^^^WW-
., : C
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
^/^
■ri%
n
THREE
TREATISES.
The First
Concerning ART.
The Second
Concerning MUSIC,
PAINTING, and POETRY.
The Third
Concerning HAPPINESS.
By J. H.J/Uyi^i }l,^^yrTui/y
LONDON:
Printed by H. Woodfall, jun.
For J. NouRSE, without Temple- Bar \ and
P. Va ILL A NT, facing Southampton-Jlreet
in the Strand.
M.DCC.XLIV,
Advertifement to the Reader.
/N the Hreatifes here publiJJoed, there
is the following Connexion. Ihejirfi
treats of Art in its moji comprehenjive
Idea J when confidered as a Genus to many
jiibordinate Species. The fecond cojifiders
three of thefe fiibordinate Species^ whofe
Beauty and Elega?ice are well known to
all. The lafi treats of that Arty which
refpeBs the ConduB of Human Life^ and
which may jujlly be valuedy as of all Arts
the mojl important, if it can truly lead
us to the End propofed.
TREATISE the First:
CONCERNING
A R 1 ,
DIALOGUE
T O T H E
Right Honourable the EARL of
SHAFTESBU RY.
CONCERNING
A R T,
A
DIALOGUE
To the Right Honourable the
Earl of Shaftesbury.
My Lord,
THE following Is a Converfation
in its kind fomewhat uncom-
mon, and for this reafon I have
remembered it more minutely than I could
imagine. Should the fame Peculiarity prove
a Reafon to amufe your Lordfliip, I fliall
think myfelf well rewarded in the Labour
of reciting. If not, you are candid enough
to accept of the Intention, and to think
there is fome kind of Merit even in the
Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no
Jonger Preface, the Fadl was as follows.
B 2 A
^ Concerning ART,
A Friend from a difliint Country hav-
ing by chance made me a Vifit, we were
tempted by the Serenity of a chearfal Morn-
ing in the Spring, to walk from S — r — ;;/
to fee Lord P—mbr-^kes at JV-^-lt—n. The
Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Paints
ing, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat,
were the Subje^St of great Entertainment to
my Friend : Nor was I, for my own part,
lefs delighted than he was, to find that our
Walk had fo v/ell anfwered liisExpedations.
We had given a large Scope to our Curiofi-
ty, when we left the Seat, and leifurely be^
gan our return towards home,
p ■
And liere, my Lord, in paffing over a
few pleafant Fields, commenced the Con-
verfition which I am to tell you, and which
fell at firft, as was natural ^ on the many
curious Works, which had afforded us both
fo elegant an Amufemcnt. This led us in-
fenfibly to difcourilng upon ART, for we
both agreed, that whatever v.^e had been
gdlT^inng of Fair and Beautifiil, could ail be
referred
y^DlALOGUE* 5
referred to no other Caufe. And here, I
well remember, I called upon my Friend
to give me his Opinion upon the meaning
of the Word ART : A Word it was (I
told him) in the Mouth of every one 3 but
for all that, as to its precife and definite Idea,
this might flill be a Secret ; that fo it was in
fa6l with a thoufand Words befide, all no
lefs common, and equally familiar, and yet
all of them equally vague and undetermined.
To this he anfwered, That as to the pre-
cife and definite Idea of Art, it was a Que-
ftion of fome Difficulty, and not fo foon to be
refolved ; that, however, he could not con-
ceive a more likely Method of coming to
Jcnow it, than by confidering thofe feveral
Particulars, to each of which we gave the
Name. It is hardly probable, faid he,
that Mufic, Painting, Medicine, Poetry,
Agriculture, and fo many more fhould be
all called by one common Nn?ne, if there was
?'iot fomething in each^ which was common to
all It fliould feem fo, replied I. What
then, faid he, fhall we pronounce this to
be ? At this, I remember, I was under
B 3 fome
6 Concerning A R T^^
fome fort of Hefitation. Have Coiiras^e,,
cried my Friend, perhaps the Cafe is not
fo defperate. Let me allc you — Is Medi-
cine the Caufe of any thing ? Yes furely,
faid I, of Health. And Agriculture,
of what ? Of the plentiful Growth of
Grain. And Poetry, of what? Of
Plays, and Satires, and Odes, and the like.
And is not the fame true, faid he, of
Mufic, of Statuary, of Architedlure, and, in
fhort, of every Art whatever ? I confefs^
faid I, it feems fo. Suppofe then, faid
he, we fliould fay. It was common to every
Art to be a Caufe. Should we err ? I
replied, I thought not. Let this then,
iixid he, be remembered, that all Art isCauCe,
I promifed him it fhould.
But how then, continued he, \^ all Art
he Caiifcy is it alfo true, that all Caufe h
Art F At this again I could not help
heiitating. You have heard, faid he,
without doubt, of that Tainter famed in
Story, who being to paint the Foam of
a Horfe, and not fucceeding to his Mind,
threw
-<^ D I A L O GUE. y
threw his Pencil at the Pidure in a Fit
of Paffion and Defpair, and produced a
Foam the moil natural imaginable. Now,
what fay you to this Fad ? Shall we pro-
nounce Art to have been the Caufe ? By
no means, laid I. What, faid he, if in-
flead of Chance^ his Hand had been guided
by mere CompuJfmn^ himfelf dllTenting and
averfe to the Violence ? Even here, re-»
plied I, nothing could have been referred to
his Art. But what, continued he, if in-
ftead of a cafual Throw, or ini^olwitary Com-
pulfion, he had 'willingly and deliberately dired-
ed his Pencil, and (o produced that Foam,
which Story fays he failed in ? Would
not Art here have been the Caufe ? I
replied, in this cafe, I thought it would.
It fliould feem then, faid he, that A?'t
implies not only Caufe, but the additional
Requilite of Intention, Reafon, Volition, and
Confcioiifnejs ; io that not every Caufe is Art,
but only voluntary or intentional Caufe,
So, faid I, it appears.
B 4 And
8 ' Concerning ART,
And fhall we then, added he, pronounce
every intentional Caufe to be Art ? I fee
no reafon, faid I, why not. Confider,
faid he ; Hunger this Morning prompted
you to eat. You were then the Caiife^
and that too the intentional Caufe, of con-
fuming certain Food : And yet will you
refer this Confumption to Art ? Did you
chew by Art ? Did you fwallow by Art ?
No certainly, faid I. So by
opening your Eyes, faid he, you are the
intentional Caufe of Seeing, and by ftretch-
ing your Hand, the intentional Caufe of
Feeling > and yet will you affirm, that
thefe things proceed from Art ? I fhould
be wrong, faid I, if I did : For what Art
can there be in doing, what every one is able
to do by mere Will, and a fort of uninfiru5led
InftinB I* You fay right, replied he, and
i'he reafon is manifeft. Were it otherwife,
we fliould make all Mankind univerfal Ar-
tills in every lingle Adion of their Lives.
And what can be a greater Abfurdity than
this ? I confelTed that the Abfurdity ap-
peared
1/^ D I A L O G U E. g
peared to be evident. But if nothing
then, continued he, which we do by Com-'
pilfioriy or without intending it, be Art ; and
not even what we do intentionally^ if it pro-
ceed from mere Will and uninJiriiBed In-
ftind: ', what is it we have left remaining,
where Art may be found converfant ? Or
can it indeed poffibly be in any thing elfe,
than in that which we do by Vfe^ PraSlice^
Experience, and the like, all which are born
with no one, but which are acquired all
afterward by Advances unperceived. I
can think, faid I, of nothing elfe. Let
therefore the Words Habit and Habitualy
faid he, reprefent this Requifite, and let us
fay, that Art is not only a Catife, but ari'
intentional Caufe ; and not only an i?jte}i~
tional Caufe, but an intentioital Caufe found-
ed in Habit, or, in other Words, an habi-
tual Caufe, You appear, faid I, to argue
rightly.
But if Art, faid he, be what we
have now alTerted, fomething learnt and
ac(^uired'f if it be alfo a thing intentiotial
or
Id Concerning A R T^
or voluntary^ and not governed either by
Chance or blind Necejity- If this, I fay,
be the Cafe, then mark the Confequences*
And what, faid I, are they ? The
firfl, faid he, is, that no Events, in what we
call the natural World, mull be referred to
Art\ fuch as Tides, Winds, Vegetation j
Gravitation, Attradion, and the like. For
thefe all happen by flated Laws j by a curi-
ous Necejfity, which is not to be withftood,
and where the nearer and immediate Caiifes
appear to be utterly unconjcious. I con-*
fefs, faid I, it feems fo. In the next
place, continued he, we muil exclude all
thofe admired Works of the Animal Worlds
which, for their Beauty and Order, we ine-^
taphorically call artificial. The Spider's
Web, the Bee's Comb, the Beaver's Houfe,
and the Bird's Nell, mull all be referred to
another Source. For who can fay, thefe
ever learnt to be thus ingenious ? or, that
tliey were igjiorant by Nature, and knowing
only by Education? None furely, re-
plied I. But we have ftill, faid he, a
higher Confideration* And what, faid I,
is
^Dialogue. h
IS that ? It Is, anfwered he, this
Not even that Divine Power, which gave
Form to all things, then aBed by Art, when
it gave that Form. For how, continued
he, can that Intelligence, which has all
Perfe5iion ever in Energy, be fuppofed to
have any Power, not original to its Nature^
How can it ever have any thing to learny
when it knows all from the Beginning ; or,
being perfeB and complete, admit of what
is additional and fecondary ? I ihould
think, faid I, it were impoffible. If ib,
faid he, then Art can never be numbered
among its Attributes : For all Art is fome-
thing learnt, fomething fecondary and aC'
quired, and 7iever origifial to any Being,
which polTefTes it. So the Fad;, faid I,
has been eflablifhed.
If this therefore, continued he, be true;
if Art belong not either to the Divine
Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate
Nature, to what Nature fhall we fay it
does belong ? I know not, faid I, unlefs
it be to the Human, You are right, faid
he^
12 Concerning ART,
he ; for every Nature elfe you pei'ceive i%
either too excellent to want it, or too bafe to be
capable of it. Befide, except the Human,
what other Nature is there left ? Or where
eife can we find any of the Arts already
inflanced, or indeed whatever others we
may now fancy to enumerate ? Who are
Statuaries, but Men ? Who Pilots, who
Muiicians? This feems, replied I, to
be the Fad:.
Let us then, continued he, fay, not
only that Art is a Canfcy but that it is
Man becoming a Caiije 5 and not only Man,
but Man intending to do what is going to
he doncy and doing it alfo by Habit-, fb
lliat its whole Idea, as far as we have
hitherto conceived it, is Man becoming
a Caiife^ Intentional and HabitnaL I con-
fefs, faid I, it has appeared fo»
And thus, faid he, have you had exhi-
bited a fort of a Sketch of Art. You mufl re-
member however, it is but a Sketch : there
is flill ibmethin'2; wantin"; to make it a
finiflied
y^ D I AL OG UE. i^
f.ninied Piece. I begged to know what
this was. In order to that, replied he,
I cannot do better, than remind you of a
PaiTage in your admired Horace. It is con-
cerning jilfefiiis; who (if you remember)
he tells us, though his Tools were laid
afide, and his Shop fliut up, was flill an
Artift as much as ever.
Alfenm vafer omni
AbjeBo injlriimento Artis, claufaq-j faberndy
Sutor erat I remember,
faid I, the Paflage, but to what purpofe is
it quoted ? Only, replied he, to iliew
you, that I fhould not be without Prece-
dent, were I to affirm it not abfolutely ne-
cefTary to the being of Art, that it fhould
be Man aBually becoming a Caufe ; but that
it was enough, if he had the Power or Capa--
city of fo becoming. Why then, faid I,
did you not fettle it fo at firft ? Becauie,
replied he, Faculties, Powers, Capacitiei
(call them as you will) are in them-
felves abftradl from Ad:ion, but obfcure and
bidden things. On the contrary, Energies
0iid Operations lie open to the Se?ifes, an4
cannot
14 Concerning ART,
cannot but be obferved, even whether wc
will or no. And hence therefore, when
firfl we treated of Ait, we chofe to treat of
jt, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we
better comprehend it, we have ventured
fomewhat farther. Repeat then, faid I,
if you pleafe, the Alteration, which you
have made. At firfl:, anfwered he, we
reafoned upon Art, as if it was only Man
aBimlly becoming a Caufe intentional and
habitual. Now we fay it is a Tower in
Man of becoming fuch Caufe ^ an^ that,
though he be not aBiially in the Exercife of
fuch a Power. I told him, his Amend-
ment appeared to be jufl.
There is too another Alteration, added
he, which, for the fake of Accuracy, is
equally wanting ; and that is with refped: to
the Epithet, Intentional or Voluntary. And
what, faid I, is that 1 We have agreed
it, replied he, to be neceffary, that all Art
fhould be under the Guidance of Inte?2tion
or Volition, fo that no Man ading by Com-^
fulfion^ or by Chance^ flioiild be called
^Dialogue. j^
^n j4?'tifi. We have. Now tlio*
this, faid he, be true, yet it is not fufficient.
We mufl h'mf this Intention or Volition to
a peculiar Kind. For were every Httle
Fancy, which we may v/ork up into Habit,
;a fufficient Foundation to conflitute an Art,
we ihould make Art one of the loweft and
mofb defpicable of things. The meaneft
Trick of a common Juggler might, in fuch
cafe, entitle a Man to the Charadter of an
Artifl. I confelTed, without fome Limi-
tation, that this might be the Confequence.
But how limit Intentions to a Kind or
Species ? What think you, replied he,
if we were to do it, by the Number and
Dignity of the Precepts, which go to the
directing of our Intentions ? You mufl
explain, faid I ; for your Meaning is obr
fcure. Are there not Precepts, replied he,
in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sow-
ing ? Are there not Precepts in Archi-
tcdure, about Orders and Proportions ?
Are there not the fame in Medicine, in
JN'avigation, and the reft? There are.
^^nd what is your Opinion of thefe
feveral
iS Concerning A R T,
feveral Precepts ? Are they arbitrary and
capricious ; or rational and Jleady ? Are
they the Inventions of a Day ; or well-
approved by long Experience ? I told him,
I fliould confider them for the moll as
rational, fteady, and well-approved by long
Experience. And what, continued he,
fhall we fay to their Number f Are they
few ? Or are they not rather fo numerous^
that in every particular Art, fcarce any
comprehend them all, but the feveral Ar-
tifts themfelves ; and they only by length
of time, with due Attendance and Appli-
cation ? I replied, It feemed fo.
Suppofe then We were to pronounce, that
to every Art tijere was a Syjiejn of fuch
various and well-approved Precepts : Should
we err ? No certainly. And fuppofe
we fliould fay, that the Intention of every
'Artift^ m his feveral Art, was direBed by
fuch a Syfiem : Would you allow this ?
Surely. And ^vill not this limiting of
Intentions to fach only, as are fo direfted,
fufficiently diflinguifh Art from any thing
^{'^ which may rcfcmble it ? In other
>vords^
■/f Dialogue. 17
itvords, Is it likely, under this Diftlndion,
to be confounded with other Habits of ji
trifling, capricious and inferior Kind ?
I repliied, 1 thought not.
Let us then fee, fald he, and colleft
all that we have faid, together. We have
already agreed, that the Power of aBing
after a certain hiahner is fiifficieht tcJ con-
ftitute Art, without the aBiially operating
agreeably to that Power. And We have
iiow farther held the Intentions of every
Artift to be directed by a Syjiem of various
mid well-approved Precepts. Befides all this,
we fettled it before, that all Art was founded
in Habit), and was peculiar to Man; and
was feen by becoming the Caufe of fome Ef-
feB. It fhoiild feerh then, that the whole
Idea of Art was this— —An habitual
Power in MAn of becoming the
Cause of some Effect, accord-
ing to a System of various
AND WELL-APPROVED PrECEPTS.
I replied, That his Account appeared
to be probable and juft.
C §. 2,
i8 Concerning A R T,
§. 2. An D now then, continued he, as we
have gone thus far, and have fettled between
us what we believe Art to be 3 fhall we go a
little farther, or is your Patience at an end ?
Oh ! no, replied I, not if any thing be
left. We have walked fo leifurely, that much
remains of our Way -, and I can think of no
Method, how we may better amufe ourfelves,
M Y Friend upon this proceeded with fay-
ing, that if Art were a Caufe, (as we had
agreed it was) it mull be the Caiife offome"
thing. Allow it, faid I. And if it be
the Caufe of fomeihifigy it mujft have a Sub-
ject to operate on. For every Agent has need
of its Patient ; the Smith of his Iron, the
Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his
Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship.
I anfwered. It was tme. If then,
faid he, the Subjeds of particular Arts be
thus evident : What Idea fliall we form of
that imiverfal SubjeBy which is common to all
Art? At this Queftion, it muft be con-
felTed^ I was a little embaraiTed.
This
A Dl AL OGUE. 19
This induced him to afk me, How many
forts of Subjeds I allowed of ? Here I
could not help hefitating again. There
IS nothing, continued he, fo difficult in the
Queftion. You muft needs perceive, that
all Natures whatever can be but either <rc;z-
tingent or necejfary. This may be, re-
plied 1 3 but even yet I do not comprehend
you. Not comprehend me ! faid he ;
then anfwer me a Queftion : Can you con-
ceive any Medium between Motion and No^
Motion^ between thange and No-Change ?
I replied, I could not. If not,
can you conceive any thing in the whole
Order of Beings which mufl not be either
liable to thefe, or not liable ? Nothing.
Call thofe things therefore, faid he,
which are liable to Change and Motion^ con-
tingent Natures : and thofe, which are not
liable^ neceJJ'ary Natures: And thus you
have a Divijion^ in which all things are /«-
eluded. We have fo, faid I,
In
20 Concerning ART,
In which therefore, faidhe, o^ thefe Na^
tures {hall we feek for this common SubjeSi of
Art ? To this, I told him, I was unable
to anfwer. Refled, faid he, a little.
We have found Art to be a Caufe.
We have. And is it not ejfentialto
e'very Caufe to operate ? or can it be a Caufe,
and be the Caufe of nothing ? Impoflible.
Where-er therefore there is Caufe,
there is neceifarily implied fome Operation.
There is. And can there poffibly
be Operation y without Motion and Change f
' There cannot. But Change and
Motion muft needs be incompatible with
what is necejfary and immutable. They
muft. So therefore is Caufe. It mufl:»
And fo therefore Art. It muft»
Truth therefore, faid he, and Know-
ledge ; Principles and Demonftrations ; the
general and intelledual ElTences of Things >
in fliort, the whole immutable and neceffary
Nature is no part of it reducible to a Subje£i
of Art. It feems fo, faid I.
If
./^Dialogue. 21
If therefore Art, faid he, have nothing
to do with the Jiead)\ abJiraB, and ne-
cejjary Nature^ it can have only to do
with the tranjient^ the particular^ and
contingent one. 'Tis true, faid I; for
there is no other left. And fliall we
then fay, replied he, it has to do with all
contingent Natures exifting in the Univerie ?
For aught, replied I, which to me ap-
pears contrary. What think you, faid
he, of thofe Contingents of higher Order ?
fuch as the grand Planetary Syftem; the
Succeffion of the Seafons 5 the regular and
uniform Courfe of all fuperior Natures in
the Univerfe ? Has A:t any Ability to
intermeddle here ? No cervuinlyj faid I.
Thefe fuperior Condi igents then,
which move without Interruption^ are, it
feem?5 above it. They are«
And fi 1^11 we fay the fame of thofe of lower
fort i thofe, whofe Courfe we fee often inter-
rupted ; thofe, which the Strength and Cun-.
ning of Man are able to i?ifuence and con-
trouli Give Inftances, faid I, of what
C 3 you
22 Concerning ART,
you mean. I mean, faid he, Earth,
Water, Air, Fire ; Stones, Trees j Ani-
mals ^ Men themfelves. Are thefe Con-
ting;ents within the reach of Art, or has
Art here no Influence ? I fliould think,
faid I, a very great x)ne.
If this, continued he, be true, it fhould
feem that the common or universal
Subject of Art was — all those con-
tingent Natures, which lie within
the reach of the Human Powers
TO influence. I acknowledge, faid I,
it appears fo.
Thus far then, faid he, we have ad-»
vanced with tolerable Succefs. We have
gained fome Idea oi Art^ and fome Idea of
its SubjeB. Our Inquiry, on the whole,
has informed us, that Art is — — an habi-
tual Power in Man of beconmig a certain
Caufe —'- ^ndth^t its Subject is every
fuch contingent Nature ^ which lies within the
-reach of the human Powers to infiuence,
§• 3-
^Dialogue, 23
§. 3. 'Tis true, faid I, this appears to have
been the Refult of our Inquiry, and a full
and ample one it feems to have been.
A long one, replied he, if you pleafe, but
not a full and ample one. Can any
thing, faid I, be wanting, after what you
have faid already? Certainly, replied
he, a great deal. We have talked much
indeed of Art, confidered as a Caufe ; and
much of the SiibjeB, on which it operates;
but what jnoves thefe Operations to com-
mence, and where it is they end, thefe are
Topicks, which we have as yet little
thought of. I begged him then, that
we might now confider them.
He was willing, he faid, for his part,
and immediately went on by afking. What
I thought was the Beginning of Art F
I mean, faid he, by Beginning, that Caufe
for the fake of which it operates, and which
being fuppofed away. Men would be ne'der
moved to follow it. To this, I told him,
I was unable to anfwer. You will not
C 4 'think
24 Concerning ART,
think it, faid he, fo difficult, when yoi4
have a little more confidered. Refled:
with yoarfelf -Was it not the Abjence
of Health, which excited Men to cultivate
the Art of Medicine ? \ replied, it was.
What then, faid he, if the Human
Body had been fo far perfeB and Jclf-
fufficienfy as never to have felt the ViciJji->
tudes of Well and III : Would not then this
Art have been wholly unknown ?
1 replied, I thought it would. And
what, fajd he, if we extend this Perfedion
a degree farther, and fuppofe the Body not
only thus healthful, but withal fo robujiy as
tQ have felt no Uneaiinefs from all Incle-
mencies of Weather : Would not then the
Arts of Building alfo and Clothing have
bpen as ufelefs, as that of Medicine ?
I replied. It feemed they would. But
what, faid he, if we bound not this Per-
fedion of ours even here ? What if we
fuppofe, that not only Things merely necef-
fary, but that thofe alfo conducive to Ele-
gance and Enjoyment were of courfe all
implied in th^ ConfUtution of Hurnan Na-
ture 5
!/^DlALOGUE. 25
ture ; that they were all ftead)\ conflant,
and tndependant from ^without, and as in-r
feparable from our Being, as Perfplring, or
Circulation : In fuch cafe, would not the
Arts of Mufic, Painting and Poetry, with
.every other Art palling under the Denomi-
nation of Elegant^ have been as ufelefs, as
we have held thofe others of Medicine,
Clothing, and Architedhire ? I replied.
It feemed they would. It was then the
Abfcnce of Joys, Elegancies, and Amufe-
ments from our Conjiitiition-, as left by
Nature, which induced us to feek them in
thefe Arts of Elegance and Entertainment.
It was. And what, faid he, are
Joys, Elegancies, Amufements, Health,
Robuftnefs, with thofe feveral other ObjeSls
of Defre, wbofe Ab fence leads to Art^ but fo
many different Names of that complex Being
called Good, under its variotis, and multi-
for?fj, and popular Appearances f I re-
plied. It feemed fp.
If this then, faid he, be granted, it
Piould feem that the Beginning or Pri?i-
ciple
z6 Concerning ART,
ciple of Art was the Ab fence of fomething
thought Goody becaufe it has appeared that
it is for the fake of fome fuch ahfent Good
that every Art operates j and becaufe, if
we fuppofe no fuch Abfence to have been,
we fidould never have known any Art,
I confefs, faid I> it feems fo.
But how then, continued he? If it be
true that all Art implies fuch Pri?icipk,
is it reciprocally true, that every fuch
Principle fliould imply Art f I fee no
reafon, fald I, why not. Coniider,
faid he. It might be thought a Good by
fome perhaps, to be as ftrong as thofe
Horfes, which are ploughing yonder Field;
to be as tall as thofe Elms, and of a Nature
as durable. Yet would the Abfence of
Goods, like thefe, lead to Art ? Or is it not
abfiird to fuppofe, there fliould be an Art
of ImpoJJibilites ? Abfurd, faid I, cer-
tainly. If fo, faid he, when we define
the Begittning or Principle of Art,, it is not
enough to call it the Abfence of fomethijtg
thought Good^ unlefs we add, that the Good
be
-^Dialogue. 27
be a Good Pojfible-y a Thing attainable by
Man ; a Thing relative to Human Life^ and
conjijlent with Human Nature : Or does not
this alfo appear a Requiiite ? I replied,
I thought it did.
But ftill, continued he Is it a fuf-
ficient Motive to Art, that the Good defired
fhould be attainable? In other Words,
does every Abfence of Good attainable lead
to Arty or is our Account ftill too loofe^ and
in need of ftridler Determination ?
Of none, faid I, which appears to me.
Refled:, faid he j there are fome of the pof-
Jible Goods fo obvious and eafy, that every
Man, in an ordinary State of common na-
tural P erf e5f ion, is able to acquire them,
without Labour or Application. You will
hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting
to eat, may be gathered 5 or a clear Spring,
tempting to drink, may be drank at, by
the mere Suggeftions of Will and unin-
fruBed InfiinSi. I granted, they might.
It would be therefore impertinent,
faid he, to fuppofe that Goods, like thefe,
fliould
28 Concerning ART,
fliould lead to Art, becaufe Art would be
Juferjimm^ and in no refped: necefTary.
Indeed, faid I, it feems fo.
If therefore, faid he, neither Impqffibks
lead to Art J becaufe of fuch there can be no
Art J nor Things eafily pojjible, becaufe in
fuch Nature can do without Art : what is it
we have left, to which we may refer it ?
Or can it indeed be to any other than to that
middle Clafs of Things y which, however pof-
fible, are ftill not fo eafy, but to be beyond
the Powers of Will, and Inftind unin-
flruded ? I replied, It feerned fo.
That there are many fuch things, faid he,
is evident paft doubt. For what Man
would pay Artifts fo largely for their Arts,
were he enabled by Nature to obtain what-
ever he defired ? Or who would ftudy to
be fkilled in Arts, were Nature's original
Powers to be in all refpedls fufficient ?
I told him. It was not likely.
It fliould feem then, faid he, according
tp this Reafoning, that the Beginning, Mo-
tive^
y^ D I A L O G U El 20
five^ or Principle oi Art j that Caufe^ which
firft moved it to ABion, and, for the fake
of which its feveral Operations are exerted,
is — THE Want or Absence of some-
thing' appearing Good; RELATIVE TO
Human Life, and attainable by*
Man, but superior to his natural
and uninstructed Faculties.
I replied, I could not deny, but that the
Account appeared probable.
§. 4. Le T this then, faid he, fuffice, as to
the Beginning of Art. But how fhall we
defcribe its Knd ? What is it we fliall pro-
nounce this ? My Anfwer, I replied,
muft be the fame as often already j which
was indeed, that I could not refolve the
Queflion. It fhould feem, faid he,
not fo difficult, now we have difcovered
what Beginning is. For if Begifining and
t^nd are Contraries and oppofed, it is but
to i?i'vert^ as it were, the Notion of Begin^
ning, and we gain of courfe the Notion of
End. I afked him, \x\ what manner ?
Thus, faid he, the Beginning of Art has
been
^o Concennng ART,
been held to be fometbiftg, which j ^ffuppofed
away. Men would be never moved to apply to
Art. By Jnverfion therefore the End of Art
muft be fomething, which, while fuppofed
eway. Men will never ceaje applying to Art^
becaufe, were they to ceafe, while the End
was wanting, they would ceafe with Im-
perfection, and their Performance would be
incomplete. To this I anfwered, That
the Account, hbwever true, was by far too
general, to give me much Intelligence.
He replied, If it was, he would endea-
vour to be more particular. And what,
continued he, fhould we fay, that every
Art, according to its Genius, will of courfe
be accomplijljed eitlier in fome Energy, or in
fome IVoj^k ; that, befides thefe two, it can
be accomplifhed in nothing elfe j and con-
fequently that one of thefe muft of necefjity be
its Endf I could not here but anfwer
him with a Smile, That the Matter was
now much obfcurer than ever. I find
then, faid he, it is proper we Hiould be more
explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our
Reafon-
y^DlALOGUE. -^j
Reafonings from feme clearer Point of
View. I told him. It was quite necef-
fary, if he intended to be intelligible.
Thus then, faid he. You will grant, that
every Art, being a Caufe, mufi be produSihe
of fome EffeB'y for inftance, Mulic, of a
Tune ; Dancing, of a Dance -, Architedure,
of a Palace J and Sculpture, of a Statue.
*Tis allowed, faid I.' You will
grant alfo, faid he, that i?! thefe ProduSfions
they are all accomplijloed and ended : Or, in
other words, that as Mufic produces a Tune,
fo is it ended and accompliflied in a Tune;
and as Sculpture produces a Statue, fo is it
ended and accomplifhed in a Statue.
'Tis admitted, faid I. Now thefe Pro-
ductions, continued he, if you will examine,
are not like Units or Mathematical Points-,
but, oh the contrary, all conjiji of a certain
Number of Parts, from whofe accurate Or"
der is derived their Beauty and Pe?fe5liofi,
For example j Notes, ranged after fuch a
manner, make a Tune in Mufic 5 and
Limbs, ranged after fuch a manner, make a
Statue
2Z Cohcernifig ART,
Statue or a Pidture. I replied, They dido-
If then the ProduBionSy continued he,
of every Art thus coniifl of certain Parts,
it will follow, that thefe Parts will be either
co-exijlenty or not^ and if not co-exijienf,
then of courfe fuccejjive, Affifl: me,
faid I, by another Inftance, for you are
growing again obfcure. Co-exiftent, re-
plied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Leg?,
Body, and Head allfubfift together at one in-
dividual Injlant : SucceJJive, as in a Tune or
Dance, where there is no fuch Co-exiftence;
but where fome Parts are ever paffing a'way\
and others are ever Jiicceeding thern.
CAhl any thing be faid to exijl, faid T,
■whofe Parts are everfajjing away ?
Surely, replied he, or how elfe exifl YearS
and Seafons, Months and Days, with their
common Parent^ 'Time itfelf ? —-- Or indeed
what is Hufnaft Life, but a Compound of
Parts thus fleeting ; a Compound of various
and multiform Adiojis, which fucceed each
other in a certain Order ? The Fad:,-
{aid Ij appears fo^
This
A Dialogue. gj
This then, continued he, being the cafcj
knd there being this Difference in Produc-
tions, call every ProduBiorii the Parts of
which exiji fuccej/helyi and whofe Nature
hath its Being or EJfence in a T^ranfition^ call
it, what it really is, a Motion or an Energy—
Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies;
thus Riding and Sailing are Energies ; and
fo is Elocution, and fo is Life itfelf. On
the contrary, call every FroduBion^ whofe
Parts exiJl ail at mce^ and whofe Nature de^
pends 7iot on a Tranfition for its EJfence^ call
it a Work, or "Thing done^ not an Energy
or Operation. Thus a Houfe is a Work,
a Statue is a Work, and fo is a Ship, and
fo a Pidure. I feem, faid I, to compre-
hend you.
If then there be ild ProduB^ionSy faid he,
but mufl be of PartSy either co-exijient or
fuccejjive\ and the one of thefe be, as you
perceive, a Work^ and the other be an
Energy 'y it will follow, there will be no
ProduBiQn, but will be either a Work or an
D Energy,
34 Concerning ART,
Energy. There will not, faid I. fiut
every Art^ faid he, you have granted, is
accomplified and ended in what it produces ?
I replied, I had. And there are
no ProduBiom, but Works or Energies f
None.
It will follow then, faid he, that every
^'Art will be accomplished and ended
IN A Work or Energy.
To this I anfwered, That his Reafoning
I could not impeach > but that ftill the Di-
ftin<5tion of Work and Energy was, what I
did not well comprehend. There are
feveral Circumftances, faid he, which will
ferve fufficiently to make it clear.
I begged he would mention fome.
Thus then, faid he When the Pro-
duction of any Art is an Energy^ then the
-PerfeBion of the Art can be only percei'ved
during that Energy, For inftance, the Per-
fection of a Mulician is only known, while
he continues playing. But when the Pro-
duction
^Dialogue. 35
dudion of any Art is a JVork^ then is not the
Perfe5iio?i vifible during the Energy^ but only
after it. Thus the Perfeftion of the Sta-
tuary is not feen during his Energies as a
Statuary, but when his Energies are over;
when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting,
but the Statue is left, as the Refult ofalL
'Tis true, faid I.
Again, continued he, in confe-
quence of this, where the Produdlion is an
Energy^ there the ProduBion is of NeceJJity
co-eval with the Artiji, For how fhould
the Energy furvive the Man ; the Playing
remain, when the Mufician is dead ? But
where the Production is a Work^ then is
there no fuch NeceJJity. The Work may well
remain, when the Artift is forgotten 3 there
being no more reafon, that the Statue and
the Artifl fhould be co-eval, than the Man
and the rude Marble, before it received a
regular Figure. You feem now, faid I,
to have explained yourfelf.
D 2 If
36 Concerning ART,
If then, faidhe, Work and Energy
be made intelligible Terms^ you cannot but
perceive the Truth of what we before af-
ferted that every Art^ according to its
GeniuSy nmft needs be accomplijhed in one of
thefe J that, except in thefe two, it can be ac-
complijhed in nothing elfe ; a7id confequently
that ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY
beitsEnd. I anfwered, That the
Reafoning appeared juftly deduced. So
much then, replied he, for the Ending or
AccompUjhment of Art -y and fo much alfo
for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Difqui-
iition.
§. 5. He had no fooner faid this, than I
was beginning to applaud him ; elpecially
on his having treated a Subje<ft fo copioufly,
ftarted, as it were, by Chance, and without
any apparent Preparation. But 1 had not
gone far, before he interrupted me, by fay*
ing, That as to my Praifes they were more
than he deferved -, that he could pretend to
no great Merit for having been, as I called
it.
./^Dialogue. 37
it, fo copious, when he had fo often before
thought, on what at prefent we had been
talking. In fliort, fays he, to tell you a
Secret, I have been a long time amufing
myfelf, in forming an Eifay upon this Sub-
Jed:. I could not here forbear reproach-
ing him, for having hitherto concealed his
Intentions. My Reproaches produced a fort
of amicable Controverfy, which at length
ended in his ofering, Tliat, to make me
fome amends, he would now recite me (if
I pleafed) a fmall Fragnient of the Piece ;
a Fragment, which he had happened acci-
dentally to have about him. The Propofal,
on my part, was willingly accepted, and
without farther Delay, the Papers were
produced.
As to the Performance itfelf. It muflbe
confeiTed, in point of Stile, it was fomewliat
high and florid, perhaps even bordering
upon an Excefs. At the time however of
recital, this gave me lefs Offence, becaufe
it feemed, as it were, to palliate the Drynefs
pf what had palfed before, and in fome fort
P 3 to
^B Concerning ART,
to fupply the Place of an Epilogue to our
Conference. Not however to anticipate,
he be2:an readinp; as follows.
" O Art! Thou Praife of Man, and
** Ornament of Human Life ! PoflefTed of
** Thee, the meaneft Genius grows deferv-
*' ing, and has a juft Demand for a Portion
" of our Efteem. Devoid of Thee, the
" Brighteft of our Kind lie loft and ufelefs,
^' and are but poorly diftinguifhed from
** the moft Defpicable and Bafe. When
" we inhabited Forefts in common with
** Brutes, nor otherwife known from thern
*' than by the Figure of our Species ; Thou
** taughteft us to aflert the Sovereignty of our
" Nature^ and to afllime that Empire, for
^* which Providence intended us. Thou-
*' fands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee j
*' thoufands of Elegancies, Pleafures, and
*' JoySj without which Life itfelf would be
" -but an inlipid PofTeilion.
«* Wi D E and extenfive is the Reach
«« of thy Dominion. No Element is
" there
"^Dialogue. 39
'* there either fo violent or {ojiibtle^ fo yield-
" ing or iojluggijh^ as by the Powers of its
" Nature to be fuperior to thy Diredlion.
" Thou dreadefl not the fierce Impetuofity
'* of Fire, but compelled: its Violence to
*' be both obedient and ufeful. By it Thou
" foftenefl the flubborn Tribe of Minerals,
" fo as to be formed and moulded into
" Shapes innumerable, Hence Weapons,
" Armour, Coin ; and previous to thefe,
*' and other Thy Worh and Energies^
" hence all thofe various Tools and Inflru-
" ments, v^hich empower Thee to proceed
" to farther Ends more excellentj Nor is
"the fubtle Air lefs obedient to Thy
" Power, whether Thou willeft it to be a
" Miniiler to our Pleafure, or Utility. At
" Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds,
« which charm the Soul with all the Powers
" of Harmony. Under thy Inftrudion it
moves the Ship o'er Seas,- while that
yielding Element, where otherwife we
fink, even Water itfelf is by Thee
" taught to bear us ; the vafl Ocean to pro^
** mote that Intercourfc of Nations, which
D 4 Igno-?
(.1
4© Concerning ART,
" Ignorance would imagine it was deflined
" to intercept. To fay how thy Influence is
^* feen on Earth, would be to teach
" the meaneft, what he knows already.
" Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable
" and Pafture j Lawns and Groves, and
" Gardens, and Plantations ; Cottages, Vil-
^' lages, Caftles, Towns ; Palaces, Temples,
** and ipacious Cities,
"Nor does thy Empire end in SubjeBs
«' thus in-animate. Its Power alfo extends
"thro' the various Race of Animals,
^' who either patiently flibmit to become
" thy Slaves, or are fure to find Thee an ir-
" refiftible Foe. The faithful Dog, the
^* patient Ox, the generous Horfe, and the
^' mighty Elephant, are content all to re-
?' ceive their Inflrucflions from Thee, and
^* readily to lend their natural InJiinBs or
?* Strength^ to perform thofe Offices, which
f * thy Occafions call for. If there be found
." any Species, which are ferviceable when
?^ dead, Thou fuggeflefl the Means to in-
|f yefligate and take them. If any be ^o^
&vage^
^Dialogue, 41
*« favage, as to refufe being tamed ; or of
" Natures fierce enough, to venture an At-
« tack J Thou teachefl us to fcorn their
" brutal Rage j to meet, repel, purfue, and
" conquer.
"And fuch, O Art ! is thy amazing
" Influence, when Thou art employed only
" on thefe inferior SubjeBs ; on Natures lu"
" animate, or at befl: Irrational. But when-
«* e'er Thou choofeft a SubjeB 7nore nobky
*'' and fetteft to the cultivating of Mind
" itfelf, then 'tis Thou becomeft truly ami-
" able and divine ; the ever flowing Source
" of thofe fublimer Beauties, of which no
^' SnbjeB but Mind alone is capable. Then
" 'tis Thou art enabled to exhibit to Man-
" kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of
" Orators ; the facred Train of Patriots and
^* of Heroes ; the godlike Lifl: of Philofo-
" phers and Legiflators) the Forms of 'u/r-
^' tuQiis and equal Politics, where private
" Welfare is made the fame with public -,
" where Crowds themfelves prove dif-
" interefted
42 Concemmg ART,
" interelled and brave, and Virtue is made
" a national and popular Charaderiftic.
"Hail! facred Source of all thefc
" Wonders ! Thyfelf inftrud: me to praife
" Thee worthily, thro' whom, whate'er
" we do, is done with Elegance and Beauty ;
" without whom, what we do, is ever grace-
*' lefs and deformed. Venerable Power !
" By what Name fliall I addrefs Thee ?
" Shall I call Thee Ornament of Mind j
" or art Thou more truly Mind itfelf? —
" 'Tis Mind Thou art, mofh perfed
" Mind ; not rude, untaught, but fair and
" poliflied ; in fuch Thou dwelleft, offuch
" Thou art the Fonn j nor is it a Thing
" more poffible to feparate Thee from fuch,
" than it would be to feparate Thee from
" thy own Exiflence." ,
My good Friend was now arrived to a
very exalted Pitch, and was purfuing his
Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency;
when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk
being
1/^ Dialogue. 43
feeing near finlflied. The People, as we
went along, began to look at us with Sur-
prize ; which I, who was lefs engaged,
having leifure to obferve, thought 'twas
proper to admonifh my Friend, that he
fliould give over. He immediately ceafed
reading j put his Papers up ; and thank'd
me for flopping him at fo feafonable a
Time.
§. 6. What remained of our Difcourfe
pafled off with lefs Rapture, and was in-
deed no more, than a kind of fhort Re-
capitulation.
He obferved to me, that our Inquiries
had flirniflied out an Anfwer to four diffe-
rent Queflions. For thus, faid he, if it be
afked us. What Art is ? We have to
Anfwer, it is ~ an habitual Power ifi
Many of becoming the Caufe of feme EffeB^
according to a Syftem of 'various and well-
approved Precepts. If it be afked us, On
M^hat SubjeB Art operates ? We can anfwer.
On a contingent i which is within the r^ach
of
44 Concerning ART,
of the Human Powers to injluence. If it be
"afked us, For what Reafon, for the fake of
what Art operates ? We may reply, For
the fake of feme abfent Good^ relative to Hu"
man Lfe, and attainable by Man, but fupe-
ferior to his natural and uninftru5ied Facul-
ties, Laftly, if it be afked. Where 'tis the
Operations of Art end? We may fay.
Either in feme Energy y or in feme Work,
He added, That if he were not afraid of
the Lnputation of Pedantry, he could be
almoft tempted to fay. That we had been
confidering Art, with refped: to tho(Q four
Caufes, fo celebrated once among ProfeiTors
in the Schools. By thefe, upon Inquiry, I
found that he meant certain Caufes , called
the * Efficient, the f- Material, the % Finals
and the jf Formal,
But
* P. 17. t P. 11. % P. 28, 29.
ii P. 34, 36.
^Dialogue. 4^
But here, without farther explaining,
he begged for the prefent that we might
conclude, being fufficiently, as he iaid,
fatigued with the Length of what had
paiTed already. The Requefl was reafon-
able I could not but own, and thus ended
our Cgnverfation, and foon after it our
Walk.
The E N D.
TREATISE the Second
DISCOURSE
O N
MUSIC,
PAINTING,
AND
POETRY.
(49)
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER the First.
INTRODUCTION Befign and
Diftribiition of the Whole -—F reparation
for the following Chapters,
CHAPTER the Second,
On the SiibjeSls, which Painting imitates—^
On the Suhje5is, which Mufc imitates — »■
Comparifon of Mufic with Fainting,
CHAPTER the Third.
On the SubjeSis which Poetry itnitates^ but
imitates only thro' natural Media^ or mere
Sounds Comparifon of Poetry i?i this
Capacity^ firfi with Paintings then with
Mufc,
E CHAP-
50 CONTENTS.
CHAPTER the Fourth,
On the SuhjeSfs which Poetry imitates^ not
by mere Sounds or natural Media^ but by
Words fignificant ; the Subje£ls being fuch^^
to which the Genius of each of the other two.
Arts is mofl perfedlly adapted. — Its Com-
parifon in thefe SuhjeBs^ p-Jl with Faint-
ing^ then with Mti/ic.
CHAPTER the Fifth.
On the SubjeBs^ which Poetry imitates by
Words fignificant, being at the fame time
Subjects not adapted to the Ge?iius of either
of the other Arts. The Nature of thefe
SubjeBs. The Abilities of Poetry to
imitate them.—— Comparifon of Poetry in
refpeB of thefe SuhjcBs^ firfi with Paint^
jngy then with Mufc.
C H A P-
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER the Sixth.
On Mujic confidered not as an Imitation^ hut
as deriving its Efficacy from another
Source. 0;z its joint Operation by this
means with Foetry. ^- An ObjcBion to
MuJic folved.— — The Advantage arifing to
it^ as well as to Poetry ^ from their being
united, Cojichfon,
51
E?
(53)
A
DISCOURSE
O N
MUSIC, PAINTING,
and POETRY.
CHAP. L
tntroduSiion. Dejign and Dijiribiifion of
the Whole. — Preparation for the following
Chapters'.
AL L Arts have this in common, Ch. L
that they refpeSl Hu??ian Life,
Some contribute to its NeceJJi-
ties, as Medicine and Agriculture j others
to its Elegance^ as Mufic, Painting, and
Poetry,
E 3 NoW;»
54 yf Discourse ^/z MU S I C,
Ch. I. Now, with refped to thefe two diffe-
rent Species, the necejfary Arts feem to have
been prior in time j if it be probable, that
Men confulted how to live and to fiipport
themfeheSy before they began to deliberate
how to render Life agreeable. Nor is this
indeed unconfirmed by FaxO:, there being
no Nation known fo barbarous and ignorant,
as where the Rudiments of thefe necejjary
Arts are not in fome degree cultivated.-
And hence poiTibly they may appear to be
the more excellent and worthy, as having
claim to a Freference, derived from their
Seniority.
The Arts however oi 'Elegance cannot
be faid to want Pretenfions, if it be true,
that Nature framed us for fometlmig more,
than ?nere Exijte?2ce. Nay, farther, if Well-
being be clearly preferable to Mere-beingy
and this without it be but a thing contemp-
tible, they may have reafon perhaps to
afpire even to a Siipejiority . But enough
of this, to come to our Purpofe.
§. 2.
PAINTING ^W POETRY, 5$
§. 2. The Defign of this Difcourfe is to Ch. L
treat of Music, Painting, and Poetry;
to confider in what they agree, and in
what they differ-, and which, upon the
WHOLE, is more excellent THAN THE
OTHER TWO.
In entering upon this Inquiry, it is firfl
to be obferved, that the Mind is made
confcious of the natural World and its Af-
fections, and of other Mhids and their
Affedtions, by the feveral Organs of the
Senfes (a). By the fame Orgajis, thefe Arts
exhibit to the Mind Imitations, and imitate
either Parts or AfFedlions of this natural
E 4 World,
(a) To explain fome future Obfervations, It will
ibe proper here to remark, that the Miu t> from thefe
Materials thus brought together, and from its own Ope-
rations on them, and in confeqiience of them, becomes
fraught with Ideas and that many Minds fo
fraught, by a fort <?/' Com pact ajjlgning to each Idea
fo?ne SoiJND to be zV; Mark or ^YU%oh,were tht
frfl Inventors and Founders o/Language.
56 A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. I. Worlds or elfe the Paffions, Energies, and
* other Affe6tions of Minds. There is this
Difference however between thefe Arts and
Nature \ that Nature pafTes to the Percipient
tliro' all the Senfes j whereas theie Arts ufe
only two of them, that of Seeing and that
of Hearing. And hence it is that the fen-
ftble OhjeBs or Media^ thro' which (b) they
imitate, can htfuch only, as thefe two Senfes
are framed capable of perceiving ; and thefe
Media are Motion^ Sounds Colour, and
Figure,
Paint-
(b) To prevent Confufion it mud be obferved,
that in all thefe Arts there is a Difference between
the fenftble Media, thro' zvhich they imitate, and the
Subje^s imitated. The fenfible Media, thro' which
they imitate, muft be always relative to that Senfcy
hy ivhich the particular Jrt applies to the Mind ; but
the Subjed imitated may hQ foreign to thatSerife, and
heyond the Power of its Perception. Painting, for in-
ilance, (as is (hewn in this Chapter) has no fenfibk
Media, thro' which it -operates, except Colour and
Figure : But as to Subje^s, it may have Motions,
Sounds, moral Afteaions and Adions ; none of which
are either Colours or Figures, but which however are
all capable of being imitated thro' them. See Chapter
the fecond. Notes {b), (cj, (dj.
PAINTING and POETRY. ^y
Painting, having the Eye for its Or- Ch. T.
gan, cannot be conceived to imitate, but
thro' the Media of vifible Objeds. And
farther, its Mode of imitating being always
motmilefs, there mull: be fubflracfted from
thefe the Medium of Motion. It remains
then, that Colour and Figure are the only
Media, thro' which Painting imitates.
Music, paffing to the Mind thro' the
Organ of the Ear, can imitate only by
Sounds and Motions,
Poetry, having the Ear alfo for its
Organ, as far as Words are confidered to be
no more than i7iere Sounds, can go no fur-*
ther in Imitating, than may be performed
by Sound and Motion. But then, as theje
its Sounds fiand by * CompaSl for the ^oarious
Ideas, with which the Mijid is fraught, it is
enabled by this means to imitate, as far as
La7i-'
■I ■ ■ I I II . ■ I m il I I III II' ■
* SeeNot-e (a) Page ^^.
5? j^ Di^covRSE on M\J SIC,
Ch. I. Language can exprefs ; and that 'tis evident
will, in a manner, include all things.
Now from hence may be feen, how
thefe Arts agree, and how they differ.
They agree y by being ^7/ M i m E t i c,
or Imitative.
They differ, as they imitate by different
Media-, Painting, hy Figure ^.ndi Colour ;
Music, hy Sound 2inA Motion ; Painting
and Music, by Media which are Natural i
Poetry, for the greater Part, by a Medium^
which is Artificial (c),
As
(c) A Figure painted, or a Compofition of Mu-
fical Sounds have always a natural Relation to thaty
of which they are intended to be the Refemblance. But
a Defcription in Words has rarely any fuch natural
Relation to the feveral Ideas^ of which thofe Words are
the Symbols. None therefore underftand the Defcrip-
tion, but thofe who fpeak the Language. On the con-
trary, Mufical and Pidure-Imitations are intelligible
ioallMett.
Why
PAINTING and POETRY. 59
§.3. As to that Art, which upon the Ch. I,
wliole is ??ioJi excellent of the three ; it mull be
obferved, that among thefe various ik/d-^/^
of imitating, fome will naturally be ;%or^ ac-
curate, fome lefs ; fome will beft imitate one
Subjedj fome, another. Again, among
the Number of SubjeBs there will be natu-
rally alfo a Difference, as to Merit and De-
merit. There will be fome fiiblime^ and
fome low 'j fome copious, and fome Jhort j
fome pathetic, and others 'void of Fafjion ;
fome formed to injlru5i^ and others 7iot ca*
pable of it.
Now, from thefe two Circumilances ;
that is to fay, from the Accuracy of the
Imitation, and the Merit of the SiibjeSi
imitated, the Queftion concerning which
Art is mojl excellent, mufl be tried and de-
termined.
This
Why it is faid that Poetry is not univerfally, but
ctjly for the greater part axXi'aciA, fee below, Chapter
the Third, where what Natural force it hus, is ex-
amined and eftimated.
6o ^ Discourse c;2 MUSIC,
Ch. I. Th IS however cannot be done, without
a Detail of Pa?'ficu!arSy that fo there may
be formed, on every part, jull and accurate
Comparifons,
To begin therefore v/ith Painting,
CHAP*
PAINTING ^W POETRY, 6i
CHAP. II.
071 the SiihjeSlSy which Pamting imitates. — -
On the SubjeBs, which Mujic imitates. —
Comparifon of MuJic with Painting.
THE FITTEST Subjects FORCh.II.
Painting, are all fuch Things
-and Incidents, as are * peculiarly cha-
ra6tcrifedbyYiG\5^'E. and Colour.
Of this kind are the whole Mafs (a) of
Things inanimate and 'vegetable \ fuch as
Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landfkips
The various Tribes oi Animal Figure s -, liich
as Birds, Beafts, Herds, Flocks The
Motions and Sounds peculiar to each Animal
Species,
* P c-
(a) The Reafon is, that thefe things are almoft
wholly known to us by their Colour and Figure. Be-
fides, they are as motmtlefs^ for the moft part, in
Nature^ as in the Imitation.
62 ^Discourse 07i MUSIC,
Ch. II. Species, when accompanied with Configura-'
tionSy which are obvious and remarkable (b)-^
The Human Body in all its Appearances (as
Male, Female J Young, Old; Handfome,
Ugly j) and in all its Attitudes^ (as Lying,
Sitting, Standing, ^c.) The Natural
Sounds pecidiar to the Human Species, (fucb
as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, ^c.) (cj—
M^ Energies, PaJJions, and Affedlions of the
Souly
(b) Instances of this kind are the Flying of
Birds, the Galloping of Horfes, theRoaring of Lions,
the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reafon is, that
though to paint Motion or Sound be impojjibk^ yet the
Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an i?n-
tacdiate and natural Cotitie^ion luith a certain viftble
Configuration of the Parts^ the Mind, from a
Profpe(5l of this Configuration^ conceives Infcnfibly that
which Is concomitant ; and hence 'tis that, by a fort of
Fallacy, the Sounds and Motions appear to be
painted alfo. On the contrary, not fo in fuch Mo-
tions, as the Swimming of many kinds of Fifh; or
mfuch Sounds, as the Furring of a Cat j becaufe her^
is no {\xc\\ fpecial Configuration to be perceived.
(c) The Reafon is of the fame kind, as that
given in the Note immediately preceding ; and by
the fame Rule, the Obfervation muft be confined to
natural Sounds only. In Language, few of the Speaker*
Know the Configurations, which attend it.
PAINTING and POETRY. 6t,
Soidj being in any degree ?7iore intenfe or Ch. II.
"oiolent than ordinary {d) All Aclions
dfjd Events, whofe Integrity or PFholenefs
depends upon a JJjort and ft If -evident Suc-
ceflion of Incidents (^e) Or if the Suc-
ceffion be extended, then fie h Aclions at
leaft, whofe Incidents are all along, during
that SucceJJion, finilar (f) All ABions,
which being qualified as above, open them-
felves
(d) The Reafon is fWl of the fdme kind, viz.
from their Vifibk Etfeds on the Body. They natu-
rally produce either to the Countenance a particular
Rednefs or Palenefs ; or a particular Modification of its
Mufcles ; or elfe to the Limbs, a particular Attitude.
Now all thefe Etfe<5ls zxe folely referable to Colour
and Figure, the two grand fenfible Media, peculiar
to Painting. See Raphael's Cartoons of St. Paul at
Jthens, and of his flriking the Sorcerer Elymas blind :
See alfo the Crucifixion of Polycrates, and the Suf-
ferings of the Conful Regulus, both by Salvator Rofa,
(e) For of necejfity every Picture is a Piin^um
'Tempsris ijr In s t a n t .
(f) Such, for inftance, as a Storm at Sea ; whofe
Incidents ofVifton may be nearly all included in foam-
ing Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their ereift
Pofture, and Men hanging upon the Ropes.
Or
64 y^ Discourse o« MUSIC,
Ch. II. felves into a laj-ge Variety of Circumftances,
C07iciirring all in the fame Point ofT'ime {g)
. jill ABiojis which are known^ and
known univerfally^ rather than Actions
newly invented^ or known but to few {h).
And
Or as a Battle ; which from Beginning to End pre-
fents nothing elfe, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and
Diforder. "Now fuch Events may be well imitated
all at once ; for how long foever they laft, they are
but Repetitions of the fame. .
(g) For Painting is notboundedin Exten-
sion, as it is in Duration. Befides, it feems
true in every Species of Compofition, that, as far as
Perplexity and Confufion may be avoided, and the
Wholenefs of the Piece may be preferved clear and in-
telligible ; the more ample the Magnitude, and the
greater the Variety, the greater alfo, in proportion,
the Beauty and Perfedion. Noble Inftances of this
are the Pidures above-mentioned in Note {d).
See Ariflot, Poet. cap. 7. 'o ^\ y.oiM^ dvl^v (pva-iv ra
7rp(iyy.ccT^ op©^, usl [xh &c. See alfo Chara^eri-
Jiicks, V. I. p. 143. and Boffu, B. i. cap. 16. VAchille
d' Homer e eft fi grand, &cc,
(h) The Reafon is, that a Pi<5lure being (as has
been faid) but a Point or Infant, in a Story well
kmvon the Spedator's Memory will fupply the pre-
vious and x\\Qfubfequent. But this cannot be done,
when
PAINTING ^«^ POETRY. 65
And thus much as to the Subjedts ofCh. II.
Painting.
§. 2. In Music, the fittest Sub-
jects OF Imitation are all fuch Things
where fuch Knowledge is wanting. And therefore it
may be juftly queftioned, whether the moft cele-
brated Subjeds, borrowed by Painting from Hiftory,
would have been any of them intelligible thro' the
Medium of Painting only^ fuppofing Hiftory to have
been lilent, and to have given no additional Information.
I T may be here added, that Horace, conformably
to this Reafoning, recommends even to Poetic Imi-
tation a known Story, before an unknown.
^Xuque
Reifius Iliacum carmen dedmis in aSfus,
^am ft proferres ignota, indidaq; primus.
Art. Poet. V. 128.
And indeed as the being underflood to others, either
Hearers or Spedators, feems to be a common Requi"
fite to all Mimetic Arts whatever j (for to thofe j who
underftand them not, they are in fadl no Mimetic
Arts) it follows, that Perfpicuity muft be Effential to
them all \ and that no prudent Artift would negle<ft,
if it were poflible, any juft Advantage to obtain this
End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than
the Notoriety of the Subjeif imitated,
F anci
66 A Discourse 07i MUSIC,
Ch. II. and Incidents, as are mofl eminently * cha-^
raBerifed by Motion and Sound.
Motion may be either Jlow or fwlff^^
e'ven or tmeven, broken or continuous. «
Sound may be either y^ or loud, high or
low. Wherever therefore any of thefe Spe-
cies of Motion or Sound may be found in
an eminent (not a moderate or mean) degree^
there will be room for Musical Imita-
tion.
THUS3 in the 'Natural or Inanimate
World, Music may imitate the Glidings,.
Murmurings, Toffings, Roarings, and other
Accide?its of Water, as perceived in Foun-
tains, Cataracts, Rivers, Seas, ^c. The
fame of Thunder — the fame of Winds, as
well the ilormy as the gentle, — ^ — In the
Animal World, it may imitate the Voice of
fome Animals, but chiefly that of iinging
Birds, It may 2\io faintly copy fome of
their Motions. — In the Human Kind, it can
alfo
Hi III I I I I '
PAINTING and POETRY. 67
dfo imitate fome Motiom (i) and Sounds (k) j Ch. II.
and of Sounds thofe jnojl perfeBly, which
are expreffive of Grief and Angiiifi (I).
And thus much as to the Subjedis,'
which Mufic imitates.
§.3. It remains then, that we compare _
thefe two Arts together. And here" in-
deed, as to Mujical Imitation in general^ it'
mufl be confelTed that — as it can, from its'
Genius, imitate only Sounds and Motions—^'
as there are not ma^iy Motions either in thS--
F 2 ' AniiMl
., — '.^
({) As the Tfaik'of the G'lmt Polypheme, in the
Paftoral of Jds and Galatea. — See what ample Stridei
he takes, &c,
(k) As tht Shouts of a Multitude, in the Corona
tion Anthem of, Godfave the King, &c.
(I) The Reafon is, that this Species of MuCiczl
Imitation fnoj} 'nearly approaches Nature. For Griefs
in moft Animals, declares xx.i^^i'Syj Sounds, which are
tiot unlike to 'long Notes in the Chromatic Syjlem>
Of this kind is the Chorus of BaaV^ Prierts iti
the Oratorio of Deborah, Doleful Tidings, how yt
wound, &c.
68 A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. W, Animal or in the InanimateV^oAd, which
are exclufively peculiar even to any Species^
and fcarcely any to an Individual as
there are no Natural Sounds, which cha-
ra(5terife at leaft lower than a Species (for
the Natural Sounds of Individuals are in
every Species the fame) farther, as
Mulic does but imperfeSlly imitate even
thefe Sounds and Motions (m) - — On the
contrary, as Figures, Poflures of Figures,
and Colours charadterife not only every Jen-
Jible Species^ but even every Individual; and
for the moll part alfo the various ^Energies
and PaJ/ions of every Individual and
farther, as Painting is able, with the highejl
Accuracy and Exa5lfiefs, to imitate all thefe
Colours and Figures j and while Mufical
Imita-
* See Note (d) of this Chapter.
(m) The Reafpn is from the Dijfimilitude be-
tween the Sounds and Motions of Nature^ and
thofe of Mufic. Mufical Sounds are all produced
from Even Vibration, moft Natural from Uneven ;
Mufical Motions are chiefly Definite in their Meafure,
Oioft Natural are Indefinite,
PAINTING and POETRY. 69
Imitation pretends at moft to no more, than Ch. II.
the railing of Ideas fimilar^ itfelf afpires to
raife Ideas the very fame in a word, as
Painting, in refpedt of its Subjects, is equal
to the nobleji Part of Imitation, the imi^
fating regular A5liom conjijiing of a Whole
and Farts ; and oifuch Imitation, Mufic is
utterly incapable from all this it
muft be confelTed, that Musical Imita-
tion IS GREATLY BELOW THAT OP
Painting, and that at befi it is but an
imperfect thing,
As to the Efficacy therefore of Music,
it muft be derived from another Source,
which muft be left for the prefent, to be
confidered of hereafter *.
There remains to be mentioned Imi-
tation by Poetry.
* Ch. VI,
CHAP.
(~
70 A Discourse on MUSIC,
CHAP. III.
On the StibjeSts which Poetry imitates^ hut
imitates only thro" natural Media, or mere
■ Sounds Comparijon of Poetry in this
Capacity J Jirjl with Painting, then with
Miijic.
Cli.III.T3^^'^^^ Imitation i?icJudes every
i- thi?2g in it, which is performed either by
Picture-Imitation or Musical; for
Jts Materials are Words, and Words are
J' Symbols by Compact of all Ideas^
Farther 2ls- Words, befide their being
Symbols by Compaft, are alfo Sounds imri-,
' oujly diftinguijhed by their Aptnefs to be
rapidly or flowly pronounced, and by the
. refpedlive Prevalence of Mutes, Liquids, of
Vowels in their Compofition ; it will follow
jhat, belide their Compadi-Rektion, tliey
will
t S?eNoti(a) Chap. I.
PAINTING ^?;z^ POETRY. 71
will have likewife a Natural Relation to all Ch. III.
fuch Things, between which and them-
felves there is any Natural Refemblance,
Thus, for inftance, there is a Natural Re-
femblance between all forts of harjh and
grating Sounds. There is therefore (ex-
clufive of its Signification) 2i Natural Ktld.-*
tion between the Sound of a vile Hautboy,
and of that Verfe in * Virgily
Stride?iti miferum Jiipuld dijperdere Carmen\
or of that other in •f* Miltony
Grate o?t their Scrannel Pipes of wretched
Straw.
So alfo between the fmooth fwift Gliding of
a River, and of that Verfe in || Horace,
— at tile
Labitiir^ (^ labetur in omne volubilis cevum.
And thus in part even Poetic Imitation
has its Foundation in Nature, But then
F 4 this
* Eel. 3. ver. 27. f Inhis Lycidas.
}j Epift. 2. 1, I. V. 42, 43,
^2 A Discourse on MUSIC,
(.h.III.this Imitation goes not far; and take,
without the Meaning derived to the Sounds
from Compa5ii is but little intelligible, how-
ever perfe(5t and elaborate.
§.2. If therefore Poetry be compared
with Painting, in refpe6t of this its
merely "Natural and Inartificial Refem-
blance, it may be juftly faid that In as
much as of this fort of Refemblance,
Poetry (like Mufic) has no other Sources,
than thoje two of Sound and Motion
in as much as it often wants thefe Sources
themfehes (for Numbers of Words neither
have^ nor can have any Refcmblance to
thofe Ideas, of which they are the Sym"
IjoIs) in as much as Natural Sounds
and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates,
are themfelves but * loofe and indefinite Ac-
cidents of thofe SubjeSis, to which they
belong, and confequently do but loofely and
indefinitely characfterife them—— laftly, in
as much as Poetic founds and Motions do
but
* p. 67, 68.
PAINTING and POETRY. 73
hut fai?2f!y referable thofe of Nature^ which Ch. III.
are themfehes confelTed to be fo imperfeSf
and vague From all this it will
follow (as it has already followed of Mufic)
that Poetic Imitation founded
IN MERE Natural Resemblance is
MUCH inferior TO THAT OF PaINT-
ING, and at beji but very imferfeB.
§. 3. As to the Preference, which fuch
Poetic Imitation may claim before
Musical, or Musical Imitation be-
fore that ; the Merits on each Side may
appear perhaps equal. They both fetch
their Imitations from -f- Sound and Motion.
Now Music feems to imitate Nature bet-
ter as to Motion^ and Poetry as to Sound.
The Reafon is, that in Motions (a) Mufic
has
t P. 57'
(a) Music has no lefs thzn five dififsrent Length
tf Notes in ordinary ufe, reckoning from the Semi-
brief to tl^e Semi-quaver 3 all which may be infi'
nite,fy
*jA A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch.III. has a greater Variety ; and in Sounds^ thofc
oi Poetry approach nearer to Nature (b).
If therefore in Sound the oiie have the
Preference, in Motion the other, and the
Merit of Sound and Motion be fuppofed
nearly equal; it will follow, that the
Merit of the two Imitations
will be nearly equal also.
nitely compounded, even in any one Time, or Mea-
fure Poetry, on the other hand, has but two
Lengths or ^lantities, a long Syllable and a /horty
(which is its Half) and all the Variety ofVerfe arifes
from fuch Feet and Metres, as thefe tiuo_ Species of
Syllables, by being compounded, can be made produce.
{b) Musical Sounds are produced by even
Vibrations, \A\\z\i fcarcely any Natural Sounds are —
on the contrary. Words are the Produd of uneven
Vibration, and fo are mojl Natural Sounds
Add to this, that Words are far more numerous, than
Muftcal Sounds, So that Poetry, as to Imitation by
Sound, feems to exceed Mufic, not only in nsarnefi
df Rejemhlame, but even in Variety alfo.
CHAP.
FAINTING and POETRY, 75
CHAP. IV.
On the Subjeofs which Poetry imitates^ not
by mere" Sounds or w^/^/r^/ Media, hut by
Words lignificant -, the SubjeSfs at the fame
timebemgfuch, to which the Genius of each
of the other two Arts is moft perfedly
adapted. — Its Comparifon i?i thefe SubjeSls^
firft with Fainting^ then with Mufc
THE Mimetic Art of Poetry hasCh.IV.
been hitherto confidered, as fetch-
ing its Imitation from mere Natural Re-
femblance. In this it has been fhewn
jnuch inferior to Painting, and nearly
equal to Music,
It remains to be confidered, what its
Merits are, when it imitates not by mere
Natural Sound, but by Sound fgnifcant %
by Words, the compaB Symbols of all kinds
pf Ideas. From hence depends its genuine
Force,
76 A Discourse o« MUSIC,
Ch. IV. Force. And here, as it is able to find
Sounds expreflive of every Idea, fo is there
no SubjeSf either of Pidlure-Imitation, or
Mulical, to which it does not afpire ; all
Things and Incidents whatever being, in a
manner, to be defcribed by Words.
Whether therefore Poetry, in this
its proper Sphere ^ be equal to the Imitation of
the other two Arts, is the Queflion at pre-
fent, which comes in order to be difcuffed.
Now as Subjects are infinite ^ and the
other two Arts are not equally adapted to
imitate all-, it is propofed, firfl to compare
Poetry with them in fuch Subjects, to
which they are mofi perfectly adapted.
§.2. To begin therefore with Paint-
ing. A Subject, in which the Power
of this Art may be mo/i fully exerted,
(whether it be taken from the Inanimate^
or the Animal^ or the Moral World) muft
be a Subject, which is principally and
eminently charaBerifed by certain ColsurSy
Figures,
PAINTING and POETRY, 77
Figures, and Pojiiires of Figures ^ nvhofe Ch. IV.
Comprehenjion depends not on a SucceJJion of^
E'vents ; or at leajl, if on a SucceJJion y on a
Jhort and fef -evident one ivhich admits a
large Variety of fuch Circumjiances, as all
concur in the fame individual Point of Time ^
and relate all to one principal AB ion »
As to fuch a Subjedl therefore In as
much as Poetry is forced to pafs thro*
the Medium o^ CompaB, while Painting
applies immediately thro' the Medium of
Nature j the one being underftood to all,
the other to the Speakers of a certain Lan-
guage * only in as much as Natural
Operations muft needs be more affedling^
than Artificial in as much as Painting
helps our own rude Ideas by its own, which
are confummate and wrought up to the Per-
fection of Art i while Poetry can raife 7io
ether (a) than what every Mind is furniflied
with
* Note (c) p. 5g.
(a) When we read in Milton of Eve, that
Grace was in all her Steps, Heaven in her Eye,
In ev'ry Gejiure Dignity and Love j
we
yS d Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch.IY. with before — in as much as Painting ihews-
all the minute and various concurrent Cir"
cumjiances of the Event in thQ,fame indivi-^
dual Point of Time, as they appear in
Nature-, while Poetry is forced to want
this Circumftance of Intelligibility, by
being ever obliged to enter into fome de-
gree of Detail — - in as much as this Detail
creates often the Dilemma of either be-
coming tedious, to be clear ; or if mi
tedious, then obfcure lailly, in as much
as all Imitations more Jimilar, more imme^ .
diate.
we have an Image not of that Eve, which Milton
conceived, but oi fuch an Eve only^ as every one^
by his own proper Genius, is able to reprefent, from
refleding on thofe Ideas, which he has annexed to
thefe feveral Sounds. The greater Part, in the mean
time, have never perhaps beftowed one accurate
Thought upon ^hztGrace, Heaven, Love, znA Dignity
mean; or ever enriched the Mind with Ideas of
Beauty, or afked luhence they are to be acquired,
and by what Proportions they are confiituted. On
the contrary, when we view Eve as painted by an
able Painter, we labour under no fuch Difficulty ;
becaufe we have exhibited before us the better Con-
ceptions of an Artist, the genuine Idm of perhaps 9
Titian or a Raphael,
PAINTING and POETRY. 79
diate^ and more intelligible, are preferable Ch. IV.
to thofe which are Icfs fo -, and for the
Reafons above, the Imitations of Poetry
are lels Jimilar, lefs immediate, and lefs /;2-
telligible than thofe of Paijiting From
ALL THIS it will follow, that IN ALL
Subjects, where Painting cA^f
FULLY EXERT ITSELF, THE IMITA-
TIONS OF Painting are superior
TO THOSE of Poetry, and conse-
qjjently in all SUCH Subjects
that Painting has the Prefe-
rence.
§.3. And now to compare Poetry
with Music, allowing to Mujic the fame
Advantage of a well-adapted ^v^^^di, which
has already been allowed to Fainting in the
Comparifon jufl preceding.
What fuch a Subject is, has already
been * defcribed. And as to Preference, it
mufl
* ^ee Chap. II. §. 2.
8o A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. IV". muft be confefTed, that In as much as
Musical Imitations, tho' Natural^
afpire not to raife the fame Ideas, but only
Ideas Wfimilar and analogous j while Poetic
Imitation, tho' Artificial, raifes Ideas
the very fame in as much as the Definite
and Certain is ever preferable to the Indefi.-
nite and Uncertain j and that more efpeci-
ally in Imitations, where the principal
(h) Delight is in recognizing the T'hing
imitated
II P. 68, 69.
(h) That there is an eminent Delight in th'n
very Recognition Hjelf, abftra<5t from any thing
pleafmg in the Subje^ recognized, is evident from
hence that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be
highly charmed with Imitations, at whofe Originals in
Nature vm are Jhocked and terrified. Such, for in-
ftance, as Dead Bodies, Wild Beafts, and the like.
The Caufe, afTigned for this, feems to be of
the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in
the SaJiity and Perfe5iion, but alfo in the juji and na-
tural Energies of our feveral Limbs and Faculties,
And hence, among others, the Joy in Reasoning j
as being the Energy of that principal Faculty, our In-
tellect or Understanding. This Joy ex-
tends, not only to the Wife, but to the Multitude.
For all Men have an AverJiQn to Ig^wance and Error ;
PAINTING md POETRY. 8i
imitated — it will £o\\o\v fro?n hence that — Ch. IV.
EVEN IN Subjects the best adapted
TO Musical Imitation, the Imita-
tion OF Poetry will be still more
excellent.
•and in fome degree, however moderate, are gUd to
learn and to infirm themfelves.
Hence therefore the Delight, arifing from thefe
Imitations ; as we are enabled, in each of them, to
'exercife the Reasoning Faculty; and, by com-
paring the Copy with the Architype in our Minds, to
INFER that THIS is SUCH a THING ; and that,
ANOTHER; a Fa(5t remaricable among Children,
even in their firft and earlieft Days.
To, T£ J^ap jOtj^afKr^aj, (7iy.(pvrov roTg av^ouTTOig Iz
•Trat^wv sVi, >«; TSTO) Ji«(^£p8(ri rwy ocKXuv ^wwv, on
lAifxyflmuTaTov so, yix) t«V (AuB-rxTsig -ttoiiTtxi Jt(%
fAi^rj(reug Txq tt^ootu^' >t, to ^ai^siv To7g [Aty.ri[ji,oict
TTSivrxg, 1,r}[Ji.£Tov S\ tjjts to cvfAf^xTvov Itt) tuv ioyuv,
A yoc^ anTOi AuTTJi^wf o^w,a£v, Tsrwv Ta? flxoyaf T«f
re fAO^(pix,g tuv dy^iuTocTuVy xj v$x^uv, "Aj'tiou <?£ >^
T»TK, OTl fAOCV^d'JU]) » jtAOVOy TOr? (piXo(To(poig Ti^lTOVj
6t\Xx Xf Toig aAAoig ofxoiuig * aAA* IttI jS^ap^u :{oi«wvs-
ffiU auTjj. A<a yx^ tsto p^ai'^so-t t«? Ejxouaf ooHovrtg,
OTt <ru/Aj3«im 3-fw^aura? (Axv^xvsrj ?^ (ruAAog/i'^fcSaf,
. TJ' £X«rM* oTov, 0T« »T©J iKeHi©^. Alift. PoCt. C. 4.
G CHAP,
2z ^ Discourse c;z MUSIC,
CHAP. V.
On the SiibjeSis which Poetry imitates by
Words Jigfiijicanty being at the fame time
SubjediS not adapted to the Genius of
either of the other Arts The Nature of
thofe Subjedfs "The Abilities of Poetry
to imitate them Comparifon of Poetry
in thefe Subje<fls, firfl with Fainting^
then with Miific.
Ch.V. ' j "^HE Mimetic Art of PoETRr
JL has now been coniidercd in two
Views — Firfl:, as imitating by mere natural
Media ; and in this it has been placed on a
level with Music, but much inferior to
Pa I n t I n g It has been fince con-
iidered as imitating thro' Sounds fignificant
by CompaBy and that in fuch Subjects re-
fpe(5tively, where Painting and Music
Jiave the fulkjl Power to exert themfelves.
Here
PAINTING ^;7^ POETRY. 83
Here to Painting it has been held uiferm, Ch. V.
but to Mufic it has been preferred.
It remains to be confidered what
other SubjeSis Poetry has left, to which the
Genius of the other two Arts is not fo per-
feSlly adapted How far Poetry is able to
imitate them and whether from the
PerfeSlion of its Imitation, and the Nature
of the Subjects themfelves, it ought to be
called no more than equal to its Sifler Arts ;
or whether, on the whole, it ihould not
rather be called fuperior,
§.2. To begin, in the firfl place, by
comparing it with Painting.
The Subjedfs of Poetry y to which the
Genius of Painting is not adapted, are
all Adions, whofe (a) Whole is of fo
G 2 lengthened
(a) For a juft and accurate Defcription of Whole-
nefizxAUnityy ktAriJl.Poet. Ch. 7 & 8. znABoJfu,
his beft Interpreter, in his Treatife on the Epic Poem,
B.II. ch. 9, 10, II.
84 * ^ Discourse o;2 MUSIC,
Ch. V. lengthejied a Duration, that no Point of
Time, in any part of that Whole, can be
given jit for Fainting ; neither in its Be^
ginning, which will teach what is ^iibfe-
qiient', nor in its End, which will teach
what is Previous ; nor in its Middle, which
will declare both the Previous and the Sub-
fequent. Alfo all Subjects fo framed, as
to lay open the internal Conftitution of Man,
and give us an Inlight into (b) Charadlers,
Manners, Pajjions, and Seiitimejtts,
The
(b) For a Defcription of Character, fee be-
low. Note (c) of this Chapter.
As for Manners, it may be faid in general,
that a certain Syjlem of them makes a Chara£ier ; and
that as thefe Syftems, by being differently compowidedy
make each a different Charader, fo is it that oJie
Man truly differs from atiother.
Pa ss I o N s are obvious j Pity, Fear, Anger, &c.
Sentiments are difcoverable in all thofe
Things, which are the proper Bufmefs and End of
Speech or Discourse. The chief Branches of
this E7id are to Ajjert and Prove ; to Solve and Re-
fute 3 to exprefs or excite Paffiom ; to amplify In-
cidents,
PAINTING and POETRY. S5
The Merit of thefe Subjeds is obvious. Ch. V.
They muft neceffarily of all be the mod
affeSlmg', the moft improving-, and fuch
of which the Mind has the firongefi Com-
prehenjion.
For as to the affeBing "Part if it be
true, that all Events more or lefs affe6i us,
as the SiibJeSfs, which they refped, are
more or lefs nearly related to us 3 then
furely thofe Events muft needs be moji af-
feBing, to whofe Stihjccfs we are of all the
j?ioJi intimately related. Now fuch is the
Relation, which we bear to Mankind-, and
Men and Human Adions are the Subjeds^
here propofed for Imitation,
G 7 As
cidents, and to dlminiJJj them. 'Tis in thefe
things therefore, that we muft look for Sentiment.
See Arijl. Poet. c. 19. t^^ $\ nxlx tiiu Anxmoc-j
Si TslwV, TO, Ie aTToSeiAVVVOil, ^ TO AU£JV, X; TO TTjr^lJ
86 A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. V. As to Improvement--— -xhtxt can be none
furely (to Man at leafl) fo great, as that
which is derived from a jufl and decent
Reprefentation of Human Manners, and
Sentiments. For what can more contribute
to give us that Majier-Knowledge (c), with-
out
C^j r N n I 2 A T T O N. But farther,
befides obtaining this mcrat Science from the Con-
templation of Human Life ; an End common both to
Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry ; there is a pecu-
liar End to Tragedy^ that of eradicating the Paflions
d Pity and Fear: "Ertv 2'u rooiycoSioi (ji.t[j.v(rig Trpdij^iu^
{y7ns^0i!<%g y^ rsXiioii; — - al IXiti ^ IpoSa 'n-iPoav^crtu Tm
Tuv toiu'twu 7ra0>5jwa7wu xafia^o-iv, Arift. Poet. c. 6.
Tragedy is the hnitation of an ASiion important and
perfe^, thro'' Pity and Fear working the Purga-
tion OF SUCH-LIKE PasSIONS.
There are none, 'tis evident, fo devoid of thefe
two Pajfiom^ as thofe perpetually cofiverfant^ where
the Occa/ions of them are moft frequent; fuch, for
inftance, as the Military Men, the ProfelTors of
Medicine^ Chirurgery, and the Uke. Their Minds,
by this Intercourfe, become as it were callous ; gain-
ing an Apathy by Experience, which no Theory can
ever teach them.
Now
PAINTING a7id POETRY. ^7
out which, all other Knowledge will prove Ch. V.
of little or no Utility ?
G 4 As
Now that, which is wrought in thefe Men by
the real Difajien of Life ^ may be fuppofed wrought
in others by the Fiiiions of Tragedy j yet with this
happy Circumftance in favour of Tragedy, that,
without the Difafters being real, it can obtain the
fame End.
It muft however, for all this, be confeflfed, that
an EfFe<5t of this kind cannot reafonably be expecfled,
except among Nations, like the Athenians of old,
who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon thefe
Theatrical Reprefentations. For 'tis not a fingle or
pccafional Application to thefe PafTions, but a con^
Jlant and uninterrupted, which alone can leffen or re^
move them.
It would be improper to conclude this Note,
without obferving, that the Philofopher m thi§
place by Pity means not Philanthropy, Na-
tural Affe5iion, a Readinefs to relieve others in their
Calamities and Difirefs ; but, by Pity, he means that
Senseless, Effeminate Consternation,
which feizes zveak Minds, on the fudden Profpe^ of any
thifig difaflrous ; which, in its more violent Effeds,
is feen in Shrickings, Siuoonings, he. a Paffion, fo far
from laudable, or fccm operating to the Good of
others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who
labours under its Intiusncej of ail Capacity to do tbt
if afi good Office,
1/^ Discourse en MUSIC,
Ch. V, As to our Comprehenfwn there is no-
thing certainly, of which we have iojlrong
Ideas, as of that which happens in the
Morale or Hmnan World. For as to the
Internal Party or Active Principle of the
Vegetable^ we know it but obfcurcly ; becaufe
there we can difcovcr neither FaJJion^ nor
Senfation. In the Animal World indeed
this Frinciple is more feen, from the Paf-
Jions and B>enfattons which there declare
themfelyes. Yet all flill refls upon the
mere Evidence of Senje j upon the Force
only of extejyjal and unajjified Experience,
But jn the Moral or Human World, as we
have a Medium of Knowledge far more
accurate than this ; fo from hence it is^
that we can comprehend accordingly.
With regard therefore to tlie various
Events, which happen here, and the vari-
ous CaufeSy by which they are produced: — -^
in other Words, of all Charaders, Manners,
Human Pafiions, and Sentiments; beiides
|he Evidence of Scnfcy we have the highejl
Evide?ic0
PAINTING and POETRY. 89
Evidence additional in having an exprefsCh. V.
Co7iJr.ioufnefi of fomething fimilar within-,
of fomething homogeneous in the RecefTes of
our own Minds ; in that, which conftitutes
to each of us his true and real Self^
These therefore being the Subjeds, not
adapted to the Genius of Fainting^ it comes
next to be conlidered, hoxvfar Poetry ca?i
imitate them.
And here, that it hzs Abilities clearly
equal, cannot be doubted; as it has that
for the Medium of its Imitation, through
which Nature declares herfelf in the fame
Subjeds. For the Se7Jtime?its in real Life
are only known by Men's * Difcourfe.
And the CharaBers^ Manners, and PaJJtons
of Men being the Prompters to what they
fay ; it muft needs follow, that their Dif-
courfe will be a conftant Specimen of thofe
0jara5lerSj Manners and Pafjions,
Fonnat
* P, 84, Note (b).
90 u^ Discourse (9;; MUS IC,
Ch. V. * Format enim Nafura prius ms Intm ad
omnem
Fortunarum habitum ; juvat^ aut impellit ad
iram :
Poji efFert Animi Motus, Interprete
Lingua.
Not only therefore Language is an ade-
quate Medium of Imitation, but in Senti-
fnents it is the ojily Medium j and in Man-
ners and PaJJtons there is no other, which
can exhibit them to us after that clear,
precife and definite Way, as they in Nature
{land alotted to the various forts of Men,
and are found to conflitute the feveral Cba-
raBers of each (d)^
§•3'
* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. io8,
(d) It is true indeed that (befides what is done
by Poetry) there is fome Idea of Chara£ter^ which
even Painting can communicate. Thus there is no
doubt, but that fuch a Countenance may be found by
Palnten for Encas^ as would convey upon view a
miUi
PAINTING ^;^iPOETRY. 91
§. 3. To compare therefore Poetry^ in Ch. V.
thefe SiibjeBsj with Painting In as much
as no Subjeds of Painting are * wholly Ju-
perior
* P- 57> 58. 75> 76.
viild^ humane, and yet a brave Difpofition. But
then this Idea would be vague and general. It would
be concluded, only in the grofs, that the Hero was
Geod. As to that Syftem of Qualities peculiar to
Mneas only, and which alone properly conjlitutes his
true and real Chara£ier, this would ftill remain a
Secret, and be no way difcoverable. For how de-
duce it from the mere Lineaments of a Countenance ?
Or, if it were deducible, how few Spe(5lators would
there be found io fagacious ? 'Tis here therefore,
that Rccourfe muft be had, not to Pamting, but to
Poetry. So accurate a Conception of Character can
be gathered only from a SucceJJion of various, and yeP
confijient Anions ; a Succeflion, enahTmg us to conjec-
ture, what the Perfon of the Drama will do in the
future, from what already he has done in the pafi.
Now to fuch an Imitation, Poetry only is equal -^
becaufe it is not bounded, like Painting, to fljort, and,
as it were, injiant Events, but may imitate Subjeds
Kii any Duration whatever. ?)QQ Arift. Poet. cap. 6-
Ji~t Oi *)t70f jU£y TO TOiaTOV, OYlAQk 7r\\l Tr^OOtiCilJi]/
(pivyii Xiyuv. Set alfo the ingenious and learned
BoJJu, Book 4. ch. 4,
gz A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. V. perior to Poetry j while the Subjedls, here
defcribed, far exceed the Power of Paint-
ing in as much as they are of all Sub-
jedts the moft -f* affeBing, and improving ^
and fuch of which we have the firongeft
Comprehenfion further, in as much as
Poetry can mofi % accurately imitate them —
in as much as, befides all Imitation, there
is a Charm in Poetry, arifing from its very
Numbers (e) ; whereas Painting has Pre-
tence
t P. 85, ^c.
X P. 89, ^c.
(e) That there is a Charm in Poetry^ arifing
from its Numbers only, may be made evident from
the five or fix firfl Lines of the Paradife LoJl\ where,
without any Pomp of Phrafe, Sublimity of Senti-
ment, or the leajl Degree of hnitation^ every Reader
muft find himfelf to be fenfibly delighted ; and that,
only from the gracefiil and fimple Cadence of the
Nutnbers^ and that artful Variation of the Cafura or
Paufe^ fo effential to the Harmony of every good
Poem.
A N EngliJJ) Heroic Verfe confifts of ten Semipedsy
or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned
the
PAINTING a?id POETRY. 93
tence to no Charm, except that of Imita- Ch. V.
tion only laftly, (which will foon be '
* fliewn) in as much as Poetry is able to
ajfociate Miific, as a moft powerful Ally ;
of which Affiftancc, Painting is utterly in-
capable From all this it may be
fairly concluded, that Poetry is not
only Equal, but that it is in faSl far Su-
perior TO ITS Sister Art of Paint-
ing.
§.4. But if it exceed Tainting in Sub^
jeBsj to which Painting is not adapted-, no
doubt u'/// it exceed Music in Subjedls to
Mufic
* Chap. VI.
the Paufes are varied upon different Semipeds in the
Order, which follows ; as may be feen by any, who
will be at the Pains to examine
Paradise Lost, B. I.
Verfe i -* f Semiped 7
I I 6
has its Paufe J 6
fall upon I 5
/ 3
94 -^ Discourse o« MUSIC,
Ch. V. Mufic not adapted. For here it has been
^ preferred y even in thofe Subjedls, which
have been held adapted the bejl of all,
§. 5. Poetry is therefore, on the
whole, much superior to either of
THE OTHER MiMETic Arts j it ha'ving
been fewn to be equally excellent in the
•f- Accuracy of its Imitation -, and to
imitate Subjects, vs^hich far surpass,
AS WELL in J Utility, as in || Dig-
nity.
* Ch. IV. §. 3. f P. 8g. % P..86.
)| See p. 83, 84. and p. 64, Note (g). See alft
p. 59.
CHAP.
PAINTING and POETRY. 95
CHAP. VI.
On Mufc conjidered not as an Imitation, hut
as deriving its Efficacy from another
Source. On its joint Operation^ by this
meanSy with Poetry. An ObjeSiion to
Miific fohed. I'he Advantage arijing to
iti as well as to Poetry ^ fj'om their being
united, Conclujion,
IN the above Difcourfe, Music hasCh.VL
been mentioned as an "^Ally to Poetry.
It has alfo been faid to derive its -f* Efficacy
from another Source^ than Imitation, It
remains therefore, that thefe things be ex-
plained.
Now, in order to this, it Is firft to be
obferved, that there are various Affediions^
which may be raifed by the Power of
Mufic^
* P- 93- t P- 69.
96 A Discourse on MUSlCj
Ch.VI. Mufic. There are Sounds to make us
chearful, or fa J -, martial ^ or tender ^^ and
fo of almofl every other AiFedion, which
we feel*
It is alfo further obfervable, that there
fe a reciprocal Operation between our Af-
feBiom^ and our Ideas ; fo that, by a fort
of natural Sympathy, certain Ideas necelTa-
rily tend to raife in us certain AffeBions ;
and thofe AffeBiojts, by a fort of Counter-^
Operation, to raife the fame Ideas. Thus
Ideas derived from Funerals, Tortures,
Murders, and the like, nattifally generate-
the Affedion of Melancholy. And when,
by any Phyfical Caufes, that AffeCfion hap-
pens to prevail, it as naturally generates the
fame doleful Ideas.
And henCe it is that Ideas , derived
from external Caufes, have at di^erent
times, upon the fame Perfon, fo different
an Effed:. If they happen to fuit the
Affections, which prevail within, then is
their ImprelTion f?ioJlfe?ifibk, and their Eifed:
7nofl
PAINTING ^wi POETRY. 97
moft lajling. If the contrary be true, then Ch. VI.
is the EfFedt contrary. Thus, for inflance,
a Funeral will much more affed: the fame
Man, if he fee it when melancholy, than
if he fee it when chearful.
Now this being premifed, it will fol-
lowj that whatever happens to be the
jlffeBion or Difpojition of Mind, which
ought naturally to refult from the Genius
of any Poem, the fame probably it will be
in the Power of fome Species of Mii/ic to
excite. But whenever the proper AffeSiion
prevails, it has been allowed that then all
kindred Ideas , derived from external Caufes,
make the mojl fenjible Imprejfion, The
Ideas therefore of Poetry mufl needs make
the moft fenlible Impreffion, when the
(a) AfFedions, peculiar to them, are al-
ready
(a) QyiNTiLiAN elegantly, and exadly appofite
to this Reafoning, fays of Mufic Namque ^
voce ^ moduktiojie grandia elate, jucunda dulciter,
moderata
H
gS A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. VI. ready excited by the Mulic. For here a
double Force is made co-operate to one End,
A Poet, thus ajjifted^ finds not an Audience
in a Temper, averfe to the Genius of his
Poem, or perhaps at befl: under a cool ht"
difference; but by the Preludes, the Sym-
phonies, and concurrent Operation of the
Muiic in all its Parts, rouzed into thofe
very AffeSiionSj which he would moll
defire.
A N Audience, fo difpofed, not only em-
brace with Pleafure the Ideas of the Poet,
when exhibited -, but, in a manner, even
anticipate them in their feveral Imagina-
tions. The Superllitious have not a more
previous Tendency to be frightned at the
fight of Sped:res, or a Lover to fall into
Raptures at the fight of his Miftrefs j than
a Mindy thus, tempered by the Power of
Mufic,
?noderata Uniter canity iotaq\ arte confentit cum
eorum, quoe dicuntur, Affectibus. Injh Orator^
1. 1, cap. 10.
PAINTING and POETRY. 99
Mulic, to enjoy all Ideas, which are fuitable Ch. VI.
to that Temper.
And hence the genuine Charm of
Mufic, and the Wonders^ which it works,
thro' its great Profefibrs (b), A Power,
which confifts not in Imitations, and the
raifing Ideas 5 but in the raifing AffeSlionSy
to which Ideas may correfpond. There
are few to be found fo infenlible, I may
even fay fo inhumane, as when good
Poetry is justly set to Music,
not in fome degree to feel the Force of
fo amiable an Union. But to the Mufes
Friends it is a Force irrefifiible^ and pene-
H 2 trates
{h) Such, above all, is George Frederick Handel \
whofe Genius, having been cultivated by continued
Exercife, and being itfelf far the fublimeft and moft
univerfal now known, has juftly placed liim with
out an Equal, or a Second. This tranfient Tefti- _
mony could not be denied fo excellent an Artift,
from whom this Treatife has borrov/ed fuch emi;^
nent Examples, to juftify its AlTertions in what it
has otfer'd concerning Mufic.
100 A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch.VI. trates into the deepeft Recefles of th€
Soul.
* PeSius inaniter migify
Irritate mulcet,faljis terroribiis implef.
§.2. Now this is that Source^ from
whence Mufic was -f* faid formerly to de-
five its greateji Efficacy. And here indeed,
not in (c) Imitation, ought it to be chiefly
cultivated. On this account alfo it has
been called a % powerful Ally to Poetry,
And farther, 'tis by the help of this Rea-
foning, that tlie ObjeBion is folved, whicli
is raifed againil the Singing of Poetry (as
in Opera's, Oratorio's, &c.) from the want
of
* Horat.EpiJl, i. 1. 2. v. 211.
t P. 69. % P. 93.
(c) For the narrow Extent and little Efficacy of
Music, confidered as a Mimetic or Imitative
Art, fee Ch. II. §. 3.
PAINTING and POETRY. loi
of Probability and Refembla?ice to Nature. Ch.VI.
To one indeed, who has no mufical Ear,
this Obje<ftion may have Weight. It may
even perplex a Lover of Muiic, if it hap-
pen to furprize him in his Hours of In-
difference. But when he is feeling the
Charm of Poetry fo accompanied, let hini
be angry (if he can) with that, which
ferves only to intereft him 7nore feelingly
in the Subjed:, and fupport him in a
jlronger and more earncjl Attention j which
enforces^ by its Aid, the feveral Ideas of
the Poem, and gives them to his Imagi-
nation with unufual Strength and Gran-
deur. He cannot furely but confefs, that
he is a Gainer in the Exchange, when
he barters the want of a fmgle Proba-
bility, that of Projiunciation ( a thing
merely arbitrary and every where different)
for a noble Heightening of AffeSlions which
are fuitable to the Occafion, and enable him
to enter into the Subjed: with do'ahh Energy
and Erijoyrnent.
" 3 §• 3-
102 A Discourse ott MUSIC,
Ch.VI. §.3. From what has been faid it is
evident, that thefe two Arts can never be
fo powerful fmgly^ as when they are pro-
perly U7iited, For Poetry^ when alone,
mufl be necelTarily forced to wajie many
of its richeil Ideas^ in the mere raifing of
Affedions, when, to have been properly
reliflied, it fhould have found thofe Af-
fedllons in their higheft Energy. And
Mujic^ when alone, can only raife Affec-
tiom^ which foon languijh and decay^ if
not maintained and fed by the nutritive
Images of Poetry. Yet muil: it be re-
membered, in this Union, that Poetry ever
have the Precedence j its * Utility y as well
^s Dignity, being by far the more con-
fiderablco
§.4. And thus much, for the prefent,
as to 'f Music, Painting, and Poetry ;
the
* Ch. V. §. 2. p. 83.
t P- 55"
PAINTING and POETRY. 103
the Circumftances, in which they agree^ Ch.VI.
and in which they differ; and the Pre-
ference, DUE TO ONE OF THEM ABOVE
THE OTHER TWO.
The END.
H A
TREATISE the Third:
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS,
DIALOGUE.
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS,
A
DIALOGUE.
PART the First.
J. H. to R S.
^^ATURE feems to treat Man, Parti.
I as a Painter would his Difciple,
"ll to whom he commits the Out-
Lines of a Figure lightly fketched, which
the Scholar for himfelf is to colour and
complete. Thus from Nature we derive
jSenfes, and Paflions, and an Intelled:,
which each of us foj'- himfelf has to model
into a Charader. And hence (the reverfd
io8 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. of every Species befide) Human Characters
alone are infinitely various ; as various in-
deed, as there are Individuals to form
them. Hence too, the great Diverlity of
Syflems, and of Doctrines, reipecfling the
Lavs^s, and Rules, and Condud: of Human
Life,
*T I s in the Hiftory of thefe, my Friend,
you have fo fuccefsfuUy employed yourfelf.
You have been fludious to know, not fo
much what Greeks^ Romans^ or Barbarians
have done ; as what they have reafoned, and
what they have taught. Not an Epicure
has more Joy in the Memory of a deli-
cious Banquet, than I feel in recolled:ing,
what we have difcourfed on thefe Sub^
jed:s.
And here you cannot forget (for we
were both unanimous) the Contempt, in
which v/e held thofe fuperficial Cenfurers,
who profefs to refute, what they want
even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the
Faith of their own Boaiting (could that be
credited)
'A Dialogue. 109
credited) Sentiments are expofed, Opinions Part L
demoli/hed, and the whole Wifdom of'
Antiquity lies vanquiflied at their Feet.
Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage,
they can with eafe diijpatch a Lion, or dif^
comfit a whole Legion. But alafs ! were
they to encounter, not the Shadow, but
the Subftance, what think you would be
the Event then ? — Little better, I fear, than
was the Fortune of poor Priam^ when the
feeble Old Man durft attack the Youthful
Pyrrhus.
* Telum imbelle Jine iBu
Conjecit : rauco quod protenm cere repulfum^
'Etjummo Clypei neqidcqiiam umbone pepe?idit^
Among the many long exploded and
obfolete Syftems, there was one, you majr
remember, for which I profelTed a great
Efteem. Not in the leafi degree con-
vinced by all I had heard againft it, I
durll
* Mtieid, 1. 2. V. 544.,
no Concernhig HAPPINESS,
Part I. durft venture to afiirm, that no Syflem
was more plaiifibki that grant but its
Principles J and the rejl followed of courfe 5
that none approached nearer to the Per-^
feBion of our own Religion, as I could
prove, v^ere there occalion, by Authority
not to be controverted. As you, I knew,
were the Favourer of an Hypothelis fome-
what -f- different j fo I attempted to lup-
port my own, by reciting you a certain
Dialogue. Not fucceeding however fo
happily in the Recolledion, as I could
wifh, I have lince endeavoured to tran-
fcribe, what at that time I would have re-
hearfed. The Refult of my Labour is the
following Narrative, which I commit with
Confidence to your Friendfhip and Can-
dour.
§. 2. 'TwAs at a time, when a certain
Friend, whom I highly value, was my
Gueft. We had been fitting together,
enter-
f Viz. the Platonic.
1^ Dialogue. ill
entertaining ourfelves with Shakefpear, Part I.
Among many of his Charaders, we had
looked into that of Woolfey, How foon,
fays my Friend, does the Cardinal in Dif-
grace abjure that Happinefs, which he was
lately fo fond of? Scarcely out of Office,
but he begins to exclaim
* Vain Fomp and Glory of the World! I hate ye.
So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary
with the Seafon ; and that in Adverlity we
are of one Mind, in Profperity, of another.
As for his mean Opinion, faid I, of
Human Happinefs, *tis a Truth, which
fmall Reflexion might have taught him long
before. There feems little need of Diflrefs
to inform us of this. I rather commend
the feeming Wifdom of that Eaftern Mo-
narch, who in the Affluence of Profperity,
when he was proving every Pleafure, was
yet fo fenfible of their Emptinefs, their In-
fufficiency to make him happy, that he
pro-
* Shakespear'; Henry the Eighths
112 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who
fhould invent a new Delight. The Re-
ward indeed was proclaimed, but the De-
light was not to be found. If by-
Delight, fcid he, you mean fome Good^
fomething conducive to real Happinefs ; it
might have been found perhaps, and yet
not hit the Monarch's Fancy.
Is that, faid I, polTible ? 'Tis pofTible,
replied he, tho' it had been the Sovereign
Good itfelf- And indeed what wonder ?
Is it probable that fuch a Mortal, as an
Eaftern Monarch j fuch a pamper 'd, fiat-
ter'd, idle Mortal j fhould have Attention,
or Capacity to a Subjed fo delicate? A
Subjed:, enough to exercife the Subtleft
and moft Acute ?
What then is it you efleem, faid I, the
Sovereign Good to be ? It fhould feem, by
your Reprefentation, to be fomething very-
uncommon* Aik me not the Queflion,
faid he, you know not where 'twill carry
us. Its general Idea indeed is eafy and
plain} but the Detail of Particulars is
perplex'd
yfDiALO.GUE, II3
perplex'd and long -Paflions, and Opi- Part I.
nions for ever thwart us ' a Paradox
appears in almoft every Advance. BefideSj
did our Inquiries fucceed ever fo happily^
the very SubjeSi itfclf is always enough to
give me Pain. That, replied I, feems
a Paradox indeed. 'Tis not, faid he,
from any Prejudice, which I have con-
ceived againft it j for to Man I efteem it
the nobleft in the World. Nor is it for
being a Subjed:, to. which my Genius does
not lead me j for no Subjed: at all times
has more employ 'd my Attention. But
the Truth is, I can fcarce ever think on it,
but an unlucky Story flill occurs to my
Mind. *' A certain Star-gazer, with his
" Telefcope, v/as once viewing the Moonj
" and defcribing her Seas, her Mountains,
" and her Territories. Says a Clown to
" his Companion, Let him fpy what he
" pleafes -, we are as near to the Moon, as
" he and all his Brethren.*' So fares it
alafs ! with thefe, our moral Speculations,
Pradice too often creeps, where Theory
can foar. The Philofopher proves as weak,
i as
114 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. as thofe, isDhotn he moft contemns, A morti-
fying Thought to fuch as well attend it.
Too mortifying, replied I, to be
long dwelt ©n. Give us rather your ge-
neral Idea of the Sovereign Good. This is
eafy from your own Account, however in-
tricate the Detail.
Thus then, faid he, fince you are fo
urgent, 'tis thus that I conceive it. The
Sovereign Good is that, the Pos-
session OF WHICH renders US HaPPY,
And how, faid I, do we polTefs it ?
Is it Senfua/j or IntelkBiial? There
you are entering, faid he, upon the Detail,
This is beyond your Queftion. Not
a fmall Advance, faid I, to indulge poor
Curiolity ? Will you raife me a Thirft, and
be fo cruel not to allay it ? 'Tis not,
replied he, of my railing, but your own.
Belides I am not certain, Ihould I attempt
to proceedy whether you will admit fuch
Author itihy as 'tis poffible I may vouch.
That, faid I, muft be determined
by their Weight, and Charader, Sup-
pofe.
^Dialogue.' 115
pofe, faid he, it (liould be Mankind; Parti,
the ivhole Human Race. Would you not
think it fomething llrange, to feek of thofe
concerning Good, who purfue it a fhoti"
fand Ways, and many of them contra^
didiory ? I confefs, faid I, it feems {o^
And yet, continued he, were there
a Point, in which fuch Diffentients ever
agreed y this Agreement would be no mean
Argument in favour of its Truth and Juji^
fiefs. But where, replied I, is this
Agreement to be found ?
He anfwered me by afking, What if
it (hould appear, that there were certain
Original Characteristics and Pre-
conceptions OF Good, which were Na-
tural, Uniform and Common to all
Men ; which all recognized in their 'various
PurfuitS'f and that the Difference lay only
in the applying them to Particu-
lars ? This requires, faid I, to be
illuftrated. As if, continued he, a
Company of Travellers, in fome wide
Foreft, were all intending for one City,
I 2 but
1 16 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. but each by a Rout peculiar to himfelf.
The Roads indeed would be various^ and
many perhapsy^^ 5 but all who travelled,
would have o?ie End in view, 'Tis
evident, faid I, they would. So fares
it then, added he, with Mankind in pur-
fuit of Good. The Ways indeed are Many^
but what they feek is One.
For inftance : Did you ever hear of
afty, who in purfuit of their Good^ were
for living the Life of a Bird, an Infedt, or
a Fifli ? None. And why not ?
It would be inconfiftent, anfwered I,
with their Nature. You fee then,
faid he, they all agree in this that what
they purfue, ought to be confijlent^ and
agreeable to their proper Nature, So
ought it, faid I, undoubtedly. If fo,
continued he, one Pre-conception is dif-
Covered, which is common to Good in gene^
ral It is, that all Good is fuppofed fome-
thing agreeable to Nature. This in-
deed, replied I, feems to be agreed on all
hands.
. But
^Dialogue, 117
But again, faid he, Is there a Man Part I.
fcarcely to be found of a Temper fo truly
mortified, as to acquiefce in the loweji^ and
Jhorteji Necejfaries of Life? Who aims not,
if he be able, at fomething farther, fome-
thing better ? I replied, Scarcely one.
Do not Multitudes purfue, faid he,
infiite Objedis of Delire, acknowledged,
every one of them, to be in no refped:
Necejjaries ? Exquifite Viands, deli-
cious Wines, fplendid Apparel, curious Gar-
dens; magnificent Apartments adorned with
Pidlures and Sculpture ; Mufic and Poetry,
and the whole Tribe of Elegant Arts ?
'Tis evident, faid I. If it be,
continued he, it fhould feem that they all
conlidcred the Chief or Sovereign Good, not
to be that, ivhich conduces to bare Exijiejice
or mere Being j for to this the Neceffaries
alone are adequate. I replied they were.
But if not this, it muil be fomewhat
conducive to that, which is fuperior to mere
Being, It muft. And what, con-
tinued he, can this be, but Weil-Being ?
I 3 . WelU
1 18 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in
which differing Opinions paint it ? Or can
you fuggell: any thing elfe ? I replied,
I could not. Mark here, then, con-
tinued he, another Fre-conception^ in which
they all agree the Sovereign Good is
fomewhat conducive^ not to mere Being, but
to Wcll'Being, I replied. It Jiad fo ap-
peared.
Again, continued he. V/'hat Labour,
what Expence, to procure thofe Rarities,
which our own poor Country is unable to
afford us ? How is the World ranfacked to
its utmoft Verges, and Luxury and Arts
imported from every Quarter ? Nay
more r— How do we baffle Nature lier-
felfj invert her Order J fcek the Vegetables
of Spring in the Rigours o^ Winter, and
Winter's Ice, during the Heats of Sum-
mer ? I replied, We did. And
what Difappointment, what Remorfe, when
Endeavours fail ? 'Tis true. If this
then be evident, faid he, it fhouid feem,
that whatever we defire as our Chief and
Sovc"
!<^ Dialogue. 119
Sovereign Goody is fomething which, as far Part I.
as poffibky ive would accommodate to all F laces
and Ti?fies. I anfwered, So it appeared/
See then, faid he, another of its Cha^
raBeriJlics, another Fre-conception,
But farther ftill What Contefts for
Wealth''^ What Scrambling for Froperty^
What Perils in the Purfuit ; what Sollicitude
in the Maintenance ? And why all this ?
To what Furpofe, what End? -Or is not
the Reafon plain ? Is it not that Wealth
may continually procure us, whatever we
fancy Good ; and make that perpetual^
which would otherwife be tranfient F
I replied, It feenied fo. Is it not far-
ther defired, as fupplyiitg its from ourfehes\
when, without it, we muft be beholden to
the Benevolence of others^ and depend on
their Caprice for all that we enjoy ?
•*Tis true, faid I, this feems a Reafon.
A G A I N Is not Power of every degree
as much contefled for, as Wealth F Are not
Magillracies, Honours, Principalities, and
I 4 Empire,
1 26 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. Empire, the Subjeds of Strife, and ever-
lafting Contention ? I replied. They
were. And why, faid he, this ? To
obtain what End ?— - — Is it not to help us,
like Wealth, to the Pojjejfion of what we
defre f Is it not farther to afcertain^ to
fecure our Enjoyments; that when others
would deprive us, we may h^Jirong enough
■to refifi them f I replied, It was.
Or to invert the whole —Why are
there, who feek Recefles the mofl diHant
and retired ? fly Courts and Power, and
fubmit to Parcimony and Obfcurity ? Why
all this, but from the fa?ne Intention ?
From an Opinion that fmall PofTeffions,
ufed moderately, are permane?2t —^-^- thsit
larger Pofleflions raife Envy, and are more
frequently invaded that the Safety of
Power and Dignity is more precarious^ than
that of Retreat; and that therefore they
have chofen, what is mofl cVgible upon the
whole ? It is not, faid I, improbable,
that they a<2: by fome fuch Motive.
Do
A Dialogue. 121
D o you not fee then, continued he, two Part I
©r three more P re-concept ions of the Sove-
reign Goody which are fought for by all, as
EfTcntial to conflitute it ? And what,
faid I, are thefe ? That it fhould
not be tranfient, nor derived from the
Will of others y nor in their Power to take
awas ; but be durable^ felfderived^ and (if
I may ufe the Expreffion) indeprivable.
I confefs, faid I, it appears fo.
But we have already found it to be con-
fidered, 2,%Jomething agreeable to our Nature',
conducive^ not to mere Being, but to Well-
Being i and what we aim to have accommo^
date to all Places and Titnes. We have.
There may be other Charaderiftics,
faid he, but thefe I think fufficient. See
then its Idea ; behold it, as colled:ed from
the Originaly Natural, ^nd' Univerfal Pre-
co?iceptions of all Mankind. The Sove-
reign Good, they have taught us, ought
to be fomething Agreeable to our
J^ATURE; CONDUCIVE TO WeLL-BeING ;
AccoM*
122 Concernhig HAPPINESS,
Parti. Accommodate to all Places and
Times; Durable, Self-derived, and
Indeprivable. Your Account, faid I,
appears jufl.
It matters, continued he, little, how
they err in the Application if they covet
that as agreeable to Nature^ which is in it-
felf moft Contrary — ■ — if they would have
that as Durable^ which is in itfelf moft
^ran/tent that as hidependent^ and their
own, which is moil precarious and Servile,
'Tis enough for us, if we know their
Aim enough, if we can difcover, what
'tis they propofe the Means and Method
may be abfurdy as it happens. I an-
fwered, Their Aim was fufficient to prove
what he had alTerted,
'Tis true, replied he, 'tis abundantly
fufficient. And yet perhaps, even tho' this
were ever fo certain, it would not be al-
together foreign, were we to examine,
how they ad:; how they fucceed in ap-
plying thefe U/fiverfals to Particular Sub-'
jeSfs,
A Dialogue. 123
je5ls. Should they be found jiiji in the Part I.
Application, we need look no farther
The true Sovereign Good would of courfe
be Plain and Obvious j and we fhould have
no more to do, than to follow the beaten
Road. 'Tis granted, replied I. But
what if they err F Time enough for
that, faid he, when we are fatisfied that
they do. We ought firft to inform our-
felves, whether they may not pofiibly be
in the Right. I fubmitted, and begged
him to proceed his own Way.
§. 3. Will you then, faid he, in this
Difquifition into Human Condud:, allow
me this - — — That fuch, as is the Species
of Life, which every one choofes; fuch is
his Idea of Happinefs, fuch his Conception
of the Sovereign Good ? I feem, faid I,
to comprehend You, but ihould be glad
You would illullrate. His Meaning,
he anfwered, was no more than tliis — - —
If a Man prefer a Life of Lidujiry, 'tis be-
caufe he has an Idea of Happinefs in Wealth -y
if he prefers a Life of Gaiety, 'tis from a
like
124 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. like Idea concerning Pleafure. And the
famey we fay, holds true in every other
Inflance. I told him. It mufl cer-
tainly.
And can you recoiled:, faid he, any
Life, but what is a Life of Bufnefs, or of
Leifure? I anfwered, None. And
is not the great E?jd of BiiJtJiefs either
Power, or Wealth^ It is. Mufl
not every Life therefore of Biifmejs^ be
either Political or Lucrative ? It muft.
Again Are not IntelleB and Senfcy
the SouVs leading Powers f They are.
And in Leifure are we not ever
feeking, to gratify one, or the other ?*
We are. Muil not every Life there-
fore of Leifure be either Pleafurable, or
Contemplative f If you confine Pleafure,
faid I, to Senfe, I think it necelTarily muft.
If it be not fo confined, faid he, we
confound all Inquiry, Allow it.
Mark then, faid he, the two grand
Genera^ the L i v e s of B u s i n e s s and of
Leisure
A Dialogue. 125
Leisure mark alfo xh^ fiihordiiiate Parti.
Species; the Political and Lucra-' ^^
TivE, • the Contemplative and
Pleasurable Can you think of any-
other, which thefe will not include ?
I replied, I knew of none. 'Tis pof-
fible indeed, faid he, that there may be
other Lives framed, by the blending of
thefe, two or more of them, together.
But if we feparate with Accuracy, we
Ihall find that here they all terminate.
I replied, fo it feemed probable.
If then, continued he, we would be
exadl in our Inquiry, we muft examine
thefe four Lives, and mark their Confe-
quences, 'Tis thus only we fliall learn, ,
how far thofe, who embrace them, find
that Good and Happinefs, which we know
they all purfiie. I made anfwer. It
feemed neceflary, and I fhould willingly
attend him.
§.4. To begin then, faid he, with the
Political Life. Let us fee the Good,
ufually
126 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. uilially fought after here. To a private
Man, it is the Favour of fome Prince, or
Commonwealth 5 the Honours and Emo-
luments derived from this Favour -, the
Court and Homage of Mankind ; the
Power of commanding others To a
Prince^ it is the fame Things nearly, only
greater in Degree j a larger Command j a
ftridler and more fervile Homage j Glory,
Conqueft, and extended Empire Am I
right in my Defcription ? I replied,
I thought he was. Whether then, faid
he, all this deferve the Name of Good or
not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or
the other, it affeds not our Inquiry. All
that I would afk concerning it, is this
Do you not think it a Good (if it really
be one) derived from Foreign and External
Caifes f Undoubtedly, replied I.
It cannot come then from oiirfekeSy or be
felf-derived. It cannot. And what
fhall we fay as to its Duration and Stabi-
lity f Is it iofirni and lafiing^ that we can-
not be deprived of it ? I fliould imagine,
faid I, quite otherwife. You infift not
then,
A Dialogue. 127
then, faid he, on my appealing to Hijiory. Part I.
You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, ^""^^^
of Empires, and their Owners. I re-
plied, I did.
If fo, faid he, it fliould feem that this
Political Good, which they feek> correfponds
not to the P re-conceptions of being Durable^
and Indeprivable. Far from it. But
it appeared jufl before, not to be Jelf-
derived. It did. You fee then,
faid he, that in three of our Pre-conceptions
it intirely fails. So indeed, faid I, it
appears.
But farther, faid he — We are told of
this Good, that in the PoJjeJ/ion it is attended
with Anxiety, and that when lojl, it is
ufually lofi with Ignominy and Difgrace ;
nay, often with Profecutions and the bit-
tereft Refentments^ with Mul(5ts, with
Exile, and Death itfelf. 'Tis frequently,
faid I, the Cafe. How then, faid he,
can it anfwer that other Pi^e-conception, of
coiitrihuting to our JVell-Being f Can that
contribute
128 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. contribute to JFell - Beings whofe Confe-
quences lead to Calamity^ and whofe Vre-
fcnce implies Anxiety ? This, it mufl be
confefTed, fald I, appears not probable.
But once more, faid he There
are certain Habits or Difpofttions of Mind,
called Sincerity, Generofity, Candour,
Plain-dealing, Juftice, Honour, Honefly,
and the like. There are. And it has
been generally believed, that thefe are
agreeable to Nature, AlTuredly.
But it has been as generally believed, that
the Political Good, v^e fpeak of, is often not
to be acquired but by Habits, contrary to
thefe 'y and which, if thefe are Natural,
muft of neceffity be unnatural. What
" Habits, faid I, do you mean ? Flattery,
anfwered he, Diffimuktion, Intrigue: upon
occafion, perhaps Iniquity, Falfliood, and
Fraud. 'Tis poffible indeed, faid J,
that thefe may fometimes be thought necef-
fary. How then, faid he, can that
Good be agreeable to Nature, which cannot
be acquired^ but by Habits contrary to
Nature ?
^Dialogue. 129
Niifuref Your Argument, fald I, Parti,
feems jufl.
If then, faid he, we have reafoned
rightly,, and our Conclufions may be de-
pended on; it fhould feem that the sup-
posed Good, which the Political Life
piirfueSy correfponds 7iot^ in any Injiance, to
our F re-conceptions of the Sovereign Good.
I anfwered, So it appeared.
§. 5. Let us quit then, faid he, thiPoIi-
ficalLife^ and pafs to the Lucrative. The
Objed; of this is Wealth. Admit it.
And is it not too often, faid he, the
Cafe, that to acquire this, we are tempted
to employ fome of thofe Habits, which we
havejuft condemned ^sU/inatural? Such,
I mean, as Fraud, Falfhood, Injuflice, and
the like ? It muft be owned, faid I,
too often.
Besides, continued he What fhall
we fay to the EJieem, the Friendfiip, and
Love of Mankind? Are they worth having?
K Is
130 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. Is it agreeable^ think ydu, to Nature^ to
endeavour to deferve them ? Agreeable,
faid I, to Nature, beyond difpute. If
fo, then to merit Hatred and Contempt,
faid he, muft needs be contrary to Nature.
UndxDubtedly. And is there any
thing which fo certainly merits Hatred 2ind
Contempt, as a mere Lucrative Life, fpent
in the uniform Purfuit of Wealth?
I replied, I believed there v^^as nothing.
If fo, faid he, then as to correjpond-
ing with our Pre-conceptiojis, the Lucrative
Good, in this refped, fares no better than
the Political It appears not.
And what fhall we fay as to Anxiety ?
Is not both the PoJfeJJion and Purfuit of
Wealth, to thofe who really love it, ever
anxious f It feems fo. And why
anxious, but from a Certainty of its Injia-'
bility; from an Experience, how obnoxious
it is to every crofs Event ; how eafy to be
loft and transfer'd to others, by the fame
Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to
ourfelves ? — -This is indeed the tritefl: of
all
y^ Di alogueJ 131
iall Topics. The Poets and Orators have Part I.
long ago exhaufted it; 'Tis true, faid I,
they have. May we not venture then,
laid he, upon the w^hole, to pafs the fame
Sentence on the Lucrative Life, as we
have already on the Political that it
propofes not A Good, correfpondent to thofe
F re-conceptions^ by which we wotdd all be
governed in the Good, which we are
all feeking^ I anfwered. We might
juftly.
§.6. If then neither the Lucrative
Life, nor the Political, faid he, procure
that Good which we defire : fhall we feek
it from the Pleasurable? Shall we
make Pi^easure our Goddefs^
Fkafure^
Who?n Love attends, and foft Defire^ and
Words
Alluring, apt thefieadiejl Heart to bend.
So fays the Poet, and plaufible his Doc-'
fine. Plaufible, faid I, indeed.
K 2 Let
132 Concerning HAPPINESS, ,
PartL Let it then, continued he, be a pka^
fur able World -^ a Race of harmlefs, loving
Animals-, an Ely/ian Temperature of Sun-
ihine and Shade. Let the Earth, in every
garter, refemble our own dear Country 5
where never was a Froft, never a Fog,
never a Day, but was delicious and ferene*
I was a little embarralled at this un-^
expecfled Flight, 'till recollecting myfelf,
I told him, (but ftill with fomc Surprize),
that, in no degree to difparage either m/
Country or my Countrymen, I had never
found Either fo exquifite, as he now
fuppofed them. There are then it
feems, faid he, in the Natural Worlds
and even in our own beloved Country^
fuch things as Storms, and Tempefls -, as
pinching Coldsy and fcorching Heats,
I replied. There were. And confe-
quent to thefe, Difeafe, and Famine, and
infinite Calamities. There are.
And in the Civil or Human World, we
have Difcord and Contention-, or (as the
Poet
^Dialogue.
~ Poet better * deicribes it)
Cruel Revenge, and rancoj'oiis Defpite,
Dijloyal Treafo?iy and heart-burning Hate.
We have. Alafs ! then, poor
Pleafure ! Where is that Good, accommo-
date to eve?'y Time -, fuited to every Place ;
felf-derived, not dependent on Foreign Ex-
ternal Caufes? Can it be Pleasure, on
fuch a changeable, fuch a turbulent Spot, as
this ? I replied, I thought not.
And what indeed, were the World,
faid he, modelled to a 'Temperature the mojl
exaB f Were the Rigours of the Seafons
never more to be known ; nor Wars, De-
vaftations. Famines or Difeafes ? Admit-
ting all this, (which we know to be im--
pojjible) can we find ftill in Pleafure that
lengthened Duration, which we confider as
an EJfential, to conftitute the Sovereign
Good ? — Afk the Glutton, the Drinker,
K 3 the
* Spencer's Fairy ^eefi, B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 22.
134 Concerning HAPPINESS,
l^art I. the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether
they know any Rnjoymcnt^ not to be can-
celled by Satiety f Which does not haftily
pafs away into the tedious Intervals of Li-
difference ?^ Or yielding all this too,
(which we know cannot be yielded) where
are we to find our Good^ how polTefs it in
Age ? In that Eve of Life, declining Age,
when the Power of Senfe^ on which all de-
pends, like the fetting Sun, is gradually for-
faking us ?
I SHOULD imagine, faid I, that Pleafure
was no mean Adverfary, fince you em-
ploy, in attacking her, fo much of your
Rhetoric. Without heeding what I faid,
he purfued his Subjed: Befide, if this
be our Good, our Happinefs, and our E?id;
to what purpofe Powers, whicli bear no
Relation to it ? Why Memory ? Why
Reafsn ? Mere Se?ifation might have been
as exquijite, had we been Flies or Earth-
worms Or can it be proved otherwife ?
I replied, I could not fay. NoAni-
maly continued he, pojj'ejes its Faculties in
vain.
A Dialogue. 135
vain. And fhall Man derive no Good Parti.
from his beft, his mofl emifient ? From
That, which of all is peculiar to himlelf ?
For as to Growth and Nutrition^ they are
not wanting to the meanefl: Vegetable ; and
for Senfes, there are Animals, which per-
haps exceed us in them all.
§. 7. This feems, faid I, no mean Ar-
gument in favour of Contemplation.
The Contemplative Life gives Reajbn
all the Scope, which it can deiire. And
of all Lives, anfwered he, would it furely
be the beft, did we dwell, like Milto?i's
Uriel, in the Sun's bright Circle. Then
might we plan indeed the moft Romantic
Kind of Happi?iefs, Stretch 'd at Eafe,
without Trouble or Moleftation, we might
pafs our Days, contemplating the Uni-
verfe ; tracing its Beauty ; loft in Wonder ;
raviihed with Ecftacy, and I know not
what But here alafs ! on ihisfublwiary,
this turbident Spot, (as we called it not
long fince) how little is this, or any thing
like it, praSlicabk f Fogs arife, which
K 4 dim
136 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. dim our Profpeds — the Cares of Life per-
petually moleft us Is Contemplation fuited
to a Placey like this F It muft be owned,
faid I, not extremely. How then is it
the Sovereign Good, which ihould be Ac^
commodate to every Place ? I replied.
It feemed not probable.
But farther, faid he — Can we enjoy
the Sovereign Goody and be at the fame
time vexedy and agitated by Paffion ? Does
not this feem a Paradox ? I anfwered.
It did. Suppofe then an Event were to
happen — not an Inundation^ or Majfacre-^-
but an Acquaintance only drop a difrefpeSi"
ful Word-y a Servant chance to break a
favourite Piece of Furniture — What would
inftrud: us to endure this ? — Contempla-
tiony Theory, Abflradions ? Why not,
faid I ? No, replied he with Warmth,
(quoting the Poet) not
« q:ho* all the Stars
Thou knew'Jl by Name-, and all the Ether ial
Powers, For
* Par, Lojly B. 12. v. 576.
'^Dialogue, ' 137
For does not Experience teach us, abun- Parti.
dantly teach us, that our deepeft Philofo-
phers, as to Temper and Behaviour^ are as
very Children for the moft part, as the
meaneft and moil illiterate ? A little more
Arrogance perhaps, from Prefumption of
what they know, but not a grain more of
Magnanimity i of Candour and calm Indu-
rance.
You are fomewhat too fevere, faid I,
in cenfuring of all. There are better and
worfe among Them, as among Others.
The Difference is no way proper^
fioned^ faid he, to the ^antity of their
Knowledge ; fo that whatever be its Caufe,
it can't be imputed to their Specidations, —
Befides, can you really imagine, we came
here only to Think ? Is Acting a Circum-
ftance, which is foreign to Our CharaBer ?
. Why then fo many Social AffeSfionSy
which all of us feel, even infpite of our-
felves ? Are we to lupprefs them All, as
tifclefs and wmatural? The Attempt,
replied I, muft needs be found imprad:i-
cable.
138 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. cable. Were they once fupprejfedy faid
he, the Confequences would be fomewhat
ftranee. We ihould hear no more of Fa-
tlier, Brother, Huiband, Son, Citizen, Ma-
giflrate, and Society itfelf. And were this
ever the Cafe, ill (I fear) would it fare
with even Contemplation itfelf. It would
certainly be but bad Speculating^ among
lawlefs Barbarians UnafTociated Ani-
mals where Strength alone of Body was
to conftitute Dominion^ and the Conteft
came to be (as * Horace defcribes it)
glandem at que cuhilia propter^
Unguibiis & pugfiis, dein ftijiibiis
Bad enough, replied I, of all con-
fcience.
It fhould feem then, faid he, that not
even the best Contemplative Life,
however noble its Ohje5i^ was agreeable
to our present Nature, or confifient
with
* Sat. 3. 1. I. V. 99.
A Dialogue. 139
niDith our prefent Situation, I confefs. Part I.
iiiid I, you appear to have proved fo.
But if this be allov^ed true of the Bejl^
tjie moft Excellent -, whit ihall we fay to
the Mockery of Monkery^ the Farce of
Frlaj's ; the ridiculous Mummery of being
fequeftred in a Cloy/lerf This furely is too
low a Thing, even to merit an Examina-
tion. I have no Scmples here, faid I,
you need not wafte your Time.
§.8. If that, faid he, be your Opinioia,
let us look a little backward. For our
Memory's fake it may be proper to reca-
pitulate. I replied, 'Twould be highly
acceptably. Thus then, faid he .
We have examined the four grand Lrjes,
which we find the Generality of Men em-
brace j the Lucrative y and the Political;
the Pleafurable, and the Contemplative,
And we have aimed at proving that
to fuch a Being as Man, isoith fuch a Body^
fuch Affeftiotts, fuch Sefjfes, and fuch an In-
felled placed in fuch a World, fuhjeSi
fo fuch Incidents-'— not one of thefe Lives is
pro-
140 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part J.produdfive of that Good, which we find all
Men to recognize thro" the fame uniform
Pre-conceptions; and which thro' one or
other of thefe Lives they all of them purfue,
§. 9. You have juftly, fald I, colleded
the Sum of your Inquiries. And
happy, faid he, fliould I think it, were
they to terminate here, I alked him.
Why? Becaufe, replied he, to in-
linuate firft, that all Mankind are in the
wrong; and then to attempt afterwards,
to fhew one's felf only to be right ; is a
Degree of Arrogance, which I would not
willingly be guilty of. I ventured here
to fay. That I thought he need not be fo
diffident that a Subjed:, where one's
own Intereft appeared concerned fo nearly\
would well juftify every Scruple^ and even
the fevereft /;?^/<f/r);. There, faid he,
you fay fomething there you encourage
me indeed. For what ? Are we not
cautioned againft Counterfeits^ even in Mat-
ters of meaneft Value ? If a Piece of Metal
be tender'd us, which feems doubtful, do
we
A Dialogue. 141
We not hefitate ? Do we not try it by the Part L
Teji, before we take it for Current f — And
is not this deem'd Prudence ? Are we not
cenfured, if we ad: otherwife ? How
much more then does it behove us not to
be impofed on here ? To be diffident and
fcrupuloufly exadj where Impofitire^ if once
admitted, may tempt us to a far worfe Bar-
gain, than ever Glaiiciis made WixhDiomedf
What Bargain, faid I, do you mean ?
The Exchange, repHed he, not of
Gold for Brafs^ but of Good for Evil, and
of Happinefs for Mifery But enough of
this, fince you have encouraged me to
proceed — We are feeking that Good, which
we think others have not found. Permit
me thus to purfue my Subjed:,
§. 10. Every Being on this our T^r-
rejirial Dwellings exifls encompafj'ed with
infinite ObjeBs ; exifls among Animals tame,
and Animals wild', among Plants and Ve-
getables of a thoufand dijfferent Qualities 5
among Heats and Colds, Tempefls and
Calms, the Friendfliios and Difcords of
hetero"'
142 . Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. heterogeneous Elements - — What fay you ?
Are all thefe Things exadtly the fame to it j
or do they differ, think you, in their £/^
jfe^s and Confequences^ They dilfer,
faid I, widely. Some perhaps then,
faid he, are u4pt. Congruous^ and Agreeable
to its Natural State. I replied. They
were. Others are Li-^pt, Incongruous,
and Difagreeable, They are.
And others again are hidiff^erent. They
are.
It fhould feem then, faid- he, if this be
allowed, that to every ijidividual Being,
ivithoiit the leaji Exception, the whole Mafs
of Things External, frojn the greatefl to the
meamjiy Jiood in the Relations of either
Agreeable, Difagreeable, or Indifferent,
I replied. So it appeared.
But tho' this, continued he, be true
in the general, 'tis yet as certain wlien we
defcend to Particulars, that what is Agree-
able to one Species is Difagreeable to another ;
and not only fo, but perhaps Indifferent to
a
A Dialogue." 143
a third, Inftances of this kind, he faid, Part L
were too obvious to be mentioned.
I REPLIED, 'Twas evident. Whence
then, faid he, this Dherfjty ? — It cannot
arife from the Externals — — for Water is
equally Water y whether to a Man^ or to a
Fijh; whether, operating on the one, it
fuffocatCy or on the other, it give Life and
Vigour. I repHed, It was. So is
Fire, faid he, the fame Fire^ however
'various in its Confequences ; whether it
harden or foften^ give Pleafure or Pain»
I replied, It was. But if this Z)/-
verfity^ continued he, be not derived from
the EiXternalsy whence can it be elfe ? — .
Or can it poffibly be derived otherwife than
from the peculiar Confitutiony from the
Natural State of every Species itfelf ?
I replied, It appeared probable.
Thus then, faid he, is it that Evejy
particular Species is, itfelf to itfelf the
Meafure of all Things in the Univerfe — thaf
as Things vary in their Relations to ity they
vary
144 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. vary too in their Value and that if their
Value be ever doubtful, it can no way be ad-^
jujledi but by recurring with Accuracy to
the Natural State of the Species, and to
thofe feveral Relations, which fuch a State
of courfe creates. I anfwered^ He ar-
gued juflly.
§. I li To proceed then, faid he---Tho*
it be true, that every Species has a Natural
State, as we have alTerted $ it is not true,
that every Species has a Se?ife or Feeling of
it. This FeeUng or Senfe is a Natural
Eminence or Prerogative, denied the Vege-^
table and Inanimate, and imparted only to
the Animal I anfwered, It was*
And think you, continued hcj that as
many as have this Senfe or Feeling of a
Natural State, are alienated from it, or in^
different to it ? Or is it not more probable,
that tliey are well^affeBcd to it ?
Experience, faid I, teaches us, how well
they are all affedted. You are right,
replied he. For what would be more
abfurd.
A Dialogue. 145
abfurd, than to be indifferent to their own Part I.
Welfare j or to be alienated from it, as tho'
'twas Foreign and U?inaturalf I replied.
Nothing could be more. But, con-
tinued he, if they are well-qffe&ed to this
their proper Natural State^ it fliould feem
too they muft be well-affe5ied to all thofe
ExternalSy which appear apt, congruous, and
agreeable to it. I anfwered. They
muft. And if {o, then ill-affeSied or
a'uerfe to fuch, as appear the contrary.
They muft. And to fuch as appear
indifferent, indifferent. They muft.
But if tliis, faid he, be allowed, it
will follow, that in confequencc of thefe
Appearances, they will think fome Exter^
nals worthy of Purfuit; fome worthy of
Avoidance-, and fome worthy of neither^
'Twas probable, faid I, tliey ftiould.
Hence then, faid he, another Divifan
of Things external-, that isj into Purfuable,
Avoidable, and Indifferent — a Divifion only
belonging to Beings Senjitive and Animate,
becaufe all, hlow thefe, can neither avoid
h nor
146 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. nor purfue. I replied. They could
not.
If, then, laid he, Man be allowed in
the Number of thefe Se?jjitive Beings, this
Diviiion will affedl Man or to explain
more fully, the whole Mafs of Things exter-
nal wilU according to this Divifion, exifi
to the Human Species in the Relatio?js ofPur-
ftiable. Avoidable J and Ivdiffere?jt, I re-
plied. They would.
Should we therefore defire, faid he,
to know what thefe things truly are, we
mufl: iirft be informed, what is Man's
truly Natural Constitution. For
thus, you may remember, 'twas fettled not
long lince — that every Species was its own
Standard, and that when the Value of
Takings was doubtful, the Species was to he
Jiudied', the Relatio?is to be deduced, which
were confequent to it-, and iti this manner
the Value of 'Things to be adjujled aftd afcer-
tained. I replied. We had fo agreed
it. I feSr then, faid he, we are en-
gaged
yf Dialogue. 147
gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Part I.
Tafk of more Difficulty, than we were at
firft aware of But Fortiina Fortei — we
mufl endeavour to acquit ourfelves as well
as we are able.
§. 12. That Man therefore has a
Body^ of a Figure and internal StrnSfure
peculiar to itfelf ; capable of certain De-
grees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the
like J this I believe is evident, and hardly
wants a Proof. I anfwered, I was
willing to own It. That he is capable
too of Pkafure and Pain ; is pofTefs'd of
'* Sefifes, AffeBionSy Appetites , and AverJio?is;
this alfo feems evident, and can fcarcely be
denied. I replied, 'Twas admitted.
We may venture then to range Him
in the Tribe of Animal Beings.
I replied, We might.
And think you, faid he, without Society^
you or any Man could have been born?
Moft certainly not. Without
Society, when born, could you have been
L 2 brought
!4B Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. brought to Maturity ? Mofl: certainly
not. Had your Parents then had no
Social AffeBiom towards you in that peri-^
bus State, that tedious Infancy, (fo much
longer than the longefi of other Animals)
you muft have inevitably periflied thro'
Want and Inability. I muft. You
perceive then that to Society you, and
every Man are indebted, not only for the
Beginning of Being, but for the Continu-
ance. We are.
Suppose then we pafs from this5/r/;^
and Infancy of Man, to his Maturity and
PerfeBion — Is there a?jy Age, think you,
fo felf'fuj^cient , as that in it he feels no
Wants'^ What Wants, anfwered I,
do you mean ? In the firft and prin-
cipal place, faid he, that of Food; then
perhaps that of Raiment t and after this,
a Dwelling, or Defence againft the Wea-
ther. Thefe Wants, replied I, are
furely Natural at all Ages. And is it
not agreeable to Nature, faid he, that they
(hould at all Ages be fupplied? Af-
furedly.
A DlAl-OGUE. 149
fiiredly. And is it not more agreeable Part I.
to have them ijoell fupplied, than ill^
it is. And mofi agreeable, to have
them hefi fupplied ? Certainly.
If there be then any 07ie State, better than
all others^ for the fupplying thefe Wants -,
this State, of all others, mujl needs be mofi
Natural It muft.
And what Supply, faid he, of thefe
Wants, fliall we efleem the meanefi, which
we can conceive ? — Would it not be fome-
thing like this ? Had we nothing beyond
Acorns for Food, beyond a rude Skin, for
Raiment ; or beyond a Cavern, or hollow
Tree, to provide us with a Dwelling ?
Indeed, faid I, this would be bad enough.
And do you not imagine, as far as
this, we might each fupply ourfehes, tho'
we lived in Woods, mere folitary Savages ?
I replied, I thought we might.
Suppose then, continued he, that our
Supplies were to be nmided for inftance,
that we were to exchange Acorns for
L 3 Bread—*
1 50 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti. Bread — Would our Savage Charader be
fufficient here? Muil we not be a little
better difciplined ? Would not fome Art
be requifite ? The Baker'% for example.
It would. And previcujly to
the Baker's, that of the Miller ? It
would. And previotifly to the Miller's,
that of the Hujbandman f It would.
Three Arts then appear necejjary\
even upon the loweji Eftimation. 'Tis
admitted.
B u T a Queftion farther, faid he — ■ Can
the Hufbandman work, think you, with-
out his I'ooh f Mufl he not have his
Plough, his Harrov/, his Reap-hook, and
the like ? He mufl. And mufl not
thofe other Artifls too be furniflied in the
fame manner ? They mufi. And
whence mufl they be furniflied ? From
their own Arts ? — Or are not the making
Tools, and the ti/ing them, two different
Occupations ? I believe, faid I, they
are. You may be convinced, continued
he, by fmall Recolledion. Does Agricuk
iure
y^DlALOGUE. 151
ture make its oivn Plough, its own Harrow ?" Part I.
Or does it not apply to other Arts, for all
Neceffaries of this kind ? It does.
Ag;ain Does the Baker build his own
Oven J or the Miller frame his own Mill ?
It appears, faid I, no part of their
Bufinefs.
What a T!ribe of Mechanics then, faid
he, are advancing upon us ? — Smiths, Car-
penters, Mafons, Mill-w^rights and all
thefe to provide the fmgle Necejjary of
Bread. Not lefs than /even or eight Arts,
we find, are wanting at the fcweji. It
appears fo. And what if to the pro-
viding a comfortable Cottage^ and RaimeJit
fuitable to an indnfrioiLS Hind, we allow a
dozen Arts more ? It would be eafy, by
the fame Reafoning, to prove the Number
double. I admit the Number, faid I,
mentioned.
If fo, continued he, it ihould feem, that
towards a tolerable Supply of the three Pri-
mary and Common Neceffaries, Food, Raiment,
L 4 iind
152 CoKCcrnlng HAPPINESS,
Part I. and a Dwellings not lefs than twenty Arts
were, on the lowefi Account, requijite.
It appears fo.
And is ojte Man equal, think you, to
the Exercife of thefe twenty Arts ? If he
had even Genius, which we can fcarce ima-
gine, is it poffible he fhould find Leifure f
I replied, I thought not. If fo,
tfen 2ifoUtary, unfocial State can never fupply
tolerably the common Necejaries of Life.
It cannotc
But what if we pafs from the Necefch-
ries of Life, to the Elegancies f To Mufic,
Sculpture, Painting and Poetry ? What
if we pafs from all Arts, whether Necejfary
or Elegant, to the large and various Tribe
ofScie?2ces f To Logic, Mathematics, Aftro-
nomy, Phyfics ? — Can one Man, imagine
you, mafter ail this ? Abfurd, faid I, im-=
pofiible. And yet /;/ this Cycle of Sciences
fnd Arts, feem included all the Comforts^
as well as Ornaments of Life 3 included all
conducive, either to Being, or to Well-Beings
It
u^DlALOGUE, 153
It muft be confeffed, faid I, it has Part I.
jthe Appearance.
What then, faid he, mufl be done?
In what manner mufl we be fupplied ?
I anfwered, I knew not, unlefs wc
made a Dijiribution — Let one exercife cne
Art ; and another a different — Let this
Man fludy fuch a Science ; and that Man,
another ' Thus the whole Cycle (as yoii
call it) may be carried ealily into Perfec-
tion. 'Tis true, faid he, it may; and
every Individual, as far as his own Art or
Science J might be fupplied completely^ and as
well as he could wifh. But what avails a
Supply in a fingle Inftance ? What in this
cafe are to become of all his numerous other
Wants'^ You conceive, replied I, what
I would have faid, but partially. My
Meaning was, that Artifi trade with Ar-
tiji -y each fupply where he is deficient^ by
exchanging where he abounds-^ fo that a
Portion of every thing may be difperfed
throughout all. You intencj then a State,
faid
154 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. faid he, of Commutation and Traffic.
I replied, I did.
If fo, continued he, I fee a new Face
of things. The Savages, with their Skins
and their Caverns, difappear. In their place
I behold a fair Community rifing. No longer
Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is Social^
Civi/j and Cultivated — And can we doubt
any farther, whether Society be Natural ? Is
not this evidently the State, which can beft
fupply the Primary Wants ? It has ap-
peared fo. And did we not agree
fome time fince, that this State, whatever
we found it, would be certainly of all others
the moji agreeable to our Nature'^ We
did. And have we not added, fince
this, to the Weight of our Argument, by
pai3ing from the Neceffary Arts to the Ele~
gant', from the Elegant, to tlie Sciences?
We have. The more, laid he,
we confider, the more fliall we be con-
vinced, that All thefe, the nobleil Honours
and Ornaments of the Human Mind, with-
out that Lcifure, that Experience, that Emu-
lation,
1^ Dialogue. 155
lation, that Reward, which the Social State Parti.
alone we know is able to provide them,
could never have found Exijlence, or been
in the leaft recognized. Indeed, faid I,
I believe not.
Let it not be forgot then, faid he, in
favour of Society, that to it we owe, not
only the Beginning and Continuation, but
the Weil-Being, and (if I may ufe the Ex-
preflion) the very Elegance, and Rationality
of our Exificnce, I anfwered. It ap-
peared evident.
And what then, continued he? — If
Society be thus agreeable to our Nature, is
there nothing, think you, within us, to ex-
cite and lead us to it ? No Impulfe, no Pre-
paration of Faculties? It would be
ftrange, anfwered I, if there fhould not.
'Twould be a lingular Exception,
faid he, with refpecft to all other herding
Species — Let us however examine — Pity,
Benevolence, Friendfliip, Love ; the general
Diilike of Solitude, and Delire of Com-
pany J
156 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. pany ; are they Natural Affections, which
come of themjehes j or are they taught us by
Art, like Mufic and Arithpietic ?
I fliould think, replied I, they were Na-^
tural, becaufe in every Degree of Men fomc
Traces of them may be dilcovered.
And are not the Powers and Capacities of
Speech, faid he, the fame ? Are not all
Men naturally formed, to exprefs their Sen-
timents byfome kind of Language ? I re-
plied, They were.
If then, faid he, thefe feveral Powers,
and Dijpofitions are Natural, fo fliould feem
too their Exefxife. Admit it. And
jif their Exercife, then fo too that State,
where alone they can be exercifed. Ad-
mit it. And what is this State^ but the
Social? Or where elfe is it pofTible to con-
^jerfe, or ufe our Speech ; to exhibit Actions
of Pity, Benevolence, Friendfliip or Love ;
to relieve our Averfion to Solitude, or gratify
pur Defire of being with others f I rcr-
plied, It could be no where elfe.
You
^ D I A L O G U £. 1 57
You fee then, continued he, a Prepa- Parti.
ration of Faculties is not wanting. We are
fitted with Powers and Difpolitions, which
have only Relation to Society, and which,
out of Society, ca?i no where elfe be exercifed^
I replied, It was evident. You have it^n
too the fuperior Advantages of the Social
State, above all others, I have.
Let this then be remember'd, faid he,
throughout all our future Reafonings, re-
membered as a firft Principle in our Ideas
of Humanity^ that Man by Nature is truly
a Social Animal. I promifed it
fliould.
§.13. Let us now, faid he, examine,
what farther we can learn concerning Him,
As Social indeed, He is diftinguiflied from
the Solitary and Savage Species -, but in no
degree from the reft, of a milder and tnore
frie7idly^2i\Mve. 'Tis true, replied I, He is
not. Does He then differ no more from
thcfe
158 Concern^tg HAPPINESS,
Part I. thefe feveral Social Species, than they, each
of them, differ yrof;2 one another ? Muft we
range them all, and Man among the refl^
under the fame common and general Genus ?
I fee no Foundation, faid I, for
making a Diftindion.
Perhaps, faid he, there may be none;
and 'tis poffible too there may. Confider
a httle — Do you not obferve in all other
Species, a Similarity among Individuals ?
a furprizing Likejiefs^ which runs thro' each
Particular^ In one Species they are all
Bold J in another, all T^imorous ; in one all
'Ravenous; in another, all Ge?itle. In the
Bird-kind only, what a Uniformity of Voice ^
in each Species, as to their Notes j of Ar-
chitecture^ as to building their Nefts^ of
Food^ both for themfelves, and for fup-
porting their Young ? 'Tis true, faid I.
And do you obferve, continued he,
the fame Similarity among Men ? Are thefe
ail as Uniform^ as to their Scntimerits and
ASlions ? I replied, By no means.
One
A Dialogue.
One Queftion more, faid he, as to the
Charader of Brutes, if I may be allowed
the Expreffion — Are thefe^ think you, what
we behold thejUy by Nature or otherwife ?
Explain, faid I, your Queftion, for
I do not well conceive you. I mean,
replied he, is it by Nature that the Swallow
builds her Neft, and performs all the Offices
of her Kind : Or is fhe taught by Art^ by
Difcipline, or Cujiom? She ad:s, re-
plied I, by pure Nature undoubtedly.
And is not the fame true, faid he, o£ every
other Bird and Beaft in the Univerfe ?
It is. No wonder then, continued he,
as they have fo wife a Governefs, that a
uniform Rule of ASlion is provided for each
Species. For what can be more worthy the
Wifdom of Nature^ than ever to the fame
Subfla?ices to give the fame Law ? It ap-
pears, faid I, reafonable.
But what, continued he, fhall we fay
as to Man ? Is He too aduated by Nature
purely f I anfwered, Why not ?
If
i66 Concerning HAPPINESS^
t*art I. If He be, replied he, 'tis flrange in Nature^
that with refpedt to Man ahie, flie ihould
follow fo different a Condud. The Particu-
lars in other Species, we agree, flie renders
Uniform ; but in Our's, every Particular feems
a fort of Model by himfelf. If Nature,
^id I, do not actuate us, what can we fup-
pofe elfe ? Are Local Ciijloms, faid he, Na-
ture ? Are the Polities and Religions of par-
ticular Nations, Nature f Are the Examples^
which are let before us; the Preceptors
who inftrudl us j the Company and Friends^
with whom we converfe, all Nature ?
No furely, faid I. And yet, faid he,
*tis evident that by thefe, and a thoufand
mcidental Circumflances, equally yor^zg-;/ to
Nature, our Adtions, and Manners, and
Charaders are adjufted. Who then can
imagine, we are aduated by Nature only f
I confefs, faid I, it appears con-
trary.
You fee then, faid he, one remarkable
jyiflinBion between Man and Brutes in ge-
neral-^ — In the Brute ^ Nature does all\ in
Man^
jd Dialogue. i6i
Man^ but Fart only. 'Tis evident, Parti.
faid L
But farther, continued he -Let US
confider the Powers, or Faculties^ pofTefTed
by each — -Suppofe I was willing to give a
Brute the fa?ne InfiriiSiion, which we give
a Man. A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might
arrive to fome fmall Degree of Mimicry ;
but do you think, upon the whole, they
would be much profited or altered'^
I replied, I thought not. And do you
perceive the fame, faid he, with refpedt to
Man ? Or does not Experience ihew us the
very reverfe ?' Is not Education capable of
moulding us into any thing of making
lis greatly Good, or greatly Bad-, greatly
IFife, or gresiny Jifurd F The Faa:,-
faid I, is indifputable.
Mark then, faid he, the Difference
between Human Powers and Brutai—-Th&
Leading Principle of Brutes appears to tend
in each Species to onefingle Purpofe — to this,
in general, it uniformly arrives , and here,
M ifl
i62 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. in general, it as imiformly Jlops — it needs no
Precepts or Difcipline to inftrud: it ; nor
will it eafily be changed, or admit a diffe-
rerit DireBion. On the contrary, the Lead-
ing Principle of Man is capable of infinite
Directions is convertible to all forts of
Purpofes equal to all forts of SubjeBs
HGgledied, remains ignorant, and void of
every Perfedion — —cultivated, becomes
adorned with Scie?ices and ^r/j-— can raife
us to excel, not only Brutes, but our own
Kind — with refpedt to our other Powers and
Faculties, can inftrudl us how to ufe them,
as well as tbofe of the various Natures^
which we fee exifting around us. In a
word, to oppofe the two Principles to each
other The Leading Priix;iple of Ma7i, is
Multiform, Origiiially UninfiruBed, Pliant
and Docil-*-ihQ Leading Principle of Brutes
is Uniform^ Originally InfiruBed-, but, in
moil Inftances afterward, Infiexible and
Indocil Or does not Experience plainly
fliew, and confirm the Truth of what we
alTert ? I made anfwer. It did.
You
A Dialogue* 163
You allow, then, fliid he, the Human Part I.
Principle, and the Brutal^ to be things of
different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do
they not each then deferve a different Ap-
pellation ? I fhould think fo. Sup-
pofe therefore we call the Human Principle
Reason; and the Brutal, Instinct:
would you objed: to the Terms ? I re-
plied, I fhould not. If not, continued
he, then Reafon being peculiar to Man, of
all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may
we not affirm of Him, by way of Diflinc-
tion, that He is a Rational Anirnal^
I replied, We might juftly.
Let this too then be remember'd, faid
he, in theCourfe of our Inquiry, that Man
is by Nature a Rational Animal.
I promifed it fhould,
§. 14. In confsquence of this, faid he, as
often as there is Occafion, I fhall appeal as
well to Reafon, as to Nature, for a Standard.
What, faid I, do you mean hy Nature?
M 2 Its
1 64 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. Its Meanings, replied lie, are many
and various. As it ilands at prefent 6p-
pofed, it may be enough perhaps to fay,
that Nature is thaty which is the Caiife of
every thiftg^ except thofe Things alone, which
are the immediate EffeBs of Reafon. In
other words, whatever is not Reafon, or
the EffeB of Reafon, we would eonfider as
Nature, or the EffeSi of Nature. I an--
fwered, as he fo diflinguifhed them, I
thought he might juflly appeal to either^
And yet, ccMitlnued he, there is a re-
markable Difference between the Standard
of Reafon, and that of Nature -, a Diffe-
rence, which at no time we ought to for-
get. What Difference, faid I, do' you
mean ? 'Tis this, anfwered he ™^- In
Nature, the Standard is fought from among
the Many -, in Reafon, the Standard is fought
from amofig the Few. You mufl ex-
plain, faid i, your Meaning, for I mufl
confefs you feem obfcure.
Thus
A Dialogue. 165
Thus then, faid he Suppofe, as an Parti.
Anatomifl:, you were feeking the Structure
of fome internal Part To difcover this,
would you not infped: a Number of Indi-
viduals ? I fhould. And would you
not inform yourfelf, what had been dif-
covered by others ? I fliould. And
fuppofe, after all, you fliould find a MuU
titude of Inftances for one Strudure, and a
few fmgular for a different : by which
would you be governed ? By the Mul-
titude, faid I, undoubtedly. Thus then
continued he, in Nature the Standard, you
fee, exijis among the Many, I replied.
It had fo appeared^
And what, faid he, were we to feek
the Perfedion of Sculpture, or of Paint-
ing ? Where fliould we inquire then ? —
Among the numerous common Artifls, or
among \}i\Qfew and celebrated ? Among
the Few, faid I. What if we were to
feek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory—
Where then ? Among the Few ftill.
M 3 What
Concerning HAPPINESS,
What if we were to feek the Per-
fedion of true Argument, or a found
Logic - — -Where then ? Still among
the Few. And is not true Argument,
or a found Logic, one of Reafon's greateft
FerfeBiom f It is. You fee then,
continued he, whence the Standard of
Reafon is to be fought— —'Tis from among
the Few, as we faid before, in fontradi-
flindion to the Standard of Nature,
I confefs, faid I, it appears fo.
And happy, faid he, for us, that Provi-
dence has fo ordered it happy for us, that
what ^Rational, depends not on the Multi-
tude ; or is to be tried by fo pitifiil a Tefl, as
the bare counting of Nofes. 'Tis bappy,
faid I, indeed-— But whence pray the Dif-
ference ? Why are the Many to determine
in Nature, and the Few only, in Reafon ?
To difcufs this at large, faid he,
would require fome time. It might in-
fenffbly perhaps draw us from our prefent
Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the
Reafon, in as few words as pollible ; which
ihouid they chance to be obfcure, be not
too
^Dialogue.
too folicltous for an Explanation.
I begged him to proceed his own way.
The Cafe, faidhe, appears to be this —
In Natural Works and Natural Operations,
we hold but one Efficient Caufe, and that
confummately wife. This Caufe in every
Species recognizing what Is beft^ and work-
ing ever uniformly according to this Idea of
PerfeBion, the Produ5lions and Ejtergies^ in
eveiy Species where it adls, are for the
^inoft ^2iViJimilar and exactly correfpondent*
If an Exception ever happen, it is from
fome hidden hic'her Motive, which tran-
fcends our Compreheniion, and whicx is
feen fo rarely, as not to injure the general
Rule, or render it doubtful and precarious.
On the contrary, in the Productions and
Energies of Reafon, there is not one Caule
but inffiite as many indeed, as there are
Agents of the Human Kind. Hen^.e Truth
being but one, and Error being infinite, and
Agents infinite rlib : what wonder they
/liould oftener rnifs, than hit the Mark ? —
that Multitudes ihouid fail^ wliere one alone
M 4 liic^
i68 Concenimg HAPPINESS,
Part I. fjcceeds, and Truth be only the PoirefTion
of the chofe?!^ fortunate Few "i You
fecm to have explained the Difficulty,
iaid I, with fufficient Perfpicuity.
L E T us then go back, faid he, and re-
collect ourfelves ; that we may not forget,
what 'tis we are feeking. I replied.
Moil willingly. We have been feek-
ing, continued he, the Sovereign Good, In
confequence of this Inquiry, we have dif-
covered that al! Things idhatever e>:ift to
the Human Species in the Relations of either
Furfuabk^ Avoidable^ or Lidifferent. To
determine thefe Relations with Accuracy,
we have been fcrutinizing the Human
Nature ; and that, upon this known
Maxim, that every Species luas its own
proper Standard \ and that where the Value
ofThings was dubious y there the Species was
to bejludied, and the Relations to be deduced y
which naturally flow, from it. The Refult
of this Scrutiny has been • — that we have
firft agreed IVlan to be a Social Animal j
and fince, to be a RationaL So that if wc
can
A Dialogue. 169
can be content with a defcriptive, concife Part I.
Sketch of Human Nature^ it will amount
to this — -that Man is a Social Rat
TioNAL Animal. I anfwered, It
had appeared fo.
§. 15. If then, faid he, we purfue our
Difquifitions, agreeably to this Idea of Hu-
man Nature, it will follow that all Things
will be Piirfudbky Avoidable, and Indiffe-
rent to Man, as they refpedt the Being
and Welfare of fuch a Social, Rational
Animal, I replied. They muft.
Nothing therefore in the firft place,
faid he, can be Purfuable, which is de-
JiruBive of Society. It cannot.
Ad:s therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and
all acquired by them, whether Wealth,
Power, Pleafure, or any thing, are evi-
dently from their very Charad:er not fit
to be purfued. They are not.
But it is impoffible not to purfue many
fuch things, unlefs we are furnifhed with
fome Hakit or Difpofition of Mind, by
which
ijo Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. which we are induced to render to all Men
their own^ and to regard the Welfare, and
Intereft of Society. It is impoiTible.
Bftt the Habit or Difpojition of ren-
dering to all their own^ and of regarding
the Welfare and Intereft of Society, is
Justice. It is. We may there-
fore fairly conclude, that Nothing is ?iatii-
rally Piirjiiable, but 'what is either correjpon-*
dent to Jujiice^ or at leaft not co?itra?')\
I confefs, faid I, fo it appears.
But farther, faid he— 'Tis poiTible we
may have the beft Difpofition to Society ;
the moft upright Intentions j and yet thro'
Want of Ahillty to difcern, and know the
Nature of Particulars, we may purfue
many things inconfillent, as well with our
Private Intereft, as the Public. We may
even purfue what is Right, and yet purfue
it in fuch a manner, as to find our Endea-
vours fruitlefs, and our Purpofes to fail,
I anfwered, 'Twas poHible.
But this would ill befit the Charader of ^
Rational Animal It would. It is
necef-
A Dialogue* 171
^leceflary therefore, we fhould be furnlflied Part I.
with fome Habit or Faculty^ inflmding us
how to difcern the real Difference of all
Particulars^ and fuggeftirtg the proper
Means, by which v/e may either avoid or
obtain them. It is. And what is
this, think you, but Prudence ?
I believe, faid I, it can be no other.
If it be, faid he, then 'tis evident from
this Reafoning, that Nothi?ig is purfuabky
'which is 7iot correjpondent to Prudence,
I replied, He had Ihewn it could not.
But farther flill, faid he — 'Tis poffible
we may neither want Prudence^ nor 'Jujiice
to dired us; and yet the Impulfes of Appe-
tite^ the Impetiiofities of Refentmenty the
Charms and Allurenients of a thoufand flat-
tering Objeds, may tempt us, in Ipite of
purfelves, to purfue what is both Imprii"
dettt, and Unjujl. They may. But
if fo, 'tis neceffary, would we purfue as
becomes our Character ^ that we fhould be
furnifhed with fome Habit, which may
moderate our E^c^Jfes 3 which may temper
our
172 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. our Adtions to the Standard of a Social
State, and to the Intereft and Welfare, not
of a Part, but of the Whole Man.
Nothing, faid I, more necefTary. And
what, faid he, can we call this Habit, but
the Habit of Temperance ? You
name it, faid I, rightly. If you think
fo, replied he, then Nothing can be Fur-
fuabky which is not either correfpondent to
'Tejnperance, or at leaft not contrary,
I replied. So it feemed.
Once more, continued he, and we have
done — 'Tis pofliblethat not ov\\y Refentment
and Appetite, not only the Charms and Al-
iu?'ements of external Obje(5ts, but the Ter-
rors too, and Dread of them may marr the
ReBitude of our Purpofes. 'Tis poffible.
Tyranny and Superftition may af-
fail us on one hand ; the Apprehenfions of
Ridicule, and a Falfe Shame on the other —
'Tis expedient, to withftand thefe, we fhould
be armed with fome Habit, or our wifefl
beft Purfuits may elfe at all times be de-
feated. They may. And what is
that
A Dialogue. 17^
that generous, manlike and noble Habit, Part I;
which fets us at all times above Fear and
Danger 5 what is it but Fortitu£)e?
I replied, It was no other. If fo
thSn, continued he, befides our former
Conclufions, Nothhig farther can be Ptir-
fiiabkj as our Inquiries now have fhewn
us, which is not either correfpondetit to For-^
tittide, or at leaft not contrary i I admit,
faid I, it is notj
Observe then, faid he, the Sum, the
Amount of our whole Reafoning No--
thi?ig is truly PUrfuable fofuch an Animal as
Man, except what is correfpondent, or ai
leaft not contrary, to Justice, Prudence,
Temperance and Foe:titude. I al-
low, faid I, it appears fo. But if no-
thing Purfuable, then nothing Avoidable or
Indifferent, but what is tried and eftimated
after the fame manner. For Contraries are
ever recognized thro' the fame Habit, one
with another. The fame Logic judges of
Truth and Falfhood; the fame Mufical
Art, of Concord and Difcord. So the fame
Mental
174 Concerning HAl^PINESS,
Part I. Mental Habitudes y of Things Avoidable and
Purfiiable, I replied, It appeared pro-
bable*
To how unexpedled a Conclufion then,
laid he, have our Inquiries infenfibly led
us ? In tracing the Source of Human
Adion, we have eftablifhed it to be thofe
Four Grand Virtues, which are
efleemed, for their Importance, the very
Hinges of all Morality,
We have*
But if fo, it fhould follow, that a Life^
whofe Purfuijigs and Auoidings are go-
verned by thefe Virtues, is that True and
Rational Life, which we have fo long
been feeking ; that Life, where the Value
cf all things is jujily meafured by thofe Re la-
tions, which they bear to the Natural Frame
and real Conjiitution of Mankind — in fewer
Words, A Life of Virtue appears to
be the Life according to Na-
ture. It appears fo.
But
^Dialogue/ 175
But mfuch a Life every Purfuit, every Part L
Avoiding^ (to include all) every ABion will
cf courfe admit of being rationally jujiified.
It will. But That^ which being
Done, admits of a Rational "Jujiijication^ is
the EfTence or genuine Charader of aa
Office^ or Moral Duty. For thus long
ago it has been defined by the beft * Au-
thorities. Admit it. If fo, then
A Life according to Virtue, is
A Life according to Moral
Offices orDuties. It appears
fo. But we have already agreed it, to
be a hife according to Nature. We
have. Obferve then: A Life ac-
cording to Virtue, according
to Moral Offices, and accord-
ing TO Nature, mean all the
same Thing, tho' 'varied in the Ex-
preffion. Your Remark, faid I, feems
juft.
* By Tully in his Offices, and by other Authors
of Antiquity,
176 Concerning HAPPINESS,^
fct I. §. 16. We need never therefor^, Re-
plied he, be at a lofs how to chufe, tho*
the Objects of Choice be ever fo infinite
and diverfified. As far as nothing is in-
conjijlent tvith fuch a Life and fiich a Cha-
raster ^ we may juftly fet E.tlftence before
Death ; prefer Health to Sicknefs ; Inte-
grity of the Limbs, to being maimed and
debilitated ; Pleafure to Pain ; Wealth to
Poverty; Fame to Diflionour; Free Go-
vernment to Slavery; Power and Magi-
flracy, to Subjection and a private State
Univerfally, whatever tends either to Being,
or to Well-Beings we may be juilified, when
we p?'efer to whatever appears the con-
trary. And when our feVeral Energies,
exerted according to the Virtues above,
have put us in PofTeffion of all that we
require : what then can there be wanting
to complete our Happinefs ; to render our
State perfeBly confonant to Nature ; or to
give us a more Sovereign Good; than that
which we now enjoy ? Nothing, re-
plied I, that I can at prefent think of
i^ Dialogue, 177
There would be nothing indeed, faid PartL
he, were our E7iergies never to fail-, were
elloMT Endeavours to be ever crowned with
due Succefs. But fuppofe the contrary——
Suppofe the worjl Siiccefs to the jnoji up-
right ConduB; to the v/ifeft Reilitude of
Energies and Adions. 'Tis poflibie, nay
Experience teaches us 'ds too often fact,
that not Only the Puriuers ' of what is co?:-
irary to Nature, but that thofe who purfue
nothing but what is firiBly coiigruous to if^
itiay mifi of their Aims, and be frrijlrated
in their Endeavours. Inquilitors and Monks
may deteft them for their Viittie, and
purfue them with all the Engines of
Malice and Inhumanity. Without thefe,
Pefts may afflid: their Bodies j Inunda-
tions o'erwhelm their Property; or what
is worfe than Inundations, either Ty-
rants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They
may fee their Country fall, and with
it their braveft Countrymen ; themfelves
pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or
N perifhing
178 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti, perifhing with the reft in the general
MafTacre.
* cadit & Ripheus, jujlijjimus units
^ifuif in Teucrisy & fervantijpmus aqui.
It muft be owned, faidi, this has too often
been the Cafe^
Or grant, continued he, that thele
greater Events never happen that the
Part allotted us, be not in the Tragedy of
Life, but in the Comedy. Even the Comic
Dijireffes are abundantly irkfome
Domeftic Jars, the ill Offices of Neigh-
bours Sulpicions, Jealoulies, Schemes
defeated The Folly of Fools -, the
Knavery of Knaves j from which, as Mem-
bers of Society, 'tis impoffible to detach
ourfelves.
Where
*
iENElD. 1. 2. V. 426,
A Dialogue,
179
Where then fliall we turn, or what Part I,
have we to imagine ? We have at length
placed Happiness, after much Inquiry, in
ATTAINING the pHfnary andjujl Requifites
of our Nature, by a Co?2du£f fui fable to Virtue
and Moral Office. But as to correfponding
with our F re-conceptions (which we have
made the Tefc) does this Syflem correfpond
better, than thofe others, which we have
rejedted ? Has it not appeared from various
Fadls, too obvious to be difputed, that in
many T^imes and Places it may be abfolutely
unattainable ? That in many, where it
exifts, it may in a moment be cancelled, and
put irretrievably out of our Power, by
Events not to be refifled^ If this be certain,
and I fear it cannot be queflioned, our
fpecious long Inquiry, however accurate
we may believe it, has not been able to
(hew us a Good, of that Charadter which
we require J a Good Durable, Indepri-
vable, and Accommodate to .^every Circum^
Jiance Far from it Oiir Speculations
N 2 (I
i8o Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. (I think) rather lead us to that low Opinion
of Happinefs, which you may remember
you * exprefTed, when we iirfl began the
Subject. They rather help to prove to us^
that inftead of a Sovereign Goody 'tis the
more probable Sentiment, there is no fuch
Good at alh I fliould indeed, faid I,
fear fo. For where, continued he,
lies the Difference, whether we purfue
what is congruous to Naftiire, or not con-
gruous -J il \}i\t Acquififion oi one be as dif-
ficulty as of the other ^ and the Pojfejion of
both equally doiihtful and precarious'^ If
Cafar fall, in attempting his Country's
Ruin J and Brutus fare no better, who only
fought in its Defence ? It muft be
owned, faid I, thefe are melancholy Truths^,
and the Inftances, which you alledge, too
well confirm them.
We were in the midfl of thefe ferious
ThoughtSj defcanting upon the Hardfhips
and
5 See p. III.
^Dialogue, i8i
and Miferies of Life, when by an Inci- Part I.
dent, not worth relating, our Speculations
were interrupted. Nothing at the time,
I thought, could have happened more un-
luckily our Queflion perplexed - — - its
Ifllie uncertain — ^ and myfelf impatient to
know the Event. Neceffity however was
not to be relifted, and thus for the prefent
oiir Inquiries wpre poflponed,
/
N 3 CON-
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS,
DIALOGUE.
PART the Second.
BRUTUS perijhed wttimely, and Part II.
Caefar did no more — Thefe Words
I was repealing the next day to
myfelf, when my Friend appeared, and
chearfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could
not return his Compliment with an equal
Gaiety, being intent, fomewhat more than
ufual, on what had paiTed the day before.
Seeing this, he propofed a Walk into the
Fields. The Face of Nature, f^iid he,
will perhaps difpel thefe Glooms. No
Affiilance, on my part, ihall be wanting,
N 4 you
:84 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 11. you may be aflured. I accepted his Pro-
pofal; the Walk began; and our former
Converfation infcniibly renewed.
Brutus, faid he, perijhed untimely, and
Caeiar did no more 'Twas thus, as I re-
meniber, riot long lince you >Yere expref-
ilng yourfelf. And yet fuppofe their For-
tunes to have been exadly parallel — —
Which would you have preferred ? Would
you have .been Ccefar or Brutus f
Brutus J replied J, beyond all controverfy.
He afked me, Why ? Where was the Dif-
ference, when their Fortunes, as we now
iiippofed them, were coniidered as the fame?
There feems, faid I, abflradl from
the'iv For times J fomething, I know not what,
intrinjically preferable in the Life and Cha-
ra<fter of Brutus, If that, faid he, be
true, then muft we derive it, not from the
Succefs of his Endeavours, but from their
'Truth and Rectitude. He had the Comfort
to be confcious, that his Caufe was a juft
one. 'Twas impofTible the other fhould
have
A Dialogue. 1^5
have any fuch Feeling. I believe, Part 11.
faid Fj^you have explained it.
Suppose then, continued he, ('tis but
merely an Hypothefis) fuppofe, I fay, v^e
were to place the Sovereign Good in fuch
aReBitude of ConduB i?i the Conduct
merely^ a?id not in the Event. Suppofe
we were to fix our Happiness, not in the
aBual Attainment of that Health, that Per-
fedion of a Social State, that fortunate
Concurrence of Externals, which is con-
gruous to our Nature, and which we have
a Right all to purfue ; but folely fix it in
the mere Doing whatever is correfpondent
to fiich an End:^ even tho' we ne^er attain,
or are near attaining k. In fewer words —
What if we make our Natural State the
Standard only to determine our Conduct 3 and
place our Happinefs iii the ReBitude of this
Condu5i alone? On fuch an Hypothefis
(and we confider it as nothing farther) we
fhould not want a Gc(yd' perhaps, to cor-
refpond to our P re-conceptions ; for this, 'tis
evident, would be correfpondent to them
alL
i86 Concernmg HAPPINESS,
Fart II. all. Your Dodrine, replied I, is fo
new and flrange, that tho' you been copi-
ous in explaining, I can hardly yet com^
prehend you. *
It amounts all, faid he, but to this
Place your Happhiefs, where your Praife
is, I afked, Where he fuppofed
that ? Not, replied he, in the Plea-
ilires which you feel, more than your
Difgrace lies in the Pain— — not in the
cafuai Prolperity of Fortune, more than
your Difgrace in the cafuai Adverfity <
but in juj} complete ASlion throughout every
Part of Life J what ever be the Face of
things, whether favourable or the con-^
trary.
But why then, faid I, (uch. Accuracy
about Externals f So much Pains to be in-
formed, what are Purfuable^ what Avoid-^.
able f It behoves the Pilot, replied he,
to know the Seas and the Winds j the
Nature of Tempefts, Calms and Tides,
They are the SubjeBs^ about which his Art
is
A Dialogue. 1^7
is converfant. Without a juft Experience Part II,
of them, he can never prove himfelf an
Artijl. Yet we look not for his Reputa-.
tlon either in fair Gales, or in adverjey
but in the Skiljulnefs of his ConduB, be thefe
Events as they happen. In like manner
fares it with this the Moral Artift. He, for
a SubjeBy has the Whole of Human Life
Health and Sicknefs ; Pleafure and Pain ;
with every other poflible Incident, which
can befal him during his Exiilence. If his
Knowledge of all thefe be accurate and
exadt, fo too mufl his CondiiSly in which
we place his Happinefs, But if this Knoiv^
ledge be defedtive, muft not his CondiiSl be
defective alfo ? I replied. So it fhould
feem. And if his Condud, then his
Happinefs ? 'Tis true.
You fee then, continued he, even the'
Externals were as nothing ; tho' 'twas true,
in their own Nature, they were neither
Good nor Evil-, yet an accurate Knowledge
of them is, from our Hypothefis, abfolutely
neceffary.
i88 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. necejfary. Indeed, faid I, you have
proved it.
He continued— —Inferior Artifls may be
at a jftand, becaufe they want Materials.
From their Stubbomefs and IntraB ability ^
they may often be difappointed. But as
long as hife is paffing, and Nature con-
tinues to operate, the Moral Artiji of Life
has at all times, all he defires. He can
never want a Subject fit to exercife him in
his proper Calling ; and that, with this
happy Motive to the Conftancy of his
Endeavours, that, the croffer, the harfher,
the more untoward the E've?its^ the greater
his Praife, the more illuftrious his Repu-
tation.
All this, faid I, is true, and cannot be
denied. But one Circumiiance there ap-
pears, v/here your Similes feem to fail.
The Praife indeed of the Pilot we allow
to be in his Conduct > but 'tis in the Succefs
of that Condu(5t, wliere we look for his
Hapfinefs. If a Storm arife, and the Ship
be
A Dialogue,' 189
be loft, we call him not happy ^ how Well Part IL
foever he may have condud:ed. 'Tis then
only we congratulate him, when he has
reached the defired Haven. Your
Diftindion, faid he, is juft. And 'tis here
lies the noble Prerogative of Moral Arttfl^y
above all others But yet I know not how
to explain myfelf, I fear my Dodrine will
appear fo ftrange. You may proceed,
faid I fafely, fince you advance it but as an
HypothefiSi
Trius then, continued he The£)W
in others Arts is ever dijlant and removed.
It Gonlifts not in the mere ConduBi much
lefs in a fmgle Energy j but is the juji Re^
fult of ?nany Energies^ each of which are
elTential to it. Hence, by Obftacles un-
avoidable, it may often be retarded: Nay
more, may be fo embarafled, as never pof-
fbly to be attained. But in the Moral Art
of Life, the very Conduct is the Endj
the very ConduB^ I fay, itfelf, throughout
every its minuteji Energy j becaufe each of
thefe, however minute, partake as truly of
Re^itude^
^90 Concernmg HAPPINESS,
Part II. ReBitudey as the large ft Combination of them ^
when confidered collectively. Hence of
all Arts is this the only one perpetually
complete in every Injlant, becaufe it needs
not, like other Arts, l^ime to arrive at that
Perfedlion, at which in every Inftant 'tis
arrived already. Henc?e by Duration it is
not rendered either more or lefs perfecft;
Completion^ like Truth, admitting of no
Degrees, and being in no fenfe capable of
either Intenfion or RemiJJion. And hence
too by neceflary Connexion (which is a
greater Paradox than all) even that Happi^
nefs or Sovereign Goody the End of this
Moral Art, is itfelf too, in every Inflant^
Confummate and Complete ; is neither heigh-
tened or diminified by the Quantity of its
Duration^ but is the fame to its Enjoyers,
for a Moment or a Century,
Upon this I fmiled. He afked me
the Reafon. 'Tis only to obferve, faid I,
the Courfe of our Inquiries A new Hy-
pothefis has been advanced Appearing
fomewhat flrange, it is defired to be ex-
plained--^
A Dialogue. l^i
plained You comply with the Requeft, Part IL
and, in purfuit of the Explanation, make
it ten times more obfcure and unintelligible^
than before. 'Tis but too often the
Fate, faid he, of us Commentators. But
you know in fuch cafes what is ufually
done. When the Comment will not ex-
plain the Text, we try whether the Text
will not explain itfelf. This Method, 'tis
pofTible, may affill us here. The Hypo-
thefis, which we would have illuftrated,
was no more than this That the Sove^
reign Good lay in ReBitude of ConduB j and
that this Good correfponded to all our Pre^
conceptions. Let us examine then, whether,
upon trial, this Correfpondence will appear
to hold; and, for all that we have advanced
lince, fuffer it to pafs, and not perplex us.
Agreed, faid I, willingly, for nov/
I hope to comprehend you.
§. 2. Recollect then, faid he. Do you
not remember that one P re-concept ion of the
Sovereign Good was, to be accommodate to
all Times and Places f I remember it.
And
192 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. And is there any Time^ or any Places
whence ReBitude of ConduEl may be ex-
eluded^ Is there not a right Adion in
Profperity, a right Addon in Adverfity ? —
May there not be a decent^ generous, and
laudable Behavioiiry not only in Peace, in
Power, and in Health; but in War, in
Oppreffion, in Sicknefs and in Death ?
There may.
And what fliall we fay to thofe other
Tre-conceptiom to being Durable^ Self-
derivedy and Indeprivable ^ Gan there be
any Good fo Durabky as the Power of al-
ways doing right ? Is there any Good con-
ceiveable, fo intirely beyond the Power of
ethers f Or, if you hefitate, and are doubt-
ful, I would willingly be informed, into
what Gircumflances may Fortune throw a
brave and honeft Man, where it fhall not
be in his Power to a£i bravely a?id honejily f
If there are no fuch, then Re&itude of Con-
diiBy if a Goody is a Good Ljdeprivable.
I confefs, faid I, it appears fo.
But
^Dialogue. 193
But farther, faid he Another Pre-FurtU.
conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be
Agreeable to Nature, It was. And
can any thing be more agreeable to a
Rational and Social Animal, than Rational
and Social Condu6l ? Nothing. But
ReSlitiide of Co7idu5l is with us Rational and
Social CojiduSt, It is.
Once more, continued he— Another
Pre-^conception of this Good was, to be Cojt-
ducive, not to Mere-being, but to Well-
being. Admit it. And can any
thing, believe you, conduce fo probably to
the Well-being of a Rational Social Animal,
as the right Exercife of that Reafon, and of
thofe Social AffeBiom ? Nothing.
And v/hat is this fame Exercife, but the
higheft ReSlitude of Conduct ^ Certainly.
§.3. You fee then, faid he, how well
our Hypothefis, being once admitted, tal-
lies with our Original Pre-co?2ceptio?2S of
the Sovereign Good, I replied, it in-
O deed
194 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. deed appeared fo, and could not be denied.
But who, think you, ever dreamt of a
Happinefs like this ? A Happinefs depen-
dent, not on the Succefs^ but on the Aim ?
Even common and ordinary Life,
replied he, can furnifh us with Examples.
Afk of the Sportfman where lies his En-
joyment ? Afk whether it be in the Pof-
fejjion of a flaughter'd Hare, or Fox ? He
would rejed, with Contempt, the very
Suppofition He would tell you, as well
as he was able, that the Joy was in the
Purfuit in the Difficulties which are ob-
viated; in the Faults, which are retrieved;
in the CondiiB and Diredion of the Chace
thro' all its Parts that the Completion of
their Endeavours was fo far from giving
them Joy, that inflantly at that Period all
their Joy was at an end. For Sportf-
men, replied I, this may be no bad Rea-
foning. It is not the Sentiment, faid he,
of Sportfmen alone. The Man of Gal-
lantry not unoften has been found to think
after the fame manner.
— Mem
^Dialogue. 195
— — ^' Mens eft anior huic Jimilis -y nam Piirt IT.
Tranfuolat in medio pojita^ ^ fiigienti a capiat.
To thefe we may add the Tribe of Buil-
ders and Projeflors. Or has not your own
Experience informed you of Numbers,
who, in the Building and haying-out ^ have
cxprelTed the highefl; Delight j but fhewn
the utmoil: Indifference to the Rejult of their
Labours, to the Manlion or Gardens, when
©nee liniihed and complete ?
The Truth, faid t, of thefe Examples
is not to be difputed. But I could wifla
your Hypotheiis had better than thefe to
fupport it. In the ferioiis Fieiv of Happi-
nefsy do you ever imagine there were any,
who could iix it (as we faid before) not
on the Siiccefsy but on the j^im ?
More, even in this light, faid he, than
perhaps at firll you may imagine. There
are Inflances innumerable of Men, bad^i^
well as goody who having fixed, as their
Ainiy a certain ConduSl of their own, have
O 2 '^o
* HoR. Sat. II. L. I. V. 107.
196 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. fo far attached their Welfare and Happinefi
to it, as to deem all Events in its Profecu-
tion, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to
be mean, contemptible, and not worthy their
Regard. I called on him for Examples.
What think you, faid he, of the Af-
faffin, who flew the firfl Pri?ice of Orange ;
and who, tho' brought by his Condud: to
the moll exquifite Tortures, yet cojifcious
of what he had done, could bear them all
unmoved ? Or (if you will have a better
Man) what think you of that flurdy Roman^
who would have difpatched Porfenna j and
who, full of his Defign, and fuperior to
all Events, could thruft a Hand into the
Flames with the fleadiefl Intrepidity ?
I replied. That thefe indeed were very un-
common Inftances.
Attend too, continued he, to Epi-
cur us dying, the Founder of a Philofophy,
little favouring of Enthifiafm " This I
" write you (fays he, in one of his Epiftles)
«« while the laji Day of Life is pajfmg, and
« that
(C
(C
A Dialogue. 197
" that a Happy One, The Faim indeed of Paxt II.
*' my Body are not capable of being height
*' tened. Tet to thefe we oppofe that foy of
the Souly which arifes from the Mejnory
of our paft speculations,'' Hear him,
confbnant to this, in another Place ailert-
ing, that a Ratiojial Adverfty was better
than a7i Irrational Profperity,
And what think you ? Had he not
placed his Good and Happinefs in the fup-
pofed ReSiitude of his Opinions^ would he
not have preferred Profperity, at all rates,
to Adverfty f Would not the Pains, of
which he died, have made his Happinefs
perfed Mifery ? And yet, you fee, he
difowns any fuch thing. The Memory of
his paft Life, and of his Philofophical In-
ventions were, even in the Hour of Death
it feems, a Counterpoife to fupport him.
It muft be owned, faid I, that you
appear to reafon juftly.
Pass from Epicurus, continued he, to
Socrates. What are the Sentiments of that
O 3 divine
1 9S Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. divine Man, fpeaking of his own unjuft
Condemnation ? " O CritOj fays he, if it
*^ be pk^Jing to thC' Gods this way\ then be
'< it this wayy And again- — " Anytus
" and Melitus, I grants can kill me-, but
" to hurt or injure rne^ is beyond their
*^ Power.''' It would not have been be-
yond it, had he thought his Welfare de-
pendent on any thing they could do ; for
tlicy v/ere then doing their worft— •--,^—
Whence then was it beyond them ?- — t-
Becaufe his Happinefs was derived not
from without J but from within j not from
the Succefs, which perhaps was due to the
Reditude of his Life, but from that Re^i-^
tude alone, every other thing difregarded.
He had not, it feems, fo far renounced his
own Dodrine, as not to remember his
former Words ; that " ^0 whom ever
" all things, co?iducive to Heppinejs, are de-
'ivcd folely^ or at leafi nearly from him-
felf\ and depend not on the Welfare or
" Adverfity of others^ from the Variety of
" whofe Condition his OFivn mifl 'vary aJfo :
*' Jle it is, who has prepared to himflf the
i' moji
cc ^^
<c
(C
.^Dialogue. 1-99
•* mqji excellent of all Lives^-^-He it is^ who Part II.
" is the Temperate, the Prudent, and the
" Brave He it is, ivho, when Wealth or
" Children either come or are taken away,
" will befi obey the Wife Man's Precept
For neither will he be feen to grieve, nor
to rejoice in excefs, from the Trujl and
" Confidence which he has repofcdin himfelf*
— You have a Sketch at leafl of his Mean-
ing, tho' far below his own Attic and truly-
elegant Expreffion. I grant, faid I,
your Example ; but this and the reft are
but fingle Inftances, What are three or
four in Number, to the whole of Hu-
man Kind ?
If you are for Numbers, replied he,
what think you of the numerous Race of
Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have
joyfully met Death, rather than defert their
Country, when in danger ? They muft
have thought furely on another Happinefs
than Succefs, when they could gladly go,
where they faw Death often inevitable.
Or what think you of the many Martyrs
O 4 for
200 Concerning HAPPINESS,.
Part II. for Syftems wrong as well as right, who
have dared defy the worft, rather than
fwerve from their Belief? You have
brought indeed, faid I, more Examples
than could have been imagined.
Besides, continued he, what is that
Comfort of a Good Conscience, cele-
brated to fuch a height in the Religion
which we profefs, but the Joy arifing from
a Confcience of right Energies; a Con-
fcience of having done nothing, but what
is confonant to our Duty ? I replied.
It indeed appeared fo.
Even the Vulgar, continued he, re-
cognize a Good of this very Character,
when they fay of an Undertaking, tho' it
fucceed not^ that they are contented-, that
they have dofie their beji, and can accufc
themfelves of nothing. For what is this,
but placing their Content, their Good, their
Hdppinefs, not in the Succefs of Endeavours,
but in the ReElitude ? If it be not the
Reditude which contents them, you muil
tell
./f Dialogue. 201
tell me what 'tis elfe. It appears, Part IL
replied I, to be that alone.
I HOPE then, continued he, that
tho' you accede not to this Notion of
Happinefs, which I advance; you will at
leafl allow it not to be fuch a Paradox, as
at iirfl you feemed to imagine. That
indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.
§. 4. Granting me this, faid he, you
encourage me to explain myfelf- — We have
fuppofed the Sovereign Good to lie in ReBi-
tude of Condu5l, We have. And
think you there can be Redlitude of Con-
dud:, if we do not live conjifiently ?
In what Senfe, faid I, would you be un-
derftood ? To live confiJtently\ faid he,
is the fame with me, as To live agreeably ta
fome one Jingle and conjonant Scheme, or Pur^
fofe. Undoubtedly, faid I, without this,
there can be no Red:itude of Condud:.
All KeBitude of Condud: then, you fay,
implies fuch Conjifience. It does.
And does all Conjijtence, think you, imply
fuch
202 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Partll. fuch Rcdlitiide^ I afked him, Whj
not ? 'Tis poffible, indeed it may,
faid he, for aught we have difcovered yet
to the contrary. But what if it fhould
be found that there may be numberlefs
Schemes, each in particular confiftent with
itfelf, but yet all of them different y and
fome perhaps contrary ? There may, you
know, be a co7iliJle?it Life of Knavery, as
well as a confiftent Life of Honefty ; there
may be a ujiiform Practice of Luxury, as
well as of Temperance, and Abftemiouf-
nefs. Will the Confiftence, common to all
cfthefe Lives y render the ConduB in each,
right ? It appears, faid I, an Abfur-
ditv, that there fhould be the fame Recfti"*
tude in two Contraries. If fo^ faid he,
we mufl: look for fomething more than
inere Confiftence^ when we fearch for that
Rediitude^ which we at ' prefent talk of.
A confiftent Life indeed is requifite, but
that alone is not enough. We muft de-
termine its peculiar Species^ if we would
be accurate and exacft. It indeed ap-
pears, faid Ij necellary.
Nor
A Dialogue. 203
Nor is any thing, continued he, more Part IL
cafy to be dilcuffed. For what can that
peculiar Conjifience of Life be elfe, than a
Life, whofe feveral Parts are not only con-
fbnant to each other, but to the Nature
alfo of the Being, by whom that Life
has been adopted ? Does not this laji De-
gree of Confidence appear as requifite as
th.^ former^ I anfwered. It could not
be otherwife.
You fee then, faid he, the true Idea
of right Condud:. It is not, merely To
live conJiJle?2tly -y but 'tis To live conjijlently
ivith Nature. Allow it.
But what, continued he ? Can we live
confiftently with Nature, and be at a lofs
how to behave ourfelves ? We cannot.
And can we know how to behave
Gurfelves, if we know nothing of what
befah us-, nothing of thofe Things and
Events, which perpetually furround, and
iifFed us ? We cannot. You fee
then,
204 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 11. then, continued he, how we are again
fallen infenlibly into that Doctrine, which
proves the Neceffity o^ fcrutinizmg, and
knowing the Value of Externals, I re-
plied, 'Twas true. If you affent, faid he,
to this, it will of courfe follow, that, To
live confiftently with Nature^ is. To live
agreeably to ajujl Experience of thofe Things j
which happen around us. It appears fo.
But farther flill, faid he. — Think you
any one can be deemed to live agreeably
to fuch ExperiencCy if he felecl not, as
far as poffible, the things mofl congruous
to his Nature f He cannot. And by
the fame Rule, as far as poffible, muft he
not reje^ fuch as are contrary ? He
muft. And that not occafionally, as
Fancy happens to prompt -, but Jieadilyy
conjlantlyy and without Remiffion.
I fhould imagine fo. You judge, faid
he, truly. Were he to adt otherwife in
the leaft inflance, he would faliify his
Profeffions ; he would not live according
10 that Experience, v^^hich we now fup-
pofe
A Dialogue. 205
pofe him to pofTefs. I replied, He Part IL
would not.
It fhould feem then, faid he, from
hence, as a natural Confequence of what
we have admitted, that the EJJence of
right Condndt lay in Selection and
Rejection. So, faid I, it has ap-
peared. And that fuch Sele5lion and
Rejection fliould be confonant with our pro-
sper Nature. 'Tis true. And be
Jieady and perpetual^, not occaiional and in-
terrupted. 'Tis true. But if this be
the ElTence of Right Condudt^ then too it
is the EfTence of our Sovereign Good-, for
in fuch Condud: we have fuppofed thii
Good to conlifi:. We have.
See then, faid he, the Refult of our
Inquiry. — The Sovereign Good, as
conftituted hy ReSfitude ofCondu6l^ has, on
our ftridteft Scrutiny, appeared to be this— -
To LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS
FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS
TO Nature, and rejecting what is
CON-
2o6 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. CONTRARY, MAKING OUR EnD THAT*
Selecting and that Rejecting only*
*Tis true, faid I, fo it appears.
§.5. Before we haften then farther^
iaid he, let us ftop to recoiled;, and fee
whether our prefent Conclulions accord
with our former. — We have now fuppofed
the Sovereign Good to be Re5titude of Con-
dudf, and this CondiiB we have made con-
fift in a certain SeleBi77g and RejeBing.
We have. And do you not imagine
that the SeleBing and RejeStijig^ which we
propofe, as they are purely governed by
the Standard of Nature, are capable in
every inftance of being rationally jujiijied^
I replied, I thought they were.
But if they admit a rational "Jujlijicationy
then are they Moral Offices or Duties-,
for thus * you remember yefterday a Moral
Office was defined. It was. But
if fo, 'To live in the Pra£lice of them^ will
be
* Sup. p. 175.
A Dialogue. 207
be To live in the Difcharge of Moral Offices, Part II.
It will. But To live in the Dif-
charge of thefe, is the fame as Living ac-
cording to Virtue J and Living according to
Nature. It is. So therefore is
Living in that SeleBion, and in that Rejec-
tion, which we propofe. It is.
We need never therefore be at a lofs,
faid he, for a Defcrlption of the Sove-
reign Good.- We may call it. Rec-
titude of Conduct. If that be too
contracted, we may enlarge and fay, 'tis-^
To live perpetually Selecting and
Rejecting according to the Stan-
dard OF OUR Being. If we are for
flill different Views, we may fay 'tis.
To live in the Discharge of Mo-
ral Offices — To live according to
Nature To live according to
Virtue -To live according to
Just Experience of those Things,
WHICH happen around US. Like
fome finiflied Statue, \ve may behold it
every way; 'tis the fame Objed:, tho'
varioufly
2o8 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. varloufly viev/ed ; nor is there a View,
but is natural, truly graceful, and en-
gaging-
§. 6. I CANNOT deny, faid I, but
that as you have now explained it, your
Hypothefis feems far more plaufible, than
when firll it was propofed. You will
believe it, faid he, more fo ftill, by con-
fidering it with more Attention. In the
firft place, tho' perhaps it efteem nothing
really Good but Virtue, nothing really
Evil, but Vice, yet it in no manner
takes away the Differejice, and DiJtinSlion
of other l^hings. So far otherwife, it is
for eftabliiliing their Difi:ind:ion to the
greateft Accuracy. For were this negledl-
ed, what would become of SeleBion and
KejeBiony thofe important Energies, which
are its very Soul and EiTence ? Were there
no Difference, there could be no Choice.
'Tis true, faid I, there could not.
Again, faid he. It is no meagre, mor-
tifying Syflem of Sclf-dejilal-^lt fupprefles
no
A Dialogue. 209
no Social and Natural Affedions, nor takes Part II.
away any Social and Natural Relations
It prefcribes no Abflainings, no Forbear-
ances out of Nature ; no gloomy, fad, and
lonely Rules of Life, without which 'tis
evident Men may be as honeft as with^
and be infinitely more ufeful and worthy
Members oi Society. It refufes no Plea-
fure, not inconfiftent with Temperance
It rejeds no Gain, not inconfiftent with
Jtijiice Univerfally, as far as Virtue
neither forbids nor diffuades^ it endeavours
to render Life, even in the mofl 'uulgar
Acceptation, as chearful, joyouSj and eaiy
as poffible. Nay, could it mend the Condi-
tion of Exiftence in any the ??ioJi trivial Ck^
cumflance, even by adding to the amplefl
Pofleffions the pooreft meaneft Utenfil, it
would in no degree contemn an Addition
even fo mean. Far other wife It would
confider, that to negled: the leaft Acqui-
fition, when fairly in its power, would
be to fall fhort of that perfeSi and accurate
ConduB, which it ever has in view, and
on which alone all depends,
P And
2IO Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. And yet, tho' thus exadl in every the
minuteft Circumftance, it gives us no Soli-
citude as to what Ra?ik we maintain in
Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy
or poor J whether merged in Bufinefs, or
confined to Inadivity, it is equally cojtfiftent
with eijery Condition, and equally capable
of adorning them all. Could it indeed
choofe its own Life, it would be always
that, where moft focial AfFedlions might
exteniively be exerted, and mofl: done to
contribute to the Welfare of Society. But
if Fate order otherwife, and this be de-
nied ; its Intentions are the fame, its En-
deavours are not wanting; nor are the
Social, Rational Powers forgotten, even in
Times and Circumflances, where they can
leaft become conipicuous.
It teaches us to confider Life, as one
great important Drama, where we have
each our Part allotted us to ad;. It tells
us that our Happifiefs, as ASfors in this
Drama, confifts not in the Length of our
Part,
yf Dialogue. 211
Part, nor in the State and Dignity, but in Part II.
the juftj the decent ^ and the natural Per-
fonnance.
If its Aims are fuccefsful, it is thankful
to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, de-
rived from their Succefs, and feels them as
fully, as thofe who know 720 other Happi-
nefs. The only Difference is, that having
a more excellent Good in view, it fixes not,
like the Many, its Happinefs on Siiccefs
alone, well knowing that in fuch cafe, if
Endeavours fail, there can be nothing left
behind but Murmurings and Mifery. On
the contrary, when this happens, 'tis then
it retires into itfelf, and refleding on what
is Fair^ what is Laudable and Honejl (the
truly beatific Vifion, not of 7nad Enthufiajls^
but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wile
and the Good) it becomes fuperioiir to all
Events -y it acquiefces in the Confcioufnefs of
its own ReSlitiide 'y and, like that Manlion
founded, not on the Sands, but on the
Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Tempefl
and Inundation.
p 2 % 7.
212 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. §.7. Here he paufed, and I took the
Opportunity to obferve, how his Subject
had warmed him into a degree of Rap-
ture 'j how greatly it had raifed both his
Sentiments and his Stile. No wonder,
faid he. Beauty of every kind excites our
Love and Admiration ; the Beauties of
Art, whether Energies or Worh ; the
Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or
Inanimate. And fliall we exped: lefs from
this Supreme Beauty -, this moral, mental,
and original Beauty ; of which all the reft
are but as liypes or Copies"^ Not how-
ever by high Flights to lofe Sight of our
Subjed:, the whole of what we have ar-
gued, may be reduced to this—
All Men pursue Good, and would
be happy, if they knew howj not happy
for Minutes, and mJferable for Hours, but
happy, if poffible, thro' eve7j Part of their
JLxifience, Either therefore there is a
Good of this fie ady durable Kind, or there
is none, \1 none, then all Good muft be
tranfent
^Dialogue. 213
tranfient and uncertain ; and if fo, an Oh- Part 11.
jeB of loweji Valiie^ which can little de-
fer ve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But
if there be a better Good, fuch a Good as
we are feeking ; like every other thing, //
muji be derived from fotm Caufe j and that
Caufe muft be either exteinial^ internal^ or
mixt, in as much as except thefe three,
there is no other poffible. Now ajieady,
durable Good, cannot be derived from an
external Caufe, by reafon all derived from
Externals mufl jluBuate, as they fluSiuate,
By the fame Rule, not from a Mixture of
the Two; becaufe the P^r/ which is external
will proportionally dejlroy its EJfence. What
then remains but the Caufe internal; the
very Caufe which we have fuppofed, when
we place the Sovereign Good in Mind; in
ReBitude of ConduB-, in juft Sele6iing and
RejeBi?2g? There feems indeed no
other Caufe, faid I, to which we cap pof-
libly aifign it.
Forgive me then, continued he,
fliould I appear to boaft We have
P 3 proved.
214 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. proved, or at leafl: there is an Appearance
we have proved, that, either there is no
Good except this of our own ; or that, if
there be any other, 'tis not worthy our Re-
gard, It muft be confefTed, faid I,
you have faid as much, as the Subjed: feems
to admit.
§.8. By means then, faid. he, of our
Hypothelis, behold one of the faireft, and
moft amiable of Objeds, behold the
TRUE AND PERFECT Man: that Or^
nament of Humanity ; that Godlike Being ;
who, without regard either to Pleafure or
Fain, uninfluenced equally by either Profpe-
rity or Adverflty, fuperiour to the World and
its beft and worfi Events, can fairly reft his
All upon the ReBitude of his own ConduB 5
can conjlantly, and uniformly, and manfully
maintain it ; thinking that, and that alone ^
wholly fifficient to make him happy.
And do you ferioufly believe, faid I,
there ever was fach a Charader ? And
what, replied he, if I ihould admit, there
never
A Dialogue. 215
ne^er ivas, is, or will be fuch a Chara5ler f — Part II.
that we have been talking the whole time
of a Being, not to be found j
AfaultlefsMonJler^which the World ne'erfawf
Suppofing, I fay, we admit this, what then?
Would not your Syflem in fuch a cale,
faid I, a little border upon the chimerical ?
I only aik the Queftion. You need
not be fo tender, he replied, in expreffing
yourfelf. If it be falfe, if it will not in-
dure the Teft, I am as ready to give it up,
as I have been to defend it. He muft be a
poor Philofopher indeed, who, when he fees
Truth and a Syjiem at variance, can ever
be folicitous for the Fate of a Syftem.
But tell me, I pray Do you objed
to mine, from its Perfe^ion, or from its
ImperfeSlion? From its being too excel-
lent for Human Nature, and above it; or
from its being too bafe, and below it ?
It feems to require, faid I, a PerfeBion^
to which no Individual ever arrived.
That very Tranfcendence, laid he, is an
P 4 Argu-
2i6 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. Argument on its behalf. Were it of a
Rank inferior, it would not be that Per-
fedlion, which we feek. Would you
have it, faid I, beyond Nature ? If you
mean, replied he, beyond any particular or
individual Nature^ moft undoubtedly I
would. As you are a Lover of Painting,
y^ fliall hear a Story on the Subjed.
"In ancient days, while Greece was
flourifliing in Liberty and Arts, a cele-
brated Painter, having drawn many ex-
" cellent Pidures for a certain free State,
" and been generoufly and honourably re-
" warded for his Labours, at lafl made
" an Offer to paint them a Helen ^ as a
" Model and Exemplar of the mofl ex-
<* quilite Beauty. The Propofal was rea-
" dily accepted, when the Artift informed
" them, that in order to draw one Fair,
** 'twas neceflary he fhould contemplate
" 7nany. He demanded therefore a Sight
" of all their finell; Women. The State,
^« to alTift the Work, aifented to his Re-
f' quefl. They were exhibited before
" him 5
cc
A Dialogue. 217
*« him ; he feledted the moft beautiful 3 Part II.
" and from thefe formed his Hehiy more
« beautiful than them all."
You have heard the Fadl, and what
are we to infer? Or can there be any
other Inference than this that the Stan-
dard of PerfeSiioUy with refpeSi to the
Beauty of Bodies, was not (as this Artifl
thought) to be difcovered in any Individual %
but being difperfed by Nature in Portions
thro' the many, was from thence, and thence
only, to be colleBed and recognized^
It appears, faid I, he thought fo. The
Pifture, continued he, is loft, but we have
Statues ftill remaining. If there be Truth
in the Teftimony of the beft and fairefl:
Judges, no Woman ever equalled the De-
licacy of the Medicean Venus, nor Man the
Strength and Dignity of the Farnhefian
Hercules, 'Tis generally, faid I, fo
believed.
And will you, faid he, from this unpa-
jralelkd and tranfcendent Excellence, deny
thefe
2i8 Ccncerning HAPPINESS,
Fart II. thefe Works of Art to be truly and ftridtly
Natural? Their Excellence, replied I,
mufl be confefled by All; but how they
can be cajled ^o flridly Natural^ I muft
own a little flartles me. That the
Juimbs and their ProportionSy faid he, are
feledled from Nature, you v/ill hardly I
believe doubt, after the Story jufl related.
I replied, 'Twas admitted. The
Parts therefore of thefe Works are Na-
tural They are. And may not
the fame be aflerted, as to th^ Arrange-
ment of thefe Parts ? Mull not this too
be natural^ as 'tis analogous we know to
Nature ? It muft. If fo, then
is the Whole, Natural. . So indeed,
faid I, it fhould feem. It cannot, re-
plied he, be otherwife, if it be a Fadl be-
yond difpute, that the JVhole is nothing
more, than the Parts under fuch Arrangement,
Enough, faid I, you have fatisfied me.
If I have, faid he, it is but to transfer
what we have alTerted of this fubordinate
Beauty, to Beauty of a higher Order-, it is
but
A Dialogue. 219
but to pafs from the External^ to the Part II.
Mor^l and Intenial For here we fay, by
parity of Reafon, that no where in any
particular Nature is the ferfeSl CharaEier
to be feen intire. Yet one is ^r^i;^ 5 an-
other is temperate 'y a third is liberal 'j and
a fourth is p^nideiit. So that in the Multi^
tude of mixed imperfeB CharaBers^ as be-
fore in the Multitude of imperfeB Bodies^ is
exprefTed that Idea, that Moral Stan-
dard OF Perfection, by which all are
tried and compared to one another, and at
lail upon the whole are either juftified or
condemned that Standard of Perfedion,
which cannot be but ?noJi Natural, as it is
purely collected from Individuals of Na^
ture, and is the Tefl of all the Merit to
which they afpire. I acknowledge,
faid I, your Argument*
I might add, faid he, if there were
Occafion, other Arguments which v/ould
furprize you. I might inform you of the
natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of
Spec if c Ideas-, that every Individual \^'2i%
2 but
220 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. but their Type, or Shadow j that the
Mind or Intellecl was the Region of Pof-
fibles ; that what ever is PoJJibk, to the
Mind adually Is-, nor any thing a Non-
entity, except what implies a Contradic-
tion ; that the genuine Sphere and ge-
nuine Cylinder, tho' Forms perhaps too
ferfe5ij ever to exijl conjoined to Matter,
were yet as true and real Beings, as the
grojfeji ObjeBs of Senfe ; were the Source of
Infinite Truths, which wholly depend on
them, and which, as Truths, have a Being
mofl unalterable and eternal. But thefe are
Reafonings, which rather belong to another
Philofophy ; and if you are fatisfied with-
out them, they are at bcfl but fuperfluous.
He waited not for my Anfwer, but
proceeded as follows. 'Tis thus, faid
he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my
power, to give you an Idea of the perfeB
CharaBer : a Character, which I am neither
fo abfurd, as to impute to myfelf j nor fo
rigorous and unfair, as to require of others.
We have propofed it only, as an ExeMt
o PLAR
./^Dialogue. 221
PLAR OF Imitation, which tho' ATb;?^ Part II.
we think can equal, yet All at leafl may
follow an Exemplar of Imitation, which
in proportion as we approach, fo we ad-
vance proportionably in Merit and in
Worth an Exemplar, which, were we
mo^ felfjloj we ftiould be Fools to rejed: ; if
it be true, that to be Happy, is the ultimate
Wijh of us all, and that Happi fiefs and Moral
Worth fo reciprocally correfpond, that there
can be no Degree of the one, without an
equal Degree of the other. If there be
Truth, faid I, in your Reafonings, it can-
not certainly be otherwife.
He continued, by faying The Pro-
ficiency of Socrates, and indeed of every
honeft Man, was fufficient to convince us,
could we be fteadfaft to our Purpofe, that
fome Progrefs at leaft might be made toward
this PerfeSiion — How far, we knew not —
The Field was open The Race was free
and common to All Nor was the Prize,
as ufual, referved only to the Firft; but
All, who run, might depend on a Reward,
having
222 Coficerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. having the Voice of Nature, would they
but liflen, to afllire them,
* Nemo ex hoc nwriero mihi non donatm
ahibit,
§. 9. Here he paufed, and left me to
meditate on what he had fpoken. For
fbme time we pafled on in mutual Silence,
till obferving me on my part little inclined
to break it. What, faid he, engages you
with an Attention fo earnefl: ? I was
wondering, faid I, whence it fhould hap-
pen, that in a Difcourfe of fuch a nature,
you fhould fay fo little of Religion^ of
Provide?2ce^ and a Deity. I have not,
replied he, omitted them, becaufe not in-
timately united to Morals ; but becaufe what
ever we treat accurately, ihould be treated
feparately and apart. Multiplicity of Mat-
ter naturally tends to Confufion. They are
weak Minds indeed, which dread a ra-
tional Sufpence ; and much more fo, when
in the Event, it only leads to a furer Know-
ledge,
* iENEiD. 1. V. V. 305.
A Dialogue. 223
ledge, and often ftrengthens the very Sub- Part II.
jedt, on which we fufpend. Could I how-
ever repeat you the Words of a venerable
Sage, (for I can call him no other) whom
once I heard diverting on the Topic of
Religion, and whom flill I hear, when
ever I think on himj you might accept
perhaps my Religions Theories as candidly,
as you have my MoraL I prefTed him
to repeat them, with which he willingly
complied.
The Speaker, faid he, whofe Words I
am attempting to relate, and whom for
the prefent I name Theophilus^ was of a
Character truly amiable in every part.
When young, he had been fortunate in a
liberal Education ; had been a Friend to
the Mufes, and approved himfelf fuch to
the Public. As Life declined, he wifely
retired, and dedicated his Time almoft
wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he
never forget the Mufes, whom once he
loved. He retained in his Difcourfe (and
fo in the Sequel you will foon find) a large
Portion
224 Concermng HAPPINESS,
Part 11. Portion of that rapturous, anti-profaic Stile,
in which thofe Ladies ufually choofe to ex-
prefs themfelves.
We were walking, not (as now) in the
chearful Face of Day, but late in the Even-
ing, when the Sun had long been fett. Cir-
cumftances of Solemnity were not wanting
to affed US; the Poets could not have
feigned any more happy a running
Stream, an ancient Wood, a ftill Night,
and a bright Moonfliine. 1, for my own
part, induced by the Occafion, fell infenfibly
into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the
Moon. From thence I wandered to other
heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there,
and Empires, and I know not what.
Who lives in the Moon, faid he, is
perhaps more than we can well learn. 'Tis
enough, if we can be fatisfied, by the help
of our beft Faculties, that hitelligence is not
confined to this little Earth, which we in-
habit i that tho' Men were not, the World
would not want Spedators, to contemplate
its
^Dialogue. 225
its Beauty, and adore the Wifdom of its Part IT.
Author.
" This whole Universe itfelf is but
" ONE City or Commonwealth
" a SyJ}e?n of Subjia?2ces varioufly formed^
" and varioufly aBuated agreeably to thofe
" Fornix a Syftem of Subftances both
immenfely great and fmall, Rational^
AiiimaU Vegetable^ and Inanimate,
(C
«
"As many Families make one Village,
" many Villages one Province, many Pro-
" vinces one Empire ; fo many Empires,
" Oceans, Wafles and Wilds, combined,
" compofe that Earth on which we live.
" Other Combinations make a Planet or a
** Moon ; and thefe again, united, make
one Planetary Syftem. What higher
Combinations fubfift, we know not.
" Their Gradation and Afcent 'tis impof-
" fible we fhould difcover. Yet the ge-
« nerous Mind, not deterred by this Im-
" menfity, intrepidly pafles on, thro' Re-
** gions unknown, from greater Syftem
9^ f. to
(c
226 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. " to greater, till it arrive at that greateft^
" where Imagination flops, and can ad-
" vance no farther. In this laft, this
" mighty, this ftupendous Idea, it beholds
** the Universe itfelf, of which every
** Thing is a Part, and with reipedl to
" which not the fmalleflAtom is either
" foreign or detached.
" Wide as it's Extent, is the Wifdom
" of its Workmanfliip, not bounded and
" narrow, like the humbler Works of Art.
Thefe are all of Origin no higher than
Human, We can readily trace them to
* their utmoft Limit, and with accuracy
difcern both their Beginning and their
End. But where the Microfcope that
•* can {hew us, from what Point Wifdom
" begins in Nature ? Where the Telefcope
that can defcry, to what Infinitude it
extends ? The more diligent our Search,
** the more accurate our Scrutiny, the
" more only are we convinced, that our
" Labours can never finifh j that Subjeds
** inex-
<c
(C
cc
(C
cc
^Dialogue. 227
*« inexhauflible remain behind, ftill un- Part II.
" explored.
" Hence the Mind truly wife, quit-
ting the Study of Particulars^ as know-
ing their Multitude to be infinite and in-
comprehenjible, turns its intellecftual Eye
to what is general and comprehenlive,
*' and thro' Generals learns to fee, and re-
cognize what ever exills.
(C
<(
«
"It perceives in this view, that every
" Subftance, of every degree, has its Na-
" ture, its proper Make, Conflitution or
" Form, by which it aBsy and by which
" it fuffers. It perceives it fo to fare with
" every natural Form around us, as with
** thofe Tools and Injftruments, by which
" Art worketh its Wonders. The Saw is
" deftined to one Ad ; the Mallet, to an-
" other J the Wheel anfwers this Purpofej
" and the Lever anfwers a different. So
" Nature ufes the Vegetable ^ the Brute y
** and the Rational, agreeably to the proper
** Form and Confiitutioii of every Kifid, The
Q^ " Vegetalfk
228 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. " Vegetable proceeds with perfed Jnjenfi-
^' bility. The Brute pofTeflcs a Senfe of
" what is pleaiurable and painful, but flops
" at mere Senfation, and is unable to go far-
" ther. The Rational^ like the Brute, has
*^ all the Powers of mere Sejifation^ but en-
" joys fuperadded a farther tranfcendent Fa-
culty, by which it is made confcious, not
only of what it feels, but of the Powers
themfehes, which are the Sources of
thofe very Feelings ; a Faculty, which
recognizing both itfelf and all Things
elfe, becomes a Canon, a CorreEior, and
a Standard Univerfal,
cc
li
<(
ec
<c
cc
cc
" Hence to the Rational alone is im-
*' parted that Master-Science, of what
" they are, where they are, and the End
" to which they are deftined.
" Happy, too happy, did they know
" their own Felicity; did they reverence
*^ the Dignity of their own fuperior Cha-
*' ra(5tcr, and never wretchedly degrade
** thcmfelves into Natures to them fubor-
" dinate.
A Dialogue. 229
" dinate. And yet alafs ! 'tis a Truth too Part II.
" certain, that as the Rational only are
" fufceptible of a Happinefs truly excel-
" lent, fo thefe only merge themfelves
" into Miferies paft Indurance,
'* Assist us then, Thou Power
" Divine, with the Light of that R e a-
" son, by which Thou lightened the
" World 3 by which Grace and Beauty is
" diffufed thro' every Part, and the Wei-
" fare of the Whole is ever uniformly up-
*' held } that Reafon, of which our own is
but a F article or Spark, like fome Pro-
methean Fire, caught from Heaven above.
So teach us to know oiirfeheSy that we
may attain that Knowledge, which
" alone is worth attaining. Check our
*' vain, our idle Refearches into the Laws,
*' and Natures, and Motions of other Be-
" ings, till we have learnt and can prac-
*' tife thofe, which peculiarly refpe6l our-
" felves. Teach us to be fit Adiors in
" that general Drama, where Thou hail
" allotted every Being, great and fmall, its
0^3 " pro
cc
<(
(C
230 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. " proper Part, the due P erf ormmice of which
" is the only End of its Exijlence.
" Enable us to curb Desire within
" the Bounds of what is Natural. Enable
" us even to fufpejid it, till we can employ
it to our Emolument. Be our frfl
Work, to have efcaped from wrong Opi-
" 7iion^ and bad Habit % that the Mind,
" thus render'd fincereand incorrupt, may
with Safety proceed to feek its genuine
Good and Plappinefs.
cc
C(
" When we are thus previoufly ex-
«^ ercifed, thus duly prepared, let not our
LovTE there flop, where it firfl begins ;
but infenfibly condu6t it, by thy invi-
** iible Influence, from lower Objeds to
higher, till it arrive at that Supreme^
where only it can find what is adequate
" and full. Teach us to love Thee, and
«^ Thy Divine Administration — —
" to regard the Univerfe itfelf as our true
" and genuine Country, not that little ca-
" fual Spot, where we firfl: drew vital
" Air.
cc
<c
cc
cc
A Dialogue. 231
" Air. Teach us each to regard Himfelf, Part II.
" but as a Part of this great Whole j
" a Part which for its Welfare we are as
" patiently to refign, as we relign a fingle
" Limb for the Welfare of our whole
" Body. Let our Life be a continued
Scene of Acquiescence and of Grati-
tude ; of Gratitude, for what we enjoy ;
of Acquiefcence, in what we fuffer j as
both can only be referable to that con-
" catenated Order of Events, which can-
not but be bej}, as being by Thee ap-
proved and chofen.
((
(C
(C
"In as much as Futurity is hidden
*' from our Sight, we can have no other
Rule of Choice, by which to govern our
Condud:, than what feems confonant to
the Welfare of our own particular Na-
" tures. If it appear not contrary to Duty
" and moral Office, (and how Ihould we
judge, but from what appears?) Thou
canft not but forgive us, if we prefer
Health to Sicknefs ; the Safety of Life
" and Limb, to Maiming or to Death.
Q_4 *' But
(C
€1
232 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Pan II. '' But did we know that thefe Incidents,
" or any other were appointed us ; were
" fated in that Order of incontroulable
" Events, by which Thou preferveft and
" adorneft the Whole : it then becomes
our Duty, to meet them with Magna-
nimity ; to co-operate with Chearfulnefs
" in what ever Thou ordaineli; that fo
*' we may know no other Will, than thine
" alone, and that the Harmony of our
" particular Minds with thy Univerfal,
" may be fteady and uninterrupted thro'
" the Period of our Exigence.
" Yet, fmce to attain this Height, this
" tranfcendent Height, is but barely pof-
" fible, if poffible, to the mod perfed:
" Humanity: regard what within us is
" Congenial fo Thee-, raife us above our-
felves, and warm us into Enthufafm.
' But let our Enthnfiafm be uich, as befits
the Citizens of Thy Polity; liberal,
gentle, rational, and humane — not fuch
« as to debafe us into poor and wretched
«' Shrccs, as if Thou wert our Tyrant,
' ^ «' not
<(
<<
li
«
A Dialogue. 233
'« not our kind and common Father ; Part II.
" much lefs fuch as to transform us into
favage Beafts of Prey, fallen, gloomy,
dark and fierce ; prone to perfecute, to
" ravage, and deftroy, as if the Luft of
♦* MaiTacre could be grateful to thy Good-
" nefs. Permit us rather madly to avow
Villany in thy Defiance, than impioufly
to alTert it under colour of thy Service.
" Turn our Mind's Eye from every Idea
" of this Charader; from the Servile, Ab-
" jed. Horrid and Ghaflly, to the Gene-
" rous, Lovely, Fair and Godlike,
" Here let us dwell j be here our
" Study and Delight. So fliall we be en-
" abled, in the filent Mirrour of Contem-
** plation, to behold thofe FormSy which
are hidden to Human Eyes that ani-
mating Wisdom, which pervades and
rules the Whole that Law irrefiflible,
<' immutable, fupreme, which leads the
Willing, and compels the Averfe, to co-
operate in their Station to the general
*' Welfare— —that Magic Divine, which
!' by
(C
((
234 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. " by an Efficacy paft Comprehenfion, can
" transform every Appearance, the moft
" hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit all
" Things Fair and Good to Thee,
" Essence Increate, ijoho art of
" purer Eyes^ than ever to behold Iniquity,
"Be thefe our Morning, thefe our
" Evening Meditations — vi^ith thefe may
** our Minds be unchangeably tinged
" that loving Thee w^ith a Love moft dif-
" interefted and fincere ; enamoured of
** thy Polity, and thy Divine Admi-
" NisTRATioN ; Welcoming every Event
" with Chearfulnefs and Magnanimity, as
" being beji upon the Whole, becaufe or-
** dained of Thee ; propoling nothing of
** ourfelves, but with a Referve that Thou
" permitteft ; acquiefcing in every Obftruc-
*' tion, as ultimately referable to thy Pro-
" vidence in a word, that working this
*' Condu(5l, by due Exercife, into perfect
" Habit', we may never murmur, never
" repine j never mifs what we would ob-
*^ tain, or fall into that which we would
" avoid J
cc
<c
<c
A Dialogue. 23^
avoid ; but being happy with that tran- Part II.
fcendent Happinefs, of which no one
can deprive us j and blefl with that Di-
vine Liberty^ which no Tyrant can an-
noy; we may dare addrefs Thee with
pious Confidence, as the Philofophic Bard
" of old,
" Co7idu6l me^ I'hou, of Beings Caufe Divine,
« Ji^here-e're Tm defiin'd in thy great Defign»
" ASiive I follow on : forfiould my Will
*' Refjiy Tm impious-, but muji follow Jiill,
In this manner did Hheophilus^ fald he,
purfue the Subjedl, to which I had led
him. He adorned his Sentiments with
Expreffions even more fplendid, than I
have now employed. The Speaker, the
Speech, the happy Circumftances which
concurred, the Night's Beauty and Still-
nefs, with the Romantic Scene where we
were walking, all together gave the Whole
fuch an Energy and Solemnity, as 'tis im-
poffible you fhould feel from the Coldnefs
of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for
z my
236 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. my own part, returned home fenfibly
touched, and retained the ftrongeft Feel-
ings of what I had heard, till the follow-
ing Morning. Then the Bufinefs of the
Day gently obliterated all, and left me by
Night as little of a Philofopher, as I had
ever been before.
§. 10. And is it poflible, faid I, fofoon
to have forgotten, what feems fo ftriking
and fublime, as the Subjed: you have been
now treating ? 'Tis Habit, replied
he, is all in all. 'Tis Practice and Exer-
cife, which can only make us truly any thing.
Is it pot evidently fo, in the moft com-
mon vulgar Arts ? Did mere Theo7'y alone
ever make the meancil Mechanic ? And
is the Supreme Artifi of Life and Manners
to be formed more eafily, than fuch a
one ? Happy for us, could we prove it near
fo eafy. But believe me, my Friend, good
Things are not fo cheap. Nothing is to
be had gratis J much lefs that which is moil
valuable.
Yet
A Dialogue. 237
Yet however for our Comfort, we have Part II.
this to encourage us, that, tho' the Diffi-
culty of acquiring Habits be great and
painful, yet nothing fo eafy, fo pleafant,
as their Energies, when once wrought by
Exercife to a due Standard of Perfeftion.
I know you have made fome Progrefs in
Mufic. Mark well what you can do, as a
Proficient this way— You can do that, which
without Habit, as much exceeds the wifeil
Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to
afcend a Cliff perpendicular. You can
even do it with Facility 5 and (left you
fliould think I flatter) not you yourfelf
alone, but a thoufand others befide, whofe
low Rank and Genius no way raife them
above the Multitude. If then you are fo
well affured of this Force of Habit in one
Inftance, judge not in other Inftances by
your own prefent Infufficiency. Be not
(hocked at the apparent Greatnefs of the
perfeB Moral CharaBer, when you com-
pare it to the Weaknefs and Imperfedlion of
your own. On the contrary, when thefe
dark.
238 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. dark, thefe melancholy Thoughts aflail
you, immediately turn your Mind to the
Conlideration of Habit, Remember how
eafy its Energies to thofe, who pojfefs it ;
and yet how impraBlcabk to fuch, as pof-^
Jefs it not.
It mufl be owned, faid I, that this is
a Satisfaction, and may be fome kind of
Affiftance in a melancholy Hour. And
yet this very Dodlrine naturally leads to
another Objection. — Does not the Difficulty
of attaining Habit too well fupport a certain
AlTertion, that, defend Virtue as we will,
'tis but a Scheme of ^ef -denial "^
By Self-denial, faid he, you mean, I
fuppofe, fomething like what follows
Appetite bids me eat ; Reafon bids me for-
bear If I obey Reafon, I de?iy Appetite;
and Appetite being a Part of myfclf to
deny it, is a Self-de?iial. What is true thus
in Luxury, is true alfo in other Subjed:s ; is
evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of
Rcfentment, or whatever elfe we purfue
by
^Dialogue. 239
by the Didate of any PaiTion. You Part II.
appear, faid I, to have flated the Objedtion
juftly.
To return then to our Inftance, faid he,
of Luxury. Appetite bids me eat ; Reafon
bids me forbear If I obey Reaforiy I deny
Appetite and if / obey Appetite ^ do I not
deny Reafon ? Can I a^ either way^ with-
out rejecting one of them ? And is not
Reafon a Fart of myfelf^ as notorioufly as
Appetite ?
Or to take another Example — I have
a Depolite in my Hands. Avarice bids
me retain — Confcience bids me reftore. Is
there not a reciprocal Denial^ let me obey
^hich I will? And is not Confcience a Fart
of me J as truly zs Avarice?
Poor Self indeed muft be denied,
take w^hich Party v^^e w^ill. But why
fliould Virtue be arraigned of thwarting it,
more than Vice her contrary ? Make the
mofl of the Argument, it can come but to
this — -
240 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. this If Self-denial be an Objection to
Virtue, fo is it to Vice If Self-denial be
no Objedlion to Vice, no more can it be to
Virtue. A wonderful and important Con-
clulion indeed !
He continued by faying, that the Soul
of Man appeared not as 2ifmgle Faculty, but
as compounded of many that as thefe Fa-
culties were not always in perfect Peace
one with another, fo there were few Ac-
tions which we could perform, where they
would be all found to concur. What then
are we to do ? Sufpend till they agree ?
Abfurd, impoffible. Nothing therefore
can remain, but to weigh well their feveral
Pretenfionsj attend to all, that each has
to offer in its behalf j and finally to purfue
the Didates of the JVifcft and the Beji.
This done, as for the Self-denial, which
we force upon the reft -, with regard to our
own CharaSler, 'tis a Matter of Honour
and Praife with regard to the Faculties
denied, 'tis a Matter of as fmall Weight, as
to contemn the Noife and Clamours of a
mad
A Dialogue. 241
mad and fenfelefs Mob, in deference to the Part IL
fober Voice of the worthier, better Citi-
zens. And what Man could be juftified,
Should he rejedl thefe, and prefer a Rabble ?
§. 10. In this place he paufed again,
and I took occalion to acknowledge, that
my Obje(5tion appeared obviated. As the
Day advanced apace, he advifed that we
might return homej and walking along
leifurely, thus refumed to himfelf the Dif-
courfe.
I dare fay, continued he, you have it.z'^
many a wife Head fhake, in pronouncing
that fad Truth, how we are gover?7ed all by
Interest. — And what do they think
fhouid govern us elfe ? Our Lofs, our
Damage, our Difintereji^ Ridiculous
indeed ! We fhouid be Idiots in fuch cafe,
more than Rational Animals. The only
Queftion is, where Jnterejt truly lies : for if
this once be well adjuiled, no Maxim can
be more harmlefs.
R '< I
cc
242 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. "I find myfelf exifting upon a little
" Spot, fbrrounde^ every way by an im-
" menfe unknown Expanfion. Where
" am I ? What fort of Place do I
inhabit ? Is it exactly accommodated,.
in every Inftance, to my Convenience ?
" Is there no Excefs of Cold, none of
" Heat, to offend me ? Am I never an-
" noyed by Animals, either of my own
" kind, or a different ? Is every thing
" fubfervient to me, as tho' I had ordered
" all myfelf ? No — nothing like it
" the fartheff from it poffible. The
" World appears not then originally made
" for the private Convenience ofmeahne? —
" It docs not. — But is it not poffible fo to
" accommodate it, by my own particular
" Induflry? If to accommodate Man
" and Beaff, Heaven and Earth, if this be
" beyond me ^ 'tis not poffible.— What
" Confequence then follows ? Or can
" there be any other than this if I feek
" an Inter eji of my own^ detached from that
" of
A Dialogue. 243
" of others-^ Ifeek an hit er eft which is chi- Part IT.
" mericalj and canneiser have Exijience ?
"How then muft I determine > Have
I no Intereft at all ? — If I have not, I
am a Fool for flaying here. 'Tis a
fmoaky Houfe, and the fooner out of
it, the better.— But v^hy no Intereil? — .
Can I be contented with none, but one
feparate and detached ? — Is a Social
Interest joined with others fuch an
Abfurdity, as not to be admitted ? The
Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herd^-
ing Animals, are enough to convince
me, that the thing is, fome where at
leaj}, poffible. How then am I afTured,
that 'tis not equally true of Man ?
Admit it j and what follows ? — If fo,
then Honour and Justice are my
Interest — then the whole Train
OF Moral Virtues are my Inte-
R E s T J without fome Portion of which ^
not even Thieves can maintain Society,
R 2 " But
^44 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. "But farther ftill — -. I Hop not here—
I purfue this Social hitereji^ as far as I
can trace my feveral Relations, I pafs
from my ov/n Stock, my own Neigh-
bourhood, my own Nation, to the whole
Race of Mankind^ as difperfed through-
cc
(C
(C
cc
*' cut the Earth. — Am I not related to them
" all, by the mutual Aids of Commerce ;
by the general Intercourfe of Arts and
Letters; by that common Nature^ of
which we all participate ? Again
I mull have Food and Clothing.
V/ithout a proper genial Warmth,
I inflantly perifli. Am I not rela-
ted, in this view, to the very Earth
" itfelf ? To the diftant Sun, from
whofe Beams I derive Vigour ? To that
ftupendous Courfe and Order of the infi-
nite Hofl of Heaven, by which the Times
*' and Seafons ever uniformly pafs on ?
" Were this Order once confounded, I
" could not probably furvive a Moment ;
*' Jo abfolutely do I depend on this common ge^
" neral JVelfare,
" What
<<
(<
(C
(.1
(C
A Dialogue. 245
« What then have I to do, but to Part II.
** enlarge Virtue into Piety? Not'
" only Honour and Jiifiice^ and what I
" owe to Man, is my Litereji j but Grati-
" tude alfo, Acquiefcence^ Refgnatioriy Ado-
" ration, and all I owe to this great Polity,
" and its greater Governor, our com-
" MON Parent.
" But if all thefe Moral and Di-
" vine Habits be my Interest, I
" need not furely feek for a better. I
" have an Interefl compatible with the
Spot on which I live 1 have an In-
terefl: which may exift, without altering
" the Plan of Providence j without wra^-
ing^ or marring the general Order of
Events — I can bear what ever happens,
with manlike Magnanimity ^ can be
" contented, and fully happy in the Good,
" which I pofTefs ; and can pafs thro' this
" turbid, this fickle, fleeting Period, with-
** out Bewailings, or Envyings, or Mur-
" murings, or Complaints.'*
And
<c
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(<
246 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. And thus, my Friend, have you my
Sentiments, as it were abridged ; my Sen-
timents on that Subjed:, which engages
every one of us. For who would be un-
happy ? Who would not, if he knew
how, enjoy 07ie perpetual Felicity ? Who
are there exifling, who do not at every
inftant feek it ? 'Tis the Wifh, the Em-
ploy, not of the Rational Man only, but
of the Sot, the Glutton, the very loweft
of our Herd. For my own Syftem, whe-
ther a juft one, you may now examine,
if you think proper. I can only fay on
its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous,
'tis a grateful Error, which I cherifli and
am fond of And yet if really fuch, I
fliall never deem it fo facred, as not wil-
lingly, upon Convidion, to refign it up to
Truth.
Little pafs'd after this worth rela-
ting. We had not far to walk, and we
fell into conimon Topics. Yet one Obfer-
vation
A Dialogue. 247
vation of his I mufl not omit. 'Twas Part II.
what follows. When we are once,
faid he, well habituated to this chie?*,
this MORAL Science, then Logic
and Physics become two profitable
AdjunBs : Logicy to fecure to us the
Pofleffion of our Opinions j that, if an
Adverfary attack, we may not bafeiy give
them up : Phyjics, to explain the Reafon
and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that
we may know fomething of that Univerfe,
where our Dwelling has been appointed
us. But let me add a Saying (and may
its Remembrance never efcape you) while
you find this great, this Majier-Science
wanting, value Logic but as Sophijiry, and
Phyjics but as Raree-Jhew -y for both, affure
yourfelf, will be found nothing better.
'TwAS foon after this that our Walk
ended. With it ended a Converfation,
which had long engaged us; and which,
according to my Promife, I have here en-
deavoured to tranfcribe.
THE END.
Advertifement to the Reader.
Q^H E Author has chofen to feparate all
Notes from his firji and third Trea-
tifes^ and thus fubjoin them to the End^
becaufe thofe T^reatifes^ being written in
Dialogue, from their Nature and Genius
admit not of Interruption, One of his
Reafons for addijig Notes was^ to give
Weight to his Ajjertions from the Autho-
thority of antient Writers. But his chief
and principal Rea/on was, to excite (if
pojfible) the Curiofity of Readers, to exa-
mine with friBer Attention thofe val.able
Remains of antlejit Literature. Should
he obtain this End, he Jhall think his
Labours (Juch as they are J abundantly
rewarded.
NOTES
O N
TREATISE the Firft
CONCERNING
A
?
NOTE I. p. 6. All Art is (^AvSE.'jJriis
maxume proprium, creare & ngnere. Cic.
de Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 22. '"^r^ 'Ts tIvv?i
noia-oi Trfpl ymo-iv. JU Art is employe:'. .';: Produc-
tion^ that is, in making fomethitig to be. Arijlot.
Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6. c. 4.
The a^tve efficient Caufes have been ranged
and enumerated after different manners. In the
fame Ethics, they are enumerated thus — allix ya,^
-TTxv TO ^l av9pw7r». The feveral Caufes appear^ to be
Nature, NeceJJity, and Chance ; and heftdes thefe. Mind
or Intelkif, and whatever operates by or thro' Man.
1. 3. c. 3. The Paraphraft Andronicus in explaining
this laft Paflage, nay to ^t' ayGpcoVs, adds v.'oy tsxi-w,
^ aAAr) tj? 7rpa?if, <7i 7^^' injlance Art^ or any other
human ASlion,
Alex-
252 NOTES on Treatise the Firji,
AiEXANDER ApHRODisiENSis fpeaks of effi-
cient Caufes as follows : 'AAAa ij.riv rd nvpiug amoe,
Caufes^ which are JtrMly and properly efficient^ are
Nature^ Art^ and each MarC s particular Choice of Action.
uri^i ^■'^'Xi? P- 1 60. B. Edit. Aid.
In what manner Art is diftinguifhed from the reft
of thefe efficient Caufes, the fubfequent Notes will
■ijittempt to explain.
Note II. p. 6. Of that Painter famed
IN Story, i2c.'\ See Valer. Max. 1. 8. c. 11.
Note III. p. 12. Art is Man becoming
A Cause, Intentional and Habitual.] Ari-
Jlotle^ in his Rhetoric^ thus accurately enumerates
all the poffible manners, either diredt or indi-
re(5t, in which Mankind may be faid to a£l or
do any thing, rtaylfj J'*) TrpalrBO-J Travra, ra jw,£v,
a 01 au/»? Ta Of, oj aul«f Twf jueu sv juti ci a.\i\\i<;^
V otra jM.*i dJ aula? 7rp« lTi<(ri, ra jutv, aro rjp(;;tij ra o£,
.'^uVft* ra ^£ S/oi "O(yoc St i\ clvlvi;, xa* coy aulol
<?i7ioij ra ^£v ^j jflof, ra J'f J'j o^s^iv' nxi to, [j.h Six
Aoj^JOJiW opi^iv, ra ^« (Jt aAoj/tj-oy. '/r* ^£ *l jM.£U
CaAJicj?, [/.ilx Koyn o^E^fj? aj/aSa — aAoj'Ot ^ ooi^ngy
opyri xai ETTiOu^ja. coff Trocvltx. ocx TrpdlTnaii)^ ocvdy-
■iin ttpixItiiv Si diVoci fVIa* SiOt rv^viVy Sioi S/av, Jia
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl, 253
All Men do all Things either ofthemfehes^ or not of
them/elves. The Things which they do not of them [elves y
they do either by Chance, or from Necejfity ; and the
Things done from Neceffity, they do either by Compulfton,
which is External Necejfity, or by Nature, which is
Internal. So that all Things wkatfoever, which Men
do not of themf elves, they do either by Chance, or from
Compulfion, or by Nature.
Again, the Things, which they do of themfelves, and
cf which they are themfelves properly the Caufes, fome
they do thra' Cujlom and acquired Habit, others thro*
original and natural Defre. Farther, the Things done
thro' natural Defire, they do either thro' fuch Defire ■ „.
ajffttd by Reafon, or thro' fuch Defire devoid of Reafori:" ■
If it be afijled by Reafon, then it affumes^the Denomi"
nation of Will; on the contrary, the irrational Defire!
are Anger and Appetite.
Hence it appears that all Things whatevei-, which
Men do, they neceffarily do thro' one of thefe feven-:
Caufes, either thro' Chance, Compulfon, Nature, Cu-
fiom^ Will, Anger, Appetite. Arijl. Rhet. 1. i.
c. 10.
ly remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to
confTder with which of thefe Caufes we ought to
arrange Art.
A's to Chance, it may be obferved in general
of all Cafual Events, that they always exclude Inten-
tion or Defgn ; But Intention and Defign, are from
Art
'e
254 NOTES on Treatise the Firft,
Jrt infeparable. Thus is the Difference between
u^rt and Chance manifeft.
As to External Compulsion, we have it
thus defcribed ^'.xm J'e, Z ji co^yji £rw0£v. That is
an A£f of Compulfwn^ the efficient Principle of which is
from without^ independent of the Doer. Ethie. Nic.
\. 3. c. I. Again, in the fame Treatife, 1. 6.
c. 4. we are told of the Works of Jrt^ that they
are fuch, m n dpyji h 1w ttoJvIj, the efficient Principle
cf which is in the Doer or Agent. Thus therefore is
Art diftinguiihed from Compulfton,
These two Caufes, Chance and Compulficn, are
mentioned and confidered in the Dialogue, Pages 6
and 7.
Nature, or rather Natural Necessity, is
that Caufe, thro' which we breath, perfpire, digeft,
circulate our Blood, ^c. Will, Anger, and Appetite,
are (as already obferved) but fo many Species of
Natural Desire, confidered either as afilfted by
Reafon, or elfe as devoid of it. Now tho' Natural
Defre and Natural Neceffity differ, becaufe in the
ohe we acl fpontaneoufly, in the other not fpontane-
oufy, yet both of them meet in the common Genus
of Natural Pozver. Moreover this is true of all Na-
tural Power, that the Pciuer itfelf is prior to any
Energies or Ads of that Power. 'Oj yci^ ix la -rroX-
Xaxi; l^Tv, n TroAAaxtj aKnaoti, ra? ccKx^rxTHi; iXd^o-
w£i'Oi ix°l*-^^- ^°^ i^^° inftance in the natural Powers
ofSenfation] it was not from often feeing, and often ^
hearings
NOTES on Treatise the Firft. 255
hearingy that we acquired thofe Senfes ; but on the (on~
trary^ being firji pojfejjed of them^ we then ufid them^
not through any Ufe or Exercife did we come to pojfefs
them. Arijl. Ethic. 1. 2. c. i.
Now the contrary to this is true in the cafe of
any Powers or Faculties not natural^ but acquired by
Cujlom and Ufage. For here there are many Ener-
gies and A£tSy which muft neceflarily precede the
Exiftence of fuch Power or Habit, it being evident
(as is faid in the fame Chapter) that U "l^v oixoixv
mpyuiov ai e'^ej? yiyvovlai^ from fimilar and homoge-
neous Energies, it is that Habits are obtained. So
again, in the fame Place, a yx^ ^eT fxac^ovloig ttoie'^j^
ymvlcni, xoc\ xi^(x,^i^o\flig Ki^oc^i^-oci. The Things which
we are to do by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus
by building Men become Builders, and by pra£iifing Mufc
they become Muficians.
Thus therefore is Art diftinguifhed from all
Natural Power of Man, whether Natural
NeceJJity, Will, Anger, or Appetite. But Art has
been already diftinguiflied from Chance and Com-
pulsion. So that being clearly not the fame with
ftx of thofe feven Caufes by which all Men do all
Things, it mufl needs be referred to xhs. feventh^
that is, to Custom or Habit.
It muft be obferved, the natural Caufes or Powers
in Man, confidered as diftinct from Art, are treated
in the Dialogue, Pages 8 and 9.
And
256 NOTES oti Treatise the Firjf,
And now as we have fhewn Art to be a certain
Caufe Ivor king in Man^ it remains to fhew how it is
diftinguiflied from thoje other Caiifei hsfide Man, which
we fuppofe to operate in the Univerfe. Thefe are
either fuch Cau/es as are below him, like the VegetO'
tive Power, which operates in Vegetables, the Sen-
fttive in Animals ; or elfe fuch Cau/es as are above
him, like God, and whatever is elfe of Intelligence
more than human.
The Causes below us may be all included in
the common Genus of Nature; and of Nature we
may fay univerfall}'-, as well of Nature without us
as within us, that its feveral Operatio?is, contrary to
thofe of Art, are not in the leajl degree, derived from
Cujiom or Ufage. Thus the Author above cited
'OjcJfy yi^o Twy (puVtt oylojv a^Xccg l^i^slut' olov Aj'Qo?
ccv y-vpixKiq avlov i^'i^yi tj? avco /)*7r/wy, adi to -rrvp
aalw. None of thofe Things, which are what they are by
Nature, can be altered by' being accuflomed. TTytts a Stone ^
which by Nature is carried downzvard, can never be
accuflomed to mount uptuard, no not tho' any one
Jf)Ould ten thoufand times attempt it by throwing the
Stone upward. The fame may be faid of accufloming
Fire to move downward. Ethic. Nico?n. 1. 2. c. i.
Again, in the fVorks of Nature, fuch as Trees,
Animals, and the like, the efficierit Principle is vi-
tally united to the SuhjeSis, wherein it operates.
h duloig iyjtTi Txujx tvv a^'x/iv. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6.
c. 4. But in the IForks of Art, fuch as Statues or
Houfes, the efficient Principle is di [united from the
SubJe^Si and exifts not in the Things done or made,
but
'i^ OTES on Treatise the FIrJ, 257
but in the Doer or Artiji—^m % ap^n Iv tZ ttoi^vV^
uWx f/,v iv 1w TTomfxivo). Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4. It
is indeed poflible that, even in Works of Art^ the
SubjeSl and efficient Caufe may be united^ as in the
Cafe of a Phyfician becoming his own Patient, and
curing himfelf. But then it mufl be remembered
that this Union is Kxroi <T\:iA^e^-ny.oqj merely acci-
dentali and no way ejfential to the conftituting of
Art, confidered as Art. By this therefore is A r t
clearly diftinguifhed from Nature, whofe Defi-
nition informs us that it is —oi.^'^ t»V xa« aM/a ts
xn/£»(&«» H, r\^i^ii)i h u VTToip^ii 7rpw7wf, H>x9' a.'J]o
xj {xri v.x\(x, <TVfM^£^r,y.o;. A certain Principle or Caufe of
moving and ceaf.ng to move, in fome Stibje^ wherein
fuch Principle exifis immediately^ ejfentially, and not by
way of Accident. Arift. Natur. Aufc. 1. 2. c. i.
The Cau s e s, which are of Rank superiouR
to Man, fuch as the Deity, can have nothing
to do with Art, becaufe being (as is £aid in the
Dialogue, p. 11.) perfect and complete, and knowing
all from the Beginning, th^y can never admit of what
is additional and fecond.ary. Art therefore can only
belong to Bei?igs, like Men, v/ho being imperfe£l
know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them
by Helps fecondary and fubfcquent. It was from a
like Confideration that Pythagoras called himfelf a
Philosopher, that is to fay (according to his own
Explication of the Name) a Lover and Seeker of
what was wife and good, but not a PofTefTor,
which he deemed a Charadler above him. Con-
fonant to this we read in Plato's Banquet, GrJu
258 NOTES on Treatise the Firji,
y^^, &c. No God philofopkizes, or defires to become
ivife, FOR He is so already. No?-, if there
he any other Being ivife, doth he philofophize for the
fame Reafon. On the other hand, neither do the Indocil
philofophize ; for this is the Misfortune of Indocility,
without being virtuous, good or prudent, to appear ts
tnefeff fufficient in all thefe Refpe^s. In general there-
fore, he who thinketh himfelf in no want, defireth
not that, luhich he thinks himfelf not to need. IVho
then, faid Socrates to Diotima, (the Speaker of this
Narration) Who are those who philoso-
phize, if they are 7ieither the Wife nor the Indocil?
That (replied Ihe) may be noiv cotifpicuous even to a
Child. They are those of middle Rank,
BETWEEN these EXTREMES. Plat. p. 203.
torn. 3. Edit. Serrani.
Here we fee (agreeably to what is faid in the
Dialogue, pages ir. and 12.) that as to acquired
or fecondary Habits, fonie Beings are too excellent
for them, and others too bafe ; and that the Deity
above all is in the Number of thofe traKfcen-
dent, and is thus, as a Caiife, diftinguilhed from
Art.
There are, befides the Deity and Nature now
fpoken of, certain other external Caufcs, which are
mentioned in the firft Note as diftinc^ from Art ;
namely Chance and Necefity. But of thefe hereafter,
when we confider the i>ubje^ of Art.
Note
NOTES on T RE AT 15E tbe Fir/I. 259
Note IV". p. 13. Faculties, Powers, ^c.
ARE obscure and HIDDEN ThINGS ENER-
GIES AND Operations lie open to the
Senses.] 'E» SI ^^ri Xsynv ri ixxrov tsIwv, olov
1 TO WTliiy.CVy 7] TJ TO aioJriHXOV, Trpo/fpOV iTTlT-
)Cc7r/£ov, Ti' TO vo£iu, noi] Ti TO d^avi^xi' Trpo-
ItpM yxp xa» (Tx(pig~ipoci Tr^oq vifxixg ruv ouva/ASW./
Iiirt at £Vfp9/£tat. Trcosi/IuJ/pi^aivonASy J/'ap aujair, tzt
ra? Juva^otEjj aVo tsIcou lirivo^fxiv. Jf we are to ex-
plain what each of thefe things are^ as for hijlance^ what
the intelligent Principle^ what the fenfttive, we miifi
firfi inquire ivhat it is to think, what to fee, hear, and
life the Senfes. For with refpe£i to us Men, the
Energies are prior and more evident tha7i
the Powers, becaufe it is in the Energies we are
firfl converfant, and comprehend the Powers from them.
Themift. in lib. 2. de Anima, p. 76. Edit. Aid. FoL
Note V. p. 15. Are there not Pre-
cepts, ^V.] Vid. Plat, in Min. torn. 2. p.3i6j
17. Edit. Serran^.
As to thofe low Habits here mention'd, from
which we diftinguilh Jrt by the Number and Dignity
of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Deno-
mination of M«1«ioTf;!(,i'»a, of which ^intilian gives
the following Account. MxlocioliX"^^^ quoque ejl
qucedam, id efi, fupervacua Artis Imitatio, qitce nihil
fane nee boni nee mail habeat, fed vanum laborem :
qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, es fpatio diflante
mijfa, in acum continuo ^ fine fruflratione inferebat :
quern, atm fpe^affet Alexander ^ donaffe dicitur ejufdem
S 2 legu-
26o NOTES on Treatise theFirJl*
leguminis modio. ^lod quidem pramium fuit illo opere
dignijfimum. Inft. Orat. 1. 2. c. 20.
Note VI. p. 17. An Habitual Power in
Man of begoming the Cause of some Ef-
fect, ACCORDING TO A SySTEM OF VARIOUS
AND WELL-APPROVED PrECEPTS ]
The Peripatetic Definition of Art is "E^ij jasla
AoT» «A>5S-«? 7roiri]ix.v — ^n efficient Habit ^ joined with
found and true Reafon. Ariftot. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4.
The Stoic Definition, as we find it in Sext.
Empir. adverfiis Logicos, p. 392. is, Xdrriy-a. U
Twy h Tu |Siw. Thus tranflated by Cicero in Dio-
denies de Grannnat. I. 2. Ars ejl Perceptionirm exerci-
tataruni £olk^io, ad unum exitwn vitce iitikm perti-
ncntium. And again by ^intilian^ Inft. Orat. 1. 2.
c. 18. Art em conjiare ex perceptionibus confentientibus
'& coexercitatis ad finem iitikfn vita:. The fame De-
finition is alfo alluded to in the Academics of Cicero,
1. 2.' c. 7. where it is faid Ars vera qua potejl
effie, nift qua non ex U7ia, ant diiabus^fed ex multis animi
perceptionibus conjlat?
There is a third Definition of Art cited by
^mtilian in the fime place, and afcribed by him to
Ckanthes — Ars eji potejlas via (id ejf, ordine) efficiens.
N o w if v/e compare thefe Definitions with that
in the Dialogue, we (hall find them all to correfpond.
"The Habitual Power in Man of beconmig the Caufe of
fme Effe^j is the fame as "e^j- 7roinlix-n in the
Peripa-
NOTES 0/2 Treatise /ZvF/V/. 261
Peripatetic Definition. According to a Syjlem of vari-
ous and well-approved Precepts^ is the fame as ^,{\x
Aoya aA>i.&af . For found and true Reafon muft; needs
be the Bafis of allfuch Precepts.
Again, as to the fecond Definition— -The Words
Su'rujua y.oC\aX-n^i(,iv [a Syfiem of Comprcheiifons, or of
certain and evident Truths'] correfpond to the latter
Part of the Definition in the Dialogue According
to a Syjiem of various and well-approved Precepts. The
Word ifyiyu^MvocfT^ivm [that is to fay, ivorhd in by
Habit and Excercife] correfponds to the firft Part,
thzt Jrt is a Caufe founded in Habit. And the reft
[tt^oj r\ TiX^, Iffc. that is to fay, a Syjiem which
kas refpe£f to fome ufiful and fervic cable End or Purpofe
in Human Lip] Ihews the Syftem here mentioned
to regard Practice and A^ion^ not Theory and Specii
lation. And thus does it correfpond with the Defi-
nition of the Dialogue, where it is faid that Art is
an Habitual Power not of merely conteinplating and
hioiving^ but of becoming the Caufe of fome Effe£l,
It is not indeed exprelled in the Dialogue, that this
Effed has refped to the Utility of Human Life., be-
caufe this latter Circumjlance is referved to the Defi-
nition of t\\Qfjial Caufe of Art, given page 29.
As to the third Definition of Art, poteflas via
efjiciens.^ a Power operating methodically., it may be
obferved, that by being called an operating Power, it
is diftinguilhed from Powers purely fpeculative \ and
as it is faid to operate methodically .^ or in a Road and
regular Procefs^ it is difiingiiifiied fi-om Chance as
well as blind Neceffty. And thus far it correfponds ■
S 3 with
262 NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
with what is offer'd in the Dialogue. But it does
not appear from this Definition, whether the Power
therein menlioned be Original and Natural, or 5^-
condary and Habitual, becaufe Pov/ers of either fort
may operate methodically. And perhaps Ckanthes
intended not to diflinguifh fo far, but took Art in
that larger and more general Senfe, adopted fome-
times by the Stoics ; as when they defcribe Nature
her jelf to be a WZa n'xyiv.o)) oow ^xSi^ov rr^oq yiviinv,
an artificial Fire, proceeding methodically to Production
or Creation. For it is not to be imagined, they in-
tended by this to infmuate that Nature was a Fire,
which had learnt by Habit fo to operate. On the
contrary, by artificial it is probable they intended
no more than fome a£iive efficient Principle, working
with Reafon, Order, and Method ; of which Principle
they confider'd Fire to be the propereji Vehicle, as
being of all Bodies the moft fubtle, and that into
which the reft are all ultimately refolvable. Fide
Dicg. Laert. K. 7. Seci. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor.
i. 2. c. 22.
Note VII. page 22. It should seem that
THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SuBJECT OF Art
-vvAs — All those contingent Natures j
WHICH lie within THE REACH OF HuMAN
Powers to influence.]
The Cause here treated is the Material,
the "YA'/i, or 'TTtoY.it^iw\\, or to t^ Z yivslxi rt
Of a Contingent, we have the following Defini-
tion —'•- Ar'j'w d' iJiy^i&c^i, yp TO i))pi'/J>i/.tvov, ov
u.'0
NOTES (?;2 Treatise the Firjh 263
iix T»7' ffJdvxrov. I call that a Con r i n g k n t , which
net being necejfary^ hut being fuppofed to he^ there will
follow nothing impojfihle from fuch Suppofition, Arift,
Anal, prior. I. i. c. 13.
That this is true in Works oi Art^ is evident.
It is not necejfary, that a given Fragment of fuch a
Rock fliould affume the Figure of Hercules : but
there follows nothing impojfihle^ if we fuppofe it fo
tigured. 'Tis for this reafon, that the SuhjeSt of
Art is in the Dialogue called a Contingent.
But however, to explain the whole of what is
faid in this Place, it is neceOary to go backward,
and deduce what we would fay from fome remoter
Confiderations,
The Peripatetics held the E^id or Aim of their
Philofophy to be the difcovering and knowing the
■AfX'^s the primary and creative Principle of all
Thijigs, They purfued this Inquiry, by beginning their
Contemplation from thofe things, which are to usfirfl
in the Order of our Comprehenfion, and fo afcend-
ing gradually to that which is truly firfl^ in the real
Order of Beings.
The firfl and original Ohje5ls of our Compre-
henfion are thofe nearer and more immediate,
viz. the OhjeSis of Sejife, with which we are fur-
rounded on every Side. Thefe Ohjeds we perceive
to be all in motion ; and the Motions are multiform,
various^ and often oppofite to each other. The Con-
S 4 fequence*
264 N O T ES c« Treatise the Firjl.
fequences of this we perpetually behold. By fuch
Motions we fee that not only the mere local Site of
thefe Beings is changed, but their very Bulk, and
Figure, and ^falities i n%y more than this, even
the Beings tkemfehes are made to feparate and perijh,
while neiv Beings arife from the Re-alTemblage of the
fcattered Parts, which Parts different Motions can as
well concrete, as di [unite. The Beings or OhjeSls of the
Charader here defcribed, the Peripatetics denoted un-
der the common Appellation of the tcx mv^iAivoc ^
(p^ct^oi, the Beings moving and corruptible.
From thefe moving and perijhahle Obje£ls, they
paffed to \hoi<t fuhlimer and more tranfcendeni Obje6ls
of Senfe, which they faw adorn the Heavens. Here
likewife they difcovered Motion ; but then this Mo-
tion was nnifor?n and conjlajit ; affeSfing not the Be-
ings moved, fave in the relation of local Site. As
therefore they beheld no Change in the Form and
EJfence of thefe Beings, they deemed them [upon
their Hypothefis) incorruptible, and out of them efta-
blifhed another Clafs of Beings, that is to fay, the
Tot >t»v»|«.fiia xsc\ d(p^a.^la, the Beings moving and in-
corruptible.
From thefe fublimer OhjeBs of Senfe, they
paffed to Objc5ls of pure IntellcB ; to Bodies devoid
of all Motion, and of all ^lallty, fave that in-
feparable one of Figure ; fuch Bodies for inftance
as the Cube, the Sphere, and the reft of Bo-
dies mathematical. From mathematical Bodies, and
the 1'ruths rcfulting from them, they paffed to
the Contemplation of Truth in general; to the
Scul, and its Powers both of Intuition and Syl-
logization ;
NOTES on Treatise the Firft. 265
hgization ; to Behig unlverfal^ and above both Time
and Place ; and thus at laft to that fupreme Caufe^
the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the
famey immutable and eternal. The feveral Obje^s of
this intclledtiial Comprehenfion they (|iled not merely
«(p0ap7a, but oKp^oiflx >^ dunyiloi. Beings incorrup-
tible and immoveable.
In this manner did the Peripatetics fpeculate.
And hence was it they eftablifhed to themfelves three
Species of Philofophical Employment one about
Beings motionlefs and eternal ; another, about Beings
moveable and eternal -^ and a third, about Beings
moveable and perijhable. The firft they held the
proper Employment of the Metaphyfician i the two
kft of the AJirommer and the Naturaliji.
Aio r^sTq oil Traa.yfj.otliCa.i' ^ /iaeu TTf^i otxivvilov* -^
<|J3ao1a. Idcirco Tres funt Tra^ationes ; una^ de im-
mobili ; altera de eo^ quod movetur quidem, fed efl
interitus expers ; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiis.
Ariftot. Natural. Aufc. 1, 2. c. 7. A»o ^ r^i7q oCl
Tr^K'yy.xlsTo!.!' i fxivy ttio] y.m^ivc<, >^ (p^ocojoi' r> h
a,(p^(x,^']a,. Themijlii Paraphrafis in he.
This threefold Subje^ of Philofophic Inquiry
is elegantly explained in the following Paflage.
T* ti TO T£A(^ £5"! T^f 'AptrolfAjxri,- (piXoa-Qpiccq ;
ipocixiv on yv(iivoi.i Try Travjojv *?%*!"> '"l" twk Travrwy
SrifMVPyov anwVy ttiu as* X; wcrs^ylc-j s^H(rxv' cctto-
SiiKVVCl
266 NOTES on Treatise the Firft,
a 7x Travlx TrocpocycoJon. T:ivcc di roc ayovloc r.fxai;
f jV THTO to Ti\^ ; (pCCfJl.h on ^ SiS<X.<T)i(X.XlX TWU £V
iv 'y$vi(r£i Xj (p^oftx, a,7ro yccp riilodv^ ^ix jw,f(rwv ]wa-
S^fjUalJHWv, ex.vdfofA.ev Ix'jlSg httj ra asi x^ ua-ccv'lu)^
f;^ov/a ' jojau /a c»£ Eft rex, ovccx.-jix' xai ktw, |t/,£Tot
Txg acroofjiXTiig v<Tia?y STTi rviy irpiiiln'j ttxvIcov apx/iv.
n.Oi(j'/i; ydp xivvKTEWf, r\ v.ot]' H<rKX,v aVjif, ri y.x]ci 7ro»oy,
?j xala TOTTov, ra ^xeu Iu ytvitrn ^ (p^oox y,cc\d 7r«(7au
x»k'j;(riv Hn'Si/ja; 'ra J'f ou<>ay;5i xa/a jwoutiu tjiv xali^ tottov.
Ac P^f"1 Ei;T«jt7w? oasvsi'j «7ro twv ttoAut^oV&jj xiv8iu.£vwi>
iTTJ ra xali^ ^/aUj x, f/.ovw xivKcriv ximfj-zViXy ^ »tw?
ettI THN AKINHTON KAf AEI flSAT-
TnS EXOT2AN APXHN. A/-^.u&y<« £»V t«V
acclnyo^toct;, p. I2. £"J/V. /^^;/^/. 8vo, 1545.
The Author of the Dialogue has had Reference
to this threefold Divifton of SubjeSfs^ as may be feen
in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occafion
to the prefent Comment. He has chofen however
to ftile the ra 'Oj^avia, or Heavenly Bodies rather
Contingents of higher Order than Beings necejhry^ as
imagining the former to be their truer Charader.
I T may be here added, that the Peripatetics con-
fined <J>Jtj? or Nature^ for the moft part, to this
Earth of our's, where they confidered her as the
a^ive Principle of Life in Plants and Jnima Is. Hence
therefore they diftinguifhed not htrEjfe^s from thofe
of y/r/, by their Necefity (for the Effects of both
they treated as contingent) but from the Caufe in
2 Natural
NOTES i'w Treatise the Firfi. 267
Natural Subje(5ls operating within^ in Artificial with*
out., as has been already oberved, p. 256, 257.
It may be farther added, that they placed thefe
Effects of Art and Nature, and indeed all other
Contingents whatever, in a middle Rank between
Things Nece^ffary, and Things ImpoJJihle. The Rea-
fon was evident. Things Neceffary could not but
be ; Things hnpojfihle could not be ; but Contingent:
were ts^ iv^i'^dy.ivx xy iivxi ytj ^y\ hvxi., that is, were
equally fufceptihle both of Being and Non-being »
But yet tho' all Contingents admitted on their
Hypothecs both of Being and Non-being, yet they
fuppofed ibme to have a greater Tendency to Ex-
iftehce, arid others to have a Jefs. The firfi: Species
of thefe they ftiled t« tV sttI to ttoAu the TJnngi
which happen for the moft part \ the laft, ra W
\Xoi.r\Q-i^ the Things which happeti lefs frequently.
Now as it is evident that both Nature and Art
cftener obtain their Eiid, than mifs it (for complete
Animals are more frequently born than Monfters,
and the Mufician, if an Artift, ftrikes oftener the
right String than the .wrong) hence it was, that
they ranged the Effe^is of Nature and Art among
thofe Contingents which were ra J? W\ to ttoAu,
Contingents of greater Frequency. But yet as thefe
Etfccts were not from the Hypothecs fieceffary^ and
(ontrary to thefe upon occalion happened, hence it
was, that whenever either Nature or Art became
Caufcs of the t« W iXarlov^ thofe rarer Events, in
/licii cafe they ^Nature and Artj were confidered
by
268 NOTES on Treatise the Firfl.
by thefe Philofophers as oiiTUi xocla cru^uj3£|3>)xoj
Cau/es by way of Accident ^ and not according to
their own EJJence and diftinguifhing Chara^er. In
fuch Inftances it was that they affumed the Nam6
of Tdx^ or ' A'jlojaalov, Fortune or Chance,
Ti/';)^v) having moftly Reference to Works of Men^
avloiJiCKlov to Works of Nature. The Inftances
given by Thcmijlius^ in Cafes of Chance and Fortune,
are as follow. A Tile falls from a Houfe. The
End of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place,
whither Nature would carry it by the common Law
of Gravity. In falling it ftrikes and wounds a Paf-
fenger. This lajl Event is from Chance. Again, a
Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging,
he difcovers a hidden Treafure. This lajl Event is
from Fortune. And thus, adds ThertiiJiiuSy r cc\jlvi
TTox^ig y^ pia, aAA» fjdv xaO' au7»ii> aMia;, aAA« Si
xxra c-uju-iSfcW?. The fame individual ASiion is the
Caufe of one Thing from its own peculiar Character,
and of another Thing, by way of Accident. And again,
£0 jU£y »v y^ Tww sTW? (n;,M.|3an/0Kl4jy *) rm (p^aiv >? rrlu
y.xlr.viy^'n, aXX' ft a^a v.oc\oi (TVf/.(^s(^n>iog. —Of thefe
F.vetits wc may call Nature or Human TVill in a man-
ner the Caufe, hut yet ?iot fo from themfelves, and ac-
cording to their own peculiar Effence ; for it was not
for the Jake of what happened that either the PajTenger
■went forth, or the Tile fell downward, but if
any thing it was by Accident. Themift. in lib. 2.
Natur. Aufcult. p. 26. Edit. Aid. See alfo Ariflot.
Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 4, 5, 6.
It
NOTES on Treatise the Firfi. 2%
I T muft be here obferved, that xxtoc (n;^j3£|3jixoV
[by accident] means in no Part of thefe Quotations
accidental^ as ftanding for cafual j for this would be
mere Tautology, as to what is here faid concern-
ing Chance. It means rather fomething by way
of Appendage ; fomething Jdventitioiis ; in other
Words, it means Accident ^ as adhering to Subftance,
without which it can have no Being, tho' fuppofe it
ahfent or taken away, the Nature of Subjiance is na
way affe^ed. It was in this Senfe, the Peripatetics
fuppofed Chance and Fortune to be Accidents or Ap^
pendages to Nature, and Mind. According there-
fore to them, the Suppofition of Chance and Fortune
was fo far from excluding Nature and Mind from
the Univerle, that they demonftrably proved their
Exiftence in it. For admitting their Account of
Chance and Fortune to be juft j if we grant the Acci-
dents to exift, much more mufl we grant the Sub-^
je^s, and this too with that fuperior Dignity and
Priority of Exiftence, which is evidently due to all
Subje6is above their Accidents. Well therefore did
the Philofopher conclude \^iri^<iv a^a to' 'AyTo^aarov,
xj ri Tvx^ T8 Na, y^ tvi; ^vascog. Sitbfequent in Ex~
ijience, are Chai^ce and Fortune to Mind and
Nature. Arijlot, Natur. Aufc. 1. 2. c. 6.
From what has been faid, we fee the Reafon of
that Enumeration of Caufes mentioned in the Be-
ginning of the firft Note, where they are defcribed
to be Necessity, Nature, Man, and For-
tune,
To
270 NOTES on Treatise the Flrji,
To Necessity they referred all thofe Things
and Events, which th^y fuppofed of 7ieceJJary Ex-
ijlence\ fuch as the Univerfe, the Heavenly Bodies,
and their Motions; Truth, and all Univerfals,
together with the 'A^pc'-^j ^^ Principle, or firjl Caufe
of all Things.
To Nature, Man, and Chance, they re-
ferred all Contingents \ to Nature and Man^ obtaining
their End^ they referred Contingents of greater Fre-
quency ; to the fame Caufes, confidered as operating
bef.de their End, and thus becoming Chance or For-
tune, tliey referred thofe oppofte Contingents^ of Ex-
ijlence lefs ufual.
And hence as Art and Fortune were both con-
verfant about th&fa}ne Subje^s {viz. the Contingent,
and not the Neceffary) and were both referable to
the fame Origin (viz. Man, becoming a Caufe, ei-
ther deftgnedly or undef.gnedly) hence the Meaning of
that NexiQ, cit4;d by Arijlotle from Agatho ;
Ti-xyn rcX'O ts^^i, >^ -r^x^ rix^vv.
Art loveth Fortune \ Fortufie loveth Art.
A s much as if he had faid, that thefe were
iindred Poivers, which amicably confpired to affift
each other ; that Art often helped Fortune, hy judi-
cious ConduSl; and that Fortune often helped Art,
by lucky Incidents. See Arijlot. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4.
More might be cited, but we cannot lengthen a
Note, which has proved, 'tis to be feared, too
long already.
Note
NOTES en Treatise the Fif^fi, 271
Note VIII. p. 23. I mean, said he, by
Beginning, that Cause for the Sake of
WHICH, is'c]
As the Cause here fpoken of, is that Cau/i-
ufu^lly called Final, it may be afked, how it
comes in this place to be confidered as a Beginning.
The Anfwer is, that what comes laji in PraSiice,
(lands in Theory firjl ; or in other Words, the Order
of Idea^ in the Intelle^ of the Artift is exadly in-
verted, with refped to the Order of his Energies.
Thus JmmDmiii^-''K^oc^oX>i yxp t?? [x\v BiwpUg
TO teA©^ yiyviron «'P)(/i rv? Trpa^jwj* sfxTrocXiv h
T»i? TTfioi^iug TO r\X^, u^x^ "^^^ S-fwpia;?. olov o
'OtxoJo'/xf^, iTrjTaffi? ojV.ou, Xtyei x«9' lauTOv, Ittbtcc-
yr,)) oTxcy Ta-oi^cat ' oWp lo (tkiztxt^x, xwXutdcoi?
OjW,|3pwy >^ xjcu/AaTWV tbto (?£ jjk «i/ yivoiTOy fAn yivo"
fxivni; Oj)o(p>5?. 'EwfuOjv av otp^srxi Trig Viu^ixg. zy^o-
€aivu)'J Si (prtTiv' 'AAA* tsto »)c av "yivoiTO, (av yi'-
voyt-ivuv Toip^wy* »Tot J't s?>t av ymivro, y.n u^o^SAjiO/v-
Twv OfjW,fA/c«;y* oV J't Of^uiAtot »)c av |3A9i6£r£v, |U5i ofiv^-
fificrn? T^>- >»if. EUT«v6« 'AficTiXn^sv y\ ^sooftia. E'JTivhv
»w «pp^fT«t ?) TSfOc^K;. TjrpOTfpoy )'«^ opuTTH T>iy yrci*
SiO' 8T« paAAjt Toy OfjasAioy* ItTa l}^£»p£» Toip^s;* x^
uj-epoy £^tT»3'i53"i TW opo^};y, ^t»? so tsA^ t^j
-nrpa^fwf. Ji ^' apX'i "J"^? '^(X^^eu?, teA^j t^j Ocwpiar,
A/Aju. f'i? KaTV)}/. p. 15. Edit. Venet. 8vo.
For in general the End of Theory is the Beginning
cfPraSfice, and fo reciprocally., the End of Pra^ice^
the
272 NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
the Beginning of Theory. Thus for iiifiance : An Ar--
chite5l^ being ordered to build a Houfe, fays to himfelf
I am ordered to build a Houfe ; that is to fay, a certain
Defence, ta prote^l againfi the Rains and the Heats.
But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From
this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds
and fays But there can he no Roof, if there be no
Walls ; and there can be no Walls, without fome Foun-
dations ; nor can there he laid Foundations, without open^
big the Earth. At this Point, the Theory is at an End.
Hence therefore commences the Praclice or Action. For
firfl he opens the Earth ; then lays the Foundation ; then
raifes the Walls ; and lajily puts on the Roof, vjhich
is the End of the A^ion or PraSlice, [but Beginning
of the Theory'] as the Beginning of the Practice was the
End of the Theory. See alfo Arifl. Ethic. Nicom.
1'3- C.3.
Note IX. p. 24. Was it not the Abfence of
Health, i^c] Vide Platon. de Rep. 1. i. torn. 2.
p. 341. Edit. Serrani. "Ho-Trf^ (^i(pnv lyu) sfjuf spoto
iioTiiiA a.v, oTi •crayroicracrt [xiv iv uFpoa'anTiXi. dioc
^O ZTQ'JTi^OV, Xp «X i^OC^KsT (X.VTlt> TCJ8TW B'.VCXl. ^lem'-
admodum, inquam, fi a mequareres, an fatisft Corporis
tit ft Corpus, an alia qiiapiam re indigeat : refponderem,
omnino indigere. Atque hdc quidem de Caufa medicince
ars nunc efi inventa, quoniam Corpus per fe profigatum
ejl, neque ipfi fatis efi, ut ft hujufrnodi.
Note X. p. 26. Or is it not absurd
TO SUPPOSE THERE SHOULD BE AN ArT OF
- Impos-
NOTES on T RE AT isE the FirJ. 273
Impossibilities ?] What is here faid concerning
the Difference between thofe things for which we
may poffibly ivijh, and thofe which we aHually
purfue, is exprefTed in the Ethics of Arijlotle^ 1. 3.
C. 2. ITpo«ip£(rtj jUEu ya,^ bjc \<r^ twv aj'iuarwv ^ t\
J* \<ri Twu ajuDaxu)!), oloy aOava(rj«?. There is indeed
no determined Choice of Action with refpe^ to Things
impojjible -, and if any one Jliould fay he had fo deter-
mined^ he would appear to be a Fool. But there may
he a Willing or Longing after things impoffible ; as for
infiancey never to die. 1
Note XI. p. 27. The Suggestions of
Will, and uninstructed Instinct.] TVill.,
PssX^io-jf, or ''Op£^j? Koyirim ; uninflru5led Infin^f,
cpf^jj uXoyir^. See before, Note III.
Note XII. p. 29. The Want or Absence
OF something appearing good; relative
to Human Life, and attainable by Man,
BUT superior to HIS NATURAL AND UNIN-
STRUCTED Faculties.]
The Cause here defcribed is the to »
ti)£)ca, or FINAL. Ariflotk in his Phyfics^ 1.2.
c. 3. in enumerating the various forts of Caufes,
reckons among the reft to S' w? to t£-
A©^, >tj t' ayx^Qv ruv oiXXoov. to ya.p » \v;nx jSjA-
1i5-ov, y^ teA©^ twv aAAwu e'S-sAn bTvxi. To thefe may
he added that Caufe^ which is confdered as the End^
end Good of all the refl. For that, for whofe fake all
T the
274 1<1 OTES on Treatise the Firft.
the others are deemed necejfary^ has juji Pretenftons to
be bejl, and to be the End of them all. To this he
fubjoins, confonant to what is faid in the Dialogue—
^HxCPlpiTOO ^£ [Jt.7]S^iV CCVTO EiTTflv WyOi^OV ») (p OClVO fAiVOV
dyx^ov — Let it make no Difference whether we call
this End., real Good., or only apparent Good. So in the
Beginning of his Ethics — Ilao-a t£;)^v», xJ Tra.crot, jeae-
TiV©^ l(piB^iXi S'oyisT. A»o y.a.Xug oi'7rt(pY!vavTO t' d'yct-
S-o\ » zTxvTcc ICpiiToii. Every Jrt, and every orderly
Speculation., fo likewife every ASiion, and determined
Choice ofPurfuit., appear all of them to tend toward fame
Good. Well therefore have they pronounced Good to b$
that., toward which all things tend.
In the Definition here treated, the Words [rela ■
tive to Human Life'\ exprefs that Part of the Stoic
Definition of Art [-srpoV t) t'lk^ £j;j^p?iroy rwy £i»
Tw 6iw.] They were omitted in the Definition, p. 17.
as more properly belonging to the prefent Defini-
tion, which refpeds Art in its fi?ial Caufe, Se^
page 261.
That what is perfeof and felf-fufficient is above
n^t fecondary Helps of Art ; that our own Weaknefs
and Infufficiency ., and the Profpe(5l of procuring that ab'
fent Good, by which we all hope to fupply ourfelves,
where deficient ; that this is the Source not only of
all Arts, but (joined to focial Aflfedion) is the
Origin^ and Cement of Human Society ; fee
(befides the Place here treated) pages 11, 12 j and
oithe third Treatife., p. 147 to p. 157.
Thus
NOTES on Treatise the Firfi, 275
Thus the Poet in StobceuSy p. 515.
Xp£tU TTlXvT i^t^X^i' T»' $ » X?^^^ ^^^ CiViV^Ol ;
Need all things taught : TVhat cannot Need invent P
Acre ABLY alfo to this, Firgil, in his firfl: Georgicj
having told us of the various Changes to the worfe,
which happened in the natural World immediately
fubfequent to the Golden Age, goes on to enumerate
the feveral Inventions of Men, which were the na-
tural Refult of this their newly indigent State. He at
laft fums up the whole by faying
Turn varies venere artes : labor omnia vicit
ImprobuSi & duris urgens in rebus egestas.
Where (according to the Dodlrlne in the Dia-
logue) Wa n t is made the Beginning or Origin of
Arts. The Poet even refers this Difpenfation, this
Introduction of Indigence^ Care, and Solicitude^ to the
immediate Will of Providence, ailing for the
Good of Mankind j left Plenty fhould lull them
into floathful Lethargy , fo as to forget their ?2obleJi
and mojl ailive Faculties.
Pater ipfe colendi
Haud facilem effe viam voluit, primufq; per art em
Movit agrosy curis acuens mortalia corda.
Nee torpere gravi pajjus fua regna veterno.
Note XIII. p. 32. Co-existent, replied
HE, AS IN A Statue, fiff. Successive, as in
T 2 A
276 NOTES on Treatise the Firft,
A Tune or Dance, ^c.^ This Divifion of
Beings or Produdtions we find mentioned by Ari-
Jlotle in his Phyfics^ (1. 3. c. 8.J where explaining
his Dodrine concerning Infinite^ he fays *AAX*
aj^wu, TO) aft aAAO xat aAAo yiviojociy xtoj >t«t to
uzrsipov. In as much as Being is manifold, fuch as is
the Being of a Day or public Feftival, {which exiji by
Continually becoming fojnething farther) fuch alfo is the
Being and Nature of Infinite. The fame Sentiment
foon after is more fully explained and opened.
"Xlft TO UTTlifOV H Ss7 Aa^jScSKEiV, Wf 7oSs T» * oloV
aym, 01; to tlvai, »;t uq acnx rig yiyovtv^ aAA' aft
Iv yi\ii(Tu v.s!.\ (p^opx. We are not to conceive of Infi'
nite, as of a pofitive particular Subjlance, like a Man
or a Houfe ; but rather as we pronowice Exijlence of a
Day or public Feftival, tvhich have their EJfence, not
as fcnfible, individual Subjlances, but by a continued
Procedure of Being and ceafing to be.
Note XIV. p. 32. What is Human Life, '
BUT A Compound of Parts thus fleet-
ing, y^ . J It is not inelegantly faid in the
Ethics fo often referred to 'H ^\ ^m Ivfp-
yncc lig £f-<, aoii IxaT^ "srept Tauroi y.xi T8T0jf
vjipyiH, a. xa.1 jM.aA»r"« dycczi-x ' olov jUjv ja«(rj){oV,
T>7 ccxQ'/i •srspt T« /xeA>i, Si (piXofji-oi^vg, rv i'lxvodx
vfi^i Tx ^S'jopriy'X'iot ' arw Je kxi twu Aoizccoy £>caf~^'.
Life is a certain Energy, and each Man energizes
about thofe Subjects, and with thofe Faculties, for which
he hath the greateji Affe^ion-t the Mufician, with his
Hearings
NOTES on Treatise the Flrji. 277
Hearings about Sounds harmonious ; the Studious^ ivith
his IntelleSl^ about Matters of Speculation ; and in like
manner each Man elfe of the various forts befde. Ethic.
Nicom. 1. 10. c. 4.
Note XV. p. 34. Every Art will be
ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WoRK OR
Energy.] The Cause here treated is the For-
mal, called by various Names ; the il$^^^ the
Aoj^©^, the T» eV*, the to t/ ?i» nvxi.
In the Beginning of the above-cited Ethics^ after
the Author has told us that every Jrt^ and Human
ASiion tend to fome Good or End, he adds Aj^^opoj
Si TJf (^ail/£T«* TCdU TiXu\) ' TX (Xl]) ycc^ EiO-JU IvSoyilOCi '
Ttx, §\ Ts-oc^ auT«f, ifycx. rivx But there appears a
Difference in Ends : For fome are Energies; fo7ne,
ever and above thefe Energies, are certain Works.
In ^lintilian's Injlitutes the fame Diflifi^ion, with
refped to the End of Arts, is mentioned /. 2.
c, 18.
But here perhaps it may be alked, ifalUrts are
ended and accomplilhed in fome Energy or ^For/t, and
this Energy or Work be almoft univerfally that abfent
Good, toward which they all tend, and for the fake
of which they are all exerted ; ('for a Dance, which
is an Energy, and a Houfe, which is a Work, are
certain abfent Goods or Pleafures, for the fake of
which certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it
may be aiked, whence then the Difference between
the Formal Caufe and the Final; the Final, as in
Note XII. it has been already treated ?
T3 The
\yS NOTES on Treatise the Firjl,
The Anfwer to this is, that they concur and are
the fame. To f/tXv yxp n' i?-i^ xxl to » ivtax, 'iy lo.
'The Formal Caufe and the ¥ iijal are on b. Arijl,
Nat. Jufc. 1. 2. c. 7. If they differ^ it is (as Joannes
Grammaticm obferves in commenting on this PlaceJ a
Difference rather in the T'tnie and Manner of our view-
ing them, than in their own E {fence and Nature. It
may not perhaps be improper to tranfcribe his own
Words. T.^u7oi' Tw cc^i^[/,w to thAw? y.oi\ to ilSo^j Ttj
o^icii y.ov/j cja(pspoyj ug hpnTaj, xoci tw ^f>ovu). otxv
fj.h yoi'^ u; ymy.vjov^ kxi jW.Ji7ru cy 0£wp>iTat, teAo?
iriv'OTy.v J?, coi Ti&^n yivof/.ivov, il^og. The End ««d?
the Form are numerically the fame ^ differing (as has
been faid) in Relation only, and Time. For thus
the fame Thing, ivhile conftdered as in its Progrefs to
Completion, but as not yet cotnplete, is fo long an End j
when confidered as adually complete, is no longer an End,
but a Form. And thus is this Queftion one way
anfwered, by acknowledging that thefe two Caufes
co-incide, and differ not in their Effence or real
Chara6l-er, but rather in the Time and Manner of
our contemplating them.
But there is another Anfwer, and that is derived
fi-om the tivofold Nature of /«^/ Caufes. According
to this Docbrine, Arts have not only a nearer and
more immediate End, (as a Sliip is the End of Ship-
building, or Navigating the End of Pilotry) but
they have a Hill remoter and higher End, a t£Ao? tj-
^i;c.i>T.^1cy, that is to fay, Man, Human-Kind, or
(in other Words) the IJtiUty or Elegance of Human
Lift. 'Thus the Stagirite. 'Etuij yoi^ irccg >iot\
55V.£tj TiAoj. * ciyjX(; 5'ap to"" » hiK;y^. For \K'E OUR-
SELVES
NOTES on Treatise. ibeFirJ. zjg
SELVES al/o are in fame fort an End ; for the final
Caufe is twofold. Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 2. If
therefore we have refpe<5t to this ultimate End,
thefe two Caufes will be found to differ, and be really
diftinc^ from each other.
And thus it is that in fome refpedls they agree^
and in others they differ^ according to the above
Diflindions eflabliflied by this Philofophy.
Note XVI. p. 38. O Art ! Thou Praise
OF Man, i^c] Eujlratius, in the Beginning of his
Comment on the Ethics of Jrijlotk^ has the follow-
ing elegant Encomium on Jrts. Aa ya^ i^ri cL'xj^y\-
r'oi; £ai;7w UTrapp^fiv tom ayOpwuTov, avcTTiTJiJfylov jU£-
vov7o5, v.x\ "loXq p^fipoci )tai a)(^fi^roig rwy uXoyoov
i^O[/.omiJi,B'JOVf aAA' Iccvia te Jtat clXXoiq ^nx, ty^; TS^vrig
TOi ^fmi^oc xa/opOsu. "Et» Je >£<%» jU.£p>? (To'lpix'; at
Tiyyoiiy ticg rviv (piKTtv (/.ifAv^ivcKi, xai uAaij ^pco/Asycxj,
xal rxvloiig a^ri ■nrfpjIiOt'jUEvat * wj xa) J<a t»7o uio
^Eu/ au'Ia? Tov (piXoo-epov aTroTrs'aTrftS-aj, i-mila, xx\
(Tus^oili •sroAu7ra7£i xat isoXv^iloc^oXtx) <rvv^s^su.mg
av6pw7iro?-, J'sn-at >cai ttoXXuv tuv s^wSfy ek j3o5i0£fav,
iva, ■crpoj Tu C,iu OiwXwg, xoci to eu ^iiu aufjW7rodts-w?
auloj TTspiyivoiloy kxi jtxv J"ia tiiv twv ;!^p}5(r/j!Awv fWijay
dvccxouloilo. Ef ^£y su twv (Mul^ovm ^lupvi^-ciiTuv lyo~
[xsvog, ovx i)(^£i y.xi •crpo? t« iXdrlco xx\ xa 7irpa$' za-^pj-
dvlip, ocrai roc. roTg avOpwHr/ym? (TU[ji,oc(Ti la'ya.i^ovla.t,
^(^pwjpa, w{p£Ax,«,£vwv Twy ^eipmccKlovvluv ttoco cIvth
-uxpog ra TEAfcoTEpa,
T 4 Note
28o NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
Note XVII. p. 44. The Efficient, the
Material, the Final, and the Formal.]
That is to fay, to xmirccvy v "TAj?, to » hsKoc, to
Thus Seneca in his 65th Epiftle. Caufam Ari-
Jloteles putat tribus modis did. Prifna^ inquit, caufa
eft ipfa Materia, fine qua nihil potejl effici. Secunday
Opifex. 'Tenia, Forma qu<s uniciiique operi imponitur,
tanquam Jiatiice 'y nam ham Arijiotelei Idos [nhc] vocat.
^Mrta quoque, inquit, his accedii, Propofitum totius
eperis.
Qu in fit hoc, aperiam. Ms prima Jlatuee caufa
eft : nunquam enim fa£ia effet, Jiifi fuiffet id, ex quo ea
funderetur, ducereturve. Secunda caufa, Artifex ejl :
non potuijfet enim iss illud in hahitum Jiatucs figurari^
nifi accefiffent peritcs matius. Tertia caufa eft Forma :
neque enim flatua ifia Doryphoros aut Diadumenos voca-
retur, nifi hcsc illi ejet impreffa fades, ^arta caufa
eji, faciendi Propofitum : nam nifi hocfuijet, faSia non
efj'et. ^id efl Propofitum? ^od invitavit arti-
ficem, quod ilk fecutus fecit. Vel pecunia ejl hoc, fi
venditurus fahricavit ; vel gloria, fi lahoravit in no-
men ; vel religio, fi donum templo paravit. Ergo ^
hcEc Caufa efl, propter quam fit. An non putas inter
caufas fa£ii operis numerandum, quo remoto fa£lum non
eJJ-etr--
Aristotle's own Words are as follow.
*'Ei/>s |W,£v »u toottov Uiliov Xiyirai to i'^ » 'ylvsTOci t»
&^'y\jc^ nr.q (^kxAkt, xJ Ta TbTwy yivvi. AAAov SI,
TO
NOTES o« Treatise theFirft. 281
TO ElJ^I^, >^ TO ZJ-CCOOC^Siy^/.tX, ' T»TO ^' l^]v Koy^
T» Ti '^v Et'vasf, Xj rx tssts J^evj] * oiov Ttf {Tja 7rx(TUV
rx duo zjpof £Uj X; oAw? o a^itj^xoi;, 7ty tx fj.e^n rx iv
Tw Aoj/tj). "Eti^ oS't'v -n' «pX^ ''^'f f/'ilx^oXvi; v •srpWT»?,
^ 51 7Yi; ripsfji.rKTiui; ' otou o (3o'jA£'J(raj, aj7<cu ' x^ o
'TTxInp, TH TSKVH ' Xy oAw? TO TTOlHV TH TTOl^^iw^ y^ TO
f-six^xXKov Ta jM,£7a|3«AAo^a£v». "Etj, w; to t£A@J *
T»TO (5"' £r"i to"" » i.sax ' olov T« TrfpfSTaTfly u vyitix '
Six ri yxp TTSpnrxTti ; (px^iv ivx uj/iainj, }£«» UTrovTi;
pUTw?, oip|U£9a xiroaiSojyJvxi to ajTJOv.
I N ^«^ ?nanner that may be called a Caufe, out of
which ^ exi fling as a Part of it, any thing is made or
compounded. Thus is Brafs the Caufe of a StatuCy
Silver of a Cup, and fo alfo the higher Genera^ in '
which thefe are included [as Metal, the Genus in-
cluding Brafs and Silver ; Body, the Genus including
Metal, b'/T. ^r.] In another way., the Form and Ex-
emplar of any thing is its Caufe ; that is to fay., in other
Words., the Definition or Rationale of its EJfence [that
which, charaderizing it to be fuch a particular thing,
diftinguifhes it from all things elfe] and of this Ra-
tionale the fever al higher Genera. Thus the Caufe of the
Diapafon or 0(flave is the Proportion of two to one j
and more generally than that., is Number ; and is more-
over the feveral Parts, out of which this Definition is
formed. Add to this Caufe., that other., from ivhence
the original Principle of Change, or of Ceafing to
change ; as for injiance, the Perfon who deliberates is
the Caufe of that, which refults from fuch Delibera-
tion ; the Father is the Caufe of the Son ; and in gene-
ral the Efficient, of the thing effected; the Power
(hanging, of the thing changed. Befides thefe Caufes,
there
282 NOTES o« Treatise the Firjl.
there is that alfo^ which is confidered as the End', that
is to fay, the Caufe, for the fake of which the thing is
done. Thus the Caufe of Exercifing is Health, For
if it be afked, TVhy does he ufe Exercife ? We fay^
To preferve his Health ; and havijig faid thus muchy
%ve think we have given the proper Caufe. Ariftot.
Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 3.
Addition to NOTE III. -
The Peripatetic Definition of Nature, given
p. 257. tho' in fome degree illuftrated p. 266. yet
being ftill from its Brevity perhaps obfcure, the fol-
lowing Explication of it is fubjoined.
In the firft place, by Nature tht Peripatetics
meant that Vital Principle in Plants, Brutes and
Men, by which they are faid to live, and to be di-
ftinguiflied from things inanimate. Nature therefore
being another Name for Life or a vital Principle,
the firji ASI of this Principle, throughout all Sub-
jeds, is univcrfally found to be of the following
kind ; namely, to advance the Subjefl, which it en-
livens, from a Seed or Embryo to fomething better and
more pcrfe^. This Progreffion, as well in Plants as
in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that
Nature is a Principle of Motion. But then
this Progreffion or Growth is not infinite. When
the Subjed is mature, that is, hath obtained its Com-
pletion and perfcSi Form, then the Progreffion ceafes.
Here therefore the Bufmcfs of the vital Principle
becomes different. It is from henceforward no
longer employed to acquire a Fortn, but to preferve
t9 its SubjeJi a Form already acquired. And thus is
it
NOTES on Treatise the Firfl, 283
it that Nature is a Principle of Reft, Stability, or
Ceafing to move. And fuch indeed fhe continues to
be, maintaining, as long as pojftble, the Fonn com-
mitted to her Care, till Time and external Caufes in
the firfl: place impair it, and induce at length its
Dijfolution, which is Death.
And thus has it been fhewn how Nature may
be called a Principle both of Motion and
Ceasing TO move.
As to the refl: of the Definition, namely that
Nature is a Principle, which inheres in its Sub-
jec5t immediately, effentially, and not by ivay of Acd'
dent; no more is meant by this, than that the
Nature or Life in every Being, which hath fuch
Principle, is really and truly a Part of that
Being, and not detached ^nd feparate firom it, like
the Pilot fi-om the Ship, the Mufician fi-om the In-
ftrument. For to thefe SubjeSis are thofe Artifls
the Principles of Motion and Reft, yet do they in no
Senfe participate with them of vital Sympathy and
Union.
END ^//y^^ NOTES on Treatise theFlrJl.
NOTES
O N
TREATISE theThirdj
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS.
NOTE I. p. 107. Nature seems to
TREAT Man, ^r.] Ut Phidias poteji a
prima injiituere ftgnum, idque perficere ;
Potejl ab alio inchoatum accipere & abfolvere : huic ejl
fapieniia fimilis. Non enim ipfa genuit hominem^ fed
accepit a natura inchoatum : hanc ergo intuens, debet
injlitutum illud, quafi fignum^ abfolvere. Cic. de
Fin. IV. 13. p. 304. Edit. Davif.
Note II. p. 113. Practice too often
CREEPS, i^c.'X See p. 136. and Note X.
Note III. p. 114. The Sovereign Good
IS that, the Possession of which renders
us HAPPY.] K.1r,(xn ya^ aj/aSwv, oi IvSocii^ovsg^
£u<5'<xi/xov£?. By the Poffeffion of Things good, are
2 the
286 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
the Happy made happy. Platon. Conviv. p. 204.
torn 2. Edit. Serrani. See Arrian, Epi5i. 1. 3. c. 22.
P- 453-
The Reader will be pleafed to obferve, that, in
all Qiiotations fi"om the Differtations of EpiSfetus
colleded by Jrri an, the Author refers to the late
Edition in two Volumes ^arto^ publiflied by his
learned and ingenious Friend, Mr. Upton.
Note IV. p. 115. Certain original
Characteristics and Pre-concep-
TioNs, ^r.] The Pre-conceptions here fpoken
^ of, are called by the Latins, Pranotiones^ or Antici-
pationes ; by the Greeks, ts^oXri-^iK;, or "Evioiai, with
the occafional Epithets of either >coii/«l, s{jt.(pv%,
or (pvatKcc),
'Tis evident that all Men, without the leaft
Help of Art, exert a kind of Natural Logic ; can in
fome degree refute, and prove, and render a Reafon,
Now this cannot be (as the meanefl Proficient
in Logic well knows) without general Ideas, and
general Propofitions, becaufe a Syllogifm of Particu-
lars is an ImpofTibility. There muft be therefore
fome natural Faculty, to provide us thefe Generals.
This Faculty cannot be any of the Senfes, for they
all refpedl Particulars only. Nor can it be the rea-
foning ox fyllogvzing Faculty, for this does not form fuch
Generals, but ufe them when formed. There only
therefore remains the Faculty called N»?, that is to
fay, the Inductive Faculty ; the Faculty, which by
InduBion of fimilar Individuals, forms out of the
2 particular
NOTES on Treatise thenird. 287
particular and the many what is general and one.
This Species of Apprehenfion is evidently our firjl
and earlieji Knowledge, becaufe all Knowledge by
Reafoning dates its Origin from it, and becaufe, ex-
cept thefe two, no other Knowledge is pofTible.
A s therefore every Ear, not abfolutely depraved,
is able to make fome general DiJlin£iiom of ^ound ;
and in like manner every Eye, with refpedl to Objedls
oiVifton y and as this general Ufe of thefe Faculties,
by being diffufed through all Individuals, may be
called common Hearing, and common Vifion, as op-
pofed to thofe more accurate Energies., peculiar only
to Artijis : fo fares it with refped: to the IntelleSf,
There are Truths, or Univerfals of fo obvious a
kind, that every Mind, or hit elk ^ not abfolutely de-
praved, without the leafl: Help of Art, can hardly
fail to recognize them. The Recognition of thefe,
or at lead the Ability to recognize them, is called
Koji/o? Naf, Common Sense, as being a Senfe
common to all, except Lunatics and Idiots,
Farther, as this Power is called Koii/o? Nsr,
fo the feveral Propofitions, which are its proper
Objedls, are called zs^oXri-^im;^ or Pre-conceptions, as
being previous to all other Conceptions. It is eafy
to gather from what has been faid, that thefe orpo-
Kn^siq muft hQ general, as being formed by lndu£lion ;
as alfo natural^ by being co7nmon to all Men, and
previous to all Inftrudion. Hence therefore their
Definition. "Es-t ^' y\ TrpoAr^J/i?, £woj« ^u(r*>£Ji rm
Koi^oXis. " A Pre-conception is the natural Ap-
prehenfion of what is general; or univerfal" Diog.
Laert.
288 NOTES c/z Treatise the Third,
Laert. /. 7. / 54 SeealfoJrrian.Epi^f. 1. i. c. 22.
L 3. c. 6. Q'c. de Naturd Dear. 1. i. c. 16, 17.
Plut. de Placit.PhUofoph. 910. c.
No.TE V. p. 115. — And that the Dif-
ference LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM
TO Particulars.] This was called ^Epcc^i^oyn
rm sTpoXri'l/suv Tccig itti y.sfnn; >i(Ticmg — rag ^ucixa?
Epia. 1. I. c. 22. p. 114, 116. Edit. Upt. See an
eminent Inftance, illuflrating the Truth of this Rea-
foning, in the fame Author, /. 4. c. 1. p. 545.
'EwoJjw-Ev yap^ oTt, &C.
Note VI. p. 120. Why are there, who
SEEK Recesses, ^r.] Multi autem ^ funt, &
fuerunt, qui earn, quam dico, tranquilitatem expetentes,
a negotiis publicis fe removerint, ad otiumque perfu-
gerint. His idem propof.tufn fuit, quod regibus i ut
ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, lihertate uterentur :
cujus proprium ejl fic vivere, ut velis. ^are cum
hot commune fit potentia cupidorum cum lis, quos dixi,
otiofis : alteri fe adipifii id pojfe arbitrantur, fi opes
magnas habeant ; alteri ft contenti fint ^ fuo, ^ parvo.
Cic. de Offic. 1. i. c. 20, 21.
Note VII. p. 121. — The Sovereign Good,
they HAVE TAUGHT US, OUGHT TO BE, ^f.]
The ORIGINAL Pre-conceptions of the Sove-
reign Good here recited, may be juftified by the
following Authorities, from among many which are
omitted.
Agreeable
NOTES on Treatise the T^hird, 289
Agreeable to Nature. Neque ulla alia
in re^ nifi //? Natura, quarendum ejje illud Sum-
mum BONUM, quo omnia referrentiir. Cic. Acad.
1. I. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Davif.
Conducive to well-being. — Epit^eius Cd\\s
that Truth or K/ioiv ledge, which reJpeJIs our real Hap-
pinefs \_Tyi> aAJiSfjay tij^v is-fpi tti^ \\i^x\,ii.o-\i'wx'\ the Truth
or Knowledge, which regards not incre Living, but
which conduces to Living well [» tw Trjpi t«
ZHN, aAAa Tw TTpoV TO ET ZHN.] Arrian.
Epi£l. 1. I. c. 4. p. 28. Edit.Vpt. 'At v.oivxi Trepi
ijdoci[ji.ov:oig svvoisci — TO ZHN KATA ^TSIN,
}^ rov xxla (pvcriv Qiov, E TA AIM ON IAN Xiyaa-i '
zjpog J's TSTOj?, To ET ZHN, ^ to iZ Sjsv, >^
7W sufwiav, 'ETAAIMONIAN (Pcc(t]v sTvxt. Our
co7nmon Pj'e-conceptions concerning Wp^vpi^es^ call it
the Living according to Nature ; farther
than this, they fay it is Lining or Exifiing zvell, the
Life of well-being. Alex, Aphrod. Trspl ij/up/.
p. 157. Edit, Aid,
Accommodate to all Places and Times—
Antoninus, fpeaking of that Happinefs, which he
deemed our Sovereign Good, calls it fomething which
was in our Power DANTAXOT ic, AIHNE-
Knx, every where ajid perpetually.
1. 7. f. 54.
Durable — and Indeprivable. — Nifi sta-
BILI ^ FIXO y PERMANENTE BONO, BEATUS
ejfe nemo potejl. Tufc. Difp. 1. 5. c. 14. p. 372. Edit.
U Davif
290 NOTES on Treatise the f bird,
Davif. So immediately after, in the fame page — "
An dubium ejl^ qu'in nihil fit habendum in eo gemre^
quo vita beata compktur, fi id poffit amitti ? nihil
enini interarefcere, nihil exjlingui^ &c. Ka) tjV
Kairap r, KatVapo? <piXo?, oiXKcx. aofa^^ ccvXnrrjg^ ztv~
pfiog^ ccaXx TpKr|t/up:a •, 11 J ETPOIA iSiv ^ro^q
%Xi^, ^i TO AIHNEKES kJ ANEMnOAI-
2TON. And what fort of Happinefs is this^ which
my thing intervening may embarraf j / fay not Csefar,
or Csefar'; Friend^ but a Crozu, a Pipcr^ a Fever^ a
thoufand things be fide? Happiness furely implies
nothing fo much^ as Perpetuity and being su-
perior TO Hindrance or Impediment.
Arridn. Epi£l. \. 4. c. 4. p. 585. Edit. Upt. See
alfo, I. 2. c. II. p. 227*
Self-derived.— y^/^;/(? hoc dabitis, ut opinor, fi
modo fit aliquid effe beatum, id cportere totum
poNi IN potestate Sapientis: nam ^ fi amitti
%nta beata potefi, beata effe nonpotefl. Cic. de Fin. 1, 2-
C. 27. p. 163. — «j TOiV ju,£v >caT aAii0Etay -mxiioiq "vot
fAig TTSpiWlTZTT'/J avGoUtC©^, ItT avico [oJ OsOi] TO TTUV
fOfvlo. That Man might not fall into real Evils, the
Gods have put the whole 1"!!^ his own Power. M.
Ant. 1. 2. f II. Tl yu,^ eov, ^Tile? Troiq avSpwTr©^ ;
EuraOwaj, hSxiiJ^ovytcxi;, IIANTA HS ©EAEI
TIOIEIN, i-t-'^ KwAiJ^o-Oaj, lUjiJ'' avafka^^frSat. i?'^^
what is it, that every Man living feeks ? To be fecurely
fixed, to be happy, to do all things accord-
ing TO his own Will, 7iot to be hindered, not
is be compelled. Arr. Epid. 1. 4. c. i. p. 539, 540.
Note
Notes on T re at ise tbe Third, 2 9 1
Note VIII. p. 125. The Political and
Lucrative, the Contemplative and
Pleasurable.] This fourfold Diftindion of
Lives is mentioned in Arijiotk's Ethics, 1. i. c. 5,
Note IX. p. 131. Pleasure
Whom Love attends, i^c,
alluding to Homer, Iliad. H. V. 214.
Note X. p. 136. Suppose an Event were
to happen — NOT AN Inundation, &c.'\ Sce
Arrian.EpiSf. I. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly
addrefTed to the Seekers of Leifure, Retirement , and
Study. Part of it has been already quoted p. 290.
xj t/? «'jt») 71 aipoja, ^c. See alfo the fame Author,
1. 4. c. I. p. 567. ITw? axa'tif, i^c. and of the
Dialogue here commented, p. 113.
Note XI. p. 137. — Is Acting a Circum-
stance, ^r.] Etenim cognitio contefnplatioque na-
tures mama qmdammodo atque inchoata fit, fi nulla
a£lio rerum confequatur, Ea autem a5iio in hominum
tommodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Cic. de Offic.
/.I. c. 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the
Subfequent, is well worthy of Perufal.
Note XII. p. 140. — If a Piece of Metal e£
tendered us, ^r.] ?>^q Jrr. EpiSi. 1. i. c;. lo.
p. no. 'Opare 7^ in\ ts voiMi(T^oi\<i^, &c.
Note XIII. p. 144. — ^Are alienated from
it, or are indifferent to it?] Placethis,in^
^uitf quorum ratio ?nihi probatur, fmul atque natitm fit
U 2 animal
292 NOTES en Treatise the Third.
animal (hinc enhn ejl ordiendum) ipfum fibi conclliari^ ^
commendari ad fe confervandum^ ^ fuum ftatum, iff ad
ea^ quee confervantia funt ejusjiatus., diligenda ; alienari
autem ab interitu, iifque rebus, qua interitum videantur
afferre. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit. Dav.
See alfo I. ^. e.g. DeOffic. \. 1. c. 4. 'Oixny/y-^Oos
7rpo\ «u7»? iu6uf ytvo^j^ivQi. Phit. Mcr. p. 1038. b.
Note XIV. p. 155. Let it not be forgot
THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SociETY, ^f.J
The whole Argument to prove Society natural to
Man, from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken
from the fecond Book of Plato's Republic. See
Plat. torn. 2. p. 369, ^c. Edit. Serrani.
Note XV. p. 156. — Are not the Powers
AND Capacities of Speech, ^^.] The Argu-
ment in favour of Society, from our being poflefled
of Aoj/^j, or the /peaking Faculty, feems to have
been much infifled on by the befl Autliors of Anti-
quity.
Tt^iog V.XI A^aryjps £S~j criy'Slov ' Sto y.x,i toTi; aXXoig
uVjipp^a (^uoig • y^X?^ y^^ ■^^''^^ '^ (pviTig ccvluv eAjiAu-
cnyoitvitv 0!.XXr,Xoig. O $i Xoyo; eVI to SyiX^v l~i
TO o"^|'-c{p£po-.', xai TO |3AaCfpo'i» • urs y.a\ to SUxiov,
y.Zi Ti fi'JiKO]/. T»7o yx^ Trr^o; ix. elXA» ^ux roTg
avOpu-
NOTES on Treatise the Third, 293
^vOpcotzroif ('(j^ov, TO [U.0VOV ayx^is kx\ >£axa, xx) J'lxaia xai
ei^ixn uKT^miV '^X^^^ ' '^ ^^ t^t-m xoiooivix zroiii oixix\i
xx\ zToXiv. The ReafonwhyM.A-ii is a Social K^i~
MAI., more than any Bee, or any herding Species whatever,
is evident from hence. Nature, we fay, makes nothing
in vain; and Man, of all Animals, is only poffeJJ'ed of
Spe ECH. Bare Sound indeed ?nay be the Sign ofivhat
is pleafurable or painful ; and for that reafon is it com-
mon even to other Animals alfo. For fo far ive perceive
even their Nature can go, that they have a Senfe of
thofe Feelings, and fignify the?n to each other. But
Speech is made to indicate ivhat is expedient, and what
hurtful, and in confequence of this, what is juji and
unjuji. It is therefore given to Men, becaiife this, with
refpe^ to other Aniinals, is to Men alone peculiar, that
of Good and Evil, fuft and Unjuft, they only poffefs a
Senfe or Feeling. Noiu 'tis the Participation or Com-
munity of thefe, which makes and confiitutes both a
Family, and a Polity. Ariflot. Polit. 1. i. c. 2.
E(xo';£? yx^ lidiv iv TV) ^f'Up(^i7 ruv zTpayy-xTuv [m
io'ny.xrx'\ ' xi Je pavxi tcov vojj^aTwu ticrli/ i'^xyyiXn-
KXi' Hj Six T»TO SiSoVTXl 'Ay^V VTTO T>]f (pU(T£Ug, "^fOq
TO §1 auTwu cniJi-xivsiv r\^x^ xXXriXoig Tvg ^v^ni; toc
vor\^XTX — \'i)X xxi Svv(jO[j.sQx xoivoovs7v xXXvXok;, xxl
(ru,U7roAjT£Uf(J"Gai ' xoivuivixov yx^ ^uov o ''Ai^Spw/r©-',
Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul ; and Sounds
are declarative of thefe Ideas. And for this reafon
■were thefe Sounds imparted to us by Nature, not only
that we might indicate to each other thefe Ideas, but
that IV e might be enabled to communicate a^id
live in Associations. ForM.\ti is by Nature a
Social Animal. Am?non.inL de Interpr. p. ib. b.
U 3 Thus^
294 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Thus Cicero, (peak'mg of Human Nature — Omitto
opportunitates hahilitatcfque reliqui corporis,, modera-
tionem vocis, orationis vim, qua conciliatrix eft
human ee maxume focietatis. De Legg. 1. i. c. 9.
F- 35' £^^^- Davif.
Again in hi^ Offices Sed quce natura prlncipia
f.nt communitatis Iff focietatis humana:, repetendum
chins videtur. Ef enim primum-, quod cernitur in
univerfi generis humani focieiate. Ejus enim vinculum
^fl Ratio, & Oratio ; qucs docendo, difcendo, cofn-
' municando, difceptando., dijudicando, conciliat inter fe
homines, conjungitque natur^li quadam focietate De
Cffic. 1. I. c. 16.
Thus too in his Treatife De Nat. Dear. Jam
vero domina rernni (ut vos foletis dicere) Eloquendi
VIS qua?n eft pr cedar a, quamque divina? ^ce primurt\
efficit, ut ea, qucs ignoramus, difcere, ^ ea, qucefcimus„
alios docere pojfimus. Dcinde hac cohortamur, hac per-
fuademus, hac confolamur affli5los, hac deducimus per-
territos a timore, hac geftientes comprimimus^ hac cupi-
ditates iracundiafqiie refinguimus : hccc nos juris, le-
gum, urbium focietate devinxit : hccc a vita immani
is ftra fegregavit. De Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 59.
p. 243. Edit. Davif. — See alio ^lint. Inft. 1. 2.
c. 16. and Alex. Aphrod. Trepl i^yp^;. p. 155. b.
Edit. /lid.
Note XVI. p. 166. 'Tis from among the
FEWjCiff.] In omni enim arte, vel fludio, vel quavii
fcientia, vel in ipfa virtute, optumum quodque rariffi-
pium efl. Cic.de Fin. 1.2. c. 25. p. i^S. Edit.Dav..
* Note
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 295
Note XVII. p. 167. — Working ever uni-
rORMLY ACCORDING TO THIS IdEA OF PeR-
FECION, ^C-l
Thus Boethiusy addrefllng the Deity,
qui perpetua mundum ratlone gubernas,
Terrarum ccelique Sator, qui tempus ab avo
Irejubesy Jiabilifque manens das cunSfa moveri ;
^em non externa pepiilerunt finger e caufa
Materia fiuitantis opus ; veru?n insita Summi
Forma boni, livore carens : Tu cun6ia superno
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchru?n pulcherri?nus ipfe
Mundum mente gerens^fimilique in imagine formam.
Confol. Philof. 1.3. Metr. 9.
Note XVIII. p. 167. — From some hidden
HIGHER Motive, ^C.'\ MvittoJs SI y.-^h rauri*
[fc. TX TSaXTOc'j TITOCpoi (pU(7IV iKTiV, OiXXcc TYI fJ.l)) //.£-
fl»>ti? (P'jVhj a (puo-fj, aAAa •srapa (puo-ju * rvi h JtaOo Ai^,
y.x\ (pJcTEi jca* nxjoi (putriv. 'H jUEv yx^ (xspiy-yi (pixrig
Ivog £j(?»j j-op^a^£T!X<, y.ocl y-ix)) opi'J'iu (pi'jyu. Ai»
T8T0 rvt iJiXv T8 ayOpwTzra (puVft to TEpc*? ars (p\j(TH
ES-iv, STE ;caTa (puo-iu ' m d oAii Cpuo-E;, ettei [j.rtdvj tw
7rauT» Trap!^ (pjVjv (o-j^lv yd^ kxkov Iv tco 7rc(\>l\) ovk
, £0 Trapa (p'J(rjv, ccXXx (p'jrrn xx\ xxlx (pv(nv,
Joannes Gram, in Ariftot. lib. 2. Natural Aufcult.
Nihil enim fieri fine caufid potefi : nee quicquafn fity
quod fieri non potefi : nee, fi id fa^um eft quod potuit
fieri, pcrtentum debet videri. Cic. de Divin. 1. 2.
c. 28. p. i8g. Edit. Davif.
U 4 Nots
296 NOTES on Treatise the 'Third. .
Note XIX. p. 169. Man is a social
Rational Animal.] Zu:ov >^o'y^■iioy ^ TroMrmovy
^.oyixO)) x^ xoivoiv'.y.h, Kcyiy.oy y^ T^.(^ovy thefe are
Defcriptions of Humanity^ which we meet in every
Page of Epi^etus and Antoninus.
I T feems indeed to have been a received Opinion
of eld, that fo intimate vvas the Relation between
thefe two Attributes^ that wherever there was Ra-
tionality^ Sociality followed of courfe. Thus Anto-
ninus ij—f oi TO AoJ/iKOv, £u6u? ytj 7raKniy.ov. 1. 10.
f. 2. And again, more fully >^ xotVjy ttuv to
rv,; vcepa? (pCa-eccg fxi^o-^ov, tt^oj 10 (Tvyyiviq o^oiicq
(nriv^Si, v r^ p^jAAo'j * ocw ycip i?~i ■KfiiiTov ttol^o, toc
a.A>^oc^ roCHTui y^ rr^oq ro cri''yxifvx.(y9jci ru omstu) xj
s-'j^z-xiTcrSat iTii^OT.'fov, 1. 9. f. 9.
It is not perhaps foreign to the prefent Subjedl to
obferve, that were the Eyes of any two Men what-
ever to view the fame ObjeSf, they would each, from
their different Places and their different Organization^
behold it differently^ and have a different Image. But
were all the Mijids in the Univerfe to recognize the
fame Truths they would all recognize it as one^ their
Recognition would be uniform, and themfeives in a
manner would be one alio. The Reafon is. Per-
ception by the Senfes admits of more and lefsy better
and worfe ; but Perception by the Intelle^i, like Truth,
its Objed, admits of no degrees, and is either no-
thing at all, or elfe total, uniform, co'mpkte, and one.
Hepce therefore one Source of the Society, and as it
were
NOTES on Treatise tk Tl:ird, 297
■were Communion of all Minds^ confidered as Minds,
namely, the Unity of Truth, their common Objed.
Again, every juft and perfedl Society ftands on
the Bafis of certain Laws. But Law is nothing
more, than right and perfeil Reason, feen in bidding
and forbidding, according to the Nature and Eilence
of thofe Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore
this Universe be ^«<? whole, or general Society,
there muft be fome common, general Law for
its Condu£i and Welfare ; and this Law muft, of con-
fequence, be fome right and perfect Reason, which
pafTes thro' all things, and extends to every Part.
Well therefore might Antoninus fay in the Beginning
of this Note, that every thing rational, was of courfe
focial, fmce Reason and Law appear to be the
fame, and Laiv to be the Support and Bafis of all
Society. Thus too Cicero fequitur, ut eadem fit
in his [fc. D/7j] quce hiimano generi Ratio j eadem
Veritas utrohique fit ; eademque Lex, qua eji re^i
prceceptio, pravique depulfio. De Nat. Deor. 1. 2.
c. 31. p. 180. See alio the fame Author Z)(? Z(?^^.
1. I. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29,41, 51. Edit. Davif. De
Fin. 1. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See alfo Diog. Laert.
1. 7. f 88. M. Anton. 1. 5. c. 16. I. 6. c. 23,
Arijl. Polit. as quoted in Nate XV.
Note XX. p. 169. Nothing can be pur-
suable, WHICH IS destructive OF SoCIETY.]
Si cnim fie erimus affe^li, ut propter fuum quifque emo~
lumentum fpoliet, aut violet alterum, difrumpi necefje
eJi earn, qucc maxime ejl fecundum naturam, humani
generis Societatem. Cic. de Offic. 1. 3. c. 5.
Note
29S NOTES on Treatise the Third,
Note XXI. p. 173. — For Contraries are
EVER recognized THROUGH THE SAME Ha-
BIT, djV.] AokeT ^i Hy % avrccTyi^ >ij.jn ETrij-jj^n Twi*
ivavjftjov, r\ dvlri iTvai. There feetns to be one and the
fame Error ^ and one and the fame Science^ with refpe5l
to things contrary. Arift. de Anim. L 3. c. 3. This
by Themiflius^ in his Paraphrafe^ is thus illuftrated.
yocp 70 ocyoi^ov CO? upiXiixo]) yivuavMVy Xj to y.xxQV
^Uy.Sv'^, irOCTTCiiC^.TXl J^ TTlfl 6«T£pOV. Of ThwgS
contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For
thus he, who knows Good to be fo?nething beneficial,
knows Evil at the fame time to be fometbing pernicious j
and he, who is deceived with refpo^l to one of thefe, is
deceived alfo ivith refpeSl to the other.
Note XXII. p. 174. — Those four Grand
Virtues, feV.] Stobceus having told us, that of
the Virtues fome were primary, fome fubordinate, adds
— TT^urxg i\ i^Jrac^ocg sivxi, (pfovnciv, (ru(pf,0(T\Jvriv, Oiv-
^fSKXv, mKOcioaxivw ' nai rrv [j.iv (ppov>i(rju, •arfpt toj
y.cc^r.y.o-flx. yivBcr^ca ' tw Js crwippoiruvjiu TCfpt rag opfAOig
T» ayGpW7r« • tyjv J'e auJpstav, Trept rug viro^ovy.g ' ttv
i\ ^piocior'jvnv, •OTtpt ra? a.7rovsfxr\(T£ig. The primary Vir-
tues are four; Prudence, Temperance, Forti-
tude, and Justice: Prudence is employed in moral
Offices ; Temperance, in Mens natur al Appetites and
pur [aits 5 Fortitude, in Endurings j and Juflice, in
Dijlrfbutions. Eel. Ethic, p. 167.
That
NOTES on Treatise the Third, 299
That the Life according /■(? Virtue, was deemed
the Life according /;? Nature, appears from what is
faid by the fame Author, in the Page following —
Uacrccv ^l TdTUfV roov dffluv to teA©^ £ivaj, to" axo-
A«9w? TYi (pv(rii (^',:u • ly.zrriv Si t»twu J'ta tuv Uiuv
•nraps^j/jaOat Tuip^avovla tov ai/9pw7rov. 77v End of all
thefe Virtues zV, to live agreeably to Nature \ and each
eftheni, by thofe Means ^ which are peculiar to itfelf is
found to put a Man in pojfejfion of this End.
So likewife Cicero Etenim quod fummum
honum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere,
id habet hanc, ut opinor, fentcntiarn^ cum virtute
congruere femper. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 3.
Note XXIII. p. 174. That Life, where
THE Value of all Things is justly mea-
sured, ^f . ] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203,
204.
Note XXIV. p. 175. — That, which BEiisre
DONE, ADMITS OF A RATINQAL JUSTIFICA-
TION.] In the Original it is -us^xyyv) vjKoyov
'i<r^ii dTToXoyKTy-ov. Diog. Laert. 1. 7. f. 107. oV^p
TSPOi.'X^iv vjXoyov iyji rriv ocTroAoyiXV. Sext. Emp. Adv.
Maihem. 1. 7. Thus rendered by C/V^r^ — Officiumid
effe dicutit, quod cur faSium fit, rdtio probabilis reddi
pojfit. De Offic. 1. I. c. 3. The Reafon of its
Greek Name, xcMkov, is given by SimpHcius. Ka-
63)coi/7<54 eV* rot, yivo^iva, xxloi to. yikovIs', >tj STnQccX-
i^ovlcc -— Moral Ofices are thofe things which are dom
agreeably
30O NOTES on Treatise the Third.
agreeably to what is fittings and expedient. Simplic. in
Ench. c. y].
Note XXV. p. 176. And when our se-
veral Energies, exerted according to
THE Virtues above, have put us in pos-
session oFjIctV.] This Vv^astheM-iJ of Happiness,
adopted by the old Jcademy, or Platonics. Secun-
dum naturam vivere, fic affe£iu7n^ ut opthne affici
pojji-t^ ad naturamque accommodatijjime . Cic. de Fin.
I. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics^ who were
originally of the fame School, held the fame. 'Et
d arw, 70 ayypWTrtvo^ aya^oy v^'oyjAi ivipynoc yiyiislai
iixf apEl'/lv — rm dpi—m >Cj nXimcirY.v — i\i Qicp TsAaw.
If this he admitted^ it foUovjs that Human Good or
Happiness /5, the energizing of the Soul according to
the hefi and mofl confummate Virtue., in a perfeoi and
complete Life. Ethic. Nic. 1. i. c. 7. A per fe Si and
complete Life^ they explained to be fuch a Life as
was Jio way deficient either as to its Duration., its bodily
Health., and its being attended ivith a proper Competence
»f exterjial Goods, and Profperity. By the befl and
mofl confummate Virtue, they not only meant that
Virtue, vvhich was in its hind mofl: perfed, but which
was the Virtue alfo of that Part., which is in each
of us jnoft excellent. For there are Virtues of the
Body, fuch as Strength and Agility ; and there are
Virtues of the Senfes, fuch as accurate Seeing, ac-
curate Tafling ; and the fame of every Faculty,
from the lowefi: to that which is fupreme.
The fovereign Good or Happinefs here fpoken of,
is again repeated, in other Words, p. i-jc). where it
is
NOTES on Treatise the Tbird. 301
is called, the Attaining the primary and jufi Re-
quifites of our Nature y by a Condu^ fuitable to Virtiit
and moral Office.
The primary and just Requisites here
mentioned, are all Things requifite to the Ufe and
Enjoyment of our Primary and Natural
Perfections. 1 hefe Primary and Naiwal
Perfeiiions mean the Natural Accomplish-
ments of both our Mind and Body. They
were called by the Latins, Prima Naturae, Prima
fecundum Naturam ; by the Greeks, rcc zj^iara. kxIx
(p'jciv, TO. zrpwTOi ritg (p6<T£oog. In them were in-
cluded Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfedl
Senfations, Memory, Docility, Invention, iffc. See
Stob. Eel. Etb. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. 1. 5. c. 7.
p. 364. A. Gell. I. 12. c. 5.
A like Sentiment of Happinefs, to this here fpoken
of, is that mentioned by Cicero Virtiite adhibitd,
frui PRIM is a naturd datis . De Fin. 1.2. c. ii.
p. 113. 'Tis there called the Opinion of the oli
Academics, and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by
the fame Author. Honefle vivere, friientem rebus
lis, quas prim as hotnini natura ccnciliet. Acad.
1. 2. c. 42. p. 24Q.
In is to be obferved that Cicero, fpeaking of this
Hypothefis, fays that it propofed an Idea of Happi-
nefs, ivhich was not properly in our own Power. Hoc
non ejl pofitum in nojlrd a6iione : completur enim ^
sx eo genere vitce, quod virtute fnitiir, & ex iis rebus
quis fecu7idum naturam funt, neque funt in nojira po-
tejlate. De Fin. i. 4. c. 6. p. 287^
HenC5
302 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Hence therefore the Deficiency of thh Doc-
trine. However juftifiable, however laudable its
End, it could not infure a due Succefs to its En-
deavours. And hence too the Force of what is ob-
jeded to it in the Dialogue, from p. 177. to the
End of the firft Part.
Note XXVI. p. 185. — To place the Sove-
reign Good in Rectitude of Conduct, ^f.J
As the CdnduM here mentioned implies a Condudi
under the Diredion of a befitting Rule or Law,
^ and that, as oppofed to wrong Condudl, which has .
cither no Rule at all, or at leaft one erroneous ; it
may not be an improper Place to inquire, what was
the antient Opinion concerning Law universal,
that great and gaieral Law, which ftood oppofed to
the municipal Laws of particular Cities, and Com-
munities.
Est quidem vera Lex, re^a ratio, natures cori-
gruefis, diffufa in omnes, con flans, fempiterna, qua vocet
dd officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat 7iec
erit alia lex Romce, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia pojl-
hac ; fed ^ o?nnes gentes, ^ omni tempore una lex, csf
fempiterna, l^ i?nmor talis continebit ; unufqiie erit corrt-
mu?ns quafi ?nagijier, & imperator o?nnium Deus. Ilk
hujits legis inventor, difceptator, lator. Cui qui mn
parebit, ipfe fe fugiet, ac tiaturam hominis afperjjabituri
hoc ipfo luet maximas pocnas, etiamfi cectera fuppliciay
qua putantur, effugerit. Fragm, Cic. de Rep. 1. 3.
Lex
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 30 j
Lex eft ratio fwnma^ infita in natura^ qua jubet
ea qua facienda funt, prohibetque contraria. What
follows is jworth remarking. Eadem ratio^ cum ejl
in hominis mente confirmata ^ confe^a., lex ejl. Cic,
de Legg. 1. i. c. 6. p. 22.
Again. Lex vera — ratio eft reSla fummi Jovis*
To which he fubjoins, as above, Ergo ut ilia divina
mens fumfna lex ejl ; ita cum in homine ejl, perfe£ia ejl
in mente fapientls. De Legg. 1. 2. c. 4, 5. p. 88.
'Tis in this Senfe the Jpoftk tells us of the Gen-
tiles , or Mankind in general^ that they Jl^ew the Work
of the Law written in their Hearts, their Confcience
alfo bearing witnefs, and their Thoughts the mean while
accufing, or elje excufwg one another. Rom. i. ji.
As Cicero, in his Book of Laws above cited, follows
the Stoic Difcipline, fo is it agreeable to their Rea-
foning, that he make the original natural Law, of
which we here treat, to be the Sovereign Rea-
son OF THE Peity him/elf. Thus Chryftppus—
Idem [fcil. ChryJJppus] legis perpetuus iff ecternce vim^
qucE quafi dux vita ^ magijlra officiorum Jit, Jovem
dicit ejje. Nat. Deor. 1. i. c. 15. p. 41.
So by the fame Philofophefs in Laertius, we
are ordered to live according to Kature, JJ^y si^f^j/sv-
IV Tw Aii, xaOjiJ/EjUovi T«TU tnj Tcou ovjccv (foF. oAwv)
i^<cjKW£wj ovli, doing nothing, forbidden by the Uni-
versal
304 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
VERSAL Law, that is to fay, hy that right Reafon,
which paffeth thro' all Things, and which is the saue
in Jove himfelf, the Governor and Condu^or of thii
univerfal Adminijlration, Laert. 1. 7. f. 88.
Agreeably to this Reafoning, Plutarch correcfl:*
thofe, who made Aixn, a Goddefs, and the JJJeJ'or
ef Joxei for, fays he, Zsjg ova t^ii y^lv tt.v Aiy.nv
ZT!>.Pi§O0V, aAX' auloj AlJtH H; 0«|U.Jf Efl, Jt; VOfXUV *
-zo-pio-teulal©-' x) tjXeio't547(^, Jove has not A'V.ji cr
Right for his Affejfor, hut is himfelf Right, and
Justice, and of all Laws the mojl antient
««^ PERFECT. Moral, p. 781. B.
Thus Antoninus -rbJ^ c\ XoyiyMv ^oo^v, t»
iTr£(T^cci Tw rng TroAeM? Jty TroXilsiag rrig Trpia-QviUTYi^
Xoyt^ y.oc\ SfT/iiw. Tl^e End of Rational Animals is to
follow the Reason and sacred Law of that City
and mofl antient Polity, [in which all rational Beings
are included.] 1. 2. f. 16.
Th e mofl fimple Account of this Law, which the
Stoics gave, feems to be that recorded by Stobaus ;
according to which they called it ao'j/ov, o^^ov ovlx,
■Ercoj-ajcljjtov [a,\v ruv zjoi'/dsuiv, ocrrayoovSliy.O]) J? TWy k
vTQiyyii-jiv, Right Reason, ordaifiing what is to be
done, and forhidding ivhat is not to be done. Eel.
Ethic. 178. See alfo the Notes of Turnebus and
Davis upon Cic. de Legg. 1. i. c. 6.
Having premifed thus much concerning Law
univerfal, it remains to fay fomething of that Rec-
titude OF Conduct, v/hich is in this Part of the
Dialogue
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 305
Dialogue propofed as our Happinefs. Rectitude
OF Conduct is intended to exprefs the Term
Ka7oa0wo-i?, which Cicero tranflates reSia Effe^io.
K'x'ioo^coy.oi he tranflates Return Fa5lum. See De
Fin. 1. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a
Ka7oo9w^a«, was No//.» 'usoorof.yiJ.c.^ a Thi?7g coin-
manded by Laiu ; to which was oppofed diy,a.plr)y,(z,
a Sin or Offence^ which was defined N ?';/.» aVa-
j'ofifU|aa, a Thing forbidden by Lazv. Plut. Mor.
1037 C. What Laiu is here meant, which thus
commands or forbids, has been Ihewn above.
Hence therefore may be feen the Reaforl, why
we have faid thus much on the Nature and Idea of
Laiv univerfal^ fo intimate being the Union between
thi^ and right Condu^, that we find the latter is no-
thing more than a perfect Obedience to the former.
Hence too we fee the Reafon, why in one view
it was deemed Happiness, to be void of Error or
Offence t a-my-oiplrflov sTvoci, as we find it in Jrrian.
Epi£f. I. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable
was the neceffary Refult of Rectitude of ConduSi.^ or
rather in a manner the fame thing with it.
I cannot conclude this Note^ without remarking
on an elegant Allufion of Antoninm to the primary
Signification of the Word K^ilopOwc-^, that is to
fay, ^'Aa, of^og, right onwards^ flraight and direSily
forwards. Speaking of the Reafoning Faculty ^ how,
without looking farther, it refs contented in its own
Energies, he adds KaOo' )(a7op0w(r£*f at Tojau7«t
For wbi(h Reafon are all Aciions, of this
X SpecieSt
3o6 . NOTES o;z Treatise the Third,
Species^ calkd Rectitudes, as denoting ths Dire^"
nefs of their Progrejfion right onwards. 1. 5. f. 14.
So again in the fame Senfe, \v^i7a.)i •srEpaiuav, to keep
on, the Jtraight Road. 1. 5. f. 3. 1. 10. f. 11.
One would imagine that our Countryman Milton
had this Reafoning in view, when in his igth Son-
net fpeaking of his own Blindnefs, he fays with' a
becoming Magnanimity,
Yet I argue not
Jgainjl Heav' n" s Hand or Will; nor bate one jot
Of Heart or Hope ; but fill bear up, and fleer
Right onwards
The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perufa!,
being both fublime and fimple.
Note XXVII. p. 185. The mere doing
WHATEVER IS CORRESPONDENT TO SUCH AN
End, EVEN THO' WE NEVER ATTAIN IT }
Thus EpiSfetus in Arrian, fpeaking of Addrefs to
Men in Power, and admitting fuch Addrefs, when
juftified by certain Motives, adds that fuch Addrefs
, ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery.
Upon this an Objedor demands of him, ■etw? »y
'i\)')(y!y S Sioixai, ; But how then am 1 to obtain that^
which I want ? The Philofopher anfwers, '£>■&)
^i coi Xiyo:, on ug TETHOMENOS dTripxa '
a^i h juovov, ivx zrpd^y}!: to (Tccvoo TrpiTrov ; Did I ever
fay to thee, that thou Jhouldfl go and addrefs, as tho'
ihou wert to succeed; and not rather with this only
View, that thou mightfl do that, which is be-
coming THY Character? — -And foon after,
when
-NOTES on Treatise the Third. 307
when an Objedion is urged from Appearance, and
the Opinion of Mankind, he anfwers oV ourO'
aAAa t« nEnPAXOAl KAAX2S; Knoweji
thou not, that a fair and good Man does 7tothing for the
fake of j^ppearance, but for the fake only of having
DONE WELL AND FAIRLY? Arr.EpiSt. 1. 3. C. 24.
p. 497, 498. This DoHrine indeed leems to have
been- the Bafis of the Stoic Morals ; the Principle,
which included, according to thefe Philofophers, as
well Honour and HoneJIy, as Good and Happinefs.
Thus Cicero— Facere omnia^ ut adipifcamur quce fecun-
dum naturam finty etfi ea non adfequamur, id effe ^
honeflum, & folu7n per fe expetendum & fummum bonum
Stoici dicunt. De Fin. 1. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this
is confonant that Sentiment of theirs in Plutarch —
oy.o?\o'ysTv, dycc^ov — And again — to i^^v xa7« (puo-jy,
teA©^ eIvm — ra xxl/x- (pvaiv^ (x.^ix(po{>!x. ilvxi, Phlt,
Mor. 1060. D. E. See below. Note XXX.
Note XXVIII. p. 185. — What if we make
OUR NATURAL StATE THE STANDARD ONLY
TO DETERMINE OUR CoNDUCT, ^f,] 'Tis in
this Senfe we find it elegantly faid in Plutarch by the
iaft mentioned Philofophers— r-oi;^£r« Tr,q ti^ziy.ovia.<;
rriv (p6(TiV, >^ TO xocld (pU(TiV that our NATURAL
State and what is confonant to it , are i'Z?*? Elements
of Happinefs — and jufl before, the fame natural State
is called t» Koc^movlf^ ^fX'^-) ^ "^'^ '^'^'^ dpelv?, the
Source of moral Office ; and the Subject Mat-
ter ^ Virtue. Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. Jtque
efiam illud perfpicuwn efl, conjiitui necej'e effe initiuniy
quod fapientia^ cum quid agere incipiat, fequatur j id-
X 2 iue
3o8 N O T ES c« Treatise the I'hird.
que initium ejfe natura accommodatujii : nam aliter ap-
petitio, &c. Cic. Acad. 1. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. Inittapro-
poni necejp ejje apta b" accommodata natures^ quorum ex
fele5iione Virtus pojjit exijlere. De Fin. 1. 4. c. 17.
p. 316. Cum vero ilia, qua officia efe dixi, proficif-
cantur ah initiis natura \ ea ad hac referri neceffe eji :
ut reSfe did pojfit, omnia officia eo referri^ ut adipifca-
mur principia natura ; nee tamen ut hoc fit bonorum
ULTiMUM De Fin. 1. 3. c. 6. p. 217.
Note XXIX. p. 185. We should not
WANT A Good to correspond, y^] Plutarch
quotes the following Sentiment of Chryfiippus, who
patronized this Idea of Good — To\ zjiol ayoc^uv
xx\ xaxwy Xoycv, ov dv'lhg iKTccysi v-oci J'ostJ^a^fJ,
cvw'puvoTO'flov m(x,i (pncri tw Stw, axi [/.ocXiroi twv
ll^(px)'rm olirliG^xi, zs^oKri^iav. Plut. Mor. 1041. E.
Note XXX. p. 187.— -Yet we look not
FOR HIS Reputation, yc] What ^dntilian
fays of Rhetoric, may with great Propriety be tranf-
ferred to Morality. Nojier orator, Arfqiie a nobis
finita, non funt pofita in eventu. Tetidit quidem
ad vi^oriam, qui dicit : fed, cum bene dixit, etiamfi
non vincat, id, quod arte continetur, effecit. Nam l^
guhernator vult falvd nave in portum pervenire : ft
tamen tetnpeflate fuerit abreptus, non idea minus erit
guhernator, dicetque notum illud\ dum clavum redum
teneam. Et inedicus fanitatem agri petit : ft tamen
aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantid agri, aliove quo
cafu fumma non contingit ; dum ipfe omnia fecunduni
rat ion em fecerit, medicina fine non excidit. It a or at or i
bene dixifi'e, finis efl. Nam efl ars ea in actu
pofita, non in eventu. Inft. Orat. I. 2. c. 17.
Note
NOTES on Treatise the "Third, 309
Note XXX. p. 187. — He for a Subject
HAS THE WHOLE OF HuMAN LlFE,^^.] 'Oj(r<as
Ti h TOO UVg', "TKxi rn TU-poatpfVsj, 'srfpi a? <x.vx-
i-psPofxivn Tvj^slcci T8 liin ciyx^^ n Kocw. Tloe EJfence
<?/" Good, h a peculiar DireSlion of Mind y and the
EJfence of Y.Yih, is a peculiar Dire£iion alfo. What
then are Externals I They ferve as Subjects to
the Mind's Dire^ion, fro?n converfing with which it
obtains its proper Good or Evil. Arr. Epicl. 1. 1. c. 29.
Again 'a» uAa*, d^isKpopci ' v Js %pr(r»? dvlm ovx
aj*«(pop(^. The Subjects are indifferent^ but fiot
fi the Usp of them. Arr. Epicft. 1. 2. c. 5,
Thus Horace:
Ncn pojfdentem tnulta vocaveris
ReSie heatum j re^ius occupat
Nomen beati, qui Deorum
Muneribus sapienter uti,
Duramque callet pauperiem pati^
Pejufq-i leto flagitium timet :
Nm iile, iffc.
Od. 1. Iv. 9.
Even the Comic Poet feems not to have been
unacquainted with this Dodlrine :
Ch. ^id narrat? CI. ^id ille? miferum fe ejfe.
Ch. Miferum ? quern minus credere eji ?
X 3 ^^<^
310 N O T E S o;z Treatise the Third.
^id 7'cUiqui ejl, quin haheat qiics quidem in homine
dicunttir bona ?
Parentis, pairiam incolunwn, a/nicos, genus, cognatoSy
divitias :
At que ha a perinde fimt ut illius animus, qui ea pof~
fidet :
^i UTi fdt, ei BONA; illi, qui non utitur re^e,
mala.
Heauton. AS.. I. S. 2. V. 18.
Note XXXI. p. 189.-— The End in other
Arts is ever distant, f5V.] Sed in caterii
artibus cum dicitur Artificiose, pojlerum quodam modo
(jf confeqiiens putandum ejl, quod illi imyivvny^aHixov
appellant ; quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur, id ad-
prim o re^ijji me dicitur : quicquid enim a fapiente pro-
fcifcitur, id co7ttinuo debet expletum eJJ'e omnibus fuis
partibus ; in eo enim pofitum efi id, quod dicimus ejfe
expetendum. Nam ut peccatum eft patriam prodere,
parentes violare, fana depeculari, qucs fiint in effeSJu :
ftc timere, fie marere, fie in libidine ejfie, peccatum eft,
etiam fiine effe5iu. Veram ut hcec, non in pojleris ^ in
confequentibus, fied in primis continuo pec cat a fiunt : fic
ea, qua: proficificuntur a virtutc, susceptione prima,
non perfectione, re6ia fiunt judicanda. Cic.de
fin. 1.3. C.9. p. 228. To JcJ'ia Ti-A»? Tufp^^avft \r\ Xo-
yixvi Y'^/C] ^^^ ^''' '''° '''^ ^^"^ ZJipxg Ittjo; " »;^,
occTTTs^ ivn ^yjritTiwq xoa i>7iO>ifi(r£Ct:g xxi twv toi«twi/,
ccTiXYig yiviloci 71 oK-n Tirpa^if, Idv rt lyxo-^r, c'AA'
Itti zsxv\o<; p£p«?, '''Mi oira ay xalaXrip^^, zrX^psg hoc)
XTTfOcr^nq ixvi'/j TO zTf-OTc^iv -ujoi^i' o)~s iiTTiTv, lyca
dn-i^u rol l^ucc. M, Ant. }. 11. f. i, Et quemad-
modum
NOTES on Treatise tbeTbird, 311
modum opportunitas (fie enim adpeUemus hxcci^tocv) non
fit major prodii5iione tempom (hahent eni?n fiuum mo-
dum qucscunqm opportuna dicuntur) fitc re£ta effeSiio
(x^ilo^Owo-ju enim ita adpello^ quoniam reSlum fa^um
xot-lop^ufji,!/,) re^a igitur effeSlio^ item convenientia^ de-
nique ipsum bonum, quod in eo pofiitum efi ut naturce
confientiat-i creficendi accejfionem nullum hahet. Ut enim
epportunitas ilia, fie hae de quihus dixi, non fiunt tem-
poris produBione majora : ob eatnque eaufiam Stoieis non
videtur optabilior nee magis expetcnda vita heata^ fi fiit
longa, quamfii brevis : utunturque fimili, ut,fit eothurni
laus ilia efi adpedem apte eonvenire, neque multi eothurni
paucis anteponerentur, nee majores minoribus : fie quo-
rum omne bonum eonvenientia at que opportunitate finitur,
nee plura paueioribus^ nee hnginquiora brevioribus ante-
ponentur. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 14. p. 242. See alfo
Dio. Laert. 1. 7. f. loi. M. Ant. 1. 6. f. 23. 1. 3.
f. 7. Senec. Epift. 66. .
Note XXXIII. p. igi. — Recollect then,
SAID he. Do you not remember that one
Pre-conception, l3c. ] In this, and the fubfequent
Pages, t\\Q. general Pre-coneeptiom ofi Good zre applied
to the particular Hypothefin ofi Good^ advanced in this
Treatifie. See before, pag. 115, 121, 122.
Note XXXIV. p. 192. And is there
ANY Time or Place, whence Rectitude
of Conduct may be excluded?] n a N-
TAXOT v.'A AlHNEKnS \iti <7oi in, y.x\
Tw srapao-'ji av^v>oc(rn ^soaiZin; rjapej-fn;, kx\ loTq uTx-
M. Ant. 1. 7. f. 54. /
X 4 Note
312 N O T E S £?;2 Treatise the Third.
Note XXXV. p. 192. —Where it shall
NOT BE IN HIS PoWER TO ACT BRAVELY
AND HONESTLY.] M>lKg7i sv jupt AEj^f, Trwj yivi]-
lai ; oVwf yaco uv yiv^ai^ (ru a,v\o ^raen; xaAw?, xx\
i?~a.i (Toi 70 diTo^ixv ivlh^y]y.a. Arrian. Epidl. 1. 4.
c. 10. p. 650.
Note XXXVI. p. 195. There are In-
stances INNVMERABLE OF MeN BAD, AS
WELL AS GooD,feV.] See a long Catalogue of
thefe in Cicero's Tufculan Difputations ; Spartan Boys ;
Barbarian Sages ; Indian Wives ; Egyptian Devotees,
i^c. &c. The whole PafTage is worth reading. Tufc.
Difp. 1.5. c. 27. p. 400, 401, ^^.
Note XXXVII. p. 196. — This I write you
(says he in one of his Epistles) while,
^C.'\ Tw [jLOcxxpiccv Otyovlsg xxi ocy-a, rsXivlocixv %^i~
fOiv TH bJ», iypa(Pofjt.BV V[jav rcc^TCt ' ^^ccfy^piocls uTo:-
pnxoAitSwEj KCii iiarivlijiixx zrx^rij UTrfpCoAw »x ixttct
Xinrovla. t« Iv ixvloTg y.eyi^vg ' a'Pnwaptyalrilo, S\
'SS(x.<Ti TSTOK to' xai« xj/up^jjv p^aTpcv sV; ta ruv ysyo-.
voTuv miJA-j SixXoyi(T[Mu.v |uuiijw,ji— Dio. Laer. 1. 10. f. 22.
Cum ageremus vitis beatum 6f eundem fupremum diem,
fcribebamus hac. Tanti autem morbi aderant veficce fef
vifcerum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem pojfit accer-
dere. Compcnfabatur tamen cum his omnibm ajiimi lee-
titid, quam capicbam memorid rationum i7iventorumque
nojlroriim -—Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. c. 30. p. 173.
Soon after we have another Sentiment of Epicu-
rus, that a rational Adverfity ijuas better than an irra-
tional
NOTES 071 Treatise the Third. 3 13
i'ioml Profperity. The original Words are — : y.^i7r~
Dio. Laert. 1. 10. f. 135.
Note XXXVIII. p. 198. O Crito, if it be
PLEASING TO THE GoDS, ^c] The three Quo-
tations in this Page are taken from Plato ; the firft
from the Crito, quoted by Epi^etus at the End of
the Eiichlridio?!, and in many other Places ; the fe-
cond from the Apology , quoted as frequently by the
fame Author ; the third, from the Meuexemis or
Epitaph. Plat. Opera, torn. 2. p. 248. Edit.Senwi.
See alfo Cic. Tiifcul. 1. 5. c. 12.
Note XXXIX. p. 199. If you are for
Numbers, replied he, what think you of
THE numerous Race of Patriots, <^r.J Sed
quid duces & priucipes noinincm ; cum legiones fcribat
Cat f ape aJacris in eum locum profe5las, wide rediiuras
fe non arbitrarentur ? Pari anlmo Lacedcemonii in
Thermopylis oc cider unt : in quos Simon ides.
Die hofpes Sparta, nos ie hie vidijfejacentes,
Dum fandis patria legibus obfequimur.
Tufcul. Difp. 1. 1. C.42. p. loi.
Note XL. Ibid. Martyrs for Sys-
tems WRONG, b'V.] That there may be a bigotted
Obftinacy in favour of what is abfurd, as well as a
nifional Conjiancy in adhering to what is right, thofe
Egyptians above mentioned may ferve as Examples.
Mgyptiorum tncrcm quis ignoret ? quorum imbutcs men-
tes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificina?n prius fubi-
grint, quam ihim aut afpidem aut felem aut canem aut
croco-
14 N O T E S o;; Treatise the Third.
crocodilum violent: quorum etiam fi imprudentes quid-
piamfecennty posnmn nullam recufent. Tufcul. Difp.
1. 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before, Note XXXVI.
Note XLI. p. 200. — Celebrated to such
A Height, in the Religion, which we
PROFESS, ^r-] 'Tis probable, that fome Analogies
of this fort induced a Father of the Church (and no
lefs a one than St. Jeroni) to fay of the Stoics, who
made moral Rectitude the only Good, no-
STRO DOGMATI IN PLERISQUE CONCORDANT.
Vid. Menag. In D. Laert. 1. 7. f. loi. p. 300.
and Gatak. Prafat. in M. Anton. See alfo of this
Trec^tife ^z^Q no. and below, NotehXYV.
Note XLII. p. 201. To live consistent-
ly, y^.J To LIVE CONSISTENTLY is here ex-
plained to be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE
SINGLE CONSONANT ScHEME OR PuRPOSE ; and
our Good or Happiness is placed in fuch Con-
sistence, upon a Suppofition that thofe, who live
inconfijlently, and without any fuch uniform Sche?ne,
are of confequence miferahle, and unhappy. To te-
fji.a'xpu.ivuiq ^wvlwv >t«5iO')aijwoD«y1wv. Stob. Eel. Lthic.
p. 171.
This Consistence was called in Greek oy.oXo-
^('a, in Latin Ccnvenientia., and was fometimes by
itfelf alone confidered as the End. Tw i [j-oKoy it^iv
/sV^o-t TfAfCv iTvai. Stob. Eel. Ethic, p. 172. See
.alfo Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c, 6. p. 216. So alfo in the fame
laft named Treatife, c. 7. p. 220. — Ut enim hijlri-
sni
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 3 15
cni a^io, faltatori motm^ non quivis, fed certiis quidam
eji datus : fie vita agenda ejl certo gencre quodani^ non
quoUbct -y quod genus conveniens consentane-
UMQUE dicimus. Nee enitn gubernatloni aut medicina
fimilem fapientiam ejfe arbitramur, fed z^iom illi potiiis^
quam modo dixi, i^ faltationi ; ut in ipfa arte infit^
NON FORis petatur extremum, id eji, artis effe^io.
'Tis upon this Principle we find it a Precept
in Cicero's Offices /;/ primis autem conftituen-
dum eft, quos nos b' quales ejfie velimus, &' in quo
genera vitae 1. i. c. 32. So likewife in the En-
chiridion oi EpiSfetUS, C. 33. Ta^oy -rivoi rih Xa.-
fxyil'^px (rav'co Xy tuttov, ov (p'jXx^vjg Itti ts <tb(x,v]oo wv,
>^ au^paVoif ETTfTufvavwv. Ordain to thyfelffome Cha-
ra^er and Model of Life y which thou may ft maintain both
by thyfelfy and vjhen thou art eonverfant ivith Mankind.
So much indeed was refted upon this Prin-
ciple of Confifte^ice, that even to be any thing con-
fifently, was held better than the contrary. Thus
Epidetus — ''Evsi cs tJ^T oiv^jouiTrov ilvca, h oiyx^ov v\
y.!X.yJv ' h to yrysuovmov as J'sT i^sp'ya.Qsa'^xi ro cxvl^iy
ri Tx Eitio? It behoves thee to be one uniform
Man, either good or bad; either to cultivate thy own
Mind, or to cultivate things external Arr. EpicH:.
1. 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does
he exprefs himfelf in a Place fubfequent ; where
having firfl: counfelled againft that falfe Complai-
fanee, which makes us, to pleafe Mankind, forget
our proper Character, and having recommended as
our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds 'Ej ti
!j.r\ clpi(TSi Txvlx, 0?^^ XTioyJ^i-jov Itt] rxvxvVx' ysvv
iT; 7MV y.pxihv^ iig TWi/ [^.OiX^-j Aia^Oopa J »tm
3i6 N O T E S o;z Treatise the Third.
■STpoTiOTroc, ov yAywIon ' ov Svoaa-oci >c, ©cpo-ixtiv UTroJtpi-
vac-Saj ^ 'Ayocfxi[j>.vovoc—An. Epid. 1. 4. c. 2. p. 580.
Bui if what I reco?mnend thee do not pleafe, then turn
thee totally to all that is contrary ; become a profigate of
the mojl proftitute kind Characters fo different are
not to be blended ; thou canfl not a6t at once Therfites
<j/;i Agamemnon .
So too Horace :
^^nto coNSTANTioR idefn
In vitiiSy tanto levins mifer^ ac prior ilk
^i jam cofitento, jam laxo fune laborat.
Sat. 7. 1. 2. V. 18.
See alfo Chara^erijlics, V. i. p- 131.
Note XLIII. p. 203. — It is not merely,
TO LIVE consistently; but to live con-
sistently wiLH Nature.] 'Oij-o\oy<i^ivw^ rtj
Cpjo-ft C,h. Cleanthes in Stob. Eel. Eth. p. 171.—
Congruenter naturts conveni enter que vivere. Cic. de
Fin. I. 3. c. 7. p. 221. The firft Defcription of
our E?id [to live conjifiently] was deemed defe^ive,
and therefore was this Addition made. See Stobaus
in the Place cited. Arr. EpiSl. 1. 3. c. i. p. 352.
Note XLIV. p. 204. To live consis-
tently WITH Nature is, to live accord-
ing to just Experience of those things,
WHICH happen around US.] TiX^ \<r\ TO
cy,oXoyi<[j.ivui; rn (p'^o'n C^nv ' oVf^ ;/pi;(ri7r7r@H' ca-
(pirs^ov QaXoyivog zrotriToii^ t^rivs^xe tov rpoTrov T«Toy,
Z'^v >t^T £p7r£j3i'c;u Twy (^i-Vj; gx'(J(.^chvo'jIo:v. Stob. Ecl.
Ethic. 171, Diog. Lacrt. 1. 7. c. 87. His verbis
[fciL
NOTES on Treatise the Tloird. 317
[fcil. vivere fecundum naturam'] tria ftgn'ificari Stoici
dicunt. Viium ejufmodi, vivere adhibentem fcientiam
earum rerum^ quce naturd cvenirent De Fin. 1. 4.
c. 6. p. 286. See alfo the fame Treatife, /. 3. c. 9.
p. 227. A 2. r. II. />. 113. where 'tis expreffed —
Vivere cum inteUlgentid earum rerum, qua naturd eve-
nirent.
Note XLV. p. 205.— To live perpetually
SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS
CONGRUOUS TO NaTURE, AND REJECTING
WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR EnD THAT
Selecting, and that Rejecting only. J
*'0 Tf 'Av^jValp^, T& Tlk^ X£r(S«<, 'Ev
(Puciv, «7r£xA£3/£(r9«t Si Toi •srapa (puVjv, C7roXoi[j.Q:^vn.
Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.2. p. 497. Edit. Potter. This
Sentiment was fometimes contrasted^ and exprefied
as follows TO \\)'Ko'y\<rvi\) Iv raT? luXoyxi;
fometimes, more concifely ftill, by the fmgle Term
T(j evXoyiri'^v. See Plutarch 107 1, 1072. Cicera
joins this, and the foregoing Defcriptions of Happi~
nefs, together. Circutnfcriptis igitur his fententiisy
quas pofui^ ^ fi quce Jimiles earum fmt ; relinquitur^
ut fummum bonum fit, vivere fcientiam adhibentem
earum rerum, quce naturd eveniant, feligentem qua fe-
cundum naturam, ^ qua contra naturam funt rejiciefi-
tern, id efi, convenienter congruent er que natures vivere,
De Fin. 1,3. c. 9. p. 227. See alfo £)i? /7«. 1.2.
c. II. p. 113. See alfo Diog. Laert. 1. 7. c. 88. —
Stob. Eel. Eth. 171.
Note XLVI. p. 207. To live in the dis-t
CHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES.] "" Kf/jhl*^^ c\
3i8 N O T E S o« Treatise the Third.
Laert.' 1. 7. c. 88. — Stob. Eel. Eth. 171. — Officia
omnia — fervantem vivere, Cic. de Fin. 1. 4. c. 6.
p. 286.
Soon after we meet the Phrafes — To live ac-
cording TO Nature 5 To live according
TO Virtue, 'o Xhrn — tsA©^ ilm^ to o'^oAo^/s-
f/Jvccg TV) ipu(T£i Lir.Vy oVfp £?-* y-ixT aptlw ^vv. Laert.
1. 7. c. 87. Confentire naturce ; quod ejfe vohint e
virtute, id eft, honejlate vivere —Dt Fin. 1. 2. c. 11.
p. 113. Where, as has been already obferved page
174, and in the Note likewife on the Place, we find
the Lives according to Nature and Virtue are con-
fidered as the fame.
However to make this AflTertion plainer, (if it
be not perhaps fufficiently plain already) it may not
be improper to confider, what Idea thefe Philofo-
phers had of Virtue.
In Laertim (where he delivers the Sentiments of
Xeno and his followers) Virtue is called Ai^'Oso-*;
oy.oXQ'y«iJ(.m, a confflent Difpofition ; and foon after,
v^'oyr^ •umroiYiixivA TSi^oq rry oixoXoyiocv "srccvlog ra Stu,
A Mind formed to Confflence thro' every Part of Life.
Laert. 1. 7. c. 8g.
In Stobaus (according to the Sentiments of the
fame School) it is called AtaOso-j? 4>ux,>)^? (ru,a!pwD©J
dvl-i) zcfpj oAoD TQv Qiov. A Difpofition of Mind, con^
fonant to it f elf throughout the zvhok of Life. Eel. Eth,
p. 167.
So
NOTES on Treatise t/je Third. 319
So Cicero in his Laws — Conjians ^ perpetua ratia
vita, quce ejl Virtus. — 1. i. c. 17. p. 55.
So Seneca in his 74?^ Epi/ile Virtus eni?n
CONVENIENTIA conjlat : o?nnia opera ejus cum ipfd
concordant, ^ congruunt.
Thus therefore Conftjlence being the EfTence of
Virtue^ and upon the Hypothefis here advanced^ the
EfTence alfo of Happinefs ; it follows lirft that a Vir-
tuous Life will be a Happy Life. But li 3. Happy 07ie,
then of courfe a Life according to Nature ; fmce no-
thing can be Good, which is contrary to Nature, nor
indeed which is not confonant, in ftridleft manner,
to it.
And here (as a proper Opportunity feems to
offer) we cannot but take notice of the great Simi-
litude of Sentiments ; it may be even faid, the Unani-
mity of almoft: all Philofophers, on this important
Subjedt concerning Ends, and Happiness.
Those, whofe Hypothefis we have followed in
this Dialogue, fuppofed it to be Virtue and con-
sistent Action, and that without regard to For-
tune or Succefs. But even they, who from their Hy-
pothefis made fome Degree of Succefs requifite ; who
refted it not merely on right Adion, but on a Propor-
tion of bodily Welfare, and good Fortune concomitant,
even thefe made right Action and Virtue to
be principal.
Thus
320 ISl Or ES on Treatise the Third,
Thus Jnhyias, according to the Dodlrine of the
Pythagorean School. 'E^Scci[xo(rvvx ^pxTig dpelag iv
ivlvyjx. Happincfs is the Ufe or Exercife of Virtue,
attended with external good Fortune. Opufc. Mytho-
log. p. 678. Confonant to this Sentiment, he fays
in the Beginning of the fame Treatife, (Av dycc-
eg a-jrip ovx ivHsuig ivoxi^oiv t^ ocvxyxag t^iii 01
£u<J'aj|Wwy, ^ ayoc^oq dvv^ Iri. The good Man is not
ef neceJfUy happy ; [becaufe, upon this Hypothefis,
external Fortune may be wanting ;] but the happy Man.
is of nee efity. Good, [becaufe, upon the fame Hypo-
thefis, without Virtue was no Happinefs.] Ibid.
p. 673. Again Ant -j-h ya,^ y^x-koSociixoviv ayxfux
70]) yixxov, aCli ^yjn IXuv (>ca)twf Is yx^ «,-J]x y^/ii\xi)
clili (T7txv'iC,oK — The had Man (fays he) muj needs
at all times be miferable, whether he have or whether he
want the Materials of external Fortune ; for if he have
them, he will employ them ill. Ibid. p. 696. Thus
we fee this Philofopher, tho' he make Externals a
Requiftte to Happinefs, yet ftill without Virtue he
treats them as of no Importa?ice. Again — A'jo J"' oSol
Teuvovlai tv tw Sjw * x y.iv ajtuSpwTrolfpa, ay tXxuoov
lQx^iC,sv ^OhcT(Tivg ' a ^\ iv^fuivolspx, rxv iTropiCslo
"i^lrcop. Txv (i'j x^slxv (pxy.i ^TiXniT^xi (lege oriXea-^xiy
Dorice pro OjAeiv) [Av rau/av, owxa^xi ol xj Tr,vxv,
There are two Roads in Life diflinSi from each other ;
cne the rougher, which the fuffering Ulyfles %ve7it ; the
other more fmooth, which ivas travelled by Neflor.
Noiu of thefe Roads (fays he) Virtue defres indeed the
latter j and yet is Jhe not unable to travel the former.
Ibid. p. 696. From which laft Sentiment it appears,
that he thought Virtue, even in any Fortune, luas
capable of producing at leaf fome degree ^/'Happiness.
As
NOTES on Treatise the Third, 32 1
. As for the SocratU Dodrine on this Subjedl, it
may be fufficiently leen by what is quoted from it,
in the Dialogue pag. 198, 199. And as the Senti-
ments, there exhibited, are recorded by Plato, they
may be called not only Socratic, but Platofiic alfo.
However, leaft this Ihould be liable to difpute, the
following Sentiment is taken from Xenocrates, one
oi Plato's immediate SuccelTors, in the old Academy
by him founded. Sivo^f>cK.Tn<; (pr,<T]'j^ 'Eu«J~^'(|u,ova £iWt
t7vai Aocifj-ovoc. Xenocrates held that /'(fz^^jEudaemon,
*r Happy, who had a virtuous Mind-, for that the
Mind was every one's Daemon or Genius. j7-ijl. Top.
1. 2. c. 6.
Here we fee Virtue made the Principle of
Happiness, according to the Hypothecs of the
Dialogue. There is an elegant Allufion in the Paf-
fage to the ^/jwi?/^^/ of the Word '£i;^a;iy,cov, which
fignifigs both [Happy] and [psjjejfed of a good Genius
cr Datnon ;] an Allufion which in tranflating 'twas
not polTible to preferve. See below, Nafe LVIII.
A s for the Peripatetic School, we find their Idea
of Happiness, as recorded by Laertius, to be in a
manner the fame with that of the Pythagoreans. It
was yjfmiq dftslrig iv Q(u tiAsm — The TJfe or Exer-
cife of Virtue, in a complete andperfe£l Life. Laert.
1. 5. c. 30. We have already, in Note XXV, cited
the fame Dov5lrine (tho' fomewhat varied in Ex-
preffion) from the Founder of the Peripatetics^
in his firfl Book of Ethics. So again we learn
from hUTl-" 0T» 7rparc»f T<1/£J X; iVioyHOH Ki-
Y y^vlM
c 2 2 N O T E S c;2 Tr E AT I s E the Third.
yov\y.i TO T£A(^, that'th certain Actons and Energies^
which are to be deemed the End. Ethic. Nic. 1. 1.
c. 8. And again— "Ert y^'^ aul^ i' iU7rp«^j'a, tj-
A*??)--. -^^J^ '^^'^ ^^^ "^'^^y R^^iiude of A^ion, which is
itfelf the End. Ibid. 1. 6. c. 5. And again, 'H eV
e^aijuovi'cf, Wi^y^iy. rig £0. Happinefs is a certain
Energizing. 1. g. c. 9. And more explicitly than
all thefe PalTages in that elegant Simile, /. i. c. 8. —
^£(p«v»y7a«, «AA' o» a.'yuvi^o[/.£voi (xBTijy }/a^ Ttvs?
vixwcriv •) »Tw >^ Twu Iv Tw C»w xaAwv >^ a^aSww OI
IIPATTONTES OPGnS l7rr,eoAo» ylyvovlxi.
For as in the Olympic Games, not thofe are crowned,
who are handfomeji and Jlrottgeji, hut thofe who combat
and cojitend^ (for 'tis from among thefe come the ViSiors -,)
fo, with refpe^l to things laudable and good in human
Life, 'tis the right ASiors only that attain the PofJeJJion
of them. Nay, fo much did this Philofopher make
Happinefs depend on right Aiiion, that the' he re-
quired feme Portion of Externals to that Felicity,
which he held/upreme ; yet ftill 'twas Honour and Fir-
iue which were its principal Ingredients. Thus fpeak-
ing of the Calamities and external Cafualties of Life,
which he confefles to be hnpediments to a Happinefs
perfectly complete, he adds ojuwc Sk >t) tu tktoj? J*a-
. 'hv.^Ttii TO xaXov, ETTficJau (pipn Tj; iVMXug TroAAotf
. t<j y-iydXcci; arup^iaf, jm.jj Si dva.X'yriiTKxv, xKXa, y^vm.
xxSot.q ecu »; ^fj'aAv^l/up^of. '£j J"' ii<Jiv on Ivi^ynxi
ii'jfixi rr? ^wif, xaOaTTsp eWo^ufv, stJ'fjf av yijoClo tm»
'^.xv.a.^iMii ol^Xi^ ' iSiTToli. ycc^ 7rpa^£j roc fAKxydx ju
- ilpauAa. Toy ya^ ug oc?^r)^ug dya^ov x) tjul^pova ZTX~
"aroig lio^t^ot, ra? ru^p^a? ha-^riuomg (pi^tiv, x) £)c tw
'iJ7r«ppi^ou7w» «£» ra KOih.Mfo(, xcparlft* * xaOarfp x^
NOTES o;2 Tr E AT isE the ^htrd, 323
IxtxxTxrXj Xj aKuloTojxov ik tw Sodivlav (tk-jIcov xxX-
Xiro^i y^TroSrifxa iroiii^ tov (X,\j\oy Si rpoTrov tCj T»f aA-
A8^ rs-Xy^TXi; ol'n-avlaf, *Ei J"' ^'rw?, adAt(^ [j.\v «7s_
TTole ykoiT av o iv^x>'fA.ccv. Jnd yet, even in fuch Inci-
dents, the fair Principle of Honour and Virtue fnnes
forthy when a Man with becoming Cahnnefs efidures
many and great Misfortunes, and that not thro'' Infcnfi-
hility, but being brave arid magnanimous. Nay more,
if it be true, as we have already affirmed, that 'tis
Actions, winch are predominant in conjlituting a happy
Life, then can no one be completely miferable, who is
happy in his right CoJidu^, becaufe he will never be the
A£lor of ivhat is detefiable and bafe. For 'tis our Opi-
nion that the Man, truly wife and good, endures all
Fortunes with beco?7iing Decency, a fid from ivhatever
iiappens to arife, fi ill frames the fair eft Actions j like as
. the good Commander ufes the Army, which he happens to
find, after the manner mofl agreeable to the Rules of
War ; and the Shoemaker, from fuch Skins as others
provide him, makes a Shoe, the befi that can be made
,fro7n fuch Materials j and fo in the fame manner all
other Artifls befide. But if this he true, then he, who
is happy in this Re^itude of G^mus, can in no In fiance
be truly and Jlri^ly vmkxuhk. Eth. Nic. 1. i. c. 10.
A s for Epicurus, tho' he was an Advocate for
Pleafure, yet fo high was his Opinion of a wife
and right ConduSf, that he thought rational Adver-
fity better than irrational Profperity. See Dial.
p. 197. Hence too he reprefented that Pleafure,
which he efteemed our Sovereign Happinefs, to be
as infeparable from Virtue, as Virtue was from that,
. Q-jk'I^iv r'(^£wf ^i;y, aveu ts (p^ovijwuif, ^ K»Kioq^ xai
324 N O T E S o« Treatise the Third.
Ti^i'x;. ^Tis impojjible to live pleafurahly ^ without
living prudently^ and honourably ^ and jujily ; or to live
prudently^ and honourably and jujily, ivithout living
pleafurabJy. Epic, in Laert. 1. lo. f. 132.
To conclude the whole, our Countryman 77;;?-
7nas Hobbes, though he profefledly explodes all this
Dodrine concerning Ends, yet feems infenfibly to
have eftablilhed an £«^ himfelf, and to have founded
it (like others) in a certain Energy or Action.
For thus 'tis he informs us, in his Treatife called
Human Nature, that there can be no Content-
ment, but in Proceeding 3 and that Felicity
confijlcth, not in Having but in Prospering.
And again, fome time after, having admitted the
Comparifon of Human Life to a Race, he imme-
diately fubjoins But this Race we mujl fuppofe fa
have no other Goal, nor other Garland, but being
FOREMOST and in it.
And thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of
Philofophers on the Subjed: of Ends, here treated.
Note XLVII. p. 208.— Yet it in no man-
ner TAKES away the DIFFERENCE AND DI-
STINCTION OF OTHER THINGS.] Cum enim vir-
tatis hoc proprium fit, earum rerum, qua fecundum
naturam fint, habere dele£lum j qui omnia fic exaqua-
verunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti
nulla feleSlione uterentur, virtutem ipfam fujiulerunt.
Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 4. p. 207.
Quid autem apertius, qiiam, fi fele£lio nulla fit ab
lis rebus, quee contra naturam fint, earum rerum qua
f.nt fecundum naturam ^ tullatur omnis ea, qua queer a-
tur
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 325
tur laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 9.
p. 227.
Deinceps expluatiir differentia rerum : quavi ft
non ullam ejfe diceremuSy confmideretur otnnis vita^ ut
ab Arijlojie ; nee ullum fapientice miinus ant opus in-
veniretur^ cum inter eas res., qua ad vitam degendam
pertinerenty nihil omnino interejfet ; neque ullum delec-
tiim haberi oporteret, Itaque cum ejjet fatis conjiitutum,
idfolum eJfe bo?ium quod ejfet honejliimy i5f id malum fo-
lum quod turpe ; tum inter hac i^ ilk, ques nihil vale-
rent ad beate mifereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo dif-
ferrenty eJfe voluerunt, ut ejfent coram alia ajlitnabilia,
alia contra y alia neutrum. Ibid. 1. 3. c. 15. p. 246.
CETERA autem etfi nee bona nee mala ejfent ; ta-
men alia fecundum naturam dicebat, alia natures eJJ'e
contraria : Us ipf.s alia interjeSIa ^ media numcrahat.
Acad. 1. I. c. II. p. 46. See Dial. p. 187.
Note XLVIII. p. 208. It suppresses ko
SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, Cffi".] As
much has been faid concerning the Stoic Apathy,
or Infenfibility with refpeSi to Pajfion, it may not
be improper to inquire, what were their real Senti- ^
ments on this Subjedt.
n«9(^, which we ufually render a PaJJion, is
always rendered by Cicero, when fpeaking as a Stoic,
Perturbatio, a Perturbation. As fuch therefore in the
firft place, we fay it ought always to be treated.
The Definition of the Term Traet^-, as given
by thefe Philofophers, was op//.-.i ■uXsovxC,>i(Tx^ tranf-
lated by Cicero, Appetitus vehementior. Tufc. 1. 4.
c. 9.* p. 273. Now this Delinition may be more
Y 3 eafily
326 NOTES <7;z, Treatise the Third.
eafily explained, if we firft inquire, what thsy meant
by op/y-J7. 'Op/W3i they defined to be (po^ot, -^i^yjiq i-rrt
Ti a Tendency cr Motion of the Soul toward fomething.
Stob. Eel. Ethic, p. 175. A 7ra9<:^ therefore, or
Perturbation muft have been, according to their De-
finition, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul^ which vjas
excefp.ve and beyond Bounds. Stobaus^ from whom
this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it ob-
ferves, a Myii rstpyjK^oc -urXsoycc^iiv, aXh" v^n tv
zrX£0'ja.(r^u> Zto, ' J ya,^ ^vvocy^eiy fxaKKov S fvspJ/Ew—
that Zeno (its Author) does not call a llaO©^ fome-
thing capable by Nature to pafs into Excefs, but fome^
thing actually in Excefs already, as having its Efjhice,
not in mere Capacity, but in ASiuality. Eel. Eth. p. 159.
There is another Definition of the fame Term,
which makes it to be y\ a\oy<^ ^ zjscpix. (p^cri-j 4u>C'^?
■ntvv\<nz CL Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to
Nature, D. Laert, 1. 7. f. no. A?idronicus Rhodius
adds, to this latter Definition, the Words Si uVo-
M-\^i-<i y.oc'i^ rt oiyx^^, from the Opinion of fom.ething
Good or Evil. Ilspl n«0. p. 523. So that its whole
Idea is as follows. J Perturbation, or Stoic Pajfion,
is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to
Nature, arifing from the Opinion of fomething Good
or Evil. Thefe laft V/ords, founding the n«9(^
or Perturbation on Opinion, con'efpcnd to what Cicero
fays, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the
Stoic Philofophers, omnes perturhationes judicio fieri ^
opinione. Tufc. 1. 4. c. 7. p. 276. Laertius informs
us, that they even made the Perturbations themfelves to
be Judgments. tiovSi ^\ aWo?? m tc-aO?) xptVa? ihce.i,
Laert. 1,. 7. f, in. He fubjoins an Inflance to illuf-
tratc. 'H1e yl^ (po.^'.fy-jpoi CiroKv^l'^i tV» ra to ap-.
yo^io'j
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 327
y^pm xoiXov iTvoci, For thus (fays he) the Love of
Money is the Judgment or Opinion, that Money is. a
thing good and excellent. Plutarch records the fame .
Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample
manner. Yld^^—Xoy^ zrowpog x) axoAar©-*, £« -
•arpoirXocQuv. A Perturbation is a vitious and in-~
temperate Reafoning, which ajfumes Vehemence and
Strength fro?n bad and erroneous Judgment. Mor.
p. 441. D.
The Subftance of what is faid above, feems
to amount to this ; that HaS':^, in a Stoic Senfe,
implied a Perturbation, and not a PaJJion ; and that
fuch Perturbation meant an irrational and violent
Motion of the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judg-
ment, which was erroneous and faulty.
Now from hence it follows, that the Man of
PERFECT Character (according to their ii^^^-
thefis) muft of neceffity be octtocH;, Apathetic,
OR VOID OF Perturbation. For fuch a Cha-
racier, as has been fliewn, implies perfect ReSiitude
of Conduct. But perfecfl Reditude of Condud im-
plies /^;y?^ ReSiitude of Judgment ; and fuch Redli-
tude of Judgment excludes all Error and wrong Judg-
ment : but if Error and wrong Judgment, then
Perturbation of confequence, which they fuppofe to
be derived froin thence alone.
That this was the Senfe, in which they under-
flood Apathy, we have their own Authority, as
given us by Laertius. f^x(s\ ^\ xa) aVctO^ tUai tov
copovf $i<x. TO cx.vs^7rliJ]ov ilvxi, Laert. 1. 7. p. 117.
Y 4 They
328 NOTES (3« Treatise the Third.
'They fay the zvife Man is apathetic, by being fuperior
to Error — by being fuperior /<? Error, if they may
be credited themfelves ; not, as for the moft part
we ahfurdly imagine, by being fuperior to all Senfe,
and Feeling, and Jffe6iion. The Sentence imme-
diately following the foregoing, looks as if thefe
Philofophers had forefeen, how likely they v/ere
to be mifunderftood. EiW» Si >^ oixxov dirxiiv, roa
(pauKov, iv iVw Xiyojj.svov tw ff}:Arjptd Xy ulpiTriof
There is alfo another fort of Jpathetic Man, who is
bad ; who is the fame in CharaSler, as the hard and
inflexible. To the fame Purpofe EpiSletus. 'Oj §11
yoco y.£ liwA drrco^ry tog OiV^piX}P,a, a.KKoc rag o^icrsig
T7)08vla rx,g ^uo-ixa? x^ iTri^irvg, ug IvasQ^ ug t/ou, ug
d^£?^(pov, cog TTcM^x, wg ttoAjtw. For I AM NOT
TO BE Apathetic, like a Statue, but I am
withal to ohferve Relations, both the natural and
adventitious; as the Man of Religion, as the Son, as
the Brother, as the Father, as the Citizen. Arr,
Epid. 1. 3. c. 2. p. 359.
Immediately before this, he tells us in the
fame Chapter, IlaS©^ yoi^ olxxug h 'yivilxi, h y-v
opi^sccg a.TToivl'Xjxviixng, v ex/cAkteco? •Erfp»7rt7r7»(r»!?',
that a Perturbation in no other way ever arifes, hut
either xvhen a Defire is fruflrated, or an Averfion
falls into that which it would avoid. Where 'tis ob-
fervable, that he does not make either Defire or
Averfion fliSsi, or Perturbations, but only the Caufe
of Perturbations, when erronecuily conduced.
Agreeably to this, in the fecond Chapter of
the Enchiridisn, we meet with Precepts about the
Condudt and Management of thefe two AffeStions--'-
Not
NOTES Gn Treatise the Third. 329
Not a word is fald about lopping off either ; on the
contrary, Averfion we are dire^^ed how to employ
immediately, and Deftre we are only ordered to fuf-
pend for the prefent, becaufe we want a proper Suh-
jedt of fit Excellence to excite it.
To this may be added, what the fame Philofo-
pher fpeaks, in his own Perfon, concerning himfelf,
Arr. Epi£f. 1. l. c. 21. 'Ej^w jub ap)t»|W.aj, av ops-
yu^lf-xv x) £)«cA/vco v.a^oi (pvcnv /, for my part, am
fatisjied a?id contented, if I can desire and avoid
agreeably to Nature. He did not remain it feems
diilatisfied, till he had eradicated thefe Affe^ionsy
but he was fatisfied in reducing them to their natU'
ral Ufe.
In Laertius we r^ad recorded for a Stoic Senti-
ment, that as the vitiom Man had his TraSvj, or Per-
turbations ; fo oppofed to thefe, had the Virtuous his
'Eu7.a;6£jaj, his Eupathies or Well-feelings, tranflated
by Cicero Conjlantice. The three chief of thefe were
B»A>i<rjf, Will, defined l^il^\<; l^\oy(^^ rational
Defre ; 'EvXoi^six, Caution, defined "EKy.Xia-ig
iu^oy^, ratio?ial Averfcn ; and Xx^.a, Joy, defined
sTTxpffi; ivXoy^^ rational Exultation. To thefe three
principal .£'///'^/^/vV; belonged many fubordinate Species ;
fuch as iv'jOiXf clyolTTrjTir^ Xi-j(a<;, T£pi];K, i-j<PpoTvvr)j
iv^v;jLix,^c. SceLaert. 1. 7. f. 115, 116. Andron.
Rhod. 7ria\ TToihuov. Cic. Tufc. 1. 4. c. 6.
Cicero makes Cato, under the Character of a Stitic^
and in explaining their Syftem, ufe the following
ExpreflTions. Pertinere antem adrefn arhitrantur, in-
tellegi natura fieri, ut liheri a parentibus amcntur : a
qm
330 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
quo initio profeSiam communem humani generis focie^
tatem perfcquuntur. De Fin. 1. 3. c. ig. The fame
Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laertius,
^x(t\ Si {01 ItwVxoI) j^ rm ir^oq roc rUva. (piXorof^yixv
(pus-txOT sZiai auloTg TJpey fay Parental AffeSlion is
natural to them. 1. 7, f. 120.
Again, foon after, in the fame Treatife de Fini^
bus. ^odque nemo in fwmna foUtudine vitam agere
velit, ne cum infinita quidem voliiptatum abundantia ;
facile intellegitur.^ nos ad conjunSiionem congregationem-
que hominu?n^ & ad naturalem communitatem effe natos.
So Laertius. "AXKx y.rv aJ' iv i^Y\y.ia ((^ao-l) SioVflat
The virtuous Man (fay they, the Stoics) will never
be for living in Solitude ; for he- is by Nature focialy
and formed for J^ion. 1. 7. f. 123.
Again, Cicero, in the above-cited Treatife. Cum
GUtefn ad tuendos confervandofque homines hominem
iiatum effe videamus ; confetttaneum ejl huic natura,
ut fapiens velit gerere, iff adminiflrare rempublicam ;
at que ut e natura vivat, uxor em adjungere, ^ velle ex
ed liber OS. Ne amores quidem fanSfos a fapiente alienos
effe arbitrantur. Vt vero confervetur omnis homini
erga hominem focietas, conjunSlio, caritas ; ^ emolu-
nienta & detrimenta communia efje voluermit. De
Fin. I. 3. c. 20, 21.
In EpiBetuSy the leading Duties., or moral Offices
of Man., are enumerated as follows. rioAiTfuf^Oaj,
T.-awfi'., -STXiooTToiua^ai., Oio-j (rsSeiv, yovioov lTn[xsXi7(T^cciy
T8TWV
NOTES c;z Treatise the Third. 331
T8TWV Jb 7r0!£~, <^r ^i^^WxfXiV. Air.Epla. 1. 3. C. 7.
p. 386. The fame Sentiments may be found re-
peated both in Stobaus and Laeriius.
I (hall only add one more Sentiment of thefe
Philo/ophers, and that is concerning Friend/hip. As-
T/so-* Si Kf rviv (piKitx.y a [ji.ovoig to7; o-tt^^xioh; slvoii
They fay that Friend/hip exijls amotig the Virtuous only.
Laert. 1. 7. f. 124.
The Sum of thefe Rotations appears to be this ;
that the Stoics, in the Char a Si er of their virtuous
Man, included rational Defire, Averfion, and ExJiU
tation ; included Love and parejital AffeSlion ; Friend-
Onp, and a general Charity or Benevolence to all Man-
kind ; that they confidered it as a Duty, arifing from
our very Nature, not to negle(5l the Welfare of pub-
lic Society, but to be ever ready, according to our
Rank, to a<5t either the Magifirate or the private
Citizen ; that their Apathy was no more than a -
Freedom from Perturbation, from irrational and ex-
cejfive Agitations of the Soul ; and confequently that
the flrange Apathy, commonly laid to their Charge,
and in the demolifliing of which there have been
fo many Triumphs, was an imaginary Apathy, for
,which they were no way accountable.
Note XLIX. p. 209. It rejects no Gain,
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH JuSTICE.] The 5/^5
were fo far from rejedling Wealth, when acquired
fairly, that they allowed their perfeSi Man, for
the fake of enriching himfelf, to frequent the Courts
of Kings, and teach Philofophy for a Stipend. Thus
Plutarch from a Treatife of Chryfppus Tsv jwb
22^ N O T E S (?;2 Tr E A T I s E the Third.
i^ (To(pis~£{)a£iv iir apj/ypi'w — Jldor. p. 1047' ^'
So likewife the Stoic HecatOy in his Treatife of
Offices y as quoted by Cicero. Sapientis ejfe^ nihil con-
tra mores J leges ^ injlituta facientem, habere rationem rei
, familiaris. Neque ent??i folum nobis divites ejfe volumus,
fed liberis, prcpinquis, amicis, maximeqne reipublicce.
Singukrum enim facultates & copies y divitice funt civi-
tatis. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 15.
Note L. p. 209. — Universally as far as
Virtue neither forbids nor dissuades, it
endeavours to render life, even in the
most vulgar acceptation, as chearful,
JOYOUS, AND EASY AS POSSIBLE.] EteuifH qiiod
fummum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter natures
viverey id habet banc (ut opihor) fententianiy Cum vir-
iule congniere femper: csetera autem, quae fecundum
naturam.efient, ita legere, li ea virtuti non repug-
na^ent. Cic. de Offic. I. 3. c. 3.
Alexander Aphrodisiensis, fpeaking of the
^toic Dodrine concerning the external ConveniencieSy
and common UtiUties of Life, delivers their Senti-
ment in the following Words xXkoi xj ^ly;a. v-h-
fj.ivicv <zp£|iif T£ (Tuv Taxot? >^ dps'l'^g fj-omqy jw.'/iJ'fVoT ai?
TOW (To(pO)i rvj ii£^upi<Ti.'.ir/iv iXsi^oiiy h itn dvlu ^ivxlov
tvj fjislx ru-j uXXocv AcXsTv. Suppojing there lay Vir-
tue en the one fide y attended ivith thefe Externals y and
Virtue on the other fide, alone by herfelfy the wife
Alan would never choofe that Virtue y which was deflitute
and f.ngky if 'twas in his power to obtain that other y
luhich
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 3.33
which zuas acce7npa7iied ivith thefe Advantages. Ilfpl
^^x- p- 157.
Note LI. p. 209. Nay, could it mend
THE Condition of Existence — by adding
TO THE AMPLEST POSSESSIONS THE POOREST,
MEANEST Utensil, it would in no degree
CONTEMN, b't.] — Si adillam vitam, qucs cum v'lr-
tute dcgatur^ ampulla aiit Jlrigilis accedat, fumptunim
fapientem earn vitam potius, cui hcec adje5la fmt—Dc
Fin. 1. 4. c. 12. p. 300.
Note LII. p. 2io~Could it indeed choose
ITS OWN Life, it would be always that,
WHERE most social AfFECTIONS MIGHT BE
EXERTED, i^c. ] Itemque magis ejl feciindum natiiram,'
pro omnibus gefitibiis (fi fieri pojfit) confervandis aui ju-
vandis^ ■ maximos labor es moleftiafqiie fufcipere, imitan-
tem Hcrculem ilium, quern ho/ninum fama, heneficiorujii
memor, in concilia coelejlium conlocavit ; quam vivere in
folitudine, non modo fine ullis molejiiis, fied etiam in
viaximis voluptatibus, abundaniem omnibus copiis ; ut
excellas etia?n pulchritudijie & viribus. ^locirca Optimo
quifique i^ fipkndidijfijno ifigenio longe illam vitam huic
anteponit. Cic. de Offic. 1. 3. c. 5.
Note LIIL ^. Ibid. It teaches us
TO CONSIDER LiFE, AS ONE GREAT IM-
PORTANT Drama, where, ^c.'\ Thus
Arijio the Chian RiW» yoi^ ouoiov tw aj^aOw
•wTTQKjul^ I0V (ro(pQv ' Os asle 0£p(r»Tii olvie Ayocf/.tfAVO'
kqAuc, The XL'ifie Man is like the good ASlor ; ivho^
whether he ajfiume the Chara^er ofi Therfites or Aga-
memnon,
334 NOTES o?i Treatise the Third.
memnon, a^s either of the two Parts luith a be-
€omhig Propriety. D. Laert. 1. 7. f. 160.
This Comparifon of Life to 2iDrm?ia or Stage-
play, feems to have been a Comparifon much ap-
proved by Authors of Antiquity. See Epi£i. Enchi-
rid, c. 17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor
Mr. Upton. See alfo M. Anton. 1. 12. f. 36. and the
^otes ofGataker.
Note LIV. p. 211. — It accepts all the
Joys derived from their Success, b'r. It
FIXES NOT, LIKE THE MANY, ITS HAPPINESS
ON Success alone, ^c.'\ One of the wifefl Rules
that ever was, with refpeSl to the Enjoyment of external
good Fortune, is that deliver 'd by Epi5ietm ; to enjoy
it, ug §i^o\(x.i, >Cf £(p' oVoy SiSolxi, in fuch manner as
it is given, and for fuch Time as it is given, remem-
bring that neither of thefe Conditions we have the
Power to command. See Arr. Epi£i. 1. 4. c. j^
p. 556. See alfo p. 573. of the fame.
Note LV. Ibid. On the contrary, when
THIS HAPPENS, 'tIS THEN IT RETIRES INTO
ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR,
WHAT IS LAUDABLE, ^f.] See beforc, p. 322.
NoteLVI. p. 212. All Men pursue Good,
^c] This is a Principle adopted by all the Stoics,
aud inculcated thro' every part of the Differtations
oiEpi^etus. Take an Example or two out of many.
^oo-j? S' ol\j]ri TTavlog, to ^iUK£tv to a.'ya.^ov, (^ivyetv t<?
y.ciKov — — T? yii^ dyoi^u <y\jlymTi^w iSiv, "Tis the
Nature
NOTES c?i Tre AT ISE de Third. 335
Nature of every one to purfue Good, and fly Evil——
for nothing is more intimately allied to us than Good.
Arr. Epidt. 1. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, /. 2. t. 22.
p. 313. n«u Zwou »(J"fvi ii^uq unhooTOii^ (cg tw <<?<&>
(Tu^tptpovT*. To nothing is every Animal fo intitnately
allied^ as to its own peculiar Welfare, and In-
terest.
So Cicero. Omncs enim expetimus utilitatem,
ad eamque rapimur J nee facer e aliter ullo modo pojfumus,
De Offic. 1. 3. c. 28.
Note LVII. p. 213. — All derived from
Externals, must fluctuate as they fluc-
tuate.] See before, pag. 126, 130, 133.
Note LVIII. Ihid, — When we place "the
Sovereign Good in Mind — ] D^^mon or
Genius means every Man's particular Mind, and
Reasoning Faculty, d^xl^uiv — sto; Si iriv
ixa'rx vvq >^ Xo-y^. M. Anton. 1. 5. p. 27. Gi- .
niiim effe uniufeujufque animum rationalem ; ^ ideo ejfe
fingulos fmgukrum — Varro in Fragm. 'Tis from this
Interpretation of Genius, that the Word, which in
Greek exprefTes Happiness, is elegantly etymolo-
gized to mean a Goodness of Genius or Mind.
'EuJ'^ti/xovi'a ir\ icilfx'xv ayaUq. M. Anton. 1. 7. f. 17.
See Gataker on the Place. The Sentiment came
originally from the old Academics. See before,
page -p.!.
Note LIX. p. 214. ~ — Behold the true
AND perfect Man: that Ornament, ^r.]
■ ^a?n gravis vero^ quam magnifica, quam conjlans con-
fcitur
336 IS^OTES on Treatise the Third,
fidtur perfona fapienth? ^i, cum rath docuerit^ quod
honejium ejjet^ id ejfe folum bofium^ femper fit necejfe
c(i beatus, vereque omnia ijia 7iomina pojfideat, qua
inrideri ah inperitis folent. Reftius eni?n appellabitur
rex, quam Tarquifiius, qui nee fs nee fuos regere po-
tuit : re£iim magijler populi, ^c. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3.
c. 22. p. 269. Ergo hie, quijquis eji, qui moderatione
& conjlantia quietus animo eft, fthique ipfe placatus ;
ut nee tabefcat molejiiis, nee frangatur timore, nee ft-
tienter quid expetem ardeat defiderio, nee alacritate
futili geJlienS deliquefcat ; is eji fapiens, quern quari-
mus, is eft beatus : cui nihil humanarum rerum aut
intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lata-
bile ad ecferendum videri potejl. ^lid enim videatur
ei magnum, ^e. Tufc. Difp. 1. 4. c. 17. p. 298.
Note LX. p. 215. — Would not your Sys-
tem IN SUCH A Case a little border upon
THE Chimerical ? (se.] Chryftppus feems to
have been fenfible of this, if we may judge from a
Pafifage of his, preferved in Plutarch. Aio koi\ ^kx
vriv uTrffltoAru t»t« [/.lyi^a; y.on tk xoiAA«f, -crAacr^at/i
^ox^uiv '^lAuce, Xiyiiv, xal i koctx tov uv^fuvov xa;
7W dv^(:u37rmv (pvcnv. For this reafon, thro' the excef-
five Greatnefs and Beauty of what we ajfert, we ap-
pear to fay things ivhich look like Fiiiions, and not fuch
as are fuitable to Man and human Nature.
Mor. 1 041. F.
Note LXI. p. 216. In antient Days,
WHEN Greece, ^f.] ?)QQ Cic. de Invent. 1,2. c. i.
See alfo Maximus Tyrius, Diff. 23. p. ^'j'j. of the
late Qiiarto Edition ; and Xenoph. Msmor, 1. 3. c. 10.
Not5
NOTES 0)1 Treatise the "Third. 337
Note LXII. p. 219. - — No where in any
PARTICULAR NaTURE IS THE PERFECT CHA-
RACTER TO BE SEEN INTIRE.] The -S/iz/Vi them-
felves acknowledged, as wc learn fromCkmens ofJIeX'
mdrJa, that their o a-opo?, or perfect Man, was
difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree j lutixj-
f£7(^ Trai/u o-cpocTpa. Strom. p. 438. Sextus Empi-
ricus gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as
yet found him^ />i£%p» t» vuu dvevpim hv']^ naT dvlits
TB (r{»;p». Adv. Phyf. p. 582. Edit. Lipfienf.
What Sextus fays, feems to be confirmed by
Cicero, who fpeaking in his Offices the Language of
a Stoic, has the following Expreflions. Nee vero,
cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri cornmemo-
rantur, aut cum Fahricius Ariflidefve juJlinomi7ia7itur ',
aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his jufiitia, tanquam a
Sapientibus, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum
SIC Sapiens eft, ut Sapientem volumus intellegi.
Nee a, qui fapientes habiti funt, ^ nominati, M. Cato
^ C. Lalius, fapientes fuerunt ; ne illi quidefn feptem:
fed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia fimilitiidinem
quandam gerebant, fpeciemque fapientum. De Offic.
1. 3. c. 4. Again, in his Lalius, fpeaking of the
fame confummate Wifdom, he calls it, Sapientia, quam
adhuc mortalis nemo eft confecutus.
So too ^intilian. ^od fi defuithls viris fumma
virtus, fie queer entibus, an orator es fuerint, refpondebo,^
quo modo Stoici, fi interrogentur , an Sapiens Zeno,
an Cleanthes, an Chryfippus, refpondeant ; magnos qui- ■
dim illos ac. venerabiles 3 non tamen id, quod natura ho^
2 fiiinii
5 3B N O T E S o« Treat isE the Third,
minis Jummam habet, confecutos, Inft. Orat. 1. 12.
c. I. p. 721,722. Edit. Caper.
So likewife Seneca : Scis, quern 7iunc honmn virum
dicam? Hujus fecundse nota. Nam ille alter for-
tajfe, tanquam phoenix, feniel anno quingentefimo nafci-
tur, Epift. 42.
Note LXIII. p. 219. — I might inform you
OF THE NATURAL PrE-EMINENCE, AND HIGH
Rank of specific Ideas.] See Cicero in his
Orator^ near the Beginning. Sed ego fic JlatuOy nihil
ejfe in idlo genere tarn pukhrmuy quo non^ i^c. &c. See
alfo the Verfes of Boethius before cited, Note XVII.
p. 295.
Note LXIV. p. 220, 221. — An Exemplar of
Imitation, which tho' none we think
can equal, yet all at least may fol-
Low--^-AN Exemplar, &c.] Seneca gives it as a
general Confeflion of the greateji Philofophers,
that the Dodtrine they taught, was not quemadmo-
dum ipfi viverenty fed quemadmodum vivendum effete
De Vita beatdy c. 18.
There appears indeed to be one common
Reasoning with refpedl to all Models, Exem-
plars, Standards, Correctors, whatever we
call them, and whatever the Subje^s, which they
are deftined to adjuft. According to this Reafoning,
if a Standard be lefs pcrfedl than the Subjed to be
adjufted, fuch Adjufting (if it may be fo called) be-
comes a Detriment, If it be but equally perfect, then
is
NOTES o« Treatise the Third. 339
is the Adjufting fuperfuous. It remains therefore
that it muft be more perfed, and that to any Tnin-
fcendence, any Accuracy conceivable. For fuppofe a
Standard as highly accurate^ as can be imagined. If
the Subjeds to be adjufted have a Nature fuitable,
then will they arrive, by fuch Standard, to a degree of
PerfeSlion, which thro' a Standard lefs accurate they
could never pofTibly attain. On the contrary, if the
Subjeds be not fo far capable, the Accuracy of the
Standard will never be a hindrance, why they Ihould
not become as perfed^ as their Nature will admit.
It feems to have been from fome Sentiments of
this kind, that the Stoics adorned their o crol^oc^ or
perfe5l Chara^er^ with Attributes fo far fuperior to
ordinary Humanity. 'EijuK©^ oA^j^, haHv^ airpca--
j£i7?, Ue7v<^ K^lcx.^y.nq^ jua)t^'pii^, ■vixu'^ 'Tiuas
he was fortunate ; 'twas he ivas above want ; 'twas he
was felf-fufficie?ity and happy, and perfect . Plutarch.
Mor. 1068. B. See iVi;/^ LXII.
Some Philofopkers have gone fo far, as not to reft
fatisfied with the mofl perfea Idea of Humanity, but
to fubftitute, for our Exemplar, even the fupreme
Being, God Himself. ThusP/^/^, in hisTheatetus^
makes the great Objed of our Endeavours, to be
o{A.iiucrig tu> Ofco xx'tix to ^■^vxJov, the becoming like to
God, as far as in our pozuer. He immediately ex-
plains, what this Refemblance is. 'Oy-oiua-ig ^), Sf-
xacioy xj ociov y-floc (p povriasug ymc^oii. It is the be-
coming jujl and holy, along with JVifdom cr Prudence.
Plat. torn. I. p. 176. Edit. Serrani.
Z z The
340 ' N T ES on Treatise the "third.
The Gofpel appears to favour the fame HypothefiS.
Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in
Heaven is perfeSl. Matt. v. 48.
What has been above faid, will be, 'tis hoped,
a fufficient Apology for the Tranfcendence of the Cha-
rader, defcribed in the Dialogue. *
Note LXV. p. 221. The Proficiency of
Socrates—was sufficient to convince us—.
THAT SOME PROGRESS, ^c.^ See Djog. Laert.
I. 7. C. 91. p. 420. Tt)c/L<,*if)jov S\ TO uTrapxTiiy £jva»
3^ AioyivYiV, ^c-
Note LXVI. p. Ibid. — Nor was the Prize,
AS USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO THE FIliST J
BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A
Reward, having, ^^.] Verum ut tranfeundi /pes
nonfit., magna tamen eji dignitas fubfequendi. Quind.
Inft. 1. 12. c. II. p. 760. Exigo itaque a me, non ut
cptimis par fim, fed ut malis melior. Senec. de Vitt
beata, c. 17. 'OjS'I yoc^ MtAwv tVojwaj, xj oyM? »>c
7»j$ xlvi(re(tig ' »'^' aVAwf olXKv Tito^ tJ)J iVj^fAe/a?, <Jja
Tw aiToyvuic-iv Tuv ajtpwv, a(pig~d(,y.i^x. -For neither
fiall I be Milo, and yet I negle£l not ?ny Body j nor
Cicefus, and yet I negleSl 7iot my EJlate ; nor in general
do we deftfl- from the proper Care of any thing, thro*
Defpair of arriving at that ivhich is fupreme. Arr.
Epid. 1. 1, c. 2. See alfo Horat, Epifi, i. I. r.
V. 28, ^c.
Note
NOTES on Treatise the I'hirl 341
Note LXVII. p. 225.- — This whole Uni-
verse — IS ONE City or Commonwealth — ]
'O y.oa-y.^ »t^ fxix TsoXiq \^\ -^rr. Epi£l. 1. 3.
c. 24. p. 486. This was a ^toic Dcdlrine, of which
Epi£ietiis and the Emperor Marcus make perpetual
mention. See of the laft, /. 12. / 36.
So Cicero. Umverfus hie mundus una clvitai com-
munh Deorum atque hominuni exijiumandus, De Legg.
1. I. c. 7. p. 29. SQcDeFifi, 1. 3. c. 19. DeNat,.
Deor. 1. 2. c. 62.
Note LXVIII. p. 227.- — Hence the Mind
TRULY WISE, QUITTING THE StUDY OF PAR-
TICULARS, ^(.] The Flatonics., confidering Sci-
ence as fomething afcirtained^ definite., and Jleady^
"would admit nothing to be its ObjeH., which was
vague., infinite, and pajfing. For this reafon they
excluded nil Individuals, or Objects of Sense,
and (as A?nnionius expreffes it,) raifed themfelves, in
their Contemplations, from Beings particular to Be-
ings w}iverfal, and which as fuch, from their own
Nature, were eternal and definite. The whole Paf-
fage is worth tranfcribing. 'Ea^tiIch on y\ (^tAoa-o^ia,
yvwG-ig Trdvlocv -Tuv ovluv i] ovlix, f5~»'v. 'E^rtrmocviv Oi
(P»Aoo"o{poj, Tivx m TpoTToy yhiM'Aa.i rwy pv7wv linT'niJ'O'-
V£C ' ^ iTTEiSn sicpcoy Tx v.xlac [A.if>(^ 'ysr/iTO. Xj (pbxitloi-
iivlx, ZTi 61 ycj a.7r?jpa, -n ci iTrirytl^V xidtoovls Xy ztetts-
aoc(T^^ViOV IfJ J/ywcrjf (to' yoio yvoorov ^iiXsla,i vtto tji?
yvj^xTZu:^ uT£^i'kx{j:Qxvi(T^xi' TO J^f OiTrEfpov, «.7r£pjArj7r7ov)
a,jr,yayov £au1»? cctto tuv [/.s^ixuv Itti tck, xx^oXv^
d'liix Q'jIx >^ ■S7£7ri^xs-[jt.hx. 'X2y j/y'^ (pfitryj UXxrc^Vy
Z 3 'Eir.rh-'t^
342 NOTES on Treat i s e the Third.
'ETTjr'V*' '^^fnloii, -crafx to Ij; ETrtf-aau ^//.a? >Cj opou
o^a T^j £K T« xa6o>.» av«(Jpojuri;. Jmmomus in his
Preface to Porphyry's Ifagogc, p. 14. Edit. 8vo.
Consonant to this, we learn 'twas the Advice
of Plato, with refpect to the Progrefs of our Specu-
Jations and Inquiries^ to defcend from thofe higher Ge-
nerUt which include ?nany fubordinate Species, doivn to
the loiueji Rank of Species, thofe which include only In-
dividuals. But here 'twas his Opinion, that our Inqui-
ries Jhould flop, and, as to Individuals, let thetn wholly
alone ; bccaufe of thefe there could not pojfihly he any
Science. Aio '^-'^XJ^^ '^'^^ etJixcoliXTcov aTro rav ytviy-u-
TJt ^l XTTiifoi (p'/itrtu iocv * ju,ji ^\ ya,^ ot.v Tsuh ysvio-^oti
T^%v iTTir^unv. Porphyr. Ifagog. c. 2.
Such was the Method of ^«//>s/Philorcphy. The
Fafhion at pref^nt appears to be fomewhat altered,
and the Bufinefs of Philofophers to be little elfe,
than the colleding from every Quarter, into
voluminous Records, an infinite Number of fen-
fble, particular, and unconne5led Fads, the chief Y.i~
fed of which is to excite our Admiration. So that
if that well-knovm Saying of Antiquity be true,
't^ijoas IVotider which induced Men firfi to philofophize,
v/e may fay that Philofophy now ends, whence ori-
ginally it began.
Note LXIX. p. 228. — A Faculty, which
RECOGNIZirCG BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS
ELSE, BECOMES A CaNON, A CORRECTOR, AND
A Standard universal.] See before, p. 162.
In
NOTES on Treatise the "IhirL 34.3
In Epi^etus^ 1. i. c. i. p. 6. the Auv«]!x»j Koyiy.\
or reafoning Power, is called the Power n >^ avlriv
6fco/)8(ra, y^ T oiXKoi ttxvIoc. So Manus — Ta' '{^iX rrq
MyiiLYii; 4"^X'^? ' io(.\j\vi opa, locvl^v Jj«p9po', &c. The
Properties of the reafoning Soul are, it beholdeth itfefi
it formeth itfef, he. 1. 11. c. i. So again Epi^etus,
— Jttej ju£u T» opxv y^ cixhiVy xj VII Aioi UTTsp «u1k
Ta C^v, noii Toov (rvvspyw zj-pog avlo, uVeo xapTruv
^JipWV, UTTEQ ori/», VTTlp iKuiH iJ'XJApi^H TW OeW * /^£jt>t-
yjjTo J"' oTi clxKo t; o"ot ^i^uKs hp£7t1ov KTrocvTuv txtw.',
to' ^pYliTO (AiVOV aUTOi?, TO $OKi[/.Oi(^OV, TO TlIU d^iXV
lxxs~>s Xoyi^fji-svov. For feeing^ for hearing, and indeed
for Life itfelf, and the various Means which co-operate
to its Support ', for the Fruits of the Earth, for Wine
and Oil, for all thefe things be thankful to God: yet be
mindful that he hath given thee fomething elfe, which
IS BETTER THAN ALL THESE ; fometUug which IS
to ufe them, to prove them, to compute the Value of
each. Arr. Epi(5t. 1. 2. c. 23. p. 321.
Note LXX. p. 228. That Master-
Science, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY
ARE, AND THE EnD TO WHICH, ^C.'\ SqQ Jrr.
Epiif. 1. 2. c. 24. p. 337. See alfo I. i. c. 6.
p. 36. and Perf Satyr. 3. v. 66.
Note LXXI. Ibid. — And never wretch-
edly DEGRADE THEMSELVES INTO NATURES
TO THEM SUBORDINATE.] ^tQ Jrr. Epeff. 1. I.
C. 3. p. 21. Aia T«UT»)y TfiV Gvyyiviiav, o'» ^\v cctto-
xKivciVTic^ A'JxoK o[Moioi ymfJLt^x^ olTrig-oi xat iTriSaXoi
nxl ^AalSfpoj'' 01 Si y^incTiV, aypioi xoci ^ripiuSsig noti
dvri^spoi ' 01 xcAfi^f J"' ri^oov aXuTrsHs;, &C, 7T;ro* this
Z 4 ^^nity
344 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or bafer
Part) fome of «;, degenerating^ become like TFolves^
faithlefiy and treacherous^ and mifchievous ; others^ like
Lions, fierce^ andfavage, and wild ; hut the greater Part
turn Foxes, little, fraudulent y ivr etched Animals. Cum
autem duohus modis, id ejl, aut vi aut fraude fat in-
juria ; fraus, quaf vulpccula, vis, leonis videtur. Cic.
deOffic. I. I. c. 13. See a\(oArr. Epi^. 1.2. eg,
p. 210. In our own Language we feem to allude
to this Degeneracy of Human Nature, when we call
Men, by way of reproach, SheepiJJj, Bear if? ^ Hog-
gif)^ Ravenous, &c.
Note LXXII. p. 229. That Reason, of
WHICH our own is BUT A PaRTICLE, OR
Spark, ^r:] — - ai \|/u;^al /x£v »tw? U(r\v iv^i§ii/.ivoci
•ny.<r^a.toi.—Arr.Epi5l. 1. I. C. 14. p. 8l- (Jai-
|Lta5U, ov £>c«r'w uTpos-aTnu xa» ri'ytiJt.ovx Zivg srJ'coJtEV,
«7r0(77ra«'^a Iccvth ' bt©-" ^i e'ov ixcx,s~>i vvg x«»
Xoy(^. Mar. Ant. 1. 5. f. 27. Humanus autem ani-
miis, decerptus ex mente divind, cum nullo alio nifi cum
ipfo Deo (f hoc fas efl di61u) comparari potejl. Tufc.
Difp. 1.5. c. 13. p. 371.
NoT2 LXXIII. Ibid. — Fit Actors in that
GENERAL Drama, where thou hast al-
lotted EVERY Being, great and small,
ITS proper Part, b'r.] See before, p. 7.10. and
Note LIII. See alfo Arr. Epi£t. 1. 3. c. 22. p. 444—
Zu '^'A('?^ Ti • ^uva-raj, ^c. The Paflage is fublime
^nd great, but too long to be here inferted,
Note
NOTES on Treatise the T/jIrd, 345
Note LXXIV. p. 230.— Enable us to curb
Desire, i^c. Enable us even to suspend
IT, ^c. Be our first Work to have
ESCAPED, ^r.] 'Ato^» •ztote ■srxvTx-rra.triv opi^t'jog^
IW zrorl ^ va\6y<^q op^X.^^- -^^^^^ P^ ^ time from
Defire altogether, that in time thou mayjl he able to
dejire rationally. Arr. Epi<ft. 1. 3. c. 13. p. 414.
Again the fame Author— S»),u£pou — op/^f j o^k ^x?^'
coty-vj, s;c>cAtVf» sr^oq fj-ovx rsc zTpoocifisliKa. To day
my Faculty of Defire I have not ufed at all ; my Aver-
fion I have employed with refpe£l only to things, which
are in my power. 1. 4. c.4. p. 588. See alfo Enchtr,
c. 2. and CharaSl. V. III. p. 202.
Horace feems alfo to have alluded to this Dodrine :
Virtus efi, viiium fugere ; ^ fapientia prima,
Stultitia caruiffe Epifl. i. 1. i. v. 41.
Note LXXV. Ibid- — Let not our Love
THERE STOP, WHERE IT FIRST BEGINS, BUT
INSENSIBLY CONDUCT IT, dfff.] 'itt Plat. Symp.
p. 210. torn, 3, Edit. Serrani. An j/ap, sCp?), tov
l^^u3z Iqvtx £7r» T«TO "ZB^paf^a, app^£(rOaj, &C.
Note LXXVL Ibid. — Not that little
CASUAL Spot, where, ^c] See Jrrian. Epi^.
1. I. c, 9. p. 51. Socrates qiiidem, cum rogaretur, cu-
jatetn fe effe diceret, Mundanum, inquit : totius enim
mundi fe incolam & dvem arbitrabatur. Tufc. Dilp,
1.5. c. 37. p. 427.
Note LXXVII. p. 231. — Teach us each
to regard himself, but as a Part of
THIS
h6 notes on Treatise the Third.
THIS GREAT Whole; a Part, b'c] Ilco? «
XiyiTXi rm IxTog nvoc y.a.rx (pvtnv, &C. In what.
Seufe then (fays the Philofopher, fmce all is referable
to one univerfal Providence) are fame things called
agreeable to our Nature , and others the contrary ? The
Anfiver is, They are fo called, by confidering our/elves as
detached, and feparate from the Whole. For thus may
I fay of the Foot, when confidered fo apart, that 'tis
agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free frofn Filth.
But if we confder it as a Foot, that is, as fomething not
detached, but the Member of a Body, it will behoove it
both to pafs into the Dirt, and to. trample upon Thorns,
end even upon occafion to be lopped off, for the Prefer-
vaiion of the Whole. Were not this the cafe, it would
be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind
Jhould we conceive with refpeSl to ourfelves. What
art thou f A Man. If thou confder thy Being as
fomething feparate and detached, 'tis agreeable to
thy Nature, in this View of Independence, to live
to extreme Age, to he rich, to be healthy. But if
ihoii confder thyfclf as a Man, and as the Member of a
certain Whole ; for the fake of that Whole, it will
eccafonally behoove thee, at one while to be fck, at
another while to fail and rifque the Perils of Naviga-
tion, at another while to be in want, and at lafl to die
perhaps before thy time. IVhy therefore do ft thou bear
thefe Events impatie?itly ? Knoiveft thou not, that after
the fame manner as the Foot ceafcth to he a Foot, fo dojl
thou too ceafe to he longer a Man ? Arr. Epi(5l. 1. 2.
c. 5. p. 191.
Note LXXVIII. p. 231. In as much as
Futurity, fa'V.J Mr'/^pt? «« aJrjAa poi •? ra \'^a;,
«£» Tw'y rj(^V£r£pv r^oj/.«jjt«jpo\ to rvl^avsiv ruv v.xia
NOTES c;? Treatise thcThird. 347
(^uVjU • aUTOf yip fJ^ 060? TOiKTWV ExXf'xTiJtoy £'?rot-
x«i «p/Awv av Jtt' a'jTO • xai ^^a^ o ttsj, £< (p^ivxg
£t%£u, wpjua au £7ri to ■sr/i^KcSaj. -«r^. Epiof. 1. 2.
c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above Sentiment
was oi Chryfippus. In the tenth Chapter of the fame
Book we have it repeated, tho' in words fomewhat
different. Aj^tkto ycxXug A/j/sciu w (ptAo(ro(^oj,
o'rt, &C.
Note LXXIX. p. 232. — That we may
KNOW NO OTHER Will, than thine alone,
AND that the Harmony of our particu-
lar Minds with thy universal, ^c]
lElvoci (?' d,-j]o ruTO TJiv tb iuj'ajjaov^ a^iim y^ ivpoixv
S»'a, oTocv ZTcivlix •nrpa7T>i1ixt y.xld rnv (rUjW.(pwv»'av t8
"srxf lacc^cp ^xii^-ov^ zjpo^ tw t» oA» S'iOiycnl^ Q^Xri-
e-iu. The Virtue of a happy Man, and the Felicity
cf Life is this, ivhen all things are tranfa£ied in
Harmony of a Man's Genius, with the Will of Him,
who adminiflers the Whole. Diog. Laert. I. 7. c. 88.
p. 418. This is what Epicletus calls t5ii; au7» ^ixn-
(Tjy (Twdp uo(T jci TOK yivo^iwiq, to attune or harmonize
one^s Mind to the things, which happen. DifT. 1. 2.
c. 14. p. 242.
Note LXXX. Ibid. Yet since to at-
tain this Height is but barely pos-
sible, ^V.] See before, page 215, ^c. See alfo
NoteshX. andLXII.
Note LXXXI. p. 233. — Such as to trans-
form us into Savage Beasts of Prey, sul-
len, ^i".] See before, Note LXXI.
Note
34*3 N O T E S o« Treatise the Third.
Note LXXXII. p. 233. That animating
Wisdom, which pervades, and rules the
Whole, (ffr.] This Poiver is called by the Em-
peror Marcus — tov ^la. rrig »V»«? ^imovjcc hoyoVy xj —
^iKOWfA^ivla TO ZTxv. 1. 5' f- 32*
Note LXXXIII. Ibid. —That Magic Di-
vine, WHICH, ^c] —>^ TO X,'^'(r/Aa »u T» Xm-
»(^j *b "^^ ^y\X7ifYifiov, xj zjcccra, )tax»p}^»'«, wj axavOa,
oj j3opfcop©^, exjjuwy iTriyswyiiJ^o^lx twu (n^Jimv xa) )««-'
Acuy. ^-•/i au aulit dX'hOTfKx, t«t», k (raSft?, (pav]a^8"
aKKoi Try 'sr^'v7wy zj-^yvi)) i-n-iXoyi^if. M. Ant. 1. 6.
f. 36. — See alfo 1. 4. f. 44. 1. 3. f. 2. "SlT-m^ ya,^
6ij xWjUWdtat ((^iiTjy) i7ciy^ccy.(j'oC\oc yiXoTa (pfpsitrjy, as
JcaO laula jusy e'o JpauAa, tu <?£ oAm ■crotriiji.oili ^afiv
TWO. •Jirpor'iyiic-iy »Twf x|>c^fjaf au au/>)V sCp tocvh^ rrtv
jtaxtay, Tolf J' aAXot? »>« ap^piir's? £0. Chryfip. apuc}
Plutarch, p. 1065. D.
Qj^i Tt yiyvsloci 'ipyov Itt) p^§oyl (r» ^jp(^«, Acci[xuy^
Ojth xal ajOsptov fifTov WAov, ^V sttj ztovJuj
UX-nv OTTQTX pt'^so"! JcaHCJ <T(pslipr,(riv dvom^.
AAAa (Tu )ta; t« z:£pi(r(Jix, iTririxa-ai oifiisc ^iTnon,
l^oci Koa-fAHv Tix. anca-fxoc, * xal « (p/A« <ro» (piXx sou,
''XI'Tj J^a^ uj £u a.Ttoi.\\(x. (njvr\^i/.o>ixg l^Xx. xaxoTa-iv,
"XitrS iva 5/i}^ye(S<S!4 ■zi:a.'Jluv X^yov dih iovjccv. forf, £oy7a,
Ckanthis Hymn, apud Steph. in PoefiPhilof. p. 49, 50.
[The Reader v.'ill obferve that the fourth of the
above \^erfes is fiipplied by the Mifcell. Ohfervationes
Criticcsj
Notes o« Treatise iheThird. 349
Criticts, Vol. VII. from a Manufcript of Vojjiui at
Leyden.^
Note LXXXIV. p. 234. — With these may
OUR Minds be unchangeably tinged, ^<:.]
^XTrliTOn ydo Onro tuv (pxv']ai(yim r\ -^v^t,
M. Ant. 1. 5. f. 16.
Note LXXXV. Ibid. With a Re-
serve, b'r.] itAfd' uTTE^atpEo-fw?. Sqq Epi^.Enchirid,
c. 2. M.Ant. 1.4. f. I. 1.5. f. 20. Seneca Xx-xsxi-
iates it, cum exceptions. ^ttDeBeneficiis, 1. 4. f. 34.
Note LXXXVI. Ibid. — Never miss what
WE would obtain, or fall into that
WHICH WE would AVOID, b'f.] fjL7\ri Opiyous-
vov aTroTuJp^aufjv, [/.sT luxXivovloi TO'£|jt7ri7r7f»y. Arr.
Epi(5l. 1.3. c. 12. p. 404.
Note LXXXVII. p. 235. — Conduct me,
Thou, ^^.J
"'Ottoi 73-09* Ujw,ri> £j,aj J'jaT8Tal]w/v©^.
'Hq 'i-\o^xi a.o-Av'^ ' r,)) Si yt ^v\ O/Aw,
Ckanthes in Epi£i. Ench, c. 52.
Thus tranflated by Seneca :
Due rngf parenSy celfique dominator poli,
^ocunque pkcuit : nulla parendi rmra eji :
Adfum
350 ^OTES 0/2 Treatise the Tfoird.
Adfum irnpiger. fac nolle : comkabor gemenSy
Malufque patiar, quod bono licuit pati.
Epifl. 107.
Note LXXXVIII. p. 236. 'Tis Habit, re-
plied HE, IS ALL IN ALL. 'TiS PRACTICE
AND Exercise, which can only, ^c. ifc.
to the End of the Paragraph.'] 'AAAa -ujoXXrq iyzi
y^peiccv zj(x,px(ry.evrig^ KOii "stovh "stoXX^ koci |u«6>)|aoiT<oi'.
T/ Ku ; iXTTi^ng, oTi rm [j.$'yi?-nv TEp^vw ostto oXiyuv
lov uTToXccQiTv ; But (fays one, with refpedt to
the virtuous Charadler) there is need of much Pre-
paration^ of much Labour and Learning. And what ?
Doji thou expea it Jhould he pofpMe (anfwers the
Philofopher) to obtain^ by little Pains, the chiefeji
GREATEST Art ? Arr.EpiSi. 1. i. c. 20. p.m..
"A^ww ^£ Taup(^ » y'wi\cA, ioi yi\)WAO% olv^puTrog '
ciXXa Sii '^ii^a(Twri(7cci, ■srupacy.B'joccoc^a.if xoci {/.n £jx»)
zraoa-Trn^^v Itt) roi fj^n^iv zTforrixovla,. No robufl and
mighty Animal is complete at once ; nor ?mre is the brave
and generous Man. 'Tis necejfary to undergo the fe-
ver efl Exercife and Preparation, and not raflAy plunge
into things, which are no way fuitable. Ejufd.
DifTert. 1. i. c. 2. p. 18. See alfo the fame Author ^
I.I. c. 15. p. 86. 1.2. c. 14. p. 243. SedutJiec
mediciy nee imperatores, nee orator es, quamvis artis.
prcEcepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum
fine ufu.^ exsrcitatione confequi poffunt : fic officii
confervandi prcecepta traduntur ilia quidem (ut facimm
ipft ; j fed rei magnitudo ufum quoque exercitationemque
defiderat. Cic. deOffic. 1. 1. c. 18. n / 'H0IKH
ig "E0OT2 zTipiyfjilui ' ohv kxI ivvoux. £^»)>t£ —
Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c. i.
Note
NOTES on Treatise the Third, 35^
Note LXXXIX. p. 236. Nothing is to
BE HAD GRATIS, y^.] z^poTyioc, JJtu 'ymlcti. AtT.
EpiSf. 1. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The fame Sentiment is
often repeated by the fame Author.
Note XC. p. 241. We are all go-
verned BY Interest, t^c.} See of the Dia-
logue^ p. 212, 246. See alfo Notes LVI. and XCII..
Note XCI. p. 243. 'Tis a smoaky
House, ^f.] Kxtti-o? lo * x-k^x^I^"-^- M.Ant,
1. 5. c. 29. See Arr. Epi£f. 1. i. c. 25. p. 129.
Note XQll. Ibid. Is a social Interest, ^V.]
As the Stoics, above all Philofophers, oppofed c
lazy ina5live Life, fo they were perpetually recom-
mending a proper regard to the Public, and encou-
raging the Pradice of cwery facial Duty. And tho*
they made the original Spring of every particular
Man's Adion, to be Self-love, and the profped of
private Intereft ; yet fo intimately united did they
efteem this private Intereft with the public, that they
held it impojfible to promote the former, and not at
the fame time promote the latter. ToMiflnv (^uo-i*
ViOV S-JVnloil Tuf^XVUV, il ^Vl TJ £»J TO XOiVo\ U)(piXvj.QV
l!TfOff(pif^0Ci ' hvlug 0UX£T* tt,KOlVUV7)loV ylvdai, TO
zrx.vloe. aula mxcs zroieTv. God hath fo framed the Na^
ture of the rational Animal, that it fhould not be able to
obtain any private Goods, if it contribute not withal forne
thing profitable to the Community. Thus is there no lotiger
any thing unsocial, in doing all things for
the sake of self. Arr.Epi^, I, i, c. 19. p. 106.
The
352 NOTiES o« Tr£atise the Third.
The Peripatetic Dodtrine was much the faiiie.
■Xlav'.uv ii ajtAjAAcdjUEi'WU srpo\ to kxXov^ y.xi J^iarfii/o^
|iA£yMv T« xxXXtrx ZTfcclTe.v, xoji.'tJ t' av T«ravjl £»^
ra Siovla, hxi i^ioi, l-nxroi roi (/.iyiroc rwy aj/aOwy,
JiTTf^ w apfW TOi^TOv lo • cdVf To'v fjih dyc^ov, ^s'l
(^ihavroy shxi ' xxi ya.o x-jto; ovrirrerai tm xaAa
•srp-xTTwy, y.xi rag aAA«? cJ^EAwft. /^^r^ ^// ?5 dim
jointly at the fair Principle of Honour^ and ever flrive
to a6i what is fairefi and moji laudable^ there would
be to every one in common whatever was wanting^ and t9
each Man in particular of all Goods the greatejl^ 'fVi^'^
tue deferve juftly to be fo ejlecmed. So that the good Man
is neccffarily a Friend /i? self: For by doing what
is laudable i he ivill always himfelf he profited^ as well
as at the fatne time be beneficial to others. Ethic. Ni-
com. 1. 9. c. 8.
Note XCIII. p. 243. — If so, then Honour
AND Justice are my Interests, ^c.'] Thus
Cicero^ after having fuppofed a focial common Interejl
to be the natural Intereft of Man, fubjoins imme-
diately ^odfi ita ejl, una co7itincw,ur omnes l^ ea~
dem lege naturee. Idque ipfum ft ita efi^ certe violare
alterum lege natures prohibcmur. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 6.
NoteXCIV. Ibid. — Without some Por-
tion OF WHICH not even Thieves, tfff.] —
Cujus (fc. fujlitia) tanta vis ejl, ut ne illi quidem,
qui maleficio y feeler e pafcuntur^ pojfint fine ulla par-
ticula jufiitia vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiamy qui
ana latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripity is fihi fie
in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ilk autem^ qui
archi-
NOTES o«Tre;atise theTloird, 353
archipirata dicitur, nifi aquabiliter praiam, i^£. De
Offic. 1. 2. c. II.
TO J'f;{aicv cvvi^ei ttiv koivuvixu^ StiXov eok Itti tw»
a^ix'JlcxTuv slvoii Jox« vlwu • «Te» (Jg EKTjy oj A5i5~at' olg
71 Trpoj a.XXr]X>ig xoivwjisi tVo ^jJcaiOTuy?;? cw^flat T»if
7rpo\- aA^'/jAsf. Ata; xf J/jx^ to fxrj ttXiovekIs'i^j aA-
AwAsf, xj (?»a TO /xi; •J/£jJ'?c9-ai, j^ eix to ti^xj/ to'
xpfn-loy oox«i/, x, to t^ (rL'r)££(jU,£ujj tpuAarTfjy, j^ c5t;t
TO So'/^Oflv To7g a<9a'f5"«pojf, <?i» rcuZlx r TrpoV a,XKy\-
A»j aulor? asivuiviu cruy-^mi ' Zv irav rHvac-Jliiv lig Zq
oi^ix>i(n TTOi^aiv. ^Tis necejfary^ Society bsing natu-
ral, that Justice JJmihl be natural alfo, by which
Society cxijls. For that Jujiice holds Society together y
is evident in thofe, who appear of all the mojl unjujl,
fuch I mean as Rubbers or Banditti, ivhofe Society
with each other is preferved by theb' Juftice to each
other. For by not afpiring to any unequal Shares, and
by never falfifying, and by fubmitting to what appears
expedient, and by jujlly guardi?ig the Booty a'/najfed to-
gether, and by ajftjling their weaker Companions, by
ihefe things it is, that their Society fubfijls ; the contrary
to all which they do by thofe, ivhom they injure. Alex.
Aphrod. TTfpt \\)X' P- 156. Edit. Aid. See alfo
Flort. deRepub. 1. i. p- 351. torn. 11. Edit. Serrani.
Note XCV. p. 245. What then have I
TO DO, BUT TO ENLARGE VlRTU£ XNToPlETY ?
Not only Honour, ^c]
A a All
^
54 NOTES on Treatise the Third,
All manner of Events, which any way afFe(fl a
Man, arife either from within hhnfelf^ or from
Caufes independent. In the former cafe, he main-
tains an a^ive Part ; in the latter, a pajjive. The
aSfive Part of his Charader feems chiefly to be the
Care of Virtue, for 'tis Virtue which teaches u's
what we are to aff or do ; the pajfive Part feems to
belong more immediately to Piety, becaufe by this
we are enabled to refign and acquiefce^ and bear with
a manly Calmnefs whatever befals us. As there-
fore we are framed by Nature both to a5i and to
fuffer, and are placed in a Univerfe, where we are
perpetually compelled to bothj neither Virtue nor
Piety is of itfelf fuflicient, but to pafs becomingly
thro' Life, we fhould participate of each.
Such appears to have been the Sentiment of the
wife and good Emperor.- — xw-mv oXov lotvlov, J'txaic-
ffuvYi fg.iv £»? TCi v^ ix'Jia ivsp'y>i[j.svx. 111 01 Toig aA-
AdJ? <jvy.Qoiiv>i(Tiy tyi rm oXuv (pv(rei. T* o ipsT tj?,
r VTroXn^eloii Trfpl aula, 5? Trpa'^fj y.Oil^ a.u]^j x'j}'' £»;
7raoc'yH\> TO vuv 7rpX(TijOtJ.ivm^ x^ (ptAsn* to vjv octtoh-
fjiofxmv ionTiw-— He (the perfect Man) commits him-
fclf wholly to Justice, and the universal Na-
ture; TO Justice, as to thofe things which are
dme by himfelf\ and in all other Events^ to the Na-
ture OF the Whole. What any one will fay,
sr think about him, or a£t againjl him, he doth ?iot fo
much as take into confideration \ contented and abun-
dantly fatisf^d with thefe two things, himfelf to do
justly what is at this injlant doing, and to ap-
prove
NOTES c« Tr E AT isE the Third, 355
PROVE and LOVE what is at this injiant allotted him.
M. Anton. 1. 10. f. 11. YIxvlx inc'vx, tCp' a ^i«
(p^oi/Tjg ' Talo Si £Ov, £«y ttxv to* 7rap£A6ou xaraAiTruf,
>^ TO [xiXXov iTrirpi^yig t» Trpouoja, Xj to -n-apov //,ouo»
^7r£vS£u->j? TTfof 'OIIOTHTA >t; AIKAIOSTNHN-
oViOT»)T(X fxiv, iW (PtA'^f re u7rovey.o^Bvo'j' <roi yx^ x\PiO n
(Pvjii; £^£p£, «J ""E T!i7w * ^i>locio(ruvn^ ;?£, iva £A£u6£pwf nc,
ywpi? TTfpiTrAox^f A£}')0? T£ T* ^A'/iSri, x^ TTparo-?)? Ta
xa7c4 vofji-ov 1^ y.aX dj^^'a-y ^H thofe things^ at which
thou lui/hejl to arrive by a Road round about ^ thou
mayjl injlantly poffefs, if thou dojl not grudge them t9
thy f elf i that is to fay^ in other words, if every tlxng
pafi thou intirely quit, if the future thou trujl to Pro-
vidence, and the prefent alone thou adjujl according t9
Piety and Justice : according to Piety, that fo thou
may ft approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever
it be, 'twas Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it ;) ac-
cording to Jujiice, that fo thou mayfl generoufy and with-
out Difguife both fpeak the Truth, and aSi what is confo-
nant to [the general] Law, and the realValue of things.
M. Ant. 1. 12. c. I. See alfo I. 7. c 54.
Note XCVI. p. 245. I have \Ji Inte-
rest WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTER-
ING THE Plan of Providence ; without
MENDING, ^V.] Hxih-oiSlxi tsIeO to [/.X9^(X~
v£iu ixx^x '^Tco IjiXiiv, u; &c. To be inftru^ed
that is to fay, t^o learn fa to will all ihbigs, as in fad
they happen. And how do they happen ? Js He ivho
ordains them, hath ordained. Now He hath ordained
that there fjould be Summer and IVintcr, and Plenty
A a 2 a?id
2s6 NOTES c;2 Treatise theThird.
and FGinlne^ and Virtue and Vice, and all manner of
Contrarieties^ for the Harmony of the Whole ; and to
each of us hath He given a Body, and its Members,
and a Fortune, and certain AJfociates. Mindful there-
fore of this Order, ought we to come for Jnfiruflion,
hot indeed how we may alter what is already ejlab/ijljed,
(for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better
fo to be ; j but hew, zvhile things continue around us,
jufi as they are, and as is their Nature, we may fiill
preferve our Judgfnettt in harmony with all that happens.
Arr. Epi(5l. I. i. c. 12. p. 74.
Note XCVII. p. 246. Who would be un-
HAFi-y ? Who would not, if he knew
HOW, ENJOY ONE PERPE TUAL FeLICITY ? b'V.]
Izg tvLlot, TT^^drlofj.iv. 'Tis for the fake of Happinefs^
we all of us do all other things whatever. Ethic. Ni-
com. 1. I. c. 12. fuh.fn.— See before, of the
Dialogue pages 212, 241. and Notes LVI and
XCII.
Note XCVIII. Ibid. If it happen to
BE ERRONEOUS, 'tIS A GRATEFUL ErROR,
WHICH I CHERISH, ^f.] 'El Jj l^ocTraJn^svloc, TiVM
t^ii y.x^vv, oil Twu iy.Tog aTrpoajpsTwu viiv £s~< tt^os
YiuiXKov ivpo'.oq KXi ara.pa.'xuq ^luxTiBxi. Were a
Man to be deceived, in having learnt concerning Ex-
ternals, that all beyond our Power was fo us as nothing ;
/, for my oii'n.part, would defire a Deceit, which would
enable me for the future to live tranquil and un~
dijlurhed, Arr. Epidt. 1. i. c. 4. p. 27.
Note
NOTES o;i Tr E AT I SE //j^ TJjird, 3 ^j
Note XCIX. p. 247. When we are
ONCE, SAID HE, WELL HABITUATED TO THIS
— MORAL Science, then Logic and Phy-
sics BECOME TWO PROFITABLE ADJUNCTS, ^f.]
Jd eafque virtutes^ de gut bus difputatu?n eji, Diale£f:-
cam etiam adjungunt iff Pbyjkam, eafque ambas vir-
tututn nomine adpellam : alteram, quod habeat ratio-
nem, ne cut faljo adfentiamiir, neve, i^c. Cic. de
Fin. 1. 3. c. 21. p. 265.
The THREEFOLD DIVISION of PHILOSOPHY
into Ethics, Phyfics, and Logic, was commonly
received by moft Seds of Philofophers. See Laert.
1. 7, c. 39. See alfo Cicero in his Treatife de Legi-
bus, 1. I. c. 23. and in his Academics, I. i. c. 5.
Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone phihfophandi ratio
triplex, l3'c. Plutarch, de Placit. Philof. p. 874.
END of the NOTES <?« Treatise theThird.
P. 304. 1. 61 for aIk»!, read Aixr;. P. 349. I. 20.
for i-^^o^xi xtxv^, read f'v[.e/^ai' y aow^.
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