this same epistle ;
as in chap. i. 12, 13, where the distinction is made just in the same manner as
here, by the change of the person, and by the distinguishing particle, also,
P That we should be to the praise of his glory who first trusted in Christ (the
first believers in Christ being of the Jews, before the Gentiles were called), in
whom ye also trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your
salvation." And in all the following part of this second chapter, as ver. 11, 17,
19, and 22, in which last verse the same distinguishing particle again is used :
" In whom ye also are builded together for a habitation of God through the
Spirit." See also the following chapters : chap. iii. 6, and iv. 17. And not
only in this epistle, but constantly in other epistles ; as Rom. i. 12, 13 ; chap,
xi. 12, 13, 17, 18, 19,20,21,22,23,24, 25,28,30,31; chap. xv. 15, 16;
1 Cor. xii. 2 ; Gal. iv. 8 ; Col. i. 27 ; chap. ii. 13 ; 1 Thess. i. 5, 6, 9 ; chap. ii.
13, 14, 15, 16.
Though I am far from thinking our author's exposition of the 7th chapter of
Romans to be in any wise agreeable to the true sense of the apostle, yet it is
needless here to stand particularly to examine it : because the doctrine of Orig-
inal Sin may be argued not the less strongly, though we should allow the thing
wherein he mainly differs from such as he opposes in his interpretation, viz.,
that the apostle does not speak in his own name, or to represent the state of a
true Christian, but as representing the state of the Jews under the law. For
even on this supposition, the drift of the place will prove, that every one who is
under the law, and with equal reason every one of mankind, is carnal, sold under
sin, in his first state, and till delivered by Christ. For it is plain, that the apos-
tle's design is to show the insufficiency of the law to give life to any one what-
soever. This appears by what he says when he comes to draw his conclusion,
in the continuation of this discourse ; chap. viii. 3,* " For what the law could
not do, in that it was weak through the flesh ; God sending his own Son," &c.
Our author supposes this here spoken of, viz., " That the law cannot give life,
because it is weak through the flesh," is true with respect to every one of man-
kind^ And when the apostle gives this reason, In that it is weak through the
flesh, it is plain, that by the flesh, which here he opposes to the Spirit, he
means the same thing which, in the preceding part of the same discourse, in the
foregoing chapter, he had called by the name^es^, ver. 5, 14, 18 ; and the law
of the members, ver. 23 ; and the body of death, ver. 24. Which is the thing
that through this chapter he insists on as the grand hinderance and reason why
the law could not give life, just as he does in his conclusion, chap. viii. 3. Which
in this last place, is given as a reason why the law cannot give life to any of man-
kind. And it being the same reason of the same thing, spoken of in the same
discourse, in the former part of it ; as appears, because this last place is the con-
clusion, of which that former part is the premises : and inasmuch as the reason
there given is being in the flesh, and a being carnal, sold under sin : therefore,
taking the whole of the apostle's discourse, this is justly understood to be a rea-
son, why the law cannot give life to any of mankind ; and consequently, that all
mankind are in the flesh, and are carnal, sold under sin, and so remain till deliv-
ered by Christ : and consequently, all mankind in their first or original state are
very sinful ; which was the thing to be proved.
* Dr. Ta>lor himself reckons this a part of the same discourse orparagraph, in the division he makes
of the epistle, in his paraphrase an<? notes upon it. t See Note on Rom. v. 20.
Vol. n. 55
434 * ORIGINAL SIN.
CHAPTER IV.
CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON ROMANS V. 12, TO THE END.
SECTION I.
Remarks on Dr. Taylor's way of explaining this Text.
The following things are worthy to be taken notice of, concerning our au-
thor's exposition of this remarkable passage of the Apostle Paul.
1. He greatly insists, that by death in this place no more is meant, than that
death which we all die, when this present life is extinguished, and the body re-
turns to the dust ; that no more is meant in the 12th, 14th, 15th, and 17th verses.
Page 27, he speaks of it as evidently, clearly, and infallibly so, because the apos-
tle is still discoursing on the same subject ; plainly implying, that it must most
infallibly be so, that the apostle means no more by death, throughout this para-
graph on the subject. But as infallible as this is, if we believe what Dr. Taylor
elsewhere says, it must needs be otherwise. He, in p. 120, S., speaking of those
words in the last verse of the next chapter, " The wages of sin is death, but the
gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord," says, " Death in this
place is widely different from the death we now die ; as it stands there opposed
to eternal life, which is the gift of God through Jesus Christ, it manifestly signi-
fies eternal death, the second death, or that death which they shall hereafter die,
who live after the flesh." But death (in the conclusion of the paragraph we are
upon in the 5th chapter, concerning the death that comes by Adam) and the
life that comes by Christ, in the last verse of the chapter, is opposed to eternal
life just in the same manner as it is in the last verse of the next chapter : " That
as sin has reigned unto death, even so might grace reign, through righteousness,
unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord." So that by our author's own argu-
ment, death in this place also is manifestly widely different from the death we
now die, as it stands here opposed to eternal life, through Jesus Christ ; and sig-
nifies eternal death, the second death. And yet this is a part of the same dis-
course or paragraph with that begun in the 12th verse, as reckoned by Dr.
Taylor himself in his division of paragraphs, in his paraphrase and notes on the
epistle. So that if we will follow him, and admit his reasonings in the various
parts of his book, here is manifest proof against infallible evidence ! So that it
is true, the apostle throughout this whole passage on the same subject, by death,
evidently, clearly, and infallibly means no more than that death we now die, when
this life is extinguished ; and yet by death, in some part of this passage, is meant
something widely different from the death we now die, and is manifestly intended
eternal death, the second death.
But had our author been more consistent with himself in his laying of it
down as so certain and infallible, that because the apostle has a special respect
to temporal death, in the 14th verse, Death reigned from Adam to Moses, there-
fore he means no more in the several consequent parts of this passage, yet he is
doubtless too confident and positive in this matter. This is no more evident,
clear, and infallible, than that Christ meant no more by perishing, in Luke xiii.
Si, when he says, " I tell you, Nay, but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise
ORIGINAL SIN. 435
perish;" than such a temporal death, as came on those that died by the fall of
the tower of Siloam, spoken of in the preceding words of the same speech;
and no more infallible, than that by life, Christ means no more than this
temporal life, in each part of that one sentence, Matth. x. 39, "He that
findeth his life shall lose it ; and he that loseth his life for my sake, shall
find it ;" because in the first part of each clause, he has respect especially to
temporal life.*
The truth of the case, with respect to what the apostle intends by the
word death in this place, is this, viz., that the same thing is meant, that
is meant by death in the foregoing and following parts of this epistle, and
other writings of this apostle, where he speaks of death as the consequence of
sin, viz., the whole of that death, which he, and the Scripture every where, speaks
of as the proper wages and punishment of sin, including death, temporal, spirit-
ual, and eternal ; though in some parts of this discourse he has a more special
respect to one part of this whole, in others to another, as his argument leads him ;
without any more variation than is common in the same discourse. That life,
which the Scripture speaks of as the reward of righteousness, is a whole, con-
taining several parts, viz., the life of the body, union of soul and body, and the
most perfect sensibility, activity, and felicity of both, which is the chief thing.
In like manner the death, which the Scripture speaks of as the punishment of
sin, is a whole, including the death of the body, and the death of the soul, and the
eternal, sensible, perfect destruction and misery of both. It is this latter whole,
that the apostle speaks of by the name of death in this discourse, in Rom. v.,
though in some sentences he has a more special respect to one part, in others to
another : and this, without changing the signification of the word. For a hav-
ing respect to several things included in the extensive signification of the word,
is not the same thing as using the word in several distinct significations. As
for instance, the appellative, man, or the proper name of any particular man, is
the name of a whole, including the different parts of soul and body. And if any
one in speaking of James or John, should say, he was a wise man, and a beau-
tiful man ; in the former part of the sentence, respect would be had more espe-
cially to his soul, in the latter to his body, in the word man : but yet without
any proper change of the signification of the name to distinct senses. In John
xxi. 7, it is said, Peter was naked, and in the following part of the same story it
is said, Peter was grieved. In the former proposition, respect is had especially
to his body, in the latter to his soul : but yet here is no proper change of the
meaning of the name, Peter. And as to the apostle's use of the word death, in
the passage now under consideration, on the supposition that he in general means
the whole of that death, which is the wages of sin, there is nothing but what is
perfectly natural in supposing that he, in order to evince, that death, the prop-
per punishment of sin, comes on all mankind, in consequence of Adam's sin,
yhould take notice of that part of this punishment, which is visible in this world,
and which every body therefore sees, does in fact come on all mankind (as in
* There are many places parallel with these, as John xi. 25, 26, " I am the resurrection and the life:
he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet he shall live : and whosoever liveth, and believeth
in me, shall never die." Here both the words, life and death, are used with this variation : " I am the res-
urrection and the life," meaning spiritual and eternal life : "He that believeth in me, though he were
dead," having respect to temporal death, " yet shall he live," with respect to spiritual life, and the restora
tion of the life of the body. " And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, snail never die," meaning a
spiritual and eternal death. So in John vi. 49, 50, " Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and
are dead," having respect chiefly to temporal death. " This is the bread which cometh down from heav-
en, that a man may eat thereof, and not die," i. e., by the loss of spiritual life, and by eternal death. (See
also ver. 58.) And in the next verse, " If any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever," have eternal
'ife. So ver. 54. See anothev like instance, John v. 24—29.
436 ORIGINAL SIN.
ver. 14), and from thence should infer, that all mankind are exposed to the
whole of that death which is the proper punishment of sin, whereof that tempo-
ral death which is visible, is a part, and a visible image of the whole, and (un-
less changed by divine grace) an introduction to the principal, and infinitely the
most dreadful part.
II. Dr. Taylor's explanation of this passage makes wholly insignificant
those first words, " By one man sin entered into the world," and leaves this
proposition without any sense or signification at all. The apostle had been
largely and elaborately representing, how the whole world was full of sin, in
all parts of it, both among the Jews and Gentiles, and all exposed to death and
condemnation. It is plain, that in these words he would tell us how this came
to pass, viz., that this sorrowful event came by one man, even the first man.
That the world was full of sin, and full of death, were two great and notorious
facts, deeply affecting the interests of mankind ; and they seemed very wonder-
ful facts, drawing the attention of the more thinking part of mankind every-
where, who often asked this question, Whence comes evil, moral and natural
evil ? (the latter chiefly visible in death.) It is manifest the apostle here means
to tell us, how these came into the world, and came to prevail in it as they do.
But all that is meant, according to Dr. Taylor's interpretation, is, " He begun
transgression."* As if all that the apostle meant, was, to tell us who happened
to sin first ; not how such a malady came upon the world, or how any one in the
world, besides Adam himself, came by such a distemper. The wrords of the
apostle, " By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin," show the
design to be, to tell us how these evils came, as affecting the state of the world;
and not only as reaching one man in the world. If this were not plain enough
in itself, the words immediately following demonstrate it : " And so death pass-
ed upon all men, for that all have sinned." By sin's being in the world, the
apostle does not mean being in the world only in that one instance of Adam's
first transgression, but being abroad in the world, among the inhabitants of the
earth, in a wide extent, and continued series of wickedness ; as is plain in
the first words of the next verse, " For until the law, sin was in the world"
And therefore when he gives us an account how it came to be in the world, or,
which is the same thing, how it entered into the world, he does not mean only
coming in, in one instance.
If the case were as Dr. Taylor represents, that the sin of Adam, either in
its pollution or punishment, reached none but himself, any more than the sin of
any other man, it would be no more proper to say, that by one man sin enter-
ed into the world, than if it should be inquired, how mankind came into Ameri-
ca, and there had anciently been a ship of the Phenicians wrecked at sea, and
a single man of the crew was driven ashore on this continent, and here died as
soon as he reached the shore, it should be said, by that one man mankind came
into America.
And besides, it is not true, that by one man, or by Adam, sin entered into -
the world, in Dr. Taylor's sense ; for it was not he, but Eve, that begun trans-
gression. By one man Dr. Taylor understands Adam, as the figure of Christ.
And it is plain that it was for his transgression, and not Eve's, that the sentence
of death was pronounced on mankind after the fall, Gen. iii. 19. It appears
unreasonable to suppose the apostle means to include Eve, when he speaks of
Adam ; for he lays great stress on it, that it was by one9 repeating it several
times.
* Page 56
ORIGINAL SIN. 437
III. In like manner this author brings to nothing the sense of the causal
particles, in such phrases as these, so often repeated ; " Death by sin," verse 12.
" If through the offence of one, many be dead," verse 15. " By one that sin-
ned— Judgment was by one to condemnation," verse 16. " By one man's of-
fence, death reigned by one," verse 17. " By the offence of one, judgment
came upon all," &c, verse 18. "By one man's disobedience," verse 19.
These causal particles, so dwelt upon, and so variously repeated, unless we
make mere nonsense of the discourse, signify some connection and dependence,
by some sort of influence of that sin of one man, or some tendency to that effect,
which is so often said to come by it. But according to Dr. Taylor, there can
be no real dependence or influence in the case of any sort whatsoever. There
is no connection by any natural influence of that one act to make all mankind
mortal. Our author does not pretend to account for this effect in any such
manner, but in another most diverse, viz., a gracious act of God, laying man-
kind under affliction, toil and death, from special favor and kindness. Nor can
there be any dependence of this effect on that transgression of Adam, by any
moral influence, as deserving such a consequence, or exposing to it on any
moral account, for he supposes that mankind are not in this way exposed to the
least degree of evil. Nor has this effect any legal dependence on that sin, or any
connection by virtue of any antecedent constitution, which God had established
with Adam ; for he insists that in that threatening, In the day thou eatest thou
shalt die, there is not a word said of his posterity, page 8. And death on man-
kind, according to him, cannot come by virtue of that legal constitution with
Adam ; because the sentence by which it came, was after the annulling and
abolishing that constitution, page 113, S. And it is manifest that this conse-
quence cannot be through any kind of tendency of that sin to such an effect,
because the effect comes only as a benefit, and is the fruit of mere favor ; but
sin has no tendency, either natural or moral, to benefits and divine favors.
And thus that sin of Adam could neither be the efficient cause nor the procur-
ing cause, neither the natural, moral, nor legal cause, nor an exciting and
moving cause, any more than Adam's eating of any other tree of the garden.
And the only real relation that the effect can have to that sin, is a relation as
to time, viz., that it is after it. And when the matter is closely examined, the
whole amounts to no more than this, that God is pleased, of his mere good
will and pleasure, to bestow a greater favor upon us, than he did upon Adam
in innocency, after that sin of his eating the forbidden fruit ; which sin we
are no more concerned in, than in the sin of the king of Pegu, or emperor of
China.
IV. It is altogether inconsistent with the apostle's scope, and the import of
what he says, to suppose that the death which he here speaks of, as coming on
mankind by Adam's sin, comes not as a punishment, but only as a favor. It
quite makes void the opposition, in which the apostle sets the consequences of
Adam's sin, and the consequences of the grace and righteousness of Christ.
They are set in opposition to each other, as opposite effects, arising from oppo-
site causes, throughout the paragraph : one as the just consequence of an offence,
the other a free gift, verses 15 — 18. Whereas, according to this scheme,
there is no such opposition in the case ; both are benefits, and both are free
gifts. A very wholesome medicine to save from perishing, ordered by a kind
father, or a shield to preserve from an enemy, bestowed by a friend, is as much
a free gift as pleasant food. The death that comes by Adam, is set in opposi-
tion to the life and happiness that comes by Christ, as being the fruit of sin,
Hub judgment for sin ; when the latter is the fruit of divine grace, verses 15,
438 ORIGINAL SIN.
17,20,21. Whereas, according to our author, both came by grace: death
comes on mankind by the free kindness and love of God, much more truly and
properly than by Adam's sin. Dr. Taylor speaks of it as coming by occasion
of Adam's sin. (But as I have observed, it is an occasion without any influ-
ence.) Yet the proper cause is God's grace ; so that the true cause is wholly
good Which, by the way, is directly repugnant to the apostle's doctrine in
Rom. vii. 13, " Was then that which is good, made death unto me ? God for-
bid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is
good." Where the apostle utterly rejects any such suggestion, as though that
which is good were the proper cause of death ; and signifies that sin is the
proper cause, and that which is good, only the' occasion. But according to this
author, the reverse is true : that which is good in the highest sense, even the
love of God, and a divine, gracious constitution, is the proper cause of death,
and sin only the occasion.
But to return, it is plain, that death by Adam, and life and happiness by
Christ, are here set in opposition ; the latter being spoken of as good, the
other as evil ; one as the effect of righteousness, the other of an offence ; one
the fruit of obedience, the other of disobedience ; one as the fruit of God's favor,
in consequence of what was pleasing and acceptable to him, but the other the
fruit of his displeasure, in consequence of what was displeasing and hateful to
him ; the latter coming by justification, the former by the condemnation of the
subject. But according to the scheme of our author, there can be no opposition
in any of these respects ; the death here spoken of, neither comes as an evil, nor
from an evil cause, either an evil efficient cause, or procuring cause ; not at
all as any testimony of God's displeasure to the subject, but as properly the
effect of God's favor, no less than that which is spoken of as coming by Christ ;
yea, and as much as to that appointed by an act of justification of the subject, as
he understands and explains the word justification ; for both are by a grant of
favor, and are instances of mercy and goodness. And he does abundantly in-
sist upon it, that " any grant of favor, any instance of mercy and goodness,
whereby God delivers and exempts from any kind of danger, suffering or
calamity, or confers any favor, blessing, or privilege, is called justification, in
the Scripture sense and use of the word."*
And over and above all these things, our author makes void, and destroys
the grand and fundamental opposition of all, to illustrate which is the chief
"cope of this whole passage, viz., that between the first and second Adam, in
the death that comes by one, and the life and happiness by the other. For,
according to his doctrine, both come by Christ, the second Adam ; both by his
grace, righteousness, and obedience : the death that God sentenced mankind to
in Gen. iii. 19, being a great deal more properly and truly by Christ, than by
Adam. For, according to him, that sentence was not pronounced on the foot
of the covenant with Adam, because that was abrogated, and entirely set aside,
as what was to have no more effect, before it was pronounced ; as he largely
insists for many pages together, pages 113 — 119, S. He says, page 113, S.
" This covenant with Adam was disannulled immediately after Adam sinned
Even before God passed sentence upon Adam, grace was introduced." And ii
p. 119, S., he says, "The death that mankind are the subjects of now, stands
under the covenant of grace." And in p. 120, S., " In the counsel and appoint-
ment of God, it stood m this very light, even before the sentence of death was
* Key, S 374, where it is to be observed, that he himself puts the word ANY in capital letters. The
same thing in substance is often asserted elsewhere. And this, indeed, is his main point in what he calls
•' the true gospfl scheme."
ORIGINAL SIN. 439
pronounced upon Adam ; and consequently, death is no proper and legal pun-
ishment of sin." And he often insists, that it comes only as a favor and benefit ;
and standing, as he says, under the covenant of grace, which is by Christ,
cherefore is truly one of the benefits of the new covenant, which comes by Christ,
the second Adam. For he himself is full in it, to use his own words,* " That
all the grace of the gospel is dispensed to us, in, by, or through the Son of God."
" Nothing is clearer (says hef) from the whole current of Scripture, than that
all the mercy and love of God, and all the blessings of the gospel, from first to
last, are in, by, and through Christ, and particularly by his blood, by the redemp-
tion that is in him. This (says he) can bear no dispute among Christians."
What then becomes of all this discourse of the apostle, about the great differ-
ence and opposition between Adam and Christ ; as death is by one, and eternal
life and happiness by the other ? This grand distinction between the two Adams,
and all the other instances of opposition and difference here insisted on, as be-
tween the effects of sin and righteousness, the consequences of obedience and
disobedience, of the offence and the free gift, judgment and grace, condemnation
and justification, they all come to nothing ; and this whole discourse of the
apostle, wherein he seems to labor much, as if it were to set forth some very
grand and most important distinctions and oppositions in the state of things, as
derived from the two great heads of mankind, proves nothing but a multitude of
words without a meaning, or rather a heap of inconsistencies.
V. Our author's own doctrine entirely makes void what he supposes to be
the apostle's argument in the 13th and 14th verses, in these words : " For until
the law, sin was in the world ; but sin is not imputed where there is no law.
Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not
sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression."
What he supposes the apostle would prove here, is, that death, or the mor-
tality of mankind, comes only by Adam's sin, and not by men's personal sins ;
and that it is here proved by this argument, viz., because there was no law
threatening death to Adam's posterity for personal sins, before the law of Moses ;
but death, or the mortality of Adam's posterity, took place many ages before the
law was given ; therefore death could not be by any law threatening death for
personal sins, and consequently could be by nothing but Adam's sin.*
On this I would observe,
1. That which he supposes the apostle to take for a truth in this argument,
viz., that there was no law of God in being, by which men were exposed to
death for personal sin, during the time from Adam to Moses, is neither true, nor
agreeable to this apostle's own doctrine.
First, It is not true. For the law of nature, written in men's hearts, was
then in being, and was a law by which men were exposed to death for personal
sin. That there was a divine establishment, fixing the death and destruction of
the sinner, as the consequence of personal sin, which was well known before
the giving of Moses' law, is plain by many passages in the book of Job, as fully
and clearly implying a connection between such sin and such a punishment, as
any passage in the iaw of Moses ; such as that in Job xxiv. 19, " Drought and
heat consume the snow waters : so doth the grave them that have sinned."
(Compare verses 20 and 24.) Also chap, xxxiv. 6, " He preserveth no; the life
of the wicked." Chap. xxi. 29 — 32, " Have ye not asked them that go by the
way ? And do ye not know their tokens ? That the wicked is reserved to the
* Key, chap. yiii. Title, p. 44. t Key, § 145.
t Pages 40, 41, 42, 57, and often elsewhere.
440 ORIGINAL SIN.
day of destruction ; they shki be brought forth to the day of wrath." Vers*
32, " He shall be brought to the grave."*
Secondly, to suppose that there is no law in being, by which men are ex-
posed to death for personal sins, where or when a revealed law of God, before,
in, or after Moses' time is not in being, is contrary to this apostle's own doctrine in
this epistle. Rom. ii. 12, 14, 15, " For as many as have sinned without law,
(i. e., the revealed law) shall perish without law." But how they can be ex-
posed to die and perish, who have not the law of Moses, nor any revealed law,
the apostle shows us in the 14th and 15th verses, viz., in that they have the law
of nature, by which they fall under sentence to this punishment. " For when
the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the
law, these, having not the law, are a law to themselves ; which show the work
of the law written in their hearts; their conscience also bearing witness."
Their conscience not only bore witness to the duty prescribed by this law, but
also to the punishment before spoken of, as that which they who sinned without
law, were liable to suffer, viz., that they should perish. In which the apostle is
yet more express, chap. i. 32, speaking more especially of the Heathen, " Who
knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy
of death." Dr. Taylor often calls the law the rule of right; and this rule of
right sentenced those sinners to death, who were not under the law of Moses,
according to this author's own paraphrase of this verse, in these words, " The
Heathen were not ignorant of the rule of right, which God has implanted in
the human nature; and which shows that they which commit such crimes, are
deserving of death." And he himself supposes Abraham, who lived between
Adam and Moses, to be under law, by which he would have been exposed to
punishment without hope, were it not for the promise of grace — in his paraphrase
on Rom. iv. 15.
So that in our author's way of explaining the passage before us, the grand
argument, which the apostle insists upon here, to prove his main point, viz., that
death does not come by men's personal sins, but by Adam's sin, because it came
before the law was given, that threatened death for personal sin : I say, this
argument which Dr. Taylor supposes so clear and strong,f is brought to nothing
more than a mere shadow without substance ; the very foundation of the argu-
ment having no truth. To say, there was no such law actually expressed in
any standing revelation, would be mere trifling : for it no more appears, that God
would not bring temporal death for personal sins, without a standing revealed law
threatening it, than that he would not bring eternal death before there was a re-
vealed law threatening that : which yet wicked men that lived in Noah's time,
were exposed to, as appears by 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20, and which Dr. Taylor supposes
all mankind are exposed to by their personal sins ; and he himself says,| " Sin, in
its own unalterable nature, leads to death." Yea, it might be argued with as
much strength of reason, that God could bring on men no punishment at all for any
sin, that was committed from Adam to Moses, because there was no standing
revealed law then exta:it, threatening any punishment. It may here be properly
observed, that our author supposes the shortening of man's days, and hastening
of death, entered into the world by the sin of the antediluvians, in the same sense
as death and mortality entered into the world by Adam's sin.§ But where was
there any standing revealed law for that, though the event was so universal 1
If God might bring this on all makind, on occasion of other men's sins, for which
* See also Job iv. 7, 8, 9. Chapter xv. 17—35. Chapter xviii. 5—21 , xix. 29, and xx. 4 — 8, and man)
other places. t Page 117, S. t Pages 77, 78. § Page 68
ORIGINAL SIN. 441
they deserved nothing, without a revealed law, what could there be to hinder
God's bringing death on men for their personal sins, for which their own con-
sciences tell them they do deserve death without a revealed law 1
2. If it had been so, that from Adam to Moses there had been no law in
being, of any kind, revealed or natural, by which men could be properly ex-
posed to temporal death for personal sin, yet the mention of Moses' law would
have been wholly impertinent, and of no signification in the argument, accord-
ing to our author's understanding of it. He supposes, what the apostle would
prove, is, that temporal death, or the death we now die, comes by Adam ; and
not by any law threatening such a punishment for personal sin ; because this
death prevailed before the law of Moses was in being, which is the only law
threatening death for personal sin. And yet he himself supposes, that the'law
of Moses, when it was in being, threatened no such death for personal sin. For
he abundantly asserts, that the death which the law of Moses threatened for per-
sonal sin, was eternal death, a? has been already noted : and he says in express
terms, that eternal death is of a nature, widely different from the death we now
die ;* as was also observed before.
How impertinently therefore does Dr. Taylor make an inspired writer argue,
when, according to him, the apostle would prove, that this kind of deal h did not
come by any law threatening this kind of death, because it came before the ex-
istence of a law threatening another kind of death, of a nature widely different !
How is it to the apostle's purpose, to fix on that period, the time of giving
Moses' law. as if that had been the period wherein men began to be threatened
with this punishment for their personal sins, when in truth it was no such thing 1
And therefore it was no more to his purpose, to fix on that period, from Adam
to Moses, than from Adam to David, or any other period whatsoever. Dr.
Taylor holds, that even now, since the law of Moses has been given, the mor-
tality of mankind, or the death we now die, does not come by that law ; but
that it always comes only by Adam.f And if it never comes by that law, we
may be sure it never was threatened in that law.
3. If we should allow the argument in Dr Taylor's sense of it, to prove that
death does not come by personal sin, yet it will be wholly without force to prove
the main point, even that it must come by Adam's sin : for it might come by
God's sovereign and gracious pleasure ; as innumerable other divine benefits do.
If it be ordered, agreeably to our author's supposition, not as a punishment, nor
as a calamity, but only as a favor, what necessity of any settled constitution,
or revealed sentence, in order to the bestowing such a favor, more than other
favors ; and particularly more than that great benefit, which he says entered
into the world by the sin of the antediluvians, the shortening men's lives so
much after the flood ? Thus the apostle's arguing, by Dr. Taylor's explanation
of it, is turned into mere trifling, and a vain and impertinent use of words, with-
out any real force or significance.
VI. The apostle here speaks of that great benefit which we have by Christ,
as the antitype of Adam, under the notion of a fruit of grace. I do not mean
only that super abounding of grace, wherein the benefit we have by Christ, goes
beyond the damage sustained by Adam ; but that benefit, with regard to which
Adam was the fgure of him that was to come, and which is, as it were, the
counterpart of the suffering by Adam, and which repairs the loss we have by
him. This is here spoken of as the fruit of the free grace of God ; as appears
by ver. 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21. This, according to our author, is the restoring
* Page 120, S. He says to the like purpose in his Note on Rom. v. 17.
t This is plain by what he says, p. 28, 40, 53, 117, S.
Vol. II. 56
442 ORIGINAL SIN.
of mankind to that life which they lost in Adam : and he himself supposes this
restoration of life by Christ to be what grace does for us, and calls it the free
gift of God, and the grace and favor of the lawgiver* And speaking of this
restoration, he breaks out in admiration of the unspeakable riches of this grace, f
But it follows from his doctrine, that there is no grace at m.11 in this benefit,
and it is no more than a mere act of justice, being only a removing of what
mankind suffer, being innocent. Death, as it commonly comes on mankind, and
even on infants (as has been observed), is an extreme positive calamity ; to bring
which on the perfectly innocent, unremedied, and without any thing to counter-
vail it, we are sufficiently taught, is not consistent with the righteousness of the
Judge of all the earth. What grace, therefore, worthy of being so celebrated,
would there be in affording remedy and relief, after there had been brought on
innocent mankind that which is (as Dr. Taylor himself represents!) the dreadful
and universal destruction of their nature ; being a striking demonstration how
infinitely hateful sin is to God ! What grace in delivering from such shocking
ruin, them that did not deserve the least calamity ! Our author says, " We
could not justly lose communion with God by Adam's sin."§ If so, then we
could not justly lose our lives, and be annihilated, after a course of extreme pains
and agonies of body and mind, without any restoration ; which would be an
eternal loss of communion with God, and all other good, besides the positive
suffering. The apostle, throughout this passage, represents the death, which is
the consequence of Adam's transgression, as coming in a way of judgment and
condemnation for sin ; but deliverance and life through Christ, as by grace, and
ihefree gift of God. Whereas, on the contrary, by Dr. Taylor's scheme, the
death that comes by Adam, comes by grace, great grace ; it being a great bene-
fit, ordered in fatherly love and kindness, and on the foot of a covenant of grace :
but in the deliverance and restoration by Christ, there is no grace at all. So
things are turned topsy-turvy, the apostle's scope and scheme entirely inverted
and confounded.
VII. Dr. Taylor explains the words, judgment, condemnation, justification ,
and righteousness, as used in this place, in a very unreasonable manner.
I will first consider the sense he puts upon the two former, judgment and
condemnation. He often calls this condemnation a judicial act, and a' sentence
of condemnation. But, according to his scheme, it is a judicial sentence of con-
demnation passed upon them that are perfectly innocent, and viewed by the
Judge, even in his passing the sentence, and condemning them, as having no
guilt of sin, or fault at all chargeable upon them; and a judicial proceeding,
passing sentence arbitrarily, without any law or rule of right before established;
for there was no preceding law or rule threatening death, that he, or any one
else, ever pretended to have been established, but only this, u In the day that
thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." And concerning this, he insists, that
there is not a word said in it of Adam's posterity. So that the condemnation
spoken of, is a sentence of condemnation to death, for, or in consequence of the
sin of Adam, without any law, by which that sin could be imputed to bring
any such consequence ; contrary to the apostle's plain scope. And not only
so, but over and sbove all this, it is a judicial sentence of condemnation to that
which is no calamity, nor is considered as such in the sentence ; but it is con-
demnation to a great favor !
The apostle uses the words judgment and condemnation in other places t
they are no strange and unusual terms with him : but never are they used by
* Pages 39, 70, 148, 27, S. See also contents of this paragraph in Rom. v. in his notes on the epistle,
and his note on ver. 15, 16, 17. t Page 119, £. t Page 69. § Page 148.
ORIGINAL SIN. 443
him in this sense, or any like it ; nor are they ever used thus anywhere else in
the New Testament. This apostle elsewhere in this epistle to the Romans is
often speaking of condemnation, using the same, or similar terms and phrases
as here, but never in the abovesaid sense. Chap. ii. 1,2, 3, six times in these
verses ; also ver. 12 and 27, and chap. iii. 7 ; chap. viii. 1 and 3 ; chap. xiv.
3, 4, and ver. 10, 13, 22 and 23. This will be plain to every one that casts
his eye on these places : and if we look into the former part of this chapter,
the apostle's discourse here makes it evident, that he is here speaking of a con-
demnation, that is no testimony of favor to the innocent ; but of God's displea-
sure towards those that he is not reconciled to, but looks on as offenders, sin-
ners, and enemies, and holds as the objects of his wrath, wrhich we are delivered
from by Christ ; as may be seen in verses 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
And viewing this discourse itself, and in the very paragraph we are upon,
if we may judge any thing by language and manner of speaking, there is every
thing to lead us to suppose, that the apostle uses these words here, as he does
elsewhere, properly, and as implying a supposition of sin, chargeable on the
subject, and exposing to punishment. He speaks of condemnation with refer-
ence to sin, as what comes by sin, and as a condemnation to death, which
seems to be a most terrible evil, and capital punishment, even in what is tem-
poral and visible ; and this in the way of judgment and execution of justice, in
opposition to grace or favor, and gift or a benefit coming by favor. And sin
and offence, transgression and disobedience, are over and over again spoken of
as the ground of the condemnation, and of the capital suffering condemned to,
for ten verses successively, that is, in every verse in the whole paragraph, with-
out missing one.
The words, justification and righteousness, are explained by Dr. Taylor, in
a no less unreasonable manner. He understands justification, in ver. 18, and
righteousness, in ver. 19, in such a sense, as to suppose them to belong to all,
and actually to be applied to all mankind, good and bad, believers and unbe-
lievers ; to the worst enemies of God, remaining such, as well as his peculiar
favorites, and many that never had any sin imputed to them ; meaning thereby
no more than what is fulfilled in a universal resurrection from the dead, at the
last day.* Now this is a most arbitrary, forced sense. Though these terms are
used everywhere, all over the New Testament, yet nothing like such a use of
them is to be found in any one instance, through all the writings of the apostles
and evangelists. The words justify, justification, and righteousness, as from
God to men, are never used but to signify a privilege belonging only to some,
and that which is peculiar to distinguished favorites. This apostle in particular,
above all the other writers of the New Testament, abounds in the use of these
terms ; so that we have all imaginable opportunity to understand his lan-
guage, and know the sense in which he uses these words : but he never else-
where uses them in the sense supposed here, nor is there any pretence that he
does. Above all, does this apostle abound in the use of these terms in this
epistle. Justification is the subject he had been upon through all the preceding
part of the epistlei It was the grand subject of all the foregoing chapters, and
the preceding part of this chapter, where these terms are continually repeated.
And the word, justification, is constantly used to signify something peculiar to
believers, who had been sinners ; implying some reconciliation and forgiveness
of sin, and special privilege in nearness to God, above the rest of the world.
Yea, the word is constantly used thus, according to Dr. Taylor's own exj^.ana-
* So pages 47, 49, 60, 61, 62, and other places
444 ORIGINAL SIN.
tions, in his paraphrase and notes on this epistle. And there is not the least
reason to suppose but that he is still speaking of the same justification and
righteousness, which he had dwelt upon from the beginning to this place. He
speaks of justification and righteousness here, just in the same manner as he
had done in the preceding part of the epistle. He had all along spoken of
justification as standing in relation to sin, disobedience to God, and offence
against God, and so he does here : he had before been speaking of justification
through free grace, and so he does here : he before had been speaking of justi-
fication through righteousness, as in Christ Jesus, and so he does here.
And if we look into the former part of this very chapter, there we shall
find justification spoken of just in the same sense as in the rest of the epistle ;
which is also supposed by our author in his exposition: it is still justification
by faith, justification of them that had been sinners, justification attended with
reconciliation, justification peculiar to them that had the love of God shed abroad
in their hearts. The apostle's foregoing discourse on justification by grace
through faith, and what he had so greatly insisted on as the evidence of the
truth of this doctrine, even the universal sinfulness of mankind in their original
state, is plainly what introduces this discourse in the latter part of this 5th chap-
ter ; where he shows how all mankind came to be sinful and miserable, and so to
need this grace of God, and righteousness of Christ. And therefore we cannot,
without the most absurd violence, suppose any other than that he is still speak-
ing of the same justification.
And as to the universal expression used in the 18th verse, " By the right-
eousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life ;" it is
needless here to go into the controversy between the remonstrants and anti-re-
monstrants, concerning universal redemption, and their different interpretations
of this place. If we take the words even as the Arminians do ; yet, in their
sense of them, the free gift comes on all men to justification only conditionally ;
i. e. provided they believe, repent, &c. But in our author's sense, it actually
comes on all, whether they believe and repent, or not ; which certainly cannot
be inferred from the universal expression, as here used. Dr. Taylor himself
supposes, the main design of the apostle in this universal phrase, all men, is to.
signify that the benefits of Christ shall come on Gentiles as well as Jews.*
And he supposes that the many, and the all, here signify the same : but it is
quite certain, that all the benefits here spoken of, which the apostle says are to
the many, does not actually come upon all mankind ; as particularly the
abounding of grace, spoken of ver. 15. The grace of God, and the gift by
grace, hath abounded unto the many, eig rovg nollovg.
This abounding of grace our author explains thus : " A rich overplus of
grace, in erecting a new dispensation, furnished with a glorious fund of light,
means and motives," p. 44. But will any pretend, that all mankind have actu-
ally been partakers of this new fund of light, &c.'? How were the many mil-
lions of Indians, on the American side of the globe, partakers of it, before the
Europeans came hither 1 Yea, Dr. Taylor himself supposes, all that is meant is,
that it is free for all that are willing to accept ofit.-f The agreement between
Adam, as the type or figure of him that was to come, and Christ as the anti-
type, appears as full and clear, if we suppose all which are in Christ (to use
the common Scripture phrase) have the benefit of his obedience, as all that are
in Adam have the sorrowful fruit of his disobedience. The Scripture speaks of
believers as the seed or posterity of Christ, Gal. iii. 29. They are in Christ
* Pages 60, 61, See also contents of this paragraph, in his notes on the epistle.
t Notes on the epistle, p. 284.
ORIGINAL SIN. 445
by grace, as Adam's posterity are in him by nature : the one are in the first
Adam naturally, as the other are in the second Adam spiritually : exactly
agreeable to the representation this apostle makes of the matter, 1 Cor. xv. 45
— 49. The spiritual seed are those which this aportle often represents as Christ's
body : and the oi nolloi here spoken of as made righteous by Christ's obedience
are doubtless the same with the oi nolloi which he speaks of in chap. xii. 5 :
We, being many, are one body ; or, we, the many, oi noXXot ev acofia eofiev. And
again, 1 Cor. x. 17, ev aoofia oi noXkoi eauev. And the same which the apostle
had spoken of in the preceding chapter, Rom. iv. 18, compared with Gen. xv. 5.
Dr. Taylor much insists on that place, 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, " For since by
man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead : for as in
Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;" to confirm his suppositions,
that the apostle here in the 5th of Romans, speaking of the death and condem-
nation which come by Adam, has respect only to the death we all die, when
this life ends : and that by the justification and life which come by Christ, he
has respect only to the general resurrection at the last day. But it is observa-
ble, that his argument is wholly built on these two suppositions, viz. First,
That the resurrection meant by the apostle, in that place in the 1 Cor. xv., is
the resurrection of all mankind, both just and unjust. Secondly, That the oppo-
site consequences of Adam's sin, and Christ's obedience, spoken of here in Rom.
v., are the very same, neither more nor less, than are spoken of there. But
there are no grounds for supposing either of these things to be true.
1. There is no evidence, that the resurrection there spoken of, is the resur-
rection both of the just and unjust ; but abundant evidence of the contrary.
The resurrection of the wicked is seldom mentioned in the New Testament, and
rarely included in the meaning of the word ; it being esteemed not worthy to
be called a rising to life, being only for a great increase of the misery and dark-
ness of eternal death : and therefore by the resurrection is most commonly
meant a rising to life and happiness ; as may be observed in Matth. xxii. 30 —
Luke xx. 35, 46 — John vi. 39, 40, 54 — Philip, iii. 11, and other places. The
saints are called the children of the resurrection, as Dr. Taylor observes in
his note on Rom. viii. 11. And it is exceeding evident, that it is the resurrec-
tion to life and happiness, the apostle is speaking of in this 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22.
It appears by each of the three foregoing verses, ver. 18, " Then they which are
fallen asleep in Christ (i. e. the saints) are perished." Ver. 19, " If in this life only
we (Christians or apostles) have hope in Christ (and have no resurrection and
eternal life to hope for), we are of all men most miserable." Ver. 20, " But
now is Christ risen from the dead, and is become the first fruits of them that
slept." He is the forerunner and first fruits only with respect to them that are
his ; who are to follow him, and partake with him in the glory and happiness
of his resurrection : but he is not the first fruits of them that shall come forth to
the resurrection of damnation. It also appears by the verse immediately fol-
lowing, ver. 23, " But every man in his own order ; Christ the first fruks, and
afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming." The same is plain by what is
said in verses 29, 30, 3 1 and 32, and by all that is said from the 35th verse to
the end of the chapter, for twenty-three verses together. It there expressly ap-
pears, that the apostle is speaking only of a rising to glory, with a glorious
body, as the little grain that is sown, being quickened, rises a beautiful flourish-
ing plant. He there speaks of the different degrees of glory among them that
shall rise, and compares it to the different degrees of glory among the celestial
luminaries. The resurrection which he treats of, is expressly a being raised in
incorruption, in glory, in power, with a spiritual body, having the image of the
446 ORIGINAL SIN.
second man, the spiritual and heavenly Adam ; a resurrection wherein this cor-
ruptible shall put on incorruphon, and this mortal put on immortality, and death
be swallowed up in victory, and the saints shall gloriously triumph over that last
enemy. Dr. Taylor himself says, that which is in effect owning the resurrection
here spoken of is only of the righteous ; for it is expressly a resurrection, sv
a&avaciav, and ay&aoaia, ver. 53 and 42. But Dr. Taylor says, " These are never
attributed to the wicked in Scripture.* So that when the apostle says here,
" As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive ;" it is as much as if
he had said, As in Adam we all die, and our bodies are sown in corruption, in
dishonor, and in weakness ; so in Christ we all (we Christians, whom I have
all along been speaking of) shall be raised in power, glory, and incorruption,
spiritual and heavenly, conformed to the second Adam. " For as we have borne
the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly," ver. 49.
Which clearly explains and determines his meaning in verses 21, 22.
2. There is no evidence that the benefit by the second Adam, spoken of in
Rom. v., is the very same (containing neither more or less) as the resurrection
spoken of in 1 Cor. xv. It is no evidence of it, that the benefit is opposed to the
death that comes by the first Adam, in like manner in both places. The resur-
rection to eternal life, though it be not the whole of that salvation and happiness
which comes by the second Adam, yet it is that wherein this salvation is princi-
pally obtained. The time of the saints' glorious resurrection is often spoken of
as the proper time of the saints' salvation, the day of their redemption, the time
of their adoption, glory, and recompense. (As in Luke xiv. 14, and xxi. 28,
Rom. viii. 23, Eph. iv. 30, Coloss. hi. 4, 2 Thess. i. 7, 2 Tim. iv. 8, 1 Pet. i.
13, and v. 4, 1 John iii. 2, and other places.) All that salvation and happiness
which is given before, is only a prelibation and earnest of their great reward.
Well therefore may that consummate salvation bestowed on them, be set in op-
position to the death and ruin which comes by the first Adam, in like manner as
the whole of their salvation is opposed to the same in Rom. v. Dr. Taylor him-
self observes,! " That the revival and resurrection of the body, is frequently put
for our advancement to eternal life." It being the highest part, it is often put
for the whole.
This notion, as if the justification, righteousness, and life spoken of in Rom.
v. implied the resurrection to damnation, is not only without ground from Scrip-
ture, but contrary to reason. For those things are there spoken of as great ben-
efits, by the grace and free gift of God ; but this is the contrary, in the highest
degree possible, being the most consummate and infinite calamity. To obviate
this, our author supposes the resurrection of all to be a great benefit in itself
though turned into a calamity by the sin and folly of obstinate sinners, who abuse
God's goodness. But the far greater part of mankind, since Adam, have never
had opportunity to abuse this goodness, it having never been known to them.
Men cannot abuse a kindness, which they never had either in possession, promise,
offer, or some intimation ; but a resurrection is made known only by divine rev-
elation, which few comparatively have enjoyed. So that as to such wicked men
as die in lands of darkness, if their resurrection comes at all by Christ, it comes
from him, and to them, only as a curse, and not as a blessing ; for it never comes
to them at all by any conveyance, grant, promise, or offer, or any thing by which
they can claim it, or know any thing of it, till it comes as an infinite calamity,
past all remedy.
VIII. In a peculiar manner is there an unreasonable violence used in our
* Note on Rom. viii. 27. t Note on Rom. riii. 11.
ORIGINAL SIN. 447
author's explanation of the words sinners and sinned, in the paragraph before us
He says, " These words, By one man's disobedience many were made sinners,
mean neither more nor less, than that by one man's disobedience, the many were
made subject to death by the judicial act of God."* And he says in
the same place, " By death most certainly is meant no other than the death ana
mortality common to all mankind." And those words, verse 12, For that all
have sinned, he thus explains, " All men became sinners, as all mankind are
brought into a state of suffering."!
Here I observe :
1. The main thing, by which he justifies such interpretations, is, that sin, in
various instances, is used for suffering, in the Old Testament.^ To which 1 re-
ply, though it be true that the word Chattaah, signifies both sin, and a sin offer-
ing ; and this, and some other Hebrew words, which signify sin, iniquity, and
wickedness, are sometimes put for the effect or punishment of iniquity, by a met-
onymy of the cause for the effect ; yet it does not appear, that these words are
ever used for enduring suffering, where the suffering is not spoken of under any
notion of a punishment of sin, or a fruit of God's anger for sin, or of any impu-
tation of guilt, or under any notion of sin's being at all laid to the charge of the
sufferer, or the suffering's being at all of the nature of any recompense, compen-
sation, or satisfaction for sin. And therefore none of the instances he mentions,
come up to his purpose. When Lot is commanded to leave Sodom, that he
might not be consumed in the iniquity of the city, meaning in that fire, which
was the effect and punishment of the iniquity of the city ; this is quite another
thing, than if that fire came on the city in general, as no punishment at all, nor
as any fruit of a charge of iniquity on the city, or of God's displeasure for their
sin, but as a token of God's favor to the inhabitants ; which is what is supposed
with respect to the death of mankind ; it being introduced only as a benefit, on
the foot of a covenant of grace. And especially is this quite another thing, than
if, in the expression used, the iniquity had been ascribed to Lot ; and God, in-
stead of saying, Lest thou be consumed in the iniquity of the city, had said, Lest
thou be consumed in thine iniquity, or, Lest thou sin, or be ma,de a sinner.
Whereas the expression is such, as does expressly remove the iniquity spoken of
from Lot, and fix it on another subject, viz., the city. The place cited by our
author in Jer. li. is exactly parallel. And as to what Abimelech says to Abra-
ham, " What have I offended thee, that thou hast brought on me, and on my
kingdom, a great sin ? It is manifest, Abimelech was afraid that God was
angry, for what he had done to Sarah ; or, would have been angry with him,
if he had done what he was about to do, as imputing sin to him for it : which is
a quite different thing from calling some calamity, sin, under no notion of Its
being any punishment of sin, nor in the least degree from God's displeasure.
And so with regard to every place our author cites in the margin, it is plain,
that what is meant in each of them, is the punishment of sin, and not some suf-
fering which is no punishment at all. And as to the instances he mentions in
his Supplement, p. 8, the two that look most favorable to his design, are those
in Gen. xxxi. 39, and 2 Kings vii. 9. With respect to the former, where Jacob
says, That which was torn of beasts, Anochi-achattenah, Dr. Taylor is pleased
to translate it, 1 was the sinner ; but properly rendered, it is, / expiated it ; the
v'erb in Pihel properly signifying to expiate ; and the plain meaning is, / bore
the blame of it, and was obliged to pay for it, as being supposed to be lost through
my fault or neglect : which is a quite different thing from suffering without any
* Page 30. t Page 54, and elsewhe-.*. X Page 34.
448 ORIGINAL SIN.
supposition of fault. And as to the latter place, where the lepers say, " This
day is a day of good tidings, and we hold our peace : if we tarry till morning
•some mischief will befall us :" in the Hebrew it is Umetzaanu gnavon, " Iniqui-
ty will find us/' that is, some punishment of our fault will come upon us. Else-
where such phrases are used, as, Your iniquity will find you out, and the like.
But certainly this is a different thing from suffering without fault, or supposition
of fault. And it does not appear, that the verb in Hiphil, hirshiang, is ever put
for condemn, in any other sense than condemning for sin, or guilt, or supposed
guilt belonging to the subject condemned. This word is used in the participle
of Hiphil, to signify condemning, in Prov. xvii. 15, " He that justifieth the wick-
ed, and he that condemneth the just, even both are an abomination to the Lord."
This Dr. Taylor observes, as if it were to his purpose, when he is endeavoring
to show, that in this place, in the 5th of Romans, the apostle speaks of God him-
self as condemning the just, or perfectly innocent, in a parallel signification of
terms. Nor is any instance produced, wherein the verb sin, which is used by
the apostle when he says, Ml have sinned, is anywhere used in our author's
sense, for being brought into a state of suffering, and that not as a punishment
for sin, or as any thing arising from God's displeasure ; much less for being the
subject of what comes only as the fruit of divine love, and as a benefit of the
highest nature.* Nor can any thing like this sense of the verb be found in the
whole Bible.
2. If there had been any thing like such a use of the words, sin and sinner,
as our author supposes, in the Old Testament, it is evident that such a use of
them is quite alien from the language of the New Testament. Where can an
instance be produced of any thing like it, in any one place, besides what is pre-
tended in this ? And particularly, where else shall we find these words and
phrases used in such a sense in any of this apostle's writings ? We have
enough of his writings, by which to learn his language and way of speaking
about sin, condemnation, punishment, death, and suffering. He wrote much
more of the New Testament than any other person. He very often has occa-
sion to speak of condemnation, but where does he express it by being made sin-
ners ? Especially how far is he elsewhere from using such a phrase, to signify
a being condemned without guilt, or any imputation or supposition of guilt j
Vastly more still is it remote from his language, so to use the verb sin, and to
say, man sinneth, or has sinned, though hereby meaning nothing more nor less,
than that he, by a judicial act, is condemned, on the foot of a dispensation of
grace, to receive a great favor ! He abundantly uses the words sin and sinner;
his writings are full of such terms ; but where else does he use them in such a
sense 1 He has much occasion in his epistles to speak of death, temporal and
eternal ; he has much occasion to speak of suffering, of all kinds, in this world,
and the world to come ; but where does he call these things sin, and denominate
innocent men sinners, or say, they have sinned, meaning that they are brought
into a state of suffering ? If the apostle, because he was a Jew, was so addict-
ed to the Hebrew idiom, as thus in one paragraph to repeat this particular He-
braism, which at most, is comparatively rare even in the Old Testament, it is
strange that never any thing like it should appear anywhere else in his wri-
tings ; and especially that he should never fall into such a way of speaking in
his epistle to the Hebrews, written to Jews only, who were most used to the He-
brew idiom. And why does Christ never use such language in any of his
speeches, though he was born and brought up amongst the Jews, and delivered
* Page 27, 8.
ORIGINAL SIN. 449
almost all nis speeches only to Jews 1 And why do none of the rest of the
writers of the New Testament ever use it, who were all bowi and educated Jews
(at least all excepting Luke), and some of them wrote especially for the benefit
of the Jews 1
It is worthy to be observed, what liberty is taken, and boldness used with this
apostle; suchwTords as afiagroXog , afiaQzuvco,nQifiu, xazaxQtfia, dixaioco, dixauoaig,
and words of the same root and signification, are words abundantly used by him
elsewhere in this and other epistles, and also when speaking, as he is here, of
Christ's redemption and atonement, and of the general sinfulness of mankind,
and of the condemnation of sinners, and of justification by Christ, and of death
as the consequence of sin, and of life and restoration to life by Christ, as here ;
yet nowhere are any of these words used, but in a sense very remote from
what is supposed here. However, in this place these terms must have a distin-
guished, singular sense found out for them, and annexed to them ! Anew lan-
guage must be coined for the apostle, which he is evidently quite unused to, and
put into his mouth on this occasion, for the sake of evading this clear, precise,
and abundant testimony of his, to the doctrine of Original Sin.
3. The putting such a sense on the word sin, in this place, is not only to
make the apostle greatly to disagree with himself in the language he uses every*
where else, but also to disagree with himself no less in the language he uses in
this very passage. He often here uses the word sin, and other words plainly of
the same design and import, such as transgression, disobedience, offence. No-
thing can be more evident, than that these are here used as several names of
the same thing ; for they are used interchangeably, and put one for another, as
will be manifest only on the cast of an eye on the place. And these words are
used no less than seventeen times in this one paragraph. Perhaps we shall find
no place in the whole Bible, in which the word sin, and other words synony-
mous, are used so often in so little compass ; and in all the instances, in the pro-
per sense, as signifying moral evil, and even so understood by Dr. Taylor him-
self (as appears by his own exposition) but only in these two places ; where in
the midst of all, to evade a clear evidence of the doctrine of Original Sin, ano-
ther meaning must be found out, and it must be supposed that the apostle uses
the word in a sense entirely different, signifying something that neither implies
nor supposes any moral evil at all in the subject.
Here it is very remarkable, the gentleman who so greatly insisted upon it,
that the word death must needs be understood in the same sense throughout this
paragraph ; yea, that it is evidently, clearly, and infallibly so, inasmuch as the
apostle is still discoursing on the same subject ; yet can, without the least diffi-
culty, suppose the word sin, to be used so differently in the very same passage,
wherein the apostle is discoursing on the same thing. Let us take that one in-
stance in verse 12, " Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and
death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." Here
by sin, implied in the word sinned, in the end of the sentence, our author under-
stands something perfectly and altogether diverse from what is meant by the
word sin, not only in the same discourse on the same subject, but twice in the
former part of the very same sentence, of which this latter part is not only the
conclusion, but the explication ; and also entirely different rom the use of the
word twice in the next sentence, wherein the apostle is still most plainly dis-
coursing on the same subject, as is not denied : and in the next sentence to that
(verse 14) the apostle uses the very same verb sinned, and as signifying the
committing of moral evil, as our author himself understands it. Afterwards
(verse 19) the apostle uses the word sinners, which our author supposes to he
Vol IL 57
450 ORIGINAL SIN.
in somewhat of a different sense still. So that here is the utmost violence of
ihe kind that can be conceived of, to make out a scheme against the plainest
evidence, in changing the meaning of a word backward and forward, in one
paragraph, all about one thing, and in different parts of the same sentences,
coming over and over in quick repetitions, with a variety of other synonymous
words to fix its signification ; besides the continued use of the word in the for-
mer part of this chapter, and in all the preceding part of this epistle, and the
continued use of it in the next chapter, and in the next to that, and the 8th
chapter following that, and to the end of the epistle ; in none of which places
it is pretended, but that the word is used in the proper sense, by our author in
his paraphrases and notes on the wThole epistle.*
But indeed we need go no further than that one, verse 12. What the
apostle means by sin, in the latter part of the verse, is evident with the utmost
plainness, by comparing it with the former part ; one part answering to an-
other, and the last clause exegetical of the former. " Wherefore as by one
man sin entered into the world, and death by sin ; and so death passed upon
all men, for that (or, unto which) all have sinned." Here sin and death are
spoken of in the former pafrt, and sin and death are spoken of in the latter part;
the two parts of the sentence so answering one another, that the same things
are apparently meant by sin and death in both parts.
And besides, to interpret sinning, here, of falling under the suffering of
death, is yet the more violent and unreasonable, because the apostle in this very
place does once and again distinguish between sin and death ; plainly speak-
ing of one as the effect, and the other the cause. So in the 21st verse,
" That as sin hath reigned unto death ;" and in the 12th verse, " Sin entered into
the world, and death by sin." And this plain distinction holds through all the
discourse, as between death and the offence, ver. 15, and ver. 17, and between
the offence and condemnation, ver. 18.
4. Though we should omit the consideration of the manner in which the
apostle uses the words sin, sinned, &c, in other places, and in other parts of
this discourse, yet Dr. Taylor's interpretation of them would be very absurd.
The case stands thus : according to his exposition, we are said to have sin-
ned by an active verb, as though we had actively sinned ; yet this is not spoken
truly and properly, but it is put figuratively for our becoming sinners passively,
our being made or constituted sinners. Yet again, not that we do truly become
sinners passively, or are really made sinners, by any thing that God does ; this
also is only a figurative or tropical representation ; and the meaning is only, we
are condemned, and treated as if we were sinners. Not indeed that we are
properly condemned, for God never truly condemns the innocent : but this also
is only a figurative representation of the thing. It is but as it were condemn-
ing ; because it is appointing to death, a terrible evil, as if it were a punish-
ment. But then, in reality, here is no appointment to a terrible evil, or any
evil at all ; but truly to a benefit, a great benefit : and so, in representing death
as a punishment or calamity condemned to, another figure or trope is made use
* Agreeably to this manner, our author, in explaining the 7th chapter of Romans, understands the
pronoun /, or me, used by the apostle in that one continued discourse, in no less than six different sen-
ses. F.e takes it in the 1st verse to signify the Apostle Paul himself. In the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th
verses, for the people of the Jews, through all ages, both before and after Moses, especially the carnal,
ungodly part of them. In the 13th verse for an objecting Jew entering into a dialogue with the apostle.
In the 15th, 16th, 17th, 20th, and latter part of the 25th verse, it is understood in two different senses, for
two Ps in the same person ; one, a man's reason ; and the other, his passions and carnal appetites. And
in the seventh and former part of the last verse, for us Christians in general ; or, for all that enjoy the
word of God, the law and the gospel : and these different senses, the most of them strangely intermixed
and interchanged backwards and forwards.
ORIGINAL SIN. 451
of, and an exceeding bold one ; for, as we are appointed to it, it is so far from
being an evil or punishment, that it is really a favor, and that of the highest
nature, appointed by mere grace and love, though it seems to be a calamity.
Thus we have tropes and figures multiplied, one upon the back of another ; and
al1 in that one word, sinned ; according to the manner, as it is supposed, the
apostle uses it. We have a figurative representation, not of a reality, but of a
figurative representation. Neither is this" a representation of a reality, but of
another thing that still is but a figurative representation of something else : yea,
even this something else is still but a figure, and one that is very harsh and far
fetched. So that here we have a figure to represent a figure, even a figure
of a figure, representing some very remote figure, which most obscurely repre-
sents the thing intended ; if the most terrible evil can indeed be said at all to
represent the contrary good of the highest kind. And now, what cannot be
made of any place of Scripture, in such a way of managing it, as this ? And
is there any hope of ever deciding any controversy by the Scripture, in the way
of using such a license with the Scripture, in order to force it to a compliance
with our own schemes 1 If the apostle indeed uses language after so strange
a manner in this place, it is perhaps such an instance, as not only there is not
the like of it in all the Bible besides, but perhaps in no writing whatsoever. And
this, not in any parabolical, visionary, or prophetic description, in which diffi-
cult and obscure representations are wont to be made use of; nor in a dramatic
or poetical representation, in which a great license is often taken, and bold
figures are commonly to be expected : but it is in a familiar letter, wherein the
apostle is delivering gospel instruction, as a minister of the New Testament ;
and wherein, as he professes, he delivers divine truth without the vail of ancient
figures and similitudes, and uses great plainness of speech : and in a discourse
that is wholly didactic, narrative, and argumentative ; evidently setting himself
to explain the doctrine he is upon, in the reason and nature of it, with a great
variety of expressions, turning it as it were on every side, to make his mean-
ing plain, and to fix in his readers the exact notion of what he intends. Dr.
Taylor himself observes,* " This apostle takes great care to guard and explain
every part of his subject : and I may venture to say, he has left no part of it
unexplained or unguarded. Never was an author more exact and cautious in
this than he. Sometimes he writes notes on a sentence liable to exception, and
wanting explanation." Now I think, this care and exactness of the apostle
nowhere appears more than in the place we are upon. Nay, I scarcely know
another instance equal to this, of the apostle's care to be well understood, by
being very particular, explicit, and precise, setting the matter forth in every
light, going over and over again with his doctrine, clearly to exhibit, and fully
to settle and determine the thing which he aims at.
SECTION II
Some Observations on the Connection, Scope, and Sense of thrs remarkable para-
graph in Rom. v. With some Reflections on the Evidence which we here have of
the Doctrine of Original Sin.
The connection of this remarkable paragraph with the foregoing discourse
in this epistle, is not obscure and difficult, nor to be sought for at a distance.
* Preface to Paraph, p. 146, 48.
452 ORIGINAL SIN
It may be plainly seen, only by a general glance on things which went before,
from the beginning of the epistle : and indeed what is said immediately before
in the same chapter, leads directly to it. The apostle in the preceding part of
this epistle had largely treated of the sinfulness and misery of all mankind,
Jews as well as Gentiles. He had particularly spoken of the depravity and
ruin of mankind in their natural state, in the foregoing part of this chapter ;
representing them as being sinners, ungodly, enemies, exposed to divine wrath,
and without strength. No wonder now, this leads him to observe, how this so
o-reat and deplorable an event came to pass ; how this universal sin and ruin
came into the world. And with regard to the Jews in particular, who, though
they might allow the doctrine of Original Sin in their own profession, yet were
strongly prejudiced against what was implied in it, or evidently followed from
it, with regard to themselves : in this respect they were prejudiced against the
doctrine of universal sinfulness, and exposedness to wrath by nature, looking
on themselves as by nature holy, and favorites of God, because they were the
children of Abraham; and with them the apostle had labored most in the fore-
going part of the epistle, to convince them of their being by nature as sinful,
and as much the children of wrath, as the Gentiles :— I say, with regard to
them, it was exceeding proper, and what the apostle's design most naturally
led him to, to take off their eyes from their father Abraham, who was their
father in distinction from other nations, and direct them to their father Adam,
who was the common father of mankind, and equally of Jews and Gentiles.
And when he was entered on this doctrine of the derivation of sin and ruin, or
death, to all mankind from Adam, no wonder if he thought it needful to be
some\vhat particular in it, seeing he wrote to Jews and Gentiles ; the former
of which had been brought up under the prejudices of a proud opinion of them-
selves, as a holy people by nature, and the latter had been educated in total
ignorance of all things of this kind.
Again, the apostle had, from the beginning of the epistle, been endeavoring
to evince the absolute dependence of all mankind on the free grace of God for
salvation, and the greatness of this grace ; and particularly in the former part
of this chapter. The greatness of this grace he shows especially by two things.
( 1.) The universal corruption and misery of mankind ; as in all the foregoing
chapters, and in the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th verses of this chapter. (2.)
The greatness of the benefits which believers receive, and the greatness of the
glory they have hope of. So especially in verses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 11th of this
chapter. And here, in this place we are upon, from verse 12 to the end, he is
still on the same design of magnifying the grace of God, in the same thing, viz.,
the favor, life, and happiness which believers in Christ receive ; speaking here
of the grace of God, the gift by grace, the abounding of grace, and the reign of
grace. And he still sets forth the freedom and riches of grace by the same two
arguments, viz., the universal sinfulness and ruin of mankind, all having
sinned, all being naturally exposed to death, judgment and condemnation ; and
the exceeding greatness of the benefit received, being far greater than the misery
which comes by the first Adam, and abounding beyond it. And it is by no
means consistent with the apostle's scope, to suppose, that the benefit which we
have by Christ, as the antitype of Adam, here mainly insisted on, is without any
grace at all, being only a restoration to life of such as never deserved death.
Another thing observable in the apostle's scope from the beginning of the
epistle, is, he endeavors to show the greatness and absoluteness of the depen-
dence of all mankind on the redemption and righteousness of Christ, for justifi-
cation and life, that he might magnify and exalt the Redeemer ; which design
ORIGINAL SIN. f 453
his whole heart was swallowed up in, and may be looked upon as the main de-
sign of the whole epistle. And this is what he had been upon in the preceding
part of this chapter ; inferring it from the same argument, the utter sinfulness
and ruin of all men. And he is evidently still on the same thing in this place,
from the 12th verse to the end ; speaking of the same justification and righteous-
ness, which he had dwelt on before, and not another totally diverse. No wonder,
when the apostle is treating so fully and largely of our restoration, righteousness,
and life by Christ, that he is led by it to consider our fall, sin, death and ruin
by Adam ; and to observe wherein these two opposite heads of mankind agree,
and wherein they differ, in the manner of conveyance of opposite influences and
communications from each.
Thus, if the place be understood, as it used to be understood by orthodox
divines, the whole stands in a natural, easy, and clear connection with the pre-
ceding part of the chapter, and all the former part of the epistle; and in a plain
agreement with the express design of all that the apostle had been saying ; and
also in connection with the words last before spoken, as introduced by the two
immediately preceding verses, where he is speaking of our justification, reconcili-
ation, and salvation by Christ ; which leads the apostle directly to observe, how,
on the contrary, we have sin and death by Adam. Taking this discourse of the
apostle in its true and plain sense, there is no need of great extent of learning, or
depth of criticism, to find out the connection : but if it be understood in Dr.
Taylor's sense, the plain scope and connection are wholly lost, and there was
truly need of a skill in criticism, and art of discerning, beyond or at least dif-
ferent from that of former divines, and a faculty of seeing something afar off
which other men's sight could not reach, in order to find out the connection.
What has been already observed, may suffice to show the apostle's general
scope in this place. But yet there seem to be some other things, which he has
his eye to, in several expressions ; some particular things in the then present
state, temper and notions of the Jews, which he also had before spoken of or had
reference to, in certain places of the foregoing part of the epistle. As partic-
ularly, the Jews had a very superstitious and extravagant notion of their law.
delivered by Moses ; as if it were the prime, grand, and indeed only rule of
God's proceeding with mankind as their judge, both in men's justification and
condemnation, or from whence all, both sin and righteousness, were imputed ;
and had no consideration of the law of nature, written in the hearts of the Gen-
' tiles, and of all mankind. Herein they ascribed infinitely too much to their
particular law, beyond the true design of it. They made their boast of the law ;
as if their being distinguished from all other nations by that great privilege, the
giving of the law, sufficiently made them a holy people, and God's children.
This notion of theirs the apostle evidently refers to, chap. ii. 13, 17, 18, 19, and
indeed through that whole chapter. They looked on the law of Moses as intended
to be the only rule and means of justification ; and as such, trusted in the works
of the law, especially circumcision ; which appears by the 3d chapter. But as
for the Gentiles, they looked on them as by nature sinners, and children of wrath ;
because born of uncircumcised parents, and aliens from their law, and who them-
selves did not know, profess and submit to the law of Moses, become proselytes,
and receive circumcision. What they esteemed the sum of their wickedness and
condemnation, was, that they did not turn Jews, and act as Jews.* This notion
of theirs the apostle has a plain respect to, and endeavors to convince them of
the falseness of, in chapter ii. 12 — 16. And he has a manifest regard again to
* Here are worthy to be observed the things which Dr. Taylor himself says to the same pur-
Dose, Key, § 302, 303, and Preface to Paraph, on Epist. to Rom. p. 144, 43.
454 . OKIGINAL SIN.
the same thing here, in the 12th, 13th, and 14th verses of chapter v. Which
may lead us the more clearly to see the true sense of those verses ; about the
sense of which is the main controversy, and the meaning of which being deter-
mined, it will settle the meaning of every other controverted expression through
the whole discourse.
Dr. Taylor misrepresents the apostle's argument iri these verses. (Which
as has been demonstrated, is in his sense altogether vain and impertinent.) He
supposes, the tiling which the apostle mainly intends to prove, is, that death or
mortality does not come on mankind by personal sin ; and that he would prove
it by this medium, that death reigned when there was no law in being which
threatened personal sin with death. It is acknowledged, that this is implied,
even that death came into the world by Adam's sin : yet this is not the main
thing the apostle designs to prove. But his main point evidently is, that sin and
guilt, and just exposedness to death and ruin, came into the world by Adam's
sin ; as righteousness, justification, and a title to eternal life come by Christ.
Which point he confirms by this consideration, that from the very time when
Adam sinned, these things, viz., sin, guilt, and desert of ruin, became universal in
the world, long before the lawT given by Moses to the Jewish nation had any being
The apostle's remark, that sin entered into the world by one man, who was
the father of the whole human race, was an observation which afforded proper in-
struction for the Jews, who looked on themselves as a holy people, because
they had the law of Moses, and were the children of Abraham, a holy father ;
while they looked on other nations as by nature unholy and sinners, because they
were not Abraham's children. He leads them up to a higher ancestor than
this patriarch, even to Adam, who being equally the father of Jews and Gentiles,
both alike come from a sinful father ; from whom guilt and pollution were de-
rived alike to all mankind. And this the apostle proves by an argument, which
of all that could possibly be invented, tended the most briefly and dirtctly to con-
vince the Jews; even by this reflection, that death had come equally on all mankind
from Adam's time, and that the posterity of Abraham were equally subject to it
with the rest of the world. This was apparent in fact, a thing they all knew.
And the Jews had always been taught that death (wThich began in the destruc-
tion of the body, and of this present life) was the proper punishment oi sin.
This they were taught in Moses' history of Adam, and God's first threatening
of punishment for sin, and by the constant doctrine of the law and the prophets,
as has been already observed.
And the apostle's observation, that sin was in the world long before the law
wras given, and wras as universal in the world from the times of Adam, as it had
been among the Heathen since the law of Moses, this showed plainly that the
Jews were quite mistaken in their notion of their particular lawT, and that the
law which is the original and universal rule of righteousness and judgment for
all mankind, was another law, of far more ancient date, even the law of nature,
which began as early as the human nature began, and was established with tht
first father of mankind, and in him with the whole race : the positive precept
of abstaining from the forbidden fruit, being given for the trial of his compliance
with this law of nature ; of which the main rule is supreme regard to God and
his will. And the apostle proves that it must be thus, because, if the law of
Moses had been the highest rule of judgment, and if there had not been a su-
perior, prior, divine rule established, mankind in general wrould not have been
judged and condemned as sinners, before that was given (for " sin is nol impu-
ted when there is no law"), as it is apparent in fact they were, because 4eazh
reio-ned before that time, even from the times of Adam.
ORIGINAL SIN. 455
It may be observed, the apostle in this epistle, and that to the Galatians,
endeavors to convince the Jews of these two things, in opposition to the no-
tions and prejudices they had entertained concerning their law. 1. That it
never was intended to be the covenant, or method by which they should actual-
ly be justified. 2. That it was not the highest and universal rule or law, by
which mankind in general, and particularly the Heathen world, were condemn-
ed. And he proves both by similar arguments. He proves that the law of
Moses was not the covenant, by which any of mankind were to obtain justifica-
tion, because that covenant was of older date, being expressly established in the
time of Abraham, and Abraham himself was justified by it. This argument the
apostle particularly handles in the 3d chapter of Galatians, especially in verses
17, 18,. 19. And this argument is alsa made use of in the apostle's reasonings
in the 4th chapter of this epistle to the Romans, especially verses 13, 14, 15.
He proves also that the law of Moses was not the prime rule of judgment, by
which mankind in general, and particularly the Heathen world, were condemn-
ed. And this he proves also the same way, viz., by showing this to be of older
date than that law, and that it was established with Jidam. Now these things
tended to lead the Jews to right notions of their law, not as the intended method
of justification, nor as the original and universal rule of condemnation, but some-
thing superadded to both, both being of older date, superadded to the latter, to il-
lustrate and confirm it, that the offence might abound ; and superadded to the
former, to be as a schoolmaster, to prepare men for the benefits of it, and to mag-
nify divine grace in it, that this might much more abound.
The chief occasion of the obscurity and difficulty which seems to attend the
scope and connection of the various clauses in the three first verses of this dis-
course, particularly the 13th and 14th verses, is, that there are two things (al-
though things closely connected) which the apostle has in his eye at once, in
which he aims to enlighten them he writes to ; which will not be thought; at
all strange by them that have been conversant with, and have attended to this
apostle's writings. He would illustrate the grand point he had been upon from
the beginning, even justification through Christ's righteousness alone, by show-
ing how we are originally in a sinful, miserable state, and how we derive this
sin and misery from Adam, and how we are delivered and justified by Christ as
a second Adam. At the same time he would confute those foolish and corrupt
notions of the Jews, about their nation and their law, that were very in-
consistent with these doctrines. And he here endeavors to establish, at once,
these two things in opposition to those Jewish notions.
1. That it is our natural relation to Adam, and not to Abraham, which de-
termines our native, moral state ; and that therefore the being natural children
of Abraham, will not make us by nature holy in the sight of God, since we are
the natural seed of sinful Adam ; nor does the Gentiles' being not descended
from Abraham, denominate them sinners, any more than the Jews, seeing both
alike are descended from Adam,
2. That the law of Moses is not the prime and general law and rule of
judgment for mankind, to condemn them, and denominate them sinners ; but
that the state they are in with regard to a higher, more ancient and universal
law, determines mankind in general to be sinners in the sight of God, and lia-
ble to be condemned as such. Which observation is, in many respects, to the
apostle's purpose ; particularly in this respect, that if the Jews were convinced,
that the law, which was the prime rule of condemnation, was given to all, was
common to all mankind, and that all fell under condemnation through the vio-
lation of that law by the common father of all, both Jews and Gentiles, then
456 ORIGINAL SIN.
they would be led more easily and naturally to believe, that the method of jus-
tification which God had established, also extended equally to all mankind ; and
that the Messiah, by whom we have this justification, is appointed, as Adam
was, for a common head to all, both Jews and Gentiles.
The apostle's aiming to confute the Jewish notion, is the principal occasion
of those words in the 13th verse : " For until the law, sin was in the world ;
but sin is not imputed when there is no law."
As to the import of that expression, " Even over them that had not sinned
after the similitude of Adam's transgression," not only is the thing signified by
it, in Dr. Taylor's sense of it, not true ; or if it had been true, would have been
impertinent, as has been shown ; but his interpretation is, otherwise, very much
strained and unnatural. According to him, by " sinning after the similitude of
Adam's transgression," is not meant any similitude of the act of sinning, nor ot
the command sinned against, nor properly any circumstance of the sin ; but
only the similitude of a circumstance of the command, viz., the threatening it is
attended with. A far fetched thing, to be called a similitude of sinning!
Besides this expression in such a meaning, is only a needless, impertinent, and
awkward repeating over again the same thing, which it is supposed the apostle
had observed in the foregoing verse, even after he had left it, and had proceed-
ed another step in the series of his discourse, or chain of arguing. As thus, in
the foregoing verse the apostle had plainly laid down his argument (as our
author understands it), by which he would prove, death did not come by per-
sonal sin, viz., that death reigned before any law, threatening death for person-
al sin, was in being ; so that the sin then committed was against no law.
threatening death for personal sin. Having laid this down, the apostle leaves
this part of his argument, and proceeds another step, Nevertheless death reigned
from Adam to Moses ; and then returns, in a strange, unnatural manner, and
repeats that argument or assertion again, but only more obscurely than before,
in these words, Even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of
Adam's transgression, i. e., over them that had not sinned against a law threat-
ening death for personal sin. Which is just the same thing as if the apostle had
said, " They that sinned before the law, did not sin against a law threatening
death for personal sin ; for there was no such law for any to sin against at that
time : nevertheless death reigned at that time, even over such as did not sin
against a law threatening death for personal sin." Which latter clause adds
nothing to the premises, and tends nothing to illustrate what was said before,
but rather to obscure and darken it. The particle xcu, even, when prefixed in
this manner used to signify something additional, some advance in the sense
or argument ; implying that the words following express something more, or
express the same thing more fully, plainly, or forcibly. But to unite two
clauses by such a particle, in such a manner, when there is nothing besides a
flat repetition, with no superadded sense or force, but rather a greater uncer-
tainty and obscurity, would be very unusual, and indeed very absurd.
I can see no reason why we should be dissatisfied with that explanation of
this clause, which has more commonly been given, viz., that by them who have
not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, are meant infants ; who,
though they have indeed sinned in Adam, yet never sinned as Adam did, by
actually transgressing in their own persons ; unless it be that this interpretation
is too old, and too common. It was well known by those the apostle wrote, to, that
vast numbers had died in infancy, within that period which the apostle speaks of,
particularly in the time of the deluge ; and it would be strange the apostle should
not have the case of such infants in his mind ; even supposing his scope were
ORIGINAL SIN. 457
what our author supposes, and he had only intended to prove that death did not
come on mankind for their personal sin. How directly would it have served the
purpose of proving this, to have mentioned so great a part of mankind that are
subject, to death, who, all know, never committed any sin in their own persons !
How much more plain and easy the proof of the point by that, than to go round
about, as Dr. Taylor supposes, and bring in a thing so dark and uncertain as
this, That God never would bring death on all mankind for personal sin (though
they had personal sin), without an express, revealed constitution ; and then to
observe that there was no revealed constitution of this nature from Adam to
Moses ; which also seems a thing without any plain evidence ; and then to in-
fer that it must needs be so, that it could come only on occasion of Adam's sin,
though not for his sin, or as any punishment of it j which inference also is very
dark and unintelligible.
If the apostle in this place meant those who never sinned by their personal
act, it is not strange that he should express this by their not sinning after the
similitude of Adam's transgression. We read of two ways of men's being like
Adam, or in which a similitude to him is ascribed to men : one is a being be-
gotten or born in his image or likeness, Gen. v. 3. Another is a transgressing
God's covenant or law, like him, Hos. vi. 7, " They, like Adam (so in the Heb.
and Vulg. Lat.), have transgressed the covenant." Infants have the former
similitude, but not the latter. And it was very natural, when the apostle would
infer that infants become sinners by that one act and offence of Adam, to ob-
serve that they had not renewed the act of sin themselves, by any second instance
of a like sort. And such might be the state of language among Jews and
Christians at that day, that the apostle might have no phrase more aptly to ex-
press this meaning. The manner in which the epithets, personal and actual,
are used and applied now in this case, is probably of later date and more modern
use.
And then this supposition of the apostle's having the case of infants in view,
in this expression, makes it more to his purpose, to mention death reigning be-
fore the law of Moses was given. For the Jews looked on all nations, besides
themselves, as sinners, by virtue of their law ; being made so especially by
the law of circumcision, given first to Abraham, and completed by Moses,
making the want of circumcision a legal pollution, utterly disqualifying for the
privileges of the sanctuary. This law, the Jews supposed, made the very in-
fants of the Gentiles sinners, polluted and hateful to God ; they being uncir-
cumcised, and born of uncircumcised parents. But the apostle proves against
these notions of the Jews, that the nations of the world do not become sinners
by nature, and sinners from infancy, by virtue of their law, in this manner, but
by Adam's sin ; inasmuch as infants were treated as sinners long before the law
of circumcision was given, as well as before they had committed actual sin.
What has been said, may, as I humbly conceive, lead us to that which is
the true scope and sense of the apostle in these three verses ; which I will en-
deavor more briefly to represent in the following paraphrase.
" The things which I have largely 12. Wherefore, as by one man sin
insisted on, viz., the evil that is in the entered into the world, and death by sin ;
world, the general wickedness, guilt and so death passed upon all men, for
and ruin of mankind, and the opposite that all have sinned. 4
good, even justification and life, as only
by Christ, lead me to observe the like-
ness of the manner in which they are
Vol. II. 58
458 ORIGINAL SIN.
each of them introduced. For it was
by one many that the general corruption
and guilt which I have spoken of, came
into the world, and condemnation and
death by sin : and this dreadful punish-
ment and ruin came on all mankind
by the great law of works, originally
established with mankind in their first
father, and by his one offence, or breach
of that law ; all thereby becoming sin-
ners in God's sight, and exposed to final
destruction.
" It is manifest that it was in this 13. For until the law, sin was in
way the world became sinful and guilty ; the world ; but sin is not imputed when
and not in that way which the Jews there is no law.
suppose, viz., that their law, given by
Moses, is the grand, universal rule of
righteousness and judgment for man-
kind, and that it is by being Gentiles,
uncircumcised, and aliens from that law,
that the nations of the world are con-
stituted sinners, and unclean. For be-
fore the law of Moses was given, man-
kind were all looked upon by the great
Judge as sinners, by corruption and
guilt derived from Adam's violation of
the original law of works ; which shows
that the original, universal rule of right-
eousness is not the law of Moses ; for
if so, there would have been no sin im-
puted before that was given, because
sin is not imputed when there is no law
"But that at that time sin was im- 14. Nevertheless, death reigned
puted, and men were by their Judge from Mam to Moses, even over them
reckoned as sinners, through guilt and that had not sinned after the similitude
corruption derived from Adam, and ofjldam's transgression.
condemned for sin to death, the proper
punishment of sin, we have a plain
proof; in that it appears in fact, all
mankind, during that whole time which
preceded the law of Moses, were sub-
jected to that temporal death, which is
the visible introduction and image of
that utter destruction which sin de-
serves, not excepting even infants, who
could be sinners no other way than by
virtue of Adam's transgression, having
never in their own persons actually sin-
ned as Adam did; nor could at that
time be ntade polluted by the law of
Moses, as being uncircumcised, or bore
of uncircumcised parents."
ORIGINAL SIN. 459
New, by way of reflection on the whole, I would observe, that though there
are two or three expressions in this paragraph, Rom. v. 12, &c, the design of
which is attended with some difficulty and obscurity, as particularly in the 13th
and 14th verses, yet the scope and sense of the discourse in general is not ob-
scure, but on the contrary very clear and manifest ; and so is the particular
doctrine mainly taught in it. The apostle sets himself with great care and pains
to make it plain, and precisely to fix and settle the point he is upon. And the
discourse is so framed, that one part of it does greatly clear and fix the meaning
of other parts ; and the whole is determined by the clear connection it stands in
with other parts of the epistle, and by the manifest drift of all the preceding
part of it.
The doctrine of Original Sin is not only here taught, but most plainly, ex-
plicitly, and abundantly taught. This doctrine is asserted, expressly or impli-
citly, in almost every verse, and in some of the verses several times. It is fully
implied in that first expression in the 12th verse, " By one man sin entered into
the world." The passage implies, that sin became universal in the world ; as
the apostle had before largely shown it was ; and not merely (which would be
a trifling, insignificant observation) that one man, who was made first, sinned
first, before other men sinned ; or, that it did not so happen that many men be-
gan to sin just together at the same moment. The latter part of the verse, " And
death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that (or, if you will unto
which) all have sinned," shows, that in the eye of the Judge of the world, in
Adam's first sin, all sinned ; not only in some sort, but all sinned so as to be
exposed to that death, and final destruction, which is the proper wages of sin.
The same doctrine is taught again twice over in the 14th verse. It is there
observed, as a proof of this doctrine, that " Death reigned over them which had
not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression ;" i. e., by their personal
act ; and therefore could be exposed to death, only by deriving guilt and pollu-
tion from Adam, in consequence of his sin. And it is taught again in those
words, " Who is the figure of him that was to come." The resemblance lies
very much in this circumstance, viz., our deriving sin, guilt, and punishment by
Adam's sin, as we do righteousness, justification, and the reward of life by Christ's
obedience ; for so the apostle explains himself. The same doctrine is expressly
taught again, verse 15, " Through the offence of one, many be dead." And
again twice in the 16th verse, " It was by one that sinned ;" i. e., it was by
Adam, that guilt and punishment (before spoken of) came on mankind : and in
these words, " Judgment was by one to condemnation." It is again plainly
*nd fully laid down in the 17th verse, " By one man's offence, death reigned by
one." So again in the 18th verse, " By the offence of one, judgment came
upon all men to condemnation." Again very plainly in the 19th verse, " By
one man's disobedience, many were made sinners."
And here is every thing to determine and fix the meaning of all important
terms, that the apostle makes use of: as, the abundant use of them in all parts
of the New Testament ; and especially in this apostle's writings, which make
up a very great part of the New Testament : and his repeated use of them in
this epistle in particular, especially in the preceding part of the epistle, which
leads to and introduces this discourse, and in the former part of this very chap-
ter ; and also the light, that one sentence in this paragraph casts on another
which fully settles their meaning : as, with respect to the words justification,
righteousness and condemnation ; and above all, in regard of the word sin,
which is the most important of all, with relation to the doctrine and controversy
we are upon. Besides the constant use of this term everywhere else through
460 ORIGINAL SIN.
the New Testament, through the epistles of this apostle, this epistle in particu-
lar, and even the former part of this chapter, it is often repeated in this very
paragraph, and evidently used in the very sense that is denied to belong to it in
the end of verse 12, and verse 19, though owned everywhere else : and its
meaning is fully determined by the apostle's varying the term ; using together
with it, to signify the same thing, such a variety of other synonymous words,
such as offence, transgression, disobedience. And further, to put the matter out
of all controversy, it is particularly and expressly and repeatedly distinguished
from that which our opposers would explain it by, viz., condemnation and death.
And what is meant by sin's entering into the world, in verse 12, is determined
by a like phrase of sin's being in the world, in the next verse. And that by the
offence of one, so often spoken of here, as bringing death and condemnation on
all, the apostle means the sin of one, derived in its guilt and pollution to man-
kind in general, is a thing which (over and above all that has been already ob-
served) is settled and determined by those words in the conclusion of this dis-
course, verse 20, " Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might abound :
but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." These words plainly
show, that the offence spoken of so often, and evidently spoken of still in these
words, which was the offence of one man, became the sin of all. For when he
says, " The law entered, that the offence might abound," his meaning cannot
be, that the offence of Adam, merely as his personally, should abound; but, as
it exists in its derived guilt, corrupt influence, and evil fruits, in the sin of man-
kind in general, even as a tree in its root and branches*
It is a thing that confirms the certainty of the proof of the doctrine of Origi-
nal Sin, which this place affords, that the utmost art cannot pervert it to another
sense. What a variety of the most artful methods have been used by the ene-
mies of this doctrine, to wrest and darken this paragraph of holy writ, which
stands so much in their way, as it were to force the Bible to speak a language
that is agreeable to their mind ! How have expressions been strained, words
and phrases racked ! What strange figures of speech have been invented, and
with violent hands thrust into the apostle's mouth ; and then with a bold counte-
nance and magisterial airs obtruded on the world, as from him ! — But, blessed
be God, we have his words as he delivered them, and the rest of the same epis-
tle, and his other writings to compare with them ; by which his meaning stands
in too strong and glaring a light to be hid by any of the artificial mists which they
labor to throw upon it.
It is really no less than abusing the Scripture and its readers, to represent
this paragraph as the most obscure of all the places of Scripture, that speak of
the consequences of Adam's sin ; and to treat it as if there was need first to con-
sider other places as more plain. WThereas, it is most manifestly a place in which
these things are declared, beyond all, the most plainly, particularly, precisely,
and of set purpose, by that great apostle, who has most fully explained to us
those doctrines in general, which relate to the redemption by Christ, and the sin
and misery we are redeemed from. And it must be now left to the reader's judg-
ment, whether the Christian church has not proceeded reasonably, in looking on
this as a place of Scripture most clearly and fully treating of these things, and
* The offence, according to Dr. Taylor's explanation, does not abound by the law at all really
and truly, in any sense ; neither the sin, nor the punishment. For he says, " The meaning is not,
that men should be made more wicked 5 but, that men should be liable to death for every trans-
gression." But after all, they are liable to no more deaths, nor to any worse deaths, if they are
not more sinful : for they were to have punishments according to their desert, before. Such as
died, and went into another world, before the law of Moses was given, were punished according
to their deserts ; and the law, when it :arr.e, threatened no more.
ORIGINAL SIN. 461
in using its determinate sense as a help to settle the meaning of many other
passages of sacred writ.
As this place in general is very full and plain, so the doctrine of the corrup-
tion of nature, as derived from Adam, and also the imputation of his first sin,
are both clearly taught in it. The imputation of Adam's one transgression, is
indeed most directly and frequently asserted. We are here assured that
by one marts sin, death passed on all ; all being adjudged to this punishment,
as having sinned (so it is implied) in that one man's sin. And it is repeated
over and over, that all are condemned, many are dead, many made sinners, &c,
by one marts offence, by the disobedience of one, and by one offence. And the
doctrine of original depravity is also here taught, when the apostle says, By one
man sin entered into the world ; having a plain respect (as hath been shown)
to that universal corruption and wickedness, as well as guilt, which he had be-
fore largely treated of.
PART III
OBSERVING THE EVIDENCE GIVEN US, RELATIVE TO THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN,
N WHAT THE SCRIPTURES REVEAL CONCERNING THE REDEMPTION BY CHRIST.
CHAPTER I.
The evidence of Original Sin, from the Nature of Redemption in the procure
ment ot it.
According to Dr. Taylor's scheme, a very great part of mankind are the sub-
jects of Christ's redemption, who live and die perfectly innocent, who never have
had, and never will have any sin charged to their account, and never are either
the subjects of, or exposed to any punishment whatsoever, viz., all that die in
infancy. They are the subjects of Christ's redemption, as he redeems them from
death, or as they by his righteousness have justification, and by his obedience are
made righteous, in the resurrection of the body, in the sense of Rom. v. 18, 19
And all mankind are thus the subjects of Christ's redemption, while they are
perfectly guiltless, and exposed to no punishment, as by Christ they are entitled
to a resurrection. Though, with respect to such persons as have sinned, he al-
lows it is in some sort by Christ and his death, that they are saved from sin, and
the punishment of it.
Now let us see whether such a scheme will consist with the Scripture account
of the redemption by Jesus Christ.
I. The representations of the redemption by Christ, everywhere in Scrip-
ture, lead us to suppose, that all whom he came to redeem, are sinners ; that
his salvation, as to the term from which (or the evil to be redeemed from) in all
is .5in, and the deserved punishment of sin. It is natural to suppose, that when
he had his name Jesus, or Saviour, given him by God's special and immediate
appointment, the salvation meant by that name should be his salvation in gen-
eral ; and not only a part of his salvation, and with regard only to some of them
that he came to save. But this name was given him to signify his saving his
people from their sins, Matth. i. 21. And the great doctrine of Christ's salva-
462 ORIGINAL SIN.
tion is, that he came into the world to save sinners, 1 Tim. i. 15. And that
Christ hath once suffered, the fust foi the unjust, 1 Pet. iii. 18. In this was mani-
fested the love of God towards us (towards such in general as have the benefit
of God's love in giving Christ), that God sent his only begotten Son into the
world, that we might live through him. Herein is love, that he sent his Son
to be the propitiation/or our sins, 1 John iv. 9, 10. Many other texts might be
mentioned, which seem evidently to suppose, that all Avho are redeemed by
Christ, are saved from sin. We are led by what Christ himself said, to suppose,
that if any are not sinners, they have no need of him as a redeemer, any more
than a well man of a physician, Mark ii. 17. And that men, in order to being
the proper subjects of the mercy of God through Christ, must first be in a state
of sin, is implied in Gal. iii. 22, " But the Scripture hath concluded all under
sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that be-
lieve." To the same effect is Rom. xi. 32.
These things are greatly confirmed by the Scripture doctrine of sacrifices.
It is abundantly plain, by both Old and New Testament, that they were types
of Christ's death, and were for sin, and supposed sin in those for whom they
were offered. The apostle supposes, that in order to any having the benefit of
the internal inheritance by Christ, there must of necessity be the death of the
testator ; and gives that reason for it, that without shedding of blood there is no
remission, Heb. ix. 15, &c. And Christ himself, in representing the benefit
of his blood, in the institution of the Lord's supper, under the notion of the blood
of a testament, calls it, The blood of the New Testament, shed for the remission
of sins, Matth. xxvi. 28. But according to the scheme of our author, many
have the eternal inheritance by the death of the testator, who never had any need
of remission.
II. The Scripture represents the redemption by Christ as a redemption from-
deserved destruction ; and that, not merely as it respects some particulars, but
as the fruit of God's love to mankind. John iii. 16, " God so loved the world,
that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not
perish, but have everlasting life :" implying, that otherwise they must perish,
or be destroyed : but what necessity of this, if they did not deserve to be de-
stroyed 1 Now, that the destruction here spoken of, is deserved destruction, is
manifest, because it is there compared to the perishing of such of the children
of Israel as died by the bite of the fiery serpents, which God, in his wrath, for
their rebellion, sent amongst them. And the same thing clearly appears by the
last verse of the same chapter, " He that believeth on the Son, hath everlast-
ing life ; and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of
God abideth on him," or, is left remaining on him : implying, that all in gene-
ral are found under the wrath of God, and that they only of all mankind, who
are interested in Christ, have this wrath removed and eternal life bestowed ; the
rest are left with the wrath of God still remaining on them. The same is clear-
ly illustrated and confirmed by John v. 24, " He that believeth, hath everlast-
ing life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death to
life." In being passed from death to life is implied, that before, they were all
in a state of death ; and they are spoken of as being so by a sentence of con-
demnation ; and if it be a just condemnation, it is a deserved condemnation.
III. It will follow on Dr. Taylor's scheme, that Christ's redemption, with
regard to a great part of them who are the subjects of it, is not only a redemption
from no sin, but from no calamity, and so from no evil of any kind. For as to
death, which infants are redeemed from, they never were subjected to it as a
calamity, but purely as a benefit. It came by no threatening or curse denounced
ORIGINAL SIN. 463
upon or through Adam ; the covenant with him being utterly abolished, as
to all its force and power on mankind (according to our author) be/ore the pro-
nouncing of the sentence of mortality. Therefore trouble and death could be
appointed to innocent mankind no other way than on the foot of another cove-
nant, the covenant of grace ; and in this channel they come only as favors,
not as evils. Therefore they could need no medicine or remedy, for they had
no disease. Even death itself, which it is supposed Christ saves them from, is
only a medicine ; it is preventing physic, and one of the greatest of benefits.
It is ridiculous to talk of persons needing a medicine, or a physician to save
them from an excellent medicine ; or of a remedy from a happy remedy ! If
it be said, though death be a benefit, yet it is so because Christ changes it, and
turns it into a benefit, by procuring a resurrection : I would here ask, what
can be meant by turning or changing it into a benefit, when it never was
otherwise, nor could ever justly be otherwise ? Infants could not be brought
under death as a calamity ; for they never deserved it. And it would be only
an abuse (be it far from us, to ascribe such a thing to God) in any being, to
make the offer to any poor sufferer, of a redeemer from some calamity, which
he had brought upon them without the least desert of it on their part.
But it is plain, that death or mortality was not at first brought on mankind
as a blessing, on the foot of the covenant of grace through Christ ; and that
Christ and grace do not bring mankind under death, but find them under it.
2 Cor. v. 14, " We thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead."
Luke xix. 10, " The son of man is come to seek and to save that which was
tost." The grace which appears in providing a deliverer from any state, sup-
poses the subject to be in that state prior to that grace and deliverance ; and
not that sudh a state is first introduced by that grace. In our author's scheme,
there never could be any sentence of death or condemnation that requires a
Saviour from it ; because the very sentence itself, according to the true mean-
ing of it, implies and makes sure all that good which is requisite to abolish and
make void the seeming evil to the innocent subject. So that the sentence it-
self is in effect the deliverer, and there is no need of another deliverer to deliver
from that sentence. Dr. Taylor insists upon it, that " Nothing comes upon us
in consequence of Adam's sin, in any sense, kind or degree, inconsistent with the
original blessing pronounced on Adam at his creation ; and nothing but what
is perfectly consistent with God's blessing, love and goodness, declared to
Adam as soon as he came out of his Maker's hands."* If the case be so, it is
certain there is no evil or calamity at all for Christ to redeem us from ; unless
things agreeable to the divine goodness, love and blessing, are things which we
need redemption from.
IV. It will follow on our author's principles, not only with respect to infants,
but even adult persons, that redemption is needless, and Christ is dead in vain.
Not only is there no need of Christ's redemption in order to deliverance from
any consequence of Adam's sin, but also in order to perfect freedom from person-
al sin, and all its evil consequences. For God has made other sufficient provi-
sion for that, viz., a sufficient power and ability, in all mankind, to do all their
duty, and wholly to avoid sin. Yea, this author insists upon it, that " when men
have not sufficient power to do their duty, they have no duty to do. We may
safely and assuredly conclude (says he), that mankind in all parts of the world,
have sufficient power to do the duty which God requires of them ; and that he
requires of them no more than they have sufficient powers to do."f And in
• P. 88, 89, S. t P. Ill, 63, 64, S.
464 ORIGINAL SIN.
another place,* " God has given powers equal to the duty which he expects."
And he expresses a great dislike to R. It 's supposing " that our propensities to
evil, and temptations, are too strong to be effectually and constantly resisted, or
that we are unavoidably sinful in a degree ; that our appetites and passions will
be breaking out, notwithstanding our everlasting watchfulness."! These things
fully imply that men have in their own natural ability sufficient means to avoid
sin, and to be perfectly free from it ; and so, from all the bad consequences of
it. And if the means are sufficient, then there is no need of more ; and there-
fore there is no need of Christ's dying, in order to it. What Dr. Taylor says,
in p. 72, S., fully implies that it would be unjust in God to give mankind being
in such circumstances, as that they would be more likely to sin, so as to be ex-
posed to final misery, than otherwise. Hence then, without Christ and his re-
demption, and without any grace at all, mere justice makes sufficient provision
for our being free from sin and misery, by our own power.
If all mankind in all parts of the world, have sufficient power to do their
whole duty, without being sinful in any degree, then they have sufficient pow-
er to obtain righteousness by the law ; and then, according to the Apostle
Paul, Christ is dead in vain. Gal. ii. 21, " If righteousness come by the law,
Christ is dead in vain ? — diet vo\iov, without the article, by law, or the rule of
right action, as our author explains the phrase.J And according to the sense
in which he explains this very place, " It would have frustrated or render-
ed useless the grace of God, if Christ died to accomplish what was or might
have been effected by law itself, without his death."§ So that it most clearly
follows from his own doctrine, that Christ is dead in vain, and the grace of God is
useless. The same apostle says, " If there had been a law which could have
given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law," Gal. iii. 21 ; i. e.
(still according to fir. Taylor's own sense), if there was a law that man, in his
present state, had sufficient power perfectly to fulfil. For Dr. Taylor supposes
the reason why the law could not give life, to be, " not because it was weak in
itself, but through the weakness of our flesh, and the infirmity of the human na-
ture in the present state."|| But he says, " We are under a mild dispensation
of grace, making allowance for our infirmities."1T By our infirmities, we may
upon good grounds suppose he means that infirmity of human nature which he
gives as the reason why the law cannot give life. But what grace is there in
making that allowance for our infirmities;, which justice itself (according to his
doctrine) most absolutely requires, as he supposes divine justice exactly propor-
tions our duty to our ability ?
Again, If it be said, that although Christ's redemption was not necessary to
preserve men from beginning to sin, and getting into a course of sin, because
they have sufficient power in themselves to avoid it ; yet it may be necessary to
deliver men, after they have by their own folly brought themselves under the do-
minion of evil appetites and passions.** I answer, if it be so, that men need
deliverance from those habits and passions, which are become too strong for
them, yet that deliverance, on our author's principles, would be no salvation
from sin. For the exercise of passions which are too strong for us, and which
we cannot overcome, is necessary, and he strongly urges that a necessary evil
can be no moral evil. It is true, it is the effect of evil, as it is the effect of
a bad practice, while the man remained at liberty, and had power to have
avoided it. But then, according to Dr. Taylor, that evil cause alone is sin ; and
* P. G7, S. f P 68, S. % Pref. to Par. on Rom. p. 143, 38. § Note on Rom. v. 20, p. 297. || Ibid.
IT Page 92, S. ** See p. 228, and also what he says of the helpless state of the Heathen, in Par. and
Notos on Rom. vii. and beginning of Chap. viii.
ORIGINAL SIN. 465
not so, the necessary effect ; for he says expressly, " The cause of every effect
is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, or which proceedeth from it."*
And as to that sin which was the cause, the man needed no Saviour from that, hav-
ing had sufficient power in himself to have avoided it. So that it follows, by our
author's scheme, that none of mankind, neither infants nor adult persons, neither
the more nor less vicious, neither Jews nor Gentiles, neither Heathens nor
Christians, ever did or ever could stand in any need of a Saviour ; and that,
with respect to all, the truth is, Christ is dead in vain.
If any should say, although all mankind in all ages have sufficient ability
to do their whole duty, and so may by their own power enjoy perfect freedom
from sin, yet God foresaw that they would sin, and that after they had sinned,
they would need Christ's death ; I answer, it is plain by what the apostle says
in those places which were just now mentioned, Gal. ii. 21, and iii. 21, that God
would have esteemed it needless to give his Son to die for men, unless there
had been a prior impossiblity of their having righteousness by law ; and that,
if there had been a law which could have given life, this other way by the death
•f Christ would not have been provided. And this appears to be agreeable to
our author's own sense of things, by his words which have been cited, wherein
he says, " It would have frustrated or rendered useless the grace of God, if Christ
died to accomplish what was or might have been effected by law itself, without
his death."
V. It will follow on Dr. Taylor's scheme, not only that Christ's redemp-
tion is needless for the saving from sin, or its consequences, but also that it does
no good that way, has no tendency to any diminution of sin in the world.
For as to any infusion of virtue or holiness into the heart, by divine power
through Christ or his redemption, it is altogether inconsistent with this author's
notions. With him, inwrought virtue, if there were any such thing, would be
no virtue ; not being the effect of our own will, choice and design, but only
of a sovereign act of God's power.f And therefore, all that Christ does to
increase virtue, is only increasing our talents, our light, advantages, means and
motives, as he often explains the matter.| But sin is not at all diminished. For
he says, Our duty must be measured by our talents ; as, a child that has less talents
has less duty, and therefore must be no more exposed to commit sin, than he
that has greater talents, because he that has greater talents, has more duty re-
quired, in exact proportion.^ If so, he that has but one talent, has as much
advantage to perform that one degree of duty which is required of him, as he
that has five talents, to perform his five degrees of duty, and is no more exposed
to fail of it. And that man's guilt, who sins against greater advantages, means
and motives, is greater in proportion to his talents. || And therefore it will fol-
low, on Dr. Taylor's principles, that men stand no better chance, have no more
eligible or valuable probability of freedom from sin and punishment, or of con-
tracting but little guilt, or of performing required duty, with the great advanta-
ges and talents implied in Christ's redemption, than without them ; when all
things are computed, and put into the balances together, the numbers, degrees
and aggravations of sin exposed to, degrees of duty required, &c. So that men
have no redemption from sin, and no new means of performing duty, that are
valuable or worth any thing at all. And thus the great redemption by
Christ in every respect comes to nothing, with regard both to infants and adult
persons.
♦ P. 128. f See pages 180, 245, 250. t In p. 44, 50, and innumerable other places
§ See p. 234, 61—70, S. II See Paraph, on Rom. ii. 9, also on Terse 12.
Vol. H. 59
466 ORIGINAL SIN.
CHAPTER II.
The Evidence of the Doctrine of Original Sin from what the Scripture teaches of the
Application of Redemption.
The truth of the doctrine of Original Sin is very clearly manifest from
what the Scripture says of that change of state which it represents as necessary
to an actual interest in the spiritual and eternal blessings of the Redeemer's
kingdom.
In order to this, it speaks of it as absolutely necessary for every one, that he
be regenerated, or born again. John iii. 3, " Verily, verily, I say unto thee, ex-
cept a man yEvr/]&v arw&ev, be begotten again, or born again, he cannot see the
kingdom of God." Dr. Taylor, though he will not allow that this signifies any
change from a state of natural propensity to sin, yet supposes that the new birth
here spoken of means a man's being brought to a divine life, in a right use and
application of the natural powers, in a life of true holiness;* and that it is the
attainment of those habits of virtue and religion, which gives us the real charac-
ter of true Christians, and the children of God ;f and that it is putting on the
new nature of right action.^
But in order to proceed in the most sure and safe manner, in our understand-
ing what is meant in Scripture by being born again, and so in the inferences we
draw from what is said of the necessity of it, let us compare Scripture with
Scripture, and consider what other terms or phrases are used in other places,
where respect is evidently had to the same change.
And here I would observe the following things :
I. If we compare one Scripture with another, it will be sufficiently manifest,
that by regeneration, or being begotten, or born again, the same change in the
state of the mind is signified with that which the Scripture speaks of as effected
in true repentance and conversion. I put repentance and conversion together,
because the Scripture puts them together, Acts iii. 19, and because they plainly
signify much the same thing. The word fieravoia (repentance) signifies a
change of the mind ; as the word conversion means a change or turning from sin
to God. And that this is the same change with that which is called regenera-
tion (excepting that this latter term especially signifies the change, as the mind
is passive in it), the following things do show.
In the change which the mind passes under in repentance and conversion, is
attained that character of true Christians, which is necessary to the eternal
privileges of such : Acts iii. 19, " Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that
your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the
presence of the Lord." And so it is with regeneration ; as is evident from
what Christ says to Nicodemus, and as is allowed by Dr. Taylor.
The change the mind passes under in repentance and conversion, is that
in which saving faith is attained. Mark i. 15, " The kingdom of God is at
hand : repent ye, and believe the gospel." And so it is with a being born
again, or born of God, as appears by John i. 12, 13 : " But as many as received
him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that be-
lieve on his name, which were 60771, not of blood, &c, but of God."
* Page 144. . t Pages 246, 248. t Page 251.
ORIGINAL SIN. 467
Just as Christ says concerning conversion, Matth. xviii. 3, " Verily, verily,
I say unto you, except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall
not enter into the kingdom of heaven ;" so does he say concerning being born
again, in what he spake to Nicodemus.
By the change men pass under in conversion, they become as little children,
which appears in the place last cited ; and so they do by regeneration, 1 Pet. i.
at the end, and chap. ii. at the beginning. Being born again — Wherefore, as
new-born babes, desire, &c. It is no objection that the disciples, whom God spake
to in Matth. xviii. 3, were converted already : this makes it not less proper for
Christ to declare the necessity of conversion to them, leaving it with them to
try themselves, and to make sure their conversion ; in like manner as he declared
to them the necessity of repentance, in Luke xiii. 3, 5, " Except ye repent, ye
shall all likewise perish."
The change that men pass under at their repentance, is expressed and exhib-
ited by baptism. Hence it is called the baptism of repentance, from time to time,
Matth. iii. 1 1, Luke iii. 3, Acts xiii. 24, and xix. 4. And so is regeneration,
or being born again, expressed by baptism ; as is evident by such representa-
tions of regeneration as those, John iii. 5, " Except a man be born of water,
and of the Spirit." — Titus iii. 5, " He saved us by the washing of regeneration."
Many other things might be observed, to show that the change men pass under
in their repentance and conversion, is the same with that which they are the sub-
jects of in regeneration. But these observations may be sufficient.
II. The change which a man passes under when born again, and in his
repentance and conversion, is the same that the Scripture calls the circumcision
of the heart. This may easily appear by considering,
That as regeneration is that in which are attained the habits of true virtue
and holiness, as has been shown, and as is confessed ; so is circumcision of heart.
Deut. xxx. 6, " And the Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart, and the heart
of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all
thy soul."
Regeneration is that whereby men come to have the character of true Chris-
tians ; as is evident, and as is confessed ; and so is circumcision of hear* ; for
by this men become Jews inwardly, or Jews in the spiritual and Christian sense
iand that is the same as being true Christians), as of old proselytes were made
ews by circumcision of the flesh. Rom. ii. 28, 29, " For he is not a Jew, which
is one outwardly ; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh :
but he is a Jew, which is one inwardly ; and circumcision is that of the heart,
in the spirit and not in the letter, whose praise is not of men, but of God."
That circumcision of the heart is the same with conversion, or turning from sin
to God, is evident by Jer. iv. 1 — 4, " If thou wilt return, 0 Israel, return (or,
convert unto me) — circumcise yourselves to the Lord, and put away the foreskins
of your heart." And Deut. x. 16, " Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your
heart, and be no more stiff-necked."
Circumcision of the heart is the same change of the heart that men pass
under in their repentance ; as is evident by Levit. xxvi. 41, "If their uncircum-
cised hearts be humbled, and they accept the punishment of their iniquity."
The change men pass under in regeneration, repentance, and conversion, is
signified by baptism, as has been shown ; and so is circumcision of the heart
signified by the same thing. None will deny that it was this internal circum-
cision, which of old was signified by external circumcision ; nor will any deny
now under the New Testament, that inward and spiritual baptism, or the cleans-
ing of the. heart, is signified by external washing or baptism. But spiritual cir-
468 ORIGINAL SIN.
cumcision and spiritual baptism are the same thing ; both being the putting off
the body of the sins of the flesh ; as is very plain by Col. ii. 11, 12, 13, u In
whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in
'putting off the body <f the sins of the flesh, by the circumcision of Christ, buried
with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him," &c.
III. This inward change, called regeneration and circumcision of the hearty
which is wrought in repentance and conve?sion, is the same with that spiritual
resurrection so often spoken of, and represented as a dying unto sin, and living
unto righteousness.
This appears with great plainness in that last cited place, Col. ii., " In whom
also ye are circumcised, with the circumcision made without hands — buried with
him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him, through the faith of the
operation of God, &c. And you, being dead in your sins and the uncircum-
cision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him ; having forgiven you
all trespasses."
The same appears by Rom. vi. 3, 4, 5, " Know ye not, that so many of us
as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death ? Therefore we
are buried with him by baptism into death ; that, like as Christ was raised
up from the dead, by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in
newness of life," &c. Verse 11, "Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be
dead unto sin, but alive unto God, through Jesus Christ our Lord."
In which place also it is evident, by the words recited, and by the whole
context, that this spiritual resurrection is that change, in which persons are
brought to habits of holiness and to the divine life, by which Dr. Taylor describes
the thing obtained in being born again.
That a spiritual resurrection to a new divine life, should be called a being
born again, is agreeable to the language of Scripture, in which we find a resur-
rection is called a being born, or begotten. So those words in flie 2d Psalm,
" Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee," are applied to Christ's res-
urrection, Acts xiii. 33. So in Col. i. 18, Christ is called the first born from the
dead ; and in Rev. i. 5, The first begotten of the dead. The saints in their con-
version or spiritual resurrection, are risen with Christ, and are begotten and born
with him. 1 Pet. i. 3, " Which hath begotten its again to a lively hope, by the
resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible." This
inheritance is the same thing with that kingdom of heaven, which men obtain by
being born again, according to Christ's words to Nicodemus ; and that same in-
heritance of them that are sanctified, spoken of as what is obtained in true con-
version. Acts xxvi. 18, " To turn them (or convert them) from darkness to
light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness
cf sins, and inheritance among them that are sanctified, through faith that is in
me." Dr. Taylor's own words, in his note on Rom. i. 4, speaking of that place
in the 2d Psalm, just now mentioned, are very worthy to be here recited. He
observes how this is applied to Christ's resurrection and exaltation, in the New
Testament, and then has this remark, " Note, Begetting is conferring a new and
happy state : a son is a person put into it. Agreeably to this, good men are
said to be the sons of God, as they are the sons of the resurrection to eternal
life, which is represented as a naliyyereaia, a being begotten, or born again, re-
generated."
So that I think it is abundantly plain, that the spiritual resurrection spoken
of in Scripture, by which the saints are brought to a new divine life, is the same
with that being born again, which Christ says is necessary for every one in or-
der to his seeing the kingdom of God.
ORIGINAL SIN. 469
IV. This change, which men are the subjects of when they are bom again,
and circumcised in heart, when they repent, and are converted, and spiritually
raised from the dead, is the same change which is meant when the Scripture
speaks of making the heart and spirit new, or giving a new heart and spirit.
It is needless here to stand to observe, how evidently this is spoken of as
necessary to salvation, and as the change in which are attained the habits of
true virtue and holiness, and the character of a true saint ; as has been observed
of regeneration, conversion, &c, and how apparent it is from thence, that the
change is the same. For it is as it were self-evident : it is apparent by the
phrases themselves, that they are different expressions of the same thing. Thus
repentance ((iszavoia) or the change of the mind, is the same as being changed
to a new mind, or a new heart and spirit. Conversion is the turning of the
heart ; which is the same thing as changing it so, that there shall be another
heart, or a new heart, or a new spirit. To be born again, is to be born anew ;
which implies a becoming new, and is represented as becoming new born babes :
but none supposes it is the body, that is immediately and properly new, but
the mind, heart, or spirit. And so a spiritual resurrection is the resurrection of
the spirit, or rising to begin a new existence and life, as to the mind, heart, or
spirit. So that all these phrases imply a having a new heart, and being re-
newed in the spirit, according to their plain signification.
When Nicodemus expressed his wonder at Christ's declaring it necessary,
that a man should be born again in order to see the kingdom of God, or enjoy
the privileges of the kingdom of the Messiah, Christ says to him, " Art thou a
master of Israel, and knowest not these things ?" i. e., " Art thou one set to teach
others the things written in the law and the prophets, and knowest not a doc-
trine so plainly taught in your Scriptures, that such a change as I speak of, is
necessary to a partaking of the blessings of the kingdom of the Messiah ?" — But
what can Christ have respect to in this, unless such prophecies as that in Ezek.
xxxvi. 25, 26, 27 ? Where God, by the prophet, speaking of the days of the Mes-
siah's kingdom, says, " Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall
be clean — A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within
you — and I will put my Spirit within you." Here God speaks of having a new
heart and spirit, by being washed with water, and receiving the Spirit of God,
as the qualification of God's people, that shall enjoy the privileges of the king-
dom of the Messiah. How much is this like the doctrine of Christ to Nicode-
mus, of being bom again of water, and of the spirit ? We have another like
prophecy in Ezek. xi. 19.
Add to these things, that regeneration, or a being born again, and the renew-
ing (or making new) by the Holy Ghost, are spoken of as the same thing. Titus
iii. 5, " By the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost."
V. It is abundantly manifest, that being born again, a spiritually rising
from the dead to newness of life, receiving a new heart, and being renewed in the
spirit of the mind, these are the same thing with that which is called putting off
the old man, and putting on the new man.
The expressions are equivalent ; and the representations are plainly of the
same thing. When Christ speaks of being bo-m again, two births are supposed ;
a first and a second ; an old birth, and a new one : and the thing born is called
man So what is born in the first birth, is the old man ; and what is brought
forth in the second birth, is the new man. That which is born in the first birth
(says Christ) is Jlesh : it is the carnal man, wherein we have borne the image
of the earthly Adam, whom the apostle calls theirs/ man. That which is born
in the new birth, is spirit, or the spiritual and heavenly man : wherein we pro-
470 ORIGINAL SIN.
ceed from Christ the second man, the new man, who is made a quickening spirit,
and is the Lord from heaven, and the head of the new creation. In the new
birth, men are represented as becoming new bom babes (as was observed before),
which is the same thing as becoming new men.
And how apparently is what the Scripture says of the spiritual resurrection
of the Christian convert, equivalent and of the very same import with putting
off the old man, and putting on the new man? So in Rom. vi. the convert is
spoken of as dying, and being buried with Christ ; which is explained, in the
6th verse, by this, that " the old man is crucified, that the body of sin might be
destroyed/' And in the 4th verse, converts in this change are spoken of as
rising to newness of life. Are not these things plain enough 1 The apostle
does m effect tell us, that when he speaks of that spiritual death and resurrection
which is in conversion, he means the same thing as crucifying and burying the
old man, and rising a new man.
And it is most apparent, that spiritual circumcision, and spiritual baptism,
and the spiritual resurrection, are all the same with putting off the old man, and
putting on the new man. This appears by Col. ii. 11, 12, " In whom also ye
are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the
body of the sins of the flesh, by the circumcision of Christ, buried with him in
baptism; wherein also ye are risen wTith him." Here it is manifest, that the
spiritual circumcision, baptism, and resurrection, all signify that change wherein
men put off the body of the sins of the flesh : but that is the same thing, in this
apostle's language, as putting off the old man, as appears by Rom. vi. 6 : " Our
old man is crucified, that the body of sin maybe destroyed." And that putting
off the old man is the same with putting off the body of sins, appears further by
Ephes*. iv. 22, 23, 24— and Col. iii. 8, 9, 10.
As Dr. Taylor confesses, that a being born again is, " that wherein are ob-
tained the habits of virtue, religion, and true holiness ;" so how evidently is the
same thing predicated of that change, which is called putting off the old man,
and putting on the new man ? Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24, " That ye put off the old
man, which is corrupt, &c, and put on the new man, which after God is created
in righteousness and true holiness."
And it is most plain, that this putting off the old man, &c.,is the very same
thing with making the heart and spirit new. It is apparent in itself : the spirit
is called the man, in the language of the apostle; it is called the inward man,
and the hidden man, Rom. vii. 22 — 2 Cor. iv. 16 — 1 Pet. iii. 4. And therefore
putting off the old man, is the same thing with the removal of the old heart ;
and the putting on the new man, is the receiving a new heart and a new spirit.
Yea, putting on the new man is expressly spoken of as the same thing with re-
ceiving a new spirit, or being renewed in spirit. Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24, " That
ye put off the old man, and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and that ye
put on the new man."
From these things it appears, how unreasonable, and contrary to the utmost
degree of Scriptural evidence, is Dr. Taylor's way of explaining the old man,
and the new man* as though thereby was meant nothing personal ; but that by
the old man was meant the heathen state, and by the new man the Christian
dispensation, or state of professing Christians, or the whole collective body of
professors of Christianity, made up of Jews and Gentiles ; when all the color
he has for it is, that the apostle once calls the Christian church a new man,
Eph ii. 15. It is very true, in the Scriptures often, both in the Old Testament
* Pages 149—153, S.
ORIGINAL SIN. 471
and New, collective bodies, nations, peoples, cities, are figuratively representee
by persons ; particularly the church of Christ is represented as one holy person,
and has the same appellatives as a particular saint or believer ; and so is called
a child and a son of God, Exod. iv. 22 — Gal. iv. 1, 2 ; and a servant of God,
Isa. xli. 8, 9, and xliv. 1. The daughter of God, and spouse of Christ, Psalm
xlv. 10, 13, 14 — Rev. xix. 7. Nevertheless, would it be reasonable to argue
from hence, that such appellations, as a servant of God, a child of God, &c ,
are always or commonly to be taken as signifying only the church of God in
general, or great collective bodies ; and not to be understood in a personal
sense ? But certainly this would not be more unreasonable, than to urge, that
by the old and the new man, as the phrases are mostly used in Scripture, is to
be understood nothing but the great collective bodies of Pagans and of Christians,
or the Heathen and the Christian world, as to their outward profession, and the
dispensation they are under. It might have been proper, in this case, to have
considered the unreasonableness of that practice which our author charges on
others, and finds so much fault with in them :* " That they content themselves
with a. few scraps of Scripture, which, though wrong understood, they make the
test of truth, and the ground of their principles, in contradiction to the whole
tenor of revelation"
VI. I observe once more, it is very apparent, that a being born again, and
spiritually raised from death to a state of new existence and life, having a new
heart created in us, being renewed in the spirit of our mind, and being the sub-
jects of that change by which we put off the old man, and put on the new man,
is the same thing with that which, in Scripture, is called a being created anew,
or made new creatures.
Here, to pass over many other evidences of this, which might be mentioned,
I would only observe, that the representations are exactly equivalent. These
several phrases naturally and most plainly signify the same effect. In the first
birth, or generation, we are created, or brought into existence ; it is then the
whole man first receives being : the soul is then formed, and then our bodies
are fearfully and wonderfully made, being curiously wrought by our Creator : so
that a new born child is a new creature. So, when a man is born again, he is
created again; in that new birth, there is a new creation ; and therein he be-
comes as a new born babe, or a new creature. So in a resurrection, there is a
new creation. When a man is dead, that which was created or made in the
first birth or creation is destroyed : when that which was dead is raised to life,
the mighty power of the Creator or Author of life, is exerted the second time,
and the subject restored to new existence, and new life, as by a new creation.
So giving a new heart is called creating a clean heart, Psal. li. 10, where the
word translated create, is the same that is used in the first verse in Genesis.
And when we read in Scripture of the new creature, the creature that is called
new is man ; not angel, or beast, or any other sort .of creature ; and therefore
the phrase, new man, is evidently equivalent with new creature ; and a putting
off the old man, and putting on the new man, is spoken of expressly as brought
to pass by a work of creation. Col. iii. 9, 10, " Ye have put off the old man,
and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image
of him that created him." So Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24, " That ye put off the old
man, which is corrupt, &c, and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and that
e put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true
oliness." These things absolutely fix the meaning of that in 2 Cor. v. 17, " If
* Page 224.
I
472 ORIGINAL SIN.
any man be in Christ, he is a new creature : old things are passed away ; be*
hold, all things are become new."
On the whole, the following reflections may be made :
1. That it is a truth of the utmost certainty, with respect to every man,
born of the race of Adam, by ordinary generation, that unless he be born again,
lie cannot see the kingdom of God. This is true, not only of the Heathen, but of
mem that are born of the professing people of God, as Nicodemus, and the
Jews, and every man born of the flesh. This is most manifest by Christ's dis-
course in John iii. 3 — 11. So it is plain by 2 Cor. v. 17, That every man who
is in Christ, is a new creature.
2. It appears from this, together with what has been proved above, that it
is most certain with respect to every one of the human race, that he can never
have any interest in Christ, or see the kingdom of God, unless he be the subject
of that change in the temper and disposition of his heart, which is made in re-
pentance and conversion, circumcision of heart, spiritual baptism, dying to sin
and rising to a new and holy life ; and unless he has the old heart taken away
and a new heart and spirit given, and puts off the old man, and puts on the new
man, and old things are passed away, and all things made new.
3. From what is plainly implied in these things, and from what the Scripture
most clearly teaches of the nature of them, it is certain, that every man is bom
into the world in a state of moral pollution : for spiritual baptism is a cleansing
from moral filthiness. Ezek. xxxvi. 25, compared with Acts ii. 16, and John
iii. 5. So the washing of regeneration, or the new birth, is a change from a
state of wickedness. Tit. iii. 3, 4, 5. Men are spoken of as purified in their
regeneration. 1 Pet. i. 22, 23. See also 1 John ii. 29, and iii. 1, 2. And it
appears that every man, in his first or natural state, is a sinner ;. for otherwise
he would then need no repentance, no conversion, no turning from sin to God.
And it appears, that every man in his original state has a heart of stone ; for
thus the Scripture calls that old heart, which is taken away, when a new heart
and new spirit is given. Ezek. xi. 19, and xxxvi. 26. And it appears, that
man',s nature, as in his native state, is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts,
and of its own motion exerts itself in nothing but wicked deeds. For thus the
Scripture characterizes the old man, which is put off, when men are renewed in
the spirit of their minds, and put on the new man, Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24 — Col. iii.
8, 9, 10. In a word, it appears, that man's nature, as in its native state, is a
body of sin, which must be destroyed, must die, be buried, and never rise more.
For thus the old man is represented, which is crucified, when men are the sub-
jects of a spiritual resurrection, Rom. vi. 4, 5, 6. Such a nature, such a body
of sin as this, is put off in the spiritual renovation, wherein we put on the new
man, and are the subjects of the spiritual circumcision. Eph. iv. 21, 22, 23.
It must now be left with the reader to judge for himself, whether what the
Scripture teaches of the application of Christ's redemption, and the change of
state and nature necessary to true and final happiness, does not afford clear and
abundant evidence to the truth of the doctrine of Original Sin.
ORIGINAL SIN. 473
PART IV.
CONTAINING ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS.
CHAPTER I
Concerning that Objection, That to suppose men's being born in sin, witho jt their
choice, or any previous act of their own, is to suppose what is inconsistent with the
nature of sin.
Some of the objections made against the doctrine of Original Sin, which
have reference to particular arguments used in defence of it, have been already
considered in the handling of those arguments. What I shall therefore now
consider, are such objections as I have not yet had occasion to take any special
notice of.
There is no argument Dr. Taylor insists more upon, than that which is
taken from the Arminian and Pelagian notion of freedom of will, consisting
in the will's self-determination, as necessary to the being of moral good or
evil. He often urges, that if we come into the world infected with sinful and
depraved dispositions, then sin must be natural to us; and if natural then
necessary ; and if necessary, then no sin, nor any thing we are blamable for,
or that can in any respect be our fault, being what we cannot help : and he
urges, that sin must proceed from our own choice, &c.*
Here I would observe in general, that the forementioned notion of Freedom
of Will, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence
of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand favorite point with Pelagians and Armin-
ians, and all divines of such characters, in their controversies with the orthodox.
There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of religion ; on the
determination of this one leading point depends the issue of almost all contro-
versies we have with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a needless task for
me particularly to consider that matter in this place ; having already largely
discussed it, with all the main grounds of this notion, and the arguments used
to defend it, in a late book on this subject, to which I ask leave to refer the
reader. It is very necessary, that the modern prevailing doctrine concerning
this point, should be well understood, and therefore thoroughly considered and
examined : for without it there is no hope of putting an end to the controversy
about Original Sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist, about
many of the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the foremen-
tioned modern divines, if they can maintain their peculiar notion of freedom ,
consisting in the self -determining power of the will, as necessary to moral agency ,
and can thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against it,
then they have an impregnable castle, to which they may repair, and remain
invincible, in all the controversies they have with the reformed divines, concern-
ing Original Sin, the sovereignty of grace, election, redemption, conversion,
the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving faith, per-
• Pages 125, 128, 129, 130, 186, 187, 188, 190, 200, 245, 246, 253, 258, 63, 64, 161, S.t and other place*
Vol. II. 60
ORIGINAL SIN.
severance of the saints, and other principles of the like kind. However,
at the same time I think this same thing will be as strong a fortress for
the deists, in common with them, as the great doctrines, subverted by their
notion of freedom, are so plainly and abundantly taught in the Scripture. But
I am under no apprehension of any danger, the cause of Christianity, or the
religion of the reformed is in, from any possibility of that notion's being ever
established, or of its being ever evinced that there is not proper, perfect, and
manifold demonstration lying against it. But as I said, it would be needless for
me to enter into a particular disquisition of this point here ; from which I shall
easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give himself the trouble of
consulting what I have already written : and as to others, probably they will
scarce be at the pains of reading the present discourse ; or at least would not,
if it should be enlarged by a full consideration of that controversy.
I shall at this time therefore only take notice of some gross inconsistencies
that Dr. Taylor has been guilty of, in his handling this objection against the
doctrine or Original Sin.
In places which have been cited, he says, that " Sin must proceed from oui
own choice : and that if it does not, it being necessary to us, it cannot be sin, it
cannot be our fault, or what we are to blame for :" and therefore all our sin must
be chargeable on our choice, which is the cause of sin : for he says, " The cause
of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, and which pro-
ceedeth from it."* Now here are implied several gross contradictions. He
greatly insists that nothing can be sinful, or have the nature of sin, but what
proceeds from our choice. Nevertheless he says, " Not the effect, but the cause
alone is chargeable with blame" Therefore the choice, which is the cause, is
alone blamable, or has the nature of sin ; and not the effect of that choice.
Thus nothing can be sinful, but the effect of choice ; and yet the effect of choice
never can be sinful, but only the cause, which alone is chargeable with all the
blame.
Again, the choice which chooses and produces sin, or from which sin pro-
ceeds, is itself sinful. Not only is this implied in his saying, " the cause alone
is chargeable with all the blame" but he expressly speaks of the choice as
faulty, \ and calls that choice wicked, from which depravity and corruption pro
ceeds.% Now if the choice itself be sin, and there be no sin but what proceeds
from a sinful choice, then the sinful choice must proceed from another antece-
dent choice ; it must be chosen by a foregoing act of will, determining itself to
that sinful choice, that so it may have that which he speaks of as absolutely
essential to the nature of sin, namely, that it proceeds from our choice, and does
not happen to us necessarily. But if the sinful choice itself proceeds from a
foregoing choice, then also that foregoing choice must be sinful ; it being the
cause of sin, and so alone chargeable with the blame. Yet if that foregoing choice
be sinful, then neither must that happen to us necessarily, but must likewise
proceed from choice, another act of choice preceding that : for we must remem-
ber, that " nothing is sinful but what proceeds from our choice." And then, for
the same reason, even this prior choice, last mentioned, must also be sinful,
being chargeable with all the blame of that consequent evil choice, which was
its effect. And so we must go back till we come to the very first volition, the
prime or original act of choice in the whole chain. And this, to be sure, must
be a sinful choice, because this is the origin or primitive cause of all the train
of evils which follow ; and according to our author, must therefore be " alone
* Page 128. t Page 190. t Page 200. See also page 216.
ORIGINAL SIN. 475
chargeable with all the blame." And yet so it is, according to him, this " can-
not be sinful," because it does not " proceed from our own choice," or any fore-
going act of our will ; it being, by the supposition, the very first act of will in
the case. And therefore it must be necessary, as to us, having no choice of
ours to be the cause of it.
In page 232, he says, " Adam's sin was from his own disobedient will ; and
so must every man's sin, and all the sin in the world be, as well as his." By
this, it seems, he must have a " disobedient will" before he sins ; for the cause
must be before the effect : and yet that disobedient will itself is sinful ; other-
wise it could not be called disobedient. But the question is, How do men come
by the disobedient mill, this cause of all. the sin in the world 1 It must not come
necessarily, without men's choice ; for if so, it is not sin, nor is there any diso-
bedience in it. Therefore that disobedient will must also come from a disobedi-
ent will ; and so on, in infinitum. Otherwise it must be supposed, that there is
some sin in the world, which does not come from a disobedient will ; contrary
to our author's dogmatical assertions.
In page 166, ft, he says, * Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination"
Here he calls that inclination itself sinful, which is the principle from whence
sinful acts proceed ; as elsewhere he speaks of the disobedient will from whence
all sin comes ; and he allows,* that " the law reaches to all the latent principles
of sin ;" meaning plainly, that it forbids, and threatens punishment for, those
latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these sinful inclinations,
without which, according to our author, there can be no sinful act, cannot all
proceed from a sinful choice ; because that would imply great contradiction.
For, by the supposition, they are the principles from whence a sinful choice
comes, and whence all sinful acts of will proceed ; and there can be no sinful
act without them. So that the first latent principles and inclinations, from
whence all sinful acts proceed, are sinful ; and yet they are not sinful, because
{hey do not proceed from a wicked choice, without which, according to him,
I nothing can be sinful."
Dr. Taylor, speaking of that proposition of the Assembly of Divines, wherein
they assert, that Man is by nature utterly corrupt, &c,f thinks himself well war-
ranted by the supposed great evidence of these his contradictory notions, to say,
" Therefore sin is not natural to us ; and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this
proposition in the Assembly of Divines is false." But it may be worthy to be
considered, whether it would not have greatly become him, before he had clothed
himself with so much assurance, and proceeded, on the foundation of these his
notions, so magisterially to charge the Assembly's proposition with falsehood,
to have taken care that his own propositions, which he has set in opposition to
them, should be a little more consistent; that he might not have contradicted
himself, while contradicting them ; lest some impartial judges, observing his
inconsistence, should think they had warrant to declare with equal assurance,
that " They shall not scruple to say, Dr. Taylor's doctrine is false."
* Contents of Rom. chap, viii., in Notes on the Epistle, t Page 125.
476 ORIGINAL SIN.
CHAPTER II.
Concerning that objection against the doctrine of native corruption, That to suppose
men receive their first existence in sin, is to make him who is the author of their
being, the author of their depravity.
One argument against men's being supposed to be born with sinful deprav-
ity, which Dr. Taylor greatly insists upon, is, " That this does in effect charge
him, who is the author of our nature, who formed us in the womb, w7ith being
the author of a sinful corruption of nature ; and that it is highly injurious to
the God of our nature, whose hands have formed and fashioned us, to believe
our nature to be originally corrupted, and that in the worst sense of corrup-
tion."*
With respect to this, I wTould observe in the first place, that this writer, in
his handling this grand objection, supposes something to belong to the doctrine
objected against, as maintained by the divines whom he is opposing, which does
not belong to it, nor does follow from it : as particularly, he supposes the doc-
trine of Original Sin to imply, that nature must be corrupted by some positive
influence ; " something, by some means or other, infused into the human na-
ture ; some quality or other, not from the choice of our minds, but like a taint,
tincture, or infection, altering the natural constitution, faculties, and dispositions
of our souls.f That sin and evil dispositions are implanted in the foetus in the
womb."{ Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing.
In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravi-
ty of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality,
infused, implanted, or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive cause,
or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature ; or of supposing, that
man is conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart, such as is any
thing properly positive. I think, a little attention to the nature of things will
be sufficient to satisfy any impartial, considerate inquirer, that the absence ot
positive good principles, and so the withholding of a special divine influence to
impart and maintain those good principles, leaving the common natural princi-
ples of self-love, natural appetite, &c. (which were in man in innocence), leaving
these, I say to themselves, without the government of superior divine princi-
ples, will certainly be followed with the corruption, yea, the total corruption of
the heart, without occasion for any positive influence at all : and, that it was
thus indeed that corruption of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall,
and comes on all his posterity, as sinning in him, and falling with him.
The case with man was plainly this : when God made man at first, he im-
planted in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which
may be called natural, being the principles of mere human nature ; such as
self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature
of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honor, and pleasure, were exer-
cised : these, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures some-
times call flesh. Besides these, there were superior principles, that were spirit-
ual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love ; wherein con-
* Pages 137, 187, 188, 189, 256, 258, 260, 143, S., and other places. t Page 187. X Pages 146
148, 149, S., and the like in many other places.
ORIGINAL SIN. 477
sisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness ;
which are called in Scripture the divine nature. These principles may, in some
sense, be called supernatural * being (however concreated or connate, yet) such
as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily re-
sulting from, and inseparably connected with, mere human nature ; and being
such as immediately depend on man's union and communion with God, or di-
vine communications and influences of God's Spirit : which, though withdrawn,
and man's nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human
nature still ; man's nature, as such, being entire, without these divine principles,
which the Scripture sometimes calls spirit, in contradistinction to flesh. These
superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute
dominion in the heart : the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient.
And while things continued thus, all things were in excellent order, peace, and
beautiful harmony, and in their proper and perfect state.
These divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and
glory of man's nature. When man sinned, and broke God's covenant, and fell
under his curse, these superior principles left his heart : for indeed God then
left him ; that communion with God, on which these principles depended, entirely
ceased ; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it
would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the covenant
and constitution God had established, that God should still maintain communion
with man, and continue, by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell
with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God's
wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly
ceased ; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn ; and thus
man was left in a state of darkness, woful corruption and ruin ; nothing but
flesh without spirit. The inferior principles of self-love, and natural appetite,
which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, of course
became reigning principles ; having no superior principles to regulate or con-
trol them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate conse-
quence of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down,
and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man
did immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and ap-
petites, as supreme ; and so they took the place of God. These inferior princi-
ples are like fi,re in a house ; which we say is a good servant, but a bad master ;
very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole
house, soon brings all to destruction. Man's love to his own honor, separate
interest, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to
God, and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels him to
pursue those objects, without regard to God's honor or law ; because there is
no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he
seeks those objects as much when against God's honor and law, as when agree-
able to them. And God, still continuing strictly to require supreme regard to
himself, and forbidding all gratifications of these inferior passions, but only in
* To prevent all cavils, the reader is desired particularly to observe, in what sense I here use the
words natural and supernatural: not as epithets of distinction between that which is concreated or con-
nate, and that which is extraordinarily introduced afterwards, besides the first state of things, or the order
established originally, beginning when man's nature began ; but as distinguishing between what belongs
to, or flows from, that nature which man has, merely as man, and those things which are above this, by
which one is denominated, not only a man, but a truly virtuous, holy, and spiritual man ; which, though
they began in Adam, as soon as humanity began, and are necessary to the perfection and well being ol
the human nature, yet are not essential to the constitution of it, or necessary to its being : inasmuch as
one may have every thing needful to his being man, exclusively of them. If in thus using the words,
natural and supernatural, I use them in an uncommon sense, it is not from any affectation of singularity
but for want of other terms more aptly to express my mea""
478 ORIGINAL SIN.
perfect subordination to the ends, and agreeableness to the rules and limits,
which his holiness, honor, and law prescribe, hence immediately arises enmity
in the heart, now wholly under the power of self-love ; and nothing but war
ensues, in a constant course, against God. As, when a subject has once re-
nounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of
enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were easy to
show, how every lust, and depraved disposition of man's hearti would naturally
arise from this privative original, if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to
give an account, how total corruption of heart should follow on man's eating
the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, without God's putting
any evil into his heart, or implanting any bad principle, or infusing any cor-
rupt taint, and so becoming the author of depravity. Only God's withdrawing,
as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel man, being as
it were driven away by his abominable wickedness, and men's natural princi-
ples being left to themselves, this is sufficient to account for his becoming en-
tirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God.
And as Adam's nature became corrupt without God's implanting or infusing
any evil thing into his nature ; so does the nature of his posterity. God deal-
ing with Adam as the head of his posterity (as has been shown) and treating
them as one, he deals with his posterity as having all sinned in him. And
therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion, and his vital, gracious influ-
ence from the common head, so he withholds the same from all the members,
as they come into existence ; whereby they come into the world mere flesh,
and entirely imder the government of natural and inferior principles ; and so
become wholly corrupt, as Adam did.
Now, for God so far to have the disposal of this affair, as to withhold those
influences without which nature will be corrupt, is not to be the author of sin.
But, concerning this, I must refer the reader to what I have said of it in my
discourse on the freedom of the will* Though, besides what I have there
said, I may here observe, that if for God so far to order and dispose the being
of sin, as to permit it, by withholding the gracious influences necessary to pre-
vent it, is for him to be the author of sin, then some things which Dr. Taylor
himself lays down, will equally be attended with this very consequence. For,
from time to time, he speaks of God's giving men up to the vilest lusts and af-
fections by permitting, or leaving them.f Now, if the continuance of sin, and
its increase and prevalence, may be in consequence of God's disposal, by his
withholding that grace that is needful, under such circumstances, to prevent it,
without God's being the author of that continuance and prevalence of sin ; then,
by parity of reason, may the being of sin, in the race of Adam, be in conse-
quence of God's disposal, by his withholding that grace, that is needful to pre-
vent it, without his being the author of that being of sin.
If it here should be said, that God is not the author of sin, in giving men up to
sin, who have already made themselves sinful, because when men have once made
themselves sinful, their continuing so, and sin's prevailing in them, and becoming
more and more habitual, will follow in a course of nature : I answer, Let that be
remembered, which this writer so greatly urges in opposition to them that sup-
pose original corruption comes in a course of nature, viz., That the course of na-
ture is nothing without God. He utterly rejects the notion of the " course of
nature's being a proper active cause, which will work, and go on by itself, with-
out God, if he lets or permits it." But affirms,! " That the course of nature,
* Part. iv. § 9, p. 354, &c. t Key, § 388, Note ; and Paraph, on Rom. i. 24, 26. J Page 134,5,
See also with what vehemence this is urged in p. 137, S
ORIGINAL SIN. 479
separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or nothing ; and that the course
of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than at
first produce itself, is absolutely impossible." These strong expressions are his.
Therefore, to explain the continuance of the habits of sin in the same person,
when once introduced, yea, to explain the very being of any such habits, in
consequence of repeated acts, our author must have recourse to those same prin-
ciples, which he rejects as absurd to the utmost degree, when alleged to explain
the corruption of nature in the posterity of Adam. For, that habits, either
good or bad, should continue, after being once established, or that habits should
be settled and have existence in consequence of repeated acts, can be owing only
to a course of nature, and those laws of nature which God has established.
That the posterity of Adam should be born, without holiness, and so with a
depraved nature, comes to pass as much by the established course of nature, as
the continuance of a corrupt disposition in a particular person, after he once
has it ; or as much as Adam's continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had once
lost his holiness. For Adam's posterity are from him, and as it were in him,
and belonging to him, according to an established course of nature, as much as
the branches of a tree are, according to a course of nature, from the tree, in the
tree, and belonging to the tree ; or (to make use of the comparison which Dr
Taylor himself chooses and makes use of from time to time, as proper to illus-
trate the matter*) just as the acorn is derived from the oak. And I think the
acorn is as much derived from the oak, according to the course of nature, as the
buds and branches. It is true, that God, by his own almighty power creates
the soul of the infant ; and it is also true, as Dr. Taylor often insists, that God,
by his immediate power, forms and fashions the body of the infant in the womb ;
yet he does both according to that course of nature, which he has been pleased
to establish. The course of nature is demonstrated, by late improvements in
philosophy, to be indeed what our author himself says it is, viz., nothing but the
established order of the agency and operation of the author of nature. And
though there be the immediate agency of God in bringing the soul into existence
in generation, yet it is done according to the method and order established by
the author of nature, as much as his producing the bud, or the acorn of the oak ;
and as much as his continuing a particular person in being, after he once has
existence. God's immediate agency in bringing the soul of a child into being,
is as much according to an established order, as his immediate agency in any of
the works of nature whatsoever. It is agreeable to the established order of na-
ture, that the good qualities wanting in the tree, should also be wanting in the
branches and fruit. It is agreeable to the order of nature, that when a particu-
lar person is without good moral qualities in his heart, he should continue with-
out them till some new cause or efficiency produces them ; and it is as much
agreeable to an established course and order of nature, that since Adam, the
head of the race of mankind, the root of that great tree with many branches
springing from it, was deprived of original righteousness, the branches should
come forth without it. Or if any dislike the word nature, as used in this last
case, and instead of it choose to call it a constitution or established order of suc-
cessive events, the alteration of the name will not in the least alter the state
of the present argument. Where the name, nature, is allowed without dispute,
no more is meant than an established method and order of events, settled and
limited by divine wisdom.
If any should object to this, that if the want of original righteousness be thus
♦ Pages 146, 187.
480 ORIGINAL SIN.
according to ar established course of nature, then why are not principles of ho-
liness, when restored by divine grace, also communicated to posterity ? I an-
swer, the divine laws and establishments of the author of nature, are precisely
settled by him as he pleaseth, and limited by his wisdom. Grace is introduced
among the race of mankind by a new establishment ; not on the foot of the ori-
final establishment of God, as the head of the natural world, and author of the
rst creation ; but by a constitution of a vastly higher kind ; wherein Christ
is made the root of the tree, whose branches are his spiritual seed, and he is the
head of the new creation ; of which I need not stand now to speak particularly.
But here I desire it may be noted, that I do not suppose the natural depravity
of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature only ; it is also owing
to the just judgment of God, But yet, I think it is as truly and in the same
manner owing to the course of nature, that Adam's posterity come into the
world without original righteousness, as that Adam continued without it, aftei
he had once lost is. That Adam continued destitute of holiness, when he had
lost it, and would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a Re-
deemer, was not only a natural consequence, according to the course of things
established by God as the Author of Nature ; but it was also a penal conse-
quence, or a punishment of his sin. God, in righteous judgment, continued to
absent himself from Adam after he became a rebel ; and withheld from him
now those influences of the Holy Spirit, which he before had. And just thus
I suppose it to be with every natural branch of mankind : all are looked upon
as sinning in and with their common root ; and God righteously withholds spe-
cial influences and spiritual communications from all, for this sin. But of the
manner and order of these things, more may be said in the next chapter.
On the whole, this grand objection against the doctrine of men's being born
coi rupt, that it makes him who gave us our being, to be the cause of the being
of corruption, can have no more force in it, than a like argument has to prove,
that if men, by a course of nature, continue wicked, or remain without good-
ness, after they have by vicious acts contracted vicious habits, and so made
themselves wicked, it makes him, who is the cause of their continuance in
being, and the cause of the continuance of the course of nature, to be the cause
of their continued wickedness. Dr. Taylor says,* " God would not make any
thing that is hateful to him ; because, by the very terms, he would hate to make
such a thing." But if this be good arguing in the case to which it is appli-
ed, may I not as well say, God would not continue a thing in being, that is hate-
ful to him, because, by the very terms, he would hate to continue such a thing
in being 1 I think the very terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these
propositions, as the other. In like manner the rest that he says on that head
may be shown to be unreasonable, by only substituting the word, continue, in the
place of make and propagate. I may fairly imitate his way of reasoning thus :
" To say, God continues us according to his own original decree, or law of con*
tinuation, which obliges him to continue us in a manner he abhors, is really to
make bad worse: for it is supposing him to be defective in wisdom, or by his own
decree or law to lay such a constraint upon his own actions, that he cannot do
what he would, but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to
do, and what he condemns in us, viz., continuing us sinful, when he condemns us
for continuing ourselves sinful." If the reasoning be weak in the one case, it
is no less so in the other.
If any shall still insist, that there is a difference between God's so disposing
* Page 136, S.
ORIGINAL SIN. 481
things as that depravity of heart shall be continued, according to the settled
course of nature, in the same person, who has by his own fault introduced it ; and
his so disposing as that men, according to a course of nature, should be born
with depravity, in consequence of Adam's introducing sin, by his act which we
had no concern in, and cannot be justly charged with. On this I would observe,
that it is quite going off the objection, which we have been upon, from God's
agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on, that simply for
him, from whose agency the course of nature and our existence derive, so to
dispose things, as that we should have existence in a corrupt state, is for him to
be the author of sin ; but the plea now advanced is, that it is not proper and
just for such an agent so to dispose, in this case, and only in consequence of
Adam's sin ; it not being just to charge Adam's sin to his posterity. And this
matter shall be particularly considered, in answer to the next objection, to which
I now proceed.
CHAPTER III
That great Objection against the Imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, consider-
ed, that such Imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his
posterity are not one and the same. With a brief reflection subjoined of what some
have supposed, of God's imputing the guilt of Adam's sin to his Posterity, but in an
infinitely less degree, than to Adam himself.
That we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main
objections against supposing the guilt of Adam's sin to be imputed to his poste-
rity ; I would premise some observations with a view to the right stating of the
doctrine of the imputation of Adam's first sin, and then show the reasonableness
of this doctrine, in opposition to the great clamor raised against it on this head.
I think it would go far towards directing us to the more clear and distinct
conceiving and right stating of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind :
that God, in each step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant
or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being one with
him. (The propriety of his looking upon them so, I shall speak to afterwards.)
And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, yet it was as the head
of the whole body, and the rod of the whole tree ; and in his proceedings
with him, he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in
their root.
From which it will follow, that both guilt, ot- exposedness to punishment,
and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon
him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches ;
allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood
in, as head or root of the whole, and being first and most immediately dealt with,
and most immediately acting and suffering. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step
of proceeding, every alteration in the root had been attended, at the same instant,
with the same steps and alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individ-
ual branch. I think this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being
a constituted oneness or identity of Adam and his posterity in this affair.
Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children
of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin,
another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so
Vol. II. 61
482 ORIGINAL SIN.
well conceived of the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first ex-
istence, is one and simple, viz., the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of
the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt aris-
ing from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be
looked upon as two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight
of God. Indeed the guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart, as it re-
mains a confirmed principle, and appears in its consequent operations, is a dw-
tinct, and additional guilt: but the guilt arising from the first existing of a
depraved disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their
fuilt of Adam's first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil
isposition or inclination of the heart of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct
from his first act of sin, but was included in it. The external act he committed
was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceeded
from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt he had double, as
for two distinct sins : one, the wickedness of his heart and will in that affair ;
another, the wickedness of the external act, caused by his heart. His guilt was
all truly from the act of his inward man ; exclusive of which the motions of his
body were no more than the motions of any lifeless instrument. His sin con-
sisted in wickedness of heart, fully sufficient for, and entirely amounting to, all
that appeared in the act he committed.
The depraved disposition of Adam's heart is to be considered two ways.
(1.) As the first rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act
of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2.) An evil disposition
of heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed principle that came by God's for-
saking him ; which was a punishment of his first transgression. This confirm-
ed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt
on his soul.
And in like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in
Adam's posterity. The Jirst existing of a corrupt disposition in their hearts, is
not to be looked upon as sin belonging to them, distinct from their participation
of Adam's first sin : it is as it were the extended 'pollution of that sin, through
the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union of the branches with the root;
or the inherence of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in the con-
sent and concurrence of the hearts of the members with the head in that first
act. (Which may be, without God's being the author of sin, about which I
have spoken in the former chapter.) But the depravity of nature remaining an
established principle in the heart of a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after
operations, is a consequence and punishment of the first apostasy thus paiticipated,
and brings new guilt. The first being of an evil disposition in the heart of a
child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve of the sin of his first father, as
fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a
full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a con-
sequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of
Adam's own heart, in the act of sinning ; which was not consequent on the im-
putation of his sin to himself, but rather prior to it in the order of natvre Indeed
the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam's posterity, or rather
the coexistence of the evil disposition, implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the
root and branches, is a consequence of the union that the wise author of the world
has established between Adam and his posterity ; but not properly a consequence
of the imputation of his sin ; nay, rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam him-
self. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the
consequences of that established union ; but yet in such order, that the evil dis*
ORIGINAL SIN.
position is first, and the charge of guilt consequent, as it was in the case of
Adam himself.*
The first existence of an evil disposition of heart, amounting to a full consent
to Adam's sin, no more infers God's being the author of that evil disposition io
the child, than in the father. The first arising or existing of that evil disposi-
tion in the heart of Adam, was by God's permission ; who could have prevented
it, if he had pleased, by giving such influences of his Spirit, as would have been ab-
solutely effectual to hinder it ; which, it is plain in fact, he did withhold : and what-
ever mystery may be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian will presume to say, it
was not in perfect consistence with God's holiness and righteousness, notwith-
standing Adam had been guilty of no offence before. So root and branches
being one, according to God's wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by vir-
tue of this oneness answerable changes or effects through all the branches coexist
with the changes in the root : consequently an evil disposition exists in the
hearts of Adam's posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted in his own heart,
when he ate the forbidden fruit. Which God has no hand in, any otherwise,
than in not exerting such an influence, as might be effectual to prevent it ; as
appears by what was observed in the former chapter.
But now the grand objection is against the reasonableness of such a consti-
tution, by which Adam and his posterity should be looked upon as one, and dealt
with accordingly, in an affair of such infinite consequence ; so that if Adam
sinned, they must necessarily be made sinners by his disobedience, and come
into existence with the same depravity of disposition, and be looked upon and
treated as though they were partakers with Adam in his act of sin. I have not room
here to rehearse all Dr. Taylor's vehement exclamations against the reasona-
bleness and justice of this. The reader may at his leisure consult his book,
* My meaning, in the whole of what has been here said, may be illustrated thus : let us suppose, that
Adam and all his posterity had coexisted, and that his posterity had been, through a law of nature estab-
lished by the Creator, united to him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the root, or the mem-
bers of the body to the head, so as to constitute as it were one complex person, or one moral whole : so
that by the law of union, there should have been a communion and coexistence in acts and affections ;
all jointly participating, and all concurring, as one whole, in the disposition and action of the head ; as
we see in the body natural, the whole body is affected as the head is affected ; and the whole body con-
curs when the head acts. Now, in this case, the hearts of all the branches of mankind, by the constitution
of nature and law of union, would have been affected just as the heart of Adam, their common root, was
affected. When the heart, of the root, by a full disposition, committed the first sin, the hearts of all the
branches would have concurred ; and when the root, in consequence of this, became guilty, so would all
the branches ; and when the heart of the root, as a punishment of the sin committed, was forsaken of God,
in like manner would it have fared with all the branches ; and when the heart of the root, in consequence
of this, was confirmed in permanent depravity, the case would have been the same with all the branches ;
and as new guilt on the soul of Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been
with his moral branches. And thus all things, with relation to evil disposition, guilt, pollution and de-
pravity, would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each branch, as in the root. Now, difference
of the time of existence does not at all hinder things succeeding in the same order, any more than differ-
ence of place in a coexistence of time.
Here may be worthy to be observed, as in several respects to the present purpose, some things that are
aaid by Stapferus, an eminent, divine of Zurich, in Switzerland, in his Theologia Polemica, published
about fourteen years ago ; in English as follows. " Seeing all Adam's posterity are derived from their
first parent, as their root, the whole of the human kind, with its root, may be considered as constituting
but one whole, or one mass ; so as not to be properly a thing distinct from its root ; the posterity not dif-
fering from it, any otherwise than the branches from the tree. From which it easily appears, how that
when the root sinned, all that which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one whole, may be
looked upon as also sinning ; seeing it is not distinct from the root, butis one with it." — Tom. i. cap. 3,
§856,57.
" It is objected against the imputation of Adam's sin, that we never committed the same sin with Adam,
neither in number nor in kind. I answer, we should distinguish here between the physical act itself,
which Adam committed, and the morality of the action, and consent to it. If we have respect only to the
external act, to be sure it must be confessed, that Adam's posterity did not put forth their hands to the for-
bidden fruit : in which sense, that act of transgression, and that fall of Adam cannot be physically one
with the sin of his posterity. But if we consider the morality of the action, and what consent there is to
it, it is altogether to be maintained, that his posterity committed the same sin, both in number and in kind,
inasmuch as they are to be looked upon as consenting to it. For where there is consent to a sin, there
the same sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam, with all his posterity, constitute but one moral
484 ORIGINAL SIN.
and see them in the places referred to below.* Whatever black colors and
frightful representations are employed on this occasion, all may be summed up
in this, That Adam and his posterity are not one, but entirely distinct agents.
But with respect to this mighty outcry made against the reasonableness of any
such constitution, by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his posterity as
one, I would make the following observations.
I. It signifies nothing to exclaim against plain fact. Such is the fact, most
evident and acknowledged fact, with respect to the state of all mankind, without
exception of one individual among all the natural descendants of Adam, as
makes it apparent, that God actually deals with Adam and his posterity as one,
in the affair of his apostasy, and its infinitely terrible consequences. It has
been demonstrated, and shown to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every
individual of mankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as that there
is no hope or possibility of any other than their violating God's holy law (if they
ever live to act at all as moral agents), and being thereby justly exposed to
eternal ruin.f And it is thus by God's ordering and disposing of things. And
God either thus deals with mankind, because he looks upon them as one with
their first father, and so treats them as sinful and guilty by his apostasy ; or
(which will not mend the matter) he, without viewing them as at all concerned
in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly innocent, does nevertheless
subject them to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam, by his sin, was
exposed to the calamities and sorrows of this life, to temporal death and
eternal ruin ; as is confessed. And it is also in effect confessed, that all his
posterity come into the world in such a state, as that the certain consequence
is their being exposed, and justly so, to the sorrows of this life, to temporal
death and eternal ruin, unless saved by grace. So that we see, God in fact
deals with them together, or as one. If God orders the consequences of Adam's
person, and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law, they are also to be
looked upon as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of the law, both' in num-
ber and in kind. Therefore this reasoning avails nothing against the righteous imputation of the sin of
Adam to all mankind, or to the whole moral person that is consenting to it. And for the reason mentioned,
we may rather argue thus : the sin of the posterity, on account of their consent, and the moral view in
which they are to be taken, is the same with the sin of Adam, not only in kind, but in number ; therefore
the sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his posterity."— Id. Tom. iv. cap. 16, § 60, 61.
'• The imputation of Adam's first sin consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed
as in the same place with their father, and are like him. But seeing, agreeable to what we have already
firoved, God might, according to his own righteous judgment, which was founded on his most righteous
aw, give Adam a posterity that were like himself ; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the
very laws of nature ; therefore he might also in righteous judgment impute Adam's sin to them ; inasmuch
as to give Adam a posterity like himself, and to impute his sin to them, is one and the same thing. And
therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter. Our adversaries
contend with us chiefly on this account. That according to our doctrine of Original Sin, such an imputa-
tion of the first sin is maintained, whereby God, without any regard to universal native corruption, esteems
all Adam's posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to condemnation, purely on account of that sinful
act of their first parent ; so that they, without any respect had to their own sin, and so, as innocent in them-
selves, are destined to eternal punishment. I have therefore ever been careful to show, that they do in-
juriously suppose those things to be separated, in our doctrine, which are by no means to be separated. The
whole of the controversy they have with us about this matter, evidently arises from this. That they sup-
pose the mediate and the immediate imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the man-
ner of conception, but in reality. And so indeed they consider imputation only as immediate ; and ab-
stractly from the mediate ; when yet our divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately
from the other. Therefore I choose not to use any such distinction, or to suppose any such thing, in
what I have said on the subject ; but only have endeavored to explain the thing itself, and to recon-
cile it with the divine attributes. And therefore I have everywhere conjoined both these conceptions
concerning the imputation of the first sin, as inseparable ; and judged, that one ought never to be considered
without the other. While I have been writing this note, I consulted all the systems of divinity, which I
have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair ; and I
found that they were of the same mind with me ; namely, That these two kinds of imputation are by no
means to be separated, or to be considered abstractly one from the other, but that one does involve the
other."— He there particularly cites those two famous reformed divines, Vitringa and Lampius. — Tom. it
Cap. 17, §78.
♦ Pages 13, 150, 151, 156, 261, 108, 109, 111, S. t Part 1, Chap. 1, the three first Sections.
ORIGINAL SIN. 485
sin, with regard to his posterity's welfare, even in those things which are most
important, and which do in the highest degree concern their eternal interest, to
be the same with the consequences to Adam himsell, then he treats Adam and
his posterity as one in that affair. Hence, however the matter be attended with
difficulty, fact obliges us to get over the difficulty, either by rinding out some
solution, or by shutting our mouths, and acknowledging the weakness and
scantiness of our understandings; as we must in innumerable other cases,
where apparent and undeniable fact, in God's works of creation and providence,
is attended with events and circumstances, the manner and reason of which are
difficult to our understandings. But to proceed :
II. We will consider the difficulties themselves, insisted on in the objections of
our opposers. They may be reduced to these two : First, That such a consti-
tution is injurious to Adam's posterity. Secondly, That it is altogether im-
proper, as it implies falsehood, viewing and treating those as one which indeed
are not one, but entirely distinct.
First Difficulty. That the appointing Adam to stand, in this great affair,
as the moral head of his posterity, and so treating them as one with him, as
standing or falling with him, is injurious to them, and tends to their hurt. To
which I answer, it is demonstrably otherwise ; that such a constitution was so
I far from being injurious and hurtful to Adam's posterity, or tending to their
calamity, any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself
personally, that it was, in itself considered, very much of a contrary tendency,
and was attended with a more eligible probability of a happy issue than the
latter would have been : and so is a constitution truly expressing the goodness
of its author. For, here the following things are to be considered.
1. It is reasonable to suppose, that Adam was as likely, on account of his
capacity and natural talents, to persevere in obedience, as his posterity (taking
one with another), if they had all been put on the trial singly for themselves.
And supposing that there was a constituted union or oneness of him and his
posterity, and that he stood as a public person, or common head, all by this
constitution would have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience,
as of the ill consequence of his disobedience, in case of his fall.
2. There was a greater tendency to a happy issue, in such an appointment,
than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself; especially on two
accounts. (1.) That Adam had stronger motives to watchfulness than his
posterity, would have had ; in that not only his own eternal welfare lay at
stake, but also that of all his posterity. (2.) Adam was in a state of complete
manhood, when his trial began. It was a constitution very agreeable to the
goodness of God, considering the state of mankind, which was to be propaga-
ted in the way of generation, that their frst father should be appointed to stand
for all. For by reason of the manner of their coming into existence in a state
of infancy, and their coming so gradually to mature state, and so remaining
for a great while in a state of childhood and comparative imperfection, after
they were become moral agents, they would be less fit to stand for themselves,
than their first father to stand for them.
If any man, notwithstanding these things, shall say, that for his own part,
if the affair had been proposed f.o him, he should have chosen to have had his
eternal interest trusted in his own hands ; it is sufficient to answer, that no
man's vain opinion of himself, as more ft to be trusted than others, alters the
true nature and tendency of things, as they demonstrably are in themselves.
Nor is it a just objection, that this constitution has in event proved for the hurt of
mankind. For it does not follow that no advantage was given for a happy
486 ORIGINAL SIN
«went, in such an establishment, because it was not such as to make it utterly
impossible there should be any other event.
3, The goodness of God in such a constitution with Adam appears in this :
That if there had been no sovereign, gracious establishment at all, but God had
proceeded only on the foot of mere justice, and had gone no further than this
required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his posterity, that they
should perform perfect, perpetual obedience, without ever failing in the least
instance, on pain of eternal death, and might have made this demand without
the p-omise of any positive reward for their obedience. For perfect obedience
is a debt, that every one owes to his Creator, and therefore is what his Creator
was not obliged to pay him for. None is obliged to pay his debtor, only for
discharging his just debt. But such was evidently the constitution with Adam,
that an eternal happy life was to bex the consequence of his persevering fidelity,
to all such as were included within that constitution (of which the tree of life
was a sign), as well as eternal death to be the consequence of his disobedience.
I come now to consider the
Second Difficulty. It being thus manifest that this constitution, by
which Adam and his posterity are dealt with as one, is not unreasonable upon
account of its being injurious and hurtful to the interest of mankind, the only
thing remaining in the objection against such a constitution, is the impropriety
of it, as implying falsehood, and contradiction to the true nature of things ; as
hereby they are viewed and treated as one, who are not one, but wholly dis-
tinct ; and no arbitrary constitution can ever make that to be true, which in
itself considered is not true.
This objection, however specious, is really founded on a false hypothesis,
and wrong notion of what we call sameness or oneness, among created things ;
and the seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration
of the degree, in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in gen-
eral, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the Supreme Author and
Disposer of the Universe.
Some things, being most simply considered, are entirely distinct, and very
diverse, which yet are so united by the established law of the Creator, in some
respects, and with regard to some purposes and effects, that by virtue of that
establishment it is with them as if they were one. Thus a tree, grown great,
and a hundred years old, is one plant with the little sprout, that first came out
of the ground, from whence it grew, and has been continued in constant suc-
cession, though it is now so exceeding diverse, many thousand times bigger,
and of a very different form, and perhaps not one atom the very same ; yet God,
according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession commu-
nicated to it many of the same qualities and most important properties, as if it
were one. It has been his pleasure to constitute a union in these respects, and
for these purposes, naturally leading us to look upon all as one. So the body
of man at forty years of age, is one with the infant body which first came into
the world from whence it grew ; though now constituted of different substance,
and the greater part of the substance probably changed scores (if not hundreds)
of times ; and though it be now in so many respects exceeding diverse, yet God,
according to the course of nature, which he has been pleased to establish, has
caused that in a certain method it should communicate with that infantile body,
in the same life, the same senses, the same features, and many of the same
qualities, and in tinion with the same soul, and so, with regard to these purpo-
ses, it is dealt with by him as one body. Again, the body and soul of a man
are one, in a very different manner, and for different purposes. Considered in
ORIGINAL SIN. 487
themselves, they are exceeding different beings, of a nature as diverse as can be
conceived ; and yet by a very peculiar divine constitution or law of nature,
which God has been pleased to establish, they are strongly united, and become
one, in most important respects ; a wonderful mutual communication is estab-
lished ; so that both become different parts of the same man. But the union
and mutual communication they have, has existence, and is entirely regulated
and limited, according to the sovereign pleasure of God, and the constitution he
has been pleased to establish.
And if we come even to the personal identity of created intelligent beings,
though this be not allowed to consist wholly in that which Mr. Locke places
it in, i. e. same consciousness ; yet I think it cannot be denied, that this is one
thing essential to it. But it is evident that the communication or continuance
of the same consciousness and memory to any subject, through successive parts
of duration, depends wholly on a divine establishment. There would be no
necessity that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should continue to
exist, but by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator. If any should here insist
that there is no need of having recourse to such a constitution, in order to ac
count for the continuance of the same consciousness, and should say, that the
very nature of the soul is such as will sufficiently account for it ; and that the
soul will retain the ideas and consciousness it once had, according to the course
of nature ; then let it be remembered, who it is gives the soul this nature ; and let
that be remembered which Dr. Taylor says of the course of nature, before ob-
served ; denying, that " the course of nature is a proper active cause, which
will work and go on by itself without God, if he lets and permits it ;*' saying
that " the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or no-
thing ;" and affirming that " it is absolutely impossible the course of nature
should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than produce it-
self;"* and that " God, the Original of all Being, is the Only Cause of all
natural effects."! Here is worthy also to be observed, what Dr. Turnbull
says of the laws of nature, in words which he cites from Sir Isaac Newton.J
" It is the will of the mind that is the first cause, that gives subsistence and
efficacy to all those laws, who is the efficient cause that produces the 'phenomena
which appear in analogy, harmony and agreement, according to these laws."
And he says, " the same principles must take place in things pertaining to
moral as well as natural philosophy.''^
From these things it will clearly follow, that identity of consciousness de-
pends wholly on a law of nature, and so, on the sovereign will and agency
of God ; and therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pol-
lution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine
constitution ; and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not
to be the only thing which constitutes oneness of person, but should, besides
that, suppose sameness of substance requisite. For if same consciousness be
one thing necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God's sovereign
constitution, it will still follow that personal identity depends on God's sove-
reign constitution.
And with respect to the identity of created substance itself, in the different
moments of its duration, I think we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to
be like that absolute, independent identity, of the First Being, whereby he is
the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever. Nay, on the contrary, it may be de-
monstrated that even this oneness of created substance, existing at different
134, S. tPage 140, S. t Mor. Phil, p. 7. • S Ibid., p. 9.
488 ORIGINAL SIN.
times, is a merely dependent identity, dependent on the pleasure and sovereign
constitution of Him who worketh all in all. This will follow from what is
generally allowed, and is certainly true, that God not only created all things,
and gave them being at first, but continually preserves them, and upholds them
in being. This being a matter of considerable importance, it may be worthy
here to be considered with a little attention. Let us inquire, therefore, in the
first place, whether it be not evident that God does continually, by his immedi-
ate power uphold every created substance in being ; and then let us see the
consequence.
That God does, by his immediate power, uphold every created substance in
being, will be manifest, if we consider that their present existence is a dependent
existence, and therefore is an effect, and must have some cause ; and the cause
must be one of these two: either the antecedent existence of the same substance,
or the power of the Creator. But it cannot be the antecedent existence of the
same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of the moon at this
present moment, cannot be the effect of its existence at the last foregoing mo-
ment. For not only was what existed the last moment no active cause, but
wholly a passive thing ; but this is also to be considered, that no cause can pro-
duce effects in a time and place in which itself is not. It is plain, nothing can
exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing. But the moon's past
existence was neither where nor when its present existence is. In point of
time, what is past, entirely ceases, when present existence begins ; otherwise
it would not be past. The past moment is ceased and gone, when the present
moment takes place ; and does no more coexist with it, than does any other mo-
ment that had ceased twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence of the
particles of this moving body produce effects in any other place than where
it then was. But its existence at the present moment, in every point of
it, is in a different place from where its existence was at the last preceding mo-
ment. From these things I suppose it will certainly follow that the present
existence, either of this, or any other created substance, cannot be an effect of
its past existence. The existences (so to speak) of an effect, or thing depen-
dent, in different parts of space or duration, though ever so near one to an-
other, do not at all coexist one with the other ; and therefore are as truly differ-
ent effects, as if those parts of space and duration were ever so far asunder ;
and the prior existence can no more be the proper cause of the new existence,
in the next moment, or next part of space, than if it had been in an age before,
or at a thousand miles distance, without any existence to fill up the intermedi-
ate time or space. Therefore the existence of created substances, in each suc-
cessive moment, must be the effect of the immediate agency, will, and power
of God.
If any shall say this reasoning is not good, and shall insist upon it, that there
is no need of any immediate divine power to produce the present existence of
created substances, but that their present existence is the effect or consequence
of past existence, according to the nature of things ; that the established
course of nature is sufficient to continue existence, where existence is once
given ; I allow it : but then it should be remembered what nature is in created
things ; and what the established course of nature is ; that, as has been ob-
served already, it is nothing separate from the agency of God ; and that, as
Dr. Taylor says, God, the Original of all being, is the only cause of all natural
effects. A father, according to the course of nature, begets a child ; an oak,
according to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or a bud ; so, according
to the course of nature, the former existence of the trunk of the tree is followed
ORIGINAL SIN. 489
by its new or present existence. In the one case and the other, the new effect
is consequent on the former, only by the established laws and settled course of
nature, which is allowed to be nothing but the continued immediate efficien-
cy of God, according to a constitution that he has been pleased to estab-
lish. Therefore, according to what our author urges, as the child and the
acorn, which come into existence according to the course of nature, in conse-
quence of the prior existence and state of the parent and the oak, are truly,
immediately created or made by God ; so must the existence of each created
person and thing, at each moment of it, be from the immediate continued
creation of God. It will certainly follow from these things, that God's pre-
serving created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation,
or to his creating those things out of nothing at each moment of their existence
If the continued existence of created things be wholly dependent on God's pre-
servation, then those things would drop into nothing, upon the ceasing of the
present moment, without a new exertion of the divine power to cause them to
exist in the following moment. If there be any who own that God preserves
things in being, and yet hold that they would continue in being without any
further help from him, after they once have existence ; I think it is hard to
know what they mean. To what purpose can it be to talk of God's preserving
things in being, when there is no need of his preserving them ? Or to talk of
their being dependent on God for continued existence, when they would of
themselves continue to exist without his help ; nay, though he should wTholly
withdraw his sustaining power and influence 1
It will follow from what has been observed, that God's upholding created
substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is altogether
equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing, at each moment. Be-
cause its existence at this moment is not merely in part from God, but wholly
from him, and not in any part or degree, from its antecedent existence. For the
supposing that its antecedent existence concurs with God in efficiency, to pro-
duce some part of the effect, is attended with all the very same absurdities,
which have been shown to attend the supposition of its producing it wholly.
Therefore the antecedent existence is nothing, as to any proper influence or as-
sistance in the affair ; and consequently God produces the effect as much from
nothing, as if there had been nothing before. So that this effect differs not at
all from the first creation, but only circumstantially ; as in first creation there
had been no such act and effect of God's power before ; whereas, his giving
existence afterwards, follows preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an
established order.
Now, in the next place, let us see how the consequence of these things is to
my present purpose. If the existence of created substance, in each successive
moment, be wholly the effect of God's immediate power, in that moment, with-
out any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of no-
thing, then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect, and
simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though
it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method.* And
* When I suppose that an effect which is produced every moment, by a new action or exertion of
power, must be a new effect in each moment, and not absolutely and numerically the same with that which
existed in preceding moments, the thing that I intend, may be illustrated by this example. The lucid
color or brightness of the moon, as we look steadfastly upon it, seems to be a permanent thing, as though
it were perfectly the same brightness continued. But indeed it is an effect produced every moment.
It ceases, and is renewed, in each successive point uf time ; and so becomes altogether a new effect
at each instant ; and no one thing that belongs to it is numerically the same that existed in the pre-
ceding moment. The rays of the sun, impressed on that body, and reflected from it, which cause the
Vol. I. 62
490 ORIGINAL SIN.
there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the arbitrary
constitution of the Creator ; who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites
these successive new effects, that he treats them as one, by communicating to
them like properties, relations and circumstances; and so leads us to regard and
treat them as one. When I call this an arbitrary constitution, I mean, it is a
constitution which depends on nothing but the divine mill ; which divine will
depends on nothing but the divine wisdom. In this sense, the whole course of
nature, with all that belongs to it, all its laws and methods, and constancy and
regularity, continuance and proceeding, :s an arbitrary constitution. In this
sense, the continuance of the very being of the world and all its parts, as well
as the manner of continued being, depends entirely on an arbitrary constitution
For it does not at all necessarily follow, that because there was sound, or light,
or color, or resistance, or gravity, or thought, or consciousness, or any other de-
pendent thing the last moment, that therefore there shall be the like at the
next. All dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing
and returning ; renewed every moment, as the colors of bodies are every mo-
ment renewed by the light that shines upon them ; and all is constantly pro-
ceeding from God, as light from the sun. In him we live, and move, and have
our being.
Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any
identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what de-
pends on God's sovereign constitution. And so it appears that the objection
we are upon, made against a supposed divine constitution, whereby Adam and
his posterity are viewed and treated as one, in the manner and for the purposes
supposed, as if it were not consistent with truth, because no constitution can
make those to be one, which are not one : I say, it appears that this objection
is built on a false hypothesis : for it appears, that a divine constitution is the
thing which makes truth, in affairs of this nature. The objection supposes,
there is a oneness in created beings, whence qualities and relations are derived
down from past existence, distinct from, and prior to any oneness that can be
supposed to be founded on divine constitution. Which is demonstrably false,
effect, are none of them the same. The impression, made in each moment on our sensory, is by the
stroke of new rays ; and the sensation, excited by the stroke, is a new effect, an effect of a new impulse.
Therefore the brightness or lucid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing with
that which existed in the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now, is individually the
same with the sound of the wind that blew just before, which, though it be like it, is not the same, any more
than the agitated air, that makes the sound, is the same ; or than the water, flowing in a river, that now
passes by, is individually the same with that which passed a little before. And if it be thus with the
brightness or color of the moon, so it must be with its solidity, and every thing else belonging to its sub-
stance, if all be, each moment, as much the immediate effect of a new exertion or application of power.
The matter may perhaps be in some respects still more clearly illustrated by this. The images of things
in a glass, as we keep our eye upon them, seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing, perfect
identity. But it is known to be otherwise. Philosophers well know that these images are constantly
renewed, by the impression and reflection of new rays of light ; so that the image impressed by the former
rays is constantly vanishing, and a new image impressed by new rays every moment, both on the glass and
on the eye. The image constantly renewed, by new successive rays, is no more numerically the same,
than if it were by some artist put on anew with a pencil, and the colors constantly vanishing as fast as
put on. And the new images being put on immediately or instantly, do not make them the same, any more
than if it were done with the intermission of an hour or a day. The image that exists this moment, is
not at all derived from the image which existed the last preceding moment ; as may.be seen, because if
the succession of new rays be intercepted, by something interposed between the object and the glass,
the in age immediately ceases ; the past existence of the image has no influence to uphold it, so much as
for one moment. Which shows that the image is altogether new made every moment ; and strictly
speaking, is in no part numerically the same with that which existed the moment preceding. And truly
so the matter must be with the bodies themselves, as well as their images. They also cannot be the same,
with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment, if the case be as has oeen
E roved, that their present existence is not, strictly speaking, at all the effect of their past existence ;
ut is wholly, every instant, the effect of anew agency, or exertion of the power, of the cause of theii
existence. If so, the existence caused is e'^.ry instant a new effect, whether the cause be light, or im-
mediate divine power, or whatever it be.
ORIGINAL SIN. 491
and sufficiently appears so from things conceded by the adversaries themselves :
and therefore the objection wholly falls to the ground.
There are various kinds of identity and oneness, found among created
things, by which they become one in different manners, respects, and degrees,
and lo various purposes ; several of which differences have been observed ; and
every kind is ordered, regulated, and limited, in every respect, by divine consti-
tution. Some things, existing in different times and places, are treated by their
Creator as one in one respect, and others in another ; some are united for this
communication, and others for that ; but all according to the sovereign pleasure
of the fountain of all being and operation.
It appears particularly, from what has been said, that all oneness, by virtue
whereof pollution and guilt from past wickedness are derived, depends entirely
on a divine establishment. It is this, and this only, that must account for guilt
and an evil taint on any individual soul, in consequence of a crime committed
twenty or forty years ago, remaining still, and even to the end of the world,
and forever. It is this that must account for the continuance of any such
thing, anywhere, as consciousness of acts that are past ; and for the continu-
ance of all habits, either good or bad : and on this depends every thing that can
belong to personal identity. And all communications, derivations, or continua-
tion of qualities, properties or relations, natural or moral, from what is past, as
if the subject were one, depends on no other foundation.
And I am persuaded, no solid reason can be given, why God, who consti-
tutes all other created union or oneness, according to his pleasure, and for what
purposes, communications, and effects, he pleases, may not establish a constitu-
tion whereby the natural posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the
buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as one with
him, for the derivation, either of righteousness, and communion in rewards, or
of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt.*
As I said before, all oneness in created things, whence qualities and rela-
tions are derived, depends on a divine constitution that is arbitrary, in every
other respect, excepting that it is regulated by divine wisdom. The wisdom,
which is exercised in these constitutions, appears in these two things. First,
in a beautiful analogy and harmony with other laws or constitutions, especially
relating to the same subject ; and secondly, in the good ends obtained, or use-
ful consequences of such a constitution. If therefore there be any objection still
* I appeal to such as are not wont to content themselves with judging by a superficial appearance
and view of things, but are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, that they may judge right-
eous judgment, whether on supposition that all mankind had coexisted, m the manner mentioned be-
fore, any good reason can be given, why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established
Mich a union between Adam and the rest of mankind, as was in the case supposed. Particularly, if it
hud been the case, that Adam's posterity had actually, according to a law of nature, somehow grown
.out of him, and yet remained contiguous and literally united to him, as the branches to a tree, or the mem-
bers of the body to the head ; and had all, before the fall, existed together at the same time, though in dif-
ferent places, as the head and members are in different places : in* this case, who can determine, that the
author of nature might not, if it had pleased him, have established such a union between the root and
branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute one moral whole ; so that by the law of
union, there should be a communion in each moral alteration, and that the heart of every branch should at
the same moment participate with the heart of the root, be conformed to it, and concurring with it in all
its ufYections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as a part of the same thing ? Why might not
God, if he had pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, a union of the various parts of such a
moral whole, as well as many other unions, which he has actually fixed, according to his sovereign plea-
sure l And if he might, by his sovereign constitution, have established such a union of the various
branches of mankind, when existing in different places, I do not see why he might not also do the same,
though they exist in different times. I know not why succession, or diversity of time, should make any
such constituted union more unreasonable, than diversity of place. The only reason, why diversity of
time can seem to make it unreasonable, is, that difference of time shows, there is no absolute identity of
the things existing in those different times : but it shows this, I think, not at all more than the difference
of the place of existence.
492 ORIGINAL SIN.
lying against this constitution with Adam and his posterity, it must be, th'at it is
not sufficiently doise in these respects. But what extreme arrogance would it
be in us, to take upon us to act as judges of the beaut/ and wisdom of the laws
and established constitutions of the supreme Lord and Creator of the universe !
And not only so, but if this constitution, in particular, be well considered, its
wisdom, in the two forementioned respects, may easily be made evident. There
is an apparent manifold analogy to other constitutions and laws, established and
maintained through the whole system of vital nature in this lower world ; all
parts of which, in all successions, are derived from the first of the kind, as from
their root or fountain ; each deriving from thence all properties and qualities,
that are proper to the nature and capacity of the kind, or species ; no deriva-
tive having any one perfection (unless it be what is merely circumstantial) but
what was in its 'primitive. And that Adam's posterity should be without that
original righteousness, which Adam had lost, is also analogous to other laws
and establishments, relating to the nature of mankind; according to which,
Adam's posterity have no one perfection of nature, in any kind, superior to
what was in him, when the human race began to be propagated from him.
And as such a constitution was Jit and wise in other respects, so it was in
this that follows. Seeing the divine constitution concerning the manner of
mankind's coming into existence in their propagation, was such as did so natu-
rally unite them, and made them in so many respects one, naturally leading
them to a close union in society, and manifold intercourse, and mutual depend-
ence. Things were wisely so established, that all should naturally be in one
and the same moral state ; and not in such exceeding different states, as that
some should be perfectly innocent and holy, but others corrupt and wicked ;
some needing a Saviour, but others needing none ; some in a confirmed state
of perfect happiness, but others in a state of public condemnation to perfect and
eternal misery; some justly exposed to great calamities in this world, but others
by their innocence raised above all suffering. Such a vast diversity of state
would by no means have agreed with the natural and necessary constitution and
unavoidable situation and circumstances of the world of mankind ; all made of
one blood, to dwell on all the face of the earth, to be united and blended ir
society, and to partake together in the natural and common goods and evils of
this lower world.
Dr. Taylor urges,* that sorrow and shame are only for personal sin : and it
has often been urged, that repentance can be for no other sin. To which I
would say, that the^se of words is very arbitrary : but that men's hearts should
be deeply affected with grief and humiliation before God, for the pollution and
guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think, is not in the least un-
reasonable. Nor is it a thing strange and unheard of, that men should be
ashamed of things done by others, whom they are nearly concerned in. I am
sure, it is not unscriptural ; especially when they are justly looked upon in the
sight of God, who sees the disposition of their hearts, as fully consenting and
concurring.
From what has been observed it may appear, there is no sure ground to
conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thing, for the race of man-
kind truly to partake of the sin of the first apostasy, so as that this, in reality
and propriety, shall become their sin ; by virtue of a real union between the
root and branches of the world of mankind (truly and properly availing to such
a consequence), established by the Author of the whole system of the universe ;
* Page 14.
ORIGINAL SIN. 493
to whose establishments are owing all propriety and reality of union, in any part
of that system ; and by virtue of the full consent of the hearts of Adam's pos-
terity to that first apostasy. And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs,
merely because God imputes it to them ; but it is truly and properly theirs, and
on that ground, God imputes it to them.
By reason of the established union between Adam and his posterity, the
case is far otherwise between him and them, than it is between distinct parts or
individuals of Adam's race ; betwixt whom is no such constituted union ; as
between children and other ancestors. Concerning whom is apparently to be
understood that place, Ezek. xviii. 1 — 20 ;* where God reproves the Jews for
the use they made of that proverb, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and
the children's teeth are set on edge ; and tells them, that hereafter they shall no
more have occasion to use this proverb ; and that if a son sees the wickedness
of his father, and sincerely disapproves it and avoids it, and he himself is right-
eous, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father ; that all souls, both the soul of
the father and the son, are his ; and that therefore the son shall not bear the iniquity
of his father, nor the father bear the iniquity of the son ; but the soul that sinneth,
it shall die ; that the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the
wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. The thing denied, is communion in
the guilt and punishment of the sins of others, that are distinct parts of Adam's
raje j and expressly, in that case, where there is no consent and concurrence,
but a sincere disapprobation of the wickedness of ancestors. It is declared, that
children who are adult and come to act for themselves, who are righteous, and
do not approve of, but sincerely condemn the wickedness of their fathers, shall
not be punished for their disapproved and avoided iniquities. The occasion of
what is here said, as well as the design and plain sense, shows, that nothing is
here intended in the least degree inconsistent with what has been supposed con-
cerning Adam's posterity's sinning and falling in his apostasy. The occasion
is, the people's murmuring at God's methods under the Mosaic dispensation ;
agreeable to that in Levit. xxvi. 39, " And they that are left of you, shall pine
away in their iniquity in your enemies' lands ; and also in the iniquities of their
fathers shall they pine away with them :" and other parallel places, respecting
external judgments, which were the punishments most plainly threatened, and
chiefly insisted on, under that dispensation (which was, as it were, an external
and carnal covenant), and particularly the people's suffering such terrible judg-
ments at that day, even in Ezekiel's time, for the sins of Manasseh ; according
to what God says by Jeremiah (Jer. xv. 4), and agreeable to what is said in
that confession, Lam. v. 7, " Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have
borne their iniquities."
In what is said here, there is a special respect to the introducing of the gos-
pel dispensation ; as is greatly confirmed by comparing this place with Jer. xxxi.
29,30, 31. Under which dispensation, the righteousness of God's dealings
with mankind would be more fully manifested, in the clear revelation then to
be made of the method of the judgment of God, by which the final state of
wicked men is determined ; which is not according to the behavior of their
particular ancestors ; but every one is dealt with according to the sin of his own
wicked heart, or sinful nature and practice. The affair of derivation of the natural
corruption of mankind in general, and of their consent to, and participation of, the
primitive and common apostasy, is not in the least intermeddled with, or touch-
ed, by any thing meant or aimed at in the true scope and design of this pldce in
Ezekiel.
* Which Dr. Taylor alleges, p. in 11, &
494 ORIGINAL SIN.
On the whole, if any do not like the philosophy, or the metaphysics (as some
perhaps may choose to call it) made use of in the foregoing reasonings ; yet I
cannot doubt, but that a proper consideration of what is apparent and undenia*
ble in fact, with respect to the dependence of the state and course of things in
this universe on the sovereign constitutions of the supreme Author and Lord of
all, who gives none account of any of his matters, and whose ways dre past
finding out, will be sufficient, with persons of common modesty and sobriety, to
stop their mouths from making peremptory decisions against the justice of God,
respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in his holy word, concerning the
derivation of a depravity and guilt from Adam to his posterity ; a thing so
abundantly confirmed by what is found in the experience of all mankind in all
ages. i
This is enough, one would think, forever to silence such bold expressions as
these— "If this he just — if the Scriptures teach such doctrine, &c, then the
Scriptures are of no use — understanding is no understanding — and, What a God
must he be, that can thus curse innocent creatures ! — Is this thy Goo, 0 Chris-
tian!"
It may not be improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this
chapter, in which we have had occasion to say so much about the imputation
of Adam's sin) concerning the opinions of two divines, of no inconsiderable note
among the dissenters in England, relating to a partial imputation of Adam's
first sin.
One of them supposes that this sin, though truly imputed to infants, so that
thereby they are exposed to a proper punishment, yet is not imputed to them
in such a degree, as that upon this account they should be liable to eternal
punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to temporal death, or annihilation ;
Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely more guilty by it,
than his posterity. On which I would observe, that to suppose, God imputes
not all the guilt of Adam's sin, but only some little part of it, relieves nothing
but one's imagination. To think of poor little infants bearing such torments
for Adam's sin, as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending
in death and annihilation, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive
of their suffering eternal misery for it. But it does not at all relieve one's rea-
son. There is no rule of reason that can be supposed to lie against imputing a
sin in the whole of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not
personally commit it, but what will also lie against its being so imputed and
punished in part. For all the reasons (if there are any) lie against the impu-
tation ; not the quantity or degree of what is imputed. If there be any rule of
reason, that is strong and good, lying against a proper derivation or communi-
cation of guilt, from one that acted, to another that did not act ; then it lies
against all that is of this nature. The force of the reasons brought against im-
puting Adam's sin to his posterity (if there be any force in them) lies in this,
that Adam and his posterity are not one. But this lies as properly against
charging a part of the guilt, as the whole. For Adam's posterity, by not being
the same with him, had no more hand in a little of what was done, than in the
whole. They were as absolutely free from being concerned in that act partly,
as they were wholly. And there is no reason to be brought, why one man's
sin cannot be justly reckoned to another's account, who was not then in being,
in the whole of it ; but what will as properly lie against its being reckoned to
him in any part, so as that he should be subject to any condemnation or punish-
ment on that account If those reasons are good, all the difference there can
be, is this ; that to bring a great punishment on infants for Adam's sin, is a
ORIGINAL SIN. 495
great act of injustice, and to bring a comparatively small punishment, is a smaller
act of injustice, but not, that this is not as truly and demonstrably an act of in-
justice, as the other.
To illustrate this by an instance something parallel. It is used as an argu-
ment why I may not exact from one of my neighbors, what was due to me from
another, that he and my debtor are not the same ; and that their concerns, in-
terests and properties are entirely distinct. Now if this argument be good, it
lies as truly against my demanding from him a part of the debt, as the whole.
Indeed it is a greater act of injustice for me to take from him the whole of it,
than a part, but not more truly and certainly an act of injustice.
The other divine thinks there is truly an imputation of Adam's sin, so that
infants cannot be looked upon as innocent creatures ; yet seems to think it not
igreeable to the perfections of God, to make the state of infants in another world
worse than a state of nonexistence. But this to me appears plainly a giving up
that grand point of the imputation of Adam's sin, both in whole and in part.
For it supposes it to be not right, for God to bring any evil on a child of Adam,
which is innocent as to personal sin, without paying for it, or balancing it with
good ; so that still the state of the child shall be as good, as could be demanded
injustice, in a case of mere innocence. Which plainly supposes that the child
is not exposed to any proper punishment at all, or is not at all in debt to di-
vine justice, on the account of Adam's sin. For if the child were truly in debt,
then surely justice might take something from him without paying for it, or
without giving that which makes its state as good, as mere innocence could in
justice require. If he owes the suffering of some punishment, then there is no
need that justice should requite the infant for suffering that punishment ; or make
up for it, by conferring some good, that shall countervail it, and in effect remove
and disannul it; so that, on the whole, good and evil shall be at an even balance,
yea, so that the scale of good shall preponderate. If it is unjust in a judge to
order any quantity of money to be taken from another without paying him again,
and fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly forfeited none
at all.
It seems to me pretty manifest that none can, in good consistence with them-
selves, own a real imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin to his posterity,
without owning that they are justly viewed and treated as sinners, truly guilty
and children of wrath on that account ; nor unless they allow a just imputation
of the whole of the evil of that transgression ; at least all that pertains to the
essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the covenant which God
had established ; even as much as if each one of mankind had the like covenant
established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion,
violated it for himself.
CHAPTER IV.
Wherein several other Objections are considered.
Dr. Taylor objects against Adam's posterity's being supposed to come into
the world under a forfeiture of God's blessing, and subject to his curse through
his sin :— That at the restoration of the world after the flood, God pronounced
equivalent or greater blessings on Noah and his sons, than he did on Adam at
496 ORIGINAL SIN.
his creation, when he said, " Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth,
and have dominion over the fish of the sea," &c*
To this I answer, in the following remarks.
1. As it has been already shown, that in the threatening, denounced for
Adam's sin, there was nothing which appears inconsistent with the continuance
of this present life for a season, or with the propagating his kind ; so for the
like reason, there appears nothing in that threatening, upon the supposition that
it reached Adam's posterity, inconsistent with their enjoying the temporal bless-
ings of the present life, as long as this is continued ; even those temporal bless-
ings which God pronounced on Adam at his first creation. For it must be
observed, that the blessings which God pronounced on Adam, when he first
created him, and before the trial of his obedience, were not the same with the
blessings which were suspended on his obedience. The blessings thus suspended,
were the blessings of eternal life ; which, if he had maintained his integrity
through his trial, would have been pronounced upon him afterwards ; when God,
as his judge, should have given him his reward. God might, indeed, if he had
pleased, immediately have deprived him of life', and of all temporal blessings
given him before. But those blessings pronounced on him beforehand, were
not the things, for the obtaining of which his trial was appointed. These were
reserved, till the issue of his trial should be seen, and then to be pronounced in
the blessed sentence, which would have been passed upon him by his judge,
when God came to decree to him his reward for his approved fidelity. The
pronouncing these latter blessings on a degenerate race, that had fallen under
the threatening denounced, would indeed (without a redemption) have been in-
consistent with the constitution which had been established. But the giving
them the former kind of blessings, which were not the things suspended on the
trial, or dependent on his fidelity (and these to be continued for a season), was
not at all inconsistent therewith.
2. It is no more an evidence of Adam's posterity's being not included in the
threatening, denounced for his eating the forbidden fruit, that they still have
the temporal blessings of fruitfulness and a dominion over the creatures continued
to them, than it is an evidence of Adam's being not included in that threatening
himself, that he had these blessings continued to him, was fruitful, and had do-
minion over the creatures after his fall, equally with his posterity.
3. There is good evidence, that there were blessings implied in the bene-
dictions God pronounced on Noah and his posterity, which were granted on a
new foundation ; on the foot of a dispensation diverse from any grant, promise
or revelation which God gave to Adam, antecedently to his fall, even on the
foundation of the covenant of grace, established in Jesus Christ; a dispensation,
the design of which is to deliver men from the curse that came upon them by
Adam's sin, and to bring them to greater blessings than ever he had. These
blessings were pronounced on Noah and his seed, on the same foundation where-
on afterwards the blessing was pronounced on Abraham and his seed, which
included both spiritual and temporal benefits. Noah had his name prophetical-
ly given him by his father Lamech, because by him and his seed, deliverance
should be obtained from the curse which came by Adam's fall. Gen. v. 29,
" And he called his name Noah (i. e. Rest), saying, This same shall comfort us
concerning our work, and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the
Lord hath cursed." Pursuant to the scope and intent of this prophecy (which
indeed seems to respect the same thing with the prophecy in Gen. iii. 15) are
* See p. 82, &c, S.
ORIGINAL SIN. 497
the blessings pronounced on Noah after the flood. There is this evidence of
these blessings being conveyed through the channel of the covenant of grace,
and by the redemption through Jesus Christ, that they were obtained by sacra-
fice ; or were bestowed as the effect of God's favor to mankind, which was in
consequence of God's smelling a sweet savor in the sacrifice which Noah
offered. And it is very evident by the epistle to the Hebrews, that the ancient
sacrifices never obtained the favor of God, but only by virtue of the relation they
had to the sacrifice of Christ. Now that Noah and his family had been so
wonderfully saved from the wrath of God, which had destroyed the rest of the
world, and the world was as it were restored from a ruined state, there was a
proper occasion to point to the great salvation to come by Christ : as it was a
common thing for God, on occasion of some great temporal salvation of his
people, or restoration from a low and miserable state, to renew the intimations
of the great spiritual restoration of the world by Christ's redemption.* God
deals with the generality of mankind, in their present state, far differently, on
occasion of the redemption by Jesus Christ, from what he otherwise would do ;
for, being capable subjects of saving mercy, they have a day of patience and
grace, and innumerable temporal blessings bestowed on them ; which, as the
apostle signifies (Acts xiv. 17), are testimonies of God's reconcilableness to
sinful men, to put them upon seeking after God.
But besides the sense in which the posterity of Noah in general partake of
these blessings of dominion over the creatures, &c. ; Noah himself, and all such
of his posterity as have obtained like precious faith with that exercised by him
in offering his sacrifice which made it a sweet savor, and by which it procured
these blessings, have dominion over the creatures, through Christ, in a more
excellent sense than Adam in innocency ; as they are made kings and priests
unto God, and reign with Christ, and all things are theirs, by a covenant of
grace. They partake with Christ in that dominion " over the beasts of the
earth, the fowls of the air, and fishes of the sea," spoken of in the 8th Psalm ;
which is by the apostle interpreted of Christ's dominion over the world. 1 Cor.
xv. 27, and Heb. ii. 7. And the time is coming when the greater part of the
posterity of Noah, and each of his sons, shall partake of this more honorable
and excellent dominion over the creatures, through him " in whom all the fami-
lies of the earth shall be blessed." Neither is there any need of supposing that
these blessings have their most complete accomplishment until many ages after
they were granted, any more than the blessing on Japhet, expressed in those
words, " God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem"
But that Noah's posterity have such blessings given them through the
great Redeemer, who suspends and removes the curse which came through
Adam's sin, surely is no argument that they originally, and as they be in their
natural state, are not under the curse. That men have blessings through
grace, is no evidence of their being not justly exposed to the curse by nature,
but it rather argues the contrary : for if they did not deserve the curse, they
would not depend on grace and redemption for the removal of it, and for bring-
ing them into a state of favor with God.
Another objection which our author strenuously urges against the doctrine
of Original Sin, is, that it disparages the divine goodness in giving us our being,
which we ought to receive with thankfulness, as a great gift of God's benefi-
cence, and look upon as the first, original, and fundamental fruit of the divine
liberality-!
* It may be noted that Dr. Taylor himself signifies it as his mind, that these blessings on Noah wer»
TO the foot of the covenant of grace, p. 84, 90, 91, 92, S. , f Pages 256, 257, 260, 71—74. *
Vol. II. 63
498 ORIGINAL SIN.
To this I answer, in the following observations.
1. This argument is built on the supposed truth of a thing in dispute, and
so is a begging the question. It is built on this supposition, that we are not
properly looked upon as one with our first father, in the state wherein God at
first created him, and in his fall from that state. If we are so, it becomes the
whole race to acknowledge God's great goodness to them, in the state wherein
mankind was made at first ; in the happy state they were then in, and the fair
opportunity they then had of obtaining confirmed and eternal happiness, and to
acknowledge it as an aggravation of their apostasy, and to humble themselves, ,
that they were so ungrateful as to rebel against their good Creator. Certainly,
we may all do this with as much reason, as (yea, much more than) the people
of Israel in Daniel's and Nehemiah's times, did with thankfulness acknow-
ledge God's great goodness to their fathers, many ages before, and in their con-
fessions bewailed, and took shame to themselves, for the sins committed by
their fathers, notwithstanding such great goodness. See the ixth chapter of
Daniel, and ixth of Nehemiah.
2. If Dr. Taylor would imply in his objection, that it doth not consist with
the goodness of God, to give mankind being in a state of misery, whatever was
done before by Adam, whether he sinned, or did not sin ; I reply, if it be justly
so ordered, that there should be a posterity of Adam, which must be looked
upon as one with him, then it is no more contrary to God's attribute of good-
ness to give being to his posterity in a state of punishment, than to continue
the being of the same wicked and guilty person, who has made himself guilty,
in a state of punishment. The giving being, and the continuing being are
both alike the work of God's power and will, and both are alike fundamental
to all blessings of man's present and future existence. And if it be said, it can-
not be justly so ordered, that there should be a posterity of Adam, which should
be looked upon as one with him, this is begging the question.
3. If our author would have us suppose that it is contrary to the attribute
of goodness for God, in any case, by an immediate act of his power, to cause
existence, and to cause new existence, which shall be an exceeding miserable
existence, by reason of exposedness to eternal ruin ; then his own scheme must
be supposed contrary to the attribute of God's goodness ; for he supposes that
God will raise multitudes from the dead at the last day (which will be giving
new existence to their bodies, and to bodily life and sense) in order only to their
suffering eternal destruction.
4. Notwithstanding we are so sinful and miserable, as we are by nature,
yet we may have great reason to bless God, that he has given us our being
under so glorious a dispensation of grace through Jesus Christ ; by which we
have a happy opportunity to be delivered from this sin and misery, and to ob-
tain unspeakable, eternal happiness. And because, through our own wicked
inclinations, we are disposed so to neglect and abuse this mercy, as to fail of
final benefit by it, this is no reason why we ought not to be thankful for it,
even according to our author's own sentiments. " What (says he*) if the
whole world lies in wickedness, and few therefore shall be saved, have men nc
reason to be thankful, because they are wicked and ungrateful, and abuse their
being and God's bounty ? Suppose our own evil inclinations do withhold us"
[viz., from seeking after happiness, which under the light of the gospel we are
placed within the nearer and easier reach of] ; " suppose the whole Christian
world should lie in wickedness, and but few Christians should be saved ; is it
* Pages 72, 73, S.
ORIGINAL SIN. 499
therefore certainly true, that we cannot reasonably thank God for the gospel ?"
Well, and though the evil inclinations, which hinder our seeking and obtain-
ing happiness by so glorious an advantage, are what we are born with, yet if
those inclinations are our fault or sin, that alters not the case ; and to say, they
are not our sin, is still begging the question. Yea, it will follow from severa
things asserted by our author, put together, that notwithstanding men are born
in such circumstances, as that they are under a very great improbability of ever
becoming righteous, yet they may have reason to be thankful for their being.
Thus, particularly, those that were born and lived among the Heathen, before
Christ came. For Dr. Taylor asserts, that all men have reason of thankfulness
for their being; and yet he supposes,, that the Heathen world, taken as a col-
lective body, were dead in sin, and could not deliver or help themselves, and
therefore stood in necessity of the Christian dispensation. And not only so,
but he supposes, that the Christian world is now at length brought to the like
deplorable and helpless circumstances, and needs a new dispensation for its
relief ; as I observed before. According to these things, the world in general,
not only formerly, but even at this day, are dead in sin, and helpless as to their
salvation ; and therefore the generality of them that are born into it, are much
more likely to perish, than otherwise, till the new dispensation comes : and yet
he supposes, we all have leason to be thankful for our being. Yea, further
still, I think, according to our author's doctrine, men may have great reason to
be thankful to God for bringing them into a state, which yet, as the case is, is
attended with misery, as its certain consequence. As, with respect to God's
raising the wicked to life, at the last day ; which, he supposes, is in itself a
great benefit, procured by Christ, and the wonderful grace of God through him :
and if it be the fruit of God's wonderful grace, surely men ought to be thank-
ful for that grace, and praise God for it. Our doctrine of Original Sin, there-
fore, no more disparages God's goodness in man's formation in the womb,
than his doctrine disparages God's goodness in their resurrection from the
grave.
Another argument which Dr. Taylor makes use of, against the doctrine of
Original Sin, is what the Scripture reveals of the process of the day of judg-
ment ; which represents the judge as dealing with men singly and separately,
rendering to every man according to his deeds, and according to the improve-
ment he has made of the particular powers and talents God has given him per-
sonally.*
But this objection will vanish, if we consider what is the end or design of
that public judgment. Now this will not be, that God may find out what men
are, or what punishment or reward is proper for them, or in order to the pass-
ing a right judgment of these things within himself, which is the end of human
trials ; but it is to manifest what men are, to their own consciences, and to the
world. As the day of judgment is called the day of the revelation of the right-
eous judgment of God ; in order to this, God will make use of evidences or
proofs. But the proper evidences of the wickedness of men's hearts (the true
seat of all wickedness), both as to corruption of nature, and additional pollution
and guilt, are men's works.
The special end of God's public judgment will be, to make a proper, per-
fect, open distinction among men, rightly to state and manifest their difference
one from another, in order to that separation and difference in the eternal retri-
bution, that is to follow : and this difference will be made to appear, by their
personal works.
•Pages 65, 66, 111, S.
500 ORIGINAL SIN.
There are two things, with regard to which men will be tried, and openly
distinguished by the perfect judgment of God at the last day ; according to the
twofold real distinction subsisting among mankind, viz., (1.) The difference of
state ; that primary and grand distinction, whereby all mankind are divided
into two .sorts, the righteous and the wicked. (2.) That secondary distinction,
whereby both sorts differ from others in the same general state, in degrees of addi-
tional fruits of righteousness and wickedness. Now the judge, in order to manifest
both these, wTill judge men according to their personal works. But to inquire
at the day of judgment, whether Adam sinned or no, or whether men are to be
looked upon as one with him, and so partakers in his sin, is what in no respect
tends to manifest either of these distinctions.
1. The first thing to be manifested, will be the state, that each man is in,
with respect to the grand distinction of the whole world of mankind into right-
eous and wicked ; or, in metaphorical language, wheat and tares ; or, the chil-
dren of the kingdom of Christ, and the children of the wicked one ; the latter,
the head of the apostasy ; but the former, the head of the restoration and recov-
ery. The judge, in manifesting this, will prove men's hearts by their works,
in such as have had opportunity to perform any works in the body. The evil
works of the children of the wicked one will be the proper manifestation and
evidence or proof of whatever belongs to the general state of such ; and partic-
ularly they will prove, that they belong to the kingdom of the great deceiver
and head of the apostasy, as they will demonstrate the exceeding corruption of
their nature, and full consent of their hearts to the common apostasy ; and also
that their hearts never relinquished the apostasy, by a cordial adherence £
Christ, the great restorer. The judge will also make use of the good works of
the righteous to show their interest in the redemption of Christ ; as thereby
will be manifested the sincerity of their hearts in the acceptance of, and adhe-
rence to the Redeemer and his righteousness. And in thus proving the state of
men's hearts by their actions, the circumstances of those actions must necessarily
come into consideration, to manifest the true quality of their actions ; as, each
one's talents, opportunities, advantages, light, motives, &c.
2. The other thing to be manifested, will be that secondary distinction,
wherein particular persons, both righteous and wicked, differ from one another,
in the degree of secondary good or evil, that is, something besides what is com-
mon to all in the same general state : the degree of evil fruit, which is addition-
al to the guilt and corruption of the whole body of apostates and enemies ; and
the degree of personal goodness and good fruit, which is a secondary goodness,
with respect to the righteousness and merits of Christ, which belong to all by
that sincere faith manifested in all. Of this also each one's works, with their
circumstances, opportunities, talents, &c, will be the proper evidence.
As to the nature and aggravations of the general apostasy by Adam's sin,
and also the nature and sufficiency of the redemption by Jesus Christ, the great
restorer, though both these will have vast influence on the eternal state, wmich
men will be adjudged to, yet neither of them will properly belong to the trial
men will be the subjects of at that day, in order to the manifestation of their
state, wherein they are distinguished one from another. They will belong to
the business of that day no otherwise, than the manifestation of the great truths
of religion in general ; as the nature and perfections of God, the dependence of
mankind on God, as their creator and preserver, &c. Such truths as these will
also have great influence on the eternal state, which men will then be adjudged
o, as they aggravate the guilt of man's wickedness, and must be considered in
order to a due estimate of Christ's righteousness, and men's personal virtue ',
ORIGINAL SIN. 501
yet, being of general and equal concernment, will not properly belong to the
trial of particular persons.
Another thing urged by our author particularly against the imputation of
Adam's sin, is this : " Though, in Scripture, action is frequently said to be im-
puted, reckoned, accounted to a person, it is no other than his own act and
deed !"* In the same place he cites a number of places of Scripture, where
ihese words are used, which he says are all that he can find in the Bible.
But we are no way concerned with this argument at present, any further
than it relates to imputation of sin, or sinful action. Therefore all that is in the
argument, which relates to the present purpose, is this : that the word is so
often applied in Scripture to signify God's imputing personal sin, but never
once to his imputing Adam's sin. — So often ! — How often ? — But twice. There
are but two of all those places which he reckons up, that speak of, or so much
as have any reference to, God's imputing sin to any person, where there is any
evidence that only personal sin is meant ; and they are Levit. xvii. 3, 4, and
2 Tim. iv. 16. All therefore the argument comes to, is this : that the word, im-
pute, is applied in Scripture, two times, to the case of God's imputing sin, and
neither of those times to signify the imputing of Adam's sin, but both times it
has reference to personal sin ; therefore Adam's sin is not imputed to his pos-
terity. And this is to be noted, that one of these two places, even that in Levit.
xvii. 3, 4, does not speak of imputing the act committed, but another not com-
mitted. The words are, " What man soever there be of the house of Israel,
that killeth an ox or lamb or goat in the camp, or that killeth it out of the
camp, and bringeth it not unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, to
offer an offering unto the Lord, before the tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall
be imputed unto that man ; he hath shed blood ; that man shall be cut off from
among his people, i. e. plainly, murder shall be imputed to him : he shall be
put to death for it, and therein punished with the same severity as if he had
slain a man. It is plain by Isai. lxvi. 3, that in some cases, a shedding the
blood of beasts, in an unlawful manner, was imputed to them, as if they slew a
man.
But whether it be so or not, although in both these places the word, impute,
be applied to personal sin, and to the very act done by the person spoken of,
and in ten more places; or although this could be said of all the places, which
our author reckons up ; yet that the word, impute, is never expressly applied
to Adam's sin, does no more argue, that it is not imputed to his posterity, than
it argues, that pride, unbelief, lying, theft, oppression, persecution, fornication,
adultery, sodomy, perjury, idolatry, and innumerable other particular moral
evils, are never imputed to the persons that committed them, or in whom they
are ; because the word, impute, though so often used in Scripture, is never ap-
plied to any of these kinds of wickedness.
I know not what can be said here, except one of these two things : that though
these sins are not expressly said to be imputed, yet other words are used that
do as plainly and certainly imply that they are imputed, as if it were said so
expressly. Very well, and so I say with respect to the imputation of Adam's
sin. The thing meant by the word, impute, may be as plainly and certainly
expressed by using other words, as if that word were expressly used ; and more
certainly, because the words used instead of it, may amount to an explanation of
this word. And this, I think, is the very case here. Though the word, impute, is
not used with respect to Adam's sin, yet it is said, All have sinned; which, re-
* Page 3, &c. 105, S.
502 ORIGINAL SIN.
specting infants, can be true only of their sinning by his sin. And it is said,
By his disobedience many were made sinners ; and, Judgment and condemna-
tion came upon all by that sin ; and that, by this means, death [the wages oi
sin] passed on all men, &c. Which phrases amount to full and precise explan-
ations of the word, impute ; and therefore do more certainly determine the
point really insisted on.
Or, perhaps it will be said, With respect to those personal sins foremention-
ed, pride, unbelief, &c, it is no argument, they are not imputed to those who
are guilty of them, that the very word, impute, is not applied to them ; for the
word itself is rarely used ; not one time in a hundred, and perhaps five hundred,
of those, wherein the thing meant is plainly implied, or may be certainly infer-
red. Well, and the same also may be replied likewise, with respect to Adam's
sin.
It is probable Dr. Taylor intends an argument against Original Sin, by that
which he says in opposition to what R. R. suggests of children's discovering
the principles of iniquity, and seeds of sin, before they are capable of moral action*
viz., that little children are made patterns of humility, meekness and innocence,
in Matth. xvii. 3 — 1 Cor. xiv. 20, and Psal. exxxi. 2.
But when the utmost is made of this, there can be no shadow of reason, to
understand more by these texts, than that little children are recommended as
patterns in regard of a negative virtue, innocence with respect to the exercises
and fruits of sin, harmlessness as to the hurtful effects of it ; and that image of
meekness and humility arising from this, in conjunction with a natural tender-
ness of mind, fear, self-diffidence, yieldableness, and confidence in parents and
others older than themselves. And so, they are recommended as patterns of
virtue no more than doves, which are a harmless sort of creature, and have an
image of the virtues of meekness and love. Even according to Dr. Taylor's-
own doctrine, no more can be made of it than this : for his scheme will not ad-
mit of any such thing as positive virtue, or virtuous disposition, in infants ; he
insisting (as was observed before) that virtue must be the fruit of thought and
reflection. But there can be no thought and reflection, that produces positive
virtue, in children, not yet capable of moral action ; and it is such children he
speaks of. And that little children have a negative virtue, or innocence, in re-
lation to the positive acts and hurtful effects of vice, is no argument that they
have not a corrupt nature within them : for let their nature be ever so corrupt,
yet surely it is no wonder that they be not guilty oi positive wicked action, be-
fore they are capable of any moral action at all. A young viper has a malig-
nant nature, though incapable of doing a malignant action, and at present ap-
pearing a harmless creature.
Another objection, which Dr. Taylor and some others offer against this
doctrine, is, That it pours contempt upon the human nature.f
But their declaiming on this topic is like addressing the affections and con-
ceits of children, rather than rational arguing with men. It seems, this doctrine
is not complaisant enough. I am sensible, it is not suited to the taste of some,
who are so very delicate (to say no worse) that they can bear nothing but com-
pliment and flattery. No contempt is by this doctrine cast upon the noble fac-
ulties and capacities of man's nature, or the exalted business, and divine and
immortal happiness he is made capable of. And as to speaking ill of man's
present moral state, I presume, it will not be denied, that shame belongs to them
that are truly sinful ; and to suppose, that this is not the native character of
* Pages 77, 78, 5. t Pages 74, 75, 5.
ORIGINAL SIN. 503
mankind, is still but meanly begging the question. If we, as we come into the
world, are truly sinful, and consequently miserable, he acts but a friendly part
to us, who endeavors fully to discover and manifest our disease. Whereas, on
.he contrary, he acts an unfriendly part, who to his utmost hides it from us ; and
so, in effect, does what in him lies to prevent our seeking a remedy from that,
which, if not remedied in time, must bring us finally to shame and everlasting
contempt, and end in perfect and remediless destruction hereafter.
Another objection, which some have made against this doctrine, much like
the former, is, That it tends to beget in us an ill opinion of our fellow creatures,
and so to promote ill nature and mutual hatred.
To which I would say, If it be truly so, that we all come sinful into the world
then our heartily acknowledging it, tends to promote humility : but our disown-
ing that sin and guilt, which truly belongs to us, and endeavoring to persuade
ourselves that we are vastly better than in truth we are, tends to a foolish self-
exaltation and pride. And it is manifest, by reason, experience, and the word
of God, that pride is the chief source of all the contention, mutual haired and ill
will, which are so prevalent in the world ; and that nothing so effectually pro-
motes the contrary tempers and deportments, as humility. This doctrine teaches
us to think no worse of others, than of ourselves : it teaches us, that we are
all, as we are by nature, companions in a miserable, helpless condition ; which,
under a revelation of the divine mercy, tends to promote mutual compassion.
And nothing has a greater tendency to promote those amiable dispositions of
mercy, forbearance, long-suffering, gentleness and forgiveness, than a sense of
our own extreme unworthiness and misery, and the infinite need we have of the
divine pity, forbearance and forgiveness, together with a hope of obtaining
mercy. If the doctrine, which teaches that mankind are corrupt by nature,
tends to promote ill will, why should not Dr. Taylor's doctrine tend to it as much 1
For he teaches us, that the generality of mankind are very wicked, having
made themselves so by their own free choice, without any necessity ; which is a
way of becoming wicked, that renders men truly worthy of resentment ; but the
other not at all, even according to his own doctrine.
Another exclamation against this doctrine, is, That it tends to hinder comfort
and jo?- and to promote melancholy and gloominess of mind.
To which I shall briefly say, Doubtless, supposing men are really become
sinful, and so exposed to the displeasure of God, by whatever means, if they once
come to have their eyes opened, and are not very stupid, the reflection on their
case will tend to make them sorrowful ; and it isft, it should. Men, with whom
this is the case, may well be filled with sorrow, till they are sincerely willing to
forsake their sins, and turn to God. But there is nothing in this doctrine, that
in the least stands in the way of comfort and exceeding joy, to such as find in
their hearts a sincere willingness, wholly to forsake all sin, and give their hearts
and whole selves to Christ, and comply with the gospel method of salvation in
him.
Another thing objected is, that to make men believe that wickedness belongs
to their very nature, tends to encourage them in sin, and plainly to lead them
to all manner of iniquity ; because they are taught that sin is natural, and there-
fore necessary and unavoidable*
But if this doctrine, which teaches that sin is natural to us, does also at the
same time teach us, that it is never the better, or less to be condemned, for
rts being natural, then it does not at all encourage sin, any more than Dr. Tay-
* Page 231, and some other places.
504 ORIGINAL SIN.
lor's doctrine encourages wickedness, when it is become inveterate ; who teaches,
that such as by custom have contracted strong habits of sin, are unable to help
themselves* And is it reasonable to represent it as encouraging a man's boldly
neglecting and wilfully continuing in his disease, without seeking a cure, to tell
him of his disease, to show him that his disease is real and very fatal, and what
he can never cure himself of; yet withal directing him to a great physician^ who
is sufficient for his restoration ? But for a more particular answer to what is
objected against the doctrine of our natural impotence and inability, as being an
encouragement to go on in sin, and a discouragement to the use of all means
for our help, I must for brevity refer the reader to what has been largely written
on this head in my discourse on the Freedom of the Will.
Our author is pleased to advance another notion, among others, by way of o&-
jcction against the doctrine of Original Sin ; that if this doctrine be true, it would
be unlawful to beget children, tie says,f " If natural generation be the means of
unavoidably conveying all sin and wickedness into the world, it must itself
be a sivful and unlawful thing." Now, if there be any force of argument here,
it lies in this proposition, " Whatsoever is a means, or occasion of the certain, in-
fallible existence of sin and wickedness, must itself he sinful." But I imagine
Dr. Taylor had not thoroughly weighed this proposition, nor considered where it
would carry him. For God's continuing in being the devil, and others that are
finally given up to wickedness, will be attended, most certainly and infallibly,
with an eternal series of the most hateful and horrid wickedness. But will any be
guilty of such vile blasphemy, as to say, therefore God's upholding them in be-
ing is itself a sinful thing 1 In the same place our author says, " So far as we
are generated in sin, it must be a sin to generate." But there is no appearance
of evidence in that position, any more than in this : " So far as any is upheld in
existence in sin, it is a sin to uphold them in existence." Yea, if there were
any reason in the case, it would be strongest in the latter position ; for parents,
as Dr. Taylor himself observes, are not the authors of the beginning of existence ;
whereas, God is truly the author of the continuance of existence. As it is the
known will of God, to continue Satan and millions of others in being, though
the most sure consequence is the continuance of a vast infernal world, full of
everlasting hellish wickedness ; so it is part of the revealed will of God, that this
world of mankind should be continued, and the species propagated, for his own
wise and holy purposes ; which will is complied with by the parents joined in
lawful marriage ; whose children, though they come into the world in sin, yet
are capable subjects of eternal holiness and happiness ; which infinite benefits for
their children, parents have great reason to encourage a hope of, in the way of
giving up their children to God in faith, through a Redeemer, and bringing
them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. I think, this may be an-
swer enough to such a cavil.
Another objection is, that the doctrine of Original Sin is no oftener, and no
more plainly spoken of in Scripture ; it being, if true, a very important doctrine.
Dr. Taylor, in many parts of his book suggests to his readers, that there are
very few texts, in the whole Bible, wherein there is the least appearance of
their teaching any such doctrine.
Of this I took notice before, but would here say further, that the reader who
has perused the preceding defence of this doctrine, must now be left to judge for
himself, whether there be any ground for such an allegation ; whether there be
not texts in sufficient number, both in the Old Testament and New, that exhibit
* See his exposition of Rom. vii. p. 205 — 220. But especially in his Paraphprase and Notes on the
Epistle. f Page 145.
ORIGINAL SIN. 505
undeniable evidence of this great article of Christian divinity ; and whether i1
be not a doctrine taught in the Scripture with great plainness. I think there
are few, if any, doctrines of revelation, taught more plainly and expressly. In-
deed, it is taught in an explicit manner more in the New Testament, than in
the Old ; which is not to be wondered at ; it being thus with respect to all the
most important doctrines of revealed religion.
But if it had been so, that this doctrine were rarely taught in Scripture ; yet
if we find that it is indeed a thing declared to us by God, if there be good evi-
dence of its being held forth to us by any word of his, then what belongs to us
is, to believe his word, and receive the doctrine which he teaches us, and not,
instead of this, to prescribe to him how often he shall speak of it, and to insist
upon knowing what reasons he has for speaking of it no oftener, before we will
receive what he teaches us, or to pretend that he should give us an account,
why he did not speak of it so plainly as we think he ought to have done, soone?
than he did. In this way of proceeding, if it be reasonable, the Sadducees of
old, who denied any resurrection or future state, might have maintained their
cause against Christ, when he blamed them for " not knowing the Scriptures,
nor the power of God ;" and for not understanding by the Scripture that there
would be a resurrection to spiritual enjoyment, and not to animal life, and sensu-
al gratifications ; and they might have insisted that these doctrines, if true, were
very important, and therefore ought to have been spoken of in the Scriptures
oftener and more explicitly, and not that the church of God should be left, till
that time, with only a/eio, obscure intimations of that which. so infinitely con-
cerned them. And they might with disdain have rejected Christ's argument by
way of inference, from God's calling himself, in the Books of Moses, the God
of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. For answer they might have said, that Moses
was sent on purpose to teach the people the mind and will of God ; and there-
fore, if these doctrines were true, he ought in reason and in truth to have taught
them plainly and frequently, and not have left the people to spell out so impor-
tant a doctrine, only from God's saying, that he was the God of Abraham, &c
One great end of the Scripture is to teach the world what manner of being
God is ; about which the world, without revelation, has been so wofully in the
dark ; and that God is an infinite being, is a doctrine of great importance, and
a doctrine sufficiently taught in the Scripture. But yet it appears to me, this doc-
trine is not taught there, in any measure, with such explicitness and precision,
as the doctrine of Original Sin ; and the Socinians, who deny God's omnipre-
sence and omniscience, have as much room left them for cavil, as the Pela-
gians, who deny Original Sin.
Dr. Taylor particularly urges, that Christ says not one word of this doctrine
throughout the four gospels; which doctrine, if true, being so important, and
what°so nearly concerned the great work of redemption, which he came to
work out (as is supposed), one would think, it should have been emphatically
spoken of in every page of the gospels.* <
In reply to this it may be observed, that by the account given in the four
gospels, Christ was continually saying those things which plainly implied, that
all men in their original state are sinful and miserable. As, when he declared
that " they which are whole, need not a physician, but they which are sick ;f
that " he came to seek and to save that which was lost ;"J that it was necessa-
ry for all to be born again, and to be converted, and that otherwise they could
not enter into the kingdom of heaven ;§ and that all were sinners, as well as
* Pages 242, 243. t Matt. ix. 12. X Matt, xviii. 11, Luke xix. 10. § Matt, xviii. 3.
506 ORIGINAL SIN.
those whose blood Pilate mingled with their sacrifices, &c, and that every one
who did not repent should perish ;* withal directing every one to pray to God
for forgiveness ofsin;f using our necessity of forgiveness from God, as an ar-
gument with all to forgive the injuries of their neighbors;! teaching that
earthly parents, though kind to their children, are in themselves evil ;§ and
signifying, that things carnal and corrupt, are properly the things of men ;||
warning his disciples rather to beware of men, than of wild beasts ;T[ often re-
presenting the world as evil, as wicked in its works, at enmity with truth and
holiness, and hating him ;** yea, and teaching plainly, that all men are ex-
tremely and inexpressibly sinful, owing ten thousand talents to their divine
creditor.ft
And whether Christ did not plainly teach JVicodemus the doctrine of origi-
nal total depravity, when he came to him to know what his doctrine was, must
be left to the reader to judge, from what has been already observed on John iii.
1 — 11. And besides, Christ, in the course of his preaching, took the most prop-
er method to convince men of the corruption of their nature, and to give them
an effectual and practical knowledge of it, in application to themselves, in par-
ticular, by teaching and urging the holy and strict law of God, in its extent and
spirituality and dreadful threatenings. Which, above all things, tends to search
the hearts of men, and to teach them their inbred, exceeding depravity ; not
merely as a matter of speculation, but by proper conviction of conscience ;
which is the only knowledge of Original Sin, that can avail to prepare the mind
for receiving Christ's redemption ; as a man's sense of his own sickness pre-
pares him to apply in good earnest to the physician.
And as to Christ's being no more frequent and particular in mentioning and
inculcating this point in a docttinal manner, it is probable one reason to be givew
for it, is the same that is to be given for his speaking no oftener of God's creat-
ing the world : which, though so important a doctrine, is scarce ever spoken of
in any of Christ's discourses ; and no wonder, seeing this was a matter which
the Jews, to whom he confined his personal ministry, had all been instructed in
from their forefathers, and never was called in question among them. And there
is a great deal of reason, from the ancient Jewish writers, to suppose that the
doctrine of Original Sin had ever been allowed in the open profession of that
people ;|J though they were generally, in that corrupt time, very far from a prac-
* Luke xiii. 1 — 5. t Matt vi. 12, Luke xi. 4. t Matt. vi. 14, 15, and xviii. 35. § Matt. vii.
11. || Matt. xvi. 23. IT Matt. x. 16, 17. ** John vii. 7, viii. 23, xiv. 17, xv. 18, 19. +t Matt,
xviii. 21, to the end.
tt What is found in the more ancient of the Jewish Rabbies, who have wrote since the coming of
Christ, is an argument of this. Many things of this sort are taken notice of by Stapferus, in his Theolo-
gia Polemica before mentioned. Some of these things which are there cited by him in Latin, I shall here
faithfully give in English for the sake of the English reader.
" — So Manasseh, concerning Human Frailty, page 129. Gen. viii. 21, " i" will not any more curse the
earth for man s sake ;for the appetite of man is evil from his youth ;" that is, from the time when he comes
forth from his mother's womb. For at the same time that he sucks the breasts, he follows his lust ; ana
while he is yet an infant, he is under the dominion of anger, envy, hatred, and other vices to which that
tender age is obnoxious. Prov. xxii. 15, Solomon says, " Foolishness is bound to the mind of a child."
Concerning which place, R. Levi Ben Gersom observes thus : " Foolishness, as it were, grows to him in his very
beginning." Concerning this sin, which is common and original to all men, David said, Psalm li. 5, " Be-
hold, I was begotten in iniquity, and in sin did my mother warm me." Upon which place Eben Ezra says thus :
** Behold, because of the concupiscence which is innate in the heart of man, it is said, lam begotten in ini-
quity." And the sense is, that there is implanted in the heart of man, Tetzer harang, an evil figment, from
his nativity.
" And Manasseh Ben Israel, de Fragil, page 2, " Behold, I was formed in iniquity, and in sin hath *nj
mother warmed me." But whether this be understood concerning the common mother, which was Eve,
or whether David spake only of his own mother, he would signify, that sin is as it were natural, and insepa-
rable in this life. Fo r it is to be observed, that Eve conceived after the transgression was ccmmitted ;
and as many as were begotten afterwards, were not brought forth in a conformity to the rule of right rea-
son, but in conformity to disorderly and lustful affections." He addjs, " One of the wise men of the Jews,
nameiy, R Aha, rightly observed, David would signify that it is impossible, even for pious men who excel
ORIGINAL SIN. 507
tiral conviction of it ; and many notions were then prevalent, especially among
tbe Pharisees, which were indeed inconsistent with it. And though on account
of these prejudices they might need to have this doctrine explained and applied
to them, yet it is well known, by all acquainted with their Bibles, that Christ,
for wise reasons, spake more sparingly and obscurely of several of the most im-
portant doctrines of revealed religion, relating to the necessity, grounds, nature,
and way of his redemption, and the method of the justification of sinners, while
he lived here in the flesh, and left these doctrines to be more plainly and fully
opened and inculcated by the Holy Spirit, after his ascension.
But if after all, Christ did not speak of this doctrine often enough to suit Dr.
Taylor, he might be asked, Why he supposes Christ did no oftener, and no more
plainly teach some of his (Dr. Taylor's) doctrines, which he so much insists on ?
As, that temporal death comes on all mankind by Adam; and, that it comes
on them by him, not as a punishment or calamity, but as a great favor, being
made a rich benefit, and a fruit of God's abundant grace, by Christ's redemption,
who came into the world as a second Adam for this end. Surely, if this were
so, it was of vast importance, that it should be known to the church of God in
all ages, who saw death reigning over infants, as well as others. If infants were
indeed perfectly innocent, was it not needful, that the design of that which was
such a melancholy and awful dispensation towards so many millions of innocent
creatures, should be known, in order to prevent the worst thoughts of God from
in virtue, never to commit any sin." Job also asserts the same thing with David, chap. xiv. 4, saying,
" Who will give a clean thing from an unclean ? Truly not one." Concerning which words Aben Ezra say»
thus : " The sense is the same with that, I was begotten in iniquity, because man is made out of an unclean
thing." Stapferus, Theolog. Polem. Tom. iii. p. 36, 37.
Id. Ibid, p. 132, &c. " So Sal Jarchi ad Gemaram, Cod. Schabbath, fol. 142, p. 2, " And this is not only
to be referred to sinners, because all the posterity of theirs* man are in like manner subjected to all the
curses pronounced on him." And Manasseh Ben Israel, in his Preface to Human Frailty, says, " I had a
mind to show by what means it came to pass, that when the first father of all had lost his righteousness, his
posterity are begotten liable to the same punishment with him." And Munsterus, on the gospel of Matthew,
cites the following words from the book called The Bundle of Myrrh : " The blessed Lord said to the^rtl
man, when he cursed him, Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee ; and thou shalt eat the herb of the
field. The thing which he means, is, that because of his sin, all who should descend from him should be
wicked and perverse, like thorns and thistles, according to that word of the Lord, speaking to the Prophet :
Thorns and irritators are with thee, and thou dwellest among scorpions. And all this is from the serpent,
who was the Devil, Sam-mael, who emitted a mortiferous and corruptive poison into Eve, and became the
cause of death to Adam himself, when he ate the fruit. Remarkable is the place quoted in Joseph de
Voisin, against Martin Raymund,v>. 471, of Master Menachem Rakanatensis, Sect. Bereschit, from Mid-
rasch Tehillim,xv\\ich is cited by Hoornbekius, against the Jews, in these words : " It is no wonder that the
sin of Adam and Eve is written and sealed with the king's ring, and to be propagated to all following
generations ; because on the day that Adam was created, all things were finished ; so that he stood forth
the perfection and completion of the whole workmanship of the world ; so when he sinned, the whole world
sinned, whose sin we bear and suffer. But the matter is not thus with respect to the sins of his posterity."
Thus far Stapferus.
Besides these, as Ainsworth on Gen. viii. 21, observes, " In Bereshith Rabba (a Hebrew commentary
on this place), a Rabbin is said to be asked, When is the evil imagination put into man ? And he answered,
From the hour that he is formed." And in Pool's Synopsis it is added from Grotius, " So Rabbi Solomon
interprets Gen. viii. 21, The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth, of its being evil from the
time that he is taken out of his mother's bowels." Aben Ezra thus interprets Psalm li. 5. / was shapen
m iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me ; that evil concupiscence is implanted in the heart from
childhood, as if he were formed in it; and by my mother, he understands Eve, who did not bear children
till she had sinned. And so Kafvenaki says, How shall I avoid sinning ? My original is corrupt, and from
thence are those sins. So Manasseh Ben Israel, from this place ( Psalm li. 5) concludes that not only David,
but all mankind, ever since sin was introduced into the world, do sin from their original. To this pur-
pose is the answer of Rabbi Hakkadosch, which there is an account of in the Talmud. From what tim*
does concupiscence rule over man ? From the very moment of his first formation, or from his nativity ?
Answ. From his formation." Pool's Synops. in Loc.
On these things I observe, there is the greatest reason to suppose that these old Rabbies of the Jewish
nation, who gave such heed to the Tradition of the Elders, would never have received this doctrine of
Origijial Sin, had it not been delivered down to them from theirforefathers. For it is a doctrine very dis-
agreeable to those practical principles and notions wherein the religion of the unbelieving Jews most
fundamentally differs from the religion maintained among Christians ; particularly their notion of justifi-
cation by their own righteousness and privileges as the children of Abraham, &c, without standing in
need of any satisfaction by the sufferings of the Messiah. On which account the modern Jews do now
universally reject the doctrine of Origina Pit and corruption of nature, as Stapferus observes. And it is
508 ORIGINAL SIN.
arising in the minds of the constant spectators of so mysterious and gloomy
dispensation ? But why then such a total silence about it, for four thousand
years together, and not one "word of it in all the Old Testament ; nor one word of
it in all the four gospels ; and indeed not one word of it in the whole Bible, but
only as forced and wrung out by Dr. Taylor's arts of criticism and deduction,
against the plainest and strongest evidence !
As to the arguments, made use of by many late writers, from the universal
moral sense, and the reasons they offer from experience, and observation of the
nature of mankind, to show that we are born into the world with principles of ,
virtue; with a natural prevailing relish, approbation, and love of righteousness,
truth, and goodness, and of whatever tends to the public welfare ; with a pre-
vailing natural disposition to dislike, to resent and condemn what is selfish, un-
just and immoral ; and a native bent in mankind to mutual benevolence, tender
compassion, &c, those who have had such objections against the doctrine of
Original Sin, thrown in their way, and desire to see them particularly considered,
1 ask leave to refer them to a Treatise on the Nature of true Virtue, lying by
me prepared for the press, which may erelong be exhibited to public view.
not at all likely that the ancient Jews, if no such doctrine had been received by tradition from the fathers,
would have taken it up from the Christians, whom they had in such great contempt and enmity ; especially
as it is a doctrine so peculiarly agreeable to the Christian notion of the spiritual salvation of Jesus, and
so contrary to their carnal notions of the Messiah, and of his salvation and kingdom, and so contrary to
their opinion of themselves, and a doctrine, which men in general are so apt to be prejudiced against.
And besides, these Robbies do expressly refer to the opinion of their forefathers ; as R. Manasseh says,
" According to the opinion ofcthe ancients, none are subject to death, but those which have sinned: for
where there is no sin, there is no death." — Stapfer. Tom. iii. p. 37, 38.
But we have more direct evidence, that the doctrine of Original Sin was truly a received doctrine
among the ancient Jews, even before the coming of Christ. This appears by ancient Jewish writings,
which were written before Christ ; as, in the apocrypha, 2 Esdras, iii. 21, " For the first Adam, bearing
a wicked heart, transgressed, and was overcome ; and so be all they that are born of him. The infirmi- ,
ty was made permanent ; and the law also in the heart of the people, with the malignity of the root ; so
that the good departed away, and the evil abode still."— 2 Esdras iv. 30, " For the grain of evil seed hath
been sown in the heart of Adam, from the beginning ; and how much ungodliness hath it brought up unto
this time ? And how much shall it yet bring forth, till the time of threshing shall come !*.' And chap. vii.
46, " It had been better, not to have given the earth unto Adam ; or else, when it was given him, to have
restrained him from sinning ; for what profit is it, for men now in this present time, to live in heaviness,
and after death to look for punishment ? 0 thou Adam, what hast thou done ! For though it was thou that
sinned, thou art not fallen alone, but we all that come of thee." And we read, Eccl. xxv. 24, " 01 the
woman came the beginning of sin, and through her we all die."
As this doctrine of original corruption was constantly maintained in the church of God from the be- \
ginning ; so from thence, in all probability, as well as from the evidence of it in universal experience, it
was, that the wiser Heathen maintained the like doctrine. Particularly Plato, that great philosopher, so
distinguished for his veneration of ancient traditions, and diligent inquiries after them. Gale, in his
Court of the Gentiles, observes as follows : " Plato says (Gorg. fol. 493), I have heard from the wise men,
that we are now dead, and that the body is but our sepulchre. And in his Timceus Locrus (fol. 103) he
says, The cause of vitiosityis from our parents, and first principles, rather than from ourselves..
So thai we never relinquish those actions, which lead us to follow these primitive blemishes of our
first parents. Plato mentions the corruption of the will, and seems to disown any free will to true
good ; albeit he allows some tv<pv'ia, or natural dispositions, to civil good, in some great heroes. Socrates
asserted the corruption of human nature, or kokov e^vrov. Grotius affirms, that the philosophers ac-
knowledged, it was connatural to men, to sin."
Seneca (Benef. v. 14) says, " Wickedness has not its first beginning in wicked practice ; though by-
that it is first exercised and made manifest." And Plutarch{de Sera vindicta) says, " Man does not first
become wicked, when he first manifests himself so : but he hath wickednessyrom the beginning ; and
he shows it as soon as he finds opportunity and ability. As men rightly judge, that the sting is not firs*
engendered in scorpions when they strike, or the poison in vipers when they bite." — Pool's Synops. on
Gen. viii. 21.
To which may be subjoined what Juvenal says :
— Ad mores natura recurrit.
Damnatos, fixa et maturi nescia.'
Englisned thus, in prose :
Nature, a thing fixed and not knowing how to change, returns to its wicked manners.
Watts' Ruin and Recovery.
ORIGINAL SIN 609
CONCLUSION.
On the whole, I observe, there are some other things, besides arguments,
in Dr. Taylor's book, which are calculated to influence the minds, and bias the
judgments of some sorts of readers. Here, not to insist on taking the profession
he makes, in many places, of sincerity, humility, meekness, modesty, charity,
&c, in his searching after truth ; and freely proposing his thoughts, with the rea-
sons of them, to others ;* nor on his magisterial assurance, appearing on many
occasions, and the high contempt he sometimes expresses of the opinions and
arguments of very excellent divines and fathers in the church of God, who have
thought differently from him :f both of which things, it is not unlikely, may
have a degree of influence on some of his readers. (However, that they may
have only their just influence, these things might properly be compared together,
and set in contrast, one with the other.) — I say, not to dwell on these matters,
I would take some notice of another thing, observable in the writings of Dr.
Taylor, and many of the late opposers of the more peculiar doctrines of Chris-
tianity, tending (especially with juvenile and unwary readers) not a little to
abate the force, and prevent the due effect, of the clearest Scripture evidences,
in favor of those important doctrines ; and particularly to make void the argu-
ments taken from the writings of the Apostle Paul, in which those doctrines are
more plainly and fully revealed, than in any other part of the Bible. What I
mean is this : these gentlemen express a high opinion of this apostle, and that
very justly, for his eminent genius, his admirable sagacity, strong powers of
reasoning, acquired learning, &c. They speak of him as a writer — of masterly
address, of extensive reach, and deep design, everywhere in his epistles, almost
in every word he says. This looks exceeding specious : it carries a plausible ap-
pearance of Christian zeal, and attachment to the Holy Scriptures, in such a
testimony of high veneration for that great apostle, who was not only the prin-
cipal instrument of propagating Christianity, but with his own hand wrote so
considerable a part of the New Testament. And I am far from determining,
with respect at least to some of these Writers, that they are not sincere in their
declarations, or that all is mere artifice, only to make way for the reception
of their own peculiar sentiments. However, it tends greatly to subserve such a
purpose ; as much as if it were designedly contrived, with the utmost subtlety,
for that end. Hereby their incautious readers are prepared the more easily to
be drawn into a belief, that they, and others in their way of thinking, have not
rightly understood many of those things in this apostle's writings, which before
seemed very plain to them ; and they are also prepared, by a prepossession in
favor of these new writers, to entertain a favorable thought of the interpretations
put by them upon the words and phrases of this apostle ; and to admit in many
passages a meaning which before lay entirely out of sight ; quite foreign to all
that in the view of a common reader seems to be their obvious sense ; and most
remote from the expositions agreed in, by those which used to be esteemed the
greatest divines, and best commentators. For they must know, that this apos-
3e, being a man of no vulgar understanding, it is nothing strange if his mean-
ing lies very deep ; and no wonder then, if the superficial discerning and obser-
vation of vulgar Christians, or indeed of the herd of common divines, such as
the Westminster Assembly, &c, falls vastly short of the apostle's reach, and
frequently does not enter into the true spirit and design of Paul's epistles. They
♦ See his Preface, and pages 6, 237, 265, 267, 175, S. t Pages 110, 125, 150, 151, 159, 161
183 188,77, S.
510 ORIGINAL SIN.
ren-
must understand, that the Jirst reformers, and preachers and expositors in gen-
eral, both before and since the reformation, for fifteen or sixteen hundred years
past, were too unlearned and shortsighted, to be capable of penetrating into the
sense, or fit to undertake the making comments on the writings of so great a
man as this apostle ; or else had dwelt in a cave of bigotry and superstition,
too gloomy to allow them to use their own understandings with freedom, in
reading the Scripture. But at the same time, it must be understood, that there
is risen up, now at length in this happy age of light and liberty, a set of men,
of a more free and generous turn of mind, a more inquisitive genius, and better
discernment. By such insinuations they seek advantage to their cause ; and
thus the most unreasonable and extravagant interpretations of Scripture are
palliated and recommended : so that, if the simple reader is not very much on
his guard, if he does not clearly see with his own eyes, or has too much indo-
lence, or too little leisure, thoroughly to examine for himself (as few, alas, are
willing to be at the pains of acquainting themselves thoroughly with the apos-
tle's writings, and of comparing one part of them with another, so as to be fully
able to judge of these gentlemen's glosses and pretences) ; in this case, he is in
danger of being imposed on with delusive appearances ; as he is prepared by
this fair pretext of exalting the sagacity of the apostle, and by a parade of
learning, criticism, exact version, penetration into the new scope, and discerning
of wonderful connections, together with the airs these writers assume of dicta-
torial peremptoriness, and contempt of old opinions and old expositions ; 1 say,
such a one is by these things prepared to swallow strange doctrine, as trusting
to the superior abilities of these modern interpreters.
But I humbly conceive, their interpretations, particularly of the Apostle
Paul's writings, though in some things ingenious, yet in many things con-
cerning these great articles of religion, are extremely absurd, and demonstrably
disagreeable, in the highest degree, to his real design, to the language he com-
monly uses, and to the doctrines currently taught in his epistles. Their criticisms,
when examined, appear far more subtle, than solid ; and it seems as if nothing
can possibly be strong enough, nothing perspicuous enough, in any composure
whatever, to stand before such liberties as these writers indulge : the plainest
and most nervous discourse is analyzed and criticised, till it dissolves into nothing,
or till it becomes a thing of little significance : the holy Scripture is subtilized
into a mere mist ; or made to evaporate into a thin cloud, that easily puts on
any shape, and is moved in any direction, with a puff of wind, just as the man-
ager pleases. It is not in the nature and power of language, to afford sufficient
defence against such an art, so abused ; as, I imagine, a due consideration of
some things I have had occasion in the preceding discourse to observe, may
abundantly convince us.
But this, with the rest of what I have offered on this subject of Original Sin,
must be left to every candid reader to judge of, for himself; and the success of
the whole must now be left with God, who knows what is agreeable to his own
mind, and is able to make his own truths prevail ; however mysterious they
may seem to the poor, partial, narrow, and extremely imperfect views of mor-
tals, while looking through a cloudy and delusory medium; and however disa-
greeable they may be to the innumerable prejudices of men's hearts : and who
has promised, that the gospel of Christ, such as is really his, shall finally be
victorious ; and has assured us, that the word which goeth out of his mouth,
shall not return to him void, bid shall accomplish that which he pleaseth, and
shall prosper in the thing whereto he sends it. Let God arise, and plead his own
•^ause, and glorify his own great name. Amen.
MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS
CONCERNING
THE DIVINE DECREES IN GENERAL,
AND
ELECTION IN PARTICULAR.
DECREES AND ELECTION. 513
MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS.
CONCERNING THE DIVINE DECREES IN GENERAL, AND ELECTION IN PARTICULAR.
§ 1. Whether God has decreed all things that ever came to pass or not,
all that own the being of a God, own that he knows all things beforehand.
Now, it is self-evident, that if he knows all things beforehand, he either doth
approve of them, or he doth not approve of them ; that is, he either is willing
they should be, or he is not willing they should be. But to will that they
should be, is to decree them.
§ 2. The Arminians ridicule the distinction between the secret and revealed
will of God, or, more properly expressed, the distinction between the decree and
law of God ; because we say he may decree one tiling, and command another.
And so they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of his contradicted
another. However, if they will call this a contradiction of wills, we know that
there is such a thing ; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We
and they know it was God's secret will that Abraham should not sacrifice his
son Isaac ; but yet his command was, that he should do it We know that
God willed, that Pharaoh's heart should be hardened ; and yet, that the hard-
ness of his heart was sin. We know that God willed the Egyptians should
hate God's people : Psal. cv. 25, " He turned their heart to hate his people,
and deal subtilly with his servants." We know that it was God's will, that
Absalom should lie with David's wives ; 2 Sam. xii. 11, " Thus saith the Lord,
I will raise up this evil against thee, out of thine own house ; and I will take
thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbor ; and he shall
lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun. For thou didst it secretly ; but I will
do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun." We know that God willed
that Jeroboam and the ten tribes should rebel. The same may be said of the
plunder of the Babylonians ; and other instances might be given. The Scrip-
ture plainly tells us, that God wills to harden some men, Rom. ix. 18. That
he willed that Christ should be killed by men, &c.
§ 3. It is most certain, that if there are any things so contingent, that there
is an equal possibility of their being or not being, so that they may be, or they
may not be ; God foreknows from all eternity that they may be, and also that they
may not be. All will grant that we need no revelation to teach us this. And
furthermore, if God knows all things that are to come to pass, he also fore-
knows whether those contingent things are to come to pass or no, at the same
time that they are contingent, and that they may or may not come to pass. But
what a contradiction is it to say that God knows a thing will come to pass, and
yet at the same time knows that it is contingent whether it will come to pass or no ;
that is, he certainly knows that it will come to pass, and yet certainly knows it
mav net corre to pass ! What a contradiction is it to say, that God certainly
Vol. II. 65
514 DECREES AND ELECTION.
foreknew that Judas would betray his master, or Peter deny him, and yet cer
tainly knew that it might be otherwise, or certainly knew that he might be de
ceived ! I suppose it will be acknowledged by all, that for God certainly t6
know a thing will be, and yet certainly to know that it may not be, is the same
thing as certainly to know that he may be deceived. I suppose it will also be
acknowledged, that certainly to know a thing, and also at the same time to
know that we may be deceived in it, is the same thing as certainly to know it,
and certainly to know that we are uncertain of it, or that we do not certainly
know it ; and that is the same thing as certainly to know it, and not certainly
to know it at the same time ; which we leave to be considered, whether it be
not a contradiction.
§ 4. The meaning of the word absolute, when used about the decrees, wants
to be stated. It is commonly said that God decrees nothing upon a foresight of
any thing in the creature ; as this, they say, argues imperfection in God ; and
so it does, taken in the sense that they commonly intend it. But nobody, I believe,
will deny but that God decrees many things that he would not have decreed, if he
had not foreknown and foredetermined such and such other things. What we
mean, we completely express thus — That God decrees all things harmoniously,
and in excellent order, one thing harmonizes with another, and there is such a
relation between all the decrees, as makes the most excellent order. Thus God
decrees rain in drought, because he decrees the earnest prayers of his people ;
or thus, he decrees the prayers of his people, because he decrees rain. I ac-
knowledge, to say, God decrees a thing because, is an improper wray of speak-
ing ; but not more improper than all our other ways of speaking about God.
God decrees the latter event, because of the former, no more than he decrees
the former, because of the latter. But this is what we mean — When God de-
crees to give the blessing of rain, he decrees the prayers of his people 5 and
when he decrees the prayers of his people for rain, he very commonly decrees
rain ; and thereby there is a harmony between these two decrees, of rain, and
the prayers of God's people. Thus also, when he decrees diligence and indus-
try, he decrees riches and prosperity ; when he decrees prudence, he often de-
crees success ; when he decrees striving, then he often decrees the obtaining the
kingdom of heaven ; when he decrees the preaching of the gospel, then he de-
crees the bringing home of souls to Christ ; when he decrees good natural fac-
ulties, diligence and good advantages, then he decrees learning ; when he
decrees summer, then he decrees the growing of plants ; when he decrees coh-
formity to His Son, then he decrees calling ; when he decrees calling, then he
decrees justification ; and when he decrees justification, then he decrees ever-
lasting glory. Thus, all the decrees of God are harmonious ; and this is all
that can be said for or against absolute or conditional decrees. But this I say,
it is as improper to make one decree a condition of another, as to make the other
a condition of that : but there is a harmony between both.
§ 5. It cannot be any injustice in God to determine who is certainly to sin,
and so certainly to be damned. For, if we suppose this impossibility, that God
had not determined any thing, things would happen as fatally as they do now.
For, as to such an absolute contingency, which they attribute to man's will,
calling it the sovereignty of the will ; if they mean, by this sovereignty of will,
that a man can will as he wills, it is perfect nonsense, and the same as if they
should spend abundance of time and pains, and be very hot at proving,
that a man can will when he doth will ; that is, that it is possible for that to be,
which is. But if they mean, that there is a perfect contingency in the will of
jnar , that is, that it happens merely by chance that a man wills such a thing,
DECREES AND ELECTION. 515
and not another, it is an impossibility and contradiction, that a thing should be
without any cause or reason, and when there was every way as much cause
why it should not have been. Wherefore, seeing things do unavoidably go
fatally and necessarily, what injustice is it in the Supreme Being, seeing it is a
contradiction that it should be otherwise, to decree that they should be as they
are?
§ 6. Contingency, as it is holden by some, is at the same time contradicted
by themselves, if they hold foreknowledge. This is all that follows from an
absolute, unconditional, irreversible decree, that it is impossible but that the
things decreed should be. The same exactly follows from foreknowledge, that
it is absolutely impossible but that the thing certainly foreknown should precise-
ly come to pass.
If it will universally hold, that none can have absolutely perfect and complete
happiness, at the same time that any thing is otherwise than he desires at that
time it should be ; or thus, if it be true, that he has not absolute, perfect, infi-
nite and all possible happiness now, who has not now all that he wills to have
now : then God, if any thing is now otherwise than he wills to have it now, is
not now absolutely, perfectly and infinitely happy. If God is infinitely happy
now, then every thing is now, as God would have it to be now ; if every thing,
then those things that are contrary to his commands. If so, it is not ridiculous to
say, that things which are contrary to God's commands, are yet in a sense
agreeable to his will. Again, let it be considered whether it be not certainly
true, that every one that can with infinite ease have a thing done, and yet will
not have it done, wills it not ; that is, whether or no he that wills not to have a
thing done, properly wills not to have a thing done. For example, let the
thing be this, that Judas should be faithful to his Lord ; whether it be not true,
that if God could with infinite ease have it done as he would, but would not
have it done as he could, if he would, it be not proper to say, that God would
not have it be, that Judas should be faithful to his Lord.
§ 7. They say, to what purpose are praying and striving, and attending on
means, if all was irreversibly determined by God before ? But, to say that all
was determined before these prayers and strivings, is a very wrong way of speak-
ing, and begets those ideas in the mind, which correspond with no realities with
respect to God. The decrees of our everlasting state wrere not before our pray-
ers and strivings ; for these are as much present with God from all eternity, as
they are the moment they are present with us. They are present as part of his
decrees, or rather as the same ; and they did as really exist in eternity, with re-
spect to God, as they exist in time, and as much at one time as another. There-
fore, we can no more fairly argue, that these will be in vain, because God has
foredetermined all things, than we can, that they would be in vain if they existed
as soon as the decree, for so they do, inasmuch as they are a part of it.
§ 8. That we should say, that God has decreed every action of men. yea,
every action that is sinful, and every circumstance of those actions ; that he
predetermines that they shall be in every respect as they afterwards are ; that
he determines that there shall be such actions, and just so sinful as they are ;
and yet that God does not decree the actions that are sinful, as sin, but decrees
them as good, is really consistent. For we do not mean, by decreeing an action
as sinful, the same as decreeing an action so that it shall be sinful ; but by de-
creeing an action as sinful, I mean decreeing it for the sake of the sinfulness of
the action. God decrees that they shall be sinful, for the sake of the good that
he causes to arise from the sinfulness thereof; wherea? man decrees them for
the sake of the evil that is in them.
516 DECREES AND ELECTION.
§ 9 When a distinction is made between God's revealed will and his seen. f
will, or his will of command and decree, will is certainly in that distinction taker,
in two senses. His will of decree, is not his will in the same sense as his will
of command is. Therefore, it is no difficulty at all to suppose, that the one may
be otherwise than the other : his will in both senses is his inclination. But when
we say he wills virtue, or loves virtue, or the happiness of his creature : thereby is
intended, that virtue, or the creature's happiness, absolutely and simply considered,
is agreeable to the inclination of his nature. His will of decree, is his inclination
to a thing, not as to that thing absolutely and simply, but with respect to the univer-
sality of things, that have been, are, or shall be. So God, though he hates a
thing as it is simply, may incline to it with reference to the universality of things.
Though he hates sin in itself, yet he may will to permit it, for the greater pro-
motion of holiness in this universality, including all things, and at all times. So,
though he has no inclination to a creature's misery, considered absolutely, yet
he may will it, for the greater promotion of happiness in this universality. God
inclines to excellency, which is harmony, but yet he may incline to suffer that
which is unharmonious in itself, for the promotion of universal harmony, or for
the promoting of the harmony that there is in the universality, and making it
shine the brighter. And thus it must needs be, and no hypothesis whatsoever will
relieve a man, but that he must own these two wills of God. For all must own,
that God sometimes wills not to hinder the breach of his own commands, be-
cause he does not in fact hinder it. He wills to permit sin, it is evident, because
he does permit it. None will say that God himself does what he does not will to
do. But you will say, God wills to permit sin, as he wills the creature should
be left to his freedom ; and if he should hinder it, he would offer violence to the
nature of his own creature. I answer, this comes nevertheless to the very thing
that I say. You say, God does not will sin absolutely ; but rather than alter
the law of nature and the nature of free agents, he wills it. He wills what is
contrary to excellency in some particulars, for the sake of a more general excel-
lency and order. So that this scheme of the Arminians does not help the
matter.
§ 10. It is a proper and excellent thing for infinite glory to shine forth ; and
for the same reason, it is proper that the shining forth of God's glory should be
complete ; that is, that all parts of his glory should shine forth, that every beau-
ty should be proportion ably effulgent, that the beholder may have a proper
notion of God. It is not proper that one glory should be exceedingly manifested,
and another not at all ; for then the effulgence would not answer the reality. For
the same reason it is not proper that one should be manifested exceedingly, and
another but very little. It is highly proper that the effulgent glory of God
should answer his real excellency ; that the splendor should be answerable to
the real and essential glory, for the same reason that it is proper and excellent
for God to glorify himself at all. Thus it is necessary, that God's awful majesty,
his authority and dreadful greatness, justice and holiness, should be manifested.
But this could not be, unless sin and punishment had been decreed ; so that the
shining forth of God's glory would be very imperfect, both because these parts
of divine glory would not shine forth as the others do, and also the glory of his
goodness, love and holiness would be faint without them ; nay, they could scarcely
shine forth at all. If it were not right that God should decree and permit and
punish sin, there could be no manifestation of God's holiness in hatred of sin, or
in showing any preference, in his providence, of godliness before it. There
would be no manifestation of God's grace or true goodness, if there was no sin
to be pardoned, no misery to be saved from. How much happiness soever he
DECREES AND ELECTION. 517
bestowed, his goodness would not be so much prized and admired, and the sense
of it not so great, as we have elsewhere shown. We little consider how much
the sense of good is heightened by the sense of evil, both moral and natural. And
as it is necessary that there should be evil, because the display of the glory of
God could not but be imperfect and incomplete without it, so evil is necessary,
in order to the highest happiness of the creature, and the completeness of that
communication of God, for which he made the world ; because the creature's
happiness consists in the knowledge of God and sense of his love. And if the
knowledge of him be imperfect, the happiness of the creature must be propor-
tionably imperfect ; and the happiness of the creature would be imperfect upon
another account also ; for, as we have said, the sense of good is comparatively
dull and flat, without the knowledge of evil.
§ 11. It is owned, that God did choose men to eternal life, upon a foresight
Af their faith. But then, here is the question, whether God decreed that faith,
nd chose them that they should believe.
§ 12. The sin of crucifying Christ being foreordained of God in his decree,
ind ordered in his providence, of which we have abundant evidence from the
nature of the thing, and from the great ends God had to accomplish by means
u° this wicked act of crucifying Christ ; it being, as it were, the cause of all the
\tecrees, the greatest of all decreed events, and that on which all other decreed
events depend as their main foundation ; being the main thing in that greatest
work of God, the work of redemption, which is the end of all other works ; and
t being so much prophesied of, and so plainly spoken of, as being done accord-
.ng to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God ; I say, seeing we
liave such evidence that this sin is foreordained in God's decrees, and ordered
*n providence, and it being, as it were, the head sin, and representative of the
nn of men in general ; hence is a clear argument, that all the sins of men are
loreordained and ordered by a wise providence.
§ 13. It is objected against the absolute decrees respecting the future ac-
tions of men, and especially the unbelief of sinners, and their rejection of the
gospel, that this does not consist with the sincerity of God's calls and invita-
'xms to such sinners ; as he has willed, in his eternal secret decree, that they
, hould never accept of those invitations. To which I answer, that there is that
in God, respecting the acceptance and compliance of sinners, which God knows
will never be, and which he has decreed never to cause to be, in which, though
it be not just the same with our desiring and wishing for that which will never
come to pass, yet there is nothing wanting but what would imply imperfection
in the case. There is all in God that is good, and perfect, and excellent in our
desires and wishes for the conversion and salvation of wicked men. As, for
instance, there is a love to holiness, absolutely considered, or an agreeableness
of holiness to his nature and will ; or, in other words, to his natural inclination.
The holiness and happiness of the creature, absolutely considered, are things
that he loves. These things are infinitely more agreeable to his nature than to
ours. There is all in God that belongs to our desire of the holiness and happi-
ness of unconverted men and reprobates, excepting what implies imperfection.
All that is consistent with infinite knowledge, wisdom, power, self-sufficience,
infinite happiness and immutability. Therefore, there is no reason that his ab-
solute prescience, or his wise determination and ordering what is future, should
hinder his expressing this disposition of his nature, in like manner as we are
wont to express such a disposition in ourselves, viz., by calls and invitations,
and the like.
The disagreeableness of the wickedness and misery of the creature, absolutely
518 DECREES AND ELECTION.
considered, tu the nature of God, is all that is good in pious and holy men's lament-
ing the past misery and wickedness of mem Their lamenting these, is good no
farther than it proceeds from the disagreeableness of those things to their holy and
good nature. This is also all that is good in wishing for the future holiness and
happiness of men. -And there is nothing wanting in God, in order to his hav-
ing such desires and such lamentings, but imperfection ; and nothing is in the way
of his having them, but infinite perfection ; and therefore it properly, naturally,
and necessarily came to pass, that when God, in the manner of his existence,
came down from his infinite perfection, and accommodated himself to our nature
and manner, by being made man, as he was, in the person of Jesus Christ, he
really desired the conversion and salvation of reprobates, and lamented their
obstinacy and misery ; as when he beheld the city Jerusalem, and wept over it,
saying, " 0 Jerusalem," &c. In the like manner, when he comes down from
his infinite perfection, though not in the manner of being, but in the manner of
manifestation, and accommodates himself to our nature and manner, in the
manner of expression, it is equally natural and proper that he should express
himself as though he desired the conversion and salvation of reprobates, and la-
mented their obstinacy and misery.
§ 14. Maxim 1. There is no such thing truly as any pain or grief, or
trouble in God.
Maxim 2. Hence it follows that there is no such thing as any real disap-
pointment in God, or his being really crossed in his will, or things going con-
trary to his will ; because, according to the notion of will, to have one's will
is agreeable and pleasing ; for it is the notion of being pleased or suited, to
have things as we will them to be ; and so, on the other hand, to have things
contrary to one's will, is disagreeable, troublesome, or uncomfortable. Job
xxiii. 13, " He is in one mind, who can turn him 1 And what his soul desireth,
that he doth."
In the first place, I lay this down, which I suppose none will deny, that as
to God's own actions, God decrees them, or purposes them beforehand. For
none will be so absurd as to say that God acts without intentions, or without
designing to act, or that he forbears to act without intending to forbear. 2dly.
That whatsoever God intends or purposes, he intends and purposes from all
eternity, and that there are no new purposes or intentions in God. For, if God
sometimes begins to intend what he did not intend before, then two things will
follow.
1. That God is not omniscient. If God sometimes begins to design what
he did not design before, it must of necessity be for want of knowledge, or for
want of knowing things before as he knows them nowr, for want of having
exactly the same views of things. If God begins to intend what he did not
before intend, it must be because he now sees reasons to intend it, that he did
not see before ; or that he has something new objected to his understanding, to
influence him.
2. If God begins to intend or purpose things that he did not intend before,
then God is certainly mutable, and then he must in his own mind and will, be
liable to succession and change ; for wherever there are new things, there is
succession and change. Therefore, I shall take these two things for positions
granted and supposed in this controversy, viz., that as to God's own actions and
forbearings to act, he decrees and purposes them beforehand ; and that whatso-
ever God designs or purposes, he purposes from all eternity, and thus decrees
from all eternity all his own actions and forbearings to act.
Coroll, Hence God decrees from all eternity, to permit all the evil tha>
DECREES AND ELECTION. 519
ever he does permit ; because God's permitting is God's forbearing to act or to
prevent.
§ 15. It can be made evident by reason, that nothing can come to pass,
but what it is the will and pleasure of God should come to pass. This maybe
argued from the infinite happiness of God. For every being had rather things
should go according to his will, than not ; because, if he had not rather, then it
is not his will. It is a contradiction to say, he wills it, and yet does not choose
it, or had not rather it should be so than not. But if God had rather things
should be according to his will than not, then, if a thing fall out otherwise than
he hath willed, he meets with a cross ; because, on this supposition, he had
rather it snould have been otherwise, and therefore he would have been better
pleased if the thing had been otherwise. It is contrary to what he chose, and
therefore it is of necessity that he must be displeased. It is of necessity that
every being should be pleased, when a thing is as he chooses, or had rather it
should be. It is a contradiction to suppose otherwise. For it is the very no-
tion of being pleased, to have things agreeable to one's pleasure. For the
very same reason, every being is crossed, or it is unpleasing to him, when a
thing is, that he chose, and nad rather should not have been. For it is the very
notion of a thing's being cross or unpleasing to any, that it is contrary to his
pleasure.
But if God can meet with crosses and things unpleasing to him, then he is
not perfectly and unchangeably happy. For wherever there is any unpleased-
ness or unpleasantness, it must, of necessity, in a degree, diminish the happiness
of the subject. Where there is any cross to a being's choice, there is something
contrary to happiness. Wherever there is any unpleasedness, there is something
contrary to pleasure, and which consequently diminishes pleasure. It is impossi-
ble any thing should be plainer than this.
§ 16. The commands and prohibitions of God are only significations of our
duty and of his nature. It is acknowledged that sin is, in itself considered, in-
finitely contrary to God's nature ; but it does not follow, but that it may be the
pleasure of God to permit it, for the sake of the good that he will bring out
of it. God can bring such good out of that, which in itself is contrary to his
nature, and which, in itself considered, he abhors, as may be very agreeable to his
nature, and when sin is spoken of as contrary to the will of God, it is contrary
to his will, considered only as in itself. As man commits it, it is contrary to
God's will ; for men act in committing it with a view to that which is evil. But
as God permits it, it is not contrary to God's will ; for God in permitting it has
respect to the great good that he will make it an occasion of. If God respect-
ed sin as man respects it in committing it, it would be exceedingly contrary to
his will ; but considered as God decrees to permit it, it is not contrary to God's
will. To give an instance : the crucifying of Christ was a great sin ; and as
men committed it, it was exceedingly hateful, and highly provoking to God.
Yet upon many great considerations it was the will of God that it should be
done. Will any body say that it was not the will of God that Christ should be
crucified ? Acts iv. 28, " For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel de-
termined before to be done."
§ 17. Sin is an evil, yet the futurition of sin, or that sin should be future, is
not an evil thing. Evil is an evil thing, and yet it may be a good thing that
evil should be in the world. There is certainly a difference between the thing
itself existing, and its being an evil thing that ever it came into existence. As,
for instance, it might be an evil thing to crucify Christ, but yet it was a good
thing that the crucifying of Christ came to pass. As men's act, it was evil,
520 DECREES AND ELECTION.
but as God ordered it, it was good. Who will deny but that it may be so that
evil's coming to pass may *be an occasion of a greater good than that is an evil,
and so of there being more good in the whole, than if that evil had not come
to pass ? And if so, then it is a good thing that that evil comes to pass. When
we say the thing is an evil thing in itself, then we mean that it is evil, consider-
ing it only within its own bounds. But when we say that it is a good thing
that ever it came to pass, then we consider the thing as a thing among events,
or as one thing belonging to the series of events, and as related to the rest of the
series If a man should say that it was a good thing that ever it happened
that Joseph's brethren sold him into Egypt, or that it was a good thing that
ever it came to pass that Pope Leo X. sent out indulgencies for the commission
of future sins, nobody would understand a man thus expressing himself, as jus-
tifying these acts.
It implies no contradiction to suppose that an act may be an evil act, and
yet that it is a good thing that such an act should come to pass. A man may
have been a bad man, and yet it may be a good thing that there has been such
a man. This implies no contradiction ; because it implies no contradiction to
suppose that there being such a man may be an occasion of there being more
good in the whole, than there would have been otherwise. So it no more im-
plies a contradiction to suppose that an action may be a bad action, and yet
that it may be a good thing that there has been such an action. God's com-
mands, and calls, and counsels, do imply another thing, viz., that it is our duty
to do these things ; and though they may be our duty, yet it may be certain
beforehand that we shall not do them.
And if there be any difficulty in this, the same difficulty will attend the
scheme of the Arminians ; for they allow that God permits sin. Therefore, as
he permits it, it cannot be contrary to his will. For if it were contrary to his
will as he permits it, then it would be contrary to his will to permit it ; for that
is the same thing. But nobody will say that God permits sin, when it is against
his will to permit it ; for this would be to make him act involuntarily, or against
his own will.
§ 18. " The wrath of man shall praise thee, and the remainder of wrath shalt
thou restrain." Psal. lxxvi. 10. If God restrains sin when he pleases ; and
when he permits it, permits it for the sake of some good that it will be an occa-
sion of, and does actually restrain it in all other cases ; it is evident that when
he permits it, it is his will that it should come to pass for the sake of the good
that it will be an occasion of. If he permits it for the sake of that good, then
he does not permit it merely because he would infringe on the creature's liberty
in restraining it ; as is further evident because he does restrain it when that
good is not in view. If it be his will to permit it to come to pass, for the sake
of the good that its coming to pass will be an occasion of ; then it is his will to
permit it, that by its coming to pass he may obtain that good ; and therefore,
it must necessarily be his will that it should come to pass, that he may obtain
that good. If he permits it, that, by its coming to pass, he may obtain a cer-
tain good, then his proximate end in permitting it, is that it may come to pass.
And if he wills the means for the sake of the end, he therein wills the end. If
God wills to permit a thing that it may come to pass, then he wills that it
should come to pass. This is self-evident. But if he wills to permit it to come
to pass, that by its coming to pass he may obtain some end, then he wills to
permit it that it should come to pass. For to will to permit a thing to come to
pass, that by its coming to pass good may be obtained, is exactly the same
thing as to will to permit it to come to pass, that it may come to pass, and so
DECREES AND ELECTION. 521
the end may be attained. To will to permit a thing to come to pass, that he
may obtain some end by its coming to pass, and yet to be unwilling that it
should come to pass, certainly implies a contradiction.
If the foundation of that distinction that there is between one man and an-
other, whereby one is a good man, and another a wicked man, be God's plea-
sure and his causation ; then God has absolutely elected the particular persons
that are to be godly. For, by supposition, it is owing to his determination.
Matth. xi. 25, 26, 27, " At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, 0
Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the
wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so
it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father ;
and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father ; neither knoweth any man the
Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.''
§ 19. It may be argued, from the infinite power and wisdom of God, that
nothing can come to pass, but that it must be agreeable to the will and pleasure
of God that it should come to pass. For, as was observed before, every being
had rather things should be according -to his will, than not. Therefore, if things
be not according to his will, it must be for want of power. It cannot be for
want of will, by supposition. It must therefore be for want of sufficiency. It
must be either because he cannot have it so, or cannot have it so without some
difficulty, or some inconvenience ; or all may be expressed in a word, viz., that
he wants sufficiency to have things as he wishes. But this cannot be the case
of a being of infinite power and infinite wisdom. If he has infinite power and
wisdom, he can order all things to be just as he wills : and he can order it with
perfect and infinite ease, or without the least difficulty or inconveniency. Two
things lie before him, both equally within his power, either to order the matter
to be, or not to order it to be ; and both of them are equally easy to him.
One is as little trouble to him as the other ; as to easiness or trouble, they are
perfectly equal. It is as easy for him to order it, as not to order it. There-
fore, his determination, whether it be ordering it, or not ordering it, must be a
certain sign of his will in the case. If he does order it to be, this is a sign that
his will is that it should be. And if he does not order it to be, but suffers it not to
be, that is as sure a sign that he wills that it should not be. So that, however
the thing is, it is a sure sign that it is the will of God that it should be as it is.
To this nothing can be objected, unless that it is not for want of will, nor
want of power in God, that things be not as he would have them, but because
the nature of the subject will not allow of it. But how can this be to the pur-
pose, when the nature of the subject itself is of God, and is wholly within his
power, is altogether the fruit of his mere will ? And cannot a God of infinite
wisdom and infinite power cause the natures of things to be such, and order them
so after they are caused, as to have things as he chooses, or without his will's
being crossed, and things so coming to pass that he had rather have them other-
wise ? As, for instance, God foresaw who would comply with the terms of
salvation, and who would not : and he could have forborne to give being to
such as he foresaw would not comply, if, upon some consideration, it was not
his pleasure that there should be some who should not comply with the terms
of salvation. Objectors may say, God cannot always prevent men's sins, unless
he act contrary to the free nature of the subject, or without destroying men's
liberty. But will they deny, that an omnipotent and infinitely wise God could
not possibly invent and set before men such strong motives to obedience, and
have kept them before them in such a manner, as should have influenced all
mankind to continue in their obedience, as the elect angels have done, without
Vol. II. 66
522 DECREES AND ELECTION
destroj ing their liberty ? God will order it so, that the saints and angels in
heaven never will sin : and does it therefore follow, that their liberty is des-
troyed, and that they are not free, but forced in their actions ? Does it follow,
that they are turned into blocks, as the Arminians say the Calvinist doctrines
turn men ?
§ 20. God decrees all the good that ever comes to pass ; and therefore there
certainly will come to pass no more good, than he has absolutely decreed to
cause ; and there certainly and infallibly will no more believe, no more be
godly, and no more be saved, than God has decreed that he will cause to believe,
and cause to be godly, and will save.
§ 21. The foreknowledge of God will necessarily infer a decree : for God
could not foreknow that things would be, unless he had decreed they should be ;
and that because things would not be future, unless he had decreed they should
be. If God, from all eternity, knew that such and such things were future, then
they were future ; and consequently the proposition was from all eternity true,
that such a thing, at such a time, would be. And it is as much impossible that
a thing should be future, without some- reason of its being future, as that it
should actually be, without some reason why it is. It is as perfectly unreason-
able to suppose, that this proposition should be true, viz., such a thing will be,
or is to be, without a reason why it is true ; as it is that this proposition should
be true, such a thing actually is, or has been, without some reason why that is
true, or why that thing exists. For, as the being of the thing is not in its own
nature necessary, so that proposition that was true before, viz., that it shall be,
is not in its own nature a necessary truth. And therefore I draw this conse-
quence, that if there must be some reason of the futurition of the thing, or why the
thing is future ; this can be no other than God's decree, or the truth of the pro-
position, that such a thing will be, has been determined by God. For the truth
of the proposition is determined by the supposition. My meaning is, that it
does not remain a question ; but the matter is decided, whether the proposition
shall be true or not. The thing, in its own nature, is not necessary, but only
possible ; and therefore, it is not of itself that it is future ; it is not of itself in a
state of futurition, if I may so speak, but only in a state of possibility ; and there
must be some cause to bring it out of a state of mere possibility, into a state of
futurition. This must be God only ; for there was no other being by supposition
existing. And though other things are future, yet it will not be sufficient to say,
that the futurition of other thiags is the cause of the futurition of this. And it
is owing only to him, that is the first being, and that exists necessarily, and of
himself, that all other things, that are not in their own nature necessary, or ne-
cessarily future, but merely possible, are brought out of that state of mere possi-
bility, into a state of futurition, to be certainly future. Here is an effect already
done, viz., the rendering that which in its own nature is only possible, to be
certainly future, so that it can be certainly known to be future ; and there must
be something already existing, that must have caused this effect. Whatsoever
is not of itself or by the necessity of its own nature, is an effect of something
else. But that such a thing should be future by supposition, is not of itself or
by necessity of its own nature. If things that appertain to the creature, or
things that come to pass in time, be not future of themselves and of their own
nature, then they are future, because God makes them to be future. This is
exceedingly evident ; for there is nothing else at all besides God and things that
come to pass in time. And therefore, if things that come to pass in time have
not the reason of their own futurition in themselves, it must be in God.
But if you say, that the ground or reason of their futurition is in the things
DECREES AND ELECTION. 523
themselves, then things are future, prior to any decree, or their futurition is an-
tecedent in nature of any decree of God. And then, to what purpose is any
decree of God 1 For, according to this supposition, God's decreeing does not
make any thing future, or not future ; because it was future, prior to his decree.
His decreeing or appointing that any thing shall be, or shall not be, does not
alter the case. It is not about to be, or about not to be, any thing the more for
God's decreeing it. According to this supposition, God has no freedom or
choice in decreeing or appointing any thing. It is not at his choice what
shall be future, and what not ; no, not in one thing. For the futurition of
things is by this supposition antecedent in nature to his choice ; so that his
choosing or refusing does not alter the case. The things in themselves are fu-
ture, and his decreeing cannot make them not future ; for they cannot be future
and not future at the same time ; neither can it make them future, because they
are future already ; so that they who thus plead for man's liberty, advance prin-
ciples which destroy the freedom of God himself. It is allowed that things are
future before they come to pass ; because God foreknows them. Either things
are future antecedently to God's decree and independently of it, or they are not
If they are not future antecedently to, and independently of God's decree, then they
are made so by his decree ; there is no medium. But if they are so antecedent-
ly to his decree, then the above-mentioned absurdity will follow, viz., that God
has no power by his decree to make any thing future or not future. He has no
choice in the case. And if it be already decided, something must have decided
it ; for, as has been already shown, it is not true without a reason why it is
true. And if something has determined or decided the truth of it, it must be
God that has decided it, or something else. It cannot be chance or mere acci-
dent : that is contrary to every rational supposition. For it is to be supposed,
that there is some reason for it, and that something does decide it. If there be
any thing that comes to pass by mere accident, that comes to pass of itself with-
out any reason. If it be not chance therefore that has decided it, it must be
God or the creature. It cannot be the creature as actually existing : for, by
supposition, it is determined from all eternity before any creature exists. There-
fore, if it be any thing in the creature that decides it in any way, it must be only
the futurition of that thing in the creature. But this brings us to the absurdity
and contradiction, that the same thing is both the cause and the effect of itself.
The very effect, the cause of which we are seeking, is the futurition of the thing ;
and if this futurition be the cause of that effect, it is the cause of itself.
§ 22. The first objection of the Arminians is, that the divine decree infrin-
ges on the creature's liberty. In answer to this objection, we may observe
some things to show what is the true notion of liberty, and the absurdity of
their notion of liberty. Their notion of liberty is, that there is a sovereignty in
the will, and that the will determines itself, so that its determination to choose
or refuse this or that, is primarily within itself; which description of liberty im-
plies a self-contradiction. For it supposes the will, in its first act, choosing or
refusing to be determined by itself; which implies that there is an antecedent
act of the will to that first act, determining that act. For, if the will deter-
mines its own first act, then there must be an act of the will before that first act
(for that determining is acting), which is a contradiction. There can be no fal-
lacy in this ; for we know that if the will determines its own act, it does not
determine it without acting. Therefore, here is this contradiction, viz., that
there is an act of the will before the first act. There is an act of the will de-
termining what it shall choose, before the first act of choice ; which is as much
as to say, that there is an act of volition before the first act of volition. For the
524 DECREES AND ELECTION.
will's determining what it will choose, is choosing. The will's determining
what it will will, is willing. So that according to this notion of liberty, the
will must choose before it chooses, in order to determine what it will choose
If the will determines itself, it is certain that one act must determine another.
If the will determines its own choice, then it must determine by a foregoing act
what it will choose. If the will determines its own act, then an antecedent act
determines the consequent ; for that determining is acting. The will cannot
determine without acting. Therefore I inquire what determines that first act of
the wdll, viz., its determination of its own act ? It must be answered, accord-
ing to their scheme, that it is the will by a foregoing act. Here, again, we
have the same contradiction, viz., that the first act of the will is determined by
an act that is before that first act. If the will determines itself, or determines
is own choice, the meaning of it must be, if ther,e be any meaning belonging to
it, that the will determines how it will choose ; and that it chooses, according
to that, its own determination how to choose, or is directed in choosing by that
its own determination. But then I would inquire, whether that first determina-
tion, that directs the choice, be not itself an act or a volition ; and if so, I would
inquire what determines that act. Is it another determination still prior to that
in the order of nature ? Then I would inquire, what determines the first act or
determination of all 1 If the will, in its acts of willing or choosing, determines
or directs itself how to choose, then there is something done by the will prior
to its act of choosing that is determined, viz., its determining or directing itself
how to choose. This act determining or directing, must be something besides
or distinct from the choice determined or directed, and must be prior in order of
nature to it. Here are two acts of the will, one the cause of the other, viz., the
act of the will directing and determining, and the act or choice directed or de-
termined. Now, I inquire, what determines that first act of the will determin-
ing or directing, to determine and direct as it does 1 If it be said, the will de-
termines itself in that ; then that supposes there is another act of the will prior
to that, directing and determining that act, which is contrary to the supposition.
And if it was not, still the question would recur, what determines that first de-
termining act of the will 1 If the will determines itself, one of these three
things must be meant, viz., 1. That that very same act of the will determines
itself. But this is as absurd as to say that something makes itself; and it sup-
poses it to be before it is. For the act of determining is as much prior to the
thing determined, as the act making is before the thing made. Or, 2. The
meaning must be, that the will determines its own act, by some other act that is
prior to it in order of nature ; which implies that the will acts before its first
act. Or, 3. The meaning must be, that the faculty, considered at the same time
as perfectly without act, determines its own consequent act ; which is to talk with-
out a meaning, and is a great absurdity. To suppose that the faculty, remain-
ing at the same time perfectly without act, can determine any thing, is a plain
contradiction ; for determining is acting. And besides, if the will does deter-
mine itself, that power of determining itself does not argue any freedom, unless
it be by an act of the will, or unless that determination be itself an act of choice.
For what freedom or liberty is there in the will's determining itself, without an
act of choice in determining, whereby it may choose which way it will deter-
mine itself ? So that those that suppose the will has a power of self-determina-
tion, must suppose that that very determination is an act of the will, or an act
of choice, or else it does not at all help them out in what they would, viz., the
liberty of the will. But if that very determination how to act, be itself an act
of choice, then the question returns, what determines this act of choice 1
DECREES AND ELECTION. 525
Also, the foreknowledge of God contradicts their notion of liberty as much,
and in every respect in the same manner as a decree. For they do not pretend
that decree contradicts liberty any otherwise, than as it infers that it is before-
hand certain that the thing will come to pass, and that it is impossible but that
it should be, as the decree makes an indissoluble connection beforehand between
the subject and predicate of the proposition, that such a thing shall be. A de-
cree infers no other necessity than that. And God's foreknowledge does infer
the same to all intents and purposes. For if from all eternity God foreknew
that such a thing would be, then the event was infallibly certain beforehand,
and that proposition was true from all eternity, that such a thing would be ; and
therefore there was an indissoluble connection beforehand between the subject
and predicate of that proposition. If the proposition was true beforehand, the
i subject and predicate of it were connected beforehand. And therefore it follows
from hence, that it is utterly impossible that it should not prove true, and that,
for this reason, that it is utterly impossible that a thing should be true, and not
true, at the same time.
§ 23. The same kind of infallible certainty, that the thing will come to
pass or impossibility but that it should come to pass, that they object against,
I must necessarily be inferred another way, whether we hold the thing to be any
I way decreed or not. For it has been shown before, and 1 suppose none will
deny, that God from all eternity decrees his own actions. Therefore he from all
eternity decrees every punishment that he ever has inflicted, or will inflict. So
that it is impossible, by their own reasoning, but that the punishment should come
to pass. And if it be impossible but that the punishment should come to pass,
then it is equally impossible but that the sin should come to pass. For if it be
possible that the sin should not come to pass, and yet impossible but that the
punishment should come to pass, then it is impossible but that God should punish
that sin which may never be.
§ 24. For God certainly to know that a thing will be, that possibly may be,
and possibly may not be, implies a contradiction. If possibly it may be other-
wise, then how can God know certainly that it will be 1 If it possibly may be
otherwise, then he knows it possibly may be otherwise ; and that is inconsistent
with his certainly knowing that it will not be otherwise. If God certainly knows
it will be, and yet it may possibly be otherwise, then it may possibly happen
to be otherwise than God certainly knows it will be. If so, then it may possi-
bly happen that God may be mistaken in his judgment, when he certainly knows ;
for it is supposed that it is possible that it should be otherwise than he judges.
For that it should be otherwise than he judges, and that he should be mistaken,
are the same thing. How unfair therefore is it in those that hold the foreknow-
ledge of God, to insist upon this objection from human liberty, against the de-
crees, when their scheme is attended with the same difficulty, exactly in the same
I manner
§ 25. Their other objection is, that God's decrees make God the author
of sin. I answer, that there is no more necessity of supposing God the author
of sin, on this scheme, than on the other. For if we suppose, according to my
doctrine, that God has determined, from all eternity, the number and persons
of those that shall perform the condition of the covenant of grace ; in order to
support this doctrine, there is no need of maintaining anymore concerning God's
decreeing sin, than this, viz., that God has decreed that he will permit all the
sin that e/er comes to pass, and that upon his permitting it, it will certainly
come to pass. And they hold the same thing ; for they hold that God does de-
termine beforehand to permit all the sin that does come to pass; and that he
526 DECREES AND ELECTION.
certainty knows that if he does permit it, it will come to pass. I say, they in
their scheme allow both these ; they allow that God does permit all the sin to
come to pass, that ever does come to pass; and those that allow the foreknow,
ledge of God, do also allow the other thing, viz., that he knows concerning all
the sin that ever does really come to pass, that it will come to pass upon his per-
mitting it. So that if this be making God the author of sin, they make him
so in the very same way that they charge us with doing it.
§ 26. One objection of theirs against God's decreeing or ordering, in an\
sense, that sin should come to pass, is, that man cannot do this without making
himself sinful, and in some measure guilty of the sin, and that therefore God can-
not. To this I answer, that the same objection lies against their own scheme
two ways : 1. Because they own that God does permit sin, and that he deter-
mines to permit it beforehand, and that he knows, with respect to all sin that
ever is committed, that upon his permitting it, it will come to pass; and we
hold no other. 2. Their objection is, that what is a sin in men, is a sin in God ;
and therefore, in any sense to decree sin, would be a sin. But if this objec-
tion be good, it is as strong against God's permission of sin, which they allow ;
for it would be a sin in men to permit sin. We ought not to permit or suffer it
where we have opportunity to hinder it ; and we cannot permit it without mak-
ing ourselves in some measure guilty. Yet they allow that God does permit sin :
and that his permitting it does not make him guilty of it. "Why must the argn-
ment from men to God be stronger in the other case than in this ?
§ 27. They say, that we ought to begin in religion, with the perfections
of God, and make these a rule to interpret Scripture. Ans. 1. If this be the
best rule, I ask, why is it not as good a rule to argue from these perfections of
God, his omniscience, infinite happiness, infinite wisdom and power, as his other
attributes that they argue from ? If it be not as good a rule to argue from these
as those, it must be because they are not so certain, or because it is not so certain
that he is possessed of these perfections. But this they will not maintain ; for his
moral perfections are proved no otherwise than by arguing from his natural perfec-
tions ; and therefore the latter must be equally certain with the former. What we
prove another thing by, must at least be as certain as it makes the thing proved
by it. If an absolute and universal decree does infer a seeming inconsistence
with some of God's moral perfections, they must confess the contrary to have a
seeming inconsistence with the natural perfections of God.
Again, 2dly. They lay it down for a rule to embrace no doctrine which
they by their own reason cannot reconcile with the moral perfections of God.
But I would show the unreasonableness of this rule. For, 1. If this be a good
rule, then it always was so. Let us then see what will follow. u We shall then,
2dly, have reason to conclude every thing to be really inconsistent with God's
moral perfections, that we cannot reconcile with his moral perfections ; for if
we have not reason to conclude that it is inconsistent, then we have no reason
to conclude that it is not true. But if this be true that we have reason to con-
clude every thing is inconsistent with God's moral perfections which we cannot
reconcile with those perfections, then David had reason to conclude that some
things that he saw take place, in fact were inconsistent with God's moral per-
fections, for he could not reconcile them with those perfections, Psalm lxxiii.
And Job had cause to come to the same conclusion concerning some events in
his day. 3. If it be a good rule that we must conclude that to be inconsistent
with the divine perfections, that we cannot reconcile with, or, which is the same
thing, that we cannot see how it is consistent with those perfections, then it must
be because we have reason to conclude that it cannot happen that our reason
DECREES AND ELECTION. 527
cannot see how it can be, and then it will follow that we must reject the doc-
trine of the Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, &c.
The Scripture itself supposes that there are some things in the Scripture that
men may not be able to reconcile with God's moral perfections. See Rom. ix.
19, " Why doth he yet find fault ? For who hath resisted his will ?" And the
apostle does not answer the objection, by showing us how to reconcile it with
the moral perfections of God, but by representing the arrogancy of quarrelling
with revealed doctrines under such a pretence, and not considering the infinite
distance between God and us. " Nay, but who art thou, 0 man, that repliest
against God ?" And God answered Job after the same manner. God rebuked him
for darkening counsel by words without knowledge, and answered him, only by
declaring and manifesting to him the infinite distance between God and him ; so
letting him know, that it became him humbly to submit to God, and acknow-
ledge his justice even in those things that were difficult to his reason ; and that
without solving his difficulties any other way than by making him sensible of
the weakness of his own understanding.
§ 28. If there be no election, then it is not God that makes men to differ,
expressly contrary to Scripture. No man ought to praise God for that happi-
ness that he has above other men, or for that distinction that is between him
and other men, that he is holy and that he is saved ; when they are not holy
and not saved. The saints in heaven, when they look on the devils in hell,
have no occasion to praise God on account of the difference between them.
Some of the ill consequences of the Arminian doctrines are, that it robs God of
the greater part of the glory of his grace, and takes away a principal motive to
love and praise him, and exalts man to God's room, and ascribes the glory to
self, that belongs to God alone. Rom. xi. 7, " The election hath obtained, and
the rest were blinded." That by the election here is not meant the Gentiles,
but the elect part of the Jews, is most apparent by the context. Such Arminians
who allow, that some only are elected, and not all that are saved, but that none
are reprobated, overthrow hereby their own main objection against reprobation,
viz., that God offers salvation to all, and encourages them to seek it, which,
say they, would be inconsistent with God's truth, if he had absolutely deter-
mined not to save them ; for they will not deny that those that are elected whilst
ungodly, are warned of God to beware of eternal damnation, and to avoid such
and such things, lest they should be damned. But for God to warn men to be-
ware of damnation, though he has absolutely determined that they shall not be
damned, is exactly parallel with his exhorting men to seek salvation, though he
has actually determined that they shall not be saved.
§ 29. That election is not from a foresight of works, or conditional, as de-
pending on the condition of man's will, is evident by 2 Tim. i. 9, " Who hath
saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but
according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus
before the world began." Philip, ii. 13, " For it is God that worketh in you,
ooth to will and to do of his own good pleasure." Rom. ix. 15, 16, " I will
have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and wilMiave compassion on whom I
will have compassion. So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that
runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." Men's labors and endeavors them-
selves are from God. 1 Cor. xv. 10, " But by the grace of God, I am what I
am , and his grace which was bestowed upon me, was not in vain ; but I
labored more abundantly than they all. Yet not I, but the grace of God which
was with me."
§ 30. God decrees all things, and even all sins. Acts ii. 23, " Him, being
Vol. II 67
528 DECREES AND ELECTION
delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken
and by wicked hands have crucified and slain ;" iv. 28, " For to do whatsoever
thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." If the thing meant, be
only that Christ's sufferings should come to pass by some means or other ; I
answer, they could not come to pass but by sin. For contempt and disgrace
was one thing he was to suffer. Even the free actions of men are subject to
God's disposal. Prov. xxi. 1, " The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord ;
he turneth it as the rivers of water, whithersoever it pleaseth him." See Jer.
lii. 3, " For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem and
Judah, till he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled
against the king of Babylon." The not complying with the terms of the cove-
nant of grace is decreed : 1 Pet. ii. 8, " A stone of stumbling and a rock of
offence to them that stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they
were appointed." What man determines, never comes to pass, unless God de-
termines it : Lam. iii. 37, " Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass, and the
Lord commandeth it not ?" By commanding is here meant willing ; and God
is elsewhere said to speak, and it was done ; to command, and it stood fast.
God determines the limits of men's lives. This is exceeding evident. Job vii.
1, " Is there not an appointed time to man upon earth ? Are not his days also
like the days of an hireling ?" Days of an hireling signifying an appointed,
certain, limited time ; as Isa. xvi. 14, and Isa. xxi. 16. If the limits of men's
lives are determined, men's free actions must be determined, and even their sins;
for their lives often depend on such acts. See also Job xiv. 5.
§ 31. If God does not know all things, then his knowledge may increase,
he may gain, and may grow wiser as he grows older. He may discover new
things, and may draw consequences from them. And he may be mistaken : if he
does not know, he may guess wrong : if he does not know, he has no infallible
judgment ; for an infallible judgment is knowledge. And if he may be mis-
taken, he may order matters wrong ; he may be frustrated ; his measures may
be broken. For doubtless, in things that are uncertain, he orders things accord-
ing to what appears most probable, or else he fails in prudence. But in so
ordering things, his measures may be broken. And then the greater part of the
great events, viz., events among rational creatures, would be uncertain to him.
For the greater part of them depend on men's free actions. That he does fore-
know, is evident by his predicting and foretelling events, and even the sins of
men, as Judas's sin. If he did not foreknow, he might change his will as he
altered his views. Now, it is especially with respect to God's will and pur-
poses, that he is said in Scripture not to be changeable. Having thus proved
the foreknowledge of God, and the greater part of Arminians not denying
it, I shall hereafter take it for granted, and shall argue against those only
that allow it. If he did not foreknow and might be disappointed, he might
repent.
§ 32. They say, as God's power extends only to all things possible, so God's
knowledge only extends to all things knowable.
Ans. Things impossible, or contradictions, are not things ; but events that
come to pass, are things. God's power does extend to all things, otherwise :*
would not be infinite. So neither is the knowledge of God infinite, unless God
knows all things. To suppose that God cannot do things impossible, does no*
suppose that God's power can be increased. But to suppose that God does no*
know men's free actions, does suppose that God's knowledge may be increased.
To suppose that God's decrees are conditional, in the sense of the Arminians, or
that they depend, as they suppose, on a foresight of something that shall come
DECREES AND ELECTION. 529
to pass in time, is to suppose that something that first begins to be in time, is
the cause of something that has been from all eternity, which is absurd ; for
nothing can be a cause of that existence, which is before the existence of that
cause. What an absurdity is it, to suppose that that existence which is an effect,
is effected by a cause, when that cause that effects it, is not, or has no being ?
If it be answered, that it is not the actual existence of the thing, that is the
reason or cause of the decree, but the foresight of the existence ; and the fore-
sight of the existence may be at the same time with the decree, and before it, in
the order of nature, though the existence itself is not ; and that it is not properly
the actual existence of the thing foreseen, that is the cause of the decree, but the
existence of it in the divine foreknowledge : I reply, that this does not help the
difficulty at all, but only puts it a step farther off; for still, by their scheme, the
foreknowledge depends on the future actual existence ; so that the actual exist-
ence is the cause of the divine foreknowledge, which is infinite ages before it.
And it is a great absurdity to suppose this effect to flow from this cause, before
the existence of the cause. And whatever is said, the absurdity will occur,
unless we suppose that the divine decree is the ground of the futurition of the
event, and also the ground of the foreknowledge of it. Then the cause is be-
fore the effect ; but otherwise the effect is before the cause.
§ 33. If God absolutely determined that Christ's death should have success
in gathering a church to him, it will follow that there was a number absolutely
elected, or that God had determined some should surely be saved. If God de-
termined that some should surely be saved, that implies that he had determined
that he would see to it. that some should perform the conditions of salvation and
be saved ; or, which is the same thing, that he would cause that they should be
surely saved. But this cannot be, without fixing on the persons beforehand.
For the cause is before the effect. There is no such thing as God's resolving
absolutely beforehand that he would save some, and yet not determining who
they should be, before they were actually saved : or that he should see to it,
that there should be in a number the requisites of salvation, and yet not deter-
mine who, till they actually have the requisites of salvation. But God had
absolutely determined that some should be saved, yea a great number, after
Christ's death ; and had determined it beforehand. Because he had absolutely
promised it ; Isa. xlix. 6, and liii. 10. See in Psal. lxxii., and other places in
the Psalms, and Tit. ii. 14. God, having absolutely purposed this before
Christ's death, must either have then determined the persons, or resolved that
he would hereafter determine the persons ; at least if he saw there was need oi
it, and saw that they did not come in of themselves. But this latter supposition,
if we allow it, overthrows the Arminian scheme. It shows, that such a prede-
termination, or absolute election, is not inconsistent with God's perfections, or
the nature of the gospel constitution, or God's government of the world, and his
promise of reward to the believing and obedient, and the design of gospel offers
and commands, as the Arminians suppose. If God has absolutely determined
to save some certain persons, then, doubtless, he has in like manner determined
concerning all that are to be saved. God's promising, supposes not only that
the thing is future, but that God will do it. If it be left to chance, or man's
contingent will, and the event happen right, God is never the truer. He per-
forms not his promise ; he takes no effectual care about it ; it is not he that
promised, that performs. That thing, or, rather nothing, called fortune, orders
all. — Concerning the absurdity of supposing that it was not absolutely deter-
mined beforehand, what success there should be of Christ's death ; see Polhill's
Spec. Theolog. in Christo,ip. 165 — 171.
Vol. II. 67
530 DECREES AND ELECTION.
It is pretended, that the antecedent certainty of any sin's being committed,
seeing that it is attended with necessity, takes away all liberty, and makes warn-
ings and exhortations to avoid sin, a mere illusion. To this I would bring the
instance of Peter. Christ told him, that he should surely deny him thrice that
night, before the cock should crow twice. And yet, after that, Christ exhorted
all his disciples to watch and pray, that they might not fall into temptation ; and
directs, that he who had no sword, should sell his garment and buy one.
§ 34. How evident is it, that God sets up that to be sought #fter as a re-
ward of virtue, and the fruit of our endeavors, which yet he has determined shall
never come to pass 1 As 1 Sam. xiii. 13, " And Samuel said unto Saul, Thou
hast done foolishly ; thou hast not kept the commandment of the Lord thy God,
which he commanded thee. For now would the Lord have established thy king-
dom upon Israel for ever." It is evident that God had long before decreed, that
the kingdom of Israel should be established in the tribe of Judah. — Luke xxii.
22, "The son of man goeth as it was determined [Matth. xxvi. 24, and Mark
xiv. 21, as it is written of him] ; but wo unto that man by whom the son of man
is betrayed." As it was determined : as this passage is not liable to the ambi-
guities which some have apprehended in Acts ii. 23, and iv. 28 (which yet seem
on the whole to be parallel to it in their most natural construction), I look upon
it as an evident proof, that those things are in the language of Scripture said to
be determined or decreed (or exactly bounded and marked out by God, as the
word cjQi^ai most naturally signifies), which he sees will in fact happen in con-
sequence of his volitions, without any necessitating agency, as well as those
events of which he is properly the author ; and, as Beza expresses it, " Qui
sequitur deum emendate sane loquitur, we need not fear falling into any impro-
priety of speech when we use the language which God has taught." Dodd-
ridge in loc.
§ 35. As to the decrees of election, see Psal. lxv. 4, " Blessed is the man
whom thou choosest, and causest to approach unto thee, that he may dwell in
thy courts : we shall be satisfied with the goodness of thy house, even of thy
holy temple." Isa. xli. 9, " Thou whom I have taken from the ends of the
earth, and called thee from the chief men thereof, and said unto thee, thou art
my servant ; I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away." Matth. xx. 16, " So
the last shall be first, and the first last : for many be called, but few chosen."
Chap. xxii. 14, " For many are called, but few are chosen." Chap. xxiv. 24,
" For there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great
signs and wonders ; in so much that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the
very elect." John vi. 37 — 46, " All that the Father giveth me, shall come to
me ; and him that cometh to me, I will in no wise cast out," &c. Chap. x. 3,
4, and verse 11, and 14 — 17, v. 26 — 30, " To him the porter openeth, and the
sheep hear his voice ; and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them
out. And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the
sheep follow him, for they know his voice. I am the good Shepherd ; and
know my sheep, and am known of mine. Therefore doth my Father love me ;
because I lay down my life, that I might take it again. But ye believe not, be-
cause ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you," &c. Chap. xvii. 6 — 20, " I
have manifested thy name unto the men thou gavest me out of the world : thine
they were, and thou gavest them me ; and they have kept thy word, &c. Nei-
ther pray I for these alone ; but for them also which shall believe on me through
their word." Acts xviii. 10, " For I am with thee, and no man shall set on
thee, to hurt thee : for I have much people in this city." As to reprobation,
sec Matth. xi. 20 — 27, " Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of
DECREES AND ELECTION. 531
his mighty works were done, because they repented not, &c. Even so, Father,
for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Fa-
ther ; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father ; neither knoweth any man
the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him."
John vi. 44 — 46, " No man can come to me, except the Father which hath
sent me draw him ; and I will raise him up at the last day, &c. Not that any
man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father."
Chap. viii. 47, " He that is of God, heareth God's words : ye therefore hear
them not, because ye are not of God." Chap. x. 26, " But ye believe not, be-
cause you are not of my sheep, as I said unto you." Chap. xvii. 9— 13, " I
pray for them : I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given
me ; for they are thine," &c. 1 Thes. v. 9, " For God has not appointed us
to wrath, but to obtain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ." 1 Pet. ii. 8, " And
a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the
word, being disobedient : whereunto also they were appointed." Jude i. 4,
" For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained
to this condemnation, turning the grace of God into lasciviousness." 1 John
iv. 6, " We are of God. He that knoweth God, heareth us ; he that is not of
\ God, heareth not us. Hereby know we the spirit of truth, and the spirit of er-
ror." Rev. iii. 8, " I know thy works : behold, I have set before thee an open
door, and no man can shut it : for thou hast a little strength, and hast kept my
word, and hast not denied my name." Chap. xx. 12, 15, " And I saw the
dead, small and great, stand before God ; and the books were opened : and
another book was opened, which is the book of life ; and the dead were judged
out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works.
And whosoever was not found written in the book of life, was cast into the
lake of fire." John xii. 37 — 41, " But though he had done so many miracles
before them, yet they believed not on him. Because that Esaias said, he hath
blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their
eyes, &c. These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory, and spake of him."
Rom. ix. 6, 7, 8, 11—14, 16—19, v. 21—24, v. 27, 29, 33, " Not as though
the word of God hath taken none effect. For they are not all Israel, which are
of Israel : neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children :
but, in Isaac shall thy seed be called." That is, they which are the children of
the flesh, these are not the children of God ; but the children of the promise are
counted for the seed. For the children, being not yet born, neither having done
any good or evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand,
not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said, " The elder shall serve the
younger, &c. What shall we say then ? Is there unrighteousness with God 1
God forbid. So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but
of God that showeth mercy, &c. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he
yet find fault 1 For who hath resisted his will f Hath not the potter power
over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another
to dishonor 1 &c. Even us whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also
of the Gentiles. Esaias also crieth concerning Israel, though the number of the
children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant shall be saved : and as
Esaias said before, except the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed, we had been
as Sodoma, and been made like unto Gomorrha. As it is written, Behold, I lay
in Sion a stumbling stone, and a rock of offence : and whosoever believeth on
him shall not be ashamed." And chap. xi. 1—6, v. 7—11, v. 15, 17, 19—23,
v. 32, 36, " I say then, Hath God cast away his people 1 God forbid. For I
also am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin, &c.
532 DECREES AND ELECTION.
Even so then at this present time also there is a remnant according to the elec-
tion of grace. And if by grace, then is it no more of works : otherwise grace
is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace : otherwise,
work is no more work. What then ? Israel hath not obtained that which he seek-
eth for ; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded. God hath
given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that
they should not hear, unto this day. Let their table be made a snare, and a
trap, and a stumbling block, and a recompense unto them, &c. And if some
of the branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olive tree, wert grafted
in among them, and with them partakest of the root and fatness of the olive
tree ; thou wilt say then, The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted
in, &c. And they also, if they abide not in unbelief, shall be grafted in : for
God is able to graft them in again. For God hath concluded them all in un-
belief, that he might have mercy upon all. For of him, and through him, and
to him, are all things : to whom be glory for ever. Amen."
§ 36. All that is intended when we say that God decrees all that comes to
pass, is, that all events are subject to the disposals of providence, or that God
orders all things in his providence ; and that he intended from eternity to order
all things in providence, and intended to order them as he does. Election does
not signify only something common to professing Christians : Matth. xx. 16,
" Many are called, but few are chosen," Matth. xxiv. 31, " He shall send forth
his angels, and gather together his elect."
§ 37. God's foreknowledge appears from this, that God has foretold that
there should be some good men, as the Arminians themselves allow. Stebbingl
in his Treatise concerning the Operations of the Holy Spirit, p. 237, second
edition, says as follows : " So long as a man may be certain that those
things will come to pass which God hath foretold, he may be certain, that
God's grace will prevail in multitudes of men before the end of all things. For,
by divers predictions in holy writ we are assured, that when Christ shall come
to judgment, there will be some who shall be changed, and put on immortality."
§ 38. The Scriptures, in teaching us this doctrine, are guilty of no hard im-
position on our understanding of a doctrine contrary to reason. If they had
taught the contrary doctrine, it would have been much more contrary to reason,
and a much greater temptation to persons of diligent and thorough consideration,
to doubt of the divinity of the Scripture.
§ 39. Concerning the decreeing of sin, see Acts iii. 17, 18, with Acts xiii.
27 : " And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also
your rulers. But those things which God before had showed by the mouth of
all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled." — " For they
that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they knew him not, nor yet
the voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath day, they have fulfilled
them in condemning him."
§ 40. It is objected, that this is a speculative point. So might they say,
Jesus's being the Messiah, is a speculative point.
§ 41. If God's inviting or commanding a person to do a thing, when he, in
his decree, has ordained that it shall be otherwise, argues insincerity in the
command or invitation, the insincerity must be in this, viz., that he commands a
thing to be done, when his end in commanding is not, that the thing may be
done ; which cannot be his end ; because he knows certainly, at the time that
he commands it, that it will not be. But it is certain that God's commanding
a thing to be done, which he certainly knows at the time will not be done, is
no evidence of insincerity in God in commanding. For thus God commanded
DECREES AND ELECTION. 533
Pharaoh to let the people go : and yet he knew he would not obey, as he says
at the same time that he orders the command to be given him, Exod. iii. 18, 19,
" And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt,
and you shall say unto him, The Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with us ;
and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days' journey into the wilderness, that
we may sacrifice to the Lord our God : and I am sure that the king of Egypt
will not let you go ; no, not by a mighty hand." See also chap. iv. 21, 22, 23,
and chap. vii. 1 — 7 ; see also chap. ix. 16, compared with Rom. ix. 17.
§ 42. It is impossible for an infinitely wise and good being to do otherwise
than to choose what he sees on the whole to be best. And certainly reason
requires us to suppose, that of all possible events with respect to sin, and the
conversion and salvation of particular persons, it is better that one of those
possible and opposite events should come to pass than another ; and therefore,
an infinitely wise and good being must choose accordingly. What God per-
mits, he decrees to permit. If it is no blemish to God to permit sin, then it is
no blemish to him to purpose or intend to permit it. And if he be omniscient,
and does designedly permit that sin which actually comes to pass, then he de-
signedly permits that sin, knowing, if he permits it, it will actually come to
pass. And this is an effectual permission, and all that we plead for. What,
then, do our adversaries quarrel with us for ? And why do they pretend that we
charge God with being the author of sin ? There is a way of drawing conse-
quences from Scripture, that begs the question. As the Arminians say, there
are many more texts plainly against election, than seem to be for it, viz., those
texts that represent, that general offers of salvation are made, as though it was
left to men's choice, whether they will be saved or no. But that is begging the
question. For the question very much consists in these things, whether an ab-
solute decree be inconsistent with man's liberty, and so with a general offer of
salvation, &c.
§ 43. Concerning the Arminian notion of election, that when the apostles
speak of election, they only mean that by which the professing Christians in
those days were distinguished from others, as the nation of Israel of old was ;
this is unreasonable, according to their own principles. For if they were elect-
ed, and that was the reason why they so far embraced the gospel, as to become
Christians rather than others, then, on Arminian principles, no thanks were due
to them for embracing the gospel ; neither were others, who continued openly
to reject the gospel, to blame ; and it was in vain to use any means to persuade
any to join with the Christian church ; nor were any to blame for not doing it,
or to be praised for doing it, &c. Besides, their principles render vain all en-
deavors to spread the gospel. For the gospel will certainly be spread to all
nations that are elected ; and all such shall have the offers of the gospel, whether
they take any care of the matter or no.
§ 44. Dr. Whitby, to make out his scheme, makes the word election signify
two entirely different things ; one, election to a common faith of Christianity ;
another, a conditional election to salvation. But every one must be sensible
of the unreasonableness of such shifting and varying, and turning into all
shapes, to evade the force of Scripture.
§ 45. It is evident the apostle, in Rom. ix., has not only respect to God's
sovereignty in the election and pretention of nations, because he illustrates his
meaning by the instance of a particular person, viz. Pharaoh. The exercise of
the sovereignty that he speaks of, appears by the express words of the apostle
about vessels of mercy and vessels of wrath, vessels of honor and vessels of
dishonor. But the vessels of mercy, he speaks of as prepared to glory. They,
634 DECREES AND ELECTION.
it is plain, are those that shall be saved, and the vessels of wrath are those that
perish. He speaks of those that shall be saved, v. 27, " A remnant shall be
saved." What is there that God does decree according to the scheme of the
Arminians so as to make it in iny measure consistent with itself ? He does
not decree any of the great events of the world of mankind (which are the
principal events, and those to which all others are subordinated), because these
depend on men's free will. He does not absolutely decree any events wherein,
the welfare of men is concerned ; for if he does, then these things according to
their scheme cannot be the subject of prayer. For according to them, it is
absurd to seek or pray for things, which we do not know but that God has
absolutely decreed and fixed before. We do not know but that he has deter-
mined absolutely and ^nfrustrably from eternity, that they shall not be ; and
then, by their scheme, we cannot pray in faith for them. See WThitby, p. 177,
&c. And if God does not decree and order those events beforehand, then what
becomes of the providence of God ; and what room is there for prayer, if there
be no providence 1 Prayer is shut out this way also. According to them, we
cannot reasonably pray for the accomplishment of things that are already fixed,
before our prayers ; for then our prayers alter nothing, and what, say they, sig-
nifies it for us to pray 1
Dr. Whitby insists upon it, that we cannot pray in faith for the salvation oi
others, if we do not know that Christ died intentionally for their salvation.
§ 46. To Dr. Whitby's observation, that the apostle speaks of churches, as
though they were all elect, I answer, he speaks from a judgment of charity, as
Dr. Whitby himself observes, p. 460. God foreknows the elect, as God is said
to know those that are his own sheep from strangers ; as Christ is said not to
know the workers of iniquity, that is, he owns them not. In the same sense,
God is said to know the elect from all eternity ; that is, he knew them as a
man knows his own things. He acknowledged them from eternity. He owns
them as his children. Reprobates he did not know ; they were strangers to
God from all eternity. If God ever determined, in the general, that some of
mankind should certainly be saved, and did not leave it altogether undetermined
whether ever so much as one soul of all mankind should believe in Christ ; it must
be that he determined that some particular persons should certainly believe in him.
For it is certain, that if he has left it undetermined concerning this and that and the
other person, whether ever he should believe or not, and so of every particular
person in the world ; then there is no necessity at all, that this or that, or any
particular person in the world, should ever be saved by Christ, for the matter
of any determination of God's. So that, though God sent his Son into the
world, yet the matter was left altogether undetermined by God, whether ever
any person should be saved by him, and there was all this ado about Christ's
birth, death, resurrection, ascension, and sitting at God's right hand, when it
was not as yet determined whether he should ever save one soul, or have any
mediatorial kingdom at all.
§ 47. It is most absurd to call such a conditional election as they talk of, oy the
name of election, seeing there is a necessary connection between faith in Jesus
Christ and eternal life. Those that believe in Christ, must be saved, according
to God's inviolable constitution of things. WThat nonsense is it, therefore, to
talk of choosing such to life from all eternity out of the rest of mankind ? A
predestination of such to life is altogether useless and needless. By faith in one
that has satisfied for sin, the soul necessarily becomes free from sin. By faith
in one that has bought eternal life for them, they have, of unavoidable conse-
quence, a right to eternal life. Now, what sense is it to say, that God from all
DECREES AND ELECTION. 535
eternity } of his free grace, chose out those that he foresaw would have no guilt of
sin, that they should not be punished for their guilt, as others were, when it is
a contradiction to suppose that they can be punished for their guilt when they
have none ? For who can lay any thing to their charge, when it is Christ that
has died ? And what do they mean by an election of men to that which is, in
its own nature, impossible that it should not be, whether they are elected to it
or no ; or by God's choosing them that had a right to eternal life, that they
should possess it ? What sense is it to say that a creditor chooses out those
among his debtors to be free from debt, that owe him nothing ? But if they say
that election is only God's determination, in the general, that all that believe
shall be saved, in what sense can this be called election ? They are not persons
that are here chosen, but mankind is divided into two sorts, the one believing,
and the other unbelieving, and God chooses the believing sort. It is not elec-
tion of persons, but of qualifications. God does from all eternity choose to be-
stow eternal life upon those that have a right to it, rather than upon those who
have a right to damnation. Is this all the election we have an account of in
God's word 1 Such a thing as election may well be allowed; for that there is
such a thing as sovereign love is certain ; that is, love, not for any excellency,
but merely God's good pleasure. For whether it is proper to say that God
from all eternity loved the elect or no, it is proper to say that God loved men
after the fall, while sinners and enemies ; for God so loved the world, that he
gave his only begotten Son to die. This was not for any goodness or excel-
lency, but merely God's good pleasure ; for he would not love the fallen
angels.
§ 48. Christ is often spoken of in Scripture as being, by way of eminency, the
Elect or Chosen of God. Isa. xlii. 1, " Behold my Servant, whom I uphold,
mine Elect in whom my soul delighteth." Luke xxiii. 35, " If he be the Christ,
the Chosen of God." 1 Pet. ii. 4, " A living stone, chosen of God, and pre-
cious." Psal. lxxxix. 3, " I have made a covenant with my Chosen :" v. 19,
" I have exalted one chosen out of the people." Hence those persons in the Old
Testament, that were the most remarkable types of Christ, were the subjects of
a very remarkable election of God, by which they were designed to some pe-
culiar honor of the prophetical, priestly, or kingly office. So Moses was called
God's chosen, in that wherein he was eminently a type of Christ, viz., as a pro-
phet and ruler, and mediator for his people ; Psal. cvi. 23, " Had not Moses,
his chosen, stood before him in the breach." So Aaron was constituted high
priest by a remarkable election of God, as in Numb. xvi. 5, and xvii. 5, Deut.
xxi. 5. So David the king was the subject of a remarkable election ; Psal.
Ixxviii. 67 — 72, " Moreover, he refused the tabernacle of Joseph, an^I chose
not the tribe of Ephraim, but chose the tribe of Judah, the mount Sion which
he loved ; and he built his sanctuary like high palaces ; like the earth which
he hath established for ever. He chose David also his servant, and took him
from the sheepfolds, from following the ewes great with young ; he brought
him to feed Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance." 1 Sam. xvi. 7 — 10,
" The Lord hath not chosen this, neither hath the Lord chosen this ; the Lord
hath not chosen these." Christ is the chosen of God, both as to his divine and
human nature. As to his divine nature, he was chosen of God, though not to
any addition to his essential glory or real happiness, which is infinite, yet to
great declarative glory. As he is man, he is chosen of God to the highest de-
gree of real glory and happiness of all creatures. As to both, he is chosen of
God to the office and glory of the mediator between God and men, and the
head of all the elect creation. His election, as it resoects his divine nature,
536 DECREES AND ELECTION.
was for his worthiness and excellency and infinite amiableness in the sight of
God, and perfect fitness for that which God chose him to, and his worthiness
was the ground of his election. But his election, as it respects his human, na-
ture, was free and sovereign, not being for any worthiness, but his election was
the foundation of his worthiness. His election, as he is God, is a manifestation
of God's infinite wisdom. The wisdom of any being is discovered by the wise
choice he makes, so the infinite wisdom of God is manifest in the wisdom of his
choice when he chose his eternal Son, one so fit upon all accounts, for the
office of a mediator, when he only was fit, and when he was perfectly and in-
finitely fit ; and yet his fitness was so difficult to be discerned, that none but
one of infinite wisdom could discover it. His election, as he was man, was a
manifestation of God's sovereignty and grace. God had determined to exalt
one of the creatures so high, that he should be one person with God, and should
have communion with God, and should have glory in all respects answerable ;
and so should be the head of all other elect creatures, that they might be united
to God and glorified in him. And his sovereignty appears in the election of
the man Jesus, various ways. It appears in choosing the species of creatures of
which he should be, viz., the race of mankind, and not the angels, the superior
species. God's sovereignty also appears in choosing this creature of the seed
of fallen creatures that were become enemies and rebels, abominable, miserable
creatures. It appears in choosing that he should be of such a branch of man-
kind, in selecting the posterity of David, a mean person originally, and the
youngest of the family. And as he was the seed of the woman, so his sove-
reignty appears in his being the seed of such particular women ; as of Leah,
the uncomely wife of Jacob, whom her husband had not chosen ; and Tamar,
a Canaanitess, and a harlot ; and Rahab a harlot ; and Ruth a Moabitess ; and
of Bathsheba, one that had committed adultery, and as he was the seed of many a
mean person. And his sovereignty appears in the choice of that individual
female of whom Christ was born.
It was owing to this election of God, that the man Jesus was not one of the
corrupt race of mankind, so that his freedom from sin and damnation is owing to
the free, sovereign, electing love of God in him, as well as in the rest of elect
men. All holiness, all obedience and good works, and perseverance in him,
was owing to the electing love of God, as well as in his elect members. And
so his freedom from eternal damnation was owing to the free, electing love of
God another way, viz., as it was owing to God's electing love to him and his
members, but to him in the first place^ that he did not fail in that great and
difficult work that he undertook ; that he did not fail under his extreme suffer-
ings, and so eternally continue under them. For if he had failed ; if his cour-
age, resolution and love had been conquered by his sufferings, he never could
have been delivered from them ; for then he would have failed in his obedience
to God, and his love to God failing, and being overcome by sufferings, these
sufferings would have failed of the nature of an acceptable sacrifice to God,
and the infinite value of his sufferings would have failed, and so must be made
up in infinite duration, to atone for his own deficiency. But God having chosen
Christ, he could not fail in this work, and so was delivered from his sufferings,
from the eternity of them, by the electing love of God. Justification and glori-
fication were fruits of God's foreknowledge and predestination w him, as well
as in his elect members.
So that the man Christ Jesus has the eternal, electing love of God to him,
to contemplate and admire, and to delight and rejoice his heart, as all H* elect
members have. He has it before him as others have, eternally to praise God *o» his
DECREES AND ELECTION. 537
free and sovereign election of him, and to ascribe the praise of his freedom from
eternal damnation (which he, with his elect members, beholds, and has had a
sense of, far beyond all the rest, and so has more cause of joy and praise for his
deliverance from it), and the praise of the glory he possesses, to that election. This
election is not for Christ's works or worthiness, for all his works and worthiness
are the fruits of it. God had power over this seed of the woman, to make it
either a vessel to honor or dishonor, as he had over the rest.
Christ is, by way of eminency, called The Elect of God. For though other
elect men are by election distinguished from the greater part of mankind, yet
they, in their election, have that which is common to thousands and millions ;
and though the elect angels are distinguished by election from the angels that
fell, yet they are chosen among myriads of others ; but this man, by his election,
is vastly distinguished from all other creatures in heaven or earth; and Christ,
in his election, is the head of election, and the pattern of all other election. Christ
is the head of all elect creatures ; and both angels and men are chosen in him in
some sense, i. e., chosen to be in him. All elect men are said to be chosen in
Christ, Eph. i. 4. Election contains two things, viz., foreknowledge and predes-
tination, which are distinguished in the 8th chapter of Romans. The one is
choosing persons to be God's, which is a foreknowing of them ; and the other,
a destining them to be conformed to the image of his Son, both in holiness and
blessedness. The elect are chosen in him, with respect to those two, in senses
somewhat diverse. With respect to foreknowledge or foreknowing, we are
chosen in him as God chose us, to be actually his in this way, viz., by being in
Christ, or being members of his Son. This is the way that God determined we
should actually become his. God chose Christ, and gave his elect people to him ;
and so, looking on tliem as his, owned them for his own. But by predestination,
which is consequent on his foreknowledge, we are elected in Christ, as we are
elected in his election. For God having in foreknowledge given us to Christ, he
thenceforward beheld us as members and parts of him ; and so ordaining the
head to glory, he therein ordained the members to glory. In destining Christ
to eternal life, he destined all parts of Christ to it also. So that we are appointed
to eternal life in Christ, being in Christ, his members from eternity. In his
being appointed to life, we are appointed to life. So Christ's election is
the foundation of ours, as much as his justification and glorification are the
foundation of ours. By election in Scripture is sometimes meant this latter
part, viz., destination to conformity to Christ in life and glory, as 2 Thess. ii.
13, " God from the beginning hath chosen you to salvation." And it seems
to be spoken of in this sense chiefly, in Eph. i. 3, 4, 5, " Who hath blessed us
with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ, according as he hath
chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and
without blame before him in love ; having predestinated us to the adoption of
children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will."
§ 49. 2 Thess. ii. 13, " But we are bound to give thanks always to God for
you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen
you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth."
Concerning this Scripture I observe the following things : 1. The word transla-
ted choseriis a word that signifies to choose or pick out from many others. 2.
That this choosing is given as a reason why those differ from others that believe
not the truth, but have pleasure in unrighteousness, as an instance of the distin-
guishing grace of God ; and therefore the apostle mentions their being chosen,
their election, as the ground of their sanctification by the Spirit and belief of the
truth. 3. The apostle speaks of their being chosen to salvation, as a ground
Vol. II. 68
038 DECREES AND ELECTION.
of their perseverance, or. the reason why they never shall fall away, as others
spoken of before, whereby they failed of salvation. See the preceding verses.
Compare Heb. vi. 9. 4. They are spoken of as thus chosen from the beginning
That place, Matth. xx. 21 — 23, " Grant that these my two sons may sit,
one on thy right hand, and the other on thy left, in thy kingdom ; — it shall be
given to them for whom it is prepared of my Father," affords an invincible ar-
gument for particular, personal predestination.
It is an evidence that the apostle, in chap. ix. of Romans, has not respect
solely to an election and dereliction of nations or public societies, that one in-
stance which he produces to illustrate and confirm what he says, is the derelic-
tion of a particular person, even Pharaoh, Rom. ix. 17. So it is an instance of
God's mercy to a particular person, even Moses. When he says to Moses, " I
will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and will have compassion on whom
I will have compassion," &c, the words cited were used by God on occasion
of, and with relation to his mercy to, a particular person, even Moses ; see
Exod. xxxiii. 19. And the language in that verse and the next, is suited to
particular persons ; as, verses 16 and 18, and verses 22, 24. And the apostle
shows plainly, verses 27, 29, that it is not an election of nations or public so- 1
cieties, but a distinction of some particular persons from others of the same so-
ciety ; as it was a distinction of particular persons, in preserving some, when
others were detroyed by Nebuchadnezzar's armies ; and in returning some from
captivity, and leaving others. This was not a showing of mercy to one public
society in distinction from another. So in chap. x. 4, 5, where the apostle
plainly continues to speak of the same election, it was not by a national election,
or election of any public society, that God distinguished the seven thousand that
he had reserved, who had not bowed the knee to Baal.
John vi. 27, " All that the Father hath given me shall come to me. And
this is the Father's will which sent me, that of all which he hath given me I
should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day." — " What is this
being given to Christ to be raised up again to everlasting life, but the election
of particular persons to salvation ? And since it is the Father's will, that of all
that he has given to Christ, he should lose nothing ; this election must be so
absolute as to insure their salvation." Green's Friendly Conferences.
It is plainly and abundantly taught in Scripture, that election is not of
works ; Rom. ix. 11, " That the purpose of God according to election might
stand, not of works, but of him that calleth." Verse 11, "Neither of them
having done either good or evil.'9 And Rom. xi. 5, 6, " Even so at this present
time also, there is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by
grace, then it is no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if
it be of works, then it is no more grace : otherwise work is no more work."
2 Tim. i. 9, " Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not accord*
ing to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was
given us in Christ Jesus before the world began."
How invincible a proof of the Calvinistical doctrine of election is that
place in Rom. xi. 5, " Even so then at this present time also, there is a rem-
nant according to the election of grace." Dr. Doddridge observes upon it, thai
some explain this of having chosen grace, i. e., the gospel. But that turn is very
unnatural, and neither suits the phrase, nor the connection with the former clause,
or with the next verse, where the apostle comments on his own words.
§ 50. If God does not some way in his providence, and so in his predeter-
minations, order what the volitions of men shall be, he would be as dependent
in governing the world, as a skilful mariner is in governing his ship, in passing
DECREES AND ELECTION. 53&
over a turbulent, tempestuous ocean, where he meets constantly, and through the
whole voyage, with things that agitate the ship, have great influence on the mo-
tions of it, and are so cross and grievous to him, that he is obliged to accommo-
date himself in the best manner that he can. He meets with cross winds, violent
tempests, strong currents, and great opposition from enemies ; none of which
things he has the disposal of, but is forced to suffer. He only guides the ship,
and, by his skill, turns that hither and thither, and steers it in such a manner as
to avoid dangers, as well as the case will allow.
§ 51. As to that objection against the election which the apostle speaks of
in his epistles, as an election by which such should be distinguished as should
certainly be saved at last, viz., that many of those whom the apostle calls elect,
chosen in Christ, &c, actually turned apostates : what Dr. Doddridge observes
in his note on Eph. i. 4, may be a sufficient answer. " The apostle speaks of
whole societies in general as consisting of saints and believers, because this
was the predominant character ; and he had reason, in the judgment of chari-
ty, to believe the greater part were such. Compare Phil. i. 7. Nor did
he always judge it necessary to make exceptions in reference to a few hypocrites
who had crept in among them, any more than Christ judged it so, to speak of
Judas as excluded, when he mentions the twelve thrones of judgment on which
the apostles should sit." Matth. xix. 28.
§ 52. Many have a notion concerning some things in religion, and, in par-
ticular, concerning predestination, that if they be the truth, yet it is not best
that they should be known. But many reasons may be offered against this
notion.
§ 53. What the devil did to afflict Job, was the exercise and fruit of his
devilish disposition, and his acts therein were devilish. And yet it is most ap-
parent, that those acts and effects of the devil towards Job, were appointed by
infinite wisdom for holy ends ; but not accomplished by God any otherwise than
by permission.
§ 54. There were many absolute promises of old, that salvation should
actually be accomplished, and that it should be of great extent, or extending to
great multitudes of mankind ; as, that " the seed of the woman should bruise
the serpent's head." " In thee, and in thy seed, shall all the families of the earth
be blessed." Psalm xxii. 30, " A seed shall serve him, and it shall be accounted
to the Lord for a generation." Isa. liii. 10, " He shall see his seed." Psalm
ii. 6, " Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance," &c.
Psalm ex., " Sit thou at my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool."
" Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power ;" and innumerable
others. And if there were absolute promises of this, then there were absolute
purposes of it ; for that which is sincerely, absolutely promised, is with an ab-
solute purpose of fulfilling the promise. But how can it be devised, that there
should be an absolute, determinate, infallible, unchangeable purpose, that Christ
should actually save vast multitudes of mankind ; and yet it be not absolutely
purposed that he should save any one single person, but that with regard to every
individual soul, this was left undetermined by God, to be determined by man's
Contingent will, which might determine for salvation, or against it, there being
nothing to render it impossible concerning any one, that his will would not
finally "determine against it ? Observe, these prophecies are not merely predic-
tions, but are of the nature of promises, and are often so called :— " Which he
hath promised by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began,"
&c God takes care to fulfil his own promises ; but, according to this scheme,
it is not God that fulfils these promises ; but men, left to themselves, to their
540 DECREES AND ELECTION.
contingent wills, fulfil them. Man's will, which God does not determine, de-
termines itself in exclusion of God.
All the promises of God are yea and amen, and God himself makes them so
to be ; he takes care of that matter.
§ 55. Concerning that grand objection, that this doctrine supposes partiality
in God, and is very dishonorable to him, being quite contrary to God's exten-
sive and universal benevolence to his creatures; it may be shown that the
Arminian notions and principles in this matter, lead directly to Deism ; and that
on these principles, it is utterly impossible to answer Tindal's objections against
revealed religion, especially in his 14th chapter. Besides unjustifiable partiality
is not imputable to a sovereign distributing his favors, though ever so unequally,
unless it be done unwisely, and so as to infringe the common good.
§ 56. God has regard to conditions in his decrees, as he has regard to a
wise order and connection of things. Such is his wisdom in his decrees, and all
his acts and operations, that if it were not for wise connection that is regarded,
many things would not be decreed. One part of the wise system of events
would not have been decreed, unless the other parts had been decreed, &c.
§ 57. God in the decree of election is justly to be considered as decreeing
the creature's eternal happiness, antecedently to any foresight of good works,
in a sense wherein he does not in reprobation decree the creature's eternal
misery, antecedently to any foresight of sin ; because the being of sin is sup-
posed in the first place in order to the decree of reprobation, which is, that God
will glorify his vindictive justice ; and the very notion of revenging justice,
simply considered, supposes a fault to be revenged. But faith and good works
are not supposed in the first place in order to the decree of election. The first
things in order in this decree are, that God will communicate his happiness, and
glorify his grace (for these two seem to be co-ordinate) ; but in neither of these
are faith and good works supposed. For when God decrees, and seeks to com
municate his own happiness in the creature's happiness, the notion of this, sim-
ply considered, supposes or implies nothing of faith or good works ; nor does
the notion of grace, in itself, suppose any such thing. It does not necessarily
follow from the very nature of grace, or God's communicativeness of his own
happiness, that there must be faith and good works. This is only a certain
way of the appointment of God's wisdom, wherein he will bring men to partake
of his grace. But yet God is far from having decreed damnation from a fore-
sight of evil works, in the sense, of the Arminians, as if God in this decree did
properly depend on the creature's sinful act, as an event, the coming to pass of
which primarily depends on the creature's determination ; so that the creature'"
determination in this decree may properly be looked upon as antecedent t
God's determination, and on which his determination is consequent and d
pendent.
§ 58. What divines intend by prior and posterior in the affair of God's de-
crees, is not that one is before another in the order of time, for all are fro
eternity ; but that we must conceive the view or consideration of one decree |
be before another, inasmuch as God decrees one thing out of respect to anoth
decree that he has made ; so that one decree must be conceived of as in som
sort to be the ground of another, or that God decrees one because of another
or that he would not have decreed one, had he not decreed that other. No
there are two ways in which divine decrees may be said to be in this sense prioi
one to another. 1. When one thing decreed is the end of another, this must i
some respect be conceived of as prior to that other. The good to be obtain
is in some respect prior, in the consideration of him who decrees and disposes,
DECREES AND ELECTION. 541
to the means of obtaining it. 2. When one thing decreed is the ground on
which the disposer goes, in seeking such an end by another thing decreed, as
being the foundation of the capableness or fitness that there is in that other
thing decreed to obtain such an end. Thus the sinfulness of the reprobate
is the ground on which God goes in determining to glorify his justice in the
punishment of his sinfulness ; because his sinfulness is the foundation of the
possibility of obtaining that end by such means. His having sin is the founda-
tion of both the fitness and possibility of justice being glorified in the punish-
ment of his sin, and therefore the consideration of the being of sin in the sub-
ject, must in some respect be prior in the mind of the disposer, to the determi-
nation to glorify his justice in the punishment of sin. For the disposer must
first consider the capableness and aptness of such means for* such an end, before
he determines them to such an end.
Thus God must be conceived of, as first considering Adonibezek's cruelty in
cutting off the thumbs and great toes of threescore and ten kings, as that which
was to be before he decreed to glorify his justice in punishing that cruelty by
the cutting off his thumbs and great toes. For God, in this last decree, has
respect to the fitness and aptness of his thumbs and great toes being cut off to
glorify his justice. But this aptness depends on the nature of that sin that was
punished. Therefore the disposer, in fixing on those means for this end, must
be conceived of as having that sin in view. Not only must God be conceived
of as having some end in consideration, before he determines the means in or-
der to that end, but he must also be conceived of as having a consideration of
the capableness or aptness of the means to obtain the end before he fixes on the
means. Both these, in different respects, may be said to be prior to the means
decreed to such an end in the mind of the disposer. Both, in different respects,
are the ground or reason of appointment of the means. The end is the ground
or reason of the appointment of the means ; and also the capacity and fitness of
the means to the end, is the ground or reason of this appointment to such an
end. So both the sin of the reprobate, and also the glory of divine justice,
Jnay properly be said to be before the decree of damning the reprobate. The
decree of damnation may properly be said, in different respects, to be because
of both these ; and that God would not have decreed the damnation of the
sinner, had it not been for the respect he had both to the one and the other.
Both may properly be considered as the ground of the decree of damnation.
The view of the sinfulness of the reprobate must be in some respect prior in the
decree, to God's decree to glorify his justice in punishing their sinfulness. Be-
cause sinfulness is necessarily supposed as already existing in the decree of
punishing sinfulness, and the decree of damnation being posterior to the con-
sideration of the sin of men in this latter respect, clears God of any injustice in
such a decree. That which stands in the place of the ultimate end in a decree,
i. e., that which is a mere end, and not a means to any thing further or higher,
viz., the shining forth of God's glory, and the communication of his goodness,
must indeed be considered as prior, in the consideration of the Supreme Dispo-
ser, to every thing excepting the mere possibility of it. But this must in some
respects be conceived of as prior to that, because possibility is necessarily sup-
posed in his decree. But if we descend lower than the highest end ; if we
come down to other events decreed, that be not mere ends, but means to
obtain that end, then we must necessarily bring in more things, as in some re-
spect prior, in the same manner as mere possibility is in this highest decree.
Because more things must necessarily be supposed or considered as existing in
the decree, in order that those things which are decreed may reach the end for
542 DECREES AND ELECTION.
which they are decreed. More things must be supposed in order to a possibility
of these things taking place as subordinate to their end ; and therefore they
stand in the same place, in these lower decrees, as absolute possibility does in
the decree of the highest end. The vindictive justice of God is not to be con-
sidered as a mere or ultimate end, but as a means to that end. Indeed, God's
glorifying his justice, or rather his glorifying his holiness and greatness, has
the place of a mere and ultimate end. But his glorifying his justice in punish-
ing sin (or in exercising vindictive justice, which is the same), is not to be con-
sidered as a mere end, but a certain way or means of obtaining an end. Vin-
dictive justice is not to be considered as a certain, distinct attribute to be
glorified, but as a certain way and means for the glorifying an attribute. Every
distinct way of God's glorifying or exercising an attribute, might as well be
called a distinct attribute as this. It is but giving a distinct name to it, and so
we might multiply attributes without end. The considering of the glorifying of
vindictive justice as a mere end, has led to great misrepresentations, and undue
and unhappy expressions about the decree of reprobation. Hence the glorify-
ing of God's vindictive justice on such particular persons, has been considered
as altogether prior in the decree to their sinfulness, yea, to their very beings.
Whereas it being only a means to an end, those things that are necessarily
presupposed, in order to the fitness and possibility of this means of obtaining
the end, must be conceived of as prior to it.
Hence God's decree of the eternal damnation of the reprobate is not to be
conceived of as prior to the fall, yea, and to the very being of the persons, as the
decree of the eternal glory of the elect is. For God's glorifying his love, and
communicating his goodness, stands in the place of a mere or ultimate end, and
therefore is prior in the mind of the eternal disposer to the very being of the
subject, and to every thing but mere possibility. The goodness of God gives
the being as well as the happiness of the creature, and does not presuppose it
Indeed, the glorifying of God's mercy, as it presupposes the subject to be
miserable, and the glorifying his grace, as it presupposes the subject to be sinful,
unworthy and ill-deserving, are not to be conceived of as ultimate ends, but only
as certain ways and means for the glorifying the exceeding abundance and
overflowing fulness of God's goodness and love ; therefore these decrees are
not to be considered as prior to the decree of the being and permission of the
fall of the subject. And the decree of election, as it implies a decree of glori-
fying God's mercy and grace, considers men as being cursed and fallen ; because
the very notion of such a decree supposes sin and misery. Hence we may
learn, how much in the decree of predestination is to be considered as prior to
the creation and fall of man, and how much as posterior ; viz., that God's decree
to glorify his love and communicate his goodness, and to glorify his greatness
and holiness, is to be considered as prior to creation and the fall of man. And
because the glory of God's love, and the communication of his goodness neces-
sarily imply the happiness of the creature, and give both their being and
happiness ; hence the design to communicate and glorify his goodness and love
eternally to a certain number, is to be considered as prior, in both those men-
tioned respects, to their being and fall. For such a design, in the notion of it,
presupposes neither. But nothing in the decree of reprobation is to be looked
upon as antecedent in one of those respects to man's being and fall ; but only
that general decree that God will glorify his justice, or rather his holiness and
greatness, which supposes neither their being nor sinfulness. But whatsoever
there is in this decree of evil to particular subjects, it is to be considered as
conseouent on the decree of their creation, and permission of their fall. And
DECREES AND ELECTION. 543
indeed, although all that is in the decree of election, all that respects good to
the subjects, be not posterior to the being and fall of men, yet both the decree
of election and rejection or reprobation, as so styled, must be considered as con-
sequent on the decrees concerning the creation and fall. For both these decrees
have respect to that distinction or discrimination that is afterwards actually made
amongst men in pursuance of these decrees. Hence effectual calling, being the
proper execution of election, is sometimes in Scripture called election ; and the
rejection of men in time is called reprobation. Therefore the decrees of election
and reprobation must be looked upon as beginning there, where the actual
distinction begins, because distinction is implied in the notion of those decrees.
And therefore, whatsoever is prior to this actual distinction, the foresight of it,
and decree concerning it, or that state that was common, or wherein they were
undistinguished, the foresight of that, or decree concerning it, must be consi-
dered, in some respect, as prior to the decree concernmg the distinction.
Because all that is before is supposed or looked upon as already put in the
decree. For that is the decree, viz., to make such a distinction between those
that were before in such a common state. And this is agreeable to the Scrip-
ture representations of those decrees, John xv. 19 : " Ye are not of the world,
but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you." See
also Ezek. xvi. 1 — 8.
The decrees of God must be conceived of in the same order, and as antece-
dent to, and consequent on one another, in the same manner, as God's acts in
the execution of those decrees. If this wTill not hold, with regard to those
things that are the effects of those acts, yet certainly it will hold with respect to
the acts themselves. They depend on one another, and are grounded on one
another, in the same manner as the decrees that these are the execution of, and
in no other. For, on the one hand, the decrees of God are no other than his
eternal doing what is done, acted or executed by him in time. On the one
hand, God's acts themselves, in executing, can be conceived of no otherwise,
than as decrees for a present effect. They are acts of God's will. God brings
things to pass only by acts of his "will. He speaks, and it is done. His wdl
says, let it be, and it is. And this act of his will that now is, cannot be looked
upon as really different from that act of will that wras in him before, and from
eternity, in decreeing that this thing should be at this time. It differs only
relatively. Here is no new act of the will in God, but only the same acts of
God's will, which before, because the time wras not come, respected future time ;
and so were called decrees. But now the time being come, they respect present
time, and so are not called by us decrees, but acts executing decrees. Yet they
are evidently the same acts in God. Therefore those acts, in executing, must
certainly be conceived of in the same order, and with the same dependence, as
the decrees themselves. It may be in some measure illustrated by this ; — The
decree of God or the will of God decreeing events, may be represented as a
straight line of infinite length, that runs through all past eternity, and terminates
in the event. The last point in the line, is the act of God's will in bringing the
event to pass, and does not at all differ from all the other points throughout the
infinite length of the line, in any other respect but this, that this last point is
' next to the event. This line may be represented as in motion, but yet always
kept parallel to itself. The hither end of the line, by its motion, describes events
in the order in which they come to pass ; or at least represents God's acts in
bringing the events to pass, in their order and mutual dependence, antecedence
and consequence. By the motion of all the other points of the line, before the
event or end of the line, in the whole infinite length of it, are represented the
D44 DECREES AND ELECTION.
decrees in their order ; which, because the line in all its motions is kept parallel
to itself, is exactly the same with the order of the motions of the last point.
For the motion of every point of the whole line, is in all respects, just like the
motion of that last point wherein the line terminates in the event ; and the
different parts of the motion of every point, are in every respect precisely in the
same order. And the maxim, that what is first in intention, is last in execution,
does not in the least concern this matter. For, by last in execution, is meant
only last in order of time, without any respect to the priority or posteriority that
we are speaking of; and it does not at all hinder, but that in God's acts, in
executing his decrees, one act is the ground or reason of another act, in the
same manner precisely as the decree that related to it was the ground or reason
of the other decree. The absolute independence of God, no more argues
against some of God's decrees being grounded on decrees of some other things
that should first come to pass, than it does against some of God's acts in time,
being grounded on some other antecedent acts of his. It is just the same with
God's acts in executing, as has been said already of his decreeing. In one res-
pect, the end that is afterwards to be accomplished, is the ground of God's
acting ; in another respect, something that is already accomplished, is the
ground of his acting, as it is the ground of the fitness or capableness of the act
to obtain the end. There is nothing but the ultimate end of all things, viz.
God's glory, and the communication of his goodness, that is prior to all fiist acts
in creating the world, in one respect and mere possibility in another. But, with
respect to after acts, other ends are prior in one respect, and other preceding
acts are prior in another, just as I have shown it to be with respect to God's
decrees. Now, this being established, it may help more clearly to illustrate,
and fully to evince, what we have insisted on concerning the order of the
decrees, and that God's decrees of some things that are accomplished first in
order of time, are also prior in the order, so as to be the proper ground and
reason of other decrees. For, let us see how it is in God's acts in executing his
decrees. Will any deny, that God's act in rewarding righteousness, is grounded
on a foregoing act of his in giving righteousness ? And that he rewards right-
eousness in such a person, because he hath given righteousness to such a person;
and that because this latter act necessarily supposes the former act foregoing ?
So, in like manner, God's decree, in determining to reward righteousness, is
grounded on an antecedent decree to give righteousness, because the former
decree necessarily supposes the latter decree, and implies it in the very notion
of it. So, who will deny, but that God's act in punishing sin, is grounded on
what God hath antecedently done in permitting sin, or suffering it to be, because
the former necessarily supposes the latter, and therefore that the actual permis-
sion of sin is prior, in the order of nature, to the punishment of it ? So that
whatever foregoing act of God is in any respect a ground and reason of another
succeeding act, so far is both the act, and decree of the act, prior to both that
other act and decree.
It may be objected to this, that if so, the decree of bestowing salvation on
an elect soul, is founded on the decree of bestowing faith on him ; for God ac-
tually bestows salvation in some respect, because he has bestowed faith ; and
this would be to make the decree of election succedaneous to the decree of giv-
ing faith, as well as that of reprobation consequent on the decree of permitting
sin. To this I answer, that both God's act, and also his decree of bestowing
salvation on such a fallen creature, is in some respects, grounded on God's act
and decree of giving faith, but in no wise as the decree or act of eternal pun-
ishing is grounded on sin, because punishment necessarily presupposes sin, so
DECREES AND ELECTION 516
that it could not be without it. But the decreeing and giving the happiness of
the elect, is not so founded on faith. The case is very different. For with res-
pect to eternal punishment, it may be said that God would not, yea, could not,
have decreed or executed it, had he not decreed and permitted sin ; but it can-
not be said, either that God could not, or would not, have decreed or bestowed
the eternal happiness of the elect, unless he had decreed and given faith. In-
eed, the salvation of an elect soul is, in this respect, grounded on the decree
giving faith as God's decree o*f bestowing happiness on the elect in this par-
cular way, as a fallen creature, and by the righteousness of Christ made his
own, by being heartily received and closed with, is grounded on the decree of
bestowing faith in Christ, because it presupposes it, as the act that answers to
this decree does. But the decree of bestowing happiness in general, which we
conceive of as antecedent to this act, presupposes no such thing ; nor does just
so much without any more in execution presuppose faith, or indeed the right-
eousness of Christ, or any act or suffering of a mediator, or even the fall of man.
And the decree of God's communicating his goodness to such a subject, does not
so much as presuppose the being of the subject, because it gives being. But
there is no decree of evil to such a subject which can be conceived of as ante-
cedent to a decree of punishment. For the first decree of evil or suffering,
implies that in it. For there is no evil decreed for any other end, but the glory
of God's justice. Therefore the decree of the permission of sin is prior to all
other things in the decree of reprobation. Due distinctions seem not to have
been observed, in asserting that all the decrees of God are unconditional ; which
has occasioned difficulties in controversies about the decrees. There are no
conditional decrees in this sense, viz., that decrees should depend on things as
conditions of them, which in this decree, that depends on them as conditions, must
be considered, like themselves, as yet undecreed. But yet decrees may, in some
sort, be conditions of decrees ; so that it may be said, that God would not have
decreed some things, had he not decreed others.
§ 59 The objection to the divine decrees will be, that according to this
doctrine, God may do evil, that good may come of it.
Ans. I do not argue that God may commit evil, that good may come of it ;
but that he may will that evil should come to pass, and permit that it may come
to pass, that good may come of it. It is in itself absolutely evil, for any being
to commit evil that good may come of it ; but it would be no evil, but good,
even in a creature, to will that evil should come to pass, if he had wisdom
sufficient to see certainly that good would come of it, or that more good would
come to pass in that way than in any other. And the only reason why it would
not be lawful for a creature to permit evil to( come to pass, and that it would
not be wise, or good and virtuous in him so to do, is, that he has not perfect
wisdom and sufficiency, so as to render it fit that such an affair should be trusted
with him. In so doing he goes beyond his line ; he goes out of his province :
he meddles with things too high for him. It is every one's duty to do things fif
for him in his sphere, and commensurate to his power. God never intrusted
this providence in the hands of creatures of finite understandings, nor is it pro-
per that he should.
If a prince were of perfect and all-comprehensive wisdom and foresight, and he
should see that an act of treason would be for the great advancement of the welfare
of his kingdom, it might be wise and virtuous in him to will that such an act of
treason should come to pass ; yea, it would be foolish and wrong if he did not ; and
it would be prudent and wise in him not to restrain the traitor, but to let him alone
to go on in the way he chose. And yet he might hate the reason at the same
Vol. II. 69
546
DECREES AND ELECTION.
time, and he might properly also give forth laws at the same time, forbidding it
upon pain of death, and might hold these laws in force against this traitor.
The Arminians themselves allow that God permits sin, and that if he per-
mits it, it will come to pass. So that the only difficulty about the act of the will
that is in it, is that God should will evil to be, that good may come of it. But it
is demonstrably true, that if God sees that good will come of it, and more good
than otherwise, so that when the whole series of events is viewed by God, and all
things balanced, the sum total of good with the* evil, is more than without it, all
being subtracted that needs be subtracted, and added that is to be added ; if the
sum total of good thus considered, be greatest, greater than the sum in any other
case, then it will follow that God, if he be a wise and holy being, must will it.
For if this sum total that has evil in it, when what the evil subtracts is sub-
tracted, has yet the greatest good in it, then it is the best sum total, better than
the other sum total that has no evil in it. But if, all things considered, it be
really the best, how can it be otherwise than that it should be chosen by an in-
finitely wise and good being, whose holiness and goodness consists in always
choosing what is best ? Which does it argue most, wisdom or folly, a good
disposition or an evil one, when two things are set before a being, the one bet-
er and the other worse, to choose the worse and refuse the better ?
§ 60. There is no inconsistency or contrariety between the decretive and
[deceptive will of God. It is very consistent to suppose that God may hate the
thing itself, and yet will that it should come to pass. Yea, I do not fear to as-
sert that the thing itself may be contrary to God's will, and yet that it may be
agreeable to his will that it should come to pass, because his will, in the one case,
has not the same object with his will in the other case. To suppose God to
have contrary wills towards the same object, is a contradiction ; but it is not so,
to suppose him to have contrary wills about different objects. The thing itself,
and that the thing should come to pass, are different, as is evident ; because it
is possible that the one may be good and the other may be evil. The thing it-
self may be evil, and yet it may be a good thing that it should come to pass.
It may be a good thing that an evil thing should come to pass ; and oftentimes
it most certainly and undeniably is so, and proves so.
§ 61. Objectors to the doctrine of election may say, God cannot always
preserve men from sinning, unless he destroys their liberty. But will they deny
that an omnipotent, an infinitely wise God, could possibly invent and set before
men such strong motives to obedience, and keep them before them in such a
manner as should influence them to continue in their obedience, as the elect an-
gels have done, without destroying their liberty ? God will order it so that the
saints and angels in heaven never will sin, and does it therefore follow that
their liberty is destroyed, and that they are not free, but forced in their actions 1
Does it follow that they are turned into machines and blocks, as the Arminians
say the Calvinistic doctrines turn men 1
§ 62. To conclude this discourse ; I wish the reader to consider the unrea-
sonableness of rejecting plain revelations, because they are puzzling to our rea-
son. There is no greater difficulty attending this doctrine than the contrary,
nor so great. So that though the doctrine of the decrees be mysterious, and at-
tended with difficulties, yet the opposite doctrine is in itself more mysterious,
and attended with greater difficulties, and with contradictions to reason more
evident, to one who thoroughly considers things ; so that, even if the Scripture
had made no revelation of it, we should have had reason to believe it. But
since the Scripture is so abundant in declaring it, the unreasonableness of reject-
ing it appears the more glaring.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 547
CONCERNING EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
§ 1. It is manifest that the Scripture supposes, that if ever men are turned
from sin, God must undertake it, and he must be the doer of it ; that it is his
doing that must determine the matter ; that all that others can do, will avail
nothing, without his agency. This is manifest by such texts as these : Jer.
xxxi. 18, 19, " Turn thou me, and I shall be turned ; thou art the Lord my
God. Surely after that I was turned, I repented ; and after that I was instruct-
ed, I smote upon my thigh," &c. Lam. v. 21, " Turn thou us unto thee, 0
Lord, and we shall be turned."
§ 2. According to Dr. Whitby's notion of the assistance of the Spirit, the
Spirit of God does nothing in the hearts or minds of men beyond the power of
the devil ; nothing but what the devil can do ; and nothing showing any greater
power in any respect, than the devil shows and exercises in his temptations.
For he supposes that all that the Spirit of God does, is to bring moral motives
and inducements to mind, and set them before the understanding, &c. It is
possible that God may infuse grace, in some instances, into the minds of such
persons as are striving to obtain it in the other way, though they may not ob-
serve it, and may not know that it is not obtained by gradual acquisition. But
if a man has indeed sought it only in that way, and with as much dependence
on himself, and with as much neglect of God in his endeavors and prayers, as
such a doctrine naturally leads to, it is not very likely that he should obtain
saving grace by the efficacious, mighty power of God. It is most likely that
God should bestow this gift in a way of earnest attention to divine truth, and
the use of the means of grace, with reflection on one's own sinfulness, and in a
way of being more and more convinced of sinfulness, and total corruption and
need of the divine power to restore the heart, to infuse goodness, and of becom-
ing more and more sensible of one's own impotence, and helplessness and in-
ability to obtain goodness by his own strength. And if a man has obtained no
other virtue, than what seems to have been wholly in that gradual and insensi-
ble way that might be expected from use and custom, in the exercise of his own
strength, he has reason to think, however bright his attainments may seem to
be, that he has no saving virtue.
§ 3. Great part of the gospel is denied by those who deny pure efficacious
grace. They deny that wherein actual salvation and the application of re-
demption mainly consists ; and how unlikely are such to be successful in their
endeavors after actual salvation 1
§ 4. Turnbull's explanation of Philip, ii. 12, 13, " Work out your own sal-
vation with fear and trembling ; for it is God that worketh in you both to will
and to do of his own good pleasure," is this {Christian Philosophy, p. 96, 97) :
" Give all diligence to work out your salvation ; for it is God, the Creator of
all things, who, by giving you, of his good pleasure, the power of willing and
doing, with a sense of right and wrong, and reason to guide and direct you,
hath visibly made it your end so to do. Your frame shows, that to prepare
yourselves foi great moral happiness, arising from a well cultivated and im-
proved mind suitably placed, is your end appointed to you by your Creator.
548 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
Consider, therefore, that by neglecting this your duty, this your interest, you
contemn and oppose the good will of God towards you, and his design in ere-
ating you"
§ 5. If we look through all the examples we have of conversion in Scrip-
ture, the conversion of the Apostle Paul, and the Corinthians (" such were
some of you, but ye are washed," &c), and all others that the apostles write
to, how far were they from this gradual way of conversion, by contracted habits
and by such culture as Turnbull speaks of ? Turnbull, in his Christian Phi-
losophy, p. 470, seems to think, that the sudden conversions that were in the
apostles' days, were instances of their miraculous power, as in these words:
" They appealed to the works they wrought, to the samples they gave of their
power to foretell future events ; their power to cure instantaneously all diseases
of the body ; their power to cure, in the same extraordinary manner, all diseases
of the mind, or to convert bad into good dispositions ; their power to bestow
gifts and blessings of all sorts, bodily and spiritual." See again, to the like
purpose, p. 472.
Now I would inquire, whether those who thus had the diseases of thei/
minds cured, and their bad converted into good dispositions, had any virtue ;
or whether those good dispositions of theirs were virtues, or any thing praise-
worthy ; and whether, when they were thus converted, they became good men,
ind the heirs of salvation ? As Turnbull himself allows, all that are not good
men, were called the children of the devil in Scripture ; and he asserts that no-
thing is virtue, but what is obtained by our own culture ; that no habit is virtu-
ous, but a contracted one, one that is owing to ourselves, our own diligence,
&c, and also holds, that none are good men but the virtuous ; none others are
the heirs of future happiness.
§ 6. What God wrought for the Apostle Paul and other primitive Chris-
tians, was intended for a pattern to all future ages, for their instruction and ex-
citement ; Eph. ii. 7, 1 Tim. i. 16. It is natural to expect, that the first fruits
of the church specially recorded in history, and in that book which is the steady
rule of the church in all things pertaining to salvation, should be a pattern to
after ages in those things, those privileges, which equally concern all. Or if it
be said, that as soon as men take up a strong resolution, they are accepted and
looked upon by God as penitents and converts ; it may be inquired, is there a
good man without good habits, or principles of virtue and goodness in his
lieart ?
§ 7. Turnbull speaks of good men as born again ; i. e. changed by culture;
Christian Philosophy, p. 282. Is there a good man without such principles as
love to God and men, or charity, humility, &c.'? How comes that resolution to
be so good, if no principle of virtue be exercised in it ?
If it be said, Paul was a good man before he was converted, it may be an-
swered, he did not believe in Christ, and therefore was in a state of condemna-
tion. Besides, he speaks of himself as being then a wicked man.
§ 8. Concerning the supposition advanced by Bishop Butler, and by Turn-
bull in his Christian Philosophy, that all that God does, even miracles them-
selves, are wrought according to general laws, such as are called the laws of
nature, though unknown to us ; and the supposition of Turnbull, that all may
be done by angels acting by general laws, I observe, this seems to be unreason*
able. If angels effect these works, acting only by general laws, then they
must do them without any immediate, special interposition at all, even without
the smallest intimation of the divine mind, what to do, or upon what occasion
God would have any thing to be done. And what will this doctrine bring in-
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 549
spiration to, which is one kind of miracle ? According to this, all significa-
tions of the divine mind, even to the prophets and apostles, must be according
to general laws, without any special interposition at all of the divine agency.
\ 9. Acts xii. 23, God was so angry with Herod for not giving him the
glory of his eloquence, that the angel of the Lord smote him immediately, and
he died a miserable death ; he was eaten of worms, and gave up the ghost.
But if it be very sinful for a man to take to himself the glory of such a qualifi-
cation as eloquence, how much more a man's taking to himself the glory of
divine grace, God's own image, and that which is infinitely God's most excel-
lent, precious and glorious gift, and man's highest honor, excellency and happi-
ness, whereby he is partaker of the divine nature, and becomes a godlike crea-
ture ? If God was so jealous for the glory of so small a gift, how much more
for so high an endowment, this being that alone, of all other things, by which
man becomes like God ? If man takes the glory of it to himself he thereby
will be in the greatest danger of taking the glory to himself that is due to God,
and of setting up himself as standing in competition with God, as vying with
the Most High, and making himself a god and not a man. If not giving God
the glory of that which is least honorable, provokes God's jealousy ; much
more must not giving God the glory of that which is infinitely the most honor-
able. It is allowed, the apostle insists upon it, that the primitive Christians
should be sensible that the glory of their gifts belonged to God, and that they
made not themselves to differ. But how small a matter is this, if they make
themselves to differ in that, which the apostle says is so much more excellent
than all gifts ?
§ 10. How much more careful has God shown himself, that men should not
be proud of their virtue, than of any other gift 1 See Deut. ix. 4, Luke xviii.
9, and innumerable other places. And the apostle plainly teaches us to ascribe
to God the glory, not only of our redemption, but of our wisdom, righteousness
and sanctification ; and that no flesh should glory in themselves in these things,
1 Cor. i. 29, 30, 31. Again, the apostle plainly directs, that all that glory in
their virtue, should glory in the Lord, 2 Cor. x. 17. It is glorying in virtue
and virtuous deeds he is there speaking of; and it is plain that the apostle uses
the expression of glorying in the Lord, in such a sense, as to imply ascribing the
glory of our virtue to God.
§ 11. The doctrine of men's being the determining causes of their own virtue,
teaches them, not to do so much, as even the proud Pharisee did, who thanked
God for making him to differ from other men in virtue, Luke xviii.
See Gen. xli. 15, 16. Jobxi. 12. Dan. ii. 25, &c. 2 Cor. iii. 5, 6. 2 Cor.
iv. 7. 2 Cor. x. 16.
Proverbs xx. 12, " The hearing ear, and the seeing eye, the Lord hath made
even both of them ;" compared with many parallel places that speak about God's
giving eyes to see, and ears to hear, and hearts to understand, &c.
§ 12. The Arminian doctrine, and the doctrine of our new philosophers,
concerning habits of virtue being only by custom, discipline, and gradual culture,
joined with the other doctrine, that the obtaining of these habits in those that
have time for it, is in every man's power, according to their doctrine of the free-
dom of will, tends exceedingly to cherish presumption in sinners, while in
health and vigor, and tends to their utter despair, in sensible approaches of death
by sickness or old age. . . _
§ 13. Observe that the question with some is, whether the Spirit of God
does any thing at all in these days, since the Scriptures have been completed.
With those that allow that he does any thing, the question cannot be, whethei
550 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
his influence be immediate ; for, if he does any thing at all, his influence must
be immediate. Nor can the question be, whether his influence, with regard to
what he intends to do, be efficacious.
The questions relating to efficacious grace, controverted between us and the
Arminians, are two : 1. Whether the grace of God, in giving us saving virtue,
be determining and decisive. 2. Whether saving virtue be decisively given by
a supernatural and sovereign operation of the Spirit of God ; or, whether it be
only by such a divine influence or assistance, as is imparted in the course of
common providence, either according to established laws of nature, or established
laws of God's universal providence towards mankind ; i. e., either, 1. Assistance
which is given in all natural actions, wherein men do merely exercise and im-
prove the principles of nature and laws of nature, and come to such attain-
ments as are connected with such exercises by the mere laws of nature. For
there is an assistance in all such natural actions ; because it is by a divine in-
fluence that the laws of nature are upheld ; and a constant concurrence of divine
power is necessary in order to our living, moving, or having a being. This we
may call a natural assistance. Or, 2. That assistance, which, though it be
something besides the upholding of the laws of nature (which take place in all
affairs of life), is yet, by a divine, universal constitution in this particular affair
of religion, so connected with those voluntary exercises which result from this
mere natural assistance, that by this constitution it indiscriminately extends to
all mankind, and is certainly connected with such exercises and improvements, as
those just mentioned, by a certain, established, known rule, as much as any of the
laws of riature. This kind of assistance, though many Arminians call it a super-
natural assistance, differs little or nothing from that natural assistance that is
established by a law of nature. The law so established, is only a particular
law of nature ; as some of the laws of nature are more general, others more
particular : but this establishment, which they suppose to be by divine promise,
differs nothing at all from many other particular laws of nature, except only
in this circumstance, of the established constitutions, being revealed in the word
of God, while others are left to be discovered only by experience.
The Calvinists suppose otherwise ; they suppose that divine influence and
operation, by which saving virtue is obtained, is entirely different from, and
above common assistance, or that which is given in a course of ordinary provi-
lence, according to universally established laws of nature. They suppose a
principle of saving virtue is immediately imparted and implanted by that
operation, which is sovereign and efficacious in this respect, that its effect pro-
ceeds not from any established laws of nature. I mention this as an entirely
different question from the other, viz., whether the grace of God, by which we
obtain saving virtue, is determining or decisive. For that it may be, if it be given
wholly in a course of nature, or by such an operation as is limited and regulated
perfectly according to established, invariable laws. For none will dispute that
many things are brought to pass by God in this manner, that are decisively oi-
dered by him, and are brought to pass by his determining providence.
The controversy, as it relates to efficacious grace, in this sense, includes in
it these four questions.
1. Whether saving virtue differs from common virtue, or such virtue as those
have that are not in a state of salvation, in nature and kind, or only in degree
and circumstances ?
2. WTiether a holy disposition of heart, as an internal, governing principle
of life and practice, be immediately implanted or infused in the soul, or only be
contracted by repeated acts, and obtained by human culture and improvement ?
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 551
3. Whether conversion, or the change of a person from being a vicious or
wicked man, to a truly virtuous character, be instantaneous or gradual ?
4. Whether the divine assistance or influence, by which men obtain true and
saving virtue, be sovereign and arbitrary, or, whether God, in giving this assist-
ance and its effects, limits himself to certain exact and stated rules, revealed
in his word, and established by his promises ?
§ 14. Eph. i. 19, 20, " What is the exceeding greatness of his power to
usward, according to the working of his mighty power," or the effectual work-
ing, as the word signifies. — These words, according to the effectual working of
his power, we shall find applied to conversion, to growth in grace, and to rising
up at last. You have them applied to conversion, Eph. iii. 7 : " Whereof I was
made a minister, according to the gift of the grace of God, given to me, by the
effectual working of his power" — So likewise to growth in grace, Eph. iv. 10 :
" The whole body increaseth with the increase of God, by the effectual working
in the measure of every part." — And to the resurrection to glory at the last day,
Philip, iii. 21 : " He will change our vile bodies, according to the effectual work-
ing of his mighty power, whereby he is able to subdue all things to himself."
And that the power of God in conversion, or in giving faith and the spiritual
blessings that attend it, is here meant, may be argued from the apostle's change
of phrase, that whereas in the foregoing verse, he spoke of the riches of the
glory of Christ's inheritance in the saints, he does not go on to say, " and what
is the exceeding greatness of his power towards them" (i. e., the saints), which
surely would have been most natural, if he still had respect only to the power
of God in bestowing the inheritance of future glory. But, instead of that, we
see he changes the phrase ; " and what is the exceeding greatness of his power
to usward who believe ;" plainly intimating some kind of change of the sub-
ject, oj a respect to the subject of salvation with regard to something diverse ;
that whereas before he spoke of saints in their future state only, now he speaks
of something that the saints, we that dwell in this world, that believe, are the sub-
jects of. And as the apostle includes himself, so it is the more likely he should
have the mighty power of God in conversion in his thought ; his conversion
having been so visible and remarkable an instance of God's marvellous power.
Again, the apostle, in praying that they " knowing the exceeding greatness
of God's power," &c, prays for such a knowledge and conviction of the power
of God to bring them to life and glory, which was a most special remedy against
such doubts as the church in the then present state was most exposed to, viz., that
of their being preserved to glory and salvation through all their trials, persecutions,
and the great opposition that was made by the enemies of Christ and their souls.
Therefore, after mentioning the glory of their inheritance, he, for their comfort
and establishment, mentions the power of God to bring them to the possession
of this inheritance, as the apostle Peter does, 1 Peter i. 4, 5 : " To an inheritance
incorruptible — who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation."
He speaks to their hearts, for here was their difficulty and temptation to doubt-
ing. But if the keeping them in faith showed such great power, much more
did the first bringing them from heathenism and the power of sin, darkness and
spiritual death and ruin, into a state of faith and salvation, quickening them when
dead in trespasses and sins ; as it is a greater instance of divine power to raise
the dead, than to maintain life that is exposed to danger ; a greater work to re-
concile us being enemies, than to keep us friends being reconciled. It was nat-
ural for the apostle to put them in mind of the power of God manifested in their
conversion, as he would strengthen their faith in his power to raise them at the
last day, and glorify them to eternity. Dr. Goodwin says, he finds most of the
552 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
Greek fathers ran this way in interpreting the place. He mentions Theophy-
lact and Chrysostom, and cites these words of Chrysostom : " The apostle's
scope is to demonstrate by what already was manifested in them, viz., the power
of God in working faith, and to raise up their hearts to believe what was not
manifested, viz., the raising of them from death to life. It being (saith he) a
far more wonderful work to persuade a soul to believe in Christ, than to raise
up a dead man, a far more admirable work of the two." Besides, what the apos-
tle says in the continuation of his discourse, explains his meaning, and puts the
matter of his intending to include the power of God manifested in their conver-
sion, out of all doubt, as, in the very next sentence, " and you hath he quickened,
who were dead in trespasses and sins :*' and every word that follows, to the end
of the second chapter, confirms the same thing. I shall mention a few of them :
verse 2, " Wherein in time past ye walked — according to the prince of the
power of the air, the spirit that now worketh effectually in the children of dis-
obedience." This shows the exceeding greatness of power in their being deliv-
ered from such a state, wherein they were held by the great power of so strong
an enemy. Verses 5 and 6, ** Even when we were dead in sins, hath quicken-
ed us together in Christ, and hath raised us up together, and made us sit together
in heavenly places in Christ Jesus." These things tend to show how the power
of God in their conversion, and the happy, honorable, and glorious change of
their state by it, was according to the power that wrought in Christ when he was
quickened, raised up, and made to sit in heavenly places, as chap.i. 19, 20, 21.
Now, to back this with a parallel place, as here in this place the apostle speaks
of the greatness of God's power in working faith, and parallels it with the power
that raised up Christ from the dead ; so we find he says the very same thing
in Colossians ii. 12, 13 : " Ye are buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye
are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him
from the dead." In that text in Ephesians the apostle speaks of faith, the power
that loorks in us that believe. So in this text in Colossians, ye are risen
through faith. -Again, 2dly, in Ephesians, together with what there follows,
chap, ii., he compareth believing to a rising from the dead. So here in Colos-
sians, ye are risen with him through faith. Thirdly, as in Ephesians the apos-
tle speaks of the work of God in giving faith, as parallel with his work in rais-
ing Christ, so he does here in Colossians : " Ye are risen with him, through the
faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead." Fourthly, as
we in Ephesians are said to believe, according to the efficacious working of God,
the word evsgyeia is also used here in Colossians. It is called faith of the opera-
tion, or effectual working of God, and as there God is said to be the author, the
same that raised up Christ, and to work faith in them ; so here it is the faith of
the operation of God who raised Christ from the dead, so that, every way, one
place is parallel with the other.
Some pretend, that in that expression, through the faith of the operation of
God, there is no respect to God's operation as the efficient cause of faith, but
only to the operation of God that raised Christ as the object of faith, which be-
lieves that power and operation as it was manifested in raising Christ, and which
is believed to be sufficient to raise us up also. But that the apostle means the
operation of God in giving faith, appears by verse 11, which introduces these
words, where the apostle says — " In whom ye are circumcised with the circum-
cision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the
circumcision of Christ." This phrase, made without hands, in Scripture, always
denotes God's immediate power, above the course of nature, and above second
causes. Thus, when he speaks of heaven, 2 Cor. v. 1, he calls it " a house not
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 553
made with hands," and in Heb. ix. 11, the human nature of Christ, which was
framed by so wonderful and supernatural a power of the Holy Ghost, is said to
be a " tabernacle made without hands."
Note. The foregoing remarks concerning the texts in Eph. i. 19, 20, and
in Coloss. ii. 11, 12, 13, are taken chiefly from Dr. Goodwin's Works, Vol. I.
p. 298, &c.
§ 15. It is a doctrine mightily in vogue, that God has promised his saving
grace to men's sincere endeavors in praying for it, and using proper means to
obtain it ; and so that it is not God's mere will that determines the matter, whether
we shall have saving grace or not ; but that the matter is left with u§, to be
determined by the sincerity of our endeavors.
But there is vast confusion in all talk of this kind, for want of its being well
explained what is meant by sincerity of endeavor, and through men's deceiving
themselves by using words without a meaning. I think the Scripture knows of
but one sort of sincerity in religion, and that is a truly pious or holy sincerity.
The Bible suggests no notion of any other sort of sincere obedience, or any other
sincerity of endeavors, or any doings whatsoever in religion, than doing from
love to God and true love to our duty. As to those that endeavor and take
{)ains (let them do ever so much), that yet do nothing freely, or from any true
ove to, or delight in God, or free inclination to virtue, but wholly for by-ends,
and from sinister and mercenary views, as being driven and forced against their
inclination, or induced by regard to things foreign ; I say, respecting such as
these, I find nothing in Scripture that should lead us to call them honest and
sincere in their endeavors. I doubt not but that the Scripture promises super-
natural, truly divine and saving blessings, to such a sincerity of endeavor as
arises from true love to our duty. But then, as I apprehend, this is only to
promise more saving grace to him that seeks it in the exercise of saving grace,
agreeably to that repeated saying of our Saviour, " to him that hath shall be
given, and he shall have more abundance." Persons, in seeking grace with
this sincerity, ask in faith ; they seek these blessings in the exercise of a saving
faith, the great condition of the covenant of grace. And I suppose, promises
are made to no sincerity, but what implies this. And whoever supposes that
divine promises are made to any other sincerity than this, I imagine he never
will be able to make out his scheme, and that for two reasons :
1. On such a supposition, the promises must be supposed to be made to an
undetermined condition. And,
2. Even on the supposition that the promises are made to some other sin-
cerity than truly pious sincerity, the sovereign grace and will of God must de-
termine the existence of the condition of the promises ; and so the whole must
still depend on God?s determining grace.
1. On the supposition that the promises of saving grace are made to some
other sincerity of endeavor than that which implies true and saving piety of
heart, they must be made to an undetermined condition, and so be in effect no
promises at all.
If there be any thing else worthy to be called sincerity in endeavors after
holiness, but a free, pious inclination, or true regard and love to holiness,
nothing better can be mentioned than this, viz., endeavors after holiness, from a
real willingness of heart to put forth those endeavors for the agent's own sake,
yet for such ends as prudence and self-love would propose ; such as his own
eternal interest, salvation from everlasting misery, &c.
So that by sincerity here, is not meant any holy freedom or virtuous dis-
position or desire ; but in it signifies no more than reality of disposition and will
Vol. II. 70
554 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
to endeavor for some end, only provided the end be subsrvient to self-preserva-
tion. But the thing that truly in this case denominates the endeavor sincere, is
the reality of the will or disposition of heart to endeavor, and not the goodness
of the will or disposition. Now if this be the sincerity of endeavor which is
meant, when men talk of its being the condition of peremptory and decisive
promises of saving grace, then it never has (as I know of) yet been told, and I
suppose, never will or can be told, what the condition of the promise is.
The thing that needs to be determined, in order to know this condition, is,
how great a degree of this sort of sincerity, or real willingness of heart to en-
deavor, a man must have, to be entitled to the promise. For there can be no
question, but that multitudes that live in gross wickedness, and are men of a
very debauched, flagitious behavior, have some degree of it ; and there are
none, even of those that are the most strict and painful in their endeavor, but
have it in a very imperfect degree, and, in many things, fail of this sincerity of
endeavor. For it must be kept in mind, that the . sincerity of heart we are
speaking of, attending religious duties, is only a reality of willingness to use
endeavors. And every man whatsoever, that uses any endeavor at all for his
salvation, or ever performs any religious duty, to the end that he may go to
heaven and not to hell, has this sincerity. For whatever men do voluntarily
for this end, they do from a real willingness and disposition of heart to do it ;
for if they were not willing to do it, they would not do it. There surely are no
voluntary actions performed without men's being willing to perform them. And
is there any man that will assert that God has absolutely or peremptorily prom-
ised his saving grace to any man that ever stirs hand or foot, or thinks one
thought in order to his salvation ?
And on the other hand, as to those that go farthest in their endeavors,
still they fail in numberless instances, of exercising this kind of sincerity, con-
sisting in reality of will. For such are guilty of innumerable sins ; and every
man that commits sin, by so doing, instead of being sincerely willing to do his
duty, sincerely wills the contrary. For so far as any actions of his are his sin,
so far his will is in what he does. No action is imputed to us any farther than
it is voluntary, and involves the real disposition of the heart. The man, in this
painful endeavor, fails continually of his duty, or (which is the same thing) of
perfect obedience. And so far as he does so, he fails of sincerity of endeavor.
No man is any farther defective in his obedience, than as he is defective in sin-
cerity ; for there the defect lies, viz., in his will, and the disposition of his heart.
If men were perfect in these, that would be the same thing as to be perfect in
obedience, or complete in holiness. Nothing, either of omission or commission,
is sin any farther than it includes the real disposition and will ; and therefore,
no men are any farther sinful, than as they are sincere in sinning ; and so far
as they are sincere in sinning, so far they are deficient of sincerely endeavoring
their duty. Now, therefore, where are the bounds to which men must come in
order to be entitled to the promise 1 Some have a faint sincerity of endeavor,
who none do suppose are entitled to the promise. And those that have most
sincerity of endeavor, do greatly fail of that degree of sincerity that they ought
to have, or fall short of that which God requires. And there are infinite de-
grees between these two classes. And if every degree of strength of endeavor
is not sufficient, and yet some certain degree of it, greatly short of that which
God requires, is sufficient, then let it be determined what that degree is.
Some have determined thus, that if men sincerely endeavor to do what they
can, God has promised to help them to do more, &c. But this question remains
to be resolved, whether the condition of the promise be, that he shall sin-
EFFICACIOUS GllACE 505
cerely endeavor to do what he can constantly, or only sometimes. For there is
no man that sincerely endeavors to do his duty to the utmost constantly, with
this sort of sincerity consisting in reality of will so to do. If he did, he would
perfectly do his duty at all times. For, as was observed before, nothing else is
required but the will ; and men never fail of their duty, or commit sin, but
when their real will is to sin.
But if the condition of the promise, be sincerely doing what they can some-
times, then it should be declared how often, or how great a part of the time of
man's life, he must exercise this sincerity. It is manifest that men fail of their
duty every day, yea continually ; and therefore, that there is a continual defect
of sincerity of endeavor in the practice of duty.
If it should be said that the condition of the promise of saving grace is,
that, take one time with another, and one duty with another, the sincerity of
their will should be chiefly in favor of their duty ; or, in other words, that they
should be sincere in endeavors to do more than half their duty, though they
sincerely neglect the rest ; I would inquire, where they find such promises as
these in the Bible 1 Besides, I think it can be demonstrated, that there is not a
man on earth, that ever comes up half way to what the law of God requires of
him ; and consequently that there is in all more want of sincerity, than any
actual possession of it. But whether it be so or no, how does it appear, that
if men are sincere in endeavoring with respect to more than half their duty,
God has promised them saving mercy and grace, though, through a defect of
their sincerity, the rest be neglected ?
But if we suppose the sincerity to which divine promises are made, implies
a true freedom of the heart in religious endeavors and performances, consisting
in love to God and holiness, inclining our hearts to our duty for its own sake,
here is something determinate and precise ; as a title to the benefit promised,
does not depend on any particular degree of sincerity to be found out by diffi-
cult and unsearchable rules of mathematical calculation, but on the nature of it ;
this sincerity being a thing of an entirely distinct nature and kind from any
thing that is to be found in those men who have no interest in the promises.
If men know they have this sincerity, they may know the promises are theirs,
though they may be sensible they have very much of a contrary principle in
their hearts, the operations of which are as real as of this. This is the only
sincerity in religion that the Scripture makes any account of. According to
the word of God, then, and then only, is there a sincere, universal obedience,
when persons love all God's commands, and love all those things wherein
holiness consists, and endeavor after obedience to every divine precept, from
love and of free choice. Otherwise, in Scripture account, there is nothing but
sincere disobedience and rebellion, without any sincerity of the contrary. For
their disobedience is of free choice, from sincere love to sin, and delight in
wickedness. But their refraining from some sins, and performing some external
iuties, is without the least degree of free choice or sincere love.
If here it should be said, that men who have no piety of heart in a saving
degree", yet may have some degree of love to virtue ; and it should be insisted
that mankind are born with a moral sense, which implies a natural approbation
of, and love to virtue ; and therefore, men that have not the principle of love
to God and virtue established to that degree as to be truly pious men, and en-
titled to heaven, yet may have such degrees of them as to engage them, with
a degree of ingenuous sincerity and free inclination, to seek after farther de-
grees of virtue, and so with a sincerity above that which has been mentioned,
viz., a real willingness to use endeavors from fear and self-interest ; it may be
556 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
replied, If this be allowed, it will not at all help the matter. For still the same
question returns, viz., what degree of this sincerity is it that constitutes the pre-
cise condition of the promise ? It is supposed that all mankind have this moral
sense ; but yet it is not supposed that all mankind are entitled to the promises
of saving mercy. Therefore the promises depend, as above noticed, on the
degree of sincerity, under the same difficulties, and with the same intricacies,
and all the forementioned unfixedness and uncertainty. And other things con-
cerning this sincerity, besides the degree of it, are undetermined, viz., how con-
stant this degree of sincerity of endeavor must be ; how long it must be contin-
ued ; and how early it must be begun.
Thus, it appears that, on the supposition of God's having made any prom-
ises of saving grace to the sincere endeavors of ungodly men, it will follow,
that such promises are made to an undetermined condition.
But a supposed promise to an undetermined condition, is truly no prom-
ise at all. It is absurd to talk of positive determinate promises made to some-
thing not determined, or to a condition that is not fixed in the promise. If the
condition be not decided, there is nothing decisive in the affair.
If the master of a family should give forth such a pretended promise as
this to his servants, " I promise, that if any of you will do something, though 1 1
tell you not what, that I will surely give him an inheritance among my chil-
dren :" would this be truly any promise at all 1
I proceed now to observe,
II. On the supposition that the promises of saving grace are made to some
other sincerity of endeavor, than that which implies truly pious sincerity, the
sovereign grace and will of God must determine the existence of the condition
of the promises ; and so the whole must still depend on God's determining
grace ; and that of whatever kind this sincerity, short of truly pious and saving
sincerity, is supposed to be ; whether it consists only in a reality of will, arising
from foreign motives, for a certain degree of endeavors or use of means ; on
whether it be a certain sincerity or reality of willingness to use endeavors,
arising from a natural love of virtue. For all suppose the sincerity, to which
the promises are made, to be that in which some are distinguished from others ;
none supposing that all mankind, without exception, have this sincerity which
is the condition of the promises. Therefore, this sincerity must be a distinguish-
ing attainment. And how it that some attain to it, and not others ? It must be
in one of these two ways ; either by the sovereign gift of God's will, or by
their endeavors. To say the former, is to give up the point, and to own that
the sovereign grace of God determines the existence of the condition of the
promises. But if it be said, that this distinguishing sincerity of endeavor is
obtained by men's own endeavor, then I ask, what sort of endeavor is it attained
by ? Sincere endeavor, or insincere ? None will be so absurd, as to say, that
this great condition of saving promises is attained to by insincere endeavors.
For what tendency, either natural or moral, can the exercise of insincerity have,
to produce, or attain to sincerity ? But if it be said, that distinguishing sincerity
of endeavor is attained to by distinguishing sincere endeavor, this is to run
round in a ridipulous circle ; and still the difficulty remains, and the question
returns, how the distinguishing sincerity that first of all took place in the affair
came to have existence, otherwise than by the determining grace of God ?
And if it be said, that there is no need of supposing any such thing as any
previous, habitual sincerity, or any such sincerity going before, as shall be an
established principle, but that it is sufficient that the free will does sincerely
determine itself to endeavor after holiness ; I answer, whether we suppose the
i
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 557
sinceiity that first entitles to the promises, to be a settled habit, or established
principle or not, it does not in the least remove the difficulty, as long as it is
something, in which some men are distinguished from others, that precedes the
distinguishing endeavor which entitles to the promises, and is the source and
spring of those endeavors. This first, distinguishing sincerity, which is the
spring of the whole affair, must have existence by some means or other ; and
it must proceed either from some previous, sincere endeavor of the man's own,
which is a contradiction ; or from God, which is the point required ; or it must
be the effect of chance, in other words, of nothing.
If we suppose that distinguishing sincerity of endeavor by which some men
are interested in the promises of saving grace, and not others, to be some cer-
tain degree of love to virtue, or any thing else in the disposition or exercise of
the heart ; yet it must be owned, that all men either are alike by nature, as to
love to virtue, or they are not. If they are not, but some have naturally a
greater love to virtue than others, andlhis determines some, rather than others,
to the requisite sincerity of endeavor after saving grace ; then God determines
the affair by his sovereign will ; for he, and not men themselves, determines
all distinguishing qualifications or advantages that men are born with. Or if
there be no difference naturally, but one man is born with the same love to vir-
tue as another ; then, how do some men first attain to more of this love to vir-
tue than others, and so possess that distinguishing sincerity of endeavor which
consists in it ? To say it arises from a previous distinguishing sincerity of en-
deavor, attempt, desire, or will, is a contradiction. Therefore, it must proceed
from the determining grace of God ; which being allowed, the great point in
dispute is allowed.
§ 16. Ephesians ii. 8, " By grace are ye saved, through faith ; and that not
of yourselves : it is the gift of God." Mr. Beach observes, " this text does not
tnean that their faith is so God's gift, as not to be of themselves, as is most evi-
dent to any one who reads the original." This is certainly a great mistake.
What I suppose he means, is, that the relative that, being of the neuter gender,
and the word mazig of the feminine, they do not agree together. But if he
would translate the Greek relative that thing, viz., the thing last spoken of, all
the difficulty vanishes. Vid. Beza in Loc. Such Scriptures as these, 1 Cor.
xv. 10, " Not I, but the grace of God that was with me ;" Gal. ii. 20, " Not
I, but Christ liveth in me ;" prove efficacious grace. The virtuous actions of
men that are reward able, are not left to men's indifference, without divine
rdering and efficacy, so as to be possible to fail. They are often in the Scrip-
ure the matter of God's promises. How often does God promise reformations ?
~ow often does God promise that great revival of religion in the latter days ?
r. Whitby seems to deny any physical influence at all of the Spirit of God on
he will ; and allows an influence by moral suasion and moral causes only,
t). 344. This is to deny that the Spirit of God does any thing at all, except
nspiring the prophets, and giving the means of grace, with God's ordination
^f this in his providence. If God do any thing physically, what he does must
3e efficacious and irresistible.
Such an assistance Dr. Whitby maintains, and, concerning it, says the fol-
owing things, p. 221,222:
" 1st. Then I say it must be granted, that in raising an idea in my brain
by the Holy Spirit, and the impression made upon it there, the action is truly
physical. 2d. That in those actions I am wholly passive ; that is, I myself do
lothincr formally to produce those ideas; but the good Spirit, without my opera-
ion, doth produce them in me. 3d. That these operations must be lrresistib *
558 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
in their production, because they are immediately produced in us without oui
knowledge of them, and without our will, and so without those faculties by
which we are enabled to act."
Though it should be allowed that God assists man with a physical assist-
ance, and yet by an obliged and promised assistance only ; then God does not
do, or effects or give the thing assisted to, any more than if he operated and
assisted men only according to the established laws of nature ; and men may
as properly be said to do it of themselves, and of their own power. The doing
of the thing, is in the same manner in their power. The assistance by which
God assists a drunkard that goes to the tavern, and there drinks excessively, or
by which he assists an adulterer or pirate in their actions, is, that he upholds
the laws of nature, the laws of the nature of the human soul, whereby it is able
to perform such and such acts in such order and dependence ; and the laws of
the union of soul and body ; and moves the body in such a stated manner in
consequence of such acts of the soul, and upholds the laws of motion, and
causes that there shall be such and such effects in corporeal things, and also of
men's minds in consequence of such motions. All the difference is, that the
assistance which he grants in the duties of religion, is according to a newer
establishment than the ether, according to a method established a little later ;
and also, that the method of assistance, in the one case, is written and revealed
by way of promise or covenant, and not in the other.
But if it be said, that though God has promised assistance, yet he has not
promised the exact degree, as, notwithstanding his promise, he has left himself
at liberty to assist some, much more than others, in consequence of the very
same endeavor ; I answer, that this will prove a giving up cf their whole
scheme, and will infallibly bring in the Calvinistical notion of sovereign and
arbitrary grace ; whereby some, with the very same sincerity of endeavor, with
the same degree of endeavor, and the same use of means, nay, although all
things are exactly equal in both cases, both as to their persons and behavior ;
yet one has that success by sovereign grace and God's arbitrary pleasure, that
is denied another. If God has left himself no liberty of sovereign grace in giv-
ing success to man's endeavors, but his consequent assistance be always tied to
such endeavors precisely, then man's success is just as much in his own power,
and is in the same way the fruit of his own doings, as the effect and fulfilment of
his endeavors to commit adultery or murder ; and indeed much more. For his
success in those endeavors, is not tied to such endeavors, but may be providen-
tially disappointed. Although particular motions follow such and such acts of
wiH, in such a state of body, exactly according to certain laws of nature ; yet
a man's success in such wickedness, is not at all tied to his endeavors by any
divine establishment, as the Arminians suppose success is to man's endeavors
after conversion.
For the Spirit of God, by assisting in the alleged manner, becomes not the
efficient cause of those things, as the Scriptures do certainly represent him. If
God be not the proper bestower, author, and efficient cause of virtue, then the
greatest benefits flow not from him ; are not owing to his goodness ; nor ha\ e
we him to thank for them.
" Christ upbraids the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done,
that they were worse than Sodom, &c, and the Jews of that generation, that
they were worse than the men of Nineveh ; and the Pharisees, that the publi-
cans and harlots went into the kingdom of God before them. But why did he
do this, if the only reason was, that the one was brought to repent by effectual
grace, and the other not V* (See Whitby, p. 169, 170, 171.) I answer, the
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 559
unbelief and impenitence of those cities, of that generation, and of those Phari-
sees, when, on the contrary, the publicans and Nineveh repented, and the men
of Sodom would have repented, was an argument that they were worse, more
perverse and hardhearted than they. Because, though repentance is owing to
special, efficacious assistance, yet, in his ordinary methods of proceeding with
men, God is wont much more rarely to bestow it on those that are more per-
verse, hardhearted, and rooted in evil, than others. So much the more as their
hearts are hardened, so much the less likely are they to be brought to repent-
ance. And though there be oftentimes exceptions of particular persons, yet it
still holds good as a general rule ; and especially with regard to societies, na-
tions, cities and ranks of men : so that Christ might well, from the fact that he
mentions, draw an argument of the greater perverseness and stubbornness of
those societies and ranks of men that he spoke of.
§ 17. A command and a manifestation of will are not the same thing. A
command does not always imply a true desire that the thing commanded should
be done. So much at least is manifest by the instance of Abraham commanded
to offer up Isaac. That command was not such an effect of the divine will, as
the commands to believe and repent, &c.
§ 18. Either the stronger the habitual inclination to good is, the more vir-
tuous ; and the stronger the disposition to evil, the more vicious ; or, if it be
otherwise, then indifference or want of inclination, is essential to both virtue
and vice.
§ 19. Dr. Whitby's inconsistence appears in that one while, when he is dis-
puting against the decree of election, he maintains that the epistles, where the
apostle speaks to the elect, are not written to the converted only ; because then
it suits his turn that the persons addressed should not be converted. But after-
wards, when disputing against efficacious grace, he maintains that where the
apostle says, " God worketh in you both to will and to do," &c, Philip, ii. 13,
he speaks only to them that are converted, p. 288. Again, when it suits the
Doctor's turn, when writing about perseverance, then all whom the apostles
write to are true saints. As particularly those the apostle Peter writes to, that
had precious faith, p. 399. And the Galatians addressed in Paul's epistle, p.
401, 402.
§ 20. When the Psalmist prays, " Make me to go in the way of thy sta-
tutes ;" is it indeed his meaning, that God would give him the general grace
which he gives to all, and which is sufficient for all if they will but improve it ?
And is this all ?
§ 21. Arminians argue that God has obliged himself to bestow a holy and
saving disposition, on certain conditions, and that what is given in regeneration,
is given either for natural men's asking, or for the diligent improvement of com-
mon grace ; because, otherwise, it would not be our fault that we are without it,
nor our virtue that we have it. But if this reasoning is just, the holy quali-
ties obtained by the regenerate, are only the fruits of virtue, not virtues them-
selves. All the virtue lies in asking, and in the diligent improvement of com-
mon grace.
§ 22. Prov. xxi. 1, "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, as
the rivers of water ; he turneth it whithersoever he will." This shows that
the Arminian notion of liberty of will, is inconsistent with the Scripture notion
)f God's providence and government of the world. See also Jer. xxxi. 18,
1 Turn me and I shall be turned." Matth. vii. 18, " A good tree cannot bring
forth evil fruit ; neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." Let us un-
lerstand this how we will, it destroys the Arminian notion of liberty, and virtue
560 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
and vice. For, if it means only a great difficulty ; then so much the less liber-
ty, and therefore so much the less virtue or vice. And the preceding verse
would be false, which says, " every good tree bringeth forth good fruit," &c.
Rom. viii. 6, 7, 8, 9, " For to be carnally minded is death ; but to be spiritually
minded is life and peace : because the carnal mind is enmity against God ; for it
is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are
in the flesh cannot please God. But we are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit,
if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. "Now, if any man have not the
Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." The design of the apostle in this place,
overthrows Arminian notions of liberty, virtue and vice. It appears from Scrip-
ture, that God gives such assistance to virtue and virtuous acts, as to be proper-
ly a determining assistance, so as to determine the effect ; which is inconsistent
with the Arminian notion of liberty. The Scripture shows that God's influence
in the case is such, that he is the cause of the effect ; he causes it to be : which
shows that his influence determines the matter, whether it shall be or not.
Otherwise innumerable expressions of Scripture are exceedingly improper, and
altogether without a meaning.
§ 23. Dr. Whitby's notion of the assistance of the Spirit, is of the same sort
with inspiration. Whereas that which I suppose is the true notion, is entirely
different. Consequently their notion is much more enthusiastical, does much
better agree with, and much more expose to pernicious enthusiasm, than ours.
Hence we find that the grossest enthusiasts, such as Quakers and others, are
generally Arminians in the doctrines of free will, &c.
§ 24. Scripture expressions are everywhere contrary to the Arminian
scheme, according to all use of language in the world in these days. But then
they have their refuge here. They say the ancient figures of speech are exceed-
ingly diverse from ours ; and that we in this distant age cannot judge at all
of the true sense of expression used so long ago, but by a skill in antiquity, and
being versed in ancient history, and critically skilled in the ancient languages ;
not considering, that the Scriptures were written for us in these ages on whom
the ends of the world are come ; yea, were designed chiefly for the latter age
of the world, in which they shall have their chief, and, comparatively, almost
all their effect. They, were written for God's people in those ages, of whom at
least ninety-nine in a hundred must be supposed incapable of such knowledge
by their circumstances and education ; and nine hundred and ninety-nine in a
thousand of God's people, that hitherto have been saved by the Scriptures. It
is easy, by certain methods of interpretation, to refine and criticise any book to
a sense most foreign to the mind of the author.
§ 25. If God be truly unwilling that there should be any moral evil in the
world, why does not he cause less moral evil to exist than really does ? If it
be answered, as is usual to such kind of objections, that though God is unwil-
ling there should be moral evil, yet he will not infringe on man's liberty, or
destroy his moral agency to prevent it ; then I ask, if this be all, why does God
cause so much less to exist at some certain times ; on the contrary, causes vir-
tue gloriously to prevail ? Other times are spoken of and promised, wherein
it shall prevail yet vastly more. And this is spoken of as of God's effecting, and
is abundantly so spoken of and promised, as what God would do, and none
should hinder, &c.
The Arminian principles, denying the efficacious, determining grace of God,
as the cause of men's virtue and piety, are wholly inconsistent with the prom-
ises and prophecies of the future Nourishing of religion and virtue in the world,
and never can be made consistent therewith. This flourishing of religion is
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 561
spoken of as what God will effect ; and is made the matter of his abundant pro-
mise ; is spoken of as his glorious work, the work of his almighty power ; what
he frill effect, and none shall hinder ; what he will effect against all opposition,
removing and overcoming the wickedness of men, &c.
§ 26. Dr. Stebbing says, page 104, " So much grace as is necessary to lead
us to that obedience which is indispensably required in order to salvation, God
will give to every one, who humbly and devoutly prays to him for it ; for this
is the condition, and the only condition prescribed by our Saviour, Luke xi. 9 —
13, " And I say unto you, ask, and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall
find ; knock, and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiv-
eth ; and he that seeketh, findeth ; and to him that knocketh, it shall be open-
ed. If then, ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children ;
how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that
ask him V* — where the promise of the Spirit is made. Here humility and de-
votion are mentioned as the condition of that obedience which is indispensably
required in order to salvation. By that obedience which is required in order to
salvation must be meant, either, 1. That sort of virtue and obedience that is re-
quisite, or, 2. Perseverance in it. If he means that sort of virtue which is re-
quisite in order to salvation ; then I would ask, what sort of humility and devo-
tion is that, to which God has promised the grace which is necessary to their
obtaining that virtue which is the condition of salvation ? Must it not be real,
sincere humility and devotion ? Surely if God has promised so great a gift to
any humility and devotion, it must be to that which is sincere and upright. Be-
cause that which is not sincere, is nothing ; it is hypocritical ; a mere show of
that which is really wanting. And it would be very unreasonable to suppose
that God promises such infinite rewards to hypocrisy, which he has often declar-
ed to be abominable to him, and which only provokes him the more. But if it
be true, sincere, upright humility and devotion, it is unreasonable to suppose
that God makes this the condition of that grace which is necessary to his obtain-
ing that kind of virtue which is requisite to salvation. Because he, who has
this humility and devotion, has that kind of virtue already. The Scripture
everywhere speaks of uprightness and sincerity of heart, as that virtue that
is saving. He that sincerely asks for grace to obey, has that sincerity and up-
rightness of heart that is exercised in sincere obedience ; for he that sincerely
asks this, is sincerely willing to obey, or sincerely desirous of obeying. Or 2.
If the Doctor, by that obedience that is indispensably required in order to salva-
tion, means perseverance in sincere virtue, and this be promised to devoutly and
sincerely asking it ; then hereby must be meant, either devoutly and sincerely
asking it once, or final perseverance in this sincere asking, or a certain limited
continuance in that asking. If a final perseverance in asking be the condition
of grace to lead us to persevere, saving virtue is, as said before, the condition of
itself. For persevering sincerity is the condition of obtaining persevering sin-
cerity. If it be only once asking, or asking a limited number of times, or a
limited continuance in asking, this is contrary to the Arminian doctrine about per-
severance. For it supposes a person in this life, on a past condition, to be al-
ready, before the end of the day of his probation, so confirmed in obedience that
it is impossible for him to fall away.
§ 27. One danger of these Arminian notions is, that they strongly tend to
prevent conviction of sin.
§ 28. The vast pretences of Arminians to an accurate and clear view of the
scope and design of the sacred penmen, and a critical knowledge of the original,
will prove forever vain and insufficient to help them against such clear evidence
Vol. II. 71
662 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
as the Scripture exhibits concerning efficacious grace. I desire it may be shown,
if it can be, that ever any terms, that are fuller and stronger, are used more
frequently, or in greater variety, to signify God's being the author, efficient and
bestower of any kind of benefit, than as to the bestowment of true virtue or
goodness of heart ; whether concerning the deliverance out of Egypt, or the
manna that was rained down from heaven, or the bestowment of the blessings
of Canaan, or saving Noah and his family in the ark ; or the raising any from
the dead, or Christ's giving health to the sick, or sight to the blind, or bread
to the hungry in the wilderness, or any thing else whatsoever ; or the giving
being to mankind in their creation ; the giving reason to them, with their other
natural faculties ; the giving them life and breath; the giving them the beauti-
ful form of their bodies ; the giving them life at the general resurrection ; the
giving them their glory and happiness in heaven ; the giving prophets, and the
word of God by the prophets and others ; the giving the means of grace and sal-
vation; the giving Christ, and providing means of salvation in him. Yea,
I know of no one thing in Scripture wherein such significant, strong expressions
are used, in so great variety, or one half so often, as the bestowment of this
benefit of true goodness and piety of heart. But after all, we must be faced
down in it with vast confidence, that the Scriptures do not imply any more than
only exhibiting means of instruction, leaving the determining and proper caus-
ing of the effect wholly with man, as the only proper, efficient and determining
cause ; and that the current of Scripture is all against us ; and that it is because
we do not understand language, and are bigots and fools for imagining any such
thing as that the Scriptures say any thing of that nature, and because the divines
on our side do not understand Greek, and do not lay the Scripture before them,
nor mind the scope of Scripture, nor consider the connection, &c. &c. Perhaps
it will be said, that every one of those Scriptures, which are brought to prove
efficacious grace, may have another interpretation, found out by careful and
critical examination. But, alas ! Is that the way of the Most High's instructing
mankind, to use such a multitude of expressions, in different languages, and
various different ages, all which, in their natural and most common acceptation,
in all languages, nations and ages, must undoubtedly be understood in a partic
ular sense ; yea, the whole thread and current of all that God says, according
to the use of speech among mankind, tends to lead to such an understanding,
and so unavoidably leads his people in all ages into such an understanding ; but
yet, that he means no such thing ; intending only that the true meaning should
not be found out, but by the means of acute criticism, which might possibly hit
upon the strange, unusual, and surprising meaning ?
' § 29. Instead of persons' being the determining and efficient causes of their
own virtue and piety, after all the moral means God uses with man, let us sup-
pose some third person between God and the subject of this gift of virtue, to be
in the very same manner the sovereignly determining cause and efficient of
virtue ; that he had power to bestow it on us, or cause us to be the subjects of
it, just in the same manner as the Arminians suppose we ourselves have power
to be the causes of our being the subjects of virtue ; and that it depended on this
third person's free will, just in the same manner as now they suppose our having
virtue depends on our own free will ; and that God used moral means with that
third person to bestow virtue on us, just in the same manner that he uses moral
means to persuade us to cause virtue in ourselves, and the moral means had the
like tendency to operate on his will as on ours ; but finally, it was left entirely
to his free will to be the sole determining cause whether we should have virtue,
without any such influence on his will as in the least to ensure his sovereignty,
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 563
and arbitrary disposal, and perfectly free self-determination ; and it should be
left contingent, whether he would bestow it or not ; and, in these circumstances,
this third person should happen to determine in our favor, and bestow virtue :
now I ask, Would it be proper to ascribe the matter so wholly to God, in such
strong terms, and in such a great variety ; to ascribe it so entirely to him as his
gift ; to pray to him beforehand for it ; to give him thanks, to give him all the
glory, &c. ? On the contrary, would not this determining cause, whose arbitrary,
self-determined, self-possessed, sovereign will, decides the matter, be properly
looked upon as the main cause, vastly the most proper cause, the truest author
and bestower of the benefit 1 Would not he be, as it were, all in the cause ?
Would not the glory properly belong to him, on whose pleasure the determina-
tion of the matter properly depended 1
§ 29. By regeneration, being new creatures, raised from death in sin, in the
New Testament, is not meant merely persons' being brought into the state and priv-
ileges of professing Christians, according to Dr. Taylor. When Christ says unto
Nicodemus, John iii. 3, " Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born
again, he cannot see the kingdom of God ;" he does not mean merely, that unless
a man be brought to a participation of the new state and privileges of the Chris-
tian church, he cannot enter on the possession and privileges of the Christian
church ; for that would be nonsense, and only to say, unless a man be born
again, he cannot be born again ; or, unless a man enter into the new state of
things, as erected by the Messiah, he cannot enter on the new state of things as
erected by the Messiah. Nor can he mean, that unless a man be a professing
Christian, he cannot see the future and eternal privileges of the kingdom of
heaven, for he supposes many heathens will see the kingdom of God in that sense.
And how unreasonable would it be to suppose that Christ would teach this
doctrine of the necessity of being instated in his new-modelled church, as such
a great, important and main doctrine of his !
Taylor to make out his scheme, is forced to suppose, that by being born of
God is meant two things in the New Testament (see p. 127, of his Key, and on
Original Sin, p. 144, &c). So he is forced to suppose, that by the kingdom of
God is meant two things (p. 125, marginal note, and other places), and so he
supposes two senses of our being of the truth, our being of, or in God, and knotv-
ing God (see p. 127, marginal note). He is forced to suppose that many of
the expressions, signifying antecedent blessings, are to be taken in a double
sense (see p. 138, No. 243, &c). See how evidently being born of God signi-
fies something else than a being brought into the state of professing Christians :
1 John ii. 29, " If he know that he is righteous, ye know that every one that
doth righteousness is born of him." Chap. iii. 8, " Whosoever is born of God,
doth not commit sin ; for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because
he is born of God." Chap. iv. 8, " Every one that loveth, is born of God, and
knoweth God." Chap. v. 4, " Whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the
world." Verse 18, " We know that whosoever is born of God, sinneth not ;
but he that is begotten of God, keepeth himself; and that wicked one toucheth
him not."
So it is exceeding apparent, that knowing God, and being of God, and in
God, having this hope in him, &c, mean something besides our Christian pro-
fession, and principles, and privileges. 1 John ii. 3, &c, " Hereby do we know
that we know him, if we keep his commandments. W7hoso keepeth his word,
in him verily is the love of God perfected. Hereby know we that we are in
him." Chap. iii. 3, " Every one that hath this hope in him, purifieth himself,
even as he is pure." Chap. iii. 14, " We know that we have passed from death
564 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
unto life, because we love the brethren." Chap. iv. 12, " If we love one an-
other, God dwelleth in us." Taylor supposes that this same apostle, by being
born of God, means being received to the privileges of professing Christians.
John i. 12 (p. 49). 1 John v. 1, and v. 18 (p. 48). 1 John iii. 1 (p. 48).
§ 31. Why does the apostle say, concerning apostates, " they were not of us :
if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us ; but they
went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us ;" if it
be, as Dr. Taylor supposes, that professing Christians are indeed of the society
of Christians to all intents and purposes, have all their privileges, are truly
the children of God, members of Christ, of the household of God, saints,
believers that have obtained like precious faith, are all one body, have one
spirit, one faith, one inheritance, have their hearts purified and sanctified,
ire all the children of light, are all of the household of God, fellow citizens
with the saints, have all fellowship with Christ, &c. 1
§ 32. It is true, the nation of the Jews are in the Old Testament said to be
elected, called, created, made, formed, redeemed, delivered, saved, bought, pur-
chased, begotten. But particular Jews are nowhere so spoken of, at least with
reference to the same thing, viz., their national redemption, when they were
brought out of Egypt, &c.
David, in the book of Psalms, though he is so abundant there in giving
thanks to God for his mercies, and is also so frequent in praising God for God's
redeeming his people out of Egypt, and the salvation God wrought for the nation
and church of Israel at that time ; yet he never once blesses God (having re-
spect to that salvation) that God had chosen him and redeemed him, bought him,
regenerated him ; never (having reference to that affair) speaks in the language
of the apostle, " He loved me, and gave himself for me ;" though he often
speaks of the blessedness of those men God had chose, and caused to come
nigh unto him, agreeably to the language of the New Testament, and often
blesses God for redeeming and saving him in particular ; but never, in any of
these things, has he respect to those national privileges, nor indeed any other of
the penmen of the Psalms ; which is very strange, if the privilege of being
bought, made, created, &c, as applied to the nation of the Jews, be that
which the apostle in the New Testament applies to himself in particular,
and which this and the other apostles applied to many other particular persons.
§ 33. That professing Christians are said to be sanctified, washed &c,
does not argue, that all professing Christians are so in fact. For Taylor him-
self says, " it should be carefully observed, that it is very common in the sabred
writings, to express not only our Christian privileges, but also the duty to
which they oblige, in the present or preterperfect tense ; or to speak of that as
done, which only ought to be done, and which, in fact, may possibly never be
done : as in Matth. v. 13, " Ye are the salt of the earth," that is, ye ought to
be. Rom. ii. 4, " The goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance ;" that is,
ought to lead thee : chap. vi. 2. chap viii. 9. Col. iii. 3. 1 Pet. i. 6, " Where-
in ye greatly rejoice ;" i. e. ought to rejoice. 2 Cor. iii. 18, " We all with open
face (enjoying the means of ) beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are
(ought to be, enjoy the means of being) changed into the same image from
glory to glory." 1 Cor. v. 7, " Ye are unleavened,", i. e. obliged by the Chris-
tian profession to be. Heb. xiii. 1 4, i( We seek (i. e. we ought to seek, or,
according to our profession, we seek) a city to come." 1 John ii. 12 — 15,
iii. 9. v. 4 — 18, and in other places. See Taylor's Key, p. 139. No. 244, and
p. 144, No. 246. This overthrows all his supposed proofs, that those which he
calls antecedent blessings, do really belong to all professing Christians.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 565
§ 34. The case was quite otherwise in the Christian church with regard to
election, redemption, creation, &c, from what it was with the Jews. With the
Jews, election, their redemption out of Egypt, their creation, was a national
thing ; it began with them as a nation, and descended, as it were, from the na-
tion, to particular persons. Particular persons were first of the nation and
church of the Jews ; so, by that means, had an interest in their election, redemp-
tion, &c, that God wrought of old. The being of the nation and church of
Israel, was the ground of a participation in these privileges* But it is evident,
it is contrariwise in Christians. With regard to them, the election, redemption,
creation, regeneration, &c, are personal things. They begin with particular
persons, and ascend to public societies. Men are first redeemed, bought, cre-
ated, regenerated, and by that means become members of the Christian church ;
and this is the ground of their membership. Paul's regeneration, and Christ's
loving him, and giving himself for him, was the foundation of his being of the
Christian church, that holy nation, peculiar people, &c., whereas, David's being
one of the nation of Israel, is the proper ground of his participation in Israel's
redemption out of Egypt, and of that birth and formation of the people that
were at that time. It is apparent the case was thus. It cannot be otherwise.
It is evident that the new creation, regeneration, calling, and justification, are
personal things, because they are by personal influences ; influences of God's
Spirit on particular persons, and personal qualifications.
Their regeneration was a personal thing, and therefore, it is not called sim-
ply an entering into the new creation, or obtaining a part in the new world or
new Jerusalem, &c, but a putting off the old man, and putting on the new man.
They are first raised from the dead, and by that means come to belong to the
church of Christ. They are first lively or living stones, and by that means
come to belong to the spiritual house, and the holy temple : by being lively
stones, they come to be parts of the living temple, and capable of it. So that
their being alive, is prior to their belonging to the Christian church. The
Christian calling, is represented as being the ground of their belonging to the
church. They are called into the church, called into the fellowship of Jesus
Christ. Their spiritual baptism or washing, is prior to their being in the church.
They are by one spirit baptized into one body. They put on Christ, and so
become interested in Christ, and sharers with those that had a part in him.
By such a personal work of the Spirit of God, they were first made meet to be
partakers with the saints in light, before they were partakers.
§ 35. It will follow from Taylor's scheme, that Simon the sorcerer had an
interest in all the antecedent blessings. Yet the apostle tells him he was at
that time in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity. If he was really
justified, washed, cleansed, sanctified ; how was he at that time in the bond of
iniquity ? Justification, forgiveness, &c, is a release from the bond of iniquity.
If the heart be purified by faith, it does not remain in the gall of bitterness.
§ 36. Saving grace differs from common grace, in nature and kind. To sup-
pose only a gradual difference, would not only be to suppose, that some in a state
of damnation are within an infinitely little as good as some in a state of salva-
tion (which greatly disagrees with the Armi";an notion of men's being saved
by their own virtue and goodness), but this, taken with the Arminian notion of
men's falling from grace, will naturally lead us to determine, that many that
are once in a state of salvation, may be in such a state, and out of it, scores of
* It is much to be doubted whether our author is correct in the material distinction he here makes
between the Jewish and Christian dispensations. The reader will consider whether privileges and
blessings were not personal as much under the one as the other.
566 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
times in a very short space. For though a person is in a state of salvation, he
may be but just in it, and may be infinitely near the limits between a state of sal-
vation and damnation ; and as the habits of grace are, according to that scheme,
only contracted and raised by consideration and exercise, and the exertion of
the strength of the mind, and are lost when a man falls from grace by the in-
termission or cessation of these, and by contrary acts and exercises ; and as the
habits and principles of virtue are raised and sunk, brought into being and
abolished by those things, and both the degree of them and the being of them
wholly depend on them ; the consequence will naturally be, that when a man
is first raised to that degree of a virtuous disposition, as to be in a state of sal-
vation, and the degree of virtue is almost infinitely near the dividing line, it will
naturally be liable to be a little raised or sunk every hour, according as the
thoughts and exercises of the mind are ; as the mercury in the thermometer or
barometer is never perfectly at rest, but is always rising or subsiding, according
to the weight of the atmosphere, or the degree of heat.
§ 37. The dispute about grace's being resistible or irresistible, is perfect
nonsense. For the effect of grace is upon the will ; so that it is nonsense, ex-
cept it be proper to say that a man with his will can resist his own will, or
except it be possible for him to desire to resist his own will ; that is, except it
be possible for a man to will a thing and not will it at the same time, and so
far as he does will it. Or if you speak of enlightening grace, and say this grace is
upon the understanding ; it is nothing but the same nonsense in other words.
For then the sense runs thus, that a man, after he has seen so plainly that a
thing is best for him that he wills it, yet he can at the same time nill it. If
you say he can will any thing he pleases, this is most certainly true ; foi
who can deny, that a man can will any thing he doth already will ? That a man
can will any thing that he pleases, is just as certain, as what is, is. Wherefore it is
nonsense to say, that after a man has seen so plainly a thing to be so much the
best for him that he wills it, he could not have willed it if he had pleased ; that is
to say, if he had not willed it, he could not have willed it. It is certain, that
a man never doth any thing but what he can do. But to say, after a man has
willed a thing, that he could have not willed it if he had pleased, is to suppose
two wTills in a man ; the one to will which goes first ; the other to please or
choose to will. And so with the same reason we may say, there is another
will to please ; to please to will ; and so on to a thousand. Wherefore, to say
that the man could have willed otherwise if he had pleased, is just all one as to
say, that if he had willed otherwise, then wTe might be sure he could will other-
wise.
§ 38. Those that deny infusion of grace by the Holy Spirit, must, of necessi-
ty, deny the Spirit to do any thing at all. By the Spirit's infusing, let be
meant what it will, those who say there is no infusion, contradict themselves.
For they say the Spirit doth something in the soul ; that is, he causeth some
motion, or affection, or apprehension to arise in the soul, that, at the same time,
wrould not be there without him. Now, God's Spirit doeth what he doeth ; he
doth as much as he doth : or he causeth in the soul as much as he causeth, let
that be how little soever. So much as is purely the effect of his immediate
motion, that is the effect of his immediate motion, let that be wThat it will; and
so much is infused, how little soever that be. This is self-evident. For sup-
pose the Spirit of God only to assist the natural powers, then there is something
done betwixt them. Men's own powers do something, and God's Spirit doth
something ; only they work together. Nowt, that part that the Spirit doth, how
little soever it be, is infused So that they that deny infused habits, own that
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 567
part of the habit is infused. For they say, the Holy Spirit assists the man in
acquiring the habit ; so that it is acquired rather sooner than it would be other-
wise. So that part of the habit is owing to the Spirit ; some of the strength
of the habit was infused, and another part is owing to the natural powers of the
man. Or if you say not so, but that it is all owing to the natural power assist-
ed ; how do you mean assisted ? To act more lively and vigorously than
otherwise 1 Then that liveliness and vigorousness must be infused ; which is a
habit, and therefore an infused habit. It is grace, and therefore infused grace.
Grace consists very much in a principle that causes vigorousness and activity in
action. This is infusion, even in the sense of the opposite party. So that, if
any operation of the Holy Spirit at all is allowed, the dispute is only, How
much is infused 1 The one says, a great deal, the other says, but little.
§ 39. 1st. The main thing meant by the word efficacious, is this, it being
decisive. This seems to be the main question. 2d. Its being immediate and
arbitrary in that sense, as not to be limited to the laws of nature. 3d. That the
principles of grace are supernatural in that sense, that they are entirely differ-
ent from all that is in the heart before conversion. 4th. That they are infused,
and not contracted by custom and exercise. 5th. That the change is instanta-
neous, and not gradual. These four last heads may be subdivisions of a second
general head : so that the divisions may be thus : 1st. The main thing meant,
is, that it is decisive. 2d. That it is immediate and supernatural. The four last
of the heads mentioned above, may be subdivisions of this last.
So that there are two things relating to the doctrine of efficacious grace,
wherein lies the main difference between the Calvinists and Arminians as to this
doctrine. First, That the grace of God is determining and decisive as to the
conversion of a sinner, or a man's becoming a good man, and having those vir-
tuous qualifications that entitle to an interest in Christ and his salvation.
Secondly, That the power and grace and operation of the Holy Spirit, in or
towards the conversion of a sinner, is immediate : that the habit of true virtue
or holiness is immediately implanted or infused ; that the operation goes so far,
that a man has habitual holiness given him instantly, wholly by the operation
of the Spirit of God, and not gradually, by assistance concurring with our en-
deavors, so as gradually to advance virtue into a prevailing habit. And besides
these, Thirdly, It is held by many, of late, that there is no immediate interpo-
sition of God ; but that all is done by general laws.
The former is that which is of greatest importance or consequence in the
controversy with Arminians (though the others are also very important), and
this, only, is what I shall consider -in this place ; perhaps the others may be
considered, God willing, in some other discourse.
§ 40. Concerning what the Arminians say, that these are speculative points ;
all devotion greatly depends on a sense and acknowledgment of our depend-
ence on God. But this is one of the very chief things belonging to our de-
pendence on God. How much stress do the Scriptures lay on our dependence
on God ! All assistance of the Spirit of God whatsoever, that is, by any present
influence or effect of the Spirit ; any thing at all that a person that is converted
from sin to God, is the subject of, through any immediate influence of the Spirit
of God upon him, or any thing done by the Spirit, since the completing and
confirming the canon of the Scriptures, must be done by a physical operation,
either on the soul or body.
The Holy Spirit of God does something to promote virtue in men's hearts,
and to make them good, beyond what the angels can do. But the angels can
present motives ; can excite ideas of the words of promises and threatenings,
568 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
&c, and can persuade in this way by moral means ; as is evident, because the
devils in this way promote vice.
§ 41. There is no objection made to God's producing any effects, or causing
any events, by any immediate interposition, producing effects arbitrarily, or by
the immediate efforts of his will, but what lies equally against his ordering it so,
that any effects should be produced by the immediate interposition of men's will,
to produce effects otherwise than the established laws of nature would have pro-
duced without men's arbitrary interposition.
I beg the reader's attention to the following quotations : " That otherwise,
the world cannot be the object of inquiry and science, and far less of imitation
by arts : since imitation necessarily presupposes a certain determinate object, or
fixed, ascertainable relations and connections of things ; and that, upon the
contrary supposition, the world must be absolutely unintelligible. Nature, in
order to be understood by us, must always speak the same language to us. It
must therefore steadfastly observe the same general laws in its operations, or
work uniformly, and according to stated, invariable methods and rules. Those
terms, order, beauty, general good, &c, plainly include, in their meaning, anal
ogy ; and constancy, uniformity amidst variety ; or, in other words, the regular
observance of general, settled laws, in the make and economy, production, and
operations or effects, of any object to which they are ascribed. Wherever
order, fixed connections, or general laws and unity of design take place, there
is certainty in the nature of such objects, and so knowledge may be acquired.
But where these do not obtain, there can be nothing but unconnected, inde-
pendent parts. All must be disorder and confusion ; and consequently, such a
loose, disjointed heap of things, must be an inexplicable chaos. In one word,
science, prudence, government, imitation and art, necessarily suppose the pre-
valence of general laws throughout all the objects in nature to which they reach.
No being can know itself, project or pursue any scheme, or lay down any max-
ims for its conduct, but so far as its own constitution is certain, and the connec-
tion of things relative to it are fixed and constant. For so far only are things
ascertainable; and therefore, so far only can rules be drawn from them."
TurnbulPs Mor. Phil. Part I. Introd.
" The exercise of all moral powers, dispositions and affections of mind, as
necessarily presuppose an established order of nature, or general laws settled by
the author of nature with respect to them, as the exercise of our bodily senses
about qualities and effects of corporeal beings do with regard to them. We
could neither acquire knowledge of any kind, contract habits, or attain to any
moral perfection whatsoever, unless the author of our nature had appointed and
fixed certain laws relating to our moral powers, and their exercises and acqui-
sitions." Ibid. p. 13, 14. Yet thisTurnbull strenuously holds a self-determin-
ing power in the will of man. Such like arguments, if they are valid against
any interposition at all, will prevail against all interposition of God or man, and
against the interposition of God ever to bring the world to an end, or amend it ;
and prove that all shall be according to general laws. And they might as well
argue, that the making of the world too was by general laws. If it be said,
that it is of great importance and absolute necessity, that God should at last in-
terpose and rectify the course of nature ; I answer, this is yielding the point,
that, in cases of great importance, it is reasonable to suppose there may be an
interposition that may be arbitrary, and not by general laws.
§ 42. It is not necessary that men should be able, by the connections of
things, to know all future events ; nor was this ever in the Creator's designs.
If it had been so, he could have enabled them to know the future volitions of
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 569
men, and those events that depend upon them, which are by far the most im
port ant.
§ 43. The nature of virtue being a positive thing, can proceed from nothing
but God's immediate influence, and must take its rise from creation or infusion
by God. For it must be either from that, or from our own choice and produc-
tion, either at once, or gradually, by diligent culture. But it cannot begin, 01
take its rise from the latter, viz., our choice, or voluntary diligence. For it
there exist nothing at all of the nature of virtue before, it cannot come from
cultivation ; for by the supposition there is nothing of the nature of virtue to
cultivate, it cannot be by repeated and multiplied acts of virtuous choice, till it be-
comes a habit. For there can be no one virtuous choice, unless God immediately
gives it. The first virtuous choice, or a disposition to it, must be immediately
given, or it must proceed from a preceding choice. If the first virtuous act of
will or choice be from a preceding act of will or choice, that preceding act oi
choice must be a virtuous act of choice, which is contrary to the supposition
For then there would be a preceding act of choice before the first virtuous act
of choice. And if it be said the first virtuous act of choice is from a preceding
act of will which is not virtuous, this is absurd. For an act of will not virtuous,
cannot produce another act of will of a nature entirely above itself, having
something positive in it which the cause has nothing of, and more excellent than
it is; anymore than motion can produce thought or understanding; or the
collision of two bodies can produce thought; or stones and lead can produce a
spirit ; or nothing can produce something.
§ 44. As to man's inability to convert himself. — In them that are totally
corrupt, there can be no tendency towards their making their hearts better, till
*hey begin to repent of the badness of their hearts. For if they do not repent,
Ahey still approve of it ; and that tends to maintain their badness, and confirm
»t. But they cannot begin sincerely to repent of the badness of their hearts, till
their hearts begin to be better, for repentance consists in a change of the mind
and heart. So that it is not men's repentance that first gives rise to their having
a better heart ; and therefore it cannot be any tendency in them to make their
hearts better, that gives rise to it. The heart can have no tendency to make
itself better, till it begins to have a better tendency ; for therein consists its bad-
ness, viz., its having no good tendency or inclination. And to begin to have a
good tendency, or, which is the same thing, a tendency and inclination to be
better, is the same thing as to begin already to be better. And therefore the
heart's inclination to be good, cannot be the thing that first gives rise to its
being made good. For its inclination to be better, is the same thing with its
becoming better.
§ 45. If there be any immediate influence or action of the Spirit of God at
all on any created beings, in any part of the universe, since the days of the
apostles, it is physical. If it be in exciting ideas of motives, or in any respect
assisting or promoting any effect, still it is physical ; and every whit as much
so, as if we suppose the temper and nature of the heart is immediately changed.
And it is as near akin to a miracle. If the latter be miraculous, so is the former.
§ 46. Who ever supposed that the term irresistible was properly used with
respect to that power by which an infant is brought into being ; meaning, irre-
sistible by the infant ? Or who ever speaks of a man's waking out of a sound
sleep irresistibly, meaning, that he cannot resist awaking ? Or who says, that
Adam was formed out of the dust of the earth irresistibly ? See what I have
said of the* use of such terms as irresistible, unfrustrable, &c, in my Inquiry
about Liberty.
Vol II 72
570 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
§ 47. The opponents of efficacious grace and physical operation, may be
challenged to show that it is possible that any creature should become righteous
without a physical operation, either a being created with the habit of right-
eousness, or its being immediately infused. See what I have written in my book
of Original Sin, in those sections wherein I vindicate the doctrine of original
righteousness, and argue, that if Adam was not created righteous, no way can
be invented how he could ever become righteous.
.§ 48. As to that, Matthew vii. 7, " Seek and ye shall find ;" it is explained
by such places as that, Deut. iv. 29, " But if from thence thou shalt seek the
Lord thy God, thou shalt find him, if thou seek him with all thy heart and with
all thy soul." And by Deut. xxx. 2 — 6, " If thou shalt return unto the Lord
thy God, and shalt obey his voice with all thy heart and with all thy soul ; the
Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul ;" which is very paral-
lel with that, " to him that hath shall be given."
§ 49. The Scripture teacheth that holiness, both in principle and fruit, is
from God. " It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good
pleasure." And Prov. xvi. 1, " The preparation of the heart in man, and the
answer of the tongue is from the Lord." Comparing this with other parts of the
book of Proverbs, evinces that it is a moral preparation, and the answer of th*
tongue in moral regards, that is meant.
§ 50. Reason shows that the first existence of a principle of virtue cannof
be from man himself, nor in any created being whatsoever ; but must be immedi
ately given from God ; or that otherwise it never can be obtained, whatever
this principle be, whether love tc*God, or love to men. It must either be
from God, or be a habit contracted by repeated acts. But it is most absurd to
suppose that the first existence of the principle of holy action, should be pre-
ceded by a course of holy actions. Because there can be no holy action with-
out a principle of holy inclination. There can be no act done from love, that
shall be the cause of first introducing the very existence of love.
§ 51. God is said to give true virtue and piety of heart to man ; to work it
in him, to create it, to form it, and with regard to it we are said to be his work-
manship. Yea, that there may be no room to understand it in some improper
sense, it is often declared as the peculiar character of God, that he assumes it
as his character to be the author and giver of true virtue, in his being called the
Sanctifier ; he that sanctifieth us. " I am he that sanctifieth you." This is
spoken of as the great prerogative of God, Levit. xx. 8, and other parallel places.
He declares expressly that this effect shall be connected with his act, or with
what he shall do in order to it. " I will sprinkle clean water, and you shall be
clean." What God does is often spoken of as thoroughly effectual ; the effect is
infallibly consequent. " Turn us, and we shall be turned." Jesus Christ has
the great character of a Saviour on this account, that " he saves his people from
their sins." See Rom. xi. 26, 27, " And so all Israel shall be saved ; as it is
written, there shall come out of Zion a deliverer, and shall turn away ungodli-
ness from Jacob. For this is my covenant unto them, when I shall take away
their sins." God says, " I will put my law into their hearts ; I will write my
law in their inward parts, and they shall not depart away from me ; I will take
away the heart of stone, and give them a heart of flesh ; I will give them a heart
to know me ; I will circumcise their hearts to love me ; oh, that there were such
a heart in them !" And it is spoken of as his work, to give, to cause, to create
such a heart, to put it in them. God is said to incline their hearts, not only tp
give statutes, but to incline their hearts to his statutes.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 571
Moses speaks of the great moral means that God had used with the children
of Israel to enlighten them, and convince and persuade them ; but of their being
yet unpersuaded and unconverted, and gives this as a reason, that God had not
given them a heart to perceive : as Deut. xxix. 4, " Yet the Lord hath not given
you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to h^.ar, unto this day." The
Scripture plainly makes a distinction between exhibiting light, or means of in-
struction and persuasion, and giving eyes to see, circumcising the heart, &c
§ 52. Why should Christ teach us to pray in the Lord's prayer, " Thy will
be done on earth as it is in heaven," if it is not God's work to bring that effect
to pass, and it is left to man's free will, and cannot be otherwise, because other-
wise it is no virtue, and none of their obedience, or doing of God's will; and
God does what he can oftentimes consistently with man's liberty, and those
that enjoy the means he uses, do generally neglect and refuse to do his will 1
He does so much, that he can well say, what could I have done more 1 And
yet almost all are at the greatest distance from doing his will. See Colos. i.
9, 10.
§ 53. If it be as the Arminians suppose, that all men's virtue is of the de-
termination of their own free will, independent on any prior determining, deci-
ding, and disposing of the event ; that it is no part of the ordering of God,
whether there be many virtuous or few in the world, whether there shall be
much virtue or little, or where it shall be, in what nation, country, or when, or
in what generation or age ; or whether there shall be any at all : then none of
these things belong to God's disposal, and therefore, surely it does not belong
to him to promise them. For it does not belong to him to promise in an affair,
concerning which he has not the disposal. .
And how can God promise, as he oftentimes does in his word, glorious times,
when righteousness shall generally prevail, and his will shall generally be done;
and yet that it is not an effect which belongs to him to determine ; it is not left
to his determination, but to the sovereign, arbitrary determination of others, in-
dependently on any determination of him ; and therefore surely they ought to
be the promisers 1 For him to promise who has it not in his hands to dispose
and determine, is a great absurdity ; and yet God oftentimes in promising,
speaks of himself as the sovereign disposer of the matter, using such expressions
as abundantly imply it. Isaiah lx. 22, " I the Lord do hasten it in its time."
Surely this is the language of a promiser, and not merely a predictor. God pro-
mises Abraham, that " all the families of the earth shall be blessed in him."
God swears, " every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess." And it is
said to be given to Christ, that every nation, &c, should serve and obey him,
Dan. vii. After what manner they shall serve and obey him, is abundantly de-
clared in other prophecies, as in Isaiah xi. and innumerable others. These are
spoken of in the next chapter, as the excellent things that God does.
§ 54. If God is not the disposing author of virtue, then he is not the giver
of it. The very notion of a giver implies a disposing cause of the possession
of the benefit. 1 John iv. 4, " Ye are of God, little children, and have over-
come them (i. e. have overcome your spiritual enemies), because greater is he
that is in you, than he that is in the world ;" that is, plainly, he is stronger, and
his strength overcomes. But how can this be a reason, if God does not put
forth any overcoming, effectual strength in the case, but leaves it to free will to
get the victory, to determine the point in the conflict 's
§ 55. There are no sort of benefits that are so much the subject of the pro-
mises of Scripture, as this sort, the bestowment of virtue, or benefits which im-
ply it. How often is the fxith of the Gentiles, or their coming into the Chris-
572 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
tian Church promised to Christ in the Old Testament, Isaiah xlix. 6, and many
other places; and he has promised it to his church, chap. xlix. 18 — 21, and
innumerable other places. See Rom, xv. 12, 13. What a promise have we,
Isaiah lx. 21, " Thy people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the
land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hand, that I may be glo-
rified,"— compared with the next chapter, 3d verse, " That they may be called
the trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that he might be glorified."
See also verse 8th of the same chapter. Likewise chap. lx. 17, 18, " I will
make thy officers peace, and thy exactors righteousness ; violence shall no more
be heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy border, but thou shalt
call thy walls salvation, and thy gates praise." Here it is promised that the ru-
lers shall be righteous ; and then, in the 21st verse following, it is promised that
the people shall be so. The change of men to be of a peaceable disposition is
promised, as in places innumerable, so in Isaiah xi. 6 — 11, "The wolf also
shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid," &c.
[saiah lv. 5, " Behold, thou shalt call a nation that thou knowest not, and na-
tions that knew not thee shall run unto thee, because of the Lord thy God, and
for the Holy One of Israel, for he hath glorified thee." Jer. iii. 15, " And I
will give you pastors according to mine heart, which shall feed you with know-
ledge and understanding." This implies a promise that there should be such
pastors in being, and that they should be faithful to feed the people with know-
ledge and understanding. Jer. x. 23, " The way of man is not in himself."
Stebbing owns, that on Arminian principles, conversion depending on the de-
termination of free will, it is possible, in its own nature, that none should ever
be converted ; p. 235. Then all the promises of virtue, of the revival of reli-
gion, &c, are nothing. Jer. xxxi. 18, " Turn thou me, and I shall be turned,"
— compared with Jer. xvii. 14, " Heal me, O Lord, and I shall be healed ; save
me, and I shall be saved, for thou art my praise." Which shows the force and
meaning of such a phraseology to be, that God alone can be the doer of it ; and
that if he undertakes it, it will be effectually done. Jer. xxxi. 32 — 35, " Not
according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day that I took
them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt (which my covenant
they brake, although I was a husband unto them, saith the Lord) : but this
shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel : After those days,
saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in theii
hearts, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall
teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying,
Know the Lord ; for they shall all know me, from the least of them, unto the
greatest of them, saith the Lord ; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will re-
member their sin no more." The prophet elsewhere tells what is connected
with knowing God, viz., doing judgment and justice, and showing mercy, &c.
Chap. xxii. 16, Jer. xxxii. 39, 40, " And I will give them one heart and one
way, that they may fear me forever, for the good of them and their children
after them ; and I will make an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not
turn away from them to do them good. But I will put my fear in their hearts,
and they shall not depart from me." Jer. xxxiii. 2, " Thus saith the Lord, the
maker thereof, the maker that formed it." Verse 8, " And I will cleanse them
from all their iniquity, whereby they have sinned against me." Ezek. xi. 18-
20, " And they shall come thither, and they shall take away all the detestable
things thereof, and all the abominations thereof from thence. And I will give
them one heart, and I will put a new spirit within you ; and I will take the
stony heart out of their flesh, and I will give them a heart of flesh ; that they
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 572
may walk in my statutes, and keep mine ordinances, and do them ; and they
shall be my people, and I will be their God."
Zech. xii. 10, to the end, " And I will pour upon the house of David, and
upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace and of supplication ; and
they shall look upon me whom they have pierced," &c.
So in the next chapter at the beginning, " I will cut off the names of idols
out of the land, and they shall be no more remembered ;" and also, " I will
cause the prophets, and also the unclean spirits to pass out of the land."
Mai. iii. 3, 4, " And he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver ; and he
shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may
offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness. Then shall the offering of Ju-
dah and Jerusalem be pleasant unto the Lord, as in the days of old, and as in
the former years."
§ 56. We are told, Job xxviii. 28, that " the fear of the Lord is wisdom,
and to depart from evil is understanding." The same is also abundantly declared
in other places. But it is equally declared, that God is the author and giver of
wisdom, and that he is the author wholly and only ; which is denied of other
things. It is also abundantly declared in this 28th chapter of Job, that it can-
not be obtained of any creature by any •means ; and it is implied in the end of
the chapter, that it is Goci that gives wisdom, as is asserted, Prov. ii. 6 : " For
the Lord giveth wisdom ; out of his mouth cometh knowledge and understand-
ing." It is the promise of God the Father, Psalm ex. 2, " Thy people shall be
willing in the day of thy power," Psaim cxix. 35, " Make me to go in the way
of thy commandments." Verse 36, " Incline my heart unto thy testimonies."
§ 57. We are directed earnestly to pray and cry unto God for wisdom, and
the fear of the Lord ; for this reason, that it is he that giveth wisdom. Prov.
ii. at the beginning : compare Job. xxviii. with Prov. xxi. 1, " The king's heart
is in the hands of the Lord, as the rivers of water ; he turneth it whithersoever
he will." Here it is represented that the will of God determines the wills of
men, and that when God pleases to interpose, he even directs them according to
his pleasure, without failure in any instance. This shows that God has not left
men's hearts so in their own hands, as to be determined by themselves alone,
independently on any antecedent determination.
Prov. xxviii. 26, " He that trusteth in his own heart is a fool." A man is to
be commended for making a wise improvement of his outward possessions, for
his own comfort ; yet this is the gift of God. Eccles. ii. 24 — 26, " There is
nothing better for a man, than that he should eat and drink, and that he should
make his soul enjoy good in his labor. This also I saw, that it was from the
hand of God."
John i. 12, 13, " As many as received him, to them gave he power to be-
come the sons of God ; which were born, not of the will of man, but of God."
Thus also we read, Luke iii. 8, " God is able of these stones to raise up children
unto Abraham." John iii. 3, " Except a man be born again, he cannot see the
kingdom of God." Verse 5, " Except a man be born of water, and of the
Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." " That which is born of the
flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." Verse 8, " The wind
bloweth where it listeth, and thou nearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell
whence it cometh, and whither it goeth ; sa is every one that is born of the
Spirit." Jam. i. 18, " Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth,
that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures."
What Christ meant by being born again, we may learn by the abundant
use of the like phrase by the same disciple that wrote this gospel, ii his first
574 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
epistle, who doubtless learned his language from his master ; and particularly
from those sayings of his concerning the new birth, which he took more spe-
cial notice of, and which left the deepest impressions on his mind, which we
may suppose are those he records, when he writes the history of his life. Matth.
iv. 19, " I will make you fishers of men." So Mark i. 16, 20, together with
Luke v. 10, " From henceforth thou shalt catch men ;" compared with the fore-
going story of Christ's giving them so great a draught of fishes, which was wholly
his doing, and ascribed to him. Matth. vi. 10, " Thy kingdom come ; thy will
be done." Matth. xi. 25 — 27, " At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank
thee, 0 Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the
wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so
it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father ;
and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father ; neither knoweth any man the
Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." So Luke
x. 21, 22. John vi. 37, " All that the Father giveth me, shall come unto me."
Verse 44, " No man can come unto me, except the Father which hath sent me,
draw him."
John x. 16, " Other sheep I have which are not of this fold ; them also I
must bring ; and there shall be one fdld and one shepherd." Verses 26 — 29,
" But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you ; my
sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me ; and 1 give unto
them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out
of my hands. My Father which gave them me," &c.
Acts xv. 3, 4, " Declaring the conversion of the Gentiles, and they declared
all things that God had done with them." Verse 9, " And put no difference be-
tween us and them, purifying their hearts by faith." Therefore it is not proba-
ble, that the heart is first purified, to fit it for faith. John xiv. 12, " Greater
works than these shall he do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son." The
meaning of it is confirmed from John xii. 23, 24, 28 — 32, and John xvii. 1, 2,
3, Isa. xlix. 3, 5, and xxvi. 15, and Isa. xvi. 14, Tsa. xvii. 3, 4, 5, and 16, 17,
and 22, 24 (especially Isa. Iv. 4, 5), Jer. xxx. 19. Rom. ix. 15, " It is not of
him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." By such
an expression in the apostle's phraseology, from time to time, is meant the use
of endeavors, whereby they seek the benefit they would obtain. So what he
here says, is agreeable to what he says in chap. xi. 4, 5, 6, 7, where he partic-
ularly shows, that it is God that preserves the remnant, and that it is of the
election of his grace and free kindness, and not of their works ; but in such a
way of freedom, as is utterly inconsistent with its being of their works. And in
verse 7, that it is not determined by their seeking, but by God's election. The
apostle here, as Dr. Taylor says, has respect to bodies of men, to the pos-
terity of Esau and Jacob, &c. Yet this he applies to a distinction made in
those days of the gospel, and that distinction made between those that were in
the Christian church, and those that were not, and particularly some of the Jews
that were in the Christian church, and others of the same nation that were not ;
which is made by some believing and accepting Christ, and others rejecting
him ; by that faith which they professed to exercise with all their hearts ; that
faith which was a mercy and virtue, and the want of which was a fault ; as
appears by the objection the apostle supposes, verse 19, " Why doth he yet find
fault V The want of which faith argued hardness of heart, verse 18, exposed
them to wrath and destruction, as a punishment of sin, verse 22, and exposes
oersons to be like the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, verse 29.
Rom. xi. 4, 5, 6, 7, " But what saith the answer of God unto him ? I have
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 575
reserved to myself seven thousand men, who have not bowed the knee to the
image of Baal. Even so at this present time, there is a remnant according to
the election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no more of works ; otherwise
grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace ; other-
wise work is no more work." 2 Tim. ii. 9. Eph. ii. 9. Tit. iii. 5, " What
then 7 Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for ; but the election hath
obtained it, and the rest were blinded." Rom. xi. 17, 18, " If some of the
branches are broken off, and thou, being a wild olive tree, wert grafted in
among them, and with them partakest of the root and fatness of the olive tree ;
boast not against the branches."
Rom. xi. 25, 26, 27, " Blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the ful-
ness of the Gentiles be come in ; and so all Israel shall be saved. As it is
written, There shall come out of Zion the deliverer, and shall turn away ungod-
liness from Jacob. For this is my covenant unto them, when I shall take
away their sins." Together with verses 35, 36, " Who hath first given unto
him, and it shall be recompensed to him again ? For of him, and through him,
and to him, are all things, to whom be glory for ever and ever."
§ 58. That expression, Rom. i. 7, and 1 Cor. i. 2, and elsewhere, called to
be saints, implies, that God makes the distinction. Compare this with what
Christ says, John x. 27, " My sheep hear my voice." Verse 16, " Other sheep
have I which are not of this fold ; them also must I bring ; and they shall hear
my voice ; and there shall be one fold and one shepherd." 1 Cor. i. 26, 27, 28,
to the end ; " For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men
after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called : but God hath
chosen the foolish things of, &c. That no flesh should glory in his presence.
But of him are ye in Christ Jesus," &c. Rom. xi. latter end. Heb. xiii. 20,
21. 1 Cor. iii. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, " W7ho then is Paul, or who is Apollos, but minis-
ters by whom ye believed, even as the Lord gave to every man. I have plant-
ed, and Apollos watered ; but God gave the increase. So neither is he that
planteth any thing, neither he that watereth ; but God that giveth the increase.
—We are laborers together with God ; ye are God's husbandry ; ye are God's
building." According to the Arminian scheme, it ought to have been ; 1 have
planted, and Apollos watered, and God hath planted and watered more espe-
cially. For we have done it only as his servants. But you yourselves have
given the increase ; the fruit has been left to your free will : agreeably to what
the Arminians from time to time insist on, in what they say upon the parable of
the vineyard which God planted in a fruitful hill, &c, and looked that it should
bring forth grapes, and says, what could I have done more unto my vineyard ?
1 Cor. iii. 3, " Ye are manifestly declared to be the epistle of Christ, minis-
tered by us, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God ; not on
tables of stone, but on the fleshly tables of the heart." They were the epistle
of Christ, as the effect of the Spirit of God in their hearts Held forth the light ot
truth ; of gospel truth with its evidence to the world ; as the church is compared
to a candlestick, and called the pillar and ground of the truth. This is agreeable
to those Scriptures in the Old Testament, that speak of writing God's law in their
hearts, &c. Add to this, chap. iv. 6, " For God, who commanded the light to
shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the know-
ledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." 2 Cor. v. 14 — 18, " If
one died for all, then were all dead ; that they which live, should not henceforth
live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again. There-
fore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature : old things are passed away :
behold, all things are become new ; and all things are of God."
576 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
2 Cor. viiL 16, 17, " Thanks be to God, who put the same earnest care into
the heart of Titus for you. For indeed he accepted the exhortation. But being
more forward, of his own accord he went unto you.'' So the next chapter
speaks of the Corinthians' forwardness and readiness in their bounty to the poor
saints, not as of necessity, but with freedom and cheerfulness, according to the
purpose of their own hearts or wills ; but yet speaks of their charity as just cause
of much thanksgiving to God; and speaks expressly of thanksgiving to him for
sucii a subjection of them to the gospel, and liberal distribution to them.
Gal. i. 15, 16, " But when it pleased God, who separated me from my
mother's womb, and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me, that I
might preach him among the Gentiles," compared with 2 Cor. iv. 6,7, and the
account which he gives himself of his conversion, Acts xxvi. 16 — 18.
Gal. ii. 19, 20, " 1 through the law am dead to the law, that I might live
unto God. I am crucified with Christ ; nevertheless I live ; yet not I, but Christ
liveth in me."
Gal. v. 22, 23, &c, " The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffer-
ing, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance."
§ 59. The apostle, in Eph. i. 18 — 20, speaks of some exceeding great work of
power by which they that believe are distinguished. But a bodily resurrection is
no such distinguishing work of power. See the words : " The eyes of your under-
standing being enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope of his calling,
and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints, and what is the
exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe, according to the
wrorking of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ Jesus, when he
raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in heavenly
places." The apostle repeats the same thing in substance again in chap-
ter iii. 14, and following verses, and tells us what sort of knowledge he
desired, and so earnestly prayed that they might receive, and what is the power
that he speaks of: " That they may be able to comprehend with all saints,
what is the breadth and length, and depth and height ; and to know the love of
Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fulness of
God." And tells by what means God would dwell in their hearts by faith, &c,
verses 16, 17. And he tells us in verse 20, what is the power of God he speaks
of. See Rom. xv. 13. 1 Pet. i. 3 — 5, and 2 Thess. i. 11, 12. See also what
the apostle speaks of as an effect of God's glorious powTer, Col. i. 11.
Eph. i. 18 — 20, is to be taken in connection with the words which follow
in the beginning of the next chapter ; which is a continuation of the same dis-
course, where the apostle abundantly explains himself. In those words, there
is an explanation of what had before been more figuratively represented. He
here observes, that those that believe, are the subjects of a like exceeding great-
ness of power that Christ was, when he was raised from the dead, and set at
God's own right hand in heavenly places. And then in the prosecution of this
discourse he shows how, viz., in our being raised from the dead, being dead
ourselves in trespasses and sins, and raised as Christ was, and made to sit
together with him in heavenly places ; and this he speaks of, not only as the
fruit of the exceeding greatness of his power, but of the riches of his mercy, and
exceeding riches of his grace ; by grace in opposition to wrorks ; that it is by faith
which is the gift of God. The apostle repeats it over and over, that it is by grace,
and then explains how ; not of works ; and that our faith itself, by which it is, is
not of ourselves, but is God's gift ; and that we are wholly God's workmanship ;
and that all is owing to God's foreordaining that we should walk in good works.
I know not what the apostle could have said more. See Eph. ii. 1 — 10.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 677
§ 60. In Eph. iii. it is spoken of as a glorious mystery of God's will, con-
trived of old, and determined from the foundation of the world, and his eternal
purpose, &c., that God would bring in the Gentiles as fellow heirs, and of the
same body, and partakers of his promise in Christ by the gospel. Which con-
firms the promises of the Old Testament ; shows that they were not foretold
only as foreseen, but Predetermined, as what God would bring to pass. This
is also spoken of elsewhere, as the fruit of God's eternal purpose, his election,
&c, as our adversaries acknowledge.
§ 61. Sincerity itself is spoken of as coming from God, Phil. i. 10 : "That
ye may approve the things that are excellent ; that ye may be sincere and with-
out offence in the day of Christ." And elsewhere God is represented as " creat-
ing a clean heart, renewing a right spirit, giving a heart of flesh," &c. The
apostle " gives thanks for the faith and love of the Colossians, their being deliv-
ered from the power of darkness, &c, and prays that they may be filled with
the knowledge of his will in all wisdom and might, agreeable to their know-
ledge, being fruitful in every good work ; and for their perseverance, and that
they might be made meet for the reward of the saints." Col i. 3, 4, 9 — 13.
This argues all to flow from God as the giver. Their first faith, and their love
that their faith was attended with, and their knowledge and spiritual wisdom
and prudence, and walking worthy of the Lord, and universal obedience, and
doing every good work, and increasing in grace, and being strengthened in it,
and their perseverance and cheerfulness in their obedience, and being made meet
for their reward, all are from God. They are from God as the determining
cause ; else, why does the apostle pray that God would bestow or effect these
things, if they be not at his determination whether they shall have them or not ?
He speaks of God's glorious power as manifested in the bestowment of these
things.
Col. ii. 13, " And you, being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of
your flesh, hath he quickened together with him."
Col. iii. 10, " Have put on the new- man, which is renewed in knowledge
after the image of him that created him."
See how many things the apostle gives thanks to God for in the Thessa-
lonians, and prays for them. 2 Thess. i. 3, 4, 11, 12, and ii. 17, 18, and iii. 3,
4, 5.. 1 Thess. i. verse 2, to the end, and chap. ii. verses 13, 14, and chap. iii.
9, 10, 12, 13, chap. v. 23, 24. 1 Thess. iii. 12, " The Lord made you to increase
and abound in love," &c. 1 Thess. iv. 10, " But as touching brotherly love, ye
need not that I should write unto you : for ye yourselves are taught of God to
love one another. And indeed ye do it towards all the brethren. 1 Thess. v.
23, 24, " And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly ; and I pray God
your whole spirit, and soul and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming
of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that hath called you, who also will
doit."
2 Thess. i. 3, 4, " We are bound to thank God always for you, because your
faith groweth exceedingly, and the charity of every one of you all towards each
other aboundeth ; so that we glory in you, for your faith and patience in all your
persecutions and tribulations."
The apostle thanks God for his own prayers, and for others ; 2 Tim. i. 3, " If
they are from God, then doubtless also our prayers for ourselves, our very prayers
for the Spirit, are from him.
The prophet ascribes persons' prayers to their having the spirit of grace and
supplication. True acceptable prayer is spoken of, Rom. viii., as being the
language of the Spirit : not that I suppose that the very words are indited, but
Vol. II. 73
578 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
the disposition is given. 2 Tim. i. 7, " God hath not us given the spirit of fear,
but of power and of love, and of a sound mind."
2 Tim. ii. 9, " Who hath saved us and called us with a holy calling, not ac-
cording to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was
given us in Christ Jesus before the world began."
Heb. xiii. 20, 21, " Now the God of peace, who brought again from the dead
our Lord Jesus, that great shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the ever-
lasting covenant, make you perfect in every good work, and to do his will,
working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ, to
whom be glory for ever and ever, Amen." See Eph. i. 19, 20, and 1 Cor. i.
latter end. Heb. xii. 2, " Jesus, the author and finisher of our faith," compared
with Philip, i. 5. James i. 5 — 8, " If any man lack wisdom, let him ask it of
God, that giveth to all liberally and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him.
But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering ; for he that wavereth is like a wave
of the sea, driven of the wind and tossed. For let not that man think he shall
obtain any thing of the Lord. A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways."
So that, in order to a man's having any reason to expect to be heard, he must
first have faith, and a sincere, single heart. And what that is which the apostle
calls wisdom, may be learnt from chap. iii. 17, 18 : " The wisdom that is from
above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy
and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy. And the fruit of
righteousness is sown in peace of them that make peace." In chap. i. 5, &c,
above cited, God is spoken of as the giver of this wisdom ; and in the following
part of the chapter, he is spoken of as the giver of this and every benefit of that
kind ; every thing that contains any thing of the nature of light or wisdom, or
moral good : and this is represented as the fruit of his mere will and pleasure.
Verses 16, 17, 18, " Do not err, my beloved brethren. Every good gift, and
every perfect gift, is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights,
with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning. Of his own will begat he
us by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures."
See John i. 13, and iii. 8.
The scope of the apostle, and connection of his discourse, plainly show that
the apostle means to assert that all moral good is from God. In the preceding
verses, he was warning those he wrote to, not to lay their sins, or pride, or lusts
to the charge of God, and on that occasion he would have them be sensible that
every good gift is from God, and no evil ; that God is the Father of light, and
only of light ; and that no darkness is from him, because there is no darkness
in him ; no change from light to darkness ; no, not the least shadow. What
he says is plainly parallel to what the Apostle John says, when he would signify
God's perfect holiness without any sin ; 1 John i. 5, 6, " This, then, is the message
which we have heard of him, and declare unto you, that God is light, and in him
is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in
darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." But if all moral good is from God,
cometh down from him, and is his gift ; then the very first good determination of
the will, and every good improvement of assistance, is so.
1 Pet. i. 2 — 5, " Elect according to the foreknowledge of God, through
sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience. Blessed be the God and Father of
our Lord Jesus Christ, who, according to his abundant mercy, hath begotten us
again unto a lively hope" (or a living hope, i. e., from the dead ; to be begotten
from the dead, in the phrase of the New Testament, is the same as to be raised
from the dead, see Coloss. i. 18, Rev. i. 5), " by the resurrection of Jesus
Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, reserved in
EFFICACIOUS GKACE. 579
heaven for you, who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salva-
tion." See Eph. i. 18—20, and ii. at the beginning.
Phil. ii. 13, " It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good
pleasure." The plain meaning of this text is, that it is God by his operation
and efficiency who gives the will, and also enables us to put that will in execu-
tion ; or that he by his efficiency gives both the will and the deed. And this
will remain the plain meaning of this text, after this sort of gentlemen have
worked upon it a thousand years longer, if any of them shall remain on earth so
long. It will be the indisputable meaning of it, notwithstanding their criticisms
on the word eveqycov, &c. I question whether any word can be found, in all
the Greek language, more expressive and significant of an actual operation.
Wherever the words effectual and effectually are used in our translation of the
Bible, this is the word used in the original. See the English Concordance.
§ 62. By the disposing or determining cause of a benefit I mean, a cause
that disposes, orders or determines, whether we shall be actually possessed of
the benefit or not ; and the same cause may be said to be an efficacious or effec-
tual cause. That cause only can be said to be an efficacious cause, whose
efficiency determines, reaches, and produces the effect.
A being may be the determiner and disposer of an event, and not properly
an efficient or efficacious cause. Because, though he determines the futurity
of the event, yet there is no positive efficiency or power of the cause that reaches
and produces the effect ; but merely a withholding or withdrawing of efficiency
or power.
Concerning the giver's being a disposer or determiner, let us consider that
objection, that when a man gives to a beggar, he does but offer, and leaves it
with the determination of the beggar's will, whether he will be possessed of the
thing offered. In answer to this I observe, that in the instance before us, the
very thing given is the fruit of the bounty of the giver. The thing given is virtue,
and this consists in the determination of the inclination and will. Therefore the
determination of the will is the gift of God ; otherwise virtue is not his gift, and
it is an inconsistence to pray to God to give it to us. Why should we pray to
God to give us such a determination of will, when that proceeds not from him
but ourselves ?
§ 63. Every thing in the Christian scheme argues, that man's title to, and
fitness for heaven, depends on some great divine influence, at once causing a
vast change, and not any such gradual change as is supposed to be brought to
pass by men themselves in the exercise of their own power. The exceeding
diversity of the states of men in another world, argues it.
§ 64. Arminians make a great ado about the phrase irresistible grace. But
the grand point of controversy really is, what is it that determines, disposes,
and decides the matter, whether there shall be saving virtue in the heart or not ;
and much more properly, whether the grace of God in the affair be determining
grace, than whether it be irresistible.
Our case is indeed extremely unhappy, if we have such a book to be our
grand and only rule, our light and directory, that is so exceeding; perplexed,
dark, paradoxical and hidden everywhere in the manner of expression, as the
Scriptures must be, to make them consistent with Arminian opinions, by what-
ever means this has come to pass, whether through the distance of ages, diver-
sity of customs, or by any other cause. It is to be considered that this is given
for the rule of all ages ; and not only of the most learned, and accu rate, and
penetrating critics, and men of vast inquiry and skill in antiquity, but for all
soi ts of persons, of every age and nation, learned and unlearned. If this be true,
5 SO EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
how unequal and unfit is the provision that is made ! How improper to answer
the end designed ! If men will take subterfuge in pretences of a vast alteration
of phrase, through diversity of ages and nations, what may not men hide them-
selves from under such a pretence ! No words will hold and secure them. It
is not in the nature of words to do it. At this rate, language in its nature has
no sufficiency to communicate ideas.
§ 65. In efficacious grace we are not merely passive, nor yet does God do
some, and we do the rest. But God does all, and we do all. God produces all,
and we act all For that is what he produces, viz., our own acts. God is the
only proper author and fountain ; we only are the proper actors. We are, in
different respects, wholly passive, and wholly active.
In the Scriptures the same things are represented as from God and from us.
God is said to convert, and men are said to convert and turn. God makes a
new heart, and we are commanded to make us a new heart. God circumcises
the heart, and we are commanded to circumcise our own hearts ; not merely
because we must use the means in order to the effect, but the effect itself is our
act and our duty. These things are agreeable to that text, " God worketh in
you both to will and to do."
§ 66. Christ says, that no other than those whom " the Father draws, will
come to him ;" and Stebbing supposes none but those whom the Father draws
in this sense, viz., by first giving them a teachable spirit, &c. But this was
false in fact in the Apostle Paul and others ; at least he did not give it in answer
to prayer, as their scheme supposes, and must suppose ; else efficacious grace
is established, and the liberty of the will, in their sense of it, is overthrown.
§ 67. When Christ says, John x., " Other sheep have I which are not of this
fold ;" it is unreasonable to suppose he meant all in the world, that were then
of a teachable disposition. Many of them would be dead before the gospel
could be spread among the Gentiles ; and many of the Gentiles were doubtless
brought in, that at that time were not of a teachable disposition. And unless
God's decrees and efficacious grace made a difference, it is unreasonable to sup-
pose any other, than that multitudes, in countries where the apostles never
preached, were as teachable as in those countries where they did go, and so
they never were brought in according to the words of Christ, " Those whom the
Father hath given me, shall come unto me." Christ speaks of the Father's
giving them as a thing past, John x. 29, " My Father which gave them me."
When Christ speaks of men's being drawn to him, he does not mean any
preparation of disposition antecedent to their having the gospel, but a being
converted to Christ by faith in the gospel, revealing Christ crucified, as appears
by John xii. 32, " And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men
unto me." Acts xv. 9, " Purifying their hearts by faith." Therefore we are
not to suppose God first purifies the heart with the most excellent virtues, tc fit
it for faith.
The apostle says, " without faith it is impossible to please God." There-
fore it is not possible that persons should have, before faith, those virtues that are
peculiarly amiable to God, as Stebbing supposes.
§ 68. The Apostle James tells us, that if we do not pray in faith, we have
no reason to expect to receive any thing, and particularly not to receive divine
wisdom. And therefore it is unreasonable to suppose with Stebbing, that per-
sons first pray, even before they have a spirit of meekness, and teachableness,
and humility, faith or repentance, and that God has promised to answer these
prayers. Christian virtues being everywhere spoken of as the special effect of
grace, and often called by the name of grace, by reason of its being the peculiar
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 581
fruit of grace, does not well consist with the Arminian notion of assistance, viz.,
that God is obliged to give us assistance sufficient for salvation from hell, be-
cause, forsooth, it is not just to damn us for the want of that which we have not
sufficient means to escape ; and then, after God has given these sufficient means,
our improving them well is wholly from ourselves, our own will, and not from
God ; and the thing wherein Christian virtue consists, is wholly and entirely
from ourselves.
§ 69. Efficacious grace is not inconsistent with freedom. This appears by
2 Cor. viii. 16, 17 : " Thanks be to God, which put the same earnest care into
the heart of Titus for you ; for indeed he accepted the invitation ; but being-
more forward, of his own accord he went unto you." So that his forwardness
being put into his heart by God, and his being forward of his own accord, are
not inconsistent, one with the other.
§ 70. According to Arminian principles, men have a good and honest
heart, the very thing that is the grand requisite in order to God's accept-
ance, and so the proper grand condition of salvation, and which is often spoken
of in the Scriptures as such, before they have the proper condition of salvation.
See Stebbing, page 48 — This good and honest, meek and humble, sincere
heart, they suppose they have before they have faith, repentance or obedience.
Yea, they themselves hold this previous qualification to be the grand and essen-
tial requisite in order to God's acceptance and salvation by Christ ; so that they
greatly insist that if men have it, they shall be surely saved, though they live and
die in ignorance of the gospel, and without faith, and repentance, and holiness,
which are necessary in order for salvation, according to them. — Stebbing, p. 13.
§ 71. I would ask, how it is possible for us to come by virtue at first, ac-
cording to Arminian principles, or how we come by our first virtue ? Is it na-
tural ? Is there some virtuous disposition with which we come into the world !
But how is that virtue ? That which men bring into the world is necessary,
and what men had no opportunity to prevent, and it is not at all from our free
will. How then can there be any virtue in it according to their principles ?
Or is our first virtue wholly from the influence of the Spirit of God, without any
endeavor or effort of ours to be partly the cause of it ? This, to be sure, can-
not be, by their principles; for, according to them, that which is not at all
from us, or that we are not the cause of, is no virtue of ours. Is it wholly from
our endeavors, without any assistance at all of the Spirit ? This is contrary to
what they pretend to hold ; for they assert, that without divine assistance there
can be no virtue. Stebbing, pages 27, 28, and pages 20, 21, and other places.
If they say it is partly from the influence of the Spirit of God, and partly from
our own endeavors, I would inquire whether those endeavors that our first vir-
tue partly arises from, be good endeavors, and at all virtuous. If the answer be
in the affirmative, this contradicts the supposition. For I am now inquiring
what the first virtue is. The first virtue we have, certainly does not arise from
virtuous endeavors preceding that first virtue ; for that is to suppose virtue be-
fore the first virtue. If the answer be, that they are no good endeavors, they
have nothing at all of the nature of the exercise of any good disposition, or any
good aim and intention, or any virtuous sincerity ; I ask, what tendency can such
efforts of the mind, as are wholly empty of all goodness, have to produce true
moral goodness in the heart 1
Can an action, that in principles and ends has no degree of moral good,
have a tendency to beget a habit of acting from good principles and for good
ends ? For instance, can a man's doing something purely to satisfy some sen-
sitive appetite of bis own, or to increase his own worldly profit, have any kind
582 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
of tendency to beget a habit of doing something from true, disinterested benevo-
lence, or to excite to any act from such a principle ? Certainly an act perfect-
ly void of benevolence, has no more tendency to produce either a habit or act
of benevolence, than nothing has a tendency to produce something.
§ 72. Stebbing supposes the assistance God gives, or the operation of the
Spirit in order to faith, is to give a good and honest heart, prepared to receive
and well improve the word ; as particularly, meekness, humility, teachable-
ness, &c. And supposes that these effects of the Spirit are to be obtained by
prayer ; but yet allows, that the prayer must be acceptably made, page 106,
which supposes that some degree or virtue must be exercised in prayer. For
surely they do not suppose any thing else, besides virtue in prayer, or in any
other part of religion, is acceptable to God. I suppose they will not deny,
that there must be at least some virtuous respect to the divine being, as well as
some virtuous concern for the good of their own souls, to make any external
act of religion in them at all acceptable to God, who is a spirit, and the searcher
of hearts. And it may be also presumed that they will allow, that there are
multitudes of men, who at present are so wicked, so destitute of virtue, that they
have not virtue enough for acceptable prayer to God. They have not now so
much respect to God or their own souls, as to incline them to pray at all. But
they live in a total neglect of that duty. Now, I would inquire, how these men
shall come by virtue, in order to acceptably praying to God 1 Or how is it
within their reach by virtue of God's promises ? Or how can they come by it,
save by God's sovereign, arbitrary grace 1 Shall they pray to God for it, and
so obtain it 1 But this is contrary to the supposition. For it is supposed, that
they now have not virtue enough to pray acceptably, and this is the very thing
inquired, how they come by the virtue necessary in order to their making ac-
ceptable prayer 1 Or shall they work the virtue in themselves wholly without
God's assistance ? But this is contrary to what they pretend, viz., that all vir-
tue is from God, or by the grace and assistance of God, which they allow to
be evident by that Scripture, " without me ye can do nothing." Or, is God
obliged to give it, or to assist them to obtain it, without their praying for it, or
having virtue enough to ask it of him ? That they do not pretend. For they
suppose the condition of our obtaining the heavenly Spirit is our seeking, &c,
asking, &c. ; and besides, if God gives it without their first seeking h\ that will
make God the first determining efficient, yea, the mere and sole author of it,
without their doing any thing toward it, without their so much as seeking or
asking for it ; which would be entirely to overthrow their whole scheme, and
would, by their principles, make this virtue no virtue at all, because not at all
owing to them, or any endeavors of theirs.
If they reply, they must in the first place consider : they are capable of
consideration ; and if they would consider as they ought and may, they wrould
doubtless pray to God, and ask his help ; and every man naturally has some
virtue in him, which proper consideration would put into exercise so far as to
cause him to pray in some measure acceptably, without any new gift from God
— I answer, this is inconsistent with many of their principles. It is so, that men
should naturally have some virtue in them. For what is natural is necessary ;
is not from themselves and their own endeavors and free acts ; but prevents
them all, and therefore cannot be their virtue. If they say, no ; consideration
will not stir up any virtue that is naturally in them, to cause them to pray vir-
tuously ; but God has obliged himself to give virtue enough to enable them to
pray and seek acceptably, if they will consider : I answer, this is more than
ihey pretend. They do not pretend that God has promised anv new grace to
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 583
any man, on any lower condition than asking, seeking, knowing, &c., and if
they should think best at last to pretend any promise on lower terms, they had
best produce the promises, and tell us what, and where they are. If they say,
serious consideration itself is some degree of seeking their own good, and there
is an implicit prayer in it to the Supreme Being to guide them into the way to
their happiness : I answer, if it be supposed that there is an implicit prayer in
their consideration, still they allow that prayer must be in some measure accept-
able prayer, in order to its being entitled to an answer ; and consequently must
have some degree of virtuous respect to God, &c, and if so, then the same
question returns with all the aforementioned difficulties over again, viz., How
came the profane, thoughtless, vain, inconsiderate person by this new virtue,
this new respect to God, that he ever exercises in this serious consideration and
implicit prayer ?
If they say, there is no necessity of supposing any implicit prayer in the
first consideration ; and yet, if the wicked, profane, careless person, makes a
good improvement of what grace he has, in proper consideration or otherwise,
God has obliged himself to give him more, in that general promise, * to him
that hath shall be given, and he shall have more abundance :" then I answer,
here is new virtue in his making a good improvement of what common assist-
ance he has, which before he neglected, and made no good improvement of
How came he by this new virtue 1 Here, again, all the aforementioned diffi-
culties return. Was it wholly from himself? This is contrary to what they
pretend. Or is God obliged to give new assistance in order to this new virtue
by any promise ? If he be, what is the condition of the promise ? It is ab-
surd to say, making a good improvement of what assistance they have ; for
that is the thing we are inquiring after, viz., How comes he by that new vir-
tue, making a good improvement of what he has, when before he had not virtue
enough to make such an improvement ?
Of whatever kind this assistance is, whether it be some afflictive dispensa-
tion of Providence, or some other outward dispensation or inward influence, the
difficulty is the same. How becomes God obliged to give this assistance; and
what is the condition of the promise 1
The answer must be, that this new virtue is without any new assistance
given, and is from God no otherwise than as the former neglected assistance or
grace subserves it. But the question is, whence comes the virtue of not neg-
lecting, but improving that former assistance ? Ts it proper to say that a man
is assisted to improve assistance by the assistance improved 1 Suppose a num-
ber of men were in the water in danger of drowning, and a friend on shore
throws out a cord amongst them, but all of them for a while neglect it ; at
length one of them takes hold of it, and makes improvement of it ; and any
should inquire how that man came by the prudence and virtue of improving
the cord, when others did not, and he before had neglected it ; would it be a
proper answer to say, that he that threw out the rope, assisted him wisely to
improve the rope, by throwing out the rope to him ? This would be an ab-
surd answer. The question is not, how he came by his opportunity, but how
he came by the virtue and disposition of improvement. His friend on shore
gave him the opportunity, and this is all. The man's virtue in improving it
was not at all from him.
Would it not be exceedingly impertinent, in such a case, to set forth from
time to time, how this man's discretion, and virtue, and prudence, was the gift
of his friend on the shore, his mere gift, the fruit of his purpose and mere good
pleasure, and of his power ; and yet that it was of his own will ?
584 EFFICACIOUS GRACE
Man's virtue, according to Arminian principles, must consist wholly and
entirely in improving assistance : for in that only consists the exercise of their
free will in the affair, and not in their having the assistance, although their vir-
tue must be by their principles entirely from themselves, and God has no hand
in it. From the latter part of the above discourse, it appears that, according to
Arminian principles, men's virtue is altogether of themselves, and God has no
hand at all in it.
§ 73. When I say that the acts and influences of' the Spirit determine the
effects, it is not meant that man has nothing to do to determine in the affair.
The soul of man undoubtedly, in every instance, does voluntarily determine with
respect to his own consequent actions. But this determination of the will of
man, or voluntary determination of the soul of man, is the effect determined.
This determining act of the soul is not denied, but supposed, as it is the effect
we are speaking of, that the influence of God's Spirit determines.
§ 74. The Scripture speaks of this as the reason that good men have virtue,
that God hath given it to them ; and the reason why bad men have it not, that
God hath not given it to them. These two together clearly prove that. God is
the determining or disposing cause of virtue or goodness in men.
§ 75. Dr. Stebbing insists upon it, that conversion is the effect of God's
word ; and supposes that therefore it is demonstratively evident, that it must
needs be the effect of men's free will, and not the necessary effect of the Spirit
of God. But I say, that by their doctrine of self-determination, it cannot be the
effect of the word of God in any proper sense at all. That it should be the
effect of the word, is as inconsistent with their scheme, as they suppose it to be
with ours. Self-determination is utterly inconsistent with conversion's being at
all the effect of either the word or Spirit.
§ 76. They say that commands, threatenings, promises, invitations, counsels,
&c, are to no purpose in our scheme. But indeed they can have no place in
their scheme : for their scheme excludes all motive.
§ 77. In many particulars their scheme contradicts common sense. It is
contrary to common sense, that a being should continually meet with millions
of millions of real, proper disappointments and crosses to his proper desires, and
not continually lead a distressed and unhappy life. It is contrary to common
sense, that God should know that an event will certainly come to pass, whose
nonexistence he at the same time knows is not impossible. It is contrary to
common sense that a thing should be the cause of itself ; and that a thing not
necessary in its own nature should come to pass without any cause : that the
more indifferent a man is in any moral action, the more virtuous he is, &c.
§ 78. If the grace of God is not disposing and determining, then a gracious
man's differing in this respect from another, is not owing to the goodness of
God. He owes no thanks to God for it ; and so owes no thanks to God, that
he is saved, and not others.
But how contrary is this to Scripture ! Seeing the Scripture speaks of the
gift of virtue, and of the possession of it, as a fruit of God's bounty.
§ 79. A man's conformity to the rule of duty, is partly owing to assistance
or motive ; if his conformity be to ten degrees, and it is in some measure, v. #-.,
to the amount of five degrees, owing to sovereign assistance ; then only the
remaining five degrees are to be ascribed to the man himself, and therefore there
are but five degrees of virtue.
§ 80. Dr. Stebbing says, " that a man is indeed both passive and active in
his own conversion," and he represents God as partly the cause of man's con-
version, and man himself as partly the cause, p. 208.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 585
Again, Stebbing says, p. 254, " Faith and regeneration are our works, as
well as his gifts, i. e., they arise partly from God and partly from ourselves."
But if so, on this scheme, they imply virtue so far only as they are our works.
Men's salvation is attributed wholly and entirely to men in their scheme,
and none of the praise of it is due to God, as will most evidently appear, if the
matter be considered with a little attention. For, 1. They hold that man's
salvation is given as a reward of man's virtue ; so is pardon of sin, deliverance
from hell, and eternal life and glory in heaven ; all is for man's virtue. 2. Re-
wardable virtue wholly consists in the exercise of a man's own free will. They
hold that a man's actions are no farther virtuous nor rewardable, than as they
are from man himself. If they are partly from some foreign cause, so far they
are not rewardable. It being so, that that virtue which is rewardable in man,
is entirely from man himself ; hence it is to himself wholly that he is to ascribe
his obtaining the reward. If the virtue, which is that thing, and that thing only,
which obtains the reward, be wholly from man himself, then it will surely fol-
low, that his obtaining the reward is wholly from himself.
All their arguments suppose, that men's actions are no farther virtuous and
rewardable, than as they are from themselves, the fruits of their own free will
and self-determination. And men's own virtue, they say, is the only condition
of salvation, and so must be the only thing by which salvation is obtained. And
this being of themselves only, it surely follows, that their obtaining salvation is
of themselves only.
They say, their scheme gives almost all the glory to God. That matter, I
suppose, may easily be determined, and it may be made to appear beyond all
contest, how much they do ascribe to the man, and how much they do not.
By them salvation is so far from God, that it is God that gives opportunity
to obtain salvation ; it is God that gives the offer and makes the promise : but
the obtaining of the promise is of men. The being of the promise is of
God ; but their interest in it is wholly of themselves, of their own free will.
And furthermore, it is to be observed, that even God's making the offer, and
giving the opportunity to obtain salvation, at least that which consists in salva-
tion from eternal misery, is not of God, so as to be owing to any proper grace
or goodness of his. For they suppose he was obliged to make the offer,
and it would have been a reproach to his justice, if he had not given an oppor-
tunity to obtain salvation. For they hold, it is unjust for God to make men
miserable for Adam's sin ; and that it is unjust to punish them for that sin that
they cannot avoid ; and that therefore, it is unjust for God not to preserve or
save all men that do what they can, or use their sincere endeavors to do
their duty ; and therefore it certainly follows, that it is unjust in God not to
give all opportunity to be saved or preserved from misery ; and consequently,
it is no fruit at all of any grace or kindness in him to give such opportunity, or
to make the offer of it. So that, all that is the fruit of God's kindness in man's
salvation, is the positive happiness that belongs to salvation. But neither of
these two things are in any respect whatsoever the fruit of God's kindness,
neither his deliverance from sin, nor from misery in his virtue and holiness ; and
when hereafter he shall see the misery of the damned, he will have it to con-
sider, that it is owing in no respect to God that he is delivered from that misery.
And that good men differ from others, that shall burn in hell to all eternity, is
wholly owing to themselves. When they, at the day of judgment, shall behold
some set on the left hand of the Judge, while they are on his right hand, and
shall see how they differ, they may, and, as they would act according to truth,
hey ought to take all the glory of it unto themselves ; and therefore the glory
Vol. II. 74
EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
of their salvation belongs to them. For it is evident that a man's making him-
self to differ with regard to any great spiritual benefit, and his not receiving it
from another, but his having it in distinction from others, being from himself, is
ground of a man's boasting and glorying in himself, with respect to that benefit,
and of boasting of it : I say, it is evident by the apostle's words, " Who maketh
thee to differ ? Why boastest thou, as though thou hadst not received it ?"
These words plainly imply it.
It is evident, that it is God's design to exclude man's boasting in the affair
of his salvation. Now, let us consider what does give ground for boasting in
the apostle's account, and what it is that in his account excludes boasting, or
cuts off occasion for it. It is evident by what the apostle says, 1 Cor. i., latter
end, that the entireness and universality of our dependence on God, is that which
cuts off" occasion of boasting ; as, our receiving our wisdom, our holiness, and
redemption through Christ, and not through ourselves ; that Christ is made to
us wisdom, justification, holiness and redemption ; and not only so, but that it
is of God that we have any part in Christ ; of him are ye in Christ Jesus :
nay, further, that it is from God we receive those benefits of wisdom, holiness,
&c, through the Saviour that we are interested in.
The import of all these things, if we may trust to Scripture representations,
is, that God has contrived to exclude our glorying ; that we should be wholly
and every way dependent on God, for the moral and natural good that belongs
to salvation ; and that we have all from the hand of God, by his power and
grace. And certainly this is wholly inconsistent with the idea that our holiness
is wholly from ourselves ; and, that wTe are interested in the benefits of Christ
rather than others, is wholly of our own decision. And that such a universal
dependence is what takes away occasion of taking glory to ourselves, and is a
proper ground of an ascription of all the glory of the things belonging to man's
salvation to God, is manifest from Rom. xi. 35, 36, " Or who hath first given
unto him, and it shall be recompensed to him again 1 For of him, and to him,
and through him, are all things ; to whom be glory for ever and ever, Amen."
The words are remarkable, and very significant. If we look into all the
foregoing discourse, from the beginning of cha'pter ix.,of which this is the con-
clusion, by not giving to God, but having all this wholly from, through, and in
God, is intended that these things, these great benefits forementioned, are thus
from God, without being from or through ourselves. That some of the Jews
were distinguished from others in enjoying the privileges of Christians, was not of
themselves ; not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that
showeth mercy. It is of him who has mercy on whom he will have mercy.
It is of God, who makes of the same lump a vessel of honor and a vessel unto
dishonor. It is not of us, nor our works, but of the calling of God, or of him
4hat calleth, chap. ix. 11, and 23, 34. Not first of our own choice, but of God's
election, chap. ix. 11 — 27, and chap. xi. 5. It is all of the grace of God in
such a manner, as not to be of our works at all ; yea, and so as to be utterly
inconsistent with its being of our works ; chap. xi. 5, 6, 7. In such a manner
as not first to be of their seeking; their seeking does not determine, but God's
election ; chap. xi. 7. It is of God, and not of man, that some were grafted in,
that were wild olive branches in themselves, and were more unlikely as to any
thing in themselves to be branches, than others, verse 17. Their being grafted
in, is owing to God's distinguishing goodness, while he was pleased to use se-
verity towards others, v. 22. Yea, God has so ordered it on purpose that all
should be shut up in unbelief ; be left to be so sinful, that he might have mercy
on all ; so as more visibly to show the salvation of all to be merely dependent
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 587
on mercy. Then the apostle fitly concludes all this discourse, Rom. xi. 35, 36,
" Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again V
For of him, and to him, and through him, are all things; to whom be glory for
ever. Amen."
Again in the apostle's account, a benefit's being of our works, gives occa-
sion for boasting, and therefore God has contrived that our salvation shall not
be of our works, but of mere grace, Rom. iii. 27, Eph. ii. 9. And that neither
the salvation, nor the condition of it, shall be of our works, but that, with re-
gard to all, we are God's workmanship and his creation antecedently to our
works ; and his grace and power in producing this workmanship, and his de-
termination or purpose with regard to them, are all prior to our works, and the
cause of them. See also Rom. xi. 4, 5, 6.
And it is evident, that man's having virtue from himself, and not r^op;vinf
it from another, and making himself to differ with regard to great spirioni l»cne
fits, does give ground for boasting, by the words of the apostle in Rom. r\. 2/
And this is allowed by those men in spiritual gifts. And if so in them, morr
so in greater things ; more so in that which in itself is a thousand times more
excellent, and of ten thousand times greater importance and benefit.
By the Arminian scheme, that which is infinitely the most excellent thing,
viz., virtue and holiness, which the apostle sets forth as being infinitely the most
honorable, and will bring the subjects of it to infinitely the greatest and high-
est honor, that which is infinitely the highest dignity of man's nature of all
things that belong to man's salvation ; in comparison of which, all things be-
longing to that salvation are nothing ; that which does infinitely more than any
thing else constitute the difference between them and others, as more excellent,
more worthy, more honorable and happy ; this is from themselves. With
regard to this, they have not received of another. With regard to this great
thing, they, and they only, make themselves to differ from others ; and this dif-
ference proceeds not at all from the power or grace of God.
Again, in the apostle's account, this scheme will give occasion to have a
great benefit, that appertains to salvation, not of grace, but of works.
Virtue is not only the most honorable attainment, but it is that which men,
on the supposition of their being possessed of it, are more apt to glory in, than
in any thing else whatsoever. For what are men so apt to glory in as their
own supposed excellency, as in their supposed virtue ? And what sort of glory-
ing is that, which, it is evident in fact, the Scriptures do chiefly guard against ?
It is glorying in their own righteousness, their own holiness, their own good
works.
It is manifest, that in the apostle's account it is a proper consideration to pre-
vent our boasting, that our distinction from others, is not of ourselves, not only
in being distinguished in having better gifts and better principles, but in our
being made partakers of the great privileges of Christians, such as being en-
grafted into Christ, and partaking of the fatness of that olive tree. Rom. xi.
17, 18, " And if some of the branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild
olive tree, wert grafted in among them, and with them partakest of the root
and fatness of the olive tree, boast not against the branches."
Here it is manifest, it is the distinction that was made between some and
others, that is the thing insisted on ; and the apostle, verse 22, calls upon
them to consider this great distinction, and to ascribe it to the distinguishing
goodness of God only. " Behold therefore the goodness and severity of God ;
on them which fell, severity ; but toward thee, goodness." And its being
owing not to them, but to God and his distinguishing goodness, is the thing the
588 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
apostle urges as a reason why they Should not boast, but magnify God's grace
or distinguishing goodness. And if it be a good reason, and the scheme of our
salvation be every way so contrived (as the apostle elsewhere signifies) that all
occasion of boasting should be precluded, and all reasons given to ascribe all to
God's grace ; then it is doubtless so ordered, that the greatest privileges, excel-
lency, honor and happiness of Christians, should be that wherein they do not
distinguish themselves, but the difference is owing to God's distinguishing good-
ness.
Stebbing strongly asserts, God is not the author of that difference that is
between some and others, that some are good and others bad.
§ 81. The Arminians differ among themselves. Dr. Whitby supposes what
God does, is only proposing moral motives ; but that in attending, adverting
and considering, we exercise our liberty. But Stebbing supposes, that the
attention and consideration is itself the thing owing to the Spirit of God ; p.
217.
§82. Stebbing changes the question, pages 223, 224. He was considering
who has the chief glory of our conversion, or of our virtue ; and there, answer-
ing objections, endeavors to prove the affirmative of another question, viz.,
whether God is the author of that pardon and salvation, of which conversion
and virtue are the condition.
§ 83. Stebbing supposes that one thing wherein the assistance of the Spirit
consists, is the giving of a meek, teachable, disinterested temper of mind, to
prepare men for faith in Christ, pages 217, 259; and that herein consists that
drawing of the Father, John vi. 44, viz., in giving such a temper of mind.
This he calls the preventing grace of God, that goes before conversion. He
often speaks of a part that we do, and a part that God does. And he speaks
of this as a part which God does. Therefore this, if it be the part which God
does, in distinction from the part which we do (for so he speaks of it), is wholly
done by God. And consequently, here is virtue wholly from God, and not at
all from the exercise of our own free will ; which is inconsistent with his own,
and all other Arminian principles. Stebbing speaks of these preparatory dis-
positions as virtue, p. 30, 31, 32, yea, as that wherein virtue does in a pecu-
liar manner consist, p. 31. And he there also, viz. page 259, talks inconsis-
tently with himself; for he supposes that this meek and teachable temper is
given by God, by his preventing grace ; and also supposes, that all that have
this, shall surely come to the Father. He says, page 256, " It is certainly true
of the meek, disinterested man, that as he will not reject the gospel at first ; so
he will not be prevailed on by any worldly considerations to forsake it after-
wards."
" He who is under no evil bias of mind, by which he may be prejudiced
against the truth (which is the notion of a meek and disinterested man), such a
one, I say, cannot possibly fail of being wrought upon by the preaching of the
word, which carries in it all that evidence of truth, which reason requires," &c,
and his words, page 259, are, John vi. 37, 39, " All that the Father giveth me,
shall come unto me ;" for to be given of the Father signifies the same thing
with being drawn of the Father, as has been already shown. And to be drawn
of the Father, signifies to be prepared or fitted for the reception of the gospel,
by the preventing grace of God, as has also been proved. Now, this prepared-
ness consisting, as has likewise been shown, in being endued with a meek and
disinterested temper of mind ; those who are given of the Father, will be the
same with Christ's sheep. And the sense of the place is the same with the pre*
ceding, where our Saviour says that his sheep hear his voice and follow him,
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 589
i. e., become his obedient disciples. This text, therefore, being no more than a
declaration of what will be certain, and (morally speaking) the necessary effect
of that disposition, upon the account of which men are said to be given of the
Father (to wit, that it will lead them to embrace the gospel, when once pro-
posed to them)." By these things, the preventing grace of God, the part that
God does, in distinction from the part that we do, and that which prevents or
goes before what we do, thoroughly decides and determines the case as to our
conversion, or our faith and repentance and obedience, notwithstanding all the
hand our free will is supposed to have in the case ; and which he supposes is
what determines man's conversion ; and insists upon it most strenuously and
magisterially through his whole book. Stebbing supposes the influence of the
Spirit necessary to prepare men's hearts, pages 15 — 18. He (pages 17, 18)
speaks of this as what the Spirit does, and as being his preventing grace ; and
speaks of it as always effectual ; so that all such, and only such as have it, will
believe. See also pages 28 — 30.
That these dispositions must be effectual ; see pages 46 — 48.
This teachable, humble, meek spirit, is what Stebbing speaks of everywhere
as what the Spirit of God gives antecedent to obedience. He insists upon it, that
God's assistance is necessary in order to obedience. In pages 20, 21, he plainly
asserts that it is necessary in order to our obedience, and declares that our Sa-
viour has asserted it in express terms in these words, John xv. 5, " Without me
ye can do nothing ; i. e., as he says, no good thing. Hence it follows, that this
teachable, humble, meek disposition, this good and honest heart, is not the fruit
of any good thing we do in the exercise of our free will ; but is merely the fruit
of divine operation. Here observe well what Stebbing says concerning God's
giving grace sufficient for obedience, in answer to prayer. Pages 103 — 106.
§ 84. No reason in the world can be given, why a meek, humble spirit, and
sense of the importance of Christian things, should not be as requisite in order
to acceptable prayer, as in order to acceptable hearing and believing the word.
It is as much so spoken of. A praying without a good spirit in these and other
respects, is represented as no prayer, as ineffectual, and what we have no reason
to expect will be answered.
§ 85. If that meekness, &c, depends on some antecedent, self-determined
act of theirs, and they be determined by that ; then their being Christ's, being
his sheep, and therein distinguished from others that are not his sheep, is not
properly owing to the Father's gift, but to their own gift. The Father's pleas-
ure is not the thing it is to be ascribed to at all ; for the Father does nothing in
the case decisively ; he acts not at all freely in the case, but acts on an antece-
dent, firm obligation to the persons themselves ; but their own pleasure, unde-
termined by God, is that which disposes and decides in the matter. How
impertinent would it be to insist on the gift of the Father in this case, when the
thing he speaks of is not from thence ?
§ 86. He supposes that the assistance that God gives in order to obedience
is giving this good and honest heart ; see p. 46, 47, together with p. 40, 45 ;
and therefore, this good and honest heart is not the fruit of our own obedience,
but must be the fruit of assistance that precedes our good works, as he often
calls it the preventing grace of God. And therefore, if this grace determines
the matter, and will certainly be followed with faith and obedience, then all
Arminianism, and his own scheme, comes to the ground.
§ 87. Stebbing interprets that passage, Luke xix. 16, 17, which speaks ot
our being little children, and receiving the kingdom of God as little children, of
that meekness and humility, &c, that is antecedent to conversion, which
590 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
it is apparent Christ elsewhere speaks of as consequent on conversion, as
Matth. xviii.
§ 88. It is manifest the power of God overcomes resistance, and great resist-
ance of some sort ; otherwise there would be no peculiar greatness of power, as
distinguishing it from the power of creatures, manifested in bringing men to be
willing to be virtuous ; which it is apparent there is, by Matth. xix. 26 : " But
Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible, but with
God all things are possible."
§ 89. The Arminian scheme naturally, and by necessary consequence, leads
men to take all the glory of all spiritual good (which is immensely the chief,
most important and excellent thing in the whole creation) to ourselves ; as much
as if we, with regard to those effects, were the supreme, the first cause, self-ex-
istent, and independent, and absolutely sovereign disposers. We leave the glory
of only the meaner part of creation to God, and take to ourselves all the glory
of that which is properly the life, beauty and glory of the creation, and without
which it is all worse than nothing. So that there is nothing left for the great
First and Last; no glory for either the Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, in the affair.
This is not carrying things too far, but is a consequence truly and certainly to
be. ascribed to their scheme of things.
§ 90. He may be said to be the giver of money that offers it to us, without
being the proper determiner of our acceptance of it. But if the acceptance of
an offer itself be the thing which is supposed to be given, he cannot, in any proper
sense whatsoever, be properly said to be the giver of this, who is not the deter-
miner of it. But it is the acceptance of offers, and the proper improvement of
opportunities, wherein consists virtue. He may be said to be the giver of money
or goods that does not determine the wise choice ; but if the wise and good choice
itself be said to be the thing given, it supposes that the giver determines the exist-
ing of such a wise choice. But now, this is the thing that God is represented as
the giver of, when he is spoken of as the giver of virtue, holiness, &c, for virtue
and holiness (as all our opponents in these controversies allow and maintain)
is the thing wherein a wise and good choice consists.
§ 91. It is the common way of the Arminians, in their discourses and doc-
trines, which they pretend are so much more consistent with reason and com-
mon sense, than the doctrines of the Calvinists, to give no account at all, and
make no proper answer to the inquiries made ; and they do as Mr. Locke says
of the Indian philosopher, who, when asked what the world stood upon, answered,
it stood upon an elephant ; and, when asked what the elephant stood upon, he
replied, on a broadbacked turtle, &c. None of their accounts will bear to be
traced. The first link of the chain, and the fountain of the whole stream, must
not be inquired after. If it be, it brings all to a gross absurdity and self-con-
tradiction. And yet, when they have done, they look upon others as stupid
bigots, and void of common sense, or at least going directly counter to common
sense, and worthy of contempt and indignation, because they will not agree
with them. *
§ 92. I suppose it will not be denied by any party of Christians, that the
happiness of the saints in the other world consists much in perfect holiness and
the exalted exercises of it ; that the souls of the saints shall enter upon it at once
at death ; or (if any deny that) at least at the resurrection ; that the saint is
made perfectly holy as soon as ever he enters into heaven. I suppose none will
say, that perfection is obtained by repeated acts of holiness ; but all will grant,
*hat it is wrought in the saint immediately by the power of God ; and yet that
it is virtue notwithstanding. And why are not the beginnings of holiness wrought
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 59 X
.11 the same manner ? Why should not the beginnings of a holy nature be
wrought immediately by God in a soul' that is wholly of a contrary nature, as
well as holiness be perfected in a soul that has already a prevailing holiness ?
And if it be so, why is not the beginning, thus wrought, as much virtue as the
perfection thus wrought ?
§ 95. Saving grace differs, not only in degree, but in nature and kind, from
common grace, or any thing that is ever found in natural men. This seems
evident by the following things. 1. Because conversion is a work that is done
at once, and not gradually. If saving grace differed only in degree from what
went before, then the making a man a good man would be a gradual work ; it
would be the increasing of the grace that he has, till it comes to such a degree
as to be saving, at least it would be frequently so. But that the conversion of
the heart is not a work that is thus gradually wrought, but that it is wrought at
once, appears by Christ's converting the soul being represented by his calling of
it ; Rom. viii. 28, 29, 30, " And we know that all things work together for good
to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.
For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image
of his Son ; that he might be the first born among many brethren. Moreover,
wThom he did predestinate, them he also called ; and whom he called, them he
also justified ; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." Acts ii. 37 — 39,
" Men and brethren, what shall we do ? Then Peter said unto them, Repent,
and be baptized every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission
of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is
unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the
Lord our God shall call." Heb. ix. 15, " That they which are called might re-
ceive the promise of eternal inheritance." 1 Thess v. 23, 24, " And the very
God of peace sanctify you wholly : and I pray God, your whole spirit, soul and
body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faith-
ful is he that calleth you, who also will do it." Nothing else can be meant in
these places by calling, but what Christ does in a sinner's saving conversion ; by
which it seems evident, that this is done at once, and not gradually. Hereby
Christ shows his great power. He does but speak the powerful word, and it is
done. He does but call, and the heart of the sinner immediately cometh, as was
represented by his calling his disciples, and their immediately following him. So,
when he called Peter and Andrew, James and John, they were minding other
things, and had no thought of following Christ. But at his call they immediately
followed him, Matth. iv. 18 — 22. Peter and Andrew were casting a net into the
sea. Christ says unto them, as he passed by, Follow me ; and it is said, they
straightway left their nets and followed him. So James and John were in the
ship with Zebedee their father, mending their nets : and he called them ; and
immediately they left the ship, and their father, and followed him. So when
Matthew was called ; Matth. ix. 9, " And as Jesus passed forth from thence, he
saw a man, named Matthew, sitting at the receipt of custom ; and he saith unto
him, Follow me : And he arose and followed him." The same circumstances
are observed by other evangelists. Which, doubtless, is to represent the manner
in which Christ effectually calls his disciples in all ages. There is something
immediately put into their hearts, at that call, that is new, that there was nothing
of there before, which makes them so immediately act in a manner altogether
new, and so alien from what they were before.
That the work of conversion is wrought at once, is further evident, by its be-
ing compared to a work of creation. When God created the world, he did
what he did immediately; he spake, and it was done: he commanded, and it
592 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
stood fast. He said, let there be light, and there was light. Also by its
being compared to a raising from the dead. Raising from the dead is not a
gradual work, but it is done at once. God calls, and the dead come forth
immediately. The change in conversion is in the twinkling of an eye ; as that
1 Cor. xv. 51, 52, " We shall be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an
eye, at the last trump. For the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised
incorruptible, and we shall be changed."
It appears by the manner in which Christ wrought all those works that he
wrought when on earth, that they were types of his great work of converting
sinners. Thus, when he healed the leper, he put forth his hand and touched
him, and said, " I will, be thou clean ; and immediately his leprosy was cleansed."
Matth. viii. 3. Mark i. 42. Luke v. 13. So, in the opening the eyes of the
blind men, Matth. xx. 30, &c, he touched their eyes, and immediately their
eyes receive^ sight, and they followed him. And so Mark x. 52. Luke xviii.
43. So, when he healed the sick, particularly Simon's wife's mother, he took
her by her hand, and lifted her up ; and immediately the fever left her, and she
ministered unto him. So when the woman that had the issue of blood, touched
the hem of Christ's garment, immediately her issue of blood stanched ; Luke
viii. 44. So the woman that was bowed together with the spirit of infirmity,
when Christ laid his hands on her, immediately she was made straight, and glo-
rified God ; Luke xiii. 12, 13. So the man at the pool of Bethesda, when
Christ bade him rise and take up his bed and walk, was immediately made
whole ; John v. 8, 9. After the same manner Christ raised the dead, and cast
out devils, and stilled the winds and seas.
2. There seems to be a specific difference between saving grace or virtue
and all that was in the heart before, by the things that conversion is represented
by in Scripture: particularly by its being represented as a work of creation.
When God creates, he does not merely establish and perfect the things that were
made before, but makes them wholly and immediately. The things that are
seen, are not made of things that do appear. Saving grace in the heart is said
to be the new man, a new creature ; and corruption the old man. If that virtue
that is in the heart of a holy man, be not different in its nature and kind,
then the man might possibly have had the same seventy years before, and from
time to time, from the beginning of his life, and has it no otherwise now, but
only in a greater degree : and how then is he a new creature ?
Again, it is evident also from its being compared to a resurrection. Natural
men are said to be dead : but when they are converted, they are by God's
mighty and effectual power raised from the dead. Now, there is no medium
between being dead and alive. He that is dead, has no degree of life. He
that has the least degree of life in him, is alive. When a man is raised from
the dead, life is not only in a greater degree, but it is all new. And this is fur-
ther evident by that representation that is made of Christ's converting sinners,
in John v. 25 : " Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour is coming, and now is,
when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God ; and they that hear shall
live." This shows conversion to be an immediate and instantaneous work, like
to the change made in Lazarus when Christ called him from the grave i there
went life with the call, and Lazarus was immediately alive. That immediately
before the call they are dead, and therefore wholly destitute of any life, is evi
dent by that expression, " the dead shall hear the voice ;" and immediately after
the call, they are alive ; yea, there goes life with the voice, as is evident not
only because it is said they shall live, but also because it is said, they shall hear
his voice. It is evident, that the first moment they have any life, is the moment
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 593
when Christ calls ; and when Christ calls, or as soon as they are called, they
are converted ; as is evident from what is said in the first argument, wherein
it is shown, that to be called, and converted, is the same thing.
3. Those that go farthest in religion, that are in a natural condition,
have no charity, as is plainly implied in the beginning of the 13th chapter of
the first of Corinthians ; by which we must understand, that they have none of
that kind of grace, or disposition or affection, that is so called. So Christ else-
where reproves the Pharisees, those high pretenders to religion among the Jews,
that they had not the love of God in them.
4. In conversion, stones are raised up to be children unto Abraham. While
stones, they are wholly destitute of all those qualities that afterward render
them the living children of Abraham ; and not possessing them, though in a
less degree.
Agreeably to this, conversion is represented by the taking away the heart
of stone, and giving a heart of flesh. The man, while unconverted, has a
heart of stone, which has no degree of that life or sense in it that the heart of
flesh has ; because it yet remains a stone ; than which, nothing is farther from
life and sense.
5. A wicked man has none of that principle of nature that a godly man has, as
is evident by 1 John iii. 9, " Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin ;
for his seed remaineth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of
God."
The natural import of the metaphor shows, that by a seed is meant a prin-
ciple of action : it may be small as a grain of mustard seed. A seed is a small
thing ; it may be buried up and lie hid, as the seed sown in the earth ; it may
seem to be dead, as seeds for a while do, till quickened by the sun and rain.
But any degree of such a principle, or a principle of such a nature, is what is
called the seed ; it need not be to such a degree, or have such a prevalency, in
order to be called a seed. And it is further evident that this seed, or this in-
ward principle of nature, is peculiar to the saints ; for he that has that seed,
cannot sin ; and therefore he that sins, or is a wicked man, has it not.
6. Natural men, or those that are not savingly converted, have no degree
of that principle from whence all gracious actings flow, viz., the Spirit of God
or of Christ ; as is evident, because it is asserted both ways in Scripture, that
those who have not the Spirit of Christ, are not his, Rom. viii. 9, and also that
those who have the Spirit of Christ, are his ; 1 John iii. 24, " Hereby we
know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us." And the
Spirit of God is called the earnest of the future inheritance, 1 Cor. i. 22, and
v. 5, Eph. i. 14. Yea, that a natural man has nothing of the Spirit in him,
no part nor portion in it, is still more evident, because the having of the Spirit
is given as a sure sign of being in Christ. 1 John iv. 13, " Hereby know we
that we dwell in him, because he hath given us of his Spirit." By which it is
evident, that they have none of that holy principle that the godly have. And
if they have nothing of the Spirit, they have nothing of those things that are
the fruits of the Spirit, such as those mentioned in Gal. v. 22, " But the fruit of
the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meek-
ness, temperance." These fruits are here mentioned with the very design, that
we may know whether we have the Spirit or no. In the 18th verse, the apostle
tells the Galatians, that if they are led by the Spirit, they are not under the law ;
and then directly proceeds, first, to mention what are the fruits or wo~ks of the
flesh, and then, nextly, what are the fruits of the Spirit, that we may judge
whether we are led by the Spirit or no.
Vol. n. 75
594 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
7. That natural men, or those that are not born again, have nothing of that
grace that is in godly men, is evident by John iii. 6, where Christ, speaking of
regeneration, says, " That which is born of the flesh, is flesh ; and that which
is born of the Spirit, is spirit." By flesh is here meant nature, and by spirit is
meant grace, as is evident by Gal. v. 16, 17. Gal. vi. 8. 1 Cor. iii. 1. Rom.
viii. 7. That is Christ's very argument ; by this it is that Christ in those words
would show Nicodemus the necessity of regeneration, that by the first birth we
have nothing but nature, and can have nothing else without being born again j
by which it is exceeding evident, that they that are not born again, have no-
thing else. And that natural men have not the Spirit is evident, since by this
text with the context it is most evident that those who have the Spirit, have it by
regeneration. It is born in them ; it comes into them no otherwise than by
birth, and that birth is in regeneration, as is most evident by the preceding and
following verses. In godly men there are two opposite principles : the flesh
lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh ; as Gal. v. 25. But
it is not so with natural men. Rebekah, in having Esau and Jacob struggle
together in her womb, was a type only of the true Church.
8. Natural men have nothing of that nature in them which true Christians
have; and that appears, because the nature they have is divine nature. The
saints alone have it. Not only they alone partake of such degrees of it, but they
alone are partakers of it. To be a partaker of the divine nature is mentioned
as peculiar to the saints, in 2 Pet. i. 4. It is evident it is the true saints the
apostle is there speaking of. The words in this verse and the foregoing, run thus :
1 According as his divine power hath given us all things that pertain unto life
and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and
virtue; whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises,
that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature ; having escaped the
corruption that is in the world through lust." Divine nature and lust are evi-
dently here spoken of as two opposite principles in men. Those that are of the
world, or that are the men of the world, have only the latter principle. But to
be partakers of the divine nature, is spoken of as peculiar to them that are dis-
tinguished and separated from the world, by the free and sovereign grace of
God giving them all things that pertain to life and godliness ; by giving the
knowledge of Christ, and calling them to glory and virtue ; and giving them the
exceeding great and precious promises of the gospel, and enabling them to
escape the corruption of the world of wicked men. It is spoken of, not only as
peculiar to the saints, but as the highest privilege of saints.
9. A natural man has no degree of that relish and sense of spiritual things,
or things of the Spirit, and of their divine truth and excellency, which a godly
man has ; as is evident by 1 Cor. ii. 14, " The natural man receiveth not the
things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he
know them, because they are spiritually discerned." Here a natural man is
represented, as perfectly destitute of any sense, perception, or discerning of those
things. For by the words, he neither does, nor can know them or discern
them. So far from it, that they are foolishness unto him. He is such
a stranger to them, that he knows not what the talk of such things
means ; they are words without a meaning to him ; he knows nothing of
the matter, any more than a blind man of colors. Hence it will follow, that
the sense of things of religion that a natural man has, is not only not to the same
degree, but is not of the same nature with what a godly man has. Besides,
if a natural person has that fruit of the Spirit, which is of the same kind with
what a spiritual person has, then he experiences within himself the things of
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 595
the Spirit of God. How then can he be said to be such a stranger to them, and
have no perception or discerning of them ? The reason why natural men have
no knowledge of spiritual things, is, that they have nothing of the Spirit of God
dwelling in them. This is evident by the context. For there we are told it is
•by the Spirit these things are taught, verses 10 — 12. Godly persons, in the text
we are upon, are called spiritual, evidently on this account, that they have the
Spirit ; and unregenerate men are called natural men, because they have nothing
but nature. Hereby the 6th argument is continued. For natural men are in
no degree spiritual ; they have only nature, and no Spirit. If they had any thing
of the Spirit, though not in so great a degree as the godly, yet they would be
taught spiritual things, or the things of the Spirit in proportion ; the Spirit, that
searcheth all things, would teach them in some measure. There would not be
so great a difference, that the one could perceive nothing of them, and that they
should be foolishness to them, while, to the other, they appear divinely and un-
speakably wise and excellent, as they are spoken of in the context, verses 6 — 9,
and as such, the apostle speaks here of discerning them. The reason why natu-
ral men have no knowledge or perception of spiritual things, is, that they have
none of that anointing spoken of, 1 John ii. 27, " But the anointing, which ye
have received of him, abideth in you, and ye need not that any man should teach
you ; but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no
lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him."
This anointing is evidently here spoken of, as a thing peculiar to true saints.
Sinners never had any of that oil poured upon them ; and because ungodly men
have none of it, therefore they have no discerning of spiritual things. If they
had any degree of it, they would discern in some measure. Therefore, none of
that sense that natural men have of spiritual things, is of the same nature with
what the godly have. And that natural men are wholly destitute of this know-
ledge, is further evident, because conversion is represented in Scripture by open-
ing the eyes of the blind. But this Would be very improperly represented, if a
man might have some sight, though not so clear and full, time after time, for
scores of years before his conversion.
10. The grace of God's Spirit is not only a precious oil with which Christ
anoints the believer by giving it to him, but the believer anoints Christ with it,
by exercising it towards him ; which seems to be represented by the precious
ointment Mary poured on Christ's head. Herein it seems to me, that Mary is a
type of Christ's church, and of every believing soul . And if so, doubtless the
thing in which she typifies the church, has in it something peculiar to the
church. There would not be a type ordered on purpose to represent the church,
that shall represent only something that is common to the church and others.
Therefore unbelievers pour none of that sweet and precious ointment on Christ.
11. That unbelievers have no degree of that grace that the saints have, is
evident, because they have no communion with Christ. If unbelievers partook
of any of that Spirit, those holy inclinations, affections and actings that the godly
have from the Spirit of Christ, then they would have communion with Christ.
The communion of saints with Christ, does certainly consist in receiving of his
fulness, and partaking of his grace, which is spoken of, John i. 16 : " Of his ful-
ness have we all received, and grace for grace." And the partaking of that
Spirit which God gives not by measure unto him, the partaking of Christ's holi-
ness and grace, his nature, inclinations, tendencies, affections, love, desires, must
be a part of communion with him. Yea, a believer's communion with God
and Christ, does mainly consist in partaking of the Holy Spirit, as is evident by
2 Cor. xiii. 14. But that unbelievers have no communion or fellowship with
596 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
Christ, appears, 1st. Because they are not united to Christ, they are not in
Christ. Those that are not in Christ, or are not united to him, can have no de-
gree of communion with him ; for union with Christ, or a being in Christ, is
the foundation of all communion with him. The union of the members with
the head, is the foundation of all their communion or partaking with the head ;
and so the union of the branch with the vine, is the foundation of all the com-
munion it has with the vine, of partaking of any degree of its sap or life, or in-
fluence. So the union of the wife to the husband, is the foundation of her com-
munion in his goods. But no natural man is united to Christ ; because all that
are in Christ shall be saved ; 1 Cor. xv. 22, " As in Adam all die, so in Christ
shall all be made alive ;" i. e. all that are in Christ ; for this speaks only of the
glorious resurrection and eternal life. Phil. iii. 8, 9, " Yea, doubtless, I count
all things but loss, for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord ;
for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung,
that I may win Christ, and be found in him, not having on my own righteous-
ness," &c. 2 Cor. v. 17, " Now, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature ;
old things are passed away ; behold, all things are become new." 1 John ii.
5, " Hereby know we that we are in him." Chap. iii. 24, " And he that keep-
eth his commandments, dwelleth in him, and he in him, and hereby we know
that he abideth in us," &c, and iv. 13, " Hereby know we that we dwell in
him, and he in us."
2d. The Scripture does more directly teach, that it is only true saints
th at have communion with Christ ; as, particularly, this is most evidently spo-
ken of as what belongs to the saints, and to them only, in 1 John i. 3 — 7 :
" That which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you, that ye also may
have fellowship with us ; and truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with
his Son Jesus Christ. If we say we have fellowship with him, and walk in
darkness, wTe lie, and do not the truth. But if we walk in light, as he is in the
light, we have fellowship one with another ; and the blood of Jesus Christ,
his Son, cleanseth us from all sin." And 1 Cor. i. 8, 9, " Who shall also con-
firm you unto the end, that ye may be blameless in the day of our Lord Jesus
Christ. God h faithful, by whom ye were called unto the fellowship of his Son,
Jesus Christ our Lord." By this it appears that those who have fellowship
with Christ, are those that cannot fall away, whom God's faithfulness is bound
to confirm to the end, that they may be blameless in the day of Jesus Christ.
§ 94. Ezekiel's vision of the dry bones is a confirmation, that however na-
tural men may be the subjects of great and wonderful influences and operations
of God's great power and Spirit ; yet they do not properly partake at all of the
Spirit before conversion. In all that is wrought in them, in every respect fit-
ting and preparing them for grace, so that nothing shall be wanting but divine
life ; yet as long as they are without this, they have nothing of the Spirit.
Which confirms the distinctions I have elsewhere made, of the Spirit of God
influencing the minds of natural men under common illuminations and convic-
tions, and yet not communicating himself in his own proper nature to them, be-
fore conversion ; and that saving grace differs from common grace, not only in
degree, but also in nature and kind. It is said, Rev. iii. 8, of the church at
Philadelphia, which is commended above all other churches, Thou hast a little
str ngth — certainly implying, that ungodly men have none at all.
§ 95. That there is no good work before conversion and actual union witl
Christ, is manifest from that, Rom., vii. 4, " Wherefore, my brethren, ye also
are become dead to the law, by the body of Christ, that ye should be married
unto another, even to him who is raised from the dead ; that we should bring
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 597
forth fruit unto God." Hence we may argue, that there is no lawful child
brought forth before that marriage. Seeming virtues and good works before,
are not so indeed. They are a spurious brood, being bastards, and not children.
§ 96. That those that prove apostates, never have the same kind of faith
with true saints, is confirmed by what Christ said of Judas, before his apostasy,
John vi. 64 : " But there are some of you, who believe not. For Jesus knew
from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray
him." By this it is evident, that Judas, who afterwards proved an apostate
(and is doubtless set forth as an example for all apostates), though he had a
kind of faith in Christ, yet did not believe in Christ with a true faith, and was at
that time, before his apostasy, destitute of that kind of faith which the true dis-
ciples had ; and that he had all along, even from the beginning, been destitute
of that faith. And by the 70th and 71st verses of the same chapter, it is evident
that he was not only destitute of that degree of goodness that the rest had, but
totally destitute of Christian piety, and wholly under the dominion of wicked-
ness ; being in this respect like a devil, notwithstanding all the faith and tem-
porary regard to Christ that he had. " Jesus answered them, Have I not cho-
sen you twelve, and one of you is a devil ? He spake of Judas Iscariot, the son
of Simon. For he it was that should betray him, being one of the twelve "
OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING FAITH.
OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING FAITH.
§ 1. Faith is a belief of a testimony ; 2 Thess. i. 10, " When he shall come,
to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe (because
our testimony among you was believed) in that day." It is an assent to truth,
as appears by the 1 lth of Hebrews ; and it is saving faith that is there spoken
of, as appears by the last verses of the foregoing chapter : " And these all,
having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise : God
having provided some better thing for us, that they, without us, should not be
made perfect." Mark i. 15," Saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdqm of
God is at hand : repent ye, and believe the gospel." John xx. 31, " But these
are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and
that, believing, ye might have life through his name." 2 Thess. ii. 13, " But
we are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren, beloved of the
Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through
sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth."
§ 2. It is the proper act of the soul towards God as faithful. Rom. iii. 3, 4,
" For what if some did not believe ? Shall their unbelief make the faith of
God without effect ? God forbid : yea, let God be true, but every man a liar ;
as it is written, that thou mightest be justified in thy sayings, and mightest over-
come when thou art judged."
§ 3. It is a belief of truth from a sense of glory and excellency, or at least
with such a sense. John xx. 29, " Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou
hast seen me, thou hast believed : blessed are they that have not seen, and yet
have believed." Matth. ix. 21, " She said within herself, If I may but touch
his garment, I shall be whole." 1 Cor. xii. 3, " Wherefore I give you to un-
derstand, that no man, speaking by the Spirit of God, calleth Jesus accursed ;
and that no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost."
§ 4. It is a belief of the truth, from a spiritual taste and relish of what is
excellent and divine. Luke xii. 57, " Yea, and why, even of yourselves, judge
ye not what is right V Believers receive the truth in the love of it, and speak
the truth in love. Eph. iv. 15, * But speaking the truth in love, may grow up
into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ."
§ 5. The object of faith is the gospel, as well as Jesus Christ. Mark i. 15,
" And saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand : repent
ye, and believe the gospel." John xvii. 8, " For I have given unto them the
words which thou gavest me ; and they received them, and have known surely
that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou didst send me."
Rom. x. 16, 17, " But they have not obeyed the gospel. For Esaias saith,
Lord, who hath believed our report ? — So then, faith cometh by hearing, and
nearing by the word of God."
Vol. II. 76
602 CONCERNING FAITH.
§ 6. Faith includes a knowledge of God and Christ. 2 Pet. i. 2, 3, " Grace
and peace be multiplied unto you through the knowledge of God, and of Jesus
our Lord ; according as his divine power hath given unto us all things that
pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called
us to glory and virtue." John xvii. 3, " And this is life eternal, that they
might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."
§ 7. A belief of promises is faith, or a great part of faith. Heb. xi., " Now
faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen," &c.
2 Chron. xx. 20, " And they rose early in the morning, and went forth into the
wilderness of Tekoa ; and as they went forth, Jehoshaphat stood and said, Hear
me, 0 Judah, and ye inhabitants of Jerusalem ; believe in the Lord your God,
so shall ye be established ; believe his prophets, so shall ye prosper." A de-
pending on promises is an act of faith. Gal. v. 5, " For we through the Spirit
wait for the hope of righteousness by faith."
§ 8. Faith is a receiving of Christ. John i. 12, " But as many as received
him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that be-
lieve on his name."
§ 9. It is receiving Christ into the heart. Rom. x. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, " But the
righteousness which is of faith, speaketh on this wise, Say not in thy heart, Who
shall ascend into heaven ? (that is, to bring Christ down from above ;) or,
Who shall descend into the deep 1 (that is, to bring up Christ from the dead.)
But what saith it ? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart
(that is, the word of faith, which we preach) : that if thou shalt confess with thy
mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart, that God hath raised
him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto
righteousness ; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."
§ 10. A true faith includes more than a mere* belief; it is accepting the
gospel, and includes all acceptation. 1 Tim. i. 14, 15, " And the grace of our
Lord was exceeding abundant with faith and love which is in Christ Jesus.
This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came
into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief." 2 Cor. xi. 4, " For if he
that cometh preacheth another Jesus, whom we have not preached ; or if you
receive another Spirit, which ye have not received ; or another gospel, which
ye have not accepted, ye might well bear with him."
§11. It is something more than merely the assent of the understanding,
because it is called an obeying the gospel. Rom. x. 16, " But they have not
all obeyed the gospel. For Esaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report ?"
1 Pet. iv. 17, " For the time is come that judgment must begin at the house of
God : and if it first begin at us, what shall the end be of them that obey not the
gospel of God V9
It is obeying the doctrine from the heart : Rom. vi. 17, 18, " But God be
thanked, that ye were the servants of sin ; but ye have obeyed from the heart
that form of doctrine which was delivered you. Being then made free from sin,
ye became the servants of righteousness," &c.
§ 12. This expression of obeying the gospel, seems to denote the heart's
yielding to the gospel in what it proposes to us in its calls : it is something more
than merely what may be called a believing the truth of the gospel. John xii.
42, " Nevertheless, among the chief rulers also, many believed on him ; but,
because of the Pharisees, they did not confess him, lest they should be put out
of the synagogue." And Philip asked the eunuch, whether he believed with
all his heart 1 — It is a fully believing, or a being fully persuaded : this passage
evidences that it is so much at least.
, CONCERNING FAITH. 603
§ 13. There are different sorts of faith that are not true and saving, as is
evident by what the Apostle James says : " Show me thy faith without thy
works, and I will show thee my faith by my works." Where it is supposed
that there may be a faith without works, which is not the right faith : when he
says, " I will show thee my faith by my %orks," nothing else can be meant,
than that I will show thee that my faith is right.
§ 14. It is a trusting in Christ. Psal. ii. 12, " Kiss the Son, lest he be
angry, and ye perish from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little :
blessed are all they that put their trust in him. I Eph. i. 12, 13, " That we
should be to the praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ : in whom ye
also trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation ;
in whom also, after that ye believed, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of
promise." 2 Tim. i. 12, " For the which cause I also suffer these things : never-
theless I am not ashamed ; for I know whom I have believed, and am persuad-
ed that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that
day."
Many places in the Old Testament speak of trusting in God as the condition
of his favor and salvation ; especially Psal. lxxviii. 21, 22, " Therefore the Lord
heard this, and was wroth : so a fire was kindled against Jacob, and anger also
came up against Israel ; because they believed not in God, and trusted not in
his salvation." It implies submission : Rom. xv. 12, " And again, Esaias saith,
There shall be a root of Jesse ; and he that shall rise to reign over the Gentiles,
in him shall the Gentiles trust." 1 Tim. iv. 10, " For therefore we both labor
and suffer reproach, because we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of
all men, especially of those that believe." 2 Tim. i. 12, " For which cause 1
also suffer these things ; nevertheless I am not ashamed ; for I know whom I
have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have com-
mitted unto him against that day." Matth. viii. 26, " Why are ye fearful, O
ye of little faith ?" Matth. xvi. 8, " Which Jesus, when he perceived, he said
unto them, 0 ye of little faith, why reason ye among yourselves, because ye
have brought no bread ?" 1 John v. 13, 14, " These things have I written
unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God ; that ye may know that
ye have eternal life ; and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God.
And this is the confidence that we have in him, that if we ask any thing accord-
ing to his will, he heareth us." Believing in Christ in one verse, is called con-
fidence in the next
§ 15. It is a committing ourselves to Christ : 2 Tim. i. 12, " For the which
cause I also suffer these things : nevertheless I am not ashamed ; for I know
whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I
have committed unto him against that day." This is a Scripture sense of the
word believe, as is evident by John ii. 24, " Jesus did not commit himself to
them." In the original it is ovx migtevev eavrov avtoig.
§ 16. It is a gladly receiving the gospel : Acts ii. 41, " Then they that
gladly received his word, were baptized ; and the same day there were added
unto them about three thousand souls." It is approving the gospel : Luke vii.
30, 35, " But the Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God against
themselves, being not baptized of him. But wisdom is justified of all her chil-
dren." It is obeying the doctrine : Rom. vi. 17, " But God be thanked, that
ye were the servants of sin ; but ye have obeyed from the heart, that form of
doctrine which was delivered you." It is what may be well understood by those
expressions of coming to Christ, of looking to him, of opening the door to let
him in. This is very evident by Scripture. It is a coming and taking the waters
604 CONCERNING FAITH.
of life, eating and drinking Christ's flesh and blood, hearing Christ's voice, and
following him. John x. 26, 27, " But ye believe not : because ye are not of
my sheep, as I said unto you. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them,
and they follow me." John viii. 12, " Then spake Jesus again unto them,
saying, I am the light of the world ; he that followeth me, shall not walk in
darkness, but shall have the light of life." Isaiah xiv. 22, " Look unto me,
and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth : for I am God, and there is none
else."
§ 17. Faith consists in two things, viz., in being persuaded of, and in em-
bracing the promises : Heb. xi. 13, " These all died in faith, not having received
the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them,
and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims
on the earth." 1 Cor. xiii. 7," Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things."
If that faith, hope and charity, spoken of in this verse, be the same with those
that are compared together in the last verse, then faith arises from a charitable
disposition of heart, or from a principle of divine love. John v. 42, " But I
know you, that ye have not the love of God in you," with the context. Deut.
xiii. 3, " Thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer
of dreams : for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the
Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul." 1 John v. 1,
" Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God : and every one
that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him."
§ 18. It is a being reconciled unto God, revealing himself by Christ in the
gospel, or our minds being reconciled. 2 Cor. v. 18, 19, 20, 21," And all
things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath
given to us the ministry of reconciliation ; to wit, that God was in Christ, recon-
ciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them ; and
hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. Now then we are ambas-
sadors for Christ ; as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ's
stead be ye reconciled to God. For he hath made him to be sin for us who
knew no sin ; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." Col.
i. 21, " And you that were sometimes alienated, and enemies in your mind by
wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled." It is the according of the whole
soul, and not merely of the understanding. Matth. xi. 6, " Blessed is he who-
soever shall not be offended in me."
§ 19. There is contained in the nature of faith a sense of our own unworthi-
ness. Matth. xv. 27, 28, " Truth, Lord, yet the dogs eat of the crumbs which
fall from their master's table. Then Jesus answered and said unto her, O wo-
man, great is thy faith." See concerning the centurion, Luke vii. 6 — 9 ; this
woman which was a sinner, ib. v. 37, 38, and especially 50 ; the prodigal son,
Luke xv., the penitent thief, Luke xxiii. 41. Consult also Hab. ii. 4, " Behold,
his soul which is lifted up, is not upright in him ; but the just shall live by his
faith. Prov. xxviii. 25 ; Psal. xi. 4, and Psal. cxxxi.
§ 20. It is a being drawn to Christ. None can come unto Christ, but whom
the Father draws. The freeness of the covenant of grace is represented thus,
that the condition of finding is only seeking ; and the condition of receiving,
asking ; and the condition of having the door opened, is knocking. From whence
I infer, that faith is a hearty applying unto God by Christ for salvation, or the
heart's seeking it of God through him. See also John iv. 10, " If thou knew-
est the gift of God, and who it is that saith unto thee, Give me to drink, thou
wouldst have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water." And
Luke xxiii, 42 ; it is calling on Christ ; if is the opposite unto disallowing and
CONCERNING FAITH. 605
rejecting Christ Jesus. John xii. 46, 47, 48, " I am come a light into the
world, that whosoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness. And if
any man hear my words, and believe not, I judge him not ; for I came not to
judge the world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not
my words, hath one that judgeth him ; the word that I have spoken, the same
shall judge him in the last day." 1 Pet. ii. 7, " Unto you therefore which be-
lieve, he is precious ; but unto them which be disobedient, the stone which the
builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner."
§ 21. Love either is what faith arises from, or is included in faith, by John
iii. 18, 19, " He that believeth not, is condemned already ; and this is their con-
demnation, that men loved darkness rather than light." 2 Thess. ii. 10, 12,
" And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish ; because
they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. That they
all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unright-
eousness."
§ 22. The being athirst for the waters of life is faith, Rev. xxi. 6. It is a
true cordial seeking of salvation by Christ. Believing in Christ is heartily join-
ing ourselves to Christ and his party, as is said of the followers of Theudas,
Acts v. 36. And we are justified freely through faith, i. e., we are saved by
Christ only on joining ourselves to him. It is a being persuaded to join our-
selves to him, and to be of his party. John viii. 12, " Then spake Jesus again
unto them, saying, I am the light of the world : he that followeth me, shall
not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life." To believe in Christ, is
to hearken to him as a prophet ; to yield ourselves subjects to him as a king ;
and to depend upon him as a priest. Desiring Christ, is an act of faith in Christ,
because he is called the desire of all nations, Hagg. ii. 7 ; that is, he that is to
be the desire of all nations, when all nations shall believe in him and subject
themselves to him, according to the frequent promises and prophecies of God's
word ; though there are other things included in the sense, yet this seems to be
principally intended. There belongs to faith a sense of the ability and sufficiency
of Christ to save, and of his fitness for the work of salvation ; Matth. ix. 2, and
28, 29, and 21. Rom. iv. 21, " And being" fully persuaded, that what he had
promised, he is able to perform." Of his fidelity: Matth. xiv. 30, 31, " But
when he saw the wind boisterous, he was afraid : and beginning to sink, he cried,
saying, Lord, save me. -And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand, and
caught him, and said unto him, 0 thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt ?"
Of his readiness to save, Matth. xv. 22, &c. 2 Tim. i. 5, 12, " Now the end of
the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of
faith unfeigned : and I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that
he counted me faithful, putting me, into the ministry." Of his ability : Matth.
viii. 2, " And behold, there came a leper, and worshipped him, saying, Lord if
thou wilt, thou canst make me clean." Matth. viii. 26, " The centurion an-
swered and said, Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst come under my roof:
but speak the word only, and my servant shall be healed.
§ 23. It is submitting to the righteousness of God. Rom. x. 3, " For they,
being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own
righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God."
It is what may be well represented by flying for refuge, by the type of flying to
the city of refuge. Heb. vi. 18, " That by two immutable things, in which it
was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation, who have
fled for refuge, to lay hold upon the hope set before us." It is a sense of the
sufficiency and the reality of Christ's righteousness, and of his power and grace
606 CONCERNING FAITa
to save. John xvi. 8, " He shall convince the world of sin, of righteousness
and of judgment." It is a receiving the truth with a love to it. It is receiving
the love of the truth. 2 Thess. ii. 10, 12, " And with all deceivableness of un-
righteousness in them that perish ; because they received not the love of the
truth, that they might be saved. That they all might be damned who believed
not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." The heart must close with
the new covenant by dependence upon it, and by love and desire. 2 Sam.
xxiii. 5, " Although my house be not so with God, yet he hath made with me
an everlasting covenant, ordered in all things, and sure. This is all my salva-
tion and all my desire, although he make it not to grow."
§ 24. Upon the whole, the best and clearest, and most perfect definition of
justifying faith, and most according to the Scripture, that I can think of, is this,
faith is the soul's entirely embracing the revelation of Jesus Christ as our Sa-
viour. The word embrace is a metaphorical expression ; but I think it much
clearer than any proper expression whatsoever : it is called believing ; because
believing is the first act of the soul in embracing a narration or revelation ; and
embracing, when conversant about a revelation or thing declared, is more prop-
erly called believing, than loving or choosing. If it were conversant about a
person only, it would be more properly called loving. If it were only conver-
sant about a gift, an inheritance or reward, it would more properly be called
receiving or accepting, &c.
The definition might have been expressed in these words, faith is the soul's
entirely adhering and acquiescing in the revelation of Jesus Christ as our Sa-
viour.— Or thus, faith is the soul's embracing that truth of God, that reveals
Jesus Christ as our Saviour. — Or thus, faith is the soul's entirely acquiescing in,
and depending upon the truth of God, revealing Christ as our Saviour.
It is the whole soul according and assenting to the truth, and embracing of
it. There is an entire yielding of the mind and heart to the revelation, and a
closing with it, and adhering to it, with the belief, and with the inclination and
affection. It is admitting and receiving it with entire credit and respect. The
soul receives it as true, as worthy and excellent. It may be more perfectly
described than defined by a short definition, by reason of the penury of words ;
a great many words express it better than one or two. I here use the same
metaphorical expressions ; but it is because they are much clearer, than any
proper expressions that I know of.
It is the soul's entirely acquiescing in this revelation, from a sense of the suf-
ficiency, dignity, glory and excellency of the author of the revelation.
Faith is the whole soul's active agreeing, according and symphonizing with
this truth ; all opposition in judgment and inclination, so far as he believes,
being taken away. It is called believing, because fully believing this revelation,
is the first and principal exercise and manifestation of this accordance and agree-
ment of soul.
§ 25. The adhering to the truth, and acquiescing in it with the judgment, is
from a sense of the glory of the revealer, and the sufficiency and excellency of
the performer of the facts. The adhering to it, and acquiescing in it with the
inclination and affection, is from the goodness and excellency of the thing re»
vealed, and of the performer. If a person be pursued by an enemy, and com-
mit himself to a king or a captain, to defend him, it implies his quitting other
endeavors, and applying to him for defence, and putting himself under him, and
hoping that he will defend him. If we consider it as a mere act of the mind, a
transaction between spiritual beings, considered as abstracted from any exter-
nal action, then it is the mind's quitting all other endeavors, and seeking and
CONCERNING FAITH. 607
applying itself to the Saviour for salvation, fully choosing salvation by him, and
delivering itself to him, or a being willing to be his, with a hope that he will
save him. Therefore, for a person to commit himself to Christ as a Saviour, is
quitting all other endeavors and hopes, and heartily applying himself to Christ
for salvation, fully choosing salvation by him, and acquiescing in his way of
salvation, and a hearty consent of the soul to be his entirely, hoping in his suffi-
ciency and willingness to save.
§ 26. The first act cannot be hoping in a promise, that is, as belonging to
the essence of the act. For there must be the essence of the act performed, be-
fore any promise belongs to the subject. But the essence of the act, as it is ex-
ercised in justifying faith, is a quitting other hopes, and applying to him for
salvation, choosing, and with the inclination closing with salvation by him in
his way, with a sense of his absolute, glorious sufficiency and mercy. Hope in
the promises may immediately follow in a moment ; but it is impossible that there
be a foundation for it, before the essence of faith be performed ; though it is
the same disposition that leads the soul to lay hold on the promise afterwards.
It is impossible that a man should be encouraged by a conditional promise, to
trust in Christ, if you mean by trusting in Christ, a depending upon his promises
to the person trusting ; for that is to suppose a dependence upon the promise ante-
cedent to the first dependence upon it ; and that the first time a man depends upon
the promise, he is encouraged to do it by a dependence upon the promise. The
conditional promise is this, that if you will trust in Christ, you shall be saved : and
you suppose the essence of this trust is depending upon this promise ; and yet
that the soul is encouraged to trust in Christ by a dependence thereupon ; which
is to say, that the first time the soul depends upon Christ's promises, it is encour-
aged to do it by a dependence on his promises.
§ 27. Faith is the soul's entirely adhering to, and acquiescing in the revela-
tion of Jesus Christ as our Saviour, from a sense of the excellent dignity and
sufficiency of the revealer of the doctrine, and of the Saviour. God is the reveal er,
and Christ is also the revealer. Christ's excellency and sufficiency include the
excellency of his person, and the excellency of the salvation he has revealed,
and his adequateness to the performance, &c, — and the excellency of his man-
ner of salvation, &c. From the excellency and sufficiency of the revealer and
performer, we believe what is said is true, fully believe it ; and from the glorious
excellency of the Saviour and his salvation, all our inclination closes with the
revelation. To depend upon the word of another person, imports two things :
First, to be sensible how greatly it concerns us, and how much our interest and
happiness really depend upon the truth of it; and, secondly, to depend upon the
word of another, is so to believe it, as to dare to act upon it, as if it were really
true. I do not say, that I think these words are the only true definition of faith.
I have used words that most naturally expressed it, of any I could think of.
There might have been other words used, that are much of the same sense.
§ 28. Though hope does not enter into the essential nature of faith, yet it is
so essential to it, that it is the natural and necessary, and next immediate fruit
of true faith. In the first act of faith, the soul is enlightened with a sense of
the merciful nature of God and of Christ, and believes the declarations that are
made in God's word of it ; and it humbly and heartily applies and seeks to
Christ ; and it sees such a congruity between the declared mercy of God, and
the disposition he then feels towards him, that he cannot but hope, that that
declared mercy will be exercised towards him. Yea, he sees that it would be
incongruous, for God to give him such inclination and motions of heart towards
Christ as a Saviour, if he were not to be saved by him.
608 CONCERNING FAITH.
§ 29. Any tiling that may be called a receiving the revelation of file gospel
is not faith, but such a sort of receiving it, as is suitable to the nature of the
gospel, and the respect it has to us. The act of reception suitable to truth, is
believing it. The .suitable reception of that which is excellent, is choosing it
and loving it. The proper act of reception of a revelation of deliverance from
evil, and the conferring of happiness, is, acquiescing in it and depending upon
it. The proper reception of a Saviour, is, committing ourselves to him and
trusting in him. The proper act of reception of the favor of God, is, believing
and esteeming it, and rejoicing in it. He that suitably receives forgiveness of
his fault, does with a humble sense of his fault rejoice in the pardon.
Thus, for instance, he that reads a truth that no way concerns his interest,
if he believes it, it is proper to say he receives it. But if there be a declaration
of some glorious and excellent truth, that does nearly concern him, he that only
believes it, cannot be said to receive it. And if a captain offers to deliver a dis-
tressed people ; they that only believe what he says, without committing them-
selves to him, and putting themselves under him, cannot be said to receive him.
So, if a prince offers one his favor, he that does not esteem his favor, cannot
be said heartily to accept thereof. Again, if one offended offers pardon to an-
other, he cannot be said to receive it, if he be not sensible of his fault, and does
care for the displeasure of the offended.
The whole act of reception suitable to the nature of the gospel, and its rela-
tion to us, and our circumstances with respect to it, is best expressed (if it be
expressed in one word) by the word thong or Jides.
He that offers any of these things mentioned, and offers them only for these
proper acts of reception, may be said to offer them freely, nay, perfectly so.
§ 30. For a man to trust in his own righteousness, is to hope that God's
anger will be appeased or abated, or that he will be inclined to accept him into
favor, upon the sight of some excellency that belongs to him ; or to have such
a view of things, that it should appear no other than a suitable and right thing
for God's anger to be abated, and for him to be inclined to take him into favor,
upon the sight of, or out of respect to some excellency belonging to him.
§31. The word mat ig, faith, seems to be the most proper word to express
the cordial reception of Christ and of the truth, for these reasons. First, this
revelation is of things spiritual, unseen, strange, and wonderful, exceedingly
remote from all the objects of sense, and those things which we commonly con-
verse with in this world, and also exceedingly alien from our fallen nature ; so that
it is the first and principal manifestation of the symphony between the soul and
these divine things, that it believes them, and acquiesces in them as true. And,
secondly, the Lord Jesus Christ, in the gospel, appears principally under the
character of a Saviour, and not so much of a person absolutely excellent ; and
therefore, the proper act of reception of him, consists principally in the exercise
of a sense of our need of him, and of his sufficiency, his ability, his mercy and
love, his faithfulness, the sufficiency of his method of salvation, the sufficiency
and completeness of the salvation itself, of the deliverance and of the happiness,
and an answerable application of the soul to him for salvation ; which can be
expressed so well by no other word but faith, or affiance, or confidence, or trust,
and others of the same signification; of which, matig, or faith, is much
the best, the most significant ; because the rest, in their common significations
imply something, that is not of the absolute essence of faith. Thirdly, we have
these things exhibited to us, to be received by us, only by a divine testimony.
We have nothing else to hold them forth to us.
§ 32. Justifying faith is the soul's sense and conviction of the reality and
CONCERNING FAITH. $09
sufficiency of Jesus Christ as a Saviour, implying a cordial inclination of soul to
him as a Saviour. It is the soul's conviction and acknowledgment of God's
power in the difficult things, of his mercy in the wonderful things, of his truth
m the mysterious and unseen things, of the excellency of other holy things, of
the salvation of Christ Jesus. Faith prepares the way for the removal of guilt
of conscience. Guilt of conscience is the sense of the connection between the
sin of the subject and punishment ; 1st, by God's law ; and 2d, by God's nature
and the propriety of the thing. The mind is under the weight of guilt, as long
as it has a sense of its being bound to punishment, according to the reason and
nature of things, and the requirements of the divine government
Faith prepares the way for the removal of this. Therefore there must be in
faith, 1. A belief that the law is answered and satisfied by Jesus Christ ; and
2. Such a sense of the way of salvation by Christ, that it shall appear proper,
and be dutiful, and according to the reason of things, that sin should not be
punished in us, but that we nevertheless should be accepted through Christ.
When the mind sees a way that this can be done, and there is nothing in the
law, nor in the divine nature, nor nature of things to hinder it ; that of itself
lightens the burden, and creates hope. It causes the mind to see that it is not
for ever bound by the reason of things to suffer ; though the mind does not
know that it has performed the condition of pardon. This is to have a sense of
the sufficiency of this way of salvation. When a man commits sin and is sensi-
ble of it, his soul has a natural sense of the propriety of punishment in such a
case, a sense that punishment, according to the reason of things, belongs to him;
for the same reasons as all nations have a sense of the propriety of punishing
men for crimes.
The blood of bulls, and goats, and calves, could never make them that
offered them perfect as to the conscience, because the mind never could have a
sense of the propriety and beauty, and fitness in reason, of being delivered from
punishment upon their account This kind of sense of the sufficiency of Christ's
mediation, depends upon a sense of the gloriousness and excellency of gospel
things in general ; as, the greatness of God's mercy ; the greatness of Christ's
excellency and dignity, and dearness to the Father ; the greatness of Christ's
love to sinners, &c. That easiness of mind which persons often have, before
they have comfort from a sense of their being converted, arises from a sense
they have of God's sovereignty. They see nothing either in the nature of God,
or of things, that will necessarily bind them to punishment ; but that God may
damn them if he pleases ; and may save them if he pleases. When persons
are brought to that, then they are fit to be comforted ; then their comfort is like
to have a true and immovable foundation, when their dependence is no way
upon themselves, but wholly upon God. In order to such a sense of the suffi-
ciency of this way of salvation, it must be seen, that God has no disposition,
and no need to punish us. The sinner, when he considers how he has affronted
and provoked God, looks upon it, that the case is such, and the affront is such,
that there is need, in order that the majesty, and honor and authority of God
may be vindicated, that he should be punished, and that God's nature is such,
that he must be disposed to punish him.
Coroll. Hence we learn, that our experience of the sufficiency of the doc-
trine of the gospel, to give peace of conscience, is a rational inward witness to
the truth of tie gospel. When the mind sees such a fitness in this way of sal-
vation, that it takes off the burthen, that arises from the sense of its being ne-
cessarily bound to punishment, through proper desert, and from the demands of
reason and nature ; it is a strong argument, that it is not a thing of mere hu-
Vol. H. 77
610 CONCERNING FAITH
man imagination. When we experience its fitness to answer its end, this is
the third of the three that bear witness on earth. The Spirit bears witness by
discovering the divine glory, and those stamps of divinity that are in the gospel
The water bears witness ; that is, the experience of the power of the gospel to
purify and sanctify the heart, witnesses the truth of it ; and the blood bears wit-
ness by delivering the conscience from guilt. Any other sort of faith than this
sense of the sufficiency of Christ's salvation, does not give such immediate glo-
ry and honor to Christ, and does not so necessarily and immediately infer the
necessity of Christ's being known. Nothing besides makes all Christianity so
to hang upon an actual respect to Christ, and centre in him. Surely, the more
the sinner has an inward, an immediate and sole and explicit dependence upon
Christ, the more Christ has the glory of his salvation from him.
In order to this sort of sense of the congruity of our sins being forgiven, and
of punishment's being removed, by the satisfaction of Christ, there must of ne-
cessity be a sense of our guiltiness. For it is impossible any congruity should
be seen, without comparison of the satisfaction with the guilt. And they can-
not be compared, except there be a sense of them both. There must not only
be such a sense of God's being very angry, and his anger being very dreadful,
without any sense of the reasonableness of that anger ; but there must be a
proper sense of the desert of wrath, such as there is in repentance. Indeed it
is possible there may be such a sense of the glory of the Saviour and his
salvation, that if we had more of a sense of guilt than we have, we should see
a congruity.
§ 33. Sinners, under conviction of their guilt, are generally afraid th'ri
God is so angry with them, that he never will give them faith in Christ. They
think the majesty and jealousy of God will not allow of it. Therefore, there
goes with a sense of the sufficiency of Christ, a sense of God's sovereignty with
lespect to mercy and judgment, that he will and may have mercy in Christ, on
whom he will have mercy, and leave to hardness whom he will. This eases of
that burden.
§ 34. For a man to trust in his own righteousness, is to conceive hopes of
some favor of God, or some freedom from his displeasure, from a false notion of
his own goodness or excellency, and the proportion it bears to that favor ; and
of his own badness, and the relation it bears to his displeasure. It is to con-
ceive hopes of some favor of God, from a false notion of the relation which our
own goodness or excellency bears to that favor ; whether this mistaken relation
be supposed to imply an obligation in natural justice, or propriety and decency,
or an obligation in point of wisdom and honor ; or if he thinks that, without it,
God will not do excellently or according to some one at least of his declared
attributes, or whether it be any obligation by virtue of his promise ; whether
this favorable respect be the pardon of sin, or the bestowment of heaven, or the
abating of punishment, or answering of prayers, or mitigation of punishment, or
converting grace, or God's delighting in us, prizing of us, or the bestowing of
any temporal or spiritual blessing. This excellency we speak of, is either real
or supposed ; either negative, in not being so bad as others, and the like, or
positive. Whether it be natural or moral excellency, is immaterial : also,
whether the sinner himself looks upon it as an excellency, or supposes God
looks upon it as such. For men to trust in their own righteousness, is to enter-
tain hope of escaping any displeasure, or obtaining any positive favor from God,
from too high a notion of our own moral excellency, or too light a notion of our
oadness, as compared with or related to that favor or displeasure.
§ 35. This is to be observed concerning the Scriptures that I have cited re-
CONCERNING FAITH. 611
specting faith, that they sometimes affix salvation to the natural and immediate
effects of faith, as well as to faith itself. Such as, asking, knocking, &c, Rom.
x. 12, 13, 14. In the 14th verse, faith is distinguished from calling upon him.
§ 36. All trusting to our own righteousness indeed, is expecting justification
for our own excellency. But they that expect that God will convert them for
their excellency, or do any thing else towards their salvation upon that account,
do trust in their own righteousness. Because, the supposing that God will be
the more inclined to convert a man, or enable him to come to Christ for his ex-
cellency, is to suppose, that he is justified already, at least in part. It supposes,
that God's anger for sin is at least partly appeased, and that God is more fav-
orably inclined to him for his excellency's sake, in that he is disposed to give
him converting grace, or do something else towards his conversion upon that
account.
§ 37. The difficulty in giving a definition of faith is, that we have no word
that clearly and adequately expresses the whole act of acceptance, or closing of
the soul or heart with Christ. Inclination expresses it but partially ; conviction
expresses it also but in part ; the sense of the soul does not do it fully. And if
we use metaphorical expressions, such as embrace, and love, &c, they are ob-
scure, and will not carry the same idea with them to the minds of all. All
words that are used to express such acts of the mind, are of a very indetermi-
nate signification. It is a difficult thing to find words to exhibit our own ideas.
Another difficulty is to find a word, that shall clearly express the whole good-
ness or righteousness of the Saviour and of the gospel. To be true, is one part
of the goodness of the gospel. For the Saviour to be sufficient, is one part of
his goodness. To be suitable, is another part. To be bountiful and glorious,
is another part. To be necessary, is another part. The idea of a real good
or lovely object, that is conceived to be real, possesses the heart after another
manner, than a very lovely idea that is only imaginary. So that there is need
of both a sense of goodness and reality, to unite the heart to the Saviour.
Faith is the soul's embracing and acquiescing in the revelation which the
word of God gives us of Jesus Christ as our Saviour, in a sense and conviction
of his goodness and reality as such. I do not consider the sense of the good-
ness and reality of Christ as a Saviour, as a distinct thing from the embracing
of him, but only explain the nature of the embracing by it. But it is implied
in it ; it is the first and principal thing in it. And all that belongs to embrac-
ing the revelation, an approbation of it, a love to it, adherence to it, acquies-
cence in it, is in a manner implied in a sense of Christ's goodness and reality
and relation to us, or our concern in him. I say, as our Saviour ; for there is
implied in believing in Christ, not only and merely that exercise of mind, which
arises from a sense of his excellency and reality as a Saviour ; but also that
which arises from the consideration of his relation to us, and of our concern in
him, his being a Saviour, for such as we are ; for sinful men ; and a Saviour
that is offered with his benefits to us. The angels have a sense of the reality
and goodness of Christ as a Saviour, and may be said with joy to embrace the
discovery of it. They cannot be said to believe in Christ. The spirit that they
receive, the notice that they have of Christ the Saviour is the same ; but there
is a difference in the act, by reason of the different relation that Christ as a Sa-
viour, stands in to us, from what he doth to them.
§ 38. Objection 1. It may be objected, that this seems to make the reve-
lation more the object of the essential act of faith than Christ. I answer, no ;
for the revelation is no otherwise the object by this definition, than as it brings
and exhibits Christ to us. It is embracing the revelation in a sense and con-
612 CONCERNING FAITH.
viction of the goodness and reality of the Saviour it exhibits. We do not em-
brace Christ by faith any otherwise, than as brought to us in a revelation :
when we come to embrace him as exhibited otherwise, that will not be faith.
A man is saved by that faith, which is a reception of Christ in all his offices ;
but hp is justified by his receiving Christ in» his priestly office.
§ 39. To believe, is to have a sense and a realizing belief of what the gos-
pel reveals of the mediation of Christ, and particularly as it concerns ourselves.
There is in faith a conviction, that redemption by that mediation of Christ
which the gospel reveals, exists, and a sense how it does so, and how it may
with respect to us in particular. There is a trusting to Christ that belongs to
the essence of true faith. That quiet and ease of mind that arises from a sense
of the sufficiency of Christ, may well be called a trusting in that sufficiency.
It gives a quietness to the mind, to see that there is a way wherein it may be
saved, to see a good and sufficient way, wherein its salvation is very possible,
and the attributes of God cannot be opposite to it. This gives ease, though it
be not yet certain that he shall be saved. But to believe Christ's sufficiency,
so as to be thus far easy, may be called a trusting in Christ, though it cannot
be trusting in him that he will save us. To be easy in any degree, on a belief
or persuasion of the sufficiency of any thing for our good, is a degree of trust-
ing. There is in faith not only a belief of what the gospel declares, that Christ
has satisfied for our sins, and merited eternal life ; but there is also a sense of
it ; a sense that Christ's sufferings do satisfy, and that he did merit, or was worthy
that we should be accepted for his sake. There is a difference between being
convinced that it is so, and having a sense that it is so. There is in the essence
of justifying faith, included a receiving of Christ as a Saviour from sin. For
we embrace him as the author of life, as well as Saviour from misery. But
the sum of that eternal life which Christ purchased is holiness ; it is a holy
happiness. And there is in faith a liking of the happiness that Christ has pro-
cured and offers. The Jews despising the pleasant land, is mentioned as part
of their unbelief. It must be as the gospel reveals Christ, or in the gospel no-
tion of him, the soul must close with Christ. For whosoever is offended in
Christ, in the view that the gospel gives us of him, cannot be said to believe in
him ; for he is one that is excluded from blessedness, by that saying of Christ,
Matth. xi. 6, " Blessed is he whosoever is not offended in me."
§ 40. There is implied in faith, not only a believing of Christ to be a real,
sufficient, and excellent Saviour for me, and having a complacency in him as
such ; but in a complete act of faith, there is an act of the soul in this view of
him, and disposition towards him, seeking to him, that he would be my Sa-
viour ; as is evident, because otherwise prayer would not be the expression of
faith. But prayer is only the voice of faith to God through Christ : and this is
further evident, as faith is expressed by a coming to Christ, and a looking to
him to be saved.
§ 41. There is hope implied in the essence of justifying faith. Thus there
is hope, that I may obtain justification by Christ, though there is not contained
in its essence a hope that I have obtained it. And so there is a trust in Christ
contained in the essence of faith. There is a trust implied in seeking to Christ
to be my Saviour, in an apprehension that he is a sufficient Saviour ; though
not a trust in him, as one that has promised to save me, as having already per-
formed the condition of the promise. If a city was besieged and distressed by
a potent enemy, and should hear of some great champion at a distance, and
should be induced by what they hear of his valor and goodness, to seek and
send to him for relief, believing what they have heard of his sufficiency, and
CONCERNING FAITH. 613
thence conceiving hope that they may be delivered ; the people, in sending,
may be said to U ust in such a champion ; as of old the children of Israel, when
they sent into Egypt for help, were said to trust in Egypt. It has by many
been said, that the soul's immediately applying Christ to itself as its Saviour,
was essential to faith ; and so that one should believe him to be his Saviour.
Doubtless, an immediate application is necessary. But that which is essential,
is not the soul's immediately applying Christ to itself so properly, as its apply-
ing itself to Christ.
§ 42. Good works are in some sort implied in the very nature of faith, as
is implied in 1 Tim. v. 8, where the apostle, speaking of them that do not pro-
vide for their parents, says, " If any provide not for his own, and especially for
those of his own house, he hath denied the faith."
§ 43. Faith is that inward sense and act, of which prayer is the expression ;
as is evident, 1. Because in the same manner as the freedom of grace, accord-
ing to the gospel covenant, is often set forth by this, that he that believes, re-
ceives ; so it also oftentimes is by this, that he that asks, or prays, or calls upon
God, receives ; Matth. vii. 7, 8, 9, 10 ; Luke xi. 9, " Ask and it shall be given
you ; seek and ye shall find ; knock and it shall be opened unto you. For
every one that asketh, receiveth ; and he that seeketh, findeth ; and to him that
knocketh, it shall be opened. And all things whatsoever ye shall ask in
prayer, believing, ye shall receive." Mark xi. 23, 24. To the same purpose
with that last mentioned place in Matthew. John xv. 7, " If ye abide in me,
and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what you will, and it shall be done
unto you." Psalm cxlv. 18, " The Lord is nigh unto all that call upon him,
to all that call upon him in truth." Joel ii. 32. The prophet, speaking there
of gospel times, says, " And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall call on
the name of the Lord shall be delivered ; for in mount Zion and in Jerusalem
shall be deliverance, as the Lord hath said, and in the remnant whom the Lord
shall call." Rom. x. 12, 13, " For there is no difference between the Jew and
the Greek : for the same Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon him.
For whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved ;" quoting the
forementioned place in Joel.
2. The same expressions that are used in Scripture for faith, may be well
used for prayer also ; such as coming to God or Christ, and looking to him.
Eph. iii. 12, " In whom we have boldness and access with confidence by the
faith of him." >
3. Prayer is often plainly spoken of as the expression of faith. As it very
certainly is in Rom. x. 11, 12, 13, 14, " For the Scripture saith, Whosoever be-
lieveth on him, shall not be ashamed. For there is no difference between the
Jew and the Greek : for the same Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon
him ; for whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. How
then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed Vs Christian prayer
is called the prayer of faith, James v. 15. And believing is often mentioned as
the life and soul of true prayer, as in the forementioned place. Matth. xxi. 21,
22. 1 Tim. ii. 8, " I will that men everywhere lift up holy hands, without
wrath and doubting." And Heb. x. 19, 22, " Draw near in full assurance of
faith." James i. 5, 6, " If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask it of God, that
iveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not ; and it shall be given him. But
et him ask in faith, nothing wavering."
Faith in God, is expressed in praying to God. Faith in the Lord Jesus Christ,
is expressed in praying to Christ, and praying in the name of Christ ; John xiv.
13 14. And the promises are made to asking in Christ's name, in the same
£
514 CONCERNING FAITH.
manner as they are to believing in Christ. John xiv. 13, 14, " And whatsoever
ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be gloriried in the
Son. If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it." Chap, xvi 23, 24,
" Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will
give it you. Hitherto you have asked nothing in my name : ask, and receive,
that your joy may be full."
§ 44. Trusting in Christ, is implied in the nature of faith ; as is evident by
Rom. ix. 33 : " As it is written, Behold, I lay in Sion a stumbling stone, and rock
of offence; and whosoever believeth on him, shall not be ashamed." The
apostle there in the context is speaking of justifying faith ; and it is evident, that
trusting in Christ is implied in the import of the word believeth. For being
ashamed, as the word is used in Scripture, is the passion that arises upon the
frustration of truth or confidence. There is implied in justifying faith, a trusting
to Christ's truth and faithfulness, or a believing what he declares and promises ;
as is evident, in that it is called not only believing in Christ, and believing on
Christ, but believing Christ ; John iii. 36, " He that believeth not the Son,
shall not see life ." Trusting in Christ is often implied in faith, according to the
representations of Scripture ; Isa. xxvii. 5, " Or let him take hold of my strength,
that he may make peace with me, and he shall make peace with me."
§ 45. Why is this reception or unition of the soul properly expressed by
faith ? Answer. Not so much, merely from the nature of the act, more abstract-
edly considered, which is unition, reception, or closing ; but from the nature of
the act, conjunctly with the state of the agent and the object of the act, which
qualifies and specifies the act, and adds certain qualifications to the abstract idea
of unition, closing, or reception. Consider the state of the receiver ; guilty,
miserable, undone, impotent, helpless, unworthy; and the nature and worth of
the received, he being a divine, invisible Saviour : the end for which he is received,
the benefits invisible : the ground on which he is received or closed with, the word
of God, and his invitations and promises : the circumstances of those things that are
received, supernatural, incomprehensible, wonderful, difficult, unsearchable : the
proper act of unition or reception in such a case, is most aptly expressed by the
word faith. Fearfulness is opposite to faith : Mark iv. 40, " Why are ye so
fearful ? How is it that ye have no faith V3 And Rev. xxi. 8, " But the fear-
ful and the unbelieving." Justifying faith is sometimes called hope in Scripture.
§ 46. The condition both of the first and second covenant, is a receiving,
compliance with, or yielding to, a signification or declaration from God ; or to
a revelation made from God. A receiving or yielding to a signification of the
will of God, as our sovereign Lord and lawgiver, is most properly called obedi-
ence. The receiving and yielding to a strange mysterious revelation and offer
which God makes of mercy to sinners, being a revelation of things spiritual, su-
pernatural, invisible, and mysterious, through an infinite power, wisdom and
grace of God, is properly called faith. There is indeed obedience in the con-
dition of both covenants, and there is faith or believing God in both. But the
different name arises from the remarkably different nature of the revelation or
manifestations made. The one is a law ; the other a testimony and offer. The
one is a signification of what God expects that we should do towards him, and
what he expects to receive from us ; the other a revelation of what he has done
for us, and an offer of what we may receive from him. The one is an expres-
sion of God's great authority over us, in order to a yielding to the authority ;
the other is a revelation of God's mysterious and wonderful mercy, and wisdom,
and power for us, in order to a reception answerable to such a revelation.
The reason why this was not so fullv insisted upon under the Old Testa-
CONCERNING FAITH. 615
ment, under the denomination of faith, was, that the revelation itself of this
great salvation, was not thus explicitly and fully made.
It must most naturally be called faith, 1. Because the word that is the object
of it, is a revelation, which most nearly concerns our interest and good ; and that
a revelation not of a work to be done by us, but an offer made to us only to be
received by us.
If it were a manifestation otherwise than by testimony, a receiving of it, and
yielding to it, would not so naturally be called faith ; and if a mere manifestation
of something not nearly concerning us, it would not naturally be called faith.
For idle stories, that do not concern us, are not the object of trust or dependence.
If it were a manifestation in order to something expected from us; some work
to be done by us ; a yielding to it would not so properly be called faith. For
yielding, then, would imply something more than just receiving the testimony.
2. Because the person that is the object of it is revealed in the character of
a wonderful Saviour. A receiving of a person in the character of a Saviour, is
a proper act of trust and affiance. And a receiving a divine invisible Saviour,
that offers to save us by infinite power, wisdom, and mercy, and by very mysteri-
ous supernatural works, is properly faith.
3. The benefits that are revealed, which are the objects of faith, are things
spiritual, invisible, wonderful and future ; and therefore, embracing and depend-
ing on these, is properly faith.
§ 47. Faith implies a cleaving to Christ, so as to be disposed to sell and
suffer all for him. See John xii. 42, 43, " Nevertheless, among the chief rulers
also, many believed on him ; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him,
lest they should be put out of the synagogue ; for they loved the praise of men
more than the praise of God." John v. 44, " How can ye believe, which receive
honor one of another, and seek not the honor that cometh from God only ?"
§ 48. Faith is not all kind of asseftt to the word of God as true and divine.
For so the Jews in Christ's time assented to the books of Moses, and therefore
Christ tells them, that they trusted in Moses ; John v. 45, " There is one that
accuseth you, even Moses, in whom ye trust." Yet the very thing that Moses
accuses them for, was not believing in him, i. e., believing so as to yield to his
sayings, and comply with him, or obey him, as the phrase in the New Testa-
ment is concerning Christ. And therefore Christ says in the next verse, " For
had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me ; for he wrote of me." There
may be a strong belief of divine things in the understanding, and yet no saving
faith ; as is manifest by 1 Cor. xiii. 2, " Though I have all faith, so that I could
remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Not only trusting in
Christ, as one that has undertaken to save us, and as believing that he is our
Saviour, is faith ; but applying to him, or seeking to bim, that he would become
our Saviour, with a sense of his reality and goodness as a Saviour, is faith; as
is evident by Rom. xv. 12, " In him shall the Gentiles trust," compared with the
place whence it is cited, Heb. xi. 10, " To it shall the Gentiles seek ;" to-
gether with Psalm ix. 10, " And they tfyat know thy name, will put their
trust in thee : for thou, Lord, hast not forsaken them that seek thee." Which
agrees well with faith's being called a looking to Christ, or coming to him for
life, a flying for refuge to him, or flying to him for safety. And this is the first
act of saving faith. And prayer's being the expression of* faith, confirms this.
This is further confirmed by Isaiah xxxi. 2, " Wo to them that go down to
Egypt for help, and stay on horses, and trust in chariots, because they are many ;
and in horsemen, because they are very strong : but they look not unto the
Holy One of Israel, neither seek the Lord." When it is said, Psalm lxix. 6.
616 CONCERNING FAITH.
" Let not them that wait on thee, 0 Lord, be ashamed for my sake : let not
those that seek thee be confounded for my sake." It is equivalent to that Scrip-
ture, " He that believeth shall never be confounded." And when it is said,
verse 32, " And your heart shall live that seek the Lord ;" it is equivalent to
that Scripture, " The just shall live by faith." So Psalm xxii. 26, and Psalm
lxx. 4. And so Amos v. 4, " For thus saith the Lord unto the house of Israel,
Seek ye me, and ye shall live." And verse 6, " Seek the Lord, and ye shalJ
live." And verse 8, " Seek him that made the seven stars and Orion, and turn-
eth the shadow of death into the morning." Cant. iv. 8, " Look from the top
of Amana." Isaiah xvii. 7, 8, " At that day shall a man look to his Maker,
and his eyes shall have respect to the Holy One of Israel, and he shall not look
to the altars, the work of his hands ; neither shall respect that which his fingers
have made, either the groves or the images." Isaiah lxv. 22, " Look unto me,
and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth." Jonah ii. 4, " I will look again
toward thine holy temple." Mich. vii. 7, " Therefore I will look unto the Lord :
I will wait for the God of my salvation : my God will hear me." Psalm xxxiv.
5, " They looked unto him, and were lightened ; their faces were not ashamed."
§ 49. Faith is a taking hold of God's strength ; Isaiah xxvii. 5, " O let
him take hold of my strength, that he may make peace with me, and he shall
make peace with me." Faith is expressed by stretching out the hand to Christ;
Psal. lxviii. 31, " Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands to God." So Christ
said to the man that had the withered hand, " Stretch forth thine hand." Pro-
mises of mercy and help are often in Scripture made to rolling our burden, and
rolling ourselves, or rolling our way on the Lord. Prov. xvi. 3, " Commit thy
works unto the Lord, and thy thoughts shall be established." Psal. xxii. 8, and
xxxvii. 5, " He trusted on the Lord that he would deliver him : let him deliv-
er him, seeing he delighted in him." " Commit thy way unto the Lord ; trust
also in him, and he shall bring it to pass."
§ 50. That there are different sorts of faith, and that all believing that
Christ is the Son of God, and Saviour of the world, &c, is not true and saving
faith, or that faith which most commonly has the name of faith appropriated to
it in the New Testament, is exceedingly evident by John vi. 64 ; " But there are
some of you that believe not. For Jesus knew from the beginning, who they
were that believed not, and who should betray him." Here all false disciples,
that had but a temporary faith, that thought him to be the Messiah, but would
fall away, as Judas and others, are said to be those that believed not, making
an essential difference between their belief, and that grace that has the term
faith, or believing, appropriated to it. Faith is a receiving of Christ into the
heart, in such a sense as to believe that he is what he declares himself ta be,
and to have such a high esteem of him as an excellent Lord and Saviour, and
so to prize him, and so to depend upon him, as not to be ashamed nor afraid to
profess him, and openly and constantly to appear on his side. See Rom. x.
8—13.
§ 51. Trusting in riches, as Christ uses the expression concerning the rich
young man, and as the expression is used elsewhere, is an extensive expression,
comprehending many dispositions, affections, and exercises of heart towards
riches ; so faith in Christ, or trusting in Christ, is as extensive. The soul's ac-
tive closing or uniting with Christ, is faith. But the act of the soul, in its unit-
ing or closing, must be agreeable to the kind and nature of the union that is to
be established between Christ and the saints, and that subsists between them,
and is the foundation of the saints' communion with Christ. Such is the nature
of it, that it is not merely like the various parts of a building, that are cemented
CONCERNING FAITH. 617
and cleave fast together ; or as marbles and precious stones ma} be joined, so
as to become one : but it is such a kind of union as subsists between the head
and living members, between stock and branches ; between which, and the
head or stock, there is such a kind of union, that there is an entire, immediate,
perpetual dependence for, and derivation of, nourishment, refreshment, beauty,
fruitfulness, and all supplies ; yea, life and being. And the union is wholly for
this purpose : this derivation is the end of it ; and it is the most essential thing
in the union. Now, such a union as this, when turned into act (if I may so
say), or an active union of an intelligent rational being, that is agreeable to this
kind of union, and is a recognition and expression, and as it were the active
band of it, is something else besides mere love. It is an act most properly ex-
pressed by the name of faith, according to the proper meaning of the word so
translated, as it was used in the days when the Scriptures were written.
§ 52. Trusting in a prince or ruler, as the phrase was understood among
the Jews, implied in it faithful adherence and entire subjection, submission and
obedience. So much the phrase plainly implies ; Judges ix. i£, " And the
bramble said unto th£ trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come
and put your trust in my shadow ; and, if not, let fire come out of the bramble,
and devour the cedars of Lebanon." We have an account of the fulfilment of
this parable in the sequel. — How the men of Shechem did not prove faithful
subjects to Abimelech, according to their covenant or agreement with him,
but dealt treacherously with him. Verse 23. And how accordingly Abimelech
proved the occasion of their destruction. The like figure of speech is used to
signify the nation's obedience to the king of Assyria ; Ezek. xxxi. 6, " All the
fowls of heaven made their nests in his boughs, and under his branches did all
the beasts of the field bring forth their young, and under his shadow dwelt all
great nations." So also it signifies the subjection of the nations to Nebuchad-
nezzar; Dan. iv. 11, " The tree grew, and was strong : the beasts of the field
had shadow under it, and the fowls of the heaven dwelt in the boughs thereof,
and all flesh fed of it." The benefit that those who are the true subjects of
Christ have by him, is expressed by the very same things ; Ezek. xvii. 23,
" In the mountain of the height of Israel will I plant it : and it shall bring forth
boughs, and bear fruit, and be a goodly cedar ; and under it shall dwell all
fowl of every wing ; in the shadow of the branches thereof shall they dwell."
Our trusting in God and Christ, is often expressed by our trusting in his shadow,
and under the shadow of his wings, and the like ; Psal. xvii. 8, and xxxvi. 7,
and lvii. 1, andlxiii. 7, and xci. 1, Cant. ii. 3, Isaiah iv. 6, and xxv. 4. Here
see Ruth ii. 12, compared with chap. i. 16, John hi. 36, " He that believeth
on the Son hath everlasting life : he that believeth not the Son, antidav" The
force of the word may in some measure be learned from Acts v. 36, 37, and
Acts v. 40, " And to him they agreed or obeyed ;" the word is the same in the
Greek And Acts xxiii. 21, " But do not thou yield unto them ;" the word is
the same in the Greek. Acts xxvi. 19, " I was not disobedient (anei&eig) to
the heavenly vision ;" Rom. xxvi. 19, " Disobedient to parents, anuOtig." See
also Acts xvii. 4, " Some of them believed (in the Greek ensigdrjaav), and con-
sorted with Paul arid Silas." Acts xiv. 2, " The unbelieving Jews, anEiOovvTeg."
Eph. ii. 2, " The spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience, anu-
deictg." We may judge something of the force of the word neteofiai, by the
signification of the word whence it comes ; Tzsidofiai is the passive of neidv,
which signifies, to counsel, to move or entice, draw or persuade unto.
§ 53. That a saving belief of truth arises from love, or a holy disposition
and relish of heart, appears by Phil. i. 9, 10, " And this I pray, that vour love
Vol. II. 78
618 CONCERNING FAITH.
may abound yet more and more in knowledge, and in all judgment, that yt
may approve things that are excellent." That this approving of the things
that are excellent, is mentioned as an instance of the exercise of that know-
ledge and judgment that is spoken of as the fruit of love, appears more plainly
in the original, as the connection is evident, eig to doxifia^eiv, unto the approv-
ing. The same thing appears by 2 Thess. ii. 12, " That they all might be
damned, who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."
It is fit that, seeing we depend so entirely and universally, visibly and
remarkably, on God, in our fallen state, for happiness, and seeing the special
design of God was to bring us into such a great and most evident dependence ;
that the act of the soul, by which it is interested in this benefit, bestowed in this
way should correspond ; viz., a looking and seeking to, and depending on God
for it; that the unition of heart, that is the proper term, should imply such an
application of the soul to God, and seeking his benefits only and entirely, and
with full sense of dependence on him, that as the condition before was obedi-
ence, or rendering to God, so now it should be seeking and looking to him,
drawing and deriving from him, and with the whole heart depending on him, on
his power and free grace, &c. Faith is the proper active union of the soul
with Christ as our Saviour, as revealed to us in the gospel. But the proper active
union of the soul with Christ as our Saviour, as revealed to us in the gospel, is the
soul's active agreeing, and suiting or adapting itself in its act, to the exhibition
God gives us of Christ and his redemption ; to the nature of the exhibition,
being pure revelation, and a revelation of things perfectly above our senses
and reason ; and to Christ himself in his person as revealed, and in the charac-
ter under which he is revealed to us ; and to our state with regard to him in
that character ; and to our need of him, and concern with him, and his relation
to us, and to the benefits to us, with which he is exhibited and offered to us in
that revelation ; and to the great design of God in that method and divine
contrivance of salvation revealed. But the most proper name for such an ac-
tive union or unition of the soul to Christ, as this, of any that language affords,
isfaith.
§ 55. The revelation or exhibition that God first made of himself, was of
his authority, demanding and requiring of us that we should render something to
him that nature and reason required. The act of the soul that is suitable to
such an exhibition, may be expressed by submitting, doing, obeying, and ren-
dering to God. The exhibition which God makes of himself, since our fall, in
the gospel, is not of his power and authority, as demanding of us, but of his
sufficiency for us, as needy, empty, helpless ; and of his grace and mercy to us,
as unworthy and miserable. And the exhibition is by pure revelation of things
quite above all our senses and reason, or the reach of any created faculties, being
of the mere good pleasure of God. The act in us, that is proper and suitable
to, and well according to such an exhibition as this, may be expressed by such
names as believing, seeking, looking, depending, acquiescing, or in one word,
faith.
§ 56. That believing in the New Testament, is much the same as trusting,
in the Old, is confirmed by comparing Jer. xvii. 5, " Cursed is the man that
trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the
Lord ;" ver 7, " Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, whose hope the
Lord is," — with Heb. iii. 12, " Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you
an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God." It also is confirmed
by this, that trusting in God, and hoping in him, are used in the Old Testament
as expressions of the same import. So hope is often in the New Testament
CONCERNING FAITH. 619
used to signify the same thing that, in other places is signified by faith. Rom.
xv. 12, 13, " And again, Esaias saith, There shall be a root of Jesse, and he that
shall rise to reign over the Gentiles, in him shall the Gentiles trust." — " Now the
God of peace fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound
ui hope through the power of the Holy Ghost." Compare Dan. iii. 38, with
Dan. vi. 23, and Heb. xi. 33, 34..
It is manifest that trusting in God is a phrase of the same import with be-
lieving in him, by comparing Isaiah xlix. 23, " They shall not be ashamed that
wait for me;" with Isaiah xxviii. 16, and Rom. ix. 33, and x. 11; 1 Pet. vi.
6, 7, 8. These places show, that waiting for God, signifies the same as believ-
ing on him. And it is evident, by various passages of Scripture, that waiting
on God, or for God, signifies the same as trusting in him.
§ 57. That saving faith implies in its nature divine love, is manifest by 1
John v. 1, " Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God ; and
every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him."
The apostle's design in this verse seems to be, to show the connection there is
between a true and sincere respect to God, and a respect to and union with
Christ ; so that he who is united to the Son, is so to the Father, and vice versal
As he believes in Christ, and so loves him, it is evident that he is a child of God,
and vice versa. He, whose heart is united to the Father, is so to the Son too.
He that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him. (Com-
pare chap. ii. 22, 23, 24, and chap. iv. 15, with John xiv. 1, and John xv. 23,
24.) The same is further manifest again by the following verses of this chapter,
3, 4, 5, " This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments ; and his
commandments are not grievous ;" i. e., this is a good evidence that we have
true love to God, that we are enabled to triumph over the difficulties we meet
with in this evil world, and not to esteem the yoke of denial of our worldly
lusts a grievous and heavy yoke, and on that account be unwilling to take it
upon us. " For whosoever is born of God, overcometh the world ; and this is
the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith." This is explaining what
he had said before, that our love to God enables us to overcome the difficulties
that attend keeping God's commands ; which shows that love is the main thing
in saving faith, the life and power of it, by which it produces great effects ;
agreeably to what the Apostle Paul says, when he calls saving faith, faith
effectual by love.9'
§ 58. Seeking God is from time to time spoken of as the condition of God's
favor and salvation, and in like manner as trusting in him ; Psal. xxiv. 5, 6,
" He shall receive the blessing from the Lord, and righteousness from the God
of his salvation. This is the generation of them that seek him ; tnat seek thy
face, O Jacob." 1 Chron. xvi. 10, " Glory ye in his holy name. Let the heart
of them rejoice that seek the Lord." See the same words in Psal. cv. 3. Psal.
xxii. 26, " The meek shall eat and be satisfied. They shall praise the Lord,
that seek him. Your heart shall live for ever." Psal. xxxiv. 10, " The young lions
do lack and suffer hunger ; but they that seek the Lord shall not want any good
thing."
They that seek God are spoken of as those that love God's salvation. Psal.
lxx. 4, " Let all those that seek thee, rejoice and be glad in thee ; and let such
as love thy salvation, say continually, Let the Lord be magnified." We have
the same words again, Psal. xl. 16. The expression seems to be in some mea-
sure parallel with trusting in God's salvation ; Psal. lxxviii. 22, " Because they
believed not in God, and trusted not in his salvation." And hoping in God's
salvation ; Psal. cxix. 166, " I have hoped for thy salvation." And waiting for
620 CONCERNING FAITH.
God's salvation ; Gen. xlix. 18, " I have waited for thy salvation, 0 God/'
Lam. iii. 25, 26, " The Lord is good unto them that wait for him ; to the soul
that seeketh him. It is good that a man should both hope and quietly Jvait
for the salvation of the Lord." Mic. vii. 7, " I will wait for the God of my sal-
vation." Agreeably to this, despising the pleasant land, is spoken of as an ex-
ercise of the spirit of unbelief; Psal. cxvi. 24} " Yea, they despised the pleasant
land : they believed not his word."
§ 59. Flying, resorting or running to, as to a refuge, are terms used as
being equivalent to trusting ; Psal. lxii. 7, 8, " My refuge is in God. Trust in
him at all times. God is a refuge for us." Psal. xci. 2. Prov. xviii. 10, " The
name of the Lord is a strong tower j the righteous runneth into it, and is safe."
Psal. lxxi. 1, 3, " In thee, 0 Lord, do I put my trust." — " Be thou my strong
habitation, whereunto I may continually resort. Thou hast given command-
ment to save me ; for thou art my rock and my fortress." Heb. vi. 18, " Who
have fled for refuge to lay hold on the hope set before us."
Waiting on the Lord, waiting for his salvation, and the like, are terms used
as being equivalent to N trusting God in the Scripture. Psal. xxv. 2, " O my
God, I trust in thee ; let me not be ashamed." Verse 5, " On thee do I wait all
the day." Verse 21, "Let integrity and uprightness preserve me, for on thee do
I wait." Psal. xxxvii. 3, " Trust in the Lord." Ver. 5, " Trust also in him."
Verse 7, " Rest on the Lord, and wait patiently for him." Psal. xxvii. 13, 14,
" I had fainted, unless I had believed to see the goodness of the Lord in the land
of the living. Wait on the Lord : be of good courage, and he shall strengthen
thine heart : wait, 1 say, on the Lord."
§ 61- Hoping in God, hoping in his mercy, &c, are used as terms equivalent to
trusting in God. Psal. Ixxviii. 7, " That they might set their hope in God."
Psal. cxlvi. 5, " Happy is that man that hath the God of Jacob for his aid ;
whose hope is in the Lord his God." Jer. xiv. 8, " 0 the hope of Israel, and the
Saviour thereof in time of trouble." Jer. xvii. 7, " Blessed is the man that
trusteth in the Lord ; whose hope the Lord is." Verse 13, " O Lord, the hope
of Israel, all that forsake thee, shall be ashamed." Verse 17, " Thou art my
hope in the day of evil." 1 Pet. i. 3, 4, 5, &c, * Hath begotten us again unto
a lively hope, by the resurrection of Christ from the dead ; to an inheritance
incorruptible, &c, who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salva-
tion, wherein ye greatly rejoice ; that the trial of your faith being much more
precious — whom having not seen, ye love ; in whom, though now ye see him
not, yet believing ye rejoice, &c, receiving the end of your faith, even the salva-
tion of your souls." Verse 13, " Be ye sober, and hope to the end, for the grace
that is to be brought unto you at the revelation of Jesus Christ." Verses 21, 22,
" Who by him do believe in God, who raised him up from the dead, and gave
him glory, that your faith and hope might be in God : seeing ye have purified
your souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit." Chap. iii. 15, " And be
ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the
hope that is in you." Heb. xi. 1, " Faith is the substance of things hoped for."
Matth. xii. 21, " In his name shall the Gentiles trust:" in the original, tlmovci,
hope.
§ 62. Looking to, or looking for, are used as phrases equivalent to trusting,
seeking, hoping, waiting, believing on, &c. Num. xxi. 9, " And it came to
pass, that if a serpent had bitten any man, when he beheld the serpent of brass,
he lived ;" together with John iii. 14, 15, " And as Moses lifted up the serpent
in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up ; that whosoever
believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." Isa. xlv. 22, " Look
CONCERNING FAITH. 621
unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth." Psal. cxxiii. I, 2, " Unto
thee lift I up mine eyes, 0 thou that dwellest in the heavens. Behold, as the
eyes of servants look unto the hand of their masters, and as the eyes of a maid-
en unto the hand of her mistress ; so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God,
until that he have mercy upon us."
§ 63. Rolling one's self, or burden on the Lord, is an expression used as
equivalent to trusting. Psal. xxii. 8, " He trusted in the Lord, that he would
deliver him :" in the original, " He rolled himself on the Lord." Psal. xxxvii.
5, " Commit thy way unto the Lord ; trust also in him, and he shall bring it to
pass :" in the Hebrew, Roll thy way upon the Lord. Prov. xvi. 3, "Commit
thy works unto the Lord, and thy thoughts shall be established :" in the He-
brew, Roll thy works.
§ 64. Leaning on the Lord, and staying ourselves on him, are of the same
force. Micah iii. 11, " Yet will they lean on the Lord." Cant. viii. 5, " Who
is this that cometh up out of the wilderness, leaning on her beloved ?"
§ 65. Relying on God, 2 Chron. xiii. 18, " Thus the children of Israel were
brought under at that time, and the children of Judah prevailed ; because they
relied upon the Lord God of their fathers ;" compared with verses 14, 15,
wherein it is said, " And when Judah looked back, behold the battle was before
and behind ; and they cried unto the Lord, and the priests sounded with the
trumpets. Theri the men of Judah gave a shout ; and as the men of Judah
shouted, it came to pass that God smote Jeroboam and all Israel, before Abijah
and Judah."
§ 66. Committing ourselves, our cause, &c, unto God, is of the same force ;
Job v. 8, " I would seek unto God, and unto God would I commit my cause,
who doth great things, and unsearchable, marvellous things without number."
§ 67. The distinction of the several constituent parts or acts of faith, into
assent, consent, and affiance, if strictly considered and examined, will appear
not to be proper and just, or strictly according to the truth and nature of things ;
because the parts are not all entirely distinct one from another, and so are in
some measure confounded one with another : for the last, viz., affiance, implies
the other two, assent and consent ; and is nothing else but a man's assent and
consent, with particular relation or application to himself and his own case, to-
gether with the effect of all in his own quietness and comfort of mind, and bold-
ness in venturing on this foundation, in conduct and practice.
Affiance consists in these five things : 1. Consent to something proposed,
to be obtained by another person, as good, eligible or desirable, and so for him.
2. Assent of the judgment to the reality of the good, as to be obtained by him ;
that he is sufficient, faithful, &c. 3. The mind's applying itself to him for it,
which has no other than the soul's desiring him to possess us of this good con-
sented to, expressing these desires before him, that he may see and take notice
of them, l. e., expressing these desires with an apprehension that he sees our
hearts, and designedly spreading them before him, to the end that they might
be observed by him and gratified. 4. Hoping that the good will be obtained
in this way ; which hope consists in two things, viz., expectation of the good
in this way ; and in some ease, quietness, or comfort of mind arising from this
expectation. 5. Adventuring some interest on this hope in practice ; which
consists either in doing something that implies trouble, or brings expense or
suffering, or in omitting something that we should otherwise do ; by winch
omission some good is foregone, or some evil is brought on.
If these acts cannot in strictness all take place at the same moment of time,
though they follow one another in the order of nature, yet they are all implied
622 CONCERNING FAITH.
in the act that is exercised the first moment, so far as that act is of such a na-
ture as implies a necessary tendency to what follows. In these three last es-
pecially consists man's committing himself to Christ as a Saviour. In the
third and fourth especially consists the soul's looking to Christ as a Saviour.
§ 68. In that consent to the way or method of salvation, which there is in
saving faith, the heart has especially respect to two things in that method, that
are the peculiar glory of it, and whereby it is peculiarly contrary to corrupt
nature : 1. Its being a way wherein God is so exalted and set so high, and
man so debased and set so low. God is made all in all, and man nothing.
God is magnified as self-sufficient and all-sufficient, and as being all in all to us ;
his power and grace, and Christ's satisfaction and merits being all : and man
is annihilated ; his power, his righteousness, his dignity, his works are made
nothing of.
2. Its being so holy a way ; a way of mere mercy, yet of holy mercy ; mer-
ry in saving the sinner, but showing no favor or countenance to sin ; a way of
free grace, yet of holy grace ; not grace exercised to the prejudice of God's
holiness, but in such a way as peculiarly to manifest God's hatred of sin and
opposition to it, and strict justice in punishing it, and that he will by no means
clear the guilty ; every way manifesting the infinite evil and odiousness of sin,
much more than if there had been no salvation offered. Therefore humiliation
and holiness are the chief ingredients in the act of consent to this way of sal-
vation.
In these things I have spoken only of a consent to the way or method of
salvation. But in saving faith is included also a consent to the salvation itself,
or the benefits procured. What is peculiarly contrary to this in corrupt nature,
is a worldly spirit ; and therefore in order to this act of consent, there must be
mortification to, or weanedness from the world, and a selling of all for the pearl
of great price.
Lastly, Besides all these, there is in saving faith consent to Christ himself,
or a closing of the heart or inclination with the person of Christ. This implies
each of the three things forementioned, viz., humiliation, holiness, and renounc-
ing the world. It implies humiliation ; for as long as men deify themselves,
they will not adore Jesus Christ. It implies sanctification ; for Christ's beauty,
for which his person is delighted in and chosen, is especially his holiness. It
implies forsaking the world ; for as long as men set their hearts on the world
as their chief good, and have that as the chief object of the relish and complai-
sance of their minds, they will not relish and take complaisance in Christ, and
set their hearts on him as their best good. The heart of a true believer con-
sents to three things exhibited in the gospel of salvation. 1. The person who
is the author of the salvation. 2. The benefit, or the salvation itself. 3. The
way or method in which this person is the author of this benefit.
§ 69. Faith implies a cleaving of the heart to Christ ; because a trusting in
others is spoken of as a departing of the heart from the Lord. Jer. xvii. 5,
" Cursed is the man that trusteth in man, whose heart departeth from the
Lord." So a heart of unbelief is a heart that departeth from the Lord. Heb.
iii. 12, " Lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from
the living God." Faith has a double office. It accepts Christ from God, and
presents Christ to God. It accepts Christ in the word, and makes use of him
in prayer. In the word, God oftereth him to you, as Lord and Saviour, to give
you repentance and remission of sins. Now, when you consent to God's terms,
this is to believe in him. — Faith presents Christ to God ; Eph. iii. 12, " In
whom we have boldness and access with confidence, by the faith of him." Al1
CONCERNING FAITH. 623
religion lieth in coming to God by him. Heb. vii. 25, " Wherefore he is able
also to save them unto the uttermost, that come unto God through him ; see-
ing he ever liveth to make intercession for them." Dr. Manton, vol. v. p. 382.
§ 70. We often read in the New Testament of the calling of Christians, of
their high calling ; and that effect of God's word and Spirit, by which they, are
brought to a saving faith, is called their calling ; and true believers are spoken
of as the called of God, called saints, &c. And this call is often represented as
an invitation, an invitation to come to Christ, to come and join themselves to
him, to come to follow him, to continue with him, to be of his party, his society,
seeking his interest, &c. To come to him for his benefits, to come for deliver-
ance from calamity and misery, to come for safety, to come for rest, to come to
eat and drink ; an invitation to come into his house, to a feast. And faith is
often called by the name of vna.Y.or\, hearing, hearkening, yielding to, and obey-
ing the gospel, obeying Christ, being obedient to the faith, obeying the form of
doctrine, &c.
Hence we may learn the nature of saving faith ; that it is an accepting,
yielding to, and complying with, the gospel, as such a call and invitation ;
which implies the hearing of the mind, i. e., the mind's apprehending or under-
standing the call ; a believing of the voice, and the offer and promises contain-
ed in it ; and accepting, esteeming, prizing the person and benefits invited to ;
a falling in of the inclination, the choice, the affection, &c.
§ 71. Faith, as the word is used in Scripture, does not only signify depen-
dence, as it appears in venturing in practice, but also as it appears in the rest
of the mind, in opposition to anxiety ; as appears by Matth. vi. 25 — 34, " Take
no thought — shall he not much more clothe you, 0 ye of little faith ?" So Luke
xii. 22 — 32, " Take no thought — how much more will he clothe you, O ye of
little faith ! Fear not, little flock, it is your Father's good pleasure to give you
the kingdom," compared with Philip, iv. 6, 7, and, Peter v. 7. This is agree-
able to that phrase used in the Old Testament for trusting, " Roll thy burden
on the Lord." Matth. xiv. 30, 31, " But when he saw the wind boisterous, he
was afraid ; and beginning to sink, he cried, saying, Lord save me. And im-
mediately .Jesus stretched forth his hand and caught him, and said unto him, 0
thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt ?"
§ 72. The following inquiries concerning saving faith, are proper and im-
portant.
1. Whether justifying faith, in its proper essence, implies, besides the act
of the judgment, also an act of the inclination and will ?
2. Whether it properly implies love in its essence 1
3. What are the Scripture descriptions, characters, and representations of
justifying faith 1
4. What is the true definition of justifying faith, a definition which agrees
with the Scripture representation of faith, and takes all in ?
5. Whether the word faith, as used in the gospel, has a signification diverse
from what it has in common speech ?
6. Why the word faith, is used to signify this complex act of the mind ?
7. How far trusting in Christ is of the nature and essence of faith 1
8. Whether assent, consent and affiance, be a proper distribution of the va-
rious and distinct acts of faith ?
9. Whether hope, as the word is used in the New Testament, be properly
distinct from saving faith ?
10. What does the word trust imply in common speech?
11. What it implies as used in Scripture ?
624 CONCERNING FAITH.
12. In what sense faith implies obedience ?
13. What is the nature of self-righteousness ?
14. How self-righteousness is peculiarly opposite to the nature of faith 1
15. In what sense there must be a particular application in the act of saving
faith?
16. Whether the first act of faith is certainly more lively and sensible, than
some of the weakest of the consequent acts of saving faith ?
17. In what sense, perseverance in faith is necessary to salvation ?
18. What sort of evidence is it which is the principal immediate ground of
that assent of the judgment which is implied in saving faith ?
§ 73. Calling on the name of Christ, is often spoken of as the proper ex-
pression of saving faith in Christ. Acts ii. 21 ; Rom. x. 13, 14 ; 1 Cor. i. 2 ;
Acts ix. 14, 21, 22, 16. Faith is trusting in Christ. See Doddridge's note on
Acts xvi. 31.
What in that prophecy of the Messiah in Isa. xlii. 4, is expressed thus,
" The Isles shall wait for his law," is, as cited in Matth. xviii. 21, " In his name
shall the Gentiles trust."
Coming to Christ, and believing in him, are evidently used as equipollen*
expressions, in John vi. 29, 30, 35, 37, 40, 44, 45, 47, 64, 65. This coming,
wherein consists believing, implies an attraction of the heart, as is manifest by
verses 44, 45.
Christ, by eating his flesh and drinking his blood, evidently means the same
thing that he intends in the same chapter, by believing in him, and coming to
him. Compare John vi. 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, with verses 29, 30, 35, 36,
37, 40, 44, 45, 47, 64, 65.
Saving faith is called in Heb. iii. 6. TzaooyGia xai to navyrnia Ttjg elm8og,
" The confidence and the rejoicing of the hope." Well expressing the act of
the whole soul that is implied in saving faith, the judgment, the will and affec-
tions. So in Heb. x. 23, " Let us hold fast the profession of our faith." In the
original it is elmSog, hope.
Justifying faith is nothing else, but true virtue in its proper and genuine
breathings adapted to the case, to the revelation made, the state we are in, the
benefit to be received and the way and means of it, and our relation to these
things.
Faith is a sincere seeking rightousness and salvation, of Christ, and in Christ.
Rom. ix. 3 1, 32, " Hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Wherefc re ?
Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law."
See also the promises made, both in the Old Testament and New, to them that
seek the Lord. To saving faith in Christ belongs adoration, submission, and
subjection, as appears by Isa. xlv., " Unto me every knee shall bow," with the
foregoing and following verses.
The general description of justifying faith is a proper reception of Christ
and his salvation, or a proper active union of the soul to Christ as a Saviour.
I say, a proper reception, which implies that it is a receiving him in a manner
agreeable to his office and character and relation to us, in which he is exhibited
and offered to us, and with regard to those ends and effects for which he is given
to mankind, was sent into the world, and is appointed to be preached ; and in
a manner agreeable to the way in which he is exhibited, made known, and
offered, i. e., by divine revelation, without being exhibited to the view of our-
selves ; and the nature of his person, character, offices and benefits ; and the
way of salvation, as related to our faculties, mysterious and incomprehensible ;
and in a manner agreeable to our circumstances, and our particular necessities, and
CONCERNING FAITH. 625
immediate and infinite personal concern with the revelation and ofFer of the
Saviour. A union of soul to this Saviour, and a reception of him and his sal-
vation, which is proper in these respects, is most aptly called by the name of
faith.
§ 74. That love belongs to the essence of saving faith, is manifest by compar-
ing Isaiah lxiv. 4 : " Men have not heard nor perceived by the ear, &c, what he
hath prepared for him that waiteth for him," as cited by the apostle, 1 Cor. ii.
9, " It is for them that love him." Now it is evident that waiting for God, in
the Old Testament, signifies the same with faith in God, or trusting in God.
Dr. Goodwin, ir Vol. I. of his Works, p. 286, says, " The Papists say,
wickedly and wretchedly, that love is the form and soul of faith." But how
does the truth of this charge of wickedness appear ?
It was of old the coming to the sacrifice, as one consenting to the offering,
active in choosing, and constituting that as his offering, and looking to it as the
means of atonement for his sins, that interested him in the sacrifice ; as appears
by Heb. x. 1, 2 ; " Could never make the comers thereunto perfect. For then,
the worshippers once purged should have had no more conscience of sins."
Compare chap. ix. 9.
Believing in one for any benefit, as sufficient for the benefit, and disposed to
procure it, and accordingly leaving our interest ■ with him, with regard to that
benefit, is implied in trusting in him ; Job xxxix. 11, " Wilt thou trust him, be-
cause his strength is great ? Or wilt thou leave thy labor with him 1 Wilt thou
believe him, that he will bring home thy seed, and gather it into thy barn ?"
As the whole soul in all its faculties is the proper subject and agent of faith, so
undoubtedly there are two things in saving faith, viz., belief of the truth and an
answerable disposition of heart. And therefore faith may be defined, a thorough
believing of what the gospel reveals of a Saviour of sinners, as true and per-
fectly good, with the exercise of an answerable disposition towards him. That
true faith, in the Scripture sense of it, implies not only the exercise of the un-
derstanding, but of the heart or disposition, is very manifest. Many important
things pertaining to saving religion, which the Scripture speaks of under the
name of some exercise of the understanding, imply the disposition and exercise
of the heart also. Such as, knowing God — understanding the word of God —
having eyes to see, and a heart to understand. And piety is called wisdom. Sc
men's wickedness is called ignorance, folly, &c. A being wise in one's own
eyes, implies a high opinion of himself, with an agreeable or answerable dis-
position.
It is evident that trust in Christ implies the disposition or will, the receiving
and embracing of the heart. For we do not trust in any person or thing for any-
thing but good, or what is agreeable to us ; what we choose, incline to, and
desire. Yea, trusting commonly is used with respect to great good ; good that
we choose, as what we depend upon for support, satisfaction, happiness, &c.
§ 75. The following things concerning the nature of faith, are extracted
from Dr. Sherlock's several discourses, preached at Temple Church ; discourse
14, page 257, &c.
" Faith, as some think, is no proper subject for exhortation. For if faith is a
mere act of the mind judging upon motives of credibility, it is as reasonable to
exhort a man to see with Ris eyes, as to judge with his understanding. But then,
if this be the true notion of faith, how comes it that in every page we find the
praises of it in the gospel ? What is there in this to deserve the blessings pro-
mised, to the faithful 1 Or whence is it that the whole of our salvation is put
upon this foot 1 How come all these prerogatives to belong to faith, if faith be
Vol. II. 79
526 CONCERNING FAITH.
nothing else but believing things in themselves credible ? Why are we not said
to be justified by light as well as by faith ? For is there not the same virtue in
seeing things visible, as in believing things credible 1 Tell me then, what is
faith, that it should raise men above the level of mortality, and make men become
like the angels of heaven ? — But further, if it be only an act of the understand-
ing formed upon due reasons, how comes it to be described in Scripture, as
having its seat in the heart? The apostle in the text (Heb. iii. 12), cautions
against an evil heart of unbelief; and the same notion prevails throughout the
books of Scripture, and is as early as our Saviour's first preaching. Faith, which
is the principle of the gospel, respects the promises and declaration of God, and
includes a sure trust and reliance on him for the performance. Beyond this,
there is no further act of faith. We are not taught to believe this, in order to
our believing something else ; but here, faith has its" full completion, and leads
immediately to the practice of virtue and holiness. For this end was the Son
of God revealed, to make known the mind and will of the Father, to declare his
mercy and pardon, and to confirm the promises of eternal life to mankind. He
that believes and accepts this deliverance from the bondage of sin, and through
patience and perseverance in well doing, waits for the blessed hope of immor-
tality ; who passes through the world as a stranger and pilgrim, looking for
another country, and a city whose builder is God; this is he whose faith
shall receive the promise, whose confidence shall have great recompense of
reward."
Here Dr. Sherlock speaks of that true Christian faith, which is the principle
of the gospel, as including a sure trust and reliance on God. The same author
elsewhere in the same book, page 251, speaks of reliance or dependence on
God, as arising from a principle of love to God, in the words following : " The
duties we owe to God, are founded in the relation between God and us. 1 ob-
serve likewise to you, that love naturally transforms itself into all relative duties,
which arise from the circumstances of the person related. Thus, in the present
case, if we love God, and consider him as Lord and Governor of the world, our
love will soon become obedience. If we consider him as wise, and good, and
gracious, our love will become honor and adoration. If we add to these our
own natural weakness and infirmity, love will teach us dependence, and prompt
us in all our wants to fly for refuge to our Great Protector."
§ 76. That expression in Psalm 1. 5, " Gather my saints, that have made a
covenant with me by sacrifice," seems to show that such is the nature of true
faith in Christ, that believers do therein, by the sincere, full act of their minds
and hearts, appoint Christ to be their sacrifice ; as such, bring him an offering
to God ; i. e., they entirely concur with what was done in his offering himself a
sacrifice for sinners, as a real sacrifice sufficient and proper for them, trusting in
this sacrifice. Faith is the believer's coming to God, and giving himself up to
God, hoping for acceptance by this sacrifice, and taking God for his God, hop-
ing for an interest in him as such by this sacrifice, that so God may be his God,
and he one of his people.
§ 77. It does not seem congruous, and in itself it is not proper for God quite
to pass over sin, rebellion and treachery, and receive the offender into his entire
favor, either without a repentance and sorrow, and detestation of his fault, ade-
quate to the aggravation of it (which can never be), or, if there be another thai
appears in his stead, and has done and suffered so much as fully to satisfy and
pay the debt, it will not be proper to forgive him, whatever is done for him bv
liis representative for his expiation, unless there be an accepting of it by the
offender for that end, a sense of its being adequate to the offence, and an apply-
CONCERNING FAITH. 627
tng of the mind to him, and a recumbence upon him for satisfaction. This now
seems to me evident from the very light of nature.
§ 78. Justifying faith is more properly called faith than acceptance, becaase
the things received are spiritual and unseen, and because they are received as
future, and entirely the free gift of God.
§ 79. Even the being of a God can be made most rationally and demonstra-
tively evident, by divine revelation, and by gracious spiritual illumination ; after
the same manner as we have shown the Christian religion, the superstructure
built upon that foundation, is evident. Suppose air the world had otherwise
been ignorant of the being of a God before, yet they might know it, because
God has revealed himself; he has shown himself; he has said a great deal to
us, and conversed much with us. And this is every whit as rational a way of
being convinced of the being of God, as it is of being convinced of the being of
a man who comes from an unknown region, and shows himself to us, and con-
verses with us for a long time. We have no other reason to be convinced of his
being, than only that we see a long series of external concordant signs of an
understanding, will and design, and various affections. The same way God
makes known himself to us in his word. And if we have a full and compre-
hensive knowledge of the revelation made, of the things revealed, and of the
various relations and respects of the various parts, their harmonies, congruities,
and mutual concordances, there appear most indubitable signs and expressions
of a very high and transcendent understanding, together with a great and mighty
design, an exceeding wisdom, or most magnificent power and authority, a mar-
vellous purity, holiness and goodness. So that if we never knew there was
any such being before, yet we might be certain that this must be such a one.
§ 80. One that is well acquainted with the gospel, and sees the beauties, the
harmonies, the majesty, the power, and the glorious wisdom of it and the like,
may, only by viewing it, be as certain that it is no human work, as a man that
is well acquainted with mankind and their works, may, by contemplating the
sun, know it is not a human work; or, when he goes upon an island, and sees
the various trees, and the manner of their growing, and blossoming, and bearing
fruit, may know that they are not the work of man.
§ 81. Faith is very often in the Scripture called trust, especially in the Old
Testament. Now, trusting is something more than mere believing. Believing
is the assent to any truth testified ; trusting, always respects truth that nearly
concerns ourselves, in regard of some benefit of our own that it reveals to us,
and some benefit that the revealer is the author of. It is the acquiescence of
the mind in a belief of any person, that by his word reveals or represents him-
self to us as the author of some good that concerns us. If the benefit be a de-
liverance or preservation from misery, it is a being easy in a belief that he will
do it. So, if we say, a man trusts in a castle to save him from his enemies, we
mean, his mind is easy, and rests in a persuasion that it will keep him safe. If
the benefit be the bestowment of happiness, it is the mind's acquiescing in it,
that he will accomplish it ; that is, he is persuaded he will do it ; he has such a
persuasion, that he rejoices in confidence of it.
Thus, if a man has promised a child to make him his heir, if we say he
trusts in him to make him his heir, we mean he has such a belief of what he
promises, that his mind acquiesces and rejoices in it, so as not to be disturbed by
doubts and questions whether he will perform it. These things all the world
means by trust. The first fruit of trust is being willing to do and undergo in
the expectation of some thing. He that does not expect the benefit, so much as
to make him ready to do or undergo, dares not trust it : he dares not run the
628 CONCERNING FAITH.
venture of it. Therefore, they may be said to trust in Christ, and they only, that
are ready to do and undergo all that he desires, in expectation of his redemp-
tion. And the faith of those that dare not do so, is unsound. Therefore, such
trials are called the trials of faith.
But this is to be considered, that Christ does not promise that he will be the
author of our redemption, but upon condition ; and we have not performed that
condition, until we have believed. Therefore, we have no grounds, until we
have once believed, to acquiesce in it that Christ will save us. Therefore, the
first act of faith is no more than this, the acquiescence of the mind in him in
what he does declare absolutely. 3t is the soul's resting in him, and adhering
to him, so far as his word does reveal him to all as a Saviour for sinners, as one
that has wrought out redemption, as a sufficient Saviour, as a Saviour suited to
their case, as a willing Saviour, as the author of an excellent salvation, &c, so
as to be encouraged heartily to seek salvation of him, to come to him, to love,
desire, and thirst after him as a Saviour, and fly for refuge to him. This is the
very same thing in substance, as that trust we spoke of before, and is the very
essence of it. This is all the difference, that it was attended with this additional
belief, viz., that the subject had performed the condition, which does not belong
to the essence of faith. That definition which we gave of trust before, holds,
viz., the acquiescence of the mind in the word of any person who reveals him-
self to us as the author of some good that nearly concerns us. Trusting is not
only believing that a person will accomplish the good he promises : the thing
that he promises may be very good, and the person promising cr offering may
be believed, and yet not properly trusted in ; for the person to whom the offer
is made, may not be sensible that the thing is good, and he may not desire it.
If he offers to deliver him from something that is his misery, perhaps he is not
sensible that it is misery ; or, he may offer to bestow that which is his happiness,
but he may not be sensible that it is happiness. If so, though he believes him,
he does not properly trust in him for it; for he does not seek or desire what he
offers; and there can be no adherence or acquiescence of mind. If a man offers
another to rescue him from captivity, and carry him to his own country ; if the
latter believes the former will do it, and yet does not desire it, he cannot be
said to trust in him for it. And if the thing be accounted good, and be be-
lieved, yet if the person to whom it is offered, does not like the person that does
it, or the way of accomplishment of it, there cannot be an entire trust, because
there is not a full adherence and acquiescence of mind.
§ 82. There are these two ways in which the mind may be said to be sen-
sible that any thing is good or excellent : 1. When the mind judges that any
thing is such as, by the agreement of mankind, is called good or excellent, viz.,
that which is most to general advantage, and that between which and reward
there is a suitableness ; or that which is agreeable to the law of God. It is a
being merely convinced in judgment, that a thing is according to the meaning
of the word good, as the word is generally applied. 2. The mind is sensible
of good in another sense, when it is so sensible of the beauty and amiableness
of the thing, that it is sensible of pleasure and delight in the presence of the idea
of it. This kind of sensibleness of good, carries in it an act of the will, or in-
clination or spirit of the mind, as well as of the understanding.
§ 83. The conditions of justification are, repentance and faith ; and the free-
dom of grace appears in the forgiving of sin upon repentance, or only for our
being willing to part with it, after the same manner as the bestowment of eter-
nal life, only for accepting of it. For to make us an offer of freedom from a
thing, only for quitting of it, is equivalent to the offering the possession of a
CONCERNING FAITH. 629
thing foi the receiving of it. God makes us this offer, that if we will in our
hearts quit sin, we shall be freed from it, and all the evil that belongs to it, and
flows from it ; which is the same thing as the offering us freedom only for ac-
cepting it. Accepting, in this case, is quitting and parting with, in our wills
and inclination. So that repentance is implied in faith ; it is a part of our
willing reception of the salvation of Jesus Christ ; though faith with respect
to sin, implies something more in it, viz., a respect to Christ, as him by whom
we have deliverance. Thus by faith we destroy sin, Gal. ii. 18.
§ 84. As to that question, Whether closing with Christ in his kingly office
be of the essence of justifying faith ? I would say : 1. That accepting Christ
in his kingly office, is doubtless the proper condition of having an interest in
Christ's kingly office, and so the condition of that salvation which he bestows
in the execution of that office ; as much as accepting the forgiveness of sins,
is the proper condition of the forgiveness of sin. Christ, in his kingly office, be-
stows salvation ; and therefore, accepting him in his kingly office, by a dispo-
sition to sell all and suffer all in duty to Christ, and giving proper respect and
honor to him, is the proper condition of salvation. This is manifest by Heb. v.
9, " And being made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation to all
them that obey him;" and by Rom. x. 10, " For with the heart man belreveth
unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."
The apostle speaks of such a confessing of Christ, or outward and open testify-
ing our respect to him, and adhering to our duty to him, as exposed to suffering,
reproach and persecution. And that such a disposition and practice is of the
essence of saving faith, is manifest by John xii. 42, 43 : " Nevertheless, among
the chief rulers also, many believed on him ; but because of the Pharisees they
did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue : for they
loved the praise of men more than the praise of Gcd ;" — compared with John
v. 44, " How can ye believe, which receive honor one of another, and seek not
the honor that cometh from God only 1"
2. Accepting Christ as»a priest and king, cannot be separated. They not
only cannot be separated, or be asunder in their subject, but they cannot be
considered as separate things in their natures ; for they are implied one in ano-
ther. Accepting Christ as a king, is implied in accepting him as a priest : for,
as a priest, he procures a title to the benefits of his kingly office ; and there-
fore, to accept him as a priest, implies an accepting him in his kingly office :
for we cannot accept the purchase of his priesthood, but by accepting the bene-
fits purchased. If faith is supposed to contain no more immediately, than only
an accepting of Christ as a Mediator for our justification ; yet that justification
implies a giving a title to the benefits of his kingly office, viz., salvation from
sin, and conformity to his nature and will, and actual salvation by actual deli-
verance from our enemies, and the bestowraen,t of glory.
§ 85. Faith divine, is a spiritual conviction of the truth of the things of reli-
gion. Some have objected against a spiritual sight of divine things in their
glorious, excellent and divine form, as being the foundation of a conviction of
the truth or real existence of them ; because, say they, the existence of things
is in the order of nature before forms or qualities of them as excellent or odious;
and so the knowledge of their existence must go before the sight of their form
or quality ; they must be known to be, before they are seen to be excellent.
I answer, it is true, things must be known to be, before they are known to be
excellent, if by this proposition it be understood, that things must be known to
exist, before they can be known really to exist excellent, or really to exist with
such and such beauty. And all the force of the objection depends on such a
630 , CONCERNING FAITH.
meaning of this assertion. But if thereby be intended, that a thir.g must be
known to have a real existence before the person has a clear understanding,
jdea or apprehension of the thing proposed or objected to his view, as it is in its
qualities either odious or beautiful, then the assertion is not true ; for his having
a clear idea of something proposed to his understanding or view, as very beau-
tiful or very odious, as is proposed, does not suppose its reality : that is, it does
not presuppose it, though its real existence may perhaps follow fro:n it. But in
our way of understanding things in general of all kinds, we first have some under-
standing or view of the thing in its qualities, before we know its existence.
Thus it is in things that we know by our external senses, by our bodily
sight for instance. We first see them, or have a clear idea of them by sight,
before we know their existence by our sight. We first see the sun, and have a
strong, lively and clear idea of it in its qualities, its shape, its brightness, &c,
before we know there actually exists such a body.
§ 86. Faith in Christ is the condition of salvation. It is observable, that as
trusting in God, hoping in him, waiting for him, &c, are abundantly insisted on
in the Old Testament, as the main condition of God's favor, protection, deliver-
ance and salvation, in the book of Psalms and elsewhere ; so, in most of those
places where these graces of trust and hope are so insisted upon, the subjects of
them are represented as being in a state of trial, trouble, difficulty, danger, op-
position and oppression of enemies, and the like. And the clearer revelation,
and more abundant light of the New Testament, bring into clearer view the
state that all mankind are in with regard to those things that are invisible, the
invisible God, an invisible world, and invisible enemies, and so showmen's lost,
miserable, captivated, dangerous and helpless state, and reveal the infinite mercy
of God, and his glorious all-sufficiency to such wretched, helpless creatures, and
also exhibit Christ in the. character of the Saviour of the miserable, the great
Redeemer of captives, &c. Hence faith, trust and hope, are most fitly insisted
on as the duty and qualification peculiarly proper for all mankind, and the vir-
tue proper to be exercised in their circumstances towards God and Christ, as
they reveal themselves in the gospel, as belonging to them in their character
and relation to us, and concern with us, in which they are there exhibited ; and
as the grand condition of our salvation, or our receiving those benefits, which
we, as sinful, miserable and helpless creatures, need from them, and which
Christ, as a Redeemer, appears ready to bestow.
§ 87. Dr. Manton reconciles the Apostle James and the Apostle Paul in the
following manner, in his 5th volume of Sermons, p. 374 : " Justification hath
respect to some accusation : now, as there is a twofold law, there is a twofold ac-
cusation and justification ; the law of works, and the law of grace. Now when
we are accused as breakers of the law of works, that is, as sinners obnoxious
to the wrath of God, we plead Christ's satisfaction as our righteousness, no
works of our own. But when we are accused as nonperformers of the condi-
tions of the covenant of grace, as being neglecters and rejecters of Christ the
Mediator, we are justified by producing our faith or sincere obedience ; so that
our righteousness by the new covenant is subordinate to our universal righteous-
ness, with respect to the great law of God ; and that we have only by Christ.
If we are charged that we have broken the first covenant, the covenant of
works, we allege Christ's satisfaction and merit If charged not to have per-
formed the conditions of the law of grace, wre answer it by producing our faith,
repentance and new obedience, and so show it to be a false charge. Our first
and supreme righteousness consists in the pardon of our sins, and our acceptance
in the beloved, and our right to impunity and glory. Our second and subordinate
CONCERNING FAITH. 631
righteousness, in having the true condition of pardon and life. In the first sense,
Christ's righteousness alone is our justification and righteousness. Faith and
repentance, or new obedience, is not the least part of it. But, in the second,
believing, repenting, and obeying, is our righteousness in their several respec-
tive ways, viz., that the righteousness of Christ may be ours, and continue ours."
See also Dr. Manton on James, p. 310, 311, 312, and p. 331, &c.
Faith is connected with obedience. The very acceptance of Christ in his
priestly office, making atonement for sin by his blood, and fulfilling the law of
God by his perfect obedience unto death ; and so the very approbation of the
attribute of God, as it is there exhibited, an infinitely holy mercy : I say, merely
the soul's acceptance and approbation of these things, do thoroughly secure ho-
liness of heart and life in the redeemed of Jesus Christ. They will secure their
conformity to the law of God, though, by this very mercy, and this very Saviour,
they are set at liberty from the law, and are no longer under the law, as a law
with its sanctions immediately taking hold of them, and binding them by its
sanctions or threatenings, connecting and binding together its fulfilment and life,
and its violation and death. Our hearts approving of that holy mercy of God
that appears in his showing mercy to sinners, in a way of perfectly satisfying
the law, suffering all the penalty of it, and of perfectly fulfilling and answering
the precepts of it, implies a heart fully approving the law itself, as most
worthy to be fulfilled and satisfied, approving the authority that established the
law, and so its infinite worthiness of being obeyed ; in that we approve of it,
that so great a person should submit to that authority, and do honor to it, by
becoming a servant to obey. God, and a sacrifice to satisfy for the contempt done
his authority, and that we approve the holy law itself as worthy of such great
honor to be done it. It implies a heart entirely detesting sin, and in some sort,
sensible of the infinite detestableness of it, that we approve of God's making
such a manifestation of his detestation of it, and approve of the declared fitness
and necessity of its being punished with so great a punishment as the sufferings
of Christ. Our accepting such sufferings as an atonement for our sin, implies
a heart fully repenting of and renouncing sin ; for it implies not only a conviction
that we deserve so great a punishment, and not only a mere conviction of con-
science, but an approbation of heart of the connection of such sin with such
punishment, which implies a hatred of the sin punished ; and the heart's entire
approbation of such methods perfectly to fulfil the obedience of the law, by so
great a person, and by his doing so great things, and denying himself so much,
implies a very high approbation of this law, and the authority of the lawgiver.
Therefore this acceptance of Christ as a Saviour, by his obedience and atone-
ment, and an acceptance of God's holy mercy, forgiving sin, and giving life in
this way. does well secure universal obedience to the law of God as a law of
liberty, and with a free and ingenuous spirit, by the obedience of children, and not
of slaves. Thus, the faith that justifies the sinner, destroys sin ; and the heart
is purified by faith. So far as this evangelical spirit prevails, so far fear, or a
legal spirit will be needless to restrain from sin, and so far will such a legal
spirit cease and be driven away.
Coroll. What has been observed, is a confirmation that this is the true na-
ture of justifying faith, and that the essence of it lies very much in the approbation
and acceptance of the heart.
§ 88. 1 John v. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, " Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ,
is born of God ; and every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that
is begotten of him. By this we know that we love the children of God, when
we love God, and keep his commandments. For this is the love of God, that
632 CONCERNING FAITH
we keep his commandments : and his commandments are not grievous. Fot
whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world : and this is the victory thai
overcometh the world, even our faith." It is a doctrine taught in this text, that
saving faith differs from all common faith in its nature, kind and essence. This
doctrine is inferred from the text, thus : it is said, " Whosoever believeth that
Jesus is the Christ, is born of God ;" by which it is manifest, that there was
some great virtue that the apostles and Christians in those days used to call by
the name of faith or believing, believing that Jesus is Christ, and the like ;
which w^as a thing very peculiar and distinguishing, and belonging only to those
that were born of God. Thereby cannot be meant, therefore, only a mere assent
to the doctrines of the gospel, because that is common to saints and sinners, as
is very evident. The Apostle James plainly teaches in chapter ii. that this faith
may be in those that are not in a state of salvation. And we read in the Evan-
gelists, of many that in this sense believe, to whom Christ did not commit himself,
because he knew what was in them : John ii. at the latter end, and many other
places. When it is said, " W'hosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is bom
of God ;" thereby cannot be meant, whosoever has such an assent as is perfect,
so as to exclude all remaining unbelief; for it is evident, that the faith of good
men does not do this. Thus a true believer said, Mark ix. 24, " Lord, I believe ;
help thou mine unbelief;" and Christ is often reproving his true disciples, that
they have so little faith. He often says to them, " O ye of little faith ;" and
speaks sometimes as if their faith were less than a grain of mustard seed. Nor
can the apostle, when he says, " Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ,
is born of God," mean, that whosoever has a predominant assent, or an assent
that prevails above his dissent, or whose judgment preponderates that way, and
has more weight in that scale than the other ; because it is plain that it is not
true that every one that believes in this sense, is born of God. Many natural,
unregenerate men, have such a preponderating judgment of the truth of the
doctrines of the gospel ; without it, there is no belief of it at all. For believing,
in the lowest sense, implies a preponderating judgment; but it is evident, as just
now was observed, that many natural men do believe : they do judge that the
doctrine is true, as the devils do.
And again, when the apostle says, " Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the
Christ, is born of God ;" all that he intends, cannot be only, that whosoever is
come to a certain particular intermediate degree of assent, between the lowest
degree of preponderating assent and a perfect assent, excluding all remains of
unbelief; he cannot mean any certain particular intermediate degree of assent,
still meaning nothing but mere assent by believing. For he does not say, he
that believes or absents that Jesus is the Christ to such a certain degree, is born
of God ; but wiiosoever believes that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God ; by
which must be understood, that whosoever at all performs that act which the
apostle calls by that name, or whosoever has any thing at all of that kind of
virtue which the apostle calls believing, is born of God ; and that he that is not
born of God, has not that virtue that he meant, but is wholly without it. And
besides, it would be unreasonable to suppose, that by this believing, which the
apostle there and elsewhere lays down as such a grand note of distinction be-
tween those that are born of God, and those that are not, is meant only a certain
degree of assent, which such have, that differs less from what those may have,
that are not born of God, than nine hundred and ninety and nine from a thou-
sand ; yea, that differs from it an infinitely little. For this is the case, if the
difference be only gradual, and it be only a certain degree of faith that is the
mark of being born of God. If this was the apostle's meaning, he would use
CONCERNING FAITH. 633
words in a manner not consistent with the use of language, as he would call
things infinitely nearly alike by such distant and contrary names ; and would
represent the subjects in whom they are, as of such different and contrary char-
acters, calling one believer, and the other unbeliever, one the children of God,
and those that are born of God, and the other the children of the devil, as this
apostle calls all that are not born of God, in this epistle (see chapter iii. 9, 10),
and would represent one as setting to his seal that God is true, and the other as
making him a liar, as in the 10th verse of the context. And besides, if this
were the case, if believers in this sense only, with such an infinitely small, grad-
ual difference, was all that he meant, it would be no such notable distinction
between those that are born of God and those that are not, as the apostle repre-
sents, and as this apostle, and other apostles, do everywhere signify. Nay, it
would not be fit to be used as a sign or characteristic for men to distinguish
themselves by ; for such minute, gradual differences, which in this case would
be alone certainly distinguishing, are altogether Undiscernible, or at least with
great difficulty determined : therefore, are not fit to be given as distinguishing
notes of the Christian character. If words are everywhere used after this
manner in the Bible, and, by faith in Christ, as the word is generally used there,
is meant only the assent of the understanding, and that not merely a predominant
assent, nor ytet a perfect assent, excluding all remaining unbelief, but only a
certain degree of assent between these two, rising up just to such a precise
height, so that he that has this shall everywhere be called a believer ; and he
whose assent, though it predominates also, and rises up as high-.as the other
within an infinitely little, shall be called an unbeliever, one that wickedly makes
God a liar, &c, this is in effect to use words without any determinate meaning
at all, of, which is the same thing, any meaning proportioned tp our understand-
ings ; therefore, there is undoubtedly some great and notable difference between
the faith of those who are in a state of salvation, and that of those who are not :
insomuch that, without that very faith, according to the common use of language
in these days, those who were not in a state of salvation, may be said not to be-
lieve at all. And besides, that virtue that the apostle here speaks of as such a
great and distinguishing note of a child of God, he plainly speaks of as a su-
pernatural thing, as something not in natural men, and given only in regeneration
or being born of God, which is the great change of men from that which is
natural to that which is supernatural. Men may have what is natural, by their
being born, born in a natural way ; but they have what is supernatural, by be-
ing born again, and born of God. But, says the apostle, " Whosoever belieyeth
that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God." The same faith is plainly spoken of
as a supernatural thing in the foregoing chapter, verse 15 : " Whosoever shall
confess that Jesus is the Son <if God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God."
But common faith is not a supernatural thing, any more than a belief of any
history. It is obtained by the same means. If one be natural, and the other
supernatural, then undoubtedly the difference is not only such a gradual differ-
ence, differing but an infinitely little. If all lies in the degree of assent, let us
suppose that a thousand degrees of assent be required to salvation, and that
there is no difference in kind in the faith of others ; how unreasonable is it to
say, that when a man can naturally raise his assent to nine hundred and ninety-
nine degrees, yet he cannot reach the other degree, by any improvement, but
there must be a new birth in order to the other degree ! And as it is thus evi-
dent, that the faith or believing that Jesus is the Christ,which the apostle speaks
of in the text, is some virtue intended by the apostle, differing not only in degree,
but in nature and kind, from any faith that unregenerate men have ; so I would
034 CONCERNING FAITH.
observe, that it is evident that this special faith, of which the apostle speaks, that
co differs from common faith, is not only a faith that some Christians only have
obtained, but that all have it that are in a state of salvation ; because the same
faith is often spoken of as that which first brings men into a state of salvation,
and not merely as that which Christians attain to afterwards, after they have
performed the condition of salvation.
How often are we taught, that it is by faith in Christ we are justified ; and
that he that believes not, is in a state of condemnation ; and that it is by this,
men pass from a state of condemnation to a state of salvation. Compare John v.
21 : " Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my words, and believeth on
him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation,
but is passed from death unto life ;" with chapter iii. 18, " He that believeth
on him is not condemned ; but he that believeth not, is condemned already, be-
cause he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." And
this faith that thus brings into a state of life, is expressed in the same words as
it is in the text, in John xx. 31 : " But these things are written, that ye might
believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God ; and that believing, ye might
have life through his name." Thus it is manifest that the faith spoken of in the
text, is the faith that all men have that are in a state of salvation, and the faith
by which they first come into salvation, and that it is a faith especially differing
in nature and kind from all common faith.
In the further prosecution of this discourse, I shall, 1. Bring some further
arguments to prove, that saving faith differs from common faith in nature and
essence. 2. Show wherein the essential difference lies, confirming the same
from the Scriptures, which will further prove the truth of the doctrine.
Fikst. I am to bring some further arguments to prove the doctrine : and
here I would observe, that there is some kind of difference or other, is most
apparent from the vast distinction made in Scripture, insomuch, that those who
have faith, are all from time to time spoken of as justified, and in a state of sal-
vation, having a title to eternal life, &c. Rom. i. 16, 17, " The gospel is the
power of God to salvation to every one that believeth." And chap. iii. 22,
" Even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all,
and upon all that believe." Rom. x. 4, " Christ is the end of the law for right-
eousness to every one that believeth." Acts xiii. 39, " And by him all that believe
are justified." In these and other places, a state of salvation is predicated of
every one that believeth or hath faith. It is not said of every one that believ-
eth and walks answerably, or of every one that believeth and takes up an an-
swerable resolution to obey ; which would be to limit the proposition, and make
an exception, and be as much as to say, not every one that is a believer, but to
such believers only as not only believe, but oh^f. But this does not consist
with these universal expressions : " The gospel is the power of God to salvation
to every one that believeth." " The righteousness of God is unto all, and upon
all them that believe." " Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every-
one that believeth." And by the supposition, they that have not saving faith are
in a rtate of damnation ; as it is also expressly said in Scripture, " He that be-
lieveth not shall be damned," and the like. So that it is evident that there is
a great difference between the virtue that the Scripture calls by the name faith,
and speaks of as saving faith, let it be what it will, and all that is or can be in
others. But here I would observe particularly : the difference must either be only
m the degree of "faith, and in the effects of it, or it is the nature of the faith itself
And I would,
I. Show that it is not merely a difference in degree.
CONCERNING FAITH. 635
1. There are other Scriptures besides the text, that speak of saving faith
as a supernatural thing. Matt. xvi. 15, 16, 17, " He saith unto them, But
whom say ye that I am 1 And Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art Christ,
the Son of the living God. And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed
art thou, Simon Barjona ; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but
my Father which is in heaven." This must evidently be understood of a super-
natural way of coming by this belief or faith ; such a way as is greatly distin-
guished from instruction or judgment in other matters, such as the wise and
prudent in temporal things had. So Luke x. 21, 22, " In that hour Jesus re-
joiced in spirit, and said, 1 thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that
thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them
unto babes : even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. No man
knoweth who the Son is but the Father ; and who the Father is, but the Son,
and he to whom the Son will reveal him." So, to the same purpose is John vi.
44, 45, " No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me,
draw him : and I will raise him up at the last day. It is written in the pro-
phets, And they all shall be taught of God : every man therefore that hath
heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me." And what is meant,
is not merely that God gives it. in his providence; for so he gives the know-
ledge of those wise and prudent men mentioned in the forecited passage. It is
said that he gives it by the teachings of his Spirit, as appears by 1 Cor. xii. 2 :
" No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost." And the
common influences of the Spirit, such as natural men, or men that are unregen-
erated may have, are not meant, as appears by what the same apostle says in
the same epistle, chap. ii. 14 : " But the natural man receiveth not the things ot
the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he know
them, because they are spiritually discerned." The things of the Spirit of God,
wO which the apostle has a special respect, are the doctrine of Christ crucified,
as appears by the beginning of the chapter, and by the foregoing chapter,
which he says is to the Jews a stumbling block, and to the Greeks foolishness.
And that the influence of the Spirit, in which this saving faith is given, is not
any common influence, or any thing like it, but is that influence by which men
are Gpd's workmanship, made over again, or made new creatures, is evident,
by Ephesians ii. 8, 9, 10 : " For by grace are ye saved, through faith ; and that
not of yourselves : it is the gift of God : not of works, lest any man should
boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works,
which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." And so, it is
manifest by the text, that this influence by which this faith is given, is no com-
mon influence, but a regenerating influence, 1 John v. 1 — 5 : " Whosoever be-
lieveth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God ; and every one that loveth
him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him. By this we know that
we love the children of God, when we love God and keep his commandments,"
&c. It is spoken of as a great work, so wrought by God, as remarkably to
show his power, 2 Thess. i. 11 : " Wherefore also, we pray always for you, that
our God would count you worthy of this calling, and fulfil all the good plea-
sure of his goodness, and the work of faith with power." And that which
makes the argument yet more clear and demonstrative is, that it is mentioned
as one of the distinguishing characters of saving faith, that it is the faith of the
operation of God ; Col. ii. 12, u You are risen with him through the faith of
the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead." Now, would this
faith be any distinguishing character of the true Christian, if it were not a faith
of a different kind from that which others may have ? And besides, it is evident-
636 CONCERNING FAITH.
ly suggested in the words, that it is hy a like wonderful operation as the raising
of Christ from the dead ; especially taken with the following verse. The words
taken together are thus, verses 12, 13 : " Buried with him in baptism, wherein
also you are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who
raised him from the dead. And you, being dead in your sins, and the uncir-
cumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him, having forgiven
you all trespasses." Let this be compared with Eph. i. 18, 19 : " The eyes of
your understanding being enlightened ; that ye may know what is the hope of
his calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints, and
what is the exceeding greatness of his power to us ward who believe, accord-
ing to the working of his mighty power." Now, is it reasonable to suppose, that
such distinctions as these would be taught, as taking place betweeen saving
faith and common faith, if there were no essential difference, but only a gradual
difference and they approached infinitely near to each other 3
2. The distinguishing epithets and characters ascribed to saving faith in
Scripture, are such as denote the difference to be in nature and kind, and not
in degree only. One distinguishing epithet is precious, 2 Peter i. 1 : " Like pre-
cious faith with us." Now, preciousness is what signifies more properly some-
thing of the quality, than of the degree. As preciousness in gold is more prop-
erly a designation of the quality of that kind of substance, than the quantity.
And therefore, when gold is tried in the fire to see whether it be true gold or
not, it is not the quantity of the substance that is tried by the fire, but the pre-
cious nature of the substance. So it is when faith is tried to see whether it be
a saving faith or not. 1 Peter i. 7, " That the trial of your faith being much
more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be
found unto praise, and honor, and glory, at the appearing of Jesus Christ." If
the trial was not of the nature and kind, but only of the quantity of faith ; how
exceedingly improper would be the comparison between the trial of faith and
the trial of gold 1 Another distinguishing Scripture note of saving faith is,
that it is the faith of Abrahan. Rom. iv. 16, " Therefore it is of faith, that it
might be by grace ; to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed, not to
that only which is of the law, but to that also which is of the faith of Abra-
ham, who is the father of us all." Now, the faith of Abraham cannot be faith
of that degree of which Abraham's was ; for undoubtedly multitudes are in a
state of salvation, that have not that eminency of faith. Therefore, nothing
can be meant by the faith of Abraham, but faith of the same nature and kind.
Again, another distinguishing Scripture note of saving faith is, that it is faith
unfeigned. 1 Tim. i. 5, " Now the end of the commandment is charity, out of
a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned." 2 Tim. i. 5,
" When I call to remembrance the unfeigned faith that is in thee, which dwelt
first in thy grandmother Lois, and thy mother Eunice ; and I am persuaded
that in thee also." Now this is an epithet that denotes the nature of a thing,
and not the degree of it. A thing may be unfeigned, and yet be but to a small
degree. To be unfeigned, is to be really a thing of that nature and kind which
it pretends to be ; and not a false appearance, or mere resemblance of it.
Again, another note of distinction between saving faith and common faith,
plainly implied in Scripture, is, that it differs from the faith of devils. It is im-
plied in James ii. 18, 19 : " Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and 1 have
works : show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith
by my works. Thou believest that there is one God ; thou dost well : the
devils also believe and tremble." Here it is first implied, that there is a differ-
ence between saving faith and common, that may be shown by works ,* a difTer-
CONCERNING FAITH. 637
cnce in the cause, that may be shown by the effects ; and then it is implied
this difference lies in something wherein it differs from the faith of devils ;
otherwise there is no force in the apostle's reasoning. But this difference can-
not lie in the degree of the assent of the understanding ; for the devils have as
high a degree of assent as the real Christian. The difference then must lie in
the peculiar nature of the faith.
3. That the difference between common faith and saving faith does not lie
in the degree only, but in the nature and essence of it, appears by this ; that
those who are in a state of damnation are spoken of as being wholly destitute
of it, as wholly without that sort of faith that the saints have. They are spoken
of as those that believe not, and having the gospel hid from them, being blind
with regard to this light ; as 2 Cor. iv. 3, 4 : " But if our gospel be hid, it, is
hid to them that are lost : in whom the god of this world hath blinded the
minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ,
who is the image of God, should shine unto them." Now, can these things be
said with any propriety, of such as are lost in general, if many of them as well
as the saved, have the same sort of faith of the same gospel, but only in a less
degree, and some of them falling short in degree, but very little, perhaps one
degree in a million ? How can it be proper to speak of the others, so little
excelling them in the degree of the same light, as having the light of the
knowledge of the glory of God shining unto them, and beholding as with open
face the glory of the Lord, as is said of all true believers in the context ?
While those are spoken of as having the gospel hid from them, their minds
blinded, lest the light of the glorious gospel should shine unto them, and so as
being lost, or in a state of damnation ? Such interpretations of Scripture are
unreasonable.
4. That the difference between saving faith and common faith is not in de-
gree, but in nature and kind, appears from this, that, in the Scripture, saving
faith, when weakest, and attended with very great doubts, yet is said never to
fail. Luke xxii. 31, 32, " And the Lord said, Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath
desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat : but I have prayed for thee,
that thy faith fail not ; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren."
The faith of Peter was attended with very great doubts concerning Christ and
his cause. Now, if the distinction between saving faith and other faith be only
in the degree of assent, whereby a man was brought fully to assent to the truth,
and to cease greatly to question it; then Peter's faith would have failed. He
would have been without any saving faith. For he greatly questioned the truth
concerning Christ and his kingdom, especially when he denied him. Other
disciples did so too ; for they all forsook him and fled. Therefore it follows, that
there is something peculiar in the very nature of saving faith, that remains in
times even of greatest doubt, and even at those times distinguishes it from ail
common faith.
I now proceed, II. To show that it does not consist only in the difference
of effects. The supposition that I would disprove is this, That there is no dif-
ference between saving faith and common faith as to their nature : all the dif-
ference lies in this, that in him that is in a state of salvation, faith produce*
anothei effect ; it works another way ; it produces a settled determination of
mind, to walk in a way of universal and persevering obedience. In the unre-
generate, although his faith be the same with that of the regenerate, and he has
the same assent of his understanding to the truths of the gospel, yet it does not
prove effectual to bring him to such a resolution and answerable practice. In
opposition to this notion, I would observe,
638 CONCERNING FAITH.
1. That it is contrary to the reason of mankind, to suppose different effects,
without any difference in the cause. It has ever been counted to be good rea-
soning from the effect to the cause ; and it is a way of reasoning that common
sense leads mankind to. But if, from a different effect, there is no arguing any
difference in the cause, this way of reasoning must be given up. If there be a
difference in the effect, that does not arise from some difference in the cause,
then there is something in the effect that proceeds not from its cause, viz., that
diversity ; because there is no diversity in the cause to answer it : therefore, that
diversity must arise from nothing, and consequently there is no effect of any thing ;
which is contrary to the supposition. So this hypothesis is at once reduced to
a contradiction. If there be a difference in the effect, that difference must arise
from something ; and that which it arises from, let it be what it will, must be
the cause of it. And if faith be the cause of this diversity in the effect, as is
supposed, then I would ask, what is there in faith, that can be the cause of this
diversity, seeing there is no diversity in the faith to answer it ? To say that the
diversity of the effect arises from likeness or sameness in the cause, is a gross
and palpable absurdity ; and is as much as to say, that difference is produced
by no difference : which is the same thing as to say, that nothing produces
something.
2. If there were a difference in the effects of faith, but no difference in the
faith itself, then no difference of faith could be showed by the effects. But that
is contrary to Scripture, and particularly to James ii. 18 : " Yea a man m ay say,
Thou hast faith, and I have works : show me thy faith without thy works, and
I will show thee my faith by my works." The apostle can mean nothing else
by this, than that I will show thee by my works that I have a right sort of
faith. I will show thee that my faith is a better faith than that of those who
have no worlds. I will show thee the difference of the causes, by the difference of
the effect. This the apostle thought good arguing. Christ thought it was
good arguing to argue the difference of the tree from the difference of the fruits ,
Matt. xii. 33, " A tree is known by its fruit." How can this be, when there
is no difference in the tree ? When the nature of the tree is the same, and
when, indeed, though there be a difference of the effects, there is no difference
at all in the faith that is the cause 1 An if there is no difference in the faith
that is the cause, the/i certainly no difference can be shown by the effects.
When we see two human bodies, and see actions performed and works produced
by the one, and not by the other, we determine that there is an internal differ-
ence in the bodies themselves : we conclude that one is alive, and the other
dead ; that one has an operative nature, an active spirit in it, and that the other
has none ; which is a very essential difference in the causes themselves. Just
so we argue an essential difference between a saving and common faith, by the
works or effects produced ; as the apostle in that context observes, in the last
verse of the chapter : " For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith with-
out works is dead also."
I come now, in the second place, to show wherein saving faith differs essen-
tially from common faith : and shall endeavor to prove what I lay down from
the Scripture, which will give further evidence to the truth of the doctrine.
There is in the nature and essence of saving faith, a receiving of the object
of faith, not only in the assent of the judgment, but with the heart, or with tht
inclination and will of the soul. There is in saving faith, a receiving of the
truth, not only with the assent of the mind, but with the consent of the heart ;
is is evident by 2 Thess. ii. 10 : " Received not the love of the truth that they
uiignt be saved." And the apostle, describing the nature of saving faith, from
CONCERNING FAITH. 639
the example of the ancient patriarchs, Heb. xi., describes their faith thus, verse
13 : " These all died in faith, not having received the promises ; but, having seen
them afar off, were persuaded of them, and embraced them." And so the
Evangelist John calls faith a receiving of Christ ; John i. 12, " But as many as
received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them
that believed on his name." Here the apostle expressly declares, that he whom
he means by a receiver, was the same with a believer on Christ, or one that
has saving faith. And what else can be meant by receiving Christ, or accept-
ing him, than an accepting him in heart ? It is not a taking him with the hand,
or any external taking or accepting him, but the acceptance of the mind. The
acceptance of the mind is the act of the mind towards an object as acceptable,
but that in a special manner, as the act of the inclination or will. And it is
farther evident, that saving faith has its seat not only in the speculative under-
standing or judgment, but in the heart or will ; because otherwise, it is not pro-
perly of the nature of a virtue, or any part of the moral goodness of the mind :
for virtue has its special and immediate seat in the will ; and that qualification,
that is not at all seated there, though it be a cause of virtue, or an erTect of it,
yet is not properly any virtue of the mind, nor can properly be in itself a
moral qualification, or any fulfilment of a moral rule. But it is evident, that
saving faith is one of the chief virtues of a saint, one of the greatest virtues pre-
scribed in the moral law of God. Matth. xxiii. 23, " Wo unto you, Scribes and
Pharisees, hypocrites ; for ye pay tithe of mint, and anise, and cummin, and
have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith :
these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone." It is a prin-
cipal duty that God required : John vi. 28, 29, " Then said they unto him, What
shall we do that we may work the works of God ? Jesus answered and said
unto them, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom God hath
sent." 1 John iii. 23, " And this is his commandment, that ye believe on the
name of his Son Jesus Christ, and love one another, as he gave us command-
ment." And therefore it is called most holy faith, Jude 20. But if it be not
seated in the will, it is no more a holy faith, than the faith of devils. That it
is most holy, implies, that it is one thing wherein Christian holiness does princi-
pally consist.
An objection may be raised against this last particular, viz., that the words
faith and believing, in common language, signify no more than the assent of the
understanding.
Answer 1. It is not at all strange, that in matters of divinity and of the
gospel of Christ, which are so exceedingly diverse from the common concerns
of life, and so much above them, some words should be used in somewhat of a
peculiar sense. The languages used among the nations of the world, were not
first framed to express the spiritual and supernatural things of the gospel of
Christ, but the common concernments of human life. Hence it comes to pass,
that language in its common U4>e, is not exactly adapted to express things of
this nature; so that there is a necessity, that when the phrases of common
speech are adopted into the gospel of Christ, they should some of them be used
in a sense somewhat diverse from the most ordinary use of them in temporal
concerns. Words were first devised to signify the more ordinary concerns of
life : hence, men find a necessity, even in order to express many things in
human arts and sciences, to use words in something of a peculiar sense ; the
sense being somewhat varied from their more ordinary use ; and the very same
words, as terms of art, do not signify exactly the same thing that they do in
common speech. This is well known to be the case in innumerable instances ;
640 CONCERNING FAITH.
because the concerns of the arts and sciences are so diverse from the common
concerns of life, that unless some phrases were adopted out of common language,
and their signification something varied, there would be no words at all to be
found to signify such and such things pertaining to those arts. But the things
of the gospel of Christ are vastly more diverse from the common concerns of
life, than the things of human arts and sciences : those things being heavenly
things, and of the most spiritual and sublime nature possible, and most diverse
from earthly things. Hence the use of words in common language, must not
be looked upon as a universal rule to determine the signification of words in
the gospel : but the rule is the use of words in Scripture language. What is
found in fact to be the use of words in the Bible, by comparing one place with
another, that must determine the sense in which we must understand them.
Answer 2. The words in the original, translated faith and believing, such
as marig, TTiaievm. nEt&m, and 7Z87Toi&rj(7igf as often used in common language, im-
plied more than the mere assent of the understanding : they were often used to
signify affiance or trusting ; which implies an act of the will, as well as of the
understanding : it implies, that the thing believed is received as good and agree-
able, as well as true. For trusting always relates to some good sought and
aimed at in our trust ; and therefore evermore implies the acceptance of the
heart, and the embracing of the inclination, and desire of the soul. And there-
fore, trusting in Christ for salvation implies, that he and his redemption, and
those things wherein his salvation consists, are agreeable and acceptable to us.
Answer 3. Supposing saving faith to be what Calvinistical divines have
ordinarily supposed it to be, there seems to be no one word in common language,
so fit to express it, as faith, mazig, as it most commonly is in the original. Or-
thodox divines, in the definitions of faith, do not all use exactly the same terms,
but they generally come to the same thing. Their distinctions generally signify
as much as a person's receiving Christ and his salvation as revealed in the gos-
pel, with his whole soul ; acquiescing in what is exhibited as true, excellent and
sufficient for him. And to express this complex act of the mind, I apprehend no
word can be found more significant than faith, which signifies both assenting and
consenting : because the object of the act is wholly supernatural, and above the
reach of mere reason, and therefore exhibited only by revelation and divine tes-
timony : and the person to be believed in, is exhibited and offered in that revela-
tion, especially under the character of a Saviour, and so, as an object of trust :
and the benefits are all spiritual, invisible, wonderful and future. If this be the
true account of faith, beware how you entertain any such doctrine, as that there
is no essential difference between common and saving faith ; and that both consist
in a mere assent of the understanding to the doctrines of religion. That this doc-
trine is false, appears by what has been said ; and if it be false, it must needs be
exceedingly dangerous. Saving faith, as you well know, is abundantly insisted
on in the Bible, as in a peculiar manner the condition of salvation ; being the
thing by which we are justified. How much is that doctrine insisted on in the
New Testament ! We are said to be "justified by faith, and by faith alone :
By faith we are saved ; and this is the work of God, that we believe on
him whom he hath sent : The just shall live by faith : We are all the children of
God by faith in Jesus Christ : He that believeth shall be saved, and he that be-
lieveth not shall be damned." Therefore, doubtless, saving faith, whatsoever
that be, is the grand condition of interest in Christ, and his great salvation. And
if it be so, of what vast importance is it, that we should have right notions of
what it is? For certainly no one thing whatever, nothing in religion is of
greater importance, than that which teaches lis how we may be saved If
CONCERNING FAITH. 641
salvation itself be of infinite importance, then it is of equal importance that we
do not mistake the terms of it ; and if this be of infinite importance, then that
doctrine that teaches that to be the term, that is not so, but very diverse, is infinitely
dangerous. What we want a revelation Irom God for chiefly, is, to teach us
the terms of his favor, and the way of salvation. And that which the revela-
tion God has given us in the Bible teaches to be the way, is faith in Christ.
Therefore, that doctrine that teaches something else to be saving faith, that is
essentially another thing, teaches entirely another way of salvation : and there-
fore such doctrine does in effect make void the revelation we have in the Bible ;
as it makes void the special end of it, which is to teach us the true way of sal-
vation. The gospel is the revelation of the way of life by faith in Christ
Therefore, he who teaches something else to be that faith, which is essentially
diverse from what the gospel of Christ teaches, he teaches another gospel ; and
he does in effect teach another religion than the religion of Christ. For what
is religion, but that way of exercising our respect to God, which is the term of
his favor and acceptance to a title to eternal rewards 1 The Scripture teaches
this, in a special manner, to be saving faith in Jesus Christ. Therefore, he that
teaches another faith instead of this, teaches another religion. Such doctrine
as I have opposed, must be destructive and damning, i. e., directly tending to
man's damnation ; leading such as embrace it, to rest in something essentially
different from the grand condition of salvation. And therefore, I would advise
fou, as you would have any regard to your own soul's salvation, and to the sal-
ration of your posterity, to beware of such doctrine as this.
END OP VOL O.
Vol. XL 81
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