They betrayed Czechoslovakia;

CO

.^

THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by G. J. GEORGE

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THEY BETRAYED
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by

G.

J.

GEORGE

with a

Preface by

EDGAR

ANSEL MOWRER

PUBLISHED AS A 'PENGUIN SPECIAL' BY

PENGUIN BOOKS LIMITED

HARMONDSWORTH MIDDLESEX ENGLAND

First published November 1938

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This book is the work of a journaUst, and not of
an historian. History will later pass judgment on
the occurrences of October 1938. All the state-
ments contained in this book are based upon trust-
worthy reports and documents. The texts of the
letters have been taken from the English White
Paper.

G. J. G.

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN FOR PENGUIN BOOKS LIMITED,
BY RICHARD CLAY AND COMPANY, LTD., BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

PREFACE

The incredible has happened. A little people,
pacific, industrious, freedom-loving, has been be-
trayed. Betrayed and partitioned. Not by ruthless
enemies, as Poland was partitioned. Partitioned by
a State reputed friendly and by a sworn ally. By
the United Kingdom and the French Republic.
By Englishmen deliberately and after calm re-
flection ; by Frenchmen in an hour of panic. More,
the guilty have accepted praise and rejoicing for
their act. For did they not save world peace? Is
anything worth more than peace — honour or free-
dom or democracy ? What if it is a German peace,
a Fascist peace, imposed on no longer quite free
peoples by the threat of war? Faced with the
choice between possible (though by no means certain)
war and dishonour, the rulers of Great Britain and
of France chose dishonour. No wonder they
have ever since sought shelter behind specious
explanations.

In that, at least, they will not succeed. This is
the story of the betrayal by one of the betrayed, a
Czechoslovak. In a series of unforgettable scenes
he traces the stages of a felony. I cannot imagine
any right-minded person in France or Great Britain
reading his story without burning cheeks. Mr.
George does not tell quite all the story. He does not
tell how the partitioning was prepared in advance.
But Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hinted at it.

vi PREFACE

He had, he told the House of Commons, long been
convinced that a settlement of what he called the
" Czechoslovak problem " was the " last obstacle ''
to the appeasement of Nazi Germany. Doubtless
his friends in Berlin told him so. We have heard
this before. The " disarmed " German Rhineland
was the " last obstacle " to appeasement, until Hitler
got up his courage to seize Austria against the wishes
of probably three-fourths of its inhabitants. Then
the last obstacle became Germany's desire to seize
the German-speaking rim of Czechoslovakia (with the
Poles and Hungarians playing jackal to the German
tiger). Mr. Chamberlain said so. He will have
plenty of opportunity to say it again. There are
still many nuclei of German " race " in the world —
in Switzerland, in the Italian Tyrol, in Alsace-
Lorraine, in Eupen-Malmedy, on the southern
fringe of Denmark, in the Polish Corridor (where
they were never anything but a minority), in Memel,
in the Baltic States, in Roumania, along the Volga
in Soviet Russia, in the United States. Enough
" last obstacles " to enliven history for many years
to come, if only Mr. Chamberlain and his likes
can remain in power, ready to turn the helpless over
to a ruthless and pirate Ship of State that has hoisted
the Jolly Roger, made its pacifists, democrats, Jews
and sincere Christians walk the plank, and is pre-
pared to sail on until it is sunk.

With apologies to poor Mr. Chamberlain, there
was no " Sudeten problem ", thanks to which the
Sudetens, even supposing they had all so desired,
had a right simply to walk out of the Czechoslovak
State and go over to Germany. If they had this

I

PREFACE vii

right, then Abraham Lincoln was a tyrant, who
prevented the Southern States from leaving the
Union at the cost of more than four years bloody
war. If they had, then Wales, Scotland and Cornwall
can secede from Chamberlain's Britain to-morrow
without England having a word to say against it.
The French Canadians have, if they choose, a right
to join a Fascist France to-morrow, and the unending
wrong of a subject Indian people must be righted at
once. Does Mr. Chamberlain believe this? Only
if he does, can he uphold the right of secession for
the Sudetens. Or have his German friends " rights "
he would deny to " inferior " peoples who have not
et risen to the level of a Nazi regime?

I say that Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier
anded over the Sudetens to Hitler, not because
the Sudetens were " oppressed " (none but an
amateur could beheve that), but because Hitler
shouted and banged on the table and threatened
war, because his army is strong, and because he must
be maintained in power, since " after all, he is the
only remaining obstacle to the bolshevisation of
Europe", etc., etc.

Here we reach the real crux of the betrayal.

But wait. The writer of these lines is neither
Communist nor Socialist, but a Liberal, a follower of
Thomas Jefferson and John Stuart Mill. He comes
of what Ku Kluxers call a " one hundred per cent.
American, white, Protestant family ", with no known
trace of Jewish blood. Among his Celto-Nordic
ancestors were even some Germans. Pitiful epoch
when pedigree alone bestows the right to state the
facts.

viii PREFACE

I repeat, Neville Chamberlain and Georges Bonnet
(let us try to forget Daladier, who surrendered from
weakness, not from bad will) betrayed Czecho-
slovakia, just as Sir John Simon betrayed China in
1931; Pierre Laval betrayed Ethiopia in 1935;
Sir Samuel Hoare betrayed the League of Nations
and Pierre-Etienne Flandin betrayed France, in
1936; Leon Blum and Anthony Eden betrayed
Republican Spain the same year and China was
deserted for the second time in 1937.

But neither Chamberlain, who believes he has
"saved peace for a generation" (his generation?),
nor Edouard Daladier, who thought the crowd
gathered at Le Bourget airport to welcome him
back from Munich had come to jeer, nor Georges
Bonnet and his confederates dare say so.

They say, there was no use in fighting; Czecho-
slovakia could not have been defended anyway.

This is probably untrue. It is far more likely
that had France and Britain taken their places
beside Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia, the
Germans would have been unable to storm that
fortress, Bohemia. But suppose Bohemia had been
overrun, was Belgium defended in Belgium or in
American munitions factories, at Verdun and the
Dardanelles? Yet Belgium is still there, happy and
prosperous.

They say, even in case of victory, the Czechs
would have been compelled by their aUies to yield
the Sudetens to Germany.

I doubt it. The Sudetens had never been part of
Germany. There is no evidence that a majority
of them wanted to be. To most of us, the spectacle

PREFACE ix

of nine and a half million Czechoslovaks outvoting
three and a quarter million free Sudetens is less
offensive than that of Germany bullying nine and a
half million Czechoslovaks. A v^ar would have
driven the Hitlerophiles from power in London and
Paris, and Hitler himself from power in Berlin.

They say, by yielding the Czechs saved their
country from utter devastation.

It is possible. So could Belgium and France
have escaped the horror of their devastated regions
by submitting in 1914. And if the Czechoslovaks,
Hke the brave Belgians and Frenchmen of a
generation ago, preferred total destruction to
capitulation, this was, after all, their affair, not that
of Neville Chamberlain.

They say, the Czechs surrendered to save world
peace.

The facts belie it. The surrender occurred only
when the French Minister told President Benes in
the Hradschin at Prague at two in the morning of
21st September, 1938, that unless Czechoslovakia
immediately and unconditionally accepted the
German Dictator's terms, shamefully transformed
into an " Anglo-British Plan ", France would
break its pledge and desert the little country in the
ensuing war !

They sa>^, they could not count on adequate
Russian aid. Lord Winterton chose to repeat this
charge several times.

Is it not a fact that the Russians told the French
Ambassador M. Coulondre in Moscow on 2nd
September, that Russia would support Czecho-
slovakia, France's and Russia's common Ally, by

^s

X PREFACE

all means in its power, and that he would welcome
staff talks between the two countries? Does this
sound like desertion?

" But the Russian aeroplanes are no good, the
Russian Army is completely demoralised."

Strange that such inferior planes have managed to
hold their own against the latest German and Italian
models in Spain, against French and American
machines flown by Japanese in China. Even a
demoralised army is, after all, worth more than the
finest force that will not fight. And none can deny
that the vast majority of military experts the world
over, including the French Chief of Staff, General
GameHn, had little doubt but that the war could be
won by the democracies with Russia, against the
dictatorships.

" But Lord Runciman reported that, under the
circumstances, the further peaceful cohabitation in
one State between Sudeten Germans provoked by
Hitler and Czechoslovaks had been impossible."

Sagacious Lord Runciman, welcomed by the
Sudetens as " Father Christmas," who, curiously
enough, managed to reach the same opinion as was
publicly expressed a month or two before by
Germanophiles like Lord Rothermere and Lord
Allen of Hurtwood ! If this opinion were correct.
Hitler needed only to be told to cease provoking
the Sudetens or he would be slapped on the wrist.
But it is not correct: for a thousand years Sudeten
Germans and Czechs have lived in close association.
And to this day there is no evidence that a majority
of the Sudetens desired to be transferred to Nazi
Germany. This transfer was decided without con-

'jam

PREFACE xi

suiting them or the Government in Prague. And
after Chamberlain and Daladier had gone through
the tragi-farce of mobihsation to oppose Hitler's
Godesberg plans for the amputation of three
million Germans and about a miUion Czechs, the
Berlin Committee set up to make effective the
Munich surrender solemnly allowed him more
territory than he had claimed at Godesberg, simply
because neither Chamberlain nor Daladier was
prepared to stand up against a blustering dictator,

I ho, by keeping his army under arms while the
liers demobiHsed, was able to reahse not one but
K'hole series of " ultimatums ".
I* But the surviving Czechoslovakia will, because
Imogeneous, be stronger than before."
Ilf so, if a country that has been deprived of its
I but impregnable fortifications, of one-third of its
population, of nearly three-fourths of its industry,
is stronger than before, then why this hurry to give
the rump a " Franco-British guarantee " that will
never be honoured (are there any pledges that France
and Great Britain still honour?), why this loan and
alms-giving to the Czechs? It looks rather like a
form of hush-money dictated by uneasy conscience.
" But Chamberlain has nothing to reproach
himself with. Why should he ? Great Britain had
no engagements towards the Czechs, a people none
of us knows anything about."

No? Is the League of Nations Covenant no
engagement? Or does the learned Sir John Simon
maintain that a multilateral contract of this type
can be annulled simply by one-sided repudiation?
Less subtle jurists are likely to maintain that so

xii PREFACE

long as Britain remained a member and the Covenant
was not amended, Britain remained honourably
bound to guarantee both the independence and the
territorial integrity of member States. But having
betrayed Ethiopia, why should Britain and France
bother about another victim, or handing over a
few hundred thousand Sudeten democrats and
Socialists to Adolf Hitler for torture?

One thing only is true. The Government of Great
Britain never wanted to defend Czechoslovakia,
and could only have been forced to if France had
kept its promise to the Czechs. And the French
failed. Foreign Minister Bonnet intrigued against
his Ally, Premier Daladier wilted in face of opposi-
tion, French pacifist and pro-Fascist currents
combined to insist on peace even at the price of
betrayal. What else could one expect when even
prosperous citizens in Paris were openly pro-
claiming their preference for Adolf Hitler as against
Leon Blum? But since this was the fact, let it be
publicly proclaimed and recognised as the fact. To
have demonstrated this is the merit of Mr. George's
book. They Betrayed Czechoslovakia.

Most of " them ", to be sure, have still only the
vaguest conception of what they have done. " They "
cannot hear the chuckles of Hermann Goering each
time a French or British statesman expresses his
behef that one " can trust the Fiihrer ". For trust*
him one can, to make no peace but a Pax Germanica
with the Duce tagging along behind. " They " do
not yet know that Fascism is not a philosophy, not
a political doctrine, but simply the national will to
aggression brought to its highest point of efficiency

PREFACE xiii

and readiness. " They " have not yet been tortured
in concentration camps or seen men herded into
jails because they sincerely believed in Jesus Christ.
" They " cannot imagine that a Fascist State cannot
cease from aggression without ceasing to be. And so
" they " think that dishonour is adequately repaid
if it bring peace. But a Winston Churchill knows
the choice is not between war and a single betrayal
of a helpless people, but between war and complete
despoliation, between living free or slave.

The abandonment of the Czechs has made the
further defence of European democracy extremely
difficult. It has given Germany almost complete
dominion in Central Europe and the Balkans. It
has accompHshed Chamberlain's apparent aim of
breaking the " French system" and confining France's
political activity to Western Europe and Africa.
It has almost isolated Soviet Russia (which alone
among European States can stand isolation). It
has paved the way for a further series of German
outrages. But it has not yet made the defence of
world democracy impossible. Britain and France
can still maintain themselves — if they fight Fascism
at home; if they quickly save Spain from Italian
and German clutches ; if they preserve the friendship,
or even the academic interest, of the American
people. But it is doubtful if they will do any of
these things. Was it not to encourage " co-opera-
tion " with Fascism that the Czechs were " sold
down the river " ?

Do London and Paris realise that, faced with
the choice of overcoming stubborn Russian resis-
tance or peacefully blackmailing the over-ripe

xiv PREFACE :;

Western countries, the Fiihrer and the Duce may I

well prefer the latter, and that only the Spanish |

Republican army stands between them and the. \

ability to do it? Or that when the day of trial 1

comes and "SOS Empire caUing " is heard along i

the ether, one hundred and thirty milUon Americans, '
taking their cue from Neville Chamberlain, may

decide that what is left of European democracy is ;
just not worth having a war to save?

EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Preface by Edgar Ansel Mowrer . . , . v

CHAPTER

I. The Big Four .19

Stage and Actors

Berchtesgaden

The Sudeten Germans

Germany Plays at War

The Times Causes a Sensation

Herr Hitler Storms

The Sudeten Germans go Crazy

Berchtesgaden — Behind the Scenes

Two Men at a Table

II. No. 10 Downing Street. .... 47

Prague Receives an Ultimatum from her Allies

Hitler Ponders

M. Bonnet Takes the Law into his Own Hands

A Terrible Night and a Sombre Day

War Knocks at the Door

Godesberg

III. Herr Hitler Draws a Map .... 73

Paris Interlude
Letters Across the Rhine
The Czechs Ready to Fight
The " Supreme Effort "
Midnight Talks

IV. One Hundred and Twenty Hours Shake

Europe 106

President Bene§ sees Hitler's Work

War or Peace ?

A Rainy Sunday

Uncertainty in Berlin

The U.S.A. Steps In

The Soldiers' Hour

Herr Hitler Listens . . . and Speaks

XV

xvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

V. The Balkans Look West . . , .134
Shadows over Europe
Paris
Prague
Warsaw

Two Communiques and a Cabinet Meeting
Sir Horace Wilson goes Home
Europe Awaits her Destiny
Paris
Prague
Brussels
Washington
Berlin
A Gentleman's Speech and Two Letters

VL Mussolini's Return to Glory . . .164

Speeding Ahead for Peace
The Pax Germanica

The Three Phases of the Dispute over Czecho-
slovakia

Epilogue 177

Appendix . 179

G0DESBER6 DEMANDS SEPTEMBER 23th 193j

UlillTfRRITORY CONTAINING 2-S0>iCZKHi

THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CHAPTER I

THE BIG FOUR

Midnight had come and gone. Four men sat
round a big table in the Fiihrer's house in Munich.
At that momentous hour it was for them to decide
upon the fate of Europe. One after another they
took up the pen to sign a document which inflicted
irreparable injuries upon a country not even
represented among them — Czechoslovakia.

At the same hour a ray of light which showed
through a curtained window in the ancient castle of
Prague told of the man who, in his study there, was
awaiting the decision : Dr. Edvard Benes, President
of the Czechoslovak Republic, and joint-founder of
this State with his predecessor, the great President
and thinker, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk.

Far below him the city lay in darkness. Prague
had for several days been expecting the German
aeroplanes to raid it. But the planes did not come :
the Czechoslovak army, counted among the best in
Europe, had been mobilised to no purpose. To no
purpose also had the impregnable concrete forti-
fications been constructed on the frontier, at the cost
of some 500 miUion dollars.

The telephone bell rang. President Benes took
up the receiver and Hstened. The Czech Minister,
Dr. Mastny, was speaking from Munich.

19

20 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia's fate had been sealed; the
democratic little country in the middle of Europe
had lost a war without having waged it. Not only
was it abandoned by its allies, but it was compelled
by them to cede to Germany great and rich territory.

The President was at that hour reminded of the
saying of Bismarck, the great German statesman:
" He who possesses Bohemia holds the key to
Europe."

Too late to think of that now. The men in whose
hands lay the fate of Europe did not know, or perhaps
did not care to know, that the fate of Czechoslovakia
was at the same time Europe's fate, and that the
democracies of Europe, in the clutch of a collective
fear, and capitulating before Hitler, were surrender-
ing themselves while surrendering Czechoslovakia.
Once Hitler has subdued Czechoslovakia, he will
soon be master of the Balkans. The rich cornfields
of Hungary, Rumania's petroleum wealth, the
countless raw materials of Central Europe will fall
to him, and he needs them badly if he is to make
Germany an invincible Power in Europe.

Europe has given way before Hitler again and
again: it permitted him to occupy the Rhineland,
which, according to the Treaty of Versailles, was to
be closed to German troops for a term of years;
it has tolerated Germany's gigantic rearmament
schemes ; it made no active objections to the invasion
of Austria, and it has now practically handed Czecho-
slovakia over to Germany. Who will be the next
to be sacrificed?

In Paris and London the signing of the Munich
pact was the signal for tremendous jubilation. The

THE BIG FOUR 21

bulk of the people did not realise that it was not for
Czechoslovakia they were supposed to fight, but for
a free Europe. Nor do they realise even now that
the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia is but one more step
along the road of Europe's decline and Germany's
domination of the Continent.

The people of France and England did not under-
stand that defeat without war is every bit as terrible
as a lost war. In these days they have been cele-
brating their own discomfiture as if it were a victory.

And yet Europe might have been saved from the
domination of Pan-Germanism even without a war.
How it was that this did not happen, and how it
was that the three most powerful nations in Europe
— Great Britain, France and Soviet Russia — yielded
to the tremendous bluff of Adolf Hitler, and sur-
rendered both themselves and Europe, will be told
in the following pages of this book.

This is the story of a betrayal prompted by fear ;
of the great game of poker which was not won by
the holder of the best cards, but by the player who
was able to put up the biggest bluff. The stake
of this game of poker, however, was not merely
Czechoslovakia — it was Europe.

Stage and Actors

The chief role in the most exciting drama in
modern world-history, which had Europe for its
stage, and for two months kept a whole world in a
state of tension, was played by Adolf Hitler, the
forty-nine-year-old Fiihrer of the German Reich, an
abstainer, a vegetarian, and a man who believes
himself to be a prophet sent by God, and receives

22 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

his inspirations direct from the ' Germanic God '.
But a man, too, who knows how to safeguard his
chances, and to turn every one of them to the utmost
account; a player playing on the fears of the
European democracies as a great musician plays on
a vioHn.

His fellow-player, and Europe's second Dictator,
the fifty-year-old Duce of Italy, Benito Mussolini,
remained in the background. Not until the great
final scene did he come forward, rushing into the
breach as saviour of the trembling European
democracies.

The two players opposite, Neville Chamberlain,
the sixty-nine-year-old Prime Minister of Britain,
and Edouard Daladier, the fifty-nine-year-old Prime
Minister of France, and former schoolmaster, were
no match for the two Dictators. Winston Churchill,
the English statesman, said of them : " The Govern-
ments of England and France had the choice of
dishonour or war. They chose dishonour, but they
will have war ". In the course of the nerve-racking
negotiations there were moments when France and
England seemed minded to choose war rather than
dishonour. On Monday the 5th September France
began her mobilisation. By the end of the month
she had a million and a half men under arms. On
Wednesday forenoon, the 28th September, the King
of England ordered the mobilisation of the Home
Fleet. On the evening before, Tuesday, 27th Sep-
tember, Neville Chamberlain, in his broadcast
speech, had said : "However much we may sympathise
with a small nation confronted by a powerful neigh-
bour, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to

THE BIG FOUR 23

involve the whole British Empire in a war simply on
her account. If we have to fight, it must be on
larger issues than that. ... If I were convinced
that any nation had made up its mind to dominate
the world by fear of its force, I should feel it
should be resisted. Under such domination the
life of people who believe in Hberty would not
be worth Uving." Therefore on Tuesday evening
Mr. Chamberlain reahsed that the actual aims of
Germany were the domination of Europe. Then
on Wednesday afternoon came Hider's invitation to
Munich, and Thursday and Friday the acceptance
of the terms laid down by Hitler. On Tuesday
evening Mr. Chamberlain expressed the opinion that
Germany wanted to dominate Europe. Did he forget
this in forty-eight hours when, on the night of Friday,
he put his signature to the fatal document ?

The fifth leading role, and the truly tragic one in
this drama, was played by Edvard Benes, the fifty-
four-year-old President of the Czechoslovak Repub-
lic. This man, of small stature but abounding
energy, had been the most intimate collaborator of
Masaryk, the founder of the Republic. For fifteen
years he was the soul of the League of Nations.
Under the compulsion of those whom he had
regarded as his allies, he had had to stand idly by
and watch the mutilation and all but annihilation of
his life's work. He had had to disregard the most
outrageous insults heaped upon him by Chancellor
Hitler in his Nuremberg speech on 12th September,
and again in the speech at the Berlin Sport Palace on
26th September. Never before had a responsible
statesman been known thus publicly to revile the

24 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

head of another country. Dr. Benes could do
nothing about it: his friends in the West had tied
his hands.

Then there were the numerous subsidiary parts.
There was Konrad Henlein, aged thirty-three, the
one-time gymnastic instructor from the small town
of Asch in Bohemia, who had made a name for
himself as leader of the Sudeten German Party,
founded by him, and directed by Germany. In the
last five years alone over three million dollars were
expended on the various activities of this Party.
This money, paid by Germany, has been a most
fruitful investment. The spa of Karlsbad, the coal-
mines of North Bohemia and its whole industrial
plant are worth many times the cost of the Sudeten
German Party. As for the outlay on Germany's
mobilisation, the whole of the Balkans will settle
that score. Konrad Henlein was only a small pawn
in Hitler's great game, as Seyss-Inquart was in the
case of Austria.

Lord Runciman, sixty-five years of age, the personal
friend of Chamberlain, and himself a former Liberal
Minister, played another secondary part. When he
came to Prague on the 3rd of August, on the instruc-
tions of the British Government, but " as a private
individual ", to mediate between the Sudeten Germans
and the Prague Government, students of European
politics in Paris and London noted with dismay that
Great Britain had that day decided to drop Czecho-
slovakia. Lord Runciman left Prague on the 16th of
September, after a six weeks' stay. His week-ends in
Czechoslovakia had been spent mostly at the castles
of the pro-German nobihty who had never been able

THE BIG FOUR 25

to live on a friendly footing with the Czech demo-
cracy, and backed Henlein's Party in the belief that
once the autonomy of the Sudeten territory was an
accomplished fact, they would again play a leading
part. The owners of those castles in Bohemia had
never considered the possibility of annexation by
Germany, for members of the nobihty have very little
say in Germany. What they will miss now will be
the free atmosphere of a democratic country. When
Lord Runciman returned to London he stated that
Germans and Czechs would never agree, and that
radical measures were necessary. He had not
studied history, and therefore could not know that
Germans and Czechs had been living together in
Bohemia for a thousand years — until such time,
indeed, as Hitler and his two great helpers in the
West arrived upon the scene.

The European drama of September 1938 was
crowded with actors, all of whom will duly appear
in their special roles. It was given to a newspaper,
however, to play one of the most fateful parts in
this story, and that newspaper was The Times, with
its leading article of 7th September.

Berchtesgaden

Adolf Hitler's house stands like a fortress high
above the little Bavarian hamlet of Berchtesgaden.
It is only a few miles from the former Austrian
border and about seventy-eight miles from that of
Czechoslovakia. It was in this house that Austria's
fate was sealed when, on the 12th February, 1938,
her ill-fated Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg,
heard Hitler's ultimatum. On the 1st September of

26 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

this same year, not six months after the annexation
of Austria, the fate of Czechoslovakia was being
decided in the same place.

Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten Germans,
had been ordered to come to Adolf Hitler. Offi-
cially it was stated that the meeting was taking place
at the instigation of Lord Runciman ; but actually
it was Hitler himself who demanded Henlein's
presence. Thus, what Henlein and his Party had
hitherto denied now became quite clear to the whole
world : that they were nothing but a branch of the
National Socialist Party, and received their orders
direct from Germany.

Henlein arrived at Berchtesgaden in the forenoon,
but was not immediately received by Hitler. He
had to wait several hours before being admitted into
the presence of his Fiihrer. Henlein's task was
difficult. The Prague Government had already
made so many concessions under pressure from
France and England that the Sudeten German Party
might have come to terms with it. It was now
possible for the Party to administer the German
territory of Czechoslovakia and to receive sub-
stantial financial assistance from Prague for that
purpose, almost, indeed, to form a State of their
own within the confines of the Czechoslovak Repub-
lic. Henlein came to Hitler with the task of winning
the Fuhrer over to acceptance of the Prague pro-
posals. The Sudeten German population — peasants,
workers and trades-people — were tired of a tension
which made work impossible for them. Karlsbad
and Marienbad were empty, the factories in the
Sudeten German area had to close down, because

THE BIG FOUR 27

their products were boycotted by the big American
department stores. In this part of the country the
tension was at its highest. The Czechs were buying
nothing from the German dealers, and the German
workmen were no longer able to earn a living.
Throughout the German camp there was a general
appeal for a cessation of the struggle and an agree-
ment with Prague.

But Adolf Hitler was inflexible. He had learned
from radical leaders of the Sudeten Germans that
Henlein wanted to give in and was showing himself
too weak. The Fiihrer was in a rage, and he did
not conceal it from his underling.

For more than an hour he talked to Henlein, who
stood there before him. His words became more
and more furious and insulting. He banged with
his right hand on the top of the table to give further
emphasis to his utterances. Henlein was barely able
to get out a word or two of the speech which he had
prepared beforehand. Hitler, well aware of all that
his henchman wanted to say, would not allow him
to say it. What he himself wanted was to pursue
the struggle to a definite decision, no matter at what
cost — even at the cost of war. But it would never
come to that, he was convinced of it. What nation
in Europe would let loose a war for the sake of
Czechoslovakia? So if Henlein would not carry
out his instructions, there were others who were
quite ready to do so. As for himself, he had no
time for weaklings and boobies.

On that same day some leading members of the
Sudeten German Party met at the Party headquarters
in Prague to await the Berchtesgaden decision.

28 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

They were Frank, Kundt, Sebekowsky and Ullrich.
Would Henlein's telephone message bid them
prepare for a settlement on peaceful lines, or must
there be bloodshed ? They waited in vain. Henlein
had been bidden to spend the night at Berchtesgaden,
and to fetch the Fiihrer's orders next morning.

Next forenoon, the 2nd September, and a cold,
wet day, Henlein was again shown into the presence
of Hitler to receive his instructions. This time the
Fiihrer was not alone : Marshal Goering ; Hess, the
Fiihrer's representative ; and Goebbels, the Minister
of Propaganda, were all with him. Some time
afterwards the Minister for Foreign Affairs, von
Ribbentrop, arrived also. It was the latter who
had given Hitler the most valuable advice in the
whole campaign: He was not to bother about
England, for England would never fight.

" Keep on fighting, come what may," were
Hitler's orders, and he then proceeded to give
Henlein — by this time so overwrought that he had
difficulty in grasping them — his future plans of
campaign. These were: to stiffen the demands of
the Sudeten Germans sufficiently to make them
inacceptable to the Prague Government; provoca-
tion of incidents in the Sudeten area, which might
possibly be worked up into an armed revolt, in
which Germany would have an excuse for inter-
vening if need be.

As the wretched Henlein was leaving Hitler's
study, Goering gave him one small word of cheer :

" Don't be alarmed, Henlein, there won't be any
war. The Fuhrer always knows what he is up

THE BIG FOUR 29

The Sudeten Germans

Towards evening of that same day Henlein
motored back to Czechoslovakia. He was received
in his native town with great rejoicings, pelted with
flowers and everywhere acclaimed. But he did not
look particularly happy. He was afraid of what lay
ahead, afraid that his own role would presently be
played out; for Hitler had the whole affair in his
own firm grasp.

The Party leaders held a conference as soon as
Henlein arrived. Two of the members had that
same day been received by President Benes, who
had spoken to them in the clear, persuasive manner
so characteristic of him: coolly, calmly and dis-
passionately. He had pointed out all the advan-
tages which the Sudeten Germans would reap from
an acceptance of the Czechoslovak offer. The two
deputies listened politely. They could not negotiate
until Henlein returned from Berchtesgaden.

But now that they sat together with Henlein in
the room where he worked, the two radical deputy-
leaders recovered their enthusiasm. Late in the
night a message was dispatched to Prague, that the
Sudeten German Party were unable to accept the
offer of the Prague Government, though they were
willing to continue the discussions.

After Henlein's interview at Berchtesgaden, the
Sudeten German question assumed dramatic forms :
negotiations were shortly to give place to deeds.

The great majority of the Sudeten German popula-
tion were not aware of what was actually going on.

30 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Up to the last few years they had lived more or less
contentedly, more or less peaceably with their Czech
neighbours, as they had done during the thousand
years which preceded. Only when the National
Socialists seized power in Germany was there
evidence of some internal disquiet among the
Germans in Czechoslovakia. They had always
been very nationalistic, and it was really from the
German areas in Bohemia that National Sociahsm
had sprung long before the War. Now it held the
reins of government in Germany. When, as a
measure of public security, the Czech Government
was obliged to put down the National Socialist
Party, the Sudeten German Party had come into
existence, and adherents were soon flocking to it.
The Party reached the summit of its power with the
annexation of Austria by Germany. It became
the strongest single Party in the Czechoslovak
Parliament. Still the wave of German nationahstic
fervour continued to grow in the Sudeten areas.
Even so, however, it did not occur to any of the
3,230,000 Sudeten Germans who made up 22^
per cent, of the total Czechoslovak population that
their country would be annexed by Germany.
Economically and geographically they belonged to
Bohemia, as they had done for the last thousand
years, ever since the Bohemian kings had called
them in to till the land and build the towns.

But Germany had her plans all ready. " There
are still ten milHon Germans on our borders who do
not belong to the Reich ", had been a favourite
public utterance of Hitler's. After the Austrian
' anschluss ' only three milUons of these were left,

THE BIG FOUR 31

the majority of them being the Germans in the
mountainous frontier territories known as the
Sudeten regions.

The Sudeten Germans hstened when their case
came up for discussion in the Reich. They responded
eagerly and enthusiastically to the calls which came
to them from across the German frontier. But they
did not know that they were simply mere pawns
on Hitler's chessboard. They were to be the
infernal machine which was to blow sky-high the
fastnesses of Czechoslovakia. The firm democratic
stand of the Republic, its loyalty to the Western
democracies, its fortresses, and its good army were
the greatest obstacles along Germany's route to
South-eastern Europe. Without Czechoslovakia
Germany could not dominate that part of the
Continent. Therefore Czechoslovak resistance would
have to be broken, and what device lent itself so
well to this purpose as that of exploiting the German
minority ? Of course when Hitler had started doing
this, he did not immediately conceive the idea of
annexing the Sudeten territory. All he wanted was
the widest possibly autonomy for the Germans in
Czechoslovakia, with a consequent undermining
and weakening of the Republic from within. It was
not until he had noticed the undecided attitude of the
Western Great Powers that he carried his game a
Httle farther, and increased his demands until they
reached their limits — the claim for an annexation
of the Sudeten Germans. In this game the Western
Powers lent him their support.

32 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Germany Plays at War

Three weeks before the occurrences which have
just been described, Germany had suddenly an-
nounced great army manoeuvres. Europe took
notice as more and more men in Germany were
called to the colours and when it was learned that
Germany was beginning in great haste to erect
gigantic fortifications on her western frontier in the
direction of France and Belgium. Hundreds of
thousands of men were mobilised for labour on
these fortifications. Motor-cars and motor-lorries
were seized for military purposes, and after a few
weeks Germany resembled one huge miUtary camp.
No less than 750,000 reservists had been called to
the colours, so that by the end of September there
were close on two million men under arms in
Germany.

The arms and munitions factories were working
day and night in unbroken shifts. Bombing-planes
were made ready for service every day, so that finally
Germany had more war-planes than England and
France put together. German chemists were pre-
paring vast quantities of the most frightful poison
gases that the world had ever seen. With this
tremendous power of hers, Germany was getting ^
ready to strike terror into the hearts of all Europe.

The plan was quite clear. Europe was to be|
given a fright, the German fortifications were toj
prevent the French army from rendering any realj
assistance to France's Czech allies.

What were the Western Powers doing in thd
meantime ? They were negotiating, jointly exertin J

THE BIG FOUR 33

pressure upon Prague to agree to more and more
concessions, and, this agreement extorted, it was
each time refused again by the Sudeten Germans,
all according to plan.

Germany was playing at war, and the Western
Powers trembled. In the diplomatic and political
salons of Paris and London a scheme was being got
ready whereby peace might be bargained for at the
expense of Czechoslovakia.

Externally there were no signs of wavering as yet.
On the very Sunday which preceded the National
Sociahst Congress at Nuremberg, M. Bonnet,
Foreign Minister of France, unveihng near Bordeaux
a memorial to La Fayette, the hero of Franco-
American liberty, took occasion to address a word
of warning to Adolf Hitler. He said : " France, at
all events, will remain true to any agreements she
may have entered into ". He was referring to the
Pact of Assistance concluded with Czechoslovakia
in 1925, by which France had promised to hasten
to the aid of Czechoslovakia if the latter were
attacked.

On Monday, the 5th September, the eagerly
awaited Congress of the National Socialists opened
in Nuremberg. Amid the ringing of bells. Hitler
drove in triumph through the streets of the ancient
city. In his eyes was no look of triumph, however :
they looked tired and strained, and his whole face
was lined with anxiety. The German Dictator
realised that he was playing a life-or-death game.
He knew that he could scarcely begin a war in which
England, France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia
would all be against him. Germany was short of

34 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

reserves ; he might risk a war lasting for six months,
but that was the limit. Shortly after the Congress
opened he had heard the news that France was
beginning to mobilise: numerous reservists and
technicians had been called up the night before.
The famous Maginot Line was to be ready in a few
days. In Nuremberg, Paris, London and Prague
the tension was becoming unbearable, and it was
in the midst of this tension that an article in Eng-
land's venerable newspaper The Times burst like a
bomb upon the world.

The Times Causes a Sensation
On Wednesday, the 7th of September, The Times
had a leading article which made a tremendous stir
throughout the world. This article dealt with the
difficulties of a solution of the Sudeten question
within the confines of the Czechoslovak State, and
went on to say : " It would be better if Czecho-
slovakia could simply cede the Sudeten German area
to Germany."

In Nuremberg, Paris, London and Prague the
article had an overwhelming effect. M. Corbin, the
French ambassador in London, at once called on
Lord Halifax, in order to protest against it in the
name of the French Government. The Prime
Minister interrupted his holiday and came back to
London with all possible speed. The Prague
Government protested in London and Paris. The
Foreign Minister of the Reich, on the other hand,
went into the Fiihrer's study in Nuremberg with a
smile on his face to tell Hitler all about it. Hitler
listened unmoved, and although knowing at once

THE BIG FOUR 35

what immense perspectives opened before him, he
never smiled. He smiles very seldom in any case
— only when there are photographers about does he
occasionally summon up a smile.

In London the Foreign Office twice denied that
the view contained in The Times articles coincided
with those of the Government, and no doubt there
was ample justification for this statement.

Meanwhile the engagement, voluntarily entered
into by France to assist Czechoslovakia, was still
in force ; England was still aware that she would be
bound to hasten to the aid of France if the latter
were involved in a war with Germany. So some-
thing would have to be done at once. England did
not want a war at all just then, least of all a war
against Germany and for Czechoslovakia, even if
the future of Europe were at stake. Therefore
France must be persuaded that it would be advisable
for her to drop Czechoslovakia.

Obviously, this would not be altogether easy.
Of course, the French Government contained a
strong group, headed by M. Bonnet, who were
absolutely opposed to war and would have been
prepared to drop Czechoslovakia ; but French public
opinion was at first all in favour of the Czechs ; so,
too, was the French General Staff, while Daladier,
the Prime Minister, held a position midway between
these two groups.

French public opinion, however, had undergone
a complete change during the course of events.
Not all that was written in Paris during the month
of September against Czechoslovakia, either directly
or indirectly can be attributed to skilful German

36 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

propaganda. A great deal of it was quite honest
in intention. There were reminders of the enormous
losses suffered by France in the World War; there
was a genuine desire for peace. The Press which
supported this section was jubilant when the out-
come of the Munich discussions became known.
Peace had been saved. But what kind of peace,
and for how long ?

Herr Hitler Storms

The prelude to the great speech whidi Hitler was
to deliver at Nuremberg was extremely ominous.

In Czechoslovakia negotiations with the Sudeten
German Party had finally collapsed. Urged by
France and England, the Czech Government had
gone so far as to agree to divide the country into
cantons on the Swiss model, and to allow the
Sudeten Germans complete autonomy inside their
own cantons. The offer was really magnanimous,
and the Sudeten German negotiators could find no
motive for refusal. Then, as if by chance, in
the large Czechoslovak manufacturing town of
Moravska Ostrava, there were violent demonstra-
tions among the Sudeten Germans, who now for the
first time protested against the imprisonment of
some of their number who had been arrested a
week previously for disorderly behaviour. The
trick proved useful; there were clashes with the
police; the Sudeten German leaders protested to
Lord Runciman and to the Czech Prime Minister,
and in token of their attitude broke off negotiations.
Herr Frank, a Sudeten Member of Parliament, went
to Nuremberg to report to Hitler.

THE BIG FOUR 37

In Nuremberg the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile
Henderson, sought vainly for an interview with Hitler,
to utter a word of warning. He did not get past
Ribbentrop. " Your Excellency ", said the British
diplomat, " I have been instructed to warn Ger-
many. If France is involved in a war with Ger-
many, England could not stand aside."

But the Reich's Minister for Foreign Affairs, the
man who once greeted the King of England with
the Nazi salute, merely laughed : " Surely you are
joking, your Excellency ", he replied in an easy,
conversational tone. " I know England, and I know
that she will not wage a war on Czechoslovakia's
account. Just leave us to settle our accounts in the
East. We have nothing more to seek in the West."

Sir Nevile reported this conversation over the
telephone to his chief. Lord Halifax, and on its
way to London the news reached Paris. Other news
came along at the same time. The Sudeten Germans
declared that they would take the law into their
own hands. This was the signal for open revolt.
And in a speech at Nuremberg Adolf Hitler said
threateningly : " Those who count on our weakness
will find themselves mistaken ".

France's retort to this was the calling up of her
naval reservists. Gamehn, the French Chief of
Staff, sent for the German mihtary attache in Paris,
and gave him a detailed report of all the military
measures already taken by France — this by way of
warning to Germany.

The French soldiers did their duty, while the
pohticians endeavoured to safeguard what they
called peace. There would have been time to bring

38 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Germany to her senses if the soldiers had been
allowed to act, and not the politicians. Germany
would have drawn back if confronted by the clear
determination of France, England and Soviet Russia.
The German General Staff had repeatedly warned
Hitler against a war in which half Europe would be
his foes. But Hitler was not to be scared. He
counted on the Great Powers' fear of war, and went
on playing his game.

On Saturday, the 10th September, two days before
Hitler's Nuremberg speech. Dr. Benes, President of
Czechoslovakia, broadcast a speech in his own
country. He expressed his belief in peace and
justice, calling upon the populace to keep calm:
" Citizens, keep calm ", he said, " the democratic
structure of the Republic will remain intact ".

A few hours earlier Goering had made a speech
in Nuremberg — a violent, venomous address — to the
soldiers, in which he described the Czechs as a
" nation of pigmies of whom nobody knows whence
they came ".

In Paris M. Daladier conferred with his Chief of
General Staff as to further military measures.
General GameHn exerted all his powers of persuasion
to convince M. Daladier and the French Government
of the importance of Czechoslovakia in the European
balance of power. In the afternoon Enghsh Min-
isters in London also conferred with the miUtary
men on the General Staff, and here, too, Czecho-
slovakia's importance was acknowledged; but, at
the same time, so was England's unpreparedness
for war.

Twenty-four hours before Hitler's speech, all

THE BIG FOUR 39

Europe was engaged in a collective effort to scare
the German Dictator. Edouard Herriot, President
of the French Chamber, and possibly future President
of the French Republic, was using all his influence
to induce M. Daladier to stand firm. Further con-
tingents of men were dispatched to the Maginot
Line. Journalists in London were authoritatively
informed : " In the event of Czechoslovakia being
attacked, and the French joining forces with her,
England could not stand aside ". In Paris on the
day of Hitler's speech on the 12th September a
meeting of the Cabinet Council took place, and
there was another conference between General
Gamelin and the Supreme Council of Defence.
Switzerland, Holland and Belgium adopted measures
of precaution.

Apparently all these measures were not without
some effect. The speech which Hitler made to the
whole world on Monday evening was outrageous in
tone, but in reality much more moderate in content
than had been feared. The German Dictator con-
tented himself with a peremptory challenge to the
Prague Government to get on with its task of
, coming to agreement with the Sudeten Germans
" one way or the other " (" So oder so ").

Only a few persons realised that Hitler was biding
his time before boldly demanding the surrender of
the Sudeten area. On Monday the 12th September
Europe was not yet prepared to grant Hitler what
he wanted. In England and France some show of
resistance was still being put up, and order still
prevailed in the Sudeten territory.

40 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Sudeten Germans go Crazy

Hitler's speech marked the close of a period of
comparative calm in Europe. It was the signal for
occurrences which in seventeen days were to bring
Europe to the brink of war — war which then, cer-
tainly, could not have been stopped once Germany
had let it loose. Nobody in Europe realised that
that day was one of the last on which war could
have been prevented and European order safe-
guarded, if the Western Powers had shown them-
selves strong enough. All that then ensued were
merely measures of desperation taken by the states-
men at the prompting of fear. Hitler had a firm
grip of all the strings.

Encouraged by Paris, and strengthened by the
decision of the French War Council to proceed to
further military measures, the Prague Government
on 12th September proclaimed martial law in those
Sudeten districts in which there had been disturb-
ances just after Hitler's speech. Eight Czechs and
four Germans had been killed in that outbreak.

In Prague, Paris and London important minis-
terial deliberations took place. The Prague Govern-
ment asked the French Government through its
Minister in Paris : " Will France support Czecho-
slovakia if she is attacked by Germany?" and an
affirmative reply was given by Paris.

On Tuesday afternoon at 5.30 the Sudeten German
Party handed an ultimatum to the Prague Govern-
ment, demanding an immediate suspension of martial
law in the Sudeten areas. The ultimatum was to
expire in six hours.

THE BIG FOUR 41

Prague and Paris were in communication again,
and again the French Government fortified Czecho-
slovakia in her resistance. " Maintain order and
calm at any price ", was the advice given to Prague
by Paris.

The Czechoslovak Government stated that it was
prepared in principle to negotiate with the Sudeten
Germans regarding the ultimatum ; but no reply to
this offer came from Henlein's headquarters in Asch.
The time-limit fixed by the Sudeten German Party
was approaching, and nothing happened. The
Prague Government extended the martial law to
more districts in which there had been disorders.

Some days later Henlein and other representatives
of the Sudeten German Party fled from Czecho-
slovakia to Germany. For a day or two the Ger-
man broadcasting stations maintained that Henlein
was still in Czechoslovakia, but such was not the
case.

BeRCHTESGADEN — BEfflND THE SCENES

It was the British Intelligence Service that was
immediately instrumental in bringing about the first
meeting between Hitler and Chamberlain.

In much the same way as the European demo-
cracies have shown themselves to be no match for
the Dictators, so, too, the famous British Secret
Service fell a victim to German bluff. It must be
admitted, of course, that this bluff was of such an
outrageous nature that it was an easy matter to fall
victim to it.

Late in the night of Tuesday, 13th September,
No. X, an official of the Intelligence Service in

B2

42 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Germany, obtained possession of a piece of informa-
tion which was apparently absolutely trustworthy.
The German General Staff — according to this — ^had
met in the evening in Munich, and resolved, on
Hitler's orders, to march into Czechoslovakia on
Wednesday at 6 p.m. To this end the German
troops were already massing along the Czech fron-
tier. No. X collected some more information
which confirmed that the German troops were
indeed on the move. And now this sensational
item of news was sent to London in the usual way.

Late on Tuesday night the British General Staff
had been advised by a Czech source of the German
troop concentrations. Similar information was sent
by Prague to Paris also, and via Paris to London.
Taken in conjunction with the report of the Intelli-
gence Service, this was all highly disturbing.

Very early next morning all these reports were
submitted to Mr. Chamberlain. Coming as they
did from three sources, it would naturally not occur
to him to doubt their accuracy. One fact stood
out: unless someone intervened now, Europe
would be plunged into war within twelve hours. Sir
John Simon and Lord Halifax were called into
consultation with the Prime Minister.

At the same time M. Daladier and M. Bonnet
were closeted together in the former's study in the
Rue St. Dominique in Paris, and anxiously going
through the reports: Sudeten German ultimatum;
concentration of troops on the German-Czecho-
slovak frontier; a situation charged with menace.
Would it come to war that very day ?

It may very well have been that, just at this

THE BIG FOUR 43

juncture, when the two French statesmen were
anxiously conferring together, they were interrupted
by a telephone call from No. 10 Downing Street,
and heard Mr. Chamberlain himself acquainting
them with his decision to send a telegram to Hitler
asking for an interview. That this meant a breath-
ing-space, and was therefore warmly welcomed,
cannot be doubted.

At noon on Wednesday, after a meeting of the
English Cabinet, the telegram drawn up by Mr.
Chamberlain himself was sent to the British Embassy
in Berhn. Towards evening Mr. Chamberlain pro-
cured the assent of the Leader of the Opposition,
Major Attlee. But by that time he was already in
possession of Hitler's favourable reply. The inter-
view was to take place on Thursday at Berchtes-
gaden.

French Government and General Staff circles
received the report of the interview between Hitler
and Mr. Chamberlain with a good deal of uneasi-
ness ; M. Daladier was besieged with warnings, and
in the afternoon he communicated with the British
Prime Minister, and asked him to accede to nothing
in Berchtesgaden which might be in the nature of a
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Chamber-
lain's reply was reassuring.

Once more German bluff had been successful.
The information which No. X had received in
Berlin ' from a trustworthy source ' was false. The
only point of truth in it was that concerning a
movement of troops on the Czech border. It would
never have occurred to Hitler to march into Czecho-

44 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Slovakia in this fashion. His method, as revealed
in his book ' Mein Kampf ', is first of all to isolate
his victim diplomatically. He had not as yet suc-
ceeded in doing so in the case of Czechoslovakia.
The small Republic was by no means isolated, see-
ing that France was still firm and Britain still
resolved to stand by France if she went to the aid
of the Czechs. No, he would have to wait for a
better opportunity.

It is not known who conceived the idea of giving
the British Intelligence Service false information of
such far-reaching effect. But whoever he may be,
he merits the highest distinction that present-day
Germany has to bestow — the golden swastika.

Two Men at a Table

On the Thursday morning when Mr. Chamber-
lain, in his seventieth year, set out on his first trip
by air, the European sky was far from peaceful.
Martial law had been extended to eighteen districts
in Czechoslovakia; frontier affrays and shootings
were becoming a regular occurrence; in Eger, the
border town between Germany and Czechoslovakia,
two hotels, in which adherents of the Sudeten German
Party had barricaded themselves, were fired upon;
in the Czech frontier village of Schwaderbach forty
Czech police and six customs officials were dragged
on to German soil by an armed band; at Weipert,
another village on the frontier, some German S.A.
men crossed the frontier and carried a man and
woman off" to Germany.

And late at night the leader of the Sudeten German
Party — Henlein — had issued a proclamation stating

THE BIG FOUR 45

in the name of the Sudeten Germans that the German
population in Czechoslovakia demanded incorpora-
tion with Germany.

Mr. Chamberlain knew nothing of this proclama-
tion as he alighted from his aeroplane at the Munich
flying-ground.

At Berchtesgaden, as he was slowly ascending
the steep steps leading to Hitler's famous terrace,
Hitler came a few paces to meet him. The Fuhrer
was wearing the uniform of the Germany army,
with the iron cross, his only war-decoration, pinned
on his breast. His face looked tired and his eyes
were red-rimmed. It was easy to see that he had
been suffering from lack of sleep. Report has it
that Hitler gets scarcely an hour's sleep at night.

He now led his guest into the study. There the
two men were alone, except for the interpreter, an
official of the German Foreign Office, and one who
was well able to cope with his difficult task; for
Hitler's words, as ever, flowed from his lips in a
torrent. The talk lasted altogether two hours, half
of which time was devoted to the general situation,
and the other half to particular instances. Hitler
did far and away most of the talking, Mr. Cham-
berlain contenting himself with scribbling down a
few notes for future reference.

When the two hours were over, came the climax
of the interview. With a " Please read this ", Hitler
handed to Mr. Chamberlain a carefully prepared
English translation of the Sudeten German pro-
clamation. The British Prime Minister read it with
some uneasiness ; simple, short and clear, the docu-
ment required no second reading.

46 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Then Mr. Chamberlain said that he had come to
save the peace, and that this proclamation could
not have been drawn up without the knowledge of
the Reich Government. He pointed out that this
was not a good beginning to their talks, and he
asked why Hitler had allowed him to take this trip
if the Reich Government had already come to its
decision.

Hitler replied that he had decided to free the
Sudeten Germans only when he saw the impossi-
biUty of an agreement between them and the Prague
Government, and when he came into possession of
the Sudeten German proclamation.

At this stage Mr. Chamberlain might have remem-
bered that the Sudeten Germans had wilfully repudi-
ated all Prague's concessions; he might have
thought of The Times article, which had doubtless
inspired Hitler's decision. Did he think of it ?

Mr. Chamberlain's answer was that it appeared
that he was wasting his time, but that he did wish
to put one question. This was : did he want peace
or war in Europe ?

In affirming that he had never wanted anything
but peace, Hitler replied that until the Sudeten
Germans were satisfied, there could be no peace,
but that it was in Mr. Chamberlain's hands to bring
the Czechs to reason, and that the Prague Govern-
ment would do what it was advised to do by the
Fiihrer and the Prime Minister. Hitler asked for
a guarantee that the British Government would
acknowledge the right of self-determination for the
Sudeten Germans, saying that he was prepared to
consider with Mr. Chamberlain some method of

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 47

accomplishing this without a war. If this guarantee
was not forthcoming, he would have to agree with
Mr. Chamberlain in thinking that to continue the
negotiations would be futile.

It was not in Mr. Chamberlain's power to give
such an assurance. But he was prepared to discuss
the matter with the members of the British Govern-
ment if Hitler would promise that nothing in the
meantime would be done to the prejudice of Czecho-
slovakia.

To this Hitler gave his consent, but on one con-
dition. That was, that in the meantime nothing
should occur in Czechoslovakia which would compel
him to hasten to the aid of the Sudeten Germans.

With that the talk came to an end between the
two men. Later they met at the tea-table, where
the other members of the party were already sitting :
von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister; Sir Nevile
Henderson ; Sir Horace Wilson, the economic adviser
of Mr. Chamberlain ; and the German General Keitel.
Hitler's demand was then discussed in detail.

CHAPTER II

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

We must now give a short account of events between
Mr. Chamberlain's departure from Berchtesgaden
on Thursday, 15th September, and the decisive
Conference between the British and French Ministers
in London on the Sunday.
In Czechoslovakia the Sudeten German Party was

48 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

dissolved and warrants were issued against the
fugitive leader, Henlein, and his colleagues. Arms
were discovered hidden in coffins at the clinic of
the German University of Prague and were con-
fiscated. Martial law was extended and order
thus maintained throughout the country. Nervous-
ness was increasing among the Sudeten inhabitants.
The agitators had fled to Germany, where they were
said to have been formed into a Sudeten German
Corps. Peace now reigned in the Sudeten regions
and a short respite was granted. A strong move-
ment was afoot in favour of an understanding with
Prague, and certain moderate leaders among the
Sudeten Germans, particularly the leaders of the
CathoHc section, were negotiating with the Govern-
ment. They did not wish to be transferred to
Germany, still less did they want to become the
cause of war. They had long criticised the intran-
sigence of Henlein and his supporters, and wanted
to settle matters with the Prague Government on
the basis of the substantial concessions already
promised.

This news caused alarm in Germany. Such a
course had at all costs to be prevented. Czecho-
slovakia must not be allowed a moment's peace,
or she might come to terms with the Sudeten Germans
and it would be seen where the truth really lay.

During the night of Saturday and Sunday, on
which day MM. Daladier and Bonnet were to fly
to London at the invitation of the British Govern-
ment, an armed attack was made from Germany
against the customs house at Eger. Innocent members
of the Czech minority in Germany were imprisoned.

At this point MussoUni, from whom nothing up

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 49

to then had been heard, thought it time to take a
hand. For the moment, however, he was too late.
Speaking at Trieste, he urged a plebiscite in the
Sudeten areas, obviously unaware that Hitler was
merely laughing at his ally's zeal — if he was still
in the mood for laughter. Hitler's demands went
much further than that: he wanted the Sudeten
areas without a plebiscite.

When the negotiations between the British and
French statesmen began at No. 10 Downing Street
early on Sunday morning, Czechoslovakia had not
yet abandoned hope. The people still did not know,
though President Benes and the Government had
already been told by Paris and London, that Hitler
was demanding from the Czechs all districts in
which there were more than 50 per cent. Sudeten
Germans. This without a plebiscite and as soon
as possible.

During the days between Thursday and Sunday
President Benes had exerted with the Western
Powers the whole of his not inconsiderable influence.
The Czechoslovak Ministers in London and Paris
had done the same. On Sunday morning, when
the discussions in London began, it was still believed
in Prague that France would not give way.

M. Daladier himself, when he entered the aeroplane
at Le Bourget, did not know whether he would
yield. During the previous two days he had been
swayed by the influence of various personal and
political friends. There was no lack of powerful
opinion in favour of supporting Czechoslovakia
firmly against Germany. At the same time there
was. much influence in the opposite direction.
Above all, the Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, was

50 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

in favour of giving way, if Germany offered certain
guarantees. And he had the majority of the French
Cabinet behind him. The Prime Minister alone
was still undecided.

The discussions between the French and British
Ministers in London lasted the whole of Sunday
and, after a long debate, ended in an undertaking
by MM. Daladier and Bonnet to recommend the
French Cabinet to accept a decision by which
Czechoslovakia should hand over to Germany all
districts where there were more than 50 per cent.
Sudeten Germans. Those areas with a smaller
percentage of Germans should receive extensive
rights of self-government. The territory to be handed
over would be fixed by an international commission,
and only then be occupied by the German Army.
The population of the ceded areas would of course
be granted all rights, including that of emigrating
and carrying its personal property with it. More-
over, before Czechoslovakia ceded the areas in
question. Great Britain, France and Germany would
provide a joint guarantee. M. Daladier had had
to fight hard for the British guarantee, which Great
Britain was unwilling to give. She agreed, however,
at last, and, after mutual congratulations, the French
Ministers left London in the morning of Monday,
19th September.

Prague Receives an Ultimatum — from her
Allies

For seventy-two hours the President of Czecho-
slovakia and the members of his Government had
had scarcely any sleep. The terms communicated by
the two Western democracies to the small democratic

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 51

State in Central Europe were harder than those
imposed upon a defeated foe after a war.

Within the shortest possible time the Czecho-
slovak Government was to make up its mind to
cede large, wealthy and important territories, to
surrender factories, coal-mines, power-stations, iron,
porcelain and radium, and to deliver over the natural
mountain frontiers of the State because its friends in
the West desired it.

When, towards evening, the first reports reached
Prague from London concerning the progress of
the British and French discussions, a Cabinet
meeting was summoned, over which President
Benes presided. Discussion turned upon what was
to be done if France left Czechoslovakia in the lurch.
Deepest pessimism prevailed, but no one believed
that France, in whom so much faith had been placed,
could sacrifice her friend and ally to the enemy at
this most critical hour.

Further reports arriving from London during the
meeting foreshadowed the worst.

Towards three in the morning the French Minister
in Prague asked for an audience with the President.
Their conversation lasted a full forty minutes, and
when Dr. Benes returned to the waiting members
of the Cabinet, they read their fate in his look of
distress.

The Prime Minister asked if the reports were
true. Benes nodded. The Ministers then departed.

At 10 a.m. on Monday the Czechoslovak Foreign
Minister, Dr. Krofta, invited the French Minister
in Prague to visit him at the Foreign Office. Dr.
Krofta, like other members of the Czech Govern-
ment, had had very little sleep of late. He was

52 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

tired, but pulled himself together when the French
Minister arrived. The latter told him that he had
nothing favourable to report, and that the Ministers
in London had agreed on matters of principle. The
Foreign Minister nodded and said nothing. The
French Minister added that the Cabinet was meeting
in Paris at that moment, and from what he had
heard, he did not doubt that they would accept the
arrangement proposed. M. de la Croix then took
his leave.

The Foreign Minister seized the telephone and
asked for Paris. There was still some faint hope
of a Cabinet crisis in France. Surely France could
not betray her ally and abandon her at the critical
moment? The call came through. No, there was
no likelihood of a Cabinet crisis ; individual Ministers
might resign, but not the whole Cabinet. More-
over, the whole of public opinion was against a
strong line, fearing that Hider might carry out his
threat of war. Public opinion was bewildered. All
talk was of the necessity of peace at any price.
The Czechoslovak Legation in Paris could report
nothing which would justify optimism.

The meeting of the Paris Cabinet, presided over
by M. Lebrun, ended at midday. M. Daladier
reported on the London discussion. This was
followed by a debate, in which a number of Ministers
at first refused to join. When M. Paul Reynaud,
Minister of Justice, pointed out that France would
be breaking her treaty obligations, the Prime
Minister denied that this was the case, and said
that they were merely recommending to Prague
the resolutions adopted in London. When asked
whether, if Prague refused, France would insist

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 53

Upon Czech acceptance, M. Daladier replied that
in that case the Cabinet would meet again to decide
on its further course. At the end of the meeting
the Foreign Minister was instructed to transmit
the results to the French Minister at Prague.

The scene now changed to the Castle at Prague
at 5 p.m. The British and French Ministers called
upon President Benes. What they had to tell him
was no news, for he had known for hours that he
had nothing better to expect. When the Ministers
handed him the British and French Note, he thanked
them, saying that he would submit the matter to
the Czechoslovak Government. The British Minis-
ter reminded the President that time was short, and
Dr. Benes, as he shook hands with them, promised
to bear that fact in mind.

In Paris, at 6 p.m., the French Foreign Minister
telephoned to Dr. Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minis-
ter, saying that he would Uke to communicate to
him the London decisions. These Dr. Osusk;^
already knew. When told that there was not much
chance of any negotiations, he asked whether there
was any purpose in his visiting M. Bonnet, but, as
the French Foreign Minister was insistent. Dr.
Osusky left on what must have been the bitterest
mission in his life.

Journalists waited impatiently for him in the
lobbies of the Foreign Ministry at the Quai d'Orsay.
The conversation lasted only about twenty minutes.
Dr. Osusky observed diplomatic correctness as
long as he was with the Minister, but, on leaving
the room, dropped further pretence.

" A country has been condemned without being
heard ", he said to the surrounding journaUsts.

54 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

And it was true; his country was condemned. Its
friends and allies had delivered an ultimatum to it.

Hitler Ponders

Meanwhile Adolf Hitler was locked in his study
at Berchtesgaden and refused to see anyone. His
henchmen knew what this meant, for this was
Hitler's way when he had to make an important
decision. What would it be this time?

The world would soon know, for on Thursday
there was to be a second meeting between Hitler
and Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg, an attractive
little town on the Rhine.

Hitler interrupted his meditations for one short
space on the Tuesday morning, when he received
the Hungarian Foreign Minister, de Kanya, and
the Polish Minister in Berlin, M. Lipski, who at his
request had hastened to Berchtesgaden.

Hungary and Poland, both Germany's friends,
felt that their moment had arrived, for they
guessed that Hitler was about to enforce territorial
cessions by Czechoslovakia. Both countries would
be glad to share in these. Poland laid claim to a
small area, known as the Teschen district, inhabited
by 100,000 Poles, which had been allotted to Czecho-
slovakia in 1920 after a local plebiscite. Hungary
wanted part of Slovakia, where Hved some 700,000
Hungarians. The district had been aL
Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of Versailles, in order
that the new State might have access to the Danube,
the most important river in Central Europe.

The representatives of the two States now gave
respectful ear to Hitler's word.

Hitler was calculating that, since the Great

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 55

Powers had accepted his first plan so easily, he would
now make much more sweeping demands, which
they would also have to accept.

The details of the plan were discussed shortly,
and on the same day the diplomatic representatives
of Poland and Hungary notified to all the capitals
of Europe their claims to parts of Czechoslovakia.

This was another master-stroke by Hitler. For
years Hungarian claims to territorial revision had
been sponsored by Signor Mussolini, but now Hitler
secured the friendship of Hungary, which he urgently
needed for the pursuit of his aims in Central Europe.

With the Abyssinian adventure and the increase
in Germany's strength, Mussolini's star in Central
Europe was on the wane. In spite of her friendship
with Italy, Germany had already seized Austria,
Mussolini's second protege in Europe. And now
she was performing immensely valuable service for
Hungary. She could thus feel sure of Hungarian
loyalty, and Hungary would no longer be an obstacle
to Germany's progress towards the oil-fields of
Rumania and the wheat-fields of the Ukraine.

Mussolini watched these developments with sus-
picion. He travelled from one North Italian town
to another, from Trieste to Udine, from Udine to
Verona, from Verona to Vicenza, everywhere mak-
ing speeches to which nobody in Europe paid any
attention. o{ He was furious, but there was nothing
he could do. For the moment he had to look on
helpless, while Hitler arranged things in Central
Europe. Mussolini was fettered to the Rome-
Berlin axis.

56 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

M. Bonnet Takes the Law into his own
Hands

The Czechoslovak Government was maintaining
order in the Sudeten districts and was continuing
to negotiate. It negotiated throughout Tuesday,
until six in the afternoon. The decision was difficult,
but it had to be taken, and time pressed. The
Ministers of Great Britain and France had already
made two demarches to the President. London and
Paris were impatient. Czechoslovakia must not be
too long committing suicide, for the sake of European
peace.

In London and Paris demonstrations were being
held in favour of Czechoslovakia. In London
crowds paraded the streets, in Paris delegations
waited upon the Czech Minister.

And in Prague discussion still went on. It was
not until evening that they concluded and an official
note was sent to London and Paris. It accepted
the arrangement in principle, but asked that an inter-
national conference, attended by Czechoslovakia,
should decide in the matter, and that the existence
of the Republic should be duly safeguarded.

Within an hour Paris and London replied that
this was not enough, and asked for a further decision.

Late that night the Czechoslovak Cabinet met
once more. This time the proposal by the Czech
Minister in Paris was accepted, and Paris and
London were told that Czechoslovakia was willing
to submit the case to a court of arbitration. This
court had been agreed upon between Germany and
Czechoslovakia in a Treaty concluded in 1925.

Obviously, the main concern of the Czechoslovak

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 57

Government was to gain time. If only there were
a respite for a few days, all German democrats and
all Sudeten Germans who did not wish to join the
Reich could be mobiUsed and show the world
that, if not a majority, at any rate a very large
number of Sudeten Germans did not want to be
united with Germany. If only there were a respite
for a few days, things might change in Paris. If
only there were more time !

At 11.30 p.m. the French Minister in Prague
learnt from his British colleague that London had
sent him instructions to make a fresh demarche to
the Prague Government, at once and in strong terms.

At 11.40 the telephone rang in the office of the
French Minister. M. Bonnet himself was on the
line. He had just been talking with London and
had heard of this new demarche. He now instructed
his Minister in Prague to act jointly with his British
colleague, and he pointed out that France, too,
insisted upon acceptance of the ultimatum.

The French Foreign Minister had apparently
forgotten that the Paris Cabinet had decided on the
previous day to meet again, should Czechoslovakia
refuse the London proposals. It had never been
said that Paris would compel the Prague Govern-
ment to accept. If the Prague Government had
refused, and had thereupon been attacked by
Germany, France would have had to come to her
assistance.

But M. Bonnet had already once declared that,
as long as he was in the Government, there should
be no war. Even without a Cabinet decision, the
Prague Government should still be forced, by Paris
also, to accept the conditions. Thus French foreign

58 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

policy was directed from London, and what London
decided, Paris approved. The Prague Government
would now accept and the French Foreign Minister
would be justified by success.

At midnight the French and British Ministers
asked President Benes for an audience. The
President could not receive them at once, for the
Cabinet was still sitting. Even now it was believed
that France would support Czechoslovakia if things
came to the worst.

A Terrible Night and a Sombre Day

Through the silent streets of the old city of Prague
two cars dashed up to the Castle, the residence of
the President of Czechoslovakia. It was 2 a.m.
on Wednesday, 21st September.

A few minutes before, the French and British
Ministers had been informed by telephone that
President Benes would receive them in a few moments.

At exactly 2.15 a.m. the two Ministers were shown
into the President's study. Dr. Benes rose from his
desk and, advancing to meet the men who had
brought him so much bad news in the past two
days, shook them by the hand.

M. de la Croix, the French Minister, was a friend
of the Czechs and hated his duty, but he had to
obey orders. Mr. Newton, the British Minister, was
showing a more detached attitude towards the
struggle of a small people for its very existence.
He was not very fond of the Czechs.

Mr. Newton spoke first. He said that he had
been instructed by his Government to say that the
Czech counter-proposals were unsatisfactory. His
Majesty's Government insisted upon the immediate

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 59

acceptance of the proposals made jointly with the
French Government. Otherwise the Czechoslovak
Government must take all the consequences.

M. de la Croix then said that the French Govern-
ment was of one mind with the Government of
Great Britain and recommended the Czechoslovak
Government to accept the London proposals, and
declared that Czechoslovakia, should she decide
otherwise, could not rely upon French help.

There was a silence. The clock of St. Vitus'
Church near by struck half-past two.

President Benes then spoke. He seemed to have
thrown off his fatigue, and with his right hand, in
which he held his glasses, he emphasised his words.

The result of the interview at Berchtesgaden
between the German Chancellor and the Hungarian
Foreign Minister and Polish Ambassador had been
made known to him, he said, a few hours earlier. It
had there been decided that these three countries
should co-operate in dividing up Czechoslovakia be-
tween themselves or in making her existence impos-
sible. Here was further proof that Germany's main
concern was not to bring the Sudeten Germans within
the Reich. Germany wanted to destroy Czecho-
slovakia, because it was an obstacle in her eastward
path. Once Czechoslovakia ceased to exist, or if
her resistance was crippled, there would be nobody
to oppose Germany. In a short time she would be
on the shores of the Black Sea and threatening
British influence in Asia Minor. It had to be
borne in mind that the question of Czechoslovakia
was a European question, a world question even.
If the Western Powers now yielded to Germany
and allowed her to destroy Czechoslovakia, it

60 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

would be the first step towards German domination
over Europe. Surely it could not be Great Britain's
purpose to allow this?

President Benes had finished. He is not a good
speaker. His words are dry, and he lacks fire;
he aims at convincing by force of argument rather
than by persuasive tones. On this occasion, how-
ever, all his arguments were in vain.

The British Minister rephed courteously, but
drily, that the British Government had taken note
of the conversations between Hitler, de Kanya and
Lipski, and he felt justified in assuming that his Gov-
ernment were aware of President Benes's views.

It was a diplomatic refusal.

President Benes then asked how long Czecho-
slovakia would be given to answer the Note. Until
that same afternoon, he was told. The President
rose, and the two Ministers followed suit. The
French Minister expressed the hope that the Czecho-
slovak Government would accept the terms. If
they did not, he said, it would be simply suicide.

The President replied : " We shall do what the
Western Powers believe to be in the interests of
European peace ".

Europe slept. Only on the borders between
Czechoslovakia and Germany small detachments
of Czechoslovak police still kept watch. There
were not many soldiers in the frontier districts,
for Czechoslovakia was afraid that this would be
regarded by Germany as provocation. In con-
sequence, isolated Czechoslovak sentry-posts were
continually exposed to attack by armed Sudeten

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 61

Germans, who came over from Germany and escaped
back again.

Europe slept. Only at the Castle in Prague the
responsible leaders of Czechoslovakia still conferred
on the fate of their country. Some were in favour
of a flat refusal by Czechoslovakia and a fight to
the last man. But reason finally prevailed. A
resolution was adopted in the early hours of the
morning, and was communicated to the repre-
sentatives of the political parties, who proceeded to
negotiate with the Government throughout the
morning.

Quite early, however, the Ministers of the two
Western democracies were informed that the answer
was an acceptance.

The Foreign Minister, Dr. Krofta, handed the
Czechoslovak reply to the British and French
Ministers at five in the afternoon : Czechoslovakia,
under pressure from her friends, accepted Hitler's
terms and was ready to surrender large territories
to Germany.

The news of the Czech acceptance and of the
dramatic events of the night of Tuesday- Wednesday
was received in Western Europe with relief, but with
no enthusiasm.

France felt ashamed. It was the first time in her
history that she had failed to observe a treaty and
left a friend in the lurch. It was an open con-
fession of weakness and a bad omen for the future.

Between M. Daladier and his Foreign Minister
there was a stormy scene. The Prime Minister now
learnt for the first time what had happened during
the preceding night, and he blamed the Foreign
Minister for taking matters into his own hands and

62 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

compelling the Prague Government to accept the
terms. Several members of the French Government
clamoured for M. Bonnet's resignation, and
threatened to resign if he did not. But no resigna-
tions followed; the headlong course of events had
dazed everyone.

At Geneva M. Litvinoff, the Soviet Foreign
Minister, declared that Russia would come to the
help of Czechoslovakia under her treaty, provided
France did the same.

France felt ashamed, but she had no intention of
coming to Czechoslovakia's help. Even had she
wished to, it was now too late. The public had been
told of Prague's acceptance.

In London Winston Churchill said : " This is the
bankruptcy of the Western Powers. Such a settle-
ment cannot bring peace. Not Czechoslovakia
alone is threatened, but the liberties of all peoples."

At Stratford-on-Avon the former Foreign Minister,
Mr. Anthony Eden, uttered words of warning and
urged the Government to stand fast.

Already by Wednesday morning dark rumours
were circulating in Prague, but nothing definite was
known. It was not till late in the day that the
Minister of Propaganda announced on the wireless :
" We have accepted in order to avoid bloodshed.
The case is unique in history ; our friends and allies
have imposed upon us terms which are usually
dictated to a defeated enemy."

From the loud-speakers in the streets the crowd
heard the message teUing them that their country
had been deserted by all its friends and aUies and
forced to accept hard terms. A cry of despair broke

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 63

from all lips. Cars and trams came to a standstill
and the streets filled with people wishing to give
voice to their feelings.

Exactly a year before, the streets of Prague had
been filled with the lamentations of the crowd
which attended the burial of Czechoslovakia's
greatest citizen, Thomas Garrigue Marasyk, president
and philosopher.

Now, a year later, the people of Prague were again
plunged in grief and despair. It was not so much
that Czechoslovakia was compelled to hand over
rich districts to Germany, her oppressor. It was
rather grief at being deserted by those whom she had
looked upon as her friends and allies — the thought
that the small Czechoslovak Republic was being
sacrificed by the two great Western democracies.

War Knocks at the Door

" The Hitler-Chamberlain conversations at Godes-
berg have broken down ! Czechoslovakia is mobilis-
ing! In one night France has called up 340,000
more men ! "

Such were the sensational reports which set
Europe quaking on Friday, 23rd September. In the
course of twice twenty-four hours this unhappy
Continent had been plunged from expectation of
peace to the verge of war.

Tanks, mechanised artillery and infantry were
marching through Prague towards the German
frontier. Trains crowded with reservists were leaving
the Paris Gare de TEst for the Maginot Line.

Throughout the night of Friday-Saturday Prague
and Paris awaited the invasion of Czechoslovakia by
the German army and the outbreak of a European war.

64 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The German wireless stations had told their
listeners to keep their sets turned on, as an
important announcement would be made. Mean-
while the * Deutschlandsender ' played gramophone
records. At first, ominous military marches. Then
hght music by Schubert, selections from Weber and
Lortzing, with nothing martial about them.

Was it possible that music of this sort could be
the prelude to universal slaughter ?

It was not. No declaration of war followed. At
3.10 a.m. the following official communique was
read over the German wireless : —

" The three-hour conversation between Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain and Chancellor Adolf
Hitler ended at half-past one this morning. When the
friendly conversation ended Chancellor Hitler handed
the British Prime Minister a memorandum stating
Germany's final proposals, which Mr. Chamberlain
will transmit to Prague."

GODESBERG

The Grand Hotel Dreesen, at Godesberg-on-the-
Rhine, where Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler were to have
their second conversation, has historical associations
for Adolf Hitler. It belongs to an old fellow-
combatant and friend of his. Here it was that
Hitler, before he became Chancellor, built up his
Party and made propaganda for it ; here, too, he often
came for relaxation. It was there that, on 30th June
1934, he learnt of the revolt plotted against him
by his friend and fellow-combatant, August
Roehm, and other members of the Party. On that
occasion he had flown at once to Munich and shot
Roehm with his own hand. During the days that
followed, the General in command of the German

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 65

army, his wife and many hundreds of others met a
violent death in the ensuing purge.

It was certainly not by accident that Hitler had
arranged this second conversation at the Hotel
Dreesen at Godesberg. Like many Germans, he is
fond of symbols.

When the British Prime Minister landed at Cologne
on this Thursday, 22nd September, the scenes that
had attended his departure from London were still
fresh in his mind.

" Stand by Czechoslovakia ", the crowd had
shouted as he left No. 10 Downing Street for the
aerodrome. At Heston airport many people had
waved Czech flags to show the sympathy of the
people of Great Britain for a small country.

Mr. Chamberlain had come to Godesberg armed
with the assent of the Czechoslovak Government and
with a French power of attorney. It was his intention
to conclude with Hitler all reasonable arrangements
arising out of this Czechoslovak acceptance.

And yet he did not feel too hopeful. During
Wednesday he had received news that Germany was
going to demand a great deal more, and intended to
espouse the claims of Poland and Hungary against
Czechoslovakia. That had not been foreseen.
France and England had certainly no wish to destroy
the whole Czechoslovak State.

Towards midday, when Mr. Chamberlain was still
on his way from Cologne to Godesberg, Chancellor
Hitler sent for his generals at the Hotel Dreesen and
gave them a lecture:

On the table lay a large map of Czechoslovakia.
It was a map prepared by the German General Staff,
and all the fortifications of Czechoslovakia were

66 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

shown in black. Hitler's generals had already given
several warnings of these fortresses, saying that they
were strategically well placed and that, if it came to
war, their capture would cost hundreds of thousands
of lives. Czechoslovakia was a fortress and, before
it could be taken, effective help would arrive from
the Western Powers and Soviet Russia. The
generals repeated these warnings, but Hitler cut them
short. These were his orders :

" I want all measures taken for an immediate
invasion of Czechoslovakia. We shall march in even
if it means a world war. I have pledged my word to
the whole German people. I am not going to be
intimidated by Czech fortresses or by anybody."

The meeting continued some twenty minutes
longer. Hitler issuing further instructions and
receiving information from his generals on technical
questions.

The Generals left in silence. Even the most loyal
of them were filled with apprehension. They knew
better than anyone how long Germany could wage a
war and who would have to bear the whole blame if
the war were lost.

Was there perhaps some truth in the rumours
current in Paris and London that the Generals would
arrest Hitler if he ventured on war ?

But Hitler knew exactly what he was doing.
He knew, of course, that his bluff had already
been so successful that he could no longer withdraw,
even if he wished to. That, however, did not worry
him. During these past years Hitler had banked
upon his luck — and upon a sound calculation of the
weaknesses of others.

A few minutes after the Generals had gone he told

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 67

his Foreign Minister that he would not sign
anything with Chamberlain until he held the Czech
fortifications. What he might sign then, he would
decide for himself.

At the Hotel Petersberg, high up in the hills across
the Rhine, where Mr. Chamberlain and his suite were
to stay, rumours were rife : at Prague popular indigna-
tion had overthrown the Hodza Government and
replaced it by a Cabinet with General Syrov^ at its
head. Only Syrovy and one other general repre-
sented the army in the new government; all the
rest were civilians. But it augured ill for the
beginning of the talks. Around Downing Street
there had been clashes between the crowds and the
police. Demonstrators were carrying posters
" Chamberlain must go ! Stand by Czecho-
slovakia." The leaders of the Sudeten Germans
were beginning to occupy villages in the Sudeten
regions. On orders from Prague the Czechoslovak
gendarmerie were not resisting. The German morn-
ing and afternoon papers demanded the removal of
Czechoslovakia from the map of Europe.

Mr. Chamberlain, as he looked from the windows at
the lovely valley of the Rhine below, felt pessimistic
about the probable outcome of the conversations.
Across the river stood the Hotel Dreesen, draped in
flags. There Adolf Hitler awaited his British guest.

At 4.35 p.m. a car drove up to the Hotel Dreesen
and, as Mr. Chamberlain ahghted, Adolf Hitler
appeared in the hotel doorway.

This time Neville Chamberlain had no steep steps
to cUmb, as at Berchtesgaden a week earlier. Only
five steps led from the drive to the lounge of the
hotel, where the talk was to begin.

68 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Hitler welcomed his guest and, after inquiries
about his journey, led him in. It was tea-time, and
von Ribbentrop, formerly German Ambassador in
London, was well versed in British customs. Mr.
Chamberlain sipped his tea with relish. Hitler
drank with him, for, though he touches no alcohol,
he likes a good cup of tea.

The conversation turned upon indifferent matters.
Hitler drew his guest's attention to the up-to-date
furnishing of the hotel and, as proudly as if he were
himself the owner, pointed out that the whole grounds
could in the twinkling of an eye be converted into a
covered winter-garden. He even offered to perform
this miracle for Mr. Chamberlain, who, however,
smilingly waved the suggestion aside.

Then, a few minutes before five, the two men
withdrew. Once again they were alone together.
The interpreter was the only other person present.

This time Mr. Chamberlain spoke first. He said
that he had brought with him the reply of the British
and French Governments to Hitler's proposal of the
previous Thursday. They had, he said, asked the
Prague Government to hand over to Germany areas
where there were more than 50 per cent. Germans.
The Prague Government had agreed. He had come to
Godesberg to report this fact and to communicate
at the same time the British and French proposals
as to how the plan should be executed.

" I did not expect ", Hitler answered, " that Great
Britain and France would recognise the right of
the Sudeten Germans to self-determination ", and
there was something Hke a smile on his jaded
face.

Mr. Chamberlain was taken aback. The .Chan-

I

M

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 69

cellor's words rankled, but he kept his feelings to
himself.

He then outlined the plan which London and
Paris had prepared and which had been com-
municated to Czechoslovakia before she accepted
the terms dictated by London.

It was, in the circumstances, a fair settlement, the
aim of which was to allow unfortunate Czecho-
slovakia to make the transfer of the Sudeten German
territories with the maximum of honour and the
minimum of unnecessary sacrifice. An inter-
national commission was to fix the areas to be
ceded to Germany. Until then those areas were to
remain under Czechoslovak control, and only be
handed over when the frontiers were settled. Order
might in the meantime be maintained by members
of the British Legion. The new frontiers would
naturally be drawn in such a way as to take into
account the most essential economic requirements
of the country. If necessary, there should be an
exchange of populations. The inhabitants would, of
course, be allowed to take with them all their movable
property. Finally, France and Great Britain offered
to guarantee the new Czechoslovak frontiers. They
expected, of course, Mr. Chamberlain concluded,
that Germany would participate in this joint
guarantee.

For a few moments there was silence. Then
Hitler jumped up. Resting his right hand on the
edge of the table, and gesticulating freely with his
left, he spoke, as if addressing a big meeting.

" Shortly before we began our conversation, I
received news from Prague that a military dictator-
ship has been proclaimed. They want to threaten

70 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

me, you see, to force my hand. This Bolshevist
crowd in Prague wants nothing less than war and
to bring Soviet Russia into Central Europe. At
the very moment when you propose that I should
guarantee the Czech frontier, a miUtary dictatorship
is proclaimed in Prague."

Hitler had begun his remarks in comparatively
moderate tones, but the more he said, the quicker
his words became, the louder his voice. Hitler was
never a diplomat. Before becoming Chancellor,
he had been a party leader, a popular orator. He
does not therefore choose his words Hke a diplomat.
It is his habit to say exactly what he thinks.

Fortunately, Mr. Chamberlain understood no
German. The tone of Hitler's voice betrayed his
excitement, but the interpreter was tactful enough
to reproduce the Fuhrer's words in more moderate
phraseology.

Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that the new
Government in Prague was not a dictatorship, still
less a military dictatorship. There were only two
generals in the Cabinet. To this the reply was that
Hitler refused to put up with such impudence on the
part of the Czechs. They had taken advantage of his
leniency. He had wanted to march into Czecho-
slovakia a week ago, and only desisted to please
Mr. Chamberlain. Now his patience was exhausted,
and he would give the order that day. Everything
was ready.

Mr. Chamberlain, not used to this form of con-
versation, began to feel uncomfortable. A British
Prime Minister is not accustomed to discussions
conducted on such lines as these. Still, an EngUsh-
man stands his ground, and Mr. Chamberlain in his

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET 71

turn raised his voice. Such orders were quite
unnecessary, he said, for the Czechs had voluntarily
abandoned the Sudeten areas.

The Czechs were a pack of liars, said Hitler, and
he didn't believe them.

Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that the British and
French Governments should surely be good enough
guarantors to assure him that Czechoslovakia would
fulfil the obligations she had accepted.

Hitler agreed, but only on other conditions. Mr.
Chamberlain felt dismayed, realising that the reports
were true which said that Germany would demand
much more, and expressed surprise that the con-
ditions were to be altered.

Hitler refused, above all, to allow any inter-
national commission to decide what belonged to
him, saying that such a commission would just suit
the Czechs, who would in the meantime continue to
terrorise the Sudeten Germans, carry off everything
movable and leave the whole country in ruins.

Hitler was thinking no doubt of the Czech
fortresses, but he did not say so.

Such a commission would take far too long. He
did not want to waste time. He wanted the Sudeten
districts united to Germany with the least possible
delay. If this was not done voluntarily, Germany
was strong enough to enforce her rights by arms.

Mr. Chamberlain suggested that the question of
an international commission might be settled by
negotiation. He inquired whether Hitler was willing
to guarantee the new Czech frontiers jointly with
England and France.

What did England want in Central Europe ? asked
Hitler. Why should they want to guarantee the

72 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czech frontier ? Mr. Chamberlain repHed with some
warmth that it was for England to decide whose
frontiers she desired to guarantee.

Hitler modified his tone a little. He saw that he
had offended Mr. Chamberlain, and that was not
his intention.

He explained that Germany would guarantee the
Czechoslovak frontiers provided that other neigh-
bouring states and Italy did the same. He would
like to point out that Poland and Hungary had
submitted just claims to Czechoslovak territory.

Mr. Chamberlain knew it. The Pohsh and Hun-
garian Ministers in London had officially informed
him of this on the previous day. His fears that
Hitler would make himself the spokesman of these
States were now confirmed.

" But you," he said, now tired and discouraged,
" are only concerned with the cause of the Sudeten
Germans. Once the Sudeten Germans are satisfied,
surely Germany could be asked to guarantee the new
frontier."

Hitler answered that he stood by what he had just
said.

Despite his disappointment, Mr. Chamberlain per-
sisted. He asked whether Hitler would be willing
to conclude a pact of non-aggression with Czecho-
slovakia, supposing his claims were met.

Hitler's answer was that he would conclude no
such pact unless the Polish and Hungarian claims
were satisfied.

The me-a-tete was at an end. It had lasted an
hour and twenty minutes.

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 73

CHAPTER III

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP

The surprises which the day held for Neville Cham-
berlain were not yet over.

The two men withdrew to an ante-room where
several people were already assembled, amongst
them von Ribbentrop and Sir Nevile Henderson.

A large map was spread out on the table. It was
a map of Czechoslovakia, on which curious lines
had been drawn by hand in red and green pencil.

Hitler's intimates have an anecdote to tell about
this map. Hitler had drawn it himself in Berchtes-
gaden and shown it to his collaborator, von Ribben-
trop. The Foreign Minister had ventured to say
that it might be a good idea to get a similar map
printed, but Hitler is reported to have said that as
long as it was only drawn in pencil, it could be
modified with an indiarubber.

I cannot say whether this anecdote is true or not.
This much we do know, however : Hitler had done
a thorough piece of work. The map he displayed
to the British Prime Minister showed nothing
remaining to Czechoslovakia but the caricature of a
State. Bohemia and Moravia were completely
surrounded on all sides by Germany. At one point
the scrap of country remaining in Czech hands was
only twenty miles across. The most vital railway
lines of the country, the two connecting Prague with
Brno, the Moravian capital and Bratislava, the
Slovak capital, respectively were each twice cut
across by German territory.

02

74 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mr. Chamberlain had never himself seen the
country ; the map did not mean a great deal to him,
but the red and green lines caught his eye.

The German Chancellor explained that the red
Hues denoted the districts which must at once be
handed over to the Germans ; the green ones showed
the districts where a plebiscite must be held. There
was no objection to the plebiscite taking place under
international supervision.

The idea of a plebiscite surprised Mr. Chamber-
lain, who thought that it was quite unnecessary, and
that Germany would be getting, without a plebiscite,
all the territories in which there were more than 50
per cent, of Germans.

Hitler then pointed out that there were several
other districts in Czechoslovakia containing Germans.
All German groups living in Czechoslovakia should
be given the opportunity of expressing themselves
in favour of a return to Germany. Who cared for
percentages, when the rights of the German People
were at stake ?

By this time Mr. Chamberlain was thoroughly
bewildered. It is true that he did not then know that
compact Czech majorities existed in the districts
which Hitler had outUned in green ; nor did he know
that these were districts containing the headquarters
of the Czech heavy industries. He was quite clear,
however, about one point. Here was something
quite different from what had been discussed in
Berchtesgaden.

Stiffly he inquired whether there were any further
communications to make.

Certainly there were. The solution proposed by
London and Paris was by no means acceptable to

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 75

the Fiihrer. He wished the territories which he had
indicated to be occupied by the German Army
within the shortest possible space of time, so that the
Sudeten German population might be protected from
further territorism by the Czechs.

That being the case, Mr. Chamberlain considered
that further negotiations were superfluous, and
decided to return to London to take counsel with his
Cabinet colleagues and with Paris.

The two men looked at each other.

Hitler had arranged a private telephone connection
for Mr. Chamberlain between London and his hotel
on the Petersberg, having already explained that
time was pressing, and that if Mr. Chamberlain
flew to London for a consultation much valuable
time would be lost. Hitler added that his patience
with the Czechs was exhausted, and he could give
no guarantee that he might not immediately
intervene if there were any unrest in the Sudeten
districts.

The interpreter rendered Hitler's statement into
English, word for word.

Finally Mr. Chamberlain yielded.

He said he would stay and continue the discussion
on the next day. Meantime he would get into touch
with the Cabinet in London and, through London,
with Paris.

Hitler could scarcely conceal his pleasure. A few
minutes later, when they began to draw up a joint
communique, he grew obstinate again, and would
accept nothing which might serve to encourage
Czechoslovakia. Discussion over the text of the
joint communique lasted for some time; several
drafts were drawn up and again rejected. Finally

76 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mr. Chamberlain alone handed to the waiting
journalists a statement which constituted an appeal
to both the interested parties — Germany and
Czechoslovakia — to take no steps which might add
to the difficulty of the negotiations.

As he took leave of his EngHsh visitor Hitler said :
" I expect a clear and unambiguous decision at our
session to-morrow ".

Mr. Chamberlain thereupon returned to his hotel
on the Petersberg. He was tired and dispirited.
The negotiations had reached a deadlock. No
further concessions could be forced from Czecho-
slovakia, and England's prestige was at stake. If
Great Britain now gave way to Hitler, what would
the prospects be for the future of Europe ?

While Europe waited in feverish tension for the
result of the Godesberg conversations, Mr. Chamber-
lain made use of the telephone connection with
London which Hitler had installed for him.

Paris Interlude

The Daladier Government in Paris was in a bad
way on that momentous Thursday when Mr.
Chamberlain was interviewing Hitler in Godesberg.
Several members of the French Cabinet were in
open revolt against the policy which led to Prague's
acceptance of the ultimatum. It was common
knowledge that Prime Minister Daladier was easily
susceptible to influence from any quarter. His
intentions were excellent, but what use was that
when he could not take a simple, clear line and stick
to it, when he would let himself be influenced by
M. Bonnet, by his entourage and by all his political
friends who wanted peace at any price provided

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 77

only that France could, for the moment, be saved
from war ?

The dissatisfaction of certain members of the
Cabinet was therefore primarily directed against
M. Bonnet. The most radical of the dissidents was
Paul Reynaud, Minister of Justice.

The two other rebellious members of the Cabinet,
MM. Mandel, Minister for Colonies, and Champetier
de Ribes, Minister of Pensions, met on that Thursday
morning at M. Reynaud's. They discussed the critical
situation and condemned the arbitrary action of
M. Bonnet, who, on his own sole initiative, had
forced Prague to accept the ultimatum. They decided
to resign that very day.

An atmosphere of crisis prevailed in the lobbies of
the French Chamber. Even in the forenoon little
hope was felt that the Godesberg negotiations could
be successful. Even if they were, the Socialists were
dissatisfied and the Communists were raging. Both
groups had decided to demand the immediate
summoning of Parliament, to impeach the Govern-
ment and to bring about M. Daladier's fall.

For the first time in history, France had betrayed
an Ally ; she had failed to honour the signature she
had placed to a treaty eight years ago. She had done
worse: she had compelled her Ally to accept the
humiliating demands of the enemy. France's posi-
tion as a Great Power was shattered. Who would
in future want to conclude a treaty with a country
which did not respect its treaties? France's allies
and friends in the Balkans, Rumania and Yugoslavia,
would turn their backs on France. Germany,
France's immemorial enemy in Europe, would be
the strongest Power on the Continent.

78 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Members of Parliament excitedly discussed the
situation in the lobbies of the House.

" France has handed in her resignation ", declared
Henri de Kerrilis of the Right ; " the people of
France have been smitten with blindness. They do
not see that later on we shall have to fight the war
which we could now risk with relative assurance.
Later we shall fight under far less favourable con-
ditions. I shall tell my constituents so, even if they
repudiate me."

M. Jacquinot, another member, cried in excite-
ment : " To-day we refuse to fight for Czecho-
slovakia. If this goes on we shall to-morrow refuse
to defend Alsace Lorraine against Germany."

With bitter irony he continued : "If Czecho-
slovakia takes Germany on single-handed, I shall
fight as a volunteer in the Czech army. I shall make
one stipulation only. If I fall, they must write over
my grave: ' Died for France '."

Exciting news was received in ParHament at noon.
General Francois Faucher, Chief of the French
MiHtary Mission in Czechoslovakia, had returned
all his French decorations, renounced his rank of
general in the French Army and placed himself at
the disposal of the Czech Army as military adviser.

This news was little calculated to allay the crisis
atmosphere that reigned in Paris. It was already
common knowledge that the Ministers Reynaud,
Mandel and de Ribes were intending to resign.

The Delegation of the Parties of the Left, a
parhamentary committee of the parties of the
Popular Front, was clamouring for the Chamber to
be summoned. The atmosphere was sultry, negotia-
tions stormy. The Radical Socialists, the Party to

I

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 79

which M. Daladier belonged, could not decide to join
in this demand, for they knew that it was contrary
to the wishes of their Party chief.

M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate, and M.
Edouard Herriot, President of the Chamber, called
on M. Daladier. Both were seriously alarmed at
the course things were taking, and sought to prevent
whatever yet might be prevented. The President
of the Senate, a former colleague of the great states-
man Georges Clemenceau, spoke with heat, saying
that they were perhaps sparing war to one generation
and condemning untold future generations to misery.
Clemenceau would never have consented. France
had surrendered — out of fear. Who could imagine
that the period upon which they were entering could
be called peace ?

Edouard Herriot rose to his feet, his massive form
towering high above M. Daladier, seated at his desk.

He would offer him no advice, but if he had been in
M. Daladier's place he would have acted differently.
If they did not make a stand against Germany now,
they would never be able to do it with success.
Think! France, Soviet Russia, Great Britain.
The three mightiest Powers in Europe. If they
made a firm stand against Germany that would be
enough. There would be no war. It might already
be too late ; that he did not know. In any case the
consequences of this lost peace be on M. Daladier's
head.

The two took their leave. M. Daladier rang up
his Foreign Minister.

The news was not cheering. Pessimism in
London. Tension in Prague. The Czechoslovak

80 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Government had had to yield to pressure and had
resigned. The Czech nation wanted to fight, they
did not want to give in without a struggle. How-
ever that might be, hope need not be given up.
It would somehow still be possible to save peace for
France and for Europe.

" Yes, yes," interposed M. Daladier, " but at what
price?"

" We have the Maginot Linei" M. Bonnet
answered, " no one can take us by surprise."

This answer was not calculated to cheer M. Dala-
dier, who had himself been Minister for War for years.
He sent for General Gamelin, Chief of the General
Staff, to discuss once again with him the strategic
position of France. For if the Godesberg negotia-
tions were to break down, would France give way
to Hitler once again? No. This time France
would stand fast and defy Hitler, even if such an
attitude led to war.

General Gamelin came in. He had already taken
all possible steps to prepare France for the worst.
He could not act alone. He had to get the per-
mission of the Head of the Government. For more
extensive preparations he required the permission
of the Cabinet, and if war were declared, the per-
mission of Parliament.

Up to this moment 110,000 reservists had been
called to the colours. This was obviously not
enough, for Germany had already nearly two
million men under arms. But, if necessary, France
could also mobilise two million men at short notice ;
for that, however, the consent of the Council of
Ministers was essential. General GameUn knew
only too well that M. Bonnet had said that as long

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 81

as he was in the Cabinet there would be no war.
And on that fateful Thursday, the 22nd of September,
M. Bonnet still held a seat in the Cabinet. He
will be there for a long time yet.

As soon as his guest had sat down, the Prime
Minister asked if there was anything new to report.
The forceful face of the French Commander-in-
Chief remained grave.

He had further news from the second Bureau of
the French Secret Intelligence in Germany. The
general mood was one of despair. The whole
population was dead against war, and it might be
expected that the first military reverse would destroy
the National Socialist regime. Disaffection reigned
in mihtary circles. They were dissatisfied with
Hitler's policy and said that it was heading for
war. They knew that Germany could not sustain
a lengthy war. The economic position was bad,
the supplies inadequate. There were even serious
deficiencies in the army itself. There was a grave
shortage of officers; a large proportion of the
rank and file were insufficiently trained. The
for-tresses that were being built along the Rhine
were inadequate. Hitler was bluffing when he had
said at Nuremberg that they would be ready in three
months. It would be at least five months before
they were completed. Concrete, moreover, takes a
considerable time to dry properly. The French
were in a position to cope with the Siegfried Line.

M. Daladier remained thoughtful, but felt that
his country was not sufficiently prepared either.
France's war output had suffered severely from the
strikes of the last few months. They had got into
arrears.

82 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

General Gamelin waved this argument aside, saying
that they were admirably prepared for a start. The
moment war broke out, their factories would all be
placed on a war footing. They would amply
suffice the country's needs. There was no need to
worry about that. France was mihtarily prepared.
As soon as the mobilisation order was issued they
would have sixty divisions promptly ready for action.
Did not France possess a first-rate Colonial army of
five million men ?

M. Daladier urged that France's air force was weak
and that Germany's was excellent.

This fact was admitted by General Gamelin, but he
thought it no cause for alarm. The French, British
and Russian air forces together were more than a
match for Germany. Moreover the United States
would supply France and England with planes.
Further, the war was not going to be decided in the
air. It would be decided solely by the infantry and
artillery. And the country could fully rely on them.

M. Daladier dismissed his Chief of the General Staff,
saying that he would inform him of his decision later.

The three malcontent Ministers, Reynaud, Mandel
and Champetier de Ribes, were already waiting in
the Prime Minister's antechamber. They told him
their intention of resigning immediately.

M. Daladier had expected this, and was prepared
for it. He succeeded in convincing his colleagues that
nothing would be more dangerous for France at the
moment than a Cabinet crisis. He reminded them
that last spring, when France was in the middle of a
Cabinet crisis of several days. Hitler had marched
into Austria.

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 83

Moreover there was a hitch in the Godesberg
negotiations. Things looked black. If the negotia-
tions broke down, they would need a united Cabinet
more than ever.

On being asked what would happen then, M. Dala-
dier replied that they would have to take energetic
action. This would be decided upon in the Council
of Ministers.

After a short discussion the three Ministers
decided not to withdraw their threat of resignation,
but for the moment not to press the point. They
left the threat hanging over M. Daladier's head like
the sword of Damocles.

Letters Across the Rhine

Mr. Chamberlain worked late on the night of
Thursday, 22nd September, conferring with London
and Paris, and what he had heard was not calculated
to reassure him.

On the Friday mortiing the situation was extremely
complicated : Hitler had made new proposals which
London and Paris could hardly accept, and which
they assuredly could not force on Prague. If he
insisted that the Sudeten German areas must
immediately be occupied by the German military
forces, the Czech army would unquestionably offer
resistance. France would certainly not leave her
Ally in the lurch this time, for the temper of Paris
had changed on Thursday. If France were at war
with Germany, England must hasten to her assist-
ance, for a military victory of Germany over France
would be a direct threat to Great Britain. The
Soviets, too, were not to be forgotten. Prague and
Paris had concluded pacts of mutual assistance with

84 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Moscow, and the Russians had declared that they
would honour their word and hasten to the assist-
ance of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Chamberlain knew
perfectly well that these three Allies could smash
Germany. But apart from the horrors of such a war,
what was to follow it ? Once the Soviets had got a
footing in Central Europe, would they voluntarily
withdraw ? Would not the defeat of Germany mean
the outbreak of Communism in Central Europe ?

There is nothing the English Lords and Con-
servatives dread more than the bogey of Com-
munism. They prefer National Socialist Germany,
even if in her new strength she were to threaten
England and the British Empire.

War must therefore at all costs be averted.
Negotiations must somehow be continued. But
how? Would it be possible to induce Hitler to
show some degree of moderation ? Mr. Chamber-
lain had his doubts. But he decided to " try again ",
and this time to vary his tactics.

A terrace of the Hotel Dreesen had been set aside
for journalists; they were waiting there in acute
suspense. They all knew that yesterday's con-
ference between the two statesmen had been in some
degree unsatisfactory. They had been despatching
their cables and telephoning their messages till late
into the night, and had begun again at dawn. Now
they were waiting, gazing down into the Rhine,
watching the spot where Mr. Chamberlain must
come ashore after crossing the river from his head-
quarters on the other bank. His steamer was
sighted. He would be over in a few minutes.

" But that's not Chamberlain ! " ejaculated one of
the journalists who was watching through a field-glass.

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 85

Everyone pricked up his ears. They all felt that
they were witnessing a dramatic event. Mr.
Chamberlain had not come. It was one of his
secretaries who had stepped out of the car and
disappeared into the Hotel Dreesen.

Straightway there was a general rush for the
telephone-boxes. Mr. Chamberlain had not come;
he had sent instead a secretary with a letter. This
letter is No. 3 in the English White Paper. It runs :

'* I am ready to put to the Czech Government your
proposal as to the areas, so that they may examine
the suggested provisional boundary. So far as I can
see, there is no need to hold a plebiscite for the bulk
of the areas, i.e, for those areas which, according to
statistics upon which both sides seem to agree, are
predominantly Sudeten German areas.

*' I have no doubt, however, that the Czech Govern-
ment would be willing to accept your proposals for a
plebiscite to determine how far, if at all, the proposed
new frontier need be adjusted.

*' The difficulty I see about the proposal you put to
me yesterday afternoon arises from the suggestion that
the areas should in the immediate future be occupied
by German troops. I recognise the difficulty of con-
ducting a lengthy investigation under existing con-
ditions, and doubdess the plan you propose would, if
it were acceptable, provide an immediate ceasing of
the tension.

*' But I do not think you have realised the impos-
sibility of my agreeing to put forward any plan, unless
I have reason to suppose that it will be considered by
public opinion in my country, in France, and indeed
in the world generally, as carrying out the principles
already agreed upon in an orderly fashion and free
from the threat of force.

" I am sure that an attempt to occupy forthwith by
German troops areas which will become part of the
Reich at once in principle, and very shortly afterwards
by formal delimitation, would be condemned as an
unnecessary display of force.

86 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

*' Even if I felt it right to put this proposal to the
Czech Government, I am convinced that they would
not regard it as being in the spirit of the arrangement
which we and the French Government urged them to
accept, and which they have accepted.

" In the event of German troops moving into the
areas, as you propose, there is no doubt that the
Czech Government would have no option but to order
the forces to resist, and this would mean the destruction
of the basis upon which you and I a week ago agreed
to work together — namely, an orderly settlement of this
question rather than a settlement by the use of force.

" It being agreed in principle that the Sudeten
German areas are to join the Reich, the immediate
question before us is how to maintain law and order
pending the final settlement of the arrangements for
the transfer."

Early that morning Adolf Hitler had summoned
Generals Keitel, Brauchitsch and Reichenau to dis-
cuss the situation with them once again. He pointed
out that negotiations might very probably break
down. If so, the march across the Czechoslovak
frontier must begin at midnight.

Hitler was painfully taken aback v^hen Mr.
Chamberlain did not come. He was in a worse
temper than ever before, and let his entourage feel it.
When the German translation of Mr. Chamberlain's
letter was laid before him, however, the Chancellor
breathed again. Beneath the firmness of the
phrasing he detected an undercurrent of readiness
to give in. Mr. Chamberlain had already given in
over the plebiscite question when Hitler had insisted.
He was still holding out against the immediate
occupation of the Sudeten areas by German troops.
This is a point on which Hitler would not give
way. He had not mobilised his forces for nothing;
he would not rob them of their triumph. More-

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 87

over, he wanted to give such a display of force as
would make an impression on the peoples of Eastern
Europe. Above all, he was determined to get the
Czech frontier fortresses into his hands ; otherwise the
whole business was futile. He was not greatly con-
cerned about freeing his German brothers from the
yoke of a free and democratic Czechoslovakia ; his
primary ambition was to remove from his path the
great obstacle to his progress eastwards: Czecho-
slovakia. This point he could not yield.

He went cautiously to work, however. He sent
a brief answer to Mr. Chamberlain acknowledging
the receipt of the British Prime Minister's letter and
stating that he hoped to reply more fully in the
course of the day. The secretary brought this letter
back to Mr. Chamberlain at Petersberg.

Feeling a shade more hopeful, Mr. Chamberlain
rang up London. He told Lord Halifax that it
looked as if there were still some chance of an
agreement. Hitler had not sent an immediate
reply to Mr. Chamberlain's firm and decisive letter.
Possibly this was a sign that he was willing to make
concessions.

The Prime Minister then had a chat with Mrs.
Chamberlain and conversations with some political
and personal friends. He looked out over the lovely
landscape of the Rhine the while — and waited for
Hitler's answer.

Meanwhile, M. Bonnet learnt via London, that in
spite of everything there was still a gleam of hope.
He hastened to communicate this to the French
Prime Minister and his other colleagues. M. Daladier
received a deputation from his Party. The Socialists
and the Communists had demanded the immediate

88 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

summoning of the Chamber ; the Radical Sociahsts
had opposed it. M. Daladier approved the refusal,
but would not commit himself to stating definitely
what France would do if the Godesberg negotiations
broke down. " That depends on circumstances . . ."
he said, and with that dismissed his Party friends.

At half-past three in the afternoon a special
messenger from Hitler was announced. He handed
over a sealed letter. The translator set feverishly
to work, as if the peace of the world hung on his
speed.

Mr. Chamberlain could hardly control his im-
patience. He snatched up the translation, then
despondently let fall the hand that held the German
Chancellor's reply. Hitler's answer scattered all
his hopes to the winds. The German Dictator and
Imperial Chancellor wrote as follows: (Document
No. 4 of the English White Paper) :

" For nearly two decades the Germans, as well as
the various other nationalities in Czechoslovakia, have
been maltreated in the most unworthy manner,
tortured, economically destroyed, and above all
prevented from realising for themselves the right of
nations to self-determination.

. " All attempts of the oppressed to change their lot
failed in the face of the brutal will to destruction of
the Czechs. The latter were in possession of the
power of the State, and did not hesitate to employ it
ruthlessly and barbarically. England and France
have never made an endeavour to alter this situation.

" If formerly the behaviour of the Czechoslovak
Government was brutal, it can only be described during
recent weeks and days as madness. The victims of
this madness are innumerable Germans.

" In a few weeks the number of refugees who have
been driven out has risen to over 120,000. This
situation as stated above is unbearable, and wiU now
be terminated by me.

I

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP S9

" What interests me, Your Excellency, is not the
recognition of the principle that this territory is to go
to Germany, but solely the realisation which both
puts an end in the shortest time to the sufferings of
the unhappy victims of Czech tyranny, and at the
same time corresponds to the dignity of a great power.

** For England it is a question at most of poHtical
imponderables, whereas for Germany it is a question
of primitive right, of the security of more than three
miUion human beings and the national honour of a
great people."

The telephone rang. In a roundabout manner,
via London, Mr. Chamberlain learned approxi-
mately what Hitler had said to his generals yesterday
and that morning. He learned of fresh concen-
trations of German troops on the frontiers of
Czechoslovakia.

He talked at great length with London — and told
of the day's happenings to date. Everyone who
spoke to him agreed that they were in the highest
degree discouraging. Mr. Chamberlain requested
that these facts should be communicated to Paris
and also the contents of the cypher telephone despatch
which he sent to London shortly after.

A few hours later the whole world was stirred to
intense excitement by the consequences of this
despatch.

The Czechs Ready to Fight

About seven o'clock that Friday evening M.
Daladier again received the members of the parlia-
mentary committee of his Party. He said to them :
" France will aid Czechoslovakia if she is attacked by
Germany ".

The Paris correspondents of the Czechoslovak
newspapers at once communicated this news to

90 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

their editors. It was their last telephone conversa-
tion with home for a long time. Two hours later
all telephonic communication had been cut between
Czechoslovakia and the outer world. Czecho-
slovakia was on a war footing.

The new Czechoslovak Government, which had
been formed on Thursday, took office in a brief
moment of relative calm. There had been huge
demonstrations in Prague on the Wednesday and
Thursday, but now there was a lull. The people,
however, felt stunned by the treachery of their
Western friends. Yet none believed that this state
of affairs was final, especially as rumours had
reached the public ear that there was a hitch in the
Godesberg negotiations.

" Hitler is our last hope ", said a highly-placed
Czech official to a friend. " He has at last over-
stepped the utmost limit of the attainable, he will
ask impossibilities of Chamberlain." He was right
in his estimate of the German Chancellor. A few
days, however, sufficed to convince him that he had
over-rated the firmness and determination of the
Western Powers.

President Benes felt a tiny stirring of hope again
that Friday. He knew that the French party which
was in favour of making a firm stand against Hitler
was gaining the upper hand. On the Thursday
afternoon — only the day before — the Polish Minister
in Prague had handed in Poland's repudiation of
the Minority Pact between Poland and Czecho-
slovakia. PoHsh mihtary forces were mustering on
the Polish-Czech border. Simultaneously, however,
there came good news from Moscow. At four

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 91

o'clock on the morning of Thursday, Potemkin,
the acting Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
had sent for the Polish Charge d' Affaires, and in-
formed him that if Poland attacked Czechoslovakia,
Soviet Russia would immediately and without
further warning break the Polish pact. At the
same time, Prague received an official answer from
the Soviet Government to her inquiries.

Through their Minister in Moscow the Czecho-
slovak Government had asked : " Does Soviet
^■tussia consider that recent events have cancelled
^Bie Russo-Czechoslovak pact of mutual assistance,
^Kr is the Soviet Government still prepared to come
Hb Czechoslovakia's assistance if she is attacked by
Germany ? "

The answer of the Soviet Government ran : "If
Czechoslovakia is attacked, Soviet Russia will fulfil
the obligations arising from the French-Czecho-
slovak-Soviet pact of mutual assistance ".

This meant that Soviet Russia was ready to help
Czechoslovakia if France also fulfilled her obliga-
tions. But would France fulfil them when she had
already left Czechoslovakia once in the lurch ?

President Benes rang up the Czechoslovak
Legation in Paris. His Minister's report was
hopeful.

President Benes stepped to the window of his
study, from which he had a glorious view over the
city of a hundred towers lying in the valley far
below. A slight haze lay over the spires and roofs.
The glorious view that met his eye had in it, as
always, a touch of melancholy.

Was this lovely town to be reduced in a few days
to a heap of ruins ? The German bombers would

92 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

not spare the glorious monuments of architecture,
once they had their orders to begin. But the
President was optimistic. He still hoped that even
now, at the eleventh hour, the appalling catastrophe
might be averted. He firmly believed that if the
Powers stood firm, Hitler would abandon his bluff.
Dr. Benes is a disciple of the French philosophers, he
clung to thephilosophy of clear logic and its unbending
laws. He was therefore convinced that Germany
would not risk a war against overwhelming odds.
He forgot that in the Europe of to-day the laws of
logic appear to have lost their vaHdity. Feelings
and emotions have routed logic.

The President lingered long at his window. He
thought on the past and on the future. The
Czechs had been only a mere twenty years in control.
Before that, for three hundred years, they had been
ruled by the Germans of the Habsburg Empire. It
was no cause for wonder that here and there old
resentments had asserted themselves, and found
vent in petty intrigues against which the President
could do little, even if he came to know of them.
The State was a democratic Republic, and the
democratic-bureaucratic machine works slowly.
Besides, what are twenty years in the life of a State ?
If Czechoslovakia were given time, Germans and
Czechs could contrive to live and work together in
friendship, to the advantage of both nations. It
was no accident that in this Bohemian land Czechs
and Germans had lived together for ten centuries.
The existence of Bohemia was economically and
politically necessary to Europe.

And now — it seemed too late. The Czechs had
denied autonomy to the Germans because they

M

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 93

feared that they would use it to create a totahtarian
State within the democratic framework of the
RepubHc. Would a wise compromise still be
possible even now, if Germany should give way?
President Benes optimistically believed that even yet
a peaceful settlement might be found for the Sudeten
Germans within the Czechoslovak Republic.

At this point in his reflections — 6.45 p.m. — his
secretary entered. The French and British Ministers
requested an audience.

The President granted it.

This time the French Minister spoke first. He
spoke solemnly and with profound emotion : " The
French Government ", he said, " have commis-
sioned me to inform Your Excellency that they no
longer regard as binding on Czechoslovakia the
promise she made not to take extraordinary measures
in the present crisis. She is again free to take any
steps she thinks imperative for her own safety."

" His Majesty's Government associates itself
unreservedly with this declaration ", added the
British Minister.

The President replied as calmly as he could :

" Thank you, gentlemen. We shall promptly
inform you of whatever measures we take."

The President knew at once what the Franco-
British message implied. The Western Powers
considered that the Godesberg negotiations had
broken down, and were preparing for the worst.
They were now giving Czechoslovakia a free hand.

A council of Cabinet Ministers was summoned
at once, and attended also by the Members of the
Ministry of Defence and the Generals of the General
taff.

94 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

At twenty minutes past 10 that same Friday
evening the Czech wireless broadcast the order for
mobilisation.

By eleven o'clock Prague lay in complete darkness.
The first attack of the German air force was expected.

But at Godesberg at that moment two men sat
together in animated conversation.

The " Supreme Effort "

Storm-clouds had gathered on the European
horizon while Chamberlain and Hitler on opposite
banks of the Rhine had been exchanging letters.

About four o'clock that afternoon the British
Prime Minister had sent the following answer to
Adolf Hitler's letter:

" My Dear Reichskanzler,

*' I have received your Excellency's communication
in reply to my letter of this morning and have taken
note of its contents.

"In my capacity as intermediary, it is evidently
now my duty — since your Excellency maintains
entirely the position you took last night — to put your
proposals before the Czechoslovak Government.

" Accordingly, I request your Excellency to be good
enough to let me have a memorandum which sets out
these proposals, together with a map showing the area
proposed to be transferred, subject to the result of the
proposed plebiscite.

" On receiving this memorandum, I will at once
forward it to Prague and request the reply of the
Czechoslovak Government at the earliest possible
moment.

" In the meantime, until I can receive their reply, I
should be glad to have your Excellency's assurance
that you will continue to abide by the understanding,
which we reached at our meeting on the 14th September
and again last night, that no action should be taken,
particularly in the Sudeten territory, by the forces of

i

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 95

the Reich to prejudice any further mediation which
may be found possible.

" Since the acceptance or refusal of your Excellency's
proposal is now a matter for the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment to decide, I do not see that I can perform any
further service here, whilst, on the other hand, it has
become necessary that I should at once report the
present situation to my colleagues and to the French
Government. I propose, therefore, to return to
England.

" Yours faithfully,

" Neville Chamberlain."

Meanwhile Hitler had shut himself up in, his
room in the Hotel Dreesen. He paced up and down
muttering half-inaudibly to himself.

The unprecedented tension that held the whole
place under a spell communicated itself to everyone.
Even the most hard-boiled journalists spoke in
whispers.

In a comer of the hotel hall two men carried on
a discreet conversation; they were von Ribbentrop
and Sir Nevile Henderson.

Ribbentrop suggested that if war were to break
out now, it would be over a mere question of pro-
cedure, as the whole question had already been
decided upon in principle.

Sir Nevile agreed, but called attention to the
serious differences on the main question, to which
Ribbentrop replied that it made no real difference
whether the German forces occupied the Sudeten
areas then or later.

The immediate occupation of the areas was vital
to Germany's prestige, according to Ribbentrop,
but Sir Nevile felt that it was no less vital to England's
prestige that the whole problem should be settled
justly.

96 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Finally the two diplomats agreed that a further
meeting between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler was
absolutely essential, and each undertook to ensure
that it should be arranged.

Before this last interview took place, Europe had
anticipated its result. Prague, as we know, had
ordered mobihsation as a direct consequence of the
cypher telephone despatch which Mr. Chamberlain
had sent to London a few hours before, and which
had brought about the joint communication made
by the French and British Ministers to President
Benes. There had been a Cabinet meeting in Paris,
which General Gamelin had attended, and which
had authorised further mobilisation measures.
Moscow was transporting more and more troops to
her western frontiers. There was talk of an army
of two million men. Finally, the English Minister
for War, Mr. Hore-BeHsha, cut short his tour of
inspection in the provinces and flew with all haste
to London.

Just before 10.30 p.m. Mr. Chamberlain alighted
from his car to bid Hitler farewell.

The journalists eagerly awaited his reappearance
to be able to transmit the sensational news to the
world. But Mr. Chamberlain did not reappear.
The journalists had to wait three hours that chilly
evening in the night air before he at last emerged.

Midnight Talks

If Mr. Chamberlain had expected to find a stem
and angry man, he had miscalculated. Hitler was
transformed as he resumed conversations in the
hall of the hotel shortly after 10.30.

Stifiiy Mr. Chamberlain announced that he had

I

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 97

come to say good-bye, much regretting that he had
to return to London with such a result. The
consequences would be incalculable.

But Hitler had prepared the Memorandum for
which Mr. Chamberlain had asked and had it with
him.

Mr. Chamberlain took the Memorandum and
began to study it. It was written in German, but
there was an English translation alongside. Germany
demanded the immediate cession of the areas marked
on the accompanying map and their occupation by
German troops before the 1 st of October. Plebiscites
must be held in the other areas, marked green on
the map, before the end of November, and the new
boundaries of Czechoslovakia laid down in ac-
ordance with the results of these plebiscites either
y a German-Czech or by an International Com-

ission. Germany demanded that all movable and
immovable property should be left behind in the
areas which were to be occupied by the German
forces. No one, not even private persons, could be
permitted to carry anything away if they wished to
move into Czech territory. The Memorandum
was couched in language not usually employed in
diplomatic documents.

Chamberlain read the Memorandum through,
then turned his gaze on Hitler, who sat motionless.

The German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop,
Sir Nevile Henderson, and Mr. Chamberlain's
adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, sat in another corner
of the room and followed the historic conversation
with strained attention.

Mr. Chamberlain said firmly that he thought
that the document was not a memorandum, but an

D

98 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ultimatum ; but Hitler answered that such was the
will of the German people. There had been no
previous talk, objected Mr. Chamberlain, of fixing a
given date for the occupation of the Sudeten areas.
And now the 1st of October was given. The short-
ness of the time left httle prospect open for use-
ful discussion.

France and England, Hitler then argued, had
recognised Germany's just right to the Sudeten
areas. Czechoslovakia had accepted Germany's
demands. But he did not trust the good faith
of the Czechs. They wanted to gain time to
mobilise the war-mongers in France, England and
Russia for their cause, and he had no great opinion
of international negotiations and commissions, but
intended to secure his right and his people with
arms.

Would not England and France be a sufficient
guarantee? asked Mr. Chamberlain, but Hitler's
simple and unambiguous reply was that Germany's
arms were the best guarantee of Germany's rights.

Mr. Chamberlain now urged Hitler to consider
what it would mean if he took the steps proposed.
France would hasten to the assistance of Czecho-
slovakia. He reminded him that the French Army
was still considered the best in Europe.

Hitler remained unmoved.

He knew that the French Army was good. But
Germany had completed a line of fortifications
along their western frontier. These fortifications
would hold up a French advance, and by that time
they would have finished their job in the east.
Besides, the French Air Force was poor. The Chief
of the French Air Force, General Vuillemin, had

I

I

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 99

been in Germany a month before. He had been
able to convince himself of the quality of Germany's
Air Force. If Germany's bombers laid a few
French towns in ruins there would be a revolution
in France.

Chamberlain wondered what would happen if
the French, Russian and Czech bombers attacked
German towns, to which Hitler replied that there
would be no German revolution. The Red bandits
in Prague and Moscow would like to think it.
And that was why he must have the business with
Prague ended by the 1st of October. Czecho-
slovakia was nothing but a Red arrow in Germany's
side. Until Czechoslovakia was overthrown and
Soviet Russia driven from Europe, there would be
no peace in that Continent.

Hitler repeated all the old arguments which have
filled the German Press for years. This time,
however, they made no impression, for Mr. Chamber-
lain was putting all the bulldog tenacity of an
obstinate Englishman into his task of saving the
peace of Europe.

England, he said, had repeatedly declared that
she would not stand aside if France became involved
in a war with Germany. The sympathy of the
United States was with the European democracies,
and they could count from the first on America's
economic help and on her supplying them with
munitions. Once war had started, who could tell
how things would develop? He asked Hitler to
remember the World War.

This time Chamberlain seemed to have hit the
mark. He was not himself aware of it, but Hitler,
and with him many of the National Socialist leaders.

100 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

have an almost superstitious terror of the power
of the mighty democracy over the sea. All Hitler's
attempts to win for himself the friendship of the
United States had failed. Germany has few friends
in America. This fact emerges unmistakably on
every occasion of crisis. And Hitler is anything
but happy about it.

Making an effort to conceal his uneasiness,
Hitler said that no one would really believe that the
United States would go to war with Germany.
They had had enough unpleasant experiences in the
last war and would turn their backs on Europe.

Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that he had good
reason to be convinced of what he had said. Not
only public opinion in England, but public opinion
in many other democratic countries would be out-
raged by the Memorandum which Hitler had just
handed him. France and Czechoslovakia would
reject it, and on the 1st of October we should have
a war in Europe of which no man could foresee when
or how it would end.

There would be no war, unless France and England
wished, replied Hitler. Czechoslovakia had been
forced to accept the main thing, and the British and
French Governments would be able to compel her
to acquiesce also in the method of procedure.

Mr. Chamberlain refused to discuss the matter
further. If the question found no peaceful settle-
ment, he said, the whole responsibihty would rest on
Hitler's shoulders in the eyes of the entire world.

Hitler swung round. In that soft, wooing voice
with which when he was still only a speaker at
mass meetings, he had enlisted hundreds of thousands
for his cause (especially women), he expressed his

I

k

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 101

heartfelt admiration for Mr. Chamberlain's efforts.
Europe should be grateful to him, for once already
had Hitler abstained from violent action for Mr.
Chamberlain's sake, but he would not do it a second
time. If the Czechs did not voluntarily withdraw
by the 1st of October, he would give the order to'
march. It was not only a question of prestige or of
the security of the German people which compelled
him. Once before, on the 21st of last May, the
Czechs had been able to flatter themselves that they
had frightened him. This behef of theirs had been
false, but dangerous. If Hitler did not act this
time, how many helpless Sudeten Germans would
pay the penalty ?

Mr. Chamberlain ventured to suggest, seeking an
acceptable formula for agreement, a force of inter-
national police to maintain order in the Sudeten
country, but Hitler would not hear of such an
arrangement. The Sudeten areas would be occupied
by German troops. If the Czechs would not peace-
fully permit the occupation, Germany would
occupy the territories by force. Sufficient proof
had been given of his good will, in cancelling,
for Mr. Chamberlain's sake, the military measures
which had already been taken. Had Mr. Chamber-
lain not come to Berchtesgaden the week before, the
whole business would have been already settled.

Mr. Chamberlain retorted that Europe would
then have been plunged in war, but Hitler emphatic-
ally denied this. He did not believe that France
would have stirred a finger. Germany would have
entered Prague within a few days, and they would have
dictated to the Czechs boundaries very different from
those which he now conceded to Mr. Chamberlain.

102 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mr. Chamberlain was profoundly shaken. Anything
he might attempt to do seemed hopeless. He was
about to get up to say good-bye; instead he asked
if he might have a few words with Hitler alone
before he went.

Hitler agreed. For the third time within a week
the two men were alone together.

Once more Hitler turned his soft side to Mr.
Chamberlain. There is no doubt that he set himself
to win the Englishman over.

Germany was asking nothing but her rights, he
pleaded. It would have been a simple thing for
her to have attacked Czechoslovakia by force.
Their detailed plans were ready. The Siegfried
Line protected their western frontier. The Russians
would have had to march through Rumania to help
the Czechs, for the Poles would not have let them
cross Poland. That would have brought the
Rumanians in on Germany's side. Long before
western help could have begun to operate, Germany
would have seized Czechoslovakia and allied them-
selves with Rumania. They would then have had
suppHes enough from Rumania, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia to fight and win a long war.
Meantime Italy would have held France in check.
Britain's job would not have been nearly so easy as
many of their Western newspaper scribblers imagined.
They had no true conception of the strength and
determination of the German people. In spite of
everything, Germany nevertheless wanted peace.
Hitler's policy had always been clear. He had
always said that there were still ten million Germans
in Europe who must be reunited to their Mother-
country. He had also always spoken of his peaceful

aa

i

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 103

intentions, and he had so far kept his promise. The
anschluss with Austria had been accompHshed with-
out his firing a shot. The anschluss of the Sudeten
country should be equally peaceful. Only if the
Czechs and their Red alHes offered resistance, fear
would not deter them from using their tanks and
aircraft. They would only be performing a service
to Europe.

Mr. Chamberlain could find no suitable reply to
this vehement outburst. He could only repeat what
he had already said several times before, and said
without success. He could only point out the
dangers which would arise from this procedure : the
anger that European civihsation would be laid in

ins for a long time to come. Hitler paid no
ttention to all this, nor to anything else which
Mr. Chamberlain brought forward. When once he
had incorporated in the Reich all the Germans who
were living on the outskirts of Germany, he would
have no further territorial ambitions in Europe, he
said.

Chamberlain remained silent.

Germany, continued Hitler, had always been
deeply anxious not only to come to terms with Eng-
land, but to live in genuine friendship with her. After
all, they were two peoples of the same Germanic race.
Why should there be discord between them ? Hitler
also reminded Mr. Chamberlain that he had already
demonstrated his readiness to be friends by con-
cluding the Naval Agreement with England. He
was ready to sign an Air Agreement, a Non- Aggres-
sion Pact and a Pact of Friendship. England and
■Oermany were racially predestined to rule Europe
^Knd the World.

104 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mr. Chamberlain was not anxious to enter into a
discussion of race. An Englishman practises race
discrimination, but he never speaks of it. On the
other hand, Hitler's declaration of friendship was
something which the British Premier could seize
upon.

Great Britain was equally anxious to live at peace
with Germany, he said eagerly. Friendship was
tested only when the moment came to prove it.
Hitler had now the opportunity of proving it. If
he would waive his demands in this matter — since
the question had already been decided in principle
in Germany's favour — he would prove that he
really desired England's friendship.

Hitler hesitated. But he did not hesitate long
enough to let Mr. Chamberlain hope afresh.

He said that he could not and would not give way,
but could once more assure Mr. Chamberlain that
he was ready to open every kind of negotiation with
England when once the Sudeten problem had been
solved. Nothing would then stand between them.

After a moment's reflection Hitler added that
there was of course still the question of Colonies
which must be settled. A powerful Empire like
Germany could not be forcibly prevented from
continuing its colonising mission. But he added
in a conciliatory tone that Germany would have no
mobilisations on that subject. With a little goodwill
on both sides that little problem could easily be
settled in a friendly way.

Mr. Chamberlain answered that he was assuming
a good will in that matter, which he gave no sign
of showing himself in the question of Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak question. Hitler pointed out,

HERR HITLER DRAWS A MAP 105

touched the German people very closely. He could
not allow foreigners to interfere when they were
about to settle matters their own way.

Mr. Chamberlain saw that they were talking at
cross purposes. This man would not be convinced
by argument. It was late, and he thought resignedly
that they had better end their conference.

The two men returned to the hall. Ribbentrop
and Sir Nevile Henderson saw at a glance that no
agreement had been reached between the two states-
men.

The four continued the conversation for a litde
while, but it now turned on irrelevant or unim-
portant matters. Once more in the course of con-
versation Mr. Chamberlain made an attempt to
induce Hitler to alter his point of view, but he knew
beforehand that the attempt was useless. Finally
they drew up a brief communique, and Mr. Chamber-
lain said that he would forward Hitler's Memoran-
dum to the Government in Prague, but he scarcely
thought that the French and British Governments
would be able to recommend Prague to accept it.

Had he been hoping that Hitler would turn right-
about, now, at the last moment? If so, he was
mistaken.

Courteous phrases and handshakes were exchanged,
and Mr. Chamberlain stepped out into the night air.

He was surrounded by journalists. Wearily he
told them that negotiations had not completely
broken down.

D2

106 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CHAPTER IV

ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY HOURS
SHAKE EUROPE

Five days had elapsed between the Saturday morning
on which Mr. Chamberlain entered the aeroplane at
Cologne to return to London and the following
Thursday, the 29th September, when, at 8.30 in the
morning, he once more entered the aeroplane which
was to take him to Munich, where he was to attend
the Conference of Four.

One hundred and twenty hours had shaken Europe
— the worst hours which it had to pass through in
this crisis.

War seemed inevitable. The negotiations had
broken down, and further talks were useless.
With whom and on what subject was it still possible
to negotiate? People had to famiharise themselves
with the idea that on the 1st of October the guns
would begin to speak, since the speech of European
statesmen was not loud enough to bring Germany to
her senses.

When night fell, the people of Europe had every
reason to suppose that they would find their Con-
tinent in a state of war on awaking next morning.
Yet there was no panic : people seemed hypnotised
by fear of the inevitable, and prepared to meet
their destiny.

Spain and China had taught every European the
horrors of warfare. All had seen pictures of the
smoking ruins which once had been cities, of dead
children and women slaughtered by enemy aircraft.

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 107

The fate of Guernica and the bombardment of
Shanghai, Taerchewang and other Chinese cities had
not been forgotten. And it was certain that if war
broke out in Europe on the 1st of October, it would
be a hundred times more hideous than the events
taking place in China and Spain.

Europe's resources v/ere at an end. It had added
fuel to the flames until it was threatened itself. The
heads of the European democracies had proved
incapable of countering Germany's bluff by bluff,
of thus preventing war, and of confining Germany
within due limits. And now the peoples seemed
doomed to pay with their blood for this ineptitude
of European statesmanship.

The two protagonists of the drama, Germany and
Czechoslovakia, were ready. The latter had mobi-
Hsed, and the former did not require mobilisation,
since she had been armed to the teeth for weeks.
France, the third chief Power concerned, was pre-
paring at accelerated speed. Russia observed a
threatening silence. In London gas-masks were
distributed to the population. Italy had com-
pleted a secret mobilisation and had taken certain
economic measures. Belgium, which had suffered
ruin during the Great War, was anxiously waiting
to see whether the Germans would once again
violate her neutraUty. Even the minor States, which
normally stand aside from Europe's major politics,
were taking steps. Switzerland had mined every
road and railway leading across her frontiers, and
issued pubUc notices that they would be blown up
on the outbreak of war. In Denmark coastguards
and sailors whose period of service was due to
expire were retained. The Netherlands Govern-

108 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ment had determined to increase the effective number
of the army.

By order of the Pope masses of intercession for
peace were celebrated in 423 churches.

The peoples of Europe saw the end of their
civilisation approaching, and prepared for death.

President BeneS sees Hitler's Work

Czechoslovakia, too, prepared for death. The
train loads of men who were being carried to
their threatened frontiers knew that in all proba-
bility they would not return home again. And
if they did return, what would they find? Prague
was a bare hour's flight from the nearest German
aerodrome. All possible measures of safety had
been taken, and Prague was surrounded by anti-
aircraft guns; but these would be of little avail
against the vast superiority of German aircraft.
All Czechoslovakia knew that at best it could resist
Hitler's forces for six weeks, and that within these
six weeks the entire country would be turned into a
desolate heap of ruins. There was, further, the
Polish threat. Poland, itself possessing a Ukrainian
minority of six miUions, thought the moment oppor-
tune to raise a claim upon the 100,000 Poles living
in Czechoslovakia.

But the Czechs are a sturdy nation : their thousand
years of national Hfe has not been easy. There
had been times before when the Czech nation had
seemed no longer to exist, and yet on each occasion
they had held their own.

In Prague the man in the street knew well
enough what was at stake. He knew what the
Western statesmen did not quite realise, that now

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 109

was the time to stop Germany's Drang nach Osten,
and thus to prevent her from achieving the hege-
mony of Europe. The Czechs knew this, and were
ready to do their duty by their country and Europe.

On the Saturday evening the British Minister in
Prague had handed Hitler's memorandum and map
to President Benes.

The President had asked whether the British
Government made any recommendations to Czecho-
slovakia with regard to the memorandum, and had
been answered in the negative. A similar reply had
been received from Paris.

And now the entire Czechoslovak Government

^as assembled around the big table in the President's

:onference-room, before them the map of the new

Czechoslovakia — the Czechoslovakia Ci la Hitler.

[Apart from members of the Government, there were

lembers of the General Staff and of the body of

)ohtical advisers whose function it is to assist the

Government.

Before them was the map with the districts marked
in red and the green Hues surrounding plebiscite
areas. What they saw was grave enough. The
new State would lose all its raw materials — lignite,
timber, china-clay, iron and radium. It would be
deprived of hops for Pilsen beer, and Prague would
be without electric current, as the Prague electricity
works were in the mixed-language district near Most.

Pilsen, with the vast Skoda works, would become
a frontier town, and almost the entire textile industry,
together with the glass, china, paper, chemical and
dye industries, would pass into German hands.
Further, the two most important railway lines of
the country — that from Prague to Brno, and that

110 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

from Prague to Moravska Ostrava — would have to
cross German territory in two places.

While other Ministers were sceptical, President
Benes remained optimistic. Neither Paris nor Lon-
don insisted on the acceptance of the terms, and he
still thought that Germany would be frightened if
she saw that the Western Powers meant business.
In that case reasonable negotiations might be
possible. At the same time one consideration re-
mained. Czechoslovakia had agreed in principle
to cede purely German districts to Germany, and
if there were to be further negotiations, Czecho-
slovakia would have to honour this pledge.

War or Peace?

The breakdown of the Godesberg negotiations
had roused the Western statesmen from their
lethargy for a few days, and had inspired more
energetic action. Now that war seemed inevitable,
the necessary preparations were made with varying
degrees of intensity.

In Paris, as we know, there had been a meeting
of Ministers on the night preceding Saturday the
24th September. General Gamelin had been
present at these consultations, at which it was
decided to take all measures not requiring a
resolution of the Council of Ministers, meeting
under the chairmanship of the President of the
Republic. In the process, certain laws and regula-
tions admittedly received rather cavalier treatment :
but there was no need to worry about such matters
now. It was necessary to prepare France at any
rate for the first assault: long before this was

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 111

achieved, the necessary resolutions of the Cabinet
and Chamber would be forthcoming.

On this Saturday morning France had nearly a
million and a quarter men under arms, and the Paris
Gare de I'Est was still thronged with reservists.
M. Daladier said to his friends, " I have done every-
thing permitted by my powers. Further measures
will require fresh resolutions."

The attitude of the population towards these events
was followed with anxious interest ; but the popula-
tion remained remarkably passive, and no definite
attitude was observable. This was natural : for the
French were not only badly informed, but had been
dehberately misled by the Press. Whether from
conviction or design, the major papers had for weeks
been stressing the need of preserving peace at all
costs : the majority of the French Press was serving
the cause of defeatism. The people had not been
told that the present need was to show firmness
in order to preserve peace and, should that be
impossible, to anticipate the more disastrous war
which an immediate future would certainly bring.
The heads of the French Government now saw,
to their dismay, the effects of such tendentious
information.

Behind the scenes Georges Bonnet, the inde-
fatigable " Angel of Peace-at-all-costs ", was active,
influencing the Press, sowing dissension within the
Government, and striving against France's Eastern
ally.

On the same Saturday, Signor Mussolini, whose
chance was soon to come although he did not know
it, appeared to have lost his nerve. He had deUvered
a militant speech at Belluno : " Our enemies beyond

112 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

the Alps ", he said, " are far too stupid to become
dangerous to us ". In commenting on this speech
the French Press did not hesitate to say that Musso-
Hni had not meant France, but only the enemies of
Fascism in general beyond the Alps.

On the same Saturday big posters were shown in
German cities like Frankfurt-on-Main, Lorrach and
Baden, bearing the inscription : " Two and a half
millions of Swiss Germans await their liberation ".

On the same Saturday Herr Hitler returned to
Berlin and Mr. Chamberlain to London. The
latter conferred with his friend Lord Halifax.
Later, before the meeting of the Cabinet, he spoke
with Mr. Hore-Belisha, the War Minister.

At five o'clock the Cabinet met at No. 10. The
Prime Minister reported on the breakdown at
Godesberg and read out the Memorandum. The
map attached to it was also submitted.

No resolutions were reached by the Cabinet on
this day. The general impression prevailed that the
Memorandum could hardly serve as a basis for
further negotiation, and the matter was postponed
until the following day. MM. Daladier and Bonnet
had already been asked to come to London, and
the problem would be discussed jointly with them.
It is possible also that many circles in London and
Paris still beheved that the Prague Government
would, after all, accept the Memorandum, and that
an easy way out of the difficulty would thus be found.

But no recommendation in this sense was made to
Prague by either capital. The necessary energy was
lacking. Instead it was preferred to prepare for the
inevitable, in the hope that Germany might still be
deterred at the last moment.

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 113

But already it was too late. Herr Hitler felt that
he had succeeded in " neutraUsing " Britain in a
sense, and, seeing how slight were the preparations
made by Britain for a possible war, he was firmly
convinced that France would not move without
Britain.

A witty British diplomat once said : " If France
makes war without asking us, we naturally join in.
If France asks us whether she should make war, of
course we say no."

A Rainy Sunday

Sunday the 25th of September was an unpleasant
day. Autumn had come early, with cold and wet
weather. A chilly wind blew through the streets of
Paris, which were almost entirely empty. Nature
seemed to have adapted herself to events.

But though the Paris streets were empty, it did not
follow that poUtical activity had come to a standstill.
Early in the forenoon M. Bonnet had received
Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador. The
British Government was anxious to know what
attitude France would take up at the present juncture.
The Foreign Minister, however, was unable to give
a satisfactory answer, because at the moment he
did not know whether he would be Foreign Minister
at the end of the day.

The ministerial crisis had indeed again become
acute, and those members of the Cabinet who were
dissatisfied with the attitude hitherto taken up by
the Government, were insisting on a firm line by
France, coupled with a plain intimation to London
that France would abide by her treaty obligations
to Czechoslovakia. Their wish was to enforce their

114 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

own policy, which was that Paris should advise
Prague summarily to reject all concessions to Ger-
many, and thus to create a definite fait accompli.
Advice in this sense was actually reaching Prague
from many sources: so far, however, the desired
answer had not been given.

M. Bonnet naturally opposed such a course, which,
he thought, would involve France in war : his attitude
being that war must be avoided at all costs. He
knew that this attitude met with the approval of
many members of the British Government. The
latter, indeed, was completely in accord with his
initiative in compelUng Prague to accept the first
ultimatum.

The mid-day papers had announced that the two
Ministers would leave for London early in the
afternoon, and the aeroplane to take them there
was waiting at the Le Bourget aerodrome. First,
however, a Cabinet had to be held. The outlook
was uncertain.

The Cabinet met at two o'clock: and the crisis
failed to materialise. M. Daladier, reporting on the
Godesberg negotiations in accordance with London
advices, informed his colleagues regarding the con-
tents of Hitler's memorandum, and submitted Hitler's
map of the new Czechoslovakia.

A heated debate ensued. The three .malcontents,
MM. Reynaud, Mandel and Champetier de Ribes,
laid down their point of view, and were joined
by three further Ministers, MM. Jean Zay,
Campinchi and Queille. Tension was growing, and
an open breach within the Cabinet began to threaten.
Yet a Government crisis was highly to be deprecated.
The French Ministers were expected in London, and

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 115

it had already been found necessary to telephone to
London to say that they would be coming later
because the morning negotiations and the protracted
meeting of the Cabinet Council had detained them
in Paris.

And indeed a Cabinet crisis would be extremely
awkward at the moment, for, though it would
certainly be possible to fill vacancies left by resigna-
tions, Sunday was not the day for such measures.

The upshot of a lengthy debate eventually was that
France would report in London that it would no
longer recommend the Prague Government to
accept the Memorandum, and that it would recom-
mend the British Government to take up a firm
attitude with regard to Germany. Further decisions
were to be taken when the Ministers returned from
London. After all, it was essential first to know the
British Government's views.

A car rushed through the empty streets of Paris,
and tliirty-five minutes later an aeroplane rose into
the air to fly to London in the wind and rain.

At half-past six M. Jan Masaryk, the Czech
Minister, in London, called on Lord Hahfax.
The son of the founder of Czechoslovakia, Jan
Masaryk had been serving as Minister in London
for a number of years. In society he was known as
a man of wit and imperturbable good temper. He
had never lost his humour during the strenuous
times through which he had lived. It was only
during the last week, when he had been forced to
report to Prague that the British and French Govern-
ments were asking his country to cede large regions
to Germany, that he had ceased to smile. He had

116 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

lived through hours of despair: but this was no
time to give way to his nerves: he had to act and
to carry on important negotiations on behalf of
his country.

He had been instructed by his Government,
he told Lord Halifax, to inform His Majesty's
Government that the acceptance of the German
Government's conditions in their present form was
considered impossible. At the same time the Czech
Government was ready to continue negotiations on
the basis of the concessions already made.

This ended the formal part of the interview.
M. Masaryk handed the Note to the Foreign
Minister, and a brief but grave conversation ensued.

When the Czechoslovak Minister left, Lord
Halifax began to study the Czech Government's
Note. It was a lengthy document, and enumerated
the reasons why Czechoslovakia could not accept
the demands made by Hitler at Godesberg. It
pointed out that Hitler's Memorandum was in fact
an ultimatum, and consisted of terms such as are
dictated to a conquered people. It was not a plan
addressed to a sovereign State which had already
declared its readiness to make great sacrifices in
the cause of European peace. The Note declared
that Herr Hitler's Government had not shown the
shghtest readiness to make concessions, and de-
monstrated the grievous consequences for the
national existence of Czechoslovakia if it yielded to
the Hitler demands. The national and economic
independence of Czechoslovakia would disappear
automatically if Hitler's plan had to be accepted.

Lord Halifax now reached the end of this moment-
ous document :

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 117

" My Government wish me to declare in all
solemnity that Herr Hitler's demands in their present
form are absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable
to my Government. Against these new and cruel
demands my Government feel bound to make their
utmost resistance, and we shall do so, God helping.
The nation of St. Wenceslas, John Hus and Thomas
Masaryk will not be a nation of slaves.

" We rely upon the two great Western democracies,
whose wishes we have followed much against our own
judgment, to stand by us in our hour of trial."

Since the previous day the British Cabinet had
met three times. It was now late in the afternoon
of Sunday, and Mr. Chamberlain was preparing
to meet his French guests.

At the moment when he drove through pouring
rain to the aerodrome, the Prime Minister was
completely informed about the British Cabinet's
views. Since his return from Godesberg on the
previous afternoon there had been no less than three
meetings of Ministers. At this moment no doubt
Mr. Chamberlain felt his sixty-nine years: but
despite his weariness he knew that he must not give
in to it. A decision had to be reached, and
peace to be saved. Time was pressing ; only a few
days remained before the 1st of October, the time-
limit of Hitler's ultimatum.

A four-fold cordon of police was necessary to
keep back the crowd assembled in Downing Street
and Whitehall to greet the French guests. Cheers
were heard as the car turned into Downing Street
and stopped at No. 10 — cheers for France, and also
for Czechoslovakia. Many shouted " Stand by
Czechoslovakia ". In many ways it was an altogether
unusual Sunday for London: most of the British

118 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

public had by now realised what was at stake;
they knew that Britain's prestige was in the balance,
and were convinced that there would be no surrender
to Germany.

A large number of measures had already been
taken in preparation for an emergency.

The Home Fleet was standing by. Measures to
ensure the safety of the population in case of air-
raids had been taken and hastily completed. Un-
known to the pubhc, all preparations had been made
for introducing conscription. Hundreds of volun-
teers were enrolUng for services of every kind. If
rumours current in London were to be beheved,
numbers of British citizens ready to fight in the
Czech Army had given in their names to the Czecho-
slovak Legation. But now things had changed.
Now, unless the unexpected happened, Enghshmen
would have to fight for the greatness and preserva-
tion of their country. The British people had seen
through Germany's intentions, and felt that Hitler
was not so much concerned with the Sudeten
Germans as with much more ambitious aims
ultimately affecting the interests of the British
Empire. Further, people were infuriated by Hitler's
lack of fairness in dealing with Czechoslovakia.
All the best British qualities were revealed in
these hours of crisis. The population knew no
fear. They were ready to fight, and knew that
they would win.

The French Ministers were negotiating with the
Inner Cabinet. They had left Paris with the
knowledge that they were backed by a resolute
Cabinet, and the negotiations showed that this
firmness was shared by the British Ministers. So

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 119

far, however, none believed in the inevitability of
war. The feeling was that Hitler would give in at
the last moment, and the possibilities of meeting him
were discussed.

But the negotiations were lengthy. Various plans
were considered and rejected, and late that night
the feehng which prevailed at No. 10 was not very
hopeful. Differences of opinion among various
members of the Cabinet emerged. M. Bonnet
maintained his thesis that the questions at issue
were only matters of procedure about which no
war could break out. M. Daladier, who now
displayed a firmer attitude, objected. Among the
JBritish Ministers, too, there were divergences of
>pinion. Some wished Germany to be shown the
full powers of the two great democracies, because that
was the only way to negotiate with her ; others were
convinced that it was essential to reach agreement
with Hitler even at the expense of Czechoslovakia.

The French Ministers were hampered by the
resolution of their own Cabinet, which was not to
go beyond the Anglo-French proposals of the
19th September. They were not at liberty to go
further and to agree to Hitler's Godesberg demands.

Some time before midnight Mr. Chamberlain
and M. Daladier withdrew to an adjacent room
for a prolonged conversation in private. At
midnight the conference was interrupted to give
^the British Cabinet an opportunity of arriving at
further resolutions. These resolutions were of far-
reaching significance. Mr. Chamberlain conveyed
to his colleagues France's firm attitude, as well as
^the readiness of MM. Daladier and Bonnet to
agree to further negotiations with Germany and

120 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

possibly to make certain minor concessions to
Hitler. At the same time the main outUnes of the
agreement of 19th September were to be maintained.

When the British Ministers concluded their
consultation, a brief summary of the day's delibera-
tions was made.

Hitler's Godesberg demands were unacceptable.
At the same time everything humanly possible
would be done to bring Hitler to his senses before
the 1st October. Simultaneously preparations would
be made for the worst. During the same night
General Gamelin was requested to come to London
immediately to discuss all necessary measures.

'' Ca m pas mar\ M. Daladier later told the
French journalists in reply to their questions.

Uncertainty in Berlin

The crisis had reached its climax. Hitler had
made his demands, and refused to budge an inch.
Prague had rejected the demands. In London the
consultations with the French Ministers ended with
an invitation to General Gamelin to come to London
on Monday. Everything seemed to indicate that
the Western democracies had grasped the position
and were ready to meet Hitler's exaggerated demands
with a firm refusal. Hitler had been carried away
by the dynamics of his policy, and now could not
have stopped, even if he had so desired.

At midnight on Sunday the 25th of September
the Berlin War Minister gave orders to the troops
stationed along the Bohemian and Moravian borders
to prepare to march into Czechoslovakia. Whether
the operations were to begin on the morrow or within
the next few days was not stated.

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 121

At the Chancellor's office work went on until
late at night. Herr von Ribbentrop had received
Sir Nevile Henderson on Sunday afternoon, and had
been told the result of the London discussions so
far as they were known. The Prague rejection wao
also conveyed. The Ambassador expressed grave
apprehensions about the future, and told the German
Foreign Minister that not only public opinion but
also the British Cabinet favoured a firm stand and
declined to give way to Germany.

But the Foreign Minister remained calm and
optimistic. He had frequently voiced the opinion
that Britain would not fight on behalf of Czecho-
slovakia— least of all on a question of procedure.
This was the opinion he had expressed to Hitler,
and he now repeated it to the British Ambassador.
The latter stressed the gravity of the position, and
suggested that British resolution was being under-
estimated. Ribbentrop insisted that agreement would
siill be reached.

Until late at night the windows of the Ministry
of Propaganda were brightly lit. Reports on public
opinion had been received from all parts of the
country, and were now being studied.

The news was not particularly satisfactory. The
furious attacks on Czechoslovakia made by the
German Press had gone too far; readers were
tired of big headlines and strong language. The
mass of the German people felt completely in-
different about the fate of the Sudeten Germans:
they admitted that they ought to be helped, but
they failed to see why there should be war on their
behalf. So far, the German Press had been careful
not to explain that opinion in the West was beginning

122 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

to change : only optimistic reports had been placed
before readers.

But the vast miUtary preparations in progress for
weeks had begun to alarm ' the populace. War
was not wanted, not even with a small country Hke
Czechoslovakia, still less with the Western Powers
and Russia. And now the opposition did not come
from the communists, but from the classes who
formerly had helped Hitler to power — the petty
bourgeoisie. This opposition could everywhere be
felt — in Wiirttemberg and Baden, in Bavaria and
in Austria. The reports of Nazi secret agents left
no doubt as to this feehng. Dr. Goebbels, the
Minister of Propaganda, gave the necessary instruc-
tions for the next few days. Unless the situation
changed, the German population would have to
be prepared for war with France and Britain, to say
nothing of Russia.

The U.S.A. Steps In

For some tune the United States had followed
developments in Europe with grave misgivings.
People had more and more begun to ask what the
U.S.A. intended to do in the case of a European
conflict. Nobody supposed that the United States
would again send troops to Europe to take part
in a European war; this was a blunder which
would not be repeated. At the same time, it was
felt that there would be ample opportunity for help-
ing the democratic Powers in other ways than by
sending troops in case of war. The Neutrality
Pact might be altered, and the European democracies
might be supplied with arms and aircraft, while

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 123

Germany could be threatened with economic
measures.

Yet though there was not the slightest intention
to send troops or to take a direct part in a war, the
American population did not feel indifferent
with regard to European events; on the contrary,
its reactions to them were far more open and
vigorous than those of the European peoples.
Through the President and all other responsible
statesmen, and through the predominant part of the
Press, it expressed its wholehearted sympathy with
the countries which were regarded as the champions
of democracy.

When Paris and London resolved to compel
Czechoslovakia to cede some of her territory,
mblic opinion turned against these two Powers.

^hen a firm attitude became apparent after the
fGodesberg conversation, feelings of sympathy
became stronger again.

At the same time, the inevitability of a European
war was not regarded as absolute in the United States.
It was felt that all problems could be settled in a
friendly manner, as was fitting between civilised
countries.

For some days Europe had been full of rumours
that President Roosevelt would take the initiative
in calUng a world conference for the settlement of
all economic and political problems. Democratic
Europe eagerly awaited the American President's
step; but it waited in vain. For reasons best
known to himself. President Roosevelt had omitted
to take this initiative: but he did adopt another
measure. With the authority of a man behind
whom stood the greatest democratic community

124 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

in the world, he sent an eloquent appeal to all
the statesmen concerned. This was on the
Monday — before the German Chancellor had spoken
in the Sportpalast. Pleading for a peaceful solu-
tion, and drawing attention to the obligations arising
from the Briand-Kellogg Pact, he said : " On behalf
of the 1 30 milHon people of the United States, and
for the sake of humanity everywhere, I most earnestly
appeal to you not to break off negotiations looking
to a peaceful, fair and constructive settlement of the
questions at issue. Opposing standpoints can be
harmonised by negotiations. Once they are broken
off reason is banished and force produces no solution
for the future good of humanity." The voice from
overseas, warning Europe of the impending conflict
at the eleventh hour, was heard in Paris and London,
Berlin and Prague, Budapest and Warsaw. Within
an hour the news agencies had spread it to the four
quarters of the globe, and soon the whole world
knew of the President's appeal.

The first reply reaching Washington did not,
however, come from Europe, but from South
America. The President of Argentina, Roberto
Ortiz, sent a telegram to thank Mr. Roosevelt for
his initiative, and to declare that Argentina was at
one with the peaceful endeavours of the United
States. At the same time President Ortiz informed
Mr. Roosevelt that Hitler and Dr. Benes had been
advised of the position taken up by Argentina.

Later the replies from Europe came in. They
were, of course, in a positive sense, and the heads
of the British and French Governments expressed
their gratitude to the American President. In 168
words Mr. Chamberlain told Mr. Roosevelt that

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 125

France and Britain would do everything to save the
peace and to settle the whole matter by negotiation.

M. Daladier's reply, which was sent from
London, where he was staying on Monday morning,
was twenty words shorter. " We are," the telegram
concluded, " confident of serving to the very end the
ideal of justice and peace which has always united
our two peoples. "

The reply sent on Monday evening by President
Benes contained 277 words. The President declared
that Czechoslovakia had ever been faithful to the
principle of solving questions under dispute by way
of negotiation. He recalled that Czechoslovakia
had signed a treaty of arbitration with Germany, and
expressed his readiness to settle the present conflict
by this method. He expressed the Czechoslovak
people's gratitude to President Roosevelt, and
declared that Czechoslovakia would defend herself
if attacked. Finally, he shared President Roose-
velt's view that war was not the method by which
problems were solved.

Hitler's reply was the longest of all. True, it was
not despatched from Berlin until twenty-four hours
later, on Tuesday. It contained no less than 1075
words, and was not so much a reply as a note.

Hitler, too, did justice to President Roosevelt's
eff'orts. Further, he gave a lengthy exposition of
the entire problem as seen from the German angle.
He spoke of the dictated peace of Versailles, of the
sufferings of the Sudeten Germans, and of the calm
attitude of the German Government. He expressed
the conviction that President Roosevelt would
recognise that the German Government had not
been lacking in moderation from beginning to end,

126 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

and had not been deficient in the desire to reach a
peaceful understanding. The responsibiUty did not
rest with Germany, but with the Czech Government,
and the decision between war and peace was with the
latter alone.

Hitler's telegram was simply a repetition in more
moderate terms of the speech delivereil on Monday
evening in the Berhn Sportpalast, a speech which
caused disgust and anger throughout Europe.

The German people was aware of Hitler's angry
speech, but it had heard nothing of President
Roosevelt's appeal nor of the Fuhrer's reply. The
organs of Dr. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda,
had kept them in ignorance.

The Soldiers' Hour

On the morning of Monday, the 26th of September,
it was the soldiers' hour in London rather than that
of the diplomats and politicians.

The politicians had reached agreement in principle
on the previous evening, and were due to finish their
consultations in the course of the morning. Mean-
while the soldiers had the floor. Or rather, in the
first instance, the soldier, the Commander-in-Chief
of the French Army, General Gamehn, who had
come from Paris in the morning. General Gamelin
had a lengthy consultation with Sir Thomas Inskip,
the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence.
The details of the impending warlike operations
which actually had been settled long ago were dis-
cussed; the armies were to be under French, and
the navies under British command. The air forces,
whose weakness was reaHsed, were also to operate
jointly.

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 127

Later, conversations took place between Mr.
Chamberlain, M. Daladier and General Gamelin.
The latter announced that the French Army was ready.

The French General's conversations in London
were a complete success. With a full sense of re-
sponsibiHty, the Generals were now preparing the
great war destined to free Europe from the
German menace. At last it was seen that the
question at issue did not concern Czechoslovakia,
but Europe itself.

And while the soldiers were preparing for war,
the politicians were still trying to save the peace.
Not perhaps at all costs, but still . . .

During the night preceding Monday, London had
telephoned to Moscow, and the British Ambassador
had paid an urgent call at the Kremlin. M. LitvinofiF,
the Russian Foreign Minister, who at the time was
away from Moscow, had certainly declared on
numerous occasions that Russia's attitude in the
present conflict was firm, and it was also known that
similar information had been conveyed to Prague.
But now that the decisive moment was approaching,
it was found desirable to be quite certain.

In the course of the morning a reassuring reply
was received from Moscow, stating that Russia was
ready.

The British and French statesmen took note of
this information. The affirmative answer given by
Russia was destined to play an important part in the
evening's official statement.

On Sunday night and Monday morning the ques-
tion had been how far it was possible to meet Ger-
many. It was accordingly resolved to accept Hitler's
time-limit for the settlement of the point at issue —

128 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

the 1st of October — and to offer him a token occupa-
tion of a small district beyond the Czech fortifica-
tions. Again, it might be possible to meet him in
subsidiary matters, provided he did not insist on
his main claim — viz., the immediate occupation of
all the Sudeten German regions. In any case, the
point was maintained that an international com-
mission must settle the new frontiers of Czecho-
slovakia, and not the German militarists.

On the other hand, if the German Army were to
attack Czechoslovakia before a peaceful settlement
of the question was reached, then, it was resolved in
London, France would help Czechoslovakia, and
Great Britain would be on the side of France. The
question of guaranteeing the frontiers which, on
Hitler's refusal to undertake a guarantee, remained
with Britain and France alone, caused a long and
extremely difficult debate. Mr. Chamberlain was
faced by the difficulty that the guarantee of Belgian
neutrality and of the Rhine frontier, imposed as
they were by military considerations, were quite
enough without having to guarantee the frontiers of
a small State in Central Europe which in the near
future would be exposed to heavy economic and
political pressure from Germany.

But the French Prime Minister remained firm,
and succeeded eventually in inducing the British
Cabinet to state its readiness to guarantee the new
Czechoslovak frontier. The British statesmen did
not like to give this promise; but they gave it.

Meanwhile Hitler's speech in the Sportpalast on
Monday evening was anxiously awaited. Con-
fidential reports had been received from Berlin
stating that it would be extremely violent.

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 129

The French and British statesmen little understood
the German Dictator's psychology. Before the
French Ministers left London it was decided to send
Sir Horace Wilson to Berlin with a fresh personal
message from Mr. Chamberlain. They little sus-
pected that they were only adding fuel to the
Chancellor's flame.

Herr Hitler Listens and . . . Speaks

Although he was drafting the speech to be
delivered that evening in the Sportpalast Herr Hitler
had found time to receive numerous personal and
military advisers and to hear their views.

Early in the morning the news of the day had been
submitted to the Fiihrer. First came President
Roosevelt's moving appeal, which he read attentively
but without comment.

Other news came later : the dissatisfaction among
the populace, the previous day's consultations in
London, General Gamehn's journey, and the ap-
parently growing resolve in the West not to give in
to Germany.

Herr von Ribbentrop had expressed his conviction
that Britain would not intervene, a view which Hitler
seemed to share. Complete certainty did not exist
about France's attitude, but it was felt that Ger-
many could settle France alone: the essential point
was to enforce a halt on France at the German
frontiers until the occupation of Czechoslovakia was
difait accompli, when it would be possible to conclude
peace with France, provided that the old methods
were followed of assuring the French people that no
harm was intended to them. Once Germany had
struck a blow at Czechoslovakia with all the power

130 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

at her command, no doubt was felt that France
would cease hostUities and leave Czechoslovakia to
her fate.

This view was shared by Dr. Goebbels, the Minister
of Propaganda, and Herr Rudolf Hess, the Fiihrer's
deputy, who visited the Chancellor's office in the
course of the morning. Field Marshal Goering, who
had recovered from his illness, was more cautious.
Despite his bellicose speech at Nuremberg, he
disliked a warlike adventure, the result of which was
dubious.

Towards noon General Keitel called on the Fiilirer.
The Commander-in-Chief reported that all pre-
parations had been made. The decisive attack
would be launched from the former Austrian frontier
in the direction of Moravia, so as to cut off Bohemia
and to prevent the Czech armies from retreating.
From Moravia it would be easier to enter Bohemia
than by forcing the strongly fortified mountain
frontiers. Certain difficulties were inherent in the
operation, but their final success was assured by
the German numerical superiority. The General
was aware that the position would become more
difficult if France were to intervene, since that
country possessed far more trained reservists than
Germany. Further, French intervention would also
automatically involve Russia.

Early in the course of the afternoon three Major-
Generals — Loeb, Bodenschatz and Hanneken —
called at the Chancellor's office and asked for an
audience, which was not granted. They left a letter
which Hitler read and put aside; the warnings not
to enter a war which might involve the entire world
did not count at this moment. What mattered was

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE lii

that the Chancellor had already learnt, to his intense
satisfaction, that Mr. Chamberlain had sent Sir
Horace Wilson to Berlin with a personal letter.
Later in the afternoon, when the hall of the Sport-
palast where he was to make his speech had already
begun to fill, the Chancellor received Mr. Chamber-
lain's emissary and the British Ambassador, Sir
Nevile Henderson.

Herr Hitler, as he listened to Sir Horace's intro-
ductory words, seemed somewhat absent-minded.
This is what Mr. Chamberlain wrote :

" The Czechoslovak Government now inform me
that, while they adhere to their acceptance of the
proposals to the transfer of the Sudeten German areas
on the lines discussed by my Government and the
French Government, and explained by me to you on
Thursday last, they regard as wholly unacceptable the
proposal in your Memorandum for the immediate
evacuation of the areas and their immediate occupation
by German troops, these processes to take place
before the terms of cession have been negotiated or
even discussed.

" Your Excellency will remember that in my letter
to you of Friday last I said that an attempt to occupy
forthwith by German troops areas which will become
part of the Reich at once in principle, and very shortly
afterwards by formal delimitation, would be con-
demned as an unnecessary display of force, and that,
in my opinion, if German troops moved into the areas
that you had proposed, I felt sure that the Czecho-
slovak Government would resist, and that this would
mean the destruction of the basis upon which you and
I agreed a week ago to work together — namely, an
orderly settlement of this question rather than a
settlement by the use of force.

" I referred also to the effect likely to be produced
upon public opinion in my country, in France, and
indeed in the world generally. The development of
opinion since my return confirms me in the views I

132 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

expressed to you in my letter and in our subsequent
conversation . . .

" I learn that the German Ambassador in Paris has
issued a communique which begins with stating that,
as a result of our conversations at Godesberg, Your
Excellency and I are in complete agreement as to
the imperative necessity to maintain the peace of
Europe. In this spirit I address my present com-
munication to you.

*' A settlement by negotiation remains possible and,
with a clear recollection of the conversations which
you and I have had, and with an equally clear
appreciation of the consequences which must follow
the abandonment of negotiations and the substitution
of force, I ask Your Excellency to agree that repre-
sentatives of Germany shall meet representatives of
the Czechoslovakian Government to discuss immedi-
ately the situation by which we are confronted with a
view to settling by agreement the way in which the
territory is to be handed over.

*' I am convinced that these discussions can be
completed in a very short time, and, if you and the
Czechoslovakian Government desire it, I am willing
to arrange for the representation of the British
Government at the discussions.

" In our conversation, as in the official communique
issued in Germany, you said that the only differences
between us lay in the method of carrying out an
agreed principle. If this is so, then surely the tragic
consequences of a conflict ought not to be incurred
over a difference in method."

The tone of the letter was fairly unequivocal.
Had it been accompanied by a general mobilisation
in Britain, it is possible that Hitler would still have
altered his speech, and would not have told the
German people about the ultimatum, of which it
knew nothing so far. We say that it is possible, for
we are not entirely convinced. We still consider
that the only thing to cause Germany to stop would
have been the timely adoption of a firm attitude by

120 HOURS SHAKE EUROPE 133

the Powers. In the letter he had just read, Hitler
had perceived the hidden threat, but also the eager-
ness to continue negotiations. The letter may have
confirmed him in his conviction that Great Britain
v^ould not make war, despite the fact that it now
seemed to be preparing for it.

" I desire," Hitler repUed, " to express to the
Prime Minister my profound gratitude for his
endeavours in the cause of peace : but I must abide
by what I have already said. I do not trust the
Prague Government, and I do not trust Dr. Benes.
He must give way, or else we will compel him to.
I do not like the idea of further conferences : they
would only delay a settlement of this question."

Sir Horace withdrew to convey Hider's statement
to London; but he did not leave Berlin. He was
to call for the FUhrer's written reply on the following
day.

A few minutes after 8 p.m. the Fiihrer entered the
crowded hall of the Sportpalast. As usual, he was
welcomed with the enthusiastic cheers of the frenzied
multitude. " German men and women . . ." he
began.

Millions listened to him: milhons all over the
world, full of hopes and fears.

One sentence which many expected to hear was
not pronounced in the course of the speech: the
proclamation of general mobilisation, the sole reply
to the Prague refusal which it might have been
thought that Germany could give. The cause of
such moderation lay in Mr. Chamberlain's letter
and in an official communique issued in London
shortly before the speech.

134 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CHAPTER V

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST

The firmer and more confident attitude that the
Western Powers took up towards Germany during
the next few days rapidly bore fruit. This appHed
above all to Rumania, which had been following
events with grave anxiety. For a short period at
the beginning of the year Rumania seemed to have
thrown herself into Germany's arms, but the diplo-
matic representations of the Western Powers, per-
haps accompanied by economic pressure or promises,
brought about a rapid change of front. Rumanian
foreign policy was once more definitely directed
towards the West. Rumania has big German and
Hungarian minorities, and it was inevitable that she
should feel that she might well be Germany's next
victim. An enormous burden of anxiety seemed to
have been lifted from her shoulders, and she looked
to the West with renewed confidence. In case of
war she was ready to allow Soviet aircraft to fly
over her territory, and was perhaps willing to inter-
vene herself, naturally on the side of the Western
Powers.

Dr. Stoyadinovich, the Prime Minister of Jugo-
slavia, whose policy had been very friendly towards
Germany for many years, hesitated. If Italy joined
in the contest, Jugoslavia's position would be critical.
Dr. Stoyadinovich had hitherto refused to beheve
that the Western Powers would fight, and had
acted accordingly. Ifi spite of widespread pro-
Czech demonstrations throughout the country, the
Government did nothing that could be interpreted

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 135

as an unfriendly act towards Germany. But the
firm attitude of the Great Powers alarmed him
somewhat, and there was talk of a radical alteration
of Jugoslav foreign policy. Jugoslavia looked to
the West with greater respect than had been the
case before.

Moreover, Germany's allies, Poland and Hungary,
hesitated too. Hungary hastily declared that she
would remain neutral, and the gravest alarm was
felt in Poland, which had heard many unpleasant
things from the West during the last few days.
They now became more unpleasant than ever.

Even General Franco, the would-be Dictator
of Spain, made a declaration of neutrality during
these few days, and this action on his part was
taken very much amiss in Germany.

There could have been no clearer demonstration
that, in spite of everything, the force of attraction
that the Western Powers exercised over the countries
of South-Eastern Europe had remained unbroken.
These countries naturally look to the West for the pro-
tection of their economic and poHtical indepen-
dence. Moreover, they are better acquainted with
Germany than the West is. They know both the
advantages and the disadvantages of Germany as a
poHtical and economic associate. They know Ger-
many can consume all their raw materials and agri-
cultural products, but they also know that Germany
has no foreign exchange and insists on making
payment in machinery and other industrial products.
And the Balkan States, which do not need so very
much machinery, will take a long time to absorb
them. They would far rather have the United
States and the capitaHst countries of the West as

136 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

their customers. But in this respect the countries
of the West, particularly France, have been very
remiss. Though the French language is popular
in Eastern Europe, and French civilisation is greatly
admired, it is not Frenchmen but Germans who are
to be found there, offering good prices and making
widespread business connections.

Moreover, the Balkan countries know the Germans
not only in the economic, but also in the political
field, and in the political field Germany is feared.
German political agents are scattered throughout
the whole of South-Eastern Europe, buying up
newspapers and influencing important people. Ger-
man colonies, established throughout the Balkans,
actively promote Nazi policy in the countries whose
hospitality they enjoy.

The Balkans admire Germany, but they also fear
her; and they look longingly to the West, hoping
for a word of guidance. But that word has not
come.

Shadows over Europe

Europe is like a stage, revolving at such dizzy
speed that it is difficult to keep pace with the light-
ning changes of scene. Now it is London, now
Paris, now Berlin. Then it shifts to Berchtesgaden
or Godesberg, to Prague, Warsaw or Moscow. For
a full and exhaustive picture of the whole a view
of the chief scenes is not sufficient. We must also
have a look at the sideshows.

On Monday, 26th September, the chief scenes of
action were London and Berlin* and Paris, Prague
and Warsaw were the sideshows. Let us now pay
some attention to the latter.

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 137

Paris

In the course of the afternoon the two Ministers,
MM. Daladier and Bonnet, returned to Paris.
M. Bonnet was upset. He had not been invited to
take part in the most important conversations.
Now that soldiers were preparing to take a hand,
he had seemed to be mistrusted, aUhough his sole
aim was at all costs to spare France a war. M.
Bonnet was profoundly convinced of the correctness
of this policy, and he was not alone. He had
widespread support, not only in his own Party and
in the Cabinet, but among the Opposition as well;
and, what was more, every important newspaper
was on his side. The French people were never
really informed of what was at stake. They
never knew that this was not just a matter of the
defence of Czechoslovakia, but of France's age-
long enemy securing the hegemony of Europe.
The French Press spoke of matters of procedure,
put blinkers over the eyes of the average French
citizen and made it impossible for him to sum up
the situation with his usual clarity. Only two Paris
newspapers told the truth. But their circulation
was relatively small, and they received little atten-
tion. If the people of France had known the truth,
things would have been very different. This offered
the Government very little scope if it were to make
a firm stand against Germany, for such a course
meant accepting the risk of war. The French
people had no objection to making a firm stand,
but they objected strongly to a war on account of a
little-known and distant country, even though that
country lay only four-and-a-half flying hours from

E 2

138 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Le Bourget. However, that was the feehng of the
country, and the Government had to take it into
account.

After M. Daladier had reported to M. Lebrun,
the President of the Republic, he received Mr.
BulHtt, the American Ambassador. After the inter-
view Mr. BuUitt said to the journaHsts : " I am
always an optimist, because I am always on the
side of truth ".

Mr. Bullitt did not, however, seem so absolutely
positive that truth would easily prevail on this
occasion, for his Embassy advised American tourists
in France to return to the United States by the first
available liner, unless they were detained in France
by urgent business.

General Gamehn returned to Paris in the even-
ing. He found the city preparing for war. The
street-lamps were dimmed, and all the hundred and
fifty sirens that were to warn the population of air
raids were ready. A force of five thousand men
had been specially appointed to warn the people of
Paris of the peril that hung over them. Experts
were busily engaged transforming forty-three thou-
sand Paris basements into bomb-proof shelters.
Even the traffic in the streets bore witness to the
preparations that were taking place for war. There
were noticeably fewer buses, because many had been
requisitioned to take reservists to the front. Hun-
dreds of Paris taxis had been commandeered for
service with the army transport, just as in 1914.
The opening of the school term was postponed, and
innumerable mothers and children were leaving the
capital for the greater security of the provinces.

Meanwhile train after train steamed out of the

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 139

Gare de I'Est, taking reservists to the Eastern
frontier of France.

Prague

President Benes, speaking to the people of Czecho-
slovakia over the wireless a few days earlier, had
said: " I have a plan ". What could this plan be?
Was he hastily making agreements with his neigh-
bours to improve his prospects of resisting Germany?

Poland, Czechoslovakia's Eastern neighbour, had
no intention of letting such a splendid opportunity
slip by without claiming her share of the spoils.

As we know, Poland had already claimed the
Teschen area, which contains important heavy
industries and coal-mines in addition to a population
of several thousand Poles. We also know that
Poland had given notice to terminate the minorities
treaty with Czechoslovakia and was concentrating
military forces on the frontier. Would Poland invade
Czechoslovakia in spite of the warning she had
received from Russia?

Czechoslovakia was prepared. A state of national
emergency had been proclaimed, and the services of
all civilians between the ages of seventeen and sixty
were declared to be at the disposal of the State.
But Prague itself remained calm. There was no
panic, in spite of the threatening danger.

President Benes had a plan. He wished to come
to an understanding with Poland. PAT, the official
Polish news agency, had already announced that
Czechoslovakia was ready to come to a territorial
understanding with Poland. This piece of informa-
tion was denied by the Czechoslovak Press Bureau,
but it was nevertheless true. For during the after-

140 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

noon an aeroplane set off from Prague in the direc-
tion of Warsaw, bearing a personal letter from the
President of the Czechoslovakian Republic addressed
to M. Ignacy Moscicki, President of the Polish
Repubhc.

Warsaw

Colonel Beck had been responsible for Polish
foreign policy for many years, and now it looked
as though he was coming into his own. The new
orientation he had given to Polish policy, directed to
coming to an understanding with Germany, had
succeeded in its aim, but at the cost of a long
struggle, at home and abroad. Colonel Beck's
policy had resulted in an estrangement from France,
Poland's traditional friend since the time of her
greatest national humiliation.

Since the end of May 1938, French diplomacy
had sought with all the means in its power to con-
vince Poland that this policy was incompatible with
the promise that Marshal Rydz-Smigly, the Dictator
of Poland, had given a few years earlier when the
Polish Government had sought and been granted
an armament loan of two thousand millions in
Paris. Marshal Rydz-Smigly had promised not only
that Poland would not attack Czechoslovakia in the
case of war, but that she would remain neutral and
permit Soviet aeroplanes to fly over Polish territory.
But now it did not look as if Poland would remain
neutral. That Poland would allow Russian aero-
planes to fly to the rescue of Czechoslovakia if she
were attacked was out of the question. Colonel
Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, had actually
attempted to persuade the Rumanian Government

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 141

to refuse permission for five Russian aeroplanes
which Prague had bought in Russia to fly over
Rumania.

All the efforts of M. Noel, the French Ambassador
in Warsaw, to persuade Poland to change her atti-
tude had been unavailing. If a conflict broke out,
Poland would certainly remain neutral, but Colonel
Beck was just as convinced as his friends in Berlin
that a conflict would not break out, and that the
Western Powers would give in to Germany. In
that case Poland could not remain disinterested.
She would claim her reward for her pact with
Germany, and Czechoslovakia would have to cede
Teschen to her.

President Moscicki read President Benes's letter,
and sent for his Foreign Minister. A conference
took place, in which Marshal Rydz-Smigly also took
part. Colonel Beck held firm to his position. Did
Czechoslovakia voluntarily offer the Teschen district
to Poland? Well and good. But as for coming to
a friendly understanding with her and signing a
non-aggression pact, that was out of the question.
In the first place, it would amount to a vote of no
confidence towards Germany, and in the second
place Colonel Beck was nursing far more ambitious
plans for his country. Why should not Slovakia
be incorporated into Poland, and why should not
Poland have a common frontier with Hungary ?

Of course there was nothing of all this in the
reply which President Moscicki sent to President
Benes next day. This reply was in very general
terms, acknowledging the promises made by Presi-
dent Benes on behalf of Czechoslovakia, but promis-
ing nothing whatever in return.

142 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Two Communiques and a Cabinet Meeting

While Hitler was speaking in the Sportpalast on
Monday evening, the British Foreign Office issued a
communique couched in unusually firm language.
It was as follows :

** During the last week Mr. Chamberlain has tried
with the German Chancellor to find the way of settling
peacefully the Czechoslovak question. It is still
possible to do so by negotiations.

'* The German claim to the transfer of the Sudeten
areas has already been conceded by the French,
British and Czechoslovak Governments, but if, in
spite of all efforts made by the British Prime Minister,
a German attack is made upon Czechoslovakia, the
immediate result must be that France will come to her
assistance, and Great Britain and Russia will certainly
stand by France.

" It is still not too late to stop this great tragedy,
and for the people of all nations to insist on settlement
by free negotiation."

This communique aroused universal interest, partly
because of its firm tone, but mostly because it
actually mentioned Russia. It was very rare for
Russia to be mentioned in an official statement
issued by the British Foreign Office.

A strange thing happened to this official state-
ment. The news agencies were at first authorised
to announce that it had been issued by the Foreign
Office, but the authorisation was later withdrawn,
and next day the London and Paris morning papers
described it as merely a statement " from an authori-
tative source ". This soft-pedalling was doubtless
due to the fact that it was still desired to treat
Germany with kid gloves. One had the impression
that those in authority were terrified by their own
boldness in mentioning Russia in the same breath

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 143

as France and England, and that they felt that
above all Germany must not be ofifended.

Late that night, after Hitler had finished his
speech, the British Cabinet met to study its contents.

At first sight the speech was terrible. In the
first place. Hitler now publicly proclaimed his ulti-
matum date — 1st of October — and thus committed
himself before his own people. In the second place.
Hitler repeatedly insulted the President of Czecho-
slovakia, an independent State, in a fashion un-
precedented in international relations.

But on second thoughts the speech was not so bad
as it looked. After all, it was felt in London that it
contained no reference to the mobilisation of the Ger-
man army. A general mobilisation in Germany
would have meant that Hitler had decided to resort
to force. But he had not done so, and that meant
that he had kept the next few days open for possible
negotiations. Nor had he repeated his Godesberg
demands in their entirety. It could therefore be
concluded that the door was still open, though the
answer he had sent to Mr. Chamberlain's letter that
night was not very encouraging. In any case, hope
must not be abandoned. The firmness which the
Western Powers had been showing since Saturday
had already borne some fruit. If things went on
in the same way, there was still hope.

At two o'clock in the morning, when the Cabinet
dispersed, Mr. Chamberlain issued the following
statement to the Press :

" I have read the speech of the German Chancellor,
and I appreciate his references to the efforts I have
made to save the peace.

144 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

" I cannot abandon those efforts, since it seems to
me incredible that the peoples of Europe who do not
want war with one another should be plunged into a
bloody struggle over a question on which agreement
has already been largely obtained.

" It is evident that the Chancellor has no faith that
the promises made will be carried out. These promises
were made, not to the German Government direct,
but to the British and French Governments in the
first instance.

" Speaking for the British Government, we regard
ourselves as morally responsible for seeing that the
promises are carried out fairly and fully, and we are
prepared to undertake that they shall be so carried
out with all reasonable promptitude, provided that
the German Government will agree to the settlement
of terms and conditions of transfer by discussion and
not by force.

" I trust that the German Chancellor will not reject
this proposal, which is made in the same spirit of
friendhness as that in which I was received in Germany,
and which, if it is accepted, will satisfy the German
desire for the union of Sudeten Germans with the
Reich without the shedding of blood in any part of
Europe."

On that agitated Monday Mr. Chamberlain, and
with him Great Britain, had the last word. Never-
theless Hitler, as we shall soon see, remained
implacable.

Sir Horace Wilson Goes Home

Hitler appeared to have taken no notice of the
diplomatic appeals and letters that had been addressed
to him in the last twenty-four hours.

True, his speech of Monday night did not slam
and bolt the door. Nevertheless he had not budged
one inch from his position. The Sudeten territory
must be voluntarily evacuated before the 1st of

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 145

October and occupied by the Reichswehr. Other-
wise . . .

The alternative filled Europe with foreboding.
On Tuesday the situation turned out to be even
more critical than it had seemed in the early hours.

At ten minutes past twelve Sir Horace Wilson
was received by the Fiihrer in an audience which
lasted for half-an-hour, and grave words passed
between them.

Following Hitler's speech, fresh instructions had
come from London, and Sir Horace accordingly
transmitted another British warning to the Chan-
cellor.

The British Government, he explained, had been
informed by the French Government that if Ger-
many attacked Czechoslovakia, France would go
to the latter's assistance, and the British Govern-
ment would then be obliged to intervene. His
Majesty's Government therefore requested the Chan-
cellor to weigh carefully all the consequences that
would ensue, and to shape his future actions
accordingly.

At this Hitler flared up. The British Fleet had
already been mobilised, he indignantly declared, and
France and Britain were preparing for war. That
was proof that they were not acting honourably
towards Germany. The Czechs had been mobilised
for the past five days. He had already informed
Prague that unless the Sudeten territory were evacu-
ated by Czech troops by two o'clock on the following
day, Wednesday, the German army would intervene.

Hitler saw that the die was cast, and his bluff
now reached its utmost limit. The more rapidly he
acted now, the more frantic he made the pace, the

146 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

greater was the chance that the Western Powers
would give in and grant everything he asked. Hitler
may not yet have foreseen exactly in what way this
would come about.

That was the situation when Sir Horace Wilson
left Berhn at 1.45 p.m., to hand the British Prime
Minister a personal letter from Herr Hitler a few
hours later.

Mr. Chamberlain had already been informed by
telephone of the general purport of Hitler's letter
and of the extremely alarming news of the German
ultimatum to Prague. But he had a plan. He in-
structed M. Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister
in London, to inquire in Prague whether Czecho-
slovakia was prepared to take part in an inter-
national conference. The answer was yes. Natur-
ally Czechoslovakia would require certain assur-
ances, in particular a guarantee that, in the interests
of her national security, she would be allowed to
maintain her mobilisation during the course of the
negotiations. Mr. Chamberlain acknowledged the
Czechoslovak reply and considered his plan further.
Perhaps Mussolini occurred to him in the course of
his meditations. MussoHni had meanwhile been
discreetly reminding Paris and London of his exist-
ence. Mussolini's hour was approaching, and in
less than twenth-four hours it would be at hand.

But things had not got as far as that yet.

In the parks and open spaces of London twenty
thousand men were engaged in digging trenches for
the protection of the population in case of air raids.
There were large numbers of volunteers for the civil
air guard. The Air Force and the Navy were
ready for action. Parhament had been called for

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 147

Wednesday, and there was feverish anxiety about
what the next few days might have in store. Was
it to be war or peace?

The King cancelled his journey to Glasgow for
the launching of the Queen Elizabeth, the world's
largest passenger ship.

The whole British Empire declared its solidarity
with the British Government. Mr. Lyons, the
Australian Prime Minister, had had a telephone
conversation on Monday with Mr. Bruce, the
Australian High Commissioner in London. The
Australian Federal Cabinet was in permanent
session. If war were to break out in Europe,
Australia was ready.

Declarations of loyalty poured in from India, and
South Africa had already announced her deter-
mination to stand by England's side, because she
knew that if Germany came out on top she would
be threatened by German colonial ambitions.

Mr. Chamberlain awaited Hitler's letter with
anxiety, although, as mentioned above, he already
had more than an inkling of its contents.

** The Government in Prague " [Hitler stated], " feel
justified in maintaining that the proposals in my
Memorandum of 23rd September went far beyond the
concessions which it made to the British and French
Governments, and that the acceptance of the Memor-
andum would rob Czechoslovakia of every guarantee
of its national existence.

" This statement is based on the argument that
Czechoslovakia is to give up a great part of her
prepared defensive system before she can take steps
elsewhere for her miUtary protection. Thereby the
political and economic independence of the country
is automatically abolished.

" Moreover, the exchange of population proposed

148 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by me would turn out in practice to be. a panic-
stricken flight.

" I must openly declare that I cannot bring myself
to understand these arguments, or even admit that
they can be regarded as seriously put forward.

" The Government in Prague simply passes over
the fact that the actual arrangements for the final
settlement of the Sudeten German problem in accord-
ance with my proposals will be made dependent, not
on a unilateral German petition or on German
measures of force, but rather, on the one hand, on a
free vote under no outside influence and, on the other,
to a very wide degree on German-Czech agreement
on matters of detail to be reached subsequently.
Not only the exact definition of the territories in
which the plebiscite is to take place, but the execution
of the plebiscite and the delimitation of the frontier
to be made on the basis of its result are, in accordance
with my proposals, to be made independently of any
unilateral decision by Germany. Moreover, all other
details are to be reserved for agreement on the part of
a German-Czech Commission. . . .

" It is clear from my Memorandum that the German
occupation would only extend to the given line, and that
the final delimitation of the frontier would take place in
accordance with the procedure which I have already des-
cribed. The Prague Government has no right to doubt
that the German military measures would stop within
these limits. If, nevertheless, it desires such a doubt
to be taken into account the British and, if necessary,
also the French Government can guarantee the quick
fulfilment of my proposal. I can, moreover, only refer
to my speech yesterday, in which I clearly declared
that I regret the idea of any attack on Czechoslovak
territory, and that under the condition which I laid
down I am even ready to give a formal guarantee
for the remainder of Czechoslovakia. . . .

" I must assume that the Government in Prague is
only using a proposal for the occupation by German
troops in order, by distorting the meaning and object
of my proposal, to mobilise those forces in other
countries, in particular in England and France, from
which they hope to receive unreserved support for

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 149

their aim and thus to achieve the possibility of a
general warlike conflagration. I must leave it to your
judgment whether, in view of these facts, you consider
that you should continue your effort, for which I
should like to take this opportunity of once more
thanking you, to spoil such manoeuvres and bring
the Government in Prague to reason at the very last
hour."

Mr. Chamberlain considered this letter with his
friends and several members of the Cabinet. It
was clear that it still held the door open for further
negotiations. True, the German ultimatum to
Prague was very alarming, but perhaps a way out
might yet be found. Moreover, in the course of
the discussions, the name of Mussolini cropped up.

Europe Awaits Her Destiny

On Tuesday, 27th September, European public
opinion regarded war as inevitable. All efforts to
find a solution to the crisis had failed. On the one
hand the German Chancellor was determined to
have his way with Czechoslovakia, on the other
Britain and France seemed equally determined to
make no more concessions that would hand over
Czechoslovakia bound hand and foot to the tender
mercies of Germany.

That was how the situation appeared in the eyes
of European public opinion. But were Britain and
France really so determined to make no more
concessions to Germany at Czechoslovakia's ex-
pense? The day drew to a close and darkness fell,
and as the hours passed by, the leading statesmen
of Europe detected a path that might lead them to
the resumption of harmonious relations. That path
led through Rome.

150 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

But before things reached that stage and hope
had definitely revived, a number of things happened
in other places to which we must now devote a
Httle attention.

Paris

The political and diplomatic activity in the French
capital resembled a revolution in a beehive. There
was a continual coming and going of diplomats at
the Quai d'Orsay, violent discussions took place in
the lobbies of the Chamber, and innumerable party
groups held long and excited conferences.

The Cabinet met and dispersed after deciding not
to recall Parliament for the time being. It would
have been dangerous to have displayed the differences
of national opinion to all the world.

For the differences of opinion in Paris were very
serious. Everybody had divergent views about what
ought to be done in this emergency. There was no
certainty about the attitude of the various parties
as a whole. Members of the Right were in favour
of resolute and determined action, come what may,
and members of the Left wanted peace at any price.

The Government majority, consisting of the
Popular Front, was more disunited than ever, and
in fact the end of the Popular Front was already
casting its shadow before. Only the Communists
were unanimously in favour of making a determined
stand, even at the cost of war : and many members
of the Right — i.e., of the Opposition — including the
extreme Right wing, were in agreement with them.
The Socialists were in an acute dilemma, and most
of them were opposed to war. The Radical
Socialists — i.e., M. Daladier's own Party — were

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 151

Utterly bewildered, and, not knowing what else
to do, decided to ratify whatever M. Daladier
might do.

The most determined advocate of peace at any
price on the Right was M. Flandin. He called a
conference of the Parhamentary minority in order
to convince them of the necessity of common action
towards this end, but he was not very successful,
because, as we have already seen, many members of
the Right were in favour of making a determined
stand. After a long debate it was determined that
the exact differences between Hitler's Godesberg
demands and the Anglo-French proposals should be
estabHshed. A deputation was sent to interview
M. Bonnet, the Foreign Minister, who expressed
his conviction that the differences were not very
great, and that it would be an appalling act of
irresponsibility if war were allowed to break out
because of what he called " questions of procedure ".
He, M. Bonnet, was absolutely opposed to it, but
the decision now lay in the hands of M. Daladier,
who had conducted all the decisive negotiations in
London. M. Bonnet, who could scarcely conceal his
nervousness and irritation, sent the deputation to see
M. Daladier. But M. Daladier decUned to receive
it, explaining that he was prevented by pressure of
business and had no time.

The rumour had already started going round
Paris that M. Daladier was planning a Government
of national union, a coalition to include all the
Parhamentary Parties, in case of war.

French pubhc opinion was opposed to war. As
we have already stated, it was misinformed, and still
believed the crisis was only about Czechoslovakia,

152 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

or, as M. Bonnet called it, " matters of procedure ".
French public opinion was quite unaware that the
sacrifice of Czechoslovakia would inevitably have
terrible consequences for France, and remained
definitely opposed to war. Hence the divergence
of opinion within the political Parties in Parliament.
The deputies knew the state of public opinion very
well. Whether the latter was due to the defective
information supplied by the French Press or to
something else made no difference now.

The writers of France issued a public proclamation.
M. Jules Romains, the president of the P.E.N. Club,
issued a manifesto addressed to the writers of Italy
and Germany, caUing on them to work for peace.
Failure to do so, the manifesto declared, would
mean working against the spirit of civilisation,
betraying the cause of humanity, and undertaking a
terrible responsibihty. There was no more talk now
of France fulfiUing her treaty obligations towards
Czechoslovakia. Was the treaty to be fulfilled, or
was it to be declared a scrap of paper? That was
not the question in men's minds. The war threat
overshadowed everything else. The future of France
as a Great Power hung in the balance. Should she
make war on Germany to prevent her from securing
the hegemony of Europe, or should she give in to
Germany now, spare the present generation the
ordeal of another war, and let future generations
foot the bill?

Public opinion was opposed to war, and public
opinion had to be reckoned with. This fact was
naturally as familiar to the Prime Minister as it was
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. Daladier
therefore listened very carefully to M. Bonnet that

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 153

evening when the latter made him a proposal. In
this the name of Mussolini again cropped up.

Later that evening — ^meanwhile, of course, contact
had been made with London — M. Daladier made a
statement to the Press.

" Complete calm and order prevails in France,"
he said. " Security measures are being carried out
in orderly fashion and according to plan. The
international struggle for peace is not yet ended.
As an old soldier, I have a right to say that my
Government will leave nothing undone to secure an
honourable peace."

Prague

The capital of Czechoslovakia was the scene of
many conferences during the course of the day.
Negotiations took place between the leaders of the
political parties, the President of the Republic had
long deliberations with various political person-
ahties, as well as with the military leaders. Their
task was relatively easy, for they had calculable
factors to deal with, such as military units, transport
arrangements, defence plans, and the organisation
of public safety. The task of the politicians was far
more difficult. Moreover, Czechoslovakia, though
the cause of the whole crisis, no longer occupied
the centre of the stage.

Prague had already spoken. She had agreed to |
surrender the Sudeten areas to Germany, decHned I
Hitler's more far-reaching Godesberg demands, and {
declared her willingness to take part in an inter- J
national conference, subject to certain guarantees. -
She had noted the German ultimatum calling upon

154 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

her to evacuate the Sudeten territories before two
o'clock on Wednesday, but she had no intention
whatever of doing so. Prague's position was clear,
and if war should break out now, the whole world
would know with whom the responsibility lay.

As, for the time being, there was nothing to do in
Prague but to take note of the diplomatic reports
from Paris and London, the contents of which were
increasingly bewildering, attention was devoted at
the last hour to the task of rallying all Germans
who did not wish to Hve in Hitler's Germany. A
pro-Czech proclamation by the Sudeten German
Democratic Youth Movement was published, and
negotiations were undertaken with those Sudeten
German politicians who were still prepared to work
for a solution by which the Sudeten Germans should
live peaceably within the framework of the Czecho-
slovak Republic. A proclamation was published
in the name of a million democratic Germans,
declaring that the majority of the Sudeten people
had no desire to be absorbed by Germany.

" The votes that we gave for Henlein [this pro-
clamation declared] gave him no authority whatever
to declare an anschluss, and still less to secure it by
means of a world war. We protest before the whole
world against the violence done to democracy by
Hitler's new demands. The cession of the Sudeten
German territory to Hitler would not prevent a war,
but would plunge Europe into catastrophe, since the
democratic Powers would henceforward be unable to
resist Fascist aggression."

However, all these negotiations and proclamations
took place in an atmosphere of bewilderment and
uneasiness. Everyone felt that the fate of Czecho-

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 155

Slovakia no longer depended upon herself, but upon
the decisions being made in the Western capitals.

Czech pubUc opinion, which in the past few days
had been so grievously disappointed in its trust in
the Western democracies, once more became hopeful.
But the statesmen in charge of affairs were sceptical
and uncertain. The language of the confusing
diplomatic reports that poured in from the Western
capitals was not reassuring.

At 5.40 p.m. President Moscicki's answer to
President Benes's letter arrived from Warsaw. As
we already know, it was written in conciliatory
terms, acknowledging the Czechoslovak promises,
but promising nothing in return.

At the same time an official PoHsh statement was
published, announcing that Poland accepted the
Czech declaration agreeing to the principle of terri-
torial revision as a means of solving the Polish-
Czechoslovak problem.

The diplomatic reports that Prague received from
Warsaw, direct and through Paris, were by no means
reassuring. Poland was of the opinion that the
moment had come to press her claims to Teschen,
but she had no intention of coming to an under-
standing with Czechoslovakia, let alone make a
treaty with her.

Brussels

Six miUtary classes had been mobihsed in Belgium,
which had been in a state of emergency for many
days. Belgium had never forgotten the terrible
years of the German occupation during the Great
War. She had declared her neutrality some time
ago, but, if a war broke out, who would pay heed to

156 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

the neutrality of a small country like Belgium?
Besides, Belgium too has a small German minority,
in the frontier districts of Eupen and Malmedy.

On Tuesday evening M. Spaak, the Prime Minister,
went to the microphone and spoke to the Belgian
people.

" Belgium is determined to defend her territory
against any attack," he said, " and will not permit
any army to march through Belgian territory."

Washington

The United States Government did not remain
inactive. Three American cruisers, Philadelphia,
Savannah and Texas, were sent to Europe to evacuate
American citizens in case of need.

During the afternoon the Czechoslovak Minister
in Washington called upon Mr. Cordell Hull, the
United States Secretary of State, and had a long
conversation with him. " It is never too late for
negotiations," the Minister said as he left the
State Department.

At seven o'clock a Cabinet meeting was held in
the White House, and soon afterwards a long cable
was sent to Europe, consisting of another appeal
by the President of the United States, this time
directed to Hitler alone. Mr. Roosevelt knew as
well as any European statesman where the real
centre of the unrest lay.

He therefore appealed to the German Chancellor
to continue negotiations for the sake of avoiding a
European war. He expressed the opinion that all
the differences between Germany and Czechoslovakia
should be settled peacefully. He pointed out that
the threat of force might easily lead to a general

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 157

war, and proposed the immediate summoning, in a
neutral European country, of a conference of all the
countries concerned in order to settle existing
differences. President Roosevelt's moving appeal
ended as follows:

" Allow me to state my unqualified conviction that
history and the souls of every man, woman and child
whose Hves will be lost in the threatened war will hold
us, and all of us, accountable should we omit any
appeal for its prevention.

" The Government of the United States has no
political involvements in Europe and will assume no
obhgations in the conduct of the present negotiations.

*' Yet in our own right we recognise our responsi-
bihties as part of a world of neighbours. Conscience
and the impelling desire of the people of my country
demand that the voice of their Government be raised
again and yet again to avert and avoid war."

President Roosevelt's wishes were to be fulfilled,
perhaps sooner than he expected. He certainly did
not anticipate that the conference he suggested
would take the form that it did take, nor that the
ensuing peace would be the peace that was arranged.
There were two important respects in which the
wishes of the American President were not fulfilled.
The conference did not take ^place in a neutral
country, but in Munich, and the country most
concerned — Czechoslovakia — was not even admitted
to it.

Berlin

Late that night a long coded cable reached Berlin
from the German Embassy in Washington. Its
contents were far from encouraging. Anti-German
feeling in America was very great, it stated. In
Roosevelt circles the opinion had been expressed

158 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

that a sharp Note ought to be addressed to Germany,
though American jurists had expressed themselves
against the proposal that Roosevelt should summon
a court of arbitration to settle the dispute. Should
war break out, the whole of America would be on
the side of the European democracies, and there
was even a possibiUty of American intervention.

With regard to the question of American inter-
vention we do not know whether the German
Ambassador exaggerated, because the people of the
United States had no desire at this moment for
armed intervention in European affairs, and they
had no ambition to pay with their own blood for
the incapacity of Europe's statesmen to maintain a
reasonable peace.

When this cable reached Berlin it did not, how-
ever, make as great an impression as it would have
done if it had arrived half a day earlier.

Germany wished to do nothing to make the path
of the Western Powers more difficult. As a proof
of this we may mention the following :

As we have stated above, Germany addressed an
ultimatum to Czechoslovakia on Tuesday calling
upon her to evacuate the Sudeten territory by two
o'clock on Wednesday. Mr, Chamberlain himself
mentioned this in the course of his speech in Parlia-
ment on Wednesday. Foreign correspondents in
Berlin learned of this ultimatum in the course of the
late afternoon and evening of Tuesday. The
correctness of this information was at first orally
confirmed, but was denied in a communique issued
by the German Press Bureau later that night.

The purpose of this dementi was obviously not to
force matters too far. For by the small hours on

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 159

Wednesday morning Berlin felt fairly sure that the
Western Powers would give in, that there would be
no European war, and that Germany would get what
she wanted. Certain information that reached
Berlin from London seemed to confirm this. Let
us see what this information was.

A Gentleman's Speech and Two Letters \/^

Mr. Chamberlain, sitting in his room at No. 10 w
Downing Street, broadcast a message to Hitler,
the German people, Europe and the whole world.
No one who listened to that speech will ever
forget it. Mr. Chamberlain's quiet, tired and
resigned voice made a far greater impression than
the temperamental outbursts of the German Chan-
cellor on the previous day.

" How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is," said
Mr. Chamberlain, " that we should be digging
trenches and trying on gas masks because of a
quarrel in a far-away country between people of
whom we know nothing.

" It seems still more impossible that a quarrel
which is already settled in principle should be the
subject of war.

" I well understand the reason why the Czech
Government felt unable to accept the terms put
before them in the German Memorandum. Yet I
beheved that, after my talks with Herr Hitler, if only
time would allow, it ought to be possible for arrange-
ment to transfer the territory that the Czech Govern-
ment had agreed to give Germany to be settled by
agreement under conditions which would ensure fair
treatment for the population concerned."

Mr. Chamberlain then gave a short account of his

160 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

efforts to save peace, described his talks with Hitler
and explained that he found Hitler's altered attitude
at Godesberg " unreasonable ". He declared that
he would not abandon his efforts to preserve peace,
and called upon the people of Great Britain to offer
their services for purposes of national defence.

" Don't be alanned," he continued, " if you hear
of men being called up to man the anti-aircraft
defences and ships. These are only precautionary
measures which the Government must take in times
like these. It does not mean that we have deter-
mined on war or that war is imminent.

" However much we sympathise with a small
country involved in a struggle with a larger neighbour,
one could not necessarily involve the whole British
Empire on that account. If this country fights, it
must be on larger issues than that.

" I am a man of peace. To the depth of my soul,
armed warfare is a nightmare to me.

" If I made up my mind that a country had decided
to dominate by fear of its force, I would feel that it
must be resisted.

" Under such a domination, life for people who
believe in hberty would not be worth living. But
war is a fearful thing, and England must be very
clear before it embarks on it that it is real and great
issues that are at stake, and then the call to risk
everything in their defence is irresistible. ... I am
going to work for peace till the last moment."

Was Germany to regard this as a last warning?
Yes and no. Mr. Chamberlain said that England
had no desire to be involved in war for the sake of
a distant country. He said that if England fought.

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 161

it must be for greater issues than that. But he also
said that if he were convinced that a country was
determined to dominate by fear of its force, he would
feel that it would be necessary to oppose it.

A big query remained. Was Mr. Chamberlain
convinced that a struggle between England and
Germany would be a struggle over " great issues " ?
Was he convinced that Germany " had decided to
dominate by fear of its force " ?

We beheve that he must have been convinced of
it. Otherwise Hitler would have been satisfied with
what the democratic Powers had granted him at
Berchtesgaden — namely, the cession of the Sudeten
German areas. That was a great deal. If Hitler
subsequently acted as he did, it could only be because
he was pursuing wider aims. In Eastern Europe
these aims are common knowledge. Hitler wished
to destroy Czechoslovakia to leave the way clear for
his drive to the East. He required an open road for
the economic expansion of the Reich. Czecho-
slovakia was the key to Eastern Europe, and that
key must be in his hands. He therefore made
every effort to secure it by diplomatic means. For
four whole months he had manoeuvred very cleverly,
and his diplomatic demarches showed him the many
weaknesses of the Western European democracies,
which had retreated step by step. At Berchtesgaden
Hitler scored his first striking success, and this
success had to be exploited. If the Western Powers
sacrificed Czechoslovakia, it was obvious that they
would sacrifice much more, and if they did so, these
additional sacrifices would involve consequences to
the structure of Europe far more extensive than the

162 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

mere occupation of Czechoslovakia. For the sake
of these great aims, it was worth taking the risk of
war. During these months, weeks and days Hitler
tested not only his and Germany's strength, but the
weaknesses of others. The history of these few
days, with which we have now nearly finished, shows
that for a short space the Western democracies
spasmodically pulled themselves together and stood
their ground. But after that they gave in. In the
European game of poker they held many trump cards,
but many of them they threw away.

As for Mr. Chamberlain's speech, it caused part
of Europe to feel fairly certain that Great Britain
was about to throw her great weight into the scales,
while it led the other part, including particularly
Berhn, to conclude that Britain would not fight.

At half-past nine, after Mr. Chamberlain's wireless
talk, the British Cabinet met. It immediately
decided on a Class B naval mobihsation. This
mobilisation had to a great extent been carried out
already, and the Cabinet decision was intended partly
to ratify it, partly to make it known to the whole
world, in order to lend emphasis to the words that
came from London. We know that Hitler was
already aware of this mobilisation, having spoken of
it to Sir Horace Wilson during the afternoon

The wishes of London and Paris met half-way.
There had been talk of MussoHni in both capitals
throughout the day. Nevertheless it seems that this
was not entirely a coincidence, and that it was
Mussolini himself who had skilfully attracted the
attention of both London and Paris and caused

THE BALKANS LOOK WEST 163

himself to be looked upon as the last hope of both.
M. Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, subse-
quently stated that the idea that the British should
approach Mussolini came from him. That is quite
possible. Nevertheless the fact remains that the
idea was not new in London, and that when a tele-
phone call came through from Paris on Tuesday
night it was already in the air.

First of all, the British and French Ambassadors
in Berlin were both instructed to approach Hitler
and make one more endeavour to persuade him to
recall his ultimatum, and then Mr. Chamberlain
took another step. He wrote to Hitler as follows :

" After reading your letter, I feel certain that you
can get all essentials without war and without delay.
I am ready to come to BerUn myself at once to discuss
arrangements for transfers with you and representa-
tives of the Czech Government, together with repre-
sentatives of France and Italy, if you desire. I feel
convinced that we can reach agreement in a week.

" However much you distrust the Prague Govern-
ment's intentions, you cannot doubt the power of the
British and French Governments to see that the
promises are carried out fully and carefully and
forthwith.

'* As you know, I have stated publicly that we are
prepared to undertake that they shall be so carried out.

" I cannot believe that you will take the responsi-
bihty of starting a world war which may end civilisation
for the sake of a few days' delay in settling this long-
standing problem."

If this letter convinced Hitler of anything at all, it
can only have been that England and France wanted
peace at any price.

Mr. Chamberlain addressed the following appeal
to Mussolini:

164 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

" I have to-day addressed a last appeal to Herr
Hitler to abstain from force to settle the Sudeten
problem, which I feel sure can be settled by a short
discussion, and will give him the essential territory,
population and protection for both Sudetens and
Czechs during the transfer.

" I have offered myself to go at once to Berlin to
discuss arrangements with German and Czech repre-
sentatives and, if the Chancellor desires, representa-
tives also of Italy and France.

*' I trust your Excellency will inform the German
Chancellor that you are willing to be represented and
urge him to agree to my proposal which will keep all
our peoples out of war.

" I have already guaranteed that Czech promises
should be carried out and feel confident full agreement
could be reached in a week."

As soon as these letters were sent to the Ambassa-
dors concerned, the fate of Czechoslovakia was sealed.
They constituted a complete capitulation, and while
offering no guarantees to Czechoslovakia against
aggression, much as she needed them, they made
lavish promises to Germany, armed to the teeth as
she was.

CHAPTER VI

MUSSOLINI'S RETURN TO GLORY

At 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 28th September, the
British Ambassador in Rome, Lord Perth, called at
the Italian Foreign Ministry. This talk was the first
item in the series of sensations with which the day
was packed.

They were sensations to the general public only,
of course, for expert politicians had heard on Tues-

MUSSOLINI'S RETURN TO GLORY 165

day night — or, if the news had not reached them till
very late — in the early hours of Wednesday morning,
that the great European crisis was on the point of
ending — ^indeed, that it was practically over.

The head of the Italian Government, Benito
MussoHni, had some difficult weeks behind him
when he found himself placed suddenly in the
forefront of European affairs. The exploits of his
partner at the other end of the Berlin-Rome axis
pleased him less and less.

Germany had snapped up Austria from under
Italy's nose, and was now preparing to go much
further. Mussolini saw clearly that if Germany
won this game, there were certain advantages which
would accrue to Italy. Italy would have, however,
to make sure of these advantages for herself. The
great disadvantage would be the further weakening
of Italy's position on the Axis. This position was
not now, by any means, a brilliant one, and Musso-
lini did not like having to play second fiddle. But,
if Germany lost the game, if war should come, what
then?

The German Reich was not enjoying any great
popularity in Italy, where people were afraid of
their neighbour beyond the Alps, and if Italy had
to join with Germany against France, she would
find herself committed to a very dubious adventure.
Hitler could, no doubt, risk his own career, and
that of his regime, for he stood to make enormous
gains, but Italians did not Hke the idea of staking
the future of Fascism in an affair in which Italy
stood to gain but little. It was no wonder, there-

166 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

fore, that the Duce was very nervous, and not
particularly amiable to his suite.

So Italy's position in the first three weeks of this
European drama was left vague. She held back,
so that the impression might arise in the West that,
under certain conditions, she would remain neutral.
That did not suit Germany in the least, for Italy
was an important card in the game of poker that
was being played for Mid-Eastern Europe. So
" strong pressure " soon set in from Germany.
Germany had several reasons to be dissatisfied with
her southern neighbour. There were differences of
opinion on the Spanish question and on the internal
weakness of the Fascist regime, to remedy which
Germany had, so far, worked in vain. To offset
this, the Duce presented the Fuhrer with his surprising
solution of the Jewish question. To please Hitler, the
fanatical and convinced anti-Semite, Italy launched
a cold-blooded campaign against the 44,000 or so
Jews within her frontiers. But the uncertain attitude
of Italy to the Czechoslovak question was a very
serious matter, and Germany, therefore, proceeded
to take the necessary measures.

The immediate results of this German pressure
were Mussolini's speeches in the Northern provinces
of Italy, which were, however, by no means a great
success for the Duce. Their effect was much
weakened by Mussolini's excursion to Jugoslav terri-
tory during his stay in northern Italy. This annoyed
Berlin considerably, and Mussolini was subjected to
still greater pressure to compel him to take up an
unambiguous position.

Now the Duce had to act. He announced to

MUSSOLINI'S RETURN TO GLORY 167

Hitler, through Bernardo Attolico, his Ambassador in
Berhn, that Italy was ready to carry out certain
mihtary measures and would, of course, be on
Germany's side in case of a conflict. At the same
time, however, he advised moderation.

So for several days Italy had been preparing.
Certain partial mobilisations had been carried out, and
Mussolini discussed the military situation with his Staff.

But, at the same time, very delicate and discreet
contacts were made with the West. " How would it
be if one could persuade the Duce to intervene with
the Fiihrer ? " Such was the purport of the suggestions
which mysterious emissaries from Rome whispered
to the ministers and diplomats in the two Western
capitals. They acted with such extreme discretion
that they even refrained from dropping inspired
hints in the Press.

For the Press was much too coarse an instrument
for these approaches. Was it an accident that, at
the beginning of this decisive week, rumours were
spread in Rome and elsewhere that the King of
Italy would abdicate in favour of his son if Italy
was involved in a war with France ? The King had
given formal instructions to Mussolini, so it was
said, to intervene energetically with the German
Chancellor. Truth or fiction? Had the King of
Italy really made this statement, or was the author
of this story not unconnected with the Italian
Ministry for Press and Propaganda? That is one
of the many mysteries of September 1938 which
only the future can unveil.

Mussolini's mood, which, as we know, was very
bad, showed signs of improvement on the following

168 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Tuesday. He felt that things were shaping well for
him, and this soon proved to be true. First came
the private message from President Roosevelt to
the Duce, requesting his intervention in favour of
peace. MussoHni replied poHtely, but not too
clearly, that the suggestion was very nice, but
should come from elsewhere — from London.

And it did come, as had been foreseen. Italian
diplomacy was exactly informed, late on Tuesday
afternoon, of the feehng in Paris ; Italy knew how
strong were the forces working in Paris for an
accommodation and for an intervention by Musso-
lini. And so they knew in Rome in the late hours
of Tuesday night and the early hours of Wednesday
what the coming day would bring — a request from
England for Mussolini's intervention with Hitler,
to which, of course, Mussolini would agree. More-
over, precise information had arrived from Berlin
which left no doubt that this intervention would be
successful.

Such was the position when, on Wednesday
morning, at 10.30 a.m., the British Ambassador,
Lord Perth, was announced to Count Galeazzo
Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, and MussoHni's
son-in-law.

Speeding Ahead for Peace

The six hours which elapsed on Wednesday
between the first interview of Lord Perth with Count
Ciano and Mr. Chamberlain's announcement in the
British House of Commons that Hitler had accepted
the proposal of a Conference of Four, produced
merely the endorsement of already definite facts.

MUSSOLINI'S RETURN TO GLORY 169

When M. Bonnet proposed Mussolini's interven-
tion, he knew that Mussolini would accept. London
knew it too. And Mussolini, on his part, was
definitely informed that this intervention would not
be without success. For Hitler knew that the
Western Powers had already decided to give way,
and that the only remaining question was that of
the method to be adopted. He was ready to offer
minor concessions for which he could make up
later.

10.30 a.m. Rome.

The British Ambassador, Lord Perth, informed
Count Ciano that he had an appeal from the British
Government to communicate to Signor MussoHni

The text of Mr. Chamberlain's message had not
yet arrived, but he would hand it over later. As
time pressed, however. ... A telephone conversa-
tion between Ciano and Mussolini. The arrange-
ment of which they had heard the previous night
had now been put into effect. An official British
demarche. But they took no steps yet ; they waited
for the letter that was promised for later on.

11 a.m. London.

King George signed the order for the mobilisation
of the British Fleet. This, however, now seemed
almost superfluous.

11.15 a.m. Berlin.

The demarche of the British and French Am-
bassadors which had been arranged on Tuesday
night was made to Hitler. He was officially in-
formed of the demarche requested by Mussolini.

F2

170 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Shortly afterwards, the Itahan Ambassador visited
the Fiihrer, on MussoHni's instructions. He informed
him that Mussolini would like to speak to the Fiihrer
by telephone, and meanwhile requested the post-
ponement of the mobilisation arranged for 2 p.m.
Hitler agreed, and stated that he was awaiting
MussoHni's telephone call.

Meanwhile, the telephone wires were buzzing
between Paris and London, London and Rome,
Rome and Paris, Paris and BerHn, Berhn and Lon-
don, Berlin and Rome. No common mortal could
carry on a conversation with a foreign country on
that Wednesday morning, for every line was blocked
with diplomatic talks.

11.30 a.m. Rome.

The British Ambassador handed to the Italian
Foreign Minister the text of Mr. Chamberlain's
letter. Count Ciano hastened from the Palazzo
Chigi to the Palazzo Venezia. He was immediately
admitted to the Duce. The Duce read " I have,
to-day, addressed a last appeal ..."

'Then Count Ciano spoke with the German Foreign
Minister in Berlin. It was a long conversation. It
lasted a full forty minutes. Germany was prepared
to hold a Conference of Four in Munich, but on one
condition . . . This condition was at once communi-
cated to London and Paris. In his last letter to
Hitler, Mr. Chamberlain had proposed that a repre-
sentative of the Czechoslovak Government should
take part in this conference. Germany rejected this
suggestion. Italy supported Germany, and the Duce
was prepared to accept the role of mediator, only on
this condition. Both London and Paris agreed.

MUSSOLINI'S RETURN TO GLORY 171

12 mid-day Rome,

The Duce spoke to the Fiihrer for fifteen minutes.
The Duce spoke German, and the Fiihrer had some
difficulty in understanding. Consequently, the talk
took a quarter of an hour. When it was over, the
Fiihrer had given his consent to the Conference of
Four, and promised to postpone the mobilisation
ordered for 2 p.m. " out of friendship " for Musso-
lini.

2.30 p.m. Pan's.

M. Daladier learned from Berlin that the French
Ambassador, M. Fran9ois-Poncet, had received an in-
vitation for the French Premier to attend the Con-
ference of Four at Munich on the following day.
The public announcement of this invitation was
made officially two hours later.

4.20 p.m. London. The House of Commons.

Mr. Chamberlain was speaking. For more than
an hour he had been giving a report of his efforts,
negotiations and journeys. Sir John Simon passed
the Premier a note. This note ran as follows :

" Herr Hitler accepts your proposals. He will be
glad to meet you at Munich to-morrow, together with
M. Daladier and Signor MussoUni."

Mr. Chamberlain paused for a moment, then he con-
tinued his speech with a voice full of emotion:
*' This is not all, I have something further to say to
the House . . ."

At 7 p.m. M. Daladier was to have broadcast to
the French people. Now he could not make the
speech he had prepared. He spoke but briefly:
" I shall not give up my fight for peace . . ."

172 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In Prague they had been celebrating the Feast of
St. Vaclav, the patron saint of Bohemia. Hundreds
of thousands had made pilgrimage to the Cathedral
of Saint Vitus to do honour to the skull of the
saint, which bears the crown of Bohemia. In the
afternoon, news came of the Munich meeting. The
effect was staggering.

That evening Czechoslovakia attempted to pro-
test against her fate being decided in the absence of
her representatives. But the Fiihrer objected to
them, and London and Paris had yielded. The
feeble voice of Czechoslovakia was now scarcely
audible in the mighty concert of the Great Powers.

The Pax Germanica

Hour after hour the ' Big Four ' deliberated in
the Fuhrerhaus in Munich. They had come from
London and Paris, from BerUn and Rome, by air
and by special train, to save peace. Nor was there
any doubt that peace would be saved.

The four statesmen understood each other per-
fectly. MussoHni, who was suffering that day from
acute pain in the kidneys, spoke all four languages ;
Hitler spoke German, M. Daladier French, and Mr.
Chamberlain English — and yet they understood each
other perfectly.

These four men had one wish in common : peace.
But of the four, one had staked all, and would stick
at nothing, to shape the peace to his design. He
held all the cards; now he was the one to grant
concessions, to whom the others had in fact come
to beg him to do so. Hitler had now come into his
own ; he was dictating his peace to Europe, a peace

MUSSOLINI'S RETURN TO GLORY 173

that he had gained without war because the others
had first left him a clear path and then run away
from the consequences.

Hour after hour the negotiations dragged on;
and when at last the four reached agreement, none
knew exactly what it was that they had agreed
upon. The broad outlines had been settled, but
not the details. These were left to be determined
by an international commission consisting of the
British, French, and Italian Ambassadors, a German
Secretary of State, and a representative of Czecho-
slovakia. And these were details that concerned
the fate of hundreds of thousands of human beings,
property to the value of milUons, and the life of a
whole people.

But peace was saved — the peace at any price.
And at 1.35 o'clock on the morning of 30th Sep-
tember, 1938, a pact was signed in Munich that
put the finishing touch to the disastrous events of
the month. People said that it was a peace without
victor or vanquished. But in fact there was a vic-
tor : Adolf Hitler. Had his concessions really been
enough to justify the Munich agreement being called
a peace without victor or vanquished ? We will see :

The plan accepted by the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment on 21st September under pressure by London
and Paris — i.e., after the Hitler-Chamberlain Berch-
tesgaden talks — differed essentially from that agreed
upon in Munich on 30th September. This latter, as
we shall see, is almost identical with Hitler's Godes-
berg demands, which the British and French Govern-
ments regarded as unacceptable. To facilitate ex-
amination of the three plans we will set them out

174 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

in tabular form, item by item. The first we will
call ' Berchtesgaden ', the second ' Godesberg ', and
the third ' Munich '.

The Three Phases of the International Dispute
OVER Czechoslovakia

Berchtesgaden.
1. Areas contain-
ing more than 50 per
cent, of Germans to
be ceded to the Reich
without plebiscite.
Where special cir-
cumstances required,
an international com-
mission, on which
Czechoslovakia
would be represented
would define the
frontiers, bearing in
mind, however, the
economic and strate-
gic requirements of
the country.

2. Optional ex-
change of popula-
tions.

Godesberg.

1. Hitler himself
marked on the map
the areas demanded
by Germany. Among
these were areas in
which the Czechs
were in a majority.
Hitler himself de-
cided the areas in
which plebiscites
were to be held, in-
cluding important
industrial districts
with Czech majori-
ties. New frontier
lines arising out of
the plebiscites were
to be determined by
a German-Czech or
an international
commission. The
areas on the map
drawn by Hitler were
to be occupied by
German troops, irre-
spective of whether
they would be finally
allotted to Germany
or Czechoslovakia.

2. No mention of
exchange of popula-
tions, but demand
for a plebiscite, not
later than 25th No-
vember, under inter-
national control, in
the areas defined by
Hitler.

Munich.
1. Hitler's map,
containing certain
areas with Czech
majorities, was not
accepted as a basis,
the decision being
left to an inter-
national commission
of the British,
French, and Italian
Ambassadors in Ber-
lin, a German Secre-
tary of State, and a
representative of
Czechoslovakia. The
activities of this
commission will be
discussed later; its
decision, however,
is anticipated in cer-
tain important
matters.

2. Right of option
agreed to, to be ex-
ercised within six
months. All matters
concerning this and
the exchange of pop-
ulation to be settled
by a German-Czech
commission. Areas
where plebiscites will
be held to be decided
by an international

MUSSOLINI'S RETURN TO GLORY

175

Berchtesgaden.

Godesberg.

3. The new fron-
tiers of Czechoslova-
kia to be internation-
ally guaranteed.
Britain to take part
in this guarantee.

4. Czechoslovakia
demanded that

pending the deter-
mination of the new
frontiers the areas in
question should re-
main under her au-
thority and that the
settlement of practi-
cal details should be
carried out in agree-
ment with her Gov-
ernment.

3. No guarantee
of the new Czecho-
slovak frontiers be-
fore Czechoslovakia
had ceded certain
areas to Poland and
Hungary. After this
the possibility of a
guarantee would be
considered.

4. Czechoslovakia
to evacuate and
hand over to Ger-
many by 1st October
the areas marked on
Hitler's map.

5. The territory to
be ceded to Ger-
many to be handed
over in its existing
condition. In par-
ticular the following
articles to be neither
destroyed nor ren-
dered useless : mili-
tary, industrial, and
traffic installations.
This includes aero-
dromes and wireless
stations.

All industrial and
traffic installations,
in particular rolling-
stock, in these areas,

Munich.
commission and oc-
cupied by inter-
national troops.
Plebiscites to be car-
ried out according
to the Saar statute,
not later than the
end of November.

3. Britain and
France guarantee the
new frontiers of
Czechoslovakia
against unprovoked
attack. When the
questions of Polish
and Hungarian min-
orities are settled,
Germany and Italy
will participate in
the guarantee.

4. The areas to
be ceded to Ger-
many to be succes-
sively occupied by
the Reichswehr dur-
ing period from 1st
to 10th October, in-
clusive. The occu-
pation to take place
in five zones, to be
determined by the
aforesaid interna-
tional commission.

5. No existing in-
stallations (includ-
ing, therefore, the
fortifications) to be
destroyed. The
Czechoslovak Gov-
ernment to be held
responsible for car-
rying out the evacu-
ation without dam-
age to any of these
installations.

176 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Berchtesgaden.

Godesberg.
to be handed over
undamaged. This
applied also to all
other public installa-
tions. Finally, no
foodstuffs, goods,
cattle, raw materi-
als, etc., to be re-
moved from these
areas.

6. The Czechoslo-
vak Government to
release forthwith all
Sudeten Germans in
the Czechoslovak
Army or Police.

7. The Czechoslo-
vak Government to
release all German
political prisoners.

8. The German
Government agreed
to the setting up of
a German-Czech
commission to settle
all other questions
of detail.

Munich.

6. Czechoslovakia
to release from the
Army and Police
within four weeks
all Sudeten Germans
who wish to be
released.

7. Czechoslovakia
to release all political
prisoners of German
race.

8. An interna-
tional commission,
consisting of the
three Ambassadors
in Berlin, a German
Secretary of State,
and a representative
of Czechoslovakia,
to settle all ques-
tions arising out of
the cession of the
areas.

9. The Heads of
the Governments of
the four Powers de-
clared that the ques-
tion of the Polish
and Hungarian min-
orities should, if not
settled within three
months by means of
direct agreement be-
tween the Govern-
ments concerned, be
the subject of an-
other four-Power
conference.

The international commission referred to in the
Munich document has since agreed to all the de-

EPILOGUE 177

mands of the Germans, so that, apart from a few
small details, the frontier as finally determined
corresponds almost exactly to that drawn by Hitler.
Such, then, is the aspect of the peace in which
there is neither " victor nor vanquished ".

EPILOGUE

THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

At two o'clock on the afternoon of 1st October,
the first German soldier entered Czech territory.
Not a shot was fired.

On the same day, in Paris, M. Daladier, the
French Prime Minister, amid resounding cheers,
lighted the lamp over the grave of the Unknown
Soldier beneath the Arc de Triomphe.

The people of France, and with them the peoples
of all Europe, acclaimed the peace. They had not
wanted war, and rejoiced that it had been prevented.

Readers of this book may perhaps have received
the impression that it is an argument in favour of
war. That is not so. The author, like every other
European, detests the cruelty and devastation of war.

But this peace that has been saved is not a good
peace for Europe. The point is not that a State
which, during the last twenty years, has been held
up as a model for all the States that were founded
after the War, has been deprived of its power of
independent existence, and has been delivered up
to Germany. The essence of the matter is that the
balance of power in Europe has been upset. The

178 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

way to the east of Europe has been opened to
Germany. Who to-day can predict the Umits of
that country's expansion ?

If from the outset the Western European demo-
cracies had shown greater firmness, it 'would have
been possible to come to a reasonable agreement
with Germany — an agreement whereby all the just
claims of the German minority in Czechoslovakia
would have been satisfied without delivering up that
country to Germany or giving Germany proof of
the weakness of the two great Western European
Powers. Germany has taken cognizance of this,
and will make further capital out of this weakness.
Peace has been concluded — at an exorbitant price;
but war in the future, or a further capitulation of
the Western Powers, has not been prevented. The
events of October 1938 have alarmingly shown that
democracy in Europe has chosen the quickest road
to abdication.

POSTSCRIPT

While this book was passing through the press,
Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano were busy
in Vienna arranging the general scheme for the
mutilation of Czechoslovakia in the east and south-
east. The results of their proceedings have now been
announced, and they are, if anything, more out-
rageous than the Munich decisions. Slovakia loses
one-fifth of its area, and more than one-sixth of
its population to Hungary. Of the 895,000 persons

i

APPENDIX 179

who are affected by this territorial operation, only
506,000 are Magyars. Hungary receives also nearly
one-eighth of Carpathian Ruthenia, with one-quarter
of its population. Here the proportion of Magyars
in the ceded territory amounts to scarcely one-half.
In both regions Czechoslovakia has to surrender
important towns, in particular Kosice, hitherto the
capital of Eastern Slovakia, as well as Uzhorod and
Mukacevo, the only towns of any size in Carpathian
Ruthenia, and both of them improved beyond
recognition by twenty years of Czech labour and
financial sacrifice.

The Vienna arrangements, like those of Munich,
include, of course, wanton destruction of railway
routes. Once again, in fact, bare-faced robbery
masquerading as self-determination has done its
worst. And the betrayal of Czechoslovakia is now
complete.

APPENDIX

Minorities in Central Europe

What would happen if all the problems relating to minorities
in Central Europe were solved as radically as that of the
Czechoslovak minorities ?

Before the War there were nearly 60,000,000 discontented
minorities; now, after the settlement of the Czechoslovak
question, there still remain some 16,500,000.

In Poland, 30 per cent, of a population of 32,000,000,
consist of minorities, including 4,200,000 Ukrainians
(7,000,000 according to Ukrainian calculations), 1,059,194
Germans, besides Lithuanians, Russians, and Czechs.

Rumania has a population of 18,000,000, of which 25
per cent., or 4,500,000, consist of minorities, 1,386,717 being
Hungarians, 774,645 Germans, besides Ruthenes and Bul-
garians.

180 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In Jugoslavia the minorities account for 15 per cent., of
which 499,326 are Germans, 468,185 Hungarians, besides
176,482 Czechoslovaks, Italians, Russians, Ruthenes, Poles,
and Bulgarians.

In Hungary also there are large minorities : some 500,000
Germans, more than 100,000 Slovaks, besides Serbs, Croats,
Rumanians, and Ruthenes.

Italy has 257,000 Germans in South Tyrol, and more than
500,000 Slovenes and Croats. The South Tyrolese have been
abandoned to Italianisation in accordance with the policy of
the ' Berlin-Rome Axis.'

And Germany herself has also national minorities.
German statistics show approximately 2 per cent, of national
minorities within her borders, or about 1,500,000. Of these
there are about 800,000 Poles (1,200,000 according to Polish
calculations), 62,000 Czechs, nearly 80,000 Lusatian Wends
(a Slav stock), besides Danes, Frisians, and Lithuanians.

PRiNaPAL Events of the European Crisis

August-October 1938

3rd Aug. Lord Runciman, the British intermediary, arrived
in Prague.

10th Aug. Abortive negotiations between Czechoslovak
Government and Henlein Party.

14th Aug. Opening of the grand manoeuvres of the German
Army, which made Germany the strongest military Power
in Europe during the crisis.

19th Aug. Concessions by the Prague Government, de-
scribed by the Sudeten Germans as insufficient.

25th Aug. New proposals of the Prague Government, which,
however, were again refused. Opening of the German
Press campaign against Prague.

28th Aug. Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer,
declared at Lanark that the British attitude in regard to
France and Czechoslovakia remained unchanged.

1st Sept. Talks between Hitler and Henlein at Berchtesgaden.
New plan of action evolved. Lord Runciman's mission
in Prague received gas-masks from England.

3rd Sept. M. Litvinoff, Russian Foreign Minister, had an
interview with the German Ambassador in Moscow, and
left him in no doubt that Russia would fulfil her obliga-
tions towards Czechoslovakia if the latter were attacked
by Germany.

APPENDIX 181

4th Sept. M. Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, stated
in a speech at Bordeaux that France would fulfil her
treaty obligations towards Czechoslovakia.
Demonstrations in Sudeten German districts.

5th Sept. France called up reservists and technical personnel.

Opening of the Nazi Party Congress at Nuremberg.

The Czechoslovak Government submitted new con-
cessions, stated to be final.
7th Sept. The Times published an article suggesting the
cession of the whole Sudeten German district to Germany
as the best solution of the problem. The article was
repudiated by the British Government, but gave Hitler
further reason to hope.

Incidents in Sudeten districts.
8th Sept. Mr. Chamberlain interrupted his holiday and
returned to London.

Lord Halifax, M. Bonnet, and M. Spaak postponed
their departure for Geneva.

Failure of Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador
in Berlin, to obtain interview with Hitler at Nuremberg.
He succeeded only in seeing von Ribbentrop, the German
Foreign Minister, whom he warned against hasty steps
in the Czechoslovak problem.

The British Home Fleet assembled for manoeuvres in
the North Sea.
9th Sept. The Sudeten Germans proclaim a state of emer-
gency.
10th Sept. Goering in a speech at Nuremberg referred to
the Czechs as " a miserable race of pygmies . . . nobody
knows from where they came ..."

Important ministerial consultations in London.
11th Sept. In Geneva M. Bonnet had discussions with M.
Litvinoff and with M. Comnen, Rumanian Foreign
Minister.

Communique issued from Downing Street to the foreign
Press stated : "In the event of Czechoslovakia being
attacked, Britain could not remain neutral in a war in
which France was involved ".

Military preparations in Belgium, Holland, and
Switzerland.

12th Sept. Hitler's speech in Nuremberg: a tirade directed
against Prague, which, however, failed to make clear his
real aims.

Cabinet meeting in Paris attended by General Gamelin,
head of the French General Staff.

Cabinet meeting in London.

182 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia protested against the proposals for a
plebiscite and demanded the right to participate in any
international negotiations held for the purpose of
deciding her fate.

Sanguinary conflictsin Sudeten districts in consequence
of Hitler's speech. Czechoslovak Government declared
martial law in these districts.
13th Sept. General Staff consultations in Paris and London.

Many sanguinary incidents in Sudetenland. Martial
law extended to more districts.

At 5.30 p.m. the Sudeten German Party issued an
ultimatum to the Czechoslovak Government demanding
revocation of martial law within six hours.

Prague Government invited leaders of Sudeten Germans
to Prague to discuss their ultimatum. They did not,
however, accept.
14th Sept. Mr. Chamberlain's letter to Hitler. Hitler
invited Mr. Chamberlain to come to Berchtesgaden.

Shooting in Sudetenland, with many killed and
wounded. Arms from Germany confiscated. Martial
law further extended. Abortive discussions between
members of the Runciman mission and Henlein.

Hitler consulted his Army leaders at Berchtesgaden.
15th Sept. Interview between Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain
at Berchtesgaden. Hitler demanded cession of Sudeten-
land.

Henlein and other deputies of his Party fled to Ger-
many. Order restored in Sudetenland by Czechoslovak
authorities. Result of disturbances : twenty-nine killed,
of which majority were Czechs ; seventy-five wounded,
of which sixty-one were Czechs.
16th Sept. Mr. Chamberlain returned to London with
Hitler's proposals.

Sudeten German Party suspended. Criminal proceed-
ings started against Henlein and other members of the
Party. Many groups of Sudeten Germans who disagreed
with Henlein's method of procedure expressed wish to
continue negotiations with Government.

Czechs in Germany arrested and held as hostages.

Lord Runciman left Prague and returned to London.

Private conference of Hungarian Cabinet with the
Regent, Admiral Horthy.
17th Sept. Further extension of special measures in Sudeten-
land. Henlein issued proclamation creating Sudeten
German legion.

Ministerial discussions in Paris and London.

Cabinet meeting in Washington.

APPENDIX 183

18th Sept. Dr. Hodza, Czechoslovak Prime Minister, spoke
on wireless : " No plebiscite. If we are forced to fight
we will fight."

In a speech at Trieste Mussolini declared in favour of
a plebiscite.

Consultations in London with MM. Daladier and
Bonnet on Hitler's Berchtesgaden demands, at which
it was decided to accept them.

19th Sept. MM. Daladier and Bonnet returned to Paris.
Cabinet consultation. London decision accepted.

Czechoslovak Government informed in the afternoon
that they should cede Sudeten districts to Germany in
accordance with Hitler's demands and the decision
arrived at in London.

Poland and Hungary, at first unofficially, put forward
demands for certain parts of Czechoslovakia.

Feverish political and diplomatic activities in Paris,
London, and Prague.

20th Sept. Hungarian Foreign Minister and Polish Ambas-
sador visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Plan of action
drawn up for further demands for cession of territory by
Czechoslovakia.

Admiral Horthy visited Marshal Goering at Sternberg,
East Prussia.

Czechoslovak Government having delayed acceptance,
Paris and London urged them to accept. Representa-
tions of British and French Ambassadors to President
Benes. Czechoslovak Government proposed submission
of dispute to arbitration of German-Czech tribunal.

Differences in French Government.

Polish Ambassadors in London, Paris, Rome, and
Berlin announced officially Poland's claims to certain
parts of Czechoslovakia.

Attacks on Czech frontier guards, organised by
Germany.

Inner Cabinet Committee in London discussed reply
from Czechoslovak Government. Cabinet meeting until
10.45 p.m. Telephone conversations between Downing
Street and Paris.

21st Sept. Further representations during night by British
and French Ministers to Dr. Benes. Britain and France
urged acceptance by Czechoslovakia of the demands.
Prague accepted.

Hungary announced through diplomatic channels her
claims to certain parts of Czechoslovakia.

Demonstrations in Prague due to popular indignation
at the acceptance of Franco-British decision.

184 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Ministerial consultations in London. Mr. Chamber-
lain had audience with the King.

In Geneva M. Litvinoff stated that if France fulfilled
her treaty obligations towards the Czechs, Russia would
come to their assistance.

22nd Sept. Mr. Chamberlain flew to Godesberg. Discus-
sions from 4 to 7.15 p.m.

Three French Ministers expressed intention to resign,
but subsequently withdrew.

In speech on wireless Dr. Bene§ called for maintenance
of order and stated that he had a plan. Resignation of
the Hodza Government and formation of a new one
with General Syrovy at its head.

Hungary informed Prague of her claims.

Poland denounced the minority agreement with
Czechoslovakia.

23rd Sept. Breakdown of Godesberg discussions.

Correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler.

Further discussions from 10.30 p.m. until 1.30 a.m.
Hitler put forward new demands.

Paris and London released Czechoslovak Government
from undertaking to do nothing that might prejudice
negotiations.

Mobilisation of Czechoslovak army proclaimed by
wireless at 10.20 p.m.

Concentration of Polish troops on Czechoslovak
frontier. Russia warned Poland that she would immedi-
ately denounce the Non- Aggression Pact between her and
Poland the moment the first Polish soldier entered
Czechoslovak territory.

M. Daladier stated that if Czechoslovakia were attacked
by Germany, France would fulfil her obligations.

M. Litvinoff stated at Geneva that if France fulfilled
her obligations towards Czechoslovakia, Russia would do
the same.

24th Sept. Mr. Chamberlain flew back from Godesberg.
British Cabinet consultations. French Ministers invited
to London.

Measures for mobilisation of French army continued.

Czechoslovakia cut off" from the rest of the world.
No communication possible by telephone, telegraph, or
aeroplane.

M. Daladier stated on wireless that France had given
proof of her desire for peace, and that she must now
prove that she was strong.

Hitler's memorandum and the map marked by him

APPENDIX 185

handed to Prague. France and Britain did not recom-
mend its acceptance.

25th Sept. Cabinet crisis in France narrowly avoided.
French Cabinet decided that firm stand should now be
made. Long consultations of French and British
Ministers in London.

Note from Czechoslovak Government refusing Hitler's
demands.
26th Sept. Consultations of French and British Ministers
in London continued. General Gamelin in London.
Military consultations.

Further war measures in Paris. Women and children
sent away.

Roosevelt's appeal to all concerned. Replies from Dr.
BeneS, M. Daladier, and Mr. Chamberlain.

Sir Horace Wilson sent to Berlin with a letter from
Mr. Chamberlain.

Further military measures in Belgium.

Hitler's speech in the Sportpalast in Berlin. Attack
on Dr. Bene§. Sudeten districts must be evacuated by
1st October.

Private letter from Dr. Benes to M. Moscicki, Polish
President.

Important announcements by Foreign Office and Mr.
Chamberlain after Hitler's speech.

British Parliament called together for Wednesday.
War preparations in England.

American tourists in Europe advised to return home.
27th Sept. Cancellation of King's visit to Glasgow.

Further interview of Sir Horace Wilson with Hitler.
Hitler's reply to Mr. Chamberlain despatched.

New ultimatum to Prague: Sudeten districts to be
evacuated by 2 p.m. on Wednesday.

Hitler's reply to President Roosevelt.

Daladier attempted to form a united national Govern-
ment. Great political activity in Paris.

Visit of three American cruisers to Europe. President
Roosevelt appealed personally to Hitler.

Gas masks distributed and trenches dug in London.

President Moscicki's reply to Dr. Bene§. Poland took
note of Czechoslovakia's agreement to the cession of
certain territory.

Mr. Chamberlain's wireless speech. Night meeting of

the British Cabinet. A last letter sent to Hitler. Appeal

to Mussolini to intervene with Hitler.

28th Sept. Two interviews between the British Ambassador

in Rome and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano.

186 THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Interview between Hitler and the Italian Ambassador.

Interview between Hitler and the British and French
Ambassadors.

Telephone conversation between Mussolini and Hitler
and between Count Ciano and Ribbentrop.

Denial of German ultimatum to Prague.

Decree mobilising the British Fleet signed by the King.

Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons.
Hitler's invitation to Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier
to a conference at Munich the next day with Mussolini
and himself.

Czechoslovak Minister in London requested that
Czechoslovakia should be permitted to attend the Munich
conference.

29th Sept. Munich conference.

30th Sept. Agreement signed at 1.35 a.m.

1st Oct. First German soldier crossed the Czechoslovak
frontier.

5th Oct. Resignation of Dr. Benes, President of Czecho-
slovakia.

AND STILL THEY COME

January 1939

TEN PENGUINS

.181 AN INNKEEPER'S DIARY John Fothergill

182 NIGHT FLIGHT Antoine de Saint-Exup€ry

183 THE FIGHT OF THE FIRECREST Alain Gerbault

184 SELECTED STORIES OF ' SAKI '

185 CONFESSIONS OF A YOUNG MAN George Moore

186 PENANG APPOINTMENT Norman Collins

187 THE EGYPT'S GOLD David Scott

188 THE MURDER IN THE MAZE J. J. Connington

189 BUT SOFT : WE ARE OBSERVED Hilaire Belloc

190 DEATH OF MY AUNT C H. B. Kitchin

February 1939

TEN PELICANS

A 41 WE EUROPEANS Julian Huxley, A. C. Haddon,

and A. M. Carr-Saunders

A 42 THE BASES OF MODERN SCIENCE... J. W. N. Sullivan

A 43 INTRODUCING SHAKESPEARE G. B. Harrison

A 44 THINKING TO SOME PURPOSE L Susan Stebbing

A 45 THE ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE Josiah Wedgwood

A 46 THE LETTERS OF GERTRUDE BELL (Part I)

A 47 BELIEF IN GOD Bishop Gore

A 48 LORD SHAFTESBURY J. L & Barbara Hammond

A49 MUTUAL AID J. KropotkIn

A 50 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE

(Epilogue : 1895-1906 : Part l)ElieHal6vy

[P.T.O.

"SPECIALS"

Penguin and Pelican Specials are books which
do not fit into the usual classified categories,
being mostly new bool<s specially written for
the series on urgent topical problems of the
day. These books are rushed through as soon
as possible after delivery of the manuscript to
us. A later page In this list gives a complete list
of Specials published up to the end of 1938, but
many new ones are scheduled for 1939. Ask
your bookseller for a list of the latest additions.

Just Published

BRITAIN Mass-Observation

WHAT HITLER WANTS E.O.Lorimer

THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

G. J. George

OTHERS COMING

PENGUIN BOOKS

COMPLETE LIST OF PUBLICATIONS TO THE END OF 1938

FICTION orange covers

" Bartimeus " A Tall Ship

Arnold Bennett Grand Babylon Hotel

Algernon Blackwood The Centaur

Phyllis Bottome Private Worlds

Marjorie Bowen The Glen O'Weeping

Ernest Bramah Kai Lung Unrolls His Mat
The Wallet of Kai Lung
Kai Lung's Golden Hours
Ann Bridge Peking Picnic

Louis Bromfleld

The Strange Case of Miss Annie Spragg

D. K. Broster Sir Isumbras at the Ford
J. L. Campbell The Miracle of Peille
G. K. Chesterton

The Man Who Was Thursday

Susan Ertz Madame Claire

Now East, Now West

William Faulkner Soldiers' Pay

E. M. Forster A Passage to India
Leonhard Frank Carl and Anna
CrosbieGarstin The Owls' House
Stella Gibbons Cold Comfort Farm
John Hampson

Saturday Night at the Greyhound
Ian Hay A Safety Match

Robert Hichens (2 vols.) Paradine Case
James Hilton Dawn of Reckoning

Constance Holme The Lonely Plough

Claude Houghton Choos is Come Again
I Am Jonathan Scrivener
W. W. Jacobs Deep Waters

M. R. James Ghost Stories of an Antiquary
Sinclair Lewis Mantrap

Rose Macau lay Crewe Train

Denis Mackail Greenery Street

Ethel Mannin Children of the Earth

Ragged Banners
R. H. Mottram The Spanish Farm

Beverley Nichols Self

Liam O'Flaherty The Informer

D. Kilham Roberts (editor)

Penguin Parade ( I )
Penguin Parade (2)
Penguin Parade (3)
Penguin Parade (4)

E. Arnot Robertson Four Frightened People
V. Sackville-West The Edwardians
Ramon Sender Seven Red Sundays
Graham Seton The W Plan
Beatrice Kean Seymour Youth Rides Out
Edward Shanks (2 vols.) Queer Street
Ignazio Silone Fontamara
Osbert Sitwell Before the Bombardment
Somerville and Ross

Some Experiences of an Irish R.M.
Alan Steele (editor)

Selected Modern Short Stories ( I )

Selected Modern Short Stories (2)

Ralph Straus The Unseemly Adventure

Tchehov Tales from Tchehov

Angela Thirkell Wild Strawberries

Edward Thompson An Indian Day

Ben Travers A Cuckoo in the Nest

Hugh Walpole Mr. Perrin and Mr. Traill

Sylvia Townsend Warner Lolly Willowes

Evelyn Waugh 6/ock Mischief

Decline and Fall

Vile Bodies

Edith Wharton Ethan Frame

P. G. Wodehouse My Man Jeeves

E. H. Young William

Francis Brett Young The Black Diamond

The Crescent Moon

CRIME

FICTION green covers

Anthony Armstrong Ten Minute Alibi

H. C. Bailey Mr. Fortune, Please

E. C. Bentley Trent's Last Case

Anthony Berkeley The Piccadilly Murder

[continued

COMPLETE LIST Of PENGUIN BOOKS (contd.)

Alice Campbell Spider Web

John Dickson Carr It Walks by Night
The Waxworks Murder
Agatha Christie The Murder on the Links
The Mysterious Affair at Styles
G. D. H. and Margaret Cole

Murder at Crome House
J. J. Connington The Dangerfield Talisman
Death at Swaythling Court
A. Conan Doyle

The Hound of the Baskervilles

John Ferguson The Man in the Dark

Richard Keverne The Havering Plot

The Man in the Red Hat

The Sanfield Scandal

C. Daly King Obelists at Sea

Philip Macdonald The Rasp

Ngaio Marsh Enter a Murderer

A. A. Milne The Red House Mystery

John Rhode The House on Tollard Ridge

The Murders in Praed Street

Sax Rohmer The Mystery of Dr. Fu-Manchu

Dorothy L. Sayers

The Documents in the Case
W. Stanley Sykes The Missing Moneylender
Edgar Wallace The Four Just Men

H. G. Wells The Invisible Man

TRAVEL &
ADVENTURE

cense covers

J. Johnston Abraham The Surgeon's Log
Edmund Blunden Undertones of War

F. S. Chapman Watkin's Last Expedition
Apsley Cherry-Garrard

(2 vols.) The Worst Journey in the World
Alexandra David-Neel

With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet
Anthony Fokker Flying Dutchman

Alfred Aloysius Horn Trader Horn

Anne Morrow Lindbergh

North to the Orient
C. A. W. Monckton

(2 vols.) Some Experiences of a New

Guinea Resident Magistrate

J. M. Scott The Land that God Gave Cain

Captain von Rintelen The Dork Invader

Nora Wain House of Exile

BIOGRAPHY &
MEMOIRS dark blue covers

H. C. Armstrong

Grey Wolf {Mustafa Kemal)
Lord of Arabia (Ibn Saud)
Margot Asquith (2 vols.) Autobiography
E. F. Benson As We Were

L. E. O. Charlton " Charlton "

Pamela Frankau / Find Four People

B. H. Liddell Hart (2 vols.) Foch

Ethel Mannin Confessions and Impressions
Andre Maurois Ariel

Disraeli
Beverley Nichols Twenty-Five

Maurice O'Sullivan

Twenty Years A-Growing

MISCELLANEOUS

yellow covers

Earl Baldvyin On England

Francis and Vera Meynell (editors)

(2 vols.) The Week-end Book
Alexander Woollcott Whi7e Rome Burns

DRAMA red covers

THE PENGUIN SHAKESPEARE, edited by
Dr. G. B. Harrison ; these plays, each in
a separate volume v^ith special Notes and
Introductions, are available so far :
Twelfth Night Henry the Fifth

Hamlet As You Like It

King Lear A Midsummer Night's Dream
The Tempest The Merchant of Venice

Richard II Romeo and Juliet

Julius Caesar Henry IV (part I)

Macbeth Henry IV {part 2)

Othello Much Ado About Nothing

The Sonnets Antony and Cleopatra

SEVEN FAMOUS ONE-ACT PLAYS, by
Alfred Sutro, A. P. Herbert, Clifford Bax,
Stanley Houghton, W. W. Jacobs, J. A.
Ferguson and Oliphant Down.

[continued

COMPLETE LIST OF PENGUIN BOOKS (contd.)

I LL USTRATED
CLASSICS*

Art Director: Robert Gibbings;
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Jane Austen Pride and Prejudice

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Robert Browning

Selected Poems (lain Macnab)
Daniel Defoe

(2 vols.) Robinson Crusoe (J. R. Biggs)

Richard Jefferies The Story of My Heart

(Gertrude Hermes)

Herman Melville Typee (Robert Gibbings)

Edgar Allan Poe

Some Tales of Mystery and Imagination
(Douglas Percy Bliss)
Laurence Sterne

A Sentimental Journey (Gwen Raverat)
Jonathan Swift

Gulliver's Travels (Theodore Naish)
David Thoreau Walden (Ethel bert White)

PENGUIN
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Norman Angell The Great Illusion — Now
The Duchess of Atholl Searchlight on Spain
Phyllis Bottome The Mortal Storm

Charlton, Garratt and Fletcher

The Air Defence of Britain
S. Grant Duff Europe and the Czechs

Louis Golding The ]ev/ish Problem

G. T. Garratt Mussolini's Roman Empire
Lord Londonderry

Ourselves and Germany
W. M. Macmillan

Warning from the West Indies
Edgar Mowrer

Gzrmany Puts the Clock Back

Mowrer in China

Wickham Steed The Press

Genevieve Tabouis Blackmail or War

PELICAN
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Anthony Bertram ^Design

Arnold Haskell "^Ballet

Robert Gibbings *6/ue Angels & Whales

PELICAN
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F. L. Allen *(2 vols.) Only Yesterday
Clive Bell Civilisation

G. D. H. Cole Practical Economics

Socialism in Evolution
J. G. Crowther

*(2 vols.) An Outline of the Universe
Dobree and Manwaring

The Floating Republic
J. H. Fabre ^Social Life in the Insect World
Sigmund Freud Totem and Taboo

Psychopathology of Everyday Life
Roger Fry Vision and Design

J. B. S. Haldane The Inequality of Man

Elie Halivy (3 vols.)

A History of the English People in 1815
G. B. Harrison (editor)

A Book of English Poetry
Julian Huxley Essays in Popular Science
Sir James Jeans *T/7e Mysterious Universe
R. S. Lambert (editor) *Art in England
H. J. Laski Liberty in the Modern State

H. J. and Hugh Massingham (editors)

(2 vols.) The Great Victorians
W. J. Perry The Growth of Civilisation

Eileen Power '^Medieval People

D. K. Roberts (editor)

(2 vols.) The Century's Poetry
Bernard Shaw

(2 vols.) The Intelligent Woman's Guide
Olaf Stapledon Last and First Men

J. W. N. Sullivan Limitations of Science
R. H. Tawney

Religion and the Rise of Capitalism
Beatrice Webb

(2 vols.) My Apprenticeship
H. G. Wells

A Short History of the World
A. N. Whitehead

Science and the Modern World

Leonard Woolf After the Deluge

Virginia Woolf The Common Reader

Sir Leonard Wooiley *Ur of the Chaldees

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