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Full text of "Three treatises. The first concerning art. The second concerning music, painting, and poetry. The third concerning happiness"

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THE LIBRARY 

OF 

THE UNIVERSITY 

OF CALIFORNIA 

LOS ANGELES 



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■ri% 



n 



THREE 

TREATISES. 

The First 

Concerning ART. 

The Second 

Concerning MUSIC, 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 

The Third 

Concerning HAPPINESS. 



By J. H.J/Uyi^i }l,^^yrTui/y 



LONDON: 

Printed by H. Woodfall, jun. 

For J. NouRSE, without Temple- Bar \ and 
P. Va ILL A NT, facing Southampton-Jlreet 
in the Strand. 



M.DCC.XLIV, 






Advertifement to the Reader. 

/N the Hreatifes here publiJJoed, there 
is the following Connexion. Ihejirfi 
treats of Art in its moji comprehenjive 
Idea J when confidered as a Genus to many 
jiibordinate Species. The fecond cojifiders 
three of thefe fiibordinate Species^ whofe 
Beauty and Elega?ice are well known to 
all. The lafi treats of that Arty which 
refpeBs the ConduB of Human Life^ and 
which may jujlly be valuedy as of all Arts 
the mojl important, if it can truly lead 
us to the End propofed. 






TREATISE the First: 



CONCERNING 



A R 1 , 



DIALOGUE 

T O T H E 
Right Honourable the EARL of 

SHAFTESBU RY. 



CONCERNING 

A R T, 

A 

DIALOGUE 

To the Right Honourable the 

Earl of Shaftesbury. 



My Lord, 

THE following Is a Converfation 
in its kind fomewhat uncom- 
mon, and for this reafon I have 
remembered it more minutely than I could 
imagine. Should the fame Peculiarity prove 
a Reafon to amufe your Lordfliip, I fliall 
think myfelf well rewarded in the Labour 
of reciting. If not, you are candid enough 
to accept of the Intention, and to think 
there is fome kind of Merit even in the 
Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no 
Jonger Preface, the Fadl was as follows. 

B 2 A 



^ Concerning ART, 

A Friend from a difliint Country hav- 
ing by chance made me a Vifit, we were 
tempted by the Serenity of a chearfal Morn- 
ing in the Spring, to walk from S — r — ;;/ 
to fee Lord P—mbr-^kes at JV-^-lt—n. The 
Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Paints 
ing, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, 
were the Subje^St of great Entertainment to 
my Friend : Nor was I, for my own part, 
lefs delighted than he was, to find that our 
Walk had fo v/ell anfwered liisExpedations. 
We had given a large Scope to our Curiofi- 
ty, when we left the Seat, and leifurely be^ 

gan our return towards home, 
p ■ 

And liere, my Lord, in paffing over a 
few pleafant Fields, commenced the Con- 
verfition which I am to tell you, and which 
fell at firft, as was natural ^ on the many 
curious Works, which had afforded us both 
fo elegant an Amufemcnt. This led us in- 
fenfibly to difcourilng upon ART, for we 
both agreed, that whatever v.^e had been 
gdlT^inng of Fair and Beautifiil, could ail be 

referred 



y^DlALOGUE* 5 

referred to no other Caufe. And here, I 
well remember, I called upon my Friend 
to give me his Opinion upon the meaning 
of the Word ART : A Word it was (I 
told him) in the Mouth of every one 3 but 
for all that, as to its precife and definite Idea, 
this might flill be a Secret ; that fo it was in 
fa6l with a thoufand Words befide, all no 
lefs common, and equally familiar, and yet 
all of them equally vague and undetermined. 
To this he anfwered, That as to the pre- 
cife and definite Idea of Art, it was a Que- 
ftion of fome Difficulty, and not fo foon to be 
refolved ; that, however, he could not con- 
ceive a more likely Method of coming to 
Jcnow it, than by confidering thofe feveral 
Particulars, to each of which we gave the 
Name. It is hardly probable, faid he, 
that Mufic, Painting, Medicine, Poetry, 
Agriculture, and fo many more fhould be 
all called by one common Nn?ne, if there was 
?'iot fomething in each^ which was common to 
all It fliould feem fo, replied I. What 
then, faid he, fhall we pronounce this to 
be ? At this, I remember, I was under 

B 3 fome 



6 Concerning A R T^^ 

fome fort of Hefitation. Have Coiiras^e,, 
cried my Friend, perhaps the Cafe is not 
fo defperate. Let me allc you — Is Medi- 
cine the Caufe of any thing ? Yes furely, 
faid I, of Health. And Agriculture, 

of what ? Of the plentiful Growth of 
Grain. And Poetry, of what? Of 
Plays, and Satires, and Odes, and the like. 

And is not the fame true, faid he, of 
Mufic, of Statuary, of Architedlure, and, in 
fhort, of every Art whatever ? I confefs^ 
faid I, it feems fo. Suppofe then, faid 
he, we fliould fay. It was common to every 

Art to be a Caufe. Should we err ? I 

replied, I thought not. Let this then, 
iixid he, be remembered, that all Art isCauCe, 

I promifed him it fhould. 

But how then, continued he, \^ all Art 
he Caiifcy is it alfo true, that all Caufe h 
Art F At this again I could not help 
heiitating. You have heard, faid he, 

without doubt, of that Tainter famed in 
Story, who being to paint the Foam of 
a Horfe, and not fucceeding to his Mind, 

threw 



-<^ D I A L O GUE. y 

threw his Pencil at the Pidure in a Fit 
of Paffion and Defpair, and produced a 
Foam the moil natural imaginable. Now, 
what fay you to this Fad ? Shall we pro- 
nounce Art to have been the Caufe ? By 
no means, laid I. What, faid he, if in- 
flead of Chance^ his Hand had been guided 
by mere CompuJfmn^ himfelf dllTenting and 
averfe to the Violence ? Even here, re-» 
plied I, nothing could have been referred to 
his Art. But what, continued he, if in- 
ftead of a cafual Throw, or ini^olwitary Com- 
pulfion, he had 'willingly and deliberately dired- 
ed his Pencil, and (o produced that Foam, 

which Story fays he failed in ? Would 

not Art here have been the Caufe ? I 

replied, in this cafe, I thought it would. 
It fliould feem then, faid he, that A?'t 
implies not only Caufe, but the additional 
Requilite of Intention, Reafon, Volition, and 
Confcioiifnejs ; io that not every Caufe is Art, 
but only voluntary or intentional Caufe, 
So, faid I, it appears. 

B 4 And 



8 ' Concerning ART, 

And fhall we then, added he, pronounce 
every intentional Caufe to be Art ? I fee 

no reafon, faid I, why not. Confider, 

faid he ; Hunger this Morning prompted 
you to eat. You were then the Caiife^ 
and that too the intentional Caufe, of con- 
fuming certain Food : And yet will you 
refer this Confumption to Art ? Did you 
chew by Art ? Did you fwallow by Art ? 
No certainly, faid I. So by 

opening your Eyes, faid he, you are the 
intentional Caufe of Seeing, and by ftretch- 
ing your Hand, the intentional Caufe of 
Feeling > and yet will you affirm, that 
thefe things proceed from Art ? I fhould 
be wrong, faid I, if I did : For what Art 
can there be in doing, what every one is able 
to do by mere Will, and a fort of uninfiru5led 
InftinB I* You fay right, replied he, and 
i'he reafon is manifeft. Were it otherwife, 
we fliould make all Mankind univerfal Ar- 
tills in every lingle Adion of their Lives. 
And what can be a greater Abfurdity than 
this ? I confelTed that the Abfurdity ap- 
peared 



1/^ D I A L O G U E. g 

peared to be evident. But if nothing 
then, continued he, which we do by Com-' 
pilfioriy or without intending it, be Art ; and 
not even what we do intentionally^ if it pro- 
ceed from mere Will and uninJiriiBed In- 
ftind: ', what is it we have left remaining, 
where Art may be found converfant ? Or 
can it indeed poffibly be in any thing elfe, 
than in that which we do by Vfe^ PraSlice^ 
Experience, and the like, all which are born 
with no one, but which are acquired all 
afterward by Advances unperceived. I 
can think, faid I, of nothing elfe. Let 
therefore the Words Habit and Habitualy 
faid he, reprefent this Requifite, and let us 
fay, that Art is not only a Catife, but ari' 
intentional Caufe ; and not only an i?jte}i~ 
tional Caufe, but an intentioital Caufe found- 
ed in Habit, or, in other Words, an habi- 
tual Caufe, You appear, faid I, to argue 
rightly. 

But if Art, faid he, be what we 
have now alTerted, fomething learnt and 
ac(^uired'f if it be alfo a thing intentiotial 

or 



Id Concerning A R T^ 

or voluntary^ and not governed either by 

Chance or blind Necejity- If this, I fay, 

be the Cafe, then mark the Confequences* 
And what, faid I, are they ? The 
firfl, faid he, is, that no Events, in what we 
call the natural World, mull be referred to 
Art\ fuch as Tides, Winds, Vegetation j 
Gravitation, Attradion, and the like. For 
thefe all happen by flated Laws j by a curi- 
ous Necejfity, which is not to be withftood, 
and where the nearer and immediate Caiifes 
appear to be utterly unconjcious. I con-* 

fefs, faid I, it feems fo. In the next 

place, continued he, we muil exclude all 
thofe admired Works of the Animal Worlds 
which, for their Beauty and Order, we ine-^ 
taphorically call artificial. The Spider's 
Web, the Bee's Comb, the Beaver's Houfe, 
and the Bird's Nell, mull all be referred to 

another Source. For who can fay, thefe 

ever learnt to be thus ingenious ? or, that 
tliey were igjiorant by Nature, and knowing 
only by Education? None furely, re- 

plied I. But we have ftill, faid he, a 
higher Confideration* And what, faid I, 

is 



^Dialogue. h 

IS that ? It Is, anfwered he, this 

Not even that Divine Power, which gave 
Form to all things, then aBed by Art, when 
it gave that Form. For how, continued 
he, can that Intelligence, which has all 
Perfe5iion ever in Energy, be fuppofed to 
have any Power, not original to its Nature^ 
How can it ever have any thing to learny 
when it knows all from the Beginning ; or, 
being perfeB and complete, admit of what 
is additional and fecondary ? I ihould 

think, faid I, it were impoffible. If ib, 
faid he, then Art can never be numbered 
among its Attributes : For all Art is fome- 
thing learnt, fomething fecondary and aC' 
quired, and 7iever origifial to any Being, 
which polTefTes it. So the Fad;, faid I, 
has been eflablifhed. 

If this therefore, continued he, be true; 
if Art belong not either to the Divine 
Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate 

Nature, to what Nature fhall we fay it 

does belong ? I know not, faid I, unlefs 
it be to the Human, You are right, faid 

he^ 



12 Concerning ART, 

he ; for every Nature elfe you pei'ceive i% 
either too excellent to want it, or too bafe to be 
capable of it. Befide, except the Human, 
what other Nature is there left ? Or where 
eife can we find any of the Arts already 
inflanced, or indeed whatever others we 
may now fancy to enumerate ? Who are 
Statuaries, but Men ? Who Pilots, who 
Muiicians? This feems, replied I, to 
be the Fad:. 

Let us then, continued he, fay, not 
only that Art is a Canfcy but that it is 
Man becoming a Caiije 5 and not only Man, 
but Man intending to do what is going to 
he doncy and doing it alfo by Habit-, fb 
lliat its whole Idea, as far as we have 

hitherto conceived it, is Man becoming 

a Caiife^ Intentional and HabitnaL I con- 
fefs, faid I, it has appeared fo» 

And thus, faid he, have you had exhi- 
bited a fort of a Sketch of Art. You mufl re- 
member however, it is but a Sketch : there 
is flill ibmethin'2; wantin"; to make it a 

finiflied 



y^ D I AL OG UE. i^ 

f.ninied Piece. I begged to know what 
this was. In order to that, replied he, 

I cannot do better, than remind you of a 
PaiTage in your admired Horace. It is con- 
cerning jilfefiiis; who (if you remember) 
he tells us, though his Tools were laid 
afide, and his Shop fliut up, was flill an 

Artift as much as ever. 

Alfenm vafer omni 

AbjeBo injlriimento Artis, claufaq-j faberndy 

Sutor erat I remember, 

faid I, the Paflage, but to what purpofe is 
it quoted ? Only, replied he, to iliew 
you, that I fhould not be without Prece- 
dent, were I to affirm it not abfolutely ne- 
cefTary to the being of Art, that it fhould 
be Man aBually becoming a Caufe ; but that 
it was enough, if he had the Power or Capa-- 
city of fo becoming. Why then, faid I, 
did you not fettle it fo at firft ? Becauie, 
replied he, Faculties, Powers, Capacitiei 
(call them as you will) are in them- 
felves abftradl from Ad:ion, but obfcure and 
bidden things. On the contrary, Energies 
0iid Operations lie open to the Se?ifes, an4 

cannot 



14 Concerning ART, 

cannot but be obferved, even whether wc 
will or no. And hence therefore, when 
firfl we treated of Ait, we chofe to treat of 
jt, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we 
better comprehend it, we have ventured 
fomewhat farther. Repeat then, faid I, 
if you pleafe, the Alteration, which you 
have made. At firfl:, anfwered he, we 
reafoned upon Art, as if it was only Man 
aBimlly becoming a Caufe intentional and 
habitual. Now we fay it is a Tower in 
Man of becoming fuch Caufe ^ an^ that, 
though he be not aBiially in the Exercife of 
fuch a Power. I told him, his Amend- 
ment appeared to be jufl. 

There is too another Alteration, added 
he, which, for the fake of Accuracy, is 
equally wanting ; and that is with refped: to 
the Epithet, Intentional or Voluntary. And 
what, faid I, is that 1 We have agreed 
it, replied he, to be neceffary, that all Art 
fhould be under the Guidance of Inte?2tion 
or Volition, fo that no Man ading by Com-^ 
fulfion^ or by Chance^ flioiild be called 



^Dialogue. j^ 

^n j4?'tifi. We have. Now tlio* 

this, faid he, be true, yet it is not fufficient. 
We mufl h'mf this Intention or Volition to 
a peculiar Kind. For were every Httle 
Fancy, which we may v/ork up into Habit, 
;a fufficient Foundation to conflitute an Art, 
we ihould make Art one of the loweft and 
mofb defpicable of things. The meaneft 
Trick of a common Juggler might, in fuch 
cafe, entitle a Man to the Charadter of an 
Artifl. I confelTed, without fome Limi- 
tation, that this might be the Confequence. 
But how limit Intentions to a Kind or 
Species ? What think you, replied he, 
if we were to do it, by the Number and 
Dignity of the Precepts, which go to the 
directing of our Intentions ? You mufl 
explain, faid I ; for your Meaning is obr 
fcure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, 
in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sow- 
ing ? Are there not Precepts in Archi- 
tcdure, about Orders and Proportions ? 
Are there not the fame in Medicine, in 
JN'avigation, and the reft? There are. 
^^nd what is your Opinion of thefe 

feveral 



iS Concerning A R T, 

feveral Precepts ? Are they arbitrary and 
capricious ; or rational and Jleady ? Are 
they the Inventions of a Day ; or well- 
approved by long Experience ? I told him, 
I fliould confider them for the moll as 
rational, fteady, and well-approved by long 
Experience. And what, continued he, 
fhall we fay to their Number f Are they 
few ? Or are they not rather fo numerous^ 
that in every particular Art, fcarce any 
comprehend them all, but the feveral Ar- 
tifts themfelves ; and they only by length 
of time, with due Attendance and Appli- 
cation ? I replied, It feemed fo. 

Suppofe then We were to pronounce, that 
to every Art tijere was a Syjiejn of fuch 
various and well-approved Precepts : Should 
we err ? No certainly. And fuppofe 
we fliould fay, that the Intention of every 
'Artift^ m his feveral Art, was direBed by 
fuch a Syfiem : Would you allow this ? 
Surely. And ^vill not this limiting of 
Intentions to fach only, as are fo direfted, 
fufficiently diflinguifh Art from any thing 

^{'^ which may rcfcmble it ? In other 

>vords^ 



■/f Dialogue. 17 

itvords, Is it likely, under this Diftlndion, 
to be confounded with other Habits of ji 
trifling, capricious and inferior Kind ? 
I repliied, 1 thought not. 

Let us then fee, fald he, and colleft 
all that we have faid, together. We have 
already agreed, that the Power of aBing 
after a certain hiahner is fiifficieht tcJ con- 
ftitute Art, without the aBiially operating 
agreeably to that Power. And We have 
iiow farther held the Intentions of every 
Artift to be directed by a Syjiem of various 
mid well-approved Precepts. Befides all this, 
we fettled it before, that all Art was founded 
in Habit), and was peculiar to Man; and 
was feen by becoming the Caufe of fome Ef- 
feB. It fhoiild feerh then, that the whole 
Idea of Art was this— —An habitual 
Power in MAn of becoming the 
Cause of some Effect, accord- 
ing to a System of various 

AND WELL-APPROVED PrECEPTS. 

I replied, That his Account appeared 
to be probable and juft. 

C §. 2, 



i8 Concerning A R T, 

§. 2. An D now then, continued he, as we 
have gone thus far, and have fettled between 
us what we believe Art to be 3 fhall we go a 
little farther, or is your Patience at an end ? 
Oh ! no, replied I, not if any thing be 
left. We have walked fo leifurely, that much 
remains of our Way -, and I can think of no 
Method, how we may better amufe ourfelves, 

M Y Friend upon this proceeded with fay- 
ing, that if Art were a Caufe, (as we had 
agreed it was) it mull be the Caiife offome" 
thing. Allow it, faid I. And if it be 
the Caufe of fomeihifigy it mujft have a Sub- 
ject to operate on. For every Agent has need 
of its Patient ; the Smith of his Iron, the 
Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his 
Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship. 
I anfwered. It was tme. If then, 

faid he, the Subjeds of particular Arts be 
thus evident : What Idea fliall we form of 
that imiverfal SubjeBy which is common to all 
Art? At this Queftion, it muft be con- 
felTed^ I was a little embaraiTed. 

This 



A Dl AL OGUE. 19 

This induced him to afk me, How many 
forts of Subjeds I allowed of ? Here I 
could not help hefitating again. There 

IS nothing, continued he, fo difficult in the 
Queftion. You muft needs perceive, that 
all Natures whatever can be but either <rc;z- 
tingent or necejfary. This may be, re- 
plied 1 3 but even yet I do not comprehend 
you. Not comprehend me ! faid he ; 

then anfwer me a Queftion : Can you con- 
ceive any Medium between Motion and No^ 
Motion^ between thange and No-Change ? 
I replied, I could not. If not, 

can you conceive any thing in the whole 
Order of Beings which mufl not be either 
liable to thefe, or not liable ? Nothing. 

Call thofe things therefore, faid he, 
which are liable to Change and Motion^ con- 
tingent Natures : and thofe, which are not 
liable^ neceJJ'ary Natures: And thus you 
have a Divijion^ in which all things are /«- 
eluded. We have fo, faid I, 



In 



20 Concerning ART, 

In which therefore, faidhe, o^ thefe Na^ 
tures {hall we feek for this common SubjeSi of 
Art ? To this, I told him, I was unable 
to anfwer. Refled, faid he, a little. 

We have found Art to be a Caufe. 

We have. And is it not ejfentialto 
e'very Caufe to operate ? or can it be a Caufe, 
and be the Caufe of nothing ? Impoflible. 
Where-er therefore there is Caufe, 
there is neceifarily implied fome Operation. 
There is. And can there poffibly 
be Operation y without Motion and Change f 
' There cannot. But Change and 

Motion muft needs be incompatible with 
what is necejfary and immutable. They 

muft. So therefore is Caufe. It mufl:» 
And fo therefore Art. It muft» 

Truth therefore, faid he, and Know- 
ledge ; Principles and Demonftrations ; the 
general and intelledual ElTences of Things > 
in fliort, the whole immutable and neceffary 
Nature is no part of it reducible to a Subje£i 
of Art. It feems fo, faid I. 



If 



./^Dialogue. 21 

If therefore Art, faid he, have nothing 
to do with the Jiead)\ abJiraB, and ne- 
cejjary Nature^ it can have only to do 
with the tranjient^ the particular^ and 
contingent one. 'Tis true, faid I; for 

there is no other left. And fliall we 

then fay, replied he, it has to do with all 
contingent Natures exifting in the Univerie ? 
For aught, replied I, which to me ap- 
pears contrary. What think you, faid 
he, of thofe Contingents of higher Order ? 
fuch as the grand Planetary Syftem; the 
Succeffion of the Seafons 5 the regular and 
uniform Courfe of all fuperior Natures in 
the Univerfe ? Has A:t any Ability to 
intermeddle here ? No cervuinlyj faid I. 
Thefe fuperior Condi igents then, 
which move without Interruption^ are, it 
feem?5 above it. They are« 
And fi 1^11 we fay the fame of thofe of lower 
fort i thofe, whofe Courfe we fee often inter- 
rupted ; thofe, which the Strength and Cun-. 
ning of Man are able to i?ifuence and con- 
trouli Give Inftances, faid I, of what 

C 3 you 



22 Concerning ART, 

you mean. I mean, faid he, Earth, 

Water, Air, Fire ; Stones, Trees j Ani- 
mals ^ Men themfelves. Are thefe Con- 
ting;ents within the reach of Art, or has 
Art here no Influence ? I fliould think, 

faid I, a very great x)ne. 

If this, continued he, be true, it fhould 
feem that the common or universal 
Subject of Art was — all those con- 
tingent Natures, which lie within 
the reach of the Human Powers 
TO influence. I acknowledge, faid I, 
it appears fo. 

Thus far then, faid he, we have ad-» 
vanced with tolerable Succefs. We have 
gained fome Idea oi Art^ and fome Idea of 
its SubjeB. Our Inquiry, on the whole, 
has informed us, that Art is — — an habi- 
tual Power in Man of beconmig a certain 

Caufe —'- ^ndth^t its Subject is every 

fuch contingent Nature ^ which lies within the 
-reach of the human Powers to infiuence, 

§• 3- 



^Dialogue, 23 

§. 3. 'Tis true, faid I, this appears to have 
been the Refult of our Inquiry, and a full 
and ample one it feems to have been. 
A long one, replied he, if you pleafe, but 
not a full and ample one. Can any 

thing, faid I, be wanting, after what you 
have faid already? Certainly, replied 

he, a great deal. We have talked much 
indeed of Art, confidered as a Caufe ; and 
much of the SiibjeB, on which it operates; 
but what jnoves thefe Operations to com- 
mence, and where it is they end, thefe are 
Topicks, which we have as yet little 
thought of. I begged him then, that 

we might now confider them. 

He was willing, he faid, for his part, 
and immediately went on by afking. What 
I thought was the Beginning of Art F 
I mean, faid he, by Beginning, that Caufe 
for the fake of which it operates, and which 
being fuppofed away. Men would be ne'der 
moved to follow it. To this, I told him, 

I was unable to anfwer. You will not 

C 4 'think 



24 Concerning ART, 

think it, faid he, fo difficult, when yoi4 
have a little more confidered. Refled: 

with yoarfelf -Was it not the Abjence 

of Health, which excited Men to cultivate 
the Art of Medicine ? \ replied, it was. 
What then, faid he, if the Human 
Body had been fo far perfeB and Jclf- 
fufficienfy as never to have felt the ViciJji-> 
tudes of Well and III : Would not then this 
Art have been wholly unknown ? 
1 replied, I thought it would. And 

what, fajd he, if we extend this Perfedion 
a degree farther, and fuppofe the Body not 
only thus healthful, but withal fo robujiy as 
tQ have felt no Uneaiinefs from all Incle- 
mencies of Weather : Would not then the 
Arts of Building alfo and Clothing have 
bpen as ufelefs, as that of Medicine ? 
I replied. It feemed they would. But 

what, faid he, if we bound not this Per- 
fedion of ours even here ? What if we 
fuppofe, that not only Things merely necef- 
fary, but that thofe alfo conducive to Ele- 
gance and Enjoyment were of courfe all 
implied in th^ ConfUtution of Hurnan Na- 
ture 5 



!/^DlALOGUE. 25 

ture ; that they were all ftead)\ conflant, 
and tndependant from ^without, and as in-r 
feparable from our Being, as Perfplring, or 
Circulation : In fuch cafe, would not the 
Arts of Mufic, Painting and Poetry, with 
.every other Art palling under the Denomi- 
nation of Elegant^ have been as ufelefs, as 
we have held thofe others of Medicine, 
Clothing, and Architedhire ? I replied. 
It feemed they would. It was then the 
Abfcnce of Joys, Elegancies, and Amufe- 
ments from our Conjiitiition-, as left by 
Nature, which induced us to feek them in 
thefe Arts of Elegance and Entertainment. 
It was. And what, faid he, are 

Joys, Elegancies, Amufements, Health, 
Robuftnefs, with thofe feveral other ObjeSls 
of Defre, wbofe Ab fence leads to Art^ but fo 
many different Names of that complex Being 
called Good, under its variotis, and multi- 
for?fj, and popular Appearances f I re- 

plied. It feemed fp. 

If this then, faid he, be granted, it 
Piould feem that the Beginning or Pri?i- 

ciple 



z6 Concerning ART, 

ciple of Art was the Ab fence of fomething 
thought Goody becaufe it has appeared that 
it is for the fake of fome fuch ahfent Good 
that every Art operates j and becaufe, if 
we fuppofe no fuch Abfence to have been, 
we fidould never have known any Art, 
I confefs, faid I> it feems fo. 

But how then, continued he? If it be 
true that all Art implies fuch Pri?icipk, 
is it reciprocally true, that every fuch 
Principle fliould imply Art f I fee no 

reafon, fald I, why not. Coniider, 

faid he. It might be thought a Good by 
fome perhaps, to be as ftrong as thofe 
Horfes, which are ploughing yonder Field; 
to be as tall as thofe Elms, and of a Nature 

as durable. Yet would the Abfence of 

Goods, like thefe, lead to Art ? Or is it not 
abfiird to fuppofe, there fliould be an Art 
of ImpoJJibilites ? Abfurd, faid I, cer- 

tainly. If fo, faid he, when we define 

the Begittning or Principle of Art,, it is not 
enough to call it the Abfence of fomethijtg 
thought Good^ unlefs we add, that the Good 

be 



-^Dialogue. 27 

be a Good Pojfible-y a Thing attainable by 
Man ; a Thing relative to Human Life^ and 
conjijlent with Human Nature : Or does not 
this alfo appear a Requiiite ? I replied, 

I thought it did. 

But ftill, continued he Is it a fuf- 

ficient Motive to Art, that the Good defired 
fhould be attainable? In other Words, 
does every Abfence of Good attainable lead 
to Arty or is our Account ftill too loofe^ and 
in need of ftridler Determination ? 
Of none, faid I, which appears to me. 
Refled:, faid he j there are fome of the pof- 
Jible Goods fo obvious and eafy, that every 
Man, in an ordinary State of common na- 
tural P erf e5f ion, is able to acquire them, 
without Labour or Application. You will 
hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting 
to eat, may be gathered 5 or a clear Spring, 
tempting to drink, may be drank at, by 
the mere Suggeftions of Will and unin- 
fruBed InfiinSi. I granted, they might. 
It would be therefore impertinent, 
faid he, to fuppofe that Goods, like thefe, 

fliould 



28 Concerning ART, 

fliould lead to Art, becaufe Art would be 
Juferjimm^ and in no refped: necefTary. 
Indeed, faid I, it feems fo. 

If therefore, faid he, neither Impqffibks 
lead to Art J becaufe of fuch there can be no 
Art J nor Things eafily pojjible, becaufe in 
fuch Nature can do without Art : what is it 
we have left, to which we may refer it ? 
Or can it indeed be to any other than to that 
middle Clafs of Things y which, however pof- 
fible, are ftill not fo eafy, but to be beyond 
the Powers of Will, and Inftind unin- 
flruded ? I replied, It feerned fo. 

That there are many fuch things, faid he, 
is evident paft doubt. For what Man 
would pay Artifts fo largely for their Arts, 
were he enabled by Nature to obtain what- 
ever he defired ? Or who would ftudy to 
be fkilled in Arts, were Nature's original 
Powers to be in all refpedls fufficient ? 
I told him. It was not likely. 

It fliould feem then, faid he, according 
tp this Reafoning, that the Beginning, Mo- 
tive^ 



y^ D I A L O G U El 20 

five^ or Principle oi Art j that Caufe^ which 
firft moved it to ABion, and, for the fake 
of which its feveral Operations are exerted, 
is — THE Want or Absence of some- 
thing' appearing Good; RELATIVE TO 
Human Life, and attainable by* 
Man, but superior to his natural 
and uninstructed Faculties. 
I replied, I could not deny, but that the 
Account appeared probable. 

§. 4. Le T this then, faid he, fuffice, as to 
the Beginning of Art. But how fhall we 
defcribe its Knd ? What is it we fliall pro- 
nounce this ? My Anfwer, I replied, 
muft be the fame as often already j which 
was indeed, that I could not refolve the 
Queflion. It fhould feem, faid he, 
not fo difficult, now we have difcovered 
what Beginning is. For if Begifining and 
t^nd are Contraries and oppofed, it is but 
to i?i'vert^ as it were, the Notion of Begin^ 
ning, and we gain of courfe the Notion of 
End. I afked him, \x\ what manner ? 
Thus, faid he, the Beginning of Art has 

been 



^o Concennng ART, 

been held to be fometbiftg, which j ^ffuppofed 
away. Men would be never moved to apply to 
Art. By Jnverfion therefore the End of Art 
muft be fomething, which, while fuppofed 
eway. Men will never ceaje applying to Art^ 
becaufe, were they to ceafe, while the End 
was wanting, they would ceafe with Im- 
perfection, and their Performance would be 
incomplete. To this I anfwered, That 

the Account, hbwever true, was by far too 
general, to give me much Intelligence. 

He replied, If it was, he would endea- 
vour to be more particular. And what, 
continued he, fhould we fay, that every 
Art, according to its Genius, will of courfe 
be accomplijljed eitlier in fome Energy, or in 
fome IVoj^k ; that, befides thefe two, it can 
be accomplifhed in nothing elfe j and con- 
fequently that one of thefe muft of necefjity be 
its Endf I could not here but anfwer 
him with a Smile, That the Matter was 
now much obfcurer than ever. I find 

then, faid he, it is proper we Hiould be more 
explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our 

Reafon- 



y^DlALOGUE. -^j 

Reafonings from feme clearer Point of 
View. I told him. It was quite necef- 

fary, if he intended to be intelligible. 

Thus then, faid he. You will grant, that 
every Art, being a Caufe, mufi be produSihe 
of fome EffeB'y for inftance, Mulic, of a 
Tune ; Dancing, of a Dance -, Architedure, 
of a Palace J and Sculpture, of a Statue. 
*Tis allowed, faid I.' You will 

grant alfo, faid he, that i?! thefe ProduSfions 
they are all accomplijloed and ended : Or, in 
other words, that as Mufic produces a Tune, 
fo is it ended and accompliflied in a Tune; 
and as Sculpture produces a Statue, fo is it 
ended and accomplifhed in a Statue. 
'Tis admitted, faid I. Now thefe Pro- 

ductions, continued he, if you will examine, 
are not like Units or Mathematical Points-, 
but, oh the contrary, all conjiji of a certain 
Number of Parts, from whofe accurate Or" 
der is derived their Beauty and Pe?fe5liofi, 
For example j Notes, ranged after fuch a 
manner, make a Tune in Mufic 5 and 
Limbs, ranged after fuch a manner, make a 

Statue 



2Z Cohcernifig ART, 

Statue or a Pidture. I replied, They dido- 
If then the ProduBionSy continued he, 
of every Art thus coniifl of certain Parts, 
it will follow, that thefe Parts will be either 
co-exijlenty or not^ and if not co-exijienf, 
then of courfe fuccejjive, Affifl: me, 

faid I, by another Inftance, for you are 
growing again obfcure. Co-exiftent, re- 

plied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Leg?, 
Body, and Head allfubfift together at one in- 
dividual Injlant : SucceJJive, as in a Tune or 
Dance, where there is no fuch Co-exiftence; 
but where fome Parts are ever paffing a'way\ 
and others are ever Jiicceeding thern. 

CAhl any thing be faid to exijl, faid T, 
■whofe Parts are everfajjing away ? 
Surely, replied he, or how elfe exifl YearS 
and Seafons, Months and Days, with their 
common Parent^ 'Time itfelf ? —-- Or indeed 
what is Hufnaft Life, but a Compound of 
Parts thus fleeting ; a Compound of various 
and multiform Adiojis, which fucceed each 
other in a certain Order ? The Fad:,- 

{aid Ij appears fo^ 

This 



A Dialogue. gj 



This then, continued he, being the cafcj 
knd there being this Difference in Produc- 
tions, call every ProduBiorii the Parts of 
which exiji fuccej/helyi and whofe Nature 
hath its Being or EJfence in a T^ranfition^ call 
it, what it really is, a Motion or an Energy— 
Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies; 
thus Riding and Sailing are Energies ; and 
fo is Elocution, and fo is Life itfelf. On 
the contrary, call every FroduBion^ whofe 
Parts exiJl ail at mce^ and whofe Nature de^ 
pends 7iot on a Tranfition for its EJfence^ call 
it a Work, or "Thing done^ not an Energy 

or Operation. Thus a Houfe is a Work, 

a Statue is a Work, and fo is a Ship, and 
fo a Pidure. I feem, faid I, to compre- 
hend you. 

If then there be ild ProduB^ionSy faid he, 
but mufl be of PartSy either co-exijient or 
fuccejjive\ and the one of thefe be, as you 
perceive, a Work^ and the other be an 
Energy 'y it will follow, there will be no 
ProduBiQn, but will be either a Work or an 

D Energy, 



34 Concerning ART, 

Energy. There will not, faid I. fiut 
every Art^ faid he, you have granted, is 
accomplified and ended in what it produces ? 
I replied, I had. And there are 

no ProduBiom, but Works or Energies f 
None. 

It will follow then, faid he, that every 
^'Art will be accomplished and ended 
IN A Work or Energy. 

To this I anfwered, That his Reafoning 
I could not impeach > but that ftill the Di- 
ftin<5tion of Work and Energy was, what I 
did not well comprehend. There are 

feveral Circumftances, faid he, which will 
ferve fufficiently to make it clear. 
I begged he would mention fome. 

Thus then, faid he When the Pro- 
duction of any Art is an Energy^ then the 
-PerfeBion of the Art can be only percei'ved 
during that Energy, For inftance, the Per- 
fection of a Mulician is only known, while 
he continues playing. But when the Pro- 
duction 



^Dialogue. 35 

dudion of any Art is a JVork^ then is not the 
Perfe5iio?i vifible during the Energy^ but only 
after it. Thus the Perfeftion of the Sta- 
tuary is not feen during his Energies as a 
Statuary, but when his Energies are over; 
when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, 
but the Statue is left, as the Refult ofalL 
'Tis true, faid I. 

Again, continued he, in confe- 

quence of this, where the Produdlion is an 
Energy^ there the ProduBion is of NeceJJity 
co-eval with the Artiji, For how fhould 
the Energy furvive the Man ; the Playing 
remain, when the Mufician is dead ? But 
where the Production is a Work^ then is 
there no fuch NeceJJity. The Work may well 
remain, when the Artift is forgotten 3 there 
being no more reafon, that the Statue and 
the Artifl fhould be co-eval, than the Man 
and the rude Marble, before it received a 
regular Figure. You feem now, faid I, 

to have explained yourfelf. 



D 2 If 



36 Concerning ART, 

If then, faidhe, Work and Energy 
be made intelligible Terms^ you cannot but 
perceive the Truth of what we before af- 

ferted that every Art^ according to its 

GeniuSy nmft needs be accomplijhed in one of 
thefe J that, except in thefe two, it can be ac- 
complijhed in nothing elfe ; a7id confequently 

that ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY 

beitsEnd. I anfwered, That the 

Reafoning appeared juftly deduced. So 

much then, replied he, for the Ending or 
AccompUjhment of Art -y and fo much alfo 
for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Difqui- 
iition. 

§. 5. He had no fooner faid this, than I 
was beginning to applaud him ; elpecially 
on his having treated a Subje<ft fo copioufly, 
ftarted, as it were, by Chance, and without 
any apparent Preparation. But 1 had not 
gone far, before he interrupted me, by fay* 
ing, That as to my Praifes they were more 
than he deferved -, that he could pretend to 
no great Merit for having been, as I called 

it. 



./^Dialogue. 37 

it, fo copious, when he had fo often before 
thought, on what at prefent we had been 
talking. In fliort, fays he, to tell you a 
Secret, I have been a long time amufing 
myfelf, in forming an Eifay upon this Sub- 
Jed:. I could not here forbear reproach- 
ing him, for having hitherto concealed his 
Intentions. My Reproaches produced a fort 
of amicable Controverfy, which at length 
ended in his ofering, Tliat, to make me 
fome amends, he would now recite me (if 
I pleafed) a fmall Fragnient of the Piece ; 
a Fragment, which he had happened acci- 
dentally to have about him. The Propofal, 
on my part, was willingly accepted, and 
without farther Delay, the Papers were 
produced. 

As to the Performance itfelf. It muflbe 
confeiTed, in point of Stile, it was fomewliat 
high and florid, perhaps even bordering 
upon an Excefs. At the time however of 
recital, this gave me lefs Offence, becaufe 
it feemed, as it were, to palliate the Drynefs 
pf what had palfed before, and in fome fort 

P 3 to 



^B Concerning ART, 

to fupply the Place of an Epilogue to our 
Conference. Not however to anticipate, 
he be2:an readinp; as follows. 

" O Art! Thou Praife of Man, and 
** Ornament of Human Life ! PoflefTed of 
** Thee, the meaneft Genius grows deferv- 
*' ing, and has a juft Demand for a Portion 
" of our Efteem. Devoid of Thee, the 
" Brighteft of our Kind lie loft and ufelefs, 
^' and are but poorly diftinguifhed from 
** the moft Defpicable and Bafe. When 
" we inhabited Forefts in common with 
** Brutes, nor otherwife known from thern 
*' than by the Figure of our Species ; Thou 
** taughteft us to aflert the Sovereignty of our 
" Nature^ and to afllime that Empire, for 
^* which Providence intended us. Thou- 
*' fands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee j 
*' thoufands of Elegancies, Pleafures, and 
*' JoySj without which Life itfelf would be 
" -but an inlipid PofTeilion. 

«* Wi D E and extenfive is the Reach 
«« of thy Dominion. No Element is 

" there 



"^Dialogue. 39 

'* there either fo violent or {ojiibtle^ fo yield- 
" ing or iojluggijh^ as by the Powers of its 
" Nature to be fuperior to thy Diredlion. 
" Thou dreadefl not the fierce Impetuofity 
'* of Fire, but compelled: its Violence to 
*' be both obedient and ufeful. By it Thou 
" foftenefl the flubborn Tribe of Minerals, 
" fo as to be formed and moulded into 
" Shapes innumerable, Hence Weapons, 
" Armour, Coin ; and previous to thefe, 
*' and other Thy Worh and Energies^ 
" hence all thofe various Tools and Inflru- 
" ments, v^hich empower Thee to proceed 
" to farther Ends more excellentj Nor is 
"the fubtle Air lefs obedient to Thy 
" Power, whether Thou willeft it to be a 
" Miniiler to our Pleafure, or Utility. At 
" Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds, 
« which charm the Soul with all the Powers 
" of Harmony. Under thy Inftrudion it 
moves the Ship o'er Seas,- while that 
yielding Element, where otherwife we 
fink, even Water itfelf is by Thee 
" taught to bear us ; the vafl Ocean to pro^ 
** mote that Intercourfc of Nations, which 

D 4 Igno-? 



(.1 



4© Concerning ART, 

" Ignorance would imagine it was deflined 
" to intercept. To fay how thy Influence is 
^* feen on Earth, would be to teach 
" the meaneft, what he knows already. 
" Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable 
" and Pafture j Lawns and Groves, and 
" Gardens, and Plantations ; Cottages, Vil- 
^' lages, Caftles, Towns ; Palaces, Temples, 
** and ipacious Cities, 

"Nor does thy Empire end in SubjeBs 
«' thus in-animate. Its Power alfo extends 
"thro' the various Race of Animals, 
^' who either patiently flibmit to become 
" thy Slaves, or are fure to find Thee an ir- 
" refiftible Foe. The faithful Dog, the 
^* patient Ox, the generous Horfe, and the 
^' mighty Elephant, are content all to re- 
?' ceive their Inflrucflions from Thee, and 
^* readily to lend their natural InJiinBs or 
?* Strength^ to perform thofe Offices, which 
f * thy Occafions call for. If there be found 
." any Species, which are ferviceable when 
?^ dead, Thou fuggeflefl the Means to in- 
|f yefligate and take them. If any be ^o^ 

&vage^ 



^Dialogue, 41 

*« favage, as to refufe being tamed ; or of 
" Natures fierce enough, to venture an At- 
« tack J Thou teachefl us to fcorn their 
" brutal Rage j to meet, repel, purfue, and 
" conquer. 

"And fuch, O Art ! is thy amazing 
" Influence, when Thou art employed only 
" on thefe inferior SubjeBs ; on Natures lu" 
" animate, or at befl: Irrational. But when- 
«* e'er Thou choofeft a SubjeB 7nore nobky 
*'' and fetteft to the cultivating of Mind 
" itfelf, then 'tis Thou becomeft truly ami- 
" able and divine ; the ever flowing Source 
" of thofe fublimer Beauties, of which no 
^' SnbjeB but Mind alone is capable. Then 
" 'tis Thou art enabled to exhibit to Man- 
" kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of 
" Orators ; the facred Train of Patriots and 
^* of Heroes ; the godlike Lifl: of Philofo- 
" phers and Legiflators) the Forms of 'u/r- 
^' tuQiis and equal Politics, where private 
" Welfare is made the fame with public -, 
" where Crowds themfelves prove dif- 

" interefted 



42 Concemmg ART, 

" interelled and brave, and Virtue is made 
" a national and popular Charaderiftic. 

"Hail! facred Source of all thefc 
" Wonders ! Thyfelf inftrud: me to praife 
" Thee worthily, thro' whom, whate'er 
" we do, is done with Elegance and Beauty ; 
" without whom, what we do, is ever grace- 

*' lefs and deformed. Venerable Power ! 

" By what Name fliall I addrefs Thee ? 
" Shall I call Thee Ornament of Mind j 
" or art Thou more truly Mind itfelf? — 
" 'Tis Mind Thou art, mofh perfed 
" Mind ; not rude, untaught, but fair and 
" poliflied ; in fuch Thou dwelleft, offuch 
" Thou art the Fonn j nor is it a Thing 
" more poffible to feparate Thee from fuch, 
" than it would be to feparate Thee from 
" thy own Exiflence." , 

My good Friend was now arrived to a 
very exalted Pitch, and was purfuing his 
Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency; 
when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk 

being 



1/^ Dialogue. 43 

feeing near finlflied. The People, as we 
went along, began to look at us with Sur- 
prize ; which I, who was lefs engaged, 
having leifure to obferve, thought 'twas 
proper to admonifh my Friend, that he 
fliould give over. He immediately ceafed 
reading j put his Papers up ; and thank'd 
me for flopping him at fo feafonable a 
Time. 

§. 6. What remained of our Difcourfe 
pafled off with lefs Rapture, and was in- 
deed no more, than a kind of fhort Re- 
capitulation. 

He obferved to me, that our Inquiries 
had flirniflied out an Anfwer to four diffe- 
rent Queflions. For thus, faid he, if it be 
afked us. What Art is ? We have to 

Anfwer, it is ~ an habitual Power ifi 

Many of becoming the Caufe of feme EffeB^ 
according to a Syftem of 'various and well- 
approved Precepts. If it be afked us, On 
M^hat SubjeB Art operates ? We can anfwer. 
On a contingent i which is within the r^ach 

of 



44 Concerning ART, 

of the Human Powers to injluence. If it be 
"afked us, For what Reafon, for the fake of 
what Art operates ? We may reply, For 
the fake of feme abfent Good^ relative to Hu" 
man Lfe, and attainable by Man, but fupe- 
ferior to his natural and uninftru5ied Facul- 
ties, Laftly, if it be afked. Where 'tis the 
Operations of Art end? We may fay. 
Either in feme Energy y or in feme Work, 

He added, That if he were not afraid of 
the Lnputation of Pedantry, he could be 
almoft tempted to fay. That we had been 
confidering Art, with refped: to tho(Q four 
Caufes, fo celebrated once among ProfeiTors 
in the Schools. By thefe, upon Inquiry, I 
found that he meant certain Caufes , called 
the * Efficient, the f- Material, the % Finals 
and the jf Formal, 



But 



* P. 17. t P. 11. % P. 28, 29. 

ii P. 34, 36. 



^Dialogue. 4^ 

But here, without farther explaining, 
he begged for the prefent that we might 
conclude, being fufficiently, as he iaid, 
fatigued with the Length of what had 
paiTed already. The Requefl was reafon- 
able I could not but own, and thus ended 
our Cgnverfation, and foon after it our 
Walk. 



The E N D. 



TREATISE the Second 



DISCOURSE 

O N 

MUSIC, 

PAINTING, 

AND 

POETRY. 



(49) 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER the First. 

INTRODUCTION Befign and 
Diftribiition of the Whole -—F reparation 
for the following Chapters, 



CHAPTER the Second, 

On the SiibjeSls, which Painting imitates—^ 
On the Suhje5is, which Mufc imitates — »■ 
Comparifon of Mufic with Fainting, 

CHAPTER the Third. 

On the SubjeSis which Poetry itnitates^ but 
imitates only thro' natural Media^ or mere 

Sounds Comparifon of Poetry i?i this 

Capacity^ firfi with Paintings then with 
Mufc, 

E CHAP- 



50 CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER the Fourth, 

On the SuhjeSfs which Poetry imitates^ not 
by mere Sounds or natural Media^ but by 
Words fignificant ; the Subje£ls being fuch^^ 
to which the Genius of each of the other two. 
Arts is mofl perfedlly adapted. — Its Com- 
parifon in thefe SuhjeBs^ p-Jl with Faint- 
ing^ then with Mti/ic. 



CHAPTER the Fifth. 

On the SubjeBs^ which Poetry imitates by 
Words fignificant, being at the fame time 
Subjects not adapted to the Ge?iius of either 

of the other Arts. The Nature of thefe 

SubjeBs. The Abilities of Poetry to 

imitate them.—— Comparifon of Poetry in 
refpeB of thefe SuhjcBs^ firfi with Paint^ 
jngy then with Mufc. 



C H A P- 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER the Sixth. 

On Mujic confidered not as an Imitation^ hut 
as deriving its Efficacy from another 

Source. 0;z its joint Operation by this 

means with Foetry. ^- An ObjcBion to 

MuJic folved.— — The Advantage arifing to 
it^ as well as to Poetry ^ from their being 
united, Cojichfon, 



51 



E? 



(53) 



A 

DISCOURSE 

O N 

MUSIC, PAINTING, 
and POETRY. 



CHAP. L 

tntroduSiion. Dejign and Dijiribiifion of 

the Whole. — Preparation for the following 
Chapters'. 

AL L Arts have this in common, Ch. L 
that they refpeSl Hu??ian Life, 
Some contribute to its NeceJJi- 
ties, as Medicine and Agriculture j others 
to its Elegance^ as Mufic, Painting, and 
Poetry, 

E 3 NoW;» 



54 yf Discourse ^/z MU S I C, 

Ch. I. Now, with refped to thefe two diffe- 
rent Species, the necejfary Arts feem to have 
been prior in time j if it be probable, that 
Men confulted how to live and to fiipport 
themfeheSy before they began to deliberate 
how to render Life agreeable. Nor is this 
indeed unconfirmed by FaxO:, there being 
no Nation known fo barbarous and ignorant, 
as where the Rudiments of thefe necejjary 
Arts are not in fome degree cultivated.- 
And hence poiTibly they may appear to be 
the more excellent and worthy, as having 
claim to a Freference, derived from their 
Seniority. 

The Arts however oi 'Elegance cannot 
be faid to want Pretenfions, if it be true, 
that Nature framed us for fometlmig more, 
than ?nere Exijte?2ce. Nay, farther, if Well- 
being be clearly preferable to Mere-beingy 
and this without it be but a thing contemp- 
tible, they may have reafon perhaps to 
afpire even to a Siipejiority . But enough 
of this, to come to our Purpofe. 

§. 2. 



PAINTING ^W POETRY, 5$ 

§. 2. The Defign of this Difcourfe is to Ch. L 
treat of Music, Painting, and Poetry; 
to confider in what they agree, and in 
what they differ-, and which, upon the 

WHOLE, is more excellent THAN THE 
OTHER TWO. 

In entering upon this Inquiry, it is firfl 
to be obferved, that the Mind is made 
confcious of the natural World and its Af- 
fections, and of other Mhids and their 
Affedtions, by the feveral Organs of the 
Senfes (a). By the fame Orgajis, thefe Arts 
exhibit to the Mind Imitations, and imitate 
either Parts or AfFedlions of this natural 

E 4 World, 



(a) To explain fome future Obfervations, It will 
ibe proper here to remark, that the Miu t> from thefe 
Materials thus brought together, and from its own Ope- 
rations on them, and in confeqiience of them, becomes 

fraught with Ideas and that many Minds fo 

fraught, by a fort <?/' Com pact ajjlgning to each Idea 
fo?ne SoiJND to be zV; Mark or ^YU%oh,were tht 
frfl Inventors and Founders o/Language. 



56 A Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch. I. Worlds or elfe the Paffions, Energies, and 

* other Affe6tions of Minds. There is this 

Difference however between thefe Arts and 

Nature \ that Nature pafTes to the Percipient 

tliro' all the Senfes j whereas theie Arts ufe 

only two of them, that of Seeing and that 

of Hearing. And hence it is that the fen- 

ftble OhjeBs or Media^ thro' which (b) they 

imitate, can htfuch only, as thefe two Senfes 

are framed capable of perceiving ; and thefe 

Media are Motion^ Sounds Colour, and 

Figure, 

Paint- 



(b) To prevent Confufion it mud be obferved, 
that in all thefe Arts there is a Difference between 
the fenftble Media, thro' zvhich they imitate, and the 
Subje^s imitated. The fenfible Media, thro' which 
they imitate, muft be always relative to that Senfcy 
hy ivhich the particular Jrt applies to the Mind ; but 
the Subjed imitated may hQ foreign to thatSerife, and 
heyond the Power of its Perception. Painting, for in- 
ilance, (as is (hewn in this Chapter) has no fenfibk 
Media, thro' which it -operates, except Colour and 
Figure : But as to Subje^s, it may have Motions, 
Sounds, moral Afteaions and Adions ; none of which 
are either Colours or Figures, but which however are 
all capable of being imitated thro' them. See Chapter 
the fecond. Notes {b), (cj, (dj. 



PAINTING and POETRY. ^y 

Painting, having the Eye for its Or- Ch. T. 
gan, cannot be conceived to imitate, but 
thro' the Media of vifible Objeds. And 
farther, its Mode of imitating being always 
motmilefs, there mull: be fubflracfted from 
thefe the Medium of Motion. It remains 
then, that Colour and Figure are the only 
Media, thro' which Painting imitates. 

Music, paffing to the Mind thro' the 
Organ of the Ear, can imitate only by 

Sounds and Motions, 

Poetry, having the Ear alfo for its 
Organ, as far as Words are confidered to be 
no more than i7iere Sounds, can go no fur-* 
ther in Imitating, than may be performed 
by Sound and Motion. But then, as theje 
its Sounds fiand by * CompaSl for the ^oarious 
Ideas, with which the Mijid is fraught, it is 
enabled by this means to imitate, as far as 

La7i-' 
■I ■ ■ I I II . ■ I m il I I III II' ■ 

* SeeNot-e (a) Page ^^. 



5? j^ Di^covRSE on M\J SIC, 

Ch. I. Language can exprefs ; and that 'tis evident 
will, in a manner, include all things. 

Now from hence may be feen, how 
thefe Arts agree, and how they differ. 

They agree y by being ^7/ M i m E t i c, 
or Imitative. 

They differ, as they imitate by different 

Media-, Painting, hy Figure ^.ndi Colour ; 

Music, hy Sound 2inA Motion ; Painting 

and Music, by Media which are Natural i 

Poetry, for the greater Part, by a Medium^ 

which is Artificial (c), 

As 



(c) A Figure painted, or a Compofition of Mu- 
fical Sounds have always a natural Relation to thaty 
of which they are intended to be the Refemblance. But 
a Defcription in Words has rarely any fuch natural 
Relation to the feveral Ideas^ of which thofe Words are 
the Symbols. None therefore underftand the Defcrip- 
tion, but thofe who fpeak the Language. On the con- 
trary, Mufical and Pidure-Imitations are intelligible 
ioallMett. 

Why 



PAINTING and POETRY. 59 

§.3. As to that Art, which upon the Ch. I, 
wliole is ??ioJi excellent of the three ; it mull be 
obferved, that among thefe various ik/d-^/^ 
of imitating, fome will naturally be ;%or^ ac- 
curate, fome lefs ; fome will beft imitate one 
Subjedj fome, another. Again, among 
the Number of SubjeBs there will be natu- 
rally alfo a Difference, as to Merit and De- 
merit. There will be fome fiiblime^ and 
fome low 'j fome copious, and fome Jhort j 
fome pathetic, and others 'void of Fafjion ; 
fome formed to injlru5i^ and others 7iot ca* 
pable of it. 

Now, from thefe two Circumilances ; 
that is to fay, from the Accuracy of the 
Imitation, and the Merit of the SiibjeSi 
imitated, the Queftion concerning which 
Art is mojl excellent, mufl be tried and de- 
termined. 

This 



Why it is faid that Poetry is not univerfally, but 
ctjly for the greater part axXi'aciA, fee below, Chapter 
the Third, where what Natural force it hus, is ex- 
amined and eftimated. 



6o ^ Discourse c;2 MUSIC, 

Ch. I. Th IS however cannot be done, without 
a Detail of Pa?'ficu!arSy that fo there may 
be formed, on every part, jull and accurate 

Comparifons, 

To begin therefore v/ith Painting, 



CHAP* 



PAINTING ^W POETRY, 6i 



CHAP. II. 

071 the SiihjeSlSy which Pamting imitates. — - 
On the SubjeBs, which Mujic imitates. — 
Comparifon of MuJic with Painting. 



THE FITTEST Subjects FORCh.II. 
Painting, are all fuch Things 
-and Incidents, as are * peculiarly cha- 
ra6tcrifedbyYiG\5^'E. and Colour. 

Of this kind are the whole Mafs (a) of 
Things inanimate and 'vegetable \ fuch as 

Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landfkips 

The various Tribes oi Animal Figure s -, liich 

as Birds, Beafts, Herds, Flocks The 

Motions and Sounds peculiar to each Animal 

Species, 

* P c- 

(a) The Reafon is, that thefe things are almoft 
wholly known to us by their Colour and Figure. Be- 
fides, they are as motmtlefs^ for the moft part, in 

Nature^ as in the Imitation. 



62 ^Discourse 07i MUSIC, 

Ch. II. Species, when accompanied with Configura-' 
tionSy which are obvious and remarkable (b)-^ 
The Human Body in all its Appearances (as 
Male, Female J Young, Old; Handfome, 
Ugly j) and in all its Attitudes^ (as Lying, 

Sitting, Standing, ^c.) The Natural 

Sounds pecidiar to the Human Species, (fucb 
as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, ^c.) (cj— 
M^ Energies, PaJJions, and Affedlions of the 

Souly 



(b) Instances of this kind are the Flying of 
Birds, the Galloping of Horfes, theRoaring of Lions, 
the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reafon is, that 
though to paint Motion or Sound be impojjibk^ yet the 
Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an i?n- 
tacdiate and natural Cotitie^ion luith a certain viftble 
Configuration of the Parts^ the Mind, from a 
Profpe(5l of this Configuration^ conceives Infcnfibly that 
which Is concomitant ; and hence 'tis that, by a fort of 
Fallacy, the Sounds and Motions appear to be 
painted alfo. On the contrary, not fo in fuch Mo- 
tions, as the Swimming of many kinds of Fifh; or 
mfuch Sounds, as the Furring of a Cat j becaufe her^ 
is no {\xc\\ fpecial Configuration to be perceived. 

(c) The Reafon is of the fame kind, as that 
given in the Note immediately preceding ; and by 
the fame Rule, the Obfervation muft be confined to 
natural Sounds only. In Language, few of the Speaker* 
Know the Configurations, which attend it. 



PAINTING and POETRY. 6t, 

Soidj being in any degree ?7iore intenfe or Ch. II. 

"oiolent than ordinary {d) All Aclions 

dfjd Events, whofe Integrity or PFholenefs 
depends upon a JJjort and ft If -evident Suc- 

ceflion of Incidents (^e) Or if the Suc- 

ceffion be extended, then fie h Aclions at 
leaft, whofe Incidents are all along, during 

that SucceJJion, finilar (f) All ABions, 

which being qualified as above, open them- 

felves 



(d) The Reafon is fWl of the fdme kind, viz. 
from their Vifibk Etfeds on the Body. They natu- 
rally produce either to the Countenance a particular 
Rednefs or Palenefs ; or a particular Modification of its 
Mufcles ; or elfe to the Limbs, a particular Attitude. 
Now all thefe Etfe<5ls zxe folely referable to Colour 
and Figure, the two grand fenfible Media, peculiar 
to Painting. See Raphael's Cartoons of St. Paul at 
Jthens, and of his flriking the Sorcerer Elymas blind : 
See alfo the Crucifixion of Polycrates, and the Suf- 
ferings of the Conful Regulus, both by Salvator Rofa, 

(e) For of necejfity every Picture is a Piin^um 
'Tempsris ijr In s t a n t . 

(f) Such, for inftance, as a Storm at Sea ; whofe 
Incidents ofVifton may be nearly all included in foam- 
ing Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their ereift 
Pofture, and Men hanging upon the Ropes. 

Or 



64 y^ Discourse o« MUSIC, 

Ch. II. felves into a laj-ge Variety of Circumftances, 
C07iciirring all in the fame Point ofT'ime {g) 

. jill ABiojis which are known^ and 

known univerfally^ rather than Actions 
newly invented^ or known but to few {h). 

And 



Or as a Battle ; which from Beginning to End pre- 
fents nothing elfe, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and 
Diforder. "Now fuch Events may be well imitated 
all at once ; for how long foever they laft, they are 
but Repetitions of the fame. . 

(g) For Painting is notboundedin Exten- 
sion, as it is in Duration. Befides, it feems 
true in every Species of Compofition, that, as far as 
Perplexity and Confufion may be avoided, and the 
Wholenefs of the Piece may be preferved clear and in- 
telligible ; the more ample the Magnitude, and the 
greater the Variety, the greater alfo, in proportion, 
the Beauty and Perfedion. Noble Inftances of this 
are the Pidures above-mentioned in Note {d). 
See Ariflot, Poet. cap. 7. 'o ^\ y.oiM^ dvl^v (pva-iv ra 
7rp(iyy.ccT^ op©^, usl [xh &c. See alfo Chara^eri- 
Jiicks, V. I. p. 143. and Boffu, B. i. cap. 16. VAchille 
d' Homer e eft fi grand, &cc, 

(h) The Reafon is, that a Pi<5lure being (as has 
been faid) but a Point or Infant, in a Story well 
kmvon the Spedator's Memory will fupply the pre- 
vious and x\\Qfubfequent. But this cannot be done, 

when 



PAINTING ^«^ POETRY. 65 

And thus much as to the Subjedts ofCh. II. 
Painting. 

§. 2. In Music, the fittest Sub- 
jects OF Imitation are all fuch Things 



where fuch Knowledge is wanting. And therefore it 
may be juftly queftioned, whether the moft cele- 
brated Subjeds, borrowed by Painting from Hiftory, 
would have been any of them intelligible thro' the 
Medium of Painting only^ fuppofing Hiftory to have 
been lilent, and to have given no additional Information. 

I T may be here added, that Horace, conformably 
to this Reafoning, recommends even to Poetic Imi- 
tation a known Story, before an unknown. 

^Xuque 

Reifius Iliacum carmen dedmis in aSfus, 
^am ft proferres ignota, indidaq; primus. 

Art. Poet. V. 128. 

And indeed as the being underflood to others, either 
Hearers or Spedators, feems to be a common Requi" 
fite to all Mimetic Arts whatever j (for to thofe j who 
underftand them not, they are in fadl no Mimetic 
Arts) it follows, that Perfpicuity muft be Effential to 
them all \ and that no prudent Artift would negle<ft, 
if it were poflible, any juft Advantage to obtain this 
End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than 
the Notoriety of the Subjeif imitated, 

F anci 



66 A Discourse 07i MUSIC, 

Ch. II. and Incidents, as are mofl eminently * cha-^ 
raBerifed by Motion and Sound. 

Motion may be either Jlow or fwlff^^ 

e'ven or tmeven, broken or continuous. « 

Sound may be either y^ or loud, high or 
low. Wherever therefore any of thefe Spe- 
cies of Motion or Sound may be found in 
an eminent (not a moderate or mean) degree^ 
there will be room for Musical Imita- 
tion. 

THUS3 in the 'Natural or Inanimate 
World, Music may imitate the Glidings,. 
Murmurings, Toffings, Roarings, and other 
Accide?its of Water, as perceived in Foun- 
tains, Cataracts, Rivers, Seas, ^c. The 

fame of Thunder — the fame of Winds, as 
well the ilormy as the gentle, — ^ — In the 
Animal World, it may imitate the Voice of 
fome Animals, but chiefly that of iinging 

Birds, It may 2\io faintly copy fome of 

their Motions. — In the Human Kind, it can 

alfo 

Hi III I I I I ' 



PAINTING and POETRY. 67 

dfo imitate fome Motiom (i) and Sounds (k) j Ch. II. 
and of Sounds thofe jnojl perfeBly, which 
are expreffive of Grief and Angiiifi (I). 

And thus much as to the Subjedis,' 
which Mufic imitates. 

§.3. It remains then, that we compare _ 
thefe two Arts together. And here" in- 
deed, as to Mujical Imitation in general^ it' 
mufl be confelTed that — as it can, from its' 
Genius, imitate only Sounds and Motions—^' 
as there are not ma^iy Motions either in thS-- 

F 2 ' AniiMl 



., — '.^ 



({) As the Tfaik'of the G'lmt Polypheme, in the 
Paftoral of Jds and Galatea. — See what ample Stridei 
he takes, &c, 

(k) As tht Shouts of a Multitude, in the Corona 
tion Anthem of, Godfave the King, &c. 

(I) The Reafon is, that this Species of MuCiczl 
Imitation fnoj} 'nearly approaches Nature. For Griefs 
in moft Animals, declares xx.i^^i'Syj Sounds, which are 
tiot unlike to 'long Notes in the Chromatic Syjlem> 
Of this kind is the Chorus of BaaV^ Prierts iti 
the Oratorio of Deborah, Doleful Tidings, how yt 
wound, &c. 



68 A Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch. W, Animal or in the InanimateV^oAd, which 
are exclufively peculiar even to any Species^ 

and fcarcely any to an Individual as 

there are no Natural Sounds, which cha- 
ra(5terife at leaft lower than a Species (for 
the Natural Sounds of Individuals are in 

every Species the fame) farther, as 

Mulic does but imperfeSlly imitate even 
thefe Sounds and Motions (m) - — On the 
contrary, as Figures, Poflures of Figures, 
and Colours charadterife not only every Jen- 
Jible Species^ but even every Individual; and 
for the moll part alfo the various ^Energies 

and PaJ/ions of every Individual and 

farther, as Painting is able, with the highejl 
Accuracy and Exa5lfiefs, to imitate all thefe 
Colours and Figures j and while Mufical 

Imita- 



* See Note (d) of this Chapter. 

(m) The Reafpn is from the Dijfimilitude be- 
tween the Sounds and Motions of Nature^ and 
thofe of Mufic. Mufical Sounds are all produced 
from Even Vibration, moft Natural from Uneven ; 
Mufical Motions are chiefly Definite in their Meafure, 
Oioft Natural are Indefinite, 



PAINTING and POETRY. 69 

Imitation pretends at moft to no more, than Ch. II. 
the railing of Ideas fimilar^ itfelf afpires to 

raife Ideas the very fame in a word, as 

Painting, in refpedt of its Subjects, is equal 
to the nobleji Part of Imitation, the imi^ 
fating regular A5liom conjijiing of a Whole 
and Farts ; and oifuch Imitation, Mufic is 

utterly incapable from all this it 

muft be confelTed, that Musical Imita- 
tion IS GREATLY BELOW THAT OP 

Painting, and that at befi it is but an 
imperfect thing, 

As to the Efficacy therefore of Music, 
it muft be derived from another Source, 
which muft be left for the prefent, to be 
confidered of hereafter *. 

There remains to be mentioned Imi- 
tation by Poetry. 



* Ch. VI, 



CHAP. 



(~ 



70 A Discourse on MUSIC, 



CHAP. III. 

On the StibjeSts which Poetry imitates^ hut 
imitates only thro" natural Media, or mere 

■ Sounds Comparijon of Poetry in this 

Capacity J Jirjl with Painting, then with 
Miijic. 



Cli.III.T3^^'^^^ Imitation i?icJudes every 
i- thi?2g in it, which is performed either by 
Picture-Imitation or Musical; for 
Jts Materials are Words, and Words are 
J' Symbols by Compact of all Ideas^ 

Farther 2ls- Words, befide their being 
Symbols by Compaft, are alfo Sounds imri-, 
' oujly diftinguijhed by their Aptnefs to be 
rapidly or flowly pronounced, and by the 
. refpedlive Prevalence of Mutes, Liquids, of 
Vowels in their Compofition ; it will follow 
jhat, belide their Compadi-Rektion, tliey 

will 



t S?eNoti(a) Chap. I. 



PAINTING ^?;z^ POETRY. 71 

will have likewife a Natural Relation to all Ch. III. 
fuch Things, between which and them- 
felves there is any Natural Refemblance, 
Thus, for inftance, there is a Natural Re- 
femblance between all forts of harjh and 
grating Sounds. There is therefore (ex- 
clufive of its Signification) 2i Natural Ktld.-* 
tion between the Sound of a vile Hautboy, 
and of that Verfe in * Virgily 

Stride?iti miferum Jiipuld dijperdere Carmen\ 

or of that other in •f* Miltony 

Grate o?t their Scrannel Pipes of wretched 
Straw. 

So alfo between the fmooth fwift Gliding of 
a River, and of that Verfe in || Horace, 

— at tile 

Labitiir^ (^ labetur in omne volubilis cevum. 

And thus in part even Poetic Imitation 
has its Foundation in Nature, But then 

F 4 this 



* Eel. 3. ver. 27. f Inhis Lycidas. 

}j Epift. 2. 1, I. V. 42, 43, 



^2 A Discourse on MUSIC, 

(.h.III.this Imitation goes not far; and take, 
without the Meaning derived to the Sounds 
from Compa5ii is but little intelligible, how- 
ever perfe(5t and elaborate. 

§.2. If therefore Poetry be compared 
with Painting, in refpe6t of this its 
merely "Natural and Inartificial Refem- 

blance, it may be juftly faid that In as 

much as of this fort of Refemblance, 
Poetry (like Mufic) has no other Sources, 

than thoje two of Sound and Motion 

in as much as it often wants thefe Sources 
themfehes (for Numbers of Words neither 
have^ nor can have any Refcmblance to 
thofe Ideas, of which they are the Sym" 

IjoIs) in as much as Natural Sounds 

and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates, 
are themfelves but * loofe and indefinite Ac- 
cidents of thofe SubjeSis, to which they 
belong, and confequently do but loofely and 
indefinitely characfterife them—— laftly, in 
as much as Poetic founds and Motions do 

but 



* p. 67, 68. 



PAINTING and POETRY. 73 

hut fai?2f!y referable thofe of Nature^ which Ch. III. 
are themfehes confelTed to be fo imperfeSf 

and vague From all this it will 

follow (as it has already followed of Mufic) 

that Poetic Imitation founded 

IN MERE Natural Resemblance is 

MUCH inferior TO THAT OF PaINT- 

ING, and at beji but very imferfeB. 

§. 3. As to the Preference, which fuch 
Poetic Imitation may claim before 
Musical, or Musical Imitation be- 
fore that ; the Merits on each Side may 
appear perhaps equal. They both fetch 
their Imitations from -f- Sound and Motion. 
Now Music feems to imitate Nature bet- 
ter as to Motion^ and Poetry as to Sound. 
The Reafon is, that in Motions (a) Mufic 

has 



t P. 57' 

(a) Music has no lefs thzn five dififsrent Length 
tf Notes in ordinary ufe, reckoning from the Semi- 
brief to tl^e Semi-quaver 3 all which may be infi' 

nite,fy 



*jA A Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch.III. has a greater Variety ; and in Sounds^ thofc 
oi Poetry approach nearer to Nature (b). 

If therefore in Sound the oiie have the 
Preference, in Motion the other, and the 
Merit of Sound and Motion be fuppofed 
nearly equal; it will follow, that the 
Merit of the two Imitations 
will be nearly equal also. 



nitely compounded, even in any one Time, or Mea- 

fure Poetry, on the other hand, has but two 

Lengths or ^lantities, a long Syllable and a /horty 
(which is its Half) and all the Variety ofVerfe arifes 
from fuch Feet and Metres, as thefe tiuo_ Species of 
Syllables, by being compounded, can be made produce. 

{b) Musical Sounds are produced by even 
Vibrations, \A\\z\i fcarcely any Natural Sounds are — 
on the contrary. Words are the Produd of uneven 

Vibration, and fo are mojl Natural Sounds 

Add to this, that Words are far more numerous, than 
Muftcal Sounds, So that Poetry, as to Imitation by 
Sound, feems to exceed Mufic, not only in nsarnefi 
df Rejemhlame, but even in Variety alfo. 



CHAP. 



FAINTING and POETRY, 75 



CHAP. IV. 

On the Subjeofs which Poetry imitates^ not 
by mere" Sounds or w^/^/r^/ Media, hut by 
Words lignificant -, the SubjeSfs at the fame 
timebemgfuch, to which the Genius of each 
of the other two Arts is moft perfedly 
adapted. — Its Comparifon i?i thefe SubjeSls^ 
firft with Fainting^ then with Mufc 



THE Mimetic Art of Poetry hasCh.IV. 
been hitherto confidered, as fetch- 
ing its Imitation from mere Natural Re- 
femblance. In this it has been fhewn 
jnuch inferior to Painting, and nearly 
equal to Music, 

It remains to be confidered, what its 
Merits are, when it imitates not by mere 
Natural Sound, but by Sound fgnifcant % 
by Words, the compaB Symbols of all kinds 
pf Ideas. From hence depends its genuine 

Force, 



76 A Discourse o« MUSIC, 

Ch. IV. Force. And here, as it is able to find 
Sounds expreflive of every Idea, fo is there 
no SubjeSf either of Pidlure-Imitation, or 
Mulical, to which it does not afpire ; all 
Things and Incidents whatever being, in a 
manner, to be defcribed by Words. 

Whether therefore Poetry, in this 
its proper Sphere ^ be equal to the Imitation of 
the other two Arts, is the Queflion at pre- 
fent, which comes in order to be difcuffed. 

Now as Subjects are infinite ^ and the 
other two Arts are not equally adapted to 
imitate all-, it is propofed, firfl to compare 
Poetry with them in fuch Subjects, to 
which they are mofi perfectly adapted. 

§.2. To begin therefore with Paint- 
ing. A Subject, in which the Power 
of this Art may be mo/i fully exerted, 
(whether it be taken from the Inanimate^ 
or the Animal^ or the Moral World) muft 
be a Subject, which is principally and 
eminently charaBerifed by certain ColsurSy 

Figures, 



PAINTING and POETRY, 77 

Figures, and Pojiiires of Figures ^ nvhofe Ch. IV. 

Comprehenjion depends not on a SucceJJion of^ 
E'vents ; or at leajl, if on a SucceJJion y on a 

Jhort and fef -evident one ivhich admits a 

large Variety of fuch Circumjiances, as all 
concur in the fame individual Point of Time ^ 
and relate all to one principal AB ion » 

As to fuch a Subjedl therefore In as 

much as Poetry is forced to pafs thro* 
the Medium o^ CompaB, while Painting 
applies immediately thro' the Medium of 
Nature j the one being underftood to all, 
the other to the Speakers of a certain Lan- 
guage * only in as much as Natural 

Operations muft needs be more affedling^ 

than Artificial in as much as Painting 

helps our own rude Ideas by its own, which 
are confummate and wrought up to the Per- 
fection of Art i while Poetry can raife 7io 
ether (a) than what every Mind is furniflied 

with 

* Note (c) p. 5g. 
(a) When we read in Milton of Eve, that 
Grace was in all her Steps, Heaven in her Eye, 
In ev'ry Gejiure Dignity and Love j 



we 



yS d Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch.IY. with before — in as much as Painting ihews- 
all the minute and various concurrent Cir" 
cumjiances of the Event in thQ,fame indivi-^ 
dual Point of Time, as they appear in 
Nature-, while Poetry is forced to want 
this Circumftance of Intelligibility, by 
being ever obliged to enter into fome de- 
gree of Detail — - in as much as this Detail 
creates often the Dilemma of either be- 
coming tedious, to be clear ; or if mi 

tedious, then obfcure lailly, in as much 

as all Imitations more Jimilar, more imme^ . 

diate. 



we have an Image not of that Eve, which Milton 
conceived, but oi fuch an Eve only^ as every one^ 
by his own proper Genius, is able to reprefent, from 
refleding on thofe Ideas, which he has annexed to 
thefe feveral Sounds. The greater Part, in the mean 
time, have never perhaps beftowed one accurate 
Thought upon ^hztGrace, Heaven, Love, znA Dignity 
mean; or ever enriched the Mind with Ideas of 
Beauty, or afked luhence they are to be acquired, 
and by what Proportions they are confiituted. On 
the contrary, when we view Eve as painted by an 
able Painter, we labour under no fuch Difficulty ; 
becaufe we have exhibited before us the better Con- 
ceptions of an Artist, the genuine Idm of perhaps 9 
Titian or a Raphael, 



PAINTING and POETRY. 79 

diate^ and more intelligible, are preferable Ch. IV. 
to thofe which are Icfs fo -, and for the 
Reafons above, the Imitations of Poetry 
are lels Jimilar, lefs immediate, and lefs /;2- 
telligible than thofe of Paijiting From 

ALL THIS it will follow, that IN ALL 

Subjects, where Painting cA^f 

FULLY EXERT ITSELF, THE IMITA- 
TIONS OF Painting are superior 
TO THOSE of Poetry, and conse- 
qjjently in all SUCH Subjects 
that Painting has the Prefe- 
rence. 

§.3. And now to compare Poetry 
with Music, allowing to Mujic the fame 
Advantage of a well-adapted ^v^^^di, which 
has already been allowed to Fainting in the 
Comparifon jufl preceding. 

What fuch a Subject is, has already 
been * defcribed. And as to Preference, it 

mufl 



* ^ee Chap. II. §. 2. 



8o A Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch. IV". muft be confefTed, that In as much as 

Musical Imitations, tho' Natural^ 
afpire not to raife the fame Ideas, but only 
Ideas Wfimilar and analogous j while Poetic 
Imitation, tho' Artificial, raifes Ideas 

the very fame in as much as the Definite 

and Certain is ever preferable to the Indefi.- 
nite and Uncertain j and that more efpeci- 
ally in Imitations, where the principal 
(h) Delight is in recognizing the T'hing 

imitated 



II P. 68, 69. 

(h) That there is an eminent Delight in th'n 
very Recognition Hjelf, abftra<5t from any thing 
pleafmg in the Subje^ recognized, is evident from 

hence that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be 

highly charmed with Imitations, at whofe Originals in 
Nature vm are Jhocked and terrified. Such, for in- 
ftance, as Dead Bodies, Wild Beafts, and the like. 

The Caufe, afTigned for this, feems to be of 
the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in 
the SaJiity and Perfe5iion, but alfo in the juji and na- 
tural Energies of our feveral Limbs and Faculties, 
And hence, among others, the Joy in Reasoning j 
as being the Energy of that principal Faculty, our In- 
tellect or Understanding. This Joy ex- 
tends, not only to the Wife, but to the Multitude. 
For all Men have an AverJiQn to Ig^wance and Error ; 



PAINTING md POETRY. 8i 

imitated — it will £o\\o\v fro?n hence that — Ch. IV. 
EVEN IN Subjects the best adapted 
TO Musical Imitation, the Imita- 
tion OF Poetry will be still more 
excellent. 



•and in fome degree, however moderate, are gUd to 
learn and to infirm themfelves. 

Hence therefore the Delight, arifing from thefe 
Imitations ; as we are enabled, in each of them, to 
'exercife the Reasoning Faculty; and, by com- 
paring the Copy with the Architype in our Minds, to 
INFER that THIS is SUCH a THING ; and that, 
ANOTHER; a Fa(5t remaricable among Children, 
even in their firft and earlieft Days. 

To, T£ J^ap jOtj^afKr^aj, (7iy.(pvrov roTg av^ouTTOig Iz 
•Trat^wv sVi, >«; TSTO) Ji«(^£p8(ri rwy ocKXuv ^wwv, on 
lAifxyflmuTaTov so, yix) t«V (AuB-rxTsig -ttoiiTtxi Jt(% 
fAi^rj(reug Txq tt^ootu^' >t, to ^ai^siv To7g [Aty.ri[ji,oict 
TTSivrxg, 1,r}[Ji.£Tov S\ tjjts to cvfAf^xTvov Itt) tuv ioyuv, 
A yoc^ anTOi AuTTJi^wf o^w,a£v, Tsrwv Ta? flxoyaf T«f 

re fAO^(pix,g tuv dy^iuTocTuVy xj v$x^uv, "Aj'tiou <?£ >^ 

T»TK, OTl fAOCV^d'JU]) » jtAOVOy TOr? (piXo(To(poig Ti^lTOVj 

6t\Xx Xf Toig aAAoig ofxoiuig * aAA* IttI jS^ap^u :{oi«wvs- 
ffiU auTjj. A<a yx^ tsto p^ai'^so-t t«? Ejxouaf ooHovrtg, 
OTt <ru/Aj3«im 3-fw^aura? (Axv^xvsrj ?^ (ruAAog/i'^fcSaf, 

. TJ' £X«rM* oTov, 0T« »T©J iKeHi©^. Alift. PoCt. C. 4. 

G CHAP, 



2z ^ Discourse c;z MUSIC, 



CHAP. V. 

On the SiibjeSis which Poetry imitates by 
Words Jigfiijicanty being at the fame time 
SubjediS not adapted to the Genius of 

either of the other Arts The Nature of 

thofe Subjedfs "The Abilities of Poetry 

to imitate them Comparifon of Poetry 

in thefe Subje<fls, firfl with Fainting^ 
then with Miific. 



Ch.V. ' j "^HE Mimetic Art of PoETRr 

JL has now been coniidercd in two 

Views — Firfl:, as imitating by mere natural 

Media ; and in this it has been placed on a 

level with Music, but much inferior to 

Pa I n t I n g It has been fince con- 

iidered as imitating thro' Sounds fignificant 
by CompaBy and that in fuch Subjects re- 
fpe(5tively, where Painting and Music 
Jiave the fulkjl Power to exert themfelves. 

Here 



PAINTING ^;7^ POETRY. 83 

Here to Painting it has been held uiferm, Ch. V. 
but to Mufic it has been preferred. 

It remains to be confidered what 

other SubjeSis Poetry has left, to which the 
Genius of the other two Arts is not fo per- 

feSlly adapted How far Poetry is able to 

imitate them and whether from the 

PerfeSlion of its Imitation, and the Nature 
of the Subjects themfelves, it ought to be 
called no more than equal to its Sifler Arts ; 
or whether, on the whole, it ihould not 
rather be called fuperior, 

§.2. To begin, in the firfl place, by 
comparing it with Painting. 

The Subjedfs of Poetry y to which the 

Genius of Painting is not adapted, are 

all Adions, whofe (a) Whole is of fo 

G 2 lengthened 



(a) For a juft and accurate Defcription of Whole- 
nefizxAUnityy ktAriJl.Poet. Ch. 7 & 8. znABoJfu, 
his beft Interpreter, in his Treatife on the Epic Poem, 
B.II. ch. 9, 10, II. 



84 * ^ Discourse o;2 MUSIC, 

Ch. V. lengthejied a Duration, that no Point of 
Time, in any part of that Whole, can be 
given jit for Fainting ; neither in its Be^ 
ginning, which will teach what is ^iibfe- 
qiient', nor in its End, which will teach 
what is Previous ; nor in its Middle, which 
will declare both the Previous and the Sub- 

fequent. Alfo all Subjects fo framed, as 

to lay open the internal Conftitution of Man, 
and give us an Inlight into (b) Charadlers, 
Manners, Pajjions, and Seiitimejtts, 

The 



(b) For a Defcription of Character, fee be- 
low. Note (c) of this Chapter. 

As for Manners, it may be faid in general, 
that a certain Syjlem of them makes a Chara£ier ; and 
that as thefe Syftems, by being differently compowidedy 
make each a different Charader, fo is it that oJie 
Man truly differs from atiother. 

Pa ss I o N s are obvious j Pity, Fear, Anger, &c. 

Sentiments are difcoverable in all thofe 
Things, which are the proper Bufmefs and End of 
Speech or Discourse. The chief Branches of 
this E7id are to Ajjert and Prove ; to Solve and Re- 
fute 3 to exprefs or excite Paffiom ; to amplify In- 
cidents, 



PAINTING and POETRY. S5 

The Merit of thefe Subjeds is obvious. Ch. V. 
They muft neceffarily of all be the mod 
affeSlmg', the moft improving-, and fuch 
of which the Mind has the firongefi Com- 
prehenjion. 

For as to the affeBing "Part if it be 

true, that all Events more or lefs affe6i us, 
as the SiibJeSfs, which they refped, are 
more or lefs nearly related to us 3 then 
furely thofe Events muft needs be moji af- 
feBing, to whofe Stihjccfs we are of all the 
j?ioJi intimately related. Now fuch is the 
Relation, which we bear to Mankind-, and 
Men and Human Adions are the Subjeds^ 
here propofed for Imitation, 

G 7 As 



cidents, and to dlminiJJj them. 'Tis in thefe 
things therefore, that we muft look for Sentiment. 
See Arijl. Poet. c. 19. t^^ $\ nxlx tiiu Anxmoc-j 

Si TslwV, TO, Ie aTToSeiAVVVOil, ^ TO AU£JV, X; TO TTjr^lJ 



86 A Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch. V. As to Improvement--— -xhtxt can be none 
furely (to Man at leafl) fo great, as that 
which is derived from a jufl and decent 
Reprefentation of Human Manners, and 
Sentiments. For what can more contribute 
to give us that Majier-Knowledge (c), with- 
out 



C^j r N n I 2 A T T O N. But farther, 
befides obtaining this mcrat Science from the Con- 
templation of Human Life ; an End common both to 
Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry ; there is a pecu- 
liar End to Tragedy^ that of eradicating the Paflions 
d Pity and Fear: "Ertv 2'u rooiycoSioi (ji.t[j.v(rig Trpdij^iu^ 
{y7ns^0i!<%g y^ rsXiioii; — - al IXiti ^ IpoSa 'n-iPoav^crtu Tm 
Tuv toiu'twu 7ra0>5jwa7wu xafia^o-iv, Arift. Poet. c. 6. 
Tragedy is the hnitation of an ASiion important and 
perfe^, thro'' Pity and Fear working the Purga- 
tion OF SUCH-LIKE PasSIONS. 

There are none, 'tis evident, fo devoid of thefe 

two Pajfiom^ as thofe perpetually cofiverfant^ where 
the Occa/ions of them are moft frequent; fuch, for 
inftance, as the Military Men, the ProfelTors of 
Medicine^ Chirurgery, and the Uke. Their Minds, 
by this Intercourfe, become as it were callous ; gain- 
ing an Apathy by Experience, which no Theory can 

ever teach them. 

Now 



PAINTING a7id POETRY. ^7 

out which, all other Knowledge will prove Ch. V. 
of little or no Utility ? 

G 4 As 



Now that, which is wrought in thefe Men by 
the real Difajien of Life ^ may be fuppofed wrought 
in others by the Fiiiions of Tragedy j yet with this 
happy Circumftance in favour of Tragedy, that, 
without the Difafters being real, it can obtain the 
fame End. 

It muft however, for all this, be confeflfed, that 
an EfFe<5t of this kind cannot reafonably be expecfled, 
except among Nations, like the Athenians of old, 
who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon thefe 
Theatrical Reprefentations. For 'tis not a fingle or 
pccafional Application to thefe PafTions, but a con^ 
Jlant and uninterrupted, which alone can leffen or re^ 
move them. 

It would be improper to conclude this Note, 
without obferving, that the Philofopher m thi§ 
place by Pity means not Philanthropy, Na- 
tural Affe5iion, a Readinefs to relieve others in their 
Calamities and Difirefs ; but, by Pity, he means that 
Senseless, Effeminate Consternation, 
which feizes zveak Minds, on the fudden Profpe^ of any 
thifig difaflrous ; which, in its more violent Effeds, 
is feen in Shrickings, Siuoonings, he. a Paffion, fo far 
from laudable, or fccm operating to the Good of 
others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who 
labours under its Intiusncej of ail Capacity to do tbt 
if afi good Office, 



1/^ Discourse en MUSIC, 

Ch. V, As to our Comprehenfwn there is no- 
thing certainly, of which we have iojlrong 
Ideas, as of that which happens in the 
Morale or Hmnan World. For as to the 
Internal Party or Active Principle of the 
Vegetable^ we know it but obfcurcly ; becaufe 
there we can difcovcr neither FaJJion^ nor 
Senfation. In the Animal World indeed 
this Frinciple is more feen, from the Paf- 
Jions and B>enfattons which there declare 
themfelyes. Yet all flill refls upon the 
mere Evidence of Senje j upon the Force 
only of extejyjal and unajjified Experience, 
But jn the Moral or Human World, as we 
have a Medium of Knowledge far more 
accurate than this ; fo from hence it is^ 
that we can comprehend accordingly. 

With regard therefore to tlie various 
Events, which happen here, and the vari- 
ous CaufeSy by which they are produced: — -^ 
in other Words, of all Charaders, Manners, 
Human Pafiions, and Sentiments; beiides 
|he Evidence of Scnfcy we have the highejl 

Evide?ic0 



PAINTING and POETRY. 89 

Evidence additional in having an exprefsCh. V. 
Co7iJr.ioufnefi of fomething fimilar within-, 
of fomething homogeneous in the RecefTes of 
our own Minds ; in that, which conftitutes 
to each of us his true and real Self^ 

These therefore being the Subjeds, not 
adapted to the Genius of Fainting^ it comes 
next to be conlidered, hoxvfar Poetry ca?i 
imitate them. 

And here, that it hzs Abilities clearly 
equal, cannot be doubted; as it has that 
for the Medium of its Imitation, through 
which Nature declares herfelf in the fame 
Subjeds. For the Se7Jtime?its in real Life 
are only known by Men's * Difcourfe. 
And the CharaBers^ Manners, and PaJJtons 
of Men being the Prompters to what they 
fay ; it muft needs follow, that their Dif- 
courfe will be a conftant Specimen of thofe 
0jara5lerSj Manners and Pafjions, 

Fonnat 



* P, 84, Note (b). 



90 u^ Discourse (9;; MUS IC, 

Ch. V. * Format enim Nafura prius ms Intm ad 

omnem 
Fortunarum habitum ; juvat^ aut impellit ad 

iram : 
Poji efFert Animi Motus, Interprete 

Lingua. 

Not only therefore Language is an ade- 
quate Medium of Imitation, but in Senti- 
fnents it is the ojily Medium j and in Man- 
ners and PaJJtons there is no other, which 
can exhibit them to us after that clear, 
precife and definite Way, as they in Nature 
{land alotted to the various forts of Men, 
and are found to conflitute the feveral Cba- 
raBers of each (d)^ 

§•3' 



* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. io8, 

(d) It is true indeed that (befides what is done 
by Poetry) there is fome Idea of Chara£ter^ which 
even Painting can communicate. Thus there is no 
doubt, but that fuch a Countenance may be found by 
Palnten for Encas^ as would convey upon view a 

miUi 



PAINTING ^;^iPOETRY. 91 

§. 3. To compare therefore Poetry^ in Ch. V. 

thefe SiibjeBsj with Painting In as much 

as no Subjeds of Painting are * wholly Ju- 

perior 

* P- 57> 58. 75> 76. 

viild^ humane, and yet a brave Difpofition. But 
then this Idea would be vague and general. It would 
be concluded, only in the grofs, that the Hero was 
Geod. As to that Syftem of Qualities peculiar to 
Mneas only, and which alone properly conjlitutes his 
true and real Chara£ier, this would ftill remain a 
Secret, and be no way difcoverable. For how de- 
duce it from the mere Lineaments of a Countenance ? 
Or, if it were deducible, how few Spe(5lators would 
there be found io fagacious ? 'Tis here therefore, 
that Rccourfe muft be had, not to Pamting, but to 
Poetry. So accurate a Conception of Character can 
be gathered only from a SucceJJion of various, and yeP 
confijient Anions ; a Succeflion, enahTmg us to conjec- 
ture, what the Perfon of the Drama will do in the 
future, from what already he has done in the pafi. 
Now to fuch an Imitation, Poetry only is equal -^ 
becaufe it is not bounded, like Painting, to fljort, and, 
as it were, injiant Events, but may imitate Subjeds 
Kii any Duration whatever. ?)QQ Arift. Poet. cap. 6- 

Ji~t Oi *)t70f jU£y TO TOiaTOV, OYlAQk 7r\\l Tr^OOtiCilJi]/ 

(pivyii Xiyuv. Set alfo the ingenious and learned 
BoJJu, Book 4. ch. 4, 



gz A Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch. V. perior to Poetry j while the Subjedls, here 
defcribed, far exceed the Power of Paint- 
ing in as much as they are of all Sub- 

jedts the moft -f* affeBing, and improving ^ 
and fuch of which we have the firongeft 

Comprehenfion further, in as much as 

Poetry can mofi % accurately imitate them — 
in as much as, befides all Imitation, there 
is a Charm in Poetry, arifing from its very 
Numbers (e) ; whereas Painting has Pre- 
tence 



t P. 85, ^c. 
X P. 89, ^c. 

(e) That there is a Charm in Poetry^ arifing 
from its Numbers only, may be made evident from 
the five or fix firfl Lines of the Paradife LoJl\ where, 
without any Pomp of Phrafe, Sublimity of Senti- 
ment, or the leajl Degree of hnitation^ every Reader 
muft find himfelf to be fenfibly delighted ; and that, 
only from the gracefiil and fimple Cadence of the 
Nutnbers^ and that artful Variation of the Cafura or 
Paufe^ fo effential to the Harmony of every good 
Poem. 

A N EngliJJ) Heroic Verfe confifts of ten Semipedsy 
or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned 

the 



PAINTING a?id POETRY. 93 

tence to no Charm, except that of Imita- Ch. V. 

tion only laftly, (which will foon be ' 

* fliewn) in as much as Poetry is able to 
ajfociate Miific, as a moft powerful Ally ; 
of which Affiftancc, Painting is utterly in- 
capable From all this it may be 

fairly concluded, that Poetry is not 

only Equal, but that it is in faSl far Su- 
perior TO ITS Sister Art of Paint- 
ing. 

§.4. But if it exceed Tainting in Sub^ 

jeBsj to which Painting is not adapted-, no 

doubt u'/// it exceed Music in Subjedls to 

Mufic 



* Chap. VI. 

the Paufes are varied upon different Semipeds in the 
Order, which follows ; as may be feen by any, who 
will be at the Pains to examine 

Paradise Lost, B. I. 

Verfe i -* f Semiped 7 

I I 6 

has its Paufe J 6 

fall upon I 5 

/ 3 



94 -^ Discourse o« MUSIC, 

Ch. V. Mufic not adapted. For here it has been 
^ preferred y even in thofe Subjedls, which 
have been held adapted the bejl of all, 

§. 5. Poetry is therefore, on the 
whole, much superior to either of 
THE OTHER MiMETic Arts j it ha'ving 
been fewn to be equally excellent in the 
•f- Accuracy of its Imitation -, and to 
imitate Subjects, vs^hich far surpass, 
AS WELL in J Utility, as in || Dig- 
nity. 



* Ch. IV. §. 3. f P. 8g. % P..86. 

)| See p. 83, 84. and p. 64, Note (g). See alft 
p. 59. 



CHAP. 



PAINTING and POETRY. 95 



CHAP. VI. 

On Mufc conjidered not as an Imitation, hut 
as deriving its Efficacy from another 

Source. On its joint Operation^ by this 

meanSy with Poetry. An ObjeSiion to 

Miific fohed. I'he Advantage arijing to 

iti as well as to Poetry ^ fj'om their being 
united, Conclujion, 



IN the above Difcourfe, Music hasCh.VL 
been mentioned as an "^Ally to Poetry. 
It has alfo been faid to derive its -f* Efficacy 
from another Source^ than Imitation, It 
remains therefore, that thefe things be ex- 
plained. 

Now, in order to this, it Is firft to be 
obferved, that there are various Affediions^ 
which may be raifed by the Power of 

Mufic^ 

* P- 93- t P- 69. 



96 A Discourse on MUSlCj 

Ch.VI. Mufic. There are Sounds to make us 
chearful, or fa J -, martial ^ or tender ^^ and 
fo of almofl every other AiFedion, which 
we feel* 



It is alfo further obfervable, that there 
fe a reciprocal Operation between our Af- 
feBiom^ and our Ideas ; fo that, by a fort 
of natural Sympathy, certain Ideas necelTa- 
rily tend to raife in us certain AffeBions ; 
and thofe AffeBiojts, by a fort of Counter-^ 
Operation, to raife the fame Ideas. Thus 
Ideas derived from Funerals, Tortures, 
Murders, and the like, nattifally generate- 
the Affedion of Melancholy. And when, 
by any Phyfical Caufes, that AffeCfion hap- 
pens to prevail, it as naturally generates the 
fame doleful Ideas. 

And henCe it is that Ideas , derived 
from external Caufes, have at di^erent 
times, upon the fame Perfon, fo different 
an Effed:. If they happen to fuit the 
Affections, which prevail within, then is 
their ImprelTion f?ioJlfe?ifibk, and their Eifed: 

7nofl 



PAINTING ^wi POETRY. 97 

moft lajling. If the contrary be true, then Ch. VI. 
is the EfFedt contrary. Thus, for inflance, 
a Funeral will much more affed: the fame 
Man, if he fee it when melancholy, than 
if he fee it when chearful. 

Now this being premifed, it will fol- 
lowj that whatever happens to be the 
jlffeBion or Difpojition of Mind, which 
ought naturally to refult from the Genius 
of any Poem, the fame probably it will be 
in the Power of fome Species of Mii/ic to 
excite. But whenever the proper AffeSiion 
prevails, it has been allowed that then all 
kindred Ideas , derived from external Caufes, 
make the mojl fenjible Imprejfion, The 
Ideas therefore of Poetry mufl needs make 
the moft fenlible Impreffion, when the 
(a) AfFedions, peculiar to them, are al- 
ready 



(a) QyiNTiLiAN elegantly, and exadly appofite 

to this Reafoning, fays of Mufic Namque ^ 

voce ^ moduktiojie grandia elate, jucunda dulciter, 

moderata 

H 



gS A Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch. VI. ready excited by the Mulic. For here a 
double Force is made co-operate to one End, 
A Poet, thus ajjifted^ finds not an Audience 
in a Temper, averfe to the Genius of his 
Poem, or perhaps at befl: under a cool ht" 
difference; but by the Preludes, the Sym- 
phonies, and concurrent Operation of the 
Muiic in all its Parts, rouzed into thofe 
very AffeSiionSj which he would moll 
defire. 

A N Audience, fo difpofed, not only em- 
brace with Pleafure the Ideas of the Poet, 
when exhibited -, but, in a manner, even 
anticipate them in their feveral Imagina- 
tions. The Superllitious have not a more 
previous Tendency to be frightned at the 
fight of Sped:res, or a Lover to fall into 
Raptures at the fight of his Miftrefs j than 
a Mindy thus, tempered by the Power of 

Mufic, 



?noderata Uniter canity iotaq\ arte confentit cum 
eorum, quoe dicuntur, Affectibus. Injh Orator^ 
1. 1, cap. 10. 



PAINTING and POETRY. 99 

Mulic, to enjoy all Ideas, which are fuitable Ch. VI. 
to that Temper. 

And hence the genuine Charm of 
Mufic, and the Wonders^ which it works, 
thro' its great Profefibrs (b), A Power, 
which confifts not in Imitations, and the 
raifing Ideas 5 but in the raifing AffeSlionSy 
to which Ideas may correfpond. There 
are few to be found fo infenlible, I may 
even fay fo inhumane, as when good 
Poetry is justly set to Music, 
not in fome degree to feel the Force of 
fo amiable an Union. But to the Mufes 
Friends it is a Force irrefifiible^ and pene- 

H 2 trates 



{h) Such, above all, is George Frederick Handel \ 
whofe Genius, having been cultivated by continued 
Exercife, and being itfelf far the fublimeft and moft 
univerfal now known, has juftly placed liim with 
out an Equal, or a Second. This tranfient Tefti- _ 
mony could not be denied fo excellent an Artift, 
from whom this Treatife has borrov/ed fuch emi;^ 
nent Examples, to juftify its AlTertions in what it 
has otfer'd concerning Mufic. 



100 A Discourse on MUSIC, 

Ch.VI. trates into the deepeft Recefles of th€ 
Soul. 



* PeSius inaniter migify 

Irritate mulcet,faljis terroribiis implef. 

§.2. Now this is that Source^ from 
whence Mufic was -f* faid formerly to de- 
five its greateji Efficacy. And here indeed, 
not in (c) Imitation, ought it to be chiefly 
cultivated. On this account alfo it has 
been called a % powerful Ally to Poetry, 
And farther, 'tis by the help of this Rea- 
foning, that tlie ObjeBion is folved, whicli 
is raifed againil the Singing of Poetry (as 
in Opera's, Oratorio's, &c.) from the want 

of 



* Horat.EpiJl, i. 1. 2. v. 211. 
t P. 69. % P. 93. 

(c) For the narrow Extent and little Efficacy of 
Music, confidered as a Mimetic or Imitative 
Art, fee Ch. II. §. 3. 



PAINTING and POETRY. loi 

of Probability and Refembla?ice to Nature. Ch.VI. 
To one indeed, who has no mufical Ear, 
this Obje<ftion may have Weight. It may 
even perplex a Lover of Muiic, if it hap- 
pen to furprize him in his Hours of In- 
difference. But when he is feeling the 
Charm of Poetry fo accompanied, let hini 
be angry (if he can) with that, which 
ferves only to intereft him 7nore feelingly 
in the Subjed:, and fupport him in a 
jlronger and more earncjl Attention j which 
enforces^ by its Aid, the feveral Ideas of 
the Poem, and gives them to his Imagi- 
nation with unufual Strength and Gran- 
deur. He cannot furely but confefs, that 
he is a Gainer in the Exchange, when 
he barters the want of a fmgle Proba- 
bility, that of Projiunciation ( a thing 
merely arbitrary and every where different) 
for a noble Heightening of AffeSlions which 
are fuitable to the Occafion, and enable him 
to enter into the Subjed: with do'ahh Energy 
and Erijoyrnent. 

" 3 §• 3- 



102 A Discourse ott MUSIC, 

Ch.VI. §.3. From what has been faid it is 
evident, that thefe two Arts can never be 
fo powerful fmgly^ as when they are pro- 
perly U7iited, For Poetry^ when alone, 
mufl be necelTarily forced to wajie many 
of its richeil Ideas^ in the mere raifing of 
Affedions, when, to have been properly 
reliflied, it fhould have found thofe Af- 
fedllons in their higheft Energy. And 
Mujic^ when alone, can only raife Affec- 
tiom^ which foon languijh and decay^ if 
not maintained and fed by the nutritive 
Images of Poetry. Yet muil: it be re- 
membered, in this Union, that Poetry ever 
have the Precedence j its * Utility y as well 
^s Dignity, being by far the more con- 
fiderablco 

§.4. And thus much, for the prefent, 
as to 'f Music, Painting, and Poetry ; 

the 



* Ch. V. §. 2. p. 83. 
t P- 55" 



PAINTING and POETRY. 103 

the Circumftances, in which they agree^ Ch.VI. 
and in which they differ; and the Pre- 
ference, DUE TO ONE OF THEM ABOVE 
THE OTHER TWO. 



The END. 



H A 



TREATISE the Third: 



CONCERNING 



HAPPINESS, 



DIALOGUE. 



CONCERNING 



HAPPINESS, 



A 



DIALOGUE. 



PART the First. 



J. H. to R S. 

^^ATURE feems to treat Man, Parti. 
I as a Painter would his Difciple, 
"ll to whom he commits the Out- 
Lines of a Figure lightly fketched, which 
the Scholar for himfelf is to colour and 
complete. Thus from Nature we derive 
jSenfes, and Paflions, and an Intelled:, 
which each of us foj'- himfelf has to model 
into a Charader. And hence (the reverfd 



io8 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. of every Species befide) Human Characters 
alone are infinitely various ; as various in- 
deed, as there are Individuals to form 
them. Hence too, the great Diverlity of 
Syflems, and of Doctrines, reipecfling the 
Lavs^s, and Rules, and Condud: of Human 
Life, 

*T I s in the Hiftory of thefe, my Friend, 
you have fo fuccefsfuUy employed yourfelf. 
You have been fludious to know, not fo 
much what Greeks^ Romans^ or Barbarians 
have done ; as what they have reafoned, and 
what they have taught. Not an Epicure 
has more Joy in the Memory of a deli- 
cious Banquet, than I feel in recolled:ing, 
what we have difcourfed on thefe Sub^ 
jed:s. 

And here you cannot forget (for we 
were both unanimous) the Contempt, in 
which v/e held thofe fuperficial Cenfurers, 
who profefs to refute, what they want 
even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the 
Faith of their own Boaiting (could that be 

credited) 



'A Dialogue. 109 

credited) Sentiments are expofed, Opinions Part L 
demoli/hed, and the whole Wifdom of' 
Antiquity lies vanquiflied at their Feet. 
Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage, 
they can with eafe diijpatch a Lion, or dif^ 
comfit a whole Legion. But alafs ! were 
they to encounter, not the Shadow, but 
the Subftance, what think you would be 
the Event then ? — Little better, I fear, than 
was the Fortune of poor Priam^ when the 
feeble Old Man durft attack the Youthful 
Pyrrhus. 

* Telum imbelle Jine iBu 

Conjecit : rauco quod protenm cere repulfum^ 
'Etjummo Clypei neqidcqiiam umbone pepe?idit^ 

Among the many long exploded and 
obfolete Syftems, there was one, you majr 
remember, for which I profelTed a great 
Efteem. Not in the leafi degree con- 
vinced by all I had heard againft it, I 

durll 



* Mtieid, 1. 2. V. 544., 



no Concernhig HAPPINESS, 

Part I. durft venture to afiirm, that no Syflem 
was more plaiifibki that grant but its 
Principles J and the rejl followed of courfe 5 
that none approached nearer to the Per-^ 
feBion of our own Religion, as I could 
prove, v^ere there occalion, by Authority 
not to be controverted. As you, I knew, 
were the Favourer of an Hypothelis fome- 
what -f- different j fo I attempted to lup- 
port my own, by reciting you a certain 
Dialogue. Not fucceeding however fo 
happily in the Recolledion, as I could 
wifh, I have lince endeavoured to tran- 
fcribe, what at that time I would have re- 
hearfed. The Refult of my Labour is the 
following Narrative, which I commit with 
Confidence to your Friendfhip and Can- 
dour. 

§. 2. 'TwAs at a time, when a certain 
Friend, whom I highly value, was my 
Gueft. We had been fitting together, 

enter- 



f Viz. the Platonic. 



1^ Dialogue. ill 

entertaining ourfelves with Shakefpear, Part I. 
Among many of his Charaders, we had 
looked into that of Woolfey, How foon, 
fays my Friend, does the Cardinal in Dif- 
grace abjure that Happinefs, which he was 
lately fo fond of? Scarcely out of Office, 
but he begins to exclaim 

* Vain Fomp and Glory of the World! I hate ye. 

So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary 
with the Seafon ; and that in Adverlity we 
are of one Mind, in Profperity, of another. 
As for his mean Opinion, faid I, of 
Human Happinefs, *tis a Truth, which 
fmall Reflexion might have taught him long 
before. There feems little need of Diflrefs 
to inform us of this. I rather commend 
the feeming Wifdom of that Eaftern Mo- 
narch, who in the Affluence of Profperity, 
when he was proving every Pleafure, was 
yet fo fenfible of their Emptinefs, their In- 
fufficiency to make him happy, that he 

pro- 



* Shakespear'; Henry the Eighths 



112 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who 
fhould invent a new Delight. The Re- 
ward indeed was proclaimed, but the De- 
light was not to be found. If by- 
Delight, fcid he, you mean fome Good^ 
fomething conducive to real Happinefs ; it 
might have been found perhaps, and yet 
not hit the Monarch's Fancy. 
Is that, faid I, polTible ? 'Tis pofTible, 
replied he, tho' it had been the Sovereign 

Good itfelf- And indeed what wonder ? 

Is it probable that fuch a Mortal, as an 
Eaftern Monarch j fuch a pamper 'd, fiat- 
ter'd, idle Mortal j fhould have Attention, 
or Capacity to a Subjed fo delicate? A 
Subjed:, enough to exercife the Subtleft 
and moft Acute ? 

What then is it you efleem, faid I, the 
Sovereign Good to be ? It fhould feem, by 
your Reprefentation, to be fomething very- 
uncommon* Aik me not the Queflion, 
faid he, you know not where 'twill carry 
us. Its general Idea indeed is eafy and 
plain} but the Detail of Particulars is 

perplex'd 



yfDiALO.GUE, II3 

perplex'd and long -Paflions, and Opi- Part I. 

nions for ever thwart us ' a Paradox 

appears in almoft every Advance. BefideSj 
did our Inquiries fucceed ever fo happily^ 
the very SubjeSi itfclf is always enough to 
give me Pain. That, replied I, feems 

a Paradox indeed. 'Tis not, faid he, 

from any Prejudice, which I have con- 
ceived againft it j for to Man I efteem it 
the nobleft in the World. Nor is it for 
being a Subjed:, to. which my Genius does 
not lead me j for no Subjed: at all times 
has more employ 'd my Attention. But 
the Truth is, I can fcarce ever think on it, 
but an unlucky Story flill occurs to my 
Mind. *' A certain Star-gazer, with his 
" Telefcope, v/as once viewing the Moonj 
" and defcribing her Seas, her Mountains, 
" and her Territories. Says a Clown to 
" his Companion, Let him fpy what he 
" pleafes -, we are as near to the Moon, as 
" he and all his Brethren.*' So fares it 
alafs ! with thefe, our moral Speculations, 
Pradice too often creeps, where Theory 
can foar. The Philofopher proves as weak, 

i as 



114 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. as thofe, isDhotn he moft contemns, A morti- 
fying Thought to fuch as well attend it. 
Too mortifying, replied I, to be 
long dwelt ©n. Give us rather your ge- 
neral Idea of the Sovereign Good. This is 
eafy from your own Account, however in- 
tricate the Detail. 

Thus then, faid he, fince you are fo 
urgent, 'tis thus that I conceive it. The 
Sovereign Good is that, the Pos- 
session OF WHICH renders US HaPPY, 

And how, faid I, do we polTefs it ? 
Is it Senfua/j or IntelkBiial? There 

you are entering, faid he, upon the Detail, 
This is beyond your Queftion. Not 

a fmall Advance, faid I, to indulge poor 
Curiolity ? Will you raife me a Thirft, and 
be fo cruel not to allay it ? 'Tis not, 

replied he, of my railing, but your own. 
Belides I am not certain, Ihould I attempt 
to proceedy whether you will admit fuch 
Author itihy as 'tis poffible I may vouch. 

That, faid I, muft be determined 
by their Weight, and Charader, Sup- 

pofe. 



^Dialogue.' 115 

pofe, faid he, it (liould be Mankind; Parti, 
the ivhole Human Race. Would you not 
think it fomething llrange, to feek of thofe 
concerning Good, who purfue it a fhoti" 
fand Ways, and many of them contra^ 
didiory ? I confefs, faid I, it feems {o^ 

And yet, continued he, were there 
a Point, in which fuch Diffentients ever 
agreed y this Agreement would be no mean 
Argument in favour of its Truth and Juji^ 
fiefs. But where, replied I, is this 

Agreement to be found ? 

He anfwered me by afking, What if 
it (hould appear, that there were certain 
Original Characteristics and Pre- 
conceptions OF Good, which were Na- 
tural, Uniform and Common to all 
Men ; which all recognized in their 'various 
PurfuitS'f and that the Difference lay only 
in the applying them to Particu- 
lars ? This requires, faid I, to be 
illuftrated. As if, continued he, a 
Company of Travellers, in fome wide 
Foreft, were all intending for one City, 

I 2 but 



1 16 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. but each by a Rout peculiar to himfelf. 
The Roads indeed would be various^ and 
many perhapsy^^ 5 but all who travelled, 
would have o?ie End in view, 'Tis 

evident, faid I, they would. So fares 

it then, added he, with Mankind in pur- 
fuit of Good. The Ways indeed are Many^ 
but what they feek is One. 

For inftance : Did you ever hear of 
afty, who in purfuit of their Good^ were 
for living the Life of a Bird, an Infedt, or 
a Fifli ? None. And why not ? 

It would be inconfiftent, anfwered I, 
with their Nature. You fee then, 

faid he, they all agree in this that what 

they purfue, ought to be confijlent^ and 
agreeable to their proper Nature, So 

ought it, faid I, undoubtedly. If fo, 

continued he, one Pre-conception is dif- 
Covered, which is common to Good in gene^ 

ral It is, that all Good is fuppofed fome- 

thing agreeable to Nature. This in- 

deed, replied I, feems to be agreed on all 
hands. 

. But 



^Dialogue, 117 

But again, faid he, Is there a Man Part I. 

fcarcely to be found of a Temper fo truly 
mortified, as to acquiefce in the loweji^ and 
Jhorteji Necejfaries of Life? Who aims not, 
if he be able, at fomething farther, fome- 
thing better ? I replied, Scarcely one. 

Do not Multitudes purfue, faid he, 
infiite Objedis of Delire, acknowledged, 
every one of them, to be in no refped: 
Necejjaries ? Exquifite Viands, deli- 
cious Wines, fplendid Apparel, curious Gar- 
dens; magnificent Apartments adorned with 
Pidlures and Sculpture ; Mufic and Poetry, 
and the whole Tribe of Elegant Arts ? 

'Tis evident, faid I. If it be, 

continued he, it fhould feem that they all 
conlidcred the Chief or Sovereign Good, not 
to be that, ivhich conduces to bare Exijiejice 
or mere Being j for to this the Neceffaries 
alone are adequate. I replied they were. 
But if not this, it muil be fomewhat 
conducive to that, which is fuperior to mere 
Being, It muft. And what, con- 

tinued he, can this be, but Weil-Being ? 

I 3 . WelU 



1 18 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Parti. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in 
which differing Opinions paint it ? Or can 
you fuggell: any thing elfe ? I replied, 

I could not. Mark here, then, con- 

tinued he, another Fre-conception^ in which 

they all agree the Sovereign Good is 

fomewhat conducive^ not to mere Being, but 
to Wcll'Being, I replied. It Jiad fo ap- 

peared. 

Again, continued he. V/'hat Labour, 
what Expence, to procure thofe Rarities, 
which our own poor Country is unable to 
afford us ? How is the World ranfacked to 
its utmoft Verges, and Luxury and Arts 

imported from every Quarter ? Nay 

more r— How do we baffle Nature lier- 

felfj invert her Order J fcek the Vegetables 
of Spring in the Rigours o^ Winter, and 
Winter's Ice, during the Heats of Sum- 
mer ? I replied, We did. And 
what Difappointment, what Remorfe, when 
Endeavours fail ? 'Tis true. If this 
then be evident, faid he, it fhouid feem, 
that whatever we defire as our Chief and 

Sovc" 



!<^ Dialogue. 119 

Sovereign Goody is fomething which, as far Part I. 
as poffibky ive would accommodate to all F laces 
and Ti?fies. I anfwered, So it appeared/ 

See then, faid he, another of its Cha^ 
raBeriJlics, another Fre-conception, 

But farther ftill What Contefts for 

Wealth''^ What Scrambling for Froperty^ 
What Perils in the Purfuit ; what Sollicitude 

in the Maintenance ? And why all this ? 

To what Furpofe, what End? -Or is not 

the Reafon plain ? Is it not that Wealth 
may continually procure us, whatever we 
fancy Good ; and make that perpetual^ 
which would otherwife be tranfient F 
I replied, It feenied fo. Is it not far- 

ther defired, as fupplyiitg its from ourfehes\ 
when, without it, we muft be beholden to 
the Benevolence of others^ and depend on 
their Caprice for all that we enjoy ? 
•*Tis true, faid I, this feems a Reafon. 

A G A I N Is not Power of every degree 

as much contefled for, as Wealth F Are not 
Magillracies, Honours, Principalities, and 

I 4 Empire, 



1 26 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. Empire, the Subjeds of Strife, and ever- 
lafting Contention ? I replied. They 

were. And why, faid he, this ? To 

obtain what End ?— - — Is it not to help us, 
like Wealth, to the Pojjejfion of what we 
defre f Is it not farther to afcertain^ to 
fecure our Enjoyments; that when others 
would deprive us, we may h^Jirong enough 
■to refifi them f I replied, It was. 

Or to invert the whole —Why are 

there, who feek Recefles the mofl diHant 
and retired ? fly Courts and Power, and 
fubmit to Parcimony and Obfcurity ? Why 
all this, but from the fa?ne Intention ? 
From an Opinion that fmall PofTeffions, 
ufed moderately, are permane?2t —^-^- thsit 
larger Pofleflions raife Envy, and are more 

frequently invaded that the Safety of 

Power and Dignity is more precarious^ than 
that of Retreat; and that therefore they 
have chofen, what is mofl cVgible upon the 
whole ? It is not, faid I, improbable, 

that they a<2: by fome fuch Motive. 



Do 



A Dialogue. 121 

D o you not fee then, continued he, two Part I 
©r three more P re-concept ions of the Sove- 
reign Goody which are fought for by all, as 
EfTcntial to conflitute it ? And what, 

faid I, are thefe ? That it fhould 

not be tranfient, nor derived from the 
Will of others y nor in their Power to take 
awas ; but be durable^ felfderived^ and (if 
I may ufe the Expreffion) indeprivable. 

I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. 
But we have already found it to be con- 
fidered, 2,%Jomething agreeable to our Nature', 
conducive^ not to mere Being, but to Well- 
Being i and what we aim to have accommo^ 
date to all Places and Titnes. We have. 

There may be other Charaderiftics, 
faid he, but thefe I think fufficient. See 
then its Idea ; behold it, as colled:ed from 
the Originaly Natural, ^nd' Univerfal Pre- 
co?iceptions of all Mankind. The Sove- 
reign Good, they have taught us, ought 
to be fomething Agreeable to our 

J^ATURE; CONDUCIVE TO WeLL-BeING ; 

AccoM* 



122 Concernhig HAPPINESS, 

Parti. Accommodate to all Places and 
Times; Durable, Self-derived, and 
Indeprivable. Your Account, faid I, 
appears jufl. 

It matters, continued he, little, how 

they err in the Application if they covet 

that as agreeable to Nature^ which is in it- 
felf moft Contrary — ■ — if they would have 
that as Durable^ which is in itfelf moft 

^ran/tent that as hidependent^ and their 

own, which is moil precarious and Servile, 
'Tis enough for us, if we know their 

Aim enough, if we can difcover, what 

'tis they propofe the Means and Method 

may be abfurdy as it happens. I an- 

fwered, Their Aim was fufficient to prove 
what he had alTerted, 

'Tis true, replied he, 'tis abundantly 
fufficient. And yet perhaps, even tho' this 
were ever fo certain, it would not be al- 
together foreign, were we to examine, 
how they ad:; how they fucceed in ap- 
plying thefe U/fiverfals to Particular Sub-' 

jeSfs, 



A Dialogue. 123 

je5ls. Should they be found jiiji in the Part I. 

Application, we need look no farther 

The true Sovereign Good would of courfe 
be Plain and Obvious j and we fhould have 
no more to do, than to follow the beaten 
Road. 'Tis granted, replied I. But 

what if they err F Time enough for 

that, faid he, when we are fatisfied that 
they do. We ought firft to inform our- 
felves, whether they may not pofiibly be 
in the Right. I fubmitted, and begged 

him to proceed his own Way. 

§. 3. Will you then, faid he, in this 
Difquifition into Human Condud:, allow 
me this - — — That fuch, as is the Species 
of Life, which every one choofes; fuch is 
his Idea of Happinefs, fuch his Conception 
of the Sovereign Good ? I feem, faid I, 

to comprehend You, but ihould be glad 
You would illullrate. His Meaning, 

he anfwered, was no more than tliis — - — 
If a Man prefer a Life of Lidujiry, 'tis be- 
caufe he has an Idea of Happinefs in Wealth -y 
if he prefers a Life of Gaiety, 'tis from a 

like 



124 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. like Idea concerning Pleafure. And the 

famey we fay, holds true in every other 
Inflance. I told him. It mufl cer- 

tainly. 

And can you recoiled:, faid he, any 
Life, but what is a Life of Bufnefs, or of 
Leifure? I anfwered, None. And 

is not the great E?jd of BiiJtJiefs either 
Power, or Wealth^ It is. Mufl 

not every Life therefore of Biifmejs^ be 
either Political or Lucrative ? It muft. 

Again Are not IntelleB and Senfcy 

the SouVs leading Powers f They are. 

And in Leifure are we not ever 
feeking, to gratify one, or the other ?* 
We are. Muil not every Life there- 

fore of Leifure be either Pleafurable, or 
Contemplative f If you confine Pleafure, 
faid I, to Senfe, I think it necelTarily muft. 

If it be not fo confined, faid he, we 
confound all Inquiry, Allow it. 

Mark then, faid he, the two grand 
Genera^ the L i v e s of B u s i n e s s and of 

Leisure 



A Dialogue. 125 

Leisure mark alfo xh^ fiihordiiiate Parti. 

Species; the Political and Lucra-' ^^ 
TivE, • the Contemplative and 
Pleasurable Can you think of any- 
other, which thefe will not include ? 
I replied, I knew of none. 'Tis pof- 

fible indeed, faid he, that there may be 
other Lives framed, by the blending of 
thefe, two or more of them, together. 
But if we feparate with Accuracy, we 
Ihall find that here they all terminate. 
I replied, fo it feemed probable. 

If then, continued he, we would be 
exadl in our Inquiry, we muft examine 
thefe four Lives, and mark their Confe- 
quences, 'Tis thus only we fliall learn, , 
how far thofe, who embrace them, find 
that Good and Happinefs, which we know 
they all purfiie. I made anfwer. It 

feemed neceflary, and I fhould willingly 
attend him. 

§.4. To begin then, faid he, with the 
Political Life. Let us fee the Good, 

ufually 



126 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. uilially fought after here. To a private 
Man, it is the Favour of fome Prince, or 
Commonwealth 5 the Honours and Emo- 
luments derived from this Favour -, the 
Court and Homage of Mankind ; the 

Power of commanding others To a 

Prince^ it is the fame Things nearly, only 
greater in Degree j a larger Command j a 
ftridler and more fervile Homage j Glory, 

Conqueft, and extended Empire Am I 

right in my Defcription ? I replied, 

I thought he was. Whether then, faid 
he, all this deferve the Name of Good or 
not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or 
the other, it affeds not our Inquiry. All 

that I would afk concerning it, is this 

Do you not think it a Good (if it really 
be one) derived from Foreign and External 
Caifes f Undoubtedly, replied I. 

It cannot come then from oiirfekeSy or be 
felf-derived. It cannot. And what 

fhall we fay as to its Duration and Stabi- 
lity f Is it iofirni and lafiing^ that we can- 
not be deprived of it ? I fliould imagine, 
faid I, quite otherwife. You infift not 

then, 



A Dialogue. 127 

then, faid he, on my appealing to Hijiory. Part I. 
You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, ^""^^^ 
of Empires, and their Owners. I re- 
plied, I did. 

If fo, faid he, it fliould feem that this 
Political Good, which they feek> correfponds 
not to the P re-conceptions of being Durable^ 
and Indeprivable. Far from it. But 

it appeared jufl before, not to be Jelf- 
derived. It did. You fee then, 

faid he, that in three of our Pre-conceptions 
it intirely fails. So indeed, faid I, it 

appears. 

But farther, faid he — We are told of 
this Good, that in the PoJjeJ/ion it is attended 
with Anxiety, and that when lojl, it is 
ufually lofi with Ignominy and Difgrace ; 
nay, often with Profecutions and the bit- 
tereft Refentments^ with Mul(5ts, with 
Exile, and Death itfelf. 'Tis frequently, 
faid I, the Cafe. How then, faid he, 
can it anfwer that other Pi^e-conception, of 
coiitrihuting to our JVell-Being f Can that 

contribute 



128 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. contribute to JFell - Beings whofe Confe- 
quences lead to Calamity^ and whofe Vre- 
fcnce implies Anxiety ? This, it mufl be 
confefTed, fald I, appears not probable. 

But once more, faid he There 

are certain Habits or Difpofttions of Mind, 
called Sincerity, Generofity, Candour, 
Plain-dealing, Juftice, Honour, Honefly, 
and the like. There are. And it has 
been generally believed, that thefe are 
agreeable to Nature, AlTuredly. 

But it has been as generally believed, that 
the Political Good, v^e fpeak of, is often not 
to be acquired but by Habits, contrary to 
thefe 'y and which, if thefe are Natural, 
muft of neceffity be unnatural. What 

" Habits, faid I, do you mean ? Flattery, 
anfwered he, Diffimuktion, Intrigue: upon 
occafion, perhaps Iniquity, Falfliood, and 
Fraud. 'Tis poffible indeed, faid J, 

that thefe may fometimes be thought necef- 
fary. How then, faid he, can that 

Good be agreeable to Nature, which cannot 
be acquired^ but by Habits contrary to 

Nature ? 



^Dialogue. 129 

Niifuref Your Argument, fald I, Parti, 

feems jufl. 

If then, faid he, we have reafoned 
rightly,, and our Conclufions may be de- 
pended on; it fhould feem that the sup- 
posed Good, which the Political Life 
piirfueSy correfponds 7iot^ in any Injiance, to 
our F re-conceptions of the Sovereign Good. 
I anfwered, So it appeared. 

§. 5. Let us quit then, faid he, thiPoIi- 
ficalLife^ and pafs to the Lucrative. The 
Objed; of this is Wealth. Admit it. 

And is it not too often, faid he, the 
Cafe, that to acquire this, we are tempted 
to employ fome of thofe Habits, which we 
havejuft condemned ^sU/inatural? Such, 
I mean, as Fraud, Falfhood, Injuflice, and 
the like ? It muft be owned, faid I, 

too often. 

Besides, continued he What fhall 

we fay to the EJieem, the Friendfiip, and 
Love of Mankind? Are they worth having? 

K Is 



130 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. Is it agreeable^ think ydu, to Nature^ to 
endeavour to deferve them ? Agreeable, 
faid I, to Nature, beyond difpute. If 

fo, then to merit Hatred and Contempt, 
faid he, muft needs be contrary to Nature. 

UndxDubtedly. And is there any 

thing which fo certainly merits Hatred 2ind 
Contempt, as a mere Lucrative Life, fpent 
in the uniform Purfuit of Wealth? 
I replied, I believed there v^^as nothing. 

If fo, faid he, then as to correjpond- 
ing with our Pre-conceptiojis, the Lucrative 
Good, in this refped, fares no better than 
the Political It appears not. 

And what fhall we fay as to Anxiety ? 
Is not both the PoJfeJJion and Purfuit of 
Wealth, to thofe who really love it, ever 
anxious f It feems fo. And why 

anxious, but from a Certainty of its Injia-' 
bility; from an Experience, how obnoxious 
it is to every crofs Event ; how eafy to be 
loft and transfer'd to others, by the fame 
Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to 
ourfelves ? — -This is indeed the tritefl: of 

all 



y^ Di alogueJ 131 

iall Topics. The Poets and Orators have Part I. 
long ago exhaufted it; 'Tis true, faid I, 
they have. May we not venture then, 

laid he, upon the w^hole, to pafs the fame 
Sentence on the Lucrative Life, as we 

have already on the Political that it 

propofes not A Good, correfpondent to thofe 
F re-conceptions^ by which we wotdd all be 
governed in the Good, which we are 
all feeking^ I anfwered. We might 

juftly. 

§.6. If then neither the Lucrative 
Life, nor the Political, faid he, procure 
that Good which we defire : fhall we feek 
it from the Pleasurable? Shall we 
make Pi^easure our Goddefs^ 

Fkafure^ 

Who?n Love attends, and foft Defire^ and 

Words 
Alluring, apt thefieadiejl Heart to bend. 

So fays the Poet, and plaufible his Doc-' 
fine. Plaufible, faid I, indeed. 

K 2 Let 



132 Concerning HAPPINESS, , 

PartL Let it then, continued he, be a pka^ 
fur able World -^ a Race of harmlefs, loving 
Animals-, an Ely/ian Temperature of Sun- 
ihine and Shade. Let the Earth, in every 
garter, refemble our own dear Country 5 
where never was a Froft, never a Fog, 
never a Day, but was delicious and ferene* 
I was a little embarralled at this un-^ 
expecfled Flight, 'till recollecting myfelf, 
I told him, (but ftill with fomc Surprize), 
that, in no degree to difparage either m/ 
Country or my Countrymen, I had never 
found Either fo exquifite, as he now 
fuppofed them. There are then it 

feems, faid he, in the Natural Worlds 
and even in our own beloved Country^ 
fuch things as Storms, and Tempefls -, as 
pinching Coldsy and fcorching Heats, 
I replied. There were. And confe- 

quent to thefe, Difeafe, and Famine, and 
infinite Calamities. There are. 

And in the Civil or Human World, we 
have Difcord and Contention-, or (as the 

Poet 



^Dialogue. 

~ Poet better * deicribes it) 

Cruel Revenge, and rancoj'oiis Defpite, 
Dijloyal Treafo?iy and heart-burning Hate. 

We have. Alafs ! then, poor 

Pleafure ! Where is that Good, accommo- 
date to eve?'y Time -, fuited to every Place ; 
felf-derived, not dependent on Foreign Ex- 
ternal Caufes? Can it be Pleasure, on 
fuch a changeable, fuch a turbulent Spot, as 
this ? I replied, I thought not. 

And what indeed, were the World, 
faid he, modelled to a 'Temperature the mojl 
exaB f Were the Rigours of the Seafons 
never more to be known ; nor Wars, De- 
vaftations. Famines or Difeafes ? Admit- 
ting all this, (which we know to be im-- 
pojjible) can we find ftill in Pleafure that 
lengthened Duration, which we confider as 
an EJfential, to conftitute the Sovereign 
Good ? — Afk the Glutton, the Drinker, 

K 3 the 




* Spencer's Fairy ^eefi, B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 22. 



134 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

l^art I. the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether 
they know any Rnjoymcnt^ not to be can- 
celled by Satiety f Which does not haftily 
pafs away into the tedious Intervals of Li- 

difference ?^ Or yielding all this too, 

(which we know cannot be yielded) where 
are we to find our Good^ how polTefs it in 
Age ? In that Eve of Life, declining Age, 
when the Power of Senfe^ on which all de- 
pends, like the fetting Sun, is gradually for- 
faking us ? 

I SHOULD imagine, faid I, that Pleafure 
was no mean Adverfary, fince you em- 
ploy, in attacking her, fo much of your 
Rhetoric. Without heeding what I faid, 

he purfued his Subjed: Befide, if this 

be our Good, our Happinefs, and our E?id; 
to what purpofe Powers, whicli bear no 

Relation to it ? Why Memory ? Why 

Reafsn ? Mere Se?ifation might have been 
as exquijite, had we been Flies or Earth- 
worms Or can it be proved otherwife ? 

I replied, I could not fay. NoAni- 
maly continued he, pojj'ejes its Faculties in 

vain. 



A Dialogue. 135 

vain. And fhall Man derive no Good Parti. 
from his beft, his mofl emifient ? From 
That, which of all is peculiar to himlelf ? 
For as to Growth and Nutrition^ they are 
not wanting to the meanefl: Vegetable ; and 
for Senfes, there are Animals, which per- 
haps exceed us in them all. 

§. 7. This feems, faid I, no mean Ar- 
gument in favour of Contemplation. 
The Contemplative Life gives Reajbn 
all the Scope, which it can deiire. And 
of all Lives, anfwered he, would it furely 
be the beft, did we dwell, like Milto?i's 
Uriel, in the Sun's bright Circle. Then 
might we plan indeed the moft Romantic 
Kind of Happi?iefs, Stretch 'd at Eafe, 
without Trouble or Moleftation, we might 
pafs our Days, contemplating the Uni- 
verfe ; tracing its Beauty ; loft in Wonder ; 
raviihed with Ecftacy, and I know not 

what But here alafs ! on ihisfublwiary, 

this turbident Spot, (as we called it not 
long fince) how little is this, or any thing 

like it, praSlicabk f Fogs arife, which 

K 4 dim 



136 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. dim our Profpeds — the Cares of Life per- 
petually moleft us Is Contemplation fuited 

to a Placey like this F It muft be owned, 
faid I, not extremely. How then is it 
the Sovereign Good, which ihould be Ac^ 
commodate to every Place ? I replied. 

It feemed not probable. 

But farther, faid he — Can we enjoy 
the Sovereign Goody and be at the fame 
time vexedy and agitated by Paffion ? Does 
not this feem a Paradox ? I anfwered. 
It did. Suppofe then an Event were to 
happen — not an Inundation^ or Majfacre-^- 
but an Acquaintance only drop a difrefpeSi" 
ful Word-y a Servant chance to break a 
favourite Piece of Furniture — What would 
inftrud: us to endure this ? — Contempla- 
tiony Theory, Abflradions ? Why not, 
faid I ? No, replied he with Warmth, 
(quoting the Poet) not 

« q:ho* all the Stars 

Thou knew'Jl by Name-, and all the Ether ial 
Powers, For 



* Par, Lojly B. 12. v. 576. 



'^Dialogue, ' 137 

For does not Experience teach us, abun- Parti. 
dantly teach us, that our deepeft Philofo- 
phers, as to Temper and Behaviour^ are as 
very Children for the moft part, as the 
meaneft and moil illiterate ? A little more 
Arrogance perhaps, from Prefumption of 
what they know, but not a grain more of 
Magnanimity i of Candour and calm Indu- 
rance. 

You are fomewhat too fevere, faid I, 
in cenfuring of all. There are better and 
worfe among Them, as among Others. 
The Difference is no way proper^ 
fioned^ faid he, to the ^antity of their 
Knowledge ; fo that whatever be its Caufe, 
it can't be imputed to their Specidations, — 
Befides, can you really imagine, we came 
here only to Think ? Is Acting a Circum- 
ftance, which is foreign to Our CharaBer ? 

. Why then fo many Social AffeSfionSy 

which all of us feel, even infpite of our- 
felves ? Are we to lupprefs them All, as 
tifclefs and wmatural? The Attempt, 

replied I, muft needs be found imprad:i- 

cable. 



138 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. cable. Were they once fupprejfedy faid 
he, the Confequences would be fomewhat 
ftranee. We ihould hear no more of Fa- 
tlier, Brother, Huiband, Son, Citizen, Ma- 
giflrate, and Society itfelf. And were this 
ever the Cafe, ill (I fear) would it fare 
with even Contemplation itfelf. It would 
certainly be but bad Speculating^ among 
lawlefs Barbarians UnafTociated Ani- 
mals where Strength alone of Body was 

to conftitute Dominion^ and the Conteft 
came to be (as * Horace defcribes it) 

glandem at que cuhilia propter^ 

Unguibiis & pugfiis, dein ftijiibiis 

Bad enough, replied I, of all con- 
fcience. 

It fhould feem then, faid he, that not 
even the best Contemplative Life, 
however noble its Ohje5i^ was agreeable 
to our present Nature, or confifient 

with 



* Sat. 3. 1. I. V. 99. 



A Dialogue. 139 

niDith our prefent Situation, I confefs. Part I. 

iiiid I, you appear to have proved fo. 
But if this be allov^ed true of the Bejl^ 
tjie moft Excellent -, whit ihall we fay to 
the Mockery of Monkery^ the Farce of 
Frlaj's ; the ridiculous Mummery of being 
fequeftred in a Cloy/lerf This furely is too 
low a Thing, even to merit an Examina- 
tion. I have no Scmples here, faid I, 
you need not wafte your Time. 

§.8. If that, faid he, be your Opinioia, 
let us look a little backward. For our 
Memory's fake it may be proper to reca- 
pitulate. I replied, 'Twould be highly 

acceptably. Thus then, faid he . 

We have examined the four grand Lrjes, 
which we find the Generality of Men em- 
brace j the Lucrative y and the Political; 
the Pleafurable, and the Contemplative, 

And we have aimed at proving that 

to fuch a Being as Man, isoith fuch a Body^ 
fuch Affeftiotts, fuch Sefjfes, and fuch an In- 
felled placed in fuch a World, fuhjeSi 

fo fuch Incidents-'— not one of thefe Lives is 

pro- 



140 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part J.produdfive of that Good, which we find all 
Men to recognize thro" the fame uniform 
Pre-conceptions; and which thro' one or 
other of thefe Lives they all of them purfue, 

§. 9. You have juftly, fald I, colleded 
the Sum of your Inquiries. And 

happy, faid he, fliould I think it, were 
they to terminate here, I alked him. 

Why? Becaufe, replied he, to in- 

linuate firft, that all Mankind are in the 
wrong; and then to attempt afterwards, 
to fhew one's felf only to be right ; is a 
Degree of Arrogance, which I would not 
willingly be guilty of. I ventured here 

to fay. That I thought he need not be fo 

diffident that a Subjed:, where one's 

own Intereft appeared concerned fo nearly\ 
would well juftify every Scruple^ and even 
the fevereft /;?^/<f/r);. There, faid he, 

you fay fomething there you encourage 

me indeed. For what ? Are we not 

cautioned againft Counterfeits^ even in Mat- 
ters of meaneft Value ? If a Piece of Metal 
be tender'd us, which feems doubtful, do 

we 



A Dialogue. 141 

We not hefitate ? Do we not try it by the Part L 
Teji, before we take it for Current f — And 
is not this deem'd Prudence ? Are we not 

cenfured, if we ad: otherwife ? How 

much more then does it behove us not to 
be impofed on here ? To be diffident and 
fcrupuloufly exadj where Impofitire^ if once 
admitted, may tempt us to a far worfe Bar- 
gain, than ever Glaiiciis made WixhDiomedf 

What Bargain, faid I, do you mean ? 

The Exchange, repHed he, not of 
Gold for Brafs^ but of Good for Evil, and 

of Happinefs for Mifery But enough of 

this, fince you have encouraged me to 
proceed — We are feeking that Good, which 
we think others have not found. Permit 
me thus to purfue my Subjed:, 

§. 10. Every Being on this our T^r- 
rejirial Dwellings exifls encompafj'ed with 
infinite ObjeBs ; exifls among Animals tame, 
and Animals wild', among Plants and Ve- 
getables of a thoufand dijfferent Qualities 5 
among Heats and Colds, Tempefls and 
Calms, the Friendfliios and Difcords of 

hetero"' 



142 . Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. heterogeneous Elements - — What fay you ? 
Are all thefe Things exadtly the fame to it j 
or do they differ, think you, in their £/^ 
jfe^s and Confequences^ They dilfer, 

faid I, widely. Some perhaps then, 

faid he, are u4pt. Congruous^ and Agreeable 
to its Natural State. I replied. They 

were. Others are Li-^pt, Incongruous, 

and Difagreeable, They are. 

And others again are hidiff^erent. They 

are. 

It fhould feem then, faid- he, if this be 
allowed, that to every ijidividual Being, 
ivithoiit the leaji Exception, the whole Mafs 
of Things External, frojn the greatefl to the 
meamjiy Jiood in the Relations of either 
Agreeable, Difagreeable, or Indifferent, 
I replied. So it appeared. 

But tho' this, continued he, be true 
in the general, 'tis yet as certain wlien we 
defcend to Particulars, that what is Agree- 
able to one Species is Difagreeable to another ; 
and not only fo, but perhaps Indifferent to 

a 



A Dialogue." 143 

a third, Inftances of this kind, he faid, Part L 
were too obvious to be mentioned. 

I REPLIED, 'Twas evident. Whence 
then, faid he, this Dherfjty ? — It cannot 
arife from the Externals — — for Water is 
equally Water y whether to a Man^ or to a 
Fijh; whether, operating on the one, it 
fuffocatCy or on the other, it give Life and 
Vigour. I repHed, It was. So is 

Fire, faid he, the fame Fire^ however 
'various in its Confequences ; whether it 
harden or foften^ give Pleafure or Pain» 
I replied, It was. But if this Z)/- 
verfity^ continued he, be not derived from 
the EiXternalsy whence can it be elfe ? — . 
Or can it poffibly be derived otherwife than 
from the peculiar Confitutiony from the 
Natural State of every Species itfelf ? 
I replied, It appeared probable. 

Thus then, faid he, is it that Evejy 
particular Species is, itfelf to itfelf the 
Meafure of all Things in the Univerfe — thaf 
as Things vary in their Relations to ity they 

vary 



144 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. vary too in their Value and that if their 

Value be ever doubtful, it can no way be ad-^ 
jujledi but by recurring with Accuracy to 
the Natural State of the Species, and to 
thofe feveral Relations, which fuch a State 
of courfe creates. I anfwered^ He ar- 

gued juflly. 

§. I li To proceed then, faid he---Tho* 
it be true, that every Species has a Natural 
State, as we have alTerted $ it is not true, 
that every Species has a Se?ife or Feeling of 
it. This FeeUng or Senfe is a Natural 
Eminence or Prerogative, denied the Vege-^ 
table and Inanimate, and imparted only to 
the Animal I anfwered, It was* 

And think you, continued hcj that as 
many as have this Senfe or Feeling of a 
Natural State, are alienated from it, or in^ 
different to it ? Or is it not more probable, 
that tliey are well^affeBcd to it ? 
Experience, faid I, teaches us, how well 
they are all affedted. You are right, 

replied he. For what would be more 

abfurd. 



A Dialogue. 145 

abfurd, than to be indifferent to their own Part I. 
Welfare j or to be alienated from it, as tho' 
'twas Foreign and U?inaturalf I replied. 
Nothing could be more. But, con- 

tinued he, if they are well-qffe&ed to this 
their proper Natural State^ it fliould feem 
too they muft be well-affe5ied to all thofe 
ExternalSy which appear apt, congruous, and 
agreeable to it. I anfwered. They 

muft. And if {o, then ill-affeSied or 

a'uerfe to fuch, as appear the contrary. 
They muft. And to fuch as appear 

indifferent, indifferent. They muft. 

But if tliis, faid he, be allowed, it 
will follow, that in confequencc of thefe 
Appearances, they will think fome Exter^ 
nals worthy of Purfuit; fome worthy of 
Avoidance-, and fome worthy of neither^ 
'Twas probable, faid I, tliey ftiould. 

Hence then, faid he, another Divifan 
of Things external-, that isj into Purfuable, 
Avoidable, and Indifferent — a Divifion only 
belonging to Beings Senjitive and Animate, 
becaufe all, hlow thefe, can neither avoid 

h nor 



146 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. nor purfue. I replied. They could 

not. 

If, then, laid he, Man be allowed in 
the Number of thefe Se?jjitive Beings, this 

Diviiion will affedl Man or to explain 

more fully, the whole Mafs of Things exter- 
nal wilU according to this Divifion, exifi 
to the Human Species in the Relatio?js ofPur- 
ftiable. Avoidable J and Ivdiffere?jt, I re- 

plied. They would. 

Should we therefore defire, faid he, 
to know what thefe things truly are, we 
mufl: iirft be informed, what is Man's 
truly Natural Constitution. For 
thus, you may remember, 'twas fettled not 
long lince — that every Species was its own 
Standard, and that when the Value of 
Takings was doubtful, the Species was to he 
Jiudied', the Relatio?is to be deduced, which 
were confequent to it-, and iti this manner 
the Value of 'Things to be adjujled aftd afcer- 
tained. I replied. We had fo agreed 

it. I feSr then, faid he, we are en- 



gaged 



yf Dialogue. 147 

gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Part I. 
Tafk of more Difficulty, than we were at 

firft aware of But Fortiina Fortei — we 

mufl endeavour to acquit ourfelves as well 
as we are able. 

§. 12. That Man therefore has a 
Body^ of a Figure and internal StrnSfure 
peculiar to itfelf ; capable of certain De- 
grees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the 
like J this I believe is evident, and hardly 
wants a Proof. I anfwered, I was 

willing to own It. That he is capable 

too of Pkafure and Pain ; is pofTefs'd of 
'* Sefifes, AffeBionSy Appetites , and AverJio?is; 
this alfo feems evident, and can fcarcely be 
denied. I replied, 'Twas admitted. 

We may venture then to range Him 
in the Tribe of Animal Beings. 
I replied, We might. 

And think you, faid he, without Society^ 

you or any Man could have been born? 

Moft certainly not. Without 

Society, when born, could you have been 

L 2 brought 



!4B Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. brought to Maturity ? Mofl: certainly 

not. Had your Parents then had no 

Social AffeBiom towards you in that peri-^ 
bus State, that tedious Infancy, (fo much 
longer than the longefi of other Animals) 
you muft have inevitably periflied thro' 
Want and Inability. I muft. You 

perceive then that to Society you, and 
every Man are indebted, not only for the 
Beginning of Being, but for the Continu- 
ance. We are. 

Suppose then we pafs from this5/r/;^ 
and Infancy of Man, to his Maturity and 
PerfeBion — Is there a?jy Age, think you, 
fo felf'fuj^cient , as that in it he feels no 
Wants'^ What Wants, anfwered I, 

do you mean ? In the firft and prin- 

cipal place, faid he, that of Food; then 
perhaps that of Raiment t and after this, 
a Dwelling, or Defence againft the Wea- 
ther. Thefe Wants, replied I, are 
furely Natural at all Ages. And is it 
not agreeable to Nature, faid he, that they 
(hould at all Ages be fupplied? Af- 

furedly. 



A DlAl-OGUE. 149 

fiiredly. And is it not more agreeable Part I. 

to have them ijoell fupplied, than ill^ 

it is. And mofi agreeable, to have 

them hefi fupplied ? Certainly. 

If there be then any 07ie State, better than 

all others^ for the fupplying thefe Wants -, 

this State, of all others, mujl needs be mofi 

Natural It muft. 

And what Supply, faid he, of thefe 
Wants, fliall we efleem the meanefi, which 
we can conceive ? — Would it not be fome- 
thing like this ? Had we nothing beyond 
Acorns for Food, beyond a rude Skin, for 
Raiment ; or beyond a Cavern, or hollow 
Tree, to provide us with a Dwelling ? 
Indeed, faid I, this would be bad enough. 

And do you not imagine, as far as 
this, we might each fupply ourfehes, tho' 
we lived in Woods, mere folitary Savages ? 

I replied, I thought we might. 

Suppose then, continued he, that our 

Supplies were to be nmided for inftance, 

that we were to exchange Acorns for 

L 3 Bread—* 



1 50 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Parti. Bread — Would our Savage Charader be 
fufficient here? Muil we not be a little 
better difciplined ? Would not fome Art 

be requifite ? The Baker'% for example. 

It would. And previcujly to 

the Baker's, that of the Miller ? It 

would. And previotifly to the Miller's, 

that of the Hujbandman f It would. 

Three Arts then appear necejjary\ 
even upon the loweji Eftimation. 'Tis 

admitted. 

B u T a Queftion farther, faid he — ■ Can 
the Hufbandman work, think you, with- 
out his I'ooh f Mufl he not have his 
Plough, his Harrov/, his Reap-hook, and 
the like ? He mufl. And mufl not 

thofe other Artifls too be furniflied in the 
fame manner ? They mufi. And 

whence mufl they be furniflied ? From 
their own Arts ? — Or are not the making 
Tools, and the ti/ing them, two different 
Occupations ? I believe, faid I, they 

are. You may be convinced, continued 
he, by fmall Recolledion. Does Agricuk 

iure 



y^DlALOGUE. 151 

ture make its oivn Plough, its own Harrow ?" Part I. 
Or does it not apply to other Arts, for all 
Neceffaries of this kind ? It does. 

Ag;ain Does the Baker build his own 

Oven J or the Miller frame his own Mill ? 
It appears, faid I, no part of their 
Bufinefs. 

What a T!ribe of Mechanics then, faid 
he, are advancing upon us ? — Smiths, Car- 
penters, Mafons, Mill-w^rights and all 

thefe to provide the fmgle Necejjary of 
Bread. Not lefs than /even or eight Arts, 
we find, are wanting at the fcweji. It 

appears fo. And what if to the pro- 

viding a comfortable Cottage^ and RaimeJit 
fuitable to an indnfrioiLS Hind, we allow a 
dozen Arts more ? It would be eafy, by 
the fame Reafoning, to prove the Number 
double. I admit the Number, faid I, 

mentioned. 

If fo, continued he, it ihould feem, that 
towards a tolerable Supply of the three Pri- 
mary and Common Neceffaries, Food, Raiment, 

L 4 iind 



152 CoKCcrnlng HAPPINESS, 

Part I. and a Dwellings not lefs than twenty Arts 
were, on the lowefi Account, requijite. 
It appears fo. 

And is ojte Man equal, think you, to 
the Exercife of thefe twenty Arts ? If he 
had even Genius, which we can fcarce ima- 
gine, is it poffible he fhould find Leifure f 
I replied, I thought not. If fo, 

tfen 2ifoUtary, unfocial State can never fupply 
tolerably the common Necejaries of Life. 
It cannotc 

But what if we pafs from the Necefch- 
ries of Life, to the Elegancies f To Mufic, 

Sculpture, Painting and Poetry ? What 

if we pafs from all Arts, whether Necejfary 
or Elegant, to the large and various Tribe 
ofScie?2ces f To Logic, Mathematics, Aftro- 
nomy, Phyfics ? — Can one Man, imagine 
you, mafter ail this ? Abfurd, faid I, im-= 
pofiible. And yet /;/ this Cycle of Sciences 
fnd Arts, feem included all the Comforts^ 
as well as Ornaments of Life 3 included all 
conducive, either to Being, or to Well-Beings 

It 



u^DlALOGUE, 153 

It muft be confeffed, faid I, it has Part I. 
jthe Appearance. 

What then, faid he, mufl be done? 
In what manner mufl we be fupplied ? 
I anfwered, I knew not, unlefs wc 
made a Dijiribution — Let one exercife cne 
Art ; and another a different — Let this 
Man fludy fuch a Science ; and that Man, 

another ' Thus the whole Cycle (as yoii 

call it) may be carried ealily into Perfec- 
tion. 'Tis true, faid he, it may; and 
every Individual, as far as his own Art or 
Science J might be fupplied completely^ and as 
well as he could wifh. But what avails a 
Supply in a fingle Inftance ? What in this 
cafe are to become of all his numerous other 
Wants'^ You conceive, replied I, what 
I would have faid, but partially. My 
Meaning was, that Artifi trade with Ar- 
tiji -y each fupply where he is deficient^ by 
exchanging where he abounds-^ fo that a 
Portion of every thing may be difperfed 
throughout all. You intencj then a State, 

faid 



154 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. faid he, of Commutation and Traffic. 
I replied, I did. 

If fo, continued he, I fee a new Face 
of things. The Savages, with their Skins 
and their Caverns, difappear. In their place 
I behold a fair Community rifing. No longer 
Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is Social^ 
Civi/j and Cultivated — And can we doubt 
any farther, whether Society be Natural ? Is 
not this evidently the State, which can beft 
fupply the Primary Wants ? It has ap- 

peared fo. And did we not agree 

fome time fince, that this State, whatever 
we found it, would be certainly of all others 
the moji agreeable to our Nature'^ We 
did. And have we not added, fince 

this, to the Weight of our Argument, by 
pai3ing from the Neceffary Arts to the Ele~ 
gant', from the Elegant, to tlie Sciences? 
We have. The more, laid he, 

we confider, the more fliall we be con- 
vinced, that All thefe, the nobleil Honours 
and Ornaments of the Human Mind, with- 
out that Lcifure, that Experience, that Emu- 
lation, 



1^ Dialogue. 155 

lation, that Reward, which the Social State Parti. 
alone we know is able to provide them, 
could never have found Exijlence, or been 
in the leaft recognized. Indeed, faid I, 
I believe not. 

Let it not be forgot then, faid he, in 
favour of Society, that to it we owe, not 
only the Beginning and Continuation, but 
the Weil-Being, and (if I may ufe the Ex- 
preflion) the very Elegance, and Rationality 
of our Exificnce, I anfwered. It ap- 

peared evident. 

And what then, continued he? — If 
Society be thus agreeable to our Nature, is 
there nothing, think you, within us, to ex- 
cite and lead us to it ? No Impulfe, no Pre- 
paration of Faculties? It would be 
ftrange, anfwered I, if there fhould not. 
'Twould be a lingular Exception, 
faid he, with refpecft to all other herding 
Species — Let us however examine — Pity, 
Benevolence, Friendfliip, Love ; the general 
Diilike of Solitude, and Delire of Com- 
pany J 



156 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. pany ; are they Natural Affections, which 
come of themjehes j or are they taught us by 
Art, like Mufic and Arithpietic ? 
I fliould think, replied I, they were Na-^ 
tural, becaufe in every Degree of Men fomc 
Traces of them may be dilcovered. 
And are not the Powers and Capacities of 
Speech, faid he, the fame ? Are not all 
Men naturally formed, to exprefs their Sen- 
timents byfome kind of Language ? I re- 
plied, They were. 

If then, faid he, thefe feveral Powers, 
and Dijpofitions are Natural, fo fliould feem 
too their Exefxife. Admit it. And 

jif their Exercife, then fo too that State, 
where alone they can be exercifed. Ad- 

mit it. And what is this State^ but the 

Social? Or where elfe is it pofTible to con- 
^jerfe, or ufe our Speech ; to exhibit Actions 
of Pity, Benevolence, Friendfliip or Love ; 
to relieve our Averfion to Solitude, or gratify 
pur Defire of being with others f I rcr- 

plied, It could be no where elfe. 

You 



^ D I A L O G U £. 1 57 

You fee then, continued he, a Prepa- Parti. 

ration of Faculties is not wanting. We are 
fitted with Powers and Difpolitions, which 
have only Relation to Society, and which, 
out of Society, ca?i no where elfe be exercifed^ 
I replied, It was evident. You have it^n 
too the fuperior Advantages of the Social 
State, above all others, I have. 

Let this then be remember'd, faid he, 
throughout all our future Reafonings, re- 
membered as a firft Principle in our Ideas 
of Humanity^ that Man by Nature is truly 
a Social Animal. I promifed it 

fliould. 

§.13. Let us now, faid he, examine, 
what farther we can learn concerning Him, 
As Social indeed, He is diftinguiflied from 
the Solitary and Savage Species -, but in no 
degree from the reft, of a milder and tnore 
frie7idly^2i\Mve. 'Tis true, replied I, He is 
not. Does He then differ no more from 

thcfe 



158 Concern^tg HAPPINESS, 

Part I. thefe feveral Social Species, than they, each 
of them, differ yrof;2 one another ? Muft we 
range them all, and Man among the refl^ 
under the fame common and general Genus ? 
I fee no Foundation, faid I, for 
making a Diftindion. 

Perhaps, faid he, there may be none; 
and 'tis poffible too there may. Confider 
a httle — Do you not obferve in all other 
Species, a Similarity among Individuals ? 
a furprizing Likejiefs^ which runs thro' each 
Particular^ In one Species they are all 
Bold J in another, all T^imorous ; in one all 
'Ravenous; in another, all Ge?itle. In the 
Bird-kind only, what a Uniformity of Voice ^ 
in each Species, as to their Notes j of Ar- 
chitecture^ as to building their Nefts^ of 
Food^ both for themfelves, and for fup- 
porting their Young ? 'Tis true, faid I. 

And do you obferve, continued he, 
the fame Similarity among Men ? Are thefe 
ail as Uniform^ as to their Scntimerits and 
ASlions ? I replied, By no means. 

One 



A Dialogue. 

One Queftion more, faid he, as to the 
Charader of Brutes, if I may be allowed 
the Expreffion — Are thefe^ think you, what 
we behold thejUy by Nature or otherwife ? 
Explain, faid I, your Queftion, for 
I do not well conceive you. I mean, 

replied he, is it by Nature that the Swallow 
builds her Neft, and performs all the Offices 
of her Kind : Or is fhe taught by Art^ by 
Difcipline, or Cujiom? She ad:s, re- 

plied I, by pure Nature undoubtedly. 
And is not the fame true, faid he, o£ every 
other Bird and Beaft in the Univerfe ? 
It is. No wonder then, continued he, 

as they have fo wife a Governefs, that a 
uniform Rule of ASlion is provided for each 
Species. For what can be more worthy the 
Wifdom of Nature^ than ever to the fame 
Subfla?ices to give the fame Law ? It ap- 
pears, faid I, reafonable. 

But what, continued he, fhall we fay 
as to Man ? Is He too aduated by Nature 
purely f I anfwered, Why not ? 

If 




i66 Concerning HAPPINESS^ 

t*art I. If He be, replied he, 'tis flrange in Nature^ 
that with refpedt to Man ahie, flie ihould 
follow fo different a Condud. The Particu- 
lars in other Species, we agree, flie renders 
Uniform ; but in Our's, every Particular feems 
a fort of Model by himfelf. If Nature, 

^id I, do not actuate us, what can we fup- 
pofe elfe ? Are Local Ciijloms, faid he, Na- 
ture ? Are the Polities and Religions of par- 
ticular Nations, Nature f Are the Examples^ 
which are let before us; the Preceptors 
who inftrudl us j the Company and Friends^ 
with whom we converfe, all Nature ? 
No furely, faid I. And yet, faid he, 

*tis evident that by thefe, and a thoufand 
mcidental Circumflances, equally yor^zg-;/ to 
Nature, our Adtions, and Manners, and 
Charaders are adjufted. Who then can 
imagine, we are aduated by Nature only f 
I confefs, faid I, it appears con- 
trary. 

You fee then, faid he, one remarkable 

jyiflinBion between Man and Brutes in ge- 

neral-^ — In the Brute ^ Nature does all\ in 

Man^ 



jd Dialogue. i6i 

Man^ but Fart only. 'Tis evident, Parti. 

faid L 

But farther, continued he -Let US 

confider the Powers, or Faculties^ pofTefTed 
by each — -Suppofe I was willing to give a 
Brute the fa?ne InfiriiSiion, which we give 
a Man. A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might 
arrive to fome fmall Degree of Mimicry ; 
but do you think, upon the whole, they 
would be much profited or altered'^ 
I replied, I thought not. And do you 

perceive the fame, faid he, with refpedt to 
Man ? Or does not Experience ihew us the 
very reverfe ?' Is not Education capable of 

moulding us into any thing of making 

lis greatly Good, or greatly Bad-, greatly 
IFife, or gresiny Jifurd F The Faa:,- 

faid I, is indifputable. 

Mark then, faid he, the Difference 
between Human Powers and Brutai—-Th& 
Leading Principle of Brutes appears to tend 
in each Species to onefingle Purpofe — to this, 
in general, it uniformly arrives , and here, 

M ifl 



i62 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. in general, it as imiformly Jlops — it needs no 
Precepts or Difcipline to inftrud: it ; nor 
will it eafily be changed, or admit a diffe- 
rerit DireBion. On the contrary, the Lead- 
ing Principle of Man is capable of infinite 

Directions is convertible to all forts of 

Purpofes equal to all forts of SubjeBs 

HGgledied, remains ignorant, and void of 
every Perfedion — —cultivated, becomes 
adorned with Scie?ices and ^r/j-— can raife 
us to excel, not only Brutes, but our own 
Kind — with refpedt to our other Powers and 
Faculties, can inftrudl us how to ufe them, 
as well as tbofe of the various Natures^ 
which we fee exifting around us. In a 
word, to oppofe the two Principles to each 

other The Leading Priix;iple of Ma7i, is 

Multiform, Origiiially UninfiruBed, Pliant 
and Docil-*-ihQ Leading Principle of Brutes 
is Uniform^ Originally InfiruBed-, but, in 
moil Inftances afterward, Infiexible and 

Indocil Or does not Experience plainly 

fliew, and confirm the Truth of what we 
alTert ? I made anfwer. It did. 

You 



A Dialogue* 163 

You allow, then, fliid he, the Human Part I. 
Principle, and the Brutal^ to be things of 
different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do 

they not each then deferve a different Ap- 
pellation ? I fhould think fo. Sup- 
pofe therefore we call the Human Principle 
Reason; and the Brutal, Instinct: 
would you objed: to the Terms ? I re- 

plied, I fhould not. If not, continued 

he, then Reafon being peculiar to Man, of 
all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may 
we not affirm of Him, by way of Diflinc- 
tion, that He is a Rational Anirnal^ 
I replied, We might juftly. 

Let this too then be remember'd, faid 
he, in theCourfe of our Inquiry, that Man 
is by Nature a Rational Animal. 
I promifed it fhould, 

§. 14. In confsquence of this, faid he, as 

often as there is Occafion, I fhall appeal as 

well to Reafon, as to Nature, for a Standard. 

What, faid I, do you mean hy Nature? 

M 2 Its 



1 64 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. Its Meanings, replied lie, are many 

and various. As it ilands at prefent 6p- 
pofed, it may be enough perhaps to fay, 
that Nature is thaty which is the Caiife of 
every thiftg^ except thofe Things alone, which 
are the immediate EffeBs of Reafon. In 
other words, whatever is not Reafon, or 
the EffeB of Reafon, we would eonfider as 
Nature, or the EffeSi of Nature. I an-- 

fwered, as he fo diflinguifhed them, I 
thought he might juflly appeal to either^ 

And yet, ccMitlnued he, there is a re- 
markable Difference between the Standard 
of Reafon, and that of Nature -, a Diffe- 
rence, which at no time we ought to for- 
get. What Difference, faid I, do' you 
mean ? 'Tis this, anfwered he ™^- In 
Nature, the Standard is fought from among 
the Many -, in Reafon, the Standard is fought 
from amofig the Few. You mufl ex- 
plain, faid i, your Meaning, for I mufl 
confefs you feem obfcure. 

Thus 



A Dialogue. 165 

Thus then, faid he Suppofe, as an Parti. 

Anatomifl:, you were feeking the Structure 

of fome internal Part To difcover this, 

would you not infped: a Number of Indi- 
viduals ? I fhould. And would you 
not inform yourfelf, what had been dif- 
covered by others ? I fliould. And 
fuppofe, after all, you fliould find a MuU 
titude of Inftances for one Strudure, and a 
few fmgular for a different : by which 
would you be governed ? By the Mul- 
titude, faid I, undoubtedly. Thus then 
continued he, in Nature the Standard, you 
fee, exijis among the Many, I replied. 

It had fo appeared^ 

And what, faid he, were we to feek 
the Perfedion of Sculpture, or of Paint- 
ing ? Where fliould we inquire then ? — 

Among the numerous common Artifls, or 
among \}i\Qfew and celebrated ? Among 
the Few, faid I. What if we were to 

feek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory— 
Where then ? Among the Few ftill. 

M 3 What 




Concerning HAPPINESS, 

What if we were to feek the Per- 
fedion of true Argument, or a found 
Logic - — -Where then ? Still among 

the Few. And is not true Argument, 

or a found Logic, one of Reafon's greateft 
FerfeBiom f It is. You fee then, 

continued he, whence the Standard of 
Reafon is to be fought— —'Tis from among 
the Few, as we faid before, in fontradi- 
flindion to the Standard of Nature, 
I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. 

And happy, faid he, for us, that Provi- 
dence has fo ordered it happy for us, that 

what ^Rational, depends not on the Multi- 
tude ; or is to be tried by fo pitifiil a Tefl, as 
the bare counting of Nofes. 'Tis bappy, 

faid I, indeed-— But whence pray the Dif- 
ference ? Why are the Many to determine 
in Nature, and the Few only, in Reafon ? 
To difcufs this at large, faid he, 
would require fome time. It might in- 
fenffbly perhaps draw us from our prefent 
Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the 
Reafon, in as few words as pollible ; which 
ihouid they chance to be obfcure, be not 

too 



^Dialogue. 

too folicltous for an Explanation. 
I begged him to proceed his own way. 

The Cafe, faidhe, appears to be this — 
In Natural Works and Natural Operations, 
we hold but one Efficient Caufe, and that 
confummately wife. This Caufe in every 
Species recognizing what Is beft^ and work- 
ing ever uniformly according to this Idea of 
PerfeBion, the Produ5lions and Ejtergies^ in 
eveiy Species where it adls, are for the 
^inoft ^2iViJimilar and exactly correfpondent* 
If an Exception ever happen, it is from 
fome hidden hic'her Motive, which tran- 
fcends our Compreheniion, and whicx is 
feen fo rarely, as not to injure the general 
Rule, or render it doubtful and precarious. 
On the contrary, in the Productions and 
Energies of Reafon, there is not one Caule 

but inffiite as many indeed, as there are 

Agents of the Human Kind. Hen^.e Truth 
being but one, and Error being infinite, and 
Agents infinite rlib : what wonder they 
/liould oftener rnifs, than hit the Mark ? — 
that Multitudes ihouid fail^ wliere one alone 

M 4 liic^ 




i68 Concenimg HAPPINESS, 

Part I. fjcceeds, and Truth be only the PoirefTion 
of the chofe?!^ fortunate Few "i You 

fecm to have explained the Difficulty, 
iaid I, with fufficient Perfpicuity. 

L E T us then go back, faid he, and re- 
collect ourfelves ; that we may not forget, 
what 'tis we are feeking. I replied. 

Moil willingly. We have been feek- 

ing, continued he, the Sovereign Good, In 
confequence of this Inquiry, we have dif- 

covered that al! Things idhatever e>:ift to 

the Human Species in the Relations of either 
Furfuabk^ Avoidable^ or Lidifferent. To 
determine thefe Relations with Accuracy, 
we have been fcrutinizing the Human 
Nature ; and that, upon this known 
Maxim, that every Species luas its own 
proper Standard \ and that where the Value 
ofThings was dubious y there the Species was 
to bejludied, and the Relations to be deduced y 
which naturally flow, from it. The Refult 
of this Scrutiny has been • — that we have 
firft agreed IVlan to be a Social Animal j 
and fince, to be a RationaL So that if wc 

can 



A Dialogue. 169 

can be content with a defcriptive, concife Part I. 
Sketch of Human Nature^ it will amount 
to this — -that Man is a Social Rat 
TioNAL Animal. I anfwered, It 

had appeared fo. 

§. 15. If then, faid he, we purfue our 
Difquifitions, agreeably to this Idea of Hu- 
man Nature, it will follow that all Things 
will be Piirfudbky Avoidable, and Indiffe- 
rent to Man, as they refpedt the Being 
and Welfare of fuch a Social, Rational 
Animal, I replied. They muft. 

Nothing therefore in the firft place, 
faid he, can be Purfuable, which is de- 
JiruBive of Society. It cannot. 

Ad:s therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and 
all acquired by them, whether Wealth, 
Power, Pleafure, or any thing, are evi- 
dently from their very Charad:er not fit 
to be purfued. They are not. 

But it is impoffible not to purfue many 
fuch things, unlefs we are furnifhed with 
fome Hakit or Difpofition of Mind, by 

which 



ijo Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. which we are induced to render to all Men 
their own^ and to regard the Welfare, and 
Intereft of Society. It is impoiTible. 

Bftt the Habit or Difpojition of ren- 
dering to all their own^ and of regarding 
the Welfare and Intereft of Society, is 
Justice. It is. We may there- 

fore fairly conclude, that Nothing is ?iatii- 
rally Piirjiiable, but 'what is either correjpon-* 
dent to Jujiice^ or at leaft not co?itra?')\ 
I confefs, faid I, fo it appears. 

But farther, faid he— 'Tis poiTible we 
may have the beft Difpofition to Society ; 
the moft upright Intentions j and yet thro' 
Want of Ahillty to difcern, and know the 
Nature of Particulars, we may purfue 
many things inconfillent, as well with our 
Private Intereft, as the Public. We may 
even purfue what is Right, and yet purfue 
it in fuch a manner, as to find our Endea- 
vours fruitlefs, and our Purpofes to fail, 

I anfwered, 'Twas poHible. 
But this would ill befit the Charader of ^ 
Rational Animal It would. It is 

necef- 



A Dialogue* 171 

^leceflary therefore, we fhould be furnlflied Part I. 
with fome Habit or Faculty^ inflmding us 
how to difcern the real Difference of all 
Particulars^ and fuggeftirtg the proper 
Means, by which v/e may either avoid or 
obtain them. It is. And what is 

this, think you, but Prudence ? 
I believe, faid I, it can be no other. 
If it be, faid he, then 'tis evident from 
this Reafoning, that Nothi?ig is purfuabky 
'which is 7iot correjpondent to Prudence, 
I replied, He had Ihewn it could not. 

But farther flill, faid he — 'Tis poffible 
we may neither want Prudence^ nor 'Jujiice 
to dired us; and yet the Impulfes of Appe- 
tite^ the Impetiiofities of Refentmenty the 
Charms and Allurenients of a thoufand flat- 
tering Objeds, may tempt us, in Ipite of 
purfelves, to purfue what is both Imprii" 
dettt, and Unjujl. They may. But 

if fo, 'tis neceffary, would we purfue as 
becomes our Character ^ that we fhould be 
furnifhed with fome Habit, which may 
moderate our E^c^Jfes 3 which may temper 

our 



172 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. our Adtions to the Standard of a Social 
State, and to the Intereft and Welfare, not 
of a Part, but of the Whole Man. 
Nothing, faid I, more necefTary. And 

what, faid he, can we call this Habit, but 
the Habit of Temperance ? You 

name it, faid I, rightly. If you think 

fo, replied he, then Nothing can be Fur- 
fuabky which is not either correfpondent to 
'Tejnperance, or at leaft not contrary, 
I replied. So it feemed. 

Once more, continued he, and we have 
done — 'Tis pofliblethat not ov\\y Refentment 
and Appetite, not only the Charms and Al- 
iu?'ements of external Obje(5ts, but the Ter- 
rors too, and Dread of them may marr the 
ReBitude of our Purpofes. 'Tis poffible. 

Tyranny and Superftition may af- 
fail us on one hand ; the Apprehenfions of 
Ridicule, and a Falfe Shame on the other — 
'Tis expedient, to withftand thefe, we fhould 
be armed with fome Habit, or our wifefl 
beft Purfuits may elfe at all times be de- 
feated. They may. And what is 

that 



A Dialogue. 17^ 

that generous, manlike and noble Habit, Part I; 
which fets us at all times above Fear and 
Danger 5 what is it but Fortitu£)e? 
I replied, It was no other. If fo 

thSn, continued he, befides our former 
Conclufions, Nothhig farther can be Ptir- 
fiiabkj as our Inquiries now have fhewn 
us, which is not either correfpondetit to For-^ 
tittide, or at leaft not contrary i I admit, 

faid I, it is notj 

Observe then, faid he, the Sum, the 

Amount of our whole Reafoning No-- 

thi?ig is truly PUrfuable fofuch an Animal as 
Man, except what is correfpondent, or ai 
leaft not contrary, to Justice, Prudence, 
Temperance and Foe:titude. I al- 

low, faid I, it appears fo. But if no- 

thing Purfuable, then nothing Avoidable or 
Indifferent, but what is tried and eftimated 
after the fame manner. For Contraries are 
ever recognized thro' the fame Habit, one 
with another. The fame Logic judges of 
Truth and Falfhood; the fame Mufical 
Art, of Concord and Difcord. So the fame 

Mental 



174 Concerning HAl^PINESS, 

Part I. Mental Habitudes y of Things Avoidable and 
Purfiiable, I replied, It appeared pro- 

bable* 

To how unexpedled a Conclufion then, 
laid he, have our Inquiries infenfibly led 

us ? In tracing the Source of Human 

Adion, we have eftablifhed it to be thofe 
Four Grand Virtues, which are 
efleemed, for their Importance, the very 
Hinges of all Morality, 
We have* 

But if fo, it fhould follow, that a Life^ 
whofe Purfuijigs and Auoidings are go- 
verned by thefe Virtues, is that True and 
Rational Life, which we have fo long 
been feeking ; that Life, where the Value 
cf all things is jujily meafured by thofe Re la- 
tions, which they bear to the Natural Frame 
and real Conjiitution of Mankind — in fewer 
Words, A Life of Virtue appears to 
be the Life according to Na- 
ture. It appears fo. 

But 



^Dialogue/ 175 

But mfuch a Life every Purfuit, every Part L 
Avoiding^ (to include all) every ABion will 
cf courfe admit of being rationally jujiified. 
It will. But That^ which being 

Done, admits of a Rational "Jujiijication^ is 
the EfTence or genuine Charader of aa 
Office^ or Moral Duty. For thus long 
ago it has been defined by the beft * Au- 
thorities. Admit it. If fo, then 
A Life according to Virtue, is 
A Life according to Moral 
Offices orDuties. It appears 
fo. But we have already agreed it, to 
be a hife according to Nature. We 
have. Obferve then: A Life ac- 
cording to Virtue, according 
to Moral Offices, and accord- 
ing TO Nature, mean all the 
same Thing, tho' 'varied in the Ex- 
preffion. Your Remark, faid I, feems 
juft. 



* By Tully in his Offices, and by other Authors 
of Antiquity, 



176 Concerning HAPPINESS,^ 

fct I. §. 16. We need never therefor^, Re- 
plied he, be at a lofs how to chufe, tho* 
the Objects of Choice be ever fo infinite 
and diverfified. As far as nothing is in- 
conjijlent tvith fuch a Life and fiich a Cha- 
raster ^ we may juftly fet E.tlftence before 
Death ; prefer Health to Sicknefs ; Inte- 
grity of the Limbs, to being maimed and 
debilitated ; Pleafure to Pain ; Wealth to 
Poverty; Fame to Diflionour; Free Go- 
vernment to Slavery; Power and Magi- 

flracy, to Subjection and a private State 

Univerfally, whatever tends either to Being, 
or to Well-Beings we may be juilified, when 
we p?'efer to whatever appears the con- 
trary. And when our feVeral Energies, 
exerted according to the Virtues above, 
have put us in PofTeffion of all that we 
require : what then can there be wanting 
to complete our Happinefs ; to render our 
State perfeBly confonant to Nature ; or to 
give us a more Sovereign Good; than that 
which we now enjoy ? Nothing, re- 

plied I, that I can at prefent think of 



i^ Dialogue, 177 

There would be nothing indeed, faid PartL 
he, were our E7iergies never to fail-, were 
elloMT Endeavours to be ever crowned with 
due Succefs. But fuppofe the contrary—— 
Suppofe the worjl Siiccefs to the jnoji up- 
right ConduB; to the v/ifeft Reilitude of 
Energies and Adions. 'Tis poflibie, nay 
Experience teaches us 'ds too often fact, 
that not Only the Puriuers ' of what is co?:- 
irary to Nature, but that thofe who purfue 
nothing but what is firiBly coiigruous to if^ 
itiay mifi of their Aims, and be frrijlrated 
in their Endeavours. Inquilitors and Monks 
may deteft them for their Viittie, and 
purfue them with all the Engines of 
Malice and Inhumanity. Without thefe, 
Pefts may afflid: their Bodies j Inunda- 
tions o'erwhelm their Property; or what 
is worfe than Inundations, either Ty- 
rants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They 
may fee their Country fall, and with 
it their braveft Countrymen ; themfelves 
pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or 

N perifhing 



178 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Parti, perifhing with the reft in the general 
MafTacre. 

* cadit & Ripheus, jujlijjimus units 

^ifuif in Teucrisy & fervantijpmus aqui. 

It muft be owned, faidi, this has too often 
been the Cafe^ 



Or grant, continued he, that thele 

greater Events never happen that the 

Part allotted us, be not in the Tragedy of 
Life, but in the Comedy. Even the Comic 

Dijireffes are abundantly irkfome 

Domeftic Jars, the ill Offices of Neigh- 
bours Sulpicions, Jealoulies, Schemes 

defeated The Folly of Fools -, the 

Knavery of Knaves j from which, as Mem- 
bers of Society, 'tis impoffible to detach 
ourfelves. 

Where 



* 



iENElD. 1. 2. V. 426, 



A Dialogue, 



179 



Where then fliall we turn, or what Part I, 
have we to imagine ? We have at length 
placed Happiness, after much Inquiry, in 
ATTAINING the pHfnary andjujl Requifites 
of our Nature, by a Co?2du£f fui fable to Virtue 
and Moral Office. But as to correfponding 
with our F re-conceptions (which we have 
made the Tefc) does this Syflem correfpond 
better, than thofe others, which we have 
rejedted ? Has it not appeared from various 
Fadls, too obvious to be difputed, that in 
many T^imes and Places it may be abfolutely 
unattainable ? That in many, where it 
exifts, it may in a moment be cancelled, and 
put irretrievably out of our Power, by 
Events not to be refifled^ If this be certain, 
and I fear it cannot be queflioned, our 
fpecious long Inquiry, however accurate 
we may believe it, has not been able to 
(hew us a Good, of that Charadter which 
we require J a Good Durable, Indepri- 
vable, and Accommodate to .^every Circum^ 

Jiance Far from it Oiir Speculations 

N 2 (I 



i8o Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part I. (I think) rather lead us to that low Opinion 
of Happinefs, which you may remember 
you * exprefTed, when we iirfl began the 
Subject. They rather help to prove to us^ 
that inftead of a Sovereign Goody 'tis the 
more probable Sentiment, there is no fuch 
Good at alh I fliould indeed, faid I, 

fear fo. For where, continued he, 

lies the Difference, whether we purfue 
what is congruous to Naftiire, or not con- 
gruous -J il \}i\t Acquififion oi one be as dif- 
ficulty as of the other ^ and the Pojfejion of 
both equally doiihtful and precarious'^ If 
Cafar fall, in attempting his Country's 
Ruin J and Brutus fare no better, who only 
fought in its Defence ? It muft be 

owned, faid I, thefe are melancholy Truths^, 
and the Inftances, which you alledge, too 
well confirm them. 

We were in the midfl of thefe ferious 
ThoughtSj defcanting upon the Hardfhips 

and 

5 See p. III. 



^Dialogue, i8i 

and Miferies of Life, when by an Inci- Part I. 
dent, not worth relating, our Speculations 
were interrupted. Nothing at the time, 
I thought, could have happened more un- 
luckily our Queflion perplexed - — - its 

Ifllie uncertain — ^ and myfelf impatient to 
know the Event. Neceffity however was 
not to be relifted, and thus for the prefent 
oiir Inquiries wpre poflponed, 

/ 



N 3 CON- 



CONCERNING 



HAPPINESS, 



DIALOGUE. 



PART the Second. 



BRUTUS perijhed wttimely, and Part II. 
Caefar did no more — Thefe Words 
I was repealing the next day to 
myfelf, when my Friend appeared, and 
chearfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could 
not return his Compliment with an equal 
Gaiety, being intent, fomewhat more than 
ufual, on what had paiTed the day before. 
Seeing this, he propofed a Walk into the 
Fields. The Face of Nature, f^iid he, 
will perhaps difpel thefe Glooms. No 
Affiilance, on my part, ihall be wanting, 

N 4 you 



:84 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part 11. you may be aflured. I accepted his Pro- 
pofal; the Walk began; and our former 
Converfation infcniibly renewed. 

Brutus, faid he, perijhed untimely, and 

Caeiar did no more 'Twas thus, as I re- 

meniber, riot long lince you >Yere expref- 
ilng yourfelf. And yet fuppofe their For- 
tunes to have been exadly parallel — — 
Which would you have preferred ? Would 
you have .been Ccefar or Brutus f 
Brutus J replied J, beyond all controverfy. 
He afked me, Why ? Where was the Dif- 
ference, when their Fortunes, as we now 
iiippofed them, were coniidered as the fame? 
There feems, faid I, abflradl from 
the'iv For times J fomething, I know not what, 
intrinjically preferable in the Life and Cha- 
ra<fter of Brutus, If that, faid he, be 

true, then muft we derive it, not from the 
Succefs of his Endeavours, but from their 
'Truth and Rectitude. He had the Comfort 
to be confcious, that his Caufe was a juft 
one. 'Twas impofTible the other fhould 

have 



A Dialogue. 1^5 

have any fuch Feeling. I believe, Part 11. 

faid Fj^you have explained it. 

Suppose then, continued he, ('tis but 
merely an Hypothefis) fuppofe, I fay, v^e 
were to place the Sovereign Good in fuch 

aReBitude of ConduB i?i the Conduct 

merely^ a?id not in the Event. Suppofe 
we were to fix our Happiness, not in the 
aBual Attainment of that Health, that Per- 
fedion of a Social State, that fortunate 
Concurrence of Externals, which is con- 
gruous to our Nature, and which we have 
a Right all to purfue ; but folely fix it in 
the mere Doing whatever is correfpondent 
to fiich an End:^ even tho' we ne^er attain, 
or are near attaining k. In fewer words — 
What if we make our Natural State the 
Standard only to determine our Conduct 3 and 
place our Happinefs iii the ReBitude of this 

Condu5i alone? On fuch an Hypothefis 

(and we confider it as nothing farther) we 
fhould not want a Gc(yd' perhaps, to cor- 
refpond to our P re-conceptions ; for this, 'tis 
evident, would be correfpondent to them 

alL 



i86 Concernmg HAPPINESS, 

Fart II. all. Your Dodrine, replied I, is fo 

new and flrange, that tho' you been copi- 
ous in explaining, I can hardly yet com^ 
prehend you. * 

It amounts all, faid he, but to this 

Place your Happhiefs, where your Praife 
is, I afked, Where he fuppofed 

that ? Not, replied he, in the Plea- 

ilires which you feel, more than your 
Difgrace lies in the Pain— — not in the 
cafuai Prolperity of Fortune, more than 

your Difgrace in the cafuai Adverfity < 

but in juj} complete ASlion throughout every 
Part of Life J what ever be the Face of 
things, whether favourable or the con-^ 
trary. 

But why then, faid I, (uch. Accuracy 
about Externals f So much Pains to be in- 
formed, what are Purfuable^ what Avoid-^. 
able f It behoves the Pilot, replied he, 

to know the Seas and the Winds j the 
Nature of Tempefts, Calms and Tides, 
They are the SubjeBs^ about which his Art 

is 



A Dialogue. 1^7 

is converfant. Without a juft Experience Part II, 
of them, he can never prove himfelf an 
Artijl. Yet we look not for his Reputa-. 
tlon either in fair Gales, or in adverjey 
but in the Skiljulnefs of his ConduB, be thefe 
Events as they happen. In like manner 
fares it with this the Moral Artift. He, for 

a SubjeBy has the Whole of Human Life 

Health and Sicknefs ; Pleafure and Pain ; 
with every other poflible Incident, which 
can befal him during his Exiilence. If his 
Knowledge of all thefe be accurate and 
exadt, fo too mufl his CondiiSly in which 
we place his Happinefs, But if this Knoiv^ 
ledge be defedtive, muft not his CondiiSl be 
defective alfo ? I replied. So it fhould 

feem. And if his Condud, then his 

Happinefs ? 'Tis true. 

You fee then, continued he, even the' 

Externals were as nothing ; tho' 'twas true, 
in their own Nature, they were neither 
Good nor Evil-, yet an accurate Knowledge 
of them is, from our Hypothefis, abfolutely 

neceffary. 



i88 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. necejfary. Indeed, faid I, you have 

proved it. 

He continued— —Inferior Artifls may be 
at a jftand, becaufe they want Materials. 
From their Stubbomefs and IntraB ability ^ 
they may often be difappointed. But as 
long as hife is paffing, and Nature con- 
tinues to operate, the Moral Artiji of Life 
has at all times, all he defires. He can 
never want a Subject fit to exercife him in 
his proper Calling ; and that, with this 
happy Motive to the Conftancy of his 
Endeavours, that, the croffer, the harfher, 
the more untoward the E've?its^ the greater 
his Praife, the more illuftrious his Repu- 
tation. 

All this, faid I, is true, and cannot be 
denied. But one Circumiiance there ap- 
pears, v/here your Similes feem to fail. 
The Praife indeed of the Pilot we allow 
to be in his Conduct > but 'tis in the Succefs 
of that Condu(5t, wliere we look for his 
Hapfinefs. If a Storm arife, and the Ship 

be 



A Dialogue,' 189 

be loft, we call him not happy ^ how Well Part IL 
foever he may have condud:ed. 'Tis then 
only we congratulate him, when he has 
reached the defired Haven. Your 

Diftindion, faid he, is juft. And 'tis here 
lies the noble Prerogative of Moral Arttfl^y 

above all others But yet I know not how 

to explain myfelf, I fear my Dodrine will 
appear fo ftrange. You may proceed, 

faid I fafely, fince you advance it but as an 
HypothefiSi 

Trius then, continued he The£)W 

in others Arts is ever dijlant and removed. 
It Gonlifts not in the mere ConduBi much 
lefs in a fmgle Energy j but is the juji Re^ 
fult of ?nany Energies^ each of which are 
elTential to it. Hence, by Obftacles un- 
avoidable, it may often be retarded: Nay 
more, may be fo embarafled, as never pof- 
fbly to be attained. But in the Moral Art 
of Life, the very Conduct is the Endj 
the very ConduB^ I fay, itfelf, throughout 
every its minuteji Energy j becaufe each of 
thefe, however minute, partake as truly of 

Re^itude^ 



^90 Concernmg HAPPINESS, 

Part II. ReBitudey as the large ft Combination of them ^ 
when confidered collectively. Hence of 
all Arts is this the only one perpetually 
complete in every Injlant, becaufe it needs 
not, like other Arts, l^ime to arrive at that 
Perfedlion, at which in every Inftant 'tis 
arrived already. Henc?e by Duration it is 
not rendered either more or lefs perfecft; 
Completion^ like Truth, admitting of no 
Degrees, and being in no fenfe capable of 
either Intenfion or RemiJJion. And hence 
too by neceflary Connexion (which is a 
greater Paradox than all) even that Happi^ 
nefs or Sovereign Goody the End of this 
Moral Art, is itfelf too, in every Inflant^ 
Confummate and Complete ; is neither heigh- 
tened or diminified by the Quantity of its 
Duration^ but is the fame to its Enjoyers, 
for a Moment or a Century, 

Upon this I fmiled. He afked me 

the Reafon. 'Tis only to obferve, faid I, 

the Courfe of our Inquiries A new Hy- 

pothefis has been advanced Appearing 

fomewhat flrange, it is defired to be ex- 
plained--^ 



A Dialogue. l^i 

plained You comply with the Requeft, Part IL 

and, in purfuit of the Explanation, make 
it ten times more obfcure and unintelligible^ 
than before. 'Tis but too often the 

Fate, faid he, of us Commentators. But 
you know in fuch cafes what is ufually 
done. When the Comment will not ex- 
plain the Text, we try whether the Text 
will not explain itfelf. This Method, 'tis 
pofTible, may affill us here. The Hypo- 
thefis, which we would have illuftrated, 

was no more than this That the Sove^ 

reign Good lay in ReBitude of ConduB j and 
that this Good correfponded to all our Pre^ 
conceptions. Let us examine then, whether, 
upon trial, this Correfpondence will appear 
to hold; and, for all that we have advanced 
lince, fuffer it to pafs, and not perplex us. 
Agreed, faid I, willingly, for nov/ 
I hope to comprehend you. 

§. 2. Recollect then, faid he. Do you 
not remember that one P re-concept ion of the 
Sovereign Good was, to be accommodate to 
all Times and Places f I remember it. 

And 



192 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. And is there any Time^ or any Places 

whence ReBitude of ConduEl may be ex- 
eluded^ Is there not a right Adion in 
Profperity, a right Addon in Adverfity ? — 
May there not be a decent^ generous, and 
laudable Behavioiiry not only in Peace, in 
Power, and in Health; but in War, in 
Oppreffion, in Sicknefs and in Death ? 
There may. 

And what fliall we fay to thofe other 

Tre-conceptiom to being Durable^ Self- 

derivedy and Indeprivable ^ Gan there be 
any Good fo Durabky as the Power of al- 
ways doing right ? Is there any Good con- 
ceiveable, fo intirely beyond the Power of 
ethers f Or, if you hefitate, and are doubt- 
ful, I would willingly be informed, into 
what Gircumflances may Fortune throw a 
brave and honeft Man, where it fhall not 
be in his Power to a£i bravely a?id honejily f 
If there are no fuch, then Re&itude of Con- 
diiBy if a Goody is a Good Ljdeprivable. 
I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. 

But 



^Dialogue. 193 

But farther, faid he Another Pre-FurtU. 

conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be 
Agreeable to Nature, It was. And 

can any thing be more agreeable to a 
Rational and Social Animal, than Rational 
and Social Condu6l ? Nothing. But 

ReSlitiide of Co7idu5l is with us Rational and 
Social CojiduSt, It is. 

Once more, continued he— Another 
Pre-^conception of this Good was, to be Cojt- 
ducive, not to Mere-being, but to Well- 
being. Admit it. And can any 

thing, believe you, conduce fo probably to 
the Well-being of a Rational Social Animal, 
as the right Exercife of that Reafon, and of 
thofe Social AffeBiom ? Nothing. 

And v/hat is this fame Exercife, but the 
higheft ReSlitude of Conduct ^ Certainly. 

§.3. You fee then, faid he, how well 
our Hypothefis, being once admitted, tal- 
lies with our Original Pre-co?2ceptio?2S of 
the Sovereign Good, I replied, it in- 

O deed 



194 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. deed appeared fo, and could not be denied. 
But who, think you, ever dreamt of a 
Happinefs like this ? A Happinefs depen- 
dent, not on the Succefs^ but on the Aim ? 
Even common and ordinary Life, 
replied he, can furnifh us with Examples. 
Afk of the Sportfman where lies his En- 
joyment ? Afk whether it be in the Pof- 
fejjion of a flaughter'd Hare, or Fox ? He 
would rejed, with Contempt, the very 

Suppofition He would tell you, as well 

as he was able, that the Joy was in the 
Purfuit in the Difficulties which are ob- 
viated; in the Faults, which are retrieved; 
in the CondiiB and Diredion of the Chace 

thro' all its Parts that the Completion of 

their Endeavours was fo far from giving 
them Joy, that inflantly at that Period all 
their Joy was at an end. For Sportf- 

men, replied I, this may be no bad Rea- 
foning. It is not the Sentiment, faid he, 
of Sportfmen alone. The Man of Gal- 
lantry not unoften has been found to think 
after the fame manner. 

— Mem 



^Dialogue. 195 

— — ^' Mens eft anior huic Jimilis -y nam Piirt IT. 
Tranfuolat in medio pojita^ ^ fiigienti a capiat. 

To thefe we may add the Tribe of Buil- 
ders and Projeflors. Or has not your own 
Experience informed you of Numbers, 
who, in the Building and haying-out ^ have 
cxprelTed the highefl; Delight j but fhewn 
the utmoil: Indifference to the Rejult of their 
Labours, to the Manlion or Gardens, when 
©nee liniihed and complete ? 

The Truth, faid t, of thefe Examples 
is not to be difputed. But I could wifla 
your Hypotheiis had better than thefe to 
fupport it. In the ferioiis Fieiv of Happi- 
nefsy do you ever imagine there were any, 
who could iix it (as we faid before) not 
on the Siiccefsy but on the j^im ? 
More, even in this light, faid he, than 
perhaps at firll you may imagine. There 
are Inflances innumerable of Men, bad^i^ 
well as goody who having fixed, as their 
Ainiy a certain ConduSl of their own, have 

O 2 '^o 

* HoR. Sat. II. L. I. V. 107. 



196 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. fo far attached their Welfare and Happinefi 
to it, as to deem all Events in its Profecu- 
tion, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to 
be mean, contemptible, and not worthy their 
Regard. I called on him for Examples. 

What think you, faid he, of the Af- 
faffin, who flew the firfl Pri?ice of Orange ; 
and who, tho' brought by his Condud: to 
the moll exquifite Tortures, yet cojifcious 
of what he had done, could bear them all 
unmoved ? Or (if you will have a better 
Man) what think you of that flurdy Roman^ 
who would have difpatched Porfenna j and 
who, full of his Defign, and fuperior to 
all Events, could thruft a Hand into the 
Flames with the fleadiefl Intrepidity ? 
I replied. That thefe indeed were very un- 
common Inftances. 

Attend too, continued he, to Epi- 
cur us dying, the Founder of a Philofophy, 

little favouring of Enthifiafm " This I 

" write you (fays he, in one of his Epiftles) 
«« while the laji Day of Life is pajfmg, and 

« that 



(C 
(C 



A Dialogue. 197 

" that a Happy One, The Faim indeed of Paxt II. 
*' my Body are not capable of being height 
*' tened. Tet to thefe we oppofe that foy of 
the Souly which arifes from the Mejnory 

of our paft speculations,'' Hear him, 

confbnant to this, in another Place ailert- 
ing, that a Ratiojial Adverfty was better 
than a7i Irrational Profperity, 

And what think you ? Had he not 

placed his Good and Happinefs in the fup- 
pofed ReSiitude of his Opinions^ would he 
not have preferred Profperity, at all rates, 
to Adverfty f Would not the Pains, of 
which he died, have made his Happinefs 

perfed Mifery ? And yet, you fee, he 

difowns any fuch thing. The Memory of 
his paft Life, and of his Philofophical In- 
ventions were, even in the Hour of Death 
it feems, a Counterpoife to fupport him. 
It muft be owned, faid I, that you 
appear to reafon juftly. 

Pass from Epicurus, continued he, to 
Socrates. What are the Sentiments of that 

O 3 divine 



1 9S Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. divine Man, fpeaking of his own unjuft 
Condemnation ? " O CritOj fays he, if it 
*^ be pk^Jing to thC' Gods this way\ then be 
'< it this wayy And again- — " Anytus 
" and Melitus, I grants can kill me-, but 
" to hurt or injure rne^ is beyond their 
*^ Power.''' It would not have been be- 
yond it, had he thought his Welfare de- 
pendent on any thing they could do ; for 
tlicy v/ere then doing their worft— •--,^— 
Whence then was it beyond them ?- — t- 
Becaufe his Happinefs was derived not 
from without J but from within j not from 
the Succefs, which perhaps was due to the 
Reditude of his Life, but from that Re^i-^ 
tude alone, every other thing difregarded. 
He had not, it feems, fo far renounced his 
own Dodrine, as not to remember his 

former Words ; that " ^0 whom ever 

" all things, co?iducive to Heppinejs, are de- 
'ivcd folely^ or at leafi nearly from him- 
felf\ and depend not on the Welfare or 
" Adverfity of others^ from the Variety of 
" whofe Condition his OFivn mifl 'vary aJfo : 
*' Jle it is, who has prepared to himflf the 

i' moji 



cc ^^ 



<c 



(C 



.^Dialogue. 1-99 

•* mqji excellent of all Lives^-^-He it is^ who Part II. 
" is the Temperate, the Prudent, and the 

" Brave He it is, ivho, when Wealth or 

" Children either come or are taken away, 

" will befi obey the Wife Man's Precept 

For neither will he be feen to grieve, nor 
to rejoice in excefs, from the Trujl and 
" Confidence which he has repofcdin himfelf* 
— You have a Sketch at leafl of his Mean- 
ing, tho' far below his own Attic and truly- 
elegant Expreffion. I grant, faid I, 
your Example ; but this and the reft are 
but fingle Inftances, What are three or 
four in Number, to the whole of Hu- 
man Kind ? 

If you are for Numbers, replied he, 
what think you of the numerous Race of 
Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have 
joyfully met Death, rather than defert their 
Country, when in danger ? They muft 
have thought furely on another Happinefs 
than Succefs, when they could gladly go, 
where they faw Death often inevitable. 
Or what think you of the many Martyrs 

O 4 for 



200 Concerning HAPPINESS,. 

Part II. for Syftems wrong as well as right, who 
have dared defy the worft, rather than 
fwerve from their Belief? You have 

brought indeed, faid I, more Examples 
than could have been imagined. 

Besides, continued he, what is that 
Comfort of a Good Conscience, cele- 
brated to fuch a height in the Religion 
which we profefs, but the Joy arifing from 
a Confcience of right Energies; a Con- 
fcience of having done nothing, but what 
is confonant to our Duty ? I replied. 

It indeed appeared fo. 

Even the Vulgar, continued he, re- 
cognize a Good of this very Character, 
when they fay of an Undertaking, tho' it 
fucceed not^ that they are contented-, that 
they have dofie their beji, and can accufc 
themfelves of nothing. For what is this, 
but placing their Content, their Good, their 
Hdppinefs, not in the Succefs of Endeavours, 
but in the ReElitude ? If it be not the 
Reditude which contents them, you muil 

tell 



./f Dialogue. 201 

tell me what 'tis elfe. It appears, Part IL 

replied I, to be that alone. 

I HOPE then, continued he, that 
tho' you accede not to this Notion of 
Happinefs, which I advance; you will at 
leafl allow it not to be fuch a Paradox, as 
at iirfl you feemed to imagine. That 

indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you. 

§. 4. Granting me this, faid he, you 
encourage me to explain myfelf- — We have 
fuppofed the Sovereign Good to lie in ReBi- 
tude of Condu5l, We have. And 

think you there can be Redlitude of Con- 
dud:, if we do not live conjifiently ? 
In what Senfe, faid I, would you be un- 
derftood ? To live confiJtently\ faid he, 
is the fame with me, as To live agreeably ta 
fome one Jingle and conjonant Scheme, or Pur^ 
fofe. Undoubtedly, faid I, without this, 
there can be no Red:itude of Condud:. 
All KeBitude of Condud: then, you fay, 
implies fuch Conjifience. It does. 

And does all Conjijtence, think you, imply 

fuch 



202 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Partll. fuch Rcdlitiide^ I afked him, Whj 

not ? 'Tis poffible, indeed it may, 

faid he, for aught we have difcovered yet 
to the contrary. But what if it fhould 
be found that there may be numberlefs 
Schemes, each in particular confiftent with 
itfelf, but yet all of them different y and 
fome perhaps contrary ? There may, you 
know, be a co7iliJle?it Life of Knavery, as 
well as a confiftent Life of Honefty ; there 
may be a ujiiform Practice of Luxury, as 
well as of Temperance, and Abftemiouf- 
nefs. Will the Confiftence, common to all 
cfthefe Lives y render the ConduB in each, 
right ? It appears, faid I, an Abfur- 

ditv, that there fhould be the fame Recfti"* 
tude in two Contraries. If fo^ faid he, 

we mufl: look for fomething more than 
inere Confiftence^ when we fearch for that 
Rediitude^ which we at ' prefent talk of. 
A confiftent Life indeed is requifite, but 
that alone is not enough. We muft de- 
termine its peculiar Species^ if we would 
be accurate and exacft. It indeed ap- 

pears, faid Ij necellary. 

Nor 



A Dialogue. 203 

Nor is any thing, continued he, more Part IL 
cafy to be dilcuffed. For what can that 
peculiar Conjifience of Life be elfe, than a 
Life, whofe feveral Parts are not only con- 
fbnant to each other, but to the Nature 
alfo of the Being, by whom that Life 
has been adopted ? Does not this laji De- 
gree of Confidence appear as requifite as 
th.^ former^ I anfwered. It could not 

be otherwife. 

You fee then, faid he, the true Idea 
of right Condud:. It is not, merely To 
live conJiJle?2tly -y but 'tis To live conjijlently 
ivith Nature. Allow it. 

But what, continued he ? Can we live 
confiftently with Nature, and be at a lofs 
how to behave ourfelves ? We cannot. 

And can we know how to behave 
Gurfelves, if we know nothing of what 
befah us-, nothing of thofe Things and 
Events, which perpetually furround, and 
iifFed us ? We cannot. You fee 

then, 



204 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part 11. then, continued he, how we are again 
fallen infenlibly into that Doctrine, which 
proves the Neceffity o^ fcrutinizmg, and 
knowing the Value of Externals, I re- 

plied, 'Twas true. If you affent, faid he, 
to this, it will of courfe follow, that, To 
live confiftently with Nature^ is. To live 
agreeably to ajujl Experience of thofe Things j 
which happen around us. It appears fo. 

But farther flill, faid he. — Think you 
any one can be deemed to live agreeably 
to fuch ExperiencCy if he felecl not, as 
far as poffible, the things mofl congruous 
to his Nature f He cannot. And by 
the fame Rule, as far as poffible, muft he 
not reje^ fuch as are contrary ? He 

muft. And that not occafionally, as 

Fancy happens to prompt -, but Jieadilyy 
conjlantlyy and without Remiffion. 
I fhould imagine fo. You judge, faid 

he, truly. Were he to adt otherwife in 
the leaft inflance, he would faliify his 
Profeffions ; he would not live according 
10 that Experience, v^^hich we now fup- 

pofe 



A Dialogue. 205 

pofe him to pofTefs. I replied, He Part IL 

would not. 



It fhould feem then, faid he, from 
hence, as a natural Confequence of what 
we have admitted, that the EJJence of 
right Condndt lay in Selection and 
Rejection. So, faid I, it has ap- 

peared. And that fuch Sele5lion and 

Rejection fliould be confonant with our pro- 
sper Nature. 'Tis true. And be 
Jieady and perpetual^, not occaiional and in- 
terrupted. 'Tis true. But if this be 
the ElTence of Right Condudt^ then too it 
is the EfTence of our Sovereign Good-, for 
in fuch Condud: we have fuppofed thii 
Good to conlifi:. We have. 

See then, faid he, the Refult of our 
Inquiry. — The Sovereign Good, as 
conftituted hy ReSfitude ofCondu6l^ has, on 
our ftridteft Scrutiny, appeared to be this— - 

To LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS 
FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS 

TO Nature, and rejecting what is 

CON- 



2o6 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. CONTRARY, MAKING OUR EnD THAT* 

Selecting and that Rejecting only* 
*Tis true, faid I, fo it appears. 

§.5. Before we haften then farther^ 
iaid he, let us ftop to recoiled;, and fee 
whether our prefent Conclulions accord 
with our former. — We have now fuppofed 
the Sovereign Good to be Re5titude of Con- 
dudf, and this CondiiB we have made con- 
fift in a certain SeleBi77g and RejeBing. 
We have. And do you not imagine 

that the SeleBing and RejeStijig^ which we 
propofe, as they are purely governed by 
the Standard of Nature, are capable in 
every inftance of being rationally jujiijied^ 

I replied, I thought they were. 
But if they admit a rational "Jujlijicationy 
then are they Moral Offices or Duties-, 
for thus * you remember yefterday a Moral 
Office was defined. It was. But 

if fo, 'To live in the Pra£lice of them^ will 

be 



* Sup. p. 175. 



A Dialogue. 207 

be To live in the Difcharge of Moral Offices, Part II. 

It will. But To live in the Dif- 

charge of thefe, is the fame as Living ac- 
cording to Virtue J and Living according to 
Nature. It is. So therefore is 

Living in that SeleBion, and in that Rejec- 
tion, which we propofe. It is. 

We need never therefore be at a lofs, 
faid he, for a Defcrlption of the Sove- 
reign Good.- We may call it. Rec- 
titude of Conduct. If that be too 

contracted, we may enlarge and fay, 'tis-^ 
To live perpetually Selecting and 
Rejecting according to the Stan- 
dard OF OUR Being. If we are for 

flill different Views, we may fay 'tis. 
To live in the Discharge of Mo- 
ral Offices — To live according to 

Nature To live according to 

Virtue -To live according to 

Just Experience of those Things, 

WHICH happen around US. Like 

fome finiflied Statue, \ve may behold it 
every way; 'tis the fame Objed:, tho' 

varioufly 



2o8 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. varloufly viev/ed ; nor is there a View, 
but is natural, truly graceful, and en- 
gaging- 

§. 6. I CANNOT deny, faid I, but 
that as you have now explained it, your 
Hypothefis feems far more plaufible, than 
when firll it was propofed. You will 

believe it, faid he, more fo ftill, by con- 

fidering it with more Attention. In the 

firft place, tho' perhaps it efteem nothing 
really Good but Virtue, nothing really 
Evil, but Vice, yet it in no manner 
takes away the Differejice, and DiJtinSlion 
of other l^hings. So far otherwife, it is 
for eftabliiliing their Difi:ind:ion to the 
greateft Accuracy. For were this negledl- 
ed, what would become of SeleBion and 
KejeBiony thofe important Energies, which 
are its very Soul and EiTence ? Were there 
no Difference, there could be no Choice. 
'Tis true, faid I, there could not. 

Again, faid he. It is no meagre, mor- 
tifying Syflem of Sclf-dejilal-^lt fupprefles 

no 



A Dialogue. 209 

no Social and Natural Affedions, nor takes Part II. 

away any Social and Natural Relations 

It prefcribes no Abflainings, no Forbear- 
ances out of Nature ; no gloomy, fad, and 
lonely Rules of Life, without which 'tis 
evident Men may be as honeft as with^ 
and be infinitely more ufeful and worthy 

Members oi Society. It refufes no Plea- 

fure, not inconfiftent with Temperance 

It rejeds no Gain, not inconfiftent with 

Jtijiice Univerfally, as far as Virtue 

neither forbids nor diffuades^ it endeavours 
to render Life, even in the mofl 'uulgar 
Acceptation, as chearful, joyouSj and eaiy 
as poffible. Nay, could it mend the Condi- 
tion of Exiftence in any the ??ioJi trivial Ck^ 
cumflance, even by adding to the amplefl 
Pofleffions the pooreft meaneft Utenfil, it 
would in no degree contemn an Addition 

even fo mean. Far other wife It would 

confider, that to negled: the leaft Acqui- 
fition, when fairly in its power, would 
be to fall fhort of that perfeSi and accurate 
ConduB, which it ever has in view, and 
on which alone all depends, 

P And 



2IO Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. And yet, tho' thus exadl in every the 
minuteft Circumftance, it gives us no Soli- 
citude as to what Ra?ik we maintain in 
Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy 
or poor J whether merged in Bufinefs, or 
confined to Inadivity, it is equally cojtfiftent 
with eijery Condition, and equally capable 
of adorning them all. Could it indeed 
choofe its own Life, it would be always 
that, where moft focial AfFedlions might 
exteniively be exerted, and mofl: done to 
contribute to the Welfare of Society. But 
if Fate order otherwife, and this be de- 
nied ; its Intentions are the fame, its En- 
deavours are not wanting; nor are the 
Social, Rational Powers forgotten, even in 
Times and Circumflances, where they can 
leaft become conipicuous. 

It teaches us to confider Life, as one 
great important Drama, where we have 
each our Part allotted us to ad;. It tells 
us that our Happifiefs, as ASfors in this 
Drama, confifts not in the Length of our 

Part, 



yf Dialogue. 211 

Part, nor in the State and Dignity, but in Part II. 
the juftj the decent ^ and the natural Per- 
fonnance. 

If its Aims are fuccefsful, it is thankful 
to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, de- 
rived from their Succefs, and feels them as 
fully, as thofe who know 720 other Happi- 
nefs. The only Difference is, that having 
a more excellent Good in view, it fixes not, 
like the Many, its Happinefs on Siiccefs 
alone, well knowing that in fuch cafe, if 
Endeavours fail, there can be nothing left 
behind but Murmurings and Mifery. On 
the contrary, when this happens, 'tis then 
it retires into itfelf, and refleding on what 
is Fair^ what is Laudable and Honejl (the 
truly beatific Vifion, not of 7nad Enthufiajls^ 
but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wile 
and the Good) it becomes fuperioiir to all 
Events -y it acquiefces in the Confcioufnefs of 
its own ReSlitiide 'y and, like that Manlion 
founded, not on the Sands, but on the 
Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Tempefl 
and Inundation. 

p 2 % 7. 



212 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. §.7. Here he paufed, and I took the 
Opportunity to obferve, how his Subject 
had warmed him into a degree of Rap- 
ture 'j how greatly it had raifed both his 
Sentiments and his Stile. No wonder, 
faid he. Beauty of every kind excites our 
Love and Admiration ; the Beauties of 
Art, whether Energies or Worh ; the 
Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or 
Inanimate. And fliall we exped: lefs from 
this Supreme Beauty -, this moral, mental, 
and original Beauty ; of which all the reft 
are but as liypes or Copies"^ Not how- 
ever by high Flights to lofe Sight of our 
Subjed:, the whole of what we have ar- 
gued, may be reduced to this— 

All Men pursue Good, and would 
be happy, if they knew howj not happy 
for Minutes, and mJferable for Hours, but 
happy, if poffible, thro' eve7j Part of their 
JLxifience, Either therefore there is a 
Good of this fie ady durable Kind, or there 
is none, \1 none, then all Good muft be 

tranfent 



^Dialogue. 213 

tranfient and uncertain ; and if fo, an Oh- Part 11. 
jeB of loweji Valiie^ which can little de- 
fer ve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But 
if there be a better Good, fuch a Good as 
we are feeking ; like every other thing, // 
muji be derived from fotm Caufe j and that 
Caufe muft be either exteinial^ internal^ or 
mixt, in as much as except thefe three, 
there is no other poffible. Now ajieady, 
durable Good, cannot be derived from an 
external Caufe, by reafon all derived from 
Externals mufl jluBuate, as they fluSiuate, 
By the fame Rule, not from a Mixture of 
the Two; becaufe the P^r/ which is external 
will proportionally dejlroy its EJfence. What 
then remains but the Caufe internal; the 
very Caufe which we have fuppofed, when 
we place the Sovereign Good in Mind; in 
ReBitude of ConduB-, in juft Sele6iing and 
RejeBi?2g? There feems indeed no 

other Caufe, faid I, to which we cap pof- 
libly aifign it. 

Forgive me then, continued he, 
fliould I appear to boaft We have 

P 3 proved. 



214 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. proved, or at leafl: there is an Appearance 
we have proved, that, either there is no 
Good except this of our own ; or that, if 
there be any other, 'tis not worthy our Re- 
gard, It muft be confefTed, faid I, 
you have faid as much, as the Subjed: feems 
to admit. 

§.8. By means then, faid. he, of our 
Hypothelis, behold one of the faireft, and 
moft amiable of Objeds, behold the 
TRUE AND PERFECT Man: that Or^ 
nament of Humanity ; that Godlike Being ; 
who, without regard either to Pleafure or 
Fain, uninfluenced equally by either Profpe- 
rity or Adverflty, fuperiour to the World and 
its beft and worfi Events, can fairly reft his 
All upon the ReBitude of his own ConduB 5 
can conjlantly, and uniformly, and manfully 
maintain it ; thinking that, and that alone ^ 
wholly fifficient to make him happy. 

And do you ferioufly believe, faid I, 
there ever was fach a Charader ? And 

what, replied he, if I ihould admit, there 

never 



A Dialogue. 215 

ne^er ivas, is, or will be fuch a Chara5ler f — Part II. 
that we have been talking the whole time 
of a Being, not to be found j 

AfaultlefsMonJler^which the World ne'erfawf 

Suppofing, I fay, we admit this, what then? 
Would not your Syflem in fuch a cale, 
faid I, a little border upon the chimerical ? 
I only aik the Queftion. You need 

not be fo tender, he replied, in expreffing 
yourfelf. If it be falfe, if it will not in- 
dure the Teft, I am as ready to give it up, 
as I have been to defend it. He muft be a 
poor Philofopher indeed, who, when he fees 
Truth and a Syjiem at variance, can ever 
be folicitous for the Fate of a Syftem. 

But tell me, I pray Do you objed 

to mine, from its Perfe^ion, or from its 
ImperfeSlion? From its being too excel- 
lent for Human Nature, and above it; or 
from its being too bafe, and below it ? 
It feems to require, faid I, a PerfeBion^ 
to which no Individual ever arrived. 
That very Tranfcendence, laid he, is an 

P 4 Argu- 



2i6 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. Argument on its behalf. Were it of a 
Rank inferior, it would not be that Per- 
fedlion, which we feek. Would you 

have it, faid I, beyond Nature ? If you 

mean, replied he, beyond any particular or 
individual Nature^ moft undoubtedly I 

would. As you are a Lover of Painting, 

y^ fliall hear a Story on the Subjed. 

"In ancient days, while Greece was 
flourifliing in Liberty and Arts, a cele- 
brated Painter, having drawn many ex- 
" cellent Pidures for a certain free State, 
" and been generoufly and honourably re- 
" warded for his Labours, at lafl made 
" an Offer to paint them a Helen ^ as a 
" Model and Exemplar of the mofl ex- 
<* quilite Beauty. The Propofal was rea- 
" dily accepted, when the Artift informed 
" them, that in order to draw one Fair, 
** 'twas neceflary he fhould contemplate 
" 7nany. He demanded therefore a Sight 
" of all their finell; Women. The State, 
^« to alTift the Work, aifented to his Re- 
f' quefl. They were exhibited before 

" him 5 



cc 



A Dialogue. 217 

*« him ; he feledted the moft beautiful 3 Part II. 
" and from thefe formed his Hehiy more 
« beautiful than them all." 

You have heard the Fadl, and what 

are we to infer? Or can there be any 

other Inference than this that the Stan- 
dard of PerfeSiioUy with refpeSi to the 
Beauty of Bodies, was not (as this Artifl 
thought) to be difcovered in any Individual % 
but being difperfed by Nature in Portions 
thro' the many, was from thence, and thence 
only, to be colleBed and recognized^ 
It appears, faid I, he thought fo. The 

Pifture, continued he, is loft, but we have 
Statues ftill remaining. If there be Truth 
in the Teftimony of the beft and fairefl: 
Judges, no Woman ever equalled the De- 
licacy of the Medicean Venus, nor Man the 
Strength and Dignity of the Farnhefian 
Hercules, 'Tis generally, faid I, fo 

believed. 

And will you, faid he, from this unpa- 
jralelkd and tranfcendent Excellence, deny 

thefe 



2i8 Ccncerning HAPPINESS, 

Fart II. thefe Works of Art to be truly and ftridtly 
Natural? Their Excellence, replied I, 

mufl be confefled by All; but how they 
can be cajled ^o flridly Natural^ I muft 
own a little flartles me. That the 

Juimbs and their ProportionSy faid he, are 
feledled from Nature, you v/ill hardly I 
believe doubt, after the Story jufl related. 
I replied, 'Twas admitted. The 

Parts therefore of thefe Works are Na- 
tural They are. And may not 
the fame be aflerted, as to th^ Arrange- 
ment of thefe Parts ? Mull not this too 
be natural^ as 'tis analogous we know to 
Nature ? It muft. If fo, then 
is the Whole, Natural. . So indeed, 
faid I, it fhould feem. It cannot, re- 
plied he, be otherwife, if it be a Fadl be- 
yond difpute, that the JVhole is nothing 
more, than the Parts under fuch Arrangement, 
Enough, faid I, you have fatisfied me. 

If I have, faid he, it is but to transfer 
what we have alTerted of this fubordinate 
Beauty, to Beauty of a higher Order-, it is 

but 



A Dialogue. 219 

but to pafs from the External^ to the Part II. 
Mor^l and Intenial For here we fay, by 
parity of Reafon, that no where in any 
particular Nature is the ferfeSl CharaEier 
to be feen intire. Yet one is ^r^i;^ 5 an- 
other is temperate 'y a third is liberal 'j and 
a fourth is p^nideiit. So that in the Multi^ 
tude of mixed imperfeB CharaBers^ as be- 
fore in the Multitude of imperfeB Bodies^ is 
exprefTed that Idea, that Moral Stan- 
dard OF Perfection, by which all are 
tried and compared to one another, and at 
lail upon the whole are either juftified or 

condemned that Standard of Perfedion, 

which cannot be but ?noJi Natural, as it is 
purely collected from Individuals of Na^ 
ture, and is the Tefl of all the Merit to 
which they afpire. I acknowledge, 

faid I, your Argument* 

I might add, faid he, if there were 
Occafion, other Arguments which v/ould 
furprize you. I might inform you of the 
natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of 

Spec if c Ideas-, that every Individual \^'2i% 

2 but 



220 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. but their Type, or Shadow j that the 

Mind or Intellecl was the Region of Pof- 

fibles ; that what ever is PoJJibk, to the 

Mind adually Is-, nor any thing a Non- 
entity, except what implies a Contradic- 
tion ; that the genuine Sphere and ge- 
nuine Cylinder, tho' Forms perhaps too 
ferfe5ij ever to exijl conjoined to Matter, 
were yet as true and real Beings, as the 
grojfeji ObjeBs of Senfe ; were the Source of 
Infinite Truths, which wholly depend on 
them, and which, as Truths, have a Being 
mofl unalterable and eternal. But thefe are 
Reafonings, which rather belong to another 
Philofophy ; and if you are fatisfied with- 
out them, they are at bcfl but fuperfluous. 

He waited not for my Anfwer, but 
proceeded as follows. 'Tis thus, faid 

he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my 
power, to give you an Idea of the perfeB 
CharaBer : a Character, which I am neither 
fo abfurd, as to impute to myfelf j nor fo 
rigorous and unfair, as to require of others. 
We have propofed it only, as an ExeMt 

o PLAR 



./^Dialogue. 221 

PLAR OF Imitation, which tho' ATb;?^ Part II. 
we think can equal, yet All at leafl may 

follow an Exemplar of Imitation, which 

in proportion as we approach, fo we ad- 
vance proportionably in Merit and in 

Worth an Exemplar, which, were we 

mo^ felfjloj we ftiould be Fools to rejed: ; if 
it be true, that to be Happy, is the ultimate 
Wijh of us all, and that Happi fiefs and Moral 
Worth fo reciprocally correfpond, that there 
can be no Degree of the one, without an 
equal Degree of the other. If there be 

Truth, faid I, in your Reafonings, it can- 
not certainly be otherwife. 

He continued, by faying The Pro- 

ficiency of Socrates, and indeed of every 
honeft Man, was fufficient to convince us, 
could we be fteadfaft to our Purpofe, that 
fome Progrefs at leaft might be made toward 
this PerfeSiion — How far, we knew not — 

The Field was open The Race was free 

and common to All Nor was the Prize, 

as ufual, referved only to the Firft; but 
All, who run, might depend on a Reward, 

having 



222 Coficerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. having the Voice of Nature, would they 
but liflen, to afllire them, 

* Nemo ex hoc nwriero mihi non donatm 
ahibit, 

§. 9. Here he paufed, and left me to 
meditate on what he had fpoken. For 
fbme time we pafled on in mutual Silence, 
till obferving me on my part little inclined 
to break it. What, faid he, engages you 
with an Attention fo earnefl: ? I was 

wondering, faid I, whence it fhould hap- 
pen, that in a Difcourfe of fuch a nature, 
you fhould fay fo little of Religion^ of 
Provide?2ce^ and a Deity. I have not, 

replied he, omitted them, becaufe not in- 
timately united to Morals ; but becaufe what 
ever we treat accurately, ihould be treated 
feparately and apart. Multiplicity of Mat- 
ter naturally tends to Confufion. They are 
weak Minds indeed, which dread a ra- 
tional Sufpence ; and much more fo, when 
in the Event, it only leads to a furer Know- 
ledge, 

* iENEiD. 1. V. V. 305. 



A Dialogue. 223 

ledge, and often ftrengthens the very Sub- Part II. 
jedt, on which we fufpend. Could I how- 
ever repeat you the Words of a venerable 
Sage, (for I can call him no other) whom 
once I heard diverting on the Topic of 
Religion, and whom flill I hear, when 
ever I think on himj you might accept 
perhaps my Religions Theories as candidly, 
as you have my MoraL I prefTed him 

to repeat them, with which he willingly 
complied. 

The Speaker, faid he, whofe Words I 
am attempting to relate, and whom for 
the prefent I name Theophilus^ was of a 
Character truly amiable in every part. 
When young, he had been fortunate in a 
liberal Education ; had been a Friend to 
the Mufes, and approved himfelf fuch to 
the Public. As Life declined, he wifely 
retired, and dedicated his Time almoft 
wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he 
never forget the Mufes, whom once he 
loved. He retained in his Difcourfe (and 
fo in the Sequel you will foon find) a large 

Portion 



224 Concermng HAPPINESS, 

Part 11. Portion of that rapturous, anti-profaic Stile, 
in which thofe Ladies ufually choofe to ex- 
prefs themfelves. 

We were walking, not (as now) in the 
chearful Face of Day, but late in the Even- 
ing, when the Sun had long been fett. Cir- 
cumftances of Solemnity were not wanting 
to affed US; the Poets could not have 

feigned any more happy a running 

Stream, an ancient Wood, a ftill Night, 

and a bright Moonfliine. 1, for my own 

part, induced by the Occafion, fell infenfibly 
into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the 
Moon. From thence I wandered to other 
heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, 
and Empires, and I know not what. 

Who lives in the Moon, faid he, is 
perhaps more than we can well learn. 'Tis 
enough, if we can be fatisfied, by the help 
of our beft Faculties, that hitelligence is not 
confined to this little Earth, which we in- 
habit i that tho' Men were not, the World 
would not want Spedators, to contemplate 

its 



^Dialogue. 225 

its Beauty, and adore the Wifdom of its Part IT. 
Author. 



" This whole Universe itfelf is but 

" ONE City or Commonwealth 

" a SyJ}e?n of Subjia?2ces varioufly formed^ 
" and varioufly aBuated agreeably to thofe 

" Fornix a Syftem of Subftances both 

immenfely great and fmall, Rational^ 
AiiimaU Vegetable^ and Inanimate, 



(C 



« 



"As many Families make one Village, 
" many Villages one Province, many Pro- 
" vinces one Empire ; fo many Empires, 
" Oceans, Wafles and Wilds, combined, 
" compofe that Earth on which we live. 
" Other Combinations make a Planet or a 
** Moon ; and thefe again, united, make 
one Planetary Syftem. What higher 
Combinations fubfift, we know not. 
" Their Gradation and Afcent 'tis impof- 
" fible we fhould difcover. Yet the ge- 
« nerous Mind, not deterred by this Im- 
" menfity, intrepidly pafles on, thro' Re- 
** gions unknown, from greater Syftem 

9^ f. to 



(c 



226 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. " to greater, till it arrive at that greateft^ 
" where Imagination flops, and can ad- 
" vance no farther. In this laft, this 
" mighty, this ftupendous Idea, it beholds 
** the Universe itfelf, of which every 
** Thing is a Part, and with reipedl to 
" which not the fmalleflAtom is either 
" foreign or detached. 

" Wide as it's Extent, is the Wifdom 

" of its Workmanfliip, not bounded and 

" narrow, like the humbler Works of Art. 

Thefe are all of Origin no higher than 

Human, We can readily trace them to 

* their utmoft Limit, and with accuracy 

difcern both their Beginning and their 

End. But where the Microfcope that 

•* can {hew us, from what Point Wifdom 

" begins in Nature ? Where the Telefcope 

that can defcry, to what Infinitude it 

extends ? The more diligent our Search, 

** the more accurate our Scrutiny, the 

" more only are we convinced, that our 

" Labours can never finifh j that Subjeds 

** inex- 



<c 

(C 

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^Dialogue. 227 

*« inexhauflible remain behind, ftill un- Part II. 
" explored. 

" Hence the Mind truly wife, quit- 
ting the Study of Particulars^ as know- 
ing their Multitude to be infinite and in- 
comprehenjible, turns its intellecftual Eye 
to what is general and comprehenlive, 
*' and thro' Generals learns to fee, and re- 
cognize what ever exills. 



(C 

<( 



« 



"It perceives in this view, that every 
" Subftance, of every degree, has its Na- 
" ture, its proper Make, Conflitution or 
" Form, by which it aBsy and by which 
" it fuffers. It perceives it fo to fare with 
" every natural Form around us, as with 
** thofe Tools and Injftruments, by which 
" Art worketh its Wonders. The Saw is 
" deftined to one Ad ; the Mallet, to an- 
" other J the Wheel anfwers this Purpofej 
" and the Lever anfwers a different. So 
" Nature ufes the Vegetable ^ the Brute y 
** and the Rational, agreeably to the proper 
** Form and Confiitutioii of every Kifid, The 

Q^ " Vegetalfk 



228 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. " Vegetable proceeds with perfed Jnjenfi- 
^' bility. The Brute pofTeflcs a Senfe of 
" what is pleaiurable and painful, but flops 
" at mere Senfation, and is unable to go far- 
" ther. The Rational^ like the Brute, has 
*^ all the Powers of mere Sejifation^ but en- 
" joys fuperadded a farther tranfcendent Fa- 
culty, by which it is made confcious, not 
only of what it feels, but of the Powers 
themfehes, which are the Sources of 
thofe very Feelings ; a Faculty, which 
recognizing both itfelf and all Things 
elfe, becomes a Canon, a CorreEior, and 
a Standard Univerfal, 



cc 

li 
<( 
ec 
<c 
cc 
cc 



" Hence to the Rational alone is im- 
*' parted that Master-Science, of what 
" they are, where they are, and the End 
" to which they are deftined. 

" Happy, too happy, did they know 
" their own Felicity; did they reverence 
*^ the Dignity of their own fuperior Cha- 
*' ra(5tcr, and never wretchedly degrade 
** thcmfelves into Natures to them fubor- 

" dinate. 



A Dialogue. 229 

" dinate. And yet alafs ! 'tis a Truth too Part II. 
" certain, that as the Rational only are 
" fufceptible of a Happinefs truly excel- 
" lent, fo thefe only merge themfelves 
" into Miferies paft Indurance, 

'* Assist us then, Thou Power 
" Divine, with the Light of that R e a- 
" son, by which Thou lightened the 
" World 3 by which Grace and Beauty is 
" diffufed thro' every Part, and the Wei- 
" fare of the Whole is ever uniformly up- 
*' held } that Reafon, of which our own is 
but a F article or Spark, like fome Pro- 
methean Fire, caught from Heaven above. 
So teach us to know oiirfeheSy that we 
may attain that Knowledge, which 
" alone is worth attaining. Check our 
*' vain, our idle Refearches into the Laws, 
*' and Natures, and Motions of other Be- 
" ings, till we have learnt and can prac- 
*' tife thofe, which peculiarly refpe6l our- 
" felves. Teach us to be fit Adiors in 
" that general Drama, where Thou hail 
" allotted every Being, great and fmall, its 

0^3 " pro 



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230 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. " proper Part, the due P erf ormmice of which 
" is the only End of its Exijlence. 

" Enable us to curb Desire within 
" the Bounds of what is Natural. Enable 
" us even to fufpejid it, till we can employ 

it to our Emolument. Be our frfl 

Work, to have efcaped from wrong Opi- 
" 7iion^ and bad Habit % that the Mind, 
" thus render'd fincereand incorrupt, may 

with Safety proceed to feek its genuine 

Good and Plappinefs. 



cc 



C( 






" When we are thus previoufly ex- 
«^ ercifed, thus duly prepared, let not our 

LovTE there flop, where it firfl begins ; 

but infenfibly condu6t it, by thy invi- 
** iible Influence, from lower Objeds to 

higher, till it arrive at that Supreme^ 

where only it can find what is adequate 
" and full. Teach us to love Thee, and 
«^ Thy Divine Administration — — 
" to regard the Univerfe itfelf as our true 
" and genuine Country, not that little ca- 
" fual Spot, where we firfl: drew vital 

" Air. 



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A Dialogue. 231 

" Air. Teach us each to regard Himfelf, Part II. 
" but as a Part of this great Whole j 
" a Part which for its Welfare we are as 
" patiently to refign, as we relign a fingle 
" Limb for the Welfare of our whole 
" Body. Let our Life be a continued 
Scene of Acquiescence and of Grati- 
tude ; of Gratitude, for what we enjoy ; 
of Acquiefcence, in what we fuffer j as 
both can only be referable to that con- 
" catenated Order of Events, which can- 
not but be bej}, as being by Thee ap- 
proved and chofen. 



(( 

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"In as much as Futurity is hidden 
*' from our Sight, we can have no other 
Rule of Choice, by which to govern our 
Condud:, than what feems confonant to 
the Welfare of our own particular Na- 
" tures. If it appear not contrary to Duty 
" and moral Office, (and how Ihould we 
judge, but from what appears?) Thou 
canft not but forgive us, if we prefer 
Health to Sicknefs ; the Safety of Life 
" and Limb, to Maiming or to Death. 

Q_4 *' But 



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€1 



232 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Pan II. '' But did we know that thefe Incidents, 
" or any other were appointed us ; were 
" fated in that Order of incontroulable 
" Events, by which Thou preferveft and 
" adorneft the Whole : it then becomes 
our Duty, to meet them with Magna- 
nimity ; to co-operate with Chearfulnefs 
" in what ever Thou ordaineli; that fo 
*' we may know no other Will, than thine 
" alone, and that the Harmony of our 
" particular Minds with thy Univerfal, 
" may be fteady and uninterrupted thro' 
" the Period of our Exigence. 

" Yet, fmce to attain this Height, this 
" tranfcendent Height, is but barely pof- 
" fible, if poffible, to the mod perfed: 
" Humanity: regard what within us is 
" Congenial fo Thee-, raife us above our- 

felves, and warm us into Enthufafm. 
' But let our Enthnfiafm be uich, as befits 

the Citizens of Thy Polity; liberal, 

gentle, rational, and humane — not fuch 

« as to debafe us into poor and wretched 

«' Shrccs, as if Thou wert our Tyrant, 

' ^ «' not 



<( 



<< 



li 



« 






A Dialogue. 233 

'« not our kind and common Father ; Part II. 
" much lefs fuch as to transform us into 
favage Beafts of Prey, fallen, gloomy, 
dark and fierce ; prone to perfecute, to 
" ravage, and deftroy, as if the Luft of 
♦* MaiTacre could be grateful to thy Good- 
" nefs. Permit us rather madly to avow 
Villany in thy Defiance, than impioufly 
to alTert it under colour of thy Service. 
" Turn our Mind's Eye from every Idea 
" of this Charader; from the Servile, Ab- 
" jed. Horrid and Ghaflly, to the Gene- 
" rous, Lovely, Fair and Godlike, 

" Here let us dwell j be here our 

" Study and Delight. So fliall we be en- 
" abled, in the filent Mirrour of Contem- 
** plation, to behold thofe FormSy which 
are hidden to Human Eyes that ani- 
mating Wisdom, which pervades and 

rules the Whole that Law irrefiflible, 

<' immutable, fupreme, which leads the 
Willing, and compels the Averfe, to co- 
operate in their Station to the general 
*' Welfare— —that Magic Divine, which 

!' by 



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234 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. " by an Efficacy paft Comprehenfion, can 
" transform every Appearance, the moft 
" hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit all 
" Things Fair and Good to Thee, 
" Essence Increate, ijoho art of 
" purer Eyes^ than ever to behold Iniquity, 

"Be thefe our Morning, thefe our 
" Evening Meditations — vi^ith thefe may 

** our Minds be unchangeably tinged 

" that loving Thee w^ith a Love moft dif- 
" interefted and fincere ; enamoured of 
** thy Polity, and thy Divine Admi- 
" NisTRATioN ; Welcoming every Event 
" with Chearfulnefs and Magnanimity, as 
" being beji upon the Whole, becaufe or- 
** dained of Thee ; propoling nothing of 
** ourfelves, but with a Referve that Thou 
" permitteft ; acquiefcing in every Obftruc- 
*' tion, as ultimately referable to thy Pro- 

" vidence in a word, that working this 

*' Condu(5l, by due Exercife, into perfect 
" Habit', we may never murmur, never 
" repine j never mifs what we would ob- 
*^ tain, or fall into that which we would 

" avoid J 



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A Dialogue. 23^ 

avoid ; but being happy with that tran- Part II. 
fcendent Happinefs, of which no one 
can deprive us j and blefl with that Di- 
vine Liberty^ which no Tyrant can an- 
noy; we may dare addrefs Thee with 
pious Confidence, as the Philofophic Bard 
" of old, 

" Co7idu6l me^ I'hou, of Beings Caufe Divine, 
« Ji^here-e're Tm defiin'd in thy great Defign» 
" ASiive I follow on : forfiould my Will 
*' Refjiy Tm impious-, but muji follow Jiill, 

In this manner did Hheophilus^ fald he, 
purfue the Subjedl, to which I had led 
him. He adorned his Sentiments with 
Expreffions even more fplendid, than I 
have now employed. The Speaker, the 
Speech, the happy Circumftances which 
concurred, the Night's Beauty and Still- 
nefs, with the Romantic Scene where we 
were walking, all together gave the Whole 
fuch an Energy and Solemnity, as 'tis im- 
poffible you fhould feel from the Coldnefs 
of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for 
z my 



236 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. my own part, returned home fenfibly 
touched, and retained the ftrongeft Feel- 
ings of what I had heard, till the follow- 
ing Morning. Then the Bufinefs of the 
Day gently obliterated all, and left me by 
Night as little of a Philofopher, as I had 
ever been before. 

§. 10. And is it poflible, faid I, fofoon 
to have forgotten, what feems fo ftriking 
and fublime, as the Subjed: you have been 
now treating ? 'Tis Habit, replied 

he, is all in all. 'Tis Practice and Exer- 
cife, which can only make us truly any thing. 
Is it pot evidently fo, in the moft com- 
mon vulgar Arts ? Did mere Theo7'y alone 
ever make the meancil Mechanic ? And 
is the Supreme Artifi of Life and Manners 
to be formed more eafily, than fuch a 
one ? Happy for us, could we prove it near 
fo eafy. But believe me, my Friend, good 
Things are not fo cheap. Nothing is to 
be had gratis J much lefs that which is moil 
valuable. 

Yet 



A Dialogue. 237 

Yet however for our Comfort, we have Part II. 
this to encourage us, that, tho' the Diffi- 
culty of acquiring Habits be great and 
painful, yet nothing fo eafy, fo pleafant, 
as their Energies, when once wrought by 
Exercife to a due Standard of Perfeftion. 
I know you have made fome Progrefs in 
Mufic. Mark well what you can do, as a 
Proficient this way— You can do that, which 
without Habit, as much exceeds the wifeil 
Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to 
afcend a Cliff perpendicular. You can 
even do it with Facility 5 and (left you 
fliould think I flatter) not you yourfelf 
alone, but a thoufand others befide, whofe 
low Rank and Genius no way raife them 
above the Multitude. If then you are fo 
well affured of this Force of Habit in one 
Inftance, judge not in other Inftances by 
your own prefent Infufficiency. Be not 
(hocked at the apparent Greatnefs of the 
perfeB Moral CharaBer, when you com- 
pare it to the Weaknefs and Imperfedlion of 
your own. On the contrary, when thefe 

dark. 



238 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. dark, thefe melancholy Thoughts aflail 
you, immediately turn your Mind to the 
Conlideration of Habit, Remember how 
eafy its Energies to thofe, who pojfefs it ; 
and yet how impraBlcabk to fuch, as pof-^ 
Jefs it not. 

It mufl be owned, faid I, that this is 
a Satisfaction, and may be fome kind of 
Affiftance in a melancholy Hour. And 
yet this very Dodlrine naturally leads to 
another Objection. — Does not the Difficulty 
of attaining Habit too well fupport a certain 
AlTertion, that, defend Virtue as we will, 
'tis but a Scheme of ^ef -denial "^ 

By Self-denial, faid he, you mean, I 

fuppofe, fomething like what follows 

Appetite bids me eat ; Reafon bids me for- 
bear If I obey Reafon, I de?iy Appetite; 

and Appetite being a Part of myfclf to 
deny it, is a Self-de?iial. What is true thus 
in Luxury, is true alfo in other Subjed:s ; is 
evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of 
Rcfentment, or whatever elfe we purfue 

by 



^Dialogue. 239 

by the Didate of any PaiTion. You Part II. 

appear, faid I, to have flated the Objedtion 
juftly. 

To return then to our Inftance, faid he, 
of Luxury. Appetite bids me eat ; Reafon 

bids me forbear If I obey Reaforiy I deny 

Appetite and if / obey Appetite ^ do I not 

deny Reafon ? Can I a^ either way^ with- 
out rejecting one of them ? And is not 
Reafon a Fart of myfelf^ as notorioufly as 
Appetite ? 

Or to take another Example — I have 
a Depolite in my Hands. Avarice bids 
me retain — Confcience bids me reftore. Is 
there not a reciprocal Denial^ let me obey 
^hich I will? And is not Confcience a Fart 
of me J as truly zs Avarice? 

Poor Self indeed muft be denied, 
take w^hich Party v^^e w^ill. But why 
fliould Virtue be arraigned of thwarting it, 

more than Vice her contrary ? Make the 

mofl of the Argument, it can come but to 

this — - 



240 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. this If Self-denial be an Objection to 

Virtue, fo is it to Vice If Self-denial be 

no Objedlion to Vice, no more can it be to 
Virtue. A wonderful and important Con- 
clulion indeed ! 

He continued by faying, that the Soul 
of Man appeared not as 2ifmgle Faculty, but 
as compounded of many that as thefe Fa- 
culties were not always in perfect Peace 
one with another, fo there were few Ac- 
tions which we could perform, where they 
would be all found to concur. What then 

are we to do ? Sufpend till they agree ? 

Abfurd, impoffible. Nothing therefore 

can remain, but to weigh well their feveral 
Pretenfionsj attend to all, that each has 
to offer in its behalf j and finally to purfue 
the Didates of the JVifcft and the Beji. 
This done, as for the Self-denial, which 
we force upon the reft -, with regard to our 
own CharaSler, 'tis a Matter of Honour 

and Praife with regard to the Faculties 

denied, 'tis a Matter of as fmall Weight, as 
to contemn the Noife and Clamours of a 

mad 



A Dialogue. 241 

mad and fenfelefs Mob, in deference to the Part IL 
fober Voice of the worthier, better Citi- 
zens. And what Man could be juftified, 
Should he rejedl thefe, and prefer a Rabble ? 

§. 10. In this place he paufed again, 
and I took occalion to acknowledge, that 
my Obje(5tion appeared obviated. As the 
Day advanced apace, he advifed that we 
might return homej and walking along 
leifurely, thus refumed to himfelf the Dif- 
courfe. 

I dare fay, continued he, you have it.z'^ 
many a wife Head fhake, in pronouncing 
that fad Truth, how we are gover?7ed all by 

Interest. — And what do they think 

fhouid govern us elfe ? Our Lofs, our 

Damage, our Difintereji^ Ridiculous 

indeed ! We fhouid be Idiots in fuch cafe, 
more than Rational Animals. The only 
Queftion is, where Jnterejt truly lies : for if 
this once be well adjuiled, no Maxim can 
be more harmlefs. 

R '< I 



cc 



242 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. "I find myfelf exifting upon a little 
" Spot, fbrrounde^ every way by an im- 

" menfe unknown Expanfion. Where 

" am I ? What fort of Place do I 

inhabit ? Is it exactly accommodated,. 

in every Inftance, to my Convenience ? 
" Is there no Excefs of Cold, none of 
" Heat, to offend me ? Am I never an- 
" noyed by Animals, either of my own 
" kind, or a different ? Is every thing 
" fubfervient to me, as tho' I had ordered 

" all myfelf ? No — nothing like it 

" the fartheff from it poffible. The 

" World appears not then originally made 
" for the private Convenience ofmeahne? — 
" It docs not. — But is it not poffible fo to 
" accommodate it, by my own particular 

" Induflry? If to accommodate Man 

" and Beaff, Heaven and Earth, if this be 
" beyond me ^ 'tis not poffible.— What 
" Confequence then follows ? Or can 

" there be any other than this if I feek 

" an Inter eji of my own^ detached from that 

" of 



A Dialogue. 243 

" of others-^ Ifeek an hit er eft which is chi- Part IT. 
" mericalj and canneiser have Exijience ? 



"How then muft I determine > Have 
I no Intereft at all ? — If I have not, I 
am a Fool for flaying here. 'Tis a 
fmoaky Houfe, and the fooner out of 
it, the better.— But v^hy no Intereil? — . 
Can I be contented with none, but one 
feparate and detached ? — Is a Social 
Interest joined with others fuch an 
Abfurdity, as not to be admitted ? The 
Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herd^- 
ing Animals, are enough to convince 
me, that the thing is, fome where at 
leaj}, poffible. How then am I afTured, 

that 'tis not equally true of Man ? 

Admit it j and what follows ? — If fo, 
then Honour and Justice are my 
Interest — then the whole Train 
OF Moral Virtues are my Inte- 
R E s T J without fome Portion of which ^ 
not even Thieves can maintain Society, 



R 2 " But 



^44 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. "But farther ftill — -. I Hop not here— 
I purfue this Social hitereji^ as far as I 
can trace my feveral Relations, I pafs 
from my ov/n Stock, my own Neigh- 
bourhood, my own Nation, to the whole 
Race of Mankind^ as difperfed through- 



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*' cut the Earth. — Am I not related to them 
" all, by the mutual Aids of Commerce ; 






by the general Intercourfe of Arts and 
Letters; by that common Nature^ of 

which we all participate ? Again 

I mull have Food and Clothing. 

V/ithout a proper genial Warmth, 
I inflantly perifli. Am I not rela- 
ted, in this view, to the very Earth 
" itfelf ? To the diftant Sun, from 
whofe Beams I derive Vigour ? To that 
ftupendous Courfe and Order of the infi- 
nite Hofl of Heaven, by which the Times 

*' and Seafons ever uniformly pafs on ? 

" Were this Order once confounded, I 
" could not probably furvive a Moment ; 
*' Jo abfolutely do I depend on this common ge^ 

" neral JVelfare, 

" What 



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A Dialogue. 245 

« What then have I to do, but to Part II. 

** enlarge Virtue into Piety? Not' 

" only Honour and Jiifiice^ and what I 

" owe to Man, is my Litereji j but Grati- 

" tude alfo, Acquiefcence^ Refgnatioriy Ado- 

" ration, and all I owe to this great Polity, 

" and its greater Governor, our com- 

" MON Parent. 

" But if all thefe Moral and Di- 
" vine Habits be my Interest, I 
" need not furely feek for a better. I 
" have an Interefl compatible with the 

Spot on which I live 1 have an In- 

terefl: which may exift, without altering 
" the Plan of Providence j without wra^- 
ing^ or marring the general Order of 
Events — I can bear what ever happens, 
with manlike Magnanimity ^ can be 
" contented, and fully happy in the Good, 
" which I pofTefs ; and can pafs thro' this 
" turbid, this fickle, fleeting Period, with- 
** out Bewailings, or Envyings, or Mur- 
" murings, or Complaints.'* 

And 



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246 Concerning HAPPINESS, 

Part II. And thus, my Friend, have you my 
Sentiments, as it were abridged ; my Sen- 
timents on that Subjed:, which engages 
every one of us. For who would be un- 
happy ? Who would not, if he knew 
how, enjoy 07ie perpetual Felicity ? Who 
are there exifling, who do not at every 
inftant feek it ? 'Tis the Wifh, the Em- 
ploy, not of the Rational Man only, but 
of the Sot, the Glutton, the very loweft 
of our Herd. For my own Syftem, whe- 
ther a juft one, you may now examine, 
if you think proper. I can only fay on 
its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, 
'tis a grateful Error, which I cherifli and 
am fond of And yet if really fuch, I 
fliall never deem it fo facred, as not wil- 
lingly, upon Convidion, to refign it up to 
Truth. 

Little pafs'd after this worth rela- 
ting. We had not far to walk, and we 
fell into conimon Topics. Yet one Obfer- 

vation 



A Dialogue. 247 

vation of his I mufl not omit. 'Twas Part II. 

what follows. When we are once, 

faid he, well habituated to this chie?*, 
this MORAL Science, then Logic 
and Physics become two profitable 
AdjunBs : Logicy to fecure to us the 
Pofleffion of our Opinions j that, if an 
Adverfary attack, we may not bafeiy give 
them up : Phyjics, to explain the Reafon 
and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that 
we may know fomething of that Univerfe, 
where our Dwelling has been appointed 
us. But let me add a Saying (and may 
its Remembrance never efcape you) while 
you find this great, this Majier-Science 
wanting, value Logic but as Sophijiry, and 
Phyjics but as Raree-Jhew -y for both, affure 
yourfelf, will be found nothing better. 

'TwAS foon after this that our Walk 
ended. With it ended a Converfation, 
which had long engaged us; and which, 
according to my Promife, I have here en- 
deavoured to tranfcribe. 

THE END. 



Advertifement to the Reader. 

Q^H E Author has chofen to feparate all 
Notes from his firji and third Trea- 
tifes^ and thus fubjoin them to the End^ 
becaufe thofe T^reatifes^ being written in 
Dialogue, from their Nature and Genius 
admit not of Interruption, One of his 
Reafons for addijig Notes was^ to give 
Weight to his Ajjertions from the Autho- 
thority of antient Writers. But his chief 
and principal Rea/on was, to excite (if 
pojfible) the Curiofity of Readers, to exa- 
mine with friBer Attention thofe val.able 
Remains of antlejit Literature. Should 
he obtain this End, he Jhall think his 
Labours (Juch as they are J abundantly 
rewarded. 



NOTES 

O N 

TREATISE the Firft 

CONCERNING 

A 



? 





NOTE I. p. 6. All Art is (^AvSE.'jJriis 
maxume proprium, creare & ngnere. Cic. 
de Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 22. '"^r^ 'Ts tIvv?i 
noia-oi Trfpl ymo-iv. JU Art is employe:'. .';: Produc- 
tion^ that is, in making fomethitig to be. Arijlot. 
Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6. c. 4. 

The a^tve efficient Caufes have been ranged 
and enumerated after different manners. In the 
fame Ethics, they are enumerated thus — allix ya,^ 

-TTxv TO ^l av9pw7r». The feveral Caufes appear^ to be 

Nature, NeceJJity, and Chance ; and heftdes thefe. Mind 

or Intelkif, and whatever operates by or thro' Man. 

1. 3. c. 3. The Paraphraft Andronicus in explaining 

this laft Paflage, nay to ^t' ayGpcoVs, adds v.'oy tsxi-w, 

^ aAAr) tj? 7rpa?if, <7i 7^^' injlance Art^ or any other 

human ASlion, 

Alex- 



252 NOTES on Treatise the Firji, 

AiEXANDER ApHRODisiENSis fpeaks of effi- 
cient Caufes as follows : 'AAAa ij.riv rd nvpiug amoe, 

Caufes^ which are JtrMly and properly efficient^ are 
Nature^ Art^ and each MarC s particular Choice of Action. 
uri^i ^■'^'Xi? P- 1 60. B. Edit. Aid. 

In what manner Art is diftinguifhed from the reft 
of thefe efficient Caufes, the fubfequent Notes will 
■ijittempt to explain. 

Note II. p. 6. Of that Painter famed 
IN Story, i2c.'\ See Valer. Max. 1. 8. c. 11. 

Note III. p. 12. Art is Man becoming 
A Cause, Intentional and Habitual.] Ari- 
Jlotle^ in his Rhetoric^ thus accurately enumerates 
all the poffible manners, either diredt or indi- 
re(5t, in which Mankind may be faid to a£l or 
do any thing, rtaylfj J'*) TrpalrBO-J Travra, ra jw,£v, 
a 01 au/»? Ta Of, oj aul«f Twf jueu sv juti ci a.\i\\i<;^ 

V otra jM.*i dJ aula? 7rp« lTi<(ri, ra jutv, aro rjp(;;tij ra o£, 
.'^uVft* ra ^£ S/oi "O(yoc St i\ clvlvi;, xa* coy aulol 
<?i7ioij ra ^£v ^j jflof, ra J'f J'j o^s^iv' nxi to, [j.h Six 
Aoj^JOJiW opi^iv, ra ^« (Jt aAoj/tj-oy. '/r* ^£ *l jM.£U 
CaAJicj?, [/.ilx Koyn o^E^fj? aj/aSa — aAoj'Ot ^ ooi^ngy 
opyri xai ETTiOu^ja. coff Trocvltx. ocx TrpdlTnaii)^ ocvdy- 
■iin ttpixItiiv Si diVoci fVIa* SiOt rv^viVy Sioi S/av, Jia 



NOTES on Treatise the Firjl, 253 

All Men do all Things either ofthemfehes^ or not of 
them/elves. The Things which they do not of them [elves y 
they do either by Chance, or from Necejfity ; and the 
Things done from Neceffity, they do either by Compulfton, 
which is External Necejfity, or by Nature, which is 
Internal. So that all Things wkatfoever, which Men 
do not of themf elves, they do either by Chance, or from 
Compulfion, or by Nature. 

Again, the Things, which they do of themfelves, and 
cf which they are themfelves properly the Caufes, fome 
they do thra' Cujlom and acquired Habit, others thro* 
original and natural Defre. Farther, the Things done 
thro' natural Defire, they do either thro' fuch Defire ■ „. 
ajffttd by Reafon, or thro' fuch Defire devoid of Reafori:" ■ 
If it be afijled by Reafon, then it affumes^the Denomi" 

nation of Will; on the contrary, the irrational Defire! 

are Anger and Appetite. 

Hence it appears that all Things whatevei-, which 
Men do, they neceffarily do thro' one of thefe feven-: 
Caufes, either thro' Chance, Compulfon, Nature, Cu- 
fiom^ Will, Anger, Appetite. Arijl. Rhet. 1. i. 
c. 10. 

ly remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to 
confTder with which of thefe Caufes we ought to 
arrange Art. 

A's to Chance, it may be obferved in general 
of all Cafual Events, that they always exclude Inten- 
tion or Defgn ; But Intention and Defign, are from 

Art 



'e 



254 NOTES on Treatise the Firft, 

Jrt infeparable. Thus is the Difference between 
u^rt and Chance manifeft. 

As to External Compulsion, we have it 

thus defcribed ^'.xm J'e, Z ji co^yji £rw0£v. That is 

an A£f of Compulfwn^ the efficient Principle of which is 
from without^ independent of the Doer. Ethie. Nic. 
\. 3. c. I. Again, in the fame Treatife, 1. 6. 
c. 4. we are told of the Works of Jrt^ that they 
are fuch, m n dpyji h 1w ttoJvIj, the efficient Principle 
cf which is in the Doer or Agent. Thus therefore is 
Art diftinguiihed from Compulfton, 

These two Caufes, Chance and Compulficn, are 
mentioned and confidered in the Dialogue, Pages 6 
and 7. 

Nature, or rather Natural Necessity, is 
that Caufe, thro' which we breath, perfpire, digeft, 
circulate our Blood, ^c. Will, Anger, and Appetite, 
are (as already obferved) but fo many Species of 
Natural Desire, confidered either as afilfted by 
Reafon, or elfe as devoid of it. Now tho' Natural 
Defre and Natural Neceffity differ, becaufe in the 
ohe we acl fpontaneoufly, in the other not fpontane- 
oufy, yet both of them meet in the common Genus 
of Natural Pozver. Moreover this is true of all Na- 
tural Power, that the Pciuer itfelf is prior to any 
Energies or Ads of that Power. 'Oj yci^ ix la -rroX- 
Xaxi; l^Tv, n TroAAaxtj aKnaoti, ra? ccKx^rxTHi; iXd^o- 

w£i'Oi ix°l*-^^- ^°^ i^^° inftance in the natural Powers 
ofSenfation] it was not from often feeing, and often ^ 

hearings 



NOTES on Treatise the Firft. 255 

hearingy that we acquired thofe Senfes ; but on the (on~ 
trary^ being firji pojfejjed of them^ we then ufid them^ 
not through any Ufe or Exercife did we come to pojfefs 
them. Arijl. Ethic. 1. 2. c. i. 

Now the contrary to this is true in the cafe of 
any Powers or Faculties not natural^ but acquired by 
Cujlom and Ufage. For here there are many Ener- 
gies and A£tSy which muft neceflarily precede the 
Exiftence of fuch Power or Habit, it being evident 
(as is faid in the fame Chapter) that U "l^v oixoixv 
mpyuiov ai e'^ej? yiyvovlai^ from fimilar and homoge- 
neous Energies, it is that Habits are obtained. So 
again, in the fame Place, a yx^ ^eT fxac^ovloig ttoie'^j^ 

ymvlcni, xoc\ xi^(x,^i^o\flig Ki^oc^i^-oci. The Things which 
we are to do by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus 
by building Men become Builders, and by pra£iifing Mufc 
they become Muficians. 

Thus therefore is Art diftinguifhed from all 
Natural Power of Man, whether Natural 
NeceJJity, Will, Anger, or Appetite. But Art has 
been already diftinguiflied from Chance and Com- 
pulsion. So that being clearly not the fame with 
ftx of thofe feven Caufes by which all Men do all 
Things, it mufl needs be referred to xhs. feventh^ 
that is, to Custom or Habit. 

It muft be obferved, the natural Caufes or Powers 
in Man, confidered as diftinct from Art, are treated 
in the Dialogue, Pages 8 and 9. 

And 



256 NOTES oti Treatise the Firjf, 

And now as we have fhewn Art to be a certain 
Caufe Ivor king in Man^ it remains to fhew how it is 
diftinguiflied from thoje other Caiifei hsfide Man, which 
we fuppofe to operate in the Univerfe. Thefe are 
either fuch Cau/es as are below him, like the VegetO' 
tive Power, which operates in Vegetables, the Sen- 
fttive in Animals ; or elfe fuch Cau/es as are above 
him, like God, and whatever is elfe of Intelligence 
more than human. 

The Causes below us may be all included in 
the common Genus of Nature; and of Nature we 
may fay univerfall}'-, as well of Nature without us 
as within us, that its feveral Operatio?is, contrary to 
thofe of Art, are not in the leajl degree, derived from 

Cujiom or Ufage. Thus the Author above cited 

'OjcJfy yi^o Twy (puVtt oylojv a^Xccg l^i^slut' olov Aj'Qo? 

ccv y-vpixKiq avlov i^'i^yi tj? avco /)*7r/wy, adi to -rrvp 
aalw. None of thofe Things, which are what they are by 
Nature, can be altered by' being accuflomed. TTytts a Stone ^ 
which by Nature is carried downzvard, can never be 
accuflomed to mount uptuard, no not tho' any one 
Jf)Ould ten thoufand times attempt it by throwing the 
Stone upward. The fame may be faid of accufloming 
Fire to move downward. Ethic. Nico?n. 1. 2. c. i. 
Again, in the fVorks of Nature, fuch as Trees, 
Animals, and the like, the efficierit Principle is vi- 
tally united to the SuhjeSis, wherein it operates. 

h duloig iyjtTi Txujx tvv a^'x/iv. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6. 
c. 4. But in the IForks of Art, fuch as Statues or 
Houfes, the efficient Principle is di [united from the 
SubJe^Si and exifts not in the Things done or made, 

but 



'i^ OTES on Treatise the FIrJ, 257 

but in the Doer or Artiji—^m % ap^n Iv tZ ttoi^vV^ 
uWx f/,v iv 1w TTomfxivo). Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4. It 
is indeed poflible that, even in Works of Art^ the 
SubjeSl and efficient Caufe may be united^ as in the 
Cafe of a Phyfician becoming his own Patient, and 
curing himfelf. But then it mufl be remembered 
that this Union is Kxroi <T\:iA^e^-ny.oqj merely acci- 
dentali and no way ejfential to the conftituting of 
Art, confidered as Art. By this therefore is A r t 
clearly diftinguifhed from Nature, whofe Defi- 
nition informs us that it is —oi.^'^ t»V xa« aM/a ts 
xn/£»(&«» H, r\^i^ii)i h u VTToip^ii 7rpw7wf, H>x9' a.'J]o 
xj {xri v.x\(x, <TVfM^£^r,y.o;. A certain Principle or Caufe of 
moving and ceaf.ng to move, in fome Stibje^ wherein 
fuch Principle exifis immediately^ ejfentially, and not by 
way of Accident. Arift. Natur. Aufc. 1. 2. c. i. 



The Cau s e s, which are of Rank superiouR 
to Man, fuch as the Deity, can have nothing 
to do with Art, becaufe being (as is £aid in the 
Dialogue, p. 11.) perfect and complete, and knowing 
all from the Beginning, th^y can never admit of what 
is additional and fecond.ary. Art therefore can only 
belong to Bei?igs, like Men, v/ho being imperfe£l 
know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them 
by Helps fecondary and fubfcquent. It was from a 
like Confideration that Pythagoras called himfelf a 
Philosopher, that is to fay (according to his own 
Explication of the Name) a Lover and Seeker of 
what was wife and good, but not a PofTefTor, 
which he deemed a Charadler above him. Con- 
fonant to this we read in Plato's Banquet, GrJu 



258 NOTES on Treatise the Firji, 

y^^, &c. No God philofopkizes, or defires to become 
ivife, FOR He is so already. No?-, if there 
he any other Being ivife, doth he philofophize for the 
fame Reafon. On the other hand, neither do the Indocil 
philofophize ; for this is the Misfortune of Indocility, 
without being virtuous, good or prudent, to appear ts 
tnefeff fufficient in all thefe Refpe^s. In general there- 
fore, he who thinketh himfelf in no want, defireth 
not that, luhich he thinks himfelf not to need. IVho 
then, faid Socrates to Diotima, (the Speaker of this 
Narration) Who are those who philoso- 
phize, if they are 7ieither the Wife nor the Indocil? 
That (replied Ihe) may be noiv cotifpicuous even to a 
Child. They are those of middle Rank, 

BETWEEN these EXTREMES. Plat. p. 203. 

torn. 3. Edit. Serrani. 

Here we fee (agreeably to what is faid in the 
Dialogue, pages ir. and 12.) that as to acquired 
or fecondary Habits, fonie Beings are too excellent 
for them, and others too bafe ; and that the Deity 
above all is in the Number of thofe traKfcen- 
dent, and is thus, as a Caiife, diftinguilhed from 
Art. 

There are, befides the Deity and Nature now 
fpoken of, certain other external Caufcs, which are 
mentioned in the firft Note as diftinc^ from Art ; 
namely Chance and Necefity. But of thefe hereafter, 
when we confider the i>ubje^ of Art. 

Note 



NOTES on T RE AT 15E tbe Fir/I. 259 

Note IV". p. 13. Faculties, Powers, ^c. 

ARE obscure and HIDDEN ThINGS ENER- 
GIES AND Operations lie open to the 
Senses.] 'E» SI ^^ri Xsynv ri ixxrov tsIwv, olov 

1 TO WTliiy.CVy 7] TJ TO aioJriHXOV, Trpo/fpOV iTTlT- 

)Cc7r/£ov, Ti' TO vo£iu, noi] Ti TO d^avi^xi' Trpo- 
ItpM yxp xa» (Tx(pig~ipoci Tr^oq vifxixg ruv ouva/ASW./ 
Iiirt at £Vfp9/£tat. Trcosi/IuJ/pi^aivonASy J/'ap aujair, tzt 
ra? Juva^otEjj aVo tsIcou lirivo^fxiv. Jf we are to ex- 
plain what each of thefe things are^ as for hijlance^ what 
the intelligent Principle^ what the fenfttive, we miifi 
firfi inquire ivhat it is to think, what to fee, hear, and 
life the Senfes. For with refpe£i to us Men, the 
Energies are prior and more evident tha7i 
the Powers, becaufe it is in the Energies we are 
firfl converfant, and comprehend the Powers from them. 
Themift. in lib. 2. de Anima, p. 76. Edit. Aid. FoL 

Note V. p. 15. Are there not Pre- 
cepts, ^V.] Vid. Plat, in Min. torn. 2. p.3i6j 
17. Edit. Serran^. 

As to thofe low Habits here mention'd, from 
which we diftinguilh Jrt by the Number and Dignity 
of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Deno- 
mination of M«1«ioTf;!(,i'»a, of which ^intilian gives 
the following Account. MxlocioliX"^^^ quoque ejl 
qucedam, id efi, fupervacua Artis Imitatio, qitce nihil 
fane nee boni nee mail habeat, fed vanum laborem : 
qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, es fpatio diflante 
mijfa, in acum continuo ^ fine fruflratione inferebat : 
quern, atm fpe^affet Alexander ^ donaffe dicitur ejufdem 

S 2 legu- 



26o NOTES on Treatise theFirJl* 

leguminis modio. ^lod quidem pramium fuit illo opere 
dignijfimum. Inft. Orat. 1. 2. c. 20. 



Note VI. p. 17. An Habitual Power in 
Man of begoming the Cause of some Ef- 
fect, ACCORDING TO A SySTEM OF VARIOUS 
AND WELL-APPROVED PrECEPTS ] 

The Peripatetic Definition of Art is "E^ij jasla 

AoT» «A>5S-«? 7roiri]ix.v — ^n efficient Habit ^ joined with 

found and true Reafon. Ariftot. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4. 

The Stoic Definition, as we find it in Sext. 
Empir. adverfiis Logicos, p. 392. is, Xdrriy-a. U 

Twy h Tu |Siw. Thus tranflated by Cicero in Dio- 
denies de Grannnat. I. 2. Ars ejl Perceptionirm exerci- 
tataruni £olk^io, ad unum exitwn vitce iitikm perti- 
ncntium. And again by ^intilian^ Inft. Orat. 1. 2. 
c. 18. Art em conjiare ex perceptionibus confentientibus 
'& coexercitatis ad finem iitikfn vita:. The fame De- 
finition is alfo alluded to in the Academics of Cicero, 

1. 2.' c. 7. where it is faid Ars vera qua potejl 

effie, nift qua non ex U7ia, ant diiabus^fed ex multis animi 
perceptionibus conjlat? 

There is a third Definition of Art cited by 
^mtilian in the fime place, and afcribed by him to 

Ckanthes — Ars eji potejlas via (id ejf, ordine) efficiens. 

N o w if v/e compare thefe Definitions with that 
in the Dialogue, we (hall find them all to correfpond. 

"The Habitual Power in Man of beconmig the Caufe of 
fme Effe^j is the fame as "e^j- 7roinlix-n in the 

Peripa- 



NOTES 0/2 Treatise /ZvF/V/. 261 

Peripatetic Definition. According to a Syjlem of vari- 
ous and well-approved Precepts^ is the fame as ^,{\x 
Aoya aA>i.&af . For found and true Reafon muft; needs 
be the Bafis of allfuch Precepts. 

Again, as to the fecond Definition— -The Words 

Su'rujua y.oC\aX-n^i(,iv [a Syfiem of Comprcheiifons, or of 
certain and evident Truths'] correfpond to the latter 

Part of the Definition in the Dialogue According 

to a Syjiem of various and well-approved Precepts. The 
Word ifyiyu^MvocfT^ivm [that is to fay, ivorhd in by 
Habit and Excercife] correfponds to the firft Part, 
thzt Jrt is a Caufe founded in Habit. And the reft 
[tt^oj r\ TiX^, Iffc. that is to fay, a Syjiem which 
kas refpe£f to fome ufiful and fervic cable End or Purpofe 
in Human Lip] Ihews the Syftem here mentioned 
to regard Practice and A^ion^ not Theory and Specii 
lation. And thus does it correfpond with the Defi- 
nition of the Dialogue, where it is faid that Art is 
an Habitual Power not of merely conteinplating and 
hioiving^ but of becoming the Caufe of fome Effe£l, 
It is not indeed exprelled in the Dialogue, that this 
Effed has refped to the Utility of Human Life., be- 
caufe this latter Circumjlance is referved to the Defi- 
nition of t\\Qfjial Caufe of Art, given page 29. 

As to the third Definition of Art, poteflas via 
efjiciens.^ a Power operating methodically., it may be 
obferved, that by being called an operating Power, it 
is diftinguilhed from Powers purely fpeculative \ and 
as it is faid to operate methodically .^ or in a Road and 
regular Procefs^ it is difiingiiifiied fi-om Chance as 
well as blind Neceffty. And thus far it correfponds ■ 

S 3 with 



262 NOTES on Treatise the Firjl. 

with what is offer'd in the Dialogue. But it does 
not appear from this Definition, whether the Power 
therein menlioned be Original and Natural, or 5^- 
condary and Habitual, becaufe Pov/ers of either fort 
may operate methodically. And perhaps Ckanthes 
intended not to diflinguifh fo far, but took Art in 
that larger and more general Senfe, adopted fome- 
times by the Stoics ; as when they defcribe Nature 
her jelf to be a WZa n'xyiv.o)) oow ^xSi^ov rr^oq yiviinv, 
an artificial Fire, proceeding methodically to Production 
or Creation. For it is not to be imagined, they in- 
tended by this to infmuate that Nature was a Fire, 
which had learnt by Habit fo to operate. On the 
contrary, by artificial it is probable they intended 
no more than fome a£iive efficient Principle, working 
with Reafon, Order, and Method ; of which Principle 
they confider'd Fire to be the propereji Vehicle, as 
being of all Bodies the moft fubtle, and that into 
which the reft are all ultimately refolvable. Fide 
Dicg. Laert. K. 7. Seci. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 
i. 2. c. 22. 

Note VII. page 22. It should seem that 

THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SuBJECT OF Art 

-vvAs — All those contingent Natures j 

WHICH lie within THE REACH OF HuMAN 

Powers to influence.] 

The Cause here treated is the Material, 
the "YA'/i, or 'TTtoY.it^iw\\, or to t^ Z yivslxi rt 

Of a Contingent, we have the following Defini- 
tion —'•- Ar'j'w d' iJiy^i&c^i, yp TO i))pi'/J>i/.tvov, ov 

u.'0 



NOTES (?;2 Treatise the Firjh 263 

iix T»7' ffJdvxrov. I call that a Con r i n g k n t , which 
net being necejfary^ hut being fuppofed to he^ there will 
follow nothing impojfihle from fuch Suppofition, Arift, 
Anal, prior. I. i. c. 13. 

That this is true in Works oi Art^ is evident. 
It is not necejfary, that a given Fragment of fuch a 
Rock fliould affume the Figure of Hercules : but 
there follows nothing impojfihle^ if we fuppofe it fo 
tigured. 'Tis for this reafon, that the SuhjeSt of 
Art is in the Dialogue called a Contingent. 

But however, to explain the whole of what is 
faid in this Place, it is neceOary to go backward, 
and deduce what we would fay from fome remoter 
Confiderations, 



The Peripatetics held the E^id or Aim of their 
Philofophy to be the difcovering and knowing the 

■AfX'^s the primary and creative Principle of all 
Thijigs, They purfued this Inquiry, by beginning their 
Contemplation from thofe things, which are to usfirfl 
in the Order of our Comprehenfion, and fo afcend- 
ing gradually to that which is truly firfl^ in the real 
Order of Beings. 

The firfl and original Ohje5ls of our Compre- 
henfion are thofe nearer and more immediate, 
viz. the OhjeSis of Sejife, with which we are fur- 
rounded on every Side. Thefe Ohjeds we perceive 
to be all in motion ; and the Motions are multiform, 
various^ and often oppofite to each other. The Con- 

S 4 fequence* 



264 N O T ES c« Treatise the Firjl. 

fequences of this we perpetually behold. By fuch 
Motions we fee that not only the mere local Site of 
thefe Beings is changed, but their very Bulk, and 
Figure, and ^falities i n%y more than this, even 
the Beings tkemfehes are made to feparate and perijh, 
while neiv Beings arife from the Re-alTemblage of the 
fcattered Parts, which Parts different Motions can as 
well concrete, as di [unite. The Beings or OhjeSls of the 
Charader here defcribed, the Peripatetics denoted un- 
der the common Appellation of the tcx mv^iAivoc ^ 
(p^ct^oi, the Beings moving and corruptible. 

From thefe moving and perijhahle Obje£ls, they 
paffed to \hoi<t fuhlimer and more tranfcendeni Obje6ls 
of Senfe, which they faw adorn the Heavens. Here 
likewife they difcovered Motion ; but then this Mo- 
tion was nnifor?n and conjlajit ; affeSfing not the Be- 
ings moved, fave in the relation of local Site. As 
therefore they beheld no Change in the Form and 
EJfence of thefe Beings, they deemed them [upon 
their Hypothefis) incorruptible, and out of them efta- 
blifhed another Clafs of Beings, that is to fay, the 
Tot >t»v»|«.fiia xsc\ d(p^a.^la, the Beings moving and in- 
corruptible. 

From thefe fublimer OhjeBs of Senfe, they 
paffed to Objc5ls of pure IntellcB ; to Bodies devoid 
of all Motion, and of all ^lallty, fave that in- 
feparable one of Figure ; fuch Bodies for inftance 
as the Cube, the Sphere, and the reft of Bo- 
dies mathematical. From mathematical Bodies, and 
the 1'ruths rcfulting from them, they paffed to 
the Contemplation of Truth in general; to the 
Scul, and its Powers both of Intuition and Syl- 

logization ; 



NOTES on Treatise the Firft. 265 

hgization ; to Behig unlverfal^ and above both Time 
and Place ; and thus at laft to that fupreme Caufe^ 
the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the 
famey immutable and eternal. The feveral Obje^s of 
this intclledtiial Comprehenfion they (|iled not merely 
«(p0ap7a, but oKp^oiflx >^ dunyiloi. Beings incorrup- 
tible and immoveable. 



In this manner did the Peripatetics fpeculate. 
And hence was it they eftablifhed to themfelves three 

Species of Philofophical Employment one about 

Beings motionlefs and eternal ; another, about Beings 
moveable and eternal -^ and a third, about Beings 
moveable and perijhable. The firft they held the 
proper Employment of the Metaphyfician i the two 
kft of the AJirommer and the Naturaliji. 

Aio r^sTq oil Traa.yfj.otliCa.i' ^ /iaeu TTf^i otxivvilov* -^ 

<|J3ao1a. Idcirco Tres funt Tra^ationes ; una^ de im- 
mobili ; altera de eo^ quod movetur quidem, fed efl 
interitus expers ; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiis. 
Ariftot. Natural. Aufc. 1, 2. c. 7. A»o ^ r^i7q oCl 
Tr^K'yy.xlsTo!.!' i fxivy ttio] y.m^ivc<, >^ (p^ocojoi' r> h 

a,(p^(x,^']a,. Themijlii Paraphrafis in he. 

This threefold Subje^ of Philofophic Inquiry 
is elegantly explained in the following Paflage. 
T* ti TO T£A(^ £5"! T^f 'AptrolfAjxri,- (piXoa-Qpiccq ; 
ipocixiv on yv(iivoi.i Try Travjojv *?%*!"> '"l" twk Travrwy 
SrifMVPyov anwVy ttiu as* X; wcrs^ylc-j s^H(rxv' cctto- 

SiiKVVCl 



266 NOTES on Treatise the Firft, 

a 7x Travlx TrocpocycoJon. T:ivcc di roc ayovloc r.fxai; 

f jV THTO to Ti\^ ; (pCCfJl.h on ^ SiS<X.<T)i(X.XlX TWU £V 

iv 'y$vi(r£i Xj (p^oftx, a,7ro yccp riilodv^ ^ix jw,f(rwv ]wa- 
S^fjUalJHWv, ex.vdfofA.ev Ix'jlSg httj ra asi x^ ua-ccv'lu)^ 
f;^ov/a ' jojau /a c»£ Eft rex, ovccx.-jix' xai ktw, |t/,£Tot 
Txg acroofjiXTiig v<Tia?y STTi rviy irpiiiln'j ttxvIcov apx/iv. 
n.Oi(j'/i; ydp xivvKTEWf, r\ v.ot]' H<rKX,v aVjif, ri y.x]ci 7ro»oy, 
?j xala TOTTov, ra ^xeu Iu ytvitrn ^ (p^oox y,cc\d 7r«(7au 
x»k'j;(riv Hn'Si/ja; 'ra J'f ou<>ay;5i xa/a jwoutiu tjiv xali^ tottov. 
Ac P^f"1 Ei;T«jt7w? oasvsi'j «7ro twv ttoAut^oV&jj xiv8iu.£vwi> 
iTTJ ra xali^ ^/aUj x, f/.ovw xivKcriv ximfj-zViXy ^ »tw? 
ettI THN AKINHTON KAf AEI flSAT- 
TnS EXOT2AN APXHN. A/-^.u&y<« £»V t«V 
acclnyo^toct;, p. I2. £"J/V. /^^;/^/. 8vo, 1545. 

The Author of the Dialogue has had Reference 
to this threefold Divifton of SubjeSfs^ as may be feen 
in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occafion 
to the prefent Comment. He has chofen however 
to ftile the ra 'Oj^avia, or Heavenly Bodies rather 
Contingents of higher Order than Beings necejhry^ as 
imagining the former to be their truer Charader. 

I T may be here added, that the Peripatetics con- 
fined <J>Jtj? or Nature^ for the moft part, to this 
Earth of our's, where they confidered her as the 
a^ive Principle of Life in Plants and Jnima Is. Hence 
therefore they diftinguifhed not htrEjfe^s from thofe 
of y/r/, by their Necefity (for the Effects of both 
they treated as contingent) but from the Caufe in 
2 Natural 



NOTES i'w Treatise the Firfi. 267 

Natural Subje(5ls operating within^ in Artificial with* 
out., as has been already oberved, p. 256, 257. 



It may be farther added, that they placed thefe 
Effects of Art and Nature, and indeed all other 
Contingents whatever, in a middle Rank between 
Things Nece^ffary, and Things ImpoJJihle. The Rea- 
fon was evident. Things Neceffary could not but 
be ; Things hnpojfihle could not be ; but Contingent: 
were ts^ iv^i'^dy.ivx xy iivxi ytj ^y\ hvxi., that is, were 
equally fufceptihle both of Being and Non-being » 

But yet tho' all Contingents admitted on their 
Hypothecs both of Being and Non-being, yet they 
fuppofed ibme to have a greater Tendency to Ex- 
iftehce, arid others to have a Jefs. The firfi: Species 
of thefe they ftiled t« tV sttI to ttoAu the TJnngi 
which happen for the moft part \ the laft, ra W 
\Xoi.r\Q-i^ the Things which happeti lefs frequently. 

Now as it is evident that both Nature and Art 
cftener obtain their Eiid, than mifs it (for complete 
Animals are more frequently born than Monfters, 
and the Mufician, if an Artift, ftrikes oftener the 
right String than the .wrong) hence it was, that 
they ranged the Effe^is of Nature and Art among 
thofe Contingents which were ra J? W\ to ttoAu, 
Contingents of greater Frequency. But yet as thefe 
Etfccts were not from the Hypothecs fieceffary^ and 
(ontrary to thefe upon occalion happened, hence it 
was, that whenever either Nature or Art became 
Caufcs of the t« W iXarlov^ thofe rarer Events, in 
/licii cafe they ^Nature and Artj were confidered 

by 



268 NOTES on Treatise the Firfl. 

by thefe Philofophers as oiiTUi xocla cru^uj3£|3>)xoj 
Cau/es by way of Accident ^ and not according to 
their own EJJence and diftinguifhing Chara^er. In 
fuch Inftances it was that they affumed the Nam6 
of Tdx^ or ' A'jlojaalov, Fortune or Chance, 
Ti/';)^v) having moftly Reference to Works of Men^ 
avloiJiCKlov to Works of Nature. The Inftances 
given by Thcmijlius^ in Cafes of Chance and Fortune, 
are as follow. A Tile falls from a Houfe. The 
End of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place, 
whither Nature would carry it by the common Law 
of Gravity. In falling it ftrikes and wounds a Paf- 
fenger. This lajl Event is from Chance. Again, a 
Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging, 
he difcovers a hidden Treafure. This lajl Event is 
from Fortune. And thus, adds ThertiiJiiuSy r cc\jlvi 
TTox^ig y^ pia, aAA» fjdv xaO' au7»ii> aMia;, aAA« Si 
xxra c-uju-iSfcW?. The fame individual ASiion is the 
Caufe of one Thing from its own peculiar Character, 
and of another Thing, by way of Accident. And again, 
£0 jU£y »v y^ Tww sTW? (n;,M.|3an/0Kl4jy *) rm (p^aiv >? rrlu 

y.xlr.viy^'n, aXX' ft a^a v.oc\oi (TVf/.(^s(^n>iog. —Of thefe 
F.vetits wc may call Nature or Human TVill in a man- 
ner the Caufe, hut yet ?iot fo from themfelves, and ac- 
cording to their own peculiar Effence ; for it was not 
for the Jake of what happened that either the PajTenger 
■went forth, or the Tile fell downward, but if 
any thing it was by Accident. Themift. in lib. 2. 
Natur. Aufcult. p. 26. Edit. Aid. See alfo Ariflot. 
Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 4, 5, 6. 

It 



NOTES on Treatise the Firfi. 2% 

I T muft be here obferved, that xxtoc (n;^j3£|3jixoV 
[by accident] means in no Part of thefe Quotations 
accidental^ as ftanding for cafual j for this would be 
mere Tautology, as to what is here faid concern- 
ing Chance. It means rather fomething by way 
of Appendage ; fomething Jdventitioiis ; in other 
Words, it means Accident ^ as adhering to Subftance, 
without which it can have no Being, tho' fuppofe it 
ahfent or taken away, the Nature of Subjiance is na 
way affe^ed. It was in this Senfe, the Peripatetics 
fuppofed Chance and Fortune to be Accidents or Ap^ 
pendages to Nature, and Mind. According there- 
fore to them, the Suppofition of Chance and Fortune 
was fo far from excluding Nature and Mind from 
the Univerle, that they demonftrably proved their 
Exiftence in it. For admitting their Account of 
Chance and Fortune to be juft j if we grant the Acci- 
dents to exift, much more mufl we grant the Sub-^ 
je^s, and this too with that fuperior Dignity and 
Priority of Exiftence, which is evidently due to all 
Subje6is above their Accidents. Well therefore did 
the Philofopher conclude \^iri^<iv a^a to' 'AyTo^aarov, 
xj ri Tvx^ T8 Na, y^ tvi; ^vascog. Sitbfequent in Ex~ 
ijience, are Chai^ce and Fortune to Mind and 
Nature. Arijlot, Natur. Aufc. 1. 2. c. 6. 

From what has been faid, we fee the Reafon of 
that Enumeration of Caufes mentioned in the Be- 
ginning of the firft Note, where they are defcribed 
to be Necessity, Nature, Man, and For- 
tune, 



To 



270 NOTES on Treatise the Flrji, 

To Necessity they referred all thofe Things 
and Events, which th^y fuppofed of 7ieceJJary Ex- 
ijlence\ fuch as the Univerfe, the Heavenly Bodies, 
and their Motions; Truth, and all Univerfals, 
together with the 'A^pc'-^j ^^ Principle, or firjl Caufe 
of all Things. 

To Nature, Man, and Chance, they re- 
ferred all Contingents \ to Nature and Man^ obtaining 
their End^ they referred Contingents of greater Fre- 
quency ; to the fame Caufes, confidered as operating 
bef.de their End, and thus becoming Chance or For- 
tune, tliey referred thofe oppofte Contingents^ of Ex- 
ijlence lefs ufual. 

And hence as Art and Fortune were both con- 
verfant about th&fa}ne Subje^s {viz. the Contingent, 
and not the Neceffary) and were both referable to 
the fame Origin (viz. Man, becoming a Caufe, ei- 
ther deftgnedly or undef.gnedly) hence the Meaning of 
that NexiQ, cit4;d by Arijlotle from Agatho ; 

Ti-xyn rcX'O ts^^i, >^ -r^x^ rix^vv. 
Art loveth Fortune \ Fortufie loveth Art. 

A s much as if he had faid, that thefe were 
iindred Poivers, which amicably confpired to affift 
each other ; that Art often helped Fortune, hy judi- 
cious ConduSl; and that Fortune often helped Art, 
by lucky Incidents. See Arijlot. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4. 
More might be cited, but we cannot lengthen a 
Note, which has proved, 'tis to be feared, too 
long already. 

Note 



NOTES en Treatise the Fif^fi, 271 

Note VIII. p. 23. I mean, said he, by 
Beginning, that Cause for the Sake of 
WHICH, is'c] 

As the Cause here fpoken of, is that Cau/i- 
ufu^lly called Final, it may be afked, how it 
comes in this place to be confidered as a Beginning. 
The Anfwer is, that what comes laji in PraSiice, 
(lands in Theory firjl ; or in other Words, the Order 
of Idea^ in the Intelle^ of the Artift is exadly in- 
verted, with refped to the Order of his Energies. 

Thus JmmDmiii^-''K^oc^oX>i yxp t?? [x\v BiwpUg 
TO teA©^ yiyviron «'P)(/i rv? Trpa^jwj* sfxTrocXiv h 
T»i? TTfioi^iug TO r\X^, u^x^ "^^^ S-fwpia;?. olov o 
'OtxoJo'/xf^, iTrjTaffi? ojV.ou, Xtyei x«9' lauTOv, Ittbtcc- 
yr,)) oTxcy Ta-oi^cat ' oWp lo (tkiztxt^x, xwXutdcoi? 
OjW,|3pwy >^ xjcu/AaTWV tbto (?£ jjk «i/ yivoiTOy fAn yivo" 
fxivni; Oj)o(p>5?. 'EwfuOjv av otp^srxi Trig Viu^ixg. zy^o- 
€aivu)'J Si (prtTiv' 'AAA* tsto »)c av "yivoiTO, (av yi'- 
voyt-ivuv Toip^wy* »Tot J't s?>t av ymivro, y.n u^o^SAjiO/v- 
Twv OfjW,fA/c«;y* oV J't Of^uiAtot »)c av |3A9i6£r£v, |U5i ofiv^- 
fificrn? T^>- >»if. EUT«v6« 'AficTiXn^sv y\ ^sooftia. E'JTivhv 
»w «pp^fT«t ?) TSfOc^K;. TjrpOTfpoy )'«^ opuTTH T>iy yrci* 
SiO' 8T« paAAjt Toy OfjasAioy* ItTa l}^£»p£» Toip^s;* x^ 
uj-epoy £^tT»3'i53"i TW opo^};y, ^t»? so tsA^ t^j 
-nrpa^fwf. Ji ^' apX'i "J"^? '^(X^^eu?, teA^j t^j Ocwpiar, 
A/Aju. f'i? KaTV)}/. p. 15. Edit. Venet. 8vo. 

For in general the End of Theory is the Beginning 
cfPraSfice, and fo reciprocally., the End of Pra^ice^ 

the 



272 NOTES on Treatise the Firjl. 

the Beginning of Theory. Thus for iiifiance : An Ar-- 
chite5l^ being ordered to build a Houfe, fays to himfelf 
I am ordered to build a Houfe ; that is to fay, a certain 
Defence, ta prote^l againfi the Rains and the Heats. 
But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From 
this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds 

and fays But there can he no Roof, if there be no 

Walls ; and there can be no Walls, without fome Foun- 
dations ; nor can there he laid Foundations, without open^ 
big the Earth. At this Point, the Theory is at an End. 
Hence therefore commences the Praclice or Action. For 
firfl he opens the Earth ; then lays the Foundation ; then 
raifes the Walls ; and lajily puts on the Roof, vjhich 
is the End of the A^ion or PraSlice, [but Beginning 
of the Theory'] as the Beginning of the Practice was the 
End of the Theory. See alfo Arifl. Ethic. Nicom. 
1'3- C.3. 

Note IX. p. 24. Was it not the Abfence of 
Health, i^c] Vide Platon. de Rep. 1. i. torn. 2. 
p. 341. Edit. Serrani. "Ho-Trf^ (^i(pnv lyu) sfjuf spoto 

iioTiiiA a.v, oTi •crayroicracrt [xiv iv uFpoa'anTiXi. dioc 

^O ZTQ'JTi^OV, Xp «X i^OC^KsT (X.VTlt> TCJ8TW B'.VCXl. ^lem'- 

admodum, inquam, fi a mequareres, an fatisft Corporis 
tit ft Corpus, an alia qiiapiam re indigeat : refponderem, 
omnino indigere. Atque hdc quidem de Caufa medicince 
ars nunc efi inventa, quoniam Corpus per fe profigatum 
ejl, neque ipfi fatis efi, ut ft hujufrnodi. 

Note X. p. 26. Or is it not absurd 

TO SUPPOSE THERE SHOULD BE AN ArT OF 

- Impos- 



NOTES on T RE AT isE the FirJ. 273 

Impossibilities ?] What is here faid concerning 
the Difference between thofe things for which we 
may poffibly ivijh, and thofe which we aHually 
purfue, is exprefTed in the Ethics of Arijlotle^ 1. 3. 
C. 2. ITpo«ip£(rtj jUEu ya,^ bjc \<r^ twv aj'iuarwv ^ t\ 

J* \<ri Twu ajuDaxu)!), oloy aOava(rj«?. There is indeed 
no determined Choice of Action with refpe^ to Things 
impojjible -, and if any one Jliould fay he had fo deter- 
mined^ he would appear to be a Fool. But there may 
he a Willing or Longing after things impoffible ; as for 
infiancey never to die. 1 

Note XI. p. 27. The Suggestions of 
Will, and uninstructed Instinct.] TVill., 
PssX^io-jf, or ''Op£^j? Koyirim ; uninflru5led Infin^f, 
cpf^jj uXoyir^. See before, Note III. 

Note XII. p. 29. The Want or Absence 
OF something appearing good; relative 
to Human Life, and attainable by Man, 

BUT superior to HIS NATURAL AND UNIN- 
STRUCTED Faculties.] 

The Cause here defcribed is the to » 

ti)£)ca, or FINAL. Ariflotk in his Phyfics^ 1.2. 

c. 3. in enumerating the various forts of Caufes, 
reckons among the reft to S' w? to t£- 

A©^, >tj t' ayx^Qv ruv oiXXoov. to ya.p » \v;nx jSjA- 
1i5-ov, y^ teA©^ twv aAAwu e'S-sAn bTvxi. To thefe may 
he added that Caufe^ which is confdered as the End^ 
end Good of all the refl. For that, for whofe fake all 

T the 



274 1<1 OTES on Treatise the Firft. 

the others are deemed necejfary^ has juji Pretenftons to 
be bejl, and to be the End of them all. To this he 
fubjoins, confonant to what is faid in the Dialogue— 

^HxCPlpiTOO ^£ [Jt.7]S^iV CCVTO EiTTflv WyOi^OV ») (p OClVO fAiVOV 

dyx^ov — Let it make no Difference whether we call 
this End., real Good., or only apparent Good. So in the 
Beginning of his Ethics — Ilao-a t£;)^v», xJ Tra.crot, jeae- 

TiV©^ l(piB^iXi S'oyisT. A»o y.a.Xug oi'7rt(pY!vavTO t' d'yct- 
S-o\ » zTxvTcc ICpiiToii. Every Jrt, and every orderly 
Speculation., fo likewife every ASiion, and determined 
Choice ofPurfuit., appear all of them to tend toward fame 
Good. Well therefore have they pronounced Good to b$ 
that., toward which all things tend. 

In the Definition here treated, the Words [rela ■ 
tive to Human Life'\ exprefs that Part of the Stoic 
Definition of Art [-srpoV t) t'lk^ £j;j^p?iroy rwy £i» 
Tw 6iw.] They were omitted in the Definition, p. 17. 
as more properly belonging to the prefent Defini- 
tion, which refpeds Art in its fi?ial Caufe, Se^ 
page 261. 

That what is perfeof and felf-fufficient is above 
n^t fecondary Helps of Art ; that our own Weaknefs 
and Infufficiency ., and the Profpe(5l of procuring that ab' 
fent Good, by which we all hope to fupply ourfelves, 
where deficient ; that this is the Source not only of 
all Arts, but (joined to focial Aflfedion) is the 
Origin^ and Cement of Human Society ; fee 
(befides the Place here treated) pages 11, 12 j and 
oithe third Treatife., p. 147 to p. 157. 

Thus 



NOTES on Treatise the Firfi, 275 

Thus the Poet in StobceuSy p. 515. 

Xp£tU TTlXvT i^t^X^i' T»' $ » X?^^^ ^^^ CiViV^Ol ; 

Need all things taught : TVhat cannot Need invent P 

Acre ABLY alfo to this, Firgil, in his firfl: Georgicj 
having told us of the various Changes to the worfe, 
which happened in the natural World immediately 
fubfequent to the Golden Age, goes on to enumerate 
the feveral Inventions of Men, which were the na- 
tural Refult of this their newly indigent State. He at 
laft fums up the whole by faying 

Turn varies venere artes : labor omnia vicit 
ImprobuSi & duris urgens in rebus egestas. 

Where (according to the Dodlrlne in the Dia- 
logue) Wa n t is made the Beginning or Origin of 
Arts. The Poet even refers this Difpenfation, this 
Introduction of Indigence^ Care, and Solicitude^ to the 
immediate Will of Providence, ailing for the 
Good of Mankind j left Plenty fhould lull them 
into floathful Lethargy , fo as to forget their ?2obleJi 
and mojl ailive Faculties. 

Pater ipfe colendi 

Haud facilem effe viam voluit, primufq; per art em 
Movit agrosy curis acuens mortalia corda. 
Nee torpere gravi pajjus fua regna veterno. 

Note XIII. p. 32. Co-existent, replied 
HE, AS IN A Statue, fiff. Successive, as in 

T 2 A 



276 NOTES on Treatise the Firft, 

A Tune or Dance, ^c.^ This Divifion of 

Beings or Produdtions we find mentioned by Ari- 

Jlotle in his Phyfics^ (1. 3. c. 8.J where explaining 

his Dodrine concerning Infinite^ he fays *AAX* 

aj^wu, TO) aft aAAO xat aAAo yiviojociy xtoj >t«t to 
uzrsipov. In as much as Being is manifold, fuch as is 
the Being of a Day or public Feftival, {which exiji by 
Continually becoming fojnething farther) fuch alfo is the 
Being and Nature of Infinite. The fame Sentiment 
foon after is more fully explained and opened. 

"Xlft TO UTTlifOV H Ss7 Aa^jScSKEiV, Wf 7oSs T» * oloV 

aym, 01; to tlvai, »;t uq acnx rig yiyovtv^ aAA' aft 
Iv yi\ii(Tu v.s!.\ (p^opx. We are not to conceive of Infi' 
nite, as of a pofitive particular Subjlance, like a Man 
or a Houfe ; but rather as we pronowice Exijlence of a 
Day or public Feftival, tvhich have their EJfence, not 
as fcnfible, individual Subjlances, but by a continued 
Procedure of Being and ceafing to be. 



Note XIV. p. 32. What is Human Life, ' 
BUT A Compound of Parts thus fleet- 
ing, y^ . J It is not inelegantly faid in the 

Ethics fo often referred to 'H ^\ ^m Ivfp- 

yncc lig £f-<, aoii IxaT^ "srept Tauroi y.xi T8T0jf 
vjipyiH, a. xa.1 jM.aA»r"« dycczi-x ' olov jUjv ja«(rj){oV, 
T>7 ccxQ'/i •srspt T« /xeA>i, Si (piXofji-oi^vg, rv i'lxvodx 
vfi^i Tx ^S'jopriy'X'iot ' arw Je kxi twu Aoizccoy £>caf~^'. 
Life is a certain Energy, and each Man energizes 
about thofe Subjects, and with thofe Faculties, for which 
he hath the greateji Affe^ion-t the Mufician, with his 

Hearings 



NOTES on Treatise the Flrji. 277 

Hearings about Sounds harmonious ; the Studious^ ivith 
his IntelleSl^ about Matters of Speculation ; and in like 
manner each Man elfe of the various forts befde. Ethic. 
Nicom. 1. 10. c. 4. 

Note XV. p. 34. Every Art will be 

ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WoRK OR 

Energy.] The Cause here treated is the For- 
mal, called by various Names ; the il$^^^ the 
Aoj^©^, the T» eV*, the to t/ ?i» nvxi. 

In the Beginning of the above-cited Ethics^ after 
the Author has told us that every Jrt^ and Human 
ASiion tend to fome Good or End, he adds Aj^^opoj 

Si TJf (^ail/£T«* TCdU TiXu\) ' TX (Xl]) ycc^ EiO-JU IvSoyilOCi ' 

Ttx, §\ Ts-oc^ auT«f, ifycx. rivx But there appears a 

Difference in Ends : For fome are Energies; fo7ne, 
ever and above thefe Energies, are certain Works. 
In ^lintilian's Injlitutes the fame Diflifi^ion, with 
refped to the End of Arts, is mentioned /. 2. 
c, 18. 

But here perhaps it may be alked, ifalUrts are 
ended and accomplilhed in fome Energy or ^For/t, and 
this Energy or Work be almoft univerfally that abfent 
Good, toward which they all tend, and for the fake 
of which they are all exerted ; ('for a Dance, which 
is an Energy, and a Houfe, which is a Work, are 
certain abfent Goods or Pleafures, for the fake of 
which certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it 
may be aiked, whence then the Difference between 
the Formal Caufe and the Final; the Final, as in 
Note XII. it has been already treated ? 

T3 The 



\yS NOTES on Treatise the Firjl, 

The Anfwer to this is, that they concur and are 
the fame. To f/tXv yxp n' i?-i^ xxl to » ivtax, 'iy lo. 
'The Formal Caufe and the ¥ iijal are on b. Arijl, 
Nat. Jufc. 1. 2. c. 7. If they differ^ it is (as Joannes 
Grammaticm obferves in commenting on this PlaceJ a 
Difference rather in the T'tnie and Manner of our view- 
ing them, than in their own E {fence and Nature. It 
may not perhaps be improper to tranfcribe his own 
Words. T.^u7oi' Tw cc^i^[/,w to thAw? y.oi\ to ilSo^j Ttj 
o^icii y.ov/j cja(pspoyj ug hpnTaj, xoci tw ^f>ovu). otxv 
fj.h yoi'^ u; ymy.vjov^ kxi jW.Ji7ru cy 0£wp>iTat, teAo? 
iriv'OTy.v J?, coi Ti&^n yivof/.ivov, il^og. The End ««d? 
the Form are numerically the fame ^ differing (as has 
been faid) in Relation only, and Time. For thus 
the fame Thing, ivhile conftdered as in its Progrefs to 
Completion, but as not yet cotnplete, is fo long an End j 
when confidered as adually complete, is no longer an End, 
but a Form. And thus is this Queftion one way 
anfwered, by acknowledging that thefe two Caufes 
co-incide, and differ not in their Effence or real 
Chara6l-er, but rather in the Time and Manner of 
our contemplating them. 

But there is another Anfwer, and that is derived 
fi-om the tivofold Nature of /«^/ Caufes. According 
to this Docbrine, Arts have not only a nearer and 
more immediate End, (as a Sliip is the End of Ship- 
building, or Navigating the End of Pilotry) but 
they have a Hill remoter and higher End, a t£Ao? tj- 
^i;c.i>T.^1cy, that is to fay, Man, Human-Kind, or 
(in other Words) the IJtiUty or Elegance of Human 
Lift. 'Thus the Stagirite. 'Etuij yoi^ irccg >iot\ 
55V.£tj TiAoj. * ciyjX(; 5'ap to"" » hiK;y^. For \K'E OUR- 
SELVES 



NOTES on Treatise. ibeFirJ. zjg 

SELVES al/o are in fame fort an End ; for the final 
Caufe is twofold. Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 2. If 
therefore we have refpe<5t to this ultimate End, 
thefe two Caufes will be found to differ, and be really 
diftinc^ from each other. 



And thus it is that in fome refpedls they agree^ 
and in others they differ^ according to the above 
Diflindions eflabliflied by this Philofophy. 

Note XVI. p. 38. O Art ! Thou Praise 
OF Man, i^c] Eujlratius, in the Beginning of his 
Comment on the Ethics of Jrijlotk^ has the follow- 
ing elegant Encomium on Jrts. Aa ya^ i^ri cL'xj^y\- 
r'oi; £ai;7w UTrapp^fiv tom ayOpwuTov, avcTTiTJiJfylov jU£- 
vov7o5, v.x\ "loXq p^fipoci )tai a)(^fi^roig rwy uXoyoov 
i^O[/.omiJi,B'JOVf aAA' Iccvia te Jtat clXXoiq ^nx, ty^; TS^vrig 
TOi ^fmi^oc xa/opOsu. "Et» Je >£<%» jU.£p>? (To'lpix'; at 
Tiyyoiiy ticg rviv (piKTtv (/.ifAv^ivcKi, xai uAaij ^pco/Asycxj, 
xal rxvloiig a^ri ■nrfpjIiOt'jUEvat * wj xa) J<a t»7o uio 
^Eu/ au'Ia? Tov (piXoo-epov aTroTrs'aTrftS-aj, i-mila, xx\ 
(Tus^oili •sroAu7ra7£i xat isoXv^iloc^oXtx) <rvv^s^su.mg 
av6pw7iro?-, J'sn-at >cai ttoXXuv tuv s^wSfy ek j3o5i0£fav, 
iva, ■crpoj Tu C,iu OiwXwg, xoci to eu ^iiu aufjW7rodts-w? 
auloj TTspiyivoiloy kxi jtxv J"ia tiiv twv ;!^p}5(r/j!Awv fWijay 
dvccxouloilo. Ef ^£y su twv (Mul^ovm ^lupvi^-ciiTuv lyo~ 
[xsvog, ovx i)(^£i y.xi •crpo? t« iXdrlco xx\ xa 7irpa$' za-^pj- 

dvlip, ocrai roc. roTg avOpwHr/ym? (TU[ji,oc(Ti la'ya.i^ovla.t, 
^(^pwjpa, w{p£Ax,«,£vwv Twy ^eipmccKlovvluv ttoco cIvth 
-uxpog ra TEAfcoTEpa, 

T 4 Note 



28o NOTES on Treatise the Firjl. 

Note XVII. p. 44. The Efficient, the 
Material, the Final, and the Formal.] 
That is to fay, to xmirccvy v "TAj?, to » hsKoc, to 

Thus Seneca in his 65th Epiftle. Caufam Ari- 
Jloteles putat tribus modis did. Prifna^ inquit, caufa 
eft ipfa Materia, fine qua nihil potejl effici. Secunday 
Opifex. 'Tenia, Forma qu<s uniciiique operi imponitur, 
tanquam Jiatiice 'y nam ham Arijiotelei Idos [nhc] vocat. 
^Mrta quoque, inquit, his accedii, Propofitum totius 
eperis. 

Qu in fit hoc, aperiam. Ms prima Jlatuee caufa 
eft : nunquam enim fa£ia effet, Jiifi fuiffet id, ex quo ea 

funderetur, ducereturve. Secunda caufa, Artifex ejl : 
non potuijfet enim iss illud in hahitum Jiatucs figurari^ 
nifi accefiffent peritcs matius. Tertia caufa eft Forma : 
neque enim flatua ifia Doryphoros aut Diadumenos voca- 
retur, nifi hcsc illi ejet impreffa fades, ^arta caufa 
eji, faciendi Propofitum : nam nifi hocfuijet, faSia non 
efj'et. ^id efl Propofitum? ^od invitavit arti- 

ficem, quod ilk fecutus fecit. Vel pecunia ejl hoc, fi 
venditurus fahricavit ; vel gloria, fi lahoravit in no- 
men ; vel religio, fi donum templo paravit. Ergo ^ 
hcEc Caufa efl, propter quam fit. An non putas inter 
caufas fa£ii operis numerandum, quo remoto fa£lum non 
eJJ-etr-- 

Aristotle's own Words are as follow. 
*'Ei/>s |W,£v »u toottov Uiliov Xiyirai to i'^ » 'ylvsTOci t» 

&^'y\jc^ nr.q (^kxAkt, xJ Ta TbTwy yivvi. AAAov SI, 



TO 



NOTES o« Treatise theFirft. 281 

TO ElJ^I^, >^ TO ZJ-CCOOC^Siy^/.tX, ' T»TO ^' l^]v Koy^ 

T» Ti '^v Et'vasf, Xj rx tssts J^evj] * oiov Ttf {Tja 7rx(TUV 
rx duo zjpof £Uj X; oAw? o a^itj^xoi;, 7ty tx fj.e^n rx iv 
Tw Aoj/tj). "Eti^ oS't'v -n' «pX^ ''^'f f/'ilx^oXvi; v •srpWT»?, 
^ 51 7Yi; ripsfji.rKTiui; ' otou o (3o'jA£'J(raj, aj7<cu ' x^ o 

'TTxInp, TH TSKVH ' Xy oAw? TO TTOlHV TH TTOl^^iw^ y^ TO 

f-six^xXKov Ta jM,£7a|3«AAo^a£v». "Etj, w; to t£A@J * 
T»TO (5"' £r"i to"" » i.sax ' olov T« TrfpfSTaTfly u vyitix ' 
Six ri yxp TTSpnrxTti ; (px^iv ivx uj/iainj, }£«» UTrovTi; 
pUTw?, oip|U£9a xiroaiSojyJvxi to ajTJOv. 

I N ^«^ ?nanner that may be called a Caufe, out of 
which ^ exi fling as a Part of it, any thing is made or 
compounded. Thus is Brafs the Caufe of a StatuCy 
Silver of a Cup, and fo alfo the higher Genera^ in ' 
which thefe are included [as Metal, the Genus in- 
cluding Brafs and Silver ; Body, the Genus including 
Metal, b'/T. ^r.] In another way., the Form and Ex- 
emplar of any thing is its Caufe ; that is to fay., in other 
Words., the Definition or Rationale of its EJfence [that 
which, charaderizing it to be fuch a particular thing, 
diftinguifhes it from all things elfe] and of this Ra- 
tionale the fever al higher Genera. Thus the Caufe of the 
Diapafon or 0(flave is the Proportion of two to one j 
and more generally than that., is Number ; and is more- 
over the feveral Parts, out of which this Definition is 
formed. Add to this Caufe., that other., from ivhence 
the original Principle of Change, or of Ceafing to 
change ; as for injiance, the Perfon who deliberates is 
the Caufe of that, which refults from fuch Delibera- 
tion ; the Father is the Caufe of the Son ; and in gene- 
ral the Efficient, of the thing effected; the Power 
(hanging, of the thing changed. Befides thefe Caufes, 

there 



282 NOTES o« Treatise the Firjl. 

there is that alfo^ which is confidered as the End', that 
is to fay, the Caufe, for the fake of which the thing is 
done. Thus the Caufe of Exercifing is Health, For 
if it be afked, TVhy does he ufe Exercife ? We fay^ 
To preferve his Health ; and havijig faid thus muchy 
%ve think we have given the proper Caufe. Ariftot. 
Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 3. 



Addition to NOTE III. - 

The Peripatetic Definition of Nature, given 
p. 257. tho' in fome degree illuftrated p. 266. yet 
being ftill from its Brevity perhaps obfcure, the fol- 
lowing Explication of it is fubjoined. 

In the firft place, by Nature tht Peripatetics 
meant that Vital Principle in Plants, Brutes and 
Men, by which they are faid to live, and to be di- 
ftinguiflied from things inanimate. Nature therefore 
being another Name for Life or a vital Principle, 
the firji ASI of this Principle, throughout all Sub- 
jeds, is univcrfally found to be of the following 
kind ; namely, to advance the Subjefl, which it en- 
livens, from a Seed or Embryo to fomething better and 
more pcrfe^. This Progreffion, as well in Plants as 
in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that 

Nature is a Principle of Motion. But then 

this Progreffion or Growth is not infinite. When 
the Subjed is mature, that is, hath obtained its Com- 
pletion and perfcSi Form, then the Progreffion ceafes. 
Here therefore the Bufmcfs of the vital Principle 
becomes different. It is from henceforward no 
longer employed to acquire a Fortn, but to preferve 
t9 its SubjeJi a Form already acquired. And thus is 

it 



NOTES on Treatise the Firfl, 283 

it that Nature is a Principle of Reft, Stability, or 
Ceafing to move. And fuch indeed fhe continues to 
be, maintaining, as long as pojftble, the Fonn com- 
mitted to her Care, till Time and external Caufes in 
the firfl: place impair it, and induce at length its 
Dijfolution, which is Death. 

And thus has it been fhewn how Nature may 
be called a Principle both of Motion and 
Ceasing TO move. 

As to the refl: of the Definition, namely that 
Nature is a Principle, which inheres in its Sub- 
jec5t immediately, effentially, and not by ivay of Acd' 
dent; no more is meant by this, than that the 
Nature or Life in every Being, which hath fuch 
Principle, is really and truly a Part of that 
Being, and not detached ^nd feparate firom it, like 
the Pilot fi-om the Ship, the Mufician fi-om the In- 
ftrument. For to thefe SubjeSis are thofe Artifls 
the Principles of Motion and Reft, yet do they in no 
Senfe participate with them of vital Sympathy and 
Union. 



END ^//y^^ NOTES on Treatise theFlrJl. 



NOTES 



O N 



TREATISE theThirdj 



CONCERNING 



HAPPINESS. 



NOTE I. p. 107. Nature seems to 
TREAT Man, ^r.] Ut Phidias poteji a 
prima injiituere ftgnum, idque perficere ; 
Potejl ab alio inchoatum accipere & abfolvere : huic ejl 
fapieniia fimilis. Non enim ipfa genuit hominem^ fed 
accepit a natura inchoatum : hanc ergo intuens, debet 
injlitutum illud, quafi fignum^ abfolvere. Cic. de 
Fin. IV. 13. p. 304. Edit. Davif. 

Note II. p. 113. Practice too often 
CREEPS, i^c.'X See p. 136. and Note X. 

Note III. p. 114. The Sovereign Good 

IS that, the Possession of which renders 

us HAPPY.] K.1r,(xn ya^ aj/aSwv, oi IvSocii^ovsg^ 

£u<5'<xi/xov£?. By the Poffeffion of Things good, are 

2 the 



286 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 

the Happy made happy. Platon. Conviv. p. 204. 
torn 2. Edit. Serrani. See Arrian, Epi5i. 1. 3. c. 22. 

P- 453- 

The Reader will be pleafed to obferve, that, in 
all Qiiotations fi"om the Differtations of EpiSfetus 
colleded by Jrri an, the Author refers to the late 
Edition in two Volumes ^arto^ publiflied by his 
learned and ingenious Friend, Mr. Upton. 

Note IV. p. 115. Certain original 
Characteristics and Pre-concep- 
TioNs, ^r.] The Pre-conceptions here fpoken 
^ of, are called by the Latins, Pranotiones^ or Antici- 
pationes ; by the Greeks, ts^oXri-^iK;, or "Evioiai, with 
the occafional Epithets of either >coii/«l, s{jt.(pv%, 
or (pvatKcc), 

'Tis evident that all Men, without the leaft 
Help of Art, exert a kind of Natural Logic ; can in 
fome degree refute, and prove, and render a Reafon, 

Now this cannot be (as the meanefl Proficient 
in Logic well knows) without general Ideas, and 
general Propofitions, becaufe a Syllogifm of Particu- 
lars is an ImpofTibility. There muft be therefore 
fome natural Faculty, to provide us thefe Generals. 
This Faculty cannot be any of the Senfes, for they 
all refpedl Particulars only. Nor can it be the rea- 
foning ox fyllogvzing Faculty, for this does not form fuch 
Generals, but ufe them when formed. There only 
therefore remains the Faculty called N»?, that is to 
fay, the Inductive Faculty ; the Faculty, which by 
InduBion of fimilar Individuals, forms out of the 
2 particular 



NOTES on Treatise thenird. 287 

particular and the many what is general and one. 
This Species of Apprehenfion is evidently our firjl 
and earlieji Knowledge, becaufe all Knowledge by 
Reafoning dates its Origin from it, and becaufe, ex- 
cept thefe two, no other Knowledge is pofTible. 

A s therefore every Ear, not abfolutely depraved, 
is able to make fome general DiJlin£iiom of ^ound ; 
and in like manner every Eye, with refpedl to Objedls 
oiVifton y and as this general Ufe of thefe Faculties, 
by being diffufed through all Individuals, may be 
called common Hearing, and common Vifion, as op- 
pofed to thofe more accurate Energies., peculiar only 
to Artijis : fo fares it with refped: to the IntelleSf, 
There are Truths, or Univerfals of fo obvious a 
kind, that every Mind, or hit elk ^ not abfolutely de- 
praved, without the leafl: Help of Art, can hardly 
fail to recognize them. The Recognition of thefe, 
or at lead the Ability to recognize them, is called 
Koji/o? Naf, Common Sense, as being a Senfe 
common to all, except Lunatics and Idiots, 

Farther, as this Power is called Koii/o? Nsr, 
fo the feveral Propofitions, which are its proper 
Objedls, are called zs^oXri-^im;^ or Pre-conceptions, as 
being previous to all other Conceptions. It is eafy 
to gather from what has been faid, that thefe orpo- 
Kn^siq muft hQ general, as being formed by lndu£lion ; 
as alfo natural^ by being co7nmon to all Men, and 
previous to all Inftrudion. Hence therefore their 
Definition. "Es-t ^' y\ TrpoAr^J/i?, £woj« ^u(r*>£Ji rm 
Koi^oXis. " A Pre-conception is the natural Ap- 
prehenfion of what is general; or univerfal" Diog. 

Laert. 



288 NOTES c/z Treatise the Third, 

Laert. /. 7. / 54 SeealfoJrrian.Epi^f. 1. i. c. 22. 
L 3. c. 6. Q'c. de Naturd Dear. 1. i. c. 16, 17. 

Plut. de Placit.PhUofoph. 910. c. 

No.TE V. p. 115. — And that the Dif- 
ference LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM 

TO Particulars.] This was called ^Epcc^i^oyn 
rm sTpoXri'l/suv Tccig itti y.sfnn; >i(Ticmg — rag ^ucixa? 

Epia. 1. I. c. 22. p. 114, 116. Edit. Upt. See an 
eminent Inftance, illuflrating the Truth of this Rea- 
foning, in the fame Author, /. 4. c. 1. p. 545. 
'EwoJjw-Ev yap^ oTt, &C. 

Note VI. p. 120. Why are there, who 
SEEK Recesses, ^r.] Multi autem ^ funt, & 
fuerunt, qui earn, quam dico, tranquilitatem expetentes, 
a negotiis publicis fe removerint, ad otiumque perfu- 

gerint. His idem propof.tufn fuit, quod regibus i ut 

ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, lihertate uterentur : 
cujus proprium ejl fic vivere, ut velis. ^are cum 
hot commune fit potentia cupidorum cum lis, quos dixi, 
otiofis : alteri fe adipifii id pojfe arbitrantur, fi opes 
magnas habeant ; alteri ft contenti fint ^ fuo, ^ parvo. 
Cic. de Offic. 1. i. c. 20, 21. 

Note VII. p. 121. — The Sovereign Good, 

they HAVE TAUGHT US, OUGHT TO BE, ^f.] 

The ORIGINAL Pre-conceptions of the Sove- 
reign Good here recited, may be juftified by the 
following Authorities, from among many which are 
omitted. 

Agreeable 



NOTES on Treatise the T^hird, 289 

Agreeable to Nature. Neque ulla alia 

in re^ nifi //? Natura, quarendum ejje illud Sum- 
mum BONUM, quo omnia referrentiir. Cic. Acad. 
1. I. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Davif. 

Conducive to well-being. — Epit^eius Cd\\s 
that Truth or K/ioiv ledge, which reJpeJIs our real Hap- 
pinefs \_Tyi> aAJiSfjay tij^v is-fpi tti^ \\i^x\,ii.o-\i'wx'\ the Truth 
or Knowledge, which regards not incre Living, but 
which conduces to Living well [» tw Trjpi t« 
ZHN, aAAa Tw TTpoV TO ET ZHN.] Arrian. 
Epi£l. 1. I. c. 4. p. 28. Edit.Vpt. 'At v.oivxi Trepi 
ijdoci[ji.ov:oig svvoisci — TO ZHN KATA ^TSIN, 
}^ rov xxla (pvcriv Qiov, E TA AIM ON IAN Xiyaa-i ' 
zjpog J's TSTOj?, To ET ZHN, ^ to iZ Sjsv, >^ 
7W sufwiav, 'ETAAIMONIAN (Pcc(t]v sTvxt. Our 
co7nmon Pj'e-conceptions concerning Wp^vpi^es^ call it 
the Living according to Nature ; farther 
than this, they fay it is Lining or Exifiing zvell, the 
Life of well-being. Alex, Aphrod. Trspl ij/up/. 
p. 157. Edit, Aid, 

Accommodate to all Places and Times— 
Antoninus, fpeaking of that Happinefs, which he 
deemed our Sovereign Good, calls it fomething which 
was in our Power DANTAXOT ic, AIHNE- 
Knx, every where ajid perpetually. 
1. 7. f. 54. 

Durable — and Indeprivable. — Nifi sta- 

BILI ^ FIXO y PERMANENTE BONO, BEATUS 

ejfe nemo potejl. Tufc. Difp. 1. 5. c. 14. p. 372. Edit. 

U Davif 



290 NOTES on Treatise the f bird, 

Davif. So immediately after, in the fame page — " 

An dubium ejl^ qu'in nihil fit habendum in eo gemre^ 
quo vita beata compktur, fi id poffit amitti ? nihil 
enini interarefcere, nihil exjlingui^ &c. Ka) tjV 

Kairap r, KatVapo? <piXo?, oiXKcx. aofa^^ ccvXnrrjg^ ztv~ 
pfiog^ ccaXx TpKr|t/up:a •, 11 J ETPOIA iSiv ^ro^q 
%Xi^, ^i TO AIHNEKES kJ ANEMnOAI- 
2TON. And what fort of Happinefs is this^ which 
my thing intervening may embarraf j / fay not Csefar, 
or Csefar'; Friend^ but a Crozu, a Pipcr^ a Fever^ a 
thoufand things be fide? Happiness furely implies 
nothing fo much^ as Perpetuity and being su- 
perior TO Hindrance or Impediment. 
Arridn. Epi£l. \. 4. c. 4. p. 585. Edit. Upt. See 
alfo, I. 2. c. II. p. 227* 

Self-derived.— y^/^;/(? hoc dabitis, ut opinor, fi 
modo fit aliquid effe beatum, id cportere totum 
poNi IN potestate Sapientis: nam ^ fi amitti 
%nta beata potefi, beata effe nonpotefl. Cic. de Fin. 1, 2- 
C. 27. p. 163. — «j TOiV ju,£v >caT aAii0Etay -mxiioiq "vot 

fAig TTSpiWlTZTT'/J avGoUtC©^, ItT avico [oJ OsOi] TO TTUV 

fOfvlo. That Man might not fall into real Evils, the 
Gods have put the whole 1"!!^ his own Power. M. 
Ant. 1. 2. f II. Tl yu,^ eov, ^Tile? Troiq avSpwTr©^ ; 
EuraOwaj, hSxiiJ^ovytcxi;, IIANTA HS ©EAEI 
TIOIEIN, i-t-'^ KwAiJ^o-Oaj, lUjiJ'' avafka^^frSat. i?'^^ 
what is it, that every Man living feeks ? To be fecurely 
fixed, to be happy, to do all things accord- 
ing TO his own Will, 7iot to be hindered, not 
is be compelled. Arr. Epid. 1. 4. c. i. p. 539, 540. 

Note 



Notes on T re at ise tbe Third, 2 9 1 

Note VIII. p. 125. The Political and 
Lucrative, the Contemplative and 
Pleasurable.] This fourfold Diftindion of 
Lives is mentioned in Arijiotk's Ethics, 1. i. c. 5, 

Note IX. p. 131. Pleasure 

Whom Love attends, i^c, 

alluding to Homer, Iliad. H. V. 214. 

Note X. p. 136. Suppose an Event were 
to happen — NOT AN Inundation, &c.'\ Sce 
Arrian.EpiSf. I. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly 
addrefTed to the Seekers of Leifure, Retirement , and 
Study. Part of it has been already quoted p. 290. 
xj t/? «'jt») 71 aipoja, ^c. See alfo the fame Author, 
1. 4. c. I. p. 567. ITw? axa'tif, i^c. and of the 
Dialogue here commented, p. 113. 

Note XI. p. 137. — Is Acting a Circum- 
stance, ^r.] Etenim cognitio contefnplatioque na- 
tures mama qmdammodo atque inchoata fit, fi nulla 
a£lio rerum confequatur, Ea autem a5iio in hominum 
tommodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Cic. de Offic. 
/.I. c. 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the 
Subfequent, is well worthy of Perufal. 

Note XII. p. 140. — If a Piece of Metal e£ 
tendered us, ^r.] ?>^q Jrr. EpiSi. 1. i. c;. lo. 
p. no. 'Opare 7^ in\ ts voiMi(T^oi\<i^, &c. 

Note XIII. p. 144. — ^Are alienated from 
it, or are indifferent to it?] Placethis,in^ 
^uitf quorum ratio ?nihi probatur, fmul atque natitm fit 

U 2 animal 



292 NOTES en Treatise the Third. 

animal (hinc enhn ejl ordiendum) ipfum fibi conclliari^ ^ 
commendari ad fe confervandum^ ^ fuum ftatum, iff ad 
ea^ quee confervantia funt ejusjiatus., diligenda ; alienari 
autem ab interitu, iifque rebus, qua interitum videantur 
afferre. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit. Dav. 
See alfo I. ^. e.g. DeOffic. \. 1. c. 4. 'Oixny/y-^Oos 
7rpo\ «u7»? iu6uf ytvo^j^ivQi. Phit. Mcr. p. 1038. b. 

Note XIV. p. 155. Let it not be forgot 

THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SociETY, ^f.J 

The whole Argument to prove Society natural to 
Man, from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken 
from the fecond Book of Plato's Republic. See 
Plat. torn. 2. p. 369, ^c. Edit. Serrani. 

Note XV. p. 156. — Are not the Powers 
AND Capacities of Speech, ^^.] The Argu- 
ment in favour of Society, from our being poflefled 
of Aoj/^j, or the /peaking Faculty, feems to have 
been much infifled on by the befl Autliors of Anti- 
quity. 

Tt^iog V.XI A^aryjps £S~j criy'Slov ' Sto y.x,i toTi; aXXoig 
uVjipp^a (^uoig • y^X?^ y^^ ■^^''^^ '^ (pviTig ccvluv eAjiAu- 

cnyoitvitv 0!.XXr,Xoig. O $i Xoyo; eVI to SyiX^v l~i 
TO o"^|'-c{p£po-.', xai TO |3AaCfpo'i» • urs y.a\ to SUxiov, 
y.Zi Ti fi'JiKO]/. T»7o yx^ Trr^o; ix. elXA» ^ux roTg 

avOpu- 



NOTES on Treatise the Third, 293 

^vOpcotzroif ('(j^ov, TO [U.0VOV ayx^is kx\ >£axa, xx) J'lxaia xai 
ei^ixn uKT^miV '^X^^^ ' '^ ^^ t^t-m xoiooivix zroiii oixix\i 
xx\ zToXiv. The ReafonwhyM.A-ii is a Social K^i~ 
MAI., more than any Bee, or any herding Species whatever, 
is evident from hence. Nature, we fay, makes nothing 
in vain; and Man, of all Animals, is only poffeJJ'ed of 
Spe ECH. Bare Sound indeed ?nay be the Sign ofivhat 
is pleafurable or painful ; and for that reafon is it com- 
mon even to other Animals alfo. For fo far ive perceive 
even their Nature can go, that they have a Senfe of 
thofe Feelings, and fignify the?n to each other. But 
Speech is made to indicate ivhat is expedient, and what 
hurtful, and in confequence of this, what is juji and 
unjuji. It is therefore given to Men, becaiife this, with 
refpe^ to other Aniinals, is to Men alone peculiar, that 
of Good and Evil, fuft and Unjuft, they only poffefs a 
Senfe or Feeling. Noiu 'tis the Participation or Com- 
munity of thefe, which makes and confiitutes both a 
Family, and a Polity. Ariflot. Polit. 1. i. c. 2. 

E(xo';£? yx^ lidiv iv TV) ^f'Up(^i7 ruv zTpayy-xTuv [m 
io'ny.xrx'\ ' xi Je pavxi tcov vojj^aTwu ticrli/ i'^xyyiXn- 

KXi' Hj Six T»TO SiSoVTXl 'Ay^V VTTO T>]f (pU(T£Ug, "^fOq 

TO §1 auTwu cniJi-xivsiv r\^x^ xXXriXoig Tvg ^v^ni; toc 
vor\^XTX — \'i)X xxi Svv(jO[j.sQx xoivoovs7v xXXvXok;, xxl 
(ru,U7roAjT£Uf(J"Gai ' xoivuivixov yx^ ^uov o ''Ai^Spw/r©-', 
Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul ; and Sounds 
are declarative of thefe Ideas. And for this reafon 
■were thefe Sounds imparted to us by Nature, not only 
that we might indicate to each other thefe Ideas, but 
that IV e might be enabled to communicate a^id 
live in Associations. ForM.\ti is by Nature a 
Social Animal. Am?non.inL de Interpr. p. ib. b. 

U 3 Thus^ 



294 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 

Thus Cicero, (peak'mg of Human Nature — Omitto 
opportunitates hahilitatcfque reliqui corporis,, modera- 
tionem vocis, orationis vim, qua conciliatrix eft 
human ee maxume focietatis. De Legg. 1. i. c. 9. 
F- 35' £^^^- Davif. 

Again in hi^ Offices Sed quce natura prlncipia 

f.nt communitatis Iff focietatis humana:, repetendum 
chins videtur. Ef enim primum-, quod cernitur in 
univerfi generis humani focieiate. Ejus enim vinculum 
^fl Ratio, & Oratio ; qucs docendo, difcendo, cofn- 
' municando, difceptando., dijudicando, conciliat inter fe 
homines, conjungitque natur^li quadam focietate De 
Cffic. 1. I. c. 16. 

Thus too in his Treatife De Nat. Dear. Jam 

vero domina rernni (ut vos foletis dicere) Eloquendi 
VIS qua?n eft pr cedar a, quamque divina? ^ce primurt\ 
efficit, ut ea, qucs ignoramus, difcere, ^ ea, qucefcimus„ 
alios docere pojfimus. Dcinde hac cohortamur, hac per- 
fuademus, hac confolamur affli5los, hac deducimus per- 
territos a timore, hac geftientes comprimimus^ hac cupi- 
ditates iracundiafqiie refinguimus : hccc nos juris, le- 
gum, urbium focietate devinxit : hccc a vita immani 
is ftra fegregavit. De Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 59. 
p. 243. Edit. Davif. — See alio ^lint. Inft. 1. 2. 
c. 16. and Alex. Aphrod. Trepl i^yp^;. p. 155. b. 
Edit. /lid. 

Note XVI. p. 166. 'Tis from among the 

FEWjCiff.] In omni enim arte, vel fludio, vel quavii 
fcientia, vel in ipfa virtute, optumum quodque rariffi- 
pium efl. Cic.de Fin. 1.2. c. 25. p. i^S. Edit.Dav.. 

* Note 



NOTES on Treatise the Third. 295 

Note XVII. p. 167. — Working ever uni- 

rORMLY ACCORDING TO THIS IdEA OF PeR- 
FECION, ^C-l 

Thus Boethiusy addrefllng the Deity, 

qui perpetua mundum ratlone gubernas, 
Terrarum ccelique Sator, qui tempus ab avo 
Irejubesy Jiabilifque manens das cunSfa moveri ; 
^em non externa pepiilerunt finger e caufa 
Materia fiuitantis opus ; veru?n insita Summi 
Forma boni, livore carens : Tu cun6ia superno 
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchru?n pulcherri?nus ipfe 
Mundum mente gerens^fimilique in imagine formam. 

Confol. Philof. 1.3. Metr. 9. 
Note XVIII. p. 167. — From some hidden 

HIGHER Motive, ^C.'\ MvittoJs SI y.-^h rauri* 

[fc. TX TSaXTOc'j TITOCpoi (pU(7IV iKTiV, OiXXcc TYI fJ.l)) //.£- 

fl»>ti? (P'jVhj a (puo-fj, aAAa •srapa (puo-ju * rvi h JtaOo Ai^, 
y.x\ (pJcTEi jca* nxjoi (putriv. 'H jUEv yx^ (xspiy-yi (pixrig 
Ivog £j(?»j j-op^a^£T!X<, y.ocl y-ix)) opi'J'iu (pi'jyu. Ai» 
T8T0 rvt iJiXv T8 ayOpwTzra (puVft to TEpc*? ars (p\j(TH 
ES-iv, STE ;caTa (puo-iu ' m d oAii Cpuo-E;, ettei [j.rtdvj tw 
7rauT» Trap!^ (pjVjv (o-j^lv yd^ kxkov Iv tco 7rc(\>l\) ovk 

, £0 Trapa (p'J(rjv, ccXXx (p'jrrn xx\ xxlx (pv(nv, 
Joannes Gram, in Ariftot. lib. 2. Natural Aufcult. 
Nihil enim fieri fine caufid potefi : nee quicquafn fity 
quod fieri non potefi : nee, fi id fa^um eft quod potuit 

fieri, pcrtentum debet videri. Cic. de Divin. 1. 2. 
c. 28. p. i8g. Edit. Davif. 

U 4 Nots 



296 NOTES on Treatise the 'Third. . 

Note XIX. p. 169. Man is a social 
Rational Animal.] Zu:ov >^o'y^■iioy ^ TroMrmovy 
^.oyixO)) x^ xoivoiv'.y.h, Kcyiy.oy y^ T^.(^ovy thefe are 
Defcriptions of Humanity^ which we meet in every 
Page of Epi^etus and Antoninus. 

I T feems indeed to have been a received Opinion 
of eld, that fo intimate vvas the Relation between 
thefe two Attributes^ that wherever there was Ra- 
tionality^ Sociality followed of courfe. Thus Anto- 
ninus ij—f oi TO AoJ/iKOv, £u6u? ytj 7raKniy.ov. 1. 10. 

f. 2. And again, more fully >^ xotVjy ttuv to 

rv,; vcepa? (pCa-eccg fxi^o-^ov, tt^oj 10 (Tvyyiviq o^oiicq 
(nriv^Si, v r^ p^jAAo'j * ocw ycip i?~i ■KfiiiTov ttol^o, toc 
a.A>^oc^ roCHTui y^ rr^oq ro cri''yxifvx.(y9jci ru omstu) xj 
s-'j^z-xiTcrSat iTii^OT.'fov, 1. 9. f. 9. 

It is not perhaps foreign to the prefent Subjedl to 
obferve, that were the Eyes of any two Men what- 
ever to view the fame ObjeSf, they would each, from 
their different Places and their different Organization^ 
behold it differently^ and have a different Image. But 
were all the Mijids in the Univerfe to recognize the 
fame Truths they would all recognize it as one^ their 
Recognition would be uniform, and themfeives in a 
manner would be one alio. The Reafon is. Per- 
ception by the Senfes admits of more and lefsy better 
and worfe ; but Perception by the Intelle^i, like Truth, 
its Objed, admits of no degrees, and is either no- 
thing at all, or elfe total, uniform, co'mpkte, and one. 
Hepce therefore one Source of the Society, and as it 

were 



NOTES on Treatise tk Tl:ird, 297 

■were Communion of all Minds^ confidered as Minds, 
namely, the Unity of Truth, their common Objed. 

Again, every juft and perfedl Society ftands on 
the Bafis of certain Laws. But Law is nothing 
more, than right and perfeil Reason, feen in bidding 
and forbidding, according to the Nature and Eilence 
of thofe Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore 
this Universe be ^«<? whole, or general Society, 
there muft be fome common, general Law for 
its Condu£i and Welfare ; and this Law muft, of con- 
fequence, be fome right and perfect Reason, which 
pafTes thro' all things, and extends to every Part. 
Well therefore might Antoninus fay in the Beginning 
of this Note, that every thing rational, was of courfe 
focial, fmce Reason and Law appear to be the 
fame, and Laiv to be the Support and Bafis of all 

Society. Thus too Cicero fequitur, ut eadem fit 

in his [fc. D/7j] quce hiimano generi Ratio j eadem 
Veritas utrohique fit ; eademque Lex, qua eji re^i 
prceceptio, pravique depulfio. De Nat. Deor. 1. 2. 
c. 31. p. 180. See alio the fame Author Z)(? Z(?^^. 
1. I. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29,41, 51. Edit. Davif. De 
Fin. 1. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See alfo Diog. Laert. 
1. 7. f 88. M. Anton. 1. 5. c. 16. I. 6. c. 23, 
Arijl. Polit. as quoted in Nate XV. 

Note XX. p. 169. Nothing can be pur- 
suable, WHICH IS destructive OF SoCIETY.] 

Si cnim fie erimus affe^li, ut propter fuum quifque emo~ 
lumentum fpoliet, aut violet alterum, difrumpi necefje 
eJi earn, qucc maxime ejl fecundum naturam, humani 
generis Societatem. Cic. de Offic. 1. 3. c. 5. 

Note 



29S NOTES on Treatise the Third, 

Note XXI. p. 173. — For Contraries are 

EVER recognized THROUGH THE SAME Ha- 
BIT, djV.] AokeT ^i Hy % avrccTyi^ >ij.jn ETrij-jj^n Twi* 
ivavjftjov, r\ dvlri iTvai. There feetns to be one and the 
fame Error ^ and one and the fame Science^ with refpe5l 
to things contrary. Arift. de Anim. L 3. c. 3. This 
by Themiflius^ in his Paraphrafe^ is thus illuftrated. 

yocp 70 ocyoi^ov CO? upiXiixo]) yivuavMVy Xj to y.xxQV 

^Uy.Sv'^, irOCTTCiiC^.TXl J^ TTlfl 6«T£pOV. Of ThwgS 

contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For 
thus he, who knows Good to be fo?nething beneficial, 
knows Evil at the fame time to be fometbing pernicious j 
and he, who is deceived with refpo^l to one of thefe, is 
deceived alfo ivith refpeSl to the other. 

Note XXII. p. 174. — Those four Grand 
Virtues, feV.] Stobceus having told us, that of 
the Virtues fome were primary, fome fubordinate, adds 
— TT^urxg i\ i^Jrac^ocg sivxi, (pfovnciv, (ru(pf,0(T\Jvriv, Oiv- 
^fSKXv, mKOcioaxivw ' nai rrv [j.iv (ppov>i(rju, •arfpt toj 
y.cc^r.y.o-flx. yivBcr^ca ' tw Js crwippoiruvjiu TCfpt rag opfAOig 
T» ayGpW7r« • tyjv J'e auJpstav, Trept rug viro^ovy.g ' ttv 
i\ ^piocior'jvnv, •OTtpt ra? a.7rovsfxr\(T£ig. The primary Vir- 
tues are four; Prudence, Temperance, Forti- 
tude, and Justice: Prudence is employed in moral 
Offices ; Temperance, in Mens natur al Appetites and 
pur [aits 5 Fortitude, in Endurings j and Juflice, in 
Dijlrfbutions. Eel. Ethic, p. 167. 

That 



NOTES on Treatise the Third, 299 

That the Life according /■(? Virtue, was deemed 
the Life according /;? Nature, appears from what is 
faid by the fame Author, in the Page following — 

Uacrccv ^l TdTUfV roov dffluv to teA©^ £ivaj, to" axo- 
A«9w? TYi (pv(rii (^',:u • ly.zrriv Si t»twu J'ta tuv Uiuv 
•nraps^j/jaOat Tuip^avovla tov ai/9pw7rov. 77v End of all 
thefe Virtues zV, to live agreeably to Nature \ and each 
eftheni, by thofe Means ^ which are peculiar to itfelf is 
found to put a Man in pojfejfion of this End. 

So likewife Cicero Etenim quod fummum 

honum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere, 
id habet hanc, ut opinor, fentcntiarn^ cum virtute 
congruere femper. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 3. 

Note XXIII. p. 174. That Life, where 
THE Value of all Things is justly mea- 
sured, ^f . ] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203, 

204. 

Note XXIV. p. 175. — That, which BEiisre 

DONE, ADMITS OF A RATINQAL JUSTIFICA- 
TION.] In the Original it is -us^xyyv) vjKoyov 

'i<r^ii dTToXoyKTy-ov. Diog. Laert. 1. 7. f. 107. oV^p 
TSPOi.'X^iv vjXoyov iyji rriv ocTroAoyiXV. Sext. Emp. Adv. 
Maihem. 1. 7. Thus rendered by C/V^r^ — Officiumid 
effe dicutit, quod cur faSium fit, rdtio probabilis reddi 
pojfit. De Offic. 1. I. c. 3. The Reafon of its 
Greek Name, xcMkov, is given by SimpHcius. Ka- 
63)coi/7<54 eV* rot, yivo^iva, xxloi to. yikovIs', >tj STnQccX- 
i^ovlcc -— Moral Ofices are thofe things which are dom 

agreeably 



30O NOTES on Treatise the Third. 

agreeably to what is fittings and expedient. Simplic. in 
Ench. c. y]. 



Note XXV. p. 176. And when our se- 
veral Energies, exerted according to 
THE Virtues above, have put us in pos- 
session oFjIctV.] This Vv^astheM-iJ of Happiness, 
adopted by the old Jcademy, or Platonics. Secun- 
dum naturam vivere, fic affe£iu7n^ ut opthne affici 
pojji-t^ ad naturamque accommodatijjime . Cic. de Fin. 
I. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics^ who were 
originally of the fame School, held the fame. 'Et 
d arw, 70 ayypWTrtvo^ aya^oy v^'oyjAi ivipynoc yiyiislai 
iixf apEl'/lv — rm dpi—m >Cj nXimcirY.v — i\i Qicp TsAaw. 
If this he admitted^ it foUovjs that Human Good or 
Happiness /5, the energizing of the Soul according to 
the hefi and mofl confummate Virtue., in a perfeoi and 
complete Life. Ethic. Nic. 1. i. c. 7. A per fe Si and 
complete Life^ they explained to be fuch a Life as 
was Jio way deficient either as to its Duration., its bodily 
Health., and its being attended ivith a proper Competence 
»f exterjial Goods, and Profperity. By the befl and 
mofl confummate Virtue, they not only meant that 
Virtue, vvhich was in its hind mofl: perfed, but which 
was the Virtue alfo of that Part., which is in each 
of us jnoft excellent. For there are Virtues of the 
Body, fuch as Strength and Agility ; and there are 
Virtues of the Senfes, fuch as accurate Seeing, ac- 
curate Tafling ; and the fame of every Faculty, 
from the lowefi: to that which is fupreme. 

The fovereign Good or Happinefs here fpoken of, 
is again repeated, in other Words, p. i-jc). where it 

is 



NOTES on Treatise the Tbird. 301 

is called, the Attaining the primary and jufi Re- 
quifites of our Nature y by a Condu^ fuitable to Virtiit 
and moral Office. 

The primary and just Requisites here 
mentioned, are all Things requifite to the Ufe and 
Enjoyment of our Primary and Natural 
Perfections. 1 hefe Primary and Naiwal 
Perfeiiions mean the Natural Accomplish- 
ments of both our Mind and Body. They 
were called by the Latins, Prima Naturae, Prima 
fecundum Naturam ; by the Greeks, rcc zj^iara. kxIx 
(p'jciv, TO. zrpwTOi ritg (p6<T£oog. In them were in- 
cluded Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfedl 
Senfations, Memory, Docility, Invention, iffc. See 
Stob. Eel. Etb. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. 1. 5. c. 7. 
p. 364. A. Gell. I. 12. c. 5. 

A like Sentiment of Happinefs, to this here fpoken 

of, is that mentioned by Cicero Virtiite adhibitd, 

frui PRIM is a naturd datis . De Fin. 1.2. c. ii. 
p. 113. 'Tis there called the Opinion of the oli 
Academics, and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by 
the fame Author. Honefle vivere, friientem rebus 
lis, quas prim as hotnini natura ccnciliet. Acad. 
1. 2. c. 42. p. 24Q. 

In is to be obferved that Cicero, fpeaking of this 
Hypothefis, fays that it propofed an Idea of Happi- 
nefs, ivhich was not properly in our own Power. Hoc 
non ejl pofitum in nojlrd a6iione : completur enim ^ 
sx eo genere vitce, quod virtute fnitiir, & ex iis rebus 
quis fecu7idum naturam funt, neque funt in nojira po- 
tejlate. De Fin. i. 4. c. 6. p. 287^ 

HenC5 



302 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 

Hence therefore the Deficiency of thh Doc- 
trine. However juftifiable, however laudable its 
End, it could not infure a due Succefs to its En- 
deavours. And hence too the Force of what is ob- 
jeded to it in the Dialogue, from p. 177. to the 
End of the firft Part. 

Note XXVI. p. 185. — To place the Sove- 
reign Good in Rectitude of Conduct, ^f.J 
As the CdnduM here mentioned implies a Condudi 
under the Diredion of a befitting Rule or Law, 
^ and that, as oppofed to wrong Condudl, which has . 
cither no Rule at all, or at leaft one erroneous ; it 
may not be an improper Place to inquire, what was 
the antient Opinion concerning Law universal, 
that great and gaieral Law, which ftood oppofed to 
the municipal Laws of particular Cities, and Com- 
munities. 

Est quidem vera Lex, re^a ratio, natures cori- 
gruefis, diffufa in omnes, con flans, fempiterna, qua vocet 

dd officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat 7iec 

erit alia lex Romce, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia pojl- 
hac ; fed ^ o?nnes gentes, ^ omni tempore una lex, csf 
fempiterna, l^ i?nmor talis continebit ; unufqiie erit corrt- 
mu?ns quafi ?nagijier, & imperator o?nnium Deus. Ilk 
hujits legis inventor, difceptator, lator. Cui qui mn 
parebit, ipfe fe fugiet, ac tiaturam hominis afperjjabituri 
hoc ipfo luet maximas pocnas, etiamfi cectera fuppliciay 
qua putantur, effugerit. Fragm, Cic. de Rep. 1. 3. 



Lex 



NOTES on Treatise the Third. 30 j 

Lex eft ratio fwnma^ infita in natura^ qua jubet 
ea qua facienda funt, prohibetque contraria. What 
follows is jworth remarking. Eadem ratio^ cum ejl 
in hominis mente confirmata ^ confe^a., lex ejl. Cic, 
de Legg. 1. i. c. 6. p. 22. 

Again. Lex vera — ratio eft reSla fummi Jovis* 
To which he fubjoins, as above, Ergo ut ilia divina 
mens fumfna lex ejl ; ita cum in homine ejl, perfe£ia ejl 
in mente fapientls. De Legg. 1. 2. c. 4, 5. p. 88. 

'Tis in this Senfe the Jpoftk tells us of the Gen- 
tiles , or Mankind in general^ that they Jl^ew the Work 
of the Law written in their Hearts, their Confcience 
alfo bearing witnefs, and their Thoughts the mean while 
accufing, or elje excufwg one another. Rom. i. ji. 

As Cicero, in his Book of Laws above cited, follows 
the Stoic Difcipline, fo is it agreeable to their Rea- 
foning, that he make the original natural Law, of 
which we here treat, to be the Sovereign Rea- 
son OF THE Peity him/elf. Thus Chryftppus— 
Idem [fcil. ChryJJppus] legis perpetuus iff ecternce vim^ 
qucE quafi dux vita ^ magijlra officiorum Jit, Jovem 
dicit ejje. Nat. Deor. 1. i. c. 15. p. 41. 

So by the fame Philofophefs in Laertius, we 
are ordered to live according to Kature, JJ^y si^f^j/sv- 

IV Tw Aii, xaOjiJ/EjUovi T«TU tnj Tcou ovjccv (foF. oAwv) 
i^<cjKW£wj ovli, doing nothing, forbidden by the Uni- 

versal 



304 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 

VERSAL Law, that is to fay, hy that right Reafon, 
which paffeth thro' all Things, and which is the saue 
in Jove himfelf, the Governor and Condu^or of thii 
univerfal Adminijlration, Laert. 1. 7. f. 88. 

Agreeably to this Reafoning, Plutarch correcfl:* 
thofe, who made Aixn, a Goddefs, and the JJJeJ'or 
ef Joxei for, fays he, Zsjg ova t^ii y^lv tt.v Aiy.nv 

ZT!>.Pi§O0V, aAX' auloj AlJtH H; 0«|U.Jf Efl, Jt; VOfXUV * 

-zo-pio-teulal©-' x) tjXeio't547(^, Jove has not A'V.ji cr 
Right for his Affejfor, hut is himfelf Right, and 
Justice, and of all Laws the mojl antient 
««^ PERFECT. Moral, p. 781. B. 

Thus Antoninus -rbJ^ c\ XoyiyMv ^oo^v, t» 

iTr£(T^cci Tw rng TroAeM? Jty TroXilsiag rrig Trpia-QviUTYi^ 
Xoyt^ y.oc\ SfT/iiw. Tl^e End of Rational Animals is to 
follow the Reason and sacred Law of that City 
and mofl antient Polity, [in which all rational Beings 
are included.] 1. 2. f. 16. 

Th e mofl fimple Account of this Law, which the 
Stoics gave, feems to be that recorded by Stobaus ; 
according to which they called it ao'j/ov, o^^ov ovlx, 
■Ercoj-ajcljjtov [a,\v ruv zjoi'/dsuiv, ocrrayoovSliy.O]) J? TWy k 
vTQiyyii-jiv, Right Reason, ordaifiing what is to be 
done, and forhidding ivhat is not to be done. Eel. 
Ethic. 178. See alfo the Notes of Turnebus and 
Davis upon Cic. de Legg. 1. i. c. 6. 

Having premifed thus much concerning Law 
univerfal, it remains to fay fomething of that Rec- 
titude OF Conduct, v/hich is in this Part of the 

Dialogue 



NOTES on Treatise the Third. 305 

Dialogue propofed as our Happinefs. Rectitude 
OF Conduct is intended to exprefs the Term 
Ka7oa0wo-i?, which Cicero tranflates reSia Effe^io. 
K'x'ioo^coy.oi he tranflates Return Fa5lum. See De 
Fin. 1. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a 
Ka7oo9w^a«, was No//.» 'usoorof.yiJ.c.^ a Thi?7g coin- 
manded by Laiu ; to which was oppofed diy,a.plr)y,(z, 
a Sin or Offence^ which was defined N ?';/.» aVa- 
j'ofifU|aa, a Thing forbidden by Lazv. Plut. Mor. 
1037 C. What Laiu is here meant, which thus 
commands or forbids, has been Ihewn above. 

Hence therefore may be feen the Reaforl, why 
we have faid thus much on the Nature and Idea of 
Laiv univerfal^ fo intimate being the Union between 
thi^ and right Condu^, that we find the latter is no- 
thing more than a perfect Obedience to the former. 

Hence too we fee the Reafon, why in one view 
it was deemed Happiness, to be void of Error or 
Offence t a-my-oiplrflov sTvoci, as we find it in Jrrian. 
Epi£f. I. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable 
was the neceffary Refult of Rectitude of ConduSi.^ or 
rather in a manner the fame thing with it. 

I cannot conclude this Note^ without remarking 
on an elegant Allufion of Antoninm to the primary 
Signification of the Word K^ilopOwc-^, that is to 
fay, ^'Aa, of^og, right onwards^ flraight and direSily 
forwards. Speaking of the Reafoning Faculty ^ how, 
without looking farther, it refs contented in its own 
Energies, he adds KaOo' )(a7op0w(r£*f at Tojau7«t 

For wbi(h Reafon are all Aciions, of this 

X SpecieSt 



3o6 . NOTES o;z Treatise the Third, 

Species^ calkd Rectitudes, as denoting ths Dire^" 
nefs of their Progrejfion right onwards. 1. 5. f. 14. 
So again in the fame Senfe, \v^i7a.)i •srEpaiuav, to keep 
on, the Jtraight Road. 1. 5. f. 3. 1. 10. f. 11. 

One would imagine that our Countryman Milton 
had this Reafoning in view, when in his igth Son- 
net fpeaking of his own Blindnefs, he fays with' a 
becoming Magnanimity, 

Yet I argue not 

Jgainjl Heav' n" s Hand or Will; nor bate one jot 
Of Heart or Hope ; but fill bear up, and fleer 
Right onwards 

The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perufa!, 
being both fublime and fimple. 

Note XXVII. p. 185. The mere doing 

WHATEVER IS CORRESPONDENT TO SUCH AN 
End, EVEN THO' WE NEVER ATTAIN IT } 

Thus EpiSfetus in Arrian, fpeaking of Addrefs to 
Men in Power, and admitting fuch Addrefs, when 
juftified by certain Motives, adds that fuch Addrefs 
, ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. 
Upon this an Objedor demands of him, ■etw? »y 
'i\)')(y!y S Sioixai, ; But how then am 1 to obtain that^ 

which I want ? The Philofopher anfwers, '£>■&) 

^i coi Xiyo:, on ug TETHOMENOS dTripxa ' 
a^i h juovov, ivx zrpd^y}!: to (Tccvoo TrpiTrov ; Did I ever 
fay to thee, that thou Jhouldfl go and addrefs, as tho' 
ihou wert to succeed; and not rather with this only 
View, that thou mightfl do that, which is be- 
coming THY Character? — -And foon after, 

when 



-NOTES on Treatise the Third. 307 

when an Objedion is urged from Appearance, and 
the Opinion of Mankind, he anfwers oV ourO' 

aAAa t« nEnPAXOAl KAAX2S; Knoweji 

thou not, that a fair and good Man does 7tothing for the 

fake of j^ppearance, but for the fake only of having 

DONE WELL AND FAIRLY? Arr.EpiSt. 1. 3. C. 24. 

p. 497, 498. This DoHrine indeed leems to have 
been- the Bafis of the Stoic Morals ; the Principle, 
which included, according to thefe Philofophers, as 
well Honour and HoneJIy, as Good and Happinefs. 
Thus Cicero— Facere omnia^ ut adipifcamur quce fecun- 
dum naturam finty etfi ea non adfequamur, id effe ^ 
honeflum, & folu7n per fe expetendum & fummum bonum 
Stoici dicunt. De Fin. 1. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this 
is confonant that Sentiment of theirs in Plutarch — 

oy.o?\o'ysTv, dycc^ov — And again — to i^^v xa7« (puo-jy, 
teA©^ eIvm — ra xxl/x- (pvaiv^ (x.^ix(po{>!x. ilvxi, Phlt, 
Mor. 1060. D. E. See below. Note XXX. 

Note XXVIII. p. 185. — What if we make 

OUR NATURAL StATE THE STANDARD ONLY 
TO DETERMINE OUR CoNDUCT, ^f,] 'Tis in 

this Senfe we find it elegantly faid in Plutarch by the 
iaft mentioned Philofophers— r-oi;^£r« Tr,q ti^ziy.ovia.<; 

rriv (p6(TiV, >^ TO xocld (pU(TiV that our NATURAL 

State and what is confonant to it , are i'Z?*? Elements 
of Happinefs — and jufl before, the fame natural State 
is called t» Koc^movlf^ ^fX'^-) ^ "^'^ '^'^'^ dpelv?, the 
Source of moral Office ; and the Subject Mat- 
ter ^ Virtue. Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. Jtque 
efiam illud perfpicuwn efl, conjiitui necej'e effe initiuniy 
quod fapientia^ cum quid agere incipiat, fequatur j id- 

X 2 iue 



3o8 N O T ES c« Treatise the I'hird. 

que initium ejfe natura accommodatujii : nam aliter ap- 
petitio, &c. Cic. Acad. 1. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. Inittapro- 
poni necejp ejje apta b" accommodata natures^ quorum ex 
fele5iione Virtus pojjit exijlere. De Fin. 1. 4. c. 17. 
p. 316. Cum vero ilia, qua officia efe dixi, proficif- 
cantur ah initiis natura \ ea ad hac referri neceffe eji : 
ut reSfe did pojfit, omnia officia eo referri^ ut adipifca- 
mur principia natura ; nee tamen ut hoc fit bonorum 
ULTiMUM De Fin. 1. 3. c. 6. p. 217. 

Note XXIX. p. 185. We should not 

WANT A Good to correspond, y^] Plutarch 
quotes the following Sentiment of Chryfiippus, who 
patronized this Idea of Good — To\ zjiol ayoc^uv 
xx\ xaxwy Xoycv, ov dv'lhg iKTccysi v-oci J'ostJ^a^fJ, 
cvw'puvoTO'flov m(x,i (pncri tw Stw, axi [/.ocXiroi twv 
ll^(px)'rm olirliG^xi, zs^oKri^iav. Plut. Mor. 1041. E. 

Note XXX. p. 187.— -Yet we look not 
FOR HIS Reputation, yc] What ^dntilian 
fays of Rhetoric, may with great Propriety be tranf- 
ferred to Morality. Nojier orator, Arfqiie a nobis 
finita, non funt pofita in eventu. Tetidit quidem 
ad vi^oriam, qui dicit : fed, cum bene dixit, etiamfi 
non vincat, id, quod arte continetur, effecit. Nam l^ 
guhernator vult falvd nave in portum pervenire : ft 
tamen tetnpeflate fuerit abreptus, non idea minus erit 
guhernator, dicetque notum illud\ dum clavum redum 
teneam. Et inedicus fanitatem agri petit : ft tamen 
aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantid agri, aliove quo 
cafu fumma non contingit ; dum ipfe omnia fecunduni 
rat ion em fecerit, medicina fine non excidit. It a or at or i 

bene dixifi'e, finis efl. Nam efl ars ea in actu 

pofita, non in eventu. Inft. Orat. I. 2. c. 17. 

Note 



NOTES on Treatise the "Third, 309 

Note XXX. p. 187. — He for a Subject 

HAS THE WHOLE OF HuMAN LlFE,^^.] 'Oj(r<as 

Ti h TOO UVg', "TKxi rn TU-poatpfVsj, 'srfpi a? <x.vx- 
i-psPofxivn Tvj^slcci T8 liin ciyx^^ n Kocw. Tloe EJfence 
<?/" Good, h a peculiar DireSlion of Mind y and the 
EJfence of Y.Yih, is a peculiar Dire£iion alfo. What 
then are Externals I They ferve as Subjects to 
the Mind's Dire^ion, fro?n converfing with which it 
obtains its proper Good or Evil. Arr. Epicl. 1. 1. c. 29. 

Again 'a» uAa*, d^isKpopci ' v Js %pr(r»? dvlm ovx 

aj*«(pop(^. The Subjects are indifferent^ but fiot 
fi the Usp of them. Arr. Epicft. 1. 2. c. 5, 

Thus Horace: 

Ncn pojfdentem tnulta vocaveris 
ReSie heatum j re^ius occupat 

Nomen beati, qui Deorum 

Muneribus sapienter uti, 

Duramque callet pauperiem pati^ 

Pejufq-i leto flagitium timet : 

Nm iile, iffc. 

Od. 1. Iv. 9. 

Even the Comic Poet feems not to have been 
unacquainted with this Dodlrine : 

Ch. ^id narrat? CI. ^id ille? miferum fe ejfe. 
Ch. Miferum ? quern minus credere eji ? 

X 3 ^^<^ 



310 N O T E S o;z Treatise the Third. 

^id 7'cUiqui ejl, quin haheat qiics quidem in homine 

dicunttir bona ? 
Parentis, pairiam incolunwn, a/nicos, genus, cognatoSy 

divitias : 
At que ha a perinde fimt ut illius animus, qui ea pof~ 

fidet : 
^i UTi fdt, ei BONA; illi, qui non utitur re^e, 
mala. 

Heauton. AS.. I. S. 2. V. 18. 



Note XXXI. p. 189.-— The End in other 
Arts is ever distant, f5V.] Sed in caterii 
artibus cum dicitur Artificiose, pojlerum quodam modo 
(jf confeqiiens putandum ejl, quod illi imyivvny^aHixov 
appellant ; quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur, id ad- 
prim o re^ijji me dicitur : quicquid enim a fapiente pro- 
fcifcitur, id co7ttinuo debet expletum eJJ'e omnibus fuis 
partibus ; in eo enim pofitum efi id, quod dicimus ejfe 
expetendum. Nam ut peccatum eft patriam prodere, 
parentes violare, fana depeculari, qucs fiint in effeSJu : 
ftc timere, fie marere, fie in libidine ejfie, peccatum eft, 
etiam fiine effe5iu. Veram ut hcec, non in pojleris ^ in 
confequentibus, fied in primis continuo pec cat a fiunt : fic 
ea, qua: proficificuntur a virtutc, susceptione prima, 
non perfectione, re6ia fiunt judicanda. Cic.de 
fin. 1.3. C.9. p. 228. To JcJ'ia Ti-A»? Tufp^^avft \r\ Xo- 

yixvi Y'^/C] ^^^ ^''' '''° '''^ ^^"^ ZJipxg Ittjo; " »;^, 
occTTTs^ ivn ^yjritTiwq xoa i>7iO>ifi(r£Ct:g xxi twv toi«twi/, 
ccTiXYig yiviloci 71 oK-n Tirpa^if, Idv rt lyxo-^r, c'AA' 
Itti zsxv\o<; p£p«?, '''Mi oira ay xalaXrip^^, zrX^psg hoc) 
XTTfOcr^nq ixvi'/j TO zTf-OTc^iv -ujoi^i' o)~s iiTTiTv, lyca 
dn-i^u rol l^ucc. M, Ant. }. 11. f. i, Et quemad- 

modum 



NOTES on Treatise tbeTbird, 311 

modum opportunitas (fie enim adpeUemus hxcci^tocv) non 
fit major prodii5iione tempom (hahent eni?n fiuum mo- 
dum qucscunqm opportuna dicuntur) fitc re£ta effeSiio 
(x^ilo^Owo-ju enim ita adpello^ quoniam reSlum fa^um 
xot-lop^ufji,!/,) re^a igitur effeSlio^ item convenientia^ de- 
nique ipsum bonum, quod in eo pofiitum efi ut naturce 
confientiat-i creficendi accejfionem nullum hahet. Ut enim 
epportunitas ilia, fie hae de quihus dixi, non fiunt tem- 
poris produBione majora : ob eatnque eaufiam Stoieis non 
videtur optabilior nee magis expetcnda vita heata^ fi fiit 
longa, quamfii brevis : utunturque fimili, ut,fit eothurni 
laus ilia efi adpedem apte eonvenire, neque multi eothurni 
paucis anteponerentur, nee majores minoribus : fie quo- 
rum omne bonum eonvenientia at que opportunitate finitur, 
nee plura paueioribus^ nee hnginquiora brevioribus ante- 
ponentur. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 14. p. 242. See alfo 
Dio. Laert. 1. 7. f. loi. M. Ant. 1. 6. f. 23. 1. 3. 
f. 7. Senec. Epift. 66. . 

Note XXXIII. p. igi. — Recollect then, 
SAID he. Do you not remember that one 
Pre-conception, l3c. ] In this, and the fubfequent 
Pages, t\\Q. general Pre-coneeptiom ofi Good zre applied 
to the particular Hypothefin ofi Good^ advanced in this 
Treatifie. See before, pag. 115, 121, 122. 

Note XXXIV. p. 192. And is there 

ANY Time or Place, whence Rectitude 
of Conduct may be excluded?] n a N- 
TAXOT v.'A AlHNEKnS \iti <7oi in, y.x\ 
Tw srapao-'ji av^v>oc(rn ^soaiZin; rjapej-fn;, kx\ loTq uTx- 

M. Ant. 1. 7. f. 54. / 

X 4 Note 



312 N O T E S £?;2 Treatise the Third. 

Note XXXV. p. 192. —Where it shall 

NOT BE IN HIS PoWER TO ACT BRAVELY 
AND HONESTLY.] M>lKg7i sv jupt AEj^f, Trwj yivi]- 
lai ; oVwf yaco uv yiv^ai^ (ru a,v\o ^raen; xaAw?, xx\ 

i?~a.i (Toi 70 diTo^ixv ivlh^y]y.a. Arrian. Epidl. 1. 4. 
c. 10. p. 650. 

Note XXXVI. p. 195. There are In- 
stances INNVMERABLE OF MeN BAD, AS 

WELL AS GooD,feV.] See a long Catalogue of 
thefe in Cicero's Tufculan Difputations ; Spartan Boys ; 
Barbarian Sages ; Indian Wives ; Egyptian Devotees, 
i^c. &c. The whole PafTage is worth reading. Tufc. 
Difp. 1.5. c. 27. p. 400, 401, ^^. 

Note XXXVII. p. 196. — This I write you 
(says he in one of his Epistles) while, 
^C.'\ Tw [jLOcxxpiccv Otyovlsg xxi ocy-a, rsXivlocixv %^i~ 
fOiv TH bJ», iypa(Pofjt.BV V[jav rcc^TCt ' ^^ccfy^piocls uTo:- 
pnxoAitSwEj KCii iiarivlijiixx zrx^rij UTrfpCoAw »x ixttct 
Xinrovla. t« Iv ixvloTg y.eyi^vg ' a'Pnwaptyalrilo, S\ 
'SS(x.<Ti TSTOK to' xai« xj/up^jjv p^aTpcv sV; ta ruv ysyo-. 
voTuv miJA-j SixXoyi(T[Mu.v |uuiijw,ji— Dio. Laer. 1. 10. f. 22. 
Cum ageremus vitis beatum 6f eundem fupremum diem, 
fcribebamus hac. Tanti autem morbi aderant veficce fef 
vifcerum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem pojfit accer- 
dere. Compcnfabatur tamen cum his omnibm ajiimi lee- 
titid, quam capicbam memorid rationum i7iventorumque 
nojlroriim -—Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. c. 30. p. 173. 

Soon after we have another Sentiment of Epicu- 
rus, that a rational Adverfity ijuas better than an irra- 
tional 



NOTES 071 Treatise the Third. 3 13 

i'ioml Profperity. The original Words are — : y.^i7r~ 

Dio. Laert. 1. 10. f. 135. 

Note XXXVIII. p. 198. O Crito, if it be 
PLEASING TO THE GoDS, ^c] The three Quo- 
tations in this Page are taken from Plato ; the firft 
from the Crito, quoted by Epi^etus at the End of 
the Eiichlridio?!, and in many other Places ; the fe- 
cond from the Apology , quoted as frequently by the 
fame Author ; the third, from the Meuexemis or 
Epitaph. Plat. Opera, torn. 2. p. 248. Edit.Senwi. 
See alfo Cic. Tiifcul. 1. 5. c. 12. 

Note XXXIX. p. 199. If you are for 

Numbers, replied he, what think you of 
THE numerous Race of Patriots, <^r.J Sed 
quid duces & priucipes noinincm ; cum legiones fcribat 
Cat f ape aJacris in eum locum profe5las, wide rediiuras 
fe non arbitrarentur ? Pari anlmo Lacedcemonii in 
Thermopylis oc cider unt : in quos Simon ides. 

Die hofpes Sparta, nos ie hie vidijfejacentes, 
Dum fandis patria legibus obfequimur. 

Tufcul. Difp. 1. 1. C.42. p. loi. 

Note XL. Ibid. Martyrs for Sys- 
tems WRONG, b'V.] That there may be a bigotted 
Obftinacy in favour of what is abfurd, as well as a 
nifional Conjiancy in adhering to what is right, thofe 
Egyptians above mentioned may ferve as Examples. 
Mgyptiorum tncrcm quis ignoret ? quorum imbutcs men- 
tes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificina?n prius fubi- 
grint, quam ihim aut afpidem aut felem aut canem aut 

croco- 



14 N O T E S o;; Treatise the Third. 

crocodilum violent: quorum etiam fi imprudentes quid- 
piamfecennty posnmn nullam recufent. Tufcul. Difp. 
1. 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before, Note XXXVI. 

Note XLI. p. 200. — Celebrated to such 
A Height, in the Religion, which we 
PROFESS, ^r-] 'Tis probable, that fome Analogies 
of this fort induced a Father of the Church (and no 
lefs a one than St. Jeroni) to fay of the Stoics, who 
made moral Rectitude the only Good, no- 

STRO DOGMATI IN PLERISQUE CONCORDANT. 

Vid. Menag. In D. Laert. 1. 7. f. loi. p. 300. 
and Gatak. Prafat. in M. Anton. See alfo of this 
Trec^tife ^z^Q no. and below, NotehXYV. 

Note XLII. p. 201. To live consistent- 
ly, y^.J To LIVE CONSISTENTLY is here ex- 
plained to be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE 
SINGLE CONSONANT ScHEME OR PuRPOSE ; and 

our Good or Happiness is placed in fuch Con- 
sistence, upon a Suppofition that thofe, who live 
inconfijlently, and without any fuch uniform Sche?ne, 
are of confequence miferahle, and unhappy. To te- 

fji.a'xpu.ivuiq ^wvlwv >t«5iO')aijwoD«y1wv. Stob. Eel. Lthic. 
p. 171. 

This Consistence was called in Greek oy.oXo- 
^('a, in Latin Ccnvenientia., and was fometimes by 
itfelf alone confidered as the End. Tw i [j-oKoy it^iv 
/sV^o-t TfAfCv iTvai. Stob. Eel. Ethic, p. 172. See 
.alfo Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c, 6. p. 216. So alfo in the fame 
laft named Treatife, c. 7. p. 220. — Ut enim hijlri- 

sni 



NOTES on Treatise the Third. 3 15 

cni a^io, faltatori motm^ non quivis, fed certiis quidam 
eji datus : fie vita agenda ejl certo gencre quodani^ non 
quoUbct -y quod genus conveniens consentane- 
UMQUE dicimus. Nee enitn gubernatloni aut medicina 
fimilem fapientiam ejfe arbitramur, fed z^iom illi potiiis^ 
quam modo dixi, i^ faltationi ; ut in ipfa arte infit^ 
NON FORis petatur extremum, id eji, artis effe^io. 

'Tis upon this Principle we find it a Precept 

in Cicero's Offices /;/ primis autem conftituen- 

dum eft, quos nos b' quales ejfie velimus, &' in quo 
genera vitae 1. i. c. 32. So likewife in the En- 
chiridion oi EpiSfetUS, C. 33. Ta^oy -rivoi rih Xa.- 

fxyil'^px (rav'co Xy tuttov, ov (p'jXx^vjg Itti ts <tb(x,v]oo wv, 
>^ au^paVoif ETTfTufvavwv. Ordain to thyfelffome Cha- 
ra^er and Model of Life y which thou may ft maintain both 
by thyfelfy and vjhen thou art eonverfant ivith Mankind. 

So much indeed was refted upon this Prin- 
ciple of Confifte^ice, that even to be any thing con- 
fifently, was held better than the contrary. Thus 
Epidetus — ''Evsi cs tJ^T oiv^jouiTrov ilvca, h oiyx^ov v\ 
y.!X.yJv ' h to yrysuovmov as J'sT i^sp'ya.Qsa'^xi ro cxvl^iy 

ri Tx Eitio? It behoves thee to be one uniform 

Man, either good or bad; either to cultivate thy own 

Mind, or to cultivate things external Arr. EpicH:. 

1. 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does 
he exprefs himfelf in a Place fubfequent ; where 
having firfl: counfelled againft that falfe Complai- 
fanee, which makes us, to pleafe Mankind, forget 
our proper Character, and having recommended as 

our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds 'Ej ti 

!j.r\ clpi(TSi Txvlx, 0?^^ XTioyJ^i-jov Itt] rxvxvVx' ysvv 
iT; 7MV y.pxihv^ iig TWi/ [^.OiX^-j Aia^Oopa J »tm 



3i6 N O T E S o;z Treatise the Third. 

■STpoTiOTroc, ov yAywIon ' ov Svoaa-oci >c, ©cpo-ixtiv UTroJtpi- 
vac-Saj ^ 'Ayocfxi[j>.vovoc—An. Epid. 1. 4. c. 2. p. 580. 
Bui if what I reco?mnend thee do not pleafe, then turn 
thee totally to all that is contrary ; become a profigate of 

the mojl proftitute kind Characters fo different are 

not to be blended ; thou canfl not a6t at once Therfites 
<j/;i Agamemnon . 

So too Horace : 

^^nto coNSTANTioR idefn 

In vitiiSy tanto levins mifer^ ac prior ilk 
^i jam cofitento, jam laxo fune laborat. 

Sat. 7. 1. 2. V. 18. 
See alfo Chara^erijlics, V. i. p- 131. 

Note XLIII. p. 203. — It is not merely, 
TO LIVE consistently; but to live con- 
sistently wiLH Nature.] 'Oij-o\oy<i^ivw^ rtj 
Cpjo-ft C,h. Cleanthes in Stob. Eel. Eth. p. 171.— 
Congruenter naturts conveni enter que vivere. Cic. de 
Fin. I. 3. c. 7. p. 221. The firft Defcription of 
our E?id [to live conjifiently] was deemed defe^ive, 
and therefore was this Addition made. See Stobaus 
in the Place cited. Arr. EpiSl. 1. 3. c. i. p. 352. 

Note XLIV. p. 204. To live consis- 
tently WITH Nature is, to live accord- 
ing to just Experience of those things, 

WHICH happen around US.] TiX^ \<r\ TO 

cy,oXoyi<[j.ivui; rn (p'^o'n C^nv ' oVf^ ;/pi;(ri7r7r@H' ca- 
(pirs^ov QaXoyivog zrotriToii^ t^rivs^xe tov rpoTrov T«Toy, 
Z'^v >t^T £p7r£j3i'c;u Twy (^i-Vj; gx'(J(.^chvo'jIo:v. Stob. Ecl. 
Ethic. 171, Diog. Lacrt. 1. 7. c. 87. His verbis 

[fciL 



NOTES on Treatise the Tloird. 317 

[fcil. vivere fecundum naturam'] tria ftgn'ificari Stoici 
dicunt. Viium ejufmodi, vivere adhibentem fcientiam 

earum rerum^ quce naturd cvenirent De Fin. 1. 4. 

c. 6. p. 286. See alfo the fame Treatife, /. 3. c. 9. 
p. 227. A 2. r. II. />. 113. where 'tis expreffed — 
Vivere cum inteUlgentid earum rerum, qua naturd eve- 
nirent. 

Note XLV. p. 205.— To live perpetually 

SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS 
CONGRUOUS TO NaTURE, AND REJECTING 
WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR EnD THAT 

Selecting, and that Rejecting only. J 

*'0 Tf 'Av^jValp^, T& Tlk^ X£r(S«<, 'Ev 

(Puciv, «7r£xA£3/£(r9«t Si Toi •srapa (puVjv, C7roXoi[j.Q:^vn. 
Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.2. p. 497. Edit. Potter. This 
Sentiment was fometimes contrasted^ and exprefied 

as follows TO \\)'Ko'y\<rvi\) Iv raT? luXoyxi; 

fometimes, more concifely ftill, by the fmgle Term 
T(j evXoyiri'^v. See Plutarch 107 1, 1072. Cicera 
joins this, and the foregoing Defcriptions of Happi~ 
nefs, together. Circutnfcriptis igitur his fententiisy 
quas pofui^ ^ fi quce Jimiles earum fmt ; relinquitur^ 
ut fummum bonum fit, vivere fcientiam adhibentem 
earum rerum, quce naturd eveniant, feligentem qua fe- 
cundum naturam, ^ qua contra naturam funt rejiciefi- 
tern, id efi, convenienter congruent er que natures vivere, 
De Fin. 1,3. c. 9. p. 227. See alfo £)i? /7«. 1.2. 
c. II. p. 113. See alfo Diog. Laert. 1. 7. c. 88. — 
Stob. Eel. Eth. 171. 

Note XLVI. p. 207. To live in the dis-t 

CHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES.] "" Kf/jhl*^^ c\ 



3i8 N O T E S o« Treatise the Third. 

Laert.' 1. 7. c. 88. — Stob. Eel. Eth. 171. — Officia 
omnia — fervantem vivere, Cic. de Fin. 1. 4. c. 6. 
p. 286. 

Soon after we meet the Phrafes — To live ac- 
cording TO Nature 5 To live according 
TO Virtue, 'o Xhrn — tsA©^ ilm^ to o'^oAo^/s- 
f/Jvccg TV) ipu(T£i Lir.Vy oVfp £?-* y-ixT aptlw ^vv. Laert. 

1. 7. c. 87. Confentire naturce ; quod ejfe vohint e 

virtute, id eft, honejlate vivere —Dt Fin. 1. 2. c. 11. 
p. 113. Where, as has been already obferved page 
174, and in the Note likewife on the Place, we find 
the Lives according to Nature and Virtue are con- 
fidered as the fame. 

However to make this AflTertion plainer, (if it 
be not perhaps fufficiently plain already) it may not 
be improper to confider, what Idea thefe Philofo- 
phers had of Virtue. 

In Laertim (where he delivers the Sentiments of 
Xeno and his followers) Virtue is called Ai^'Oso-*; 
oy.oXQ'y«iJ(.m, a confflent Difpofition ; and foon after, 
v^'oyr^ •umroiYiixivA TSi^oq rry oixoXoyiocv "srccvlog ra Stu, 
A Mind formed to Confflence thro' every Part of Life. 
Laert. 1. 7. c. 8g. 

In Stobaus (according to the Sentiments of the 

fame School) it is called AtaOso-j? 4>ux,>)^? (ru,a!pwD©J 

dvl-i) zcfpj oAoD TQv Qiov. A Difpofition of Mind, con^ 

fonant to it f elf throughout the zvhok of Life. Eel. Eth, 

p. 167. 

So 



NOTES on Treatise t/je Third. 319 

So Cicero in his Laws — Conjians ^ perpetua ratia 
vita, quce ejl Virtus. — 1. i. c. 17. p. 55. 

So Seneca in his 74?^ Epi/ile Virtus eni?n 

CONVENIENTIA conjlat : o?nnia opera ejus cum ipfd 
concordant, ^ congruunt. 

Thus therefore Conftjlence being the EfTence of 
Virtue^ and upon the Hypothefis here advanced^ the 
EfTence alfo of Happinefs ; it follows lirft that a Vir- 
tuous Life will be a Happy Life. But li 3. Happy 07ie, 
then of courfe a Life according to Nature ; fmce no- 
thing can be Good, which is contrary to Nature, nor 
indeed which is not confonant, in ftridleft manner, 
to it. 

And here (as a proper Opportunity feems to 
offer) we cannot but take notice of the great Simi- 
litude of Sentiments ; it may be even faid, the Unani- 
mity of almoft: all Philofophers, on this important 
Subjedt concerning Ends, and Happiness. 

Those, whofe Hypothefis we have followed in 
this Dialogue, fuppofed it to be Virtue and con- 
sistent Action, and that without regard to For- 
tune or Succefs. But even they, who from their Hy- 
pothefis made fome Degree of Succefs requifite ; who 
refted it not merely on right Adion, but on a Propor- 
tion of bodily Welfare, and good Fortune concomitant, 
even thefe made right Action and Virtue to 
be principal. 



Thus 



320 ISl Or ES on Treatise the Third, 



Thus Jnhyias, according to the Dodlrine of the 

Pythagorean School. 'E^Scci[xo(rvvx ^pxTig dpelag iv 
ivlvyjx. Happincfs is the Ufe or Exercife of Virtue, 
attended with external good Fortune. Opufc. Mytho- 
log. p. 678. Confonant to this Sentiment, he fays 
in the Beginning of the fame Treatife, (Av dycc- 
eg a-jrip ovx ivHsuig ivoxi^oiv t^ ocvxyxag t^iii 01 
£u<J'aj|Wwy, ^ ayoc^oq dvv^ Iri. The good Man is not 
ef neceJfUy happy ; [becaufe, upon this Hypothefis, 
external Fortune may be wanting ;] but the happy Man. 
is of nee efity. Good, [becaufe, upon the fame Hypo- 
thefis, without Virtue was no Happinefs.] Ibid. 

p. 673. Again Ant -j-h ya,^ y^x-koSociixoviv ayxfux 

70]) yixxov, aCli ^yjn IXuv (>ca)twf Is yx^ «,-J]x y^/ii\xi) 
clili (T7txv'iC,oK — The had Man (fays he) muj needs 
at all times be miferable, whether he have or whether he 
want the Materials of external Fortune ; for if he have 
them, he will employ them ill. Ibid. p. 696. Thus 
we fee this Philofopher, tho' he make Externals a 
Requiftte to Happinefs, yet ftill without Virtue he 
treats them as of no Importa?ice. Again — A'jo J"' oSol 
Teuvovlai tv tw Sjw * x y.iv ajtuSpwTrolfpa, ay tXxuoov 
lQx^iC,sv ^OhcT(Tivg ' a ^\ iv^fuivolspx, rxv iTropiCslo 
"i^lrcop. Txv (i'j x^slxv (pxy.i ^TiXniT^xi (lege oriXea-^xiy 
Dorice pro OjAeiv) [Av rau/av, owxa^xi ol xj Tr,vxv, 
There are two Roads in Life diflinSi from each other ; 
cne the rougher, which the fuffering Ulyfles %ve7it ; the 
other more fmooth, which ivas travelled by Neflor. 
Noiu of thefe Roads (fays he) Virtue defres indeed the 
latter j and yet is Jhe not unable to travel the former. 
Ibid. p. 696. From which laft Sentiment it appears, 
that he thought Virtue, even in any Fortune, luas 
capable of producing at leaf fome degree ^/'Happiness. 

As 



NOTES on Treatise the Third, 32 1 

. As for the SocratU Dodrine on this Subjedl, it 
may be fufficiently leen by what is quoted from it, 
in the Dialogue pag. 198, 199. And as the Senti- 
ments, there exhibited, are recorded by Plato, they 
may be called not only Socratic, but Platofiic alfo. 
However, leaft this Ihould be liable to difpute, the 
following Sentiment is taken from Xenocrates, one 
oi Plato's immediate SuccelTors, in the old Academy 
by him founded. Sivo^f>cK.Tn<; (pr,<T]'j^ 'Eu«J~^'(|u,ova £iWt 

t7vai Aocifj-ovoc. Xenocrates held that /'(fz^^jEudaemon, 
*r Happy, who had a virtuous Mind-, for that the 
Mind was every one's Daemon or Genius. j7-ijl. Top. 
1. 2. c. 6. 

Here we fee Virtue made the Principle of 
Happiness, according to the Hypothecs of the 
Dialogue. There is an elegant Allufion in the Paf- 
fage to the ^/jwi?/^^/ of the Word '£i;^a;iy,cov, which 
fignifigs both [Happy] and [psjjejfed of a good Genius 
cr Datnon ;] an Allufion which in tranflating 'twas 
not polTible to preferve. See below, Nafe LVIII. 

A s for the Peripatetic School, we find their Idea 
of Happiness, as recorded by Laertius, to be in a 
manner the fame with that of the Pythagoreans. It 
was yjfmiq dftslrig iv Q(u tiAsm — The TJfe or Exer- 
cife of Virtue, in a complete andperfe£l Life. Laert. 
1. 5. c. 30. We have already, in Note XXV, cited 
the fame Dov5lrine (tho' fomewhat varied in Ex- 
preffion) from the Founder of the Peripatetics^ 
in his firfl Book of Ethics. So again we learn 

from hUTl-" 0T» 7rparc»f T<1/£J X; iVioyHOH Ki- 

Y y^vlM 



c 2 2 N O T E S c;2 Tr E AT I s E the Third. 

yov\y.i TO T£A(^, that'th certain Actons and Energies^ 
which are to be deemed the End. Ethic. Nic. 1. 1. 

c. 8. And again— "Ert y^'^ aul^ i' iU7rp«^j'a, tj- 

A*??)--. -^^J^ '^^'^ ^^^ "^'^^y R^^iiude of A^ion, which is 
itfelf the End. Ibid. 1. 6. c. 5. And again, 'H eV 

e^aijuovi'cf, Wi^y^iy. rig £0. Happinefs is a certain 

Energizing. 1. g. c. 9. And more explicitly than 
all thefe PalTages in that elegant Simile, /. i. c. 8. — 

^£(p«v»y7a«, «AA' o» a.'yuvi^o[/.£voi (xBTijy }/a^ Ttvs? 
vixwcriv •) »Tw >^ Twu Iv Tw C»w xaAwv >^ a^aSww OI 
IIPATTONTES OPGnS l7rr,eoAo» ylyvovlxi. 
For as in the Olympic Games, not thofe are crowned, 
who are handfomeji and Jlrottgeji, hut thofe who combat 
and cojitend^ (for 'tis from among thefe come the ViSiors -,) 
fo, with refpe^l to things laudable and good in human 
Life, 'tis the right ASiors only that attain the PofJeJJion 
of them. Nay, fo much did this Philofopher make 
Happinefs depend on right Aiiion, that the' he re- 
quired feme Portion of Externals to that Felicity, 
which he held/upreme ; yet ftill 'twas Honour and Fir- 
iue which were its principal Ingredients. Thus fpeak- 
ing of the Calamities and external Cafualties of Life, 
which he confefles to be hnpediments to a Happinefs 

perfectly complete, he adds ojuwc Sk >t) tu tktoj? J*a- 

. 'hv.^Ttii TO xaXov, ETTficJau (pipn Tj; iVMXug TroAAotf 

. t<j y-iydXcci; arup^iaf, jm.jj Si dva.X'yriiTKxv, xKXa, y^vm. 

xxSot.q ecu »; ^fj'aAv^l/up^of. '£j J"' ii<Jiv on Ivi^ynxi 

ii'jfixi rr? ^wif, xaOaTTsp eWo^ufv, stJ'fjf av yijoClo tm» 

'^.xv.a.^iMii ol^Xi^ ' iSiTToli. ycc^ 7rpa^£j roc fAKxydx ju 

- ilpauAa. Toy ya^ ug oc?^r)^ug dya^ov x) tjul^pova ZTX~ 

"aroig lio^t^ot, ra? ru^p^a? ha-^riuomg (pi^tiv, x) £)c tw 

'iJ7r«ppi^ou7w» «£» ra KOih.Mfo(, xcparlft* * xaOarfp x^ 



NOTES o;2 Tr E AT isE the ^htrd, 323 

IxtxxTxrXj Xj aKuloTojxov ik tw Sodivlav (tk-jIcov xxX- 
Xiro^i y^TroSrifxa iroiii^ tov (X,\j\oy Si rpoTrov tCj T»f aA- 
A8^ rs-Xy^TXi; ol'n-avlaf, *Ei J"' ^'rw?, adAt(^ [j.\v «7s_ 
TTole ykoiT av o iv^x>'fA.ccv. Jnd yet, even in fuch Inci- 
dents, the fair Principle of Honour and Virtue fnnes 
forthy when a Man with becoming Cahnnefs efidures 
many and great Misfortunes, and that not thro'' Infcnfi- 
hility, but being brave arid magnanimous. Nay more, 
if it be true, as we have already affirmed, that 'tis 
Actions, winch are predominant in conjlituting a happy 
Life, then can no one be completely miferable, who is 
happy in his right CoJidu^, becaufe he will never be the 
A£lor of ivhat is detefiable and bafe. For 'tis our Opi- 
nion that the Man, truly wife and good, endures all 
Fortunes with beco?7iing Decency, a fid from ivhatever 
iiappens to arife, fi ill frames the fair eft Actions j like as 

. the good Commander ufes the Army, which he happens to 
find, after the manner mofl agreeable to the Rules of 
War ; and the Shoemaker, from fuch Skins as others 
provide him, makes a Shoe, the befi that can be made 

,fro7n fuch Materials j and fo in the fame manner all 
other Artifls befide. But if this he true, then he, who 
is happy in this Re^itude of G^mus, can in no In fiance 
be truly and Jlri^ly vmkxuhk. Eth. Nic. 1. i. c. 10. 

A s for Epicurus, tho' he was an Advocate for 
Pleafure, yet fo high was his Opinion of a wife 
and right ConduSf, that he thought rational Adver- 
fity better than irrational Profperity. See Dial. 
p. 197. Hence too he reprefented that Pleafure, 
which he efteemed our Sovereign Happinefs, to be 
as infeparable from Virtue, as Virtue was from that, 
. Q-jk'I^iv r'(^£wf ^i;y, aveu ts (p^ovijwuif, ^ K»Kioq^ xai 



324 N O T E S o« Treatise the Third. 

Ti^i'x;. ^Tis impojjible to live pleafurahly ^ without 
living prudently^ and honourably ^ and jujily ; or to live 
prudently^ and honourably and jujily, ivithout living 
pleafurabJy. Epic, in Laert. 1. lo. f. 132. 

To conclude the whole, our Countryman 77;;?- 
7nas Hobbes, though he profefledly explodes all this 
Dodrine concerning Ends, yet feems infenfibly to 
have eftablilhed an £«^ himfelf, and to have founded 
it (like others) in a certain Energy or Action. 
For thus 'tis he informs us, in his Treatife called 
Human Nature, that there can be no Content- 
ment, but in Proceeding 3 and that Felicity 

confijlcth, not in Having but in Prospering. 

And again, fome time after, having admitted the 
Comparifon of Human Life to a Race, he imme- 
diately fubjoins But this Race we mujl fuppofe fa 

have no other Goal, nor other Garland, but being 
FOREMOST and in it. 

And thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of 
Philofophers on the Subjed: of Ends, here treated. 

Note XLVII. p. 208.— Yet it in no man- 
ner TAKES away the DIFFERENCE AND DI- 
STINCTION OF OTHER THINGS.] Cum enim vir- 
tatis hoc proprium fit, earum rerum, qua fecundum 
naturam fint, habere dele£lum j qui omnia fic exaqua- 
verunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti 
nulla feleSlione uterentur, virtutem ipfam fujiulerunt. 
Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 4. p. 207. 

Quid autem apertius, qiiam, fi fele£lio nulla fit ab 
lis rebus, quee contra naturam fint, earum rerum qua 
f.nt fecundum naturam ^ tullatur omnis ea, qua queer a- 

tur 



NOTES on Treatise the Third. 325 

tur laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 9. 
p. 227. 

Deinceps expluatiir differentia rerum : quavi ft 
non ullam ejfe diceremuSy confmideretur otnnis vita^ ut 
ab Arijlojie ; nee ullum fapientice miinus ant opus in- 
veniretur^ cum inter eas res., qua ad vitam degendam 
pertinerenty nihil omnino interejfet ; neque ullum delec- 
tiim haberi oporteret, Itaque cum ejjet fatis conjiitutum, 
idfolum eJfe bo?ium quod ejfet honejliimy i5f id malum fo- 
lum quod turpe ; tum inter hac i^ ilk, ques nihil vale- 
rent ad beate mifereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo dif- 
ferrenty eJfe voluerunt, ut ejfent coram alia ajlitnabilia, 
alia contra y alia neutrum. Ibid. 1. 3. c. 15. p. 246. 

CETERA autem etfi nee bona nee mala ejfent ; ta- 
men alia fecundum naturam dicebat, alia natures eJJ'e 
contraria : Us ipf.s alia interjeSIa ^ media numcrahat. 
Acad. 1. I. c. II. p. 46. See Dial. p. 187. 

Note XLVIII. p. 208. It suppresses ko 

SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, Cffi".] As 

much has been faid concerning the Stoic Apathy, 

or Infenfibility with refpeSi to Pajfion, it may not 
be improper to inquire, what were their real Senti- ^ 
ments on this Subjedt. 

n«9(^, which we ufually render a PaJJion, is 
always rendered by Cicero, when fpeaking as a Stoic, 
Perturbatio, a Perturbation. As fuch therefore in the 
firft place, we fay it ought always to be treated. 

The Definition of the Term Traet^-, as given 
by thefe Philofophers, was op//.-.i ■uXsovxC,>i(Tx^ tranf- 
lated by Cicero, Appetitus vehementior. Tufc. 1. 4. 
c. 9.* p. 273. Now this Delinition may be more 

Y 3 eafily 



326 NOTES <7;z, Treatise the Third. 

eafily explained, if we firft inquire, what thsy meant 
by op/y-J7. 'Op/W3i they defined to be (po^ot, -^i^yjiq i-rrt 
Ti a Tendency cr Motion of the Soul toward fomething. 
Stob. Eel. Ethic, p. 175. A 7ra9<:^ therefore, or 
Perturbation muft have been, according to their De- 
finition, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul^ which vjas 
excefp.ve and beyond Bounds. Stobaus^ from whom 
this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it ob- 
ferves, a Myii rstpyjK^oc -urXsoycc^iiv, aXh" v^n tv 
zrX£0'ja.(r^u> Zto, ' J ya,^ ^vvocy^eiy fxaKKov S fvspJ/Ew— 
that Zeno (its Author) does not call a llaO©^ fome- 
thing capable by Nature to pafs into Excefs, but fome^ 
thing actually in Excefs already, as having its Efjhice, 
not in mere Capacity, but in ASiuality. Eel. Eth. p. 159. 

There is another Definition of the fame Term, 
which makes it to be y\ a\oy<^ ^ zjscpix. (p^cri-j 4u>C'^? 
■ntvv\<nz CL Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to 
Nature, D. Laert, 1. 7. f. no. A?idronicus Rhodius 
adds, to this latter Definition, the Words Si uVo- 
M-\^i-<i y.oc'i^ rt oiyx^^, from the Opinion of fom.ething 
Good or Evil. Ilspl n«0. p. 523. So that its whole 
Idea is as follows. J Perturbation, or Stoic Pajfion, 
is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to 
Nature, arifing from the Opinion of fomething Good 
or Evil. Thefe laft V/ords, founding the n«9(^ 
or Perturbation on Opinion, con'efpcnd to what Cicero 
fays, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the 
Stoic Philofophers, omnes perturhationes judicio fieri ^ 
opinione. Tufc. 1. 4. c. 7. p. 276. Laertius informs 
us, that they even made the Perturbations themfelves to 

be Judgments. tiovSi ^\ aWo?? m tc-aO?) xptVa? ihce.i, 

Laert. 1,. 7. f, in. He fubjoins an Inflance to illuf- 

tratc. 'H1e yl^ (po.^'.fy-jpoi CiroKv^l'^i tV» ra to ap-. 

yo^io'j 



NOTES on Treatise the Third. 327 

y^pm xoiXov iTvoci, For thus (fays he) the Love of 
Money is the Judgment or Opinion, that Money is. a 
thing good and excellent. Plutarch records the fame . 
Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample 
manner. Yld^^—Xoy^ zrowpog x) axoAar©-*, £« - 

•arpoirXocQuv. A Perturbation is a vitious and in-~ 
temperate Reafoning, which ajfumes Vehemence and 
Strength fro?n bad and erroneous Judgment. Mor. 
p. 441. D. 

The Subftance of what is faid above, feems 
to amount to this ; that HaS':^, in a Stoic Senfe, 
implied a Perturbation, and not a PaJJion ; and that 
fuch Perturbation meant an irrational and violent 
Motion of the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judg- 
ment, which was erroneous and faulty. 

Now from hence it follows, that the Man of 
PERFECT Character (according to their ii^^^- 
thefis) muft of neceffity be octtocH;, Apathetic, 
OR VOID OF Perturbation. For fuch a Cha- 
racier, as has been fliewn, implies perfect ReSiitude 
of Conduct. But perfecfl Reditude of Condud im- 
plies /^;y?^ ReSiitude of Judgment ; and fuch Redli- 
tude of Judgment excludes all Error and wrong Judg- 
ment : but if Error and wrong Judgment, then 
Perturbation of confequence, which they fuppofe to 
be derived froin thence alone. 

That this was the Senfe, in which they under- 
flood Apathy, we have their own Authority, as 
given us by Laertius. f^x(s\ ^\ xa) aVctO^ tUai tov 
copovf $i<x. TO cx.vs^7rliJ]ov ilvxi, Laert. 1. 7. p. 117. 

Y 4 They 



328 NOTES (3« Treatise the Third. 

'They fay the zvife Man is apathetic, by being fuperior 
to Error — by being fuperior /<? Error, if they may 
be credited themfelves ; not, as for the moft part 
we ahfurdly imagine, by being fuperior to all Senfe, 
and Feeling, and Jffe6iion. The Sentence imme- 
diately following the foregoing, looks as if thefe 
Philofophers had forefeen, how likely they v/ere 
to be mifunderftood. EiW» Si >^ oixxov dirxiiv, roa 

(pauKov, iv iVw Xiyojj.svov tw ff}:Arjptd Xy ulpiTriof 

There is alfo another fort of Jpathetic Man, who is 
bad ; who is the fame in CharaSler, as the hard and 
inflexible. To the fame Purpofe EpiSletus. 'Oj §11 
yoco y.£ liwA drrco^ry tog OiV^piX}P,a, a.KKoc rag o^icrsig 
T7)08vla rx,g ^uo-ixa? x^ iTri^irvg, ug IvasQ^ ug t/ou, ug 
d^£?^(pov, cog TTcM^x, wg ttoAjtw. For I AM NOT 
TO BE Apathetic, like a Statue, but I am 
withal to ohferve Relations, both the natural and 
adventitious; as the Man of Religion, as the Son, as 
the Brother, as the Father, as the Citizen. Arr, 
Epid. 1. 3. c. 2. p. 359. 

Immediately before this, he tells us in the 
fame Chapter, IlaS©^ yoi^ olxxug h 'yivilxi, h y-v 
opi^sccg a.TToivl'Xjxviixng, v ex/cAkteco? •Erfp»7rt7r7»(r»!?', 
that a Perturbation in no other way ever arifes, hut 
either xvhen a Defire is fruflrated, or an Averfion 
falls into that which it would avoid. Where 'tis ob- 
fervable, that he does not make either Defire or 
Averfion fliSsi, or Perturbations, but only the Caufe 
of Perturbations, when erronecuily conduced. 

Agreeably to this, in the fecond Chapter of 
the Enchiridisn, we meet with Precepts about the 
Condudt and Management of thefe two AffeStions--'- 

Not 



NOTES Gn Treatise the Third. 329 

Not a word is fald about lopping off either ; on the 
contrary, Averfion we are dire^^ed how to employ 
immediately, and Deftre we are only ordered to fuf- 
pend for the prefent, becaufe we want a proper Suh- 
jedt of fit Excellence to excite it. 

To this may be added, what the fame Philofo- 
pher fpeaks, in his own Perfon, concerning himfelf, 
Arr. Epi£f. 1. l. c. 21. 'Ej^w jub ap)t»|W.aj, av ops- 

yu^lf-xv x) £)«cA/vco v.a^oi (pvcnv /, for my part, am 

fatisjied a?id contented, if I can desire and avoid 
agreeably to Nature. He did not remain it feems 
diilatisfied, till he had eradicated thefe Affe^ionsy 
but he was fatisfied in reducing them to their natU' 
ral Ufe. 

In Laertius we r^ad recorded for a Stoic Senti- 
ment, that as the vitiom Man had his TraSvj, or Per- 
turbations ; fo oppofed to thefe, had the Virtuous his 
'Eu7.a;6£jaj, his Eupathies or Well-feelings, tranflated 
by Cicero Conjlantice. The three chief of thefe were 
B»A>i<rjf, Will, defined l^il^\<; l^\oy(^^ rational 
Defre ; 'EvXoi^six, Caution, defined "EKy.Xia-ig 
iu^oy^, ratio?ial Averfcn ; and Xx^.a, Joy, defined 
sTTxpffi; ivXoy^^ rational Exultation. To thefe three 
principal .£'///'^/^/vV; belonged many fubordinate Species ; 

fuch as iv'jOiXf clyolTTrjTir^ Xi-j(a<;, T£pi];K, i-j<PpoTvvr)j 

iv^v;jLix,^c. SceLaert. 1. 7. f. 115, 116. Andron. 
Rhod. 7ria\ TToihuov. Cic. Tufc. 1. 4. c. 6. 

Cicero makes Cato, under the Character of a Stitic^ 
and in explaining their Syftem, ufe the following 
ExpreflTions. Pertinere antem adrefn arhitrantur, in- 
tellegi natura fieri, ut liheri a parentibus amcntur : a 

qm 



330 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 

quo initio profeSiam communem humani generis focie^ 
tatem perfcquuntur. De Fin. 1. 3. c. ig. The fame 
Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laertius, 
^x(t\ Si {01 ItwVxoI) j^ rm ir^oq roc rUva. (piXorof^yixv 

(pus-txOT sZiai auloTg TJpey fay Parental AffeSlion is 

natural to them. 1. 7, f. 120. 

Again, foon after, in the fame Treatife de Fini^ 

bus. ^odque nemo in fwmna foUtudine vitam agere 
velit, ne cum infinita quidem voliiptatum abundantia ; 
facile intellegitur.^ nos ad conjunSiionem congregationem- 
que hominu?n^ & ad naturalem communitatem effe natos. 
So Laertius. "AXKx y.rv aJ' iv i^Y\y.ia ((^ao-l) SioVflat 

The virtuous Man (fay they, the Stoics) will never 
be for living in Solitude ; for he- is by Nature focialy 
and formed for J^ion. 1. 7. f. 123. 

Again, Cicero, in the above-cited Treatife. Cum 

GUtefn ad tuendos confervandofque homines hominem 
iiatum effe videamus ; confetttaneum ejl huic natura, 
ut fapiens velit gerere, iff adminiflrare rempublicam ; 
at que ut e natura vivat, uxor em adjungere, ^ velle ex 
ed liber OS. Ne amores quidem fanSfos a fapiente alienos 

effe arbitrantur. Vt vero confervetur omnis homini 

erga hominem focietas, conjunSlio, caritas ; ^ emolu- 

nienta & detrimenta communia efje voluermit. De 

Fin. I. 3. c. 20, 21. 

In EpiBetuSy the leading Duties., or moral Offices 
of Man., are enumerated as follows. rioAiTfuf^Oaj, 
T.-awfi'., -STXiooTToiua^ai., Oio-j (rsSeiv, yovioov lTn[xsXi7(T^cciy 



T8TWV 




NOTES c;z Treatise the Third. 331 

T8TWV Jb 7r0!£~, <^r ^i^^WxfXiV. Air.Epla. 1. 3. C. 7. 

p. 386. The fame Sentiments may be found re- 
peated both in Stobaus and Laeriius. 

I (hall only add one more Sentiment of thefe 
Philo/ophers, and that is concerning Friend/hip. As- 

T/so-* Si Kf rviv (piKitx.y a [ji.ovoig to7; o-tt^^xioh; slvoii 

They fay that Friend/hip exijls amotig the Virtuous only. 
Laert. 1. 7. f. 124. 

The Sum of thefe Rotations appears to be this ; 
that the Stoics, in the Char a Si er of their virtuous 
Man, included rational Defire, Averfion, and ExJiU 
tation ; included Love and parejital AffeSlion ; Friend- 
Onp, and a general Charity or Benevolence to all Man- 
kind ; that they confidered it as a Duty, arifing from 
our very Nature, not to negle(5l the Welfare of pub- 
lic Society, but to be ever ready, according to our 
Rank, to a<5t either the Magifirate or the private 
Citizen ; that their Apathy was no more than a - 
Freedom from Perturbation, from irrational and ex- 
cejfive Agitations of the Soul ; and confequently that 
the flrange Apathy, commonly laid to their Charge, 
and in the demolifliing of which there have been 
fo many Triumphs, was an imaginary Apathy, for 
,which they were no way accountable. 

Note XLIX. p. 209. It rejects no Gain, 

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH JuSTICE.] The 5/^5 

were fo far from rejedling Wealth, when acquired 
fairly, that they allowed their perfeSi Man, for 
the fake of enriching himfelf, to frequent the Courts 
of Kings, and teach Philofophy for a Stipend. Thus 
Plutarch from a Treatife of Chryfppus Tsv jwb 



22^ N O T E S (?;2 Tr E A T I s E the Third. 

i^ (To(pis~£{)a£iv iir apj/ypi'w — Jldor. p. 1047' ^' 



So likewife the Stoic HecatOy in his Treatife of 
Offices y as quoted by Cicero. Sapientis ejfe^ nihil con- 
tra mores J leges ^ injlituta facientem, habere rationem rei 
, familiaris. Neque ent??i folum nobis divites ejfe volumus, 
fed liberis, prcpinquis, amicis, maximeqne reipublicce. 
Singukrum enim facultates & copies y divitice funt civi- 
tatis. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 15. 

Note L. p. 209. — Universally as far as 
Virtue neither forbids nor dissuades, it 
endeavours to render life, even in the 
most vulgar acceptation, as chearful, 

JOYOUS, AND EASY AS POSSIBLE.] EteuifH qiiod 

fummum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter natures 
viverey id habet banc (ut opihor) fententianiy Cum vir- 
iule congniere femper: csetera autem, quae fecundum 
naturam.efient, ita legere, li ea virtuti non repug- 
na^ent. Cic. de Offic. I. 3. c. 3. 

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, fpeaking of the 
^toic Dodrine concerning the external ConveniencieSy 
and common UtiUties of Life, delivers their Senti- 
ment in the following Words xXkoi xj ^ly;a. v-h- 

fj.ivicv <zp£|iif T£ (Tuv Taxot? >^ dps'l'^g fj-omqy jw.'/iJ'fVoT ai? 
TOW (To(pO)i rvj ii£^upi<Ti.'.ir/iv iXsi^oiiy h itn dvlu ^ivxlov 
tvj fjislx ru-j uXXocv AcXsTv. Suppojing there lay Vir- 
tue en the one fide y attended ivith thefe Externals y and 
Virtue on the other fide, alone by herfelfy the wife 
Alan would never choofe that Virtue y which was deflitute 
and f.ngky if 'twas in his power to obtain that other y 

luhich 



NOTES on Treatise the Third. 3.33 

which zuas acce7npa7iied ivith thefe Advantages. Ilfpl 

^^x- p- 157. 

Note LI. p. 209. Nay, could it mend 

THE Condition of Existence — by adding 

TO THE AMPLEST POSSESSIONS THE POOREST, 

MEANEST Utensil, it would in no degree 
CONTEMN, b't.] — Si adillam vitam, qucs cum v'lr- 
tute dcgatur^ ampulla aiit Jlrigilis accedat, fumptunim 
fapientem earn vitam potius, cui hcec adje5la fmt—Dc 
Fin. 1. 4. c. 12. p. 300. 

Note LII. p. 2io~Could it indeed choose 
ITS OWN Life, it would be always that, 

WHERE most social AfFECTIONS MIGHT BE 

EXERTED, i^c. ] Itemque magis ejl feciindum natiiram,' 
pro omnibus gefitibiis (fi fieri pojfit) confervandis aui ju- 
vandis^ ■ maximos labor es moleftiafqiie fufcipere, imitan- 
tem Hcrculem ilium, quern ho/ninum fama, heneficiorujii 
memor, in concilia coelejlium conlocavit ; quam vivere in 
folitudine, non modo fine ullis molejiiis, fied etiam in 
viaximis voluptatibus, abundaniem omnibus copiis ; ut 
excellas etia?n pulchritudijie & viribus. ^locirca Optimo 
quifique i^ fipkndidijfijno ifigenio longe illam vitam huic 
anteponit. Cic. de Offic. 1. 3. c. 5. 

Note LIIL ^. Ibid. It teaches us 

TO CONSIDER LiFE, AS ONE GREAT IM- 
PORTANT Drama, where, ^c.'\ Thus 

Arijio the Chian RiW» yoi^ ouoiov tw aj^aOw 

•wTTQKjul^ I0V (ro(pQv ' Os asle 0£p(r»Tii olvie Ayocf/.tfAVO' 

kqAuc, The XL'ifie Man is like the good ASlor ; ivho^ 
whether he ajfiume the Chara^er ofi Therfites or Aga- 
memnon, 



334 NOTES o?i Treatise the Third. 

memnon, a^s either of the two Parts luith a be- 
€omhig Propriety. D. Laert. 1. 7. f. 160. 

This Comparifon of Life to 2iDrm?ia or Stage- 
play, feems to have been a Comparifon much ap- 
proved by Authors of Antiquity. See Epi£i. Enchi- 
rid, c. 17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor 
Mr. Upton. See alfo M. Anton. 1. 12. f. 36. and the 
^otes ofGataker. 

Note LIV. p. 211. — It accepts all the 
Joys derived from their Success, b'r. It 

FIXES NOT, LIKE THE MANY, ITS HAPPINESS 

ON Success alone, ^c.'\ One of the wifefl Rules 
that ever was, with refpeSl to the Enjoyment of external 
good Fortune, is that deliver 'd by Epi5ietm ; to enjoy 
it, ug §i^o\(x.i, >Cf £(p' oVoy SiSolxi, in fuch manner as 
it is given, and for fuch Time as it is given, remem- 
bring that neither of thefe Conditions we have the 
Power to command. See Arr. Epi£i. 1. 4. c. j^ 
p. 556. See alfo p. 573. of the fame. 

Note LV. Ibid. On the contrary, when 

THIS HAPPENS, 'tIS THEN IT RETIRES INTO 
ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR, 

WHAT IS LAUDABLE, ^f.] See beforc, p. 322. 

NoteLVI. p. 212. All Men pursue Good, 
^c] This is a Principle adopted by all the Stoics, 
aud inculcated thro' every part of the Differtations 
oiEpi^etus. Take an Example or two out of many. 

^oo-j? S' ol\j]ri TTavlog, to ^iUK£tv to a.'ya.^ov, (^ivyetv t<? 

y.ciKov — — T? yii^ dyoi^u <y\jlymTi^w iSiv, "Tis the 

Nature 



NOTES c?i Tre AT ISE de Third. 335 

Nature of every one to purfue Good, and fly Evil—— 
for nothing is more intimately allied to us than Good. 
Arr. Epidt. 1. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, /. 2. t. 22. 
p. 313. n«u Zwou »(J"fvi ii^uq unhooTOii^ (cg tw <<?<&> 
(Tu^tptpovT*. To nothing is every Animal fo intitnately 
allied^ as to its own peculiar Welfare, and In- 
terest. 

So Cicero. Omncs enim expetimus utilitatem, 
ad eamque rapimur J nee facer e aliter ullo modo pojfumus, 
De Offic. 1. 3. c. 28. 

Note LVII. p. 213. — All derived from 
Externals, must fluctuate as they fluc- 
tuate.] See before, pag. 126, 130, 133. 

Note LVIII. Ihid, — When we place "the 
Sovereign Good in Mind — ] D^^mon or 
Genius means every Man's particular Mind, and 
Reasoning Faculty, d^xl^uiv — sto; Si iriv 
ixa'rx vvq >^ Xo-y^. M. Anton. 1. 5. p. 27. Gi- . 
niiim effe uniufeujufque animum rationalem ; ^ ideo ejfe 
fingulos fmgukrum — Varro in Fragm. 'Tis from this 
Interpretation of Genius, that the Word, which in 
Greek exprefTes Happiness, is elegantly etymolo- 
gized to mean a Goodness of Genius or Mind. 
'EuJ'^ti/xovi'a ir\ icilfx'xv ayaUq. M. Anton. 1. 7. f. 17. 
See Gataker on the Place. The Sentiment came 
originally from the old Academics. See before, 
page -p.!. 

Note LIX. p. 214. ~ — Behold the true 

AND perfect Man: that Ornament, ^r.] 

■ ^a?n gravis vero^ quam magnifica, quam conjlans con- 

fcitur 



336 IS^OTES on Treatise the Third, 

fidtur perfona fapienth? ^i, cum rath docuerit^ quod 
honejium ejjet^ id ejfe folum bofium^ femper fit necejfe 
c(i beatus, vereque omnia ijia 7iomina pojfideat, qua 
inrideri ah inperitis folent. Reftius eni?n appellabitur 
rex, quam Tarquifiius, qui nee fs nee fuos regere po- 
tuit : re£iim magijler populi, ^c. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. 
c. 22. p. 269. Ergo hie, quijquis eji, qui moderatione 
& conjlantia quietus animo eft, fthique ipfe placatus ; 
ut nee tabefcat molejiiis, nee frangatur timore, nee ft- 
tienter quid expetem ardeat defiderio, nee alacritate 

futili geJlienS deliquefcat ; is eji fapiens, quern quari- 
mus, is eft beatus : cui nihil humanarum rerum aut 
intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lata- 
bile ad ecferendum videri potejl. ^lid enim videatur 
ei magnum, ^e. Tufc. Difp. 1. 4. c. 17. p. 298. 

Note LX. p. 215. — Would not your Sys- 
tem IN SUCH A Case a little border upon 
THE Chimerical ? (se.] Chryftppus feems to 
have been fenfible of this, if we may judge from a 
Pafifage of his, preferved in Plutarch. Aio koi\ ^kx 
vriv uTrffltoAru t»t« [/.lyi^a; y.on tk xoiAA«f, -crAacr^at/i 
^ox^uiv '^lAuce, Xiyiiv, xal i koctx tov uv^fuvov xa; 
7W dv^(:u37rmv (pvcnv. For this reafon, thro' the excef- 
five Greatnefs and Beauty of what we ajfert, we ap- 
pear to fay things ivhich look like Fiiiions, and not fuch 
as are fuitable to Man and human Nature. 
Mor. 1 041. F. 

Note LXI. p. 216. In antient Days, 

WHEN Greece, ^f.] ?)QQ Cic. de Invent. 1,2. c. i. 
See alfo Maximus Tyrius, Diff. 23. p. ^'j'j. of the 
late Qiiarto Edition ; and Xenoph. Msmor, 1. 3. c. 10. 

Not5 



NOTES 0)1 Treatise the "Third. 337 

Note LXII. p. 219. - — No where in any 

PARTICULAR NaTURE IS THE PERFECT CHA- 
RACTER TO BE SEEN INTIRE.] The -S/iz/Vi them- 
felves acknowledged, as wc learn fromCkmens ofJIeX' 
mdrJa, that their o a-opo?, or perfect Man, was 
difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree j lutixj- 
f£7(^ Trai/u o-cpocTpa. Strom. p. 438. Sextus Empi- 
ricus gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as 
yet found him^ />i£%p» t» vuu dvevpim hv']^ naT dvlits 
TB (r{»;p». Adv. Phyf. p. 582. Edit. Lipfienf. 

What Sextus fays, feems to be confirmed by 
Cicero, who fpeaking in his Offices the Language of 
a Stoic, has the following Expreflions. Nee vero, 
cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri cornmemo- 
rantur, aut cum Fahricius Ariflidefve juJlinomi7ia7itur ', 
aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his jufiitia, tanquam a 
Sapientibus, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum 
SIC Sapiens eft, ut Sapientem volumus intellegi. 
Nee a, qui fapientes habiti funt, ^ nominati, M. Cato 
^ C. Lalius, fapientes fuerunt ; ne illi quidefn feptem: 
fed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia fimilitiidinem 
quandam gerebant, fpeciemque fapientum. De Offic. 
1. 3. c. 4. Again, in his Lalius, fpeaking of the 
fame confummate Wifdom, he calls it, Sapientia, quam 
adhuc mortalis nemo eft confecutus. 

So too ^intilian. ^od fi defuithls viris fumma 
virtus, fie queer entibus, an orator es fuerint, refpondebo,^ 
quo modo Stoici, fi interrogentur , an Sapiens Zeno, 
an Cleanthes, an Chryfippus, refpondeant ; magnos qui- ■ 
dim illos ac. venerabiles 3 non tamen id, quod natura ho^ 

2 fiiinii 



5 3B N O T E S o« Treat isE the Third, 

minis Jummam habet, confecutos, Inft. Orat. 1. 12. 
c. I. p. 721,722. Edit. Caper. 

So likewife Seneca : Scis, quern 7iunc honmn virum 
dicam? Hujus fecundse nota. Nam ille alter for- 
tajfe, tanquam phoenix, feniel anno quingentefimo nafci- 
tur, Epift. 42. 

Note LXIII. p. 219. — I might inform you 

OF THE NATURAL PrE-EMINENCE, AND HIGH 

Rank of specific Ideas.] See Cicero in his 
Orator^ near the Beginning. Sed ego fic JlatuOy nihil 
ejfe in idlo genere tarn pukhrmuy quo non^ i^c. &c. See 
alfo the Verfes of Boethius before cited, Note XVII. 
p. 295. 

Note LXIV. p. 220, 221. — An Exemplar of 
Imitation, which tho' none we think 
can equal, yet all at least may fol- 
Low--^-AN Exemplar, &c.] Seneca gives it as a 
general Confeflion of the greateji Philofophers, 
that the Dodtrine they taught, was not quemadmo- 
dum ipfi viverenty fed quemadmodum vivendum effete 
De Vita beatdy c. 18. 

There appears indeed to be one common 
Reasoning with refpedl to all Models, Exem- 
plars, Standards, Correctors, whatever we 
call them, and whatever the Subje^s, which they 
are deftined to adjuft. According to this Reafoning, 
if a Standard be lefs pcrfedl than the Subjed to be 
adjufted, fuch Adjufting (if it may be fo called) be- 
comes a Detriment, If it be but equally perfect, then 

is 



NOTES o« Treatise the Third. 339 

is the Adjufting fuperfuous. It remains therefore 
that it muft be more perfed, and that to any Tnin- 
fcendence, any Accuracy conceivable. For fuppofe a 
Standard as highly accurate^ as can be imagined. If 
the Subjeds to be adjufted have a Nature fuitable, 
then will they arrive, by fuch Standard, to a degree of 
PerfeSlion, which thro' a Standard lefs accurate they 
could never pofTibly attain. On the contrary, if the 
Subjeds be not fo far capable, the Accuracy of the 
Standard will never be a hindrance, why they Ihould 
not become as perfed^ as their Nature will admit. 

It feems to have been from fome Sentiments of 
this kind, that the Stoics adorned their o crol^oc^ or 
perfe5l Chara^er^ with Attributes fo far fuperior to 
ordinary Humanity. 'EijuK©^ oA^j^, haHv^ airpca-- 

j£i7?, Ue7v<^ K^lcx.^y.nq^ jua)t^'pii^, ■vixu'^ 'Tiuas 

he was fortunate ; 'twas he ivas above want ; 'twas he 
was felf-fufficie?ity and happy, and perfect . Plutarch. 
Mor. 1068. B. See iVi;/^ LXII. 

Some Philofopkers have gone fo far, as not to reft 
fatisfied with the mofl perfea Idea of Humanity, but 
to fubftitute, for our Exemplar, even the fupreme 
Being, God Himself. ThusP/^/^, in hisTheatetus^ 
makes the great Objed of our Endeavours, to be 
o{A.iiucrig tu> Ofco xx'tix to ^■^vxJov, the becoming like to 
God, as far as in our pozuer. He immediately ex- 
plains, what this Refemblance is. 'Oy-oiua-ig ^), Sf- 
xacioy xj ociov y-floc (p povriasug ymc^oii. It is the be- 
coming jujl and holy, along with JVifdom cr Prudence. 
Plat. torn. I. p. 176. Edit. Serrani. 



Z z The 



340 ' N T ES on Treatise the "third. 

The Gofpel appears to favour the fame HypothefiS. 
Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in 
Heaven is perfeSl. Matt. v. 48. 

What has been above faid, will be, 'tis hoped, 
a fufficient Apology for the Tranfcendence of the Cha- 
rader, defcribed in the Dialogue. * 

Note LXV. p. 221. The Proficiency of 
Socrates—was sufficient to convince us—. 
THAT SOME PROGRESS, ^c.^ See Djog. Laert. 
I. 7. C. 91. p. 420. Tt)c/L<,*if)jov S\ TO uTrapxTiiy £jva» 

3^ AioyivYiV, ^c- 
Note LXVI. p. Ibid. — Nor was the Prize, 

AS USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO THE FIliST J 
BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A 

Reward, having, ^^.] Verum ut tranfeundi /pes 
nonfit., magna tamen eji dignitas fubfequendi. Quind. 
Inft. 1. 12. c. II. p. 760. Exigo itaque a me, non ut 
cptimis par fim, fed ut malis melior. Senec. de Vitt 
beata, c. 17. 'OjS'I yoc^ MtAwv tVojwaj, xj oyM? »>c 

7»j$ xlvi(re(tig ' »'^' aVAwf olXKv Tito^ tJ)J iVj^fAe/a?, <Jja 
Tw aiToyvuic-iv Tuv ajtpwv, a(pig~d(,y.i^x. -For neither 
fiall I be Milo, and yet I negle£l not ?ny Body j nor 
Cicefus, and yet I negleSl 7iot my EJlate ; nor in general 
do we deftfl- from the proper Care of any thing, thro* 
Defpair of arriving at that ivhich is fupreme. Arr. 
Epid. 1. 1, c. 2. See alfo Horat, Epifi, i. I. r. 
V. 28, ^c. 

Note 



NOTES on Treatise the I'hirl 341 

Note LXVII. p. 225.- — This whole Uni- 
verse — IS ONE City or Commonwealth — ] 

'O y.oa-y.^ »t^ fxix TsoXiq \^\ -^rr. Epi£l. 1. 3. 

c. 24. p. 486. This was a ^toic Dcdlrine, of which 
Epi£ietiis and the Emperor Marcus make perpetual 
mention. See of the laft, /. 12. / 36. 

So Cicero. Umverfus hie mundus una clvitai com- 
munh Deorum atque hominuni exijiumandus, De Legg. 
1. I. c. 7. p. 29. SQcDeFifi, 1. 3. c. 19. DeNat,. 
Deor. 1. 2. c. 62. 

Note LXVIII. p. 227.- — Hence the Mind 

TRULY WISE, QUITTING THE StUDY OF PAR- 
TICULARS, ^(.] The Flatonics., confidering Sci- 
ence as fomething afcirtained^ definite., and Jleady^ 
"would admit nothing to be its ObjeH., which was 
vague., infinite, and pajfing. For this reafon they 
excluded nil Individuals, or Objects of Sense, 
and (as A?nnionius expreffes it,) raifed themfelves, in 
their Contemplations, from Beings particular to Be- 
ings w}iverfal, and which as fuch, from their own 
Nature, were eternal and definite. The whole Paf- 
fage is worth tranfcribing. 'Ea^tiIch on y\ (^tAoa-o^ia, 
yvwG-ig Trdvlocv -Tuv ovluv i] ovlix, f5~»'v. 'E^rtrmocviv Oi 
(P»Aoo"o{poj, Tivx m TpoTToy yhiM'Aa.i rwy pv7wv linT'niJ'O'- 
V£C ' ^ iTTEiSn sicpcoy Tx v.xlac [A.if>(^ 'ysr/iTO. Xj (pbxitloi- 
iivlx, ZTi 61 ycj a.7r?jpa, -n ci iTrirytl^V xidtoovls Xy ztetts- 
aoc(T^^ViOV IfJ J/ywcrjf (to' yoio yvoorov ^iiXsla,i vtto tji? 
yvj^xTZu:^ uT£^i'kx{j:Qxvi(T^xi' TO J^f OiTrEfpov, «.7r£pjArj7r7ov) 
a,jr,yayov £au1»? cctto tuv [/.s^ixuv Itti tck, xx^oXv^ 
d'liix Q'jIx >^ ■S7£7ri^xs-[jt.hx. 'X2y j/y'^ (pfitryj UXxrc^Vy 

Z 3 'Eir.rh-'t^ 



342 NOTES on Treat i s e the Third. 

'ETTjr'V*' '^^fnloii, -crafx to Ij; ETrtf-aau ^//.a? >Cj opou 

o^a T^j £K T« xa6o>.» av«(Jpojuri;. Jmmomus in his 
Preface to Porphyry's Ifagogc, p. 14. Edit. 8vo. 

Consonant to this, we learn 'twas the Advice 
of Plato, with refpect to the Progrefs of our Specu- 
Jations and Inquiries^ to defcend from thofe higher Ge- 
nerUt which include ?nany fubordinate Species, doivn to 
the loiueji Rank of Species, thofe which include only In- 
dividuals. But here 'twas his Opinion, that our Inqui- 
ries Jhould flop, and, as to Individuals, let thetn wholly 
alone ; bccaufe of thefe there could not pojfihly he any 
Science. Aio '^-'^XJ^^ '^'^^ etJixcoliXTcov aTro rav ytviy-u- 

TJt ^l XTTiifoi (p'/itrtu iocv * ju,ji ^\ ya,^ ot.v Tsuh ysvio-^oti 
T^%v iTTir^unv. Porphyr. Ifagog. c. 2. 

Such was the Method of ^«//>s/Philorcphy. The 
Fafhion at pref^nt appears to be fomewhat altered, 
and the Bufinefs of Philofophers to be little elfe, 
than the colleding from every Quarter, into 
voluminous Records, an infinite Number of fen- 
fble, particular, and unconne5led Fads, the chief Y.i~ 
fed of which is to excite our Admiration. So that 
if that well-knovm Saying of Antiquity be true, 
't^ijoas IVotider which induced Men firfi to philofophize, 
v/e may fay that Philofophy now ends, whence ori- 
ginally it began. 



Note LXIX. p. 228. — A Faculty, which 

RECOGNIZirCG BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS 
ELSE, BECOMES A CaNON, A CORRECTOR, AND 

A Standard universal.] See before, p. 162. 

In 



NOTES on Treatise the "IhirL 34.3 

In Epi^etus^ 1. i. c. i. p. 6. the Auv«]!x»j Koyiy.\ 
or reafoning Power, is called the Power n >^ avlriv 
6fco/)8(ra, y^ T oiXKoi ttxvIoc. So Manus — Ta' '{^iX rrq 
MyiiLYii; 4"^X'^? ' io(.\j\vi opa, locvl^v Jj«p9po', &c. The 
Properties of the reafoning Soul are, it beholdeth itfefi 
it formeth itfef, he. 1. 11. c. i. So again Epi^etus, 
— Jttej ju£u T» opxv y^ cixhiVy xj VII Aioi UTTsp «u1k 
Ta C^v, noii Toov (rvvspyw zj-pog avlo, uVeo xapTruv 

^JipWV, UTTEQ ori/», VTTlp iKuiH iJ'XJApi^H TW OeW * /^£jt>t- 

yjjTo J"' oTi clxKo t; o"ot ^i^uKs hp£7t1ov KTrocvTuv txtw.', 

to' ^pYliTO (AiVOV aUTOi?, TO $OKi[/.Oi(^OV, TO TlIU d^iXV 

lxxs~>s Xoyi^fji-svov. For feeing^ for hearing, and indeed 
for Life itfelf, and the various Means which co-operate 
to its Support ', for the Fruits of the Earth, for Wine 
and Oil, for all thefe things be thankful to God: yet be 
mindful that he hath given thee fomething elfe, which 

IS BETTER THAN ALL THESE ; fometUug which IS 

to ufe them, to prove them, to compute the Value of 
each. Arr. Epi(5t. 1. 2. c. 23. p. 321. 

Note LXX. p. 228. That Master- 
Science, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY 
ARE, AND THE EnD TO WHICH, ^C.'\ SqQ Jrr. 

Epiif. 1. 2. c. 24. p. 337. See alfo I. i. c. 6. 

p. 36. and Perf Satyr. 3. v. 66. 

Note LXXI. Ibid. — And never wretch- 
edly DEGRADE THEMSELVES INTO NATURES 
TO THEM SUBORDINATE.] ^tQ Jrr. Epeff. 1. I. 
C. 3. p. 21. Aia T«UT»)y TfiV Gvyyiviiav, o'» ^\v cctto- 
xKivciVTic^ A'JxoK o[Moioi ymfJLt^x^ olTrig-oi xat iTriSaXoi 
nxl ^AalSfpoj'' 01 Si y^incTiV, aypioi xoci ^ripiuSsig noti 
dvri^spoi ' 01 xcAfi^f J"' ri^oov aXuTrsHs;, &C, 7T;ro* this 

Z 4 ^^nity 



344 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 

Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or bafer 

Part) fome of «;, degenerating^ become like TFolves^ 
faithlefiy and treacherous^ and mifchievous ; others^ like 
Lions, fierce^ andfavage, and wild ; hut the greater Part 
turn Foxes, little, fraudulent y ivr etched Animals. Cum 
autem duohus modis, id ejl, aut vi aut fraude fat in- 
juria ; fraus, quaf vulpccula, vis, leonis videtur. Cic. 
deOffic. I. I. c. 13. See a\(oArr. Epi^. 1.2. eg, 
p. 210. In our own Language we feem to allude 
to this Degeneracy of Human Nature, when we call 
Men, by way of reproach, SheepiJJj, Bear if? ^ Hog- 
gif)^ Ravenous, &c. 

Note LXXII. p. 229. That Reason, of 

WHICH our own is BUT A PaRTICLE, OR 

Spark, ^r:] — - ai \|/u;^al /x£v »tw? U(r\v iv^i§ii/.ivoci 

•ny.<r^a.toi.—Arr.Epi5l. 1. I. C. 14. p. 8l- (Jai- 

|Lta5U, ov £>c«r'w uTpos-aTnu xa» ri'ytiJt.ovx Zivg srJ'coJtEV, 
«7r0(77ra«'^a Iccvth ' bt©-" ^i e'ov ixcx,s~>i vvg x«» 
Xoy(^. Mar. Ant. 1. 5. f. 27. Humanus autem ani- 
miis, decerptus ex mente divind, cum nullo alio nifi cum 
ipfo Deo (f hoc fas efl di61u) comparari potejl. Tufc. 
Difp. 1.5. c. 13. p. 371. 

NoT2 LXXIII. Ibid. — Fit Actors in that 
GENERAL Drama, where thou hast al- 
lotted EVERY Being, great and small, 
ITS proper Part, b'r.] See before, p. 7.10. and 
Note LIII. See alfo Arr. Epi£t. 1. 3. c. 22. p. 444— 
Zu '^'A('?^ Ti • ^uva-raj, ^c. The Paflage is fublime 
^nd great, but too long to be here inferted, 



Note 



NOTES on Treatise the T/jIrd, 345 



Note LXXIV. p. 230.— Enable us to curb 
Desire, i^c. Enable us even to suspend 
IT, ^c. Be our first Work to have 
ESCAPED, ^r.] 'Ato^» •ztote ■srxvTx-rra.triv opi^t'jog^ 
IW zrorl ^ va\6y<^q op^X.^^- -^^^^^ P^ ^ time from 
Defire altogether, that in time thou mayjl he able to 
dejire rationally. Arr. Epi<ft. 1. 3. c. 13. p. 414. 
Again the fame Author— S»),u£pou — op/^f j o^k ^x?^' 

coty-vj, s;c>cAtVf» sr^oq fj-ovx rsc zTpoocifisliKa. To day 

my Faculty of Defire I have not ufed at all ; my Aver- 
fion I have employed with refpe£l only to things, which 
are in my power. 1. 4. c.4. p. 588. See alfo Enchtr, 
c. 2. and CharaSl. V. III. p. 202. 

Horace feems alfo to have alluded to this Dodrine : 

Virtus efi, viiium fugere ; ^ fapientia prima, 
Stultitia caruiffe Epifl. i. 1. i. v. 41. 

Note LXXV. Ibid- — Let not our Love 

THERE STOP, WHERE IT FIRST BEGINS, BUT 
INSENSIBLY CONDUCT IT, dfff.] 'itt Plat. Symp. 
p. 210. torn, 3, Edit. Serrani. An j/ap, sCp?), tov 
l^^u3z Iqvtx £7r» T«TO "ZB^paf^a, app^£(rOaj, &C. 

Note LXXVL Ibid. — Not that little 

CASUAL Spot, where, ^c] See Jrrian. Epi^. 
1. I. c, 9. p. 51. Socrates qiiidem, cum rogaretur, cu- 
jatetn fe effe diceret, Mundanum, inquit : totius enim 
mundi fe incolam & dvem arbitrabatur. Tufc. Dilp, 
1.5. c. 37. p. 427. 

Note LXXVII. p. 231. — Teach us each 
to regard himself, but as a Part of 

THIS 



h6 notes on Treatise the Third. 






THIS GREAT Whole; a Part, b'c] Ilco? « 

XiyiTXi rm IxTog nvoc y.a.rx (pvtnv, &C. In what. 
Seufe then (fays the Philofopher, fmce all is referable 
to one univerfal Providence) are fame things called 
agreeable to our Nature , and others the contrary ? The 
Anfiver is, They are fo called, by confidering our/elves as 
detached, and feparate from the Whole. For thus may 
I fay of the Foot, when confidered fo apart, that 'tis 
agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free frofn Filth. 
But if we confder it as a Foot, that is, as fomething not 
detached, but the Member of a Body, it will behoove it 
both to pafs into the Dirt, and to. trample upon Thorns, 
end even upon occafion to be lopped off, for the Prefer- 
vaiion of the Whole. Were not this the cafe, it would 
be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind 

Jhould we conceive with refpeSl to ourfelves. What 

art thou f A Man. If thou confder thy Being as 
fomething feparate and detached, 'tis agreeable to 
thy Nature, in this View of Independence, to live 
to extreme Age, to he rich, to be healthy. But if 
ihoii confder thyfclf as a Man, and as the Member of a 
certain Whole ; for the fake of that Whole, it will 
eccafonally behoove thee, at one while to be fck, at 
another while to fail and rifque the Perils of Naviga- 
tion, at another while to be in want, and at lafl to die 
perhaps before thy time. IVhy therefore do ft thou bear 
thefe Events impatie?itly ? Knoiveft thou not, that after 
the fame manner as the Foot ceafcth to he a Foot, fo dojl 
thou too ceafe to he longer a Man ? Arr. Epi(5l. 1. 2. 
c. 5. p. 191. 

Note LXXVIII. p. 231. In as much as 

Futurity, fa'V.J Mr'/^pt? «« aJrjAa poi •? ra \'^a;, 
«£» Tw'y rj(^V£r£pv r^oj/.«jjt«jpo\ to rvl^avsiv ruv v.xia 



NOTES c;? Treatise thcThird. 347 

(^uVjU • aUTOf yip fJ^ 060? TOiKTWV ExXf'xTiJtoy £'?rot- 

x«i «p/Awv av Jtt' a'jTO • xai ^^a^ o ttsj, £< (p^ivxg 
£t%£u, wpjua au £7ri to ■sr/i^KcSaj. -«r^. Epiof. 1. 2. 
c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above Sentiment 
was oi Chryfippus. In the tenth Chapter of the fame 
Book we have it repeated, tho' in words fomewhat 
different. Aj^tkto ycxXug A/j/sciu w (ptAo(ro(^oj, 



o'rt, &C. 



Note LXXIX. p. 232. — That we may 
KNOW NO OTHER Will, than thine alone, 
AND that the Harmony of our particu- 
lar Minds with thy universal, ^c] 

lElvoci (?' d,-j]o ruTO TJiv tb iuj'ajjaov^ a^iim y^ ivpoixv 
S»'a, oTocv ZTcivlix •nrpa7T>i1ixt y.xld rnv (rUjW.(pwv»'av t8 
"srxf lacc^cp ^xii^-ov^ zjpo^ tw t» oA» S'iOiycnl^ Q^Xri- 
e-iu. The Virtue of a happy Man, and the Felicity 
cf Life is this, ivhen all things are tranfa£ied in 
Harmony of a Man's Genius, with the Will of Him, 
who adminiflers the Whole. Diog. Laert. I. 7. c. 88. 
p. 418. This is what Epicletus calls t5ii; au7» ^ixn- 
(Tjy (Twdp uo(T jci TOK yivo^iwiq, to attune or harmonize 
one^s Mind to the things, which happen. DifT. 1. 2. 
c. 14. p. 242. 

Note LXXX. Ibid. Yet since to at- 
tain this Height is but barely pos- 
sible, ^V.] See before, page 215, ^c. See alfo 
NoteshX. andLXII. 

Note LXXXI. p. 233. — Such as to trans- 
form us into Savage Beasts of Prey, sul- 
len, ^i".] See before, Note LXXI. 

Note 



34*3 N O T E S o« Treatise the Third. 

Note LXXXII. p. 233. That animating 
Wisdom, which pervades, and rules the 
Whole, (ffr.] This Poiver is called by the Em- 
peror Marcus — tov ^la. rrig »V»«? ^imovjcc hoyoVy xj — 
^iKOWfA^ivla TO ZTxv. 1. 5' f- 32* 

Note LXXXIII. Ibid. —That Magic Di- 
vine, WHICH, ^c] —>^ TO X,'^'(r/Aa »u T» Xm- 
»(^j *b "^^ ^y\X7ifYifiov, xj zjcccra, )tax»p}^»'«, wj axavOa, 
oj j3opfcop©^, exjjuwy iTriyswyiiJ^o^lx twu (n^Jimv xa) )««-' 
Acuy. ^-•/i au aulit dX'hOTfKx, t«t», k (raSft?, (pav]a^8" 
aKKoi Try 'sr^'v7wy zj-^yvi)) i-n-iXoyi^if. M. Ant. 1. 6. 
f. 36. — See alfo 1. 4. f. 44. 1. 3. f. 2. "SlT-m^ ya,^ 
6ij xWjUWdtat ((^iiTjy) i7ciy^ccy.(j'oC\oc yiXoTa (pfpsitrjy, as 
JcaO laula jusy e'o JpauAa, tu <?£ oAm ■crotriiji.oili ^afiv 
TWO. •Jirpor'iyiic-iy »Twf x|>c^fjaf au au/>)V sCp tocvh^ rrtv 
jtaxtay, Tolf J' aAXot? »>« ap^piir's? £0. Chryfip. apuc} 
Plutarch, p. 1065. D. 

Qj^i Tt yiyvsloci 'ipyov Itt) p^§oyl (r» ^jp(^«, Acci[xuy^ 
Ojth xal ajOsptov fifTov WAov, ^V sttj ztovJuj 
UX-nv OTTQTX pt'^so"! JcaHCJ <T(pslipr,(riv dvom^. 
AAAa (Tu )ta; t« z:£pi(r(Jix, iTririxa-ai oifiisc ^iTnon, 
l^oci Koa-fAHv Tix. anca-fxoc, * xal « (p/A« <ro» (piXx sou, 
''XI'Tj J^a^ uj £u a.Ttoi.\\(x. (njvr\^i/.o>ixg l^Xx. xaxoTa-iv, 
"XitrS iva 5/i}^ye(S<S!4 ■zi:a.'Jluv X^yov dih iovjccv. forf, £oy7a, 

Ckanthis Hymn, apud Steph. in PoefiPhilof. p. 49, 50. 

[The Reader v.'ill obferve that the fourth of the 
above \^erfes is fiipplied by the Mifcell. Ohfervationes 

Criticcsj 



Notes o« Treatise iheThird. 349 

Criticts, Vol. VII. from a Manufcript of Vojjiui at 
Leyden.^ 

Note LXXXIV. p. 234. — With these may 
OUR Minds be unchangeably tinged, ^<:.] 

^XTrliTOn ydo Onro tuv (pxv']ai(yim r\ -^v^t, 

M. Ant. 1. 5. f. 16. 

Note LXXXV. Ibid. With a Re- 
serve, b'r.] itAfd' uTTE^atpEo-fw?. Sqq Epi^.Enchirid, 
c. 2. M.Ant. 1.4. f. I. 1.5. f. 20. Seneca Xx-xsxi- 
iates it, cum exceptions. ^ttDeBeneficiis, 1. 4. f. 34. 

Note LXXXVI. Ibid. — Never miss what 
WE would obtain, or fall into that 

WHICH WE would AVOID, b'f.] fjL7\ri Opiyous- 
vov aTroTuJp^aufjv, [/.sT luxXivovloi TO'£|jt7ri7r7f»y. Arr. 
Epi(5l. 1.3. c. 12. p. 404. 

Note LXXXVII. p. 235. — Conduct me, 
Thou, ^^.J 

"'Ottoi 73-09* Ujw,ri> £j,aj J'jaT8Tal]w/v©^. 
'Hq 'i-\o^xi a.o-Av'^ ' r,)) Si yt ^v\ O/Aw, 

Ckanthes in Epi£i. Ench, c. 52. 

Thus tranflated by Seneca : 

Due rngf parenSy celfique dominator poli, 
^ocunque pkcuit : nulla parendi rmra eji : 

Adfum 



350 ^OTES 0/2 Treatise the Tfoird. 

Adfum irnpiger. fac nolle : comkabor gemenSy 
Malufque patiar, quod bono licuit pati. 

Epifl. 107. 

Note LXXXVIII. p. 236. 'Tis Habit, re- 
plied HE, IS ALL IN ALL. 'TiS PRACTICE 

AND Exercise, which can only, ^c. ifc. 

to the End of the Paragraph.'] 'AAAa -ujoXXrq iyzi 

y^peiccv zj(x,px(ry.evrig^ KOii "stovh "stoXX^ koci |u«6>)|aoiT<oi'. 
T/ Ku ; iXTTi^ng, oTi rm [j.$'yi?-nv TEp^vw ostto oXiyuv 

lov uTToXccQiTv ; But (fays one, with refpedt to 

the virtuous Charadler) there is need of much Pre- 
paration^ of much Labour and Learning. And what ? 
Doji thou expea it Jhould he pofpMe (anfwers the 
Philofopher) to obtain^ by little Pains, the chiefeji 
GREATEST Art ? Arr.EpiSi. 1. i. c. 20. p.m.. 
"A^ww ^£ Taup(^ » y'wi\cA, ioi yi\)WAO% olv^puTrog ' 
ciXXa Sii '^ii^a(Twri(7cci, ■srupacy.B'joccoc^a.if xoci {/.n £jx») 
zraoa-Trn^^v Itt) roi fj^n^iv zTforrixovla,. No robufl and 
mighty Animal is complete at once ; nor ?mre is the brave 
and generous Man. 'Tis necejfary to undergo the fe- 
ver efl Exercife and Preparation, and not raflAy plunge 
into things, which are no way fuitable. Ejufd. 
DifTert. 1. i. c. 2. p. 18. See alfo the fame Author ^ 
I.I. c. 15. p. 86. 1.2. c. 14. p. 243. SedutJiec 
mediciy nee imperatores, nee orator es, quamvis artis. 
prcEcepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum 
fine ufu.^ exsrcitatione confequi poffunt : fic officii 
confervandi prcecepta traduntur ilia quidem (ut facimm 
ipft ; j fed rei magnitudo ufum quoque exercitationemque 
defiderat. Cic. deOffic. 1. 1. c. 18. n / 'H0IKH 
ig "E0OT2 zTipiyfjilui ' ohv kxI ivvoux. £^»)>t£ — 
Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c. i. 

Note 



NOTES on Treatise the Third, 35^ 

Note LXXXIX. p. 236. Nothing is to 

BE HAD GRATIS, y^.] z^poTyioc, JJtu 'ymlcti. AtT. 

EpiSf. 1. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The fame Sentiment is 
often repeated by the fame Author. 

Note XC. p. 241. We are all go- 
verned BY Interest, t^c.} See of the Dia- 
logue^ p. 212, 246. See alfo Notes LVI. and XCII.. 

Note XCI. p. 243. 'Tis a smoaky 

House, ^f.] Kxtti-o? lo * x-k^x^I^"-^- M.Ant, 

1. 5. c. 29. See Arr. Epi£f. 1. i. c. 25. p. 129. 

Note XQll. Ibid. Is a social Interest, ^V.] 
As the Stoics, above all Philofophers, oppofed c 
lazy ina5live Life, fo they were perpetually recom- 
mending a proper regard to the Public, and encou- 
raging the Pradice of cwery facial Duty. And tho* 
they made the original Spring of every particular 
Man's Adion, to be Self-love, and the profped of 
private Intereft ; yet fo intimately united did they 
efteem this private Intereft with the public, that they 
held it impojfible to promote the former, and not at 
the fame time promote the latter. ToMiflnv (^uo-i* 

ViOV S-JVnloil Tuf^XVUV, il ^Vl TJ £»J TO XOiVo\ U)(piXvj.QV 
l!TfOff(pif^0Ci ' hvlug 0UX£T* tt,KOlVUV7)loV ylvdai, TO 

zrx.vloe. aula mxcs zroieTv. God hath fo framed the Na^ 
ture of the rational Animal, that it fhould not be able to 
obtain any private Goods, if it contribute not withal forne 
thing profitable to the Community. Thus is there no lotiger 
any thing unsocial, in doing all things for 
the sake of self. Arr.Epi^, I, i, c. 19. p. 106. 

The 



352 NOTiES o« Tr£atise the Third. 

The Peripatetic Dodtrine was much the faiiie. 

■Xlav'.uv ii ajtAjAAcdjUEi'WU srpo\ to kxXov^ y.xi J^iarfii/o^ 
|iA£yMv T« xxXXtrx ZTfcclTe.v, xoji.'tJ t' av T«ravjl £»^ 
ra Siovla, hxi i^ioi, l-nxroi roi (/.iyiroc rwy aj/aOwy, 
JiTTf^ w apfW TOi^TOv lo • cdVf To'v fjih dyc^ov, ^s'l 
(^ihavroy shxi ' xxi ya.o x-jto; ovrirrerai tm xaAa 

•srp-xTTwy, y.xi rag aAA«? cJ^EAwft. /^^r^ ^// ?5 dim 
jointly at the fair Principle of Honour^ and ever flrive 
to a6i what is fairefi and moji laudable^ there would 
be to every one in common whatever was wanting^ and t9 
each Man in particular of all Goods the greatejl^ 'fVi^'^ 
tue deferve juftly to be fo ejlecmed. So that the good Man 
is neccffarily a Friend /i? self: For by doing what 
is laudable i he ivill always himfelf he profited^ as well 
as at the fatne time be beneficial to others. Ethic. Ni- 
com. 1. 9. c. 8. 

Note XCIII. p. 243. — If so, then Honour 
AND Justice are my Interests, ^c.'] Thus 
Cicero^ after having fuppofed a focial common Interejl 
to be the natural Intereft of Man, fubjoins imme- 
diately ^odfi ita ejl, una co7itincw,ur omnes l^ ea~ 

dem lege naturee. Idque ipfum ft ita efi^ certe violare 
alterum lege natures prohibcmur. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 6. 

NoteXCIV. Ibid. — Without some Por- 
tion OF WHICH not even Thieves, tfff.] — 
Cujus (fc. fujlitia) tanta vis ejl, ut ne illi quidem, 
qui maleficio y feeler e pafcuntur^ pojfint fine ulla par- 
ticula jufiitia vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiamy qui 
ana latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripity is fihi fie 
in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ilk autem^ qui 

archi- 



NOTES o«Tre;atise theTloird, 353 

archipirata dicitur, nifi aquabiliter praiam, i^£. De 
Offic. 1. 2. c. II. 

TO J'f;{aicv cvvi^ei ttiv koivuvixu^ StiXov eok Itti tw» 
a^ix'JlcxTuv slvoii Jox« vlwu • «Te» (Jg EKTjy oj A5i5~at' olg 
71 Trpoj a.XXr]X>ig xoivwjisi tVo ^jJcaiOTuy?;? cw^flat T»if 
7rpo\- aA^'/jAsf. Ata; xf J/jx^ to fxrj ttXiovekIs'i^j aA- 
AwAsf, xj (?»a TO /xi; •J/£jJ'?c9-ai, j^ eix to ti^xj/ to' 
xpfn-loy oox«i/, x, to t^ (rL'r)££(jU,£ujj tpuAarTfjy, j^ c5t;t 
TO So'/^Oflv To7g a<9a'f5"«pojf, <?i» rcuZlx r TrpoV a,XKy\- 
A»j aulor? asivuiviu cruy-^mi ' Zv irav rHvac-Jliiv lig Zq 
oi^ix>i(n TTOi^aiv. ^Tis necejfary^ Society bsing natu- 
ral, that Justice JJmihl be natural alfo, by which 
Society cxijls. For that Jujiice holds Society together y 
is evident in thofe, who appear of all the mojl unjujl, 
fuch I mean as Rubbers or Banditti, ivhofe Society 
with each other is preferved by theb' Juftice to each 
other. For by not afpiring to any unequal Shares, and 
by never falfifying, and by fubmitting to what appears 
expedient, and by jujlly guardi?ig the Booty a'/najfed to- 
gether, and by ajftjling their weaker Companions, by 
ihefe things it is, that their Society fubfijls ; the contrary 
to all which they do by thofe, ivhom they injure. Alex. 
Aphrod. TTfpt \\)X' P- 156. Edit. Aid. See alfo 
Flort. deRepub. 1. i. p- 351. torn. 11. Edit. Serrani. 

Note XCV. p. 245. What then have I 

TO DO, BUT TO ENLARGE VlRTU£ XNToPlETY ? 

Not only Honour, ^c] 

A a All 



^ 



54 NOTES on Treatise the Third, 

All manner of Events, which any way afFe(fl a 
Man, arife either from within hhnfelf^ or from 
Caufes independent. In the former cafe, he main- 
tains an a^ive Part ; in the latter, a pajjive. The 
aSfive Part of his Charader feems chiefly to be the 
Care of Virtue, for 'tis Virtue which teaches u's 
what we are to aff or do ; the pajfive Part feems to 
belong more immediately to Piety, becaufe by this 
we are enabled to refign and acquiefce^ and bear with 
a manly Calmnefs whatever befals us. As there- 
fore we are framed by Nature both to a5i and to 
fuffer, and are placed in a Univerfe, where we are 
perpetually compelled to bothj neither Virtue nor 
Piety is of itfelf fuflicient, but to pafs becomingly 
thro' Life, we fhould participate of each. 

Such appears to have been the Sentiment of the 
wife and good Emperor.- — xw-mv oXov lotvlov, J'txaic- 
ffuvYi fg.iv £»? TCi v^ ix'Jia ivsp'y>i[j.svx. 111 01 Toig aA- 

AdJ? <jvy.Qoiiv>i(Tiy tyi rm oXuv (pv(rei. T* o ipsT tj?, 
r VTroXn^eloii Trfpl aula, 5? Trpa'^fj y.Oil^ a.u]^j x'j}'' £»; 

7raoc'yH\> TO vuv 7rpX(TijOtJ.ivm^ x^ (ptAsn* to vjv octtoh- 
fjiofxmv ionTiw-— He (the perfect Man) commits him- 
fclf wholly to Justice, and the universal Na- 
ture; TO Justice, as to thofe things which are 
dme by himfelf\ and in all other Events^ to the Na- 
ture OF the Whole. What any one will fay, 
sr think about him, or a£t againjl him, he doth ?iot fo 
much as take into confideration \ contented and abun- 
dantly fatisf^d with thefe two things, himfelf to do 
justly what is at this injlant doing, and to ap- 
prove 



NOTES c« Tr E AT isE the Third, 355 

PROVE and LOVE what is at this injiant allotted him. 
M. Anton. 1. 10. f. 11. YIxvlx inc'vx, tCp' a ^i« 

(p^oi/Tjg ' Talo Si £Ov, £«y ttxv to* 7rap£A6ou xaraAiTruf, 
>^ TO [xiXXov iTrirpi^yig t» Trpouoja, Xj to -n-apov //,ouo» 
^7r£vS£u->j? TTfof 'OIIOTHTA >t; AIKAIOSTNHN- 
oViOT»)T(X fxiv, iW (PtA'^f re u7rovey.o^Bvo'j' <roi yx^ x\PiO n 
(Pvjii; £^£p£, «J ""E T!i7w * ^i>locio(ruvn^ ;?£, iva £A£u6£pwf nc, 
ywpi? TTfpiTrAox^f A£}')0? T£ T* ^A'/iSri, x^ TTparo-?)? Ta 

xa7c4 vofji-ov 1^ y.aX dj^^'a-y ^H thofe things^ at which 

thou lui/hejl to arrive by a Road round about ^ thou 
mayjl injlantly poffefs, if thou dojl not grudge them t9 
thy f elf i that is to fay^ in other words, if every tlxng 
pafi thou intirely quit, if the future thou trujl to Pro- 
vidence, and the prefent alone thou adjujl according t9 
Piety and Justice : according to Piety, that fo thou 
may ft approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever 
it be, 'twas Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it ;) ac- 
cording to Jujiice, that fo thou mayfl generoufy and with- 
out Difguife both fpeak the Truth, and aSi what is confo- 
nant to [the general] Law, and the realValue of things. 
M. Ant. 1. 12. c. I. See alfo I. 7. c 54. 

Note XCVI. p. 245. I have \Ji Inte- 
rest WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTER- 
ING THE Plan of Providence ; without 

MENDING, ^V.] Hxih-oiSlxi tsIeO to [/.X9^(X~ 

v£iu ixx^x '^Tco IjiXiiv, u; &c. To be inftru^ed 

that is to fay, t^o learn fa to will all ihbigs, as in fad 
they happen. And how do they happen ? Js He ivho 
ordains them, hath ordained. Now He hath ordained 
that there fjould be Summer and IVintcr, and Plenty 

A a 2 a?id 



2s6 NOTES c;2 Treatise theThird. 

and FGinlne^ and Virtue and Vice, and all manner of 
Contrarieties^ for the Harmony of the Whole ; and to 
each of us hath He given a Body, and its Members, 
and a Fortune, and certain AJfociates. Mindful there- 
fore of this Order, ought we to come for Jnfiruflion, 
hot indeed how we may alter what is already ejlab/ijljed, 
(for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better 
fo to be ; j but hew, zvhile things continue around us, 
jufi as they are, and as is their Nature, we may fiill 
preferve our Judgfnettt in harmony with all that happens. 
Arr. Epi(5l. I. i. c. 12. p. 74. 

Note XCVII. p. 246. Who would be un- 
HAFi-y ? Who would not, if he knew 

HOW, ENJOY ONE PERPE TUAL FeLICITY ? b'V.] 

Izg tvLlot, TT^^drlofj.iv. 'Tis for the fake of Happinefs^ 
we all of us do all other things whatever. Ethic. Ni- 

com. 1. I. c. 12. fuh.fn.— See before, of the 

Dialogue pages 212, 241. and Notes LVI and 
XCII. 

Note XCVIII. Ibid. If it happen to 

BE ERRONEOUS, 'tIS A GRATEFUL ErROR, 
WHICH I CHERISH, ^f.] 'El Jj l^ocTraJn^svloc, TiVM 
t^ii y.x^vv, oil Twu iy.Tog aTrpoajpsTwu viiv £s~< tt^os 

YiuiXKov ivpo'.oq KXi ara.pa.'xuq ^luxTiBxi. Were a 
Man to be deceived, in having learnt concerning Ex- 
ternals, that all beyond our Power was fo us as nothing ; 
/, for my oii'n.part, would defire a Deceit, which would 
enable me for the future to live tranquil and un~ 
dijlurhed, Arr. Epidt. 1. i. c. 4. p. 27. 

Note 



NOTES o;i Tr E AT I SE //j^ TJjird, 3 ^j 

Note XCIX. p. 247. When we are 

ONCE, SAID HE, WELL HABITUATED TO THIS 

— MORAL Science, then Logic and Phy- 
sics BECOME TWO PROFITABLE ADJUNCTS, ^f.] 

Jd eafque virtutes^ de gut bus difputatu?n eji, Diale£f:- 
cam etiam adjungunt iff Pbyjkam, eafque ambas vir- 
tututn nomine adpellam : alteram, quod habeat ratio- 
nem, ne cut faljo adfentiamiir, neve, i^c. Cic. de 
Fin. 1. 3. c. 21. p. 265. 

The THREEFOLD DIVISION of PHILOSOPHY 

into Ethics, Phyfics, and Logic, was commonly 
received by moft Seds of Philofophers. See Laert. 
1. 7, c. 39. See alfo Cicero in his Treatife de Legi- 
bus, 1. I. c. 23. and in his Academics, I. i. c. 5. 
Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone phihfophandi ratio 
triplex, l3'c. Plutarch, de Placit. Philof. p. 874. 



END of the NOTES <?« Treatise theThird. 



P. 304. 1. 61 for aIk»!, read Aixr;. P. 349. I. 20. 
for i-^^o^xi xtxv^, read f'v[.e/^ai' y aow^. 



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