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From the Library of
Henry Goldman, Ph.D.
1886-1972
THE
WORKS OF PLATO:
A NEW AND LITERAL VERSION,
CHIEFLY FROM THE TEXT OF STALLBAUM.
VOL. Fit
CONTAINING
MENO, EUTHYDEMUS, THE SOPHIST, THE STATESMAN,
CRATYLUS, PARMENIDES, AND THE BANQUET.
BY GEORGE BURGES, M. A.
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
LONDON :
HENRY G. BOHN, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
MDCCCL,
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PREFACE.
THE present portion of the works of Plato having been
placed in my hands for translation, I undertook the
task the more readily, as it enabled me to renew my
acquaintance with an author to whose writings I formerly
paid considerable attention.
It is now more than five and twenty years since 1
prepared for the press, for Mr. Priestley, his variorum
edition of Plato, published in 1826; for which object I
carefully examined whatever had been contributed by
my predecessors, especially Routh, Fischer, Wytten-
bach, Heusde, Heindorf, Buttman, Bekker, Ast, Schnei-
der,and Stallbaum. Since then I have from time to time
read or looked into the more recent publications illus-
trative of my author, and therefore feel myself competent
to pronounce an opinion on their labours.
The seven Dialogues contained in the present volume
are confessedly among the most difficult, and this chiefly
because, with the exception of the Parmenides, they are
the most corrupt. Hence I have found myself compelled
to write longer and more frequent notes than would
otherwise have been requisite; and sometimes, with the
view of arriving at the probable meaning of the author,
to suggest new readings.
G. B.
November, 1850.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
PREFACE ᾿ ‘ Z ‘ . ; . . 7 yen
INTRODUCTION TO THE MENO . : 2 : ξ 3
MENO, or RESPECTING VIRTUE . : : : 4 τι.
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYDEMUs . : : = ᾿ Ἶ 49
EUTHYDEMUS . ᾿ y ἑ : : Ἢ ᾿ J - ol
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST ‘ : : Α : ἐς | OR
THE SOPHIST . A : ; ; - : ᾿ 3 . 103
‘INTRODUCTION TO THE STATESMAN. : Ν Ξ ᾿ . ἘΤΕΣ
THE STATESMAN. » ἑ : ‘ Ἶ ‘ 3 . 189
INTRODUCTION ΤῸ THE CRATYLUS : . : t ᾿ . an
CRATYLUS $ Α = : : ; : ᾿ κ᾿ . 283
INTRODUCTION TO THE PARMENIDES - 5 ‘ ς ‘ » 897
PARMENIDES, or on Ipgairigs : . 3 4 d . 401
INTRODUCTION TO THE Banquet’ : ; : 5 ‘ 471
THE BANQUET, or on Love . : : : - ; . 473
INTRODUCTION TO THE MENO.
OR
RESPECTING VIRTUE.
Tue object of this dialogue is to inquire into the nature of Virtue
in the abstract; to ascertain whether it can or cannot be taught ;
and to show that the knowledge we now possess is but the recollec-
tion of what the mind was conversant with at some former period.
On the first of these points Plato, as usual, arrives at no conclu-
sion. For Socrates, who is merely Plato’s mouth-piece, and not, as
many imagine, the exponent of his own opinions, never pretended to
know any thing in the abstract. He was therefore content to show,
that for the development of Virtue a correct moral conduct, founded
on prudence, temperance, and justice, is all that is requisite.
ith regard to the question, whether Virtue can or cannot be
taught, we are told that, as Virtue is not a science, it cannot, like
a science, be made the subject of teaching; and that the virtuous
person is such, rather by an act of the deity than by any efforts
made by man.
Of the speakers, the principal is Meno, a Thessalian, who had been
a pupil of Gorgias, and is supposed to be the person mentioned by
Xenophon in the Anabasis, where his character is drawn in the
darkest colours, and reflecting to the life the conduct of those, who
had been taught by the Sophists of Greece :—
* querenda pecunia primum ;
Virtus post nummos.”
Seek money first ; and virtue after coin.
Towards the latter part of the dialogue, Anytus, best known as
one of the accusers of Socrates, is introduced, as taking accidentally
a share in the conversation ; partly because he was Meno’s host ;
B
“2
»92
2 INTRODUCTION TO THE MENO.
but more, perhaps, with the view of enabling Plato to show, that
the answers which Anytus gives to questions on political subjects,
were less sensible than those, given by his own slave on geometrical
problems; and this too, although the former had been under the
cleverest masters, and the latter was merely self-taught.
MENO.
MENO, SOCRATES.
[1.1 Meno. Can! you tell me, Socrates, is virtue to be
taught? or is it to be not taught, but acquired by (mental)
exercise ?? or does it come to man neither by (mental) exer-
cise, nor teaching, but by nature, or some other means ?
Socrates. The Thessalians, Meno, have been of old in great
repute among the Grecians, and admired for their skill in
horsemanship,’ and for their wealth; and now, I think, (they
are) no less so for their wisdom. And not the least so, are
the fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus of Larissa. Now
of this Gorgias is the cause. For when he came to the city
(of Larissa), he so captivated the chiefs of the Aleuade,® one
of whom is your friend Aristippus, and those of the other
Thessalian families, that they fell in love with him for his
wisdom.® And in truth this custom has habituated you to
answer fearlessly and with a high bearing, if any one asks
a question; as indeed becomes those who know a subject
1 From the very abrupt opening of the dialogue, some persons have
supposed that the original commencement has been lost. But something
similar occurs in the Cratylus and Philebus.
2 The same question is touched upon in the Protagoras.
35. See Plato’s Hipp. Maj. Suidas in Ἱππεῖς λευκοθώρακες, and the
Ζεύξις and {π6 Ἔρωτες of Lucian. S.
4 This is ironical. For Plutarch relates that, when Simonides was
asked why he had not deceived the Thessalians, he replied, ‘‘ They are
too ignorant to be deceived by me.” GEDIKE.
5 This was the noblest family in Larissa. They were descended from
Aleuas, one of the kings of Thessaly, of the race of Hercules.
6 Hence Philostratus, in the Proeme to his Lives of the Sophists,
says, ἦρξε τῆς ἀρχαιοτέρας [sc. σοφιστικῆς] Topyiac ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐν
Θετταλοῖς.
B 2
4 MENO.
thoroughly. Since he’ too offered himself for any of the Greeks
to interrogate him on any matter he might think proper; and
there was not one, to whom he did not give an answer. But
here, friend Meno, the very reverse has occurred. There is, as it
were, a dearth of wisdom ; and there is a danger, that wisdom
has departed from this country, and has fled to yours. Should
you then be willing to put this question to any one here, there
is not a man who would not laugh and say, “I run the risk,
stranger, of seeming to you to be one of the blessed,* in know-
ing whether virtue is to be taught, or comes by any other
means whatever; since I am so far from knowing whether it
is to be taught or not, that I happen not to know what virtue
is at all.” Now this, Meno, is my own case. [2.] I am in
the same poverty of knowledge as my fellow-citizens in this
affair; and I blame myself for being totally ignorant of virtue.
How then can I know the quality of that, of which I know
nothing? Or do you think it possible for a man, wholly
ignorant, who Meno is, to know whether Meno is a handsome,
or rich, or generous spirit, or the reverse of all these charac-
ters? [Do you think it possible? 79
Meno. I do not. But in good sooth, Socrates, do you really
not know what virtue is? and shall I send home this report
of you?
Soc. Not only that, my friend, but this further—that I
never met any where with any person who, as I think, (did
know).
Meno. Did you never then meet with Gorgias, when he
was here ?
Soc. I did.
Meno. And did he not seem to you to know?
Soc. I do not perfectly remember, Meno; so that I am not
able to say at present what I then thought of him. But per-
haps both he knew himself, and you too, what he said. Do
you then bring to my recollection what he said; or, if you
7 On this boldness of Gorgias thus challenging persons to try his powers
as a sophist, see Plato Gorg. p. 447, D., and Cicero De Finib., from
which it would appear that he was the "admirable Creighton of his day.
* By μακάριος is meant not simply blessed, but blessed as a god. So
Cicero in Tuscul. i. 11, “ Harum sententiarum que vera sit, deus aliquis
viderit.”” GEDIKE.
® This clause, properly rejected as a needless repetition by Gedike, is
vainly defended by Heindorf on Charmid. ᾧ 33.
MENO. 5
would rather, tell it in your own words ; for surely you agree
with him in opinion,
Meno. I do.
Soc. Let us then put him aside ; especially as he is absent.
But, by the gods, do you, Meno, tell me yourself what you
assert virtue to be; and do not grudge me (the knowledge of
it), in order that I may have uttered a most fortunate untruth,
should both you and Gorgias appear (to know), what I said
I had never met with a person (who did know).
[8.1 Meno. Nay, Socrates, it is by no means difficult to
tell. In the first place, if you wish (me to tell) the virtue of
a man, it is easy (to say) that a man’s virtue consists in his
being competent to manage the affairs of the state, and, man-
aging them, to do good to its friends, evil to its enemies,
and to take care that he suffers himself nothing of that kind.
Then, if you wish to know the virtue of a woman, it is not
difficult to go through (the particulars): that it is to manage
well the affairs of her family, to keep safe the things in the
house, and to hearken to her husband. Another kind of virtue
is that of a child, either a girl or boy; and of a man advanced
in years; and, if you choose (to go on), of a free-man and of
a slave. Many more virtues are there, of all kinds; so that
there is no want of power to tell concerning virtue, what it
is. For in every action, and in every age of life, and for
every kind of business, there is (a peculiar) virtue to each per-
son: and similarly, Socrates, I think, there is (a peculiar) vice.
Soc. I think myself greatly indeed favoured by fortune,
Meno. For, when I was only in quest of one virtue, I have
found, it seems, a whole swarm of virtues hiving with you.
But with regard to this simile, taken from bees, had I, Meno,
asked you respecting the nature of a bee, and you had told
me that bees were many and various, what answer would you
have given me, had I demanded of you further—Do you call
them many and various, and differing one from another, in
respect of their being bees; or do they differ not in this
respect, but with regard to something else, as beauty, or size,
or any other thing of a like kind? Tell me, what answer
would you have made, had you been so questioned ?
Meno. I (would have answered) thus; that so far as they
are bees, they differ not at all one from another.
Soc. Had I then afterwards said—Tell me now, Meno, con-
6 MENO.
cerning this very thing, in respect of which they do not differ,
but are all the same ; what say you is this? Would you have
had any thing to say?
Meno. 1 should.
[4.] Soc. Just so it is with the virtues. Although they
are many indeed, and of various kinds, yet they all agree in
one and the same idea, through which they are virtues; and
to which it is well for him to look, who by his answer would
point out to the inquirer what virtue happens to be. Do you
not comprehend what I am saying ?
Meno. I think Ido. But I do not grasp, as I could wish,
the question.
Soc. Do you think only after this manner concerning virtue,
that the virtue of a man is one thing, the virtue of a woman
another thing, and so of the other virtues, (that they are all
different)? or have you the same way (of thinking) as regards
health, size, and strength? Do you consider the health of a
man to be one thing, the health of a woman to be another?
or is the same kind (of health) every where, wherever health
is, whether it be in a man, or in any other subject whatever ?
Meno. The health of a man and of a woman, I think, is the
same thing.
Soc. (The same then applies to) size and strength. A
woman, if she be strong, is strong according to the same
idea, and with the same strength, (as applies to a
man). By the same strength I mean this. That whether
strength be in a man, or in a woman, as regards the existence
of strength, there is no difference; or do you think there is
a difference ?
Meno. I think there is not.
Soc. Will there be any difference in virtue, with respect
to its being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an aged
person, in ἃ woman or in a man?
Meno. This case, Socrates, seems to me somehow to be not
quite similar to the other.
Soc. Why? Did you not tell me that the virtue of a man
consisted in his well managing a state, and that of a woman,
in well managing a household ?
Meno. I did.
Soc. Is it, then, possible to manage well a state or household,
or any thing else whatever, without justice and prudence.
MENO. 7
Meno. By no means.
Soc. If then the management be just and prudent, will not
the managers manage with justice and with prudence?
Meno. They will of necessity.
Soc. Both of them, therefore, the woman and the man,
have need of the same things, (namely,) justice and prudence,
if they are about to be good (managers).
Meno. It appears so.!°
Soc. What then, can a child, or an old man, ever be good,
if dissolute and dishonest ?
Meno. By no means.
Soc. But only if sober and honest ?
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. All persons, surely, are good in the same way; for
they are good by possessing the same qualities.
Meno. It seems so.
Soc. Now, if virtue were not the same in them (all), they
surely would not be good in the same way.
Meno. They would not.
[5.1 Soc. Since then the virtue is the same in them all,
endeavour to recollect and tell!! me, what says Gorgias of it,
and you with him.
Meno. What else is it than to be able to govern men?
If you are in search of one thing, applicable to all (persons).
Soc. It is the very thing I am in search of. But is this
then the same virtue of a child, Meno, and of a slave, to be
able? to govern their master? Do you think that he who
rules would be still a slave ὃ
Meno. I do not think he would, Socrates, at all.
Soc. For it is not reasonable, my very good (friend). Con-
sider this again.'* You say (it is virtue) to be able to govern.
Shall we not subjoin the (word) justly, but not, unjustly.
Meno. I think so. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.
Soc. Is it, Meno, virtue, or some virtue?
10 Instead of φαίνονται, one MS. has correctly φαίνεται. The other
reading would be at variance with the sense.
Nl Sydenham has thus tacitly corrected the collocation of the words
εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι.
12 The common text offers some difficulties, which no critic has suc-
cessfully overcome.
18 Ficin. “ rursus,”’ from whence Stalb. and Buttm. would read δ᾽ αὖ
for γὰρ. y
8 MENO.
Meno. How say you this?
Soc. As respecting any thing else whatever. For instance,
if you please, respecting roundness, I would say that it is a
figure, and not thus absolutely that it is figure. And I should
say so for this reason, because there are other figures.
Meno. You would thus speak rightly. Since I too myself
not only say that justice is a virtue, but that there are other
virtues.
Soc. Say what these other (virtues) are; as I would, were
you to bid me, tell you other figures beside the round. Do
you then likewise mention to me other virtues beside justice.
Meno. Well then, courage, I think, is a virtue, and tem-
perance, and wisdom, and a lofty bearing, and a great many
other (qualities).
Soc. Again, Meno, we have met with the same thing as
before. We have again found many virtues, while in search
of only one, but in a different way from that just now: but the
one virtue, which pervades all these, we are not able to find.
[6.] Meno. For I am not able as yet, Socrates, to lay hold
of one such virtue as you are seeking, applicable to all, as in
the other instances.
Soc. Probably so; but I will show a readiness to urge our-
selves onward, if I can. Already you apprehend, in some
measure, that thus matters stand as regards every thing. For
had any person asked you, what was figure, the thing I just
now mentioned, and you had said it was roundness, had he
then said to you, as I did, Is roundness figure, or a figure?
you would surely have said, It is a figure.
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. And for this reason, because there are other figures ?
Meno. For that very reason.
Soc. And had he asked you further, of what sort those
other figures were, you would have told them.
Meno. I should.
Soc. And had he asked you in the same manner concern-
ing colour, what it is? If you had answered, It is whiteness ;
would not the interrogator have taken you immediately up with
this question—Is whiteness colour, or a colour ? and you would
have said, A colour ; because there happen to be other colours.
Meno. I should.
Soc. And if he had bidden you to enumerate such other
MENO. 9
colours, you would have mentioned those, which happen to be
colours no less than white.
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. If then he had pursued the argument as I do, and
said—We are always getting into a multitude. Do not (speak)
thus to me. But since you call all this multitude by one
name, and assert that there is none of them which is not
figure ; and this too, notwithstanding they are contrary to one
another ;'* what! is this thing which comprehends the round
as well as the straight, this to which you give the name of
figure ; and yet you say that the round is figure not more than
the straight? or do you not say this?
Meno. I do.
Soc. When you speak thus, do you mean that the round is
not more round than is the straight ? and that the straight is
not more straight than is the round ?
Meno. I do not mean this, Socrates.
Soe. But you mean that the round is not more a figure
than is the straight, nor is this than the other.
Meno. You say what is true.
[7.] Soe. Endeavour then to tell me—What is that thing
which is called by the name.of figure? Now if to an inquirer
in this way concerning figure, or colour, you had said, I do
not comprehend what it is you would have, man, nor do I
know what it is you mean: he perhaps would have wondered,
and said, Do you not comprehend that I am inquiring what
is the same in all these? Would you have had nothing to
say even after this, Meno, had one inquired—What is that
applicable to the round, and to the straight, and to the other
things which you call figures, being the same for all? Endea-
vour to tell me what it is, in order that you may be ready,
by practice, to give a reply to the question respecting virtue.
Meno. Not so, Socrates ; but do you yourself rather say
what figure is.
Soc. Would you have me oblige you in this point ?
Meno. By all means.
Soc. Shall you then be ie to tell me what virtue is?
Meno. 1 shall.
15. Since rectilinear figures are contrary to circles. S.
15. So Gedike ; who reads ri for 6, τι, But the whole passage is scarcely
intelligible; and so, I suspect, is Stalbaum’s German version of it.
10 MENO.
Soc. Let me then show my readiness; for the cause is
worthy of it.
Meno. Without all doubt.
Soc. Come then; let us try if we can tell you what
is. See if you can accept it, as being this. Let then figure
be that which of all things is the only one, that always hap-
pens to accompany colour. Does this suffice you? or do you
seek for any thing further? For I should be thus content, if
you would tell me virtue."
Meno. But, Socrates, this surely is silly.
Soc. How so?
Meno. According to your account, figure is that which
always accompanies colour.
Soc. Be it so.'®
[8.] Meno. But should any person assert, that he knew
not what colour was, and was equally at a loss concerning
colour and concerning figure, what answer do you think you
would have given him?
Soc. That I had answered with truth. And if the questioner
happened to be one of the wise men, fond of dispute and
contention, I would tell him—*“ 1 had spoken; and that, if I
had not spoken rightly, it was your business to take up the
discourse, and to refute me.” But if two parties, such as you
and I here, were inclined to have a discourse together, as
friends, they ought to answer each other in a milder and more
conversational manner. Now it is perhaps more conversa-
tional to answer not only truthfully, but in terms which the
party questioned confesses he understands.!7_ Accordingly, I
shall now attempt to make you such a kind of answer. For
tell me; do you call a certain thing by the name of end? I
mean such a thing as bound or extreme? For by all these
15. From Sydenham’s translation, “1 should be well contented, if you
would give me but as good an account of virtue,’’ it is easy to see, that
he wished to read, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπῴην, εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν οὕτως εἴποις :
which would make a far better sense than the received text, ἐγὼ γὰρ
κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην, εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.
16 Heusde and Heindorf on Cratyl. p. 410, C., throw the Greek word
elev, commonly given to Socrates, into the speech of Meno. For εἶεν is
similarly introduced in Alcib. i. p. 106, A., where see Buttmann.
1 Instead of ἐρωτώμενος, “ questioned,” Cornari suggested ἐρόμενος,
“ questioning,”” which, though approved of by Schleiermacher and Butt-
mann, is rejected by Stalbaum.
ΜΕΝΟ. ll
words I mean the same thing. Prodicus, indeed, might pos-
sibly differ from us; but you at least would say, that a thing
has been bounded, or, has had an end. ‘This is what I mean
to say; nothing many-coloured.
Meno. Well, I do call (something end): and I think I un-
derstand what you mean.
Soe. And do you not call something a superficies? and
another thing a solid? such as are in geometry.
Meno. Yes, I do.
Soc. Now then, from these (premises) you can understand
what I mean by figure. For in every figure, that which
bounds the solid, I say, is figure; which (idea) I would con-
cisely express by saying that figure is the bound of solid.
[9.1 Meno. And what say you colour is?
Soc. You are a saucy fellow, Meno. You impose upon an
old man the task of answering; yet are unwilling yourself to
recollect and tell (me) what Gorgias said that virtue was.
Meno. But I will tell, after you have told me this, (what
colour is).
Soe. A man with his eyes hoodwinked might perceive from
your way of conversing, Meno, that you are handsome, and
still have your admirers.
Meno. How so?
Soc. Because you do nothing but command in conversation;
as foppish'* fellows do, as being lordlings, so long as they are
in the prime of beauty; and at the same time you have per-
haps convicted me, as being subdued by beauty. I will there-
fore gratify you and give an answer.
Meno. By all means do gratify me.
Soc. Do you wish me to answer like Gorgias,!9 so that you
may most easily follow me?
Meno. I do wish it. How not?
Soc. Do not you and Gorgias say, according to Empedo-
cles,”° that certain effluvia proceed from bodies ?
18 The French “ petit-maitres”’ is perhaps the best modern version of
τρυφῶντες applied to young men.
19 Gorgias asserted that the qualities of things were perceived by the
five outward senses, through small and invisible bodies, continually flow-
ing from the larger and visible. Thus odours, whether fragrant or fcetid,
were held to be the effluvia of isa odoriferous, affecting agreeably or
disagreeably the olfactory nerves.
= precio, a Pythagorean ἀκ κταλοΣ of Agrigentum in Sicily,
12 MENO.
Meno. We do so firmly.
Soc. And that there are certain pores, to which and through
which those effluvia pass ?
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. And that of those effluvia, some are fitted to some οἱ
these pores, but that others are less or greater?
Meno. It is so.
Soe. And do you not call something sight ?
Meno. I do.
Soc. From these (premises) “ Understand,” as Pindar has
said, “ what I am saying.” Colour then is the flowing off
from figures, agreeing with the sight, and by it perceived.”4
Meno. In this answer, Socrates, I think you have spoken as
well as possible.
Soc. (You say so) perhaps because this has been said ac-
cording to your habits; and because at the same time you per-
ceive, I imagine, that you are able from thence to state what
is sound,” and smell, and many other things of the like kind.
Meno. It really is so.
Soc. The answer, Meno, was tragical ;7> and soit was more
agreeable to you than that relating to figure.
wrote a poem in three books concerning nature, on the principles of Py-
thagoras. His theory was that the four elements of the universe, fire,
water, earth, and air, were not irregular and infinite, as the Atomic and
Atheistic philosophers imagined, but formed by rule in number and in
measure, as being the work of mind. His poetry [the fragments of which
have been collected by Sturz] was deemed by the ancients in point of ver-
sification equal to that of Homer. On the publication of his poem, the
Pythagoreans expelled him from their society, and at the same time made
a law, that from henceforth no poet should be admitted a member of
their body. Ss.
* Aristotle in his treatise Περὲ Αἰσθήσεως καὶ Αἰσθητῶν, says that
Empedocles held the eye, that is, the sight of the eye, to be fire; and
vision to be produced by the emission of light from the eye, as from a
lantern. S. Plato in Tim. p. 67, B., describes colour, as φλόγα τῶν
σωμάτων ἑκάστων ἀπορρέουσαν, ὄψει σύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς
αἴσθησιν: from whence one would read here σωμάτων in lieu of
σχημάτων.
33 Thus sound was said to be air, violently forced out of some body
stricken, and propagating its motion by strokes continually repeated along
the air, until it reached the ear; that odours were the subtle effluvia of
bodies, conveyed along the air to the organ of smell; and that from
bodies applied to the palate, juices were expressed, insinuating them-
selves into the pores of the organ of taste. S.
33 The commentators explain τραγικὴ by saying that the language ot
MENO. 13
Meno. To me it was.
Soc. And yet, son of Alexidemus, I persuade myself, that
not {815,25 but that, was the better answer. I conceive too,
that you would not have thought thus, unless, as you said yes-
terday, there was necessity for you to go away before the
mysteries. But if you could stay and be initiated, * * **
Meno. But if you would tell me many such things, I would
certainly stay.
Soc. In my best endeavours to say such things I shall not
be wanting, for my own sake as well as yours. But (I fear)
I shall not be able to say much in that way. [10.] But
come now, and try yourself to perform your promise, by speak-
ing of virtue, what it is in general: and cease making many
out of one; as persons say perpetually, when bantering those,
who pound any thing to pieces ;*° but leaving virtue whole
and entire, tell me what it is. Patterns of such a definition
you have had from me.
Meno. I think then, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says,
In what is fair, to feel a joy,
And (0’er it) to have power
and this, I say, is virtue—for him who has a desire for beau-
tiful things, to be able to obtain them.
Soc. Do you mean that the person, who desires beautiful
things, has a desire for good things ?
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. Is it that there are some who have a desire for evil
things, and others, who have a desire for good things? Do
you not think, my good (friend), that all men desire good things?
Meno. I do not.
Soc. But that some desire evil things?
Meno. I do.
Empedocles was inflated like that of tragedy. But as there is nothing of
that kind in the answer given by Socrates, the real meaning of τραγικὴ
remains still to be discovered.
* There is nothing in the Greek to answer to “ (815. Hence Buttmann
was led to read Οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν, ὦ wai—He should have suggested
Οὔχ ἐστιν αὕτη, ὦ rai—For thus αὕτη might easily have dropt out be-
fore ὦ παῖ. ;
* Here is a lacuna. The sense to be supplied is evidently ‘you
would learn something perhaps not far from the truth;” as Gedike was
the first to remark.
35. On this saying Stalbaum refers to Erasm. Adag. p. 266, ed. Steph.
14 MENO.
Soc. Say you that these men desire evil things, conceiving
them to be good? or, knowing them to be evil, do they still
desire them ?
Meno. Both these events, I think, occur.
Soc. Is there any man, think you, who, knowing evil Οὐδὲν
to be evil, yet nevertheless desires them ?
Meno. Without doubt.
Soc. What do you mean, by desiring them? Is it not that
he may have them ?
Meno. To have them. For what else (can I mean)?
Soc. Does he imagine that evil things profit the person
who has them, or does he know that evil things are hurtful,
to whomsoever they are present ?
Meno. There are those who think that evil things are
profitable ; and those who know them to be hurtful.
Soc. Do you think that they know evil things to be evil,
who imagine such evil things to be profitable ὃ
Meno. By no means do I think that.
Soc. Is it not then evident, that those who do not desire evil
things know not the nature of the things (they desire) ; but
(rather), that they desire things which they imagine to be good,
but which are in reality evil? So that they, who are igno-
rant of them, and imagine them to be good, do, it is plain,
desire good things. Do they not ἢ
Meno. They seem to be.
Soc. But they who desire evil things, as you say, conceiv-
ing at the same time that evil things are hurtful to the pos-
sessor, surely know that they will be harmed by those (evil
things).
Meno. This must be.
Soc. But do they not think, that such as are harmed are
in an evil plight, so far as they are harmed?
Meno. This also must be.
Soc. And that those in evil plight are unhappy ?
Meno. Assuredly.
Soc. Is there a man, then, who wishes to be in evil plight,??
and to be unhappy ?
Meno. I think not any, Socrates.
27 Aristotle, in Nicomach. Eth. iii. 5, ag probably from Euripides,
a similar sentiment: Οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς, οὐδ᾽ ἄκων μάκαρ: “ None
willingly is pained, nor gainst his will Blessed.” 5.
ὌΝ τ τ “““ῦῖῖ΄τ΄“ρ““ “μή
MENO. 15
Soc. No man then, Meno, wishes for evils; unless he
wishes to be such. For what else is it to be unhappy, than
to desire evil things, and to possess them ?
Meno. You are saying, Socrates, what is nearly true. For
no man wishes evil things.
[11.1 Soe. Did you not say just now, that virtue consisted
in the wishing for, and having a power over, good things ?
Meno. I did say so.
Soc. From what has been said,?9 is not this a wish to all men?
and in this respect one man is not better than another ?
Meno. It appears so.
Soc. But it is clear, that if one man is better than another,
he would be so in respect of his power.
Meno. Undoubtedly.
Soc. This then, as it seems, according to your account, is
virtue, the power of obtaining good things.
Meno. 'The case seems to me, Socrates, to be entirely so, as
you now understand it.
Soc. Let us see then if this too you say truly: for perhaps
you will say well. You say, that to be able to gain good
things is virtue.
Meno. I do.
Soc. Do you not call good things such as health and wealth ?
And I say,* to possess gold and silver, and honours in the state,
and magistracies? You do not speak of any other things as
good, except things of this kind ?
Meno. No other ; I mean all such sort of things.
Soc. Well then, to get money is virtue; as Meno says, the
hereditary guest of the great king.*' But do you add to this
(idea of) getting, (the ideas of) honesty and holiness ? or is
*8 Ficin. ‘Nemo enim vult mala: ” which leads to καὶ γὰρ in lieu of
καὶ alone,
39 Ficinus has “ ex eo quod dictum est.” His manuscript therefore read
ἐκ τοῦ λεχθέντος,--- δὲ the sense requires, not τούτου λεχθέντος. S.
Hence Schleiermacher was led ἴο --- τούτου τοῦ AexévToc.—Perhaps
Plato wrote—a7d τοῦ λεχθέντος. For απὸ τοῦ differs by only one letter
from rovrov.
30 The introduction of the verb λέγω is so perfectly useless, that it has
been neglected by Ficinus; unless it be said, that it was omitted in his
Greek MS., as it is in another collated by Bekker.
31 This was the title of the king of Persia. So the king of France used
to be called ‘‘ Le Grand Monarque.’’
16 MENO.
this a matter of indifference to you; but that, even if a person
acquires them unjustly, you call the act*® equally virtue?
Meno. By no means, Socrates ; but (I call the act) wicked-
ness.
Soc. By all means then there ought, as it appears, to be
added to the act of acquisition justice, or prudence, or sanctity,
or some other part of virtue; for otherwise, it will not be vir-
tue, notwithstanding it procures for us good things.
Meno. For without those how could it be virtue ?
Soe. And to not obtain gold and silver, whether for himself
or others, when the act is not just, is not this non-attainment
likewise virtue ?
Meno. It appears so.
Soc. The attainment then of these good things, is not more
virtue than the non-attainment; but, as it seems, that which
is combined with honesty, is virtue ; and that which is separ-
ated from all such things, is wickedness.
Meno. I think it must of necessity be as you say.
[12.] Soc. Did we not say a little while since, that honesty,
and prudence, and every thing of that kind, was a part of
virtue ?
Meno. We did.
Soc. Then, Meno, you are playing with me.
Meno. How so, Socrates ?
Soc. Because, when I just now desired you not to break
down nor split virtue into fractions, and gave you patterns,
by which you ought to answer, you have paid no regard to
them, but you tell me that virtue is the power of gaining good
things with justice; yet this, you say, is only a part of virtue.
Meno. I do.
Soc. It follows then, from what you confess yourself, that
to do whatever one does with a part of virtue, this is virtue.
For you say that justice, and each of those things (above-men-
tioned) is a part of virtue.
Meno. What then? granting that I say this.**
32. In lieu of αὐτὰ, which is without regimen, Schneider correctly reads
αὐτὸ, i. 6. τὸ πορίζεσθαι. Stalbaum however vainly attempts, as usual, to
defend the common text.
38. The common text has ME. τί ody δὴ τοῦτο Aéyw; TQ. 6, τι ἐμοῦ .---
Schleiermacher would read ri οὖν δὴ ; εἰ τοῦτο Aeyw—similar to Syden-
ham’s “ granting that I say this.” Stalbaum first suggested ME. Ti οὖν δὴ ;
MENO. 17
Soc. (Truly) that, having been requested to tell me what
the whole of virtue is, you are far from stating what it is; but
you say, that every act is virtue, if it is performed with a part
of virtue; as though you had already told me what virtue
was in the whole, and that I should now know it, when you
split it into fractions. You have need therefore, as it seems
to me, of the same question again from the beginning, friend
Meno—What is virtue? Or* can every act, accompanied
with a part of virtue, be said to be virtue itself? For it is to
say this, when one says that every act accompanied with jus-
tice is virtue. Ordo you think there is no need to you of
the same question; but do you think that one may know a
part of virtue, what it is, without knowing virtue itself?
Meno. I think he cannot.
Soc. For, if you remember, when I gave an answer just
now respecting figure, we rejected such a kind of answer, as
attempted to reply by terms still the subject of inquiry, and
not as yet confessedly understood.
Meno. And we did rightly reject, Socrates.
Soc. Do not then imagine, my very good (friend), while
we are as yet inquiring what virtue is in the whole, that, by
answering in terms relating to its parts, you will show clearly
to any one virtue itself; or, by speaking of any thing else
in this very same manner; but that there will be still need
again of the same question—Respecting virtue—as being
what,® do you speak, what you speak? Or do you think that
I am saying nothing (to the purpose) ?
Meno. 1 think you are speaking correctly.
[13.] Soc. Answer then again, (as) from the beginning,—
What do you and your friend say that virtue is?
Meno. I heard, Socrates, before I came together with you,
that you (do) nothing else than doubt yourself, and cause
others to doubt. And you seem to be now playing a wizard’s
tricks, and to drug me, and really use incantations so as to fill
SOK. Τοῦτο Aéyw—understanding λέγεις after Ti οὖν δή ;—and so after
him Buttman.
3 Instead of ἢ Bekker has edited εἰ from one MS., answering to “si
quidem ” in Ficinus. Stalbaum defends ἢ, and renders it “ aliter, alio-
quin,”’ a meaning that ἢ never has.
35 The neuter ὄντος is here applied to the feminine ἀρετῆς, as in Rep.
p- 336, A., οὐδὲτοῦτο ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη : wane by Heindorf on Hipp.
Maj. ἢ 43. But.
Cc
18 MENO.
me with doubts. And, if I too must banter a little, I think
you resemble exactly, both in form and in other respects also,
that broad sea-fish, called the torpedo; for that too produces
a numbness in the person whoever approaches and touches
it.36 You seem to have done some such thing at present to
me, [to benumb*’ me]. For in very truth I am benumbed,
both in mind and mouth,** and I have not what reply to give
you. And yet I have spoken very many discourses ten
thousand times about virtue, and to many persons, and ex-
tremely well too, as I thought myself; but now I have it not
in my power at all to tell what (virtue) is. I think that you
have consulted well for yourself in never sailing out from
_ hence nor travelling abroad. For if you were as a stranger
to act in this manner in another city, you would perhaps be
driven thence* as a wizard.
Soc. You are full of craftiness, Meno, and you have nearly
put a cheat upon me.
Meno. How particularly so, Socrates ?
Soc. I know why you brought a simile against me.
Meno. Why think you?
Soc. That I might bring a simile against you in return.
For this I know respecting all handsome persons, that they
love to have likenesses made of them. For it is to their in-
terest ; since of handsome persons the pictures too are hand-
some. But I will not draw your likeness in return. As to
myself, if the torpedo be thus numb itself, and produces a
numbness in others also, then am I like to it; but if other-
wise, I am not. For I do not, when not doubting myself,
cause others to doubt; but rather when I am in doubt myself,
I in like manner cause others to doubt. And now respect-
ing virtue, what it is, I know not: you, however, knew it
formerly; perhaps, before you had touched me. But now
% On the benumbing faculty of this fish, see Aristotle in Hist. of
Animal. ix. 37. Oppian. Halieut. ii. 56—85; iii. 149. Plutarch.
Solert. Animal. ss. Plin. Η. iv., xxxii. 1; and lian N. A, i. 36; ix.
14. Gepike.
* The word ναρκᾷν is evidently an explanation of τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι.
38. The reading στόμα, found in the best MSS., answers to “os” in
Ficinus. ButrMann.
39. Buttm. and Stalb, explain ἀπαχθείης by ‘ you would be led off to
prison.” But it does not appear that wizards were so treated; although
they might be expelled from a.city, as Plato wished the Sophists to be in
$29. See Euthydem. § 2.
a, ΞΡ
MENO. 19
you are like one,*® who knows nothing of the matter. Iam
desirous, however, of looking into the matter with you, and
of searching out jointly, what (virtue) is.
[14.] Meno. But in what way, Socrates, will you search for
a thing, which you do not know at all, what it is? For by
placing before you what of the things, which you do not
know, will you seek it? Or, if you should fall in with it, how
will you know that this is the thing, of which you were
ignorant ? |
Soc. I understand, Meno, what you mean to say. See
you, how captious a method of reasoning you introduce?
That it is impossible for a man to seek, either what he does
know, or does not know. For no man would seek what he
knows; because he knows it already; and for such a person
there is no need of seeking. Nor (would any man seek)
what he knows not; because he does not know what he
would seek.
Meno. Do you then, Socrates, think that this way of reason-
ing is not fair?
Soc. I think it not (fair).
Meno. Can you say in what way ?
Soc. I can. For I have heard men and women wise in
divine matters—
Meno. Saying what?
Soc. Things, I think, true and fair.
Meno. What were they? and who said them ?
Soc. They, who said them, were belonging to the priests
and priestesses ; whose business it is, and who are able to give
a reason for the things to which they put their hands. Pindar,
too, and many other of the poets, such as are divine, say them ;
and what they say is this. But do you consider whether you
think they speak the truth. For they say that the soul of
man is immortal; and at one time it ends, which they call
dying; and that another it exists again; but is never de-
stroyed; and that for this reason we ought to live throughout
our lives as holy as possible. “To them, from whom has
Proserpine received the payment for an ancient act of grief,
# From the words of Ficinus, “ignoranti mihi assimilis,”” Sydenham
fancied the translator found in his MS. ἐμοὲ ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ sidére; Which he
says is a sense suited to the mask of ignorance, worn by Socrates
throughout the dialogue.
c
20 MENO.
she in the ninth year does give back their souls to the upper
sun; and from them‘! kings in splendour, and through their
strength swift-footed, and in wisdom men mightiest increase,
and heroes are called holy by mankind in future times.”
[15.] The soul then, as being immortal, and born fre-
quently, and having seen both the things here, and those in
Hades, and* all things, there is nothing it has not learned ;
so that it is no wonder that it is able to recollect, with
to virtue and other things, what it formerly knew. For the
whole of nature being of one kindred, and the soul having
heretofore known all things, there is nothing to prevent a
person, who remembers—what men call learning—only one
thing, from discovering again all the rest; if he has but
courage, and seeking faints not. For to search and to learn
is reminiscence all. We must not, therefore, submit to that
captious way of reasoning, for it would make us idle; since
to persons of a soft nature it is pleasant to hear it; whereas
this makes men active and inquiring ; and which I believing
to be true, I am willing with you to seek out what virtue is.
Meno. With all my heart, Socrates. But how say you
this, that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is
reminiscence? Have you it in your power to teach me that
this is so?
Soc. Even just now I said, Meno, that you are very
crafty. Since now you ask me, if I have the power to teach
you; I, who say there is not teaching, but (only) remini-
scence ; so that I may appear directly to contradict myself.
Meno. Not so, Socrates, by Jupiter. I did not say so
with an eye to this; but (merely) from habit. But if any
way you can prove to me that things are as you assert,
prove it.
Soc. This is no easy task. However, for your sake, I am
willing to show my readiness. Call hither to me then one of
4 Instead of ἐκ ray Steph. suggested, what Sydenh. has adopted, ἔστ᾽
adyv—avwyrac—similar to ““ quousque—evadant”’ in Ficin.; while to sup-
port ἐκ τᾶν Boeckh. alters ψυχὰν into ψυχάς.
“ Struve and Buttman would expunge καὶ before tévra—Stalbaum
renders kai by “denique,” i. 6. summatim; and refers to Scheefer on
Demosth. Appar. i. p. 305. Fritzsche in Quest. Lucian. p. 67. Winckel-
mann on Euthyd. p. 291, D. and his own note on Gorg. p. 465, B.
43 Instead of ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς Stalb. has edited ἀλλὰ πῶς from two MSS.
and Stobzeus,
MENO. 21
your numerous attendants here, whomever you please, that
through him I may give you the proof.
Meno. Most readily. Come hither, you.
Soc. Is he a Greek, and speaks he Greek ?“*
Meno. Perfectly well, as he was born in the family.
Soc. Now then pay attention, and (mark) whether he
appears to recollect himself, or to learn from me.
Meno. I will be attentive.
[16.] Soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a four-angled
space is such as this ?*
Boy. 1 do.
Soc. A four-angled space then has all these lines, being four
equal.
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. Has it not also these lines through the middle of it
equal ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Could there be a space like this, larger and less?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. Now if this side were two feet, and this two, how
many feet would there be in the whole? Consider it in this
manner. If, on*® this (side) the space were two feet, and
on this only one foot, would the space be other than*’ of two
feet once (told) ?
Boy. It would (not).
Soc. But since it is two feet on this side likewise, is it any
other space than of twice two feet ?
Boy. No.
Soc. It is then (a space) of twice two feet ?
** This question is put, because slaves were frequently brought from
foreign countries, where Greek was not spoken, just as they now are from
Africa to America.
45. During this conversation Socrates is supposed to draw on the
ground the geometric figures to which he alludes.
4. All the MSS. read ἐν: but as Ficin. has “si latus hoc dscran esset
pedum,”’ Wolf suggested #7—adopted by Bekk., Buttm., and Stalb.
47 After ἄλλο τε Bekker constantly rejects, to the detriment of the
sense, the particle ἢ, which is here correctly found in three MSS. and sup-
ported by “‘quam” in Ficin. Stalbaum too, although he follows Bekker
here, yet in p. 83, B. justly objects to the practice of Bekker, misled, it
would seem, by Hermann on Viger. n. 110.
48 To the question asked by ἄλλο τι, Buttm. says the answer in Greek
is by the affirmative vai, not the negative ov.
22 MENO.
Boy. Yes.
Soc. How many feet are twice two? reckon, and tell me.
Boy. Four feet, Socrates.
Soc. Cannot there be another space, the double of this (in
size), but of the same kind, having, like this, all its sillas — ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Of how many feet will it be ?
Boy. Eight.
Soe. Come now, endeavour to tell me, how long will each
line of this (space) be? Now of this (space) the line is twe
feet. What (will be) the length of the line of (the space)
double the size?
Boy. It is plain, Socrates, that it (will be) double (the
length).
Soe. You see, Meno, that I teach this (boy)* nothing, but
only question him about all. And now this boy thinks he
‘knows of what length is the line from which a space of sit sei
feet is produced. Do you not think he does ?
Meno. I do. .
Soc. And does he (really) know?
Meno. Certainly not.
Soc. But he thinks he does from (the idea of) a doubled
(quantity).
Meno. Yes.
Soe. View him now recollecting in order (things) as he
should recollect. [17.] Now speak to me, (boy). You say
that from a line, double in length, there is produced a space
double in size: I mean a space of this kind; not one side
long, the other short; but let it be equal on every side, like
this, but twice the size of eight feet. See now, whether you
still think this will be from the doubled (line).
Boy. 1 do.
Soc. Does not this become the double of that, if we add
another from this point ?
Boy. Yes, surely.
Soc. Now, from this (line), you say that there will be a
space of eight feet, if there be four such lines ?
49. Instead of τούτων Schliermacher suggested τοῦτον, found subse-
quently in four MSS., and adopted by Bekk. and Stalb. Buttmann how-
ever prefers οὐδὲν τούτων, read in one MS. and rm i μα, οὐ by Ficin
“nihil ex his.” Either will do.
MENO. 23
Boy. I do.
Soc. Let us then draw from it four equal lines. Would
this space be any other than that which you say is of eight
feet? .
Boy. Not at all.
Soc. Are there not in this space these four spaces, each of
which is equal to that of four feet?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. How large is become the whole space? Is it not four
times as large?
Boy. How not?
Soc. Is that two-fold which is taken four times ὃ
Boy. No, by Jupiter.
Soc. How many fold?
Boy. Four-fold.
Soc. From a line, therefore, double in length, there is pro-
duced a space, not two-fold, but four-fold.
Boy. You say true.
Soc. Four times four is sixteen: is it not?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. But from what line is (to be drawn) a space of eight
(square) feet? Is it not from this four-fold?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And from the half of this line (there is drawn). this
space of four feet®° (square).
Boy. There is.
Soc. Well; but is not that (square of) eight feet twice as
large as this, and half as large as that?
Boy. Certainly.*!
Soc. Will it not be from a line longer than this, and
shorter than that?
Boy. So at least it appears to me.
Soc. (You say) correctly ; for answer only what appears to
you. And tell me this too. Was not this line two feet, and
that four?
Boy. Yes.
80 In lieu of τέταρτον Cornarius suggested τετράπουν, adopted by:
Bekk., Buttm., and Stalb. To meet the difficulty, Sydenham translated
τέταρτον ‘the fourth part.” But τέταρτος has never such a meaning.
51 This answer is omitted in all the best MSS. Ficin. however has
‘“‘Tta’’—the Latin for Nai—found in one MS. from a correction.
24 MENO.
Soc. The line therefore of the eight-foot space must be
greater than this of two feet, but less than that of four feet.
Boy. It must be.
Soc. Try now, and tell me how long you think it is.
Boy. Three feet long.
Soc. If then it be three feet, we will add the half of this
(line), and now this will be three feet. For these are two
(feet), and this is one foot: and in the same manner, these are
two (feet), and this is one; and this space becomes such as
you say.
Boy. It is so.
Soc. If then this line here be three feet, and that here
three feet, the whole space becomes thrice three feet.
Boy. It appears so.
Soc. And how many feet are thrice three ?
Boy. Nine.
Soc. But how many feet ought the doubled space (above
mentioned) to be ?
Boy. Eight.
Soc. Hence from a line three feet (long) there is not (to be
drawn) the space (above mentioned) of eight feet.
Boy. There is not.
Soc. But from how long a line? Endeavour to tell me
exactly. Or, if you do not like to give it in numbers,” at
least point out from what line (it may be drawn).
Boy. By Jove, Socrates, I do not know.
[18.] Soc. Do you observe again, Meno, whither** this
boy is proceeding in (the road to) recollection ? since at first
he knew not what is the line of the (above-mentioned) space
of eight feet; as, indeed, he does not yet know; but he then
fancied he knew it, and answered boldly, as a knowing person
would, nor did he think he should be at a loss. - But he now
deems himself at a loss, and, as he knows not, does not even
think he knows.
5? Had Socrates not added this, he would have put the boy on telling
how long is the side of a square, the superficies of which contains eight
square feet. Now the number of feet in the side of such a square cannot
be expressed except by decimals, of which the boy could not be supposed
to know any thing. 5.
53. Instead of ov, Beck suggested oi, which, though praised by Buttm.,
is rejected by Stalb., who should have remem that οὗ is ‘‘ where,”
but of “* whither,’ which alone can be united to a verb of motion,
MENO. 25
Meno. You say what is true.
Soc. Is he not then in a better state now as regards the
matter of which he was ignorant ?
Meno. This too appears to me.
Soc. In causing him then to be at a loss, and to be be-
numbed, as is the torpedo, have we done him any harm?
Meno. None, I think.
Soc. We have at least made some progress, as it seems,
towards his finding out where he is. For now, knowing no-
thing, he -would readily search. But he then fancied he could
readily, before many persons and often, say respecting the
(above-mentioned) doubled space, that it ought to have a line
twice as long.
Meno. So it seemed.
Soc. Think you, then, that he would have attempted to
seek or learn that, of which, though ignorant, he fancied he
knew it, before he had fallen into a difficulty,** by conceiving
he did not know, and had felt a desire to know ?
Meno. I do not think, Socrates, he would.
Soc. He was benefited, then, by being benumbed.
Meno. I think so.
Soc. Now mark what, after this difficulty, he will discover
by searching with me, (doing) nothing else but asking ques-
tions, and not teaching. And watch me, if any where you
can discover me teaching or telling him any thing, and not
asking him rather his own opinions. [19.] Now, boy, tell
me, is not this space four feet? Do you comprehend ?
Boy. 1 do.
Soc. Now we will apply to it this other (space) equal to it.
Boy. Well.
Soc. And this a third (space) equal to either of these?
Boy. Very well.
Soe. What if we add this (space), likewise (equal),® to fill
up the corner here.
Boy. Very well.
Soc. Will these be any thing else than these four equal
spaces ?
54 From the words of Ficin., “ potius quam,” it would seem that he
found in his MS. μᾶλλον ἢ instead of ἀλλὰ μὴ.
55 To make all clear, there should be in the Greek some word answer-
ing to ‘‘ equal.’”? Hence, instead of οὐκοῦν we might perhaps read καινὸν---
26 MENO.
Boy. No.
Soc. Well then, how much larger is this whole space than
that ?
Boy. Four times.
Soc. But we wanted one only twice as large. Or do you
not remember ἢ
Boy. (I remember it) very well.
Soe. Does not this line from corner to some*® corner, cut
each of these spaces in half ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Are not therefore these four lines equal, which en-
close this space ?
Boy. They are.
Soc. Consider then, how large is this space.
Boy. I do not comprehend.
Soc. Has not each (line) of each (space) cut off within it
half of these four (spaces)? or not?
Boy. They. have.
Soc. How many such (spaces) then are there in this
(figure) ?
Boy. Four.
Soc. And how many in this (figure) ?
Boy. Two.
Soc. How much of two is four?
Boy. Twice as much.”
Soc. How many feet then does this (space) become ?
Boy. Eight.
Soc. Drawn from what line?
Boy. From this here.
Soc. From the line reaching from corner to corner of the
space of feet ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Now the sophists call such a line the diameter; so
that, if the diameter be its name,** from the diameter, as you,
6 The common text has εἰς γωνίαν Twa τέμνουσα, which Wolf cor-
rected into εἰς γωνίαν τείνουσα τέμνει.
57 Between this answer and the ye llowing question, Schleiermacher sus-
pected there was a lacuna, to be thus supplied,—‘ Soe. How much again
as that is this? Boy. Twice as much. Soe. And of what length is this
space ? Boy. Four feet.”
588. This seems a rather strange supposition. For of the name of the
diameter there could be no doubt. Besides the truth of the proposition
ΜΕΝΟ. 27
Meno’s boy, assert, there can be produced a space twice as
large. :
Boy. Assuredly, Socrates.
[20.] Soe. Well, what think you, Meno? 15 there an opi-
nion, which he has given in his answers, that is not his own?
Meno. None, but his own.
Soc. And yet, as we said a little before, he knew nothing.
Meno. True.
Soc. Yet these very opinions existed in him. Or did they
not?
Meno. They did.
Soe. In a man, therefore, who is ignorant, there exist true
opinions concerning those very things of which he is ignorant.*®
Meno. So it appears.
Soc. These very opinions then have been lately stirred up
afresh in him, as if it were adream. And should any one .
put questions to him respecting these same matters at many
times and in many places, be assured he will at length know
them not less accurately than any man.
Meno. It seems so.
Soc. Will he not then, without any one having taught
him, and by some one putting questions, recover, himself
through himself, his (former) knowledge ?
Meno. He will.
Soc. Now for a person to recover knowledge, himself
through himself, is not this to recollect ?
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. And this knowledge, which he now possesses, he has
either at some time acquired, or has possessed it always ?
Meno. Yes.
Soc. If then he was always possessed of it, he was always
a person of knowledge. But if he acquired it at any time, he
would not have got it in the present life; or has some one
taught him geometry? For he will act in the very same
manner with regard to the whole of geometry, and all other
depends not upon the name of the diameter, but upon the existence of
sucha line. There is an error here, which it would be easy to correct.
5° The words περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε, which Schleiermacher and
Bekker reject as spurious, were not found in the MS. of Ficinus. They
ought to be inserted after δόξαι, just above. They were, strange to say,
defended by Heindorf.
28 MENO.
matters of learning. Is there any one then who has taught
the boy all this? (I ask you); for you ought to know,
especially since he was born and bred up in your family.
Meno. I know well that no person has ever taught him.
Soc. And yet he entertains these very opinions ; does he not?
[21.] Meno. There appears, Socrates, the necessity.
Soc. If, having got (this knowledge), not in this present
life, he did not know this,” it is plain that he ΟΝ it in
some other time and had learnt it.
Meno. It appears so.
Soc. And is not then that the time, when he was not 8 a
man ?
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. If then, during the time when he is, and during the
time when he is not a man, true opinions exist in him; which,
roused up by questioning, become knowledge, will not his
soul have learnt through eternity? for it is plain, that during
all time he either is, or is not a man.
Meno. It appears so.
Soc. If then the truth of things, that are, exists always in
the soul, the soul would be immortal; so that, whatever you
happen now not to know, that is, not to remember, you ought
to attempt with confidence to seek, and to recollect.
Meno. You seem to me, Socrates, I know not how, to
speak rightly.
Soc. And I (seem) to myself too, Meno. And yet in other
respects I would not contend very strenuously in defence of
my argument; but that in thinking we ought to seek the
things which one does not know, we should become better
and more manly, and less idle, than if we supposed it impos-
sible for us to find out, and that it did not behove us to
inquire into what we know not; for this I would, if I were
able, violently contest both by word and deed.
Meno. In this also, Socrates, you seem to me to say well.
[22.] Soc. Since then we are of one mind, that a person
© Bekk., Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ viv βίῳ λαβὼν οὐκ gos τοῦτο. Syden-
ham wished to omit οὐκ, and so did Buttm. once; bat he afterwards re-
tained it for reasons that failed to convince even Stalbaum, who has
edited Ei δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ viv βίῳ λαβὼν, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον. But ἤδη
could not be thus inserted between ov and rovro. He should have
suggested Ei δὲ μὴ-:-λαβὼν ἣν δὴ, οὐ τοῦτο δήλον ---
MENO. 29
ought to inquire after what he does not know, are you will-
ing for us to attempt jointly to inquire what is virtue ?
Meno. By all means. Not but that I should with the
greatest pleasure take into consideration, and hear you on the
question I first asked you, whether we must put our hand to
the inquiry about virtue as a thing to be taught, or as com-
ing by nature, or by some other means to man.
Soc. Had I been master not only of myself, but of you too,
Meno, we would not have considered whether virtue is a thing to
be taught or not, before we had ascertained what is the first in-
quiry, what virtue is. But since you do not even attempt to
master yourself in order that you may be a free-man, and yet
undertake to govern me, and actually do govern me, I shall
yield to you. For what mustIdo? Weare to consider then,
it seems, what belongs to a certain thing, whilst yet we know
not what the thing is. But do you relax if not some,®! yet
a little, the strictness of your rule, and agree to consider hy-
pothetically, whether virtue can be taught to a man, or how
otherwise (it is to be attained). I say hypothetically as geo-
metricians often do in treating a question; when one asks them,
as it were, about a space,®* whether it is possible for this space
to be placed ® triangularly ®4 within this, a (geometrician)
would answer,—I know not as yet, of what kind ® the triangle
is; but I think I have, as it were, an hypothesis, that may
be of use for the matter (in hand) of this kind.—If the space
be of such a kind, as that by stretching © along the line given
there, it would be deficient by such a space as would be the
6 The Greek is εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν ye. Butas re and σμικρόν
are synonymous, they ;could not be thus opposed to each other. Besides
‘ovv could not be thus inserted between rt and d\Ad.—The train of ideas
manifestly leads to εἰ μὴ τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ᾽ οὖν σμικρόν γε, “if not entirely,
at least a little.”
62 The word χωρίον was used by the Greek mathematicians to signify
the space comprehended by the lines of any geometrical figure.
83 In lieu of ἐνταθῆναι, which is applied only to a straight line, the
sense requires here ἐνσταθῆναι ; and similarly ἐνστάσεως, found in three
MSS. a little below, instead of ἐντάσεως.
54. This is the interpretation of Stalbaum.
85 Whether right-angled, obtuse, or acute-angled. S.
6° In the Greek ὥσπερ μὲν there is evidently some error.
87 Vulg., παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν. But
as there is nothing to which παρατείναντα can be referred, Stalbaum
suggested παρατεῖναν, i. 6. χωρίον. To complete, however, the correc-
tion, he should have proposed ἔτι ἐλλίποι dy. For the infinitive ἐλλεί-
πεῖν is without regimen.
90 MENO.
space itself stretched along, there would, I think, be one re-
sult : 58. but another, if this (hypothesis) were impossible to oc-
cur. Laying down then an hypothesis, I am willing to tell you
what will happen respecting the placing of it (the space) within
the circle, whether it be impossible or not.—[23.] And thus
too concerning virtue, since we know not, either what it is, or
what is its quality, we will lay down an hypothesis, and con-
sider whether it is to be taught or not, by stating the question
thus. If virtue be in its quality one of things, which belongs
to the soul, is it to be taught, or not to be taught? In the
first place, if it is either different from knowledge, or of the
same kind with it, is virtue or is it not to be taught, or (as
we said just now) to be recollected; for whichever of these
expressions we use, let it make no difference to us. Is then
virtue to be taught? Now is it not evident to every one, that
a man is taught no other thing than knowledge?
Meno. To me it seems so.
Soc. If then virtue be a kind of knowledge, it is evil
that virtue is to be taught.
Meno. For how not?
Soe. From this question then we have been quickly re-
lieved, that, if virtue be such a kind of thing (as knowledge),
it is to be taught; but not, if it be not such a kind of thi
Meno. Very true.
Soc. Next after this, it seems, we must consider whether
virtue be knowledge or apart from knowledge.
Meno. We must, I think, consider this in the next place.
Soc. Well now; say we that virtue is any thing else but a
good; and shall we abide by this hypothesis, that virtue is a
good ?
Meno. By all means.
Soc. Now if there be also any other good apart from know-
ledge, then perhaps virtue may not be a kind of knowledge.
But if there be no good which knowledge does not compre-
hend, then in suspecting virtue to be a kind of knowledge we
should suspect justly.
88 Of the problem to which Plato alludes, solutions have been suggested
by Sydenham, Grou, Gedike, Anonymous, J. W. Muller, Schleiermacher,
Mollweide, Kliigel, Tremble, Nickel, Buttmann, Wex, Dobree, and Stal-
baum. But as all of them have supposed the existence of literal errors, or
the omission of some words, or else attributed new meanings to well-known
geometrical terms, it is evident that the passage must be left to exercise, as
before, the ingenuity of critics, conversant alike with Geometry and Greek.
ΜΕΝΟ. 81
Meno. It is so.
Soc. And yet through virtue at least we are good.
Meno. Yes.
Soc. And if good, then useful. For all things that are
good are useful: are they not?
Meno. They are.
Soe. Virtue then is a thing useful.
Meno. It must needs be, from what has been admitted.
[24.] Soc. Now let us consider what sort of things, taking
each by itself, are useful to us: health, we say, and strength,
and beauty, and wealth. These things and others of a like
kind we call useful: do we not?
Meno. We do.
Soc. And say we not that these very things are sometimes
hurtful to us? or do you say otherwise? or thus?
Meno. Not (otherwise) ; but thus.
Soc. Consider now, at what time is any one of each of these
things, when it leads, useful to us; and at what time is it
hurtful. Is it not, when a right use (leads), it is useful to us,
but when not, it is hurtful ?
Meno. Certainly so.
Soc. Further then let us consider the things belonging to
the soul. You call something by the name of temperance,
and of justice, and of fortitude, and of docility, and of memory,
and of high bearing, and of all such things.
Meno. I do.
Soe. Now consider such of these things, as you think to
be not knowledge, but apart from knowledge, whether they
are not sometimes hurtful, and sometimes useful? for in-
stance, unless prudence is present, fortitude is only a kind of
boldness. Is not a man hurt, when he is bold without
reason? but when he is bold with reason, is he not bene-
fited 369
Meno. Yes.
Soc. Is it not so with temperance, and docility? Are not
things learnt and prepared (for use) with understanding use-
ful, but without understanding hurtful ?
Meno. Very much so.
Soc. In a word, do not all the endeavours and endurings
6° So Horace—“ Vis consilii expers, mole ruit sua.”
82 ΜΈΝΟ.
of the soul, when prudence leads, tend to happiness; but if
imprudence leads, to the reverse ?
Meno. It seems so.
Soe. If virtue then be one of those things belonging to the
soul, and if it is necessary, as you say, for it to be useful, it
must be prudence: since all the things belonging to the soul
are of themselves neither useful nor hurtful; but imprudence
or prudence being added, they become hurtful or useful. Now
according to this reasoning it must needs be that virtue, being
useful, is a kind of prudence.
Meno. So it seems to me.
_[25.] Soc. Now then as to the other things, which we said
just now were sometimes beneficial and sometimes hurtful,
both wealth and the things of that kind: does not prudence,
when leading the rest of the soul, make the things belonging
to the soul useful, but imprudence hurtful? and in like
manner does not the soul, by rightly using and leading them,
render them useful, but by (using) wrongly, hurtful?
Meno. Most certainly.
Soc. And does not a prudent soul rightly lead, but an im-
prudent one, incorrectly ?
Meno. Such is ;the fact.
Soc. Thus then we may say universally, that in the ease of
man all the other things” depend on his soul; but the things
belonging to the soul itself depend on prudence, if they are
to be beneficial. And by this reasoning prudence would be
the useful. But we said that virtue was useful.
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. We assert therefore that prudence is virtue, either
wholly, or in part.
Meno. What has been said seems to me, Socrates, to have
been well said.
Soe. If then it be so, the good are not good™ by nature.
Meno. It seems to me, they are not.
Soc. For then this too would follow. If the good were
good by nature we should have some where persons, who
70 By the words τὰ ἄλλα πάντα are meant all the things which are
not within the soul. The Stoics described such things by ra ἔξω. 5.
7 Vulg., οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. But Sydenham’s tacit emendation οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
ἀγαθοὶ, which Struve has likewise suggested, and Buttmann approved,
and is found in the best MS. Flor. x., Stalb. rejects as unnecessary.
ΜΈΝΟ. 98
knew of our youths the naturally good; over whom, when
those had shown them to us, we should place a guard in the
citadel, putting a seal on them, rather than on gold, so that no
person might corrupt them, and that, when they arrived at
manhood, they might become useful to the state.
Meno. It were reasonable (to do so), Socrates.
[26.] Soe. Since then the good are not good by nature, are
they by learning ?
Meno. I think this is of necessity so. And it is plain,
Socrates, that if, according to the hypothesis, virtue is a
science, it is to be taught.
Soc, Perhaps so, by Jove. But did we admit that correctly ?
Meno. And yet it lately seemed to be fairly said.
Soc. But I suspect, it ought not only to have seemed lately
to be said fairly, but to seem so at present, and hereafter too,
if there be any thing sound in it.
Meno. What is the matter now? looking to what are you
dissatisfied with it? and why doubt that virtue is a science?
Soc. I will tell you, Meno. That virtue is to be taught, if
it be a science, is a position I do not retract,’ (so to say)
that it has not been correctly asserted. But consider whether
I appear to reasonably doubt, that virtue is a science. For
tell me this. If any thing is to be taught, not virtue only,
must there not be of necessity both teachers and scholars ?
Meno. I think there must.
Soc. Hence, on the contrary, that, of which there are
neither teachers nor scholars, should we conjecture rightly, in
conjecturing it is not to be taught?
Meno. Such is the fact. But do you not think that there
are teachers of virtue?
Soc. After a lengthened inquiry, whether there were any
teachers of virtue, I cannot, with all my efforts, discover any.
And yet do I make the search with many, and those, too,
whom I think would be the most skilled in the matter. And
just now, Meno, in happy time has Anytus’ sat down here
2 In the verb ἀνατίθεμαι, (I put back for myself,) there is an allusion
to a game, similar to draughts or backgammon. Stalb. refers to Gorg, p.
461, Ὁ. 462, A., Protag. p. 354, F., Phedon. p. 87, A., and Charmid.
p- 164, Ὁ.
8 Steph. αὐτὸς, for which Struve proposed to read “Avuroc, suggested
perhaps by the note of Sydenham, who says that “‘ Anytus had probably
now seated himself close to Socrates.’’ The reading, now happily con-
D
34 MENO.
by us, to whom we can give a share in the search. And with
reason should we give hima share. For, in the first place, he
is the son of the wealthy and the wise Anthemion, a man who
has become rich, not by accident, nor yet by a gift from any
one, as Ismenias 15 of Thebes has done, who has lately obtained
the property of Polycrates, but having acquired his wealth
by his own wisdom and carefulness ; and secondly, as regards
his other qualities, he is a citizen deemed to be neither
haughty nor puffed up, nor overbearing, but to conduct him-
self like a decent and well-behaved man; and then, he has
brought up and educated his son here very well, in the opinion
of the Athenian multitude; for they elect him to the highest
offices in the state. With such men it is right then to make
a search after teachers of virtue, whether there are any or not,
and who they are. ([27.] Do you then, Anytus, unite with
me, and Meno here, your guest, in our search after this very
thing, as to who are the teachers of it. Now consider the
matter in this way. If we wished this Meno to become a
good physician, to what teachers should we send him? Should
we not send him to the physicians ?
Anytus. By all means.
Soc. And if we wished to make him a good currier, should
we not send him to the curriers ?
Any. To be sure.
Soc. And so as regards the rest of subjects ?
Any. Without doubt.
Soc. But concerning the same things tell me again this. In
sending him to the physicians we say we should do well, if
we wished to make him a good physician. Now when we
say this, do we not mean, that we should act with prudence
in sending him to those, who make that art their profession,
rather than to those who do not; and who making for them-
selves a remuneration for this very thing, put themselves forth
as the teachers of any one willing to go and learn. [8 it not
from looking to these matters that we should do well in send-
ing him?
Any. Yes.
firmed by the best MS. Flor. x., even Stalbaum is osed to adopt ;
although he has left αὐτὸς in the text, misled by the subtleties of Butt-
mann’s defence of αὐτός.
74 Both Buttmann and Stalbaum confess that nothing can be said
certain of the person to whom Plato alludes.
MENO. 35
Soc. Hence in the case of music, and the other (arts), the
same things (take place). And it is a great folly for us, if we
wish to make any one a flute-player, to be willing to send him
not to such as profess to teach the art, and to make money by
it ; but, to give trouble to some other persons, and to look for
his learning from those, who do not profess to be teachers,
and have not one pupil in that branch of instruction, which
we think proper that the person, whom we send, should
learn. Does not this seem to you to be very unreasonable ?
Any. Yes, by Jupiter, and ignorance to boot.
[28.] Soc. You say well. Now then you may consult in
common with me about this guest of yours, Meno here. For
he told me some while ago, Anytus, that he had a longing for
that wisdom and virtue, through which men govern well both
their household and the state, and pay attention to their pa-
rents, and know how to receive both their countrymen and
foreigners, and to send them away ina manner worthy of a
good man. Consider then, to what persons (about to teach)”
this virtue, should we in sending him correctly send. Is it
not clear that, according to the reasons (detailed) just now,
(we should send him) to those who profess to be teachers of
virtue, and publicly proffer themselves common to any one
of the Greeks desirous to learn; after fixing the price, and
making it a matter of business.
Any. Of what persons, Socrates, are you speaking ?
Soc. You surely know that these are they whom men call
sophists.
Any. O Hercules! speak fair words, Socrates.. On none
of my relations, or family, or friends, or fellow-citizens, or
foreign guests, may ever such a madness seize, as to go and be
spoiled by them. For those fellows are clearly the bane and
corruption of their associates.
Soc. How say you, Anytus? Are they the only men among
those who, so widely different from all the rest, profess the
knowledge of doing something beneficial, and yet do not only
not improve, as others do, what one puts into their hands, but
τ. Bekk. ταύτην οὖν τήν ἀρετὴν σκόπει. Stephens was the first to re-
mark a defect here, pointed out by the version of Ficinus—‘“ ad quem po-
tissimum hujus comparande virtutis gratia hunc mittere deceat.’’ Hence
he would read Διὰ ταύτην owv—Sydenham suggested the insertion of
διδάξοντας or μαθησόμενον after apernv.—Biester, whom Stalbaum [0]-
lows, considers the accusative to be used absolutely.
Ρ 2
36 MENO.
on the contrary, spoil it? and do they think fit openly to make
money for themselves for this? [29.] For my part, I know
not how to believe you. For I know that one man, Protagoras
(by name), has acquired singly more wealth from this wisdom,
than both” Phidias, who has produced works so conspicu-
ously beautiful, and ten other statuaries besides. Indeed it isa
prodigy you are telling me; if when the menders of old shoes
and the patchers of old clothes could not escape for thirty days
from being publicly known, if they returned the clothes or
shoes in a worse condition than they received them, and if
they did so, they would soon perish by hunger ; yet, that Pro-
tagoras should undiscovered corrupt the whole of Greece by
sending away his associates even worse men than he received
them, and this for above forty years. For I think he was
near seventy years of age when he died, after having passed
forty in his profession. And during all that time he never
ceased being in high repute, even to this day; and not only
Protagoras (met with this success), but very many others,
some born prior to him, and some still living. Shall we then
say, according to your account, that they knowingly deceived
and corrupted the youth, or that they did so unconscious of
it to themselves? Shall we deem those to be so much out of
their senses, who, some say, were the wisest of mankind ?
Any. They are far from being out of their senses, Socrates.
Much rather so are those youths, who give them money ; and
still more so than the youths are their relations in committing
them to such men; but most so of all are the states that suffer
them to come thither, and do not drive out a person, whether
foreigner or citizen, who endeavours to do any such thing.
[30.] Soe. Has any of the sophists done you, Anytus, any
injury ? or why are you so hard upon them?
Any. I have never, by Jupiter, associated with one of them
myself; nor would I suffer any person who belonged to me to
do so.
Soc. You have no experience at all then of those men.
Any. And never may I have.
Soc. How then should you know, O happy man, respect-
ing this matter, whether it has any good or harm, when you
have no experience of it at all?
%® Bekk. Φειδίαν ye. Heindorf suggested re, and so Stalbaum from the
best MS. Flor. x.
MENO. 37
Any. Easily enough. For I know what sort” of fellows
they are, whether I have any experience or not of them.
Soc. Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus. Since how other-
wise you could know respecting them, I should, from what
you say yourself, much wonder. But we were not inquiring,
what the persons are, to whom Meno might go, and become a
bad man. For let these, if you will, be the sophists. But
now speak to us of those others; and do an act of kindness
to this hereditary friend of yours, by telling him to what per-
sons in this great city he may go and become worthy of note
for that virtue which I was just now detailing.
Any. But why did you not tell him yourself ?
Soc. What persons I conceived to be the teachers of these
things I have told already. But I happen to have said no-
thing (to the purpose), as you inform me. 7 And perhaps
there is something in what you say.“* Now, therefore, do you
in your turn tell him to whom of the Athenians he should go.
Mention the name of whomsoever you like.
[31.] Any. What need is there of hearing the name of
any one man? For whomsoever of the men of honour and
virtue among the Athenians he may meet, there is not one of
them who would not make him a better man, than the sophists
would, if he will be but persuaded.
Soc. But did these men of honour and virtue become such
spontaneously, and without having learnt from any man (to
be so)? and are they able to teach others, what they were
never taught themselves ?
Any. They, I presume, learnt from their predecessors, being
men of honour and virtue. Or think you that many excellent
men have not been produced in this city?
Soc. I think, Anytus, that there are in this city men excel-
lent in political affairs, and that there have been still not less
so than there are. But were they good teachers of their own
virtue? For it is this, about which our present discourse
happens to be; not whether good men are at present here or
not; nor whether such have been produced formerly ; but
77 Steph. of. Wolf would read οἷοι, found subsequently in the two
best MSS. Flor. x. and Coisl. He got the idea from Ficinus’ “ quales
sunt.”’ Buttm. and Stalb. are content with οἵ,
7378 These words were, before the time of Bekker, assigned to Anytus.
But he gave them to Socrates, on the faith of Ficinus’ version.
38 MENO.
whether virtue is to be taught or not, we have been fora long
time considering: and in considering that question, we are
come to consider this, whether those excellent men, either of
the present or former (day), knew how to hand over to another
that virtue, by which they themselves were good; or whether
this cannot be handed over to, or received by, one man from
another. This it is, which we have been long examining, I
and Meno. [82.] Consider then the question in this manner,
according to your own argument. Would you not say that
Themistocles was a good man?
Any. Yes, the best of all.
Soc. And would you not then (say), that, if ever any other
man was the teacher of his own virtue, he was one?
Any. I suppose so, if he wished it.
Soc. But would he not have wished, think you, for some
others to become men of honour and virtue, and especially his
own son? Or do you think that he envied his son, and did de-
signedly not hand.over to him that virtue, in which he himself
was excellent? Have you not heard that Themistocles caused”
his son Cleophantus to be taught to be*® a good horseman?
For example, he remained standing upright upon horses, and
upright (too) upon horses he threw a javelin, and performed
many other surprising feats, in which his father had caused
him to be instructed; and that he made him skilled in such
accomplishments as are connected with the having
teachers? Have you not heard this from the elderly people?
Any. I have heard it.
Soc. No one then would have accused his son of being
of an evil nature.
Any. Perhaps not.
Soe. But what is this? That Cleophantus, the son of The-
mistocles, became a good and a wise man, as did his father, have
you ever heard this from any person, either young or old?
79 On the difference between διδάσκειν, “ to teach,’ and διδάσκεσθαι,
(middle, ) “ to cause to be taught,’’ see Porson on Med. 297, who might
have said the same of παιδεύειν and παιδεύεσθαι, as shown here. But,
as Porson confesses, the difference is sometimes neglected.
- ® Bekk. ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο. But μὲν has no meaning here. Syden-
ham was the first to see that μὲν is an error for εἶναι, found correctly in
the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Mepi ᾿Αρετῆς, § 3, where this part of the
Meno is copied almost verbatim. Stalbaum indeed refers to ἱππέας μὲν
ἐδίδαξεν here, in § 33. But there too εἶναι has dropt out after μὲν.
ΜΕΝΟ. 39
Any. No indeed.
Soc. Do we imagine then that he wished to bring up his
own son in such studies, and yet, in the wisdom where he
himself was wise, not to make his son at all better than his
neighbours, if virtue could be taught ?
Any. By Jove, perhaps not.
[33.] Soe. Such a teacher of virtue then is this one of
yours, whom you yourself acknowledge to have been amongst
the best men of former times. And now let us consider an-
other, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. Do you not confess
that he was a good man?
Any. I do entirely.
Soc. And did not he too give his son Lysimachus®! the
best education at Athens, so far as depended on teachers ?
and do you think he made him a better man than any one
whatsoever? For you have associated with him, and you
see what sort of a man he is.*? But if you wish (another),
you know that Pericles, a man of such lofty bearing and
wisdom, bred up his two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.
Any. I do.
Soc. These, as you know yourself, he taught to be horse-
men not inferior to any of the Athenians; and he instructed
them in music and gymnastics, and the rest of accomplish-
ments that depend on art, so as to be inferior to none. But
had he no wish to make them good men? I believe he had
the wish; but I suspect it to be impossible (to teach virtue).
And that you may not think that a few persons, and the most
humble in means** of the Athenians, were incompetent for
$1 It was common amongst the Athenians to give the eldest son the
name of his grandfather; so that two names were continued alternately
in the same family. S.
82 We find nothing more of this Lysimachus, than what Plutarch states,
that the Athenians, out of respect for the memory of his father, who died
poor, gave him a small landed estate, a sum of money in hand, and a
trifling pension. He is one of the speakers, however, in Plato’s Laches,
where he complains that his father, Aristides, had too much indulged
him in leading an idle and luxurious life, and, by giving himself up wholly
to state affairs, had neglected his son’s education, S.
8 By φαυλοτάτους Sydenham, Gedike, and Schleiermacher under-
stand meanness of birth; which, though applicable to Themistocles, and
perhaps to Aristides, could not be said of Pericles, who was on his
mother’s side of a high family. By comparing however a little below
Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἣν Kai οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι, it would seem
that φαυλοτάτους is here ‘the most humble in means.”
40 MENO.
such an affair, consider that Thucydides™ likewise brought
up his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and educated them
well in other respects, and particularly in wrestling the best
of the Athenians. For he intrusted one to Xanthias, and the
other to Eudorus; and these (two) were thought to be the
best wrestlers of that time. Do you not remember this?
Any. I do by hearsay.
[34]. Soc. Is it not plain then, that he would never have
taught his children those things, in the teaching of which he
must have been put to expense, and not have taught them to
be good men, which would have required him to spend
nothing, if such a thing could be taught? But Thucydides
perhaps was of very humble means, and had not very many
friends among the Athenians and their allies. (It was not so.)
For he was of a noble family, and had great influence in the
city and in the other Grecian states ; so that if this could be
taught, he might have found out a person, either one of his
own countrymen or a foreigner, who might have made his
sons virtuous, if, through his superintendence of the state, he
had no leisure himself. But I fear, friend Anytus, that
virtue is a thing not to be taught.
Any. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak ill of persons
with great facility. But I would advise you, if you are
willing to hearken to me, to be on your guard. For in
another city too it is perhaps more easy to do a man mischief
than good; but in this it is especially so; and I think you
are sensible of it yourself.
[35.] Soc. Anytus seems to me to be angry, Meno. And
I am not at all surprised at it. For, in the first place, he
thinks I am speaking ill of those very persons; and then
he considers himself to be one of them. But if he should
ever know what it is to speak ill (of others), he will cease
to be angry; but at present he is ignorant of it. Do you then
tell me, are there not amongst us men of honour and virtue ?
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. And are these men willing to offer themselves to
youths as teachers? and to confess both that they are teachers
and that virtue is to be taught?
8 This Thucydides was not the historian, but a politician of the aris-
tocratical party at Athens, and the opponent of Pericles, who favoured the
democratic. S.
MENO. 4]
Meno. By Jupiter, Socrates, they do not. But you may
hear them (saying) at one time that it is to be taught, at
another, not.
Soc. Shall we say then that these men are teachers of that
thing, about which they are not agreed ?
Meno. I think not, Socrates.
Soc. Well; but do those sophists, who alone proclaim
themselves teachers, appear to you to be so?
Meno. It is for this, Socrates, that I especially admire
Gorgias, because you would never hear him making such
professions. On the contrary, he laughs at the others, when-
ever he hears them making such a promise; and conceives
that he ought to make men powerful in speaking.
Soc. Do not then the sophists seem to you to be teachers
(of virtue) ?
Meno. I know not, Socrates, what to say. For I have
suffered myself, what the many do. Sometimes I think they
are, and sometimes, not.
Soc. But you know, that not only to yourself and the others
versed in civil affairs, it seems at one time that this is to be
taught, and at another, not; and you know that the poet
Theognis says the very same thing.
Meno. In what verses ?
[36.] Soc. In his Elegiacs ; 85 where he says,
With some drink thou and eat, and with some sit,
And pleasant be to those, whose power’s far known :
Good from the good thou’lt learn; but with the bad
Mixing, thou’lt lose the good thoughts once thine own.
Do you perceive that in these (verses) he speaks of virtue as
a thing to be taught?
Meno. So it appears.
Soc. And yet in other verses he says, passing on a little
further, that
If wisdom could be made and placed in man,
they, who could accomplish this,
Many and great rewards would carry off;
and
8 V. 33 and foll., ed. Bekker. They are quoted likewise by Xenophon
in M.S. i. 2, 20.
42 MENO.
From a good sire no bad son e’er woud come,
To words of wisdom listening; but thou’lt ne’er
By teaching make the bad a virtuous man.
Do you observe, that in speaking upon the same subjects, he
contradicts himself ?
Meno. So it appears.
Soc. Can you tell me then of any other thing whatever,
of which they, who profess to be teachers, are not only not
held by others to be teachers, but who (confess) to be ignorant
of it themselves, and who act like knaves in that very thing,
which they profess to teach ; and where they, who are allowed
to be men of honour and virtue themselves, at one time say
it is to be taught, and at another, itis not? Those then, who
are so tossed about in mind about any subject whatever,
would you say are the master-teachers of it?
[37.| Meno. By Jupiter, not I.
Soc. If then neither the sophists, nor they who are men of
honour and virtue themselves, are teachers of this thing, it is
plain there can be no others beside.
Meno. I think there can be none.
Soc. But if no teachers, then no scholars.
Meno. I think the matter is as you say.
Soc. But we have agreed that the thing, of which there are
neither teachers nor scholars, is not to be taught.
Meno. We have agreed.
Soc. Of virtue then there appear no where any teachers.
Meno. It is so.
Soc. And if no teachers, then no scholars.
Meno. It appears so. ᾿
Soc. Virtue therefore cannot be taught.
Meno. It seems so, if we have considered the matter rightly ;
so that, Socrates, I am led to wonder whether there are any
men really good; and if there are, what can be the manner
of producing good men.
Soc. We are in danger, O Meno! of being, both you and
I, men of no mark; and that Gorgias has not taught you
sufficiently, nor Prodicus me. Above all things therefore we
ought to apply our minds to ourselves, and to seek a person,
who by one way at least would make us better men. I say
this with an eye to the inquiry lately made; since it has
escaped us ridiculously, that it is not only under the guidance
MENO, 43
of science, that affairs are administered by men rightly and
well; or, [if we should not grant that, (namely,) that it is not
under the conduct of science only, but of some other thing
also, 755 perhaps the knowledge of the means, by which men
become good, has escaped us.
Meno. How, Socrates, say you this?
[38.] Soc. In this way. Because, since we have rightly
agreed that good men must be useful to us, this®? cannot be
otherwise. Is it not so?
Meno, Certainly.
Soe. And that they will be useful, should they conduct
affairs rightly, did we not well admit this ?
Meno. Yes.
Soc. But are we like persons that have not rightly agreed,
(in saying) that unless one is prudent, it is not possible to
conduct (affairs) rightly ?
Meno. How say you rightly ἢ
Soc. I will tell you. If a man, who knew the way to
Larissa,®* or wherever else you please, were to walk, and act
as a guide to others, would he not conduct them well and
rightly ?
Meno. Without doubt.
Soc. What if one had only a correct opinion about the way,
but had never gone it himself, nor had any certain know-
ledge of it, would not he also conduct (others) rightly ?
Meno. To be sure.
Soe. And so long as he had anyhow a correct opinion of
things, of which the other man had a certain knowledge, he
would not be at all a worse guide, though (only) surmising
justly, and not knowing (clearly), than the other with his
(perfect) knowledge ?
Meno. Not at all (worse).
Soc. Correct opinion, therefore, with regard to correct
action, is not at all a worse guide than (perfect) knowledge.
8° The Greek words for the English within brackets are omitted by all
the MSS. but the one used by Aldus; nor were they read iby Ficinus.
*" Instead of τοῦτό γὲ, ὅτι, the sense requires τοῦτό γ᾽ ἔτι----
88 The road to Larissa is taken as an illustration, because it was most
pee to Meno, who came from Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, near
arissa.
44 MENO.
And this it is, which we omitted just now in considering of
what kind is the nature of virtue, when we said that prudence
only led to right action ; now this is correct opinion.
Meno. It seems so. -
Soc. Correct opinion therefore is not at all less beneficial
to man than (certain) knowledge.
Meno. In this respect, however, Socrates, it is; because he,
who has a (perfect) knowledge, would always attain his
object; but he, who had only a correct opinion, would some-
times attain it, and sometimes not.
[39.] Soc. How say you? would not the man who has al-
ways a correct opinion, always attain (his object) so long as
he had a correct opinion ?
Meno. It appears to me that he must; so that, this being
the case, I wonder, Socrates, on what account it is that
science is so much more valuable than correct opinion; and
in what respect it is that one is this thing, and the other
another.
Soc. Do you know why you wonder? or shall I tell you?
Meno. By all means tell me.
Soc. It is because you never directed your mind to the
images®® made by Daedalus. But perhaps you have none of
them amongst you.
Meno. With what view do you say this?
Soc. Because, if they are not fastened, they run away and
become fugitives; but if they are fastened, they stay.
Meno. And what then?
Soc. To possess one of his works unfastened, is, like the
possessing a runaway Slave, a matter of little value, because
it does not remain. But fastened, it is of great value; for
indeed they are works of great beauty. But why do I thus
speak of them? It is with reference to true opinions. For true
opinions likewise, so long as they abide by us, are a valuable
possession, and procure for us all good things ; but they are not
willing to abide a long time, for they run away from the soul
of a man; so that they are of little value, until one has
8° To these automaton figures of Dedalus there is an allusion in
Euthyphr. p. 11, B. Suid. in Δαιδάλου ποιήματα. Schol. in Eurip.
Hec. 828. Diodor. Sic. iv. 76. Pausan. ii. 4, ix.40. Palephatus c.
22. Tzetz. Chil. i. 19. GerpiKe.
MENO. 45
fastened them down by the reasoning respecting their cause.°°
And this, friend Meno, is reminiscence, as we before agreed.
But when they are fastened down, in the first place they be-
come (perfect) knowledge, and subsequently abiding. Now
it is on this very account that (perfect) knowledge is a thing
more valuable than correct opinion; and it is by this binding
that (perfect) knowledge differs from correct opinion.
Meno. By Jupiter, Socrates, it seems like to some such
thing.®!
[40.] Soc. And yet I speak thus, not as one knowing, but
only from conjecture. But that correct opinion and science
are two different things, this I seem to myself not to con-
jecture; but if I should say I knew any thing else, (and there
are but few things I would say I know,) I would set down this
as one of those I do know.
Meno. And you say rightly, Socrates.
Soc. What then, (say I) not rightly this too, that correct
opinion, having the conduct of any work of action? what-
ever, executes (her office) not at all worse than (perfect)
knowledge?
Meno. And this too I think you say rightly.
Soc. Correct opinion therefore is a thing not at all inferior
to (perfect) knowledge, nor less beneficial with regard to
action: nor is the man, who has a correct opinion, (inferior)
to the man of (perfect) knowledge.
Meno. It is so.
Soc. And it has been agreed, that a good man is useful.
Meno. Yes.
Soc. Since then it is not through (perfect) knowledge alone
that men can be good and useful to their country, (if there
are any such men,) but by correct opinion likewise; and since
neither of these exists to men by nature, [neither science nor
% The Greek is αἰτίας λογισμῷ, by a rational account of the cause; or
by proving, how and from what cause it is that they are true. For the
cause of every truth is some other truth, higher and more general, in
which it is included. S.
91 In the words, ἔοικε τοιούτῳ τινι, there is nothing to which ἔοικε can
be referred. Ficinus has, “ congrua comparatio.”
% In the Greek text τὸ ἔργον τῆς πράξεως is a combination of words
not to be found elsewhere; moreover as ἡγεῖσθαι governs a genitive or
dative, but not an accusative, perhaps Plato wrote ἡγουμένη ἑκάστης τῆς
πράξεως---ἀπεργάζεται τὸ ἔργον : and we shall thus recover the accusative
required by ἀπεργάζεται. :
46 MENO.
correct opinion ];%* or® do you think that either of them
comes by nature?
Meno, Not I.
Soc. Since then they are not by nature, neither is it by
nature that men could have been virtuous.
Meno. Certainly not.
Soc. Since then (virtue comes) not by nature, we inquired,
in the next place, whether it is to be taught.
Meno. Just so.
Soe. Did it not 48.8%) to us both, that it was to be taught,
if virtue were wisdom ?
Meno. It did.
Soc. And that if it were to be taught, then (virtue) would
be wisdom ?
Meno. Very true.
Soc. And that, if there were any teachers, it could be a
thing to be taught; otherwise, not ?
Meno. Just so.
Soe. But we have agreed that there are no teachers of it.
Meno. It is so.
Soc. We are agreed, therefore, that it is not to be taught,
nor is it wisdom.
Meno. Certainly.
Soc. But. we agreed besides, that it was something good..
Meno. Yes.
Soe. And that whatever conducted affairs rightly was a
thing beneficial.
Meno. We did clearly.
Soc. And that affairs are conducted rightly by these two
things only, correct opinion and (perfect) knowledge; by pos-
sessing which a man is a good guide. For what comes from
fortune is not the effect of human guidance. But where a
man is the guide to right, there are these two, correct opinion
and (perfect) knowledge.
Meno. I think so.
33 The words within brackets are evidently an explanation of the pre-
ceding “neither of these,” a fact passed over by fei commentator. |
*% After ἢ in the Greek, follow two words, οὐδ᾽ ἐπίκτητα, which
Cornari was the first to expunge; and though Sydenham, and even the
more recent editors, have adopted the idea, they have failed to show how
they could be found here. There is here nee some ie es
corruption.
MENO. 47
[41.] Soc. Now since (virtue) is not to be taught, it is not
the effect of (perfect) knowledge.
Meno. It appears it is not.
Soe. Of the two things then, good and serviceable, one
has been set loose, nor can (perfect) knowledge be a guide in
the administration of civil affairs.
Meno, 1 think it cannot.
Soc. Not therefore as being wise in any wisdom, did such
men take the lead in the state, as Themistocles, and the rest,
of whom Anytus here has just now spoken. And for this very
reason they were not able to make others such as themselves ;
because it was not through (perfect) knowledge they were such.
Meno. 'The case, O Socrates, seems to be as you represent it.
Soc. If then it is not by (perfect) knowledge, it follows it
is by correct opinion ; of which politicians making an use, re-
gulate states, being men not at all superior in wisdom to oracle-
singers and divine prophets; for these also utter many true
sayings, but know nothing of what they utter.
Meno. This seem to be very near the fact.
Soc. Is it not meet then, O Meno, to call these men divine,
who, without possessing a mind concerning what they do and
say, direct many and great things aright?
Meno. By all means.
Soc. Rightly then should we call those men divine, whom
we just now mentioned, the oracle-singers and the prophets,
and all poetical persons. And. not the least divine of such
persons should we say that statesmen are, and no less enthu-
siasts, being inspired divinely, and possessed by the divinity,
when in their speeches they direct aright many and great
affairs, without knowing any thing of what they are saying.
Meno. Certainly we should.
Soc. And even women, Meno, call good men divine; and
the Lacedemonians, when they celebrate with encomiums
any brave man, say, “ This is a divine man.””
Meno. And they appear, O Socrates, to speak justly too.
And yet, perhaps, Anytus here is offended at what you say.
Soe. I care not. [42.] With him, Meno, we shall have
some discourse at another time. But if we, during all this
% On this expression, Casaubon on Athenzus, viii. p. 631, refers to
Aristot. Eth. Nicom. vii. 1, where it appears that Lacedemonians said
Σεῖος ἀνὴρ in their own dialect.
48 MENO.
conversation, have inquired and spoken correctly, virtue can
neither come by nature, nor yet be taught, but by a divine
fate is present to those, with whom it is present, without
intelligence ; unless amongst statesmen there be such a per-
son as is able to make another man a statesman; and if
there be, he might almost be said to be such among the living,
as Homer tells us Tiresias is among the dead; where, speak-
ing of him, he says, [Od. x. 495,] that he alone, of those in
Hades, was intelligent; but (the rest), like shadows, flitted.
The same thing would forthwith® such a man be, with respect
to virtue, as a true thing is compared with shadows.
Meno. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak most beautifully.
Soc. From this reasoning then, Meno, it appears to us that
to whom virtue is present, it is present by a divine fate. But
on this point we shall then know the truth, when, previous to
our inquiries by what means is virtue present to men, we set
about searching first, what virtue is by itself. But it is now
time for me to go some where else. And do you, since you
are persuaded yourself on these points, persuade also your
guest Anytus here, in order that he may thus become more
mild; so that, should you persuade him, it is possible for you
to do some service to the Athenians likewise.
% None have as yet satisfactorily explained, nor could they explain, the
meaning of εὐθὺς, “ forthwith.” Buttmann says that εὐθὺς ἂν εἴη is
to be rendered “‘ would immediately appear to be,” as if εὐθὺς were
meant merely to draw an inference.
INTRODUCTION ΤῸ THE EUTHYDEMUS.
Prato, having proved in the Meno the impossibility of teaching
virtue, in opposition to Gorgias, who boasted he could do it, has in
this dialogue shown how equally incompetent were the Sophists of
the schools of Protagoras and Prodicus to teach any of the arts and
sciences, which they. not only said they knew, but the knowledge of
which they proclaimed they had the power to impart. For, like
some of the schoolmen of the middle ages, they were wont to speak
‘de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis,” with the view of showing,
as Horace has recorded, that a Sophist could with equal readiness
become a cobbler or a king; while to their vaunted universality of
attainments may be applied the well-known lines of Juvenal in S.
iii. 73—77, who drew his information partly from personal observa-
tion, and partly probably from the perusal of this dialogue of Plato,
or the Clouds of Aristophanes; between which there is a curious
coincidence, as remarked by Winckelmann in the Prolegomena to
the Euthydemus, p. xlv.
Ingenium velox, audacia perdita, sermo
Promptus et [5880 torrentior. Ede, quid illum
Esse putes? Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos,
Grammaticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Aleiptes,
Augur, Schcenobates, Medicus, Magus. Omnia novit.
In genius quick, of desperate impudence,
Ready in speech, and than Iszeus dashing
More torrent-like, what think you is he? say.
He with himself brings whomsoe’er you will,
Grammarian, Orator, Geometrician,
Painter, oiled Wrestler, Soothsayer, Ropedancer,
Physician, Conjurer. All things he knows.
With regard to the matter of the dialogue, its object is to show
that the subtleties, on which the Sophists relied to prove and dis-
prove the same propositions, were in their hands only a play upon
words; and that, like all such displays of misplaced ingenuity, they
could lead to no practical and useful results on questions relating to
E
50 INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYDEMUS.
intellectual wisdom or political well-being ; on both of which con-
joined depends the happiness of man.
With respect, however, to the manner in which the subject is
treated, Plato has here, as in the Hippias Major, given up occasion-
ally the character of the serious philosopher and assumed that of
the laughing one. For, as Horace says—
Ridiculum acri
Fortius ac melius plerumque secat res—
A knotty point oft ridicule assails
Strongest and best, where reason nought prevails—
a doctrine derived, it would seem, from Socrates, who says in Plato
Legg. vii. p. 816, D., that without the aid of ridicule one cannot
even in serious matters arrive at the truth.
Did, however, the ridiculous specimens of the subleties of the
Sophists rest upon the testimony of Plato alone, we might perhaps
have fancied, that to heighten the effect, he chose to draw rather a
caricature than a portrait of the persons, whose pursuits he believed
to be worse than useless, absolutely mischievous. But we have the
evidence of Aristotle to show that the picture is not overcharged.
For in his treatise “On the Disproofs of Sophists,” he has alluded
to some of the instances produced by Plato; which he would
scarcely have done, had they not been known as facts rather than
as fictions. In truth, it may be said of the Sophists of Greece, in
whose schools the orators learnt the rudiments of their art, what
Gay has sung in his Fables respecting the barristers of more
recent times—
I know you lawyers can with ease
Twist words and meanings as you please ;
And language, by your skill made pliant,
Can bend to favour every client.
They, however, who wish to see even a greater abuse of the
Sophists of Greece than is to be found in the dialogues of Plato,
may turn to Mitchell’s Preliminary Dissertation to his translation,
or transformation rather, of Aristophanes; where the writer’s zeal
has, as is often the case, πη τας ἐπροῚ his discretion.
EUTHYDEMUS,
THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
CRITO, SOCRATES, EUTHYDEMUS,! DIONYSODORUS,
CLINIAS, CTESIPPUS.
CRITO.
[1.] Wo was he, Socrates, with whom you were con-
versing yesterday in the Lyceum? where? so great a crowd
stood around you, that though I approached, desirous to hear,
I could hear nothing clearly. However, leaning over? I looked
down, and it seemed to me that it was a stranger with whom
you were conversing. Who was he?
Soc. About which of them, Crito, are you inquiring? for
there was not one, but two.
Cri. He whom I mean, sate the third from you on your
right hand; but in the midst of you was a youth,‘ the son of
Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great
progress,° and does not differ much in age from our Crito-
* Although Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Clinias, and Ctesippus do not
actually speak, yet their names are given here, as they are reported to
have taken a part in the conversation.
? The MSS. vary between ἡ and 7. Heindorf, after showing that ἡ
could not be used here, wished to read πολὺς yap. He should have
adopted ᾧ, found in many MSS., “‘ where,” which Stalbaum without reason
rejects.
3 Budeus explains ὑπερκύψας by “standing on tiptoe and leaning
over.” But the word ἀκροβατήσας, or something like it, answering to
“* standing on tip-toe,”’ could hardly be omitted.
* His name was Clinias. See ᾧ 10.
5 The verb ἐπιδεδωκέναι, is generally applied to “having made a pro-
gress in art,” but here it refers to —
E
52 EUTHYDEMUS.
bulus ;° though that one’ is weazen-faced,® but this one lanky
but of a fair and engaging aspect. ;
Soc. This is Euthydemus, Crito, about whom you are in-
quiring: but he who sate by me, on my left hand, was his
brother Dionysodorus, who also partook of the discourse.
[2.79 Cri. I know neither of them, Socrates.
Soc. They are some new wisdom-mongers, as it appears.
Cri. Whence do they come; and what is their wisdom ?
Soc. They are of a race some where hence, I think of
Chius; but they migrated to Thurii,!° and having fled from
thence, are dwelling for many years about these parts. But
as to your inquiry (respecting) their wisdom, it is wonderful,
Crito ; they are indeed all-wise.!! Since even I have not hither-
to known they were pancratiasts : 13 for they are skilled in every
kind of contest ; not after the manner of the brother pancrati-
asts of Acarnania;!* for these are able to contend with their
body alone; but those, in the first place, are most powerful in
body, and excel in the contest, which consists in vanquishing
all men. For they are very skilful themselves in contending
® Who, as stated in § 81, was now an adult.
τ By ἐκεῖνος, “that one,” Stalbaum understands Clinias, and by οὗτος,
“this one,’ Critobulus: but Heindorf, by ἐκεῖνος, Critobulus; while
Winckelmann refers οὗτος to Euthydemus. For the reasons that led
those scholars to such different conclusions, the inquisitive reader must
turn to their respective notes.
8. The Greek words σκληφρὸς and προφερὴς, I have translated “weazen-
faced ’’ and “lanky,” as being perhaps the nearest meanings in English.
From the conflicting statements of Greek lexicographers and scholiasts
it is evident that the words have never been thoroughly understood. Fi-
cinus has “ ille aridioris quodam corporis habitu, iste grandioris specimen
pre se ferre videtur.”
9. On the reading and arrangement of the words, spoken by Crito and
Socrates respectively, Heindorf, Winckelmann, and Stalbaum all differ.
10 Thurii, or Thurium, was a town in the southern part of Italy, to
which the Athenians sent a colony, and with which a communication was
long kept up by the mother country.
Ἡ Here, too, critics differ, I have followed Stalbaum, although the pas-
sage is not even now correct.
2 The contest called παγκράτιον is described by Lucian as the union
of boxing and wrestling, during the latter of which the combatants were
on the ground ; but by A. Gellius as simply a stand-up pugilistic encounter.
Lucian’s account is the more correct, as may be inferred from Aristoph.
Eip. 863.
"18. Of these brother pancratiasts nothing, says Heindorf, is known else-
where.
EUTHYDEMUS. 53
with their weapons, and they know how to impart their skill
to any other person who will pay them. In the next place,
they are most powerful in judicial contests, and are able
both to contend themselves, and instruct others, to speak and
write speeches suited for courts of justice. [3.] Formerly
they were terrible in these things alone; but now they have
put a finish to their pancratiastic art; for the kind of contest,
which was left by them undone, they have now completed, so
that no one is able to lift (a hand) against them; so skilful
have they become in verbal contests, and in confuting what-
ever happens to be said, whether it be true or false. I have
a mind therefore, Crito, to put myself under these men; for
they say that in a short time they can make any other person
whatever skilled in the very same things.
Cri. But fear you not, Socrates, for your age, that you are
already too old?
Soc. By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument
and consolation against fear. For these very men, so to say,!4
have, though old, begun the study of this wisdom, which I am
longing for, in the art of contending. For last year, or the
year before last, they were not wise in the least. [4.| But
of one thing only I am afraid, lest I should bring disgrace
upon these strangers, as I do upon the harper Connus, the
son of Metrobius, who teaches me even now to play on the
harp. The boys, therefore, who are my school-fellows, on
seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the teacher of old men.
Lest therefore some one should reproach these strangers with
the very same thing, and they, dreading this, should be
unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other old
men to go thither as my school-fellows; and here also I
will endeavour to persuade others; and do you frequent the
school with us.!° Perhaps too, as an allurement, we may
1 The words “so to say,’’ have no meaning here, as I have shown in
Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 219, where I proposed to read we ἔπος εἰπεῖν,
ὠμογέροντε, in allusion to the Homeric word found in IA. ¥. 793, and ex-
plained by γήραϊ ὠμῷ in Od. Ο. 356. Others would prefer perhaps ὡς
ἔπος εἰπεῖν, Néorope ὄντε, as coming nearer to εἰπεῖν γέροντε.
15. Bekk. καὶ σύ τί που συμφοίτα : where Heindorf correctly objected
to ποῦ, thus united to an imperative. But he did not see that Plato pro-
bably wrote καὶ σύ γ᾽, ὦ παῖ, συμφοίτα, for thus Socrates would facetiously
address Crito, who was, like himself, an old man, asa boy. Stalbanm
seems to approve of Winckelmann’s καὶ σὺ ri οὐ συμφοιτᾷς. For Ficinus
has “Sed cur non et tu venis?”’ Or we might read καὶ od (ri δ᾽ οὔ ;)
συμφοίτα. “And do you, (why not?) come along with me.”
54 EUTHYDEMUS.
bring your sons to them; for having a hankering after them,
they will, I know, instruct even us.
Cri. There is nothing to hinder us, Socrates, if it seems
good to you. But first tell me what is the wisdom of these
men, that I may know what it is we shall learn.
Soc. You shall quickly hear, since I cannot say that I did
not attend to them; for I paid great attention, and very well
remember what they said; and I will endeavour to relate the
whole to you from the beginning. [5.] For, by some act of
a god, I had seated myself alone in the Apodyterium!® where
you saw me: and 1 had it just in my mind to rise up; but as
I was rising up, there was the accustomed signal of my
Genius. I therefore sat down again; and soon after those
two, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, entered, and with them
many others, disciples, it seemed to me; and having entered,
they sauntered about in the covered course (of the gymnasium).
But they had not yet gone two or three rounds, when Clinias
entered, who you say, and say truly, has made a great pro-
gress. Behind him there were many others his lovers, and
Ctesippus too, a youth of the district of Pmanea,"” very
beautiful and good naturally, except that he was saucy in
consequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, seeing me from
the entrance sitting alone, came straight towards me, and sate
down on my right hand, as you say. [6.] And Dionysodorus
and Euthydemus perceiving him, at first stopped and con-
versed with each other, looking at us on this side and on that
—for I beheld them very attentively—and then advancing,
they sate down, Euthydemus by the youth, and the other
(Dionysodorus) by me, on my left hand. The rest seated
themselves just as each happened to do. These therefore I
embraced, not having seen them for some time. After this,
I said to Clinias, These men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,
O Clinias, are wise not in small but in great things. For
they know every thing pertaining to war, (and) whatever he.
who would be a good general, ought (to know), the arrange-
ment and management of encampments, ‘Sand whatever is to be
taught for engaging with weapons : 5. and they know too how
© That part of the gymnasium, in which those who bathed or exer-
cised put off their clothes.
1” One of the districts into which Athens was divided.
18. From the omission of these words, not found in the version of
EUTHYDEMUS. 55
to'render a person able to assist himself in courts of justice,
when any one injures him. [7.] For thus speaking, however,
I was held in contempt by them ; and both therefore laughed,
looking at each other. And Euthydemus said, We no longer
engage in these matters as being serious, Socrates, but as of
secondary moment. And I being astonished said, Your
(serious) studies must indeed be beautiful, if such great
affairs are of secondary moment with you. Now by the gods
inform me, what is this beautiful study (of yours).—We
think, Socrates, said he, that we are able of all men to teach
virtue in the best and quickest manner.—O Jupiter! I re-
plied, what a mighty thing are you telling! From whence
did you get this windfall?!° I had hitherto conceived of you,
for the most part, as.I just now said, that you were very skil-
ful in this,”° to fight in arms; and this I have said respecting
you. For when you first tarried here, I remember, you
publicly boasted of this. But now, if in reality you possess
this science, may you be propitious. For I invoke you, as if
you were gods, entreating you to pardon?! what I have before
said. But see, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, if you have
boasted truly: for it is by no means wonderful, from the
magnitude of the boast, that a person should disbelieve.—[8. ]
Rest assured, Socrates, that it is so, they replied.—TI therefore
consider you (said I) much more blessed in this possession,
than is the great king”? in his empire. But tell me thus
much, whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom? or how
have you determined /—We are here, Socrates, for this very
purpose, as being about to exhibit and to teach, if any one is
willing to learn. But that all, who do not possess (wisdom),
will be willing to learn, [am a guarantee: first, I myself (am
willing), and next, Clinias here; and in addition to us,
Ctesippus and all the rest here—and I pointed out to him the
Ficinus, it is evident that Taylor made his English translation not from
the Greek, but the Latin merely.
1 The word ἑρμαῖον was applied to any thing of value found in the
road, over which Ἑρμῆς was the presiding deity.
20 So Routh, whom Heindorf and Stalbaum, strange to say, follow.
But to me the words are perfectly unintelligible. For it is absurd to sup-
pose that the speaker would himself explain τοῦτο by ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι.
21 It is evident that Socrates is speaking ironically. For otherwise he
need not have prayed for pardon.
2 Of Persia: see Meno, § 1].
δ6 EUTHYDEMUS.
lovers of Clinias, who happened to be standing round us: for
Ctesippus at that time was sitting at a distance from Clinias.
And as it seemed to me,” Euthydemus, while he was discours-
ing with me, did by his stooping forward darken Ctesippus’s
view of Clinias, who was seated in the middle of us. [9.7
Ctesippus therefore wishing to see his boy-love, and at the
same time curious to hear, was the first to leap up, and stood
directly opposite to me. Thus too the rest, when they saw
him do so, stood around us, both the lovers of Clinias, and the
friends of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. I therefore, point-
ing them out to Euthydemus, informed him they were all
ready to learn. And Ctesippus and the rest very readily as-
sented; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit
the power of his wisdom. I therefore said, Do, Euthydemus
and Dionysodorus, by all means gratify these persons, and ex-
hibit your wisdom for my sake. Now to demonstrate the
most of the things pertaining to this subject will, it is evident,
be no small labour; but tell me this, whether you are able to
make him alone a good man, who is already persuaded that he
ought to be instructed by you, or him also, who is not yet
persuaded, through his not believing that virtue is a thing to
be learnt, or that you are the teachers of it. Come then, (say,)
is it the business of the same art, to persuade a man thus
affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are the per-
sons from whom one could learn it the best; or is it of
another ?—[10.] It is (the business), Socrates, said Dionyso-
dorus, of the very same (art).—You therefore, Dionysodorus,
said I, can, the best of all men now existing, exhort to philo-
sophy and the study of virtue.—We think we can, Socrates.
—Of other things put off, I said, for another time the exhibi-
tion, but show us this-now. Persuade this youth that he
ought to philosophize, and study virtue; and gratify me, and
all these here. For this has happened to him, that both I,
and all these, are desirous for him to become the best (of
men). - He is the son of Axiochus, who is descended from
the Alcibiades of olden times, and the cousin of now-living
33 Vulg. ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν we, words which have puzzled not a little the
modern editors ; and so perhaps they did Ficinus, who has omitted ἐμοὲ
δοκεῖν. Taylor’s version, which leads to ὡς δ᾽ ἐμοὲ δοκεῖ, will seem perha:
to some to solve the difficulty. Stalbaum translates ἐμοὲ δοκεῖν, “as far
as I remember,”’ a meaning those words never have and could not have.
EUTHYDEMUS. 57
Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is still young,
and we have a fear about him, as is reasonable in the case of
a youth, lest some one should anticipate us, and by turning his
mind to some other pursuit, corrupt it. [11.] You are there-
fore come most opportunely ; and, if it makes no difference
to you, make a trial of the youth and converse with him be-
fore us.—When I had thus spoken nearly these very words,
Euthydemus replied with courage, and even with confidence,
It makes no difference, Socrates, if the youth is but willing
to answer.—Nay, I replied, he is accustomed to do this. For
frequently do these coming ask many questions of, and discourse
much with him, so that he is sufficiently bold to answer.*4
But how, O Crito, shall I narrate to you correctly what
occurred after this? For it is no trifling labour to be able to
take up and go through wisdom so boundless. So that I am
compelled, as poets are, in beginning the tale, to invoke the
Muses and Mnemosyne. Euthydemus, then, began, I think,
after some such manner.— Whether, O Clinias, are the men
who learn, the wise or the unwise? [12.| But the youth,
through the greatness of the question, blushed, and being at
a loss, looked at me. And I, perceiving he was flurried,
said, Cheer up, Clinias, and answer boldly whatever seems
good to you; for perhaps you will be benefited” to the
greatest extent. Whereupon Dionysodorus, bending a little
towards my ear, and with a smile on his countenance, said, I
tell you beforehand, Socrates, that in whatever manner the
youth may answer, he will be confuted. While he was thus
speaking, Clinias happened to give an answer, so that it was
not possible for me to exhort the youth to be on his guard.
And he answered, that the wise are those who learn. Euthy-
demus, therefore, said, Do you call certain persons teachers,
or not ?—He admitted he did.—[13.] Are not then teachers
the teachers of those that learn? As, for instance, a harper
and a grammarian were the teachers of you and other boys,
and you were their disciples.—He assented.— When you
% The Greek is at present, wore ἐπιεικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
But since Ficinus translates, ‘‘ quocirca consentaneum est, ut respondere
audeat,” he probably found in his MS. wore ἔστὶν εἰκὸς θαρρεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν
ἀποκρίνεσθαι, “So that it is likely he will have the boldness to reply.”
35 The Greek is ὠφελεῖ. Ficin. ‘‘ juvabit.” From whence Buttmann
suggested ὠφελήσει, the fut. middle in the sense of the fut. passive,
ὠφεληθήσει.
58 EUTHYDEMUS.
learned, therefore, you did not know what you were learning.
—I did not.—Were you then wise, when you were ignorant
of these things ?—By no means.—If then you were not wise,
you were ignorant ?—KEntirely.—You then, when learning
what you did not know, learned them as being ignorant ?—
The youth nodded assent.—The ignorant therefore learn,”
O Clinias, and not the.wise, as you think.—On his saying
this, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, just like
a chorus on a signal given by the ballet-master, made a great
uproar and laughed. And before the youth could recover his
breath, Dionysodorus, taking him up, said well and cleverly *
—But, Clinias, when the grammarian says any thing by word
of mouth, are the boys who learn what he so gives out, the
wise or the unwise ?—The wise, said Clinias.—[14.] The wise
therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and you did not rightly
just now answer Euthydemus.—On this, the admirers of these
men laughed very loudly and made an uproar, struck with
their wisdom ; but the rest of us were amazed and remained
silent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our amazement,
that we might yet still more wonder at him, did not let the
lad go, but kept interrogating him; and, like skilful dancers,
twisted his inquiries about the same thing in a double (maze),
and said, Whether do learners learn what they know, or what
they do not know? And again Dionysodorus said to me in a
whisper, This also, Socrates, is just such another question as
the former.—O Jupiter, said I, even the former question ap-
peared to be honourable to you.—We always ask, said he, Socra-
tes, such-like questions, from which there is no escape.—{ 15. ]
Hence you appear to me, said I, to be in high repute amongst
your disciples. In the mean time Clinias gave an answer to
Euthydemus, that learners learn what they do not know. And
Euthydemus interrogated him in the same manner as before.
—Do you not, said he, know your letters ?—I do.—Do you
* Bekk. οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἄρα μανθάνουσι. But after ἄρα two MSS. insert
σοφοὶ, which Winckelmann first adopted, and after him Stalbaum. Why
they did so is beyond my comprehension.
, " These words Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Stalbaum refer to
ἀναπνεῦσαι. But Winckelmann more correctly, with Ficinus, to ἐκδεξά-
μενος.
35. Winckelmann was the first to remark, that in διπλᾶ there is an
allusion to a so-called kind of dance, mentioned by Hesychius. Per-
haps it was something like the modern waltz.
EUTHYDEMUS. 59
not then know all?—He acknowledged it.—When therefore
any one recites any thing, does he not recite letters ?—He
confessed it.—Hence he recites, said he, something of what
you know, if you know all (the letters).—This also he ac-
knowledged.— What then, said he, do you not learn that,
which some one recites ?—He assented.””—But do you learn,”
not knowing your letters ?—I do not, (said he,) but I learn,
having known them.*!—Do you not therefore learn what you
know, if you know all the letters ?—He acknowledged it.—
Hence, said he, you have not answered rightly.—This had been
spoken not violently*? by Euthydemus, when Dionysodorus,
taking up the discourse, as if it had been a ball, again aimed
at the lad as at a mark, and said, Euthydemus is deceiving
you, Clinias. [16.] For tell me, is it not to learn, to receive
the science of that which any one learns ?—Clinias assented.
—But, to know, said he, is it any thing else than to possess
science ?—He acknowledged (it was nothing else).—To know
not, then, is to not possess science.—He assented to this.—
Whether then are the receivers of a thing, they who possess
it already, or they who do not possess it ?—They who do not
possess it.—Have you not then confessed that they who do
not know, are among those who do not possess ?—He nodded
assent.—They that learn, then, belong to those that receive,
and not to those that possess.—He granted it.—They there-
fore, Clinias, he said, learn, who know not; and not they who
know. After this Euthydemus rushed to the third, as it were,
wrestler-fall, being about to throw ** down the youth. But
I, seeing the lad just sinking, and wishing to give him a res-
pite, lest he should exhibit cowardice before us,* said, in order
29 This answer is wanting in all the MSS. except the one used by Ficin.,
who translates “‘ Assensus est.”
_* The Greek MSS. read, ὁ δὲ---μανθάνει. Ficinus’ version is “ dis-
cis,” i. 6. od δὲ---͵ανθάνεις.
31 The word εἰδὼς was altered by Routh into ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, but both seem to
be required, or rather, what Plato perhaps wrote, ἡ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰδὼς τὸ εἶδος,
μανθάνω, “1 learn, said he, having known their shape.”
32. 1 cannot understand σφόδρα τι. Ficinus has “ Vix autem—”
33 Steph. καταλαβὼν. Heindorf suggested καταβαλῶν, adopted by
Bekker and Stalbaum. But Winckelmann prefers the old reading. For
he saw that Heindort’s conjecture would make the collocation of the
words very disjointed.
_ * This seems to be the meaning of ἡμῖν ἀποδειλιάσειε, But the pas-
sage is probably corrupt,
60 EUTHYDEMUS.
to console him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if these discourses ap-
pear to you to be unusual.® [17.] For perhaps you do not
perceive what the two strangers are doing about you. They
are doing the same, that persons do in the initiation of the
Corybantes, when they make an enthronement for him whom
they are about to initiate; for there takes place the |
out to dance and sports, (as I think you would understand)**
if you had been initiated in these mysteries. And now these do
nothing else but dance, and, as it were, sportively leap round,
as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think
that you have heard the first part of the sacred rites of so-
phists. For, in the first place, as Prodicus says, it is neces-
sary to learn the proper signification of words; which these
strangers exhibit to you, because you have not perceived.that
men apply “to learn” to a thing of this kind, when any one,
having at first no knowledge respecting a thing, afterwards re-
ceives the knowledge of it; and when any one, having this
knowledge, does by this very knowledge look into the very
same thing, either while being done or being said. But they
rather call this “to comprehend” than “to learn;” although
sometimes they call it “to learn.” But this, as they show,
has lain hid from you, that the same word is applied to per-
sons affected in a contrary manner, both to him who knows,
and to him who does not know. [18.] Similar to this is
that which was in the second question ; in which they asked
you, whether men learn what they know, or what they do not.
These indeed are the playthings of learning. Hence I say
that these men are playing with you. But I call these a play-
thing on this account; because, although some one may learn
many, or even all such particulars as these, yet he would not
in any respect know better how things exist. However, by
the difference of words he may play with men, tripping up
and overturning what they assert; just as they do, who,
drawing away the stools from under those, who are going to
% There is evidently something wrong here. For the reasonings of
the two sophists more than seemed to be unusual. They were really so.
Hence Winckelmann adopted from five MSS. ἀληθεῖς for ἀηθεῖς, to
which Stalbaum objects; for he did not see that the train of thought re-
quired—* Do not wonder if these unusual reasons appear to be true.”—
In Greek, Μὴ θαύμαζε, εἴ σοι φαίνονται ἀληθεῖς ἀηθεῖς οἱ λόγοι.
38 There is nothing in the Greek to answer to the version οἵ Ficinus,
“ Intelligere hec te arbitror,” words absolutely necessary for the sense.
EUTHYDEMUS. 61
sit down, are delighted and laugh, when they see him whom
they have overturned lying on his back. Consider therefore
what has happened to you from these men as fun. But
what is to follow, it is clear, they will exhibit to you as seri-
ous concerns; and I will be their guide, that they may give
what they promised me. . For they said they would exhibit
their exhortatory wisdom: but now, it appears to me, they
have thought it was requisite first to play with you.
[19.] Thus far therefore, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,
let it have been made a sport by you; and there is perhaps
enough of it. But in the next place exhort the lad, and show
how he must pay attention to wisdom and virtue. But first
I will point out to you how I understand the matter, and what
I desire to hear concerning it. If, then, I shall appear to you
to do this in a simple and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at
me; for, through a desire of hearing your wisdom, I will
venture for a time to speak before you off-hand. Endure
therefore to hear me, both you and your disciples, without
laughing : but do you, O son of Axiochus, answer me.—Do
we not all then wish to do well? Or is this question one of
the ridiculous, of which I was just now afraid? For surely
it is stupid to ask questions of this kind; for who is there
that does not wish to do well ?—There is no one that does not,
said Clinias.—[20.] Be it so, said I.—But in the next place,
since we wish to do well, in what manner shall we do well ?
Shall we say, if we have many good things? Or is this an-
swer still more stupid than the former? for it is evident that
this also must be the case.—He assented.—But come, what
are the things, of those that exist, good for us? Or does it ap-
pear to be a thing neither difficult, nor belonging to a solemn
person,*? to be at no 1055 88 in this? For every one will tell
us that it is good to be rich; will they not ?—Certainly, said
he.—And is it not also (good) to be in health, to be beautiful,
and to be sufficiently furnished with other things pertaining to
the body ?—So it appeared to him.—But nobility also, power,
and honours, in one’s own country are plainly good.—He ad-
_ 37. Ficinus translates σεμνοῦ by ‘“‘eleganti ingenio. Stalbaum, by “ex-
cellentis.”” Heindorf says it is the same as οὐ φαύλου. I suspect there
is some error here.
88 Stalbaum, with Winckelmann, prefers εὐπορεῖν, found in two MSS.,
to εὑρεῖν.
62 EUTHYDEMUS:
mitted it.— What then, said I, yet remains for us among things
good? Is it to be temperate, just, and brave? Whether, by
Jupiter, Clinias, do you think that we shall put down these
things properly, if we consider them as good? or if we do
not? for perhaps this may be disputed by some one. But
how does it appear to you ?—That they are good, said Clinias.
—[21.] Be it so, said I; but in what part of the chorus shall
we place wisdom? among things good? or how say you?—
Among things good.—But consider lest among things good
we omit what is worthy of mention.—But, said Clinias, we ap-
pear (to have omitted) nothing.—However, I recollecting said,
But, by Jupiter, we appear to have nearly omitted the greatest
of things good.— What is that? said he.—Felicity, Clinias ;
which all men, and even the very bad, say is the greatest good.
—What you say is true, said he.—And I again, correcting my-
self, said, We have nearly, both I and thou, son of Axiochus,
rendered ourselves ridiculous to these strangers.—How so?
said he.—Because, having placed felicity in the things we be-
fore enumerated, we now again speak of it.—But why is this
(improper) ?—It is surely ridiculous to adduce that again,
which was formerly proposed, and to say the same things
twice.—[22.] How do you mean? said he. Wisdom, I re-
plied, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.—And he
indeed was astonished, so young and simple is he. And J,
perceiving his astonishment, said, Do you not know, Clinias,
that as regards the felicity of flute-playing, flute-players are
the most happy ?—He admitted it.—Are not then, said I,
grammarians also (most happy) as regards (the felicity of)
writing and reading ?—Certainly.—But what, as regards the
dangers of the sea, do you think that any one, so to say gener-
ally, are more happy than wise pilots ?—Certainly not.—Again,
With whom would you, when in the army, more readily share
in danger and fortune? with a clever, or ignorant general ?
—With a wise one.—And under whom would you, when
you are dangerously ill, more readily be? under a clever or
ignorant physician ?—Under a clever one.—Is it not there-
fore, said I, because you think that you would do better, by
acting with a wise person than an ignorant one ?—He granted
it.—Wisdom, then, every where renders men happy; for
surely no one can ever err through wisdom ; but through this
he must act rightly, and obtain (his end): for otherwise it
EUTHYDEMUS. 63
would not be wisdom.—[23.] At length, I know not how, we
summarily agreed that this was the case; that, to whom wis-
dom is present, to him nothing of felicity is wanting.
After we had agreed on this point, I again asked him, how
with regard to us would be what had been previously admit-
ted? For, said I, we admitted that if many good things were
present with us, we should be happy and do well.—He as-
sented to this.—Should we then be happy through present
good, if it did not benefit us, or if it did?—If it benefited us,
said he.—Would then any thing benefit us, if we only pos-
sessed it, but did not use it? As, for instance, if we pos-
sessed much food, but did not eat it; or drink, but did not
drink it; could we be benefited at all?—Certainly not, said
he.—But if all artificers had every thing requisite prepared
for them, each for his own work, but did not use them, when ~
thus procured, would they do well [through the possession 89
merely, because they possessed every thing which an artificer
ought to possess? Thus, if a carpenter had all kinds of in-
struments and wood prepared for him in sufficiency, but yet
should fashion nothing, would he be benefited at all from the
possession ?>—By no means, said he.—[24.] But what, should
any one possess wealth, and all such things as we now de-
nominate good, and should not use them, would he be happy
through the possession of these goods ?—He certainly would
not, Socrates.—It is necessary then, said I, as it seems, that
he, who is to be happy, should not only possess good things
of this kind, but should likewise use them.—You speak truly.
—Is not then, Clinias, the possession and the use of good
sufficient to make any one happy ?—It appears so to me.—
Whether, said I, if any one uses good things properly, or if
he does not ?—If he uses them properly.—You say correctly,
said I, for I think the evil is greater if a person uses any
thing whatever not correctly, than if he lets it alone. For
the former is wrong ; but the latter is neither right nor wrong ;
or do we not say so?—He assented.—What then? In the
workmanship and use of things pertaining to wood, is there
any thing else that produces a right use than the science of
% These words are evidently a needless repetition; or else we must
adopt what Ficinus found in his MS., and thus translated into Latin,
*“Num bene agent propter ipsam duntaxat possessionem eorum, que ad
perfectionem operis requiruntur.”’ .
64 EUTHYDEMUS.
a carpenter ?—Certainly not, said he.—So too, in the work-
manship relating to vases, it is science which causes for them
a right (use).4°—He admitted it—[25.] Whether then, said
I, with respect to the use of those goods which we first men-
tioned, wealth, health, and beauty, is it science, leading and
directing properly action, which enables us to use every thing
of this kind properly, or is it any thing else ?—It is science,
said he.—Science, then, imparts to men in possession and
action, not only happiness, but, as it seems, likewise the well-
doing.—He confessed it.
Is there then, said I, by Jupiter, any advantage to be de-
rived from other possessions, without prudence and wisdom ?
Will a man be benefited, who, without intellect, possesses
many things, and performs many actions? or, with intellect,
possesses and performs a few? Consider it thus. Will he
not, by doing less, err less? and erring less, will he not act
less improperly? And acting less improperly, will he not be
less miserable ?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether then will he
perform fewer things being poor, than being rich ?—Being
poor, said he.—And whether being weak or strong ?—Being
weak.— Whether also, being honoured or dishonoured ?—
Being dishonoured.—And whether, being brave and temper-
ate,*! will he do less, or being timid ?—Being timid ?—[26.]
(Will not then this happen) if he is indolent rather than ac-
tive ?—He admitted it.— And if he is slow, rather than quick ὃ
and if he sees and hears dully, rather than quickly ?—In every
thing of this kind we agreed with each other.—And to crown
all, I said, it very nearly appears, Clinias, that, with respect
to all the things which we first asserted to be good, the con-
clusion is not about this, that they are, taken by themselves,
good naturally, but, as it seems, that they exist in this man-
ner; that if ignorance guides them, they are greater evils
than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are
of ministering to that evil leader; but that if prudence and
‘wisdom lead them, they are greater goods; but that taken by
themselves, neither of them is of any worth.—It appears,
4° In the Greek, after τὸ ὀρθῶς, Stalbaum thinks χρῆσθαι, found just
above, is to be supplied. So Ficinus has “ rectum usum scientia prestat.”’
*' As there is nothing in the reply of Clinias corresponding to “and
temperate,” it is evident there are either too many words in the question,
or too few in the answer. :
EUTHYDEMUS. 65
said he, to be as you say.—What then, from what has been
said, takes place to us? Is it any thing else than this, that
not one of the other things is either good or evil, but that
of these, being two, wisdom is a good but ignorance an ill ?—
He assented.
Let us then, said I, consider further, what still remains.
Since we all of us are eager to be happy, and we appear to
become such from using things, and from using them rightly,
and science affords the correctness (of use)*? and felicity, it is
requisite, as it seems, that every man should by all possible
means endeavour to become most wise; or is it not so ?—It
is so, said he.—[27.] And he ought to think“ that he receives
this from his father, guardians, frrends, and the rest, who pro-
fess themselves to be his lovers, much more than wealth ; and
to beg and pray strangers and fellow-citizens to impart wis-
dom, is in no respect base; nor is it reprehensible, Clinias,
for the sake of this, to act the minister and slave to a lover
and to every man, and to willingly serve him in any honour-
able service whatever, through an ardent desire of becoming
wise. Or does it not appear so to you? said I.—You appear,
said he, to me to speak very well.—If, said I, Clinias, wisdom
can indeed be taught, and does not exist of its own accord
among men. For this is yet to be considered by us, and has
not yet been assented to by me and you.—But to me, said he,
Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.—And I, being de-
lighted, said, you speak beautifully, O best of men; and you
have done well in liberating me from a long inquiry about
this very thing, whether wisdom can, or cannot be taught.‘4
[28.] Now therefore since it appears to you that it can be
taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man
happy and prosperous, would you say that any thing else is
necessary than to philosophize? And have you a mind to do
this ?—Entirely so, Socrates, said he, as much as possible—
* The words “ οὗ use,’ have been inserted from Ficinus, “ rectitu-
dinem—usus.” They are absolutely necessary to preserve the train of
ideas.
‘8 To explain this difficult passage, which he says is perfectly sound,
Stalbaum, after Heindorf, gives a version of what is not in the Greek
text.
44 As the object of the Meno is to inquire whether virtue can or cannot
be taught, it is probable that this dialogue was written about the same
time as that.
F
66 EUTHYDEMUS.
And I, delighted to hear this, said, My pattern, Ὁ Dionyso-
dorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory discourses, such as I
desired them to be, is of this kind, like a common person’s
perhaps, and stated at length with difficulty: but let which-
ever of you is willing, do this very thing according to art, and
exhibit it tous. But if you are not willing to do this, show to
the lad in order, from the point where I left off, whether he
ought to get every science, or whether there is one, which,
when he gets it, he will necessarily be a happy and good man ;
and what that science is. For, as I said in the beginning, it is
of great consequence to us that this youth should become
wise and good.
[29.] This then, Crito, did I say ; and I paid. very great
attention to what followed, and considered after what manner
they would handle the discourse, and whence they would
begin, while they were exhorting the youth to study wisdom
and virtue. Dionysodorus then, who was the elder of them, first
began the conference; and all of us looked at him, as about
to hear immediately some wonderful reasons; which indeed
happened to us. For the man, Crito, commenced an admirable
discourse, which it is proper for you to hear, as being an ex-
hortation to virtue.
Tell me, Socrates, said he, and the rest of you, who express.
a desire for this youth to become wise, whether you are jest-
ing when you make this assertion, or truly and seriously
desire it?—It was then I perceived, that they thought we
had been previously jesting, when we exhorted them to con-
verse with the youth, and that on this account they too had
been jesting, and had not been acting seriously by him. Per-
ceiving this, I said still more strongly, that we were serious
in a wonderful degree. And Dionysodorus said, See, Socrates
that you do not (hereafter) deny what you now assert.—I
have considered this, said I: for I shall never deny it.—{ 30. ]
What is it then, said he? Say you that you wish him to be-
come wise ?—Certainly.—But, said he, is Clinias now wise or
not ?—He says, not yet at all, and he is no braggart.—But do
you, said he, wish him to become wise, and not be unlearned ?
—We acknowledged it.—Do you not then wish him to be-
come what he is not; and to be no longer what he now is ?—
And I, on hearing this, was confused. But he, on my being
confused, taking up the discourse, said, Since you wish him
στ" eres νσΩ
ED ας, ee
EUTHYDEMUS. 67
to be no longer what he now is, you wish, as it seems, for
him to perish. And yet such friends and lovers would cer-
tainly be of much worth, who should consider it a thing of
great moment for their boy-loves to perish. Ctesippus on
hearing this was indignant, on account of his love for the
youth ; and said, O Thurian stranger, if it were not rather
rude to say so, I would say, On your head be the evil ;4° for
knowing what do you falsely ascribe to me and the rest a
thing of this kind, which I think it is unholy to assert, that I
should be willing for this youth to perish.
[31.] But, said Euthydemus, does it appear to you,
Ctesippus, that it is possible to speak falsely ?—By Jupiter,
said he, it does, unless 1 am mad.—Whether, when a person
is asserting a thing about which there is a discourse, or when
not asserting it.—When asserting it.—If then he asserts
it, he does not say any thing else of things existing than
what he asserts?—For how should he do otherwise, said
Ctesippus ?—But of existing things that, of which he speaks,
is one apart from the rest.—Certainly.— Does he then, when
he speaks of that thing, not speak of that which has a being ?
—Yes.—But he who speaks of that which is, and of existing
beings, speaks the truth ; so that if Dionysodorus speaks of
beings, he speaks the truth, and utters nothing false against
you.—He does so, said he; but he, who says this, added
Ctesippus, does not speak, Euthydemus, of beings.—To this
Euthydemus (replied), Are non-entities any thing else than
things which are not ?—They are not.—Therefore, non-entities
are beings no where.—No where.—Is it possible then for any
one to do any thing about non-entities, so as to make them to
exist no where ?4’—It does not appear to me, said Ctesippus,
that he can.—[32.] What then? When orators speak to
4S Unless this is said ironically, the sense would require, as Taylor
translated, ‘ of little worth” —in Greek, not καίτοι πολλοῦ, but καίτοι
ov πολλοῦ. '
46 That is, “ to perish.”
‘7 This is the English for the Latin of Ficinus. The Greek is a mass
of corruption, as Winckelmann has the honesty to confess, Stalbaum
adopts the reading found in three MSS., ὥστ᾽ ἐκεῖνά ye Κλεινίᾳ ποιήσειεν
a@yv—and renders the passage thus: “15 it possible for any one to do any
thing about non-beings, so that any person whatever may do to Clinias
what does not exist?’? But why there should be any allusion to Clinias
he does not state. Besides, after ποιεῖν correct Greek requires not “the
dative but accusative. "
F
68 EUTHYDEMUS.
the people, do they nothing ?—They do something, he re-
plied. —If, then, they do something, do they not also make
something? Yes.—To speak, then, is to do and to make.8—
He assented.—But no one, said he, speaks of non-entities: for
he would make something ; but you have acknowledged that
no one can make non-entities: so that, according to your rea-
soning, no one can assert things which are false; but if Diony-
sodorus speaks, he speaks things which are true, and he speaks
of entities.—By Jupiter, said Ctesippus, (it is so,) Euthydemus.
Yet he speaks of entities after a certain manner, though not as
they subsist.—How say you, Ctesippus? said Dionysodorus.
Are there some who speak of things as they are ?— There are
indeed, said he; and these are men worthy and good, and
who assert things which are true.— What then? said he ; are
not good things, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned ?—{ 33.]
He conceded.—And do you not acknowledge that the worthy
and the good speak of things as they are ?—I do.—The good
therefore, Ctesippus, said he, speak ill of evil things, if they
speak of them as they are.—Truly, said he, by Jupiter, they
do very much so of bad men, for example ; among whom, if
you are persuaded by me, you will be careful not to be num-
bered, lest the good should speak ill of you; because you well
know that the good speak ill of the bad.—Do they not also,
said Euthydemus, speak in high terms of great men, and in
warm terms of the fervent ?—Very much so indeed, said Cte-
sippus ; of cold men therefore they speak coldly, and assert
that they converse (frigidly).4°—You are abusive, Ctesippus,
said Dionysodorus, you are abusive.—Not I, by Jupiter, said
he ; for, Dionysodorus, I love you; but I admonish you as
my companion, and I endeavour to persuade you, never in my
presence to so rudely assert, that I wish for the destruction of
those on whom I set a great value.
[34.] I then, since they seemed to me to conduct themselves
in a rather rude manner towards each other, had some fun
4. On the difference between πράττειν and ποιεῖν, see Heindorf in
Charmid. § 23, p. 163, A.
* This word Ficinus has alone preserved in his version,—“ aiuntque
disserere frigide.” How strange that the recent editors should have
failed to remark that ψυχρῶς was evidently wanting after διαλέγεσθαι.
be 7 passage of Plato may be compared that of Aristoph. in
esm. 168.
EUTHYDEMUS. 69
with Ctesippus, and said, It appears to me, Ctesippus, that we
ought to receive from the strangers what they assert, if they
are willing to give, and not to contend about a word. For if
they can destroy men in such a manner, as to make them, from
being wicked and senseless, good and wise, and this too
whether they have discovered themselves, or learnt from some
other person a corruption and destruction of this kind, so that
having destroyed him who is wicked, they might afterwards ex-
hibit him an honest man,—if they know how to effect this, and
it is evident that they do know; for they say that their new-
ly discovered art does make men good after being wicked,—
we must therefore consent to this. Let them destroy the
lad, and make him and all the rest of us wise. But if you
young men are afraid, let the trial be made on me, as if I were
a Carian ;*! since, though an elderly man, I am prepared to
run the risk ; and I deliver myself up to this Dionysodorus,
as (Pelias*”) did to [Medea] the Colchian (woman), Let him
destroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever (else) he
pleases with me if he does but render me a good man. [35. |
And Ctesippus said, I also, Socrates, am prepared to deliyer
myself to these strangers, if they wish, for them to flay me more
than they flay at present, provided my skin does not end in
a bladder, like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. Dionysodorus
indeed here thinks that Iam angry with him. I am not, how-
ever, angry; but I contradict what I think he has not well
said against me. But do not, said he, my noble Dionysodorus,
call contradiction reviling ; for reviling is a different thing.
Το: this Dionysodorus replied, Do you, Ctesippus, compose
your discourse, as if contradiction existed ?—** Entirely, and
very much so, said he; or do you, Dionysodorus, think that there
is not contradiction ? You could not, said he, prove that at any
This “therefore” is manifestly absurd. After εἰ ἐπίστασθον we
must write not συγχωρήσωμεν ody, but συγχωρήσομεν with two MSS.
and omit οὖν with one. Stalbaum vainly defends οὖν.
5t As if I were a person of no value, as the Carians were said to be in
war, and hence frequently captured and sold as slaves; when they were
sometimes put to the torture, for the benefit of their masters.
52 From the mention of Medea, it is evident that in the words “ boil
me” Plato alluded to Pelias; who suffered himself to be cut up and
boiled in a magic cauldron, in the vain hope of being made young again.
The same story Cicero had in mind, De Senectut. § 23, “nec me, tan-
quam Peliam, recoxent.”’
70 EUTHYDEMUS.
time, since you have heard no one contradicting another.**—
True, said he; but let us now hear, whether I can prove it to you
by Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus. Could you give a
reason for this ?°4—By all means, said he.—What then? said
he; are there words® for each of the things that exist ?—
Certainly, said he.—Whether, then, as each thing is, or as it
is not?—As it is. [36.] For if you remember, Ctesippus, said
he, we have just now shown that no one speaks of a thing as
it is not. For no one is seen to speak of that which is not.
But why this? said Ctesippus. Do you and I contradict the
less ?— Whether then, said he, shall we contradict, if we both of
us pronounce” the word for the same thing, or shall we thus
assert the same thing ?—He admitted (we should).—But, said
he, when neither of us gives the word for that. thing, shall we
then contradict ? Or, (will it not follow,) that thus neither will
have made any mention at all of the thing ?—And this too he
granted.—But, said he, when I pronounce the word for that
thing, and you for some other thing, do we then contradict each
other? Ordo I then speak of that thing, but you do not speak
of it in any respect whatever? And how can he, who does
not speak of a thing, contradict him who does?
And Ctesippus indeed was then silent. But I, wondering
at the reasoning, said, How say you, Dionysodorus? For,
though I have heard this reasoning often, and from many, yet
I have always wondered at it. For Protagoras and others
still more ancient have made much use of it. But to me it
always appears to be wonderful, through its subverting the
reasoning of others and itself too. I think, however, that I
5383 Such is the literal translation of this passage ; out of which none
of the editors have, either with or without alterations, been able to elicit
an atom of sense.
54 So Stalbaum translates. But παρέχειν λόγον is “ to give a reason,”
while ὑπέχειν λόγον is “ to bear with a reason,” or “a speech,” as in
Protag. p. 338, D., and Gorg. p. 465, A., quoted by Stalbaum himself.
More correctly then did Taylor translate, *‘Can you bear a discourse.”
Routh explains the words Ἦ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἂν τούτου λόγον ---" Would
you answer me on this point?” and attributes the whole question to
Dionysodorus, in which he is followed by Winckelmann and Stalb.
55 Ficinus, uncertain how to translate λόγοι, has rendered it “ sermo-
nes rationesque.”
56 Heindorf’s conjecture, λέγοντες for γνόντες, has been confirmed by
two MSS. The fact is, that if λόγος be translated “word,” the sense
requires λέγοντες : if “reason,” then γνόντες must be retained.
EUTHYDEMUS. 71
shall learn its truth the best from you. [87.757 Is the reason-
ing then other (than this), that it is not possible to assert
things which are false? For this is the force of the argument.
Is it not? And that the speaker asserts things which are
true, or does not assert?57 He admitted it. Whether, then,
is it not possible to assert things which are false, but possible
to form a false opinion ?—It is not possible, said he, to form
even a false opinion.—There is then, said I, no such thing as
a false opinion at all—There is not, said he.—Neither then
is there ignorance, nor are there ignorant persons. Or would
not this be ignorance, if there were the power to speak
falsely of things ?—Certainly, said he.—But, said I, this is
not possible.—It is not, said he.—Do you make this assertion,
Dionysodorus, for the sake of talking, that you may say what
is strange? or do you really think that no man is ignorant ?
—Confute, said he, the assertion. Is it possible, according to
your assertion, to confute when no man speaks falsely ?—It is
not, said Euthydemus.—Neither did I, said Dionysodorus,
order you to confute.** For how can any one order that,
which does not exist ?—O Euthydemus, I said, I do not clearly
understand these clever and coherent assertions; but I have
somehow a muddled perception of them. Perhaps then I
shall ask something rather unpleasant ; but do you pardon me.
See then. [38.] For if it is neither possible to speak falsely,
nor to entertain a false opinion, nor to be ignorant, neither is
it possible for any one to err, when he does any thing. For
5787 Here too is another passage, which Heusde was the first to confess
had become confused. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, ‘‘ Num
sibi id vult sermo, ut falsa dicere impossibile sit, oporteatque illum, qui
loquitur, vera proferre, vel omnino non loqui.”
58 Heusde was the first to notice the difficulty here. For Dionysodorus
had just before bid Socrates to confute. He, therefore, proposed to read,
Οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ὡς viv δὴ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐξελέγξαι, “ Nor did I
bid you, said he, as did Dionysodorus just now, to confute.” This
emendation so simple has been rejected by Winckelmann, who fancies
there is some nice distinction, which, however, he does not point out,
between ἐλέγξαι and ἐξελέγξαι : while Stalbaum, after asserting that the
learned have vainly tortured their brains about the meaning, adds, not
very wisely, that no one will easily discover, by conjecture, what Plato
really wrote. He was then not aware, that there is a lacuna here, supplied
in part by three MSS.: “And do you not order me now, Euthydemus,
said I.—(No.) For how, said he, can one order that which does not ex-
ist?’ In Greek, Οὐδὲ κελεύεις ἔτι νῦν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε; TO γὰρ
μὴ ὃν πῶς ἄν τις, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, κελεύσαι ;
72 EUTHYDEMUS.
the doer cannot err in what he does. Do you not say so?—
Just so, said he.—This then, said I, is the unpleasant question.
For if we do not err, either acting, or speaking, or thinking,
if this be the case, of what, by Jupiter, are ye come as the
teachers? Did you not just now say, that you could, the best
of all men, impart virtue to a person willing to learn ?—Then
said Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse, Are you such a
crone,°® Socrates, as to remember now what we first said, and
would even now remember any thing I said last year, yet do
not know how to use what has been said at present ?—For
(the words), said I, are difficult (to understand), and very
reasonably so; for they are spoken by wise men; since it is
very difficult to make use of the last words you are saying.
For what do you mean, Dionysodorus, by the expression, “ I
know not how to use”? Does it not mean this, that I do not
know how to confute it? Since, tell me, what other con-
ception do you form of these words, “1 do not know how to
use the words.”—[39.] But what you say, said he, this is
very difficult to use. Since® answer.—( What,) before you
have answered Dionysodorus? said I.—Will you not answer?
said he.—Is it just? (said I).—It is certainly just, said he.—
For what reason? said I. Or is it plain that it is for this 3,
because you, a very wise person in words, have now come to
us, and know when you ought to answer, and when not; and
now you will not answer a jot, as knowing that you ought
not.—You are a babbler, said he, and are careless in answer-
ing. But, my good man, be obedient and answer; since you
acknowledge that I am a wise man.—I must yield then, said
I, and, as it seems, to necessity; for you are the ruler. Ask,
then.— Whether then do things that have a soul understand ?
or soul-less things also?—Those that have a soul—Do you
know then, said he, any word that has a soul ?—Not I, by
Jupiter.—[40.] Why then did you just now ask me, what
my word understood ?®!—For what else, said I, than because
5° The English “ crone”’ is evidently derived from the Greek κρόνος,
by which was meant “an old fool,” as shown by Aristoph. Neg. 926,
Snr. 1458. Winckelmann, however, still sticks to κενὸς, found in all
the MSS. but two.
s°_8° In these two places, “ since ”’ is perfectly absurd, although not no-
ticed by any editor. In fact, the whole passage is a mass of corruption,
arising chiefly from mterpolations. Ξ
*! In the original, 6, tt μοι νοοῖ τὸ ρῆμα, literally, “ what my word
EUTHYDEMUS. 73
I have erred through my stupidity: or, did I not err, but
tightly said this too, when I asserted that my words under-
stood? Whether then will you say that I did err, or I did
not? For if I have not erred, neither will you confute,
although you are a wise man; nor have you the power to
make use of my assertion; but if I have erred, neither thus
do you speak rightly, in saying that it is not possible to err.
And I say this not in opposition to what you asserted last
year. But this discourse, said I, Ὁ Dionysodorus and Euthy-
demus, seems to remain in the same state, and still, as of old,
having thrown down others, to fall itself; nor for this not to
-happen has it*been discovered even by your art, and this too
so wonderful for the accuracy of reasoning.—Ctesippus then
said, You certainly say wonderful things, O men of Thurii
or Chios, or from whatever place you are, and by whatever
name you delight to be called; as you care not to talk wildly.
—([41.] And I, fearing lest reviling should take place, again
softened down Ctesippus, and said, What I told Clinias just
now, I say also, Ctesippus, to you, that you do not know the
wisdom of these strangers how wonderful it is. They are,
however, unwilling to exhibit it to us seriously ; but are imi-
tating Proteus the Egyptian® sophist, and deceive us by their
sorcery. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus,® and not sepa-
rate ourselves from the men, till they have thoroughly shown
us on what point they are serious; for I think that something
of theirs very beautiful will appear, when they begin to be
serious; and let us beg and exhort and pray them to exhibit
themselves thoroughly.
It seems then good to me to again point out in what man-
ner I prayed them to appear to me; for I will endeavour, as
far as I can, to go through all in order® from where I then
left off, that I may call them out to pity me; and that com-
miserating me on a tenter-hook and acting seriously, they may
act seriously themselves. But do you, Clinias, said I, enable
me to recollect from what point we broke off. [42.] As I
UNDERSTOOD for me,” the words of Socrates are perverted by the sophist,
that he might play on the verb “ understand.” Taytor.
6282 Plato here, and in Euthyphr. p. 15, and Pseudo-Plato in Ion, p.
541, E., refer to Hom. Od. iv. 354.
585. The word πᾶν, which is required by ἑξῆς and διελθεῖν, has been
luckily preserved in three MSS.
74 EUTHYDEMUS.
think, we broke off some where there, when we acknowledged
at last that we ought to philosophize ; did we not ?—Yes, said
he.—But philosophy is a possession of knowledge; is it not
so? said I.—Yes, said he.—By possessing then what know-
ledge, shall we rightly possess it? Is not this the simple fact,
that (it is by possessing) that (knowledge) which will benefit
us ?—Certainly, said he-—Would it then benefit us at all, if
we knew to know™ by going about in what part of the earth
the most gold had been dug ?—Perhaps so, said he.—But
formerly, I replied, this was our decision, that we should gain
nothing, even though, without labour, and without digging
the earth, all the gold (that exists) should be ours. So that
if we knew how to make the rocks of gold,® even this know-
ledge would be nothing worth: for if we knew not how to
use the gold, (its possession) would appear to be of no ad-
vantage. Or do you not remember? said L—I remember
very well, said he.—Nor, as it seems, will any advantage be
derived from any other science, either relating to money
matters or to medicine, or to any other, by which a person
knows how to make any thing, but does not (know) how to
use what he makes. Is it not so ?—He assented.—Nor even
if there were a science to make men immortal, without their
knowing how to make use of such immortality, would there
be, it seems, any advantage from it, if it is fair to infer any
thing from what has been previously admitted.—In all these
points we both agreed.
[43.] There is a need then, O handsome youth, of some sci-
ence of such a kind, said I, as that there may concur in it both
the power to make, and the knowledge how to use that which
% Not a single editor has seen the absurdity of the expression, ἐπισταί-
μεθα γιγνώσκειν, and still less that the sense requires ἐπισταίμεθα yeywy-
ίσκειν, i. 6. “ knew to proclaim ;” for the two words are constantly con-
founded, as I have shown in Poppo’s Prolegom, p. 314, and I could now
add not a few places more. Ficinus has merely “ si sciremus, quibus in
terris aurum multum effodiatur.” ;
8° From this passage it would seem that in Plato’s time some attempts
had been made to discover the philosopher’s stone; unless it be said that
there is an allusion to the circumstance mentioned in the fragment of a
comedy by Eubulus, called. Glaucus, who, like Proteus, was a marine
deity, and was feigned to say—‘“ We once the sons of Cecrops did per-
suade To march out to Hymettus, and with arms In hand and three
days’ food against the ants; Since grains of molten gold had there
appeared.”
EUTHYDEMUS. 75
one makes.—It appears so, said he.—®* We are far then, it
seems, from being skilful lyre-makers, or from possessing any
knowledge of that kind»; for there the art that makes is on
one side, and on the other the art that uses, (and there is a
division about the same thing).® For the lyre-making and
the harp-making (arts) differ very much from each other. Is
it not so?—He assented.—Nor shall we, it is plain, require
the flute-making art: for this is another such-like art.°7—He
was of that opinion.—But, by the gods, said I, if we should
learn the art of composing speeches, is this the art from the
possession of which we should be happy ?—I think not, said
Clinias, taking up the (discourse).°—Of what proof, said I,
do you make use ?—I see, said he, some speech-makers, who
do not know how to use their own speeches that they make
themselves, just as lyre-makers do with their lyres ;® but
here are others able to use the speeches which those have
made, although unable to make speeches themselves. It is
plain, then, that with respect to speeches, the art of making
is separate from the art of using them.—[44.] You appear to
me, said I, to give a sufficient proof that the art of speech-
makers is not that art, by the possession of which a person
would be happy; and yet I thought that here would appear
the science, of which for a long time we have been in search.
For to me those very speech-makers, Clinias, appear to be
vastly wise, when I am in their company ; and this very art
86 After all the efforts of scholars to recover what Plato wrote, I con-
fess my inability to understand a word of what is found in Stalbaum’s
text. Ficinus has, ““ Permultum igitur abest, ut lyrarum fabros esse nos
oporteat; talemque scientiam assequi. In his enim ars efficiens ab arte,
que utitur, circa idem distinguitur :’’ which is precisely what the train of
ideas requires.
67 Instead of the sense contained in these words, Ficinus has more to
the purpose—“ Ea siquidem ab illa, que utitur, discrepat.”’
8 Taylor omitted ‘‘taking up (the discourse)’ answering to the
Greek ὑπολαβὼν, because he found in the Latin of Ficinus no transla-
tion of that word; while all the more recent editors have failed to
observe that ὑπολαβὼν is never, and could be never, introduced into a
reply. There is some error here, which I will leave for others to correct.
The remedy, I suspect, is not far off.
89. Ficinus has, what is much more clear than the Greek, “ perinde uti
nesciunt, ac lyris fabri ipsi lyrarum, qui ad aliorum usus lyras construx-
erunt, quas et, qui illis utuntur, facere nesciunt,”’ i.e. “just as lyre-
makers themselves, who make lyres for the use of others, cannot use the
lyres, which those, who use them, cannot make.”
76 EUTHYDEMUS.
of theirs also appears to be something divine and elevated.
This, however, is by no means wonderful. For it is a por-
tion of the art of charming, and is but a little inferior to it ;
for the art of charming is that by which vipers,” and pha-
langia,”! and scorpions, and other wild animals, and even
diseases are charmed ; but this happens to be the charming
and soothing of judges, and of persons assembling at public ~
meetings, and of other mobs. Or are you of a different
opinion ?—I am not, said he; but it appears to me as you
say.—Where then, said I, shall we yet turn ourselves? to
what art ?—I do not well see the way, said he.—But I think,
said I, that I have discovered (the art).—What is it? said
Clinias.—The art of a general, said I, appears to me, more
than any other, to be that, by possessing which a person would
be happy.—It does not appear so to me.—Why not? said L—
This is certainly a man-hunting art.—What then? said L—
[45.] No (part), said he, of the hunting art itself” extends
beyond hunting and getting into the hand; but when persons
have got into their hands what they have hunted, they are
not able to use it; but hunters and fishermen assign it to
cooks. But on the contrary, geometricians, astronomers, and
those skilled in arithmetic—for these also are of the hunting
art—for each of these™ do not make diagrams, but find out
things existing. As then not knowing how to use them, but
only to hunt for them, they deliver up their inventions for
those to make a bad use” of in dialectics—such at least of them
as are not very stupid.—Be it so, I said, O most beautiful and
most wise Clinias. But is such the case ?—Certainly. And
thus in the same manner, said he, generals, when they have
taken a city or camp, deliver it over to statesmen; for they
know not how to use the things they have taken; just as, I
τὸ Routh quotes from Virgil, Ain. vii. 755, “ Vipereo generi et graviter
spirantibus hydris Spargere qui somnos cantuque manuque solebat Mul-
cebatque iras.et morsus arte levabat.”
τι The phalangia were a kind of venomous animal, with many legs,
like a spider.
” Out of this corrupt passage no editor has yet been able to make
any thing satisfactorily.
18. Here too is another corrupt passage; where a future editor of Plato
will find not a little to try his sagacity.
This is the proper meaning of καταχρῆσθαι. Hence it is evident
that Plato is speaking ironically. Otherwise he would have said χρῆσθαι.
EUTHYDEMUS. i 77
think, the catchers of quails deliver them up to quail-feeders.
[46.] If then, he said, we are in want of that art which,
whether making or hunting, knows itself how to use what
it possesses, and is such an art as will render us happy, we
must, said he, instead of the general’s seek out some other art.
Cri. What say you, Socrates? Did that lad talk thus ?
Soc. Do you not think he did, Crito?
Cri. By Jupiter, I do not indeed. For I think if he had
spoken thus, he would not have wanted either Euthydemus
or any other man for his instruction.
Soc. But, by Jupiter, was it not Ctesippus that spoke thus ?
for I do not remember.
Cri. What, Ctesippus ?
Soc. This, however, I well know, that it was neither Eu-
thydemus nor Dionysodorus who spoke thus. But, good
Crito, was it not some divinity, who being present said these
things? For I well know that I heard them.
Cri. It is so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and to me it appears
very much so indeed, to have been some divinity. But after
this, did you still search out any art? And have you dis-
covered or not that, for the sake of which you made the
search ? .
[47.] Soc. Whence, blessed man, did we discover it? But
we were altogether a subject of laughter, like children that
run after larks; for we continually thought we should imme-
diately catch each of the sciences, but they were always
flying secretly away. Why therefore should I speak to you
about the majority ? But when we came to the regal art, and
thoroughly considered whether it is that, which imparts and
works out happiness, here falling, as it were, into a labyrinth,
when we thought we were now at the end, we again turned
round in our course, and appeared to be at the beginning of
our inquiry, and we wanted just as much (of the mark), as
when we were first making the search.
Cri. But how did this happen, Socrates, to you ?
Soc. I will tell you. For the art of the statesman and that
of the king it has been determined by us are the same.
[48.] Cri. What then?”
Soc. To this art then, as alone knowing how to make a
proper use of things, have the general’s art and the other arts
7S This question is omitted by Ficinus.
78 EUTHYDEMUS.
(determined)’* to give dominion over those works of which
they are the mere artisans. This then clearly appeared to us
to be the art we were seeking, and the cause of good conduct
in a city; and really, according to the Iambic verse of
4Eschylus,” that it alone is seated in the stern of the city,
directing, as by the rudder, all things, and commanding all
persons to do all things useful.
‘Cri. Does not this then appear to you to be well said
respecting this art?
Soc. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what
after this happened to us. For we were considering again
somehow thus. Does that regal art, which rules over all,
effect any thing for us or nothing? We said to each other
that it certainly will. For would not you too assert this,
Crito ἢ
Cri. I would.
Soc. What then would you say is its effect? Just as if I
should ask you, what effect does the physician’s art produce
in all the things over which it rules? Would you not say it
is health ?
Cri. I should.
[49.] Soc, And what does agriculture, your art, effect in
all the things over which it rules? Would you not say that
it affords us food from the earth ?
Cri. I would.
Soc. And what does the regal art effect, while it commands
every thing over which it rules? Perhaps you do not very
well see your way.
Cri. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates.
Soc. Nor do we, Crito. But thus much at least you know,
that if it is that art, which we are seeking, it ought to be useful.
Cri. Certainly.
Soc. Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain
good?
Cri. Necessarily so, Socrates.
76 Heindorf says that ἔδοξαν may easily be supplied from the pre-
ceding ἔδοξε, He got the idea from Ficinus, who has inserted the verb
*‘viderentur.”’ But the arts could not be said to come to any determina-
tion. Plato wrote, I suspect, παραδιδόασι, corrupted subsequently into
παραδιδόναι.
τ The passage alluded to is in 5. Th. 2.
EUTHYDEMUS, 79
Soc. But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Cli-
nias, that good is nothing else than a certain science.
Cri. Yes, you did say so.
Soe. The other works then, which one may say belong to
the statesman’s art—but these would be many—for example, to
make the citizens rich, free, and free from sedition—do not
they all appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is neces-
sary for this art to make men wise, and to impart knowledge,
if it is to be that, which benefits and renders men happy.
[50.] Cri. It is so: and thus it was agreed upon by you,
as you have narrated the discourse.
Soc. Does then the regal art make men wise and good?
Cri. What prevents it, Socrates ?
Soe. Does it then make all men so, and good in all respects ?
And is it the art which furnishes every science, that of the
currier, of the carpenter, and all the other crafts ὃ
Cri. I think not, Socrates.
Soc. But what science (does it furnish)? To what pur-
pose do we employ it? For of no works, either good or evil,
ought it to be the artificer, but to impart no other science than
itself. Let us then say what it is; to what purpose we should
use it. Are you willing, Crito, we should say it is that, by
which we make others good ?
Cri. Entirely so.
Soe. But in what will these be good, and to what purpose
will they be useful? Or shall we still say that they will make
others good, and that those others will make others so? How-
ever, they no where appear to us in what way they are good;
because we have held in no honour the works, which are said
to belong to the statesman’s science. But in reality, there is,
according to the proverb,’* Corinthus the son of Jupiter ; and
as I have said, we are still equally, or even more, wanting to-
wards knowing what the science is, which will make us
happy.
Cri. By Jupiter, Socrates, you have come, it seems, to a
great difficulty.
[51.] Soe. I myself then, Crito, since I had fallen into
this difficulty, sent forth every kind of cry and entreated the
*8 By this proverb is meant a weariness from words repeated vainly.
2 origin is rather obscure ; see the Scholia here, and on Pindar Nem. vii.
54.
80 EUTHYDEMUS.
strangers, and called upon them, as if they were the Dioscuri,”
to save us, both me and the lad, from the triple waves of the
discourse; to be by all means serious, and seriously to show
us what that science is, by the possession of which we may
pass well through the remainder of life.
Cri. And was then Euthydemus willing to show you any
thing ἢ
Soc. How not? And he began, my friend, the discourse
very magnificently thus. Whether, said he, Socrates, shall I
teach you this science about which you formerly were at a loss,
or show you that you possess it ?—O blessed man, said I, are
you able to effect this ?—-Certainly, said he-—Show me, then, by
Jupiter, said I, that I possess it; for this is much easier than
for a man so old to learn.—Come then, said he, answer me.
15 there any thing which you know ?—Certainly, said I;
many * things, but trifling.—[52.] It is sufficient, said he.
Does it then appear to you to be possible, that any thing which
exists should not be what it is?—It does not, by Jupiter.
—Did you not say that you knew something ?—I did.—Are
you not then knowing, if you know ?—Certainly, in that very
thing.—It makes no difference. But is it not necessary that
you, being knowing, should know all things ?—It is not, by
Jupiter, said I, since there are many other things which I do
not know.—If then you do not know a thing, you ar@ not
knowing ?—Of that thing, friend, said I—Are you not then,
said he, less knowing? But you just now said, that you were
knowing; and thus you are the very same person that you are,*!
and again not the same person, according to the same things,
(and)*? at the same time.—Be it so, I said, Euthydemus: for,
according to the saying, “ You rattle indeed very pretty.”**
79 The Dioscuri are Castor and Pollux, the sons of Leda by Jupiter,
who were invoked by sailors when in danger during a storm. See the
commentators on Horace, Od. I. 3. 2.
8° As Socrates professed to know only that he knew nothing, Serranus
justly found fault with καὶ πολλὰ. Nor has a single scholar, as far as I
can learn, been able to get rid of the objection; although it were easy to
do so by a very slight alteration.
81 Instead of ‘‘ that you are,” the train of ideas seems to require “ that
you were,” in Greek, ὃς ἦσθα, not ὃς εἶ.
8 This “and” Taylor found in Ficinus “‘ simul et secundum eadem :”
which leads to ἅμα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτά. And thus the difficulty is overcome,
at which Schleiermacher and others had stumbled, in κατὰ ταὐτὰ :
83 In lieu of καλὰ δὴ πάντα λέγεις, Stalbaum has edited καλὰ δὴ πα-
EUTHYDEMUS. 81
How then do I know that science which we were seeking ?
since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.
If I know one thing, do I know all things? For I cannot be
knowing and not knowing at the same time. And since I
know all things, do I possess that knowledge likewise? Is this
then what you say? And is this that wise thing ?—You are,
Socrates, said he, confuting yourself.—[53.] But what, said I,
Euthydemus, are you not suffering the very same thing? For
whatever I may suffer together with you and Dionysodorus
here, O beloved head, I shall not take much to heart. ‘Tell me,
do you not know some things, and know not others ?—By no
means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.—How say you? said I.
Do you then know nothing ?—Certainly,™ said he—Do you
then know all things, said I, since you know any thing what-
ever ?—All things, said he.—And you too, if you know one
thing, know all things.—O Jupiter! I replied, how wonderful
and mighty a good you tell me hasappeared. Do then all other
men likewise know all things, or nothing ?—They surely, said
he, do not know some things, but do not know others ;®° and
are at the same time knowing, and not knowing.—But how is
this ? said I.—All men, he said, know all things, if they know
one thing.—O, by the gods! said I, Dionysodorus,—for it is
now manifest to me that you are serious, though I with diffi-
culty invoked you to be so,—do you in reality know all things ?
For instance, the art of a carpenter and a cobbler ?—Certainly,
said he.—And are you also able to stitch shoes ?—I am, by
Jupiter, said he, and also to mend them.—Do you also know
rayeic, the conjecture of Abresch, who refers the gl. in Hesych. and Pho-
tius, Καλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς, to this passage; where Plato seems from the
Scholia to have alluded to the Tewpyoi of Aristophanes.
_ * This answer ought to be, as Taylor translated it, “‘ Far from it,” But
such is not the meaning of Kai μάλα. Instead then of οὐδὲν in the pre-
ceding question one would prefer εὖ γ᾽ ἕν.
86 To get rid of the tautology in the two portions of this answer, Stal-
baum supposes that Dionysodorus speaks ironically; as if a direct
answer could be ironical, as well as an indirect question. Ficinus has
‘Non enim dicendum videtur scire eos aliqua, nescire alia: Ὁ which
seems to lead to Οὐ γὰρ δεῖ εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐπίστανται, τὰ δὲ οὐκ
ἐπίστανται. But a Sophist should assert something decisive; not say
merely οὐ δεῖ εἰπεῖν. Winckelmann preserves δήπου but reads ἔφην, and
gives all the words down to “ All men, he said,” to Socrates. But Stal-
baum correctly observes that ἔφην---ἔφην---ἣν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, could not be thus ap-
plied to the same person; nor could ἀλλὰ ri be found except in the
speech of another party. Perhaps Plato wrote,—é¢n, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τὰ piv—
G
82 EUTHYDEMUS.
such things as these, the number of the stars and the sands ?%
—[54.] Perfectly so, said he. Think you, we should not
confess that we do ?—-And Ctesippus then, taking up (the dis-
course), said, By Jupiter, Dionysodorus, show me some et
of these. things, that I may know that you are s
truth.—W hat proof shall I show ? said he.—Do you know sea
many teeth®? Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know
how many you have ?—Is it not enough, said he, for you, to
hear that we know all things ?—By no means, said he; but
only tell us this one thing more, and show that you speak the
truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have,
and you appear on our counting them to have known this, we
will then believe. you in other things likewise. They then,
thinking they were mocked at, were unwilling (to comply),
but acknowledged they knew all things, while they were
questioned on each point singly by Ctesippus. For there was
nothing which Ctesippus did not ask them without conceal-
ment, and at last even if they knew the most indecent
things. And they, confessing that they did know, advanced
most bravely against the questions, like wild boars pressing
on against the blow; [55.] so that I too, Crito, was at length
compelled myself through my incredulity to ask Euthydemus,
whether Dionysodorus knew also how to dance? and he said,
Perfectly so.—However, said I, he surely does not know
how to act the tumbler upon swords,** and to be whirled on a
wheel,®* being so old. (Or,)®® so far (towards) wisdom has he
come ?—There is nothing, said he, which he does not know.
—But whether, said I, do you only now know all things, or
have you always (known them) ?—Always, said he.—And
when you were children, and as soon as you were born, did
you know ?—All things, said both of them together.—To us
86 Here seems to be an allusion to a philosopher, like Archytas, whom
Horace addresses ‘‘ Te maris et terre numeroque carentis arene Men-
sorem.’
ὅτ Porson on Aristoph. Plut. 1057, was the first to point out the simil-
arity in the jokes of the comic poet and the philosopher; and Dobree the
fragment of Lysias, quoted by Athenzus, to which he might have added
Pseudo-Demetr. de Elocut. § 275.
88. Feats, like those mentioned in the text, are said to be performed
even now in the East. Routh refers to Xenoph. Sympos. 2, and
Winckelmann to Anabas. v. 9.
8° Heusde and Heind. insert ἢ, “ or,” which Stalb. incorrectly rejects.
= τ δὴ
EUTHYDEMUS. 83
the thing appeared to be incredible. But said Euthydemus,
Do you disbelieve, Socrates ?—Except, I said, that it is likely
you are wise men.*’—But, said he, if you are willing to give
me answers, I will also show you, giving your assent to these
wonderful things.—Indeed, I shall®! most gladly, said I, be
confuted on these points. For if I am wise, not knowing it,
and you demonstrate this that I know all things, and have al-
ways (known), what greater wind-fall than this could I find
in all my life?—Answer then, said he.—[56.] Ask me, as
one that will answer.—Whether, then, Socrates, said he, do
you know any thing or not ?—I do.—Do you then know by that
thing, through which you are knowing, or by any thing else ?
—By that by which I am knowing: for I suppose you mean
the soul. Or do you not mean it?—Are you not ashamed
of yourself, Socrates? said he. You ask a question when you
are asked one.—Be it so, said I; but what shall I do? For I
will do as you bid me. (But) when I know not what it is
you ask me, you nevertheless order me to answer and not to
ask a question.— You, doubtless, said he, understand what I
say.—I do, said I.— Now then answer to that which you do
understand.— What then, said I, if you ask a question, think-
ing in one way, and I understand it in another, and then I
give an answer to it, is it enough for you, if I answer nothing
to the purpose?—To me it would, said he, but not to you, I
think.—I will not, by Jupiter, answer, said I, before I hear.”
—You will not answer, said he, to what you may happen to un-
derstand, because you are a trifler, and more of a silly old
man than is becoming.—And I then perceived he was annoyed
at me for defining precisely what was said, as he was desirous
to make me his prey by placing his words around me (as a net).
1 recollected, therefore,®* that Connus was always annoyed at
me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid
- ® On this passage see Heind., Winckelm., Stalb., who all differ, without
any of them being able to discover what Plato wrote.
1 Ficinus has “ redargutio erit,’’ which leads to ἐξελέγξομαι, fut. med.,
for ἐξελεγχθήσομαι, in lieu of ἐξελέγχομαι.
92 After “1 hear,’’ there is evidently an omission of some words, which
Ficinus supplies by his version, ‘‘ non prius respondebo, quam quomodo
respondendum sit, intellexero,”’ i. 6. “1 will not answer, before I under-
stand -how I am to answer.”
% This “therefore ’’ is without meaning. One MS. has γὰρ for οὖν.
Plato wrote δ᾽ εὖ--- 4
G
84 EUTHYDEMUS.
less attention to me, as one that was ignorant. [57.] But
since I had determined to go as a scholar to those men, T
thought I ought to yield, lest they should consider me a stupid
fellow, and not receive me asa scholar. Hence I said, If it
seems good for you to act thus, Euthydemus, let it be done:
for perhaps in every respect you, who possess the art, know
better how to converse than I do, who am an unskilled indi-
vidual. Question me then again from the beginning.—Answer
then again, said he, whether you know what you know by
something or not.—I do, said I, by the soul.—Again, said he,
this man in his answer adds to the questions he is asked. For
I did not ask by what you know, but if you know by any
thing.—Again I said, I have answered more than was neces-
sary, through my want of instruction; but pardon me, For
I will now answer simply, that I know always by something,
what I know.— But, said he, whether do you always know by
the same thing? Or is it at one time by this thing and at an-
other time by another ?—Always by this, said I, when I know.
—Again, said he, will you not cease to speak beside (the ques-
tion) ?—But (I fear, said I,) lest this “ always” should trip us
up.—lIt will not us, said he; but, if at all, it will you. But
answer me, Do you always know by this ?—Always, I said;
since I must take away the “when.”—[58.] You therefore
always know by this. And always knowing, whether do you
know some things by that, by which you know, and other
things by something else? or do you know all things by
that ?—All things, said I, which I know, by that.—This has
come, said he, the same by-answer.—I take away then, said
I, the words “ which I know.”—Take not away, said he, even
one word; for I make you no request.°*—But answer me,
Would you be able to know all things, unless you could know
all things ?—This would be a prodigy, said I.—-Add now, said
he, whatever you like; for you confess that you know all
things.—I appear to have done so, said I; since the expres-
sion, “ the things which I know,” possess no power whatever ;
[but I know all things ].%—Have you not then confessed that
™ After “‘ request’ understand, “to take away any thing,” as shown
by Phedon. p. 95, E., quoted appositely by Winckelmann, οὐδὲν---οὔτ᾽
ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι.
95. Heindorf correctly wished to expunge the words πάντα δὲ ἐπίστα-
pat, which Winckelmann and Stalbaum vainly attempt to preserve. For
they plainly interfere with the whole train of thought.
aoe ee
EUTHYDEMUS. 85
you always know by that thing by which you know? whe-
ther it be when you know, or in whatever way you please:
for you have confessed that you know always, and all things
at the same time. It is evident, therefore, that you knew
when you was a boy, and when you was begotten, and when
you was born; and even before you was born, and before hea-
ven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always
possessed knowledge ; and you, by Jupiter, said he, will know
always, and all things, if I wish it—[59.] And may you wish
it, much-honoured Euthydemus, said I, if you speak the truth
in reality. But I do not quite believe that you are sufficient
for this, unless this your brother here, Dionysodorus, assist you
with his counsel: and thus perhaps you would be (sufficient).%”
But tell me, said I—for in other things I cannot contend against
you, men of such portentous wisdom, (nor say) that I do not
know all things, since you assert it—how, Euthydemus, shall I
say that I know that good men are unjust? Come, tell me,
do I know this, or do I not know it ?—You certainly know it,
said he.— What, said I, (do I know) ?—That good men are not
unjust.—This, I said, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But
1 am not asking this; but where did I learn that good men
are unjust ?—No where, said Dionysodorus.—lI do not there-
fore, said I, know it.—Euthydemus then said to Dionysodorus,
You are destroying the reasoning; and this man will appear
to be not knowing, that he is at the same time both knowing
and not knowing. [60.] And Dionysodorus blushed. But,
Euthydemus, said I, how say you? Does not your brother,
who knows all things, appear to you to speak correctly ?—
But am I the brother of Euthydemus? said Dionysodorus,
hastily taking up the discourse.—And I said, Leave me alone,
my good man, till Euthydemus shall have taught me how I know
that good men are unjust; and do not begrudge me the lesson.
% Bekker has καὶ vai pa Ai’, ἔφη, αὐτὸς aei—Heindorf was the
first to object to αὐτὸς, and to suggest εὐθὺς dei ad.—Stalbaum prefers
abies dei.—Winckelmann unites αὐτὸς with cai, “and even you your-
self—”’
9: Stalbaum omits the words οὕτω δὲ τάχ᾽ ἄν. He should have read,
οὕτω γὰρ τάχ᾽ ἂν εἴης" scil. ἱκανός, by the aid of Ficinus, ‘‘ Sic enim
forte valebis.”” The ellipse, however, seems to be defended by τάχ᾽ ἄν"
4AX’—in Sophist. p. 257, D., and τάχ᾽ ἄν" οὐ μὴν---ἰιι Phileb. p. 23, E.,
quoted by Winckelmann
86 EUTHYDEMUS.
—You are flying away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and are
unwilling to answer.—And reasonably so, said I: for I am
inferior even to either one of you; so that I have a great
need to fly from the two. For I am somehow far weaker than
Hercules ; who was not able to contend with the Hydra—a
sophist that did by her wisdom, if one head of the discourse
was cut off, send up again many instead of one—and at the
same time with the Crab,® a certain other sophist, who, as it
appears to me, had come recently from the sea; and when it
was annoying Hercules on the left hand by speaking to and
biting him, he called upon Iolaus, the son of his brother, to
aid him; and he gave him sufficient aid. But if my Iolaus,
Patrocles,'° were to come, he would rather produce mis-
chief.
[61.] Answer then, said Dionysodorus, since this tale has
been sung by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of
Hercules than of you.—It is then best for me, Dionysodorus,
said I, to answer you. For you will not desist—of this I am
pretty well certain—from asking questions, and grudging me
(to learn), and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that
wise thing.—Answer, however, said he.—I will answer then,
said I, that Iolaus was the nephew of Hercules, but, as it ap-
pears to me, mine not at all. For my brother, Patrocles, was
not his father; but Iphicles,who nearly resembles him in name,
was the brother of Hercules.—But is Patrocles, said he, your
brother ?—Certainly, said I; for he had the same mother, though
not the same father with myself.—He is then your brother,
and not your brother.—I said, He was not from the same fa-
ther, O best of men: for his father was Cheredemus, but mine
Sophroniscus.—But, said he, Sophroniscus was a father, and
Cheredemus (likewise).—Certainly, said I; the former was
my father, and the latter his—Was not then, said he, Chere-
demus different from a father?—From my father, said L—
88. Instead of ἑτέρου Ficinus found in his MS. ἑκατέρου, as shown by.
his “ alterutro.” :
% This contest of Hercules with the Crab is mentioned by Apollodorus
in Biblioth. II. 5. 2, and Palephatus Incredibil. fab. 39. ᾽
100 To this brother of Socrates Winckelmann thinks there is an allusion
in Aristoph. Plut. 84, where he is described as a person who had never
washed himself from the time of his birth.
EUTHYDEMUS. 87
Was he then (said he) a father, different from a father? Or
are you the same thing as the'®! stone ?—[62.] I fear, said 1,
lest under you I shall appear to be the same; but I do not
think so myself.—Are you then, said he, different from the 10]
stone ?—Different, certainly.—Being then something different
from a stone, you are not a stone: and being different from
gold, you are not gold.—It is so.— Will not Chzredemus then,
since he is different from a father, be not a father ?—It seems,
said I, he is not a father.—For certainly, said Euthydemus,
taking up the discourse, if Cheredemus is a father, and Sophro-
niscus, on the contrary, being different from a father, is not a fa-
ther, so that? you, Socrates, are without a father.—And then
Ctesippus, taking up the discourse, said, Is not your father in
the very same predicament? for he is different from my father.
—Very far from it, said Euthydemus.—Is he then the same ? he
replied.— Yes, the same.—I would not wish this. But whether,
Euthydemus, is he my father alone, or the father of other men
likewise ?—Of other men likewise, said he. Or do you think
that the same person, being a father, is not a father?—So I
thought indeed, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he, (do you
think) that athing being gold is not gold? or (a person) being a
man is not a man ?—[63. | Say not 80,5 said Ctesippus. Accord-
ing to the proverb, you do not, Euthydemus, join thread with
thread. For you speak of a dreadful thing, if your father is the
father of all.—But he is, said he.—Whether of men, said Cte-
sippus, or of horses too? or of all other animals likewise ?—Of
all (animals), said he.—Is your mother too the mother (of all) ?5
—Yes, the mother.—Your mother then, said he, is the mother
101. ΟῚ The article has no meaning here. The passage is corrupt, and
may be corrected without much difficulty.
* This “so that,’”’ in Greek ὥστε, plainly proves that the hypothesis of
the proposition is without its conclusion. There is another error too in εἰ
yap δήπου. For δήπου never follows εἰ, only od. And hence Ficin, has
* Haud—”
3 So Stalbaum renders μὴ γὰρ, as if λέγε were understood. But in
this ellipse yap never is, for it never could be, found.
4 This proverb was applied to those who say or do the same things
through the same means, as remarked by the Scholiast; who quotes
Aristotle, Φυσικ. ’Axpoac. iii. 6, 9.
᾿ 5. Ficinus alone has preserved, what no editor has yet remarked, the
true readings here, as shown by his version, ‘An et mater tua mater
omnium.” ‘The Greek is ἦ καὶ μήτηρ ἡ μήτηρ.
88 EUTHYDEMUS.
of sea-urchins.—And yours too, said he.—Hence then you are
the brother of gudgeons, and puppies, and little pigs.—And
so are you, said he.—And besides this, your father is a dog
too.—And so is yours, said he.—But, said Dionysodorus, if
you would answer me, you would forthwith acknowledge
these things. For tell me, have you a dog ?—Yes, a very bad
one, said Ctesippus.—Has he then puppies ?—He has indeed,
said he, others very much of the same kind (as himself}),—Is
not the dog then their father?—At least, I saw him having
connexion with a bitch.— What then? Is he not your dog ?—
Certainly, said he.—Being a father then, is he not yours? So
that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of
puppies.—[64.] And Dionysodorus again, quickly taking up
the discourse, that Ctesippus might not get a word in before
him, said, Answer me still in a small matter. Do you strike
this dog ?—And Ctesippus said, laughing, By the gods, I do;
for I cannot (strike) you.u—You strike your father then, said
he.—Much more justly, said he, should I strike your father,
who, having endured what, has begotten such wise sons.
But surely, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, your father and the
father of the puppies has enjoyed many good things from this
your wisdom. But neither is he in want of many good things,
Ctesippus, nor are you.—Nor are you, Euthydemus, said he.
—wNor is any other man (said he) in want of them. For tell
me, Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to
drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good,
when it is requisite; or when any one is going to a battle,
ought he rather to go armed, or unarmed?—To me, said he,
(it appears);® although I think that you are about to say
some of your beautiful things—[65.] You shall know the
best, said he; but answer me. For since you acknowledge
that it is good for a man to drink medicine when it is
requisite, is it not meet to drink as much as possible of this
good, and will it not in this case be well there,’ if some one,
bruising it, should mingle with it a cart-load of hellebore.—
And Ctesippus said, This would be very proper indeed,
5 Here is evidently some omission. For to a double question there
could not be a single answer.
7 Bekk. has ἐκεῖ, which, omitted by Ficinus, and Schleiermacher and
Heindorf could not understand, is absurdly explained by Winckelmann,
whom Stalbaum follows in ed. 2
EUTHYDEMUS. 89
Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the statue
in Delphi.*—As therefore, said he, it is also good to have
arms in battle, is it not meet to have a great number of shields
and spears, since it is a good thing?—Very much so, said
Ctesippus. But you are not of this opinion, Euthydemus;
for you think that one (shield) and one spear are sufficient.
Or do you not?—I do.— Would you, said he, arm Geryones
too and Briareus in this manner? But I thought you were
more skilful (than to do so), as being one who fights with a
soldier’s arms, and so too was this your friend.—And Euthy-
demus indeed was silent. But Dionysodorus asked, in refer-
ence to what had been before answered by Ctesippus, Does it
not then appear to you to be good likewise to possess gold ?—
Certainly, said Ctesippus, and this too in plenty.—[66. ] What
then, does it not appear to you to be a good thing to possess
riches always, and every where ?—Very much so, said he.—
Do you not then acknowledge gold likewise to be a good
thing ?—I have acknowledged it, said he.—Is it not then meet
to possess it always, and every where, and especially in one’s
self? And would not a man be most happy, if he had three
talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his skull, and a stater
of gold in each of his eyes ?—They say indeed, Euthydemus,
said Ctesippus, that those amongst the Scythians are the most
happy and the best men, who have much gold in their own
skulls, just as you lately spoke of the dog being your own
father: and, what is still more wonderful, they say, that they
drink out of their own golden skulls, and look within them,
having their own head in their hands.—[67.| Whether, said
Euthydemus, do the Scythians and other men see things which
can be seen, or things which cannot be seen ?—Things, surely,
which can be seen.—Do you then (do so) likewise? said he.—
I do.—Do you then see our garments ?—Yes.—Can then
these things see ?—Beyond all measure, said Ctesippus.—But
what? said he.—Nothing. But perhaps you think you do
not see them, so facetious are you; but to me you appear,
Euthydemus, not sleeping to be asleep, and, if it were possi-
ble for a man, when speaking, to say nothing, to do this like-
wise.—Is it not then possible, said Dionysodorus, for him who
8. Of the statue alluded to it appears that nothing is told elsewhere.
9 The Greek word ἀσπίδα is wanting in the text. Taylor supplied
‘* shield ” from the context. Ficinus has ‘*‘ unum duntaxat jaculum.”
90 EUTHYDEMUS.
is silent to speak ?—By no means, said Ctesippus.—Is it also
impossible for him, who speaks, to be silent ?—Still less so,
said he.— When therefore you speak of stones, and woods, and
things of iron, do you not speak of things silent ?—I do not,
said he, if I am walking in braziers’ shops ; but the pieces of
iron are speaking, and make the greatest noise, if any’ one
touches them. So that you know not that with (all) your
wisdom you have said nothing. But further still, explain to
me the other assertion, how it is possible for one who speaks
to be silent.'"°—And Ctesippus appeared to me to be in
agony on account of his boy-love.—[68.] When you are
silent, said Euthydemus, are you not silent as to all things ?—
I am, said he.—Are you not therefore silent as to things
which speak, if things which speak" are among the number
of all things ?—But what, said Ctesippus, are not all things
silent ?—Certainly not, said Euthydemus.—Do then, thou
best of men, all things speak?—The speaking things do.—
But, said he, I do not ask this; but whether all things
are silent, or speak?—They do neither, and they do both,
said Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse. For I
well knew, that you would not have any thing to say to this
answer.—And Ctesippus, as was usual with him, laughing
very loudly, said, Your brother, Euthydemus, has put his
argument on both sides, and he has perished and is van-
quished.!2 And Clinias was very much delighted and
laughed; so that Ctesippus became ten times as great (as he
was before). But Ctesippus, as being very crafty, appeared
to me to have heard these things on the sly from these very
men. For such kind of wisdom is not now possessed by any
other persons. [69.] And I said, Why do you laugh, Clinias,
at things so serious and beautiful?—-What, Socrates, have
10 From the want of connexion it is evident that something has been
lost here.
" Here Ficinus and a single MS. acknowledge λέγοντα in lieu of
λεγόμενα, which Winckelmann has alone the hardihood to defend, at
variance with the whole tenor of the passage.
12 In the words “he has perished and is vanquished,” there is either a
tautology, or the cart is put before the horse. For the vanquishing ought
to precede the perishing. The passage, as shown by the variations of
MSS.., is evidently corrupt, and may be easily mended by a critic of the
least ingenuity. Heindorf would read ἀπολώλεκε καὶ ἥττηται, i. 6. “it
has destroyed and been vanquished,”’ from the version of Ficinus, “eum-
que disperdidit, et ratio vestra succubuit,”’
EUTHYDEMUS. 91
-
you ever seen a beautiful thing? said Dionysodorus.—I have,
said I, and many such, Dionysodorus.— Were they then, said
he, things different from the beautiful, or the same with the
beautiful ?—And I then became perfectly involved in doubt,
and thought I had suffered justly for having grunted out a
word. I said, however, they are different from the beautiful ;
but a certain beauty is present with each of them.'*—If, then,
said he, an ox is present with you, are you an ox? and be-
cause I now am present with you, are you Dionysodorus ?—
Say words of good omen, said I.—But after what manner,
said he, if even one thing is present with another, will that
which is different be different ?—-Are you then, said I, in a
difficulty respecting this? For I have just now endeavoured
to imitate the wisdom of the men,!‘ as being desirous of it.—
How should I not doubt, said he, both I and all other men, of
that which is not ?—What do you say, said I, Dionysodorus ?
15 not the beautiful, beautiful, and the base, base ?—-Provided,
said he, it appears so to: me.—Does it then appear so to you?
—Entirely so, said he.—Is not likewise the same, same? and
is not the different, different? For certainly the different is
not the same. And I thought that not even a boy would doubt
this, that the different is not different. [70.] But. this,
Dionysodorus, you have willingly passed by : 5 since in other
respects, like the artists, on whom it is incumbent to work out
each part in detail, you seem to me to work out a discourse in
a thoroughly beautiful manner.—Do you know then, said he,
what is proper for each artist? In the first place, do you
know to whom it belongs to work in copper?—I know that
this belongs to copper-smiths.—And to whom does it belong
to fashion things in clay ?—To a potter.—And whose busi-
ness is it to cut a throat, to flay, and, cutting off small pieces
of flesh, to boil and roast them?—It is the business of a
13 Respecting the notion that things are beautiful not in themselves but
according to their adjuncts, see Hipp. Maj. :
14 In “the men” the article has nothing to which it can be referred.
Hence, since three good MSS. read τῶν ἀνδρῶν, Plato probably wrote
τινῶν ἀνδρῶν, in allusion to the Sophists.
15. Heindorf perceiving that παρῆκας could not mean here “ passed
by,” renders it, “You have spoken rather carelessly.” But no Sophist
ever did or would speak carelessly. Plato wrote ἠπόρηκας, “‘ you have
doubted,” an emendation so obvious, that even Winckelmann and Stal-
baum, who have adopted Heindorf’s translation, ought to have hit upon it.
92 EUTHYDEMUS.
cook, said I.—If then, said he, a man does things which are
proper, does he not act rightly ?—Perfectly.—But it is proper,
as you say, that a cook should cut a throat and flay. Have
you assented to this or not?—I have assented, I said; but
pardon me.'*—It is evident, then, said he, that should any one
cut the throat of the cook and chop him into small pieces, and
boil and roast him, he would do what is proper; and should
any one work like a brazier on the copper-smith himself,!”
and like a potter on the potter, he too would do what is
proper.—[71.] O Neptune, said 1, now you put the Colophon ®
on your wisdom. Will it then ever be present with me, so
as to become familiar to me?—You will know it, Socrates,
said he, when it becomes familiar to you.—This, said I, is
evident, if you wish it—But what, said he, do you think you
know your own things ?—Unless you say something else. For
I must begin from you, and end with Euthydemus here.—
Do you then, said he, consider those things yours, over which
you have a power, and which you can use as you please, such
as oxen and sheep? do you think that those are yours which
it is lawful for you to sell, and to give away, and to sacrifice
to whatever god you please; but that those, which are not so
circumstanced, are not yours ?—And I, for I knew that from
the questions something beautiful would peep out, and at the
same time I was desirous to hear as quickly as possible, said,
It is perfectly so; things of this kind alone are mine.—But
what, said he, do you not call those things animals, which pos-
sess a soul?—-Yes, I said.—Do you acknowledge then, that
those alone among animals are yours, to which you have the
liberty of doing what I have just now mentioned ?—I ac-
knowledge it.—[72.] And he, pausing a while, as if reflecting
upon something of great consequence, said with an assumed
gravity, Tell me, Socrates, is there with you a paternal Ju-
16 Why Socrates should thus request pardon of the Sophist for assert-
ing, it is difficult to explain; unless the clause be introduced a little be-
low, after ‘‘ your wisdom.”’
17 Stalbaum properly objects to this “ himself;’’ which ought to be
added to the cook and potter likewise, or else omitted entirely.
#8 The origin of this proverb is explained by Strabo, xiv. p. 643, who
says that the troops of the Colophonians were so excellent both by land
and sea that a war always terminated in favour of the party on whose side
they fought. See Erasmus on Adag. Chiliad, p. 570, and Ruhnken in
Heusd. Specim. Crit. p. 33, on Theetet. p. 153, C.
EUTHYDEMUS. 93
piter?—And I suspecting that the discourse would come to
the place where it ended, endeavoured to fly from a certain
crafty turn, and now twisted myself,!® as if caught in a net ;
and I said, There is not,” Dionysodorus.— You are therefore a
miserable man; nor are you an Athenian, since you have nei-
ther paternal gods, nor sacred rites, nor any thing else beau-
tiful and good.—Hold, said I, Dionysodorus; speak words of
good omen, and do not instruct me harshly. For there are
to me altars and sacred rites, both domestic and belonging to
my country, and the rest of the things of this kind as appertain to
the Athenians.—Then, said he, is there not a paternal Jupiter
to the rest of the Athenians ?—There is not, said I. This
appellation exists not to any one of the Ionians, nor to such
as are colonized from this city, nor tous. But Apollo is (our)
paternal (god),”! through the race of Ion; and Jupiter is not
called by us Paternal, but Herceus?? and Phratrius;?* and
Minerva too is called Phratria.—[73.] This is sufficient, said
Dionysodorus ; for you have, as it seems, Apollo, Jupiter, and
19 This is the interpretation given by Heindorf to the words, ἄπορόν
τινα στροφὴν ἔφευγόν τε καὶ ἐστρεφόμην. But he did not perceive that
στροφὴ would be applied not to the Sophist but to Socrates; and that
the endeavour to escape would follow, not precede, the act of twisting
oneself. Had he remembered the passage quoted by Winckelmann from
Rep. iii. p- 405, C., ἱκανὸς πάσας στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, he would have
seen perhaps that Plato wrote ἄπορόν τινα στροφὴν τοῦ φεύγειν ἕνεκα
διεστρεφόμην, “1 twisted myself into some intricate turn, for the sake of
escaping.” ;
20 This assertion has given rise to no little difficulty. For it is said,
that, contrary to the express testimony of Plato, there was at Athens a
paternal Jupiter. But the passages quoted from Soph. Trach. 764,
Eurip. Electr. 675, and Aéschyl. Niob. Fr. 1., prove only that Jupiter
was the paternal deity of Hercules, Orestes, and Tantalus, not one of
whom was an Athenian. We find indeed in Aristoph. Ned. 1468, Nai
vai καταιδέσθητι πατρῶον Δία. But if that verse were, as Porson sup-
posed on Med. 1314, taken from a play of Euripides, it was probably
spoken by some person not an Athenian, as remarked by Lobeck in Ag-
laophamus, p. 772, or else Aristophanes wrote, I suspect, Nai, vai, καται-
δέσθητι πατέρ᾽, οἷον Δία, i. 6. “‘ Respect a father, as thou shouldst e’en
Jove.”
21 Apollo having had a connexion with Creusa, the daughter of Erec-
theus, begot Ion, from whom the Athenians were at one time called Io-
nians, and he himself was worshipped as Paternal Apollo.
2 ‘The Athenians called the enclosure round a house, ἕρκος, Herkos, and
hence Jupiter was called Herkeus, as the guardian of the Herkos.
33 This name is derived from φρατρία, by which was meant a third part
of the φυλὴ, * tribe.”
94 EUTHYDEMUS.
Minerva.—Certainly, said I.— Will not these then, said he, be
your gods ?—Progenitors, said I, and masters.—To you then,
said he, they will be so. Or have you not confessed that they
are yours?—I have confessed it, said I. For what could I
do?—Are not then, said he, these gods animals likewise? For
you have acknowledged that whatever have a soul are animals.
Or have not those gods a soul?—They have, said I.—Are
they not therefore also animals ?—Animals, said I.—But of
animals, said he, you have acknowledged these to be yours,
which you can give and sell, and sacrifice to any god you
please.—I have acknowledged it, said I. For there is no
backing out, Euthydemus.—Come then, said he, and straight-
way tell me, since you acknowledge that Jupiter is yours and
the other gods likewise, are you permitted to sell them, or
give them, or to use them in any way you please, as you
would do other animals? I then, O Crito, as if struck down
by the argument, lay speechless; but Ctesippus, coming as it
were to the rescue, Pyppax Hercules, said he, a beautiful dis-
course! And then said Dionysodorus, Whether is Hercules
Pyppax, or Pyppax Hercules ?—[74.] And Ctesippus said, O
Neptune, what words of wisdom! I retire; the men are un-
conquerable.
Here indeed, friend Crito, there was not one of those pre-
sent who did not exceedingly praise the discourse; and the
two men were almost stretched at their length,** laughing,
clapping, and exulting. For upon each (and) all of the
things (said) previously in a very beautiful manner, the
admirers alone of Euthydemus made an uproar; but here, al-
*4 Stalbaum has preferred παρετάθησαν to παρείθησαν, found in the
best Vatican MS., which Abresch. had already conjectured, and con-
firmed by the gl. in Hesych. Παρείθη" παρελύθη. He has, however, the
good sense to add that he is unwilling to assert what is the true reading.
For he probably perceived, that though παρετάθησαν would by itself be
intelligible, it would not be so when united to ὀλίγου. For a person
may be said to be stretched out positively or not; but he cannot be said
to be nearly so. He may however be said to be dead or nearly so.
Winckelmann has correctly edited παρείθησαν, and he might have re-
ferred to Petronius, “ Gyton risu dissolvebat ilia sua.” Porson too on
Med. 585, ἕν yap ἐκτενεῖ σ᾽ ἐπος, defends παρετάθησαν, not aware that
Euripides wrote, what is partly found in some MSS., ἕν γὰρ εὖ Krevii
σ᾽ ἕπος.
% Although πᾶς τις ἕκαστος is found in good Greek, yet here one
would expect an antithesis between “each”’ and “all.”
EUTHYDEMUS. 95
most the pillars in the Lyceum made a clattering in favour of
the two men, and were delighted. I too felt disposed myself
to acknowledge that I had never at any time seen men so
wise ; and being perfectly enslaved by their wisdom, I turned
myself to praising and passing encomiums on them; and I
said, O blessed ye for your wondrous genius, who have so
rapidly, and in a short time, accomplished a thing of such
magnitude! [75.] Your arguments indeed, Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this
is the most magnificent thing in them, that you care nothing for
the mass of mankind, nor for persons of solemn mien, and who
think themselves something, but only for those who are like
yourselves. For I know well, that very few men similar to
yourselves, would delight in these arguments ; while the rest
are so ignorant of them, that, I am sure, they would be more
ashamed to confute others with such arguments, than to be
confuted themselves. This too again is another popular and
gentle character in your arguments, that when you say there
is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or any thing
else of this kind, and, in short, that one thing is not different
from another, you in reality sew up the mouths of men, as in-
deed you assert you do; and not only the mouths of others,
but ye would appear (to sew up) your own. (Now) this is a
very gracious act, and removes whatever is oppressive in
your arguments. The greatest thing however is, that these
arguments subsist in such a manner, and have been discovered
by you with such skill, that any one may learn them in avery
short time. (For) I have perceived, by directing my atten-
tion to Ctesippus, how rapidly on the instant he has been able
to imitate you. [76.] The (wisdom) then of your practice,
with respect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is
beautiful; but it is not adapted for discussion before men.”
But, if you will be persuaded by me, be careful not to speak
before many, lest through their learning rapidly, they should
give you no thanks for your instruction. But especially con-
% This is a strange expression. Did Socrates then wish the Sophists
to converse in the presence of animals? Ficinus has “coram multis
hominibus”’ more correctly. But as πολλῶν would thus interfere with
the same expression in the next sentence, instead of avwy, (for so
ἀνθρώπων is generally written in MSS.,) perhaps the true reading is
ἔννων, “sensible.” For thus Socrates would give vent to a bitter
sarcasm against the Sophists.
96 EUTHYDEMUS.
verse amongst yourselves alone: and if not, should you dis-
course in the presence of another, let it be before him alone,
who gives you silver for what you say. The same advice, if
you are wise, you will give to your disciples likewise, never
to discourse with any man, except with you and themselves.
For that which is rare, Euthydemus, is valuable; but water,
although the best of things, as Pindar says, may be bought
very cheap. But lead on, said I, and receive Clinias here
and myself (as your scholars) on the sly.
Having, Crito, spoken these words and a few others, we
departed. Consider therefore now, how you will accompany
me to these men; for they say they are able to teach any one
who is willing to give them money; and that they do not ex-
clude any natural disposition or age; and, what is especially
proper for you to hear, they say that an attention to money-
making does not hinder any one from easily receiving their
wisdom.
[77.] Cri. In good truth, Socrates, I am desirous of hear-
ing them, and would willingly learn something from them;
although I almost appear to be one of those, not like to Eu-
thydemus, but to those who, as you have just said, would
more willingly be confuted by such arguments, than confute
them. It seems however to me to be ridiculous to give you
advice; nevertheless, I wish to relate to you what I have
heard. Know” then, that as I was taking a walk, a man came
to me from among those that had left you, and thinking him-
self to be very wise, as being one of those who are skilled in
speeches suited for courts of justice, said to me—Crito, have
you heard* nothing of these wise men ?—By Jupiter, I have
not, said I. For, on account of the crowd, I was unable to
stand close and hear.—And yet, said he, it was worth while
to hear them.— Why ἢ said I.—Because you would have heard
men discoursing, who are the wisest of all those who at pre-
sent engage in such-like arguments.—And I said, What then
27 Instead of οἶσθα, Heindorf suggests icf. Winckelmann and Stal-
baum, however, still stick to οὖσθα, which they take interrogatively ; as
if a question would be thus asked at the commencement of a narrative.
It was then either from his MS. or own good sense that Ficinus omitted
οἶσθα. ‘Taylor translated, “Do you not know?” but the negative is not
found in the Greek.
38 Instead of ἀκροᾷ, Heindorf suggested ἠκροάσω, from “ audivisti”’
in Ficinus.
ee:
EUTHYDEMUS. 97
did they appear to you?—-What else, said he, than that they
are such as one will always hear from such-like triflers, who
bestow unworthy attention on things of no worth. For so
did he say in very words.—[78.] And I said, But certainly
philosophy is an elegant thing.—How, elegant, said he, Ὁ
blessed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you
had been present just now, I think you would have been
ashamed of your associate. He was so absurd, as willingly
to put himself in the power of men, who pay no attention to
what they say, but lay hold of every word. And these men,
as I just now said, are among the best of those that exist at
present. But indeed, Crito, said he, both the thing itself,
and the men who are conversant with it, are worthless and
ridiculous.—But to me, Socrates, neither he appears to blame
the thing with justice, nor would any one else blame 1{.23. To
be willing, however, to discourse with these men in the pre-
sence of many appears to me to be an act that may be justly
blamed.
Soc. Wonderful, Crito, are the men of this kind. But I do
not yet know what I am about to say.*° Of what class of
men was he, who came to you, and blamed philosophy? Was
he some pleader among those who are skilful in contending
in courts of justice; or was he one of those who introduce
men of this description, (and) a maker of the speeches with
which orators contend?
[79.] Cri. The least of all was he, by Jupiter, an orator ;
nor do I think that he ever ascended the platform in a court
of justice; but they say that he is knowing in the thing itself,
by Jupiter, and likewise that he is a person of power and
composes powerful speeches.
Soc. I now understand; and I was myself just now about
to speak of those men. For they are those, Crito, whom
Prodicus says are on the confines of a philosopher and poli-
tician ; and think themselves to be the wisest of allmen; and
in addition to their being such, they (fancy) they seem so
to the many; so that none others but the persons engaged
22 The formula εἴ τις ἄλλος has no meaning here, The version of
Ficinus, ‘vel quisquis alius improbet,” leads at once to οὔτ᾽ ἄν τις
ἄλλος Ψέγοι.
30. This is rather strange language in the mouth of Socrates. The pas-
sage is no doubt corrupt; nor can it be compared with Theetet. § 109.
H
98 EUTHYDEMUS.
in philosophy are an impediment to their gaining a reputation
amongst all. They think therefore, that if they can establish
an opinion that philosophers are nothing worth, they shall,
without a contest, carry off the prize of a reputation for
wisdom amongst all mankind. For they consider themselves
to be in reality most wise; but think that they are lessened
by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted*!
in their private discourses. And yet they very reasonably
think themselves wise men: for to possess philosophy in
moderation, and with moderation to engage in political con-
cerns, is very much according to reason; for (this is) to
partake of both, as far as is requisite, and to enjoy the fruits
of wisdom, secure from dangers and contests. ᾿
[80.1 Cri. What then, do they appear to you, Socrates, to
say any thing (of consequence) ?
Soc. By no means.*?
Cri. Yet the discourse of the men possesses a certain
speciousness.
Soc. It has in reality, Crito, speciousness rather than truth.
For it is not easy to persuade them, that in the case of men
and all other things, which subsist between two certain things,
and partake of both, such as (are) from good and evil, become
better than the one, and worse than the other; but that such
things as (are) from two goods, not (tending)** to the same
point, are worse than both, with respect to that, for which
each of the things, of which they are composed, is useful; and
that such things as are composed of two evils, not tending to
the same, are in the middle, these taken alone are better than
each of those things, in both of which they take a part. If
then philosophy and political action are good, but each (tends)
to something else, and these men, while they partake of both,
3 Instead of ἀποληφθῶσι, Ast on Sympos. p. 363, suggests ἀπολειφ-
Odor, “ are deficient.”
82 This answer is found in Ficinus alone, “ Nequaquam.” Hence
probably Heindorf wished to read, Od μέντοι, or Οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε. He
should have suggested Οὐ γάρ τι. For thus τὶ would answer to re in the
question of Crito. Routh, however, whom Heindorf, Winckelmann, and
Stalbaum have followed, continues the speech, without any answer, in
the mouth of Crito.
38. Heindorf, perceiving that something was wanting after πρὸς ταὐτὸν,
wished to insert ὄντοιν, as we find just after πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντοιν.
Ficinus supplies in the first sentence, “ conducentibus,’’ and in the
second, ‘‘ spectant.”’
EUTHYDEMUS. 99
are situated in the middle, they say nothing to the purpose ;
for they are viler than both. But if (philosophy and political
action) are both good and bad,*4 these men are better than
some and worse than others. But if both are bad, they will
thus assert something which is true; but otherwise, not at
all. [81.] I do not therefore think they will acknowledge,
either that both these are bad, or that the one is bad and the
other good; but partaking of both, they are in reality inferior
to both, with respect to (the performing of) either, with a view
to which both political science and philosophy are worthy
of regard; and though in reality they are the third, they
endeavour to appear to be the first. It is requisite, therefore,
to pardon their desire, and not to be indignant at them; but we
should consider them to be such as they are: for it is requisite
to be content with whatever man says any thing bordering
on intellect, and who courageously labours in going through*®
(his task).
Cri. And indeed, Socrates, I too, as I am always saying to
you, am in a difficulty respecting my children, how I ought
to treat them. The one indeed is still rather young, and
little; but Critobulus is already an adult, and requires
some one to be a benefit to him. When therefore I am
associating with you, I feel disposed to think that it is mad-
ness to be, for the sake of children, so much concerned about
many other things, such as marriage, that they may be born
of a mother of high family, and about wealth, that they may
become very rich, and yet to neglect their education. But
when I look at any one of those, who profess to instruct men,
I am amazed; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them
appears to me, on reflection, to be unfit for the purpose; so
that I know not how to give the youth a turn for philosophy.
[82.] Soc. Know you not, friend Crito, that in every pur-
% Ficinus has, ‘sin autem unum quidem horum bonum, malum vero
alterum, hoc quidem meliores, illo deteriores,”’ i. 6. “ But if one of these
is good, and the other bad, they are better than the latter, worse than the
former.”’ This is at least intelligible, which the Greek is not.
35 In the whole of this passage I candidly confess my inability to dis-
cover a particle of meaning. Heindorf has recourse to the figure of
speech called Chiasmus.
38 Instead of ἐπεξιὼν the two best MSS. read ἐπὲ δεξιῶν : from which
it were perhaps not difficult to elicit what Plato wrote. Ficinus has
‘viriliter peragit,”’ as if his MS. read neither ἐπεξιὼν nor ἐπὶ δεξιῶν.
H 2
100 EUTHYDEMUS.
. suit, the bad are many and of no worth, but the good are few
and worthy of all regard ?37 For does not the art of the
gymnast, that of the money-scrivener, that of the rhetorician,
and that of the general, appear to you to be beautiful?
Cri. To me in every respect.
Soc. What then, in each of these do you not see that the
many are to be ridiculed with respect to each of their doings ?
Cri. Yes, by Jupiter ; and you speak with great truth.
Soc. Would you then on this account avoid all those pur-
suits yourself, and not impose them on your son?
Cri. This surely, Socrates, would not be just.
Soc. Do not then, Crito, do what you ought not; but
bidding farewell to those who study philosophy, whether they
are good or bad, examine the thing itself, well and properly ;
and if it appear to you to be a vile thing, turn aside every
man from it, and not your sons only; but if it appear to you
such as I think it is, boldly pursue and practise it, according
to the saying, ‘both you and your children’.*
3: By comparing the language of Socrates just after, it is clear that
Plato wrote, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ φαῦλοι---οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι σπουδαῖοι, not οἱ μὲν
φαῦλοι πολλοὶ---οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι,---ἀπὰ so Taylor translated, led
rather by the sense than syntax.
38 On this saying see the commentators on Aristoph. Ὄρν, 132. Βατρ.
586. Plato Politic, p. 307, E. Rep. ii. p. 372, B.
INTRODUCTION ΤῸ THE SOPHIST.
Arter producing in the Euthydemus some specimens of the ap-
parently clever but really absurd subtleties of which the Sophists
of Greece were wont to make a display, and to gain the admiration
of those, who could not detect a fallacy, and the rpms of those,
who could, Plato has in this dialogue pointed out in what class of
persons those must be placed, who professed to be on all questions
of philosophy, politics, and science, equally competent to raise a
doubt or to solve one.
In pursuing this inquiry, Plato has, like a keen sportsman, fol-
lowed the track of the animal, to which he oe the Sophist,
until he arrives at the long-sought-for lair; and he then discovers
that, instead of the Sophist being the purveyor of intellectual food,
he is occupied merely in the art of catching the many, and thus
gaining a credit for talents which are not only of no use to himself
and others, but are the bane of both.
During the course of the jor we go he is led to examine the theor
respecting the first element of all things, called τὸ ὃν or οὐσία, whic
I have rendered “ the existing” and “ existence” respectively, and
not, as others have done, “the being” and “ essence.” Of this ex-
istence, identified by some philosophers with “the one,” and by
others with “the whole,” there were said to be an infinite number
of parts, or species, all differing from each other, and Abe producing
what Horace calls “ rerum concordia discors,” through the proper-
ties of existence, connected respectively with the ideas of identity
and difference, motion and rest.
From the fact of finding the same speakers in the Theetetus
and Sophist, some have considered the latter dialogue to be only a
continuation of the former; while its similarity in the manner of
subdividing a genus into different species, proves its still greater
102 INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST.
affinity with the Statesman—for such is the best English translation
of the Greek Πολιτικὸς---ηᾷ with the Cratylus, in its touching upon
the phenomena of language, and with the Parmenides, as
the doctrine of “the existing,” and the forms it assumes in the
mind of “ the one.”
a
THE SOPHIST.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,
THEODORUS, SOCRATES, A GUEST FROM ELEA,
THEATETUS.
[1.] AccorpIne to our agreement yesterday, both we our-
selves are come, Socrates, in due order, and we bring this our
guest,! an Elean by birth, and a friend of Parmenides and
Zeno, and a great philosopher.
Soc. Are you not, Theodorus, unconsciously bringing not
a guest but some god, according to the language of Homer,?
who says in behalf of such mortals, as have a portion of due
respect, both other gods, and especially the deity who presides
over guests, become a follower and survey the insolent
and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he,
who now follows you, may be one of the better beings about
to survey and confute us, when ill-conducting ourselves in
a strife of words, through his being a kind of a disproving
god.
Theo. Such is not the manner of this stranger, Socrates ;
but he is more moderate than those that are studious of con-
tention; and the man appears to me, not to be a deity, but
divine: for such I denominate all philosophers.
[2.1 Soc. And you do well, my friend. Although I fear
this race (of philosophers) is scarcely more easy to distinguish,
I may say, than that of the divinity. For they, who are
philosophers, not made up, but in reality, appear, through the
1 This Theodorus was a geometrician of Cyrene, and Plato’s pre-
ceptor in that science.
? Plato here brings together two different passages of Homer; one
from O60, I. 770, Ξείνιος (Ζεὺς) ὃς ξείνοισιν ἅμ᾽ αἰδοίοισιν ὁπηδεῖ : and
the other from Οδ, P. 485, Θεοὶ---ἐπιστροφῶσι πόληας, ᾿Ανθρώπων ὕβριν
τε καὶ εὑνομίην ἐφορῶντες.
104 THE SOPHIST.
ignorance of others, to be of a multiform kind, while they
wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of those
below them; and to some they seem to be worthy of no
honour, but to others of all; and now they appear to be
politicians; and now sophists; and sometimes there are
those, to whom they give the idea that they are altogether
mad. I would, however, gladly hear from this our guest, if it
is agreeable to him, what the people about the place there
think of these things, and how they denominate them.
Theo. What things?
Soc. The sophist, statesman, and philosopher.
[3.] Theo. What, and of what kind, is the doubt about
them, respecting which you have it in your mind to make an
inquiry ?
Soc. It is this. Whether they consider all these as one or
two? Or as there are three names, whether they distribute
them into three kinds likewise, and attach to each singly a
name ?
Theo. He will not, I think, grudge to go through them.
Or how shall we say, guest ?
Guest. Thus, Theodorus. For I do not grudge, nor is it
difficult to say, that they think them three kinds. But to
define clearly what each of them is, is not a small nor an easy
task.
Theo. You have by accident, Socrates, laid hold of questions
similar to those, which we were asking this our guest, before
we came hither. But he then made the same pretence to us,
as he just now did to you: since he says that he had suffi-
ciently heard, and did not forget.
[4:] Soe. Do not then, stranger, deny us the first favour
we ask. But tell us thus much; whether you are wont more
readily to go through by yourself and to state in a long dis-
course whatever you wish to show forth, or by interroga-
tions? such as I once heard Parmenides employing, and at
the same time going through very beautiful arguments, when
I was a young man and he very old at that time.
Guest. With him who converses by answers, Socrates, with-
out pain, and (as it were) with a light rein, it is more easy
thus with another; but if not, by oneself.
* Such is the literal translation of the nonsensical Greek, ῥᾷον οὕτω
τὸ πρὸς Gow" εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ καθ᾽ αὐτόν ; in lieu of which Ficinus has what
THE SOPHIST. 105
Soc. You are at liberty then to select whom you please of
those present here: for we shall all of us readily obey you.
You will however, if you take my advice, select some of the
young men, either Theztetus here, or any of the rest, if such
is your mind.
[5.] Gwest. A kind of shame has come upon me, Socrates,
in that, conversing with you now for the first time, I have not
carried on the intercourse in detail, word for word, but by
drawing out a discourse to a great extent, either by myself or
to another, I have as it were made a display. For in reality,
that which is now said is not (such) as a person would ex-
pect it to be, when interrogated about it;4 for it requires a
very long discussion. But on the other hand, not to gratify
you and these, especially since you have spoken as you have
spoken,°® would, as it appears to me, be unlike a guest and
boorish ; since, from what I have before said, and from what you
now urge me, I receive Theztetus here to be the respondent.
[6.] Thee. Will you then, stranger, as Socrates said,
gratify us all ἢ
Guest. It nearly appears then, Theetetus, that nothing
further must be said on this point. And as it seems, the dis-
course must hereafter be addressed to you. But if, wearied
by the length of the discourse, you shall be somewhat annoyed,
blame not me, but these your companions, as the cause.
Thee. But I think I shall not faint in this way for the
present. If, however, such a thing should take place, then I
will take to myself as an ally Socrates, the namesake of
Socrates here, who is of the same age with me, and my
is at least intelligible, ‘‘ facilius est cum alio interrogando disserere; sin
contra, per se ipsum quisque facilius disputat,” i. e. ‘it is more easy to
dispute with another by interrogations; otherwise, every one converses
more easily (by talking) himself.”
* So Stalbaum would have us translate the words τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὐχ
ὅσον ὧδε ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίσειεν ἂν αὐτὸ εἶναί τις, out of which Stephens
could make no sense, nor can I. Some error lies in οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε---εἶναι;
which it were not difficult perhaps for a conjectural critic to correct.
5 On this formula see Blomf. on Agam. 66. Matth. Gr. Gr. § 558.
® Strange to say even Heindorf, who once saw correctly that “Apa
τοίνυν could not be here used interrogatively, afterwards vainly attempted
to defend the reading; nor did he perceive, what is evident at a glance,
that Plato wrote Apa τοίνυν, “ Do so then, stranger, and you will gratify
us ΑΘ; as Socrates said.’’ Stalbaum follows, as usual, Heindorf blind-
fold.
106 THE SOPHIST.
associate in gymnastic exercises, and not unaccustomed to
labour in many things with me.’
Guest. You say well. Deliberate then about these things by
yourself, as the discourse proceeds. But now you must con-
sider in common with me, beginning in the first place, as it
appears to me, from the sophist ; and searching out and show-
ope by a reason, what thing he is. For now both you
and I have only the name in common respecting this thing ;
but as regards the thing by what name we call it, perhaps each
of us have one peculiar to ourselves. But it is always requi-
site respecting every thing, to agree rather through reasons as
to the thing itself, than to the name alone without a reason.
[7.] However, with respect to the tribe which we now have it
in our mind to investigate, it is not the easiest of all things to
comprehend what a sophist is. But whatever things of mo-
ment ought to be well and thoroughly laboured at, respecting
these it has been decreed by all of old that we must practise
them first in small and more easy matters, previous to those in
the greatest. Now then, Theetetus, I too recommend, since we
conceive the genus of a sophist is difficult to hunt out, that we
should in like manner practise the method in something more
easy ; unless you are able to show some other and easier road.
Thee. But I am not able.
Guest. Are you willing then to go after something of little
value, and to endeavour to put it as the pattern of a greater?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. What then if we propose a thing well known, and
of trifling value, but possessing a subject for discourse not
less than things greater? as, for instance, a fisherman. Is
not this thing known to every one, and worthy of not very
great and serious thought ?
Thee. It is so.
Guest. And I suspect it has a method and reasoning not
unsuited for us.
[8.1 Thee. It would then answer well.
Guest. Come then, let us begin from it thus; and tell me,
whether we shall put down a fisherman as skilled in some
art, or unskilled in some art, but possessing another power.
Thee. By no means as unskilled in some art.
* As shown in the Politic. p. 257, C., where this same Socrates takes
up the discourse, after Theetetus had ceased speaking.
THE SOPHIST. 107
Guest. But of all arts there are nearly two species.
Thee. How so?
Guest. Agriculture, and the care respecting every thing
mortal, and that relating to the putting together and moulding
what we call an utensil, and the imitative power, all these
may be justly called by one name.
Thee. How so? and by what name?
Guest. When any one leads subsequently into existence
that which was previously not in existence, then we say that
he who leads, makes, and that the thing led, is made.
Thee. Right.
Guest. But all which we just now mentioned are wont to
possess their own power (suited) to this.
Thee. They do.
Guest. This then let us summarily call the making power.
Thee. Be it so. .
[9.1 Guest. After this the whole species of discipline and
knowledge, and the species relating to money-making, and
contending, and hunting, may be said to be clearly a certain
acquiring power, through all their details; since not one of
these makes any thing, but gets hold of some things, which
are and have been, through words and deeds, and does not
give up to others who attempt to get hold® of them.
Thee. Truly so; for it would be proper.
Guest. Since then all arts consist either in acquiring or in
making, in which of these, Theztetus, shall we place the art
of fishing ?
Thee. Doubtless in the art of acquiring.
Guest. But are there not two species of the art of ac-
quiring ? the one being an interchange between those that are
willing, through the medium of gifts, wages, and purchase ?
but the other would be a getting hold, effected entirely either
by deeds or words.
Thee. So it appears from what has been said.
Guest. But must not the getting hold likewise receive a
two-fold division ?
Thee. In what way?
Guest. The one being openly done, and wholly from a
contest ; but the other secretly, and consisting wholly in
hunting.
§ So Stalbaum translates χειρουμένοις.
108 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. Yes.
[10.] Guest. It is likewise irrational not to give hunting
a two-fold division.
Thee. Say how.
Guest. By making one relate to a race inanimate, and the
other to an animated one.
Thee. How not? if there are both these.
Guest. How should there not be? But we may pass by
(the hunting of) inanimate things as being without a name,
except as regards some portions of the art of diving, and other
trifling things of this kind; but call the other part, relating
to the hunting of an animated race, animal-hunting.
Thee. Be it so.
Guest. But is it not justly said, that of animal-hunting
there is a twofold kind? one being the hunting of walking
animals, which is distinguished by many species and names,
but the other of swimming animals, and which is hunting in
a liquid.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. But of the swimming division, we see that one kind
is winged and the other aquatic. ὁ
Thee. Undoubtedly.
Guest. But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called
bird-catching.
Thee. It is so called.
Guest. But that of nearly all the aquatic, sea-fishing.
Thee. Yes.
[11.] Guwest. But shall we not divide this hunting into
two chief parts ?
Thee. What are they ?
Guest. According as the one makes for itself a catch with
nets, the other by a blow.
_ Thee. How say you? And how do you divide each?
Guest. Whatever by enclosing on all sides restrains any
thing for the sake of an hinderance, it is reasonable to call
a net.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. But do you call a net of twigs, of twine, of reeds,
and a casting-net, any thing else than nets ἢ
® On the different kind of nets Heindorf refers to Oppian iii. 81, and
Pollux v. 28.
THE SOPHIST. 109
Thee. Nothing else. Dan
Guest. We must therefore say that this hunting with nets
is a part of fishing, or something of this kind.
Thee. Yes.
Guest. But that which takes place with hooks and three-
forked harpoons, by a blow,!° and which is different from the
other kind, it will be requisite for us now to call by one
word, by-a-blow-hunting.'' Or what would any one, Thee-
tetus, say better?
Thee. Let us disregard the name; for this is sufficient.
[12.] Guest. Of by-a-blow-hunting then one kind is, I
think, at night effected by the light of fire ; and it happens to _
be called the fire-kind'? by those engaged in the hunting.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. But the other kind is by day, and is effected with
rods'* and harpoons, having hooks at their extremities, and is
wholly hook-fishing.
Thee. It is so called.
Guest. Of hook-fishing, and by a blow, that which takes
place (by darting) downwards the harpoons from on high, is
I think called harpoon-fishing, on account of persons wit
the harpoons in that way.
Thee. So-some persons say.
Guest. There remains then only one kind, so to say.
Thee. What is that?
Guest. That which is with a blow contrary to this, and
effected with a hook, but not striking, as it may happen, upon
any part of the body of fishes, as in the case of harpoons, but
about the head and mouth of the fish caught on each oceasion,
and drawing it from below to the contrary up!4.by rods and
1° The Greek word πληγῇ is correctly omitted by Ficinus.
1 [ have been compelled to coin this uncouth compound in English,
‘* by-a-blow-hunting,”’ to suit the Greek.
® Of this fishing by the aid of fire an elegant description is given by
Oppian iv. 640, and something is said to be done even to this day by the
fishermen in the Straits of Messina. See too Casaubon on Athen. xy.
700, D.
Pi Bekk. ἐχόντων ἐν ἄκροις ἄγκιστρα καὶ τῶν τριοδόντων. But καὶ
is without meaning here. Ficinus has “in extremo virge cujusdam
ferentes uncum, tridentibus usi.’
4 Bekk. τοὐναντίον ἄνω. But ἄνω is an explanation of τοὐναντίον,
or else there is some more deeply-seated disorder.
110 THE SOPHIST.
reeds ; to which fishing what name, Theetetus, shall we say
ought to be given?
Thee. [That of hook-fishing with rods]; and we now
appear to have arrived at the end of that, which we proposed
as being necessary to find out.
[13.] Guest. Now then, you and I have not only agreed
about a name for the fishing art, but we have likewise suffi-
ciently accepted the reason respecting the thing itself. For
of the whole art, a half was in the acquiring; and of the
acquiring, a half was in the getting hold; and of the getting
hold, a half was in the hunting; and of the hunting, (a half)
was in the animal-hunting ; and of the animal-hunting, (a
half’) was in the hunting in a liquid ; and of the hunting in a
liquid, the downward division was wholly sea-fishing ; and of
the sea-fishing, (a half) was the fishing by a blow ; and of
the fishing by a blow, (a half) was by a hook; and of this (a
half) was about the blow drawing from below upwards ;'°
and that from the act itself (to which) the name has been
made to resemble the fisherman’s art, having been now dis-
covered, is called by that appellation.
Thee. This, then, has been shown in every respect suffici-
ently.
Guest. Come then, let us endeavour according to this ex-
ample to discover what a sophist is.
Thee. By all means.
[14.] Guest. Now this was the first search in the pattern
just adduced, whether we must put down a fisherman as an
untaught individual, or as possessing some art.
Thee. Tt was. + Lets
Guest. And now, Theztetus, shall we put down this per-
son as an untaught individual, or as truly a sophist in all
things ?!7
18 This answer, plainly required by the question, Taylor ventured to
insert, without saying a word of its being not found in the original.
16 Such is the literal translation of the nonsense of the Greek text,
which Heusde partially corrected by reading ἀνασπώμενον for dvacrw-
μένην. He probably got the idea from Ficinus, whose version is at least
intelligible, and probably true to the Greek found in his MS. “ Hujus
denique percussio; que sursum versus ab inferiori parte conficitur retra-
hendo, et inde nomen sortita, ‘ retrahens,’ et hamatoria piscatio dicitur.”
For it would be thus seen that ἀσπαλιευτὴς was supposed to have some
affinity with ἀνασπᾶσθαι.
17 Here again is a mass of rubbish, which Stalbaum vainly endeavours
THE SOPHIST. 111
Thee. By no means as an untaught individual. For I un-
derstand what you mean,!* that he who possesses the name,
ought to be such. But we must put him down as possessing
some art.
Guest. What is then the art? By the gods, are we ig-
norant that one of these men is a relation of the other ?
Thee. Whom of whom ?
Guest. The fisherman of the sophist.
Thee. In what way ?
Guest. Both of them appear to me to be hunters.
Thee. Of what prey is this (the hunter)? for we have
spoken of the other,
Guest. We divided the whole of hunting into the swimming
and the walking.
» Thee. We did.
Guest. And we went through such a portion as related to
the swimming part of the aquatic kind? but we left the walk-
ing undivided, having said that it was multiform.
Thee. Entirely so.
[15.] Guest. Thus far then the sophist and the fisherman
equally proceed from the art of acquiring.
Thee. They appear so.
Guest. But they turn themselves from the animal hunting,
one to the sea, and rivers, and lakes, and he catches animals
in these.
Thee. Undoubtedly.
Guest. But another (turns himself) to the land, and
some other rivers, as if they were meadows of wealth and youth
without stint, with the view of getting hold of the animals
nourished in them.
Thee. How say you?
Guest. Of the hunting on foot, there are two chief parts.
Thee. Of what kind is each?
Guest. One is the hunting of tame animals, and the other
of wild.
to explain by saying that Plato is playing on the word σοφιστὴν, by which
he meant not ἃ sophist, in a bad sense, but in a good one, as being σοφόν.
But such a play would in aserious inquiry be quite out of character.
Ficinus has, what the sense requires, “‘ Et nunc quidem sophistam ru-
demne an callidum appellabimus ?”
18 By the aid of Ficinus Heindorf was enabled to restore the arrange-
ment of the speeches, and to correct some literal errors, found in all the
Greek MSS.
112 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. Is there any hunting then of tame animals?
Guest. If indeed man is a tame animal. But lay down in
whatsoever way you like, either that no animal is tame, or
that some other is tame, but that man is a wild one; or
you say 15 that man indeed is a tame animal, but you think’
that there is no hunting of men. Whichever of these
sitions you deem it agreeable to you to be stated, this do you
define.
Thee. I think, stranger, we are a tame animal, and I say
that there is a hunting of men.
[16.] Guest. Let us say then that tame-animal hunting is
of two kinds.
Thee. Speaking according to what manner?
Guest. By defining the hunting by robbers, and that which
makes slaves, and that by tyrants, to be one and all a hunting
by force.
Thee. Very well.
Guest. But by calling that which pertains to law-courts,
popular assemblies, and (private) discourse, one and all a cer-
tain single persuasive art.
Thee. Right.
Guest. Now of this persuasive art let us say there are two
kinds.
Thee. What are they?
Guest. One is, private, and the other public.
Thee. There are then these two species.
Guest. Again, with respect to private hunting, one kind is
(connected with) wages, and the other with gifts.
Thee. I do not understand.
Guest. It seems you have never given your mind to the
hunting of lovers.
Thee. Why say you so?
Guest. Because persons bestow even gifts in addition upon
the caught.
Thee. You speak most truly.
1° After θὲς---τιθεῖς, by no process could λέγεις and ἡγεῖ be introduced,
as is evident from the nonsense of a literal translation; which is gener-
ally the best test of some error in the Greek. Plato might have written
λέγοις ἂν for λέγεις ad, and ἡγοῖο for ἡγεῖ, taken interrogatively. But I
suspect that he omitted, as Ficinus does, both the verbs. Heindorf, whom
Stalbaum follows as usual, saw there was some difficulty here, but failed
to surmount it.
THE SOPHIST. 113
Guest. Let this then be a kind of the amatory art.
Thee. By all means.
[17.1 Gwest. But as regards that connected with wages,
that part of it which keeps up an intercourse through favour,
and has in every way made a bait through pleasure, and bar-
gains for food for itself as its wages, this, I think, we should
all of us call adulation, or”? a certain pleasure-giving art.
Thee. Undoubtedly.
Guest. But the other part of it, which professes to keep
up an intercourse for the sake of virtue, and bargains for
coin as its wages, is it not worthy to call by another name?
Thee. How not?
Guest. But with what (name)? ‘Try to tell me.
Thee. It is evident. For we appear to me to have found
the sophist; and thus calling him, I think I should call him
by a fitting name.
Guest. According to the present reasoning, it seems,
Thestetus, the art of a sophist must be called ?! domestic
hold-getting, [acquiring,] hunting, animal-hunting, [land-
hunting], on land, [tame-animal-hunting, | man-hunting, (by-
persuasion-hunting,) individual-hunting, [wages-hunting, |
coin-selling, and insnaring rich and noble young men, through
a false reputation for erudition, as the present reasoning now
goes with 8.5}
[18.] Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Let us consider further still in this way. For the
20 Taylor had anticipated Heindorf in supplying ἢ before ἡδυντικὴν.
21_21 Τῇ lieu of this mass of corruption, Ficinus has what is not indeed
“unworthy of Plato, but what he probably made out, not so much from
the text found in his MS., as from his own good sense: ‘‘ Ut ex hac dis-
putatione colligitur, constat, O Theztete, sophisticam facultatem appel-
landam esse artem, que in conciliando comparandoque versatur, animali-
umque gressibilium et terrenorum domesticorumque venatio est, hominum
yidelicet privata captura ob nummorum mercedum et juvenum divitum
atque nobilium opinione virtutis disciplineque irretitio.”” “With regard
to the words within brackets [ ] and lunes ( ), the former have been
rejected, and the latter inserted, by Schleiermacher, whom Heindorf and
Stalbaum have followed. They failed, however, to perceive that in this
enumeration, which is intended to be a summary of the preceding sub- .
divisions, only such words would be introduced as had been mentioned
already; and ‘that consequently we must reject all the rest, with the ex-
ception of νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομενη θήρα, which evidently
belong to another place ; for they could not occur here for the first time,
as nothing had been said on that subject previously.
I
114 THE SOPHIST.
object of our present search does not participate in some con-
temptible art, but in a very clever one. For from what has
been before stated, an idea presents itself that it is not that
kind of art, which we just now said, but some other kind.
Thee. How so?
Guest. Of the art of acquiring, there was a two-fold kind,
one consisting in the catching, and the other in the ex-
changing
Thea. There was.
Guest. Let us say then, that of the exchanging there are two
kinds, the one consisting in giving, and the other in selling.
Thea. Let it be so said.
Guest. And again, we will say that the selling must have
a two-fold division.
Thee. In what way?
Guest. ®» He who exposes his own works for sale is called
a seller of his own (property); but he who sells the works
of others, an exchanger.”
Thee. Entirely so.
[19.] Guest. But is not the exchange, which takes place
in (the same) city, and which is nearly a half of the whole
of the trade, called capelic ἢ 38
Thee. Yes.
Guest. And is not that which effects an exchange from
one city to another, by buying and selling, (called) emporic ἢ 35
Thee. How not?
Guest. And do we not perceive, in the case of the em-
poric,”® that the sale of the articles by which the body and
soul are nourished, and which they use (respectively), becomes
barter by means of coin?
22__22 Such is Taylor’ s translation of the version of Ficinus, “‘ Qui opera
sua venalia facit, propriorum venditor nominatur ; 3, qui aliena vendit, com-
mutator.” The Greek at present is, Τὴν μὲν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν
διαιρουμένην, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην, μεταβλητικήν.
This Stephens could not understand, nor canI; even if we read, with
seven MSS., διαιρούμενοι in lieu of διαιρουμένην, which Heindorf, whom
Stalbaum follows as usual, renders, ‘‘ ex partitione orientem,”’ a mean-
ing that διαιρεῖσθαι never has nor could have. What Plato really wrote,
might be elicited perhaps in part from Themistius Orat. xxiii. p. 297.
* I have preserved the Greek words in English letters, because we
have none answering exactly to the original. Perhaps κάπηλος is huckster,
chapman, or retail home tradesman, and ἔμπορος, trafficker, or whole-
sale foreign merchant,
————— a
ves
ee wel
THE SOPHIST. 115
Thee. How say you this?
Guest. Of that part, which relates to the soul, we are
perhaps ignorant: but the other we understand.
Thea. We do.
Guest. **Let us say then as regards music in general,
which is constantly purchased at one place, and, carried from
city to city, is sold at another; and as regards painting,
wonder-working, and other things pertaining to the soul,
which are imported and sold, some for the sake of amusement,
others for graver pursuits, that the person, who imports and
sells them, would give a handle to be called a merchant no
less than by the sale of meats and drinks.
[20.] Thee. You speak most true.
Guest. Will you not, then, call by the same name him who
goes about from city to city to buy learning for money? —
Thee. Certainly.
Guest. But of this soul-trafficking, would not one part be
most justly called an exhibition ; but the other part, although
no less ridiculous 35 than the former,” still as being a selling
of learning, there is a necessity to call it by a name the brother
to the act.
Thee. Certainly.
Guest. But in this learning-selling, the trade which relates
to other arts must be called by one name, and that which re-
lates to virtue by another.
Thee. How not ὃ
Guest. For as regards the others, the name “art-seller”
would be fitting; but as regards this, do you consider what
name to call it.
Thee. And what other name, except that sought out
now for the sophistic race, could one mention without an
error ?
Guest. No other. Now then let us collect it together, by
saying that by a second (search), the sophistic art appeared
to consist in the acquiring, exchanging, buying, trafficking,
2424 The whole of this most corrupt passage is found in the version of
Ficinus in apparently an abridged and certainly altered form.
35. Heindorf says that τό γέλοιον agrees with ὄνομα understood. To
this Stalbaum objects, and would receive what Heind. rejects γελοίῳ---
cannot understand either, and still less the common text.
35. By “ the former” Heindorf understands “ the name, Ψυχεμπορικὴ,᾽
which he says was ridiculous, as πρὸ not a Greek word,
I
116 THE SOPHIST.
soul-trafficking respecting discourses, and the selling the
learning of virtue.
[21.] Thee. Just so.
Guest. By a third (search), I think that you will call by no
other name, than (we have done) just now, the person who,
being settled in a city, partly buys and partly fabricates
himself learning respecting these very same subjects, and by
selling determines for himself to live by such a plan.
Thee. Why, indeed, should I not ?
Guest. And that part too of the acquiring art, which
consists in exchanging, purchasing, and selling in both ways,
either one’s own inventions, or those of others, you will ever
call, as you seem, a sophistic kind, whatever may be the
learning-selling respecting such things.?”
Thee. Necessarily so. For it is necessary to be the fol-
lower of reason.
Guest. Let us still further consider, whether the kind, which
has been now pursued, is similar to some such thing as this.
Thee. To what?
Guest. Of the art of acquiring a certain part consisted in
contesting.
Thee. It did.
Guest. It will not then be from the purpose to divide it in-
to two. uh
Thee. Say into what parts?
Guest. By laying down one part as a contest (of friends),
and the other as the fight of (foes).
Thee. It is so.
[22.] Guest. Of the fighting part then, when a body comes
in conflict with a body, it is nearly reasonable and becoming
for persons, laying down” a name, to pronounce it, as it were,
violent.
Thee. Tt may.
27 This is the literal translation of the mass of nonsense in the text, which
Stalbaum vainly endeavours to conceal by a more elegant but less faithful
version. Ficinus has what is at least intelligible, by omitting the very
words in which the chief difficulty lies, and by rendering καπηλικὸν εἴτε
αὐτοπωλικὸν, “ sive sua inventa sive aliena—vendat,” a version which
Heindorf and Stalbaum have thought proper to adopt rather than confess,
as they should have done, their inability to understand fairly the passage.
28 Instead of the circumlocution found in the Greek text, which it is
not easy to explain grammatically, Ficinus has merely, “‘ Pugna utique
‘corporis ad corpus violentia congrue nuncupatur.”
es
THE SOPHIST. 117
Guest. But in the case of reasons (coming in conflict) with
reasons, what else, Thestetus, would any one call it but con-
tention ?
Thee. Nothing else.
Guest. But as to contentions, we must lay down a twofold
division.
Thee. In what way?
Guest. So far as (contention) takes place through prolix
arguments against prolix arguments and about things just and
unjust in a public matter it is jacieis
Thee. It is.
~ Guest. But when it takes place i in a private one, and is
broken to minute parts, by questions to answers,”® are we ac-
customed to call it any thing else than contradiction.
Thee. Nothing else.
Guest. But of contradiction, that part which respects (pri-
vate) contracts is made the subject of dispute, and is carried
on carelessly and without art, we must place as a separate
(kind); since reason distinguishes it as being something dif-
ferent; but it has neither obtained an appellation from any
of those of a former period, nor does it deserve to obtain one
now from us.
Thee. True, for it is divided into parts extremely small
and very various.
- [23.] Guest. But that which is according to art, and dis-
putes about things just and unjust, in the abstract, and uni-
versally about other matters, we are accustomed to call con-
tentious.
Thee. How not?
Guest. But of the contentious, one part destroys wealth,
and the other makes it.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Let us then endeavour to state by what name it is
needful to call each of these.
Thee. It is proper to do so.
Guest. I think then that the neglect of private affairs,
which takes place through the delight in the practice of con-
tention, and through the telling to the majority of listeners
39 To avoid the ὕστερον πρότερον in the words “ by questions to an-
swers”’ Ficinus has “‘ interrogando respondendoque,’”’ which makes at
least an intelligible sense.
118 THE SOPHIST.
what is not heard with pleasure, may be called, according to
my notion, something not different from babbling.
Thee. It is indeed called so.
Guest. But do you now in your turn endeavour to tell the
contrary name of him, who makes money through private
quarrels.
Thee. Would not any one err, in calling him by any other
name than that of the wonderful sophist, who, after being
pursued by us, has now come again for the fourth time (in
our view)?
Guest. The sophist then, as it seems, is nothing else but
that money-making genus, which is a part of the arts of quar-
relling, contradiction, controversy, (hostile) fighting, (friendly)
contest, and acquisition, as our reasoning has pointed out.
Thee. He is altogether so.
[24.] Guest. You see, then, it is truly said, that this wild
beast is a various animal, and that, according to the pro-
verb, he is not to be caught with the left hand.
Thee. It is necessary then (to use) both hands.
Guest. It is necessary; and we must to the utmost of our
power do something of this kind, by running after its foot-
marks. But tell me, have we not words relating to household
affairs ?
Thee. Yes, many. But about which of the many are you
inquiring ?
Guest. Such as when we say to pass through a cullender,
to bolt through a bag, to pass through a sieve, [to separate. | *!
Thee. How not?
Guest. And besides these, we know the words, to ecard
(wool), to draw it down, to weave it, and ten thousand others
of a like kind existing in the arts. Do we not?
Thee. What being desirous to point out respecting them,
and to bring forward as a pattern, have you made this inquiry
in general terms ?
% In his translation of this passage Ficinus has introduced the words
** questiunculas semper aucupatur,” of which there is no vestige at pre-
sent in the Greek text; where to restore the syntax we must read, περὲ
δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῦ τοῖς πολλοῖς---ἀκουομένου in lieu of—AéEw τοῖς πολλοῖς
--ὠἀκουόμενον.
31: With his usual want of judgment Stalbaum defends διακρίνειν, which
Heindorf had correctly expelled as an interpretation. For a verb de-
scriptive of some specific act, not a general one, is required here.
THE SOPHIST. 119
Guest. All the names that have been mentioned, are in a
certain respect divisive.
Thee. They are.
Guest. According to my reasoning then we will think worthy
of one name the art, which as regards them is one in them all.
[25.] Thee. What name calling it ?
Guest. Discriminative.
Thee. Be it so.
Guest. Consider again, whether we are able to perceive
two kinds of it ?
Thee. You are imposing, for a person like me, a rapid
consideration.
Guest. In the discriminations mentioned above it was our
business to separate the worse from the better, and the similar
from the similar.
Thee. It appears that it was nearly so said.
Guest. Of the latter (discrimination) I cannot tell the
name; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects
the worse.
Thee. Inform me what it is.
Guest. The whole of this discrimination, as I understand it,
is called by all men a certain purification.
Thee. It is so called.
Guest. Would not then every one see that the purification
is in kind twofold?
Thee. Yes, (looking at it) at leisure perhaps; but I do
not see it at present.
[26.] Guest. It is proper then to comprehend in one name
the many kinds of purifications appertaining to the body.
Thee. What (are they)? and by what name (do you call
them) ?
Guest. Whatever within the bodies of living animals is,
after being properly separated by the arts of exercise and
of medicine, purified, and whatever the bath-art supplies, re-
lating to things outside (the body) very vile to mention, and
the things relating to inanimate bodies, of which the fuller’s
art, and the whole art of adorning the body, have the care in
trifling matters, possess many and seemingly ridiculous names.*”
* Such is the literal version of this perplexed passage, where some-
thing is evidently wanting to complete the sense. Ficinus could, I sus-
pect, do no more than guess at the meaning of the Greek text, which he
120 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. Very much so.
Guest. Entirely 50,38 Theetetus. But the method of rea-
soning cares not either much or little about the art of wip-
ing with a sponge or the drinking a medicine, whether the
one benefits us little and the other much, by a purifica-
tion. Since for the sake of the mind possessing something
correctly,** (science)®* endeavours. to understand what is
allied and what is not allied to all arts, and it honours all
equally on this account ; and does not consider that some
things are more ridiculous than others as regards their simili-
tude; nor has it held that he, who exhibits the hunting art
in the character of a general, is at all more respectable than
(he who does so) in that of a louse-catcher, but is for the
most part more vain.** [27.] And now, indeed, which was
what you asked, by what name shall we speak of all the
powers together which are allotted for the purifying a body
either animate or inanimate? But it makes no difference
what name may appear to be more becoming. Let it be only
separate from the purgations of the soul, and include (in it-
self) all such things as purify any thing else. For (the method
of reasoning) has just now endeavoured to separate the in-
tellect from the rest of things, if we understand what it
means.
has thus translated :—‘* Purgatio animati corporis, intrinsecus operans per
gymnasticam et medicinam et que extrinsecus balneis, quod dictu vile
est mundat, item que inanimata corpora fullonum ministerio abstergendo
colorat, et universa, ornandi corporis curatura, sigillatim varia viliaque
nomina sortiuntur ?
33 Stephens saw correctly, that after Theetetus had said, “‘ Very much
so,” the Guest could not subjoin, “ Entirely 50." And hence he sus-
pected that something was wanting. Heindorf however, who takes every
opportunity of finding fault with Stephens, attempts to support the in-
tegrity of the text by a solitary passage, which he should have seen was
not in point.
34 T have translated this passage as if the original -were, τοῦ κτήσασθαι
ἕνεκ᾽ εὖ νοῦν τι, πασῶν---ποῖ ἕνεκεν νοῦν, πασῶν---Ἔοτ ἕνεκεν is never
found in prose; nor could κτήσασθαι dispense with its object; while re
has been lost through z. ;
35 T have introduced the noun, which is wanting at present, to agree
with πειρωμένη. But the prosopopeia is rather violent.
36. Here is evidently a lacuna. For some reason should be given for an
assertion that admits of dispute. Respecting the meaning of χαῦνος, I
have written something on Prom. 979, and I could now add a great deal
more. The word answers exactly to Shakspeare’s “‘ A thing of sound
and fury, signifying nothing.”
THE SOPHIST. 121
Thee. But I do understand, and I grant that there are two
species of purification; one species respecting the soul, and
separate from that respecting the body.
Guest. (You speak) in the most beautiful manner. Listen
then to me in what follows, and endeavour to give a two-fold
division to what has been said.
Thee. Wherever you may lead, I will endeavour to make
a division with you.
Guest. We say, then, that depravity in the soul is some-
thing different from virtue.
[28.] Thee. How not?
Guest. And that to leave the one, and to cast out as far as
may be the bad, was a purification.
Thee. It was so.
Guest. Of the soul then, as far as we can discover a taking
away of depravity, we shall, in calling it a purification, speak
harmoniously.
Thee. Yes, very much so.
Guest. As regards the soul, then, we must speak of two
kinds of depravity.
Thee. What are they?
Guest. The one is like a disease in the body, but the other
is like an inherent baseness.
Thee. I do not understand.
Guest. Perhaps you have not thought that disease is the
same with sedition.
Thee. Nor, again, have I what I ought to answer to this.
Guest. Whether do you think sedition is any thing else
than the difference from a natural alliance through a certain
corruption.
Thee. It is nothing else.
Guest. And is baseness any thing else than that kind of
dissonance which exists*” every where disagreeable ἢ
Thee. It is nothing else.
[29.] Guest. What then, have we not perceived in the
soul of those who conduct themselves ill, opinions at variance
37 Heindorf adopted correctly Schleiermacher’s ἐνὸν for ἕν ὃν, which is
however defended by Creuzer on Plotinus, Περὶ Κάλλους, p. 174, while
Stalbaum reads ὃν, with four MSS. and Galen de Dogm. Hippocrat. et
Platon. T. v. p. 288, ed. Bas.
122 THE SOPHIST.
with desires, anger with pleasures, reason with pain, and all
these with each other?
Thee. And very much so.
Guest. And yet all (these) are necessarily allied to each
other.
Thee. How not?
Guest. In calling then depravity a sedition and disease of
the soul, we shall speak correctly.
Thee. Most correctly.
Guest. But when such things as participate of motion, and
propose to themselves a certain end, are, in attempting to
reach it, carried according to each impulse beside it, and miss
it, shall we say that they are affected thus through a con-
gruity towards each other, or, on the contrary, through an
incongruity ?
Thee. It is evident through an incongruity.
Guest. But we know that every soul is involuntarily
ignorant of any thing.
Thee. Very much so.
Guest. But ignorance is nothing else than a delirium of the
soul, which, while it is impelled to truth, is carried away
from a (correct) perception.**
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. We must consider, therefore, a soul without intelli-
gence as base and incongruous.
Thee. So it appears.
[30.] Guest. It seems then there are these two kinds of
evil in the soul ; one, which is called by the multitude de-
pravity, and is most evidently its disease—
Thee. It is.
Guest. But the other (the multitude) call ignorance ; but they
are unwilling to confess that it alone®® is a vice in the soul.
Thee. It must be readily granted, what, when you just
now spoke of it, I doubted, that there are two kinds of vice in
38 To obtain this sense, and to preserve the syntax, we must read
παραφόρου δ᾽ ἐκ ξυνέσεως, in lieu of παραφόρου ξυνέσεως.
39. I cannot understand the words αὐτὸ---μόνον, which Ficinus has
omitted. Stalbaum renders μόνον “ eximie,” and refers to his note on
Sympos. p. 215, C. and p. 222, A. But αὐτὸ---μόνον, never does and
never could mean any thing else but “itself—alone.”’
THE SOPHIST. 123
the soul; and that we ought to consider cowardice, intem-
perance, injustice, all taken together as a disease in us; but
we must lay down the accident of ignorance great and of
various kinds as a baseness.
Guest. In the body then are there not two arts relating to
these two accidents ?
Thee. What are they?
Guest. Relating to baseness, the gymnastic; but to disease,
the medical.
Thee. They seem so.
Guest. As regards insolence, injustice, and cowardice, is
not the chastising [ justice |*° naturally the most fitting of all
arts ?
Thee. It is likely, as I may say,*! according to human
opinion.
Guest. But can any one say that there is a more proper
(remedy )*? for all ignorance than the teaching art.
Thee. There is none.
[31.] Guest. Come then, must we say there is only one
kind of the teaching art, or more? But take notice, that there
are two greatest kinds of it.*
Thee. I do take notice.
Guest. And it appears to me that we shall very quickly
discover this.
Thee. In what way?
Guest. By perceiving whether ignorance has a division in
the middle of it. For being twofold, it is evident that it
10 The word δίκη, as remarked by Stalbaum, is evidently an interpret-
ation of ἡ κολαστικὴ, which agrees with τέχνη understood.
“1 Stalbaum says that we εἰπεῖν is added to give an excuse for the
modest assent in the words, τὸ γοῦν εἰκός. But an excuse is required,
not for a modest expression, but an hyperbolical one, as I have shown in
Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 217. From whence it will be seen that we εἰπεῖν
must follow either ξύμπασαν in the next question of the Guest, or
οὐδεμίαν in the next reply of Theetetus.
42 This word Taylor introduced from the version of Ficinus—“ quid
aliud preter doctrinam remedium invenitur,”’ which leads to ἄλλην rw’
ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εὕροι τις ἴαμα ay;
48 There is evidently some error here. For after the Guest had ask-
ed whether there were one or more kinds of the teaching art, he could
not immediately bid Theztetus to consider that there are two greatest
kinds of it. Plato probably wrote, ἄρα ἕν μόνον γένος φατέον εἶναι
ἢ, εἰ πλείω, dbo ye—‘* Must we say there is only one kind, or, if more,
that there are at least two kinds.”
124 THE SOPHIST.
compels the teaching art to have two parts, one for each one
of its own. :
Thee. What then? Has the thing sought become visible ?
Guest. I seem to see set apart a great and difficult kind of
ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.
Thee. Of what kind is it?
Guest. When he, who does not know a thing, thinks he
knows it; through which it nearly happens that all those
things, in which we are deceived by the imagination, take their
rise in the case of all persons.
Thee. True.
Guest. And I think that to this (division) of ignorance alone
the name of non-erudition should be given.
Thee. Entirely so.
[32.] Guest. By what name then is to be mentioned that part
of the teaching art which frees (a person) from this (ignorance) ?
Thee. I think, Guest, that the other part is called handi-
craft teaching, but that this is called here through us dis-
cipline.4
Guest. It is so called, Theztetus, by nearly all the Greeks.
But this also must be considered by us, whether the whole of
this is indivisible, or possesses a certain division worthy a
name.
Thee. It is requisite to consider this.
Guest. It appears then to me, that this may in some way
be still further divided.
Thee. In what?
Guest. Of the teaching art relating to discourses, one way
appears to be more rough, but another part of it more smooth.
Thee. Of what kind shall we call each of these ?
Guest. One, the old-fashioned, paternal, which persons for-
merly adopted, especially towards their children, and many use
even now, when children do wrong, partly by severely re-
“* In this passage, easy as it seems to be, there are some difficulties
which none of the editors have noticed. In the first place, the words
‘through us” are perfectly unintelligible, and are properly omitted by
Ficinus; although less dependence is to be placed on his testimony than
it would otherwise deserve, as he omits “here” likewise. Secondly, as
the διδασκαλία is called δημιουργικηὴ, so ought the παιδεία to have its
distinguishing epithet; and lastly, to preserve the climax in “ here”—
and, afterwards, “‘ nearly all the Greeks’—the name of a place should be
given or alluded to.
THE SOPHIST. 125
reproving, and partly by mildly admonishing them. Now the
whole of this one may call most correctly admonition.
Thee. It is so.
[33.] Guest. But the other“°—since some seem, after
giving themselves to reflection, to hold that all ignorance is
involuntary, and that no one, who thinks himself wise, is will-
ing to learn those things in which he considers himself
skilled, and that the admonitory kind of instruction, even
with great labour, effects but little.
Thee. And they think right.
Guest. They therefore direct their course to an outlet for
their opinion by another mode.
Thee. By what mode ?
Guest. They inquire into those matters, about which a man
thinks he says something to the purpose, when he is saying
nothing. They then easily examine the opinions of persons
as if they were in error, and bringing them together by a
reasoning process to the same point, they place them by the
side of each other; and by so placing, they show that the
opinions are at one and the same time contrary to themselves,
about the same things, with reference to the same circum-
stances, and according to the same premises. And they see-
ing“ are indignant with themselves, and become milder towards
others; and in this way are liberated from strong and harsh
opinions ; a liberation of all others the most pleasant to hear,
and the most firm to the party suffering. [34.] For they,
my dear boy, who purify these, think as physicians do with
respect to the body—that the body cannot enjoy food, which is
brought to it, until some one casts out the impediments in it ;
and in like manner the others think that the soul can derive
no advantage from the learning brought to it, until some one,
by confuting, places the party confuted in a state of shame,
and by taking away the opinions, which are the impediments
to learning, exhibits him purified, and thinking that he knows
those things alone which he does know, and nothing more.
Thee. This is the best and the most temperate of habits.
Guest. For all these reasons then, Theztetus, we must say,
that confutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications ;
45 After ‘the other,” there is an interruption in the definition.
46. After “‘ seeing,” the editors understand “ this,” answering to ‘‘ hoc”’
in Ficinus.
126 THE sOPHIST.
and, we must think that he who is not confuted, even though
he should be the great king himself, would be unpurified to
the greatest degree, and become uninstructed and ugly with
respect to those things, in which it is fit that he should be
most pure and beautiful, who is to be in reality happy.
[35.] Theew. Entirely so.
Guest. But whom shall we say employ this art? For I
fear to say the sophists.
Thea. Why so?
Guest. Lest we should place on them a greater honour than
is fitting.
Thee. But yet what has been just now said appears to be
suited to some such character.
Guest. So does a wolf (resemble) a dog, a most savage
animal one the most mild. But he who wishes to be most of
all free from stumbling, ought to keep ever a guard on simili-
tudes ; for it is a most slippery race. Let them however stand,
for I think there will not be a dispute about trifling defini-
tions, at a time when persons are watching them sufficiently.
Thee. It is not likely at least.
Guest. Let then there be of the separating art one portion,
the purifying; of the purifying, let the part relating to the
soul be divided off; and of this let (a part) be the teaching
art; and of the teaching art, let instruction (be a part); and
of instruction, let that confutation, which takes place respect-
ing a vain opinion of wisdom, be called, through the reason
now exhibited, nothing else than the sophistic art of a noble
race.
[36.] Thee. Let it be so called. But in consequence of so
many things having just now presented themselves, I am
doubtful what, as speaking the truth and urging it strenu-
ously, I ought to say the sophist really is.
Guest. You are very properly in doubt. And indeed one
ought to think, that even a sophist himself will now very
much doubt by what means he shall slip through the argu-
ment. For the proverb rightly says, It is not easy to avoid
all (traps). Now therefore let us attack him with all our
might.
Thee. You speak well.
_ Guest, But, in the first place, let us stand and as it were
take breath ; and while stopping let us reason among ourselves,
THE SOPHIST. 127
Come then, in how many forms has the sophist appeared? For
I think, he was found at first a hunter for wages of the youth-
ful and rich.
Thee. He was.
Guest. Secondly, a certain trafficker in the learning of the
soul.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Thirdly, did he not appear as a chapman in the
very same articles ἢ
Thee. He did. And fourthly, he was the seller of his own
inventions.
Guest. You have properly reminded me of this; and of
the fifth (form) I will endeavour to remind you. For he was
a combatant in the contests of words, having been (so) defined
from the art of contention.”
[37.] Thee. He was so.
Guest. The sixth form is indeed ambiguous ; but neverthe-
less we laid it down and conceded to him,** that a sophist is
a purifier, as regards the soul, of such opinions as are an im-
pediment to learning.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Do you then perceive, that, when any one seems
to know many things, and is called by the name of one art,
this it is not a healthful seeming; but that he, who is
thus affected with respect to any art, evidently cannot see
that part of it to which all this learning tends? and hence
he*® calls the person possessing them by many names, instead
of one.
Thee. This almost appears to be very natural,
47 In the Gteek words, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος, Heindorf
not only gives to the perf. pass. an active syntax, but takes it in a middle
sense, by rendering ἀφωρισμένος “ 5101 seorsim assumpsit.”? So too does
Stalbaum. But neither of them have been able to produce a single
passage in support of their views. I have followed Taylor; conceiving
κατὰ to be understood. Ficinus has most loosely, “ artificiosus nimium
litigator,”
48 So Stalbaum translates airy συγχωρήσαντες. But αὐτῷ has no
meaning here. Ficinus has “ in presentia,’”’ which leads to τέως, a purely
Attic word for “ previously,”’ as shown by Suidas.
#9 Fischer says, the nominative to προσαγορεύει is ὁ πάσχων. But
it is not the person who is so circumstanced that gives the name, but
something else. There is an error here, which it would not be difficult,
perhaps, to correct.
128 THE SOPHIST.
Guest. Let us not then suffer the same*® thing in this
search through indolence ; but let us in the first place take up
again one of the things stated of the sophist ; for one of them
appeared to me especially to indicate him.
Thee. Which of them ?
Guest. We said that he was in a certain respect a contra-
dictor.
Thee. We did.
Guest. And does he not also become a teacher of this to
others ?
Thee. How not?
[38.] Guest. Let us then consider about what such per-
sons say they make contradictions. And let our consideration
be from the beginning in this way. With respect to divine
things, which are non-apparent to the many, do sophists make
them able to do this, (viz. to contradict) ?
Thee. This is indeed asserted of them.
Guest. But with respect to the apparent things of earth
and heaven, and what pertains to these ?
Thea. Why not?
Guest. In private meetings at least, when any thing is
asserted of generation and existence in general, we are con-
-
scious that the sophists are powerful in contradicting, and ἐπα
they make others as powerful as themselves.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. But with respect to laws, and all political matters,
do they not also promise to make men contentious in these ?
Thee. Not one, as I may say, would discourse with them
unless they promised this.
Guest. But writings relating to all the arts, and to each art
singly, are made public and deposited by him, who wishes to
learn what he ought to say against each handicraftsman.
Thee. You appear to me to speak of the writings of Pro-
tagoras about wrestling and the other arts.
Guest. And to the writings of many others, O blessed man.
But does not the art of contradicting seem to be a power
sufficient for controversy about all things, (to speak) sum-
marily ?
Thee. It appears that scarcely not a thing would be wanting.
% Instead of ye αὐτὸ, Ficinus found in his MS. ye ταὐτὸ, as is evident
from his version, “ Ne—nobis idem—contingat.”
i.
THE SOPHIST. 129
[39.] Guest. But by the gods, O boy, do you think this is
possible? For perhaps you young men see more acutely,
but we more dully, this thing.
Thee. What thing? and at what are you particularly
talking? For I do not understand at all the present ques-
tion.
Guest. (Consider, ) if it be possible for any one man to know
all things.
Thee. If it were possible our race, O guest, would indeed
be blessed.
Guest. How then can any one without knowledge him-
self be able to urge any thing sound against him who pos-
sesses knowledge ?
Thee. Not at all.
Guest. What then would be the wonder in the sophistic
power ?
Thee. About what ἢ
Guest. The manner by which sophists are able to get up
an opinion amongst the young, that they are the wisest
of all men in all things. For it is evident that, if they nei-
ther contradicted rightly, nor appeared to the young to do so,
and, when appearing to do so, unless they seemed to be more
wise through their contentions, no one would, as far as your
business is concerned, even at leisure,®! give them money,
or be willing to become their scholar.
Thee. Not even at leisure indeed.
Guest. But now persons are willing.
Thee. And very much so.
Guest. For the sophists appear I think to have a knowledge
themselves of that against which they speak.
Thee. How should they not?
Guest. But do they act so in all things? Say we it?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. They appear, then, to their disciples to be wise in
all things.
Thee. How not?
Guest. But not being so in reality; for this appeared to be
impossible.
Thee. For how is it not impossible ?
51 On the use of the word σχολῇ see the commentators on Soph.
Cad. T. 434.
K
130 THE SOPHIST.
Guest. The sophist, then, has been shown to us to possess
a certain kind of a reputation for knowledge about all things,
but not according to the truth.
Thee. Entirely so. And what has been now said respect-
ing sophists seems very nearly to be most rightly said.
[40.] Guest. Let us therefore take a clearer pattern re-
specting them.
Thee. What is that?
Guest. This. But endeavour to answer by giving your
mind very closely to what I am saying.
Thee. Of what kind is the pattern ?
Guest. As if any one should say, that he knows not (the
art of’) asserting and contradicting, but of making and causing
all things by one art.
Thee. How said you all ?
Guest. Of the commencement of the discourse you are
straightway ignorant; for, as it seems, you do not understand
the “all.”
Thee. I do not.
Guest. I say then that you and I are in the number of all
things, and besides us, there are other animals and trees.
Thee. How say you? .
Guest. If any one should assert that he would make you and
me, and all the rest of productions—
Thee. Of what making do you speak? For you are not
speaking of a husbandman; because you mentioned him as a
maker of animals.
Guest. I say, moreover, that he is the maker of the sea, the
earth, the heavens, the gods, and all other things ; and rapidly
making each of these, he sells them for a small sum.
Thee. You are speaking in jest.
Guest. What! must we not consider that as a jest, when a
man asserts that he knows all things, and can teach another
all things, for a small sum of money, and in a short time ?
Thee. Entirely so.
[41.] Guest. But have you any kind of jesting more arti-
ficial or agreeable than the imitative ? }
Thee. I have not. For you have mentioned a very large
kind, and comprehended all things in one, and that one nearly
the most varied.
Guest. Do we not then know that he who undertakes to
THE SOPHIST. 131
be able to make all things by one art, will, by fabricating
imitations and homonyms*®” of things, through the art of
painting, be able, by showing the pictures at a distance, to
lie concealed from the stupid amongst young men (and) boys,
as being a person most competent to do whatever he pleased ?
Thee. How not?
Guest. 58 But as to discourses, do we not expect that there
is such another art? or is it not possible to bewitch the young
men, and those still standing far off from the truth of things,
through words (spoken) in their ears, and by showing them
images, as they are called, of every thing, so as to cause them
to be said to seem true, and for the speaker to be the wisest
of all men in all things ἢ ὅ8
[42.] Thee. Why should there not be another such art ἢ
Guest. Is it not then necessary, Theetetus, that the ma-
jority of those, who were then hearing, should, after a suf-
ficient time has passed and they have themselves arrived at
manhood, come near to things as they are, and be compelled
through accidental circumstances to handle realities clearly,
and to change their former opinions, so that things (once)
great appear small, those (once) difficult, easy, and all the
mere appearances produced by discourses, are entirely over-
thrown through works which occur in practice?
Thee. It appears so to me, as far as my age is capable of
judging ; for I think that I too am one of those who are far
distant (from the truth).
Guest. All we then, who are present, will endeavour, and
let us now endeavour,” free from all accidental circumstances,
52 What can be the meaning of ὁμώνυμα, I confess my inability to ex-
plain. Ficinus has “ picturam fingentem equivoca simulacra,” which
is equally unintelligible. The commentators, according to custom, are
silent. Perhaps Plato wrote, what the train of thought evidently re-
quires, ὁμοιώματα, ‘ likenesses.”
5883 In the place of this mass of nonsense, it will be sufficient to
_ give the English reader a translation of what it were easy to show Plato
did actually write: ‘“ But as regards discourses, may we not expect
that there is such another art, by which it is possible for a person to lie
concealed from simpletons and those standing still further off from the
truth of things, and to bewitch them by wérds (spoken) in their ears,
while he is showing the images of things, so as to cause what is spoken
to seem to be true, and the speaker on all subjects to be talked of as the
wisest of all men upon all points?”
** Here is evidently some error, which it would require no great talent
to correct.
Υ K 2
132 THE SOPHIST.
to bring you as near as possible (to the truth). With respect
to a sophist then tell me this. Is it clear, that he is one of
enchanters, as being an imitator of things? or do we yet
doubt, whether in the matters, respecting which he appears able
to contradict, he possesses in reality the requisite science ?
Thee. But how, Guest, can we (doubt of this)? For
it is nearly evident from what has been said, that he is one
of those who take a part in jesting.
Guest. We must put him down then as some enchanter
and mimic.
[43.] Thee. How must we not so put him?
Guest. Come then, it is now our business not to let go the
wild beast, for we have now nearly enclosed the sophist in a cast-
ing net, one of the instruments used in discourses about things
of this kind,®° so that he cannot any longer escape from this.
Thee. From what?
Guest. That he is one of the wonder-workers.
Thee. This also is my opinion respecting him,
Guest. It is decreed then, that we divide as quickly as pos-
sible the image-producing art, and, going down against it,
seize upon the sophist, should he forthwith®® wait for us, ac-
cording to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit
our prey to him (the king). But if he creeps into the parts
of the imitative art, we are to follow him, always dividing
the part which receives him, until he is caught. For neither
will he, nor any other genus, ever boast to escape the method
of those, who are able to follow thus the points singly and
universally.
Thee. You speak well. And in this manner, therefore,
we must act.
55 All the edd. have, ἐν᾽ ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις a
τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων, which is evidently an explanation of a lost -
nical word. Ficinus translates, “‘ veluti funda quadam irretitum, ratioci-
nando comprehendimus,” as if he had found in his MS., ὥσπερ σφενδόνῃ,
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. But no person could be said to enclose an animal wi
a sling. Plato wrote, I suspect, περιειλήφαμεν νεφέλῃ. For such was
the name of a kind of net, as we learn from Aristoph. ’Opy. 194, Μὰ γῆν,
μὰ παγίδας, μὰ νεφέλας, μὰ» δίκτυα.
56 This “ forthwith’? has no meaning here. In lieu of εὐθὺς, Plato
evidently wrote οἷα θὼς, similar to θῆρα a little above. The θως, says
Hesychius, was a hybrid animal, the produce of a wolf and hyena. The
word has been corrupted elsewhere, as I have shown on Euripid. Tro.
602, and Soph. Phil. 760, and I could now add many more passages.
THE SOPHIST. 133
[44.] Gwest. According to the preceding method of divi-
sion, I now seem to see two kinds of the imitative art; but
in which of these happens to be the idea of which we are in
search, I do not now seem to be able to perceive.
Thee. But first tell me, and divide the two kinds of which
you are speaking.
Guest. I see that one is the assimilative art. And this
especially takes place, when any one according to the propor-
tions of the original, in length, breadth, and depth, and more-
over by adding fitting colours, works out the production of an
imitation.
Thee. What then, do not all imitators endeavour to do this ?
Guest. Not such as mould or paint any great work. For,
if they would give the true proportion of beautiful things, you
know that the upper parts would appear smaller than is fit-
ting, and the lower parts larger, through the former being
seen by us at a distance, and the latter close at hand.
Thee. Entirely so.
[45.] Guest. Do not then the artists, bidding farewell to
truth, now work out not real proportions, but such as will
seem to be beautiful in their representations ?
Thee. Entirely so.
- Guest. Is it not then just, as being at least probable,®’ to call
one an image?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. And we must call the part of the imitative art, sub-
sequent to this, as we said above, assimilative.
Thee. We must so call it.
Guest. But what shall we call that, which appears indeed
similar to the beautiful, *®through the view taken from a fa-
vourable point,®* but which, (when seen by him®) who has
the power to look on such things sufficiently,™ is not like that
to which it professes to be like? Must we not (call it) an
appearance, since it appears to be, but is not like?
57 I confess I do not understand the words εἰκός ye ὃν.
58.88 These words were omitted by Taylor, because he did not know what
to make of the version of Ficinus, ‘‘ ex eo quod haud pulchrum respiciat,”’
who found in his MS. the οὐκ before ἐκ καλοῦ, which three MSS. omit,
as Schleiermacher conjectured.
5° The words within the lunes were properly added by Taylor to com-
plete the sense.
% This “sufficiently ’’ is scarcely intelligible.
134 THE SOPHIST.
. Thee. Undoubtedly.
Guest. Is not this part to be found abundantly in painting,
and in the whole of the imitative art?
Thee. How not?
Guest. But may we not most correctly call that art, which
produces an appearance, but not an image, phantastic ?
Thee. Very much 80.
Guest. Now I have already said that these were the two
kinds of the image-producing art, the assimilative and phan-
tastic.
Thee. Correctly so.
[46.] Guest. But that of which I doubted then, viz. in which
of these kinds we must put the sophist, I am not at all able even
now to see clearly. For the man is truly wonderful; and it is
extremely difficult to get a view of him; since even now, very
well and cleverly, he has fled into a species, where it is hard
to track him out.
Thee. So it seems.
Guest. Do you then assent to this through understanding
it? or has a certain rush of reasoning carried you away to
giving a rapid assent according to custom ?®
Thee. How and for what do you say this?
Guest. We are, O blessed man, truly engaged in a specula-
tion thoroughly difficult. For that this thing should appear
both to seem to be, and yet not be; and that a man should
assert certain things, and yet not true,—all these things (were)
always full of difficulty formerly, and are now. For he, who
thus © speaks, must either say or think that false things truly
exist ; and thus speaking, Theetetus, it is extremely difficult
for him not to be hampered by a self-contradiction.
[47.] Thee. Why so?
Guest. (Because) such a mode of speaking dares to suggest
that a nonentity exists; for otherwise there would not be a
falsehood, which exists. And the great Parmenides, O boy,
while we were yet boys, did from the first to the last ify
to this. For, both in prose and verse, he on every occasion
δι But so far was Theetetus from being accustomed to give a rapid
assent, that he previously complained of the Stranger being too fast for a
man 80 slow. Hence we must insert οὐ between λόγου and συνειθισ-
EvoV.
we Had Heindorf seen Taylor’s translation, he would perhaps have sug-
gested οὕτως, and have thus obviated all the difficulty now found in ὅπως.
THE SOPHIST. 135
thus speaks, “ You must not (think),” says he, “ non-entities
exist ; but keep thy thoughts when searching from this road.”
This then is both testified by him, and this discourse will the
most of all point it out, if examined with moderation. Let
us then, if it makes no difference to you, consider this in the
first place.
Thee. Put my business where you like. But in what
way the discourse will best proceed, do you consider yourself,
and lead me along in that path.
Guest. It will be proper so todo. Tell me, then. Dare
we pronounce that which in no respect is?
Thee. How not?
[48.] Guest. If then, not for the sake of contention nor of
jesting, but in seriousness, it were necessary for any of the
hearers to join with us in considering and stating to what
point one ought to carry the word “non-entity,” for what thing
and of what kind do we think he would be able ® to use it
himself, and to show (its use) to a person inquiring ?
Thee. You ask a difficult question, and to a person like my-
self utterly insurmountable.
Guest. This however is evident, that to any one of entities
the expression of non-entity cannot be referred.
Thee. For how could it ?
Guest. Since then it cannot be referred to an entity, one
cannot rightly refer it to any thing.
Thee. How could he?
Guest. And this too is evident to us, that we pronounce on
each occasion this word “something” respecting an entity.
For it is impossible to pronounce it alone, as if it were naked
and placed in a desert from all entities.
Thee. It is impossible.
Guest. Thus considering, do you then agree with me, that
he who pronounces the word “something,” must necessarily
mean some one thing ?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. For you will say, that the word “something” is a
sign of one thing, and that “somethings” is a sign of many
things.
85. Stalbaum omits ἔχειν and admits re with MSS. which he considers’
the best; but which here and elsewhere frequently offer the worst
readings.
136 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. How not?
Guest. But it is most necessary, as it appears, that he who
speaks of that, which is not something, must speak entirely of
nothing.
Thee. This is most necessary.
Guest. Is not then this to be granted, that such a person
speaks indeed, but speaks of nothing? But neither must we
say that he speaks, who endeavours to enunciate non-entity ?%
Thee. The discourse would have then an end of doubt.
[49.] Guest. Do not as yet speak any big word. For, O
blessed man, the greatest and first of doubts still remain as re-
gards these things: for it happens to be about the very com-
mencement of it (the discourse).
Thee. How say you? Speak, and do not hesitate.
Guest. To that, which is, something else may be added of
things that are.
Thee. How not?
Guest. But to that, which is not, shall we say that something
can be added of things that are?
Thee. How so?
Guest. Now we place number universally among things
that are.
Thee. If indeed any thing else is to be placed as a thing
that is.
Guest. Let us then not attempt to attribute “the many,”
nor “the one,” to a non-entity.
Thee. We cannot it seems® with propriety attempt it, as
reason says.
Guest. How then can any one enunciate by the mouth, or
comprehend at all by intellect, non-entities, or a non-entity,
apart from number?
Thee. Tell me why not.
Guest. When we speak of non-entities, do we not endeavour
to add “the many” of number?
* I confess my inability to see what the speaker is aimingat. Ficinus
too seems to have been equally in the dark. For he thus renders the whole
passage: “ Ho. Neque id concedendum hominem talem dicere quidem
aliquid, sed non unum quid, id est nihil dicere. The. Atqui neque loqui
dicendus est ille, qui conatur non-ens proferre. Unde sermo extremum
dubitationis haberet.”’
85 The words we ἔοικεν are correctly omitted by Ficinus. They are
evidently superfluous on account of ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος.
THE SOPHIST. 187
Thee. How not?
Guest. And (when we speak of) a non-entity, (do we) not
(endeavour to adjoin) “ the one” (of number) ?
Thee. Yes, most clearly.
Guest. And yet we say, that it is neither just nor right to
endeavour to add an entity to a non-entity.
Thee. You speak most truly.
Guest. You perceive then, that it is not possible correctly to
enunciate, or speak of, or think of, a non-entity itself by itself ;
but that it is incomprehensible, unspeakable, unpronounceable,
and irrational ?
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Did I, then, just now speak falsely, when I said, that
I would tell of the greatest doubt respecting it ?
Thee. What then, can we mention any (doubt) greater than
this ?
Guest. Do you not see, O wonderful youth, from what has
been said, that non-entity leads him, who confutes it, into such
a perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it, he is com-
pelled to contradict himself?
“Thee. How say you? Speak yet clearer.
Guest. For me there is no occasion to consider any thing
clearer. For, when I laid down the proposition, that non-en-
tity ought to participate neither of “the one,” nor of “the many,”
both a little before and now, I said “the one” abstractedly.
For I was speaking of a non-entity ; you perceived this?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. And again, a little before, I said that a non-entity was
unspeakable, ineffable, and irrational. Do you follow me?
Thee. 1 do follow in a certain way.
Guest. When, therefore, I endeavoured to fit entity (to non-
entity), did I not say what is contrary to former (assertions) ?
Thee. You appear so.
Guest. What then, did I not, when attributing this to it,
speak to it ® as to one thing ?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. And yet, while calling it irrational, ineffable, and
unspeakable, did I not make the assertion as pertaining to
one thing ?
56. So Stalbaum from many MSS., which I cannot understand. Heindorf
would read οὐχ we ἕν dy, in lieu of we ἕν.
198 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. How not?
Guest. For we say, that if any one correctly speaks of non-
entity, he ought to define it neither as one, nor many, nor
give it any appellation whatever; for it would be called al-
ready one thing, according to this appellation.”
[51.] Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. What then will some one say of me? For, both for-
merly and now, he will find me overthrown respecting the
proof of a non-entity. So that, as I have already said, let us.
not think, in my speaking at least, of logical precision respect-
ing a non-entity. But come, let us now consider this affair
in your speaking.
Thee. How say you?
Guest. Come, endeavour in a becoming and noble manner,
as being a young man, and exerting yourself with all your
might, pronounce something about non-entity, conformable to
right reason, without adding to it either existence, or the one
or the many of number.
Thee. The readiness of my attempt would be vastly absurd,
were I, after seeing you suffer thus, to make it.
Guest. But, if it seems good, let us dismiss both yéu
and myself with a farewell; and until we meet with some one
who is able to do this, let us say that the sophist has, with a
knavery greater than all, let himself down into a place from
which there is no outlet.
[52.] Thee. So indeed it appears.
Guest. If then we should say that he possessed a certain fan-
ey-effecting art, he would, from his use of words, easily lay hold
of us, and turn the discourse to the very contrary point. For
when we call him a maker of images, he will immediately ask
us, What do we assert an image to be universally. It is meet
then, Thestetus, to consider what answer to this question
should one give to the young man.
Thee. It is evident that we shall say that things seen in
water and mirrors are images, and moreover such things as are
painted and fashioned and the rest of other things of this kind.
Guest. It is evident, Theetetus, that you have never seen
a sophist.
Thea. Why so?
δ: This is the translation of Stalbaum’s text after a correction by Hein-
dorf. I cannot understand it.
THE SOPHIST. 139
Guest. He will appear to you to wink, or to have no eyes
at all.
Thee. How so?
Guest. When you give him this answer,® should you speak
of any thing (seen) in mirrors or mouldings, he will laugh at
your reasons; when you speak to him as being able to see,
he will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors, or water,
or of sight at all, but will ask you of that, which depends on
reason alone.
Thee. What is that ?
Guest. That, which in all those things you have mentioned,
you, speaking of as many, think fit to call by one name, pro-
nouncing the word image as being in them all one thing. Speak
then and defend yourself, and yield nothing to the man.
[53.] Thee. What then, O guest, can we say an image is,
except that it is made to resemble the truth, being another
thing the counterpart ?
Guest. Do you say that such other thing is truly so, or to
what do you apply the expression, such other ?
Thee. It is by no means truly a such other, but only
seems to be.
Guest. Do you then call a truth a real entity ?
Thee. I do.
Guest. But is not that, which is not true, contrary to truth ἢ
Thee. How not?
Guest. © You say then that the seeming is not an entity, if
you assert that it is not a truth. It is however an entity.
Thee. How so?
Guest, Do you not say then truly ?
Thee. Certainly not, except a likeness in reality.
8° Taylor, translating, as usual, from the Latin instead of the Greek,
left out the words, ‘When you give him this answer,” omitted by
Ficinus ; nor did even Heindorf. perceive that they ought to commence
the preceding speech of the Guest; and though he was offended at the
' double protasis, he did not see that Plato wrote Ὅταν μὲν ἐν κατόπτροις
Ὅταν δ᾽ we βλέποντι---
69__69 | cannot understand either this text, given by Stalbaum, or: the
corrections proposed by Schleiermacher and Heindorf. Ficinus has,
“Ho. Si ergo id, quod simile vocas, verum esse negas, ens quoque
existere negas; est tamen. The. Quo pacto? Ho. Esse quidem, sed
vere esse non fateris? The. Certe non verum ens, sed imaginem veram.
Ho. Ergo non vere et ens id, quod vere esse imaginem dicimus; et non
vere ens est vere.”
140 THE SOPHIST.
Guest. That then which is not really a non-entity, is really
that which we call a likeness.
Thee. It nearly appears that non-entity is entwined by a
certain connexion of this kind with entity; and it is very
strange.
Guest. How is it possible it should not be strange? You
now therefore perceive that through this alternation, the
many-headed sophist compels us unwillingly to confess that
non-entity does somehow exist.
Thee. I see it, and very much so.
[54.] Guest. How, then, shall we define his art, and yet
be able to be consistent with ourselves ?
Thee. Why do you speak thus, and of what are you afraid ?
Guest. When we say that he is a deceiver about an appear-
ance, and that his is a certain deceptive art, whether shall we
say that our soul then has a false opinion, through his art?
or what shall we say ?
Thee. This very thing. For what else can we say?
Guest. But will false opinion be fancying things contrary
to those that are ?
Thee. Contrary.
Guest. You say then that false opinion fancies things that
are not.
Thee. It does so of necessity.
Guest. Whether does it fancy that non-entities do not exist,
or that non-entities do exist in a certain way ?
Thee. If any one is ever deceived even a little, he must
(fancy)7° that non-entities do exist in a certain way.
Guest. And will not entities entirely be likewise fancied
not to exist at all?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. And this too falsely ?
Thee. Yes, this too.
Guest. And false reasoning will, I think, be deemed, in the
same way, to assert that entities do not exist, and non-entities
do exist.
[55]. Thee. For how can it otherwise become such (viz.
false) ?
7 Ficinus has, “Si quis unquam quoquomodo opinando mentitur,
necesse est ut, que non sunt, esse quodammodo judicet ’—as if he
found in his MS. δεῖ δοξάζειν instead of δεῖ γε,
———
a
THE SOPHIST. 14]
Guest. Nearly not at all. But the sophist will not say
so. Or what device is there for any one of a sound mind to
concede; when “the things that have been granted before
these7! have been admitted to be unspeakable, ineffable,
irrational, and incomprehensible? Do we understand what
(the sophist) says, Thezetetus ?
Thee. How is it possible we should not? For he will
assert that we are saying things contrary to the present, in
having dared to assert that falsehoods exist in opinions and
reasons ;"* for that having been often compelled to unite
entity to non-entity, we have just now acknowledged, that
this is somehow the most impossible of all things.
Guest. You have rightly recalled (me tothe argument). But
it is now time to consult about what we ought to do respecting
the sophist. For, if we should attempt to search him out, by
placing him in the art of falsehood-workers and enchanters,
you see that his counter-graspings will be easy and (our)
difficulties many.
Thee. Very.
Guest. We have then gone through only a small asi of
them ; since they are, as I may say, boundless.
Thee. If such is the case, it would be impossible, it seems,
to catch the sophist.
[56.] Guest. What then, shall we now stand cowardly
aloof ?
Thee. I say we ought not, if we are able by ever so little
to lay hold in some way of the man.
Guest. You will then grant me pardon, and, as you just
now said, be satisfied, if we can draw by some means even a
little for ourselves out of such powerful reasoning.
Thee. How shall I not?
Guest. This too I beg of you still further.
Thee. What?
Guest. That you do not think I am become, as it were, a
parricide.
Thee. Why so?
"1 These words Heindorf fancied to be elegantly introduced by
Plato, to avoid the repetition of ra μὴ ὄντα.
12 Ficinus has “ cum nunc non ens in opinione et locutione ponamus,”
as if his MS. omitted ψευδῆ and read ὡς ἔστι τὸ μὴ by—instead of we
ἔστιν.
142 THE SOPHIST.
Guest, Because it will be necessary for us, in self-defence,
to put to the torture the reasoning of my father Parmenides,
and to compel a nonentity to exist in some way, and again an
entity in some way not to exist.
Thee. It appears that we must battle in our reasonings
for a thing of this kind.
Guest. For how should this not be evident, as it is said,
even to a blind man? For, while these things are neither
confuted nor confessed, any one will be able to speak at lei-
sure about false assertions, or opinions respecting resemblances,
or images, or imitations, or appearances, or of the arts con-
versant with these, without being ridiculous through his
being compelled to contradict himself.
Thee. Most true.
Guest. Hence we, must dare to oppose my father’s reason-
ing, or we must dismiss it altogether, if any sluggishness
restrains us from doing so (viz. opposing it).
Thee. But let nothing by any means restrain us.
Guest. I will now beg of you still a third and trifling
request.
Thee. Only mention it.
Guest. I just now stated that I was always faint-hearted
about the confutation of these points, and so I am now.
Thee. You did say so.
Guest. I fear as regards what has been said, lest I seem to
you to be insane, through my changing myself on the instant,
up and down. For we will throw ourselves on the confutation of
the reasoning, for your sake, if indeed we happen to confute it.
Thee. As you will not then by any means appear to me
to act improperly by advancing to the confutation and de-
monstration, on this account at least advance boldly.
Guest. Come then, what beginning shall we make to this
very danger-bringing discourse? Now it appears, O boy, to
be most necessary for us to turn to this road.
[58.] Thee. What?
Guest. 73'To consider first those things which now seem to
be clear, lest we become flurried about them; and that we
without difficulty assent to each other, as if we were in a
position to judge correctly.
7818 Tn the whole of this passage Taylor merely put into English the
Latin version of Ficinus, which differs so widely from the Greek, as to
OO EEE —<£_ +
THE SOPHIST. g 143
Thee. State more clearly what you mean.
Guest. Both Parmenides and whoever else has rushed for-
ward to the trial respecting the defining the quantity and
quality of entities, seems to me to have discussed the ques-
tion loosely.’*
Thee. How 80 ὃ
Guest. Each seem to me to have told a tale to us, as if we
were boys. One of them said that the entities are three ; 15
but that some of them at one time are at war with each other
in some manner; and at another, becoming friends, are mar-
ried, bring forth, and furnish food to their offspring. But
another’® said that the entities are only two, the moist and the
dry, or the hot and the cold; and these he unites in one house
and gives them (in marriage) to each other. But the Ele-
atic sect among us, which derives its origin from Xenophanes,
and from others still prior to him, details in fables that what
is called the all is really one. But the Ionian,” and subse-
quently some Sicilian 18 muses have thought it more safe to
connect these with each other, and to say that entity is both
many and one, but held together by enmity and friendship.
For that, which is separated, always comes together, say the
make one believe, that he supplied from his own head what was either
wanting entirely, or only partially legible, in the MS. he had before him.
™ So Heindorf understands εὐκόλως, which is literally, “ of easy tem-
per.’ But no philosopher would reason loosely. He might argue in a
circle. Hence Plato wrote, perhaps, ἐγκυκλίως.
15. Of the ancient philosophers, some said that the first principles were
three in number, the hot and the cold as extremes, but the moist as the
medium ; which sometimes conciliated the extremes, and sometimes not 3.
but they did not place the dry in the rank of a principle at all, because
they thought it subsisted either from the absence or evaporation of mois-
ture. On the other hand, the followers of Anaxagoras asserted that there
were four elements, heat and cold being the active powers, and dryness
and moisture the passive. Heraclitus and Empedocles asserted that the
matter of the universe was one, but its qualities many; with which the
matter sometimes agreed, and at others disagreed. Heraclitus, however,
conceived that the particles of the world were, through some discordant
concord, always similar, though not the same; for all things were in a
continual flux. But Empedocles asserted that the substance of the world
remained the same; and that at one time all things were separated into
chaos through discord, and in another were out of chaos reunited through ™
concord. T.
78 This was Archelaus, the pupil of Anaxagoras, See Heindorf.
7 This alludes to Heraclitus of Ephesus.
* This refers to Empedocles of Agrigentum.
144 : THE SOPHIST.
more energetic 7? of the Muses. But the more gentle ™ relax 19
(the doctrine by saying) *° that this takes place alwaysas regards
(the whole),*° but that the whole is in turn now one, and friendly
(to itself ),°° through Venus; and now many, and hostile to
itself, through a certain strife. [59.] But whether any one
has asserted all this truly or not,*! it is difficult and wrong to
bring so great a reproach upon illustrious and ancient men.®!
This, however, I may without envy show forth.
Thee. What?
Guest. That they greatly looked down upon, and held in little
esteem, us the many. For each of them finish their own work,
without caring at all whether we follow them when speaking,
or desert them.
Thee. How say you?
Guest. When any one of them asserts in his speech that—
many, or one or two, exist, or have been, or are in the course
of production, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, (and)
elsewhere lays down somehow discretions and concretions,—
by the gods, Theztetus, do you understand what they are on
each occasion asserting? Indeed, when I was younger, I
thought that when any one spoke of a non-entity I accurately
understood that, which is now doubtful; but now you see
where we are in a difficulty respecting it. :
Thee. I do see.
[60.] Guest. Perhaps then, receiving in no less a degree the
same feeling in our soul respecting an entity, we say we can
easily understand it, when it is enunciated by any one; but
not so, as regards the other, though similarly affected with re-
spect to both.
Thee. Perhaps so.
Guest. And let this very same thing be said by us respect-
ing the other things before mentioned.
7 In the words συντονώτεραι, padaxwrepat, and ἐχάλασαν there is, as
Boeckh was the first to remark, an allusion to musical terms; which
would now be called—* forte,”’ “‘ piano,”’ and “‘ the letting down a string”
to convert a sharp into a flat.
8° The words within lunes have been inserted to complete the sense.
81_8! The whole of this passage is in the original a mass of corruption;
which I could easily correct. The sense evidently required is something
to this effect—But whether any one has asserted all this truly or not, it is
difficult to say; and it would be improper for me at least, if for any one,
to bring a great reproach upon men of celebrity and of the olden time.
¥
-
THE SOPHIST. 145
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. We will speculate then, after this, about the many
things, if it seems good; but let us now speculate about the
greatest and first leading thing.
Thee. Of what are you speaking? Or is it plain that you
assert that we ought in the first place to search after entity,
and (see) what they, who speak of it, think they show.
Guest. You understand me, Thextetus, on the instant.
For I say that we ought to adopt the same method, as if we
were inquiring of them here present in this way. Come, ye
who assert that the hot and the cold, or any two such things,
are the whole, what is it you affirm to subsist in both of these,
when you say that both and each exist? What are we to
understand by this term of yours “to exist”? Is it a third
thing different from those two, and are we to lay down three
things as the whole, and no longer two things, according to
you? For, while you call one of the two an entity, you can-
not surely say that both are similarly an entity. For in both
ways there would nearly be one thing, and not two.
Thee. You speak the truth.
Guest. Are you then willing to call both of them an entity ?
Thee. Perhaps so.
Guest. But, O friends, we shall say, you would thus most
clearly call even the two things one.
Thee. You speak most correctly.
[61.] Guest. Since then we are thus in doubt, do you
sufficiently explain to us what you wish to signify, when you
pronounce (the word) entity? For it is evident that you are
conversant with these things long ago; and we formerly
thought (we knew them), but now we are in doubt. Instruct
us then, first in this very thing, that we may not fancy we un-
derstand what is asserted by you, when what is entirely contrary
_ to this is taking place. In speaking in this manner, and
_ making this request, both to these, and to such others as assert
that the all is more than one thing, shall we, O boy, do
any wrong?
Thee. By no means.
Guest. But ought we not to inquire, to the utmost of our
_ power, of those who assert that the all is one, what they call
entity?
Thee. How not?
146 ᾿ς HE SOPHIST.
Guest. To this question then let them answer, Do you
assert there is one thing alone? They will say, We do assert
it. Will they not?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. What then, do you call entity a thing?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. Do you say, it is that which the one is, employing
two names respecting the same thing? or how?
[62.] Thee. What answer will they have after this, O
stranger ?
Guest. It is evident, Theztetus, that to him who lays down
this hypothesis, it will not be the easiest thing of all to give
an answer respecting the present question, or any other
whatever.
Thee. How so?
Guest. To acknowledge that there are two names, while
laying down that there is not but one thing, is surely ri-
diculous.
Thee. How not?
Guest. And to receive (the assertion) altogether from him,
who says that a name is a thing possessing no value—
Thee. In what manner ?
Guest. He who lays down a name as different from a thing,
speaks of two certain things.
Thee. He does.
Guest. And yet, if he lays down that the name is the
same with the thing, he will be compelled to say, it is
the name of nothing; or, if he says it is the name of some-
thing, it will result that a name is only the name of a name,
but of nothing else.
Thee. It is so.
Guest. And the one must be one entity alone of one, and
not* itself the entity of a name.
* To complete the sentence, Ficinus adds, “ temerarium,” i. 6. it is
rash; who omits, however, the words, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον, in which all the
difficulty lies. Taylor translates, “ of which no account can be given.”
Stephens, “ rationi consentaneum haud fuerit,”” and reads ἔχοι, Hein-
dorf and Stalbaum retain yoy; but they do not condescend to tell us
how they understand the words.
** This is the emendation of Ast and Stalbaum, who read kai οὐ τοῦ
ὀνόματος, in lieu of καὶ τοῦτο ὀνόματος in some MSS., and καὶ τοῦ
ὀνόματος in others.
THE SOPHIST. 147
Thee. It is necessary.
Guest. But do they say that the whole is different from
the one entity, or the same with it ?
[63.] Thee. How will they not say it, and do say it ?&4
Guest. If, then, a whole is, as Parmenides says, “ Like the
bulk of a sphere that is a perfect circle on all sides, and pos-
sessing equal powers on every part from the middle;®* for
there must needs be nothing greater or less on this side or on
that ;” it is necessary for entity, being of such a kind, to have
a middle and extremities; and having these, there is every
necessity for it to have parts. Or how shall we say ?
Thee. Just so.
Guest, But nothing prevents the divided from having in
all its parts the accident of the one; and in this way every
entity and a whole would be one.
Thee. How not?
Guest. But is it not impossible that what suffers such acci-
dents should itself be the very one?
Thee. How so?
Guest. Surely according to right reason, that, which is truly
the one, must be said to be entirely without parts.
Thee. It must indeed.
Guest. But such a thing as consists of many parts would
not harmonize with the one.*®
Thee. I understand you.
Guest. But whether will entity, having the accident of the
one, be thus one, and whole? or must we by no means say that
entity is a whole?
Thee. You have proposed a difficult choice.
δι Hereissome error. ΤῸ ἃ double question there could not be a single
answer. Ficinus has “Cur non dixerint? Dicunt enim.”
85 Ficinus, perceiving doubtless that the definition given by Parmenides
of a sphere was geometrically incorrect, added, I suspect, out of his own
head, between “ἃ medio,” and “ penitus eque distans,” the words “ad
circumferentiam.’? Had he been still living, I would have told him what,
I suspect, the philosophic poet did really write. As it is, I will leave the
truth to be discovered by future geometers and Greek scholars united.
86 So Taylor translated, it would seem, from finding that the Greek
τῷ ὅλῳ (or τῷ ὅλῳ λόγῳ in some MSS., or τῷ λόγῳ ὅλω in others) was
at variance with the chain of reasoning. Heindorf indeed asserts, that
τῷ λόγῳ is to be referred to τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, mentioned just before. But
in that case ὀρθῷ would not have been omitted here. Perhaps Plato
wrote τῷ Evi γε ὕλῳ. 4
L
148 THE SOPHIST.
Guest. You speak however most truly. For entity having
the accident to be in some way one, it does not appear to be
the same as the one; and the all will be more than one. Is
it not so?
Thee. Yes.
[64.] Guest. But yet if entity is not a whole, on account
of its being subject to the accident belonging 57 to the whole,
and yet is the whole itself, it follows that entity is in want of
itself.*$
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. And entity, according to this reasoning, being de-
prived of itself, will be a non-entity.
Thee. Just so.
Guest. And thus again the all becomes more than one ; since
both entity and the whole have obtained each their proper na-
ture, apart from the other.
Thee. True.
Guest. And if the whole has not an existence at all, the
very same things will take place with respect to entity ; and
in addition to its not having an existence, it would at no time
have been produced.
Thee. Why so?
Guest. Whatever is produced is always produced as a
whole. So that he, who does not place amongst entities [the
one or] 385 the whole, ought to speak neither of existence or
production as an entity.
Thee. It appears that such is wholly the case.
Guest. Moreover, that, which is not a whole, must not have
the accident of any quantity whatever. For, while it has the
accident of quantity, whatever that may be, it must necessarily
be a whole.
[65.] Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Each (view) then will appear to have taken up ten
thousand other endless doubts for him, who says that entity
is either two or only one.
Thee. The light which is just now breaking almost shows
ὅδ This is the only intelligible rendering I can give to ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου.
Heindorf refers to his note on Phedon. § 110.
88 How entity can be said to be in want of itself, I confess I do not under-
stand; unless it be said that by “itself” is meant “being” or “ existence.”
8° Schleiermacher was the first to expunge the words within brackets
as interfering with the chain of reasoning.
CO EE ——— ΑΝ ΝΥΝ
THE SOPHIST. 149
(this). For one thing is linked with another and brings with
it a wandering (of the mind) greater and more dangerous
respecting what has been from time to time asserted before.
Guest. But we have not yet gone through the whole® of
those, who have accurately discoursed about entity and non-
entity. Let, however, (this) suffice. And let us consider
again those who speak inaccurately on these subjects, that we
may perceive from all quarters, that it is in no respect more
easy to say what entity is, than what non-entity is.
Thee. We rust therefore march against them.
Guest. Now, in truth, there appears to be among them,
as it were, a kind of giants’ war, through their conflicts with
each other respecting existence.
Thee. How so?
Guest. Some of them draw down to earth all things from
heaven and the unseen region, unskilfully®! laying hold for
this purpose of rocks and oaks. For through their touching
all such things as these, they strenuously contend that that
alone exists, which affords impact and touch; and they défine
body and existence to be the same. But if any one says that
of other things some have not a body, they thoroughly despise
(the assertion), and are unwilling to hear another (word).
Thee. You have spoken of terrible men. For I also have
met with many such.
[66.] Guest. Wherefore the opponents%? of these men very
carefully defend themselves from on high, from the invisible re-
gion, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal forms to be
the true existence ; and breaking into small pieces the bodies of
the others, and that, which is called by them truth, they do in
their own discourses, instead of existence, talk of some produc-
tion carried on. But between these, Thextetus, an immense
contest has always existed respecting these matters.
Thee. True.
Guest. Let us now, therefore, receive from both these
% The reading of πάντως, preserved by Eusebius alone, has been
adopted in lieu of πάνυ, by Stalbaum at Heindorf’s suggestion. The
whole passage is, however, far from being correct.
Ῥ1 1 have translated ἀτέχνως “ unskilfully,” to show what Plato thought
of the Materialists of his day. Stalbaum has unskilfully preferred its
ordinary meaning “ really.”
%2 These, says Schleiermacher, were the philosophers of Megara; of
whom the principal was Euclid.
150 THE SOPHIST.
races 955 an account in detail of the existence which they lay
down. ‘
Thee. But how shall we receive it?
Guest. From those that place existence in forms we may
easily receive it; for they are more mild; but from those
who violently draw all things to body, with more difficulty.
And perhaps it will be nearly impossible. It appears to me,
however, that we ought to act with respect to them in this way:
Thee. In what?
Guest. Most of all to render them, if possible, better in deed ;
but if we make no progress in this, let us render them so in
word, by supposing them to answer more equitably than at pre-
sent they would be willing to do. For that, which is assented to
by better persons, possesses more authority than that (which is
assented to) by worse. However, we pay no attention to these
things, but are seeking out the truth.
Thee. Most right.
[67.] Guest. Order therefore those that have become bet-
ter to answer you, and to interpret what they assert.
Thee. Be it so.
Guest. Let them say then whether they call a mortal ani-
mal a thing?
Thee. How not?
Guest. And do they not acknowledge that this is an ani-
mated body ?
Thee. Certainly.
Guest. Laying down that the soul is one of the things that
exist.
Thee. Yes.
Guest. But do they not say that one soul is just, and an-
other unjust; and one prudent, and another imprudent?
Thee. How not?
Guest. But does not each soul become such through the
habit and presence of justice, and the contrary (through the
habit and presence) of the contraries ?
Thee. Yes; to this likewise they assent.
Guest. But will they say that what is able to be present to,
and absent from, any thing, is'something ?
* I cannot believe that Plato wrote here τοῖν yevoty, One would pre-
fer τοῖν ynyevoiy, asin § 71, where there is an allusion to the giants
mentioned in § 65.
ΡΣ
THE ΒΟΡΈΠΞΤ, 161
Thee. They say it.
Guest. Since then justice and prudence, and the other vir-
tues, and their contraries, together with the soul in which they
are implanted, exist, whether will they say that each of these
is invisible and tangible, or that all of them are invisible ?
Thee. They will assert that nearly not one of them is
visible.
[68.] Guest. But what? Do they say that any one of such
things has a body?
Thee. They do not give the same answer to the whole of
this question; but that the soul itself appears to them to pos-
sess a certain body; but with respect to prudence, and each
of the other things about which you just now inquired, they
are ashamed to dare either to confess that they are not one of
existing things, or to strenuously assert that all of them are
bodies.
Guest. The men, Theztetus, have clearly become better.
For such of them as are seed-sown,* or earth-sprung,® would
not be ashamed to assert one of these points, but would con-
tend that whatever they cannot squeeze together with their
hands, is altogether nothing.
Thee. You state very nearly what they think.
Guest. Let us then again ask them. For, if they are will-
ing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is
sufficient. For they must say, with respect to these (incorpo-
real) and those (corporeal), which have a body born with them,
what it is they look to, when they assert that both exist.
[69.] % Thee. Perhaps, however, they would be in a dif-
- fieulty.
% Guest. But if they suffer any thing of this kind, consider
whether, on our proposing the question, they would be willing
to admit and confess that existence is a thing of this kind.
Thee. Of what kind? Speak, and we shall quickly know.
Guest. I say then, that what possesses any power soever,
whether of doing any thing naturally to another, or of suffering
% Tn the expression “ seed-sown,” there is an allusion to the Thebans,
who were said to be the descendants of the men, who sprung up from the
teeth of the serpent, which Cadmus had scattered as seed.
% So too in “ earth-sprung,”’ there is a reference to the Athenians, who
boasted that, like grasshoppers, they had sprung from the earth.
%_9 1 have followed, what common sense requires, the arrangement
of the speeches suggested by Cornarius, and adopted by Taylor.
152 THE SOPHIST.
even the least thing from the vilest thing, although only once,—
every thing of this kind does really exist. For 1 lay down a de-
finition by defining that existences are nothing else but power.
Thee. But since they cannot at present say any thing better
than this, they receive it.
Guest. It is well; for perhaps hereafter both to us and them
something different will appear. Let this then here remain
acknowledged by us on their account.
Thee. It shall remain.
[70.] Guest. Let us now proceed to the others, the friends
of forms. And do you interpret to us what is said by them.
Thee. Tt shall be so.
Guest. Do you then say that generation is one thing,” and
existence another, separating them in some way?
Thee. We do.
Guest. And that by body we communicate with generation,
through sensation, but through reason by our soul with real
existence, which you say is found for ever under the same
circumstance in a similar manner, but that generation exists
differently at different times ?
Thee. We do.
Guest. But, ye best of men, what shall we say you mean
by the communion between both? Is it not that which we
just now mentioned ?
Thee. What was that?
Guest. Passion or action arising from a certain power,
from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps,
Theztetus, you have not heard their answer to this question ;
but I have, through my familiarity with them.
Thee. What answer then do they give?
[71.] Guest. They do not admit with us, what was just
now said against the earth-born® respecting existence.
Thee. What was that?
Guest. We laid down as a sufficient definition of existence,
(that it is) when the power is present to any thing, either of
suffering or doing in the smallest point.
%” Ficinus has, “‘ Aliud essentiam, aliud generationem dicitis.” He
found therefore in his MS., τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν, as Cornarius
partly saw.
88 By the “earth-born” are meant the “seed-sown’’ and “ earth-
sprung’ mentioned in ᾧ 68, or the giants alluded to in § 65.
THE SOPHIST. 153
Thee. We did.
Guest. To this they say, that a power of doing and suffer-
ing has a share with generation; but that neither of these
powers is adapted to existence.
Thee. Do they then not speak to the purpose ?
Guest. To this we must say that we require to hear from
them still more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the
soul knows, and that existence is known.
Thee. They certainly say this.
Guest. But do you say that to know, or tu be krown, is
action, or passion, or both? Or that passion is one thing, and
(action)®® another? Or that neither of these has a share in
any respect with the other ?
Thee. It is evident that neither (has a share) with the
other. For, (if they admitted this,)' they would contradict
what they before asserted.
Guest. I understand this at least, that if to know were to
do something, it would necessarily happen that what is
known would become passive. And according to this reason-
ing, existence being known by knowledge, would, as far as it
is known, be, through becoming passive, moved; which we
say cannot take place about the act of resting.
Thee. Rightly so.
[72.] Guest. What then, by Zeus, shall we be easily per-
suaded that motion, life, soul, and prudence, are not truly
present to that which is existing in perfection, and that it
neither lives, nor thinks, but stands immovable, not possess-
ing an intellect as an object of respect and holy?
Thee. It would be a dreadful thing, O guest, to admit this.
Guest. Shall we say then that it possesses intellect, but
not life ?
Thee. And how ?
Guest. But say we that both these reside in it, but shall
we say that it does not possess these in soul at least?
Thee. But after what other manner can it possess ?
99 Taylor found in his copy of Ficinus, as Fischer did in his, “aut
aliud quidem pati, aliud autem agere.’’ But in the ed. pr. the whole
clause is omitted, as itis in many MSS. And so it should be; or else
we must insert with Heindorf ποίημα to balance πάθημα, whatever
Stalbaum may say to the contrary.
1 Ficinus has “ Alioquin contraria illorum, que supra concesserant,
nunc admitterent.””
154 THE SOPHIST.
Guest. That it (possesses)! then at least intellect, life, and
soul; but that, though animated, it abides perfectly im-
movable?
Thee. All this appears to me at least to be irrational.
Guest. We must therefore grant that both the moved and
motion are existences.
Thee. How not?
Guest. It follows then, Theztetus, that intellect is never on
any account in any way present to any one of things immovable.
[73.] Thee. It (follows) easily.
Guest. And yet, if we grant that all things are borne along
and moved, we shall by such an assertion take away this
sameness from existences.
Thee. How so?
Guest. Does it appear to you that what exists according to
the same, and in a similar manner, and about the same, can
ever exist without a standing ?
Thee. By no means.
Guest. But do you perceive that intellect ever is or would
be without these ὃ
Thee. Least (of all).
Guest. And truly we should contend with every argu-
ment against him, who, causing science, or prudence, or intel-
lect to “disappear, strenuously insists in behalf of any thing
in any way whatever.
Thee. And very much so.
Guest. But there is every necessity, as it appears, for the
philosopher, and him who honours these things the most on
this account, not to listen at all to those, who, asserting that
there is either one or many forms, admit that the whole
stands still; nor on the other hand, to those who are putting
existence into motion by every means; but to say, according
to the prayer of boys, ?whatever are immovable, and have
been moved, are both the being and the all.?
* Heindorf says that, “although ἔχειν might have dropt ‘out easily
after ψυχὴν, he would not introduce it without the authority of MSS.”
Ficinus perhaps found it in his. For his version is ‘‘ Utrum mentem,
vitam, animam habere dicendum.” :
2—2 Out of this mass of rubbish. neither Schleiermacher nor Heindorf
could elicit a particle of sense; for they did not see, what Stalbaum was
the first to remark, that there is an allusion to some game, during which
the children said, “What are unmoved, may they be moved.” But in
— —— —
THE SOPHIST. 155
' Thee. Most true.
[74.] Guest. Do we not then appear to have now reason-
ably in our discourse comprehended existence ?
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Ho! ho! Theztetus, how do we now seem about
to know the difficulty of the inquiry about it.
Thee. How so? and why do you assert this?
Guest. Do you not perceive, O blessed man, that we are
at present in the greatest ignorance respecting it ? And yet we
appear to ourselves to say something about it.
Thee. To myself at least. But I do not very well under-
stand how we are unconsciously in this state.
Guest. Consider more clearly, whether, by assenting to
this, we should not be justly asked, as we have asked them,
who said that the whole consisted of the hot and the cold.
. Thee. Remind me what these questions were.
Guest. By all means: and I will endeavour to do this by
asking you this, as I then asked them, that we may make
some progress together.
Thee. Rightly so.
[75.] Guest. Be it so. Do you not say then, that motion
and standing are contrary to each other ?
Thee. How not?
Guest. And you surely say that both and each of them
exist equally.
Thee. I do.
Guest. Do you then say that both and each are moved,
when you admit that they exist ?
Thee. By no means.
Guest. But do you mean that they stand, when you say
that both exist?
Thee. How can 19
that case the past participle κεκενημένα would not have been used instead of
the present participle, κινούμενα. The allusion I suspect is to a top or tee-
totum, which the faster it is made to revolve on its axis, the more it seems
to stand still, or, as boys say, to sleep ; and thus gives the best idea of the
universe being in motion and standing still at one and the same time.
Hence Plato perhaps wrote κατὰ τὴν τῶν περὶ δίνων τέχνην, οἷς ἀκίνητα
τὰ καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν δίνην ξυναμφότερα λέγειν : where
δίνην still lies hid in ἤδη, found in ἃ single MS. The sense would then
be, “To call both the one and the whole a whirl, according to the skill
of those engaged in playing with tops, by whom even things which have
been put into motion become unmoved.”
156 THE SOPHIST.
Guest. Placing then existence, as a third thing, alongside
these in your soul, and considering it as comprehending under
itself standing and motion, and looking to their communion
with existence, you have asserted that both of them exist.
Thee. We seem nearly to prophesy very truly that exist-
ence is a certain third thing, when we say that motion and
standing exist.
Guest. Existence then is not both motion and standing,
but something different from them.
Thee. It appears so.
Guest. Hence existence, according to its own nature,
neither stands nor is moved.
Thee. It is nearly so.
Guest. Whither then ought } he to turn his thoughts, who
wishes to fix in himself any clear conceptions respecting ex-
istence ?
Thee. Whither?
Guest. To no point do I think it is yet easy for him (to
turn). For, if existence is not moved, why has it not stood
still? Or on the other hand, why is that, which in no
respect stands still, not moved? But existence has just now
appeared to us to be apart from both of these. Is this, how-
ever, possible ?
Thee. It is the most impossible of all things.
[76.] Guest. In the next place, then, it will be just to —
to mind this.
Thee. What?
Guest. That being asked what name non-entity ought to
bear, we were hampered by the greatest difficulty. Do you
remember ?
Thee. How not?
Guest. Arewe then in a less difficulty now respecting entity ?
Thee. We appear to be, O guest, if it be impossible to
say so, in a greater.
Guest. Let then this question of difficulty lie here. But
since both entity and non-entity have equally a share of diffi-
culty, there is now a hope that, if one of them shall appear
more obscure, or more clear, the other will appear such
likewise ; and on the other hand, if we should not be able to
see either of them, (the other also will be in a similar state.)*
3 This clause, evidently required to balance the sentences, is omitted
THE SOPHIST. 157
And thus we shall pursue,‘ in the most becoming manner we
ean, the discourse respecting both of them together.
Thee. Very well.
[77.] Guest. Let us state then after what manner we call
on each occasion this same thing by many names.
Thee. Such as what? Give an example.
Guest. In speaking of man we give him various appella-
tions, and attribute to him colour, figure, magnitude, vices,
and virtues; in all which, and ten thousand other particulars,
we not only say that he is a man, but that he is good, and an
infinity of other things: and in the same manner we lay down
other things, each as one, and we again call it many things,
and by many names.
Thee. True.
Guest. Whence, I think, we have prepared a feast to young
men, and to those old men who learn late in life.5 For it is
easy for every one immediately to lay hold (of the doctrine),
that it is impossible for the many to be one, and the one many.
Hence they exult forsooth, not suffering us to say that aman is
good, but that the good isa good, and themanaman. ForlI
think, Thezetetus, you have often met with those, who serious-
ly apply themselves to things of this kind, (and) sometimes
(even)® with rather elderly persons, who, through the poverty
of their possessions with respect to wisdom, admire such
things as these, and think they have discovered the very-wise
thing itself.
[78.] Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. That our discourse then may extend to all who
have ever conversed at all respecting existence, let what will
be now said in the way of interrogation, be for those and for
the rest with whom we have before conversed.
Thee. What is this ?
Guest. Whether we should neither join existence to motion
in all the Greek MSS., and preserved only in the version of Ficinus—
‘“‘alterum quoque similiter fore.”
* All the MSS. have διωσόμεθα, contrary to the sense. Heind. suggested
τειν ape from “ persequamur” in Ficinus. Stalbaum prefers διασω-
σόμεθα.
Ι Stalbaum thinks that Plato alludes here to Euthydemus and Diony-
sodorus, who are said in Euthydem., p. 272, B., to have learnt Dialectics
late in life.
° Ficinus has “‘ plerumque etiam seniores.””
158 THE SOPHIST.
and standing, nor any thing else to any thing else; but as if
things were unmixed, and impossible to take a part with
each other, we should place them thus (separate) in our dis-
course? Or whether we should bring all things to the same,
as if they were able to take a part with each other? Or
(only) some, and some not? Which of these, Thestetus,
shall we say they would prefer ?
Thee. I indeed have nothing to answer to this on their
behalf. Why do you not, by answering each question, con-
sider what follows from each ?
[79.] Guest. You say well; and let us suppose them, if
you please, to say, in the first place, that nothing has any
power of communion with any thing for any thing. Will
not then motion and standing in no respect take a part of ex-
istence ?
Thee, They will not.
Guest. But will either of them exist, not having a com-
munion with existence ?
Thee. It will not.
Guest. By this admission, all the doctrines, it seems, have
become rapidly subverted, as well of those, who put all things
in motion, as of those, who make (all things) stand like one,
and of those, who assert that entities, according to forms,
subsist ever under the same circumstances and in a similar
manner. For all these join existence at least (with their
doctrines), some asserting that things are really moved, and
others that they really stand.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Moreover, such as at one time unite all things, and
at another separate them, whether 7 dividing them into one and
from one into infinite, or into finite elements, and composing
from these,’ and whether they consider this as partially,
or as always taking place,—in all these cases they will say
nothing to the purpose, if there is in no respect a commin-
gling. \
[80.] Thee. Right.
Guest. Further still, they will have gone through their dis-
course the most ridiculously of all men, who permitting no-
7—7 I confess my inability to understand all this. I suspect there is
an error here, arising from the wrong collocation of some words and the
omission of others.
THE SOPHIST. 159
thing to the communion of the accident of “ different,” (have ἡ
thought proper) to use the appellation, “ the other.” ὃ
Thee. How so?
Guest. They are compelled somehow to employ about all
things, “to be,” and “apart,” and “others,” and “by itself,”
and ten thousand other (expressions), from which being unable
to abstain, and® not to insert them in their discourses, they do
not require others to confute them, but walk about, having,
as the saying is, an enemy and an adversary at home, vocifer-
ating within, and always carrying, as it were, the absurd
Eurycles!° with them.
Thee, You really say what is similar and true.!!
Guest. But what if we permit all things to have the power
of alternate communion with each other?
15 Thee. This I myself am able to refute.
Guest. How?
Thee. Because motion itself would entirely stand (still),
and on the other hand, standing itself would be moved, if
they were alternately mingled'* with each other.
Thee. But this indeed is impossible from the greatest
necessity, for motion to stand still, and standing to be moved.
Thee. How not?
12 Guest. The third thing therefore alone remains.
Thee. Yes.
[81.] Guest. For one of these things is necessary ; either
5. To complete the sense I have ventured to supply the verb, which
should govern προσαγορεύειν.
5.1 cannot understand this “‘and.”’ The sense requires “‘so as,” in
Greek, wore—
10 This proverb, says the Scholiast, was applied to those who prophesy
evil to themselves. For Eurycles appeared to have a certain demon in
his belly, from whence he was called a ventriloquist; but having on one
occasion prophesied evil ‘to some person, he was ill-treated by him; as
Calchas would have suffered at the hands of Agamemnon for prophesying
evil, had he not first engaged Achilles to defend him.
1 Ficinus has “ Verum est quod dicis ac simile.” From whence it is
easy to elicit λέγεις ἀληθές τι ἢ Kai ὅμοιον. On ἢ καὶ see my Poppo’s
Prolegom. p. 114.
‘1212 In the arrangement of the speeches here I have followed Bekker ;
who knew, what Stalbaum did not, that the words ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν---γε always
commence a speech in Plato.
8 Ficinus has, ‘‘ si invicem commiscerentur,” in Greek, ἐπιμιγνυοίσ-
ΤῊΣ on so probably reads one MS. Y., and not ἐπιμιγνοίσθην, as stated
y Be
160 THE SOPHIST.
that all things should be commingled, or nothing; or that
some things should be willing to be ΡΝ and others
not.
Thee. How not?
Guest. Now it has been found that two cannot (be o-
mingled).
Thee. Just so.
Guest. Every one therefore who wishes to answer rightly,
will adopt that which remains of the three.
Thee. Very much so.
Guest. But since some things are willing to do so, (be
mingled,) and others not, they will be affected nearly in the
same manner as letters. For some of these do not fit with
each other, but others do fit.
Thee. How not?
Guest. For vowels being pre-eminently the bond, as it
were, of the other (letters), it has come to pass, that without
some one of them, it is impossible for any of the rest to fit
one with the other.
Thee. And very much so.
Guest. Does then every one know what letters will unite
with what? or is there a need of art to him, who is about to
do this sufficiently ?
Thee. Of art.
Guest. What kind of art ?
Thee. The grammatic. ;
[82.] Guest. What then, with respect to sharp and flat
sounds, is not he, who has the art to know the sounds that are
combined or not, a musician, but he who does not know, not
a musician ?
Thee. It is so.
Guest. And in other things of skill, and want of skill, we
shall find other circumstances of such a kind.
Thee. How not?
Guest. Since then we have acknowledged, that the genera
(of things) have a mingling with each other, after the same
manner, is it not necessary for him to proceed in his discourse
with some science, who is about to show what kind of genera
accord with what kind, and what do not receive each other?
Likewise, whether these genera so hold together through all
things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again
THE SOPHIST. 161
in their divisions, whether there are other causes of division
through wholes ?
Thee. How is there not a need of science, and, perhaps, of
nearly the greatest ?
Guest. What then, Theztetus, shall we call this science ἢ
Or, by Jupiter, have we ignorantly fallen upon the science of
freemen? And do we nearly appear, while searching after a
sophist, to have found previously a philosopher ?
[83.] Thee. How say you?
Guest. Shall we not say, that to divide according to genera,
and neither to think the same species different, nor a different
species the same, is the business of the dialectic science ?
Thee. Yes, we will say so.
Guest. He then who is able to do this, perceives sufficiently
one idea every way extended through many things, of which
each one lies apart, and many different from one another, ex-
ternally comprehended under one; and on the other hand, one
idea through many wholes conjoined in one, and. many ideas,
every way separated (from each other). This is to know how
to distinguish according to genus, in what point each can
have a communion, and where they cannot.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. But you will not, I think, assign the dialectic art to
any other than one, who philosophizes purely and justly.
[84.] Thee. For how should any one assign it to any
other ?
Guest. If we seek indeed, we shall find, both now and here-
after, a philosopher in a place of this kind, though difficult to
see him clearly ; but the difficulty in the.case of a sophist and
that of a philosopher is of a different kind.
Thee. How so?
Guest. The one flying into the darkness of non-entity, and
by rubbing touching it,!? is through the obscurity of the place
hard to be perceived. Is it not so?
Thee. So it seems.
12 This is the literal translation of the nonsensical τριβῇ προσαπ-
τόμενος αὐτῆς, with which some will perhaps compare Milton’s “ dark-
ness palpable,” derived from the Scriptural—“ a darkness that could be
felt.” But such an idea is not what the train of thought requires.
Ficinus has ‘‘ et diuturna consuetudine tenebris illis offunditur,” which
Taylor translated ‘‘and by use becoming adapted to it.”’
M
162 THE SOPHIST.
_ Guest. But the philosopher, always lying, through reasoning,
near the idea of entity, is, through the splendour of the region,
‘by no means easily discerned. For the eyes of the soul of the
many are unable to endure the looking upon what is divine.
Thee. And this too it is likely is : the case, no less ‘thth
that.
Guest. On this point, therefore, we shall shortly sdaaih
more clearly, if it be permitted to us wishing it. But with
respect to the sophist, it is evident that we must not dismiss
him, before we have sufficiently surveyed him.
Thee. You speak well.
[85.] Guest. Since then it isacknowledged by us, that some
genera have a communion with each other, and some have ποῖ,
and that nothing prevents some from having a communion
with a few, others with many, and others through all and
with all,—let us, in the next place, follow the reasoning, and
in this way speculate, not about all species, lest we be con-
founded by their multitude,—but, selecting some of those called
the greatest, let us first consider the qualities of each, and then
what power of communion they possess with each other, in
order that, although we may not be able to comprehend entity
and non-entity with all clearness, we may at least not want
for reasons respecting them, as far as the manner of the pre-
sent speculation admits, if perchance it be permitted us, when
we assert that non-entity is in reality a non-entity, to ~~
unscathed.
Thee. So must we do.
[86.] Guest. Now the greatest of all the genera, which we
have now mentioned, are, entity itself, standing, and motion.
Thee. Very much so.
Guest. And we have said that the two (latter) are unmixed
with each other.
Thee. Very much so.
Guest. But entity is mixed with both; for both do some-
how exist.
Thee. How not?
Guest. These things then become three.
Thee. Certainly.
Guest. Is not then each of these different from the other
two, but the same with itself ?
Thee. It is.
THE SOPHIST. 168.
Guest. What then have we now said of sameness and
difference? (Must we say that), as there are two genera
different from the other three, but yet always mingled with
them from necessity, we have to consider about five, and not
three genera only? Or have we unconsciously denominated
the same and the different, as something belonging to them ?}4
[87.] Thee. Perhaps so.
Guest. But surely motion and standing are neither the
different nor the same?
Thee. How so?
Guest. That which we in common call motion and stand-
ing can be neither of these.
Thee. Why?
Guest. Because motion would be standing, and standing
be motion. For, with respect to both, either one becoming
the other, would compel that other to change into the con-
trary to its nature, as participating in the contrary.
Thee. Very much so.
Guest. But yet both participate of the same and the
different.
Thee. They do.
Guest. Let us then not assert that motion is either the
same or the different, nor on the other hand (assert this), of
standing.
Thee. Let us not.
Guest. But must entity and the same be considered by us
as one?
Thee. Perhaps so.
Guest. But if entity and the same signify that which is in
no respect different, when we again say that motion and
standing both exist, we shall thus assert that they are the
same, as things existing.
Thee. But this is surely impossible.
Guest. It is impossible then for the same and entity to
be one.
Thee. Nearly so.
15. Instead of ἐκείνων τι, Ast has happily restored & ἐκείνων τι, “ some-
thing belonging to those five ;’’ for thus numerals, by being united to
nouns or pronouns, have frequently led to the corruption of the text; as
I have shown in Poppo’s Prolegomena, p. 223, by numerous instances ;
to which I could now add many πο
M
΄
164 THE ΒΟΡΉΠΞΤ.
Guest. We must place then the same as ἃ fourth species,
in addition to the former three.
Thee. Entirely so.
[88.] Guest. But must we say that the different is a fifth
species? Or must we conceive that this and entity are some
two names belonging to one genus? .
Thee. Perhaps so.
Guest. But I think you will grant, that of existences,
some always subsist themselves by themselves, but others in
relation to each other.'*
Thee. Why not ?
Guest. But the different is always referred to the differ-
eft. Is it not?
Thee. Τὶ is.
Guest. But this would not be, unless entity and the differ-
ent widely differed from each other. But if the different
participated of both species, as entity does, there would be
something even of the different not different with reference
to the different. But now it happens from necessity that,
whatever is really different, is so from its relation to that
which is different.!®
Thee. You say, as the fact is.
Guest. We must say then, that the nature of the different
must be added as a fifth to the species, of which we have al-
ready spoken. ,
Thee. Yes.
Guest. And we will say that it pervades through all these.
For each one is different from the others, not through its own
nature, but through participating in the idea of the different.
Thee. And very much so.
[89.] Guesé. Let us say thus of the five genera, taking
each singly.
Thee. How?
4 The antithesis in “themselves by themselves,” requires here
** others,’ not “ each other,’’ in Greek ἄλλα, not ἄλληλα : unless it be
said that Plato wrote ἄλλῳ ἄλλα, i. 6. “some to one thing, and some to
another.”
15. So Taylor translates the version of Ficinus, “ ut secundum id, quod
est, alterum sit,’ answering to the Greek in some MSS., πρὸς ἕτερον
τοῦτο, ὕπερ ἐστὶν, εἶναι : for which Bekker and Stalbaum read from
other MSS. ἑτέρου τοῦτο, ὕπερ ἐστὶν, εἶναι : which I cannot understand.
4. aa
THE SOPHIST. 165
Guest. In the first place, that motion is entirely different
from standing. Or how shall we say ?
Thee. Thus.
Guest. It is not then standing.
Thee. By no means.
Guest. But it exists through its participating in entity.
Thee. It does.
Guest. Again, motion is different from the same.
Thee. Nearly so.
Guest. It is not therefore the same.
Thee. It is not.
Guest. And yet it was the same, through its participating
on the other hand in the same.!®
Thee. And very much so.
Guest. It must be confessed then that motion is both the
same and not the same; nor must we be indignant at this.
For, when we say that it is both the same, and not the same,
we do not speak of it in a similar manner; but when (we
say)! it is the same, we call it so, through the participation of
the same with respect to itself; but when (we say) it is not
the same, (we call it so) through its communion with the
different; through which, being separated from the same, it
becomes not the same, but the different; so that it is again
rightly said to be not the same.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. If, then, motion itself'* has in any respect par-
ticipated in standing, there would be no absurdity in calling
it stable.
Thee. Most truly, if we should acknowledge that some of
the genera are willing to be mixed with each other, but
others not.
Guest. And yet we arrived at the proof of this prior to the
present (remarks), by showing that it exists in this manner
naturally.
1861 have adopted with Stephens the correetion of Cornarius, who
would read διὰ τὸ μετέχειν ad πάλιν ταὐτοῦ in lieu of διὰ τὸ μετέχειν ad
πάντ᾽ αὐτοῦ : out of which others may perhaps make, what I cannot,
something like sense.
1 Heindorf would insert λέγωμεν, which Taylor had already antici-
pated by his “‘ we say.”
18 Instead of αὐτὴ, which has no meaning here, Ast would read αὖ ἡ---
Stalbaum prefers αὐτὴ ἡ.
166 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. How not?
[90.] Guest. Let us then say again (that) motion is a
thing different from the different, just as it was from the
same and standing.
Thee. It must be so.
Guest. It is then, in a certain respect, not different and
different, according to the present reasoning.
Thee. True.
Guest. What then follows? Shall we say it is ‘different
from the three (genera), but not from the fourth? acknow-
ledging that there are five, about which, and in which, we
propose to speculate ?
Thee. And how so? for it is impossible to grant that the
number is less than it now appears.
Guest. We may, therefore, fearlessly contend that mosion
is different from entity.
Thee. We may most fearlessly.
Guest. Clearly then motion is really a non-entity and an
entity, since it participates of entity.
Thee. Most clearly.
Guest. It is then of necessity that non-entity exists with
respect to motion, and as regards all the genera. For as
regards all, the nature of the different, rendering them different
from entity, makes each to be a non-entity. Hence we rightly
say, that all of them are, as regards the same, non-entities ; and
again, because they participate in entity, that they exist ani?
are entities.!9
Thee. It appears s
[91.] Guest. ‘About each of the species then, the entity is ©
many, but the non-entity is in multitude endless.”
Thee. Tt appears so.
Guest. Must not then entity itself be said to be different
from the others ?
19 If we wish to avoid the tautology in εἶναί re καὶ ὄντα, we must
adopt the version of Ficinus, ‘‘ entiaque vocabimus’’—i. e. “ and we will
call them entities.”
» These, to me at least, perfectly unintelligible words are thus ex-
plained by Heindorf and Stalbaum: “ΤῸ each species many things may
be attributed; and in this respect entity is many; but as each of the
many may be "varied infinitely, in this respect it is infinite.” But as this
explanation takes no notice of the non-entity, it may fairly be considered
a non-entity itself.
THE SOPHIST. 167
Thee. Of necessity.
Guest. 3. Entity then does not exist according to so many
in number as the others; for entity, being one itself, is
not them; but the others, being infinite in number, are
not entity. 3]
Thee. This is nearly the case.
Guest. We ought not.then to be indignant at this, since
the nature of the genera have a communion with each other.
But if some one does not admit this, let him, having per-
suaded 33 our former reasoning, in like manner persuade 23 the
subsequent assertions.
Thee. You speak most justly.
Guest. Let us look at this likewise.
Thee. What?
_ Guest. When we say non-entity, we do not, as it appears,
speak of any thing contrary to entity, but only as something
different from it.
Thee. How so?
Guest. Just as when. we say a thing is not great, do we
then appear to you to point out by this word what is small
rather than what is equal ?
Thee. How could you?
Guest. We must therefore admit that the contrary to a
thing is not signified, when negation is spoken of ; but thus
much only, that the (prohibitive) “not,” and the (negative)
“no,” when prefixed, signify something relating to the words
that follow, or rather to the things, respecting which are
placed the words of the negation afterwards enunciated.”
Thee. Entirely so.
[92.] Guest. This also. let us consider, if it seems good to
you. ;
31 51 Such is the literal translation of the Greek; where, however, I
have tacitly changed the last word αὖ into ὃν, to preserve the antithesis.
But of the first clause I confess my inability to understand the sense.
Taylor’s version is—‘‘ Being, therefore, is not so many in number as the
others.. For not being them it is itself one, but is not other things, which
are infinite in number.’’ The reader is therefore left to choose which he
prefers.
25. 52 Tn lieu of the nonsensical πείσας and πειθέτω, it is evident at a
glance that Plato wrote ἀπώσας and ἀπωθείτω---ἰ. e. “ having rejected—
reject.”
23 Here too is another unintelligible, because corrupt, passage.
168 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. What is that ?
Guest. The nature of the different appears to me to have
been cut into fractional parts, in the same manner as science.
Thee. How? |
Guest. The (nature) is one; but the portion of it that is
attached to any thing does, when separated, possess individu-
ally its peculiar appellation; on which account arts and
sciences are said to be many.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. Have not then the parts of the nature of the different,
which is itself one thing, been affected in the very same way ?
Thee. Perhaps so. “But let us tell how this takes place.
Guest. Is there any part of the different opposed to the
beautiful ?
Thee. There is.
Guest. Shall we say it is nameless, or that it has some
appellation ?
Thee. That it has. For that which we call on each occa-
sion not-beautiful, is not different from any thing else but
the nature of the beautiful.
Guest. Come, then, tell me this.
[93.] Thee. What?
Guest. When any thing is separated from some kind of ex-
istences, and is again opposed to some kind of existences, does
it happen that thus it is not beautiful ?*4
Thee. It does.
Guest. But the opposition of entity to entity happens, as it
seems, to be not-beautiful.
Thee. Most right.
Guest. What then, according to this reasoning does the
beautiful belong more to entities, and the non-beautiful, less ?
Thee. Not at all.
* In the place of this mass of rubbish Ficinus has what is at least
intelligible in part; for his MS. was fuller than any, which have
been collated subsequently. “Cum aliquid in parte quadam entium
determinatum sit, rursusque alicui entium opponatur, contingatque ita
non pulchrum dici, sequitur non pulchrum esse aliquid, quandoquidem
est illud cui opponatur.” There is however something evidently wanting
after ‘‘ determinatum sit,”’ to this effect, “‘id dici pulchrum debere, cui
nihil opponatur.” So too there is wanting in Ficinus the close of this
speech of the Stranger and the whole of the next one, together with the
intermediate answer of Theetetus.
THE SOPHIST. 169
Guest. We must say then, that the not-great and the great.
exist similarly.
Thee. Similarly.
Guest. Hence too we must lay down respecting the just, in
the same manner as of the not-just, that the one in no respect
exists more than the other.
Thee. How not?
Guest. And we will speak of other things in this way ;
since the nature of the different appears to be one of entities ;
and as it exists, it is necessary for us to lay down the parts of
it, as no less existing.
Thee. How not?
Guest. The opposition then, it seems, of a part of the na-
ture of the different, and of entity 35 opposed to each other,
are no less existence, if it be lawful to say so, than existence
itself; nor do they signify what is contrary to existence, but
only so much, what is different from it.
Thee. It is most clear.
[94.] Guest. What then, shall we call it the (antithesis) ?
Thee. It is evident that non-entity, which we have been
seeking on account of the sophist, is this very thing.
Guest. Whether then, as you have said, is it no more de-
ficient of existence than the others? And ought we now
boldly to say, that non-entity possesses its own nature firmly,
in the same manner as the great was found to be great, and
the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great to be (not-great),?6
and the not-beautiful (not-beautiful) ??° and that thus too non-
entity was and is non-entity, as being one species numbered
amongst the many existing? Or must we still, Theztetus,
have with regard to this some want of faith ὃ
Thee. None at all.
Guest. Do you perceive then, how we have been with some
prolixity disobedient to the prohibition of Parmenides ?
Thee. In what respect ἢ
Guest. We have farther than he ordained?’ us to inquire,
exhibited ourselves, still exploring onwards.
535. -55 The words ‘‘ opposed to each other” are omitted by Ficinus cor-
rectly. For they are only an explanation of the preceding ‘‘ opposition.”
%—26 The words “ not-great’’ and “ not-beautiful,’’ which Heindorf
and Stalbaum say that Boeckh was the first to restore, Taylor had already
printed in his translation.
27 Stalbaum, led no doubt by the version of Ficinus, “ulterius quam
170 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. How?
Guest. Because he says some where,—“ Non-beings never,
and by no means are. And from this path thy searching
thought restrain.” Ἷ
Thee. And so he does say. ᾿
Guest. But we have not only shown that non-entities exist,
but we have demonstrated what kind of thing a non-entity is.
For, having proved that the nature of the different has an ex-
istence, and that it is cut up into fractions, (distributed),
mutually through all things, we then dared to say, that each
part of it, which is opposed to entity, is itself truly a non-
entity.
Thee. And to me, O guest, we appear to have spoken
with the greatest truth.
[95.] Guest. Let no one then say, that we, having proved
that non-entity is contrary to entity, dare to assert that it
exists. For we some time since did to something, contrary to
it, bid a farewell, whether it exists or not, and possesses a
certain reason, or is entirely irrational. But, with respect to
that which we now call non-entity, either let. some one per-
suade (us) by showing that we speak not well; or, as long as
he is unable (to do this), he must also say, as we say, that the
genera are mixed with each other, and that entity and the
different pervading through all things, and through each
other, the different, partaking of entity, does through this
participation exist, not being that of which it participates, but
something else; and being different from entity, it clearly
follows that it is necessarily non-entity.. And on the other
hand entity, having partaken of the different, will be different.
from the other genera; but being different from all of them,
it is not any one of them, nor all the others, nor any thing
besides itself. So that incontestably entity is not ten thou-
sand things in ten thousand things: and thus the rest taken.
singly and together exist in many forms, but do not exist in
many forms.”8
[96.] Thee. True.
statuerit,” which Taylor translated “‘ beyond the limits he appointed,”
first objected to ἀπεῖπε: but he failed to see, what is obvious at a glance,
that Plato wrote ὠνεῖπε, a word peculiarly applied to the ordonnance of.
a deity, with whom a philosopher was wont to be compared,
35. This is an instance of the “reductio ad absurdum.”
β
|
THE SOPHIST. 171
Guest. Now if any one either does not believe in these
contrarieties, let him reflect and produce something better
than has been stated now ;”? or if, perceiving this to be a
difficult speculation, he is pleased at drawing out his argu-
ments now on this side and now on that, he is engaged, as our
present reasoning shows, in a pursuit not deserving very
serious attention. For this is neither a clever thing nor
difficult to discover; but that is at one and the same time
difficult and honourable.*°
Thee. What?
Guest. That which has been stated before ; so that, omit-
ting these as possible, we may be able, by following up what
has been said, each by itself, to confute a person, when he says
that what is different is same, and what is the same different,
3!in the way and according to the circumstance by which
he says either is affected.*! For, to show that the same is
different, and the different same, and the great small, and the
similar dissimilar, and to be pleased in thus introducing con-
trarieties in discourse, is not a true confutation, but one
evidently newly born of some one, who has recently laid hold
of entities.
Thee. Very much so.
[97.] Guest. For, my good (friend), to endeavour to
separate every thing from every thing, is inelegant in other
respects, and the part too of one untaught and unphilosophical.
Thee. Why so?
Guest. To loosen each thing from all things, is the most
perfect abolition of all discourse. For discourse subsists
through the conjunction of species with each other.
Thee. True.
Guest. Consider then, how opportunely we have now con-
tended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit
one thing to be mixed with another.
Thee. With a view to what?
Guest. To this, that discourse may be one certain thing
7° Compare Horace, “‘si quid novisti rectius istis, Candidus imperti;
si non, his utere mecum.,”’
30 Here is an allusion to the saying, “ Difficult things are honourable.”
See Hipp. Maj. § 56. ‘
31_3! The whole of this passage Taylor tacitly omitted, at the sugges-
tion of Cornarius, who considered it an interpolation.
172 THE SOPHIST.
belonging to the genera of existences. For, if we are de-
prived of this, we shall, for the most part, be deprived of
philosophy. And further still, it is requisite at present that
we agree about discourse what it is. But if we take it away
entirely from us, so as not to exist at all, we can no longer
speak about any thing. And we should take it away, if we
admit that there is no mixing of any thing for any thing.
[98.] Thee. This is (said) quite rightly. But I do not
understand why we should agree about discourse.
Guest. But, perhaps, you will most easily understand by
following me in this way.
Thee. In what way?
Guest. Non-entity has appeared to us to be one of the rest
of genera, and to be dispersed through all existences.
Thee. It has so.
Guest. After this, therefore, we must consider whether it
is mixed with opinion and discourse.
Thee. On what account?
Guest. Because, if it is not mixed with these, it must
necessarily follow that all things are true; but, if it is mixed
with these, false opinion and (false)*® discourse is produced.
For to fancy or speak of non-entities, is a falsehood existing
in the mind and in discourse.
Thee. It is so.
Guest. But, being falsehood, it is deception.
Thee. It is.
Guest. And deception existing, all things must necessarily
be full of resemblances, images, and fancies.
Thee. How not ?
Guest. But we have said that the sophist flew to (and
stayed) in this place, while he denies that there is any such
thing as falsehood ; for (he says) that no one can either think
or speak of a non-entity ; because it in no respect partakes of
existence.
Thea. It was (so) said.
[99.] Guest. But now it has appeared to partake of entity ;
so that in this respect perhaps he will no longer oppose us.
Perhaps, however, he will say, that of species some partake of
nonrentity, and others not; and that discourse and opinion
82 This idea, wanting in the Greek, has been preserved in the “‘ oratio-
que falsa”’ of Ficinus alone.
THE SOPHIST. 173
are amongst those things that do not partake of it. So that
he will again contend with us, that the image-making and
fancy-producing art, in which we have said he is concealed,
exists not at all; since opinion and discourse have no com-
munion with non-entity ; for that falsehood does not exist at all,
if this communion of things takes place no where. Hence we
must search out discourse, opinion, and fancy, what they are,
in order that we may perceive after their appearance their
communion with non-entity ; and having perceived this, we
may prove that falsehood exists ; and having proved this, we
may put the sophist into bonds, if he is guilty ; or, setting him
free, search for him in some other genus.
[100.] Thee. What was said, O guest, at first about the
sophist, appears to be very true—that he is a genus difficult
to hunt out. For he appears to be full of fences ; 88. of which
when he throws up one, it is necessary to take it by storm,
before you can reach him himself. And even now we have
scarcely passed over the obstacle he had raised, that a non-
entity does not exist, when he immediately throws up
another. Hence it is requisite to show that falsehood does
exist, both in discourse and opinion; and after this perhaps
something else, and another thing after that; and, as it seems,
no end will e’er appear.*4
Guest. He, Theztetus, should be bold, who is able to pro-
ceed, though only a little, continually onwards. For what
will he be able to do in other things who is faint-hearted
in these, and is either effecting nothing in these, or is
driven back again? Such a person will scarcely, according to
the proverb, ever take a city. But now, O good man, since
this, as you say, has been passed through, the greatest wall
will have been taken by us, and the rest will be more easy
and of small account.
Thee. You say well.
Guest. Let us then now in the first place take up, as we
said, discourse and opinion, that we may more clearly cal-
33 In the Greek word πρόβλημα there is a double sense ; one applica-
ble to a war carried on by soldiers in the field, and the other to that by
philosophers in their schools; as Stalbaum has correctly observed.
* T have designedly put the concluding words into verse; as Plato
himself has almost done in a trochaic line—Kat πέρας, we ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν
(ἐκ)φανήσεταί ποτε,
174 THE SOPHIST.
culate,®° whether non-being touches upon these, or whether
both these are in every respect true, and neither of scores at
any time false.
Thee. Right.
Guest. Come then, let us again speculate about nouns, in
the same manner as we did about species and letters. For
the present inquiry appears*® somehow to lie in this road.
Thee. What then is to be heard forsooth about nouns? —
Guest. Whether all of them fit together, or not; ors
are wont to do 80, but others not.
Thee. This is evident, that some are wont and others not.
Guest. Perhaps you mean some such thing as this; that
some being spoken in order and signifying something, do fit
together ; but that such as in continuity signify nothing, do
not fit together.
[102.] Thee. Why, and how say you this ?
Guest. What I thought you would understand and acknow-
ledge. For there is a twofold kind of significations by the
voice respecting existence.
Thee. How ?
Guest. One called nouns, and the other verbs.
Thee. Speak of each.
Guest. That which has a signification in the case of
actions, is called a verb.
Thee. It is.
Guest. But a sign of the voice, applied to the doers them-
selves of those actions, we call a noun.
Thee. Certainly.
Guest. From nouns then alone, spoken in succession, there
is not a discourse ; nor, on the other hand, from verbs spoken
without nouns.
Thee. I have not learned this.
Guest. Yet it is plain that you just now acknowledged
‘this, when looking to something else. For this very thing I
meant to say, that when these are spoken in succession, there
is not a discourse.
35. Instead of ἀπολογησώμεθα, Heindorf conjectured ἀπολογισώμεθα.
Ficinus had already “ ostendamus.”
% Stalbaum has adopted Heindorf’s φανεῖται for φαίνεται unneces-
sarily.
THE SOPHIST. 175
Thee. How so?
Guest. As for instance, should any one say in succession
“walks,” “runs,” “sleeps,” and such other words as signify
actions, he would not form a discourse at all.
Thee. For how could he ?
[103.] Guest. Again then, when any one says, “lion,”
“stag,” “horse,” and such other nouns, as are named after
those doing acts, no discourse is composed by such a con-
tinuity. For the words spoken do not, “either in this way
or that,®’ signify action, or non-action, or the existence of a
thing which is or is not, until one mixes verbs with nouns ;
and then they fit (with each other), and a discourse is pro-
duced immediately, and their first connexion is nearly the
first and shortest discourse.
Thee. How say you this?
Guest. When any oné says, “ Man learns,” would you not
say that this is the shortest and first discourse ὃ
Thee. I should.
Guest. For he then points out something respecting things
which exist, or are in the course of existing, or have been, or
will be; nor does he name a thing merely, but completes
something by connecting verbs with nouns. Hence we say
that he speaks, and does not merely name a thing ; and
through this connexion we pronounce the noun “discourse.”
[104.] Thee. Right.
Guest. Thus too in the case of things, some did fit with
each other, and others did not ; so likewise with respect to
the signs of the voice, some do not fit, but others of them
by fitting produce discourse.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. There is still this trifling thing.
Thee. What?
Guest. It is necessary for a discourse, when it takes place,
to be a discourse about something ; for it is impossible to be
about nothing.
Thee. It must.
Guest. Ought it not then to be of some particular kind ?
Thee. How not ?
Guest. Let us then pay attention to ourselves.
37_37 These words are omitted by Ficinus. They are perfectly un-
necessary.
176 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. For it is requisite.
Guest. I will then pronounce you a discourse, having
united a thing with an action, through a noun and a verb ;
and do you tell me of what it is the discourse.
Thee. This shall be as far as I am able.
Guest, Thextetus sits.—This is not a long discourse.
Thee. No; a moderate one.
Guest. It is now your business to say about whom is the
discourse, and whose it is.
Thee. It is evident that it is about me and mine.*
Guest. But what again is this ?
Thee. What?
Guest. Thextetus, with whom I am now conversing, flies.
Thee. Respecting this also, no one can say but that it is
mine,** and of me. ;
[105.] Guest. But we said it was necessary that every
sentence should be of some particular kind.
Thee. Yes.
Guest. But of what kind must each of the sentences just
now mentioned be ?
Thee. One must be false and the other true. _
Guest. But of them the one which is true asserts things
respecting you, as they are.
Thee. How not ?
Guest. But the one which is false (asserts) things respect-
ing you, different from what they are.
Thee. It does.
Guest. It speaks then of things which are not, as if they were.
Thee. Nearly so.
Guest. And it speaks of things about you different from the
existing. For we said that about each thing there are many
things which exist, and many which do not.
ss_88 This is a remarkable instance of the carelessness of even the most
attentive editors. For not one has remarked that, as the Guest, and not
Theetetus, had pronounced the words “ Theetetus sits,” the discourse
belonged to the former, although it was about the latter. Plato must
therefore have written not ἐμὸς but ὁ σός : while instead of περὲ οὗ τ᾽
ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου we must read περὶ οὗ τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ οὗ---“ about whom and
whose,”’ as shown by the version of Ficinus, ‘‘de quo δὲ οὐ) : ᾿᾿ although
he shortly afterwards supports πλὴν ἐμὸν by his “ nisi de me meaque;”
where, for a similar reason, we must read πλήν ye σὸν, as we find a
little below Ei δὲ μὴ ἔστι σός.
=
THE SOPHIST. 177
Thee. Certainly.
Guest. The discourse then which I last spoke about you,
should, from what we have defined a discourse to be, of ne-
cessity be, in the first place, one of the shortest.
Thee. This we have just now acknowledged.
Guest. In the next place, it is a discourse of some one.
Thee. It is so.
Guest. But if it is not yours, it is not of any one else.
Thee. For how should it?
Guest. And if it is not about some thing, it cannot be a dis-
course at all. For we have shown that it is (one) of things
impossible, for a discourse to exist about nothing.
Thee. Most correctly.
Guest. When therefore the different is asserted of you as
if it were the same, and things not existing as if existing,
such an arrangement of verbs and nouns altogether becomes,
as it appears, a really and truly false discourse.
Thee. Most true. ;
[106.] Guest. But what, is it not now evident, that all
these genera, both false and true, such as thought, opinion,
and fancy, are produced in our souls ?
Thee. How ?
Guest. You will more easily understand it thus, if you first
take,°° what each of them is, and in what they differ each
from the other.
Thee. Only give.
Guest. Are not then thought and discourse the same, ex-
cept that the former being within the soul a voiceless dialogue
with itself, is called by us by the name of thought ?4°
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. But the stream of thought passing through the
mouth with a sound is called discourse.
Thee. True.
Guest. We know of this too in discourse.
Thee. What?
Guest. Affirmation and negation.
39. The verb “take” is used in English as λαμβάνειν is in Greek, in
a mental as well as manual sense. Hence the joke in the answer of
Theetetus, “‘ Give.”
4° It was with reference to this notion, that the Greek verb φράζειν,
to speak ’’ to another in the active voice, means in the middle, φράζεσθαι,
“to think,” i. 6. to speak to oneself.
N
178 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. We do.
Guest. When therefore this is generated in the soul accord-
ing to thought, accompanied with silence, can you call it any
thing else than opinion ?
Thea. How can 1?
Guest. But when, again, some circumstance of this kind is
present to any one, not according to itself,4! but through sens-
ation, is it possible to call itcorrectly any thing else than fancy ?
Thee. Nothing else.
[107.] Guest. Since then discourse is both true and false,
and it appears that thought is a dialogue of the soul with it-
self, but opinion the termination of thought, and what we
mean by “it appears ” is the mixture of sensation and opinion,
it is necessary, that of these, being allied to discourse, some
should be false and sometimes.*
Thee. How not?
Guest. Do you perceive then, that opinion and discourse
have been previously found to be false more easily, than
according to our expectation? For “5 just now we were afraid,
lest by searching into this matter we should throw ourselves
upon a work perfectly impracticable.
Thee. 1 do perceive.
Guest. Let us not then be faint-hearted as to what remains.
For since these have been made to appear, let us recall to our
memory the previous divisions according to species. _
Thee. Of what kind were they ?
Guest. We divided image-making into two species; the
one assimilative, and the other fanciful.
Thee. We did.
Guest. And we said we were dubious in which of these we
should place the sophist.
411 cannot understand the words “‘ according to itself,” nor could
Taylor, who translated “according to the dianoétic energy,” as if he
wished to read κατ᾽ αὐτὴν, and thus to make a proper distinction between
κατὰ διάνοιαν, and κατὰ μὴ διάνοιαν.
1. Had the editors looked to the version of Ficinus, “ ut cogitationes
Opinionesque partim vere, partim false sint,” they would perhaps have
seen that Plato did not write the nonsensical ψευδῆ re αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ
ἐνίοτε" εἶναι, where re wants its corresponding conjunction, but something
more fit to be read to this effect—wWevdy re αὐτῶν τιν᾽ ἐνίοτε καὶ αὖ ἐνίοτε
μὴ εἶναι. Stephens and Heindorf would expunge re after ψευδῆ.
‘4S Here again Ficinus found in his MS. the correct reading, προσδοκίαν"
ἐφοβήθημεν γὰρ dorc—instead of προσδοκίαν, ἣν ἐφοβήθημεν ἄρτι---
THE SOPHIST. 179
Thee. It was so (said).
Guest. And while we were doubting of this, a still greater
dizziness was shed around us, through the assertion appearing
a matter of doubt to all men, that there cannot be at all either
a resemblance, or an image, or fancy; because no falsehood
exists by any means at any time or in any place.
Thee. You speak the truth.
[108.] Guest. But now since discourse has made its ap-
pearance, and false opinion likewise, it is eonceded that there
are imitations of things existing ; and that from ‘this disposi-
tion of things the art of deceiving is produced.
Thee. It is agreed.
Guest. And yet was it not also acknowledged by us above,
that the sophist is one of these ?
Thee. It was.
Guest. Let us then again endeavour, by always bisecting
the proposed genus, to proceed along the right hand* of the
section, and attend to its communion with the sophist, until,
having cut off all his common properties, we leave the nature
peculiar to himself, and exhibit it to ourselves especially, and
afterwards to those also, who are naturally the nearest of kin
to this method.
Thee. Right.
[109.] Guest. Did we not then begin by dividing the
making art and the acquiring art ?
Thee. Yes.
Guest. And the acquiring art presented itself to us in
hunting, contests, traffic, and in some such-like species.
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. But now, since the imitative art comprehends the
sophist, it is evident that the making art must first receive a.
twofold division. For imitation is a certain kind of making.
We said, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of each
themselves.** Did we not?
Thee. Entirely so.
“* This seems to have been a phrase in Greece, something like the one
in England, borrowed from horse-racing, “to get the whip-hand of a
person.”
4 This nonsense was, strange to say, passed over by Heindorf.
Ficinus has “non verarum rerum :” which leads at once to οὐκ αὐτῶν τῶν
éxaoror ὄντων, ‘not of the things themselves existing on each occasion,”
in lieu of οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων.
Ν 2
180 THE SOPHIST.
Guest. But, in the first place, let there be two parts of the
making art.
Thee. What are they?
Guest. One divine, the other human.
Thee. I do not understand you.
Guest. The making art, if we remember what was said at’
first, we asserted to be every power, which might be the cause
of things being produced subsequently, that did not previously
exist.
Thee. We do remember.
[110.] Guest. But, with respect to all living animals, and
plants, which are produced in the earth from seeds and roots,
together with such inanimate bodies as subsist on the earth,
able to be liquefied or not, can we say that not existing pre-
viously they were subsequently produced by any other than
some fabricating god? Or making use of the opinion and
assertion of the many—*®
Thee. What is that ?
Guest. That nature generates these from some self-acting
fortuitous cause, and without a generating intellect; or (is
it) with reason and divine science, originating from a god?
Thee. I, perhaps, through my age, am often changing my
opinions to both sides. But at present looking to you, and
apprehending that you think these things are produced accord-
ing to (the will of) a deity, I think so too.
Guest. It is well, Theetetus. And if we thought that you
would be one of those, who at a future time would think dif-
ferently, we should now endeavour to make you acknowledge
this by the force of reason, in conjunction with the persuasion
of necessity. But since I know your nature to be such, that,
without any arguments from us, it will of itself arrive at that
conclusion to which you say you are now drawn, I will leave
the subject; for the time*’ would be superfluous. But I will
6 After χρώμενοι Fischer Would supply φήσομεν. Heind. and Stalb.
dream about an aposiopesis. Had they duly weighed the various read-
ings, preserved by Stobeus in quoting this passage, χρώμενοι ποιητῶν
τὴν φύσιν in lieu of χρώμενοι ποιῷ τῷ τὴν φύσιν, they would have been
able perhaps to see that Plato wrote—i τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ
ῥήματι χρώμενοι ποιητῶν, THY φύσιν PHooweyv—where φήσομεν has been
lost on account of φύσιν.
*" Ficinus has “nam supervacua talis disputatio esset,’’ which shows, as
Heindorf remarked, that he found not χρόνος but λόγος in his MS., as
the sense evidently requires. Stalbaum still sticks to χρόνος.
THE SOPHIST. 181
lay this down, that the things, which are said to be made by
nature, are (made) by divine art; but that the things, which
are composed from these by men, are produced by human
(art): and that, according to this assertion, there are two
kinds of the making art, one human, and the other divine.
Thee. Right.
[111.] Guest. But, since there are two kinds, bisect each
of them.
Thee. How?
Guest. Just as the whole of the making art was then
divided, according to breadth, so now divide it according to
length.
Thee. Let it be so divided.
Guest. And thus all its parts will become four; two of
which, with reference to us, will be human; and two again,
with reference to the gods, divine.
Thee. They will.
Guest. But with respect to these, as being again divided in
a different manner, one part of each division is self-making,
but the remaining parts may be nearly called image-making ;
and in this way again, the making art is divided into two
parts.
Thee. Tell me again how each is (to be divided).
Guest. With respect to ourselves and other animals, and
the things from which they naturally consist, fire and water,
and the sisters of these, we know that all these productions
are individually the offspring of a deity. Or how?
Thee. Thus.
Guest. And that the images of each of these, and not the
things themselves, follow, and these too produced by the
artifice of some demon-like power.
Thee. Of what kind are these?
Guest. Fancies, which occur in dreams, and such as ap-
pear in the day, are called self-produced ; (as, for instance,) a
shadow, “when darkness is generated in fire:** but this is
4848 This I cannot understand. Ficinus has, “ cum tenebre igni mis-
centur,” which shows that he found in his MS. ody τῶ πυρὶ σκότος συμ-
μιγνύηται, in lieu of ἐν τῶ πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνηται. But perhaps Plato
alluded to those fantastic forms, which are seen in a fire, when it is gradu-
ally dying away. But in that case he would have written, I think, ἐντὸς
πυρὸς, (as in the Timeus, p. 46, A., ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐκτὸς ἐντός τε TOU πυ-
poc—,) and σκότος σὺν αὐγῇ γεννᾷ τινα, “ when darkness with light
produces one,”’ i. 6. a shadow.
182 THE SOPHIST.
“twofold, when its own and foreign light meeting in one
about shining and smooth bodies, effects by these means a
species,*® producing a sensation of seeing contrary to accus-
tomed vision.
Thee. These works then of divine making are two, the
things themselves, and the image which follows each.
[112.] Guest. But what of our art? Shall we not say
that it does, by the art of house-building, make a dwelling,
and has made by painting another (dwelling), which is, as it
were, a dream made by man to persons awake ?
Thee. Entirely so. |
Guest. °° In this way then are the rest. (Divided) into two
parts are the works of our making power; that which relates
to the thing itself we call thing-itself-making, but that which
relates to the image, image-making.*?
Thee. I now understand you better; and I lay down in
two parts two kinds of the making art, the divine and human,
according to one section; and, according to the other, δ᾽ one
(a production) from themselves, and the other of certain re-
semblances.*!
4949 On these unintelligible words, all that the editors have hitherto been
able to do, is to quote a still more obscure passage of Plato’s Timeeus, and
his Latin commentator, Chalcidius. I suspect the author wrote—dvorrpov
δὲ ἡνίκ᾽ dv φῶτε, οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον, παρὰ τὰ λαμπρὰ Kai λεῖα εἰς
ἕν συνελθόντε, τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον
εἶδος ἀπεργάζηται, i. 6. “ When two lights, its own and foreign, coming
to one point along the shining and smooth part of a reflector, work out
a form, that- produces a sensation of seeing, opposite to the previously
accustomed one.” For the allusion is to a sheet of water, on the surface
of which two lights were supposed to meet, one from within the water,
and the other from without, and thus forming a dioptron, or transparent
mirror, that reflected an image directly contrary to what the object ap-
peared itself out of the water. Compare ᾧ 53, where reflexion by mir-
rors (κάτοπτρα) and by water are alluded to. That there was here a
reference to an optical illusion, is plain from the words of Chalcidius, p.
333, “Αἱ vero Plato censet duum luminum coitu confluentium in tersam
speculi et solidam cutem, id est diurni luminis et intimi—’”’ from whence
Ihave altered φῶς into φῶτε for the sense; and, for the syntax, ξυνέλθον
into ξυνελθόντε, with which neuter dual nominatives the singular azep-
γάζηται agrees.
50__50 This seems to be the meaning of what Stalbaum thinks Plato
wrote, Ficinus has, “ In aliis quoque similiter per duo partiendo, gemina
opera effectricis nostre actionis invenimus ; ipsam quippe rem principali
facultate, imaginem vero imaginaria facimus.’”’ This is certainly intel-
ligible, but not to be elicited from the Greek, as found at present.
515! Here again I am utterly in the dark. Ficinus has, “ deinde in
rerum ipsarum imaginumve effectionem.”” ’
THE SOPHIST. 183
Guest. Let us then recollect, that of the image-pro-
ducing art we said, one kind was about to be a likeness-pro-
ducing, and the other a fancy-producing, if it should appear
that falsehood is in reality a falsehood, and one of things
existing.
Thee. It was so.
Guest. There have then appeared, and we shall on this
account enumerate ourselves,” incontestably two species.
Thee. Yes.
[113.] Guest. Let us then again divide into two the
fancy-producing species.
Thee. In what way ?:
Guest. One produced through instruments, but *’the other,
when he, who causes the fancied appearance, exhibits himself
as the instrument of the thing.**
Thee. How say you?
Guest. I think, when any one employing his own body,
causes your figure to appear similar to (his own),°4 or voice
to voice, this is especially called an imitation belonging to
the fancy-producing species.
Thee. It is.
Guest. Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but
let us, now reduced to a jelly,®° dismiss all the rest, and we
will permit some other person to collect (the facts) into one,
and to give them a proper appellation.
52 Ficinus has “ ipsi—enumerabimus,’’ which leads to αὐτὼ, found in
one MS. and adopted by Bekker. Heindorf and Stalbaum prefer αὐτῷ,
which they refer to ψεύδει, understood. But the dative would be without
regimen.
8883 Such is the English of Stalbaum’s Latin version of the Greek,
out of which the reader is left to make what sense he can. It is beyond
my comprehension. How superior is that of Ficinus, “ Illius, qui sese
instrumentum, phantasma efficientis, exhibet,”’ i. 6. ‘‘ of him, who affords
himself as an instrument of the person, who is working the fancied ap-
pearance ;”’ just as persons do in the present day, when they put themselves
into the hands of a mesmerizer or any other charlatan in any science real
or unreal. There is however a slight error in the Greek, where we must
read τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ παρέχοντος ἑαυτὸν ὄργανον. For thus διὰ τοῦ παρέ-
xovroc will balance the preceding δι ὀργάνων.
5 Ficinus has preserved some words wanting here to complete the sense,
“‘ corpus suum tuo reddit persimile.”’
85. This pugilistic phrase is the best version of the Greek word pada-
κισθέντες. For to mental encounters are thus constantly applied the
terms used in corporeal contests.
184 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. Let one then be divided, and the other dismissed..
Guest. And yet, Thestetus, it is fit to think that this also
is twofold ; but take notice on what account.
Thee. Say on.
Guest. Of those who imitate, some knowing what they
imitate, do this, but others not knowing. And yet what di-
vision can we make greater than that of ignorance and know-
ledge? |
Thee. Not one.
Guest. Will not then that, which was just now mentioned,
be an imitation by those, that are endued with knowledge ?
For a man by knowing you, would imitate your figure like-
wise.
Thee. How not?
[114.] Guest. But what shall we say respecting the figure
of justice, and, in short, of the whole of virtue? *®Donot many,
though ignorant, yet fancying they know it, vehemently en-
deavour to make it appear that, what seems to be (justice in
them), is inherent in them, and that they are particularly de-
sirous of it, by imitating it in deeds and words.*®
Thee. Very many indeed.
Guest. Do not then all fail in seeming to be just, by their
not being just at all? Or does the contrary of this take place
wholly ?
Thee. Wholly.
Guest. I think then we must say that the imitator, who is
ignorant, is different from the other who knows.
Thee. Yes.
Guest. ‘Whence, then, can any one of them obtain a name
adapted toeach? Or is it evident that it is difficult ; because
a certain ancient cause’ of the division of genera into species
5656 Such seems to be the meaning of the original; where I have endea-
voured to overcome the difficulty by supposing that δίκαιον has dropt out
before δοκοῦν, and by changing προθυμεῖσθαι---ὕὅτει μάλιστα into προθυ-
μεῖσθαί re wadtora.—Ficinus has “ An non multi, dum ignorant, nosse au-
tem hanc opinantur, quod illis videtur, id ipsum imitantes tam verbis quam
operibus annituntur, ut inesse ipsis appareat?”’ as if his MS. omitted προ-
θυμεῖσθαι bri μάλιστα.
57. ΟἹ Boeckh was the first to find fault with αἰτία, and Heindorf with
ἀσύννους : for which the former would read ἀήθεια and the latter ἀσύννῳ.
Plato wrote perhaps—é:awpicewe πέρι παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς
ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσυνεσία, i. 6. “some old-fashioned, as it seems, idleness
and stupidity respecting the division—”
THE SOPHIST. 185
was unknown” to our ancestors, so that none of them at-
tempted even to divide; and on this account there was a ne-
cessity for them not to be very ready at names. But at the
* same time, although it may be rather bold to be asserted, for
the sake of distinction, let us call the imitation which subsists
with opinion, the “ opinion-mimicking,” but that which sub-
sists in conjunction with science, a certain scientific®’ imi-
tation.
Thee. Be it so.
[115.] Guest. We must therefore make use of the other:
for a sophist was not among the scientific but the imitators.
Thee. And very much so.
Guest. Let us then look into this opinion-mimie, as if he
were a piece of iron, and (see) whether he is sound and
whole, or contains in himself some layer doubled over.
Thee. Let us consider.
Guest. He has it indeed very thick. For, of sophists, one
is a simpleton, and thinks he knows what he (merely) fancies.
But the figure of another, through his tossing about in his
discourse, carries with it much of suspicion and fear, that he
is ignorant of what before others he pretends to know.
Thee. There are both these kinds of sophists, of whom you
have spoken.
Guest. We will therefore place one as a simple imitator,
but the other as an ironical one.
Thee. It is proper (to do so).
Guest. And again, shall we say that the ¢ genus of this is
one or two ?
Thee. Do you look to it.
Guest. Ido consider; and some two imitators appear before
me. One I behold able to employ irony in public, and in
lengthened speeches before the masses; but the other in
private, and in short discourses, compelling the person who
converses with him to contradict himself.
Thee. You speak most correctly.
[116.] Guest. What then may we show the imitator to be,
who employs lengthened discourses? A statesman, or a mob-
orator ?
38 Ficinus, uncertain how to translate ἱστορικὴν, has— historicam
quandam scientemque? I suspect the word conceals some corruption ;
which I confess I am unable to correct satisfactorily.
186 THE SOPHIST.
Thee. A mob-orator.
Guest. But what shall we call the other? a wise man, or
wiseman-like ?
Thee. To (call)*® him a wise man is impossible, since we ἡ
have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an
imitator of a wise man, it is plain he must receive some similar
appellation; and I now nearly understand, that we ought
truly to call this person the perfectly real sophist.
Guest. Shall we not then bind together his name, as we
did before, connecting (every thing) from the end to the be-
ginning ?
Thee. Entirely so.
Guest. δ. He, then, who is a portion of the art that makes
a discourse to contradict itself, (and) a part of the ironic
species, and of the opinion-mimicking, (and) of the faney-pro-
ducing, (and) of that (proceeding) from the image-making,
(and) separated from the making, not as a god but man, (and)
in discourses is the wonder-working portion,®! whoever shall
say that he is “of this race and blood”® a real sophist, such
a person will, as it appears, speak with the greatest truth.
Thee. Entirely so.
59 Ficin. has “Sapientem quidem illum vocare non licet.’’ Hence
he probably found in his MS. Τὸ μὲν αὐτὸν σοφὸν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν, ἐπεί
mep—for εἰπεῖν might easily have been lost through ἐπεὶ, while from,
hence Stephens got his τὸ for τὸν.
% Ficin. has “ omnia complicantes,” which shows that his MS. sup-
plied πάντα, now wanting before aré—
61_81 The whole of this passage in the original presents considerable
difficulties, as Stalbaum confesses; and even Heindorf has not been able
to master them; for he did not perceive that there are not only interpo-
lations and literal errors in the Greek, but a lacuna likewise, which it
were easy to supply from the version of Ficinus, were this the place for a.
lengthened discussion. .
A As words ‘of this race and blood,” are taken from Homer, I.
Z. "
INTRODUCTION ΤῸ THE STATESMAN,
Or this dialogue, which is feigned to have taken place on the
game day as the Sophist, and may be considered both in manner and
matter a continuation of it, although directed to a different subject,
the argument may be comprised in a very few words. Its object,
as stated towards the close of it, is to show that the head of the
state, who should be a king, ought to combine not only in his own
rson, but in that of the people over whom he rules, the two con-
icting characters of manliness and moderation. For by such an
union alone is it possible to correct the mischiefs arising equally
from the excess and deficiency of energy in all matters relating to
the well-being of the state.
To arrive at this conclusion Plato has thought proper to give the
rein to his imagination instead of curbing it ; and he has been com-
pelled in consequence to apologize for the prolixity of his discourse ;
where he was evidently carried away with the same desire to draw
subtle distinctions in things apparently similar, as he has done in
the Sophist. For he was anxious, perhaps, to show his acquaintance
with the minutiz of some handicraft trades, instead of keeping
rather the attention of the reader fixed to a few leading points,
and putting down only
Quod bene proposito conducat et hereat apte.
What to the subject’s fitted and sticks close.
In the midst, however, of this discursive matter, we meet with a
curious digression, where Plato has in part anticipated the theory of
the Geologists of the present day, respecting the ch which the
earth has undergone at different periods, together with an allusion
to a primeval state, not very unlike that recorded in Holy Writ ;
although in neither case did he probably do more than τ into his
wn words, what he found in the writings of preceding philosophers.
188 INTRODUCTION TO THE STATESMAN.
This dialogue is remarkable, moreover, for the development of the
notion, so contrary to that of modern times, that laws should be
made not so much to chime in with the feelings of the people, as to
oppose their prey aiices, provided the object of such legislation be
to improve their moral and ἘΜΌΣ condition. But as this end
could not be accomplished, where the ruling power rests with the
masses, who, as Plato had seen at Athens, were alternately ferocious
despots or fawning slaves, he suggested the propriety of establish-
ing in conjunction with a king, an aristocracy, composed of persons,
not superior to their countrymen in wealth, but in virtue, and pos-
sessing, like the king, the qualities n for a real statesman ;
who should be at once a shepherd, to look to the rearing of his
charge, and a physician, to watch over their health, and a philoso-
pher, to superintend their mental and moral culture.
As this dialogue has been edited separately only by Stalbaum—
for Fischer's publication is, like the rest of that scholar’s works, be-
neath even a passing notice—it presents not a few to
exercise, and, as I have found, to baffle the ingenuity of emendatory
criticism ; to which Stalbaum should have resorted rather than have
sought to support the nonsense of a gail ἃ text. As regards, how-
ever, the matter of the dialogue, he has left little to desire in his
Prolegomena of 132 8vo pages; to which the reader is referred,
who wishes to know something of what has been written by the
more recent scholars of Germany on questions, that will, it is to be
feared, remain for ever in their present obscurity.
THE STATESMAN.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES, THEODORUS, A GUEST, AND SOCRATES JUN.
SOCRATES.
[1.71 owe you, Theodorus, surely many thanks for my
acquaintance with Theztetus and this guest to boot.
The. Perhaps, Socrates, you will owe me thrice as many,
when they shall have worked out for you a statesman and a
philosopher.
Soc. Be it so. But shall we say we have thus heard this
from you, the most powerful in calculations and geometry ?
The. How, Socrates ?
Soc. As having put down each of these men of equal
’ worth, who are in value more removed from each other than
accords with the analogy of your art.
The. By our god Ammon,' Socrates, you have well and
justly, and very rememberingly? reproved me for my error in
calculation. But I will follow you up about this at a future
time. But do not you, O guest, in any respect be faint-
hearted in gratifying us; but select for us either first a
1 Theodorus, who was a mathematician of Cyrene, is feigned to swear
by Jupiter Amm-on, (literally, ‘‘ Sand-Being,) the tutelary deity of his’
native city, situated on the confines of the sandy desert of Libya.
2 Edd. πάνυ μὲν οὖν μνημονικῶς. This I cannot understand. The
sense required seems to be, “‘ and you have very kindly reproved me, for-
getful with respect to the error in calculation.” ΑἹ all events μὲν οὖν
could not be found in this member of the sentence; while μνημονικῶς
belongs to ἁμάρτημα rather than to ἐπέπληξας.
190 THE STATESMAN.
statesman, or a philosopher; and having selected go through
(the discussion).
Guest. This must be done, Theodorus ; for since we have
put our hand to this discussion, we must not stand aloof, till
we arrive at the end of it. But what must I do with Thezxte-
tus here?
The. As regards what ?
Guest. Shall we suffer him to rest, and take in his stead
Socrates? here, his fellow-combatant ? Or how do you advise?
The. Take him, as you say, in his stead. For, both being
young men, they will after resting easily endure every labour.
Soc. And indeed, O guest, both of them appear almost to
have an affinity with me from some quarter. For you say
that one of them (Theetetus) seems to resemble me in the
natural form of his face; and the appellation of the other,
being of the same name as myself, and his address® furnish a
kind of family connexion. It is meet then for us to recognise
always with readiness in conversation those of the same kin.
Now yesterday I mingled in a conversation with Thestetus,®
and I have now heard him answering ; but neither (case
applies) to Socrates (here). It is meet, however, for us to con-
sider him likewise. Let him then at some other time answer
me, but at present you.
Guest. Be it so. Do you, Socrates (junior), hear this So-
crates ?
Soc. jun. I do.
Guest. Do you then agree to what he says ?
Soc. gun. Entirely.
Guest. It appears then, that your affairs will not be an
hinderance ; and perhaps it is requisite for me to be much less
an hinderance. But after the sophist’ it is necessary, as it
appears to me, for us to seek out the statesman. [2.] Tell
me then, whether must we place this (character) too among
the possessors of knowledge, or how ?
3 Respecting this Socrates junior see Sophist, § 6, and Theetet. § 13.
* See Theetet. § 5.
> As κλῆσις and πρόσρησις have the same meaning, it is evident that
Plato did not write both those words; but which of them he did write,
is not quite so clear.
® From hence it appears that the present dialogue is feigned to have
taken place the day after that in which the Theetetus occurred,
* This dialogue was written, then, after the Sophist.
THE STATESMAN. 191
Soe. jun. In this way.§
Guest. We must then divide the sciences, as (we did) when
we were inquiring into the former (character).
Soc. jun. Perhaps so.
Guest. But yet the division appears to me, Socrates, to be
not after the same manner.
Soe. jun. Why not?
Guest. But after another.
Soe. gun. It would seem so.
Guest. Where then can one find the statesman’s path ? For
find it we must; and separating it from the rest, put on it the
seal of one (general) form, and on the other deflections the
mark of another species; and thus cause our soul to conceive
that all the sciences do in reality belong to two species.
Soc..jun. I think, O guest, that this is your business, and
not mine.
Guest. But indeed, Socrates, it must needs be yours too,
when it becomes apparent to us.
Soc. jun. You speak well.
Guest. Are not then arithmetic, and certain other sciences
allied to this, divested of action; and do they not afford a
subject of thought alone ?
Soc. jun. It is so.
Guest. But those which pertain to carpenter’s work, and
the whole of handicraft trades, possess a science, as it were,
innate in their operations, and at the same time complete the
bodies produced by them, which had not an existence previ-
ously.
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. In this manner then divide sciences in general,
calling one practical and the other merely intellectual.
Soc. jun. Let there be then of one whole science two
species.
Guest. Whether then shall we lay down the statesman, the
king, the despot, and the head of a household, and call them
ali by one name? Or shall we say there are as many sciences
as have been their mentioned names? Or rather follow me
hither.
8 Toa bipartite question there could not be a single answer. Ficinus
has correctly, “ Utrum hunc in eorum, qui scientes dicuntur, numerum
referre deceat? Decet—”’ omitting ἢ πῶς.
192 THE STATESMAN,
Soc. jun. Whither ὃ
Guest. On this road. If a private person is able to give
advice sufficiently well to any of the public physicians,® is it
not necessary for him to be called by the name of the art, the
same as he is, to whom he gives advice.
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. What then, whatever private person is skilled in
giving advice to the king of a country, shall we not say that
he. possesses the science, which the ruler himself ought to
possess ?
Soc. jun. We shall. ᾿
Guest. But surely the science of a true king is a kingly
(science).
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. And may not he, who possesses this science,
whether he is a private man, or a king, be in every vempott
rightly called, according to this art, king-like.
Soc. jun. J ustly so.
Guest. And are not the head of a household and a despot
the same ?
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. But what, will the size of an extensive household
or the swollen form! of a small state make any difference as
regards the government ?
Soc. jun. Not at all.
Guest. It is evident then, what is indeed the thing we
were just now inquiring, that there is one science respecting
all these. But whether any one calls it the science of a king,
a statesman, or a family-man, let us not differ about it.
Soc. jun. Why should we?
[3.] Guest. This toois evident, that each individual" king
5 By comparing this and some other passages of Plato and of Xenophon,
M. 8. iv. 2, 5, Aristotle, Polit. ii. 4, Strabo iv. p. 125, and Schol. on
Aristoph. "AY. 1029, quoted by Casaubon, Schneider, and Boeckh, CGEcon.
Athen. i. p. 132, it appears that there was at Athens a body of medical
men paid by the state, as well as those in private practice.
10 Instead of μεγάλης σχῆμα---σμικρᾶς--ὄγκος, one would have ex-
pected μεγάλης ὄγκος---σμικρᾶς σχῆμα: for ὄγκος applies rather to a
thing of large size than a small one.
Ἢ Stalbaum renders ἅπας “ unusquisque,” a meaning that word never
has. The train of thought requires βασιλεὺς πᾶς αὐτὸς, in lieu of
βασιλεὺς ἅπας, “every king by himself.” Compare a little below
ἀρχιτέκτων πᾶς αὐτὸς.
THE STATESMAN. 193
has in his hands, and the whole of his body, some little power
towards retaining his rule, as compared with the intelligence
and strength of his soul.
Soc. jun. It is evident.
Guest. Are you willing then for us to say that a king is
more allied to intellectual than to manual and wholly practical
science ?
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. We will then put together in the same (class)
statesmanship and a statesman, kingship and a king, as being
all one thing.
Soc, jun. It is evident.
Guest. Shall we not proceed then in an orderly manner, if
after this we divide the intellectual science ?
Soe. gun. Entirely so.
Guest. Attend, then, and inform me whether we can per-
ceive any point of union?!
Soc. jun. Tell me of what kind.
Guest. Of this kind. We have a certain caleniatiig art.
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. And this I think entirely belongs to the intellectual
arts.
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. Shall we concede to the calculating art, that knows
the difference in numbers, any thing more than that it dis-
tinguishes things, the subjects of intellect.
Soc. jun. How should we?
Guest. For every architect is not a workman himself, but
is the ruler over workmen.
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. And he imparts indeed intellect, but not the work
by hand.
Soe. jun. Just so.
Guest. He may justly then be said to have a share in in-
tellectual science.
Soe. jun. Entirely.
Guest. And for him I think it is fitting, after he has
15 Instead of διαφυγὴν, Heindorf, on Phedon. p. 98, C., suggested,
what has been subsequently found in three MSS., τ ὡς δας word ap-
plied to the knotty parts of a blade of straw, and to the union of bones
and joints.
ο
194 THE STATESMAN.
passed a judgment, not to have an end, nor to be freed, as the
calculator was freed (from doing more), but to command every
workman (to do) that which is suited to him, until they shall
have worked out what has been commanded.
Soc. jun. Right.
Guest Are not then all such as these, and such as are con-
sequent upon the calculating art, intellectual? And do not
these two genera differ from each other in judgment and com-
mandment ?
Soc. jun. They appear to do so.
Guest. If then we should divide the whole of the intel-
lectual science into two parts, and call the one mandatory, and
the other judicial, should we not say that we have made a
careful division ?
Soc. jun. Yes, according to my mind.
Guest. But for those, who do any thing in common, it is
delightful to be of one mind.
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. As far then as we participate!* on this point, we
must bid farewell to the opinions of others.
[4.] Soc. jun. Why not?
Guest. Come, then, inform me in which of these arts we
must place the kingly character. Must we place him in the
judicial art, as some spectator? Or rather, shall we place
him in the commanding art, as being a despot ?
Soc. jun. How not rather in this?
Guest. We may consider again the commanding art,
whether it stands in any way apart. For it appears to me,
that as the art of a huckster is separated from his, who sells
his own goods,'‘ so is the genus of a king from the genus of
public criers.
Soe. jun. How so?
Guest. Hucksters, having received the previously sold
works of others, afterwards sell them again themselves,
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. The tribe of criers too, after receiving the thoughts
of strangers, enjoins them again to others.
15 1 suspect there is some error in κοιγωνῶμεν, which it were easy to
correct, if requisite.
1% On the difference between the κάπηλος and αὐτοπώλης, see So-
phist, § 18.
— 'δς δὰ μὰν ἡ
THE STATESMAN, 195
Soc. jun. Most true. ;
| Guest. What then, shall we mix in the same (class) the
king-art, and that of the interpreting, ordering, prophesying,
and public-crying, and many other arts allied to these, all
which have this in common that they command? Or are you
willing that, as we just now instituted a resemblance (in
things), we should make a resemblance in the name likewise ?
since the genus of those, who rule their own concerns, is
nearly without a name; and shall we so divide these, by
placing the kingly genus among those, who command their
own concerns, and by neglecting every thing else, leave any
one to put another name on them? For our method was
(adopted) for the sake of a ruler, and not for its contrary.
Soe. jun. Entirely so.
[5.1 Guest. Since then this stands at a moderate distance
apart from those, and is separated from that, which is foreign,
into that which is domestic, it is necessary to divide this
again, if we have yet any yielding» section in this.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow
me and divide.
Soc. jun. Whither ἢ
Guest. Shall we not find that all such as we conceive to be
rulers, do, by making use of a command, give a command for
the sake of producing something ?
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. And indeed it is not at all difficult for all things
that are produced, to receive a twofold division.
Soc. jun. In what way?
Guest. Some among all of them are animated, and others
are inanimate.
Soc. jun. They are so.
Guest. If we wish to cut the portion of intelligence, that
has a commanding power over these very things, we will
cut 16 it.
18 Instead of ὑπείκουσαν, some one, says Stalbaum, wished to read
ὑπάρχουσαν : which would certainly make a somewhat clearer sense.
But I confess I do not very well see the meaning of the whole of this
speech, and especially of the words ἀλλοτρίητι διορισθὲν πρὸς οἰκειότητα.
16 Instead of τεμοῦμεν, Ficinus found in his MS. τέμωμεν, as shown
by his “‘secemus.” One would prefer, however, τέμοιμεν ἄν, “If we
wish to cut, we can.” J
ο
196 THE STATESMAN,
Soc. jun. According to what?
Guest. By assigning one part over the generation of inani-
mate things, and the other over the generation of animated.
And thus the whole will be divided into two parts.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. One part then let us put aside, and take up again
the other; and after taking it up, divide the whole into two
parts.
Soc. jun. But which of these do you say is to be resumed ?
Guest. By all means, that which has a command over ani-
mals. For it is not the province of the kingly science to have
a command over things inanimate, like the science of archi-
tecture ; but, being of a more noble nature, over animals;
and it ever possesses a power relating to such very things.
Soc. jun. Right.
Guest. (With respect to) the generation and nurture of
animals, a person may see the former as single-feeding, but
the latter as the common-feeding of the nurslings in herds.'7
Soc. jun. Right.
Guest. But we shall find that the statesman is not a breeder
of his own property, like an ox-driver, or some horse-currier;'*
but is rather like the person who rears horses and oxen.
Soc. jun. What has been just said seems to be the fact.
Guest. Whether then (with respect to) the nurture of ani-
mals, shall we call the common-rearing of all together a herd-
rearing, or a certain general-rearing.
Soc. jun. Whichever may happen in the discourse.
[6.] Guest. You (have said) well, Socrates. And if you
avoid paying too serious an attention to names, you will ap-
pear in old age to be more rich in prudence. But now we
must do as you recommended. But do you understand how
some one will, having divided the herd-rearing art into two,
17 On this mass of nonsense Stalbaum says, as usual, not a word; nor
does he notice even the remarkable version of Ficinus, ‘‘ Circa genera-
tionem nutritionemque animalium cura duplex invenitur ; animalis cujus-
dam una; gregis totius altera.” By uniting the Gr ek and the Latin, one
might perhaps recover, without difficulty, the very words of the author.
18. Here again Ficinus exhibits a curious variation from the text found
at present in the Greek. “ Civilis autem non propriam curam aggreditur,
.quemadmodum arator, qui bovem agitat, vel minister, qui sternit equum ;”
from whence Cornarius was the first to elicit ἐδεοτρόφον, in lieu of ἐδιό-
τροπον, found in all the MSS. but a solitary one at Paris.
ee νὰ y
THE STATESMAN. 197
cause, what is now sought for in a double, to be sought for
then in halves ?!9
Soc. jun. I shall be eager (to do so): and it appears to me
that there is one rearing of men, and another of beasts.
Guest. You have divided in every respect most readily
and courageously. However, (we must be careful) to the
utmost of our power not to suffer hereafter this.
Soc. jun. What?
Guest. That we do not take away one small part as appli-
cable to many and great parts, nor yet without a species; but
let it always have at the same time a species. For it is very
well to separate immediately the thing sought for from all the
rest, if the separation be rightly made ; just as you did a little
before, through conceiving the division to be rightly made,
hasten on, seeing that the discourse was tending to man.
But, my friend, it is not safe to divide with subtlety ;7° but
it is more safe to proceed in the middle”! by dividing (con-
tinually); for thus will one more (readily)”? meet with forms
(of existence). But the whole of this relates** to our in-
quiries.
Soc. jun. How say you this, O guest ?
Guest. I must endeavour to speak yet more clearly, through
a kind feeling towards your disposition,™* Socrates. But it
is impossible in the subject at hand to show what is now
1 Such is Stalbaum’s version of the Greek text. Both are equally
beyond my comprehension; and so is the Latin of Ficinus: “ Sed nun-
quid vides, quo pacto quis, gregis nutritionem geminam ostendens, efficiat
ut, quod in duplis ad id, quod nunc propositum est, investigabitur, in
dimidiis iterum perquiratur.” By following however the train of
thought, and adopting the alterations to which it leads, one might perhaps
recover what Plato wrote.
2 Ficinus has, “ δα extremum quiddam et-tenue protinus adventare.”’
21 So Ovid, ‘‘ medio tutissimus ibis.”
2 Ficinus has ““ facilius meliusque,’’ as if he had found in his MS.
κάλλιον καὶ μᾶλλον, as a little below, κάλλιον δὲ που καὶ μᾶλλον.
383 To prove that διαφέρειν, which is elsewhere “ to differ,” is here “‘ to
refer,’ Stalbaum quotes Xenophon C&conom. 20. 16, μέγα διαφέρειν εἰς
τὸ λυσιτελεῖν yewoyiay—not aware that the author wrote μέγα δὴ φέρειν,
and Plato perhaps AIAN φέρει, not ΔΙΑφέρει.
_ 38 Such is Stalbaum’s version. But εὔνοια is generally followed by a
dative, as in Eurip. Tro. 7, Εὔνοια---πόλει. Orest. 858, εὔνοιαν πατρί.
Isocrat. εὔνοιαν---τοῖς πραττομένοις. Demosth. Olynth. ii. εὔνοιαν τῇ
πόλει. Coron. εὔνοιαν---τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν. Midian. τὴν eb-
νοιαν---τῇ πατρίδι.
198 THE STATESMAN.
said in a manner wanting in nothing ; still we must endea-
vour, for the sake of perspicuity, to carry on the ey a
little further.
Soc. jun. In what respect then do you say we have, by
dividing, just now not rightly done?
Guest. In this respect; that, should any one attempt to
give a twofold division to the human genus, he would divide,
in the way that the majority here divide. For by separating
the Grecian genus, as one apart from all, they give to all
the rest, who are innumerable, unmixt, and not speakin:
the same language with each other, one name, that of a Bar-
barian race; and through this one name they fancy the race
itself to be one; or as if some one, thinking that number
should be divided into two species, should, after eutting off
ten thousand from all numbers, put it aside as one species,
and, giving one name to all the rest, should think that, through
that appellation, this genus will become separate and different
from the other. He however would make in a more beautiful
manner, and more according to species, and* a two-fold
division, who should divide number into even and odd, and ©
the human species into male and female; and, after arranging
the Lydians or Phrygians, or some other nations, should then
separate them into wholes, when he is incapable of finding
the genus, and at the same time the species of each of the
divided portions.
[7.] Soc. jun. Most right. But (explain),?° O guest, this
very thing— How can any one rather clearly know that genus
and species are not the same, but different from each other?
Guest. O Socrates, thou best of men, thou commandest no
trifling thing. Already have we wandered further from our
proposed discourse than is fitting; and yet you order us to
wander still further. Now then let us, as is reasonable, turn
back again ; and hereafter we will at leisure pursue this point,
as having come upon the track. Do not, however, by any
means guard against this,?’ that you have heard from me
this point clearly determined.
25 Sauppe would omit καὶ before δίχα. ‘
35. Ficinus has, “ At illud—ostende,” which leads to ἀλλὰ λέγε καὶ, in
lieu of ἀλλὰ yap—
27 The common text exhibits a combination of words at variance
with correct Greek, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γε--φυλάξαι. For ob μὴν are
THE STATESMAN. 199
Soe. jun. What?
Guest. That species and part are different from each other.
Soc. jun. Why (say you) so?
Guest. When any thing is a species of some thing, it is
necessary for it to be a part of the thing of which it is said
to be the species: but there is no necessity for a part to be a
species. Always consider me, therefore, Socrates, as assert-
ing this rather than that.
Soe. jun. Be it so.
Guest. But tell me that, which is after this.
Soc. jun. What?
Guest. The point of the digression which has brought us
hither. For I think it was especially at that point, when, on
your being asked how we must divide herd-rearing, you an-
swered very readily, that there were two kinds of animals,
the one of man, and the other of brutes taken all together.
Soe. jun. True.
Guest. And you then appeared to me, after taking away
a part, to think that you ought to leaves the remainder as
one genus of all (brutes), because you could give to them all
the same name, by calling them brutes.
Soe. jun. Such was the case.
Guest. But this, O most courageous of men, is just as if
some other prudent”? animal, such as seems to be the crane,
or some other animal of a similar kind, should, in the same
manner as you do, oppose the cranes, as one race, to all other
animals, and make itself an object of respect ; and, putting all
the rest together with men into one race, call them perhaps
nothing else but brutes. Let us then endeavour to avoid
every thing whatsoever of this kind.
Soc. jun. How?
Guest. By not dividing every genus of animals, that we
may suffer the less.
Soc. jun. For there is no necessity.
never united to an imperative ; nor does ἀλλὰ, as far as I remember, ever
follow od μήν. To avoid the difficulty, Ficinus omits οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ, and
makes Plato write something like sense.
33 Ficinus has, ‘‘ putavisse ponendum,” as if he had found in his MS.
not καταλιπεῖν, but καταλειπτέον εἶναι, what the sense manifestly re-
quires. After verbals in—réoy, εἶναι is thus found perpetually.
39 Plato had probably in his mind the expression φρονιματάτους, ap-
plied to birds by Sophocles in Electr. 1047,
200 THE STATESMAN.
Guest. For we then erred in this way.
Soc. jun. In what?
Guest. Such part of intellectual science as related to com-
manding was (said) by us to be of the animal-rearing kind,
as regards gregarious animals. Was it not?
Soc. jun. It was.
Guest. The whole animal genus, therefore, was even then
divided into the tame and wild. For those animals that have
a nature to become gentle, are called tame; but those that
have not, are (called) wild.
Soc. jun. Correctly.
Guest. But the science, of which we are in the hunt, was
and is in the case of tame animals, and is to be sought for
among the gregarious rearlings. ᾿
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. Let us then not divide, as formerly, looking to all
animals, nor with haste, so that we may quickly arrive at
state-science. For this has caused us to suffer even now
according to the proverb—*?
Soc. jun. What?
Guest. By not well dividing*! quietly, to complete (the
task) more slowly.
Soc. jun. And it has, O guest, properly caused (us to suffer).
[8.] Guest. Be it so then. But let us again from the
beginning endeavour to divide the common-rearing (of ani-
mals). For perhaps the discourse itself, being brought to a
conclusion, will more clearly unfold what you desire. But
tell me—
Soc. jun. What ?
Guest. This; if indeed you have frequently* heard it from
80 The proverb was, perhaps, Οὐχ ἥσυχοι βραδύτερον ἁνύτουσιν, simi-
lar to the Latin “ Festina lente,” according to Stalbaum ; who, to avoid
the doubled tribrach and to preserve the Attic form, should have sug-
gested βράδιον and added πόδες to complete the verse.
$1 As there is nothing in the proverb to which Plato alludes, relating
to ‘ well dividing,’ C. Badham has, in The Surplice, No. 32, for July 4,
1846, suggested ὁδοιποροῦντας in lieu of εὖ διαιροῦντας ; which led me,
in No. 33, to propose ἡσύχως πόδ᾽ aipovrac—a form of expression found
in MSS., or, from conjecture, in Hecub. 950, πόδα---αἴροντι. Phen.
1034, πόδ᾽ aipovo’. Herc. F. 882, Νῦν θές πόδ᾽. aipe κῶλον. 868, Στεῖχ᾽
Ὀλύμπονδ᾽ αὖ, πόδ᾽ aipovo’, “Ipt. Ip. Tiyvopat ᾿κποδών. Phaethont.
Fr., ᾿Εκτόπιοί re δόμων πόδ᾽ ἀείρατε.
32 In the phrase, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις, Heindorf on Phedon. p. 60, e., says
THE STATESMAN. 201
certain persons. For I do not think you have met with the
tame-fish places in the Nile, or in the royal lakes. But
perhaps you have seen the taming of these in (artificial)
fountains.
Soc. jun. I have seen these frequently, and I have heard of
those from many.
Guest. You have likewise heard and believe that geese and
cranes are reared, though you have never wandered about the
Thessalian plains.
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. On this account I have asked you all these ques-
tions, because the rearing of herds of animals is partly of
those moving * in the water, and partly on dry land.
Soe. jun. It is so.
Guest. Does it not then appear to you likewise, that we
ought to cut in two the common-rearing science, [distributing
to each of them its own part,*4] and call the one a rearing-in-
moisture, and the other a rearing-on-dry-land.
Soc. jun. (It does so appear) to me.
Guest. But we will not in the same manner inquire to
which of these arts king-science belongs. For it is evident
to every one.
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. And every one can separate the dry-rearing portion
of the herd-rearing.
Soc. gun. How?
Guest. Into the flying and walking-on-foot.
Soc. jun. Most true.
Guest. But what of state-science, must it be inquired whe-
ther it relates to the walking-on-foot? Or do you not think,
that the most stupid person, so to say, would imagine so?
Soe. gun. I do.
Guest. But it is requisite to show that the art of rearing
foot-walking (animals) is, as number was just now, cut into
two parts.
that πολλάκις means “ perchance.” But how πολλάκις, “ frequently,”
could have such a meaning, it is difficult to understand. Plato wrote
ὃ dn, to which οὐδὲ for εἰ, in one MS., plainly leads,
33. In lieu of ἔνυδρον, Atheneus, in iii. p. 99, B., gives another read-
ing, ὑδροβατικὸν. My friend Buckley would form the two into ἐνυδρο-
TUKOY,
% All the words between brackets are omitted by Ficinus.
202 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. This is evident.
Guest. And yet to the part, to which our discourse has led
us on, there seem to be some two paths extending themselves ;
the one quicker, by being divided, a small part as compared
with a large one; but the other longer, from preserving
rather the precept, which we mentioned before, that we
ought to cut as much as possible through the middle. ΤῈ is
in our power then to proceed by either of the paths we may
wish. .
Soc. jun. Is it then impossible to proceed by both?
Guest. What by both at once, Ὁ wonderful youth? Al-
ternately, however, it is plain the thing is possible.
Soc. jun. I choose then both alternately.
Guest. The thing is easy; since short is the remainder (of
the road). In the beginning indeed and middle of our journey
the command® would have been difficult. But now, since
this seems good, let us first proceed by the longer road. For,
as we are fresh, we shall more easily journey through it. But
do you look to the division.
[9.] Soc. jun. Speak it.
Guest. Of such tame animals as are gregarious, the foot-
walking have been divided by us according to nature.
Soc. jun. What (nature) ?
Guest. By some of their race being hornless and others
horned.
Soc. jun. So it appears.
Guest. Divide then the art of rearing foot-walking animals,
and assign to each part, making use of reason. For should
you wish to name them, the thing will become complicated
more than is fitting.
Soc. jun. How then must one speak (of them) ὃ
Guest. Thus. Of the science of rearing foot-walking
animals, divided into two parts, let one portion be as-
signed to the horned part of the herd, but the other to the
hornless.
36. As no command had been given, C. Badham, in The Surplice, quoted
in n, 31, would read πρᾶγμα. :
% After “part,” some word is evidently wanting. Ficinus has “utrius-
que partis conditionem sermone describe.” Perhaps ὅρον has dropt out
after μέρει, Stalbaum translates λόγῳ χρώμενος, “using a definition.”
But he does not say what noun is to follow ἀπόδος,
THE STATESMAN. 203
Soc. jun. Let this be so said: for they have been suffi-
ciently shown to be so.
Guest. Now then the king is evidently the shepherd over
a flock of animals deprived of horns.
Soc. jun. For how is he not evident ?
Guest. Breaking then this (herd) into portions, let ys en-
deavour to assign the result*” to him (the king).
Soc. gun. Entirely so.
Guest. Whether then are you willing for us to divide it
(the herd) by the cloven, or, what is called, the solid hoof? Or
by ἃ common or individual generation? For you understand.
Soc. jun. What?
Guest. That the race of horses and asses naturally pro-
create with each other.
Soe. jun. It does.
Guest. But the other still remaining portion of the
smooth*’-haired herd of tame animals, is unmixed in their
generation with each other.
Soe. jun. How not?
Guest. But whether does the Statesman appear to take care
of animals having a common, or individual generation ?
Soe. jun. It is evident of the unmixed (generation).
Guest. We must then, as it seems, divide this, as those be-
fore, into two parts.
Soc. jun. Yes; we must.
Guest. But we have cut into minute portions nearly every
tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is
not fit to rank the genus of dogs*® among gregarious cattle.
3 Stalbaum explains τὸ γιγνόμενον, the emendation of Cornarius, by
‘what is belonging to.” The expression means rather “‘ what is pro-
duced’ by the breaking. The word in Latin would be “ proventus.*’
Ficinus has “ quod movetur,” answering to τὸ κινούμενον, found in all
the MSS. but one; and even there ycvo is merely a reading over κιρού-
μενον, which would lead to ἱκνούμενον, “the result.’
38. Stalbaum after Bekker has adopted from four MSS. λείας, in lieu of
μιᾶς, and refers to Cratyl. p. 406, A., where ἥμερον re καὶ λεῖον are
united and opposed to τραχύ. But λεῖος is here rather “ smooth-haired,”
or “‘ without manes,”’ such as kine are. Ficinus acknowledges neither μιᾶς
nor λείας in his version. ‘‘ Reliqua vero domestica et socialis generis
animalia, sine aliena commixtione, propria tantum ex specie procreant.””
39. Why dogs should be excluded, if they are gregarious, it is difficult
to say; and if they are not, it is still more difficult to explain, why Plato
mentioned them at all. Ficinus has “ genus porro nostrum inter grega-
204 THE STATESMAN.
Soe. jun. It is not. But in what manner shall we divide
these two?
Guest. In that, by which it is just for you and Theztetus
to divide them, since you are handling the science of geometry.
Soc. jun. In what. manner?
Guest. By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the
diameter.*°
Soc. jun. How say you?
Guest. Is the nature, which the race of us men possesses,
adapted to locomotion in any other way than as a diameter,
which is two feet in power ? Ὁ |
Soc. jun. In no other way.
Guest. Moreover the nature of the remaining genus is
again according to the power of our power, a diameter, if it
naturally consists of twice two feet.
Soc. jun. Undoubtedly. And now I nearly understand
what you wish to show.
Guest. But in addition to these, do we perceive, Socrates,
something else belonging to those having a reputation for
laughter,*! which happened to us in making the former
division ?
Soc. jun. What is that?
Guest. This our human race, sharing the same lot and run-
ning the same course with a race the most generous* and
most handy of existing (animals).
bilia pecora numerare non decet,” as if he found in his MS. τὸ γὰρ τῶν
γ᾽ avery, (i. 6. ἀνθρώπων).
#40 Others may perhaps, but I cannot, understand what is meant by
the diameter of a diameter; except by saying, as Stalbaum has in
suggested, that as the diagonal of a square of one foot is two square feet,
a man with two feet is compared to the diagonal of such a square; and
that as a four-footed animal is in that respect the double of a two-footed
one, it may be called the diameter of a diameter. I suspect, however,
that the whole passage has come down to us in a very imperfect state.
‘| The expression τῶν πρὸς γέλωτα εὐδοκιμησάντων, seems very strange
in Greek. Ficinus has merely “ risu dignum.” Plato wrote perhaps τῶν
παρ᾽ ᾿Ινδοῖς κινησάντων yikwra—
42 Of this utterly unintelligible word different emendations have been
suggested by different scholars. Stalbaum alone has had the hardi-
hood to attempt to defend a mass of nonsense by comparing γενναιοτάτῳ
καὶ εὐχερεστάτῳ in this place, with τῆς ἀνδρείας re καὶ εὐχερείας in Rep.
iv. p. 426, D. But even he is unable to tell what is the animal to which
Plato alludes. Winckelmann suspected it was the monkey. But he
failed to see that the author wrote γελοιοτάτῳ, which was first proposed
σου ὖς ee
THE STATESMAN. 205
Soc. jun. I perceive it happening very absurdly too.*
Guest. Is it not fit that the slowest things should arrive
last of all ?4*
Soc. jun. It is.
Guest. But we do not perceive this, that a king ap
still more ridiculous, when running together with the herd,
Sand performing his course in conjunction with him, who is
exercised in the best manner with respect to a tractable life.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
by C. Badham in The Surplice, No. 32, July 4, 1846, which I supported in
No. 33, by quoting Hipp. Maj. p, 289, A., where Plato compares man to
a monkey, as Heracleitus had done before him; who said that the most
beautiful monkey would appear an ugly creature, when compared with a
man; and so, says Plato, the wisest of men would be no better than a
monkey, when compared with the Creator. And it was in allusion to this
doctrine of Heracleitus, that Ennius said, as we learn from Cicero, “ Simia
quam similis, turpissima bestia nobis.” It-will however be objected, per-
haps, that monkeys do not herd together, nor converse with their keepers.
But the monkey is known in its natural state to be a gregarious animal ;
and though their talk is not intelligible to man, their chatter, no doubt, is
to each other. Besides, in this allusion to a monkey in a dialogue relat-
ing to Statesmanship, Plato had in mind, I suspect, an ASsopo-Socratic
fable preserved in the prose of the Progymnasmata of Hermogenes to the
following effect—The monkeys came together to consult about the neces-
sity of fixing their dwelling ina city. After they had so decreed, and
were about to put their hands to the work, an old monkey stopped them
by saying that they would be caught still easier, should they shut them-
selves up within gaclosures—To the same fable there is an allusion in
the Gorgias, p. 484, F., ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἴς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν
πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι ot πολιτικοί; where,
since ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι have not a particle of meaning, it is evident that
Plato wrote, ὥσπερ αἵ ye Μιμὼ αἱ πολιτικαι. For Μιμὼ is the synonyme
of πίθηκος, as shown by Suidas, πίθηκος" ἡ Μιμώ. With regard to
εὐχερεστάτῳ, since man is, according to the theory of Helvetius, “ the
handy animal,” and called by that name, from the Latin man-us, ‘‘ hand,”
the same epithet may be fairly applied to the monkey, whose hand, both
in form and power, is very similar to that of man ; and whose very name,
“monkey,” is only a corruption of ““ mannikin,” the diminutive of
**man.””
43 In lieu of this mass of nonsense, Ficinus has, “ Cerno, et quidem
clare, quod sequitur ;”” which leads distinctly to καθορῶ καὶ μάλ᾽ εὖ τό
πως ξυμβαῖνον, instead of μάλ᾽ ἀτόπως.
ΜΓ I confess I do not see the relevancy of this remark; the words
seem to contain a Choliambic verse spoken of the tortoise, Οὐκ εἰκὸς
ὕστατ᾽ ἣν βράδιστον ἀφικνεῖσθαι.
45-. Here again are some words, which having not the least connexion
with what precedes, plainly prove that something has dropt out; to say
nothing of the literal errors to be found in them.
206 THE STATESMAN.
Guest. For now, Socrates, that is more apparent, which
was said by us in our search for a sophist.‘®
Soc. jun. What is that?
Guest. That in such a method of discourse thereié is no
greater care for what is venerable, than what is not, nor does
it prefer the small to the great, but always accomplishes, μον
which according to itself is most true.
Soc. jun. It appears so.
Guest. After this, that you may not anticipate me by ask-
ing what is the shorter road to the definition of a king, shall
I traverse it the first ?
Soc. jun. By all means.
Guest. I say then, that we ought to have divided forthwith
the foot-walking genus into the biped and quadruped; and,
seeing that the human race shared the same lot with the
flying genus alone, we ought to have again divided the two-
footed into the wingless and winged ; and this division having
been made, and the art shown, which is the rearer of men,
we ought to have brought forward and placed over it the
statesman and kingly character, like a charioteer, and given
him the reins of the city,’ in consequence of this science
being peculiarly his own.
Soc. jun. You have (spoken) beautifully, and given me an
account, as it were, of a debt, and added a digression, by
way of interest, and completed (the transaction).
[10.] Guest. Come then, let us, going back to the be-
ginning, connect with the end the discourse concerning the
name of the statesman’s art.
Soc. jun. By all means.
Guest. One part then of intellectual science was at the
beginning the commanding; and the part assimilated to this
was called the self-commanding. Again, of the self-command-
ing, the rearing of animals was cut off, as not the smallest
part of the genera; and of the rearing of animals, the rear-
ing of herds was a species; and of the rearing of herds, (a
part) was the care of foot-walking animals; and of the care
*6 The passage of the Sophist alluded to is in p. 227, A. § 26.
* On the phrase, τὰς τῆς πόλεως ἡνίας, Stalbaum refers to Aristoph.
Eccl. 466, Eq. 1109, and Boissonad on Marin. p. 81.
S Instead of καθαπερεὶ χρέος, the sense evidently requires καθάπερ
του χρέους. For λόγος is here “ an account,” not “ a speech.”
THE STATESMAN. 207
of foot-walking animals, the science of rearing the hornless
face was especially cut off. But of this again, it is neces-
sary to connect a part, not less than the triple, if any one
is desirous of bringing it under one name, by calling it the
science of tending an unmixed genius. But a section from
this, which alone remains, and which rears men, as being a
biped flock, is the part which has been just now explored,
and is called, at one and the same time, the kingly and states-
manly kind.
Soe. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. Do you then, Socrates, think that this has been, as
you say, really done well ?
Soe. jun. What?
Guest. That the thing proposed has been in every respect
sufficiently discussed. Or has our investigation been parti-
cularly deficient in this very thing, that the account has been
given in words, but not in all respects worked out to the end?
Soc. jun. How say you?
Guest. I will endeavour to explain to ourselves more clearly
what I am thinking of.
Soe. jun. Say it.
Guest. There is then of many herdsmen’s arts, that have
appeared to us, one, the statesman’s, and the guardianship of
some one herd.
Soc. jun. There is.
Guest. This our discourse has defined to be neither the
rearer of horses, nor of other animals, but to be the science
of rearing men in common.
[1l.] Soc. jun. It did so.
Guest. Now let us see what is the difference between all
herdsmen and kings.
Soc. jun. What is it?
Guest. If any one of the rest,*® possessing the name of
another art, says and pretends to be the rearer in common
of the herd, (what should we say) ?*°
Soc. jun. How say you?
Guest. Just as if all merchants, and husbandmen, and pur-
49.1 confess I cannot understand τῶν ἄλλων here, nor τῆς ἀγελῆς just
afterwards; although Stalbaum says the sense is plain from what fol-
lows.
50 These words Taylor added from Ficinus, ‘‘ quid dicendum ?”
208 THE STATESMAN,
veyors of food, and besides these, teachers of gymnastics, and
the genus of physicians, should, you know that®! by their
speeches oppose altogether the herdsmen of the human race,
whom we have called statesmen, and assert that it is their
care to rear men, and not only men herded together, but even
the rulers themselves—
Soc. jun. Would they not rightly say ?
Guest. Perhaps so. And we will consider this too. We
know that no one will contend with a herdsman about things
of this kind; since he is himself the rearer, himself the
physician, and himself, as it were, the bridesman (of the
herd), and is alone skilled in the midwife’s art respecting
the birth and delivery of the produce. No one, besides,
is better able, by such sport and music as cattle can, by their
nature, share in, to console and soothe, and render gentle,
both with instruments and the naked mouth, handling in
the best way the music of his flock.*? And the same may
be said of other herdsmen. Or may it not?
Soc. jun. Most right.
Guest. How then will our discourse respecting a king ap-
pear to be right and entire, when we place him alone, as
the herdsman and rearer of the human herd, selecting him
alone out of ten thousand others contending with him?
Soc. jun. By no means.
Guest. Did we not then a little before very properly fear,
when we suspected, lest we should only speak of a certain:
figure of a king, and not perfectly work out the statesman,
until by taking away those, who were diffused around him,
and laid claim to a fellow-rearing, and, by separating him
from them, we should exhibit him alone and pure?
Soc. jun. Most rightly (did we fear).
Guest. This then, Socrates, must be done by us, unless we
are about to bring disgrace upon our discourse at its end.
51 The phrase, oic@’ Sri, is here manifestly absurd, and omitted by
Ficinus. Two MSS. read, οἵδ᾽ ὅτι, from which nothing is to be gained.
% Instead of τῶν γιγνομένων one would prefer τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων,
“‘ of the increasing produce.”
58 That Plato thus repeated μουσικὴν after the preceding μουσικῆς, I
for one will never believe ; ; and still less that any Greek author would
have written, τὴν τῆς ποίμνης povouny. The whole passage has been
corrupted by design rather than accident, and might perhaps be emended
by a critic, conversant with the customs of ancient times.
THE STATESMAN. 209
Soc. jun. But this at least must by no means be done.
~~ 12.) Guest. We must then march by another road again
from another beginning.
~ Soe. jun. By what road?
Guest. By mixing up almost some merriment. For it is
requisite to make use of the prolix portion of a long story,
and, as regards what still remains, to take away, as we did
before, always a part from a part, till we arrive at the summit
of the inquiry. Must we not do so?
Soc. jun. Certainly.
Guest. Give then, as children do, entirely your attention
to my story; (for)®** you are not altogether flying from
many years®° of merriment.
Soc. jun. Relate it.
Guest. Of the things then said of old, there have been,
and will be still, many others (preserved), and the prodigy
likewise relating to the reported contests between Atreus and
Thyestes. For you have surely heard and remember what is
then said to have happened.
Soc. jun. Perhaps you mean the prodigy respecting the
golden ewe. :
Guest. By no means; but respecting the change in the
rising and setting of the sun, and of the other constellations,
how that they set then at the very place from whence they
now rise, and rose from the opposite one ;°° and that the deity
gave a testimony in favour of Atreus, and changed (the
heavens)*" into the present figure.
Soc. gun. This too is reported.
Guest. And we have likewise heard from many of the
kingdom over which Kronos (Saturn) ruled.
Soe. jun. We have from very many.
‘4 Ficinus alone has ‘‘ enim,”’ required to supply the asyndeton.
55 Instead of ἔτη, Plato wrote, I suspect, ἔπη, ‘‘ words ;”? and in lieu
of πολλὰ, Stalbaum would read πολὺ; the error is in πάντως rather,
which it would not be difficult to correct.
56 In this solution of the story is to be found the germ of the notion of
modern geologists, that the position of the poles of the earth has been
changed at some very remote period.
57 Ficinus has “ἴῃ hanc ceeli figuram mutavit,”’ which is more intelli-
gible than the Greek μετέβα λὲν αὐτὸ (one MS, αὐτὸν) ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν σχῆμα:
unless we read τὸ νῦν οὐνοῦ (i. 6. οὐρανοῦ). As regards the story Stal-
baum refers to Orest. 800 and 989, Add. Iph. T. 187,
P
210 THE STATESMAN.
Guest. And that the men of former times were produced
earth-born, and not begotten from each other 3 88
Soc. jun. This too is one of the things said of old.
Guest. All these things then arose from the same cireum-
stance, and in addition to these ten thousand others, and still
more wonderful. But, through the length of time, some of
them have become extinct, and others are told in a dispersed
manner, separate from each other. But that which is the
cause of this to all these, no person has told as yet; and it
must be now told; for being told it will be something con-
spicuous for showing forth the king.
[13.] Soc. jun. You have spoken most beautifully. Say
on then, and omit nothing.
Guest. Hear, then. This universe the deity does at one
time conduct himself, as it proceeds, and with it rolls on ; but
at another leaves it, when its revolutions shall have received
the measure of the fitting time; and it is then brought back
again of its own accord to a contrary state, being a thing
of life, and having a share of intelligence from him, who put it
together at its outset. Now this movement backwards has
been of necessity implanted in it through this.
Soc. jun. Through what ?
Guest. To subsist always according to the same, and ina
similar manner, and to be the same, belongs to the most divine
of all things alone. But the nature of body is not of this order.
But that, which we have called heaven and the world, has a
share in many and blessed (gifts) from the producing (cause) ;
moreover,’ it has hada share of body; from whence it cannot
be entirely without a share of change; nevertheless, according
to its power it is moved as much as possible in the same, and
according to the same, by one impetus. Hence it is allotted a
revolving movement, as being the smallest change in its mo-
tion. But scarcely any thing is able to turn itself by itself, ex-
cept that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And
it is not lawful for this to move at one time in one way, and at
another in a contrary way. From all this then we must say,
58 This is a strange expression ; as if both children were begotten by their
parents, and parents by their children. Plato wrote, ἐξ ἐπαλλή
‘from one after the other in succession,” and similarly in ᾧ 15.
°° I confess I do not understand ἀτὰρ οὖν δηὴ--- γε---ἃ combination of
particles not to be found, I suspect, elsewhere.
THE STATESMAN. 211
that the world does not always cause itself to revolve, nor that
the whole is always made by the deity to revolve in two and
contrary revolutions: nor, again, that some two deities, whose
thoughts are contrary to each other, cause it to revolve; but
what has been said just now, and remains alone, that at one
time it is conducted by another divine cause, possessing the
power to live again, and receiving an immortality prepared by
the demiurgus ; but that at another time, when it is let loose,
it proceeds itself by itself; and, after being thus let loose
for such® a time as to perform back again many myriads of
revolutions, it proceeds by its being of the greatest size, and
most equally balanced, to move at the smallest foot.
Soc. jun. All that you have gone through appears to be
said very reasonably indeed.
[14.] Guest. Reasoning then from what has been said
already, let us think together on the circumstance, which we
stated was the cause of all these wonderful doings. For it
is this very thing.
Soe. jun. What?
Guest. That the movement of the universe is at one time
carried on, as it is at present, in a circle, and at another time
in the contrary direction.
Soe. jun. How is this ?
Guest. We must consider this change of motion to be the
greatest and most perfect of all the revolutions, relating to
the heavenly bodies.
Soe. jun. It is likely.
Guest. It is proper then to think that the greatest changes
happen at that time to us, who are living within the universe.
Soc. jun. And this too is likely.
6° Thave with Sauppe united τοσοῦτον to καιρὸν, despite the opposition
of Stalbaum, who might have found in Ficinus “‘ tali tempore.”
51 Τ am quite at a loss in the words ἐπὶ σμικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι.
For though βῆ ἰέναι is constantly found in Homer, yet Baive is never, I
believe, united to ἐέναι. Perhaps Plato wrote ἐπὲ σμικρότατον βῆμα
οὐνοῦ πόλους ἰέναι, i. 6. “to send the poles of heaven on the shortest
march.” For there would thus be an allusion to the theory, that the
whole system of the universe had a progressive movement in space, but
of so slow a kind, that it took about 120,000 years to complete the great
year, when every thing was brought back to the point from whence the
system first started. Respecting the loss or confusion of οὐρανοῦ πόλους,
i have written something worth reading on sch. Suppl. 24, and I could
now add not a little more equally ἘΠ
P
212 THE STATESMAN,
Guest. But do we not know that the nature of animals sus-
tains with difficulty changes great, numerous, pares of all
kinds?
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. Hence the greatest destruction of other ites
necessarily takes place at that time, and that of the human
race only some small portion remains. And to these many
other wonderful and novel circumstances happen at the same
time; but this is the greatest, and follows that revolution of
the universe at that period, when a turn occurs contrary to
the present state of things.
Soc. jun. What?
Guest. The period of life, which each animal then had, this
was first arrested in all; and all that was mortal ceased to be
seen advancing to old age, but changing back to the contrary,
grew, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white
hairs too of older people became black, and the cheeks of those
that had beards becoming smooth, brought back each
to the past blooming period of life. The bodies likewise of
such as were in manhood’s prime, becoming smoother and
smaller each day and night, returned again to the nature of a
newly-born child, and were assimilated to this nature, both in
soul and body; and thenceforth wasting away, disappeared in
reality entirely ;® and the corpses of those, who died at that
time through violence, did, through undergoing the self-
same fate, become in a manner unseen, and in a few days,
quite putrid.®
[15.] Soc. jun. But what was then, O guest, the gener-
ation of animals, and in what manner were they produced.
from each other?
Guest. It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was
no generation of one thing from another ; but, it is said, there
was once an earth-born race; this was at that period restored
back again from out the earth; and the tradition of it was
remembered by our first progenitors, who were close upon the
revolution (that reached to) the period next in order, and were
62__62 Ficinus offers a remarkable variation here. “ Cadavera preeterea
illorum, qui ceelestis mutatione vertiginis subito corruerunt, idem pati-
untur, et simili retrogressione clam ac brevi putrescunt,”’ and such in fact
is what the context requires; where the mention of violence in the pre-
sent Greek text is scarcely intelligible.
THE STATESMAN. 218
born at the beginning of the present state of things. For they
became the heralds to us of those accounts, which are at pre-
sent disbelieved improperly by the multitude. For I think
we ought to reflect together on the consequence. For from
the fact of old men coming to the nature of boys, it follows,®
®4that of such as were dead, but (not) laid in the earth, the
corpses would be put together and made to revive “ by the turn
of production revolving in a contrary direction; and that the
earth-born race would, according to this method® being neces-
sarily produced, have their name and speech, except such as a
deity conveyed (elsewhere), or invested with another fate.
Soc. jun. This really follows from what has been said above.
But with respect to the life, which you say was under the rule
of Kronos (Saturn), did it subsist in those revolutions, or in
these? For it is evident that the change in the position of the
stars and the sun coincides with both these revolutions.
Guest. You have followed well the discourse. But,. in
answer to your question respecting all things being produced
spontaneously for mankind, this by no means is the case in
the present revolution; but it occurred in the former. For
then the deity was at first the ruler and guardian of the whole
revolving circle; just as now the parts of the world are lo-
cally distributed by gods ruling in the very same way. Divine
demons, too, had a share, after the manner of shepherds, in
animals according to genera and herds, each being sufficient
forall things pertaining to the several particulars over which
58. Instead of ἐχόμενον, Stalbaum suggests ἐπόμενον, to which he was
probably led by “‘consonum” in Ficinus, translated by Taylor, “it
follows.”
δ: δὲ T have translated this passage, as if the Greek were—ix τῶν
τετελευτηκότων μὲν, κειμένων δ᾽ οὐκ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν νεκροὺς συνισταμένους
καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους ἔσεσθαι, instead of ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων αὖ,
κειμένων δ᾽ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν ἐκεῖ συνισταμένους ---ἕπεσθαι, words, I confess,
beyond my comprehension.
% Heusde properly referred to this place the variation of τρόπον for
λόγον, preserved by Eusebius just afterwards.
6° The MSS. vary between ἐκόμισε and ἐκόσμησε. The MS. used by
Ficinus united both, as shown by his version “in aliam sortem—trans-
tulit vel exornavit.” I have therefore introduced “elsewhere.” For
ἄλλοσε might easily have dropt out before ἐς ἄλλην. I suspect, however,
that Plato wrote ἐς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν ἢ ἐκοίμισεν, i. e. “ conveyed to
some other fate or put to sleep: ”? where there is an allusion to the fates
respectively of Prometheus and Typheus.
214 THE STATESMAN.
he presided; so that there was nothing of a wild nature, no
eating of each other, no war, nor sedition of any kind; and
ten thousand other things might be stated, which follow upon
such an arrangement. But what is said respecting the spon-
taneous life of these men, has been stated on this account.
The deity himself tended them, and was their protector; just
as men now, being an animal more divine than others, tend
other races meaner than themselves; and as he tended them,
there were no forms of state or polity, nor a property in.
women and children; for all these were restored to life from
the earth, and had no recollection of former events.® But
all such things were absent; they had however fruit in
abundance from oaks, and many other trees, not grown by
land tilling, but given spontaneously by the earth. They
lived, too, for the most part naked, upon no strewed couch, and
in the open air; for the temperament of the seasons was not
painful to them; theirs were soft beds of grass, springing up
without grudging from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you
hear what was the life of men under Kronos (Saturn): but
you, being present yourself, perceive what is life now, which
is said to be under Zeus (Jupiter). But are you able and
willing likewise to judge which of these is the happier ?
Soc. jun. By no means.
Guest. Do you wish then that I should, after a fashion,
judge for you ?
Soc. jun. Entirely so. mrs
[16.] Guest. If then those nurtured by Kronos (Saturn), when
they had so much leisure and the power to converse not only
with men, but with brutes likewise, had used all these means for
the purposes of philosophy, associating with brutes and with
each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a per-
ceptive power of its own, in what respect it differed from the
rest for the collecting together of prudence, it is easy to judge
that the men of that time were ten thousand-fold happier than
those of the present. But if, being filled to satiety with meats
57. [ have adopted ἑτέρων, found in one MS., in preference to Zrepov.
88. On the other hand Plato, in the Meno and Phedo, says that man’s
present knowledge is only the recollection of what the soul knew in a
previous state of existence, according to the Pythagorean doctrine of the
Metempsychosis.
THE STATESMAN. 215
and drinks, they discoursed with each other, and with brutes,
in fables® such as are now told of them, it is easy, according to
my opinion, to prove the very same” thing. Let us, however,
dismiss this question, until some one shall appear sufficient to
point out whether the men of that time had any desire for
science and the need of discourse. But let us now state for
what reason we have raised up the fable, in order that we
may after this proceed onwards.7! For when the time of all
these was completed, and it was necessary for a change to take
place, and moreover when the whole race on earth was already
consumed, “and every soul had given up its generations, and
as many seeds as were ordained for each soul, it having fallen
on the earth,”—then did the governor of the universe, re-
leasing himself, as it were, from the handle of a rudder, depart to
59 Here is evidently an allusion to the A’sopic Fables, which I have
shown in The Surplice,"No. 35, July, 1846, and foll., to have been written
by Socrates; to which Plato has thus properly paid no mean a compli-
ment; for they were above all praise; although they are found at present in
only a mutilated form, like some of the finest temples of former times.
7 J have translated as if the Greek were ταὐτὸ, not τοῦτο.
Ficinus has a remarkable variation—‘“‘ ut sequentia cum anteceden-
tibus conjungamus,” as if his MS. read—iva τοῖς πρόσθεν τὰ ὀπίσω
συνείρωμεν. For τα ὀπίσω means the future. Hesych. ᾿Οπίσω---τὸ
μέλλον. See Elmsley on Soph. (θά. T. 490,
7272 Qn this mass of nonsense Stalbaum has written a lengthy note,
where he vainly endeavours to explain what is absurd, and still more
vainly to correct what is corrupt. Plato wrote, I suspect, something to
this effect—mdoac αὖ ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς ἐς τὰς γενέσεις ὑποδεδυκυίας,
ὅσα τε ἣν ἑκάστῃ προσταχθέντα, τοσαῦτα αὐγῆς σπέρματα ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁ
ἀγούσης ---ἶ. 6. “each soul having again secretly entered into all gener-
ations, and bringing from the sun seeds of light, as many as were ordained
for each generation—’’ This would be intelligible to those at least, who
know that the word ἡλίου is often expressed by the symbol ©, as shown
by Schefer on Aristoph. Plut. Epimetr. p. xlii., and Gaisford on Hesiod.
Theogon. 709, and of myself on Aisch. Eum. 2: while they who remem-
ber the σπέρμα πυρὸς of Homer, and the “ semina flamme ” of Virgil,
will be ready to receive here αὐγῆς σπέρματα. The fact is, that Plato
alluded to the story of Prometheus bringing fire from heaven, which he
obtained from a ferule applied to the wheel of the chariot of the Sun, as
we learn from Servius on Virgil. Bucol. vi. 42. But as the light of the
soul is an immaterial light, and arising from reflexion, it would be said
more correctly to be derived from the Moon, which shines itself by a re
flected light ; and hence we ought to read perhaps, αὐγῆς σπέρματα ἀπὸ
τῆς ( ἀγούσης. For Dobree has shown, on Photius, p. 699, that, insteaa
of Σελήνη, the symbol ¢ is found in MSS.; and hence in Suid. ’Exny-
κυλημένα---Θεοειδῆ, Where Toup wished to read μηνοειδῆ, we must write
what Gaisford failed to see, ( εοειδῆ, i. 6. Σεληνγοειδῆ.
216 THE 5ΤΑΤΈΒΜΑΝ,
his own place of a look-out ; and then Fate and implanted De-
sire again caused the world to revolve. All the gods then, who
govern locally, in conjunction with the greatest divinity, know-
ing what was now taking place, again deprived the parts of
the world of their providential care. But the world having un-
dergone a change in its revolution, conflicting’ and
with the contrary impulse of a beginning and end, and pro-
ducing in itself a mighty concussion, worked out again another
destruction of all kinds of animals. After this, when a suf-
ficient time had gone on, the world ceasing from tumult, con-
fusion, and concussions, did, taking advantage of a calm,
proceed, arranged most beautifully‘ in its usual course, pos-
sessing a guardianship and dominion itself over the things in
itself and belonging to itself; (and) remembering, to the
utmost of its power, the instructions of the demiurgus and
father. Now at the commencement it performed this duty
more carefully, but at the end more obtusely. But the cause
of this is in the corporeal form of the temperature, which
had grown up™ with its former nature; since it partook of
much disorder,”® before it arrived at its present orderly ar-
rangement. For from him, who put it together, it obtained
every good; but from its previous habit, whatever harshness
and injustice exist in heaven, these it does both possess
itself from that former habit, and introduce likewise into
animals. In conjunction then with the ruler, the world, when
nourishing the animals within it, brings forth evil of a small
kind, but good of a large; but separated from him, it con-
ducts all things beautifully during the time nearest to his
departure; but as time goes on, and oblivion comes on it, the
circumstance of its former unfitness domineers with greater
force; and at the concluding period of time it bursts out into
the full flower of wrong ;77 and (producing) only a little good,
78 I confess I cannot understand ξυμβάλλων thus standing by itself.
Ficinus has omitted the word entirely. His version is, ‘‘ Mundus deinde
contraria principii finisque sese agitatione re reflectens.””
76 1 have translated as if the Greek were κάλλιστα κοσμούμενος, not
κατακοσμούμενος. Ficinus has “ in ordine debito constitutus.”
75. So Stalbaum understands féyrpogoy. Ficinus has “ prisce nature
fomes.” He therefore found some other word in his MS.
76 Ficinus, ‘‘ Nam valde deforme erat et ordinis expers,” as if his ΜΒ...
= ἀμορφίας μετέχον καὶ dratiac—On ἀμορφία, see my note on Prom.
τ Stalbaum says correctly, that ἐξανθεῖν is applied to a disorder or
THE STATESMAN. 217
but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary
to good, it arrives at the danger of both its own destruction,
and of the things within it. Hence the god, who arranged
the world, perceiving it in difficulties, and anxious lest, being
thus tempest-tost, it should be thoroughly loosened by the
hurly-burly, and be plunged into the infinite βθὰ 18 of dissimili-
tude, again seats himself at the helm ; and whatever is labour-
ing and loosened”? in its own former period, he having turned
arranges, and by putting straight, renders the world free from
death and old age. This then is (one) end of the whole story.
But this is sufficient to show, from what has been said, the na-
ture of a king to such, as lay hold of the discourse. For the
world having been again turned to the present path of genera-
tion, its age was again stopped, and it imparted novel things, the
contrary towhat it had doneformerly. For animals, wanting but
little to be through their small size annihilated, are increased ;
and hoary bodies recently born from the earth, dying again,
descend into the earth; and all other things are changed,
imitating and following the condition of the universe. The
imitation, likewise, of conception, generation, and nourishing,
followed all things from necessity. For it was no longer
possible for an animal to be produced in the earth, through the
different things, which compose it; but, as the world was or-
dained to be the absolute ruler of its own progress, so after the
evil that bursts out into full strength; and aptly compares Adsch. Pers.
821, Ὕβρις γὰρ ἐξανθοῦσ᾽ ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν * Arne, and Plutarch Thes.,
§ 6, ἐξήνθησαν ai κακίαι καὶ ἀνερράγησαν. Ficinus, mistaking the mean-
ing, rendered it ‘‘ deflorescit.”’
% This is the translation of Taylor, who doubtless wished to read
πόντον for τόπον : and so too Stalb. For the whole description is taken
from a ship inastorm. On the metaphorical use of πόντος, see Monk
on Hippol. 824.
7 Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is as unintelligible as
the English. The natural flow of ideas seems to require something of
this kind—rd νοσήσαντα ἀκεῖται, λυθέντα τε συνδεῖ, καὶ στρεφθέντα
ἐπανορθῶν, τῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἀγήρων αὐτὸν
καὶ ἀθάνατον ἀπεργάζεται, i. 6. “ he repairs what has become disordered,
and binds together what has become loosened, and making straight again
what has become bent, he arranges it according to its former revolution
under himself, and renders it free from old age and death.” With respect
to ἀκεῖται, that verb is properly applied to repairing a shattered ship, with
which the world is here compared. It would be, however, hazardous to
assert, that Plato did write so in reality. For if he did, the passage must
have been corrupted antecedent to the time of Eusebius, who in Prepar.
Evang. xi. 34, quotes it nearly as it is found here.
218 THE STATESMAN.
same manner its parts also were destined by a similar guid-
ance to spring forth,*° generate, and nourish, as far as they
were able. But we have now arrived at the very question for
the sake of which the whole of our discourse has
For, with respect to other beasts, many circumstances, and of
a prolix nature, might be gone through; such as, from what
each is, and through what cause they have been changed;
but those relating to man are shorter, and more to our
purpose. For mankind having become destitute of the
guardian care of the demon, who possesses and tends us,
while the majority of animals, that were naturally cruel, have
on the other hand become savage, men, now weak, and with-
out a guard, were torn in pieces by such animals; and, in
those earliest times, they were without inventions and arts;
for after the earth had failed in its spontaneous food, they did
not know how to procure it, through no want having previ-
ously compelled them (to get it). From all these causes they
were in the greatest difficulties. Hence, the old-mentioned gifts
were given us by gods, together with the necessary instruc-
tion and erudition ;*! fire from Prometheus, and arts from He-
phestus (Vulcan), and his fellow-artist (Pallas); on the other
hand, seeds and plants were given by others, and all such things
as furnish a support for human life, were produced from these ;
since, as was stated just now, the guardian care of the gods
had deserted mankind; and it became requisite for men to
have the conduct and care of themselves, in the same manner
as the whole world; in the imitating and following which,
through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born,
now in this way, and now in that. Let this then be the end
of the story. But we will make it useful for discovering how
far we have erred in defining the characters of a king and
statesman in our previous discourse.
[17.] Soc. jun. In what respect then, and how far, do you
say has there been an error?
8 Instead of φύειν two MSS. have φύρειν. They should have read
κύειν, “to conceive,’ as shown by κυήσεως καὶ γεννήσεως καὶ τροφῆς,
just above.
81 In what way διδαχὴ differs from παίδευσις, neither myself nor any
one else could tell. Hones I suspect καὶ παιδεύσεως is an explanation
merely of διδαχῆς, or else those letters conceal some words not difficult
to elicit, relating to the givers of good things.
THE STATESMAN. 219
Guest. °° Partly less, and partly in a very generous man-
ner, and in a greater degree, and more than before.*?
Soe. jun. How?
Guest. Because, when we were asked respecting a king
and a statesman belonging to the present revolution and ge-
neration, we spoke of a person tending a human herd of the
contrary period, and this too a god, and nota man. In this
then we transgressed very much. But when we exhibited him
as the ruler of the whole state, we did not say in what man-
ner (he was so); and in this respect the truth was told, but
not the whole (truth), nor was it clearly enunciated ; hence
we erred less in this case than in that.
Soe. gun. True.
Guest. We ought then, it seems, to expect that the states-
man will have been completely described by us, when we shall
have defined the manner of governing a state.
Soc. jun. Very well.
Guest. On this account we have brought forward the story,
in order that (one)** might show, with respect to the herd-
tending, not only that all contend about it with the person now
sought for; but that we might more clearly perceive him, whom
alone it is fitting, according to the pattern of shepherds and
neat-herds, to have the tending of the human herd, and alone
worthy to be called by that name.
Soe. jun. Right.
Guest. But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine
shepherd is still greater than becomes a king; and that the
statesmen now existing here are much more like subjects in
their nature, and take more nearly a share in discipline and
nurture.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. But they will have to be investigated neither more
nor less, whether they are naturally in this position or in
that.
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. Let us then turn back again. For we said, that
8282 Ficinus has, ““ Partim minus, partim generosius magisque, et
plus quam tune erratum,” which is a far more elegant collocation of
words than the Greek is at present.
83 1 have inserted “‘ one’’ answering to τις, which has evidently dropt
out after ἐνδείξαιτο: that would otherwise want its nominative.
~
290 THE STATESMAN.
there was a self-commanding art respecting animals, which
took care of them, not privately, but in common; and this art
we then straightway called the herd-tending art. Do you
recollect ?
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. In this then we erred. For we have not by any
means laid hold of the statesman, nor given him a name; but
as regards the appellation, it has lain hid from and escaped us.
Soc. jun. How 80 ἢ
Guest. To tend the several kinds of herds belongs to all
other herdsmen; but we have not given a fitting name to the
statesman, it being requisite for him to bear one of those
common to all.
Soc. jun. You speak the truth, if indeed there happens to be
(a common one). *4
Guest. But how is it not possible to apply the word healing,
as something common to all, neither tending nor any other
occupation being stated ? and if *it is lawful for persons giv-
ing a name (to an art) to wrap it up (in words like) herd-tend-
ing, or healing in any way, as being applicable generally, (it
is lawful to wrap up) the word statesman likewise® together
with others, especially since reason shows that this should
(be done) ?
[18.] Soc. jun. Right. But after this in what manner
would the division be made ?
Guest. In the same manner, as we before divided the
herd-tending art for the walking and wingless* tribes, and for
the unmixed and hornless, in the very same manner by divid-
ing the herd-tending, we shall have comprehended both the
present kingly rule and that in the time of Kronos (Saturn)
similarly in our discourse.
δε Heusde was the first to see that something was wanting after εἴπερ
érbyxavé ye ὄν. But he did not see that Plato wrote—ye κοινὸν ὄν, Stal-
baum vainly, as usual, defends the old reading.
858 Such seems to be the meaning which Plato wished to convey.
But to get at it we must read ἀλλ᾽ εἰ for ἀλλ᾽ 7}—which Bekker found in
some MSS, in lieu of d\Any—and to repeat ἐξῆν before καὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν
—For when a word is thus repeated, it is generally followed by καὶ, as I
have shown in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 156 and 281, and I could now add a
host of similar passages.
8° Ficinus has “ et volatilium,’’ which leads, as Stephens remarks, to
πτηνοῖς.
“"
Ss ee
THE STATESMAN. 221
Soc. jun. It appears so. But I am seeking what (will be)
after this.*?
Guest. It is plain that if the word herd-tending had been
thus spoken, no one would have contended with us that there
is no idea whatever of attention in it; as it was then justly
contended, that there is no art amongst us which deserves the
appellation of tending; and that if there were, it belongs to
many things prior and preferable to any thing pertaining to
kings.
Soc. jun. Right. ,
Guest. ** But no other art would be willing to say that it is
more and before kingly rule, as a careful tending of the whole
of human fellowship, and of men taken generally.**
Soc. jun. You say rightly.
Guest. Butafter this, Socrates, do you perceive that an error
has been made frequently towards the very end ?
Soc. jun. Of what kind ?
Guest. In this, that though we have conceived that there
is a certain rearing art of a biped herd, we ought not any
more to have straightway called it, as if entirely complete, the
art of the king and statesman.
Soc. jun. Why not?
Guest. In the first place, as we said, we (ought) to have
suited the name more to guardianship than to nutriment: and
in the next place, to make a division in this (guardianship).
For it will have no small divisions.
Soe. jun. Of what kind ?
Guest. In that we can surely place apart the divine
shepherd, and the human guardian.
Soe. jun. Right.
ἜΤ Ficinus has merely “‘ Videtur ; sed quid tum ἢ ”
8888 Such according to Stalbaum is the version of the Greek, where
he would adopt προτέρα, found in Stobeus, ed. Trincavell., in lieu of
πρᾳοτέρα, and support μᾶλλον Kai προτέρα by μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφρο-
δροτέρα in Phileb. p. 41, C. But the syntax and the sense appear to me
equally objectionable. Instead, then, of ἐθελήσειεν ἑτέρα μᾶλλον καὶ
πραοτέρα 1 should prefer—i0ednoeev εὐνουστέρα μᾶλλον καὶ πρᾳοτέρα,
i. e. ‘more kindly disposed and more mild.” Ficinus has—‘ Nulla vero
ars alia de hoc contendit, quasi sit totius humane communionis curatio
major mitiorque regia,” thus omitting entirely the concluding words of
the speech, either because they were not in his MS., or because, like
myself, he could not understand them.
222 THE STATESMAN.
Guest. And again it is necessary to cut into two the dis-
tributed 58 guardianship.
Soc. jun. Into what?
Guest. Into the violent and the voluntary.
Soc. jun. What then?
Guest. By erring before in this more stupidly alan was
fitting, we put down together a king and a tyrant as the same ;
although they are most dissimilar both in themselves and in
their form of government respectively.
Soc. jun. True.
Guest. Now therefore, again correcting ourselves, let us,
as I have already said, divide human guardianship into the
violent and the voluntary.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. And calling the guardianship by the violent tyran-
nic, but the voluntary, *{and the herd-tending of voluntary
biped animals, 150 statesmanship, let us show, that he who pos-
sesses this [art and]®! guardianship is truly a king and a
statesman.
[19.] Soc. jun. And thus the demonstration, O guest, re-
specting the statesman, is very like to appear to us as μετ
perfect.
Guest. This would be well for us, Socrates. But it is ~
requisite that this should appear not only to you, but likewise
to me, in common with you. At present, however, the king
appears to me not to possess as yet a perfect figure; but just
as statuaries, who by hastening their work sometimes unsea-
sonably, do, through introducing more and greater things
than are fitting, retard it; so have we at present, in order
that we might show both quickly and splendidly, that we
* As ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν could hardly stand here by itself, Ficinus has cor-
rectly supplied “curationem item humanam in duo, "ἢ which leads at
once to τὴν avny ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν, where avny is the perpetual abbrevi-
ation of ἀνθρωπίνην, as a; have shown in Append, ad Troad. p. 160. This
introduction of ἀνθρωπίνην is plainly confirmed by what Tollows just
after, τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμελητικὴν δίχα διαιρώμεθα.
%_ All the words between the brackets are evidently an interpola-
tion ; or else something has been lost after the preceding τῶν βιαίων, to
preserve the balance of the two sentences ; which leads to τὴν μὲν ---τῶν
βιαίων, and τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκουσίων.
*' Here again is another interpolation.
THE STATESMAN. 223
erred in the former part of our digression, through thinking
that great patterns should be employed in the case of a king,
have brought in a marvellous mass of a myth, and been com-
pelled to use a greater portion of it than was proper. On this
account, we have made a rather prolix demonstration, and
have not entirely finished the fable. But our discourse really
appears somewhat like an animal, to have its outline defined
sufficiently, but to have not received the distinctness given by
pigments, and the mixture of colours. But it is more becom-
ing to exhibit every animal by a description, to such as are
able to follow the account,* than by painting, and all the
work of hand; but to other persons through works of the
hand.
Soc. jun. This indeed (is said rightly): but show me why
you say you have not yet spoken sufficiently.
Guest. It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great
things sufficiently, without using patterns. For each of us
appear to know all things as in a night-dream, and again to
be ignorant of all things according to a day-dream.™
Soc. jun. How said you this ?
Guest. We appear in the present case to have mooted very
absurdly the circumstance relating to the knowledge (which
is) in us.
Soc. jun. How so?
Guest. The pattern, O blessed one, has required itself
again a pattern.
Soc. jun. What? Tell me, and do not, on my account at
least, hesitate.
- [20.] Guest. I must speak, since you are ready to follow.
For we know, that children know their letters.
Soc. jun. What? ͵
Guest. That they understand sufficiently each of the
letters in the shortest and easiest syllables, and are able to
speak the truth concerning them.
% 1 have translated this passage as if καὶ (or rather ye) λόγῳ were
inserted between δυναμένοις and ἕπεσθαι. For λέξει καὶ λόγῳ could not
be thus united, nor could ἑπομένοις here dispense with its case.
58. On the difference between ὄναρ, “a night-dream,” and ὕπαρ, “ἃ
day-dream,” applied respectively to the things of fancy and fact, see
Blomfield on Prom. 495.
224 THE STATESMAN,
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. But, being on the other hand doubtful εὐνοῶν those
in other syllables, they say what is false in idea and word.
Soc, jun. Entirely so.
Guest. Is it not then the easiest and the best thing to dead
them thus to what is not yet known ?
Soc. jun. How ?
Guest. By first leading them back to those things, in wie
they had correct ideas respecting those very same matters ;
and after leading them, to place before them things not yet
known; and by comparing them together, to show that there
is the same likeness ** and nature in both the combinations, till
the things conceived, having been compared with all the
unknown, are shown correctly; and, after being shown and
becoming thus patterns, cause each one of all the letters in
all the syllables to be called one different, and another the
same, as being always under the same circumstances, differ-
ent and the same (respectively).
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. This then we sufficiently comprehend, that the pro-
duction of a pattern then takes place, when that, which is the
same, is, in the case of another thing placed apart, rightly con-
ceived by opinion, and being brought together to it, produces
one true opinion respecting either, as it did about both.
Soc. jun. It appears so.
Guest. Shall we then wonder, if our soul, suffering naturally
the same thing respecting the elements of all things, does at
one time stand firm in certain points under the influence of
truth respecting each individual thing, and at another time
fluctuates in other points respecting all things ? and that when,
(as regards) some (elements) of comminglings, it thinks
rightly, it should somehow or another again be ignorant of
these very same things, when they are transferred to long and
difficult syllable-like unions of things ?®
* In lieu of τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν, where there is a com-
bination of words at variance with common sense, Plato wrote, I suspect,
τὴν Na ἢ καὶ ὁμοιοτάτην φύσιν, i. 6. “a nature the same or very
similar
% Such is the literal version of the Greek ; out of which the reader is left
tomake what sense he can. There is evidently something wanting in the
first clause to preserve the balance of the sentence in the second.
"oO τ Νεν
THE STATESMAN. 225
Soe. jun. There is nothing wonderful in this.
Guest. But % how, my friend, can any one, beginning from
false opinion, arrive at even a small portion of truth, and thus
acquire wisdom ?
Soc. jun. Nearly not at all.
_ Guest. If then these things are naturally in this way, you
and I shall not in any respect overdo it, if, by first endeavour-
ing to perceive the nature of the whole pattern in some other
small and partial one, and after this,*’ by transferring to the
nature of a king, which is the greatest of all patterns, the
same species, from lesser things from some quarter, we shall
be about to endeavour again, through a pattern, to know by
art the care of state affairs,” so that there may be a day-dream
instead of a night one.
Soc. jun. Perfectly right. ,
Guest, Again then let us take up the preceding reasoning,
that since ten thousand persons contend with the kingly genus,
respecting the guardianship of a state, it is requisite to separ-
ate all these, and to leave it by itself. And for this purpose ἡ
we said we have need of some pattern.
Soc. jun. And very much so.
[21.] Guest. By producing then what pattern, which em-
braces an occupation similar to statesmanship, 58 and is the
smallest possible,®* could one sufficiently find the thing sought
for? Are you, Socrates, willing, by Zeus, unless we have
something else at hand, for us to choose at least the weaving
% Instead of πῶς yap Stalbaum suggests πῶς ἄρ. Read πῶς δ᾽ ap’ —
97 Here again a literal English version of Stalbaum’s Latin translation
proves, if any thing can, the mass of nonsense to be found in the Greek ;
which I can neither construe nor correct, except by reading—pera δὲ
ταῦτα ἑλόντες αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, μέγιστον ὃν, σχῆμα, διὰ παρα-
δείγματος, ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἀπ᾽ ἐλαττόνων φέροντός ποθεν, ἐπιχειρῶμεν τὴν
τῶν κατὰ πόλιν θεραπείαν τέχνῃ γνωρίζειν, ἵνα ὕπαρ ἀντ᾽ ὀνείρατος ἡμῖν
γίγνηται, i.e. “ and after this taking the form itself of the king, as being
the greatest, we should endeavour by a pattern, that brings from some
quarter the same form from lesser things, to discover by art the care of the
things that relate to a state, so that there may.be a day-dream (of fact)
instead of a night-one (of fiction).”’ To the change of μέλλοντες into
ἑλόντες, I was led by finding in one MS. μέλοντες.
%8__9%8 Instead of τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτικὴν πραγμάτειαν, Which is here mani-
festly absurd, Ast correctly suggested—zrodurixy, which even Stalbaum is
disposed to adopt. But even thus the passage is not correct. For Plato
wrote σμικρότατον μὲν, ἔχον δὲ, as found in the MS. of Ficinus; who
translates “‘exemplum exiguum quidem et—continens.”
Q
226 THE STATESMAN.
art? and this too not the whole, if it seems good; for, per-
haps, the art relating to weaving of wool will suffice. For it
may happen, that even this portion being chosen will witness
to what we want (to show).
Soc. jun. For why should it not ?
Guest. Why then have we not, as we did before, after cut-
ting the parts, each of them separate, done the very same
thing now in the case of the weaving art? and why, after
passing over all things to the best of our power in the short-
est manner possible, have we not come to what is useful at
present ?
Soc. jun. How say you?
Guest. I will make the digression itself an answer.
Soc. jun. You speak most excellently.
Guest. Of all the things which we fabricate and possess,
some are for the sake of our doing something, and others are
defences against our not suffering. And of these defences some
are medicinal, both divine and human; others are protective.
And of the protective, some are warlike implements, others
(peaceful) defences. And of the (peaceful) defences, some
are veils, others are to ward off heat and cold. And of those
that ward off, some cover at a distance, others near. And of
the near, some are extended under, others around. And of
those extended around, some are cut as a whole piece, others
put together. And of those put together, some are perfor-
ated, others are bound together, not perforated. And of those
that are not perforated, some are composed of the fibres of the
plants of the earth, others are hairy. And of the hairy, some
are conglutinated by water and earth, others are connected
themselves with themselves. Now to these defences and cover-
ings, which are wrought from the things bound together, them-
selves with themselves, we give the name of dress, And let
us call the art, which is especially conversant with dresses,
dress-making, from the thing itself; in the same manner as we
called above the art respecting a state, statesmanship. And
let us say too, that the weaving art, so far as it weaves for
the most part garments, differs in nothing but the name from
the dress-making art; just as (we said) there, that the king-art
(differed only nominally) from statesmanship.
Soc. jun. Most correctly.
Guest. After this let us reason (thus), that some one may
THE STATESMAN. 227
perhaps think that the weaving art relating to dresses has been
thus defined sufliciently, he being unable to perceive that it
is not yet distinguished from its proximate co-operators, but
is separated from many other things of a kindred nature.
[22. Soc. jun. Tell me what things of a kindred nature.
Guest. You have not followed what has been said, as it
seems.°® It appears, therefore, that we must return from
the end to the beginning. For, if you understand affinity,
we have now separated this from that, by separating the com-
position of coverings into things put under, and around.
Soc. jun. I understand you.
Guest. We have likewise separated every kind of manufac-
ture from flax and hemp, and all such things as we just now
described in the list of the fibres of plants. We also defined the
art of making a felt-like substance, and the putting together
by means of perforation and sewing, which for the most part
pertains to the cobler’s art.
Soc. gun. Entirely so.
Guest. We have also separated the care! bestowed on the
cobler’s art relating to coverings cut in the whole piece, and
of such as are employed in building, and in the whole of the
carpenter’s art, and in all others that are employed in stop-
ping the flowing of water, and such arts too of (peaceful)
defences as furnish works to be an impediment to thieving
and to acts of violence, and which are employed about the
production of obstacles and the fixing of doors, and are dis-
tributed as parts of the bolt-making art. We have likewise
divided the armour-making art, which is a section of the great
and varied power of defence-making. We also defined, in
the very beginning, the whole art of quackery, which is con-
versant with medicines; and we left, so that we might seem
(to be),! the very art defensive against storms, of which we
* Instead of ὡς φαίνει, one would prefer, as Taylor. translated, ὡς
φαίνεται. But see Sophist, § 21, προσερεῖς, we φαίνει.
100 The word θεραπείαν is properly omitted here by Ficinus. I sus-
pect it ought to be inserted a little below after μαγευτικὴν, for it is
applied to the art of medical quacks.
1 Of this nonsense Stalbaum has taken not the least notice. After
λελοίπαμεν, correct Greek would require we δόξαιμεν without dy. Fici-
nus has, ‘‘ artem—que visa est iila esse, quam querimus,” as if his MS.
read, ἣ ἔδοξεν εἶναι αὐτὴ ἡ ζητθεῖσα. Plato wrote, I suspect, we δείξ-
αιμὲν αὖ ed—for he goes on to show the weaving art.
ῳ 2
228 THE STATESMAN.
are in search, and which produces woollen vestments, and is
called the art of weaving.
Soc. jun. It seems so.
Guest. But this matter, O boy, has not been perfectly
detailed. For he, who first engaged in the making of
garments, appeared to act in a manner directly contrary to
weaving.
Soc. jun. How so ὃ
Guest. For the work of weaving is a certain knitting to-
gether.
Soc. jun. It is.
Guest. But the work (of the garment-maker) consists in
loosening things put together, and felted together.
Soc. gun. What kind of work is this ὃ
Guest. The work of the art of the wool-carder. Or shall
we dare to call the art of wool-carding the weaving art, and
a wool-carder a weaver ?
Soc. jun. By no means.
Guest. But if any one should call the art of making the
warp and woof the weaving art, would he not assert a para-
dox, and give it a false name?
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. But whether shall we say that the whole of the fuller’s
and the mender’s art contribute nothing to the attention to and
care of garments? Or shall we call all these weaving arts?
Soc. gun. By no means.
Guest. But all these contend with the power of the weaving
art, respecting the care and the production of garments; at-
tributing, indeed, to it the greatest part, but likewise assign-
ing to themselves great portions of the same art.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. Besides these, it further appears requisite, that the
handicraft arts, relating to the instruments through which the
works of the weaver are performed, should lay claim to be
co-causes of all weaving.
Soc. jun. Most right.
Guest. Whether then will our discourse about the weaving
art, a part of which we have chosen, be sufficiently defined, if
we lay it down that it is the most beautiful and the greatest
of all the arts, which are employed about woollen garments ἢ.
Or shall we thus, indeed, speak something of the truth, but
THE STATESMAN. 229
yet neither clearly nor perfectly, till we have separated all
these arts from it ?
Soc. jun. Correctly.
[23.] Guest. Must we not then after this so act, that, what
we say, may proceed in an orderly series ?
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. In the first place then let us consider two arts, which
exist about all things.
Soc. jun. What are they ?
Guest. One is the co-cause of generation, and the other is
the cause itself.
Soc. jun. How ?
Guest. Such arts, as do not fabricate the thing itself, but
prepare instruments for the fabricating (arts), without the pre-
sence of which the proposed work could not be effected ? by
each of the arts,? these are co-causes: but those, which fabri-
cate the thing itself, are causes.*
Soe. jun. ‘This is reasonable.
Guest. In the next place, those arts which produce the dis-
taff, and the shuttle, and such other instruments as contribute
to the making of garments, all these are co-causes:* but
those which pay attention to and fabricate garments, causes.
Soc. jun. Most right.
Guest. But of causes, it is reasonable to comprehend that
portion of it® especially, which pertains to washing and mend-
ing, and all the caring about these, since the adorning art is
abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller’s art.
Soe. jun. It will so.
Guest. Moreover, the carding and spinning, and all that re-
lates to the making of the garment, of which we are detailing
the parts, is one art, called by all persons the wool-working.
Soc. jun. How not?
22 These words are omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently unne-
cessary.
3 Hertelius, quoted by Stalbaum, would insert καλῶ, which he got
from the version of Ficinus, “ ut ita dixerim, nominamus—causas appella-
mus.’ Stalbaum says that by a kind of zeugma we are to understand
θεασώμεθα, especially as Stobeus, who quotes this passage in Εἰ]. Eth.
p- 380, does not acknowledge any verb here.
* Here, too, Ficinus has “ concausas nuncupemus.””
5 I confess I do not understand the words—rotvrav@a αὐτῆς μόριον,
nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them.
280 THE STATESMAN.
Guest. Of the wool-working there are two sections, and
each of these are together naturally parts of two arts.
Soc. jun. How ?
Guest. The carding, and the half of that which uses the
shuttle, and separates from each other whatever are placed
together, all this in short is a part of the wool-working art;
and there were two great parts as regards the whole, one eom-
mingling, and the other separating.
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. Of the separating then, both the carding and all those
just now mentioned are a part. For that, which in the ease of
the wool and thread is the separating art, takes place, after one
manner with the shuttle, and after another with the hands, has
the names which we have just now mentioned.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. Again, let us take a part of the commingling, and of
the wool-working contained in it; but let us pass by all that
was there relating to the separating, and let us bisect the
wool-working (art) together into the commingling and se-
parating section.
Soc. gun. Let it be so divided.
Guest. We must then, Socrates, divide the commingling,
and at the same time the wool-working, if we are about
to comprehend sufficiently the proposed weaving art.
Soc. jun. It will be requisite.
Guest. It willindeed ; and let us say, that one part of it is
twisting, and the other complicating.
Soc. jun. Do I then understand you? For you appear to
me to say that the working of the thread is twisting.
Guest. Not the working of this only, but likewise of the
woof.6 Or shall we find any production of it which is not
twisting ?
Soc. jun. By no means.
Guest. Define also each of these : for perhaps the definition
will be suitable.
Soe. jun. In what way ἢ
Guest. In this. We say that of the operations of wool-
5. AsI am nota learned weaver, and do not know the words in E
corresponding to the Greek, I must refer the reader, who wishes for the full-
est information, to Salmasius Exercitat. Plinian. p. 277, and Schneider
on Scriptores de Re Rustic. T. iv. p. 364, quoted by Stalbaum.
THE STATESMAN. 231
carding, that which has been drawn out into length and pos-
sesses breadth, is a certain filament.
Soc. jun. We do.
Guest. And of this, when it is turned by the spindle, and
becomes a solid thread, do thou call a stamen; but the art,
which regulates it, let us say that this is stamen-weaving.
Soc. jun. Right.
Guest.. But such fabrics as receive a loose twisting, and, by
the infolding of the stamen through the dragging of the knap-
ping process, acquire a moderate softness, of these we call
what is spun the woof, but the art itself which presides over
these, woof-spinning.
Soc. jun. Most right.
Guest. And now that part of the weaving art, which we
have brought forward, is obvious to every one. For, with
respect to a part of the commingling art in wool-working,
when it accomplishes that, which is woven by a straight-
knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole
of the thing woven we call a woollen garment, but the art
(presiding) over it, weaving.
Soc. jun. Most right.
[24.| Guest. Be it so. But why then did we not immedi-
ately answer, that the weaving (art) is that which infolds the
woof and the thread, instead of proceeding in a round-about
way, and defining many things in vain?
Soc. jun. It does not appear to me, O guest, that of what
has been said a single thing has been said in vain.
Guest. This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O
blessed youth, it will appear so. But against such a disorder,
should it hereafter by chance? come upon you—*for nothing
is wonderful’—hear a certain discourse, proper to be spoken
about all such things as these.
Soc. jun. Only relate it.
Guest. Let us then in the first place look into the whole of
excess and deficiency, in order that we may praise and blame
7 Here, as in § 8, n. 32, Stalbaum translates πολλάκις “ by chance.”
This sense was first pointed out by Abresch in Dilucid. Thucyd. on § 13,
and has been adopted by the generality of modern scholars.
8—8 This clause seems to be an explanation of the words τὸ νόσημα
τὸ τοιοῦτον.
232 THE STATESMAN.
according to reason whatever is said on each occasion at
greatér length, or the contrary, than is becoming in disputa-
tions of this kind.
’ Soe. jun. It will be proper so to do.
Guest. Our discourse taking place on these points, would,
I think, take place rightly.
Soc. jun. About what things ?
Guest. About length and shortness, and the whole of ex-
cess and deficiency. For the art of measuring is conversant
with all these.
Soc. jun. It is.
Guest. Let us divide it then into two parts. For it is
necessary for that, to which we are hastening.
Soc. jun. Inform me how this division (is to be made).
Guest. Thus. One part according to the ideas relating in
common to great and little, but the other part according to
the necessary existence of production.
Soc. jun. How say you?
Guest. Does it not appear to you to be according to nature,
that we ought to speak of the greater as being greater than
nothing else but the lesser? and on the other hand of the
lesser, as being lesser than the greater, but nothing else?
Soc. jun. 'To me it does.
Guest. But what, must we not say that, what surpasses
the nature of moderation, and is surpassed by it, whether in
words or actions, is, when produced in reality, that by which
the good and bad of us differ the most from each other?
Soc. jun. It appears so.
Guest. These twofold existences then and judgments re-
specting the great and the small we must lay down ; but not,
as we just now said, with reference to each other only; but,
as is just now said, we must speak of one as being referable?
to each other, but of the other (as referable) to moderation.
Are we however willing to learn on what account this is
requisite ?
Soe. jun. How not?
Guest. If any one admits the nature of the greater (to
® After δεῖν Heindorf wished to insert εἶναι ; and so does Stalbaum.
Schleiermacher conceived the passage to be imperfect. Hence it is
evident he did not see what Plato meant to say; nor do I.
THE STATESMAN. : 233
be referable)! to nothing but the lesser, it will not be (refer-
able) to moderation. Will it?
Soe. jun. (It will be) thus.
Guest. Shall’ we not then destroy the arts themselves, and
all their works, according to this reasoning? And shall we
not cause to disappear entirely the statesman’s science, which
we are now investigating, and that which is called the weav-
ing art? For all such things as these guard against that,
which is more or less than moderation, not as if it had no
existence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in practice; and
after this manner preserving moderation, they effect every
thing beautiful and good.
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. If then we cause to disappear the statesman’s sci-
ence, will not our subsequent search of king-science be with-
out a road?
Soc. jun. Very much so.
Guest. Whether then, as in the Sophist, we compelled non-
entity to exist,!! after the discourse about it had fled from us
in that direction, so now we shall compel the more and the
less to become measured, not only with reference to each other,
but likewise to the production of moderation? For no one
can become indisputably a statesman, or be any person else,
possessing a knowledge relating to actions, if this be not ac-
knowledged.
Soc. jun. We ought then to do this even now as much as
possible.
[25.] Guest. This, Socrates, is a still greater work than
that; although we remember how great was its prolixity.
But it is very just to put hypothetically something of this
kind respecting them. .
Soc. gun. Of what kind ὃ
Guest. That there will be a need of what has been just
stated, for the demonstration of what is accurate respecting
it.’ But as regards the present question, this reasoning is
1 For the sake of perspicuity, Plato must, I think, have written, ἐάσει
τις φύσιν sivar—
1 See Sophist, p. 240, C. § 53.
15. Ficinus has, ‘ad sinceri ipsius absolutique ostensionem,” which
leads to τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς ἐπίδειξιν, instead of τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ
τἀκριβὲς ἐπίδειξιν. From the two we may elicit what Plato wrote, τὴν
234 THE STATESMAN.
shown, well and sufficiently, it appears to me, to assist us in
a conspicuous manner, so that'? we must think all arts are to
be measured according to something more and at the same
time less, not only with reference to one another, but to the
production likewise of moderation. For when this exists,
they exist also; and when they exist, this exists also; but
when either of these does not exist, neither of those will
exist.
Soc. jun. This indeed is right. But what is there after this ?
Guest. It is evident that we should divide the art of mea-
suring, as has been said, into two parts; placing as one of
its parts all those arts, which measure number, and length,
and depth, and breadth, and thickness, with reference to the
contrary ; but placing as its other part, such arts as regard
the moderate and the becoming, the seasonable and the fit,
and all such as are separated from the extremes towards the
middle (point).
Soe. gun. Each of these sections is great, and they differ
much from each other.
Guest. That, Socrates, which many clever men, who think
they are saying something wise, sometimes assert, when they
say that the art of measuring is conversant with all generated
natures, that very thing happens to be now asserted by us.
For all things of art do after a certain manner partake of
measure; but, in consequence of not being accustomed to divide
according to species, these men immediately bring together
to the same point things widely differing from each other, and
consider them as similar; and, on the other hand, they do the
very contrary to this, by not dividing according to their parts
things that are different; although it is requisite that when
any one first perceives the communion of many things, he
should not desist till he perceives all the differences in it,
which are placed in species; and again, when the all-various
dissimilitudes in multitudes are perceived, he should not be
able, through a feeling of disgust, to desist *(from this un-
περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς ἐπίδειξιν, “ the demonstration of accuracy re-
specting it.”
1 By taking δοκεῖ μοι parenthetically, and reading ὥστ᾽ for we, and
uniting εἶναι to ἡγητέον, we can not only perceive what Plato wrote, but
get rid of Stalbaum’s lengthy and unsatisfactory annotation.
*—* Ficinus has alone “ab hac aspectus molestia,””—required. by
the sense.
THE STATESMAN. 235
pleasant view),* till, having enclosed all such things as are
allied in one similitude, he invests them with the existence of
a certain genus. And thus much may suffice respecting these
particulars, and concerning defect and excess. Let us only
carefully observe, that two genera of the measuring art re-
specting these have been found out, and let us remember what
we say they are.
[26.] Soc. jun. We will remember.
Guest. After this discussion, let us assume another re-
specting the objects of our search, and the whole mental ex-
ercise in discourses of this kind.
Soc. jun. What is it?
Guest. If any one should ask us respecting the assembling
together! of those that learn their letters, when one is asked
of what letters does any word (consist), shall we say that the
inquiry is then made for the sake of the one word proposed,
rather than that of the party becoming more skilful as a gram-
marian, with respect to every thing placed before him.
Soc. jun. Evidently as regards every thing (of grammar).
Guest. Has the inquiry respecting a statesman been pro-
posed by us more forthe sake of the statesman himself, than for
ourselves to become more skilful dialecticians on every point ?
Soc. jun. This too is evident, that (it is for ourselves to
become such) on every point.
Guest. No one indeed endued with intellect would be will-
ing to hunt out the rationale of the art of weaving, for its own
sake alone. But I think it has lain hid from most men, that
to some things, which are naturally easy to learn, there are
certain similitudes to be perceived by the senses, which it is
not difficult to make manifest, when any one wishes to point
them, out to some one inquiring a reason respecting a thing,
not with trouble, but easily without a (long) speech.’ But of
16 I confess myself unable to understand συνουσίαν. Ficinus has “ de
puerorum—exercitatione.”” Perhaps Plato wrote σύνεσιν, “ the intelli-
nce.”
14515 Such is the literal English version of the Latin one, given by
Heusde in Init. Philosoph. Platon. vol. ii. P. 2, p. 119, which Stalbaum
has thought proper to praise, without being able to understand it; for
most assuredly μὴ μετὰ πραγμάτων could never mean “non egre et cum
molestia.”” Equally unintelligible, to myself at least, is the representa-
tion of Ficinus, ‘‘ non cum ipsis rebus, sed seorsum ratione facile demon-
strare.” Had Plato written μὴ μετὰ ταραγμάτων, there would have
286 THE STATESMAN.
things the greatest and the most honoured, there is not any
image made clear for men, by which being shown, he who
wishes to fill the soul of the inquirer, will fill it sufficiently by
suiting it to one of the senses. Hence it is requisite to
practice oneself in being able to give and receive a reason for
every thing. For incorporeal natures, being the most beauti-
ful and the greatest, are exhibited by reason alone, and by
nothing else; and it is for this that all has been said now.
But the consideration of every particular occurs more easily
in small things than in great.
Soc. jun. You speak most beautifully.
Guest. Let us then remember that all these things have
been said by us on this account.
Soc. gun. On what?
Guest. Not the least on account of the disgust, which we
have felt disgustingly '*through the prolix discourse about
the weaving art, and about the revolution of the universe, and
that of the sophist about the existence of a non-entity, con-
ceiving it to have a rather (considerable) length. And on all
these accounts we reproached ourselves, fearing lest we should
speak superfiuously in conjunction with prolixity.'© That we
may not then suffer any thing of this kind again, think that on
account of all these things our former remarks have been made.
Soc. jun. Be it so. Only say what is in order."
Guest. I say then, it is requisite that both you and I
should be mindful of what we have now said, ‘Sand to give on
each occasion blame and praise of brevity as well as prolixity ®
been less perhaps to object to, as being opposed to ῥᾳδίως. But even thus
the whole passage still fails to present a perspicuous sense.
616 To avoid the insufferable tautology in τῆς δυσχερείας ἥν---
ἀπεδεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς, Heindorf and Schleiermacher proposed to place
ἣν after ὑφαντικὴν. They should have suggested ὁλοσχερῶς, explained by
Suidas ὁλοτελῶς, or have omitted δυσχερῶς, with Ficinus. Unless it be
said that ὁλοσχερῶς ought to be inserted between ks τὸ fb and λέγοιμεν,
in lieu of καὶ μακρὰ, which are plainly superfluous after περίεργα : but if
altered into ἢ καὶ μακρὰ, they might be placed after πλέον, a little before.
At least by such changes we can get rid of all that is objectionable in the
present state of the Greek text. ἣ
17 Ficinus has “ Dic age que restant,” as if he had found in his MS.
μόνον τὸ λοιπόν.
18..--ἰ Tn the place of this mass of nonsense, Ficinus has what is at least
intelligible in part—‘‘ita ut non invicem prolixitates dijudicemus, sed
secundum facultatis dimetiendi partem, quam supra diximus ad decori
normam esse referendam.”” From whence it is evident that he did not
THE STATESMAN. 237
respecting what we may happen to be speaking, not judging
of prolixities with reference to each other, but according to
that part of the measuring art, which we then said we ought
to remember relating to the becoming.'*
Soc. jun. Right.
Guest. But yet all things are not (to be referred) to this.
19For we shall not be in need of prolixity, which, as regards
pleasure, is not all fitting, unless as something of no import-
ance:!9 on the other hand, as regards the search of what has
been proposed, in order that we may find it most easily, and
quickly, reason bids us regard it as a secondary, not primary ob-
ject; but to honour the most and in the first place, the method of
being able”? to divide according to species ; and to pay a serious
regard to a discourse, if when spoken at great length it renders
the hearer more inventive; and not to take it ill; and in like
manner, if it be shorter. And still, in addition to this, (reason
says)”! that he who blames long discourses in meetings such as
these, and who does not admit round-about periods, must not
dismiss them altogether, rapidly, and immediately, by abusing
merely what has been spoken at great length, but he must
show moreover that he "thinks that (words) being shorter”?
would render persons coming together more fitted for dialectics,
and more able to discover the demonstration by reason of exist-
ing things; but of the praise and blame of others relating to
any other subjects we need take no thought, nor appear to
hear at all such words as these. [27.] But of this there is
enough, if so it seems likewise to you. Let us then again re-
turn to the statesman, introducing the pattern of the above-
mentioned weaving art.
find in his MS. μεμνῆσθαι : in lieu of which Schleiermacher would read
@ τότε ἔφαμεν δεῖν μετρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον, in allusion to what is
stated in ᾧ 20, μετροῦσι---πρὸς τὸ πρέπον.
1219 1 confess 1 do not perceive what Plato is aiming at.
20 Here again I aminthe dark. Icould have understood ‘‘ the method
ofa person able to divide genera according to species” in Greek,—rod κατ᾽
εἴδη δυνατοῦ γένη διαιρεῖν.
21 Stalbaum says that the ellipse, “‘reason says,’’ is to be supplied from
the expression used a little before, ὁ λόγος παραγγελλει. He got the
idea from Ficinus’ version, ‘‘ eumque jubet.”
222 Ficinus has ‘‘ immo potius ostendere disputationem breviorem,”’
which shows that οἴεσθαι was certainly omitted in his MS., and ὡς
βραχύτερα ἂν τὰ λεγόμενα probably found there instead of—dy γενόμενα:
for γενόμενα and λεγόμενα are constantly confounded in MSS.
288 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. You speak well ;' and let us do as you say.
Guest, Has not then the king been separated from the
majority (of arts), as are fellow-tending, or rather from all
that relate to herds ? But the remaining, we say, (are those)
that (belong to) the co-causes, and causes relating to the state
itself, which we must separate from each other.
Soe. jun. Right.
Guest. You know then that it is difficult to bisect these ;
and the reason will, I think, as we advance, be not the less
apparent.
Soc. jun. It will be then meet to do so.
Guest. Let us then separate them like a victim piecemeal ;
since we cannot do so by a bisection: for it is always requisite
to cut into the nearest number possible.
Soc. jun. How then shall we do so at present ?
Guest. Just as before; for we laid down as co-causes what-
ever (arts) furnished instruments for weaving.
Soc. jun. Yes. :
Guest. The same thing therefore we must do now, and still
more than then. For such arts as fabricate, with regard to a
state instrument, either small or large, we must lay down all
of them as co-causes; since without these a state could not
exist, nor yet statesmanship. But on the other hand we will
not lay down any one of these as the work” of kingship.
Soc. jun. We will not.
Guest. And yet we are attempting to do a difficult thing, in
separating this genus from the rest. *4For if it appears that
he, who says that whatever exists is an instrument of some
one thing, says what is credible, 25 still on the other hand let
us say that there is this thing different from the possessions
in a state.
Soc. jun. What thing ἢ
* Instead of ἔργον the train of ideas seems to lead to ὄργανον.
38. 1 have translated, as if the Greek were é τι---δοκεῖ tiv’ εἰρηκέναι,
instead of ὕὅτι---δοκεῖν εἰρηκέναι. For whatever Stalbaum may assert to
the contrary, εἰπόντα must have either the positive article before it, or
the indefinite pronoun after it. To meet the difficulty in the syntax,
Stephens suggested ἔστι for ὅτι. Ast would insert δεῖ before δοκεῖν, but
Stalbaum, ἀνάγκη after πιθανόν.
* If [have restored correctly the preceding sentence, we must read
here ὅμως εἶναι for ὕμως δὲ, or else omit δὲ entirely. (
THE STATESMAN. 239
Guest. As* itis not having,this very power. *™ For that
thing is not put together like an instrument, as a cause of pro-
duction, but for the safety of that which is fabricated.”
Soe. jun. What kind of thing ?
Guest. That thing, which being worked up from materials
dry and moist, and exposed to fire, and without fire,* is a
species of varied kind, which we call by one appellation, a
vessel; and though it is a numerous” species, it does not I
think belong*® at all to the science we are seeking.
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. Of these possessions, there is another and third
species very numerous to be looked into, being on land and
in the water, and much-wandering and not-wandering, and
honourable and dishonourable; but possessing one name, be-
cause the whole of it exists for the sake of a certain sitting,
as becoming always a seat for something.
Soc. jun. What kind of thing is it ?
Guest. We call it a vehicle, a thing not at all the work
of the statesman’s science, but rather more of the carpenter,
potter, and brass-founder.
[28.] Soc. jun. I understand.
Guest. What of the fourth (species)? Must we speak of
one different from these, in which the most of the things for-
merly mentioned are contained; every kind of dress, the greater
part of arms, and all walls, such as are thrown round, of
earth or stone, and ten thousand other things. And since all
these are constructed for the sake of a protection, the whole
may most justly be called a defence; and may, for the most
part, be considered much more the work of the architect, and
more rightly*! of the weaver, than of the statesman.
35 Instead of we the train of ideas leads to Ὅ γ᾽, “ Which is—” For
there is evidently required an answer to the preceding question.
ὅτ 57 Here again I scarcely perceive what Plato means to say.
35. 988. The words καὶ ἐμπύροις καὶ ἀπύροις are omitted by the three
MSS. of the same family, considered by Stalbaum as the best; who, after
describing the passage as wretchedly corrupt, attempts to amend it by
reading παντοδαπὸν εἶδος ἐργασθὲν ἐργαλεῖον καὶ ἀγγεῖον, ὃ δὴ μιᾷ κλήσει
προσφθεγγόμεθα. ;
, 39 What can be the meaning of συχνὸν here, without a more specific
enumeration ?
30 If the species did not bear upon the searched for science, what could
have led Plato to allude to it ?
31 Stalbaum, who seems quite enamoured of the intolerable tautology
240 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. Entirely so. '
Guest. Are we willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of
adorning and painting, and such as making use of it (painting)
and music, finish as imitations, fabricated for our pleasure,
and which may be justly comprehended in one name?
Soc. jun. In what name?
Guest. They may be surely denominated amusement.
Soc. jun. How not? ‘
Guest. This one name then will suit, when pronounced,
with all these: for not one of these things is done through
seriousness, but all for the sake of amusement.
Soc. jun. This too I nearly understand.
Guest. But that, which prepares for all these materials
bodies, out of which and in which, whatever arts have now
been mentioned, manufacture (something),*? shall we not place
as a sixth all-various species, the offspring of many other arts.
Soc. jun. Of what (art) are you speaking ?
Guest. *3' That (which furnishes) gold and silver, and other
substances found as metals, and whatever the art of felling
trees, and the whole of the clipping art, furnishes to the car-
penter, and the knitting art, and still further that which barks
trees, and takes off the skins of living animals, [the currier’s
art, |>* and all such (arts) as are conversant with things of
this kind, and such as working on corks, and papyrus-reeds,
and withies, furnish the means of manufacturing from
not put together, species that are put together. The whole of
this let us call the first-born possession of man, without any
putting together, and by no means the work of the science of
kingship.
Soc, jun. Right.
Guest. The possession of nutriment, and of such things as
when mingled with the body possess a certain power, by their
in πολλῷ μᾶλλον and ὀρθότερον, was not aware that Ficinus has proper!
omitted Ar vitor whieh is evidently a gl. of πολλῷ μᾶλλον. Y
* To preserve the syntax, we must insert rt after δημιουργοῦσι.
%3 The whole of this passage was found in a better state in the MS.
used by Ficinus, than in any other collated subsequently ; as is evident
from his version: “" Eam, que aurum et argentum ceteraque metaila,
terre eruta visceribus, preparat; item, que silvas incidit, que tondet,
que ex his construit aliquid, que plicat atque contexit, seu que cortices
arborum, sive que animalium pelles circumcidit et polit.”
* Stalbaum considers σκυτοτομικὴ as an interpolation.
THE STATESMAN. 241
parts, to be subservient to the parts of the body, we must
rank in the seventh place, by calling it altogether our nurse,
unless we have some other better name to give. However,
we will place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting,
exercise, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to these arts
more properly than to the science of the statesman.
[29.] Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. Nearly then all, whatsoever is connected with posses-
sion, with the exception of tame animals, has I think been men-
tioned in these seven genera. But consider. For it was most
just that the species (called) first-born should be placed first ;
and after this, instrument, vessel, vehicle, protection, amuse-
ment, and cattle.* But if any thing of no great consequence
has escaped us, which it is possible to suit only (with diffi-
culty)** to some one of these, we omit it; such as the idea of
coin, of seals, and of every thing bearing a mark. For these
things have not in themselves a genus much in common; but
some will agree as regards ornament, others as regards instru-
ments, drawn (into the discussion) indeed with violence, but
nevertheless completely. But the tending of herds, as pre-
viously divided, will appear to have comprehended the whole
possession of tame animals with the exception of slaves.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. The genus of slaves and of all servants remains ;
amongst whom I conjecture will become apparent those, who
engaged in the very thing woven,*” contend with the king in
the same manner as those above, that are engaged in knitting,
and in wool-combing, and in such other arts as we then men-
tioned, did with the weavers. But all the rest, spoken of as
co-causes, have, together with the works just now mentioned,
35 So Taylor translates θρέμμα, which is literally “a nursling.” Stal-
baum says the word is here taken actively, as γέννημα is in the Sophist,
p- 266, D. § 112. But nouns derived from the perfect passive of a verb,
could never have an active meaning. Schleiermacher wished to read
τροφὴν for θρέμμα, and Ast θρεπτικόν. They ought rather to have altered
τροφὸν just before into θρέμμα.
% So Stalbaum, by reading μόγις for μέγα, which is omitted not only
in his three best MSS., but by Ficinus likewise.
37 This, says Ast, is to be explained by what the author states subse-
quently in p. 308, D., § 46, where the science of the king is compared
with that of the weaver.
R
249 THE STATESMAN.
been done away with,** and separated from the action of the
king and statesman.
Soc. jun. So they seem.
Guest. Come then, let us approach nearer, and consider
the rest, that we may perceive them more firmly.
Soc. jun. It is requisite (to do so).
Guest. We shall find then that the greatest servants, 80
far as we can see from those here, are in a pursuit, and
under circumstances the very contrary to what we have
suspected.
Soc. jun. Who are they?
Guest. They who are purchased, and in this manner be-
come a property ; whom, beyond all controversy, we may call
slaves and laying the least claim to the kingly science.
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. But what shall we say of those free-born persons, who
willingly put themselves to ministering to the parties*® men-
tioned just now, and by conveying the produce of agriculture,
and of other arts, to each other, and “° by equalizing the pos-
session and value of articles,’ do some at (home) markets, and
others by going from state to state, by sea and land ex
coin against other things, or itself against itself, (whom we
have called money-changers, ship-owners, and hucksters,) will
these contend for any part of the statesman’s science ? .
Soc. jun. Perhaps some of the foreign merchants will.
Guest. And yet we shall never find those, who for wages
most readily become servants to all persons, laying any claim
to the science of a king.
Soc. jun. For how should we?
Guest. What then (shall we say) of those, that do such
ministerings for us on each occasion.
Soe. jun. Of what and whom are you speaking ἢ
38 Instead of ἀνήλωνται Stalbaum says it were easy to read ἀνῴρηνται,
“done away with:” but the alteration is not necessary. Ficinus has
“*sejuncti atque discreti,”” by an hendyadis, from which it is difficult to
ascertain more than that his MS. did not read ἀνήλωνται. Perhaps
ἀναλέλυνται, “loosened.”
% Instead of taking τοῖς---ῥηθεῖσιν as dependent on ὑπηρετικὴν, Stal-
baum would read dco σὺν τοῖς---ῥηθεὺσιν, i. e. “as many as
with those mentioned—”
4°40 Such is perhaps the meaning of ἀνισοῦντες, in the language of
commerce, that equalizes the products of different climes.
THE STATESMAN. 243
Guest. I speak of the tribe of heralds,‘' and of those who
become accomplished in the art of writing,*? and often act as
ministers, and certain other persons, who have very great
talents for some other and many kinds of business connected
with public offices. What shall we say of these ?
Soc. jun. What you have said just now, that they are min-
isters, but no rulers in states.
Guest. But surely 451 was not, I think, seeing a vision,"
when I said that in this way, perchance, would be seen those
strenuously contending for the science of a statesman. And
yet it would seem to be very absurd to seek after these in any
ministering portion.
Soc. jun. Very much so, indeed.
Guest. Let us then approach still nearer to those who have
not been as yet examined. Now these are such as possess a
certain portion of ministering science relating to divination.
For they are held to be the interpreters of gods to men.
Soc. jun. They are.
Guest. The genus too of priests, as the law says, knows how
gifts should be offered by us through sacrifices to the gods,
agreeably to them; and how we should request of them by
prayer the possession of good things. Now both these are
parts of the ministering art.
[30.] Soc. jun. So it appears.
Guest. Now then we seem to me to touch, as it were, upon
some foot-print of the object to which we are on the road.
For the figure of priests and prophets is replete with pru-
41 The persons alluded to would be now called “ diplomatists,”’ as is
evident from the Hippias Major; where the Pantologist of his day is said
to have been frequently employed in that character. }
42 As the art of writing was in ancient times known only to a few, such
persons became of necessity the men of office and consideration in the
state; just as no man will ever become the prime minister of England,
unless he can figure as a debater. For though nearly every body can
read and write, yet few can open a debate with a long speech, and fewer
still close it with a reply to the different arguments urged on the opposite
side. The persons to whom Plato alludes were called Tpapparei¢ or
Ὑπογραμματεῖς, i. 6. “ Secretaries,” or ‘ Under-secretaries ;,’ who, says
Aristophanes in The Frogs, 1095, while they amuse the people with
monkey-tricks, pick their pockets. Stalbaum refers here to Boeckh’s
Econom. Athen. i. p. 198, and Schemann. de Comit. p. 318.
4343 In the place of the words between the figures Ficinus has
merely, “ Haud abs re—” A
R
244 THE STATESMAN,
dence, and obtains a reputation for respect through the great-
ness of the matters in their hands; so that in Egypt it is not
permitted for a king to govern without the sacerdotal science ;
and should any one previously of another genus* of men be-
come by violence (the king), he is afterwards compelled to be
initiated in the mysteries of this genus. Further still among
the Greeks, one may find in many places that the greatest
sacrifices relating to matters of this kind are imposed upon
the greatest offices; and what I assert is shown particularly
among you. For to him who is chosen by lot the king here,*®
they say that of all the ancient sacrifices, those held in the
highest veneration and most peculiar to the country are
assigned.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. We must then consider these kings chosen by lot,
together with the priests, and their ministers, and a certain
other very numerous crowd, which has just now become
manifest to us, apart from those previously mentioned.
Soc. jun. Of whom are you speaking ?
Guest. Of certain very strange persons.
Soc. jun. Why so?
Guest. As I was just now speculating, their genus appeared
to me to be all kinds. 4’For many men resemble lions and
centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are
similar to satyrs, and to weak and versatile wild beasts. They
likewise rapidly change their forms and their power into each
other.47 And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myself to have
just now perceived these men for the first time.
Soc. jun. Speak; for you seem to see something strange.
Guest. I do; for what is strange is the result of ignorance
“* The modern name is “ caste,”’ still found in Hindostan; where have
been preserved not a few of the customs of Egypt.
45. Ficinus has, what appears requisite to complete the sense, “ut rex
denique sit et sacerdos.” '
46 The second archon at Athens was called “ the king,’ and had cog-
nizance over the principal religious festivals. ,
4747 With this passage in Plato may be compared that in Shakspeare,
where Hamlet thus amuses himself at the expense of Polonius. “‘ Ham. Do
you see yonder cloud that is almost in the shape of acamel? Pol. By the
mass, and it is like a camel, indeed. Ham. Methinks it is like a weasel.
Pol. It is backed like a weasel. Ham. Or like a whale. Pol. Very like
a whale.” εὐ haa
THE STATESMAN. 245
in the case of all.48 And I myself just now suffered the
very same thing: for I was suddenly involved in doubt on
seeing the dancing-troop*® relating to state affairs.
Soc. jun. Of what kind ?
Guest. The greatest wizard of all the wise,®° and the most
skilled in this art ; who must be separated from the really ex-
isting statesmen and kings, although it is very difficult so to
separate him, if we are about to see clearly the object of our
search.
Soc. jun. We must not give up this, at least.
Guest. Not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me
this.
[31.] Soc. jun. What ?
Guest. Is not a monarchy one of the forms of state-rule ?
Soc. jun. It is.
Guest. And after a monarchy one would, I think, speak of
an oligarchy.
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. But is not the rule of the many called by the name
of a democracy, a third form of state-polity ?
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. Do not these being three become after a manner five,
by two producing from themselves two other names in addi-
tion to their own ?
Soc. jun. What ?
Guest. They who look to the violent and the voluntary, to
poverty and wealth, to law and lawlessness, which take place
in them, give a twofold division to each one of the two, and
call monarchy, as exhibiting two species, by two names, one
tyranny, the other royalty.
Soc. jun. How not?
48 So Johnson said that wonder was the effect of novelty upon ig-
norance.
49 By no process of thinking and writing correctly could a single person
be called “ἃ dancing-troop.”” He might indeed be called the leader of
such a troop. Hence it is evident that Plato wrote not χορὸν but
χορηγόν. : ‘
50 'This is the correct reading found in six MSS., in lieu of σοφιστῶν :
which Stalbaum says was altered by scribes, who did not perceive the
ridicule which Plato was throwing on the Sophist, whom Stalbaum
should have seen the author had not here, and could not have had, in his
thoughts.
246 THE STATESMAN,
Guest. But the state ever governed by a few, (we call) an
aristocracy and an oligarchy.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. But of a democracy, whether the people govern the
rich violently, or with their consent, and whether they strictly
guard the laws or not, no one is ever accustomed to change
the name at all.
Soc. jun. True.
Guest. What then? Do we think that any one of these
state-polities is right, thus bounded by these definitions, such
as by one, and a few, and a many, and by wealth and poverty,
by the violent and the voluntary, *!and happening to exist*!
by statutes and without laws?
Soc. jun. What should hinder?
Guest. Consider more attentively, following me by this
road,
Soc. gun. What road ὃ
Guest. Shall we abide by what was asserted at first, or
shall we dissent from it ?
Soc. jun. To what assertion are you alluding ?
Guest. I think we said that a regal government was one
of the sciences.
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. Yet not of those taken together as a whole; but
we selected it from the other sciences, as something judicial
and presiding.
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. And from the presiding science (we selected) one
part, as belonging to inanimate acts, and the other as belong-
ing to animals. And dividing after this fashion, we have
arrived thus far, not forgetful of science, but unable to de-
termine with sufficient accuracy what science is.
Soc. jun. You say rightly.
Guest. Do we then understand this very thing, that the
definition must be respecting them,” not (as regards) the few,
51—51 The words ξυμβαίνουσαν γίγνεσθαι are omitted by Ficinus, and,
after him, of course, by Taylor.
8 I confess I cannot understand περὲ αὐτῶν. For αὐτῶν can hardl
be referred to the forms of government; and if it could, the words prs
αὐτῶν should be placed between roy and ὅρον, as in Ficinus, * ipsorum
determinationem descriptionemque ;’ 3, * whose secundum p paucos”’ shows
that he probably found in his MS. οὐ κατ᾽ ὀλίγους in lieu of οὐκ ὀλίγους.
THE STATESMAN. 247
nor the many, nor the voluntary or involuntary, nor poverty
or wealth, but (as regards) a certain science, if we follow
what has been formerly detailed ?
[82.1 Soc. jun. It is impossible, indeed, not to do this.
Guest. We must of necessity then consider now this; in
which of these does the science respecting the government
of men happen to exist, being nearly *the greatest and most
difficult’ to obtain. For it is requisite to inspect it, that we
may perceive who are the parties we must take away from a
prudent king, who lay claim to be statesmen, and persuade
the multitude (of it), and yet are so not at all.
Soc. jun. We must do so, as the reasoning has previously
told us.
Guest. Does it then appear to you that the mass in a city
is able to acquire this science ?
Soc. jun. How can they ἢ
Guest. But in a city of a thousand men, is it possible ἪΝ a
hundred, or even fifty, to acquire it sufficiently ?
Soc. jun. It would be then the most easy of all arts. For
we know that among a thousand men there could not be
found so many tip-top draught-players as compared with
those in the rest of Greece, much less kings. For, according
to our former reasoning, we must call him, who possesses
the science of a king, whether he governs or not, a regal
character.
Guest. You have very properly reminded me. And I think
it follows from this, that a right government, when it exists
rightly, ought to be investigated as about one person,** or two,
or® altogether about a few.
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. And we must hold, as we think now, that these
exercise rule according to a certain art, whether they govern
the willing or the unwilling, whether according to statutes or
without statutes, and whether they are rich or poor. For we
—*8 This, which is the natural order of ideas, i is properly found in
ΕΥ̓ ΤΩ * comparatu maxima—atque difficillima.”? The common order,
χαλεπωτάτης καὶ μεγίστης, is supported however by Repub. viii. p.
— 4 So Ficinus has “ unum vel duo vel paucos,”’ which shows that his
MS. read ἕνα τινα ἢ δύο ἢ---ὀλίγους instead of καὶ δύο καὶ. On the con-
fusion of ἢ and καὶ, see my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 112.
248 THE STATESMAN.
have considered those as not the less physicians, whether
they cure us, willing or unwilling, by cutting, or burning, or
applying any other pain; and whether according to written
rules or not, and whether they are themselves poor or rich.
In all (these cases) we say that they are no less physicians, so
long as they stand over (the patient)®*° according to art,®® purg-
ing or some other way attenuating (the body), or in causing
(it) to increase, and so long as, for the good of the body
alone, they bring it from a worse to a better state, and by at-
tending preserve each*” (body) attended to. After this man-
ner, and in no other, as I think, we will lay down that the
definition of the medicinal or any other rule is rightly made.
Soc. jun. And very much 80.
[33.] Guest. It is necessary then, as it seems, that of poli-
ties that must be pre-eminently correct, and the only polity,
in which the governors are found to possess science truly, and
not in appearance merely ; whether theyrule according to laws
or without laws, over the willing or the unwilling, and are
themselves poor or rich. For not one of these things must
we consider at all, as regards any rectitude (of government).
Soc. jun. Beautifully (said). ͵
Guest. And whether they purge the state to its good, by
putting to death or banishing certain persons; or by sending
out colonies some where, like a swarm of bees, they reduce it to
a less size; or whether by introducing some others from abroad
they make citizens of them, and thus increase its size, so long as
by making use of science and justice, they preserve it, and cause
it to the utmost of their power to pass from a worse condition
to a better one, then, and according to such limits, must we
speak of a polity as alone rightly existing. Butwe must say that
such others, as we have mentioned, are not genuine, nor do
they in reality exist; *%but that those, which we call well-
regulated, imitate this for the better, the others for the worse.*®
55. This word is graphically applied here to a physician standing over
the bed of the patient.
56 Stalbaum says that the generality of translators have considered
τέχνῃ as governed by ἐπιστατοῦντες, instead of taking it as the dative
of the manner. Ficinus has however, ‘‘ arte—president.”
5? 1 have adopted ἕκαστα (i. 6. σώματα), found in one MS., in lieu of
ἕκαστοι, which is superfluous here as applied to the physicians.
588 The version of Ficinus exhibits here a remarkable variation from
the Greek text of Stalbaum, which is made up in part from the conjectures
THE STATESMAN. 249
Soc. jun. The other points, O guest, appear to have been
stated with moderation: but that it is requisite®® to govern
without laws, has been stated as a thing rather harsh to hear.
Guest. You have anticipated me a little, Socrates, by your
question. For I was about to ask you, whether you admit all
these points, or whether you find any difficulty in any matter
that has been stated. It is however evident, that we now
wish to discuss the point respecting the rectitude of those,
who govern without laws.
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. After a certain manner it is evident that legislation
is a part of the science of a king: but it is best, not for the
laws to prevail,® but for a man, who has with prudence the
power of aking. Do you know in what way?
Soc. jun. In what way do you mean?
Guest. Because the law cannot, by comprehending that
which is the best and most accurately just in all cases, at the
same time ordain what is the best. For the inequalities of
men and their actions, and the fact that not a single atom, so
to say, of human affairs, enjoys a state of rest, do not permit
any art whatever to exhibit in any case any thing simple
(without exception) respecting all matters and through all
time. Shall we admit this?
Soc. gun. How not?
Guest. And yet we see the law tending nearly to this very
point; and, like a certain self-willed and ignorant man, it
does not suffer any person to do any thing contrary to its own
orders, nor to put a question, not even should something new
happen to be in some case ®!better as compared with the de-
cree®! it had ordained.
of Heindorf and his own, “Sed eas, que hanc imitantur, libenter landamus,
quasi facile ad meliora tendentes ; alias vero contra vituperamus, tanquam
imitatione malorum ad deteriora proclives.”
59 Instead of δεῖν, which Stalbaum absurdly endeavours to defend, Ast
suggested εἶναι, to which he was probably led by Ficinus’ version,
ἐς gubernationem sine legibus rectam esse posse ;” from whence I would
rather elicit, ἄνευ νόμων εἶναι εὖ ἄρχειν ἐξεῖ----
50 This was ἃ Pythagorean doctrine. Compare The Laws, ix. p. 875,
C. So says Stalb., who refers to Valckenaer on Herodot. iii. 38.
s1_S! Stalbaum translates παρὰ τὸν λόγον “ preter opinionem.” But
λόγος is “reason,” not “ opinion.”’ And if it ever did mean “ opinion,”
it could not do so here, where it is followed by ὃν ὁ νόμος ἐπέταξεν. For
the law can never ordain an opinion, only a fact.
250 THE STATESMAN,
Soc. jun. True. For the law does really so, as you have just
now said, to each of us.
Guest. Is it not then impossible for that, which is under all
cases simple, to do well in cases which are never at any time
simple ἢ |
Soc. jun. It appears so nearly.
[34.] Guest. Why then is it necessary to lay down laws?
since law is not a thing of the greatest rectitude. Of this we
must inquire the cause. :
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. Are there not then amongst us, as in other cities
likewise, certain exercises of men collected together for the
sake of competition relating to running, or something else ?
Soc. jun. Yes. There are very many.
Guest. Come then, let us again recall to our memory the
orders of those, who practise scientifically exercises in meet-
ings of this kind.
Soc. jun. What is this ?®
Guest. They do not conceive it is requisite to be very fine
in ordering, according to each individual, what is suited to the
body of each; but think more stupidly, that they ought to
make their arrangements of what benefits the body, suited to
the majority of circumstances and persons.
Soc. jun. Excellent.
Guest. On which account assigning now ® equal labours to
persons collected together, they urge them on together, and
stop them together in the race, and wrestling, and all the
labours of the body.
Soc. jun. Such is the fact.
Guest. Let us hold then, that the legislator who would pre-
side over his herds® in matters of justice, and their contracts
62 1 have translated as if the Greek were ἀγοραῖς, not ἀρχαῖς, which is
manifestly absurd. Stalbaum suggests ἀγέλαϊς. But as laws were made
in the ἀγορὰ, and gymnastic exercises took place there likewise, a word
is required suited at once to the arena of law and of gymnastics. Besides,
in ἀγοραῖς there is an allusion to the mention of ἁθρόων ἀνθρώπων. For
Hesychius explains ᾿Αγορὰ by ἅθροισμα.
53 The question τὸ ποῖον seems strange, thus following ἐπιτάξεις.
% Instead of παχύτερον Plato evidently wrote παχύτεροι, opposed to
λεπτουργεῖν : and so too shortly afterwards, παχύτερος ὧν instead of
παχύτερως. ;
8 To avoid the unmeaning “ now,” Stalbaum would read ἀποδιδόντες,
86 Although Ficinus renders ταῖσιν ἀγέλαις “ suis gregibus,”’ yet it is
THE STATESMAN. 251
with each other, will never be sufficient for all collectively, by
accurately enjoining upon each individual what is fitting.
Soe. jun. This is likely.
Guest. But I think he will establish laws suited to the
majority of persons and circumstances, and somehow thus in
a more stupid way for each, delivering them in writings, and
in an unwritten (form), and legislating according to the
customs of the country.
Soc. jun. Right.
Guest. Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can any one be
so all-sufficient as, by sitting near ® through the whole of life,
to enjoin accurately what is adapted to each? Since, although
any one soever of those who possess the science of a king
could, I think, do this, he would scarcely impose on himself
impediments, by writing down the so-called laws.
Soc. jun. (So it appears,) O guest, from what has been
now said.
Guest. And still more, O thou best one, from what will be said.
Soc. jun. What is that ?
Guest. Of this kind. For let us thus say to ourselves.
no where stated that the legislator has, like a king, a herd of his own.
And were the fact otherwise, yet ταῖσιν could not be found in prose for
ταῖς. Opportunely then do the three oldest MSS. offer τασιν, without
an accent; a proof of the reading being corrupt. Plato wrote, I suspect,
δίποσιν, which would be in MSS. ὕποσιν. For thus errors constantly
arise from the loss or confusion of letters indicative of numerals, as I
have shown in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 223, and 329; and to the passages
corrected there by myself, Bentley, Porson, Kidd, and Dobree, I could
now add full twenty more, where all the modern editors have, like Stal-
baum here, been utterly in the dark. With respect to v, thus written for
β, see Bast in Paleograph. Grec. p. 218, and Wellaver on Eumen. 115,
who has stolen there an emendation of mine.
% The words kai ἐν γράμμασιν ἀποδιδοὺς καὶ ἐν ἀγραμμάτοις πατρίοις
δὲ ἔθεσι νομοθετῶν Stalbaum thus paraphrases, misled, it would seem, as
Stephens was likewise, by Ficinus—“ Et scriptis leges promulgans et
secundum mores et instituta litteris quidem non consignata, sed tamen
patria, leges sanciens—” observing that ἔθος is here, as in Critias, p. 121,
B., the same as νόμος. Had he remembered that the laws, which Pytha-
goras gave his disciples, were unwritten, he would have seen to what is
to be referred the expression ἐν ἀγραμμάτοις.
55. 1 cannot understand παρακαθήμενος thus written by itself. Ficinus
has “sedulusque assidere cuique.’”” But even thus the passage is not
complete. The place where the lawgiver is supposed to sit should be
mentioned. There is a lacuna here, which it would not be difficult to
supply by the aid of Aschylus and Aristophanes.
252 THE STATESMAN.
Would not a physician, or any teacher of gymnastics, being
about to travel, and to be absent as he fancied from those
under his care for a long time, and thinking that those en-
gaged in exercises, or sick, would not remember his precepts,
be willing to write something to refresh their memory? Or
how (would he act) ? .
Soc. jun. In this way.
Guest. But what, if the physician, having been abroad a
less time than he expected, should come back, would he not
dare to suggest certain other things besides those contained
in his writings, other circumstances occurring more favourable
for the sick, through winds, or any thing else of those that are
wont to take place from Zeus (the air), contrary to expecta-
tion ? Would he think that he ought to persevere in not going
out of his old injunctions, and neither himself order other
things, nor dare to do to the sick man things different from
what had been written, as if these were medicinal and salubri-
ous, but those of a different kind noxious, and not according
to art? Or rather, would not every thing of this kind, oceur-
ring according to science and true art, in all matters become
altogether the greatest ridicule of such injunctions ?
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. But shall not he, who writes down what is just and
unjust, beautiful and base, good and evil, and who establishes
unwritten laws for the herds of human beings who live in
cities, in each® according to the laws of those who have
written them,—whether he comes himself (back)?° after hay-
ing written (laws) contrary to art, or some other like him, be
permitted to enjoin things different from these? Or, would
not this interdiction appear to be in reality no less ridiculous
than the former?
Soc. jun. How not?
[35.] Guest. Do you know then the language spoken by
the multitude respecting such a thing ?
Soc. jun. I have it not at present in my mind.
8° The words “in each,’”’ which are here manifestly absurd, Stalbaum
vainly, as usual, attempts to defend. For he did not know that Plato in-
serted them between τῶν and γραψάντων, understanding πόλεσι. They
are omitted by Ficinus entirely.
7 Ficinus renders ἀφίκηται “ redeat,” which shows that he found in
his MS. ἀφίκηται ad.
THE STATESMAN. 253
Guest. And yet it is very specious. For they say that, if
any one knows of laws better than those of their ancestors,
such a person should, after persuading his own state, become
a legislator ; otherwise not.
Soc. jun. Do they not then (say) rightly? -
Guest. Perhaps so. But if any one should, not by persua-
sion, force on the better, what would be the name of this
violence? Do not however (say) a word, but previously re-
specting the former.
Soe. jun. What do you mean?
Guest. Should some one, not by persuading a person under
a physician, but by possessing his art correctly, compel a boy,
or ἃ man, or a woman, contrary to prescriptions, to do that
which is better, what will be the name of this violence ?
Ought it not to be called rather any thing than some?! mis-
chievous transgression of art? And is it not for us to say,
that every thing (has happened’?) to the compelled person,
rather than that he has suffered any thing mischievous and
without art from the compelling physicians ?
Soc. jun. You speak most true.
Guest. But what is that error called by us, which is con-
trary to the statesman’s art? Must it not be the base, evil,
and unjust ἢ
Soe. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. Of those, who have been forced to act contrary to
the written precepts, and the customs of the country, more
justly, better, and more beautifully than before, come, (tell
me,) “(can any one), unless he is about to be the most
ridiculous of all men, (pronounce) a disapprobation of such
violence done to such persons? Must it not be said’ rather
τι Stalbaum endeavours absurdly to defend ἁμάρτημα, τὸ νοσῶδες,
where Stephens correctly suggested ἁμάρτημά τι---
7 The word necessary for the sense Ficinus has supplied by his “ con-
tigisse dicendum,”’ from which, one would suspect that he found in his
MS. πάντα ὀρθῶς εὖ πεσεῖν εἰπεῖν ἐστι. For εὖ πεσεῖν has been simi-
oe in the passages corrected by myself in Poppo’s Prolegom.
p- 148.
18. τὸ In translating this passage, where only a Stalbaum would at-
tempt to defend the want of connexion in the syntax, I have pute into
English what I suspect Plato wrote to this effect, in Greek—gépe, τὸν
τῶν τοιοῦτων ψόγον ἄν τις περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης βίας ἐροίη, εἰ μέλλει
πάντα δ᾽ αὐτῷ μᾶλλον λεκτεόν ἑκάστοτε, ὡς, πλὴν aioyod—instead of
254 THE STATESMAN,
by him on each occasion, that they, who have been forced,
have suffered at the hands of the forcing party ony thing,
except what is base, unjust, and evil ?
Soc. jun. You speak most true.
Guest. But if he who forces is rich, will the acts done
forcibly by him be just, but, if he is poor, unjust? Or,
whether a person persuades or does not persuade, (whether)
rich or poor, and (whether) according or contrary to written
statutes, he does what is useful, must this be the definition
the most true on all sides of the correct administration of a
state, by which” a wise and good man will (well) administer
the interests of those under his charge; just asa pilot watches
over whatever happens to conduce to the welfare of the vessel
and crew; and not by laying down written orders, but by
making his skill a law, he preserves his fellow-sailors. And
thus, [after this very same manner, 715 will an upright polity
be produced by those who are able to govern thus, by ex-
hibiting a strength of skill superior to the laws. And indeed
in the case of prudent rulers there will be no error, let them
do every thing; as long as they observe this one great maxim,
to distribute ever with intellect and art to those in the state
what is the most just, to keep them such as they are, and to
finish by rendering them, as far as possible, better instead of
worse.
Soc. jun. It is not possible to say the contrary to what has
been now asserted.
Guest. Nor yet against those to say even a word.
[36.] Soc. jun. Of what are you speaking ?
Guest. That no mob of any persons whatever can receive
this kind of science, and be able to administer with intellect
a state, but that we must seek for a correct polity amongst
a small number, and a few, and one person ; ;° and that we
must lay down other polities as imitations, as we observed a
little before, some for the better, and some for the worse,
τοιούτων αὖ ψόγον --- βίας, dp’, εἰ μέλλει --- πάντα αὐτῶ μᾶλλον ---
πλὴν wWe—
τε Stalb. with Steph. considers ὃν governed by κατὰ understood. But
as two MSS. read ἕν, perhaps Plato wrote ἐν ᾧ εὖ---
79.-Οτϊ These words are an intolerable tautology after οὕτω, * thus.”
6 Ficinus has, ‘“‘apud unum vel paucissimos,” which makes a far
better sense.
THE STATESMAN, 255
Soc. jun. How and why say you this? For I did not under-
stand just now forsooth”™ the remark respecting imitations.
Guest. Truly it were not a stupid act for a person, after
starting an argument of this kind, to lay it down there,” and
not, by going through it, to show the error which at present
exists about it.
Soc. jun. What error ?
Guest. It is meet to search into a thing of such a kind
as’? is not very usual, nor easy to perceive; but at the same
time we must endeavour to apprehend it. For, come, since
the polity of which we have spoken is tle only correct one,
you know that other polities ought to be thus*® preserved,
while they use the institutions of this, and do what was just
now praised, though it is not most right?
Soc. jun. What is that ?
Guest. That no one of those in the city dare to do any
thing contrary to the laws ; and that he whodares, shall pay the
forfeit by death, and all the extreme of punishments.*! This
too is most right and beautiful, as a second thing; * after
that some one shall have first changed the just now said.*?
But in what manner that, which we have called second, ex-
ists, let us proceed to state. Shall we not?
Soc. jun. By all means.
[37.| Guest. Let us then again return to the images, to
which it is ever necessary to assimilate kingly rulers,
7 In ἄρτι δῆθεν is an error, not as yet noticed by any editor; but
which it were not difficult perhaps to correct.
78 Stalbaum explains αὐτοῦ by “ immediately,” a meaning that word
never has. He should have suggested αὔτως, rendered “‘ at ease.” See
my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 14].
79 Stalbaum has failed to notice that ὃ has dropt out before οὐ, but is
preserved by Ficinus, ‘‘ quod—”
89 Stalbaum says that ‘‘ thus” is explained by the following expres-
sion, ‘‘ do what was just now praised.” I suspect however that οὕτως is
a corruption of ἀεί πως, for ἀεί πὼς carries with it the idea of a doubt.
81 This alludes to the confiscation of property, and the prohibition of
burial, which, as seen by the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles, was con-
sidered the extreme of punishment.
52. 85 This is a literal translation of the nonsense of the Greek text ;
which Stalbaum vainly endeavours to conceal by his version, “‘ ubi quis
mutaverit ac seposuerit primum illud, de quo modo dictum est ;”” which I
will leave for himself alone to understand, for nobody else can. Ficinus
has, “ primo namque in loco ponendum quod nunc est dictum,” as if he
had found in his MS. ἐπειδὴ ἣν ἐς τὸ πρῶτον ἐσμεταθετέον τὸ νῦν δὴ
ῥηθέν.
256 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. Of what kind? as
Guest. The noble-minded pilot, and *%the physician, who
is of equal worth with many others.’ Let us then, after
moulding from these (two) a certain figure, contemplate it.
Soe. jun. Of what kind? bt
Guest. Such a one, as if we all conceived that we are suf-
fering the most dreadful things from them. For such of us
as either of them wish to save, they do equally save;** and
such as they wish to injure, they injure by cutting and burn-
ing, at the same time ordering us to bring to them the means
of expense, as a tribute, of which they spend on the sick
little or even nothing,* but they and their domestics make use
of the rest. And lastly, receiving money (as) wages,®® from
either the kindred or some enemies of the sick man, they
cause him to die. They too who have the command of a ves-
sel, do ten thousand other things of this kind. * For after
some plotting, when out at sea, they leave persons deserted,
and, committing errors at sea, hurl them into the sea, and
do them other mischief.*’ If then, reflecting on these matters,
8383 Plato here alludes to the Homeric,—'Inrpd¢ γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν
ἀντάξιος ἄλλων, in IX. xi. 514,
86 1 confess I cannot understand here ὁμοίως δὴ, which Ficinus has
omitted. I could have understood ὀλούμενον διασώζουσιν, “ they save
completely about to perish,” or εὐνόως δὴ, “ with a kind feeling.”
85 Ficinus has “nihil aut parum admodum—” His MS. had therefore
opixpa—f καὶ οὐδὲν, not καὶ οὐδὲν. A similar error is to be corrected
similarly in the passages quoted by Stalbaum. See my Poppo’s Prolegom.
p. 114.
% To avoid the tautology we must omit μισθὸν, as Ficinus does, who
has merely “ pecuniis acceptis.”’
8787 If Plato alluded, as I suspect he did, to the story of Arion,
against whom some sailors laid a plot and threw him into the sea; and
to that of Philoctetes, against whom the Greeks, alleging some fault, left
him on a desert island, he would have written perhaps to this effect.
“* For after some plotting, they do, when out at sea, throw persons into the
water, or, alleging some fault against them, leave them deserted im shal-
low places, and do them, beyond common ills, a wrong.” For in the
concluding words there is an allusion perhaps to the anecdote told by Plu-
tarch in Dion. § 5, respecting the tyrant of Syracuse bribing one Pollis
to murder Plato during his voyage home; or, if that were not practicable,
to sell him into slavery; which would be considered by a person like
Plato, the very height of wrong. To arrive however at this sense, greater
alterations would be requisite than an ordinary scholar would admit; who
is therefore left to believe, if he will, that Plato wrote what is found in the
present text.
THE STATESMAN. ~° 257
we should enter into some consultation respecting them, (so
that)** we should no longer permit either of those arts to have
an absolute control over slaves or the free-born; but that we
should collect together an assembly consisting of ourselves or
all the people, or the rich alone; and that it should be lawful
for private individuals, and the rest of the operatives, to bring
together their opinions respecting sailing and diseases, as to
what manner it is meet to use medicines, and medical in-
struments, for those that are ill; and moreover, (how to use)
both the vessels themselves and nautical instruments for the
requirements of vessels in case of danger during the voyage
from winds and the sea and the meeting with pirates, and,
if requisite, in fighting with long ships*® against others of the
like kind; and that, what shall have been decreed by the mul-
titude on these points, by the advice of physicians and pilots,
or of other® unskilled individuals, persons should inscribe
in triangular tables®! and pillars, and laying down other un-
written regulations, as the customs of the country, it should
be necessary to navigate vessels in all future times according
to this method, and to administer remedies to the sick.
Soe. gun. You have mentioned things really very absurd.
Guest. Further, that rulers of the people should be ap-
pointed yearly, whoever may be chosen by lot from the rich
or from all the people; and that the rulers so appointed
88 To destroy the asyndeton in the protasis of this long-winded sen-
tence, of which, says Stalbaum, the apodosis is to be found a full page
lower, it was merely necessary to suppose, that ὥστε had here dropt out
between viva and τοῦτων, and that a little below ταῦτα δεῖν had been
corrupted into ταῦτα δὴ.
5° Amongst the ancients, ships of war were long, those of commerce
more round.
® Instead of ἄλλων, which, despite what some scholars say about
ἄλλος being used pleonastically, makes nonsense here, Plato wrote
ἄλλως, “ merely,” a meaning on which Ruhnken on Timeus, Οὐκ ἄλλως
προνοεῖ, and Toup on Longinus, ᾧ 7, have said all that is requisite.
% The tablet called Κύρβις had three faces forming a triangle, fixed to
a centre pole, called the ἄξων, and on each face was laid, probably, a
volume of the laws originally relating to religious matters, but subse-
quently to civil likewise. Such tablets were once found in Christian
churches ; and the priest, or rather some clerical assistant in the character
of a canon or chorister, used to chant from it the Psalms, and to read the
two Lessons of the morning or evening service, which were placed re-
spectively on the three faces of the tablet.
s
258 THE STATESMAN.
should rule according to the written ee ae pilots
over vessels and physicians over the sick.
Soc. jun. These things are still more harsh,» >
[38.1 Guest. Let us see now after this what follows, For
when the year of each governor shall have expired, it will be
necessary to appoint 53 tribunals of persons, taken either by a
selection from the rich or from all the people by lot, and'to bring
the rulers before them and to pass their accounts, and for νι
one to accuse them for not having acted, during his year, the
pilot, according to the written regulations, nor according to
the old customs of their forefathers; and for the very same
things to take place in the case of those healing the sick; and
that whoever of them should be convicted, certaim persons
should fix what the party must suffer (in person) or pay (in
urse).
“ Soc. jun. Would not he, who is ready of his own accord to
be a ruler under such circumstances, most justly suffer (in
person) and pay (in purse) ?
Guest, Further still, it will be necessary to make 8 Jaw on
all these points, that, if any one be proved to be seeking out the
art relating to piloting and ships in general, or to health, and
the truth of the physician’s theory about winds, heat and
cold, contrary to the written regulations, or devising™ any
thing whatever about affairs of this kind, he shall, in the
first place, be called neither as one skilled in physicking or
piloting, but a talker of matters on high, or some babbler ;
and that, in the next place, it shall be lawful for any one to
write down an indictment against him for lawlessness,” and to
® Stalb. has adopted καθίσαντες from twoMS. He did not know that
καθίζειν would be said of a judge; καθιστάναι, of a tribunal.
°° Here and elsewhere the English phrase, answering to the Greek
zene. Ta γράμματα, is “ contrary to the statutes, made in that case and
provided.”
* After σοφιζόμενος, Ficinus seems to have found in his ΜΒ. καὶ
διδάσκων, as shown by his “ philosophetur et doceat.” At all events, such
an idea is requisite on account of the subsequent “ corrupting.”
% The edd. have γραψάμενον εἰσάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον οἷς ἔξεστιν εἰς
δή τι δικαστήριον. Here Ast was the first to object to οἷς ἔξεστιν, as be-
ing without syntax, and consequently without sense. But. his proposed
new reading, of ἔξεστιν, is, if possible, worse than the old one; while
Stalbaum’s notion that ‘olg ἔξεστιν is an interpolation, arising. from τὸν
βουλόμενον, may be safely left to its own refutation, Had these scholars
THE STATESMAN. 259
bring him before some court of justice, as corrupting the
younger,*® and persuading the silly to put their hands to the
arts of a pilot and a physician not according to the laws, and
to rule self-willed over vessels and the sick; and that if any one
shall'be found persuading either young or old men, contrary
to the laws, and the written regulations, (it shall be lawful)
to punish him with the extreme (of punishments). For
no one* ought to be wiser than the laws; nor on the other
hand, should any one be ignorant of the arts of medicine
and of healing, nor of piloting and shipping, (according to) the
written regulations and the customs laid down of the country ;
for he who wishes may learn. If then, Socrates, this should
take place about the sciences we mentioned, and we should look
into any portion of the general’s art, and the whole of any
kind of hunting, and of painting, or of imitation in general,
and carpentry, and the formation in general of instruments of
any kind, and of agriculture, and the art relating to plants in
general; or, again, into the care of breeding horses, according
to written regulations,*® and herds of cattle of every kind, and
prophecy, and all the portion that the ministering art embraces,
the playing at games of dice, the whole of arithmetic, (whe-
ther) simple or (relating to) a plane, either in depth, or swift-
ness ;! 1 (if) respecting all these things (it were) so done,
what would appear produced according to written regulations,
and not according to art ?!
remembered that a genitive of the crime, laid to the charge of a person
indicted, follows γράφεσθαι, they might perhaps have seen that Plato
wrote γραψάμενον--- βουλόμενον ἀνομίας ἔξεσται, as I have translated.
% Edd, ἄλλους νεωτέρους. One MS. τοὺς ἄλλους νεωτέρους. Hence
Plato wrote, I suspect, rode νεωτέρους : while trom ἄλλους I have
elicited ἄνους, and inserted it after ἀναπείθοντα. On the confusion be-
tween ἄνους and ἄλλους, see my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 106.
7 Instead of οὐδὲν common sense requires οὐδένα, and οὐδ᾽ iva γ᾽ αὖ
in lieu of οὐδένα γὰρ.
* By inserting κατὰ ra before γεγραμμένα, required alike by the sense
and syntax, and placing ἐξεῖναι---μανθάνειν after κείμενα, and not, as
usual, after ναυτικὸν, have made Plato talk something like sense, in
lieu of the nonsense with which Stalbaum is so highly delighted.
99. The words κατὰ συγγράμματα are omitted by Ficinus, for he was not
aware perhaps that horses, as shown by Xenophon, were reared by rules.
100 Of the mass of nonsense to be found here, it is easy to see the cor-
rection by turning to p. 284, F. § 25. Ξ
1 Of all this heap of rubbish, without sense or syntax, Ficinus has
omitted every atom; and in the La summary of different arts, he
s
960 THE STATESMAN.
Soe. jun. It is evident that all arts would be entirely sub-
verted, nor would they exist again, through such a law for-
bidding one to investigate. So that life, which is now difficult,
would at that time become utterly unable to be endured.
[39.] Guest. But what (will you say) to this? If we should
compel each of the above-mentioned to take place according to
written regulations, and should appoint as the guardian of these
statutes a man either chosen by suffrage, or chance, but who,
giving no thought to them, either for the sake of a certain
gain, or private pleasure, should endeavour, although knowing
nothing, to act contrary to these statutes, would not this be a
still greater evil than the former?
Soc. jun. Most truly so.
Guest. For he, who should dare to act contrary to those
laws, which have been laid down after much experience, (or)
through certain advisers recommending each in a pleasant
manner, and persuading the people to peas them, will commit
an error many-fold greater than an error,? and subvert every
process much more than written statutes.
Soc. jun. How is he not about (to do so)?
Guest. Hence there is a second sailing, as is said, for those
that establish laws and statutes respecting any thing what-
ever, that is, not to suffer any one person, or the multitude,
to do any thing of any kind at any time contrary to them.
Soc. jun. Right.
Guest. Will not these statutes then, written by men intel-
ligent as far as their power permits, be imitations of the truth
of each of these ?
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. And yet, if we remember, we said that the man,
who is in reality a statesman, would, being intelligent, do many
things from art, in reference to his own course of action,
without giving a thought to statutes, when other things seem
to him better than what had been written by himself and
enjoined upon some persons absent.
Soc. jun. We did say so.
Guest. Would not then any single man whatever, or any
has shown that his MS. omitted words that have been interpolated, ond
-ransposed those which have been misplaced.
, 53. Ficinus has ‘scelus committit superiori peccato longe deterius,”
which is far more intelligible than the Greek.
THE STATESMAN. 261
people whatever, by whom laws happen to be laid down, act
in the same way as that true (statesman), should they endea-
vour to do to the utmost of their power contrary to them?
(the laws) what is something different and better?
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. If then they should without knowledge act in this
manner, would they not attempt to imitate what is true? and
yet they would imitate all badly; but if with art, this is no
longer an imitation, but is the very truth itself.
Soc. jun. Altogether so.
Guest. And yet it was before laid down as a thing acknow-
ledged by us, that the mob is incapable of receiving any art
whatever.
Soc. jun. It was so laid down.
Guest. If then there is a certain kingly art, the mob of the
rich, and the whole of the people, could never receive this
science of the statesman.
Soc. jun. For how can they ?
Guest. It is requisite then, as it seems, that such-like
polities, if they are about to imitate correctly, to the best of
their power, the true polity under a single person ruling with
art, must never, ‘the laws having been laid down by them,‘
do any thing contrary to the written statutes and customs of
the country.
Soc. jun. You speak most beautifully.
Guest. When therefore the rich imitate this polity, we
then denominate such a polity an aristocracy; but when they
give no thought to the laws, an oligarchy.
Soc, jun. So it nearly seems.
‘Guest. And again, when one man rules according to the
laws, imitating the person endued with science, we call him a
king, not distinguishing by name the person ruling alone with
science, or with opinion according to the laws.
3 Stalbaum says that ταῦτα is to be referred to νόμους (the laws).
But how a neuter noun could thus be made to agree with a masculine
one, was known only, I suspect, to himself and Matthie, whom he quotes.
To my mind the noun to be understood is συγγράμματα.
4‘—4 Of these words, perfectly useless here, Ficinus has taken not the
least notice, either because he could not understand them, or because they
were not in his MS. Perhaps κειμένων αὑτοῖς ought to be inserted be-
tween τῶν and νόμων in the next speech of the Guest, where αὑτοῖς, “by
themselves,” would refer to the rich.
262 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. We nearly appear to do so.
Guest. If then a person possessing in realiiquaglatine rules
alone, he is called altogether by the same name, a king, and no
other will be mentioned in addition: through which ® the five
names of the polities just now mentioned become only one.
Soc. jun. So it appears. gon
Guest. But when one man rules neither according to the
laws nor the customs of the country, but pretends, as the
person possessing science, that the best is to be done, contrary
to the written statutes, and there exist a certain desire and
ignorance as the leaders of this imitation, must we not call
each man of this kind a tyrant ?
[40.] Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. Thus then we say has been produced a tyrant; a ing,
an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, from mankind
indignantly bearing with such a single monarch, and not be-
lieving that any one would ever be worthy of such an office,
so as to be both willing and able to rule with virtue and
science, and to distribute properly to all persons things just
and holy;® but (disposed) to maim, and kill, and maltreat?
whomsoever he might wish: yet, if such a person should
arise, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved and live at
home happily,® guiding throughout, like a pilot, alone a polity
accurately correct.
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. But now, a3 we truly say, since there is no) sii
king produced in states, as is produced by nature in a swarm
of bees, excelling straightway alone in body and soul, we must,
5 As there is nothing to which δι᾿ ἃ can be referred, one would read here,
either dv’ ὃ, “ through which thing,” or dc’ ὃν, ‘‘ through which person.””
5. Ficinus inserts here, “‘ timerentque prieterea, ne forte vir unus licen-
tiam nactus—’’ I suspect rather from his own head than his MS.: and
he is followed, as usual, by Taylor, who rarely troubled himself with
looking at the “Greek.
” Here the maltreating, after killing, has reference to the conduct pur-
sued by tyrants to the dead bodies of their political enemies, as shown in
the case of Ajax by the Atride, and in that of Polynices by Creon. ἡ
* To obtain this sense, it will be requisite to put εὐδαιμόνως before
διακυβερνῶντα, instead of after it. But if οἰκεῖν is to be taken transi-
tively, which can hardly be done, after the preceding passive verb
ἀγαπᾶσθαι, we must translate, “he would be beloved through his ad-
ministering alone, and guiding ‘throughout, like a pilot, happily κα see
accurately correct :”” as if the Greek were ἀγαπᾶσθαι ἂν διὰ τὸ οἰκεῖν----
ποὶ ἀγαπᾶσθαί τε ἂν καὶ οἰκεῖν.
THE STATESMAN. 263
as it seems, come together and write down statutes, treading
in the footsteps of a polity the most true.
Soe. jun. It nearly appears so.
Guest. And do we wonder then, Socrates, that in such-
like polities evils, such as do happen, and will happen, are pro-
duced, when the foundation placed under them (exists) by
statutes and customs, Yand not with the foundation of science,
which performs its actions in a different way than what a
polity does, which, making use of imprudence, will be evident
to every one, that it will destroy every thing produced by that
(imprudence).? Or ought we not to wonder rather at this, how
strong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have for
time without end been suffering thus, yet some of them are
still remaining, and are not overturned. Many however
sometimes, like sinking !° vessels, are perishing, have perished,
and will perish,!! through the incorrect conduct of the pilots
and sailors,!? who, having obtained the greatest ignorance re-
specting the greatest concerns, do still, although they know
nothing about state affairs, think they have obtained this
knowledge the most clearly of all.
[41.] Soc. jun. Most true.
Guest. Which then of these incorrect polities, where all
are full of difficulties, is the least difficult to live in, and
which the most oppressive, it is meet for us to look into a
little; although it is what is called a by-deed'® as regards
our present inquiry; yet, perhaps, on the whole, we all of us
do all things for the sake of a thing of this kind.’
*9 Such is my translation of this passage, which is perfectly unintelligible
in the Greek, through the loss of some words that neither Schleiermacher
nor Stalbaum had the sagacity to supply, here enclosed within lunes—
(καὶ) "μὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης (τῆς) πραττούσης τὰς πράξεις ἑ ἑτέρᾳ πως (ἢ ἡ),
χρωμένη (ἀνοίᾳ), παντὶ κατάδηλος (ἔσται), ὡς πάντ᾽ ἂν Scodeoece τὰ
ταύτῃ γιγνόμενα.
10 Instead of καταδυόμεναι, one would prefer καταλυόμεναι, i. 6. not
** sinking,’’ but ‘‘ loosened as to their timbers.”
Ficinus has, “‘ perierunt pereunt atque peribunt,” which is the
more natural order of ideas.
12. By sailors are meant those who are sailing in the vessel of the state.
13 So we say “ by-play”’ and ‘‘ by-blow.”
* Stalbaum defends, with Wyttenbach in Select. Histor. p. 414, and
Hermann on Philoct. 557, the pleonasm in ἕνεκα and χάριν, not aware
that the passage here i is corrupt. Donaldson in The New Cratylus, p. 350,
renders ἕνεκα “ only,’”’ a meaning never found elsewhere. Had he read
my note on Phil. 549—556, he would have found there something better
_ than his borrowed nonsense.
264 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. It is meet. How not?
Guest. Of three things then, say that the same is remark-
ably difficult, and at the same time most easy.
Soc. jun. How say you?
Guest. Not otherwise than, as I said before, that a mon-
archy, the government of a few, and of many, are those three
polities mentioned by us at the commencement of the dis-
course, which has now flowed upon us.
Soc. jun. They were.
Guest. Bisecting then each of these, we shall produce six,
separating from these the correct polity, as a seventh.
Soc. jun. How so? t
Guest. Out of monarchy. there came, we said, the regal
and the tyrannic; and out of that (composed) not of the
many, the well-omened aristocracy and oligarchy. But out
of that (composed) of the many, we then laid it down under
the name of a simple democracy; but we must now lay it
down as two-fold.
Soc. jun. How so? And after what manner do we make
this division ?
Guest. Not at all different from the others; even although
the name of this is now two-fold. But to govern according to
the laws, and contrary to them, is common both to this and
the rest.
Soc. jun. It is so.
Guest. Then indeed, when we were seeking a correct
polity, this bisection was of no use, as we have shown above ;
but since we have separated it from the others, and have con-
sidered the others as necessary, the being contrary or accord-
ing to law causes a bisection in each of these.'®
Soc. jun. So it appears from what has now been said.
Guest. A monarchy then, yoked to correct writings, which
we call laws, is the best of all the six polities; but when it
is without law, it is grievous, and most burthensome to live
under.
As this passage is at variance with that in p. 292, A. § 31, where
Plato denies that a peculiar name can be given to a democracy, accord-
ing as the people exercise their power wisely or wickedly, some person,
as stated by Stalbaum, conceived the existence of an error here.
16 Ficinus seems not to have found τούτων, evidently unnecessary, after
ἐν ταύταις, in his MS. His version is, “in his jam legis servatio et
transgressio singulas bifariam partiuntur.”
THE STATESMAN: 265
Soe. jun. It nearly appears so.
Guest. But the polity of the not-many we have considered
as a medium between both, as a few 15 ἃ medium between
one and many ; but on the other hand, the polity of the many,
as being weak in all things, and unable, as compared with the
others, to do any thing great, either for good or evil, through
the offices in this polity being divided into small parts amongst
many. Hence, of all the polities acting according to law,
this is the worst, but the best of all such as act contrary to
law. And where all are intemperate, it is the best to live ina
democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the
worst to live in. In the first polity is the first and best con-
dition (of life), with the exception of the seventh; for we
must separate this from all the other polities, as a god from
men.
Soe. jun. These things appear thus Το be produced!’ and
happen ; and that must be done, which you mention.
Guest. Ought we not then to take away the sharers in all
these polities, with the exception of the scientific one, as being
not truly statesman-like but seditious-like ; and as presiding
over the greatest resemblances, and being such themselves ;
and, as they are the greatest mimics and enchanters, to be
called 18 too the greatest sophists of sophists ?
Soc. jun. This appellation seems nearly to be retorted most
correctly on those called statesmen.
Guest. Be it so. This indeed is, as it were, a drama for us;
just as it was lately said, that we saw a certain dancing-troop
of Centaurs and Satyrs, which was to be separated from the
statesman’s art; and now this separation has been with so
much difficulty effected.
Soc. jun. So it appears.
Guest. But another thing remains, still more difficult than
this, through its being more allied to the kingly genus, and
at the same time more difficult to understand. And we ap-
v— The words γίγνεσθαί re καὶ are omitted in the three oldest but
not the best MSS. They are rejected by the Zurich editors, but defended
by Stalbaum. They are certainly here perfectly useless. But, if inter-
polated, why and from whence did they come ?
15. Instead of γίγνεσθαι, the train of ideas leads to λέγεσθαι, as I have
translated; unless it be said that Plato wrote both, γίγνεσθαί re καὶ
λέγεσθαι, and that from this passage came the γίγνεσθαί re καὶ found at
present a little above.
266 THE STATESMAN.
pear to me to be affected ne ne τον Ὁ. νν that
wash gold.
Soc. jun. How so? 3%
Guest. Those workmen first of all separate ὁ εν,
and many other things; but after this there are left sub-
stances, allied to gold, mixed together and of value, and to
be separated only by fire, such as brass and silver, and some-
times a diamond; which'® being with difficulty separated by
the experiments of fusion (in the crucible), suffer us to see
itself by itself that which is called pure gold. τ sod
Soc. jun. It is said that such things are so done.
[42.] Guest. After the same manner then it seems that
things different from, and such as are foreign and not friendly
to, the statesman’s science, have been separated by us; but
there have been left such as are of value and allied to it.
Now of these are the military and judicial arts; and that
oratory, which has a share of the kingly science, and does, by
persuading men to do justice, conjointly regulate affairs in
states; by separating (all) of which in a certain manner, most
easily will a person show naked and alone by itself the charac-
ter of which we are now in search.
Soc. jun. It is evident that we should endeaious to do this
in some way.
Guest. As far as experiment goes, it will be evident. But
let us endeavour to show it by means of music. ἘῸΝ me,
then— ς
Soc. jun. What?
Guest. Have we any teaching of music, and universally ὁ of
the sciences, relating to handicraft trades ἢ
Soc. jun. We have.
Guest. But what, shall we say that there is this too, a cer-
tain science respecting those very things, *°(which teaches
19. This word, wanting in all the MSS., has been preserved by Ficinus
alone ; from whose version, ‘‘ que,” Stephens elicited, with the approba-
of ἃ all modern scholars, &—required by the syntax for the following
φ ἐντα---
pie The words “ which teaches ” are taken from “‘ que doceat”* in
the version of Ficinus, who probably found in his MS. διδακτικὸν. ray
of αὖ καὶ ταύτην, that are quite superfluous; to say nothing of the το-
peated αὖ, which even Stalbaum can hardly stomach ; while, instead of
Ἔστι Ti δὲ τὸ δ᾽ αὖ, which he vainly attempts to defend, we ‘must read,
Soc. jun. "Ἔστι" τί δ᾽ ob. Guest. Ti δέ--
THE STATESMAN. 267
us)?° whether we ought to learn any one of them whatever
or not? Or how shall we say?
Soc. jun. We will say that there is?
Guest. Shall we not then confess, that this is different from
the others ?
Soe. jun. Yes.
Guest. But whether must we say that not one of them
ought to rule over the other? or the others over this? or that
this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?
Soc. jun. That this science (ought to rule)?! over those ;
(which teaches)?! whether it is requisite to learn, or not.
Guest. You tell us then, that it ought to rule over both
the taught and the teaching.
Soe. jun. Very much so.
Guest. And that the science (which decides)? whether it
is requisite to persuade or not, should rule over that which
is able to persuade ?
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. To what science then shall we attribute that, which
persuades the multitude and the crowd, through fable-talk-
ing,” but not through teaching ὃ
Soc. jun. I think it is evident that this is to be attributed
to the science of the orator.
Guest. But on what science, on the other hand, shall we
impose this, (to decide)** whether it is meet to do any thing
whatever to any persons by persuasion, or violence, or to
abstain” entirely.
2121 The words within lunes were inserted by Taylor to complete the
sense. Stalbaum follows Ast, who thus arranged the speeches. Soc. jun.
This over those. Gwest. Do you then tell us, that the science, (which
teaches) whether it is requisite to learn or not, ought to rule over the
taught and teaching ?
22 Ficinus supplied, what Taylor adopted, ‘* quee—dijudicat.”
. 33. There is the same distinction drawn between ῥητορικὴ and διδαχὴ in
Gorg. p. 454, E.. § 22, as remarked by Stalbaum; who however does
not state in what way ὄχλος differs from πλῆθος ; and still less that
κεν Ἢ has merely “ad turbam,”’ as if πλήθους κε καὶ were wanting in
is MS.
*4 Here again Ficinus has inserted the word “‘ judicare,”’ requisite to
supply the sense.
25. So Stalbaum, by reading ἀπέχειν for ἔχειν. Ficinus has “in quibus
et in quos uti deceat,” as if he had filled out the sense from his own head,
in consequence of some defect in his MS.
268 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. To that, which rules over the arts of persuasion
and discourse.
Guest. But this, as I think, will not be any other on the
power of the statesman.
Soc, jun. You have spoken most beautifully.
Guest. Thus then the science of the orator appears to have
been very rapidly separated from that of the a as
being another species, but subservient to this.
Soc. jun. Yes.
[48.] Guest. But what on the other hand must we con-
ceive respecting this power?
Soc. jun. What power?
Guest. (Respecting) that, by which we are to war with
each of those against whom we may have chosen to war.
Whether shall we say that this power is without art or with
art?
Soc. jun. And how can we conceive that power to be with-
out art, which the general’s art and all warlike operations put
into practice ?
Guest. But must we consider that power, which is able and
skilful in deliberating, whether we ought to engage in war, or
separate peaceably, as different from this, or the same with it?
Soc. jun. To those following®® the preceding (reasoning) it
is of necessity different.
Guest. Shall we not, then, assert that this (the art of de-
liberation) rules over that (which carries on war), if we
understand in a manner similar to what has been advanced
before ?
Soc. jun. So I say.
Guest. What power then shall we endeavour to show as
the mistress of the whole art of war, so terrible and mighty,
except the truly kingly science ?
Soc. jun. None other.
Guest. We must not then lay down the science of general-
ship as that of the statesman, of which the former is the min-
istering assistant.
36 Iné ἑπομένοισιν, an Tonic form, inadmissible in an Attic writer, evi-
dently lies hid é ἑπομένοις ἦν. We find indeed i in p. 291, A. § 30, τούτοισιν
ἑτέροις, where it is easy to read τοιούτοις γ᾽ ἑτέροις. "Stalbaum refers to
Zeller in Commentat. de Legg. Platon. p. 87. But I suspect nothing more:
is to be found there than what Matthiar has stated in Gr. Gr. ᾧ 69. 7.
THE STATESMAN. 269
Soc. jun. It is not reasonable.
Guest. But come, let us contemplate the power of judges,
who judge rightly.
Soe. jun. By all means.
Guest. Is it then capable of doing any thing more than merely
judging respecting compacts, when, having received from a
king the lawgiver, whatever has been laid down as legal, and
looking both to those, and to what has been ordained to be just
and unjust, it exhibits its own peculiar virtue, of never being
overcome by certain bribes, or fear, or pity, or any other?’
hatred, or love, so as to be willing to settle mutual accusa-
tions contrary to the ordonnance of the legislator.
Soc. jun. ‘The employment of this power is nearly nothing
else,** than what you have mentioned.
Guest. We find then, that the strength of judges is not
kingly, but the guardianship of the laws, and ministering to
the kingly science.
Soe. gun. It appears so.
Guest. This also must be understood by him, who. looks
into all the aforesaid sciences, that the statesman’s science has
not appeared to be one of them. For it is not meet for the
truly kingly science to act itself, but to rule over those able
to act; since it knows that the commencement and progress ”°
of things of the greatest consequence in states depends on
opportunity 39 and the want of it ; but it is the province of the
other sciences to do as they are ordered.
Soc. jun. Right ?
Guest. Hence, since the sciences which we have just now
27 On the pleonastic use of ἄλλος, which Stalbaum renders ‘‘ moreover,”
various scholars, quoted in his note, have produced various instances. But
in all of them it were easy to show, that there is some error hitherto un-
noticed. Here Ficinus has omitted ἄλλης. Plato wrote ἄλλοις ἔχθρας.
** enmity to others.” For nouns of anger govern a dative. See my note
on isch. Suppl. 125, and Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 173, 264, 313.
38. Ficin. has ‘‘ Non aliud certe quam,” which leads to Οὐκ ἄλλ᾽ ἢ---ἰη
lieu of Οὔκ ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν.
29 Ficinus translates τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν by “ principium et pro-
gressum.” De Geer, in Diatrib. de Politic. Platon. Princip. p. 144, wished
toread ῥώμην. Stalbaum defends ὁρμὴν, and renders it “ aggressionem,”’
attack. But in that case he should have applied τῶν μεγίστων to per-
sons and not to things. With regard to the sentiment, we may compare
the proverb that ‘‘ opportunity makes the thief.’ Some however would
prefer perhaps to translate “‘since it knows that the power and onward
movement of the greatest men in states—”
270 THE STATESMAN.
discussed, neither rule over each other nor themselves, but
that each is occupied with a certain proper employment of its
own, they have justly obtained according to the —
ity of their actions a peculiar name.
Soc. jun. So they seem,
Guest. But we having rightly comprehended its ae
under an appellation in common, should, it seems, most justly
call that the science of the statesman, ‘whitey rules over all
these and takes care of the laws, and of every thing relating
to the state, and weaves all things together most correctly.
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
[44.] Guest. Are we then willing to go through this science
at present, according to the pattern of the weaving art, since
all the genera pertaining to a state have become manifest
to us?
Soc, jun. And very much so.
Guest. We must then, as it seems, define what is the kingly
entwining, and what, after entwining, is the web it produces
for us.
Soc, jun. It is evident.
Guest. It has become necessary, as it appears, to show forth
a thing really difficult.
Soc. jun. It must however be told by all means.
Guest. For that a part of virtue differs in a certain man-
ner from a species of virtue, is a point that may be very easily
attacked by those, who contend in discourses against the opin-
ions of the many.
Soc. gun. I do not understand you.
Guest. (Think) again in this way. For I suppose’ you
consider fortitude to be one part of virtue.
Soe. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. And that temperance is different indeed from for-
titude, but that this is also a part of what that is likewise.
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. On these points then we must dare to unfold a cer-
tain marvellous discourse.
Soe. jun. Of what kind?
Guest. That they have after a certain manner very greatly
30. Stalbaum supplies the ellipse by ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὧδε πάλιν ἴδωμεν, and refers
to Heindorf on Sophist. p. 262, A, ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν τόδε. Ficinus has
“* Sic forte intelliges,”’
THE STATESMAN. 271
an enmity with each other, and are of an opposite faction in
many of the things that exist.*!
Soe. jun. How say you?
Guest. An assertion by no means usual. For all the parts
of virtue are said to be friendly to each other.
Soc. gun. Yes.
Guest. Let us consider then, applying very closely our
mind, whether this is so without exception,** or whether
rather any part** of them differs from their kindred.
Soc. jun. Inform me how we are to consider.
Guest. In all such things as we call beautiful, it is proper
to investigate, but we refer them to two species contrary to
each other.*
Soc. jun. Speak more clearly.
Guest. Of acuteness then and swiftness, either in bodies or
mind, or of the throwing out the voice, when such things exist
themselves or in their resemblances, such as music and paint-
ing by imitating exhibit, have you ever been a praiser yourself,
or, being not*® present, have you heard another person prais-
ing any one of these things ?
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. Do you likewise remember after what manner they
do*? this in each of these cases ?
3! In this speech Ficinus has omitted the Latin for the Greek words
εὖ μάχα and στάσιν ἐναντίαν, either because they were not in his MS. or
rejected as unnecessary.
32 Ficinus has “ amicitia vinciri dicuntur,’’ as if he had found in his
MS. σύνδετα ἀλλήλοις---λέγεται φιλίᾳ instead of οὖν δὴ---φίλια : where
οὖν δὴ have not an atom of meaning.
33. So Stalbaum translates here and elsewhere ἁπλοῦν.
34 Here Stalbaum has inserted 7: after ἐστε from the conjecture of
Heindorf.
35 Such is the literal version of the Greek ; which I confess I do not
understand, even though Stalbaum says that by a change of construction
the demonstrative pronoun αὐτὰ is put for the relative ἃ, I could have
understood a sense to this effect—“ In all things, such as we say are beau-
tiful, it is meet to seek, whether there are two species, which we place
opposite to each other—” in Greek, Ἔν τοῖς ξύμπασι χρὴ ζητεῖν, doa καλὰ
γ᾽ εἶναι λέγομεν, εἰ ἔστι δύο δὴ, & ye τίθεμεν ἐναντία ἀλλήλοιν εἴδη, in-
stead of καλὰ μεν λέγομεν εἰς δύο δ᾽ αὐτὰ τίθεμεν----
36 I cannot understand εἴτε ἄλλου παρὼν, nor could Ficinus, I sus-
pect, who has omitted παρὼν. I have therefore translated as if od had
dropt out after ἄλλου.
37 Stalbaum explains δρῶσι by “they praise,” and so Ficinus, “ lau-
dant.”
272 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. By no means.
Guest. Shall I then be able to point out to you πόμα
words, as I have it in my mind?
Soc. jun. Why not?
Guest. You seem to think a thing of this kind easy. Let
us consider it then in genera somewhat contrary. For in
many actions, and oftentimes on each occasion,** when we
admire the swiftness, vehemence, and acuteness of thought,
body, or voice, we praise them, and at the same time employ
one of the appellations of manliness.
Soe. jun. How so?
Guest. We say it is acute and manly, swift and manly, and
in a similar manner vehement : 33 and, universally, by applying
the name which I say is common to all these natural qualities,
we praise them,
Soc. jun. Yes.
Guest. But what, have we not often praised in many ac-
tions “°the species of quiet production ?*°
Soc. jun. And very much so.
Guest. Do we not then, in saying the contrary to what
(we did) about them, say this ?*
Soc. jun. How so?
Guest. As* we speak on each occasion of things done
quietly and moderately as regards the mind, and admire them ;
and as regards actions, slowly and softly; and further as re-
spects voice, smoothly and gravely, and of all rhythmical
movement, and the whole of music which makes use of slow-
38 Of the absurdity of thus uniting καὶ πολλάκις ἑκάστοτε, Ficinus
seems to have been aware. At all events he has omitted those words.
I suspect, however, that Plato wrote, πολλαῖς πολλάκις καὶ τά
καὶ pene μι κοτέ éxdorore—For thus ἑκάστοτε is y
united to verbs of speaking, as may be seen in Ast’s Lexicon Platon.,
while ἐν πολλαῖς πολλάκις is supported by πολλάκις ---ὄν πολλαῖς a
little below.
3° Ficinus has, “vehemens et forte,” as if he had found in his MS.
καὶ σφοδρὸν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον, not καὶ σφοδρὸν ὡσαύτως.
“49 Stalbaum remarks that this is said for “‘ the species of things
produced in quietness.”
“1 Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, ‘‘ Non contrariis in hac
atque in illis laudibus utimur ?”
*® Both Ast and Stalbaum would expunge Ὥς, as being merely a repe-
tition in att the preceding πῶς. They should have suggested either
Οὕτως" or *Q
THE STATESMAN. 278
ness opportunely, do we not assign to all these the appellation
of the moderate, and not of the manly ?
Soe. jun. Most assuredly.
Guest. But when, on the other hand, both these take place
unseasonably,*? we then in turn blame each of them by their
names, distributing (them) back to their opposites.‘
Soc. jun. How so?
Guest. By calling things that are and seem (to be) more
acute, and quick, and harsh than is seasonable, by the names
of insolent and mad; but those that are more slow and soft,
(by the names of) timid and slothful. And for the most part
nearly we find that these, and the moderate and manly natures,
having like hostile species obtained by lot their respective
stations* opposite to each other, never mingle together in
actions about things of this kind; and still further we shall
see, if we pursue (the inquiry) diligently,“° that they, who
possess these in their souls, are at variance with each other.
[45.] Soe. jun. Where do you say?
Guest. In all the points which we have just now mentioned,
and, it is likely, in many others. For I think that, on ae-
count of their alliance with each,“’ by praising some things
as their own property, but blaming the things of those who
differ, as being foreign, they stand in great enmity with each
other and on account of many things.
Soc. gun. They nearly appear to do so.
Guest. This difference then between these species is a kind
of sport. But a disease the most baneful of all others hap-
pens to states about things of the greatest consequence.
48 All the MSS. read absurdly ἀκέραια. Ficinus has “‘ opportunitatem
—non seryant.”’ From which Stephens elicited ἄκαιρα.
“t This is the only version I can give to ἐπὶ τἀναντία πάλιν ἀπονέ-
poyvrec. Ficinus omits ἀπονέμοντες, in which the whole difficulty lies.
Stalbaum renders διαλαχούσας στάσιν by “ seditionem sortitas.”’
But no person or thing could be said to have obtained by Jot a sedition.
There is here, I suspect, an allusion to the three powers of matter,
called respectively, the creative, the conservative, and the destructive,
each having its allotted station; and on which was founded some un-
known boys’ game.
46 With a perversity of judgment, to be found only in a stickler for the
received text, Stalbaum rejects σπουδῇ, furnished by the very MSS, which
he elsewhere follows, almost to the very letter, and supported by “ dili-
genter”’ in Ficinus, as Winckelmann was the first to remark.
“7 Ficinus has “ utrique pro nature sue convenientia.”
τ
274 THE STATESMAN.
Soc. jun. About what things are you speaking ?
Guest. About the whole form of living, as it is reasonable
I should. For they who are pre-eminently well-ordered are
always prepared to live a quiet life, themselves by themselves,
managing only“ their own concerns, and so associating: with
all at home, and being ready, in like manner, to be at
after a certain fashion, with foreign states; and through this
desire, more unseasonable than is fitting, when they are doing
that which they wish, they become “unconsciously unwar-
like, and affect the young men in a similar manner, and
become ever the prey of parties attacking; of whom in
not many years themselves, their children, and the whole
city, often unconsciously, instead of being free, become the
slaves.
Soc. gun. You speak of a severe and terrible suffering.
Guest. But what are they, who incline more to manliness ?
Do they not incite their own cities ever to some warfare,
through a desire more vehement than is becoming of such a
kind of life; and thus standing in hostile array against many
and powerful (nations), either entirely destroy their own
country, or place it in slavery under the power of their foes?
Soc. jun. This too is the case.
Guest. How then shall we not say, that in these cases both
these genera have ever against each other the greatest enmity
and array ?*9.
Soc. jun. It can never be that we should say no,
Guest. Have we not then found out, what we were con-
sidering at the beginning, that certain parts of virtue differ
not a little from each other naturally, and that they likewise
cause those, who possess them, to do the same?
Soc. jun. They nearly appear (to do so).
Guest. Let us handle again this too,
[46.] Soc. jun. What?
Guest. Whether any one of the sciences, that bring things
* By reading μόνον for μόνοι, we can get rid of the objection started,
by Valckenaer on Hippol. 785, against αὐτοὶ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς vot. It is
good Greek to say, αὐτὸς cal? αὑτὸν, or μόνος καθ᾽ αὑτὸν, or αὐτὸς
μόνος, but not αὐτὸς καθ᾽ αὑτὸν μόνος. In Rep. x. p. 604, A., ὅταν
ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ᾽ αὑτὸν γίγνηται, the μόνος is evidently an
interpretation of αὐτὸς καθ᾽ αὑτὸν.
# “Although στάσιν seems to be supported by διαλαχούσας στάσιν a
little above, yet here it is quite superfluous.
THE STATESMAN. 275
together, does compose any act of its works, although it
should be the vilest, willingly from things evil and useful?
Or does every science always reject things evil to the
utmost of its power, and receive such as are apt and useful ?
and that from these, both similar and dissimilar, it does, by
collecting all into one, fabricate one certain power and form?
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. The statesman’s science, when it really exists ac-
cording to nature, will never willingly form a state composed
of good and bad men ; but it is very evident, that it will first
examine by means of play ;°! and, after the examination, it
will hand over to such as are able to instruct and to minister
to this very purpose, itself commanding and presiding, just as
the weaving art presides over the wool-combers, **and those
who prepare the rest of the materials for weaving, and fol-
lowing them up, gives its orders and stands over them, point-
ing out to each to complete their work, such as it conceives
to be fitted for its own putting together.”
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. In the very same way the kingly science appears to
me to keep to itself the power of the presiding art, and not to
permit all, who instruct and rear up according to law, to practise
aught, except what any one would, by working out a manner
suited to its own temperament, effect; and this alone it ex-
horts them to teach; but those who are unable to communicate
a manner manly and moderate, and whatever else tends to
virtue, and through the force of a depraved nature are im-
pelled 58 to ungodliness, and insolence, and injustice, it casts
50 Such a union of πρᾶγμα and ἔργων, is, I believe, not to be found else-
where. Ficinus has “ opus aliquod suum,” as if his MS. omitted ἔργων.
51 Stalbaum, adopting παιδιᾳ from fifteen MSS., explains it by saying
that Plato considered that the disposition of boys was to be first ascertained
in their sports. But the mention of boys could not be omitted. Oppor-
tunely then two MSS. offer παιδία, “children.” But as the subject of
the examination ought to be stated, something it is evident has dropt out.
Ficinus has “immo disciplina unumquemque primum examinabit.” Per-
haps Plato wrote παιδία παιδιᾳς, “ children by their sports.”
5282 “Ficinus has exhibited the whole of this passage in an abridged and
somewhat better form—‘ czterisque lanificii preparationibus presidet,
talia precipiens singulis, qualia ad texturam suam conducere arbitratur.””
58. Stalbaum has adopted ἀπωθουμένους in lieu of ἀπωθούμενα from a
solitary MS. It was so written however in the MS. of Ficinus, as shown
by his version, “ qui—ad ΝΟ
T
276 THE STATESMAN.
out, punishing them with death and exile and the greatest
of dishonours.
Soc. jun. This is said to be the case.
Guest. But those who wallow in ignorance and have a very
abject spirit, it yokes to the race of slaves.
Soc. jun. Most right. wg.
Guest. With respect to the rest however, whose natures
meeting with instruction are sufficient to reach*4 to what is
high-minded, and to receive through art a commingling with
each other, of these it considers such, as incline more to man-
liness, to have a firmness of conduct like the strong thread in
the web; »°but such (as incline) more to a well-ordered con-
duct (it considers) as making use (of a thread) supple and soft,
and, according to the simile (from weaving), suited toa thinner
stuff;°° and it endeavours to bind and weave together the
natures inclining in a contrary direction from each other in
some such manner—
Soc. jun. In what manner?
Guest. *°In the first place, according to the alliance having
fitted together the eternal part of their soul with a divine
bond ; and after that the divine (portion) that produces life
with human—*
[47.] Soe. jun. Why again have you said this ?
Guest. When an opinion really true exists with firmness in
the soul, respecting the beautiful, and just, and good, and the
contraries to these, I say that a god-like (opinion) is produced
in a divine genus.*?
5 Ficinus has ‘‘ad generosum habitum—evehi,” as if he had found in
his MS. either καθικνεῖσθαι or καθάπτεσθαι, instead of καθίστασθαι.
5555 Such is the only intelligible translation I can give to the elliptical
and technical language of the original.
5656 Such is the literal version of the Greek text; where I confess
I am utterly in the dark. For I cannot understand why the middle voice,
ξυναρμοσαμένη, is here used instead of the active, nor what is the verb
required to complete the sentence, nor how δεσμοῖς can be supplied after
ἀνθρωπίνοις ; nor in what way ἀειγενὲς and Cwoyevic could be, as they
seem to be here, opposed to each other. Ficinus has “ Primo quidem
secundum cognationis naturam, anime ipsorum partem, que sempiterne
generationis est, divino vinculo nectit; post divinam autem illam, que
animalis nature est, humanis.”’
5: Here again I must leave for others to understand what is quite be-
yond my comprehension. Stalbaum explains ἐν δαιμονίῳ γένει by ἐν τῷ
θείῳ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν πέρει. But if Plato intended to say so, what
THE STATESMAN. 277
Soc. jun. It is proper it should.
Guest. Do we not know that it befits the statesman and a
good legislator alone to be able, with the discipline of the
kingly science, to effect this very thing in those who take
properly a share in instruction, and whom we have just now
mentioned ?
Soc. gun. This is reasonable.
Guest. But the person, Socrates, who cannot accomplish a
thing of this kind, we must by no means call by the names
now sought for.
Soc. jun. Most right.
Guest. What then? Is not a manly soul, when it lays hold
of a truth of this kind, rendered mild? and would it not be
willing in the highest degree to partake of things just? But
not sharing it, will it not incline rather to a certain savage
nature ?
Soc. jun. How not ?
Guest. But what, does not that, which is a part of a well-
ordered nature, after receiving these opinions, become truly
moderate and prudent, at least in a polity? But when it has
not partaken of the things we are speaking of, does it not ob-
tain most justly some disgraceful reputation for stupidity ?
Soc. jun. Entirely so.
Guest. Must we not say that this entwining and binding
together of the evil with themselves, and of the good with the
evil, can never become stable, and that no science will ever
employ it with any serious care on such as these?
Soc. jun. For how can it?
Guest. But that in those alone, who have been born with
noble manners from the first, and educated according to
nature, this (bond) is naturally implanted through the laws ?
and for these too there is a remedy through art; and, as we
said before, that this is the more divine bond of the parts of
virtue which are naturally®® dissimilar, and tending to con-
traries ?
Soc. jun. Most true.
Guest. Since then this divine bond exists, there is scarcely
could induce him to put down words not necessarily conveying such a
meaning ?
88 Instead of φύσεως Stalbaum would read φῦσει, with Stephens, who
got the idea from the version of Ficinus, ‘“‘ natura contrariarum.”
218 THE STATESMAN.
any difficulty in either understanding the other bonds which
are human, or for a person understanding to bring: see toa
completion.
Soc. jun. How so? And what are these bonds #y Gal
Guest. Those of intermarriages and of a communion of
children, and those relating to private®® betrothals and
espousals. For the majority are in these matters not) properly
bound together for the purpose of begetting children.
Soc. jun. Why?
Guest. The pursuit of wealth and power on such oceasions
who would seriously blame, as being worthy of notice ?® ,
Soc. jun. It is not.
[48.] Guest. But it will be more just to speak of those,
who make the genera®! the object of their care, should pi
do any thing not according to propriety.
Soc. jun. It is at least reasonable.
Guest. They do not indeed at all act from right reason, but
pursue a life easy for the present; and through their hugging
those similar to themselves, and of not loving those that are
dissimilar, they give up themselves for the greatest. part to
an unpleasant feeling.
Soc. jun. How so?
Guest. They that are well-ordered seek after manners like
their own, and as far as they can marry from amongst such ;
and on the other hand send away to them their own daughters
to be married. In the same manner acts the genus that de-
lights in manliness, while going in the pursuit of its own
nature ; whereas it is requisite for both the genera to do en-
tirely the contrary.
Soc. jun. How, and on what account ?
Guest. Because manliness, having been propagated, un-
mixed for many generations with a temperate nature, is
59 I cannot understand here ἰδίας, “* private,” asif there were ever public
betrothals. Ficinus exhibits a remarkable variation, “‘ Conjugia i inquam
maris et feemine ad filiorum procreationem. Plurimi enim circa hee tum
accipiendo tum dando aberrant.”
® Such is the version of the Greek, with the exception of the words ri
καὶ before τίς ἂν, which I cannot understand ; nor could Ficinus, who
has omitted them. One MS. has rtva—another omits τι. There issome
error here,
61 Stalbaum, uncertain to what ra yer. can be applied, woul read
ἤθη, referring that word to the varieties of disposition, mentioned. just
afterwards.
THE STATESMAN. 279
naturally at the beginning blooming with strength, but in the
end bursts out altogether into madness,
Soe. jun. It is likely.
Guest. On the other hand, a soul very full of modesty, and
unmixed with manly boldness, when it has been propagated
in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes un-
seasonably sluggish, and at last perfectly mutilated.
Soc. jun. And this also is likely to happen.
Guest. I have said that it is not difficult to bind together
these bonds,® the fact being that both genera have one opinion
respecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one
and entire work of kingly weaving, never to suffer moderate
manners to subsist apart from such as are manly ; but, placing
both in the same shuttle, to bring out from them a web
smooth, and, as it is said, well-woven, by means of similar
opinions, and honours, and dishonours, and glories,® and the
interchange of pledges,®* and to commit over to these in com-
mon the offices in the state.
Soe. jun. How?
Guest. Wherever there happens to be a need of one
governor, by choosing a president who possesses both these
(manners); but where (there is need) of more than one, by
mingling a portion of both of them. For the manners of
temperate governors are very cautious, just, and conserya-
tive; but they are in want of a certain sourness, and a sharp
and practical daring.
Soc. jun. These things also appear so to me.
Guest. On the other hand, manliness is with respect to
® Ficinus has “ His, ut diximus, ligamentis vincire utraque hominum
genera facile possumus,”’ which is, what the Greek is not, intelligible.
Perhaps Plato wrote Τούτοις δὴ τοῖς δεσμοῖς---ξυνδεῖν τὼ γένη, ὑπάρξαντε
τοῦ---μίαν ἔχειν ἀμφότερα δόξαν---ἰ. 6. ‘‘ With these bonds—to bind the
two genera, after they have begun to have both one opinion.”’ For thus
we get rid of the strange use of ὑπάρξαντος, thus found absolutely in the
sense of existing.
68 Ficinus correctly omits δόξαις : which, if it means ‘‘ glories,’’ is al-
most synonymous with τιμαῖς ; if ‘ opinions,”’ with ὁμοδοξίαις. On the
other hand, the oldest MS. omit ἀτιμίαις, which Ficinus renders “ vitu-
perationes.””
* Such is Stalbaum’s version of ὁμηρείων ἐκδόσεσιν, But interchange
is in Greek ἀντίδοσις or ἐπίδοσις. In ἐκδόσεσιν there is evidently an al-
lusion to the “giving in marriage”? mentioned above. Hence Ficinus has
** per alterna conjugia.”” There is however some deep-seated disorder
here, which only a bold conjecture will be able to cure.
280 THE STATESMAN.
justice and caution rather deficient in those virtues; but it
has pre-eminently in actions a daring. It is however im-
possible for all things pertaining to states, both of a private and
public nature, to well exist, unless both of these are present..
Soc. jun. How not?
Guest. Let us say® then that this is the end of the web of
the statesman’s doing, (so as for him) to weave with straight-
weaving the manners of manly and temperate men, when the
kingly science shall by bringing together their common life,
through a similarity in sentiment and friendship, complete the
most magnificent and excellent of all webs, [so as to be
common, |** and enveloping all the rest in the state, both
slaves and free-men, shall hold them together by this texture,
and, as far as it is fitting “for a state to become prosperous,
shall rule and preside over it, deficient® in that point not
one jot.
Soc. jun. You have brought, O guest, most beautifully, on
the other hand,® the characters of the king and statesman to
a finish.
'
55. From the letters τὸ μὲν, which Stalbaum has cancelled, as if they
had dropped from the clouds, Ast most happily elicited ἐσαμὸν, the very
word requisite to complete the sense.
56. Stalbaum has improperly adopted φαμὲν, with his three best MSS.,
in lieu of φῶμεν.
6787 ΤῸ the words within brackets, in Greek ὥστ᾽ εἶναι κοινὸν, Ast,
whom Stalbaum follows, first objected; for he probably saw that they
were omitted by Ficinus. They ought not however to be rejected en-
tirely, but inserted a little above, by reading—Towro δὴ τὸ τέλος, ὑφάσ-
ματος we εὐθοπλοκίᾳ ξυμπλακὲν, γίγνεσθαι φῶμεν πολιτικῆς πράξεως,
ὥστ᾽ εἶναι κοινὸν τὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ σωφρόνων ἦθος, ὁπόταν ---ἰ. e.
“Let us say then that this is the end, as of a garment woven by a
straight weaving, of the statesman’s working, so that the manners of manly
and moderate men may be in common.” To get, however, at this sense it
was requisite to retain the old reading, ξυμπλακὲν, for which Stalbaum
has from his three best MSS. substituted ξυμπλέκειν, to the destruction
alike of sense and syntax, and to insert we after ὑφάσματος.
*s—*s Ficinus has more intelligibly, “‘ut nihil pretermittat eorum, que,
quoad fieri potest, beatam efficiunt civitatem.”
% In lieu of αὖ, which has no meaning here, one MS. has dv, which
would lead to δὴ, as shown by Porson in Miscellan. Crit. p. 182. Unless
indeed it be said with Stalbaum that the concluding speech is to be as-
signed to the elder Socrates; who would thus be seen to praise this
dialogue at its end, as he does at its commencement the Sophist; which
is feigned to have taken place on the same day as this, and of which the
Statesman is merely the continuation. ΠΝ
INTRODUCTION ΤῸ THE CRATYLUS.
Prato having on various occasions, and especially in the Sophist
and Statesman, applied some of the phenomena of language to the
illustration of his argument on questions relating to Dialectics, and
Moral and Political Philosophy, has in this Dialogue entered more
at length on so much of the same subject, as is connected with the
origin of words in the case of persons, acts, and things.
To this step he was probably led by finding that the Sophists,
whom he every where opposes with reason and ridicule united, and
whom he hunted down with all the ardour of a philosophical Nim-
rod, were generally the followers of the school of Parmenides or
Heracleitus. Of these, the former asserted that all the phenomena
of existence could be explained on the principle, that all things are
ever at rest; the latter on the contrary principle, that every thing
is in motion. To prove then that both were equally wrong, Plato
had recourse to the phenomena of language. For as they formed
a part of things in existence, the supporters of those theories ought
to be able to explain, why certain names were given to certain per-
sons, acts, and things. And so, it would seem, Protagoras did in
reality attempt to do in that part of his work under the title of
᾿Αλήθεια (Truth), which was Περὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος (On
the propriety of names), as Stalbaum has suggested ; and so too, I
suspect, did Euthyphron, in his philosophical poem ealled Μοῦσα
Φιλόσοφος, where the doctrines attributed to Orpheus were developed ;
and from whence Proclus probably obtained the quotations from
the Orphic poems, to be found in his Commentaries on the Cratylus
and Parmenides. For such was the elasticity of the Greek language,
that subjects, apparently the least suited to verse, were treated in a
metrical form; as is shown by the fragments of Empedocles, Par-
menides, and of Epicharmus the philosopher.
282 INTRODUCTION TO THE CRATYLUS.
But as the reasons, by which the Philosophical Etymologists
arrived at their conclusions, were little satisfactory to Plato, he
probably thought, that to prove the absurdity of their theories, it
was only requisite to carry out their principles to the fullest extent.
He therefore amused himself with bringing forward some proper
names, and nouns appellative, and a few verbs, which he pretends
to explain on their own principles. But this is done in a manner
so utterly ridiculous, as to exhibit its own refutation on its very
face ; but with an air so grave, that Payne Knight said it was difficult
to decide whether Plato was in jest or in earnest. So successfully
indeed has the mystification been carried on, that, as stated by Stal-
baum, while Menage and Tiedemann believed Plato to be speaking
seriously his real sentiments, Garnier and Tennemann perceived
that he was playing his usual part of an ironical philosopher. For
the etymologies are not only at variance with all the well-ascer-
tained principles of the Greek language, but they are supported by
arguments one can hardly believe to be other than, as in the case
of the Hippias Major, the broadest caricature of those brought for-
ward by the persons, whom it was Plato’s intention to ridieule.
To preserve however his assumed character the better, Plato pre-
tends to account for his ignorance of the origin of some words
by saying, as probably did some of the Pseudo-philosophical Ety-
mologists of his day, and as their counterparts of the present time do
certainly, that to the East we must look for the solution of many
difficulties connected with this inquiry; as if any person, acquainted
with all the dead and living languages of the whole world, could
arrive at the origin of words, unless he could tell—what, I
Prodicus or some other of the philosophers, whom Plato had in
mind, attempted to do—what was the origin of each letter, and
why they had a certain form, and how that form was connected
with the sound of each, and how they came to follow each other in
a certain order. It was not then without reason that Plato con-
cluded the Dialogue by saying, that the question was one of so
intricate a nature, as to require much further consideration ; as
it was impossible to prove in all cases that the names of persons,
things, and acts were originally given with reference to the in-
herent nature of the objects represented by them, or from the
caprice of one person, or the agreement of many.
ΤΗΝ CRATYLUS.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES.
HERMOGENES.
[1.7 Arg you willing then that we should communicate
our discourse to Socrates here?
Crat. If it seems good to you.
Herm. Cratylus here, O Socrates, says that there is a pro-
priety of appellation naturally subsisting for every thing that
exists ; and that this name is not, what certain persons conven-
tionally call it, while they articulate with a part oftheir speech ;
but that there is a certain propriety of names, naturally the same
both among the Greeks and all Barbarians. I ask him then
whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is.
What then is the (true name) of Socrates? He replies, So-
erates, In the case of all other persons then, said I, is not
that the name of each, by which we call him? Your name,
says he, is not Hermogenes, although all men call you so,!
And upon my putting a question, and being very desirous
to know what he means, he does not state any thing dis-
tinctly, but uses dissimulation towards me, and a feint, as
if he had some thoughts in his own mind, which, should he,
as being conversant with the subject, be willing to state
clearly, he would cause me to agree with him, and to say
1 ἐς Cratylus,” says Stalbaum, “ denies that Hermogenes was correctly
so called. For Hermogenes was neither wealthy nor eloquent, as shown
by § 3 and ὁ 54,”
284 CRATYLUS.
what he does himself. [2.] If then you can by any means
unfold by guessing this oracular language of Cratylus, I shall
very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I
would much more gladly hear about the propriety of names,
in what way the matter seems to stand to you.
Soc. O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus,? there is an old
proverb, that beautiful things are somehow difficult to learn.*
Now the learning relating to names happens to be no small
affair. If however I had heard that exhibition of Prodicus
valued at fifty drachms,* by which he who heard might have
been instructed, as he himself says, on this very point, no-
thing would have prevented you from knowing immediately
the truth respecting the propriety of names. But I never
heard except the one for a single drachm.> Hence I know
not where the truth is on such-like points; but am neverthe-
less prepared to seek it along with you and Cratylus. [3.]
But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality
Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he is, as it were,®
at you; for he thinks, perhaps, that though covetous of wealth,
you have failed on each occasion in acquiring it. But, as I
just now said, it is hard to know such-like matters; by
placing however (the arguments) in common, it is meet to
consider whether the fact is as you say, or as Cratylus.
Herm. In good truth, Socrates, although I have frequently
disputed with this person and many others, I cannot be per-
suaded that there is any other propriety of appellation, than
through convention and common consent. For to me it ap-
pears, that the name, which any one assigns to a thing, is the
proper one; and that, if he should even change it to another,
3 Respecting this Hipponicus, Heindorf refers to Thucyd. iii. 91;
Anos. Orat, iv. p. 296; Plutarch, Alcibiad. p.195; and Athenzus y.
p. 218.
3 On this proverb, see the Schol. here, and Hesych. in XaXera.
* To this high-priced exhibition Plato alludes in Charmid. § 24, and
Aristotle in Rhetor, iii. 14. Herp.
5 From this passage, and the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called Axi-
ochus, § 6, it has been inferred that Prodicus used to suit the price of
his instructions to the purse of his pupils. Hence as Socrates was a
very poor man, he could only get at the lectures given for a very low
sum, and consequently of very little value.
δ I have translated ὥσπερ as if it were ὡσπερεὶ. Ficinus has, “ tibi non
esse revera nomen Hermogenis, quod a lucro dicitur,” either from his
own head or the MS. before him.
4
¢
CRATYLUS. 285
and call it no longer by the previous one, the latter name will
be no less right than the former ; just as we are accustomed
to change the names of our servants, ‘[and the name so
changed is not the less proper than the one previously
given];’ for to each thing there is no name naturally inhe-
rent, but only through the law and custom of those who are
wont so to call them. But, if the case is otherwise, I am
ready both to learn and hear, not only from. Cratylus, but
from any other person whatever.
[4.] Soc. Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something (to the
purpose). Let us then consider, Is that the name of a thing,
which any one puts on each thing as its appellation ?
Herm. To me it appears so.
Soe. And this, whether a private person so calls it, or
a state ?
Herm. So I say.
Soc. What then, if I should give a name to whatever that
exists, in such a manner, as to denominate that a horse,
which we now call a man, and that a man, which we now
call a horse, the name of man will, as regards the public, re-
main to the same (object); but as regards the individual, the
name of horse? and on the other hand, as regards the in-
dividual, the name of man, but as regards the public, the
name of horse? Do you say so?
Herm. It appears so to me.
Soc. Tell me then, do you say it is a thing, to speak true
and false?
Herm. I do.
Soc. There will then be a discourse, one true but another
false.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Will not that discourse then, which speaks of things
as they are, be true; but that which (speaks of them) as they
are not, false ὃ
Herm. Yes.
[5.1 Soc. This then is possible,* to speak in a discourse of
things which are, and which are not.
7—’ Cornarius was the first to reject as spurious the words within
brackets; for he doubtless saw they were omitted by Ficinus. They are
vainly defended by Heindorf and Stalbaum.
8 So Heind. explains Ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, as if ἔστιν were used in the
286 CRATYLUS.
Herm. Entirely so. in
Soc. Is the discourse, which is true, true as a — while
its parts are not true? Tag ois
Herm. No; but the parts are true likewise. ds bot
Soc. But are the greater portions true, and the smaller,
not? or are they all (true)? at UME
Herm. I think all. 08 at
Soc. Is there any part of a discourse, of what you! are
speaking, smaller than a name?
Herm. No. This is the smallest of all.
Soc. And the name is said to be a part of a true ἅμ
course ?
Herm. Yes.
Soc. And it is, as you say, true.
Herm. Yes.
Soc. But is not the part of a false discourse false?
Herm. I say so.
Soc. It is then permitted to call a name true and false,
since (we can call) a discourse so.
Herm. How not?
Soc. Is that, which each person says is the name of a
thing, the name of each thing ?
Herm. Yes.
Soc, Will there be as many names to a thing, as any per-
son assigns to it? and at that time, when he assigns them?
[6.7 Herm. I have no other propriety of appellation, So-
erates, than this; that I should call a thing by one name,
which I assign to it, and you by another, which you (assign)
to it. And after this manner, I see that by each state, names
are assigned individually, sometimes® to the same things, both
by Greeks apart from! the other Greeks, and by Greeks
apart from Barbarians.
sense of ἔνεστι. But in that case, as Heindorf confesses, one would ex-
pect τοῦτο, τὸ---λέγειν, although the article is omitted in Euthyd. ᾧ 37,
ἡ καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο---ἐξελέγξαι. Had however Heindorf known that one
MS. reads τοῦτ᾽ οὖν for τοῦτο, and another τῷ, perhaps he would have
seen that Plato wrote ὁτῳοῦν λόγῳ, i i. e. “by any discourse whatever.” ©
* Buttmann’s emendation, ἐνίοτε for ἐνίοις, preserved by some MSS.
after ἑκάσταις, has been adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb.
19. So Stalbaum translates παρὰ. I suspect however that τισὶ has’ dropt
after the first” E\Anot, and πᾶσι after the second, to preserve the’ balance
in the two parts of each sentence.
CRATYLUS. 287
Soc. Come, let us see, Hermogenes, whether things that
are, appear to you to exist in such a manner, '' with respect
to the peculiar essence of each,!! as Protagoras said, when he
asserted that: man was the measure of all things;!? (and)!*
that things are to me, such as they appear to me; and that, on
the other hand, they are to you such, as (they appear) to you;
or do some of these seem to you to possess a certain stability
of existence ?
Herm. Already, Socrates, I have, through doubting, been
led to this, which Protagoras asserts ;'4 but yet this does not
perfectly appear to me to be the case.
[7.] Soc. But what, have you ever been led to this, so that
it never seemed to you that a man existed perfectly evil?
Herm. Never, by Zeus! But I have often had this feei-
ing, so as to think, that there are some men, and very many
too, profoundly wicked.
Soc. But what, have there never seemed to you to be men
very good?
Herm. Very few, indeed.
Soc. Yet they have seemed to be?
Herm. Yes, to me.
Soc. How, then, do you establish this? Is it thus? That
the very good are very prudent, and the very bad are very
imprudent ?
Herm. It appears so to me.
Soc. Is it possible then, if Protagoras speaks the truth, and
this is the truth 1561 15 that each'® thing is such, as it ap-
pears to each one to be, for some of us to be prudent, and
some imprudent ?
1. πὶ So Taylor translates the Greek words ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία εἷναι
ἑκάστῳ, where I can discover neither sense nor syntax; nor could
Ficinus, as may be inferred from his version, “ut propria rerum apud
unumquemque essentia sit,” which to me is quite as unintelligible as the
Greek.
2 On this celebrated doctrine of Protagoras, see Theetet. § 23, and
the authors quoted by Menage on Diogen. L, ix. 61.
13 [ have translated as if καὶ had dropped out before wc.‘
τ Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain away the incorrect Greek in the
words ἐνταῦθα---εἰς ἅπερ---λέγει. ‘There is some error here, which only
a bold critic would be able to correct.
16. Stalbaum conceives there is an allusion to a work of Protagoras
under the title of “The Truth.”
16 Heindorf thinks that Ficinus found in his MS. ἑκάστῳ ἕκαστα : for
his version is “ qualia queque cuique videntur.”’
288 CRATYLUS.
[8.] Herm. By no means.
Soc. And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you,
that, since prudence and imprudence exist, it is not possible
for Protagoras to speak the truth entirely ; for one person will
not in truth be more prudent than another, if that, which
seems to each one, is to each one true.
Herm. It is so.
Soc. I think however you will not, according to the theory
of Euthydemus," imagine that all things exist to all persons
in a similar manner, and at the same time,'S and always; for
thus some persons would not be good, and others bad, if virtue
and vice existed to all persons, and in.a similar manner, and
always inherent in all things.
Herm. You speak the truth.
Soc. If then neither all things exist similarly and at the
same time, and always to all persons, !*nor each thing is what
it seems to each person,!° it is evident that there are things,
which possess themselves a certain firm existence of their
own; and this not as regards us, nor by being drawn up-
wards and downwards by us, through our imagination, 39 but
possessing of themselves their own existence, which is natur-
ally theirs.?°
Herm. This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.
[9.1 Soe. Will then the things themselves exist naturally
in this manner, but their actions not in the same manner? or
are not their actions themselves one species of things ?
17 This is the same person as he who is mentioned in the dialogue of
that name, where his theory is explained in § 55.
18. Ficin. omits ἅμα, correctly it would seem, for it is not introduced
into the next sentence. But as it is repeated in the next speech of So-
crates, perhaps cai ἅμα ought to be inserted here before καὶ aei, or elsé
dpa omitted again with Ficinus.
19. So Taylor translated, as the train of ideas evidently requires.
The Greek is literally, “‘ nor to each person individually are each of the
things existing.’ Ficinus has, ‘ neque cuique proprium unumquodque,”’
as if his MS. omitted with thirteen others τῶν ὄντων ἔστι.
30. 20 T have translated as if the Greek were ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὴν
αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἥπερ πέφυκεν---ποῦ αὑτὰ πρὸς τὴν---ἧστερ, which I
cannot understand ; nor could Ficinus, whose version is “ sed secundum
se ipsas, quoad ipsarum essentiam, ut nature institute sunt, permanentes,”
as if he had found in his MS. ὄντα instead of ἔχοντα, in which word the
whole difficulty lies; for it could not be taken here intransitively, as
shown by the preceding αὐτὰ αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα, and by αὐταὶ πρὸς
αὑτὰς---τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσι in Parmenid. § 15, quoted by Heindorf.
CRATYLUS. 289
Herm. They are perfectly so.
Soe. Actions too are performed then according to their own
nature, (and) not according to our opinion. As, for instance,
if we should attempt to cut any of things existing, whether
must each (particular) be cut as we please, and with what we
please? or if we should desire to cut any thing, 3) according
to its nature of being cut, and with the (instrument) of which
it is the nature to cut,?! ?2shall we both cut and will some-
thing more take place, and shall we do this rightly ??? But if
(we wish to act) contrary to nature, shall we (not) err, and
effect nothing ?
Herm. To me it appears so.
Soe. If then we should attempt to burn any thing, we
ought not to burn it, according to every opinion, but according
to that which is the right one; *8and this is in the way, in
which each thing is by nature to be burnt and burn, and
with what it is by nature.”
Herm. It is so.
[10.] Soe. Are not thus too the rest of things?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Is not then to speak one of the things (called) actions ?
Herm. Yes.
*1_21 All the MSS. have κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τέμνειν TE καὶ τέμ-
νεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε, nor has a single editor seen that the thing to be cut
can alone have the nature to be cut, and the cutting instrument alone the
nature to cut. Wisely then did Taylor omit the words τέμνειν τε καὶ.
But he failed to see that τέμνειν τι should follow ᾧ πέφυκε, as I have
translated.
2222 Others may, but I never will, believe that Plato wrote τεμοῦμέν
τε---καὶ ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο, as if the latter expression were not per-
fectly superfluous after the former. He might indeed have written, and
probably did, cai ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τὸ πᾶν, as opposed to οὐδ᾽ ἕν πράξο-
μεν: while, as opposed to ἐξαμαρτησόμεσθα, common sense requires
τελοῦμέν τι εὖ.
38. 953 Here again, in the place of a mass of nonsense, Plato wrote, I
suspect, something more fit to be read, to this effect, “And this is for
each thing to be burnt in the way it is naturally, and with the material
which naturally burns,’’—in Greek, αὕτη dé ἐστι τὸ, 9 ye πέφυκεν, Exac-
Tov καίεσθαι, καὶ, ᾧ γε πέφυκε, καίειν : Where I have substituted 9 ye πέ-
φυκε and ᾧ γε πέφυκε, partly with two MSS., instead of ἡ ἐπεφύκει and
ᾧ ἐπεφύκει, Where the preposition is perfectly absurd, as Hermann might
have remarked, who, in his book, De Emendand. Ration. Grec, Gramm.
p- 202, and on Eurip. Hec. 213, ed. pr., correctly objected to the plu-
perfect.
υ
290 CRATYLUS.
Soc. Whether then does he, who speaks in the way he
thinks he ought to speak, correctly speak ? Mor, should he
speak in the way in which it is the nature of things to
and be spoken of, and with the instrument,™ will he effect
something and speak ; but if not, will he err ane ‘teeieno-
thing ?
Hers. It appears to me 10 is thus as you say. ©.
Soc. Is it not then a part of speaking to name a thing ?
25 For they who name a thing, speak the discourses,> _
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Is it not then an action to name a thing? since to
speak about things was a certain action.
Herm. Yes.
Soc. But actions have appeared as existing not with respect
to us, but as having a certain proper nature of their own,
Herm. They have so.
Soc. We must then give names to things, in the way and
by the instrument through which they exist in nature, [to
name and be named, 135 and not as we please, if there is about
to be an assent to what has been said before. And thus we
shall do something more, and give a name, but otherwise not.
Herm. It appears so to me.
[11.] Soc. Come then, say we that a thing which we
ought to cut, we ought to cut with something ?
424 Here again the Greek presents the same incorrect collocation of
words, as I have already noticed, and at variance with the natural flow
of ideas, which is partially preserved i in the version of Ficinus—“‘an po-
tius quisquis ita dicat, ut natura ipsa rerum dicere dicique requirit? et,
quo natura exigit, eo et dicat, aliquid dicendo proficiet ?”’ From whence
it is easy to see that Plato wrote—tay μὲν, ἡ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα yw
θαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε λέγειν---ταύτῃ καὶ τούτῳ λέγῃ.
35. 35 "Heindorf considered the whole of this clause as an inte
For λέγουσι is not used by Plato, like φασὲ, without a nominative. Stal-
baum, in defence of the “omitted article, quotes, as Heindorf had done
himself, Thucyd. vii. 69, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσιν. But
there I have restored oi before ἐν, in Poppo’s Prolegom. p- 107. The
preceding however is not the only error here. For τοὺς before λόγους i is
perfectly wee atecae Plato wrote, οἱ ὀνομάζοντες γάρ τι οὐ Aéy
Tov λόγου τι; i.e. “ For do not they, who name a thing, speak a part of
a discourse.”
*—%6 The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation. Op-
portunely then does one of the three oldest MSS. omit ὀνομάζειν te and
another kai ὀνομάζεσθαι, and a third place ὀνομάζειν re καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι
only in the margin.
CRATYLUS. 29]
Herm. Certainly.
Soe. And that what we ought to weave, we ought to weave
with something ? And that what we ought to bore, we ought
to bore with something ?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. And what we ought to name, we ought to name by
something ?
Herm. ΤῈ is so.
Soc. Now what is that with which we ought to bore ?
Herm. An auger.
Soe. And what (is that) with which (we ought to weave)?
Herm. A shuttle.’
Soc. And what (is that) by which (we ought) to name?
Herm. A name.
Soe. You speak well. ‘The name then is a certain instru-
ment.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. If then I were to ask, What instrument is a shuttle ὃ
*8(would you not answer, 28 It is that with which we weave?
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. But what do we perform with the shuttle? Do we
not separate the warp and the woof, which have been mixed
together ?
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. Would you not be able to speak in the same manner
of an auger, and the other (instruments) ?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Can you in like manner speak of a name? Using
the name as an instrument, what do we perform by naming?
Herm. I cannot tell. ,
[12.] Soe. Do we teach one another something, and dis-
tinguish things as they are ἢ
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. A name then is a kind of instrument to teach and
37 Ficinus, uncertain how to translate κερκὶς, makes use of two words,
“ radius pectenque.”’
**—*8 ‘The words within lunes Taylor inserted from “ responderes ” in
the version of Ficinus. Stalbaum says that the apodosis is omitted,
where one would expect οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγοις ἂν, as supplied by Hein-
dorf. But why Plato should thus omit what is absolutely requisite for
the sense, Stalbaum does not, for he could not, tell. I suspect that ἐρεῖς
has dropt out after @ κερκίζομεν,
292 CRATYLUS.
distinguish the (parts) of existence,”® as a shuttle (does those)
of a web.
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. The shuttle is a weaving instrument?
Herm. How not?
Soc. He who weaves then will employ a shuttle well;* and
by well, is meant in a weaver-like manner; and he who
teaches (will employ) a name well, and by well, (is meant) in
a teacher-like manner.
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. By the work of whom does the weaver employ pro-
perly the shuttle, when he uses it?
Herm. The carpenter.
Soc. But is every one a carpenter, or he only who pos-
sesses that art ?
Herm. He (who possesses) the art?
Soc. By the work of whom does the borer properly use
the auger, when he uses it ?
Herm. The smith’s.
Soc. Is then every one a smith, or he only who possesses
that art?
Herm. He (who possesses) the art.
Soc. Well then, by the work of whom does the teacher
employ a name, when he uses it ἢ
Herm. Not even this can I tell.3!
Soc. Nor can you tell even this, who has handed down to
us the names which we use ?
Herm. Not 1.
Soc. Does it not appear to you that custom*®? has handed
down these?
79 As the genitive τῆς οὐσίας cannot thus depend upon διακριτικὸν
Plato wrote, I suspect, τὰ οὐσίας. For otherwise the article τοῦ would
be required before ὑφάσματος.
3° The word “ well,” in Greek καλῶς, Cornarius was the first to see
was wanting here; for he found “ recte utetur”’ in the version of Ficinus.
31. Heindorf says that in Οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχω, without λέγειν, there is an al-
lusion to Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν in § 11. But as the allusion would be too distant,
one would have expected rather Οὐκ ἔχω, similar to “ Nescio ” in Ficinus.
* So Heindorf explains ὁ νόμος, referring to νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν---κα-
λούντων in § 3, whom Stalbaum follows. But instead of ὁ νόμος, “a
thing,”’ the train of reasoning evidently requires ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης, “ἃ per-
son,” as is read in MS. Gud. here and elsewhere. Besides, although a
person may be said to introduce a custom, he can scarcely be said to
CRATYLUS. 293
Herm. It does.
[13.] Soc. He then who teaches, empleys the work of the
custom-introducer 35 when he uses a name.
Herm. It appears so to me.
Soc. But does every man appear to you to be a custom-
introducer, or he only who possesses that art ?
Herm. He (who possesses) that art.
Soc. It is not then the province of every man, Hermo-
genes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names ;
and this, as it seems, is the custom-introducer,** who is the
most rare of artificers among men.
Herm. So it appears.
Soc. But come, consider, to what does the custom-intro-
ducer* look when he establishes names ; and make the survey
from the previous instances. ΤῸ what does the carpenter
look, when he makes a shuttle? Is it not to some such thing
as is weaving naturally ?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. But if the shuttle should be broken by him while
making it, would he make another, looking to the broken one,
or to that form, according to which he was making the shuttle
he had broken ?
Herm. To that, it appears to me.
Soc. **Should we not therefore most justly call that very
form the shuttle itself Ὁ 886 >
possess the art of introducing a custom. For there is not, and never was,
such an art.
33 So Stalbaum understands νομοθέτου. But νομοθέτης always means
elsewhere in Greek a ‘‘ law-giver ;”’ nor is Plato thus wont to affix new
meanings to well-known words.
% Heindorf says, that if ὀνοματοθέτης be rendered “ a name-imposer,”
Plato will be guilty of a wretched tautology in thus introducing évoparo-
θέτης after ὀνοματουργός. But ὀνοματοθέτης, found in the margin of
one MS. and in the text of the MS. used by Ficinus, as shown by his
version, ‘‘ hic autem etiam, ut videtur, nominum institutor,” is evidently
an interpretation of ὀνοματουργὸς, a word coined by Plato, after the
analogy of δημιουργὸς ; and hence the whole clause, οὗτος δὲ ἐστιν, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ὃ ὀνοματοθέτης, must be rejected as the interpolation of some
Scholiast.
* One MS. has ὀνοματοθέτης as a var. lect., which Ficinus found in
the text of his MS. For he translates it ‘‘ nominum institutor.”
*° Ficinus seems to have found something different from the present
Greek text in his MS., for his version is, “ἡ Nonne speciem ipsam merito
ipsius radii rationem ipsumque radium nominabimus ?”
7
294 CRATYLUS.
Herm. It appears so to me.
[14.] Soc. When therefore it is requisite to make a shuttle,
(adapted) to a thin or thick garment, either of thread or wool,
or of any material whatever, it is necessary for all of them
to have the form of the shuttle; but to impart its nature to
each kind of work according as it is naturally the beeietmtied
for it.
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. And the same method applies in the case of other
instruments. For he who has discovered an instrument
naturally suited to each thing, must assign it to that work,
from which he will make not what he pleases, but that which
is natural (to the instrument). %7 For as it seems, a person
ought to know how to form of iron an auger naturally suited
for each (work).*7 .
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. And of wood a shuttle naturally suited for Hb
(work).
Herm. It is so.
Soe. For each shuttle, as it seems, is naturally HR to
each kind of weaving; and so are the other (instruments).
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. It is necessary then, O best (of men), for the custom-
introducer*®* to know how to form a name of sounds and syl-
lables ; and looking to what is really a name,*” to frame and
establish all names, if he is about to be the master-founder of
names. [15.] But if each founder of names does not form of-
the same syllables a name,“° we ought not to be ignorant of
this.4! For neither does every smith use the same iron, when
3137 Ficinus has, *‘ Terebrum namque cuique accommodatum scire
oportet in ferro perficere,”’ omitting φύσει---ὡς torxe—rrepuKdc—_
* Heindorf and Stalbaum still stick to νομοθέτην, although MS. Gud.
has ὀνοματοθέτην, and Ficinus “ nominum institutor.” Buta little be~
low, (n. 5,) Heindorf has correctly preferred ὀνοματοθέτης, found i in the
same MS.
89 Instead of οὗ ἔστιν ὄνομα, Buttmann, with the appt of
Heindorf and Stalbaum, suggested ὃ ἔστι» ὄνομα, which he obtained
from Ficinus, “ quod i ipsum nomen est,”
© Ficinus has “ nominum conditor nomen exprimit,” for he doubiless
found in his MS. ὀνοματοθέτης τίθησιν ὄνομα---
“ Stalbaum, as usual, vainly attempts to defend the unintelligible
οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν, by saying that ‘one must not be ignorant of
this,” is the same as, “‘ one must remember this.” Heindorf more cor-
CRATYLUS. 295
making the same instrument for the sake of the same thing ;
but as long as he gives it the same form, although from
even®'a different kind of iron, the instrument is equally 43
eorrectly made, whether one makes it here, or among the
Barbarians. Is not this the case?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Will you not therefore deem it right to say, that, so
long as the founder of names,“ both here and among the Bar-
berians, assigns the form of a name accommodated to each
thing, in any kind of syllables whatever, the founder of names
here is not worse than the founder in any other place what-
ever?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soe. Who then is likely to know whether the convenient
form of a shuttle exists in any kind whatever of wood? Is it
tae carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it?
Herm. It is more probable he who is to use it, Socrates.
[16.] Soc. Who is it then that uses the work of the lyre-
maker? Is it not he, who knows how best to superintend the
maker, and knows when it is made, whether it is properly
made or not ?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. But who is this?
Herm. The lyre-player.
Soc. And who is it (that uses) the work of the ship-
wright ?
Herm. The pilot.
Soe. And who is he, that would superintend the best the
work of the founder of names, and decide about it when finished,
rectly saw that the version of Ficinus, ‘‘ animadvertendum est quod,”
ve a sense better suited to the train of thought. Hence out of οὐδὲν
εἴ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν, οὐδὲ yap, one might elicit εἰδέναι εὖ τοῦτό γ᾽ ἄνῳ ἣν
ὅτι οὐδὲ εἰς --““ a man without wit might know this well, that not even” --
4 Stalbaum would read, ἐὰν καὶ for ἐάν τε. He should have suggested
ὁτῳοῦν ἐν ἄλλῳ as being nearer to ἐάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ.
48. Stephens correctly suggested ὁμοίως for ὕμως. Heindorf quotes
opportunely Euthyd. § 3, ἐξελέγχειν---ὁμοίως, ἐάν τε ψεῦδος ἐάν τε ἀληθὲς
9. Stalbaum still sticks to the doubled ὅμως, because forsooth ὁμοίως is
opposed to the reading of the MSS.; as if all conjectures are not made in
defiance of them.
“4 Here, and shortly afterwards, Stalbaum rejects, what Heindorf had
properly restored from MS. Gud., ὀνοματοθέτην : and a similar observa-
tion applies to all the subsequent passages of the same kind.
206 CRATYLUS.
both here and among the Barbarians? Is it not he, who is to
use it?
Herm. Yes.
Soc. And is not this person, one who knows how to in-
terrogate ?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc.’ And likewise to answer?
Herm. Yes.
Soc. But would you call him, who knows how to interro-
gate and answer, any thing else, than a dialectician ?
Herm. No; but this.
Soc. It is the business then of the shipwright to rin a
rudder, while the pilot is superintending, if the rudder is
about to be a good one.
Herm. It appears so.
Soc. And (to make) a name (it is the business) of the
name-founder, it seems, to have a dialectician as his superin-
tendent, if he is about to found names correctly.
Herm. Such is the case.
[17.] Soc. It nearly appears then, Hermogenes, that the
imposition of names is not, as you think it, an affair of no mo-
ment, nor for men of no mark, nor of such as may be met
with any where. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says
that names belong to things from nature; and that every one
is not the artificer of names, but he alone, who looks to that
name, which is naturally suited to each thing, and who is able
to mould its form into letters and syllables.
Herm. 1 know not, Socrates, how I ought to oppose myself
to what you are saying. It is not however easy perhaps to
be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think I should be more
easily persuaded by you, if you could show me what is that
which you call a natural propriety of appellation.
Soc. I myself, O blessed Hermogenes, say there is none.
But you have forgotten, what I said a short time previously,
that I knew nothing, but would consider the matter together
with you. But now, to myself and you considering well the
question together, thus much appears contrary to our former
opinion, that the name possesses some natural propriety, and
15. Ficinus has “ mihi et tibi simul investigantibus.”’” From whence it
is easy to read ἅμ᾽ εὖ for ypiv—
CRATYLUS, 297
that it is not for every man to know how to give a name to
any thing whatever correctly. Or is it not so?
Herm. Entirely so.
[18.] Soc. It is necessary then to inquire, if you desire to
know it, after this, in what does the propriety of a name
consist.*®
Herm. But I do desire to know it.
Soe. Consider then.
Herm. How must I consider?
Soc. The most correct inquiry, my friend, (will be) with
those, who know through your telling out money to them, and
giving them thanks. These are the sophists, to whom your
brother Callias*’ told out a mint of money, and (now) appears
to be a wise man. But, since you are not the master of your
patrimony,‘** you must earnestly entreat your brother, and
beg of him to show you the propriety respecting things of this
kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.
Herm. But this request of mine would be absurd, Socrates,
if, when I reject entirely “The Truth”* of Protagoras, I
should embrace what is stated in such a truth, as things of
any value.
[19.1 Soe. But if this does not please you, we must learn
from Homer, and the other poets.
Herm. And what says Homer, Socrates, about names; and
where ?
Soc. In many places. But those are the chief and most
beautiful (passages), in which he distinguishes between the
names, which men and gods assign to the same things. Or
do you not think that he says something great and wonderful
46 Instead of αὖ ἐστὶν, where αὖ has no meaning, one MS. has cor-
rectly ἔνεστιν.
7 On this Callias, see Heindorf on Theetet. § 57.
48 From this it would seem that the father of Hermogenes was still
alive. Compare Aristoph. Σφηκ. 1354. Νῦν δ᾽ οὐ κρατῶ ᾽γὼ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ
χρημάτων. Νέος γάρ εἰμι.
rs ta is an allusion to the work of Protagoras called “ The Truth,”
as in § 8.
59. Unless τῇ τοιαύτῃ be said in contempt of the work, one would sus-
pect that Plato—ra δὲ ἔπη ἐν ἀυτῇ, of which τῷ ᾿Αληθείᾳ would be the
interpretation. On the loss or confusion of ἔπη, I have written some-
thing worth reading in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 180, and in the Glossary
appended to my translation of the Midian oration of Demosthenes, p. 68,
and I could now add a great deal more.
298 CRATYLUS.
in those passages relating to the propriety of names? For it
is evident surely that the gods.call things according to the
propriety which names naturally possess. Or do me not
think so?
Herm. I well know, that if (the gods) call any tldnpiby a
name, they call it so correctly. But of what passages = eg
speaking ?
Soc. Do you not know, that when speaking of the ipa at
Troy, which fought in a single combat with Hephzestos; (Vul-
can, ) he says, (i. xx. 74,)
Whom gods call Xanthus, but Scamander, men,
Herm. Ido. What then ?5!
Soc. Do you not think that this is something of high’ im-
port, to know in what way it is right to call that river
Xanthus, rather than Scamander? [20.] Or, if you prefer it,
in the case of the bird, which he says, (Il. xx. 291,)
Chalcis the gods, but men Kymindis call.
Do you think this is a trifling piece of learning, (to know)
how much more proper it is to call the same bird Chalcis than
Cymindis, or Myrine than Batiea;** and there are many
other (passages), both in this poet and in others. . But these
things are perhaps too great forme and you to discover. But
the names Scamandrius and Astyanax are, as it appears to
me, more for a (common) man to investigate and more easy
(to see), what is the propriety of the names, which, he says,
were given to the son of Hector. For you doubtless know
the verses, in which are the names I am speaking of.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Which then of these names do you think Homer con-
sidered as more correctly given to the boy, ASLSABE or
Scamandrius ?
Herm. I cannot tell.
Soc. But reflect in this way. If any one should ask ‘you,
whether you thought the more wise or the less wise would
call things in the more correct manner? bay
511 have adopted with the Zurich editors Heindorf’s suggestion in as-
signing “‘ What then?” to Hermogenes, and not, as in other editions;ay
Socrates.
52 The passage alluded to is in Il. ii. 813.
CRATYLUS. 299
Herm. It is manifest I should answer, the more wise.
[21.] Soc. Whether then do women, or men, to speak of
the whole (human) race, appear to you to be the wiser in
cities ἢ 58
Herm. 'The men.
Soe. Do you not then know, that Homer says that the son
of Hector was called by the men of Troy,*4 Astyanax, but
Scamandrius, *°it is plain,®® by the women ; since the men*®
were wont to call him Astyanax. :
Herm. It appears so. ᾿
Soc. Do you not then conceive that Homer considered the
men of Troy wiser than the women?
Herm. I think so.
_ Soc. He therefore thought that the name Astyanax was
more correctly given to the boy than Scamandrius.
| Herm. It appears so.
Soc. But let us consider why he did so. Or does he not
himself give the best explanation for the reason? For he
says,
To throw a bulwark he alone was found,
The city’s gates*’ and the long walls around.
On this account then, as it seems, it is proper to call the son
of the saviour, Astyanax ; of that®* which, as Homer says,
his father preserved.
[22.1 Herm. So it appears to me.
53 Ὁ e. in a civilized state.
54 In Il. xxii. 506.
5555 The words δῆλον ὅτι are omitted in MS. Gud. and the version
of Ficinus. They are perfectly unnecessary.
56 It was not the men of Troy, but Hector himself, who called his son
Astyanax, as stated in 1]. vi. 402.
57 In Homer, I]. x. 506, the existing text has πύλας instead of πόλιν,
as quoted by Plato. I have united the two readings.
58 In lieu of the unintelligible τούτου, which has nothing to which it
can be referred, Ficinus offers a supplement, nothing similar to which
seems at present to have been found in any MS.—* Quapropter decet,
ut videtur, protectoris fillium nominare Astyanacta, id est regem urbis ;
urbis, inquam, ejus, quam pater suus servavit, ut inquit Homerus.” Per-
haps Plato wrote καλεῖν τὸν Ἕκτορος υἱὸν ᾿Αστυάνακτα, ὅτι τὸ ἄστυ
ἔσωζεν ἄναξ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτός, i.e. ‘to call the son of Hector Astyanax,
because the father had, as a prince, himself saved the city.”” Opportunely
then does MS. Gud. read “Ἕκτορος for σωτῆρος.
300 CRATYLUS.
Soc. But what is this? For I do not myself understand
this at all. Do you understand it?
Herm. By Zeus, I do not.
Soc. But, my good (friend), Homer has himself given to
Hector his name.
Herm. Why so?
Soc. Because it appears to me that this name (of Hector)*®
is something similar to Astyanax, “and these names appear
to be Greek ; for king and Hector signify nearly the same
thing; both the names to be royal. For over whatsoever
one is a king, he is also doubtless a Hector over it; since he
evidently rules over it, ®' possesses and has it.*' Or do I ap-
pear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but unconsciously
(err), in thinking I have hit upon, as it were, the track of
Homer’s thoughts respecting the propriety of names?
Herm. By Zeus, not you indeed, as it seems to me; but
perhaps you have hit upon something.
Soc. For it is just, as it appears to me, to call the offspring
of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do
not mean, should something else than a horse be produced,
like a monster, from a horse, but I speak of that which should
be its offspring as a natural production. For “if a horse
59 Ficinus alone has “ id nomen Hector.”
60.69 Such is the literal version of the nonsense in the Greek text.
Ficinus has ‘“‘ Ferme enim idem significant; putantque Greci utraque
hec nomina regia esse.”” Heindorf, translating ἔοικεν by “like to,”
would read δοκεῖ--- Αστυάνακτι καὶ ἐοικέναι "Ἑλληνικοῖς ταῦτα τὰ ὀνό-
ματα (ὁ γὰρ ἄναξ καὶ ὁ “Ἕκτωρ σχεδόν τι ταυτὸν σημαίνει) βασιλικὰ
ἀμφότερα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα ; while Stalbaum would incorrectly expel
βασιλικὰ, ck. τ. X., as an addition arising from a gloss. He saw however
correctly that τὰ ὀνόματα could not be thus repeated. Hence Plato
wrote, I suspect, καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν σημαίνει ταύτω τὼ ὀνόματε ὅ
τε ἄναξ καὶ ὁ ἕκτωρ' καὶ ἔοικεν Ἑλληνικῶς ἀμφότερα βασιλικὰ εἶναι.
The source of the error is to be traced to the transposition of some words
and the interpolation of others.
s1_s! This repetition of αὐτοῦ and αὐτὸ is extremely inelegant. In-
stead of κρατεῖ τε αὐτοῦ one would prefer κρατεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος. With regard
to the derivation of ἕκτωρ from ἔχω, like aerwp from ἄγω, Plato seems to
have forgotten that it was contrary to analogy. For all nouns in twp are
derived from the third pers. sing. of the perf. pass. But as ἔχω has no
rf. pass., there could be no such noun appellative as ἕκτωρ. But
though ἔχω has no perfect passive in use, it seems to have had one
originally. At least there would be naturally formed from it ἔχμα, as
remarked by the Etymol. Μ, p. 405, 19, and ἕξις.
6262 Such is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek ; and equally
CRATYLUS. 301
should, contrary to nature, beget a calf, the produce of a cow
by nature, we must call it not a colt, but a calf. Nor do
I think that, if from a man an offspring should be produced
not of a man, the progeny ought to be called a man; but
if it be the offspring.®* And similar is the case of trees, and
all other things. Or do you not agree with me?
Herm. I do
[23.] Soc. You speak well. But take care lest I somehow
cheat you. For according to the same reasoning, the offspring of
a king ought to be called a king. Now it matters not whether
the signification be the same in syllables different in one way
nonsensical is the version of Ficinus, “‘ Si enim bovis secundum naturam
filius equum gignit, non vitulus, qui nascitur, sed pullus equinus est
nuncupandus.”’ Plato wrote, I suspect, ἐὰν yap βοῦς ἵππου ἔκγονον,
ὅν φασιν ἡμίιππον παρὰ φύσιν τέκη, ob μόσχον, κλητέον ἀλλὰ πῶλον,
i. e. “if a bull should, contrary to nature, beget the progeny of a mare,
which they call a half-horse, we must call it not a calf, but a colt.’? With
regard to ἡμίιππον, the compound follows the analogy of ἡμίανδρος, and
ἡμίονος, and ἡμίθεος in Greek, and of “semivir”’ and “ semibos” in
Latin. This, however, is not the only error in this passage. For, as
Taylor was the first to remark, Ficinus found in his MS. something at
present wanting in the common text, ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππος Tapa
φύσιν τέκῃ μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον, ἀλλὰ μόσχον. Instead of which
we ought, says Taylor, to read, ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππον τέκῃ οὐ
μόσχον κλητεόν, ἀλλὰ πῶλον, καὶ ἐὰν ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ μόσχον,
οὐ πῶλον κλητέον, ἀλλὰ μόσχον; corresponding to the version of Ficinus,
**Si enim bovis secundum naturam filius equum gignit, non vitulus, qui
nascitur sed pullus equinus est nuncupandus ; et, si equus preter naturam
gignit vitulum, non pullus equinus dicendus est iste, sed vitulus.” By
the aid of which, Buttman would read, with the approbation of Heindorf,
᾿Εὰν γὰρ βοῦς ἵππου ἔκγονον φύσει παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ, οὐ μόσχον ἀλλὰ
πῶλον κλητέον" καὶ ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππος τέκῃ, οὐ πῶλον κλη-
τέον ἀλλὰ μόσχον. But in the first clause, φύσει παρὰ φύσιν could not
‘be thus united; and if they could, παρὰ φύσιν could not be omitted in
“the second clause. I suspect then that, as the whole of this sentence
was meant to balance the preceding one, Plato wrote, ἐὰν δὲ ἵππος παρὰ
φύσιν, ὅν φασιν ἡμίβουν, βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον, ἀλλὰ
μόσχον, i. 6. “if a horse should, contrary to nature, beget a progeny
from a cow, what they call a half-cow, we must call it not a colt but a
calf. See § 25, κἂν ἵππος βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ. Stalbaum however con-
ceives, with Schleiermacher and Beck, that no alteration will be requisite
if we merely expunge the first μόσχον.
58. 65 Here again the Latin of Ficinus is both different from, and supe-
rior to, the present Greek text—‘‘ Neque etiam, si ex homine alia proles,
quam humana, producitur, quod nascitur, homo vocari debet,’’ which
would be in Greek, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, οἶμαι, ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπου,
ἔκγονον γένηται, τὸ ἔκγονον ἄνθρωπος κλητέον.
302 CRATYLUS.
or another; nor if a letter be added or taken away, is even
this any thing, so long as the existence of the basen 1 is in
force, and shown by the name.
Herm. How say you this? on
Soc, Nothing complex; but as you know we βεμτβρυειδὰ
the names of the elements, but not the elements themselves,
except four, ε and v, and o and w; and placing round, you
know, other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-
vowels, (consonants,) we form names, and pronounce them.
But, as long as we insert the exhibited power of the element,
it is well to call it by the name which the element exhibits.
As, for instance, βῆτα. Here you see that, although the ἡ and
the τ and the a have been added, there is nothing to pain®
us, so as not to exhibit by the whole name the nature of that
element which its name-founder®™ intended; so well did he
know how to give names to letters.
Herm. You appear to me to speak the truth.
[24.] Soc. Will not then the same reasoning take place
respecting aking? For a king will be produced from ἃ
both good from a good one, and beautiful from a beautiful
one ;* and so in the case of every thing else, from each
genus another such is the progeny, unless something mon-
strous is produced, and they must be called by the same
name. But it is possible to vary (the names) by syllables, so
that, to an unskilled person, what are the same would appear
te be different from each other. Just as the drugs of phy-
sicians, when varied by colours or smells, appear to us to be
different, although really the same; but to the physician, as
one who looks to the power of the drugs, they appear to be
the same, nor is he struck at all with astonishment by the
additions to them. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled
in names looks to their value, and is not struck with astonish-
*. Ficinus has “ addentes,” as if he found in his MS. προστιθέντες.
Perhaps Plato wrote ἢ προστιθέντες ἢ περιτιθέντες"--
τ The verb constantly used elsewhere by Plato in this formula is
Kw, ὑει.
8 Strange to say, Heindorf has here left ὁ νομοθέτης in the text, al-
though Ficinus had already pointed to ὀνοματοθέτης by his “ nominum
auctor.”
87 Such too is the sentiment of Horace, “‘ Fortes creantur fortibus; et
bonis Est in juvencis, est in equis patrum Vigor,” for so Wakefield ior
rectly points that passage.
CRATYLUS. 303
ment if a letter is added, or changed, or taken away, or the
same value of the name. is found in the other letters taken
all together. [25.] As in the names of Astyanax and Hec-
tor, which we have just spoken of; they do not possess any
one of the same letters, except the 7, and yet they signify the
same thing, And what has ἀρχέπολις (ruler of a city) in its
letters common (with the two preceding names) ?® and yet
it means the same thing. And there are many other words
which signify nothing else than a king; and others again
(which signify) an army-leader, as ἴΑγις, Πολέμαρχος, Εὐπό-
λεμος ; and others connected with medicine, as ᾿Ιατροκλῆς and
᾿Ακεσίμξροτος. And perhaps we could find many others dis-
agreeing in syllables and letters, but in their value speaking
the same sense. Does this appear to you to be the case,
or not? »
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. And that to those, who exist according to nature, the
same names should be assigned ἢ
Herm. Perfectly so.
Soc. What then, to those, who are born contrary to nature,
and in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious
man an impious one is produced; surely, as we said before,
that if a horse should beget a progeny from a cow (the off-
spring) ought not to have the name of the begetter, but of
the party that brought it forth ὃ Τὸ
Herm, Entirely so.
[26.| Soc. To the impious man, then, produced from the
pious one, the name of his genus must be assigned ?
Herm. Such is the case.
Soc. Not Theophilus, (god-loving,) nor Mnesi-theus, (god-
\. remembering,) nor any name of this kind, but something which
8 The words within lunes Taylor took from the version of Ficinus,
“cum duobus superioribus.”’
. ® Heindorf acutely saw that τὸ ἔκγονον, which is wanting, was preserved
correctly in the version of Ficinus, whose Latin is rather more intelligible
than the Greek : “ qui genitus est, non genitoris nomen sortiri debit ; sed,
ejus in quo ipse est generis; quemadmodem supra diximus, si equus bovis
prolem generat, non equum ejus filium sed bovem denominandum.”
7 Such is evidently the sense required by the antithesis ; although it
can hardly be got from the words τοῦ γένους οὗ εἴη, which mean literally,
“οὗ the genus to which it belongs.” But as the offspring in this case
would belong to two genera, that genus should be distinctly stated, from
which it has to take its name.
804 CRATYLUS.
signifies the contrary to these, 7\(must we call such a son,)*!
if names are to possess any propriety.
Herm. By all means, Socrates.
Soc. Just as, Hermogenes, the name of Orestes nearly ap-
pears to be correct ; whether a certain fortune assigned to him
this appellation, or some poet, 7 pointing out by this name the
savageness of his nature, and his wildness, and the (habits) of
ἃ mountaineer.”
Herm. So it appears, Socrates.
Soc. It seems also that the name of his father was accord-
ing to nature.
Herm. Tt does so.
Soc. For it nearly appears that Agamemnon was “such a
person as, with respect to whatever he had determined to
labour through and endure, to put the finish to what he had
determined on through valour.7? And the proof of his patient
endurance is his staying at Troy with so great a host. That
τι τὶ Ficinus has in his version alone, “ yocare filium talem decet,”’
preserved the words wanting to complete the sense.
% This notion turns on the supposition that ’Opéorne, like ᾿Ορεστιάς,
the name for a mountain-nymph, is derived from"Opoc, a mountain. While
from the allusion to a poet, it is easy to see that Auschylus or Euripides
wrote in some play the distich—Kadéc ᾿Ορέστην ὄνομά τις τύχη ἴθετο,
Τὴν θηριώδους σὴν ὀρεινὴν γνοὺς ¢vow—addressed to Orestes by Clytem-
nestra, Menelaus, or some other character.
73 Such is the literal version of the Greek text, οἷος, ἃ ἄν δόξειεν αὐτῷ
διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν, τέλος ἐπιτιθεὶς τοῖς δόξασι dv ἀρετὴν: where
others may, but I will never, believe that Plato wrote ἃ ἂν δόξειεν---τοῖς
δόξασι---οὐ that οἷος ἐπιτιθεὶς is any thing but a barbarism. Opportunely
then does MS. Gud. offer ἐπιτιθέναι. Unless I am greatly mistaken, in
τοῖς δόξασι δι’ ἀρετὴν there lies hid τῆς δόξης didiac Ov ἀρετὴν. For the
whole sentence was originally to this effect—oioe, οἷς ἂν δόξειεν αὐτῷ δια-
πονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν, τέλος ἐπιτιθέναι τῆς δόξης ἀϊδίας Ov ἀρετῆν, i. 6.
‘such as to put by his valour the finish of an eternal glory to whatever he
‘ had determined to labour through and endure.” For thus, δόξης ἀϊδίας
may be compared with ἀΐδιον δόξαν in Thucyd. iv. 87 ; ἀθάνατον μνήμην
ἀρετῆς πέρι in Plato Sympos. p. 208. D., ἀθάνατον δόξαν in Isocrat. Archi-
dam. p. 138. B.
7 [ have adopted, with Heindorf, what Ficinus found in his MS. as
shown by his version: “ Argumentum vero tolerantie sue apud Trojam
tanto cum exercitu perduratio prebuit :”? which is far more intelligible
than the Greek, σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐν Τροίᾳ μονὴ τοῦ πλήθους τε kai
kaptepiac—which Stalbaum fancies is to be restored by reading τοῦ πλή-
θοὺς pera καρτερίας. But it was not by his staying with a great or small
army that Agamemnon gave any proof of his patient endurance. It
‘was rather by the great number of the years, during which he staid at
Ν
—=
ς
CRATYLUS. 305
this man therefore is to be admired for his staying, and is de-
noted bythe name Agamemnon.” [27.]Perhaps, too, Atreus is
correctly said; for his murder of Chrysippus, and what he did
so very cruelly to Thyestes, were all noxious and hurtful as
regards virtue.’° The appellation, therefore, of the name”
turns a little on one side, and conceals its meaning, so as not
to show the nature of the man to all; but to those who are
skilled in names, Atreus sufficiently points out what it means.
For his name properly exists in every way with reference to
what is not worn down, not fearing,’* and hurtful. It appears
also to me, that his name was properly given to Pelops: for
this name signifies one who sees things near; and I think” he
is worthy of the appellation in some such way 4s this.
Herm. How?
Soc. In such a way as this. It is reported against this
man, that in the murder of Myrtilus, he was neither able to
think beforehand, nor perceive any of the things afar off relating
to his whole race, with how great a calamity he would fill it ;
but only to 5665 what was near, and on the instant; for such
Troy. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ τῆς καρτερίας ἡ
ἐν Τροία μονὴ ἀν᾽ ἐτῶν τόσον πλῆθος : where I have elicited μονὴ ἀν᾽
ἐτῶν τόσον πλῆθος from μονὴ μετὰ τόσου πλήθους in a solitary MS. Re-
specting the loss or corruption οἵ ἐτῶν see my Poppo’s Prologem. p.
222; and with the phrase ἐτῶν πλῆθος compare χρόνου πλῆθος in Thucyd.
i. 1, Plato Theetet. p. 158, D., μηνῶν πλήθει in Soph. Philoct. 724,
πλήθους ἐτῶν in Aristoph. Ned. 845, and πλῆθος---ἐτῶν in Isocrates.
% For ᾿Αγαμέμνων, says the Etymol. M., is formed from ἄγαν, “ very,”
and μίμνων, “ staying.”
76 As the name of ᾿Ατρεὺς is thus feigned to be connected with ἀτηρὸς,
the words ζημιώδη πρὸς ἀρετὴν ought to follow drnod, not precede it.
Plato wrote πάντα ταῦτα ἀτηρὰ καὶ ζημιώδη πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἦν.
τ Heindorf vainly attempts to explain τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπωνυμία. For he
did not see that Plato wrote τοῦ ἀνόμου τόσου ἐπωνυμία, i. 6. “ the ap-
.. pellation for such iniquity.”
~ 78 Etymol. M. ᾿Ατρεύς---παρὰ τὸ τρέω γίνεται rpsicgr καὶ μετὰ τοῦ
στερητικοῦ a ἀτρεὺς, ὁ ἄφοβος, ἣ παρὰ τὸ τείρω τὸ καταπονῶ, μετὰ τοῦ
στερητικοῦ α, ἀτειρεὺς καὶ συγκοπῇ ἀτρεὺς, ὁ ἀκαταπόνητος.
7 The common text is ἄξιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπωνυμίας. But one MS.
has καὶ ἄξιον, and another τῆς οὑτωσί πως ἐπωνυμίας : while to support
the syntax Buttmann would read οἶμαι for εἶναι. Plato wrote, as I have
translated, καὶ ἄξιον οἶμαι εἶναι αὐτὸν οὑτωσί πως τῆς ἐπωνυμίας. Stal-
baum’s rendering is, ‘‘ For this name signifies that he, who looks near, is
worthy of such an appellation.”’ But the word Pelops could not signify
that such a person was worthy of such a name.
δ One MS. has ὁρᾶν for ὁρῶν, which leads to rd δ᾽ ἐγγὺς, for τὸ
éyydc—Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend the anomaly of the syntax.
x
306 CRATYLUS.
is the meaning of πέλας (near), when he desired to obtain, by
all means, his marriage with Hippodamia. ὃ: (From whence
the name of Pelops comes from πέλας, near, and ὄψις,
sight).*! [28,7 To Tantalus, likewise, all would deem the
name to have been properly and naturally assigned, if it be
true what is told of him. i) Fons
Herm. What is it? [5 ὴ
Soc. That, while he was yet living, many and terrible mis-
fortunes happened to him; of which* at last his whole coun-
try was overthrown ;** and that, when he was dead, there was
the vibration ** of the stone over his head in Hades, it being
wonderfully in unison with his name; for it really seems as
if one, wishing to call him ταλᾷάντατος (most miserable), did,
concealing (that name), call him by the name of Tanta-
lus (instead of Talantatus).®° And it seems that the accident
S18! The words within lunes are found only in the version of Ficinus,
“Unde Pelopi nomen a pelas, id est prope, et opsis, quod ad visionem
pertinet.”
8? Stalbaum fancies that ὧν can follow τέλος used adverbially. Hein-
dorf would supply the ellipse by rd τέλος ἦν. Plato wrote perhaps
ὥστε kai—for καὶ thus follows ὥστε, as shown by Elmsley in Cl. Jl. N. xi.
p- 222. f
35. Stalbaum would translate ἀνετράπετο, “corruit.”” But the aor, 2,
in the middle voice of τρέπω, could not be thus used passively. He
should have read ἀνετρέπετο, or ἀνετέτραπτο.
* Bekker has ἡ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς Tov λίθου τανταλεία, θαυμαστὴ we
ξύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι. But as τανταλεία could not be used for ταντά-
λεῦσις or ταντάλωσις, or, if it could, it would not suit the subsequent
ταλάντατον, Stalbaum has adopted ταλαντεία, the conjecture of Schlei-
ermacher, found subsequently in one MS., and to which Schleier. was
probably led by “sors certe durissima” in Ficinus. But ταλανεία, not
ταλαντεία, would come legitimately from τάλας. I suspect that Plato
wrote ἡ τοῦ λίθου ταλαντιαίου θαυμαστὴ στάσις, οὖσα ξύμφωνος τῷ
ὀνόματι. For λίθου ταλαντιαίου would be similar to ταλαντιαῖον κλῆρον
in Suid. ἜἜγγειον, and to χρημάτων βάρος τριταλαντιαῖον in Suid
Τριτάλαντον : while in the play upon the words Τάνταλος and Ταλαντι-
aioc, there would be an allusion to the proverb τὰ Ταντάλον τάλαντα,
which Plato had in mind, when he was speaking of the Ταντάλου
χρήματα in Euthyphr. p. ii. D.—§ 12. With regard to στάσις, the more
correct word would perhaps be κρέμασις, as may be inferred from the
passages quoted by Porson on Orest. 5. But στάσις οὖσα are nearer the
letters acorn ὡς συμ than κρέμασις οὖσα. ant
%_8$ Edd. ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἴποι ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνου. But
Ficinus, “paulo locutus obscurius pro Talantato Tantalum posuisset,”
thus avoiding the inelegant tautology in ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἴποι, where lies
hid, I suspect, εὖ τὰ ἀνόσια καὶ ἄθεα, εἴποι--- For the acts of Tantalus
were ἀνόσια and ἄθεα. a
Tih)
i
CRATYLUS. 307
of the rumour 35 contributed to some such appellation. But it
appears that the name of him, who was called his father, was
made in an all-beautiful manner. It is however by no means
easy to understand it. For in reality the name of Zeus is, as it
were, a sentence; and persons dividing it into two parts,
some of us make use of one part, and some of another; for
some call him Ζὴν, and some Afc. But these parts collected
into one, exhibit the nature of the god; which, as we have
said, a name ought and should be able todo. For there is no
one, who is more the cause of living, both to us and eve
thing else, than he who is the ruler and king of all.87 [29.] It
follows therefore that this god is rightly named, through
whom life is present to all living beings; but the name,
though one, is distributed, as 1 have said, into two parts, Dis
and Zén. Now he, who hears on a sudden that this god is
the son of Kronos, may perhaps think it an insulting asser-
tion. But it is according to reason for Zeus to be the off-
spring of some great intellect. Now Koros** does not signify
a boy, but the pure and unmixed nature of intellect. Now he
(Kronos) is the son of Ouranus (Heaven): and the sight
directed to things above has fairly a right to be called by
this name, Ourania (heavenly), from beholding things on
high. From whence too, Hermogenes, they who discourse
on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with
39. T cannot understand ἡ τύχη τῆς φήμης. I could however ἡ τῆς τύχης
ἡ φήμη, i. 6. “ the report of his misfortune.”
87 From this passage of Plato were perhaps derived the Pseud.-Orphic
verses, quoted by Joannes Diac. Allegor. on Hesiodi Theog. p. 278; 482,
Gaisf. “Ἔστιν δὴ πάντων ἀρχὴ Zebc. “Ζεὺς yap ἔδωκε, Léa τ’ ἐγέννησεν"
καὶ Ζῆν᾽ αὐτὸν καλέουσι, Καὶ Δία 7 ἠδ᾽ ὅτι δὴ διὰ τοῦτον ἅπαντα
τέτυκται. Ἐΐϊς δὲ πατὴρ οὗτος πάντων, θηρῶν τε βροτῶν τε. i. 6. “ Zeus
is the beginning of all things. For Zeus has given and generated animals,
and men call him Ζὴν, and also Δίς : because all things were fabricated
through him; and he is the one father of all things, both beasts and
men.”
88 Ficinus has ‘“‘ Quod enim Coros dicitur.” But the train of ideas
evidently requires something to connect Kronos with Koros. Hence, says
Heindorf, one would have expected that Plato wrote Κρόνος γὰρ κόρον
σημαίνει" κόρος δὲ οὐ παῖδα. There was, I suspect, originally something
. to this effect, ‘‘ Now Koros, which Kronos was once, signifies not a boy.”
For that Kronos was once a boy, is evident from the legend that makes
him the son of Ouranus. To this passage is to be referred Etymol. M.
Κρόνος" 6 Κρόνος τῆς νοερᾶς ζωῆς ἐστὶ δοτὴρ, κόρος ὧν τοῦ vod" μαλλον
δὲ κόρος νοῦς καὶ καθαρός. ‘
x
908 CRATYLUS.
him, and that the name of Ouranus™ is very properly given
to him. Indeed, if I had remembered Hesiod’s genealogy of
the gods, (and)*' whom he mentions as their still preceding
progenitors, I should not have desisted from showing you
how correctly their names have been laid down, until I had
made trial of this wisdom, what it will effect, whether it faints
or not, which has now recently come upon me so suddenly, I
know not from whence.
[30.] Herm. Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to
speak oracles on a sudden, like those inspired by a god.
Soc. And the reason I assign,9? Hermogenes, is, that
this wisdom has come upon me through Euthyphron of the
ward of Prospaltius:°? for I was much with him in the
morning, and I gave him my ears.®! It nearly appears then,
that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears
with divine wisdom, but laid hold also of my very soul. Τὶ
appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in this way; to
make use of this wisdom to-day, and to contemplate what yet
remains concerning the propriety of names; but to-morrow,
if it seems good to you, we will send it away (as a pollution),
and purify ourselves from it, after finding out a person who is
skilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he be one of
the priests, or the sophists. i
Herm. 1 assent to this; for I shall hear, with great plea-
sure, what remains (of the discussion) respecting names.
Soc. But it is necessary to act thus. From whence then
do you wish us to begin the inquiry, since we have arrived at
a certain form, that we may know whether the names them-
os For Οὐρανὸς is feigned to be derived from ὁρᾶν ἄνω, “to look
above.”
% This “‘ and,”’ requisite for the sense and syntax, has been preserved
by Ficinus alone.
95. Ficinus translates αἰτιῶμαι by “ reor,” as if he had read ἀξιοῦμαι.
% This was a ward of the tribe of Acarnas. On the wards of Athens
the reader may consult Gronovius’ Thesaur. Antiquitat.t.xi. Leake
in The Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, t. i. p. 2, p. 114,
and foll. A Dissertation by Westermann in Zeitschrift fiir die Alterthums—
wissenschaft, 1848, No. 5—8. Sauppe too has written “De Demis
Urbanis Atheniensibus,” Leips. 1846, and Ross, “‘ Die Demen von
Δ κι Halle, 1846. But of the two last works I know nothing except?
the .
* The phrase in Shakspeare is “ Lend me thine ears.”
% Instead of τύπον one would expect either τόπον, “place,” ordrpamoy
“path.” For though I am well aware that τύπος is constantly applied
CRATYLUS. 909
selves will testify in our favour, that they were not entirely
fabricated from chance, but possess a certain propriety? [31.]
Now the names that are mentioned of heroes and men would
perhaps deceive us; for many of these exist according to the
appellations of their ancestors, and do not suit some persons,
as we stated at the commencement. But many assume them,
as matters of boasting,*’ such as Eutychides (the son of the
fortunate), Sosias (the son of the saved), and Theophilus
(the god beloved), and many others. Such then as these, it
appears to me, we ought to dismiss. But it is most probable
that we shall find names properly imposed, respecting things
existing for ever, and naturally produced; for in these it is
especially fitting for the imposition of names to be a careful
study. But perhaps some of these have been given by a
power more divine than that of man.
Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak well.
Soe. Will it not then be just, to begin from the gods, when
we are considering that very thing, why the gods are properly
ealled by that name?
Herm. It will be reasonable.
Soc. I suspect then it is of this kind. It appears to me
that the first men of those connected with Greece, considered
those only as gods, whom many at present of the Barbarians
do; the sun, and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and
the heavens. Now as they perceived all these moving and
running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of run-
ning they called them gods ;*° but afterwards, perceiving that
there were others, they called all of them by the same name.
_ Seems what I say to be like the truth, or not?
~~ Herm. It seems very like.
to a discourse, yet, I believe, it is not elsewhere united to εἰσβαίνειν.
Ficinus has “‘formulam prescripsimus.”
356. Some MSS. ἐνίοις, others ἐνίοτε. Perhaps Plato united the words.
51 Stalbaum has failed to see that in εὐχόμενοι there is an allusion to
the Homeric εὔχομαι εἶναι.
% For θεὸς was supposed to come from θέειν. Hence in Etymol. M.
Θεός, παρὰ τὸ θέω, τὸ τρέχω᾽---οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἐπὶ
ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων, ἀστατοῦσι γὰρ, ἐτίθεσαν τὸ ὄνομα παρὰ τὸ
ἀεὶ θεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι---ἢ παρὰ τὸ θέω, τὸ κατασκευάζω καὶ ποιῶ" 6
πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων κατασκευῆς αἴτιος γίνεται θὸς καὶ
θεός ; where instead of ΘΟΌ, one would prefer ΘΟΘ. For, as Herodotus
says in ii. 52, the Egyptians called the deities θεοὺς, as θέντας (having
placed) the universe in order.
910 CRATYLUS.
[32.] Soc. What then shall we consider after this? Is it
not clear, (we ought to consider about) demons, heroes, and
men ?
Herm. About demons. We
Soc. Now in good truth, Hermogenes, what does the word
demons mean? Consider whether I say aught to the purpose : ?
Herm. Only say what it is.
Soc. Know you then whom Hesiod says are demons ? ”
Herm. I do not understand. .
Soc. But know you not that he says, the golden race of
men was first created ?
Herm. This I know.
Soc. He says, then, concerning it,%°
But when concealed had Destiny this race,
Demons there were, called holy, upon earth
Good, ill-averters, and of man the guard.
Herm, What then?
Soc. I think he calls the race golden, not as being naturally
of gold, but as being beautiful and good. And I infer this,
from his calling us an iron race.
Herm. You speak the truth.
Soe. Do you not then think, that if any one of those living
now were good, Hesiod would say he was of that golden r race?
Herm. Probably.
Soc. But are the good any other than the prudent?
Herm. The prudent.
[33.] Soc. On this account then, especially, as it appears
to me, he speaks of them as demons ; because they were
(deemones) prudent and learned.. And, in our old language,
this very name occurs. Hence both he, and many other
poets, say well, who say that when a good man shall have
reached his end, he receives a mighty destiny and honour,
and becomes a demon, according to the appellation of pin
dence. I therefore give (my vote)! for this, that every!
* In Hesiod’s Works and Days, v. 120, the present text has more cor-
rectly Tata, instead of Μοῖρα, while Plato, in Rep. v. p. 468, E., _ has
more correctly τελέθουσι than καλέονται.
1 After τίθεμαι, we must understand γνώμην, as shown by the »
sages quoted by myself on Soph. Philoct. 1445, or ψῆφον, as shown here
by the subsequent ὁμόψηφος.
1 Stalbaum omits πάντα with a single MS. He should have inserted
CRATYLUS. 311
demon (learned) man, who is good, is demon-like, both while
living and when dead, and is properly called a demon.
Herm. And I, Socrates, seem to myself to give entirely
the same vote with you on this point. But what can the
name of hero be?
Soc. This is by no means difficult to understand. For
their name is drawn aside a little, showing that its origin is
from love.
Herm. How is this?
Soe. Do you not know that heroes are demigods ?
Herm. What then?
[34.] Soc. All of them were doubtless begotten either
from a god falling in love with a mortal woman, or from a
mortal man (falling in love) with a goddess. If then you
consider the matter according to the old Attic language, this
too you will more clearly understand. For it will show you
that the word (hero) is slightly drawn aside, for the sake of
the name,” from the word love, through which the heroes were
begotten. And either this says the heroes,? or because they
were wise and rhetoricians, powerful and skilled in dialec-
tic, and all-sufficient to interrogate ;* for εἴρειν is the same as
to speak. Hence, as we just now said, in the Attic language
they, who are called heroes, coincide® as certain rhetoricians,
it before ἀγαθὸς. For πάντα is thus constantly united with ἀγαθός.
See Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 1402, τῷ πάντ᾽ ἀγαθῷ.
? This derivation depends on the affinity between ἥρως and ἔρως.
3. This is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, ἤτοι τοῦτο λέγει
τοὺς ἥρωας, which I cannot understand ; nor could Ficinus, whose ver-
sion is, “aut hinc heroum est nomen ductum.” Opportunely then does
the best MS. Gud. read λέγειν, by the aid of which it is easy to see that
Plato wrote ἤτοι ἐκ τούτου λέγ᾽ εἶναι τοὺς ἥρωας, i. 6. “ either from this
(love) say thou the heroes are.”
4 After ἐρωτᾶν, Stephens wished to insert καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. For in p.
390, § 16, the dialectician is said to be ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστά-
μενος. Besides, Ficinus has “ad interrogandum disserendumque promp-
tissimi.’’ From whence Stalbaum endeavoured to elicit λέγειν, to pre-
serve the train of thought between λέγειν and εἴρειν. He should have
suggested ἐρωτᾶν καὶ εἴρειν, which latter verb Plato naturally explains
by λέγειν, for it is very rare in Greek. It is however found in Hesiod.
eog. 38, Εἰρεῦσαι (Μοῦσαι) τά τ᾽ té6yra—quoted by Heindorf.
5 So we may perhaps render συμβαίνουσιν. But as the translation of
Ficinus is “‘ videntur,” it would seem that he found in his MS. συμφαίν-
οὔσιν, ἃ corruption, I suspect, for συμφωνοῦσιν, i. e. “ harmonize,’ as in
§ 41, συμφωνεῖ,
312 CRATYLUS.
interrogators, and lovers:® so that the genus of rhetoricians
and sophists becomes an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not
difficult to understand; but rather this respecting men, why
they are called ἄνθρωποι. Can you tell the reason ?
Herm. From whence, my good (man), can I? And in-
deed were 1 at all able to find this out, I shall not exert my-
self, through my thinking that you will more easily discover
it than myself.
Soe. You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthy-
phron.
Herm. Evidently so.
Soc. And rightly relying. For I now seem to myself to
understand it in a clever manner; and 1 shall run the risk, if
I do not take care, of becoming to-day wiser than is fitting.
[35.] But consider what I am saying. For this ought in the
first place to be understood concerning names, that we often
introduce letters, and (often)’ take some away, while we give
names, as we please: and (often)* change the acute syllables.
As when we say Adi φίλος (a friend of Dis): for, in order
that there may be a noun instead of a verb, we take away the
second ira, and, instead of an acute syllable in the middle,
we pronounce a grave one. But on the contrary, in others
we introduce letters, and others again, with a graver accent,
we pronounce with a more acute one.®
Herm. You speak the truth.
Soc. Of these things one, as it appears to me, takes place
in the name ἄνθρωπος (man): for a noun is generated from a
verb, one letter, a, being taken away,'° and the end of the
word becoming more grave.
Herm. How do you mean?
6 The MSS. vary between ἐρωτητικοὶ and ἐρωτικοί. Ficinus found both
in his MS. For his version is, ‘‘ disputatores et amatorii.” Stalbaum
omits ἐρωτικοὶ, although Plato had just above shown the affinity between
ἥρως and ἔρως. To this passage is to be referred the gl. of Etymol. M. in
Ηρωες---ο---ὠἀπὸ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως" διαλεκτικοί yap——i) ἀπὸ τῶν ἐρώτων" ἐξ
ἐρώτων γὰρ θείων ἐγένοντο ------οἱ γὰρ θεοὶ bonraitc γυναιξὶ συνερχόμενοι
ἐποίουν τὸ τῶν ἡρώων γένος.
7_8 This “often” is found only in Ficinus—“ sepe etiam demimus”
—and again, “‘ sepenumero transmutamus.”
® From the MS. of Serranus, whose version is, “ δὲ que acute pronun-
tiabamus, graviter pronuntiamus,” Buttmann was led to introduce ὀξύ-
repa, adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb. ;
10 ἐς For according to the derivation it should be ἀναθρωπός.᾽" Stars.
CRATYLUS. 313
Soc. Thus. This name (ἄνθρωπος) indicates that other
animals, who can see, neither consider, nor reason, nor contem-
plate; but that man sees—for such is the meaning of érwxe—
“land at the same time contemplates and reasons upon what he
sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated
&vOpwroc,'! contemplating what he sees.
[86.7.3 Herm. What then, shall I ask you what follows
after this, (and) which I would very gladly hear?
Soe. By all means.
Herm. As then there appears to me to be something in
order after these ; for we surely call the soul and body of man
by some name.!*
Soc. How not?
Herm. Let us, then, endeavour to divide these too, as we
did the former subjects.
Soc. Do yousay that you have considered ! first the soul, that
it has with reason this name, and afterwards so has the body ? !?
Herm. Certainly.
Soe. To speak then off-hand, I think that those, who called
the soul by that name, understood some such thing as this;
that whenever it is present to the body, it is the cause of its
life, giving it the power to breathe, and cooling it; but as
soon as the cooling power ceases, the body is dissolved and
comes to an end. From whence, as it appears to me, they
Ἡ αὶ This clause is omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.
\, By its aid, however, we can restore what Plato wrote—é δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα
ὄπωπε--τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι τὸ ἑώρακε. For it is evident that ἑώρακε, the more
common word, would be the interpretation of the less common one; and
that ὄπωπε would be mentioned here as being one of the words, from
which ἄνθρ-ωπος is supposed to be derived. With regard to this descrip-
tion of man, Ovid has something similar in Metam.i.: ‘‘ Os homini sub-
lime dedit, ceelumque tueri Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.”
%—_ Τῇ the arrangement of the speeches Heindorf, whom Bekker and
Stalbaum follow, has done all that a critic should do. But with respect
to the words, he has been unable to explain ὥσπερ τοίνυν, in which lie hid
Ὡς τὸ πρὶν, τὸ νῦν, i. 6. “As before, (so) now—” Ficinus has, “ Succe-
dere statim superioribus mihi videtur de anima et corpore consideratio.”
13. Stalbaum learnedly defends the reading furnished by ten MSS.,
σῶμά τι καλοῦμεν, where Bekker had rejected τι. Ficinus, too, has
*‘nam anima et corpus aliquid hominis sunt.”
4 T cannot understand ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι : I could, ἐπισκέψε-
σθαι, ‘‘ Say you that you will consider?” Ficinus, “Querendum primo
de anima putas?”
814 CRATYLUS.
called the soul (ψυχή). But, if you please, be quiet.. For
I think I see something carrying more conviction than: this
to the followers of Euthyphron ; for this, as it appears to me,
they would despise, and consider it as farcical. . But consider
whether this will please you. ir babes
Herm. Only say it. J
[37.] Soc. What else but the soul do you Rees ἀρδδονο
and carries the nature of the whole body, so that it lives ΜΝ
goes about.
Herm. No other.
Soc. But what, do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that i in-
tellect and soul orders and holds the nature of every thing else ?
Herm. I do.
Soc. It will be proper then to give this name to that power
which carries and holds nature, φυσέχην : but it may be
called more elegantly ψυχή."
1 Herm. Entirely so; and this latter appellation appears to
me to be more agreeable to art than the former.
Soc. For it is certainly so. It would however appear to
be truly ridiculous, if it were named, as it is formed.”
Herm. But what shall we next consider after this ?
Soe. Are you speaking of the body ?
Herm. Yes.
Soc. In many ways this appears to me, whether one causes
it to deflect little or much,'* For some say it is the sepulchre
15. From the affinity between ψῦχος, “ cold,” and ψυχή, “ soul,” which
some considered to be warm, others cold, as we learn from Aristotle,
Περὶ Ψυχῆς, i. 223, quoted by Stalbaum, Διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολου-
θοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ἃ ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὠνόμασται,
οἱ δὲ rd ψυχρὸν διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν.
And it was perhaps in ridicule of this theory, that Socrates wrote the
Asopic fable of the person who blew hot and cold with the same breath.
18 “ΒΥ the change of φυσε into ψυ. See Eustath. Ιλ. A. p. 22, 50, Bas.
—' Heusde was not the first to arrange the speeches in a correct
ae For Ficinus had done so already.
18 Stalbaum’s translation is, “‘ The name of the body seems to me to
be many-fold; if any one causes it to deflect even a little, it is still
many-fold.” But this is at variance equally with the Greek words and
with common sense. He did not perceive that Plato wrote πόλλ᾽ ἔχειν
μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε, ἂν μὲν ἢ σμικρόν τι τις παρακλίνῃ ἢ καὶ πάνυ, i. 6.
“This word (body) seems to me to have many (meanings), whether any
one causes it to deflect either little or much:” where the edd. have Ππολ-
λαχῇ ---καὶ σμικρόν τις---καὶ πάνυ. me
CRATYLUS. 315
of the soul, as being buried! at the present time; and on the
otherhand, because whatever the soul marks out it marks out by
the body; on this account it is properly called a mark. [38. ]
The followers however of Orpheus appear to me to have
founded this name, especially since the soul suffers a punish-
ment on account of the things it suffers ;7° and that it may
be preserved, it has this enclosure, the image of a prison ; and
that (the body), as it is called, is the saving of the soul, until
it (the soul) shall have paid the penalty due; and that there
is no need of introducing?! a single letter.
Herm. On this, it appears to me, Socrates, enough has been
said. But about the names of the gods, could we, in the
same manner as you have just now spoken about Zeus, con-
sider by what propriety their names are laid down.
Soc. By Zeus, Hermogenes, if we possessed any mind, (we
should have)? one the most beautiful method, (by confessing)
© This was the doctrine of Philolaus the Pythagorean, in the passage
preserved by Clemens Alexandr. Strom. lib. iii. p. 403, Maprupéovrac dé
καὶ ot παλαιοὶ θεόλογοί τε καὶ μάντεις, we διά τινα τιμωρίαν ἁ ψυχὰ τῷ
σώματι συνέζευκται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σώματι τούτῳ τέθαπται, i. 6. The
ancient theologists and priests also testify that the soul is united with
body for the sake of suffering punishment; and that it is buried in a
body, as ina sepulchre.” T.
20 IT confess I cannot understand δίκην διδούσης---ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσε,
nor could Ficinus, whose version is, ‘“‘ quod anima in corpore hoc delic-
torum det peenas,” which gives a sense perfectly intelligible; but not to
Ἂ be obtained from the Greek. Some error had crept in here before the
\time of Stobeus, who has quoted this passage in Eclog. Physic. p. 86,
here Gesner has given the version of Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote
ixny διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς νῦν, ὧν δὴ ὁ ὧν ἐκεῖ οὐ δίδωσιν. For thus
ἐκεῖ is said δεικτικῶς of the grave in § 43, and Rep. i. p. 330, D., τὸν
ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην : ii. p. 365, A., τελετὰς---αἱ τῶν
ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς : p. 366, A., ἐν “Αἰδου δίκην δώσομεν, ὧν ἂν
ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν. The followers of Orpheus seem to have thought
with Juvenal, “‘Exemplo quodcunque malo committitur, ipsi Displicet
auctori; prima est hec ultio quod, se Judice nemo nocens absolvitur,”’
and with Cicero in Milon. § 23, “ panam semper ante oculos versari pu-
tant, qui peccaverunt.”’ Or we might read ὧν 6 verde οὐ δίδωσι, “ which
the dead body does not suffer.’”’ For the Orphic verse might have been
Ψυχὴ δοῦσα δίκην ὧν ὀυχὶ δίδωσιν ὁ νεκρός. The preceding is however
not the only error here. For the version οἵ Ficinus points to a lacuna,
which it were easy to supply by the aid of Etymol. M. in Σῶμα.
*1' I have translated παράγειν “to introduce.” Ficinus has “ neque
literam aliquam adjiciendam putant,” which leads to ἐπάγειν.
35 Heindorf says that it is easy to supply ἔχοιμεν ἄν που---ἐπισκέψασθαι.
But words are not to be thus supplied at random. Ficinus has “ precipu
um rectitudinis modum arbitraremur, fateri—”’
316 CRATYLUS.
that we know nothing of the gods either themselves or the names
by which they call themselves ; for it is evident that they call
themselves by correct names. But the second mode of pro-
priety consists in our calling the gods by those names, by which
there is a law for us to invoke them in our prayers, Whisever
they are, and by whatever name they like to be addressed,
since we know of nothing else; for this appears to me to have
been beautifully ordained. [39.] If you are willing, therefore,
let us consider this point, having previously, as it were, de-
clared to the gods, that we shall speculate nothing about
them—for we do not think ourselves worthy to do so—but
about the men, what thoughts they had, when they gave
the names ; for this will not expose us to their wrath.
Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak with modera-
tion; let us therefore act in this manner.
Soc. Ought we not then to begin, according to custom,
from Hestia ἢ 38
Herm. It is just what we should.
Soc. What then shall we say the person intended, who gave
the name of ‘Eoria?
Herm. By Zeus, I do not think this is an easy thing.
Soc. The men, O good Hermogenes, who first founded
names, seem almost to be no mean persons, but conversant
with high subjects and discourses on them.”
Herm. What then?
Soc. It seems to me that the founding of names was the
work of some such men. And indeed, if any one considers
foreign names, what each means is not the less discovered.
[40.] For instance, in the case of that which we call Οὐσέα,
there are, who call it ’Ecia, °and others again ‘Qeia.® In
33 The goddess whom the Greeks called Ἑστία, was the Vesta of the
Romans. From which it would seem that the Greek word had origin-
ally the digamma F placed before the aspirate, just as we have a w before
hin some words. The altar of the deity was in the centre, as it were, of
the house, andisacrifices commenced with her; because, as Plato says in
the Timeeus, she was the oldest of all the gods; or rather the pivot on
which all the others turned.
34. Ficinus, “ facile inventu,” as if his MS. had γνῶναι instead of εἶναι.
35. Originally μετεωρολόγοι and ἀδολέσχαι were taken in a good sense ;
but subsequently in a bad one, as shown respectively by Phedr. § 120,
and Rep. vi. p. 488, quoted by Heindorf. Add Aristoph. Neg. 148,
38. 6 Jt is not known in what dialect οὐσια became ἐσία : but ὠσία
CRATYLUS. 317
the first place then, according to one of these names (’Ecia),
the existence of things (Οὐσία) has a right to be called "Eoria ;
and again, because we call that which participates in exist-
ence by the name of Ἑστία, it would on this ground be pro-
perly called “Eoria: for we too seem of old to have pronounced
Οὐσία, “Ecia.27 Moreover, if any one bears in mind the busi-
ness of sacrifice, he will deem that this was in the thoughts
of those who instituted (the names). For it is likely, that
they, who called Οὐσία (Ousia), the existence of all things,
Ἕστια (Hestia), sacrificed to Hestia before all the gods. But
they who called it ᾿Ωσία (Osia), would nearly, according to
Heraclitus, consider that all things move, and nothing is at
rest. The cause therefore and leader of things with them was
τὸ ὠθοῦν (the pushing on): and hence they very properly
ealled it Ὦσία (Osia)."2 And thus much let it be said as if
from those who know nothing.” But, after Hestia, it is just to
speculate about Rhea and Kronos, although we have discussed
already the name of Kronos. But, perhaps, I say nothing to
the purpose.
[41.] Herm. Why so, Socrates ?
Soc. I perceive, (my) good man, a certain hive®® of wisdom.
Herm. Of what kind is it?
_ Soe. It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think
\it has some plausibility.
Herm. What is this?
Soc. I seem to myself to see Heracleitus speaking artlessly *!
for οὐσία is found in ag Doric of Archytas and Ocellus, quoted by
Stobeus, p. 76, and p. 4
27 This may fairly be. doubted. They more probably pronounced it
Ὁσίαν, the very word found in MS. Gud. But such a pronunciation
would not suit the argument. Stalbaum has however acutely seen that
in ’Esia, or rather ‘Ecia, there is perhaps an allusion to the doctrine of
the Eleatic school, who considered the universe as a “ one-ness,”’ i. 6.
‘Eoia, derived from Εἷς, as Οὐσία is from Ei.
28 For ’Qoia is derived from σις, the root of which is ’Q0éw, “1 push.
39. From this it is evident that the whole of the preceding derivation of
Ἑστία is a ridicule of those, whom Plato considered as knowing nothing
on the subject; although it is quite clear that Ἑστία is derived from
ἧστ-αι, the third pers. perf, pass. of ovat, and means that point at the
centre of the universe, where sits the power that gives motion to all the
particles of matter around it.
% This is a favourite metaphor of Plato. Heindorf refers to Meno, p
72, A. § 3, and Rep. v. p. 400, A.
5! I have translated ἀτέχνως “ artlessly,”’ and united it to λέγοντα, to
318 CRATYLUS.
some old wise saw about Kronos and Rhea, which Homer too
asserts. WAHL, .o08
Herm. How say you this? OW, By:
Soc. Heracleitus says some where that all thing mee) and
nothing is at rest; and comparing things to the flowing
of a river, observes that “Thou canst not twice into the
same stream go.” 3? L sway
Herm. Such is the fact. ¥
Soc. What then, does he appear to you to think differently
from Heracleitus, who gave the names of Rhea and Kronos to
the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that
Heracleitus by chance assigned to both of them the names of
flowing streams?*% As then*4 Homer (Il. xiv. 201) calls
Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother,
so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod.® a
Orpheus says some where,
Ocean with lovely streams did first begin
Marriage, and wedded Tethys, sister-kin.
Consider then, how all these harmonize with cathy ay all
tend to the doctrine of Heracleitus.
[42.] Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to say som
to the purpose. I do not however understand what the name
Tethys means.
Soc. Surely it nearly implies this of itself, that ἄνα Ἢ a
name of a fountain concealed; for that which is pereolated,®
and strained through, is the representation of a fountain ; _
from both these names the name Tethys*’ is composed. ᾿
show what Plato really thought of the doctrine of Heracleitus, as being
Kronika, that is, old and silly, as in Aristoph. Plut. 581.
*? As the words of Heracleitus fall into a Choliambic verse, Aig dc’ τὸν
αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, I have designedly introduced a metrical
version.
% To understand this, Buttmann conceived that Plato alluded to a
fancied affinity between Κρόνος and Κρουνὸς, “a rivulet.” τ΄
* Instead of αὖ, adopted by Bekk. and Stalb. from nearly all the MSS.,
Stephens has ody, and so MS. Gud., which is far preferable to ai. Heindorf
indeed refers to § 48, ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ θετταλοὶ. But Plato wrote ὥσπερ νῦν---
35. “In Theogon. y. 337, Hesiod says that Ocean and Tethys were the
parents of rivers and ocean nymphs, but not of all the gods.” Heinp.
35. The reading διαττώμενον, in lieu of διαττόμενον, which Ruhnken
on Timeus, p. 80, discovered in Proclus on the Timezus, p. at, hagheus
subsequent! found in five MSS.
37 For rn9d¢ was supposed to have some affinity with τὸ ἡουον | Dats
CRATYLUS. 319
Herm. This, Socrates, is elegant.
Soc. How is not about to be?’ But what is after this?
Of Zeus we have already spoken.
Herm. Yes. _
Soc, Let us then speak of his brothers, Poseidon and Pluto,
and of that other name*® by which he is called.
Herm. By all means.
Soc. The name then of Poseidon appears to me to have
been given by*° the party first naming it, because the nature
of the sea stopped him when walking, and did not permit
him to proceed any further, but became as it were a chain to
his feet. He therefore denominated the ruler of this power
Ποσειδῶν, as Ποσί-δεσμος ὥν being (a foot-chainer). But the
ε was perhaps added for the sake of elegance. And perhaps
too it would not mean this ; but two AA were originally spoken
instead of o; signifying that this god is much-knowing.*!
And perhaps likewise he was denominated ὁ σείων (the shak-
ing), from σείειν (to shake), and π᾿ and 6 were added.” [48,7]
But Πλούτων (Pluto) was so called from the gift of Πλοῦτος
(wealth), because riches are dug out of the bowels of the
earth.“ But by the appellation Αἵδης, the multitude appear
to me to understand that τὸ ἀειδὲς “5 was spoken of, and that,
being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.
Herm. But how does it seem, Socrates, to you?
Soc. In many ways do men appear to me indeed to have
erred about the power of this god, and to have a fear of him,
who is not worthy of it. For they fear that, when any one
38. Heind. was the first to restore Τὶ δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει instead of μέλλω from
MS. Gud. And so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. For his version
is * Quid ni?”
39 This was Αἵδης.
“Ὁ. Heindorf, whom Stalbaum should have followed, has properly in-
serted ὑπὸ, preserved only in the best MS. Gud.
41 For Πολλ-ειδὼν would thus be formed, similar to πολλὰ εἰδώς,
“ much-knowing.”
42. Cornarius, perceiving that σείων could not become ποσειδὼων by ad-
ding π᾿ and ὃ, proposed to read τὸ π᾿ καὶ τὸ ο καὶ τὸ o; and so one MS.
subsequently collated. Heindorf however says that the o is to be got
from ὁ σείων. .
45. In allusion to this notion, Aschylus says in Κ. Th. 948, ὑπὸ γᾶς
πλοῦτος ἄβυσσος ἔσται. See more in Spanheim’s Commentary on Calli-
mach. p. 84]
“ The word ἀειδὲς is either ‘ unseen” or ‘‘ unseemly,’’—both equally
suited to the receptacle for the dead.
320 CRATYLUS.
of us dies, he remains* there for ever, and that the soul,
divested of the body, departs to him, “this too they fear.“
But all these things, the empire of the god, and his name,
appear to me to tend to something the same.
Herm. How so?
Soc. I will tell you what appears to me. For tell. me,
Which of these is the stronger bond to any animal whatever,
so as to cause it to remain in any place whatever, necessity,
or desire ἢ
ΡΝ Desire, Socrates, is by far the superior.
44.) Soe. Do you not think that many would fly from
Hades, unless it held those who go thither by the strongest
bond ?
Herm. This is evident.
Soe. It binds them then, as it appears, by a certain desire ;
since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with
necessity.
Herm. Tt appears so.
Soc. Now are there not many desires ?
Herm. Yes.
Soc. It binds them therefore with the pe of all desires,
if it is about to bind them with the greatest of bonds.
Herm. Yes.
Soc. Is there then any greater desire, than when any one,
by associating with another, thinks that, through him, he shall
become a better man?
Herm. By Zeus, Socrates, there is not any whatever.
Soc. On this account, Hermogenes, let us say, that not one
of those there*’ is willing to come hither, not even the Syrens
themselves ;*8 but that both they, and all others, are en-
chanted ; such beautiful discourses does Pluto, it seems,
know how to utter. And by this reasoning this god is both
a perfect sophist, and a great benefactor to those with him ;
and who sends up to those here such good things; so many
things does he have in superfluity ; and from hence he has the
45. Instead of ἐστὶ, one would prefer ἔσται. Ficinus has “ quod
huc redit,” i. 6. οὐ κάτεισί τις. On κάτειμι see Porson Med. 1011.
486-65 This clause Ficinus has properly omitted.
47 Instead of τῶν ἐκεῖθεν, one would prefer, as I have translated, τῶν
ἐκεῖ, unless we omit τῶν, as Ficinus has done, “ huc illinc—reverti.””
48. “There is,” says Heindorf, “ frequent mention of the Syrens on
sepulchres, but not of them in Hades.”
CRATYLUS. 321
name of Pluto. [45.] And on the other hand, through 49 his
unwillingness to associate with men invested with bodies,
but only to have an intercourse with them, when the soul be-
comes cleansed from all the evils and desires which were
around the body, does he not appear to you to be a philoso-
pher,®® and to have well considered this, that he should thus
detain them, by binding them with the desire for virtue; but
that if they possessed the flutterings and mad feelings®! of the
body, not even his father Kronos would be able to detain them
with him, in those bonds with which he was said to be bound.*?
Herm. You nearly seem, Socrates, to speak something to
the purpose.
Soc. The name then, O Hermogenes, of ᾿Αἴδης, wants much
of being called ᾿Αἴδης from ᾿Αειδὴς, “ unseemly:” but it is
much rather from knowing all beautiful®* things, that ᾿Αἴδης
was so called by the fabricator of names.*4
Herm. Be it so. But what shall we say of Demeter,
and Hera, and Apollo, and Athena, and Hephestus, and Ares,
and of the rest of the gods?
[46.] Soc. It appears that Δημήτηρ (Demeter) was so called
from the gift of food, as being διδοῦσα μήτηρ, “a giving mother.”
But Ἥρα (Hera) from being ’Epar) (beloved) ; as if Zeus is
said to have loved-her, and had her (for ἃ wife).5® Perhaps,
‘also, the founder of this name, speculating upon things on
49 The syntax requires KAIAIA, not KAI simply.
50 Heindorf has without reason approved of the reading suggested by
Heusde, and founded on the version of Ficinus—‘“ annon philosophi tibi
yidetur officium virique summa prudentia et consilio preediti.”
51 The words πτοίησις and μανία are frequently used to express any
strong carnal desires. See my notes on Bailey’s Hermesianax, p. 79.
82 To the bonds with which Zeus is said to have bound his father,
there is an allusion in Asch. Eum. 627, and Aristoph. Ned. 898, while
Macrobius, in Saturn. i. 8, has preserved the interpretation of the legend
given by Apollodorus.
58. Although ’Atdn¢ might be formed from εἴδω, yet there is nothing in
that word to which τὰ καλὰ can be referred. Hence there is probably
some error here. Plato wrote, I suspect, βαντί τῳ κάτω ἀεὶ δοῦναί τι,
i. e. “ever giving something to a person going below,” for thus “Acdn¢
would be from ὁ ἀεὶ dove.
54 Here, as before, and shortly afterwards, Heindorf properly reads
with MS. Gud. and Ficinus, ὀνοματοθέτου for νομοθέτου.
85. In the words ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ there is not a particle of meaning. In
Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 317, I have restored εἰς σπόρον ye—
86 So Stalbaum, after Matthie in Gr. Gr. § 559, b., explains ἔχειν.
x
322 CRATYLUS.
high, denominated ᾿Αὴρ (air) Ἥρα: but, for the sake of con-
cealment, he placed the beginning at the end.5” And this you
will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name
Ἥρα. But Φερρέφαττα (Proserpine) many are terrified at,
and at ᾿Απόλλων (Apollo), through a want of skill, as it ap-
pears, in the propriety of names. For by making a
they think upon Φερσεφόνη ; and this appears to them a thing
of dread.*® But it (Weppéparra) means, that the is
wise. For while things are carried along, that which aa
upon ], and handles, and is able to follow : them, will be wisdom.
This goddess therefore may with great propriety be named
Φερέπαφα, or something of this kind, on account of her wis-
dom, and contact of that which is borne along: and hence
the wise ᾿Αἴδης (Pluto) associates with her, because she too is
such (i. e. wise). But men now turn aside from this name, set-
ting more value upon a good pronunciation than truth, so as to
call her @eppégarra. [47.] In like manner with respect to
᾿Απόλλων (Apollo), many, as I said before, are terrified at this
name of the god, as if it signified something dreadful. Or
know you not this?
δ᾽ That there is some affinity between HPA and AHP is true enough.
But to understand what Plato says respecting the placing the
at the end, we must suppose him to have written τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡ, “ the
letter ἡ δἱ the beginning,” instead of τὴν ἀρχὴν
88. Boissonade, on Excerpt. ex Procl. Schol. in Platon, Cratyl. p. 99.
says, after Heindorf, that ἀὴρ will be seen if one pronounces ἤρα ἤρα. Of
this doctrine there is a ridicule in Aristoph. ‘Imm. 25, where no critic
has yet seen, what it is easy enough to discover by the aid of the Scholi-’
ast, all the jokes of the dramatist, concealed at present by the corruptions
of the text. To this passage of Plato, allusion is made by Athenagoras
Legat. pro Christian. ᾧ 18, p. 83, quoted by Stalbaum.
58° As if Φερσε-φόνη were derived from Φέρ-ειν, “ to bring,” and ae
‘ slaughter.”
® The words ἐφαπτόμενον kai are evidently a gl. of ἐπαφῶν.
ing καὶ, or ἢ, or ἤγουν thus introducing an interpretation into the text, I
have written something worth reading in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 188,
although neither Poppo, nor Arnold, nor Bloomfield, have thought ΑΝ
to take notice of the truths developed in that volume ; and I co
add not a little more equally valuable.
% For ᾿Απόλλων was supposed to have some affinity with ᾿Απολλύων,
as shown by Aischylus in Agam. 1048, "Απολλον ---ἀπολλὺν
᾿Απώλεσας γάρ i ἐν βολαῖς τὸ δεύτερον. For so we must read, in lieu
of ἀπολλων ἐμός" ᾿Απώλεσας yap οὐ μόλις τὸ δεύτερον : where οὐ
is an absurdity, that only a Hermann would have dared to defend. ; 50
too Euripides 1 in Phaéthont. Fr. has Ὦ χρυσοφεγγὲς "HX, ὥς μ᾽ ἀπώλε-
σας" Κἀκ τοῦδ᾽ ᾿Απόλλων ἐμφανῶς κλῴζει βροτοῖς. -
CRATYLUS. 323:
Herm. I (know it) very well; and you speak the truth.
Soe. But this name, as it appears to me, is most beautifully
laid down, with respect to the power of the god.
Herm. How?
Soc. I will endeavour to tell you what the fact appears to
me. For there is no other name, which, although one, fits ®
better with four powers of this god, so as to touch upon
them all, and to show, in a certain manner, his art in music,
prophecy, medicine, and archery.
Herm. Tell me, then; for you seem to me to speak of this
name as something strange.
Soc. This name then is well fitted, as belonging to a mu-
sical god. For, in the first place, would not purgations and puri-
fications, both according to the arts of medicine and prophecy,
and likewise the going round with torches steeped in drugs,
ordered by medical men and prophets,® and the lustrations
on such occasions, and the sprinklings, would not (I say)
all these be able (to do)® one thing, (namely,) to render a
man pure, both in body and soul?
Herm. Entirely so.
[48.] Soc. Will not then the god who purifies, who washes,
and who releases us from such evils, be of such (a name) ?
. 53 Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, adopted ἥρμοσεν from MS. Gud.,
‘with which many MSS. coincide. But in that case dy should be omitted.
For οὐκ ἐστιν dre ἂν ἥρμοσεν is a solecism, as I have shown on Prom.
299: Other MSS. offer ἡρμοσμένον in lieu of ἥρμοσεν ἕν ὃν. But in
that case we must read οὔκ ἐστιν 6, τι dy ὄνομ᾽ εἴη ἡρμοσμένον, Plato
wrote, I suspect, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα μᾶλλον ἡρμοσμένον---
88. They, who have seen in a Roman Catholic chapel the young choristers
going round with censers filled with frankincense, will be the best able to
understand this passage ; which is well illustrated by Casaubon on Theo-
phrast, Character. xvi., and Turnebus Adversar. iv. 15, where reference is
made to Virgil. Ain. vi. 226, ‘‘ Idem ter socios pura circumtulit unda :”
and to Tibullus, i. 5, ‘‘ Ipseque ter centum lustravi sulfure puro, Carmine
quum magico precinuisset anus;’’ from which last passage one would
have suspected that Plato wrote μαγικὴν and μαγικοῖς, instead of μαντι-
κὴν and μαντικοῖς, were it not that μαντικὴν has reference to what had
just been stated.
* I confess I do not understand ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, omitted by Ficinus ;
while one MS, has τὰ ἐν τούτοις. I could have understood καὶ ai περι-
θειώσεις Te καὶ τὰ λουτρὰ καὶ αἱ περιράνσεις ἔν τε τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς φαρμά-
κοις καὶ τοῖς μαγικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις. For all three are alluded to
in Eurip. Helen. 872—878.
8 Heindorf says δύνασθαι is here “ to be able to do;”’ and Stalbaum
refers to Phileb. p, 23, A., Gorg. p. a Pheedr. p. 275, A.
Υ
824 CRATYLUS.
Herm. Perfectly so.
Soc. According then to the releasings and washings which
he affords, as being the physician in the case of such-like
things, he will be properly called ᾿Απολούων (the washer). But
according to his prophetic power, and truth and ici
for these two are the same, he would most properly be called
ἱΑπλοῦς (simple), as the Thessalians call him now ™ [for all
the Thessalians call this god ‘AzAéy]. But, on account of
his being ever mighty in shooting arrows by his skill in
archery,” he is ’Ael-Gad\\wy (ever-darting).” But with
respect to his musical power, it is proper to understand
that, as in the words ἀκόλουθος (a follower), and ἄκοιτις (a
wife), a often signifies the same as together; so here Sane and
πολέω signify)"! τὴν ὁμοῦ πολησιν (the rolling together), both
about heaven, which men call πόλους Τ2 (the poles); and about
the harmony existing in song, which is called symphony ;
because all these, as the clever in music and astronomy assert,
eause all things to roll together with a certain harmony.”
* Instead of ταὐτον γάρ ἐστιν, the sense manifestly requires τούτω
yap ἐστιν ἕν, i. 6. “ for these two are one.” With regard to the identity
of truth and simplicity, it will be sufficient to quote the well-known verse
of Euripides, ᾿Απλοῦς ὁ ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ, in Phen, 472.
- δ΄ Τὰ lieu of ὥσπερ οὖν, I have translated as if the Greek were ὥσπερ
νῦν. See at § 41. Of course I am aware that ὥσπερ οὖν are sometimes
found thus united. But all the passages are corrupt, and have been cor-
rected by myself in The Surplice, No. 22, April 25, 1846.
68 The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
99 On the subject of Apollo’s skill in archery, there is an elegant Pseudo-
Babrian fable, No. 68, amongst those discovered a few years ago in an
Athos MS., in a more ‘perfect state than it had been previously in a Vati-
can one ; but which I partially emended on the Pseudo-Platonie Si
phus, ᾧ 5, n. 3, and restored completely in Revue de Philologie, T. ii. p. 295,
Ἢ Plato, remembering no doubt the commutability of the te let-
ters and 8, considered ᾿Α-πόλλων as an abbreviation of ἀεὶ- βάλλων.
71 The words within lunes have been happily preserved in the version
of Ficinus alone, “in his quoque a et polleo significant versionem, quie
simul et una peragitur,” and we thus get rid of Stalbaum’s abortive
attempt to explain and correct a corrupt text.
% With regard to the etymology, it was evidently ridiculed by Figen: τ
in ’Oov. 181, Ὁτιὴ πολεῖ τις ταῦτα καὶ διέρχεται Τὰ πάντα, aus te
εὖ καλεῖται νῦν πόλος : which Cobet, whom Holden has incorrectly fol-
lowed, should have emended as I have done, and not have rejected’ as
an interpolation.
18 Plato alludes here to the so-called harmony of the spheres, which
was founded on the similarity of the phenomena of light and sound,
over both of which Apollo presided. For as there are seven prismatic
CRATYLUS. 325
Now this god presides over harmony, ὁμοπολῶν, (causing to
roll) all these things together, both among gods and men.
[49.] As therefore we call ὁμόκελευθος (following together)
and ὁμόκοιτις (lying together), ἀκόλουθος and ἄκοιτις, by
changing o into a, so likewise we denominate ᾿Απόλλων, who
was ὁμοπολῶν, by inserting another A, because it would have
been’* synonymous with the harsh name. And this some
at. the present day suspecting, in consequence of the value
of this name not being rightly considered, are terrified at it,
as if it signified some destruction. But, as was just now
stated, the much “ is laid down, touching upon all the powers
of the god, his simple, ever-darting, purifying, and together-
rolling nature. But the name of the Μοῦσαι (Muses), and of
music universally, some one,” as it seems, made from μῶσθαι
(to inquire), and from investigation and philosophy. But
Λητὼ (Latona), (is derived) from the mildness of the god-
dess, “with reference to her being ἐθελήμων (willing), in
what any one might request; but perhaps, as foreigners call
her; for many call her Ληθώ. It seems then that she was
called Ληθὼ by those calling her by this name, with reference
not to the roughness, but the gentleness and smoothness of her
manner. [50.| But ἤΑρτεμις (Diana) appears to be (so
colours, from whence the sun was called, by the Chaldeans, a seven-rayed
god, so there are seven notes in the diatonic scale of sound. For a list
of the writers on the harmony of the spheres, the reader must turn to
Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. Advers. Music. p. 363.
τὰ Ficinus has, “ equivocum fuisset,” which leads to ὁμώνυμον ἂν
ἐγίγνετο.
> i, 6. ἀπολλύων, “ destroying.”
76 Heindorf, justly objecting to πολὺ, felt half inclined to omit it, with
MS. Gud. Stalbaum would read with one MS. τὸ δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον---
Ficinus has “re vera.” Perhaps Plato wrote τὸ dé διὰ πολλὴν ἅμιλλαν
ἐὸν, i, 6. ὄνομα, “‘ But the name which has gone through a great contest: ”
or we may read τὸ δὲ πολοῦν μετὰ dA ἢ Evi, i. 6. “ but the word πολοῦν
with two ἃ or one.” 3
τ Between τοῦτο and ἐπωνόμασεν, τις has perhaps dropt out; unless
we read ἐπωνόμασαν with MS. Gud., which Heindorf adopted.
7%3_78 This derivation, and indeed the whole passage, would have been
perfectly unintelligible, but for the gloss in Etymol, M. Λητώ" παρὰ τὸ
λήθω, τὸ λανθάνω" ὁ μὲν Πλάτων φησὶν ᾿Ελεητώ" ἐλεήμων γὰρ ἡ θεὸς καὶ
πραεῖα καὶ πάντας ἐλεοῦσα᾽ κατὰ δέ τινας Ληθώ" τὸ γὰρ ἥμερον Kai πραῦ,
ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιλελῆσθαι τῶν εἰς αὐτὴν πλημμελημάτων ἐμφαίνεται" ὁ δὲ
᾿Αρίσταρχος παρὰ τὸ AG τὸ θέλω ..----καὶ τὸ λῆ τὸ θελει Δωρικῶς" ἐπειδὴ ὃ ἄν
τις θέλη, παρ᾽ αὐτῆς λαμβάνει. From hence Buttmann was led to be-
lieve that the writer of the gloss found in his copy of Plato not ἐθελήμονα,
826 CRATYLUS.
called) on account of her conduct being ἀρτεμὲς,19 flawless and
orderly through her desire of virginity. 8 Perhaps also the
founder of her name so called her, as being cognizant of
virtue.®! And it may be, that hating the ἄροτον 53 (ploughing)
of man in a woman, or through some of these or all of them,
the founder of the name gave it to the goddess.
Herm. But what is Dionysus and Aphrodite ? ἫΝ
Soc. You are asking about great things, O son of Hip-
ponicus. But the manner of the appellations given to these
divinities, has been said to be both serious and jocose. Ask
therefore others about the serious manner ;** but nothing
but ἐλεήμονα. He ought rather to have said that Plato probably wrote
to this effect—Anrw δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πραότητος τῆς θεοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἐθελ
εἶναι δοῦναι, ὦ ὧν ἄν τις τι airgrac ὡς γὰρ ξένοι καλοῦσί τινες, τὸ λῆν τὸ
ἐθέλειν : ἴσως δὲ καὶ ᾿Ελεητώ" a % ἧς, τοῦ ε δὶς ἀφῳρημένου, γίγνεται
Λητὼ, ἡ πάντας ἐλεοῦσα" πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ Ληθὼ καλοῦσι" τὸ γὰρ ἥ μερον καὶ
πρᾶον ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιλελῆσθαι τῶν εἰς αὐτὴν πλημμελησάντων ἐμφαίνεται
ἔοικεν οὖν πρὸς τὸ μὴ τραχὺ τοῦ ἤθους ἀλλὰ τὸ λεῖον Λητὼ
i. e. But Λητὼ (Latona) (is derived) from the mildness of the 5 se
with reference to her being willing to give something of what any one
may request. For as some foreigners say, τὸ Any means “ to be ”
Perhaps too (her name was) ᾿Ελεητὼ, from which, the ε being twice
taken away, there becomes Λητὼ, “‘ who ities all.” Many too call her
Ληθώ. For her gentleness and mildness is shown by her forgetting those
who sin against her. It seems then that she is called Λητὼ from not the
roughness, but the smoothness of her conduct.” This at least would be
worthy of Plato, which cannot be said of the rubbish in the text. .
19 This derivation is adopted by the Etymol. M. and his transcriber
Eustathius ; from whom it would seem that Plato wrote”"Apremeg δὲ διὰ
τὸ ἀρτεμὲς ἢ ἄρτιον, κατὰ τὸ κόσμιον. tnt
80 As shown by Callimachus H, in Dian. 6. Δός μοι παρθενίην.. -
ΒΥ what process Αρτεμις could be derived from, or explained ὍΝ;
ἀρετῆς ἵστορα, even Plato, or the philosophers whom he is ridi
would have been unable to state. By turning however to Etymol. M. in
“Aprepuc’ ἡ θεὸς ἀερότεμίς τις οὖσα ἡ τὸν ἀέρα τέμνουσα" ἡ αὐτὴ γάρ san
τῇ Σελήνη, it is easy to see that Plato probably wrote ἴσως δὲ Ly
τέμνουσα δι’ ἄστρα: with which may be compared the ex
Euripides in Phen. 1, Ὦ τὴν ἐν ἄστροις οὐρανος τέμνων ὁδὸν. Ἥλιε.
Stalbaum indeed says that the reader must be as stupid as the stump of a
tree not to see that Plato is here having a bitof fun. But even fun ought
to be something more than folly merely.
8? On the metaphorical use of ἄροτον, see Hemsterhuis on Lucian.
Timon. ὁ 17; D’Orvill on Chariton. p. 345, ed. Lips; Bergler on Alci-
phron i. 6; myself on Aisch. Eum. 400; Peerlkamp in Bibliothee. oni
Nov. T. i. Ῥ. 96; Winckelmann on Plutarch, Amator, p. 757... Ὁ.
8 Plato, who had been partly initiated in the mysteries of De
and Dionysus, where the meanings of those names were expo Lin a
CRATYLUS. 327
hinders us from relating the jocose; for these deities are
lovers of jesting and sport. Now Διόνυσος (Dionysus) would
be the giver of wine, and may be jocosely called Διδ-οένυσος.
‘And οἶνος (wine) may be most justly called oidvove, because
it makes the majority of those who drink it to have wit, not
having it (before).84 But, with respect to Aphrodité, it is
not proper to contradict®® Hesiod, (Theog. 195,) but to allow
that she was called ’Agpodirn, through her generation from
ἀφρὸς (foam).
[51.] Herm. But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you
will not forget either Athena, or Hephestus, or Ares.
Soe. For it is by no means reasonable.
Herm. It is not.
Soc. One of the names of her, (Athena,) it is not difficult
to say why it was imposed.
Herm. Which?
Soe. We surely call her Pallas ?
Herm. How not?
Soe. Considering then this name to have been formed
from dancing in armour,*® we shall, as it appears to me, think
properly; for to lift up oneself or any thing else on high,
either from the earth, or to shake or be shaken in the hands,
we call it to make to®’ dance and to dance.
serious manner, thus avoids the necessity of breaking his oath of secrecy.
So Herodotus constantly does by his formula, εὔστομά μοι κείσθω.
8: With this passage may be compared the expression in Horace, ap-
plied to the wine bottle, “ΤῸ lene tormentum ingenio admoves Plerumque
duro :”’ although Shakspeare says that ‘‘ when the wine isin, the wit is out.”
85 Plato said this, because he doubtless knew that Euripides had, in
Tro. 992, given a less favourable etymology in the words—Td μωρὰ γὰρ
πάντ᾽ ἄφροσι δὴ Kpaiver βροτοῖς, Ἧς τοὔνομ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἐστὶν ᾿Α φροδίτη,
Κύπρις. For so I would have edited that passage, had the dissertation
of Lydus περὲὸ Μηνῶν, been published in 1807, who says, in p. 88—212,
Εὐριπίδης δὲ ᾿Αφροδίτην αὐτὴν ἀξιοῖ ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ ἄφρονας
ἐρῶντας ἀποτελεῖν.
86° How Plato could assert that Παλλὰς has any affinity with ἐν τοῖς
ὅπλοις ὀρχεῖσθαι, is past my comprehension. The Etymol. M. has more
properly—zapa τὸ ἀεὶ πάλλειν---δόρυ. I suspect that the passage has
come down in an imperfect state, and that Plato wrote something to this
effect—a7d τοῦ πολὺ ἅλλεσθαι ἡγούμενοι---ἃ πα shortly afterwards—
μετεωρίζειν ἀπὸ γῆς dia τῆς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ὀρχήσεως. For the word
μετξωρὸς is particularly applied to vessels seen δὲ a distance from the
land, and, as it were, dancing on the water, while the tide is flowing or
ebbing, or tost in a storm.
87 The verb ὀρχεῖν is rarely found in a transitive sense. Heindorf
928 CRATYLUS
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. The goddess therefore on this account (we call)§*
Pallas.
Herm. And properly so. But what say you of her other
name ?
Soc. That of Athena?
Herm. Yes.
[52.] Soc. This name, my friend, is of greater weight. For
the ancients appear to have considered Athena, as those of the
present day do, who are skilled in the interpretation of
Homer. Forthe majority of these, in explaining the poet, say
that by Athena he intended mind and intellect. Now he who
founded names seems to have understood some such thing as
this respecting the goddess; or expressing rather something
yet greater, he speaks of her as the intelligence of a god :89 for
that she is a Θεοσνόη, (the god-mind, ) employing after a foreign
mode a instead of η, and taking away. and σι But
it is not even in this way. But he called her Ocovdy, as she
understood divine concerns better than all the rest. Nor is
it far off to say that he was willing to call “intelligence
in manner,” [as being this deity,]®°*by the name of Ἠθονόη.
But either the founder himself, or some persons
turned the name aside to something more beautiful, as they
thought, and called her ᾿Αθηνάα (Athena).
Herm. But what will you say of Hephestus ?
Soc. Are you asking about the noble (deity) skilled in light ?
Herm. I seem so.
Soc. Is he not evident to all as being Φαῖστος (luminous),
having drawn to himself the ».°!
Herm. It nearly appears so; unless [as it seems] it ap-
pears to you in some other way.
quotes opportunely Athen. i. p. 21, A. Ἴων" Ἔκ τῶν ἀέλπτων μᾶλλον
ὠρχῆσεν φρένας.
88. Ficin. ‘‘ Palladem eam vocamus.” The verb can scarcely be omitted.
8° Ficinus has “ ut Dei mentem induxit,” as if he had found in his MS.
νόησιν, ὡσπερεὶ θεοῦ, ἐπάγει, instead of λέγει.
990 The words within brackets, which are an evident interpolation,
Ficinus has correctly omitted. To understand however the etymology,
we must suppose ᾿Ηθο-γνόη to come from Ἦθος and νόος, and to be cor-
rupted into ᾿Αθη-νάα.
31. Ficinus adds, “ Unde Ephestos, id est luminis preses, est dictus,”
which is evidently an interpolation.
' % The words between brackets Bekker was the first to introduce from
CRATYLUS. 329
Soc. But, that it may not appear, ask about” Apyc (Mars).
Herm. 1 ask then.
Soc. If you please, then, the name of “Apne shall be de-
rived from τὸ ἄρρεν (the male), and τὸ ἀνδρεῖον (the manly).
But if, on the other hand, (you wish it) from his harsh and
not-to-be-turned nature, which is called dpparoy,** it will be
proper for a god warlike every where, to be called by this
name.
* Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Let us then, by the gods, free ourselves from the gods ;
for I fear to discourse about them. But about some others,
if you wish it, propose as questions, that you may see of what
kind are the horses of Euthyphro.*4
Herm. I will do what you say, after asking you one thing
yet about Ἑρμῆς (Hermes), since Cratylus says® that I am
not Hermogenes. Let us endeavour then to look into the
name Hermes, that we may know whether he says any
thing to the purpose.
Soc. This name of Hermes*® does indeed seem to pertain
somewhat to discourse, and to imply that with reference®’ to
his being an interpreter and a messenger, and to his stealing
and deceiving in discourses and market-dealing,® the whole
of his business is connected with the power of speech. [54.]
*9 As then we said before, (ὃ 34,) τὸ εἴρειν is the use of speech,
and as Homer frequently says, ἐμήσατο, (he planned), [now
allthe MSS. They are perfectly useless, and correctly omitted by Ficinus.
As far as I remember, ὡς ἔοικε never thus follows κινδυνεύει. Perhaps
Plato wrote ἐὰν μή wy σοι, ὃς ἔθηκεν αὐτὸ, Ere ἄλλο θέλειν δόξῃ, i. 6.
Ro it appears that he, who founded the name, meant something
er?
% This word is found only in Plato, and evén there very seldom. See
Ruhnken on Timeus, p. 50.
% Here is an allusion to Homer, I]. v. 221, ὄφρα ἴδηαι Οἷοι Τρώϊοι
ἵπποι.
95. In § 1 and 3.
- ® The words ὁ ἙἝἭ ρμῆς, are evidently an explanation of τοῦτο.
97 1 have adopted cai κατὰ τὸ, found in one MS. for καὶ ro—
% Ficinus improperly translates τὸ ἀγοραστικὸν, ‘“‘vehemens con-
cionator.”” The reference is to Hermes, the god of gain, arising from
dealings in a market. In enumerating these attributes of the god,
Plato had probably in mind Aristoph. Plut. 1153—1161.
99. 89 Out of this mass of rubbish Ficinus has contrived to elicit some-
thing like sense—‘“ Profecto, quemadmodum in superioribus diximus,
irin sermonis est usus. Sepe vero de hoc Homerus ait, emesato, id est
380 CRATYLUS.
this is to plan.] From both of these then this god, planning
to speak, and the speech—but εἴρειν means to speak—just as
if the name-founder gives his command to us, He, Ὁ men,
who has planned the speaking, would be justly called
Eipéune.? But we of the present times, thinking ‘to give
elegance to the name, denominate him Ἑρμῆς, Herr
100 And Iris too it seems is so called, from εἴρειν, (to speak, )
because she is a messenger. |! Pate
Herm. By Zeus, well does Cratylus seem to me to have
said that I am Hermogenes. Iam not indeed a ready planner
of a discourse. )
machinatus est. Ex utrisque igitur nomen hujus dei componitur, tum ex
eo, quo loqui est, tum ex eo, quod machinari et cogitare dicenda.
Perinde ac si nominis auctor nobis preciperet, Par est, O viri, ut deum
illum, qui irin emesato, id est loqui machinatus est, Iremen yocetis.”
Different however as this translation is from the Greek text at presen δὲ
is easy to see that, instead of τοῦτο δὲ μηχανήσασθαι ἐστι, he found in hi
MS. τοῦτο δὲ ἐμηχανήσατο : and made perhaps out of his own brain ἐξ
ἀμφοτέρων οὖν τούτων, Tov τε εἴρειν, ὅ ἐστι λέγειν, Kai τοῦ τὰ ἃ
μήσασθαι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐτίθετο, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπιτάττοι ἡμῖν ὁ
ὀνοματοθέτης, τοῦτον τὸν θεὸν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἴρειν ἐὶ ἤσατο,
δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτε Εἰρέμην. And this indeed is, as regards the sub-
stance, nearly what the author in all probability wrote. One would how-
ever prefer something to this effect—ré re εἴρειν, ὃ λόγου χρεία ἐστὶ, To
τε, οἷον καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ λέγει, ἐμήσατο---τοῦτο δὲ ἐμηχανήσατό
ἐστι---τίθει συ" ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ, οἶμαι, τούτων τοῦ τε εἴρειν καὶ τοῦ τὰ
λόγου μησαμένου, τοῦτον τὸν θεὸν πέρι, οὕτως ἐπιτάττει ἡμῖν ὁ ὀνοματο-
θέτης, Ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἴρειν ἐμήσατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ὑπὸ ὑμῶν
Εἰρεμης ; i. 6. do you put down both the word εἴρειν, which means the
use of speech, and, what Homer frequently says, éujoaro—that is, he
planned. For from both of these, the act of speaking, and the party
planning the things belonging to speech, I think, the founder of the name
does, as regards this deity, thus give us an ordonnance—* O men, he who
has planned the art of speaking, may be justly called by us Eipéune.” To
arrive however at this sense, it is necessary to reject what has been inter-
polated, and to correct what has become corrupt; of which latter the
most remarkable are the change of φησὶ into τίθει ov: of ἂν into γὰρ
οἶμαι ; and of ὡσπερεὶ into πέρι οὕτως.
100100 All the words between the brackets Schleiermacher, Heindorf,
and Bekker consider as an interpolation. But who would have i
lated them, or why, those critics have not deigned to tell us. I
they ought to be inserted a little above, after τό τε εἴρειν, ὃ λόγου"
ἐστὶ, to show that as both Ἑρμῆς and Ἶρις were the messengers of the
gods, their names were derived from the same verb εἴρειν, “ to speak,”’ as
remarked by Eustathius, IA. A. p. 84, 50. ed. Bas. ὅτι δὲ re
λέγονται Ἑρμῆς καὶ Ἶρις παρὰ τὸ εἴρειν, δῆλόν ἐστι. And if this noti
of mine be correct, we must read καὶ γὰρ ἡ Ἴρις, instead of καὶ ἥ γε
Ἶρις.
ἐω"Σ od ae
CRATYLUS. 331
Soe. It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan is the
two-formed son of Hermes.
Herm. How so?
Soc. You know that speech signifies the all,!®! and circu-
lates and causes to roll perpetually; and that it is two-fold,
true and false.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Is not then the truth of it smooth and divine, and
dwelling on high amongst the gods; but that which is false
(dwells) below amongst the mass of mankind, and is rough
and goat-like? For from hence are the greatest number of
fables, and the falsehoods connected with the goat-like life.?
[55.|] Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Rightly then would :he, who indicates every thing,®
and ever rolls, be Πὰν αἰπόλος, the biform son of Hermes;
who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts
rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the
brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is
by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to
brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let
us free ourselves from the gods.
Herm. From gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates.
101 How speech can be said to signify the all, is beyond my compre-
hension. Perhaps we ought to read Οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἐς τὰ ὦτα πᾶν
σῆμα νοῦ κατακυλίει [ἢ πολεῖ] ἀεί, i. 6. “οι know that speech ever rolls
to the ears every indication of mind.’? For thus ἢ πολεῖ would be the
interpretation of κατακυλίει, which I have elicited from καὶ κυκλεῖ ; and
this with the greater readiness, as ἀεὶ πολῶν is said just below to be the
origin of αἰπόλος ; while ὦτα and νοῦς would be corrupted here, as they
are elsewhere, as shown by myself in Tro. Append. p. 176, C., Ausch.
Eum. 120, Prom. 667, and Soph. Philoct. 49, 86. With regard to the
general idea, it may be compared with what Pope says in his Abelard
and Eloisa of letters, that they
“ Speed the soft intercourse of soul with soul,
And waft a sigh from Indus to the Pole.”
2 Heindorf conceives that there is a pun in τραγικὸν, where allusion is
made to the goat-like form of Pan, and to tragedies, so called from the
goat given as a prize for the best tragedy. Such a pun would however
be frigid beyond conception. Plato wrote, I suspect, περὲ τὸν Σατυρικὸν
βίον, in reference to the satyric drama, where Pan was no doubt fre-
quently introduced and ridiculed.
5 If I have rightly altered, just above, τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει into τὸ πᾶν
σῆμα νοῦ, it is easy to read here ὁ πᾶν νόημα μηνύων, in lieu of πᾶν
μηνύων.
332 CRATYLUS.
But what hinders you from discussing such divinities‘ as
Ἥλιος (sun), and Σελήνη (moon), and ”Aorpa (stars), and Τῆ
(earth), and Αἰθὴρ (zther), and” Ajp (air), and Πῦρ (fire), and
Ὕδωρ (water), and ὯΩραι (seasons), and ᾿Ενιαυτὸς (year) ?
Soc. You enjoin me many things; still if it will gratify
you, I am willing (to speak).°
Herm. You will indeed gratify me.
[56.] Soc. What then do you wish the first? Or shall we
discuss as you have enumerated, (first) the sun? .
Herm. Entirely so. ᾿
Soc. It seems then that this would become more manifest,
if one should use the Doric name: for the Dorians call the sun
“Adwec. He will therefore Ὅ6 ἽΔλιος, from ἁλέζειν (collecting)
men into one spot when he rises; and he would be so, from
always εἱλεῖν (revolving) while going round the earth. And
he would seem to be so, because in going he causes to be vari-
ous the productions of the earth. Now the verbs ποικέλλειν
and αἰολεῖν have the same meaning.
Herm. But what will you say of Σελήνη (moon)?
Soc. This name seems to press upon Anaxagoras.
Herm. Why?
Soc. It seems to indicate something of a more ancient
date than® what he lately stated, that the moon obtains her ἡ
light from the sun.
Herm. But how ?
Soc. Σέλας is the same with φῶς (light).
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. Now this light about the moon is perpetually νέον
(new), and ἔνον (old),’ if the Anaxagoreans say true; for,
perpetually revolving in a circle, she perpetually renews this
light; but the light of the former month becomes old.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. And many call her Zedavaia.®
4 For such alone were once considered divinities, as stated in § 31.
5 The word λέγειν is supplied by only one MS.
5 Had Heusde seen that ἢ had dropt out, he would not have altered
δηλῶν τι into δηλῶντι : which, though adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum,
I cannot understand.
7 According to the Etymol. Σελήνη is παρὰ τὸ σέλας νέον ἔχειν" ἢ
παρὰ τὸ σέλας ἀεὶ ἕν ἔχειν, ὅθεν καὶ ἔνος, ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς, ὁ ἀεὶ νεάζων. On
ἔνον see Ruhnken, Tim. p. 103.
8 Heindorf quotes Phen. 178, and Aristoph. Neg. 614,
CRATYLUS. 333
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. But, because it perpetually possesses new and old
splendour, it may be more justly called ceda-evo-veo-det-a,
but compressed together it is called Σελαναία.
[57.] Herm. This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But
what will you say of Μὴν (month), and” Aorpa (stars) ἢ
Soc. Meic (month) would be properly called μείης, from pe-
οὔσθαι (to be diminished) ;° but” Acrpa (stars) appear to derive
their name from ᾿Αστραπὴ (lightning). Now ἀστραπὴ would be
ἀναστρωπὴ, because it ὦπα ἀναστρέφει (turns the eyes); but
being formed with elegance, it is now called ἀστραπή.
Herm. But what (are) Πῦρ (fire) and Ὕδωρ (water) ?
Soc. About Πῦρ (fire) I am at a loss; and it nearly appears,
that either the Muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or this
word is very difficult. Behold then the artifice which I in-
troduce in all such cases where I am at a loss.
Herm. What is it?
Soc. I will tell you. Answer me then. Do you know on
what account Πῦρ (fire) was so called ?
Herm. By Zeus, not I.
Soc. Consider then what my suspicions are concerning it.
For I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under
the Barbarians, received many of their names from the
Barbarians.
Herm. What then?
[58.] Soe. Should any one then investigate how reasonably
these names were given according to the Greek language, and
not according to that from which the name happens to come,
you know he would be at a loss.
Herm. Very likely.
Soc. Consider then, whether this name, πῦρ (fire), is not of
Barbaric origin. For itis by no means easy to adapt this to
the Greek language. But the Phrygians are thus clearly call-
ing fire, with a trifling deviation, and the word ὕδωρ (water),
and κύνες (dogs),!° and many other names.
Herm. They are so.
9. How the idea of diminution came to be connected with the name of a
month Plato has failed to explain. By comparing however Etymol. M. in
. part where Plato is quoted, it would seem that something has dropt out
ere.
» © From this confession on the part of Plato that πῦρ, ὕδωρ, and κύνες
are foreign words, it would seem that fire, water, and canis, found in the
-
334 CRATYLUS.
Soc. It is not proper then to use violence with these words ;
since any one can say about them.'! On this account there-
fore I reject the words πῦρ and ὕδωρ. But ᾿Αὴρ (air), Her-
mogenes, (is so called)? because αἴρει (it raises) things from?
the earth; or because dei ῥεῖ (it always flows); or because,
from its flowing, a breathing is produced: for the poets" call
winds ἀῆται (breathings). Perhaps then it means as if a
person! should say rvevpardppovy (a flowing breathing), or
ἀητόρρουν (a flowing wind), !°[ from whence he wishes to call
it thus, because it is Af]. But I consider αἰθὴρ (ether) in
some way as this; because ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων (it always
runs and flows about the air), it would be called ἀειθεήρ. [59. ]
But Τῇ (earth), more plainly indicates its meaning, if any one
calls it Tata, For γαῖα would be properly called γεννήτειρα
(producer), as Homer says; for he speaks of γεγάασι as
γεγενῆσθαι (to have been produced). ᾿
Northern and Latin languages, were of Phrygian origin. According to
Etym. M. Πῦρ᾽ φῦρ τι ἐστίν, where is the Teutonic “ fire.”
1! Ficin., “‘de ipsis nihil dicere quisquam potest.’”’ From whence
Cornarius got his ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔχοι γ᾽ ἄν τις. He should have written ἐπεὶ
οὐκ ἔχοι--- Heindorf attempts to support ἐπεὶ ἔχοι γ᾽ ἄν τις, by r i
“nam possit quispiam aliquid :᾿ which would be in Greek ἐπεὲ ἔχοι ἄν τε
Tec; and hence in Rep.i. p. 350, Ὁ. καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν, he should
have read καὶ ἔχω τι wepi—and in Euthyphr. p. 9, B. ἐπεὶ πανύ τι
σαφῶς ἔχοιμ᾽ ay, instead of πάνυ ye, especially as in the former case
λέγειν, and in the latter ἐπιδεῖξαι, require an accusative.
12 Ficin., “sic est dictus.”
3 Ficin., “ que circa terram,”’ i. 6. τὰ περὶ τῆς γῆς. This derivation
was obtained from a philosopher of Cyrene, as shown by the Etymol. M.
Αἰθὴρ, παρὰ τὸ θεῖν κυκλοφορικῶς, φησὶν ᾿Αριστοτέλης περὶ Κυρηναίων,
by whom Ζεὺς was called Αἰθηὴρ, as may be inferred from Eustath. IA.
=. p. 972, 47, ὁ Ζεὺς αἰθὴρ ἀεὶ ἐγρήγορε τῇ κυκλοφορίᾳ, ὃς καὶ παρὰ τὸ
ἀεὶ θεῖν αἰθὴρ καλεῖται.
4 Homer IA. 0. 626, and Hesiod frequently. -
In the formula ὥσπερ dy εἰ εἴποι τις cannot be omitted. See
Heindorf on Phedon. p. 87, B. G. C. Lewis in Cl. Jl. No. 68, p. 198,
and myself on Pseudo-Platon, Sisyph. § 2, n. 4.
616 This mass of nonsense Ficinus omitted, either because he could
not understand it, or because it was not in his MS. Heindorf considers
it as an interpolation. Hence Stalbaum has bracketed it, Perhaps
Plato wrote ὅθεν δὴ βούλοιτ᾽ ἄν τις αὐτὸν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅστις ἐστι
γνοήρης, where I have elicited βούλοιτ᾽ ἂν τις from βούλεται, and. ὅστις
ἐστι νοήρης from bre ἐστὶν ὁ ἀὴρ in MS. Gud. For Hesych. has
Νοαρέως" νουνεχόντως, the Doric form for Νοήρως, similar to 1o+
On words in -ypy¢ I have said something at Aisch. Suppl. 34, and 1
could now say a great deal more.
CRATYLUS. 335
Herm. Be it so.
Soc. What is there then for us after this ?
Herm. *Qpat (hours), Socrates, and ’Evcavrd¢ and ”Eroc.!7
Soe. Now ‘Opa: must be pronounced (Ὅραι),}8 as of old in
the Attic dialect, if you wish to know what is reasonable.
For they are dpa, through their determining winters and
summers and winds, and the fruits!® of the earth; and as
ὁρίζουσαι (determining), they would be justly called ὅραι.
But ’Eviavrdg and” Eroc (year), nearly appear to be one thing,
each in turn. For that which brings to light the natural
productions of the earth, and does, itself by itself, explore
them, is "Eyvavrdce (the year). And as stated before, regard-
ing the name of Zeus, divided into two, some called the deity
Zeus and some Dis, so here with respect to the year, it is
called by some ᾿Εγιαυτὸς, because it (explores) ἐν ἑαυτῷ (in it-
self); but “Eroc, because ἐτάζει 39 (it explores). *! And the
whole reasoning is for that, which explores in itself, to be
called, being one, twofold;?! so that two names are pro-
duced, ᾿Ενιαυτὸς and” Eroc, from one reason.
τ MS. Gud. and Ficin. omit «ai ἔτος incorrectly.
18 Heusde and Heindorf correctly saw that ὄραι had dropt out between
παλαιὸν and ῥητέον.
19 Serranus proposed to read, what the sense requires, and is therefore
adopted by Heindorf, τοὺς καιροὺς πρὸς τοὺς καρποὺς, “the seasons
suited for fruits.’ Stalbaum, however, sticks as usual to the non-
sense of the common text. Etymol. M. ᾿Ενιαυτὸς---παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ
διειληφέναι πάντα τούς τε καρποὺς Kai τὰς τροπάς.
20 Although the word ἐτάζειν is thus repeated in the text, I cannot be-
lieve that it was written even once by Plato. For by comparing Etymol.
in "Ετος---παρὰ τὸ ἔτι καὶ ἔτι εἶναι ἢ ἰέναι, and in ᾿Ενιαυτὸς---παρὰ τὸ
ἰαύω, σύνθετον ἐνιαύω τὸ ἐνδιατρίβω, and Eustath. IA. B. p. 144, 49,
Bas. ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς γίνεται μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰαύω τὸ διατρίβω" δηλοῖ δὲ χρόνον
μακρόν" ἰαύειν γὰρ τὸ διατρίβειν, Plato wrote, I suspect, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ
ἔτος ἐξ ἔτους ζῶν---ἀπά οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτὸν, bre ἔστιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οἱ δὲ ἔτος, ὅτι
ἔτι ζεῖ. For thus ἔτος ἐξ ἔτους, is similar to ἔτους εἰς ἔτος in Soph. Antig.
348. If however ἐτάζον is to be preserved, it is evident that the preposi-
tion ἐξ would be at variance with the derivation.
2121 Stalbaum proposed to read ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐτάζον"
τοῦτο δὲ προσαγορεύεται ἕν ὃν δίχα, which he got from Ficinus; “ In-
tegra vero oratio est ipsum quod in se ipso examinat: unde ex oratione
una nomina duo selecta sunt.”” I suspect however that we ought to read
ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἐστὶν, ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔτι ζῶν οὕτω προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἕν
ὃν, δίχα χρὴ---ἴον thus ὅτι might have easily dropt out between ἐστι and
τὸ, and χρὴ after δίχα.
336 ORATYLUS.
Herm. But then,” Socrates, you have made a great pro-
58.
[60.] Soc. I seem, indeed, to have driven a long way on
the road to wisdom.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Perhaps you will speak something*’ more.
Herm. But after this species (of inquiry), I would most
gladly contemplate those beautiful names relating to virtue,
with what propriety φρόνησις (prudence), σύνεσις (conscious-
ness), δικαιοσύνη (justice), and all the rest of this kind are
given.
Soc. You raise up, my friend, no mean a genus of names.
But however, since I have put on the lion’s skin,** I must not
act the coward; but, as it seems, look into prudence, and in-
telligence, and thought, and knowledge, and all the other
beautiful names of which you speak.”
Herm. We ought by no means to stand apart previously.
Soc. And indeed, by the dog,” I seem to myself not to act
the part of a prophet badly, about what I understand at pre-
sent, that those ancient men, who laid down names, did, like
the majority of the wise men of the present period, through
their frequently turning themselves round, while in search of
the spot where existences are, become dizzy beyond all
bounds; and that subsequently all?’ things appear to them
to turn round” and to be borne along on every side. [61.]
They do not however blame what they suffer within them-
2 In lieu of the nonsensical δῆτα, three MSS. read δῆλα, which leads
to δῆλα d7)—a phrase perpetually used by Plato. The error arose from
the similarity of r and ἃ in MSS. as shown by Pierson on Merris, p. 254.
33 Heindorf was the first to read φήσεις for ἐφήσεις, and to support it
by Legg. i. p. 625, C., and Rep. x. p. 596, C. Perhaps however in
ἐφήσεις lies hid τι φήσεις.
34. Here is an allusion to a well-known sopo-Socratic fable, to which
Shakspeare alluded in King John.—* Thou wear the lion’s hide! Doff
it, for shame; And hang a calf’s skin on thy recreant limbs.”
35 Instead of ἃ φὴς, MS. Gud. ἀφιῆς, which leads to ἃ ἔφης, “ of
which you were speaking.”
76 On this Socratic oath see my note on Hipp. Maj. § 18, n. 1.
77 In lieu of τὰ πράγματα, common sense demands πάντα ; for thus
πάντα and πάντως are perpetually united, as shown by myself in Poppo’s
Prolegom. p. 178, and by Lobeck on Soph, Aj. 852, ed. 2.
28 One MS. has alone preserved περιστρέφεσθαι. Ficinus has “ per-
ferri et vacillare,”’ which leads to περιφέρεσθαι, and στρέφεσθαι.
CRATYLUS. 337
selves as the cause of this opinion, but that things are of
themselves so formed by nature, (that)*® nothing is abiding and
firm, but that all things*® flow and are carried along, and are
full of all kinds of generation and destruction.*! I speak
this, as having thought on the names just now (mentioned).*?
Herm. How is this, Socrates ?
Soc. Perhaps you have not perceived that those lately
mentioned were imposed upon things altogether borne along,
flowing, and in a state of generation.**
Herm. 1 do not altogether consider it.
Soe. Now, in the first place, what we mentioned first is
entirely something of this kind.
Herm. Which is that ?
Soc. Φρόνησις (prudence). For it is the perception of a
movement and flowing. One may also understand by it the
utility of movement.** But at least it is connected with the
idea of being carried along.** But if you will, [yan (thought)
indicates altogether the looking-into and agitating (mentally)
a begetting ;*° for the word νωμᾷν (to agitate) is the same as the
word σκοπεῖν 51 (to look into). Orif you will, νόησις (intelligence)
is τοῦ véov ἕσις (the desire of a novelty); since for existing
things to be new, it indicates that they are perpetually in the
course of being produced. Hence he, who founded the word
vedeowy, pointed out that the soul was desirous of this (novel-
ty): for it was not called νόησις anciently, but instead of η,
29 After οὕτω πεφυκέναι we must insert wore, despite the authority of
all the MSS, that omit it, except the one used by Ficinus; who has “ita
natura habere se putant, ut nihil—sit.”
80 Here again Ficinus shows by his “fluant omnes,” that he found in
his MS. μεστὰ εἶναι πάντα πάσης---
51 In lieu of φορᾶς three MSS. read φθορᾶς. Ficinus has “‘ gignantur
et defluant,”” which leads to γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, found in Parmen. § 20.
Rep. vi. p. 485, B., Legg. x. p. 891, E. 894, B., all quoted by Heindorf.
Cornarius was the first to suggest φθορᾶς.
32. Ficin. “ que nunc relata sunt,” asif his MS. read τὰ vi δὴ ῥηθέντα.
33 Ficin. “ jugi generatione,”’ as if he found in his MS. ἀεὶ ἐπιγιγνομέ-
νοις.
% This is said, as if φρόνησις were derived from φορὰ and ὄνησιο.
35 As the Schol. has preserved a various reading—«at περὶ τὸ ῥεῖν ye,
Heindorf would unite the two—*repi ye τὸ ῥεῖν τε καὶ φέρεσθαι---οοΥ-
rectly: to which ῥεῖν for περὶ in one MS, plainly leads.
36 This appears from Aésch. S. Th. 25, Ἔν ὠσὶ νωμῶν καὶ φρεσὶν: and
Soph. Gid. T. 800, Ὦ πάντα νωμῶν Τειρεσία διδακτά τε" Ἀρρητά τε.
37 For γνώμᾳ is thus feigned to be derived from γονὴ and νωμᾶν.
Ζ
338 CRATYLUS.
it was necessary to pronounce ε twice,—vedeow.® . [62.] But
Σωφροσύνη (temperance) is the σωτηρία 39 (safety) of that φρό-
γησις (prudence) which we have just now considered, Ἔπισ-
Thun (science) moreover points out that the soul, which is
worthy of notice, follows things hurried along, and is neither
left behind them, nor goes before them. Hence by throwing
out ε, it ought to be called morhyn. But Σύνεσιο (under-
standing), lon the other hand, would thus‘! appear to be, as
it were, a syllogism. “3 For when it says * συνίεναι (to under-
stand), it follows that the same thing in every respect is meant
as by the. word ἐπίστασθαι (to know): for συνιέναι means that
the soul marches along with things.** Σοφία (wisdom), how-
ever, means to touch upon movement. This, however, is
rather obscure and foreign. But we should recollect, from
out of the poets, that they often say, (when they happen to
say) “tof a person from among those, who begin to go forward
quickly, that ἐσύθη (he rushed forth) they say:* and a man
38 Ficinus adds “ quasi neu (véov) id est novi, et esis, appetitia;’
if he had found in his MS. ἅτε νέου ἕσιν τὸ ὄνομα ὄν : what the train 0)
thought manifestly requires.
* For Plato feigns that σωφροσύνη is derived παρὰ τὸ σώξειν τὸ
φρονεῖν, as stated by Etymol. M. in p. 744, 33, who has thus
some words that were found in this passage originally, as shown by Aris-
totle in Ethic. vi. 5, ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν
τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώξζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν.
“—® Although Stalbaum has left in the text ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ ει,
ἐπιστημένην αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν, he prefers in the notes the correction of
Cornarius—ixBaddovrac δεῖ τὸ εἰ, πιστήμην. But as we thus not only
lose sight of ἕπεσθαι, but introduce πιστήμη, a word to which there is
not the most distant allusion in the text, Heindorf suggested é
τας δεῖ τὸ ει, ἑπειστήμην. The reader is therefore left to take his choice ;
for I confess I am here quite in the dark.
‘141 Heindorf explains αὖ οὕτω μὲν by “ thus, the matter not having
been considered.’ But such could not be the meaning of those *
Ficinus takes no notice of them. They conceal something like ἔννῳ τινι
a&v— to any person of mind.”
' # Ficinus has “ cum autem syniene dicitur;” from whence Heindorf
would read λέγηται, instead of Aéyy, which wants its nominative. Stal-
baum m suggests λέγῳς---ἰ should prefer λέγῳ τις---
“5. To understand this etymological syllogism, we must suppose that
συνιέναι, “to understand,”’ is derived from συνιέναι, “to go-together,”’
like συμπορεύεσθαι. Now as ἐπιστήμη has been shown to come) from
ἕπεσθαι and ἴ ἴσημι, and as ἕπεσθαι is the same as Cup ropeveRi te se fol-
lows that σύνεσις is the samé as ἐπιστήμη.
—* This is Stalbaum’s translation of the words in the text; as if
σαν and φασὶ could be thus repeated actually, and λέγοντες too be
CRATYLUS. 339
of Lacedzmon, (one) of the famous, had the name of Σοῦς 5
(rusher): for by this appellation the Lacedemonians denomin-
ate arapid rush. Of this hurried motion then Σοφία (wisdom)
signifies ἐπαφὴν “5 (the contact), as if things were continually
earried along. [63.] But the word ᾿Αγαθὸν (good) is wont
to be imposed as the name for that portion of all nature which
is ἀγαστὸν (to be admired): for since all“ existences march
on, there is in some swiftness, but in others slowness pre-
vails. 48 Every thing therefore is not swift, but there is a
part of it ἀγαστὸν (to be admired). To this portion, ἀγαστὸν
(to be admired), is given the appellation ἀγαθὸν (good).*
understood. How superior to this rubbish is the version of -Ficinus—
* quotiens volunt adventantem aliquem et irruentem exprimere, esythe
(id est erupit, prosilit) dicere.’’ Perhaps Plato wrote 6 re πολλαχοῦ λέ-
γουσι, ἂν τύχῃ τις ἑκὼν ἢ περί του ἀρχόμενος προϊέναι, ἐσύθη" φασὶ δὲ Aa-
κωνικῷ γε ἀνδρὶ---εἶναι, i. 6. “ that they often say, should a person, either
willingly or being commanded respecting a thing, happen to go forward
quickly, that ἐσύθη (he rushed). It is said too that there was the name’
of Σοῦς borne by even a Lacedemonian.”’
4 The name of the Lacedemonian was probably Σόξος, not Σοῦς, as
acutely remarked by Valckenaer in Digress. in Theocrit. p. 271, C., who
wonders that Plato should not have so written, as being nearer to Σοφός.
I suspect that he did so. But that when the F became obsolete, its place
was supplied by another letter, just as we find TeowFia altered into Γερω-
σία, as Valckenaer has pointed out himself.
46 By the introduction of the word ἐπαφὴ, Plato shows that he meant
to derive Σοφὸς from σόω and ἀφὴ, for so we must read in lieu of ἐπαφὴ,
where the preposition interferes with the etymology.
“1 Ficin. has “ postquam fluunt omnia,” which leads to ἐπειδὴ πορεύ-
ἔται πάντα τὰ ὄντα, instead of ἐπειδὴ πορεύεται τὰ ὄντα.
1: 48 The Greek is ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν τὸ ταχὺ, ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν"
τούτῳ οὖν δὴ τῷ ἀγαστῷ αὑτὴ ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. This even
Stalbaum confesses to be wretchedly corrupt; and he proposes to read
ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστὸν, τὸ Body. For it appears from
ᾧ 83, that the word θοὸν formed a part of the etymology of the word
ἀγαθὸν, as Heindorf saw acutely. The words there are οἷον νῦν δὴ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν ἔφαμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θοοῦ συγκεῖσθαι. But neither
of those Scholars have told us why any part of the quick moving should
be said to be admired. I suspect then that the Etymol. M. in ᾿Αγαθὸν,
παρὰ τὸ ἄγαν θέειν ἡμᾶς ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγάξζω, has preserved some
words that have dropt out here, and that Plato wrote "Eorw οὖν οὐ τὸ πᾶν
θοὸν, 6 ἐστι ταχὺ, ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστὸν, διὰ τὸ ἄγαν θέειν ἡμᾶς ἐπ᾽
αὐτό" τούτῳ οὖν, ᾧ δή τι τῶν ἀγαστῶν, αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
i, 6: The whole is not θοὸν, that is, quick, but some part of it is to be
admired, through our running quickly to it. Hence to that, to which
there is a portion of the admired, this appellation is given of good—where
I have adopted @ from one MS. and τῶν ἀγαστῶν from another. Fi-
cinus has “Est igitur non omne velox; sed ipsius aliquid agaston; quid
z2
840 CRATYLUS.
But of Δικαιοσύνη (justice) it is easy to conjecture that its name
was imposed on the perception of what is just. But what is
just in itself, it is difficult (to say): for it appears to be
agreed upon by the multitude up to a certain point; but be-
yond it to be disputed. For indeed, such as think that the
universe is on a march, conceive the greatest part of it to be
of such a nature, that it does nothing but yield ; and that, on
this account, there is something pervading the universe ὅθ᾽
which all generated natures are produced; and that this per-
vading thing is most swift and most attenuated: for otherwise
it would be unable to pass through every thing while going
on, unless it were the most attenuated, so as to hold nothing ;
and the most swift, °! so as to make use of the other things as
if in a state of rest.°! Because therefore it governs all other
things διαϊὸν (by going through), it is properly called δίκαιον,
receiving the value of the letter « for the sake of an elegant
pronunciation. [64.] And thus far, as we have just now
stated, the multitude agree with us, that this is the meaning
of the word δίκαιον (just)? But I, Hermogenes, being
eager on this point, have inquired about all these things,
(and heard) * in the ᾿Απόρρητα (Mysteries to be unrevealed),
quidem agathon ipsius agathon nomine declaratur,” where the first
‘‘agathon,” in Bekker’s reprint, is a typographical error for “ agaston,”
found correctly in ed. pr.
# Although συμβαλεῖν might be supplied after χαλεπὸν, yet as Ficinus
has “ difficile cognitu,”’ one may suppose that he found in his MS. either
χαλεπὸν γνῶναι, as in ; 65, οὐ ῥάδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι, or χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν.
50 The Greek is διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναί τι διεξιὸν, which Ficinus
translates ‘‘ perque omne aliquid permanare,” as if his MS. had, what is
found in three others, διὰ δὲ rod παντὸς--- ΡἸαίο wrote διὰ δὲ αὐτὸ (i. e.
τὸ χωρεῖν) τοῦ παντὸς--- “σι
5. 51 1 confess I hardly understand what is meant “ by making use of
the other things as if in a state of rest.” ane
52 That the multitude had any such notion of the meaning of δίκαιον,
Plato has indeed asserted; but “credat Judeus Apelles, Non ego,” to
use the words of Horace. !
58. It seems very strange that Plato should confess that he had heard
any secrets from those who had sworn in the Mysteries not to reveal
them. Perhaps he wrote ἐν dei ποτε ῥητοῖς, * in words ever spoken,” to
which the subsequent ἰδίᾳ, “ privately,” would be properly opposed. Fi-
cinus has “ perscrutatus sum, et in arcanis percepi,”’ as ifaaéppyntra meant
here simply “a secret; ” for the philosophers of antiquity were wont to
make a secret of their doctrines, as may be inferred from Phedon., p, 62,
B. § 16, Thewtet. p. 152, C. § 25, Rep. ii. p. 378, A. In that case
however the subsequent ἰδίᾳ would be superfluous. Ficinus indeed
CRATYLUS. 341
that this 1554 the just and the cause; for that, through which
a thing is generated, is the cause; and some one has said
privately, that it was on this account it was (said) so cor-
rectly. But when, after hearing this, 1 nevertheless quietly
ask them, What, O best of men, is the just, if this is (said)
so correctly ? I seem to inquire beyond what is becoming, and
to leap, as it is said, over the lines dug out;°° for they say
I have sufficiently inquired and heard, and they endeavour,
through the wish to satisfy me, to say, one one thing, and
another another, and they no longer chime-in together. For
one says that the Sun is τὸ δίκαιον (the just); for that by it
alone, διαϊόντα (pervading) and caiovra (burning), it becomes
the guardian of all things. But when, delighted, as having
heard something beautiful, I mention®’ this to another
person, the hearer laughs at me,®* and asks me if I think
there is nothing just amongst men, when the sun has set?
[65. ] Upon my begging then (to know) what the other means,
he says it is fire itself.°? But this is by no means easy to
understand. But another person says, it is not fire itself, but
the heat itself which exists in fire. Another again says, that
he laughs at all these opinions ; but that the just was that in-
tellect of which Anaxagoras speaks ; for he said that this pos-
sesses a power from itself, and is not mixed up with anything,
translates ἐδίᾳ καλεῖν' by “ proprie vocare.” But that would be εὖ, or
καλῶς, or ὀρθῶς, or δικαίως. Hence Buttman proposed to read καὶ
διακὸν καλεῖν, as if διακὸν were derived from δι᾽ ὃ and the origin of δίκαιον:
while C, F. Hermann on Lucian De Hist. Conscrib. p. 21, prefers καὶ
τὸν Δία καλεῖν. Stalbaum’s version is “ et peculiariter justum cause
nomine appellare ;” where his “‘ peculiariter”’ in Latin is quite as unintel-
ligible as ἐδίᾳ in Greek.
5¢ Buttmann would read ταὐτὸ for rovro—And so Taylor had already
translated ‘‘ the same.”
5° This is certainly true; but how δίκαιον could thus be shown to be
the same as, or similar to, αἴτεον, I cannot understand.
5° With this proverb, Leopard. in Emendat. i. 22, compares the ex-
pression in Horace, ‘‘ Sepe trans finem jaculo nobilis expedito.’” Hesych.
Σκάμμα" ὁ ἀγὼν, στάδιον. It was rather the dug-out limit of the arena,
fet a contest took place; answering to the ring of English prize-
ters.
51. Ficinus, “ omnia gubernare,” which leads to πάντα ra ὄντα, instead
of τὰ ὄντα, or else to τὰ ὅλα, found in one MS.
88 Compare Hipp. Maj. § 15 and 32.
5° This was the doctrine of Heracleitus and of Hippasus, as we learn
from Aristot. Metaphys. i. 3. Hzxnp.
342 CRATYLUS.
but that it puts into order (all)® things while pervading all
things. But here, my friend, I am in a much greater diffi-
culty than before I attempted to learn what justice is. But®!
at least this name, for the sake of which we have been making
the inquiry, appears to have been given to it (justice) for
these reasons.
Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these
(notions) from some one, and not to improvize ® them yea
Soc. But what of the rest?
Herm. Not entirely so.
Soc. Hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what
remains, as if I had not heard (what) ®* 1 am saying. What
then remains for us after justice? [66.] I think we have
not yet discussed ᾿Ανδρεία (fortitude); for injustice is evi-
dently a real hinderance to the pervading power ; but "Ay-
δρεία (fortitude) signifies that it is so named from fortitude
in fight. Now a fight, if things flow in reality, is nothing
else than a contrary flowing. If then one takes away the ὃ
from the name ἀνδρία, the name ’Aypeia, which remains, points
out the thing itself.’ Hence it is evident that not the flowing,
which is contrary to every flowing, is ’Avdpéa (fortitude), but
only that which flows contrary to what is just; for (other-
wise)® fortitude would not be praised. In some similar man-
® Ficinus, “exornare omnia per omni penetrantem, ”? who foitia
doubtless in his MS. κοσμεῖν παντὰ τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ao
κοσμεῖν Ta πράγματα.
“1 Ficinus, ‘‘ Ceterum, ut redeamus ad id, cujus gratia disputamus,”
which would lead to the insertion of ἐπανίωμεν after ἐσκοποῦμεν."
® Since two MSS, read οὕτω κεῖσθαι, one would suspect that Ficinus
found the same word likewise in his; for he renders *‘ quale diximus.”
Unless in οὕτω lie hid εὖ ra— ποῦ
58. This is the exact meaning of αὐτοσχεδιάζειν.
65: Ficinus, . quasi que afferam, non audiverim,” which leads to we
αὐκ ἀκηκοὼς ἃ λέγω. Or we may read τὰ ἐπίλοιπα---λέγων. The com-
mon text, ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοὼς λέγω, is unintelligible.
% i.e. τοῦ διαϊόντος, which τὸ δίκαιον was said to possess, and from
which it was feigned to be derived.
Tn lieu of this inelegant repetition of ἀνδρείας, Ficinus has sitegly
“Andria in pugna versatur,” as if his MS. had ἀνδρεία δέ ἐστιν ἐν
μάχῃ.
δ᾽ For dypeia is feigned to be formed from avd (back) and pow (flow-
ing).
58. Ficinus has “ neque enim aliter,” absolutely requisite for the Woriae-
Hence it is evident that ἄλλως has dropt out after dv.
CRATYLUS. 3438
ner τὸ ἄρρεν (the male) and ὁ ἀνὴρ (man) (derive their origin)®®
from ἄνω fof (an upward flowing). But Τυνὴ (woman) ap-
pears to me to mean γονὴ (begetting); and τὸ θῆλυ (the fe-
male) seems to be so called from θηλὴ (the pap); but 6nd),
Hermogenes, from causing, as it were, things irrigated to
germinate.
Herm. It appears so, Socrates.
Soc. But the word ϑάλλειν (to germinate) appears to me
to represent the increase of younglings, because it takes place
swiftly and suddenly. Such then has he” imitated by the
name, having fitted it together from ϑεῖν (to run) and ἅλλε-
σθαι (to leap). But do you not perceive that I am carried, as
it were, out of the course, since I have come upon a smooth
(path)? But many words yet remain of those that seem
worthy of attention.
Herm. You speak the truth.
[67.] Soc. One of these is Τέχνη (art), which we must
look into (and see) what it means.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soe. Does not then this signify ἕξιν νοῦ (a habit of thought),
by taking away r, and inserting o between y and ν, and be-
tween ν and n?
Herm. And this in a very poor’! manner, Socrates.
Soc. But do you not know, blessed man, that the names
first formed, are now overlaid by those desirous of travestying
them in a stilted style; and who, for the sake of an elegant
pronunciation, add and take away letters, and twist them in
every way, partly through ornament, and partly through
time? For in the word Κάτοπτρον (mirror), does it not appear
to you that the p has been absurdly introduced? But such
alterations some, I think, make, who care nothing for truth,
© In lien of ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ τινι τούτῳ ἐστὶ τῇ ἄνω poy, where τούτῳ
is perfectly unintelligible, Ficinus has “a simili quodam ducunt originem,
scilicet ab ano rhoe.”’ Perhaps Plato wrote, εἰπὲ, παραπλησίῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ
io’ tori (are equal) τῇ ἄνω ῥοῇ : where εἰπὲ (say thou) lies hid in ἐπεὶ,
found in three MSS., one of which is Gud., that in this dialogue is the
best of all.
_ Edd. οἷόν περ οὖν μεμίμηται, which Stalbaum defends by taking οἷον
in the sense of ὃ, “quod,” as translated by Ficinus. Plato wrote, I
suspect, τῦιόν τι ὁ ἐρῶν μεμιμηται, i. 6. “ He who was about to speak
of some such thing, has imitated "᾿---
| Heindorf quotes γλίσχρως εἰκάζω from Rep. vi. p. 488, A. Ficinus,
“ aride et inculte.”
844 CRATYLUS.
but moulding (prettily) the mouth; so that, after adding
much to the first names, they at length rendered it impossi-
ble for a single man to understand what the name means; as
in the case of the Sphynx, which they call Σφέγξ imstead of
iyi," and so in many others.
Herm. Such is indeed the case, Socrates.
[68.] Soc. Indeed, should any one permit one to add to
names, and take away from them whatever he wishes, there
would be a very easy road; and one might adapt every name
to every thing.
Herm. You speak the truth.
Soc. The truth indeed. But I think that you, who are a
wise president, ought to keep a guard over what is moderate
and the probable.
Herm. I wish I could.
Soc. And I too, Hermogenes, wish it with you. But do
not, O divine man, discuss too accurately, “lest you perfectly
exhaust my force:”™* for I shall ascend to the summit of
what I have said, when, after τέχνην (art), I have considered
μηχανὴν (artifice). For Mnyav) (artifice) seems to me to
mean τὸ ἄνειν (to complete a thing for the most part). For
μῆκος signifies “length.” From both of these, μῆκος (length)
and ἄνειν (to complete), is formed the word μηχανή. But, as
I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our
discourse. For we must inquire what the names of *
(virtue) and Kaxia (vice) mean. Now one of these I do not
as yet see clearly; but the other appears to me to be mani-
fest ; for it chimes-in with all that has been said before. For
in consequence of all’ things moving on, whatever is κακῶς
ἰὸν (moving on badly) will be κακία (bad-moving); but this,
when it subsists in the soul, through its badly moving on to
her concerns, 7° most eminently possesses the appellation of
the whole of depravity. [69.] But that to move on badly,
153 Ficinus has, with more elegance than truth, “ talia—faciunt quod
oris illecebras pluris estimant, quam veritatem.” From whence, how-
ever, I conceive εὖ has dropt out between στόμα and πλάττοντες.
8 On the word Φίγξ, which seems to have been peculiar to Beotia, see
J. Clericus in Hesiod. Theogon. 326.
** Here is a quotation from Homer, II. vi. 265. : ἀρῶ
5. Ficinus, “ tanquam eant omnia,” which leads to ἰόντων πάντων τῶν
πραγμάτων, not merely ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων. a
**—76 Such is Taylor’s translation of the words μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου
CRATYLUS. 845
whatever it is, appears to me to show (itself) in Δειλέα (timid-
ity), which we have not yet discussed, but have passed it
over; although it is proper to consider it, after fortitude.
And we likewise seem to have passed over many other names.
Now δειλία (timidity) means, that the bond of the soul is
strong: for the word λίαν (vehemently) is (applied to)
strength: and hence the vehement and greatest bond of the
soul will be timidity,” just as ἀπορία (want) is an evil, and
every thing, as it seems, which is an impediment to [going
and] marching on.”* To go on badly, then, seems to signify
the marching on in a restrained and shackled manner ; which
when the soul suffers,” it becomes full of κακίας (evil). But
if to such things the name of vice is applicable, the contrary
of this would be ἀρετὴ (virtue), signifying, in the first place,
ease in marching; and, in the next place, that τὴν ῥοὴν (the
ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει τῆς κακίας. Stalbaum’s is, “ hoc a toto maxime appellatur,
hoc est, a pravitate,’ which I hope he could understand. It is above my
comprehension. Ficinus has, “‘communiter prava dicetur,’’ which is
evidently a guess at the meaning.
7 That Plato would thus, after saying in one sentence that timidity is
the greatest bond of the soul, repeat the very same idea in almost the
next sentence, I for one will never believe ; and still less that in deriving
δειλία from δεῖν (to bind) and λίαν (vehemently), he would omit one
half of the etymology; and least of all that he would here assert that
δειλία is τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμὸς, when that is the very proposition to be
proved. There is evidently a lacuna here, which might be thus supplied,
“Now δειλία is some evil of the soul, and signifies, I think, a strong
binding. For δέος (fear), from whence is δεσμὸς, binds the foot, the
tongue, and the mind; and λίαν (vehemently) is applied to strength.
Hence δειλία would be the vehement binding of the 501}. That there
was some allusion to κακὸν here, is evident from the subsequent expres-
sion, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ Kai ἡ ἀπορία κακόν ; and it is equally evident that some
affinity was pointed out between δειλία and δέος, of which the Etymol.
M. says that it is derived, ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσμεύειν" ὁ γὰρ φόβος συνδεῖ τοὺς
πόδας καὶ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος : in lieu of which I have substituted
some words taken from Euripides, probably—Ilédace τε γὰρ γλῶσσάν τε
kai νοῦν δεῖ φόβος, a sentiment it were easy to support by numerous
parallel passages. Instead, however, of endeavouring to follow out the
chain of reasoning, Stalbaum is content to say that ‘‘ Plato derives ridi-
culously δειλέα from δεσμὸς and λίαν, which, if my notions are correct,
Plato did not do; and, even if wrong, no man in his senses would ever
attempt to do.
8 As ἀπορία has an affinity with πορεύεσθαι, it is evident that ἰέναι
καὶ are from a gl.; nor were they in the MS. of Ficinus, whose version
is “ac summatim quodcunque progressus ipsius impedimentum,”’ as if
he had found cai πᾶνως εἰπεῖν, instead of καὶ πᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν.
79. Ficinus renders ἔχῃ by “ subit,’’ which leads to πάσχῃ.
846 CRATYLUS.
flowing) of a good soul is ever let loose ; so that;what always
flows unrestrained and unimpeded, very properly, as it seems,
receives this appellation. [It is right then to call it ]®° ἀειρεέτη.
Perhaps also (some one‘!) may call it αἱρετὴ, as this isa habit
the most eligible.S? But the word is moulded together and
called dper#.8? Perhaps, too, you will say again, that I feign;
but I assert, that if the name of vice is correct, as 1 have
said above, this name of virtue is correct likewise. ©
[70.] Herm. But what does Κακὸν (evil) mean, through
which word you have explained many things previously ἢ 88.
Soc. It appears to me, by Zeus, something strange, and dif-
ficult to conjecture. I bring therefore to this too that
artifice. ἰῇ
Herm. What is that?
Soc. To assert that this name too is something barbaric.
Herm. And you seem to be like a person speaking cor-
rectly. \ But, if it seems good, we will omit ** these; and
endeavour to see in what way the words Καλὸν (beautiful) and
Αἰσχρὸν (base) are well said.
Soc. Αἰσχρὸν (base), then, seems to me just ποὺ to be
very plain as to what it means. For it corresponds with the
preceding remarks. For he who founded names, appears to
me to have throughout found fault with that, which hinders
and restrains things from their flowing; and that he now
8° The words within brackets are rightly omitted by Ficinus. Theyare
evidently an interpolation. They show, however, that Plato wrote εἴληφεν
εὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο Td ὄνομα, ἀειρείτην ; Where εὖ answers to ὀρθῶς. ὁ
81. Ficinus has “ vocet quis,” which leads to λέγει τις. One MS. has
λέγειν, i.e. λέγειν ἦν. Heindorf and Stalbaum understand ὁ éyvo,
της. But nominatives are not to be thus understood at random. ~~ =
82_82 All these words were omitted by Taylor, although found im ΕἸ:
cinus’ version. They ought, however, to be inserted after ἀειρείτη. For
those are the letters moulded together to form ἀρετῇ. Besides, the re-
peated ‘‘ perhaps’”’ ought not to be separated by any extraneous matter...
88. So Stalbaum; and so, long before him, Taylor had correctly.
lated this passage. Penohe
54. This was very clever in Plato; for he was, doubtless, unable to sug-
gest an etymology for κακός. 7
85. Stalbaum agrees with Hartung in his German work on Greek Par-
ticles, i. p. 254, who explains καὶ 67) “jam adeo.”” They did ποὺ know
that Plato wrote cai παιδὶ, “‘ to me even a boy.’ Heindorf quotes Thesms
769, οἶδ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ δὴ πόρον ᾿Εκ τοῦ Παλαμήδους. He should have sug-
gested τόνδ᾽ ἔγωγ᾽ οἶδ᾽ εὖ πόρον---Εοτ καὶ δὴ are never found except ἀπ
the beginning of a sentence. ist *
CRATYLUS. 347
assigned the name ἀεισχοῤῥουν to that which is ἀεὶ ἴσχον ῥοῦν
(ever restraining the flowing). But at present they call it, by
moulding the words together, αἰσχρόν.
Herm. But what is Καλὸν (beautiful) ?
Soc. This is more difficult to understand; ® although he
says that it is a derived only by the harmony and length of
the ov.6
Herm. But how?
Soc. It appears that this name is some appellation for in-
tellect.
Herm. How say you?
[71.] Soe. What think you is the cause of each existing
thing being called by some*’ name? Is it not that which
gives names? :
Herm. Entirely so.
86__86 Such is the literal English translation of Stalbaum’s text—xatroz
λέγει ye αὐτὸ ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ ov παρῆκται, which Stalbaum
thus renders into Latin, “‘ Quanquam τὸ καλὸν dicit numeri tantum gra-
tia ; atque hoc nomen mora syllabe ov est mutatum.”” But what he meant
by those words I confess myself unable to explain. For, 1. λέγει wants
its nominative. 2. Even if λέγει ἁρμονίᾳ could mean “ dicit numeri
gratia,” καὶ μήκει would not be thus separated from ἁρμονίᾳ, especially
if μήκει means, as Buttmann and Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, un-
derstand it, the metrical quantity of a syllable. 3. A nominative is re-
quired for παρῆκται : and lastly, παρῆκται does not mean ‘‘ mutatum ;”’
for παῤάγειν is, etymologically speaking, “ to derive.’’ Correctly then
did Heindorf conceive the whole passage to be most obscure and corrupt.
And so too did Buttmann; who, thinking that καλὸν had some affinity
with καλεῖν, wished to read καίτοι τοῖς λέγουσί ye αὐτὸ ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον
καὶ μήκει τοῦ ov παρῆκται, i.e. “although by those pronouncing it there
is a change only in the harmony and length of the vowel o,”’ which was
written and called in the time of Plato ov: and hence καλὸν was origin-
ally καλοῦν, a notion for which Buttmann was indebted, I suspect, to
ἐς bach ethane τὸ καλῶ ἐκ τοῦ καλεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ExasTor, ὡς
ἀγαθὸν, ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἄγαν θέομεν. Creuzer however seems to have been nearer
the mark in his Prolegom. in Plotin. Περὲ Κάλλους, p. xvii-, where he
wishes to read μήκει Tov νοῦ παρῆκται. For, says he, to the question of
Hermogenes, What is καλόν ἢ Socrates replies by saying, “ It is difficult to
understand. But by those who pronounce the word, it is turned aside
from vod by its harmony and length.” . For thus the mention of νοῦ is
connected with that of διανοίας just afterwards; while both are subse-
quently united. By following then this clue it is easy to suggest that
Plato wrote something to this effect—xairot λέγουσί γ᾽ ὅτι, αὐτοῦ ἡ ap-
μονία μόνον μὴ κάμῃ μήκει, τὰ vou περιῴρηται----“ And yet they say that
the-letters vov have been clipt off, merely that its harmony might not la-
bour from its length.” For the word was originally καλόνου.
87 Stalbaum would insert re after κληθῆναι----
948 CRATYLUS.
Soc. Will not then this (cause) be the intellect either of
gods, or men, or of both?
Herm. Yes.
Soc. That then which calls things, and the beautiful, are
the same, this 88 intellect.
Herm. It appears so.
Soc. Whatever things then mind and intellect effect, these
are to be praised ; but what they do not, are to be blamed?
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Now the medicinal business produces medical results ;
and the carpenter’s business carpentry results: or how say
you?
Herm. I (say) thus.
Soc. And the beautiful produces things beautiful ?
Herm. It must needs do so.
Soc. But this, as we have said, is intellect.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Τὸ καλὸν (the beautiful) then will be properly the
appellation of that φρόνησις (prudence) which produces such
things as we call beautiful, and which we embrace.
Herm. It appears so.
Soc. What then remains of such like names?
Herm. Those that are conversant with the ἀγαθὸν (good),
and the καλὸν (beautiful), such as Συμφέροντα (things condu-
cive), and Λυσιτελοῦντα (profitable), and Ὠφέλιμα (advantage-
ous), and Kepdadéa (gainful), and their contraries.
[72.] Soc. You may then by reflecting find rd συμφέρον (the
conducive) from the previous remarks; for it appears to be
a kind of a brother to science. For it exhibits nothing but the
motion of the soul in conjunction with things ; and that what
results from some such a thing should be called συμφέροντα
and σύμφορα (conducive), from συμπεριφέρεσθαι (to be carried
round in conjunction), is reasonable.*®
Herm. It is reasonable.
8 I cannot understand ταὐτόν ἐστι τοῦτο διάνοια. I could ταὐτόν ἐστί
mov τῇ διανοίᾳ---ἰ. 6. “it is the same with intellect.”
8° By adding here ἔοικε with Heusde, and repeating Ἔοικε μέντοι in the
answer of Hermogenes, we shall not only support the syntax, but restore
Plato’s usual method of uniting μέντοι with the word repeated in the
answer, as I have shown on Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2, and to the
there quoted I could now add many more. Here μέντοι might easily have
dropt out between ἔοικεν and rd—
CRATYLUS. 349
Soe: But κερδαλέον (gainful) is from κέρδος (gain); and to
him, who puts a ν instead of ἃ ὃ in this name, it points out
what it means: for it thus gives, after another manner, the
name for “good ;” for as it is mingled with ® and pervades
all things, he who assigned it this name expressed its power,
and thus, by placing ὃ instead of v, he pronounced it κέρδος."}
Herm. But what is λυσιτελοῦν (profitable) ?
Soc. It seems,°? Hermogenes, not as hucksters use it,
should any one ° settle an expenditure, does it seem good to
me to understand τὸ λυσιτελοῦν (the profitable) ; but being the
swiftest® thing in existence, it does not suffer things to stand
still, nor the rushing-on to obtain an end of being borne
along, and to stand still® and to cease; but always °° frees it,
99 Ficin. “ omnibus immiscetur diffusum per omnia,” as if he had found
in his MS. κεράννυται πᾶσι, πάντα διεξιὸν instead of κεράννυται ἐς
πάντα διεξιὸν----
% Since by changing ὃ into ν, κέρδος would become κέρνος, ἃ word
would be formed which Plato must have known never existed in Greek,
the derivation was feigned, I suspect, with the view of ridiculing some-
thing equally absurd propounded by other etymologists.
% Enamoured, as usual, with a faulty expression, Stalbaum endea-
yours to defend the union of ἔοικε with the subsequent μοι δοκεῖ. Had he
remarked that for δὲ ri δή, in the question of Hermogenes, the best MS.
Gud. reads τῇδ᾽ ---6 would perhaps have seen that Plato wrote Λυσιτελ-
οὖν δὲ τί; SQK. τῇδ᾽ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες" i. 6. “Τί seems to be in
this way.”
98. Here again Stalbaum would mislead an incautious reader by his as-
sertion that κάπηλος is to be understood before dodgy. For there τις
has evidently dropt out after ἐὰν. Nor is this the only error ; for the ex-
pression is not ἀπολύειν, but λύειν τἀνάλωμα, as shown by Diphilus in
Athen. vi. p. 227, F.*He ai πρόσοδοι λύουσι τἀάναλωματα. And were the
fact otherwise, ἀπὸ could have no part here, where Plato is explaining the
word λυσιτελοῦν, not ἀπολυσιτελοῦν. Nor could τὸ ἀνάλωμα be intro-
duced here without showing its affinity in meaning with τέλος. He
wrote, I suspect, ἐάν τις τέλος, 6 ἐστιν ἀνάλωμα, πᾶν λύῃ. For Etymol.
M. has Τελος--δαπάνημα. Besides it is only after the whole bill has
been settled, that a tradesman can count up his profit,
* How the profitable can be the swiftest thing m existence I must leave
for others to explain; and even if it were the quickest, it would be un-
able to keep every thing in motion, unless it had a weight, or rather a
momentum, which in mechanics represents the velocity multiplied into
the mass of matter.
95 Edd. τὴν φορὰν τοῦ φέρεσθαι. But that Plato would thus unite
τὴν φορὰν and τοῦ φέρεσθαι, and repeat here στῆναι after the preceding
ἵστασθαι, others may, but I will not, believe. Correctly has Ficinus,
“neque permittit lationem telos (id est finem) progressionis accipere at-
que cessare,” which leads to τὴν φορὰν πορεύεσθαι καὶ παύεσθαι.
350 CRATYLUS.
should any end attempt to be produced,” and renders it un-
ceasing and immortal. In this way it seems to me that
λυσιτελοῦν (the profitable) obtained the reputation of ἀγαθὸν
(the good); for τὸ τῆς φορᾶς λύον τὸ τέλος (that which dis-
solves the end of rushing) was called λυσιτελοῦν. [78.1 But
τ᾽ Ὠφέλιμον (useful) is a foreign name which Homer himself
often uses, τῷ ὀφέλλειν. “1 But this is the appellation ΜῊ in-
creasing and making.®*
Herm. But how stand the contraries of these ?
Soc. Such of these as express a negation, there is no need,
it appears to me, to go through.
Herm. But what are they?
Soc. The non-conducive, and useless, and unproistabile: and
the non-lucrative.
Herm. You speak the truth.
Soc. But Βλαξερὸν (hurtful), and Ζημιῶδες (noxious).
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. Now τὸ βλαξερὸν (the hurtful), he says,® is that which
is βλαπτὸν τὸν ῥοῦν (hurting the flowing). But βλάπτον means
τὸ βουλόμενον ἅπτειν (that which wishes to bind); and arrew
(to bind), is the same as δεῖν: but this he blames! every
%_% Edd. ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ λύει αὐτῆς, ἄν τι ἐπιχειρῇ τέλος ἐγγί
which words, says Stalbaum, are to be thus resolved—dAN’ de ὕει, ἂν
τέλος τι αὐτῆς ἐπιχειρῇ ἐγγίγνεσθαι : as if Plato would have thus
ated αὐτῆς from τέλος, and have used ἐγγίγνεσθαι for the simple’ 7
σθαι. Ficinus has, “‘sed semper solvit ab illa fugatque, si quis
superveniat.” Plato wrote, I suspect, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ λύει αὐτῇ ἄν ye
τέλους ἐγγὺς γίγνεσθαι, i.e. “ but ever does what is good for it (r7 ?;
should it attempt to be nearits end.” For thus λύει αὐτῇ is
τέλη λύει φρονοῦντι in CEd. T. 324.
*’—* Such is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, Ὠφέλεμον δὲ,
ξενικὸν τὸ ὄνομα, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κέχρηται, τῷ ae ~ But
Homer never uses ὠφέλιμον, although he frequently does
wrote εἰ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κέχρηται τῷ ὀφελλέιν. Nor is this the
only error. For the article before ὄνομα is superfluous, ©
ξενικόν τι, as in ᾧ 70, βαρβαρικόν τι, and ξενικόν τι in § 77, and BapBape-
κόν Trin § 82, where many MSS. omit τι.
% Instead of ποιεῖν Heindorf suggested, even with the approbation of
Stalbaum, πιαένειν, of which the interpretation would be πίονα ποιεῖν.
9. Both Heind. and Stalb. understand ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης before λέγει.
But as one MS. has λέγειν, and εἶναι is perfectly ore we must read,
what Plato wrote—oipat λέγειν, “1 think it means’
100 Here again Heind. and Stalb. supply ὁ ἀνυματοθίνος before Nye
But why the founder of the name should find fault with the notion that
drew καὶ δεῖν mean the same, we are not told. Since then MS. Gud.
CRATYLUS. 351
where... He, therefore, who wishes ἅπτει» ῥοῦν (to bind a flow-
ing), will be most properly called βουλαπτεροῦν ; but it appears
to me, that, being spoken elegantly, it (becomes) βλαβερόν.
Herm, A. variety of names come out, Socrates, to your
view ; and you just-now appeared to me to have played a pre-
lude with your mouth, as it were, of the melody belonging to
Athena, while you pronounced this name βουλαάπτεροῦν."
Soc. Lam not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but those
who founded the name.
[74.] Herm. You speak:the truth; but what can the word
ζημιῶδες (noxious) be ?
Soc. What can ζημιῶδες (noxious) be ἢ Behold, Hermogenes,
how I shall speak the truth by saying, that through adding
and taking away letters, persons vary so very much the
meanings of names, that by turning then aside sometimes
only a little they cause words to have the very contrary
meaning. As in τὸ δέον (the needful). For I understood,
and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am
about to say to you, that? this new speech of ours, itself the
beautiful, has turned round τὸ δέον and ζημιῶδες, (so as) to in-
dicate the contrary,? and causing to disappear what they
has ἁπανταχοῦ, I suspect Plato wrote τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰπόντα γ᾽ οὐ ψέγει τις"
To—i. e. “‘ And no one blames a person so speaking.”
1 How Socrates could be feigned to have played a prelude with his
mouth to the hymn of Athena, the goddess of wisdom, by his absurd
etymology of βλαβερὸν, I cannot understand ; unless it be said that Plato
is here, as elsewhere, speaking ironically. Instead of τῆς ᾿Αθηνάας,1
suspect the author wrote τῆς σῆς ᾿Ανειλειθύιας. For as Socrates was the
son of ἃ midwife, and professes, in Theet. p. 151, B. § 22, to practise in
the case of the mind, what his mother did in that of the body, the mid-
wife’s art, the tutelary deity of his family would be not ᾿Αθηνᾶ but
᾿Ανειλείθυια. But as Euripides in Ion, 452, thus identifies the two,
Σὲ τὰν ὠδίνων λοχίαν ᾿Ανειλέιθυιαν ἐμὰν ᾿Αθανᾶν ἱκετεύω, we might
perhaps read here σῆς ᾿Αθηνᾶς ᾿Ανειλειθυίας.
2—? Such is the literal translation of the Greek ; where, says Heindorf,
there is a ridicule of the new speech in the words ἡ καλὴ αὕτη. But why
Plato should introduce this ridicule, neither he, nor Stalbaum, who fol-
lows him, has deigned to explain. Besides, although Stalbaum asserts
that περιέτρεψε καὶ μηνύειν is the same as περιέτρεψεν ὥστε καὶ μηνύειν,
no one conversant with the language will admit the assertion for a mo-
ment....And even if such an ellipse would preserve the syntax, still the
sense would be none. For we have still to learn what is the contrary
meaning, which the new speech attributes to the words δέον and ζημιῶδες.
Lastly, in the phrase “to turn round to the contrary,” correct Greek
would require ἐς τοὐναντίον wepiirpeve. Unless I am egregiously mis-
᾿
352 CRATYLUS.
mean: but the ancient speech points out what both these
words mean.
Herm. How say you?
Soc. I will tell you. Our ancestors you know very fre-
quently used the « and 6, and not the least the women, who
particularly preserved the ancient tongue.* But now, instead
of the «, they perversely use either ε or ἡ, and ζ instead of ὃ,
as being more stately.
Herm. But how? ὶ
Soc. Just as, for instance, the most ancient men calle
ἡμέρα (day) ἱμέρα, and some of them ἑμέρα ; but those of the
present times ἡμέρα.
[75.] Herm. This is so.
Soc. You know then that this ancient name alone points
" out what was in the mind of the founder; for, because light
is wont to emerge from darkness upon men pleased with and
desiring its beams,* on this account they called day ἱμέρα.
Herm. It appears so.
Soc. But as it is now spoken in high-flown language, you
can by no means understand what ἡμέρα means; although
some think that day is called on this account ἡμέρα, because it
renders things ἥμερα, gentle.
Herm. So it appears to me.
Soe. And you likewise know that the ancients called Ζυγὸν
(a yoke) Avoyow.5
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. Now ζυγὸν indicates nothing. But that which exists
for the two things together, for the sake of a binding, is justly
taken, Plato wrote—1) μέν νέα φωνὴ κεκαλλιεπημένη οὐκ εὖ ἐς τοὐναντίον
περιέστρεψεν, ἃ μηνύει νῦν ἕν, τὸ δέον καὶ ζημιῶδες, i. 6. the new speech,
having been beautified by words, has not well turned round to the con-
trary the words δέον and ζημιῶδες, which now signify one thing : ” where
I have adopted περιέστρεψε from three MSS., and μηνύει from one; and
been led to κεκαλλιεπημένη by κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους in Apolog. p.
17, B., and οὐ καλλιεπούμεθα in Thucyd. vi. 83, which Valckenaer, in
Diatrib, p. 291, so beautifully elicited from οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἑπόμεθα.
3 The same thing took place in Italy, as remarked by Cicero de Orator.
iii. 12, “Facilius mulieres incorruptam antiquitatem conservant ser-
monis.”’
= pe sch. Prom. 23, ἀσμένῳ δὲ coi—Ilaxvny ἑῴαν ἥλιος σκεδᾷ
παλιν. ᾿
5 Schneider would read δυαγὸν from Etymol. Ζυγὸς παρὰ τὸ δύε
ἄγειν δυαγὸς, καὶ ἐν συγκοπῇ δυγὸς καὶ ζυγός.
a
CRATYLUS. 353
called dvoyév. But it is now ζυγόν. And there are many
others so circumstanced.
Herm. It appears so.
Soe. In this way then at first the word δέον (binding), when
it is thus spoken, signifies the contrary to all the names con-
nected with ἀγαθὸν (good). For this name being a species
of the good, appears to be a binding of, and hinderance to, a
rushing-on, as being the brother of βλαβερὸν (noxious).
[16.1 Herm. It appears, Socrates, to be very much so.
Soc. But not if you use the ancient name; which it is
likely was founded with much more propriety than the pre-
sent one. And it will agree ® with those former good names,
if you substitute as of old« for «; for διὸν Τ and not δέον,
signifies that good, which (the founder of names)® praises.
And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself ;
but the names δέον, ὠφέλιμον, λυσιτελοῦν, κερδαλέον, ἀγαθὸν,
συμφέρον, εὔπορον: (easily-going,) all appear the same; signi-
fying by different names that }°what adorns and pervades
every where (is) praised,'° but that what detains and binds,
is blamed. And indeed, in the name ζημιῶδες, if, according
to the ancient speech, you substitute ὃ for Z, it will appear to
5. Ficinus, “ consenties.”” But ὁμολογήσει is not the fut. med. 2 pers.,
but fut. indic. 3 pers., and agrees with ὄνομα understood, as Heind. was
the first to remark.
7 As διὸν at no period was written for dtidy, it is evident that Plato
bby τὸ ἰῶτα ἀποδιδῷς dic. For thus δὲς might easily drop out after
-0@e.
5 Ficinus alone has preserved the nominative to ἐπαινεῖ in his “ quod
semper nominum laudat institutor.’’ But not the name-founder alone
praises the good, but every one else. Hence I suspect we ought to read
ὕπερ ἀεὶ πᾶς ἐπαινεῖ, similar to πανταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον, a little be-
low. Stalbaum, with his so-called best MSS., reads δὴ and omits AEI, of
which AH is the evident corruption.
® The introduction of εὔπορον seems strange here ; for neither before
nor subsequently is there given any etymology of it, as there is of all the
other words; and though εὐπορία is mentioned in § 77, yet there it has
come from a gloss.
10_ Ficinus has “aliquid per omnia penetrans, omniaque perorans,
idque ubique laudatum,”’ which leads, as Heindorf saw, to καὶ διϊὸν
πάντα, πάνταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον. Instead however of diidy, nearly all
the MSS. read καὶ ὃν, from whence Bekker elicited καὶ ἐὸν, with the ap-
probation of Stalbaum; who forgot that the whole chain of reasoning
imperiously demands διϊὸν, of which οἷον, found in two MSS., preserves
the vestige. For and o are constantly confounded, as shown by Koen
on Gregor. de Dialect. p. 120, ed. ἘΝ
Α
354 CRATYLUS.
you that this name was applied to δοῦντε τὸ ἰὸν (binding
that which is going), and was called δημιῶδες. δι ἐγ 9
[11]. 1 Herm. But, Socrates, what is Ἡδονὴ (p leseuie);
and Λύπη (pain), and ᾿Ἐπιθυμέία (desire), and such like
names. ao
Soc. They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Her-
mogenes. For ἡδονὴ (pleasure) seems to have obtained this
appellation as an action tending towards ὄνησις (enjoyment) ;
but the ὃ was added, that it might be called ἡδονὴ instead of
ἡονή.13 But λύπη (pain) seems to be so named from the διά-
λυσις (dissolution) 15. of the body, which the body undergoes
in that suffering: and Avia (grief), as impeding τὸ iévac
(going) :!* but ᾿Αλγηδὼν (torture) appears to me to be some
foreign word, and to be so called from ἀλγεινὸς (torturing).
But Ὀδύνη (anxiety) appears to be called from the ἔνδυσις (in-
gress of pain). But ᾿Αχθηδὼν (heaviness of heart) is clear even
to 811 15 that it is a name assimilated to the heaviness of rush-
ing: |" (for ἄχθος is “a burden,” and ἰὸν “a thing moving”)!
But Χαρὰ (joy) seems to be called from the ὃ διάχυσις (dif-
fusion) and Εὐπορία (easy going) of the flowing 18 of the soul;
but Τέρψις (delight) was derived from τερπνὸν (pleasant);
but τερπνὸν was so called from being assimilated to πνοὴ
τ Compare Etymol. Ζημία---ἢ δημία τις οὖσα ἡ πολιτική.
12. For Plato thus supposes the existence of ὄνη, the root of ὄνημει.
13 On λύπη, as if it were derived from λύειν, and its affinity with διά-
λυσις, Heind. refers to Wyttenbach upon Plutarch, S. N. V. p. 103. But
even he failed to see that, as Chrysippus, quoted by Cicero in Tuse. Disp.
iii. 25, considered λύπη to be λύσις totius hominis, Plato perhaps wrote
here ἔσχει τις avoc, not ἴσχει τὸ σῶμα : where σῶμα is inelegantly re-
peated after τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος. Stalbaum would read ij—ioyxet,
and render ἴσχει “keep i in, restrain.’
** Hence Etymol. ᾿Ανία---δύναται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰέναι γίνεσθαι" apae-
διστικὸν γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀνία.
15. That Plato derived ἀλγηδὼν from ἀλγεινὸν, and then lost all sight
of -δὼν, it is impossible to believe. He might have written ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄλγη
δύνειν; just as he derives ὀδύνη from ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης. ‘
16. The expression “ even to all’’ is a manifest absurdity. Plato wrote
καὶ παιδὶ, “even to a child.”—The word παντὶ without καὶ would have
been intelligible. There is a similar error in Sympos. p. 187, A. § 14,
-ἰ The words within lunes have been found only in Ficinus’ bee.)
ectthos enim onus est; ion vero pergens.”
1818 By comparing Etymol. Xaipw, παρὰ τὸ xo τὸ διαχέω, π΄ ἘΡΉΜΩΝ
χαίρω, one would have expected χαρὰ, δὲ τῇ χύσει καὶ εὐροίᾳ τῆς ἧς
So that χαρὰ might be derived from yéw and εὔροια: for most ass
it could not be from διάχυσις and εὐπορία.
CRATYLUS. 855
(the breath), creeping through the soul; it would be there-
fore justly called ἕρπ-νουν 15 (mind-creeping), but in time it was
deflected into τερπνόν. [78.] But Evgpoctvy (hilarity) wants
nothing to explain “the why” of its denomination ; for it is ob-
vious to all, that it received its name, εὐφεροσύνη, in strict
justice from the soul being εὖ (well) συμφέρεσθαι (borne along)
with all things; nevertheless we call it εὐφροσύνη. Nor is
᾿Επιθυμία (desire) difficult : 2! for it is plain that this name was
applied to a power going on to ϑυμὸς (anger). But ϑυμὸς (an-
ger) would have its appellation from ϑύσεως (raging) and ζέσεως
(boiling). And again, Ἵμερος (desire) was so called from ῥοῦς
(a flowing) vehemently drawing the soul. For because ἱέμενος
pet (it flows urged on), and is desirous of things, and thus
strongly draws the soul through the sending-forth of its
flowing, it is, from the whole of this power, called ἵμερος.
Moreover Πόθος (regret) is so called signifying ** that there
is (something) of desire not present, and of a stream,” but
from that which is elsewhere, and absent. 7? From whence
it is called πόθος (regret), a feeling which is then called ἵμερος
(desire), when that is present, for which there is a wish.”? [79.]
But”Epwe (love), because it flows inwardly from without,™
19 Ficin. “ merito vocaretur empnum, id est inspirans,’’ this MS. there-
fore read ἕμπφγουν.
2 Ficinus has strangely misunderstood this passage; ‘‘hoc nomen
trahitur ab eo quod dicitur eu, id est bene, et sympheresthe, id est una
sequi, quasi dicatur anima bene res assequi.”’
21 The ellipse, supplied by Stalbaum, is seen in the version of Ficinus—
‘neque difficile est assignare quid epithymia—sibi velit.”” But whether
he found the corresponding Greek words, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιθυμία χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν
ὅτι βούλεται, in his MS. is another question.
22__22 To get rid of the nonsense in the words σημαίνων ob τοῦ παρόν-
τὸς ἱμέρου τε Kai ῥεύματος, Stalbaum would reject ἱμέρου re καὶ ῥεύματος
as an interpolation. But why they were interpolated he does not, for he
could not, tell. Ficinus has “‘ quod sane presentem suavitatem non respi-
cit, quemadmodum himeros, sed absentem ardet.” Perhaps Plato wrote
σημαίνων οὔ του παρόντος εἶναι ἵμερόν ye κατὰ ῥεῦμάτι ὅσον, i. 6. “ sig-
nifying that there is not of something present the desire, how great,
rushing stream-like.”’. Stalbaum indeed fancies that πόθος was derived by
Plato from πόθι, not aware that rd ὑπαῖθον had probably dropt out be-
tween ἀπόντος and ὅθεν. For both the desire of something present, and
the regret of something absent, carry away the mind, as with a torrent,
or inflame it, as with a torch.
%—% All the words between the figures were omitted by Taylor, al-
though found in the version of Ficinus.
24 The same doctrine broached εἰ the ΒΆΒΟΠΩ, p: 251, Β. § 68.
2a
356 CRATYLUS.
and because this flowing is not the property of him who
possesses it, but is introduced through the eyes, was on this
account called of old ἔσρος, from ἐσρεῖν (to flow towards) ; but
at present it is called ἔρως, through the change of w into
0. But what say you” shall we still consider?
Herm. What does Δόξα (opinion), and such-like names,
seem to you (to signify).
Soc. Δόξα (opinion) was denominated either from δίωξις
(pursuit), in which the soul proceeds, while pursuing its
knowledge as to how things exist; or else from τόξου βολῆ
(the darting of an arrow) ;*" and to this it seems more like.
Hence Οἴησις (opinion) chimes in with this; 39 for it seems to
be like ἱέσις (a sending-forth) of the soul to all things, when
it is showing to those in doubt what each is in reality.2® For
*5 Beck was/the first to remark that there is some error here.
It should have been stated that ἔσρος first became ἔρος by throwing out
the σ, and then ἔρως by the change of ο into ὦ.
35. Ficinus has “\Verum quid deinceps considerandum precipis.” From
whence Heindorf elicited ri ἔτι σὺ Aéyeceo—Stalbaum still sticks to οὐ,
although he confesses that, if od be retained, ἔτι should follow σκοπῶμεν.
27 That Plato would thus compare δόξα with the shooting of arrows,
without assigning some reason for the comparison, it is impossible to
believe. I suspect there is a lacuna here, which it would be easy to
supply.
a in lieu of τοῦτο in some MSS., Bekker has edited from others τούτῳ,
which I cannot understand: while instead of μᾶλλον two MSS. read
μάλιστα. I suspect that Plato wrote τοῦτο τὸ βαλλόμενον εὖ,
in allusion to the preceding βολῇ. We should say in English, “ This
appears to be the best shot.” Or we may read κάλλιστα, which is per-
petually confounded with μάλιστα. 13
2929 Such is the meaning of the words which Plato wrote, I suspect
--ἰέσεσι yap τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῷ
ὄντι ὃν, δηλούσης τοῖς ἀπόροις, ἔοικεν εἷναι, in lieu of which Bekker’s
edition has—oiow γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν πρᾶγμα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν
ὄντων δηλοῦση προσέοικεν. But of the strange word οἷσιν, which some
have attempted to derive from οἴσω, the fut. of φέρω, the variations in
MSS, are very remarkable. Some read οἴσειν ἴσως, others οὖσιν ἴσως,
and others εἶσιν ἴσως. Some again, omitting ἴσως, have οἷσιν or εἶσιν, and
ει οι
some have both, οἷσιν, or εἶσιν : one reads of εἰσιν, and ὁπ6 ἴση. Hein-
dorf acutely saw that the word, ἵεσις, derived from ἱέναι, lay hid here ;
for thus ἵεσις would be similar in meaning to βολή. But beyond this he
did not venture to go. Stalbaum has however not only adopted the cor-
rection, which he calls “ egregious,” but edited τὸ πρᾶγμα for πᾶν
πρᾶγμα, from seven MSS., without deigning to explain how ἕκαστον
could thus follow τὸ πρᾶγμα, or, if in ἕκαστον there is no reference to τὸ
πρᾶγμα, what is the meaning of rd πρᾶγμα ; and still less has he shown
CRATYLUS. 357
80 just as Βουλὴ (counsel) is to βολὴ (shooting), so βούλεσθαι (to
wish), which signifies τὸ ἐφέεσθαι (to desire), is to βουλεύεσθαι
(to consult).2° For! all these in following δόξα (opinion),
appear to be certain resemblances of βολὴ (shooting) ;*? just
again as, on the contrary, ᾿Αβουλέα (a want of counsel), appears
to be the mishap *of a person neither shooting, nor obtaining
that at which he shot, and what he wished, and about what
he deliberated, and what he desired.®3
[80.] Herm. **You seem to me, Socrates, to have just now
introduced these names rather thickly and rapidly.
Soe. For I now wish an end.*4 But I wish then still to
go through *Avayxny (necessity), which comes in order after
those, and also 'Ἑκούσιον (voluntary).*4
what he understands by δηλούσῃ προσέοικε, or how προσέοικε could be
used here for the simple εὔικε.
so__30 Here again, aided partly by Stalbaum, I have been able to restore
what Plato wrote—Worep γὰρ ἔχει ἡ βουλὴ πρὸς τὴν βολὴν, καὶ τὸ
βούλεσθαι, ὃ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει, πρὸς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι, in lieu of the un-
intelligible ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ βουλὴ πρὸς τὴν βολὴν καὶ τὸ βουλεσθαι τὸ
ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει καὶ βουλεύεσθαι : where Stalbaum was the first to see
that to preserve the balance of the sentence πρὸς must be inserted in the
second clause. With regard to the affinity between βούλεσθαι and
βουλεύεσθαι, Shakspeare has something similar in his well-known—
** Harry, thy wish was father to the thought.”
3! Taylor has properly introduced * for,”’ to preserve the connexion of
the sentences.
% As MS. Gud. has τῆς Wuyij¢ instead of τῆς βολῆς, Heindorf
wished to read τῆς βολῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.
3333 Even Heindorf failed to see the absurdity of the present text.
For most assuredly, it cannot be said of him who does not shoot at all,
that he misses what he shot at; nor would Plato have been guilty of a
tautology in writing οὗ ἐφίετο after ὃ ἐβούλετο : unless it be said that οὗ
ἐφίετο is to be rendered “at what he aimed;” but even then it would be
unnecessary after περὲ οὗ ἐβουλεύετο. Common sense evidently leads to
—* of a person neither shooting where he intended, nor hitting what he
wished, or, obtaining what he did not desire;’’ according to the saying in
English, ‘‘ He shot at a pigeon, and killed a crow ;” and, “ He shot ata
barn-door, and missed the barn.”? ‘The Greek then would be ὡς οὐ
βαλόντος του, οἵ ἐβουλεύετο, οὐδὲ τυχόντος, ob ἐβούλετο, ἢ Kai, οὗ ἐφίετ᾽
οὔ, λαβόντος.
34... 8..Α}} within the figures are generally assigned to Hermogenes ; in
Ald., to Socrates, from τέλος to the end, which Stalbaum after Stephens
adopts, and reads θέλω for θεῷ, or, as it is written in one MS., ody θεῷ,
as Ficinus found in his MS. likewise. For his version is, “" Quare finis
sit jam favente deo.”” But as scarcely more than two-thirds of the
dialogue has been gone through, there would be scarcely any allusion here
to its termination ; and even if there were, correct Greek would require
358 CRATYLUS.
Soc. Now τὸ ἑκούσιον (voluntary) signifies τὸ εἶκον (the
yielding), and not the beating-against; but, ®as I say, εἶκον
τῷ ἰόντι (yielding to what is going on) would be shown by
this name, which exists according to βούλησις (the will).*
But τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (the necessary), and ἀντέτυπον (the beating-
against), the being contrary to the will, would be connected
with ἁμαρτία (error), and ἀμαθία (ignorance).** But they are
τὸ τέλος. Some one says Stephens wished to read Oe, “ video ;”’ but
θεῶ in that sense is found only in the middle voice. Hence he
εἰς τέλος θέω, ‘ad finem propero,” i. 6. “1 am hastening to the end.”
But that could be no reason for Socrates introducing a number of names.
He would rather have cut short his speech. Abresch. in Auctor. Thucyd.
p. 306, suggests τέλος θεῶ, “look to the end.”’? He ought rather to have
proposed θὲς es—But the imperative could not thus follow γάρ. Plato
wrote, I suspect, βέλος γὰρ ἤδη ἴσον θείῳ, ‘‘ For I have witnessed a bolt
equal to a divine one.”’ And thus there would be an allusion to the βολὴ
just spoken of, and to the fact that in a storm the bolts of heaven fall
fast and thick.*’ So in Gad. C. 1462, we must read οὐρανοῦ yap ἀστραπὴ
φλέγει πόλον, μάταν ἐφεῖσ᾽ οὐ βέλος" δέδια δ᾽ ---ποὶ φλέγει πάλιν" τί μὰν
ἀφήσει τέλος : where βέλος is due to London ed. B., noticed by Elmsley;
while μάταν ἐφεῖσ᾽ οὐ βέλος may be compared with the Homeric οὐχ
ἅλιον βέλος, and θεῖον βέλος. After this compliment, Socrates returns
to the subject, by saying ᾿Ανάγκην δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, not οὖν ἔτι βούλομαι : to
which Hermogenes rejoins, Καὶ βούλομαι. At least by such ἃ remodel-
ling of the speeches, can we understand the course of the dialogue.
3585 ] cannot understand how after τὸ εἶκον Plato could add ἀλλ᾽
λέγω εἶκον : still less how εἶκον could stand here by itself; and least of
all, what Heindorf was the first to notice, how a name could be said to be
produced according to will in the abstract. Ficinus has, “ Ecusion equi-
dem est icon, id est cedens, neque renitens. Hoc si quidem nomine
declaratur icon ionti, id est, cedens eunti, quodve ex voluntate perficitur.”
He therefore did not find ὥσπερ λέγω in his MS., or finding it, designedly
omitted it, as being unintelligible. Heindorf proposed to read ὀνόματε
Tov—ytyvopévov. From which I do not see what we are to gain. Per-
haps Plato wrote τὸ μὲν οὖν ἑκούσιον τὸ εἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀντίτυπον ἣν τῷ
κατὰ τὴν βούλησίν του γιγνομένῳ" καλῶς ἄρα. λέγω, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι τι
δεδηλωμένον ἂν εἴη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι---ἶ. 6. “ The word ἑκούσιον (volun.
tary) means yielding to, and not beating against, that which exists ac-
cording to the will of some one. I say then that by this name would be
correctly indicated any thing yielding to what is going οὐ." This, I flat-
ter myself, is something more fit to be read, than the rubbish which Stal-
baum attempts to explain by asserting that the words τῷ κατὰ τὴν βού-
Anow γιγνομένω are added after τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι as an epexegesis to,
and having the same meaning as, τῷ ἑκουσίῳ, If then I have correctly
restored here κατὰ τὴν βοὐλησίν του, we must read just afterwards 7
τὴν βοὐλησίν του---- jee
36. This is said because, according to Plato’s theory, no one errs except_
unwillingly or unwittingly. bait
CRATYLUS. 359
likened to a going along κατὰ ἄγκη (gorges); because being
difficult to pass, and rugged and thick (with bushes), they im-
pedea going-on. And hence, perhaps, ἀνάγκη (necessity) was
so called from its resemblance to a journey through a gorge.
But as long as our strength remains, let us not give up the
journey. Do not you then give up, but interrogate me.
Herm. Lask then about-things the greatest and most beau-
tiful, ᾿Αλήθεια (truth), and Ψεῦδος (falsehood), and τὸ Ὃν (enti-
ty); and that very thing, about which is the subject of our
present discourse, "Ovoza (name), why was it so called ?
Soc. You say that μαίεσθαι means something.
Herm. I say it means ζητεῖν (to inquire).
[81.] Soc. 31 It looks like a name moulded together from a
discourse, which says that this name is an entity which an in-
quiry hits.27 But you would know it rather in the word which
we pronounce ὀνομαστὸν (to be named); * for there it clearly
states * that that is ὃν (entity) of which there is μάσμα (an in-
31. 87 Such is the literal version of the Greek, Ἔοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου
ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένῳ, λέγοντος ὅτι TOUT ἐστιν ὃν, οὗ τυγχάνει ζήτημα,
τὸ ὄνομα. Ficinus has, ‘‘ Videtur nomen hoc ex illo sermone conflatum,
quo dicitur on, id est ens, esse, cujus nomen inquisitio est?’”’? He there-
fore found in his MS.”Eotke τοίνυν τὸ ὄνομα ἐκ λόγου Tov συγκεκροτη-
μένον, λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ὃν, οὗ ὃν τυγχάνει ζήτημα τὸ ὄνομα. ‘The
word ὄνομα seems to have been moulded from some discourse, which as-
serts that the entity exists, the name of which happens to be the object of
inquiry.” But how Hermogenes could get any clue to the meaning or
etymology of ὄνομα, I must leave for others to explain. Heindorf cuts
the matter very short by saying, that according to Socrates “the word
ὄνομα is derived from ὃν and μαίεσθαι, 1. 6. ζητεῖν, to seek, for that ὄνομα
is that entity about which there isan inquiry. But in that case μαΐεσθαι
would have been distinctly mentioned or alluded to. Besides, there is
not here at least, whatever there may be in other dialogues, especially
the Parmenides, any inquiry about entity, or its correct name. More-
over unless τυγχάνειν means “to hit upon,” it would require the parti-
ciple ὃν, which might however have easily dropt out aftey οὗ.
388 Here again I confess myself completely in the dark. The Greek
is, ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὀνόμασμά ἐστιν, which Ficinus
thus translates, “ Hic enim exprimitur nomen quid sit, entis videlicet in-
quisitio.”” From whose “ inquisitio”’ both Heusde and Buttmann were
led to οὗ μάσμα ἐστιν. But if μάσμα formed any portion of ὄνομα, most
assuredly some reason would have been assigned for the change of μάσμα
into ova. But as no such reason is here given, it is evident that after all
the exertions of critics we neither know now, nor perhaps are ever likely
to know, what Plato wrote, except by the aid of conjectural criticism,
which few can apply successfully, and fewer still appreciate, when so ap-
plied. Ishall therefore refrain from producing my own.
960 CRATYLUS.
quiry). But ᾿Αλήθεια (truth), this seems to have been
moulded together * like the rest; for the divine rushing-on
of entity appears to have been addressed by this name ἀλήθεια,
as being ϑεία ἄλη (a divine wandering). But Ψεῦδος (false-
hood) is contrary to a rushing-on. For here again returns
that which is abused as being detained and is compelled to be
at rest ; and (the name) is assimilated to those, who sleep ;
but the ~ being added conceals the meaning of the name.
But Ὃν (entity) and Οὐσία (existence) agree with ἀλήθεια
(truth), by receiving the addition 4! of an x; for then they sig-
nify ἰὸν (going), (and ἰουσία) 33 (the act of going). And on
the other hand οὐκ ὃν (non-being), as some also call it, οὐκ 8 ἰὸν
(not-going.)
Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to have rattled through
these questions in a very manly manner. But should any one
ask ‘you, what propriety of appellation have the words Τὸν
(going), “Péor (flowing), and Δοῦν (binding )—
3989 The Greek is, ἡ δ᾽ ἀλήθεια καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδικε συγκεκρο-
τῆσθαι, which Stalbaum thus translates, ‘‘ Quod autem attinet ad nomen
ἀλήθεια, etiam hoc reliquis simile videtur, hoc est, conflatum esse ex in-
tegra propositione.”” Butas there is nothing in the original to which the
words “ ex integra propositione’’ can be referred, we may dismiss his inter-
pretation as utterly untenable. Heindorf was near the mark in suggesting
κατὰ ταὐτὰ, and so was Stephens in proposing ἐκ τοῦ τῆς ἄλης. For
Plato probably wrote, κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἀπό τινος ἄλης---ἃπα shortly after-
wards—robryr@ ῥήματι, ὡς Grn θεία odca—for τῇ ἀληθείᾳ is evidently
as gl. for τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι : while the etymology in ἀλήθεια requires not
θεία οὖσα Gdn, but Grn θεία οὖσα.
40 Instead of καθεύδουσι it is manifest that Plato wrote τοῖς γε εὕδουσι,
instead of τοῖς καθεύδουσι. For ψεῦδος is formed, not by adding Ψ to
καθευδω, but to εὕδω.
41 Instead of ἀποβαλὸν, which makes absolute nonsense, Heusde was
the first to conjecture ἀπολαβὸν, which he got from the version of Fi-
cinus, “ si apponatur,” and is confirmed by three MSS. I do not how-
ever remember another passage where ἀπολαμβάνειν means “ to receive
in addition.” gHence I should prefer τοῦ ἰῶτα ἐπιβαλλομένου. But this
is not all. For instead of τῷ ἀληθεῖ we must read τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. For τὸ
ἰὸν and ἡ tovcia have an affinity with ἄληθείᾳ rather than τῷ ἀληθεῖ.
12 To complete the sense I have added the words within lunes.
43 Out of this mass of nonsense we may elicit something intelligible by
reading in the Greek, καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἰὸν αὖ εἰσί τινες οἱ ὄνομά τί νομίζουσιν,
αὐτὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ὄν---πᾶ rendering in English, “ and on the other hand, there
are some who consider that what does not go on is a name merely, and
does not itself exist :’? where, since the two oldest MSS. read τινὲς ὀνόμα-
τι instead of ὥς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν, I have, by uniting the readings,
obtained τινες οἱ ὄνομά τι μόνον νομίζουσι, adding to complete the sense
and syntax δ᾽ after αὐτό.
CRATYLUS. 361
Soc. Should I be able to answer him? you mean. Is it
not so?
[82.1 Herm. Perfectly so.
Soc. One thing I have just now got somehow, so that by
answering I shall appear to say something to the purpose.
Herm. What is it?
Soc. To say that what we know not is of Barbarian origin:
for perhaps this would be really the case with some; and
the first names would be inscrutable on account of their
antiquity. For through the names being twisted in every
way, it would be not at all wonderful if the ancient speech,
as compared with the present, differed in nothing from a
Barbarian one.
Herm. You speak nothing from the purpose.
Soe. Nay, I speak what is reasonable. But yet the con-
test does not appear to me to admit of excuses ;44 but we must
be ready to reflect upon these matters; and let us consider, that,
should any one always inquire into the verbs, through which
a noun is spoken, and again those nouns through which verbs
are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, must not
he, who answers such a one, fail at length in his replies ?
Herm. It appears so to me.
[83.] Soc. When therefore will he, who fails to answer,
justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names,
which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses
and names? For these, if they are so circumstanced, can no
longer justly appear to be composed from other names. Just
as we said above,* that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was composed from ἀγαστὸς
(to be admired) and ϑοὸς (swift). But Sodc, we may perhaps
say, is composed from other words, and these last again from
others: but if we ever lay hold of that, which is no longer
composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have
at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer
to refer this to other names.
Herm. You seem to me to speak correctly.
Soc. Are not then the names, about which you are asking,
elements? And must we not consider in some other manner
what is their propriety ?
Herm. It is likely.
* On this expression see Heindorf’s learned note.
45. See § 63.
862 CRATYLUS.
Soc. It is likely indeed, Hermogenes. All the former
names, therefore, must come back to these. And if this be
the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again with me,
lest I act like a silly person, while stating what the θέον
of the first names ought to be.
[84.] Herm. Only do but speak, and I will, to the utmost
of my power, consider the matter with you.
Soc. I think then you will agree with me in this, that there
is one propriety in every name, both first and last; and that
none of them differ, so far as they are names. ’
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. But the propriety of the names we have just now
discussed, was such as to show of what kind is each of the
things existing.
Herm. How should it be not so?
Soc. This property then the prior names ought to possess
no less than the posterior, if they are to be names.
Herm. Entirely so.
Soc. But the posterior names, as it appears, are “able to
effect this through the prior.
Herm. It appears so.
Soc. Be it so then. “But after what manner will the first
names, which no others precede,*? make, as much as they pos-
sibly can, the things existing clear to us, if they are about to
be names ?46 But answer me this. If we had neither voice
nor tongue, and yet wished to point out things to one another,
should we not, as the dumb do at present, endeavour to indi-
cate them by the hands, head, and the rest of the body?
[85.] Herm. How could we otherwise, Socrates?
Soc. I think then that if we wished to indicate that which
is (going) upwards and is light, we should raise our hands
towards heaven and imitate the nature of the thing itself;
but if (to indicate) things (going) downwards and heavy, (we
should point) to the earth. And if we were desirous of in-
dicating a horse running, or any other animal, you know that
4646 | fear I do not quite understand this.
4“ So the sense requires. But ὑπόκειται is “ succeed.” Hence since’
MSS. vary between ἕτερα and πρότερα, we must read ἕτερα πρότερα
κεῖται.
* This is evidently required by the sense. The word ἰὸν has accident
ally dropt out between τὸ and ἄνω, and ὃν after κοῦφον.
CRATYLUS. 368
we should make our bodies and gestures as like as possible to
those things.
Herm. It appears to me that the facts are necessarily as
you say.
Soc. For in this manner, I think, the indication of any
thing is produced by the body imitating,*® as it seems, that
which any one wishes to point out.
Herm. Certainly.
Soc. But since we wish to indicate a thing by our voice,
and tongue, and mouth, will not an indication of each thing
then take place through these, when an imitation of any
thing whatever is produced through them ?
Herm. It appears to me necessarily so.
Soc. A name then is, as it seems, an imitation by the
voice™® of that, which he who imitates, imitates and nomi-
nates by the voice what he imitates.®!
Herm. It appears so to me.
Soc. But, by Zeus, my friend, I do not think that I have
yet spoken in a becoming manner.
Herm. Why so?
Soe. Because we should be compelled to confess, that they
who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals, give names
to the things which they imitate.
Herm. You speak the truth.
Soc. But do you think this is correct ?
Herm. I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will the
name be ?
® Edd. τῷ σώματι --- μιμησαμένου --- τοῦ σώματος. But two MSS.
μιμησαμένους. To avoid the inelegant repetition in σώματι and σώματος,
it is easy to read μιμησαμένῳ, and to omit τοῦ σώματος, and to insert rec
after ἐβούλετο, as I have done in the translation.
*° Stalbaum unjustly hesitates between φωνῇ and φωνῆς. For μίμημα
φωνῆς is “imitation of a voice,” but μίμημα φωνῇ, “imitation by a
voice,’ what the sense manifestly requires.
5! In this definition Heindorf has corrected one error by reading ὅταν
μιμῆται for ὃ ἂν μιμῆται ; which Stalbaum has properly praised and
learnedly supported. But Heindorf failed even to see the other error.
For who can believe that Plato wrote ὃ μιμεῖται---ὁ μιμούμενος --ὅταν
μιμῆται. He might however have written ὃ μιμεῖταί τις, καὶ ὀνομάζει τῇ
φωνῇ, ὅταν μομῆται, “ which some one imitates, and, when he imitates,
gives it a name with his voice.” Ficinus has, “ imitatio vocis, qua quis-
quis aliquid imitatur, per vocem imitatur et nominat,”’ omitting ὃ ἂν
μιμῆται.
364 CRATYLUS.
[86.] Soc. **In the first place, as it appears to me, not if,
as we imitate things with music, we so imitate, although we
then imitate with the voice: and in the next place, if we imi-
tate what music imitates, we do not appear to me to make use
of names.*? But I assert something of this kind. There is
a certain voice, figure to each thing, and a colour to many.
Herm. Entirely so. nS
Soc. It appears then that although any one should imitate
in this way, the name-giving art would not be conversant
with these imitations ; for these are partly musical and partly
painting. Is it not so?
Herm. Yes.
Soc. But what is this? Seems there not to you an exist-
ence to every thing, as well as colour, and the other things
we just now mentioned? In the first place,®* is there not an
existence to colour itself, and voice, and to all the rest, which
are deemed deserving of the appellation of being ?
Herm. It appears so to me. a
Soc. But what then, if any one is able to imitate this very
thing, the existence of each thing,>* by letters and syllables,
would he not indicate what each thing is?
Herm. Entirely so.
5282 This is the literal English version of Stalbaum’s Latin transla-
tion of the Greek, which I confess I cannot comprehend ; nor will, I sus-
pect, any one else. Ficinus has, “ Non talis imitatio, qualis per musicam
fit, quamvis voce fiat ; neque etiam eorundem, quorum et musica imitatio
est, neque per musicam imitationem enim nominare videmur,” which is
evidently a vain endeavour to give, what he believed to be the
sense of the passage; which was perhaps originally to this effect, “ In the
first place, as it seems to me, (the name) would not be an imitation,
should we, as with music, imitate with the voice things well and beauti- |
fully ; nor, secondly, should we well imitate, what music does do I
think a name would be an imitation ;” i. 6. in Greek, Πρώτον μὲν, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐὰν, καθάπερ τῇ μουσικῇ, οὕτω Kui TY φωνῇ εὖ καλώς
τε μιμώμεθα τὰ πραγματα᾽ ἔπειτα δὲ οὐκ ἂν, ἔαν, ἅπερ ἡ μουσικὴ οὐ μιμεῖ-
ται, εὖ ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ὄνομα μίμησιν.
58. Ficinus has, “‘ Annon inest colori ac voci essentia quedam et 8}118,᾿
omitting πρῶτον aire before τῴ χρώματι, and ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν, not with-
out reason; for all those words are quite useless; and so too does the
whole clause, πρῶτον---ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν, after the preceding sentence. _
“ Either αὐτὸ τοῦτο or ἑκάστου τήν οὐσίαν is an interpolation. Fi-
cinus omits αὐτὸ τοῦτο. Perhaps, however, as MS. Gud. has αὐτῶν
τοῦτο, there lies hid ἔκ τον θεῶν ἢ αὐτὸς ; for τούτων and τοῦ θέών are
confounded in Eurip. Bacch. 328, as I have shown on Aésch. Suppl. 336,
or we may read ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου του ἤ αὐτὸς---
CRATYLUS. 365
Soc. And what would you call him who is able to do this,
as you called, of the former characters, one conversant with
music, and the other with painting ; how (call you) this ἢ
[87.] Herm. This name, Socrates, appears to me what we
are for some time seeking. For he would be a name-giver.®®
Soc. If then this is true, as it appears to be, let us con-
sider those names about which you were inquiring ; about Po}
(flowing), and Igvaz (to go), and Zyéore*® (holding), whether
in their letters and syllables a person lays hold® of entity, so
as to imitate existence or not.
Herm. By all means.
Soc. Come then, let us see whether these alone are a part
of the first names, or whether there are many others.
Herm. I think there are many others.
Soc. For it is probable. But what shall be the mode of
division from whence the imitator begins to imitate? Is it
not, since the imitation happens to be by syllables and letters,
the most proper to distribute first the elements ? just as those
who put their hands to rhythms,°** distribute first the powers
of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables, and thus at
length come to consider the rhythms themselves, but pre-
viously not ?
Herm. Yes.
[88.] Soe. Ought we not then to divide thus the vowels,
and afterwards the rest according to species, both consonants
and mutes ?—for so say®® those who are skilled in these mat-
ters—and again, such as are not indeed vowels yet are not
mutes? and of the vowels themselves, such as have a different
species from each other ? and after we have properly distributed
55. Heindorf vainly attempts to defend rovro—otroc—é ὀνομαστικὸς
by two passages, where, after τοῦτο, have been interpolated the word to
which it refers; while the third I have corrected at Hipp. Maj. § 54, n. 2,
by the aid of Ficinus. Here it is evident that Plato wrote ἐζητοῦμεν
εἶναι ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ ὀνομαστικός.
56 By σχέσις, says Heindorf, we must understand δέσις, as shown by ᾧ
81. Ficinus renders it ‘‘ detentione.”
57 Heindorf understands ὁ ὀνομαστικὸς as the nominative to ἐπιλάμ-
Baverat. He should have suggested, τοῦ ὄντος γέ τι λαμβάνεται, ὥστε
αὐτῶν---ἰυδίοδα of τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν ὥστε, i. 6. “ any part
of entity is understood, so that it imitates their existence.”
᾿ 588. Heindorf refers to Rep. iii. p. 400, B.
59. Heindorf refers to Theetet. § 142.
366 CRATYLUS.
all these [existences] it is again requisite to impose names,
and to consider, if there are certain things into which, as into
elements, these may be referred; and from which it is possi-
ble to see both them, and whether there are species in them
in the same manner as in the elements ;® (and) having well
and thoroughly looked into all these points, (it behoves us)®
to know how to bring in each® according to its likeness ;
whether it is necessary to bring in one to one, or to mix®
many with one; just as painters do, when they wish to pro-
duce a resemblance, sometimes introduce only the oyster™ (a
scarlet colour), and sometimes any other pigment whatever ;
and sometimes again they mingle many colours together, as
when they prepare the likeness of a man,® or any thing else
of this kind; according as, I think, each picture seems to re-
quire each colour. In the same manner we will bring the
elements (of words) to things, and one to one, wherever it
seems to be necessary, and many together,’ making what per-
sons call syllables; and again, combining those syllables to-
gether, from which nouns and verbs are composed; and
again, from these nouns and verbs we will compose something
50. 60 Beck, whom Stalbaum follows, would omit τὰ ὄντα, as Ficinus
had done already. Heindorf more acutely would read, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα διε-
λώμεθα πάντα εὖ, τὰ ὄντα αὖθις δεῖ (διελέσθαι) καὶ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι.
Stalbaum however conceives the whole passage to have been originally
to this effect: ‘‘ And after we have properly distributed all these, we must
again consider, whether there are not certain genera, to which all the
existences are to be referred, as in the case of the elements in letters;
from which genera it is possible to perceive the existences themselves,
and also to understand this, whether in them there are species and genera
in the same manner, as in the elements of letters,” thus omitting entirely
ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι, or rather considering ἀνόματα as ἃ corruption of
ὄντα, and ἐπιθεῖναι of ἐπισκέψασθαι.
51. Ficinus has “scire oportet.’’ Stalbaum thinks that ἐπίστασθαι de-
pends on the preceding δεῖ.
®? Stalbaum would read ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ, “each to each,” which he
got from Heindorf’s note, ἕκαστον ὄνομα ἑκάστῳ πράγματι...
“ The balance of the sentence requires ἐπιφέρειν and συγκεραννύναι,
not συγκεραννύντα.
δὲ On the scarlet dye obtained from a kind of oyster found near Tyre,
see Smith’s Greek ant Roman Antiquities.
** On the word ἀνδρείκελον Stalbaum refers to E. H. Barker's diseerta
tion in Wolf. Analect. Literar. T. i, P. 2. p. 388.
® So seven MSS. for σύμβολα acknowledged by Ficinus. The Pas-
sage however is not even now correct. t
CRATYLUS. 867
great and beautiful and entire, and like the animal there
(described) by the painter’s art, discourse by the name-giving,
or rhetorical, or whatever art it may be. [89.] Or rather,
we will not do 1{. But I have in speaking been carried out
(of the course), for the ancients have put together the words
in the way as they lie together. But we must, if we know
how to consider them artistically, to distinguish them thus,
and to see whether the first and last names were laid down in
a proper manner or not; for to connect them otherwise (take
eare) lest it be wrong, my dear Hermogenes, and not in the
road to reason.
Herm. Perhaps so, by Zeus, Socrates.
Soc. What then, can you trust yourself as being able to
divide them in this manner? for I cannot.
Herm. 1 want indeed much of doing this.
Soe. Let us leave it then; or are you willing we should
undertake it as we best can, although we are able to look but
very little into them; by stating, as we said before,® in the
case of the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth, we merely
conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them; so now, on
the other hand, we should proceed ® in our own case by de-
claring that, “if these have been distributed in the best way
either by us or by any other, they ought to have been so di-
vided ;7° but now it will be requisite for us to be busy about
them as it said,”! as best we may. Or how say you?
8? Ficinus alone supplies the ellipse. ‘‘ Immo nos non istud agemus ;
modum namque loquendo transgressus sum,” which seems to lead to
μᾶλλον δὲ οὐχ ἡμεῖς αὐτο---πολλὰ γὰρ λόγων ἐξηνέχθημεν---δράσομεν"
where ἐξηνέχθημεν is due to three MSS.
58. See § 39.
69 Instead of ἴωμεν Heusde wished to read ἴδωμεν, similar to the pre-
ceding κατιδεῖν. But Heindorf renders ἴωμεν ‘ pergamus,” with Ficinus.
But that would be in correct Greek προΐωμεν rather, or πόρρω ἴωμεν.
7070 Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, which both
Heindorf and Stalbaum seem inclined to adopt ; although the former once
wished to read, ὕτι εἰ μέντοι, ἡ χρὴ, ἔδει αὐτὰ διελέσθαι, and the latter
would prefer ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὡς ἄριστον ἔδει, obtained from Buttmann’s ὅτι,
εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἄριστα Edetc—They should have proposed ὅτι, εἰ μέν γε χρὴ
ἄριστα δὴ αὐτὰ, which differs but little from ὅτι εἰ μέν Te χρηστὸν ἔδει
α —
τι Heindorf considers the proverb alluded to is the line, Zépev γὰρ οὐχ
ὡς θέλομεν, ἀλλ᾽ we δυνάμεθα, attributed to Menander, and translated by
Terence in Andr. iv. 6, 10, “‘ Ut quimus, aiunt, quando, ut volumus, non
licet.” But then Plato would have written κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐ θέλησιν,
368 CRATYLUS.
[90.] Herm. It seems so to me.
Soc. I think, Hermogenes, it will appear ridiculous for
things to become manifest through being imitated by letters
and syllables. And yet it must be so. For we have not any
thing better than this, to which we can refer, touching the
truth of the first names; unless, indeed, as the writers of tra-
gedies, when they are in any difficulty, fly to their machinery
and introduce the gods,” so we shall be released by assert-
ing that the gods founded the first names, and that on this
account they exist correctly. Is not this the best of reasons?
or the other, that we have got them from some Barbarians?
—for the Barbarians are more ancient than us.—Or that,
through their antiquity it is impossible to perceive their
meaning, as is the case with the Barbaric names? But all
these would be the (not) very clever evasions on the part of
him who is not willing to give a reason for the right imposition
of the first names; although he who does not know the pro-
priety of the first names, is surely unable to know that of the
subsequent, which must necessarily be made manifest from the
former, of which he knows nothing. But it is evident, that
he who professes to be skilled in subsequent names ought to
be able to explain the first, in the best ™ and clearest manner,
or to be well convinced that, as regards the subsequent, he is
a mere trifler. Or does it appear otherwise to you ?
[91.] Herm. Not otherwise, Socrates, in any respect what-
ever.
Soc. What I formerly fancied about the first names, appear
to me now very saucy and ridiculous. If you wish it then,
I will communicate them to you; but if you have any thing
better to obtain from any quarter, communicate it to me.”
Herm. I will do so; but do you speak now boldly.
Soc. In the first place then p appears to me to be, as it
and so perhaps he did write. For οὐ θέλησιν might easily have dropt out
before δεήσει.
2 Erasmus, in Adag. p. 591, compares this passage of Plato with that of
Cicero Nat. Deor. i. 20, “‘ Ut tragici poete, quum explicare argumentum
non potestis, confugitis ad deum.” Herp. ;
15. Unless καὶ μαλὰ κομψαὶ be said ironically, which could hardly be
done here, Plato must have written od μάλα κομψαὶ---
** Instead of μάλιστα, common sense leads to κάλλιστα. The two
words are constantly confounded, as shown by Porson on Phen. 878.
15. So Horace, “ si quid novisti rectius istis, Candidus imperti.”
CRATYLUS. 369
were, the organ of all motion; although we have not yet
stated why Κίνησις has this name. It is evident however that
it implies ἴεσις (going); for ἡ was not used formerly, but εἰ.
Its origin is from κίειν (to go), which is a foreign name," and
signifies ἰέναι. If then any one could find out its ancient
name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very pro-
perly called ἴεσις. But now from the foreign name κίειν, and
the change of the », together with the interposition of the ν,
it is called κίνησις, but it ought to be called Τί κέεισις or ἴεσις.1ἴ
But ™ Srdere (standing) is the negation of ἰέναι (to go); and
for the sake of elegance is called στάσις. [92.] The ele-
ment therefore p, as I said, appeared to the founder of names
to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of ex-
pressing a similitude to rushing on; and hence he in many
places employed it for this purpose. And in the first place,
the words ‘Peiy (to flow) and ‘Por (flowing) imitate a rushing-
on by this letter; and in the next place, in the words Τρόμος
(trembling) and Τραχὺς (rough) ; also in such verbs as Κρούειν,
(to strike), Θραύειν (to break), ᾿Ερεέκειν 19 (to pierce), Θρύπτειν
(to fritter), Κερματέζειν (to cut into small pieces), and 'Ῥυμβεῖν
(to rumble): in all these he made for the most part a re-
semblance to p (to arushing-on).8° For he saw that the tongue
remains quiet for the least time on this letter, but is moved
the most; and hence it appears to me that he employed this
. letter for those words, but the « for all things attenuated,
which especially go through all things. And hence he imi-
tated, by the words ἰέναι (to go) and ἴεσθαιδὶ (to be sent), «, just
76 As the word κίω is found in Homer, and even in Aischylus, it seems
strange that Plato should rank it amongst foreign words; unless he con-
sidered all words as foreign that were not used generally at Athens.
7717 Such is the correction of Cornarius for κιείνησιν---ἢ εἶσιν in some
MSS., or κίνησιν--εἴεισιν in others.
7878 Schleiermacher was the first to remark that there is evidently a
Iacuna here. For it ought to be told how στάσις, which is the negation
of teow, was formed from ἀ-ίεσις into στάσις, by throwing out ε and pre-
fixing or.
19 This was the correction of Buttman, subsequently confirmed by MSS.,
for ἐρύκειν. On the loss of ἐρείκειν, or rather its confusion with ἐρείδειν,
see my note on Eurip. Tro. 88.
_® Between τοῦ ῥῶ and ἑώρα (which Heindorf has acutely restored in
lieu of ἐῶ) there has dropt out I suspect τῇ φορᾷ, similar to ἀφομοιοῦν τῇ
φορᾷ, a little above. Ficinus, “ ad similitudinem motionis effingit.”
8! Instead of ἴεσθαι one MS. has ἰένεσθαι ; another, ie σθαι; which
seems to lead to ἀνύεσθαι. At all events ἴεσθαι is superfluous after ἰέναι.
28
370 CRATYLUS.
as by ¢, Ψ, o, and Z, because these letters are inflated, the
name-giver imitated all such things as Ψυχρὸν (cold), Ζέον
(boiling), Σείεσθαι (to be shaken), and universally Σεισμὸν 55 (a
shaking). And when the name-founder would imitate any
thing inflated, he every where, for the most part, appears to
have introduced such-like letters. [93.] But he seems to
have thought that the power of compression in ὃ and 7, and
the pushing the tongue (against the roof of the mouth),**
were useful for the imitation of the words Δεσμὸς (bond) and
στάσις (standing). But perceiving, on the other hand, that
the tongue moves glibly in A, by means of the resemblance
he formed the names Acia (smooth), and the very word Ολε-
σθάνειν (to slide), Λιπαρὸν (oily), Κολλῶδες (glue-like), and all
other such-like words. But where the power of y lays hold
of the tongue, sliding through Δ, he imitated the TAuypor
(stickiness) in Iv«d (sweet) and TAowdec (viscous). Per-
ceiving likewise that the sound of the ν was within, he made
the names Ἔνδον (the within) and Ἐντὸς (within), that he might
assimilate the acts to the letters. But he assigned a to Μέγας
(great) and ἡ to Μῆκος (length), because these letters are
great.64 But requiring for Τογγύλος (round) the sign of ο,
he mixed up o for the most part in that name. And thus
too the name-giver® appears to have forced, as regards both
letters and syllables, other circumstances to each of existing
things, making both a mark and name; and from these to
8? Heindorf justly found fault with ὅλως σεισμὸν, as being superfluous
after σείεσθαι ; and wished to read ὅλως σισμόν (hissing).
83 IT have introduced all between the lunes, as absolutely requisite for
the sense. For unless I am greatly mistaken, πρὸς seapanedilan dropt
out before ἀπερείσεως. The word ὑπερωὴν is found in the well-known
Homeric, Il. x. 495, Χείλεα μέν τ᾽ ἐδίῃν᾽, ὑπερώην δ᾽ οὐκ ἐδιῃνε. Stalbaum
translates ἀπερείσεως τῆς γλώττης, “ innixus lingue ;” but even he
would find it difficult to explain the meaning of those words. Ficinus
has, what is equally unintelligible, “‘lingue velut herentis retractionem.”
84 How a and ἢ can be said to be greater letters than the rest of the —
alphabet, I cannot understand. In this passage, as in others, there is
doubtless an allusion to notions current at the period when Plato lived, —
but which have been lost in the lapse of time. To something of this
kind is to be referred the nursery-song, “ Great A, little a; bouncing B.”
Here, after μεγάλα τὰ γράμματα, one would expect καὶ μακρά, in allu- —
sion to μέγας καὶ μῆκος. ;
85 Here, as elsewhere, Heindorf has adopted from MS. Gud. ὀνοματο-
θέτης, confirmed by “nominum auctor” in Ficinus. Stalbaum sticks as
usual to νομοθέτης. v3
CRATYLUS. 371
have composed what still®® remains, by imitating in this way.
[94.] Such, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the propriety
in names, unless Cratylus here asserts any thing else.
Herm. In truth, Socrates, Cratylus very often gives me
much trouble, as I stated at the beginning, by his asserting
that there is a propriety in names; but he does not clearly
inform me what it is; so that I am unable to know whether
he thus obscurely speaks on each occasion willingly or un-
willingly. Now then, Cratylus, state before Socrates, whe-
ther what Socrates says respecting names is pleasing to you,
or whether you have any thing better to produce? and if you
have, mention it, so that either you may learn from Socrates,
or teach us both.
Crat. But what, Hermogenes, does it appear to you to be
an easy matter to learn and teach any thing so suddenly, and
much less that which seems to be amongst the greatest ?57
Herm. To me, by Zeus, it does not. But the saying of
Hesiod (Ἔργ. 359) appears to me well said, that, should one
a little to a little add, there would be something done of mo-
ment. [95.] If then you are able to do any thing at all,
although but trifling, do not be faint-hearted, but benefit
Socrates here, for®* you can, and me.
Soc. I would not myself, Cratylus, confidently assert a single
point of what I have said above. But I have considered with
Hermogenes in the way it seemed good to me; so that, on
this account at least, speak boldly, as I am ready to receive it,
if you have any thing better to say than this. Nor. shall I
wonder, if you have something to say better; for you seem
to me to have considered things of this kind yourself, and to
have learnt them from others. Should you then say any
thing better, write me down as one of your disciples respect-
ing the propriety of names.
Crat. And in truth, Socrates, I have, as you say, made
this the subject of my meditations; and perhaps I shall cause
you to become one of my disciples. And yet I fear that the
85 In lieu of εἴδη, MS. Gud. alone has in the text ἤδη, which is con-
stantly united to λοιπὸν, as shown by Elmsley on Cid. Ὁ, 1619.
** On the formula ἐν τοῖς μέγιστον, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 289.
* Instead of δὲ, I have substituted γὰρ from Ficinus—“ debes enim.”
The two particles are frequently confounded. See Schefer’s Index to
Porson’s Euripides, in Γάρ.
2852
372 CRATYLUS.
very contrary of all this will take place. For somehow it
comes into my mind to say to you, what Achilles did to Aias
in that part of the poem called Acrai®® (supplications). For
he says,
“ Aias, of Telamon the son, and sprung
From Zeus, and leader of the people, all
To my own heart thou seem’st to haye well said.”
And you too, Socrates, seem to have acted ‘the prophet ina
reasonable manner according to my notions, whether you were
inspired by Euthyphron, or whether some other muse has
been existing in you in secret.
[96.] Soc. My good Cratylus, I have for a long time ago
been wondering myself at my own wisdom ; and still do not
believe it. I think it therefore requisite for me to examine
again what I am saying. For to be deceived by one’s own
self is the most terrible of all things ; for since the deceiver is
never for a moment absent, but always present, how can it
not be terrible? It is necessary then, as it seems, to turn
ourselves frequently to what has been said before, and to en-
deavour, according to the saying of the poet,*! “to look at the
same time before and behind.” Let us then now take a view of
what has been asserted. We said then, that the propriety of
name is that which points out the quality of a thing. Shall
we say that this is sufficiently laid down?
Crat. To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.
Soc. Names then are spoken for the sake of teaching ?
Crat. Entirely so.
Soc. Shall we not therefore say that this is an art, and that
there are workmen of it.
Crat. Perfectly so.
Soe. But who are they ?
8° Originally the Iliad was not divided into books, but into subjects,
The passage alluded to is in ix. 640, where an embassy is sent to Achilles
to entreat him to take again a part in the war, from which he had been so
on
ΩΣ From ¢ this passage it may be inferred that Socrates was thought to
have written something in verse anonymously, in ridicule, I suspect,
really, but apparently in praise of Euthyphron, who seems, from p. 409, q
D. 57, to have published a poem under the title of Μοῦσα
At least, in the words of Plato there lies hid an heroic distich, Eire παρ᾽
Ἐὐθύφρονός γε νοήμονος ἣν Gp’ ἐπίπνους, Etre καὶ ἄλλη Μοῦσα πάλαι
ué γ᾽ ἐνοῦσ᾽ ἐλελήθει.
51. Hom. I]. iii. 109.
CRATYLUS. 373
Crat. Those name-givers*? which you spoke of at the be-
inning.
[97.] Soc. Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men,
like other arts also, or not? I mean to say some such thing
as this. Painters are surely some worse, some better.
Crat. Entirely so.
Soc. Will not the better exhibit more beautiful pictures of
animals as their productions; but the worse, worse?°? And
in like manner, do not builders erect some more beautiful
dwellings, others more ugly ?
Crat. Yes.
Soc. And with respect to name-givers,* will not some ex-
hibit their works more beautiful, others more ugly ?
Crat. This does not appear to me.
Soc. Does it not therefore appear to you, that some name-
workers * are better and others worse ?
Crat. It certainly does not.
Soc. And does not one name seem to you to be better laid
down than another ?
Crat. It does not.
Soc. Are all names then correctly laid down?
Crat. As far as they are names.
% Ficinus has “legum et nominum conditores.”” From whence it is
vopo
evident that he found in his MSS. ὀνοματοθέτας. Heindorf, whom Stal-
baum follows, here retains νομοθέτας on account of § 12 and 13. But
there MS. Gud. has, as here, preserved the right reading. For names
never were, and never could be, imposed by a legislator, except so far as
they related merely to some technical expressions in legal enactments,
such as Solon is said to have introduced,
98. Unlike himself, Heindorf, although he saw that the balance of the
sentence required οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους---καλλίω---οὶ δὲ φαυλότεροι φαυλότερα,
says that the common reading ot δὲ φαυλότερα is preferable ; while Stal-
baum flies to the modern panacea of an anacolouthon; a figure of speech,
which Matthie says truly it is very dangerous to apply, except in a very
few cases; of which the present is certainly not one, where φαυλότερα
could have easily been lost before φαυλότεροι.
* MSS. Gud. and Par, read here correctly ὀνοματοθέται from a recent
d.
% Had Heindorf remembered the word ὀνοματουργὸς, found in § 13,
and similar to δημιουργοὶ, both there and in ᾧ 96, he would perhaps have
seen that Plato wrote, not νόμοι, but ὀνοματουργοί, Stalbaum, in defence
of νόμοι, says that not all laws are here meant, but laws in the abstract—
a distinction which those perhaps will acknowledge, who can understand
his German interpretation, which I do not.
874 CRATYLUS.
Soc. But what then shall we say to the name of Hermo-
genes here, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that
this name was not rightly given him, unless something of
Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως (of the generation of Hermes) belongs to
him, or that it was indeed given him, but not correctly?
Crat. It seems to me, Socrates, to be not given to him, but
only appears to be given; but that this is the name of some
other person, whose nature points out the name. ;
[91.] Soc. Will not then a person say false, who says
that he is Hermogenes? %for (see), lest on the other hand
even this be possible, to call this person Hermogenes,” if he
is not so.
Crat. How say you?
Soc. Does your reasoning mean this, that it is impossible
to speak a falsehood ?** For there are many, my dear Cratylus,
who say this now, and (have said it) of old.
Crat. How is it possible, Socrates, that, when any one
speaks about any thing, he should speak about that which is
not? Or is not this to speak a falsehood, to speak of things
which are not?
Soc. This reasoning, my friend, is more clever than suits
me or my time of life. But however tell me thus much.
Does it appear to you not possible to speak about a false-
hood, but (possible) to pronounce it ?
Crat. It appears to me not possible even to pronounce it.
Soc. Nor to speak of, nor to address you. As, for in-
stance, if any one, meeting you, should, through his feeling as
an host, take you by the hand, and say, All hail, Athenian
guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion—would he say this, or
pronounce this, or speak of {815,59 or thus address, not you,
but Hermogenes here, or no one?
35 In § 23, it is stated that the name points out the nature. Hence
Heindorf would read οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἣν τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ, whose note
Stalbaum reprints ; but without passing any judgment upon it.
*—* Ficinus has “ neque enim hoc est dubitandum, quin eum dicat
Hermogenem.” From which it is evident that he did not understand the
elliptical expression, (ὅρα) μὴ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ὦ. But even Heindorf has
failed to see that αὖ has no meaning here. Perhaps Plato wrote AYNH,
(you are not able), which might easily have been corrupted into AY H.,,
8 On this doctrine of the Sophists, see § 5, where Heindorf properly
refers to Euthyd. § 37; Sophist, p. 260, C. § 98; and Isocrat. Helen.
Encom. § 1.
%_% 7 confess my inability to point out the difference here between
CRATYLUS. 875
Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that he would pronounce
* these words in vain.
[99.] Soe. With this then let us be contented. But
whether would he, who pronounced these words, pronounce
that which is true or false? Or would a part be true, and a
part false? for this last would be sufficient.
Crat. I should say, that such a one would, moving himself
in vain, make a noise, as the person would, who should move
a piece of brass and strike 1.100
Soc. Come then, Cratylus, (and see) since! we are re-
conciled somehow, would you not say that the name is one
thing, and that, of which it is the name, is another ?
Crat, I would.
Soe. And do you not confess, that the name is some imita-
tion of a thing?
Crat. Most of all.
Soc. And do you not say, that pictures are in some other
manner imitations of certain things?
Crat. I do.
Soe. Come then—for perhaps I do not understand suffi-
ciently what you mean, although you are perhaps speaking
correctly—is it possible to distribute and assign both these
imitations, ®[the pictures and the names, |? to the things, of
which they are imitations, or not ?
Crat. It is possible.
[100.] Soe. But consider this first. Can any one assign
the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a
woman; and so in other things?
Crat. Entirely so.
Soc. And is it possible, on the contrary, to assign the image
of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?
λέξειεν, φαίη, and εἴποι. Others may perhaps be more acute. Although
they seem all required by the preceding, λέγειν, φάναι, εἰπεῖν, and προσ-
εἰπειν.
1 Heindorf refers to Protag. p. 329, A. § 49, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκεῖα πλη-
γέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ.
τ Ficinus translates Φέρε δὴ --- ἐάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν by “ Animad-
verte—utrum quoquo modo conyeniamus,” correctly, as shown by Stal-
baum, who quotes Legg. i. p. 660, E., φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν ξυνομολογησώμεθα.
= Υ. p. 453, E., φέρε δὴ, ἐάν πῃ εὕρωμεν : iv. p. 434, A., ἴδε δὴ, lis
OKQ.
2s The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of ἀμφό-
τερα τὰ μιμήματα. The same thing has taken place in ᾧ 100.
376 CRATYLUS.
Crat. This also is possible.
Soc. Are then both these assignments correet; or only one
of them ὃ
Crat. Only one of them.
Soe. That, I think, which assigns to each, what is suited t
it and similar ? & :
Crat. It appears so to me.
Soc. Lest then you and I, who are friends (in fact), should
become foes in words, receive from me what I say. For, my
friend, I call such a distribution in the case of both imitations
[pictures (of animals)? and names] correct; but in the case of
names, in addition to its being correct, true likewise: but I
call the other, [the giving and introduction, |° relating to the
dissimilar, not correct; and, when it takes place in names,
false.
Crat. But (consider), Socrates, whether this may not be
in the case of paintings, to make an incorrect distribution, but
in the case of names, not so; but that in this it is always
necessarily correct.
[101.] Soc. How say you? In what does this differ from
that ? May not a person, on meeting a man, say to him, “ This
is your picture,” and show him, it may be, his own likeness, or
it may be, that of a woman? by showing, I mean, placing it
before the sense of seeing.
Crat. Entirely so. :
Soc. But what, may he not again, meeting with the sam
person, say to him, “ This is your name?” for a name, as well
as a painting, isan imitation. I meanthis. May he not say,
“This is your name?” And after this, may he not present to
the sense of hearing, it may be, an imitation of himself, by
saying that it is a man; and, it may be, an imitation of a
female of the human species, by saying that it is a woman?
? Ficin. has “ distributionem in imitationibus utrisque tam nominibus
quam picturis,” as if his MS. read τοῖς re ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ζωγραφήμα-
σιν. But Heindorf says that ζώοις is put here for ζωγραφήμασι, as in
8 97. But as MS. Gud. and two others offer ζωγραφήμασι, it was
doubtless so read in the MS, of Ficinus. The words, however, within
brackets are here, as in § 99, evidently an interpolation.
* The words between brackets are clearly an interpolation. From the
preceding use of the verbs ἀποδοῦναι and προσενεγκεῖν, it is plain that
Plato would have written here not δόσιν and ἐπιφορὰν, but ἀπόδοσιν and
προσφοράν, although ἐπιφέρειν is found in § 105.
CRATYLUS. 377
Does it not appear to you, that it is possible for this to occur
sometimes ?
Crat. I am willing to concede it, Socrates; and let it be so.
Soc. You do well, my friend, if such be the state of the
case; for there is no need at present to contest much about it.
If, then, there is a distribution of this kind on this point‘ (in
names), we are willing to say° that one of these speaks truly,
but the other falsely. [102.] And if this be the case, and it
is possible to distribute nouns not correctly, and not to assign
things adapted to each, ®and (to assign) what is not adapted,®
it will be possible to do the very same thing with verbs. And
if it is possible to thus put down verbs and nouns, there is a
necessity to do so with sentences likewise; for sentences are,
I think, but the putting together of those. Or how say you,
Cratylus ?
Crat. Thus; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.
Soc. If then we assimilate the first names to letters, it is
possible, as in the pictures of animals, to assign all the fitting
colours and figures; and on the other hand, not to assign all,
but to leave some and to add others, more and greater.’ Is it
not so?
Crat. It is.
Soc. Does not he then, who assigns every thing (proper),®
render beautiful both letters and resemblances; but he, who
adds or takes away, works out indeed letters and images, but
such as are faulty ?
Crat. Certainly.
* The adverb ἐνταῦθα is rarely thus applied to a thing, instead of a
place. Plato wrote perhaps γ᾽ ὀνοματοθέτῃ, not καὶ ἐνταῦθα.
5 I scarcely understand βουλόμεθα καλεῖν, where one would expect
λέγειν. Ficinus “ vere loqui—vocamus.”’ But ‘‘ voco’’ can hardly be used
in the place of “‘ dico.””
6_§ All between the figures, though found in Ficinus, Taylor omits.
7 Ficin. * pluraque et pauciora exhibeamus ;’’ which leads to what the
sense requires, πλείω καὶ μείω, or ἐλάσσω, in lieu of πλείω καὶ μείζω.
Compare Herod. i. 201, μείζων καὶ ἐλάσσων. ii. 19, πλείων---καὶ ἐλάσσων.
Thucyd. ii. 49, τό τε πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον. Aristoph, Σφηκ. 489, Ἢν μεῖζον
ἐλάσσω
ἤν τ᾽ ἔλαττον. From μείω came μείζω.
§ Ficin. ‘ Qui convenientia omnia tribuit ;᾿ who therefore found in his
MS. πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα, as just above and below, or πάντα τὰ εὖ.
For thus εὖ is united to the article, as I have shown in Poppo’s Prolegom.
p. 154, and to the instances there given of the loss of εὖ, or τὸ εὖ, I could
now add not a few more.
978 CRATYLUS.
Soc. But what does the person imitating the essence of
things through syllables and letters? Will not there be, ac-
cording to the same reasoning, a beautiful image, when he
assigns every thing fitting? Nowthis isa name. Butif he
is deficient even in small matters, or sometimes makes an
addition, a resemblance will be produced, but not a beautiful
one, so that some of the names will be beautifully formed, pce
others badly ?
Crat. Perhaps so.
[103.] Soc. Perhaps then the one will be a good artificer
of names, but the other a bad one.
Crat. Certainly,
Soc. Now was not the name of this person a name-
founder ? °
Crat. Yes.
Soc. Perhaps then, by Zeus, as in other arts, one name-
founder is good and another bad, if we agree in what has
been said before.
Crat. It is so. But you surely perceive, Socrates, that,!®
when we assign the letters a and , and each of the elements
to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away,
add, or change any thing, a name indeed is written by us,
yet not properly; or it is not written at all; but there is
immediately something else, if it suffers any thing of this
kind.
Soc. (See), Cratylus, lest in viewing the matter in this way,
we do not view it correctly.
Crat. How then ?
Soc. Perhaps such things as must necessarily be or not, when
composed of a certain number, suffer what you say; as in the
ease 1} of ten things, or whatever other number you will, if
you take away or add aught, it immediately becomes some
other number. But (see) that there is not the same propriety
in the case of any certain quality and of every resemblance,
but a contrary one; and that it is not necessary to assign to
* Here and shortly afterwards, in despite of common sense, Stalbaum
still sticks to νομοθέτης, although ὀνοματοθέτης is found in MS. Gud.
and supported by Ficinus’s ‘‘ conditor nominum.’
10 Instead of ὅταν Heindorf correctly suggested bre ἀν. Ficinus
** cernis—quod.”’
1 Instead of αὐτὰ, which has no meaning here, Ast suggested, what
Stalbaum approves of, αὐτίκα.
CRATYLUS. 879
an image | all such as is that which one represents,!? if it is
about to be a resemblance. [104.] But consider if I say
any thing to the purpose. Would there not be two things,
such as Cratylus and the resemblance of Cratylus, if any one
of the gods should not only make a likeness of yourself in co-
lour and figure, as painters do, but should make all the inward
parts such as yours are, and infuse into them the same soft-
ness, and warmth, and motion, and soul, and intellect, as is in
you; and, in one word, fashion every thing as you have, 15 and
place such other things close to you,!* whether would there be
one Cratylus, and a resemblance of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses ?
Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.
Soc. You see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek
after another propriety of a resemblance than what we just
now spoke of; and that there is no necessity, that, if any
thing is taken away or added, for it to be any longer a re-
semblance. Or do you not perceive how much resemblances
want from being the same as their patterns ?
Crat. I do.
Soc. Those things then, ' of which the names are names,'4
would suffer a ridiculous fate through their names, if they were
in every respect assimilated to them ; for all things would be-
come double; nor could one’ tell of either of them, which
was the thing itself and which the name.
Crat. You speak the truth.
[105.] Soc. Boldly then, my noble fellow, admit that one
name is well imposed and another not; nor compel it to have
12_12 J cannot understand the Greek πάντα---οἷόν ἐστιν ὃ εἰκάζει, nor the
Latin of Ficinus, ‘‘ omnia—quecunque illud, cujus imago est.”” One MS.
has ὦ for ὃ, which leads to ravra—oi’ ἔνεστιν ᾧ εἰκάζεται, i. 6. “ all—that
exists in that, to which it isa resemblance.”’ And thus we avoid the ne-
cessity of supposing that τινα is to be supplied before ἀποδοῦναι and
εἰκάζει. Stalbaum’s version is, “‘ omnia—talia, quale est quod, quis imi-
tando exprimit,”’ i. e. “all such things as is that, which any one exhibits
by an imitation ”’—
%3—18 All the words between the figures are omitted by Ficinus, and
after him by Taylor.
4—_14 This I confess I cannot understand. I could have understood—
“of which the names are the imitations,” in Greek, ὧν μιμήματά ἐστι
τὰ ὀνοματα. Unless it be said that Plato meant, “of which the names
are nouns.”
16. Heindorf acutely saw that τις has dropt out after εἰπεῖν. For other-
wise ἔχοι would want its nominative.
380 CRATYLUS.
every letter, in order that it may be really such as is that, of
which it is the name; but suffer it to introduce a letter which
is not fitting, and if (you suffer) a letter (to do so, suffer) like-
wise a noun in a discourse ; and if a noun, (suffer) a sentence
not suited to things to be introduced in a discourse, and not
less a thing to be named and spoken of, so long as the type
exists of the thing respecting which there is the discourse;
just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember,
I and Hermogenes just now discussed.
Crat. I do remember.
Soc. It is well. For when this (the type)!® is there, al-
though it may not have all that is fitting, ' yet the thing itself
will be (014 18 correctly, when all !9(fitting) things (are there) ;
incorrectly, when only a few.!7 But let us now, blessed man!
* permit that the thing is spoken οὐ "Ὁ in order that we may
not, like those who walk about late at night in Adgina, (owe
a debt); ?4and thus appear to have arrived at the things by
the truth itself, later than is becoming.”! Or at least seek after
16 For the sake of perspicuity one would expect οὗτος, to be referred
to τύπος.
17!7 In the place of these intelligible words, of which the Latin is to
be found in the version of Ficinus, Taylor has, I know not from whence,
introduced the following, “ Yet the representation may be said to subsist,
as it ought.’’ And this he doubtless considered a translation of Plato!
8 Instead of λελέξετει, all the MSS. read λέξεται: incorrectly, says
Stalbaum ; for he did not know that, in many verbs, the future middle is
used for the future passive. A large list of such verbs was given first by
Burney, alias Porson, in the Monthly Review for July, 1789, p. 13, and
afterwards by Monk on Hippol. 1458.
#9 The antithesis requires not πάντα, as opposed to ὀλίγα, but πολλὰ ---
2020 Stalbaum renders λέγεσθαι--- ἐῶμεν by “let us permit the thing to
be named ;” that is, says he, “ let us concede that a thing may have a
name.” But how τὸ πρᾶγμα, or πρᾶγμα, could be understood, or what
is the meaning of the whole sentence, he does not deign to explain.
21_21 Such is the literal and unintelligible translation of the nonsensi-
cal Greek; where, since Heindorf and Stalbaum confess themselves
equally in the dark, I hope it will be said I have thrown some light on the
passage, by reading, Διαλέγεσθαι δ᾽, οἶμαι, ἄκαιρα ἐῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ σφαλῶμεν
ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθεία, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ἐν ἀφό-
doug καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξομεν οὕτω πὼς ἐληλυθέναι
ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δεόντος : i.e. “ Let us leave off conversing, I think, un-
seasonably ; lest we stumble at the very truth, as persons, who walk about
late at A¢gina do, in the ordure (of the street); for we shall appear to
have arrived at the facts, later than is fitting.” The Greek is in all the
MSS. but οπο---Λέγεσθαι δ᾽ οὖν ὦ μακάριε ἐῶμεν ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν Hor
οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δε.
CRATYLUS. 381
some other propriety of name, and do not confess that an in-
dication by letters and syllables is a name: for, if you admit
both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.
[106.] Crat. But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in
a moderate manner; and I so do put down (my vote).”
Soc. Since then the same things”? seem good to us after
these, let us consider this too.24 We say, that if the name is
- about to be properly imposed, it ought to have fitting letters.
Crat. Yes.
Soc. And it ought (to have) the letters similar to things ?
Crat. Entirely so.
Soe. Such then as are beautifully composed are composed
in this manner. But if any one is not correctly composed, it
will perhaps, for the most part, consist of fitting and similar
letters, if it shall be a resemblance; but it will have a portion
not fitting, through which the name would be neither beauti-
ful nor beautifully formed. Shall we speak” in this way, or
otherwise ?
Crat. There is no need, I think, to quarrel, Socrates; al-
though it does not please me to say, that a name exists, and
yet is not beautifully composed.
Soc. Does this too not please you, that the name is an in-
dication of a thing?
Crat. It does please me.
. Soc. And does it not seem to you to be well said, that of
opey αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθεία οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δεόντος. The
best MS. Gud. has, however, ὀψὲ ἐφ᾽ ὁδοῖς: From which I have elicited
ὀψὲ ἐν ἀφόδοις, by the aid of Suidas, ᾿Αφοδεῦσαι, ἸΤλάτων ᾿Αδωνισι, καὶ
Αφοδος" ὁ ἀπόπατος. Hence it. is fair to infer that the people at Augina
were accustomed, like those of Edinburgh not many years ago, to place,
at night-fall, the filth of their dwellings in the street, thus rendered slip-
pery by the accumulation of ordure. A similar practice took place at
Athens, as shown by Aristophanes ἴῃ Ἥρωσι---Μήποτ᾽ ἀπόνιπτρον θύραζ᾽
ἐκχεῖτε μηδὲ λουτρίον. With regard to the alteration of ὀφείλωμεν into
σφαλῶμεν, and its union with ry ἀληθείᾳ, it may be compared with
ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας in § 112.
2 On τίθεμαι, with or without γνώμην, see at Philoct. 1445.
23 Instead of ταῦτα, common sense requires ταὐτὰ---
2 Picinus—‘“ quod restat, discutiamus;” as if he had found in his
MS. τὰ pera ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν.
353 Although Ficinus has ‘‘ censemusne,” answering to φάμεν in all the
MSS. but one, yet that one, Gud., has here, as elsewhere, preserved the
correct reading, φῶμεν, which is the constant formula in Plato, as shown
by Heindorf.
382 CRATYLUS.
names some are formed from the preceding, and others are
themselves the first ?
Crat. To me it seems so.
[107.] Soc. But if the first names should be indications of
certain things, have you any better method for their being
indications than to make them as nearly as possible such as are
the things which they ought to indicate? Or does the method
which Hermogenes and many others speak of please you more,
that names are conventional, and indicate (their meaning) to
those who have agreed together and known beforehand the
things (so named) ; and that in this conventionality exists 35 the
propriety of names; and that it matters not whether any one
agrees to call them, as they are at present imposed, or the con-
trary, (to call) that which is now 7’ small o great w, and great
w small οὗ Which of these methods is agreeable to you ?
Crat. It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to in-
dicate by a resemblance what one wishes to indicate, ** but
not by any chance 38 method.
Soc. You speak well. If then the name shall be similar
to a thing, is it not necessary for the elements, from which a
person shall have composed the first names, to be naturally
similar to the things themselves? My meaning is this, Could
any one put together a picture, which we have just now said
is the resemblance of something existing, unless the pigments,
from which the picture of living things is composed, were na~
turally similar to those which the art of painting imitates ?
Or is it impossible?
Crat. Impossible.
[108.] Soe. In like manner then names would never become
similar to any thing, unless the things, from which names are
*° To preserve the sense we must read, καὶ εἶναι ἐν ταύτῃ τὴν Spore
ὀνόματος τῇ ξυνθήκῳ, i in lieu of καὶ εἶναι ταὐτων ὀρθότητα τος
ξυνθήκην : unless it be said that Plato wrote, καὶ εἶναι ταύτῃ (in this
way) τὴν ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος, without ξυνθήκῃῳ, a gl. for ταύτῳ. :
3: οἱ Such is the version of what Ficinus found in his MS. and is ac-
knowledged by all the others. Heindorf was the first to adopt from MS.
Gud., with which the three oldest agree, ἐπὲ μὲν @ νῦν σμικρὸν μέγα
καλεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ᾧ ᾧ μέγα σμικρὸν, i. 6. to call by the name of little, what i is
now called great, and of great, what is now little.”
ἘΞ. Ficinus has, “ preestat—quam quovis alio modo.” From whence
I suspect he found in his MS. μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ye τυχόντι, in lieu of ἀλλὰ
μὴ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι. For ὁ τυχὼν, not ὁ ἐπιτυχὼν, means “fortuitus”’ in
correct Greek.
CRATYLUS. 383
composed, possessed originally at first 35. some similitude to
those of which the names are the imitations. Now elements
are the things from which names are to be composed.
Crat. Yes.
Soc. You therefore now take a share in the discourse which
Hermogenes did a little before. Come then, do we seem to
you to have said correctly, or not, that the letter p is similar
to a rushing-on, and to motion, and to hardness ?
Crat. To me, correctly.
Soc. And that the letter ἃ (is similar) to the smooth and
soft, and to what we just now mentioned ?
Crat. Yes.
Soe. Do you know then that for the same thing we say
Σκληρότης, but the Eretrians Σκληρότηρ ?
Crat. Entirely so.
Soc. Do then both p and o seem to be similar to the same
thing ? and does that word indicate the same thing to them,
ending with a p, as it does to us ending with a ¢? or does
it indicate nothing to the others of us.*°
Crat. It indicates one thing *! to both.
Soc. Whether in that p and ¢ are similar, or in that they
are not?
Crat. In that they are similar.
Soc. Are they then similar in every way?
Crat. At least in indicating a rushing-on.
Soc. But what as regards the inserted X? Does it not in-
dicate the contrary of hardness ?
[109.] Crat. Perhaps, Socrates, it is not correctly in-
serted ; just as in the names which you lately mentioned to
Hermogenes, by taking away and adding letters where it was
requisite. And you then appeared to me (to act) * properly.
And now, perhaps, ρ ought to be inserted instead of X.
Soc. You say well. What then, do we, as we are now
speaking, mutually understand nothing, when one pronounces
_ 39 The word πρῶτον is superfluous after ὑπάρξει, and is correctly
omitted by Ficinus.
80 This is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, which Ficinus
renders by “ quibusdam nostrum;’’ Stalbaum, by “ alterutris,” which
leads at once to ἑκατέροις, instead of ἑτέροις, as he should have seen,
opposed to ἀμφοτέροις in the answer of Cratylus,
51 Instead of οὖν Plato wrote ἕν, as I have translated.
32 Ficinus, “ facere videbaris,’’ as if he had found δρᾶν before ἐδόκεις.
584 CRATYLUS.
the (hard) word σκληρόν (hard)? And do you not under-
stand what I am saying ?
Crat. I do, my very good friend, through custom.
Soc. But in saying custom, do you think you are saying
any thing different from convention? Or do you call custom
any thing else than this, that when I pronounce this word, I
understand it, and you know that I understand it? Do da
not mean this?
Crat. Certainly.
Soc. If then you know this, when I pronounce it, there is
an indication (of something)** to you through me.
Crat. Certainly.
Soc. From that which is dissimilar to what I have in mind,
when I pronounce it, if Δ is dissimilar** to the σκληρότης,
which you pronounce. [110.] And if this is the case, what
else is it, than that you have made a convention with yourself,
and that the propriety of the name is a compact with your-
self; since both similar and dissimilar letters, when- i
with custom and compact, indicate (the same thing)® to you?
But if custom is very far from being a compact, it will be no
longer proper to say that similitude is an indication, but custom
(rather): for this, as it appears, indicates both by the similar
and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we agree in this—
for I will put down your silence as consent,® it is surely
necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the
indication of what we have in mind and pronounce; since if,
O best of men! you are willing to come to number, from
whence do you think you will be able to attribute similar
names to each number, if you do not permit this consent and
compact of yours to possess some authority about the propriety
of names? It pleases me, indeed, that names should be, as
much as possible, similar to things; but yet I fear, lest per-
3% After γίγνεται I suspect τοῦ has dropt out.
* As it would be absurd to say that the letter is dissimilar to σκλη-
ρότης (hardness), Plato wrote, no doubt, εἴπερ τὸ τοῦ A—i. 6. if the idea
of softness in the letter is dissimilar to the idea of hardness in the word
σκληρότης.
35. Ficinus, by his “idem—representant,” shows that he found in his
MS. ταὐτὸ after γράμματα. as required by the sense.
* Compare Eurip. Iph. A. 1142, Abed | δὲ τὸ σιγᾷν ὁμολογοῦντός ἐστι
σοῦ : Plutarch, ii. p. 532, F., Ἡ γὰρ σιωπὴ τοῖς σοφοῖσί γ᾽ ἀποκρίσις.
So in English, “Silence gives consent.”
CRATYLUS. 385
chance the attraction of this similitude be really very slight,
according to the language of Hermogenes,*” and that it will be
necessary for us to make use of that ridiculous thing, called
compact, as regards a propriety of names ; since (words) * will
be spoken perhaps in the most beautiful manner possible, when
they shall be spoken (by letters) either entirely, or for the most
part similar,** that is, fitting; but in the most ugly manner,
when the contrary takes place. But after these still tell me
this. What power do names possess with respect to us, and
what beautiful effect must we say they produce ?
[111.] Crat. To me, Socrates, they appear to teach; and
that it is without exception true, that he who knows the
names, knows the things likewise.
Soc. Perhaps, Cratylus, you mean some such thing as this ;
that when any one knows the quality of the name,—now it
is of the same quality as the thing,—he then also knows the
thing ; since it is similar to the name ; and that there is one and
the same art in all things, which are similar to one another ;
and in consequence of this you appear to me to assert, that he,
who knows the names, knows also the things.
Crat. You speak most truly.
Soc. Come now, let us see what is this mode of teaching
existing things, of which you are now speaking, and whether
there is any other method, this however being the better : 89
or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think
is the case ὃ
Crat. I think thus, that there is no other method ; but that
this is the only one, and the best.
Soc. But whether do you think that there is likewie the
very same invention of things existing, (and)*° that he, who
37 In ὁ 67, where γλισχρῶς is used as γλισχρᾷ is here.
%__8 Heindorf says that ὀνόματα is to be thus supplied. He should
have corrected λέγοιτο into λέγοι τις, and λέγηται into λέγῃ τι; for the
sense would then be—*‘ Since a person would then speak perhaps in the
most beautiful manner possible, when he shall speak any thing in words
either wholly or for the most similar, that is to say fitting (to things).’
With regard to ὁμοίοις for ὁμοίως, the true reading has been preserved, as
Heindorf was the first to notice, by Ficinus alone.
39. Ficinus has “ utrum alius preterea sit, hic tamen potior habeatur ;’
where there is a proper antithesis between “sit” and “ habeatur,”’ not
found in the Greek.
4 The conjunction καὶ has evidently dropt out after εἶναι, whatever
Stalbaum may say to the contrary. ι
σ
386 CRATYLUS.
invented the names, invented also the things, of which there
are the names? Or that it is necessary to seek and find
another method, but to learn this ?
Crat. Above all things to seek after and discover the very
same method, as regards the same things.
[112.] Soc. Come then, let us consider, 4! Cratylus, if any
one, while seeking after things, follows after names, and looks
upon the quality of each, do you not consider‘! that there is
no small danger of his being deceived ?
Crat. How?
Soc. It is plain, that he, who first founded names, formed
them, as we have said, such as he thought the things them-
selves were. Is it not so?
Crat. Certainly.
Soc. If then he did not think rightly, but formed them, as
he fancied, 4? what think you shall we suffer, who are his fol-
lowers?*? Is it aught else, than for us to be deceived ?
Crat. But (see), Socrates, lest this be not the case; but
that it is necessary for him, who founded the names, to have
founded them knowingly ; for otherwise, as I before remarked,
names would never have existed. And let this be the greatest
proof to you that he, who founded them, did not stumble from
the truth. For all things would not have thus chimed in with
him. Or, did you not perceive this yourself, when you were
saying, that all names were composed 45 according to the same,
and for the same ἢ 43
[113,] Soe. But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of
no weight. For if the founder of names, after stumbling at
41_41 Neither Heindorf nor Stalbaum have remarked, that, as ἐννοήσω-
μὲν could not be thus followed by ἄρ᾽ ἐννοεῖς, we must, in lieu of ὌΝ δὴ
ἐννοήσωμεν, read Φέρ᾽ ὧδε ἐννοήσωμεν, what Ficinus found in his MS.,
as shown by his version, ‘‘ Age, ita consideremus.”
#242 Although every page of Taylor’s translation betrays an ignorance
quite marvellous of the original, yet in this passage he has outdone all
his former mistakes by his version of the most easy of Greek texts. ‘‘ What
must we think of those who were persuaded to follow him ?”’ And yet this
was the person, who presumed to put the Athenian philosopher into an
English dress, for the benefit, forsooth, of those, who were to be led to
the greater mysteries of Proclus, after they had been initiated by the self-
taught hierophant into the lesser of Plato.
4s_43 Taylor has anticipated by his ‘ according to the same,” the read-
ing κατὰ ταὐτὸν, first introduced by Heindorf from MS. Gud., in lieu
of κατ᾽ αὐτὸ.
CRATYLUS. 387
first, forced the rest (of the words) to this point, and compelled
them to chime in with himself, there is nothing strange ; just
as in the case of diagrams, in which sometimes the first mis-
take being trifling and unapparent, all the remaining parts,
although very numerous, follow as they ought,‘ and agree
with each other. There ought then at the beginning of every
thing to be to every person much discussion and reflection,
whether the principle is properly laid down or not; and this
being sufficiently examined, the rest, I say, will appear* to
follow it. And yet I should not wonder if names chime in
with each other. For let us again consider, what we dis-
cussed before, that of the whole going on, and carried on,
and flowing, the names signify to us, we say, the existence.
Do they seem to you to indicate any thing else than“ in this
way?
Crat. Very much so; and that they correctly signify this.
[114.] Soe. Let us consider then again taking from out of
them, in the first place, this name, ᾿Ἐπιστήμη (science) ; since it
is doubtful, and seems to signify that ἵστησιν (it stops) our soul
in acts, rather than that it is borne along with them; and
hence it is more proper to enunciate its beginning as now,
‘than by throwing out ε, πιστήμη, and to make an insertion in
that of εἴ in the place of that ine. “In the next place, the
word BeGaoy (firm) is so called, because it is the imitation of
a certain βάσις (basis), and στάσις (standing), but not of φορὰ
(rushing-on). Again, Ἱστορία (history) indicates surely that
ἵστησι τὸν ροῦν (it stops the flowing); and the word (Πιστὸν)
(credible) indicates a thing ἱστᾶν (causing to stand).‘* Like-
wise Μνήμη (memory) indicates surely to every one, that there
“ Instead of ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόμενα I have translated as if Plato had
written, ὄντα, 7 δεῖ, ἑπόμενα.
45 As there is nothing on which φαίνεσθαι can depend, I suspect Plato
wrote τὰ λοίπ᾽ ἂν φημὶ φαίνεσθαι, instead of τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι. Ficinus
has “ cetera jam principium sequi debent.””
4 T have followed Heindorf in adopting ἄλλο τι ἢ, from MS. Gud.,
with which seven other MSS. agree. Stalbaum omits ἢ.
“- αἴ Such is the version of Bekker’s text; and this of Stalbaum’s—
“than ἐπιστήμη, by throwing in εν but to make a throwing-in, instead ot
that in ¢, in that ofc.” I can understand neither; nor perceive even
what Plato meant to say.
—48 All between the numerals Stalbaum considers an interpolation.
But why any one should have interpolated words which no one can un-
derstand, he does not deign to νὰν ὁ ὃ
σ
388 CRATYLUS.
is a μονὴ (abiding) in the soul, but not a rushing-on. And,
if you will, ᾿Αμαρτία (error), and Συμφορὰ (contingeney), if any
one follows them according to their name, will appear to be
the same with the aforesaid *® Σύνεσις (intelligence), and Ἔπι-
orhpn (science), and all the other names connected with se-
rious matters. [115.] Still further, ’Aya@éa (ignorance), and
᾿Ακολασία (intemperance), appear to be similar to these: for
ἀμαθία (ignorance) appears to be the march of one going
ἅμα θεῷ (with a god); but ἀκολασία (intemperance) appears
to be ἀκολουθία (a following) in all respects of things.. And
thus, the names which we consider applicable to the basest
things, would appear to be most similar to those applicable to
the most beautiful. And I think that any one would discover
many others of this kind, if he busied himself about them;
from which he would imagine, that the founder of names did
not indicate things going on and borne along, but such as
have an abiding.
Crat. And yet you see, Socrates, that he indicated many
things by that (notion).
Soc. What is this, Cratylus? Shall we count the num-
ber of names as if they were (votes by) pebbles? And will
their propriety consist in this, that the truth will be there, to
which side soever the greater number of the names appear to
point.
Crat. Is not this®! reasonable?
Soc. Not in the least, my friend. But let us leave these
points there,®? and consider whether you will agree or not
with us in this. [116.] Have we not lately acknowledged,
that those who founded names on each occasion®® in cities,
* So Stalbaum; but Heindorf prefers Buttmann’s αὐτῷ, “itself;” I
can understand neither. For ταύτῃ could not mean “ the aforesaid.”
The proper word would be ἐκείνῃ.
* Ficinus has “secundum agitationis significationem,”’ as if he had
found in his MS. κατὰ κίνησιν in lieu of ἐκείνως.
5: Instead of οὔκουν, said positively, I have translated as if it were ove
οὖν, interrogatively, on account of the answer ; where Plato very
dismisses the consideration of the question, whether the number of names
‘was, or was not, to decide the truth of the doctrine in dispute.
52 Instead of αὐτοῦ, ““ there, ”” one would prefer ταύτῃ, “in this way,
as in Sympos. p. 220, C., καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταύτῃ: in two MSS,
rectl
- Ὧω lieu of ἑκάστοτε, an adverb of time, one would prefer senor an
adverb of place.
CRATYLUS. 389
both Grecian and Barbarian, were name-founders, °4and that
the art, competent for this, is name-founding.®*
Crat. Entirely so.
Soc. Tell me now, did they, who were the first name-
founders, found the first names, while they knew the things
to which they assigned their names, or did not know?
Crat. I think, Socrates, while they knew them.
Soc. For surely, friend Cratylus, (they could not do so)
while they did not know.
Crat. It does not appear to me (that they could).
Soc. Let us then return to the point from whence we
digressed ; for you just now,® in what has preceded, (stated, )
if you recollect, that he, who founded names, must have previ-
ously known the things to which he assigned their names.
Are you then of this opinion still, or not?
Crat. Still.
Soc. Say you, that he who founded the first names, founded
them knowing (the things) ?
Crat. Knowing them.
Soc. From what names then did he either learn or find out
the things, if the first names were not yet laid down? But,
on the other hand, said we not, that it is impossible to learn
and find out the things by any other way,* than by learning
or finding out ourselves the quality of names ?
Crat. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the
purpose.
5454 Here, as elsewhere, I have, with Heindorf, adopted what com-
mon sense requires, ὀνοματοθέτας, and ὀνοματοθετικὴν, and ὀνοματο-
θέται, preserved in MS. Gud. alone, and in the corrected version of Fi-
cinus ; for in the ed. pr. all is omitted between ὦ φίλε, just before, down
to ἐπανέλθωμεν.
55 Schleiermacher suggests, with the approbation of Stalbaum, ἄρτι
γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν. For ἄρτι would refer to the preceding answer,
and ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν to p. 433, B. § 106. Ficinus omits ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν.
56 Although even Heindorf failed to see any difficulty here, it is evident
that Plato wrote, ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλων μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς
ἐξευρόντας. For thus ἄλλοι and αὐτοὶ are perpetually opposed to each
other in this formula, as I have shown in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 254 and
356, where I should have stated that in Thucyd. i. 22, Dionysius Hal.
in p. 820, found the correct reading in his MS., οἷς re αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ,
ὧνπερ ἀπελείφθην, παρ᾽ ἄλλων : and we shall thus obviate the objection
started by Poppo against my ἔκλυον, as being found only in poetry. To
the already quoted in defence of the antithesis I could now
add full twenty more.
390 CRATYLUS.
[117.] Soe. After what manner then shall we say that they
knew (the things) and founded their names? or that there
were name-founders before any name whatever was laid down,
and that they knew (the things),®” if indeed it is impossible to
learn things otherwise than from names ?
Crat. I think, Socrates, that the account respecting these
matters is the most true, (which says) that a power greater
than that of man assigned the first names to things, so that
they must of necessity be in a correct state.
Soc. Do you think then that he who laid down names,
whether he was a certain demon, or ἃ god,** would lay down
things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have
just now said nothing to the purpose ἢ
Crat. But (see) lest the other sort of these are not names.
Soc. Which sort, thou best of men? those which lead to
standing, or those to rushing-on? For, as we just now said,
it will not be determined by their number.
Crat. It is thus indeed just,®® Socrates. wen
Soc. The names then being divided into factions, and some
asserting that they are like the truth, and others that they
are, how shall we decide? or to what (tribunal) go? For
surely (we cannot go) to other names, different from these ;®°
for there are no others. But it is plain that certain other
things, besides names, must be sought after, which will show
57 After εἰδέναι Heindorf understands τὰ πράγματα, as did Ficinus,
whose version is, “‘eosque res antea cognovisse.” Stalbaum supplies
αὐτὸ, i, 6. ὄνομα, as Taylor did. But the sense is, I think, “and they
knew them,” i. 6. that the persons who knew the things, knew the parties
who gave the names. For most assuredly ἐκείνους cannot be referred to
the same persons as αὐτούς.
58 So δαίμων and θεὸς are opposed in Eurip. Hec. 164,
5° So all the MSS. and Ficinus. Heindorf suggested, with the appro-
bation of Stalbaum, Οὔτοι δὴ δίκαιόν ye, in lieu of Οὕτω 67)—But δὴ never
thus follows οὔτοι δὴ. Plato wrote, Ob γὰρ τόδ᾽ ἣν δίκαιόν ye.
® So Taylor translated ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων, before Heind. and Stalb.
But though ἕτερος can and does govern a genitive, ἄλλος cannot and does
not, except in the passages quoted by Matthie and Kuhner, which are
either corrupt or interpolated. But were the fact otherwise, a
ἄλλα could not be thus united in Plato. The usage was of a later
fact not known to Hermann; who would defend, in Eurip. Suppl. 589,
Πολλοὺς ἔτλην δὴ χἁτέρους ἄλλους πόνους : although it is evident that
the dramatist wrote, Πολλοὺς ἔτλην δὴ καρτερὸς καλοὺς πόνους : where
καλοὺς is due to Markland, and καρτεροὺς to Musgrave ; for which 1 have
substituted καρτερὸς, remembering that Ulysses is called καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ
in Οὗ. A. 242. Correctly then did Heusde read in Plato ἄττα for ἄλλα.
CRATYLUS. 391
us, without names, which of these are true, after having
pointed out, it is evident that,®! the truth of things.
[118.] Crat. It appears so to me.
Soc. It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, if such be the case,
to learn, as it seems, existing things without names.
Crat. It appears so.
Soc. Through what else then do you expect to learn them ?
Is it through any thing else than what is reasonable and most
just, through their communion with each other, if they are in
any way mutually allied, and especially through themselves ?
For surely that, which is different from and foreign to these,
would indicate something different and foreign, but not them ὃ
Crat. You appear to me to speak the truth.
Soe. But hold, by Zeus. Have we not often confessed that
names properly imposed are like the things, of which they are
the names laid down, and are the resemblances of the things ?
Crat. Yes.
Soc. If then one may learn, as much as possible, the
things through names, and likewise through themselves, which
will be the best and clearest method of learning? To learn
from a resemblance, both itself, whether it is a beautiful like-
ness, and likewise the truth, of which it is the resemblance ;
or from the truth, both itself, and whether its resemblance has
been fashioned in a becoming manner ?
Crat, There appears to me a necessity (to learn) from the
truth.
[119.] Soc. After what manner then one must learn, or
find out existing things, is perhaps a greater task than for me
and you to know; and we must be content to confess this,
that they are to be learned and sought for, not from the names,
but much rather themselves from themselves ?
Crat. It appears so, Socrates.
Soe. Still further let us consider this ; that these many names
tending to the same thing may not deceive us; if, in reality,
61 In lieu of the nonsensical δείξαντα δῆλον ὅτι, for which some would
read δηλονότι, answering to “ videlicet”’ in Ficinus, Plato evidently wrote
δείξαντι ἄδηλον éErt,—“‘ having pointed out the truth, still not evident.’
® The emendation ἀλλοῖον for ἄλλο ὃν, suggested by Heusde, has
been adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb.
% Instead of μάλιστα, common sense requires κάλλιστα, “ as well a
possible,” similar to ihe subsequent καλλίων.
δὲ In thus inserting “ if,’’ Taylor has anticipated Wyttenbach; both o.
whom found the idea in the “cum” of Ficinus. Stalbaum is content
392 CRATYLUS.
they who founded them considered all things as going-on ever
and flowing—for they appear to me to have so considered—and
if this were the case it would not thus (be well).® But these men
have fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, and are themselves
stirred about, and by dragging us along, hurl us into it. For
consider, O wondrous Cratylus, what I often dream about,
whether we should say or not that there exists in the abstract
the beautiful and the good, and each of the things existing.
Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that there does exist.
Soc. Let us then consider that very thing, not as if a coun-
tenance or any thing of this kind were beautiful—for®™ all these
appear to flow—but shall we say that beauty in the abstract
is not always such as it is?
Crat. We must.
{120.] Soe. Can one then correctly say, if it is always
secretly going away, first, that it is, and next, that it is of
such a kind? Or is it necessary, while we are speaking about
it, for it to become immediately something else, and to
secretly withdraw itself, and to be such no longer.
Crat. It is necessary.
Soc. How then can that be any thing, which never subsists
in a similar manner? For if it ever subsists® in a similar
with ἐξαπατᾶται" τῷ ὄντι piv—For he takes ἐξαπατᾶται in an active
sense, misled by a corrupt passage in Aristotle’s Problem. § 28; and
rejects entirely re after διανοηθέντες, and says that μὲν is used by an ele-
gant asyndeton for μὲν γὰρ. What Plato wrote might perhaps be guessed
at; it is however quite certain to me that he did not write ἐξαπατᾶται. τῷ
οντι ϑ-- Υ
“5 teal of ody οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽, one would expect οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι ἂν
καλῶς, ἀλλ’ ---πὰ so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. For his version
is, “‘ quorum tamen opinio, si talis exstitit, falsa habenda est.” On the
expression καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι, see my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 182. Stalbaum,
after. Heindorf, renders, ‘‘ quum tamen fortasse non ita sit.” But that
would be in correct Greek τὸ δὲ τυχὸν οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.
86 Instead of κυκῶνται, one would prefer κύκλῳ κινῶνται, i. 6. “ are
carried about in acircle.” Ficinus has “ vacillant jactanturque.” The
verb κυκᾷν seems scarcely adapted to δίνη ; which is connected with the
idea of a circular movement, not a stirring about, as a cook stirs a pot of
porridge.
87 Instead of καὶ we must read with Heindorf καὶ ydo—Ficinus has Ὁ
“‘quippe.” Stalbaum absurdly, as usual, defends the common reading. «+
ὅ85. Bekker and Stalbaum have incorrectly adopted ἴσχει from many
MSS. in lieu of ἔχει. They did not know that ἔσχει is never used in- »
transitively, except in Politic. p. 307, F., Legg. viii. p. 846, C., Rep. p.
484, B., and even there it is easy to restore the more usual form. Vainly
CRATYLUS. 393
manner, during that time ®[when it subsists in a similar
manner ],°° it is evident that it does not change; but, if it al-
ways subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can
it change, or be moved, not having started out from its own
form of existence?
Crat. By no means.
Soc. But neither can it be known by any one. For, as
soon as that approaches which is about to know it, it becomes
something else, and of a different kind, so that it cannot be
known of what quality it is, or how it subsists. Now surely
no knowledge knows that, which it knows has no manner of
subsistence.
Crat. It is as you say.
Soc. But neither, Cratylus, is it reasonable to say that
knowledge exists, if all things change and fall away, and
nothing abides. For if this very thing [I mean know-
ledge |"° itself does not change and fall away, so as to be not
knowledge, it would remain for ever [knowledge ],’! and be
knowledge; but if the form itself of knowledge changes and
falls away, it will at the same time change and fall away into
a form different from knowledge, and will be knowledge no
longer; but if it always changes and falls away, it will
always be not knowledge: and by this reasoning there would
be neither the thing about to know, nor that about to be
known. [121.] But if that always subsists which knows,
then that which is known subsists, and the beautiful subsists,
and the good subsists, and each single thing else of those ex-
isting ; nor do these appear to me to be really similar to the
flowing, or rushing-on, of which we were speaking.” But
whether these things subsist in this way, or in the way that
then does Buttman attempt to draw a nice distinction between ἔχειν and
ἔσχειν.
Sots The words within brackets are omitted by twenty MSS. and
Ficinus. They are evidently an interpolation.
7 The words ἡ γνῶσις are clearly an explanation of αὐτὸ τοῦτο.
τι Here too the words ἡ γνῶσις have been unnecessarily foisted in.
™_7 | have translated as if the Greek were οὐδὲ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα
ὅμοια τῷ ὄντι εἷναι---ῥοῆ οὐδαμὰ οὐδὲ φορα. For I cannot understand οὔ
μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὕμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ
φορᾷ. After φαίνεται the verb εἶναι could not be omitted; nor is there
any need of ὄντα, to say nothing of the asyndeton in οὔ μοι. Ficinus has
** quee in presentia dicimus, fluxus lationis similia non videntur.”’
394 CRATYLUS.
the followers of Heraclitus and many others’ assert, (see)
that it is by no means an easy subject of inquiry; nor is it the
part of a person possessing much mind, to give himself up,
and his own soul, to the study of names, (and) confiding” in
them and those that founded them, to make a bold assertion,
as if he knew something, and to give a verdict against himself
and existing things, as if nothing of any thing were sound,”
but that all things did, like (unsound)’* vessels of clay, let the
water run through ; and really, like persons labouring under a
catarrh, fancy that things are so disposed, and “things are
seized with a flowing and catarrh.” -[122.] Perhaps then,
Cratylus, this is the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is
proper to reflect upon this well and manfully,” and not
to receive any thing easily :7° for as yet you are a young man,
and possess the vigour of age ;*° and if, after reflecting, you
discover any thing, communicate it to me.
Crat. And so I will do. But rest assured, Socrates, that
even now I am not without consideration; but to me on re-
flection, and *' having had trouble, it appears to be much more
on that side®! as Heraclitus asserts.
73 Such as Protagoras and Empedocles. See Theetet. § 25. Hemp.
7 By simply inserting re after πεπιστευκότα, I have restored the
syntax, that previously laboured not a little. Taylor too has “ and con-
fiding.’’
75 On οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενὸς, Heindorf refers to Phedon, p. 68, A.
76 As not all clay-vessels, but only the unsound, let the water run
through, it is evident that Plato wrote ὥσπερ κεράμια σαθρὰ ῥεῖ. Com-
pare Gorg. p. 493, E. § 106, where a person is said to fill with difficulty
ἀγγεῖα σαθρά. On the word itself see Toup. on Longin. § 18, Heindorf
on Theetet. p. 179, D., Stalbaum on Phileb. p. 56, C., and myself on
Prom. 966.
77117 Unless I am greatly mistaken, the words ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ
karappov are the explanation of οὕτως : while it is impossible to believe
that πάντα χρήματα would be thus repeated after τὰ πράγματα. Plato
wrote, I suspect, οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, καὶ πανταχοῦ ῥεύ-
part ἔχεσθαι, i. 6. “and are every where seized with a flowing.”
78 Here, as elsewhere, MS. Gud. has alone preserved the true reading,
εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως.
79 After ἀποδέχεσθαι an accusative could scarcely be omitted. Hence
Plato probably wrote ἀποδέχεσθαί γέ τι. For γέ re could easily drop out
before ἔτι. ᾿
80. Ficinus has “ atque tibi sufficit etas.”” For he perhaps found in his
MS. ἡλικίαν ἱκανὴν ἔχεις.
81. δὶ Although πράγματα ἔχειν is correct Greek, and so is πολὺ μᾶλ-
λον, yet one would prefer πράγματα ἔχοντι πολλὰ, μᾶλλον εὖ καὶ ἐννόως
CRATYLUS. 395
Soc. Do you then hereafter, my friend, when you return 82
hither, instruct me ; but now, as you have made preparations,
proceed to the country ; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.
Crat. This shall be, Socrates; and do you also endeavour
to think upon these matters, as is meet.*?
φαίνεται ἔχειν, in lieu of ἐκείνως, or retaining ἐκείνως, φαίνεται εὖ ἔχειν.
For ἔχειν could not here stand by itself; and scarcely ἐκείνως, where the
usual word is οὕτως.
82 Ficinus, “ quando redieris,”’ which leads to ἐπειδὰν ἀνήκῃς, instead
of ἐπειδὰν ἥκῃς.
88. In lieu of ἤδη, which never ends a sentence, one would expect ἡ δεῖ,
as I have translated; or else ταῦτα δῆ. For δὴ thus closes a sentence in
Meno, § 24, καὶ πλοῦτος δή: where Buttmann quotes Demosth. Midian.
ᾧ 8, καὶ τἄλλα δή. We meet indeed with Λείπομεν ὑμᾶς, λέιπομεν ἤδη
in Philoct. 1459. But there I have τεβίογθα---λειπόμενοι δὴ, which I
should have supported by quoting Eurip. El. 1310, Καί σ᾽ ἀπολείψω, σοῦ
λειπόμενος.
a
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INTRODUCTION TO ΤῊΝ PARMENIDES.
Or all the Dialogues of Plato the Parmenides is one of the most
remarkable. For not only does it turn upon questions relating to
the most abstruse abstractions of metaphysics, but the manner too,
in which the subject is handled, affords the best illustration of that
“ sapientiz insanientis”—cleverness without sound sense—in the
meshes of which Horace says he was at one time caught; and to
which he might have fairly applied his own graphic verse—
“ Diruit, edificat, mutat quadrata rotundis.”’
Pulls down, builds up, and changes squares for rounds.
By achain of reasoning, where subtleties assume the garb of truths,
conclusions are arrived at, so as to fully justify the fear, which So-
crates is here feigned to feel, that by pursuing metaphysical inqui-
ries, he would fall into the bottomless sea of trifling ; from which,
as from Hades, according to Virgil, only they,
‘* quos ardens evexit ad ethera virtus,”
Valour soul-burning to the skies hath borne,
could hope to escape; and, like Ulysses under the guidance of the
goddess of wisdom,
‘* Salvos se superas potuisse evadere ad auras,”’
In safety could to upper air return.
Such at least seems to have been the fate of every Commentator,
who has ventured to enter the maze of mind, which Plato has with
such art built up. For neither Proclus and Damascius of the olden
time, nor more recently Ficinus, nor, within the last hundred years,
Taylor in England, Schleiermacher and others in Germany, nor
398 INTRODUCTION TO THE PARMENIDES.
Cousin in France, have been able to understand thoroughly them-
selves, and to explain satisfactorily to others, what is likely to re-
main for ever an intellectual puzzle.
It is then a fortunate circumstance for such as may be still dis-
posed to enter the labyrinth, that Stalbaum has furnished them
with a clue, by prefixing to his edition of the Parmenides, published
at Leipsig in 1848, four books of elaborate Prolegomena, running
to 343 octavo pages. For the reader will find there an ample and
generally satisfactory discussion on various points connected with
the doctrines promulgated in the dialogue. Of these perhaps the
most startling is the theory of Socher, who would have the world
believe that the Parmenides was not written by Plato, but by some
anonymous philosopher, to whom is to be attributed likewise the
Sophist and Statesman. In defence of this novel notion, which,
says Stalbaum, Socher has been unable to support by a single argu-
ment of the least weight, Stalbaum himself has produced one, that
Socher has omitted. For according to Stalbaum, Aristotle has never ~
made a direct allusion to the Parmenides ; although there seem to
be two indirect in Physic. i. 8, and as many in Sophist. El. e. ix.
But he might have added that, even if there were not a single one
of any kind whatever, it is easy to understand why Aristotle would
take no notice of Plato. For the Stagirite could not have failed to
perceive, that Plato was not so much giving expression to his own
opinions, as putting into prose what Parmenides appears to have
written in verse; while, as regards the doctrines of Zeno, it was far
better for Aristotle to draw them from the discourses of that phi-
losopher himself, than from the representations of a less faithful
reporter.
With far greater reason have Schleiermacher and Ast imagined
that the dialogue was left in an unfinished state. Perhaps it would
be safer to assert that it has come down to us ‘shorn of its fair -
proportions.’ For it is hard to believe that Plato wanted either
the power or inclination to put the finishing hand to a production,
which exhibits the marks of no common mind.
Respecting the object of the Dialogue, Taylor, echoing, as usual,
the sentiments of his favourite Proclus, fancies it was intended to
exhibit a complete system of a philosophical theology ; and hence he ©
has given it the title of ““ Parmenides, or on the Gods.” But here,
as indeed through the whole of Plato, the two Neo-Platonists have
INTRODUCTION TO THE PARMENIDES. 399
preferred to float amidst the mists of mysticism, rather than breathe
the generally clear empyreum of Plato’s mind. More correctly does
Diogenes Laert., in ix. 13, entitle it Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ᾿Ιδεῶν, and, in
iii. 50, class it with the Statesman, the Sophist, and Cratylus, as
exhibiting proofs of the philosopher’s powers as a dialectician.
Amongst the more recent translations of this Dialogue, is one in
French by Schwalbé, Par. 1844, 12, where, in a note at the end of
the argument, a reference is made to his “ Parmenide, traduit et
expliqué.” But whether he has been able to overcome any of the
difficulties arising from the corruptions of the text, I am unable
to state, as I have never seen the work; and a similar remark is
applicable to the various publications quoted by Stalbaum, who has
seldom taken the least notice of his countrymen’s verbal criticism ;
for, like Poppo in the case of. Thucydides, he seems to think that
the very words of the author have been miraculously preserved by
a certain class of MSS.; and that if they are not found there, it is
merely labour in vain to endeavour to seek for them elsewhere ;
and even in the Latin version of Ficinus, which was evidently made
_ from a MS. frequently superior to all that have been hitherto col-
lated by Bekker and others. I suspect, however, that, like the ma-
_ jority of modern scholars in France, Schwalbé does not feel himself
_ sufficiently strong in Greek to grapple with verbal difficulties ; which
after all must be first successfully mastered, before a person pre-
sumes to talk of that, with which most readers are satisfied, the
conventional sense of a passage which is felt to be difficult; but
which the genuine verbal critic knows to be difficult generally,
only because it is corrupt.
| As it is by no means easy, even with an attention constantly ex-
__erted, to follow the subtleties that pervade the whole Dialogue, it
_ will be perhaps not without its use to give Stalbaum’s summary of
the principal questions discussed, and of the conclusions to which
they lead.
A. If “the one” be supposed to exist—
_ In the first place, it is necessary to consider it abstractedly by
__ itself, and likewise in a double point of view, either as existing apart
by itself, or united to “ being ;” from whence there arise two con-
— propositions and conclusions—
. If “the one” exists, it is nothing, p. 137, C—142, B.
x If “ the one” exists, it is every thing, p. 142, B—157, B.
400 INTRODUCTION TO THE PARMENIDES.
Secondly, we must consider “the others; by which is meant
every thing except “the one” (p. 159, B. § 63); and respecting
these there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions: for,
1. If “the one” exists, “the others” are all things, p. 157, B.—
159, B.
2. If “the one” exists, “the others” are nothing, p. 159, B.—
160, B.
B. If “the not-one” be supposed to exist—
In the first place, we must consider “ the not-one” abstractedly
by itself, and likewise in a double point of view ; from whence there
arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions—
1. If “the not-one” exists, and is understood in a relative sense
with respect to “the others,” it is by itself every thing,
p. 160, B.—163, B.
2. If “the not-one” exists abstractedly, it is by itself nothing,
p- 163, B—164, B.
So too we must consider “ the others.” And hence there arise
ἮΝ conflicting propositions and conclusions—
. If “the not-one” exists, “the others,” as being freed from
one-ness, are every thing, p. 164, B.—165, E.
2. If “ the not-one” exists, “ the others” are nothing, p. 165, E.
Before, however, Parmenides, of whom Plato is the mouth-piece,
entered upon these inquiries, there should have been given defini-
tions of the terms employed, or at any rate care should have been
taken by Plato to use the same terms in always the same sense. —
But so far is this from being the case, that, as remarked by Wytten-
bach, on Phedon. p. 270, with whom Creuzer, on Plotinus Περὶ
Κάλλους, p. 169 and 388, agrees, the same meaning is assigned to
ἰδέαι and εἴδη ; although Stalbaum, on Parmenid. p. 128, E., at-
tempts to draw a nice distinction between them; and so he does
too in the case of ἄλλα and ἕτερα, in Prolegom. p. 114, although
he fairly confesses that those two words are sometimes used indis-
criminately.
PARMENIDES.
OR
ON IDEALITIES.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
CEPHALUS, ADEIMANTUS, ANTIPHO, GLAUCO, PYTHO-
DORUS, SOCRATES, ZENO, PARMENIDES.
[1.1 Wen we arrived at Athens from home, [from Clazo-
menz,!] we happened to meet with Adeimantus and Glaucon?
in the place of assembly. And Adeimantus, taking me by the
hand, said, Hail, Cephalus ;* and if you are here in want of any
thing over which we have any power, mention ittome. Nay,
I replied, I came for this very purpose, to beg of you a favour.
Will you then, says he, state your request? And I replied,
What was the name of your brother by the same mother? for
1 Although οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν would, no doubt, appear unobjection-
able to those, who are satisfied with ἐκ τοῦ ΓΑργους ἀυτόθεν in Thucyd.
v. 83, αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ in Plato Theetet. p. 143, D., atrot—év τῇ Ἐῤ-
βώπῃ, Alcibiad. i. p. 105, B., οἴκοθεν---Φαληρόθεν in Sympos. p. 172, ἐν
τῇ Τεγέᾳ αὐτοῦ, Xenoph. K. A. vii. 4. 36, yet as ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν is repeated
immediately afterwards, it is evident that in this place those words are an
interpolation. We meet indeed with οἴκονδε---Εἰς ᾿Ιθάκην in Od. Α. 17.
But the words are properly separated there, not, as here, united.
2 Of the Adeimantus and Glaucon mentioned here, and introduced as
speakers in the Republic, nothing is known, except that they were not the
brothers of Plato; although, according to C. F. Hermann, quoted by
Stalbaum in Prolegom, p. 302, they were older members of the same
family stock ; from whom the younger and collateral branches derived
their names.
% That the Cephalus here alluded to was not the father ofyLysias the
orator seems to be clearly made out. But beyond that ὅν saeco is
known satisfactorily. Ἢ
D
402 PARMENIDES.
I do not remember it: for he was a child when I first* came
here from Clazomenez; and it is now a long time since then.
His father’s name was, I think, Pyrilampes.® Just so, says
he, and (his brother’s) was Antipho. But why do you
especially ask?, These, my fellow-citizens, said I, are much
given to philosophy, and have heard that this Antipho had
frequently met with one Pythodorus,® a friend of Zeno; and
that having frequently? heard from Pythodorus the conversa-
tions which Socrates,’ Zeno, and Parmenides held with each
other, he had remembered them. You speak the truth, says
he. These then, said 1, we beg to hear. This, says he, is no
difficult matter. For, although young, he has exercised himself
greatly in them ; since? he now, after the example of his grand-
father, who is his namesake, applies himself much to equestrian
affairs. [2.] But, ifit seems good,!° we will go to him: for he is
just gone home!! from hence; and dwells hard by, in Melita.”
So saying, we went, and caught him at home, giving orders
to a coppersmith to make him a bit. But as soon as he was
at liberty, and his brothers told him the cause of our coming,
4 The MSS. vary as usual between πρότερον and πρῶτον : which is
the correct reading Stalbaum says he is unable to decide, :
5 Although Plato in Charmid. ᾧ 12, speaks of a Pyrilampes, as the uncle
of Charmides, and in Gorg. § 82, as the father of Demus, yet C. F. Her-
mann conceives that the one here mentioned was of a different family,
related to Plato by his mother’s side.
6 Pythodorus is mentioned as the friend of Zeno in Alcibiad. i. p. 119, A.
7 Here πολλὰ is put for πολλάκις. Stalbaum aptly quotes Phedon.
p- 61, C., πολλὰ---ἐντετύχηκα.
8 Atheneus in xi. p. 505, F., and Macrob. in Saturnal. i., accuse Plato of
an anachronism in making Socrates converse with Parmenides. But they
fergot, as remarked by Heindorf, that Socrates here and in the Theetetus,
§ 101, and Sophist, § 4, speaks of himself as being very young, when Par-
menides was an old man. "
9 Instead οἵ ἐπεὶ, which is here absurd, and omitted by Ficinus, one
would expect εἰ cai, “ although—” b
10 In lieu of ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δεῖ, Heind. suggested ἀλλ᾽, εἰ δοκεῖ, which is the
phrase constantly in use, as I have shown on Philoct. 1398, and to the pas-
sages quoted there I could now add a dozen more. Stalbaum defends εἰ
δεῖ, acknowledged by Proclus, and translates—‘‘if I must ;” as if Adei-
mantus, who had professed his readiness to do Cephalus a service,
consider it an act of compulsion to go with his friend to Antipho, whose
house was close at hand. τὰ Bi
1 Stal justly finds fault with Bekker for omitting οἴκαδε, which is
required by the tenor of the story. Flo?
12 This Melité was a demus of the tribe of Cecrops. gels
PARMENIDES. 403
he recognised me through my previous sojourn at this place,
and he embraced me; and on our begging him to go through
the conversations, he at first shrunk back, for he said it would
be a troublesome task; but afterwards, however, he detailed
them.
Antipho then said that Pythodorus had told bim that Zeno
and Parmenides once came to the great Panathenea;!* that
Parmenides was then a rather old man, with very hoary locks,
but of a handsome and noble aspect, and full sixty-five years
of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, very
tall and graceful to beliold, and was reported to have been
the bosom friend of Parmenides ; he said, too, that they lodged
with Pythodorus, in the Cerameicus,'* beyond the walls; whi-
ther also Socrates came, and many others with him, who were
eager to hear the writings of Zeno; for then for the first time
they had been brought by the (strangers); but that Socrates
was at that time very young. [8.] That Zeno therefore
himself read the writings to them; and Pythodorus further
related that Parmenides happened to be gone out; and that of
the discourses so read there remained only a very small portion,
when he himself entered, and Parmenides with him and Aris-
totle,!° who was one of the Thirty (Tyrants); and that he heard
but a little at that time; '®but that nevertheless he had (often)
heard the (whole)'® discourse previously from Zeno.
(He added) that Socrates, on hearing (the discourses),
entreated him to read again the first hypothesis of his first
discourse ; and that, when it was read, Socrates said—How do
you, Zeno, assert this, that if the things existing are many, the
18. On the Panatheneza, see Potter’s or Smith’s Grecian Antiquities.
™ On the two Cerameici, see Schol. in Aristoph. ‘Imz. 769. They
were in fact burial-grounds, and strewed over with fragments of the cine-
rary urns there deposited in honour of the dead. Of the same kind was
doubtless the Potter’s Field, near Jerusalem, where the body of Judas
Iscariot was thrown.
15. This Aristotle is numbered by Xenophon, in H. Ὁ. ii. 2, amongst the
Thirty Tyrants, as they were called, whom Lysander appointed to be the
governors of Athens, after it fell into his hands. Stalbaum thinks he was
the author of some Forensic speeches, mentioned by Diogenes Laert. v. 34.
- 4%— 16 Heindorf says that in the words οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε ἀλλὰ καὶ, there
is an unusual transposition of ἀλλὰ, which should follow οὐ μὴν. But
ἀλλὰ καὶ, I suspect, is a corruption of πολλάκις. Taylor, too, has inserted
‘often ” from his own head ; and “‘ whole” from “‘ omnia ”’ in Ficinus ;
unless it be said that Plato wrote ye τὰ ὅλα, which come nearer to ye ἀλλὰ,
D2
404 ; PARMENIDES.
same things must be both similar and dissimilar? But that
this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be
similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this what
you assert? Zeno answered, It is. [4.] If then it is im-
possible for dissimilars to be similar, and similars dissimilar,
it is impossible likewise for many things to exist? For if
there were many, they would undergo impossibilities. Is this
what your discourses mean? Is it any thing else than to
contest, contrary!” to all that is (usually) asserted, that “the
many” does not exist? And do you fancy that each of your
discourses is a proof of this very doctrine ? so that you conceive
you have produced as many proofs as you have written dis-
courses, (to show) that “the many” does not exist? say you
thus, or do I not rightly understand you? No, said Zeno; but
you understand quite well the meaning of the whole work.
Then said Socrates, I perceive, Parmenides, that Zeno here
wishes not only to be familiar with you in other bonds of
friendship, but in your writings likewise. For Zeno has, in
a certain manner, written the same as yourself ; but by some
change he endeavours to deceive us, as if asserting something
different. For you in your poems assert that the universe is
“one;” and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in
support of this opinion. [5.] But Zeno says that “the many”
does not exist, and he too produces very many and mighty
proofs. With regard then to the fact, that you assert that “the
one” exists, and he, that “the many” does not exist; and that
each of you speak so as to appear to have said not an atom
of the same things, although you both assert nearly the same,
it seems to me that what has been said by you is above us the
rest.'8 Τὸ is so, Socrates, said Zeno. But you do not per-
fectly comprehend the truth of niy writings; although, like
the dogs of Laconia,'® you excellently pursue and track out
1’ Heindorf properly translates παρὰ, “contrary to;” Ficinus, by
“per,” “through,” which Stalbaum adopts in defiance of the language;
for παρὰ never has that meaning. ΤῸ show more clearly what Plato in-
tended, I have inserted “ usually,” unless it be said that he wrote παρὰ
τὰ παντί τῳ λεγόμενα, not παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα. a
18 In lieu of τοὺς ἄλλους one would prefer τοὺς ἄνους, “ the simpletons.”
On the change of ἄνους and ἄλλους, see my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 106._
19 On the superiority of this breed of dogs, see the Commentators on
Soph. Aj. 8, and Virgil. Georg. iii. 345. Hence, says Proclus, that animal
was called a philosopher; just as Pope describes the elephant as “ half-
reasoning.”
PARMENIDES. 405
what is there asserted. But this in the first place lies hid
from you, that this discourse is not in every respect of so
solemn a cast, that it was written, as you say, with the set
purpose”® of being concealed from mankind,”! as if effecting
something great; yet you have spoken something of what has
happened; and in truth, these writings are a kind of sup-
port to the doctrine of Parmenides against those who en-
deavour to ridicule it, (by saying) that if “one” exists, it
would follow that such an assertion would suffer many things
of a laughable kind, and contrary to itself. This writing there-
fore contradicts those, who assert that “the many” exists ;
and it gives in return these”? and many other reasons; as it
intends to show that the hypothesis, which (asserts) the ex-
istence of “the many,” would suffer things still more laugh- -
able than that, which says of 351} “many” exist, or of “one”
existence,”* should a person go through the question suffi-
ciently. [6.] Through some such love of contention was this
discourse composed by me, when a youth; but some one stole it
after it was written, so that it was out of my power to de-
liberate whether it should be brought out into the light or not.
*4 Hence it lies hid from you, Socrates, that it was written by a
20 Perhaps διανοηθὲν might be translated, “‘ with a mental reservation.”
a it be said that Plato wrote ἰδίᾳ νοηθὲν, “to be understood pri-
vately.”’
*t Here again one would prefer τοὺς ἄνους, “ the silly,”’ to τοὺς avove,
“mankind.”
2 Tn lieu of ταῦτα, Heindorf with Schleiermacher would read ταὐτὰ,
i.e. τὰ γελοῖα. Stalbaum defends ταῦτα by saying that it refers to the
arguments, brought forward by the opponents of Parmenides. The word
is omitted by many MSS., and Ficinus. The sense seems to require ἄλλα
καὶ καλλίω ἔτι, “ other things and better still ;”’ for the question would be
decided by the excellence, not the number merely, of the arguments.
2328 Τ cannot make out the syntax in, nor see the sense of, ἡ εἰ πολλά
ἐστιν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἕν εἶναι. I could have done both had the words been, ἣ λέγει
bre πολλά ἐστιν, ἣ τούτου, ὅτι Ev: and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS.,
for his version is, “ex opinione illorum, quod scilicet multa sint, quam
ex opinione Parmenidis, quod sit unum ;”’ in English, “their hypothesis,
which says that ‘many things exist,’ than the hypothesis of this person,
that ‘ one exists.’ "ἢ
2424 This is evidently the sense of the passage. But to get at it, we
must suppose Plato to have written, ταύτῃ οὖν ce λανθάνει, ὦ Σωκρατες,
τὸ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας ἕνεκα αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ, ὡς οἴει, ὑπὸ
πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας. Ficinus found something different in his MS.,
for his version is, “‘Id ergo te fugit, O Socrates, quod existimas, non a
juvenili certamine sed a senili ambitione scriptum fuisse.”’
406 PARMENIDES.
young person through the love of contention, and not, as you
fancy, by an older one, through the love of renown, since,”
as I have said, you have not made a bad guess. I receive (the
account), says Socrates; and I think the case is as you have
stated. But tell me this too. Do you not think there is a cer-
tain form of similitude, existing itself by itself? and that another
is contrary to this, which is dissimilar? and that you and me,
and other things, which we call many, participate in these two ?
and that some things, participating in similitude, become similar
in that respect and so far as they participate? but that others,
(which participate) in dissimilitude, (become) dissimilar? and
that those (which participate in) both (become) both? But if all
things participate in both, which are contrary to each other, and
’ that similar and dissimilar to each other exist through partici-
pating of both, what is the wonder? [7.7 For, if any one should
show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars
similar, I should think it would be a prodigy. But if he
shows that such things, as participate in both of these, suffer
likewise both these, it does not appear to me, Zeno, that there
would be any thing absurd in the case; nor again, if amy one
should show that all things are one, through their participat-
ing in “the one,” and that very same things are many, through
their participating in multitude. But I should very much
wonder if any one should show that what is one, is itself
many, and on the other hand, that what are many is one; and
in a similar manner concerning all the rest. It would indeed
be worthy of wonder, if he should show that both the genera
themselves and the species in them suffered these aoe
affections. But what is there wonderful, if any one should
show that I am both one thing and many, by saying, that
when he wishes to prove I am many, that the parts on
the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the
anterior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward
from the downward parts—for I think that I participate in
multitude—but when (he desires to show that) I am one, he
will say, that, we being seven in number, I am one man,
and participate in “the one”? so that he would by this
means prove both to be true. If then any one should en-
35 Here again ἐπεὶ, “since,” is quite unintelligible. Ficinus has
i Veruntamen,” from which I can elicit nothing except αὐτοῦ δὲ πέρι, ὡς
εἰπον.: 3
PARMENIDES. 407
deavour to show that stones, wood, and all such things, are
both many and one, we would say that he shows such things
as are many and one, but not that “the one” is many, nor
“the many” one; and that he does not say any thing wonder-
ful, but what we should all confess. [8.] But if any one
should, in the first place, distribute the species of things, con-
cerning which I have just been speaking, separating them
according to their very selves, such as similitude and dissimili-
tude, and multitude and the one, and standing and motion,
and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show that
these things can in themselves be mixed and separated, I
should, Zeno, says he, be marvellously astonished. But it
appears to me that you have very manfully made this your
business; yet I should be much more astonished if any one
could solve this very same difficulty, which is involved on all
sides in species themselves; and, as you have gone through
in the case of things sensible to the sight, so (should he go
through) in the case of things comprehended by reason,
On Socrates saying this, Pythodorus observed that he
thought that Parmenides and Zeno were at each remark an-
noyed;”° but they gave the greatest attention to him, (Socrates, )
and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at
Socrates. Hence on his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said—
How worthy, Socrates, are you of admiration?’ for your
ardour in what relates to reasoning! Tell me then, have you
thus separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves,
and likewise those, that participate in them, apart? And does
similitude itself appear to you to be separate from that simili-
tude which we possess,”* and “one” and “many,” and all such
other things as you have just now heard of from Zeno? To me,
said Socrates, it does, [9.] And does it appear to you, (said
Parmenides,) that these things too exist, such as a species of
justice, itself by itself, and of the beautiful and the good, and all
things of suchakind? Yes, says he. What, is there a species
35 Instead of ἄχθεσθαι Heindorf suggested, what Stalbaum is disposed
‘toapprove, ἀχθέσεσθαι, “‘ would be annoyed.”
+1” As the verb ἄγασθαι is never, I believe, used in a passive sense, one
would prefer ἀγασθῆναι, found in Here. F. 847, of which θαυμάζεσθαι, in
two MSS., is the interpretation, as in Hesych., ᾿Αγασθείς" θαυμασθείς.
28 Ficinus has ‘‘ cujus nos participes sumus.”’ So too one MS. froma
recent hand, μετέχομεν. But Proclus, ἔχομεν, with which Thomson and
Heindorf are satisfied.
408 PARMENIDES.
of man separate from us and all the things, such as we are,
29 some species itself of man,” or of fire, or water? I have often,
said (Socrates), been in doubt, Parmenides, on this point ; whe-
ther it is necessary to speak of these in the same manner as of
those, or in a different manner. And do you doubt, Socrates,
whether itis necessary to say that of each individual thing, as
may appear to be ridiculous, such as hair, clay, and filth, or
any thing else the most worthless and vile, there is a species
apart, as being different from those which we take into our
hands? By no means, said Socrates; but (I think)*° that
things are as we see them: but (consider) lest it be not very
absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? Al-
ready it has at some time disturbed me, lest there be some-
thing of the same kind in the case of every thing. But
afterwards, when I have been standing*! in this way, I rapidly
take myself off, fearing lest, falling into an abyss of trifling,”
I should utterly perish and be lost. But, returning from
thence** to what we have just now asserted as possessing
species, I have passed my time in busying myself about
them. [10.] For, said Parmenides, you are as yet but a
young man, Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet laid hold
of you, as she will yet lay hold of you, according to my
thinking, when you shall not despise any of these things: but
now, through your juvenile age, you still look to the opinions
of men. Tell me then this. Does it appear to you, as you
39. 29 The words within the numerals I cannot understand ; nor could
Ficinus, who has omitted them.
30. Heindorf says that there is an ellipse of οἶμαι. He ought to have
elicited οἶμαι from εἶναι.
a Ficinus has “ paulisper institi.”” Hence one would read τέως στῶ,
where τέως still lies hid i in ἐγὼ, found before στῶ in two MSS., and be-
fore ἱστῶ in one. On τέως see Ruhnken on Timeus, p. 256.
® In lieu of ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν, Wyttenbach, on Plutarch de S. N. V.
p- 72, suggested ἄβυσσον φλυαρίας, as quoted by Synesius in Dion. p.
52, A., and ἄβυσσον is now found in many MSS., and φλυαρίας in one.
Stalbanm > sticks to ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν, with Schefer on Plutarch,
t. v. p. 18
* Stalbaum seems to think that ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἃ ἐλέγομεν is
such Greek as Plato would not have disdained to write. Some scholar
with better taste would expunge εἰς. He should have suggested rather
ἐκεῖθεν, similar to “unde reversus” in Ficinus; or still better, ἐκεῖθεν
δὲ ἀφικόμενος cic, A—For σῶς has steer constantly lost, as I have shown
in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 304; and to the passages quoted there, and cor-
rected, I could now add not a few more.
PARMENIDES. 409
say, that there are certain species, of which these the rest*
participating retain their appellations ; as, for instance, that
such things as participate in similitude are similars ; in great-
ness, are great; and in beauty and justice, are beautiful and
just? Entirely so, said Socrates. Does not every thing
which participates, either participate in the whole species, or
only in a part of it? Or can there be any other mode of
participation besides these? How can there be? said (So-
crates). Does it then appear to you that the whole species in
each individual of many things is one? Or how? What,
said Socrates, prevents it, Parmenides, from being 80 ἢ 85
Being, therefore, one and the same in things many and se-
parate from each other, it will be** at the same time whole,
and thus it will be separate itself from itself. It would not
be so, said (Socrates), if, just as the day, being one and the
same, is present in many places at the same time, and yet is
not the more separate from itself; in the same manner,” if
every species may be at once one and the same in all. [11.]
Pleasantly indeed, said Parmenides, do you, Socrates, make
one and the same thing to be in many places; just as if,
covering many men with a sail-cloth, you should say that
there is one whole over many ; or do you think that you would
not assert something of this kind? Perhaps so, said So-
erates. Will then the whole sail-cloth be over each person,
or one part of it over one person, and another over another ?
A part. Then, said Parmenides, these species, Socrates, are
divisible; and that which participates in them, would par-
ticipate only in a part of them; and there would no longer
be in each a whole, but only a part of each.** So it seems.
Are you then willing to assert that one species is in truth
561 scarcely understand τάδε τὰ ἄλλα. Ficinus has “ species quedam
existere, et ea, que illis participant,’ as if he had found in his MS. ὧν
τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα--
35. Instead of ἕν εἶναι, Stalbaum has adopted ἐνεῖναι, the correction of
Schleiermacher.
35 Heindorf reads ἔνεσται for ἕν ἔσται.
ὅτ Ficinus supplies, what makes the sense clearer, “ ita nihil prohibet, a
unless we omit εἰ, with Stephens, and read εἰδῶν ἂν tv—to which ? ἕν,
omitted by Bekker, from many MSS., before ἔν, seems to lead.
% Schleiermacher once wished to read ἑκάστῳ for ἑκάστου, which
Heindorf adopted. He was subsequently content with the old reading.
Stalbaum has suggested ἑκάστοτ᾽ ἂν. But ἑκάστοτε is seldom found in
Plato except united to verbs of speaking.
410 PARMENIDES.
divided, and that it is still one? By no means, said (So-.
. erates). For see, said (Parmenides), whether, if you should,
divide magnitude itself, and if each of the many things
which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude, less
than magnitude itself, it would not appear absurd. Entirely
so, said (Socrates). δὰ τ θ
What then? * Will each little thing, by taking a part of
the equal, have that, which, to a thing less than the
itself, will be the thing having equal to some thing 339. It is
impossible. 4° But some one of us will possess a part of the
small; and the small itself will be greater than this, inasmuch
as it is a part of itself; and thus the small itself will be
greater: but that to which the part taken away shall be added,
will become smaller, but not greater than before. [12.] This,
said Socrates, cannot be.*° After what manner then, Socrates,
3989 Such is the literal and nonsensical version of the unintelligible
Greek. Ficinus has, “ Ipsius equalis parte unumquidque parvum parti-
cipans habebit, quo minore existente quam ipsum equale, id, quod habet,
zequale alicui sit ;’”? which I cannot understand: and I am equally in the
dark as regards Heindorf’s translation—‘“ Quando quidque parvam ali-
quam τοῦ ἴσου particulam acceperit, continebitne hoc in se aliquid;
quo, quanquam id minus sit quam ipsum τὸ ἔσον, tamen cui Tel
equale effici possit?’’ But to get even at this sense, Heindorf is com-
pelled to acknowledge that the words τὸ ἔχον, in which the principal
difficulty lies, might be omitted without any detriment to the sense; as
if either Plato or any other correct writer would thus insert words
fectly useless. Stalbaum, who hardly ever pens a note at once original,
acute, and satisfactory, is content to reprint Heindorf’s, as if it had left
nothing to desire. 1 could, perhaps, have understood the Greek, had it
been to this effect—Ti dai; τοῦ ἴσου μέρος ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολάβον,
τί ἕξει: Τῷ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ἔχειν τοῦ ἴσον τι ἀδύνατον,
i. 6. “ What then? If each small thing obtains a part of the equal, what
will it have? It will be impossible for that, which is less than the equal
itself, to have any part of the equal.’ With regard to the general sense,
Proclus says, as translated by Taylor, “If any thing has a share in a
part of equality, it has a share in something less than the whole; but
that which participates in the lesser, is no longer lesser, ΡΝ . This,
however, ought not to be; since it has been agreed that forms (εἴδη)
give the appellation of themselves to sensibles. Hence that which par.
ticipates in the lesser, must not be called equal, but lesser ; nor must ὧν
which participates in the equal, be called lesser, but equal; nor that,
which participates in the greater, be called equal or lesser, but greater.””
4°40 According to Proclus, all within the numerals was thought by some
persons to be spurious in consequence of the difficulty of perceiving what
Plato was aimingat. Tried by this test, nearly the whole of what Proclus
has written himself might be rejected as apocryphal. Absurd as. the
theory is, it has been adopted by some of the modern scholars of Germany,
PARMENIDES. ‘Sie
can the other things participate in species, if they are able to
participate neither according to parts, nor according to wholes ?
It does not, said (Socrates), appear to me, by Zeus, to be at all
an easy matter to define in a question of this kind. What
then? How stands the case with you in regard to this? To
what? I think that you consider every species as one, on some
such account as this. When some things many in number seem
to you to be great, there seems perhaps to be one and the same
idea to you, who survey them all; from whence you con-
sider the great to be one. You speak the truth, said So-
erates; but what, as regards the great itself, and the other
things which are great, if you look upon them all in like
manner through the soul, will not, on the other hand, a cer-
tain one thing appear to you great, through which all these
necessarily seem to be great? It seems so. Another species
of magnitude will then become apparent, besides magnitude
itself and its participants: and in addition to all these, another
(species), through which all these become great ; each of your
Species will no longer be one, but infinite in number. But,
in the case of Thucydides especially ; for they thus found it much easier
to cut out corruptions than to cure them. In the present case, however,
Stalbaum refuses to admit the notion of an interpolation, and least of all
in a passage which, he says, is so clear, that a person must be blind in-
deed not to understand it. Accordingly he thus translates the first sen-
tence ; “ Let us suppose that any one of us contains in himself a part
of smallness itself.’? But although he asserts that the use of the future
in a hypothetical sense has nothing uncommon in it, he will find it difficult
to produce a single similar instance in the whole of Plato. And even if
he could find one in every page, yet he ought to have shown likewise
how, in a purely abstract question, there could be any allusion to human
beings, taken individually; for the expressions ἐν ἡμῖν and wap’ ἡμῖν, in
§ 15, are not in point. By observing, however, the balance of the sen-
tences, it is easy to see that as τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος is opposed to the pre-
ceding τοῦ ἴσου μέρος, so ought the latter part of one clause to balance
the latter part of the other. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote—AdAa
TOU σμικροῦ μέρος ἕκαστον μέγα aroha Bor τι ἕξει: ‘Qc οἶμαι, τούτου
δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται, ἅτε μέρους αὐτοῦ ὄντος : i. 6. “ But if
each great thing obtains a part of the small, what will it have? As I
think, the small itself will be greater than this (great thing), as being (the
great) in a part of it (the small). And if this be a real restoration of
what Plato wrote, we must read—Kai εἰ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον
ἔσται μεγαλου, ᾧ γ᾽ ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν, τοῦτ᾽ ἔτι σμικρότερον
ἔσται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μεῖζον ἢ τὸ πρίν. i. 6. “ And if the small itself is thus
greater than the great thing, that, to which what has been taken away shall
be added, will be still smaller, and not greater than before.”
412 PARMENIDES.
said Socrates, (Have a care,) Parmenides, lest each of these
species be nothing more than a mental conception, and that it
is not meet for it to exist any where but in souls. For thus
each would be one, nor would the consequences, just now
mentioned, occur. [13.] What then, said (Parmenides), is
each of these mental conceptions one, and is there a mental
conception of nothing? This, (said Socrates, ) is impossible. It
is then of something? Yes. Of a being or of a non-being ὃ
Of a being. Is it not of some one thing, *! which that mental
conception understands as being a one certain idea over all
things ?4! Yes. Will not then that species, which is under-
stood to be one, be always the same over all things? This, on
the other hand, seems to be necessary. But what, said Par-
menides, Is it not necessary, since you say that the other
things participate in species, either that each should seem to
you to be from mental conceptions, and that all of them under-
stand, or that being mental conceptions, they understand
nothing? But this, said Socrates, has no reason for it. But
this appears, Parmenides, to me to be for the most part
the case. That these species stand, as it were, patterns
in nature; but that the other things are similar to them,
and are their resemblances: and that this participation of
species by the other things, is nothing more than an assi-
milation to them. If then any thing, said (Parmenides),
becomes similar to the species, can it be possible for that
species not to be similar to the assimilated, so far as it is ren-
dered similar? Or is there any method by which the similar
would not be similar to the similar? There is not. Is there
not, therefore, a great necessity for the similar to participate
in one and the same form as the similar? There is a neces-
sity. But will not that, through the participation of which
the similars become similars, be species itself? Entirely so.
[14.] It is not, therefore, posssible for a thing to be similar to
the species, nor the species to another. For otherwise an-
4141 Instead of ἐπὸν νοεῖ, Thomson proposed to read ἐπινοεῖ, and so one
MS. Βαϊ ἐπὶ would haveno meaning here. The three oldest MSS. offer
εἱποννοεῖν. Ficinus found in his MS. ἑπομένην. For his version is
** notionem—sequentem.”” There is some deep-seated error here. From
the subsequent ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, it is evident that Plato did not write
ἐπόν. He might have written, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὃν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα νοεῖ, εἰπεῖν
τ᾽ ἦν μίαν τιν᾽ οὖσαν ἰδέαν, i. 6. “ which that conception understands as
being over all, and of which one may speak as being a certain one idea.”’
PARMENIDES. 418
other species will always appear by the side of the species;
and should this again become similar to another, another
(would appear); and a new species would never cease to be
continually produced, if the species should be produced similar
to its participant. You speak most truly. Hence, then, the
other things do not participate in species through similitude ;
but it is necessary to seek after something else, through
which they do participate. So it seems.
See you then, Socrates, said (Parmenides), how great is the
difficulty, should any one define species as existing themselves
by themselves? Very much so. Know then well, said (Parme-
nides), that you do not apprehend at all, so to speak, how great
is the difficulty, if, separating each of the things existing, you
should lay down one species. How so, said (Socrates)? There
are many and other (doubts), said (Parmenides) ; but this is
the greatest. Should any one assert that it is not proper for
the species to be known, if they are such as we have said they
ought to be, a person would not have it in his power to de-
monstrate to the party asserting this, that he is deceived; un-
less he who doubts is skilled in many thngs, and is of a good
disposition, and willing to follow the demonstrator, while
busied in many (proofs), and these far-fetched ; while he who
holds, as a matter of necessity, that they are not to be known,
will be unpersuaded. [15.] In what way, Parmenides?
said Socrates. Because, Socrates, I think that both you and
(any)* other person, who lays down that the essence of each
species exists itself by itself, would allow, in the first place,
that not one of them exists in us. For, said Socrates, how
could it still exist itself by itself? You speak well, (Par-
menides) said. But do not such ideas as are, with relation to
each other, such as they are, possess also their essence with
respect to themselves, and not with reference to things exist-
ing among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever
manner a person may set them down; by the names of each
#2 This “any” is supported by ικ quemvis ” in Ficinus ; who found, I sus-
pect, in his MS, ἄλλον τινα, ὅστις αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τινα
τίθεται εἶναι : for his version is, ‘ quicunque essentiam quandam cujus-
que ipsam secundum se existentem Ponit ; ;” and thus we shall get rid of
Twa, improperly interposed between αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν, and of αὐτοῦ
(omitted likewise in the oldest MS.) before ἑκάστου, and unite τινα
closely, as it should be, to οὐσίαν. To these niceties, strange to say, not
even Heindorf has paid the least attention.
414 PARMENIDES.
of which, while we participate in them, we are called? but
the things existing among us, and which are synonymous to
those, exist, on the other hand, with reference to themselves,
and not with relation to the species ;-and belong to themselves,
but not to those which receive from them a common app
lation. How say you? replied Socrates. As if, said Parmie-
nides, some one of us should be the master or slave of any one’;
“3for a slave is surely not the slave of a master, who is ab-
stractedly speaking a master, nor is a master the master of a
slave, who is abstractedly speaking a slave ;# ‘but
a man, both these are of a man;** “but master itself is that,
which it is from its relation to slavery itself; and slavery itself
is in a similar manner slavery with reference to mastery it-
self.*° But what are in us do not possess any power, as regards
those, nor those any, as regards us; but they exist, as I say, from
themselves, and with relation to themselves ; and those by us
ina similar manner with relation to themselves. Or do you
not understand what I am saying ? I understand, said Socrates,
perfectly. [16.] 4° Would not science itself, said (Parmenides),
which is a thing science, be a science of that itself which is a
thing truth.** Certainly. But would each of the sciences which
#43 This I presume is the meaning of the Greek words, οὐκ αὐτοῦ
δεσπότου ὕ ἐστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλός ἐστιν" οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὅ
ἐστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης : where, I confess, I cannot understand
ἐκείνου : nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. I have therefore trans-
lated as if the Greek were, δοῦλος ὁ δοῦλος, to balance δεσπότης ὃ
δεσπότης. ;
“*_44 Here again the sense is obscure, because the words are corrupt.
Ficinus renders “ sed hac utraque est tanquam homo.” For he found in
his MS. ἀλλ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ἀμφότερα ταῦτά ἐστι: Where ἀνθρώπου was
omitted, as it is ἴη ἥν MSS. What Plato even meant to say, I will leave’
for others to discover. ¥2
45. 45. Such is nearly Taylor’s translation of the Greek words, αὐτῇ δὲ
δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἔστιν, 6 ἐστί, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτὴ dov-
λεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας : where the balance of the sentence plainly proves
that δουλεία is an interpolation; although it is acknowledged by the ver-
sion of Ficinus, “ ipsa vero dominatio servitutis ipsius existit id, quod est;
et ipsa iterum servitus eodem modo ipsius dominatio est servitus.”
Heindorf indeed asserts that δουλεία here answers to ὃ ἐστὲ in the pre
ceding clause; but to those words is to be referred ὡσαύτως. From the
“iterum” in Ficinus, it is evident he found in his MS. cai—av αὐτὴ. ἡ
4646 Here again is a mass of Greek words, out of which I can make
not an atom of sense. I have given therefore an unintelligible literal
translation. Ficinus has, “Nonne et scientia ipsa, quod scientia est,
illius ipsius, quod est veritas, scientia?”’? He therefore found in his MS.
ee
PARMENIDES. 415
exists really, be the science of each of the things which exist
really, or not? Yes, it would. But would not the science
which is among us be the science*’ of the truth which is?
And again, would not each science that is among us, turn out
to be the science of things existing among us? It is neces-
sary. But, as you have admitted, we do not possess species
themselves, nor is it possible for them to exist among us.
For it is πού. But each of the genera, which really exist, are
surely known by the species itself of its proper science. Yes.
But this species we do not possess. For we do not. No
species therefore is known by us, since we do not participate
in science itself? It appears itis not. Therefore the beauti-
ful itself, which exists really, and the good itself, and all the
things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown
to us? It nearly seems so. [17.] Now look at this, which is
yet still more dreadful. What? Would you say, or not,** that,
if there is a certain species itself of science, it would be*?
much more accurate than the science which is among us? and
beauty (itself),°° and every thing else in the same manner ?*!
Certainly. If then any thing else participates in science it-
self, would you not say that no one possesses the most
accurate science more than a god? It is necessary (to say so).
But will a god, possessing science itself, be able to know the
matters among us? Why not? Because, said Parmenides, it
Οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτή μὲν, ὕ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὐτῆς ἐκείνης,
ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, ἐπιστήμη, instead of ἐπιστήμη τῆς, ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια,
ἀυτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη : while Proclus, in lieu of τῆς, ὃ ἔστιν
ἀλήθεια, has τῆς ἀληθείας, correctly as far as the language is concerned ;
for ὃ ἔστιν cannot be thus inserted between τῆς and ἀλήθεια or ἀληθείας,
but must follow the noun or pronoun to which it belongs, as shown by
ἐπιστήμη αὐτὴ μεν, ὃ ἔστιν, and ἐπιστημῶν ἣ ἔστιν, and τῶν ὄντων, ὃ
ἔστιν. Had the Greek been Οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν, ὃ
ἔστι, ἀληθείας ὅ ἔστιν, αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη, the sense would haye
been as intelligible in that language as it is in English—‘‘ Would not
science too itself, said Parmenides, which exists really, be the science of
truth itself, which exists really.”
* The MS. of Ficinus has luckily preserved the word ἐπιστήμη, want-
ing in all the other MSS., as shown by his version—‘ Scientia vero nostra
nonne veritatis, que circa nos, scientia erit ?”’
8 Ficinus omits ἢ οὗ. His version is ‘“‘ Num fateris, si—’’
_* I have translated as if the Greek were ἂν εἶναι instead of εἶναι.
* Ficinus has, what the sense requires, “et ipsam pulchritudinem,”
for he doubtless found in his MS. καὶ αὐτὸ κάλλος, not καὶ κάλλος.
51 Ficinus, ‘‘ eodem pacto,” which leads to ὡσαύτως in lieu of οὕτως.
416 PARMENIDES,
has been, Socrates, confessed by us, that those species do not
possess the power, which they possess, in relation to those
among us, nor those among us in relation to them; but that
each (possess their power) in relation to themselves. It was
so confessed. If then there is this®? the most exact
with the deity, and this the most exact science, their®? mastery
will not rule over us, nor will (their) science know us, nor
aught of the things among us; and similarly we donot rule™
over them by our rule, nor do we know aught of things di-
vine®® by our science. [18.] °®[And again, according to the
same reasoning, they will neither, though gods, be our masters,
nor have any knowledge of human affairs }.°° But (have a care),
said (Socrates), lest the reasoning be not very wonderful,
should it deprive the deity of the power of knowing. These,
said Parmenides, and very many others, Socrates, in addition
to these, it is necessary for the species to undergo, if there
are these ideas of things existing, and if any one shall define
each species, as being something itself; so that the hearer
may be in a difficulty, and, doubting, contend that such
do not exist; or if they do exist ever so much, that there is a
great necessity for them to be unknown by human nature;
and that he who says so, seems to say something to the pur-
pose ; and to be, as we just now stated,*’ a person wonderfully
difficult to be persuaded, and that there is (need)** of a person
52 Heindorf would read twice αὐτὴ for αὕτη, from Ficinus’s version,
“‘suprema ipsa dominatio——ipsa suprema scientia.” Stalbaum retains
αὕτη, which he explains by “ illa, quam dixi.”
88 The introduction of the plural ἐκείνων, when only a single deity had
been just before mentioned, seems very strange. Correctly then has
Ficinus omitted ἐκείνων here, although he acknowledges the same word
a little below.
5+ After the preceding ἂν δεσπόσειεν, one would expect here, to pre-
serve the balance of the sentence, ἄρχοιμεν ἂν, and γιγνώσκοιμεν ἂν,
instead of ἄρχομεν and γιγνώσκομεν dy: and so perhaps Ficinus found
in his MS. For his version is, “ imperabimus—percipiemus.”” vind
85 Here likewise, to preserve the antithesis in ἡμᾶς οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν
παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, one would have expected to find before τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν the
words τὸν θεὸν οὔτε, or rode θεοὺς οὔτε.
5656 All within the brackets is evidently useless after the preceding
reasoning ; although the whole clause was read by Proclus, who says that
the expression “ θεοὶ évreg” being added, affords a considerable —
stration of ve oragiee 6
57 In p. 133, B. § 14.
-
P
'
τ
88. Heindorf. was the first to see that δεῖν had dropt out has il a
PARMENIDES. 417
naturally clever to be able to perceive that there is a certain
genus of each thing, and an essence existing itself by itself:
but of a person still more wonderful, who shall discover (him-
self’),5° and be able to teach another to distinguish™ all these
in a sufficient manner. I agree with you, Parmenides, said
Socrates, for you speak entirely to my mind.
But however, said Parmenides, If any one, Socrates, on
the contrary, will not admit that there are species of ex-
isting things, looking to what has been now said, [and to other
things of the same kind,*'] © nor will define the species of each
thing as being something itself,®® he will not have where to
turn his thoughts, while he does not permit the idea of each
existing thing to be always the same; and by this means he
will entirely destroy the power of speaking logically. Some
such thing as this you seem to me to have perceived even
more.® You speak the truth, Socrates said. [19.| What
then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will
you turn yourself, if these are unknown? Indeed I do not
seem to myself to see clearly at present. Before you exercised
yourself, said (Parmenides), you endeavoured,® Socrates, be-
should have inserted it before ἀνδρὸς, not after εὐφυοῦς. Ficinus has,
“viri admodum ingeniosi esse;”’ for he found perhaps in his MS. μὲν
εἶναι, similar to which is μὲν ody in one of the oldest MSS.
59 The antithesis in εὑρήσοντος and ἄλλον διδάξαι, plainly proves
that αὐτοῦ has dropt out after eto7c0vr0c—Ficinus has ““ postquam inve-
nerit,”’ as if his MS. offered εὑρόντος or εὑρηκότος.
6 As the act of distinguishing must be subsequent to, or coincident
with, that of teaching, we must read διευκρινησόμενον, as I have trans-
lated, in lieu of διευκρινησάμενον.
61 Ficinus omits the words καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα correctly, for they are not
only useless, but actually absurd; as if Plato would thus allude not only
to what had been said, but to something similar, which had not.
& All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; al-
though duly translated by Ficinus—“ neque speciem ipsam uniuscujusque
distinguat,”’ who therefore found in his MS. not μηδέ re ὁριεῖται εἶδος
ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, but μηοὲ αὐτό τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, as just above,
ὁριεῖται τις αὐτὸ τι ἕκαστον εἶδος.
58. Stalbaum says that “ although one would easily suspect that καὶ μάλα
ought to be read, yet we must not alter any thing.” He did not perceive
however, that as Ficinus has not badly, as he confesses himself, “ tu pree-
cipue sensisse mihi videris,”” we might elicit from thence καὶ μάλιστα, in
lieu of καὶ μᾶλλον : and still less that the sense requires here κάλλιον
veov ἠσθῆσθαι, ‘to have perceived better than a young person ;” for
that Socrates was then very young, is shown by § 2.
% 1 have adopted ἐπεχείρεις, found in two excellent MSS., in lieu of
ἐπεχειρεῖς, for the allusion is to a past act.
25
4}3 PARMENIDES.
times® to define what is the beautiful, the just, and the good,
and each of the other species: for I lately perceived, and I heard
you discoursing with this Aristotle here. . Beautiful and
divine, be assured, is that ardour of yours, by which you rush
onwards to rational conversations. But draw yourself out,®
and exercise yourself (still) more while you are yet young, on
account of (the ardour) appearing useless to the many, and
being called by them a mere idle talking; for if you do te
the truth will escape you completely.
What then, said (Socrates), is the method of the eugene
Parmenides ? That, said (Parmenides), which you haye heard
from Zeno, except this, 1 admired you while asserting, con-
trary to Zeno,® that you did not permit (a person) in the things
seen (by the eye) to look into the aberration about them, but
about those, which a person could especially lay hold of by
reason, and would consider to be species.®® For it appears to
me, said (Socrates), that in this way it would be not difficult
to prove that the things existing are both similar and dis-
similar, and suffering any other state whatever. You speak
well, said (Parmenides): but it is necessary for you to do this
likewise ; not only to make a supposition, whether each thing
exists, and to consider the consequences from the supposition,
but also, if it does not exist, to suppose this same thing,”° if
you wish to be more exercised (in this matter). How say JOM,
hy Ruhnken, on Timeus, p. 226, says that πρῷ rarely means πρὸ τοῦ
δέοντος, “too early.” It never has that meaning. Heindorf vainly re-
fers to Trach. 630, δέδοικα γὰρ, Μὴ row λέγοις ἂν τὸν πόθον τὸν ἔξ
Πρὶν εἰδέναι τἀκεῖθεν. For there Sophocles wrote Μὴ moiv—Néyye ἂν
Πρὶν, for thus πρὲν is repeated perpetually in both clauses. rer?
8° The metaphor in ἕλκυσον σαυτὸν, “draw yourself out,” Heindorf
says is taken from weaving; where a thread becomes the finer the more
itis drawn out. We have a similar metaphor in English ; where a person
is said “to draw out the thread of his verbosity finer than the staple of
his argument ;”’ quoted from one of Foote’s farces by Porson in his Let- :
ters to Travis, if I rightly remember. Ficinus has “ collige te ipsum."
67 1 cannot understand πλὴν τοῦτο. Ficinus has, “ Sed etiam illud.”
* See § 7 and 8.
® The reading εἴδη, which Heindorf rejected, is found in all the Mss.
but two, and confirmed by “ Species” in Ficinus. The sense. seems
however to require καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο ὄντως εἶναι, i. 6. “and would
consider to be in reality species.’
” I confess I cannot understand what is meant here by τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτό.
I could have understood τοιοῦτὸ γ᾽ αὖ ri—i. 6. “some such thing on the
other hand. = Ono
PARMENIDES. 419
said (Socrates)? [20.] As if, said (Parmenides), you should
wish to (exercise yourself) in ‘the hypothesis which Zeno has
laid down, that, “if there are many things,” what must happen
both to “the many,” with respect to themselves, and to “ the
one;” and to “the one” with respect to itself, and to “the many:”
and “if many are not,” to consider again what will happen both
to “the one” and to “the many,” with respect to themselves and
to each other: and again, if you made the supposition “if simi-
litude is,” or “if it is not,” what will on each supposition happen
both to the things supposed and to the others, with respect to
themselves and to each other; and the same reasoning (must
be) concerning “the dissimilar,” and “ motion” and “standing,”
and “generation” and “destruction,” and “entity” and “ non-
entity ;” and, in one word, concerning every thing which you
Suppose either to be or not to be, or suffering any other state
whatever, it is necessary to consider what will happen both to
itself and to each individual of the other things, which you
may select, and towards many, and towards all things in a
similar manner ; and again, how the other things are related
to themselves, and to another, which you may select, whether
you suppose that, which is the subject of your supposition,
as existing or not existing; if you are about to be exercised
in a masterly manner, and to perceive thoroughly the truth.
You are speaking, Parmenides, of an impossible occupation,
said Socrates, nor do I very well understand you. But why
do you not go through a certain supposition yourself, that I
may learn the better? You enjoin, Socrates, said (Parmenides),
a great task upon a man so old as myself. But why do not you
then, Zeno, said Socrates, go through it for us ? And then (Py-
thodorus) stated that Zeno laughing said—[21.] Let us, So-
crates, request Parmenides himself; for (see) lest it be no trifling
matter, as he says ; or do you not perceive how great a task you
are enjoining? If then we were many it would not be pro-
per to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially
for a man of such an age, to speak things of this kind before
many. For the many are ignorant that, without this discur-
siveness and wandering through all things, it is impossible for
¢he inind to meet with the truth, and to keep possession of it.
I therefore, Parmenides, do, t together with Socrates, make the
request in order that I too may rafter a long time hear it. On
Zeno so saying, Antiphon τὰς 0G Pythodorus related that
Ez
420 PARMENIDES.
he too, and Aristotle, and the rest, entreated Parmenides to de-
clare what he had said, and not to do otherwise. There is a ne-
cessity then, said Parmenides, for me to comply; although I
seem to myself to suffer the fate of the horse of Ibyeus, to
whom as being a competitor and rather old, when about to
contend in a chariot race, and fearing through his experience
for the event, Ibycus*! compares himself by saying, “ Thus I
too, who am so old, am forced to the contests of love to go;”
so I, upon recollection, appear to myself to feel a great fear
how I, at such an age, must swim through such and so great a
sea 7 of words ;" yet I must gratify you, since, as Zeno says,
we are by ourselves. Whence then shall we begin; and what
shall we first of all suppose? [22.] Or are you willing,
since it seems good to play a business-like game, for me to
begin from myself, and my own hypothesis, by supposing,
with respect to “the one itself,” if one “is,” or “is not,”
what must happen? By all means, said Zeno. Who then,
said (Parmenides), will answer me? Will the youngest?
For he will have very little trouble; for™ he will answer
what he thinks; and his answer will be at the same time
a resting-place for me. I am prepared, said Aristotle, in
this point,’ for you, Parmenides; for you mean me, when
71 The fragment preserved by the Scholiast here and Proclus was first
edited by F. Ursinus in Fragm. Lyr. p. 115, and reprinted by Schnei-
dewinn in Ibyci Fragm. Gotting. 1833, and restored to a new metrical
form by Hermann in Jahn’s and Klotz’s Pedagog. 1833, p. 380, and by
Bergk in Lyrici Greci.
72 With a want of critical taste and tact, very unusual, Heindorf rejects
the reading πέλαγος in lieu of πλῆθος, preserved by Ficinus alone, and
which even Fischer was disposed to adopt after he had read what had
been written in its support by Ruhnken on Timeus, p. 79, and Valckenaer
on Hippol. 822, and that Hesychius explains πέλαγος by πλῆθος. Stal-
baum however and Koch still stick to πλῆθος.
73 Stalbaum has edited ὅμως δὲ---δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁ
Ζήνων λέγει---αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν. But the second γὰρ is properly omitted
by Bekker with the five best MSS., although it is found in Legg. viii. p.
836, B., Protag. p. 309, A., Aristoph. Ach, 506, but omitted in the similar
phrase in Menex. § 5, σοί ye dei χαρίζεσθαι---ἐπειδή ye μόνω ἐσμὲν.
Alcib. i. p. 118, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμὲν, ῥητέον. Stalbaum ought rather to
have omitted the first γὰρ with three MSS., and to have read καθ᾽ ὃ in-
stead of καὶ 6— ἴω
74 Instead of καὶ Plato evidently wrote καὶ γὰρ---
7 The MSS. offer here τοῦτο for τοῦτον, to which Heindorf properly
objected. But ἕτοιμος τοῦτο is scarcely good Greek. One would expect
τοῦτο ποιεῖν, OY We must omit τοῦτο with Ficinus.
PARMENIDES. 491
speaking of the youngest. Ask me then, as one who will an-
swer you. Be it so, said (Parmenides).
If “ one” is, is it not that “ the one” will not be many?
For how can it be? There must then be of it neither a part
nor a whole. How so? [5 not a part a part of a whole?
Yes. But what isa whole? Would not that, to which no
part is wanting, be a whole? Entirely so. On both sides
then “ the one” would be (composed) of parts, as being a
whole and having parts? It is necessary. And so in both
ways “the one” will be many, but not one. True. But it
must be not many, but one. It must. Hence, it will neither
be a whole, nor possess parts, if “the one” is one. It will
not. [23.] If then it has no parts, it has neither beginning,
nor middle, nor end; for such as these would be its parts?
Right. But end and beginning are the bounds of each
thing? Hownot? ‘“ Theone” therefore is infinite, if it has
neither beginning nor end? Infinite. And therefore with-
out figure; for it neither participates of the round nor the
straight. Howso? For the round figure” is that, the ex-
tremities of which are on all sides equally distant from the
middle. Yes. And the straight is that, the middle of which
is situated before both the extremes?’® It is so. Would
not then “‘ the one” have parts, and be many, whether it par-
ticipates in a straight figure or a round? Entirely so. It is
therefore neither straight nor circular, since it has not parts.
Right. And being such, it will be no where; for it would
be neither in another, nor in itself. How so? Being in
another, it would somehow be surrounded circularly by that,
in which it might be, and it would be touched by many things
in many places. But it is impossible for “the one,” being
without parts, and not participating in a circle, to be touched
in a circle in many places. It is impossible. [24.] But
being itself in itself, it would be likewise surrounding itself;
since it is no other than itself, if it were in itself 77 for it is
76 Thomson appositely refers to Cicero. N. Ὁ. ii. 18.
76 This is a strange definition of a straight line, or figure. In lieu of
ἐπίπροσθεν, Proclus has ἐπιπροσθοῦν, From which others may perhaps,
what I cannot, elicit the true reading by the aid of Euclid’s definition of
a straight line—EvGcia γραμμή ἐστιν, ἥτις ἐξίσου τοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ σημείοις
“Κεῖται. Ficinus has ‘‘ Rectum vero, cujus medium extremis utrisque
precedit,” which is just as unintelligible as the Greek.
717 The words between the numerals, Stalbaum says, merely repeat
422 PARMENIDES.
impossible for a thing to be in that, which does not surround
it. It is impossible. [24.] Would not then that, which
contains, be one thing, and that which is contained, another?
78 For the same whole cannot at the same time suffer and do
both these :78 and thus “ the one” would no longer be oné,
but two. It certainly would not. “ The one,” therefore, is
not any where, being neither in itself nor in another. It is
not. But consider, whether, being in this state, it is possible
for it to stand or be moved. Why can it not? Because be-
ing moved it would be carried on or be changed ;” for these
alone are the kinds of motion. Certainly. But “the one”
being changed from itself, it is impossible surely for it to be
still one. Impossible. It is not then moved as regards a
change. It appears it isnot. But is it by being carried on?
Perhaps so. And yet if “ the one” is carried on, it would be
either carried round in the same circle, or it would change
from one place to another. Necessarily so. But ought not
that, which is carried round in a circle, to stand firm in the
middle, and to have the other parts of itself carried about the
middle? But what method is there for that, which has neither
a middle nor parts, to be carried circularly about the middle?
There is none. But by changing its position it is some-
times here and other times there, and is moved? If in-
deed it (were moved).®° Has it not appeared to be im
sible for “the one” to be in any thing? It has. [25.
it not much more impossible for it to be in the act of bein
(in any thing)?*! Ido not understand how. If any thing is
in the act of being in any thing, is it not necessary for it to be
not yet in it, since it is in the act of being; nor yet entirely
the preceding ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν. But he does not say what could induce
Plato to introduce so useless a repetition.
-- 8. Such is the translation of the Latin of Ficinus, “ Nunquam enim
idem ipsum totum utraque hee simul pateretur et ageret,” as if he had
found in his MS, ob γὰρ ὅλον ye ταὐτὸν ἄμφω τούτω ἅμα πείσεται καὶ
ποιήσει, of which both Heind, and Stalb. approve.
τὸ ‘The same idea in Thesetet. p- 181, Ὁ. § 95.
*° In lieu of Εἴπερ ye δὴ, Ficinus found in his MS. Ἴσως, answeridly to
his “Forte.” But after Εἴπερ is to be supplied κινεῖται, as pers
Stalbaum.
51. Ficinus has “ in aliquo fieri,” as if he had found in his MS. ἔτι. ἐν
τῳ γίγνεσθαι, not simply ἔτι γίγνεσθαι: or else ἔτε wy, answering to
ὕπῳ in the next remark of Aristotle: although ἔν rw is supported by. _
next question of Parmenides. ἶ
PARMENIDES. 423
out of it, if it be already in the act of being? It is necessary.
If then any other thing suffers this state, that alone would
suffer it, which possesses parts; for one part of it would be
in that thing, but another out of it; but it will not be possible
for that, which has no parts, to be by any means wholly within
or without any thing. It is true. But is it not much more
impossible for that, which neither has parts nor happens to be
a whole, to be in the act of being in any thing; since it can
neither exist in the act of being according to parts, nor ac-
cording toa whole? So it appears. Hence it does not change
its place, neither by going any where, nor in the act of being
in any thing, nor in being carried round in the same, nor in
being changed. It does not appear it does. ‘The one” there-
fore is immovable, according to every kind of motion. Im-
movable. But we have likewise asserted that it is impossible
for “‘the one” to be in any thing. We have said so. It can
never therefore be in “the same.” Why so? Because it
would be already in that,** in which it is(as if) in “the same.” 895
Entirely so. But the one itself*4 can neither be in itself nor
in another. It cannot. The one therefore is never in “the
same.” It does not appear that is. But that which is never
in “the same,” is neither at rest nor stands still.®° For it
cannot. “The one,” therefore, as it appears, neither stands
still noris itmoved. [26.] *°It does not appear indeed.*¢ Nor
%3_83 Such is Stalbaum’s version of ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν: where al-
though τῷ αὐτῷ thus follows ἐν ᾧ, as in § 63, quoted by Heindorf, yet
there Ficinus has, “‘in quo velut in eadem sede,’ which is much more
intelligible than his version here, ‘‘ in quo eodem est.” Taylor’s trans-
lation is, “‘in which same is ;”” who has thus anticipated partially rd αὐτὸ,
found in the text of three MSS., and written thus in three others,
7) ὸ
τῶ αὐτῶ. What Plato meant to say is beyond my comprehension.
τ § Instead of αὐτῷ ἐν εἶναι, Heind. suggested αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι, subse-
‘quently found in two MSS. and adopted by Bekk. and Stalb.. But Ficin.
has ‘ipsum unum esse poterat.” For he found in his MS,, αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν
εἶναι as, read in two MSS.
85. I cannot see the difference between ἡσυχίαν ἄγει and ἕστηκεν.
©, %—8§ To the assertion ὡς ἔοικεν οὔθ᾽ ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται, the answer
‘could not be οὐκ οὖν φαίνεταί ye δὴ, by way of an assent; and if dissent
be intended, the grounds of such dissent should be stated by one party
and met bythe other. Moreover, although ody—ye thus follow ἀλλὰ, yet
these particles do not, and could not, I imagine, follow οὐκ. For in § 28,
Οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται ye, one MS. correctly omits ye. There is therefore
either something too much or too little in the text, as it stands at present.
424 PARMENIDES.
will it be the same either with “ different,”*®’ or with itself ; nor
again different either from itself or from “different.” How
so? Being different from itself, it would surely be different
from “one,” and so would not be “one.” True. And if it
should be the same with “ different,” it would be that (“ dif-
ferent”), and would not be itself ; so that “one” would thus be
not what it is, but different from “one.” It would not in-
deed. *It will then be not the same with “different” or
different from itself? It will ποί. 88 But it will not be dif-
ferent from “ different,” while it is “one.” For it does not
belong to “one” to be different from any thing, but to be “dif-
ferent” alone, and to nothing else. Right. In consequence,
then, of its being “one,” it will not be “ different ;” or do you
think (it can)? Certainly not. 89 But if it is not (different)
through this, neither will it be through itself.8® But if not
different in any way, it will be different from nothing. Right.
Nor yet will it be the same with itself. How not? % The
nature of “the one” is surely this of “the same.”®- How?
Because, when any thing becomes the same with any thing,
it does not become one. But what then? That, which be-
comes the same with many things, must necessarily become
many, and not one. True. * But if “the one” and “the
same” differed®! in no respect, whenever any thing became
8? Here ἕτερον means not another, as Taylor translated, but “ differ-
ent,” as understood by Stalbaum: although when ἕτερον has this mean-
ing elsewhere, it has the article prefixed: which Plato has omitted on
this occasion, because ἕν is without its article likewise.
8888 Here again I cannot understand a single answer given to a bi-
partite question. .
89. 59 Stalbaum thus explains this difficult passage, ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ
τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται" εἰ δὲ μὴ αὑτῷ οὐδὲ αὐτό, by supposing that from
the preceding speech of Parmenides ἕτερον is to be supplied, and τούτῳ
is to be referred to τῷ ἕν εἶναι. But on what ἑαυτῷ is to depend, he does
not say; nor has any one observed that the balance of the sentence re-
quires εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ---εἰ δὲ μὴ ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ ad τῳ, i.e. “if not
by this, then not by itself; and if not by itself, then not by any thing.”
ῳ
Correctly then has one MS. αὐτό.
%__9 Ficinus has, ‘‘ Non ea est ipsius unius natura, que ipsius -
dem natura.” He therefore found in his MS. Οὐχ, ἥπερ αὐτοῦ τοῦ
φύσις ἐστὶ δήπου ἡ ταὐτοῦ, i. 6. “The nature of the same itself is not
surely that, which is of the one itself.’? Words somewhat more intelligible
as regards the sense, and more correct as regards the language, than the
present Greek text, Οὐχ, ἥπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ δήπου Kai τοῦ ταὐτοῦ.
*—*! Ficinus has, “ Ac si ipsum unum atque ipsum idem nihil ἀἴβοτθς
i
PARMENIDES. 495
“the same,” it would always become “one,” and whenever
it (became) “the one” it (would be) “the same.” Entirely so.
[217.1 If then “the one” shall be “the same” to itself, it will
not be “one” to itself; and thus “one” will not be “one.” But
this indeed is impossible. It is impossible, therefore, for “the
one” to be either different from “different,” or the same with
itself. Impossible. And thus “the one” would be neither
different nor the same, either with respect to itself or different.
It would not. But neither will it be similar to any thing,
or dissimilar either to itself or to different. Why so? *Be-
cause the “similar” somehow has the accident of®? “same.”
Certainly. But it has been seen that “the same” is naturally
separate from “the one.” It has been so seen. But if “ the
one” should suffer any thing apart from being “the one,”
it would suffer the being more than one; but this is im-
possible. Certainly. In no respect then can “the one” suf-
fer the being “the same,” either with another or with itself.
It does not appear it can. Nor can it therefore be similar
either to another or to itself. It seems it cannot. Nor yet
has “the one” suffered the being “different ;” for thus it
would suffer the being more than one. For (it would) more.
But that which suffers the being different either from itself or
from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another,
if that which suffers the being the same is similar. Right.
But “the one,” as it appears, since it in no respect suffers the
being “ different,” would in no respect be dissimilar either to
itself or to another. It would not. “The one,” therefore,
would be neither similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to
itself. It does not appear (that it would). [28.] But since
it is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal, either to itself
or to another. How so? Being equal, it would be of the
same measure as that to which it is equal. Certainly. But
being greater or less than the things, with which it is com-
mensurate, it will have more measures than the less quanti-.
ties, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But of those,
with which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one
parent:” from whence Heindorf would read διέφερε for διαφέρει. He
should have read likewise, ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ αὐτὸ ἕν καὶ αὐτὸ ταὐτὸν.
*_* Ficinus has, “ Quia simile est, quod ipsius ejusdem est particeps,””
and which leads to Ὅτι αὐτὸ ταὐτὸν ἔστι που, in lieu of Ὅτι τὸ ταὐτόν
wou: where one MS. reads τι for που.
496 PARMENIDES.
part, it will consist of lesser ; and with respect to the other; of
greater measures. How should it not? Is it not therefore
impossible for that which does not participate in “the same,”
to consist either of the same measures, or of any thing else
whatever the same? It is impossible.- It would therefore’ be
equal neither to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of
the same measures. It appears not. But if it consists of more
or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there aré
measures ; and thus again it will no longer be “one,” but as
many as there are measures. Right. But even if it should
be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure,
But it has been seen to be impossible for one (itself)? to be
equal to any thing. It has been seen. [29.] “The one”
therefore neither participates in one measure, nor in many,
nor in a few, nor in any way participates in “the same,” nor
will it ever, as it seems, be equal to itself or to another; nor,
on the other hand, greater or less either than itself or “" differ-
ent.” It is in every respect so. But what,°t does “the one”
seem (to be) older or younger (than any thing), or to be of
the same age (with any thing)? Why should it not? If it
had in any respect the same age, either with itself or with
another, it would participate in the similitude and equality of
time, in which properties we have asserted “the one”® does
not participate °° [either similitude or equality ].°° We so as-
serted. And this also we asserted, that it participates neither
in dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely so. How then,
being such, can it be either older or younger (than any
thing), or of the same age with any thing? By no means,
“The one” therefore will be neither younger, nor older, nor
of the same age, either with itself or with another. It does
* Ficinus has “ipsum unum equale cuique esse,’’ which leads τὸ
ἴσον τῳ αὐτὸ ἕν εἶναι, in lieu of ἴσον τῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι.
* Heindorf was the first to see that εἶναι had droptout after νεώτερον:
and Stalbaum to remark that τῳ depends upon τὴν αὐτὴν, not on δοκεῖ:
Hence, as Ficinus has “aut junius aliquo—ipsum unum—’ it is plain
that Plato wrote 77, ἐσβύτερον ἢ ἢ νεώτερόν Tov εἶναι ἢ THY αὐτὴν τῳ ἡλι-
κίαν ἔχειν αὐτὸ ἕν δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι ; ars}
δ Ficinus has “ ipsi uni adesse,”” asif he had found in his MS, παρεῖναι
αὐτῷ ἑνί, instead of μετεῖναι τῷ ἑνὶ. nave
%—%*% The words within brackets were properly omitted by Taylors
For they are evidently an interpolation of the preceding relative “ which.”
% Here again Ficinus has correctly, ‘“ junius aliquo,” in Greek, γεώτε-
pov του. See just above, ἢ. 94.
PARMENIDES. 427
ποῦ appear it would. Would it not then be impossible for
“the one” to exist at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not
necessary that, if any thing exists in time, it should always
become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not the
older always older than the younger? What then? That
which is in the act of being older than itself, is at the same
time in the act of being younger than itself, “if it is about to
have that (through) which it is in the act of being older.
[80.1 How say you? Thus. It is requisite that nothing
should exist in the act of being at variance one with an-
other, *? when it is already at variance ;°° but that being now
at variance, to be so now; and having been, to have been
so (formerly), and being about to be, to be so (hereafter) ;
but being in the act, to neither have been, nor to will be,
nor to be at all at variance,!® but to be in the act, and
not otherwise to exist. It is necessary. But the older is at
variance with the younger, and with nothing else. Certainly.
Hence, that which is in the act of being older than itself,
must necessarily at the same time be in the act of being
younger than itself. It seems so. !But likewise to be in
the act of being ' for a time not longer than itself, nor shorter ;
but for a time equal to itself to be in the act of being, and
to be, and to have been, and to be about to be.! For these
are necessary. It is necessary therefore, as it appears, for
such things as are in time, and participate in some such thing,
to be, each of them, [itself]? the same age with itself, and
98. 985 Such is Taylor’s translation of the Greek, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν
ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται. Ficinus has “si quidem aliquo senius esse
debet ys ? as if he had found in his MS. εἴπερ μέλλει γέ πρεσβύτερον Tov
tyvéeovat.
μ Ὧ Although ἕτερον ἑτέρου might mean ‘‘ one with another,” yet as
érepoy has hitherto meant “ different,” the other meaning seems rather
strange here.
400100 Al] the words within the numerals seem to me to be super-
fluous; unless it be said that the Latin of Ficinus has preserved the
vestiges of what was originally in the Greek, ‘‘ Oppositum alterum alteri,
nihil fieri oportet, opposito altero jam existente; sed, hoc jam existente,
jam esse, preterito illo, preteriisse ; futuro, fore: dum vero fit unum op-
positum, alterum quoque oppositum, nec preteriisse, nec fore, nec esse
diversum est, sed fieri, nec aliter esse.’ I confess myself however un-
able to perceive what Plato meant to say; and therefore unable to re-
cover what he wrote.
ot Here again I am quite at a loss.
51 have bracketed “ itself,” a word to me at least perfectly unintel-
428 PARMENIDES.
to be in the act of being both older at the same time and
younger than itself. It nearly seems so. But in none of
these accidents is there any share for “the one.” There is
no share. Neither then has it any share of time, nor does it
exist in any time. [31.] It does not, indeed, as the reason-
ing holds. What then, do not the terms “was,” and “has
been produced,” and “ was in the act of being,” seem to sig-
nify a participation in what formerly existed. Very much
so. And do not the terms “ will be,” and “ will be in the act
of being,” and “will be generated,”® (signify a participation
in time) that is about to be hereafter?4 Yes. And do not
the terms “is,” and “is in the act of being,” (signify a par-
ticipation) in time that is now present?° Entirely so. If
then “the one” participates not at all in any time, it never
has been, nor has been in the act of being, nor was [ever]?
nor §[has it been now generated, nor 75 is it in the act of being,
ligible, because αὐτὸ is omitted in two excellent MSS., and not acknow-
ledged by Ficinus.
3.4.5 In the expressions χρόνου---τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος---τοῦ ἔπειτα τοῦ
μέλλοντος, and τοῦ νῦν παρόντος, it is strange that Heindorf, who pro-
perly objected to τοῦ before μέλλοντος, should not have seen that
νότος, and τοῦ μέλλοντος, and τοῦ παρόντος, were the interpretations
respectively of τοῦ ποτὲ, and τοῦ ἔπειτα, and τοῦ νῦν. He
however to have been. misled by finding in Thucyd. i. 123, περὶ δὲ τῶν
ἔπειτα μελλόντων : to which he might have added i. 130, ἐς ἔπειτα ἔμελλε
πράξειν. But both passages are equally corrupt, and admit of easy cor-
rections. Hermann, with his usual want of critical sagacity, proposes,
on Iph. T. 1234, to read οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτά που μέλλοντος, as if the indefinite
που could be thus inserted between ἔπειτα and μέλλοντος. The ab-
surdity is however swallowed of course by Stalbaum. Ficinus has “ an
non futurum nobis designant? Futurum:” which is not sufficiently
literal to enable one to see what he found in his MS. ;
5. Instead of γενηθήσεται, which is not found, Schleiermacher wished
to γεγενήσεται, which is a solecism equally. Plato wrote γεννηθήσεται
here, and again shortly afterwards. Had Stalbaum known this fact, it
would have saved him the trouble of writing a long and unsatisfactory
note.
7 This repetition of ποτὲ after ἣν, when it had been already intro-
duced before γέγονεν, is evidently not from the hand of Plato. In fact,
the second ποτὲ, and viv, and ἔπειτα, have been probably interpolated.
For they are not found in the version of Ficinus—‘“ Si ergo ipsum unum
nullo participat tempore, nec fuit unquam nec fit, nec est, neque fiet,
neque factum erit, neque erit.’’
88 The words between the numerals are properly rejected by Ast,
whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary ; who fancies that νῦν γέγονεν
here means the present time of an action completed ; as if such an idea
i i i 0...
PARMENIDES. 429
nor is, nor will be in the act of being hereafter, nor will be
generated, nor will be. It is most true. Is it possible then
for any thing to participate in being, except according to
some one of these? It is not. In no way then does “the
one”? participate in being. It appears not. “ The one”
therefore in no way is. It seems not. Nor is it then in such
a state as to be one; for it would be a being, and participate
in being; but, as it seems, the one neither is one, nor is it at
all, if one must. trust to reasoning of this kind. It seems
nearly so, But to that which is not, can there be any thing
either for itself or from itself? How can there? Hence
there is not for it a name, or discourse, or any science, or
perception, or opinion. It appears not. Hence it cannot
either be named, or spoken of, or conceived by opinion, or
known, nor does it perceive!® any thing of those really ex-
isting. So it seems. Is it possible then for this to be the
case respecting “the one?” It seems to me not possible.
[32.] Are you then willing for us to return again from the
beginning to our supposition, if by chance any thing shall
appear to us, on returning, in a different light? Iam very
willing. Did we not say then, that!! if “one is,” whatever?
may be the consequences from that supposition, we must
admit them. Is it not so? Yes. Consider now from the
beginning. If “ one is,” is it possible for it to be, and yet not
participate in being? Itis not. Would not being then be a
property of “the one,” although not the same as “the one ?”
could be possibly introduced in a passage, where especial care is taken
to mark distinctly the three periods into which all time is divisible—the
past, present, and future. Stalbaum was perhaps misled by the words
of Proclus, on the Timeus, quoted by Thomson—r6 γίγνεσθαί ποτὲ ἢ
νῦν γεγονέναι, ἢ ἐσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι : but it is evident that we must read
there—rd γίγνεσθαι νῦν, ἤ ποτὲ γεγονέναι, ἢ ἐσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι. For νῦν
indicates the present, πότε the past, and ἐσαῦθις the future.
® Here, as every where else, Ficinus has ‘“‘ ipsum unum,” i. 6. αὐτὸ ἕν.
Peceived by the preceding passive verbs, Ficinus translated αἰσθά-
verar— sentitur,”’ forgetting that αἰσθάνεσθαι is a deponent.
11 From “ confessi sumus”’ in Ficinus, Heindorf suggested ἔφαμεν for
φαμὲν, as there is here a reference to what had been stated in § 22.
Stalbaum however says that though φαμὲν is constantly used parentheti-
cally, ἔφαμεν is never so, or very rarely. Of course he did not see that
ὅτι had dropt out before ra— ;
15 Heindorf’s ὕποια for ποῖα is indisputably correct, whatever Stalbaum
may say to the contrary. See my Poppo’s Prolegom, p. 147, and 306.
To the passages there corrected, I could now add many more. -
430 PARMENIDES.
for, 3 (if it were the same,)' it would not be the being
of it,'4 nor would “the one” participate in being ; but it
would be all one to say “one is,” and “one one.” But now
our supposition is not, “if one (is) one,” what must be the
consequence, but “if one is.” Is it not so? Entirely so.
Ts it not then that 15 the term “is” means something different
from the term “one?” Necessarily. If then a person sumi-
marily asserts that “ one is,” would this be no other assertion
than that the one participates in being. Certainly. Let us
say then again, if “one is,” what will be the consequence?
Consider then, if it is not necessary for this supposition to
signify that “one” is existing of such a kind as to possess
parts? How? Thus. If the term “it is” is said of “the
one being,” and “ the one ” (said) of “the being which is one,”
and both being and the one are not !® the same, !” but pense
”
to that same thing which we have supposed to be “ the one,
is it not necessary that the whole being one should be it,®
but that its parts should be “one” and “being?” It is ne-
cessary. [33.] Whether then should we call each of these
12. 15 The words within lunes are supplied by Ficinus, * alioquin si
idem ”’—
414 T do not believe that another passage can be produced where
ἐκεῖνος is thus applied to two different nouns. I know indeed that the
same thing is said to take place in the case of αὐτός. But all the in-
stances I have noticed in Thucydides and Plato admit of an easy correction.
Ficinus has, “non utique illius essentia esset, neque ipsum unum illa
participAsset.”” From which it is evident that he omitted, either from his
MS. or his own good sense, ἐκείνη and ἐκεῖνο : the latter of which is perfectl
superfluous, despite the defence of Stalbaum, who says that τὸ ἕν is added
to ἐκεῖνο as an explanation. But correct writers are not thus wont to put
dowi some words superfluously and then explain them by another. Per-
haps Plato wrote, ob γὰρ ἂν ἐκοινώνει ἑνὸς οὐσία, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐκοινοῦτο ἕν
ἐκείνης. For μετεῖχεν would be thus the interpretation οἵ ἐκοινώνει and
ἐκοινοῦτο. ‘
18 Ast was justly offended with wc. But he incorrectly wished to read
οὕτως---σημαίνει for ὡς---σημαῖνον. Ficinus has, “ Nonne ita dicitur
tanquam aliud,” where “‘ dicitur’’ was inserted to complete the sense.
Stalbaum understands αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσίς ἐστι. Perhaps Plato wrote Odxn
οὖν ἦν πως ἄλλο--- a
16 This negative is omitted in eight MSS. and by Ficinus, who has
‘est autem idem essentia et unum ”’— -
17. 7 Ficinus has “ eodem existente uno quod supposuimus,”’ as if he
had found in his MS. τοῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ οὗ ὑπεθέμεθα ἑνὸς ὄντος, without
ἐκείνου, which is certainly superfluous, or else τοῦ ἑνὸς is an interpolation.
18. In lieu of αὐτοῦ Thomson was the first to suggest αὐτό: which he
got perhaps from Ficinus, ‘‘ totum quidem unum ens ipsum esse.” sd
"y
ΓΑ]
PARMENIDES. 431
parts part alone? '% Or must we call a part a part of the
whole? Of the whole.!9 Whatever then is one, is a whole,
and possessesa part. Entirely so. What then, 20 of these parts
of the one being both “one” and “being,” do either desert
each the other, 8 so that “one” is wanting to “ being,” and
“being” wanting to “one”?”? It would not be. Again, each
of the parts contains both “one ” and “being;” */and the
least part is composed of two parts; ;71 and thus perpetually
by the same reasoning, whatever becomes a part possesses
these two parts perpetually; for “one” always contains
“being,” and “ being, one;” *?so that, two things being pro-
duced, one never is.” Entirely so. Would not then “the one”
existing thus become an infinite multitude. So it seems.
Proceed still further by this road. By what? We have
said that the one participates in “ being,” so far as it is being.
We have said so. And on this account “ one being” appears
to be “many.” Itdoesso. What then? If one itself, which
we say participates in being, we receive mentally, alone by
itself, and apart from that in which we say it participates,
will it appear to be one alone? Or will this very thing be
many? I think it will be one. [34.] But let us likewise
look to another thing.”* It is necessary for its “‘ being” to be
one thing, and itself another, if “the one” itself is not “be-
—!9 The correct arrangement of the speeches as suggested by Hein-
dorf, Ficinus had already given in his version.
029 Such is the English for the Latin of Ficinus, “Num he partes
unius entis, scilicet unum et ens, ita se invicem deserunt, ut ipsi enti
unum, et ipsi uni ens desit:’’ which is certainly more intelligible than
the Greek, but not a translation of the words, τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τού-
των τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἕν καὶ τὸ ὃν, ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον, ἢ 7 τὸ ἕν τοῦ
ὄντος εἷναι μόριον ἢ τὸ ἕν τοῦ ἑνὸς μόριον : words that Schleiermacher
could not understand; and hence he wished, with the approbation of
Heindorf, to reject both the μόριον : while Stalbaum would read μορίου
with ed. Bas. 2, and in some MSS. But what is gained by the alteration
on the ground of either sense or syntax he does not state, nor can I dis-
cover.
21_2t Stalbaum quotes the version of Ficinus, “adeo ut pars quelibet
ex duabus saltem particulis constituatur.”” But there is nothing in the
Greek to answer to “quelibet,” nor could τὸ ἐλαχιστον be rendered
“saltem.”
. ™—* I confess I cannot see the syntax in ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύ᾽ ἀεὶ γιγνό-
μενον μηδέποτε ἕν εἶναι.
So Ficinus renders, Ἴδωμεν δὴ ἄλλο τι, ““ Consideremus jam et aliud.
quiddam,” which leads to Ἴδωμεν δὲ δη καὶ---- Heindorf objected to
this version, not perceiving | that in ἄλλο τι there was a reference to the
preceding Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι.
482 PARMENIDES.
ing ;” but as being one™ it participated in “being.” It is ne-
cessary. If then “being” is one thing, and “one” another,
neither is “ one” by its existence as one different from “ being,”
nor “ being” by its existence as “ being” different from “one ;”
but they are different from each other * through that which is
different and another. Entirely so. So that “the different” is
the same neither with “the one” nor with “the being.” How
can it? What then, if we should select from them, whether if
you will “the being” and ‘the different,” or “the being” and
‘the one,” or “the one” and “ the different,” should we not, in
each selection, select certain two things, which it is proper to
denominate both? Howso? Thus. Itis possible to speak of
“being.” Itis. And again, to speak of “one.” And this
likewise. Are not then either spoken of ? Yes. But what,
when I say “being,” and “one,” do I not pronounce both?
Entirely so. And if I should say “being” and “ different,”
r “different” and “one,” should I not in each of these pro-
nounce both perfectly ??6 Yes. But can those things which
are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two?
They cannot. And is there any method for each of things,
that are two, not to be one? There isnot. Of these then,
since each two exist together, each would be one. It appears
so. [35.] But if each of them is one, and any one whatever
is placed together with them, by any kind of union whatever,
do not they all become three? Certainly.. But are not three
odd, and two even? How should they not be? What then,
being two, is it not necessary for twice to be? and being three,
thrice; since twice one exists in two, and thrice one in three ?
It is necessary. But if there are two and twice, is it not
necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are
three and thrice, that there should be thrice three? How
not? But what, if there are three and twice, and there are
two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be 37 twice
* Here, by the aid of Ficinus, “‘sed ut unum essentia partici
Heindorf elicited we ἕν ὃν οὐσίας from we ἕν οὐσίας, which Stalbaum has
unwisely rejected.
$545 Ficinus has “per id quod est ipsum per se alterum et ipsum per
se aliud,’”’ which points to something else than τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ary.
% Such is Taylor’s translation of πανταχῶς. Perhaps he had in his
mind παντελῶς: which would be certainly more correct, or rather
πανταχῶς εὖ, as shown by the following ὀρθῶς.
—*" Instead of τρία τε δὲς εἶναι καὶ δὶς τρία, Schleiermacher sug-
gested, what Heindorf and Stalbaum have adopted, τρία τε δίς εἶναι καὶ
PARMENIDES. 433
three and thrice two??? Entirely so. Hence, there would be ᾿
the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and
the evenly odd. Itis so. If then this is the case, do you
think that any number is left, which is not necessarily there ?
By no means. If then “one” exists, it is necessary for
number to exist likewise. It is necessary. But if number
exists, the many would exist, and an infinite multitude of
beings; or is there not a number, infinite in multitude, and
participating in “being?” -There is, by all means. If then
every number participates in “being,” would not each part
also of number participate in “being?” Yes. “ Being” then
has been distributed through all things, being many, and
stands apart from nothing existing, whether the least or the
greatest. Or is it not absurd even to ask this question ἢ 38
For how could “being” stand apart from any thing existing ?
By no means. [36.] “Being” then is cut up into fractions
the smallest possible, and the greatest, and existing in every
degree, **and is divided the most of all things,” and the parts
of “being” are infinite. ®°Such is the case. Very many,
therefore, are its parts. Very many, indeed.3* What then, is
there any one of these, which is a part of “being,” and yet is
not one part ? But how can this be ? But if it is, I think there
must always be a necessity for it, as long as it exists, to be
a certain one thing; but that it cannot possibly be nothing.
There is a necessity. *!“ The one,” therefore, is present to
all (and) each part of “being,”*! deficient in neither a less or
δύο τρίς. Taylor perhaps led the way to the right reading by his trans-
lation, “* thrice two and twice three.’’
35. Ficinus has “Atque id dubitare absurdum est:” as if he had
found in his MS. αἴρεσθαι, read in another MS. likewise. The whole
clause was omitted by Taylor.
2929 Of the clause between the numerals καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μά-
λιστα (or as one MS. reads, μέγιστα) the words 7 ῆ μεμέρισται seem to be
a gl. for κεκερμάτισται, and πάντων μάλιστα for ὡς olovrs—péytora; or
else there is some derangement of the text here.
3030 Here again there seems to be another interpolation. For all the
words between the numerals are perfectly superfluous after the preceding
ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας. Unless it be said that the dialogue ought
to be thus arranged, by reading after πανταχῶς ὄντα. Ἔχει οὕτως.
Πλεῖστα ἄ ἄρα ἔστι τὰ μέρη τῆς οὐσίας. Πλεῖστα μέντοι. Καὶ μεμέρισται
wy μάλιστα, ἅ εστι μέρη αὐτῆς ἀπέραντα. Ὡς οἷον τε.
“31: 81 Ficinus has, “ΝΟΠ solum ergo universe essentie, sed illius etiam
singulis partibus unum adest.”” From whence Heindorf elicited Ipdc
τῷ -παντὶ ἄρα καὶ ἑκάστῳ tesa He should have suggested Πρός
2F
454 PARMENIDES,
a greater part, or in any thing else. It isso, Isthen “one”.
a whole, existing in many places at the same time? Look into
this. I do look, and I see it is impossible. It is divided then,
since it is not a whole; for it will not otherwise ina
divided state, be present to all the parts of “ being.” γ.
But there is a great necessity for that, which is divisible, to
be as many as are the parts. There is a necessity. [87.} We
did not then just now say truly, when we said that “
was distributed into very many parts. For it is not divided i
more parts than “one” itself,*? but into parts equal to those
“the one:” for neither is “being” wanting to “ the one,”
“the one” to “ being ;” but being two are always panna:
through all things. It appears to be entirely so. ‘ One it-
self,” therefore, having been cut up into fractions by “ being,”
becomes many and infinite in multitude. So it appears. Not
only then is “ the being ”*3 many, but it is likewise necessary
for “the one,” when distributed by “being,” to be many.
Entirely so. Moreover, because the parts are parts of a
whole, “ the one” will be finite according as it isa whole. Or
are not the: parts included in the whole? Necessarily so.
But that which includes would be a bound. How not?
“ The one” therefore is somehow both one and many, whole
and parts, finite and infinite in multitude. It appears so,
As it is bounded then, has it not likewise extremes? Of
necessity. But what, if it be a whole, would it not have
likewise a beginning, a middle, and anend? Or can there be
any whole without these three? And if any one whatever of
these be wanting to any thing, will that thing be willing to
be any longer a whole? It will not. “The one ” then, as it
seems, would possess a beginning, and end, and a middle. It
would. [38.] But the middle is equally distant from the ex-
τε wavtt doa ἑκάστῳ re—as I have translated. Stalbaum would read,
Πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἑκάστοτε. But ἑκάστοτε, “ on every occasion,” would be
here absurd. For ἑκάστοτε is seldom found l except with verbs of speaking.
* Ficinus has, “ipsum unum,” i. 6. αὐτοῦ, not τοῦ ; or else ἌΣ
omit τοῦ with three MSS.
3 Instead of τὸ ὃν ἕν, Thomson would read, from Proclus, τὸ ἕν. ὃν.
But as ὃν is omitted by many MSS., Stalbaum correctly rejects
thus τὸ ὃν and τὸ ὃν are properly opposed to each other. and?
* Influenced by the syntax, Ficinus translated τοῦ ἕν as if it were τοῦ"
ἑνὸς ; but Taylor more correctly omitted those words entirely, and thus
perhaps led Schleiermacher to read τοῦ év—adopted by Heind., Bekk.,
and Stalb. But then we ought to read ἐθελήσει αὐτὸ, in lieu of ᾿θελήσει
ἔτι. For thus αὐτὸ would refer to του.
PARMENIDES. 435
tremes ; for it would not otherwise be the middle. It would
not. And “the one” being such would, as it appears, partici-
pate in a certain figure, either straight or round, or mixed up
of both. It wouldso. Will it then, being such, not exist itself
in itself and in another? How? Each of the parts is surely in
the whole, nor is any one out of the whole. It isso. But
all the parts are surrounded by the whole. Yes. But “the
one” is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less
than all. Certainly. Is not then the one the whole? How
not? If then all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts
are the one, and the whole itself and all the parts are surround-
ed by the whole, “the one” would be surrounded by “the one,”
and thus “the one” would be already in itself. It appears so.
But on the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, neither
in all, nor in any one. For, if it were in all, it would’neces-
sarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not
be able to be in all. But if this one is a portion of all the
parts, and the whole is not in this, how can it be®® any longer
in all the parts? Not at all. Nor yet in any of the parts. For
if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be
in the lesser; which is impossible. It is impossible. [39.]
But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all
the parts, is it not necessary for it to be either in some other,
or no where? It is necessary. But if no where, will it not be
nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it
not necessary for it to be in another? Entirely so. So far
therefore as “the one” is a whole, it is in another; but so far
as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in
itself; and thus “ the one” will necessarily be in itself and in
another. Necessarily.
But as “the one” is naturally such, is it not necessary for
it to be both moved and to stand still? How? It stands still,
if it be in itself. For being in one and not departing from
this, it will be in the same, through being in itself. It will.
But that which is always in the same must somehow neces-
sarily stand still always. Entirely so. What then, must not
that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily
be never in the same? But if it be never in the same, can it
% Instead of ἕν ἔσται, acknowledged by “‘erit unum” in Ficinus,
‘Taylor was the first to read tacitly ἔνεσται, as suggested subsequently by
Heindorf, and confirmed by two MSS.
28 2
436 PARMENIDES.
ever stand still; and if it does not stand still, must it not be
moved? Certainly. It is necessary therefore for “the one,”
being always in itself and in another, to be always moved and
to stand still. It appears so.
It ought moreover to be the same with itself, and different
from itself; and, in like manner, the same with and different
from others, if it suffers what has been (mentioned) before.
[40.] How? Every thing somehow is in this state with rela-
tion to every thing. It is either the same or different: or if
not the same or different, it will be a part of that, to which it
is so related, or, it will be with respect to a part a whole. It
appears so. Is then “the one” a part of itself? By no means.
ὅ0 10 will not then with respect to a part of itself be a whole,
nor with respect to itself a part.** For it cannot. But is
“one” therefore different from “the one?” By no means. It
will not then be different from itself. Certainly not. If then
it is neither different, nor a whole, nor yet a part, with respect
to itself, is it not necessary for it to be the same with itself?
It is necessary. What then, is it not necessary for that,
which is elsewhere than itself,?” while existing in the same
with itself, to be different from itself, if indeed it shall be
elsewhere ἢ 38. It appears so to me. In this state does “the
one” appear to be existing at the same time both in itself and
36. 06 Such is evidently what the balance of the sentence Ε
The Greek is, Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς
ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν : which Stalbaum, with Schmidt, says is to be thus taken,
Οὐδ᾽ dpa αὐτὸ (τὸ tv) αὑτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη ὡς πρὸς μέρος, and thus trans-
lated, ‘‘ It will then be neither a whole of itself, as if in relation to a
part:”’ out of which I must leave others to make what sense they can. It
is beyond my comprehension. And even were the sense as clear as it is
now obscure, the syntax would be inadmissible. For in the expression
αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ, those two words must go together; nor could αὑτοῦ ὅλον
mean in genuine Greek “a whole of itself;” for the expression ὅλον we
μορίον, in § 41, is corrupt, and is there corrected. The proper phrase is
in § 44, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ. Plato probably wrote, as I have translated, Οὐ δ᾽
ἄρα we πρὸς μέρος αὑτοῦ αὐτὸ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, οὐδ᾽ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος dv.
Correctly then has one MS. αὑτοῦ αὐτὸς Heindorf was near the mark,
aoa he explained πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὃν by οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος
ν εἴη.
51.ΑᾺ5 ἑτέρωθι is an adverb it should be opposed to another adverb, and
thus united to ἑαυτοῦ, a pronoun.
38. Ficinus has “ Si quidem alibi quam ipsummet existat.” But the
whole clause would thus be only a repetition of what has been just enunci-
ated. I suspect that εἴπερ ἑτέρωθι ἔσται is merely an explanation of τὸ
ἑτέρωθι ὄν.
PARMENIDES. 487
in another. 850 10 seems. In this way then it appears that “the
one” will be different from itself. It does so. What then,
if any thing*® is different from any thing, will it not be differ-
ent from that which is different? Necessarily so. But are
not all such things, as are not one, different from “ the one?”
And is not “the one” (different from such things as) are not
one? How not? “ The one” therefore will be different from
the rest. Different. See then, are not “the different” and
“the same” contrary to each other. How not? Is the same
ever wont to be in the different, or the different in the same ὃ
It is not wont. [41.] If therefore the different is never in the
same, there is not one of existing things, in which the differ-
ent exists for any time; for if it existed in any thing during
any time whatever, during that time the different would be in
the same. Is it not so? It is so. But since it is never in the
same, the different would never exist in any of existing things.
True. Neither therefore would the different exist in things
which are not one, nor in “ the one.” It would not. Through
“the different” therefore the one will not be different from
things which are not one, nor things which are not one be
different from “the one.” Not indeed. Nor through them-
selves will they be different from each other, since they do
not participate in “the different.” For how can they? But
if they are different neither through themselves, nor through
“the different,” would they not escape entirely from being
different from each other? They would escape. But neither
do things, which are not one, participate in “the one:” for
they would be no longer not one, but in some way one. True.
Nor would things, which are not one, be number ; for possess-
ing number, they would thus be altogether not one. They
would not. But what, can things which are not one be parts
of one? Or would not things, which are not one, in this way
participate in “the.one?” They would participate. If then
this is entirely “one,” but those not one, “the one” would
not be a part of things, which are not one, ΠΟΥ a whole, as if
they were a part ;*° nor, on the contrary, would things, which
89 Instead of εἰ rovri two MSS. εἴ τοῦ τι, as suggested by Heindorf.
And so Ficinus, ‘‘ Si quid vero ab aliquo alterum est.”
#940 The Greek in most MSS. is οὔθ᾽ ὅλον we popiov—and (*!—*!)
οὔθ᾽ we μορίῳ τῷ ἑνί. Now as the two clauses ought evidently to balance
each other, Plato probably wrote ὡς μορίων, (i. 6, τῶν μὴ Ey—) and we
438 PARMENIDES.
are not one, be parts of “the one,” nor wholes “as if the one
were a part.*! They will not. [42.] But we have said that
things, which are neither parts, nor wholes, nor different
from each other, will be the same with each other. We have
said so. Shall we then assert that “the one,” since it is in
this state with respect to things which are not one, is the
same with them? Let us say so. ‘The one” then, as it ap-
pears, is both different from others and itself, and the same
with them and with itself. It appears very nearly so, at least
from this reasoning.
But is it also similar and dissimilar to itself and otheri?
Perhaps so. Since then it appears to be different from the
others, the others likewise will be somehow different from it.
But what then? Will it not then be different from the others
in the same manner as the others from it? And this neither
more nor less? For what should it be? If then neither more
nor less, it (will be) similarly. Certainly. In the manner
then through which “the one”* suffers to become different
from the others, and the others similarly from it, in that
manner would the one be suffering similarly to the others, and
the others (similarly) to the one? How say you? Thus. Do
not you apply each name to something? I do; what then?
Could you pronounce the same name often or once? I could.
When therefore you pronounce (a name) once, do you speak of
the thing, to which the name belongs; but not, if often? Or, is
there not a great necessity for you always to speak of the same
thing, whether you pronounce the same name once or often?
What then? [43.] Is not “different” a name applied to some
thing ? Entirelyso. When therefore you pronounce it, whether
once or often, you do not apply this name to any other thing,“
μορίου (i. e. τοῦ ἑνός). Opportunely then does one ‘MS, offer μορίων.
And thus we shall get rid of the incorrect expression objected to in § 40.
* Ficinus has “ si uni contigit, ut alterum sit ab aliis.”” For he pro-
bably found in his MS. πέπονθε τὸ ἕν τῶν ἄλλων. At least τὸ ἕν might
easily have dropt out before τῶν.
4. This is a strange answer to a bipartite question. Hence Taylor : in-
serted “‘once.”” But that is at variance with the subsequent question of
Parmenides. Perhaps Plato wrote "Eywy’ ἑκατέρως, i. e. “1 could either
way.” For ἑκατέρως might have been lost through the following πότερον.
Ficin., “‘ vel sepius vel semel.”
“ As in’ ἄλλῳ ὀνομάζειν and ἄλλο ὀνομάζειν are synonymous, itis
evident that Plato did not write both here. Correctly then has Ficinus
omitted one by rendering “ad aliud quiddam significandum.”
PARMENIDES. 439
but that of which it is the name. Necessarily so. When we
say then that “the others” are different from “the one,” and
*the one” different from “the others,” twice pronouncing the
name “ different,” we do not at all apply the expression to any
other nature but that of which it is fhe name. Entirely so.
In the way then that “the one” is different from “the others,”
and “the others” from “the one,” “aecording to the very
thing which “the different” has, “the one” would suffer
nothing else than what the others do, but just the same:® but
that which somehow suffers the same (is) similar. Is it not?
Yes. But in the way that “the one” suffers so as to be dif-
ferent from the others, according to that very way*® every
thing would be similar to every thing; for every thing is dif-
ferent from every thing. It appears so. Moreover the similar
is contrary to the dissimilar. Itis. Is not “the different” too
contrary to “the same?”47 This also. Moreover this like-
wise has been made apparent, that “the one” is the same with
[and different from**] “the others.” It has been made ap-
parent. But to be the same with “ others” is a contrary suffer-
ing to the being different from “the others.” Entirely so. As
far as it was different, it appeared to be similar. Yes. So far
then as it is the same, it will be dissimilar according to its suffer-
ing the contrary to that suffering which produces the similar:
“but did the different produce the similar?*® Yes. The
**—45 Such is the English version of Stalbaum’s Latin translation of the
Greek text, where all previous commentators have been equally in the
dark, κατὰ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι, k.T.rA. For so Stalbaum has,
with Thomson, adopted τὸ ἕτερον found in an Oxford MS. of Damascius
Περὶ ᾿Αρχῶν, and subsequently in one MS. of Plato. But upon what
πεπονθέναι is to depend Stalbaum does not say himself, nor could any
one else. The whole passage is desperately corrupt. From the version
of Ficinus it would seem as if there was in his MS. a different, though
not more intelligible, arrangement of the words.
48 Ficin., ‘secundum hoc idem,” i, e. κατὰ ταὐτο τοῦτο, found subse-
quently in a single MS., which I have adopted in lieu of κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο.
47 Ficinus, ‘‘ Nonne et ipsum alterum ipsi eidem,” which leads to Οὐκ
οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἕτερον αὐτῷ ταὐτῷ. Whatever Stalbaum may say, the
| article could not be prefixed to τὸ αὐτὸ. Identity in Greek is ταυτότης,
‘not τὸ ταὐτόν.
το The words within brackets all the MSS. and Ficinus omit.
4#29_49 Ficinus has “simile autem nonne faciebat ipsum alterum,”’
which leads to ὡμοίου dé τι οὐ τὸ ἕτερον, in lieu of ὡμοίου δὲ που τὸ ἕτερον.
For ὁμοιοῦν requires its case. And hence, just before, one would prefer
τῷ ὁμοιοῦντί τι πάθει to τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. Hence too just afterwards
440 PARMENIDES.
same therefore will render something dissimilar; or it will
not be contrary to the different. So it appears. [44.] “The
one” therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to “the
others ;” so far as it is different it will be similar; but so far
as it is the same, dissimilar. “? It has, it seems, such reasoning.*®
And it has this likewise. What? So far as it suffers the
same, it does not suffer what is of a different kind; and not
suffering what is of a different kind, it is not dissimilar; and
not being dissimilar, it is similar: but so far as it suffers an-
other thing, it is of a different kind; and being of a different
kind, it is dissimilar. You speak the truth. Since then “the
one” is both the same with and different from “the others,”
according to both and each of these cases, it will be similar
and dissimilar to ‘the others.” Entirely so. And will it notin
a similar manner, since it has appeared to be both different
from, and the same with, itself, appear, according to both
these, and each, to be similar and dissimilar to itself? Ne-
cessarily so.
But consider now how “the one” subsists with respect to
touching and not touching itself and “the others.” I consider.
For “the one” has somehow appeared to be in itself a whole.
Right. Butis not “the one” in “the others” likewise? Yes.
So far then as “the one” is in “the others,” it will touch “the
others ;” but so far as it is in itself, it will be prevented from
touching “the others ;” but being in itself it will touch itself.
So it appears. And thus, indeed, “the one” will both touch
itself and “the others.” It willtouch. But what (will it be) in
this view? Must not every thing, which is about to touch any
thing, lie close to that, which it is about to touch, and occupy
that seat, °° which may be after that seat, in which that may lie,
we must read ᾿Ανομοιώσει dpa τι ταὐτὸν in lieu of τό ταὐτὸν, where the
five best MSS. omit τὸ.
#94 I cannot understand "Exe yap οὖν δὴ---καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον. For
though τὸ ἕν might be the nominative to ἔχει, yet οὖν dy and καὶ haye not
the least force here ; nor could τοιοῦτον be opposed to τόνδε. Fricin. has,
ME mise ut videtur, rationem habet,” omitting γὰρ οὖν δὲ, while in cai lies
ἔοικε.
5°_5° Such is the unintelligible version of Stalbaum’s text, ταύτην τὴν
ἕδραν κατέχον, ἣ ἂν μετ᾽ ἐκείνην 9 ἕδραν ; ἦ ἂν κέηται, ἅπτεται. But
ἕδραν could not be thus repeated, nor could per’ ἐκείνην thus follow 9, ἃ
verb of rest. We meet indeed just after with ἐφεξῆς μεθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ με δ τα
But there Plato wrote ἐφεξῆς ἑαυτῷ, similar to the preceding and follow-
ing ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῳ: while here the words ἣ ἂν per’ ἐκείνην 9 ἕδρα are
PARMENIDES. 441
which it touches ?°° It is necessary. “ The one,” therefore, if
it is about to touch itself, ought to lie close to itself, and occupy
the place close to that in which it is. It ought so. [45.]
Would not “the one,” if it were two, do this, and be in two
places at once? But as long as it is one, it will not be wont
todo so. Itwill not. The same necessity therefore belongs
to “the one,” to be neither two nor to touch itself. The same.
But neither will it touch the others. Why? Because we
have said, that when any thing is about to touch any thing,
which is separate from it, it ought to be placed close to that
which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in
the middle of them. True. Two things therefore at the least
are requisite, if contact is about to take place. Certainly.
But if a third is added close upon the two terms,®! there will
now be three, but the contacts two. Certainly. And thus
one always being added, one contact will be likewise added ;
and the result is that the contacts will be less by one than the
multitude of the numbers. For by how much the two first
things exceeded the contacts, ὅ2 [50 as to be more in number
than the contacts, 753 by just so much does all the following
number exceed the multitude of the contacts. For already
hereafter®* one is added to the number, and one contact to the
contacts. Right. As many then as are in number the things
existing, (by so many,) less by one, are the contacts always.
True. If then there is only one thing, and not a pair, there
can be no contact. How can there? Have we not said that
the other things, different from “the one,” are neither one nor
participate of it, since they are different? We have. [46.]
evidently the interpretation of τὴν ἐχομένην. For thus the expression τὴν
ἕδραν κατέχον τὴν ἐχομένην in the first clause is the counterpart of τὴν
ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον in the second; and so too by the aid of ἐκείνης
ἐν i αὐτό ἐστιν in the second, we may correct the first by reading ἧς, iv’
ἂν κέηται ἅπτοιτ᾽ ἄν. The sense would then be, ‘‘ occupying the seat close
upon that which, where should it lie perchance, it would touch.”
51 Heindorf was justly offended with Spo. But incorrectly suggested
᾿Εὰν δὲ δυοῖν évroww—For in this formula the article cannot be omitted.
Compare Legg. iii. p. 685, A., p. 692, D., Lysid. p. 220, C., Thucyd. i. 104,
which I should have quoted in my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 156, to confirm
my correction in Thucyd. i. 36, τούτων δεῖ, εἰ περιόψεσθ᾽ ἕν, τὰ δύο εἰς
ταὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν. Sauppe happily reads here ὁμόροιν, “contiguous.” I
prefer παρόντοιν to ὕροιν---
52__82 ΠῊρ words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
8 As τὸ λοιπὸν cannot be united to προσγίγνεται, read κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
442 PARMENIDES.
Number therefore is not in the others, since one is not in
them. How canit? ‘The others, therefore, are not one, or
two, or *4any thing possessing the name of another number.**
No. “The one,” therefore, is one alone, and could not be
two. It appears not. Contact, therefore, is not, when two
are not. Itis not. “The one” therefore will neither touch
“the others,” nor will “the others” touch “the one,” as there
is no contact. Certainly not. On all these accounts, there-
fore, “the one” will both touch and not touch others and
itself. So it appears. :
Is it not therefore equal and unequal to itself and “the
others?” How? Ifthe one” were greater or less than “the
others,” or “the others” greater or less than “the one,” would
it not follow that by “the one” being one, and “ the others” dif=
ferent from “the one,” they would be not an atom greater or
an atom less than each other, by those very existences? But
if, in addition to their being such as they are, each possessed
equality, they would be equal to each other. Butif “the one”
possessed magnitude, and “ the others” smallness, or “the one”
magnitude, but “the others” smallness, would not that, to
whatever species magnitude was present, be the greater; and
that, to whatever (species) smallness (was present), be the less.
Necessarily so. Are there not therefore these two species,
magnitude and smallness? For if they had no existence they
surely could never be contrary to each other, and be inherent
in things existing. [47.] How should they? If then small-
ness is inherent in “the one,” it will either be inherent in the
whole or in a part of it. It is necessary. But what if it be in-
herent in the whole? Will it not either be extended on an
equality through the whole of “the one,” or surround “ the
one?” Plainly so. If smallness then is inherent on an
equality in “the one,” will it not be equal to “the one;” but
if it surrounds “the one,” will it not be greater? How not?
Can then smallness be equal to or greater than any thing, and
produce the effects of magnitude and equality, but not on itself ?
It is impossible. Smallness then will not be inherent in the
whole of “the one ;” but, if at all,in a part. Certainly. Nor
*— From Taylor’s translation of the Greek οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ
ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδὲν, it would seem he wished to read, what the sense
requires, οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ Exov τὸ ὄνομα οὐδέν, in lieu of ἔχοντα
ὄνομα, I should however prefer οὔτε ἄλλο ἀριθμοῦ ἔχον τὸ ὄνομα οὐδέν,
i. e. “nor any thing else possessing the name of number ”
PARMENIDES. 443
yet, on the other hand, in the whole part; for if not, it would
produce the same effect as in the case of the whole; (for)*> it
would either be equal to, or greater than, the part in which it
is inherent. It is necessary. Smallness then will not be in
any thing existing, being inherent in neither a part nor a
whole; nor will there be any thing small, except smallness
itself. It seems not. °° Neither will magnitude be in it. For
there would be some other thing greater, and, besides magni-
tude itself, that in which magnitude is inherent, and this too,
although it being not small, which it ought to exceed, if in-
deed it be great ;°° but which in this case is impossible, since
smallness is not inherent in any thing existing. True. But
magnitude itself is not greater than any thing else but small-
ness itself; nor is smallness less than any thing else but mag-
nitude itself. [48.] It is not. Neither then would “the others”
be greater than “ the one,” nor less, since they possess neither
magnitude nor smallness ; nor do these two possess any power
either of exceeding or of being exceeded with respect to “the
one,” but only with respect to each other; nor, on the con-
trary, will “the one” be either greater or less than these two,
or “the others,” as it possesses neither magnitude nor smallness.
So indeed it appears. If then “the one” is neither greater
nor less than “the others,” is it not necessary for it to neither
exceed nor be exceeded by them? It is necessary. Is there
not also a great necessity for that, which neither exceeds nor
is exceeded, to be on an equality? and if on an equality, to
be equal? How not? “The one” therefore will be in this
state with respect to itself. Possessing neither magnitude
nor smallness in itself, it would neither exceed nor be ex-
ceeded by itself; but being on an equality, it would be equal
to itself. Entirely so. “The one” therefore will be equal
both to itself and “the others.” So it appears.
But being itself in itself, it would also be externally about
itself ; and surrounding itself, it would be greater than itself;
55 Ficinus has ‘“quippe.’”’ From whence Thomson suggested γὰρ ἴση
ἔσται, 7—The asyndeton is however supported by Heind. and Stalb.
» 5656 ] must leave for others to understand, if they can, all the words
between the numerals. Ficinus has, “ Sed neque etiam magnitudo inerit ;
quippe aliud quidquam, preter ipsammet magnitudinem, majus esset,
ut puta id, cui inerit magnitudo; veruntamen nihil est parvum, quod
quidem superari oportet a magno, si quid magnum sit;’’ which is not more
intelligible than the Greek.
444 PARMENIDES,
but being surrounded, less than itself; and thus “the one”
would be both greater and less than itself. It would so. Is
not this also necessary, that there is nothing beyond “ the one”
and “the others?” How should it be otherwise? But ought
not that, which has a being, to be always some where? Yes.
And does not that, which exists in another, exist as the less
in the greater? For one thing cannot otherwise exist in
another. [49.] It cannot. But since there is nothing else
apart from “ the one” and “the others,” and it is necessary for
these to be in something, is it not necessary for them to be in
one another, *’[the others in “the one,” and “the one” in
the others] ;°7 or that they should be no where? It appears
so. Because then “the one” is in “the others,” “the others” will
be greater than “the one,” through surrounding it; and “the
one” will be less than “the others,” by being surrounded. But
because “the others” are in “ the one,” “ the one,” by the same
reasoning, would be greater than “the others;” and “the others”
less than “the one.” It appears so. “ The one,” therefore,
is equal to, greater and less, than both itself and others. It
seems so. But if it is greater, equal, and less, it will be of
equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and “the
others ;” and if of measures, also of the parts. How should
it not? Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer mea-
sures, it will also in number be more and less than itself and
‘the others ;” and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and
“the others.” How? It would surely be of greater measures
than are those things, than which it is greater; and (it would
be) of as many parts as measures ; and in the same manner, (in
the case of those) than which it is less; and similarly (in the
case of those) to which it is equal. It is so, Since then “the
one” is both greater, less, and equal to itself, will it not also
contain measures equal to, more, and fewer than itself? And
if of measures, will not this also be true of parts? How not?
If then it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal
in multitude to itself; but if more, more in multitude, and
if fewer, less in multitude, than itself. It appears so. [50.]
But will not “the one” be in a similar state as regards “ the
others?” Because it appears to be greater in magnitude than
them, is it not necessary for it to be more in number than “ the
5787 The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
PARMENIDES. 445
others?” and, because less in magnitude, fewer in number? and
because equal in magnitude, equal likewise in multitude to “the
others?” It is necessary. And thus again, as it seems, “the
one” will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself
and “the others.” It will so.
Does “ the one,” then, participate in time? And is it, and
does it become, younger and older, itself than itself and “ the
others?” And again,®® neither younger nor older than itself
and the others, although participating of time? How? “To
be” is surely its property, since it “is the one.” Certainly.
But what else is “to be” than a participation in “being” in
conjunction with the present? Just as “it was” is a parti-
cipation in “being” in conjunction with the past, and “ it
will be” with the future? It isso. It must participate then in
time, if it participates in “being.” Entirely so. Must it not
therefore participate in time while progressing? Certainly.
It is always, therefore, in the act of being older than itself,
if it proceeds according to time. It is necessary. Do we
then remember that the older is (always)? becoming older
than that which is becoming younger?® We remember.
Would not then “the one,” since it is becoming older than
itself, become older than itself, while it is thus becoming
younger? Necessarily so. It becomes then both younger
and older than itself. Certainly. [51.] But is it not then
older, when it is in the act of being according to the present
time, which is between the “was” and the “will be:” for in
proceeding from the “then” to “the hereafter,” it will not pass
over “the now?” It willnot. Will it not then stop in the act
of being older, when it arrives at “the now,” and is no longer
in the act of being, but is already®! older? Foras it proceeds
58 Ficinus has “ et rursus contra,” as if he had found in his MS. καὶ
τοὐναντίον αὖ, or simply καὶ ad—
59 This “ always” is from “ sepe” in Ficinus; who perhaps found ἀεὶ
before τὸ πρεσβύτερον---
_ % This proposition was discussed in § 29 and 30.
1 By no process can τότ᾽ ἤδη be thus united, as I long since stated, on
Prom. 947. Wherever those words are combined in prose, we may
generally read τότε δὴ. Sometimes however the correction is not quite
so easy; yet even here it is nearer at hand than one would expect to find
it. For Ficinus has “‘ nec tum fit, sed est jam senius,”’ which leads to καὶ
οὐ γιγνέται τότ᾽, GAN ἔστιν ἤδη πρεσβύτερον. With regard to Prom.
947, 1 should have corrected πατρὸς δ᾽ ἀρὰ Κρόνου τό τ᾽, οἵδ᾽ εὖ, παντελῶς
κρανθήσεται : and similarly in Agam. 940, Ὅταν δὲ τεύχῃ Ζεὺς ἀπ᾽ ὄμφα-
446 PARMENIDES.
it will never be laid hold of by “the now.” For that which is"
proceeding is in such a state as to touch both “the now” and
“the hereafter,” leaving hold of “the now,” but laying hold of
“the hereafter,” because it is in the act of being between “the
hereafter” and “the now.” ‘True. But if it is necessary for
whatever is in the act of being not to pass by “the now,”
when it arrives at that point, it always stops in the act of
being, and “is” then whatever it may happen to become. It
appears so. “The one,” then, when, in becoming older, it
arrives at “the now,” stops in the act of being, and then
“is” older. Entirely so. “Is” it not then older than what
it was becoming older? And was it not becoming (older)
than itself? Certainly. Now the older is older than the
younger. It is. “The one” then is younger than itself,
when in becoming older, it arrives at “the now.” Of neces-
sity. But “the now” is always present with “the one,”
through the whole of its being; for it is always “now,” as
long as it “is.” How not? ‘The one,” therefore. always is,
and is in the act of being younger and older than itself. So
it appears. But “is the one,” or is it in the act of being,
for a time longer than or equal to itself ?° An equal time.
[52.] But that which either is in the act of being, or is for
an equal time, has the same age. How not? But that which
has the same age is neither older nor younger. It is neither.
“The one,” therefore, since it is in the act of being, and is
for a time equal to itself, neither is nor is in the act of being
younger or older than itself. It appears to me not. |
But what of “the others?” Ihave not what to say. But
this at least you have to say, that “the others,” if they are
different things from “the one,” and not a different thing, are
more than “one.” For that which is different would be one;
but those that are different are more than one, and would
possess multitude. They would. But being a multitude
κος πικρᾶς Οἶνον, τότ᾽ ἂν οἵδ᾽ ψῦχος ἐν δόμοις πέλειν, quoted by reat
ἐπ gpinsey my canon. Render, “Then know I upon the house there will
Θ cold.
6282 Ficinus has “ Quin etiam longiusne vel brevius tempus est aut:
fit, quam ipsummet; an potiusequum.” From whence Cornarius would
supply ἢ ἐλάττω after χρόνον; which Heindorf felt half disposed to)
adopt ; for the flow of the ideas appears thus to be more natural. :
58. The genitive τῶν ἄλλων has nothing to dependon. The syntax re-
quires τὰ τῶν ἄλλων---
* Here τοῦ ἑνὸς depends not on τὰ ἄλλα, but on ἕτερον.
ῬΑΒΜΕΝΙΡΌΕΒ. 447
they would participate in a greater number than ‘the one ?”
How not? What then? Shall we say that the things more in
number are, or have been, generated prior, or the less? The
less. The least then is the first. Now is not this “the one?”
Certainly. ‘The one,” therefore, was generated the first of all
things possessing number: but all “the others” have number,
if they are others and not another. They have. But that
which was first generated was, I think, prior in existence:
but the others are posterior. But such as have been gener-
ated posterior, are younger than that which was generated
prior; and thus “ the others” would be younger than “the one,”
and “the one” would be older than “the others.” It would.
But what is this? Could “the one” be generated contrary
to its nature? or is this impossible? Impossible. But “the
one” has appeared to possess parts ; and, if parts, a beginning,
an end, and a middle. Yes. Is not then the beginnin
generated first of all, both of “the one” and of each of “the
others ;” and after the beginning all “the others,” as far as the
end? What then? [53.] We will say moreover, that all
the others are parts of the whole and of one; but that “the
one,” together with the end, has been generated one and a
whole. Wewillsayso. Now the end, I think, is generated the
last of all, but “the one” is naturally generated together with
this ; so that, if it is necessary for “the one” to be generated not
contrary to nature, it would, having been generated together
with the end, be naturally generated the last of “the others.” It
appears so. “The one,” therefore, is younger than “ the others,”
but “the others” are older than “the one.” So again it appears
tome, But what, must not the beginning or any other part
whatever of “the one,” or of any thing else, if it isa part, and
not parts, be necessarily one, [since it is a part]?® Neces-
sarily. “The one,” therefore, would be generated together
with the first (part), while in the act of being, and together
with the second; and is never wanting to any one of the other
parts, while in the act of being, until, arriving at the extremity,
it becomes one whole, having been left out neither from the
middle, nor from the last. nor the first, nor from any other
(part) whatever in its generation. True. ‘“ The one,” there-
fore, will have the same age with “the others,” so that, if it be
5. The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
448 PARMENIDES.
not “the one” contrary to its own nature, it would be generated
neither prior nor posterior to “the others,” but together with
them ; and according to this reasoning, “ the one” will neither
be older nor younger than “the others,” nor “ the others” than
“the one:” but, according to the former reasoning, “the one”
was both older and younger than “ the others,” and they in a
similar manner than it. Entirely so.
[54.] After this manner, then, “the one” is and has been
generated. But what again shall we say of its becoming
older and younger than the others, and of the others than
“the one;” and again, that it neither becomes older nor
younger? (As we said) respecting its being, (shall we say)
in the same manner respecting its becoming to be? or other-
wise? Iam not able to say. But I am able (to say) this;
that, although one thing is older than another, yet it cannot
become still older, than by that difference of age which it
possessed as soon as it was produced; nor, on the other hand,
can that which is younger become younger. For, equal things
being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing
else, always cause them to differ by the same degree as that, by
which they were distant at first. How not? “That which is”
therefore would never become older or younger than any being,
if it is always different by an equal quantity from it in age:
but (this) ® is and was older, and that younger; but is not
becoming so. ‘True. ‘The one” likewise will never become
either older or younger than “the others,” it being so already.
Never. But see whether in this way (they) become younger and
older.® In what way? The same as that through which “the
86 Instead of τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, Schleiermacher,with whom Heindorf, Bek-
ker, and Stalbaum agree, would read τοῦ évyroc—One would prefer ὄντος
ὁτουοῦν, i. e. “ any being whatever.”
6 On the omission of τὸ μὲν in the first clause, answering to τὸ δὲ in
the second, Heindorf refers to his note on Theetetus, § 96, which Stal-
baum has, according to custom, transcribed on Protagor. p. 330, A., Rep. v.
p. 451, E. Butthere, as here, Ficinus probably found the correct reading
in his MS., as shown by his version, “ hoc quidem senius, illud autem
junius.”’
As there is nothing to which the plurals πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα can
be referred, Heindorf wished to read πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον. But
Stalbaum would understand αὐτὰ, ἱ. 6. τὸ ἕν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Taylor trans-
lated ‘‘ other things,” misled by the version of Ficinus: ‘Sed aspice post-
hac, utrum alia quadam ratione et juniora hec et seniora fiant,’ where
“alia” is the ablative case, not nominative. He should have elicited
a,
PARMENIDES. 449
one” was made to appear older than “the others,” and “the
others” (older) than “the one.” [55.] What then? Since “the
one” is older than “ the others,” it has been generated during a
longer time than “ the others.” Certainly. Now consider again,
if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the
longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a smaller part ?
By asmaller. 59 Will not then “the one” differ from “ the
others” by an age as great subsequently as it did at first? but,
receiving an equal time with “the others,” it will differ always
in age less than before.® Will it not be so? Yes. But
would not that, which differs less in age, with respect to any |
thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with
respect to those, than which it was before older? Younger.
But if that is younger, will not, on the other hand, “the others”
be older with respect to “the one” than before? Entirely
so. That, therefore, which was generated younger, would be
in the act of becoming older, with respect to that which was
before generated and is older; but it never is older, but is
always in the act of becoming older than it; for the one ad-
vances to a younger, but the other to an older, state; and on
the other hand, that which is older is in the act of becoming
younger in the same manner than the younger. For both
tending to that which is contrary to themselves, they are in
the act of becoming contrary to each other; the younger be-
coming older than the older, and the older younger than the
younger. But they would not be able to become so. For
should they become so, they would no longer be in the act of be-
coming, but would be (πον). But now they are in the act
of becoming younger and older than each other; and “ the
one” indeed is in the act of becoming younger than “the others,”
rather from ‘‘ posthac,”’ and “alia,”’ and “hee,” “Opa δ᾽ ἔτι, εἰ ἄλλῃ
ὁδῷ ταὐτὰ πρεσβύτερα, although Ficinus found in his MS. ταῦτα, “hee,”
not ταὐτὰ, “eadem.’? ‘The sense would then be—‘‘ But see further,
whether by another road the same things become older and younger.”
59. 69 This is well explained by Heindorf; who says that this is not,
although it seems at first sight to be so, at variance with the preceding as-
sertion in ᾧ 54, that if equals be added to unequals, the two quantities will
not differ more than they did originally. For here the proposition may
‘be understood by supposing that, if the ages of A and B are respectively
20 and 18 years, A is older than B by ,'; of the longer period; but if 4
years be added to each, then A will be older than B by only ,', of the
longer period.
7 Ficinus, “sed jam essent,”’ ὌΠ leads to ἀλλ᾽ εἶεν ἂν viv νῦν δὲ----
6
450 PARMENIDES.
because it has been made to appear to be older, and ἐσ
have had a prior generation: but “the others” (have been
made to appear to be) older than “the one,” because they
have had a posterior generation. [56.] According to the
same reasoning, “the others” likewise are similarly related
with respect to “the one,” since they were made to appear to
be older and to have had a prior generation. So indeed
it appears. So far then as neither becomes younger or older
than the other, through their differing by an equal num-
ber from each other, “the one” will not become older or
younger than “ the others,” nor the others than “the one.” But
so far as it is necessary for the prior’! to differ by a part
ever another 13 from the posterior, and the posterior from the
prior, so far it is necessary for them to become older and
younger than each other, and “the others” than “ the one,” and
“the one” than “the others?” Entirely so. On all these ac-
counts then “ the one” is, and is in the act of becoming older
and younger both than itself and “the others ;” and again, it
neither is nor is in the act of “ becoming” older or younger
than itself and “the others.” It is perfectly so. But since “the
one” participates in time, and in the act of becoming older
and younger, is it not necessary for it to participate in “the
then,” and “the hereafter,” and “the now,” if it participates
in time? It is necessary. ‘The one,” therefore, was,
and will be, and is; and has been in the act of becoming,
and is in the act of becoming, and will be in the act of be-
coming. What then? And there would be something for
it, and of it, and which was, and is, and will be., Entirely
so. [57.] Now there would be the knowledge and opinion
and perception of it, if we now 1340 all these things’ re+
lating to it. You speak rightly. There is likewise for it a
name and a discourse; and it may be named and spoken of:
τι Ficinus has “ differre necesse priora posterioribus ;”’ as if his MS. cor-
rectly omitted γενόμενα (for which two MSS. read γινόμενα) after τὰ πρό-
τερα τῶν ὑστέρων ---
τῷ, τὸ Ficinus, “ altera semper parte.” But I confess I hardly under-
stand ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ, although I am quite aware of the meaning of det
thus placed between ἄλλῳ and μορίῳ, after what Scaliger has written on
Propertius i. 18, 15. Hudson on Thucyd. iv. 68, Valckenaer on The-
ocrit. Adoniaz. p. 197, C., and Elmsley on (Βα. C. 1532, who alluded, 1
ae to Barker in Classical Recreations, p. 182, as I stated on eer
73.73 Namely, know, think, and perceive. i
PARMENIDES. 451
and whatever circumstances of such a kind take place with
regard to ‘the others,” take place with regard likewise to “the
one.” Such is entirely the case.
Let us then speak of the third point. If “the one” is such
as we have discussed, is it not necessary, since it is both one
and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating
in time, that because it is one, it should participate at one time
in “being ;” but that because it is not one, it should participate
at no time in “being?” Itis necessary. Will it then be pos-
sible for it not to participate, when it does; or to participate,
when it does not? It will not be possible. It participates
then at one time, and does not participate at another; for
thus alone can it participate and not participate in the same.
Right. Is not this then the time when it participates in “be-
ing,” and again is freed from it? Or how is it possible for it
to possess at one time the same thing, and at another time not,
unless at some time it both receives and dismisses it? Not
otherwise. Do you not call the receiving of “being” by the term
to be generated? Ido. And to be freed from “being” (by the
term) to be destroyed? Entirely so. ‘ The one” then, as it
seems, by receiving and dismissing “ being,” is generated and
destroyed. Necessarily so. [58.] But since it is one and
many, and is generated and destroyed, when it becomes one,
is not the being many destroyed, and when it becomes many,
is not the being one destroyed? Entirely so. But, when it
becomes one and many, must it not be separated and united ?
It must. And when it becomes unlike and like, must it
not be made like and unlike? Certainly. And when it be-
comes greater, less, and equal, must it not be increased, and
wasted away,’4 and equalized? It must so. But when from
being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it
changes into being moved, ” it is requisite surely for it to be not
inone time.” Howshouldit? But that which stood still be-
fore and is afterwards moved, and that which was moved before
4 Instead φθίνειν one would have expected ἐλαττοῦσθαι, to answer to
ἔλαττον or μειοῦσθαι, just as ἰσοῦσθαι does to ἴσον.
775 The words between the numerals I cannot understand. The
train of ideas evidently is, ‘‘ it is requisite surely for those two things not
to exist at one time ;” in Greek, δεῖ δὴ που αὐτά ye μὴ δύο ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ
εἶναι. Ficinus has “‘ oportet hoc non uno in tempore esse ἢ He there-
fore found in his MS. τοῦτο, not αὐτό. Stalbaum however translates
μηδ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι, “to be 1 time at all.”
G 2
452 PARMENIDES.
and afterwards stands still, cannot be thus affected without a
change. For howcan it? But there is no time, in which any
thing can at once be neither moved nor stand still. Thereis not.
But it cannot change without a change. It is probable not.
When, therefore, does it change? For it would change, neither
while it stands still, nor while it is moved, nor while it is in time.
It would not. Is there then that strange thing, in which it would
be, when it changes? What thing? “The sudden.” ΤΊ For
‘the sudden ” seems to signify some such thing as ” changing
from it to either.” For there is no change from standing,
while standing ; nor a change from motion, while in motion;
but that wonderful nature “the sudden” is situated between
motion and standing, and is in no time; and into this and
from this that, which is moved, changes for the purpose of
standing still; and that which stands, for the purpose of being
moved. It nearly appears so. [59.] “The one,” therefore,
if it stands still and is moved, must change into either; for
thus alone would it produce both these effects. Butin chang-
ing, it changes suddenly ; and when it changes, it would be in
no time, and would neither stand still nor be moved. It
would not. Is then “the one” in this state also with respect
to the other changes? and when it changes from being into
being destroyed, or from non-being into the act of becoming,
does it not then become a medium between certain movements
and standings? and then it neither is nor is not, nor is in the
act of becoming, nor is destroyed? It appears so. And by
76 Ficinus strangely translates τὸ ἐξαίφνης, ‘‘ momentum individuum.”
τι. τ Τῇ explanation of these unintelligible words, Heindorf says that
ἐκείνου is to be referred to τὸ ἐξαίφνης, as if it were correct Greek to
say τὸ ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλον ἐξ ἐξαίφνης. But to what can εἰς ἑκά
be referred? Stalbaum’s version is, ‘“‘ The sudden seems to signify
to turn something from it to either; which I presume he understands;
for if not, he has written a mass of rubbish. The sense required is to
this effect, “ The sudden seems to signify something of this kind, that by
quickly moving it can change a thing that is, from one state to another.”
In Greek, Td γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ὀξὺ κινοῦν
μεταβάλλοι ἄν, ὃ ἔστιν, ἑτέρωθεν ἑτέρωσε, as in ᾧ 68, μεθίσταιτο
ποι. On the loss or corruption of ὀξὺ, see myself on Aisch. Suppl. 901,
and Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 144, where Poppo should have noticed in his
second ed. my restoration of Thucyd. iii. 37, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ὀξείᾳ
αὑτῶν ξυνέσει, which 1 could confirm by a dozen passages.
78 Instead of οὐδὲν, Thomson was the first to suggest οὐδενὶ; for he
found in Ficinus “nullo prorsus in tempore.” The credit of the restor-
ation is given by Heindorf and Stalbaum to Schleiermacher.
PARMENIDES. 453
the same reasoning, when it passes from one into many and
from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it se-
parated nor united; and in passing from like to unlike, and
from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it
made like nor unlike; and while it passes from small into
great, and into equal and the contraries,’? it will be neither
small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor wasting
away, nor equalized. It appears not. But all these accidents
“the one” would suffer, if itis. How not?
But must we not consider what it is meet for “the others”
to suffer, if “one” exists? We must consider. Shall we state
then, if “one” exists, what “the other” must suffer from *°
“the one?” Let us state. Since then “the others” are
different from “ the one,” they are not “ the one:” for other-
wise they would not be different from “the one?” Right.
Nor yet are “the others” entirely deprived of ‘the one,” but
somehow participate in it. In what way? Because “the
others,” having parts, are different from “the one:” for if
they had not parts, they would be entirely one. Right. But
parts, we have said,*! belong to that, which is a whole. We
said*! so. But it is necessary for a whole to be one (com-
posed) of many, of which one the parts are parts: for each
of the parts must not be a part of many, but of a whole.
How is this? [60.] If any thing should be a part of many,
amongst which it is itself, it would surely be both a part of
itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others;
since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of
these, it will be a part of the others, with the exception of
this; and thus it will not be a part of each one; and not
being a part of each, it will be a part of not one of the
many; and being a part of not one of these (the many), it
is impossible for it to be any thing belonging to all those,
779 Whatever Heindorf and Stalbaum may assert, I cannot believe
that Plato expressed himself in so loose a manner, when the very balance
of the sentence shows he would have written only καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ καὶ
μεγάλου καὶ ἴσου sic τἀναντία ἰὸν, while the words οὔτε αὐξανόμενον
οὔτε φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον have been evidently interpolated from ᾧ 58.
80 Ficinus, “alia ab uno pati,’’ which would seem to lead to rd ἄλλα
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς---πεπονθέναι, in lieu of τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς. But τοῦ ἑνὸς
follows here τὰ ἄλλα, as in § 63, τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πεπονθέναι.
ὅ1. From “ asseruimus ” twice in Ficinus, Heindorf corrected ἔφαμεν :
for there is an allusion to § 22. Stalbaum however still sticks to φαμέν.
454 PARMENIDES.
of not one of which it is either *a part, or®? any thing .
else. So it appears. <A part, therefore, is neither a part of
the many nor of all; but of some one idea and of some one
thing, which we call a whole, having become from all one
thing complete. ®[Of this a part would be a part]. En-
tirely so. If therefore the others have parts, they too would —
participate in a whole and one. Certainly. One perfect
whole then possessing parts, must necessarily be different®*
from “the one.” It is necessary. There is moreover the
same reasoning respecting each of the parts: for it is neces-
sary that this** (each part) should participate in “the one.”
For, if each of these is a part, the very being each signifies
surely one thing, separated indeed from others, but existing by
itself, if it shall be truly each. Right. But it would partici-
pate in “the one,” as being evidently something else than “the
one ;” for (otherwise)** it would not have participated, but
would have been “the one itself.” But now it is surely im-
possible for any thing to be “the one,” except “the one
itself.” Impossible. [61.] But it is necessary for both the
whole and the part to participate in “the one.” ®?For the
whole will be one thing *’ of which the parts are parts; but on
the other hand each (part will be) a part of the whole,® of
whatever whole it may be a part. It isso. Will not then
82. 82 Ficinus, “vel pars vel aliud quodlibet.”” He therefore found
in his MS. 7—7, not rai—«ai, On the confusion of those words see
Bast, Paleograph. p.815. Damascius however, quoted by Stalbaum,
acknowledges the doubled rai; and so he does the εἶναι after ἀδύνατον,
which Heindorf wished to expunge, as it has nothing on which it can
depend, and is omitted by Ficinus, either from his MS. or his own good
sense. Stalbaum is nevertheless satisfied with the want of syntax.
83_83 The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
8¢ Ficinus, “alia ipsa,” as if his MS. had αὐτὰ τὰ ἄλλα ---
85 So Heind., whom Stalb. follows, reads τοῦτο for τούτου. But the
best MSS. have ἐὰν τοῦτο: where ἐὰν τοῦτο perhaps conceal ἕκαστον
αὐτὸ. Ficinus acknowledges τούτου by his “ hujus unius.”
86 Ficinus has alone “ alioquin haud quaquam participaret.”
57. 57 Heind., whom Stalb. follows, renders, “ For one (i. 6. the whole)
will be some one whole; but the other (i. e. a part) will be some part
of the whole.” I have translated with Taylor, as if the Greek were τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ὅλον ἕν ἔσται---ποὶ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕν ὅλον ἔσται. 3
8 Instead of οὗ ἂν ἢ μόριον ὅλου, Heindorf would read ὃ ἂν 9 μόρισν
ὅλου; and so probably found Ficinus in his MS., whose version is
“ queecunque pars totius existat.” Stalbaum however, with Schmidt,”
would adopt Schleiermacher’s conjecture, ὃ ἂν ᾧ μορίου (or rather,
μορίων) ὅλον, 1. 6. “ whatever may be a whole of the parts,” referring to.
ῬΑΒΜΕΝΙΡΕΒ.. ; 455
those things, which participate in “the one,” participate in it’
as being different from “the one?”*? How not? But things
different from “the one,” will surely be many. For if the
things different from “the one” were neither one nor more
than one, they would be nothing. They would. But since
the things, which participate in the one part and in the one
whole, are more than one, is it not necessary for those very
things, which participate in “ the one,” to be infinite in multi-
tude? How? Let us look at the matter in this way. Being
neither one, nor participating in “the one,” do they then not
participate in it when they do participate? Certainly. Are%
not multitudes those in which “the one” is not? Multitudes,
certainly. What then, if we should be willing in imagination
to take away from these the least quantity we can, must not
this quantity so taken away, be a multitude, and not one,
since it does not participate in “the one?” It must. To him
then, who thus surveys ever the different nature of the species
itself by itself, will not as much of it, as we may behold,*! be in-
finite in multitude? Entirely so. And moreover, since each
part becomes one part,*? (the parts)*? have a bound with re-
spect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with
respect to the parts. Perfectly so. It results then, to the
things different from “the one,” as it seems, that, from “ the
p. 147, B.§ 4. But ὕλον μορίων, as I have there stated, could not be
said in correct Greek.
89 Ficinus has “‘ Nonne igitur, cum alia sint, quam unum, uno partici-
pant omnia, que participant.” From whence Stephens wished to read,
“Οὐκ οὖν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς, τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ."
He should have read likewise πάντα τὰ μετέχοντα.
% Ficinus, ‘‘ Nonne multitudines sunt,’’ which leads to Οὐκ οὖν πλήθη
ἔστι τινὰ, unless it be said that πλήθη ὄντα is here opposed to the pre-
ceding οὐχ ἕν ὄντα. But in that case ἀλλὰ would have been written, not
ode οὖν. Stalbaum explains πλήθη ὄντα by “ infinite.” But how the
same word could mean “‘ multitude ”’ and ‘“‘infinity,’’ he does not state,
nor can I understand.
* How this ὁρῶμεν can follow the preceding σκοποῦντι, I must leave
for others to explain. Ficinus has, what is far preferable, ‘‘ Nonne tibi
sie semper consideranti—quantumcunque illius inspexeris.”
® Cornarius was the first to repeat μόριον, which, thongh rejected by
Heindorf, has been adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from the best MSS.
85. To preserve the balance of the sentence, Heindorf suggested πρὸς τὸ
ὅλον τὰ μόρια καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. And so Ficinus, “ terminum
jam partes invicem et ad totum habent.” Stalbaum still sticks to the
common reading.
456 PARMENIDES.
one” and themselves having a communion, something different
is produced in themselves, which furnished them indeed a
bound with respect to each other, but their own nature would
be with respect to themselves infinity.** It appears so. [62.]
Thus the things different from “the one,” both as wholes and
according to parts, are infinite and participate in bound.
Entirely so. Are they not therefore similar and dissimilar,
both to each other and to themselves ἢ Why? Because, so far
as all of them are somehow infinite, according to their own
nature, they would all in this way suffer the same. Entirely.
% And so far as they all participate in a bound, they would in
this way too suffer the same. But so far as they suffer the
being bounded and infinite, “they suffer [these very] acci-
dents, [being accidents] contrary to each other. Certainly.
But contrary things are as much as possible dissimilar.
What then? According to each accident they would be simi-
lar to themselves and to each other; but according to both
they are on both sides®’ most contrary and dissimilar. It
nearly appears so. And thus “the others” themselves* would
be similar and dissimilar to themselves and to each other.
They would so. And they (would be) the same to, and different
from, each other, and be moved and stand still; and we should
without difficulty find the things different from “the one,”
suffering all contrary accidents, since they have been shown
to suffer these. You speak rightly.
[63.] Shall we not then dismiss these things as evident,
and again consider if “the one” is, whether the others differ-
* Instead of ἀπειρίαν, which, says Stalbaum, depends upon ἔχει, to be
got out of παρέσχε, the five best MSS. read ἀπειρία. Hence Plato evi-
dently wrote ἀπειρία ἂν ἣν, as I have translated.
%__% All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, al-
though duly found in the version of Ficinus.
556-86 Ficinus has “‘ que sunt contrarie passiones, quam maxime fieri
potest, dissimilia sunt,’’ thus showing that there was something wanting
in his MS., which has been supplied by others; where however πάθη,
ὄντα, and ταῦτα, are all equally superfluous, and hence included here in
brackets.
7” One good although a modern MS. has ἀμφοτέροις, the conjecture
af Heindorf, who understood by it “‘ both themselves and each other.”
% Although the best MSS. confirm αὐτὰ, the conjecture of Schleier-
macher, for ταῦτα in Stephens, and ταὐτὰ, which Ficinus found in his
MS., as shown by his version “ eadem,”’ yet I confess I cannot understand
it. Perhaps Plato wrote ἅμα re αὑτοῖς, where re would precede instead
of following αὑτοῖς.
ae
PARMENIDES. 457
ent from “the one” are not likewise in this state, or after this
manner alone? Entirely so. Let us then say again as at the
beginning, if “the one” is, what must the things different
from “the one” suffer. Let us say it. Is not then “the one”
separate from “the others,” and are not “the others” separate
from “the one?” Why? Because there is nothing else “ differ-
ent” except these, (namely, ) that which is different from “ the
one,” and that which is “different” from “the others ;” for all
is said, when “the one” and “the others” are said. All, in-
deed. ‘There is nothing else therefore except these, in which,
as being the same, “ the one” and “the others” would exist.
Nothing. “The one” and “the others” are therefore never in
the same. They arenot. Are they then separate? Yes. We
have said moreover that “the truly one” has not any parts.
For how can it? Neither therefore will the whole of “the one”
nor its parts be in “the others,” if it is separate from “the
others,” and has no parts. How not? In no way then will “the
others” participate in “the one ;” since they participate neither
according to a certain part, nor according to the whole. It
seems not. By no means then are “the others” “one,” nor
have they any one in themselves. [64. ] They have not. Neither,
then, are “the others” many; for, if they were many, each of
them, as being a part of a whole, would be one; but now the
things different from “the one” are neither one nor many,
nor a whole nor parts, since they in no respect participate in
“the one.” Right. “The others” then % are of themselves”
neither two nor three, nor one in them, because they are en-
tirely deprived of “the one.” So it is. “The others,” therefore,
are of themselves! neither similar nor dissimilar to “the one,”
nor are similitude and Seeiuse | in them. For if they were
similar and dissimilar, or! possessed in themselves similitude
and dissimilitude, the things different from “the one” would
possess in themselves two species contrary to each other. So
it appears. But it is impossible for those to participate in
any two things, which do not participate even in one. Im-
_ 9999 Ficinus, “nec duo nec tria sunt nec unum illis inest.”? He there-
fore found in his MS. neither the αὐτὰ of other MSS. nor the ταὐτὰ of
Stephens’ text; while he acknowledges ἕν ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, for which
‘Heindorf suggested é ἔνεστιν, found subsequently i in three MSS.
1° Ficinus, “nec eadem sunt alia uni,” i. e. οὔτε ταὐτὰ ἔστι τῷ ἑνὶ.
1 Instead of ᾧ ἔχοι, which is unintelligible, the four best MSS. have
ἢ, adopted by Stalbaum.
458 PARMENIDES.
possible. ‘The others” therefore are neither similar nor dis-
similar, nor both. For, if they were similar or dissimilar,
they would participate in one species of the different; and if
they were both, they would participate in two contrary species :
but this has been shown to be impossible. ‘True. They are
therefore neither same nor different, nor moved, nor standing
still, nor generated, nor destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor
equal, (nor unequal, )? nor do they suffer any thing else of this
kind. For, if the others could endure to suffer any such acci-
dent, they would participate in one, and two, and three, and in
even and odd; in all which it has been shown it is impossible
for them to participate ; since they_are in every way and en-
tirely deprived of “ the one.” Most true. Hence, then, if “the
one” exists, “the one” is all things and nothing, both as re-
gards itself, and as regards “ the others” #in like manner.’
Entirely so.
[65.] Beit so. But ifthe one” is not, must we not con-
sider after this what ought to happen? We must consider.
What then would be this supposition, if “one is not?” Does
it differ from this, “If that, which is not one, is non-existing ?”
It does differ. Does it differ merely from, or is the saying, “If
that which is not one, is non-existing,” entirely contrary (to
the saying), “Ifthe one is not?” Entirely the contrary. But
what, should any one say, if magnitude is not, or if smallness
is not, or any thing else of this kind, would he not show in
each of these cases that he is speaking of that, which is not, as
something different? Entirely so. Would he not therefore
now show that he is speaking of that which is not as some-
thing’ different from “the others,” when he says “if the one is
not ;” and do we understand what he is saying? We do un-
derstand. In the first place then he speaks of something
which may be known; and next of something different from
“the others,” when he says “one ;” whether he adds to it the’
term of “ being” or “not being ;” ‘for that which is said not
to be, is known none the less, and that it is different from “' the ,
2 How strange that not a single commentator should have seen that
οὐδὲ ἄνισα is evidently to be supplied after οὐδὲ ἴσα, to complete {μ΄
climax of the series of contraries.
3 As there is nothing to which ὡσαύτως can be referred, Heindorf |
wished to read, what Stalbaum feels half-inclined to adopt, wai πρὸξ΄
τάλλα, καὶ τἄλλα ὡσαύτως. ἢ αἱ
—* I am here quite in the dark; and so was Ficinus, as is evident”
PARMENIDES. 459
others:”* is it not so? Necessarily so. Let us then say (as) at
the beginning, “If the one is not,” what ought to occur. In
the first place then this, as it seems, ought to occur to it; that
either there should be a knowledge of it, or that nothing of
what is said can be known, when any one says, “ If one is non-
existing.” True. (Must not this too happen), either that “the
others” are different from it, or that even it cannot be said
to be different from “the others?” Entirely so. It has there-
fore diversity in addition to knowledge. For he does not
speak of the diversity of “the others,” when he says that “ the
one” is different from “the others,” but of the diversity of
“the one.” It appears so. And yet the one which is non-ex-
isting, participates in “that,” and “some,” and “ this,”> and
“these,” and every thing of this kind. For neither could “the
one” be spoken of, nor things different from “the one,” nor
would there be any thing for it, or belonging to it, nor could
it be called any thing, if it had no share in something, or in
the other things of this kind.6 Right. [66.] But to be can-
not be present to “the one,” if it non-exists; though nothing
prevents it from participating in the many; nay, it must
(participate), if “the one” is that, ‘and not another thing is
not existing.’ ‘If however it will not be either “the one”
nor that, but the discourse about something else, it is meet to
say nothing. But if “the one” is supposed (as) that thing
from his unintelligible version, “‘ nihilominus cognoscitur, quid non esse
dicatur, quodque differens quiddam est ab aliis.”” So too was Heindorf,
who wished to read γιγνώσκεται, ὥς τι τὸ λεγόμενον : and so lastly was
Stalbaum, who has laid hold of Heindorf’s ὡς, as a drowning man does
of a straw, and with the same unhappy result.
5 After καὶ τούτου, there is in the Greek καὶ τούτῳ, answering to
*huic”’ in Ficinus’ version. But amongst a mass of genitives dependent
on μετέχει, a dative could not be thus inserted. Hence Heindorf once
wished to read τοῦ τούτῳ, but was restrained by meeting with something
similar in § 71. But that passage is wretchedly corrupt. Taylor more
correctly has tacitly omitted καὶ τούτῳ.
6 Ficinus has “‘ ceterorum talium.’’ He therefore found in his MS
not τούτων, but τοιούτων.
7—7 Such is the English version of cai μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν, similar to
the Latin of Ficinus, ‘‘ nec aliud non est;’’ which Stalbaum, I presume,
unable to explain, has thought proper to give a paraphrase of it in German.
But whether the German is more intelligible than the Greek, Latin, and
English, I am unable to state.
8_8 Here again is a passage which, says Stalbaum, Damascius did not
understand, and Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Schmidt have vainly at-
460 PARMENIDES.
and not as another to non-exist, it is necessary for it to par-
ticipate in that and many other things. Entirely so. Dissimili-
tude, therefore, is present to it with respect to “ the others ;”
for “the others,” being different from “the one,” will also be
foreign (from it). Certainly. But are not things foreign
various? How not? And are not things various dissimilars ?
Dissimilars. If then they are dissimilars to “the one,” it is
evident they would be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar.
It is evident. There would then be present to “the one” a
dissimilitude with respect to which “the others” are dissimilar
toit. It seems so. But if there is to it a dissimilitude from “the
others,” must there not be to it a similitude of itself? How?
If there be a dissimilitude of “the one” to “the one,” no
discourse would take place about a thing of such a kind as
“the one;” nor would the supposition be about “the one,”
but about something different from “the one.” Entirely so.
But it ought not. Certainly. There ought, then, to be a simili-
tude of itself to “the one.” There ought. But neither is “the
one” equal to “the others.” For, if it were equal, *it would
be according to equality, similar to them ;* but both these are
impossible, if “the one” is not. Impossible. [67.] But
since it is not equal to “the others,” is it not necessary for “the
others” also to be not equal to it? It is necessary. But are
not things which are not equal unequal? Certainly. And
are not unequals unequal by that which is unequal? How
not? ‘The one,” therefore, participates in the inequality, ac-
cording to which “the others” are unequal to it. It does par-
ticipate. But magnitude and smallness belong to inequality.
They do. Do magnitude and smallness then belong to one
of this kind? It nearly appears so. But magnitude and
tempted to emend. Accordingly he proposes to read εἰ μέντοι μὴ τὸ ἕν
μόνον μὴ μόνον ἔσται, as if by any process μόνον could be corrupted into
μήτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο. For this idea however respecting the introduction of μόνον,
Stalbaum was indebted to “ipsum unum illud duntaxat”’ in Ficinus, to
whom he should have given the honour of the discovery.
*—* Such is Taylor’s translation of the version of Ficinus, “jam pro-
fecto etiam simile illis secundum equalitatem existeret ;’” who therefore
found in his MS. εἴη ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα, not the
unintelligible εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα,
where τὲ couples nothing, and ἂν εἴη is repeated in all the MSS. but the
two best. Stalbaum thus explains the words, εἴη re ἂν ἤδη, καὶ ὅμοιον
ἂν ein — ‘jam affirmante predicato ornatum esset”’—from which the
reader is left to draw what conclusion he can.
PARMENIDES. 461
smallness are always separated from each other. Entirely so.
There is then always something between them. Certainly.
Can you mention any thing else between these, except
equality? Nothing else. To whatever thing therefore
there is magnitude and smallness, to this there is equality
also as a medium between the two. It appearsso. To “the
one” then which is non-existing, equality, magnitude, and
smallness, as it appears, belong. So it seems. But it ought
likewise to participate in a certain way in “being.” How so? It
ought to be in the statewhich we have mentioned ? for, unless it
be in that ‘state, we should not speak the truth in saying that
“the one” is not; but if (we speak) the truth, it is evident that
we have spoken of things that exist. Is it not so? Itisso. But
since we assert that we speak the truth, it is necessary for us
to assert that we are speaking of things which exist. It is
necessary. °“ The one,” therefore, which does not exist, as it
appears, does exist; for if it should non-exist while non-
existing, but remit something of existence with respect to
non-existence, it will immediately become existing. Entirely
so. [68.] !°It ought therefore to have, as the bond of non-
existence, an existence not existing, if it is about to non-exist ;
just as existence (ought) to have (as a bond of existence) a
non-existence existing,!® in order that it may be perfectly to
be.!! For thus especially existence would exist, and non-
9. 9 Of all the words between the numerals, I confess my inability to
understand an atom. ‘The reader will therefore be glad perhaps to see
Taylor’s explanation of this difficult passage, which is equally unintelligi-
ble in the Latin of Heindorf, and, I suspect, too in the German of Stal-
baum.—Any remission of “ being” is attended with “ non-being,” which
is the same with “is ποῦ: and if any thing of ‘‘is” be taken away,
“is not”? is immediately introduced ; and so it will immediately become
‘is not non-being,”’ that is, “it is being.”
10. 10 The balance of the sentences evidently requires, as I have trans-
lated, Aci ἄρα αὐτὸ (i. 6. τὸ μὴ ὃν) δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ
ὃν, and τὸ ὃν (δεσμὸν ἔχειν) τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὄν. For thus τὸ μὴ
ὃν would be opposed to τὸ ὃν, and τοῦ μὴ εἶναι to τοῦ εἶναι, and τὸ εἶναι
to τὸ μὴ εἶναι, and μὴ ὃν to ὄν. The edd. have τὸ ὃν τὸ μὴ ὃν ἔχειν μὴ
εἶναι, in the second clause, which I cannot understand; nor could
Stalbaum, who proposes to read ὥσπερ τὸ ὃν μὴ ὃν ἔχειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι ;
or with the omission οἵ ἔχειν entirely.
1 Here again I am quite ata loss. Ficinus has “ ut perfecte rursus esse
liceat.”” But as in the Greek words ἵνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι 7, there should
be a balance to the subsequent—ei καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν ad τελέως μὴ ἔσται, it is
evident that ad ἵνα could not be found in the first clause; and even if it
462 PARMENIDES.
existence not exist, '*participating (respectively) the former
in existence (for the sake) of “ being” ᾿ existing 3 but in non-
existence (for the sake) of “non-being ” existing, if it is about
to exist completely ; the latter (participating) in non-existence
(for the sake) of “non-being” not existing ; but (participating)
in existence for the sake of “ being” existing ; if non-existence
is to non-exist completely.'? Most truly so, Since then both
to existence there is a share of non-existence, and to non-
existence a share of existence, is it not necessary for “the
one” also, since it does not exist, to participate in existence
for the purpose of non-existence? It is necessary. Existence
therefore appears to be “the one,” if it does not exist. So it
seems. And non-existence, if it does not exist. How not?
Can any thing then, which is in some state, be not in that
state, when it does not change from that state? It cannot.
Every thing then of such a kind, which is and is not in sucha
state, indicates some change. How not? Is change motion? or
what shall we call it? Itis motion. But has not “the one” ap-
peared to be both “being” and “not-being?” Yes. It appears
then to be and not to be insuchastate. It seemsso. ‘The
non-existing one” appears then to be moved, since it has a
change from “being” into “not-being.” It appearsso. But ifit
be no where among beings, as it is not, since it is a not-being,
it cannot change its place from any where to any where. For
it cannot. It will not then be moved by changing its place.
For it will not. Neither will it revolve in “the same ;” for
could, by no process could εἶναι ἢ yj mean “it may be lawful to be.” Per-
haps Plato wrote ἵνα τελέως ἂν ἢ τὸ εἶναι : to which would lead αὖ τ εἶναι
in one MS. and ἂν εἴη εἶναι in another; for thus τὸ εἶναι would answer
Ἑ τὸ μὴ ὃν, (or, as it should be read, τὸ py eivat,) and ἂν 9 to μὴ
σται.
12. -1Ὦὁ By attending here, as before, to the balance of the sentences, I
have been able, I trust, to perceive, what nobody else seems to have done,
the flow of ideas; which leads to μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν. ὃν οὐσίας μὲν, τοῦ εἶναι
ὃν ἕνεκα ὃν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶνα μὴ ὄν---τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν, τοῦ μὴ
εἶναι μὴ ὃν, οὐσίας δὲ, τοῦ εἶναι ὃν : where μὲν isinserted after the first ov-
σίας to preserve the antithesis, and ἕνεκα for the syntax ; and μὴ is omitted
before the concluding 6 ὄν. For the words are thus opposed toeach other,
τὸ μὲν ὃν, ἴο τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃν, and οὐσιας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι ὃν to μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ
μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὃν, and μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὃν to οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι
ὄν. With regard to the insertion of ἕνεκα, although that adverb may be
omitted before an infinitive, in the case of a negative sentence, it cannot
be in the case of a positive one—a distinction first pointed out by Hermann,
and supported by myself in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 268.
<
PARMENIDES. 463
it will never touch “the same,” since the same is “being.” But
it is impossible for “ not-being” to reside in any “being.” Im-
possible. [69.] “The one,” therefore, “which is not,” cannot
revolve in that, in which it is not. It cannot. Neither will “the
one” be altered from itself, either into “ being” or “ not-be-
ing :” for our discourse would no longer be concerning the one,
if it were altered from itself, but concerning something else.
Right. But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in the same,
nor changes its place, can it still be moved inany way? How
can it? But it is necessary for that, which is unmoved, to
be at rest; and for that, which is at rest, to stand still.!3 It is
necessary. As it seems, therefore, “the one” which is not,
both stands still and is moved. It appearsso. And yet if
it be moved, there is a great necessity for it to be altered ;
for, so far as any thing is moved, it is no longer in the same
state that it was, but ina different one. Soitis. “The one,”
therefore, since it is moved, is also altered. Yes. And yet
being moved not at all, it would be not at all altered. It
would not. So far then as “the one” which is not, is moved,
it is altered; but so far as it is not moved, it is not altered.
Certainly not. “The one,” therefore, which is not, is both
altered and not altered. It appears so. But is it not neces-
sary for any thing, when it is altered, to be in the act of being
different from what it was before, and to die away from its
former state; but for a nature, which is not altered, to be
neither in the act of being, nor of dying away? It is neces-
sary. ‘ The one,” therefore, which is not, by being altered,
is in the act of being, and of dying away; but at the same
time, from its not being altered, it is not in the act of being
or of dying away. [70.] And thus “the one,” which is not,
is in the act of being and of dying, and is neither in the act
of being nor of dying away. For it is not (otherwise).
But let us again return to the beginning, about to see
whether these things will appear to us as they do now, or
otherwise. It is necessary. Have we not already said, 13 “If
‘the one is not, what ought to happen concerning it?” Cer-
18 Here, as in ὁ 25, Iam unable to see the difference between ἡσυχίαν
ἄγειν and ἑστάναι.
™“ Here, asin § 32, Heindorf adopted ἔφαμεν for φαμὲν, from “ disseru-
imus’”’ in Ficinus; and so did Stephens tacitly, no doubt from the same
source.
464 PARMENIDES.
tainly. But when we say “it is not,” do we intend any an
else than the absence of “ being” from that which we say is not
Nothing else. Whether therefore, when we say that a thi
“is not,” 14. do we say that in a certain respect it is not,
that in a certain respect it is?!® or does the term “is not”
simply signify that, what is not, is no where at all, and that it
does not in any way participate in “ being,” if it is not? It
signifies this most distinctly. Neither then can that, which is
not, be, nor in any other way participate in “being.” It can-
not. But are the terms “to be generated” and “to be de-
stroyed,” any thing else than for one thing to participate in
“being,” and for another to lose “being?” It is nothing
else. The thing therefore to which no atom of “ being” is
present, can neither receive nor lose it. How can it? “ The
one” therefore, since it is not at all, can neither possess, be
freed from, nor participate in “being,” in any manner what-
ever. This seems reasonable. “The one” which is not,
is then neither destroyed nor in the act of being, if it par-
ticipates not at all in being. It appears not. Neither
therefore is it at all altered; for if it thus suffered it would
be in the act of being destroyed. True. But if it is not
altered, is it not also necessary for it to be not moved? It is
necessary. But that, which in no respect is, we will say
cannot stand still; for that which stands still ought to be in
some (spot) ever the same? In the same;!° for how not?
[71.] Thus then let us say, that “ not-being” at no time either
stands or is moved. For it does not. Moreover not any of
things existing is present to it; for participating in any of
things existing!’ it would participate in “being.” It is evident
515 Such is evidently what the train of ideas demands. But in that
case the Greek should be, οὐκ εἶναι τι ὡς φαμὲν αὐτὸ, εἶναι δὲ πως, not
πῶς οὐκ εἴναι---πῶς δὲ εἶναι. For πῶς, the interrogative, could not thus
follow πότερον, despite what Heindorf says about the double interrogative,
πῶς τί, in Hipp. Maj. § 40.
16 Heindorf has acutely restored the passage, where Stephens was at ἃ
loss; and so too was Ficinus, who consequently omitted the repeated τῷ
αὐτῷ : which does not however require the preposition inserted by Hein-
dorf; for Stalbaum shows by numerous examples, that a preposition in
the answer is to be supplied from the one in the question. ha
7 Instead of τούτου μετέχον ὄντος, Ficinus found in his MS. 6 του
μετέχον, as shown by his version, “ alicujus existentis—particeps.” Fr
whence Schleiermacher suggested τοῦ for τούτου. But as two MSS. offer
ὄντως for ὄντος we may read τοῦ τῶν ὄντων μετέχον, in allusion to the
τι τῶν ὄντων, immediately preceding : where τοῦ is due to one MS. Stal~
PARMENIDES. 465
It has therefore neither magnitude, nor smallness, nor equality.
It has not. It has moreover neither similitude nor diversity,
either with respect to itself or to others. It appears not.
What then, is it possible for it to have the other things, if
nothing must be present to it? It is not possible. To it
then there are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same
nor different. There are not. But what, will there be, re-
specting a thing that is not, the term “at it,” or “to it,”'8
or “of this,” or “to this,” or “of another,” or “ to another,”
or “formerly,” or “ hereafter,” or “now,” or “knowledge,” or
“ opinion,” or “ perception,” or “ discourse,” or “a name,” or
any thing else belonging to things existing? There will not.
19 A not-one then is in this state. What state? Not being
seems to be in no state. In no state.!9
But let us still (again) say, if “one” is not, what must
“the others” suffer. Let us say. In a certain way “others”
must exist themselves; for, if “others” do not exist, there
would be nothing”! said about “the others.” True. But if there
is the discourse about “the others,” “the others” will be differ-
ent: or do you not apply to the same thing the word “ other”
and the word “ different?” I do. But we surely say that * the
“ different” is different from “ different,” and “the other” is
other than “other ?”2? Yes. To “theothers,” therefore, if there
are about to be “others,” there is something from which they
will be “others.” It is necessary. But what would this be ὃ
For they will not be different from “the one,” since it is not.
baum, however, prefers τούτου μετέχον του ὄντος. He should have sug-
gested τοιούτου μετέχον του ὄντος. For the definite τούτου τοῦ ὄντος
could hardly be referred, as he fancies, to the indefinite re τῶν ὄντων.
18 After ἐκέξινῳ is inserted ἢ τὸ τί, But from the surrounding genitives
and datives it is evident that no nominative could be introduced here;
and hence I have translated as if the Greek were not ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ
τούτου, but ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ τὸ τούτῳ, to which τούτῳ for τούτου in one
MS. evidently leads. And even if ἃ nominative were admissible, the in-
definite 7: would not be, and still less the interrogative τί.
19... 19 Since some of the best MSS. assign οὐδαμῇ to Aristotle, I have
translated as if the Greek were, Οὕτως δὴ ἕν ὃν οὐκ ἔχει; Πῶς; Οὐκ ὃν δὴ
ἔοικέ γε οὐδαμῆ ἔχειν. Οὐδαμῆ. For thus the answers would be given,
as they always are, in the fewest possible words.
2 Ficinus, “‘ Est ne iterum disputandum,”’ which leads to δ᾽ αὖ for δὴ.
*1 Instead of λέγοιτο sense and syntax require λέγοιτό Te.
*%2—%2 Others may, but I cannot, understand all between the numerals. [
could have understood the passage, had it been to this effect: ‘‘ The dif-
ferent is different from something, and the other is other than something.”
25
466 PARMENIDES.
They will not. They are different therefore from each other;
for this alone remains to them, or to be”® different from no-
thing. Right. [72.] According to multitudes therefore, each
is different from each other; for they cannot be different ac-
cording to one, since “ one” is not. But each mass of them,
as it appears, is infinite in multitude; even although one
should lay hold of that which appears to be the least, “like a
dream in sleep, many appear on a sudden, instead of one
seeming to be; and™ instead of the smallest, a quantity very
great as compared with the fractions formed out of it. Most
right. Masses of such kind existing,”° others will be mutually
different from one another, if “ others” are, while “one” is
not. Completely so. Will there not then be many masses,
each appearing as one, but not being so, since “ one” is not?
There will. There will likewise appear to be a number
of them, if each is one, while there are many. Entirely so.
But the even and odd among them will appear*® not truly, if
“one” shall not exist. They will not. But likewise the small-
est, as we have said,?’ will seem to be in them. But this (the
smallest) will appear to be many and* great, as compared
with each of the many and small. How not? And each
mass will be imagined to be equal to many and small quanti-
ties; for it will not appear to change from a greater to a less
quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between
them; and this would be a fancied notion of equality. It is
likely. Will it not also (appear) to have a bound with respect
to another mass, having itself, with respect to itself, neither a
beginning, nor a middle, nor an end? In what way? Because
35 Stalbaum says that εἶναι is governed by ἀναγκαῖον understood. He
should have suggested τὸ εἶναι: for thus τὸ εἶναι would be opposed to
τοῦτο, and both depend upon λείπεται.
4 Although Heindorf justly objected to ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ, he unjustly
wished to omit ὄναρ, misled by his copy of the version of Ficinus; which,
he says, has simply “ velut in somno.”. But the ed. pr. has “in somno
somnium.” He should have suggested καὶ, ὥσπερ ὀνειρώττοντί Ty, i. 6.
*and like to a person dreaming.” The verb ὀνειρώττειν is found seven
times at least in Plato.
35. Heindorf correctly saw that ὄντων has dropt out after ὄγκων. ~
356. Ficinus, “ videbitur;” from whence Thomson suggested φανεῖται
for φαίνεται. ὃ
3: Heindorf prefers ἔφαμεν to φαμὲν, for Ficinus has “ ut dictum est,”
and there is an allusion to what had been stated a little above. etoat
35. Instead of ὡς, Plato wrote καὶ, as shown by the sentence following.
PARMENIDES. 467
when a person takes hold by his intellect of some one of these,
39 [45 being one of these, |? there will always, prior to the
beginning, appear another beginning, and after the end an-
other end will be left behind; but in the middle (there will
be) other things more in the middle than the middle; but
smaller, on account of their not being able to take hold of
each one of them, since “the one” is not. This is most true.
[73.] But every thing which a person can lay hold of by his
intellect, must, [ think, be broken into small pieces ; for a mass
would be (ever)*° laid hold of (mentally) without a one.
Entirely so. But is it not necessary for such a mass to
appear to him, who beholds it at a distance and with a dull
eye, to be one; but to him who surveys it near and with an
acute mind, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, if
it is deprived of “the one,” not existing. It is most neces-
sary. Thus then each of “the others” ought to appear in-
finite and bounded, and one and many, if one does not exist,
and “the others” (besides)*! “the one” do exist. They ought.
Will they then appear also to be similars and dissimilars ἢ
In what way? Just as objects in a shaded picture appear
all to be one to a person standing at a distance, (they will
seem) to suffer the same accident, and to be similar. En-
tirely so. But to him, who approaches nearer, (they will
appear) to be many and different, and different from and dis-
similar to themselves, through the fancied notion of diversity.
It is so. It is therefore necessary for the masses to appear
to be similar and dissimilar to themselves and to each other.
Entirely so. And to be the same with, and different from,
each other, and to touch and be apart *? from themselves, and
be moved through all possible movements, and standing still
every where, and be in the act of being and of destruction,
_ 2 T cannot understand all within the brackets; nor could Ficinus,
who has omitted them. Heindorf says those words refer to ἀρχὴν, πέρας
μέσον. Butif so, to what do αὐτῶν τι refer?
% Ficinus, ‘‘ Semper—excipitur.”” He found therefore in his MS.,
what three others offer, dei λαμβάνοιτο.
31 The Greek is τᾶλλα δὲ ἑνὸς, where I cannot discover on what ἑνὸς
depends. Ficinus has “sed alia preter unum sunt,” asif he had found
in his MS. τἀλλὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς.
35. Some one, as appears from Stalbaum’s note, wished to read χωρὶς
ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, which is absolutely requisite on account of the other par-
ticiples. So too in § 74, one would prefer οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρὶς
ὄντα. where ὄντα is at present 4s
H
468 PARMENIDES.
and neither of these, and all of this kind,®* which it were
easy for us to go through, if, though one does not exist, many
do exist? Most true.
[74.] Once more then, returning again to the beginning,
let us say, “If one is not,” but the things different from
“the one,” what ought tohappen. Letus say. “The others”
then are not one. How should they be? Nor yet are they
many; for in many there would be one likewise, For if
none of these is one, all are nothing ; so that there would be
not even many. True. One therefore not being in the others,
the others are neither many nor one. They are not. Nor
do they appear to be either one or many. Why not? Be-
cause “ the others” have not in any way any communication at
all with any of the things which are not, nor is any one of
the non-existing present to “the others ;” for there is no part *4
to non-beings. True. Neither therefore is there any opinion
about that, which is not in “the others,” nor any fancied notion ;
nor does that ““ which is not,” become in any way the subject of
opinion applicable to “the others.”® It does not. If there-
fore one does not exist, not any of “the others” is conceived in
opinion to be one or many; for it is impossible to form an
opinion of many without one. Itisimpossible. If one there-
fore does not exist, neither do “the others” exist ; nor is one
or many conceived by opinion. Itseems not. Neither there-
fore do similars or dissimilars exist. They donot. Nor the
same nor different, nor things touching nor apart, ὅθ ΠΟΙ such
others, as we have already discussed, as appearing themselves ;*°
3383 As there is nothing on which μηδέτερα καὶ πάντα ποὺ τὰ τοι-
avra can depend, Heindorf says he ;should have expected to find here
πεπονθότας.
%¢ Heindorf justly objects to μέρος, which, meaning only “‘a part,” has
no meaning here. Perhaps Plato wrote οὐδ᾽ tv yap ἀμερὲς ἔστι, “ for there
is not a single atom.” Stalbaum would read, with three modern MSS.,
οὐδὲ μέρος, “for not even a part.” But this does not get rid of the
difficulty started by Heindorf.
35 Instead of δοξάζεται---ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ΠΟΙ could be said only of per-
sons, Schleiermacher proposed ἐπὶ, adopted by Heindorf and Stalbaum.
36_36 Jn the words within the numerals I cannot discover an atom of
meaning; nor, it appears, could Ficinus; whose version is, ‘‘ neque re-
liqua quotcunque in superioribus, tanquam qi ad alia spectare videren-
tur, enarravimus, jam ad ipsa alia spectaret vel spectare videntur, unum
si minime est.’”” From whichI willingly leave to others to elicit what he
found in his MS., unless he supplied from his own head what he con-
ceived the sense to require.
PARMENIDES. 469
of these there neither is any one, nor do “the others” appear,
if the one does not exist. True. If then we summarily
say, that “if one is not, nothing is,” shall we not rightly
say? Entirely so. Let both this then be asserted by us,
and this also, as is reasonable, that whether one is or is not,
both itself, and the others, are, with respect to themselves and
to each other, all things entirely, and are not, and appear to
be, and do not appear. It is most true.
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INTRODUCTION ΤῸ THE BANQUET.
Ir the beauty of a dialogue of Plato is to be estimated by the
number of separate Editions to which it has given rise, and by the
quantity of Annotations written upon it, the Banquet would be
fairly deemed to be second only to the Phzdo, if not superior to it.
For during the last seventy-four years it has been edited by Fischer,
Wolf, Ast, Sommer, Dindorf, Reynders, Rickert, Hommel, twice by
Stalbaum and the triumvirate of the Scholars at Zurich; and it
has been commented upon by Wyttenbach, Schiitz, Bast, Heusde,
Thiersch, Orelli, Creuzer, and Voegelin: and tothese must be added
the pamphlets of Hartmann and C. F. Hermann, (of which I know
nothing but the titles,) together with the Academical Dissertations of
different Professors and embryo Critics in Germany, and the articles
written in various periodicals of that country, ne wholly or in
part to classical literature.
Nor is this all; for during the same period the οὐδ has been
translated twice into English, thrice into German, and once into
French. But even here it has been the misfortune of the philoso-
pher to have his ideas travestied, rather than transferred to modern
tongues. Such at least is the case in the miscalled versions of Syden-
ham and Shelley ; the latter of whom has never looked beyond the
Latin of, Ficinus, reprinted by Bekker from the original edition ;
472 INTRODUCTION TO THE BANQUET.
while the former, disdaining to follow as closely a generally faithful
guide, has given a paraphrase rather than a translation; and this to
such an extent, that more than a third of what he has put down is
the mere coinage of his own brain, and not a vestige of it is to be
found in the original Greek.
Nor is it amongst the moderns alone that this dialogue has met
with a marked attention. For it seems to have been no less a fa-
vourite with the Moral Philosophers of the Pagan world, and the
Fathers of the Christian Church, and of those too, who, like the Neo-
Platonists, occupied the neutral ground between the rising and
decaying forms of faith. Of this the edition of Reynders affords
abundant proof; who has either collected himself, or found in the
notes of Wyttenbach, perhaps all the references to this dialogue to
be met with in the series of authors alluded to; and after their
united labours in this field, a very scanty gleaning has been left, I
suspect, for such as may be disposed to go over the same ground.
Far different, however, is the case as regards the verbal difficulties
of the text. For there, after all the labours of the learned, I have
found not a little to exercise my own ingenuity; and where I have
failed, others will, I hope, be led to try their hands ; for it is only by
such continued efforts that we can expect to recover what has been
lost, or to correct what has become corrupted, in one of the most
fanciful, and, despite a portion of its matter, happily abhorrent from
our finer feelings, one of the most beautiful dialogues of Plato.
With regard to the object which Plato had in view in writing the
Banquet, they who are desirous of seeing the conflicting and equally
untenable notions of some of the scholars of Germany, must turn to
Stalbaum’s Prolegomena, p. 35—39, where they will find a sensible
rejection of the theory of Schleiermacher; who with a perversity of
judgment for which it is difficult to account, considered the Banquet
as being closely connected with the Sophist and Statesman, with
which it has not an atom in common, instead of being rather a com-
panion to the Phedrus, but written if not in a more chaste, at least
a more chastened, style, than that misunderstood rhapsody.
THE BANQUET.
OR, ON LOVE.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
APOLLODORUS, FRIEND. OF APOLLODORUS, GLAUCO,
ARISTODEMUS, SOCRATES, AGATHO, PAUSANIAS,
ARISTOPHANES, ERYXIMACHUS, PHADRUS,
DIOTIMA, ALCIBIADES.
APOLLODORUS.
[1.1 ! Respectine the matters, about which you are inquir-
ing,' I think myself to be not unprepared. For I happened
yesterday to be coming up to the city from my house at Pha-
lérus ;? when one of my acquaintances, who was behind, see-
ing me at distance, called out to me; and playing upon my
name, said, at the same time, Hollo!* Apollodorus, you Pha-
lerean,* will you not stop? Upon which I stopped, and waited
1! As nothing is stated at the commencement of the dialogue respect-
ing the persons addressed, one would be inclined to believe that something
has been lost.
2 Phalérus was a sea-port about twenty stadia or two miles from Athens.
3 On this use of οὗτος, see Kthner, Gr. Gr. § 476, a.
4 The play in the word Φαληρεὺς, Ast would explain by an allusion to
the word Φαλαρὶς, or Φαληρὶς, which was the name of an aquatic bird
with a bald pate, in Greek φαλακρός, and was here said in reference to
the baldness of Apollodorus. Other interpretations are to be found in
Stalbaum’s note. Plato wrote, I suspect, ὦ ®aAnpic. For the Schol. on
Aristoph. ’Opyv. 565, says, ὁ δὲ φαληρὶς ὀρνέον ἐστὶ λιμναῖον εὐπρεπές"
ἐσχημάτισε δὲ παρὰ τὸν φάλλον : where we must evidently read—d perc
éoxnpariorat—F or nothing connected with the φάλλος could be εὐπρεπές.
A similar pun was made upon Alcibiades, as shown by Hesychius, ’Eri
Parnviov' τὸν ᾿Αλκιβιάδην φησὶν ὁ ᾿Αρίσταρχος (read ᾿Αριστοφάνης) ἐπὶ
474 THE BANQUET.
for him. He then said, Apollodorus, I was just now looking
after you, being desirous of hearing fully about the meeting
between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest
who were present at the supper, which took place then, when
there were® some speeches on the subject of love. For another
person narrated a part,® having heard it from Phoenix, the
son of Philip; and he said that you knew (all): but that he
had it not in his power to state any thing clearly. Do you
then tell me; for you have the best right to narrate the con-
versation of your friend. But first, said he, tell me, were you
present yourself at the meeting or not ?—It appears, said I,
that your informant has by no means given you a clear ac-
count, if you suppose that the meeting, about which you are
asking, took place recently, so that I could be present at it.
—I (thought so), said he-—How, Glauco, (could it be,) said I?
——Know you not, that Agatho has not sojourned here for many
years ?? whereas, since I first passed my time with Socrates, and
made it my care each day to know what he said and did, it is
not yet three years. Before that time, running about wherever
chance led me, and fancying I was doing something, I was
more wretched than any being whatever, and not less so than
you are now in thinking that you must do every thing rather
Φαληνίου γεγενῆσθαι σκώπτων παρὰ Payra’ ἐπ᾽ ἀναισχυντίᾳ γὰρ ὃ
Φάλης. The bird was ἃ species οἵ water-wagtail, in Greek σε ic,
applied, in a similar manner, to a lascivious person. Opportunely then
has Hesychius, badnpic ὄρνις λιμναῖος, κατὰ τὸ Φάλης (read Φάλητος)
δερμάτινον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον. Of the names of birds, thus given to persons
at Athens, Aristophanes has given a list in "Opyv. 1288—1298.
5.1 have translated as if the Greek were διαπυθέσθαι τὴν---Ξυνουσίαν
--τῶν τότε ὅτε περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγοι τινες ἧσαν--- τὰ not τῶν
τότε---περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τίνες ἧσαν. For the ξυνουσία was not
περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων. The λόγοι took place merely accidentally at
the banquet. Moreover, τότε evidently requires its correlative ὅτε, which
I have inserted before περὶ, Lastly, as there were no λόγοι called espe-
cially ἐρωτικοὶ, by τῶν ἐρωτικῶν are meant “ things relating to love.”
6 Since some MSS. read διηγεῖτο τι, others διηγεῖται, Plato doubtless
wrote διηγεῖτό τι, and instead of καὶ, which has no meaning here, πᾶν, to
balance re. )
7 According to Ritschel, De Agathonis Vita, p. 19, quoted by Stalbaum,
Agatho retired to the court of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, not later than
Ol. 93.1; but not, I suspect, as the Scholiast, on Aristoph. Barp. 85, says,
with the view of enjoying the luxurious living to be found there, but of
meeting with his friend Euripides, who had been invited thither by Ar-
chelaus ; whose countrymen thought more highly, than did the Athenians;
of the talents of the dramatist. Op
THE BANQUET. 475
than philosophize.—Do not scoff, said he, but tell me when the
meeting took place.— When we were still children, said I, it was
that Agatho won the prize® with the first tragedy, and the day
after that in which he and his performers in the Chorus had
made the sacrifice for his victory.—It is then, said he, a long
time since, it seems ; but who wastherelater? Was it Socrates
himself ?—-Not Socrates, by Zeus, replied 1; but he who told
it to Phenix. It was one Aristodemus,? a Cydathenzan, a
man of small size, and who always went without sandals.!° He
was present at the meeting, being, it seems to me, an admirer,
the greatest amongst those then living, of Socrates. Never-
theless, I inquired of Socrates himself about some of the
things I had heard from him (Aristodemus); and he (So-
crates) confessed to all he had reported.—Why then, said he,
(Glauco,) do not you tell me? The road to the city is very
convenient for persons, as they walk along, to speak and hear.!!
Proceeding in this way we entered into conversation together,
so that I am now, as I said at the commencement, not quite un-
prepared. If then I must relate these matters (over again) to
you, I must doso.'? Besides, for in other respects, when I am
either making myself, or hearing from others, any discourse on
philosophy, I feel, independent of considering myself bene-
fited, a delight beyond all bounds. But when (I hear) some
other conversation, and especially yours, who are wealthy,
and engaged in money-making, I feel a weariness myself,
and pity for you my friends, who fancy you are doing some-
thing, while you are in fact doing nothing. But perhaps, on
the other hand, you consider me possessed with an evil genius;
and I think that you think correctly. I do not however think
so of you; but I know it full well.
8 It was at the festival of the Lenéa, celebrated in Ol. 90. 4, says
Atheneus, v. p. 217, that Agatho obtained the first prize.
9 Xenophon, in Mem. Socr. i. 4. 2, informs us, that Aristodemus was
surnamed “the Little,” and that he was an atheist, until he was taught
better by Socrates.
10 This was done in imitation of his master, Socrates.
1 There is an allusion to the fact of persons walking along a road and
entering into conversation in Pseudo-Babr. Fab., which I have restored,
what no one else has been able to do, in The Surplice, No. 37, 1846.
12 Ficinus has, ‘Quod si iterum vobis recenseri hee vultis, iterum
recensebo,”’ as if he had found in his MS, εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι
αὖθις ταῦτα, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.
476 THE BANQUET.
[2.] Friend. You are always the same man, Apollodorus,
ever railing at yourself and others, and you seem to me as
if you really thought all men, commencing from yourself, to
be, with the exception of Socrates, miserable. Now, from
whence you acquired the surname of a madman,'* I know
not; for in your discourses, you are ever in such a mood,
and are savage against yourself and all others, Socrates ex-
cepted.
took And is 1,6 my dearest friend, evident then that
by so thinking of myself, and you, I am mad and talk at
random ?!7
Friend. It is not worth while, Apollodorus, to dispute
about this now. But as to what we have requested, do not
do otherwise, but tell us what the speeches were.
Apol. The speeches then were of some such kind as this.
But I will rather endeavour to relate, as he (Aristodemus) re-
lated to me (all)'* from the beginning.
For he told me that Socrates, having washed himself and put
on his slippers, which he was wont to do very seldom,!® met
him ; and that he asked him, whither he was going, after he had
made himself so smart; when Socrates told him, he was going
to Agatho’s to supper; for yesterday (said he) at the sacri-
18 Apollodorus was not really mad, but only as violent as a madman in
all he did and said. For such is the meaning of μανικὸς, as shown by
Stalbaum.
4 The sense requires, what Bast was the first to remark, “I know
very well,” in Greek, εὖ κάτοιδ᾽ ἔγωγε.
15. Hommel quotes opportunely from Plautus, “Non sanus satis, Me-
neechme, qui nunc ipsus maledicas tibi.”’
16 Stalbaum says that Apollodorus ironically confesses himself to be
mad. But in what word, or words, the irony is to be found, he does not
deign to tellus. The sentence is interrogative, as remarked by Hommel,
whom Stalbaum should have followed.
On the use of παραπαίεν, see my note in Asch, Prom. 1092, where,
in illustration of my restoration of a fragment of A’schylus—Ei δ᾽ οὖν
σοφιστής ; Μὴ ἀλλὰ παραπαίω xékvv—I should have referred to Troilus
and Cressida, iii, 2; “Nell, he is full of harmony. No truly, lady, no;
Rude, in good soothe ; in good soothe, very rude.”
18 Here again one would prefer πᾶν toxai. On the confusion in καὶ and
παῖ, see Porson, Orest. 614.
19 Despite this assertion, we are told by Aélian, in Var. Hist. iv. 18,
that Socrates was accused of being nice about his personal appearance.
And so perhaps he was, as compared with some of the philosophers, who,
in the language of Aristophanes, ‘“‘ were for six years unwashed.”
a
THE BANQUET. 477
fice for the victory, I avoided him, for fear of the crowd; but
agreed to be with him to-day. I have therefore made myself
smart to go to a handsome man in a handsome manner.2° But
how, said he, Aristodemus, have you the disposition to be
willing to go with me,”! uninvited, to a supper ?—And I re-
plied, said (Aristodemus), that I will do as you may command.
—Follow me then, said (Socrates), that we may by a change
pervert the proverb,”? that
To the feasts of the good will go
The good of their own accord.
Homer, however, nearly seems to have not merely perverted
the proverb, but to have done violence to it. For after de-
scribing Agamemnon as pre-eminently good in the affairs of
war, and Menelaus as “a soft-hearted spearman,” (in IA. P. 588, )
yet, when Agamemnon had made a sacrifice and was feasting,
he has introduced (in IA. B. 408) Menelaus as coming to the
feast uninvited, an inferior man to the banquet of his betters.
On hearing this, said (Aristodemus), Perhaps I too shall run
a risk, not Socrates, as you say, but as in Homer, if I, a person
of no parts, go to the banquet of a clever man uninvited,
Will you then make an apology for bringing me? for, as to
myself, I will not confess that I came uninvited, but invited
by you.
«23 We two together going will consult,
The one for the other,’’ * what we have to say,
20 Stalbaum conceives, with Hermann and Rost, that ἵν᾽ ἴω could follow
ἐκαλλωπισάμην, contrary to the canon of Dawes. Had he looked to the
ον
readings of the MSS. he would have seen that two offer καλῶ, which leads
to Καλῶς toys παρὰ καλὸν καλούμενος, a verse probably of Euripides.
At all events Socrates, who was as ugly as Silenus, would scarcely speak
of himself as a handsome man, although he might speak of his doing a
thing in a handsome manner.
21 In lieu of ἂν igvatc—which could not follow ἐθέλειν, common sense
manifestly points to ἅμ᾽ ἰέναι---ἃ fact that has escaped the notice of every
editor, despite the subsequent Σύν re δύ᾽ ἐρχομένω.
2 The proverb was originally, as stated by the Scholiast, Adréparor δ᾽
ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ian, 1. 6. “To the feasts of the coward will go
the brave of their own accord,” and was applied to Hercules when he ap-
eared before Ceyx, as the latter was enjoying a feast. It is alluded to
in a fragment of Bacchylides, and of Cratinus and Eupolis, quoted re-
spectively by Atheneus and the Scholiast here.
*3_*8 Τῇ the words within the numerals, Σύν re δύ᾽ ἐρχομένω πρὸ ὁ
τοῦ βουλευσόμεθα, there is an allusion to Homer, IX. K. 224, Dvr re δύ᾽
ἐρχομένω καί τι πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν. From whence, strange to say, Fischer
478 THE BANQUET.
replied (Socrates). But come, let us be going. [3.] After
conversing a little in this way, he said, on they went. But
on the way, Socrates, attending to something in his own mind,
was left behind in the walk; and that he, (Socrates,) bade
him, (Aristodemus, ) who was waiting, to go on; but that when’
he arrived at Agatho’s dwelling he found the door open, and
there, he said, happened a ludicrous incident. For a servant
from within, straightway meeting him, led him to where the rest
were reclining (at the table); and that Agatho, on seeing him,
said immediately, Aristodemus, you are come very opportunely
to sup with us ; but if you are come for any other purpose, de-
fer it to another time ; for (know that) I was looking about for
you yesterday, that I might invite you, but I could not see
you. But how are you not bringing Socrates to us ?—And I,
turning round, said he, saw no where Socrates following me.
I stated however that I had come with Socrates, having been
invited hither by him to supper.—You did well, said Agatho ;
but where is he himself ?—He was coming behind me just now,
said I; and I too wonder where he can be.—Boy, said Agatho
to one of his servants, will you not make inquiry for Socrates,
and bring him in? butdoyou, Aristodemus, said he, recline near
Eryximachus. * And he said that a servant washed him,”*
that he might take his place upon the couch ; but that some other
of the servants came and brought word, that this” Socrates
had withdrawn himself, and was standing in the porch of a
was the first to correct 6 row for ὁδοῦ, found in all the MSS., and in the
version of Ficinus, “in ipso itinere,” and still more strangely Wytten-
bach, in Biblioth. Crit. i. p. 117, rejected the only successful restoration
made by Fischer in the whole of Plato.
424 The old edd. have, Kai ἐμὲ ἔφη ἀπονίζειν τὸν παῖδα, ἵνα mov
κατακέοιτο : out of which Ficinus was unable to make the least sense ;
and hence he has given, what the train of ideas seemed to require, “ Heus
tu, dato huic manibus aquam, ut jam sedeat.”” Stephens however was the
first to suggest that € lay hid here; from whence Bast, in Specimen Critic.
p. 10, was led to ἕ μὲν, adopted by Bekk. , Ast., Stalb. Butin the first place,
although ov and of are frequently found in pure Attic Greek, 2 never is,
except in two doubtful passages, one in § 4, and the other in Rep. i. p. 327,
A. Secondly, the article could not be thus introduced before παῖδα. ‘And,
lastly, it is in vain to say with Stalbaum that που, omitted in the maj
of MSS., owes its origin to ἵνα ὕπου, found in five MSS., as if ὅπου w
be employed to explain ἵνα. There is some deep-seated disorder here,
which I could perhaps by a bold conjecture cure.
* Instead of οὐτος, Plato evidently wrote αὗτὸς : and so Ficinus found
in his MS., as shown by his version, ‘‘ Socratem ipsum.’
THE BANQUET. 479
neighbouring house; and when I called to him,” (said the
boy,) he refused to come in.—Absurd! said (Agatho), will
you not call him? and do not leave him there.—But (Aristo-
demus) told me, that he said, By no means; but let him alone;
. for he had such a habit of withdrawing himself. He some-
times stands still, said he, wherever he may happen tobe. He
will be here presently, as I guess. Do not then disturb him,
but let him alone. Nay then, if you think it best, said
(Agatho), so we must do. But, slaves, said he, prepare the
feast for us the rest. By all means” put before us what you
like; since there is nobody to superintend—an act which I
never do myself. Conceiving then myself and the rest here
to be invited by you to supper, entertain us so that we may
commend you.—{ 4.] After this, he said, they went to supper ;
but Socrates had not come in. Agatho, therefore, gave fre-
quent orders to send for Socrates; ** but he (Aristodemus)
would not permit it. That he (Socrates) therefore came, hav-
ing waited as usual, a not long time,” but at furthest, when
they were in the middle of supper. Agatho then, who hap-
26 Stalbaum, strange to say, still sticks to κἀμοῦ, found it seems in not
a single MS., and which is intelligible only by inserting, as Sydenham
has done, the words “said the boy.”” The MSS. vary between rai οὗ
and καὶ gov. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, καὶ του καλοῦντος, i. 8.
** and on some one calling.”
27 Thiersch, justly offended with πάντως, wished to read ἑστιᾶτε
πάντας, with two MSS.; and so Rynders and Ruckert. Stalbaum at-
tempts to defend πάντως by passages not in point. Plato wrote, I sus-
pect, ἑστιᾶτε πεινῶντας" παρατίθετ᾽ oby—. For thus, by the mention of
hunger, the slaves would know that they were to place an abundance on
the table.
28_28 Here Stalbaum was the first to introduce ἕ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν, found in
three MSS., in lieu of αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν in some, or τὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν in
others, or ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν, adopted by Bekker, from four MSS. Ficinus
has evidently abridged the whole passage, either because there was some-
thing wanting in his MS., or because he could not make out the syntax.
Plato wrote, I suspect, αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀνεῖναι, i. e. ‘‘ but that Socrates did
not give in,” and ἥκειν δ᾽ αὐτὸν οὔ, πολὺν χρόνον, ὡς εἰώθει, διατρί-
ψαντα, i. 6. “and that he now came not, having wasted, as he was wont,
some considerable time.”” This would be at least intelligible, which the
Greek at present is not. Bekker, however, would in lieu of ἕ read ἃ,
which is said to be an obsolete form of the nominative of the reciprocal
pronoun od: nor has he felt the least repugnance to defile the pure Greek
of Plato in a way to satisfy Donaldson indeed in The New Cratylus, p.
171, but nobody else, that I have heard of. For the smallest particle of
common sense would enable any one to see that a reciprocal pronoun
could not have a nominative.
480 THE BANQUET.
pened to be lying on the couch at the lower (end of the table)
alone, said, Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourself down by
me ; in order *that, by touching you,”* I may enjoy that wise
thought, which has occurred to you in the porch. For it is
plain that you have found out and possess it; for you would not
have previously stood aloof.*°—Socrates then, sitting down,
observed, It would be well, Agatho, if wisdom were a thing
of such a kind, as to flow from the party filled with it, to the
one who is less so, when they touch each other; like water
in vessels running by means of a thread of wool*! from the
fuller vessel into the emptier. For if wisdom were in this
state, I should value*® highly a reclining near you. For I
think I should be filled by you with wisdom abundant and
beautiful, For mine would be mean and questionable, being
as it were a dream. But yours is brilliant, and has a great
229 As the words ἁπτόμενος cov are omitted in what are called the
four best MSS., they are considered an interpolation by Hommel. It is
certainly difficult to understand how Agatho could better enjoy the wisdom
of Socrates by touching him than by not touching.
%0 The Greek is οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαπέστης, which Ficinus renders *‘ Alio-
quin non tam diu restitisses.”” But he thus lost sight of the doubled pre-
positions, πρὸ πᾶ απο. Sydenham has, “ For otherwise you would never
have desisted from your pursuit.” Shelley, ‘‘ You would not have de-
parted till you had discovered and secured it.”” And so Stalbaum; who says
that we must supply εἰ μὴ εὗρες αὐτό, after προαπέστης. The sense evi-
dently required is, “‘ You would not have stood apart in a state of doubt ;”
in Greek, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπορήσας ἀπέστης.
81. De Geel, in Bibliothec. Crit. Nov. t. ii. p. 274, was the first to ex-
plain the allusion in the words, διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου, by showing that if a thread
of wool be so placed, that one end of it is in a glass full of water, and the
other in an empty one, the water will by a kind of capillary attraction
rise from the fuller vessel and fall into the emptier one, until the —
in each is equal. The same idea seems to have presented itself to Shell
who thus translates the passage, “‘ Like the water in two chalices, which
will flow through a flock of wool from the fuller into the emptier, until
both are equal.” But De Geel failed to remark, that as διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου
could not be found in correct Greek, Plato probably wrote διὰ Awéov
ἐρίου, or even without διὰ, if to this passage is to be referred the gl. in
Hesych. Λινέω ἐρίω. With regard to the preceding sentence, it is alluded
to by Plutarch, in Sympos. ii. p. 818, E., ὥσπερ ἐκ πλήρους κύλικος εἰς
κενὴν a ay τις γίγνεται. ;
32. As the three so-called best MSS. read τιμῶμεν, Stalbaum sug-
gested τιμῶ μὲν, observing that the apodosis of the sentence might be
understood. But after the preceding εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, there could be no
apodosis, and even if there could, that in correct Greek τιμᾶσθαι, not
τιμᾶν, means “ to seta value.” Correctly then does he add that “ there
is need of the alteration,”
THE BANQUET. 481
(hope for an)*? increase, since already it has shone out from
you so vehemently, and became conspicuous the day before
yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand*
Greeks, its witnesses. . You are saucy, Socrates, said Agatho.
But I and you will shortly afterwards try the question touch-
ing our wisdom, and Bacchus shall decide the cause, but for
the present turn yourself to the supper. Upon this he told me
that Socrates reclined himself, and took his supper, and so did
the rest, and that they made libations, *4and sung the praises
of the god, and (after performing) the other rites,*4 they
turned themselves to drinking; when Pausanias,®* he said,
opened the conversation thus :—
Well then, gentlemen, said he, after what fashion shall we
drink the easiest (and best)?%* For my part, I confess to you
that I really feel myself not very well from yesterday’s de-
82 Although πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα would mean “ having made a
great progress,” yet such an idea would be inapplicable in the case of
Agatho, whose early success gave the promise of future progress. Hence
Plato wrote, I suspect, πολλὴν ἐλπίδ᾽ ἐς ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα, for ἐλπίδ᾽ ἐς
might easily have dropt out before ἐπίδοσιν. Hence, too, we can under-
stand the origin of ἐπίτασιν, found in the margin of a Vienna MS.
88 This number is mentioned not without reason. For Aristophanes
says in Ἔκκλ. 1134, there were more than 30,000 citizens; and so does
Herodotus in v. 99; and Auschines in Περὶ Παραπρ. p. 316, that there
were just as many disreputable persons, as Demosthenes at Athens.
The number would have been increased, had not Agatho’s victory been
gained at the Lenzea, the dramatic festival, at which Athenians alone
were present, as we learn from Aristoph. Ay. 478, Αὐτοὶ yap ἐσμὲν,
ἐπί τε Ληναίῳ ’or’ ἀγὼν, Κοὔπωξένοι πάρεισιν.
3434 The Greek is καὶ ἄσαντας τὸν ϑεὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα.
But as there is nothing to tell what god is here alluded to, and nothing
to govern τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα, opportunely has Atheneus, in v. Ὁ. 179,
D., ἅπερ καὶ Πλάτων φυλάσσει κατὰ τὸ Suprdowy μετὰ γὰρ τὸ
δειπνῆσαι σπονδάς τέ φησιν ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸν ϑεὸν παωνίσαντας τοῖς νο-
μιζομένοις γέρασι. From whence it is easy to see that Plato wrote—«ai
τὸν θεὸν παιανίσαντας καὶ λύσαντας Ta ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα---Ἰ. 6.
““ hymning with a pean the god (Apollo), and paying the other rites.”
For thus λύσαντας τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα would be similar to θεοῖς --
τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ νομιξζόμενα---δωσσμεν, in Pseudo-Platon. Alcibiad. ii.
p. 151, B., and παανίσαντες with ἐσπείσαντο καὶ ἐπαιάνισαν in Xenoph.
Sympos. ii. 1.
ἡ! On this Pausanias, who was a lover of Agatho, see Protagor. p. 315,
. $18.
8° The old edd. ἤδιστα. The MSS. ῥᾷστα. Ficinus unites both—
“levius suaviusque.”” Perhaps Plato wrote here ὡς (for so two MSS.)
ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα.
21
482 THE BANQUET.
bauch, and I have need of some respite, and so I think the
most of you have; for you were here yesterday. Consider
then in what way we may drink the easiest.57—Aristophanes®
then said, You speak however® well, Pausanias, on this point,
that we should by all means procure for ourselves an easy
method in our drinking. For I am one of those, who were
thoroughly drenched yesterday.—Upon hearing this, Eryxi-
machus,*! the son of Actiménus, said, Both of you say well:
but I want to hear from one of you, how does Agatho bear
up with strength in drinking.—I am by no means very strong,
said (Agatho).—It would be a god-send, said Eryximachus, for
us, both myself, and Aristodemus, and Phzdrus,‘? and these
here, if you, the stouter men at the bottle, have on the present
occasion flinched. For we are at all times weak. Socrates
indeed I put out of the account; for he is all-sufficient on
both points,‘* so that it matters not to him, whichsoever we
may do. Since then none of the persons present seem in-
clined to drink much wine, I may be perhaps the less dis-
agreeable, if I tell the truth about getting drunk. For from
the physician’s art, I conceive that this has become a matter
quite evident to myself, that drunkenness is for men a ¥
bad thing; and I would neither willingly myself “be willing
to drink far on, nor advise any other person (to do so),
especially when still suffering with a head-ache from the night
before.—As for me, said Phedrus of Myrrhinous,® taking
up the discourse, I am accustomed to attend to you in other
3: The repetition of ὡς ῥᾷστα is rather jejune. Ficinus has “ levius
salubriusque.”
% This was the Comic poet; as shown by § 43, where is quoted a
verse from Ned. 361.
39. Instead of τοῦτο μέντοι εὖ λέγεις, Where Stalbaum vainly attempts to
defend μέντοι by passages not in point, one would prefer Τοῦτ᾽ ἐμόν ye
νοῦν, εὖ λεγεις. For thus ἐμὸν νοῦν is found without κατὰ, similar to
γνώμην γ᾽ ἐμὴν in Aristoph, ᾿Εκκλ. 349, (372,) Eip, 232.
“1 On this Eryximachus, see Protagor. p. 315, C. § 18.
*2 This Phedrus gave the name to Plato’s earliest Dialogue.
13 In lieu of καὶ ἀμφότερα, where καὶ is unintelligible, Ficinus found
κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, as shown by his version, “ad utrumque,”—i. e. “ to drink
or not.”
“- 4 By no process could ἑκὼν εἶναι---ἐθελήσαιμι be thus found in one
sentence; nor could πόρρω be united to ἐθελήσαιμε or πιεῖν. There is
some error here, which I could correct, satisfactorily to myself, but not
so perhaps to others. ;
* Myrrhinous was a parish belonging to the Pandion tribe at Athens.
THE BANQUET. 483
respects, and in whatever you say about the physician’s art,
and so would the rest here, if they are well-advised.“°—[ 5. ]
On hearing this, they all agreed not to make the present
meeting a debauch; but to drink thus‘” as they pleased,.—
Since then this has been decreed, said Eryximachus, that we
are to drink as each one pleases, and that there is to be no
compulsion, the next thing I have to propose is, to let the
flute-playing damsel, who has just come in, go away and play
to herself, or, if she pleases, to the women within; but for
us to mix with each other to-day in conversation: and on
what kind of conversation I am willing, if you wish it, to
explain.—This, they all said, they wished, and bade him ex-
plain accordingly.
Hereupon Eryximachus said, The commencement then of
my speech is in the style of the Melanippe of Euripides,
The tale I have to tell is not my own,®*
but from Phedrus here. For Phedrus is on every occasion
saying to me, with an air of indignation, Is it not a shocking
thing, says he, Eryximachus, for hymns and pans to be made
by poets in honour of some other deities; and yet not one
amongst so many poets who have been born,‘ has ever com-
posed a panegyric upon Love, who is a deity of such an age,*°
and of such a power? But if, on the other hand, you are
willing to look carefully into the utilitarian®! sophists, (you
46 1 have translated as if the Greek were νῦν δ᾽ ἂν, εἰ εὖ βουλεύοιντο,
καὶ ot λοιποί: where ἂν is due to eight MSS., εἰ to Orelli on Isocrat.
Περὶ ᾿Αντιδοσ. p. 32, εὖ to Bast, Epist. Crit. p. 13, and to βουλεύοιντο I
have been led by ἄν εὖ βουλεύωνται, the conjecture of Winckelmann on
Euthydem. p. 140. The old edd. have νῦν δ᾽ ad εὖ βούλονται. Ficinus,
“nunc similiter modo ceteri quoque consentiant.”’
47 Stalbaum asserts that οὕτως is spoken δεικτικῶς. But how any one
could by any gesture show that each of the party was to drink as he
liked, he does not, nor could he, explain. Plato wrote αὕτως, “ of his
own will.” See my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 14].
48 The whole verse, of which Plato has quoted only the first half, was
Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ᾿αλλ᾽ ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα, as shown by Dionys. Hal. t.
ii. p. 58 and 103. Otherwise one might have elicited Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθός
ἐστιν, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν, as Sydenham partly suggested.
The introduction of γεγονότων is due to the notion that “ Poeta
nascitur, non fit ’—
50 This is said with reference to the fiction of Cupid being a child and
a god at the same time.
51 This is the exact rendering ἐν xpnerous : for the Sophists in the
I ‘
484 THE BANQUET.
will find that some)®? have composed encomiums in prose on
Hercules, and other persons, as the best of them, Prodicus,®*
has done. This, however, is the less wonderful. But I
have lately met with a little book, by a wise man, in which
salt has a wondrous praise for its utility; and upon many
other things of such a kind you may see encomiums.*?
time of Plato were, like the Pantologists of the present day, constantly
directing public attention to what was useful in a pecuniary view, and
laughing down every other pursuit of a more intellectual character.
See my article “On the New School of Superficial Pantology,” in The
Church of England Quarterly Review, vol. i. p. 446—474.
53 For the preservation of εὑρήσεις we are indebted to Ficinus, who
has “ Atqui, si vis querere, invenies profecto Sophistas disertos—laud-
asse.”” Hence I suspect that εὕροις τινας ἂν has dropt out after σοῴφισ-
rac—for ὁ and ¢p are easily confounded in MSS., as shown by Schow on
Hesych., where in Aivdy the MS. has τήμφον for τήμερον. Stalbaum says
that ξυγγράφειν is governed by δεινόν. But he adds, as if half ashamed of
the absurdity, that Ficinus has “ invenies sophistas—laudasse,” and seems
to have read in his MS. εὑρήσεις---ξυγγράφειν, with αὐτοὺς understood.
58. Plato alludes to the dissertation of Prodicus, entitled "Qpat, so much
admired, as we learn from Philostratus in his Lives of the Sophists, and
from Xenophon in his Memoirs of Socrates. The allegorical story of the
Judgment of Hercules is related by the last-mentioned writer, although,
as he tells us himself, not in the pompous words of the original author,
but in his own more simple style. S. >
5¢ In defence of καὶ after μᾶλλον, to which Bast and Thiersch objected,
and which is omitted by two MSS,, Stalbaum has produced, as usual, pas-
sages not in point.
58 Tzetzes in Chiliad. ii. 385, and Erasmus in the commencement of
his “ Stultitie Laus,” and in the letter to Sir Thomas More prefixed to
it, has given a list of similar treatises; to some of which Wolf has alluded
in his Prolegomen. p. xxxv. to the Leptinean oration of Demosthenes ;
and Wyttenbach on Plutarch Moral. t. i. p. 385, ed. Lips., and to the
authors quoted by both, may be added Pseudo-Demetr. Περὶ Ἕρμην. §
172. Fronto’s Encomium on Smoke and Dust, and Carelessness, pub-
published by Maii, who, in p. 361, refers to the praise of Poverty in Xeno-
phon’s Banquet, iv. 29, and to that of the Gnat, by Dio Chrysostom, who
likewise wrote the praise of a parrot, as stated by Synesius; while
Fronto, in p. 41, alludes to M, Cesar’s praise of Sleep. Appion’s Encomium
on Adultery is given by Clemens Romanus, i. p. 665, ed. Coteler.; while
amongst the unedited works of Michael Psellus, says Fabricius in
Biblioth. Greec. T. x. p. 71, are to be found Encomiums on Bugs, Lice,
Fleas, and Wine. With regard to the praise of salt, this probably came
from the school of Pythagoras. At least in the Timeus, p. 60, E., there is
the remarkable expression ἁλῶν--- Θεοφιλὲς σῶμα : while by comparing Cle-
mens Alexandrin. in Cohortat. p. 13, Plutarch in Sympos. ii. p. 685, E.,
and Athen. viii. p. 359, E., some idea may be formed of the matter con-
tained in the praise of salt; the anonymous author of which was, I sus-
pect, no less a person than Socrates.
THE BANQUET. 485
56(Strange) that about such subjects many should have be-
stowed great care,°® but that not a single person should ever to
this day have dared to hymn Love worthily; and thus has a
deity so great been neglected. Now, in all this, Phedrus
seems to me to speak correctly. I am desirous. therefore to
bring at the same time my contribution to this subject, and
to gratify him; and at the same time it seems to me becom-
ing for the persons here on the present occasion to give glory
to the god. Ifthen this seems good to you likewise, there will
be a sufficient subject of discussion before us. For I vote that
each of us shall speak in praise of Love, an oration, the most
beautiful he can, proceeding on the right-hand side; and that
Phzdrus shall begin, as he is reclining at the top, and is,
moreover, the father of the discussion.—Not a single person,
Eryximachus, said Socrates, will give a contrary vote.* For
neither would I say no, who say that I know nothing else than
the matters relating to love; nor would Agatho, nor Pau-
sanias,°** nor would, I ween,®? Aristophanes, whose whole
occupation is relating to Dionysus and Aphrodite; nor
5686 The Greek is, τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιή-
σασθαι, where τὸ---ποιήσασθαι is compared with the passages quoted by
critics from Aristoph. ’Opy. 5 and 7, Barp. 74], Ned. 816, Plato Phedon.
p- 99, B., to prove that τὸ with an infinitive is expressive of astonishment.
But in that case, as Stephens was the first to remark, one would have ex-
pected ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἠμελῆσθαι τὸν θεὸν in the next clause. And so Ficinus
has translated, “‘ In his itaque studiose versari, Amorem vero, tantum deum,
a nullo adhuc in hunc usque diem pro dignitate laudari, sed usque contemni,
cui non gravissimum videtur,” as if his MS. had rim οὐ πάνδεινον εἶναι
δοκοίη ἄν ; words that might have easily dropt out from their similarity to
ταῦτα δή μοι δοκεῖ εὖ. Be this however as it may, it is evident that τοιού-
των could not be separated from zepi by μὲν, and that the antithesis in
μηδ᾽ Eva requires πολλοὺς, which is requisite likewise before ποιήσασθαι :
for in this formula the accusative is and must be found with the verb.
And so I have translated. Plato wrote τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων πέρι πολ-
λοὺς σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, where τῶν is due to two MSS.
57 The Greek is Wy¢ueirat, in allusion to the pebble which was used for
voting in public meetings.
58 Ficinus has ‘‘ nec etiam Agathon et Pausanias adversabuntur.”” For
he probably found in his MS., οὔτ᾽ ἀντείποιεν dy, in lieu of οὔτε που,
where ποὺ has no meaning, and rarely, if ever, follows οὔτε,
59 In defence of οὐδὲ μὴν after οὔτε,---οὔτε, Stalbaum refers to Herbst
on Xenophon’s Symposium, p. 17. He ought rather to have suggested,
οὐδ, oi’, ἂν, as I have translated.
6° Stalbaum appositely refers to Lucian’s Κρονικὰ, § 34, where Dionysus,
Aphrodité, and the Graces are similarly united with the idea of “a feast of
reason and a flow of soul.”’
486 THE BANQUET.
would any one else of these whomI see here. And yet it is
not fair and equal for us who are reclining the lowest downs
However, if those who are before us shall speak sufficiently
and well, it will be enough for us. Let Phedrus then, with
fortune favouring, begin and make a panegyric upon Love.
[6.] To this all the rest assented, and bade him do, as So-
crates (had said). Of all then which each person said, neither
had Aristodemus a perfect recollection, nor have I of all that
he told me: but®! what was said, and by whom, that seemed
to be δ᾽ worth remembering on these points, I will detail the
speech of each individual.
He told me then, as I say, that Phzdrus first began some-
what after this way, and said—Love is a deity mighty and
wonderful amongst men and gods, on many other accounts, and
not the least as regards his origin. For to be one of the oldest
of the gods, is a thing (said he) ® of honour. And there is
616! Misled as usual by his superstitious reverence for what he con-
siders the best MSS., Stalbaum would omit, as they do, εἶναι after ἀξιομ-
νημόνευτον, as if ἔδοξε could thus stand by itself in any but incorrect
Greek. Had he not been misled likewise by Ast, who fancies that @—
ἀξιομνημόνευτον is an admissible construction, he might perhaps have
seen that Plato wrote, ἃ δὲ κάλλιστα ἀκούειν ἔδοξέ por ἀξιομνημονευτέα
τ᾽ εἶναι, i. 6. “ But what seemed to me the most beautiful to hear, and
worthy to be remembered :”” which makes a somewhat better sense than
the rubbish of the received text, ἃ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιομνη-
μονεύτων εἶναι. For thus μάλιστα and κάλλιστα are frequently con-
founded, as shown by Porson on Phen. 878: and while κάλλιστ᾽ ἀκούειν
may be compared with Tair’ οὐκ ἀκούειν---καλὰ in Soph. Aj. 1209, very
luckily has ἀξιομνημόνευτα been found in three MSS.; for it leads to
ἀξιομνημονευτέα : and thus ἔδοξε---ἀξιομνημονευτέα εἶναι will be similar
to ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παριτητέα εἶναι in Thucyd. i. 72, and a similar union of
δοκεῖν with a verbal adjective in—réoc and εἶναι will be found in i. 118,
ii, 13, v. 15, vi. 25, vii. 73; in Xenophon, K. A. iv. 4, 14, iv. 5, 1; in
Arrian, E. A. ii, 26,3; in Suidas’ ᾿Εξαιρετέα and Πολεμητέα, and here
in § 40, ἐδοξέ μοι ἐπιθετέον εἶναι. Sometimes the εὖναι is wrongly omit-
ted, as shown by Thucyd. vii. 60, βουλευτέα ἐδόκει. Appian i. p. 67,
Schw., Πύρρῳ πολεμητέα---ἐδόκει. Agathias ii. p. 60, ἀποπορευτέα---
αὐτῷ ---ἐδόκει : and Suidas in ᾿Απτέα, and ᾿Αποπορευτέα. In Thucyd.i.
140, MS. g. has correctly ξυμβουλευτέα μοι εἶναι instead of ὄντα.
®2 Bast was the first to object to ἡ δ᾽ ὅς, which could not be thus in-
troduced in a direct speech. It is however partially supported by εἶδος
in Stobeus Physic. p. 154, by the aid of which Creuzer on Plotinus Περὶ.
Κάλλους, p. 521, proposed to read τίμιον ὄνειδος, similar to καλὸν beachek
in Soph. Phil. 476, κάλλιστον ὄνειδος in Phen. 828. But such an oxy-
moron would be here out of place. Accordingly in a Vienna periodical
he suggested that doc was an abbreviation for ἡσίοδος, quoted just after-
THE BANQUET. 487
a proof of this. For the parents of Love neither exist, nor are
said by any individual ® or poet to exist.“4 Now Hesiod
says, (in Theogon. 116,)
Chaos was first produced; Earth rose the next,
Wide-bosomed, a firm seat for all; then Love—
the poet says that next after Chaos were born these two,
Earth and Love. And Parmenides says of © Generation,
that it 56
Plann’d that of all the gods Love should be first.®*
Acousilaus too agrees with Hesiod. Thus on many sides it
is confessed that Love is among the most ancient (of things).
And being the most ancient,” he is the cause to us of the great-
est good. For to a person ® being now young,® I cannot men-
wards. He should have proposed τίμιον ἕδος, “ἃ seat of honour.” Ti-
meus has Ἕδος" τὸ ἄγαλμα καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἵδρυται. See Heindorf on
Phedon. p. 111, B.
6$ Both Hemsterhuis on Lucian Necyom. p. 484, and Ruhnken on
Longin. § 34. I understand by ἰδιώτης, ““ ἃ prose writer,” as opposed to a
poet. But in Gréek λόγιος is a prose writer.
δε. This is not quite true to the letter, as may be seen in the learned,
ingenious, and elegant “‘ Diatribe in Euripid.”’ of Valckenaer, p. 154—161.
s—® As all the words within the numerals are omitted by Stobeus,
Heyne, in Memoires de |’ Academ. Paris, t. i. p. 377, wished to expunge
them, conceiving they had been interpolated from Aristot. Metaphys. 3, 4,
καὶ γὰρ οὗτος (ὁ Παρμενίδης) κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν, Πρώ-
τιστον μὲν, φησὶν, Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων. But Hommel more
correctly rejects only, φησὶ μετὰ-- Ἔρωτα : unless it be said that from
Ἔρως φησὶν μετὰ is to be elicited”Epog καὶ ’Opgede σε μετὰ. For we
thus obtain an additional testimony to the truth of the theory, and can
now understand, better than before, why Plato should speak shortly after-
wards of the number of the witnesses.
66566 Hermann, as stated by Koch in his Preface to Additament. in
Timei Lex. p. xii., quoted by Stalbaum, was the first to see that Γένεσις
was personified by Parmenides. But he did not see that ὅτι had dropt
out between λέγει and πρώτιστον, which even Stalbaum has stumbled
upon; and still less that, as Simplicius on Aristot. Physic. p. 127, testifies
to Parmenides holding that there was θεῶν αἰτίαν δαίμονα ἐν μέσῳ πάν-
των ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ. Plato probably wrote, Tlappevidec δὲ αἰτίαν τὴν
Τένεσιν λέγει ὅτι Πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσσατο πάντων, Δαίμονα
δ᾽ ἐν μέσσῳ πάντων, i) πάντα κυβερνᾷ.
6'_87 In the words Πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὧν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἴτιός
ἐστιν, lies hid, I suspect, a verse of Parmenides, Πρεσβύτατος δ᾽ ἀγαθῶν
νῦν αἴτιός ἐστι μεγίστων.
58.-.65 In the words εὐθὺς véw ὄντι there is a corruption which I could
easily correct, if this were the place for a lengthened discussion.
488 THE BANQUET.
tion what is a greater good than a useful lover, or® to a
lover than an object of affection. For that, which should lead
persons who are to live correctly through the whole of life,
neither consanguinity” is able to produce in us, nor honours,
nor wealth, nor any thing else, so well as love; ™ I mean some
such thing as” the shame for base acts, and the love of glory
for honourable deeds. For without these (two) it is not pos-
sible for a state or individual to accomplish any thing great
or honourable. I assert therefore that he, who loves, if he is
found committing any base act, or suffering one from any body,
and failing through cowardice to revenge himself, would not
be in so much pain, when seen by his father and friends or
any one else, as by the object of his affection. In the very
same manner, we see that the party loved is vehemently
ashamed before the parties loving, if discovered doing any dis-
honourable act. If then there could be any contrivance to
form a city or an army of persons loving and loved, it is not
possible for them to regulate 7? their own country better” than
by abstaining from every thing base, and having a desire to
be honoured by one another **(for what is noble) : 18 and fight-
ing side by side, such persons, although few in number, would
conquer, so to say, the whole world. For a lover would less
endure to be seen by his beloved, when deserting his post, or
throwing away his arms, than by all the others; and in pre-
ference to this, “either to leave behind his beloved (when
6° Hommel reads ἢ for καὶ, to balance the sentence.
τὸ In lieu of συγγένεια, Wyttenbach, in Epist. Crit. p. 9, suggested
εὐγένεια. But Ast refers to Rep. vi. p. 491, C., κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ
ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια. But there Reynders would read εὐγένεια,
similar to οὔτε yap πλοῦτος οὔτε κάλλος οὔτε εὐγένεια in Musonius.
τι. τὶ As two things are mentioned, αἰσχύνη and φιλοτιμία, it is evi-
dent that Plato wrote, λέγω δὴ δύο τὼ τούτω, not λέγω δὲ δή τι τοῦτο---
and just before, not ὃ χρὴ, but ἃ χρὴ, and just after, τούτοιν instead of
τούτων. The passages produced by Ast in defence of λέγω δὲ δὴ ri rov-
ΤῸ are not in point.
7272 Stalbaum says, that after τὴν ἑαυτῶν is to be understood πόλιν.
But Ficinus has, what is better suited to the train of thought—“ fortiter
agerent administrarentque singula.”’
7378 Ficinus has, what is evidently required by the balance of the
sentences—‘ dum per verecundiam a turpibus abstinerent, et ad honesta,
quasi quadam emulatione contenderent.’’ From which Ast was led to
read καὶ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, similar to ἐπὶ
τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν, a little above.
7414 Instead of καὶ μὴν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ, where καὶ μὴν
THE BANQUET. 489
he has fallen,)"4 or not to assist him when in danger, he would
rather die many deaths. There is not a man so much of a
coward as that Love would not divinely inspire him to deeds of
valour, and make him equal to the very best by birth. [7.]
And in good truth, what Homer says,” that a god did into
some heroes breathe a spirit, this, from himself produced, does
Love to (all)*® lovers furnish. Moreover, to die (for another)’
lovers alone are ready, not only men, but women too. Of this
Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, affords a sufficient proof
amongst the Hellenes in behalf of this reasoning, in being
alone willing to die for her husband, although his father and
mother were then living ; whom she so much excelled in affec-
tion through love as to prove them to be aliens (in blood) to
their own son, and relations only in name. And having done
this deed so noble, she was thought by not only men, but the
gods likewise, to have effected that, although many had
achieved many and noble acts, to only some,’* to be easily count-
ed, did the gods grant this asa gift, for the soul to return from
Hades; but”? they sent her back, struck with admiration of
the deed. Thus do even the gods especially honour the zeal
bestowed on Love and valour. But Orpheus, the son of
Oeagrus, did the gods send back from Hades with his object
unaccomplished, by showing him the phantom merely of his
—ye and ἐν before καταλιπεῖν are equally unintelligible, I have trans-
lated, as if the Greek were—? κείμενον καταλιπεῖν αὐτοῦ τὰ παιδικὰ : for
κείμενον is properly opposed to the subsequent κινδυνεύοντι, and both
are united to τὰ παιδικὰ, as in Pheedrus, p. 239, A., et 240, A. With re-
d to the introduction of κείμενον, they who remember the battle in
the Iliad over the fallen body of Patroclus, will see at once that it is the
very word here required to complete the sense.
7 The passages alluded to are, IX. K. 482, and O. 262, where the heroes
are respectively Diomed and Hector.
7° To balance the preceding ἐνίοις, Orelli on Isocrat. Περὶ ᾿Αντιδοσ. p.
325, corrected τοῖς into πᾶσιν.
7 Ficinus has alone “ pro alio mori amantes soli,” what the sense re-
quires. Perhaps Plato wrote ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γ᾽ ἐρωμένων---οἱ ἐρῶντες.
78 The whole list of those who, after dying, were said to have come
back to earth, is confined to Eurydice, Alcestis, and Sisyphus.
The ἀλλὰ here is so manifestly absurd, that one would have ex-
pected even Stalbaum would not have ventured to defend it. Ficinus
has “continuo,” which would lead to αὐτίκα, or rather αὐτίκα μάλα.
For so those words are constantly united ; and we should thus perceive
the peculiarity in the fate of Alcestis, who, as we learn from the play of
Euripides, was restored to life on the very day of her death.
490 THE BANQUET.
wife, for whom he went, and not restoring her real self; be-
cause he appeared to act the coward, as being a harper, and
not daring, like Alcestis, to die for Love, but contriving to
go alive to Hades. Hence on this very account did the gods
impose on him a punishment, and caused his death to take
place at the hands of women. Not so did they honour him, as
they did Achilles, the son of Thetis, whom they sent even to
the islands of the blest,8° because, having heard from his
mother, that he would die himself, after he had slain Hector,
but that if he slew not Hector, he would return home and
die an old man, he dared to prefer, after aiding his lover
Patroclus and avenging his fate, not only to die for him, but
over him when dead. From whence the gods, being amazingly
struck with admiration, honoured him exceedingly, because
he had valued so highly the person who had loved him. For
/Eschylus®! talks idly, in saying that Achilles was in love
with Patroclus; for Achilles was more handsome not only
than Patroclus, but all the other heroes, and still beardless,
and moreover, as Homer says,8? much younger. But in
reality the gods honour most the valour, which is shown in
behalf of love: they still feel a greater wonder and admiration,
and act more kindly, when the person loved has an affection
for the lover, than when the lover has for the loved. For the
lover is more of a godlike thing than the loved, as being in-
spired by a god. On this account did (the gods) honour
Achilles even more than Alcestis, by sending him to the
islands of the blest. Thus then do I assert that Love is the
most ancient, and most honoured, and most: powerful of the
gods, for the attainment of valour and happiness by man
both during life and in the grave.
[8.1 Some such speech as this, Aristodemus told me, did
Phedrus pronounce. But after Phedrus, there were some’
others, which he did not well remember ; and omitting these,
he repeated that of Pausanias, who said :—
The subject, Phedrus, does not seem to me to have been
fairly set before us, when it was simply proposed to make an
δ On the islands of the blest, see Gorg. p. 523, A. § 106, Menex. Pe
235, D. § 2, Horat. Epod. 16. ie
at This was doubtless, as Fischer remarks, in the ‘‘ Myrmidons pa in
the: ara "Ἔ which play there are passages relating to this very point.
nIA. A, 787. :
THE BANQUET. 491
encomium upon Love. This would have been well had there
been but one Love; ®* but now it is not, for one there is ποί.88
Since then one there is not, the better way is for it to be ὁ
stated beforehand which kind of love we ought to praise.
I will endeavour then to put the question on a right footing,
and to state first what Love we ought to praise; and then to
praise in a manner worthy of the god. We all know that
without Love Venus is not. If then there were only one
Venus, there would have been only one Love. But since there
are two, there must be likewise two Loves. And how are
there not two,®4 one the elder, and who had no mother, a
daughter of Uranus, (Heaven,) whom we name the celestial ;
the other, younger, a daughter of Jupiter and Dione, whom
we call the vulgar. It is necessary then for the Love who
works with the latter Venus to be called the vulgar, but the
other, the celestial. All the gods, indeed, we ought to praise ;
but we must endeavour to state what each has obtained by lot.
For every action is in this state; it is itself by itself neither
honourable nor base; as for instance, what we are now doing,
either drinking, or singing, or discoursing, there is not one of
these acts which is good, itself by itself, but it turns out such
in the doing. Rightly performed * [according as it may be
done 788 it is right and honourably ; not rightly performed, it
is dishonourable. So in the case of loving, not every Love is
honourable, and worthy to be highly praised, but that which
impels to loving honourably. The one then belonging to
the vulgar Venus is a Love truly vulgar, and works out
8888 Ficinus omits all between the numerals; and so does Shelley, who
here, as elsewhere, has looked rather to the Latin translation than to the
original Greek ; which is νῦν δὲ, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εἷς. But Plato wrote, both
here and in Apolog. p. 38, B., νῦν δὲ ob οὐ yap ἐστιν εἷς. For thus od is
found at the end of one sentence, and followed by οὐ at the commence-
ment of another in Criton, p. 46, D. ὁ 6, τὰς μὲν, τὰς δὲ οὔ οὐδε, or by
another vowel, as in Phedon. p. 73, B., ἀπιστῶ---οὔ αὐτο δὲ.
84 This distinction between the two kinds of Venus was a part of ancient
mythology, as shown by the Banquet of Xenophon, where Socrates says,
‘Whether there be one Venus only, or two, both celestial and vulgar, I
know not; but this I do know, that there are altars and temples and sacri-
fices to each apart ; to the vulgar, such as are rather trivial, to the celestial,
such as are more holy. And you may fairly conjecture that the vulgar
sends upon us sensual loves; but the celestial, those of the soul and of
friendship, and of honourable acts.—S.
88 The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
492 THE BANQUET.
whatever may happen; and this it is which inspires the
worthless love; and such persons in the first place love women
not less than boys; and next, of such as they love, (they love)
the bodies rather than the minds; **and then of persons the
most silly that can be,*® through their looking only to the act
of enjoyment, and disregarding the doing so honourably or
not. And hence it results that they do whatever they may
have in their power,*’ whether good or the reverse. ** For
there is even from the younger deity much than from the
other, and partaking of the female and male in its generation.**
But that from the celestial Venus, *’in the first place, not
partaking of the female, but only of the male, [and this is
the love of boys]: next of the elder, and a not sharing in
lust ;8° and hence they who are inspired by this love, turn
86. 6 Instead of the nonsensical Greek ἔπειτα, ὡς ἂν δύνωνται,
ἀνοητάτων, Ficinus has, what the sense manifestly requires, “et sine
mente homines potius quam prudentes,” which Shelley has adopted. To
soften the absurdity in ὡς ἂν δύνωνται, Sydenham translates, “ the
silliest creatures they can light on,’’ which would be in Greek ὧν ἂν
δύνωνται εὑρεῖν, τῶν ἀνοητάτων : while Schiitz suggested, what has
been found subsequently in two MSS., ἀνοητάτως, adopted originally Ὁ
Stalbaum, despite the sensible remark of Ast, that it was at variance a 4
the chain of thought.
87 In lieu of τύχωσι, which could not be thus applied, I have translated
as if the Greek were γ᾽ ἔχωσι.
ss_8§ The Greek for this mass of nonsense is, Ἔστι yap καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
θεοῦ νεωτέρας τε οὔσης πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἑτέρας Kai μετεχούσης ἐν τῇ γενέσει
καὶ θηλέος καὶ ἄρρενος : where, says Stalbaum, πολὺ is to be referred to
νεωτέρας, for πολὺ thus follows the comparative elsewhere in Plato. But
it could not do so after the intervention of two words, re οὔσης. And even
if it could, the point at issye has nothing to do with the age of the two
kinds of Venus respectively. The passage has evidently been tampered
with, as shown by two MSS. omitting καὶ, and one reading ἄρεος for
ἄρρενος. Ficinus has “ Affectus enim hujus modi a Venere illa juniore
et utriusque sexus in generatione participe profiuit:’’ who has thus
omitted καὶ and πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἑτέρας.
89. 89 Here again is a mass of nonsense, which Ast and Stalbaum have
indeed been able to swallow; but Wolf and Schtitz more correctly re-
jected the words between brackets as a manifest interpolation; while
Ruckert as correctly objected to πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετεχούσης, which would
require οὔσης after πρεσβυτέρας, to say nothing of ὁ δὲ thus standi
without its logical copula, in the shape of a verb. In the place of all this
rubbish how clear is the language of Ficinus, “‘ Amor autem, qui celestem
sequitur Venerem, que non fcminei, sed masculi tantum sexus in
generatione est particeps ipse quoque genus respicit masculum; deinde
quoniam antiquioris Veneris pudiceeque est comes, et ipse petulantie
THE BANQUET. 493
themselves to the male, feeling an affection for that which is
naturally of greater strength and possesses more of mind.
[9.] And any one would in the boy-love itself discover those
sincerely impelled by this passion. For they do not love boys,
but (youths),°° when they are beginning to possess mind.
91. Now this is near the time of their obtaining a beard.°! But
they who begin from this date to love, are, I think, prepared,
as if about to associate through the whole of life together, and
to live in common, *and not, after having obtained an object
in an hour of imprudence, through cheating him as a youth,
to go away, laughing at him, and to run to another one.
There ought then to be a law not to love a boy, in order that
much care may not be wasted upon an uncertainty; for it is
uncertain to what end may come that relating to boys, whether
of vice or virtue, as regards the body or soul. Such a law do
men of virtue indeed lay down, themselves for themselves,
of their own accord; but we ought to compel in some such
way as this those vulgar lovers; just as we compel them, as
far as we can, not to fallin love with free-born women. For
it is such lovers as these who give rise to the reproach, that,
as some dare to say, it is shameful to gratify a lover. Now
they say so with a view to lovers of this kind, from witness-
ing their conduct at once unseasonable and unjust. For
certainly no act done decently and lawfully can bring with it
justly blame. And indeed the law relating to love in other
states is easy to be understood, for it has been defined with
simplicity ; but that one here, and that at Sparta, are com-
omnis est expers.”” But that he found in his MS. the Greek words an-
swering to this version may fairly admit of doubt.
% Ficinus has alone “‘ pueros non amant, sed adolescentes, cum mente
valere jam ceeperint,” as if he had found in his MS. οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παίδων
:ἀλλ᾽, ἐπειδὰν ἤδη ἄρχωνται νοῦν ἔοχειν, νέων. Bekker has adopted ἀλλ᾽
ἢ from Stephens’s conjecture, from which nothing however is gained.
991 The words within the numerals Schiitz proposed to reject. In
their stead Ficinus has a remarkable supplement—‘ Hujuscemodi vero
genus exercende menti propinquius est, ad eamque exercendam famili-
aritas inter illos initur,”’ as if his MS. had not only, in lieu of γενειάσκειν,
the reading γένει ἀσκεῖν, found in seven MSS., but something else not
found there, nor any where else at present. But rd γενειάσκειν, as
Stalbaum observes, answers to ἥβη χαριεστάτη in Hom. Od. x. 279.
82 Here again the version of Ficinus offers a remarkable variation,
“neque amatum decipere, neque ab uno in alterum amandum abire ;
Neque enim pueros adhuc mentis expertes amant, quos deinde exoletos
irrideant et relinquant.”
494 THE BANQUET.
plex. For in Elis, and amongst the Beotians, and wherever
there are not persons clever in speaking, the law is laid down
simply, that it is honourable to gratity a lover; nor would
any one there, either young or old, say that it is disgraceful,
in order, I presume, that they who endeavour to persuade
over the youths, may not be put to trouble, as being unskilled
in speaking. But by those® in Ionia, and many other
*4{ where persons live under the barbarians, |® it is held to be
dishonourable. For through their tyrannical governments
this, and the love of wisdom and of gymnastic exercises,”
(are considered) disgraceful. For it is not, I conceive, to the
interest of the rulers that high thoughts should be engendered
in their subjects, nor strong friendships formed, nor societies
in common ; all which® those other things and love especially
is wont to introduce. And thus by experience learnt the
tyrants here. For the love of Aristogeiton and the firm
friendship of Harmodius dissolved their power.’ [10.] And
thus, wherever it has been held disgraceful to gratify a lover,
it has been so laid down through the depravity of the legis-
lators, and the desire of possession in the rulers, and the want
of manliness in the ruled; but wherever it is simply enjoined,
it is through the listlessness of soul in the legislators. But
here the law is placed upon a better footing; although, as I
said before, it is not easy to understand it. For to a person
considering * that it is reputed more honourable to love openly
% In lieu of τῆς δ᾽ ᾿Ιωνΐας, which Bast and Stalbaum vainly attempt ἡ
to defend, Ast would read τοῖς δ᾽ "Iwviac. For ἡ and ot are uently —
confounded in MSS. as shown in Orest. 1127, and 1694. I should however :
prefer τοῖς δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ᾿Ιωνίας, similar to ““ Pastor ab Amphryso,” in Virgil,
and in the other passages quoted by Blomfield on Aisch, 8. Th. 259.
* The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
"5. The gymnastic exercises are thus united to philosophy, because it was
at the gymnasia that the young men became acquainted with their clever,
but Saneene profligate instructors, as remarked by Cicero in Tusceul.
iv. 33.
"5 The Greek is ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ 6 &
ἐμποιεῖν, where Schleiermacher was the first to object correctly to πάντα.
But he incorrectly suggested ταῦτα. He should have pro , as I have
translated, ἃ δὴ πάντα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν,
similar to the version of Ficinus, “ que cum ab aliis tum vel maxime ab
amore gigni consueverunt,”’ although πάντα is there omitted. ;
ὃ: On the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, see Thucyd. vi. 54, and
the authors quoted in the dissertation of Meursius De Peisistrato, ᾧ 13. —
% As there is nothing to which the dative ἐνθυμηθέντι can be referred,
THE..BANQUET; 495
than secretly, and especially the most nobly born and the
best; even though they be uglier than others; and on the
other hand, that *the exhortation to a lover from all parties
is wonderful, as if he were not doing something disgraceful,
and that it appears to be honourable to the party obtaining,
but not obtaining. disgraceful; and that towards making the
attempt to obtain, the law grants a permission to the lover,
while doing wonderful! acts, to be commended, such acts as,
should a person dare to do when pursuing any thing else
whatever, and desirous to accomplish it, except this, he would
obtain as the fruit of his doings, the greatest reproaches of
philosophy.! For if with a desire either to obtain money
from any one, or an office in the government, or a power of
any other kind, a person would be willing to do what lovers
do towards their boy-loves, by making supplications, and
urgent requests [in their beggings],? and swearing oaths,
3lying down down at their doors, and willingly enduring a
servitude® such as not even a slave would endure, he would be
we may adopt ἐνεθυμήθην, found in three MSS., or read from conjecture
ἐνθυμήθητε, addressed to the parties present.
9, 100 To others I must leave to understand, what I cannot, θαυμαστὴ
and θαυμαστά. Wyttenbach, according to Reynders, would render
θαυμαστὸς “ agreeable,” a meaning which that word never has nor could
have. I could have understood θεμιστὴ and θεμιστὰ, for the whole
question is about what may be legally done. Ficinus has “ communis
omnium cohortatio.” For he either did not understand θαυμαστὴ, or his
MS. omitted it.
1 Instead of φιλοσοφίας, which Schleiermacher, Bekker, and Hommel
would reject as having dropt from the clouds, Creuzer would read
φλυαρίας, but another scholar, says Stalbaum, φιλαυτίας. Plato wrote,
I suspect, οὐ φαύλης ἀσοφίας, i. e. “ of not a little folly.” Compare Rep.
v. p. 497, A., ἀτελῆ δὴ τοῦ γελοίου οὐ σοφίας δρέπων καρπόν : iii. p. 403,
ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξοντα. Or we may read ἀφιλοσοφίας,
formed from ἀφιλόσοφος, found in Phedr. p. 256, C., ἐὰν δὲ διαίτῃ
φορτικωτέρῳ τε Kai ἀφιλοσόφῳ---χρήσωνται.
2 The words ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσιν are evidently superfluous after ἱκετείας
and ἀντιβολήσεις, as shown by Lex. Bekker, Anecd. i. p. 407. ᾿Αντι-
βόλησις" δέησις καὶ ἱκεσία---πλάτων ἐν Συμποσίῳ. What the author
teally wrote, may be guessed from a celebrated story in Petronius.
3_8 The Greek is κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις καὶ ἐθέλοντες δουλειας δουλεύ-
ev, But as there is nothing to govern κοιμήσεις, and ἐθέλοντες is super-
fluous after the preceding ἐθέλοι, Plato wrote perhaps κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ
θύραις καταθλεύοντες δουλείας τε δουλεύειν, where Te would couple ἐθέλοι
ποιεῖν and δουλεύειν. Ficinus either found in his MS. or formed out of
his own head something more than is in the Greek text at present—
“supplex oret et obtestetur, ad fores noctu jaceat et sedula quadam ob-
496 THE BANQUET.
stopped from acting in this way both by friends and enemies;
the latter reproaching him for his fawning and want of spirit,
and the former giving him advice, and feeling ashamed on his
behalf. But even a grace follows‘ the lover when doing all
this; and he is allowed by the law to do so without reproach,
as performing some very honourable act... But the most
terrible thing is what the multitude say, that there is to him
alone, after swearing an oath, a pardon from. the gods for
transgressing it. °“For an oath, they say, of Venus is no
oath.”> Thus both gods and men give all kinds of licence to
the lover, as says the law here. In this way then.a person
would imagine that in this state it is held a very honourable
thing both to love and to be the friend to a lover. [11.] But
when we see that parents, after appointing instructors over the
loved, do not permit them to have any intercourse with their
lovers, and that orders are given to this effect to the in-
structor, and when their equals in age and companions censure
them, if they see any such thing taking place, and when the
old folks do not stop the censurers, nor abuse them for speak-
ing not correctly, a person, looking to such acts, would
imagine, on the contrary, that love of this kind is here held to
be disgraceful. But the case I conceive stands thus. As it
was stated at the beginning, (to love) is not a simple thi
Taken itself by itself I conceive it to be® neither honourable
nor disgraceful; but if carried on honourably, it is honour-
servantia serviat, et in omnibus obsequatur, que servus aliquis nec agere
vellet nec etiam cogeretur.” The introduction of ἐθέλοντες here is owing
to δουλεύειν ἐθέλοντα---δουλείαν in § 1].
* I have adopted what every critic, with the Zurich editors, has neglect-
ed, the elegant reading ἕπεται for ἔπεστι, furnished by three capital MSS.
For thus Χάρις y ποίῳ is similar to ‘‘ subsequitur Pudor” in Tibullus.
TES
Another MS. has ἕπεται. See my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 175.
5—5 As in the Greek words ᾿Αφροδίσιον γὰρ ὕρκον ob φασιν εἶναι, there
lies hid a Choliambic verse, ᾿Αφροδίσιον γάρ φασιν, ὅρκον οὐκ εἶναι, Lhaye
given a metrical version ; unless it be said that Plato wrote ” ἵσιος
γὰρ ὅρκος οὐκ ἔμποινιμος, a line quoted by Suidas in ᾿Αφροδὶ and
raxy ἄμονας. So Shakspeare—‘‘ At lovers’ perjuries they say Jove
aughs.”’ ’
§ Although three MSS. omit εἶναι, which is without regimen here, I
think that νοοῦμαι has dropt out after εἶναι, and so I have translated.
Had Stalbaum been aware that the difficulty lay in εἶναι, he would not
have followed Bast in rejecting οὐχ before ἁπλοῦν in the sentence pre- _
ceding. 1" "ὧ
THE BANQUET. 497
able; if disgracefully, disgraceful. Now to gratify a vicious
person in a vicious manner is (to earry it on) disgracefully ;
but (to gratify) a virtuous person in a virtuous manner (is to
carry it on) honourably. The vicious lover is he of the vul-
gar kind, who is in love with the body rather than the mind.
For he is not a lasting lover, being in love with a thing which
is not lasting ; since, with the decaying flower of the body, of
which he is enamoured,’ he goes away on wing,® putting to
shame all his speeches and promises. But he who is enamour-
ed of a virtuous character, abides a lover through life, as being
closely united with what is itself abiding. Now these our law
is desirous to test well and truly, and (to permit)® persons to
gratify some, and to fly from others. On this account therefore’
it exhorts some to pursue, but others to fly ; by appointing itself
the judge in a contest, and testing of what kind is the lover, and
of what the loved. And thus! by this very reason! it is held by
law to be disgraceful, in the first place, for a person to be cap-
tivated quickly ; in order that timie may intervene, which seems
to be of many things the fairest test; in the next place, it is
held disgraceful for a person to be caught by considerations
of money or political power; whether he crouch on being ill
used and do not bear up manfully, or whether, being kindly
treated as regards pecuniary and political transactions, he does
not feel a contempt. For none of these things appear to be
firm and abiding, without a generous friendship being pro-
duced from them. [12.] There is left then one only way for
our law, if the object in view is to gratify honourably the lover.
7 Ficinus has “corporis species, quam cupierat, deflorescit,” thus
showing that he found in his MS. τοῦ σώματος, οὗπερ ἤρα, ἄνθει λήγοντι,
and thus too obviating the change proposed by Sydenham, of λήγοντι into
λήγοντος, which even Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt.
8 In the words ὥχετ᾽ ἀποπτάμενος, there is an allusion to Hom. IA. B.
71, as Sydenham was the first to remark.
® As the law could not of itself gratify one party and fly from another,
it is evident that, after διαφεύγειν, ἐᾶν has dropt out, as it has done in
Plato and Thucydides, as I have shown on Criton, § 15, n. 27, and in
Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 121, and to the passages there quoted I could now
add a dozen more. ;
1010 ΤῸ prevent the tautology in Οὕτω δὴ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς airiac, I
should prefer Οὕτω δὴ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐτάσεως, i. e. * after this inquiry,”
where ἔτασις would answer to the preceding βασανίζειν. Baiter pro-
poses to omit ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, as if those words had dropt from
the clouds.
2k
498 THE BANQUET.
For our law is, as it was in the case of lovers, that for a person
willing to endure any servitude whatever for his beloved youth,
itis not an act of fawning nor worthy of reproach. | Thus then
there is left only one other willing servitude not worthy of
reproach ;!! and this is that which relates to virtue. For it
is a settled law with us, that whoever wishes to pay court to
any one, conceiving that through that person he shall be-.
come better as regards wisdom, or any other part of virtue,
such voluntary servitude again! is neither disgraceful nor an
act of fawning, Now these two laws ought to come to the same
point, and both the one relating to the love of youths, and the
other relating to philosophy and the other parts of virtue, if
indeed it is about to be agreed that it is honourable to gratify
a lover. For, when the lover and the beloved youth come to-
gether, each having their (respective) laws, the one in minister
ing to the beloved youth, who is complying, ‘would justly
minister any thing whatever, and the other (being subservient)
to the person making him both wise and good, would on the
other hand be justly subservient!? in any thing whatever.
For the one being able to make a collision! for the attain-
ment of prudence and the other parts of virtue, and the
iit! 1 must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, the connexion
in the train of thought; nor indeed could Schiitz or Bast; who wished to
make some alterations in the text, by which nothing, as far as I can see,
is gained. τ
. ἢ Instead of αὖ, which has no meaning here, one MS. has οὖν, which
seems to lead to μόνη.
1313 J have translated as if the Greek were, ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιοῦν δικαίως
ἂν ὑπηρετοίη, and ὑπουργῶν δικαίως αὖ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργοίη, in lieu of
ὑπηρετῶν---ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν---ηὰ δικαίως--οὑπουργεῖν. For it is eviden'
from the balance of the sentences, that as ὑπηρετῶν.---ὑπηρετοίη is fo
in the former, so ought ὑπουργῶν---ὑπουργοίη to be found in the latter; and
as there is nothing to govern the infinitives, ὑπηρετεῖν and ὑπουργεῖν, it.
is equally evident that Plato wrote ὑπηρετῶν δικαίως ἂν banperoin, and
ὑπουργῶν δικαίως ἂν ὑπουργοίη---ἃ form of expression similar to θεὸν
ὑμνοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν below in p. 193, Ὁ. § 19. Menex. p. 244,
εἴ τις βούλοιτο κατηγορῆσαι---ὀρθῶς ἂν karnyopoin, and the host of exam-
ples produced by Ast on Legg. iii. p. 682, A. By such easy alterations
have I restored both sense and syntax to a passage, where neither is to be
seen at present. Baiter too would insert ὑπουργῶν, to balance the preced-
ing ὑπηρετῶν. :
14 From ξυμβαλέσθαι, found in seven MSS,, it is easy to elicit ξυμβολὰς
θέσθαι; where ξυμβολὰς is used here to indicate at one and the same time
a mental and bodily collision. Stalbaum’s German translation of ξυμβάλ-
λεσθαι is left for those who can understand that language.
THE BANQUET, 499
other being desirous to acquire instruction’ and the other
parts of wisdom, then only indeed while these two partiés
'8come to the same spot,!® do (the matters relating to) the two
laws fall to the same point, (so that) it is honourable for the
boy to gratify a lover? And in this case it is no disgrace to be
deceived ; “but in the others it brings on shame (equally) to
the party deceived or πο. For if any one for the sake οἵ.
money gratifies a lover as being wealthy, and is disappointed,
and obtains no money, through the lover being found to be
poor, the act is not at all the less disgraceful ; for such a person
seems to lay open his character, and that for the sake of
money he would minister in any thing to any person. Now
this is not honourable. By parity of reasoning, should any one
gratify a person, as if he were virtuous, and with the view of
becoming himself better through the friendship of the lover,
and be disappointed through his being found to be a bad
man, and not possessed of virtue, the disappointment neverthe-
less is still honourable: for on the other hand, this person
too seems to have laid open his character, and that for the
sake of virtue, and to be made better, he would be ready to
(minister)! in every thing to every one.. Now this, on the
other hand, is of all acts the most honourable. So entirely
honourable is it to gratify for the sake of virtue. This is that
love, the (co-worker) of the celestial Venus, (himself )!* ce-
lestial, and of great value to both the state and individuals,
through compelling, both the lover himself and the party
18 Schtitz was the first to reject εἰς before παίδευσιν. For it could not
follow κτᾶσθαι. It came from ἐστι, which was inserted to prevent the
sentence from being taken absolutely.
6—I6 Ast correctly saw that τούτων is to be referred to the two persons,
and not to the laws, as shown by the preceding, ὅταν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν
ipaorne τε kai παιδικὰ ; but he did not see that Plato wrote τὰ τῶν νόμων
μοναχοῦ ἐς ταὐτὰ ξυμπίπτει, ὥστε τὸ---ποὶ τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα
ξυμπίπτει, To—as shown by the preceding τὼ νόμω ξυμβαλεῖν εἰς ταὐτὸ---
17. τ Stalbaum would supply τὸ χαρίσασθαι as the nominative to αἰσχύ-,
γὴν φέρει. Andso Ficinus, “‘in aliis autem omnibus obsequium hujuscemo-
di turpe censetur, sive obsequentem fallat opinio sive non fallat.”” Instead
however of πᾶσι, one would prefer ἐπ’ ἴσα. Sydenham too has “ equally,”’
185. The balance of the sentences evidently shows that ὑπουργεῖν has
dropt out between παντὶ and προθυμηθείη. For thus ὑπηρετεῖν and
ὑπουργεῖν are applied to two different parties a little before. Ficinus
has “‘paratum ad omnia ministeria—toleranda.”
19 Ficinus alone has “ ceelestis et ipse,”’ as if he had found in his MS.
καὶ αὐτος οὐράνιος.
2x2
δ00 THE BANQUET.
beloved by him, to pay considerable attention to virtue; but
all the others belong to the other Venus, the vulgar. Thus
much, Phedrus, have I to contribute, said he, on the instant,
upon the subject of love.
[13.] On Pausanias pausing,—for the wise teach me to
talk thus in parities,*°°—Aristodemus told me, that Aristo-
planes should have spoken: but either from repletion, or
some other cause, a fit of the hiccups happened to come upon
him, and he became unable to speak; and he said to the
physician, Eryximachus, who was reclining lower, You are
the proper person, Eryximachus, either to stop my hiccups, or
to speak in my turn, until I cease from them myself.—To
which Eryximachus replied, I will do both. I will speak in
your turn, and when your hiccups are gone you shall speak
in mine: and while I am speaking, should the hiccups cease,
through your keeping yourself without breathing for some
time, (it is well,)?! but if not, gargle your throat with water ;
and if they are very violent, take some such thing as this,
with which you can tickle” your nose and then sneeze; and
when you have done so once or twice the hiccups will cease,”
be they ever so violent.—You will not say a word, says
Aristophanes, before I do so.—Eryximachus then said—
Since then Pausanias, after setting out so well on the sub-
* This is Sydenham’s version of ἴσα. Ast compares the idea with what
is now called alliteration, and aptly refers to Empedocles, p. 532, who
wrote the following epitaph on Acron, a physician of Agrigentum in
Sicily—"Axpoy ἰητρὸν "Axpwr’ ᾿Ακραγαντῖνον, πατρὸς ἀκροῦ, Kpimre
κρημνὸς ἀκρὸς πατρίδος ἀκροτάτης : a couplet that surpasses the single
line of Pope, ‘“‘ How high his honour holds his haughty head!” Instead
however of ἴσα, which the passages quoted by Stalbaum do not defend, I
should prefer διδάσκουσι yap μ᾽ εὔμουσα, in English, “‘ may teach them
prettinesses.” Julian, quoted by Stephens, Χαρίτων γέμοντα καὶ εὐμουσίας.
21 On this ellipse see Koen on Gregor. de Dialect. Attic. § 13.
2 All the MSS. of Plato read κινήσαις. But Stobeus, in xcviil. p.
542, has κνήσαις, thus confirming what Sydenham saw the sense ired.
Bekker however and Stalbaum have adopted κνήσαιο, the conjecture of
Luzac, De Digamia Socratis, p. 125. But κνήσαις is here required on
account of τὴν piva.
33 So Hippocrates, in Aphorism. vi. 13, and Celsus, 1. ii. 6. 8, tell us,
that “if sneezing comes upon a man in a fit of the hiccups, it puts an end
to the disorder.’’ Stahl, however, says, in his Collegium Minus, cas. 53,
that the rule was true, where the sneezing was spontaneous, but when
procured by art, it was never recommended. But he is there pea
not of accidental hiccups merely, but of such as accompany fever an
other dangerous diseases. ;
THE BANQUET. 501
ject has ended imperfectly, 4 it seems that I must of neces-
sity** endeavour to put the finish to the speech. In dis-
tinguishing Love into two kinds, he appears to me to have
correctly divided. And that the Love exists not only in the
soul of man for beautiful persons, but for many other objects in
other beings likewise, in the bodies of all animals as well as in
the productions of the earth, and, so to speak, in all existing
things I seem to myself to see clearly from my own healing
art; and how great [and wonderful] 35 a god is Love, who ex-
-tends his sway over all, as regards things human and divine.
And I will commence with the healing art in order that I may
give the highest honours to my own profession. [14.] Now
the very nature of our bodies partakes of this twofold love.
For health and disease in the body are confessedly different
and unlike. Now the unlike longs for and loves the unlike.
The love in a healthy body is of one kind; the love in a dis-
eased body is of another. Now it is, as Pausanias just stated,
honourable to gratify the good amongst men, but dishonour-
able the vicious ; so in the case of bodies themselves, to gratify
the good and healthy parts of each is well and necessary, and
this it is from which there is the name of the healing art.
But (to gratify) the bad and diseased is disgraceful; and he
who would act according to art, must deny the gratification.®
For medical science, to speak summarily, is the knowledge of
the feelings of love in the body relating to repletion and
evacuation ;?7 and he, who in these appetites can distinguish
34. αὶ This will doubtless appear to some a sufficiently accurate trans-
lation of Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δεῖν tui. But whatever
Schefer and Ast may say, Plato would not have written such ἃ tautology as
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι and δεῖν. He probably wrote ἀπετέλεσεν, οὐ δεινὸν ἐμὲ --
For thus Eryximachus would naturally say of himself, that being “‘not
skilled in oratory” he would attempt to speak. The error is to be traced
to the fact that δεινὸν would be written in MSS. dey". See my nate on
#isch. Eum. Ficinus has briefly ‘‘ quod deest a me nunc impleri.”
35. Stalbaum rejects καὶ θαυμαστὸς omitted in the generality of MSS,
They were found however in that of Ficinus, as shown by his version,
“ magnum quoque atque mirabilem.”’
35. According to Hippocrates, [epi ‘Iepa¢ Νόσου, sub. fin., “ the physi-
cian ought to apply to each disease that, which is the most hostile to it, not
that which is friendly: for by the latter it acquires vigour; by the former
it decays.”” And in Epidem. v. 5, 7, he says that ‘to cure is to act
against, not to agree with, a disorder.” S.
** So Hippocrates, De Flat. p. 296, ed. Foes., says that ‘‘ the healing
art consists in the drawing off of what is over-abundant, and the supply-
502 THE BANQUET.
the right love and wrong, is the best physician ; while he who
causes a change, so as to obtain one in the place of the other,
and knows how to infuse a love into those bodies in which it
is not, but ought to be, and how to expel a love which is
‘there, but ought not to be, would be a skilful practitioner.
For he should be able to cause things in the body, that are
most hostile, to be friendly and to love each other. Now the
-things most hostile are such as are the most contrary, as cold
is to hot, [bitter to sweet, ]** dry to moist, (and)? all things
of that sort. Into these things our ancestor Adsculapius, know-
ing. how to introduce love and concord, as say the poets
here,®® and as I believe, put together our art. And the
present *! art of healing is, as I state, entirely regulated by
this very deity. And in like manner * is the gymnastic art,
and agriculture.** And it is evident to every one, who gives
even a little attention to the subject, that music is in the
same state as the others, as Heracleitus perhaps meant to say ;
for he expresses himself not clearly in his language. For he
ing what is deficient; and that whoever can do these things best, is the
best physician.” S.
78 As Eryximachus, in § 15, omits all mention of bitter and sweet, Ast,
with whom Stalbaum agrees, considers the words within brackets to be
-interpolated, although there is a similar enumeration of opposites in
Lysid. p. 216, A.
39. Ficinus has “ ceteraque hujuscemodi.”” From whence Wolf would
read καὶ wavra—But in this formula καὶ is omitted, as shown by Heind.
on Gorg. p. 517. i
30 The poets alluded to, says Wolf, whom Stalbaum follows, were
Agathon and Aristophanes. But in that case Plato would have written,
οἵδε δύο ποιηταί. Moreover as neither the Tragic nor Comic poet had
written a philosophical poem, as Empedocles did on the theory of two
antagonistic principles in the Universe, it is evident that neither of them
would be here alluded to. Plato wrote, I suspect, οἱ θεῖοι ποιηταὶ, si-
milar to ot θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ, in Legg. ii. p. 366, B.
31 Hommel and Stalbaum vainly attempt to defend # re οὖν : for they
did not see that the sense evidently requires ἡ δὲ νῦν ---
32 The object of the medical art is the health of the body; that of the
gymnastic, its strength. Andas they gain their several ends by favouring
what is right in the body, and correcting what is wrong, those arts are
-analogous the one to the other. S.
88 The soil bears an analogy to the body ; and the different kinds of ma-
nure and cultivation are similar to food and medicine. A good soil is im-
proved by a manure homogeneous to it; a bad soil, by an opposite method
of cultivation, altering its nature. As regards the metaphor, we even
now say that such a soil loves such a manure, and that such a plant loves
such a soil, when the nature of the one is fitted to that of the other. 8S.
THE BANQUET. 503
says that the one disagreeing with itself,*4 is carried on like
the harmony of the bow and lyre.*° Now it is very irrational -
to say that harmony differs (from itself); or that it exists
from things that differ: but perhaps he meant to say this;
that from a sharp and flat, different originally, (a harmony)**
is produced from their subsequent agreement through the art
of musicians. For harmony cannot assuredly consist of sharp
and flat sounds, while still disagreeing; because harmony is
consonance, and consonance is a kind of agreement ; and it is
impossible for any agreement to exist between things disa-
34. Pseud-Aristotle, in the treatise Περὶ Κόσμου, quotes from Heracleitus
what may serve to illustrate this passage. ‘‘ You must connect the whole
and the not whole; the agreeing and the disagreeing; the consonant
and the dissonant; and from all things the one, and from the one all
things.” T. .
35 Although much has been written on this dictum of Heracleitus,
ὥσπερ ἁρμονία τόξου τε καὶ λύρας, not a single person, as far as I know,
has seen that, from the expression in Plutarch ii. p. 369, A., wadivrovog
ἁρμονίη κόσμου, ὥσπερ λύρης Kai τόξου, καθ᾽ Ἡράκλειτον, and in ii. p.
1026, B., Ἡράκλειτος δὲ παλίντροπον ἁρμονίην κόσμου, ὅκως περ λύρης
καὶ τόξου, the dark philosopher wrote παλίντονος ἁρμονίη ὥσπερ τόξου
καὶ νευρῆς : by which he meant that in using a bow, while the stick is
pushed from the body of the archer, the string is drawn to it, and thus the
two are παλίντονα. For Heracleitus had doubtless a recollection of
the Homeric Νευρὴν piv palo πέλασεν τόξῳ δὲ σίδηρον, in IX. Δ, 123;
and so too had Plato in Rep. iv. p. 439, B., where he describes the atti-
tude of an archer—ai χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνταί τε καὶ προσέλκονται---
ἄλλη μὲν ἀπωθοῦσα, ἑτέρα δὲ προσαγομένη : and so too had Virgil in
Ἐπ. ix. 623, ““ Contendit telum diversaque brachia ducens;” and it is
by this act that we can understand the phrase παλίντονα τόξα, properly
explained by Hesychius, τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερα τρεπόμενα. As regards the con-
fusion between νευρᾶς and λύρας, I have written something worth reading
in my Excursus on Plato’s Hip. Maj. p. 201. Should it, however, be
said, that from the subsequent mention of sharp and flat notes, there must
have been some allusion to a musical instrument, it may be replied, that
the word νευρὰ, “ἃ string,’ which, according as it is longer or shorter,
varies the quality of the tone, is equally applicable to the string of the
lyre and that of the bow.
36 The word ἁρμονία, omitted by all the MSS., has been preserved by
Ficinus alone, ‘‘deinde per artem musicam consonantibus harmonia
conficitur.’’ If, however, it is to be omitted, as perhaps it ought, we
must alter ἔπειτα into εὖ τὰ ὄντα, not only that γέγονεν may recover its
nominative, but that the sentence may be similar to the subsequent—we
πὸ ῥυθμὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος Kai Bpadéog διενηνεγκομένων πρότερον, ὕστερον
δὲ ὁμολογησάντων, γέγονε : Where ἔπειτα is omitted, as it should be, while
εὖ τὰ ὄντα is supported by διὰ τῆς tvayrio τροπῆς ἡρμόσθαι τὰ ὄντα in
Diog. Laert. ix. 7, and ἐκ μαχομένων καὶ ἐναντίων συνέστη τὰ ὄντα in
Nicomach. Arithmet., ii. p. 59, ed. Ast.
504 THE BANQUET.
greeing, so long as they disagree ; 57 [and on the other hand,
it is impossible to fit a thing disagreeing and not agreeing }.*7
So too rhythm® is produced from notes quick and slow pre-
viously disagreeing, but subsequently agreeing. As there the
medical art, so here the musical art, introduces in all these 39
an agreement, by affecting a love of and a concord with each
other; and thus music is the knowledge of amorous (unions)
relating to harmony and rhythm. [15.] Now in this com-
bination itself of harmony and rhythm, it is not at all diffienlt
to know thoroughly the amorous (unions); for the twofold
love exists there not at all. But when it shall be necessary to
misuse *? rhythm and harmony, applied to mankind, by a person
composing, what is called setting to music, or in making a
right use of melodies and measure composed ‘already, which
is called instruction, there indeed the thing is very difficult,
and requires a skilful practitioner. For here recurs the same
reasoning (as before), that we must gratify the well-ordered,
and those who would be, but are not as yet, better ordered,
and we must guard their love. For this is the honourable,
the heavenly, the (co-worker with) the heavenly muse. But
the (co-worker with) Polyhymnia is the vulgar love, whoma
8787 The words between brackets are evidently an interpolation or
corruption, For as διαφερόμενον and μὴ ὁμολογοῦν mean the same thing,
the proposition contains a tautology merely, instead of two things bei
mentioned different from each other. Moreover, ἁρμόσαι would require
a dative as well as an accusative to follow it. Ficinus has, “ quod vero
discrepat neque est concors, concinere nequit,”—which Shelley trans-
lates “‘ Between things which are discordant and dissimilar there is then
no harmony.” But this would be merely a repetition of the preceding
remark, that “it is impossible for an agreement to exist between things
disagreeing, as long as they disagree.”
38 By rhythm is here meant, what is now called in music, the time in
which a movement is played, either quick or slow.
% In lieu of πᾶσι τούτοις, Ficinus seems to have found something else
better suited tothe train of thought. For his version is “ quem admodum
humoribus medicina concordiam, ita vocibus musica consonantium tri-
buens.” Shelley’s translation is, “ So does medicine, no less than music,
establish a concord between the objects of its art, producing a love and
agreement between adverse things.”
© This introduction of καταχρῆσθαι, “ to misuse,’’ where the sense
requires χρῆσθαι, “ to use,” seems very strange. Ficinus has “cum ad
alios rhythmo et harmonia utendum est,”’ as if he had found in his MS,
πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ypijoPai—where ἄλλους was written for Grove, the
abbreviated form of ἀνθρώπους. Plato probably wrote καλῶς χρῆσθαι,
as he has a little below, Νοδλθε ἀρ καλῶς χρῆσθαι. ui
THE BANQUET. 505
person ought with caution‘! to bring to whom he may bring
it, in order that men may enjoy*? the pleasure from it, and
that he may not introduce any intemperance; just as in our
own art it isa matter of moment to use correctly the appe-
tites relating to the confectioner’s art, so that a person may
enjoy the pleasure without detriment to health. Thus, in mu-
sic, and in medicine, and in all other things, both human and
divine, we must, as far as is permissible, watch each of those
Loves: for both exist. Since even the constitution of the
seasons of the year is full of both these ; and when the hot
and the cold, the dry and the moist, which I mentioned be-
fore, meet in opposition to each other, with a well-regulated
love, and receive a temperate fitting-together and combina-
tion, they come bringing in their train a year of good seasons
and health to men, and the rest of animals, and plants, and
-do no injury.44 But when the love which is mixed up with
ungovernable passion becomes rather violent as regards the
seasons of the year, it destroys or injures many things. For
from such seasons are wont to be produced plagues and many
other unequal“ disorders on wild beasts and plants. For
hoar-frosts, and hail-storms, and mildews are generated from
the excessive and disorderly state of such feelings of love
with respect to each other; the knowledge of which, as re-
41 As there is nothing to which εὐλαβούμενον can be referred, I sus-
pect that dowdy has dropt out after ὅν dei—
42 As Ficinus has “ut voluptatem quidem homines hauriant,” it is
evident that he found in his MS. rapwwowyrat, as required by the pre-
ceding oie, not καρπώσηται, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain.
43 Ficinus has “animantibus omnibus.’’ Perhaps Plato wrote race
τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις. ,
4 Instead οἵ ἠδίκησε, which can hardly follow ἥκει, we must read ἀδὲ-
xei—just as we find in the following sentence in some MSS. and Stobzeus,
διαφθείρει καὶ ἀδικεῖ. For after ἐπειδὰν with a subjunctive correct
Greek requires either the present or future—a fact unknown to Stalbaum ;
who has rejected διαφθείρει, furnished by the MSS. which he considers
the best, and confirmed by ‘“‘ corrumpit”’ in Ficinus.
45 Stalbaum renders ἀνόμοια by “ inter se dissimilia ac diversa.” But
though the disorders might be unlike each other, yet how any effect could
be produced by such dissimilarity, he neither does nor could tell. Ficin.
has, “‘aliique morbi permulti et varii,’’ which, if not a translation of
ἀνόμοια, is an error for virulenti. For Plato wrote ἄλλα βίαια καὶ
πολλὰ, similar to ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ βίαια, in p. 195, C. On the loss and
confusion of βίαια I have written something, to which the editors of
Thucydides should have attended, in my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 261 and
337, and to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more.
506 THE BANQUET.
gards the movements of the stars and the seasons of the
year, is called astronomy.*® Further still, all kinds of sacrifice,
and the things over which the diviner’s art presides—now
these are the reciprocal intercourse between gods and men—
are conversant about nothing else than the guardianship and
the healing “’ of Love. For every kind of impiety is wont to be
generated, if one does not gratify the well-ordered Love, and
honour him, and hold him as the chief,—but. serve** rather the
other,—in every act relating to parents living and dead, and to
the gods, “according as it has been ordained for the divining art
to superintend the Loves and to healthem.*® And again, the
divining art is the artificer, skilled (in promoting) friendship
between gods and men, through knowing what things relating
to Love amongst mortals tend to justice and impiety (respect-
ively). So various and vast, or rather universal, a power
does every kind, to speak in one word, of Love possess. But
that which is conversant about the good, and is effected in
union with temperance and justice, both towards us and the
gods, this is the one that has the greatest power, and procures
for us every kind of happiness, so as°® to enable us to asso-
ciate with each other, and to be dear to beings superior to
‘6 On this application of the word astronomy, which was subsequently
called astrology, Ast aptly refers to Rep. vii. p. 527, D.
47 I confess I cannot understand: ἴασιν. Ficinus has “ curationem.”
But that is ambiguous, and translated by Shelley, “‘right government.”
Plato wrote perhaps here περὶ Ἔριδος φυλακήν τε καὶ ἴασιν, i. 6. “the
guarding against and cure of quarrel ;”” and similarly just above, ἐριστικῶν
for ἐρωτικῶν, and just below, τὰ τὴς "Ἔριδος for τοὺς “Epwrag: where
there would be an allusion to the doctrine of Empedocles respecting the
*Eopwe and Ἔρις of the Universe. ἢ
48. The Greek is, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸν ἕτερον---: where Sydenham was the
first to reject epi, which is omitted by Stobeus and one Vienna MS.
Ficinus has “‘sed circa Amorem alterum pervagatur.” From whence
Sauppe elicited, as stated by Koch on Antonin. Liberal. p. lvii. ἀλλ᾽ ἀλᾶ-
rat περὶ τὸν ἕτερον. But no person could be said ἀλᾶσθαι περὲ τινα in
the sense of attending. I suspect that in ἀλλὰ περὲ lies hid ἀλλὰ λατί
For Suid. has Aarpevw" τιμῶ, and Hesych. Λατρεύω" σέβω : or wemay
ἀλλὰ Aurapy, “ vehemently pray to.”” But I prefer the other conj
- 4949 Or we may translate, “ which it has been ordained by the divining
art that the Loves look upon and heal—.’ But in either case 1 am
equally in the dark, Ficinus has, ‘‘ hos amores discernere atque curare
vaticinii propositum est—,’’ which Shelley translates, “it is the object of
divination to distinguish and remedy the effects of these opposite Loves.”
8 Riickert was the first to find fault with καὶ, which he should not
have expelled, but have altered into ὥστε, to support the syntax.
»
᾿
|
‘
§
4
:
q
[
THE BANQUET. 507
ourselves, [the gods].5! It is possible, indeed, that I too, in
praising Love, have omitted many things; not, however, in-
tentionally. But if I have left out aught, it is your business,
Aristophanes, to fill it up; or, if you have it in your mind to
praise the god in any other way,” praise him, now that your
hiccups have ceased.
[16.] He said then that Aristophanes, taking up the dis-
course, observed that—the hiccups had very much® ceased, not
however before the sneezing was applied to them, so that I
wonder how a well-ordered part of the body should be in love
with such noises and ticklings, such as sneezing is: for when
I brought to it a sneezing it immediately ceased entirely.—
Upon this said Eryximachus, My good (friend) Aristophanes,
consider what you are doing. For being about to speak, you
are acting the buffoon,*4 and compel me to keep a watch over
your speech,” lest you say aught to excite a laugh, when
you might speak in peace.—To which Aristophanes, with a
smile, replied, You have spoken correctly, Eryximachus; and
let what I said just now be considered as unsaid. But do
not watch me. Since I have a fear of what is about to be said,
lest I should say not what will be laughable—for that would be
an advantage and indigenous to my muse—but to be laughed
down.—Having shot your bolt, Aristophanes, said Eryxima-
chus, think you to escape? But have a care, and so speak,
as if about to give an account for it. Perhaps, however, if it
seem good to me, I shall dismiss you (unhurt).°®
51 The word θεοῖς is evidently the interpretation of τοῖς κρείττοσιν.
See Blomfield on Prom. 935.
52 Instead of εἴ πως ἄλλως, correct Greek requires εἰ ἄλλως πως---
similar to ἄλλῃ γέ πη, a little below.
88 The union of μάλα and ἐπαύσατο would be admissible here only if
the hiccups had greatly subsided. But as they had ceased entirely, in-
stead of μάλα we must read pa A’—
54. This is the correct meaning of γελωτοποιεῖς. For Aristophanes had
just been alluding in ridicule to the theory of Eryximachus. Ficinus was
mistaken in rendering, “‘ risum contra te moves.’’ Shelley, scarcely more
correctly, ‘‘ you predispose us to laughter.”
55 rov Adyou—rov σεαυτοῦ is rendered by Ficinus, “ sermonis tui.”
But that would be, in correct Greek, rov cov. But as Eryximachus was
evidently sore at being made the butt of Aristophanes, it is quite clear
that τοῦ σεαυτοῦ conceals τοῦ σοῦ οὐ τλητοῦ, i. 6. “ your speech, not to
be borne.”? Compare Hec. 159, τᾶς οὐ τλατᾶς. And hence Aristophanes
was led to make an apology in the words—ipoi ἔστω ἄρρητα τὰ εἰρημένα.
6 1 have inserted ‘ unhurt,’”’ because the train of thought evidently
508 THE BANQUET.
In good truth, Eryximachus, said Aristophanes, I have it
in my mind to speak in some other way than you and Pansa-
nias have spoken. For to me men appear to be utterly in-
sensible of the power of Love. Since, being sensible of it,
they would have instituted most important sacred rites, and
(built) altars, and made to him the greatest sacrifices ;*” nor,
as now, would any thing of this kind have occurred, at a
time when it ought to have occurred the least. For he is,
of all the gods, the most friendly to man, the aider of
man, and the healer of those (wounds)*® which, being healed,
there would be the greatest happiness to the human “race.
I will, therefore, endeavour to explain to you his power, and
you shall be the teacher of it to others. But you must first
learn the nature of man, and what sufferings it has undergone,
For our nature of old was not the same as it is now. In the
first place, there were three kinds of human beings, not as at
present, only two, male and female; but there was also a
third common to both of those; the name only of which now
remains, it has itself disappeared. It was then [one] man-
woman,®! whose form and name partook of ana was common
to both the male and the female. But it is now nothing but
a name, given by way of reproach. In the next place, the
entire form of every individual of the human race was round-
ed, having the back and sides as ina circle. It had four hands,
and legs equal in number to the hands; and two faces upon
the circular neck, alike in every way, and one head on
both the faces placed opposite, and four ears, and two kinds
shows that, after μέντοι, ἄνατον has dropt out; a word elsewhere lost and
restored by myself to Aristophanes and Demosthenes. See the Glossary
appended to my translation of the Midian oration in “A@w, p. 65.
Shelley has here, “1 may dismiss you without question.”
57 There were, however, sacred rites to Love, as shown by Valckenaer
in Diatrib. c. xi.
_ 8—88 This repetition of φιλανθρωπότατος---ἀνθρώπων and ἀνθρωπείῳ
is extremely inelegant.
5° This is Shelley’s happy introduction of the very word required here,
and which has led me to suggest τραυμάτων for τούτων.
80 This ἕν Stalbaum still retains, and attempts to explain, although
omitted by Stobeus and Eusebius, and many MSS. and Ficinus.
61 1 have coined this word, in lieu of hermaphrodite, for the sake of
showing its derivation from ἀνδρ, “ man,” and γυν-ἡ, “ woman.” ;
_® Shelley, unable to understand how the faces were placed opposite, has
omitted the words ἐναντίοις κειμένοις, and translated incorrectly the
ceding by “one head between the two faces,” instead of “upon.” U
a
THE BANQUET. 509
of sextal organs, and from these it is easy to conjecture how
all the other parts were (doubled).® They walked, as now,
upright, whithersoever they pleased. And when it made haste
to run, it did, “in the manner of tumblers, who after turning
their legs (upward) in a circle, place them accurately in an
upright position,™ support itself on its eight limbs,® and after-
wards turn itself over quickly in a circle. Now these three
and such kinds of beings existed on this account, © because the
male kind was the produce originally of the sun, the female
of the earth, and that which partook of the other two, of the
moon ;® for the moon partakes of both the others (the sun
and the earth). The bodies thus were round, and the man-
ner of their running was circular, through their being like
their parents. [17.] They were terrible in force and strength
_ and had high aspirations, and they made an attempt against
the gods; and what Homer (in O60. X. 307) says of Ephi-
altus and Otus, was told of them likewise ; that they attempt-
ed to ascend to heaven with the view of attacking the gods.
Upon which Jupiter and the other gods consulted together
what they should do to them; but they were in a difficulty.
They had not the mind to destroy them by making the race
to disappear with the thunderbolt, as they did the giants ; for
then the honours and the holy rites paid them by that race would
have been extinct, nor yet could they suffer them to act wan-
tonly. At length Jupiter, on reflection, said, I seem to myself to
have a plan, so that men may exist, and still be stopt by becom-
I am mistaken, Plato wrote ἀπ᾿ ἐναντίας δερκομένοις, i.e. looking from
opposite quarters, like the figure of Janus, described by Ovid.
53. So Sydenham, as if he wished to read καὶ διπλᾶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα
instead of καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα.
6464 Such is the meaning which I think Plato meant to convey; who
probably wrote, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβιστῶντες εἰς ὀρθὸν, ἄνω τὼ σκελη περιφερ-
όμενοι κύκλῳ, ἀκριβῶς ἱστᾶσι, not, as the present text has, εἰς ὀρθὸν τὼ
σκέλη περιφερόμενοι κυβιστῶσι κύκλῳ, where I have elicited ἄνω, by the
aid of “‘ sursum circumferentes,” in Ficinus, from εἰς ὀρθὰ ὄντα σκέλη in
Stobeus. The whole description will be intelligible to those, who have
seen tumblers walking on their hands and feet alternately.
% By the eight limbs are meant the four hands and four feet.
_ 8686 Qn this theory Ast refers to Aristot. Metaphys. i. 3, 6, Phys, i.
6, De Generat. i. 3, ii. 3, Ciceron. Academ. iv. 37, Tim. Locr. p. 99, Ὁ.
E., Menag. in Diogen. L. p. 74,317.
67 So Orestes in Aisch. Cho. 252, prays to Jove not to destroy him, lest
he should no longer be able to set up his altar on the days of sacrifice.
510 THE BANQUET.
ing weaker from their unbridled licentiousness. For now, said
he, I will divide each of them into two; and they will at the
same time become weaker, and at the same time more useful to
us, through their becoming more in number; and they shall
walk upright upon two legs; but if they shall think fit to
behave licentiously, and are not willing to keep quiet, I will
again, said he, divide them, each into two, so that they shall
go upon one leg, hopping. So saying, he cut men into two
parts, as people cut medlars® when about to pickle them, or as
they cut eggs with hairs. But whomsoever he cut, he ordered
Apollo to turn the face and the half of the neck to that
part where the section had taken place, in order that the man
might, on seeing the cutting off, be better behaved than before,
and he ordered” him to heal the other parts. And he
(Apollo) turned the face; and Τὶ pulling the skin together on
every side like a contracted purse,”! over that which is now
called the belly, he did, after making a single orifice, tie up (the
skin) at the middle of the belly, now called the navel. He
then smoothed the greater part of the remainder of the wrinkles
of the skin, and jointed the breast, having an instrument such
as shoemakers use when they smooth wrinkles of the leather
on the last. But he left a few wrinkles on the belly and navel
as a memorial of their original suffering. Now when their
nature had been bisected, each half perceived with a longing its
other self ;7? and throwing theirarms around each other and
becoming entwined, they had a great desire to grow together,
but they died through famine and idleness.* And when one of
68. On Ruhnken’s elegant and certain emendation, ὄα for ὠὰ, see his
note on Timeus, p. 189, while to this passage of Plato Taup on Suid.
in | Ταριχεύειν has referred that in Plutarch Erot. ii. p. 770, B., ὥσπερ
ὠὸν τριχὶ διαρεῖσθαι τὴν φιλίαν, which Hommel acutely conjectures to
have been a kind of children’s game.
°—S° Whatever others may pretend to do, I certainly cannot under-
stand what Plato meant by this description of the operation.
Ὁ This repetition of the verb ἐκέλευεν at the end of the sentence is evi-
dently an interpolation.
—" Here again I confess I do not quite understand the mention of
the contracted purse. I suspect there is an allusion to an operation still
performed in India, to enable a person to wear an artificial nose; unless
it be said that Plato in this fictitious account, to which Julian alludes, i in
Epist. x, p. 448, C., was caricaturing some theory of the day.
τὸ Instead of τὸ αὑτοῦ one would prefer τὸ ἄλλο αὑτοῦ, although the
common reading is found in Priscian xvii. p. 1100, ed. Putsch.
73 Stalbaum translates τῆς ἄλλης ἀργίας, “ and moreover by idleness.”
THE BANQUET. δι:
these halves died, and the other was left, the surviving half
sought another, and was entwined with it, whether it met
with the half: of a whole woman, (which half we now call a
woman, ) or with (the half of a whole) man. And thus they
were in the act of perishing. [18.] But Jupiter in pity de-
vised another plan, and placed the organs of generation in
front,"* for hitherto they had been on the outside, and they
begot and bred, not with one another, but with the earth;
like grasshoppers. And therefore he changed them’7® to the
front; and by them he caused the generation to be with each
other, from the female through the male, on this account, that
should a male meet with a female, they might in the embrace
at one time generate, and the race be thus propagated ; but if
at another time a male met with a male, a surfeit might take
place from the connexion, and that they might cease and turn
themselves to their business, and attend to the other affairs of
But such a sense those words could never bear in correct Greek, In all
the passages where ἄλλος is said to be used pleonastically there is some
error, which it is not difficult to correct. Thus in Eurip. Med. 298,
Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης, ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας, Φθόνον πρὸς ἀστῶν ἀλφανοῦσι
δυσμενῆ, we may read Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄτης,--ἧς λάχωσιν, ἀργίας, as I have
stated in the Surplice, No. 11, Feb. 7, 1846, p. 153, where I completed the
restoration commenced in Tro. Append. p. 125, B. So too here, since two
MSS. read ὑπὸ τῆς λιμοῦ, Plato wrote, I suspect, ὑπὸ τῆς λίχνου κοίτης
παλαιᾶς λαιμαργίας, i. 6. ‘ From the lascivious and hungry longing for
their former bed :”” where ὑπὸ κοίτης λαιμαργίας may be compared with
ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἡδονῆς in Legg. x. p. 888, A.; while λίχνου, which Hesy-
chius explains by λαιμαργὸς, is found in somewhat a similar sense in
Eurip. Hipp. 916,‘H γὰρ ποθοῦσα πάντα καρδία κλύειν Κἀν τοῖς κα-
κοῖσι λίχνος οὖσ᾽ ἁλίσκεται : and thus the introduction of κοίτης παλαιᾶς
carries out the allusion to παλαιοῦ πάθους : and the two halves would
suffer the fate of Narcissus, who died by constantly viewing in the water
the reflexion of his body, with which he had fallen in love.
4 Ficinus has alone what the sense requires, “‘ et que prius retro erant,
ad anteriores partes transtulit;’’ in Greek, sic τὸ πρόσθεν, ἃ ὄπισθεν ἣν
τῷ πρίν.
15. Here again Ficinus has preserved the vestiges of the right reading
in his version, “ Antea siquidem, cum ad nates hec haberent, non in-
vicem sed in terram spargentes semina, cicadarum instar concipiebant,
atque generabant.”’
7 Stalbaum says that Sommer properly unites αὐτῶν with εἰς τὸ πρό-
σθεν. But as αὐτὰ is found in many MSS., as Stephens conjectured, Ast
has properly adopted it; and properly too did he object to τε after
μετέθηκε ; but improperly suggest dé—for he should have read τοίνυν in-
stead of re οὖν : while in lieu of οὕτως, omitted in eleven MSS., one would
prefer εὖ πως--
512 THE BANQUET.
life. From this” (period) has been implanted by nature in
mankind a mutual love, which is the bringer together of their
ancient nature, and which endeavours to make one out of two,
and to heal the nature 18 of man. Each of us then is but the |
counterpart 19 of a human creature, as having been cut like the
Psettz 89 from one into two. Hence each one is in search of
his counterpart. As many men then as are sections of the
form common to men, which was then called Man-Woman,
are lovers of women ; and from this raceare sprung the majority.
of adulterers: and on the other hand, as many women as are
addicted to the love of men, and are adulteresses, are sprung
from the same*! race. But such women as are sections of the
female, do not pay much attention to men, but turn themselves
rather to women; and from this race are the (Lesbian)
courtesans. Such as are sections of the male form, follow the
males: and whilst they are young, being fragments of men,
they love men and are delighted in being with them; and
these are the best of boys and youths, as being the most manly
in their disposition. Yet some say, indeed, they are shameless,
But in this they say false; for it is not through shamelessness,
but through assurance, and a manly temper and manly look, that
they embrace what resembles themselves. And of this there is
a great proof. For when they are full grown, such alone turn
77 There is some error in ἐκ τόσου, which is never used for ἐκ τούτου.
Stalbaum’s German version is, “‘ seit so langer Zeit.’’ Plato probably
wrote ἐκ τότ᾽ ἴσως, i. 6. “perhaps from that time.’ On the phrase ἐκ
τότε, see Kiihner, Gr. Gr. § 644, ed. Jelf. Shelley has, “ From this pe-
riod,” which he got from Ficinus, “ ex illo tempore.”
78 Shelley has, what the sense requires, ‘‘ and to heal the divided na-
ture of man.”? This has led me to suggest σχίσιν for φύσιν, which is
extremely inelegant after the preceding φύσεως.
79 This was the doctrine of Empedocles, as we learn from Aristotle,
Περὶ Φύσεως Ζώων, i. 18. In the word σύμβολον is an allusion to the
rae of friendship cut into two parts, one of which was preserved by
e host, and the other by the guest; and when the two were brought to-
gether by the two parties or their friends, a recognition of acquaintance
took place. See Schol. on Eurip. Med. 6.
8 As it is not known what kind of flat-fish is meant by Ψψῆττα, I have
left the original word in the text. Sydenham compares it with the polypus.
The simile is well put by Plato into the mouth of Aristophanes, who has
alluded to the same circumstance in Lysistr. 115, ᾿Εγὼ δ᾽ ἑκοῦσ᾽ dy,
ὡσπερεὶ ψῆτταν, δυκῶ Aodva ἂν ἐμαυτῆς παρταμοῦσα θὕμισυ, where I
have changed Ἐγὼ δὲ γ᾽ ἂν, κἂν---ἰπίο ᾿Εγὼ δ᾽ ἑκοῦσ᾽ ἂν ---
8ι. So Sydenham. As if he wished to read ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, instead of ἐκ
τούτου, which is however repeated just afterwards.
THE BANQUET. : 513
out men as regards political affairs: but when they have be-
come men, they feel a love for young persons, and do not turn
their thoughts to marriage and child-getting naturally, but
are led by the force of custom and law,* although it would be
sufficient for them to continue to live unmarried. - Altogether
then such a person is both a lover of youths and a lover of
those who love him, and ever embraces what is from the same
race as himself. [19.] Now, whenever **the lover of youths,
and every one else,®* meet with that very thing, the half of him-
self, they are both smitten with a friendship in a wondrous
manner, and (attracted) *‘ by an intimacy and love, and are un-
willing to be separated from each other for even, so to say, a
brief period. And these are they, who continue to live together
through life ; and yet they could not tell what they wish to take
place to themselves from each other ; for it does not seem to be
sexual intercourse, that the one should, for the sake of that, be
delighted with the company of the other, and (seek it) with
so much trouble; but the soul of each being evidently de-
sirous of something else, which it is unable to tell, it divines
what it wishes, and hints at it.6° And if while they are lying
down in the same place, Vulcan were to stand over them with
his tools in his hand, and ask them “ What is it do ye, mortals,
desire to take place, the one by the other?” and if, finding
them in a difficulty, were he to demand them again, “ Do ye
desire this, to be as much as possible in the same place with
each other, so as never, by night or day, to be apart from >
each other? *for if ye long for this, I am willing to melt you
down together, and to mould you into the same mass, so that
82 There is probably an allusion here to a law at Sparta, which com-
pelled persons under certain circumstances to marry, as we learn from
Stobeeus, Ixv. p. 410, for nothing of the same kind was known at Athens.
88. 88 Instead of 6 παιδεραστὴς καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς, Ficinus has “ cujuscun-
que sexus avidus sit,’ which was evidently an abortive attempt made by
the translator to supply some words obliterated in his MS., and of which
those in the text are an evident corruption. For Plato wrote cai 6 καλὸς
Taic—
84 Sydenham has introduced the verb “ attracted,’ which has led me
to suggest that ἕλκονται has dropt out before oixewsry7t—which would
lead to καίονται---- : Ficinus has “amicitiaque et familiaritate ardent.”
85 Tn lieu of the single word αἰνίττεται, Ficinus has “ et affectum in-
situm vestigiis signat obscuris ;” thus translated by Shelley, “‘and traces
obscurely the footsteps of its ae desire.”
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514 THE BANQUET.
ye two may become one,* and as long as ye live, may live
both of you in common, as one person; and when ye die,
may, having died in common, *‘remain for ever®’ in Hades,
one (soul) instead of two. See then whether ye desire this,
and it is sufficient for you, should ye obtain it.” On hearing
this not a single person, I know that, would refuse, nor would
he appear to wish for any thing else ; but (every one)** would
in reality conceive he had heard that which he had long ago
wished for, and that having come into the company of, and be-
ing melted with, his beloved, he would out of two become one.
And of this*® the cause is, that this was our original nature.
We were once whole. To the desire then and pursuit of this
whole, the name of Love is given. And we were, as I said,
formerly one. But now, for our iniquity, ° we have been cut
in twain® by the deity, and have been made, like the Arca-
dians by the Lacedemonians, to dwell asunder.%° There is
therefore a fear, that, unless we are well-behaved towards the
gods, we shall be again cleft in twain, and go about with our
noses split down, as those have, who are modelled on pillars
in profile,*! and become, 5285 it were, pebbles cut through
8686 ΤῸ this celebrated passage there are allusions in Aristotle, Polit.
ii. 1, 16, Synesius, Epist. p. 151, and the other authors, quoted by Wyt-
tenbach i in the notes of Rynders.
—7 Instead of αὖ---εἶναι, I have translated as if the Greek were
hidssipibale and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version,
‘* apud inferos unum semper perseveretis.”” On this wish of friends and
lovers to live and die together, it will be sufficient to refer to Eurip. Iph.
T. 984, Kai ζῆν θέλοιμ᾽ ἂν καὶ θανεῖν, λαχών γ᾽ ἴσον : and
*“Tecum vivere amem, tecum obeam libens.”
88 On πᾶς, thus obtained from the opposite οὐδὲ εἷς, see Stalbaum.
8° Instead of τοῦτο, Bast, with whom Ast agrees, suggested rovrov—
And so Ficinus, ‘‘ Hujus causa est.”
® The Greek is διῳκίσθῃμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ ὑπὸ A :
νίων. But Ficinus found in his MS. διεσχίσθημεν, as shown by his
version—‘ a deo scissi sumus.”’ I have therefore united the two, dtec-
χίσθημεν---καὶ καθάπερ---διῳκίσθῃμεν. For in the former verb there
is an allusion to the cutting in two, mentioned in § 15, and in the latter ~
to the fact of the Helots, who were originally Arcadians, bei
to live apart in villages after they had been conquered by the Lacede-
monians. By so slight and obvious a correction have I got rid of the
mass of notes written on this passage.
* Such is the interpretation of the words κατὰ γραφὴν ἐκτετυπωμένοι
given by Hermann in Programm. De Veter. Grecor. Pictura Parietum,
p. 8, Opuscul. where he has reference to Hipparchus on Aratus, i. 6, p:
THE BANQUET. 515
and rubbed smooth. On this account then, it is meet to
exhort every man to behave in all things piously towards
the gods, that we may on the one hand escape from the ills,
98 and on the other obtain the good,** to which Love is our guide
and general; to whom let no one act in opposition. For he
who acts in opposition, is an enemy to the gods. But by be-
coming friends and being reconciled to the god, we shall, what
few of those now living do, find and meet with our beloved,
the halves® of ourselves. And let not Eryximachus take
me up, and ridicule my speech, as if I meant Pausanias and
Agatho. For perhaps they are amongst such, (the fortunate
180, who uses κατάγραφον in the sense noticed by Pliny on H. N. xxxv.
34, who says of Cimon the Clenean, “ Hic catagrapha invenit, hoc est,
obliquas imagines.”’ But in that case the preposition εἰς or κατὰ should
precede καταγραφὴν, and τὸ κατάγραφον be written instead of κατα-
γραφήν. I am therefore more disposed to adopt Hommel’s ingenious
alteration—xara pagry.- For he supposes that figures of human beings
were so placed at the corners of the walls of temples, that one half of
the face was seen on one side, and the other half on the adjoining side ;
and they must therefore have appeared with the nose split down.
- ® The Greek is, ὥσπερ λίσπαι ἀλλὰ τούτων Eveca—But ἀλλὰ could
not thus be used before τούτων ἕνεκα, unless there had been something
said previously, to which ἀλλὰ would indicate the opposite idea. Such
however is not the case here. Besides, as λίσπος is an adjective, it re-
quires a substantive. Hence I have translated as if the Greek were—
ὥσπερ λίσπαι λάλλαι' τούτων ody Eveka—For Hesychius has Λάλλαι"
λάλλας λέγουσι τὰς παραθαλασσίους καὶ παραποταμίους ψήφους, i. 6.
‘pebbles found along seas and rivers,’ which became smooth by the
action of the water, and which, when cut lengthways or crossways, pre-
sent two halves, the counterparts of each other. The same fact is found
in the case of Scotch pebbles, when detached from the granite in which
they are imbedded. ‘To this restoration of λάλλαι I have been led by
Ruhnken’s very same correction of Theocritus in Hesych. T. i. Auctar.,
and we can now perceive why Suidas and Hesychius, and the Scholiast
here, explain Λίσποι by διαπεπρισμένοι ἀστράγαλοι, or, as Ruhnken
correctly reads, δίχα πεπρισμένοι, both in Plato and in the Lexicons
that referred to Plato. Timeus has Λίσποι" οἱ δίχα πεπρισμένοι.
%_% The Greek is τὰ piv ἐκφύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ τύχωμεν. But as two
MSS. offer φύγωμεν, it is evident that Plato wrote τὰ μὲν κακὰ φύγωμεν,
τῶν δὲ εὖ τύχωμεν. For thus κακὰ and εὖ properly balance each other ;
while εὖ has been lost here, as in the passages corrected by myself in
Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 154.
* Instead of ἡμετέροις, which Ast and Stalbaum vainly attempt to
defend, Bast suggested ἡμιτόμοις, answering to “ dimidium” in Ficinus ;
and the emendation is adopted by Creuzer in his work on the worship of
Dionysus, P. i. p. 169, as stated by ἫΝ
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516 THE BANQUET.
few,) and are both of them males in nature.® TI say then of
all in general, both men and women, that the whole of our
race would be happy, if we worked out Lave perfectly; and
if each were to meet with his beloved, having returned® to
his original nature. If this then be the best, it necessarily
follows, that of the things now present, that which is nearest
to this is the best; and that is, to meet with youthful objects
of love that are naturally suited to one’s ideas. In celebrating
then the deity who is the cause of this fitness, we should justly
celebrate Love; who both at the present time benefits us the
most, by leading us to our own; and for hereafter gives us
the greatest hopes, that, if we pay the debt of piety to the
gods, he will restore us to our original nature, and, by healing
us, render us happy.
[20.] Such, Eryximachus, said he, is my speech, in be-
half of Love, of a different kind from yours. As then I
requested, do not ridicule it, in order that we may hear what
each of the rest will say; or rather what both will; for the
rest are only Agatho and Socrates.
He stated then that Eryximachus said, I will be obedient ;
for the speech has been spoken in a delightful manner; and
if I were not conscious that Socrates and Agatho were deeply
versed in affairs of Love, I should have greatly feared they
would be at a loss for reasons through there having been said
so much, and of all kinds. But now I have every confidence.
—(This, ) said Socrates,(is all very well for you,) Eryximachus ;
since you have already gone through the ordeal yourself with
honour. But if you were, where I am now, or rather per-
haps where I shall be, when Agatho shall have spoken his
speech cleverly,” you would be in a very great fright, and in
every (kind of heart-sinking),®* as I am now.—You wish, So-
% To preserve the train of thought, and thus elicit something like
sense out of these words, Orelli on Isocrat. de Permutat. p. 330, sug-
gested ἄρρενος ἑνὸς, i. 6. “ both from one male.”
% Ficinus has “in antiquam naturam—restitutus,’ which leads to
ἀνελθὼν in lieu of ἀπελθὼν--- ;
97 Ficinus has “scite dixerit,” thus uniting εὖ to εἴπῳ, and not, as all
others have done, to καὶ μάλ᾽.
% Instead of ἐν παντὶ εἴης, which is perfectly unintelligible, even
Fischer had the good sense to propose ἐν παντὶ εἴης ἀπορίας ὥσπερ, to
which he was led by “ angustiis undique premereris,” in Ficinus. Besides
THE BANQUET. 517
erates, said Agatho, to drug me, in order that I may be con-
fused through thinking that the spectators have a great ex-
pectation of my, being about to make a clever speech.—I
should have been, Agatho, forgetful indeed, if, after witnessing
your courage and high spirit, when you came upon the stage
with the performers and looking so numerous an audience in
the face, you were about to exhibit your compositions without
being in the least daunted, I thought you could be now dis-
turbed on account of us, so few in number.—Surely, So-
crates, said Agatho, you do not think me so inflated by a
theatrical audience, as not to know that to a man, who has any
mind, a few persons of sense are more awful than a multitude
of fools.—I should be acting not at all correctly, said Socrates,
if I thought there was any thing about you, Agatho, of a boor-
ish nature. But I know very well, that if you met with any
whom you considered wise, you would think more of them
than of the multitude. But I fear we are not such; for we
were there likewise, and made a part of that multitude. But if
you had met with other wise men, you would perhaps have felt
a shame before them, had you thought you were doing an act
really! disgraceful. Is it not so? or how say you ?—It is true,
said Agatho.—But before the multitude, said Socrates, would
you not feel a shame, if you thought you were doing any
thing base ?—Hereupon Phedrus, taking up the discourse, said,
If, dear Agatho, you will give Socrates an answer, it will be
no manner of concern to him what becomes of any thing
whatever here, or if he can only have somebody to converse
with, and especially one who is handsome. I confess I do
he perhaps remembered ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας in Euthyd. p.
300, C., and ἐν παντὶ κακῷ εἴη in Rep. ix. p. 505,C. But in the former
Plato wrote ἐν παντί τῳ ἀπορίας ἐγενόμην, and in the latter ἐν παντί
τῳ κακοῦ, as shown by Thucyd. vii. 55, ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας, where I
should prefer ἐν παντί τῳ, as in Philoct. 174, ἐν παντί τῳ χρείας, were it
not that Dionys. H. A. R. vi. 70, ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας, seems to support
the common reading. Wyttenbach indeed on Plutarch de S.N. V., p.
127, quotes from Xenoph. H. Gr. v. 4, 29, ἐν παντὶ ἦσαν μὴ---εἴη. But
it is easy to read here ἐν παντί τῳ ἄσης ein, and there ἐν παντί τῳ dong
ἦσαν: for don has been elsewhere lost or corrupted, as I have shown on
Esch, Eum. 116, and I could now show still more.
99 Of this passage there is a palpable imitation in Themistius, Or. xxxvi.
p- 311, B., and a covert one in Aristenetus, Ep. i. 19.
100 Instead of ὃν, which has no meaning here, Plato wrote, as I have
translated, ὄντως. Ast wished to expunge ὃν entirely ; for it is not found
in the correlative sentence just afterwards.
518 THE BANQUET.
with much pleasure hear Socrates conversing: but it is ne-
cessary for me to take care of the panegyric upon Love, and
to receive! a speech from every one of you. But do both of
you pay! thus your tribute to the god, and then converse.
You say well, Phzdrus, (said Agatho); and there is nothing
to prevent me from beginning my speech. For TI shall have
frequently the means of conversing again with Socrates.
[21.] I wish in the first place to state how I ought to speak ;
and I will then so speak.? For all of those who have
spoken before me, appear to me to have celebrated not the
god, but to felicitate mankind upon the good, of which the
god is the cause. But what he is himself, who has bestow-
ed these gifts, not one of them has explained. Now upon
each subject of every panegyric, there is only one correct
method ; and that is, to detail in a rational way of how great
things how great a cause is he, respecting whom the dis-
course may be.* In this way then it is meet for us to make
the encomium upon Love, (by showing,) first, how great he is,
and afterwards his gifts. I assert then, that of all the gods
(in reality)* blessed, Love is, if it is lawful to say so, and
without calling down vengeance, the most blessed of all the
gods, and at once® the most beautiful and the best. ®But
such he is, being the most beautiful. In the first place,
he is, Phedrus, the youngest of the gods. Of this asser-
1 On the meaning of ἀποδέχεσθαι and ἀποδοῦναι, ‘to receive” and
“pay” a debt, Stalbaum refers to Politic. p. 173, B., and Rep. p. 612, B.
? Ficinus has “postea dicam,” which leads to εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν, in lieu of
εἰπεῖν, which makes nonsense here.
3. Ficinus either found something different in his MS., or formed some-
thing out of his own head, which he did not find there. For his version
is, ‘Sic et in presentia, qualis ipse sit Amor, primum ostendere decet;
deinde munera illius exponere.””
* Unless I am grievously mistaken, Plato wrote ὄντως ὄντων, for ὄντων
by itself would be perfectly useless. .
5 Although, as Stalbaum shows, αὐτῶν might perhaps stand at the end
of a sentence, of which I have my doubts, yet since Stobzeus offers here
αὐτὸν, it is evident that Plato wrote dua τὸν κάλλιστον. For the article
could hardly be omitted.
6_§ Such is the literal version of the words, Ἔστι δὲ κάλλιστος ὧν
τοιόσδε: which others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote:
especially when Ficinus has, “ Quod vero pulcherrimus sit, ex eo primum
patet—”’ from which, however, one can easily discover that he did not find
in his MS. ὧν rowdode. Perhaps Plato wrote, ἐς δὲ τὸ κάλλος, παῖς ὧν,
ποῖος δὴ ; i.e. But as regards his beauty, being a boy, of what kind is he?
THE BANQUET. 519
tion he affords himself a powerful proof, by running away
in haste from Old Age, who is quick-footed, it is plain, at
least it approaches quicker than is necessary; and which,
indeed, Love naturally hates, nor does he come near to
it within a great (distance);7 but he is eyer with the young,
and is.6 For, as the old proverb rightly has it, “ Like always
doth approach to like.”® Now, though I agree with Phe-
drus in many other points, I do not agree in this, that Love
is older than Saturn and Japetus ; but of gods, I affirm, he is
the youngest, and is ever young, and that the doings!° of the
olden time, which Hesiod and Parmenides detail, were pro-
duced, if indeed they say true, by the power of Necessity, and
not Love. For, had Love been with them, there had been no
castrations,'! nor bindings,!? nor those many other acts of
violence, but friendship and peace, as now, from the time
when Love came to be the ruler of the gods. Thus then
he is young, and in addition to being young is a tender being.
But he wants a poet, such as Homer was, to express the ten-
τ All the MSS. read, οὐδ᾽ ὄντος πολλοῦ. Gesner on Stobeus, Ix1. p.
269, was the first to suggest οὐδ᾽ ἐντὸς, and so too Sydenham: as if
χωρίου were understood, which is supplied in Thucyd. ii. 77, ἐντὸς πολ-
λοῦ χωρίου---πελάσαι. They, however, who know how constantly Plato
alludes covertly to Homer, will read ἐντὸς τοῦ ὀλοοῦ ofd0t—similar to
drop ἐπὶ γήραος" οὐδῶ, in IA, Q. 487: and in Axioch. § 9, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἐπ’
: οὐδῷ γήραος, in lieu of ἄλλοι πολυγήρως : for γήραος οὐδὸν is found
there in ᾧ 10, and in Plato Rep. i. p. 328, F.
8 In lieu of the nonsensical dei ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν, which Ast and Stal-
baum vainly, as usual, attempt to defend, Bast once proposed to read,
what he afterwards retracted, ξύνεστί re καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστιν. He should have
read, ξύνεστί re καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, “he is and ever will be.’’ On this union
of the present and future, compare Thucyd. v. 105, τὸν vépov—dvra—
ἐσόμενον 6¢—Olympiodor. in Alcibiad. i. § 11, p. 105, ἔστὲ καὶ ἔσται.
Menander in Stob. xxxviii., Πεπόηκε καὶ ποήσει καὶ woei—Anstid. H. in
Jov. p. 21. Jebb. ὅδε (ὁ Ζεὺς) ἔστι---ῖἣν τε καὶ ἔσται, The passage of Plu-
tarch in ii. p. 352, A., quoted by Wyttenbach on S. N. V. p. 36, is not in
point, παρ᾽ αὐτῇ καὶ per’ αὐτῆς ὄντα Kai συνόντα. Winckelmann in
Zeitschrift fiir Alterthumswissenschaft, 1840. p. 1282, would read ξύνεστι
καὶ ἕπεται.
9 The proverb is quoted at length in Lysid., p, 214, A., ᾿Αιεί τοι τὸν
ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον from Od. xvii. 218. Ὡς ἀιεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον---
1 Instead οἵ πράγματα, the best MSS., as they are called, offer
ippara. Plato wrote ταράγματα.
μετα" these castrations there is an allusion in Euthyph. § 6.
. 32 The. binding of Saturn by his son is mentioned by Aésch. in Eum.
627, and Aristoph. in Ned. 898, and Plato in Cratyl. § 45.
δ20 THE BANQUET.
derness of the god. Now Homer describes Ate as a goddess,
and of a tender frame. At least he speaks of her feet as
being tender :
Her feet are tender; not on ground she stalks,
But on the top’ of human heads she walks.
The poet then seems to me to show by such a proof her ten-
derness ; because she walks not upon a hard place, but a soft
one. And the same proof we shall use respecting Love, that
he too is tender. For he neither walks on the ground, nor
upon (human) skulls, which in truth are places not very soft ;
but on the softest of all existing things, he walks and dwells
there. For he-has fixed his abode in the dispositions and souls
of gods and men:!* and yet not in all souls indiscriminately:
but whenever he meets with a soul possessing a harsh dispo-
sition, away he goes, and takes up his abode with a tender one.
Since, then, he is ever touching with his feet, and in every
way the softest parts in the softest persons, he must needs be
extremely tender. Thus then he is very young and very
tender; and in addition to these qualities he is of a flexible
form. For he would not be able to entwine himself around every
thing, nor to pass through every soul, at first unperceived,
and to go out (again),'° if he were of a hard substance. And a
great proof of his form being in proportion’® and flexible, is
in its gracefulness, which Love confessedly possesses in a man-
ner superior to all. For between Ungracefulness and Love
there is always a war. His diet too on flowers points out the
beauty of his colour. ἢ For Love does not settle upon a body,
13 T have translated as if the Greek were ἀλλ᾽ ἄκρ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἥγε κατ᾽ ἀν-
δρῶν κράατα βαίνει, and not ἀλλ᾽ dpa ijye—although instead of ἄρ᾽ ἥγε
I should prefer ἄνυξι, for ὑπαλοὶ means here not “ tender,” but “ slim.”
With regard, however, to my ἄκρ᾽, itis put beyond all doubt by Rhianus
Fragm. i. ‘H δ᾽ "Arn ἁπαλοῖσι μετατρωχῶσα πόδεσσι Ακρῳς ἐν κεφαλῇσι
--Οἰφίσταται.
4 On this sentiment see Valckenaer in Diatrib. Euripid. p. 157.
18 The antithesis in εἰσιὼν τὸ πρῶτον evidently requires ἐξιὼν αὖ----
‘6 What the idea of proportion has to do with that of flexibility, it is
hard to say. The passage was, however, so read by Aristenetus, when
describing the σύμμετρα καὶ τρυφερὰ μέλη of Lais, in Epist.i. 1. Unless
I am mistaken, Plato wrote συμμέτρου δὲ SKQAHKI, a word which
might easily have dropt out through—OYAEKAI—for of all animals the
worm-tribe is the most flexible.
1717 Aristenetus, Ep. ii. 1, seems to have found in his MS. of Plato,
οὐ πέφυκε προσιζάνειν instead of οὐκ ἐνίζει.
‘
Oe ν..κω.. «.
THE BANQUET. 521
or any other spot where flowers are not, or where they have
fallen off; but wherever is a spot flowery and fragrant, there
he settles and fixes his abode.!* [22.] As regards then the
beauty of the god '*thus much is sufficient; although much
still remains.'* I must speak after this on virtue of Love.
Now is the highest (praise); that he does no injury to a god
or man, nor by a god or man is he injured. Nor, if he suffers
aught, does he suffer by violence; for violence touches not
Love; nor if he does aught, does he it with violence ;!° for
every one willingly ministers in every thing to Love.” But
whatever one party agrees (to do) of his own accord for an-
other party of his own accord, such acts the laws, that are
the rulers in a state, say are justly done. In addition to jus-
tice, Love has the greatest share of temperance. For to be
superior to pleasures and to passions, is every where confessed
to be temperance. But no pleasure is superior to Love. If
then they are inferior, they will be Love’s subjects; and he
will be their master; and being thus superior to pleasures and
passions, he will be pre-eminently temperate. Moreover, as
regards valour, not Arés (Mars) himself can stand up against
Love.2! *For it is not Arés that holds Love, but Love Arés,
1818 Ficinus has, ‘‘ permulta insuper afferri possent; sed ista suffi-
cient,’’ which would lead to ért καὶ πολλὰ λείπεται" ἔστω δὲ ταῦθ᾽ ἱκανά,
in lieu of καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ἱκανὰ καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ λείπεται---
19. Ficinus correctly, “‘ neque vi facit, si quid faciat.”” He therefore
found in his MS. οὔτε τι ποιῶν ποιεῖ Big—which is required to balance
Big πάσχει, εἴ τι πάσχει. Stalbaum, however, says there is no need of
βίᾳ, found in Bas. 2, and one MS., and in Stobeus.—But here, as else-
where, the proverb is true—‘‘ Many men of many minds; Many birds of
many kinds.”
39 In the words Πᾶς γὰρ ἑκῴν "Ἔρωτι πᾶν (Stob. πάνθ᾽) ὑπηρετεῖ, there
lies hid an Iambic verse, probably of Agatho himself, Ἔρωτι γὰρ πᾶς
πάνθ᾽ ἑκὼν ὑπηρετεῖ. So too from the following words, ἃ δ΄ ἄν τις
ἑκὼν ἑκόντι ὁμολογήσῃ, φασὶν οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι δίκαια, εἶναι, it is
easy to elicit the distich, “A τὶς δ᾽ ἑκὼν ἑκόντα δρᾶν ἂν ὁμολογῆ, Βασι-
λῆς πόλεως, δίκαια φασὶν οἱ νόμοι.
31 Blomfield, in Mus. Crit. No. 2, p. 144, has aptly compared Soph.
Thyest. Fr. Πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην odd" Apne ἀνθίσταται. But he did not
see that in this passage of Plato there lies hid a distich, probably of Aga-
tho, Kai μὴν ἐς ἀνδρίαν y’"Epwrt, παιδὶ δὴ, ύκτης ἀνὴρ ὥς, ob0’” Apne
ἀνθίσταται, where I have introduced Πύκτης from Soph. Trach. 441,
Ἔρωτι μὲν viv boric ἀντανίσταται, ἸΤύκτης ὅπως ἐς χεῖρας, οὐ καλως
φρονεῖ: while, to preserve the antithesis, in which Agatho, as we learn
from Aristotle, indulged, I have added likewise παιδὶ δὴ---ἀνὴρ ὥς----
2222 Flere again it is easy to elicit another distich of Agatho, from the’
522 THE BANQUET.
(the son,) as the saying is, of Aphrodite? (Venus). Now he
who holds is superior to the party held; and he who is the
master of the party more valiant than all the rest, will be the
most valiant. Thus then have we spoken of the justice, and
temperance, and valour of the god ; and it is left (to speak) of
his wisdom. As far then as we can, we must endeavour to
be in no way wanting. And in the first place, that I too may
do honour to my own art, as Eryximachus did to his, the god is
so clever a poet, that he is able to make even another person one.
3 For each becomes a poet, though before
He was not musical, when Love touches him.
This testimony it is fitting for us to use, (to prove) that
the poet Love is excellent for all the creative power con-
nected with the Muse. For that, which one has not, or
does not know, he can not either give to another or teach.
Moreover who will gainsay (the assertion) that the making
of all animals is through the wisdom of Love, by which all
living things are generated and produced?*4 Then as re-
gards handicraft-skill in arts, know we not that he, whose
teacher is the deity, turns out a person of repute and il-
lustrious ; but he on whom Love does not lay his hands, re-
mains in obscurity? The art of the archer, and of the
physician, and of the prophet, did Apollo invent, under the
words Οὐ γὰρ éyst”Eowra” Apne, ἀλλ᾽ "Ἐρως"Αρη, Ἀφροδίτης, ὡς λόγος, by
reading "Exe γὰρ οὐκ Apne "Epwr’,”Apy δ᾽ "Ἔρως, Παῖς ᾿Αφροδίτης opt-
κρὸς ᾧν, ὡς 3 λόγος. And hence we may read, ’Agpodirne υἱὸς, ὡς
λόγος ; and thus obtain the very word required to govern er eh
which Stalbaum says depends upon”Epwe, and appeals to Monk on Ale.
50, where there is not a word bearing on the question. From his refer-
ence to Od. 6. 266, Stalbaum seems to think that there is an allusion to
the story told by Homer. But the remark of Agatho was of a wider kind,
and applicable to the loves of Arés generally.
3. 95 Here too lies hid another distich of Agathon, Πᾶς yap ποητὴς
γίγνεται, κἂν ἢ τὸ πρὶν ΓΛμουσος ἐς πᾶν, οὗ γ᾽ [Ἔρως ποθ’ ἅψεται, where
he imitated his beloved Euripides in Sthenob. ΕἾ. iii. μουσικὴν δ᾽ apa” Epws
διδάσκει, κἂν ἄμουσος ἢ τὸ piv—while ἐς πᾶν is similar to the expres-
sion in Longinus, § 39, κἂν ἄμουσος ἦ παντάπασι. With regard to Love
making a person a poet, Shakspeare alludes to it, where he speaks of a
lover “ with his woeful ballad, made to his mistress’ eye-brow.” —
* To get rid of the tautology in γίγνεται and φύεται, we must read,
what Plato wrote, φαίνεται, ‘‘ make their appearance.”
*%—2% The edd. have ἐπιθυμίας καὶ "Ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος. But
ἐπιθυμίας καὶ are here out of place, where the whole question is about
the deity called Love. The words ἐπιθυμίας καὶ are a corruption of
ἐπιθυμίας ἕνεκα, and should be inserted between καὶ and Μοῦσαι: while
THE BANQUET. 523
guidance of Love; so that he would be disciple of Love; and
(through desire) the Muses (became the inventors) of music,
and Hephestus (Vulcan), of brass-working, and Athena
(Minerva), of weaving, and Zeus (Jupiter), of governing gods
and men. From whence then were the affairs of the gods
put into order? Through the birth, it is plain, of the love of
beauty; for Love does not follow” ugliness. For previously,
as I stated at the commencement, many and terrible things
befell, as they say, the gods, through the rule of necessity.*
But when this god was born, through his loving all things of
beauty, “to gods and men did all good things arise.”°—[23. ]
Thus, Phedrus, Love appears to me to be, in the first place,”
himself the most beautiful and best; in the next, to be the
cause of such like beautiful things*! in other beings. And it
comes into my mind to speak something in verse, because he
it is, who produces
Peace amongst men, upon the sea a calm ;
Stillness on winds,® on joyless bed sweet sleep.**
after Μοῦσαι has dropt out ἧσαν, and after ἀνθρώπων, ἑυρέται. For thus
only can we get rid of all the difficulties of the passage, which Ast and
Stalbaum have vainly attempted to soften down.
26 In lieu of ὅθεν, I have translated as if the Greek were πόθεν, and
the sentence interrogative instead of being affirmative.
27 The MSS. vary between ἔστιν, ἔνεστιν, and ἔπεστιν, which last
leads to ἕπεται, as shown by the version of Ficinus, “ deformitatem
quippe non sequitur Amor.” The very same confusion is found in the
Cratylus, § 10, where the Zurich editors have adopted from MS. Bodl.
alone ἕπεται for ἔπεστι.
28 For, as Prometheus says in Adschylus, “ Necessity is greater than
Zeus himself.’’ So too Simonides, Fr. 139, ἀνάγκῃ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.
39 Here again is another verse of Agatho, Πάντ᾽ ἀγαθὰ γέγονε θεοῖσί τ
ἀνθρώποις ἅμα.
30 Instead οἵ πρώτος, vainly defended by Stalbaum, one MS. and Sto-
beus offer πρῶτον, absolutely requisite to balance μετὰ τοῦτο. Ficinus
too “‘ primum —deinde.”” :
31 Instead of ἄλλων, which is scarcely intelligible, Plato wrote καλῶν,
as shown by the preceding κάλλιστος : and so I have translated.
32 Hermogenes T.i. p. 321, ed. Walz., ἀνέμοις for ἀνέμων : and so too
four MSS. as required by the preceding ἀνθρώποις and πελάγει.
33 From the variations of MSS. it is probable that Plato wrote, as I have
translated, κοίτῃ θ᾽ ὕπνον ἡδὺν ἀηδεῖ. On the loss and corruption of
ὕπνον ἡδὺν, I have given another instance in The Surplice, No. 25, p.
385, for May 16, 1846, by restoring to Apollon. Rh. iii. 763, ὕπνον δ᾽ ἔχε-
καί τις ὁδίτης Ἡδύν. Stalbaum says that Dindorf’s κοίτη θ᾽ ὕπνον νηκηδῆ
scarcely admits of doubt: for though νηκηδῆ has not been hitherto found
524 : THE BANQUET.
It is he who divests us of all feelings of alienation; and fills
us with those of intimacy; who establishes all™ i
such as these, and in festivals, in dances, (and) in sacrifices,*
he becomes the leader ; introducing mildness, and banishing a
harshness of manners; the friendly giver of good-will, the
non-giver of enmity; gracious to the good; looked up to by
the wise, admired by the gods; envied by those who have no
lot in life, possessed by those who have; the parent of luxury,
of tenderness, of elegance, of grace, of desire, and regret;
careful of the good, regardless of the bad; in labour, in fear,
in wishes, and in speech,* the pilot, the encourager,®” the by-
stander, and best saviour:** of gods and men, taken all to-
gether, the ornament; a leader the most beautiful and best : 39
in whose train it is the duty of every one to follow, hymning
well his praise, and bearing a part in that sweet song which
he sings himself when soothing the mind of every god and
man.—Let this my speech be offered up, Phadrus, said he, to
in any Greek writer, yet it is sufficiently supported by the analogy of
νηπενθής. Nor is he altogether displeased with Hommel’s κοίτην ὕπνον
τ᾽ ἐνὶ κήτει: for Hesychius has Κῆτος--ἀπορια. But this is a manifest
error for χῆτος, as those scholars should have known. Or we might read
κραδίην θ᾽ ὑπνῶν ἐνὶ κήδει, i. 6. “and bringing to the heart In sadness
sleep.” For Plato might have had in mind Od. xvi. 450, Κλαῖεν ἔπειτ᾽
(read ἄπληστ᾽) Ὀδυσῆα, φίλον πόσιν, ὄφρα οἱ ὕπνον Ἡδὺν ἐπὶ βλεφά-
ροισι βάλε γλαυκῶπις ᾿Αθήνη. Shelley has “repose and sleep in sad-
ness.” But the hendyadis would be extremely tame.
3, The text is πάσας τιθεὶς ξυνιέναι : where Hommel objects to πάσας
and would read πάντας. But he still leaves untouched τιθεὶς ξυνιέναι,
which could not be said in correct Greek. There is some error, which
others may perhaps, but I cannot, satisfactorily correct.
35 Instead of ἐν θυσίαις, Stobeeus offers ἐνθυμίαις : which leads to
ἐν θοίναις, ἐν θυσίαις.
356. Schiitz was the first to object to λόγῳ, for which he proposed to read
μόγῳ. But that word is never found in prose, and rarely even in poetry.
Perhaps Plato wrote ἐν χόλῳ, “in anger.”
37 I cannot understand ἐἀδ γεῦμα which Ficinus translates “ pre-
fectus,”’ which is quite as incorrect as Sydenham’s “encourager.” For
the ἐπιβάτης was the name given to the person, who fought on board a
vessel, but did not row, answering to “a marine” in the English navy.
Plato wrote, I suspect, ὑπασπισὴς, for sucha person is required in a case
of fear. Hesych. Ὑπαπιστής" βοηθός.
38 If I have rightly restored χόλῳ for λόγω, we must read ᾿Ιατὼρ
ἄριστος, in allusion to ᾿Ιητρὸς ἄριστος in Homer, quoted here in § 38,
39. Although κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος are perpetually united, yet here the
repetition of ἄριστος is extremely disagreeable. One would expect rather
καὶ χαριέστατος, “ most agreeable.”
δ δ νων". ....
THE BANQUET. 525
Love, partaking, as best I could, in some parts of what is gay,
in others of what is grave.
[24.] When Agatho had done speaking, all present, said
Aristodemus, roared out (applause), for he had spoken ina
manner worthy of himself and the god.—Upon which Socrates,
looking at Eryximachus, said, Do I appear to you, son of Acii-
ménus, to have felt just now a fear that was no fear,*® when I
spoke prophetically, what I asserted lately, that Agatho would
speak marvellously well, and that I should be placed in a diffi-
culty ?—One portion, replied Eryximachus, you appear to have
foretold truly, that Agatho would speak excellently, but the
other, that you would be in a difficulty, I do not consider (true).
And how, O happy man, said Socrates, am I not likely to be ina
difficulty, and any one else too, who is to speak after a speech so
full of beauty and variety? 4'In other respects it was not equally
admirable,*! but who, that heard the conclusion, would not
have been struck with the beauty “of the nouns and verbs ?#
For when I consider how unable I shall be to say any thing
beautiful approaching to this, I should run away for very
shame, had I in any way the power. For the speech put me
in mind of Gorgias: so that I suffered what is told in Ho-
mer.*® For I feared that Agatho would at last send in his
speech the head of that formidable speaker Gorgias against my
speech ; and, through my inability to say a word, turn me into
stone! And I perceived how ridiculous I was then, when
I agreed that I would in my turn after you make an encomium
upon Love, and asserted that I had some skill in the matter
of Love, yet knowing nothing of it, nor how it was necessary
to praise any thing whatever. For in my stupidity I thought
4° Suidas in ’Adséc— Αδεὲς δέδιας δέος.
“14! Ficinus has “et cetera quidem, quamvis apte composita non
adeo miranda videntur.’’ He therefore found something in his MS.
answering to “quamvis apte composita,’’ wanting at present in the
Greek.
#42 Tn thus alluding to the beauty of the nouns and verbs, Socrates
is supposed to be speaking ironically in praise of that which he really
considered reprehensible. For, unlike the rhetoricians and sophists, he
looked rather to the matter of a speech than the manner. There is a
similar sneer at fine words merely in the Menexenus, p. 234, C.
‘8 The passage alluded to is in Od. A. 636—
** Then pale fear seized me, lest the Gorgon’s head
Should Proserpine of hallowed mien send out,
A prodigy great and terrible, from Hell.”
δ26 THE BANQUET.
one ought to speak truths respecting each subject praised,
and that these were to be the substratum, and that
out of these very matters the most beautiful, to put them to-
gether in the most becoming manner. And I had a great
notion that I should speak well, as knowing well the truths
relating to the praising of any thing whatever. But this it
seems is not the way to praise correctly, but (we must) attri-
bute to the subject qualities the greatest and the best possible,
whether they are such or not; and if the encomiums are un-
true, that is an affair quite immaterial. For it was stated
before, as it seems, that each of us 44 should appear to praise
Love, and not merely to praise.** On this account, I suppose,
you “turn over every topic and attribute to Love,® and
assert that he is of such a kind, and the cause of things so
great, as to appear the most beautiful and best—to those
it is clear who know him not—for he certainly would not
(appear so) to those who did know him. And thus the praise
becomes fine and pompous. But for my part, I know nothing
of this kind of praise; and through not knowing, I agreed
to compose myself in my turn apanegyric. “ But my tongue
only “ promised, not my mind.” And so farewell to it. For
I should not be able (to say any thing), not I indeed.” But
*4_4 The words between the numerals I cannot understand ; nor could
Ficinus, as is evident from his equally unintelligible version—*‘ cum pro-
positum sit, quomodo Amor ipse laudetur, immo ut quisque Amorem
laudare quam maxime videatur.”” I could have understood, what Plato
probably wrote,—Sawe ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐγκωμιάσεται, οὐχ
ὅπως ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει, i. 6. “ that each of us should praise Love, and
not merely be thought to praise him.” For thus there would be a proper
antithesis between real and seeming praise. On this antithesis I have
oe something worth reading on Hipp. Maj. § 29, n. 3, and on Philoct.
271
45_45 In the words πάντα λόγον κινοῦντες there is an allusion to the
proverbial expression πάντα λίθον κινεῖν, as shown by Wyttenbach on
Plutarch, S. N, V. p. 83. Here however Ficinus has “ universa Amori
tribuitis,” omitting λόγον κινοῦντες. From whence I suspect that Plato
wrote πάντα λίθον κινοῦντες, πάντα ἀνατίθετε, i. 6. ‘ moving every
stone, you attribute every thing to Love.”’ For thus we shall recover the
object required after the verb ἀνατίθετε.
“ In the words ἡ yAwrra οὖν ὑπέσχετο, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὔ, there is an allu-
sion to Eurip. Hippol. 612, ‘H γλῶσσ᾽ ὀμώμοχ᾽, ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος,
translated by Cicero De Offic. iii. 29, ** Juravi lingua; mentem injuratam
gero,” as remarked by Stalbaum, who did not, however, see that, as οὖν
is here unintelligible, Plato wrote ἡ γχῶττα μὲν ὑπέσχετο---
* On this repetition of ob μὲν roe after οὐ, Stalbaum refers to Od. P.
THE BANQUET. 527
I am ready to speak the truth according to my own notions,
if you are willing (to hear), but not by way of comparison
with yours, in order that I may not pay the debt of laughter.
Do you then, Phzedrus, consider, if indeed you are in want
at all of such a speech, “*(whether you wish)** to hear the
truth spoken about Love with such an arrangement of nouns
and verbs“? as may happen to come (into my mind).5° [25.]
Phedrus then, he said, and the rest requested him to speak
in the manner which he thought he ought to speak. Permit
me, Phadrus, however, said Socrates, to ask Agatho still some
trifling questions ; that, °'after having obtained a confession
from him, I may then speak®! in this way. I permit you,
said Phedrus. Question him. Hereupon he said, that
Socrates began somewhat after this fashion :
In good truth, friend Agatho, you seem to me to have begun
your speech well, in saying that we ought in the first place to set
forth what is the nature of Love, and afterwards his doings.
With this introduction I am quite delighted. Come, then,
touching this Love; since you have gone through the other
points in a beautiful and splendid manner, tell me this also. Is
Love a being of such a kind as to be (the love) of something or
nothing? I do not ask, whether it is of some father or mother ;
27, Οὐ γὰρ ὀΐω οὐ, and Hipp. Maj. p. 292, B., odor δοκεῖ---οὔκ : but
μέντοι is not thus introduced, except in the case of. a confirmation by
another speaker, as I have shown in Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2. There is
some error here.
48S_48 The words within the numerals have been inserted to complete
the sense and syntax, which are both. equally neglected in the original ;
where Plato wrote, I suspect, πότερον περὶ "Epwroc τἀληθῆ λεγόμενα
ἀρέσκει ἀκούειν, in lieu of περὶ Ἔρωτος τἀληθῆ λεγόμενα ἀκούειν.
Ficinus, ‘‘ utrum vobis placeat—audire.”
Instead of ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων, one would have expected
ὀνομάτων δὲ καὶ ῥημάτων θέσει, similar to τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων
καὶ ῥημάτων, ἃ little before. Ficinus, “ verborum nominumque—com-
positione.”’
*° As all the MSS. but one read ὁποία δ᾽ ἄν τις, Stalbaum suggested
ὁποία δὴ τις. He should have proposed ὁποία pou, for pot could scarcely
be omitted after ἐπελθοῦσα.
51. δ᾽ Such is the interpretation of Budeus. But Ficinus has “ ut con-
firmatus ab illo loquar.”’ The sense required is, ‘ that, having reflected
upon some trifling point, I may speak.as is fitting,’ in Greek, iva ἀναλο-
γισάμενος περί του, οὕτως, ἡ δεῖ, λέγω. For though οὕτως ἤδη is found
here in § 20, and in Phedo, p. 61, D., yet in both these cases the same
alteration is requisite. To the recovery of the sense three MSS. have
led the way by reading ἀναλογισάμενος.
528 THE BANQUET.
—for the question, whether love is the love of a father or
mother, would be ridiculous—but as if I had asked this re-
specting a father, Is a father a father ; and the father of some-
thing, or not? In this case you would surely have said, if
you wished to answer correctly, that a father is the father of a
son or daughter, would you not ?—Certainly, said Agatho.—
And is not a mother in the same predicament ?—To this too
Agatho assented.—Answer me still further, said Socrates, to
a question a little larger, that you may the better apprehend
my meaning. IfI had asked, What, then, of a brother—
whatever that very thing may be—is he a brother of some
person, or not ?—(Agatho) said, He is.—Is he not of a brother
or a sister ?—Agatho assented.—Try then, said (Socrates), to
tell me about love. Is it the love of nothing, or of something ?—
Of something, by all means, (replied Agatho).—This, there-
fore,** said Socrates, keep to. yourself, remembering what it
is; but tell me so much as this. “Does love desire that very
thing, of which it is the love, or does it not ?—Desires it, cer-
tainly.— Whether, when possessing what it desires and loves,
does it then desire and love it ? or only when not possessing it ?
—It would seem, he replied, only when not possessing it.—
[26.] Instead of seeming,** said Socrates, consider if it be not
of necessity thus, that desire desires only that, of which it is in
want; and that it does not desire, if it be from want. For
to me, Agatho, this seems to be marvellously necessary. But
how does it to you?—To me too it seems, replied (Agatho).—
You say well, said (Socrates). Would then a big man, being
big already, wish to be big? or a man being strong, wish
to be strong ?—This is, from what has been just now stated,
impossible (replied Agatho). For, being 50,55 he would not
® In lieu of ἐστιν we must read ἐστί τινος, as shown by “ Alicujus
certe,”’ in Ficinus.
58. Sydenham has, “‘ for the present keep,” which is what the sense re-
quires; and so Plato wrote in Greek, Τοῦτο μὲν τὰ νῦν, not Τοῦτο μὲν
τοίνυν, where τοίνυν is unintelligible.
5 There is a similar play on the word ‘ seeming,” in Hamlet, where
to the Queen’s inquiry, “ Why seems it so particular with thee?” the
Prince replies “Seems, Madam; nay, itis. I know not seems.” See
my note on Cratyl. p. 400, B. § 37.
55 Ficinus has “ Neque enim indigus esset eorum, que in se ipso jam
contineret.” He therefore found in his MS. not ὅ γε ἂν, but & ye ἔχω:
ἣν, which is far more correct ; for ἔχων is opposed to ἐνδεὴς, and not dy,
and better chimes in with the preceding ἔχων, οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ---ἢ οὐκ ἔχων.
ΑΝ “μι, ,
THE BANQUET. 529
be wanting on those points.—You say true, replied Socrates ;
for, if a person, being already strong, should wish to be strong,
and being swift, (wish to be) swift, and (being) healthy, (wish
to be) healthy,®? one might perhaps imagine that those who
are such, as regards these and such-like points, and possess
these, would desire those things which they already possess.5*
That we may not therefore be deceived, it is for this that I
speak. For if you consider the matter, Agatho, (you will
see) that they, who possess at present any of those things,
paust possess them, whether they will or not; and of such a
‘thing, how can any one ever have a desire? But when a
person says thus—“ I, who am now in health, desire to be in
health; and I, who am now wealthy, desire to be wealthy;
and I long for those very things, which I possess ;” we should
say to him thus: “ You mean, my man, that you, who now
possess wealth, and health, and strength, are desirous to pos-
sess those things for the time to come ; since at the present time
you possess them, whether you will or not.” When you say,
therefore, thus—“ I desire what is present,” consider whether
you are saying any thing else than this—“I wish that what are
now present may be present for the time to come.” Would aught
else but this be acknowledged ?®°—Agatho agreed that it would
not.—"Is not this then, said Socrates, to love (to desire)
57 After “‘ healthy,”’ Stalbaum fancies that the apodosis is wanting ; for
he did not perceive that γὰρ is a corruption merely for γ᾽ dp’—
58__58 [nstead of the horrible verbiage in the Greek text, ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις
ταῦτα οἰηθείη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ὄντας TE τοιούτους Kai ἔχον-
τας ταῦτα τούτων, ἅπερ ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν---ἴονν terse and to the
purpose is the translation of Ficinus—‘ forte quispiam crederet et hos et
alios quoslibet ea, que habent, appetere,’’ i. 6. ‘‘ perhaps any one would
believe that both these, and any others, would desire what they possess.”
59 Sydenham was the first to bring back ὁμολογοῖτ᾽ dy, found in the
three earliest edd. Ficinus too, ‘‘ Censes hunc hominem—responsurum.”
Bekk. and Stalbaum, from MSS., ὁμολογοῖ: which would be in Attic
Greek ὁμολογοίη.
60__60 Such seems to be a part of the meaning required by the context ;
but even this cannot be got out of the Greek—Ov« οὖν τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐστὶν
ἐκείνου ἐρᾷν ὃ οὔπω ἕτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστιν. For where there is no syntax,
there is no sense. Ficinus has, ‘“‘ Amor profecto, hujusmodi illud respicit,
quod nondum in promptu est nec habetur,” as if he had found in his
MS. ὁρᾶν, which has been furnished by a solitary one subsequently ex-
amined. I have followed Sydenham in part, who supplied ‘‘ to desire,”
although I suspect Plato wrote something else, which I could easily restore
by the aid of an Asopic fable. ἡ
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530 THE BANQUET.
that which is not at hand to him, and which he does not pos-
sess; and that what are now present should be preserved for
him for the time to come.—Certainly so, (replied Agatho).—
Both this man, therefore, (said Socrates,) and every one else
who feels a desire, desires that which lies not at hand, and
which is not present, and which he has not, and which he
himself is not, and of which he is in want of; such things
only are those of which there is the desire and the love.—
Certainly, said he.—®! Come then, said Socrates, let us agree
upon what has been said.®! Is Love any thing else than, in
the first place, the love of something? next, of those things
of which there is a want ?—Clearly (not), replied Agatho.—
In addition to these, said Socrates, recollect, of what things
you asserted in your speech there was a Love. But, if you
wish it, I will remind you. For, I think, you said something
like this—“ that their affairs were put into order by the gods,
through a love of things beautiful: for that of things ugly
there could be no love.” Did you not say some such thing?
I did say so, answered Agatho.—And you spoke reason-
ably, friend, replied Socrates. Now, if such be the case,
would Love be any thing else than the love of beauty, and
not of ugliness? —He confessed it.—And has it not been
confessed, said Socrates, that a person loves that thing of
which he is in want, and which he does not possess ?—Yes,
said (Agatho).—Love then, (said Socrates,) is in want of, and
does not possess, beauty.—It is so of necessity, said (Agatho).
—What then, (said Socrates,) do you call that beautiful, to
which beauty is wanting, and does not possess it at all?—
Certainly not, (replied Agatho).—Do you then, said Socrates,
still confess that Love is beautiful, if such be the case ?—And
Agatho then said, I seem nearly, Socrates, to know nothing
of what I then asserted—And you have, Agatho, spoken
fairly, said Socrates. But tell me still one little thing. Do
not things good seem to you to be also beautiful ?—They do,
(said Agatho).—If then, (said Socrates,) Love is in want of
S16! Stalbaum, perceiving the evident absurdity of these words, would
render ἀνομολογησώμεθα τὰ εἰρημένα by “de quibus convenit, paucis
repetamus.”” But there is nothing in the Greek to answer to “ paucis,””
nor to ‘‘repetamus,” which last he took from Ficinus—‘* que supra
dicta repetamus.’’ Plato wrote here, as before, in § 25, ἀναλογισώμεθα
κατὰ τὰ εἰρημένα; i, 6. “ let us reason according to what has been said,”
ee ee
“ws
THE BANQUET. 581
things beautiful, and if good things are beautiful, Love will
be in. want of good things likewise.—I am not able, re-
plied (Agatho), to argue against you, Socrates; let then
the case be as you say.— You are not able, my beloved
Agatho, said Socrates, to argue against the truth: for (to
argue) against Socrates is by no means difficult. [27.] And
now here I will leave you. But as regards the discourse
about Love, which I heard for merly from Diotima of Manti-
nea, who was a clever person on these and many other points—
for when the Athenians were making sacrifices on account of the
plague,® she effected its being put off for ten years—she it was
who instructed even me in Love affairs. The speech then which
she spoke I will endeavour to go through before you on the
principles agreed upon by myself and Agatho, (relying) as
well as I can, myself upon myself. It is then, Agatho,
® The MSS. vary between Μαντικῆς and Μαντινικῆς. The former
was found in the one used by Ficinus, as shown by his version “ Fatidica;”’
the latter is quoted by Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xxiv. § 4, and 7. According to
the Scholiast on Aristid. T. p. 468, ed. Dind., she was a priestess of the
temple of Zeus Lyceus in Arcadia ; while Aristides himself, in the speech
against Demosthenes in Maii’s Scriptor. Vet. Collect. t. ii. p. 30, describes
her ἐκ MvXirov: where De Geel in Biblioth. Crit. Nov. t. iv. p. 93,
would read, with the approbation of Stalbaum, Μιλήτου. I conceive, how-
ever, that as the talented Aspasia, who is similarly introduced in the
Menexenus, was the mistress of Pericles, so Diotima was another of the
same profession, and one of the three λαικάστριαι alluded to in Aristoph.
Ach. 529, as being the real cause of the Peloponnesian war, just as
Helen had been of the Trojan. Maximus Tyrius too seems to have had
some such notion; for his words are, εἴτε Μαντινικὴ εἴτε καὶ Λεσβία τις
ἦν. And if such be the fact, it is easy to see, that although the ladies of
Miletus were quite as notorious as those of Lesbos, yet here one may read
in Aristides ἐκ μύλης Tov, “ from the mill of some :’’ for to the tread-mill
in ancient times disorderly females were sent, as they were lately in Eng-
land. Proclus indeed on Republ. p. 420, ranks her amongst the Pytha-
gorzans; and so were many of her sex, for reasons it would not be diffi-
cult to explain. With regard to her name Μαντι-νίκη, there is not, I
suspect, any allusion to Mantinea—for a female of that town would have
been called Mayrivic—but to the circumstance of her having stayed the
plague, and was thus a victor over soothsayers by doing that, which they
could not accomplish ; and as she was thus god-honoured, her name was
properly Διό-τιμα Mavre-virn.
83 The plague alluded to is. the one so graphically described by Thucy-
dides ii. 47 ; while with this feat of Diotima may be compared the one at-
tributed to Empedocles, who, from his supposed power over the winds, was
called Παυσανέμας.
*% This is said, because Socrates used to pretend that he had a bad
memory. was
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532 THE BANQUET.
very meet to declare, first, as you have stated, who Love
is, and of what kind, and then his doings. Now it seems
to me a thing the most easy to go through the subject, as
the stranger went through it, while sifting myself. For
I spoke to her in other words, but on nearly such points
as Agatho just now did to me, (by saying) that Love was a
god of goodness,® and was also (one) of things beautiful.®
But she refuted me with the same arguments as I did this
person (Agatho) ; (by showing) that, according to my own
reasoning, Love was neither beautiful nor good. How say
you, Diotima? said I. Is Love an ugly and an evil being ?—
Will you not speak words of good omen ? she replied; or do
you imagine that every thing which is not beautiful, must of
necessity be ugly ?— Most certainly.—And is every thing that
is not wise, ignorant? Or do you not perceive, there is some-
thing between wisdom and ignorance ?—What is that >—To
think correctly, and without being able to give a reason,
know you not, said she, is neither to know—for how can
knowledge exist without a reason ?—nor yet is it ignorance ;
for how can that which hits the truth be ignorance ?® There
is then some such thing as correct opinion between intelli-
gence and ignorance.”—You say truly, said I.—Do not then
compel what is not beautiful to be ugly ; or what is not good to
be evil. And thus, since you have confessed that Love is
neither good nor beautiful, do not fancy a whit the more that
he is ugly and evil; but something, she said, between those
two.—However, said I, he is acknowledged by all to be a
8 Instead of μέγας θεὸς, Sydenham translated ‘“‘a deity excellent in
goodness,”’ as if he wished to read, ἀγαθὸς θεὺς, which Wolf adopted, to
chime in with the subsequent οὔτε καλὸς,---οὔτε ἀγαθός. Stalbaum, how-
ever, without a shadow of reason, or a particle of taste, still sticks to
peyac.
56. Stalbaum says that τῶν καλῶν depends upon Ἔρως, and that the
sense is “‘ the love of things beautiful.”” But in that case the subsequent
nt καλὸς οὔτε ἀγαθὸς would be perfectly unconnected with what pre-
cedes.
87 Ficinus—“ iisdem,”’ which leads to τοῖς αὐτοις in lieu of τούτοις τοῖς.
* So Aristotle in Ethic. Nicomach. vi. 6, μετὰ λόγου ἡ ἐπιστήμη,
quoted by Sydenham.
® By τοῦ ὄντος is meant, as Sydenham translated, “the truth.”’ Stal-
baum refers to Rep. i. p. 334, E. and Xenoph, Anab. iii. 2, 39.
τὸ Stalbaum refers to Theetet. p. 190, A. Phileb. p. 37, A. Sophist.
p- 263. Rep. v. p. 477, A.; vi. p. 506, C.
THE BANQUET. 533
god of might.—By all who do not know him, said she, or by
those who do likewise ?—By all universally. [28.] And she
said with a smile, How, Socrates, can he be acknowledged a
god of might by those, who say he is no god at all?—-Who are
they ? said I— You yourself, replied she, are one, ané¢ I am
one.—How say you this? I replied.”|—Easily, said she. For
tell me. Say you not that all the gods are blest and beauti-
ful? or would you dare assert that any one of the gods is not
beautiful and blest ?—Not I, indeed, by Zeus, said I.—Say you
not that those who possess things good and beautiful are
happy ?—Certainly.— But you have confessed that, through
the want of things good and beautiful, Love has a desire for
those very things of which he is in want.—I have confessed.
—But how can he be a god, who has no share in things beau-
tiful and good ?—It seems, by no means.—You see then, said
she, that even you do not consider Love as a god.— What
then, said I, is Love a mortal ?—Least of all.—What then ?—
As in the case before mentioned, she replied, between a
mortal and immortal.—What is this, Diotima ?—A great
dzmon,’? Socrates. For the whole demon-kind is between a
god73 and mortal.—What power has it, said 1?—It interprets
for, and transmits to, the gods what is sent from men; and
for and to men what (is sent) from the gods; from men, their
petitions and sacrifices ; from the gods, their commands “and
returns for sacrifices ;74 and being in the middle space be-
tween both (gods and men)” it fills up the whole. So that by
it all have been bound together into one.” Through them
71 ΑΚ εἶπον and ἔφη could not be thus found united, Ficinus has very
opportunely, “‘Quonam pacto me dixisse hoc asseris,’’ which leads to
Kai ἐγὼ εἶπον, Ide τοῦτό μεφάναι λέγεις, in lieu of τοῦτο ἔφην.
7 On the subject of demons, the mass of authors quoted here by Ast
and Stalbaum will give all the information required. According to an
Orphic fragment preserved by Clemens Alexandr, Strom. v. p. 724, it
would seem that the doctrine promulgated by Diotima emanated from the
disciples of the Orphic school.
73 Instead of θεοῦ one would prefer θείου, to answer to θνητοῦ.
74_74 Tn lien of these words Ficinus has “ sacrosque solennes in-
stitutiones et ordinem.’’ But ἀμοιβὰς was found here by Pollux, who, how-
ever, in vi. 187, says that the meaning is uncertain. For ἀμείβεσθαι, as
applied a; the gods, would signify rather ‘‘ to requite evil’’ than “to re-
turn a
775 Such is evidently what the train of thought requires, The Greek
is συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὑτὸ αὑτῷ ξυνδεδέσθαι. But as Ficinus has
‘totum complet, ut universum secum ipso tali vinculo connectatur,”
δ84 THE BANQUET.
proceeds every kind of prophecy, and the priestly art relating
to sacrifices, and initiations and incantations, and the whole
of magic” and sorcery. For a god is not mixed up with man;
but through that (middle nature) is carried on all intercourse
and converse between gods and men,” whether awake or
asleep. Now he who is wise in things of thtis kind is a de-
mon-like man; but he who is wise in any other matter, whe-
ther arts or handicrafts, is an operative merely. But these
demons are many and various, and one of them is Love.—
[29.] But, said 1, from what father or mother is he ?—It is
a rather long story, said she, to tell. However, I will relate it.
When Venus was born®™ the gods had a feast, all the rest,
and likewise Plenty, the son of Planning. And when they
had supped, Poverty came 7 to beg, as there was good cheer”
Orelli, on Isocrat. Mepi ’Avridoo. p. 331, suggested ξυμπληροῖ τὸ πᾶν,
wore αὐτὸ. But Rynders more correctly, τὰ ὅλα ξυμπληροῖ, ὥστε αὐτὸ----
For Proclus, on Alcibiad. i. p. 69, has τὰ τε μέσα τῶν δαιμόνων γένη
ξυμπληροῖ τὰ ba καὶ συνδεῖ, There is, however, still a difficulty in
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ. For the question is not what the Universe can do towards
binding itself with itself, but what the middle demon power can. Hence
Plato wrote, I suspect, ξυμπληροῖ τὰ dda, ὥστε εἰς ἕν πάντα αὐτῷ ξυνδε-
δέσθαι, as I have translated. Stalbaum, however, still sticks to com-
mon text, of which he gives a brief German version. I wish he had ex-
pressed his ideas in a longer Latin note.
7% Instead of μαντείαν, which has been already mentioned, Plato
evidently wrote μαγείαν---καὶ γοητείαν or μαγγανείαν, which is united to
ἐπῳδαὶς in Legg. xi. p. 933, while μαγείαν is found in Alcib. i. p. 122, A,
77 By the aid of Proclus on Parmenides, t. iv. p. 60, ed. Cousin, Heusde
in Specim, Crit. p. 60, wished to supply, after ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἄνθρωποις
πρὸς θεοὺς : for otherwise the gods and not men would be said to be
asleep and awake. The idea is rejected point blank by Ast, nor fully
adopted by Stalbaum.
78 Of the different writers who have alluded to this story, Ast has
given avery full list, both ancient and modern, to which Stalbaum adds
Damascius Tlepi ᾿Αρχῶν, p. 302, ed. Kopp., and Reynders says that it
was turned into verse by D. Heinsius in Monobibl. Eleg. ix.
7779 The Greek is προσαιτήσουσα οἷον δὴ εὐωχίας. Now, though
οἷον δὴ might be used as οἷα δὴ in Menexen. § 2, yet as the object is
wanting after προσαιτήσουσα, Ficinus has ‘‘ mendicatura cibum,” as if
he had found in his MS. CITON, which might have dropt out before
OION. But the word was, I suspect, σκύβαλον. For Suidas has Σκυ-
βαλίζεται----κυρίως δὲ ἀκύβαλον, κυσὶ βαλόν τι ὃν ἢ τὸ ταῖς κυσὶ βαλλό-
μενον" ἐν ᾿Επιγράμματι, (Leonid. Alex. 30.) Οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ δειπνιδίου γευσό-
μενος σκυβάλου. Compare too Phocylid., Μηδ᾽ ἄλλου παρὰ δαιτὸς ἔδοις
σκυβάλισμα τραπέζης. So Ulysses is compared, in Od. xvi. 221, toa
person who is πολλῆς φλιῇῦσι παραστὰς Αἰτίζων ἀκόλους : ἃπὰ 50 too
THE BANQUET. 535
there, and she staid about the door. Just then Plenty, intoxi-
cated with nectar,—for as yet wine was not,—went into the
garden of Zeus, and being drowsy with liquor, fell asleep.
Poverty therefore laid a plot against him, so as to have a
child by Plenty, and placed herself down by him, and became
pregnant with Love. Hence Love has become the follower
of and attendant upon Venus, as having been begotten on
the birth-day of that deity, and being also naturally fond of
the beautiful and of Aphrodité,8° as being beautiful. As
Love then is the son of Plenty and of Poverty, he is in this
state of fortune. In the first place, he is always poor; and
so far from being either tender or fair, as the multitude
fancy, he is rough and dirty, and shoeless, and houseless,
ever stretched on the bare ground, and bedless, and lying
at doors, and in the road under the sky alone; (and) as par-
taking of his mother’s nature, dwelling ever with indigence.
On the other hand, taking after his father, he is a plotter
against the beautiful and good; courageous and bold, and
on the stretch*! (to act); a skilful hunter, for ever weay-
ing some contrivance; * eagerly desirous of intellect, and
G2dipus in Col. 5, is described as Σμικρὸν μὲν ἐξαιτῶν and τοῦ σμικροῦ
ἔτι μεῖον φέρων.
89 As there is nothing to which καὶ τῆς ᾿Αφροδίτης can be referred, it
is evident that Plato wrote zepi τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰ ᾿Αφροδίτης καλῆς οὔσης.
Stalbaum renders, “80 simul natur& sud pulchri amans, quum etiam
Venus pulchra sit:’’ which he got from Ficinus, “ quinetiam natura pul-
chri desiderio capitur, cum Venus ipsa sit pulchra.’” But Love does not
love the beautiful, because Aphrodité is beautiful; but loves the beauti-
ful Aphrodité, because he loves the beautiful.
81 Although Themistius, in Or. xiii. p. 162, D., has σύντονος only, yet
from Olympiodor. in Alcibiad. i. p. 14,ed. Creuzer, πᾶς yap ἔρως σὐντονός"
ἐστι μανία, one might elicit σύντονος ὡς τῇ μανίᾳ. For σύντονος can
hardly stand here by itself. On the madness of love, see my note in Bai-
ley’s Hermesianax, p. 79, to which I could now add much more.
s2—82 1 cannot well understand πλέαων μηχανὰς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐπι-
θυμητὴς καὶ ποριμός. I could have understood πλέκων μηκανὰς φρονή-
σεως, ὡς Προμηθεύς τις, καὶ εἰς ἄπορα πόριμος ὦν" i. 6. “ weaving con-
trivances of intellect, as some Prometheus, and finding a path along the
pathless.”” For so Prometheus is described by Aischylus in v. 59, Δεινὸς
γὰρ εὑρεῖν κἀξ ἀμηχάνων πόρους : where, to the passages already quoted,
I should have added Eurip. Hippol. Fr. 3, "Ev τοῖς ἀμηχάνοισιν εὐπορ-
ὦτατον "Epwra, Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xxvi. p. 309, καὶ τὰ ἄπορα αὐτῷ
(Epwrt) εὐπορώτατα. Theophrast. in Athen. p. 362, F., εὐπόρους "Ev
τοῖς ἀπόροις. Of which the most apposite is Aélian. H. A. iii. 30,
σοφώτατος πλέκειν εὐπόρους ἐξ ἀπόρων μηχανάς. Themistius, however,
has ἐπιθυμητὴν τῆς ἐρωτικῆς, in Or. xiil. p. 163, Β.
536 ξ THE BANQUET.
finding a way for himself ;*? acting the philosopher * through
the whole of life; *a clever sorcerer and a drug-employer, and
sophist ;** and naturally neither an immortal nora mortal; but
at one time in the same day *he blooms and lives, when he
is faring well; and at another time he dies;** but revives
again 86 through his father’s nature. Whatever is furnished
to him, is ever secretly flowing out ; so that Love is never
either in want or in wealth. He is likewise in a middle place
between wisdom and ignorance. For the case is this :—No
god philosophizes, or desires to become wise; for they are so;
and if there is any other being who is wise, neither does he
philosophize. Nor yet are the ignorant philosophers, nor do
they desire to become wise. For on this very account,®? Ignor-
83 Stalbaum, after Jacobs on Achill. Tat. p. 449, refers to Xenoph.
Cyrop. vi. I, 41, τοῦτο πεφιλοσόφηκα μετὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου σοφιστοῦ Tov
Ἔρωτος. Add Chariton. ii. 4, τὴν boxy ἐν ἔρωτι φιλοσοφοῦσαν.
8. 56 Τῇ the words, Δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστῆς, evidently
lies hid an Iambic verse. In. faet, nearly the whole of this iptior
like the greater part of the poetical passages in Plato, has been merely
put into prose from a lost play, I suspect, of Aristophanes. At least it is
easy to elicit the pentastich following: ᾿Ανδρεῖος ὧν ἴτης re σύντονος
τ᾽ ἰὼν Μανία, κύων ὥς, χαρμόνης θήραν ἔπι Πλέκων τ᾽ ἀεὶ τὰς μηχανὰς
φρονήσεως, Ὥς τις Προμηθεὺς, καὶ πόριμος εἰς τάπορ᾽, ὧν Δεινὸς σο-
φιστὴς, καὶ γόης, καὶ φαρμακεύς : where | have introduced θήραν ἔπε from
Themistius, who found in his MS. θηρευτὴς δεινὸς τοῦ κάλλους, as shown
by his μηχανὰς ἐπὶ τῇ θήρᾳ πεπλεγμένας τοῦ κάλλους.
86. -86 The Greek text is θάλλει Kai ζῇ---Ὄν an ὕστερον πρότερον, which
Euripides has correctly avoided in Iph. A. 1226, Zwody re καὶ θάλλου-
cay. It is not, however, quite certain that καὶ (i. 6. ἢ) ζῆ is not a gloss
for θάλλει. At least, Maximus Tyr. in Dissert. xxiv. p. 297, ed. 2 Davis,
has θάλλει μὲν ἔρως εὐπορῶν, ἀποθνήσκει δὲ ἀπορῶν : and thus luckily
supplies ἀπορῶν, which, although requisite for the balance of the sen-
tence, had dropt out before ἀποθνήσκει. If, however, ζῇ is to be retained,
we must, for a similar reason, supply likewise φθίνεε καὶ between
ἀπορῶν and ἀποθνήσκει: for thus ζῇ καὶ θάλλει, bray εὐπορήση, will be
the antithesis to ἀπορῶν φθίνει καὶ ἀποθνήσκει, i. 6. “ when faring ill, he
droops and dies.”’ ,
86 With this passage of Plato may be compared the lines of Pope in the
Rape of the Lock :
When bold Sir Plume had thrown Clarissa down,
Chloe stept in and kill’d him with a frown.
She smiled, to see the doughty hero slain ;
But at her smile the beau revived again.
8’ The Greek is αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν apabia—Where since
αὐτὸ τοῦτο have nothing to depend upon, it is evident that Ar’ has dropt
out after Ac at the end of γενέσθαι, as it has in Thucydides, as shown
by myself in Poppo’s Prolegom. p, 116. The preposition, however, was
“THE BANQUET, 537
ance is in a hard ease, in that a person,** being neither beau-
tiful, nor good, nor wise, still appears to himself to be all-
sufficient. Hence he who fancies himself to be not wanting,
does not desire that, of which he fancies he is not in want.
—Who then, Diotima, said 1, are they who philosophize? if
they are neither the wise nor the ignorant ?—This, said she,
is surely clear even to a child, that they are those between
both of these ; of whom Love too (is one).°° For of the things
most beautiful is wisdom. Now Love is conversant with the
beautiful. So that it is of necessity for Love to be a lover of
wisdom, and for a lover of wisdom to be between the wise and
the ignorant. And of this too the cause is in his birth; for
he is from a father wise and in abundance, but from a mother
unwise and in want. [30.] Such, my dear Socrates, is the
nature of this demon. But as to whom you fancied to be
Love, you have suffered nothing to be wondered at. For you
fancied, as it seems to me, making a guess from what you are
saying, that Love is the thing loved, and not the loving; and
hence, I think, Love appeared to you to be all-beautiful.
For the thing loved is in reality beautiful and delicate and
perfect and blest. But the thing loving possesses another na-
ture, and such as I have described.—Be it so, stranger lady,
said I; for you have spoken well. But if Love be of such a
nature, of what advantage is he to mankind ?—This, Socrates,
said she, I will subsequently endeavour to teach you. Love
then is of such a nature, and has been-so begotten; and he
is, as you assert, the love of things beautiful. Now should
any one ask us, What is, O Socrates and Diotima, the Love
of things beautiful ?—but I will speak more clearly in this
way—What does the lover of things beautiful long for 2—
For them to be his, said I.—This answer, said she, seeks still
wanting in the MS. used by Proclus, who quotes αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ
διπλῆ (thus) ἀμαθία. Ficinus has “hoc enim habet ignorantia ‘pessi-
mum,” as if he had found in his MS. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν τῇ
ἀμαθίᾳ, where ἀμαθίᾳ, first proposed by Sydenham, is furnished by
two MSS.
88. To preserve the syntax Ast correctly saw that τινὰ, which might
easily have dropt out after ὄντα, is here required.
89 The Greek was ὧν ἂν «ai ὁ ἔρως. Bekker, whom Hommel and
’ Stalbaum follow, has edited αὖ, from two MSS. But Riickert correctly
objects to αὖ, as being perfectly absurd. Plato wrote, I suspect, ὧν sle—
Ficinus has “ e quibus est Amor,” omitting both ἂν and cai—
538 THE BANQUET.
such a question as this. What will there be to that man, who
shall possess things beautiful ?—To this question I said, I had
it not in my power to give an answer very ready at hand.—
But, said she, should a person making a change, and putting
good in the place of beautiful, inquire of you (by saying),
Come (tell me), Socrates, what does the lover of good things
long for?—For them to be his, I answered.—And what will
there be to a man, who shall possess good things ?—This, said
I, is more easy to answer: that he will be happy.—(Right,)
said she; for by the possession of good things the happy are
happy, nor is there any need to ask, Why does he, who wishes
to be happy, wish so; but the answer appears to be conclu-
sive.-—You say true, I replied—Now do you conceive, said
she, that this wishing and this longing is common to all men,
and that all wish for good things to be in their possession
always; or how say you?—lI think in this way, said 1; that
it is common to all.—Why then, Socrates, said she, do we
not say that all men are in love, if all love the same things,
and always? but say (rather),* that some are in love, and
some are not ?—I too®! am in a wonderment, said L—Do not
wonder, said she; *for after we have taken away a certain
species of love, we call it love, adding the name of the whole ;
but as regards the rest, we make an improper use of other
names.°2—As how, for example? said I.—As this, said she.
You know that creation is a thing of extensive meaning. For
that which is the cause of any thing coming out of non-existence
into existence, is altogether a creation. So that all the oper-
ations effected by all the arts, are creations; and all the
workers of them are creators.—You say true, said I—And
yet you know, continued she, they are not called creators, but
have other names; but from all kinds of creation one portion
has been separated, relating to the musical art and to metres ;
% After ἀλλὰ I suspect that μᾶλλον has dropt out, for thus ἀλλὰ μᾶλ..
λον are constantly opposed to τί od —
% This “too” has no meaning here.
%_% Such is the literal version of the Greek, with which may be com-
pared κατὰ ἕν τι εἶδος ἰόντες τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα ἴσχουσιν in§3l Shel-
ley’s translation is—‘‘ W onder not, said Diotima; for we select a particular
species of love, and apply to it distinctively the appellation of that which
is universal.”” But he omits the next clause, although found in Ficinus. ~
For he probably saw the want of connexion in the train of thought. There
is some error here, which I could without much difficulty correct.
ee ie i ... ..
THE BANQUET. 539
and is called by the name belonging to the whole. “For it
alone is called poesy (i. 6. making) ;°* and they, who possess
this portion of the creative power, are poets (i. 6. makers) :—
You say true, said .—[31.] Just so it is with Love, said she.
Universally all long after good things ; and a state of good
fortune is to every one a Love “the greatest and deceitful.%
But some persons, turning themselves towards him 35 in many
and various ways,” either through money-making, or a love
of gymnastic exercises, or of wisdom, are neither (said) to be
in love nor are called lovers; while others who ὅσο, and
are seriously occupied,® according to one kind of love, have
the name of the whole, and love, and are (said) to be in
love, and are called lovers—You are very near the truth,
said I—®*’ There is a story told, she said, that they who are
in love are in search of their other half.97 But my doctrine
is, that a person loves neither the half nor the whole of
% The word ‘‘ make ’’ was adopted by Spenser in the sense of ‘‘ making
verses,’ to answer to the Greek ποιεῖν in the hackneyed quotation, ‘* Who
taught me as I can to make.”
%_% How the universal longing after happiness could be called “ de-
ceitful,’’ except in a religious point of view, one cannot understand ; unless
indeed it be said that Plato was here thinking, not of Love, but Hope, which
is called ‘‘ credula’’ by Horace; and that, since Hope is the daughter of
Desire, what is true of the offspring may be predicated of the parent, just
as we say conversely in English, ‘‘ Like father like son,” and was said in
Greece, ἐοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσιν. But even thus Plato would scarcely have
united μέγιστος and δολερός. Hence Stalbaum now wishes to read δολε-
pwraroc : although he once considered the whole clause, ὁ μέγιστός τε καὶ
δολερὸς Ἔρως πάντι, as an interpolation. There has been rather an ex-
cision of some words and an alteration of others, which only a dashing
conjecturist would attempt to restore. Creuzer ina Vienna periodical
would read, ὁρμητικός τε kai τολμηρὸς ἔρως παντί. Hommel—kai κοινὸς
—Shelley translates ‘‘ the greatest and subtlest ;’’ for he perhaps remem-
bered some of the passages quoted by myself on Aisch. Suppl. 1035, where
the epithet of deceitful is applied to Love and Venus.
%_95 These words are omitted by Ficinus. The phrase however is in
p. 178, A. § 6, and in Menex. p. 237, C., πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἄλλη, and so
it should be written here.
%_96 Ficinus has simply “ contendunt,”’ as if his MS. omitted ἐσπου-
δακότες. Plato wrote καὶ ἐσπουδακότες ἐρωτικὰ, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα
ἔχουσι: where ἔχουσι is due to three MSS. and ἐρωτικὰ is substituted for
ἔρωτά τε, which, as shown by the balance of the sentence, could not
precede καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐρασταί, nor could ἐσπουδακότες dispense with its
. Object; and still less could ἔρωτά τε follow τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα.
97. 97] Hence it appears that the speech of Aristophanes was founded
on some old story. See § 16.
δ40 THE BANQUET.
any thing, unless it happens, my friend, to be somehow a good.
Since men are willing to have their feet and hands eut off, if
their own limbs are deemed to be an evil.8 For each person
does not hug his own, I faney, unless he calls good his own
property,** but evil the property of another: since there is
nothing else of which men are in love, but good alone. How
do they seem to you?—By Zeus, said I, to me at least not
(otherwise).—May we not then say simply, she replied, that
men love the good ?—Yes, said L—What, said she, must we
not add that they desire the good to be present to them ?—
This, said I, must be added.—And not only, she said, to be
present, but to be present always ?—This too must be added.—
There is then, to speak comprehensively, said she, the desire that
the good should be present to a person for ever.—You speak
most truly, said I.—Since then, said she, there is the love of this,
(the good, ) of those who pursue it in any manner,!” and by any
act, the eagerness and the stretch for it would be called love.
‘But can you state what this act would happen to be?!—I
should not however? have wondered, Diotima, said I, at your
wisdom, nor have frequented (your school) to learn these very
things, (had I been able to tell.) —Well then, said she, I will
tell you. The act is of breeding upon a beautiful thing, as
% So Christ said, ‘‘ If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off.”
39. I cannot understand οἰκεῖον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ. The words καὶ (i. 6. ἢ)
ἑαυτοῦ are from a gl., as shown by the balance of the sentence, where
ἀλλότριον alone is opposed to οἰκεῖον. Of this Shelley was
aware; and he has therefore filled out the idea by his version, “‘Nor de
they cherish and embrace that, which may belong to themselves, merely
because it is their own; unless indeed any one should choose to say, that
what is good is attached to his own nature and is his own, while that
which is evil is foreign and accidental.”
100 Although I am aware that a double interrogative is to be found oc-
casionally in Plato, as Heindorf was the first to remark on Hipp. Maj.
ᾧ 40, yet there I have taken ru and rim in an indefinite sense, it
even the collocation of the pronouns, which ought to follow rather
precede the nouns τρόπον and πράξει. Diotima did not intend to ask a
question, but to state a fact, the groundwork of the subsequent questions.
1—1! I confess I cannot understand the words ri τοῦτο τυγχάνει τὸ
ἔργον. I could have understood ri ταῦτα κιγχάνοι dy τὸ ἔργον, i 6. At
what act would these (eagerness and stretching) arrive ?
2 The Greek is, Ob μέντοι ἂν---ἐθαύμαζον, without the apodosis to the
sentence. But in that case γὰρ is used, not μέντοι: which means “ how-
ever,”’ a meaning here totally out of place. Plato wrote Οὐ γὰρ μὰ τὸν,
without the name of a deity. See Matth. Gr. Gr. § 281, 2.
a a a 2
THE BANQUET. 541
regards both the body and soul.—What you are saying, I re-
plied, has need of divination. For I do not understand.—I,
will speak then, said she, more clearly. All human beings, So-
crates, said she, yearn, as regards the body and soul ; and when
they arrive at maturity our nature longs to beget. But it is
unable to beget upon an ugly thing, but only upon a beautiful
one. *%¥or the begetting is through the connexion of a man
and woman.* But this is a god-like act, and this [the yearning
-and generation |* is in a mortal animal an immortal act. But
these it is impossible to take place in a thing unsuitable. Now
what is ugly is ill-suited to every thing that is divine ? But what
is beautiful is suited. °For Beauty is Fate and Eileithuia, who
presides over child-birth.’ Hence when what is yearning comes
close to what is beautiful, it becomes joyous, and being de-
lighted it pours itself out and breeds and begets.® But when
3—% The words between the numerals are rejected by Ast and Rickert.
Stalbaum defends them by scarcely the shadow of.an argument. For he
did not perceive that Plato wrote τίκτειν---οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ καλῷ" ἡ
yap ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συνουσία ἄτοκός ἐστι νοῦ, i, 6. for the inter-
course between a man and woman is unproductive of mind. Ina similar
strain the philosopher says in Rep. vi. p. 496, A., that οἱ ἀνάξιοι παιδεύ-
σεως are unable γεννᾷν διανοήματα: but in p. 490, B., that ὁ φιλομαθὴς
—pyeic τῷ ὄντι ὄντως is able γεννᾷν νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν,
4_* The words within brackets are evidently an explanation of τοῦτο.
5—5 How Beauty can be Fate and the goddess who presides over
child-birth, called Εἰλείθυια, one of the titles of Athené, as we learn from |
Eurip. Ion, Stalbaum attempts to explain in a way I cannot under-
stand. I suspect that instead of the unintelligible Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ ἙΕἰλεί-
θυια ἡ καλλόνη ἐστὶ τῇ γενέσει, Plato wrote the very intelligible Μοῖρα
οὖν καὶ Εἰλείθυια καὶ Καλλόνη τρεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει εἰσί, i.e. “ Fate then,
and Hileithuia, and Beauty, are three powers that preside over gener-
ation.” For thus τρεῖς is perpetually introduced, where three things are
mentioned, as I have shown in the Transactions of the Royal Society of
Literature, where I have supported the reading furnished by Stobeus,
liy. p. 364, in Thucydides v. 9, Νομίσατε rpia εἶναι τοῦ καλῶς πολεμεῖν,
and acknowledged by the Scholiast, ἐκ τριῶν γίνεται τὸ καλλῶς πολεμεῖν,
by quoting fifty similar passages, and I could now add half as many
more.
6_8 The Greek is τίκτει re καὶ γεννᾶ. But as in the corresponding
clause there is only one verb, γεννᾷ, it is evident that Plato did not write
here two with the same meaning. He might however have written here
τίκτει τέκνα γενναῖα, and afterwards οὐδ᾽ ἕν γεννᾶ. For thus οὐδ᾽ ἕν is
properly opposed to the plural τέκνα. It is true that τῆς γεννήσεως and
Tov τόκου are found united just below. But there καὶ τοῦ τόκου is an
evident interpolation, as shown by the subsequent conversation, which
turns entirely upon the mention of γέννησις alone. So in ᾧ 33, τέκτει re
καὶ γεννᾷ is to be twice corrected similarly.
δ42 THE BANQUET.
it (comes close) to what is ugly, it assumes a sour look, and is
vexed ‘and coils itself up, and turns away, and unrolls itself,’
and does not beget, but restraining the swelling, it takes the
matter grievously to heart. Hence tothe party yearning and
swelling with desire, there is an excessive fluttering of mind
respecting the beautiful; on account of its being able to de-
liver him who has it from his great agony. But, Socrates,
said she, this is not, as you fancied, the love of the beautiful —
Of °what then is it? said I.—It is the love, replied she, of ge-
neration [and of begetting]!° in a beautiful thing.—Be it so,
said I.—By all means, she replied.—But why, said I, of gener-
ation ?—!! Because generation is a thing ever producing, and
immortal, as far as it can be for a mortal. ᾿Ξ Now from what has
been agreed upon it is necessary to desire immortality with
a good, if there is to Love the desire of the good being ever
present to himself. It is necessary then from this reasoning,
that there is a love likewise of immortality.!?
[32.] All this did Diotima teach me, when she was dis-
coursing upon love matters. And once upon a time she asked
me, What do you imagine, Socrates, to be the cause of that
‘love and desire? Do you not perceive how vehemently all
brute animals are affected, when they feel such a desire to
breed, both beasts and birds? '%how they are all sick and lov-
ingly disposed,!* in the first place, to have a connexion with
. ‘— As the idea in συσπειρᾶται is the converse of that in ἀνείλλεται,
both could not have been thus applied to the same thing at the same time.
Moreover ἀποτρέπεται should follow σκυθρωπὸν and λυπούμενον. Plato
wrote, I suspect, ἀποτρέπεται kai, ὃ συνεσπείραται, ἀνείλλεται, i.e. “and
that, which had coiled itself up, is unrolled.” ‘The idea is taken from a
snake, which, previous to making an attack, coils itself up; but when
frightened, unfolds itself, and slinks away. It was not then without
reason that two MSS. offer συνσπείρεται.
5.1 cannot understand τὸν ἔχοντα. I could have understood τὸν éy-
γιοῦντα, “about to approach it,” similar to the preceding προσπελάζῃ.
® Instead of ri μὴν, which Stalbaum attempts to defend by passages
not in point, Stephens suggested τίνος, from “ cujus”’ in Ficinus; for the
genitive is required by the preceding remark, and subsequent reply of
Diotima.
4% See at n. 2.
1 Ficinus, “ Quia Amor sempiternum quiddam est et immortale, quem-
admodum in ipso mortali generatio,” as if he had found in his MS.
Ort ἀειγενές ἐστι τι καὶ ἀθάνατον Ἔρως, ὡς καὶ ἐν θνητῷ ἡ γέννησις,
at least ἐν is read in two MSS.
—12 T must leave for others to perceive the connexion of the reasoning
in all the words between the numerals. ‘* Davus sum non C&dipus.”
8—I8 Ficinus has ‘toto impetu proferuntur et amoris ardore insa-
THE BANQUET. 543
each other; and afterwards to rear their offspring ; and how
ready in their behalf the weakest are to fight against the
strongest, and to die for them, and though they are themselves
pining away with hunger, they do not faint in doing every
thing, so as to bring them ἀρ. Human beings indeed, she
said, one might fancy, acted thus from reflection, but what
reason is there for wild animals to be so lovingly disposed.
Can you state ?—And I said again that I did not know.—And
do you think, said she, ever to become a person of power in
questions of love, if you do not understand this ?—It is for
this very reason, said I, Diotima, as I just now stated, that I
come to you, being well aware that I have need of teachers.
Do you then tell me the cause both of this and of all the rest
relating to questions of love.—If you believe then, said she,
that there is naturally the love of that, which we have often con-
fessed, do not wonder. For here, on the same ground as that, the
mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be ever and immortal.!°
niunt,” which isinfinitely more graphic than the lifeless Greek—voootvra
‘Te πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα : where διατιθέμενα is most inelegantly
repeated after διατίθεται in the preceding sentence. The passage has
evidently been tampered with.
414 The Greek is, wor’ ἐκεῖνα ἐκ τρέφειν καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ποιοῦντα, i, 6.
“80 as to bring them up, and are doing every thingelse—’? But in the
formula πᾶν ποιεῖν the word ἄλλο never is, nor could be found. Hence
in lieu of καὶ ἄλλο, Plato wrote either, as I have translated, οὐκ ἀλύει, a
verb peculiarly appropriate here, as may be seen in my note on Philoct.
174, where I should have quoted Perizonius on #lian. V. H. ix. 5, and
Wyttenbach’s on Plutarch. de Audiend. Poet. c. v.; or since the neuter
plural ζῶα, signifying a thing of life, would require a verb plural ἀλύουσι,
we may read αἰκάλλει τι, i. 6. “a certain feeling cheats them into the
doing every thing so as to bring up their young.” For thus we find in
Aristoph. Thesm. 870, ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἥπερ αἰκάλλει τι καρδίαν ἐμὴν, Μὴ ψευστὸν
ᾧ Ζεῦ, τῆσδε ποήσῃς μ᾽ ἔλπίδος. For by the slight change of Ψεῦσον into
Ψευστὸν, and of τῆς ἐπιούσης into τῆσδε ποήσῃς μ᾽, we get rid of all the
rubbish heaped up by the Scholiasts, who did not know that Sophocles
wrote likewise in Peleus, Μὴ ψευστὸν, ὦ Ζεῦ, μή μ᾽ Eye ἄνευ δορός, not Μὴ
ψεῦσον, in defiance of the language. In the passage of Plato, however,
there is, I suspect, an error in παρατεινόμενα. For the effect of hunger
is to contract, not extend, the muscles of the body. In fact, raparsive-
σθαι is applied rather to the fulness than emptiness of the stomach, as
shown by “Αλις ἀφύης" παρατέταμαι γὰρ ἐσθίων, quoted from Aristophanes
by Suid. in Maparérapac: ἐξώγκωμαι. One would have expected rather
λιμῷ ἀπορίᾳ τε τειρόμενα, 1. 6. “ wasted with hunger and with want.”
Ficinus has, ‘“‘ parata sunt fame deficere, modo filios nutriant, et aliud
quodlibet audacter aggrediuntur.”’
15 In what way ἀεὶ εἶναι differs from ἀθάνατος, I must leave for others
544 THE BANQUET.
Now this it effects only by generation ; when it leaves another
new thing in the place of the old; since at the time when each
individual animal 1615 said to live, and to be the same ;!° as for
instance, a person is called the same from childhood, until ‘he
becomes an old man; and though he never possesses the same
things in himself, he is nevertheless called the same person,
1Tbeing perpetually altered, (by obtaining some new things,)
and losing (the old),'? as regards the hair and flesh, and bones
and blood, and the whole body. And not only as regards the
body, but the soul likewise; his manners, morals, opinions, de-
sires, pleasures, pains, fears, all these never remain the same
to any man; but some are produced, and some destroyed.
And there is something still more strange than this; since not
only are some sciences produced, and some lost by us, but we
are never the same, not even as regards sciences in general ;
but each single science suffers in a similar way. For what
we call to practise oneself is to act, as if a science were about
to depart; and indeed oblivion is the departure of science ;
but practice, introducing again a fresh remembrance in the
place of the departing one, preserves the science, so that it
seems to be the same. In this manner every thing mortal is
preserved, not by its being in every respect the same forever, .
to explain. Nor just before do I see how ἐνταῦθα, an adverb of time or
place, can be opposed to ἐκείνῳ, a pronoun relating to a thing or
Hence, since nearly all the MSS. read τὸ εἶναι, perhaps Plato wrote ἀειγενές
τι εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατον, as just before in § 31, “ἐειγενές---καὶ ἀθάνατον:
where, to avoid the tautology, I have rendered devyevic “ ever prod: »
--16 Such is the barefaced nonsense, which Stalbaum believes Plato
wrote, only because he was determined to reject the certain emendation
of Hommel—which he has chosen to pass over with a sneer—év ᾧ ζῆν
καλεῖται, καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸς For Hommel knew, what Stalbaum
did not, that «ai is thus added after a repeated word, as I have shown in
Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 155, 258, and 307, and to the passages meronueias
I could now add full thirty more. “They however, who are disposed to
believe that Plato, whose language is generally as clear as crystal, would
render his meaning muddy by an unusual construction, will of course re-
ceive Stalbaum’s note as a god-send.
17 Tn lieu of ἀλλὰ νεός αεὶ γιγνόμενος, Stephens was near the
mark in proposing ἀλλοῖος ἀεὶ γενόμενος. He should have suggested
ἀλλοιούμενος dei—So too instead of supplying τὰ μὲν προσλαμ ἄνων,
to answer to τὰ δὲ ἀπολλὺς, F. Wolf should have elicited τὰ μὲν νέ
ἀρνύμενος from γιγνόμενος ; while by the aid of Ficinus’ “ et vetera
exuit,” Bast happily restored τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ ἀπολλὺς. The word
γιγνόμενος is evidently owing to the subsequent τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ
ἀπόλλυται.
να ee συ.
THE BANQUET. 545
as the deity is; but by the thing that is departing and grow-
ing old, leaving another new thing, such as it was itself. By
this contrivance, Socrates, said she, that which is mortal par-
takes of immortality, both body and all other things. ‘But
that which is immortal in another way.!® Do not then wonder
that every thing!’ honours its own offspring. For this
earnest attention and love follows” every thing for the sake
of immortality.—[33.] 2! And I on hearing the discourse was
amazed and said,*! Be this so, said 1,22 thou most wise Dio-
tima; since such is truly the case. And she, like the perfect 33
sophists, replied, Rest assured,”* Socrates. Since, if you are
willing to turn your eyes-to the love of glory in mankind,
you would wonder at your want of reason touching the points
on which I have spoken, unless you bear in mind and consider
how terribly they are affected* with the desire to become
renowned,
—18 This, says Stalbaum, is added to limit the universality of the as-
- sertion, “ and all other things.” But surely Plato would never have pre-
sumed to hint at the manner in which animmortal thing is preserved and
perpetuated, even if he wanted the wit to perceive that what is immortal
would never require any preserving process. To avoid therefore the
absurdity, which Stalbaum has admitted into his 2nd edition, although
properly rejected in his first, Creuzer in Lect. Platonic, at the end of his
edition of Plotinus de Pulchritud. p- 528, would read ἀδύνατον, which
Ast and Rynders have adopted; for they did not see that Plato wrote
ἀθέμιτον δὲ ἄλλῳ, i. 6. but unlawful in any other way.””
12 The word πᾶν here, and shortly afterwards παντὶ, could hardly
stand without ζῶον or θνητὸν ---
2 Ficinus has ‘‘ amor inest,”’ which leads to ἔπεστι. The two words
are interchanged in Cratylus, § 10.
2121 The words between the numerals are omitted by Sydenham, al-
though found in the version of Ficinus.
= Others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote εἶπον, rps ha
δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ὦ ὦ σοφωτάτη, when he might have written εἶπον, Elev, νὴ Δί᾽,
γύναι σοφωτάτη.
23 Stalbaum says, that in ot τέλεοι σοφισταὶ there is a covert ridicule
of the Sophists. But as Diotima was only a solitary person, she could
hardly be compared to many sophists. Plato wrote either γελοῖός τις
σοφιστὴς, or ὁ ἀπ᾽ ᾿Ελέας σοφιστὴς, as in the Sophist, § 1, ἐξ ᾿Ελέας ---
φιλόσοφον.
2 As there is nothing to which the expression * rest assured ”? ean be
applied, Plato probably wrote Rai, ἡ δ᾽ ἣ---ἶὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔφης εὖ, Σώκρατες,
instead of Καὶ ἡ,--- Εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, O—
% Although δεινῶς διάκεινται might perhaps stand, yet δεινῶς διακαί-
ovrat, “ terribly inflamed,”’ would τῇ far more forcible.
N
δ46 THE BANQUET.
2 And fame undying to lay up for ever.
And for this they are ready to run the risk of all kinds of
danger, even still more than for their children, and to ex-
pend their substance, and undergo labours of whatsoever kind,
and for it to die. Since do you fancy, said she, that Alcestis
would have died for Admetus, or Achilles?” have died over
the body of Patroclus, or your countryman Codrus to pre-
serve the kingdom for his children,* had they not thought
that of their virtuous deeds the remembrance would never-
dying live, as it actually does for ever, which we cherish to
this day ?*°—* Far from it, said 1, But I think, that in be-
half of undying virtue, and of a reputation glorious*! as this,
all men perform all deeds, and so much the more, as they are
the more excellent.*° For they have a yearning for immor-
tality. —They then, said she, who have a yearning according
to the body, turn themselves rather to women, and are in this
way given to love affairs; and by child-getting procure for
themselves, as they fancy, immortality and a remembrance
36... 926 As the Greek words Kai κλέος ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἀθάνατον
καταθέσθαι contain a latent hexameter, I have put the translation into
verse. On the peculiar use of καταθέσθαι, see Valckenaer on Herodot.
vi. 73.
7 The example of Achilles in dying for glory, is brought forward by
Aristotle in his well-known hymn to Glory, of which I gave a translation
in the Gentleman’s Magazine, June, 1833, p. 538.
*8 Horace assigns a more noble motive in his ‘‘Codrus pro patria non
timidus mori.”
2729 Here again are some latent hexameters, portions of which Hom-
mel was the first to detect; but he did not perceive that Plato had in
mind a distich on Codrus—Quero γὰρ περὶ οὗ τεθνηκότος αἰὲν ἔσεσθαι
᾿Αθάνατον μνήμης ἀρετῆς, ἣν ἴσχομεν ἡμεῖς.
3030 All the words between the numerals are assigned correctly to
Socrates by Ficinus, who saw probably that οἶμαι could not be said. by
Diotima, who would have spoken with more decision, as became an in-
structress. Ficinus, however, omits ἔφη, and so does another MS., for
Plato wrote ἔφην. We find indeed οἶμαι twice a little below, but incor-
rectly in both places.
31 The Greek is τοιαύτης δόξης εὐκλεοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιοῦσιν.
But εὐκλεοῦς is perfectly useless after τοσαύτης. Moreover it should be
stated not that men do all things, some of which might be base in them-
selves, but only such as are honourable. Hence for εὐκλεοῦς, three MSS.
fortunately read εὐκλεῶς, which leads to εὖ καὶ καλῶς, a formula perpetual
in Plato. See the critics quoted by myself on Prom. 1067. Addend.
THE BANQUET. 547
and happiness for the time to come.*? 33 But they (who have
a yearning) according to the soul—Are there then, said I,
they who yearn in their souls?—Still more (said she) than
in their bodies; for which it is fitting for the soul to yearn
and to bring forth. What fitting (offspring) is this? In-
tellect and every other excellence.** Of which all poets are
the generators, and such handy-craftsmen as are said to be in-
ventive. But the greatest and most beautiful part of intellect
is that, which is conversant in the well-ordering of cities and
private dwellings, to which is given the name of temperance
and justice. With these when any one is teeming “from his
youth, as being divine in his soul, and when he has arrived
at a mature age,*4 he longs already *to beget and breed ;*
36 and he seeks, I think, even he,** going about, for the beau-
tiful thing, upon which he may generate: for he never will
generate on what is ugly; and thus yearning, he takes to his
arms handsome bodies rather than the ugly ; but if he meets
with a soul beautiful and noble, and finely moulded, he ardent-
ly embraces both united ; and to such a person he immediately
discourses copiously on virtue, and what a virtuous man ought
to be, and what pursuits he should follow; and he endeavours
82 In the words Εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρνόον πάντα ποριζόμενος is an evi-
dent pentameter, probably accidental.
3383 ΑἹ] the words between the numerals are commonly assigned to
Diotima; and the whole chain of the conversation is so broken, as to
defy even the critical powers of Stalbaum to unite the links. For neither
he nor any one else has seen that Plato wrote ἔφην, ἡ δ᾽ ἡ, ἢ and τίκτειν,
not ἔφη, ἢ and Kvecyv—for κύειν could not thus follow κυῆσαι, despite the
nice distinction of Stalbaum between κυῆσαι, “to have a completed
conception,” and κύειν, ‘ to be in the state of a conception.” But the
very clever critic forgot that the idea of a completed act would be ex-
pressed by κεκυηκέναι, not κυῆσαι.
%4_* Ficinus has, ‘‘ideoque divinus «tate debita imminente,” as if
his MS. had omitted ἐκ véov: and just before, from his “ hujusmodi
natura,” Fischer elicited φύσιν for Yvx7v—Plato probably wrote both—
Thy τε φύσιν Kai τὴν ψυχὴν θεῖος ὧν---
3585 Here, as in § 31, where the same phrase occurs, I would read
τίκτειν τέκνα γενναῖα, instead of τίκτειν τε καὶ γεννᾷν, and so too a little
rwards.
%_% The Greek is ζητεῖ δὴ, οἶμαι, καὶ οὗτος περιιὼν τὸ καλὸν---ΕἸ-
cinus has “ Et idcirco passim vagatur queruntque pulchrum,”’ omitting
οἶμαι, which is ill-suited to the magisterial Diotima, and καὶ, which has
no meaning here. Plato wrote, I suspect, ζητεῖ δὲ, δαιμονικώτατος περι-
wy, or ζητεῖ δὲ, ὧν μανικώτατος.
2n 2
548 THE BANQUET.
himself to act the teacher; for laying hold, I think,®’ of a
beautiful thing, and associating with it, he breeds and begets
that, with which he has been yearning of old, and has both
- present and absent borne in recollection; and in common
with the other party, he brings up what has been produced;
so that such persons have a communion of feeling towards
each other much greater than what arises from (other)** chil-
dren, and a friendship more firm; inasmuch as they have a
joint interest in children more lovely and more immortal.*9
Now every one would choose that such children should be
born to him rather than those of a human kind. And turn-
ing his thoughts to Homer, Hesiod, and the rest of the excel-
lent poets, he would envy“ them for having left such an issue
of their own, as to obtain for them an undying glory and re-
membrance. Or, if you prefer it, said she, (see) what chil-
dren Lycurgus left behind him at Lacedzemon, the saviours
of their country,*! and, so to say, of the whole * of Greece.
Amongst yourselves, too, how honoured is Solon, for his be-
getting the laws! and there are many * other men elsewhere
and in many places amongst both the Greeks and Barbarians,
who have shown forth many and noble deeds, and begotten
every kind of virtue. And to them many holy rites** have
ὅ: Ficinus again omits οἶμαι. Plato probably wrote γὰρ ἐρωμανὴς, a
word elsewhere corrupted, as I have shown in Bailey’s Hermesianax, p.
79, and to the passages quoted there I could now add as many more,
%8 Ficinus has “quam mortalium filiorum parentes,” which probably
led Bast to τῆς τῶν παιδοσπόρων---Τἴ the Latin of Ficimus be a truthful
version, he must have found τῆς τῶν θνητῶν παίδων roxtwy. But per-
haps ἄλλων merely has dropt out before παίδων.
39 This “‘more immortal’? seems a rather strange expression. As if
there were degrees in immortality. One would have expected rather
‘less mortal.”
Ast correctly suggested ζηλοίη for ζηλῶν, which Stalbaum vainly
attempts to defend.
“1 Instead of τῆς Λακεδαίμονος Plato wrote τῆς γῆς, of which Λακεδαί-
povog is the interpretation.
# The Greek is ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Ficinus has “ totius
pene Grecie,”’ which leads to καὶ πάσης, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῆς Ἑλλάδος.
For ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν could not thus stand by itself, as I have shown in
Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 218, and I could now add twice as much to what
I have there written.
43 Ficinus—“ aliique permulti alibi.” He therefore found in his MSS.
καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ἄλλοθι. -
“4 For ἃ list of mortals worshipped as gods Ast refers to Clemens Alex-
THE BANQUET. 549
been paid on account of such their progeny; but never to
any man on account of his human offspring. [34.] In such
mysteries relating to Love even you, Socrates, would perhaps
be initiated. But the consummation,“ on account of which
the looking-on itself exists, if a person follows the rites cor-
rectly, “7I know well you would not complete.*? However,
andr. Strom. i. 15, and he might have added the same Father’s Cohort. p.
24, Athenagoras Legat. p. 2 and 53, ed. Ox., and Theodoret, p. 42.
* This was said designedly by Plato, who knew that Socrates was
never initiated and never wished to be; while to rescue the character of
Diotima from being a false prophetess, the “‘ perhaps”? was introduced.
“© To understand this allusion to the Mysteries, Sydenham says
that, previous to a person being perfectly initiated, three degrees were
to be taken, answering, he might have observed, to the three degrees
at the University and in Freemasonry, both to be traced to a common
origin in the Mysteries. The first degree was called ‘“ purgation,” the
second “ illumination,” and the third “a looking-on.” The consummation
however did not take place until five years after the initiation. Agreeable
to this gradation Diotima initiates Socrates into the mysteries of Love;
where her confutation of his pretended former notions, but, in reality, of
the preceding speeches in this Dialogue, answers to the first step, ‘‘ pur-
gation.”” Her instructions as to the true doctrine of Love answer to the
second step, “illumination.” And the remainder of her discourse alludes
to the last step, “‘a looking-on.”” But Sydenham seems to have forgotten
that, as the initiation was not completed until the Neophyte had become
an ᾽᾿Επόπτης, “a looker-on,”’ Plato could not have written τὰ δὲ τέλεια
καὶ ἐποπτικὰ : and still less did Stalbaum perceive that the words ὧν ἕνεκα
καὶ ταῦτα could not have reference to what had been already said; for
from the passage quoted by himself from § 35, θεώμενος---πρὸς τέλος
ἤδη ἰὼν, it is evident that Plato wrote τὰ δὲ τέλεια, ὧν ἕνεκά ye αὐτὰ τὰ
ἐποπτικά ἐστιν : and so I have translated; for we thus get at the natural
meaning of simple words, out of which Ficinus has made this high-
flown sense—‘“‘ Utrum vero ulterius procedas ac perfecta demum amatoria,
queve sublime spectant, quorum gratia hec sunt, animadvertas utrum
inquam pergere valeas necne, ignoro.”’ According to the Scholiast on
Aristoph. Barp. 744, in the Mysteries, the Neophyte was called in the first
year, Méorne; in the second, Ἔφορος ; and in the third, Ἐπόπτης. But
as Ἔφορος and ᾿Επόπτης are synonymous, we must read Keprvogépoc, as
is evident from Clemens Alex. Cohort. c. ii. 15. For κέρκνος is the name
of a hawk or cock, and was the symbol of certain rites practised in the
Mysteries, as may be inferred from a line in Aristophanes.
4747 The Greek is, οὐκ οἵδ᾽ εἰ οἷός τ᾽ ἂν εἴης. But εἰ ἂν εἴης is the
extreme of barbarism. The particles εἰ dy are never united in prose;
and if they could be, they would be followed by a subjunctive, as being
synonymous with ἐάν. Granting, however, the syntax to be correct, the
sense is none. Stalbaum, indeed, would supply μυηθῆναι after οἷός τ᾽ ἂν
εἴης. How much easier is it to read, οὐκ, οἶδ᾽ εὖ, οἷός τ᾿ ἂν ἁνύσαι: as I
have translated.
— 650 THE BANQUET.
said she, I will tell you, and not be wanting in a readiness
(to instruct you). But do you endeavour to follow me, as
long as you are able. He then, said she, who would rightly
arrive at this consummation, must begin when young to direct
his steps to forms that are beautiful. And if, in the first
place, his leader conducts him rightly, he must feel a love for
one of them, and there beget conversations full of beauty.
In the next place, he must have a due perception that the
beauty, which exists in any form whatever, is the brother to
that which is in adifferentform. And if he must pursue* the
beauty, which is ina species, “there would be a great want of
understanding 3 not to consider the beauty found in all bodies
as one and the same. * And he, who thus considers, must?
become a lover of all beautiful forms, °!and relax the violence
(of his love) for a single form, and despise it, and hold it of
no moment;°! and afterwards consider of greater value the
beauty existing in the soul, than that existing in the body;
so that, if there be a person only reasonably beautiful®? in
soul, and if he bears only a small flower,®* he should be
48 Dissatisfied, as every one must be, with the nonsensical εἰ δεῖ διώκειν ----
as if the idea of a necessity could be here introduced—even Stalbaum
proposed to read εἰ δὴ διώκει. He should have suggested εἰ ἴδοι διώκων,
“if he should see in his pursuit.”
49_49 Although πολλὴ ἄνοια might perhaps stand here with ἐστὶ un-
derstood, yet one would prefer πολλὴ ἂν ἄνοια ein—
50. 560 The Greek is τοῦτο δὲ ἐννοήσαντα καταστῆναι. Ficinus has
‘* Et qui hoc advertit—evadere debet,” from whence Stephens propose
to read τοῦτο δὲ δεῖ ἐννοήσαντα--- δ should have suggested τοῦτο δὲ dé.
For thus δέον has been lost or corrupted elsewhere through δὲ, as I have
shown in Poppo’s Prolegom. p, 157.
51_51 Here again it is easy to see that Ficinus found in his MS. a text
far superior to the present one—évic δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι
καταφρονήσαντα Kai σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον : where τοῦτο has nothing to
which it can be referred, and καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον
is an insufferable tautology. From both these faults the Latin of Ficinus
is free: “ Amoris autem erga unum vehementiam hac ratione remittere,
utque unius speciem parvi facere,” which leads to ἑνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα ἔρω-
Tog τι χαλάσαι κατὰ φρόνησιν, ἕν τι καλὸν σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον, i. 6.
** to relax somewhat of the violence of love for one, and prudently to hold
cheap a solitary case of beauty.”
52 The Greek is ἐπιεικὴς ὧν τὴν ψυχὴν. But the idea of beauty could
not be omitted. Plato evidently wrote ἐπιεικῶς καλὸς--ο
5388 The Greek is καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ. Stalbaum would ex-
punge ἐὰν. He should have seen that, as ἄνθος could not thus stand by
itself, the train of thought requires ἐννοίας καὶ σμικρὸν ἄνθος, “ even a
THE BANQUET. 551
satisfied to feel a love, and to tend with care, and to give birth
to conversations of this kind, full of beauty, and to seek such
as will make the young better, in order that he may, on the
other hand,** be compelled to behold the beauty existing in
the employments of 116,55 and the regulations of laws, and to
see this, that all this has an affinity with itself, in order®® that
he may consider as of little value the beauty that is around
the body ; and after these (liberal) employments to lead him δ
to sciences®* in order that he may see again the loveliness of
science; and looking upon beauty as being now manifold, he
may no longer be the slave of that which exists in one form—
as ἃ domestic is contentedly in love with the beauty of a
little child, or of a man, or one employment®°—and become a
small flower of intellect.” Ficinus has “ quamvis forma corporis aliis
ἀπ υρῖνα cedat ;᾿ supplying, probably, out of his own head a dacuna in
54. Instead of ad one would prefer εὖ, “ well,’ or ἀεὶ, ““ constantly.’’
8S By ἐπιτηδεύματα were meant all the pursuits, bodily and mental,
requisite for persons of family, fortune, and of a liberal turn of mind, and
not engaged in handicraft trades, S.
56 Ast justly objects to ἵνα repeated. But he did not see that, as Plato
wrote καὶ τοῦτο ἰδὼν ὅτι, not iseiv—the ἵνα could not be omitted.
57 As there is nothing on which ἀγαγεῖν can depend, Ficinus translated
“ ducatur.” Stalbaum says that τὸν ἡγούμενον is to be supplied. Plato
wrote, I suspect, ὁδηγὸν ἔχειν, “ to have a way-leader.”
58 By sciences are meant arithmetic, geometry, music in its theory, and
astronomy, all of which were requisite for the study of true philosophy.
In these sciences every step is from beauty to beauty; for in every new
theorem there is discovered something to attract by its intellectual charm,
as the beauty of body does the eye; and thus each different science seems
a different and a wider world of beauty. S.
5989 Such is the literal version of the Greek—wozep οἰκέτης ἀγαπῶν
παιδαρίου κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος. Now although
domestic servants do in many countries feel a pride in the beauty of the
children under their care, yet the circumstance is not of so constant oc-
currence, as to become the groundwork of anillustration. Correctly then
did Hommel object to οἰκέτης, but incorrectly propose ὁ ἱκέτης. For
Plato evidently wrote ὁ τοκεὺς, “ the begetter;’’ and as ποιητὴς was
another name for a begetter, as before stated, it is equally evident that
we must read ἢ ἀνθρώπινός τις ποιητὴς ἐπιτηδεύματος ἑνὸς, i. 6. “ or
some mortal begetter of one studious pursuit,” of which the inventor or
professor becomes the slave; the very expression applied to Garrick by
Goldsmith, who called him “ the slave of his αὐτί." So too ambitious
persons are said to be “ the slaves of glory.” Even “ philosophus,” ac-
cording to St. Hieronym. Epist. p. 585, was “‘ gloriae—vile—mancipium :”
by the aid of which passage, I corrected, in the Gentleman’s Magazine,
July 1833, p. 34, Thucyd. ii. 42, by reading τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον δοῦλοι
552 THE BANQUET.
person of no mark, and of contracted. notions; but turning
himself to the wide sea of beauty, and contemplating the
many and beautiful and magnificent discourses, he may
°(there) give birth to conceptions in unstinting® phi
phy, until being there (in philosophy) strengthened and in-
ereased,® he shall behold some single science of such a kind that
it is conversant with so great and beautiful a thing. [35.]
But now try, said she, to give me all the attention you can.
Whoever then has been instructed thus far in the mysteries of
Love, and has beheld in due order and correctly the things of
beauty, he will, when he arrives at the consummation of the
things of Love, see on a sudden some wondrous sight of na-
tural beauty, for the sake of which all his previous labours
have been undertaken. For in the first place, it exists for
ever, being neither produced nor destroyed, and neither suffer-
ing increase nor decay. In the next place, it is not beautiful
only on this side, but ugly on that; nor only at one time, but
not so at another ; nor as regards one point beautiful, but as re-
gards another ugly ; nor as being beautiful in the eyes of some,
but ugly in the eyes of others ; nor will its beauty be a mere out-
ward appearance, as if it were a face, or hands, or any thing
else in which the body participates; nor is it any discourse or
science; nor does it exist in any other being, such as an
ἢ déove—* the slaves of glory rather than of fear ;”’ similar to δοῦλοι----
τῶν ἀεὶ ἀτόπων, in Thucyd. iii. 38, where Bloomfield quotes from Aristides
τῆς χρείας ἀεὶ δούλους εἶναι, and from Gregor, Nazianz. δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν
ἀεὶ ταρόντων : and he might have added Dionys. Hal. p. 426, who calls
Philistus, δοῦλον πλεονεξίας.
% By his translation—“‘ preclaros sermones magnificasque animi sen-
sus ”’—it would seem that Stalbaum wished to read, θεωρῶν πολλοὺς cai
καλοὺς λόγους, τίκτῃ μεγαλοπρεπέστατα τὰ διανοήματα, For thus each
substantive ΣΝ its fitting adjective. ἕν
1 In lieu of ἀφθόνῳ, “ unstinting,” one MS. has ὄνως, answering
to “ abunde ” in Ficinus ; which Ast feels disposed to adopt.
628 Others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote here
after θεωρῶν just before, or that ἥ ἐστε καλοῦ τοιοῦδε could follow reva
ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, unless it be said that κατίδῃ means, “ he may
look down upon,” and in that case we must take τοιοῦδε in a i
sense. For the meaning would be, “‘ Until being there strengthened and
increased, he shall look down with scorn upon such a single science as this,
which is conversant about such a thing of beauty forsooth!”. Stalbaum
indeed fancies that by κατίδῃ τινα ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοσαύτην we are to
understand, “he may behold the science of beauty itself.” But Plato
would then have written αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην μίαν, without τοσαύτην,
and even without μίαν. :
THE BANQUET. 553
animal; nor in the earth, nor in the heavens, nor “in any
other part of the universe ;** but it subsists by and with it-
self, and possesses a form eternally one; while all the other
things are beautiful through their participating in this, in
some such manner, that whereas the rest are produced and
destroyed, it becomes neither greater in aught, nor less, nor
is exposed to any state of suffering. And when ascending
from these, through rightly loving the young, he begins to
have a view of the beautiful, he will have nearly arrived at
the consummation. Now this is to march (by oneself)
correctly to the affairs of Love, or to be led by another;
beginning from the things of beauty, to keep ascending, for
the sake of the beautiful itself, by making use as it were of
steps, from one beautiful object to two, and from two to all;
and from the beauty of bodies © (to the beauty of soul; and
from the beauty of soul) ® to that of pursuits; from the beauty
of pursuits to that of doctrines; until he arrives at length from
the beauty of doctrines (generally), to that single one relating
to nothing else than beauty in the abstract, ® [and he knows
at last what is the beautiful 1561}. In this state of life, if
any where, dear Socrates, said the stranger-prophetess,™ should
53. 65. From this translation it would seem as if Sydenham wished to
read ἔν τινι τοῦ ὅλου ἄλλῳ---
5. To preserve the balance of the sentence I have translated as if αὐτὸν
had dropt out between évat and ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου. See my Poppo’s Pro-
legom. p. 254.
%_ From the repetition of τελευτῶν after τελευτήσῳ it is evident that
the words within brackets are an interpolation. Stalbaum indeed once
felt half disposed to reject καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων---τελευτήσῃ, because
this is the only passage in Plato where ἔστ᾽ dy is to be found united to
a subjunctive ; but he was led to admit the usage from meeting with γνῷ
shortly afterwards. He did not then perceive that the repetition of μά-
Onpa suggests another objection to the genuineness of the present text;
where Plato wrote, I suspect, ἕως ἂν ἀπὸ καλῶν τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ᾽
ἐκεῖνο τελευτήσῃ, 6 ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα. Here
καλῶν has heen obtained from καὶ read in most of the MSS. and ἂν in
others; for in this climax the word καλῶν is designedly repeated, while
ἕως ἂν is due to Stalbaum.
666 In the Greek there seems to be here an omission of the words be-
longing to those included between the brackets, ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων
ἐπὶ τὰς καλὰς ψυχὰς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ψυχῶν] ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτη-
εύματα. For some such words are plainly necessary to make this re-
capitulation agree with the account given before. 85. It was from this
passage that the subsequent philosophers defined Beauty as existing, 1.
in the Soul; 2. in the Body; 3. in Morals; and 4. in Arts.
87 Sydenham was the first to adopt μαντικὴ found in the version of Fi-
554 THE BANQUET.
a person live, contemplating beauty in the abstract; which
should he behold, it will appear to be not in a bit of gold, nor
in dress, nor in beautiful boys or youths; with the sight of
which you are struck, and are ready both yourself and many
others, if it were possible, to look upon your beloved and live
with them for ever, and to neither eat nor drink, but © to feast
yourselves with the view,® and to be together. What think
you then, said she, would take place, if it were in the
power of any person to behold beauty itself, clear as the
light, pure and unmixed, but’ not polluted with human
flesh and colour, and much of other kinds of mortal trash;
but be able to view the godlike” beautiful in its singleness
of form? Think you, said she, that the life of a man would be
of little account who looks thither, and beholds it with what
he ought,” and is in its company? Perceive you not, said
cinus, as he says. But the ed. pr. omits the Latin words corresponding
to the Greek, ἔφη ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη. They were first introduced into
the eonsupton copy of that version by Simon Gryneeus, as Fischer has duly
noticed.
68. 65 Instead of θεᾶσθαι, four MSS. offer θεάσασθαι, from which it is
easy to elicit θέᾳ ἑστιᾶσθαι: to which I was led by Sydenham’s “ feast-
ing the eyes,’’ who saw that something was required here to answer to
the preceding ἐσθίειν. On the metaphorical use of ἑστιᾶν see Ast on
Pheedr, p. 227, B.
6 If θέᾳ ἑστιᾶσθαι has been correctly restored, it is evident that
in ξυνεῖναι, which, like θεᾶσθαι, is perfectly superfluous after ὁρῶντες
and ξυνόντες, there lies hid some word better suited to the flow of ideas.
Perhaps Plato wrote ξυντιθέναι τὴν daira. For τὴν daira might easily
have dropt out before ri δῆτα: while ξυντιθέγαι τὴν daira would al-
lude to the fact of both parties making a joint feast of the same kind.
A similar comparison of love to a feast is found in the well-known lines
of Shakspeare—
‘* As if increase of appetite would grow By what it fed on.”
70 Ast justly objected to ἀλλὰ, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to de-
fend by passages not in point. Ficinus has “ simplex,” which leads at
once to ἁπλοῦν.
71 The Greek is αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον kadkov—But θεῖον could not be thus in-
serted between αὐτὸ τὸ and καλὸν---ΝῸΥ do I very well understand
μονοειδὲς, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it; nor could Shelley,
who translates it, as Taylor would have done, ‘‘ monoeidic.”
72 The Greek is in some MSS. καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ ξυνόντος
αὐτῷ, in others, ᾧ δεῖ, which Ast conjectured and Stalbaum has adopted.
But what is the meaning of ᾧ δεῖ, neither Ast nor Stalbaum has thought
proper to explain. For most assuredly on the present occasion the idea
of any necessity or fitness would be totally irrelevant. Moreover
θεωμένου could not thus follow βλέποντος, nor could ἐκεῖνο and αὐτῷ be
thus applied to the same thing. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato
THE BANQUET. 555
she, that there alone will it be in the power of him, who looks
upon the beautiful withthe eye by which it can be seen, to be-
get not the shadowy show of virtue—as not coming in contact
with shadowy shows—but virtue in reality, as coming in con-
tact with a reality ; and that to aperson, begetting virtue in real-
ity and bringing her up, it will happen for him to become god-
beloved, and, if ever man was, immortal.—{ 36. ] Thus, (friend)
Phedrus and ye the rest here, spoke Diotima, and I am my-
self convinced, and being convinced, I am endeavouring to
convince the rest, that no one would readily find a better
assistant to human nature for the attainment of such a pos-
session than Love. And hence I assert, that every man
ought to hold Love in honour; and I do myself pay all
honours to the things of Love, and cultivate them particularly,
and I exhort others likewise ; and both now and ever I cele-
brate, as far as I can, the power and the excellence of Love.”
— Consider then, Phzedrus, this speech as having been spoken
in praise of Love, if you are so inclined; but if not, giving it
wrote ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου ἀόκνου, οἷα δὴ τὸν © θεωμένου ὀξὺ Kai
οὐ μύοντος ἀετοῦ, i. 6. “ of a man looking thitherwards without fear, as
the eagle looks with a piercing eye upon the sun without blinking.”” The
causes of error are to be traced to the corruption of ἀόκνου, and ®, (i. 6.
Ἥλιον,) and ὀξὺ, and μύοντος, on which I could say or have said something
in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 249, Eum. 2, Suppl. 901, and Hippias Maj. § 17,
n. 5. With regard to the fact of the eagle being supposed to possess the
power of looking upon the sun without being blinded, compare Ecphan-
tus in Stobeus, p. 333, 14, τὸ κράτιστον ἐν πτανοῖς ζῶον ἀετὸς ἀντωπὸν
ἁλίῳ γενόμενον. Themist. Or. ii, v. 61, Petar.—xx. p. 240, συχνά γ᾽
ἐμοῦ ἀπεπειρω, καθάπερ οἱ ἀετοὶ τῶν νεοττών, εἰ δύναταί μου στέγειν τὰ
ὄμματα καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τὴν αὐγλὴν τῆς ἀληθείας. The same fact is men-
tioned by Ζ)]αη. Hist. Animal. x. 14, in the case of hawks, Ὁρώσιν
ἱέρακες ὀρνίθων μόνοι ἀεὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀκτῖσι τοῦ ἡλίου ῥᾳδίως. And hence
Moore has used it as an illustration in his Epistle to Lord John Russell’s
meditated retirement from public life :
** What thou, with thy genius, thy youth, and thy name,
Thou born of the Russells, whose instinct to run
The accustomed career of their sire is the same,
As the eaglet’s to soar with its eyes to the sun.”
By a similar metaphor Empedocles said, ᾿Ανταυγεῖ πρὸς Ὄλυμπον
ἀταρμύκτοισι προσώποις : while Epicurus was described, probably by
lian, quoted by Suid. in ᾿Επίκουρος---ἀμβλυώττων τε καὶ πρὸς THY TOU
ἡλίου αἰγλὴν δειλὸς ὦν. ᾿
78 This seems to be the only intelligible rendering in this place of
ἀνδρίαν, which however I hardly think Plato wrote here, but rather
ἐνεργείαν.
556 THE BANQUET.
any other name, and taking it in any other sense, so eall
1
[37.] When Socrates had thus spoken, the rest praised the
speech; but Aristophanes endeavoured to say something,
because Socrates had, when speaking, alluded” to his speech.
On a sudden, however, the door of the porch was knocked at
and it sent within a loud noise, so that there was heard the
voice of revellers, and of a pipe-playing damsel. Upon this
Agatho said to the servants, Will you not see to the matter?
and if there is any acquaintance, invite him in; but if not,
say that we are no longer drinking, and have already left off.
Not long afterwards, the voice of Alcibiades, who was very
drunk, was heard in the court, bawling very loud, and ask-
ing— Where is Agatho? and ordering (a slave) to lead him to
Agatho. The flute-player, therefore, and some others of his fol-
lowers, supported him towards Agatho, and he stood at the door
crowned with a garland of ivy and violets, and having very
many fillets on his head, and exclaiming, All hail, my friends !
Either receive as a fellow-tippler a man very drunk, or let us
depart, after crowning Agatho alone, for which purpose we
have come. For I was not able, said he, to come yesterday ;
but I am here now with fillets on my head, that, from my own,
I may bind them on the head of the wisest” and the most
beautiful person. “If I should say so, will you laugh” at
7 Instead of ὀνόμαζε, one would expect rather νόμιζε, “ consider,” to
answer to the preceding νόμισον.
5 See § 31.
τὸ Although σοφωτάτου here seems to be supported by σοφοῦ in p. 174,
B. § 2, yet Agatho would hardly be called σοφώτατος in the presence of
Socrates ; to whose wisdom not only had Agatho, in § 4, alluded, but an
oracle had said, that he was ᾿Ανδρῶν πάντων σοφώτατος. I suspect that
Plato wrote here ἰσοθεωτάτου, and in § 2, ἐπ’ ἰσοθέου. For both men and
women, remarkable for their beauty, were said to be equal to the gods; as
Polyxena is in Hecub. 356, "Ion θεῇσιν. So Cicero Nat. Deor. i. 79,
**deo pulchrior.”’
τ The Greek is insome MSS. κεφαλὴν ἐὰν εἴπω οὑτωσὶ ἀναδήσω, apa
καταγελάσεσθε---ἰπι four others more correctly κεφαλὴν οὑτωσὶ ἀναδήσω,
ἐὰν εἴπω doa—which Ast has adopted; forhe knew that ἐὰν εἴπω οὑτωσὶ
could not mean “ut ita dicam.” Stalbaum, however, rejects ἐὰν εἴπω
οὑτωσὶ as an interpolation. Had he entered into the spirit of the dialogue,
he would perhaps have seen that Plato wrote κεφαλὴν οὑτωσὶ ἀναδήσω,
ὃν ἐὰν εἴπω "Ἔρωτα, καταγελάσεσθε, i.e. “thus bind the head of him,
whom should I call Love, you will laugh at me.” For thus a reason
THE BANQUET. 557
me, as being drunk? However, although you may laugh, I
well know that I am speaking the truth. But tell me imme-
diately, shall I come in or not on these conditions? Will you
drink with me or not? Thereupon all the company was in an
uproar, and ordered him to enter and recline on a couch, and
Agatho too invited him. And he (Alcibiades) came, led by
his attendants ; and at the same time taking off the fillets, as
if about to bind them (on Agatho), he did not see Socrates,
who was before his eyes, but sate down by Agatho, and be-
‘tween him and Socrates: for Socrates had made way for him
that he might sit down ; and sitting down he embraced Agatho,
and bound the fillet on him. Thereupon said Agatho, Slaves,
unloose the sandals of Alcibiades, that he may recline as the
third amongus. By all means, said Alcibiades ;’* but, who is this
third person our fellow-drinker? and at the same time turn-
ing round, he beheld Socrates; and on seeing him, he started
up, and exclaimed, O Hercules! what is this? What ho
Socrates? are you again sitting here in ambush against me,
just as you are wont to do, and to appear suddenly, where I
least expected you would be. And why are you reclining
here? and” not with Aristophanes, or any other person
who is, and wishes to be a source of merriment? But you
have contrived to sit near the most beautiful of those within.*?
Then said Socrates, See, Agatho, if you can assist me ; for the
love of this man here is to me no trifling matter; since
from the time when I fell in love with him, I am no longer
permitted either to look at, or speak to, any beautiful person ;
would be.given for the laughter, and Agatho be called by the name ap-
plied to a beautiful boy by Martial, “Sic tu cecus Amor ;” while of his
equally beautiful sister it was said, “‘ Sic erit illa Venus.”
78 Although persons, when reclining at meals, were accustomed to take
off their slippers, as shown by Gataker in Adversar. Miscell. Post. c. 19,
quoted by Stalbaum, yet, to the command given by Agatho, Alcibiades
could scarcely have added Πάνυ ye: although he might have said Πάνυ
γε εὖ, similar to ἔχει κάλλιστα in Theocrit. Id. xv. 3, which, as remarked
by Valckenaer, was a polite manner of expressing a refusal; just as we
say in English, “‘1t does very well.”
τὸ The Greek is ὡς, which Stalbaum renders “ quippe, nam.” Syden-
ham “and,” as if he wished to read καὶ: and so perhaps Plato wrote.
Ficinus has “ potius quam apud Aristophanem—aut—”
80 Instead of τῶν ἔνδον one would prefer τῶν συνδαίτων, answering to
“convivarum ”’ in Ficinus.
558 THE BANQUET.
οὐδ᾽ he is, through jealousy and envy, practising strange de-
vices, and abuses me, and scarcely keeps off his hands? See
therefore that he does not do something now, but do you re-
concile us; or, should he attempt to do any violence, do you
assist me: for I greatly fear the madness of this man, and
his strong feeling of love.—But, said Alcibiades, there shall
be®? no reconciliation between you and me. For I will by
and by revenge myself upon you for this. But for the pre-
sent, Agatho, said he, give me some of the fillets, that I may
bind them on the wonderful head of this man, and he may
not find fault with me, because I have bound the fillets on
you, but not on him, who vanquishes all men in discourse,
not only lately as you have done, but at all times, upon all
subjects. And at the same time, taking some of the fillets,
he bound them upon Socrates, and laid himself down. When
he had laid himself down, he said, [38.] ** Let things be; for
you appear to me to be sober; this you must not be allowed,
but you must drink ;*4 for so it has been agreed. I therefore
elect myself the chairman® until you have drunk enough. But,
Agatho, let some one bring a beaker, if there is a large one;
ὃ: The Greek is ἢ οὑτοσὶ, where Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain 9.
One would expect rather ἀεὶ οὗτος, παῖς ὥς, to which οὑτοσὶ πως in
MS. I. evidently leads. For the sense is, ‘‘ Like a boy, he is ever
jealous.”
82 Some MSS. read οὐκ ἐστὶ, others ἔτι. Plato wrote οὐκ ἔτ᾽ ἔσται.
8 The Greek is ἔπειτα---ἀνέδησα. But ἔπειτα could not be thus in-
serted between νικῶντα and ἀνέδησα. Stalbaum was misled by the pas-
sages produced by Blomfield on Prom. Vinct. 802, He should have sug-
gested, as I have translated, ἐς ra4vra—For thus πάντας and πάντα are
perpetually united, as I could prove by full twenty passages collected in
my MS. notes on Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 178.
8484 This is. what has been hitherto palmed off upon the world
as the very words of Plato. Ficinus has, however, “ Nimium mihi
sobrii, convive, videmini,” and has thus got rid of Etey dy—a formula
that could. not be found in this place. We might indeed read ἘΣ
οὖν δὴ, where Winckelmann on Euthydem. p. 88, was the first to
suggest οὖν. But Plato wrote something, I suspect, to this effect—
“If then ye are indeed men, as ye seem to me, I must not permit
you to be sober; but ye must now drink bumpers.” | In Greek, Ei
οὖν δὴ ἄνδρες ἐστὲ --- δοκεῖτε γάρ por—vigew οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον ὑμῖν"
νῦν δ᾽ ἡμῖν μάλα ποτέον : where νῦν has been luckily preserved by one
excellent MS., while ἀλλὰ has been changed into μάλα.
856. On the chairman at wine-parties, see the Commentators on Horace,
Od. i, 4, 17, “‘ Quem Venus arbitrum Dicet bibendi.”
THE BANQUET. 559
or rather, there is no need; but bring hither, boy, said he,
that wine cooler, which seems*® to hold more than eight
kotyle.§’ Having filled it, he first drank it off himself; and
afterwards ordered them to pour out of it for Socrates, and
stated at the same time, This stratagem of mine, gentlemen,
is of no avail against Socrates ; for, let him drink as much as
any one may command, he will not be a bit the more intoxi-
cated.*8 Socrates then, when the boy had poured out the
wine, drank it off. And Eryximachus: said, What shall we
do, Alcibiades ? Shall we neither say nor sing over the cup,
but drink really like those who are thirsty? To this Alci-
biades replied, Hail, Eryximachus! thou best of men, sprung
from the best and most temperate of fathers. And hail? thou
too, said Eryximachus. But what shall wedo? Whatever
you may order; for you we must obey. For
A man of physic has *gainst many others
A worth.*
Order then what you will. Hear then, said Eryximachus.
Before you came in, it was determined that every one,
beginning at the right hand, should in turn make a speech
in praise of Love, to the best of his ability. All the rest
of us, therefore, have spoken; and it is just, since you
have not spoken, but have been drinking, that you too
should make a speech; and, when you have spoken, order
86 This intransitive sense of ἰδόντα is, what no editor has remarked, a
barbarism. Plato wrote we ἰδόντος, ‘as for a person to see.” For a
similar syntax, see Kuhner Gr. Gr. § 701, ed. Jelf.
87 On the measure called ‘‘ kotyla,’’ nothing appears to be known for
a certainty. It answered probably to the old English “magnum.” With
regard to the custom of asking, as persons were getting drunk, for tum-
blers, it will be sufficient to refer to Horace—‘‘ Tum calices poscit ma-
jores,” and ‘‘Capaciores affer huc, puer, scyphos,’’ and to Aristoph.
Τηρυταδ. Fr. viii., Ἦν δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ ἑορτή περιέφερεν δ᾽ ἐν κύκλῳ λεπασ-
τὴν Παῖς ταχὺ, προσφέρων δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐνέχεεν σφόδρα κυανοβενθῆ : for so
that fragment ought to be read, as it were easy to show by parallel
passages.
88 Ficinus has “ nec ebrium unquam videbitis,”’ as if he had found in
his MS. οὐ μήποτ᾽ αὐτὸ μέθυσον ἴδητε : similar to Σώκράτη μεθύοντα
οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἑώρακεν.
89 The Greek is Καὶ γὰρ σύ" where γὰρ is perfectly absurd. Ficinus
has more correctly, “ Et tu salve,” which leads to Kai χαῖρε σύ. So in
Eurip. Orest. 470, Ὦ χαῖρε πρέσβυ----Ὦ χαῖρε καὶ σύ : where see Porson.
This is a line of Homer in Ιλ. A, 514,
560 THE BANQUET.
Socrates to do whatever you please, and he too order the
person on his right hand, and so with respect to the rest.
Alcibiades then said, You say well, Eryximachus; but it is
not fair®! to compare a drunken man against a sober one in
their speeches. But, O happy man, does Socrates
you with respect to what he has just now said? Ordo you
know that every thing is the contrary to what he has said?
For he it is, who, when I in his presence praise any one, ex-
cept himself, whether god or man, will not keep his hands
from me. Will you not speak fair words? said Socrates.
By Neptune, said Alcibiades, say nothing against this; for I
will praise no other person, while you are present. Do so then,
said Eryximachus; if you will, praise Socrates. How say
you? rejoined Alcibiades. Does it seem good to you, Eryx-
imachus, that I:should do so? Must I fall upon® this man,
and revenge myself before you? Ho, sir, said Socrates, what
have you in mind? Will you praise me so as to make me
ridiculous ?** or what will you do? I will speak the truth. But
‘see whether you will permit me. Nay, said Socrates, I both
permit, and command you to speak the truth. 551 will do it
instantly, said Alcibiades. But however do you act thus; if
*! The Greek is μεθύοντα ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους = ἀλ-
λειν: where, according to Ast and Stalbaum, τῶν is to be supplied before
rf raat and τοὺς before λόγους. I have translated, παρὰ νήφοντ᾽ ἐν
ὄγοις. ;
® Or we may translate, ‘‘ Will you not hold your tongue?” For εὐφη-
μεῖν has both these meanings.
% How Alcibiades could inquire, whether he should fall foul upon
Socrates, when he had been requested, if he liked, to praise him, I can-
not understand. I could have understood it, had he been told to praise
or abuse, as he liked best. But in that case, Plato would have written
ἐπαίνεσον 1} κακῶς λέγει. For ἢ κακῶς λέγεις might easily have dropt out
before πῶς λέγεις.
* From this bitter sneer it is evident that Socrates preferred the abuse
of Alcibiades to his praise.
%—9*5 The Greek is Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι εἰπεῖν τὸν ᾿Αλκιβιάδην καὶ μέντοι
οὑτωσὶ ποίησον, which Ficinus thus puts into Latin, ** Parebo quam li-
bentissime, modo id assequi possim.” For he did not understand the
phrase οὐκ ἂν φθάγοιμι : nor did Hommel see how ποίησον could thus fol-
low οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι: and though Stalbaum translates οὐκ dy ue
by “I will immediately make a beginning,” he should have ced at
least one passage, where φθάνειν is so used, without a participle. Unless
Iam greatly mistaken, Plato probably wrote Οὐκ ἂν φθονοίμην ἐπαινῶν.
For ἐπαινῶν could have dropt out very easily before εἰπεῖν : while in the
words καὶ μέντοι οὗτωσι ποίησον lies hid καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτως σὺ ποίησον.
THE BANQUET. 561
Tassert any thing not true, lay hold of me while speaking if you
will, and say that I am telling a falsehood ; for I shall not will-
ingly tell a lie. And do not wonder if I speak as if recollecting
one thing after another ; for it is not easy for a man in my state
to enumerate readily, and in succession, your strange be-
haviour. [39.] I will then endeavour, gentlemen, to praise
Soerates in this way by means of images. He indeed will per-
haps imagine that I.am turning him into ridicule; but the
image will be for the sake of what is true, and not ridiculous.
I say, then, that Socrates is most like the figures of Silenus
that are seated in the workshops of statuaries, which the
artists have made, holding reeds or flutes; but which, when
they are opened down the middle, appear to contain within them
statues® of the gods. And I again say, that he resembles the
satyr Marsyas.*’ Now that in your outward form, Socrates,
you resemble these things, even you yourself will not deny ;
but that you resemble them likewise in other points, hear in
the next place. You are saucy in deeds; or are you not?
For, if you do not acknowledge it, I will bring witnesses to
the fact. Are you not also a piper much more wonderful than
Marsyas? For he charmed men through instruments, by a
power proceeding from the mouth; and he (charms)* even
now, when any one plays his melodies. For what Olympus!
*° Taylor refers here to the Scholia of Maximus on Pseudo-Dionysius
Areopagite, t. ii. p. 209, where it is said that ‘‘ the Greeks made statues,
without hands or feet, which they called Herma, hollow within, but
with doors: within these they placed statues of the gods whom they
worshipped, but they closed them by the Herme externally. Hence
these Herme appeared to be things of no value; but inwardly they con-
tained the ornaments of the gods themselves.”’ Of these identical Scholia
there is a transcript in Etymol. M. ᾿Αρμάριον, p. 146, 58, while, by the
knowledge of this fact, we can understand A®sop, Fab. 128, and the story
told by Cornelius Nepos-of Hannibal saving some gold by placing it in
the statue of a god.
% A celebrated player on the flute, of which he was said to be the in-
ventor ; and that having challenged Apollo to a trial of skill as a musician,
he was beaten and flayed alive by the god. T.
98. Instead of ye, Stalbaum says one would have expected γάρ, which
Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version “enim.” Vainly
then does Stalbaum attempt to defend ye.
99. This verb is to be got out from the preceding ηὔλει.
1 Olympus the musician was a disciple of Marsyas. Stalbaum refers
to Plato, Legg. iii. p. 677, Pseudo-Plato Minos, p. 318, B., Aristotle
Polit. viii. 5, and Plutarch, t. ii. Ῥ᾿ 1138.
ο
562 THE BANQUET.
played, I call the melodies of Marsyas, who taught him. Now
his melodies, whether a good male flute-player plays them, or a
bad female one, alone' cause a person to be spell-bound, and
point out, through their being divine, those that stand in need?
of the gods and the mysteries; but you in this respect alone
differ from him, that you effect the very same thing by naked
words without instruments. We therefore, when we hear
another person, although a good speaker himself, pronouncing
the speeches of others, not a single hearer, so to say, pays
any regard to them; but when any one hears you, or your
discourses spoken by another, although he is a wretched
speaker, yet, whether a woman or a man or a lad is the
auditor, we are astonished and spell-bound. I therefore, gen-
tlemen, unless I seemed to be very much in liquor, would tell
you upon oath what I have suffered by the discourses of this
man, and am suffering even now. For when I hear him, my
heart leaps much more than that of the Corybantes;* and
my tears flow forth through his discourses. I see too many
others suffering in the very same way. But when I hear
Pericles, and other excellent orators, I think indeed that they
speak well, but I suffer nothing of this kind; nor is my soul
agitated with tumult, nor is it indignant, as if I were in a
servile state. But by this Marsyas here I am often so affected,
that it appears to me I ought not to live, while I am in such a
state. You willnot, Socrates, say that this is not true. And
even now I feel conscious that, were I willing to lend him my
ears, I could not bear it, but should suffer in the very same
way. For he would compel‘ me to confess, that, being yet
very deficient, I neglect my own affairs,° but attend to those
of the Athenians. ΤΥ violence therefore restraining my-
self as to my ears,’ I depart from him, flying, as it were, from
1 Stalbaum says that μόνα means “very greatly.” But in the passages
he quotes μόνος has its usual meaning, “ἢ only.”
2 Proclus, in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades, says, that the
flute was used in the Mysteries, to excite the feelings of the hearers to
what was divine. Such therefore, as were excited by the melody of the
pipe, may be supposed to stand in need of the gods and mysteries. T.
3 On the Corybantes, see Ruhnken in Timeus Lex. Κορυβαντιᾷν.
4 So Sydenham, as if he wished to read ἀναγκάζοι γὰρ ἄν με, instead of
ἀναγκάζει yao με.
5 Instead of ἔτι, the two oldest MSS. offer τι, which leads to τὰ.
» δ See Alcibiad. i. p. 259, B.
7—7 The Greek is βίᾳ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων, ἐπισχόμενος τὰ
THE BANQUET. 563
the Syrens, lest I should sit there by him until I grew old.
And towards him alone of all men, I suffer that, which no one
would think to be in me, to be ashamed of any one. *®[But I
am abashed before him alone.]* For I feel conscious of my
inability to deny that what he exhorts me to do ought not to
be done; but when Idepart from him, I am (conscious) of
being overcome by the honour (I receive) from the multitude.
I therefore run away from and avoid him ; and when I see him,
I am ashamed for what I had consented to do. And often,
indeed, I would gladly see him no longer amongst men: and
yet again, if this should happen, I well know I should be
afflicted still more; so that I know not what to do with this
man. And from the melodies indeed of this Satyr in such a
manner both I and many others have suffered.
[40.] Hear too from me on other points, how like he is to
what I have compared him, and what a wonderful power he
possesses. For be well assured, that not one of you knows
him; but I will lay him open, since I have begun (to
speak.)® You see then that he is !°disposed in a very ama-
tory manner towards beautiful persons ;!° and that he is al-
ways about them and struck with them; but on the other
hand, 'he is ignorant of every thing and knows nothing how
his figure is. Is not this Silenus-like ?!! For he is invested with
ὦτα. Butas two excellent MSS. offer ἐπισπώμενος in lieu of ἐπισχόμε-
γος, it is evident that the text has been tampered with. Plato wrote, I
suspect, Biwy οὖν, ὕπερ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων ἔπασχεν ἀποσπώμενος, τὰ
ora: where βύων---τὰ ὦτα is the splendid emendation of Abresch in Lec-
tion, Aristenet. p. 147, obtained from Hesych., Biwy τὰ wra* ἐπιφράτ-
των: for there is a distinct allusion to Ulysses stuffing his ears with wax
to prevent his hearing the strains of the Syrens, fraught at once with de-
light and destruction to those who listened to them, as stated in O6.
.M. 47.
8_8 The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
9. Ficinus has “ dicere jam incepi,”’ as if he had found in his MS., what
the sense requires, ἠρξάμην λέγειν.
1010 The Greek is ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν. But the genitive
could hardly depend upon the adverb, Plato wrote, I suspect, ἔρωτί πως
διακαίεται τῶν καλῶν, “ he is inflamed with the love of things beautiful.”
The common reading is however found in Aristnetus, i. 18.
τ αἰ Sych is the literal translation of the text, adopted by Schleier-
macher, Bekker, and Stalbaum, and which others may, but I cannot under-
stand, for it is a mere tautology to say οὐδὲν οἶδεν, after ἀγνοεῖ πάντα;
besides the ignorance of his figure could be no proof that Socrates was
like Silenus. The sense evidently ie is, ‘‘ And although he ac-
20
δδ4 THE BANQUET.
this externally like a carved Silenus; but whem he is opened
inwardly, with temperance how great, think you, fellow-
tipplers, is he filled ? Know too, that if any person is beautiful,
he regards him not, but despises him to such an extent as no
one would suppose ; nor if he is wealthy, or possesses any other
honour amongst those who are considered by the multitude as
blessed ; but he holds all these possessions to be nothing worth,
and that we too are of no account.!? He passes likewise the
whole of life indulging in irony and jests against mankind ;
but when he is serious andis opened, I know not whether any
one (of you)!’ has seen the images within; but I once saw them,
and they appeared to me to be so divine and golden, and all-
beautiful and wonderful, that I (thought) I must in a short
time do whatever Socrates ordained. Conceiving too that
he paid great attention to my beauty, I considered this as a
god-send, and a piece of wondrous good fortune for myself
᾽
cuses himself of being ignorant of every thing, still does he know well his
own figure, that it is very Silenus-like. This would be in Greék—xai εἰ
ἀγνοεῖν πάντα καταυδᾷ, εὖ οἷδεν ὅμως τὸ σχῆμα αὑτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτὸ Σειληνῶ-
δὲς σφόδρα ἐστί : which is at least more worthy of the philosopher than that
found at present—cai αὖ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἷδεν ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ
τοῦτο οὐ Σεληνῶδες σφόδρα γε. For by the verb καταυδᾷ, Alcibiades,
or rather Plato himself, meant to show that Socrates accused himself
wrongfully of ignorance ; for by knowing his own likeness, he proved that
he had practised the precept given by the Delphic oracle, “ Know thy-
self,” to which Plato has alluded in Phedr. § 8, Phileb. § 107, Charmid.
ᾧ 26, and Protag. § 82.
12 The majority of MSS. read καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγω ὑμῖν, and so
did the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version, “‘ nullius nos esse
eum vobis assero.” Plato wrote, I suspect, καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδενὸς εἶναι ἐν
λόγῳ μεῖον. Compare Theetet. p. 180, E., ἧττον--- ἢ τὸ μηδὲν : and as
regards ἐν λόγῳ, the words of the oracle, οὔτ᾽ ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ἀριθμῷ,
quoted by Heindorf on Hipp. Maj. § 19, Stalbaum too believes the
sage to be corrupt, but is unable to correct it; nor could he see that oe
‘ Fingit tamen ironicus aliter,” in Ficinus, it is easy to elicit εἐρωνευόμε-
voc δὲ d\Nwo—where ἄλλως is not “aliter,” but “merely.”
18 Ficinus has alone preserved the words wanting here. For he has “si
quis vestrum,”’ which leads to εἴ τις ὑμῶν---
4 Here again Ficinus found in his MS. the very word required to com-
plete the sense. For his version is, ‘‘ ut nullo modo fas existimem aliter,
quam Socrates precepit, agere ;” from whence it is easy to read, ὥστε
ποιητέον εἶναι wpny. For ᾧμην might easily have dropt out after εἶναι,
while as regards the phrase ποιητέον εἶναι ὥμην, see my note on Politic.
p- 263, C. § 7. Now that Ficinus followed here his MS. closely may
be inferred from finding that he has omitted ἐν βραχεῖ, which is wanting
‘in another MS. likewise.
a is
THE BANQUET. 565
since by gratifying Socrates it would be in my power to hear
from him all that he knew. For I prided myself on my
beauty marvellously. With these thoughts in my head, al-
though I had previously been never accustomed to be in his
company without an attendant, on that occasion I sent the
page away and remained with him alone; for I must state
the whole truth, and do you give me your attention ; and if I
am telling a falsehood, do you, Socrates, confute me. I was,
gentlemen, alone with him alone; and I thought he would
immediately converse with me in the way that lovers are
wont to speak to their beloved in private; and’ I was (highly)
delighted (with the expectation).!> Nothing however of this
kind very much 16 took place ; but after conversing somewhat!”
and passing the day with me as usual, he went away. Then
Ichallenged him to contend with me in the naked exercises,
and I did contend as if about to effect something by this
means. He engaged therefore naked, and had a tussel fre-
quently against me, no one being present. But why need I
mention this? Nothing more took place. But when I ac-
complished nothing at all by this means, I determined to
attack the man with all my might, nor to let him off; ‘since
I had put my hand to the task.’ But you must now
‘know what is the affair.!9 Accordingly I invited him to
supper, artlessly?? laying a plot as a lover does against his
1515 Ficinus has ‘‘ qua spe valde letabar,”’ as if he had found in his
MS. καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι πολύ δή τι ἔχαιρον.
16 Instead οἵ μάλα, Plato evidently wrote μὰ Δία, an oath, which is, 1
think, to be restored repeatedly in the place of μὲν or μὴν δὴ. In a
MS. of Plutarch, which I collated thirty years ago, in the Royal Library
at Brussels, the same oath has been every where omitted. It would have
been good Greek to say, οὐ μᾶλλον ---οὐδ᾽ Ev—
17 Since three MSS. omit ἂν, Ast would read ἄττα. He should have
suggested τινα. Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend ἂν.
18. 18. The words within the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after
him by Sydenham. a ad i
1919 Tn lieu of ἰστέον ἤδη τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα, Wyttenbach in Biblioth.
Crit. i. 1, p. 50, proposed to read ἐτέον ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. He should
have suggested ἐτέον ἤδη ἐπ᾽ ἄϊστον ἔτι πρᾶγμα, i.e. “I must come now
toa matter never yet known.” For the article rd could not be applied to
a thing not as yet mentioned. Stalbaum indeed with Ast would render
ἰστέον “ we must explore.” But that would be in correct Greek either
σκεπτέον or ἱστορητέον. And were the meaning such as they conceive,
there could be no need of exploring in a case, where Alcibiades knew
all the facts, and was going to tell them.
20 Although ἀτέχνως might perhaps stand, yet one would prefer évréy-
vue, “ artfully.”
566 THE BANQUET.
beloved. Even to this he did not quickly give ear. In time,
however, he was over-persuaded. But when he came for the
first time, he wished, as soon as he had supped, to go away ;
and 1, feeling ashamed, let him go. Having laid however
again a plot, after supper I had a conversation with him far
into the night ; and when he wished to go away, I pretended
it was late, and I compelled him to stay. He reposed, there-
fore, in a couch close to mine, and on which he had supped;
and no other person besides us slept in the house. [41.]
Thus far in my story it would be well to state to any one; but
what is to come, you would not have heard me telling, unless,
in the first place, according to the proverb,?!
Wine, with children, or without,
Does a tale of truth let out ;
and in the second place, it seems to me to be unjust in him who
comes to praise a person, to leave in obscurity a proud deed of
Socrates. Mereover, the suffering of him, who has been bitten
by a viper, possesses likewise myself. For they say that the per-
son so suffering is unwilling to tell what itis, except to those who
have been bitten, as being alone about to know and to pardon
him, should he dare to do and say every thing from excess of
pain. *I say it then, having been bitten by something still
1 In the words of the proverb, Oivoc ἄνευ re παίδων καὶ μετὰ παί-
δὼν ἦν ἀληθής, there lies hid an hexameter, Oivoe ἄνευ παίδων ἄρ᾽ ἀλη-
θὴς καὶ μετὰ παίδων. According to the Schol. transcribed by Photius
and Suidas, there were two proverbs, Oivoc ἀλήθεια, and Oivoe καὶ παῖδες
αληθεῖς. From these, however, a third seems to have been formed.
Respecting the proverb itself, “ In vino veritas,” Ast refers to the Com-
mentators on Horace, Od. iii. 21, 15, Epist. i. 5, 16, and to Jacobs on
Antholog. Gr. i. p. 314.
35. 5 To this inelegantly written period I trust I have restored its
original beauty, by translating as if the Greek were, Λέγω οὖν dedny-
μένος ἔτι ὑπὸ Tov ἀλγεινοτέρου --- καὶ γὰρ tori τὸ ἀλγεινότατον ὧν
ἄν τις δηχθείη --- τὴν καρδίην ἢ ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸ ὀνομάσαι ὑπὸ
τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γε λόγων, οἱ ἔχεόν τι ἐχίδνης ἀγριώτερον, νέου καὶ
ψυχὴν μὴ ἀφυοῦς bray λάβωνται, καὶ ποιῶσι δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ὁτιοῦν
—in lieu of ᾿Εγὼ ---τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγείνοτατον ---καρ-
δίαν γὰρ ἢ --- ὀνομάσαι πληγείς τε καὶ δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ --- οἵ ἔχονται --- νέον
ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ---ποιοῦσι---Βυΐ, 1. re couples nothing. 2. Although Stal-
baum supposes that the idea of pain is beautifully represented by the
figure of speech called Anacolouthon, yet the happy idea never occurred
to Sophocles; who has never resorted to such a rhetorical artifice,
while depicting the excruciating pains that Philoctetes is feigned to feel.
3. After the perfect δεδηγμένος most assuredly the aorist δηχθεὶς would
not have been introduced ; and if it could it would not have been united
THE BANQUET. 567
more painful. For it is the most painful of all, by which
a person can be bitten, in heart or soul, or whatever else it is
meet to call it, [bitten and wounded, | namely, by discourses in
philosophy ; which are wont to give out something more acute
than that from the viper, when they (the discourses) lay hold of
a young person with a not badly-disposed soul, and cause him
to doand say any thing whatever”. And looking, moreover, at
the Phedruses, Agathos, Eryximachuses, Pausaniases, Aris-
todemuses, Aristophaneses.—**But why need I say, Socrates
himself, and whoever forms the rest (of the company ).”° For all
of you have partaken with me of the madness and Bacchic fury
of philosophy ; and on this account you shall all hear. For
you will pardon what was done then, and is said now. But let
the domestics, and if there is any other profane and rude
person present, place upon their ears** gates of very great
to its synonyme πληχθείς. 4. The verb could not stand thus without its
genitive, as even Rost had the sense to see. 5. Although νέου might
perhaps be united to Ψυχῆς, yet ἀφυοῦς would require the copulative καὶ,
improperly omitted in the best MSS. Lastly, after λάβωνται, the rai
would require ποιῶσι; for ποιοῦσι could not be united ἰο ἔχονται. With
regard to the alterations, 1. ἐγὼ and λέγω are frequently interchanged ;
2. Exedy re scarcely differs from ἔχονται as regards the letters; while, as
regards the sense, some allusion ought to be made to the fact of words
pouring out ideas, as vipers do poison; and lastly, ψυχὴν is due to a single
MS. That Ficinus did not find in his MS. what exists at present in the
Greek text is clear enough; but what he did find, is not so clear. Thus
much however is certain, that either πληγείς or δηχθεὶς was wanting in
his MS., and some members of the period transposed, and not a little
added. For it is to this effect—‘‘ Ego igitur (pre ceteris) astrictus vehe-
mentiori (philosophie#) morsu, qui omnium est acerrimus, et sive cor,
sive animum, sive quomodocunque id appellandum sit, saucius (cupidi-
tate) in philosophia sermonum, qui acrius quam vipera (mordent et) oc-
cupant, si quando attigerint juvenilem animum, qui non penitus ignarus
sit, compelluntque ad quicquid tandem sit, faciendum atque dicendum
(nihil intentatum relinquere statui, quo Socratem ad explendam hanc
sitim mihique conjunctissimum facerem) ;’’ where to all the words be-
tween the lunes there is nothing to answer at present in the Greek text.
Now that Ficinus introduced all this matter out of his own head, is
scarcely credible; for he is generally content to give almost ἃ verbal
translation of the original.
38. 58 -The Greek is now Σωκράτη δὲ αὐτὸν ri δεῖ καὶ λέγειν καὶ ὅσοι
ἄλλοι---ἰξ was originally Σωκράτη δὲ αὐτὸν τόνδε, καὶ ὅσοι εἰσὶν, ἄλλοι
ἐκὼν λέγοιμ᾽ ἄν, i. 6. “and Socrates himself here, and whoever are the
rest, I will tell willingly,” for we shall thus complete the sentence, at
present imperfect.
Ξε On the Orphic verse—GéyEopar οἷς ϑέμις" ὠσὶ Sipac ἐπίθεσθε βέ-
βηλοι, i. 6. To whom it is lawful [1 speak ; place a door on your ears,
568 THE BANQUET.
size.” When therefore the lamp was extinguished, and the
servants had gone out, it seemed to me that I ought not to
employ words of many meanings towards him, but tell him
freely what was in my thoughts. And nudging him I said,
Socrates, are you asleep? Not yet, he replied. Do you know
then on what I am determined? What is it particularly?
said he. You seem to me, said I, the only lover worthy of
myself; and yet you appear to feel a dread to have a recollec-
tion** towards me. But, as I am thus affected, I think it very
silly for me not to gratify you both in this point, and in any
thing else of which you may be in want, whether it be my
own property, or that of my friends: for nothing is to me of
greater moment than to become the best of men: and for this
I think there is no person a more competent assister than
yourself; and I should feel a much greater shame before the
wise, in not gratifying such a man, than before the *’{many
and the’]?” unwise by gratifying him. Socrates, having heard
me, said, very ironically, and very much after his usual man-
ner, My dear Alcibiades, you seem to be in reality a man of
no common mark, if what you say concerning me happens to
be true, and there is in me a certain power, through which
you can become better. But what boundless beauty could
you see in me, and vastly superior to the fine form in yourself,
if, on beholding it, you endeavour to have dealings** with me,
and to exchange beauty for beauty. You have surely an idea
of possessing more than I do; for you endeavour to obtain
the truth of beautiful things instead of the reputation, and
you conceive that you will in reality exchange brass for gold.”
ye profane, (for so I tacitly corrected at Prom. 165, the reading Φθέγξο-
μαι οἷς θέμις tore θύρας δ᾽ ἐπίθεσθε, βέβηλοί. | See Ruhnken at
Timeeus in Βέβηλοι. .
35. Why Plato should have alluded to the great βίζθϊοῦ the gates I must
leave for others to explain.
26 Others may, but I cannot, understand μνησθῆναι. Plato wrote, I
suspect, μυηθῆναι ra πρὸς ἐμέ. For that acts, similar to those here al-
luded to, took place in the Mysteries, is shown by Taylor in his Disserta-
tion on the Mysteries, p. 123.
ὅτ οἱ The words within the brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus,
as they interfere with the balance of the sentence.
383. Such seems to be the mercantile meaning of κοινώσασθαι.
39 Here is an allusion to Hom. IA. Z. 236,
There did Zeus, son of Kronos, take away
His wits from Glaucus ; who exchanged his arms
Golden, worth hundred beeves, for brass, worth nine.
THE BANQUET. 569
But, O blessed man, think better of it, nor let me lie hid from
you, as being nothing. The power of intellectual vision be-
gins then to see acutely, when that of the eye loses its acmé.%°
You however are still far off from this. And I, having heard
him, replied, As regards myself the facts are so; of which not
one has been stated otherwise than as I conceive myself. But
do you counsel me in what you may consider to be best both
for you and me. In this, said he, you say well: for in the
time to come let us consult together, and we will do what ap-
pears to be the best for us, both with respect to these and
other matters. [42.] Having thus heard and *! spoken, and sent
as it were arrows,*! I thought that he was wounded; and I
rose up, and not suffering him to speak any more, I wrapped
myself round with this garment, (for it was winter, ) and lying
down under the old cloak of this man, I threw my arms
around the truly divine and wonderful man, and lay there the
whole night. And in this again, Socrates, you will not say
that I am telling a falsehood. But though I acted in this
manner, yet he was victorious, and despised, and jeered at, and
even insulted my beauty. And yet I fancied it was some-
thing, men and judges, for judges you are, of the haughtiness
of Socrates. For by the gods and goddesses, rest assured that
I rose from Socrates no otherwise than if I had slept with my
father, or my elder brother.
30 The same theory is promulgated, if I rightly remember, by Aristotle.
Here however there is evidently some error in λήγειν ἐπιχειρῇ : which I
could perhaps correct, but not without some violence to the text. Fici-
nus has “‘ cum primum ‘corporis oculus deflorescit.”’
81. 81 The Greek is καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀφεὶς ὥσπερ βέλη. But from the imi-
tation in Aristenetus, Epist. ii. 4, καὶ, ὥσπερ Behn, τοὺς λόγους ἀφεῖσα,
and the expression in Plato, Phileb. p. 28, βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπρο-
σθεν λόγων, it is evident that ὥσπερ βέλη could not stand thus by itself.
Plato wrote, I suspect, καὶ ἐπέων ὡς ἀφεὶς εὔπτερα βέλη, in allusion to
the ἔπεα πτερόεντα of Homer; and the εὔπτερος (Vulg. ἄπτερος) φάτις
in Agam. 267; and Τοῦτο διαμπερὲς ὡς εὔπτερον ἧκε βέλος, in Cho. ;
and in Plato, Theetet. p. 180, A., ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ρηματίσκια---
ἀποτοξεύοντες ; and in Heliodor. Aithiop. vii. p. 312, Θεαγένης, ὥσπερ
βέλει, τῷ ῥήματι βληθείς. With regard to the loss or confusion of ἐπέων,
it will be sufficient to refer to Prom, 766, where some MSS. read correctly
μηδ᾽ ἐπῶν προοιμίοις for μηδέ mw—To meet however the objection in
εἰπὼν, which could hardly thus follow ἀκούσας, Ficinus has “ objecis-
sem,’ as if he has found in his MS. ἀντειπὼν : but such I do not believe
was the reading there. Shakspeare too has united “ words” and “ dag-
gers”’ in his well-known—“ These words, like daggers, enter in my ears.”’
510 THE BANQUET.
3 What feelings then do you fancy I had after this,®? on
reflecting that I had been dishonoured, but yet admiring the
nature, and the temperance and fortitude of this man, after
I had met with a person such as I never thought I should
meet with for prudence and self-control; so that I neither
had it in my power to be angry with him, nor though I was
deprived of intercourse with him, had I any means of attach-
ing him to myself. For I well knew that he would be on
every side more invulnerable to money, than Ajax** was to
the sword; and that he had escaped me, at the very time
when I fancied he would be caught. And thus I was reduced
to my wits’ ends, and went about, the slave of this man, as
no one else was of any other. For not only did all this oceur
to me formerly, but after this likewise, during a campaign
common to both of us, took place against Potidea, and there
we messed together. And here, in the first place, he not
only surpassed myself, but all others, in the labours of the
field. But when we were left some where, and compelled, as
happens in campaigns, to be greatly** without food, the rest
were nothing to him for the power of endurance. On the
other hand, at our jollifications, he was the only person who
could enjoy them; for though he was generally® unwilling
to drink, yet when forced to do so, he beat all the rest; and
what is the most wonderful of all, no one ever saw Socrates
intoxicated. But of this it appears to me there will be shortly
aconfutation. Again, with respect to his endurance in winter,
for the winters there are very severe,*® he performed wonders
in other ways, and once also when the frost was most bitter,
32... 82 Compare Iph. A. 1162, Tir’ ἔνδον εἷς σὲ καρδίαν μ᾽ ἕξειν δοκεῖς.
38. This allusion to Ajax seems very strange, when the tradition was,
that he had destroyed himself, as shown in the play of Sophocles. Plato
wrote, I suspect, ᾿Αχιλλεὺς, who, as being invulnerable by a sword, was
killed by an arrow from the bow of Paris. The Schol. on Aj. 833, says
however that he was invulnerable except under the arm-pit; through his
body being covered with the lion’s hide, which had belonged to Hercules ;
and had been perhaps a gift from that hero to Telamon, after they had
conjointly taken Troy.
3: In lieu of ὁπόταν γοῦν ἀναγκασθείημεν, where even Stalbaum can-
not endure ὁπόταν joined to an optative, some MSS. read ὁπότε, while
the majority omit γοῦν, and one has ἂν. Hence it is easy to read ὁπότε
αὖ dyav—where ἄγαν is to be united to ἀσιτεῖν.
35 Instead of ra τ᾽ ἄλλα καὶ, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to ex-
plain, Plato evidently wrote τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ, as I have translated.
% For Potidea was a town on the frontiers of Thrace.
ω
THE BANQUET. 571
and all did not go out from their quarters, or if any did so,
he; clothed himself in wonderfully thick (cloaks),?7 had his
feet bound and wrapped in felt and sheep-skins, Socrates went
out amongst them, wearing just the same clothing as he had
been previously accustomed to wear, and marched through
the ice without shoes, more easily than others with shoes ;
and the soldiers had a suspicion that he held them in con-
tempt. [43.] And thus much on these points.
‘But what this patient man did do and dare,”** during the
campaign there, it is worth while to hear. For while he was
thinking of some question from himself,*® he stood from the
dawn investigating it; and, as he did not succeed, he did not
desist, but stood still investigating it. It was mid-day, and
some persons perceived him, and wondering said, one to the
other, that Socrates had been standing from the morning think-
ing upon something. At length some Ionian soldiers, when
it was evening, having supped—for it was then summer—
brought out their ground-litters, and partly slept in the cold
and partly kept watch, whether he would stand there all night.
And he did stand until the dawn appeared and the sun rose ;
after which he departed, having first offered a prayer to the
sun.*° And if you are willing (to hear), 4‘'what he was in
battle, must not be passed by.‘! For it is surely just to pay
him this tribute. For when the battle took place, in which
the generals assigned to myself the prize of superior good
conduct, no other man rescued me but he, through his being
unwilling to leave me when wounded; and he preserved both
my arms and myself.. And I indeed at that time urged the
commanders to give you, Socrates, the prize of good conduct—
and for stating this, you will neither blame me, nor say that
I am speaking falsely—but the generals, looking to my rank
in life, and wishing to give me those rewards, you were more
37 In θαυμαστὰ δὴ ὅσα there evidently lie hid θαυμαστὰ δασέα.
38. This is a line of Homer in Οδ. A. 242.
39 In lieu of αὐτόθι, two MSS. read αὐτόθεν.
49 Perhaps it would not be difficult to show that the prayer of Socrates
was subsequently published, and is still to be found in an Oriental version.
411 Τῇ lieu of ἐν μάχαις, Ficinus has “In preliis quoque qualis
fuerit, non est silentio pretereundum,” omitting εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε. He
therefore found in his MS. οἷος ἦν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις οὐκ ἐατέον : where
οὐκ ἐατέον might easily have been lost through τοῦτο. But as he omits
the next clause—roiro γὰρ δὴ δίκαιόν ye αὐτῷ arodovvar—perhaps he
introduced the other words to fill up the sense.
572 THE BANQUET.
eager for me to receive them than for yourself.» Further ‘still,
gentlemen, it was well worth while to see Socrates when our
army retreated from Delium ;‘? for I happened to be present
with the cavalry, but Socrates was among the heavy-armed.
For when the troops were already scattered, both he and
Laches retreated; and I, meeting with and seeing the two,
immediately exhorted them to take courage, and said that I
would not abandon them. Here then I had a better view of
Socrates than at Potidea; for I was in less fear, because I
was on horseback. In the first place then, how greatly did he
surpass Laches in his being cautious; and in the next place,
he seemed, according to your description, Aristophanes, to
earry himself loftily,** and to throw his eye on one side, to
survey quietly both friends and foes; and it was manifest to
every one, and even to a person at a distance, that whoever
presumed to touch this man, would be very vigorously re-
pulsed. Hence both he and the other departed in safety; for
scarcely any one, who thus conducts himself in war, is
touched ; but the pursuit is of those who turn and run away.
[44.] 44There are many other things for which a person would
have it in his power to praise Socrates wondrously. But of
his other pursuits, some one may perhaps speak in this way
even about another person ;44 but to be like not one, either of
the ancients or moderns, this is a thing worthy of all wonder.
For such as Achilles was, one might conjecture was Brasidas®
and others: and again, that, such as Pericles was, were An-
*® This event took place in Ol. 89, 1. See Thucyd. iv. 96.
43 The passage of Aristophanes alluded to is in Ned. 361. With regard
to the verb βρενθύεσθαι, it is said to be derived from βείνθες, an aquatic
bird, found in marshes, and that walks with its long legs, as if on stilts.
From this reference to the very play of Aristophanes where Socrates is
the constant butt of the dramatist, and from the two being thus ht to-
gether, as the common friends of Agatho, it has been fairly infer that
either the dramatist had in reality no ill-will towards Socrates, or that the
philosopher was indifferent to what he knew was ὍΣ a farcical caricature.
Ἡ- ὦ Here, as in many other places, the Latin of Ficinus differs from the
Greek, His version is, “In multis quidem aliis mirifice laudari Socrates
potest; sed talia sunt, ut ceteri quoque forsan nonnulli eandem laudem me-
reantur.” From which, however, it is easy to see that he found in his MS.
not ἄλλου τοιαῦτα, but ἄλλου του ταὐτὰ, to which ταῦτα in two MSS.
plainly leads. The pursuits alluded to were, probably, his skill as a seulptor,
philosopher, and poet. ᾿
9. On Brasidas, the Spartan general, and his doings, the reader is referred
to Thucydides, who has shown that he was the Nelson of his country. For,
like the modern naval hero, the general of his yp arwes himself into notice
despite the opposition of ministers at home, and died in the arms of victory.
THE BANQUET. 5738
tenor and Nestor. And there are others likewise; and the
rest *® a person might compare after the same manner. But
such a strange character as is this man, both in himself and
in his discourses, no one will by searching discover any man
approaching near to him, either among those living now or
in the olden time ; unless indeed some one should compare him
to no human being, but to what I have mentioned, Silenuses
and Satyrs. For I omitted to state this at first, that his dis-
courses too are very like the Silenuses when opened. For
should any one be willing to hear the discourses of Socrates,
they will appear to be “’ very ridiculous at first ;47 with such
nouns and verbs do they envelop externally, 48 85 it were, the
hide of a Satyr.** For he speaks of panniered asses,*? and of
copper-smiths, and leather-cutters, and tanners, and he ap-
pears to be always saying the same things upon the same
subjects ;°° so that every man who has neither skill nor sense
will laugh at his words. But he who beholds his discourses
when opened, and gets within them, will, in the first place,
find that they alone of (all other) *!discourses possess an in-
ternal meaning ; and, in the next place, that they are most
divine, and hold the most numerous®” images of virtue, and
extend to the farthest point, or rather to every thing, which
4° The Greek is εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κατὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἄν τις ἀπει-
κάζοι. But Ficinus has “ sunt alii quoque, qui hoc modo conferri possunt,”’
which leads to εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι, οὕς ye d\Aots—The article could not be
here introduced before ἄλλους.
747 As the oldest MSS. omit πάνυ, and one of the oldest reads λεῖοι, it
is evident that the. text has been corrupted, which I could easily restore ;
but not without writing a long and learned note.
4848 The Greek is Σατύρου dy τινα, where, although his six favourite
MSS. omit ἂν, Stalbaum woola still retain it, misled, as usual, by Hermann on
Dissert. “Av, p. 187, who quotes there Eurip. Alcest, 181, and Aristoph. Eq.
1257, neglecting the reading ov yi for οὐκ ἂν furnished by Suidasin Κλέπτης.
Rickert would read αὖ, which is quite as unmeaning as Hommel’s αὐτίκα,
in lieu of ἄν τινα. How easy was it to suggest, Σατύρου οἵαν twa—
4 According to Hesychius, Κανθήλως ὄνος was μωρὸς ὄνομα. But there
the learned read Κανθήλιος ὄνος, as shown by the fragment of Hermippus
quoted by Schol. in Aristoph. ’Opv. 1555. Respecting the fact here alluded
to, of Socrates talking of vulgar things, and to low persons, see Ruhnken on
Xenoph. M.S. i. 2, 37.
50 The same remark is made by Xenophon in M. S. iy. 416, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ
πὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ Kal περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, says Socrates; and both these
es Cicero had perhaps in mind in Amicit. § 4., ““ Socrates, qui non tum
oc tum illud, ut fit in plerisque, sed idem dicebat semper.”” Compare too
Gorg. p. 490, E., dei ταὐτὰ λέγειν---περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, applied to Socrates.
= The Greek is now μόνους---τῶν λόγων. It was μόνους πάντων τῶν
ἄλλων, as shown by “solos aliorum omnium,” in Ficinus.
32 For καὶ πλεῖστ᾽ one would prefer καὶ κάλλιστ᾽, * the most beautiful.’’
574 THE BANQUET.
it is fitting for him to consider, who intends to become a man
at once beautiful and good. ‘These then are the reasons,
gentlemen, for which I praise Socrates; but on the other
hand, for what I blame him, I have mixed up in the recital of
the insults he has heaped upon me. Nor has he acted in this
manner towards me alone, but 4150 towards Charmides, the
son of Glauco, Euthydemus, the son of Diocles, and very
many others ; whom this man has deceived, as if he were their
lover, when, instead of the loving, he is himself the beloved.
Hence,** I caution you, Agatho, not to be deceived by this
man; but, taught by my sufferings, to have a care, and not,
according to the proverb, By suffering, like a silly person,
knowledge gain.*4 |
When Alcibiades had thus spoken, there was a (general)®°
laugh at his freedom of speech, because he appeared to be -
lovingly disposed towards Socrates ; who thereupon observed,
You seem to me, Alcibiades, to be sober; for, otherwise, you
would not have attempted in so elegant and circuitous a man-
ner to conceal that, for the sake of which you have said all
this ; and, as if mentioning something of no consequence, you
have cleverly placed at the end that you have said all this
on this account, namely, to throw discord®® between me and
Agatho, conceiving that I ought to love you and no other
person, and that Agatho ought to be loved by you, and by no
one else. But you have not lain hid from me; but this play
of yours is plainly a Satyric one and Silenus-like. But, my
dear Agatho, let not any thing occur in his favour, but do you
prepare yourself so that no one may set you and me at vari-
ance. Whereupon said Agatho, You seem indeed, Socrates,
to be speaking very nearly the truth, and I conjecture that he
33 The Greek is now“A δὴ, it was Ai’ “A δὴ, as shown by “ quamobrem,”’
in Ficinus. On the loss of Δὲ before A see my Poppo’s Prolegom. Ὁ. 116,
where I have by the slightest emendations rescued the character of Thucy-
dides trom the charge of writing one thing and meaning another.
5+ The proverb alluded to is in Hes. Eoy. 216, παθὼν δέ τι νήπιος ἔγνω.
58 Ficinus has ‘‘ risum omnibus,”’ as if his MS. read πᾶσιν before ἐπὶ.
56 In διαβάλλειν there is what is called a pregnant sense. For it means,
first, to keep apart, as regards a local position, and secondly, as a
friendly feeling. As this remark was made originally by Wytteubech, it
seems strange that Stalbaum should not have seen the fe pac oue of the
BX
reading preserved in one MS. διαλάβη, and in another διαβάλῃ : where how-
ever, after κατεκλίνη, correct syntax would require διαλάβοι, according to
the canon of Dawes, despite what Stalbaum may say to the contrary, misled
by the subtleties of Hermann.
THE BANQUET. 575
has been reclining between you and me, that he might keep
us apart. There will not, however, occur any thing in his
favour from this; for I will come and recline by you. By all
“means, said Socrates, come hither, and recline below me. Ὁ
Zeus! said Alcibiades, how greatly again do I suffer from
this man! He fancies he must surpass me in every thing;
but, O wonderful man, if nothing else, suffer at least Agatho
to recline between us. It is impossible, said Socrates: for
as you have praised me, it is now necessary for me to praise
him, reclining at my right hand. If, therefore, Agatho reclines
below you, he will not surely again praise me, before he has
been praised by me. Cease, then, thou happy fellow, and do
not grudge my being praised by the youth; for I have a great
desire to pass an encomium on him. Ho! ho! said Agatho to
Alcibiades, there is no reason why I should remain here, but
every reason rather that I should change my place, that I may be
praised by Socrates. This is, said Alcibiades, as usual. When
Socrates is present, it is impossible for any other to share the
favours of the beautiful. And now observe how easily he
has discovered a persuasive language, so that this youth should
recline at his side. After this Agatho rose up, as if about to
recline close to Socrates. But on a sudden there came very
many revellers to the gates, and, finding them open, in con-
sequence of some one having gone out in an opposite direction,
they marched in, and threw themselves on the couches; and
the whole place was filled with uproar, and no longer in any
order (every one)*” was compelled to drink a great quantity
of wine. Whereupon Eryximachus and Phedrus, and some
others, said Aristodemus, went away,°* but that sleep laid
hold of him ;° and that he slept for a very long time, as the
37 As there is nothing to which ἀναγκάζεσθαι can be referred, Sydenham
has introduced “ every one ;”’ which has led me to suggest πάντα πολὺν,
in lieu of πάμπολυν. Ficinus has merely, ‘‘ nec ullus post hee modus in
bibendo servatus.”’
53 Stalbaum remarks correctly, that Eryximachus and Pheedrus are pro-
perly said to have gone away ; for the physician was no friend of intemper-
ance, as stated in p, 176, Ὁ. § 4, and Phedrus was, on this point especially,
accustomed to follow the example of his medical friend, as he confesses in
the same ᾧ.
59 The best MSS. read 2 δὲ, others ἕαδε, and one ἐμὲ δὲ, just as we find
in p. 175, A. § 3, ἐμὲ in all the MSS., which Stephens first altered into ἕ μὲν.
But as in Attic Greek the reciprocal pronoun is ἑαυτὸν or αὑτὸν, we must
here and elsewhere look for some other remedy, Perhaps Plato wrote, εἰς
δὲ ἔπνον ὕπνον ἑαυτὸν λαβεῖν, i. 6. “ sleep laid hold of him at the stove:’
where the mention of the stove is very appropriate ; for not only were the
576 THE BANQUET.
nights were long, and rose at daybreak while the cocks were
crowing ; and on getting up he saw that the rest of the guests
were asleep, or® gone; but that Agatho, Aristophanes, and
Socrates were still awake, and drinking out of a great bowl, —
which they kept passing to the right hand,*! and that Socrates
was discoursing with them; but he did not recollect, said
Aristodemus, what the discourse was in other respects, as he
was not present at the beginning of it, and dozing; but the
sum of it, he said, was this, that Socrates was compelling
them to admit that it was the province of the same person to
know how to write comedy and tragedy, and that he, who was
by art a tragic poet, was also a comic one; and that when they
had been compelled (to admit) this, they began, as not very
well following (the argument),®? to doze; and that Aristo-
phanes fell asleep the first, and when it was now day,
Agatho; but that Socrates, having put them to sleep, got up
and went away; and that “he, (Aristodemus,) as he was
wont, followed ; and that he (Socrates) went to the Lyceum,
and, having washed himself as at another time, passed the
rest of the day ;® and having thus passed it till evening, he
took his rest at home.
nights long, as stated shortly afterwards, but cold likewise. For the Lenza
were celebrated in January. Γ
80 In lieu of καὶ Hommel properly suggested 4. Ficinus has ayoided the
difficulty in καὶ, for the same persons were assuredly not asleep and gone,
by his ‘* partim dormiebant, partim discesserant.”’
6 On the phrase πίνειν ἐπιδέξια, see Casaubon on Athenzeus, 1. p. 21, B.
55. Stalbaum, to supply the ellipse, quotes very opportunely Euthyphr. p.
12, A., οὐχ ἕπομαι τοῖς λεγομένοις.
663 As αὐτὸς is omitted in nearly all the MSS., Bekker thinks that Plato
wrote here, as in § 4, the obsolete ὃ, Ficinus has “ ipso, ut consueverat,
comitante,’’ which confirms αὐτὸς.
*t Although ὥσπερ ἄλλοτε might perhaps stand, yet one would prefer
ὥσπερ ἐλιννύοντα, “ like a dawdler,” as having nothing todo, On the gloss
or corruption of ἐλιννύειν, Toup has written with his usual le , Sa-
gacity, and taste, on Suid. t. ii. p. 201. In fact, if some such idea be not intro-
duced, the subsequent οὕτω would be scarcely intelligible. But if ἄλλοτε
be preserved, we must read αὔτως, “αὖ leisure,” for οὕτω. 3
55. Instead of ἄλλην, Ficinus found in his MS, ὅλην, as shown by his
“totum.” From whence Stephens edited ὅλην.
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