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f T. E. PAGE, c.h., litt.d. f E. CAPPS, ph.d., ll.d, 
t W. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d. f L • A. POST, l.h.d. 
Ε. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.hist.soc. 




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American ISBN 0-674-99120-6 
British ISBN 434 99108 2 

First published 1919 

Revised and Reprinted 1928 

Reprinted 1935, 1951, 1956, 1962, 1969, 1980 

Printed in Great Britain by 
Fletcher ώ Son Ltd, Norwich 









book π 257 




PIRAEUS ,, 157 


Three ancient biographies 1 of Thucydides have 
come down to us, but they are of little value. They 
are derived from ancient commentaries, and the bio- 
graphical details which they contain, wherever they 
do not rest upon inference from the text of the 
history itself, are often confused and contradictory. 
These are supplemented by scattered statements of 
several ancient writers — Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
who wrote two treatises on Thucydides (De Thucy- 
didis hist aria indicium and the Second Letter to Am- 
maeus), Plutarch (Cimon iv), and Pausanias (i. xxxii.). 

The only authentic facts about the life of Thucy- 
dides are gathered from casual mention in the History. 
He was the son of Olorus (iv. civ. 4) ; commenced 
the compilation of materials for writing the History 
at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (i. i. 1); 
and lived through the whole war, ripe in years and 

1 One of these, compiled in three distinct portions "from 
the commentaries," passed under the name of Marcellinus, 
who is probably to be identified with the author of Scholia 
on Hermogenes irepl στάσεων, who seems to have lived in the 
fifth century a.d. ; another was by an anonymous gram- 
marian ; and the third is a short notice in Suidas, e.v. 



judgment, following it with close attention, that he 
might acquire accurate information (v. xxvi. 5). He 
suffered from the plague of 429 b.c. (π. xlviii. 3), of 
which he wrote his famous account (n. xlvii-liv). 
Elected one of the ten generals in 424 B.C., he was 
sent to the coast of Thrace (where he enjoyed the 
right of working certain gold mines) to operate 
against Brasidas. Failing to relieve Amphipolis, he 
was exiled in 424 B.C., and remained in banishment 
for twenty years, and thus was able to become ac- 
quainted with affairs on both sides (v. xxvi. 5). 

For other facts we are dependent largely upon 
inference ; some are reasonably certain, others less 
so. The name of his father was identical with that 
of the Thracian prince Olorus, whose daughter He- 
gesipyle was married to Miltiades, and his tomb, 
having the inscription Θουκυδίδης Όλόρου ' Αλιμηνσως, 
was in the suburb of Athens known as Κοιλ^ MeAc- 
tiScs, adjoining those of Cimon and Miltiades (Plut. 
Cim. iv). We may therefore assume that Olorus, 
the father of Thucydides, was a near kinsman of the 
Thracian prince Olorus. If, as Marcellinus says (§ 2), 
Thucydides' mother was named Hegesipyle, like 
Cimon's mother, that would be confirmation of the 
relationship; but Plutarch makes no mention of this. 
It seems likely, then, that Thucydides was of near 
kin to Cimon, younger perhaps by one generation. 
His father Olorus was probably a full citizen of 
Athens, as is indicated by the fact that, mentioning 



himself as στρατηγός (iv. civ. 4), he writes ®ονκνδίδψ 
τον Όλορου; for only as an Athenian citizen could 
his father be mentioned in this official style. 

As to the date of Thucydides' birth, the only 
ancient statement that seems worthy of credence 
was made by Pamphila, a woman writer who in the 
time of Nero made a great compilation of the results 
of learning. Aulus Gellius (Ν.Λ. xv. 23) quotes 
from Pamphila that, at the beginning of the Pelo- 
ponnesian War, Hellanicus was sixty-five years of 
age, Herodotus fifty-three, Thucydides forty. Pam- 
phila' s dates were probably taken from the chrono- 
logical handbook of Apollodorus (second century b.c), 
which was generally accepted among the Greeks and 
Romans. The term forty years used by Pamphila 
doubtless meant the ακμή or prime of Thucydides, 
and may have been fixed on the basis of his own 
assertion that he began to collect material at the 
opening of the war (i. i. 1) and was then in full 
maturity of mind (v. xxvi. 5). At any rate his own 
statement, taken with Pamphila's date, has led to 
the general assumption that the historian was born 
somewhere about 472 b.c. 

It is indicated by Marcellinus (§ 46), and is prob- 
able in itself, that the decree for Thucydides' ban- 
ishment was adopted on the motion of Cleon, who 
was then at the height of his power ; and it is 
probable that the charge brought against him was 
treachery (προδοσία), as stated by Marcellinus (§ 55) 



and the anonymous biographer (§ 2), and apparently 
implied by Aristophanes {Vesp. 288). His own words, 
ξννίβη μοί <t>€vy€tv s admit of this interpretation ; and 
the statement of Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9) that he was 
later recalled from exile on the motion of Oenobius l 
is best understood on this basis. If he had been 
banished by a simple decree of the people, the 
general amnesty that followed the capture of Athens 
by Lysander would have been sufficient for him as 
for other exiles ; if the sentence was more severe, 
a special decree would be necessary. But it is 
possible, of course, that the motion of Oenobius 
antedated the amnesty of Lysander's peace by a 
few months. 

As to Thucydides' death, there was a persistent 
tradition that he was assassinated, and the fact that 
the History breaks off suddenly in the midst of ex- 
citing events of the Decelean War seems to support 
the tradition. Plutarch (Cim. iv. 3) says that it was 
commonly reported that he died a violent death at 
Scapte Hyle; Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9), that he was 
murdered on his journey home from exile ; Marcel- 
linus (§ 10), that after his return from exile he died 
and was buried in Athens. But whether he died in 

1 The name, which is a rare one in the fifth century, is 
found as that of a general commanding in the neighbourhood 
of Thasos in 410-9 B.C. and we hear somewhat later of one 
Eucles, son of Oenobius ; hence it has been conjectured that 
the father of Oenobius was Eucles, who was Thucydides' 
colleague in Thrace in 424 B.C. (lv. civ). 


Thrace or in Athens, it seems clear from his own 
words that he outlived the term of his banishment 
(v. xxvi, 5, ζννεβη μοι φευγειν την Ιμαντον ίτη είκοσι) 
and that he returned to Athens, since his description 
of the wall of Themistocles, whose remains "may 
still be seen at the Peiraeus " (i. xciii. 5), shows that 
he was there after the destruction of the walls by 
Lysander. If he had lived to see the restoration of 
the walls by Conon in 395 b.c., it seems he would 
certainly have mentioned it. There is another reason, 
too, for supposing that he did not live to this year : 
in in. cxvi. 2 he says that the eruption of Aetna, 
which occurred in the spring of 425 B.C., was the 
third on record ; hence the one mentioned by Dio- 
dorus (xiv. lix. 3) for 396 b.c. could not have been 
known to him. It seems reasonable, then, to assume 
that he was not alive in 396 b.c. 

There is a pretty and oft-repeated story l that 
Thucydides, as a boy, heard Herodotus recite a 
portion of his History at Olympia and was moved 
thereby to tears, whereupon Herodotus said, "Olo- 
rus, your son's spirit is aflame with a passion for 
learning." But Lucian, when telling of the powerful 
effect of Herodotus' recitation at Olympia, 2 would 
surely have mentioned this circumstance had he 
known of it ; besides, chronology is in the way, it 

1 Suidas s.v. opyav and ©oi//ci/S/5r/j ; Photius, Bill. 60; 
Marcellinus, § 54. 
3 Herod, i. 



we hold to Pamphila's testimony. But if he did 
not as a boy hear Herodotus recite at Olympia, he 
must have known him later as a man at Athens. 
The period of his youth and early manhood fell in 
the time when Athens was most prolific in great 
men. It is clear that he had heard and admired Pe- 
ricles, and he must have seen Aeschylus and known 
Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Anaxagoras, So- 
crates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Pheidias, Polygnotus, 
Mnesicles, Ictinus, Callicrates, and Hippocrates. 
Association with such men and the atmosphere of 
Athens at such a time best explain the development 
of his genius ; but the limits of his subject, as he 
conceived it, precluded any mention of any of these 
except Pericles, so that for any personal influence of 
theirs upon him we are left to inference. The first 
seven years of the war, before his banishment, were 
doubtless spent in large part at Athens, where he 
must have heard the speeches of Pericles, the dis- 
cussions about Mytilene and about Pylos, as well as 
about other matters of which we have accounts in 
this History. But the twenty years of his exile he 
probably passed largely on his properties in Thrace, 1 
engaged in the task of compiling materials for his 
work about the war, as indeed we are told that he 

1 It was his family connection with Thrace which led to 
his acquiring the right of working gold mines in that region 
(iv. cv. 1), which is all that he himself says, though his 
biographers state that he was the owner of gold mines at 
Scapte Hyle. 



did by Plutarch (De Exit xiv.) and Marcellinus (§§ 25 
and 47). 

From Thucydides' opening statement, that he 
began the composition of his History at the out- 
break of the war, expecting it to be a great one 
and more noteworthy than any that had gone before, 
we should naturally infer that he continued the 
compilation and composition throughout the war, 
and in fact — as it is clearly unfinished — until his 
death. Again, as it was never completed, so it was 
never completely revised, and it is natural that one 
can find traces of the different dates at which the 
several portions were composed. Evidence of this 
kind has been brought forward in support of differ- 
ent hypotheses as to the composition of the work. 
The most famous of these was that put forth by 
F. W. Ullrich in his Beitrdge zur Erklarung des Thu- 
kydides, Hamburg, 1845, in which it is maintained 
that Books I-V. xxvi, which contain the history ot 
the Archidamian War (432-421 B.C.), formed a sepa- 
rate treatise composed between the Peace of Nicias 
and the Sicilian Expedition, and that the phrase 
"this war" in the earlier books refers to the Ten 
Years' War only. 

In v. xxvi Thucydides does make a fresh start with 
the words, "The same Thucydides recorded the 
events in order, reckoning by summers and winters, 1 

1 His division of the year corresponds to the actual con- 
ditions of the carrying on of war in ancient times ; summer 



until the fall of Athens." But he adds, "The 
war lasted for twenty-seven years, and anyone 
who declines to count the interval of truce as war 
is mistaken ; " which sounds very much like the 
opening of a second volume of a work that falls 
into natural divisions. It is quite likely, as Ullrich 
maintains, that the account of the Archidamian War 
(i.-v. xxvi.) was composed mainly in the interval 
between 421 and 416 b.c. ; but that it received im- 
portant additions after the fall of Athens seems 
certain, e.g. IX. lxv. on the career of Pericles. So 
much may well be admitted for Ullrich's hypothesis, 
but it is not necessary to admit more. Even the 
story of the Sicilian expedition, the finest part of 
the whole work, need not be considered to have 
been originally a separate treatise, but only to have 
received especial care. As for the rest, a paragraph 
from Classen's introduction to Book V outlines a 
probable order for the growth of the history which 
seems reasonable : "Though I am convinced thai 
the whole work was written in the shape in which 
we have it after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian 
War, and that Thucydides was called away from life 
when engaged in the last revision and combination 
of the portions which he had noted down and 
sketched in outline from the beginning of the war, 

— the larger half, including both spring and autumn— cover- 
ing the time approximately from March to October, winter 
from November to February. 



yet I do not believe that all parts of the work re- 
ceived an equally thorough review. I think that the 
masterly introduction, which makes our First Book, 
was completed with the full knowledge of the disas- 
trous result of the twenty-seven years' war; that 
then the history of the ten years' war and the Si- 
cilian Expedition, for which it is likely that the 
results of laborious inquiry were already at hand 
more or less perfectly worked out, received their 
final touches ; and that after this, before the thread 
of the narrative was taken up again with the Ionic- 
Decelean War, the intervening period of the άρψη 
ύπουλος was described." 

The most interesting testimony as to the recog- 
nition of the power of Thucydides in ancient times 
is Lucian's statement (adv. Indoct. 102) that Demo- 
sthenes copied out the history eight times. Dio 
Cassius constantly imitated and borrowed from him, 
and among others of the later historians who emu- 
lated him were Philistus, Arrian, and Procopius. 
There is internal evidence that Tacitus was influ- 
enced by him, and Sallust often imitated him. Quin- 
tilian's oft-quoted characterization, Densus et brevis et 
semper insians sibi Thucydides , shows his appreciation. 
In modern times his greatest panegyrist is Macaulay : 
"There is no prose composition, not even the De 
Corona, which I place so high as the Seventh Book 
of Thucydides. It is the ne plus ultra of human 
art"; again, "The retreat from Syracuse — Is it or 



is it not the finest thing you ever read in your life?" ; 
and still again, " He is the greatest historian that 
ever lived.*' John Stuart Mill said, "The most 
powerful and affecting piece of narrative perhaps 
in all literature is the account of the Sicilian cata- 
strophe in his Seventh Book/' The Earl of Chatham, 
on sending his son William Pitt to Cambridge, "left 
to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the 
classic authors, but made it his particular desire that 
Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen, should 
be the first Greek which his son read after coming 
to college." And the Earl of Chatham's estimate is 
well supported by Sir G. Cornwall Lewis : " For 
close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on political 
questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never 
been surpassed ; and indeed they may be considered 
as having reached the highest excellence of which 
the human mind is capable in that department. ,, 

In the ordinary narration of events the style of 
Thucydides is clear, direct, graphic. In strong con- 
trast with this generally simple and lucid form of 
statement is his style in describing battles and other 
critical events, in generalizations, and especially in 
the speeches ; here the statement is often so concise 
and condensed as to become very difficult. Thucy- 
dides was not the first to use speeches as a means 
of vivid presentation of important crises and the 
actors in them ; for that he had the precedent of 
Homer and the Attic drama. But he used this 



means with such impressive effect and success as to 
induce frequent imitation in later historical writing 
in ancient times. He does not pretend to give the 
exact words of the speakers, but says frankly in the 
Introduction (i. xxii. 1): "As to the speeches that 
were made by different men, either when they were 
about to begin the war or when they were already 
engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with 
strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for 
me as regards that which I myself heard, and for 
those who from various other sources have brought 
me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the 
language in which, as it seemed to me, the several 
speakers would express, on the subjects under con- 
sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, 
though at the same time I have adhered as closely as 
possible to the general sense of what was actually 
said." As a natural result the language of the 
speeches has a uniform character, both in the struc- 
ture of the sentences and in particular expressions — 
in other words it is that of Thucydides himself; but 
at the same time the character and mode of thought 
of the assumed speaker are clearly manifest in each 
speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means 
of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordin- 
arily effective ; here, as in his most striking narra- 
tions, his readers become spectators, as Plutarch 
expressed it. Or as Classen said, " Without our own 
choice we find ourselves involved in the conflict of 



interests, and are put in the position to form judg- 
ment for ourselves from the situation and the feeling 
of parties. Very seldom does the historian himself 
add a word of comment." 

We are accustomed to admire among Thueydides' 
great qualities as historian, his impartiality, his 
trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast, 
conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve, 
pathos. We come to approve heartily his way of 
leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped to 
carry their own judgments. He is never a partisan, 
and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder 
what his nationality was did he not frequently sub- 
scribe himself "Thucydides the Athenian." Histo- 
rians sometimes criticise his attitude, but they all 
accept his statements of fact. His descriptions of 
battles read as if he himself had been present. He 
dramatises history by placing events in such juxta- 
position that a world of moral is conveyed without 
a word of comment ; for example, when the funeral 
oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed 
by the description of the plague, the disgraceful 
Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster, 
the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over 
against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He 
packs his language so full of meaning that at times 
a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a 
sentence. " Of all manifestations of power, restraint 
impresses men most," and however much we regret 



his reserve, since for much that he might have told 
us we have no other witnesses, we come more and 
more to regard this as great art. As for pathos, no 
historian ever excelled such passages as those where 
the utter defeat of a hitherto invincible navy is por- 
trayed (vn. lxxi), or the misery and dejection of the 
departing Athenian host is described (vn. lxxv), or 
where the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus 
seems to occur before our eyes, preparing us for the 
final sentence : " Fleet and army perished from the 
face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the 
many who went forth few returned home." 



Of Thucydidean manuscripts the following are, according 
to Hude, the most important : — 

A Cisalpinus ewe Italics, now in Paris (suppl. Gr. 255), 

parchment, 11th or 12th century. 
Β Vaticanus, Vatican Library at Rome (126), parchment, 

11th century. 
C Laurentianus, Lanrentian Library at Florence (69, 2), 

parchment, 11th century. 
Ε Palatinus, Library at Heidelberg (252), parchment, 11th 

F Auguxtanus, Library at Munich (430), parchment, 11th 

G Monacensis, Library at Munich (228), paper, 13th century. 
Μ Britannicus, British Museum (11727), parchment, 11th 


No one of these manuscripts is of such age or excellence as 
to deserve preference before all others ; but of the two 
families which may be distinguished, Laurentianus leads the 
one, namely, C and G, Vaticanus the other, namely, ABEF. 
Britannicus holds a sort of middle ground between the two. 
Hude'e preference is for Laurentianus; Classen's, following 
Bekker, for Vaticanus. From vi. xciv on Vaticanus has a 
special value as coming perhaps from a different copy. 

Complete Editions 

Aldus: Editio Princeps, Venice, 1502, folio; scholia 1503. 
Stephanus . Paris, 1564, folio; with scholia and Valla's Latin 

version made in 1452. The second edition (1688) is the 

source of the Vulgate. 
I. Bekker: Oxford, 1821, 4 vols., with scholia and Duker's 

Latin version. Also Ed. ster. altera, Berlin, 1832 

('46, '68). 



Poppo : Leipzig, 1821-40, 11 vols, (prolegomena, commen- 
tary, etc.). 

Poppo : Minor edition, Leipzig, 1843-51, 4 vols. ; revised 
1875-85 by Stahl. 

Goeller : Leipzig, 1826 and 1836, 2 vols., annotated. 

Arnold : London and Oxford, 1830-39, 3 vols., annotated. 

Didot : Paris, 1840, text with Latin version by Haase. 

Bloomfield : London, 1842-43, 2 vols., annotated. 

Kruger : Berlin, 1846-7 and 1858-61, 2 vols., annotated. 

Boehme : Leipzig, 1856 and 1871-75, annotated ; new edition 
revised by Widmann. 

Classen: Berlin, 1862-76 and 1875-85, 8 vols., annotated; 
revised by Steup. 

Stahl: Editio ster. Leipzig, 1873-74, 2 vols., introduction, 
text and adnotatio critica. 

Van Herwerden : Utrecht, 1877-82, 5 vols., text with critical 

Jones: Oxford, 1898, 2 vols., text. 

Hude : Leipzig, 1898-1901, text with critical notes. 


In the Bude series (Paris, 1953-1967) books 1, 2, 4, and 5 
have been contributed by Jacqueline de Romilly who 
helped also in book 3 by R. Weil and in books 6 and 7 
by L. Bodin. 

H. S. Jones and J. E. Powell: Oxford; the latest edition is 

0. Luschnat: Leipzig, 1960. 


A. W. Gomme: A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 
Oxford, Vol. I, 1950, Vol. II and Vol. Ill, 1956. 

A. W. Gomme: Essays in Greek History and Literature, 
Oxford, 1936. 

A. W. Gomme: More Essays etc., Oxford, 1962. 

B. W. Henderson : The Great War between Athens and Sparta, 

London, 1927. 
G. Γ. Abbott: Thucydides, London, 1925. 



C. Ν. Cochrane : Thucydides and the Science of History, Lon- 
don, 1929. 

E. Barker : Greek Political Theory, Plato and his Predecessors, 
London, 1925. 

Jacqueline de Romilly: Thucydide et VimpSrialisme athenien, 
Paris, 1951. English translation by P. Thody, Oxford, 

Jacqueline de Romilly: Histoire et Raison chez T., Paris, 





Ι. ®ουκυ8ί8ης Αθηναίος ξυνέγραψε τον πό- 
Χεμον των ΤΙεΧοποννησίων καϊ αθηναίων ως 
εποΧέμησαν προς άΧΧηΧους, άρξάμενος ευθύς 
καθισταμένου και εΧπίσας μέγαν τε εσεσθαι καϊ 
άξιοΧογώτατον των προγεγενη μένων, τεκμαιρό- 
μενος οτι ακμάζοντες τε rjaav ες αυτόν αμφότεροι 
παρασκευή ttj πάση καϊ το αΧΧο *ΕλΧηνικον 
ορών ξυνιστάμενον προς εκατέρους, το μεν ευθύς, 
2 το 8ε και Βιανοονμενον. κίνησις yap αΰτη 8η 
μεγίστη τοις "ΕΧΧησιν ε<γενετο καϊ μέρει τινϊ των 
βαρβάρων, ως 8ε ειπείν καϊ επι πΧεΐστον ανθρώ- 
πων, τα yap προ αυτών καϊ τα ετι παΧαίτερα 
σαφώς μεν εύρεΐν 8ια χρόνου πΧήθος άΖύνατον 
ην, εκ 8ε τεκμηρίων ων επί μακρότατον σκοποΰντί 
μοι πιστευσαι ξυμβαίνει, ου μεγάΧα νομίζω 
γενέσθαι οΰτε κατά τους ποΧέμους οΰτε ες τα 

II. Φαίνεται yap ή νυν Ελλάς καΧουμένη ου 
πάΧαι βεβαίως οικουμένη, άΧΧα μεταναστάσεις 
Τ€ οΰσαι τα πρότερα καϊ ρα8ίως έκαστοι την 

1 The Greek text used for this translation of Thucydides 
is that of Hude. Variations from his text are indicated in 




I. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history 
of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the 
Athenians against one another. He began the task 
at the very outset of the war, in the belief that 
it would be great and noteworthy above all the 
wars that had gone before, inferring this from the 
fact that both powers were then at their best in 
preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the 
rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state 
or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. 
For this was the greatest movement that had ever 
stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the 
Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part 
of mankind. Indeed, as to the events of the period 
just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date, 
it was impossible to get clear information on account 
of lapse of time ; but from evidence which, on pushing 
my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can 
trust, I think that they were not really great either as 
regards the wars then waged or in other particulars. 

II. For it is plain that what is now called Hellas 
was not of old settled with fixed habitations, but 
that migrations were frequent in former times, each 
tribe readily leaving its own land whenever they were 


εαυτών άποΧείποντες, βιαζόμενοι υπό τίνων αϊεΧ 

2 πΧειόνων. της yap εμπορίας ουκ ούσης ούδ' 
€7ΓΐμΐΎνυντ€? άδεώς άΧΧήΧοις οΰτ€ κατά yrjv ούτε 
διά θαΧάσσης, νεμόμενοί τε τα εαυτών έκαστοι 
όσον άποζήν καϊ περιουσίαν χρημάτων ουκ έχοντες 
ουδέ yr\v φυτεύοντες, άδηΧον δν οπότε τις επεΧ- 
θών, καϊ ατείχιστων άμα όντων, άΧΧος άφαιρψ 
σεταί, της τε καθ* ημεραν αναγκαίου τροφής 
πανταχού αν ηγούμενοι επικρατεΐν ου χαΧεπώς 
άπανίσταντο, καϊ Si αύτο οΰτε μεγέθει πόΧεων 

3 Ισχύον ούτε τη άΧΧη παρασκευή. μάΧιστα δέ 
της γης η αρίστη αίεϊ τάς μεταβοΧας των οίκη- 
τορων εϊχεν, ή τε νυν ©εσσαΧία καΧουμενη καϊ 
Έοιωτία ΤΙεΧοποννησου τε τα ποΧΧα πΧην Ά/ο- 

4 καδίας της τε αΧΧης οσα ην κράτιστα. διά yap 
άρετην γης αϊ τε δυνάμεις τισϊ μείζους iyyiyvo- 
μεναι στάσεις ενεποίουν εξ ων εφθείροντο, καϊ 

δ άμα υπο άΧΧοφύΧων μάΧΧον επεβουΧεύοντο. την 
γουν ' Αττίκ η ν εκ του επι πΧεΐστον διά το Χεπτό- 
γεων άστασίαστον οΰσαν άνθρωποι ωκουν οι 

6 αυτοί αιεί. καϊ παράδειγμα τόδβ του λόγοι; ουκ 
εΧάχιστόν εστί διά τας μετοιΚ7]σει^τά άΧΧα μη 
ομοίως αύξηθήναι* εκ yap της άΧΧης Ελλάδος οι 
ποΧέμω ή στάσει εκπίπτοντες παρ 9 Αθηναίους 
οι δυνατώτατοι ως βέβαιον ον άνεχώρουν, καϊ 
ποΧϊται γιγνόμενοι ευθύς άπο παΧαιοΰ μειζω ετι 

1 So Ullrich : μ.6τ* ι κί as is Μη. 

BOOK Ι. ιι. ι~6 

forced to do so by any people that was more numer- 
ous. For there was no mercantile traffic and the 
people did not mingle with one another without fear, 
either on land or by sea, and they each tilled their 
own land only enough to obtain a livelihood from it, 
having no surplus of wealth and not planting orchards, 
since it was uncertain, especially as they were yet 
without walls, when some invader might come and 
despoil them. And so, thinking that they could ob- 
tain anywhere the sustenance required for their daily 
needs, they found it easy to change their abodes, and 
for this reason were not strong as regards either the 
size of their cities or their resources in general. And 
it was always the best of the land that was most 
subject to these changes of inhabitants — the districts 
now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Pelo- 
ponnesus except Arcadia, and the most fertile regions 
in the rest of Hellas. For the greater power that 
accrued to some communities on account of the 
fertility of their land occasioned internal quarrels 
whereby they were ruined, and at the same time 
these were more exposed to plots from outside tribes. 
Attica, at any rate, was free from internal quarrels 
from the earliest times by reason of the thinness of 
its soil, and therefore was inhabited by the same 
people always. And here is an excellent illustration 
of the truth of my statement that it was owing to 
these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did 
not increase in the same way as Attica ; for the most 
influential men of the other parts of Hellas, when 
they were driven out of their own countries by war 
or sedition, resorted to Athens as being a firmly 
settled community, and, becoming citizens, from the 
very earliest times made the city still greater in the 


εποίησαν πλήθει ανθρώπων την πολιν, ώστε 
κα\ ες Ίωνίαν ύστερον ώς ούχ Ικανής ούσης της 
'Αττικής αποικίας εξέπεμψαν. 

III. Αηλοΐ δε μοι και τόΒε των παλαιών άσθε- 
νειαν ούχ ήκιστα* προ yap τών Ύρωικών ούΒεν 
φαίνεται πρότερον κοιντ) ερηασαμενη η Ελλάς* 

2 Βοκεΐ Be μοι, ούΒε τοΰνομα τούτο ξύμπασά πω 
είχεν, άλλα τα μεν προ "Ελληνος του ΔευκαΧίω- 
νος και πάνυ ούΒε είναι η έπίκλησις αύτη, κατά 
έθνη Be άλλα τ ε και το ΥΙέλασηικον επι πλείστον 
αφ' εαυτών την επωνυμίαν παρέχεσθαι, "Έλληνος 
Βε και τών παίΒων αυτού εν ττ} ΦθιώτιΒι ισχύ- 
σάντων, καϊ επαγόμενων αυτούς επ' ώφελία ες 
τας άλλας πόλεις, καθ' εκάστους μεν ηΒη ττ\ 
ομιλία μάλλον καλεΐσθαι "Έλληνας, ου μέντοι 
πολλού ye χρόνου εΒύνατο καϊ απασιν εκνικήσαι. 

3 τεκμηριοΐ Βε μάλιστα "Ομηρος. πολλφ yap 
ύστερον ετι καϊ τών Ύρωικών yεv6μεvoς ούΒαμοΰ 
οΰτω λ τους ξύμπαντας ώνόμασεν ούΒ' άλλους 
ή τους μετά Άχιλλέως εκ τής ΦθιώτιΒος, οΐπερ 
κα\ πρώτοι "Ελληνες ήσαν, Δαναούς Βε εν τοις 
επεσι καϊ ' Apyείoυς καϊ 'Αχαιούς ανακαλεί, ου 
μην ούΒε βαρβάρους εϊρηκε Βια τό μηΒε "Ελ- 
ληνας πω, ώς εμοϊ Βοκεΐ, άντίπαλον ες εν όνομα 

4 άποκεκρίσθαι. οι Β' ούν ώς έκαστοι "Ελληνες 
κατά πόλεις τε όσοι αλλήλων ξυνίεσαν και ζύμ- 
παντες ύστερον κληθέντες ούΒεν προ τών Τρωι- 
κών Βι άσθένειαν καϊ άμειξίαν αλλήλων αθρόοι 

1 Added by Reiske. 

BOOK Ι. π. 6-in. 4 

number of its inhabitants ; so that Attica proved too 
small to hold them, and therefore the Athenians 
eventually sent out colonies even to Ionia. 

III. The weakness of the olden times is further 
proved to me chiefly by this circumstance, that before 
the Trojan war, Hellas, as it appears, engaged in no 
enterprise in common. Indeed, it seems to me that 
as a whole it did not yet have this name, either, but 
that before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, 
this title did not even exist, and that the several 
tribes, the Pelasgian most extensively, gave their 
own names to the several districts ; but when Hellen 
and his sons became strong in Phthiotis and were 
called in to the aid of the other cities, the clans 
thenceforth came more and more, by reason of this 
intercourse, to be called Hellenes, though it was a 
long time before the name could prevail among them 
all. The best evidence of this is given by Homer ; 
for, though his time was much later even than the 
Trojan war, he nowhere uses this name of all, or 
indeed of any of them except the followers of 
Achilles of Phthiotis, who were in fact the first 
Hellenes, but designates them in his poems as 
Danaans and Argives and Achaeans. And he has 
not used the term Barbarians, either, for the reason, 
as it seems to me, that the Hellenes on their part 
had not yet been separated off so as to acquire one 
common name by way of contrast. However this 
may be, those who then received the name of 
Hellenes, whether severally and in succession, city 
by city, according as they understood one another's 
speech, or in a body at a later time, engaged 
together in no enterprise before the Trojan war, 
on account of weakness and lack of intercourse 


έπραξαν, αλλά καϊ ταύτην την στρατείαν θα- 
Χάσση ηδη πΧείω χρώμενοι ξυνήΧθον. 

IV. Μίνως yap παΧαίτατος ων άκοτ) ϊσμεν 
ναυτικον έκτησατο κα\ της νυν Ελληνικής θα- 
Χάσσης επι πΧεΐστον εκράτησε καϊ των ΚυκΧά- 
8ων νήσων ήρζε Τ€ καϊ οικιστής πρώτος των 
πΧϊίστων iy ενετό, Κάρας εξεΧάσας καϊ τους 
εαυτού παϊδας ^εμόνας ^καταστησας* το τε 
Χτ)στικόν, ώς εικός, καθτ/ρει εκ της θαΧάσσης εφ* 
όσον εδύνατο, τον τας προσόδους μάΧΧον Ιεναι 

V. Οι yap "ΈίΧΧηνες το παΧαι καϊ των βαρ- 
βάρων οι τε εν Tjj ηπείρω παραθαΧάσσιοι καϊ 
όσοι νήσους είγον, επειδή ήρξαντο μάΧΧον πε- 
ραιοΰσθαι ναυσίν eV άΧΧηΧους, έτράποντο προς 
Χηστείαν, ^ουμενων ανδρών ου των άδυνατωτά- 
των κέρδους τον σφετερου αυτών ένεκα και τοις 
άσθενεσι τροφής, και προσπίπτοντες ποΧεσιν 
άτειχίστοις καϊ κατά κώμας οίκουμεναις ήρπαζον 
καϊ τον πΧεΐστον του βίου εντεύθεν εποιούντο, 
ουκ έχοντος πω αίσχύνην τούτου τού εpyoυ, 

2 φέροντος δε τι καϊ δόξης μάΧΧον δηΧούσι δε τών 
τε ήπειρωτών τίνες ετι καϊ νύν, οις κόσμος καΧώς 
τούτο δράν, καϊ οι παΧαιοϊ τών ποιητών τας 
πύστεις τών καταπΧεόντων πανταχού ομοίως 
ερωτώντες ει Χτ^σταί είσιν, ώς οΰτε ων πυνθάνοιτ- 
ται άπαξιούντων το Zpyov, οΐς τε επιμεΧες εΐη 


BOOK I. in. 4-v. 2 

with one another. And they united even for this 
expedition only when they were now making con- 
siderable use of the sea. 

IV. Minos is the earliest of all those known to us 
by tradition who acquired a navy. He made himself 
master of a very great part of what is now called 
the Hellenic Sea, and became lord of the Cyclades 
islands and first colonizer of most of them, driving 
out the Carians and establishing his own sons in 
them as governors. Piracy, too, he naturally tried 
to clear from the sea, as far as he could, desiring 
that his revenues should come to him more readily. 

V. It should be explained that in early times both 
the Hellenes and the Barbarians who dwell on the 
mainland near the sea, 1 as well as those on the islands, 
when once they began more frequently to cross over 
in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the 
lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was 
their own private gain and the support of their 
weaker followers, and falling upon cities that were 
unprovided with walls and consisted of groups of 
villages, they pillaged them and got most of their 
living from that source. For this occupation did not 
as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred some- 
thing even of glory. This is shown by the practice, 
even at the present day, of some of the peoples on 
the mainland, who still hold it an honour to be suc- 
cessful in this business, as well as by the words of 
the early poets, who invariably ask the question of 
all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates, 2 
the inference being that neither those whom they 
ask ever disavow that occupation, nor those ever 

1 e.g. Phoenicians, Carians, and probably Epirots. 
1 cf. Homer, 7 73 ; ι 252. 

VOL. L B 9 


3 είδέναι ουκ όνειδιξόντων. ελτιζοντο δέ καϊ κατ 
ήπειρον αλλήλους, καϊ μέχρι, τούδε πολλά της 
Έλλάδο? τω παλαίω τρόπω νέμεται περί τε 
Αοκρούς τους Όζόλας καϊ Αιτωλούς κα\ *Ακαρ- 
νάνας καϊ την ταύττ} ηπειρον το τβ σιδηροφορεΐ- 
σθαι τούτους τοις ήπειρώταις από της παλαιάς 
ληστείας εμμεμένηκεν. 

VI. ΤΙάσα yap ή Ελλάς εσιδηροφόρει διά τας 
άφάρκτους τε οικήσεις καϊ ουκ ασφαλείς παρ 
αλλήλους εφόδους, καϊ ξυνήθη την δίαιταν μεθ > 

2 οπλών εποιήσαντο ώσπερ οι βάρβαροι, ση μείον 
δ' εστί ταύτα της Ελλάδος ετι ούτω νεμόμενα 

3 των ποτέ και ες πάντας ομοίων διαιτημάτων. εν 
τοις πρώτοι δε 'Αθηναίοι τον τε σίδηρον κατε- 
θεντο καϊ άνειμέντ) ττ} διαίτη ες το τρυφερώτερον 
μετέστησαν. καϊ οι πρεσβύτεροι αύτοΐς των ευ- 
δαιμόνων δια το άβροδίαιτον ου πολύς χρόνος 
επειδή χιτώνας τε λινούς επαύσαντο φορούντες 
καϊ χρυσών τεττίηων ενερσει κρωβυλον άναδού- 
μενοι τών εν τι) κεφαλή τριχών* αφ' ου καϊ 
Ιώνων τους πρεσβυτέρους κατά το ξυμένες επϊ 

4 πολύ αύτη ή σκευή κατέσχεν. μετρία δ' αύ 
έσθητι καϊ ες τον νυν τρόπον πρώτοι Αακεδαι- 
μόνιοι εχρησαντο καϊ ες τα άλλα προς τους πολ- 
λούς οι τα μείζω κεκτημένοι Ισοδίαιτοι μάλιστα 

5 κατέστησαν, εηυμνώθησάν τε πρώτοι καϊ ες το 


BOOK I. v. 2-vi. s 

censure it who are concerned to have the informa- 
tion. On the mainland also men plundered one 
another ; and even to-day in many parts of Hellas 
life goes on under the old conditions, as in the region 
of the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and 
the mainland thereabout. And these mainlanders' 
habit of carrying arms is a survival of their old 
freebooting life. 

VI. Indeed, all the Hellenes used to carry arms 
because the places where they dwelt were unpro- 
tected, and intercourse with each other was unsafe ; 
and in their everyday life they regularly went armed 
just as the Barbarians did. And the fact that these 
districts of Hellas still retain this custom is an evi- 
dence that at one time similar modes of life pre- 
vailed everywhere. But the Athenians were among 
the very first to lay aside their arms and, adopting an 
easier mode of life, to change to more luxurious 
ways. And indeed, owing to this fastidiousness, it 
was only recently that their older men of the wealthier 
class gave up wearing tunics of linen and fastening 
up their hair in a knot held by a golden grasshopper 
as a brooch ; l and this same dress obtained for a 
long time among the elderly men of the Ionians 
also, owing to their kinship with the Athenians. 
An unpretentious costume after the present fashion 
was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, and in 
general their wealthier men took up a style of living 
that brought them as far as possible into equality 
with the masses. And they were the first to bare 
their bodies and, after stripping openly, to anoint 

1 The mode of wearing the hair in a knot on the top of 
the head with the insertion of a pin in the form of a cicada 
seems to have persisted long at Athens, a mark of antiquated 
manners as characteristic as the queue or pig-tail with us. 



φανερον αποδύντες Χίπα μετά του ηυμνάζζσθαι 
ήΧείψαντο. το δε πάλαι καϊ εν τω ΌΧυμπικω 
aycovi διαζώματα έχοντες περί τα αιδοΐα οι άθΧη- 
ταϊ τυωνίζοντο, κα\ ου ποΧΧα ετη επειδή πεπαυν- 
ται* ετι δε κα\ εν τοις βάρβαροι? εστίν οΐς νυν, 
κα\ μάΧιστα τοις Άσιανοϊς, πυγμής καϊ πάΧης 
6 αθΧα τίθεται, και διεζωμένοι τοΰτο δρώσιν. ποΧΧα 
S* αν καϊ άΧΧα τις άποδείξειε το παΧαιον Έλ- 
Χηνικον ομοιότροπα τω νυν βαρβαρικω διαιτώ- 

VII. Ύών δε πόΧεων οσαι μεν νεώτατα ωκίσθη- 
σαν καϊ ήδη πΧωιμωτέρων όντων περιουσίας μάΧ- 
Χον εχουσαι χρημάτων, επ* αύτοΐς τοις αι^ιαΧοΐς 
εκτίζοντο καϊ τείχεσι τους ισθμούς άπεΧάμβανον 
εμπορίας τε ένεκα καϊ της προς τους προσοίκους 
έκαστοι ισχύος' ai δε παΧαιαϊ δια την Χτ]στείαν 
επί ποΧύ άντίσχουσαν άπο θαΧάσσης μάΧΧον 
ωκίσθησαν, αϊ τε εν ταΐς νήσοις καϊ εν ταΐς 
ήπειρο ις (εφερον yap άΧΧήΧους τε καϊ των αΧΧων 
όσοι οντες ου θαΧάσσιοι κάτω ωκουν), καϊ μέχρι 
τούδε ετι άνωκισμενοι είσιν, 

VIII. Και ούχ ήσσον Χησταϊ ήσαν οι νησιώται, 
Κάρες τε οντες καϊ Φοίνικες, ούτοι yap δη τας 
πΧείστας των νήσων ωκησαν. μαρτύρων δέ• 
Δϊ/λου yap καθαιρομενης υπ ο Αθηναίων εν τωδ€ 
τω ποΧέμω καϊ των θηκών άναιρεθεισών, οσαι 
ήσαν των τεθνεώτων εν τή νήσω, υπέρ ήμισυ 


BOOK I. vi. 5-vui. ι 

themselves with oil when they engaged in athletic 
exercise ; for in early times, even in the Olympic 
games, the athletes wore girdles about their loins in 
the contests, and it is not many years since the 
practice has ceased. Indeed, even now among some 
of the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where 
prizes for wrestling and boxing are offered, the con- 
testants wear loin-cloths. And one could show that 
the early Hellenes had many other customs similar 
to those of the Barbarians of the present day. 

VII. However, the cities which were founded in 
more recent times, when navigation had at length 
become safer, and were consequently beginning to 
have surplus resources, were built right on the sea- 
shore, and the isthmuses l were occupied and walled 
off with a view to commerce and to the protection of 
the several peoples against their neighbours. But 
the older cities, both on the islands and on the main- 
land, were built more at a distance from the sea on 
account of the piracy that long prevailed — for the 
pirates were wont to plunder not only one another, 
but also any others who dwelt on the coast but were 
not sea-faring folk — and even to the present day 
they lie inland. 

VIII. Still more addicted to piracy were the 
islanders. These included Carians as well as Phoe- 
nicians, for Carians inhabited most of the islands, as 
may be inferred from the fact that, when Delos was 
purified by the Athenians in this war 2 and the graves 
of all who had ever died on the island were re- 
moved, over half were discovered to be Carians, 

1 i.e. fortified cities were established on peninsulas, con- 
nected with the mainland by an isthmus, which was then 
walled off as Epidamnus (ch. xxvi. 5) and Potidaea (iv. cxx. 3). 

* In the sixth year of the war, 426 B.a cf. m. civ. 



Κάρες εφάνησαν, γνωσθβντες rfj τε σκευή τών 
οπλών ζυντεθαμμεντ) καϊ τω τρόπω ω νυν ετι 

2 Καταστάντος δε του ^Λίνω ναυτικού πλωιμώ- 
τερα iy ενετό παρ αλλήλους {οι yap εκ των νήσων 
KaKodpyoi άνέστησαν υπ αύτοΰ, οτεπερ καϊ τάς 

3 πολλά? αυτών κατωκιζε), και οι παρά θάλασσαν 
άνθρωποι μάλλον ήδη την κτήσιν τών χρημάτων 
ποιούμενοι βεβαιοτερον ωκουν, και τίνες καϊ τείχη 
περιεβάλλοντο 1 ως πλουσιώτεροι εαυτών yiyvo- 
μενοι• εφιέμενοι yap τών κερδών οι τε ήσσους 
ύπέμενον τών κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οι τε δυνα- 
τώτεροι περιουσίας έχοντες προσεποιοΰντο υπη- 

4 κόους τάς ελάσσους πόλεις, και εν τούτω τω 
τρόπω μάλλον ήδη οντες ύστερον χρόνω επί 
Ύροίαν εστράτευσαν. 

IX. Άyaμεμvωv τε μοι δοκεΐ τών τότε δυνάμει 
προύχων καϊ ου τοσούτον τοις Ύυνδάρεω ορκοις 
κατειλημμένους τους Ελένης μνηστήρας άyωv τον 
2 στολον ayeipai* Χ^ουσι δε καϊ οι τα σαφέστατα 
ΤΙεΧοποννησίων μνήμη παρά τών πρότερον δε- 
δεyμεvoι Τίέλοπά τε πρώτον πλήθει χρημάτων, α 
ήλθεν εκ της 'Ασίας έχων ες ανθρώπους απόρους, 
δύναμιν περιποιησάμενον την επωνυμίαν της χώ- 
ρας επηλυν οντά όμως σχεϊν, καϊ ύστερον τοις 

1 Hud© reads ττ^ρι^βάΧοντο with C r . 

1 According to the post-Homeric legend, all who paid 
their court to Helen engaged to defend the man of her 


BOOK L viii. ι -ix. a 

being recognized by the fashion of the armour found 
buried with them, and by the mode of burial, which 
is that still in use among them. 

But when the navy of Minos had been established, 
navigation between various peoples became safer — 
for the evil-doers on the islands were expelled by him, 
and then he proceeded to colonize most of them 
— and the dwellers on the sea-coast now began to 
acquire property more than before and to become 
more settled in their homes, and some, seeing that 
they were growing richer than before, began also 
to put walls around their cities. Their more settled 
life was due to their desire for gain ; actuated by 
this, the weaker citizens were willing to submit to 
dependence on the stronger, and the more powerful 
men, with their enlarged resources, were able to 
make the lesser cities their subjects. And later on, 
when they had at length more completely reached 
this condition of affairs, they made the expedition 
against Troy. 

IX. And it was, as I think, because Agamemnon 
surpassed in power the princes of his time that he 
was able to assemble his fleet, and not so much 
because Helen's suitors, whom he led, were bound 
by oath to Tyndareus. 1 It is said, furthermore, by 
those of the Peloponnesians who have received the 
clearest traditional accounts from men of former 
times, that it was by means of the great wealth 
which he brought with him from Asia into the midst 
of a poor people that Pelops first acquired power, 
and, consequently, stranger though he was, gave his 
name to the country, and that yet greater things 

choice against all wrong, cf. Isoc. x. 40 ; Paus. in. xx. 9 ; 
Apollod. in. x. 9. 


εκηόνοις ετι μείξω ξυνενεχθήναι, Έ*υρνσθέως μεν 
εν τη 'Αττική υπό 'ΗρακΧεώών αποθανόντος, 
Ατρεως Be μητρός άΰεΧφοΰ οντος αύτω καϊ επι- 
τρέψαντος Εύρυσθέως, δτ' εστράτευε, Μυκηνας 
Τ6 καϊ την άρχην κατά το οίκεϊον Άτρεΐ (τι/γχά- 
νειν ό€ αυτόν φεύ^οντα τον πατέρα 8ιά τον 
Χρυσίππου θάνατον), καϊ ώς ούκέτι άνεγωρησεν 
Έύρυσθεύς, βουΧομένων καϊ των Μυκηναίων φόβω 
των < \\ρακΧειΒων καϊ άμα δυνατόν Βοκοΰντα είναι 
καϊ το πΧήθος τεθεραπευκότα των Μυκηναίων τ€ 
καϊ όσων Εύρυσθεύς ηρχε την βασιΧείαν 'Ατρέα 
παραΧαβεΐν καϊ των ΥΙερσεώών τους ΥΙεΧοπίΒας 

3 μείζϋυς καταστήναι. α μοι 8οκεϊ Αγαμέμνων 
παραΧαβων καϊ ναυτικω δε άμα επί πΧέον των 
άΧΧων ίσγυσας την στρατείαν ου γάριτι το πΧεον 
η φόβω ξυναηαηων ποιησασθαι. φαίνεται yap 
ναυσί τε πΧείσταις αυτός άφικόμενος καϊ Άρκάσι 
π ροσ παράσχων, ως "Ομηρος τούτο 8εδ)]Χωκεν, εϊ 

4 τω Ικανός τεκμηριωσαι. καϊ ev του σκήπτρου 
άμα τη παραδόσει εϊρηκεν αυτόν " ποΧΧησι νή- 
σοισι καϊ "Apye'i παντϊ άνάσσειν " ουκ αν οΰν 
νήσων εξω των περιοικίδων {αύται he ουκ αν 
ποΧΧαϊ elev) ηπειρώτης ων εκράτει, el μη τι καϊ 

5 ναυτικόν είχεν. είκάζειν he χρη και ταύττ) τη 
στρατεία οία ην τα προ αυτής. 

1 Chrysippus, his half-brother, son of Pelops and Axiocho, 
was killed by Atreus and Thyestes at the instance of their 
mother Hippodameia. 


BOOK I. ix. 2-5 

fell to the lot of his descendants. For when Eu- 
rystheus set out on the expedition that resulted in 
his death in Attica at the hands of the Heracleidae, 
Atreus, his mother's brother, who chanced to have 
been banished by his father for the death of Chry- 
sippus, 1 was intrusted by Eurystheus with Mycenae 
and the sovereignty because he was a kinsman ; and 
when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, in accord- 
ance with the wish of the Mycenaeans, who feared 
the Heracleidae, and because he seemed to be a 
man of power and had won the favour of the mul- 
titude, received the sovereignty over the Mycenaeans 
and all who were under the sway of Eurystheus. And 
so the house of Pelops became greater than the house 
of Perseus. And it was, I think, because Agamemnon 
had inherited all this, and at the same time had be- 
come strong in naval power beyond the rest, that he 
was able to collect his armament, not so much by 
favour as by fear, and so to make the expedition. 
For it is clear that he himself brought the greatest 
number of ships, and that he had others with which 
to supply the Arcadians, 2 as Homer testifies, if he is 
sufficient witness for anyone. And he says, in the 
account of the delivery of the sceptre, 3 that Aga- 
memnon "ruled over many islands and all Argos." 
Now, if he had not had something of a fleet, he 
could not, as he lived on the mainland, have been 
lord of any islands except those on the coast, and 
these would not be "many." And it is from this 
expedition that we must judge by conjecture what 
the situation was before that time. 

2 c/. Homer, Β 576 and 612. 
2 cf. Homer, Β 101-109. 



X. Καϊ οτι μεν Μυκήναι μικρόν ην, η €Ϊ τι των 
τότε πόΧισμα νυν μη άξιόχρεων δοκεΐ είναι, ουκ 
άκριβεΐ αν τις σημείω χρώμενος άπιστοίη μη 
γενέσθαι τον στόλον τοσούτον όσον οι τε ποιηταϊ 

2 είρήκασι καϊ 6 λόγο? κατέχει. Λακεδαιμονίων 
μεν ι γαρ ει η πολις ερημωθείη, λειφθείη δε τα 
τε ιερά καϊ της κατασκευής τά εδάφη, ποΧΧήν αν 
οίμαι άπιστίαν της δυνάμεως προίΧθόντος ποΧΧού 
'χρόνου τοις έπειτα προς το κΧέος αυτών είναι 
(καίτοι ΏεΧοποννήσου τών πέντε τας δύο μοίρας 
νέμονται της τε ξυμπάσης ηγούνται καϊ τών εξω 
ξυμμάχων ποΧΧών όμως δέ, ούτε ξυνοικισθείσης 
της 2 πόλεως ούτε ιεροΐς καϊ κατασκευαΐς ποΧυ- 
τεΧέσι χρησαμένης, κατά κώμας δε τω παλαίω 
της 'Ελλάδος τρόπω οίκισθείσης, φαίνοιτ αν υπο- 
δεεστέρα), Αθηναίων δε το αυτό τούτο παθόντων 
ΒιπΧασίαν αν την δύναμιν είκάζεσθαι από της 

3 φανεράς όψεως της ποΧεως ή εστίν, οΰκουν άπι- 
στεΐν εικός ουδέ τας όψεις τών πόΧεων μάλλον 
σκοπεΐν ή τας δυνάμεις, νομίζειν δε την στρατείαν 
εκείνη ν μεηίστην μεν γενέσθαι τών προ αυτής, 
Χειπομένην δε τών νύν, τή 'Ομηρου αυ ποιήσει ει 
τι χρή κάνταύθα πιστεύειν, ήν εικός επι το μείζον 
μεν ποιητήν οντά κοσμήσαι, όμως δε φαίνεται 

4 καϊ οΰτως ενδεεστέρα, πεποίηκε yap χιλίων καϊ 
διακοσίων νεών τας μεν Βοιωτών είκοσι καϊ 
εκατόν ανδρών, τας δέ ΦιΧοκτητου πεντήκοντα, 

1 Added by Hude. 8 Added by Stephanus. 

BOOK I. χ. 1-4 

X. And because Mycenae was only a small place, 
or if any particular town of that time seems now to 
be insignificant, it would not be right for me to treat 
this as an exact piece of evidence and refuse to 
believe that the expedition against Troy was as great 
as the poets have asserted and as tradition still main- 
tains. For if the city of the Lacedaemonians should 
be deserted, and nothing should be left of it but its 
temples and the foundations of its other buildings, 
posterity would, I think, after a long lapse of time, 
be very loath to believe that their power was as great 
as their renown. (And yet they occupy two -fifths 
of the Peloponnesus and have the hegemony of the 
whole, as well as of their many allies outside ; but 
still, as Sparta is not compactly built as a city and 
has not provided itself with costly temples and other 
edifices, but is inhabited village-fashion in the old 
Hellenic style, its power would appear less than it 
is.) Whereas, if Athens should suffer the same fate, 
its power would, I think, from what appeared of the 
city s ruins, be conjectured double what it is. The 
reasonable course, therefore, is not to be incredulous 
or to regard the appearance of cities rather than 
their power, but to believe that expedition to have 
been greater than any that preceded it, though 
falling below those of the present time, if here 
again one may put any trust in the poetry of Homer; 
for though it is natural to suppose that he as a poet 
adorned and magnified the expedition, still even on 
his showing it was evidently comparatively small. 
For in the fleet of twelve hundred vessels he has 
represented the ships of the Boeotians as having 
one hundred and twenty men each, and those of 



ΒηΧών, ώς εμοϊ δοκεΐ, τας μβγίστας καϊ εΧαχί- 
στας' αΧλων <γονν μεγέθους πέρι εν νεών κατα- 
λογω ουκ εμνήσθη. αύτερέται he οτι ήσαν καϊ 
μάχιμοι πάντες, εν ταΐς ΦιΧοκτήτον νανσΐ δεδή- 
Χωκεν* τοξότας yap πάντας πεποίηκε τους προσ- 
κώπους. περίνεως δε ουκ είκος ποΧΧούς ξυμπΧεΐν 
εζω των βασιΧέων καϊ των μάΧιστα εν τέλει, 
άΧΧως τε καϊ μεΧΧοντας πέXayoς περαιώσεσθαι 
μετά σκευών ποΧεμικών ουδ' αΰ τα πΧοΐα κατά- 
φαρκτα έχοντας, άΧΧα τω παΧαιω τρόπω Χηστι- 

5 κώτερον παρεσ κευασμένα. προς τας μεηίστας δ' 
ουν καϊ εΧαχίστας ναΰς το μέσον σκοπουντι ου 
ποΧΧοϊ φαίνονται εΧθ οντες, ώς απ ο πάσης της 
'Ελλάδος KOivfj πεμπόμενοι. 

XI. Αϊτιον δ' ην ούχ ή οΧιηανθρωπια τοσούτον 
όσον η άχρηματία. της yap τροφής απορία τον 
τε στρατον εΧάσσω r)yayov και όσον ήΧπιζον 
αντόθεν ποΧεμοΰντα βιοτεύσειν, επειδή δε άφι- 
κόμενοι μάχτ) εκράτησαν (δήΧον δε* το yap ερυμα 
τω στρατοπέδω ουκ αν ετειχίσαντο), φαίνονται δ' 
ούδ' ενταύθα πάστ) ττ) δυνάμει χρησάμενοι, άΧΧα 
προς yeωpyίav της Χερσονήσου τραπόμενοι καϊ 
Χηστείαν της τροφής απορία, rj καϊ μάΧΧον οι 
Ύρώες αυτών διεσπαρμένων τα δέκα ετη άντεΐχον 
βία, τοις αιεϊ υποΧειπομένοις άντίπαΧοι οντες. 

2 περιουσίαν δε ει ήΧθον έχοντες τροφής καϊ οντες 


BOOK Ι. χ. 4-xi. 2 

Philoctetes as having fifty, 1 indicating, it seems to 
me, the largest and the smallest ships ; at any rate, 
no mention as to the size of any others is made in 
the Catalogue of Ships. But that all on board were 
at once rowers and fighting men he has shown in 
the case of the ships of Philoctetes ; for he repre- 
sents all the oarsmen as archers. And it is not likely 
that many supernumeraries sailed with the expedi- 
tion, apart from the kings and those highest in office, 
especially as they were to cross the open sea with all 
the equipment of war, and, furthermore, had boats 
which were not provided with decks, but were built 
after the early style, more like pirate-boats. In any 
event, if one takes the mean between the largest 
ships and the smallest, it is clear that not a large 
number of men went on the expedition, considering 
that they were sent out from all Hellas in common. 2 
XL The cause was not so much lack of men as 
lack of money. For it was a want of supplies that 
caused them to take out a comparatively small 
force, only so large as could be expected to live on 
the country while at war. And when they arrived 
and had prevailed in battle — as evidently they did, 
for otherwise they could not have built the defence 
around their camp — even then they seem not to 
have used their whole force, but to have resorted to 
farming in the Chersonese and to pillaging, through 
lack of supplies. Wherefore, since they were scat- 
tered, the Trojans found it easier to hold the field 
against them during those ten years, being a match 
for those who from time to time were left in camp. 
But if they had taken with them an abundant 

1 Horn. Β 510, 719. 

2 The number would be 102,000, i.e. 1,200 ships at 85 men 




αθρόοι άνευ Χηστείας καϊ ^εωρ^ία^ ξυνεχώς top 
πόΧεμον διεφερον, ραδίως αν μάχη κρατούντες 
εΐΧον, οι yε και ούχ αθρόοι, άΧΧα μέρει τω αιεϊ 
παρόντι άντεΐχον, ποΧιορκία δ' αν προσκαθεζό- 
μενοι εν εΧάσσονί τε γ^ρόνω καϊ άττονώτερον την 
Ύροίαν εΐΧον. άΧΧα Si άγβηματιαν τά τε προ 
τούτων ασθενή ην καϊ αυτά yε δ?) ταύτα, ονομα- 
στότατα των πρϊν γενόμενα, δηΧοΰται τοις ερηοις 
υποδεέστερα οντά της φήμης καϊ του νυν περί 
αυτών δια τους ποιητας Χόηου κατεσχηκότος. 

XII. ΈπεΙ καϊ μετά τα Τρωικά ή Έλλά? ετι 
μετανίστατό τε καϊ κατωκιζετο, ώστε μη ήσυχα- 

2 σασα αύξηθήναι. η τε yap αναχώρησις των Έλ- 
Χήνων εξ *ΙΧίον χρονιά ηενομενη ποΧΧα ενεόχ- 
μωσε, και στάσεις εν ταΐς πόΧεσιν ως επί το 
ποΧυ iyiyvovTOy αφ ων εκπιπτοντες τάς πόΧεις 

3 εκτιζον. Βοιωτοί τε yap οι νυν εξηκοστώ ετει 
μετά *\\ίου ά,Χωσιν εζ "Αρνης άναστάντες ύπο 
©εσσαΧών την νυν μεν Έοιωτίαν, πρότερου δε 
Καδμηίδα yrjv καΧουμενην ωκησαν (ην δε αυτών 
καϊ άποδασ μος εν τη yfj ταύτη πρότερον, άφ' ων 
καϊ ες "ΐΧιον εστράτευσαν), Αωριής τε όyδoηκoστω 

4 eVet ζύν ΊΙρακΧείδαις ΤΙεΧοπόννησον εσγον. μό- 
Χις τε εν πόΧΧώ χρόνω ήσυγάσασα ή Ελλάς 
βεβαίως καϊ ούκετι άνισταμενη αποικίας εξε- 


BOOK Ι. χι. 2-xn. 4 

supply of food, and, in a body, without resorting to 
foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war 
continuously, they would easily have prevailed in 
battle and taken the city, since even with their 
forces not united, but with only such part as was 
from time to time on the spot, they yet held out ; 
whereas, if they could have sat down and laid siege 
to Troy, they would have taken it in less time and 
with less trouble. But because of lack of money not 
only were the undertakings before the Trojan war 
insignificant, but even this expedition itself, though 
far more noteworthy than any before, is shown by 
the facts to have been inferior to its fame and to the 
tradition about it that now, through the influence 
of the poets, obtains. 

XII. Indeed, even after the Trojan war Hellas 
was still subject to migrations and in process of 
settlement, and hence did not get rest and wax 
stronger. For not only did the return of the Hel- 
lenes from Ilium, occurring as it did after a long 
time, cause many changes ; but factions also began 
to spring up very generally in the cities, and, in con- 
sequence of these, men were driven into exile and 
founded new cities. The present Boeotians, for 
example, were driven from Arne by the Thessalians 
in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium and 
settled in the district now called Boeotia, but formerly 
Cadmeis ; only a portion of these had been in that 
land before, and it was some of these who took part in 
the expedition against Ilium. The Dorians, too, in the 
eightieth year after the war, together with the Hera- 
cleidae occupied the Peloponnesus. And so when 
painfully and after a long course of time Hellas 
became permanently tranquil and its population was 
no longer subject to expulsion from their homes, it 



ττ€μπ€, καϊ "Ιωνας μεν 'Αθηναίοι καϊ νησιωτών 
τους ποΧΧούς ωκισαν, 'Ιταλία? δε καϊ ΣικεΧίας 
το πΧέον ΤΙεΧοποννησιοι της Τ€ άΧΧης Έλλάδο? 
εστίν α χωρία, πάντα δε ταύτα ύστερον των 
Ύρωικών εκτίσθη. 

XIII. Δυνατωτέρας δε ηι^νομίνης της Ελλάδος 
teal των χρημάτων την κτησιν ετι μάΧΧον η πρό- 
T€pov ποιούμενης τα ποΧΧα τυραννίδες iv ταΐς 
πόΧεσι καθίσταντο, των προσόδων μειζόνων yi- 
ηνομενων {πρότερον δε ήσαν επί ρητοΐς yk -ρασι 
πατρικαϊ βασιΧεΐαι), ναυτικά τε εξηρτύετο η 
Έλλά? καϊ της θαΧάσσης μάΧΧον άντείχοντο. 

2 πρώτοι δε Κορίνθιοι Χέζονται εγγύτατα του νυν 
τρόπου μεταχειρίσαι τα περί τάς ναΰς καϊ τριή- 
ρεις πρώτον εν Κορίνθω της Ελλάδος ενναυπη- 

3 <γηθήναι. φαίνεται δε καϊ Σαμίοις ΆμεινοκΧής 
Κορίνθιος ναυπηγός ναΰς ποιησας τεσσάρας* ετη 
δ' εστί μάΧιστα τριακόσια ες την τελει/τ?^ τούδε 
του ποΧεμου, οτε ΆμεινοκΧής Σαμίοις ηΧθεν. 

4 ναυμαχία τε παΧαιτάτη ων ϊσμεν ηί^νεται Κο- 
ρινθίων προς Κερκυραίους* ετη δε μάΧιστα καϊ 
ταύτη εξηκοντα καϊ διακόσια εστί μέχρι του 

5 αυτού χρόνου, οίκούντες yap την ποΧιν οι Κο- 
ρίνθιοι επί τού ισθμού αίεϊ δη ποτέ εμπόριον 
είχον, τών ΈΧΧήνων το πάΧαι κατά yrjv τα πΧείω 
η κατά θάΧασσαν, τών τε εντός ΤΙεΧοποννησου 
καϊ τών εξω, διά της εκείνων παρ άΧΧηΧους 
επιμισyόvτωv, χρήμασί τε δυνατοί ήσαν, ώς καϊ 


BOOK I. xii. 4-xiii. 5 

began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonized 
Ionia and most of the islands ; the Peloponnesians, 
the greater part of Italy and Sicily and some portions 
of the rest of Hellas. And all these colonies were 
planted after the Trojan war. 

XIII. As Hellas grew more powerful and con- 
tinued to acquire still more wealth than before, 
along with the increase of their revenue tyrannies 
began to be established in most of the cities, whereas 
before that there had been hereditary kingships 
based on fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes began to 
fit out navies, too, and to apply themselves more to 
the sea. And the Corinthians are said to have been 
the first of all to adopt what was very nearly the 
modern plan as regards ships and shipping, 1 and 
Corinth was the first place in all Hellas, we are told, 
where triremes were built. And it appears that 
Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships 
for the Samians, also ; and it was about three hundred 
years before the end of the Peloponnesian war that 
Ameinocles came to the Samians. 2 The earliest sea- 
fight, too, of which we know, was fought by the 
Corinthians against the Corcyraeans ; 3 and this was 
two hundred and sixty years before the same date. 
For as the Corinthians had their city on the Isthmus, 
from the very earliest times they maintained there 
a market for the exchange of goods, because the 
Hellenes within and without the Peloponnesus, in 
olden times communicating with one another more by 
land than by sea, had to pass through their terri- 
tory; and so they were powerful and rich, as has 

1 The reference seems to be to the construction of har- 
bours and clocks as well as to the structure of the ships, 
e.g. providing them with decks (ch. x. 4). 

8 704 b.o. * 664 B.C. 

2 5 


τοΐς παΧαιοΐς ποιηταΐς δεδήΧωται• άφνειον yap 
επωνόμασαν το χωρίον, επειδή τε οι "ΕΧΧηνες 
μάΧΧον επΧωζον, τ ας ναύς κτησάμενοι το Xyari- 
κον καθόμουν, καϊ εμπόριον παρέχοντες αμφότερα 
δυνατή ν εσχον χρημάτων προσόδω την πόΧιν. 
6 καϊ "Ιωσιν ύστερον ττοΧύ jiyveTCit, ναυτικον επί 
Κύρου ΤΙερσών πρώτον βασιλεύοντος καϊ Καμ- 
βύσου του υίεος αυτού, της τ€ καθ* εαυτούς 
θαΧάσσης Κύρω ποΧεμούντες εκράτησάν τίνα 
χρόνον. καϊ ΥΙοΧνκράτης, Σάμου τυράννων iirl 
Καμβύσου, ναυτικώ Ισχύων αλΧας τ€ των νήσων 
υπηκόους εποιήσατο καϊ Ύήνειαν ελών άνεθηκε 
τω ΆποΧΧωνι τω ΑηΧίω. Φωκαής τβ Μ,ασσαΧίαν 
οίκίζοντες Καρχηδονίους ενικών ναυμαχούντες. 

XIV. Δυνατώτατα yap ταύτα των ναυτικών 
ήν. φαίνεται δε και ταύτα, ποΧλαΐς yεvεaϊς 
ύστερα yεvόμεva των Τρωικών, τριήρεσι μεν όΧί- 
γα*? χρώμενα, πεντηκοντεροις δ' ετι καϊ πΧοίοις 

2 μακροΐς εξηρτυμενα ωσπερ εκείνα. oXiyov τε προ 
των Μηδικών καϊ τού Δαρείου θανάτου, ος μετά 
Καμβνσην Περσών ε βασίλευσε, τριήρεις περί τε 
ΣικεΧίαν τοις τυράννοις ες πΧηθος iy^vovTO καϊ 
Κερκυραίοις* ταύτα yap τεΧευταΐα προ της Έ,ερ- 
ξου στρατείας ναυτικά a^ioXoya εν ττ) Ελλάδα 

3 κατέστη. Klyivrfcai yap καϊ Αθηναίοι, καϊ 

1 cf. Horn. Β 570 ; Pind. ΟΙ. xiii. 4. 

2 559-529 B.C. 3 532-522 B.C. * cf. in. civ. 
5 Marseilles, founded 600 B.C. 


BOOK I. xiii. 5-xiv. 3 

been shown even by the early poets, who called the 
place " Wealthy Corinth." x And when navigation 
grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the 
Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of 
piracy, and offering a market by sea as well as by 
land, raised their city to great power by means of 
their revenues. The Ionians, too, acquired a power- 
ful navy later, in the time of Cyrus, 2 the first king of 
the Persians, and of Cambyses his son ; and waging 
war with Cyrus they maintained control of the sea 
about their own coasts for some time. Polycrates, 
also, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cam- 
byses, 3 was strong in sea-power and subdued a num- 
ber of the islands, Rhenea among them, which he 
captured and consecrated to the Delian Apollo. 4 
Finally the Phocaeans, when they were colonizing 
Massalia, 5 conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight. 
XIV. These were the most powerful of the fleets ; 
and even these, we learn, though they were formed 
many generations later than the Trojan war, were 
provided with only a few triremes, but were still 
fitted out with fifty-oared galleys and the ordinary 
long boats, 6 like the navies of that earlier time. In- 
deed, it was only a little before the Persian war and 
the death of Darius, 7 who became king of the Per- 
sians after Cambyses, that triremes were acquired in 
large numbers, namely by the tyrants in various parts 
of Sicily and by the Corcyraeans ; and these were the 
last navies worthy of note that were established in 
Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. As for the 
Athenians and Aeginetans and any other maritime 

6 7τλο?α, usually contrasted with war-ships [τρι-ηρας), but 
here marked as ships of war by the epithet μακρά, though 
probahly differing little except in size from trading- vessels. 

» 485 B.O. 



oirives aXXoiy βραχέα εκεκτηντο και τούτων τά 
ποΧΧα πεντϊ]κοντέρους- οψέ τ€ άφ' ου 'Αθηναίους 
©εμιστοκΧής επεισεν Αίγινηταις ποΧεμοϋντας. 
καϊ άμα του βαρβάρου προσδόκιμου οντος, τάς 
ναΰς ποιήσασθαι, αισπερ καϊ εναυμάχησαν καϊ 
αύται οΰπω είχον δια πάσης καταστρώματα. 

XV. Τά μεν ουν ναυτικά των 'ΚΧΧήνων τοι- 
αύτα ήν, τά τ€ παΧαιά καϊ τά ύστερον γενόμενα, 
ίσχυν δε περιεποιησαντο όμως ουκ εΧαχίστην οι 
προσσχόντες αύτοΐς χρημάτων τε προσόδω καϊ 
άΧΧων άργτ)• επιπΧεοντες yap τάς νήσους κατε- 
στρεφοντο, καϊ μάλιστα όσοι μη διαρκή είχον 

2 χωράν, κατά yrjv δε πόΧεμος, όθεν τις καν δύνα- 
μις περιεγένετο, ουδείς ξυνεστη• πάντες δε ήσαν, 
όσοι καϊ εγένοντο, προς όμορους τους σφετερους 
εκάστοις, καϊ εκδημονς στρατείας πο\ύ άπο της 
εαυτών επ* άΧΧων καταστροφή ουκ έζησαν οι 
"ΈιΧΧηνες. ου jap ξυνειστηκεσαν προς τάς μεγί- 
στας πόΧεις υπήκοοι, ούΰ* αΰ αυτοί άπο της ϊσης 
κοινάς στρατείας εποιουντο, κατ άΧΧηΧους δε 
μάΧΧον ως έκαστοι οι άστυγείτονες εποΧέμουν. 

3 μάΧιστα δε ες τον πάΧαι ποτέ γενόμενον πόΧεμον 
ΧαΧκίδέων καϊ Έρετριων καϊ το άΧΧο 'ΈΑΧηνικον 
ες ξυμμαχίαν εκατερων διέστη. 

1 Referring to Xerxes' invasion. This Aeginetan war ie 
referred to in ch. xli. 2. 


BOOK I. xiv. 3-xv. 3 

powers, the fleets they had acquired were incon- 
siderable, consisting mostly of fifty-oared galleys ; 
and it was only quite recently that the Athenians, 
when they were at war with the Aeginetans and 
were also expecting the Barbarians, 1 built their fleet, 
at the instance of Themistocles — the very ships 
with which they fought at Salamis. And these 
vessels were still without decks throughout their 

XV. Such were the navies of the Hellenes, both 
those of early and those of later times ; nevertheless 
those who gave attention to such matters acquired 
not a little strength by reason both of revenue of 
money and of sway over others. For they — and 
especially the peoples whose own territory was insuffi- 
cient — made expeditions against the islands and sub- 
jugated them. But by land no wars arose from which 
any considerable accession of power resulted ; on the 
contrary, all that did occur were border wars with 
their several neighbours, and foreign expeditions far 
from their own country for the subjugation of others 
were not undertaken by the Hellenes. For they 
had not yet been brought into union as subjects of 
the most powerful states, nor, on the other hand, 
did they of their own accord make expeditions in 
common as equal allies ; it was rather against one 
another that the neighbouring peoples severally 
made war. But it was chiefly in the war that arose 
a long time ago between the Chalcidians and the 
Eretrians, 2 that all the rest of Hellas took sides in 
alliance with the one side or the other. 

a The war for the Lelantine Plain (cf. Hdt. v. xcix. ; Strabo, 
x. i. 11) ; usually placed in the seventh century, but by 
Curtius in the eighth (see Htrmvs> x. pp. 220 ffl). 



XVI. *Επεγενετο δε αΧλοις τε άλλοθι κωλύ- 
ματα μη αύξηθΡ]ναι, και "Ιωσι προγωρησάντων 
επ\ μέγα των πραγμάτων Κΰρος καϊ η Ώερσικη 
εξουσία Κροΐσον καθ έλουσα καϊ οσα εντός" Αλυος 
ποταμού προς θάλασσαν, επεστράτευσε καϊ τας 
iv τη ήπείρω πόλεις εδούλωσε, Δαρείος τβ ύστερον 
τω Φοινίκων ναυτικω κρατών καϊ τας νήσους. 

XVII. Τύραννοι τε δσοι ήσαν iv ταΐς *Έλληνι- 
καις πόλεσι, το εφ* εαυτών μόνον προορωμενοι ες 
τ ε το σώμα καϊ ες το τον ίδιον οίκον αύξειν δι 
άσφαΧείας όσον εδύναντο μάλιστα τας πόΧεις 
ωκουν, επράγβη τε ουδέν απ αυτών έργον άξιο- 
Xoyov, el μη εϊ τι προς περιοίκους τους αυτών 
εκάστοις. 1 οΰτω πανταχόθεν η 'Ελλάς επι ποΧύν 
χρόνον κατείγετο μήτε κοινή φανερον μηδέν κατ- 
εργάζεσθαι, κατά πόΧεις τε ατολμότερα είναι. 

XVIII. Έπειδη δβ ο! τε 'Αθηναίων τύραννοι 

καϊ οι εκ της αΧΧης 'Ελλάδος επί ποΧυ καϊ πρϊν 

τυραννευθείσης οι πΧεΐστοι καϊ τελευταίοι πλην 

των εν Σικελία υπό Αακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν 

ή jap Λακεδαίμων μετά την κτίσιν τών νυν 

ενοικούντων αυτήν 2 Αωριών επι πλείστον ων 

ϊσμεν γρόνον στασιάσασα όμως εκ παλαιτάτου 

καϊ ηύνομηθη καϊ αίεΐ άτυράννευτος ην ετη yap 

1 After εκάστοις theMSS. have oi yap ir Σικελία ίπ\ πλείστον 
4χώρ-ησαν Βυνάμ€ω$, for those in Sicily advanced to a very 
great degree of power, which Wex deletes, followed by most 
editors. 2 Hude omits with E. 


BOOK I. xvi.-xviii. ι 

XVI. But different Hellenic peoples in different 
localities met with obstacles to their continuous 
growth ; for example, after the Ionians had attained 
great prosperity, Cyrus and the Persian empire, after 
subduing Croesus l and all the territory between the 
river Halys and the sea, made war against them and 
enslaved the cities on the mainland, and later on 
Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician 
fleet, enslaved the islands also. 2 

XVII. The tyrants, moreover — whenever there 
were tyrants in the Hellenic cities — since they had 
regard for their own interests only,both as to the safety 
of their own persons and as to the aggrandizement 
of their own families, in the administration of their 
cities made security, so far as they possibly could, 
their chief aim, and so no achievement worthy ot 
mention was accomplished by them, except per- 
chance by individuals in conflict with their own 
neighbours. So on all sides Hellas was for a long 
time kept from carrying out in common any notable 
undertaking, and also its several states from being 
more enterprising. 

XVIII. But finally the tyrants, not only of Athens 
but also of the rest of Hellas (which, for a long time 
before Athens, had been dominated by tyrants) — at 
least most of them and the last that ever ruled, 
if we except those in Sicily — were put down by the 
Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after 
the settlement there of the Dorians who now inhabit 
it, was, for the longest period of all the places of 
which we know, in a state of sedition, still it obtained 
good laws at an earlier time than any other land, 
and has always been free from tyrants ; for the 

1 546 b. α 2 493 b.c. 



εστί μάΧιστα τετρακόσια καϊ ολίγω πΧείω ες την 
τεΧευτην τούδε του ποΧέμου, αφ' ου Αακεδαι- 
μόνιοι τι} αύττ) ποΧιτεια χρώνταΐ' καϊ δι αύτο 
δυνάμενοι κα\ τα εν ταΐς αΧΧαις πόΧεσι καθίστα- 
σαν. μετά δε την των τυράννων κατάλυσιν εκ 
της *Έ,ΧΧάδος ου ποΧΧοΐς ετεσιν ύστερον καϊ η iv 
Μαραθώνι μά%η Μ^δωζ; προς Αθηναίους iyeveTO. 

2 δεκάτω δε ετει μετ αυτήν αύθις 6 βάρβαρος τω 
με^άΧω στόΧω επί την 'ΕΧΧάδα δουΧωσόμενος 
ήΧθεν. καϊ με Γ γάΧου κινδύνου επικρεμασθεντος 
οϊ τε Αακεδαιμόνιοι των ξυμποΧεμησάντων Έλ- 
Χηνων ηηησαντο δυνάμει προύχοντες, καϊ οι ' Αθη- 
ναίοι επ ιόντων των Ήίηδων διανοηθεντες εκΧιπεϊν 
την πόΧιν καϊ άνασκευασάμενοι ες τάς ναϋς 
εσβάντες ναυτικοί iyivovTO. κοινή τε άπωσά- 
μενοι τον βάρβαρον ύστερον ου ποΧΧω διεκρίθη- 
σαν ττρός τε 'Αθηναίους καϊ Αακεδαιμονίους οϊ τε 
άττοστάντες βασιΧεως "ΕΧΧηνες και οι ξυμποΧε- 
μήσαντες* δυνάμει yap ταύτα μ^ιστα διεφάνη' 

3 Χσγυον yap οι μεν κατά yrjv, οι δε ναυσίν. καϊ 
oXiyov μεν χρόνον ξυνέμεινεν ή ομαιχμία, έπειτα 
διενβχθέντες οι Αακεδαιμόνιοι καϊ οί 'Αθηναίοι 
εποΧεμησαν μετά των ξυμμάχων προς άΧΧηΧους, 
καϊ των άΧλων ΈΐΚΚηνων εϊ τίνες που διασταΐεν, 
προς τούτους ηδη εγωρουν. ώστε άπο των Μηδι- 
κών ες τόνδε αίει τον πόΧεμον τα μεν σπενδόμενοι. 

1 The legislation of Lycurgus, thus placed by Thucydidee 
at four hundred years or more before 404 B.C., would be about 
804 B.C. (Eratosthenes gives 884). 


BOOK I. xvm. 1-3 

period during which the Lacedaemonians have been 
enjoying the same constitution l covers about four 
hundred years or a little more down to the end of 
the Peloponnesian war. And it is for this reason 
that they became powerful and regulated the affairs 
of other states as well. Not many years after the 
overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas by the Lace- 
daemonians the battle of Marathon 2 was fought 
between the Athenians and the Persians ; and ten 
years after that the Barbarian came again with his 
great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face 
of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedae- 
monians, because they were the most powerful, 
assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined 
in the war ; and the Athenians, when the Persians 
came on, resolved to abandon their city, and pack- 
ing up their goods embarked on their ships, and 
so became sailors. By a common effort the Bar- 
barian was repelled ; but not long afterwards the 
other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from 
the King and those who had joined the first con- 
federacy against him, parted company and aligned 
themselves with either the Athenians or the Lace- 
daemonians ; for these states had shown themselves 
the most powerful, the one strong by land and the 
other on the sea. The defensive alliance lasted only 
a little while ; then the Lacedaemonians and the 
Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective 
allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest 
of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance, 
from now on resorted to one or the other. So that 
from the Persian invasion continually, to this present 
war, making peace at one time, at another time 

a 490 b.o. 



τα δε ποΧεμοΰντες η άΧΧηΧοις η τοις εαυτών 
ζυμμάχοις άφισταμενοις ευ παρεσ κευάσαντο τα 
ποΧεμια καϊ εμπειρότεροι lykvovTO μετά κινδύνων 
τας μεΧετας ποιούμενοι. 

XIX. Kat οι μεν Αακεδαιμόνιοι ούχ υποτελείς 
έχοντες φόρου τους ζυ μμάχους τζούντο, κατ όΧι- 
yapxiav δε σφίσιν αύτοΐς μόνον επιτηδείως 6πω% 
ποΧιτεύσουσι θεραττεύοντες, 'Αθηναίοι δε ναΰς τ€ 
των πόΧεων τω χρόνω παραΧαβόντες, πΧην Χίωυ 
καϊ Αεσβίων, καϊ χρήματα τοις πασι τάξαντες 
φέρειν. καϊ ε^ενετο αύτοΐς ες τόνδε τον πόΧεμον 
ή Ιδία παρασκευή μείζων ή ώς τα κράτιστά ποτέ 
μετά ακραιφνούς της ξυμμαχίας ήνθησαν. 

XX. Τά μεν ουν παΧαια τοιαύτα ηΰρον, χαΧεπά 
οντά παντϊ εξής τεκμηρίω πιστεΰσαι. οι yap 
άνθρωποι τας άκοας των πρoyεyεvημεvωv > καϊ ην 
επιχώρια σφίσιν fj, ομοίως άβασανίστως παρ 

2 άΧΧήΧων δέχονται. Αθηναίων yodv το πΧήθος 
"Ιππαρχον οϊονται ύφ' 'Αρμοδίου καϊ 'Apιστoyεί- 
τονος τύραννον όντα άποθανεΐν και ουκ ΐσασιν 
οτι 'Ιππίας μεν πρεσβύτατος ων ηρχε των ΤΙεισι- 
στρατού υίέων,' Ίππαρχος δε καϊ Θεσσαλό? άδεΧ- 
φο\ ήσαν αυτού, ύποτοπήσαντες δε τι εκείνρ ττ) 
ήμερα καϊ παραχρήμα 'Αρμόδιος καϊ *Apwroyei- 
των εκ των ζυνειδότων σφίσιν Ιππία μεμηνΰσθαι, 

1 cf. νι. lxxxv. 2 ; νιι. lvii. 4. 

1 Lost its independence after the revolt of 427 B.C. 
cf. in. L * i.e. as if they took place in some distant land. 


BOOK I. xviii. 3-xx. 2 

fighting with each other or with their own revolted 
allies, these two states prepared themselves well in 
matters of war, and became more experienced, 
taking their training amid actual dangers. 

XIX. The Lacedaemonians maintained their hege- 
mony without keeping their allies tributary to them, 
but took care that these should have an oligarchical 
form of government conformably to the sole interest 
of Sparta ; the Athenians, on the other hand, main- 
tained theirs by taking over in course of time the 
ships of the allied cities, with the exception of 
Chios l and Lesbos,' 2 and by imposing on them all a 
tax of money. And so the individual resources of 
the Athenians available for this war became greater 
than those of themselves and their allies when that 
alliance was still unimpaired and strongest. 

XX. Now the state of affairs in early times I 
have found to have been such as I have described, 
although it is difficult in such matters to credit 
any and every piece of testimony. For men accept 
from one another hearsay reports of former events, 
neglecting to test them just the same, 3 even though 
these events belong to the history of their own 
country. Take the Athenians, for example ; most of 
them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he 
was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton. 4 They 
do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of 
the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that 
Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers ; 
further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspect- 
ing, on that very day and at the very moment of 
executing their plan, that information had been con- 
veyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators, 

* 514 B.C. On this digression, c/. Hdt. v. lv. ; VI. cxxiii. ; 
Arist. Ά0. Πολ. 17 £. 



του μεν άπεσχοντο ώς προειδότος, βουΧόμενοι Si 
πρίν ξυΧΧηφθήναι Βράσαντες τι καϊ κινδύνευσαν, 
τω Ίππάρχω περιτυχόντες παρά το Αεωκόρειον 
καΧούμενον την Τί αν αθηναϊκή ν πομπην διάκο- 

3 σμουντι άπέκτειναν. ποΧλά δε κα\ ά\\α ετι καϊ 
νυν οντά καϊ ου χρόνω άμνηστουμενα καϊ οι 
αΧΧοι "ΕΧΧηνες ουκ ορθώς οΐονται, ώσπερ τους 
τε Αακεδαιμονίων βασιΧεας μη μια ψηφώ προσ- 
τίθεσθαι εκάτερον, άλλα δυοΐν, καϊ τον ΤΙιτανάτην 
Χόχον αύτοΐς είναι, ος ουδ' εγενετο πώποτε. οΰτως 
άταΧαίπωρος τοις ποΧΧοΐς η ζητησις της αλη- 
θείας καϊ επί τα έτοιμα μάΧΧον τρέπονται. 

XXI. Έ /c δε των είρημενων τεκμηρίων όμως 
τοιαύτα αν τις νομίζων μάΧιστα α διήΧθον ούχ 
άμαρτάΐΌΐ, καϊ ούτε ώς ποιηταϊ ύμνήκασι περί 
αυτών επί το μείζον κοσμουντες μάΧΧον πιστεύων, 
οΰτε ώς Χορογράφοι ζυνεθεσαν επί το προσαγω- 
γότερον ttj ακροάσει η άΧηθεστερον, οντά άνεξε- 
Χεγκτα καϊ τα πόΧΧα υπο χρόνου αυτών άπίστως 
επί το μυθώδες εκνενικηκότα, ηυρήσθαι δε ήγησά- 
μενος εκ τών επιφανέστατων σημείων ώς παΧαιά 

2 είναι άποχρώντως. καί 6 πόΧεμος ούτος, καίπερ 

1 In the inner Ceramicus near the temple of Apollo 

2 Herodotus is doubtless one of the Hellenes here criti- 
cised, cf. vi. lvii., referring to the two votes; ix. liii., 
where he seems to have applied a term belonging to a deme 
{cf. Hdt. in. lv.) to a division of the army. 


BOOK I. xx. 2-xxi. 2 

held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do 
something before they were seized and then take 
their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was mar- 
shalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanc- 
tuary called Leocorium, 1 and killed him. There 
are many other matters, too, belonging to the 
present and not forgotten through lapse of time, 
regarding which the other Hellenes 2 as well hold 
mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon 
the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that 
the Lacedaemonians have the " Pitana company " in 
their army, which never at any time existed. So 
averse to taking pains are most men in the search 
for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what 
lies ready at hand. 

XXI. Still, from the evidence that has been given, 
any one would not err who should hold the view 
that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty 
nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater 
credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which 
the poets have put into song, adorning and amplify- 
ing their theme, and, on the other, which the 
chroniclers have composed with a view rather of 
pleasing the ear 3 than of telling the truth, since 
their stories cannot be tested and most of them 
have from lapse of time won their way into the 
region of the fabulous so as to be incredible. He 
should regard the facts as having been made out 
with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest 
indications, considering that they have to do with 
early times. And so, even though men are always 

1 Public recitation was the ordinary mode of getting 
the works of the poets and early logographers before the 



τών ανθρώπων iv ω μίν αν ποΧεμώσι τον παρόντα 
alel μεηιστον κρινόντων, παυσαμένων δε τά αρ- 
χαία μαΧΧον θανμαζόντων, απ* αυτών των έρ- 
γων σκοπουσι δηΧώσει δ/χω? μείζων γεγενημενος 


XXII. Καϊ οσα μεν λόγω είπον έκαστοι η μεΧ- 
Χοντες ποΧεμήσειν ή εν αύτώ ήδη οντες, χαΧεπον 
την άκρίβειαν αυτήν των Χεχθέντων δια μνημόνευ- 
σαν ην εμοϊ τε ων αυτός ήκουσα καϊ τοις αΧΧοθεν 
πόθεν εμοϊ άπαγγέΧΧουσιν ώς δ' αν εδόκουν μοι 
έκαστοι περί των αΙε\ παρόντων τα δέοντα μάΧιστ 
είπεΐν, εχομενω οτι εγγύτατα της ξυμπάσης ηνώ- 
Ί μης των αληθώς Χεχθέντων, οΰτως εϊρηται' τά 
δ' e' /ογα τών πραχθέντων εν τω ποΧέμγ ουκ εκ 
του παρατυχόντος πυνθανομενος ήξιωσα γράφειν 
ούδ' ώς εμοϊ εδόκει, άΧΧ οϊς τε αυτός παρήν καϊ 
πάρα τών αΧΧων όσον δυνατόν ακρίβεια περί 

3 εκάστου επεξεΧθών. επιπόνως δε ηυρίσκετο, διότι 
οι παρόντες τοις εργοις εκάστοις ου ταύτα περί 
τών αυτών εΧεηον, άΧΧ ώς εκατερων τις εύνοιας 

4 ή μνήμης εχοι. καϊ ες μεν άκρόασιν ϊσως το 
μη μυθώδες αυτών άτερπεστερον φανεΐται* όσοι 


BOOK I. xxi. 2-xxii. 4 

inclined, while they are engaged in a war, to judge 
the present one the greatest, but when it is over 
to regard ancient events with greater wonder, yet 
this war will prove, for men who judge from the 
actual facts, to have been more important than any 
that went before. 

XXII. As to the speeches that were made by 
different men, either when they were about to begin 
the war or when they were already engaged therein, 
it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy 
the words actually spoken, both for me as regards 
that which 1 myself heard, and for those who 
from various other sources have brought me re- 
ports. Therefore the speeches are given in the 
language in which, as it seemed to me, the several 
speakers would express, on the subjects under con- 
sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occa- 
sion, though at the same time I have adhered as 
closely as possible to the general sense of what 
was actually said. But as to the facts of the 
occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty 
to give them, not as ascertained from any chance 
informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only 
after investigating with the greatest possible ac- 
curacy each detail, in the case both of the events in 
which I myself participated and of those regarding 
which I got my information from others. And the en- 
deavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, 
because those who were eye-witnesses of the several 
events did not give the same reports about the same 
things, but reports varying according to their cham- 
pionship of one side or the other, or according to 
their recollection. And it may well be that the 
absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem 



δε βουΧήσονται των τε γενομένων το σαφές 
σκοπεΐν καϊ των μεΧΧόντων ποτέ αύθις κατά το 
άνθρώπινον τοιούτων καϊ παραπΧησίων εσεσθαι, 
ώφέΧιμα κρίνειν αυτά αρκούντως εξει. κτήμα 
τε 69 alel μάΧΧον ή αγώνισμα ες το παραχρήμα 
άκούειν ξύγκειται. 

ΧΧΤΙΙ. Των δε πρότερον έργων μέγιστον επρά- 
χθη το Μηδικόν, καϊ τούτο όμως δυοΐν ναυ μαχίαιν 
καϊ πεζομαχίαιν ταχεΐαν την κρίσιν εσχεν. τού- 
του δε του ποΧέμου μήκος τβ μέγα προύβη, 
παθήματα τε ξυνηνέχθη γενέσθαι iv αύτω τή 

2 Έλλαδί οία ούχ έτερα iv ϊσω χρόνω. ούτε yap 
πόΧεις τοσαίδε Χηφθεϊσαι ήρημώθησαν, αϊ μεν 
υπό βαρβάρων, αϊ δ' υπό σφών αυτών άντιποΧε- 
μούντων (είσϊ δ' at καϊ οΐκήτορας μετεβαΧον 
άΧισκόμεναι), ούτε φυγαϊ τοσαίδε ανθρώπων κα\ 
φόνος, 6 μεν κατ αυτόν τον πόΧεμον, 6 δβ διά το 

3 στασιάζειν. τα τε πρότερον ακοή μεν Χεγόμενα, 
έργω δε σπανιώτερον βεβαιούμενα ουκ άπιστα 
κατέστη, σεισμών τε περί, οΐ επϊ πΧεϊστον άμα 
μέρος γής καϊ Ισχυρότατοι οι αύτοϊ επέσχον, 
ήΧίου τε εκΧείψεις, αΐ πυκνότεραι παρά τα εκ του 
πρϊν χρόνου μνημονευόμενα ξυνέβησαν, αύχμοί τε 
εστί παρ' οΐς μεγάΧοι καϊ απ* αυτών καϊ Χιμοϊ 

1 Artemisium and Salamis. 

a Thermopylae and Plataca. 

1 As Colophon (in. xxxiv.), Mycaleesus (vn. xxix.). 


BOOK I. xxii. 4-XX111. 3 

less pleasing to the ear ; but whoever shall wish to 
have a clear view both of the events which have 
happened and of those which will some day, in all 
human probability, happen again in the same or a 
similar way — for these to adjudge my history profit- 
able will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has 
been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for 
the moment, but as a possession for all time. 

XXIII. The greatest achievement of former times 
was the Persian war, and yet this was quickly 
decided in two sea-fights 1 and two land-battles. 2 
But the Peloponnesian war was protracted to a 
great length, and in the course of it disasters be- 
fell Hellas the like of which had never occurred 
in any equal space of time. Never had so many 
cities been taken and left desolate, some by the 
Barbarians, 3 and others by Hellenes 4 themselves 
warring against one another; while several, after 
their capture, underwent a change of inhabitants. 6 
Never had so many human beings been exiled, or 
so much human blood been shed, whether in the 
course of the war itself or as the result of civil 
dissensions. And so the stories of former times, 
handed down by oral tradition, but very rarely 
confirmed by fact, ceased to be incredible : about 
earthquakes, for instance, for they prevailed over a 
very large part of the earth and were likewise of 
the greatest violence ; eclipses of the sun, which 
occurred at more frequent intervals than we find 
recorded of all former times ; great droughts also in 
some quarters with resultant famines ; and lastly — 

* e.g. Plataea (ill. lxviii. 3), Thyrea (iv. lvii.). 

* e.g. Sollium (11. xxx.), Potidaea (11. lxx.), Anactorium 
(iv. xlix.), Scione (v. xxxii.), Melos (v. cxvi.). 

▼OU L 



και η ονχ ηκιστα βΧάψασα και μέρος τι φθείρασα 
η λοιμώδης νόσος* ταύτα jap πάντα μετά τούδε 

4 τον ποΧεμον άμα ζννεπέθετο. ηρξαντο δε αυτού 
* Αθηναίοι καϊ ΠεΧοποννησιοι Χνσαντες τάς τρια- 
κοντοντεις σποιδάς at αντοΐς iyivovTO μετά Ευ- 

5 βοίας άΧωσιν. δι δ τι δ' εΧνσαν, τάς αιτίας 
πρού Γ γραψα πρώτον καϊ τάς διαφοράς, τον μη 
τίνα ζητήσαί ποτέ εξ οτον τοσούτος πόΧεμος τοις 

6 "ΕΧΧησι κατέστη, την μεν yap άΧηθεστάτην 
πρόφασιν, άφανεστάτην δε λόγω τονς 'Αθηναίους 
ηγούμαι με^άΧονς ηιηνομενονς και φόβον παρέ- 
χοντας τοις Αακεδαιμονίοις αναηκάσαι ες το πο- 
Χεμεΐν αϊ δ' ες το φανερον Χεηόμεναι αίτίαι αΐδ' 
ήσαν έκατέρων, άφ? ων Χνσαντες τάς σπονδάς ες 
τον πόΧεμον κατέστησαν. 

XXIV. Έπίδαμνός εστί πόΧις εν δεξιά εσπΧέ- 
οντι τον Ίόνιον κόΧπον προσοικούσι δ' αντην 

2 ΎανΧάντιοι βάρβαροι, ΊΧΧνρικον έθνος, τ αντην 
άπωκισαν μεν Κερκνραΐοι, οικιστής δ' εγένετο 
ΦαΧίος ΈρατοκΧείδον, Κορίνθιος ηένος, των αφ' 
ΉρακΧεονς, κατά δη τον παΧαιον νόμον εκ της 
μητροπόλεως κατακΧηθείς. ζννωκισαν δε καϊ 
Κορινθίων τίνες καϊ τον αΧΧον Δωρικού ηένονς. 

3 προεΧθόντος δε τού χρόνον ε Γ /ένετο ή τών Έπι- 
δαμνίων δνναμις με^άΧη κα\ ποΧνάνθ ρωπος. 

4 στασιάσαντες δε εν άΧΧηΧοις ετη ποΧΧά, ώς 
λέγεται, άπο ποΧεμον τίνος τών προσοίκων βαρ- 
βάρων εφθάρησαν καϊ της δννάμεω? της ποΧΧής 

6 εστερηθησαν. τά δε τεΧενταΐα προ τούδε τού 
ποΧεμον 6 δήμος αυτών εξεδίωξς τονς δυνατούς, 
οι δε έπεΧθόντες μετά τών βαρβάρων εΧήζοντο 


To /ace page 43. 

Wm. Heinemann, Ltd. 

Edward Start ford Ltd., London 

BOOK I. xxiii. 3-xxiv. 5 

the disaster which wrought most harm to Hellas and 
destroyed a considerable part of the people — the 
noisome pestilence. For all these disasters fell upon 
them simultaneously with this war. And the war 
began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke 
the thirty years* truce, 1 concluded between them 
after the capture of Euboea. The reasons why they 
broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first 
set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for 
what cause the Hellenes became involved in so great 
a war. The truest explanation, although it has been 
the least often advanced, I believe to have been 
the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which 
brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced 
them to Avar. But the reasons publicly alleged on 
either side which led them to break the truce and 
involved them in the war were as follows. 

XXIV. There is a city called Epidamnus on the 
right hand as one sails into the Ionian gulf, and its 
next-door neighbours are a barbarian tribe, the Tau- 
lantians, of Illyrian race. The city was colonized 
by the Corcyraeans, and its founder was Phalius, son 
of Eratocleides, of Corinthian stock and a descendant 
of Heracles, who was invited from the mother-city 
according to the ancient custom ; but some Corinth- 
ians and other Dorians joined the Corcyraeans in 
establishing the colony. As time passed the city of 
the Epidamnians became great and populous ; but 
civil wars ensued, lasting, it is said, for many years, 
and in consequence of a war with the neighbouring 
barbarians they were crippled and stripped of most 
of their power. Finally, just before the Peloponne- 
sian war, the populace expelled the aristocrats, and 
they, making common cause with the barbarians and 

1 445 B.C.; cf. ch. cxt. L 



τους εν rrj πόΧει κατά τε ηην teal κατά θάΧασ- 

6 σαν. ol Be εν rfj πόΧει οντες *Έ*πιΒάμνιοι 
€7Τ€ίΒη επιέζοντο, πέμπουσιν ες την Κέρκυραν 
πρέσβεις ώς μητρόποΧιν ουσαν, Βεόμενοι μη σφάς 
περιοράν φθειρομένους, αλλά του? τε φεύγοντας 
ξυναΧΧάξαι σφίσι καΧ τον των βαρβάρων ττό- 

7 Χεμον καταΧυσαι. ταύτα he ίκέται καθεζόμενοι 
ες το f/ Hpaiov εΒέοντο. ol Be Κερκυραίοι την ίκε- 
Teiav ουκ εΒεξαντο, άΧΧ\ άπρακτους απέπεμψαν. 

XXV. Γνόϊ>τ€9 Be οι 'ΚπιΒάμνιοι ούΒεμίαν 
σφισιν άπο Κερκύρας τιμωρίαν ουσαν εν άπόρω 
είχοντο θέσθαι το παρόν, καΧ πέμψαντες ες 
ΑεΧφούς τον θεον επηρώτων εΐ παραΒοΐεν Κορίν- 
θιο ις την πόΧιν ώς οίκισταΐς καΧ τιμωρίαν τίνα 
πειρωντ άπ αυτών ποιεϊσθαι. ο δ' αύτοΐς 
άνεϊΧε παραΒουναι καΧ ηγεμόνας ποιεϊσθαι. 

2 έΧθόντες Βε οι 'Έ*πι8άμνιοι ες την Κόρινθον κατά 
το μαντεΐον παρέΒοσαν την άποικίαν, τόν τε 
οικιστην άποΒεικνύντες σφών εκ Κορίνθου οντά 
καΧ το χρηστήριον ΒηΧοΰντες, εΒέοντό τε μη 
σφάς περιοράν φθειρομένους, άλλ' επαμΰναι. 

3 Κορίνθιοι Βε κατά τε το Βίκαιον υπεΒέξαντο την 
τιμωρίαν, νομίζοντες ούχ ησσον εαυτών είναι 
την άποικίαν τ) Κερκυραίων, άμα Be καΧ μισεί 
τών Κερκυραίων, οτι αυτών παρημεΧουν οντες 

4 άποικοι, ούτε yap εν πανηγύρεσι ταΐς κοιναΐς 
ΒιΒόντες γέρα τα νομιζόμενα ούτε Κορινθίω άνΒρι 

1 The κοινοί -navnyvp^is are the four great games, here 
doubtless referring especially to the Isthmian Games held at 
Corinth. The "privileges " would be places of honour 
(•κρο&ρίαΐ), animals for sacrifice presented by the colonies erf 


BOOK I. xxiv. 5-xxv. 4 

attacking Epidamnus, plundered those who were in the 
city both by land and sea. These, when they were 
being hard pressed, sent envoys to Corey ra, as being 
their mother-city, begging them not to look on and 
see them destroyed, but to reconcile them with 
the exiles and to put a stop to the war with the 
barbarians. This petition they made, sitting as 
suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corey- 
raeans denied their supplication, and sent them 
back unsuccessful. 

XXV. The Epidamnians, recognizing that no aid 
was to be had from Corcyra, were at a loss how to 
settle their present difficulty ; so they sent to Delphi 
and asked the god whether they should deliver up 
their city to the Corinthians as founders and try to 
procure some aid from them. The god answered that 
they should deliver it up to them and make them 
leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and 435 b.c 
delivered up the city as a Corinthian colony, in 
accordance with the oracle, showing that their founder 
was from Corinth and stating the response of the 
oracle ; and they begged the Corinthians not to look 
on and see them utterly destroyed, but to come to 
their rescue. The Corinthians undertook the task, 
partly on the ground of right, because they con- 
sidered that the colony belonged to them quite as 
much as to the Corey raeans, partly also through hatred 
of the Corcyraeans, for the reason that these, though 
Corinthian colonists, neglected the mother-city. For 
neither at their common festival gatherings l would 
they concede the customary privileges to Corinthians, 
nor would they begin with a representative of 

the mother-city, sending of delegates (θεωροί) to Corinthian 
festivals, etc. 



π ροκαταρχόμενοι των ιερών, ώσπερ αϊ αΧΧαι 
άποικίαι, περιφρονούντες δε αυτούς καν χρημά- 
των δυνάμει οντες κατ εκείνον τον χρονον όμοια 
τοις 'ΚΧΧήνων πΧουσιωτάτοις και τη ες πόΧεμον 
παρασκευή δυνατώτεροι, ναυτικώ δε και ποΧύ 
προύχειν εστίν οτε επαιρόμενοι καϊ κατά την 
Φαιάκων προενοίκησιν της Κερκύρας κλέος εχόν- 
των τα περί τάς ναΰς* fj καϊ μάΧΧον έξηρτύοντο 
το ναυτικον καϊ ήσαν ουκ αδύνατοι/ τριήρεις yap 
είκοσι καϊ εκατόν ύπήρχον αύτοΐς οτε ηρχοντο 

XXVI. ΤΙάντων οΰν τούτων εηκΧήματα έχον- 
τες οι Κορίνθιοι επεμπον ες την Έπίδαμνον 
άσμενοι την ώφβΧίαν, οϊκητορά τε τον βουΧο- 
μενον ίεναι κεΧεύοντες και Άμπρακιωτών καϊ 

2 Λευκαδίων καϊ εαυτών φρουρούς, επορεύθησαν 
δε πεζή ες * ΑποΧΧωνίαν Κορινθίων ουσαν άποι- 
κίαν, δέει των Κερκυραίων μη κωΧύωνται υπ' 

3 αυτών κατά θάΧασσαν περαιούμενοι. Κερκυραίοι 
δε επειδή ησθοντο τους τε οίκητορας και φρου- 
ρούς ηκοντας ες την Έπίδαμνον την τε άποικίαν 
Κορινθίοις δεδομενην, εχαΧεπαινον καϊ πΧεύ- 
σαντες ευθύς πέντε καϊ είκοσι ναυσϊ καϊ ύστερον 
ετερω στόΧω τους τε φεύγοντας εκεΧευον κατ 
επήρειαν δεχεσθαι αυτούς (ήΧθον yap ες την 
Κέρκυραν οι τών Έπιδαμνίων φυyάδες τάφους τε 
άποδεικνύντες καϊ ξυyyέvειav, ην προϊσχόμενοι 
εδέοντο σφας κaτάyειv) τους τε φρουρούς ους 

1 According to the custom obtaining in Hellenic cities, 
whereby a stranger could offer sacrifice only through a 
citizen who acted for hln. -κ ροκα-τ αρχόμενοι, as the Schol. 
explains, 5<5oWes πρότερον {sc. ^ τοΓ$ άλλοΓϊ) τά* καταρχάί, i.e. 
giving the hair cut from the victim's forehead to a repre- 


BOOK I. xxv. 4-xxvi. 3 

Corinth the initial rites at sacrifices, 1 as the rest of 
the colonies did, but they treated them with contempt. 
For at that time they were in point of wealth equal 
to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation 
for war even stronger, while in sea-power they some- 
times boasted that they were greatly superior, just 
because of the former occupation of the island by 
the Phaeacians, 2 whose glory was in their ships. It 
was for this reason that they kept on developing 
their navy, and they were in fact powerful ; for they 
had on hand one hundred and twenty triremes when 
the war began. 

XXVI. So the Corinthians, having all these grounds 
of complaint, gladly sent the desired aid to Epidam- 
nus, inviting whoever wished to go along as settlers 
and despatching as a garrison some Ambraciots and 
Leucadians and a detachment of themselves. They 
proceeded to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians^ 
going by land through fear of the Corcyraeans, lest 
they might be prevented by them if they should at- 
tempt to cross the sea. But when the Corcyraeans 
perceived that the settlers and the garrison had 
arrived at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been 
given up to the Corinthians, they were indignant. So 
they sailed immediately with twenty-five ships, and 
later with a second fleet, and insolently bade the Epi- 
damnians dismiss the garrison sent by the Corinthians 
and the settlers, and also receive back their exiles; for 
the exiled Epidamnians had gone to Corcyra, and 
pointing to the sepulchres of common ancestors and 

sentative of Corinth, that he might throw it on the fire 

a cf. in. lxx., whftre a sacred precinct of Alcinous in Corcyra 
is mentioned. The ancient belief that Corcyra was the 
Homeric Scheria has no support in the Odyssey. 



Κορίνθιου έπεμψαν καΧ τους οίκητορας άποπεμ- 

4 πειν. οι Βε ΈπιΒάμνιοι ούΒεν αυτών υπηκουσαν, 
άλ,λά στρατεύουσιν eV αυτούς οι Κερκυραίοι 
τεσσαρακοντα ναυσϊ μετά των φυ^άΒων ώς 
κατάξοντες, καΧ τους *ΙΧΧυριούς προσΧαβόντες. 

5 προσκαθεζόμενοι Βε την πόΧιν προεΐπον Έπί- 
Βαμνίων τε τον βουΧομζνον καΧ τους ξένους απα- 
θείς άπιέναι• εΐ Βε μη, ώς ποΧεμίοις χρήσεσθαι. 
ώς δ* ουκ επείθοντο, οι μεν Κερκυραίοι (εστί δ' 
ισθμός το χωρίον) εποΧωρκουν την πόΧιν. 

XXVII. Κορίνθιοι Β\ ώς αύτοΐς εκ της Έπι- 
Βάμνου ηΧθον ά^εΧοι οτι ποΧιορκούνται, παρε- 
σκευαζοντο στρατείαν, και αμα άποικίαν ες την 
'Ι&πίΒαμνον εκηρυσσον επΧ ττ} ϊστ} καΧ ομοία τον 
βουΧόμενον ίεναι* ει δε τ*9 τό παραυτίκα μεν 
μη εθέΧει ξυμπΧεΐν, μετέχειν Be βούΧεται της 
αποικίας, πεντήκοντα Βραχμάς καταθεντα Κοριν- 
θίας μενειν. ήσαν Βε καΧ οι πΧέοντες ποΧΧοΧ 
2 καΧ οι ταρηύριον καταβάΧΧοντες. εοεήθησαν Βε 
καΧ των ^Λεηαρεων ναυσι σφας ξυμπροπέμψαι, 
εί άρα κωΧυοιντο υπο Κερκυραίων πΧεΐν οι Βε 
παρεσκευάζοντο αύτοΐς οκτώ ναυσι ζυμπΧεϊν, 
και ΙΙαΧής ΚεφαΧΧηνων τεσσαρσιν. καΧ Έπέ- 
Βαυρίων εΒεήθησαν, οι παρέσχον πέντε, Ερμιόνης 
Βε μίαν καΧ Ύροιζηνιοι Βύο, ΑευκάΒιοι Βε Βέκα καΧ 
*Κμπρακιώται οκτώ. ®ηβαίους Βε χρήματα τ}τη- 
σαν καΧ ΦΧειασίους, ΉΧείους Be ναϋς τε κενας 

4 8 

BOOK Ι. χχνι. 3-xxvii. 2 

invoking the tie of kinship had begged the Corcy- 
raeans to restore them. As the Epidamnians paid no 
heed to them the Corcyraeans proceeded against them 
with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom 
they intended to restore, and taking along the Il- 
ly rians also. And sitting down before the city they 
proclaimed that the foreigners and any Epidamnians 
who wished might go away in safety ; otherwise they 
would treat them as enemies. But when the Epidam- 
nians would not comply, the Corcyraeans laid siege to 
the city, which is connected with the shore by an 

XXVII. But the Corinthians, when messengers 
came from Epidamnus announcing the siege, pre- 
pared an expedition and proclaimed at the same 
time a colony to Epidamnus, saying that any who 
wished might go there on a basis of equal rights for 
all, and that if anyone was not inclined to sail at 
once, but wished to have part in the colony, he 
might make a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae l 
and remain at home. The number that sailed was 
large, as also of those who deposited the money. 
Request was also made of the Megarians to convoy 
them with ships, in case an attempt should be made 
by the Corcyraeans to prevent their sailing; and 
these were preparing to accompany them with eight 
ships, and the Paleans, from Cephallenia, with four. 
The Epidaurians, of whom a like request was made, 
furnished five ships, the Hermionians one, the Troe- 
zenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots 
eight. Upon the Thebans and the Phliasians a 
demand was made for money, and upon the Eleans 

1 The Corinthian drachma was about equivalent to Qd. t 
but of course had greater purchasing power. The Attic 
drachma = 9|ci. 



καΧ χρήματα, αυτών δε Κορινθίων νήες πάρε- 
σκευάζοντο τριάκοντα καΧ τρισχίΧιοι όπΧΐται. 

XXVIII. *Έ*πειδη δε επύθοντο οι Κερκυραίοι 
την παρασκευήν, εΧθόντες ες Κορινθον μετά 
Αακεδαιμονίων καϊ ^ικυωνίων πρέσβεων, ους 
παρέΧαβον, εκέΧευον "Κορινθίους τους iv Έπίδα- 
μνω φρουρούς τ€ καϊ οίκήτορας άπάηειν, ως ου 

2 μετον αύτοΐς 'Επιδάμνου. el δε τι αντιποιούνται, 
δίκας ήθεΧον δούναι iv ΤΙεΧοποννήσω πάρα πο- 
Χεσιν αις αν αμφότεροι ξυμβωσιν όποτέρων δ' 
αν δικασθτ} είναι την άποικίαν, τούτους κρατεΐν* 
ηθεΧον δε καΧ τω iv ΔεΧφοΐς μαντείω επιτρέψαι. 

3 ποΧεμον δε ουκ, εϊων ποιεΐν el δε μή, καΧ αύτοΧ 
άναηκασθήσεσθαι εφασαν, εκείνων βιαζο μένων, 
φίΧους ποιεΐσθαι ους ου βούΧονται, ετέρους των 

4 νυν όντων μαΧΧον, ώφελίας ένεκα, οι 8ε Κορίν- 
θιοι άπεκρίναντο αύτοΐς, ην τάς τε ναΰς καΧ τους 
βαρβάρους άπο Έπιδάμνου άπαηάηωσι, βουΧεύ- 
σεσθαι* προτερον δ' ού καΧως εγειν τους μεν 

5 ποΧιορκεΐσθαι, εαυτούς 8ε δικάζεσθαι. Κερκυ- 
ραίοι δε άντεΧεηον, ην καΧ εκείνοι τους εν *Επιδά~ 
μνω άπαηά^ωσι, ποιήσειν ταύτα• έτοιμοι δε 
είναι καΧ ώστε αμφότερους μενειν κατά γωραν 
σπονδας δε ι ποιήσασθαι εως αν η δίκη ηενηται. 

1 Hude deletes 5e, after Poppo. 

1 A threat of an alliance with the Athenians, τών νυν 
ίντων referring to the Lacedaemonians and other Pelopon- 
nesians, not to the Illyrians (cf. ch. xxvi. 7), as Poppo 


BOOK I. xxvii. 2-xxviii. 5 

for unmanned ships as well as for money. And the 
Corinthians themselves, for their part, made ready 
thirty ships and three thousand hoplites. 

XX VIII. When the Corey raeans learned of these 
preparations they went to Corinth, with Lacedae- 
monian and Sicyonian envoys whom they took with 
them, and bade the Corinthians withdraw the gar- 
rison and settlers at Epidamnus, on the ground that 
they had no part in Epidamnus. But if they made any 
claim to it they were willing, they said, to submit the 
matter for arbitration to any states in the Pelopon- 
nesus that both should agree upon, and to whichever 
party the colony should be adjudged to belong, these 
should have it ; and they were willing also to submit 
the matter to the oracle at Delphi. War, however, 
they warned them not to bring on ; but if it must be, 
they too would be compelled, if the Corinthians forced 
the issue, to make friends with those for whom they 
had no wish, others beyond their present ones, in order 
to secure assistance. 1 The Corinthians answered that 
if the Corcyraeans would withdraw their ships and 
the barbarians from Epidamnus they would consider 
the matter, but that meanwhile it was not proper 
for them 2 to be discussing arbitration while the 
Epidamnians were undergoing siege. Whereupon 
the Corcyraeans replied that they would do this if 
the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their 
forces at Epidamnus ; but they were also ready to 
arbitrate on condition that both parties should re- 
main where they were and that they should make a 
truce until the decision should be given. 8 

2 i.e. the envoys and the Corinthians. 

8 Or, omitting δβ, "that they were also ready to make a 
truce until the decision should be given, on condition that 
both parties should remain where they were.' , 



XXIX. Κορίνθιοι δέ ούδεν τούτων ύπήκουον, 
αλλ' επειδή πΧηρεις αύτοΐς ήσαν αϊ νήες και οι 
ξύμμαχοι παρήσαν, προπέμψαντες κήρυκα πρό- 
τερον ποΧεμον προεροΰντα Κερκυραίοις, άραντες 
έβδομήκοντα νανσϊ και πέντε δισχιΧίοις τ€ οπΧί- 
ταις επΧεον επί την Έπίδαμνον, Κερκυραίοις 

2 εναντία ποΧεμησοντες• εστρατ^ει δε των μεν 
νέων * Αριστεύς 6 ΤΙεΧΧίχου και ΚάΧΧικράτης 6 
ΚαΧΧίου καϊ Ύιμάνωρ 6 Ύιμάνθους, του δε πεζού 
1 Αρχέτιμός Τ€ 6 Εύρυτίμου καϊ Ίσαρχίδας ο 

3 *\σ άρχου, επειδή δ' iyivovTO iv Άκτίω της 
Άνακτορίας 7779, ου το ιερόν του ' ΑπόΧΧωνός 
εστίν, επί τω στόματι του Κμττρακικού κόΧπου, 
οι Κερκυραίοι κήρυκα τε προύπεμψαν αύτοΐς εν 
άκατίω άπερούντα μη πΧειν επι σφας, καϊ τάς 
ναΰς άμα επΧηρουν, ζεύξαντές τε τάς παΧαιάς 
ώστε πΧωίμους είναι καϊ τάς άΧΧας επισκευά- 

4 σαντες. ως δε ο κήρυξ τε άπήγγειΧεν ούδεν 
ειρηναΐον παρά των Κορινθίων καϊ αϊ νήες αύτοΐς 
επεπΧήρωντο ουσαι οηΰοήκοντα (τεσσαράκοντα 
yap Έπίδαμνον εποΧιόρκουν), άντ αν ay ay 6 μεν ο ι 

5 καϊ παραταξάμενοι ε ναυμάχησαν* και ενίκησαν 
οι Κερκυραίοι πάρα ποΧυ καϊ ναΰς πέντε καϊ 
δέκα διέφθειραν των Κορινθίων, τη δε αύτη 
ημέρα αύτοις ξυνέβη καϊ τους την Έπίδαμνον 
ποΧιορκοΰντας παραστησασθαι όμoXoyίa ώστε 
τους μεν επήΧυδας άποδόσθαι, Κορινθίους δε 
δήσαντας εχειν εως αν αΧΧο τι δοξη. 

XXX. Μετά δε την ναυμαχίαν οι Κερκυραίοι 
τροπαΐον στησαντες επι τή Λευκίμνη της Κερ- 
κυραίας άκρωτηρίω τους μεν αΧΧους ους εΧαβον 


BOOK I. xxix. ι-χχχ. ι 

XXIX. The Corinthians, however, would not listen 
to any of these proposals, but, as soon as their ships 
were manned and their allies were at hand, they 

sent a herald in advance to declare war against the *34 b.o 
Corcyraeans ; then, setting off with seventy-five ships 
and two thousand hoplites, they sailed for Epidamnus 
to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their ships were 
under the command of Aristeus son of Pellichus, 
Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Ti- 
manthes; the infantry under that of Archetimus 
son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus. 
But when they reached Actium in the territory of 
Anactorium, where is the sanctuary of Apollo at the 
mouth of the Ambracian gulf, the Corcyraeans sent 
out a herald in a small boat to forbid their advance, 
and at the same time proceeded to man their ships, 
having previously strengthened the old vessels with 
cross-beams so as to make them seaworthy, and 
having put the rest in repair. When their herald 
brought back no message of peace from the Corin- 
thians and their ships were now fully manned, being 
eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidam- 
nus), they sailed out against the enemy and, drawing 
up in line, engaged in battle ; and they won a 
complete victory and destroyed fifteen ships of the 
Corinthians. On the same day it happened that 
their troops which were engaged in the siege of 
Epidamnus forced it to a capitulation, on condition 
that the other immigrants 1 should be sold into 
slavery but the Corinthians kept in bonds until 
something else should be agreed upon. 

XXX. After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans set up 
a trophy of their victory at Leucimne, a promontory 
in the territory of Corcyra, and put to death the 

1 i.e. the Ambraciote and Leucadians ; cf. ch. xxvi. 1. 



αίχβάλώτονς άπέκτειναν, Κορινθίους δε δήσαντες 

2 είχον. ύστερον δε, επειδή οι Κορίνθιοι κα\ οι 
ξύμμαχοι ήσσημένοι ταΐς ναυσϊν άνεχώρησαν eV 
οίκου, τής θαλάσσης άπάσης εκράτουν της κατ 
εκείνα τα χωρία οι Κερκυραίοι, καϊ πλεύσαντες 
ες Αευκάδα την Κορινθίων άποικίαν της *γής Ιτε- 
μον καϊ Κυλλήνην τό 'Ηλείων επίνειον ενέπρησαν, 

3 οτι ναΰς καϊ χρήματα παρέσχον Κορινθίοις. τον 
τε χρόνου τον πλείστον μετά την ναυμαχίαν 
επεκράτουν της θαλάσσης και τους των Κοριν- 
θίων ζυμμάχους επιπλέοντες εφθειρον, μέχρι ου 
Κορίνθιοι περιόντι τω θερει πέμψαντες ναΰς καϊ 
στρατιάν, έπεϊ σφών οι ξύμμαχοι επόνουν, εστρα- 
τοπεδεύοντο επϊ Άκτίω καϊ περί το Χειμέριον 
της ©εσπρωτίδος, φυλακής ένεκα της τε Αευκάδος 
καϊ των άλλων πόλεων οσαι σφίσι φίλιαι ήσαν. 

4 άντεστρατοπεδεύοντο δε καϊ οι Κερκυραίοι επϊ 
Tjj Αευκίμντ) ναυσί τε καϊ πεζω. επέπλεόν τε 
ουδέτεροι άλληλοις, άλλα το θέρος τούτο άντι- 
καθεζόμενοι χειμώνος ήδη άνεχώρησαν €7τ' οϊκου 

XXXI. Ύον δε ενιαυτον πάντα τον μετά την 
ναυμαχίαν καϊ τον ύστερον οι Κορίνθιοι opyrj 
φέροντες τον προς Κερκυραίους πολεμον εναυπη- 
γουντο καϊ παρεσκευάζοντο τά κράτιστα νέων 
στ όλον, εκ τε αυτής ΥΙελοποννήσου άηειροντες 
καϊ τής άλλης Ελλάδος ερέτας μισθω πείθοντες. 
2 πυνθανόμενοι δε οι Κερκυραίοι την παρασκευήν 
αυτών εφοβουντο, και (ήσαν yap ούδενος Έλλή- 


BOOK I. xxx. i-xxxi. 2 

prisoners they had taken, with the exception of the 
Corinthians, whom they kept in fetters. But after- 
wards, when the Corinthians and their allies had 
gone back home with their ships after their defeat, 
the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole sea in 
that quarter, and sailing to Leucas, the colony of the 
Corinthians, they ravaged the country and burned 
Cyllene, the naval arsenal of the Eleans, because they 
had furnished ships and money to the Corinthians. 
And so for most of the time after the sea-fight they 
had control over the sea ; and sailing against the 
allies of the Corinthians they kept harrying them, 
until the Corinthians, as the summer was drawing 
to an end, 1 seeing that their allies were suffering, 
sent ships and an army and encamped at Actium 
and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thes- 
protis, as a protection for Leucas and the other 
cities that were friendly to themselves. And the 
Corcyraeans encamped on the opposite coast at Leu- 
cimne with both ships and infantry. Neither side 
sailed against the other, but they faced each other 
for the rest of this summer ; it was not until winter 
had come that they each went back home. 

XXXI. During the whole year after the sea-fight 
and the next year the Corinthians, being angrily in- 
dignant about their war with the Corcyraeans, kept 
building ships and preparing a naval armament with 
all their might, and collected oarsmen from both 
the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas by the in- 
ducement of pay. The Corcyraeans, on the other 
hand, were alarmed when they learned of their pre- 
parations, and since they were without an ally among 

1 ireptovri (as the MSS. read) = ircpuavrt. But Ullrich 
(Beitr. 2. Kr. iii. p. 5) explains = Iv rv ττ€ριόντι τον Bipovs, 
"in what remained of the summer." So Boehme. 



νων ενσπονΒοι ούΒε iaeypayjravro εαυτούς ούτε ες 
τας 'Αθηναίων σπονΒας ούτε ες τάς Λακεδαι- 
μονίων) εΒοξεν αύτοΐς εΧθοΰσιν ως τους 'Αθηναί- 
ους ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι καϊ ώφεΧίαν τινά πειρα- 

3 σθαι απ' αυτών εύρίσκεσθαι, ol Βε Κορίνθιοι 
πυθόμενοι ταύτα ηΧθον καϊ αυτοί ες τάς 'Αθήνας 
πρεσβευσόμενοι, όπως μη σφίσι προς τω 'Κερ- 
κυραίων ναυτικώ καϊ το αυτών προσηενόμςνον 
εμπόΒιον γένηται θεσθαι τον ποΧεμον y βού- 

4 Χονται. κατάστασης Be εκκΧησίας ες avTtXoyiav 
ηΧθον. καϊ οι μεν Κερκυραίοι ελεξαν τοιάΒε. 

XXXII. "Δίκαιον, ω 'Αθηναίοι, τους μήτε 
ευεργεσίας μεηάΧης μήτε ξυμμαχίας προυφειΧο- 
μένης ήκοντας παρά τους πεΧας επικουρίας, ωσ- 
περ καϊ ημείς νυν, Βεησομενους άναΒιΒάξαι πρώ- 
τον, μάΧιστα μεν ως καϊ ξύμφορα Βέονται, εί Βε 
μή, οτι ye ουκ επιζήμια, έπειτα Be ως καϊ την 
χάριν βέβαιον εξουσιν εί Βε τούτων μηΒεν σαφές 

2 καταστήσουσι, μή ορηίζεσθαι ην άτυχώσιν. Κερ- 
κυραίοι Βε μετά της ξυμμαχίας της αιτήσεως καϊ 
ταύτα πιστεύοντες εχυρά ύμΐν παρεξεσθαι άπε- 

3 στειΧαν ημάς. τετύχηκε Βε το αύτο επιτήΒευμα 
προς τε υμάς ες την χρείαν ημών aXoyov καϊ ες 
τα ημέτερα αυτών εν τω παρόντι άξύμφορον. 

4 ξύμμαχοί τε yap ούΒενός πω εν τω προ του 
εκούσιοι yεvόμεvoι νυν άΧΧων τούτο Βεησομενοι 
ηκομεν, καϊ άμα ες τον παρόντα ποΧεμον Κοριν- 
θίων έρημοι Βι αύτο καθεσταμεν. καϊ περιε- 
στηκεν η Βοκοΰσα ημών πρότερον σωφροσύνη, το 


BOOK I. xxxi. 2-xxxii. 4 

the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in 
the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lace- 
daemonians, they decided to go to the Athenians, 
become their allies, and try to procure some aid 
from them. But the Corinthians also, hearing of 
this, themselves sent envoys to Athens to prevent 
the accession of the Athenian fleet to that of the 
Corcyraeans, as this would hamper them in settling 
the war as they wished. And when an assembly 438b.* 
was held opposing speeches were made, and the 
Corcyraeans spoke as follows : 

XXXII. "It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that 
those who, without any previous claim on the score 
of important service rendered or of an existing al- 
liance, come to their neighbours to ask aid, as we 
do now, should show in the first place, if possible, 
that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that 
it is not hurtful, and, in the second place, that their 
gratitude can be depended on ; but in case they 
establish neither of these things clearly, they should 
not be angry if unsuccessful. Now the Corcyraeans 
have sent us to ask for an alliance, and in full con- 
fidence that they will be able to give you guarantees 
on just these points. But it so happens that our 
policy has been at one and the same time incon- 
sistent, as it must seem to you, with our petition, 
and is also disadvantageous under present circum- 
stances to ourselves ; for although heretofore we 
have freely chosen to be allies of no one, we have 
now come to ask others for an alliance, and at the 
same time, in the face of the present war with the 
Corinthians, we are, because of this very policy, 
isolated. And so what was formerly fondly imagined 
to be wise discretion on our part — to enter into no 



μη εν άΧΧοτρία ζυμμαχία τη του πεΧας γνώμη 
ξυγκινδυνεύειν, νυν άβουΧία καϊ ασθένεια φαι- 

5 νομένη. την μεν ούν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αύτοϊ 
κατά μόνα? άπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους• επειδή δε 
μείζονι παρασκευή άπο ΤΙεΧοποννησου καϊ της 
αΧΧης *ΕΧΧάδος εφ' ημάς ώρμηνται καϊ ημείς 
αδύνατοι όρώμεν οντες rf} οικεία μόνον δυνάμει 
περιηενέσθαι, καϊ άμα μέγας 6 κίνδυνος, el έσο• 
μέθα υπ αύτοΐς, ανάγκη καϊ υμών καϊ άΧΧου 
παντός επικουρίας δεΐσθαι, καϊ ξυγγνώμη, εΐ μη 
μετά κακίας, δόξης δε μάΧΧον αμαρτία τη πρό- 
τερον άπραγμοσύνη εναντία τοΧμώμεν. 

XXXIII. " Γενησεται δε ύμΐν πειθομένοις 
καΧη ή ξυντυχία κατά ποΧΧά της ημετέρας 
χρείας, πρώτον μεν οτι άδικου μένοις καϊ ούχ 
ετέρους βΧάπτουσι την επικουρίαν ποιησεσθε, 
έπειτα περί τών μεγίστων κινδυνεύοντας δεξά- 
μενοι ως αν μάΧιστα μετ αιειμνήστου μαρτυρίου 
την χάριν καταθησεσθε, ναυτικον τε κεκτημεθα 

2 πΧην του παρ ύμΐν πΧεΐστον. καϊ σκέψασθε 
τις εύπραξία σπανιωτέρα η τις τοις ποΧεμίοις 
Χυπηροτερα, el ην ύμεΐς αν προ ποΧΧών χρημά- 
των και χάριτος ετιμησασθε δύναμιν ύμΐν προσ- 
γενέσθαι, αυτή πάρεστιν αύτεπάγγεΧτος, άνευ 
κινδύνων καϊ δαπάνης δίδουσα εαυτην καϊ προσ- 
έτι φέρουσα ες μεν τους ποΧΧούς άρετην, οΐς δε 
επαμυνειτε χάριν, ύμΐν δ\ αύτοΐς Ισχύν a ev τφ 
58 ' 

BOOK I. xxxii. 4-xxxiii. 2 

foreign alliance, with the possibility of having to 
take our share of the danger of our neighbour's 
policy — has now, in the event, proved want of 
wisdom and a source of weakness. It is true that, 
in the sea-fight we have had, we repulsed the Co- 
rinthians single-handed ; but now that they have set 
out to attack us with a greater force, drawn from the 
Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, and we see 
that we are unable to prevail with our own strength 
alone, and since, further, our peril will be serious if 
we come into their power, we are constrained to ask 
help of you and of everyone else; and it is pardon- 
able if we now, actuated by no baseness, but rather 
Acknowledging an error of judgment, venture upon 
a course that runs counter to our former policy of 
avoiding foreign entanglements. 

XXXIII. " For yourselves, if you concede what we 
ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can 
get both honour and advantage in many ways : first, 
you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged 
and not to those who injure others ; next, by taking 
into alliance men whose most vital interests are at 
stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for grati- 
tude with a record which will abide in our memories 
for ever ; and, lastly, we have a navy greater than any 
but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune 
could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than 
this — that the power which you would have ac- 
counted it worth much money and gratitude to 
acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itself 
to you without danger or expense, and bringing you, 
besides, a good name before the world, gratitude 
from those who are to receive your help, and en- 
hanced strength for yourselves? To few in all 



παντϊ χρόνω oXiyois δη άμα πάντα ξυνέβη, και 
6\iyoi ξυμμαχίας δομένου οίς επικαλούνται 
άσφάΧβιαν και κόσμον ούγ ησσον δίδοντες η 
ληψόμενοι Trapayiyvovrai. 

3 "Ύον δε πόλεμον, δι ονπερ χρήσιμοι αν είμεν, 
€Ϊ τις υμών μη οϊεται εσεσθαι, yvώμης άμαρτάνβι 
κ αϊ ού /c αισθάνεται τους Λακεδαιμονίους φόβω 
τω ύμετέρω πόλε μη σείοντας και τους Κοριν- 
θίους, δυναμένους παρ αύτοΐς και ύμΐν εχθρούς 
οντάς, 1 π ρο καταλαμβάνοντας ημάς νυν ες την 
ύμετέραν επιχειρήσω, ίνα μη τω κοινω εχθει 
κατ αυτούς μετ αλλήλων στώμεν μηδέ δυοϊν 
φθάσαι άμάρτωσιν, η κακώσαι ημάς ή σφάς αυ- 

4 του? βεβαιώσασθαι. ήμέτερον δε y αΰ "ipyov 
προτερήσαι, των μεν διδόντων, υμών δε δεξαμε- 
νών την ξυμμαχίαν, και προεπιβουλεύειν αύτοΐς 
μάλλον η άντεπιβουλεύειν. 

XXXIV. "*Ην δε λ^ωσιν ως ού δίκαιον τους 
σφετερους άποικους υμάς δέχεσθαι, μαθ όντων 
ως πάσα αποικία ευ μεν πάσχουσα τίμα την 
μητροπολιν, αδικούμενη δε άλλοτριούται* ού yap 
επι τω δούλοι, αλλ,' επί τω όμοιοι τοις λειπομε- 

2 νοις είναι εκπέμπονται, ως δε ηδίκουν σαφές 
εστίν προκληθέντες yap περί 'Κπιδάμνου ες 
κρίσιν πολεμώ μάλλον η τω ϊσω εβουϊ ήθησαν τα 

3 εγκλήματα μετελθεΐν. και ύμΐν έστω τι τεκμψ 

1 καί, before τροκαταλαμβάροντας in the MSS., deleted by 

1 This allegation is denied in the speech of the Corinthians, 
ch. xli. 1. 

2 Or, retaining καί before -κροκαταΚαμβάνοντα*, "and fails 
to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, 


BOOK I. xxxiii. 2-xxxiv. 3 

history have such opportunities fallen all at the 
same time, and few are they who, when they beg for 
an alliance, come offering to those to whom they 
make their appeal as large a degree of security and 
honour as they expect to receive. 

" Now as to the war which would give us occasion 
to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not 
occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that 
the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager 
for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great 
influence with them and are enemies of yours, 1 are 
making a beginning with us now 2 with a view to a 
subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may 
not be led by our common hatred to take our stand 
together against them, and that they may not fail, 
before we unite, to attain their two objects — to 
harm us and to strengthen themselves. It is our 
business, on the other hand, to get the start of 
them — we offering and you accepting the alliance 
— and to forestall their schemes rather than to 
counteract them. 

XXXIV. " But if they say that it is not right for 
you to receive their colonists, let them know that 
while every colony honours the mother-city so long 
as it is well treated, yet that if wronged it becomes 
alienated ; for colonists are not sent out to be slaves 
to those who are left behind, but to be their equals. 
And that they were in the wrong is manifest ; for 
when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus 
they preferred to prosecute their charges by war 
rather than by equity. And let their present treat- 
are eager for war, and that the Corinthians have great in- 
fluence with them and are enemies of yours, and are making 
a beginning with us with a view to a subsequent attack upon 
you ..." 



ριον α προς ημάς τους ξυγγενεϊς Βρώσιν, ώστε 
άπατη τε μη παράηεσθαι υπ αυτών δεομένοις τ€ 
εκ του εύθέος μη uirovpyeiv 6 yap εΧαχίστας τ ας 
μεταμεΧείας εκ του χαρίζεσθαι τοις εναντίοις 
Χαμβάνων άσφαΧέστατος αν διατεΧοίη. 

XXXV. " Αύσετε δε ούδε τάς Αακεδαιμονίων 
σπονδάς δεχόμενοι ημάς μηδετέρων οντάς ξυμμά- 

2 χους. εϊρηται jap εν αύταΐς, των 'ΈΧΧηνίδων 
πόΧεων ήτις μη δα μου ξυμμαχεϊ, εζεΐναι τταρ 

3 οποτέρους αν άρέσκηται εΧθεΐν. καϊ δεινον εΐ 
τοίσδε μεν αϊτό τε τών ενσπόνδων εσται πΧηρούν 
τ ας ναυς και προσέτι καϊ εκ της αΧΧης ΈΧΧάδος 
καϊ ούχ ηκιστα άπο τών υμετέρων υπηκόων, ημάς 
δε άπο της προκειμένης τε ξυμμαχίας εϊρξουσι 
καϊ άπο της αΧΧοθέν πόθεν ώφεΧίας, είτα ι εν 
άδικηματι θησονται πεισθέντων υμών α δεόμεθα* 

4 ποΧύ δε εν πΧείονι αίτια ημείς μη πείσαντες 
υμάς εξομεν ημάς μεν yap κινδυνεύοντας καϊ ουκ 
εχθρούς οντάς άπώσεσθε, τώνδε δε ούχ όπως 
κωΧυταϊ εχθρών όντων καϊ επιόντων γενήσεσθε, 
άΧΧα καϊ άπο της υμετέρας άρχης δύναμιν προσ- 
Χαβεΐν περιόψεσθε* ην ου δίκαιον, αλλ* ή κάκεί- 
νων κωΧύειν τους εκ της υμετέρας μισθοφόρους η 
καϊ ημΐν πέμπειν καθ' 6 τι αν πεισθήτε ώφεΧιαν 
μάΧιστα δε άπο του προφανούς δεξαμένους βοη- 

5 θεΐν. ποΧΧα δέ, ωσπερ εν άρχη ύπείπομεν, τα 
ξυμφέροντα άποδείκνυμεν, και μέηιστον οτι οι τε 

1 With the MSS.; Kriiger conjectures €Ϊ re, followed by 


BOOK I. xxxiv. 3-xxxv. 5 

ment of us, who are their kinsmen, be a warning to 
you, that you be not misled by their deceit, or, if 
they seek aid from you directly, that you may refuse 
it. For whoever finds fewest occasions to regret 
doing favours to his opponents will ever remain 
most secure. 

XXXV. " Neither will you be breaking your treaty 
with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are 
allies of neither party. For in this treaty it is stipu- 
lated that if any of the Hellenic cities is a member 
of no alliance, it is at liberty to join whichever side it 
pleases. And it is monstrous if they are to be al- 
lowed to recruit their navy, not only from their own 
allies, but also from the rest of Hellas besides, and 
particularly from your subjects, but are to debar us 
from the alliance that should naturally be open to us 
as well as from aid from any other quarter, and then 
shall count it a crime if you are persuaded to con- 
cede what we ask. Far more shall we hold you at 
fault if we fail to win your consent ; for you will be 
repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies, 
while as regards these men, who are enemies and ag- 
gressors, you will not only not be thwarting them, 
but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces 
from your own dominions. To that they have no 
right ; but it is right that you should either prevent 
them from raising mercenaries in places under your 
control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever 
terms you may be induced to make ; but it would be 
best of all for you openly to receive and help us. 
And many, as we suggested at the outset, 1 are the 
advantages which we can show you, and the most 
important of all is this, that the enemies of both of 

1 Ch. xxxiii. 1. 



αυτοί πολέμιοι ημΐν ήσαν (όπερ σαφέστατη 
πίστις) καϊ ούτοι ουκ ασθενείς, αλλ* Ικανοί τους 
μεταστάντας βλάψαι. καϊ ναυτικής και ουκ 
ηπειρώτιδος της ξυμμαγίας διδομένης ούχ όμοια 
η άλλοτρίωσις, άλλα μάλιστα μίν, εί δύνασθε, 
μηδένα άλλον lav κεκτήσθαι ναυς, el Be μη, 
όστις εχυρώτατος, τούτον φίλον εχειν. 

XXXVL " Καϊ οτω τάδε ξυμφέροντα μεν δοκεΐ 
λέηεσθαι, φοβείται δε μη δι αυτά πειθόμενος τάς 
σπονδάς λύση, ηνωτω το μεν δεδιος αυτού Ισγυν 
έχον τους εναντίους μάλλον φοβήσον, το δε θαρ- 
σοΰν μη δεξαμένου ασθενές 6ν προς ισχύοντας 
τους εχθρούς άδεέστερον έσόμενον, και άμα ου 
περί της Κερκύρας νυν το πλέον ή καϊ των 'Αθη- 
νών βουλευό μένος, καϊ ου τα κράτιστα αύταΐς 
προνόων, όταν ες τον μέλλοντα και όσον ου 
παρόντα πολεμον το αύτίκα περισκοπών εν- 
δοιάζη χωρίον προσλαβεΐν ο μετά μεγίστων 
2 καιρών οίκειουταί τε καϊ πολεμοΰται. της re 
yap Ιταλίας και Σικελίας καλώς παράπλου 
κείται, ώστε μήτε εκείθεν ναυτικον εάσαι Πβλο- 
ποννησίοις επελθεΐν τό τε εντεύθεν προς τάκεΐ 
παραπέμψαι, καϊ ες τάλλα ξυμφορώτατον εστίν. 

1 So 9\σαν seems to mean here, where (ΙσΙ was to be ex- 
pected ; cf. ch. xxxiii. 3. 

2 δ€? or ξνμφ€ρ€ΐ seems to be implied. 

* The thirty -years' truce with Sparta ; cf. ch. xxiii. 4. 

6 4 

BOOK I. xxxv. 5-xxxvi. 2 

us are, as we see, 1 the same — which is the surest 
guarantee of fidelity — and these are not weak, but 
able to injure those who withdraw from them. And 
furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with 
a maritime and not with a continental power, the 
alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indif- 
ference ; on the contrary, you should 2 by all means, 
if possible, permit no one else to possess ships ; but 
if that is impossible, you should have as your friend 
him who is strongest therein. 

XXXVI. " If anyone thinks that this course is in- 
deed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this con- 
sideration he will be breaking off the truce, 3 he should 
understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will 
make his enemies more afraid ; 4 whereas, if he re- 
ject our alliance, his confidence 5 will be unsupported 
by might and will therefore be less formidable against 
enemies that are strong. He should understand, 
furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the in- 
terests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and 
that he is not making the best provision for her 
when, in the face of the war that is impending and 
all but present, he hesitates, through cautious con- 
sideration of the immediate chances, to attach to 
himself a country which is not made a friend or a 
foe except with the most momentous consequences. 
For Corcyra is favourably situated for a coasting 
voyage either to Italy or Sicily, 6 so that you could 
prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Pelo- 
ponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here; 
and in other respects it is a most advantageous 

4 i.e. of themselves breaking the truce. 

5 i.e. in the security of the truce. 

• Ancient mariners preferred to hug the coast rather than 
sail through the open sea. 



3 βραχυτάτφ δ* &ν κεφαΧαίω, τοις τε ξύμπασι καϊ 
καθ* εκαστον, τωδ' αν μη προέσθαι ημάς μάθοιτε' 
τρία μεν οντά λόγου άξια τοις f ΕΧΧησι ναυτικά, 
το παρ ύμΐν κα\ το ημέτερον και το Κορινθίων 
τούτων δε ει περιόψεσθε τα δύο ες ταύτον εΧθεΐν 
και Κορίνθιοι ημάς προκαταΧήψονται, Κερκυ- 
ραίοι? τ€ καϊ ΤΙεΧοποννησίοις άμα ναυμαχήσετε• 
δεξάμενον δε ημάς εξετε προς αυτούς πΧείοσι 
ναυσί ταΐς ήμετέραις άηωνίζεσθαιΓ 

4 Τοιαύτα μεν οι Κερκυραίοι είπον οι δε Κορίν- 
θιοι μετ αυτούς τοιάδε, 

XXXVII. " *Ανα>γκαΐον Κερκυραίων τώνδε ου 
μόνον περί του δεξασθαι σφάς τον Xoyov ποιησα- 
μένων, αλλ* ώς και ήμεΐς τε άδικοϋμεν και αυτοί 
ουκ είκότως ποΧεμούνται, μνησθέντας πρώτον και 
ημάς περί αμφοτέρων ούτω καϊ επι τον άΧΧον 
Xoyov ίέναι, ίνα την αφ' ημών τε άξίωσιν άσφα- 
Χέστερον προειδήτε καϊ την τώνδε γρείαν μη 
άXoyίστως άπώσησθε. 

2 " Φασι δε ξυμμαγίαν δια το σώφρον ούδενός 
πω δέξασθαι* το δ* επι κακουρηία καϊ ούκ αρεττ} 
επετήδευσαν, ξύμμαχόν τε ούδένα βουΧόμενοι 
προς τάδικήματα ούτε 1 μάρτυρα εγειν ούδε παρα- 

3 καΧούντες αίσγύνεσθαι, κάί ή πόΧις αυτών άμα 
αυτάρκη θέσιν κειμένη παρέχει αυτούς δικαστάς 
ών βΧάπτουσί τίνα μάΧΧον η κατά ξυνθήκας 

1 For ούδ€ of the MSS., Dobree's conjecture. Hude reads 

ovde . • • βυδί. 


BOOK I. xxxvi. 3-xxxvn. 3 

place. And by one briefest concluding word, which 
embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts, 
you will be convinced that you should not abandon 
us : The Hellenes have only three fleets that are 
worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the 
Corinthians ; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us 
first and you thus let two of these fleets become 
united, you will have to fight on the sea against 
both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians at once ; but 
if you accept us, you will be able to contend 
against them with your navy augmented by our 

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans, and after them the 
Corinthians as follows : 

XXXVII. " Since these Corcyraeans have not con- 
fined themselves to the question of their admission 
into your alliance, but have gone further and urged 
that we are the wrong-doers and they are unfairly 
attacked, we too must of necessity touch upon both 
these points before we proceed to our general argu- 
ment, in order that you may be more definitely 
forewarned of the nature of the demand we have 
to make, and may have good grounds for rejecting 
their petition. 

"They say that 'a wise discretion ' has hitherto 
kept them from accepting an alliance with anyone ; 
but the fact is that they adopted this policy with a 
view to villainy and not from virtuous motives, and 
because they wished in their misdeeds not to have 
any ally as witness, or to be put to shame if they 
invited his presence. Moreover, the insular and in- 
dependent position of this state causes them to be 
arbitrary judges of the injuries they do to others 
instead of being judges appointed by mutual agree- 



yiyveaOac, δια το ηκιστα επί τους πέλας εκπΧε- 
οντας μάλιστα τους αΧΧους avayKjj καταίροντας 

4 δεχεσθαι. καϊ τούτο το ευπρεπές άσπονδον ούχ 
ίνα μη ξυναδικώσιν ετεροις προβέβΧηνται, αλλ' 
όπως κατά μονάς άδικώσι και όπως εν ω μεν αν 
κρατώσι βιάζωνται, ου δ' αν Χάθωσι πΧέον έ'χω- 
σιν, ην δε Ίτού τι προΧάβωσιν αναισγυντώσιν* 

5 καίτοι ει ήσαν άνδρες, ωσπερ φασίν, ayaOoi, οσω 
άΧηπτότεροι ήσαν τοις πεΧας, τόσω he φανερω- 
τέραν εξην αύτοΐς την άρετην διδοΰσι και δεχο- 
μενοις τα δίκαια δεικννναι. 

XXXVIII. " Άλλ* ούτε προς τους αΧΧονς ούτε 
ες ημάς τοιοίδε είσίν, άποικοι δ' οντες άφεστάσί 
τε δια παντός καϊ νυν ποΧεμοΰσι, Χ^οντες ως 

2 ουκ επί τω κακώς πάσγειν εκπεμφθεΐεν. ημείς 
δε ούδ' αυτοί φαμεν επι τω ύπο τούτων ύβριζε- 
σθαι κατοικίσαι, αλλ,' επι τω ^εμονες τε είναι 

3 καϊ τα εικότα θαυμάζεσθαι. αι yodv αΧΧαι 
άποικίαι τιμώσιν ημάς καϊ μάΧιστα ύπο αποίκων 

4 στεpyόμεθa ^ καϊ δήΧον οτι, ει τοις πΧεοσιν άρε- 
σκοντές εσμεν, τοϊσΚ αν μόνοις ούκ ορθώς άπαρέ- 
σκοιμεν, ούδ' επιστρατεύομεν εκπρεπώς μη καϊ 

β διαφερόντως τι αδικούμενοι. καΧον δ' ην, ει καϊ 
ημαρτάνομεν, τοΐσδε μεν είξαι τι) ημέτερα opyj), 
ημΐν δε αίσχρον βιάσασθαι την τούτων μέτρι- 

BOOK I. xxxvii. 3-xxxviii. 5 

raent; owing to the fact that they resort very 
little to the ports of their neighbours, but to a 
very large extent receive into their ports others 
who are compelled to put in there. And mean- 
while they have used as a cloak their specious policy 
of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid 
joining others in wrong-doing, but that they may do 
wrong all alone ; that wherever they have power 
they may use violence, and wherever they can escape 
detection they may overreach someone ; and if, per- 
chance, they can steal a march on anyone, that they 
may brazen it out. And yet, if they were really honest 
men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were 
to attack by their neighbours the more clearly they 
might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by 
offering and accepting proposals of arbitration. 

XXXVIII. "But neither toward others nor to- 
ward us have they shown themselves honest men ; on 
the contrary, although they are colonists of ours, they 
have constantly stood aloof from us, and now they 
are at war with us, claiming that they were not sent 
out to be ill treated. But neither did we colonize 
them to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders 
and to receive from them all due reverence. The 
rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and 
by our colonists we are beloved more than is any 
other mother-city. And it is clear that, if we are 
acceptable to the majority, it cannot be on good 
grounds that we are unacceptable to these alone ; 
nor are we making war upon them in a way so 
unusual without being also signally wronged. And 
even if we were at fault, the honourable course for 
them would have been to make allowance for our 
temper, in which case it would have been shameful 


6 ότητα* ΰβρει Be καϊ εξουσία πΧούτου ποΧΧα €ς 
ημάς άΧΧα τε ημαρτηκασι καϊ ^ττίΒαμνον ήμετε- 
ραν ουσαν κακουμενην μεν ου πρυσεποιοΰντο, 
έΧθόντων Βε ημών εττί τιμωρία εΧόντες βία 

XXXIX. " Καϊ φασϊ Βη Βίκ -rj ττρότερον εθε- 
Χήσαι κρίνεσθαι, ην ye ου τον προύχοντα καϊ εκ 
του άσφαΧοϋς ττροκαΧούμενον Xeyecv τι Βοκεΐν 
Bet, άΧΧα τον ες Ισον τα τε epya ομοίως καϊ τους 

2 X6yoυς ττρϊν BίayωvίζeσθaL καθιστάντα. οΰτοι 
Be ου ΊτρΙν ττοΧιορκεϊν το χωρίον, αλλ' επειΒή ήγη- 
σαντο ημάς ου περιόψεσθαι, τότβ καϊ το ευπρεπές 
της Βίκης τταρέσχοντο* καϊ Βεΰρο ηκουσιν, ου 
τάκεΐ μόνον αυτοί άμαρτοντες, άΧΧα καϊ υμάς 
νυν άξιουντες ου ξυμμαχεϊν, άΧΧα ξυναΒικεΐν καϊ 

3 Βιαφόρους οντάς ημίν Βεχεσθαι σφάς* ους χρην, 
οτε άσφαΧέστατοι ήσαν, τότε ττροσιεναι, καΧ μη 
εν ω ήμ€Ϊς μεν ηΒικημεθα, ούτοι Be κινΒυνεύουσι, 
μηΒ* ev ω ύμεΐς της τε Βυνάμεως αυτών τότε ου 
μεταΧαβόντες της ώφεΧίας νυν μεταΒώσετε καϊ 
τών αμαρτημάτων αττο yεvoμεvoι της αφ ημών 
αιτίας το Ισον εξετε, ττάΧαι Βε κοινώσαντας την 
Βύναμιν κοινά καϊ τα άττοβαίνοντα εχειν. 1 

XL. " Ώ9 μεν οΰν αυτοί τε μετά προσηκόντων 
eyκXημάτωv ερχόμεθα καϊ οΐΒε βίαιοι κα\ πΧεο- 

1 ^κλημάτων 5i μόνων αμ€τόχους οΰτω* τών μ*τ&, τλϊ "Kpd^eis 
τούτων μ}) κοινωνΰν, " As. however, you have had no share in 
the accusations, you should not share in the consequences." 
This clause is omitted by all good MSS. except G, and by all 
recent editors except Bloomfield. 


BOOK I. xxxviii. 5-xl. ι 

for us to outrage their moderation ; but in the 
insolence and arrogance of wealth they have wronged 
us in many other ways, and particularly in the case 
of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim 
to when it was in distress, but seized by force the 
moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold^ 

XXXIX. "They pretend, forsooth, that they were 
the first to agree to an arbitration of the issue ; 
but surely it is not the proposals of the one who has 
the advantage, and occupies a safe position when he 
invites arbitration, that ought to have weight, but 
rather those of the one who has made his actions tally 
with his professions before appealing to arms. These 
men, however, bring forward their specious offer of a 
court of arbitration, not before laying siege to the 
place, but only after they had concluded that we 
would not permit it. And now, not satisfied with the 
blunders they have committed themselves at Epi- 
damnus, they have come here demanding that you 
too at this juncture, shall be, not their allies, but 
their accomplices in crime, and that you shall receive 
them, now that they are at variance with us. But 
they ought to have come to you when they were 
in no peril at all, and not at a time when we are 
victims of their injustice and they are consequently 
in danger, nor when you, without having had the 
benefit of their power before, will now have to give 
them a share of your aid, and, though you had nothing 
to do with their blunders, will have to bear an equal 
part of the blame we shall bestow. For only if you 
from the first had shared their power ought you to 
share the consequences also now of their acts. 

XL. " Now it has been clearly shown that we have 
come with proper grounds of complaint against 



νεκται είσϊ δεδήΧωται* ως δέ ουκ αν δικαίως 

2 αυτούς δέχοισθε μαθεΐν χρη. el yap είρηται εν 
ταΐς σπονδαϊς, εξεΐναι παρ* όποτερους τις βού- 
Χεται τών άγραφων πόΧεων εΧθεΐν, ου τοις επί 
βΧάβη ετέρων ίουσιν η ξννθηκη εστίν, αλλ' 
όστις μη αΧΧου εαυτόν άποστερών άσφαΧείας 
Κείται καϊ όστις μη τοις δεξαμένοις, ει σωφρο- 
νοΰσι, πόΧεμον άντ ειρήνης ποιήσει• ο νυν ύμεΐς 

3 μη πειθόμενοι ημΐν πάθοιτε αν. ου yap τοΐσδε 
μόνον επίκουροι αν yέvoισθε, άΧΧα καϊ ήμΐν αντϊ 
ενσπόνδων ποΧέμιοι. ανάγκη yap, el ϊτ€ μετ 

d αυτών, καϊ αμύνεσθαι μη άνευ υμών τούτους, καί- 
τοι δίκαιοι y εστε μάΧιστα μεν εκποδών στήναι 
άμφοτέροις, ει δε μη, τουναντίον επί τούτους μεθ" 
ημών ίεναι (Κορινθίοις μεν ye ενσπονδοί εστε, 
Υ^ερκυραίοις δε ούδε δι άνοκωχής πώποτε εyέ~ 
νεσθε), καϊ τον νόμον μη καθιστάναι ώστε τους 

5 ετέρων άφισταμένους δέχεσθαι. ούδε yap ημείς 
Ταμιών άποστάντων ψήφον προσεθέμεθα εναν- 
τίαν ύμΐν, τών αΧΧων ΤΙεΧοποννησίων δίχα εψη- 
φισμενων ει χρή αύτοΐς αμύνειν, φανερώς δε 
άντείπομεν τους προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αυτόν 

6 τίνα κοΧάζειν. ει yap τους κακόν τι δρώντας 
δεχόμενοι τιμωρήσετε, φανεΐται καϊ α τών ύμετε- 

1 i.e. " who will permit peace to be maintained by their 
new friends if they exercise ordinary discretion." No new 
allies should be received who will render ordinary discretion 


BOOK I. xl. 1-6 

them and that they are violent and overreaching ; 
but you have still to learn that you have no right to 
receive them into your alliance. For even though it 
is stipulated in the treaty that any unenrolled city 
may join whichever party it pleases, the provision is 
not intended for those who apply to one side for 
admission with a view to the injury of the other, 
but for any one who, without defrauding another 
state of his services, asks for protection, and any 
one who to those who received him will not — if 
they are prudent — bring war instead of peace. 1 
But this is precisely what will be your fate if you 
do not listen to us. For you will not merely be- 
come allies to them, but also enemies to us instead 
of being at truce with us. For it will be necessary 
for us, if you go with them, to include you when we 
proceed to take vengeance upon them. And yet the 
right course for you would be, preferably, to stand 
aloof from us both, — or else to go with us against 
them, remembering that you are under treaty with 
the Corinthians, but have never had with the 
Corcyraeans even an arrangement to refrain from 
hostilities for a time, — and not to establish the 
precedent of admitting into your alliance those who 
revolt from the other side. Why, when the Samians 2 
revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were 
divided in their votes on the question of aiding them, 
we on our part did not vote against you ; on the 
contrary, we openly maintained that each one should 
discipline his own allies without interference. If you 
receive and assist evil-doers, you will surely find that 

unavailing to prevent war, as the Corcyraeans are sure 
to do. 
1 440 B.C. cf. ch. cxv. 

VOL. Ι. Π " 


ρων ουκ ελάσσω ήμΐν πρόσεισι, καϊ τον νόμον εφ* 
υμΐν αύτοΐς μάλλον ή εφ' ήμΐν θήσετε. 

XLI. " Δικαιώματα μεν οΰν τάδε προς υμάς 
εχομεν, ικανά κατά τους Κ\\ηνων νόμους, παραί- 
νεσιν δε και άξίωσιν χάριτος τοιάνδε, ην ουκ 
εχθροί οντες ώστε βΧάπτειν ούδ' αΰ φίλοι ώστ 
έπιχρήσθαι, άντιδοθήναι ήμΐν εν τω παρόντι 

2 φ α μεν χρήναι. νέων yap μακρών σπανίσαντες 
ποτέ προς τον Ακίνητων υπέρ τα Μηδικά 1 
πόΧεμον πάρα Κορινθίων είκοσι ναυς ελάβετε* 
καϊ ή ευεργεσία αυτή τε καϊ ή ες Χαμίους, το 
δι* ήμας ΤΙεΧοποννησίους αύτοΐς μη βοηθήσαι, 
παρέσχεν υμΐν ΚΙηινητών μεν επικράτησιν, Σα- 
μίων δε κόλασιν, καϊ εν καιροΐς τοιούτοις iy ενετό, 
οίς μάΧιστα άνθρωποι επ* εχθρούς τους σφετε- 
ρους ιόντες των απάντων άπεριοπτοί είσι παρά 

3 το νικαν φίλον τε yap ήyoΰvτaι τον ύπoυpyoΰvτa, 
ην καϊ πρότερον εχθρός η, πολέμων τε τον άντι- 
στάντα, ην καϊ τύχτ\ φίλος ων, επεϊ και τα οικεία 
χείρον τίθενται φιΧονικίας ένεκα της αύτίκα. 

XLII. "*Ων ενθυμηθεντες και νεώτερος τις 

πάρα πρεσβυτέρου αυτά μαθών άξιούτω τοις 

ομοίοις ήμας άμύνεσθαι, και μη νομίστ] δίκαια 

μεν τάδε Χ^εσθαι, ξύμφορα δε, ει πολεμήσει, 

2 άλλα είναι, το τε yap ξυμφέρον εν ω αν τις 

1 virep τ λ ΜηΖικά Kriiger deletes, followed by Hude. 

BOOK I. xl. 6-xmi. 2 

full as many of your allies will come over to us, and 
the precedent you establish will be against yourselves 
rather than against us. 

XLI. " These, then, are the considerations of right 
which we urge upon you — and they are adequate ac- 
cording to the institutions of the Hellenes ; but we 
have also to remind you of a favour and to urge a 
claim based upon it ; and since we are not your 
enemies so as to want to injure you, nor yet your 
friends so that we could make use of you, we think 
this favour should be repaid us at the present time. 
It is this : when once, before the Persian war, you 
were deficient in battle-ships for the war you were 
waging with the Aeginetans, you borrowed twenty 
from the Corinthians. And this service and that we 
rendered in connection with the Samians — our pre- 
venting the Peloponnesians from aiding them — 
enabled you to prevail over the Aeginetans and to 
chastise the Samians. Both incidents happened, too, 
at a critical time, when men, engaged in assailing 
their enemies, are most indifferent to every con- 
sideration except victory, regarding any one who 
assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy be- 
fore, and any one who stands in their way as an 
enemy, even if he happen to be a friend ; for they 
even mismanage their own interests in the eager 
rivalry of the moment. 

XLII. " Bearing these favours in mind — let every 
young man here be told of them by one who is 
older — do you consider it your duty to requite us 
with the like. And do not think that this course 
is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that 
another course is advantageous if you come to war. 
For advantage is most likely to result when one 



ελάχιστα άμαρτάνη μάλιστα έπεται, καϊ το 
μέλλον του πολέμου ω φοβούντες υμάς Κερκυ- 
ραίοι κελεύουσιν άδικείν εν άφανεϊ ετι κείται, καϊ 
ουκ άξιον επαρθέντας αύτω φανεράν εχθραν ήδη 
καϊ ου μέλλουσαν προς Κορινθίους κτήσασθαι, 
της 8ε ύπαρχούσης πρότερον δια Μεγαρέας ύπο- 

3 ψίας σώφρον ύφελεΐν μάλλον (η yap τελευταία 
χάρις καιρόν έχουσα, καν έλάσσων η, δύναται 

4 μείζον έγκλημα λύσαι), μηδ' οτι ναυτικού ξυμ~ 
μαχίαν μεγαλην διδόασι, τούτω εφέλκεσθαι* τό 
jap μη άδικεΐν τους ομοίους εχυρωτέρα δύναμις ή 
τω αύτίκα φάνε ρω επαρθέντας δια κινδύνων το 
πλέον εχειν. 

XLIII. "*Ημεΐς δε περιπεπτωκοτες οίς εν τη 
Αακεδαίμονι αυτοί προείπομεν, τους σφ έτερους 
ξυμμάχους αυτόν τίνα κοΧάζειν, νυν παρ* υμών 
το αύτο άξιούμεν κομίζεσθαι, καϊ μη τη ημέτερα 
ψήφω ώφεΧηθεντας τη υμέτερα ημάς βλάψαι. 

2 το δε ΐσον άνταπόδοτε, γνόντες τούτον εκείνον 
είναι τον καιρόν, εν ω ο τε υπουργών φίΧος μά- 

3 Χιστα καϊ 6 άντιστάς εχθρός, καϊ Κερκυραίους 
<γε τούσδε μήτε ξυμμάχους δεχεσθε βία ημών 

4 μήτε άμύνετε αύτοΐς άδικοΰσιν. και τάδε ποι- 
ουντες τα προσήκοντα τε δράσετε καϊ τα άριστα 
βουΧεύσεσθε ύμΐν αύτοΐς. 

XLIV. Τοιαύτα δε καϊ οι Κορίνθιοι ειπον. 
'Αθηναίοι δε άκούσαντες αμφοτέρων, γενομένης 



errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which 
the Corcyraeans would frighten you into wrong- 
doing, is still uncertain ; and it is not worth while 
for you to be so carried away by it as to acquire 
an enmity with the Corinthians that will be from 
that moment on a manifest fact and no longer a 
contingency. It would be, rather, the prudent course 
to remove something of the suspicion which has 
heretofore existed on account of the Megarians x ; 
for the favour which comes last, if conferred at the 
right moment, even though a small one, can cancel a 
greater offence. Nor ought you to be tempted by 
their offer of a great naval alliance ; for to refrain 
from wronging equals is a surer strength than to be 
carried away by present appearances and seek an 
advantage by incurring dangers. 

XLII I. " But we, since events have brought us 
under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at 
Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now 
claim from you in return the same treatment — that 
you who were then aided by our vote should not in- 
jure us by yours. Pay back like with like, determining 
that this is the supreme moment when assistance is 
cne truest friendship— opposition the worst hostility. 
We beg you neither to accept the Corcyraeans as 
your allies in despite of us, nor to aid them in their 
wrong-doing. And if you do this, you will not only be 
taking the fitting course, but will also be consulting 
your own best interests. ,, 

XLIV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the 
Athenians, having heard both sides, held a second 

1 Referring apparently to the exclusion of the Megarians 
from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from 
the market at Athens, ch. lxvii. 4. 



καϊ Βϊς εκκΧησίας, τη μεν πρότερα, ούχ ησσον 
τών Κορινθίων άπεδεξαντο τους λόγους, iv δε τη 
ύστεραία μετ^νωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μεν 
μη ποιήσασθαι ώστε του? αυτούς εχθρούς καϊ 
φίΧους νομίζειν (ει yap επϊ Κόρινθον εκέΧευον 
σφίσιν oi Κερκυραίοι ξυμπΧεΐν, εΧύοντ αν αύτοΐς 
αϊ προς ΤΙεΧοποννησίους σπονδαί), επιμαχίαν δε 
εποιησαντο τη αΧΧήΧων βοηθεΐν, εάν τις επϊ 
Κέρκυραν ϊη η 'Αθήνας ή τους τούτων ξυμμάχους. 

2 εδόκει yap 6 προς ΤΙεΧοποννησίους πόΧεμος καϊ 
ως εσεσθαι αύτοΐς, καϊ την Κέρκυραν εβούΧοντο 
μη προεσθαι τοις Κορινθίοις ναυτικον εχουσαν 
τοσούτον, ξυyκpoύειv δε οτι μάΧιστα αυτούς 
άΧΧήΧοις, ίνα άσθενεστεροις ούσιν, ην τι δέη, 
Κορινθίοις τε καϊ τοις άΧΧοις τοις ι ναυτικον 

3 εχουσιν ες πόΧεμον καθιστωνται. άμα δε της τε 
ΊταΧίας καϊ ΧικεΧίας καΧώς εφαίνετο αύτοΐς ή 
νήσος εν παράπΧω κεΐσθαι. 

XLV. Τοιαύτη μεν yvώμη οι Αθηναίοι τους 
Κερκυραίους προσεδέξαντο, καϊ των Κορινθίων 
άπεΧθόντων ού ποΧύ ύστερον δέκα ναΰς αύτοΐς 

2 άπεστειΧαν βοηθούς* εστρατ^ει δε αυτών Λακε- 
δαιμόνιος τε 6 Κίμωνος καϊ Αιότιμος 6 Ζτρομ- 

3 βίχου καϊ ΤΙρωτεας 6 ΈπικΧεους. προεΐπον δε 
αύτοΐς μη ναυμαχεΐν Κορινθίοις, ην μη επϊ 
Κέρκυραν πΧέωσι καϊ μέΧΧωσιν άποβαίνειν η ες 
των εκείνων τι χωρίων ούτω δε κωΧύειν κατά 
δύναμιν. προεΐπον δε ταίτα του μη Χύειν ένεκα 

™9 ο™*™- ι Added by Bekker. 
7 8 

BOOK I. xliv. i-xlv. 3 

session of the Ecclesia ; and although at the earlier 
one they were rather inclined to agree with the words 
of the Corinthians, on the second day they changed 
their minds in favour of the Corcyraeans, and decided, 
not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive 
alliance with them, for in that case, if the Corcyraeans 
then asked them to join in an expedition against 
Corinth, they would have to break, on their own re- 
sponsibility, the treaty with the Lacedaemonians — 
but they made a defensive alliance, namely to aid 
one another in case anyone should attack Corcyra or 
Athens or the allies of either. For they believed that 
in any event the war with the Peloponnesians would 
have to be faced, and they did not wish to give up 
Corcyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians, 
but hoped to wear them out upon one another as 
much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as 
well as other naval powers * might be found weaker 
in case they had to go to war with them. Besides, 
the island seemed to them admirably situated for a 
coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily. 2 

XLV. With these motives the Athenians received 
the Corcyraeans into alliance and sent to their 
aid, soon after the departure of the Corinthians, ten 
ships commanded by Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, 
Diotimus son of Strom bichus, and Proteas son of 
Epicles. Orders were given to these not to engage 
with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against 
Corcyra and attempt to land there, or to some place 
belonging to the Corcyraeans ; but in that case they 
were to thwart them if possible. The object of these 
orders was to avoid breaking the treaty. 

1 Referring especially to those mentioned ch. xxvii. 2. 
3 c/. ch. xxxvi. 2. 



XLVI. Αι μεν Βη νήες άφικνούνται ες την 
Κερκυραν. οι Βε Κορίνθιοι, επειΒη αύτοΐς παρε- 
σκεύαστο, επΧεον επϊ την Κερκυραν νανσι πεντή- 
κοντα καϊ εκατόν, ήσαν Βε ΉΧείων μεν δέκα, 
Meyapecov Βε ΒώΒεκα καϊ ΑευκαΒίων Βέκα, Άμ- 
πρακιωτών Be επτά καϊ είκοσι καϊ Άνακτ ορίων 

2 μία, αυτών Be Κορινθίων ενενήκοντα• στρατηηοϊ 
Be τούτων ήσαν μεν καϊ κατά πόΧεις εκάστων, 
Κορινθίων Be ΞενοκΧείΒης 6 ΕύθυκΧέους πέμπτος 

3 αυτός. επειΒή Be προσεμειζαν τη κατά Κέρκυραν 
ηπείρω άπο ΑευκάΒος πΧέοντες, ορμίζονται ες 

4 Ύ^ειμεριον της ®εσπρωτίΒος <γής. εστί Βε Χιμην, 
καϊ πόΧις υπέρ αυτού κείται άπο θαΧάσσης εν 
τη ' ΚΧαιάτιΒι της ©εσπρωτίΒος Έφύρη. εξίησι Be 
παρ αύτην * Αχερουσία Χίμνη ες θάΧασσαν Βια 
Βε της ®εσπρωτίΒος Άχέρων ποταμός ρέων 
εσβάΧΧει ες αύτην, αφ' ου καϊ την επωνυμίαν 
έχει, ρεΐ Be καϊ ®ύαμις ποταμός ορίζων την 
(&εσπ ρωτίΒα καϊ Κεστρίνην, ων εντός η άκρα 

5 άνέχει το Χειμέριον. οι μεν ούν Κορίνθιοι της 
ηπείρου ενταύθα ορμίζονται τε καϊ στρατόπεΒον 

XLVII. 0/ Βε Κερκυραίοι ως ησθοντο αυτούς 
π ροσπΧέοντας, πΧηρώσαντες Βέκα καϊ εκατόν 
ναύς, ων ηρχε ΉίικιάΒης καϊ ΑίσιμίΒης καϊ Κύρύ- 
βατος, εστρατοπεΒεύσαντο εν μια τών νήσων αϊ 
καΧούνται Έύβοτα, καϊ αι Αττικαϊ Βέκα παρησαν. 

2 επϊ Βε τη Αευκίμνη αύτοΐς τω άκρωτηρίω ο πεζός 
ην καϊ Ζακυνθίων χίΧιοι όπΧΐται βεβοηθηκότες. 

3 ήσαν Βε καϊ τοις Κορινθίοις εν τη ηπείρω ποΧΧοϊ 
τών βαρβάρων παραβεβοηθηκότες' οι jap ταύττ) 
ηπειρώται αίεί ποτέ φίΧοι αύτοΐς είσιν. 


BOOK I. xlvi. i-xlvii. 3 

XLVI. These ships arrived at Corcyra, and the 
Corinthians, when their preparations had been made, 
sailed against Corcyra with one hundred and fifty 
ships. Of these ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve to 
the Megarians, ten to the Leucadians, twenty seven 
to the AmbraciotSjOiie to the Anactorians, and ninety 
to the Corinthians themselves. The several cities 
had each its own general, but Xenocleides son of 
Euthycles and four others commanded the Corin- 
thians. They sailed from Leucas, and when they drew 
near the mainland over against Corcyra, anchored at 
Cheimerium in the territory of Thesprotia. It is a 
harbour, and above it lies a city away from the sea in 
the Eleatic district of Thesprotia, Ephyra by name. 
Near it is the outlet into the sea of the Acherusian 
lake ; and the river Acheron runs through Thesprotia 
and empties into the lake, to which it gives its name. 
There is also the river Thyamis, which separates 
Thesprotia and Cestrine, and between these rivers 
rises the promontory of Cheimerium. It was at this 
point of the mainland then that the Corinthians cast 
anchor and made a camp. 

XLVI I. The Corcyraeans, when they became 
aware of their approach, manned a hundred and ten 
ships under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, 
and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands 
which are called Sybota, the ten Attic ships being 
also present. Their land-forces were at the promon- 
tory of Leucimne, and also a thousand hoplites of 
the Zacynthians who had come to aid the Corcy- 
raeans. The Corinthians, also, had the aid of many 
barbarians who had assembled on the mainland ad- 
jacent ; for the dwellers on the mainland in that 
region have always been friendly to them. 



XL VIII. Επειδή δε παρεσκεύαστο τοις Κοριν- 
θίου, Χαβοντες τριών ήμερων σιτία άνήγοντο 

2 α>9 επί ναυμαχία από του Χειμερίου νυκτός, καϊ 
άμα εφ πΧέοντες καθορώσι τάς των Κερκυραίων 

3 ναΰς μετεώρους τε καϊ επι σφάς πΧεούσας. ώς 
δε κατεΐδον άΧΧηΧους, άντιπαρετάσσοντο, επι 
μεν το δεξιόν κέρας Κερκυραίων αί Άττικαϊ 
νήες, το δε άΧΧο αυτοί επείγον τρία τεΧη ποιή- 
σαντες των νέων, ων ηρχε τριών στρατηγών 
εκάστου εις. ούτω μεν Κερκυραίοι ετάξαντο. 

4 Κορινθίοις δε το μεν δεξιόν κέρας αί Μεγαρίδες 
νήες είχον και αί Άμπρακιώτιδες, κατά δε το 
μέσον οι αΧΧοι ζύμμαχοι ώς έκαστοι, ευώνυμον 
δε κέρας αυτοί οι Κορίνθιοι ταΐς άριστα τών νεών 
ιτΧεούσαις κατά τους 'Αθηναίους καϊ το δεξιόν 
τών Κερκυραίων εΐχον. 

XLIX. Άυμμείξαντες δε, επειδή τά σημεία 
έκατέροις ήρθη, έναυμάχουν, ποΧΧούς μεν όπΧίτας 
έχοντες αμφότεροι επι τών καταστρωμάτων, ποΧ- 
Χούς δε τοξότας τε καϊ άκοντιστάς, τω παΧαιώ 

2 τρόπω άπειρότερον ετι παρεσκευασμένοι. ην τ€ 
ή ναυμαχία καρτερά, τί) μεν τέχντ) ούχ ομοίως, 

3 πεζομαχία δε το πΧέον προσφερής ούσα. επειδή 
yap προσβάΧοιεν άΧΧήΧοις, ου ραδίως άπεΧύοντο 
υπό τε του πΧήθους καϊ οχΧου τών νεών και μαΧ- 
Χόν τι πιστεύοντες τοις επι του καταστρώματος 
όπΧίταις ες την νίκην, οι καταστάντες εμάχοντο 
ησυχαζουσών τών νεών* διέκπΧοι δέ ουκ ήσαν, 
άΧΧά θυμώ καϊ ρώμτ) το πΧέον έναυμάχουν ή 


BOOK I. xlviii. i-xlix. 3 

XLVIII. When their preparations had been made, 
the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days, 
put off by night from Cheimerium with the intention 
of giving battle, and at daybreak as they sailed along 
they descried the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea 
and sailing to meet them. And as soon as they saw 
one another, they drew up in opposing battle lines, 
the Attic ships on the right wing of the Corcyraeans, 
who themselves held the rest of the line forming 
three divisions, each under the command of one of 
the three generals. So the Corcyraeans arrayed them- 
selves ; but the right wing of the Corinthian fleet 
was held by the Megarian ships and the Ambracian, 
in the centre were the other allies with their several 
contingents, while the left was held by the Corinth- 
ians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed 
to the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcy- 

XLIX. When the standards were raised on either 
side they joined battle and fought, both having many 
hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and 
javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather 
rudely in the ancient fashion. And so the sea-fight was 
hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill 
displayed as because it was more like a battle on land. 
For when they dashed against one another they could 
not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number 
and throng of the ships, still more because they 
trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks, 
who stood and fought while the ships remained 
motionless ; and there was no cutting of the line, 1 but 
they fought with fury and brute strength rather than 

1 δύκπλους was a breaking of the line so as to ram the 
enemy's ship in the flank or astern. 



4 επιστήμη, πανταχτ) μεν ούν πολύς θόρυβος 
και ταραχώδης ην η ναυμαχία 9 εν rj αϊ * Αττικοί 
νήες παραγιγνόμεναι τοις Κερκυραίοις, ει πη 
πιέζοιντο, φόβον μεν παρεΐχον rots: εναντίοις, 
μάχης δε ούκ ηρχον δεδιότες οι στρατηγοί την 

5 πρόρρησιν των Αθηναίων, μάλιστα δε το δεξιον 
κέρας των Κορινθίων επόνει. οι yap Κερκυραίοι 
είκοσι ναυσίν αυτούς τρεμάμενοι καϊ καταδιώ- 
ξαντες σποράδας ες την ήπειρον καϊ μέχρι του 
στρατοπέδου πλεύσαντες αυτών καϊ επεκβάντες 
ενέπρησάν τε τας σκηνάς έρημους καϊ τα χρήματα 

6 διήρπασαν. ταύτη μεν ούν οι Κορίνθιοι καϊ οι 
ξύμμαχοι ησσώντο τε καϊ οι Κερκυραίοι έπε- 
κράτουν fj 8έ αύτοϊ ήσαν οι Κορίνθιοι, επί τω 
εύωνύμω, πολύ ενικών, τοις Κερκυραίοις τών 
είκοσι νεών άπο ελάσσονος πλήθους εκ της διώ- 

7 ξεως ού παρουσών. οι δε 'Αθηναίοι ορώντες τους 
Κερκυραίους πιεζόμενους μάλλον ήδη άπροφα- 
σίστως επεκούρουν, το μεν πρώτον άπεχόμενοι 
ώστε μη εμβάλλειν τινί' επειδή δε η τροπή 
εγίγνετο λαμπρώς καϊ ενέκειντο οι Κορίνθιοι, τότε 
δη έργου πάς εϊχετο ηδη καϊ διεκέκριτο ούδεν 
ετι, άλλα ξυνέπεσεν ες τούτο ανάγκης ώστε 
επιχειρησαι άλληλοις τους Κορινθίους καϊ 'Αθη- 

L. Ύης δε τροπής γενομένης οι Κορίνθιοι τά 
σκάφη μεν ούχ εΐλκον άναδούμενοι τών νεών ας 
καταδύσειαν, προς δε τους ανθρώπους ετράποντο 
φονεύειν διεκπλέοντες μάλλον η ζωγρεΐν, τους τε 
αυτών φίλους, ουκ ησθημένοι οτι ησσηντο οι επί 
2 τω δεξιώ κέρα, άγνοούντες εκτεινον. πολλών γαρ 

8 4 

BOOK I. xlix. 3-l. 2 

with skill. Accordingly there was everywhere much 
tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic 
ships, if they saw the Corcyraeans pressed at any 
point, came up and kept the enemy in awe ; but 
their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to 
disobey the instructions of the Athenians. The right 
wing of the Corinthians suffered most; for the 
Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pur- 
sued them in disorder to the mainland, and then, 
sailing right up to their camp and disembarking, 
burned the deserted tents and plundered their 
property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and 
their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans pre- 
vailed ; but on the left wing where the Corinthians 
themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for 
the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin 
with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit. But 
the moment the Athenians saw that the Corcyraeans 
were being hard pressed, they began to help them 
more unreservedly, and though they at first refrained 
from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it 
was conspicuously clear that they were being put to 
flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then 
at length every man put his hand to work, and fine 
distinctions were no longer rrcade ; matters had come 
to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of 
necessity had to attack one another. 

L. After the rout of the Corcyraeans the Corinth- 
ians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the 
ships which had been disabled, but turned their 
attention to the men, cruising up and down and 
killing them in preference to taking them alive ; and 
they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being 
aware that their right wing had been worsted. For 



νεών ούσών αμφοτέρων καϊ επι ποΧύ της θα- 
Χάσσης επεχονσών, επειδή ζυνέμειζαν άΧΧηΧοις, 
ου ραδίως την Ζιάηνωσιν εποιοΰντο οποίοι εκρά- 
τονν ή εκρατοΰντο* ναυμαγία yap αΰτη "ΈιΧΧησι 
προς "ΈΧΧηνας νεών πΧηθει μεγίστη δη των προ 

3 αυτής ηβη&νηται. επειδή δε κατεδίωξαν τους 
Κερκυραίους οι Κορίνθιοι ες την yrjv, προς τά 
ναυάγια καϊ τους νεκρούς τους σφετέρους ετρά- 
ποντο, καϊ των πΧείστων εκράτησαν ώστε 
προσκομίσαι προς τά Σύβοτα, ου αύτοΐς 6 κατά 
yrjv στρατός των βαρβάρων προσεβεβοηθήκεν 
εστί δε τα Χύβοτα της ©εσπρωτίδος Χι μην 
έρημος, τούτο δε ποιησαντες αύθις άθροισθεντες 

4 επεπΧεον τοις Κερκυραίοις. οι δε ταΐς πΧωίμοις 
καϊ δσαι ήσαν Χοιπαϊ μετά των 'Αττικών νεών 
καϊ αυτοί άντεπέπΧεον, δείσαντες μη ες την yrjv 

5 σφών πειρώσιν άποβαίνειν. ήδη δε ην όψε καϊ 
επεπαιάνιστο αύτοΐς ως ες επίπΧουν, και ol 
Κορίνθιοι έξαπίνης πρύμναν εκρούοντο,κατιδόντες 
είκοσι ναύς Αθηναίων π ροσπΧεουσας, ας ύστερον 
των δέκα βοηθούς εξέπεμψαν οι Αθηναίοι, δεί- 
σαντες, όπερ εηένετο, μη νικηθώσιν οι Κερκυραίοι 
καϊ αϊ σφέτεραι δέκα νήες oXiyai άμύνειν ώσιν. 
LI. ταύτας ούν προϊδόντες οι Κορίνθιοι και 
ύποτοπησαντες απ* Αθηνών είναι, ούχ όσας 

2 εώρων άΧΧα πΧείους, ύπανεγωρουν. τοις δέ Κερ- 
κυραίοις (επεπΧεον yap μάΧΧον εκ του αφανούς) 

1 Thucydides makes allowance for Salamis, for example, 
where Greeks had fought against Persians. 


BOOK I. L. 2-LI. 2 

since the ships or the two fleets were many and 
covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when 
they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to 
determine just who were conquering and who were 
being conquered ; for this sea-fight was in number of 
ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had 
ever before fought against Hellenes. 1 But as soon 
as the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the 
shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead, 2 
and they were able to recover most of them and to 
fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thes- 
protia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had 
come to their aid. When they had accomplished 
this, they got their forces together and sailed once 
more against the Corcyraeans. And they, with such 
of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that 
had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships, 
on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that 
they would attempt to disembark on their territory. 
It was now late and the paean had been sounded for 
the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to 
back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships 
approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after 
the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what 
happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be de- 
feated and their own ten ships would be too few to 
help them. LI. So when the Corinthians sighted 
these ships before the Corcyraeans did, suspecting that 
they were from Athens and that there were more of 
them than they saw, they began to withdraw. For the 
Corcyraeans, however, the Athenian ships were sailing 
up more out of view and could not be seen by them, 

* The bodies of the dead which were on the disabled 



ούχ εωρώντο, καϊ εθαύμαζον τους Κορινθίους 
πρύμναν κ ρουο μένους, πριν τίνες ίδόντες ειπον 
οτι νηες εκεΐναι επιπΧεουσιν. τ ore δη και αυτοί 
άνεχώρονν (ξυνεσκόταζε yap ήδη), και ol Κορίνθιοι 

3 αποτραπομενοι την διάΧυσιν εποιήσαντο. οΰτω 
μεν ή άτταΚΧα^ή iyevero άΧΧηΧων, και ή ναυμαχία 

4 ετεΧεύτα is νύκτα, τοις δε Κερκυραίοις στρατό- 
πεδευομένοις επϊ τη Αευκίμνη αί είκοσι νηες αϊ 
εκ των ' Αθηνών αύται, ων ήρχ€ ΤΧαύκων τ€ 6 
Aεάy ρου καϊ 'Ανδοκίδης 6 Aeωyόpoυ, δια των 
νεκρών καϊ vaυayίωv π ροσ κο μισθ είσαι κατέπΧεον 
ες το στρατόπεδον ου ποΧΧώ ύστερον ή ώφθησαν. 

5 οι δε Κερκυραίοι (ην yap νύξ) εφοβήθησαν μη 
ποΧέμιαι ώσιν, έπειτα δε έγνωσαν και ώρμίσαντο. 

LII. Ύύ) δέ υστεραία άvayayόμ€vaι αϊ τε Άττι~ 
καϊ τριάκοντα νήες και τών Κερκυραίων οσαι 
πΧώιμοι ήσαν επέπΧευσαν επί τον εν τοις Συβό- 
τοις Χι μένα, εν φ οι Κορίνθιοι ώριιουν, βουΧό- 

2 μενοι είδεναι ει ναυμαχήσουσιν. οι δε τάς μεν 
ναυς άραντες άπο της γ% καϊ παραταζάμενοι 
μετεώρους ήσύχαζον, ναυμαχίας ου διανοούμενοι 
αρχειν εκόντες, ορώντες π ρο σyεyεvη μεν ας τε ναυς 
εκ τών % Αθηνών ακραιφνείς καϊ σφίσι ποΧΧά τα 
άπορα ξυμβεβηκότα, αίχμαΧώτων τε περί φυΧα- 
κής, οΰς εν ταΐς ναυσϊν είχον, καϊ επισκευην ουκ 

3 ουσαν τών νεών εν χωρίω ερήμω• του δε οϊκαδε 
πΧού μαΧΧον δι,εσκοπουν οπη κομισθήσονται, δε- 
διάτες μη οι Αθηναίοι νομίσαντες ΧεΧυσθαι τ ας 
σπονδάς, διότι ες χείρας ήΧθον, ουκ εώσι σφάς 

LIIL "Έ*δοξεν ουν αύτοΐς άνδρας ες κεΧήτιον 



and so they wondered that the Corinthians were 
backing water, until some of them caught sight of the 
ships and said, f< Yonder are ships sailing up." Then 
they too retreated — for it was already getting dark ; 
whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and 
broke off the action. Thus they separated, the sea-fight 
ending at nightfall. And while the Corcyraeans were 
encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from 
Athens, under the command of Glaucon son of 
Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made 
their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed 
down to the camp not long after they were sighted. 
And the Corcyraeans — for it was night — were afraid 
they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized 
them and the ships came to anchor. 

LI I. On the next day the thirty Attic ships and 
as many of the Corcyraean as were seaworthy put 
to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota, 
where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see 
whether they would fight. But the Corinthians, 
although they put out from shore and drew up in 
line in the open sea, kept quiet : for they had no 
thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it, 
as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from 
Athens and that they themselves were involved 
in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the 
captives whom they had in their ships and the im- 
possibility of refitting their ships in a desert place. 
What they were more concerned about was the 
voyage home, how they should get back, for they 
were afraid that the Athenians would consider that 
the treaty had been broken, since they had come to 
blows, and would not let them sail away. 

LIU. Accordingly they determined to put some 

8 9 


εμβιβάσαντας άνευ κηρυκείου προσπέμψαι τοις 

2 Αθηναίοις και πεΐραν ποιησασθαι. πέμψαντες 
τε eXeyov τοιάΒε* " ΆΒικεΐτε, ώ ανΒρες ' Αθηναίοι, 
ποΧέμου άρχοντες και σπονΒάς Χύοντες* ημΐν yap 
ποΧεμίους τους ημετέρους τιμωρουμένοις έμποΒών 
ΐστασθε δπΧα άνταιρόμενοι. ει S* ύμΐν yvώμη 
βστί κωΧύειν τ€ ημάς επί Κέρκυραν ή άΧΧοσε εϊ 
77*77 βουΧόμεθα πΧεϊν καϊ τας σπονΒας Χύετε, 
ημάς τούσΒε πρώτους Χαβοντες χρησασθε ως 

3 ποΧεμίοις." oi μεν Βη τοιαύτα εΐπον των he 
Κερκυραίων το μεν στρατόπεΒον όσον επηκουσεν 
άνεβόησεν ευθύς Χαβεΐν τε αυτούς καϊ άποκτεΐναι, 

4 oi Be 'Αθηναίοι τοιάΒε άπεκρίναντο- " Ούτε αρ- 
χομεν ποΧέμου, ώ άνΒρες ΤΙεΧοποννησιοι, οΰτε 
τας σπονΒάς Χύομεν, Κερκυραίοις Βε τοΐσΒε ζυμ- 
μάχοις οΰσι βοηθοί ήΧθομεν. εϊ μεν ουν άΧΧοσε 
ίτοι βούΧεσθε πΧεΐν, ου κωΧύομεν εϊ Βε επί 
Κέρκυραν πΧευσεΐσθε ή ες των εκείνων τι χωρίων, 
ου περιοψόμεθα κατά το Βυνατόν." 

LIV. Τοιαύτα των 'Αθηναίων άποκριναμενων 
οι μεν Κορίνθιοι τον τε πΧουν τον επ' οίκου πάρε- 
σκευάζοντο καϊ τροπαΐον έστησαν εν τοις εν τη 
ηπείρω Συβότοις• οι Βε Κερκυραίοι τα τε vaυάyιa 
καϊ νεκρούς άνείΧοντο τα κατά σφας, εξενεχθέν- 
των υπό τε του ρου καϊ άνεμου, ος yεvόμεvoς της 
νυκτός ΒιεσκέΒασεν αύτα πανταχη, καϊ τροπαΐον 
άντέστησαν εν τοις εν τη νήσω Χυβότοις ώς 
2 νενικηκότες. yvώμr} Βε τοιαΒε έκάτεροι την νίκην 
προσεποιησαντο' Κορίνθιοι μεν κρατησαντες ττ} 

1 To bear a herald's wand would have been a recognition 
of a state of war, whereas the Corinthians were anxious not 
to be regarded as enemies by the Athenians. 



men, without a herald's wand, 1 into a boat and send 
them to the Athenians, to test their intentions. 
And these men bore the following message : u You 
do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a 
treaty ; for by taking up arms against us you inter- 
fere with us when we are but punishing our enemies. 
But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing 
against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and 
you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here 
and treat us as enemies. " Thus they spoke ; and 
all the host of the Corcyraeans that was within 
hearing shouted : " Take them and kill them ! " But 
the Athenians made answer as follows : " We are not 
beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we 
breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the 
Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you 
wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you ; 
but if you ever sail against Corcyra or any place of 
theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to 
prevent it." 

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, 
the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage 
homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the 
mainland ; and the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks 
and dead bodies 2 that had been carried in their 
direction by the current and by the wind, which had 
arisen in the night and scattered them in every 
direction, and set up, as being the victors, a rival 
trophy at Sybota on the island. Each side claimed 
the victory on the following grounds : The Corinth- 
ians set up a trophy because they nad prevailed in 

a Taking up the dead bodies without asking permission of 
the enemy indicated that the field was maintained, and was 
therefore a claim of victory. 



ναυμαχία μέχρι νυκτός, ώστε real ναυάγια πΧείστα 
καϊ νεκρούς προσκομίσασθαι, καϊ άνδρας έχοντες 
αίχμαΧώτους ουκ εΧάσσους χιΧίων ναυς τε κατά- 
δύσαντες περί εβδομηκοντα έστησαν τροπαΐον ι 
Κερκυραίοι δε τριάκοντα ναυς μάλιστα διαφθεί- 
ραντες, καϊ επειδή 'Αθηναίοι ηΧθον, άνεΧόμενοι 
τα κατά σφάς αυτούς ναυάγια καϊ νεκρούς, καϊ 
οτι αύτοΐς τη τε προτεραία πρύμναν κρουόμενοι 
ύττεχώρησαν οι Κορίνθιοι ιδόντες τάς Άττικάς 
ναύς, καϊ err είδη ηΧθον οι Αθηναίοι, ουκ άντεπέ- 
πΧεον εκ των Ίίυβότων, δια ταύτα τροπαΐον έστη- 
σαν, ούτω μεν εκάτεροι νικάν ήζίουν. 

LV. 0/ δε Κορίνθιοι άποπΧεοντες επ' οϊκου 
'Ανακτόρων, 6 εστίν επϊ τω στόματι του ' Αμ- 
πρακικου κόΧττον, εΐΧον απάτη (rjv δε κοινον 
Κερκυραίων καϊ εκείνων), καϊ καταστήσαντες 
εν αύτω Κορινθίους οίκητορας άνεχώρησαν επ' 
οϊκου* καϊ των Κερκυραίων οκτακόσιους μεν οι 
ήσαν δουΧοι άπέδοντο, πεντήκοντα δε καϊ δια- 
κόσιους δησαντες εφύΧασσον καϊ εν θεραπεία 
εϊχον ποΧΧτ), όπως αύτοΐς την Κερκυραν άνα- 
χωρήσαντες προσποιησειαν ετύηχανον δε και 
δυνάμει αυτών οί πΧείους πρώτοι οντες της 
2 πόΧεως. ή μεν ούν Κέρκυρα ούτω περισώνεται 
τω ποΧεμω των Κορινθίων, καϊ αί νηες των 
'Αθηναίων άνεχώρησαν εξ αύτης. αίτια δε αύτη 
πρώτη eyivero του ποΧέμου τοις Κορινθίοις ες 
τους 'Αθηναίους, οτι σφίσιν εν σπονδαΐς μετά 
Κερκυραίων εναυμάχουν. 

LVI. Μετά ταύτα δ' ευθύς καϊ τάδε ξυνεβη 

1 έστησαν τοοπαϊον bracketed by Hude, following Kruger. 



the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able 
to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead 
bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less 
than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy 
ships ; and the Corcyraeans, because they had de- 
stroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians 
came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way 
and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the 
day before had backed water and retreated at sight 
of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came 
would not sail out from Sybota and give battle — 
for these reasons set up a trophy. So each side 
claimed the victory. 

LV. The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward, 
took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth 
of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corcy- 
raeans and themselves in common, and establishing 
there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of 
their Corcyraean prisoners they sold eight hundred 
who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they 
kept in custody and treated them with much con- 
sideration, their motive being that when they re- 
turned to Corcyra they might win it over to their 
side ; λ and it so happened that most of these were 
among the most influential men of the city. In this 
way, then, Corcyra had the advantage in the war 
with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians 
withdrew from it. And this was the first ground 
which the Corinthians had for the war against the 
Athenians, because they had fought with the Corcy- 
raeans against them in time of truce. 

LVI. Immediately after this the following events 

1 cf. in. lxx. 1, where the carrying out of this plan of the 
Corinthians leads to the bloody feud at Corcyra. 



γενέσθαι τοις Αθηναίοι? καϊ ΤΙελοποννησίοις 
2 διάφορα ες το πολεμεΐν. των yap Κορινθίων 
πρασσοντων όπως τιμωρησονται αυτούς, υποτο- 
πησαντες την εχθραν αυτών οι Αθηναίοι ΥΙοτει- 
δεάτας, οΐ οίκοΰσιν επί τω ίσθμώ της ΤΙαλληνης, 
Κορινθίων αποίκους, εαυτών δε ξυμμάχους φόρου 
υποτελείς, εκέλευον το ες ΤΙαΧληνην τείχος κάθε- 
Χεΐν και ομήρους δούναι, τους τε επιδημιουρ^ούς 
εκπεμπειν καϊ το λοιπόν μη δέχεσθαι ους κατά 
έτος εκαστον Κορίνθιοι επεμπον, δείσαντες μη 
άποστώσιν υπό τε ΤΙερδίκκου πειθόμενοι καϊ 
Κορινθίων, τους τε άλλους τους επί ®ράκης 
ξυναποστησωσι ξυμμάχους. 

LVII. Ύαΰτα δε περί τους Υίοτειδεάτας οι 
Αθηναίοι προπαρεσκευάζοντο ευθύς μετά την εν 

2 Κέρκυρα ναυμαχίαν οΐ τε yap Κορίνθιοι φανερώς 
ηδη διάφοροι ήσαν, Ώερδίκκας τε ο 'Αλεξάνδρου, 
Μακεδόνων βασιλεύς, επεπολέμωτο ξύμμαχος 

3 πρότερον καϊ φίλος ων. επολεμώθη δε, οτι 
Φιλίππω τω εαυτού άδελφω καϊ Αερδα koivtj 
προς αυτόν ενάντιου μένοις οι 'Αθηναίοι ζυμμαγίαν 

4 εποιησαντο. δεδιώς τε επρασσεν ες τε την Αακε- 
δαίμονα πέμπων όπως πόλεμος ye -νηται αύτοΐς 
προς ΤΙελοποννησίους, καϊ τους Κορινθίους προσ- 
εποιεΐτο της ΤΙοτειδαίας ένεκα αποστάσεως' 

6 προσέφερε δε λόyoυς καϊ τοις επϊ ®ράκης Χαλκι- 
δεΰσι και Έοττιαίοις ξυναποστηναι, νομίζων, el 
ξύμμαχα ταύτα εχοι, όμορα οντά, τα χωρία, 

1 Son of Alexander, who had been a friend of the Hellenes 
in the Persian war. Perdiccas, who originally possessed 
only Lower Macedonia, had deprived his brother Philip of 


BOOK I. lvi. i-lvii. 5 

also occurred, which caused differences between the 
Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the 
war. While the Corinthians were devising how they 
should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter, 
suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans 
(who dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are 
colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the 
Athenians), to pull down their wall on the side of 
Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send 
away and not receive in the future the magistrates 
whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send 
every year. For they were afraid that the Poti- 
daeans, persuaded by Perdiccas 1 and the Corinthians, 
would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in 
Thrace to revolt with them. 

LVI I. These precautions the Athenians took with 
regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the sea- 
fight at Corcyra; for the Corinthians were now openly 
at variance with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, 
king of the Macedonians, who had before been an 
ally and friend, had now become hostile. And he 
had become hostile because the Athenians had made 
an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, 
who were making common cause against himself. 
Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lace- 
daemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens 
and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win 
over the Corinthians, with a view to the revolt of 
Potidaea ; and, furthermore, he made overtures to 
the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join 
in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these 
countries, which bordered on his own, it would be 

Upper Macedonia, and now was king of all Macedonia. 
See, further, n. xcix. ff. 



6 paov αν τον ποΧεμον μετ α*των ποιεΐσθαι. ων 
οι Αθηναίοι αίσθομενοι καϊ ΙβουΧόμενοι προκατα- 
Χαμβάνειν των πόΧεων τας αποστάσεις (ετυχον 
yap τριάκοντα ναύς άποστεΧΧοντες καϊ χίλιους 
όπΧίτας επί την ηην αυτού ' Αρχεστράτου του 
Αυκομηδους μετ αΧΧων τεσσάρων στρατηγούν- 
τος), επιστεΧΧουσι τοις άρχουσι των νεών ΥΙοτει- 
δεατών τε ομήρους Χαβεΐν καϊ το τείχος καθεΧεϊν, 
των τε πΧησίον πόΧεων φυΧακην εχειν όπως μη 

LVIII. ΐίοτειδεαται δε πέμψαντες μεν καϊ 
παρ* ' Αθηναίους πρέσβεις, ει πως πείσειαν μη 
σφών περί νεωτερίζειν μηδέν, εΧθόντες δε καϊ 
ες την Αακεδαίμονα μετά Κορινθίων, 1 όπως 
ετοιμάσαιντο τιμωρίαν, ην δέη, επειδή εκ τε 
'Αθηνών εκ ποΧΧοΰ πράσσοντες ουδέν ηΰροντο 
επιτηδειον, άλλ' αϊ νήες αι επί Μακεδονίαν καϊ 
επί σφας ομοίως επΧεον καϊ τα τέΧη των Αακε- 
δαιμονίων ύπέσχετο αύτοΐς, ην επί ΤΙοτείδαιαν 
ϊωσιν 'Αθηναίοι, ες την Άττικην εσβαΧεΐν, τότε 
δη κατά τον καιρόν τούτον αφίστανται μετά 
ΧαΧκιδεων καϊ Βοττιαίων κοινή ξυνομόσαντες. 

2 καϊ ΤΙερδίκκας πείθει ΧαΧκιδεας τας επί θαΧάσση 
πόΧεις εκΧιπόντας καϊ καταβαΧόντας άνοικί- 
σασθαι ες "ΟΧυνθον μίαν τε ποΧιν ταύτην Ισχυραν 
ποιησασθαν τοις τ εκΧιπούσι τούτοις της εαυτού 
γης της Ήίυγδονίας περί την Τ&όΧβην Χίμνην 
έδωκε νέμεσθαι, εως αν 6 προς 'Αθηναίους πόΧε- 

1 ϊπρασσον, before #π»ι in all MSS•, deleted by Poppo. 

9 6 

BOOK I. lvii. 5~lviii. 2 

easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the 
war. But the Athenians became aware of these 
designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the 
cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since 
they happened to be sending against the country oi 
Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under 
the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes 
and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans 
and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch 
upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them 
from revolting. 

LVII I. The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent 
envoys to Athens, to see if they could persuade 
them not to take any harsh measures with reference to 
themselves ; but envoys of theirs went also to Lace- 
daemon in the company of the Corinthians, with 
the object of having assistance ready to hand in 
case of need. From the Athenians, with whom they 
carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no 
satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships 
destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail 
against themselves as well, whereas the magis- 
trates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to 
invade Attica if the Athenians went against Poti- 
daea ; so they seized this opportunity and revolted, 
entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians ! 
and Bottiaeans. Perdiccas at the same time per 
suaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull dowr 
their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at 
Olynthus, making there a single strong city ; and 
he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a 
part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake 
Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war 

H.e. the Chalcidians of Thrace. 



μος rj. καϊ οι μεν άνωκίζοντό τβ καθαιρούντες 
τάς πόΧεις καϊ ες πόλεμον παρεσκευάζοντο* 
LIX. ai δε τριάκοντα νηες των 'Αθηναίων άφι- 
κνοΰνται ες τα επϊ ®ράκης καϊ καταΧαμβάνουσι 
2 την τε ΤΙοτείδαιαν καϊ τάΧΧα άφεστηκότα. νομί- 
σαντες δε οι στρατηγοί αδύνατα είναι προς τε 
Τίερδίκκαν ποΧεμεϊν ττ) παρούστ) δυνάμει καϊ τα 
ξυναφεστώτα χωρία, τρέπονται επϊ την Μακε- 
δονίαν, εφ? όπερ καϊ το πρώτον εξεπέμποντο, καϊ 
καταστάντες επολεμουν μετά Φίλιππου καϊ των 
Δέρδου άδεΧφών άνωθεν στρατιά εσβεβληκότων. 
LX. Καϊ εν τούτω οι Κορίνθιοι, της ΤΙοτειδαίας 
άφεστηκυίας καϊ των 'Αττικών νεών περί Μακε- 
δονίαν ούσών, δεδιότες περί τω γωρίω και οίκεΐον 
τον κίνδυνον ηγούμενοι πέμπονσιν εαυτών τε 
εθελοντάς καϊ τών άΧΧων ΤΙεΧοπον νησιών μισθω 
πείσαντες εξακόσιους καϊ χίλιους τους πάντας 

2 όπλίτας και ψιλούς τετρακόσιους, εστρατηηει 
δε αυτών Άριστεύς ο Αδειμάντου, κατά φιλίαν 
τε αυτοί) ούχ ηκιστα οι πλείστοι εκ Κορίνθου 
στρατιώται εθεΧονταϊ ξυνεσποντο' ην yap τοις 

3 ΤΙοτειδεάταις αίεί ποτέ επιτήδειος, καϊ άφικνοΰν- 
ται τεσσαρακοστή ήμερα ύστερον επί ®ράκης ή 
ΐίοτείδαια άπεστη. 

LXI. *ί1Χθε δε καϊ τοις Άθηναίοις ευθύς ή 
άγγεΧία τών πόλεων οτι άφεστάσι, καϊ πεμ- 
πουσιν, ως ησθοντο καϊ τους μετά Άριστέως 
επιπαριόντας, δισγιλίους εαυτών όπΧίτας καϊ 
τεσσαράκοντα ναΰς προς τα άφεστώτα, καϊ ΚαΧ- 
Χίαν τον ΚαΧΧιάδου πέμπτον αύτον στρατηηον 
2 οι άφικόμενοι ες Μακεδονίαν πρώτον καταλαμβά- 

9 8 


with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to 
dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for 
war. LIX. But when the thirty ships of the 
Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found 
Potidaea and the other places already in revolt. 
Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with 
their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas 
and the places which had revolted, turned their 
attention to Macedonia, which was their destination 
at the start, and when they had got a foothold 
carried on Avar in concert with Philip and the 
brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Mace- 
donia from the interior with an army. 

LX. Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that 
Potidaea had revolted and the Attic ships were in 
the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed 
about the place and thinking that the danger came 
home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own 
and such other Peloponnesians as they induced 
by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four 
hundred light-armed troops. The general in com- 
mand was Aristeus son of Adimantus ; and it was 
chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the 
soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers ; for 
he had always been on friendly terms with the Poti- 
daeans. And they arrived on the coast of Thrace 
on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidaea. 

LXI. The news of the revolt of the cities quickly 
reached the Athenians also ; and when they learned 
that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to 
support the rebels, they sent against the places in 
revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty 
ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other 
generals. These first came to Macedonia and found 



νουσι τους προτέρους χίλιους ®ερμην άρτι rjpy- 

3 κότας καϊ ΐΐύδναν πολιορκοΰντας, προσκαθε- 
ζόμενοι δε καϊ αυτοί την ΙΙύδναν επολιόρκησαν 
μεν, έπειτα δε ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι καϊ ζυμ- 
μαχίαν avayKaiav π ρος τον Ώερδίκκαν, ώς αυτούς 
κατηπε^εν η ΥΙοτείδαια καϊ 6 Άριστεύς παρελη- 

4 λυθώς, άπανίστανται εκ της Μακεδονίας, καϊ 
άφικόμενοι ες Βέροιαν κάκεϊθεν επϊ έτρεψαν 1 καϊ 
πειράσαντες πρώτον του χωρίου καϊ ούχ ελόντες 
επορεύοντο κατά yrjv προς την ΤΙοτείδαιαν 
τρισχιλίοις μεν όπλίταις εαυτών, χωρίς δε των 
ξυμμάχων πολλοίς, ιππευσι δε εζακοσίοις Μακε- 
δόνων τοις μετά Φιλίππου καϊ ΐίαυσανίου* άμα 

5 δε νηες παρέπλεον εβδομήκοντα. κατ oXiyov δε 
προϊόντες τριταίοι άφίκοντο ες Τί^ωνον καϊ 

LXII. ΐίοτειδεάται δε καϊ οι μετά Άριστεως 
ΥΙελοποννήσιοι προσδεχόμενοι τους Αθηναίους 
εστ ρατοπεδεύοντο προς ΌΧύνθου εν τω ισθμω 

2 καϊ ayopav εξω της πόλεως επεποίηντο. στρα- 
^yov μεν ονν του πεζού παντός οι ζύμμαχοι 
7/ρηντο ' Αριστέα, της δε ίππου ΤΙερδίκκαν άπεστη 
yap ευθύς πάλιν των 'Αθηναίων καϊ ζυνεμάχει 
τοις ΤΙοτειδεάταις Ίόλαον άνθ αύτοΰ καταστησας 

3 άρχοντα, ην δε η yvώμη του Αριστέως, το μίν 
μεθ* εαυτού στρατόπεδον εχοντι 2 εν τω Ισθμω 
επιτηρεΐν τους 'Αθηναίους, ην επίωσι, Χαλκιδεας 
δε καϊ τους εξω Ισθμού ζνμμάχους καϊ την παρά 
ΥΙερδίκκου διακοσίαν ΐππον εν Όλύνθω μενειν, 

1 Μ Στρέψα?, Pluygers' certain emendation for 4πιστρ4- 
ψαι/τ€* of the MSS. 

2 Madvig deletes, followed by Hude. 



that the former thousand had just taken Therme 
and were besieging Pydna ; so they also took part 
in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they con- 
cluded an agreement and an alliance with Per- 
diccas, being forced thereto by the situation of 
Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which compelled 
them to hasten, and then they withdrew from Mace- 
donia. On their way they came to Beroea and 
thence to Strepsa, 1 and after an unsuccessful at- 
tempt upon this place proceeded overland to Poti- 
daea with three thousand hoplites of their own and 
with many of their allies besides, and with six 
hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the 
command of Philip and Pausanias ; and at the same 
time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the 
coast. And marching leisurely they arrived on the 
third day at Gigonus, and went into camp. 

LX1I. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians 
under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, en- 
camped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus ; and 
they had established a market outside of the city. 
The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the 
infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry ; for Perdiccas 
had immediately deserted the Athenians again 2 and 
was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having 
appointed Iolaus as his administrator at home. The 
plan of Aristeus was as follows: he was to hold his 
own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach 
of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the 
other allies from outside of the isthmus 3 and the 
two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were to 

1 In Mygdonia, north of Therme. 

2 For his first desertion of the Athenians, see ch. Ivii. 

8 i.e. the Bottiaeans, who, like the Chalcidians, lived out- 
side the isthmus. 



καϊ όταν ' Αθηναίοι επί σφας χωρώσι, κατά νώτου 
βοηθούνται iv μέσω ποιεΐν αυτών τους πολεμίους. 

4 ΚαΧλίας S* αΰ 6 των Αθηναίων στρατηγός καϊ οι 
ξυνάρχοντες τους μεν Μακεδόνας ιππέας καϊ τών 
ξυμμάχων ολίγους επι Όλύνθου άποπέμπουσιν, 
όπως εϊργωσι τους εκείθεν επιβοηθεΐν, αυτοί δε 
άναστησαντες το στρατόπεδον εχώρουν επί την 

5 ΤΙοτείδαιαν. καϊ επειδή προς τω ίσθμω iyevovTo 
καϊ είδον τους ενάντιους παρασκευαζόμενους ως 
ες μάχην, άντικαθίσταντο καϊ αυτοί, καϊ ου πολύ 

6 ύστερον ξυνεμισηον. καϊ αυτό μεν το του Ά/η- 
στεως κέρας καϊ όσοι περί εκείνον ήσαν Κορινθίων 
Τ€ καϊ των άλλων λο<γάδες έτρεψαν το καθ* 
εαυτούς καϊ επεξήλθον διώκοντες επί πολύ 9 το 
δε άλλο στρατόπεδον ΐίοτειδεατών καϊ ΙΙελο- 
ποννησίων ησσατο υπο τών ! Αθηναίων καϊ ες το 
τείχος κατέφυγεν. 

LXIII. Έπαναχωρών δέ ο Άριστεύς απο της 
διώξεως, ως όρα το άλλο στράτευμα ήσσημένον, 
ηπόρησε μεν όποτερωσε διακινδύνευση χωρησας, 
η επί της 'ΟΧύνθου η ες την ΤΙοτείδαιαν εδοξε 
δ' ουν ζυναηαηοντι τους μεθ* εαυτού ως ες 
ελάχιστον χωρίον δρόμω βιάσασθαι ες την 
ΤΙοτείδαιαν, καϊ παρήλθε πάρα την χηλην δια 
της θαΧάσσης βαλλόμενος τε καϊ χαλεπώς, ολί- 
γους μεν τινας αποβολών, τους δε πλείους σώσας. 
2 οι δ' απο της Όλύνθου τοις ΤΙοτειδεάταις βοηθοί 


BOOK I. lxii. 3-LX111. 2 

remain at Olynthus ; then when the Athenians 
should move against the forces of Aristeus, the 
others were to come up and attack them in the rear, 
and thus place the enemy between their two divi- 
sions. But Callias, the commander of the Athenians, 
and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and 
a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to shut off aid 
from that quarter, while they themselves broke 
camp and advanced against Potidaea. And when 
they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy pre- 
paring for battle, they took up their position facing 
them ; and soon the two sides joined battle. And 
the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included 
the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the 
forces opposed to them and pressed on a long dis- 
tance in pursuit; but the rest of the army of the 
Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by 
the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of 

LXIII. When Aristeus returned from the pursuit 
and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he 
was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way 
through towards Olynthus or into Potidaea. He 
determined, however, to bring his own troops to- 
gether into as compact a body as possible and to force 
his way into Potidaea on a run. And he succeeded 
in getting in by way of the breakwater through the 
sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles ; 
but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater 
number of them. Now when the battle began and 
the standards had been raised, 1 the auxiliaries of 

1 These signals were not for battle, but for the Olynthian 
auxiliaries to come, and as soon as it became clear, through 
the speedy success of the Athenians, that their object could 
not be accomplished, they were lowered. 

io 3 


(απέχει δέ εξήκοντα μάλιστα σταΒίους καϊ εστί 
καταφανές), ώς ή μάχη iyiyveTO καϊ τα σημεία 
ήρθη, βραχύ μεν τι προήΧθον ώς βοηθήσοντες, 
και οι ΜακεΒόνες ίππής άντιπαρετάξαντο ώς 
κωΧυσοντες• επειδή Be Βιά τάχους η νίκη των 
1 Αθηναίων iyiyveTO και τα σημεία κατεσπάσθη, 
πά\ιν επανεχώρουν ες το τείχος και οι Μακεδόνες 
πάρα τους * Αθηναίους• ίππής δ' ούΒετεροις πάρε- 

3 yevovTO. μετά Be την μάχην τροπαΐον έστησαν 
οι ' Αθηναίοι καϊ τους νεκρούς ύποσπόνΒους άπέ- 
Βοσαν τοις ΐΙοτειΒεάταις• άπεθανον δε ΤΙοτειΒεα- 
των μεν καϊ των ξυμμάχων dXiy<o εΧάσσους 
τριακοσίων, 'Αθηναίων Be αυτών πεντήκοντα καϊ 
εκατόν καϊ ΚαΧΧίας 6 στρατηγός. 

LXIV. Το δε εκ του ισθμού τείχος 1 ευθύς οι 
1 Αθηναίοι άποτειχίσαντες εφ ρου ρουν* το δ' ες την 
ΙΙαΧλήνην άτείχιστον ην ου yap ίκανοϊ ενόμιζον 
είναι εν τε τω ισθιχω φρουρεΐν καϊ ες την Παλ- 
Χήνην Βιαβάντες τειχίζειν, ΒεΒιότες μη σφίσιν οι 
ΥΙοτειΒεαται καϊ οι ξύμμαχοι yεvoμέvoις Βίχα 

2 επίθωνται* καϊ πυνθανόμενοι οι εν τη πόΧει 
* Αθηναίοι τήν ΏαΧΧήνην άτείχιστον ουσαν, χρονω 
ύστερον πέμπουσιν εξακόσιους καϊ χιΧίους 
όπΧίτας εαυτών καϊ Φορμίωνα τον Άσωπίου 
στpaτηyόv % ος άφικόμενος ες την ΤΙαΧΧήνην καϊ εξ 
Άφύτιος ορμώμενος πpoσήyayε ττ) ΥΙοτειΒαία τον 

1 Classen deletes, followed by Hude. 

1 On the Athenian side were 600 Macedonian cavalry 
(ch. lxi. 4), on the Potidaean side 200 Macedonian cavalry 
under Perdiccas (ch. lxii. 3). 

2 Thucydides omits the loss of the allies of the Athenians. 
8 The wall on the isthmus side of the Potidaeans is the 



the Potidaeans in Olynthus — which is only about 
sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidaea — 
advanced a short distance to give aid, and the Mace- 
donian cavalry drew up in line against them to 
prevent it. But since the Athenians were soon 
proving the victors and the standards were pulled 
down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls 
of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the 
Athenians. And so no cavalry got into Action 
on either side. 1 After the battle the Athenians set 
up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to 
the Potidaeans. There were slain, of the Potidaeans 
and their allies a little less than three hundred, and 
of the Athenians alone 2 about a hundred and fifty, 
and also their general Callias. 

LXIV. The city wall on the isthmus side 3 the 
Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall 
and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene 
was not shut off. 4 For they thought their numbers 
were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus 
and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall 
there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces, 
the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them. 
Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned 
that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen 
hundred of their own hoplites under the command 
of Phormio son of Asopius ; and he, when he arrived 
at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his 
army to Potidaea, marching leisurely and ravaging 

τβίχο* of ch. lxii. 6 ; the wall to Pallene is that mentioned 
in ch. lvi. 2 as rb is Υ1α\\4)νην τβίχοϊ. 

4 The investment of Potidaea was effected by walling off 
first the northern and then also the southern city wall by a 
blockading wall ; on the west and east, where the city ex- 
tended to the sea, the blockade was made with ships. 



στρατόν, /caret βραχύ προϊων κα\ κείρων άμα την 
3 yfjv ώς δε ούΒεΙς επεξήει ες μάχην, άπετείχισε 
το εκ της ΤΙαΧΧηνης τείχος• και ούτως τ/δ?; κατά 
κράτος η ΤΙοτείδαια άμφοτερωθεν εποΧιορκεΐτο 
καϊ εκ θαΧάσσης ναυσίν άμα εφορμονσαις. 

LXY. Άριστεύς δε άποτειχισθείσης αυτής καϊ 
ελπίδα ούδεμίαν έχων σωτηρίας, ην μη τι άπο 
ΏεΧοποννησου η αΧλο πάρα. Xoyov ηίηνηται, 
ξυνεβούΧευε μίν πΧην πεντακοσίων άνεμον τη- 
ρησασι τοις άΧΧοις εκπΧεΰσαι, όπως επί πΧεον 
ο σίτος άντίσχτ), καϊ αυτός ηθεΧε των μενόντων 
είναι* ως δ' ουκ έπειθε, βουΧόμενος τα επί τούτοις 
παρασκευάζειν καϊ όπως τα έξωθεν εξει ως άριστα, 
εκπΧουν ποιείται Χαθων την φυΧακην των Άθη~ 

2 ναίων καΧ παραμένων εν ΧαΧκιΒεΰσι τά τε αΧΧα 
ξυνεποΧεμει καϊ ΧερμυΧιών Χοχησας προς τη 
πόΧει ποΧΧούς διέφθειρεν, ες τε την ΤΙεΧοπόννη- 

3 σον επρασσεν οπτ) ωφεΧια τις γενήσεται. μετά 
$6 της Τίοτειδαίας την άποτείχισιν Φορμίων μεν 
έχων τους εξακόσιους καϊ χιΧ'ιους την ΧαΧκιδικην 
καΧ Έοττικην εοήου καϊ εστίν α καϊ ποΧίσματα 

LXVI. Ύοΐς δ' Άθηναίοις καϊ ΤΙεΧοποννησίοις 
αίτίαι μεν αύται προσ Γ γεγένηντο 1 ες άΧΧηΧους, 
τοις μεν Κορινθίοις 2 οτι την ΤΙοτείΒαιαν εαυτών 
ουσαν άποικίαν καϊ άνδρας Κορινθίων τ€ καϊ 

1 Hude reads npovycytvwro, with BCE. 

2 Hude inserts, after KopivBiois, the words is robs 'Αθηναίου*, 
following Reiske 



the country at the same time. And as no one came 
out against him to give battle he built a wall to 
blockade the Pallene wall. And so Potidaea was at 
length in a state of siege, which was prosecuted 
vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, 
where a fleet blockaded it. 

LXV. As for Aristeus, now that Potidaea was cut 
off by the blockade and he had no hope of saving it 
unless help should come from the Peloponnesus or 
something else should happen beyond his expecta- 
tion, he advised all the garrison except five hundred 
men to wait for a wind and sail out of the harbour, 
that the food might hold out longer, and he himself 
was ready to be one of those who should remain. But 
since he could not gain their consent, wishing to do 
the next best thing and to provide that their affairs 
outside should be put into the best possible con- 
dition, he sailed out, unobserved by the Athenian 
guard. He then remained among the Chalcidians, 
whom he assisted generally in carrying on the war, 
and especially by destroying a large force of Ser- 
mylians, whom he ambushed near their city ; and 
meanwhile he kept up negotiations with the Pelo- 
ponnesians to see if some aid could not be obtained. 
Phormio, however, after the investment of Potidaea 
was complete, took his sixteen hundred troops and 
ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice ; and he also cap- 
tured some Jowns. 

LXVI. As between the Athenians and the Pelo- 
ponnesians, then, these additional grounds of com- 
plaint had arisen on either side, the Corinthians 
being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieg- 
ing Potidaea, a colony of theirs with men in it from 



ΤΙελοποννησίων εν αντί} οντάς εποΧιόρκουν, τοις 
δε 'Αθηναίοι? ες τους ΥΙελοποννησίους οτι εαυτών 
τ€ πόλιν ξυμμαγίδα κ αϊ φόρου υποτελή απέ- 
στησαν καϊ ελθόντες σφίσιν άπο του προφανούς 
εμά-χοντο μβτά ϊίοτειδεατών. ου μέντοι δ j€ 
πόλεμος πω ξυνερρώηςί, άλλ' ετι άνοκωγτ) ην* 
Ιδία yap ταύτα οι Κορίνθιοι έπραξαν, 

LXVII. ΤΙολιορκουμενης δε της ΤΙοτειδαίας 
ούχ ήσύχαζον, ανδρών τε σφίσιν ενόντων και 
άμα περί τω γωρίω δεδιότες. παρεκάλουν τε 
ευθύς ες την Αακεδαίμονα τους ξυμμάχρυς καϊ 
κατεβόων ελθόντες των 'Αθηναίων οτι σπονδάς 
τε ΧεΧυκότες εΐεν καϊ άδικοΐεν την ΤΙεΧοπόννησον. 

2 Aiy ινήταί τε φανερώς μεν ου πρεσβευόμενοι, 
δεδιότες τους ' Αθηναίους, κρύφα δε, ούχ ήκιστα 
μετ αυτών ενηηον τον πόΧεμον, λεyovτες ουκ 

3 είναι αυτόνομοι κατά τάς σπονδάς. οι δε Αακε- 
δαιμόνιοι προσπαρακαΧέσαντες των ξυμμάγων 
καϊ 1 ει τις τι άΧΧος εφη ηδικήσθαι υπό Αθηναίων, 
£oXXoyov σφών αυτών ποιησαντες τον είωθότα 

4 λ^ειν εκελευον. καϊ άΧΧοι τε παριόντες iyKXrj- 
ματα εποιοΰντο ώς έκαστοι καϊ M.εyapής, δη- 
Χούντες μεν καϊ έτερα ουκ oXiya διάφορα, μάΧιστα 
δε Χι μένων τε εϊpyεσθaι τών εν ttj 'Αθηναίων 
αρχή και της 'Αττικής ayopfc πάρα τας σπονδάς. 

5 παρελθόντες δε τελευταίοι Κορίνθιο/ καϊ τους 
άλλους εάσαντες πρώτον παροξυναι τους Αακε- 
δαιμονίους επεΐπον τοιάδε. 

LXVIII. "Το πιστόν υμάς, ώ Αακεδαιμόνιοι, 
της καθ' υμάς αυτούς πολιτείας καϊ ομιλίας 

1 Hud θ reads tc καϊ with C and some inferior MS8. 


Corinth and the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, because 
the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of 
a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and 
then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans 
against themselves. As yet, however, the war had 
not openly broken out, but there was still a truce 
for in these things the Corinthians had acted only on 
their own authority. 

LXVI I. But when siege was laid to Potidaea they 
did not take it quietly, not only because Corinthians 
were in the town, but also because they were in fear 
about the place ; and they immediately summoned 
the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, they pro- 
ceeded to inveigh against the Athenians on the 
ground that they had broken the treaty and were 
wronging the Peloponnesus. The Aeginetans also 
sent delegates — not openly, to be sure, for they 
feared the Athenians, but secretly — and, acting with 
the Corinthians, took a leading part in fomenting 
the war, saying that they were not autonomous as 
stipulated in the treaty. Then the Lacedaemonians 
sent out a summons to all the other allies who 
claimed to have suffered any wrong at the hands ot 
the Athenians, and calling their own customary 
assembly bade them speak. Others came forward 
and stated their several complaints, and particularly 
the Megarians, who presented a great many other 
grievances, and chiefly this, that they were ex- 
cluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian 
dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary 
to the treaty. Lastly the Corinthians, after they 
had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lace- 
daemonians, spoke as follows : — 

LXVI II. " That spirit of trust which marks your 
domestic policy, Ο Lacedaemonians, and your relations 



άπιστοτέρους, ες του? αΧΧους ην τι Χεγωμεν, 
καθίστησιν καϊ άπ αυτού σωφροσύνην μεν 
έχετε, άμαθία δε πΧέονι προς τα εξω πράγματα 

2 χρήσθε. ποΧΧάκις yap προαγορευόντων ημών 
α εμέΧΧομεν υπο Αθηναίων βΧάπτεσθαι, ου περί 
ών εδιδάσκομεν εκάστοτε την μάθησιν εποιεΐσθε, 
άλλα των Χεγοντων μάΧΧον ύπενοεΐτε ώς ένεκα 
των αύτοΐς ιδία διαφόρων Χέγουσιν καϊ δι αύτο 
ου πριν πάσχειν, άλλ* επειδή iv τφ έργω εσμέν, 
τους ξυμμάχους τούσδε παρεκαΧέσατε, iv οΐς 
προσήκει ημάς ούχ ηκιστα ειπείν δσω καϊ μέγιστα 
εγκλήματα εχομεν, υπο μεν 'Αθηναίων υβριζο- 

3 μενοι, υπο δε υμών άμεΧούμενοι* καϊ εΐ μεν 
αφανείς που οντες ηδίκουν την Ελλάδα, διδασκα- 
λίας αν ως ουκ είδόσι προσέδει• νυν δε τι δει 
μακρηγορεΐν, ών τους μεν δεδουΧω μένους οράτε, 
τοις δ' επιβουΧεύ οντάς αυτούς, καϊ ούχ ηκιστα 
τοις ήμετεροις ξυμμάχοις, καϊ εκ ποΧΧοΰ προ- 

4 παρεσ κευασ μένους, ει ποτέ ποΧεμήσονται; ου yap 
αν Κέρκυράν τε ύποΧαβόντες βία ημών είχον και 
ΤΙοτείδαιαν εποΧιόρκουν ών το μεν επικαιρότατον 
χωρίον προς τα επί ®ρακης άποχρήσθαι, ή δε 
ναυτικον αν μέγιστον παρέσχε τοις ΤΙεΧοποννη• 

LXIX. " Καϊ τώνδε ύμεΐς αίτιοι, το τε πρώτον 
έάσαντες αυτούς την ποΧιν μετά τα Μηδικά 



with one another, renders you more mistrustful 
if we bring any charge against others, and thus 
while this quality gives you sobriety, yet because 
of it you betray a want of understanding in dealing 
with affairs abroad. For example, although we 
warned you time and again of the injury the 
Athenians were intending to do us, you refused to 
accept the information we kept giving you, but pre- 
ferred to direct your suspicions against the speakers, 
feeling that they were actuated by their own private 
interests. And this is the reason why you did not act 
before we got into trouble, but it is only when we 
are in the midst of it that you have summoned these 
allies, among whom it is especially fitting that we 
should speak, inasmuch as we have the gravest accu- 
sations to bring, insulted as we have long been by the 
Athenians and neglected by you. And if they were 
wronging Hellas in some underhand way, you might 
have needed additional information on the ground 
of your ignorance ; but as the case stands, what need 
is there of a long harangue, when you see that they 
have enslaved some of us * and are plotting against 
others, notably against your own allies, and that 
they have long been making their preparations with 
a view to the contingency of war ? For otherwise 
they would not have purloined Corcyra, which they 
still hold in despite of us, and would not be besieg- 
ing Potidaea — one of these being a most strategic 
point for operations on the Thracian coast, while the 
other would have furnished a very large fleet to the 

LXIX. "And the blame for all this belongs to 
you, for you permitted them in the first instance to 

1 Referring especially to the Aeginetans, in the other 
c&ses to the Megarians and Potidaeans. 



κρατυναι καϊ ύστερον τά μακρά στήσαι τείχη, ες 
τόδε τε αίεΐ άποστερουντες ου μόνον τους υπ 
εκείνων δεδουλω μένους ελευθερίας, άλλα καϊ τους 
υμετέρους ήδη ξυμμάχους* ου yap 6 δουλωσά- 
μενος, άλλ ο δυνάμενος μεν παυσαι, περιορών δε 
άληθέστερον αυτό δρα, εϊπερ καϊ την άξίωσιν της 

2 αρετής ώς ελευθέρων την Ελλάδα φέρεται, μόλις 
δε νυν yε ξυνήλθομεν καϊ ούδε νυν επϊ φανεροΐς. 
χρήν yap ουκ ει άδικου μέθα ετι σκοττεΐν, άλλα 
καθ* ο τι άμυνούμεθα* οι yap 1 δρώντες βεβουλευ- 
μενοι προς ου δ^νωκότας ήδη και ου μέλλοντες 

3 επέρχονται, καϊ επιστάμεθα οία όδώ οι 'Αθη- 
ναίοι και οτι κατ 6\iyov χωρουσιν επϊ τους 
πέλας. και λανθάνειν μεν οίόμενοι διά το 
άναίσθητον υμών ήσσον θαρσοΰσι, γνόντες δε 

4 είδότας περιοράν ισχυρώς ^κείσονται. ησυχά- 
ζετε yap μόνοι 'Ελλήνων, ω Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ου ττ} 
δυνάμει τινά, άλλα ττ} μελλήσει αμυνόμενοι, και 
μόνοι ουκ άρχομενην την αΰξησιν τών εχθρών, 

5 διπλάσιου μένην δε καταλύοντες. καίτοι ελέyεσθe 
ασφαλείς είναι, ων άρα ο λoyoς του εpyoυ εκράτει. 
τόν τε yap Μήδον αυτοί ϊσμεν εκ περάτων γ?)? 
πρότερον επϊ την ΐίελοπόννησον ελθόντα η τά 

1 οΐ yap, so MSS. : Hude reads 61 yt after Classen. 

1 See ch. xc. ff. * See ch. cvii. 1. 

* Referring to the recent increase of the Athenian navy by 
the accession of the Corcyraean fleet. 


BOOK I. lxix. 1-5 

strengthen their city after the Persian war, 1 and 
afterwards to build their Long Walls, 2 while up to 
this very hour you are perpetually defrauding of their 
freedom not only those who have been enslaved by 
them, but now even your own allies also. For the 
state which has reduced others to slavery does not 
in a more real fashion enslave them than the state 
which has power to prevent it, and yet looks care- 
lessly on, although claiming as its preeminent dis- 
tinction that it is the liberator of Hellas. And now 
at last we have with difficulty managed to come 
together, though even now without a clearly defined 
purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering 
whether we are wronged, but how we are to avenge 
our wrongs. For where men are men of action, it is 
with resolved plans against those who have come to no 
decision, it is at once and without waiting, that they 
advance. We know too by what method the Athen- 
ians move against their neighbours — that it is here 
a little and there a little. And as long as they think 
that, owing to your want of perception, they are 
undetected, they are less bold ; but once let them 
learn that you are aware but complaisant, and they 
will press on with vigour. For indeed, Ο Lacedae- 
monians, you alone of the Hellenes pursue a passive 
policy, defending yourselves" against aggression, not 
by the use of your power, but by your intention to 
use it ; and you alone propose to destroy your 
enemies' power, not at its inception, but when it is 
doubling itself. 3 And yet you had the reputation of 
running no risks ; but with you, it would seem, repute 
goes beyond reality. For example, the Persian, as 
we ourselves know, came from the ends of the earth 
as far as the Peloponnesus before your forces went 



παρ υμών αξιως προαπαντήσαι, κα\ νυν τους 
* Αθηναίους ούχ εκάς, ώσπερ εκείνον, αλλ' εγγύς 
οντάς περιοράτε, καϊ άντϊ του επεΧθεϊν αυτοί 
άμυνεσθαι βουΧεσθε μάΧΧον επιόντας καϊ ες 
τύχας προς ποΧΧώ δυνατωτέρους αγωνιζόμενοι 
καταστηναι, επισταμένοι και τον βάρβαρον αυτόν 
περί αύτώ τα πΧείω σφαΧέντα καϊ προς αυτούς 
τους 'Αθηναίους ποΧΧα ημάς ήδη τοις άμαρτή- 
μασιν αυτών μάΧΧον η Trj αή> υμών τιμωρία 
περιγεγενημενους* επεϊ αϊ γε ύμετεραι εΧπίδες 
ήδη τινάς που καϊ άπαρασκεύους δια το πιστευ- 

6 σαι έφθειραν, καϊ μηδεϊς υμών επ* έχθρα το 
πΧεον η αίτια νομίση τάδε Χεγεσθαι* αιτία μεν 
yap φίΧων ανδρών εστίν αμαρτ αν όντων, κατη- 
γορία δε εχθρών αδικησάντων* 

LXX. " Καϊ άμα, εϊπερ τίνες και άΧΧοι, νομί- 
ζομεν άξιοι είναι τοις πεΧας ψόγον επενεγκεΐν, 
άΧΧως τε καϊ μεγάΧων τών διαφερόντων καθεστώ- 
των, περί ών ουκ αίσθάνεσθαι ημΐν γε δοκεΐτε ούδ' 
εκΧογίσασθαι πώποτε προς οίους ύμΐν 'Αθηναίους 
οντάς καϊ όσον υμών καϊ ώς πάν διαφέροντας ό 

2 άγων εσται. οι μεν γε νεωτεροποιοϊ καϊ επι- 
νοησαι οξείς καϊ επιτεΧεσαι έργω α αν γνώσιν, 
ύμεΐς δε τα υπάρχοντα τε σωζειν καϊ επιγνώναι 
μηδέν καϊ έργω ούδε τάναγκαΐα εξικέσθαι* 


forth to withstand him in a manner worthy of your 
power; and now you regard with indifference the 
Athenians who are not afar off, as the Persian was, but 
near at hand, and instead of attacking them your- 
selves, you prefer to ward them off when they 
attack, and incur hazard by joining in a struggle 
with opponents who have become far more powerful. 
Yet you know that the Barbarian failed mostly by 
his own fault, and that in our struggles with the 
Athenians themselves we have so far often owed 
our successes rather to their own errors than to any 
aid received from you ; indeed, it is the hopes they 
have placed in you that have already ruined more 
than one state 1 that was unprepared just because 
of trust in you. And let no one of you think that 
these things are said more out of hostile feeling 
than by way of complaint ; for complaint is against 
friends that err, but accusation against enemies that 
have inflicted an injury. 

LXX. " And besides, we have the right, we think, 
if any men have, to find fault with our neighbours, 
especially since the interests at stake for us are im- 
portant. To these interests it seems to us at least 
that you are insensible, and that you have never even 
fully considered what sort of men the Athenians are 
with whom you will have to fight, and how very, how 
utterly, different they are from you. For they are 
given to innovation and quick to form plans and to 
put their decisions into execution, whereas you are 
disposed merely to keep what you have, to devise 
nothing new, and, when you do take action, not to 
carry to completion even what is indispensable. 

1 Alluding perhaps to the Thasians (ch. ci.) and the 
Euboeans (ch. cxiv.). 



3 αύθις δε οι μεν και παρά δύναμιν τοΧμηται καϊ 
παρά ηνώμην κινδυνευται καϊ εν τοις δεινοΐς 
εύεΧπιδες* το δε ύμετερον της τ€ δυνάμεως ενδεά 
πράξαι της τε γνώμης μηδέ τοις βεβαίοις πιστευ- 
σαι των τ€ δεινών μηδεποτε οϊεσθαι άπόΧυθψ 

4 σεσθαι. καϊ μην και άοκνοι προς υμάς μεΧΧητάς 
και άποδημηταϊ προς ενδημοτάτους• οϊονται yap 
οι μεν tj; απουσία αν τι κτάσθαι, ύμεΐς δε τω 

5 εξεΧθεΐν καϊ τα έτοιμα αν βΧάψαι. κρατούντες 
τε των έχθρων επί πΧεΐστον εξέρχονται καϊ 

6 νικώμενοι eV εΧάχιστον άναπίπτουσιν. ετι δε 
τοις μεν σώμασιν άΧΧοτριωτάτοις υπέρ της 
πόΧεως χρώνται, ttj δε ηνώμτ) οίκειοτάττ) ες το 

7 πράσσειν τι υπ ε ρ αυτής* καϊ α μεν αν επινοή- 
σαντες μη επεξέΧθωσιν, οικείων στερεσθαι rjyodv- 
ται, α δ' αν επεΧθ όντες κτησωνται, oXiya προς 
τα μέΧΧοντα τυχεΐν πράξαντες, ην δ' άρα του και 
πείρα σφαΧωσιν, άντεΧπ ίσαντες άΧΧα επΧηρωσαν 
την χρείαν μόνοι yap εχουσί τε ομοίως και 
εΧπίζουσιν α αν επινοησωσι δια το ταχεΐαν την 

8 επιχείρησιν ποιεϊσθαι ων αν yvώσιv ^ και ταύτα 
μετά πόνων πάντα καϊ κινδύνων δι οΧου του 
αιώνος μοχθοΰσι, και άποΧαύουσιν εΧάχιστα των 
υπαρχόντων δια το αίεϊ κτάσθαι καϊ μήτε εορτην 
άΧΧο τι ^εΐσθαι ή το τα δέοντα πράξαι ξυμ- 
φοράν τε ούχ ήσσον ήσυχιαν aπράyμova η 


BOOK I. lxx. 3-8 

Again, they are bold beyond their strength, venture- 
some beyond their better judgment, and sanguine in 
the face of dangers ; while your way is to do less 
than your strength warrants, to distrust even what 
your judgment is sure of, and when dangers come 
to despair of deliverance. Nay more, they are 
prompt in decision, while you are dilatory ; they 
stir abroad, while you are perfect stay-at-homes ; 
for they expect by absence from home to gain 
something, while you are afraid that, if you go out 
after something, you may imperil even what you have. 
If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their 
advantage to the utmost ; if beaten, they fall back 
as little as possible. Moreover, they use their bodies 
in the service of their country as though they were 
the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as 
though they were wholly their own, so as to accom- 
plish anything on her behalf. And whenever they 
have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfil- 
ment, they think themselves robbed of a possession 
of their own ; and whenever they go after a thing 
and obtain it, they consider that they have accom- 
plished but little in comparison with what the future 
has in store for them ; but if it so happens that they 
try a thing and fail, they form new hopes instead and 
thus make up the loss. For with them alone is it 
the same thing to hope for and to attain when once 
they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly 
undertake whatever they determine upon. In this 
way they toil, with hardships and dangers, all their 
life long; and least of all men they enjoy what they 
have because they are always seeking more, because 
they think their only holiday is to do their duty, 
and because they regard untroubled peace as a far 



9 άσχοΧίαν επίπονον* ώστε εϊ τις αυτούς ξυνεΧών 
φαίη πεφυκεναι επί τω μήτε αυτούς εχεινήσυχίαν 
μήτε τους άΧΧους ανθρώπους εάν, ορθώς αν 


LXXI. "Ταύτης μεντοι τοιαύτης άντικαθεστη- 
κυίας πόΧεως, ω Λακεδαιμόνιοι, διαμεΧΧετε καϊ 
οΐεσθε την ησυχίαν ού τούτοις των ανθρώπων επί 
πΧεϊστον άρκεϊν, οΐ αν τη μεν παρασκευή δίκαια 
πράσσωσι, τη δε γνώμη, ην άδικώνται, δήΧοι 
ώσι μη επιτρέποντες, αλλ' επι τω μη Χυπεϊν τε 
τους άΧλους καϊ αύτοϊ αμυνόμενοι μη βΧάπτεσθαι 

2 το Ισον νέμετε. μοΧις δ αν ποΧει ομοία παροι- 
κούντες ετυγχάνετε τούτου* νυν δ\ όπερ καϊ άρτι 
εδηΧώσαμεν, αρχαιοτροπα υμών τα επιτηδεύματα 

3 προς αυτούς εστίν. ανάγκη 8ε ωσπερ τέχνης 
αΐεϊ τα επιγενόμενα κρατεΐν καϊ ησυχαζούση 
μεν ποΧει τα ακίνητα νόμιμα άριστα, προς 
ποΧΧα δε άναγκαζομενοις ίεναι ποΧΧης καϊ 
της επιτεχνήσεως δει. δι* όπερ καϊ τα των 
'Αθηναίων άπο της ποΧυπειρίας επί πΧεον υμών 

4 " Μέχρι μεν ουν τοΰδε ώρίσθω υμών η βραδυ- 
της* νυν δε τοις τε αΧΧοις καϊ ΤΙοτειδεάταις, ωσπερ 
ύπεδεξασθε, βοηθήσατε κατά τάχος εσβαΧόντες 
ες την Άττικήν, ίνα μη άνδρας τε φίΧους καϊ 
Ρνγγενεΐς τοις εχθιστοις προησθε καϊ ημάς τους 
άΧΧους άθυμία προς ετεραν Tivh, ξυμμαχίαν 

1 i.e. you attempt to be fair on the principle that it is wise 
not to offend others and so run the risk of injury which may 


BOOK I. lxx. 8-lxxi. 4 

greater calamity than laborious activity. Therefore 
if a man should sum up and say that they were born 
neither to have peace themselves nor to let other 
men have it, he would simply speak the truth. 

LXXI. u And yet, although you have such a state 
ranged against you, Ο Lacedaemonians, you go on 
delaying and forget that a peaceful policy suffices 
long only for those who, while they employ their 
military strength only for just ends, yet by their 
spirit show plainly that they will not put up with 
it if they are treated with injustice ; whereas you 
practise fair dealing on the principle of neither giving 
offence to others nor exposing yourselves to injury 
in self-defence. 1 But it would be difficult to carry 
out such a policy successfully if you had as neighbour 
a state just like yourselves ; whereas now, as we have 
just shown, your practices are old-fashioned as com- 
pared with theirs. But in politics, as in the arts, the 
new must always prevail over the old. It is true 
that when a state is at peace the established practices 
are best left unmodified, but when men are compelled 
to enter into many undertakings there is need of 
much improvement in method. It is for this reason 
that the government of the Athenians, because they 
have undertaken many things, has undergone greater 
change than yours. 

" Here, then, let your dilatoriness end ; at this 
moment succour both the Potidaeans and the rest 
of your allies, as you promised to do, by invading 
Attica without delay, that you may not betray your 
friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and 
drive the rest of us in despair to seek some other 

arise in defending yourselves against the attacks you have 

u 9 


5 τρέψητε. δ ρω μεν δ* αν άδικον ούδεν ούτε προς 
θεών των ορκίων ούτε προς ανθρώπων των αίσθα- 
νομενων Χύουσι yap σπονδάς ούχ οι δι ερημίαν 
αΧΧοις προσιοντες, άΧΧ οί μη βοηθοΰντες οΐς αν 

6 ξυνομόσωσιν. βουΧομενων δε υμών προθύμων 
είναι μενοΰμεν ούτε yap όσια αν ποιοΐμεν μετά- 
βαΧΧόμενοι οΰτε ξυνηθεστερους αν αΧΧους εύροι- 

7 μεν. προς τάδε βουΧεύεσθε εν κα\ την ΤΙεΧο- 
πόννησον πειράσθε μη εΧάσσω εζηyεϊσθaι η οί 
πατέρες ύμΐν παρεδοσαν" 

LXXII. Τοιαύτα μεν οι Κορίνθιοι ειπον. των 
8ε Αθηναίων έτυχε yap πρεσβεία προτερον εν 
τη Αακεδαίμονι περί αΧΧων παρούσα, καϊ ως 
ησθοντο των Xόyωv, εδοξεν αύτοϊς παριτητεα ες 
τους Αακεδαιμονίους είναι, των μεν εyκXημάτωv 
περί μηδέν άπoXoyησ ο μένους, ων αϊ ποΧεις ενε- 
κάΧουν, δηΧώσαι δε περί του παντός ώς ου ταχέως 
αύτοΐς βουΧευτέον εϊη, άλλ' εν πΧεονι σκεπτεον. 
καϊ άμα την σφετεραν πόΧιν εβουΧοντο σημήναι 
οση εϊη δύναμιν, καϊ ύπόμνησιν ποιησασθαι τοις 
τε πρεσβυτέροις ων ηδεσαν καϊ τοις νεωτέροις 
είςηηησιν ων άπειροι ήσαν, νομίζοντες μαΧΧον αν 
αυτούς εκ των λόγωι; προς το ησυχάζειν τραπέ- 
2 σθαι ή προς το ποΧεμεΐν. προσεΧθόντες ούν τοις 
Αακεδαιμονίοις εφασαν βουΧεσθαι καϊ αυτοί ες 
το πΧήθος αυτών ειπείν, ει τι μη άποκωΧυοι. οι 
δε εκεΧευον τε παριεναι, καϊ παρεΧθόντες οί 
1 Αθηναίοι εXεyov τοιάδε. 


BOOK I. lxxi. 4-lxxii. 2 

alliance. If we took such a course we should be 
committing no wrong either in the sight of the gods 
we have sworn by or of men of understanding ; for 
treaties are broken not by those who when left un- 
supported join others, but by those who fail to 
succour allies they have sworn to aid. But if you 
mean to be zealous allies we will stay ; for in that 
case we should be guilty of impiety if we changed 
our friends, nor should we find others more congenial. 
In view of these things, be well advised, and make 
it your endeavour that the Peloponnesian league shall 
be no weaker under your leadership than when you 
inherited it from your fathers." 

LXXI I. Thus spoke the Corinthians. But there 
happened to be present at Lacedaemon an embassy 
of the Athenians that had come on other business, 
and when they heard the various speeches they 
deemed it advisable to appear before the Lacedae- 
monians, not indeed to make any defence on the 
charges brought by the cities, but to make clear with 
regnrd to the whole question at issue that the Lace- 
daemonians should not decide it hastily but should 
take more time to consider it. At the same time 
they wished to show how great was the power of 
their own city, reminding the older men of what 
they already knew, and recounting to the younger 
things of which they were ignorant, in the belief 
that under the influence of their arguments the 
Lacedaemonians would be inclined to peace rather 
than war. Accordingly they approached the Lace- 
daemonians and said that they also wished, if there 
was nothing to hinder, to address their assembly. The 
Lacedaemonians invited them to present themselves, 
and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows : 



LXXIII. " Ή μεν πρέσβευσις ημών ουκ ες 
avriXoyiav τοΐς υμετέρου ξυμμάχοίς iyevero, 
άΧΧα 7Γ€ρϊ ων η ποΧις επεμψεν αίσθανόμενοι δε 
καταβοην ουκ οΧί<γην οΰσαν ημών παρήΧθομεν, 
ου τοΐς ^κΧημασι τών πόΧεων άντεροΰντες (ου 
yap παρά, δικασταΐς ύμΐν ούτε ημών ούτε τούτων 
οι Xoyoi αν yίyvoιvτo) i άλλ' όπως μη ραδίως περί 
μεyάXωv πpayμάτωv τοις ξυμμάγοις πειθόμενοι 
'χείρον βουΧεύσησθε, καΐ άμα βουΧόμενοι περί 
του παντός X6yoυ του €9 ημάς καθεστώτος δηΧώ- 
σαι ώς ούτε άπεικότως εγρμεν α κεκτημεθα, η τε 
πόΧις ημών αξία λόγου εστίν» 

2 " Καϊ τα μεν πάνυ παΧαια τι δει Χ^ειν, ων 
άκοαϊ μαΧΧον Xόyωv μάρτυρες η οψις τών άκου- 
σομίνων; τα δε Μηδικά καϊ οσα αυτοί ζύνιστε, 
el καϊ δι δχΧου μαΧΧον εσται αΐεϊ προβαΧΧο- 
μενοις, avay^ Χ^ειν. καϊ yap οτε εδρώμεν, επ 
ώφεΧία εκινδυνεύετο, ης του μεν εpyoυ μέρος 
μετεσγετε, του δε X6yoυ μη παντός, εϊ τι ώφεΧεΐ, 1 

3 στερισκώμεθα. ρηθησεται δε ου παραιτήσεως 
μαΧΧον ένεκα η μαρτυρίου καϊ δηΧώσεως προς 
οΐαν ύμΐν ποΧιν μη ευ βουΧευομενοις ο ay ων 

4 " Φαμεν yap Μαραθώνί τε μόνοι προκινδυ- 
νεύσαι τω βαρβάρω καϊ οτε το ύστερον ηΧθεν, 

1 ωψ4\ίΐ Ε. 

BOOK I. lxxiii. 1-4 

LXXIII. "Our embassy did not come here to 
enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the 
business for which our city sent us. Perceiving, 
however, that no small outcry is being made against 
us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges 
of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or 
we are addressing you as judges), but in order that 
you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your 
allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters 
of great importance. And at the same time we wish, 
as regards the whole outcry that has been raised 
against us, to show that we are rightfully in posses- 
sion of what we have acquired, and that our city is 
not to be despised. 

" Now, what need is there to speak about matters 
quite remote, 1 whose only witnesses are the stories 
men hear rather than the eyes of those who 
will hear them told? But concerning the Persian 
War and all the other events of which you have 
personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even 
though it will be rather irksome to mention them, 
since they are always being paraded. For when we 
were performing those deeds the risk was taken for 
a common benefit, and since you got a share of the 
actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly 
deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that. 
And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not 
so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence 
with what sort of city you will be involved in war 
if you are not well advised. 

"For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore 
the first brunt of the Barbarian's attack, and that 

1 The Schol. remarks rb. κατά *Αμαζ6να$ καΐ Θράκας καϊ 
*Ηροκλ€ίδαϊ, favourite themes in eulogies, panegyric speeches, 



ούχ Ικανοί οντες κατά yrjv άμύνεσθαι, εσβάντες 
ες τάς ναΰς πανδημει εν ΧαΧαμΐνι ξυνναυμαχψ 
σαι, όπερ εσχε μη κατά ποΧεις αυτόν επιπΧέοντα 
την ΥΙεΧοποννησον πορθεΐν, αδυνάτων αν όντων 

5 προς ναΰς ποΧΧάς αΧΧήΧοις επιβοηθεϊν. τεκμή- 
ριον δε μεηιστον αύτος εποίησεν νικηθείς yap 
ταΐς ναυσιν ώς ούκέτι αύτω όμοιας ούσης της 
δυνάμεως κατά τάχος τω πΧεονι τον στρατού 

LXXIV. " Ύοιούτου μέντοι τούτου ξυμβάντος 
και σαφώς δηΧωθέντος οτι iv ταΐς ναυσϊ των 
'ΕΧΧήνων τα π pay ματ a iyeveTo, τρία τά ώφεΧι- 
μώτατα ες αύτο παρεσχόμεθα, αριθμόν τ€ νέων 
πΧεΐστον και άνδρα στpaτηybv ξυνετώτατον και 
ττροθυμίαν άοκνοτάτην ναΰς μεν ye ες τάς 
τετρακοσίας oXiya* εΧάσσους των δύο μοιρών, 
©εμιστοκΧέα 8ε άρχοντα, ος αίτιώτατος εν τω 
στενω ναυμάχησαν iy^To, όπερ σαφέστατα 
έσωσε τά πpάyμaτa, και αύτον διά τούτο νμεΐς 
ετιμησατε μάΧιστα δη άνδρα ξένον τών ώς υμάς 

2 εΧθόντων* ττροθυμίαν δε και ττοΧύ τοΧμηροτάτην 
εδείξαμεν, οι ye, επειδή ήμΐν κατά yrjv ουδείς 
εβοηθει, τών άΧΧων ήδη μέχρι ημών δουΧευόν- 
των, ηζιώσαμεν εκΧιπόντες την πόΧιν και τά οι- 
κεία διαφθείραντες μηδ* ως το τών περιΧοίπων 
ξυμμάχων κοινον προΧιπεΐν μηδέ σκεδασθέντες 
αχρείοι αύτοϊς yεvέσθaι, αλλ' εσβάντες ες τάς 
ναΰς κινδυνεΰσαι και μη 6py^0rjvai οτι ήμΐν ου 

1 Probably a round number for 378 given by Hdt. viii. 
xiviii., of \shich the Athenian contingent (200, i.e. 180 + 20 
lent to the Chalcidians, Hdt. viii. i.) could be spoken of as 


BOOK I. lxxiii. 4-lxxiv. 2 

when he came again, not being able to defend our- 
selves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships 
and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented 
his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the 
Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to 
aid one another against a fleet so numerous. And 
the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we 
say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when 
his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power 
was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he 
hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army. 

LXXIV. "Such, then, was the issue of that battle, 
and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation 
of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that 
issue we contributed the three most serviceable ele- 
ments, namely, the largest number of ships, the 
shrewdest general, and the most unfaltering zeal. 
Of the four hundred 1 ships our quota was a little 
less than two-thirds. The commander was Themis- 
tocles, who more than any other was responsible for 
our fighting the battle in the strait, which most 
surely was our salvation ; and on this account you 
yourselves honoured him above any stranger who 
ever visited you. 2 And the zeal we displayed was 
that of utmost daring, for when there was no one to 
help us on land, since all the rest up to our very 
borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon 
our city and sacrifice all our possessions ; yet not even 
in that extremity to desert the common cause of the 
allies who remained, or by dispersing to render our- 
selves useless to them, but to embark on our ships 
and fight, and not to be angry because you failed to 

•w\ciovs τών ημισ4ων or with slight exaggeration as 6kty<p 
i\daaovs των Βύο μοιρών. 
2 See Hdt. vm. cxxiy.; Plut. Them. χτϋ. 3. 



3 προυτιμωρησατε. ώστε φαμεν ούχ ησσον αυτοί 
ώφεΧήσαι υμάς ή τυχεΐν τούτου, ύμεΐς μεν γαρ 
από τβ οίκου μένων των πόλεων καϊ επί τω το 
Χουπον νέμεσθαι, επειδή εδείσατε υπέρ υμών καϊ 
°νχ ημών τ"ο πΧέον, εβοηθησατε (οτε γοΰν η μεν 
ετι σω, ου παρεγένεσθε), ημείς δε από τε της ουκ 
ούσης ετι ορμώμενοι καϊ υπέρ της εν βραχεία 
εΧπίδι οΰσης κινδυνεύοντες ζυνεσώσαμεν υμάς τε 

4 το μέρος καϊ ημάς αυτούς, ει 8ε προσεχωρησαμεν 
πρότερον τω Μήδω δείσαντες, ώσπερ καϊ άΧΧοι, 
περί τχ\ χώρα, η μη ετοΧμησαμεν ύστερον εσβήναι 
ες τ ας ναυς ώς διεφθαρμένοι, ούδεν αν έδει ετι 
υμάς ι μη έχοντας ναΰς ίκανάς ναυμαχεΐν, αΧΧα 
καθ" ησυχίαν αν αύτω προυχώρησε τα πράγματα 
τ) εβουΧετο. 

LXXY. " Αρ άξιου εσμεν, ώ Αακεδαιμόνιοι, 
καϊ προθυμίας ένεκα της τότε καΧ γνώμης ξυνέ- 
σεως αρχής γε ης εχομεν τοις "ΚΧΧησι μη ούτως 

2 άγαν επιφθόνως διακεϊσθαι; καϊ γαρ αυτήν τηνδε 
εΧάβομεν ου βιασάμενοι, αλλ,' υμών μεν ουκ 
εθεΧησάντων παραμείναν προς τά υπόΧοιπα του 
βαρβάρου, ημΐν 8ε προσεΧθόντων τών ξυμμάχων 

3 καϊ αυτών δεηθέντων ηγεμόνας καταστήναι. εξ 
αύτου δε του έργου κατηναγκάσθημεν το πρώτον 

1 ύμας : Hude inserts irpbs before ύμά$. 

1 cf. the taunt of Adimantus (Hdt. viii. lvii. 7), πβρί ovoe- 
μίης tri πατρίδος ναυμάχησα*, " You will fight for a country 
that is no more," and the famous answer of Themistoclee 



help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on 
our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as 
great as we received ; for whereas the population of 
the cities from which you brought aid was still un- 
disturbed and you could hope to possess them in the 
future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather 
than for us — at any rate you did not come near so 
long as we were still unharmed — we on our part, 
setting forth from a city that was no more, 1 and 
risking our lives in behalf of one whose future hung 
upon but a slender hope, bore our part in saving 
both you and ourselves. But if we had acted as 
others did, and through fear of losing our territory 
had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or 
afterwards had lacked the courage to embark on 
our ships, in the conviction that we were already 
ruined, it would from that moment have been use- 
less for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at 
sea, but the Persian's plans would have moved on 
quietly just as he wished. 

LXXV. " Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the 
zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed 
at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this 
excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account 
of the empire we possess ? And indeed we did not 
acquire this empire by force, but only after you had 
refused to continue to oppose what was left of the 
barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of 
their own accord asked us to assume the leadership. 
It was under the compulsion of circumstances that 

(Hdt. VIII. lxi. 8), ώί €Ϊη καϊ πόλις κα\ yrj μίζων ήπβρ κ^ίνοισι 
€<ττ' h.v διηκόσιαι vies σφι ίωσι π^πληρωμέναι, " We have a city 
and a country greater than jomtb as long as we have two 
hundred ships fully manIled. ,, 



Trpoayayetv αυτήν ες roBe, μάλιστα μεν υπο 
δέους, έπειτα καϊ τιμής, ύστερον καϊ ωφελίας, 

4 και ουκ ασφαλές ετι εδόκει elvai, τοις πολλοίς 
άπηχθημένους καί τίνων καϊ ήδη άποστάντων 
κατεστραμμένων, υμών τε ήμΐν ούκέτι ομοίως 
φίλων, άλ,λ' υπόπτων και διαφόρων όντων, άνέν- 
τας κινδυνεύειν (καϊ yap αν αϊ αποστάσεις προς 

5 υμάς iyiyvovTo)' πάσι δε άνεπίφθονον τά Συμ- 
φέροντα των μεyίστωv περί κινδύνων ευ τί- 

LXXVI. " *Ύμεΐς yox)v, ω Αακεδαιμόνιοί, τας 
εν ττ\ ΤΙελοποννήσω πόλεις επι το υμΐν ώφέλιμον 
καταστησάμενοι έΐς^εΐσθε* καϊ ει τότε υπο- 
μείναντες δια παντός άπήχθεσθε εν ττ} ^εμονία, 
ωσπερ ημείς, ευ ϊσμεν μη αν ήσσον υμάς λύπη- 
ρους yεvoμέvoυς τοις ξυμμάχοις καϊ άvayκaσθέv•' 
τας αν η άρχειν iyKpaTw ή αυτούς κινδυνεύειν. 
2 οΰτως ούδ' ήμεΐς θαυμαστον ουδέν πεποιήκαμεν 
ουδ' από του ανθρωπείου τρόπου, ει αρχήν τε 
διδομένην έδεξάμεθα καϊ ταύτην μη άνεΐμεν 
υπό 1 των μεyίστωv νικηθέντες, τιμής καϊ δέους 
καϊ ωφελίας, ούδ 1 αυ πρώτοι του τοιούτου υπάρ- 
ξαντες, αλλ' αΐεϊ καθεστώτος τον ήσσω υπό του 
δυνατωτέρου κaτείpyεσθaι, άξιοι τε άμα νομί- 
ζοντες είναι καϊ υμΐν δοκουντες, μέχρι ου τά 
ξυμφέροντα λoyιζόμεvoι τω δικαίω λόyω νυν 

1 Hude inserts τριών before των μεγίστων, with van 
Herwerden and Weil. 


BOOK I. lxxv. 3-Lxxvi. 2 

we were driven at first to advance our empire to its 
present state, influenced chiefly by fear, then by 
honour also, and lastly by self-interest as well ; and 
after we had once incurred the hatred of most of 
our allies, and several of them had already revolted 
and been reduced to subjection, and when you were 
no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at 
variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk 
relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone 
over to you. And no man is to be blamed for making 
the most of his advantages when it is a question of 
the gravest dangers. 

LXXVI. " At any rate you, Lacedaemonians, in 
the exercise of your leadership over the Pelopon- 
nesian states regulate their polities 1 according to 
your own advantage ; and if in the Persian war 
you had held out to the end in the hegemony 
and had become unpopular in its exercise, as we 
did, you would certainly have become not less ob- 
noxious to the allies than we are, and would have 
been compelled either to rule them with a strong 
hand or yourselves to risk losing the hegemony. 
Thus there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with 
human nature in what we also have done, just because 
we accepted an empire when it was offered us, and 
then, yielding to the strongest motives — honour, 
fear, and self-interest— declined to give it up. Nor, 
again, are we the first who have entered upon such a 
course, but it has ever been an established rule that 
the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And at 
the same time we thought we were worthy to rule, 
and used to be so regarded by you also, until you fell 
to calculating what your interests were and resorted 

1 i.e. by setting up oligarchies in them, cf. ch. xix. 



χρήσθε, ov ουδείς πω παρατυχόν Ισχύ ι τι κτή- 
σασθαι προθεϊς τον μη πΧεον εχειν άπετράπετο. 

3 επαινεΐσθαί Τ€ άξιοι, οϊτινες χρησάμενοι ττ) 
ανθρωπεία φύσει ώστε ετέρων άρχειν δικαιό- 
τεροι η κατά την ύπάρχουσαν Βύναμιν ηενωνται. 

4 αΧλους y αν ουν οίόμβθα τα ημέτερα Χαβοντας 
δείξαι αν μάλιστα ει τι μετριάζομεν, ημΐν δε και 
£κ τον επιεικούς άδοξία το πΧεον ή έπαινος ουκ 
είκότως περιεστη. 

LXXYII. " ΚαΙ εΚασσούμενοι yap εν ταΐς 
ξυμβοΧαίαις προς τους ξυμμάχους δίκαις κα\ 
παρ ήμΐν αύτοΐς εν τοις ομοιοις νόμοις ποιησαντες 

2 τ ας κρίσεις φιΧοδικεΐν δοκού μεν. καΧ ουδείς 
σκοπεί αυτών, τοις καϊ άΧΧοθί που εχουσιν άρχην 
καϊ ησσον ημών προς τους υπηκόους μετρίοις 
οΰσι δι* ο τι τούτο ουκ όνειδίζεται• βιάζεσθαι 
yap οίς αν εζτ), δικάζεσθαι ουδέν προσδέονται. 

3 οι δε είθισμένοι προς ημάς από του ϊσου όμιΧεΐν, 
ην τι πάρα το μη οϊεσθαι χρηναι ή yvώμrj η 
δυνάμει ττ} δια την άρχην καϊ όπωσοΰν εΧασσω- 
θώσιν, ου του πΧεονος μη στερισκόμενοι χάριν 
εχουσιν, άΧΧα του ενδεούς χαΧεπώτερον φερουσιν 
η ει από πρώτης αποθεμένοι τον νόμου φανερώς 

1 These seem to have been disputes in matters of trade 
tried before federal courts elsewhere than in Athens ; whereas 
ras Kpiaeis refers to compulsory jurisdiction which Athene 
enforced upon her allies in her own courts. 



as you do now, to the plea of justice — which no one, 
when opportunity offered of securing something by 
main strength, ever yet put before force and ab- 
stained from taking advantage. And they are to be 
commended who, yielding to the instinct of human 
nature to rule over others, have been more observant 
of justice than they might have been, considering 
their power. At least, if others should seize our 
power, they would, we think, exhibit the best proof 
that we show some moderation ; but in our case the 
result of our very reasonableness is, perversely enough, 
obloquy rather than commendation. 

LXXVI I. "For although we are at a disadvantage 
in suits l with our allies arising out of commercial 
agreements, and although in our own courts in 
Athens, where we have established tribunals, the 
same laws apply to us as to them, we are thought 
to insist too much upon our legal rights. And 
none of our allies observes why it is that those 
who hold dominion elsewhere, and are less mode- 
rate than we are toward their subjects, are not 
reproached on this account. It is because those 
who may use might have no need to appeal to right. 
But if ever our allies, accustomed as they are to 
associate with us on the basis of equality, come off 
second best in any matter, however trivial, contrary 
to their own notion that it ought to be otherwise, 
whether their discomfiture is due to a legal decision 
or to the exercise of our imperial power, instead of 
being grateful that they have not been deprived of 
what is of greater moment, 2 they are more deeply 
offended because of their trifling inequality than if 
we had from the first put aside all legal restraints 

8 Namely, their equality before the law. 



έπΧεονεκτοΰμεν. εκείνως δε ούδ* &ν αυτοί άντ6- 
Xeyov ώς ου χρεών τον ησσω τω κρατουντι 

4 ύποχωρεΐν. αδικούμενοι τε, ως βοικεν, οι άνθρω- 
ποι μάΧλον οργίζονται η βιαζόμενοι* το μεν yap 
άπο τον ϊσου δοκεΐ πΧεονεκτεΐσθαι, το δ' από 

5 του κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι. υπό yoOv του 
ΝΙήδου δεινότερα τούτων πάσχοντες ήνείχοντο, 
ή δε ημετέρα αρχή χαΧεπη δοκεΐ είναι, εικότων 

6 το παρόν yap αίεϊ βαρύ τοις ύπηκόοις. ύμεΐς y 
αν ονν ει καθεΧόντες ημάς άρξαιτε, τάχα αν την 
evvoiav ή ν δια το ήμετερον δέος ειΧηφατε μετα- 
βάλοιτε, εϊπερ οία καϊ τότε προς τον Μήδον δι 
oXiyov ^ησάμενοι ύπεδείξατε, όμοια καϊ νυν 
yvώσεσθε. άμεικτα yap τα τε καθ* υμάς αυτούς 
νόμιμα τοις άΧλοις έχετε και προσέτι εις βκαστος 
εξιων ούτε τούτοις χρήται ούθ* οΐς ή αΧΧη Ελλάς 

LXXVIII. " ΒουΧεύεσθε ονν βραδέως ως ου 
περί βραχέων, και μη άΧΧοτρίαις yvώμaις καϊ 
^κΧημασι πεισθεντες οίκεΐον πόνον πρόσθησθε. 
τού δε ποΧέμου τον πapάXoyov όσος εστί, πρϊν 

2 εν αύτω yεvεσθaι προδιάψ>ωτε• μηκυνόμενος yap 
φιΧεΐ ες τύχας τα ποΧΧα περιίστασθαι, ων ϊσον 
τε άπεχομεν καϊ οποτβρως εσται εν άδηΧω κιν- 

3 δυνεύεται. Ιόντες τε οι άνθρωποι ες τους ποΧέ- 
μους των εpyωv πρότερον εχονται, α χρήν ύστερον 

ι 3 2 

BOOK I. lxxvii. 3-LXXV111. 3 

and had openly sought our own advantage. In that 
case even they would not be setting up the claim 
that the weaker should not have to yield to the 
stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of in- 
justice than of violence ; for the former, they feel, is 
overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is 
coercion by a superior. At any rate, they submitted 
to more grievous wrongs than these at the hands of 
the Persians, while our rule is hard to bear, as they 
think ; and no wonder, for the present yoke is always 
heavy to subjects. Certainly you, should you over- 
throw us and obtain supremacy, would soon lose the 
good will which you have gained through fear of us — 
if indeed you mean again to show such temper as you 
gave a glimpse of at that time when for a little while 
you had the hegemony against the Persian. 1 For the 
institutions that prevail among you at home are in- 
compatible with those of other peoples, and, besides, 
each one of you when he goes abroad uses neither 
these nor those which the rest of Greece is accustomed 

LXXVIII. "Be slow, then, in your deliberations, 
for no slight matters are at stake ; and do not, 
influenced by the opinions and accusations of others, 
burden yourselves needlessly with trouble of your 
own. Realise before you get into it how great are 
the chances of miscalculation in war. For when it 
is long drawn out, it is wont generally to resolve it- 
self into a mere matter of chance ; and over chance 
both sides equally have no control, and what the 
outcome will be is unknown and precarious. Most 
men rush into war and proceed to blows first, 
although that ought to be the last resort, and then, 

1 e.g. the conduct of Pausanias described in ch. cxxx. 

r 33 


δράν, κακοπαθοΰντες δε ήδη των Xoycov άπτονται. 

4 ημείς δε iv ουδεμία πω τοιαύτη αμαρτία οντες 
οΰτ αυτοί ονθ* υμάς όρώντες Χε^ομεν ύμϊν, εως 
ετι αυθαίρετος άμφοτεροις ή ευβουλία, σπονδας 
μη Χύειν μηδέ παραβαίνειν τους όρκους, τα δέ 

5 διάφορα δίκη Χύεσθαι κατά την ξυνθηκην, η 
θεούς τους όρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι πειρασό- 
μέθα άμύνεσθαι πολέμου άρχοντας ταύτη η αν 

LXXIX. Ύοιαΰτα δε οι Αθηναίοι ειπον. επει- 
δή δε των τε ξυμμάχων ήκουσαν οι Αακεδαιμόνιοι 
τα εγκλήματα τα ες τους * Αθηναίους και των 
Αθηναίων α ελεξαν, μεταστησάμενοι πάντας 
εβουλεύοντο κατά σφάς αυτούς περί των παρον- 
2 των. καϊ των μεν πΧεόνων επί το αύτο αϊ ηνωμαι 
εφερον, άδικεΐν τε τους 'Αθηναίους ήδη καϊ ποΧε- 
μητβα είναι εν τάχει % παρελθών δε Αρχίδαμος 6 
βασιλεύς αυτών, άνηρ καϊ ξυνετος δοκών είναι 
καϊ σώφρων, ελεξε τοιάδε. 

LXXX. " Και αύτος ποΧΧών ηδη ποΧέμων 
έμπειρος είμι, ω Αακεδαιμόνιοι, καϊ υμών τους εν 
τη αύτη ηλικία ορώ, ώστε μήτε απειρία επιθυμή- 
σαί τίνα του ερ^ου, όπερ αν οί ποΧΧοϊ πάθοιεν, 

2 μήτε αγαθόν καϊ ασφαλές νομισαντα. εΰροιτε δ' 
αν τόνδε περί ου νυν βουΧεύεσθε ούκ αν ελά- 
χιστον ηενόμενον, ει σωφρόνως τις αύτον iKXoyi- 

3 ξοιτο. προς μεν yap ΤΙελοποννησίους καϊ τους 


BOOK I. lxxviii. 3-Lxxx. 3 

when they are in distress, at length have recourse to 
words. But since we ourselves are not as yet involved 
in any such error and see that you are not, we urge 
you, while wise counsels are still a matter of free 
choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty or 
transgress your oaths, but to let our differences be 
settled by arbitration according to the agreement. 
But if you refuse, we shall invoke as witnesses the 
gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall en- 
deavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war, 
following that path in which you have led the way." 

LXXIX. Thus the Athenians spoke. And when 
the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought 
by the allies against the Athenians, and what the 
latter said in reply, they caused all others to with- 
draw and deliberated by themselves on the situation 
before them. And the opinions of the majority 
tended to the same conclusion, namely, that the 
Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that 
they must go to war without delay. But Archidamus 
their king, a man reputed to be both sagacious and 
prudent, came forward and spoke as follows : 

LXXX. " I have both myself, Lacedaemonians, had 
experience in my day of many wars, and I see men 
among you who are as old as I am ; no one of them, 
therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience, 
as would be the case with most men, nor because 
he thinks it a good or a safe thing. And you 
would find that this war about which you are now 
deliberating is likely to prove no trifling matter, if 
one should reflect upon it soberly. For in a contest 
with the Peloponnesians or the neighbouring states 1 

1 By the Peloponnesians Thucydides means the Spartan 
alliance ; the neighbouring states would then be the Pelo- 
ponnesian states not in the alliance, e.g. Argos. 



aarvy€LTOvas παρόμοιος ημών η άΧκη, καϊ Βια 
ταχέων οίον τε εφ έκαστα εΧθεΐν προς Βε άνδρας 
οι yrjv τε εκας εχουσι καϊ προσέτι θαλάσσης 
εμπειρότατοι είσι και τοις άΧΧοις απασιν άριστα 
εζήρτυνται, πΧούτω τε ΙΒίω καϊ Βημοσίω και 
ναυσι και ίπποις καϊ οπΧοις και οχΧω όσος ουκ 
iv άΧΧω ενι ye χωρίω ΈΧΧηνικώ εστίν, ετι Βε καϊ 
ξυμμάχους ποΧΧούς φορον ύποτεΧεΐς εχουσι, πώς 
χρη προς τούτους ραΒίως πόΧεμον άρασθαι καϊ 
τίνι πιστεύσαντας άπαρασκεύους επειχθηναι; 

4 ποτερον ταΐς νανσίν; άΧΧ ησσους έσμέν ει Βε 
μεΧετησομεν καϊ άντιπαρασκευασόμεθα, χρόνος 
ενεσται. άλλα τοις χρήμασιν; άλλα ποΧΧώ 
πΧεον ετι τούτω εΧΧειπομεν και ούτε iv κοινώ 
εχομεν ούτε ετοίμως εκ τών ΙΒίων φερομεν. 

LXXXI. " Ύάχ άν τις θαρσοίη οτι τοις οπ- 
Χοις αυτών καϊ τω πΧηθει ύπερφερομεν, ώστε 

2 την yrjv BrjoOv επιφοιτώντες. τοις Βε άΧΧη γή 
εστί ποΧΧη ης άρχουσι, καϊ εκ θαΧάσσης ών 

3 Βέονται επάξονται. ει δ' αυ τους ξυμμάχους 
άφιστάναι πειρασόμεθα, Βεησει καϊ τούτοις ναυσϊ 

i βοηθεΐν το πΧέον οΰσι νησιώταις. τις ουν εσται 
ημών ό πόΧεμος; ει μη yap ή ναυσι κρατησομεν 
η τας προσόΒους άφαιρησομεν άφ' ών το ναυτικον 

5 τρέφουσι, βΧαψομεθα τα πΧείω. καν τούτω 
ούΒε καταΧύεσθαι ετι καΧόν, άΧΧως τε καϊ ει 

1 i.e. it is military rather than naval ; similar, too, in the 
matter of wealth, equipment, absence of foreign resources, 
tributary allies, etc. 


BOOK I. lxxx. 3-Lxxxi. 5 

our power is of the same type with theirs l and we can 
be upon them quickly at every point ; but when op- 
posed to men whose territory is far away, who besides 
are beyond all others experienced in seamanship and 
are best equipped in all other respects, with wealth 
both private and public, ships, horses, arms and a 
larger population than is to be found in any other single 
district in Hellas, who have, moreover, numerous 
allies subject to tribute — against such men why should 
we lightly take up arms ? In what do we place our 
trust that we should attack them unprepared ? In 
our ships? But there we are inferior; and if we 
train and make ourselves ready to encounter them, 
that will take time. In our wealth then ? But in 
that respect we are still more deficient, neither having 
money in the treasury of the state nor finding it easy 
to raise money from our private resources by 
taxation. 2 

LXXXI. " Perhaps some of us are emboldened by 
our superiority in arms and numbers, which enables 
us freely to invade and lay waste their territory. 
But there is other territory in plenty over which 
they hold sway, and they will import by sea what- 
ever they need. And if, on the other hand, we try 
to induce their allies to revolt, we shall have in 
addition to protect them with a fleet, since they are 
chiefly islanders. What then will be the character 
of the war we shall be waging? Unless we can 
either win the mastery on the sea or cut off the 
revenues by which they support their navy, we shall 
get the worst of it. And, if it comes to that, we 
can no longer even conclude an honourable peace, 

2 The poverty of the Peloponnesians is referred to by 
Pericles in ch. cxli. 3. The statement is true especially of 
the Spartans, but also of all the rest except the Corinthians. 

vol. i• - *37 


β δόξομεν αρξαι μάλλον της διαφοράς, μη yap δή 
εκείντ) ye τη εΧπίδι επαιρώμεθα ως ταχύ παυσθή- 
σεται 6 πόΧεμος, ην την yr\v αυτών τεμωμεν. 
δεδοικα δε μάΧΧον μη και τοΐς παισ\ν αυτόν ύπο- 
Χίπωμεν οΰτως βίκος 'Αθηναίους φρονήματι μήτε 
rfj yrj δουΧεύσαι μήτε ώσπερ απείρους κατά- 
TrXayrjvai τω ποΧεμω. 

LXXXII. " Ου μην ούδε άναισθήτως αυτούς 
κελεύω τους τε ζνμμάχους ημών εάν βΧάπτειν 
καϊ επιβουΧεύοντας μη καταφωράν, άλλα οπΧα 
μεν μήπω κινεΐν, πεμπειν δε καϊ αίτιάσθαι μήτε 
πόΧεμον ayav δηΧοΰντας μήθ' ώς επιτρεψομεν, 
καν τούτω καϊ τα ήμετερ* αυτών εξαρτύεσθαι 
ξυμμάχων τε πpoσayωyfj, καϊ ΕΧΧήνων καϊ 
βαρβάρων, ει πόθεν τίνα ή ναυτικού ή χρημάτων 
δύναμιν προσΧηψόμεθα (άνεπίφθονον δε, όσοι 
ώσπερ κα\ ημείς ύττ Αθηναίων επιβουΧευόμεθα, 
μη'ΈλΧηνας μόνον, άλλα καϊ βαρβάρους προσΧα- 
βόντας διασωθήναι), καϊ τα αυτών άμα εκπορι- 

2 ζώμεθα. καϊ ην μεν εσακούωσι τι πρεσβευο μένων 
ημών, ταύτα άριστα* ην δε μη, διεΧθόντων ετών 
δύο καϊ τριών άμεινον ήδη, ην δοκη, πεφpayμέvoι 

3 ϊμεν επ αυτούς, και ϊσως όρώντες ημών ήδη την 
τε παρασκευήν καϊ τους X6yoυς αυτί} όμοια υπο- 
σημαίνοντας μάΧΧον αν εϊκοιεν, καϊ yrjv ετι άτμη- 
τον έχοντες καϊ περϊ παρόντων aya0wv καϊ οΰπω 


BOOK I. lxxxi. 5-Lxxxii. 3 

especially if it is believed that we rather than they 
began the quarrel. For we assuredly must not be 
buoyed up by any such hope as that the war will 
soon be over if we but ravage their territory. I fear 
rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children, 
so improbable it is that the Athenians, high spirited 
as they are, will either make themselves vassals to 
their land, or, like novices, become panic-stricken at 
the war. 

LXXXII. " Yet assuredly I do not advise you 
that you should blindly suffer them to injure our 
allies and allow their plotting to go undetected, but 
rather that you should adopt the following course: 
Do not take up arms yet, but send envoys to them 
and make complaints, without indicating too clearly 
whether we shall go to war or put up with their 
conduct ; also in the meantime, let us proceed with 
our own preparations, in the first place by winning 
allies to our side, Barbarians as well as Hellenes, in 
the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other 
additional resources in ships or money (for those who, 
like ourselves, are plotted against by the Athenians 
are not to be blamed if they procure their salvation 
by gaining the aid, not of Hellenes only, but even of 
Barbarians) ; and let us at the same time be developing 
our resources at home. And if they give any heed 
to our envoys, there could be nothing better ; but if 
not, then, after the lapse of two or three years, we 
shall at length be better equipped to go against 
them, if we decide to do so. Or perhaps when they 
see our preparations, and that our words correspond 
thereto, they will be more inclined to yield, for they 
will both have their land still unravaged and their 
deliberations will concern goods that are still theirs 



4 εφθαρμενων βουΧευόμενοι. μη yap αΧΧο τι 
νομίσητε την yrjv αυτών ή ομηρον εχειν καϊ ουχ 
ησσον οσω άμβινον βξείρηασται• ης φείδεσθαι 
χρη ώς eVi. πΧεΐστον, καϊ μη ες άπόνοιαν κατά- 

5 στησαντας αυτούς άΧηπτοτέρους εχειν. el yap 
άπαράσκευοι τοις των ξυμμάχων ^κΧήμασιν 
επειχθέντες τεμοΰμεν αυτήν» οράτε όπως μη 
αίσχιον κα\ άπορώτερον τη ΥΙεΧοποννήσω πράξο- 

6 μεν. &γκ\ημα,τα μεν yap καϊ πόΧεων καϊ 
ιδιωτών οίον τ€ καταΧΰσαί* ποΧεμον δε ζύμπαν- 
τας άραμένους ένεκα τών Ιδίων, ον ουχ υπάρχει 
εΐδέναι καθ* 6 τι χωρησει, ου ράδιον εύπρεπώς 

LXXXIIL "Και άνανδρία μηδενϊ ποΧΧούς μια 

2 πόΧει μη ταχύ επεΧθεϊν δοκείτω είναι, είσϊ yap 
καϊ εκείνοις ουκ εΧάσσους χρήματα φέροντες 
ξύμμαχοι, καϊ εστίν 6 πόΧεμος ούχ οπΧων το 
ττΧέον, άΧΧα δαπάνης, δι ήν τα οπΧα ώφεΧεΐ, 

3 αΧΧως τε καϊ ήπειρώταις προς θαΧασσίονς. πο- 
ρισώμεθα οΰν πρώτον αύτην, καϊ μη τοις τών 
ξυμμάχων X6yoLς πρότερον επαιρώμεθα, οΐπερ δε 
καϊ τών άποβαινόντων το πΧέον επ* αμφότερα 
της αιτίας εξομεν, ούτοι καϊ καθ' ησυχίαν τι 
αυτών προ'ίδωμεν. 

LXXXIV. " Καϊ το βραδύ καϊ μεΧΧνν, ο μέμ- 
φονται μάΧιστα ημών, μη αίσχύνεσθε. σπεύ- 
δοντές τε yap σχοΧαίτερον αν παύσαισθε δια το 
άπαράσκευοι ε^χειρεϊν, καϊ άμα εΧευθέραν καϊ 

BOOK I. lxxxii. 3-Lxxxiv. 1 

and as yet not ruined. For do not regard their land 
as anything but a hostage for us to hold, and a better 
hostage the better it is cultivated. You should there- 
fore spare it as long as possible, instead of making them 
desperate and thus having a more intractable foe to 
deal with. For if, without adequate preparation, 
egged on by the complaints of our allies, we shall 
ravage their territory, beware lest we adopt a course 
which might rather l result in disgrace and diffi- 
culties for the Peloponnesus. For complaints, in- 
deed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, 
may possibly be adjusted ; but when a whole con- 
federacy, for the sake of individual interests, under- 
takes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, 
it is not easy to end it with honour. 

LXXXIII. "And let no man think it pusillanimous 
that many states should hesitate to attack a single 
city. For they also have allies not less numerous 
than ours who pay tribute ; and war is a matter not 
so much of arms as of money, for it is money alone 
that makes arms serviceable, especially when an inland 
opposes a maritime power. Let us therefore provide 
ourselves with money first, instead of being carried 
away prematurely by the eloquence of our allies ; 
and, just as it is we who shall bear the greater part 
of the responsibility for the consequences, whether 
for good or evil, so let it be our task also calmly to 
get some forecast of them. 

LXXXIV. "And so be not ashamed of the slow- 
ness and dilatoriness for which they censure us most ; 
for speed in beginning may mean delay in ending, 
because you went into the war without preparation, 
and, moreover, in consequence of our policy we have 

1 i.e. than the opposite course. 



εύδοξοτάτην πόλιν διά παντός νεμόμεθα. κα* 
δύναται μάλιστα σωφροσύνη εμφρων τουτ είναι* 

2 μόνοι yap δι' αύτο εύπραγίαις τε ουκ εξυβρίζομεν 
κα\ ξυμφοραΐς ησσον έτερων εϊκομεν, των τε ξυν 
επαινώ εξοτρυνόντων ημάς επί τα δεινά παρά το 
δοκούν ήμΐν ουκ επαιρόμεθα ηδονή, καϊ ην τις 
άρα ξυν κατηγορία παροξύνχι, ούδεν δη μάλλον 

3 άχθεσθεντες άνεπείσθημεν. πολεμικοί τε και 
εΰβουλοι διά το εΰκοσμον ηιγνόμεθα, το μεν οτι 
αιδώς σωφροσύνης πλείστον μετέχει, αισχύνης δε 
εύψυχία, εΰβουλοι δε άμαθεστερον των νομών 
της υπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι καϊ ξυν χαλεπότητι 
σωφρονέστερον ή ώστε αυτών άνηκουστεΐν, καϊ 
μη, τά αχρεία ξυνετοϊ ay αν οντες, τάς των πολε- 
μίων παρασκευάς λόγω καλώς μεμφόμενοι άνο- 
μοίως έργω επεξιεναι, νομίζειν δε τάς τε διανοίας 
τών πελας παραπλήσιους είναι καϊ τάς προσπι- 

4 πτούσας τύχας ου λόγω διαιρετάς. αίεϊ δε ώς προς 
ευ βουλευομένους τους εναντίους έργω παρασκευα- 
ζόμεθα 9 καϊ ουκ εξ εκείνων ώς άμαρτησομενων 
εχειν δει τάς ελπίδας, αλλ* ώ? ημών αυτών ασφα- 
λώς προνοουμενων, πολύ τε διαφέρειν ου δει 

1 The speaker uses (ϋκοσμον, rather than βραδύ employed 
by the critics of Sparta, to suggest the contrast with im- 
pulsiveness or undue haste. 


BOOK I. lxxxiv. 1-4 

ever inhabited a city at once free and of fairest 
fame. And, after all, this trait in us may well be in 
the truest sense intelligent self-control, for by 
reason of it we alone do not become insolent in 
prosperity or succumb to adversity as much as others 
do; and when men try to goad us by praise into 
dangerous enterprises against our better judgment, 
we are not carried away by their flattery, or, if any- 
one goes so far as to attempt to provoke us to action 
by invective, we are none the more moved to com- 
pliance through vexation. Indeed, it is because of 
our orderly temper l that we are brave in war and 
wise in counsel — brave in war, because self-control is 
the chief element in self-respect, and respect of self, 
in turn, is the chief element in courage ; and wise in 
counsel, because we are educated too rudely to 
despise the laws and with too much severity of 
discipline to disobey them, and not to be so ultra- 
clever in useless accomplishments 2 as to disparage 
our enemy's military preparations in brave words 
and then fail to go through with the business with 
corresponding deeds, but rather to consider that the 
designs of our neighbours are veiy much like our own 
and that what may befall from fortune 3 cannot be 
determined by speeches. But it is our way always 
to make our preparations 'by deeds, on the presump- 
tion that we go against opponents who are wise in 
counsel ; and we ought never to build our hopes on 
the chance that they are going to make mistakes, 
but on the belief that we ourselves are taking safe 
precautions. And we must not believe that man 

1 With a glance at the Athenians' attention to culture, 
especially the art of elegant speech. 

* cf. the Corinthians' charge, ch. box. 5, that the Spartans 
trusted to chance. 



νομίζειν άνθρωπον ανθρώπου, κράτιστον δε elvai 
όστις εν τοις avaytcaiOTaroLS παιδεύεται. 

LXXXV. " Ταύτας οΰν ας οι πατέρες τε ήμΐν 
παρέδοσαν μεΧέτας καϊ αυτοί δια παντός ωφελού- 
μενοι εχομεν μη παρώμεν, μηδέ επειχθέντες εν 
βραχεί μορίω ημέρας περί ποΧΧών σωμάτων καί 
χρημάτων καϊ ποΧεων και δόξης βουΧεύσωμεν, 
άλΧα καθ" ήσυχίαν. εξεστι δ' ήμΐν μάΧΧον ετε- 

2 ρων δια ίσχύν. καϊ προς τους ' Αθηναίους πέμ- 
πετε μεν περί της Ώοτειδαίας, πέμπετε δε περί 
ων οι ξύμμαχοί φασιν άδικεΐσθαι, αΧΧως τε καϊ 
ετοίμων όντων αυτών δίκας δούναι* επι δε τον 
δίδοντα ου πρότερον νόμιμον ώς eV άδικουντα 
ίέναι. παρασκευάζεσθε δε τον πόΧεμον άμα. 
ταύτα yap καϊ κράτιστα βουΧεύσεσθε καϊ τοις 
εναντίοις φοβερώτατα" 

3 Καϊ 6 μεν Αρχίδαμος τοιαύτα είπεν παρεΧ- 
θ ων δε ΣθενεΧάδας τεΧευταΐος, εις των εφόρων 
τότε ων, εΧεξεν τοις Αακεδαιμονίοις * ώδε. 

LXXXVL "Ύονς μεν Xόyoυς τους ποΧΧούς τών 
* Αθηναίων ου yιyvώσκω ^ επαινεσαντες yap ποΧΧα 
εαυτούς ούδαμού άντεΐπον ώς ουκ άδικοΰσι τους 
ημετέρους ξυμμάχους καϊ την ΙΙεΧοπόννησον 
καίτοι ει π(>6ς τους Μήδους εyέvovτo aya0oi τότε, 
προς δ' ημάς κακοί νυν, δίπΧασίας ζημίας άξιοι 
2 είσιν, οτι άντ ^αθών κακοί yεyέvηvτaι. ημείς 
δε όμοιοι και τότε καϊ νυν εσμεν, καϊ τους ξυμμά- 

1 Hude deletes with Kruger. 

BOOK I. lxxxiv. 4-Lxxxvi. 2 

differs much from man, 1 but that he is best who is 
trained in the severest discipline. 

LXXXV. "These are the practices which our 
fathers bequeathed to us and we ourselves have 
maintained from the beginning to our profit; let us 
not abandon them, nor allow ourselves in a small 
portion of one day to be hurried into a decision which 
involves many lives, much money, many cities and a 
good name ; but let us deliberate at our leisure. And 
this course is permitted to us more than to the sup- 
porters of the other view because of our strength. And 
send envoys to the Athenians to take up the question 
of Potidaea, and also to take up the matters wherein 
our allies claim that they are wronged. The chief 
reason for this is that they are ready 2 to submit to 
arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith 
against one who offers arbitration as though against a 
wrong-doer. But all the while prepare yourselves 
for the war. This decision will be best for yourselves 
and will inspire most fear in your foes/' 

Thus spoke Archidamus, and finally Sthenelaidas, 
one of the ephors at that time, came forward and 
addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows : 

LXXXVI. "The long speeches of the Athenians 
I cannot understand ; for though they indulged in 
much praise of themselves, they nowhere denied that 
they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnesus. 
And yet, if they conducted themselves well against 
the Persians in former times but are now conducting 
themselves ill toward us, they deserve two-fold 
punishment, because they used to be good and have 
become bad. But we are the same now as we were 

1 c/. the Corinthians' praise of Athenian superiority, ch. lxx. 
1 ς/, ch. lxxviii. 4. 



χους, ην σωφρονώμεν, ου περιοψόμεθα αδικού- 
μενους ούδε μεΧΧήσομεν τιμωρεΐν οι δ' ούκέτι 

3 μέΧΧουσι κακώς πάσχειν. αΧΧοις μεν yap χρή- 
ματα εστί και νήες καϊ ίπποι, ήμΐν δε ξύμμαχοι 
άβαθοι, ους ου παραδοτέα τοις ' Άθηναίοις εστίν, 
ούδε δίκαις καϊ λόγοι? διακριτέα μη λόγω καϊ 
αυτούς βΧαπτο μένους, άλλα τιμωρητέα iv τάχει 

4 καϊ παντι σθένει. καϊ ώς ήμας πρέπει βουΧεύ- 
εσθαι αδικούμενους μηδεϊς διδασκέτω, άλλα τους 
μέΧΧοντας άδικεΐν μαΧΧον πρέπει ποΧύν χρόνον 

5 βουΧεύεσθαι. ψηφίζεσθε ουν, ω Αακεδαιμόνιοι, 
άξίως της Σπάρτης τον ποΧεμον καϊ μήτε τους 
' Αθηναίους εατε μείζους ηίηνεσθαι, μήτ€ τους 
ξυμμάχους καταπροδιδώμεν, άλλα ξύν τοις θεοΐς 
επίωμεν επί τους άδικούντας" 

LXXXYIL Ύοιαΰτα Χέξας επεψήφιζεν αυτός 
έφορος ων ες ι την εκκΧησίαν των Αακεδαιμονίων. 

2 6 δε (κρίνουσι yap βογι και ου ψήφω) ουκ εφη 
δiayιyvώσκeιv την βοην ποτέρα μείζων, άλλα 
βουΧομενος αυτούς φανερώς άποδεικνυ μένους την 
yvώμηv ες το ποΧεμεΐν μαΧΧον όρμήσαι εΧεζεν 
"'Ότω μεν υμών, ω Αακεδαιμόνιοι, δοκοΰσι Χε- 
Χύσθαι αϊ σπονδαΧ καϊ οι αθηναίοι άδικεΐν, 
άναστήτω ες εκείνο το χωρίον," δείξας τι χωρίον 
αυτοις, οτω οε μη όοκουσιν, ες τα επι σατερα. 

3 αναστάντες δε διέστησαν, και ποΧΧω πΧείους 

4 iykvovTO οίς εδόκουν αι σπονδαι ΧεΧύσθαι. προσ- 

1 Hude deletes, after Fr. Miiller. 

i 4 6 


then, and if we are in our right minds, we shall not 
permit our allies to be wronged or even put off 
avenging their wrongs, since they cannot longer put 
off suffering them. Others, indeed, may have money 
in abundance and ships and horses, 1 but we have 
brave allies, and they must not be delivered over to 
the Athenians ; nor must we seek redress by means 
of legal processes and words when it is not in word 
only that we ourselves are being injured, but we 
must avenge them speedily and with all our might. 
And let no man tell us that it befits us to deliberate 
when a wrong is being done us ; nay, it befits rather 
those who intend to do us a wrong to deliberate a 
long time. Vote, therefore, Lacedaemonians, for the 
war as beseems the dignity of Sparta, and do not 
permit the Athenians to become too great ; and let 
us not prove false to our allies, but let us with the 
favour of the gods go against the wrong-doer." 

LXXXVII. When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken, 
he himself, since he was an ephor, put the vote to 
the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. Now in their 
voting they usually decide by shout and not by 
ballot, but Sthenelaidas said that he could not distin- 
guish which shout was the louder, and wishing to 
make the assembly more eager for war by a clear 
demonstration of their sentiment, he said : " Who- 
ever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty 
has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong, 
let him rise and go to yonder spot (pointing to a 
certain spot), and whoever thinks otherwise, to the 
other side. ,, Then they rose and divided, and those 
who thought the treaty had been broken were found 
to be in a large majority. Then they called in the 

1 cf. ch. lxxx. 3. 



καΧεσαντες τε τους ξυμμάχους ειπον οτι σφίσι 
μεν 8οκοΐεν άΒικεΐν oi 'Αθηναίοι, βούΧεσθαι δέ 
καϊ τους πάντας ξυμμάχους παρακαΧεσαντες 
ψήφον eirayayelv, όπως κοινί) βουΧευσαμενοι τον 

5 ποΧεμον ποιώνται, ην δο /cfj. καϊ oi μεν άπεχω- 
ρησαν επ* οίκου 8ιαπραξάμενοι ταύτα, και oi 
1 Αθηναίων πρέσβεις ύστερον εφ? απερ ηΧθον χρη- 

6 Ή 8ε 8ιαηνώμη αυτή της εκκΧησίας του τας 
σπον8ας ΧεΧύσθαι ι iyivero iv τετάρτω καϊ δβ- 
κάτω ετει των τ ριακοντουτί8ων σπονδών προ- 
κεχωρηκυιών, αϊ ε^ενοντο μετά τα Ευβοϊκά. 
LXXXVIIL εψηφίσαντο 8ε oi Αακε8αιμονιοι 
τας σπονΒάς ΧεΧύσθαι καϊ ποΧεμητεα είναι, ου 
τοσούτον των ζυμμάχων πεισθεντες τοις λόγους 
όσον φοβούμενοι τους 'Αθηναίους μη επί μείζον 
δυνηθώσιν, όρώντες αύτοΐς τα ποΧΧα της Έλλά- 
8ος υποχείρια η8η οντά. 

LXXXIX. Oi yap 'Αθηναίοι τρόπω τοιω8ε 
2 ηΧθον επί τα πράγματα εν οις ηύξηθησαν. επει8η 
Μ.ή8οι άνεχώρησαν εκ της Ευρώπης νικηθέντες 
καϊ ναυσϊ καϊ πεζώ ύπο ΈΧΧήνων καϊ οι κατά- 
φυ^όντες αυτών ταΐς ναυσϊν ες ΜυκάΧην 8ιεφθά- 
ρησαν, Αεωτυχί8ης μεν 6 βασιΧεύς τών Αακε8αι- 
μονίων, οσπερ η^εϊτο τών εν ΜυκάΧη ΈΧΧήνων, 
άπεχώρησεν επ* οίκου έχων τους απ ο ΤΙεΧοπον- 
νήσου ξυμμάχους• οι 8ε Αθηναίοι και οι απο 

1 τον rb.s c-novZhs \*\νσθαι, omitted by Hude, following 
van Herwerden. 


BOOK I. lxxxvii. 4-lxxxix. 2 

allies and told them that, in their opinion, the Athe- 
nians were doing wrong, but that they wished to 
summon the whole body of the allies 1 and put the 
vote to them, in order that they might all deliberate 
together and together undertake the war, if it should 
be so decided. And so the allies who were there 
went back home, having brought these matters to a 
settlement, and so did the Athenian envoys later, 
after they had finished the business on which they 
had come. 

This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had 
been broken, was made in the fourteenth year 2 from 
the beginning of the thirty years' truce, which was 
made after the Euboean war. 3 LXXXVII 1. And 
the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had 
been broken and that they must go to war was 
determined, not so much by the influence of the 
speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians, 
lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater 
part of Hellas was already subject to them. 

LXXXIX. For it was in the following manner that 
the Athenians found themselves face to face with 
those circumstances in dealing with which they rose 
to greatness. When the Persians had retreated from 
Europe, defeated on both sea and land by the Hel- 
lenes, 4 and those of them who with their ships had 
taken refuge at Mycale had perished there, Leoty- 
chides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was com- 
mander of the Hellenes at Mycale, went home with 
the allies from the Peloponnesus. But the Athe- 
nians, together with the allies from Ionia and the 

1 A general convocation of the allies ; at this time only 
part of them had been invited, according to ch. lxvii. See 
ch. cxix , where the plan is carried out. 2 445 B.C. 

8 cf. ch. cxiv. 4 At Salamis, Plataea, Mycale. 



Ιωνίας καϊ Ελλησπόντου ξύμμαχοι, ήδη άφεστη- 
κότες από βασιλέως, ύπομείναντες Ση στον επο- 
λιόρκουν Μηδων εχόντων, και επιχειμάσαντες 
εΐλον αύτην εκλιπόντων των βαρβάρων, καϊ μετά 
τούτο απέπλευσαν εξ ^Ελλησπόντου ώς έκαστοι 

3 κατά πόλεις. Αθηναίων δε το κοινόν, επειδή 
αύτοΐς οι βάρβαροι εκ της χώρας άπηλθον, διεκο- 
μίζοντο ευθύς όθεν υπεξεθεντο παΐδας καϊ γυναί- 
κας καϊ την περιοΰσαν κατασκευήν, καϊ την πάλιν 
άνοικοδομεΐν παρεσκευάζοντο και τα τείχη* του 
τε γαρ περιβόλου βραχέα είστηκει καϊ οϊκίαι αι 
μεν πολλαϊ επεπτώκεσαν, όλίγαι δε περιησαν, εν 
αίς αυτοί εσκηνωσαν οι δυνατοί των ΤΙερσών. 

XC. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δε αίσθόμενοι το μέλλον ήλ• 
θον πρεσβείαν, τα μεν καϊ αύτοϊ ήδιον αν όρώντες 
μητ εκείνους μητ άλλον μηδένα τείχος έχοντα, 
το δε πλέον των ξυμμάχων εξοτρυνόντων καϊ 
φοβούμενων του τε ναυτικού αυτών το πλήθος, ο 
πρίν ούχ υπήρχε, καϊ την ες τον Μηδικον πόλε- 

2 μον τόλμαν γενομένην. ήξίουν τε αυτούς μη 
τειχίζειν, άλλα καϊ των εξω Τίελοποννησου μάλ- 
λον δσοις είστηκει ξυγκαθελεΐν μετά σφων τους 
περιβόλους, το μεν βουλόμενον και υποπτον τής 
γνώμης ου δηλούντες ες τους Αθηναίους, ώς δε 
του βαρβάρου, ει αύθις επέλθοι, ουκ αν έχοντος 

1 The contingents from the islands and the coast of Asia 
Minor, who, in consequence of the battle at Mycale and the 



Hellespont, 1 who were already in revolt from the 
King, remained at their task and besieged Sestos, 
which was held by the Persians ; and passing the 
winter there they took it, as it had been deserted by 
the Barbarians ; and after that the contingents of 
the several cities sailed away from the Hellespont. 
But the Athenian people, when the Barbarians had 
departed from their territory, straightway began to 
fetch back their wives and their children and the 
remnant of their household goods from where they 
had placed them for safety, 2 and to rebuild the city 
and the walls ; for of the encircling wall only small 
portions were left standing, and most of the houses 
were in ruins, only a few remaining in which the 
chief men of the Persians had themselves taken 

XC. But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what 
was in prospect, came on an embassy, partly because 
they themselves would have preferred to see neither 
the Athenians nor anyone else have a wall, but more 
because their allies urged them on through appre- 
hension, not only of the size of the Athenian navy, 
which had hitherto not been large, but also of the 
daring they had shown in the Persian war. So they 
requested them not to rebuild their walls, but rather 
to join with them in razing the walls of whatsoever 
towns outside the Peloponnesus had them standing, 
giving no indication of their real purpose or of their 
suspicion with regard to the Athenians, but repre- 
senting that the Barbarian, if he should attack them 
again, would not have any stronghold to make his 

advance of the victors to Abydos, had been received into the 
Hellenic alliance. 
a Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen ; cf. Hdt. vin. xli. 



άπο εχυροΰ πόθεν, ώσπερ νυν εκ των Θηβών, 
ορμασθαι, την τε ΥΙεΧοπόννησον πάσιν εφασαν 

3 άναχώρ^σίν τε καϊ άφορμην Ίκανην είναι, οι δ' 
' Αθηναίου ΘεμιστοκΧέους ηνώμη τους μεν Λακε- 
δαιμόνιους ταύτ είπόντας, άποκρινάμενοι οτι πέμ- 
ψουσιν ώς αυτούς πρέσβεις περί ων Xiyovaiv, 
ευθύς άπήΧΧαζαν εαυτόν δ' έκέΧευεν άποστέΧ- 
Χειν ώς τάχιστα ο ®εμιστοκΧής ες την Λακεδαί- 
μονα, άΧΧους δέ προς εαυτω εΧο μένους πρέσβεις 
μη ευθύς εκπέμπειν, αλλ' έπίσχειν μέχρι τοσού- 
του εως αν το τείχος ίκανον αρωσιν ώστε άπομά- 
χεσθαι εκ του αναγκαιοτάτου ύψους* τειχίζειν δέ 
πάντας πανδημεϊ τους εν ττ} πόΧει, 1 καϊ αυτούς 
και γυναίκας και παΐδας, φειδομβνους μήτε ιδίου 
μήτε δημοσίου οικοδομήματος όθεν τις ώφεΧία 
εσται ες το ερηον, άΧΧά καθαιρουντας πάντα. 

4 καϊ ο μεν ταύτα διδάξας καϊ υπειπών, ταΧΧα οτι 

5 αυτός τάκεΐ πράξοι, ωχετο. καϊ ες την Λακεδαί- 
μονα εΧθών ου προσηει προς τάς αρχάς, άΧΧά 
διη'γε καϊ προυφασίζετο. καϊ οπότε τις αύτον 
εροιτο των εν τέΧει όντων ο τι ουκ επέρχεται επί 
το κοινόν, εφη τους ξυμπρέσβεις άναμένειν, άσχο- 
Χίας δέ τίνος ονσης αυτούς ύποΧειφθήναι, προσ- 
δάχεσθαι μέντοι εν τάχει ήξειν καϊ θαυμάζειν ως 
οΰπω πάρεισιν. 

XCI. ΟΙ δέ άκούοντες τω μεν ©εμιστοκΧεΐ 
έπείθοντο δια φιΧίαν, τών 2 δέ αΧΧων άφικνου- 
μένων καϊ σαφώς κατηηορούντων οτι τειχίζεταί 

1 τους Ι* ττ) πόλςι, Kriiger brackets, followed by Hude. 
καϊ αύτουε . . . παΓδα$ also bracketed by Hude, as not read by 

3 Hude adopts Shilleto'e conjecture αυτόπτων. 


BOOK I. χα 2-xci. ι 

base of operations, as lately he had made Thebes ; 
the Peloponnesus, they added, was large enough for 
all, both as a retreat and as a base of operations. To 
these proposals of the Lacedaemonians, the Athe- 
nians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that 
they would send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss 
these matters, and so got rid of them without delay. 
Themistocles then proposed that they should send 
himself as speedily as possible to Lacedaemon ; that 
they should then choose other ambassadors in addi- 
tion, but, instead of sending them immediately, 
should wait until they should have raised the wall to 
such a height as was absolutely necessary for defence ; 
and that the whole population of the city, men, 
women, and children, should take part in the wall- 
building, sparing neither private nor public edifice 
that would in any way help to further the work, but 
demolishing them all. After he had given these 
instructions, and an intimation that, for the rest, he 
would himself look after matters at Sparta, he 
departed. And when he came to Lacedaemon he 
did not present himself to the magistrates, but kept 
putting it off and making excuses ; and whenever 
any one of those in authority asked why he did not 
come before the people, he said that he was waiting 
for his colleagues, who had stayed behind on account 
of some urgent business ; he expected them however 
to come soon, and wondered that they were not 
already there. 

XCI. And the Lacedaemonian magistrates were 
disposed to be content with this reply by reason 
of their friendship for Themistocles ; but when every- 
body who came from Athens declared quite positively 



τε και ήδη ΰψος Χαμβάνει, ουκ είχον όπως χρή 

2 άπιστήσαι. yvovs δε εκείνος κεΧεύει αυτούς μη 
Xoyow μαΧΧον Ίταράηεσθαι η πεμψαι σφών αυ- 
τών άνδρας οΐτινες χρηστοί κα\ πιστώς avayye- 

3 Χοΰσι σκεψάμενοι. άποστέΧΧουσιν οΰν, καϊ περί 
αυτών 6 ®εμιστοκΧής τοΐς Άθηναίοις κρύφα 
πέμπει κεΧεύων ι ως ήκιστα επιφανώς κατασχεΐν 
καϊ μη άφεϊναι πρϊν αν αυτοί πάλιν κομισθώσιν 
(ήδη yap teal ήκον αυτώ οι ξυμπρεσβεις, Άβρώ- 
νιχός τ€ 6 ΛυσικΧεους καϊ Αριστείδης 6 Λυσι- 
μάχου. άyyέXXovτες εχειν Ικανώς το τείχος) 9 
εφοβεΐτο yap μη ol Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφάς, οπότε 

4 σαφώς άκούσειαν, ούκέτι άφώσιν. οι τε οΰν 
Αθηναίοι τους πρέσβεις ώσπερ επεστάΧη κατεΐ- 
χον, και ο ©εμιστοκΧής επεΧθων τοΐς Αακεδαι- 
μονίοις ενταύθα δη φανερώς ειπεν οτι η μεν πόΧις 
σφών τετείχισται ήδη ώστε Ικανή είναι σωξειν 
τους ενοικουντας, ει δε τι βούΧονται Λακεδαι- 
μόνιοι ή οι ζύμμαχοι πρεσβεύεσθαι πάρα σφάς 
ως προς διayιyvώσκovτaς το Χοιπον Ιεναι τα τε 

5 σφίσιν αύτοΐς ξύμφορα καϊ τα κοινά, την τε yap 
πόΧιν οτε εδόκει εκΧιπεΐν αμεινον είναι καϊ ες τας 
ναΰς εσβήναι, άνευ εκείνων εφασαν 2 yvόvτες τοΧ- 
μήσαι, και οσα αΰ μετ εκείνων βουΧεύεσθαι, 

6 ούδενός ύστεροι yvωμr^ φανήναι. δοκεΐν οΰν σφίσι 
καϊ νυν άμεινον είναι την εαυτών πόΧιν τείχος 

1 Hude omits with Lex. Vindob. 

a Deleted by Kriiger, followed by Hude. 


BOOK I. xci. 1-6 

that the wall was going up and was already attaining 
height, they did not know how to discredit it. 
Themistocles, however, when he perceived this bade 
them not to be misled by reports, but rather to send 
some trustworthy men of their own number who 
would see for themselves and bring back a faithful 
report. They did so, and Themistocles sent word 
secretly to the Athenians to detain the envoys as 
covertly as possible and not to let them go until they 
themselves returned — for by this time his colleagues, 
Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of 
Lysimachus, had joined him, with the news that the 
wall was high enough — the reason for his precaution 
being that he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when 
they heard the truth, would then refuse to let them 
go. Accordingly the Athenians detained the envoys 
as they were directed, and Themistocles, appearing 
before the Lacedaemonians, at length told them 
frankly that the city was now walled and therefore 
in a position to protect its inhabitants, and that if 
the Lacedaemonians or their allies cared to negotiate 
any matter with them they must hereafter come to 
them with the understanding that they were dealing 
with men who were fully aware of what was for 
their own and the general interest. For when they 
thought it best to abandon their city and embark on 
their ships, they had resolved, said the ambassadors, 
upon this bold step without the advice of the Lace- 
daemonians, and again in all matters in which the 
Athenans took counsel with the Lacedaemonians 
they had shown themselves inferior to none in 
judgment. Accordingly in the present instance also 
it seemed to them best that their city should have 
a wall, and that this course would be of great 



εχειν, και Ιδία τοις ποΧίταις και ες του? πάντας 
7 ξυμμάχους ώφεΧιμώτερον εσεσθαι* ου yap οίον τ 
είναι μη άπο αντιπάλου παρασκευής όμοΐόν τι ή 
ΐσον ες το κοινον βουΧεύεσθαι. η πάντας ουν 
ατείχιστους εφη χρήναι ξυμμαχεϊν η καϊ τάδε 
νομίζειν ορθώς εχειν. 

XCII. Οι δε Λακεδαιμόνιοι άκούσαντες opyrjv 
μεν φανεράν ουκ εποιοΰντο τοις Άθηναίοις (ούδε 
yap επι κωΧύμη, άΧΧα yvώμης παραινέσει δήθεν 
τω κοινω επρεσβεύσαντο, άμα δε καϊ προσφιλείς 
οντες εν τω τότε δια την ες τον Μήδον προθυμίαν 
τα μάΧιστα αύτοΐς ετ^χανον), τής μεντοι βου- 
Χήσεως άμαρτάνοντες άδήΧως ήχθοντο. οι τε 
πρέσβεις εκατέρων άπήΧθον eV οϊκου άνεπικΧψ 

XCIII. Τούτω τω τρόπω οι Αθηναίοι την πο- 
2 Χιν ετείχισαν εν ολιγω χρόνω, καϊ δήΧη η οίκοδο- 
μία ετι καϊ νυν εστίν οτι κατά σπουδην iy ενετό, 
οι yap θεμεΧιοι παντοίων Χίθων υπόκεινται καϊ 
ου ξύνει ρ-γασ μένων εστίν rj, αλλ' ως έκαστοι 1 
ποτέ προσέφερον, ποΧΧαί τε στήΧαι άπο σημά- 
των καϊ Χίθοι εlpyaσ μένοι εyκaτεXέyησav. μεί- 
ζων yap ό περίβοΧος πανταχτ) εξήχθη τής πό- 

1 Hude reads ϊκαστον with C. 

1 The remains of the walls now seen around the Peiraeus 
are not those of the Themistoclean walls, which were de- 
stroyed at the end of the Peloponn-sian War, but of the 
walls built by Conon in 393. A small part of these remains, 


BOOK I. xci. 6-xciii. 2 

advantage both to themselves in particular, and to 
the whole body of the allies ; for it was impossible 
for them, he added, to have equal or similar weight 
in the general councils of the alliance except on the 
basis of a military strength that was a match for 
theirs. Therefore, he concluded, the members of 
the alliance should either dispense with their walls 
one and all, or regard this act of the Athenians as 

XCI I. On hearing this, the Lacedaemonians did not 
openly show any resentment against the Athenians ; 
for they had sent their embassy to Athens, not to 
stop the work, but to offer, as they professed, a sugges- 
tion in the common interest, and besides, they enter- 
tained at that time the most friendly feelings for the 
Athenians on account of their zeal in opposing the 
Persians ; since, however, they had failed in their 
purpose, they were secretly vexed. So the envoys 
on either side returned home without making any 
formal complaint. 

XCI 11. It was in this manner that the Athenians 
got their wall built in so short a time, and even 
to day the structure shows that it was put together 
in haste. 1 For the lower courses consist of all sorts 
of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just 
as they were when the several workers brought 
them, and many columns from grave monuments 
and stones wrought for other purposes were built in. 
For the circuit-wall of the city was extended in 

on the flat ground north of the Peiraeus toward the main- 
land, answers exactly to Thucydides' description —being of 
solid stone and over 25 feet thick — but most of the remains 
are of two outer faces of stone, the intermediate spaces filled 
in with rubble and earth. On Munychia there is no trace 
anywhere of a solid wall of the age of Themistocles. 



Χεως, καϊ δια τούτο πάντα ομοίως κινουντες 

3 ήπε'^οντο. έπεισε δε κα\ του ΤΙειραιώς τά Χοιπα 
6 ©εμιστοκΧής οίκοδομεΐν (υπήρκτο δ' αυτού 
πρότερον επί της εκείνου αρχής ης κατ ενιαυτον 
Άθηναίοις ηρζβ), νομίζων τό τε χωρίον καΧον 
είναι Χιμενας έχον τρεις αυτοφυείς, καΐ αυτούς 
ναυτικούς ηεηενη μένους μζηα προφερειν ες τό 

4 κτησασθαι δύναμιν (της yap δη θαΧάσσης πρώ- 
τος ετοΧμησεν είπεΐν ως άνθεκτέα εστί), καϊ την 

5 άρχην ευθύς ξυηκατεσκεύαζεν. καϊ ωκοδόμησαν 
τη εκείνου ηνωμη το πάγος του τείχους όπερ νυν 
ετι δήΧον εστί περί τον ΐίειραιά• δύο jap άμαξαι 
εναντίαι άΧΧηΧαις τους Χίθους επή<γον, εντός δε 
ούτε χάΧιζ ούτε πηΧος ην, άΧΧα ξυνωκοδομημέ- 
νοι μεγάΧοι Χίθοι καϊ εντομή εηηωνιοι, σιδηρω 
προς άΧΧηΧους τα έξωθεν καϊ μοΧυβδω δεδεμενοι. 
το δε ύψος ήμισυ μάΧιστα ετεΧεσθη ου διενοεΐτο. 

6 εβούΧετο yap τω μεyέθει καϊ τω πάχει άφιστάναι 
τας των ποΧεμίων επιβουΧάς, ανθρώπων τε ενό~ 
μιζεν ολίγων καϊ των αχρειότατων άρκέσειν την 
φυΧακην, τους δ' άΧΧους ες τας ναϋς εσβήσεσθαι. 

7 ταΐς yap ναυσϊ μάΧιστα προσεκειτο, ίδών, ώς 
εμοϊ δοκεΐ, της βασιΧέως στρατιάς την κατά 
θάΧασσαν εφοδον εύπορωτεραν της κατά yrjv 
ούσαν τον τε ΥΙειραια ώφεΧιμώτερον ενόμιζε της 
άνω πόΧεως, καϊ ποΧΧάκις τοις Άθηναίοις παρη- 

1 The Peiraeus, here in widest sense, is the peninsula, the 
heart of which is the steep height of Munychia, from which 


BOOK I. xciii. 2-7 

every direction, and on this account they laid hands 
upon everything alike in their haste. Themistocles, 
moreover, persuaded them also to finish the walls of 
the Peiraeus, a beginning of which had been made 
during the year in which he was archon of the Athe- 
nians ; for he considered that the Peiraeus with its 
three natural harbours l was a fine site to develop and 
that to have become a nation of seamen would be a 
great advantage to the Athenians themselves, with a 
view to their acquisition of power — mdeed it was he 
who first dared declare that they must apply them- 
selves to the sea — and so he immediately took the 
first steps in this undertaking. 2 And following his 
advice they built the wall round the Peiraeus of the 
thickness that may still be observed ; for two wagons 
carrying the stones could meet and pass each other. 
Inside, moreover, there was neither rubble nor 
mortar, but stones of large size hewn square were 
closely laid together, bound to one another on the 
outside with iron clamps and lead. But the wall 
was completed to only about half of the height he 
originally intended, for what he wished was to be 
able to repel the assaults of the enemy by the very 
height and thickness of the wall, and he thought 
that a few men, and these the least effective, would 
suffice to guard it, while all the rest might man the 
ships. For Themistocles devoted himself particularly 
to the navy, because, as it seems to me, he had 
observed that the approach of the King's forces was 
easier by sea than by land ; and he thought that the 
Peiraeus would prove more serviceable than the upper 
city, and often advised the Athenians, if ever they 

it stretches into the sea like an indented leaf, forming three 
natural basins — the Peiraeus, Zea, Munychia. 

2 Others render : immediately began to help them to lay 
the foundation of their empire. 



vei, ην apa ποτέ κατά ηήν βιασθώσι, καταβάντας 
ες αύτον ταΐς νανσϊ προς απαντάς άνθίστασθαι. 

8 * Αθηναίοι μεν ούν ούτως ετειγισθησαν και ταΧΧα 
κατεσκευάζοντο ευθύς μετά την ΜηΒων άναγω- 

XCIV. ΤΙαυσανιας Βε ο ΚΧεομβροτου εκ Αακε- 
Βαίμονος στρατηγός tow *ΕΧΧήνων εξεπέμφθη 
μετά είκοσι νέων απ ο ΐίελοποννήσον ξυνέπΧεον 
Βε καϊ Άθηναΐοι τριάκοντα ναυσϊ καϊ των άΧΧων 

2 ξυμμάχων πΧήθος. και εστράτευσαν ες Κύπρον 
καϊ αυτής τα ποΧΧα κατεστρέψαντο, καϊ ύστερον 
ες Ήυζάντιον ΜηΒων εχόντων καϊ εξεποΧιόρ- 
κησαν εν τηΰε τη ηγεμονία. 1 

XCV. ν Ηδτ/ 8ε βίαιου οντος αυτού οι τε αΧΧοι 
ΈΧΧηνες ηγθοντο καϊ ούχ ήκιστα οι "Ιωνες 
καϊ όσοι άπο βασϊΧεως νεωστί ηΧευθερωντο* 
φοίτώντές τε προς τους Αθηναίους ήξίουν αυ- 
τούς ηγεμόνας σφών ηίηνεσθαι κατά το ζυη- 
ηενες και ΤΙαυσανία μη επιτρεπειν, ην που 

2 βιάζηται. οι δε 'Αθηναίοι εΒέξαντό τε τους 
λόγους καϊ προσείγον την ηνωμην ως ου περί- 
οψόμενοι ταΧΧά τε καταστησομενοι η φαίνοιτο 

3 άριστα αύτοΐς. εν τούτω δε οι ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι 
μετεπεμποντο ΥΙαυσανίαν άνακρινούντες ων περί 
επυνθάνοντο• καϊ yap άΒικια ποΧΧη κατη^ορεϊτο 
αυτού ύπο των *ΕΧΧήνων των άφικνουμένων, 
καϊ τυραννίΒος μαΧΧον εφαίνετο μίμησις η 

1 Hude transfers, with Kruger, 4v τί}δ€ τρ τυςμονία to 
ch. xcv., deleting U after ήδη. 


BOOK I. xciii. 7-xcv. 3 

were hard pressed on land, to go down to the Pei- 
raeus, and resist all their opponents with their fleet. 
It was in this way, then, that the Athenians got 
their walls built, and came to be engaged upon their 
other fortifications, immediately after the withdrawal 
of the Persians. 

XCIV. Meanwhile Pausanias son of Cleombrotus 
was sent out from Lacedaemon in command of the 
Hellenes with twenty ships from Peloponnesus, 
accompanied by thirty Athenian ships and a multi- 
tude of other allies. They made also an expedition 
against Cyprus, subduing most of it, and afterwards, 
at the time of Pausanias' leadership, besieged By- 
zantium, which the Persians then held, and took it. 

XCV. But, since he had already become head- 
strong, 1 the rest of the Hellenes became disaffected, 
especially the Ionians and all who had been recently 
emancipated from the King. So they waited upon 
the Athenians and begged them in the name of 
their kinship 2 to become their leaders, and to resist 
Pausanias if he should attempt to coerce them. 3 The 
Athenians accepted their proposals and gave full 
attention to the matter with the determination to 
endure Pausanias' conduct no longer and to settle 
all other matters as should seem best to them- 
selves. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled 
Pausanias in order to interrogate him about re- 
ports they were hearing, for much wrongdoing was 
charged against him by the Hellenes who came to 
Sparta, and his behaviour seemed an aping of des- 
potic power rather than the conduct of a general 

1 cf. ch. cxxx. 2. 

2 As the mother city ; cf ch. ii. (end). 
* 478 B.C. 



4 στρατηγία. ξυνεβη re αύτφ καλεϊσθαί τε άμα 
καϊ τους ζυμμάχους τω εκείνου εχθει παρ Αθη- 
ναίους μετατάξασθαι πλην των άπο ΤΙεΧοπον- 

5 νήσου στρατιωτών. ελθών δε €9 Αακεδαίμονα 
των μεν ιδία προς τίνα αδικημάτων ηύθύνθη, τά 
δε μεηιστα απολύεται μη άδικεΐν κατηγορεΐτο 
δε αυτού ούχ ήκιστα μηδισμος και εδόκει σαφέ- 

6 στατον είναι, και εκείνον μεν ούκέτι εκπέμπου- 
σιν άρχοντα, Δόρκιν δε καϊ άλλους τινάς μετ 
αυτού στρατιάν έχοντας ου πολλήν οϊς ούκέτι 

7 εφίεσαν οί ξύμμαχοι την ηηεμονίαν. οι δε al- 
σθόμενοι άπήλθον, και άλλους ούκέτι ύστερον 
εξέπεμψαν οι Αακεδαιμόνιοι, φοβούμενοι μη 
σφίσιν οι έξιόντες χείρους ηίηνωνται, όπερ και 
iv τω ΤΙαυσανία ενεΐδον, απάλλαξε ίοντες δε καϊ 
του Μηδικού πολέμου καϊ τους 'Αθηναίους νομί- 
ζοντας ικανούς έξηηείσθαι καϊ σφίσιν iv τω τότε 
παρόντι επιτηδείους. 

XCVI. ΤΙαραλαβόντες δε οί 'Αθηναίοι την 
ηηεμονίαν τούτω τψ τρόπω έκοντων των Συμμά- 
χων δια το Τίαυσανίου μΐσος, έταξαν άς τε έδει 
παρεχειν των πόλεων χρήματα προς τον βάρ- 
βαρον καϊ ας ναυς* πρόσχημα yap ην άμύνεσθαι 
2 ων επαθον δηοΰντας την βασιλέως χωράν. κα\ 
*ΕΧΧηνοταμίαι τότε πρώτον Άθηναίοις κατέστη 
αρχή, οι εδέχοντο τον φόρον ούτω yap ώνομάσθη 


BOOK I. xcv. 3-xcvi. 2 

And it so happened that he was cited before the 
court at the very time that the allies in vexation at 
him had gone over to the side of the Athenians, all 
except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus. And 
although, on his return to Lacedaemon, Pausanias 
was held to account for any personal wrongs he had 
committed against individuals, yet on the principal 
charges he was acquitted of misconduct ; for he was 
accused most of all of treasonable relations with the 
Persians, and it seemed to be a very clear case. And 
they did not again send him out as commander, but 
Dorcis, together with some others, with an incon- 
siderable force ; but the allies did not entrust these 
with the chief command. And they, being now 
aware of the situation, went back home ; and the 
Lacedaemonians sent out no other commanders 
thereafter, fearing that any who went out might be 
corrupted, as they saw had happened in the case of 
Pausanias ; they also wanted to be rid of the Persian 
war, and thought that the Athenians were com- 
petent to take the leadership and were friendly to 
themselves at the time. 

XCVI. After the Athenians had succeeded in this 
way to the leadership over the allies, who freely 
chose them on account of their hatred of Pausanias, 
they assessed the amount of their contributions, both 
for the states which were to furnish money for the 
war against the Barbarians and for those which were 
to furnish ships, the avowed object being to avenge 
themselves for what they had suffered by ravaging 
the King's territory. And it was then x that the 
Athenians first established the office of Hellenic 
treasurers, who received the tribute ; for so the 

1 476 b.o. 



τών 'χρημάτων η φορά. ην δ' ό πρώτος φόρος 
ταχθΛς τετρακόσια τάΧαντα και εξήκοντα, τα- 
μιεΐόν τ€ ΔήΧος ην αύτοΐς και αϊ ξύνοδοι ες το 
Ιερόν eyiyvovTO. 

XCVII. Ηγούμενοι δε αυτονόμων το πρώτον 
των ξυμμάχων καϊ άπο κοινών ζυνόδων βουΧευ- 
όντων τοσάδε εττήΧθον ποΧέμω τ€ καΐ διαχειρίσει 
πραγμάτων μεταξύ τοΰδε του πολέμου καϊ τον 
Μηδικού, a εγένετο προς τε τον βάρβαρον αύτοϊς 
καϊ προς τους σφ ετέρους ξυμμάχους νεωτερί- 
ζοντας καϊ ΤΙεΧοποννησίων τους αιεϊ π ροστυγχά- 
2 νοντας εν εκάστω. έγραψα δε αυτά καϊ την 
εκβοΧην του λόγου εποιησάμην δια τόδε, οτι τοις 
προ εμοΰ άπασιν εκΧιπες τούτο ην το χωρίον καϊ 
ή τα προ τών Μηδικών 'ΕΧΧηνικά ξυνετίθεσαν η 
αυτά τα Μηδικά* τούτων δε οσπερ καϊ ήψατο 
εν τι) ' Αττική ζνγγραφη *ΕΧΧάνικος, βραχέως τε 
καϊ τοις χρόνοις ουκ ακριβώς επεμνήσθη• άμα δε 
και της αρχής άπόδειξιν έχει της τών 'Αθηναίων 
εν οϊω τρόπω κατέστη. 

XCVIII. ΤΙρώτον μεν Ήιόνα την επι Στρυμόνι 
Μ^δωζ; εχόντων ποΧιορκία εΐΧον κά\ ηνδραπό- 
δισαν Κίμωνος του ΜιΧτιάδου στρατηγοΰντος, 

2 έπειτα Σκυρον την εν τω Αίγαιω νήσον, ην ωκουν 

3 ΔόΧοπες, ήνδραπόδισαν ι καϊ ωκισαν αυτοί, προς 
δε Καρυστίους αύτοϊς άνευ τών άΧΧων Κύβοέων 
πόΧεμος εγένετο, καϊ χρόνω ξυνέβησαν καθ" 

1 Deleted by Hude, after Cobet. 

i6 4 

BOOK I. xcvi. 2-xcviii. 3 

contribution of money was termed. The amount 
of the tribute first assessed was four hundred and 
sixty talents, and the treasury of the allies was 
Delos, where the meetings were held in the temple. 

XCVII. Exercising then what was at first a leader- 
ship over allies who were autonomous and took part 
in the deliberations of common assemblies, the 
Athenians, in the interval between this war and the 
Persian, undertook, both in war and in the adminis- 
tration of public affairs, the enterprises now to be 
related, which were directed against the Barbarian, 
against their own allies when they attempted revolu- 
tion, and against such of the Peloponnesians as from 
time to time came into conflict with them in the 
course of each attempt. And I have made a 
digression to write of these matters for the reason 
that this period has been omitted by all my pre- 
decessors, who have confined their narratives either 
to Hellenic affairs before the Persian War or to the 
Persian War itself; and Hellanicus, the only one of 
these who has ever touched upon this period, has in 
his Attic History treated of it briefly, and with 
inaccuracy as regards his chronology. And at the 
same time the narrative of these events serves to 
explain how the empire of Athens was established. 

XCVill. First, then, under the leadership of 
Cimon son of Miltiades, they took by siege Eion 
on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and en- 
slaved its inhabitants l ; then they enslaved Scyros, 
the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, 
and colonised it themselves. And a war arose 
between them and the Carystians, the other Eu- 
boeans taking no part in it, and after a time terms 

1 476 B.o. 



4 όμοΧογίαν. Ναξίοις δέ άποστασι μετά ταύτα 
εποΧέμησαν καϊ πολιορκία παρεστησαντο, πρώτη 
τε αυτή πόΧις ξυμμαχϊς πάρα το καθεστηκος 
εδουΧώθη, έπειτα δέ καϊ των άΧΧων ώς εκάστη 
ξυνέβη. 1 

XCIX. ΑΙτίαι δε άλΧαι τε ήσαν των αποστά- 
σεων καϊ μεγισται αϊ των φόρων καϊ νέων εκδειαι 
καϊ Χιποστράτιον ει τω iy ενετό• oi yap Αθηναίοι 
ακριβώς επρασσον καϊ Χυπηροϊ ήσαν ουκ είωθό- 
σιν ουδέ βουΧομένοις ταΧαιπωρεΐν π ροσ άγοντες 

2 τάς άνάγκας. ήσαν δε πως καϊ άΧΧως οι 'Αθη- 
ναίοι ούκετι ομοίως iv ηδονή άρχοντες, καϊ οΰτε 
ξυνεστ ράτενον άπο τον Ισου ραδιόν τε προσά- 
γεσθαι ην αύτοΐς τους άφισταμενους* ών αυτοί 

3 αϊτιοι εγενοντο οι ξύμμαχοι* δια yap την άπό- 
κνησιν ταύτην των στρατειών οι πΧείονς αυτών, 
ίνα μη απ' οίκου ώσι, χρήματα ετάξαντο αντί 
τών νεών το ικνούμενον άνάΧωμα φερειν, καϊ τοις 
μεν Άθηναίοις ηνξετο το ναυτικον άπο της δαπά- 
νης ην έκεΐνοι ξυμφεροιεν, αυτοί δε, οπότε άπο- 
σταϊεν, άπαράσκευοι καϊ άπειροι ες τον ποΧεμον 

C. 'Έγενετο δε μετά ταύτα καϊ ή επ' Εύρυμέ- 
δοντι ποταμώ εν ΤΙαμφυΧία 2 πεζομαχία καϊ ναυ- 
μαχία Αθηναίων και τών ζυμμάχων προς Μηδους, 
καϊ ενικών τη αύτη ημέρα αμφότερα 'Αθηναίοι 

1 Deleted by Hude as probably not read by Schol. 

2 4v Τΐαμψυκίς, omitted by Hude and Stahl, with Codex M. 


BOOK I. xcviii. 3-c. ι 

of capitulation were agreed upon. After this they 
waged war upon the Naxians, 1 who had revolted, 
and reduced them by siege. And this was the first 
allied city to be enslaved in violation of the estab- 
lished rule ; but afterwards the others also were 
enslaved as it happened in each case. 

XCIX. Now while there were other causes of 
revolts, the principal ones were the failures in bring- 
ing in the tribute or their quota of ships and, in 
some cases, refusal of military service ; for the 
Athenians exacted the tribute strictly and gave 
offence by applying coercive measures to any who 
were unaccustomed or unwilling to bear the hard- 
ships of service. And in some other respects, too, 
the Athenians were no longer equally agreeable as 
leaders ; they would not take part in expeditions on 
terms of equality, and they found it easy to reduce 
those who revolted. For all this the allies them- 
selves were responsible ; for most of them, on account 
of their aversion to military service, in order to 
avoid being away from home got themselves rated 
in sums of money instead of ships, which they should 
pay in as their proportionate contribution, and con- 
sequently the fleet of the Athenians was increased 
by the funds which they contributed, while they 
themselves, whenever they revolted, entered on the 
war without preparation and without experience. 

C. After this occurred at the river Eurymedon in 
Pamphylia the land-battle and sea-fight of the 
Athenians 2 and their allies against the Persians ; 
and the Athenians were victorious in both on the 

1 466 b.c. 

2 For this glorious victory of Cimon's, whose date (466 B.C. ?) 
is not certain, c/. Diod. xi. 60 ; Plut. Cim. xiL 



Κίμωνος τον ΜιΧτιάδον στρατη^γοΰντος, καϊ εΐΧον 
τριήρεις Φοινίκων καϊ διεφθειραν τας πάσας ε? 

2 διακοσίας. χρόνω δε ύστερον ξυνέβη ®ασίους 
αυτών άποστήναι διενεχθέντας περί των εν τη 
άντιπερας ®ράκτ) εμπορίων καϊ του μετάΧΧου, 
α ενέμοντο. καϊ ναυσϊ μεν επϊ ®άσον πΧεύ- 
σαντες οι Αθηναίοι ναυμαχία ε κράτησαν καϊ ες 

3 την ηην απέβησαν επϊ 8ε Στρυμόνα πεμψαντες 
μυρίους οίκήτορας αυτών καϊ τών ξνμμάχων υπο 
τους αυτούς χρόνους, ως οικιοΰντες τας τότε 
καΧουμένας 'Ewea όδους, νυν δε ΆμφίποΧιν, τών 
μεν Εννέα οδών αυτοί εκράτησαν, ας ειχον Ήδω- 
νοί, προεΧθόντες δε της Θράκης ες μεσόηειαν 
διεφθάρησαν εν Αραβησκώ τγ ΊΙδωνικτ) υπο τών 
Θ ρακών ξυμπάντων οΐς ποΧεμιον ην το χωρίον χ 

CI. ®άσιοι δέ νικηθεντες μάχρ καϊ ποΧιορκού- 

μενοι Λακεδαιμονίους επεκαΧοΰντο καϊ επαμυνειν 

2 εκεΧευον εσβαΧοντας ες την Άττικήν. οι δε 

ύπέσχοντο μεν κρύφα τών Αθηναίων καϊ εμεΧΧον, 

διεκωΧυθησαν δε υπο του γενομένου σεισμοί), εν ω 

καϊ οι ΚΪΧωτες αύτοΐς καϊ τών περιοίκων ®ουριά- 

ταί τε καϊ Αίθαιής ες Ίθώμην άπεστησαν. πΧεΐ- 

1 αί Έννία δδοϊ, in the MSS. after χωρίον, rejected by 

1 46ό b.o. 

2 The Thasians had a gold mine at Skapte Hyle on the 
Thraeian coast, from which they drew rich revenues ; cf. 
Hdt. vi. xlvi. £. 

1 68 

BOOK I. c. i-ci. 2 

same day under the command of Cimon son of 
Miltiades, and they took and destroyed triremes of 
the Phoenicians to the number of two hundred all 
told. And some time afterwards it came to pass 
that the Thasians revolted from them, 1 a quarrel 
having arisen about the trading posts and the 
mine 2 on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which 
the Thasians enjoyed the profits. Thereupon the 
Athenians sailed with their fleet against Thasos, 
and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on 
the island. About the same time they sent to the 
river Strymon ten thousand colonists, consisting of 
Athenians and their allies, with a view to colonising 
the place, then called Nine Ways, but now Am- 
phipolis ; and though these colonists gained posses- 
sion of Nine Ways, which was inhabited by Edoni, 
yet when they advanced into the interior of Thrace 
they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the 
united forces of the Thracians, to whom the settle- 
ment of the place was a menace. 

CI. As for the Thasians, who had been defeated 
in battle and were now besieged, they appealed to 
the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to 
their aid by invading Attica. This, unknown to the 
Athenians, they promised to do, and intended to 
keep their promise, but were prevented by the 
earthquake 3 which occurred at the time 4 when both 
their Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea 
revolted and went to Ithome. 5 Most of the Helots 

8 Called "the great earthquake" in ch. cxxviii. 1. 

4 464 B.C. 

5 The Perioeci were the old inhabitants of the country, 
chiefly of Achaean stock, reduced to a condition of depen- 
dence, i.e. were not citizens, though not state-slaves as the 
Helots were. 

vol. I. n x69 


στοι δε των ΈίΧώτων iyevovro οι των παλαιών 
Μεσσηνίων τότε δουΧωθεντων airoyovor rj κα\ 
3 Μεσσηνιοι εκΧηθησαν oi πάντες, προς μεν ουν 
του? iv Ιθώμη πόΧεμος καθειστηκει Αακεδαι- 
μονίοις* %άσιοι δε τρίτω ετει ποΧιορκούμενοι 
ώμο\6<γησαν ' Αθηναίοι? τείχος τ€ καθεΧοντες καϊ 
ναΰς παράγοντες, χρήματα τε οσα έδει απ ο- 
δούναι αντίκα ταξάμενοι καϊ το Χοιπον φερειν, 
την τε ήπειρον καϊ το μεταΧΧον αφέντες. 

CII. Αακεδαιμόνιοι δε, ώς αύτοΐς προς τους εν 
Ιθώμη εμηκυνετο ο πόΧεμος, άΧΧονς τε επεκαΧέ- 
σαντο ξυμμάχους καϊ 'Αθηναίους• οι δ' ηΧθον 

2 Κίμωνος στρατη^ουντος πΧηθει ουκ όλ/γω. μά- 
Χιστα δ' αυτούς επεκαΧεσαντο, οτι τειχομαχεΐν 
εδόκουν δυνατοί είναι, της δε ποΧιορκίας μακράς 
καθεστηκυίας τούτου ενδεά εφαίνετο• βία yap 

3 αν εΙΧον το χωρίον, και διάφορα εκ ταύτης της 
στρατείας πρώτον Αακεδαιμονίοις καϊ Άθηναίοις 
φανερά εηενετο. οι yap Αακεδαιμόνιοι, επειδή το 
χωρίον βία 1 ούχ ήΧίσκετο, δείσαντες των 'Αθη- 
ναίων το τοΧμηρον καϊ την νεωτεροποιίαν, καϊ 
άΧΧοφύΧονς άμα ή-γησάμενοι, μη τι, ην παρα- 
μείνω σιν, ύπο των εν Ιθώμη πεισθέντες νεωτερί- 
σω σι, μονούς των ξυμμάχων απέπεμψαν, την μεν 
ύποψίαν ου δηΧουντες, είπόντες δε οτι ούδεν 

4 προσδεονται αυτών ετι. οι δ' 'Αθηναίοι έγνωσαν 

1 Kruger deletes, followed by Hude. 

BOOK I. ci. 2-cn. 4 

were the descendants of the early Messenians who 
had been enslaved of old, 1 and hence were all called 
Messenians. The Lacedaemonians, then, were in- 
volved in war with the rebels on Ithome ; and so the 
Thasians, who were in the third year of the siege, 
came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down 
their walls and delivering over their ships, agreeing 
to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should be 
required of them and to render tribute in future, and, 
finally, giving up both the mainland and the mine. 

CI I. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, 
when their war with the rebels on Ithome proved a 
long affair, appealed to their allies in general and 
especially to the Athenians, who came with a con- 
siderable force under the command of Cimon. The 
principal reason why an appeal was made to them 
was that they were reputed to be skilful in siege 
operations, whereas the long continuance of the siege 
snowed their own deficiency in this respect ; for other- 
wise they would have taken the place by assault. And 
it was in consequence of this expedition that a lack of 
harmony in the relations of the Lacedaemonians and 
the Athenians first became manifest. For the Lace- 
daemonians, when they failed to take the place by 
storm, fearing the audacity and the fickleness of 
the Athenians, whom they regarded, besides, as men 
of another race, thought that, if they remained, they 
might be persuaded by the rebels on Ithome to 
change sides ; they therefore dismissed them, alone 
of the allies, without giving any indication of their 
suspicion, but merely saying that they had no further 
need of them. The Athenians, however, recognized 

1 Referring to the mythical time of the first Messenian 



ουκ επί τω βεΧτίονι Xoytp άποπεμπόμενοι, άλλα 
τίνος υπόπτου γενομένου, καϊ δεινον ποιησάμενοι 
καϊ ουκ άζιώσαντες υπο Λακεδαιμονίων τούτο 
παθεΐν, ευθύς επειδή άνεχώρησαν, αφέντες την 
ηενομένην επι τω Μτ^δω ξυμμαχίαν προς αυτούς 
Άργείοις τοις εκείνων ποΧεμίοις ξύμμαχοι εγέ- 
νοντο, καϊ προς Θεσσαλούς άμα άμφοτέροις οι 
αυτοί όρκοι καϊ ξυμμαχία κατέστη. 

CIII. Ο/ δ' εν Ιθώμη δεκάτω ετει, ως ούκετι 
εδύναντο άντέχειν, ξυνέβησαν προς τους Λακε- 
δαιμονίους εφί* ω έζιασιν εκ ΏεΧοπον νήσου ύπό- 
σπονδοι καϊ μηδέποτε επιβήσονται αυτής 9 ην δε 

2 τις άλίσκηται, του Χαβόντος είναι δοΰΧον. ην δε 
τι καϊ χρηστηριον τοις Λακεδαίμονίοις Τίυθικον 
προ του, τον ικέτην του Δι6ς του Ίθωμήτα άφιέ- 

3 ναι. εξήΧθον δε αυτοί καϊ παίδες καϊ γυναίκες, καϊ 
αυτούς οι 'Αθηναίοι δεξάμενοι κατά εχθος ήδη το 
Λακεδαιμονίων ες Ναύπακτον κατωκισαν, ην 
ετυχον ηρη κότες νεωστι Λοκρών των ΌζοΧων 

4 εχόντων, προσεχώρησαν δε και Μεγαρής Άθη- 
ναίοις ες ξυμμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίων άποστάντες, 
οτι αυτούς Κορίνθιοι περί γί}$ ορών ποΧέμψ 
κατεΐχον. και εσχον Αθηναίοι Μέγαρα και ΐΐη- 
*γάς, καϊ τα μακρά τείχη ωκοδόμησαν Μεγαρεΰσι 

1 455 β. α 

BOOK I. en. 4-C111. 4 

that they were not being sent away on the more 
creditable ground, but because some suspicion had 
arisen ; so because they felt indignant and con- 
sidered that they had not deserved such treatment 
at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, the instant 
they returned home they gave up the alliance which 
they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the 
Persians and became allies of their enemies, the 
Argives. And an alliance at the same time, on the 
same terms and confirmed by the same oaths, was 
concluded by both the Athenians and the Argives 
with the Thessalians. 

CI 1 1. In the tenth year 1 the rebels on Ithome 
found that they could hold out no longer and surren- 
dered to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they 
should leave the Peloponnesus under a truce and 
should never set foot in it again ; and if any of them 
should be caught there, he was to be a slave of his 
captor. Moreover, before this time the Lacedae- 
monians also received a Pythian oracle, which bade 
them let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus. So 
the Messenians left the Peloponnesus, themselves 
and their children and wives ; and the Athenians 
received them, in consequence of the enmity to the 
Lacedaemonians already existing, and settled them 
at Naupactus, which they happened to have lately 
taken from its possessors, the Ozolian Locrians. And 
the Megarians also entered into alliance with the 
Athenians, revolting from the Lacedaemonians be- 
cause the Corinthians were pressing them hard in 
a war about boundaries; and thus the Athenians 
secured Megara and Pegae, 2 and they built for the 
Megarians the long walls which run from the city to 

1 Pegae was the Megarian harbour on the Corinthian gulf : 
Nisaea, a nearer one, on the Saronic gulf. 



τά άπο της πόλεως ες Νίσαιαν real εφρούρουν 
αυτοί• καϊ Κορινθίοις μεν ούχ ήκιστα αττο τούδε 
το σφοδρον μίσος ηρξατο πρώτον ες ' Αθηναίους 

CIV. Ίνάρως δε 6 Ψαμμητίχου, Αίβυς, βασι- 
λεύς Αιβύων τών προς Αί<γύπτω, ορμώμενος εκ 
Μαρείας της υπέρ Φάρου πόλεως άπεστησεν 
Αιγύπτου τα πλείω από βασιλέως Άρταξέρξου, 
και αυτός άρχων γενόμενος ' Αθηναίους επηηά- 

2 <γετο. οι δε (ετυχον yap ες Κύπρον στρατευό- 
μενοι ναυσϊ διακοσίαις αυτών τε και τών Συμ- 
μάχων) ηλθον άπολιπόντες την Κύπρον, και 
άναπλεύσαντες άπο θαλάσσης ες τον Νεϊλον του 
τε ποταμού κρατούντες καϊ της Ήίέμφιδος τών 
δύο μερών προς το τρίτον μέρος ο καλείται 
Αευκον τείχος επολεμουν* ένησαν δέ αυτόθι ΐίερ- 
σών και ^Ιίηδων οι καταφυηόντες καϊ Αιγυπτίων 
οι μη ξυναποστάντες. 

CV. Άθηναίοις δε ναυσίν άποβάσιν ες Άλιας 
προς Κορινθίους καϊ Έπιδαυρίους μάχη εγενετο, 
καϊ ενικών Κορίνθιοι. καϊ ύστερον ' Αθηναίοι 
εναυμάχησαν επϊ Κεκρυφαλεία Τίελοποννησίων 

2 ναυσί, καϊ ενικών 'Αθηναίοι, πολέμου δε κατά- 
στάντος προς Αίγινήτας Άθηναίοις μετά ταύτα 
ναυμαχία ψήνεται επ* Aiyivrj μεyάλη ' Αθηναίων 
καϊ Ακίνητων (καϊ οί ξύμμαχοι εκατεροις παρή- 
σαν), καϊ ενικών ' Αθηναίοι, καϊ ναυς έβδομη κοντά 
λαβόντες αυτών ες την yrjv απέβησαν και επο- 
λιόρκουν Αεωκράτους του Χτροίβου στρατηγουν- 


BOOK I. cm. 4-cv. 2 

Nisaea and held it with a garrison of their own 
troops. And it was chiefly because of this act that 
the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the 
Athenians first arose. 

CIV. Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a 
Libyan and king of the Libyans who are adjacent to 
Egypt, setting out from Mareia, the city just north 
of Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt 
from King Artaxerxes, 1 and then, when he had 
made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians. 
And they left Cyprus, 2 where they happened to be 
on an expedition with two hundred ships of their 
own and of their allies, and went to Egypt, and 
when they had sailed up the Nile from the sea, 
finding themselves masters of the river and of two- 
thirds of Memphis, they proceeded to attack the 
third part, which is called the White Fortress. And 
in this fortress were some Persians and Medes who 
had taken refuge there, and such Egyptians as had 
not joined in the revolt. 

CV. The Athenians also made a descent with a 
fleet upon Halieis, where they had a battle with 
some Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the 
Corinthians won. And afterwards the Athenians 
fought a sea-fight at Cecryphaleia with a Pelopon- 
nesian fleet, in which the Athenians won. After 
this war broke out between the Athenians and the 
Aeginetans, and a great sea-fight occurred between 
the Athenians and the Aeginetans off Aegina, in 
which the allies of both sides were present. This the 
Athenians won and having taken seventy Aeginetan 
ships they descended upon their territory and 
laid siege to the city, Leocrates son of Stroebus, 

1 460 b.o. * cf. ch. xciv. 2. 



3 τος. έπειτα ΏεΧοποννήσιοι άμύνειν βουΧομενοι 
KiyivrjTa^ ες μεν την Aiy ιναν τριακόσιους 
όπΧίτας, πρότερον 'Κορινθίων καϊ 'Κπιδαυρίων 
επικούρους, διεβίβασαν, τα δε άκρα της Τερανείας 
κατεΧαβον καϊ ες την Mey αρίδα κατέβησαν 
Κορίνθιοι μετά των ξυμμάχων, νομίζοντες άδι/- 
νάτους εσεσθαι ' Αθηναίους βοηθεϊν τοις Μεγα- 
ρεΰσιν εν τ ε Alyivrj αιτούσης στρατιάς ποΧΧης 
καϊ εν ΚΙ^ύπτω• ην δε καϊ βοηθώσιν, απ Κί^ίνης 

4 άναστησεσθαι αυτούς, οι δε Αθηναίοι το μεν 
προς Alyivrj στράτευμα ουκ εκίνησαν, των δ' εκ 
της πόΧεως ύποΧοίπων οι τ ε πρεσβύτατοι και oi 
νεώτατοι άφικνουνται ες τα Miyapa Μυρωνίδου 

5 στpaτηyoΰvτoς. καϊ μάχης y€voμεvης ισόρροπου 
προς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν απ* άΧΧηΧων, καϊ 
ενόμισαν αυτοί εκάτεροι ουκ εΧασσον εχειν εν τω 

6 €/5γω. και οι μεν Αθηναίοι (εκράτησαν yap 
όμως μάΧΧον) άπέΧθοντων των Κορινθίων τρο- 
παΐον έστησαν οι δε Κορίνθιοι κακιζομενοι υπ ο 
των εν τύι πόΧει πρεσβυτέρων και παρασκεύασα- 
μενοι, ημέραις ύστερον δώδεκα μάΧιστα εΧθόντες 
άνθίστασαν τροπαΐον και αυτοί ώς νικήσαντες, 
καϊ oi 'Αθηναίοι εκβοηθησαντες εκ των hlεyάpωv 
τους τ€ το τροπαΐον ίστάντας διαφθείρουσι και 
τοις άΧΧοις ξυμβαΧόντες εκράτησαν. CVL οι 
δε νικώμενοι υπεγώρουν, και τι αυτών μέρος ουκ 
oXiyov προσβιασθεν καϊ διαμαρτον της οδού 
εσέπεσεν ες του χωρίον ίδιώτου, ω έτυχεν 


BOOK I. cv. 2-cvi. ι 

being in command. Thereupon the Peloponnesians, 
wishing to aid the Aeginetans, sent into Aegina 
three hundred hoplites, who had previously been 
assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. More- 
over, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Gera- 
neia, and made a descent upon the territory of 
Megara in conjunction with their allies, thinking 
that the Athenians would be unable to aid the 
Megarians, since many of their troops were away in 
Aegina and in Egypt, or if they should attempt it 
that they would have to withdraw from Aegina. 
The Athenians, however, did not disturb the army 
besieging Aegina, but with such forces as were left 
in the city, consisting of the oldest and the youngest * 
men, marched into Megara, the general in command 
being Myronides. An indecisive battle was fought 
with the Corinthians, whereupon they separated, each 
side thinking they had not got the worst of it in the 
action. And the Athenians, who had in fact got 
rather the better of it, when the Corinthians with- 
drew, set up a trophy; but the Corinthians, being 
reproached by the older men in their city, made 
their preparations and about twelve days later came 
back and set up for themselves a rival trophy, as 
though they had won. Hereupon the Athenians 
made a sally from Megara, slew those who were 
setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the 
rest defeated them. CVI. The vanquished party 
now retreated, and a not inconsiderable portion 
of them, being hard pressed, missed their way 
and rushed into a piece of land belonging to 

1 These performed military service only in extraordinary 
cases ; the former were between fifty and sixty, the latter 
under twenty years of age. 



2 όρυγμα μέγα περιεΐργον καϊ ουκ ην έξοδος, οι 
δε 'Αθηναίοι γνόντες κατά πρόσωπον τε είργον 
τοις όπλίταις καϊ περιστησαντες κύκλω τους 
ψιλούς κατέλευσαν πάντας τους εσελθόντας, καϊ 
πάθος μέγα τούτο Κορίνθιοι? εγένετο. το δε 
πλήθος άνεχωρησεν αύτοΐς της στρατιάς επ' 

CVII. "Ηρξαντο δε κατά τους χρόνους τούτους 
καϊ τα μακρά τείχη ' Αθηναίοι ες θάλασσαν 
οικοδομεΐν, τό τ€ ΦαΧηρόνδε καϊ το ες ΤΙειραια. 

2 καϊ Φωκέων στρατευσάντων ες Δωριάς την Αακε- 
δαιμονίων μητρόπολιν, Τ&οιόν και Κυτ ίνιον και 
Έρινεόν, καϊ ελόντων εν των πολισμάτων τούτων 
οι Αακεδαιμόνιοι Νικομήδους του Κλεομβρότου 
ύπερ ΤΙλειστοάνακτος του ΤΙανσανίου βασιλέως, 
νέου οντος ετι, ηγουμένου εβοήθησαν τοις Δω- 
ριεΰσιν εαυτών τ€ πεντακοσίοις καϊ χιλίοις όπλί- 
ταις καϊ των ξυμμάχων μυρίοις, κα\ τους Φωκέας 
ομολογία άναγκάσαντες άποδοΰναι την πόλιν 

3 άπεχώρουν πάλιν. καϊ κατά θάλασσαν μεν 
αυτούς, δια του Κρισαίου κόλπου el βούλοιντο 
περαιοΰσθαι, Αθηναίοι ναυσϊ περιπλεύσαντες 
εμελλον κωλύσειν δια δε της Τερανείας ουκ 
ασφαλές αύτοΐς εφαινετο Αθηναίων εχόντων 
Μ.έγαρα καϊ ΐΐηγας πορεύεσθαι- 1 δύσοδός τε γαρ 
η Γεράνεια καϊ εφρονρεΐτο αίεϊ ύπδ 'Αθηναίων, 
καϊ τότε ησθάνοντο αυτούς μέλλοντας καϊ ταύτη 

4 κώλύσειν. εδοξε δε αύτοΐς εν Έοιωτοΐς περιμεί- 
νασι σκέψασθαι δτω τρόπω ασφαλέστατα δια- 
πορεύσονται. το δέ τι καϊ άνδρες επήγον αυτούς 

1 ττορ*ύ€σθαι deleted by Hude as not read by SchoL 


BOOK I. cvi. i-cvii. 4 

some private person, which was enclosed by a great 
ditch and had no exit. And when the Athenians 
perceived this, they shut them in by barring the 
entrance with hoplites, and stationing light-armed 
troops all round stoned all who had entered. And 
this was a great calamity to the Corinthians ; the 
main body of their army, however, returned home. 

CVI I. About this period 1 the Athenians began to 
build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, 
the other to the Peiraeus. And the Phocians made 
an expedition against the land of the Dorians, the 
mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, namely the 
towns of Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, one of 
which they captured ; whereupon the Lacedae- 
monians, under the lead of Nicomedes son of Cleom- 
brotus, acting for King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, 
who was still a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians 
a force of fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and 
ten thousand of their allies, and after they had forced 
the Phocians to make terms and restore the city 
they began their return homeward. Now if they 
wished to take the sea-route and make their passage 
by way of the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were 
sure to take their fleet round the Peloponnesus and 
block their way ; and to march over the Geranaean 
pass appeared to them hazardous, since the Athenians 
held Megara and Pegae. Besides, the Geranaean 
pass was not easy to traverse and was at all times 
guarded by the Athenians, and at this present time, 
as the Lacedaemonians perceived, they intended 
to block their way. So they decided to wait in 
Boeotia and consider how they might most safely 
cross over to the Peloponnesus. To this course they 
were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were 

1 457 B.a 



των Αθηναίων κρύφα, εΧττίσαντες δήμόν re κατα- 
τταύσειν καϊ τά μακρά τείχη οικοδόμου μένα. 

5 i βοήθησαν δε επ αυτούς oi y Αθηναίοι ττανδημεϊ 
και 'Αρχείων χίΧιοι και των άΧΧων ζυμμάχων 
ώς έκαστοι* ξύμτταντες Be iyevovTO τετρακισχί- 

6 Χιοι καϊ μύριοι. νομίσαντες δε άπορεΐν otttj 
διέΧθωσιν, εττεστράτευσαν αύτοΐς, και τι και του 

7 δήμου καταΧύσεως υποψία. ηΧθον δε και ®εσ- 
σαΧών ιππής τοις Αθηναίοι? κατά το ξυμμαχι- 
κόν, οΐ μετέστησαν εν τω έργω παρά τους 

CVIIL Γενομένης δε της μάχης εν Ύανάηρα 
της "Βοιωτίας ενικών Αακεδαιμόνιοι καϊ οι ζύμ~ 

2 μαχοι, καϊ φόνος εηίνετο αμφοτέρων ποΧύς. καϊ 
Αακεδαιμόνιοι μεν ες την Μεγαρίδα εΧθόντες και 
δενδροτομήσαντες τταΧιν άπήΧθον επ οίκου διά 
Τερανείας καϊ Ισθμού 9 'Αθηναίοι δε δευτέρα καϊ 
εξηκοστή ημέρα μετά την μάχην εστράτευσαν ες 

3 Βοιωτούς Μυρωνίδου στρατη^ούντος, και μάχη 
εν Οίνοφύτοις Βοιωτούς νικήσαντες της τε χώρας 
εκράτησαν της Βοιωτίας και Φωκίδος καϊ Ύανα- 
ηραίων το τείχος περιεΐΧον καϊ Αοκρων των 
Όπουντίων εκατόν άνδρας ομήρους τους πΧον- 
σιωτάτους εΧαβον, τά τε τείχη εαυτών τα μακρά 

4 άπετέΧεσαν. ωμοΧόηησαν δε καϊ οι Αΐηινήται 
μετά ταύτα τοις Άθηναίοις, τείχη τε περιεΧόντες 
και ναυς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ες τον 

5 έπειτα χρόνον. και ΤΙεΧοπόννησον περιέπΧευσαν 
* Αθηναίοι ΎοΧμίδου τον ΎοΧμαίου στρατηηούντος, 

1 8ο 

BOOK I. cvn. 4-cvin. 5 

secretly inviting them into their country, in the hope 
of putting an end to the democracy and to the build- 
ing of the long walls. But the Athenians went out 
against the Lacedaemonians with their whole force 
and with one thousand Argives and contingents of 
the several allies, the whole body amounting to 
fourteen thousand men. And they undertook the 
expedition against them because they believed that 
they were at a loss how to get through, and partly 
too on a suspicion of a plot to overthrow the 
democracy. The forces of the Athenians were 
strengthened by some Thessalian cavalry, who came 
in accordance with the terms of the alliance, but 
they deserted to the Lacedaemonians in the course 
of the action. 

CVIII. The battle took place 1 at Tanagra in 
Boeotia, and in it the Lacedaemonians and their 
allies were victorious, and there was much slaughter 
on both sides. The Lacedaemonians then entered 
the Megaiian territory, cut down the trees, and went 
back home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. 
But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the 
Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia 
under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oeno- 
phyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled 
down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred 
of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Locrians as 
hostages. Meanwhile they completed their own long 
walls. After this the Aeginetans also capitulated to 
the Athenians, pulling down their walls, delivering 
up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future. 2 
And the Athenians, under the command of Tohnides 
son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnesus, 

1 456 b.o. f 455 b.o. 



καϊ το νεώριον τών Αακεδαιμονίων it /ίττρησαρ 
καϊ ΧαΧκίδα Κορινθίων ειΧον zeal Χικυωνίους εν 
άποβάσει της <γής μάχη εκράτησαν. 

CIX. Οι δ' iv rr) Αίηύπτω y Αθηναίοι και οι 
ξύμμαχοι επέμενον, καϊ αύτοΐς ποΧΧαΙ Ιδέαι 

2 ποΧέμων κατέστησαν, το μεν yap πρώτον εκρά- 
τονν της ΑΙ<γύπτον οι ' Αθηναίοι, καϊ βασιλεύς 
πέμπει ες Αακεδαίμονα Μ6 ρ γάβαζον άνδρα ΐΐέρ- 
σην χρήματα έχοντα, όπως ες την Άττικην 
εσβαΧεΐν πεισθέντων τών ΤΙεΧοποννησίων air 

3 Αιγύπτου anayayoi 'Αθηναίους, ώς δε αύτω ου 
προυχώρει καϊ τα χρήματα άΧΧως άνηΧοΰτο, 6 
μεν Mεyάβaζoς και τα Χοιπά τών χρημάτων 
πάΧιν 69 την Άσίαν άνεκομίσθη, M€yάβυζov δε 
τον Ζωπύρου πέμπει άνδρα ΤΙέρσην μετά στρα- 

4 τιας ποΧΧής• ος άφικόμενος κατά yrjv τους τε 
Α^υπτίους καϊ τους ξυμμάχους μάχη εκράτησε 
καϊ εκ της Μέμφιδος εξήΧασε τους "ΕΧΧηνας καϊ 
τέΧος ες ΤΙροσωπίτιδα την νησον κατέκΧησεν 
καϊ εποΧιόρκει iv αύτη ενιαυτον καϊ εξ μήνας, 
μέχρι ου ξηράνας την διώρυχα και παρατρέψας 
άΧΧη το ύδωρ τάς τε ναυς επι του ξηρού έποίησε 
καϊ της νήσου τα ποΧΧά ηπείρου, καϊ διαβάς 
εΙΧε την νησον πεζή. 

CX. Οΰτω μεν τα τών ΈΧΧηνων π pay ματ α 

εφθάρη εξ ετη ποΧεμήσαντα* καϊ oXiyoi άπο 

ποΧΧών πορευόμενοι δια της Αιβύης ες Κυρήνην 

2 εσώθησαν, οι δε πΧεΐστοι άπώλοντο. Aϊyυπτoς 

δε πάΧιν υπ ο βασιΧέα εyέvετo πΧην Άμυρταίου 


BOOK 1. cviii. 5-cx. 2 

burned the dock-yard 1 of the Lacedaemonians, took 
Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and making a de- 
scent upon the territory of the Sicyonians defeated 
them in battle. 

CIX. Meanwhile the Athenians and their allies 
stayed on in Egypt and the war took on many forms. 
At first the Athenians had the mastery in Egypt, and 
the King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian 
with a supply of money, in order that the Lacedae- 
monians might be induced to invade Attica and the 
Athenians thus be drawn away from Egypt. But 
when he found that matters did not advance and the 
money was being spent in vain, Megabazus betook 
himself back to Asia with the money that was left, 
and Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, 2 a Persian, was des- 
patched with a large army. 3 He marched thither by 
land, and defeated the Egyptians and their allies in 
battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and fin- 
ally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where 
he besieged them for a year and six months, then 
finally, by diverting the water into another course, 
drained the canal and left the ships high and dry, 
converting the greater part of the island into main- 
land ; then he crossed over dry-shod and took the 

CX. Thus this undertaking of the Hellenes came 
to naught after a war of six years ; 4 and but few out 
of many, making their way through Libya into 
Cyrene, escaped with their lives ; the most of them 
perished. And all Egypt again came under the 
King's dominion, except Amyrtaeus, the king of the 

1 Gytheum, on the Laconian gulf. 

2 Hero of the capture of Babylon, Hdt. in. clx. 

3 Diodorus gives him with Artabazus 300,000 men (xi. 75) 
and 300 ships (xi. 77). 4 454 b.o. 



του εν τοις εΧεσι βασιλέως• τούτον δέ Βιά 
μέγβθός τ€ του εΧους ουκ εΒύναντο eXeiv καϊ άμα 

3 μαχιμώτατοί είσι των Αιγυπτίων oi εΧειοι. Ινά- 
ρως Βε 6 Λιβύων βασιΧεύς, ος τα πάντα έπραξε 
περί της Αιγύπτου, προΒοσία Χηφθεϊς άνεσταυ- 

4 ρώθη. εκ Βε των 'Αθηνών καϊ της άΧΧης ξυμ- 
μαχίΒος πεντήκοντα τριήρεις ΒιάΒοχοι πΧέουσαι 
ες Αϊγυπτον εσχον κατά το ΜενΒήσιον κέρας, 
ουκ είΒότες των γεγονότων ούΒέν καϊ αύτοΐς εκ 
τε γης επιπεσόντες πεζοί καϊ εκ θαΧάσσης Φοι- 
νίκων ναυτικον Βιέφθειραν τάς ποΧΧάς των νεών, 

5 αί Β εΧάσσους Βιέφυγον πάΧιν, τα μεν κατά 
την μεγάΧην στρατείαν Αθηναίων καϊ των ξυμ- 
μάχων ες Αϊγυπτον οΰτως ετεΧεύτησεν. 

CXI. *Ejc Βε ©εσσαΧίας 'Ορέστης 6 Έχεκρατί- 
Βου υιός του ©εσσαΧών βασιΧέως φεύγων επεισεν 
'Αθηναίους εαυτόν κατάγειν καϊ παραΧαβόντες 
ϋοιωτούς καϊ Φωκεας οντάς ξομμάχους οι 'Αθη- 
ναίοι εστράτευσαν της ©εσσαΧίας επϊ ΦάρσαΧον. 
καϊ της μεν γης εκράτουν οσα μη προϊόντες ποΧυ 
εκ των οπΧων (οι γαρ ιππής των ©εσσαΧών 
είργον), την Βε πόΧιν ούχ εΐΧον, ούΒ' άΧΧο πρου- 
χώρει αύτοΐς ούΒεν ων ένεκα εστράτευσαν, άΧΧ' 
απεχώρησαν παΧιν Όρέστην έχοντες άπρακτοι. 
2 Μετά Βε ταύτα ου πόΧΧω ύστερον χίΧιοι 
'Αθηναίων επϊ τάς ναυς τας εν ΥΙηγαΐς επιβάντες 
(είχον Β' αυτοί τάς ΤΙηγάς) παρέπλευσαν ες 
Σικυωνα ΤΙερικΧέους του Ξανθίππου στρατη- 
γοΰντος, καϊ άποβάντες Ί,ικυωνίων τους προσμεί- 


BOOK I. ex. a-cxi. 2 

marshes l ; for the Persians were unable to capture 
him, both on account of the extent of the marsh and 
because the marsh people are the best fighters 
among the Egyptians. Inaros, however, the king of 
the Libyans, who had been the originator of the 
whole movement in Egypt, was taken by treachery 
and impaled. And when fifty triremes, which sailed 
to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the con- 
federacy to relieve the fleet there, put in at the 
Mendesian mouth of the Nile, quite unaware of what 
had happened, the infantry fell upon them from the 
shore and a Phoenician fleet from the sea and de- 
stroyed most of the ships, a small number only 
escaping. So ended the great expedition against 
Egypt of the Athenians and their allies. 

CXI. And now Orestes son of Echecratidas, king 
of the Thessalians, who was exiled from Thessaly, 
persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And they, 
taking along some Boeotians and Phocians who were 
allies, made an expedition against Pharsalus in 
Thessaly. And though they made themselves masters 
of the land, so far as this was possible without going far 
from their camp — for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed 
them in — they failed to capture the city and indeed 
none of the other objects of their expedition was 
attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful, 
having Orestes with them. 

Not long after this 2 one thousand Athenians, em- 
barking on the ships at Pegae, which was now in 
their possession, 8 sailed along the coast to Sicyon 
under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, 
and disembarking defeated in battle the Sicyonians 

1 cf. Hdt. Π. cxl. ; in. xv. 
1 454 B.C. 8 cf. ch. ciii. 4. 



3 ξαντας μάχη εκράτησαν. κα\ ευθύς παραΧα- 
βόντες 'Αχαιούς καϊ διαπΧεύσαντες πέραν, της 
Ακαρνανίας ες Οίνιάδας εστράτευσαν καΐ επο- 
Χιόρκουν, ου μέντοι εΐΧον γε, άΧΧ* απεχώρησαν 
επ οίκον. 

CXII. - Ύστερον δε ΖιαΧιπόντων ετών τριών 
σπονδαϊ ψήνονται ΤΙεΧοποννησίοις καϊ ' Αθηναίο ις 

2 πεντέτεις. καϊ ΕλΧηνικοΰ μεν ποΧεμου εσχον οι 
'Αθηναίοι, ες δε Κύπρον εστρατεύοντο νανσΐ 
διακοσίαις αυτών τε και των ξυμμάχων Κίμωνος 

3 στ ρατη<γοΰντος. και εξηκοντα μεν νήβς ες Αϊ- 
ηυπτον άπ αυτών επΧευσαν Άμυρταίου μετα- 
πέμποντος τον iv τοις εΧεσι βασιλέως, αι δε 

4 άΧΧαι Κίτιον εποΧιόρκουν. Κίμωνος δε απο- 
θανόντος καϊ Χιμοΰ γενομένου απεχώρησαν άπο 
Κιτίου• καϊ πΧεύσαντες ύπερ ΣαΧαμΐνος της iv 
Κύπρω Φοίνιξι καϊ Κνπρίοις και ΚιΧιξιν εναν- 
μάχησαν κα\ έπεζομάχησαν άμα, και νικήσαντες 
αμφότερα απεχώρησαν επ' οίκου και αι εξ Αί- 

5 ηύπτου νηες πάΧιν άνεΧθουσαι μετ αυτών. Αακε- 
δαιμόνιοι δε μετά ταύτα τον ιερόν καΧούμενον 
πόΧεμον έστράτενσαν, καϊ κρατησαντες του εν 
ΔεΧφοΐς ίεροΰ παρέδοσαν Δελφοί?* καΧ αύθις 
ύστερον 'Αθηναίοι αποχωρησάντων αυτών στρα- 
τεύσαντες και κρατησαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεΰσιν. 

CXIIL Καϊ χρόνου εγγενομένου μετά ταύτα 
1 Αθηναίοι, Βοιωτών τών φενγόντων εχόντων Όρ- 
χομενον καϊ Ύ^αιρώνειαν καϊ άΧΧ' αττα χωρία της 
ΙΒοιωτίας, εστράτευσαν εαυτών μεν χιλίοις όπΧί- 
ταις, τών δε ξυμμάχων ώς εκάστοις επί τα χωρία 
ταύτα ποΧέμια οντά, ΎοΧμίδου τού ΎοΧμαίου 
στρατηγούντος. και Ύ^αιρώνειαν έΧόντες καϊ 

1 86 

BOOK I. cxi. 2-cxiii. ι 

who came out against them. Immediately thereafter, 
taking along some Achaeans and sailing across the 
gulf, they made an expedition against Oeniadae in 
Acarnania and laid siege to it ; but failing to take it 
they went back home. 

CXI I. Three years afterwards 1 a truce was made 
between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, to last 
five years. And the Athenians did abstain from war- 
fare against Hellenes, but they made an expedition 
against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own 
and of their allies, under the command of Cimon. 
Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt on the summons 
of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, while the 
others laid siege to Citium. But Cimon died and a 
famine arose, and so they withdrew from Citium ; 2 
and on their way home, when off Salamis in Cyprus, 
they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians 
by sea and on land. Gaining the victory in both 
battles they went back home, and with them returned 
the ships that had been in Egypt. After this the 
Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war, 
and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, de- 
livered it to the Delphians ; and afterwards, when 
they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedi- 
tion, got possession of it, and delivered it again to 
the Phocians. 

CXIII. Some time after this 3 the Athenians under 
the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one 
thousand hoplites of their own and the respective 
quotas of their allies, made an expedition against 
Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places 
in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeo- 
tian exiles and therefore hostile. And after taking 

1 451 b.c. a 449 b.o. 8 447 b.o. 



ανδραποδίσαντες άπεχώρουν φυΧακήν καταστή- 

2 σαντες. πορευομενοις δ' αντοΐς εν Κορώνεια 
επιτίθενται οι τε εκ της 'Ορχομενού φνγάδες 
Βοιωτών καϊ Αοκροϊ μετ αυτών καϊ Εύβοέων 
φυγάδες καϊ όσοι της αυτής 'γνώμης ήσαν real 
μάχη κρατήσαντες τους μεν διεφθειραν των *Αθη- 

3 ναίων, τους δε ζώντας εΧαβον. καϊ την Βοιωτίαν 
εξεΧιπον Αθηναίοι πάσαν, σπονδάς ποιησάμενοι 

4 εφ' ω τους άνδρας κομιούνται. και οι φεύ^οντες 
Βοιωτών κατεΧθόντες και οι άΧΧοι πάντες αυτό- 
νομοι ττάΧιν ε^ενοντο. 

CXIV. Μετά δε ταύτα ου ποΧΧω ύστερον 
Εύβοια άπεστη άπο 'Αθηναίων, καϊ ες αυτήν 
διαβεβηκότος ήδη ΏερικΧεους στρατιά 'Αθηναίων 
ήγγέΧθη αύτώ οτι Miyapa άφέστηκε και ΙΙεΧο- 
ποννήσιοι μεΧΧουσιν εσβάΧΧειν ες τήν ' Αττικήν 
καϊ οι φ( ουροϊ 'Αθηναίων διεφθαρμένοι είσιν ύπο 
Μβγαρβωζ/, πΧήν όσοι ες Νίσαιαν άπεφυ^ον επα- 
ηαηόμειοι δε Κορινθίους καϊ Έικυωνίους καϊ Έπι- 
δαυρίους απ έστησαν οι Μεγαρής. 6 δε ΏερικΧής 
πάΧιν κατά τάχος εκόμιζε τήν στρατιάν εκ της 

2 Ευβοίας, καϊ μετά τούτο οι ΠεΧοττοννήσιοι της 
'Αττικής ες 'Ελευσίνα καϊ ®ριώζε εσβαΧόντες 
εδήωσαν ΐίΧειστοάνακτος του ΐίαυσανίου βασι- 
Χέως Αακεδαιμονίων ή^ουμένου 9 καϊ το πΧέον 

3 ούκέτι προεΧθόντες απεχώρησαν επ' οίκου, καϊ 
'Αθηναίοι πάλιν ες Εύβοιαν διαβάντες ΤΙερι- 
κΧεους στρατ7^οΰντος κατεστρέψαντο πάσαν, 
καϊ τήν μεν άλΧην ομοΧθ Γ γία κατεστήσαντο, 
*Έ*στιαιάς δε έξοικίσαντες αύτοϊ τήν yrjp εσχον. 

4Αό β. α 
1 88 

BOOK I. cxiii. i-cxiv. 3 

Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery, 
they placed a garrison in it and departed. But 
while they were on the march they were attacked at 
Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, to- 
gether with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and 
others who held the same political views, and were de- 
feated, some of the Athenians being slain and others 
taken alive. Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the 
whole of Boeotia, making a treaty upon the stipula- 
tion that they should receive back their prisoners. 
And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they 
as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became 

CXJV. Not long after this 1 Euboea revolted from 
Athens; and Pericles had just crossed over to the 
island with an Athenian army when word was brought 
to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponne- 
sians were about to invade Attica, and that all the 
Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Mega- 
rians except such as had escaped to Nisaea. The 
Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corin- 
thians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid. So 
Pericles in haste brought his army back again from 
Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians, under the 
command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the 
Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis 
and Thria, ravaging the country ; but without going 
further they returned home. Thereupon the Athen- 
ians again crossed over into Euboea under the com- 
mand of Pericles and subdued the whole of it; 
the rest of the island they settled 2 by agreement, 
but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and 
themselves occupied their territory. 

1 Setting up democracies, etc. φ G.I. A. iv. 27 a. 



CXV. * Ανάγω ρήσαντες δε απ Ευβοίας ου 
ποΧΧώ ύστερον σπονδάς εποιήσαντο προς Αακε- 
δαιμόνιους καϊ τους ξυμμάγους τριακοντούτεις, 
άποίόντες Νίσαιαν και ΤΙηγας καΧ Ύροιζήνα και 
Άχαιίαν ταύτα yap είγρν Αθηναίοι ΤΙεΧοπον- 

2 "Εκτω δε ετει Χαμίοις καϊ ΜιΧησίοις πόΧεμος 
iyeveTO περί ΤΙριήνης" καϊ οι Μ,ιΧήσιοι έλασ- 
σον μεν οι τω πόΧεμω παρ* 'Αθηναίους εΧθοντες 
κατ e βοών των Σαμίων. ξυνεπεΧάβοντο δε καϊ i£ 
αυτής της Σάμου άνδρες ίδιώται, νεωτερίσαι 

3 βουΧόμενοι την ποΧιτείαν. 1 πΧεύσαντες οΰν 
Αθηναίοι ες Χάμον ναυσϊ τεσσαράκοντα δήμο- 
κρατίαν κατέστησαν και ομήρους εΧαβον των 
Σαμίων πεντήκοντα μεν παΐδας, ϊσους δε άνδρας, 
καϊ κατέθεντο ες Αήμνον καϊ φρουράν εηκατα- 

4 Χιπόντες άνεχώρησαν. των δε Σαμίων ήσαν yap 
τίνες οι ονχ ύπ έμειναν, αλλ' εφυyov ες την ήπει- 
ρον, ξυνθέμενοι των εν τή πόΧει τοις δυνατω- 
τάτοις και Υίισσούθνη τω 'Ύστάσπου ζυμμαγίαν, 
ος είχε Σάρδεις τότε, επικούρους τε ξυΧΧεξαντες 
ες επτακόσιους διεβησαν ύπο νύκτα ες την Χάμον. 

δ καϊ πρώτον μεν τω δήμω επανεστησαν και εκρά- 
τησαν τών πΧείστων, έπειτα τους ομήρους εκ- 
κΧεψαντες εκ Αήμνον τους αυτών άπέστησαν, 
και τους φρουρούς τους 'Αθηναίων καϊ τους 
άρχοντας οι ήσαν παρά σφίσιν εξεδοσαν ΤΙισ- 
σούθνη, επί τε ΜίΧητον ευθύς παρεσκευάζοντο 
στρατεύειν. ξυναπεστησαν δ' αύτοΐς καϊ Βυ- 
ζάντιο ι. 

1 tV xo\irdav seems not to have been read by the SchoL, 
and so is deleted by van Herwerden and Hude. 


BOOK I. cxv. 1-5 

CXV. Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not 
long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedae- 
monians and their allies which was to last for thirty 
years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea ; 
for these were the places belonging to the Peloponne- 
sians which the Athenians then held. 

Six years later x a war arose between the Samians 
and the Milesians about the possession of Priene, 
and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the 
war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians. 
They were seconded in their complaint by some 
private citizens from Samos itself who wished to 
revolutionize the government. So the Athenians 
sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a de- 
mocracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys 
and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos ; 
then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison 
behind. Some of the Samians, however, did not 
stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance 
with the most influential men who remained in the 
city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then 
satrap of Sardis ; and collecting mercenary troops to 
the number of seven hundred they crossed over by 
night to Samos. First they attacked the popular 
party and got most of them into their power ; then 
they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and 
revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes 
the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the 
island, and at once set about preparing an expedition 
against Miletus. And the Byzantines also joined in 

their revolt. 

1 440 B.o. 



CXVI. ' Αθηναίοι δε ως τ}σθοντο, πΧεύσαντες 
νανσϊν εξηκοντα επί Σάμου ταΐς μεν εκκαίδεκα 
των νεών ουκ εχρησαντο (ετυχον yap αί μεν 
επι Καριάς ες προσκοπην των Φοινισσών νβων 
οιχόμεναι, at δε επι Χίου teal Αεσβου TreptayyiX- 
Χονσαι βοηθεΐν), τεσσαράκοντα δε ναυσϊ και τεσ- 
σαρσι ΤΙερικΧεους δεκάτου αυτού aTpa^yodvTO? 
εναυμάχησαν προς Τραγιά τί} νήσω Σαμίων 
ναυσίν εβδομηκοντα 9 ων ήσαν αί είκοσι στρατιώ- 
τιδες (ετυχον 8ε αί πάσαι άπο ΜιΧητου πΧε- 

2 ουσαι), και ενικών Αθηναίοι, ύστερον δε αύτοΐς 
εβοήθησαν εκ των * Αθηνών νήες τεσσαράκοντα 
και Χίων και Αεσβίων πέντε καϊ είκοσι, και 
άποβάντες και κρατούντες τω πεζω εποΧιορκουν 
τρισϊ τείχεσι την πόΧιν και εκ θαΧάσσης άμα. 

3 ΤΙερικΧής δε Χαβων εξηκοντα ναΰς άπο των 
εφορμονσών ωχετο κατά τάχος επι Καύνου καϊ 
Καρίας, εσayyεXθεvτωv δτι Φοίνισσαι νηες επ* 
αυτούς πΧέουσιν ωχετο yap και εκ της Σάμου 
πέντε ναυσϊ Xτησayόpaς καϊ άΧΧοι επι τάς 

CXVIL Έι/ τούτω δε οι Σάμιοι εξαπιναίως 
εκπΧουν ποιησάμενοι άφάρκτω τω στρατοπέδω 
επιπεσόντες τάς τε προφυΧακίδας ναΰς διεφθειραν 
και ναυμαχοΰντες τάς άvτavayoμεvaς ενίκησαν, 
καϊ της θαΧάσσης της καθ* εαυτούς εκράτησαν 
ημέρας περί τεσσάρας καϊ δέκα καϊ εσεκομίσαντο 
2 καϊ εξεκομίσαντο α εβουΧοντο. εΧθόντος δε 
ΏερικΧέους πάΧιν ταις ναυσϊ κατεκΧγσθησαν. 
και εκ των ' 'Αθηνών ύστερον προσεβοήθησαν 


BOOK I. cxvi. i-cxvii. 2 

CXVI. But when the Athenians heard of this they 
sailed for Samos with sixty ships. Sixteen of these, 
however, they did not make use of on this enterprise, 
for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep 
watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios 
and Lesbos to summon aid ; but with forty-four ships, 
under the command of Pericles and nine others, 1 
they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against 
seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were 
transport-ships, the whole fleet being on the way 
back from Miletus; and the Athenians were vic- 
torious. Later, having received a reinforcement 
from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and 
Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being 
superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded 
to invest the city with three walls, at the same 
time blockading it by sea as well. But Pericles took 
sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and de- 
parted in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report 
having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing 
against his forces ; for Stesagoras and others had 
gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the 
Phoenician ships. 

CXVI I. Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a 
sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which 
was unprotected by a stockade, destroying the guard- 
ships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that 
put out against them. And for about fourteen days 
they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing 
in and carrying out whatever they wished ; but when 
Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea. 
And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens 

1 Sophocles was on the fleet, as one of the ten generals of 
the year. 


τεσσαράκοντα μεν αϊ μετά ®ουκυ8ίδου καϊ "Αγ- 
νωνος καϊ Φορμίωνος νήες, είκοσι δε ai μετά 
ΎΧηποΧέμου καϊ ΆντικΧεους, εκ δε Χίου καϊ 

3 Αέσβον τριάκοντα, και ναυμαχίαν μεν τίνα 
βραχεΐαν έποιήσαντο οι Χάμιοι, αδύνατοι δε 
δντες άντίσχειν εξεποΧιορκήθησαν ενάτω μηνϊ 
καϊ προσεχώρησαν όμοΧο^ία, τείχος τε καθε- 
Χόντες και ομήρους δόντες καϊ ναΰς τταραδόντες 
και χρήματα τά άναΧωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατά 
χρόνους άττοδοΰναι. ξυνεβησαν δε και Έυζάντιοι 
ώσπερ καϊ ττρότερον υπήκοοι είναι. 

CXVIII. Μετά ταύτα δε ήδη ηίηνεται ου 
ποΧΧοΐς ετεσιν ύστερον τά προειρημενα, τά τε 
Κερκυραϊκά καϊ τά ΙΙοτειδεατικά καϊ οσα προ- 

2 φασις τοΰδε του ποΧέμου κατέστη, ταύτα δε 
ξύ μπάντα οσα έπραξαν οι "ΕΧΧηνες προς τε 
άΧΧήΧους καϊ τον βάρβαρον εηενετο εν ετεσι 
πεντήκοντα μάΧιστα μεταξύ της τε Εέρξου ανα- 
χωρήσεως καϊ της αρχής τούδε του πόΧεμου* εν 
οίς οι Αθηναίοι τήν τε αρχήν εηκρατεστεραν 
κατεστήσαντο καϊ αύτοϊ επϊ μεηα εχώρησαν 
δυνάμεως, oi δε Αακεδαιμόνιοι αίσθόμενοι ούτε 
εκώΧυον ει μη επϊ βραχύ, ήσύχαζόν τε το πΧέον 
του χρόνου, οντες μεν καϊ προ του μη ταχείς 
ίέναι ες τους ποΧέμους, ην μη άναηκαζωνται, το 
δε τι ι καϊ ποΧεμοις οίκείοις εξειρηόμενοι, πριν δη 
ή δύναμις των Αθηναίων σαφώς ηρετο καϊ της 

1 rb δ*' τι, so MSS.: τοτ€ δ' fri is read by Hude, after 
Reiske (Dion. Η. τ<ίτ€ δ€ τι). 

1 Possibly the historian, as some have thought ; others 
explain as the son of Melesias and opponent of Pericles ; 
still others as the poet from the deme of Acherdus. 


BOOK 1. cxvn. 2-cxviii. 2 

of forty ships under the command of Thucydides, 1 
Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and 
Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. Now 
the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a 
short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in 
the ninth month 2 were reduced by siege and agreed 
to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving 
hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting 
to pay back by instalments the money spent upon 
the siege. The Byzantines too came to terms, 
agreeing to be subjects as before. 

CXVIII. It was not many years 3 after this that 
the events already narrated occurred, namely the 
Corcyraean affair, 4 the Potidaean, 5 and all the other 
incidents 6 that furnished an occasion for this war. 
And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one 
another and against the Barbarian, took place in the 
interval of about fifty years between the retreat of 
Xerxes and the beginning of this war. 7 It was in 
this period that the Athenians established their rule 
more firmly and themselves advanced to great power. 
And the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their 
growing power, made no attempt to check it, except 
to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater 
part of the time, since they had never been quick to 
go to war except under compulsion, and in this case 
were in some degree precluded from interference by 
wars of their own. 8 But at last the power of the 
Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were 

2 439 b.c. 

1 Hardly four years, since the naval battle between the 
Corcyraeans and Corinthians seems to have occurred 435 Β.σ. 

4 Chs xxiv-lv. 6 Chs. liv-lxvi. 

6 The transactions in the Spartan assembly, chs. lxvii- 
lxxxviii. 7 479-432 B.C. 

8 The Helot rebellion, ch. ci. tt seq. 


ξυμμαχίας αυτών ηπτοντο. τότε Be ούκέτι άνα- 
σχετόν εποιούντο, αλλ' επιχειρητεα εΒόκει είναι 
πάστ) προθυμία καΐ καθαιρετέα η £σχι/?, ην Βύ- 
νωνται, άραμενοις Βη τόνΒε τον πόΧεμον. 

Αύτοΐς μεν ουν τοις ΑακεΒαιμονίοις Βιεγνωστο 
ΧεΧυσθαι τε τας σπονΒας καϊ τους Αθηναίους 
άΒικεΐν, π € μπάντες Βε ες ΔεΧφούς επηρώτων τον 
θεον εΐ ποΧεμούσιν άμεινον εσται. 6 Be άνεΐΧεν 
αύτοΐς, ώς Χεγεται, κατά κράτος ποΧε μούσι νίκην 
εσεσθαι, καϊ αύτος εφη ξυΧΧήψεσθαι καϊ πάρα- 
καΧούμενος καϊ άκΧητος. CXIX. Αύθις Be τους 
ξυμμάχους παρακαΧέσαντες ψήφον εβουΧοντο 
επαγαγεΐν el χρη ποΧεμεΐν. καϊ εΧθ όντων των 
πρέσβεων άπο της ξυμμαχίας καϊ ξυνόΒου γενο- 
μένης οι τε αΧΧοι είπον α εβουΧοντο, κατηγο- 
ροΰντες οι πΧείους των 'Αθηναίων καϊ τον πόΧεμον 
άξιούντες γίγνεσθαι, καϊ οι Κορίνθιοι Βεηθεντες 
μεν καϊ κατά πόΧεις πρότερον εκάστων ΙΒία 
ώστε ψηφίσασθαι τον πόΧεμον, ΒεΒιότες περϊ τί) 
ΤΙοτειΒαία μη προΒιαφθαρτ), παρόντες Be καϊ τότε 
καϊ τεΧευταϊοι επεΧθόντες εΧεγον τοιάΒε. 

CXX. "Ύούς μβν ΑακεΒαιμονίους, ω άνΒρες 
ξύμμαχοι, ουκ αν ετι αίτιασαίμεθα ώς ου καϊ 
αύτοϊ εψηφισμενοι τον πόΧεμον είσι καϊ ημάς ες 
τούτο νυν ξυνηγαγον. χρη γαρ τους ηγεμόνας 
τα ϊΒια εξ Ισου νεμοντας τα κοινά προσκοπεΐν, 
ωσπερ καϊ εν άΧΧοις εκ πάντων προτιμώνται. 

BOOK I. cxviii. 2-cxx. ι 

laying hands upon their allies. Then the Lacedae- 
monians could bear it no longer, but determined 
that they must attack the Athenian power with all 
zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking 
this war. 

The Lacedaemonians themselves, then, 1 had de- 
cided that the treaty had been broken and that the 
Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi 
they asked the god if it would be advisable for 
them to go to war. The god answered them, as it is 
said, that if they warred with all their might, victory 
would be theirs, and said that he himself would help 
them, whether invoked or uninvoked. CX1X. But 
they wished to summon their allies again and put 432 Β,α 
to them the question whether they should go to 
war. And when the envoys from the allies had 
come and an assembly was held, the others said 
what they wished, most of them complaining of the 
Athenians and demanding that the war should be 
entered upon, and especially the Corinthians. They 
had already, before the meeting, privately begged 
the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest 
Potidaea would be destroyed before help came, and 
now, being also present at this meeting, they came 
forward last of all and spoke as follows : 

CXX. " Men of the allies, we can no longer com- 
plain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both 
themselves voted for the war and also brought us to- 
gether for this object. And that is right ; for it is 
the duty of leaders, while equitably considering 
their particular interests, to have special regard for 
the general weal, just as in other matters they are 

1 Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of ch. 



2 ημών δε όσοι μεν Άθηναίοις ηδη ξυνηλλάγησαν 
ουχί διδαχής δέονται ώστε φυλάξασθαι αυτούς" 
τους δε την μεσόγειαν μάλλον κα\ μη iv πορω 
κατωκημβνονς είδεναι χρη οτι, τοις κάτω ην μη 
άμύνωσι, χαλεπωτέραν εξουσι την κατακομιδην 
των ωραίων καϊ πάλιν άντίληψιν ων η θάλασσα 
tj} ηπείρω δίδωσι, καϊ των νυν λεγομένων μη 
κακούς κριτας ως μη προσηκόντων είναι, προσδε- 
χεσθαι δε ποτέ, ει τα κάτω πρόοιντο, καν μζχρι* 
σφών το δεινον προελθεΐν, καϊ περί αυτών ούχ 

3 ήσσον νυν βουλεύεσθαι. δι όπερ καϊ μη οκνεΐν 
δει αυτούς τον πόλεμον άντ ειρήνης μεταλαμβα- 
νειν. ανδρών yap σωφρόνων μεν εστίν, ει μη 
άδικοΐντο, ησυχάζειν, αγαθών δε αδικούμενους εκ 
μεν ειρήνης πολεμεΐν, ευ δε παρασχον εκ πόλε- 
μου πάλιν ξυμβήναι, καϊ μήτε τη κατά πόλεμον 
ευτυχία επαίρεσθαι μήτε τω ήσύχω της ειρήνης 

4 ηδόμενον άδικεΐσθαι' ο τε γαρ δια την ηδονην 
όκνών τάχιστ αν άφαιρεθείη της ραστώνης το 
τερπνόν δι όπερ όκνεΐ, ει ήσυχάζοι, 1 δ τε εν 
πολεμώ ευτυχία πλεονάζων ουκ εντεθύμηται 

5 θράσει άπίστω επαιρόμενος. πολλά yap κακώς 
γνωσθεντα άβουλοτερων τών εναντίων τυχόντα 
κατωρθώθη, καϊ ετι πλείω καλώς δοκοΰντα 
βουλευθήναι ες τουναντίον αίσχρώς περιεστη• 

1 u ησυχάζοι deleted by Hude, after Lehner. 

BOOK I. cxx. 2-5 

honoured above all. Now those of us who have 
had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not 
need to be taught to be on our guard against them. 
But those who dwell more in the interior and away 
from any trade-route should be warned that, if they 
do not aid those who are on the seaboard, they will 
find it more difficult to bring the products of the 
land down to the sea and to get in return what the 
sea gives to the mainland ; and that they should not 
be careless judges of what is said here, as though it 
were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if 
they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger 
may possibly some day reach them, and that they 
are deliberating upon their own interests no less 
than upon ours. They ought not, therefore, to 
hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace. 
For though it is the part of men of discretion to 
remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it 
behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from 
peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers 
to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing 
themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor 
to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to sub- 
mit to wrong. For he who for the sake of his comfort 
shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, 
very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which 
caused him to shrink ; and he who presumes upon his 
success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is 
the confidence which elates him. For many enter- 
prises which were ill-planned have succeeded because 
the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, 
and yet more, which to all appearances were well 
advised, have turned out the opposite way and 
brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a 



ενθυμειται yap ουδείς όμοια 1 rfj πίστει καϊ €ρηφ 
επεξβρχεται, άλλα μετ άσφαΧείας μεν δοξάζομεν, 
μβτά δέους δε εν τω e /ογω εΧΧείπομεν. 

CXXL " 'ϊΐμεΐς δε νυν καϊ αδικούμενοι τον 
πόΧεμον έγβίρομεν και ικανά έχοντες €"γκ\ηματα, 
και όταν άμννώμβθα Αθηναίους, καταθησομεθα 

2 αύτον iv καιρώ. κατά ποΧΧα δε ημάς βίκος 
επικρατήσαι, πρώτον μεν πΧηθει προύχοντας καϊ 
εμπειρία ποΧεμικί), έπειτα ομοίως πάντας ες τα 

3 παραγγεΧλόμενα ιόντας, ναντικόν τε, ω ισχύ- 
ουσιν, άπο της υπαρχούσης τε έκάστοις ουσίας 
εζαρτυσόμεθα καϊ άπο των εν Δελφοΐς καϊ 
'ΟΧυμπία χρημάτων δάνεισμα yap ποιησάμενοι 
ύποΧαβεϊν οίοι τ' εσμεν μισθώ μείζονι τους ξέ- 
νους αυτών ναυβάτας. ώνητη yap ή * Αθηναίων 
δύναμις μαΧΧον ή οικεία* ή 8ε ημετέρα ησσον αν 
τούτο πάθοι, τοΐς σώμασι το πΧεον ισχύουσα ή 

4 τοΐς χρημασιν. μια τε νίκτ) ναυμαχίας κατά το 
είκος άΧίσκονται• el δ' άντίσχοιεν, μεΧετήσομεν 
καϊ ημείς εν πΧέονι χρόνω τα ναυτικά, και όταν 
την επιστήμην ες το ϊσον καταστησωμεν, Ttj ye 
εύψυχία δήπου περιεσόμεθα' ο yap ημείς εχομεν 
φύσει aya0ov, εκείνοις ουκ αν yivoiro διδαχτ), ο 

1 Reiske'e correction for Ζμοια of the MSS. 

1 cf. π. xiii. 4, where Pericles suggests a similar resource. 
The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according 
to ch. cxviii. 3. 


BOOR i. cxx. 5-cxxi. 4 

plan with the same confidence with which he con- 
ceives it ; on the contrary we form our fond schemes 
with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their 
execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short ot 

CXXI. " And so now in our own case, it is because 
we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for 
complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as 
soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the 
Athenians we will bring the war to an end when 
occasion offers. And for many reasons we are likely 
to prevail : first, because we are superior in point of 
numbers and in military experience ; secondly, because 
we all with one accord obey the word of command ; 
and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we 
shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the 
means which we severally possess, but also with the 
funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia. 1 For by 
contracting a loan we can use the inducement of 
higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary 
sailors ; for the forces of the Athenians are made up 
of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, where- 
as ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of 
the men than in the pay they get, would be less 
subject to such defection. And so, if we win a single 
victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated. 2 
If, however, they should still hold out, we on our 
part shall have more time for practice in seaman- 
ship, and as soon as we have brought our skill to a 
parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be 
superior. For the excellence that nature has given 
us cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas 

1 Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Pelopon- 
nesian side for higher pay• 

VOL. I. XT 201 


δ' εκείνοι επιστήμη προύχουσι, καθαιρετον 1 ημϊν 
5 εστί μεΧετη. 'χρήματα δε ώστε εχειν €5 αυτά, 
οϊσομεν η δεινον αν εϊη εΐ οι μεν εκείνων ζνμ- 
μαχοι επί δουΧεία, τη αυτών φέροντες ουκ άπε- 
ροΰσιν, ημείς δ' επί τω τιμωρούμενοι τους εχ- 
θρούς κα\ αυτοί άμα σωζεσθαι ουκ άρα δαπανή- 
σομεν καϊ επί τω μη ύττ εκείνων αυτά αφαιρε- 
θέντες αύτοΐς τούτοις κακώς πάσχειν. 

CXXII. "'Ύπάρχουσι δε καϊ άΧΧαι οδοί του 
ποΧεμου ήμϊν, ξυμμάχων τε άπόστασις, μάΧιστα 
παραίρεσις ούσα τών προσόδων αίς Ισχύουσι, καϊ 
επιτειχισμος τη χώρα, άΧΧα τε οσα ουκ άν τις 
νυν προϊδοι, ήκιστα yap πόΧεμος επι ρητοΐς 
χωρεί, αύτος δε αφ* αυτού τα ποΧΧά τεχνάται 
προς το παρατυ^γχάνον εν ω ο μεν εύορηήτως 
αύτω προσομΐΧήσας βεβαιότερος, ο δ* ορκισθείς 
περί αύτον 2 ουκ εΧάσσω πταίει. 
2 "Ήνθυμώμεθα δε καϊ δτι, el μεν ημών ήσαν 
εκάστοις προς άντιπάΧους περί <γής ορών αί δια- 
φοραί, οίστον άν ην νυν δε προς ξύμπαντάς τ€ 
ημάς 'Αθηναίοι ικανοί καϊ κατά ποΧιν ετι δυνα- 
τώτεροι* ώστε, ει μη καϊ αθρόοι καϊ κατά έθνη 
καϊ εκαστον άστυ μια ηνώμη άμυνούμεθα αυτούς, 
δίχα γ€ οντάς ημάς άπόνως χειρώσονται. καϊ 
την ησσαν, εΐ και δεινόν τω άκοΰσαι, ϊστω ουκ 

1 καθαιρ€τόν, which Hude adopts from C and G (ex corr. ), 
against καθαιρ*τ*ον of the other MSS., is confirmed by the 
echo in Dio C. xliii. 11, το μϊν yap κτ-ητον δ«ά βραχςο* rols rbv 
νουν αύτψ ττροσίχουσι καϊ καθαιρ*τον μςΚίττι civai. 

2 Dobree's correction for avrbv of nearly all MSS. 


BOOK I. cxxi. 4-cxxii. 2 

the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us 
through practice. And as to the money we need to 
accomplish all this, we shall provide it by contributions; 
or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to 
pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to 
secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety 
for ourselves, shall prove unwilling to spend money, 
aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very 
wealth and withal have it used to our destruction. 

CXXI I. " But we have other ways also of waging 
war — inducing their allies to revolt, which is the 
best means of depriving them of the revenues in 
which their strength consists, the planting of forts in 
their territory, and all the other measures which one 
cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms 
to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form 
its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources 
allow ; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper 
cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be 
safe, while he who loses his temper over it 1 makes 
more blunders. 

" And let us reflect also that, if we individually 
were involved in a dispute about mere boundary- lines 
with an enemy who was no more than our equal, 
that might be borne ; but as the case stands, the 
Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and 
still more powerful against us city by city. Hence, 
unless all of us together, every nation and town, with 
one accord resist them, they will easily overpower 
us because we shall be divided. And as to de- 
feat — even though this is terrible to hear, let it 

1 Or, reading αυτόν with the MSS., ''makes blunders 
through his own fault as much as anything," i.e. "the man 
who loses his head has only himself to blame for his disasters." 



3 aXXo τι φέρουσαν η άντικρυς δουΧείαν δ καϊ 
λόγω ενδοιασθήναι αίσχρον rjj ΥΙεΧοποννησω 
και πόΧεις τοσάσδε υπο μιας κακοπαθεΐν. iv ώ 
η δικαίως δοκοΐμεν αν πάσγειν η δια δειΧίαν άνε- 
γεσθαι καϊ των πάτερων χείρους φαίνεσθαι, οι 
την ΈΧΧάδα ήΧευθερωσαν ημείς he ουδ' ήμΐν 
αύτοΐς βεβαιοΰμεν αυτό, τύραννον δέ εώμεν ey- 
καθεστάναι πόΧιν, τους δ' εν μια μονάργρνς 

4 άξιουμεν καταΧύειν. καϊ ουκ ϊσμεν όπως τάδε 
τριών των μεγίστων ξυμφορών άπηΧΧακται, 
άξυνεσίας ή μαΧακίας ή άμεΧείας. ου yap δη 
πεφευγότες αυτά επι την πΧείστους δη βΧάψασαν 
καταφρόνησιν κεγωρηκατβ, η εκ του ποΧΧούς 
σφάΧΧειν το εναντίον όνομα αφροσύνη μετωνο- 

CXXIIL "Τα μεν ουν προγεγενημενα τί δει 
μακροτερον η ες όσον τοις νυν ξυμφερει αϊτια- 
σθαι; περί δε των έπειτα μεΧΧοντων τοις παροΰ- 
σι βοηθουντας χρη επιταΧαιπωρεΐν (πάτριον yap 
ήμΐν 1 εκ των πόνων τας άρετας κτάσθαι), καϊ μη 
μεταβάΧΧειν το εθος, ει άρα πΧούτω τε νυν καϊ 
εξουσία oXiyov προφέρετε (ου yap δίκαιον a ttj 
απορία εκτήθη ττ) περιουσία άποΧεσθαι), άΧΧά 
θαρσοΰντας ιεναι κατά ποΧΧα ες τον ποΧεμον, 
του τε θεού χρήσαντος καϊ αυτού υποσχόμενου 

1 With C, the other MSS. have ύμίν. 

1 καταφρύνησίϊ is that proud and haughty spirit which pre- 
cedes and invites a falL It seems impossible to reproduce io 


BOOK I. cxxn. 2-cxxni. ι 

be well understood that it brings nothing else than 
downright slavery. That such an outcome should 
even be spoken of as a possibility, or that so many 
cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a 
disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men 
would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or 
that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that 
we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who 
liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making 
this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be 
established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim 
the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single 
states. We know not how such a course can be ac- 
quitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity 
or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose 
that, escaping those errors, you have reached that 
most fatal spirit of proud disdain τ which has ruined 
so many men that it has taken on a new name, 
that of despicable folly. 

CXXIII. "With regard, however, to what is past 
and done, what need is there to find fault at 
length, except in so far as that is profitable for what 
is present? But with a view to what shall be 
hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task 
in hand — for to win virtue 2 by toils is our heritage 
— and make no change of custom because you 
now have a slight superiority in wealth and power ; 
for it is not right that attributes which have 
been won through poverty should be lost through 
prosperity. Nay, you should go into the war with 
confidence, and for many reasons : the god has 
spoken through his oracle and promised that he 

English the assonance of the words κατα<ρρ6ι>7)*τι$ αφροσύνη. 
Thucydidee was fond of paronomasia ; cf. eh. xxxiii. 4. 
a Or, "the rewards of virtue "—honour, renown. 


ξνΧΧηψεσθαι, καϊ της άΧΧης *ΈΧΧάδος άπάσης 
ξννα,Ύωνίονμβνης, τα μεν φόβω, τα δε ωφεΧία. 
2 σπονδάς τε ου Χύσετε πρότεροι, ας ye και 6 θεός 
κεΧεύων ποΧεμεΐν νομίζει παραβεβάσθαι, ήδι- 
κημέναις δε μάΧΧον βοηθήσετε' Χύουσι yap ονχ 
οι αμυνόμενοι, αλλ' οι πρότεροι επιόντες. 

CXXIY. "'Ώστε πανταχόθεν καΧώς υπάρχον 
ύμΐν ποΧεμεΐν καϊ ημών Koivfj τάδε παραινούντων, 
εϊπερ βεβαιότατον το ταύτα 1 ξυμφεροντα και 
ποΧεσι καϊ ιδιώταις είναι, μη μελΧετε ΤΙοτει- 
δεάταις τε ποιεΐσθαι τιμωρίαν ουσι Αωριεΰσι 
καϊ υπο Ιώνων ποΧιορκουμενοις, ου πρότερον 
ην τουναντίον, καϊ των αΧΧων μετεΧθεΙν την 
εΧευθερίαν, ώς ούκέτι ενδέχεται περιμένοντας 
τους μεν ήδη βΧάπτεσθαι, τους δ\ ει ^/νωσθησό- 
μεθα ζυνεΧθόντες μεν, άμύνεσθαι δε άτοΧμώντες, 

2 μη ποΧύ ύστερον το αυτό πάσχειν άΧΧα νομί- 
σαντες ες avay^v άφϊγθαι, ω άνδρες ξύμμαχοι, 
καϊ άμα τάδε άριστα Xεyεσθaι, ψηφίσασθε τον 
πόΧεμον μη φοβηθέντες το αύτίκα δεινόν, της δ' 
απ* αυτού δια πΧείονος ειρήνης έπιθυμησαντες* 
εκ ποΧέμου μεν yap ειρήνη μάΧΧον βεβαιουται, 
αφ* ησυχίας δε μη ποΧεμησαι ούχ ομοίως άκίν- 

3 δυνον. καϊ την καθεστηκυΐαν εν ττ) Ελλάδα 
πόΧιν τύραννον ^ησάμενοι επί πάσιν ομοίως 
καθεστάναι, ώστε των μεν ήδη άρχειν, των 8e 

1 So Hude, after Reiske (ταύτα F, ταυτά yp.a?) ; ταντα 


BOOK I. cxxiii. i-cxxiv. 3 

himself will help you ; all the rest of Hellas will join 
you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly 
through self-interest; and, finally, you will not be 
the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in 
bidding you go to war, considers it to have been 
transgressed already, but you will be going to the 
defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it 
is not those who fight in self-defence that break a 
treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked. 

CXXIV. " So then, since from every quarter a 
favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to 
war, and since we recommend this course in the 
common interest — if it be true that identity of 
interest 1 is the surest policy for states and individuals 
to follow — make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who 
are Dorians and besieged by Ionians — the reverse of 
what used to be — and to recover the liberty of the 
rest ; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when 
some are already being injured, and others, if it shall 
become known that we have had a meeting and 
dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same 
fate. On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize 
that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the 
same time that this proposal is for the best ; and 
vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger, 
but coveting the more enduring peace which will 
result from the war. For peace is more firmly 
established when it follows war, but to refuse to 
go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means 
so free from danger. And so, in the conviction that 
the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas 
is a menace to all alike, ruling over some already and 

1 Or, reading ταΟτα, " if it be most certain that this course 
(i.e. declaration of war) is advantageous for states as well as 



διανοεΐσθαι, παραστησώμεθα επεΧθόντες, κάϊ 
αυτοί τε ακινδύνως το Χοιπον οΐκώμεν κα\ τους 
νυν δεδουΧω μένους r ΕΧΧηνας έΧευθερώσωμεν" 

CXXV. Τοιαύτα μεν οι Κορίνθιοι εΐπον. οι 
δε Λακεδαιμόνιοι επειδή άφ' απάντων ηκουσαν 
γνώμην, ψήφον επη<γα*/ον τοις ξνμμάχοις άπασιν 
όσοι παρήσαν εξής καϊ μείζονι καϊ εΧάσσονι πο~ 
2 Χει* καϊ το πΧηθος εψηφίσαντο ποΧεμεΐν. δεδογ- 
μενον δε αύτοϊς ευθύς μεν αδύνατα ην επιχειρεΐν 
άπαρασκεύοις οΰσιν, εκ-πορίζεσθαι δε εδόκει έκά- 
στοις α πρόσφορα ην καϊ μη είναι μεΧΧησιν. 
όμως δε καθισταμένοις ων έδει ενιαυτος μεν ου 
διετρίβη, εΧασσον δε, πριν εσβαΧεΐν ες την 
Άττικην καϊ τον ποΧεμον άρασθαι φανερώς. 

CXXVL Έζ/ τούτω δέ έπρεσβεύοντο τω χρόνω 
προς τους 'Αθηναίους εηκΧηματα ποιούμενοι, 
όπως σφίσιν οτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εϊη του ποΧε- 

2 μεΐν, ην μη τι εσακουωσιν. καϊ πρώτον μεν 
πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οί Λακεδαιμόνιοι εκέΧευον 

3 τους Αθηναίους το άγος εΧαύνειν της θεού. το 
δε άγος ην τοιόνδε. ΚύΧων ην 'Αθηναίος άνηρ 
ΌΧυμπιονίκης τών πάΧαι ευγενής τε καϊ δυνατός 9 
ε^ε^αμηκει δε θυγατέρα ®εα Γ γένους Με<γαρεως 
ανδρός, ος κατ εκείνον τον χρόνον ετυράννει 

4 Μεγάρων, χρω μένω δε τω ΚύΧωνι εν ΔεΧφοΐς 
άνεΐΧεν 6 θεός εν του Διός τη με-γίσττ) εορτή 

δ καταΧαβεΐν την 'Αθηναίων άκρόπόΧιν. ο δε παρά 
τε του ®εα^ένους δύναμιν Χαβων και τους φι\ους 
αναπείσας, επειδή επήΧθεν 'ΟΧύμπια τα εν 
ΤίεΧοποννήσω, κατέλαβε την άκρόπόΧιν ως επι 
τυραννίδι, νοαίσας εορτην τε του Δώς μεηίστην 


BOOK I. cxxiv. 3-cxxvi. 5 

designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce 
it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set 
free those Hellenes who are already enslaved." 

CXXV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the 
Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions 
of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied 
states which were present, both great and small ; 
and the majority voted for war. But though the 
decision was made it was impossible for them to 
take up arms at once, as they were unprepared ; it 
was determined, however, that the several states 
should make the fitting preparations and that there 
should be no delay. Nevertheless, in providing them- 
selves with what was needed there was spent, not 
indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they 
invaded Attica and took up the war openly. 

CXXVI. During this interval they kept sending 
embassies to the Athenians and making complaints, 
that they might have as good a pretext as possible 
for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse 
to consider them. And first the Lacedaemonian 
envoys bade the Athenians drive out the " curse of 
the goddess." The curse was as follows: There 
was an Athenian in days of old named Cylon, a 
victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful ; and 
he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, 
who was at that time tyrant of Megara. Now Cylon 
consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in 
answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens 
"at the greatest festival of Zeus." So he obtained a 
force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to 
help, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnesus 
came on he seized the Acropolis with a view to 
making himself tyrant; for he thought that the 



είναι teal εαυτω τι προσηκειν 'ΟΧύμπια νενικη- 

6 κότι. εί δε εν ttj ' Αττική ή άλλοθι που η μέγιστη 
εορτή εϊρητο, ούτε εκείνος ετι κατενόησε το τε 
μαντεΐον ουκ, εδηλου (εστί yap καϊ 'Αθηναίοι? 
Αιάσια, α καλείται, Αιος εορτή Μειλιχίου με- 
γίστη, εξω της πόλεως, εν rj πανδημει θύουσι, 
πολλοί * ούχ ιέρεια άλλα θύματα επιχωρια), 
δοκών δε ορθώς ηιηνωσκειν επεχείρησε τω έργω, 

7 οί 8ε 'Αθηναίοι αίσθόμενοι εβοηθησάν τε παν- 
δημεϊ εκ των αγρών επ αυτούς καϊ προσκαθε- 

8 ζόμενοι επο\ιόρκουν. χρόνου 8ε iyyiyvo μενού οι 
'Αθηναίοι τρυχόμενοι τη προσεδρία άπηλθον οί 
πολλοί, επιτρεψαντες τοις εννέα άρχουσι την 
φυλακην τε και το παν αύτοκράτορσι διαθεϊναι 
rj αν άριστα 8ιayιyvωσκωσιv % τότε δε τα πολλά 
τών πολιτικών οί εννέα άρχοντες επρασσον. 

9 οι δε μετά του Κύλωνος πόλιορκούμενοι φλαύρως 
10 είχον σίτου τε και ύδατος απορία, ο μεν ούν 

ΚύΧων και ο αδελφός εκδιδράσκουσιν οί δ' άλλοι 
ώς επιεζοντο και τίνες καϊ άπέθνγσκον υπο του 
Χιμοΰ, καθίζουσιν επι τον βωμον ίκεται τον εν ττ} 

1 πολΚο) : Hude adopts C. F. Hermann's conjecture πολλά, 
and, after Madvig, inserts ayva before θύματα. 

1 On this first attempt to establish a tyranny in Athens, 
see also Hdt. v. lxxi ; Plut. Solon, xii. It was not a rising 
of the people against the nobles, but the attempt of an am- 
bitious man who aspired to royal power, supported only by a 
few friends and a body of Megarian soldiers. To the mass 


BOOK I. cxxvi. 5-10 

Olympic festival was not only the greatest festival 
of Zeus, but also in a manner was connected with 
him as having won an Olympic victory. 1 But 
wh ether the oracle meant the greatest festival in 
Attica or somewhere else he did not go on to con- 
sider, and the oracle did not make it clear. For, in 
fact, the Athenians also have a festival in honour of 
Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called, a very 
great festival celebrated outside the city, whereat 
all the people offer sacrifices, many making offer- 
ings 2 peculiar to the country instead of victims. 
But Cylon, thinking that he was right in his opinion, 
made his attempt. And the Athenians, when they 
were aware of it, came in a body from the fields 
against them and sitting down before the Acropolis 
laid siege to it. But as time passed the Athenians 
grew weary of the siege and most of them went 
away, committing the task of guarding to the nine 
Archons, to whom they also gave full power to settle 
the whole matter as they might determine to be 
best ; for at that time 3 the nine Archons transacted 
most of the public business. But Cylon and those 
who were being besieged with him were in hard 
straits through lack of food and water. So Cylon 
and his brother escaped ; but the rest, when they 
were in great distress and some of them were even 
dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the 

of the people it seemed to portend subjection to Megara, so 
they flocked in to crush the movement, not, as Cylon hoped, 
to support it. 

2 A scholiast suggests cakes (ττ4μματα) made in the forms 
of animals. 

* i.e. before the legislation of Solon ; from that time the 
power of the Archons decreased, and was restricted chiefly 
to judicial functions. 



11 άκροποΧει. άναστήσαντες δε αυτούς οι των 'Αθη- 
ναίων επιτετραμμένοι την φυΧακήν, ως έώρων 
άποθνησ κοντας iv τω Ιερώ, εφ' ω μ /δεν κακόν 
ποιησουσιν, απαγαγόντες άπέκτειναν καθεζομέ- 
νους δε τινας καϊ επϊ των σεμνών θεών τοις 
βωμοΐς iv τη παρόδω άπεχρήσαντο. καϊ άπο 
τούτου εναγείς καϊ άΧιτηριοι της θεού IxeivoL τ€ 

12 εκαΧούντο καϊ το γένος το απ εκείνων. ηΧασαν 
μεν ουν καϊ οι Αθηναίοι τους εναγείς τούτους, 
ήΧασε δε καϊ Κλεομένης 6 Λακεδαιμόνιος ύστερον 
μετά ' Αθηναίων στασιαζόντων, τους τε ζώντας 
εΧαύνοντες καϊ των τεθνεώτων τα οστά άνε\6ντες 
εξέβαΧον κατηΧθον μέντοι ύστερον, καϊ το γένος 
αυτών ετι εστίν εν ττ) πόΧει. 

CXXVII. Ύοΰτο δη το άγος οι Αακεδαιμόνιοι 
εκέΧευον έΧαύνειν δήθεν τοις θεοΐς πρώτον τιμω- 
ροΰντες, είδότες δε ΤΙερικΧέα τον Έϊανθ ίππου 
προσεγομενον αύτώ κατά την μητέρα καϊ νομί- 
ζοντες εκπεσόντος αύτοΰ ραον αν ι σφίσι προ- 

2 γωρεϊν τα άπο τών Αθηναίων, ου μέντοι τοσού- 
τον ηΧπιζον παθεΐν αν αύτον τούτο όσον διαβοΧην 
οϊσειν αύτώ προς την ποΧιν, ώς καϊ δίά την 

3 εκείνου ξυμφοραν το μέρος εσται 6 πόΧεμος. ών 

1 Added by Stahl. 

1 Of Athena Polias. 

2 The sanctuary of the Ewmenides, which lay between the 
Acropolis and the Areopagus. 


BOOK I. cxxvi. io-cxxvii. 3 

altar 1 on the Acropolis. And the Athenians who 
had been charged with guarding them, when they 
saw them dying in the temple, caused them to arise 
on promise of doing them no harm, and leading 
them away put them to death ; and some who in 
passing by took refuge at the altar of the Awful 
Goddesses 2 they dispatched even there. For this 
act both they and their descendants 3 were called 
accursed and sinners against the Goddess. Accord- 
ingly the accursed persons were driven out not only 
by the Athenians but also at a later time by Cleo- 
menes the Lacedaemonian, with the help of a 
faction of the Athenians, during a civil strife, when 
they drove out the living and disinterred and cast 
out the bones of the dead. Afterwards, however, 
they were restored, and their descendants are still 
in the city. 

CXXVII. It was this " curse" that the Lacedae- 
monians now bade the Athenians drive out, prin- 
cipally, as they pretended, to avenge the honour of 
the gods, but in fact because they knew that Pericles 
son of Xanthippus was implicated in the curse on 
his mothers side, 4 and thinking that, if he were 
banished, they would find it easier to get from the 
Athenians the concessions they hoped for. They 
did not, however, so much expect that he would 
suffer banishment, as that they would discredit him 
with his fellow-citizens, who would feel that to some 
extent his misfortune 5 would be the cause of the 

* Chiefly the Alcmaeonidae, whose head was Megaeles, 
Archon at the time of Cylon's attempt. 

* Pericles was a descendant in the sixth generation from 
Megaeles, his mother Agariste being niece of the Alcmaeonid 
Cleisthenes (Hdt VI. exxxi.). 

6 As belonging to the accursed family• 



jap δυνατώτατος τών καθ* εαυτόν κα\ αηων την 
ποΧιτείαν ήναντιοΰτο πάντα τοις Αακεδαιμονίοις, 
καΧ ουκ εία ύπείκειν, άΧΧ* €? τό^ πόΧεμον ω ρ μα 
τους ' Αθηναίους, 

CXXVIII. *ΑντεκέΧενον δε καΧ οι * Αθηναίοι 
τους Αακβδαι μονίους το άπο Ταινάρου α^ος εΧαύ- 
νειν. οι yap Αακεδαιμονιοι άναστησαντές ποτέ 
εκ του ιερού του ΙΙοσειδώνος άπο Ταινάρου 1 
των Έ*ίΧώτων ικέτας άπαηα'γοντβς διέφθειραν δι* 
ο δη και σφίσιν αύτοΐς νομίζουσι τον μεηαν 

2 σεισμον γβνβσθαι iv Σπάρτη. εκεΧευον Be καϊ το 
της ΧαΧκιοίκου ά Γ /ος εΧαύνειν αυτούς 9 ε^γένετο δε 

3 τοιόνδε. επε/δη ΤΙαυσανίας 6 Αακεδαιμόνιος το 
πρώτον μεταπεμφθεϊς υπο Σπαρτιατών άπο της 
αρχής της iv 'ΕλΧησπόντω καϊ κριθείς υπ* αυτών 
άπεΧυθη μη άδικεΐν, δημοσία μεν ουκ έτι εξεπεμ- 
φθη, ιδία δε αύτος τριήρη Χαβών 'Έρμιονίδα 
άνευ Αακεδαιμονίων άφικνεΐται ες ' ΕΧΧήσποντον, 
τω μεν λόγω επί τον Μηδικον πόΧεμον, τω δε 
ερ^ω τά προς βασιΧέα πράγματα πράσσειν, 
ώσπερ καϊ το πρώτον επεχείρησεν, εφιεμενος της 

4 ΈΧΧηνικής αρχής. εύερ Γ γεσίαν δε άπο τοΰδε 
πρώτον ες βασίΧία κατέθετο καϊ του παντός 

δ πράγματος άρχην Ιποιήσατο. Έυζάντιον jap 

1 Van Herwerden deletes, followed by Hude. 

1 φ ch. ci. 2. 

BOOK I. cxxvn. 3-cxxviii. 5 

war. For being the most powerful man of his time 
and the leader of the state, he was opposed to the 
Lacedaemonians in all things, and would not let 
the Athenians make concessions, but kept urging 
them on to the war. 

CXXVIII. The Athenians answered with the 
demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out 
the curse of Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians had 
on one occasion caused some suppliant Helots to leave 
their refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, 
then had led them off and put them to death ; and 
the Lacedaemonians believe that it was because 
of this sacrilege that the great earthquake 1 befell 
them at Sparta. And the Athenians also bade them 
drive out the curse of Athena of the Brazen House. 2 
And this is the way it was incurred. After Pau- 
sanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the 
Spartans, on the first occasion, 3 from his command 
on the Hellespont, and on trial had been acquitted 
of wrong doing, he was never again sent out in a 
public capacity, but privately and on his own account 
he took a trireme of Hermione without authority of 
the Lacedaemonians and came to the Hellespont, 
to take part, as he pretended, in the Persian war, but 
in reality to carry on an intrigue with the Great King 
— an enterprise to which he had set his hand in the 
first instance also, his aim being to become master 
of all Hellas. He had namely first laid up for him- 
self with the King a store of gratitude in the follow- 
ing circumstances, and thus had begun the whole 
affair. When he was in that quarter before, after 

2 So called from her temple or shrine in the citadel at 
Sparta. Pausanias says (in. xvii. 2) both temple and statue 
were of bronze. 8 477 b.o. c/. ch. xcv. 3. 



ελών τ?) πρότερα παρουσία μετά την εκ Κύπρου 
άναχώρησιν (είχον 8ε Μή8οι αύτο καϊ βασιλέως 
προσήκοντες τίνες καϊ ξυγγενεΐς, οί έάλωσαν εν 
αύτω τότε) τούτους ους ελαβεν αποπέμπει βασι- 
Χεΐ κρύφα των άΧλων ξυμμάχων, τω 8ε λόγω 

6 άπέΒρασαν αυτόν, επρασσε 8ε ταύτα μετά Τογ- 
γύλου του Έρβτριως, ωπερ επέτρεψε το τε Έυζάν- 
τιον καί τους αιχμαλώτους. έπεμψε 8ε καϊ 

7 επιστόλην τον Υογγύλον φέροντα αύτω. ενε- 
γέγραπτο 8ε τά8ε εν αυτί), ώς ύστερον άνηυρεθη* 

" ΤΙαυσανίας 6 τρέμων της Σπάρτης τούσ8ε τέ 
σοι χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος αποπέμπει 8ορϊ ελών, 
καϊ γνώμην ποιούμαι, ει καϊ σοϊ 8ο κει, θυγατέρα 
Τ€ την σην γήμαι καί σοι Χπάρτην τε καϊ την 
άλλην Ελλάδα ύποχείριον ποιήσαι. 8υνατος 8ε 
8οκώ είναι ταύτα πράξαι μετά σοΰ βουλευόμενος. 
ει ούν τί σε τούτων αρέσκει, πέμπε άν8ρα πιστον 
επί θάλασσαν 8ι ου το λοιπόν τους λόγους ποιη- 
σόμεθα" τοσαύτα μεν ή γραφή ε8ηλου. 

CXXIX. Ξέρξης 8ε ησθη τε ττ} επιστολτ) καϊ 
αποστέλλει * Αρτάβαζον τον Φαρνάκου επί θά- 
λασσαν καϊ κελεύει αύτον την τε Δασκυλΐτιν 
σατραπείαν παραλαβεΐν ^Ιεγαβάτην άπαλλά- 
ξαντα, ος πρότερον ηρχε, καί πάρα ΤΙαυσανίαν 
ες Έυζάντιον επιστόλην άντεπετίθει αύτω ώς 
τάχιστα 8ιαπέμψαι καϊ την σφραγΐ8α άπο8εϊξαι, 
καϊ ην τι αύτω Υίαυσανίας παραγγέλλη περί των 
εαυτού πραγμάτων, πράσσειν ώς άριστα καϊ 
2 πιστότατα, ό 8ε άφικόμενος τά τε άλλα εποίησεν 


BOOK I. cxxviii. 5-cxxix. 2 

the return of the Hellenic fleet from Cyprus, 1 he 
had taken Byzantium, then in the possession of the 
Persians, and certain connections and kinsmen of 
the King were captured in the place when the city 
fell. These prisoners he sent back to the King 
without the knowledge of the allies in general, whom 
he gave to understand that they had escaped from 
him. And he was carrying on this intrigue in con- 
cert with Gongylus the Eretrian, the very man whom 
he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the 
captives. And he also sent a letter by Gongylus 
to the King, in which the following was written, 
as was afterwards discovered : 

"Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to 
do you a favour, sends you back these men whom 
he took with the spear. And I make the proposal, 
if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter 
and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to 
you. And I am able, I think, to accomplish these 
things with the help of your counsel. If any ot 
these things pleases you, send a trusty man to the 
sea, and through him we shall in future confer." 
So much the letter disclosed. 

CXXIX. Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and 
sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, com- 
manding him to take over the satrapy of Dascylium, 
superseding Megabates, who was governor before ; 
and he charged him with a letter in reply to 
Pausanias, bidding him transmit it to him in By- 
zantium as quickly as possible and to show him 
the seal, and if Pausanias should give him any 
direction about the King's affairs, to execute it with 
all care and fidelity. And he on his arrival did 

1 cf. ch. xciv. 2. 



ωσπερ εϊρητο καϊ την επιστοΧην διέπεμψεν. 
άντενεγέγραπτο δε τάδε• 

3 " τ Ωδβ \eyei βασιΧεύς ΐΕέρξης ΤΙανσανία• και 
των ανδρών ους μοι πέραν θαΧάσσης εκ Βυζαντίου 
έσωσα? κείσεταί σοι ευεργεσία iv τω ημετέρω 
οϊκφ ες alel άνάγραπτος, καϊ τοις Χόγοις τοις απ 6 
σου αρέσκομαι* και σε μήτε νυξ μήθ* ημέρα 
επισχέτω ώστε άνεΐναι πράσσειν τι ων εμοϊ 
ύπισχνεΐ, μηδέ χρυσού καϊ αργύρου δαπάνη 
κεκώΧυσο μηδέ στρατιάς πΧηθει, ει ποι δει 
παραγίγνεσθαι, άλλα μετ Άρταβάζου ανδρός 
αγαθού, δν σοι έπεμψα, πράσσε θαρσων καϊ τα 
εμά καϊ τα σα δπη κάλλιστα κα\ άριστα εξει 

CXXX. Ύαΰτα Χαβών 6 ΥΙαυσανίας τα γράμ- 
ματα, ων καϊ προτερον εν μεγάΧω άξιώματι υπο 
των 'ΈΐλΧήνων δια την ΤίΧαταιάσιν ηγεμονίαν, 
ποΧΧω τότε μάΧΧον ηρτο καϊ ούκέτι εδύνατο εν 
τω καθεστώτι τρόπω βιοτεύειν, άΧΧά σκευάς τε 
Μηδικάς ενδυό μένος εκ του Βυζαντίου εξηει καϊ 
δια της ®ράκης πορευόμενον αύτον Μήδοι και 
Αιγύπτιοι εδορυφόρουν, τράπεζάν τε ΤΙερσικην 
παρετίθετο και κατέχειν την διάνοιαν ουκ εδύ- 
νατο, άΧΧ* εργοις βραχέσι προυδηΧου α τη γνώμη 

2 μειζόνως ες έπειτα εμεΧΧε πράξειν. δυσπρόσοδόν 
τε αυτόν παρείχε καϊ τη οργή οΰτω χαΧεπη 
εχρήτο ες πάντας ομοίως ώστε μηδένα δύνασθαι 
προσιέναί" δι δπερ καϊ προς τους 'Αθηναίους ούχ 
ήκιστα η ξυμμαχία μετέστη. 

CXXXI. Οι δβ Αακεδαιμόνιοι αίσθόμενοι το 
τε πρώτον δι αυτά ταύτα άνεκάΧεσαν αυτόν, καϊ 


BOOK I. cxxix. 2-cxxxi. ι 

other things as he was told and transmitted the 
letter. And this reply of the King ran as follows : 

" Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias : As touch- 
ing the men whom thou didst save for me out of 
Byzantium beyond the sea, a store of gratitude is 
laid up for thee, of record, in our house forever, and 
with thy words also I am pleased. And let neither 
night nor day stay thee to make thee remiss in 
performing aught of what thou dost promise me ; 
and let nothing hinder thee, either expense of gold 
and silver or number of troops, if there be need of 
their presence anywhere ; but with Artabazus, a 
good man, whom I have sent to thee, transact with 
confidence my business and thine as shall be most 
honourable and best for both of us." 

CXXX. When Pausanias received this letter, 
although even before this he had been held in high 
consideration by the Hellenes because he had led 
them at Plataea, he was then far more elated and 
couid no longer bring himself to live in the usual 
manner of his people, but clad himself in Persian 
apparel whenever he went forth from Byzantium, 
and when he travelled through Thrace a body-guard 
of Medes and Egyptians attended him; he had his 
table served in Persian style, and indeed could not 
conceal his real purpose, but by such trifling acts 
showed plainly what greater designs he purposed in 
his heart to accomplish thereafter. And so he made 
himself difficult of access, and indulged in such a 
violent temper towards everybody that no one could 
come near him ; and this was one of the chief 
reasons why the allies went over to the Athenians. 

CXXXI. Now it was just this conduct that had 
caused the Lacedaemonians in the first instance to 



επειδή ττ) 'Ερμιονίδι νηι το δεύτερον εκπΧεύσας 
ου κεΧευσάντων αυτών τοιαύτα εφαίνετο ποιων, 
κα\ εκ του Βυζαντίου βία υπ * Αθηναίων εκποΧι- 
ορκηθεΧς ες μεν την Σπάρτην ουκ επανεχώρει, ες 
δε Κ,οΧωνας τας Τρωάδα? ιδρυθείς πράσσων re 
εσηγγέΧΧετο αύτοΐς ες τους βαρβάρους κ αϊ ουκ 
eV αηαθω την μονην ποιούμενος, ούτω δη ούκέτι 
επέσχον, άλλα πεμψαντες κήρυκα οι έφοροι καϊ 
σκυτάΧην είπον του κήρυκος μη Χείπεσθαι, el δε 
μή, πόΧεμον αύτω Σπαρτιάτας προαηορεύειν. 

2 ο δε βονΧόμενος ώς ηκιστα ύποπτος είναι κ αϊ 
πιστεύων χρήμασι διαΧυσειν την διαβοΧην ανα- 
χωρεί το δεύτερον ες Χπάρτην. κα\ ες μεν την 
είρκτην εσπιπτει το πρώτον υπο τών εφόρων 
(εξεστι δε τοΐς εφόροις τον βασιΧέα δράσαι τούτο), 
έπειτα διαπραξάμενος ύστερον εξηΧθε καϊ καθί- 
στησιν εαυτόν ες κρίσιν τοΐς βουΧομενοις περί 
αυτών ΙΧ&γγειν* 

CXXXII. Καϊ φανερον μεν είχον ούδεν οι 
%παρτιαται σημεΐον, ούτε οι εχθροί οΰτε ή πάσα 
πόΧις, οτω αν πιστεύσαντες βεβαίως ετιμωροΰντο 
άνδρα γένους τε του βασιΧείου οντά καϊ εν τω 
παροντι τιμήν έχοντα {ΐίΧείσταρχον yap τον 
Αεωνίδου οντά βασιΧεα καϊ νέον ετι ανεψιός ών 

2 επετρόπευεν), υποψίας δε ποΧΧας παρείχε τ$ τε 

1 The σκυτάλη was a staff used for writing dispatches. 
The Lacedaemonians had two round staves of one size, the 
one kept at Sparta, the other in possession of commanders 


BOOK I. cxxxi. i-cxxxh. 2 

recall Pausanias, when they learned of it ; and when 
this second time, on his sailing away in the ship of 
Hermione without their authority, it was evident 
that he was acting in the very same manner- — when, 
after being forcibly dislodged from Byzantium by 
the Athenians, instead of returning to Sparta, he 
settled at Colonae in the Troad and was reported to 
the ephors to be intriguing with the Barbarians and 
tarrying there for no good purpose — then at length 
they held back no longer, but sent a herald with a 
skytale-dispatch, 1 in which they told him not to lag 
behind the herald, or the Spartans would declare 
war upon him. And he, wishing to avoid suspicion 
as far as possible, and confident that he could 
dispose of the charge by the use of money, returned 
the second time to Sparta. And at first he was 
thrown into prison by the ephors, who have the 
power to do this in the case of the king himself; 
then, having contrived after a time to get out, he 
offered himself for trial to any who might wish to 
examine into his case. 

CXXXI I. There was, indeed, no clear proof in 
the possession of the Spartans, either his personal 
enemies or the state at large, on the strength of 
which they could with entire confidence proceed to 
punish a man who was of the royal family and held 
high office for the time being— for as cousin of 
Pleistarehus son of Leonidas, who was king and 
still a minor, he was acting as regent for him ; but 
he, by his disregard of propriety, and particularly by 

abroad. A strip of paper was rolled slantwise round the staff 
and the dispatch written lengthwise on it ; when unrolled 
the dispatch was unintelligible, but rolled slantwise round 
the commander's skytale it could be read. 



παρανομία καϊ ζηΧώσει των βαρβάρων μη ΐσος 
βούλεσθαι είναι τοις παροΰσι, καϊ 1 τά τε αΧΧα 
αύτον ανασκοπούν εϊ τί που εξεδεδιγτητο των 
καθεστώτων νομίμων καϊ δτι επί τον τρίποδα 
ποτέ τον iv ΔεΧφοΐς, ον ανέθεσαν οι "ΈΧΧηνες 
απ ο των Μηδων άκροθίνιον, ήξίωσεν επιδρά- 
ψασθαι αύτος ιδία το iXeyetov τόδε• 

'ΕΧΧήνων αρχηγός επεϊ στρατον ωλεσε Μηδων, 
ΤΙαυσανίας Φοίβω μνημ άνεθηκε τόδε. 

3 το μεν ουν εΧεγεΐον οι Λακεδαιμόνιοι εξεκόΧαψαν 
ευθύς τότε άπο του τρίποδος τούτο κα\ επεγραψαν 
όνομαστί τας πόλεις οσαι ξυγκαθεΧουσαι τον 
βάρβαρον έστησαν το ανάθημα' τον μεντυι 
Ώαυσαιίον αδίκημα καϊ τότ εδόκει είναι, καϊ επεί 
<γε δη εν τούτω καθειστηκει, ποΧΧω μάΧΧον 
παρόμοιον πραγθηναι εφαίνετο τη παρούση δια- 

4 νοία. επυνθ άνοντο δε και ες τους Έ/ίΧωτας 
πράσσειν τι αυτόν, καϊ ην δε οΰτως* εΧευθέρωσίν 
τε yap υπισγνεϊτο αύτοΐς και ποΧιτείαν, ην 
ξυνεπαναστώσι καϊ τό παν ξυγκατεργάσωνται. 

5 αλλ' ούδ' ως ούδε των ΈίΧωτων μηνυταΐς τισι 
πιστεύσαντες ηξίωσαν νεώτερόν τι ποιεΐν ες 

* Added by Ullrich. 

1 A golden tripod set upon a three-headed bronze serpent 
(Hdt. IX lxxxi.). The gold tripod was carried off by the 
Phocians in the Sacred War (Paus. x. xiii. 5), but the 
bronze pillar, eighteen feet high, of three intertwined snakes, 
was removed by the Emperor Constantino to Constantinople 


BOOK I. cxxxn. 2-s 

his aping of the Barbarians, gave them much ground 
for suspecting that he did not want to remain an 
equal in the present order of things at Sparta. And 
they went back into his past and scrutinized all his 
other acts, to see if perchance he had in his mode 
of life departed from established customs, and they 
recalled especially that he had once presumed, on 
his own authority, to have inscribed on the tripod 
at Delphi, 1 which the Hellenes dedicated as first 
fruits of the spoils they had won from the Persians, 
the following elegiac couplet : 

"When as captain of the Hellenes he had 
destroyed the Persian host, Pausanias dedicated 
this memorial to Phoebus." 2 

Now the Lacedaemonians had immediately chiselled 
off these verses and inscribed on the tripod by 
name all the cities which had had a part in over- 
throwing the Barbarians and had together set up 
this offering. The act of Pausanias, however, was 
felt at the time to have been a transgression, and 
now that he had got into this further trouble, it 
stood out more clearly than ever as having been 
but a prelude to his present designs. They were 
informed also that he was intriguing with the 
Helots ; and it was even so, for he was promising 
them freedom and citizenship if they would join 
him in a revolt and help him accomplish his whole 
plan. But not even then, nor relying on certain 
Helots who had turned informers, did they think it 
best to take harsh measures against him ; they 

and placed in the hippodrome, the modern Atmeidan, where 
it still is. It contains the names of thirty-one Greek states 
which took part in the Persian War. 

1 The distich was composed by Simonides. 



αυτόν, χρώμενοι τω τρόπω ωπερ εΐώθασιν ες 
σφας αυτούς, μη ταχείς είναι περί ανδρός Χπαρ- 
τιάτου άνευ αναμφισβήτητων τεκμηρίων βου- 
Χεΰσαί τι άνηκεστον, ττρίν γε δη αύτοΐς, ως 
Χέζεται, ο μεΧΧων τας τεΧευταίας βασιΧεΐ 
επιστολας προς 'Αρτάβαζον κομιεΐν, άνηρ 9 Αρ- 
ηίΧιος, παιδικά ποτέ ων αυτοΰ καϊ πιστότατος 
εκείνω, μηνυτής ηίηνεται, δείσας κατά ενθύμησίν 
τίνα οτι ουδείς πω των προ εαυτού άγγέΧων 
πάΧιν άφικετο, καϊ παρασημηνάμενος, ίνα, ην 
ψευσθτ) της δόξης η καϊ εκείνος τι μετα<γράψαι 
αίτηση, μη επιηνω, Χύει τας επιστοΧάς, εν αίς 
ύπονοησας τι τοιούτον προσεπεστάΧθαι και αυ- 
τόν ηΰρεν εηηεηραμμενον κτείνειν. 

CXXXIII. Τότε 8η οι έφοροι δείξαντος αυτού 
τα γράμματα μάΧΧον μεν επίστευσαν, αύτηκοοι 
δε βουΧηθεντες ετι γενέσθαι αυτού ΤΙαυσανίου τι 
Χεηοντος, από παρασκευής του ανθρώπου επί 
Ύαίναρον ίκέτου θιγομένου καϊ σκηνωσαμενου 
διπΧην διαφράηματι καΧυβην, ες ην των 
εφόρων 1 εντός τινας έκρυψε, καϊ ΤΙαυσανίου ως 
αυτόν εΧθόντος καϊ ερωτώντος την πρόφασιν της 
Ικετείας ησθοντο πάντα σαφώς, αΐτιω μενού του 
άνθρωπου τα τε περί αυτού γραφεντα και ταΧΧ' 
άποφαίνοντος καθ* εκαστον, ως ούδεν πώποτε 
αυτόν εν ταΐς προς βασιΧεα διακονίαις παραβά- 
Χοιτο, προτιμηθείη δε εν ϊσω τοις ποΧΧοΐς των 

1 των τ€ ίφόρων in the MISS. ; Poppo deletes τ§. 

BOOK I. cxxxn. 5-cxxxiii. 

adhered to their usual method in dealing with men 
of their own class — not to be hasty, in the case of a 
Spartan, in adopting an irrevocable decision unless 
they had indisputable proofs. But at last, as it is 
said, the man who was to take to Artabazus 
Pausanias' last letter to the King, a man of Argilus 
who had once been a favourite of his and had 
hitherto been most loyal to him, turned informer. 
For he took fright when he called to mind that no 
previous messenger had ever come back again ; and 
so, having made a counterfeit seal, in order that his 
act might not be discovered, in case he should be 
wrong in his suspicion or in case Pausanias should 
ask to make some alteration in the letter, he opened 
the letter and in fact found written therein, as he 
suspected he should find something of the sort to 
have been directed, an order for his own death. 

CXXXIII. At this point the ephors, when the 
man showed them the letter, were at last more 
nearly convinced, but they wished besides to hear 
with their own ears some word from Pausanias* own 
lips ; so in accordance with a prearranged plan the 
man went as a suppliant to Taenarus and put up 
there a hut divided by a partition. In the inner 
room of the hut he concealed some of the ephors, 
and when Pausanias visited him and asked the 
reason of his taking the position of a suppliant, they 
heard clearly everything that was said : they heard 
the man accuse Pausanias of having written the 
order about himself, reveal the other items of the 
plot in detail, and protest that, though he had never 
yet compromised Pausanias in his errands to the 
King, the special honour awarded him was no better 
than that which the common run of his servants 



διακόνων άποθανεΐν, κάκείνου αυτά re ταΰτα 
ξυνομοΧογούντος καϊ περί του παρόντος ουκ 
εώντος οργίζεσθαι, αλλά πίστιν εκ του ιερού 1 
δίδοντος της αναστάσεως καϊ άξιούντος ώς τά- 
χιστα πορεύεσθαι καϊ μη τα πρασσόμενα διακω- 

CXXXIV. Άκούσαντες δε ακριβώς τότε μεν 
άπήΧθον οι έφοροι, βεβαίως δε ηδη είδότες εν ττ) 
πόΧει την ξύΧΧηψιν εποιούντο. Χέζεται δ' αυτόν 
μέΧΧοντα ζυΧΧηφθησεσθαι εν ττ} οδω, ενός μεν 
των εφόρων το πρόσωπον προσιόντος ώς είδε, 
γνώναι εφ' ω εχώρει, άΧΧου δε νεύματι άφανεΐ 
χρησαμένου καϊ δηΧώσαντος εύνοια, προς το ιερόν 
της ΧαΧκιοίκου χωρήσαι δρόμω καϊ προκαταφυ- 
γεΐν ην δ' εγγύς το τέμενος, καϊ ες οίκημα ού 
μέγα ο ην του ιερού εσεΧθών, ίνα μη υπαίθριος 

2 ταΧαιπωροίη, ησύχαζεν. οι δε το παραυτίκα μεν 
υστέρησαν ττ) διώξει, μετά δε τούτο του re οική- 
ματος τον οροφον άφεΐΧον και τας θύρας ένδον 
οντά τηρησαντες αύτον καϊ άποΧαβόντες εσω 
άπωκοδόμησαν, προσκαθεζόμενοί τε εξεπόΧιόρ- 

3 κησαν Χιμώ. κα\ μέΧΧοντος αυτού άποψύχειν 
ώσπερ είχεν εν τω οικηματι, αισθόμενοι εξά- 
γουσιν εκ τού ιερού ετι εμπνουν οντά, καϊ εξαχ- 

4 θεϊς απέθανε παραχρήμα, καϊ αύτον εμέΧΧησαν 
μεν ες τον Καιάδαν, ούπερ τους κακούργους, εσ- 

1 4κ του Upov deleted by Hude, after Kriiger. 

1 The temple would have been polluted if he had been 
allowed to die there. 


BOOK I. cxxxin.-cxxxrv. 4 

received — to be put to death ; and they heard 
Pausanias acknowledge these same things, urge the 
man not to be angry with him this time, offer him 
a guarantee that he might leave the temple in 
safety, and finally request him to go on his way 
with all speed and not frustrate the negotiations. 

CXXX1V. When the ephors had heard all the 
details they went back home for the present, but 
inasmuch as they now had certain knowledge, they 
were planning to make the arrest in the city. And 
the story goes that when Pausanias was about to be 
arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the 
ephors as he was approaching and realised for what 
purpose he was coming, and that another ephor out 
of friendship warned him by giving a covert nod, 
whereupon he set off on a run for the temple of 
Athena of the Brazen House, and reached the refuge 
first, as the sacred precinct was near by. Entering 
then into a building of no great size belonging to 
the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure 
under the open sky, he kept quiet. For the 
moment then the ephors were distanced in their pur- 
suit, but afterwards they took the roof off the build- 
ing and, watching until he was inside and shutting off 
his retreat, walled up the doors ; then they invested 
the place and starved him to death. And when he 
was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the 
building, 1 they perceived his condition and brought 
him out of the temple still breathing ; but when he 
was brought out he died immediately. It was their 
first intention to cast him into the Caeadas, 2 where 

2 A cleft in the mountains not far from the city, probably 
near the modern Mistra, into which in early times prisoners, 
in later, corpses of criminals, were thrown ; cf. Strabo, viii. 
v. 7 ; Paue. iv. xviii. 3. 



βάΧΧειν έπειτα εδοξε πΧησίον που κατορύξαι. 
6 δε θεός ό εν Δελφοί? τον τε τάφον ύστερον 
έχρησε τοις Αακεδαιμονίοις μετενε^κεΐν ουπερ 
απέθανε {καϊ νυν κείται εν τω προτεμενίσματι, ο 
<γραφτ} στήΧαι δηΧοΰσι), καϊ ως αγο? αύτοΐς ον το 
πεπραημένον δυο σώματα άνθ* ενός τ$ ΧαΧκιοίκφ 
άποδοΰναι. οι 8ε ποιησάμενοι χαΧκοΰς ανδριάν- 
τας δύο ώς αντί ΤΙανσανίον ανέθεσαν. 

CXXXY. Οί δε 'Αθηναίοι, ώς και τον θεού 
αγο9 κρίναντος, άντεπέταξαν τοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι? 
έλαύνειν αυτό. 

2 Ύοΰ δε μηδισμοΰ του ΐΐανσανίου οί Αακεδαι- 
μόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες πάρα τους ' Αθηναίους 
ξννεπτ)τιωντο καϊ τον ©εμιστοκΧέα, ώς ηύρισκον 
εκ των ΐίαυσανίου εXέyχωv, ηξίουν τε τοις αύτοΐς 

3 κοΧάζεσθαι αυτόν, οι δε πεισθέντες (έτυχε yap 
ωστρακισμένος καϊ έχων δίαιταν μεν εν "Αργεί, 
έπιφοιτών δε καϊ ες την άΧΧην ΤΙεΧοποννησον) 
πέμπουσι μετά των Αακεδαιμονίων ετοίμων όντων 
ξυνδιώκειν άνδρας οΐς εϊρητο αηειν οπού αν 

CXXXVX Ό δε %εμιστοκΧης προαισθόμενος 
φεύγει εκ ΤΙεΧοποννησου ες Έίέρκυραν, ων αυτών 
ευεργέτης, δεδιέναι δε φασκόντων Κερκυραίων 

1 cf. ch. cxxviii. 1. 

2 cvepyeTTis, benefactor, a title of honour bestowed upon 
him, either because he took the part of the Corey raeans in a 
dispute with Corinth (Plut. Them, xxiv), or because he had 


BOOK I. cxxxiv. 4-cxxxvi. 1 

they throw malefactors ; but afterwards they decided 
to bury him somewhere near the city. But the god 
at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by 
oracle to transfer him to the place where he died 
(and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, 
as an inscription on some columns testifies), and that 
they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House 
with two bodies in place of one, since their act 
had brought a curse upon them. So they had two 
bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena 
to be a substitute for Pausanias. 

CXXXV. Thus it was that the Athenians, 1 in re- 
sponse to the demand of the Lacedaemonians, 
ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarus, 
seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse. 

But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treason- 
able dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent 
envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles 
also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with 
discoveries they had made in connection with their 
investigation about Pausanias ; and they demanded 
that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians 
agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised, 
and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other 
parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men, 
accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were 
quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions 
to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him. 

CXXXVI. But Themistocles, forewarned, fled 
from the Peloponnesus to Corcyra, since he was a 
benefactor 2 of the Corcyraeans. As they, however, 
alleged that they were afraid to keep him and thus 

excused their absence (Schol.) in the Persian war (Hdt. vii. 
cxv). Themistocles relied upon the right of asylum, which 
had doubtless been decreed him as wepyt^s. 



εχειν αυτόν ώστε ΑακεΒαιμονίοις καϊ * Αθηναίοι? 
άπεχθέσθαι, διακομίζεται ύπ αύτων ες την 

2 ηπειρον την καταντικρύ, και Βιωκόμενος ύπο 
των προστεταγ μένων κατά πύστιν fj χωροίη, 
αναγκάζεται κατά τι άπορον πάρα "ΑΒμ,ητον τον 
Μολοσσών βασιΧεα οντά αύτω ου φίΧον κατά- 

3 Χύσαι. καϊ 6 μεν ουκ ετυχεν επιΒημων, 6 Βε της 
γυναικός ικέτης γενόμενος Βιδάσκεται ύπ* αυτής 
τον παϊΒα σφών Χαβων καθέζεσθαι επί την 

4 εστίαν. καϊ εΧθόντος ου ποΧυ ύστερον του 
* Αδμήτου ΒηΧοΐ τε ος εστί και ουκ άξιοι, εϊ τι 
άρα αύτος άντεΐπεν αύτω 'Αθηναίων Βεομενω, 
φεύγοντα τιμωρεΐσθαι. καϊ jap αν ύπ εκείνου 
ποΧΧω ασθενέστερου 1 εν τω παρόντι κακώς πα- 
σχειν, γενναίο ν Βε είναι τους ομοίους άπο του 
Ισου τιμωρεΐσθαι. καϊ άμα αύτος μεν εκείνω 
χρείας τίνος καϊ ουκ ες το σώμα σωζεσθαι έναν- 
τιωθήναι, εκείνον δ' αν, ει εκΒοίη αυτόν (είπων 
ύφ' ων καϊ εφ' ω Βιώκεται), σωτηρίας αν της 
ψυχής άποστερήσαι. 

CXXXVII. Ό Βε άκουσας άνίστησί τε αύτον 
μετά του εαυτού υιέος (ωσπερ καϊ έχων αύτον 2 
εκαθεζετο, και μέγιστον ην Ικέτευμα τούτο) καϊ 
ύστερον ού ποΧΧω τοις τε Αακεδαιμονιοις καϊ 
Άθηναίοις έΧθούσι καϊ ποΧΧα είπούσιν ούκ 
εκΒίΒωσιν, αλλ' άποστέΧΧει βουΧόμενον ώς βασι- 
Χέα πορενθήναι επϊ την ετέραν θάΧασσαν πεζή 
2 €9 ΤΙύΒναν την 'ΑΧεξάνΒρου. εν fj οΧκάΒος τυχών 

1 The reading of nearly all the better MSS.; Hude and 
many other recent editors adopt the correction of Graevianue 


1 Hude deletes, as not read by the Scholiast. 

BOOK I. cxxxvi. i-cxxxvii. 2 

incur the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and 
Athenians, he was conveyed by them across to the 
mainland opposite. And being pursued by those 
who had been appointed to the task, according as 
they could learn the course he was taking, he was 
forced in some strait to take lodging with Admetus, 
king of the Molossians, who was not friendly to him. 
Admetus happened not to be at home, but Themis- 
tocles approached his wife as a suppliant and was 
instructed by her to take their child and seat 
himself on the hearth. And when Admetus re- 
turned after a short time, Themistocles declared 
who he was and urged that, if he had ever opposed 
any request Admetus had made to the Athenians, 
he ought not to take vengeance on him when a 
fugitive ; for in his present plight he might come to 
harm at the hands of a far weaker man than 
Admetus, whereas the noble thing to do was to 
take vengeance on fair terms upon equals. Besides, 
he added, he had opposed Admetus merely in the 
matter of a petition and not of his personal safety ; 
whereas Admetus, if he gave him up to his pursuers 
(telling who these were and what the charge against 
him), would deprive him of the salvation of his life. 

CXXXVI I. Admetus, hearing this, raised him up, 
together with his own son, even as he still sat 
holding him, this being the most potent form of 
supplication. And when, not long afterwards, the 
Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and made 
urgent demands for him, Admetus would not give 
him up, but, since he wished to go to the King, gave 
him an escort overland to Pydna on the other 1 
sea, the capital of Alexander. 2 There he found a 

1 The Aegean. * King of Macedonia. 



αναγόμενης €π* Ιωνίας καϊ έπιβας καταφέρεται 
χειμώνι ες το * Αθηναίων στρατόπεΒον ο επολι- 
όρκει Νάξον. real (ην jap άγνως τοις iv τγ νηί) 
Βείσας φράζει τω ναυκληρω όστις εστί καϊ Βι α 
φεύγει, καϊ el μη σώσει αυτόν, εφη ερεΐν ότι 
χρημασι πεισθείς αύτον άγει* την 8ε άσφάλειαν 
είναι μηΒενα εκβήναι εκ της νεως μέχρι πλους 
γενηται* πειθομένω δ* αύτω χάριν άπομνησεσθαι 
κατ άξίαν. 6 Βε ναύκληρος ποιεί τε ταύτα καϊ 
άποσαλεύσας ημέραν καϊ νύκτα υπέρ του στρατό- 

3 πέΒου ύστερον άφικνεΐται ες Έφεσον. και 6 
Θεμιστοκλής εκείνον τε εθεράπευσε χρημάτων 
Βόσει (ήλθε yap αύτω ύστερον εκ τε 'Αθηνών 
πάρα τών φίλων καϊ εξ "Αργούς α ύπεξέκειτο), 
καϊ μετά των κάτω ΤΙερσων τίνος πορευθείς άνω 
εσπέμπει γράμματα προς βασιλέα * Αρταξερξην 

4 τον ρ,ερξου νεωστϊ βασιλεύοντα. εΒήλου Βε η 
y ραφή δτι " Θεμιστοκλής ηκω πάρα σε, ος κακά 
μεν πλείστα 'Έιλλήνων εϊργασμαι τον νμετερον 
οίκον, όσον χρονον τον σον πάτερα επ ιόντα εμοϊ 
άνάγκτ) ήμυνόμην 4 πολύ δ' ετι πλείω αγαθά, 
επειΒη εν τω άσφαλεΐ μεν εμοί, εκείνω Βε εν 
επικινΒύνω πάλιν ή άποκομιΒη εγίγνετο. καί μοι 
ευεργεσία οφείλεται (γράψας την τε εκ Σαλαμίνος 
προάγγελσιν της αναχωρήσεως και την τών 
γεφυρών, ήν ψευΒώς προσεποιησατο, τότε Βι 


BOOK I. cxxxvn. 2-4 

merchant vessel putting off for Ionia, and going on 
board was driven by a storm to the station of the 
Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. Themis- 
tocles became afraid and told the captain who he 
was (for he was unknown to those on board) and 
why he was in flight, adding that if he did not 
save him he would tell the Athenians that he 
had been bribed to give him passage ; their only 
chance for safety, he explained, was that no one 
be allowed to leave the ship until the voyage 
could be resumed, and he promised that if he com- 
plied with his request he would make a fitting 
return for the favour. The captain did as he was 
bidden, and after riding out the gale for a day and 
a night just outside the Athenian station, duly 
arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded 
him handsomely with a gift of money (for he soon 
received from his friends in Athens and from Argos 
the funds which he had deposited for safekeeping) ; 
then proceeding into the interior with one of the 
Persians who dwelt on the coast, he sent on a letter 
to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had lately 
come to the throne. And the letter ran as follows : 
" I, Themistocles, am come to you, who of all Hel- 
lenes did your house most harm so long as your 
father assailed me and I was constrained to defend 
myself, but still greater good by far when, his 
retreat being in progress, I was in security and he 
in dire peril. And there is a kindness due to me 
(here he related the timely warning to retreat given 
at Salamis, and the failure of the Hellenic fleet to 
destroy the bridges at that time, 1 which he falsely 

1 For Themistocles' advice given to Xerxes to retreat before 
it was too late and his claim about the non-destruction of 
the bridges, cf. Hdt. vni. cviii-cx. 

VOL. I. I 


αύτον ου διάΧνσιν), καϊ νυν έχων σε μεγάΧα 
αγαθά δράσαι πάρειμι διωκόμενος ύπο των Έλλτ;- 
νων διά την σην φιΧίαν. βούΧομαι δ' ενιαυτον 
ετησίων αυτός σοι περϊ ων ηκω δηΧώσαι" 

CXXXVIII. ΈασιΧεύς δε, ώς λέγεται, εθαν- 
μασε τε αυτού την διάνοιαν καϊ εκεΧενε ποιεΐν 
ούτω. 6 δ' iv τω χρόνω ον επεσχε της τε ΤΙερ- 
σίδος γΧώσσης οσα εδύνατο κατενόησε καϊ των 

2 επιτηδευμάτων της 'χωράς* άφικόμενος δε μετά 
τον ενιαντον γίγνεται παρ αύτω μέγας καϊ όσος 
ουδείς πω *ΈΧΧήνων δια τε την προϋπάρχον σαν 
άξίωσιν καϊ του *ΈΧΧηνικον ελπίδα ην υπετίθει 
αύτω δουΧώσειν, μάΧιστα δε άπο τον πεΐραν 

3 διδούς ξυνετος φαίνεσθαι. ην yap ο ©εμιστοκΧής, 
βεβαιότατα δη φύσεως Ισχύν δηΧώσας, καϊ δια- 
φερόντως τι ες αύτο μαΧΧον έτερον άξιος θαν- 
μάσαι* οικεία jap ξυνεσει καϊ ούτε προ μαθών ες 
αύτην ούδεν ούτ επιμαθών, των τε παραχρήμα 
δι εΧαχίστης βουΧης κράτιστος γνωμών καϊ των 
μεΧΧόντων επϊ πΧεΐστον του ηενησομενου άριστος 
είκαστης* καϊ α μεν μετά χείρας εχοι, καϊ 
εξηγήσασθαι οιός τε, ων δ' άπειρος εϊη, κρΐναι 
ίκανως ούκ άπήΧΧακτο, το τε άμεινον ή χείρον εν 

1 Or, as some take it, " character." ef. Plut. Them, xxviii 
rh φρόνημα καϊ τήν τόΚμαν αύτον, the boldness of his spirit. 


BOOK I. cxxxvn. 4-cxxxviii. 3 

claimed to have been due to his own efforts), and 
now I am here, having it in my power to do you 
great good, being pursued by the Hellenes on 
account of my friendship to you ; and my desire is 
to wait a year and then in person explain to you 
that for which J am come." 

CXXXVIII. The King, it is said, marvelled at 
his purpose 1 and bade him do as he desired. And 
Themistocles, in the interval of his waiting, made 
himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the 
Persian language and with the customs of the 
country ; but when the year was ended he came to 
the King and became more influential with him 
than any of the Hellenes ever had been before, both 
because of the reputation he already enjoyed and 
of the hope which he kept suggesting to him that 
he would make all Hellas subject to him, but 
most of all hi consequence of the insight he mani- 
fested, of which he gave repeated proofs. For 
indeed Themistocles was a man who had most con- 
vincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural 
sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy 
of admiration in that respect. For by native in- 
sight, not reinforced by earlier or later study, 2 he 
was beyond other men, with the briefest delibera- 
tion, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present 
and wise in forecasting what would happen in the 
most distant future. Moreover, he had the ability 
to expound to others the enterprises he had in 
hand, and on those which he had not yet essayed 
he could yet without fail pass competent judgment; 
and he could most clearly foresee the issue for better 

2 i.e. without knowledge acquired either before or after 
the occasion for action had arisen. 



τω άφανεΐ ετι προεώρα μάλιστα, καϊ το ξύμπαν 
είπεΐν φύσεως μεν δυνάμει, μελέτης δε βραχύτητι 
κράτιστος $η ούτος αυτοσχεδίαζαν τα δέοντα 
iy ενετό. 

4 Νόσησα? δε τελευτα τον βίον λέηουσι he 
τίνες καϊ εκούσιον φαρμάκω άποθανεΐν αυτόν, 
αδύνατον νομίσαντα είναι επιτελεσαι βασίλεΐ α 

5 ύπεσγετο. μνημεΐον μεν οΰν αύτου εν M.ayvησίa 
εστί τ?} Άσίαντ) εν τη ayopq• ταύτης yap ηρχε 
της χώρας, δόντος βασιλέως αύτω ^Αα^νησίαν 
μεν αρτον, ή προσέφερε πεντήκοντα τάλαντα του 
ενιαυτού, Αάμψακον δε olvov (εδόκει yap πολυ- 
οίνότατον των τότε είναι), Μυοΰντα δε οψον. 

6 τα δε οστά φασί κομισθηναι αύτου ol προσή- 
κοντες οϊκαδε κελεύσαντος εκείνου καϊ τεθήναι 
κρύφα * Αθηναίων εν τη Άττικτ)• ου yap εξην 
θάπτειν * ώς επϊ προδοσία, φεύyovτoς. τα μεν 
κατά ΐίαυσανίαν τον Αακεδαιμόνιον καϊ ®εμι- 
στοκλεα τον * Αθήναιον λαμπρότατους yεvoμεvoυς 
των καθ* εαυτούς Ελλήνων ούτως ετελεύτησεν. 

CXXXIX. Αακεδαιμόνιοι δε επϊ μεν της πρώ- 
της πρεσβείας τοιαύτα επεταξάν τε καϊ άντε- 
κελεύσθησαν περϊ των εν ay ων της ελάσεως* 
ύστερον δε φοιτώντες πάρα ' Αθηναίους ΤΙοτειΒαίας 
τε άπανίστασθαι εκελευον καϊ Aiyivav αύτόνομον 
άφιέναι, καϊ μάλιστα yε πάντων καϊ ενδηλοτατα 
πρoύλεyovτo περϊ Μ εyapεωv ψήφισμα καθελούσι 

Hude deletes, after Cobet. 

BOOK I. cxxxviii. 3-cxxxix. 1 

or worse that lay in the still dim future. To sum 
up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and 
because of the brief preparation he required, he 
proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to 
hit upon the right expedient. 

He died a natural death, an illness taking him off, 
though some say that he put an end to his own life 
by poison 1 when he realised it to be impossible to 
fulfil his promises to the King. There is a monu- 
ment to him at Magnesia in Asia, in the market- 
place ; for he was governor of this country, the 
King having given him, for bread, Magnesia, which 
brought in a revenue of fifty talents a year, for wine, 
Lampsacus, reputed to be the best wine country of 
all places at that time ; and Myus for meat. But 
his bones, his relations say, were fetched home by 
his own command and buried in Attica unknown to 
the Athenians ; for it was not lawful to bury him 
there, as he had been banished for treason. Such 
was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and of 
Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished 
of the Hellenes of their time. 

CXXXIX. The Lacedaemonians 2 then had on 
the occasion of their first embassy directed the 
Athenians, and received a counter demand from them, 
to take such measures about the expulsion of the 
accursed. Later, however, they frequently repaired 
to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea, 
and give Aegina its independence, and above all 
they declared in the plainest terms that they could 
avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the 

1 For the various accounts, see Cic. Brut. xi. 43 ; Plut. 
Them. xxxi. ; Diod. xi. 58 ; Ar. Eq. 83. 

2 Taking up the narrative from ch. cxxvi. 



μη αν γίγνεσθαι πόΧεμον, εν ω εϊρητο αυτούς μη 
χρήσθαι τοις Χιμέσι τοις εν τη 'Αθηναίων άρχη 

2 μηδέ τη 'Αττική αγορά, οι δ' 'Αθηναίοι ούτε 
ταΧΧα ύπηκουον ούτε το ψήφισμα καθηρουν 
έπικαΧουντες επεργασίαν Μεγαρεΰσι της 'γης της 
ιεράς καϊ της αορίστου καϊ άνδραπόδων ύποδοχην 

3 των αφ ισταμένων. τέΧος δε αφ i/co μένων των 
τελευταίων πρέσβεων εκ Αακεδαίμονος, 'Ραμφίου 
τε καϊ ΜεΧησ ίππου καϊ Αγησάνδρου, καϊ Χεγόν- 
των άΧΧο μεν ούδεν ων πρότερον είώθεσαν, 1 αυτά 
δε τάδε οτι " Αακεδαιμόνιοι βούΧονται την ε'ιρηνην 
είναι, εϊη δ' αν, ει τους "ΈΧΧηνας αυτόνομους 
άφεΐτε," ποιησαντες εκκΧησίαν οι 'Αθηναίοι γνώ- 
μας σφίσιν αύτοΐς προυτίθεσαν, καϊ εδόκει άπαξ 
περί απάντων βουΧευ σα μένους άποκρίνασθαι. 

4 καϊ παριόντες άΧΧοι τε ποΧΧοϊ εΧεγον, επ' αμ- 
φότερα γιγνόμενοι ταΐς γνώμαις καϊ ώς χρη 
ποΧεμεΐν καϊ ώς μη εμπόδιον είναι το ψήφισμα 
ειρήνης, άΧΧα καθεΧεΐν, καϊ παρεΧθών ΤΙερικΧής 
6 Ξανθίππου, άνηρ κατ' εκείνον τον χρονον πρώ- 
τος 'Αθηναίων, Χέγειν τε καϊ πράσσειν δυνατώ- 
τατος, παρηνει τοιάδε. 

CXL. " Ύης μβν γνώμης, ω 'Αθηναίοι, αιεϊ της 
αυτής εχομαι μη εϊκειν ΤΙεΧοποννησίοις, καίπερ 
είδώς τους ανθρώπους ου τη αύτη οργή αναπειθο- 
μένους τε ποΧεμεΐν καϊ εν τω έργω πράσσοντας, 
προς δ\ τας ξυμφορας καϊ τας γνώμας τρεπομέ- 

1 ΐΐώθβσαν deleted by Hude. 

1 See ch. lxvii 4, and the references in Ar. Acharn. 520-3 
and 533 f. The date of the decree must have been near the 
outbreak of the war (432). 


BOOK I. cxxxix. i-cxl. ι 

Megarians, 1 in which they were forbidden to use any 
of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the 
Athenian market. But the Athenians would pay no 
heed to their other demands and declined to rescind 
the decree, charging the Megarians with encroach- 
ment upon the sacred land and the border-land not 
marked by boundaries, 2 and also with harbouring 
runaway slaves. But at last a final embassy came 
from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Mele- 
sippus, and Agesander, who said nothing of the 
demands they had hitherto been wont to make, 
but only this : " The Lacedaemonians desire peace, 
and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes 
their independence." Whereupon the Athenians 
called an assembly and gave their citizens an oppor- 
tunity to express their opinions ; and it was resolved 
to consider the whole question and then give their 
answer once for all. And many others came forward 
and spoke, in support of both sides of the question, 
some urging that war was necessary, others that the 
decree should not stand in the way of peace, but 
should be rescinded ; and finally Pericles son of 
Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at 
that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech 
and in action, came forward and advised them as 
follows : 

CXL. u I hold, men of Athens, to the same judg- 
ment as always, that we must not yield to the Pelo- 
ponnesians, although I know that men are not as a 
rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually 
engaged in war as when they are being persuaded 
to undertake it, but change their judgments in 

2 The reference is, first, to the tillage of land dedicated to 
the Eleusinian goddesses ; second, to land still in dispute 
between Athens and Megara, and therefore unmarked. 



νους. ορώ 8k καϊ νυν όμοια καί παραπΧήσια 
ξυμβουΧευτεα μοι οντά, καϊ τους αν απ ειθ ο μεν ους 
υμών δικαιώ τοις κοινή δόξασιν, ην άρα τι καϊ 
σφαΧΧώμεθα, βοηθεΐν, η μηδέ κατορθοΰντας της 
ξυνέσεως μεταποιεΐσθαι. ενδέχεται yap τας 
ξυμφορας των ττραημάτων ουχ ησσον άμαθώς 
χωρήσαι η καϊ τας διάνοιας του ανθρώπου* δι 
όπερ καϊ την τύχην, δσα αν πάρα Xoyov ζυμβτ}, 
είώθαμεν αίτιασθαι. 

2 " Αακεδαιμόνιοι δε πρότερο ν τε δηΧοι ήσαν 
επιβουΧεύοντες ημΐν καϊ νυν ουχ ηκιστα. είρη- 
μενον yap δίκας μεν των διάφορων άΧΧήΧοις 
διδόναι καϊ δεχεσθαι, εχειν δε εκατερους α εχομεν, 
ούτε αυτοί δίκας πω ητησαν ούτε ημών διδόντων 
δέχονται, βουΧονται δε ποΧεμω μάΧΧον η Xoyow 
τα ^κΧήματα διαΧυεσθαι, καϊ επιτάσσοντες ηδη 

3 και ουκετι αίτιώμενοι πάρεισιν. Τίοτειδαίας Τ€ 
yap απανίστασθαι κεΧεύουσι καϊ Aiyivav αυτο- 
νομον άφιεναι καϊ το Mεyapεωv ψήφισμα καθαι- 
ρεΐν οι δε τεΧευταΐοι οΐδε ηκοντες καϊ τους 

ΈίΧΧηνας προαηορεύουσιν αυτόνομους άφιεναι. 

4 υμών δε μηδεϊς νομίση περί βραχέος αν ποΧεμεΐν, 
εί το lslίεyapεωv ψήφισμα μη καθέΧοιμεν, όπερ 
μαΧιστα προύχονται εί καθαιρεθείη μη αν yi- 
yvεσθaι τον πόΧεμον, μηδέ εν ύμΐν αύτοΐς αιτίαν 

5 υποΧιπησθε ώς δια μικρόν εποΧεμησατε. το yap 
βραχύ τι τούτο πάσαν υμών έχει την βεβαίωσίϋ 

BOOK I. cxl. 1-5 

accordance with events. And now also I see that 
I must give you the same or nearly the same advice 
as in the past, and I demand that those of you who 
are persuaded by what I shall say shall support 
the common decisions, even if we should in any way 
fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share 
in the good judgment shown. For it is just as 
possible for the course of events to move perversely 
as for the plans of men; and it is for that very 
reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame 
for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations. 

"As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly 
clear before that they were plotting against us, and 
it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was 
expressly stipulated that we should submit our 
differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile 
keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for 
arbitration themselves nor do they accept it now 
when we make the offer. What they want is to 
redress their grievances by war rather than by 
discussion, and they are here dictating already and 
no longer expostulating. For they order us to raise 
the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of 
Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree ; and these 
men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must 
give all the Hellenes also their independence. But 
let no one of you think that we shall be going to 
war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to 
rescind the Megarian decree — the thing they espe- 
cially insist upon, saying that there will be no war 
if it is rescinded — and do not let there remain 
in your minds any self-reproach that it was a 
small matter for which you went to war. For 
this trifling thing involves nothing less than the 



καϊ πεΐραν της γνώμης, οΐς el ξυγχωρησετε, καϊ 
άΧΧο τι μείζον ευθύς επιταχθήσεσθε ως φόβω 
καϊ τοντο ύπακούσαντες• άπισχυρισάμενοι δέ* 
σαφές αν καταστησαιτε αύτοΐς άπο του Ισου 
υμΐν μαΧΧον προσφερεσθαι. CXLI. αύτόθεν Βη 
Βιανοηθητε ή ύπακούειν πριν re βΧαβηναι, ή εΐ 
πόΧεμησομεν, ώσπερ εμοιγε άμεινον Βοκεΐ είναι, 
καϊ επϊ μεγάΧτ} καϊ επί βραχεία, ομοίως προφάσει 
μη εϊξοντες μηΒε ξύν φόβω εξοντες α κεκτήμεθα. 
την γαρ αυτήν Βΰναται ΒούΧωσιν ή τε μεγίστη 
καϊ η ελαχίστη Βικαίωσις άττο των ομοίων προ 
Βίκης τοις πέλας επιτασσομένη. 

2 " Τα δε του ποΧεμου καϊ των εκατεροις υπαρ- 
χόντων ως ουκ ασθενέστερα εξομεν γνώτε καθ' 

3 εκαστον ακούοντες. αυτουργοί τε yap είσι Πελο- 
ποννησιοι καϊ οΰτε ΙΒία οΰτ εν κοινω χρήματα 
εστίν, έπειτα χρονιών ποΧεμων καϊ Βιαποντίων 
άπειροι Βια το βραχεως αύτοϊ επ* άΧΧηΧους υπο 

4 πενίας επιφερειν. καϊ οι τοιούτοι οΰτε ναυς πΧη- 
ροΰν οΰτε πεζας στρατιάς ποΧΧάκις εκπεμπειν 
Βύνανται, άπο των ΙΒίων τε άμα απόντες καϊ άπο 
των αυτών Βαπανώντες καϊ προσέτι καϊ θαΧάσσης 

6 είργόμενοί' αι Βε περιουσίαι τους πόΧέμους 
μαΧΧον ή αϊ βίαιοι εσφοραϊ άνέχουσιν. σώμασί 
τε ετοιμότεροι οι αυτουργοί των ανθρώπων ή 

1 t.e. by the superior navy of the Athenians. 

BOOK I. cxl. 5-CXL1. 5 

vindication and proof of your political conviction. 
If you yield this point to them you will imme- 
diately be ordered to yield another and greater 
one, as having conceded this first point through 
fear ; whereas by a downright refusal you will give 
them clearly to understand that they must be more 
disposed to deal with you on terms of equality. 
CXLI. So make up your minds, here and now, 
either to take their orders before any damage is 
done you, or, if we mean to go to war, — as to me 
at least seems best — do so with the determination 
not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not 
to hold our possessions in fear. For it means en- 
slavement just the same when either the greatest or 
the least claim is imposed by equals upon their 
neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by 

" But as regards the war and the resources of 
each side, make up your minds, as you hear the 
particulars from me, that our position will be fully 
as powerful as theirs. For the Peloponnesians till 
their lands with their own hands ; they have no 
wealth, either private or public ; besides, they have 
had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, 
because, owing to their poverty, they only wage brief 
campaigns separately against one another. Now 
people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently 
sending out expeditions by land, since they would 
thus have to be away from their properties and at 
the same time would be drawing upon their own 
resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred 
from the sea as well. 1 Again, it is accumulated 
wealth, and not taxes levied under stress, that 
sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own lands 



χρήμασι πολεμεΐν, το μεν πιστον έχοντες εκ των 
κινδύνων κάν περ^ενέσθαι, το δε ου βέβαιον μη 
ου προαναλώσειν, άλλως τε καν πάρα δόξαν, 

6 όπερ εικός, 6 πόλεμος αυτοΐς μηκύνηται. μάχη 
μεν yap μια προς απαντάς "ΈΧληνας δυνατοί 
ΤΙέλοποννησιοι καϊ ol ξύμμαχοι άντίσχειν, πολε- 
μεΐν Be μη προς όμοίαν άντιπαρασκευην αδύνατοι, 
όταν μήτε βουλευτηρίω ένϊ δρώμενοι παραχρήμα 
τι οξέως επιτελώσι πάντες τε ισόψηφοι οντες 
καϊ ούχ ομόφυλοι το εφ' εαυτόν έκαστος σπεύδτ), 

7 εξ ων φιλεΐ μηδέν επιτελές ηίηνεσθαι. και yap 
οι μεν ως μάλιστα τιμωρησασθαί τίνα βούλονται, 
οι δε ώς ήκιστα τα οικεία φθεΐραι. χρόνιοι τε 
ξυνιόντες εν βραχεί μεν μορίω σκοποΰσί τι των 
κοινών, τω δε πλέονι τα οίκεΐα πράσσουσι, καϊ 
έκαστος ου πάρα την εαυτού άμελειαν οϊεται 
βΧάψειν, μελειν δε τινι και άλλω υπέρ εαυτού 
τι προϊδεΐν, ώστε τω αύτω υπο απάντων ιδία 
δοξάσματι Χανθάνειν το κοινον άθρόον φθειρό- 
μενον. CXLII. μεηιστον δε, ττ\ τών χρημάτων 
σπάνει κωλύσονται, όταν σχολή αυτά ποριζόμενοι 
διαμελλωσιν του δε πολέμου οι καιροί ου με- 

2 Μ Καϊ μην ού$* ή επιτείχισις ούδε το ναυτικον 


BOOK I. cxli. 5-cxlii. 2 

are more ready to risk their lives in war than 
their property ; for they have confident hope of 
surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will 
not use up their funds before the war ends, espe- 
cially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted 
beyond expectation. Indeed, although in a single 
battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong 
enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are 
not strong enough to maintain a war against a 
military organisation which is so different from 
theirs, seeing that they have no single general 
assembly, and therefore cannot promptly put into 
effect any emergency measure ; and as they all 
have an equal vote and are of different races they 
each strive to advance their own interests. In such 
circumstances it usually happens that nothing is 
accomplished. And indeed it could scarcely be 
otherwise, for what some of them want is the 
greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, 
others the least possible damage to their own pro- 
perty. And when after many delays they do meet, 
they give but a scant portion of their time to the 
consideration of any matter of common concern, but 
the larger portion to their own individual interests. 
And each one thinks no harm will come from his 
own negligence, but that it is the business of some- 
body else to be provident on his behalf; and so, 
through all separately cherishing the same fancy, 
universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole 
body. CXLI I. And what is most important, they 
will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that 
providing it slowly they are subject to delays; but 
the opportunities of war wait for no man. 

Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our 




3 αυτών άξιον φοβηθηναι. την μεν yap χάΧεπον 
καϊ iv elprjvrj πό\ιν άντίπαΧον κατασκευάσασθαι, 
η που δη iv πόΧεμία τε καϊ ούχ ησσον εκείνοις 

4 ημών άντεπιτετειχισμένων φρουρών δ' ει ποιη- 
σονται, της μεν γτ}ς βΧάπτοιεν αν τι μέρος κατά- 
δρομαΐς καϊ αύτομοΧίαις, ου μέντοι ικανόν ye 
εσται επιτειχίζειν τε κωΧυειν ημάς πΧεύσαντας 
iv τη εκείνων και, ηπερ ίσχύομεν, ταΐς ναυσίν 

5 άμύνεσθαι. πΧέον yap όμως ημείς εχομεν του 
κατά yr\v εκ του ναυτικού εμπειρίας η κείνοι 

6 εκ του κατ ήπειρον ες τα ναυτικά, το 8ε της 
θάΧάσσης επιστήμονας yεvέσθaι ου ραδίως αύτοΐς 

7 πpoσyεvησετaι. ού8ε yap ύμεΐς, μεΧετώντες αύτο 
ευθύς άπο των Μηδικών, i^ipyaadk πω• πώς 8η 
άν8ρες yεωpyol καϊ ου θαΧάσσιοι, καϊ προσέτι 
ούδε μεΧετησαι εασομενοι δια το ύφ* ημών ποΧ- 
Χαΐς ναυσίν αιεί εφορμεΐσθαι, άξιον αν τι δρώεν; 

8 προς μεν yap όΧίγας εφορμούσας καν διακιν- 
8υνεύσειαν πΧηθει την άμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, 
ποΧΧαΐς 8ε εlpyόμεvoι ήσυχασουσι, και εν τω 
μη μεΧετώντι άξυνετώτεροι έσονται και δι αύτο 

9 καϊ οκνηρότεροι, το 8ε ναυτικον τέχνης εστίν, 
ωσπερ καϊ αΧΧο τι, καϊ ούκ ενδέχεται, όταν τύχη, 
εκ πapέpyoυ μέΧετάσθαι, άΧΧά μαΧΧον μηδέν 
εκείνω πάρερηον αΧΧο yίyvεσθaι. 

1 cf. ch. cxxii. 1. 

BOOK I. cxlii. 2-9 

territory 1 need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their 
navy. For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter 
even in time of peace to construct here a city that 
will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing 
this in a hostile country and at a time when we 
have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them. 
But suppose they do establish a fort ; although they 
might injure a part of our territory by making raids 
and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be 
sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and 
building forts there, or making reprisals with our 
fleet, wherein our strength lies. For we have gained 
more experience of operations on land from our 
career on the sea than they of naval operations 
from their career on land. As for their acquiring 
the art of seamanship, that is an advantage they 
will not easily secure ; for even you, who began 
practising it immediately after the Persian war, 
have not yet brought it to perfection. How 
then could men do anvthin£ worth mention who 
are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially 
since they will not even be permitted to practise, 
because we shall always be lying in wait for them 
with a large fleet? For if they had to cope with 
only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps 
risk an engagement, in their ignorance getting 
courage from their mere numbers ; but if their way 
is blocked by a large fleet, they will remain inactive, 
their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice, 
and that in itself will make them more timid. 
Seamanship, like any other skill, is a matter of art, 
and practice in it may not be left to odd times, as 
a by-work ; on the contrary, no other pursuit may 
be carried on as a by-work to it, 



CXLIII. " ΕΓ τε καϊ κινησαντες τών Όλυ/ζ- 
πίασιν η Αελφοΐς 'χρημάτων μισθω μείζονι πει- 
ρωντο ημών ύπολαβεΐν τους ξένους των ναυτών, 
μη όντων μεν ημών αντίπαλων εσβάντων αυτών 
Τ€ κα\ τών μετοίκων δεινον αν ην νυν δε τοδε τ€ 
υπάρχει και, όπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας εχομεν 
πολίτας καϊ την άλλην υπηρεσίαν πλείους καϊ 

2 άμείνους ή άπασα ή άλλη Έλλα<?. καϊ επί τω 
κινδύνω ουδείς αν δέξαιτο τών ξένων την τε αυτού 
φεύγειν καϊ μετά της ήσσονος άμα ελπίδος ολίγων 
ημερών ένεκα μεγάλου μισθού δόσεως εκεινοις 

3 " Καί τα μεν ΤΙεΧοποννησίων εμοιγε τοιαύτα 
καϊ παραπλήσια δοκεΐ είναι, τα δε ημέτερα 
τούτων τε ώνπερ εκείνοις εμεμψάμην άπηλλάχθαι 

4 και αΧΧα ουκ άπο του ϊσου μεγάλα εχειν. ην τε 
επί την χωράν ημών πεζή ϊωσιν, ημείς επί την 
εκείνων πλευσούμεθα, καϊ ούκέτι εκ του ομοίου 
εσται ΥΙελοποννησου τε μέρος τι τμηθηναι καϊ 
την Άττικην άπασαν* οι μεν yap ούχ εξουσιν 
αΧλην άντιλαβεΐν άμαχεί, ημϊν δ' εστί γη πολλή 
καϊ εν νησοις καϊ κατ ήπειρον* μέγα yap το της 

5 θαλάσσης κράτος, σκέψασθε δε• ει yap ημεν 
νησιώται, τίνες αν άληπτότεροι ήσαν; καϊ νυν 
χρη δτι εγγύτατα τούτου διανοηθέντας την μεν 
γην καϊ οικίας άφεΐναι, της δε θαλάσσης και 

1 The mercenaries drawn from the states of the Athenian 
confederacy; no one of those who had taken pait with the 
Peloponnesians would be allowed to return to his native city. 


BOOK I. cxliii. 1-5 

CXLIII. " Then again, if they should lay hands 
upon the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to 
entice away the mercenaries among our sailors by the 
inducement of higher pay, that indeed might be a 
dangerous matter if we were not a match for them, 
assuming that both citizens and our resident aliens 
have manned our ships. But as a matter of fact we 
are a match for them, and, what is of the highest 
importance, we have citizens for pilots, and our 
crews in general are more numerous and better than 
those of all the rest of Hellas. And no one of our 
mercenaries, 1 when it came to facing the risk, would 
elect to be exiled from his own land and, with a 
lesser hope of victory at the same time, fight on 
their side because of the offer of a few days' high 

" Such, as it seems to me at least, or approxi- 
mately such, is the situation as far as the Pelopon- 
nesians are concerned ; as regards our own, I believe 
we are free from the defects I have remarked upon 
in them, and that we have in other respects advan- 
tages which more than counterbalance theirs. If 
they march against our territory, we shall sail 
against theirs ; and the devastation of a part of the 
Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from 
that of the whole of Attica. For they will be 
unable to get other territory in its place without 
fighting, while we have an abundance of territory 
both in the islands and on the mainland. A great 
thing, in truth, is the control of the sea. Just 
consider : if we were islanders, who would be more 
unassailable ? So, even now, we must, as near as may 
be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and 
houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city ; 



ττόΧεως φυΧακήν εχειν, και ΤΙεΧοττοννησίοις νττερ 
αυτών opyLaOevras ττοΧΧω ττΧεοσι μη διαμά-χεσθαι 
{κρατήσαντες τε yap αύθις ούκ εΧάσσοσι μαγρύ- 
μβθα καϊ ην σφαΧώμεν, τα των ξνμμάχων, όθεν 
ίσχύομεν, προσαπόΧΧυται• ου yap ήσυγάσονσι 
μη ικανών ημών όντων εττ αυτούς στρατεύειν), 
την τ€ οΧοφυρσιν μη οικιών καϊ γτ)? ποιεΐσθαι, 
άΧΧα τών σωμάτων ου yap τάδε τους άνδρας, 
αλλ' οι άνδρες ταύτα κτώνται. καϊ ει ωμην 
ττείσειν υμάς, αυτούς αν εξεΧθ όντας εκέΧευον αυτά 
δρώσαι καϊ δεϊξαι ΤΙεΧοττοννησίοις οτι τούτων ye 
ένεκα ούχ ύπακονσεσθε. 

CXLIV. " Πολλά Be καϊ άΧΧα έχω e? εΧττίδα 
του περιεσεσθαι, ην εθέΧητε αρχήν τε μη επι- 
κτάσθαι άμα ττοΧεμοΰντες καϊ κινδύνους αυθαί- 
ρετους μη ττροστιθεσθαι* μάΧΧον yap ττεφόβημαι 
τάς οικείας ημών αμαρτίας ή τάς τών εναντίων 
2 διανοίας, αλλ' εκείνα μεν καϊ εν άΧΧω λόγω άμα 
τοΐς εpyoL•ς δηΧωθήσεται* νυν δε τούτοις άττο- 
κρινάμενοι αποπέμψω μεν, Mεyapεaς μεν οτι εάσο- 
μεν ayopa καϊ Χιμεσι χρήσθαι, ην καϊ Αακεδαιμό- 
νιοι ξενηΧασίας μη ττοιώσι μήτε ημών μήτε τών 
ημέτερων ξυμμάχων (ούτε yap εκείνο κωΧύει εν * 
ταΐς σπονδαΐς ούτε τόδε), τάς δε ττόΧεις οτι αυτό- 
νομους άφήσομεν, ει καϊ αυτόνομους έχοντες 
εσττεισάμεθα καϊ όταν κάκεϊνοι ταΐς εαυτών 

1 iv deleted by Hude, after Dion. H. 

BOOK I. cxliii. 5-cxLiv. 2 

and we must not give way to resentment against the 
Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a 
decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers 
as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them 
again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our 
allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as 
well ; for they will not keep quiet when we are no 
longer able to proceed in arms against them. And 
we must not make lament for the loss of houses and 
land, but for men ; for these things do not procure 
us men, but men these. Indeed, had I thought 
that I should persuade you, I should have urged 
you to go forth and lay them waste yourselves, and 
thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for 
the sake of such things, yield them obedience. 

CXL1V. " Many other considerations also lead me 
to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will 
consent not to attempt to extend your empire while 
you are at war and not to burden yourselves need- 
lessly with dangers of your own choosing ; for I am 
more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's 
plans. But these matters will be explained to you 
on some later occasion * when we are actually at 
war ; at the present time let us send the envoys 
back with this answer : As to the Megarians, that 
we will permit them to use our markets and 
harbours, if the Lacedaemonians on their part will 
cease passing laws for the expulsion of aliens so far 
as concerns us or our allies (for nothing in the treaty 
forbids either our action or theirs) ; as to the states 
in our confederacy, that we will give them their 
independence if they were independent when we 
made the treaty, and as soon as they on their part 

1 cf. 11. xiii. 



άποδώσι πόΧεσι μη σφίσιν τοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι? 1 
επιτηδείως αύτονομεΐσθαι, άλλ' αύτοΐς εκάστοις 
ως βουΧονται• δίκας τε δτι εθεΧομεν δούναι κατά 
τάς ξυνθήκας, ποΧέμου δε ουκ άρξομεν, αρχό- 
μενους δε άμυνούμεθα. ταύτα yap δίκαια και 
πρέποντα άμα τηδε τη ποΧει άποκρίνασθαι. 

3 είδέναι δε χρη οτι ανάγκη ποΧεμεΐν (ην Be εκού- 
σιοι μάΧΧον δεχώμεθα, ησσον ε^γκεισ ο μένους τους 
εναντίους εξομεν), εκ τε των μεγίστων κινδύνων 
οτι και ποΧει καϊ ιδιώτη μέηισται τιμαι περί- 

4 ryiyvovTai. οι yodv πατέρες ημών ύποστάντες 
Μηδους καϊ ουκ άπο τοσώνδε ορμώμενοι, άλλα 
και τα υπάρχοντα εκΧιπόντες, ηνώμη τε πΧέονι 
η τύχη καϊ τόΧμη μείζον ι η δυνάμει τον τ ε βάρ- 
βαρον άπεώσαντο καϊ ες τάδε προηηα^ον αυτά• 
ων ου χρη Χείπεσθαι, άλλα τους τε εχθρούς 
παντϊ τρόπω άμύνεσθαι καϊ τοις επιηι^νομένοις 
πειρασθαι αυτά μη εΧάσσω παραδουναι" 

CXLV. Ό μεν ΤΙερικΧής τοιαύτα είπεν. οι δε 
'Αθηναίοι νομίσαντες άριστα σφισι παραινεΐν 
αύτον ε^τηφίσαντο ά εκεΧευε, καϊ τοις Λακεδαιμο- 
νίοις άπεκρίναντο τη εκείνου ηνωμη, καθ* έκαστα 
τε ως εφρασε καϊ το ξύμπαν, ούδεν κεΧευόμενοι 
ποιησειν, δίκη δε κατά τάς ξυνθηκας έτοιμοι είναι 
διαΧύεσθαι περί τών εηκΧημάτων επί ϊση καϊ 

* Deleted by Hude, following Schol. 


grant the states in their alliance the right to exercise 
independence in a manner that conforms, not to the 
interest of the Lacedaemonians, but to the wishes of 
the individual states ; and as to arbitration, that we 
are willing to submit to it in accordance with the 
treaty, and will not begin war, but will defend our- 
selves against those who do. This answer is just 
and at the same time consistent with the dignity of 
the city. But we must realise that war is inevitable, 
and that the more willing we show ourselves to 
accept it, the less eager will our enemies be to 
attack us, and also that it is from the greatest 
dangers that the greatest honours accrue to a state 
as well as to an individual. Our fathers, at any rate, 
withstood the Persians, although they had no such 
resources as ours, and abandoned even those which 
they possessed, and by their resolution more than by 
good fortune and with a courage greater than their 
strength beat back the Barbarian and advanced our 
fortunes to their present state. And we must not 
fall short of their example, but must defend our- 
selves against our enemies in every way, and must 
endeavour to hand down our empire undiminished 
to posterity. " 

CXLV. Such were the words of Pericles : and the 
Athenians, thinking that he was advising them for 
the best, voted as he directed, and answered the 
Lacedaemonians according to his bidding, both as 
regards the particulars as he set them forth and on 
the whole question, to the effect that they would do 
nothing upon dictation, but were ready in accord- 
ance with the treaty to have all complaints adjusted 
by arbitration on a fair and equal basis. So the 



όμοια, καϊ οι μεν απεχώρησαν €π οίκου teal 
ούκετί ύστερον επρεσβεύοντο. 

CXLVL Αίτίαι 8ε αύται κα\ Βιαφοραϊ iyevovTO 
αμφότεροι? προ του ποΧέμου, άρξάμεναι ευθύς 
άπο των iv Έπώάμνω καϊ Κέρκυρα, επεμίηνυντο 
8ε όμως εν αύταΐς καϊ παρ άΧλήΧους εφοίτων 
άκηρύκτως μεν, άνυπόπτως 8ε οΰ• σπον8ων yap 
ξύγχυσις τα ηιηνομενα ην καϊ πρόφαση του 



Lacedaemonian envoys went back home and there- 
after came on no further missions. 

CXLVI. These were the grounds of complaint 
and the causes of disagreement on both sides before 
the war, and they began to appear immediately 
after the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Never- 
theless the two parties continued to have intercourse 
with one another during these recriminations and 
visited each other without heralds, 1 though not 
without suspicion ; for the events which were taking 
place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty 
and furnished an occasion for war. 

1 i.e. without the formalities which are indispensable after 
war is declared. 




Ι. "Αρχεται δε ο πόλεμο? ενθένδε ήδη 'Αθηναίων 
καϊ ΤΙεΧοττοννησίων και των έκατέροις ξυμμάχων, 
iv ω ούτε έττεμίηνυντο ετι άκηρυκτϊ τταρ άΧΧή- 
Χους καταστάντες τε ξυνεχώς εποΧέμουν, καϊ 
ηέηραπται εξής ως έκαστα iyiyvero κατά θέρος 
καϊ χειμώνα. 

II. Τέσσαρα καϊ δέκα μεν ετη ένέμειναν αϊ 
τριακοντούτεις σττονδαΧ at έηένοντο μετ Εύβοιας 
αΧωσιν τω δε πέμπτω καϊ δεκάτω ετει, επι 
Χρυσίδος iv "Αργεί τότε πεντήκοντα δυοΐν δέοντα 
ετη ίερωμένης καϊ Αίνησίου εφόρου εν Σπάρτη 
καϊ ΙΙνθοδώρου ετι τεσσάρας μήνας άρχοντος 
Άθηναίοις, μετά την εν ΤΙοτειδαία μάχην μηνϊ 
εκτω καϊ δεκάτω, άμα 1 ήρι άρχομένω Θηβαίων 
άνδρες όλ,/γω πΧείους τριακοσίων (tjjovvto δε 
αυτών βοιωταρχουντες ΥΙυθά^εΧός τε ό ΦυΧείδου 
και Αιέμττορος ό Όνητορίδου) έσήΧθον περί πρώ- 
τον ΰπνον ζνν οττΧοις ες ΐΐλάταιαν της Βοιωτίας 

1 Hude's correction for *κτφ καϊ αμα of the MSS. Lipsius 
suggested ίκτφ <κα\ Senary > καϊ, 

1 The mode of reckoning customary in the time of Thucy- 
dides, and continued long afterwards. In such a scheme 
the summer included the spring and the winter the autumn : 



I. At this point in my narrative begins the 
account of the actual warfare between the Athenians 
and the Peloponnesians and their respective allies. 
While it continued they ceased having communi- 
cation with one another except through heralds, and 
when once they were at war they waged it without 
intermission. The events of the war have been 
recorded in the order of their occurrence, summer 
by summer and winter by winter. 1 

II. For fourteen years the thirty years' truce 
which had been concluded after the capture of 
Euboea remained unbroken; but in the fifteenth 
year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year 
of her priesthood 2 at Argos, and Aenesias was ephor 
at Sparta, and Pythodorus had still four months to 
serve as arch on at Athens, in the sixteenth month 
after the battle of Potidaea, at the opening of 431 b.o. 
spring, some Thebans, a little more than three 
hundred in number, under the command of the 
Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phyleidas and Diem- 
porus son of Onetoridas, about the first watch 

of the night entered under arms into Plataea, a 

the summer period was equal to about eight months, the 
winter to about four. 

2 The commencement of the war is fixed according to the 
forms of reckoning customary in the three most important 
Hellenic states. 



2 ονσαν * Αθηναίων ξνμμαχίδα. επη^ά^οντο δε 
καϊ άνεωξαν τάς πύΧας ΤΙΧαταιων άνδρες, Ναυ- 
κΧείδης τε και οι μετ αυτόν, βονΧόμενοι Ιδίας 
ένεκα δυνάμεως άνδρας τε των ποΧιτών τους 
σφίσιν νπεναντίονς διαφθεΐραι καϊ την πάλιν 

3 ©ηβαίοις προσποιήσαι. έπραξαν δε ταύτα δι 
Ένρυ μάχου του Αεοντιάδον, ανδρός ©ηβαίων 
δυνατωτάτου. προϊδόντες yap οι ©ηβαϊοι οτι 
εσοιτο ο ποΧεμος, εβούΧοντο την ΤίΧάταιαν alel 
σφίσι διάφορον ονσαν ετι εν ειρήνη τ€ καϊ του 
ποΧέμου μήπω φανερού καθεστώτος προ κατά- 
Χαβεΐν. rj κα\ ραον εΧαθον εσεΧθόντες, φυΧακης 

4 ου προ καθεστηκυίας, θεμενοι δε ες την ayopccv 
τα δπΧα τοις μεν επα^α^ομενοις ουκ επείθοντο 
ώστε ευθύς ερηου εγεσθαι καϊ ίέναι επί τάς οικίας 
των εχθρών, <γνώμην δ' εποιούντο κηρύημασί τε 
χρήσασθαι επιτηδείοις καϊ ες ξύμβασιν μαΧΧον 
καϊ φιλίαν την ποΧιν ά<γα>γεΐν {καϊ άνεΐπεν 6 
κήρυξ, ει τις βούΧεται κατά τα πάτρια των πάν- 
των ϋοιωτων ξυμμαχεΐν, τίθεσθαι παρ αυτούς 
τά οπΧα), νομίζοντες σφίσι ραδίως τούτω τω 
τρόπω προσχωρήσειν την ποΧιν. 

III. Οι δε ΤΙλαταιής ώς -βσθοντο ένδον τε οντάς 
τους ©ηβαίονς και εξαπιναίως κατειΧημμένην 
την πόΧιν, καταδείσαντες καϊ νομίσαντες ποΧΧω 
πΧείονς εσεΧηΧυθέναι (ου yap εώρων εν τ?} ννκτι) 
προς ξύμβασιν εγωρησαν και τους X6yovς δεξά- 

BOOK II. π. ι-ιπ. ι 

town of Boeotia which was in alliance with Athens. 
They had been invited over by some Plataeans, 
Naucleides and his partisans, who opened the gates 
for them, intending, with a view to getting power 
into their hands, to destroy the citizens who were 
of the opposite party and make over the city to the 
Thebans. And they had conducted their intrigue 
through Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of 
great influence at Thebes. For, as Plataea was 
always at variance with them, the Thebans, fore- 
seeing that the war 1 was coming, wished to get 
possession of it while there was still peace and 
before the war had yet been openly declared. And 
so they found it easier to make their entry unob- 
served, because no watch had been set to guard the 
city. And when they had grounded their arms in 
the market-place, instead of following the advice of 
those who had invited them over, namely to set to 
work at once and enter the houses of their enemies, 
they determined rather to try conciliatory proclama- 
tions and to bring the city to an amicable agreement. 
The proclamation made by herald was that, if anyone 
wished to be an ally according to the hereditary 
usages of the whole body of the Boeotians, he 
should take his weapons and join them. For they 
thought that in this way the city would easily be 
induced to come over to their side. 

III. And the Plataeans, when they became aware 
that the Thebans were inside, and that the city 
had been taken by surprise, took fright, and, 
as it was night and they could not see, thinking 
that a far greater number had come in, they con- 
cluded to make terms, and, accepting the proposals 

1 i.e. the war between Athens and Sparta. 



μενοι ήσύχαζον, αΧΧως τε καϊ επειδή ες ουδενα 

2 ούδεν ενεωτέριζον. πράσσοντες δε πως ταντα 
κατενόησαν ου ποΧΧούς τους Θηβαίους οντάς καϊ 
ενόμισαν επιθίμενοι ραδίως κρατησειν τω yap 
πΧηθει των ΤίΧαταιών ου βουΧομένω ην των 

3 ' Αθηναίων άφίστασθαί. εδόκει οΰν επιχειρητεα 
είναι καϊ ξυνεΧέγοντο διορύσσοντες τους κοινούς 
τοίχους παρ άΧΧηΧους, όπως μη δια των 68ών 
φανεροί ώσιν ίόντες, άμαξας τε άνευ των υπο- 
ζυγίων ες τάς οδούς καθίστασαν, ίνα αντί τείχους 
τ), καϊ τάΧΧα εξήρτυον fj εκαστον εφαίνετο προς 

4 τα παρόντα ξύμφορον εσεσθαι. επεϊ δε ώς εκ 
των δυνατών έτοΐμα ην, φυΧάξαντες ετι νύκτα 
καϊ αύτο το περίορθρον εγωρουν εκ τών οικιών 
επ αυτούς, όπως μη κατά φώς θαρσαΧεωτεροις 
ούσι προσφεροιντο καϊ σφίσιν εκ του Ισου yi~ 
ηνωνται, άλλ' εν νυκτϊ φοβερώτεροι οντες ήσσους 
ώσι της σφετερας εμπειρίας της κατά την πόΧιν, 
προσεβαΧόν τε ευθύς καϊ ες χείρας ήσαν κατά 

IV. Οι δ' ώ? έγνωσαν εξηπατημενοι, ξυνεστρε- 
φοντό τε εν σφίσιν αύτοΐς καϊ τας προσβοΧας 
2 η προσπίπτοιεν άπεωθουντο. καϊ δις μεν η τρϊς 
άπεκρούσαντο, έπειτα ποΧΧώ θορύβω αυτών τε 
προσβαΧόντων καϊ τών γυναικών καϊ τών οίκετών 
άμα άπο τών οικιών κραυγϊ) τε καϊ όΧοΧυγτ) 
νρωμενων Χίθοις τε καϊ κεράμω βαΧΧοντων, καϊ 
νετοΰ άμα δια νυκτός ποΧΧοΰ επιγενομένου, έφο~ 


BOOK II. in. ι -ιν. 2 

made to them, raised no disturbance, especially as 
the Thebans did no violence to anyone. But, as it 
happened, while they were negotiating the terms 
they perceived that the Thebans were few in 
number, and thought that by an attack they might 
easily overpower them ; for it was not the wish of 
the majority of the Plataeans to withdraw from the 
Athenian alliance. So it was determined to make 
the attempt, and they began to collect together, 
reaching each other's houses by digging through the 
party-walls that they might not be seen going 
through the streets, and they placed wagons 
without the draught-animals in the streets to serve 
as a barricade, and took other measures as each 
appeared likely to be advantageous in the present 
emergency. And when all was ready as far as they 
could make it so, waiting for the time of night just 
before dawn, they sallied from their houses against 
the Thebans, not wishing to attack them by day 
when they might be more courageous and would be 
on equal terms with them, but at night when they 
would be more timid and at a disadvantage, in com- 
parison with their own familiarity with the town. 
And so they fell upon them at once, and speedily 
came to close quarters. 

IV. The Thebans, when they found they had 
been deceived, drew themselves up in close ranks 
and sought to repel the assaults of the enemy 
wherever they fell upon them. And twice or three 
times they repulsed them ; then when the Plataeans 
charged upon them with a great uproar, and at the 
same time the women and slaves on the house-tops, 
uttering screams and yells, kept pelting them with 
stones and tiles — a heavy rain too had come on 



βηθησαν κα\ τραττόμενοι βφβνγον δια της ττόΧεως, 
άπειροι μεν οντες οι πΧείους εν σκότω καϊ πηΧω 
των διόδων fj χρη σωθηναι (και yap τεΧευτωντος 
του μηνός τα ηιηνόμςνα ην), έμπειρους δε έχοντες 
τους διώκοντας του μη βκφβύιγειν, 1 ώστε διεφθεί- 

3 ροντο ποΧΧοί. των δε ΤΙΧαταιών τις τας πύΧας 
fj εσήΧθον καϊ αΐπερ ήσαν μόναι άνεφημεναι, 
εκΧγσε στυρακίω ακοντίου άντϊ βαΧάνου χρησά- 
μένος ες τον μοχΧόν, ώστε μηδέ ταύττ) εξοδον ετι 

4 είναι, διωκόμενοι δε κατά την πόΧιν οι μεν τίνες 
αυτών επί το τείχος άναβάντες έρριψαν ες το εξω 
σφάς αυτούς καϊ διεφθάρησαν ol πΧείους, οι δε 
κατά πύΧας έρημους γυναικός δούσης πεΧεκυν 
Χαθόντες 2 διακόψαντες τον μοχΧον έξήΧθον 
ου ττοΧΧοί (αίσθησις yap ταχεία επεyεvετo), 
άΧΧοι δε aXXrj της πόΧεως σποράδες άπώΧΧυντο. 

6 το δε ιτΧεϊστον καϊ όσον μάΧιστα ην ξυνεστραμ- 
μένον εσπίπτουσιν ες οίκημα /χεγα, δ ην του 
τείχους και αι ζ θύραι άνεο^μέναι ετυχον αυτού, 
οΐόμενοι πύΧας τας θύρας του οικήματος είναι 

καϊ αντικρυς δίοδον ες το εξω. όρώντες δε αυ- 
τούς οι ΐΙΧαταιής άπειΧημμένους εβουΧεύοντο 
εϊτε κατακαύσωσιν ώσπερ εχουσιν, εμπρήσαντες 

7 το οίκημα, εϊτε τι άΧΧο χρήσωνται. τέΧος δε 

1 του μ)) iK(pevyeiv Hude deletes, after van Herwerden. 
9 κα\ of MSS. after Kadovres deleted by van Herwerden. 
3 So Hude with CG ; ai πλησίον θύραι ABEFmjj. Didot and 
Haase would transpose thus : του τ^ίχου5 πλησίον καϊ al θύραι. 


BOOK II. ιν. 2-7 

during the night — they became panic-stricken and 
turned and fled through the city; and since most 
of them were unfamiliar with the thoroughfares by 
which they must save themselves amid the darkness 
and mud — for these things happened at the end of 
the month 1 — , whereas their pursuers knew full well 
how to prevent their escape, many of them conse- 
quently perished. One of the Plataeans, moreover, 
had closed the gates by which they had entered — 
the only gates which had been opened — using the 
spike of a javelin instead of a pin to fasten the bar, 
so that there was no longer a way out in that direc- 
tion either. And being pursued up and down the 
city, some of them mounted the wall and threw 
themselves over, most of these perishing; others 
succeeded in getting out by an unguarded gate 
without being observed, cutting through the bar 
with an axe which a woman gave them — but not 
many, for they were soon discovered; and others 
got isolated in various parts of the city and were put 
to death. But the greater number, those who had 
kept more together than the others, rushed into a 
large building abutting upon 2 the wall whose doors 
happened to be open, thinking that the doors of the 
building were city-gates and that there was a pas- 
sage right through to the outside. And the 
Plataeans, seeing that they were cut off, began to 
deliberate whether they should set fire to the 
building and burn them up without more ado or 
what other disposition they should make of them. 

1 When there would be no moon. 

a Or, as most MSS. read, " a large building . . . whose 
doors near by happened to be open "; with Didot and Haase, 
" & large building near the wall whose doora . . ." 

▼OL. L Κ ° 


ούτοι τε καϊ όσοι άΧΧοι τών ®ηβαιων περιήσαι 
κατά την πόΧιν πΧανωμενοι, ξυνέβησαν τοΐς 
ΤΙλαταιεΰσι παραδουναι σφάς τε αυτούς καϊ τα 
δπΧα χρήσασθαι 6 τι αν βουΧωνται. 

V. Οι μεν δη εν τη ΤΙΧαταία ούτως βπβπράγε- 
σαν. οι δ' άΧΧοι ®ηβαΐοι ους έδει ετι της νυκτός 
τταρα^βνβσθαι πανστρατια, εϊ τι άρα μη προ- 
γωροίη τοις εσεΧηΧυθόσι, της ά<γγβΧίας άμα καθ* 
οδον αύτοΐς ρηθείσης περϊ των ηβ^ενη μίνων επε- 

2 βοηθούν. απέχει Be ή ΤϊΧαταια των ®ηβων 
σταδίους εβδομήκοντα, καϊ το ύδωρ το ηενόμενον 
της νυκτός εποίησε βραδύτερον αυτούς εΧθεΐν 
ό yap 'Ασωπός ποταμός ερρύη μεηας καϊ ου 

3 ραδίως διάβατος ην. πορευόμενοί τε εν ύετω και 
τον ποταμον μοΧις διαβάντες ύστερον παρε- 
ykvovTO, ήδη των ανδρών των μεν διεφθαρμένων, 

4 τών δε ζώντων εχομένων. ώς δ' ησθοντο οι Θη- 
βαίοι το ηεηενημένον, επεβουΧευον τοις εξω της 
πόΧεως τών ΤίΧαταιών (ήσαν yap καϊ άνθρωποι 
κατά τους άyρoύς καϊ κατασκευή, οΐα απροσδό- 
κητου του 1 κάκου εν ειρήνη yεvoμέvoυ)^ έβού- 
Χοντο yap σφίσιν, ει τίνα Χάβοιεν, ύπάρχειν 
άντϊ τών ένδον, ην άρα τύγωσί τίνες eζωypημέvoι. 

5 καϊ οι μεν ταύτα διενοουντο* οι δε ΤίΧαταιής ετι 
διαβουΧευομίνών αυτών ύποτοπήσαντες τοιούτον 
τι εσεσθαι καϊ δείσαντες περϊ τοις εξω κήρυκα 
εξέπεμψαν παρά τους ©ηβαίους, Xέyovτες οτι 
ούτε τα πεποιημένα όσια δράσειαν εν σπονδαΐς 
σφών πειράσαντες καταλαβεΐν την πόΧιν, τά τε 
εξω εXεyov αύτοΐς μη άδικεΐν ει δε μή, καϊ αύτοϊ 
εφασαν αυτών τους άνδρας άποκτενεΐν ους εγρυσι 

1 Added by Bredow and Baumeister. 

BOOK II. iv. 7-v. s 

But finally these and the other Thebans who sur- 
vived and were wandering up and down the city 
came to an agreement with the Plataeans to 
surrender themselves and their arms, to be dealt 
with in any way the Plataeans wished. 

V. The Thebans in Plataea had fared thus ; but 
the main body of the Thebans, who were to have 
come in full force while it was still night, on the 
chance that things might not go well with those 
who had entered the city, received while on the way 
news of what had happened and were now hastening 
to the rescue. Now Plataea is about seventy stadia 
distant from Thebes, and the rain that had come 
on during the night delayed their coming; for 
the river Asopus was running high and was not easy 
to cross. And so, marching in the rain and crossing 
the river with difficulty, they arrived too late, some 
of their men having already been slain and others 
taken captive alive. And when the Thebans learned 
what had happened, they began to plot against the 
Plataeans who were outside the city — there were, of 
course, men in the fields and household property, as 
the trouble had come unexpectedly in time of 
peace — for they desired to have such men as they 
could lay hands on as hostages for those within, in 
case any of them had chanced to be taken captive. 
Such then were their plans ; but the Plataeans, 
while the Thebans were still deliberating, suspected 
that something of the sort would be done, and 
fearing for those outside sent out a herald to the 
Thebans, saying that they had done an impious 
thing in trying to seize their city in time of peace, 
and they bade them do no injury outside the walls ; 
if they did, they on their part would put to death 



ζώντας• άναχωρησάντων δέ πάλιν εκ της <γής 

6 άποδώσειν αύτοις τους άνδρας. Θηβαίοι μεν 
ταύτα Xeyovai και επομόσαι φασϊν αυτούς' 
ΤίΧαταιής δ' ούχ όμοΧογουσι τους άνδρας ευθύς 
ύποσχέσθαι άποδώσειν, άΧΧά Xόyωv πρώτον 
ηενομβνων ην τι ξυμβαίνωσι, και επομόσαι ου 

7 φασιν. εκ δ' ούν της <γής αναχώρησαν οι Θηβαίοι 
ούδεν άδικησαντες" οι δε ΤίΧαταιής επειδή τα εκ 
της χώρας κατά τάχος εσεκομίσαντο, άπεκτειναν 
τους άνδρας ευθύς. ήσαν he οηδοήκοντα και 
εκατόν οι Χηφθέντες, καϊ Εύρύμαχος αυτών ην, 
προς ον έπραξαν οι προδιδόντες. 

VI. Ύοΰτο δε ποιησαντες ες τε τας ' "Αθήνας 
ayyeXov επεμπον καϊ τους νεκρούς ύποσπόνδους 
άπέδοσαν τοις θηβαίοις, τά τε εν τί) πόΧει 
καθίσταντο προς τα παρόντα rj εδόκει αύτοΐς. 

2 τοις δ' *ΑθηναΙοις η^ελθη ευθύς τά περί των 
ΐΙΧαταιών ηεηενημενα, καϊ Βοιωτών τε παρα- 
χρήμα ξυνεΧαβον δ σοι ήσαν εν τί) * Αττική καϊ 
ες την ΐΓΧάταιαν έπεμψαν κήρυκα, κέλεύοντες 
ειπείν μηδέν νεώτερον ποιεΐν περί τών ανδρών ους 
εχουσι Θηβαίων, πρίν άν τι καϊ αύτοϊ βουΧεύ- 

3 σωσι περί αυτών* ου yap ^γγελ^ αύτοΐς δτι 
τεθνηκότες είεν. άμα yap τη εσόδω yιyvoμεvrj 
τών Θηβαίων 6 πρώτος άγγελο? εξη€ΐ, 6 δε δεύ- 
τερος άρτι νενικημενων τε και ξυνεϊΧημμενων, καϊ 
τών ύστερον ούδεν ηδεσαν. ούτω δη ούκ είδότες 
οι 'Αθηναίοι επέστεΧΧον 6 δε κήρυξ άφικόμενος 

BOOK II. v. 5-νι. 3 

the men whom they held captive, but if the Thebans 
withdrew from their territory they would restore 
the men to them. Now this is the account which 
the Thebans give, and they allege that the Plataeans 
confirmed their promise with an oath ; the Plataeans 
do not admit that they promised to restore the men 
at once, but only that they would do so in case 
they should come to an agreement after preliminary 
negotiations, and they deny that they swore to it. 
At any rate, the Thebans withdrew from their terri- 
tory without doing any injury; but the Plataeans, 
as soon as they had hastily fetched in their property 
from the country, straightway slew the men. And 
those who had been taken captive were one hundred 
and eighty in number, one of them being Eury- 
machus, with whom the traitors had negotiated. 

VI. When they had done this, they sent a mes- 
senger to Athens, gave back the dead under a 
truce to the Thebans, and settled the affairs of the 
city as seemed best to them in the emergency. 
The report of what had been done in Plataea was 
made to the Athenians promptly ; and they instantly 
apprehended all the Thebans who were in Attica 
and sent a herald to Plataea, bidding him tell 
them to take no extreme measures regarding the 
Thebans whom they held captive until they them- 
selves should have taken counsel about them ; for 
the news had not arrived that the men had been 
put to death. For the first messenger had set out at 
the time the Thebans were entering the city, the 
second immediately after their defeat and capture, 
and the Athenians knew nothing of later events. 
Consequently the Athenians sent their orders 
without knowing the facts; and the herald on his 



4 ηύρε τους άνδρας διεφθαρμένους. κα\ μετά ταύτα 
οι ' Αθηναίοι στρατεύσαντες ες ΤΙΧάταιαν σΐτόν 
τβ earjyayov καϊ φρουρούς εγκατέΧιπον, των τ€ 
ανθρώπων τους αχρειότατους ξύν γυναιξί καϊ 
παισϊν έξεκομισαν. 

VII. Γεγενημενου δε του iv ΤίΧαταιαΐς έργου 
καϊ ΧεΧυμένων Χαμπρώς των σπονδών οι ' Αθη- 
ναίοι παρεσκευάζοντο ως ποΧεμησοντες, πάρε- 
σκευάζοντο 8ε καϊ Αακεδαιμόνιοι καϊ οι ξύμμαχοι, 
πρεσβείας τε μεΧΧοντες πεμπειν πάρα βασιλέα 
καϊ άΧΧοσε προς τους βαρβάρους, εϊ πόθεν τίνα 
ώφεΧιαν ηΧπιζον εκάτεροι προσΧηψεσθαι, πόΧεις 
τε ξυμμαχίδας ποιούμενοι οσαι ήσαν έκτος της 

2 εαυτών δυνάμεως, καϊ Αακεδαιμονίοις μεν προς 
ταΐς αύτοΰ ύπαρχούσαις εξ ΊταΧίας καϊ ΧικεΧίας 
τοΐς τάκείνων εΧομένοις ναΰς επετάχθησαν ι ποι- 
εΐσθαι κατά μέγεθος των πόΧεων, ως ες τον 
πάντα αριθμόν πεντακοσίων νέων εσομενων, και 
apyvpiov ρητον ετοιμάζειν, τά τε αΧΧα ησυχά- 
ζοντας καϊ ' Αθηναίους δεχόμενους μια νηι εως 

3 αν ταύτα παρασκευασθώ * Αθηναίοι δε την τ€ 
ύπάρχουσαν ξυμμαχίαν εξηταζον καϊ ες τά περί 
ΤΙεΧοπόννησον μαΧΧον χωρία επρεσβεύοντο, Kep- 
κυραν καϊ ΚεφαΧΧηνίαν καϊ ' Ακαρνανας καϊ 
Ζάκυνθον, όρώντες, εί σφίσι φίΧια ταυτ εϊη 

1 ίπ^τάχθη διακοσίαι Hude, with Herbst {έπςτάχθη </). 

1 ef. ch. lxxviii. 3. 

9 Referring, in the one case, to the unsuccessful embassy 
of the Lacedaemonians to the King mentioned in ch. lxvii.; 


BOOK II. vi. 3-V11. 3 

arrival found the men slain. After this the Athe- 
nians, marching to Plataea, brought in food and left 
a garrison, 1 taking away the least efficient of the 
men along with the women and children. 

VII. Now that the affair at Plataea had occurred 
and the treaty had been glaringly violated, the 
Athenians began preparing for war, and the Lace- 
daemonians and their allies also began ; both sides 
were making ready to send embassies to the King 
and to the barbarians of any other land/ 2 where 
either of them hoped to secure aid, and they were 
negotiating alliances with such cities as were outside 
of their own sphere of influence. The Lacedae- 
monians, on their part, gave orders to those in Italy 
and Sicily who had chosen their side 3 to build, in 
proportion to the size of their cities, other ships, in 
addition to those which were already in Pelopon- 
nesian ports, their hope being that their fleet would 
reach a grand total of five hundred ships, and to 
provide a stated sum of money ; but as to other 
matters, they were instructed to remain inactive and 
to refuse their ports to Athenians if they came with 
more than a single ship, until these preparations 
had been completed. The Athenians, on the other 
hand, began to examine their existing list of allies 
and also sent embassies more particularly to the 
countries lying about the Peloponnesus — Corcvra, 
Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus — perceiving 
that if they were sure of the friendship of these 

in the other, to the connection of the Athenians with the 
Odrysian court mentioned in chs. xxix. and lxvii. 

3 Referring to the Dorian colonies in Italy and Sicily (ef. 
in. lxxxvi. 2), which, however, contributed no ships till 
412 B.C. (cf. viii. xxvi. 1). 



βεβαίως, πέριξ την ΥίεΧοπόννησον καταποΧεμψ 

VIII. 9 OXiyov re επενόουν ούΒεν αμφότεροι, 
άΧΧ' ερρωντο ες τον πόΧεμον ουκ άπεικότως• 
αρχόμενοι yap πάντες όζύτερον αντιλαμβάνονται, 
τότε δε καΧ νεότης ποΧΧη μεν ούσα εν ττ) Πβλο- 
ποννήσω, ποΧΧη δ' εν ταΐς 'Αθήναις ουκ ακουσίως 
υπο απειρίας ήπτετο του ποΧεμου. η τε άΧΧη 
Ί&λΧάς άπασα μετέωρος ην ξυνιουσων των πρώ- 

2 τωι/ πόΧεων. κ αϊ ποΧΧα μεν Xoyia εΧ^ετο, 
ποΧΧα δε / χpησμoXόyoι ηΒον εν τε τοις μεΧΧουσι 

3 ποΧεμήσειν καϊ εν ταΐς άΧΧαις πόΧεσιν. ετι Be 
ΔήΧος εκινήθη oXiyov προ τούτων, πρότερον 
οΰπω σεισθεϊσα άφΐ ου ( ΕίΧΧηνες μεμνηνται. 
εΧ^ετο Be καϊ εΒόκει επί τοις μεΧΧουσι yevij- 
σεσθαι σημήναι* εϊ τε τι άΧΧο τοιουτότροπον 
ξυνέβη yεvεσθaι, πάντα άνεζητεΐτο. 

4 Ή Βε εύνοια πάρα ποΧύ εποίει των ανθρώπων 
μάΧΧον ες τους ΑακεΒαιμονίους, άΧΧως τε καϊ 
προειπόντων οτι την Ελλάδα εΧενθεροΰσιν. 
ερρωτό τε πάς καϊ ΙΒιώτης καϊ πόΧις εϊ τι Βνναιτο 
καϊ λόγω καϊ έργω ζυνεπιΧαμβάνειν αύτοΐς• εν 
τούτω τε κεκωΧυσθαι εΒόκει εκάστω τα π pay- 

5 ματα ω μη τις αυτός παρέσται. ούτως εν ι opyfj 
εί-χον οι πΧείους τους Αθηναίους, οι μεν της 
αρχής άποΧυθήναι βουΧόμενοι, οι δέ μη άργθωσι 

1 Added by Stephanu•. 


BOOK II. νιι. 3-νιιι. 5 

places they would be able to encircle the Pelo- 
ponnesus and subdue it. 

VIII. There was nothing paltry in the designs of 
either side ; but both put their whole strength into 
the war, and not without reason, for men always 
lay hold with more spirit at the beginning, and at 
this time, in addition, the young men, who were 
numerous both in the Peloponnesus and in Athens, 
were unfamiliar enough with war to welcome it. 
All the rest of Hellas was in anxious suspense as its 
foremost cities came into conflict with each other. 
And many were the prophecies recited and many 
those which oracle-mongers chanted, both among 
the peoples who were about to go to war and in the 
Hellenic cities at large. Moreover, only a short 
time before this, Delos had been shaken, although it 
had not before been visited by an earthquake within 
the memory of the Hellenes. 1 This was said and 
believed to be ominous of coming events, and indeed 
every other incident of the sort which chanced to 
occur was carefully looked into. 

The general good-will, however, inclined decidedly 
to the side of the Lacedaemonians, especially since 
they proclaimed that they were liberating Hellas. 
Every person and every state was strongly purposed 
to assist them in every possible way, whether by 
word or by deed, and each man thought that 
wherever he could not himself be present, there the 
cause had suffered a check. To such an extent were 
the majority of the Hellenes enraged against the 
Athenians, some wishing to be delivered from their 
sway, others fearful of falling under it. 

1 Probably an intentional contradiction of Hdt. VI. xcviii., 
where it is stated that an earthquake occurred shortly before 
the battle of Marathon, but none later• 



IX. ΤΙαρασκευη μεν ουν καϊ ηνωμη τοιαύττ) 
ωρμηντο. πόλεις δε εκάτεροι τάσδε έχοντες ξ νμ- 

2 μάγους ες τον πόλεμον καθίσταντο. Αακεδαιμο- 
ΖΊωρ /i€i/ οιοε ξνμμαχοι Ιιελοποννησιοι μεν οι 
εντός Ισθμού πάντες πλην * Αρχείων καί ' Αχαιών 
{τούτοις δε ες αμφότερους φιλία ην ΤΙεΧληνής δέ 
1 Αχαιών μόνοι ξυνεπολεμουν το πρώτον, έπειτα 
δε ύστερον καί άπαντες), εξω δε ΤΙελοποννήσου 
ΤΑε^αρής, Βοιωτοί, Αοκροί, Φωκής, Άμπρακιώται, 

3 Αευκάδιοι, Άνακτόριοι. τούτων ναυτικον παρεί- 
χοντο Κορίνθιοι, Με Γ γαρής, Χικυώνιοι, ΙΙεΧληνής, 
'Ίΐλεΐοι, ' Αμπρακιώται, Αευκάδιοι, ιππέας δε 
Βοιωτοί, Φωκής, Αοκροί, αϊ δ' άλλαι πόλεις 

4 πεζον παρεΐχον. 1 αΰτη μεν Αακεδαιμονίων 
ξυμμαχία' ^Αθηναίων δέ Χίοί, Αέσβιοι, Πλα- 
ταιής, Μεσσήνιοι οι εν Ναυπάκτω, ' Ακαρνάνων 
ol πΧείους, Κερκυραίοι, Ζακύνθιοι, καϊ άλλαι 
πόλεις αϊ υποτελείς ουσαι εν εθνεσι τοσοΐσδε, 
Καρία ή επι θαλασσή, Δωριής Καρσί πρόσοικοι, 
Ιωνία, *ΕΧλήσποντος, τα επι ®ρακης, νήσοι δσαι 
εντός ΤΙελοποννήσου καϊ Κρήτης προς ήλιον 

6 άνίσχοντα 2 π\ήν Μτ^λοι; καϊ ©ήρας. τούτων 
ναυτικον παρείχοντο Χ?οι, Αέσβιοι, Κερκυραίοι, 

6 ο Ι δ' άλλοι πεζον καϊ χρήματα, ξυμμαχία μεν 

αΰτη εκατέρων καϊ παρασκευή ες τον πόλεμον ήν. 

Χ. Οι δε Αακεδαιμόνιοι μετά τα εν ΥίΧαταιαϊς 

ευθύς περιή^ελλον κατά την ΤΙεΧοπόννησον καϊ 

1 Herbst deletes, followed by Hude. 

2 Before πλην C gives πάσαι at Κυκλάδα, the other MSS. 
πασαι at άλλοι Κυκ\άδ*$. Deleted by Dobree. 


BOOK II. ιχ. ι-χ. ι 

IX. Such were the preparations and such the 
feelings with which the Hellenes went into the 
conflict. And the states which each side had as its 
allies when it entered the war were as follows. 
These were the allies of the Lacedaemonians : all 
the Peloponnesians south of the Isthmus with the 
exception of the Argives and Achaeans (these latter 
had friendly relations with both sides, and the 
Pellenians were the only Achaeans who at first took 
part in the war with the Lacedaemonians, though 
eventually all of them did), and outside of the Pelo- 
ponnesus the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Pho- 
cians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. 
Of these, the Corinthians^ Megarians, Sicyonians, 
Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians 
furnished ships, while cavalry was contributed by 
the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, and infantry 
by the other states. These were the allies of the 
Lacedaemonians. Those of the Athenians were : 
the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians of 
Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Cor- 
cyraeans, the Zacynthians, and in addition the cities 
which were tributary in the following countries : 
the seaboard of Caria, the Dorians adjacent to the 
Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the districts on the 
coast of Thrace, and the islands which lie between 
the Peloponnesus and Crete toward the east, with 
the exception of Melos and Thera. Of these, the 
Chians, Lesbians, and Corey raeans furnished ships, 
the rest infantry and money. Such were the allies 
of each side and the preparations they made for 
the war. 

X. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the 
Lacedaemonians sent word around to the various 



την εξω ξυμμαχίδα στρατιαν παρασκευάζεσθαι 
ταΐς πόΧεσι τά τε επιτήδεια οία βίκος επϊ εξοδον 
εκδημον εχειν, ως εσβαΧοΰντες ες την Άττικήν. 

2 επειδή δε έκάστοις έτοιμα yiyvoiTo, κατά τον 
χρόνου τον είρημένον ξυνησαν τα δύο μέρη από 

3 ποΧεως εκάστης ες τον Ισθμόν. και επειδή πάν 
το στράτευμα ξννεΐΚε^μενον ην, 'Αρχίδαμος 6 
βασιλεύς των Αακεδαιμονίων, οσπερ η^εΐτο της 
εξόδου ταύτης, ξυηκαΧεσας τους στρατηγούς των 
πόΧεων πασών καΧ τους μάΧιστα εν τέΧει καΐ 
άξιο\ο Γ γωτάτους παρτ/νει τοιάδε. 1 

XI. " "Ανδρες ΤΙεΧοποννήσιοι καϊ ξύμμαχοι, 
καϊ οι πατέρες ημών ποΧΧας στρατείας καϊ εν 
αύτη τ?} ΥΙεΧοποννησω καϊ εξω εποιησαντο, καϊ 
ημών αυτών ol πρεσβύτεροι ούκ άπειροι ποΧέμων 
εισίν όμως δε τήσδε ούπω μείζονα παρασκευην 
έχοντες έξηΧθομεν, άλλα καϊ επϊ πόΧιν δυνατω- 
τάτην νυν έρχόμεθα, καϊ αύτοϊ πΧεΐστοι καϊ 

2 άριστοι στρατεύοντες. δίκαιον ούν ημάς μήτε 
τών πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι μήτε ημών αυτών 
της δόξης ενδεέστερους, ή yap Ελλα9 πάσα 
τηδε ττ) όρμη επηρται καϊ προσέχει την ηνώμην, 
εύνοιαν έχουσα δια το Αθηναίων εχθος πράξαι 

3 ημάς α έπινοουμεν. ούκουν χρη, ει τω καϊ 
δοκού μεν πΧήθει έπιέναι καϊ άσφάΧεια ποΧΧη 
είναι μη αν εΧθεϊν τους εναντίους ήμΐν δια μάχης, 
τούτων ένεκα άμεΧεστερόν τι π αρεσκευασ μένους 
χωρεΐν, άλλα καϊ πόΧεως εκάστης ηγεμόνα καϊ 
στρατιώτην το καθ* αυτόν αίεϊ προσδέχεσθαι ες 

1 Sintenis' correction for icapuvcu roiatf &«{cv of the MSS. 

BOOK Π. χ. ι-χι. 3 

states in the Peloponnesus and their confederacy 
outside the Peloponnesus to make ready such troops 
and supplies as it was appropriate they should have 
for a foreign expedition, their intention being to 
invade Attica. When everything was ready in the 
several states, two-thirds of the contingent of each 
state assembled at the appointed time at the 
Isthmus. And when the whole army was assembled, 
Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who 
was to be the leader of this expedition, called 
together the generals of all the states as well as the 
chief officials and the most notable men, and 
exhorted them as follows : 

XL a Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made 
many campaigns both in the Peloponnesus and 
beyond it, and the elder men also amongst us do 
not lack experience in warfare, yet never before 
have we taken the field with a greater armament 
than this ; but though we were never more numerous 
and puissant, it is also a very powerful state we 
now go against. It is but right, therefore, that we 
neither should show ourselves worse men than our 
fathers nor wanting to our own fame. For all 
Hellas is stirred by this enterprise of ours, and 
fixes her gaze upon it, and being friendly to us on 
account of their hatred of the Athenians hopes 
that we shall succeed in carrying out our designs. 
Therefore, even if some of us may think that we 
are going against them with superior numbers and 
that in all likelihood the enemy will not risk a 
pitched battle with us, we must not on that account 
be a whit less carefully prepared when we advance, 
but rather must officer and soldier of every state for 
his own part be always expecting to encounter 



4 κίνΒυνόν τίνα ηζειν. αΒηΧα yap τα των πολέμων, 
καϊ εξ ολίγου τα 7Γθλλά καϊ Βι opyrj? αϊ επι- 
χειρήσεις yiyvovTai• ποΧΧάκις τβ το εΧασσον 
πΧηθος ΒεΒιος άμβινον ημύνατο τους πΧεονας Βια 

5 τό καταφρονούνται άπαρασκεύους yeveaOau. χρη 
Be aiel iv ττ} ποΧεμία ττ) μεν yvωμr| θαρσαΧέους 
στρατβύβιν, τω δ' έργω ΒεΒιότας παρ€σκευάσθαι. 
οΰτω yap προς τ€ το επιέναι τοις ενάντιο ις 
βύψυχότατοι αν elev, προς τβ το επιχειρείσθαι 

6 "'Άμεΐς Βε ούΒ' επϊ αδύνατον άμύν€σθαι οΰτω 1 
πόΧιν ερχόμεθα, άΧΧα τοις πασιν άριστα π ape- 
σκβυασμένην, ωστβ χρη καϊ πάνυ εΧπίζειν Sea 
μάχης Ikvai αυτούς, el μη κα\ νυν ωρμηνται iv 
ω ονπω πάρεσμεν, άΧΧ όταν iv ttj yfj όρώσιν 

7 ημάς Βτ)οΰντάς Τ€ καϊ τάκ€ΐνων φθείροντας, πάσι 
yap iv τοίς όμμα σι καϊ iv τω παραυτίκα οραν 
πάσχοντας τι άηθες opyr) προσπίπτβι, καϊ οι 
Xoyισμω ελάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμω πΧ€ΐστα ες 

8 epyov καθίστανται. 'Αθηναίους Be καϊ πΧέΌν τι 
των άΧΧων €ΐκος τούτο Βράσαι, οι άρχειν τ€ των 
αΧΧων άξιοΰσι καϊ επιόντβς την των πεΧας Βγουν 

9 μάΧΧον η την αυτών οραν. ως ουν επϊ τοσαύτην 
πόΧιν στρατεύοντες καϊ μεyLστηv Βόξαν οισόμενοι 
τοις τε πpoyόvoις και υμίν αύτοΐς επ* αμφότερα 
εκ των άποβαινόντων, €π€σθε οπτ] αν τις rjyrJTai, 
κόσμον καϊ φυΧακην περί παντός ποιούμενοι καϊ 
τα πapayyeXX6μeva οξέως Ββχόμβνοι• κάΧΧιστον 

1 ούτω deleted by Hude, after Madvig. 

BOOK II. χι. 3-9 

some danger. For the events of war cannot be 
foreseen, and attacks are generally sudden and 
furious ; and oftentimes a smaller force, made 
cautious by fear, overmatches a larger number that 
is caught unprepared because it despises the foe. 
One should, however, when campaigning in an 
enemy's country always be bold in spirit, but in 
action cautious and therefore prepared. For thus 
men will be most valorous in attacking their oppo- 
nents and most secure against assault. 

" And we are going against a city which is not 
so powerless to defend itself as some may think, 
but is perfectly prepared in all respects ; we have 
therefore every reason to expect them to risk a 
battle, if they have not already set out before we 
are yet there, at any rate when they see us in 
their territory laying it waste and destroying their 
property. For with all men, when they suffer an 
unwonted calamity, it is the sight set then and 
there before their eyes which makes them angry, 
and when they are angry they do not pause to think 
but rush into action. And the Athenians are even 
more likely than most men to act in this way, since 
they are more disposed to claim the right to rule 
over others and to attack and ravage their neigh- 
bours' land than to see their own ravaged. Real- 
ising, then, how powerful is the city against which 
vou are taking the field, and how great is the fame, 
for better or for worse, which you are about to win 
for your ancestors and for yourselves from the out- 
come, follow wherever your officers lead you, 
regarding good order and vigilance as all-important, 
and sharply giving heed to the word of command ; 
for this is the fairest as well as the safest thing — for 



yap τόδε καϊ άσφαΧέστατον ποΧΧους οντάς evl 
κόσμω χρωμένους φαίνεσθαι'' 

XII. Ύοσαΰτα ειπών καϊ διαΧύσας τον ξυΧΧο- 
yov 6 'Αρχίδαμος ΜεΧήσιππον πρώτον άπο στ έΧΧει 
ες τας 'Αθήνας τον Διακριτού, άνδρα Σπαρτια- 
τών, el τι άρα μάΧΧον ενδοΐεν ol 'Αθηναίοι ορών- 

2 τες σφας ηόη ev οοω οντάς, οι 06 ου προσεοε- 
ξαντο αυτόν ες την ποΧιν ούδ' επί το κοινόν ην 
yap ΤΙερικΧέους ηνώμη πρότερον νενικηκυϊα κή- 
ρυκα καϊ πρεσβείαν μη δέχεσθαι Αακεδαιμονίων 
εξεστρατευ μένων, άποπέμπονσιν ουν αύτον πριν 
άκουσαι καϊ εκέΧευον έκτος ορών είναι αυθημερόν, 
το τε Χοιπον άναγωρήσαντας επί τα σφ έτερα 
αυτών, ην τι βουΧωνται, πρεσβεύεσθαι. ξνμ- 
πεμπουσι τε τω ΜεΧησιππω άηωηούς, όπως 

3 μηδενι ξυ^ένηται. 6 δ' επειδή επι τοις όρίοις 
εγένετο καϊ εμεΧΧε διαΧύσεσθαι, τοσόνδε ειπών 
επορεύετο οτι "'Ήδε ή ήμερα τοις "ΈλΧησι μεηά- 

4 Χων κακών άρξει." ώς δε άφίκετο ες το στρατό- 
πεδον καϊ ε<γνω 6 'Αρχίδαμος οτι οι 'Αθηναίοι 
ουδέν πω ενδώσουσιν, ούτω δή αράς τω στρατω 

δ προυχώρει ες την ηήν αυτών. Βοιωτοί δε μέρος 
μεν το σφέτερον καϊ τους ιππέας παρείχοντο 
ΐΙεΧοποννησίοις ξυστρατεύειν, τοις δε Χειπομένοις 
ες ΐΙΧάταιαν εΧθόντες τήν ηήν εδήουν. 

XIII. Έτι δε τών ΏεΧοποννησίων ξυΧΧεγομέ- 


BOOK II. χι. 9-χιπ. ι 

a great host to show itself subject to a single dis- 

XII. With these words Archidamus dismissed the 
assembly. He then first sent Melesippus son of 
Diocritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in the hope that 
the Athenians, when they saw that the Lace- 
daemonians were already on the march, might be 
somewhat more inclined to yield. But they did not 
allow him to enter the city, much less to appear 
before the assembly ; for a motion of Pericles had 
already been carried not to admit herald or embassy 
after the Lacedaemonians had once taken the field. 
They accordingly dismissed him without hearing 
him, and ordered him to be beyond their borders 
that same day ; and in future, they added, the Lace- 
daemonians must first withdraw to their own terri- 
tory before sending an embassy, if they had any 
communication to make. They also sent an escort 
along with Melesippus, in order to prevent his 
having communication with anyone. And when he 
arrived at the frontier and was about to leave his 
escort, he uttered these words before he went his 
way, " This day will be the beginning of great evils 
for the Hellenes." When he came to the army, 
and Archidamus had learned that the Athenians 
would not as yet make any concession, then at 
length they broke camp and advanced into Athenian 
territory. And the Boeotians not only supplied 
their contingent 1 and the cavalry to serve with the 
Peloponnesians, but also went to Plataea with their 
remaining troops and proceeded to ravage the 

XIII. While the Peloponnesian forces were still 
1 ».e. two-thirds of their full appointment; cf, ch. x. 2. 



νων re ες τον ίσθμον καϊ εν όδω όντων, πρϊν 
έσβαΧεΐν ες την Άττικήν, ΤΙβρικΧής 6 Ξανθίπ- 
που, στρατηγός ων 'Αθηναίων δέκατος αυτός, ώς 
εγνω την βσβοΧην εσομένην, ύποτοπησας, δτι 
' Αρχίδαμος αύτω ξένος ων ετύγχανα, μη ποΧΧά- 
κις η αύτος Ιδία βουΧόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τους 
άκρους αυτού παραΧίπη καϊ μη δηώση, η καϊ 
Αακεδαιμονίων κεΧευσάντων επί διαβοΧη τη 
εαυτού γένηται τούτο, ωσπερ κα\ τα αγη εΧαύνειν 
προεΐπον ένεκα εκείνον, προηγόρευε τοις Άθηναί- 
οις εν τη εκκΧησία οτι ' Αρχίδαμος μέν οι ξένος 
εϊη, ου μεντοι επί κακω γε της πόΧεως γένοιτο, 
τους δε αγρούς τους εαυτού καϊ οικίας ην άρα μη 
δηώσωσιν οι ποΧέμιοι ωσπερ καϊ τα των άΧΧων, 
άφίησιν αυτά δημόσια είναι, καϊ μηδεμίαν ol 

2 υποψίαν κατά ταύτα γίγνεσθαι, παρηνει δε καϊ 
περί των παρόντων άπερ καϊ πρότερον, παρα- 
σκβυάζεσθαί τε ες τον πόΧεμον καϊ τα εκ των 
αγρών εσκομίζεσθαι, ες τε μάχην μη επεξιέναι, 
άλλα την πόΧιν βσεΧθόντας φυΧάσσειν, καϊ το 
ναυτικόν, ηπερ ίσχύουσιν, εξαρτύεσθαι, τά τε των 
ξυμμάχων δια χειρός εχειν, Χέγων την Ισχύν 
αύτοΐς άπο τούτων είναι των χρημάτων της 
προσόδου, 1 τά δέ ποΧΧα τού ποΧεμου γνώμη καϊ 

3 χρημάτων περιουσία κρατεΐσθαι. θαρσεΐν τβ 

1 των χρημάτων τη$ προσόδου deleted by Hude, after van 


BOOK II. xiii. ι-3 

collecting at the Isthmus and while they were on the 
march but had not yet invaded Attica, Pericles son 
of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian 
generals, when he realised that the invasion would be 
made, conceived a suspicion that perhaps Archi- 
damus, who happened to be a guest-friend of his, 
might pass by his fields and not lay them waste, doing 
this either on his own initiative, in the desire to do 
him a personal favour, or at the bidding of the Lace- 
daemonians with a view to creating a prejudice 
against him, just as it was on his account that they 
had called upon the Athenians to drive out the 
pollution. 1 So he announced to the Athenians in 
their assembly that while Archidamus was indeed a 
guest-friend of his, this relationship had certainly 
not been entered upon for the detriment of the 
state ; and that in case the enemy might not lay 
waste his fields and houses like the rest, he now gave 
them up to be public property, and asked that no 
suspicion should arise against himself on that account. 
And he gave them the same advice as before 2 about 
the present situation : that they should prepare for 
the war, should bring in their property from the 
fields, and should not go out to meet the enemy in 
battle, but should come into the city and there act 
on the defensive ; that they should equip their fleet, 
in which their strength lay, and keep a firm hand 
upon their allies, explaining that the Athenian power 
depended on revenue of money received from the 
allies, and that, as a general rule, victories in war 
were won by abundance of money as well as by wise 
policy. And he bade them be of good courage, as on 

1 cf. l cxxviL 1• 
8 cf. L cxliii. 



εκέλευε προσιόντων μεν εξακοσίων ταλάντων ώς 
επι το ττοΧύ φόρου κατ ενιαυτον άπο τών ξυμμά- 
χων τγι πόλει άνευ της άλλης προσόδου, υπαρ- 
χόντων δε iv ttj άκροπολει ετι τότε αργυρίου 
επίσημου εξακισχΐλίων ταλάντων (τα yap πλεΐ- 
στα τριακοσίων άποδεοντα μύρια εγενετο, άφ' 
ων ες τβ τα προπύλαια της ακροπόλεως καϊ ταλ- 
λα οικοδομήματα καϊ ες ΤΙοτείδαιαν άπανηλώθη), 

4 χωρίς δε χρυσίου άσημου καϊ αργυρίου εν τε 
άναθημασιν Ιδίοις καϊ δημοσίοις και οσα ιερά 
σκεύη περί τε τάς πομπάς και τους αγώνας καϊ 
σκύλα Μηδικά καϊ ει τι τοιουτότροπον, ουκ 

δ ελάσσονος 1 η πεντακοσίων ταλάντων, ετι δε 
καϊ τά εκ των άλλων ιερών προσετίθει χρήματα 
ουκ ολίγα, οΐς χρήσεσθαι αυτούς, καϊ ην πάνυ 
εξείργωνται πάντων, και αυτής της θεού τοις 
περικειμενοις χρυσίοις* άπβφαινε δ' έχον το 
άγαλμα τεσσαράκοντα τάλαντα σταθμον χρυ- 
σίου άπεφθου και περιαιρετον είναι άπαν. χρη- 
σαμένους τε επί σωτηρία εφη χρήναι μη ελάσσω 

1 %u of the MSS., after iKaaaovos, deleted by Abresch. 

1 About £120,000, or $583,200. The original amount at 
the institution of the Confederacy of Delos was 460 talents 
(i. xcvi. 2). The figure here given is an average amount, 
because the assessment was revised every four years at the 

These figures, and all other equivalents of Greek financial 
statements, are purely conventional, inasmuch as the purchas- 
ing power of money was then very much greater than now. 

2 The ordinary revenue, apart from the tribute, consisted 
of customs duties, tax on sales, poll tax on resident aliens, 


BOOK II. χπι. 3-5 

an average six hundred talents l of tribute were 
coming in yearly from the allies to the city, not 
counting the other sources 2 of revenue, and there 
were at this time still on hand in the Acropolis six 
thousand talents 3 of coined silver (the maximum 
amount had been nine thousand seven hundred 
talents, from which expenditures had been made for 
the construction of the Propylaea 4 of the Acropolis 
and other buildings, 5 as well as for the operations at 
Potidaea). Besides, there was uncoined gold and 
silver in public and private dedications, and all the 
sacred vessels used in the processions and games, and 
the Persian spoils and other treasures of like nature, 
worth not less than five hundred talents. 6 And he 
estimated, besides, the large amount of treasure to 
be found in the other temples. All this would 
be available for their use, and, if they should be 
absolutely cut off from all other resources, they 
might use even the gold plates with which the 
statue of the goddess herself was overlaid. 7 The 
statue, as he pointed out to them, contained forty 
talents' weight of pure gold, and it was all re- 
movable. 8 This treasure they might use for self- 
preservation, but they must replace as much as they 

rents of state property, especially the silver mines, court 
fees and fines. 
8 About £1,940,000, or $9,4'28,400. 

4 Completed about 432 B.C. 

5 Such as the Parthenon, the Odeum, and the Telesterion 
at Eleusis (see Plut. Per. xiii. ). 

6 About £100,000, or $486,000. 

7 The chryselephantine statue of Athena by Phidias in the 

8 According to Plut. Per. xxxi., Phidias, by the advice of 
Pericles, laid on the gold in such a way that it could all be 
removed and weighed. 



6 άντικαταστήσαι πάΧιν. χρημασι μεν οΰν ούτω 
εθάρσυνεν αυτούς• οπΧίτας δε τρισχιΧίους και 
μύριους είναι άνευ των εν τοις φρουρίοις κα\ των 

7 τταρ* επαΧξιν εξακισχίΧίων καϊ μυρίων, τοσού- 
τοι yap εφύΧασσον το πρώτον οπότε οι ποΧέμιοι 
εσβάΧοιεν, από τβ των πρεσβυτάτων καϊ των 
νεωτάτων καϊ μετοίκων όσοι όπΧΐται ήσαν. του 
τ€ yap ΦαΧηρικοΰ τείχους στάδιοι ήσαν πέντε 
καϊ τριάκοντα προς τον κύκΧον του άστεως καϊ 
αυτού του κύκΧου το φυΧασσόμενον τρεις και 
τεσσαράκοντα {εστί δε αύτοΰ ο και άφυΧακτον 
ην, το μεταξύ του τε μακρού καϊ του ΦαΧηρικοΰ), 
τα 8ε μακρά τείχη προς τον Πειραιά τεσσαρά- 
κοντα σταδίων, ων το έξωθεν ετηρεΐτο, και του 
ΤΙειραιώς ξύν Μουνιχία εξηκοντα μεν σταδίων 6 
άπας περίβοΧος, το δ* εν φυΧακτ} ον ήμισυ τού- 

8 του. ιππέας δε άπέφαινε διακόσιους καϊ χιΧίους 
ξύν ίπποτοξόταις, εξακόσιους δέ καϊ χιΧίους 
τοξότας, καϊ τριήρεις τάς πΧωίμους τριακοσίας. 

9 ταύτα yap ύπήρχεν Αθηναίοι? και ουκ εΧάσσω 
έκαστα τούτων, οτε ή εσβοΧη το πρώτον εμεΧΧε 
ΤΙεΧοποννησίων εσεσθαι καϊ ες τον πόΧεμον καθί- 
σταντο. ελεyε δε καϊ αΧΧα οϊάπερ είώθει ΤΊερι- 
κΧής ες άπόδειξιν του περιεσεσθαι τφ πόΧέμω. 

XIV. Οι δε ' Αθηναίοι άκούσαντες άνεπείθοντό 
τε καϊ εσεκομίζοντο εκ των άypώv παΐδας και 
yυvaΐκaς καϊ την άΧΧην κατασκευήν y κατ οίκον 


BOOK II. χιπ. 5-χιν. ι 

took. As to their resources in money, then, he thus 
sought to encourage them ; and as to heavy-armed 
infantry, he told them that there were thirteen 
thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand men 
who garrisoned the forts and manned the city walls. 
For this was the number engaged in garrison duty at 
first, when the enemy were invading Attica, and they 
were composed of the oldest and the youngest 1 
citizens and of such metics as were heavily armed. 
For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five 
stadia to the circuit- wall of the city, and the portion 
of the circuit- wall itself which was guarded was forty- 
three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that be- 
tween the Long Wall and the Phalerian) ; and the 
Long Walls to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent, 
of which only the outside one was guarded ; and the 
whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia 
was sixty stadia, half of it being under guard. The 
cavalry, Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve 
hundred, including mounted archers, the bow-men 
sixteen hundred, and the triremes that were sea- 
worthy three hundred. For these were the forces, 
and not less than these in each branch, which the 
Athenians had on hand when the first invasion of the 
Peloponnesians was impending and they found them- 
selves involved in the war. And Pericles used still 
other arguments, as was his wont, to prove that they 
would be victorious in the war. 

XIV. After the Athenians had heard his words 
they were won to his view, and they began to bring 
in from the fields their children and wives, and also 

1 The age limits were eighteen to sixty, those from 
eighteen to twenty (ττςρίπολοι) being called on only for gar- 
rison duty within the bounds of Attica. The age of full 
citizenship was twenty. 



έχρώντο, καϊ αυτών τών οικιών καθαιρουντες την 
ξύλωσιν πρόβατα δε καϊ υποζύγια ες την Ει/- 
βοιαν διεπέμψαντο καϊ τάς νήσους τάς επικει- 
2 μένας. χαλεπώς δε αύτοΐς δια, το αίεϊ εΐωθέναι 
τους πολλούς iv τοις άγροΐς διαιτάσθαι ή άνά- 
στασις εγίγνετο. XV. ξυνεβεβήκει he από του 
πάνυ αρχαίου έτερων μάλλον Άθηναίοις τούτο» 
επί yap Κέκροπος καϊ τών πρώτων βασιλέων ή 
1 Αττική ες ®ησέα alel κατά πόλεις ωκειτο πρυ- 
τανεία τε έχουσας καϊ άρχοντας, καϊ οπότε μη 
τι δείσειαν, ου ζυνησαν βουλευσόμενοι ως τον 
βασιλέα, αλλ' αυτοί έκαστοι έπολίτευον καϊ 
εβουΧεύοντο* και τίνες καϊ επολέμησάν ποτέ αυ- 
τών, ώσπερ καϊ ελευσίνιοι μετ Κύμόλπου προς 

2 Έρεχθέα. επειδή δε ®ησεύς έβασίΧευσε, γενό- 
μενος μετά του ξυνετοΰ καϊ δυνατός τά τε άλλα 
διεκόσμησε την χώραν και καταλύσας τών αΧ- 
Χων πόλεων τά τε βουλευτήρια καϊ τάς αρχάς ες 
την νυν πάλιν οΰσαν, εν βουΧευτηριον άποδείξας 
καϊ πρυτανεΐον, ξυνωκισε πάντας, καϊ νεμομένους 
τά αυτών εκάστους άπερ καϊ προ του ηνάγκασε 
μια πόλει ταύτη χρησθαι, ή απάντων ήδη ξυν- 
τελούντων ες αυτήν μεγάλη γενομένη παρεδόθη 
υπό ®ησέως τοις έπειτα* καϊ ξυνοίκια εξ εκείνου 
Αθηναίοι ετι και νυν τη θεώ εορτην δημοτελη 

3 Το δε προ του η ακρόπολις ή νυν ούσα πόλις 

1 Others render : " since all were now counted as belonging 
to it." 


BOOK It xiv. i-xv. 3 

their household furniture, pulling down even the 
woodwork of the houses themselves ; but sheep 
and draught-animals they sent over to Euboea and 
the adjacent islands. And the removal was a hard 
thing for them to accept, because most of them 
had always been used to live in the country. 
XV. And this kind of life had been the character- 
istic of the Athenians, more than of any other Hel- 
lenes, from the very earliest times. For in the time 
of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, 
Attica had been divided into separate towns, each 
with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as 
they had nothing to fear they did not come together 
to consult with the king, but separately administered 
their own affairs and took counsel for themselves. 
Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, 
for example, the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did upon 
Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and 
proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler, 
he not only re-organized the country in other respects, 
but abolished the councils and magistracies of the 
minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into 
union with what is now the city, establishing a single 
council and town hall, and compelled them, while con- 
tinuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use 
Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, 
since all were now paying their taxes to it^and was 
such when Theseus handed it down to his successors. 
And from his time even to this day the Athenians 
have celebrated at the public expense a festival 
called the Synoecia, 2 in honour of the goddess. 
Before this 3 what is now the Acropolis was the 

1 " Feast of the Union," celebrated on the sixteenth of the 
month Hecatombaeon. 

■ i.e. before the Synoecismus, or union of Attica under 



ην, καϊ το υπ αυτήν προς νότον μάλιστα τετραμ- 
4 μένον. τεκμηριον δε• τΛ yap leph εν αύττ} τί} 
άκροπολει και άλλων θεών εστί, καϊ τα εζω 
προς τούτο το μέρος της πόλεως μάλλον ΐδρυται, 
το τε του Διός του *Ό\νμπίου καϊ το Ώύθιον καϊ 
το της Γης καϊ το του ι iv Αίμναις Διονύσου, φ 
τα αρχαιότερα Διονύσια τί} δωδέκατη 2 ποιείται 
ev μηνΐ * Ανθεστηρίων ι, ωσπερ real οι απ Αθη- 
ναίων "Ιωνες ετι και νυν νομίζουσιν. ΐδρυται δϊ 
δ και αΧλα ιερά ταύτη αρχαία, και τί) κρηνρ τη 
νυν μεν των τυράννων ούτως σκευασάντων Έι/- 
νεακρούνω καΧουμένη, το δε πάλαι φανερών των 
πηηών ούσων KaWippSy ώνομασμένη εκείνοι τε 
εγγύς ούση τα πλείστου άξια εχρώντο, καϊ νυν 
ετι άπο του αρχαίου προ τε ηαμικών καϊ ες αΧλα 
6 των ιερών νομίζεται τω ύδατι χρήσθαι. καλείται 
δε δ*ά την πάλαιαν ταύτη κατοίκησιν και η άκρο- 
πολις μέχρι τούδε ετι υπ* * Αθηναίων πολις. 

XVI. Ύη δ ούν επί πο\ύ κατά την χωράν 
αύτονομω οικήσει 3 οι Αθηναίοι, καϊ επειδή 
ξυνωκίσθησαν, δίά το εθος iv τοις ά^ροϊς όμως 
οι πλείους τών τε αρχαίων και των ύστερον 

1 Added by Cobet. 

1 ττ) δωδ^άττ? deleted by Hude, after Torstrick. 
1 μίΤ€?χον, in the MSS. before ol 'Αθηναίοι, deleted by 

1 It is taken for granted that these temples were ancient 


BOOK II. xv. 3-χνι. τ 

city, together with the region at the foot of the 
Acropolis toward the south. And the proof of 
this is as follows : On the Acropolis itself are the 
sanctuaries 1 of the other gods as well as of Athena, 2 
and the sanctuaries which are outside the Acro- 
polis are situated more in that quarter of the city, 
namely those of Olympian Zeus, of Pythian Apollo, 
of Earth, and of Dionysus in Limnae, in whose 
honour are celebrated the more ancient Dionysia 3 
the twelfth of the month Anthesterion, just as the 
Ionian descendants of the Athenians also are wont 
even now to celebrate it. In that quarter are also 
situated still other ancient sanctuaries. And the 
fountain now called Enneacrunus, 4 from the fashion 
given it by the tyrants, but which anciently, when 
the springs were uncovered, was named Callirrhoe, was 
used by people of those days, because it was close by, 
for the most important ceremonials ; and even now, 
in accordance with the ancient practice, it is still 
customary to use its waters in the rites preliminary 
to marriages and other sacred ceremonies. And, 
finally, the Acropolis, because the Athenians had 
there in early times a place of habitation, is still to 
this day called by them Polis or city. 

XVI. Because, then, of their long-continued life of 
independence in the country districts, most of the 
Athenians of early times and of their descendants 
down to the time of this war, from force of habit, 
even after their political union with the city, continued 

3 A lacuna in the text is generally assumed ; Classen would 
supply κα\ τά τη$ Άθηϊ/α* after θςών 4στι 9 and I translate this. 

* The Anthesteria, contrasted with the Lenaea, which was 
also an ancient festival, but of less antiquity. The city 
Dionysia was of comparatively recent origin. 

4 Enneacrunus, Nine Conduits ; Callirrhoe, Fair Stream. 



μέχρι τοΰΰε του πολέμου πανοικησία 1 γενόμενοι 
τε καϊ οϊκησαντες, ου ρα$ίως τας αναστάσεις 
εποιοΰντο, άλλως re καϊ άρτι άνειληφότες τά? 

2 κατασκευάς μετά τα ΙΑηΒικά• εβαρύνοντο δέ καΧ 
χαλεπώς εφερον οικίας τ€ καταλείποντες καϊ 
ιερά α Βία παντός ην αύτοΐς i/e της κατά, το 
άρχαΐον πολιτείας πάτρια, Βίαιτάν τ€ μέλλοντες 
μεταβάλλειν καϊ ούοεν άλλο ή πόλιν την αυτού 
άπολείπων έκαστος. 

XVII. Επειδή 8ε άφίκοντο ες το άστυ, ολίγοις 
μεν τισιν ύπήρχον οικήσεις καϊ πάρα φίλων τινάς 
ή οικείων καταφυγή, οι δέ πολλοί τα τε έρημα 
της πόλεως οίκησαν καϊ τα ιερά καϊ τά ήρωα 
πάντα πλην της ακροπόλεως καϊ του 'Ελευσίνιου 
καϊ ει τι άλλο βεβαίως κληστον ην* το τε 
ΤΙελαργικον 2 καλούμενον το υπο την άκροπόλιν, 
ο καϊ επάρατόν τε ην μη οίκεΐν και τι καϊ ΐΐυθι- 
κοΰ μαντείου άκροτελεύτιον τοιονΒε Βιεκώλυε, 
Χεγον ώς " Το ΤΙελαργικον άργον άμεινον" δμως 

2 υπο της παραχρήμα ανάγκης εξωκηθη. και μοι 
Ζοκεϊ το μαντεΐον τουναντίον ξνμβήναι η προσε- 
Βεχοντο, ου γαρ 8ιά την παράνομον ενοίκησιν αί 
ξυμφοραϊ γενέσθαι τη πολει, άλλα δια τον πόλε- 

1 πανοικησία placed by Hude, following Lipsius, after 

2 With C and a popular decree found in 1880 (C.I.A., iv. 
27 b) ; tho other MSS. n*\aayiic6v. 


BOOK II. χνι. ι-χνπ. 2 

to reside, with their households, in the country where 
they had been born ; and so they did not find it easy 
to move away, especially since they had only recently 
finished restoring their establishments after the 
Persian war. They were dejected and aggrieved at 
having to leave their homes and the temples which 
had always been theirs, — relics, inherited from their 
fathers, of their original form of government — and at 
the prospect of changing their mode of life, and 
facing what was nothing less for each of them than 
forsaking his own town. 

XVII. And when they came to the capital, only a 
few of them were provided with dwellings or places 
of refuge with friends or relatives, and most of them 
took up their abode in the vacant places of the city 
and the sanctuaries and the shrines of heroes, all 
except the Acropolis and the Eleusinium and any 
other precinct that could be securely closed. And 
the Pelargicum, 1 as it was called, at the foot of the 
Acropolis, although it was under a curse that forbade 
its use for residence, and this was also prohibited by 
a verse-end of a Pythian oracle to the following 
effect : 

"The Pelargicum unoccupied is better/' 

nevertheless under stress of the emergency was com- 
pletely filled with buildings. And the oracle, as it 
seems to me, came true, but in a sense quite the 
opposite of what was expected ; for it was not on 
account of the unlawful occupation of the place that 
the city was visited by the calamities, but it was on 

1 A fortification built by the "Pelasgians " on the west 
side of the Acropolis, the only side accessible to an enemy. 
It was to the space below and above this fortification that 
the curse attached. 



μον f) ανάγκη τής οίκήσεως, ον ουκ όνομάζον το 
μαντεΐον προήδει μη επ* άγαθω ποτ ε αυτό κατοι- 

3 κισθησόμενον. κατεσκευάσαντο δέ καϊ εν τοις 
πύργοις τών τειχών ποΧΧοϊ καϊ ώς έκαστος που 
εδύνατο• ου yap εχώρησε ξυνεΧθ όντας αυτούς ή 
πόΧις, αλλ' ύστερον δη τα τε μακρά τείχη 
ωκησαν κατανειμάμενοι καϊ του ΤΙειραιώς τα 

4 ποΧΧά. άμα δε καϊ των προς τον ποΧεμον 
ήπτοντο, ξυμμάχους τε άγείροντες καϊ ττ) ΤΙεΧο- 

5 ποννήσω εκατόν νέων επίπλουν εξαρτύοντες- καϊ 
οι μεν εν τούτω παρασκευής ήσαν. 

XVIII. Ό δε στρατός των ΤΙεΧοποννησίων 
προϊων άφίκετο της ' Αττικής ες Οίνόην πρώτον, 
ηπερ εμεΧΧον εσβαΧεΐν. καϊ ώς εκαθεζοντο, 
προσβοΧας παρεσκευάζοντο τω τείχει ποιησό- 

2 μενοι μηχαναΐς τε καϊ άΧΧω τρόπω 9 ή yap Οίνοη 
ούσα εν μεθορίοις της * Αττικής καϊ Βοιωτίας 
ετετείχιστο καϊ αύτώ φρουρίω οι Αθηναίοι 
εχρώντο οπότε πόΧεμος καταΧάβοι. τάς τε ουν 
προσβοΧας ηυτρεπίζοντο καϊ άΧΧως ενδιέτριψαν 

3 χρόνον περί αυτήν, αίτίαν δε ουκ εΧαχίστην 
1 Αρχίδαμος εΧαβεν απ* αύτοΰ, δοκών και εν ttj 
ξυναγωγτ) του ποΧεμου μαΧακος είναι καϊ τοις 
* Αθηναίοις επιτήδειος, ου παραινών προθύμως 
ποΧεμεΐν επειδή τε ξυνεΧεγετο ο στρατός, ή τε 
εν τω Ισθμώ επίμονη γενομένη κα\ κατά την 

1 cf. ι. Ιχχχ.-ΐχχχτ. 

BOOK II. χνπ. a -χνπι. 3 

account of the war that there was the necessity of its 
occupation, and the oracle, although it did not men- 
tion the war, yet foresaw that the place would never 
be occupied for any good. Many also established 
themselves in the towers of the city walls, and where- 
ever each one could find a place ; for the city did 
not have room for them when they were all there 
together. But afterwards they distributed into lots 
and occupied the space between the Long Walls and 
the greater part of the Peiraeus. And while all 
this was going on, the Athenians applied themselves 
to the war, bringing together allies and fitting out 
an expedition of one hundred ships against the 
Peloponnesus. The Athenians then, were in this 
stage of their preparations. 

XVIII. Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians 
was advancing and the first point it reached in Attica 
was Oenoe, where they intended to begin the 
invasion. And while they were establishing their 
camp there, they prepared to assault the wall with 
engines and otherwise ; for Oenoe, which was on the 
border between Attica and Boeotia, was a walled 
town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians 
whenever war broke out. So the Lacedaemonians 
went on with their preparations to assault the place, 
and in this and other ways wasted time. And it was for 
his conduct here that Archidamus was most severely 
censured, though it was thought that in the levying 
of the war, too, he had been slack and had played 
into the hands of the Athenians when he did not 
advise the Peloponnesians to make war with vigour. 1 
Again, when the army was being collected, he was 
criticized for the delay which occurred at the 
Isthmus, and afterwards for the leisurely way in 



αΧΧην iropeiav ή σχοΧαιοτης διέβαλβν αυτόν, 

4 μάλιστα δ\ ή ev τη Οίνότ) €πίσχ€σις. οι yhp 
Αθηναίοι βσβκομιζοντο ev τω χρόνω τούτω, καϊ 

έδόκουν οι ΤΙβΧοττοννήσιοί €π€Χθόντ€ς αν δ*ά τά- 
χους πάντα €τι βξω κατάλαββΐν, el μη δ^ά την 

5 ifceivov μ^Χλησιν. ev τοιαύτη μ^ν opyrj 6 στρατός 
τον ' Αρχίδαμον ev ττ) καθέδρα el^ev. 6 Be, προσ- 
δ€χομ€νος, ώς XeyeTai, τους 'Αθηναίους της ηής 
€τι άκ€ραίου ούσης ένδώσζιν τι καϊ κατοκνησ€ΐν 
TrepuBelv αύτην τμη0€ΐσαν, avei%ev. 

XIX. Έ7Γ6^δ^ μέντοι 7τροσβα\6ντ€ς ttj Olvorj 
και πασαν iheav π€ΐράσαντ€ς ουκ έδύναντο eXeiv, 
οϊ Τ€ ' Αθηναίοι ούδ£ν έπ€κηρυκ€υοντο, ούτω 8η 
6ρμησαντ€ς απ αυτής μ€τα τά ev ΤΙΧαταία 1 
γ€νόμ€να ημέρα ^δοηκοστή μάλιστα, θέρους καϊ 
του σίτου ακμάζοντος, €σ€βαΧον ές την Άττικήν 
rjyeiTO Be 'Αρχίδαμος 6 Ζ€υξιδάμου, AaKeBai- 

2 μονίων βασιλ€υς. καϊ καθ€ζομ€νοι €Τ€μνον πρώ- 
τον μίν *Ει\€νσΐνα καϊ το ©ριάσιον π€Βίον καϊ 
τροπην τίνα των 'Αθηναίων ιππέων π€ρι τους 
c PetT0U9 καΧουμένους έποιησαντο* £π€ΐτα πρου- 
γωρουν ev 8ej;ia £χοντ€ς το Α/γάλεωζ/ ορός δ*ά 
Κρωπιας £ως άφίκοντο e? Άγαρνάς, χωρίον μέ- 
ηιστον της ' Αττικής των δήμων καλουμένων, καϊ 
κα0€ξόμ€νοι ές αύτον στρατοπ€δόν τ€ έποιησαντο 
χρόνον τ€ ποΧύν €μμ€ΐναντ€ς £τ€μνον. 

XX. Γνώμτ) Be τοιαδ€ XeyeTai τον ' Αργίδαμον 

1 των 4σ*λθόντων Θηβαίων, in the MSS. after Πλαταίφ, 
deleted by Classen. 


BOOK II. xviii. 3-xx. ι 

which the march was made, but most of all for the 
halt at Oenoe. For in the interval the Athenians 
continued to bring their property into the city and 
the Peloponnesians believed that but for his pro- 
crastination they could have advanced quickly and 
found everything still outside. Such was the re- 
sentment felt by the army toward Archidamus while 
they were sitting still. But the reason, it is said, 
why he kept holding back was that he expected the 
Athenians would make some concession while their 
territory was still unravaged and would be loath to 
see it laid waste. 

XIX. When, however, after assaulting Oenoe 
and trying in every way to take it they were not able 
to do so, the Athenians meanwhile making no over- 
tures, then at length they set off from there, about 
eighty days after the events at Plataea, when it was 
midsummer 1 and the corn was ripe, and invaded 
Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of 
Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. Making 
a halt they proceeded to ravage, first of all, the 
territory of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and 
they routed the Athenian cavalry near the streams 
called Rheiti ; then they advanced, keeping Mount 
Aegaleos on their right through Cropia, 2 until they 
came to Acharnae, the largest of the demes of Attica, 
as they are called. Halting in the town they made 
a camp, where they remained for a long time ravaging 
the country. 

XX. And it is said that the motive of Archidamus 

1 The reference is to the Attic summer, which included 
spring. The date was about the end of May, the average 
time for cutting grain in Attica. 

1 Δ deme between Aegaleos and Parnes. 

τ «97 
vol. I. L 


περί τε τας Άχαρνάς ώς ες μάχην ταξάμενον 
μεΐναι καϊ ες το πεδίον εκείνη rfj εσβοΧη ου κατά- 

2 βήναι• τους yap 'Αθηναίους ήΧπιζεν, ακμάζοντας 
τε νεότητι ποΧΧή κα\ παρεσ κευασ μένους ες πόΧε- 
μον ώς οΰπω προτερον, Ισως αν επεζεΧθεϊν καϊ 

3 την yrjv ουκ αν περιιδεΐν τμηθήναι. επειδή οΰν 
αύτω ες 'Ελευσίνα καϊ το ©ριάσιον πεδίον ουκ 
απήντησαν, πεΐραν εποιεΐτο περί τας Άχαρνάς 

4 καθήμενος ει επ*ξίασιν αμα μβν yap αύτω 6 
χώρος επιτήδειος εφαίνετο ενστρατοπεδεΰσαι, αμα 
δε καϊ οι Άχαρνής μέya μέρος οντες της πόΧεως 
(τρισχίΧιοι yap οπΧίται εyέvovτo) ου περιόψεσθαι 
έδόκουν τα σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα, άΧΧ' ορμήσειν 
καϊ τους πάντας ες μάχην. εϊ τε καϊ μή επεξ- 
εΧθοιεν εκείνη τη εσβοΧη οί Αθηναίοι, άδε- 
έστερον ήδη ες το ύστερον το τε πεδίον τεμεϊν 
καϊ ες αυτήν την ποΧιν χωρησεσθαι* τους yap 
Άχαρνέας εστερημένονς των σφετέρων ούχ ομοίως 
πρόθυμους εσεσθαι υπέρ της των αΧΧων κινδυ- 

5 νεύειν, στάσιν δ' ενέσεσθαι τή yvώμη ^ τοιαύτη 
μεν διάνοια 6 'Αρχίδαμος περί τας Άχαρνάς ήν. 

XXI. 'Αθηναίοι δε μέχρι μεν ου περί 'ΕΧευσΐνα 
καϊ το %ριάσιον πεδίον 6 στρατός ήν καί τίνα 
εΧπίδα είχον ες το έyyυτεpω αυτούς μή προϊέναι, 
μεμνημένοι καϊ ΥίΧεοστοάνακτα τον ΤΙαυσανίου 
Αακεδαιμονίων βασιλέα, οτε εσβαΧων της 'Αττι- 
κής ες 'ΕΧευσΐνα καϊ ®ριώζε στρατω ΪΙεΧοπον- 
νησίωνπρο τούδε του ποΧέμου τέσσαρσι καϊ δέκα 
ετεσιν άνεχώρησε ποΧιν ες το πΧέον ούκέτι 


BOOK II. xx. ι-χχι. ι 

in waiting about Acharnae with his troops ready for 
battle, instead of descending into the plain during 
this invasion, was as follows : He cherished the 
hope that the Athenians, who were at their very best 
as regards the multitude of their youth and prepared 
for war as never before, would perhaps come out 
against him and not look on and see their land 
ravaged. So when they did not come to meet him 
at Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain, he settled 
down in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, to make a 
test whether they would come out ; for not only did 
that seem to him a suitable place for his camp, but 
also the Acharnians were an important part of the 
state, their hoplites numbering three thousand, and 
he thought that they would not look on and see their 
fields ravaged, but would urge the whole people 
also to fight. And even if the Athenians should not 
come out against him during this invasion, he would 
thenceforward proceed with less apprehension to 
ravage the plain and even advance to the very walls 
of the city ; for the Acharnians, once stripped of 
their own possessions, would not be as eager to incur 
danger as before in behalf of the lands of the rest, 
and so a division would arise in the counsels of the 
Athenians. It was with this design that Archidamus 
stayed at Acharnae. 

XXI. Now so long as the Peloponnesian army 
remained in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the 
Thriasian plain, the Athenians retained hope that they 
would not advance nearer; for they remembered that 
Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedae- 
monians, when fourteen years before this war he had 
invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians and 
proceeded as far as Eleusis and Thria, had advanced 



προεΧθών (Βι h Βη καϊ η φυ<γη αύτφ iyivero εκ 
Σπάρτης Βόξαντι χρημασι πεισθηναι την άναχώ- 

2 ρησιν)' επειΒη Βε περί Άχαρνάς εΙΒον τον στρατον 
εξηκοντα σταΒίους της πόΧεως απέχοντα, ουκετι 
άνασχετόν εποιουντο, αλλ' αύτοΐς, ως el/cos, γτ}? 
τεμνόμενης iv τω εμφανεΐ, ο οΰπω εοράκεσαν οϊ 
ye νεώτεροι, ούδ' οι πρεσβύτεροι πΧην τα Μη- 
Βικά, Βεινον εφαίνετο καϊ εΒόκει τοις τε άλΧοις 
καϊ μάλιστα τη νεότητι επεξιέναι καί μη περί- 

3 οράν. κατά ξυστάσεις τε ηι^νόμενοι εν ποΧΧτ) 
εριΒι ήσαν, οι μεν κεΧεύοντες επεξιέναι, οι Βε τίνες 
ουκ εώντες. χρησμοΧό^ου Τ€ yBov χρησμούς 
παντοίους, ων άκροασθαι ως έκαστος ωρμητο} 
οϊ τε Άχαρνής οίόμενοι πάρα σφίσιν αύτοΐς ουκ 
ελαχίστην μοΐραν είναι 'Αθηναίων, ώς αυτών ή 
yrj ετεμνετο, ivrjyov την εξοΒον μάΧιστα. παντί 
τε τρόπω άνηρεθιστο η ποΧις καϊ τον ΙΙερικΧεα 
εν opyy είχον, καϊ ων παρηνεσε προτερον εμέ- 
μνηντο ούΒεν, αλλ' εκάκιζον οτι στρατηγός ών ουκ 
έπεζά^οι, αίτιον τε σφίσιν ενόμιζον πάντων ών 

XXII. ΏερικΧής Βε ορών μεν αυτούς προς 
το παρόν χαΧεπαίνοντας και ου τα άριστα φρο- 
νουντας, πιστεύων Be ορθώς ηιηνώσκειν περί του 
μη επεξιέναι, εκκΧησιαν τε ουκ εποιει αυτών ουΒε 
ξύΧΧο^ον ούΒένα, του μη opyfj τι μαΧΧον η yvώμη 
ξυνεΧθ όντας εξαμαρτείν, την τε πόΧιν εφύΧασσε 

1 With CEG ; & Ρ γητο ΑΒΜ. 

BOOK II. χχι. ι-χχιι. ι 

no farther but had gone back again. (And indeed this 
was the cause of his banishment from Sparta, since 
he was thought to have been bribed to retreat.) But 
when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of 
Acharnae, only sixty stadia from the city, they thought 
the situation no longer tolerable ; on the contrary, it 
naturally appeared to them a terrible thing when their 
land was being ravaged before their eyes, a sight 
which the younger men had never seen, or even the 
older men except in the Persian war ; and the general 
opinion, especially on the part of the younger men, 
was that they ought to go forth and put a stop to it. 
They gathered in knots and engaged in hot disputes, 
some urging that they should go out, others opposing 
this course. Oracle-mongers were chanting oracles 
of every import, according as each man was disposed 
to hear them. And the Acharnians, thinking that 
no insignificant portion of the Athenian people lived 
at Acharnae, insisted most of all upon going out, as 
it was their land that was being devastated. Thus 
in every way the city was in a state of irritation ; and 
they were indignant against Pericles, and remember- 
ing none of his earlier warnings they abused him 
because, though their general, he would not lead 
them out, and considered him responsible for all 
their sufferings. 

XXII. Pericles, however, seeing them exasperated 
at the present moment and that their intentions 
were not for the best, and convinced that his 
judgment was right about refusing to go out, would 
not convoke a meeting of the assembly or any 
gathering whatever, for fear that if they got to- 
gether there would be an outbreak of passion 
without judgment that would end in some serious 



καϊ δι ησυχίας μάλιστα όσον εδύνατο €ΐχεν. 

2 ιππέας μέντοι έξέπεμπβν αίεϊ του μη προδρόμους 
άπο της στρατιάς εσπίπτοντας ες τους άκρους 
τους €γγι/9 της πόλεως κακουρηείν καϊ ίππο- 
μάγια τις ε^ένετο βραχεία εν Φρυηίοις των τ€ 
Αθηναίων τέλει ενϊ των ιππέων και Θεσσαλοί? 
μετ αυτών προς τους Βοιωτών ιππέας, iv fj> 
ουκ έλασσον εσχον οι 'Αθηναίοι καϊ Θεσσαλοί 
μέχρι ου προσβοηθησάντων τοις Έοιωτοΐς τών 
οπλιτών τροπή εηένετο αυτών* καϊ άπέθανον τών 
©εσσαλών καϊ Αθηναίων ου πολλοί, άνείλοντο 
μέντοι αυτούς αυθημερόν άσπονδους. καϊ ο! 
ΤΙελοποννήσιοι τροπαΐον τη ύστεραία έστησαν, 

Ζ η he βοήθεια αύτη τών ©εσσαλών κατά το 
πα\αιον ζνμμαχικον ε^ενετο τοις Άθηναίοις, καϊ 
άφίκοντο παρ' αυτούς Ααρισαΐοι, Φαρσάλιοι, 1 
Κραννώνιοι, ΤΙυράσιοι, Υυρτώνιοι, Φεραΐοι. 
rjyodvTO δε αυτών εκ μεν Ααρίσης ΤΙολυμηδης 
καϊ Άριστόνους, άπο της στάσεως έκάτερος, εκ 
δε Φαρσαλου Μένων ήσαν δε καϊ τών άλλων 
κατά πόλεις άρχοντες. 

XXIII. Οί δε ΤΙελοποννήσιοι, επειδή ουκ 
επέζησαν αύτοΐς οί 'Αθηναίοι ες μάχην, άραντες 
εκ τών 'Αχαρνών εδηουν τών δήμων τινας άλλους 
τών μεταξύ ΤΙάρνηθος καϊ Βριλησσον ορούς. 

2 όντων δε αυτών εν τη yfj οί 'Αθηναίοι απέστειλαν 
τάς εκατόν ναΰς περί ΤΙελοπόννησον άσπερ 
ηταρεσκευάζοντο και χίλιους οπλιτας επ αυτών 

1 Παράσ*οί, in MSS. after Φαρσάλιοι, deleted by Heringa. 

BOOK Π. χχπ. ι-χχπι. 2 

mistake ; moreover he guarded the city, and as far 
as he could kept 'it free from disturbances. He 
did, however, constantly send out detachments of 
cavalry to prevent flying parties from the main army 
from raiding the fields near the city and ravaging 
them ; and there was a cavalry skirmish at Phrygia 
between a company of Athenian horsemen, assisted 
by some Thessalians, and the Boeotian cavalry, in 
which the Athenians and Thessalians fully held their 
own, until their heavy infantry came to the support 
of the Boeotians, when they were routed. A few of 
the Thessalians and the Athenians were killed, but 
their bodies were recovered the same day without a 
truce ; and on the next day the Peloponnesians set up 
a trophy. This auxiliary force of the Thessalians was 
sent to the Athenians in accordance with an ancient 
alliance, 1 and those who came were Larisaeans, 
Pharsalians, Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and 
Pheraeans. And their leaders were, from Larissa, 
Polymedes and Aristonous, each representing his own 
faction, and from Pharsalus Menon ; and the others 
had their own commander city by city. 

XXIII. The Peloponesians, on the other hand, 
when the Athenians did not come out to do battle 
with them broke up their camp at Acharnae and 
ravaged some of the demes which lie between Mt. 
Parnes and Mt. Brilessus. 2 But while they were 
still in their territory the Athenians sent out on 
an expedition round the Peloponnesus the hundred 
ships 3 which they had been equipping, and on 

1 cf. 1. cii. 4. 

2 More generally known as Pentelicus, so called from the 
deme Pentele on its southern slope. 

8 cf ch. xvii. 4. 



καϊ τοξότας τετρακόσιους' εστρατήηει δέ Καρ- 
κίνος τ€ 6 Άενοτίμου και ΤΙρωτέας 6 ΈπικΧέους 

3 καϊ Σωκράτης 6 'Avrvyivov?, καϊ οι μεν αραντες 
τη παρασκευή ταύτη περιέπΧεον, οι δε Πελο- 
ποννήσιοι χρόνον εμμειναντες εν τη 'Αττική όσου 
εΐχον τα επιτήδεια άνεχώρησαν δια ϋοιωτών, ούχ 
ηπερ εσέβαΧον παριόντες 8ε Ώρωπον την yfjv 
την Υραϊκην καΧουμένην, ην νέμονται Ώρώπιοι 
9 Αθηναίων υπήκοοι, έδωσαν, άφικόμενοι δε ες 
ΤΙεΧοπόννησον διεΧύθησαν κατά πόΧεις έκαστοι. 
XXIV. y Αναχώρησαν τ ων δε αυτών ol Αθη- 
ναίοι φυΧακας κατεστήσαντο κατά yfjv καϊ κατά 
θάλασσαν, ώσπερ δη εμεΧΧον δια παντός του 
ποΧεμου φυΧάξειν καϊ χιΧια τάΧαντα άπο των 
εν τη άκροπόΧει χρημάτων εδοξεν αύτοΐς εξαίρετα 
ποιησαμένοις χωρίς θέσθαι καϊ μη άναΧουν, άΧΧ! 
άπο τών άΧΧων ποΧεμεΐν ην δε τις είπη η επι- 
ψηφίση κινεΐν τά χρήματα ταύτα ες αΧλο τι, 
ην μη οι ποΧέμιοι νηιτη στ par ω επιπΧέωσι τί) 
πόΧει και δέη αμύνασθαι, θάνατον ζημίαν επέ- 

2 θεντο. τριήρεις τε μετ αυτών εξαίρετους εποιή- 
σαντο κατά τον ενιαυτόν εκατόν τας βεΧτίστας 
καϊ τριηράρχους αύταΐς, ων μη χρήσθαι μηδέ μια 
ες άΧΧο τι η μετά τών χρημάτων περί του αυτού 
κινδύνου, ήν δέη. 

1 Named after the ancient town of Γραία (Horn. Β 498). 

BOOK II. χχπι. 2-χχιν. 2 

them a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers ; 
and the generals in command were Carcinus son of 
Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son 
of Antigenes. So they set sail with this force and 
began their cruise ; the Peloponnesians, on the other 
hand, remained in Attica for as long a time as they 
were provisioned and then withdrew through Boeotia, 
taking a different route from that by which they had 
entered Attica. They passed by Oropus and laid 
waste the district called Grai'ce, 1 which the Oropians 
occupy as subjects of the Athenians. 2 Then on their 
return to the Peloponnesus they were dismissed to 
their several cities. 

XXIV. After the retreat of the Lacedaemonians, 
the Athenians set guards to keep watch both by land 
and sea, their purpose being to maintain a like guard 
throughout the war. They decided also to set apart 
one thousand talents 3 of the money stored on the 
Acropolis as a special reserve fund, and not to 
spend it, but to use the rest to carry on the war ; 
and if anyone should make or put to vote a pro- 
posal to touch this money except in the one case 
that the enemy should attack the city with a fleet 
and they should have to defend it, death was to be 
the penalty. And along with this sum of money 
they set apart for special service each year one 
hundred of the very best triremes, appointing 
trierarchs to command them, and no one of these 
ships was to be used in any other way than in connec- 
tion with this particular fund in dealing with the 
same danger should the emergency arise. 

2 This was written before 412/11, when Oropus was cap- 
tured by the Boeotians. 

» About £200,000, or $972,000. This was part of the 
6,000 talents stored on the Acropolis (ch. xiii. 3). 



XXV. Οι δ' εν ταΐς εκατόν ναυσϊ περί Πελο- 
πόννησον Αθηναίοι καϊ Κερκυραίοι μετ αυτών 
πεντήκοντα ναυσϊ π ροσβεβοηθηκότες καϊ αΧΧοι 
τίνες των εκεί ξυμμάχων άΧΧα τε εκάκουν περί- 
πΧεοντες καϊ ες Μεθώνην της Αακωνικης άπο- 
βάντες τω τείνει προσεβαΧον, οντι ασθενεί καϊ 

2 ανθρώπων ουκ ενόντων. έτυχε 8ε περί τους 
χώρους τούτους Βρασίδα? ό Τελλ^δο?, άνηρ 
Σπαρτιάτης, φρουραν έχων, καϊ αίσθόμενος εβοή- 
θβι τοις εν τω χωρίω μετά όπΧιτών εκατόν, 
ΰιαδραμών δε το των ' Αθηναίων στρατόπεδον, 
εσκεδασμένον κατά την χώραν καϊ προς το τείχος 
τετραμμένον, εσπίπτει ες την Μ.εθώνΐ]ν καϊ ολί- 
γους τινας εν τη εσΒρομη άποΧεσας των μεθ* 
αυτού την τε πόΧιν περιεποίησε καϊ άπο τούτου 
του τοΧμήματος πρώτου των κατά τον πόΧεμον 

3 επηνεθη εν Σπάρτη, οι δε 'Αθηναίοι άραντες 
παρέπλεον, καϊ σχόντες της 'Ηλεία? ε'? Φειάν 
εοηουν την yrjv επϊ ούο ημέρας καϊ προσβοηθή- 
σαντας των εκ της κοίΧης "Ηλ^δο? τριακόσιους 
λογάδα? καϊ των αύτόθεν εκ της περιοικίΒος 

4 Ηλείων μάχη εκράτησαν. άνεμου δε κατιόντος 
μεηάΧου χειμαζόμενοι εν άΧιμενω χωρίω, οι μεν 
ποΧΧοϊ επέβησαν επϊ τάς ναΰς καϊ περιεπΧεον 
τον Ίχθΰν καΧούμενον την άκραν ες τον εν τη 
Φε^α Χιμενα, οι δε Μεσσήνιοι εν τούτω καϊ άΧΧοι 
τίνες, οι ου δυνάμενοι επιβήναι, κατά yrjv χωρή- 

5 σαντες την Φειάν αίροΰσιν. καϊ ύστερον αϊ τε 
νηες περιπΧεύσασαι άναλαμβάνουσιν αυτούς καϊ 
έξανά^ονται εκΧείποντες Φειάν, καϊ των *ΗΧείων 
ή ποΧΧη ήΒη στρατιά προσεβεβοηθήκει. πάρα- 


BOOK II. xxv. 1-5 

XXV. Meanwhile the Athenians who had been 
despatched in the hundred ships around the Pelopon- 
nesus, together with the Corey raeans, who had rein- 
forced them with fifty ships, and some of their other 
allies in that quarter, were pillaging various places as 
they cruised about, and in particular disembarked at 
Methone in Laconia and assaulted its walls, which 
were weak and without adequate defenders. But 
Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in 
that neighbourhood with a guarding party, and 
seeing the situation he set out with one hundred hop- 
lites to relieve the garrison. Dashing through the 
army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the 
country and was occupied solely with the fortress, he 
threw his force into Methone, losing a few of his men 
in the rush, and thus saved the city. This daring 
exploit, the first of the kind in the war, was acknow- 
ledged at Sparta by a vote of thanks. The Athenians 
then weighed anchor and continued their cruise along 
the coast, and putting in at Pheia in Elis ravaged the 
land for two days, defeating in battle a rescue-party 
of three hundred picked men gathered from the low- 
lands of Elis and from the immediate neighbourhood 
of Pheia. But a heavy gale of wind arose, and since 
they were exposed to the storm in a harbourless 
region, most of them embarked on their ships and 
sailed round the promontory called Ichthys into the 
harbour at Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians and 
some others, who could not get on board, marched 
overland and took Pheia. Afterwards, when the 
fleet had rounded the promontory, it took up these 
men, abandoned Pheia, and put out to sea, for mean- 
while the main body of the Eleans had come to the 
rescue. The Athenians now resumed their voyage 



πλεύσαντες δέ οι 'Αθηναίοι επϊ αΧλα χωρία 

XXVI. 'Ύπο δε τον αυτόν χρόνον τούτον 
Αθηναίοι τριάκοντα ναΰς εξέπεμψαν περϊ την 
Λοκρίδα καΐ ι Έ^ύβοίας άμα φυΧακην εστρατηηει 

2 δε αυτών ΚΧεόπομπος ο Κλεινίου. και απο- 
βάσεις ποιησάμενος της τ€ παραθαΧασσίου εστίν 
a εδτ^ωσε καϊ ©ρονιον εΙΧεν, όμηρους τε εΧαβεν 
αυτών, καϊ iv ΆΧοπτ) τους βοηθησαντας Αοκρών 
μάχρ εκράτησεν. 

XXVII. Άνέστησαν δε καΧ Αίηινήτας τω αύτω 
θέρει τούτω 4ξ Λίθινης 'Αθηναίος αυτούς Τ€ καϊ 
παΐδας καϊ γυναίκας, επικαΧέσαντες ούχ ήκιστα 
του ποΧέμου σφίσιν αίτιους είναι* καϊ την Aiyi- 
ναν άσφαΧέστερον εφαίνετο ttj ΙΙεΧοποννήσω 
επικειμένην αυτών πέμψαντας εποίκους εχειν. 
καϊ εξέπεμψαν ύστερον ου ποΧΧώ ες αύτην τους 

2 οίκητορας. εκπεσουσι δε τοις Αίηινήταις οι 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι εδοσαν ®υρέαν οίκεΐν καϊ την yrjv 
νεμεσθαι, κατά τε το 'Αθηναίων διάφορο ν καϊ 
οτι σφών εύερηέται ήσαν υπο τον σεισμον καϊ 
τών ΈιίΧώτων την επανάστασιν. ή δε ©υρεάτις 
γη μεθόρια της Άρ-γείας καϊ Λακωνικής εστίν, 
επϊ θάΧασσαν καθήκουσα. καϊ οι μεν αυτών 
ενταύθα ωκησαν, οι δε εσπάρησαν κατά την 
αΧΧην 'ΈιΧλάδα. 

XXVIII. Ύοΰ δ' αύτοΰ θέρους νουμηνία κατά 
σεΧηνην, ώσπερ καϊ μόνον δοκεΐ είναι ηίηνεσθαι 

1 κατ read by Hude, after Madvig. 

BOOK II. xxv. 5-χχνιιι. 

along the coast, and visiting other places made 

XXVI. About this same time the Athenians sent 
out thirty ships to operate around Locris and at the 
same time to serve as a guard for Euboea. These 
were under the command of Cleopompus son of 
Clinias, who made descents upon various places along 
the seaboard and ravaged them, captured Thronium, 
some of whose inhabitants he took as hostages, 
and at Alope defeated in battle the Locrians who 
came to the defence of the town. 

XXVII. in the course of this summer the Athen- 
ians also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina, to- 
gether with their wives and children, making it their 
main charge against them that they were responsible 
for the war in which they were involved; besides 
Aegina lay close to the Peloponnesus, and it was 
clearly a safer policy to send colonists of their own 
to occupy it. And indeed they soon afterwards sent 
thither the settlers. As for the Aeginetan refugees, 
the Lacedaemonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in 
and its territory to cultivate, moved to do this not 
only by the hostility of the Aeginetans towards the 
Athenians but also because the Aeginetans had done 
them a service at the time of the earthquake and 
the revolt of the Helots. 1 Now the district of Thyrea 
is the border country between Argolis and Laconia, 
extending down to the sea. There some of the 
Aeginetans settled, while some were scattered over 
the rest of Hellas. 

XX VII I. During the same summer at the beginning 
of a lunar month 2 (the only time, it seems, when 

1 c/. 1. ci. 2. 

9 August 3rd, 431 b.o. 



δυνατόν, 6 ήΧιος εξέλιπε μετά μεσημβρίαν καϊ 
πάλιν άνεπΧηρώθη, γενόμενος μηνοειδης καϊ ασ- 
τέρων τινών εκφανέντων. 

XXIX. Καϊ εν τω αύτω θέρει Νυμφόδωρον τον 
ΤΙύθεω, άνδρα Άβδηριτην, ου είχε την άδέλφην 
ΣιτάΧκης, δυνάμενον παρ* αύτω μέγα οι 'Αθηναίοι 
ιτροτερον ποΧέμιον νομίζοντες πρόξενον εποιή- 
σαντο καϊ μετεπέμψαντο, βουΧόμενοι ΧιτάΧκην 
σφίσι τον Ύήρεω, ©ρακών βασιλέα, ξύμμαγρν 

2 γενέσθαι. 6 δε Ύήρης ούτος 6 του Χιτάλκου 
πατήρ πρώτος Όδρύσαις την μεγάΧην βασιλείαν 
επϊ πΧέον της άΧλης ©ράκης εποίησεν πολύ 

3 yap μέρος καϊ αύτόνομόν εστί ©ρακών. Ύηρεΐ δε 

τω ΐΐρόκνην την ΤΙανδίονος απ* Αθηνών σχόντι 

γυναίκα προσήκει ο Ύήρης ούτος ουδέν, ούδε 

της αυτής ©ράκης εγένοντο, αλλ' ό μεν εν ΑαυΧία 

της Φωκίδος νυν καλούμενης γης 6 Ύηρεύς ι ωκει, 

τότε ύπο ©ρακών οικουμένης, καϊ το έργον το 

περί τον "Ιτυν αϊ γυναίκες εν τη γη ταύτη 

έπραξαν (ποΧΧοΐς δε και τών ποιητών εν άηδόνος 

μνήμη ΔαυΧιάς η opvic επωνόμασται), εικός τε 

καϊ το κήδος ΤΙανδίονα ξυνάψασθαι της θυγατρος 

δια τοσούτου επ ώφελια τη προς άλΧήΧους 

μαλΧον η δια ποΧΧών ημερών ες Όδρύσας όδον* 

Ύήρης δε ούδε το αύτο όνομα έχων βασιλεύς 2 

1 Deleted by Hude, after van HerwerdeD, as not read by 
the Scholiast. 
* re, in the MSS. after βασίλβί»*, deleted by Classen. 

1 i.e. their representative to look after Athenian interests 
in the country of Sitalces and Tereus. The latter had violated 


BOOK II. χχνιπ.-χχιχ. 3 

such an occurrence is possible) the sun was eclipsed 
after midday ; it assumed the shape of a crescent and 
became full again, and during the eclipse some stars 
became visible. 

XXIX. In this summer, too, Nymphodorus son of 
Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister Sitalces had 
to wife, and possessing great influence with Sitalces, 
the Athenians made their proxenus l with that king, 
although they had hitherto regarded him as an 
enemy ; and they summoned him to Athens, wishing 
to gain Sitalces, son of Teres and king of the 
Thracians, as their ally. Now this Teres, the father 
of Sitalces, was the first to found the great kingdom 
of the Odrysians, which extended over the larger 
part of Thrace ; for a considerable portion of the 
Thracians are independent. This Teres is not in 
any way connected with Tereus who took from Athens 
to be his wife Procne the daughter of Pandion, nor 
indeed did they come from the same Thrace. Tereus 
dwelt at Daulia in the land now called Phocis, which 
was then occupied by Thracians, and it was in that 
land that the women 2 perpetrated their deed upon 
Itys. In fact many of the poets, when they refer to 
the nightingale, call it the bird of Daulia. Besides 
it was natural for Pandion to contract the marriage 
alliance for his daughter at so short a distance as 
Daulia with a view to mutual protection, rather than 
among the Odrysians, who are many days' journey 
distant. Teres, however, whose name was not the 
same as the other's, was the first king to attain 

Philomela, sister of Procne, and cut out her tongue to prevent 
her telling of it ; but she revealed it by weaving the story 
into a piece of tapestry. 

2 The women, i.e. Procne and Philomela, who murdered 
Itys, son of Procne, 



4 πρώτος εν κράτει Όδρυσών iyevero. ου δη οντά 
τον ΣιτάΧκην οι 'Αθηναίοι ξύμμαγρν εποιοΰντο, 
βουΧομενοι σφίσι τα επΧ ©ρφκης 'χωρία καΧ 

5 ΤΙερδίκκαν ξυνεξεΧεΐν αυτόν, εΧθών τε 65 τας 
'Αθήνας 6 Νυμφόδωρος την Τ€ του ΣιτάΧκου 
ξνμμαχίαν εποίησε και Σάδοκον τον υίον αυτού 
Άθηναΐον, τον τε επΧ ©ράκης πόΧεμον υπεδεχετο 
καταΧύσειν πείσειν yap ^ιτάΧκην πεμπειν στρα- 
τών ©ρακίαν 'Αθηναίοι? ιππέων τε καΧ πεΧ- 

6 ταστών. ξυνεβίβασε δε καΧ τον ΤΙερδίκκαν τοις 
Άθηναίοις και ©ερμην αυτω επεισεν άποδουναί' 
ξυνεστράτευσέ τε ευθύς Ώερδίκκας επΧ ΧαΧκιδέας 

1 μετά Αθηναίων καΧ Φορμίωνος, οΰτω μεν Σ^τάλ- 
κης τε 6 Ύήρεω, ©ρακών βασιΧεύς, ζυμμαχος 
βένετο Άθηναίοις καΧ Υίερδίκκας 6 'ΑΧεξάνδρου, 
Μακεδόνων βασιΧεύς. 

XXX. Οι δ' εν ταΐς εκατόν ναυσΧν Αθηναίοι 
ετι οντες περΧ ΙΙεΧοπόννησον ΣόΧΧιόν τε Κοριν- 
θίων πόΧισμα αίρούσι και παραδιδόασι ΏαΧαι- 
ρεύσιν Άκαρνάνων μόνοις την yrjv καΧ ποΧιν 
νεμεσθαι• καΧ Άστακόν, ης Έ*ΰαρχος ετυράννει, 
Χαβόντες κατά κράτος καΧ εξεΧάσαντες αυτόν το 

2 χωρίον ες την ξυμμαγίαν προσεποιήσαντο. επί 
τε ΚεφαΧΧηνίαν την νησον προσπΧεύσαντες 
πpoσηyάyovτo άνευ μάχης* κείται δε ή ΚεφαΧ- 
Χηνία κατά Άκαρνανίαν και Αευκάδα τετράποΧις 

3 ούσα, ΤΙαΧής, Κράνιοι, Σαμαΐοι, ΤΙρώννοι. ύστε- 
ρον δ' ου ποΧΧω άνεχωρησαν αϊ νήες ες τας 


BOOK II. χχιχ. 3-xxx. 3 

great power among the Odrysians. And it was his 
son, Sitalces, whom the Athenians wanted to make 
their ally, wishing him to help in subduing the 
places on the coast of Thrace and Perdiccas. So 
Nymphodorus came to Athens, brought about the 
alliance with Sitalces, and got Sadocus son of Sitalces 
made an Athenian citizen ; and he promised also 
to bring the war in Thrace to an end, saying that he 
would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a 
Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover, 
he brought about a reconciliation between Perdiccas 
and the Athenians, whom he persuaded to restore 
Therme 1 to him. Perdiccas immediately joined 
forces with the Athenians under Phormio 2 and took 
the field against the Chalcidians. It was in this way 
that Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, 
became an ally of the Athenians, and also Perdiccas 
son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians. 

XXX. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred 
ships, who were still operating on the Peloponnesian 
coast, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corin- 
thians, which they then handed over, the territory 
as well as the city, to the people of Palaerus in 
Acarnania, for their exclusive occupation. They also 
stormed Astacus, which Euarchus ruled as tyrant, 
drove him out, and incorporated the place in their 
confederacy. Sailing then to the island of Cephal- 
lenia, they brought it over to their side without a 
battle. Now Cephallenia lies over against Acar- 
nania and Leucas and is a union of four communities, 
the Palians, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnians. 
And not long afterwards the ships withdrew to 

1 cf. 1. lxi. 2. a φ ι. lxiv. 2 ; lxv. 3. 



XXXI. ΤΙερϊ δε το φθινοπωρον του θέρους 
τούτον Αθηναίοι πανδημεί, αυτοί καϊ οι μέτ- 
οικοι, εσέβαΧον ες την MeyapiSa ΤϊερικΧέους του 
Έανθ ίππου στρατη^ουνΊος. καϊ οι περί Πελο- 
πόννησον 'Αθηναίοι iv ταΐς εκατόν ναυσίν 
(βτυχον yap ήδη iv Atyivrj οντες επ' οίκου ova- 
κομιζομενοι) ώς ησθοντο τους εκ της πόΧεως 
πανστρατια iv Meyapow οντάς, επΧευσαν παρ' 

2 αυτούς καϊ ξύνε μείχθη σαν. στρατόπεδόν τ€ 
μέηιστον δη τούτο άθρόον * Αθηναίων iyiveTO, 
άκ μαζούσης ετι της ποΧεως καϊ οΰπω νενοσηκυίας' 
μυρίων yap οπΧιτων ούκ εΧάσσους ήσαν αύτοϊ 
οι 'Αθηναίοι (χωρίς δ' αύτοΐς οι iv Ώοτειδαία 
τρισχιΧιοι ήσαν), μέτοικοι δε ξυνεσέβαΧον ούκ 
βΧάσσους τρισχιΧιων όπΧιτών, χωρίς δε ό αΧΧος 

3 ομιΧος ψιΧών ούκ 6Xίyoς. δτ)ώσαντες δε τα 
ποΧΧά της yής άνεχώρησαν. iyivovTO δε καϊ 
αΧΧαι ύστερον iv τω ποΧβμω κατά έτος εκαστον 
εσβοΧαϊ 'Αθηναίων ες την Mεyapίδa καϊ ιππέων 
καϊ πανστρατια, μέχρι ου Νίσαια εάΧω υπ' 

XXXII. 'Έ*τειχίσθη δε καϊ ΆταΧάντη ύπο 
'Αθηναίων φρούριον του θέρους τούτου τεΧευτων- 
τος, η επί Αοκροΐς τοις Οπουντίοις νήσος, έρημη 
προτερον ούσα, του μη Χηστας εκπΧέοντας εξ 
Όπουντος και της αΧΧης Αοκρίδος κaκoυpyεΐv 
την Κνβοιαν. ταύτα μεν εν τω θέρει τούτω μετά 
την ΤΙεΧοποννησίων εκ της Αττικής άναχώρησιν 

XXXIII. Ύοΰ δ' επ^^νομένου χειμωνος Εδ- 
αρχος 6 Άκαρνάν, βουΧόμενος ες την Άστακον 


BOOK II. χχχι. ι-χχχιιι. ι 

XXXI. Toward the autumn of this year the Athe- 
nians with all their military forces, drawn both from 
the citizens and the resident aliens, invaded Megaris 
under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, 
who was general. 1 The Athenians of the fleet of 
one hundred ships operating around Peloponnesus, 
who happened to be at Aegina on their way home, 
when they heard that the whole military force of the 
city was at Megara, sailed over and joined them. 
This was the largest army of Athenians that had 
ever been assembled in one body, for the city was 
still at the height of its strength and not as yet 
stricken by the plague ; the Athenians themselves 
numbered not less than ten thousand heavy in- 
fantry, not including the three thousand at Potidaea, 2 
and there were three thousand heavy-armed aliens 
who took part in the invasion, and, besides, a con- 
siderable body of light-armed troops. After they 
had ravaged most of the Megarian country they 
retired. Later on in the course of the war still 
other invasions were made by the Athenians into 
Megaris every year, both with the cavalry and with 
the whole army, until Nisaea was captured. 3 

XXXII. Towards the end of this summer the 431 b.o. 
Athenians also fortified and garrisoned Atalante, the 
island which lies off Opuntian Locris and had hitherto 
been unoccupied. Their object was to prevent 
pirates sailing from Opus and the other ports of 
Locris and ravaging Euboea. These were the events 
which took place during this summer after the 
withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Attica. 

XXXIII. But in the ensuing winter, Euarchus the 
Acarnanian, wishing to return to Astacus, persuaded 

1 i.e. one of the ten generals elected annually. 
8 </. I. lxi. 4. • iv. lxvi.-lxix. 



κατελθεΐν, πείθει, Κορινθίους τεσσαράκοντα νανσϊ 
καϊ πεντακόσιοι? καϊ χιλίοις όπλίταις εαυτόν 
κατάγειν πλεύσαντας, και αυτός επικούρους τινας 
προσεμισθώσατο* ηρχον δε της στρατιάς Ευ- 
φαμίδας τε 6 Άριστωνύμου και Ύιμόξενος 6 

2 Ύιμοκράτους και Έΰμαχος 6 Χρύσιδος. καϊ 
πλεύσαντες κατηηαηον καϊ της άλλης 'Ακαρ- 
νανίας της περί θάλασσαν εστίν α χωρία βουλό- 
μενοι προσποιησασθαι καϊ πειραθέντες, ως ουκ 

3 εδύναντο, άπέπλεον επ* οϊκου. σχόντες δ' εν τφ 
παράπλω ες Κεφαλληνίαν καϊ άπόβασιν ποιη- 
σάμενοι ες την Κρανίων <γήν, άπατηθέντες υπ* 
αυτών εξ ομολογίας τίνος άνδρας τε άποβάλλουσι 
σφών αυτών, επιθεμενων άπροσδοκητως των 
Κρανίων, καϊ βιαιότερον αναηαηομενοι εκομίσθη- 
σαν επ' οϊκου. 

XXXI Υ. Έι/ δε τω αύτω χειμώνι 'Αθηναίοι 
τω πατρίω νόμω χρώμενοι δημοσία ταφάς εποιή- 
σαντο των εν τωδε τω πολεμώ πρώτων αποθανόν• 

2 των τρόπω τοιώδε. τα μεν οστά προτίθενται 
των άποηενομένων πρότριτα σκηνην ποιησαντες, 
καϊ επιφέρει τω αυτού έκαστος ην τι βούληται• 

3 επειδαν δε η εκφορά η, λάρνακας κυπαρισσίνας 
άγουσιν αμαξαι, 1 φυλής εκάστης μιαν ενεστι δε 
τα οστά ης έκαστος ην φυλής, μία δε κλίνη 
κενή φέρεται εστρωμένη των αφανών, οΐ αν μη 

4 ευρεθώσιν ες άναίρεσιν. ξυνεκφέρει δε 6 βουλό- 
μένος και αστών καϊ ξένων, καϊ γυναίκες πάρεισιν 
αϊ προσήκουσαι επί τον τάφον όλοφυρόμεναι. 

/- χ Hude inserts 5c'ica, following Gertz. 

BOOK II. χχχιιι. ι-χχχιν. 4 

the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen 
hundred heavy infantry and restore him to power, 
and for this purpose he himself hired some mer- 
cenaries. The commanders of the expedition were 
Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of 
Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. They 
did in fact sail over and restore him ; and wishing 
to acquire some other places along the seaboard of 
Acarnania they made the attempt but failed, and 
thereupon sailed for home. As they skirted the 
coast they touched at Cephallenia, where they 
made a descent upon the territory of the Cranians ; 
here deceived by the inhabitants through some sort 
of agreement they lost a few of their men by an un- 
expected attack of the Cranians, and finally, after 
they had got out to sea with considerable difficulty, 
managed to get back home. 

XXXIV. In the course of the same winter the 
Athenians, following the custom of their fathers, 
celebrated at the public expense the funeral rites of 
the first who had fallen in this war. The ceremony 
is as follows. The bones of the departed lie in state 
for the space of three days in a tent erected for that 
purpose, and each one brings to his own dead any 
offering he desires. On the day of the funeral 
coffins of cypress wood are borne on wagons, one 
for each tribe, and the bones of each are in the 
coffin of his tribe. One empty bier, covered with a 
pall, is carried in the procession for the missing 
whose bodies could not be found for burial. Any 
one who wishes, whether citizen or stranger, may 
take part in the funeral procession, and the women 
who are related to the deceased are present at the 



5 τιθεασιν ουν ες το δημόσιον σήμα, ο εστίν επί 
του καΧΧιστου προαστειου τής ποΧεως καϊ αϊεϊ 
εν αύτω θάπτουσι τους εκ των ποΧεμων πλην γε 
τους iv Μαραθώνΐ' εκείνων Be διαπρεπή την 
άρετην κρίναντες αυτού κα\ τον τάφον εποίησαν. 

6 επειδαν 8ε κρύψωσι yrj, άνηρ ηρημενος ύπο της 
πόΧεως ος αν ηνώμτ) τε δοκτ) μη άξύνετος είναι 
καϊ αξιώσει προήκτ), Χε^ει επ αύτοΐς επαινον 

7 τον πρέποντα• μετά δε τούτο απέρχονται, ώδε 
μβν θάπτουσιν καϊ Sea παντός του ποΧεμου, 

8 όποτε ξυμβαίη αύτοΐς, εχρώντο τω νόμω. επϊ 
δ' ουν τοις πρώτοις τοΐσδε ΤΙερικΧής ο Ξανθίππου 
ηρεθη Χεηειν. καϊ επειδή καιρός εΧάμβανε, 
προεΧθών άπο του σήματος επϊ βήμα υψηΧον 
πεποιημενον, όπως άκούοιτο ως επϊ πΧεΐστον του 
όμίΧου, εΧεγε τοιάδε. 

XXXV. " Οί μεν ουν ποΧΧοϊ των ενθάδε ηδη 
είρηκότων επαινουσι τον προσθέντα τω νόμω τον 
Xoyov τόνδε, ως καΧον επϊ τοΐς εκ των ποΧεμων 
θαπτομενοις αηορεύεσθαι αυτόν, εμοϊ δε αρκούν 
αν εδόκει είναι ανδρών αηαθών ερηω ηενομενων 
ερ^/ω καϊ δηΧουσθαι τας τιμάς, οία καϊ νυν περϊ 
τον τάφον τόνδε δημοσία παρασκευασθέντα 
όρατε, καϊ μη εν ενϊ άνδρϊ ποΧΧών άρετάς κινδυ- 
νεύεσθαι ευ τε καϊ χείρον είπόντι πιστευθήναι. 
2 χαΧεπον yap το μετρίως ειπείν εν ω μόΧις καϊ η 

1 The Outer Cerameicus, just outside the Dipylon gate. 
Thi9 street was to Athens what the Appian Way was to 


BOOK Π. χχχιν. 5-xxxv. 2 

burial and make lamentation. The coffins are laid 
in the public sepulchre, which is situated in the most 
beautiful suburb 1 of the city; there they always bury 
those fallen in war, except indeed those who fell at 
Marathon ; for their valour the Athenians judged to 
be preeminent and they buried them on the spot 
where they fell. But when the remains have been 
laid away in the earth, a man chosen by the state, 
who is regarded as best endowed with wisdom and is 
foremost in public esteem, delivers over them an 
appropriate eulogy. After this the people depart. In 
this manner they bury ; and throughout the war, 
whenever occasion arose, they observed this custom. 
Now over these, the first victims of the war, Pericles 
son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And when 
the proper time came, he advanced from the sepulchre 
and took his stand upon a platform which had been 
built high in order that his voice might reach as far 
as possible in the throng, and spoke as follows : 

XXXV. "Most of those who have spoken herein 
the past have commended the law-giver who added 
this oration to our ceremony, feeling that it is meet 
and right that it should be spoken at their burial 
over those who have fallen in war. To me, however, 
it would have seemed sufficient, when men have 
proved themselves brave by valiant acts, by act 
only to make manifest the honours we render them 
— such honours as to-day you have witnessed in 
connection with these funeral ceremonies solemnized 
by the state — and not that the valour of many men 
should be hazarded on one man to be believed or not 
according as he spoke well or ill. For it is a hard 
matter to speak in just measure on an occasion 
where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker's 



δόκησις της αληθείας βεβαιοΰται. ο τε yap 
ξυνειδώς καϊ εΰνους ακροατής τάχ αν τι ενδε- 
εστερως προς α βούΧεταί τε καϊ επίσταται νομί- 
σειε δηλοΰσθαι, ο τε άπειρος εστίν α καί 
πΧεονάζεσθαι, δια, φθόνον, εϊ τι υπέρ την αυτού 
φύσιν άκούοι. μέχρι yap τοΰδε ανεκτοί οι έπαινοι 
εισι περί ετέρων Χεγόμενοι, ες όσον αν καί αυτός 
έκαστος οϊηται ικανός είναι δράσαί τι ων ήκουσεν 
τω δε υπερβάΧΧοντι αυτών φθονοΰντες ήδη και 
3 απιστουσιν. επειδή δε τοις πάλαι οΰτως εδο- 
κιμάσθη ταύτα καλώς εχειν, χρη καϊ εμε επομενον 
τω νόμω πειράσθαι υμών της εκάστου βουΧήσεώς 
τε καϊ δόξης τυχεΐν ώς επί πΧεΙστον. 

XXXVI. Μ "Αρξομαι δε από τών προγόνων 
πρώτον 9 δίκαιον yap αύτοΐς καϊ πρέπον δε άμα 
εν τω τοιώδε την τιμήν ταύτην της μνήμης 
δίδοσθαι. την yap χώραν οι αύτοϊ αίει οικοΰντες 
διάδοχη τών επιγενομένων μέχρι τοΰδε ε'λει/- 

2 θέραν δι άρετην παρεδοσαν. καϊ εκείνοι τε άξιοι 
επαίνου και ετι μάΧΧον οι πατέρες ημών κτησά- 
μενοι yap προς οϊς εδέξαντο οσην εχομεν άρχην 

3 ουκ άπόνως, ημΐν τοις νυν π ροσ κατελιπον . τα 
δε πΧείω αυτής αύτοϊ ημείς οΐδε οί νυν ετι οντες 
μάΧιστα εν τη καθεστηκυία ηλικία επηυξησαμεν, 
καϊ την ποΧιν τοις πάσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καϊ ες 

4 πόΧεμον καϊ ες είρηνην αύταρκεστάτην. ών εγώ 

1 Those enumerated by Pericles in ch. xii . — money, army 
and navy• 


BOOK II. xxxv. 2-χχχνι. 4 

accuracy is established. For the hearer who is 
cognizant of the facts and partial to the dead will 
perhaps think that scant justice has been done 
in comparison with his own wishes and his own 
knowledge, while he who is not so informed, when- 
ever he hears of an exploit which goes beyond 
his own capacity, will be led by envy to think 
there is some exaggeration. And indeed eulogies 
of other men are tolerable only in so far as each 
hearer thinks that he too has the ability to perform 
any of the exploits of which he hears ; but whatever 
goes beyond that at once excites envy and unbelief. 
However, since our forefathers approved of this 
practice as right and proper, I also, rendering obedi- 
ence to the law, must endeavour to the best of my 
ability to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of each of 

XXXVI. "I shall speak first of our ancestors, for 
it is right and at the same time fitting, on an occasion 
like this, to give them this place of honour in re- 
calling what they did. For this land of ours, in 
which the same people have never ceased to dwell in 
an unbroken line of successive generations, they by 
their valour transmitted to our times a free state. 
And not only are they worthy of our praise, but our 
fathers still more ; for they, adding to the inheritance 
which they received, acquired the empire we now 
possess and bequeathed it, not without toil, to us who 
are alive to-day. And we ourselves here assembled, 
who are now for the most part still in the prime of 
life, have further strengthened the empire in most 
respects, and have provided our city with all re- 
sources, 1 so that it is sufficient for itself both in 
peace and in war. The military exploits whereby 



τα μεν κατά ποΧεμους epya, οϊς έκαστα εκτηθη, 
η εΐ τι αυτοί η οι πατέρες ημών βάρβαρον η 
"ΈΧΧηνα πόΧεμον 1 επιόντα προθύμως ημυνάμεθα, 
μακρη^ορΛν εν είδόσιν ου βουΧομενος, εάσω• 
άπο δε οίας τβ επιτηδβύσεως ηΧθομεν επ* αυτά 
και μεθ* οίας ποΧιτείας καϊ τρόπων εξ οίων 
μεηαΚα £ Γ γένετο, ταύτα δηΧώσας πρώτον ειμί καϊ 
επ\ τον τώνδε επαινον, νομίζων επί τε τω παρόντι 
ούκ αν άπρεπη Χεχθήναι αύτα καϊ τον πάντα 
δμιΧον καϊ αστών καϊ ξένων ξύμφορον είναι 
επακούσαι αυτών. 

XXXVII. " Χρώμεθα yap ποΧιτεία ου ζηΧού- 
στ) τους τώνπεΧας νόμους, παράδειγμα δε μάΧΧον 
αυτοί οντες τισϊν η μιμούμενοι έτερους. καϊ 
όνομα μεν δια το μη ες όΧί^ους άλλ* ες πΧείονας 
οικεΐν δημοκρατία κεκΧηται, μέτεστι δε κατά μεν 
τους νόμους προς τα ϊδια διάφορα πάσι το ϊσον, 
κατά δε την άξίωσιν, ώς έκαστος εν τω ευδοκιμεί, 
ούκ άπο μέρους το πΧέον ες τα κοινά ή απ' 
άρετης προτιμάται, ούδ' αύ κατά πενίαν, έχων δε 
τι ayaObv δρασαι την πόΧιν, αξιώματος άφανεία 
2 κεκώΧυται. εΧευθέρως δε τά τε προς το κοινον 
ποΧιτεύομεν καϊ ες την προς άΧΧηΧους τών καθ' 
ημεραν επιτηδευμάτων ύποψιαν, ού δι opy^ τον 
πέΧας, ει καθ' ηδονην τι δρα, έχοντες, ούδε άζψ 
1 πόλεμον, Hude adopts Haase's conjecture πο\4μιον. 

1 Alluding to the Spartans, whose institutions were said 
to have been borrowed from Crete ; in fact, throughout the 
whole speech the contrast is with Spartan conditions. 


BOOK II. χχχνι. 4-χχχνιι. 2 

our several possessions were acquired, whether 
in any case it were we ourselves or our fathers 
that valiantly repelled the onset of war, Bar- 
barian or Hellenic, I will not recall, for I have no 
desire to speak at length among those who know. 
But I shall first set forth by what sort of training we 
have come to our present position, and with what 
political institutions and as the result of what manner 
of life our empire became great, and afterwards pro- 
ceed to the praise of these men ; for I think that on 
the present occasion such a recital will be not in- 
appropriate and that the whole throng, both of citizens 
and of strangers, may with advantage listen to it. 

XXXV11. "We live under a form of government 
which does not emulate the institutions of our neigh- 
bours l ; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model 
which some 2 follow, rather than the imitators of 
other peoples. It is true that our government is 
called a democracy, because its administration is in the 
hands, not of the few, but of the many ; yet while 
as regards the law all men are on an equality for 
the settlement of their private disputes, as regards 
the value set on them it is as each man is in any way 
distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, 
not because he belongs to a particular class, but be- 
cause of personal merits ; nor, again, on the ground of 
poverty is a man barred from a public career by 
obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the 
state a service. And not only in our public life are 
we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from 
suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day 
life ; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour 

a Possible allusion to the embassy sent from Rome in 
454 B.C. to examine the laws of Solon (Livy, iii. 31). 



μίους μβν, λυπηρας δε ττ) όψει άχθηδόνας προστι- 
3 θεμενοι. άνεπαχθώς δε τα ϊδια προσομιλουντες 
τα δημοσία δια δέος μάλιστα ου παρανομοΰμεν, 
των τε αιει εν άργτ) όντων άκροάσει καΐ των 
νόμων, καϊ μάλιστα αυτών όσοι τε εττ ωφελία 
των αδικούμενων κείνται και όσοι άγραφοι οντες 
αίσχύνην όμολογουμένην φέρουσιν. 

XXXVIII. " Και μην και των πόνων πλείστας 
ανάπαυλας τη γνώμη επορισάμεθα, άγώσι μεν 
γε καϊ θυσίαις διετησίοις νομίζοντες, ίδίαις δέ 
κατασκευαΐς εύπρεπέσιν,ών καθ* ημέρανη τέρψις 

2 το λυπηρον εκπλήσσει. επεσέρχβται δε δια 
μέγεθος της πόλεως εκ πάσης γης τα πάντα, καϊ 
ξυμβαίνει ήμΐν μηδέν οίκειοτέρα τη απολαύσει 
τα αυτού αγαθά γιγνόμενα καρπουσθαι η καϊ τα 
των άλλων ανθρώπων. 

XXXIX. " Αιαφέρομεν δε καν ταΐς των πολε- 
μικών μελέταις των εναντίων τοΐσδε. την τε γαρ 
πόλιν κοινην παρέχομεν καϊ ουκ εστίν οτε ξένη- 
λασίαις άπειργομέν τίνα η μαθήματος η θεά μα- 
τος, ο μη κρυφθεν αν τις τών πολεμίων ιδων 
ώφεληθείη, πιστεύοντες ου ταΐς παρασκευαΐς το 

1 Referring especially to the contests at the chief festivals, 
like the Panathenaea and Dionysia, which by their artistic 
setting and performance were recreations of mind and spirit 
quite as much as physical exercises. 

2 Thucydides refers to the spiritual no less than to the 
physical products which the greatness of Athens attracts to 
her, to the poetry, music, and art which find there a con- 


BOOK II. χχχνιι. 2-χχχιχ. ι 

if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour 
looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. 
But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private 
intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from 
lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we 
render obedience to those in authority and to the 
laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained 
for the succour of the oppressed and those which, 
though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a 
disgrace which all men recognize. 

XXXVIII. "Moreover, we have provided for the 
spirit many relaxations from toil : we have games 1 
and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and 
homes fitted out with good taste and elegance ; and 
the delight we each day find in these things drives 
away sadness. And our city is so great that all the 
products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is 
the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our 
own soil with no more home-felt security of enjoy- 
ment than we do those of other lands. 2 

XXXIX. "We are also superior to our opponents 
in our system of training for warfare, and this in the 
following respects. In the first place, we throw our 
city open to all the world and we never by exclusion 
acts debar any one learning or seeing anything 
which an enemy might profit by observing if it were 
not kept from his sight ; for we place our depend- 
ence, not so much upon prearranged devices to 

genial home as well as to articles of commerce. On these 
latter compare a passage in the pseudo-Xenophontic Con- 
stitution of Athens (ii. 7), written somewhat earlier than this 
portion of Thucydides' history : " Whatever desirable thing 
is found in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the 
Peloponnesus, or anywhere else, all these things are brought 
together at Athens on account of her mastery of the sea." 



πΧέον καϊ άπάταις ή τω άφ' ημών αυτών ες τά 
epya εύψυχω• καϊ εν ταΐς παιδείαις οι μεν επι- 
πονω ασκήσει ευθύς νέοι οντες το άνδρεΐον 
μετέρχονται, ημεΐς 8ε άνειμενως διαιτώμενοι ούδεν 
ησσον επι τους ίσοπαΧεΐς κινδύνους γωροΰμεν. 

2 τεκμηριον δέ• ούτε yap Αακεδαιμόνιοι καθ* εαυ- 
τούς, μεθ* απάντων δε ες την yrjv ημών στρατεύ- 
ουσι, την τε τών πεΧας αυτοί επελθόντες ου 
χαΧεπώς εν ττ} άΧΧοτρία τους περί τών οικείων 
αμυνόμενους μαχόμενοι τα πΧείω κρατοΰμεν 

3 αθρόα τε ττ} δυνάμει ημών ουδείς πω ποΧεμιος 
ενετυγε δια την του ναυτικού τε άμα επιμεΧειαν 
και την εν τη yfj επί ποΧΧα ημών αυτών επί- 
πεμψιν* ην δε που μορίω τινί προσμείξωσι, 
κρατησαντες τε τινας ημών πάντας αύγούσιν 
άπεώσθαι και νικηθεντες ύφ απάντων ήσσήσθαι. 

4 καίτοι ει ραθυμία μάΧΧον η πόνων μεΧετη καϊ μη 
μετά νόμων το πΧεον ή τρόπων ανδρείας εθεΧομεν 
κινδυνβύειν, περ^'^νεται ήμΐν τοις τε μεΧΧουσιν 
άXyειvoΐς μη προκάμνειν, καϊ ες αυτά εΧθούσι 
μη άτοΧμοτέρουϊ τών αΐεϊ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι, 
καϊ εν τε τούτοις την ποΧιν άζίαν είναι θαυμά- 
ζεσθαι καϊ ετι εν άΧΧοις. 

XL. " ΦιΧοκαΧοΰμέν τε yap μετ εύτεΧείας και 
φιΧυσοφοΰμεν άνευ μαΧακίας• πΧούτω τε epyov 
μάΧΧον καιρώ η Xoyoυ κομπψ χρώμεθα, καϊ το 

1 Pericles here hints at his policy, outlined in ch. xiii. 2, 
of always acting on the defensive when the enemy forces are 
distinctly superior. 


BOOK II. xxxix. i-xl. ι 

deceive, as upon the courage which springs from our 
own souls when we are called to action. And again, 
in the matter of education, whereas they from early 
childhood by a laborious discipline make pursuit of 
manly courage, we with our unrestricted mode of life 
are none the less ready to meet any equality of 
hazard. 1 And here is the proof: When the Lace- 
daemonians invade our territory they do not come 
alone but bring all their confederates with them, 
whereas we, going by ourselves against our neigh- 
bours' territory, generally have no difficulty, though 
fighting on foreign soil against men who are defend- 
ing their own homes, in overcoming them in battle. 
And in fact our united forces no enemy has ever yet 
met, not only because we are constantly attending to 
the needs of our navy, but also because on land we 
send our troops on many enterprises ; but if they by 
chance engage with a division of our forces and defeat 
a few of us, they boast that they have repulsed us all, 
and if the victory is ours, they claim that they have 
been beaten by us all. If, then, by taking our ease 
rather than by laborious training and depending on a 
courage which springs more from manner of life than 
compulsion of laws, we are ready to meet dangers, the 
gain is all ours, in that we do not borrow trouble by 
anticipating miseries which are not yet at hand, and 
when we come to the test we show ourselves fully 
as brave as those who are always toiling ; and so our 
city is worthy of admiration in these respects, as well 
as in others. 

XL. " For we are lovers of beauty yet with no 
extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without 
weakness. Wealth we employ rather as an oppor- 
tunity for action than as a subject for boasting; 



πένεσθαι ούχ 6μο\οηεΐν τινι αίσχρον, άλλα μη 

2 hiafyevyetsV έργω αϊσχιον. ενι τε τοις αύτοΐς 
οικείων άμα και πολιτικών επιμέλεια καϊ ετέροις 1 
προς έργα τετραμμένοις τά πολιτικά μη ενδεώς 
yvcuvar μονοί yap τον τε μηδέν τώνδε μετέχοντα 
ουκ άττράημονα, άλλ άχρεΐον νομίζομεν, καϊ 
αυτοί 2 ήτοι κρίνομέν yε ή ενθυμούμεθα ορθώς τά 
πράγματα, ου τους λόγου? τοις βρηοις βλάβην 
ηγούμενοι, άλλα μη προδιδαχθηναι μάλλον λόγω 

3 προτερον η επί α δει έ'/ογω ελθεΐν. διαφερόντως 
yap 8η καϊ τόδε εχομεν ώστε τολμάν τε οι αυτοί 
μάλιστα κα\ περί ών επιχειρησομεν εκλοηιζεσθαι* 
ο τοις άλλοις άμαθία μεν θράσος, λογισμός δε 
οκνον φέρει. κράτ ιστοί δ' αν ψυχην δικαίως 
κριθεΐεν οι τά τε δείνα καϊ ηδέα σαφέστατα 
<γι<γνώσκοντες καϊ δια ταύτα μη άποτρεπομενοι 

4 εκ των κινδύνων, καϊ τα ες άρετην ενηντιώμεθα 
τοις πολλοίς* ου yap πάσχοντες ευ, άλλα δρώντες 
κτώμεθα τους φίλους, βεβαιότερος δε 6 δράσας 
την χάριν ώστε ώφειλομένην δι εύνοιας ω δέδωκε 
σωζειν 6 δε άντοφείλων άμβλύτερος, είδώς ουκ 
ές χάριν, άλλ' ώς οφείλημα την άρετην αποδώ- 

1 kripon < 'ίτ€ρα> , Hude. a Hude reads ol αυτοί. 

1 As contrasted with the Spartans, whose officials made the 
most important decisions. 


BOOK II. xl. 1-4 

and with us it is not a shame for a man to ac- 
knowledge poverty, but the greater shame is for 
him not to do his best to avoid it. And you 
will find united in the same persons an interest at 
once in private and in public affairs, and in others 
of us who give attention chiefly to business, you 
will find no lack of insight into political matters. 
For we alone regard the man who takes no part in 
public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, 
but as good for nothing ; and we Athenians decide 
public questions for ourselves 1 or at least endeavour 
to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the 
belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, 
but rather not to be instructed by debate before the 
time comes for action. For in truth we have this point 
also of superiority over other men, to be most daring 
in action and yet at the same time most given to re- 
flection upon the ventures we mean to undertake ; 
with other men, on the contrary, boldness means 
ignorance and reflection brings hesitation. And they 
would rightly be adjudged most courageous who, 
realizing most clearly the pains no less than the 
pleasures involved, do not on that account turn away 
from danger. Again, in nobility of spirit, we stand 
in sharp contrast to most men ; for it is not by 
receiving kindness, but by conferring it, that we 
acquire our friends. Now he who confers the 
favour is a firmer friend, in that he is disposed, 
by continued goodwill toward the recipient, to 
keep the feeling of obligation alive in him 2 ; but 
he who owes it is more listless in his friendship, 
knowing that when he repays the kindness it will 
count, not as a favour bestowed, but as a debt 

1 This must be the meaning of the Λστβ clause, but some- 
thing is perhapi wrong with the text. 

VOL. Ι. Μ ° y 


6 σων* και μονοί ου του ξυμφεροντος μάλλον 
λογισμω η της ελευθερίας τω πεστώ άδεώς τίνα 

XLI. " Ξυνελών τε λέγω την Τ€ ττάσαν πόλιν 
της Ελλαδο? παίδευσιν είναι και καθ* εκαστον 
δοκεΐν αν μοι τον αυτόν άνδρα παρ* ημών επί 
πλεϊστ αν είδη κ αϊ μετά 'χαρίτων μάλιστ αν 

2 εύτραπέλως το σώμα αΰταρκες παρεχεσθαι. καϊ 
ώς ου λόγων iv τω παρόντι κόμπος τάδε μάλλον 
ή έργων εστίν αλήθεια, αύτη ή δύναμις της 
πόλεως, ην άπο τώνδε τών τρόπων εκτησάμεθα, 

3 σημαίνει. μόνη yap τών νυν ακοής κρείσσων 
ες πεΐραν έρχεται, καϊ μόνη ούτε τω πολεμίω 
επελθόντι άγανάκτησιν έχει νφ' οίων κακοπαθεΐ, 
ούτε τω ύπηκόω κατάμεμψιν ώς ούχ υπο άξιων 

4 άρχεται. μετά μεγάλων δε σημείων καϊ ου δη 
τοι άμάρτυρόν ye την δύναμιν παρασχόμενοι 
τοις Τ€ νυν καϊ τοις έπειτα θαυμασθησόμεθα, 1 
ουδέν προσδεομενοι οΰτε Ομηρου επαινετού ούτε 
όστις επεσι μεν το αύτίκα τέρψει, τών δ' έργων 
την ύπόνοιαν ή αλήθεια βλάψει, άλλα πάσαν 
μεν θάλασσαν και γήν εσβατόν τη ημέτερα τόλμη 
καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχού δε μνημεία 

δ κακών τε κάγαθών άίδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες. περί 
τοιαύτης ούν πόλεως οΐδε τε γενναίως δικαιοΰντες 
1 κα\, before ovbev in the MSS., deleted by Kriiger. 

1 The reference is to Athenian colonies and cleruchies, 
which, according to the bearing of the natives, had been 


BOOK II. xl. 4-xli. s 

repaid. And, finally, we alone confer our benefits 
without fear of consequences, not upon a calculation 
of the advantage we shall gain, but with confidence 
in the spirit of liberality which actuates us. 

XLI. "In a word, then, I say that our city as a 
whole is the school of Hellas, and that, as it seems to 
me, each individual amongst us could in his own per- 
son, with the utmost grace and versatility, prove 
himself self-sufficient in the most varied forms of 
activity. And that this is no mere boast inspired by 
the occasion, but actual truth, is attested by the very 
power of our city, a power which we have acquired in 
consequence of these qualities. For Athens alone 
among her contemporaries, when put to the test, is 
superior to the report of her, and she alone neither 
affords to the enemy who comes against her cause 
for irritation at the character of the foe by whom 
he is defeated, nor to her subject cause for com- 
plaint that his masters are unworthy. Many are 
the proofs which we have given of our power and 
assuredly it does not lack witnesses, and there- 
fore we shall be the wonder not only of the 
men of to-day but of after times ; we shall need 
no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet 
whose verses may perhaps delight for the moment 
but whose presentation of the facts will be dis- 
credited by the truth. Nay, we have compelled 
every sea and every land to grant access to our 
daring, and have everywhere planted 1 everlasting 
memorials both of evil to foes and of good to friends. 
Such, then, is the city for which these men nobly 
fought and died, deeming it their duty not to let her 

attended with ill consequences for these {e.g. Oreos, and later 
Aegina) or good (e.g. on the Thracian coast). 



μη άφαιρεθήναι αύτην μαχόμενοι ετελεύτησαν 9 
καϊ των λειπομένων πάντα τίνα εικός εθελειν 
υπέρ αυτής κάμνειν. 

XLII. " Δι ο δη καΧ εμηκυνα τα περί της πό- 
λεως, διδασκαλίαν τ β ποιούμενος μη περί ίσου ημΐν 
είναι τον ay&va καϊ οίς τώνδε μηδέν υπάρχει 
ομοίως, καϊ την cvXoyiav άμα εφ? οΐς νυν λέγω 

2 φανεραν σημείοις καθιστάς, καϊ εϊρηται αυτής 
τα μέγιστα* a yap την πόλιν ύμνησα, αϊ τώνδβ 
καϊ των τοιώνδε άρεταϊ εκόσμησαν, καϊ ουκ αν 
πολλοίς των 'Ελλήνων Ισόρροπος ώσπερ τώνδε 
6 λόγο? των βρ Γ /ων φανείη. δοκεΐ δε μοι δηλούν 
ανδρός άρετην πρώτη τ€ μηνύουσα καϊ τελευταία 

3 βεβαιούσα ή νυν τώνδε καταστροφή, καϊ yap 
τοις ταλλα γείροσι δίκαιον την ες τους πολέμους 
υπέρ τής πατρίδος άvδpayaθιav προτίθεσθαι• 
ayaOcp yap κακόν άφανίσαντες κοινώς μάλλον 

4 ωφέλησαν ή εκ των ιδίων έβλαψαν, τωνδε δέ 
ούτε πλούτου τις την ετι άπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας 
εμαλακίσθη ούτε πενίας ελπίδι, ώς καν ετι δια- 
φυyωv αύτην χ πλουτήσειεν, άναβολην του δεινού 
εποιήσατο• την δε των εναντίων τιμωρίαν ποθεί- 
νοτέραν αυτών λαβόντες καϊ κινδύνων άμα τονδε 
κάλλιστον νομίσαντες εβουλήθησαν μετ αύτου 

1 αυτήν : Hude brackets. 

BOOK II. xli. 5-XL11. 4 

be taken from them ; and it is fitting that every man 
who is left behind should suffer willingly for her 

XLII. "It is for this reason that I have dwelt 
upon the greatness of our city ; for I have desired to 
show you that we are contending for a higher prize 
than those who do not enjoy such privileges in like 
degree, and at the same time to let the praise of these 
men in whose honour I am now speaking be made 
manifest by proofs. Indeed, the greatest part of 
their praise has already been spoken ; for when I 
lauded the city, that was but the praise wherewith 
the brave deeds of these men and men like them 
have already adorned her ; and there are not many 
Hellenes whose fame would be found, like theirs, 
evenly balanced with their deeds. And it seems to 
me that such a death as these men died gives proof 
enough of manly courage, whether as first revealing 
it or as affording its final confirmation. Aye, even in 
the case of those who in other ways fell short of 
goodness, it is but right that the valour with which 
they fought for their country should be set before all 
else ; for they have blotted out evil with good and 
have bestowed a greater benefit by their service to 
the state than they have done harm by their private 
lives. And no one of these men either so set his 
heart upon the continued enjoyment of wealth as to 
become a coward, or put off the dreadful day, yield- 
ing to the hope which poverty inspires, that if he 
could but escape it he might yet become rich ; but, 
deeming the punishment of the foe to be more de- 
sirable than these things, and at the same time 
regarding such a hazard as the most glorious of all, 
they chose, accepting the hazard, to be avenged 



τους μεν τιμωρεΐσθαι, των δε άφίεσθαι, εΧπίδι 
μεν το αφάνες του κατορθώσειν επιτρεψαντες, 
έργω δέ περί του ήδη όρωμενου σφίσιν αύτοΐς 
άξωΰντες πεποιθεναι* καϊ εν αύτω το 1 άμύ- 
νεσθαι καϊ 2 παθεϊν καΧΧιον 8 ήηησάμενοι ή το 4 
ενδόντες σωζεσθαι, το μεν αϊσχρον του λόγοι; 
εφυηον, το δ' ερηον τω σώματι ύπεμειναν, καΧ δι 
ελαχίστου καιρού τύχης άμα άκμτ) της δόζης 
μαΧΧον η του δέους άπηΧΧάηησαν. 

XLTIL u Kal οϊδε μεν προσηκόντως ττ) πόΧει 
τοιοίδε εηενοντο• τους δέ Χοιπους χρη άσφα- 
Χεστεραν μεν εΰχεσθαι, ατοΧμοτέραν δε μηδέν 
άξιουν την ες τους ποΧεμίους διάνοιαν εχειν, 
σκοπουντας μη λόγω μόνω την ώφεΧίαν, ήν αν 
τις προς ονδεν χείρον αυτούς ύμας 5 εΙΒότας μη- 
κύνοι, Χε<γων οσα εν τω τους ποΧεμίους άμύνεσθαι 
άγαθα εν εστίν, αλλά μαΧΧον την της πόΧεως 
δύναμιν καθ* ημεραν ερηω θ εω μένους καί εραστας 
ηνγνομένους αυτής, καϊ όταν ύμΐν με^άΧη δόξη 
είναι, ενθυμουμένους οτι τοΧμώντες καϊ ηιηνώ- 
σκοντες τα δέοντα καί εν τοις ερηοις αίσχυνόμενοι 
άνδρες αύτα εκτησαντο, καϊ οπότε καϊ πείρα του 
σφαΧεΐεν, ουκ οΰν καϊ την πόΧιν ye της σφετερας 
αρετής άξιουντες στερίσκειν, κάΧΧιστον δέ ερανον 

1 So most MSS. Hude reads τφ with CG. 
1 καί : Hude brackets. 

8 Dobree's correction for μάλλον of the MSS. Hude inserts 
5eu> and retains μάλλον. 4 Deleted by Hude. 

5 ύμά$ : Hude bracket•. 


BOOK II. xlii. 4-XL111. 1 

upon the enemy and to relinquish these other things, 
trusting to hope the still obscure possibilities of 
success, but in action, as to the issue that was before 
their eyes, confidently relying upon themselves. And 
then when the moment of combat came, thinking it 
better to defend themselves and suffer death rather 
than to yield and save their lives, they fled, indeed, 
from the shameful word of dishonour, but with life 
and limb stood stoutly to their task, and in the brief 
instant ordained by fate, at the crowning moment 
not of fear but of glory, they passed away. 

XLIII. u And so these men then bore themselves 
after a manner that befits our city; but you who 
survive, though you may pray that it be with less 
hazard, should resolve that you will have a spirit to 
meet the foe which is no whit less courageous ; and 
you must estimate the advantage of such a spirit not 
alone by a speaker's words, for he could make a 
long story in telling you — what you yourselves know 
as well as he — all the advantages that are to be gained 
by warding off the foe. Nay rather you must daily 
fix your gaze upon the power of Athens and become 
lovers of her, and when the vision of her greatness 
has inspired you, reflect that all this has been ac- 
quired by men of courage who knew their duty and 
in the hour of conflict were moved by a high sense 
of honour, who, if ever they failed in any enter- 
prise, were resolved that at least their country 
should not find herself deserted by their valour, but 
freely sacrificed to her the fairest offering l it was in 

1 %ρανο$ 9 a joint contribution, the regular term for a con- 
tribution made for mutual benefit, e.g. to a common meal, 
to a benevolent society, etc. Demosthenes (cont. Mid. 27) 
represents the state as a sort of benefit society to which 
every citizen owes a contribution. 



2 avrfi προϊέμενοι. KOivfj yap τα σώματα δίδοντες 
ίδια τον αηηρων επαινον εΧάμβανον καϊ τον 
τάφον ζπισημότατον, ουκ iv ω κείνται μάλΧον, 
αλλ' iv ω ή δόξα αυτών πάρα τω εντυγόντι αίεϊ 
κα\ \6ηου και βρηου καιρώ αίείμνηστος κατά- 

3 Χείπεται. ανδρών yap επιφανών πάσα yrj τάφος, 
καϊ ου στηΧών μόνον iv τη οικεία σημαίνει επι- 
ypaφη, άΧΧα και εν ττ} μη προσηκούση γράφος 
μνήμη παρ εκάστω της yvώμης μαΧΧον ή του 

4 εpyoυ ενδιαιτάται. ους νυν ύμεΐς ζηΧώσαντες 
καϊ το ευδαιμον το εΧεύθερον, το δ' εΧεύθερον το 
εΰψυχον κρίναντες, μη περιοράσθε τους ποΧεμι- 

5 κονς κινδύνους, ου yap ol κaκoπpayoυvτες δίκαιο- 
τερον άφειδοΐεν αν του βίου, οΐς εΧπϊς ουκ εστίν 
aya0oD, αλλ' οΐς η εναντία μεταβοΧη εν τω ζην 
ετι κινδυνεύβται καϊ εν οίς μάΧιστα μεyάXa τα 

6 διαφέροντα, ην τι πταίσωσιν. aXye.ivoTipa yap 
άνδρί yε φρόνημα εχοντι η μετά του 1 μαΧα~ 
κισθηναι κάκωσις η ο μετά ρώμης καϊ κοινής 
εΧπίδος α μα yιyvόμevoς αναίσθητος θάνατος. 

XLIY. "Δ^ όπερ και τους τώνδε νυν τοκέας, 
όσοι π αρεστέ, ουκ οΧοφύρομαι μάΧΧον ή παρα- 
μυθησομαι. εν ποΧυτρόποις yap ξυμφοραϊς επί- 
στανται τραφεντες* το δ' ευτυχές, 2 οι αν της 
ευπρεπέστατης Χάγωσιν, ωσπερ οΐδε μεν νυν, 
τεΧευτής, ύμεΐς δε Χύπης, καϊ 61ς ενευδαιμονησαι 
Τ€ 6 βίος ομοίως καϊ εντεΧευτήσαι ξυνεμετρήθη. 

1 4u τ£, in some MSS. before, in others after, μ€τά του, 
deleted by Bred ο w. 

2 Hude reads r68e €υτυχί$, following Abresch. 


BOOK II. xliii. i-xliv. ι 

their power to give. For they gave their lives for 
the common weal, and in so doing won for themselves 
the praise which grows not old and the most dis- 
tinguished of all sepulchres — not that in which they 
lie buried, but that in which their glory survives in 
everlasting remembrance, celebrated on every occa- 
sion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of 
emulation. For the whole world is the sepulchre of 
famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments 
set up in their own land that alone commemorates 
them, but also in lands not their own there abides in 
each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted 
in the heart rather than graven on stone. Do you, 
therefore, now make these men your examples, and 
judging freedom to be happiness and courage to be 
freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of 
war. For it is not those that are in evil plight who 
have the best excuse for being unsparing of their 
lives, for they have no hope of better days, but 
rather those who run the risk, if they continue to 
live, of the opposite reversal of fortune, and those to 
whom it makes the greatest difference if they suffer 
a disaster. For to a manly spirit more bitter is 
humiliation associated with cowardice than death 
when it comes unperceived in close company with 
stalwart deeds and public hopes. 

XLIV. " Wherefore, I do not commiserate the 
parents of these men, as many of you as are present 
here, but will rather try to comfort them. For they 
know that their lives have been passed amid manifold 
vicissitudes ; and it is to be accounted good fortune 
when men win, even as these now, a most glorious 
death — and you a like grief — and when life has been 
meted out to them to be happy in no less than to 



2 χαΧεπον μεν ουν οϊδα πείθειν ον, ων καϊ ποΧΧάκις 
εξετε υπομνήματα iv αΧΧων ευτυχίαις, αίς ποτέ 
καϊ αυτοί ήγάΧλβσθε• καϊ Χύπη ούχ ων αν τις μη 
πειρασάμενος αγαθών στερίσκηται, αλλ' ου αν 

3 έθας γενόμενος άφαιρεθτ). καρτερεΐν δε χρη καϊ 
αΧΧων παίδων εΧπίδι οΐς ετι ήΧικία τέκνωσιν 
ποιείσθαι* Ιδία τε yap τών ουκ όντων Χηθη οι 
επιγενόμενοι τισιν έσονται, καϊ ττ) πόΧει διχόθεν, 
εκ τε του μη ερημουσθαι καϊ άσφαΧεία, ξυνοίσεν 
ου yap οίον τε ϊσον τι η δίκαιον βουΧεύεσθαι οι 
αν μη καϊ παΐδας εκ του ομοίου παραβαΧΧόμενοι 

4 κινδυνεύωσιν. όσοι δ' αυ παρηβηκατε, τον τε 
πΧεονα κέρδος ον ηύτυχεΐτε βίον ^εΐσθε καϊ 
τόνδε βραχυν εσεσθαι, καϊ τί) τώνδε εύκΧεία 
κουφίζεσθε. το yap φιΧότιμον ^ηρων μόνον, 
καϊ ουκ εν τω άχρείω της ήΧικίας το κερδαίνειν, 
ωσπερ τινές φασι, μαΧΧον τέρπει, άΧΧά το 

XLV. "ΤΙαισι δ' αυ όσοι τώνδε πάρεστε ή 
άδεΧφοΐς ορώ μέyav τον αγώζ/α {τον yap ουκ 
οντά άπας εϊωθεν επαινεΐν), και μόΧις αν καθ* 
υπερβοΧην αρετής ούχ όμοιοι, αλλ' oXiytp χείρους 

1 No one could be a member of the Boule or Senate till he 
was thirty, when he was almost certain to be married ; and, 
according to Deinarchus (§71), no man was allowed to speak in 
the Assembly until he had legitimate male issue (Zimmern). 

2 e.g Simonides. cf. Plut. Moral. 786 b : Σιμωνίδη* ϊ\€γ* 
wphs robs 4yKa\ovvras αϋτψ <pi\apyvptav, Ζτι των άλλων άπ€- 



die in. It will be difficult, I know, to persuade 
you of the truth of this, when you will constantly be 
reminded of your loss by seeing others in the enjoy- 
ment of blessings in which you too once took de- 
light ; and grief, I know, is felt, not for the want of 
the good things which a man has never known, but 
for what is taken away from him after he has once 
become accustomed to it. But those of you who are 
still of an age to have offspring should bear up in 
the hope of other children ; for not only to many of 
you individually will the children that are born here- 
after be a cause of forgetfulness of those who are gone, 
but the state also will reap a double advantage — it 
will not be left desolate and it will be secure. For 
they cannot possibly offer fair and impartial counsel 
who, having no children to hazard, 1 do not have an 
equal part in the risk. But as for you who have 
passed your prime, count as gain the greater portion 
of your life during which you were fortunate and re- 
member that the remainder will be short ; and be 
comforted by the fair fame of these your sons. For 
the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and 
when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is 
not ' gain ' as some say, 2 that gives the greater 
satisfaction, but honour. 

XLV. " But for such of you here present as are 
sons and brothers of these men, I see the greatness of 
the conflict that awaits you — for the dead are always 
praised — and even were you to attain to surpassing 
virtue, hardly would you be judged, I will not say 

στερημένος δια το yrjpas η$ονων νπο μια.5 ίτι γηροβοσ κείται, τη$ 
αϊτό του κερδαίνειν, Simonides replied to those who charged him 
with love of money, that, deprived by old age of other pleasures, 
he μ still comforted by one, that of gain, 



κριθείτε, φθόνος γαρ τοις ζώσι προς το άντί- 
παλον, 1 το δε μη έμποδών άνανταγωνίστω εύνοια 

2 " ΈίΙ δε με δει καϊ γυναικείας τι αρετής, οσαι 
νυν εν χηρεία έσονται, μνησθήναι, βραχεία 
παραινέσει άπαν σημάνω, της τε yap ύπαρχου- 
σης φύσεως μη χείροσι γενέσθαι ύμΐν μεγάλη ή 
δόξα καϊ ης αν επ* ελάχιστον αρετής πέρι ή 
ψόγου εν τοις αρσεσι κλέος rj. 

XLVI. " Κΐρηται καϊ εμοϊ λόγω κατά τον 
νόμον οσα εϊχον πρόσφορα, καϊ έργω οι θαπτό- 
μενοι τα μεν ήδη κεκόσ μηνται, τα δε αυτών τους 
παΐδας το απο τούδε δημοσία η πόλις μέχρι ήβης 
θρέψει, ώφέλιμον στέφανον τοΐσδέ τε καϊ τοις 
Χειπομένοις τών τοιώνδε αγώνων προτιθεΐσα* 
άθλα γαρ οΐς κείται αρετής μέγιστα, τοις δε καϊ 

2 άνδρες άριστοι πολιτευουσιν. νυν δε άποΧο- 
φυράμενοι ον προσήκει έκάστω άπιτε" 

XLVII. Ύοιόσδε μεν ό τάφος εγένετο εν τω 
χειμώνι τούτω' καϊ διεΧθόντος αυτού πρώτον 

2 έτος του ποΧέμου τούτου ετεΧεύτα. του δε θέ- 
ρους ευθύς αρχομένου ΏεΧοποννήσιοι καϊ οι ζύμ- 
μαχοι τα δύο μέρη ώσπερ καΧ το πρώτον εσέ- 
βαΧον ες την Άττικήν (ήγεΐτο δε 'Αρχίδαμος ό 
Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς), καϊ κάθε- 

3 ζόμενοι εδτ]ονν την γήν. καϊ όντων αυτών ου 

1 vphs rb αντίπαλον, the reading of ABFMfG] ; rbv άκτί- 
tra\ou CE. Hude reads τών αντι-κάκων, after Croiset. 


BOOK II. xlv. i-xlvii. 3 

their equals, but even a little inferior. For there is 
envy of the living on account of rivalry, but that 
which has been removed from our path is honoured 
with a good-will that knows no antagonism. 

" If I am to speak also of womanly virtues, re- 
ferring to those of you who will henceforth be in 
widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition : 
Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard 
which nature has set for your sex, and great also is 
hers of whom there is least talk among men whether 
in praise or in blame. 

XLVI. " I have now spoken, in obedience to the 
law, such words as I had that were fitting, and those 
whom we are burying have already in part also 
received their tribute in our deeds ; 1 besides, the 
state will henceforth maintain their children at the 
public expense until they grow to manhood, thus 
offering both to the dead and to their survivors a 
crown of substantial worth as their prize in such con- 
tests. For where the prizes offered for virtue are 
greatest, there are found the best citizens. And 
now, when you have made due lament, each for his 
own dead, depart." 

XLVI I. Such were the funeral ceremonies that took 
place during this winter, the close of which brought 
the first year of this war to an end. At the very 
beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their 430 b.o, 
allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before, 2 in- 
vaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son 
of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and 
establishing themselves proceeded to ravage the 
country. And before they had been many days in 

1 i.e. the honours shown them throughout the rest of the 
ceremony, described in ch. xxxiv, as contrasted with the 
words of the eulogist. ■ cf. ch. x. 2. 



ποΧΧάς πω ημέρας εν τη 9 Αττική ή νόσος πρώτον 
ηρξατο γενέσθαι τοΐς 'Αθηναίος, Χεγόμενον μίν 
καϊ πρότερον ποΧΧαχόσε εγκατασκήψαι καϊ περί 
Αημνον και εν άΧΧοις γωρίοις, ου μέντοι τοσούτος 
γε Χοιμος ούδε φθορά οΰτως ανθρώπων ούδαμον 
4 εμνημονεύετο γενέσθαι, οΰτε γαρ ιατροί ήρκονν 
το πρώτον θεραπεύοντες άγνοια, αλλ,' αύτοι μά- 
Χιστα εθνησκον οσω καϊ μάλιστα προσησαν, 
οΰτε άΧΧη ανθρωπεία τέχνη ουδεμία' οσα τ€ 
προς ίεροΐς ίκέτευσαν η μαντείοις και τοΐς τοιού- 
το ις εχρησαντο, πάντα άνωφεΧή ην, τεΧευτώντές 
τε αυτών άπέστησαν υπο του κακοί) νικώμενοι. 

XLVIII. "Υίρξατο δε το μεν πρώτον, ως Χέ- 
ζεται, εξ Αιθιοπίας της υπ ε ρ Αιγύπτου, έπειτα 
δε καϊ ες Αϊγυπτον καϊ Αιβύην κατέβη καϊ ες 

2 την βασιΧέως γην την ποΧΧην. ες δε την 'Αθη- 
ναίων ποΧιν εζαπιναίως ενέπεσε, καϊ το πρώ- 
τον εν τω ΤΙειραιεΐ ήψατο τών ανθρώπων, ώστε 
καϊ έΧέγθη υπ αυτών ως οι ΤΙεΧοποννησιοι 
φάρμακα εσβεβΧήκοιεν ες τα φρέατα* κρηναι 
γαρ ούπω ήσαν αυτόθι, ύστερον δε καϊ ες 
την άνω πόλιν άφίκετο καϊ εθνησκον ποΧΧω 

3 μάΧΧον ηδη. Χεγέτω μεν ουν περί αύτου ως 
έκαστος γιγνώσκει καϊ ιατρός και ιδιώτης αφ* 
ότου είκος ην 1 γενέσθαι αυτό, και τάς αιτίας 
άστινας νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβοΧής ι καν ας 
είναι• 2 εγώ δε οΐόν τε εγίγνετο Χέξω καϊ αφ 
ων αν τις σκοπών, ει ποτέ καϊ αύθις επιπέσοι, 

1 1\ν : Hude deletes. 

1 ΰύναμιν is rh μ€ταστησαι σχεΐν, in the MSS. after cfreu, 
deleted by Gesner ; Hude deletes Ifcavks «Γναι and is rh 
μ^ταστησαι, with F. Mueller. 


BOOK II. xlvii. 3-XLV111. 3 

Attica the plague * began for the first time to show 
itself among the Athenians. It is said, indeed, to 
have broken out before in many places, both in Lemnos 
and elsewhere, though no pestilence of such extent 
nor any scourge so destructive of human lives is on 
record anywhere. For neither were physicians able 
to cope with the disease, since they at first had to treat 
it without knowing its nature, the mortality among 
them being greatest because they were most exposed 
to it, nor did any other human art avail. And 
the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to 
oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last men 
desisted from them, overcome by the calamity. 

XLVIII. The disease began, it is said, in Ethiopia 
beyond Egypt, and then descended into Egypt and 
Libya and spread over the greater part of the 
King's territory. Then it suddenly fell upon the 
city of Athens, and attacked first the inhabitants ot 
the Peiraeus, so that the people there even said that 
the Peloponnesians had put poison in their cisterns ; 
for there were as yet no public fountains there. But 
afterwards it reached the upper city also, and from 
that time the mortality became much greater. Now 
any one, whether physician or layman, may, each 
according to his personal opinion, speak about its 
probable origin and state the causes which, in his 
view, were sufficient to have produced so great a 
departure from normal conditions; but I shall de- 
scribe its actual course, explaining the symptoms, 
from the study of which a person should be best able, 

1 It is perhaps impossible to identify the plague of Athens 
with any known disease. Grote describes it as an eruptive 
typhoid fever. It has perhaps more symptoms in common 
with typhus than with any other disease. 



μά\ιστ αν εχοι τι προειδώς μη ayvoetv, ταύτα 
δηλώσω αυτό? τε νοσήσας καϊ αυτό? 18ών άλλους 

XLIX. Το μεν yap έτος, ώς ωμόλοηβΐτο εκ 
πάντων, μάλιστα δή εκείνο άνοσον ες τάς άΧλας 
ασθενείας βτνγχανβν ον ει δε τις καϊ προύκαμνέ 

2 τι, ες τούτο πάντα άπβκρίθη. τους δε άλλους απ* 
ουδεμιάς προφάσεως, αλλ' εξαίφνης ^ιβΐς οντάς 
πρώτον μβν της κεφαλής θέρμαι Ισχυραϊ καϊ των 
οφθαλμών ερυθήματα καϊ φ\όyωσις ελάμβανε, 
καϊ τα βντος, η τε φάρυξ καϊ ή y\ώσσa, ευθύς 
αίματώδη ην καϊ πνβΰμα άτοπον καϊ δυσώδες 

3 ήφίει' έπειτα εξ αυτών πτ αρμός καϊ βpάyχoς 
weyiyveTO, καϊ iv ου ποΧλω χρόνω κατεβαινεν ες 
τα στήθη 6 πόνος μετά βηχός Ισχυροί)' καϊ οπότε 
ες την καρδίαν στηρίξειεν, άνεστρεφέ τε αυτήν 
καϊ αποκαθάρσεις χο\ής πάσαι οσαι υπό Ιατρών 

4 ώνομασ μεναι είσιν επήσαν, καϊ αυταϊ μετά ταλαι- 
πωρίας μεyά\ης i \6yl; τε τοΐς πΧείοσιν ενέπιπτε 
κενή σπασμόν ενδιδοΰσα Ισχυρόν, τοΐς μεν μετά 
ταύτα Χωφήσαντα, τοΐς δβ καϊ ποΧλώ ύστερον. 

5 καϊ τω μβν έξωθεν άπτομένω το ι σώμα ούτ 
ayav θερμον ήν ούτε χλωρόν, άλΧ ύπέρυθρον, 
πεΧιτνόν, φλυκταίναις μικραΐς καϊ ελκεσιν εξην- 
θηκός* τά δε εντός ούτως εκαιετο ώστε μήτε τών 
πάνυ λεπτών Ιματίων καϊ σινδόνων τάς επιβολάς 
μη$ άλλο τι ή yυμvol άνεχεσθαι, ήδιστά τε αν ες 
ύδωρ ψυχρον σφάς αυτούς ρίπτειν (καϊ ποΧΧοϊ 
τούτο τών ήμεΧημενων ανθρώπων καϊ έδρασαν ες 
φρέατα) τη δίψη άπαύστω ξυνεχόμενοί' καϊ εν τψ 
όμοίω καθειστήκει τό τε π\έον καϊ έλασσον πο- 

1 Added by Hude. 


BOOK II. xlviii. 3-xux. 5 

having knowledge of it beforehand, to recognize it 
if it should ever break out again. For I had the 
disease myself and saw others sick of it. 

XLIX. That year, as was agreed by all, happened 
to be unusually free from disease so far as regards the 
other maladies ; but if anyone was already ill of any 
disease all terminated in this. In other cases from 
no obvious cause, but suddenly and while in good 
health, men were seized first with intense heat of the 
head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes, and 
the parts inside the mouth, both the throat and the 
tongue, immediately became blood-red and exhaled 
an unnatural and fetid breath. In the next stage 
sneezing and hoarseness came on, and in a short 
time the disorder descended to the chest, attended 
by severe coughing. And when it settled in the 
stomach, that was upset, and vomits of bile of every 
kind named by physicians ensued, these also attended 
by great distress ; and in most cases ineffectual 
retching followed producing violent convulsions, 
which sometimes abated directly, sometimes not 
until long afterwards. Externally, the body was not 
so very warm to the touch ; it was not pale, but 
reddish, livid, and breaking out in small blisters and 
ulcers. But internally it was consumed by such a 
heat that the patients could not bear to have on 
them the lightest coverings or linen sheets, but 
wanted to be quite uncovered and would have liked 
best to throw themselves into cold water — indeed 
many of those who were not looked after did throw 
themselves into cisterns — so tormented were they 
by thirst which could not be quenched ; and it was 
all the same whether they drank much or little. 



6 τόν. καΧ η απορία του μη ήσυχάζειν καΐ η aypv- 
πνία επέκειτο δια παντός. καΧ το σώμα, 6σονπ€ρ 
χρόνον και η νόσος άκμάζοι, ουκ εμαραίνετο, αλλ' 
άντείγε πάρα δόξαν τη ταΧαιπωρία, ώστε ή διε- 
φθείροντο οι πΧεΐστοι εναταΐοι καΧ εβδομαΐοι υπο 
του εντός καύματος, en έχοντες τι δυνάμεως, η ει 
διαφύ^οιεν, επικατ ιόντος του νοσήματος ες την 
κοιΧίαν καΧ εΧκώσεώς τε αυτί) Ισ-χυρας iyyiyvo- 
μενης καΧ διάρροιας άμα άκρατου επιπιπτούσης 
οι ποΧΧοΧ ύστερον δια την άσθένειαν διεφθείροντο. 

7 διεξηει yap δια παντός του σώματος άνωθεν άρξά- 
μενον το εν τη κεφαΧη πρώτον ιδρυθέν κακόν, καΧ 
ει τις εκ των μεyίστωv περ^ενοιτο, των yε άκρω- 

8 τηρίων άντίΧηψις αύτοΰ επεσήμαινεν κατέσκηπτε 
yap καΧ ες αιδοία καΧ ες άκρας χείρας καΧ πόδας, 
καΧ ποΧΧοΧ στερισκόμενοι τούτων διέφευyov, είσΧ 
8* οι καΧ των οφθαΧμών. τους δε καΧ Χηθη εΧαβε 
το παραυτίκα άναστάντας πάντων ομοίως καΧ 
^νόησαν σφάς τε αυτούς καΧ τους επιτηδείους. 

L. Υενόμενον yap κρεΐσσον λόγοι; το είδος της 
νόσου τά τε άΧΧα χαΧεπωτέρως η κατά την άν- 
θρωπείαν φύσιν προσεπιπτεν εκάστω καΧ εν τωδε 
εδηΧωσε μάΧιστα άΧΧο τι δν η των ξυντρόφων τι' 
τ a yap ορνεα καΧ τετράποδα οσα ανθρώπων άπτε- 
ται ποΧΧών άταφων yεvoμεvωv ή ου προσηει η 
2 yευσάμeva διεφθείρετο. τεκμήριον δέ• των μεν 


BOOK II. xlix. 5-l. 2 

They were also beset by restlessness and sleeplessness 
which never abated. And the body was not wasted 
while the disease was at its height, but resisted sur- 
prisingly the ravages of the disease, so that when the 
patients died, as most of them did on the seventh or 
ninth day from the internal heat, they still had some 
strength left; or, if they passed the crisis, the 
disease went down into the bowels, producing there 
a violent ulceration, and at the same time an acute 
diarrhoea set in, so that in this later stage most of 
them perished through weakness caused by it. For 
the malady, starting from the head where it was first 
seated, passed down until it spread through the 
whole body, and if one got over the worst, it seized 
upon the extremities at least and left its marks 
there ; for it attacked the privates and fingers and 
toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, though 
some lost their eyes also. 1 In some cases the sufferer 
was attacked immediately after recovery by loss of 
memory, which extended to every object alike, so 
that they failed to recognize either themselves or 
their friends. 

L. Indeed the character of the disease proved such 
that it baffles description, the violence of the attack 
being in each case too great for human nature to 
endure, while in one way in particular it showed 
plainly that it was different from any of the familiar 
diseases : the birds, namely, and the fourfooted 
animals, which usually feed upon human bodies, 
either would not now come near them, though many 
lay unburied, or died if they tasted of them. The 
evidence for this is that birds of this kind became 

1 Evidently as the result of gangrene, duo to stoppage of 
circulation. This after-effect of typhus was of common oc- 
currence in the outbreak in the Balkans in 1915. 



τοιούτων ορνίθων επίΧειψις σαφής iyevero, καϊ 
ούχ εωρώντο ούτε αΧλως ούτβ περί τοιούτον ούΒεν 
οι Βε κύνες μάΧλον αϊσθησιν παρεΐχον του άπο- 
βαίνοντος Βια το ξυνΒιαιτασθαι. 

LI. Το μεν ούν νόσημα, ποΧΧα καϊ αΧΚα πάρα- 
Χιπόντι άτοπίας, ώς εκάστω iTvyyavk τι Βιαφε- 
ρόντως ετέρω προς έτερον ηι^νομενον, τοιούτον ην 
επί πάν την ΙΒέαν. καϊ άΧΧο παρεΧύπει κατ 
εκείνον τον χρόνον ούΒεν των είωθότων* ο Βε καϊ 

2 yevoiTo, ες τούτο ετεΧεύτα. εθν^σκον Βε οι μεν 
άμεΧεία, οι Be καϊ πάνυ θεραπευόμενοι. εν τ€ 
ούΒεν κατέστη ϊαμα ώς ειπείν ο τι χρην προσφέ- 
ροντας ώφεΧεΐν (το yap τω l;vveveyKov άΧλον 

3 τούτο εβΧαπτε), σώμα τε αΰταρκες δν ούΒεν Bie- 
φάνη προς αύτο ισχύος περί η ασθενείας, άλλα 
πάντα ξυν^ρει καϊ τα πάσγ Βιαίττ) θεραπευόμενα. 

4 Βεινότατον 8ε παντός ην τού κακού ή τε άθυμία, 
οπότε τις αίσθοιτο κάμνων (προς yap το άνεΧ- 
πιστον ευθύς τραπόμενοι ττ) yvώμη ποΧΧω μάλ- 
Χον προίεντο σφάς αυτούς καϊ ουκ άντεΐχον), και 
οτι έτερος άφ' ετέρου θεραπεία άναπιμπΧάμενοι 
ωσπερ τα πρόβατα εθνρσκον καϊ τον πΧεΐστον 

5 φθόρον τούτο ενεποίει. εϊτε yap μη *θέ\οιεν Βε- 
Βιότες άΧληΧοις προσιέναι, άπώΧλυντο έρημοι, 
καϊ οΐκίαι ποΧλαϊ εκενώθησαν απορία τού θερα- 
πεύσοντος* εϊτε προσίοιεν, Βιεφθείροντο, καϊ μα- 


BOOK II. l. 2-li. 5 

noticeably scarce, and they were no longer to be 
seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; 
while the dogs gave a still better opportunity to 
observe what happened, because they live with 

LI. Such, then, was the general nature of the 
disease ; for I pass over many of the unusual symp- 
toms, since it chanced to affect one man differently as 
compared with another. And while the plague lasted 
there were none of the usual complaints, though if 
any did occur it ended in this. Sometimes death 
was due to neglect, but sometimes it occurred in spite 
of careful nursing. And no one remedy was found, 
I may say, which was sure to bring relief to those 
applying it — for what helped one man hurt another 
— and no constitution, as it proved, was of itself 
sufficient against it, whether as regards physical 
strength or weakness, 1 but it carried off all without 
distinction, even those tended with all medical 
care. And the most dreadful thing about the 
whole malady was not only the despondency of 
the victims, when they once became aware that 
they were sick, for their minds straightway yielded 
to despair and they gave themselves up for lost 
instead of resisting, but also the fact that they 
became infected by nursing one another, and died 
like sheep. And this caused the heaviest mor- 
tality ; for if, on the one hand, they were restrained 
by fear from visiting one another, the sick perished 
uncared for, so that many houses were left empty 
through lack of anyone to do the nursing ; or if, on 
the other hand, they visited the sick, they perished, 

1 i.e. "no constitution was of itself strong enough to 
resist or weak enough to escape the attacks" (Jowett). 



Χιστα oi αρετής τι μετ απ ο ιού μεν ο ι* αίσχύντρ yap 
ήφείδουν σφών αυτών εσιόντες πάρα, τους φίΧους, 
επεϊ και τας όΧοφύρσεις τών απ oycyvo μένων τβ- 
Χευτώντες καΐ οι οικείοι εξέκαμνον ύπο του ποΧΧού 
6 κακού νικώ μεν οι. επι πΧεον δ' όμως οι Βιαπε- 
φευ^ότες τον τε θνήσκοντα και τον πονούμενον 
ωκτίζοντο Βια το προειΒεναι τε καϊ αυτοί ή8η εν 
τω θαρσαΧέω είναι* Βϊς yap τον αυτόν, ώστε καϊ 
κτείνειν, ουκ επεΧάμβανεν. και εμακαρίζοντό τε 
υπο τών αΧΧων καϊ αυτοί τω παραχρήμα περί- 
χαρεΐ καϊ ες τον έπειτα χρόνον εΧπίΒος τι είχον 
κουφής μη$* αν υπ άΧΧου νοσήματος ποτέ ετι 

LIL Έπίεσε δ' αυτούς μάΧΧον προς τω υπάρ- 
χοντι πόνω καϊ ή ξυyκoμιδη εκ τών ^ρών ες το 

2 άστυ, καϊ ούχ ήσσον τους επεΧθόντας. οικιών 
yap ούχ ύπαρχου σών, αλλ,' εν καΧύβαις πν^ηραΐς 
ωρα έτους διαιτω μένων 6 φθόρος εyίyvετo ούΒενι 
κόσμω, άΧΧα καϊ νεκροί επ* άΧΧηΧοις αποθνή- 
σκοντες εκειντο καϊ εν ταΐς οΒοΐς εκαΧινδοΰντο καϊ 
περί τας κρηνας απάσας ήμιθνήτες του ύδατος 

3 επιθυμία, τα τε ιερά εν οΐς εσκηνηντο νεκρών 
πΧεα ην, αυτού εναποθνγσ κοντών* ύπερβιαζο- 
μενού yap τού κακού οι άνθρωποι, ούκ έχοντες δ 
τι yεvωvτaι, ες οΧ^ωρίαν ετράποντο καϊ ιερών 

4 καϊ οσίων ομοίως. νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταρά- 
χθησαν οϊς εχρώντο πρότερον περί τας ταφάς, 


BOOK II. li. 5-L11. 4 

especially those who made any pretensions to good- 
ness. For these made it a point of honour to visit 
their friends without sparing themselves at a time 
when the very relatives of the dying, overwhelmed 
by the magnitude of the calamity, were growing 
weary even of making their lamentations. But still 
it was more often those who had recovered who had 
pity for the dying and the sick, because they had 
learnt what it meant and were themselves by this 
time confident of immunity ; for the disease never 
attacked the same man a second time, at least not 
with fatal results. And they were not only con- 
gratulated by everybody else, but themselves, in the 
excess of their joy at the moment, cherished also a 
fond fancy with regard to the rest of their lives that 
they would never be carried off by any other disease. 
LII. But in addition to the trouble under which 
they already laboured, the Athenians suffered further 
hardship owing to the crowding into the city of the 
people from the country districts ; and this affected 
the new arrivals especially. For since no houses 
were available for them and they had to live in huts 
that were stifling in the hot season, they perished in 
wild disorder. Bodies of dying men lay one upon 
another, and half-dead people rolled about in the 
streets and, in their longing for water, near all the 
fountains. The temples, too, in which they had 
quartered themselves were full of the corpses of those 
who had died in them ; for the calamity which 
weighed upon them was so overpowering that men, 
not knowing what was to become of them, became 
careless of all law, sacred as well as profane. And 
the customs which they had hitherto observed re- 
garding burial were all thrown into confusion, and 



εθαπτον δε ώς έκαστος έδύνατο. καϊ ποΧΧοϊ ες 
αναίσχυντους θήκας ετράποντο σπάνει των επι- 
τηδείων δια, το συχνούς ηδη προτεθνάναι σφίσιν 
επι πύρας yap άΧΧοτρίας φθάσαντες τους νησ ον- 
τάς οι μεν έπιθέντες τον εαυτών νεκρον ύφήπτον, 
οι 8ε καιομένου αΧΧον επιβαΧόντες άνωθεν ον 
φέροιεν άπησαν. 

LIII. ΥΙρώτόν τε ηρζε καϊ ες ταΧΧα τη ποΧει 
επί πΧέον ανομίας το νόσημα, paov yap ετόΧμα 
τις α πρότερον απεκρύπτετο μη καθ* ηδονην 
ποιεΐν, ^χίστροφον την μεταβοΧην όρώντες των 
τε εύδαιμονων καϊ αιφνιδίως θνησκόντων καϊ των 
ουδέν πρότερον κεκτημένων, ευθύς δε τάκείνων 

2 εχόντων, ώστε ταχείας τας επαυρέσεις και προς 
το τερπνόν ήξίουν ποιεΐσθαι, εφήμερα τά τε σώ- 

3 ματα καϊ τα χρήματα ομοίως ^ούμενοι. καϊ το 
μεν προταΧαιπωρεΐν 1 τω δόξαντι καΧω ουδείς πρό- 
θυμος ην, άδηΧον νομίζων ει πρϊν €7Γ αυτό εΧθεϊν 
διαφθαρησεται, ο τι δε ήδη τε ηδύ πανταχόθεν τε 
ες αυτό κερδαΧέον, τούτο καϊ καΧον καϊ χρησιμον 

4 κατέστη, θεών δε φόβος ή ανθρώπων νόμος ου- 
δείς άπεΐpyε, το μεν κρίνοντες εν όμοίω και σέβειν 
και μη εκ του πάντας όράν εν ϊσω άποΧΧυ μένους, 
των δε αμαρτημάτων ουδείς εΧπίζων μέχρι του 

1 With CE, the other MSS. ΐΓροσταλαι-κωρέιν. 

1 i.e. they concealed the fact that they were acting after 
their own pleasure (the μή being induced by the negative 
idea in απ€κρύιττ€το). 


BOOK II. lii. 4-L111. 4 

they buried their dead each one as he could. And 
many resorted to shameless modes of burial because 
so many members of their households had already 
died that they lacked the proper funeral materials. 
Resorting to other people's pyres, some, anticipating 
those who had raised them, would put on their own 
dead and kindle the fire ; others would throw the 
body they were carrying upon one which was already 
burning and go away. 

LI 1 1. In other respects also the plague first in- 
troduced into the city a greater lawlessness. For 
where men hitherto practised concealment, that 
they were not acting purely after their pleasure, 1 
they now showed a more careless daring. They 
saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the 
case both of those who were prosperous and sud- 
denly died, and of those who before had nothing 
but in a moment were in possession of the pro- 
perty of the others. And so they resolved to get 
out of life the pleasures which could be had 
speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their 
bodies and their wealth alike as transitory. And 
no one was eager to practise self-denial in prospect 
of what was esteemed honour, 2 because everyone 
thought that it was doubtful whether he would live 
to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and 
whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be 
regarded as at once honourable and expedient. No 
fear of gods or law of men restrained ; for, on the 
one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, 
they judged that piety and impiety came to the same 
thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he 

2 Or, reading ιτροσταΚαιπωρ*Ίν 9 "to take trouble about what 
was esteemed honour." 



Βίκην γενέσθαι βιονς &v την τιμωρίαν άντιΒονναι, 
ποΧύ Βε μείζω την ηΒη κατεψηφισμένην σφων 
επικρεμασθήναι, ήν πρϊν εμπεσεΐν et/cbs είναι του 
βίου τι άποΧανσαι. 

LIV. Ύοιοντω μεν πάθει οι 'Αθηναίοι περιπε- 
σόντες επιεζοντο, ανθρώπων τ ενΒον θνησκόντων 

2 καϊ/γήϊ ££ω Βτ)θνμενης. iv Bk τω κακω οία εικός 
άνεμνησθησαν και τοΰΒε τον έπους, φάσκοντες οι 
πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι αΒεσθαι ""ϊίξει Αωριακος πό- 

8 Χεμος και Χοιμός άμ αντωΓ εηενετο μ\ν ονν ερις 
τοις άνθρωποι? μη Χοιμον ώνομάσθαι εν τω επει 
υπό των παΧαιων, άλλα Χιμόν, ενικησε Β\ επι τον 
παρόντος εΐκότως Χοιμον είρήσθαι• οι yap άνθρω- 
ποι προς α επασγρν την μνήμην εποιονντο. ην 
Βέ γε οΐμαί ποτέ αΧΧος πόΧεμος καταΧάβη Δω- 
ρικός τονΒε νστερος καϊ ζνμβί) γενέσθαι Χιμόν, 

4 κατά το εικός όντως ασονται. μνήμη Βε εγενετο 
και του ΑακεΒαιμονίων χρηστηρίον τοις ειΒόσιν, 
δτε επερωτώσιν αύτοΐς τον θεον ει χρη ποΧεμεΐν 
άνεΐΧε κατά κράτος ποΧεμοΰσι νίκην εσεσθαι, καϊ 

δ αντός εφη ξνΧΧήψεσθαι. περί μεν ουν τον χρή- 
στη ρίον τά ηιηνόμενα ηκαζον όμοια είναι 9 εσβε- 
βΧηκότων Βε των ΤΙεΧοποννησίων ή νόσος ηρξατο 
ενθνς. καϊ ες μεν ΤΙεΧοιτόννησον ονκ εσηΧθεν, δ 
τι και άξιον ειπείν, επενείματο Βε 'Αθήνας μεν 

1 φ ι. cxviii. 3. 

BOOK II. liii. 4-liv. 5 

would live to be called to account and pay the penalty 
of his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that 
the penalty already decreed against them, and now 
hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one, and 
that before this fell it was only reasonable to get 
some enjoyment out of life. 

LIV. Such then was the calamity that had befallen 
them by which the Athenians were sore pressed, 
their people dying within the walls and their land 
being ravaged without. And in their distress they 
recalled, as was natural, the following verse which 
their older men said had long ago been uttered : 

"A Dorian war shall come and pestilence with it." 

A dispute arose, however, among the people, some 
contending that the word used in the verse by the 
ancients was not λοιμός " pestilence/' but λιμός, 
"famine," and the view prevailed at the time that 
"pestilence" was the original word; and quite 
naturally, for men's recollections conformed to their 
sufferings. But if ever another Dorian war should 
visit them after the present war and a famine 
happen to come with it, they would probably, I fancy, 
recite the verse in that way. Those, too, who were 
familiar with it, recalled that other oracle given to the 
Lacedaemonians, when, in answer to their inquiry 
whether they should go to war, the god responded 
that if they " warred with all their might victory 
would be theirs," adding that he himself would 
assist them. 1 Now so far as the oracle is concerned, 
they surmised that what was then happening was 
its fulfilment, for the plague broke out immediately 
after the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica; and 
though it did not enter the Peloponnesus to any 
extent, it devastated Athens most of all, and next 



μάλιστα, έπειτα Βε καϊ τών αΧΧων χωρίων τά 
ποΧυανθ ρωποτατα. ταύτα μεν τα κατά την νοσον 

LV. Οι δέ ΤΙεΧοποννήσιοι επειΒη ετεμον το 
πεΒίον,παρήΧθον ίςτηρ ΥΙάραΧον γήν καΧουμένην 
μέχρι Ααυρείου, ου τα άργύρεια μέταΧΧά εστίν 
Άθηναίοις. καϊ πρώτον μεν ετεμον ταντην y 
προς ΤΙεΧοπόννησον όρα, έπειτα Be την προς 
2 Έύβοιάν τε καϊ "ΑνΒρον τετραμμένην. ΤΙερικΧής 
Βε στρατηγός ων και τότε περί μεν τον μη επεξι- 
έναι τους Αθηναίους την αυτήν γνώμην είχεν 
ώσπερ καϊ εν τη πρότερα εσβοΧη. 

LVI. "Ετ* δ' αυτών iv τω πεΒίω όντων, πριν 
ες την παραΧίαν εΧθεΐν, εκατόν νέων επίπλουν 
τη ΐΙεΧοποννήσω παρεσκευάζετο, και επειΒη 

2 έτοιμα ην, άνήγετο. ηγε δ' επι τών νεών όπΧίτας 
7 Αθηναίων τετρακισχιΧίους καϊ ιππέας τριακό- 
σιους εν ναυσϊν ιππαγωγοΐς πρώτον τότε εκ τών 
παλαιών νεών ποιηθείσαις• ξυνεστρατεύοντο Βε 

3 και Χΐοι καϊ Αέσβιοι πεντήκοντα ναυσίν. δτβ Βε 
άνήγετο η στρατιά αυτή 'Αθηναίων, ΤΙεΧοπον- 
νησίους κατέλιπον της 'Αττικής οντάς εν ττ} 

4 παραΧία. άφικομενοι Βε ες ΈπίΒαυρον της Πβλο- 
ποννήσου ετεμον της γης την ποΧΧην, καϊ προς 
την ποΧιν προσβαΧόντες ές εΧπίΒα μεν ηΧθον 

δ του έΧεΐν, ου μέντοι προυχώρησέ γε. avay αγό- 
μενοι Βε εκ της ' Επιδαύρου ετεμον την τε Ύροζη- 
νίΒα γήν καϊ 'ΑΧιάΒα καϊ ΈρμιονίΒα• εστί Βε 
ταύτα πάντα επιθαΧάσσια της ΤΙεΧοποννήσου. 

6 άραντες Βε απ* αυτών άφίκοντο ες ΙΙρασιάς, της 


BOOK II. liv. s-lvx. 6 

to Athens the places which had the densest popula- 
tion. So much for the history of the plague. 

LV. The Peloponnesians, after ravaging the plain, 
advanced into the district called Paralus l as far as 
Laurium, where are the silver mines of the Athe- 
nians. And first they ravaged that part of this 
district which looked towards the Peloponnesus, and 
afterwards the part facing Euboea and Andros. But 
Pericles, who was general, still held to the same 
policy as during the earlier invasion, insisting that 
the Athenians should not take the field against 

LVI. But before they had left the plain and entered 
the Paralus, Pericles had begun to equip a fleet of a 
hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnesus, and 
when all was ready he put to sea. He took with 
him on the ships tour thousand Athenian hoplites 
and three hundred cavalry in horse-transports, then 
employed for the first time, which had been made 
out of the old galleys. The Chians and Lesbians 
also took part in the expedition with fifty ships. 
And when this armament of the Athenians put to 
sea, the Peloponnesians whom they left in Attica 
were already in the Paralian district. On reaching 
Epidaurus in the Peloponnesus the Athenians ra- 
vaged most of that land ; they also attacked the city, 
but, though they at first had hopes of taking it, they 
did not succeed. Then, leaving Epidaurus, they went 
to sea again, and ravaged the territory of Troezen, 
Halieis, and Hermione, which are all on the Pelo- 
ponnesian coast. Sailing next from this region they 

1 The plain referred to was that about Athens, while the 
Paralian district was the sea-coast, or south-eastern part, 
terminating in the promontory of bunium. 



λακωνικής πόΧισμα επιθαΧάσσιον, καϊ της τβ 
7*7? ετεμον καϊ αύτο το πόΧισμα εΐΧον καϊ επόρ- 
θησαν. ταύτα he ποιήσαντες επ' υΐκον άνεχώ- 
ρησαν. τους οε ΤΙεΧοποννησίους ούκετι κατεΧαβον 
εν τη 'Αττική οντάς, άΧΧ' αν ακεχωρη κότας. 

LVIL "Οσον δέ χρόνον οι τε ΤΙεΧοποννησιοι 
ήσαν iv τη yfj τη 'Αθηναίων καϊ oi 'Αθηναίοι 
εστράτευον επί των νέων, ή νόσος εν τ€ ttj στρα- 
τιά τους Αθηναίους έφθειρε καϊ iv τη πόΧει, ώστε 
καϊ ελέχθη τους ΤΙεΧοποννησίους δείσαντας το 
νόσημα, ώς επυνθάνοντο των αύτομόΧων οτι iv 
τη πόΧει €Ϊη καϊ θάπτοντας άμα ησθάνοντο, 

2 θάσσον εκ της 'γης εξεΧθεΐν. τη δε εσβοΧη ταύτη 
πΧεΐστόν τε χρόνον ενεμειναν καϊ την ηήν πασαν 
ετεμον* ημέρας yap τεσσαράκοντα μάΧιστα εν τη 
yfj τή 'Αττική εγένοντο. 

LVIII. Ύοΰ δ' αυτοΰ θέρους" Αγνών ο Νικίου 
καϊ Κ,Χεόπομπος ο ΚΧεινίου, ξυστράτηγοι οντες 
ΤΙερικΧεους, Χαβόντες την στρατιάν ηπερ εκείνος 
εχρήσατο εστράτευσαν ευθύς επί Χαλ/αδβα? τους 
επί Θράκης καϊ ΙΙοτείδαιαν ετι ποΧιορκουμενην, 
άφικόμενοι δε μηχανάς τε τη ΤΙοτειδαία προσέ- 

2 φερον καϊ παντϊ τρόπω επειρώντο εΧεΐν. πρου- 
χωρει δε αύτοΐς ούτε η αϊρεσις της πόΧεως ούτε 
τάΧΧα της παρασκευής άξίως* επιγενόμενη yap 
η νόσος ενταύθα 8η πάνυ επίεσε τους 'Αθη- 
ναίους, φθείρουσα την στρατιάν, ώστε καϊ τους 
προτέρους στρατιώτας νοσήσαι των Αθηναίων 
απο τής ξυν " Αγνών ι στρατιάς εν τω προ του 

1 On the expedition against the Peloponnesian coasts, cj. 
ch. lvi. ■ cf. i. lxiv. 


BOOK II. lvi. 6-lviii. 2 

came to Prasiae, a town on the coast of Laconia, 
where they not only ravaged parts of the country, 
but also captured the town itself and pillaged it. 
After they had completed these operations they went 
back home, where they found that the Peloponne- 
sians were no longer in Attica but had retired. 

LVI I. During this entire period, while the Pelo- 
ponnesians were in Attica and the fleet of the Athe- 
nians was on the expedition, the plague was making 
havoc among the Athenians, both in their fleet and 
in the city. The statement was therefore made that 
the Peloponnesians left Attica in haste because they 
were afraid of the disease, since they not only heard 
from deserters that it was in the city, but also could 
see them burning their dead. In this invasion, how- 
ever, they remained in Attica longer than at any 
other time, and also ravaged the entire country ; 
indeed they were in Attica almost forty days. 

LVI 1 1. In the same summer Hagnon son ot 
Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias, colleagues 
of Pericles, taking the armament which he had 
employed, 1 at once set out on an expedition 
against the Chalcidians in Thrace and against Poti- 
daea, which was still under siege, 2 and on their 
arrival they brought siege -engines to bear upon 
Potidaea, and tried in every way to take it. But no 
success commensurate with the appointments of the 
expedition attended their efforts, either in their at- 
tempt to capture the city or otherwise ; for the 
plague broke out and sorely distressed the Athenians 
there, playing such havoc in the army that even the 
Athenian soldiers of the first expedition, 3 who had 
hitherto been in good health, caught the infection 

8 The 3,000 soldiers of the first expedition ; cf. ch. xxxi. 2 
and 1. lxi. 4. 



χρόνω υγιαίνοντας. Φορμίων δέ κα\ οι εξακόσιοι 
3 καϊ χίΧιοι ούκετι ήσαν περί ΧαΧκιΒέας. 6 μεν 
ουν "Αγνών άνεχώρησε ταϊς νανσϊν ες τας ' Αθή- 
νας, άπο τ€τ ρακισχιΧιων όπΧιτών χίλιους καϊ 
πεντήκοντα τη νοσώ άποΧεσας iv τεσσαράκοντα 
μάΧιστα ήμέραις• οι Βε πρότεροι στρατιώται 
κατά χωράν μένοντες εποΧιόρκουν την ΙΙοτεί- 

LIX. Μβτά Βε την Βευτεραν εσβοΧην των 
ΤΙεΧοποννησίων οι ' Αθηναίοι, ως ή τ€ γη αυτών 
ετέτμητο το δεύτερον καϊ η νόσος επεκειτο άμα 

2 καϊ 6 ποΧεμος, ηΧΧοίωντο τας γνώμας, καϊ τον 
μεν ΤΙερικΧεα iv αιτία είχον ως πείσαντα σφάς 
ποΧεμεΐν καϊ Βι* εκείνον ταΐς ζυμφοραϊς ττερι- 
πεπτωκότες, προς Βε τους ΑακεΒαιμονίους ωρ- 
μηντο ξυγχωρεΐν καϊ πρέσβεις τινας πεμψαντες 
ως αυτούς άπρακτοι εγενοντο. πανταχόθεν τε 
τη γνώμη άποροι καθεστηκοτες ενεκειντο τω 

3 ΤΙερικΧεΐ. 6 Βε ορών αυτούς προς τα παρόντα 
χαΧεπαίνοντας καϊ πάντα ποιουντας απερ αύτος 
ηΧπιζε, ξύΧΧογον ποιησας (ετι δ' εστρατηγει) 
έβούΧετο θαρσυναί τε καϊ άπαγαγών το οργιζό- 
μενον της γνώμης προς το ήπιώτερον καϊ άδβ- 
έστερον καταστήσαι• παρεΧθών Βε εΧεξε τοιάΒε. 

LX. " Και προσΒεχομενω μοι τα της οργής 
υμών ες με γεγενηται (αισθάνομαι γαρ τας αιτίας) 
καϊ εκκΧησίαν τούτου ένεκα ξυνήγαγον, όπως 
υπομνησω καϊ μεμψωμαι ει τι μη ορθώς η εμοϊ 


from Hagnon's troops. Phormio, however, and his 
sixteen hundred men, were no longer in Chalcidice. 1 
Accordingly Hagnon took his fleet back to Athens, 
having lost by the plague in about forty days one 
thousand and fifty out of a total of four thousand 
hoplites ; but the soldiers of the former expedition 
remained where they were and continued the siege 
of Potidaea. 

LIX. After the second invasion of the Peloponne- 
sians the Athenians underwent a change of feeling, 
now that their land had been ravaged a second time 
while the plague and the war combined lay heavily 
upon them. They blamed Pericles for having per- 
suaded them to go to war and held him responsible 
for the misfortunes which had befallen them, and 
were eager to come to an agreement with the Lace- 
daemonians. They even sent envoys to them, but 
accomplished nothing. And now, being altogether 
at their wits' end, they assailed Pericles. And when 
he saw that they were exasperated by the present 
situation and were acting exactly as he had himself 
expected, he called a meeting of the assembly — for 
he was still general — wishing to reassure them, and 
by ridding their minds of resentment to bring them 
to a milder and less timorous mood. So he came 
forward and spoke as follows : 

LX. " I have been expecting these manifestations 
of your wrath against me, knowing as I do the causes 
of your anger, and my purpose in calling an assembly 
was that I might address to you certain reminders, 
and remonstrate if in any case you are either angry 

1 cf. i. lxiv. 2. Phormio's departure must have occurred 
before the events described in ch. xxxi. 2, but is nowhere 

vol• ι. ν 3 61 


2 χαΧβπαίνετε ή ταΐς ξυμφοραΐς el/cere, εγώ yap 
ηγούμαι πόΧιν πΧείω ξύμπασαν ορθουμενην ωφε- 
Χεΐν τους ΙΒιώτας ή καθ' εκαστον των πολιτών 

3 €υπρα Γ γονσαν, αθρόαν Βε σφαΧΧομενην. καΧώς 
μεν yap φερόμενος άνηρ το καθ' εαυτόν Βιαφθειρο- 
μένης της πατρίΒος ουΒεν ησσον ξυναττόΧΧυται, 
κακοτυχών Be iv ευτυχούσα ποΧΧω μαΧΧον 

4 Βιασωζεται. οπότε οΰν ποΧις μεν τας ΙΒίας 
ξυμφορας οία τ€ φερειν, eh Be έκαστος τας εκείνης 
άΒύνατος, πώς ου χρη πάντας άμύνειν αυτί), καϊ 
μη ο νυν ύμεΐς Βράτ€, ταΐς κατ οίκον κακό- 
πραηίαις εκπεπ\ηημενοι του κοινού της σωτηρίας 
άφίεσθε, καϊ εμε τε τον παραινέσαντα ποΧεμεΐν 
καϊ υμάς αυτούς ο'ϊ Ιςυνεηνωτε Βι αιτίας έχετε. 

5 καίτοι εμοι τοιούτω άνΒρϊ 6ρ Γ /ίζεσθε ος ούΒενος 
ησσων οϊομαι είναι ηνώναί τε τα Βεοντα καϊ 
ερμηνεΰσαι ταύτα, φιΧόποΧίς τε καϊ χρημάτων 

6 κρείσσων. 6 τε yap yvoυς καϊ μη σαφώς ΒιΒάξας 
εν ϊσω καϊ ει μη ενεθυμήθη• ο τε έχων αμφότερα, 
ttj Βε πόΧει Βύσνους, ουκ αν ομοίως τι οικείως 
φράζοι* προσόντος Βε κα\ τουΒε, χρημασι Βε 
νικωμενου, τα ξύμπαντα τούτου ενός αν πωΧοΐτο. 

7 ώστ εϊ μοι καϊ μβσως ^ούμενοι μαΧΧον ετέρων 
προσβΐναι αύτα ποΧεμεΐν επείσθητε, ουκ αν 
εΐκότως νυν του ye άΒικεΐν αΐτίαν φεροίμηρ. 


BOOK II. lx. 1-7 

with me or are giving way to your misfortunes with- 
out reason. For in my judgment a state confers a 
greater benefit upon its private citizens when as 
a whole commonwealth it is successful, than w T hen 
it prospers as regards the individual but fails as a 
community. For even though a man flourishes in 
his own private affairs, yet if his country goes to 
ruin he perishes with her all the same ; but if he is 
in evil fortune and his country in good fortune, he is 
far more likely to come through safely. Since, then, 
the state may bear the misfortunes of her private 
citizens but the individual cannot bear hers, surely 
all men ought to defend her, and not to do as you 
are now doing — proposing to sacrifice the safety of 
the commonwealth because you are dismayed by the 
hardships you suffer at home, and are blaming both 
me who advised you to make war and yourselves who 
voted with me for it. And yet I, with whom you 
are angry, am as competent as any man, I think, 
both to determine upon the right measures and to 
expound them, and as good a patriot and superior to 
the influence of money. For he who determines 
upon a policy, and fails to lay it clearly before others, 
is in the same case as if he never had a conception 
of it ; and he who has both gifts, but is disloyal to 
his country, cannot speak with the same unselfish 
devotion ; and if he have loyalty also, but a loyalty 
that cannot resist money, then for that alone every- 
thing will be on sale. If, therefore, when you al- 
lowed me to persuade you to go to war, you believed 
that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate 
degree more than other men, it is unreasonable that 
I should now bear the blame, at any rate, of wrong- 



LXI. " Kal yap οΐς μεν αΐρ€σις ηε^ίνηται 
ταΧΧα βντνχοΰσί, ποΧΧη άνοια ποΧεμησαι* el δ* 
avayxaiov ην η el ζάντας ευθύς τοις ττέΧας ύπα- 
κοΰσαι η κινδυνβύσαντας περ^ενεσθαι, 6 obvyoov 

2 τον κίνδυνον του ύποστάντος μβμπτότερος. καϊ 
iyco μεν 6 αυτός είμι καϊ ουκ εξίσταμαι* ύμεΐς δέ 
μεταβάΧΧετε, επειδή ξυνέβη ύμΐν πεισθηναι μεν 
άκεραίοις, μεταμεΧειν δε κακουμενοις, και τον 
εμον Xoyov iv τω ύμετερω ασθενεί της yvώμης μη 
ορθόν φαίνεσθαι, διότι το μεν Χυποΰν έχει ήδη 
την αίσθησιν εκάστω, της δε ώφεΧίας άπεστιν 
€τι ή δήΧωσις άπασι, καϊ μεταβοΧης μεyάXης t 
καϊ ταύτης εξ ολίγοι/, εμπεσούσης ταπεινή υμών 

3 ή διάνοια ey/capTepeiv α έ'γυωτβ. δουΧοΐ yap 
φρόνημα το αίφνίδιον καϊ άπροσδόκητον καϊ το 
πΧείστω napaXoycp ξυμβαΐνον* ο ημΐν προς τοις 
αΧΧοις ούχ ήκιστα καϊ κατά την νοσον yey ^ηται. 

4 όμως δε πόΧιν μeyάXηv οίκοΰντας καϊ iv ήθεσιν 
άντιπάΧοις αύτη τεθ ραμμένους χρεών καϊ ξυμ- 
φοραΐς ταΐς μeyίστaις εθεΧειν ύφίστασθαι καϊ 
την άξίωσιν μη άφανίζειν (iv ?σω γα/) οι άνθρωποι 
δικαιοΰσι της Τ€ υπαρχούσης δόξης αιτιάσθαι 
όστις μαΧακία εΧΧείπει και της μη προσηκούσης 
μισεΐν τον θρασύτητι όpeyόμevov) > άπaXyησavτaς 

1 Described by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, cha. 


BOOK II. lxi. 1-4 

LXI. "For though I admit that going to war is 
always sheer folly for men who are free to choose, 
and in general are enjoying good fortune, yet if the 
necessary choice was either to yield and forthwith 
submit to their neighbours' dictation, or by accepting 
the hazard of war to preserve their independence, 
then those who shrink from the hazard are more 
blameworthy than those who face it. For my part, 
I stand where I stood before, and do not recede from 
my position ; but it is you who have changed. For 
it has happened, now that you are suffering, that you 
repent of the consent you gave me when you were 
still unscathed, and in your infirmity of purpose my 
advice now appears to you wrong. The reason is 
that each one of you is already sensible of his 
hardships, whereas the proof of the advantages is 
still lacking to all, and now that a great reverse has 
come upon you without any warning, you are too 
dejected in mind to persevere in your former re- 
solutions. For the spirit is cowed by that which 
is sudden and unexpected and happens contrary 
to all calculation ; and this is precisely the experi- 
ence you have had, not only in other matters, but 
especially as regards the plague. Nevertheless, see- 
ing that you are citizens of a great city and have 
been reared amid customs which correspond to her 
greatness, 1 you should willingly endure even the 
greatest calamities and not mar your good fame. 
For as all men claim the right to detest him who 
through presumption tries to grasp a reputation to 
which he has no title, so they equally claim a right 
to censure him who through faintheartedness fails to 
live up to the reputation he already enjoys. You 
should, rather, put away your grief for private ills 



δε τα ΪΒια τον κοινοί) της σωτηρίας άντιΧαμβά- 

LXII. "Τον δε πονον τον κατά τον πόΧεμον, 
μη γένηταί τ€ ποΧύς καΐ ούΒεν μάΧΧον περιγενώ- 
μεθα, άρκείτω μεν ύμΐν και εκείνα iv oh άΧΧοτε 
ποΧΧάκις γε δ^ άπέΒειξα ουκ ορθώς αυτόν ύπο- 
πτευομενον, ΒηΧώσω Be καϊ τόΒε, ο μοι Βοκεΐτβ 
ούτ αυτοί πωποτε ενθυμηθηναι υπάρχον ύμϊν 
μεγέθους περί ες την αρχήν ούτ εγώ εν τοις πρϊν 
Χόγοις* ούΒ* αν νυν εχρησάμην κομπωΒεστέραν 
εχοντι την προσποίησιν, ει μη καταπεπΧηγμένους 

2 υμάς πάρα το είκος εώρων. οϊεσθε μεν yap των 
ξυμμάχων μόνων άρχειν, εγώ δε άποφαίνω Βύο 
μερών τών ες χρήσιν φανερών, γης καϊ θαΧάσσης, 
του ετέρου υμάς παντός κυριωτάτους οντάς, εφ' 
όσον τε νυν νέμεσθε καϊ ην επί πΧέον βουΧηθήτε• 
καϊ ουκ εστίν όστις ttj υπάρχου ση παρασκευή 
του ναυτικού πΧεοντας υμάς ούτε βασιΧεύς ούτε 
άΧΧο ούΒεν έθνος τών εν τω παρόντι κωΧύσει. 

3 ώστε ου κατά την τών οικιών καϊ της γης χρείαν, 
ων μεγάΧων νομίζετε εστερησθαι, αύτη η Βύναμις 
φαίνεται* ούδ' είκος χαΧεπώς φέρειν αυτών μαΧ- 
Χον ή ου κηπίον καϊ εγκαΧΧωπισμα πΧούτου 
προς ταύτην νομίσαντας οΧιγωρησαι καϊ γνώναι 
εΧευθερίαν μεν, ην άντιΧαμβανομενοι αυτής Βια- 
σώσωμεν, ραΒίως ταύτα άναΧηψομενην, αΧΧων Be 

1 cf. ch. xiii and I. cxl-cxliv. 


BOOK II. lxi. 4-lxii. 3 

and devote yourselves to the safety of the common- 

LXII. t€ As to the hardships involved in this war, 
and your misgivings lest they prove very great and 
we succumb after all, let those arguments suffice 
which I have advanced on many other occasions 1 in 
order to convince you that your fears are groundless. 
But there is one point I propose to lay before you 
on which, I think, you have never yourselves as yet 
reflected, in spite of the advantage it gives you as 
regards your empire and its greatness, and which I 
have never previously dealt with in my speeches, 
and should not have done so now — for it makes a 
somewhat boastful claim — had I not seen that you 
are unreasonably dejected. You think that it is only 
over your allies that your empire extends, but I 
declare that of two divisions of the world which lie 
open to man's use, the land and the sea, you hold 
the absolute mastery over the whole of one, not 
only to the extent to which you now exercise it, 
but also to whatever fuller extent you may choose ; 
and there is no one, either the Great King or 
any nation of those now on the earth, who will 
block your path as you sail the seas with such a 
naval armament as you now possess. This power, 
therefore, is clearly not to be compared with the 
mere use of your houses and fields, things which you 
value highly because you have been dispossessed of 
them ; nor is it reasonable that you should fret about 
them, but you should make light of them, regarding 
them in comparison with this power as a mere flower- 
garden or ornament of a wealthy estate, and should 
recognize that freedom, if we hold fast to it and 
preserve it, will easily restore these losses, but let 



υπακούσασι καϊ τά προ κεκτημένα 1 φιΧεΐν εΧασ- 
σουσθαι, των τ€ πατέρων μη χείρους κατ αμφό- 
τερα φανήναι, οι μετά πόνων και ου παρ άΧΧων 
8εξάμενοι κατέσχον τε κα\ προσέτι 8ιασώσαντες 
παρε8οσαν ύμΐν αυτά (αΧσχιον 8ε έχοντας άφαι- 
ρεθήναι η κτώμενους ατυχήσαν), Ιεναι 8ε τοις 
εχθροίς όμόσε μη φρονηματι μόνον, άΧΧα καΐ 

4 καταφρονηματι. αΰχημα μεν yap κ αϊ άπο άμα- 
θίας ευτυχούς καϊ 8ειΧω τινι εηηίηνεται, κατα- 
φρόνησις 8ε ος αν καϊ ηνωμη πιστευχι των εναντίων 

δ περιέχειν, ο ήμΐν υπάρχει, καϊ την τοΧμαν άπο 
της όμοιας τύχης ή ξύνεσις εκ του υπέρφρονος 
εχυρωτεραν παρέχεται, εΧπί8ι τε ησσον πιστεύει, 
ης εν τφ άπόρω η Ισχύς, ηνωμη 8ε άπο των υπαρ- 
χόντων, ης βεβαιότερα η πρόνοια. 

LXIIL "Ύής τε ποΧεως υμάς εικός τω τιμω- 
μένω άπο του άρχειν, ωπερ άπαντες ά^άΧΧεσθε, 
βοηθεΐν, καϊ μη φεύ^ειν τους πόνους ή μη8ε τάς 
τιμάς 8ιώκειν μη8ε νομίσαι περί ένος μόνου, 8ου- 
Χείας άντ έΧευθερίας, άηωνίζεσθαι, άΧΧά κα\ 
αρχής στερήσεως καϊ κιν8ύνου ων εν ττ\ άρχτ) άπή- 

2 χθεσθε. ης ούδ' εκστήναι ετι ύμΐν εστίν, εϊ τις 
καϊ τό8ε εν τφ παρόντι 8ε8ιως άπραημοσύντ) 

1 So most editors with Gma,; all other MSS. χροσαα-ψ 
μίνα except Μ ττροσ κεκτημένα. 


BOOK II. lxii. 3-lxiii. 2 

men once submit to others and even what has been 
won in the past l has a way of being lessened. 
You must therefore show yourselves not inferior 
in either of these two respects to your fathers, who 
by their own labours, and not by inheritance, not 
only acquired but also preserved this empire and 
bequeathed it to you (and it is a greater disgrace 
to let a possession you have be taken away than 
it is to attempt to gain one and fail) ; and you 
must go to meet your enemies not only with con- 
fidence in yourselves, but with contempt for them. 
For even a coward, if his folly is attended with good 
luck, may boast, but contempt belongs only to the 
man who is convinced by his reason that he is superior 
to his opponents, as is the case with us. And, where 
fortune is impartial, the result of this feeling of con- 
tempt is to render courage more effective through 
intelligence, that puts its trust not so much in 
hope, which is strongest in perplexity, as in reason 
supported by the facts, which gives a surer insight 
into the future. 

LXII I. " You may reasonably be expected, more- 
over, to support the dignity which the state has at- 
tained through empire — a dignity in which you all 
take pride — and not to avoid its burdens, unless you 
resign its honours also. Nor must you think that 
you are fighting for the simple issue of slavery or 
freedom ; on the contrary, loss of empire is also in- 
volved and danger from the hatred incurred in your 
sway. From this empire, however, it is too late for 
you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, 
through fear and shrinking from action does indeed 

1 Or, reading τά προσεκτημίνα, "freedom and all that 
freedom gives" (= irpbs rj) 4\*υθ€ρία Κ€κτημ4να, as Poppo 



άνδραγαθίζβταί• ώς 1 τυραννίδα yap ηδη έχετε 
αυτήν, ην Χαβεΐν μίν άδικον δοκεΐ είναι, άφεΐναι 
3 δε επικίνδυνον. τάχιστ αν Τ6 πόΧιν οι τοιούτοι 
έτερους τε πείσαντες άποΧεσειαν καϊ εϊ που επί 
σφών αυτών αυτόνομοι οίκήσειαν το yap airpay- 
μον ου σώζεται μη μετά του δραστήριου τεταγ- 
μένου, ουδέ εν άρχούση πόΧει ζυμφερει, αλλ' εν 
ύπηκόω, άσφαΧώς δουΧεύειν. 

LXIV. " *Ύμεΐς δβ μήτε ύπο των τοιώνδε ποΧι- 
τών παρά^εσθε μήτε εμε δι ο/)γ% έχετε, ω καϊ 
αυτοί ξυνδιε^νωτε ττοΧεμεΐν, ει καϊ επεΧθόντες οι 
ενάντιοι έδρασαν απ ε ρ εικός ην μη εθεΧησάντων 
υμών ύπακούειν, εττιηεηενηται τε πέρα ων προσ- 
εδεχόμεθα ή νόσος ηδε, ττραημα μόνον δη τών 
πάντων έΧπίδος κρεϊσσον ηεηενημενον. καϊ δι 
αυτήν 618 οτι μέρος τι μαΧΧον ετ ι μισούμαι, ου 
δικαίως, ει μη και όταν πάρα Xoyov τι ευ πράξητε 

2 εμοί άναθήσετε. φέρειν δε χρη τα τε δαιμόνια 
αναηκαίως τά τε από τών ποΧεμιων ανδρείως* 
ταύτα yap εν εθει τήδε ττ) πόΧει πρότερόν τε ην 

3 νύν τε μή εν ύμΐν κωΧυθη. yvώτε δε όνομα μεγι- 
στον αύτην εχουσαν εν απασιν άνθρώποις δια το 
ταΐς ζυμφοραϊς μη είκειν, πΧεΐστα δε σώματα καϊ 
πόνους άνηΧωκέναι ποΧεμω, καϊ δύναμιν /χβγιστ?;^ 
δη μ^χρι* τούδε κεκτημενην, ης ες άίδιον τοις επι- 

1 Dobree deletes, followed by Hude• 

BOOK II. lxiii. 2-lxiv. 3 

seek thus to play the honest man ; for by this time 
the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem 
wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is 
dangerous to let go. Men like these would soon 
ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to 
their views, or if they should settle in some other 
land and have an independent state all to themselves ; 
for men of peace are not safe unless flanked by men 
of action ; nor is it expedient in an imperial state, 
but only in a vassal state, to seek safety by 

LXI V. " Do not be led astray by such citizens as 
these, nor persist in your anger with me, — for you 
yourselves voted for the war the same as I — just be- 
cause the enemy has come and done exactly what he 
was certain to do the moment you refused to hearken 
to his demands, even though, beyond all our expec- 
tations, this plague has fallen upon us — the only thing 
which has happened that has transcended our fore- 
sight. I am well aware that your displeasure with 
me has been aggravated by the plague ; but there 
is no justice in that, unless you mean to give me also 
the credit whenever any unexpected good fortune 
falls to your lot. But the right course is to bear with 
resignation the afflictions sent by heaven and with 
fortitude the hardships that come from the enemy ; 
for such has been the practice of this city in the past, 
and let it find no impediment in yourselves. And 
realize that Athens has a mighty name among all 
mankind because she has never yielded to mis 
fortunes, but more freely than any other city has 
lavished lives and labours upon war, and that she 
possesses to-day a power which is the greatest that 
ever existed down to our time. The memory of 



yιyvoμέvoις, ην κα\ νυν υπενδώμέν ποτέ (πάντα 
yap πέφυκε καϊ ελασσουσθαι), μνήμη καταλελεί- 
ψεται, 'Ελλήνων τε οτι "Έλληνες πλείστων 8η 
ήρξαμεν καϊ πολέμοις μ€ Γ /ίστοίς άντέσγομεν προς 
re ξύμπαντας καϊ καθ' έκαστους, πόλιν τε τοις 

4 πάσιν εύπορωτάτην καϊ μεηίστην ωκήσαμεν. καί- 
τοι ταύτα ο μεν άπράημων μεμψαιτ αν, 6 δε δράν 
τι καϊ αυτός βουΧόμενος ζηλώσει* εί δε τις μη 

5 κέκτηται, φθονήσει, το δε μισεΐσθαι καϊ λυπη- 
ρούς είναι εν τω παρόντι πάσι μεν υπήρξε δη 
όσοι έτεροι ετέρων ήξίωσαν άρχειν όστις δε επι 
με^ίστοις το επίφθονον Χαμβάνει, ορθώς βου- 
λεύεται, μίσος μεν yap ούκ επί πολύ αντέχει, ή 
δε παραυτίκα τε λαμπρότης καϊ ες το έπειτα δόξα 

6 αίείμνηστος καταλείπεται. ύμεΐς δε ες τε το μέλ- 
λον καλόν προ^νόντες ες τε το αύτίκα μη αίσχρόν 
τω ήδη προθύμω αμφότερα κτήσασθε, καϊ Αακε- 
δαιμονίοις μήτε επικηρυκεύεσθε μήτε ενδηλοι εστε 
τοις παρούσι πόνοις βαρυνόμενοι, ώς οΐτινες προς 
τας ξυμφορας ηνώμη μεν ήκιστα λυπούνται, ερ^ω 
δε μάλιστα άντέχουσιν, ούτοι καϊ πόλεων καϊ 
Ιδιωτών κράτιστοί είσιν. 

LXV. Τοιαύτα ό ΤΙερικλής λέ^ων επειρατο 
τους Αθηναίους της τε ες αυτόν όρ^ής παραλύειν 
καϊ από τών παρόντων δεινών άπάηειν την yvco- 
2 μην. οι δε δημοσία μεν τοις Xoyo^ άνεπείθοντο 
καϊ ούτε προς τους Λακεδαιμονίους ετι επεμπον 
ες τε τον πόλεμον μάλλον ώρμηντο, Ιδία δε 


BOOK II. lxiv. 3-lxv. 2 

this greatness, even should we now at last give 
way a little — for it is the nature of all things to 
decay as well as to grow — will be left to posterity 
forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over 
the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest 
wars held out against our foes whether united or 
single, and inhabited a city that was the richest 
in all things and the greatest. These things the 
man who shrinks from action may indeed dis- 
parage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accom- 
plish something will make them the goal of his 
endeavour, while every man who does not possess 
them will be envious. To be hated and obnoxious for 
the moment has always been the lot of those who 
have aspired to rule over others ; but he who, aim- 
ing at the highest ends, accepts the odium, is well 
advised. For hatred does not last long, but the 
splendour of the moment and the after-glory are 
left in everlasting remembrance. Do you, then, 
providently resolving that yours shall be honour in 
ages to come and no dishonour in the present, 
achieve both by prompt and zealous effort. Make 
no overtures to the Lacedaemonians and do not let 
them know that you are burdened by your present 
afflictions ; for those who in the face of calamities 
show least distress of spirit and in action make most 
vigorous resistance, these are the strongest, whether 
they be states or individuals." 

LXV. By such words Pericles endeavoured to cure 
the Athenians of their anger toward him, and to di- 
vert their minds from their present ills. And as 
regards public affairs they were won over by his 
arguments, sending no further envoys to the Lace- 
daemonians, and were more zealous for the war ; but 



τοις παθημασιν ελυπούντο, ο μεν δήμος οτι άπ 
ελασσόνων ορμώμενος εστέρητο και τούτων, οί 
δε δυνατοί καλά κτήματα κατά την γωραν * 
οίκοδομίαις τ€ καϊ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαΐς άπο- 
λωλεκότες, το δε μέγιστον, πόλεμον αντ ειρήνης 

3 έχοντες, ου μέντοι πρότερόν γε οί ξύ μπάντες 
έπαύσαντο iv opyfj έχοντες αυτόν πρϊν εζημίωσαν 

4 χρήμασιν. ύστερον δ' αύθις ου πολλω, όπερ φι- 
λεϊ όμιλος ποιεΐν, στρατηγον εΐλοντο καϊ πάντα 
τα πράγματα επέτρεψαν, ων μεν περί τα οικεία 
έκαστος ήλγει άμβλύτεροι ηδη οντες, ων δε ή 
ξύμπασα πόλις προσεδεϊτο πλείστου άξων νομί- 

5 ζοντες είναι, όσον τε yap χρόνον προύστη της 
πόλεως εν τη ειρήνη, μετρίως εξηγεΐτο καϊ ασφα- 
λώς διεφύλαξεν αυτήν, καϊ εγένετο €7τ' εκείνου 
μεγίστη, επειδή τε 6 πόλεμος κατέστη, ο δε φαί- 
νεται και εν τούτω προγνούς την δύναμιν. 

6 Έπεβίω δε δύο ετη καϊ εξ μήνας* καϊ επειδή 
άπέθανεν, επί πλέον ετι εγνώσθη ή πρόνοια αυτού 

7 η ες τον πόλεμον. ο μεν yap ησυχάζοντας τε 
και τό ναυτικον θεραπεύοντας και άρχην μη 
επικτωμένους εν τω πολέμω μηδέ τη πόλει κινδυ- 
νεύοντας εφη περιέσεσθαι* οί δε ταύτα τε πάντα 
ες τουναντίον έπραξαν καϊ άλλα εξω τού πολέμου 
δοκούντα είναι κατά τάς ιδίας φιλοτιμίας καϊ 
ϊδια κέρδη κακώς ες τε σφας αυτούς καϊ τους 

1 Hude inserts iv with Madvig. 

1 Eighty talents, according to Diod. xn. xlv. ; but accord- 
ing to Plut. Per. xxxv. estimates varied from fifteen to fiftj 


BOOR II. lxv. 2-7 

in private they were distressed by their sufferings ; 
for the commons, having less to start with, had been 
deprived even of this, while the upper classes had 
lost their beautiful estates in the country, both 
buildings and costly furniture, and above all they 
had war instead of peace. Indeed one and all they 
did not give over their resentment against him until 
they had imposed a fine l upon him. But not long 
afterwards, as is the way with the multitude, they 
chose him again as general and entrusted him with 
the whole conduct of affairs ; for they were now be- 
coming individually less keenly sensible of their 
private griefs, and as to the needs of the state as a 
whole they esteemed him invaluable. For so long 
as he presided over the affairs of the state in time of 
peace he pursued a moderate policy and kept the 
city in safety, and it was under him that Athens 
reached the height of her greatness ; and, after the 
war began, here too he appears to have made a far- 
sighted estimate of her strength. 

Pericles lived two years and six months beyond the 
beginning of the war; and after his death his fore- 
sight as to the war was still more fully recognized. 
For he had told the Athenians that if they would 
maintain a defensive policy, attend to their navy, and 
not seek to extend their sway during the war, or do 
anything to imperil the existence of the state, they 
would prove superior. But they not only acted con- 
trary to his advice in all these things, but also in 
matters that apparently had no connection with the 
war they were led by private ambition and private 
greed to adopt policies which proved injurious both 

talents. The charge was embezzlement, according to Plato, 
Gorg. 576 A. 



ξυμμάχους επολίτευσαν, α κατορθουμενα μϊν τοις 
ίδιώταις τιμή καϊ ώφελία μάλλον ην, σφαλέντα 
δε tjj πόλει ες τον πόλεμου βΧάβη καθίστατο. 

8 αίτιον δ' ην οτι εκείνος μεν δυνατός ων τφ τβ 
άξιώματι και τη γνώμη χρημάτων τ€ διαφανώς 
άδωρότατος γενόμενος κατείχε το πλήθος ελευθέ- 
ρως, και ουκ ήγετο μάλλον υττ αυτού η αυτός 
ηγε, δια το μη κτώμενος 4ξ ου προσηκόντων την 
δύναμιν προς ηδονήν τι λέγειν, άλλ' έχων επ 

9 αξιώσει καϊ προς όργήν τι άντειπεΐν. οπότε γοΰν 
αϊσθοιτό τι αυτούς παρά καιρόν ΰβρει θαρσοΰν- 
τας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν επί το φοβεΐσθαι, καϊ 
δεδιότας αΰ άλόγως άντικαθίστη πάλιν επί το 
θαρσεΐν. iyiyvero τ ε λόγω μεν δημοκρατία, 

10 έργω δε υπο του πρώτου ανδρός αρχή. οι δέ 
ύστερον ϊσοι μάλλον αυτοί προς αλλήλους οντες 
καϊ όρεγόμενοι του πρώτος έκαστος γίγνεσθαι 
ετράποντο καθ" ηδονας τω δήμω καϊ τα πράγματα 

11 ενδιδόναι. εξ ων άλλα τε πολλά, ώς εν μεγάλη 
πόλει καϊ αρχήν εχούση, ήμαρτήθη και 6 ες 
Ο,ικελίαν πλους, ος ου τοσούτον γνώμης αμάρ- 
τημα ήν προς ους επησαν, όσον οι εκπεμψαντες 
ου τα πρόσφορα τοις οίχομενοις επιγιγνώσ κοντές, 
αλλά κατά τάς ιδίας διαβολάς περί της του 

1 The reference is especially to the Sicilian expedition ; 
the pernicious results were seen in the Decelean war. 


BOOK II. lxv. 7-1 1 

as to themselves and their allies ; for these policies, so 
long as they were successful, merely brought honour 
or profit to individual citizens, but when they failed 
proved detrimental to the state in the conduct of 
the war. 1 And the reason for this was that Pericles, 
who owed his influence to his recognized standing and 
ability, and had proved himself clearly incorruptible 
in the highest degree, restrained the multitude while 
respecting their liberties, and led them rather than 
was led by them, because he did not resort to flattery, 
seeking power by dishonest means, but was able 
on the strength of his high reputation to oppose 
them and even provoke their wrath. At any rate, 
whenever he saw them unwarrantably confident and 
arrogant, his words would cow them into fear ; and, 
on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably 
afraid, he would restore them to confidence again. 
And so Athens, though in name a democracy, 
gradually became in fact a government ruled by its 
foremost citizen. But the successors of Pericles, 
being more on an equality with one another and yet 
striving each to be first, were ready to surrender 
to the people even the conduct of public affairs 
to suit their whims. And from this, since it hap- 
pened in a great and imperial state, there resulted 
many blunders, especially the Sicilian expedition, 2 
which was not so much an error of judgment, when 
we consider the enemy they went against, as of 
management ; for those who were responsible for it, 
instead of taking additional measures for the proper 
support of the first troops which were sent out, gave 
themselves over to personal intrigues for the sake of 

1 For the history of this expedition, see Books vi and vti. 



δήμου προστασίας τά re εν τω στρατοπέδω άμ- 
βΧυτερα εποίουν καϊ τα περί την ποΧιν πρώτον 

12 iv άΧΧήΧοις εταράχθησαν. σφαΧέντες δε iv 
"ΖικεΧία aXXrj τε παρασκευή κα\ του ναυτικού τω 
πΧεονι μορίω καϊ κατά την πόΧιν ήδη iv στάσει 
οντες όμως δέκα * μεν ετη άντεΐχον τοις τ€ πρό- 
τερον υπ άρχου σι ποΧεμιοις καϊ τοις απ ο ΧικεΧίας 
μετ αυτών καϊ τών ξυμμάχων ετι τοις πΧεοσιν 
άφεστηκόσι, Κύρω τβ ύστερον βασιΧεως παιδί 
προσηενομενω> ος παρείχε χρήματα ΤΙεΧοπον- 
νησίοις ες το ναυτικού, καϊ ου πρότερον ενίδοσαν 
ή αυτοί εν 2 σφίσιν αύτοΐς κατά τάς ιδίας δια- 

13 φοράς περιπεσόντες εσφάΧησαν. τοσούτον τω 
ΐΙερικΧεΐ επερίσσευσε τότε άφ' ων αύτος προεηνω 
και πάνυ αν ραδίως περιηενεσθαι την πόΧιν 
ΏεΧοποννησίων αυτών τω ποΧεμω. 

LXVI. Οι δε Αακεδαιμόνιοι καϊ οι ξύμμαχοι 
του αυτού θέρους εστράτευσαν ναυσϊν εκατόν ες 
Ζάκυνθον την νήσον, ή κείται άντιπερας 'ΉΧιδος* 
είσϊ δε ' Αχαιών τών εκ ΙΙεΧοποννήσου άποικοι 
2 καϊ ' 'Αθηναίο ις ξυνεμάχουν. επεπΧεον δε Αακε- 
δαιμονίων χίΧίον όπΧϊται καϊ Κνήμος Σπαρτιάτης 
ναύαρχος, άποβάντες δε ες την ηήν εδήωσαν τα 
ποΧΧά. καϊ επειδή ου ξυνεχώρουν, άπέπΧευσαν 
επ οίκου. 

LXVII. Kcu του αυτού θέρους τεΧευτώντος 
1 Αριστεύς Κορίνθιος καϊ Αακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις 
1 Άνήριστος και ΝικόΧαος καϊ ΙΙρατόδαμος καϊ 

1 MSS. read τρία, but Hude follows Haacke in reading 
Ζίκα. So also van H., CI., Stahl, F. Mueller, Croiset, 
Marchant. οκτώ is preferred by Shilleto, Aem. Mueller. 

1 Deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude. 


BOOK II. lxv. ii-lxvii. ι 

gaining the popular leadership and consequently not 
only conducted the military operations with less 
rigour, but also brought about, for the first time, civil 
discord at home. And yet, after they had met with 
disaster in Sicily, where they lost not only their army 
but also the greater part of their fleet, and by this 
time had come to be in a state of sedition at home, 
they neverthless held out ten years not only against 
the enemies they had before, but also against the 
Sicilians, who were now combined with them, and, 
besides, against most of their allies, who were now 
in revolt, and later on, against Cyrus son of the 
King, who joined the Peloponnesians and furnished 
them with money for their fleet ; and they did not 
finally succumb until they had in their private 
quarrels fallen upon one another and been brought 
to ruin. Such abundant grounds had Pericles at that 
time for his own forecast that Athens might quite 
easily have triumphed in this war over the Pelopon- 
nesians alone. 

LXVI. During the same summer the Lacedae- 
monians and their allies made an expedition with a 
hundred ships to the island of Zacynthus, which lies 
over against Elis. The Zacynthians are colonists 
of the Achaeans in the Peloponnesus and were in 
alliance with the Athenians. On board the ships 
were one thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, and 
Cnemus a Spartan was admiral. And making a 
descent upon the land they ravaged most of it ; but 
as the inhabitants would not come to terms they 
sailed back home. 

LXVII. And at the end of the same summer 430 b.o. 
Aristeus a Corinthian, three Lacedaemonian envoys, 
Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, also Timagoras 



Τεηεάτης Τιμαηορας καϊ Άρ^εϊος Ιδία ΠόΧΧις, 
πορευόμενοι ες την Άσίαν ώς βασιλέα, εϊ πως 
πεισειαν αυτόν χρήματα τε παρασχεΐν καϊ ζυμ- 
πολεμεΐν, άφικνοΰνται ώς Ιίιτάλκην πρώτον τον 
Ύήρεω €9 Θράκην, βουλόμενοι πεΐσαί τε αυτόν, ει 
δύναιντο, μεταστάντα της 'Αθηναίων ξυμμαχίας 
στρατευσαι επί την ΪΙοτείδαιαν, ου ην στράτευμα 
των 'Αθηναίων πολιορκούν, και, ηπερ ώρμηντο, δι 
εκείνου πορευθηναι πέραν του Ελλησπόντου ώς 
Φαρνάκην τον Φαρναβάζου, ος αυτούς εμελλεν 

2 ώς βασιλέα άναπέμψειν. παρατυχόντες δ£ 
'Αθηναίων πρέσβεις Αέαρχος Καλλιμάχου καϊ 
Άμεινιάδης Φιλήμονος πάρα τω Σιτάλκτ) πεί- 
θουσι τον %άδοκον τον ηεηενημενον 'Αθήναιον, 
Σιτάλκου υίόν, τους άνδρας εηχειρίσαι σφίσιν, 
όπως μη διαβάντες ως βασιλέα την εκείνου πολιν 

3 το μέρος βλάψωσιν. 6 δέ πεισθείς πορευομένους 
αυτούς δια της ®ράκης επί το πλοΐον ω εμελλον 
τον ( ΕΧΧ?]σπον7ον περαιώσειν, πρ\ν εσβαίνειν 
ξυλλαμβάνει, άλλους δη ξυμπέμψας μετά του 
Αεάρχου καϊ Άμεινιάδου, καϊ εκέλευσεν εκείνοις 
παραδοΰναι* οί δε Χαβόντες εκόμισαν ες τας 

4 'Αθήνας, αφ ι κο μένων δε αυτών δείσαντες οί 
'Αθηναίοι τον Άριστέα μη αύθις σφάς ετι πΧείω 
κακουρηη διαφυγών, οτι καϊ προ τούτων τα της 
ΤΙοτειδαίας καϊ των επί ®ράκης πάντα εφαίνετο 
πράξας, άκριτους κα\ βουΧομένους εστίν α ειπείν 
αυθημερόν άπέκτειναν πάντας και ες φάρα^ηα 

1 Because Argos was a neutral state ; cf. ch. ix. 2. 

2 Then satrap of Dascylium ; ς/*. I. cxxix. 1• 
s c/. ch. xxix. 5. 


BOOK II. lxvii. 1-4 

of Tegea and Pollis of Argos, the last acting in a 
private capacity, 1 set out for Asia to the King's court 
to see if they might persuade hirn to furnish money 
and join in the war. On their way they came first 
to Sitalces son of Teres in Thrace, their desire being 
to persuade him, if possible, to forsake the Athenian 
alliance and send a force to relieve Potidaea, where 
an Athenian army was conducting the siege ; and 
also, in pursuance of their object, with his help to 
cross the Hellespont to Pharnaces 2 son of Pharna- 
bazus, who was to escort them up the country to the 
King. But two Athenian envoys, Learchus son of 
Callimachus and Ameiniades son of Philemon, who 
chanced to be visiting Sitalces, urged Sadocus son of 
Sitalces, who had been made an Athenian citizen, 8 
to deliver the men into their hands, that they might 
not cross over to the King and do such injury as 
might be to his adopted city. 4 To this Sadocus 
agreed, and sending some troops to accompany 
Learchus and Ameiniades, seized them as they 
iourneved through Thrace before thev embarked on 
the boat by which they were to cross the Hellespont. 
They were then, in accordance with his orders, 
delivered to the Athenian envoys, who took them 
and brought them to Athens. When they arrived, 
the Athenians, in fear that Aristeus might escape 
and do them still more harm, because he had evi- 
dently been the prime mover in all the earlier 
intrigues at Potidaea and along the coast of 
Thrace, put them all to death on that very day 
without a trial, though they wished to say something 
in their own defence, and threw their bodies into a 

4 Possibly tV ίκείνου νό\ιν τό μ*ρο5 means "a city in a 
measure his own." 



εσέβαΧον, δικαιούντες τοις αύτοΐς άμύνεσθαι 
οίσπερ καϊ οι Λακεδαιμόνιοι υπήρξαν, τους έμ- 
πορους ους εΧαβον * Αθηναίων και των ξυμμάγων 
iv όΧκάσι περί ΤΙεΧοπόννησον πΧέοντας άποκτεί- 
ναντες καϊ ες φάραγγας έσβαΧόντες. πάντας 
yap δη κατ αργίας του ποΧέμου Λακεδαιμόνιοι 
όσους Χάβοιεν εν τη θαΧάσση ώς ποΧεμίους διέ- 
φθεφον, καϊ τους μετά Αθηναίων ξ υ μποΧεμούντας 
καϊ τους μηδέ μεθ* ετέρων. 

LXVIII. Κατά δε τους αυτούς χρόνους, του 
θέρους τεΧευτώντος, καϊ Άμπρακιώται αυτοί τε 
καϊ των βαρβάρων ποΧΧούς άναστησαντες εστρά- 
τβυσαν επ "Αρωγός το ΆμφιΧοχικόν καϊ την 

2 αΧΧην * ΑμφιΧογίαν. έχθρα δε προς τους Άρ- 
γβίους από τούδε αύτοΐς ηρξατο πρώτον γενέσθαι. 

3 "Αργός το ΆμφιΧοχικον και ΑμφιΧονίαν την 
αΧΧην έκτισε μεν μετά τα Τρωικά οϊκαδε άνα- 
χωρήσας καϊ ουκ άρεσκό μένος τη εν "Αργεί κατα- 
στάσει "ΑμφίΧοχος ό 'Αμφιάρεω εν τω ^Αμπρα- 
κικώ κοΧπω, όμώνυμον τη αυτού πατρίδι "Αργός 

4 όνομάσας (καϊ ην η ποΧις αύτη μεγίστη της 
*ΑμφιΧοχίας καϊ τους δυνατωτάτους ειχεν οίκψ 

5 τορας), υπό ξυμφορών δε ποΧΧαΐς γενεαϊς ύστερον 
πιεζόμενοι ' Άμπρακιώτας όμορους οντάς τη Άμ- 
φιΧοχικτ) ξυνοίκους έπηγάγοντο, καϊ ήΧΧηνίσθη- 
σαν την νύν γΧώσσαν πρώτον από τών Αμπρα- 

1 Alcmaeon, the elder brother of Amphilochus, had slain 
their mother Eriphyle (c/. ch. cii. 5). The fouudation of 


BOOK II. lxvii. 4-LXV111. 5 

pit, thinking it justifiable to employ for their own 
protection the same measures as had in the first 
instance been used by the Lacedaemonians when 
they killed and cast into pits the traders of the 
Athenians and their allies whom they caught on 
board merchantmen on the coast of the Pelopon- 
nesus. For at the beginning of the war all persons 
whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea they 
destroyed as enemies, whether they were fighting 
on the side of the Athenians or not even taking 
part on either side. 

LXVIII. About the same time, as the summer 
was ending, the Ambraciots themselves, with many 
of the barbarians whom they had summoned to their 
standard, made an expedition against the Amphi- 
lochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia. And 
enmity between them and the Argives first began 
from the following circumstance. Amphilochus son 
of Amphiaraus, when he returned home after the 
Trojan war, was dissatisfied with the state of affairs 
at Argos, 1 and therefore founded Amphilochian 
Argos on the Ambracian gulf, and occupied the 
country of Amphilochia, calling the town Argos 
after the name of his own fatherland. And this 
city was the largest in Amphilochia and had the 
wealthiest inhabitants. But many generations later 
the Amphilochians, under the stress of misfor- 
tunes, invited in the Ambraciots, who bordered 
on Amphilochia, to share the place with them, 
and these first became Hellenes and adopted their 
present dialect in consequence of their union with 

Amphilochian Argos is ascribed by other authors (Strabo, 
vii. 326 c ; Apollod. in. 7) to Alcmaeon or to his son 



κιωτών ξυνοικησάντων οι Be αΧΧοι ΆμφίΧοχοι 

6 βάρβαροι είσιν. εκβάΧΧουσιν οΰν τους 'Apyeuovs 
οι y Αμπρακιώται χρόνω καϊ αύτοϊ ϊσχουσι την 

7 πόΧιν. οι δ' ΑμφίΧοχοι γενομένου τούτου ΒιΒο- 
ασιν εαυτούς Άκαρνάσι, καϊ προσπαρακαΧεσαν- 
τες αμφότεροι ' Αθηναίους, οΐ αύτοΐς Φορμίωνα 
τ€ στρατηηον έπεμψαν καϊ ναυς τριάκοντα, 
άφικομενου Βη του Φορμίωνος αίρουσι κατά κρά- 
τος "Αργός καϊ τους ' Αμπρακιώτας ήνΒραποΒισαν, 
κοινχι τ€ ωκισαν αύτο ΆμφίΧοχοι καϊ ' Ακαρνανες. 

8 μετά Βε τούτο ή ξυμμαχία πρώτον iyiveTO Άθψ• 

9 ναίοις καϊ Ακαρνάσιν, οι Βε 'Αμπρακιώται την 
μεν εχθραν ες τους *Apyείoυς άπο του άνΒρα- 
ποΒισμοΰ σφών αυτών ττρώτον εποιήσαντο, ύστε- 
ρον Βε εν τω ποΧεμω τηνΒε την στρατείαν 
ποιούνται εαυτών τε καϊ Χαόνων και άΧΧων 
τινών τών πΧησιοχώρων βαρβάρων εΧθόντες Βε 
προς το *Apyoς της μεν χωράς εκράτουν, την Βε 
πόΧιν ώς ουκ εΒύναντο εΧεΐν προσβαΧοντες, 
απεχώρησαν επ' οίκου καϊ ΒιεΧύθησαν κατά έθνη. 
τοσαυτα μεν εν τω θέρει iy ενετό. 

LXIX. Ύοΰ δ' eirtyiyvo μενού χειμώνος 'Αθη- 
ναίοι ναυς εστειΧαν είκοσι μεν περϊ ΤΙεΧοπόννησον 
καϊ Φορμίωνα στρατ^ον, ος ορμώμενος εκ Ναυ- 
πάκτου φυΧακην είχε μήτ εκπΧεΐν εκ Κορίνθου 
καϊ του Κρισαίου κόΧπου μηΒενα μητ εσπΧεΐν, 
ετέρας Βε εξ επϊ Καρίας καϊ Αυκίας καϊ ΜεΧή- 
σανΒρον στpaτηyόv, όπως ταΰτά τε άpyυpoXoyώσι 
καϊ το Χηστικον τών ΏεΧοποννησίων μη εώσιν 
αύτόθεν ορμώμενον βΧάπτειν τον πΧουν τών 
6Χκά8ων τών άπο ΦασήΧιΒος καϊ Φοινίκης καϊ 


BOOK II. lxviii. 5-lxix. ι 

the Ambraciots ; but the rest of the Amphilochians 
are still barbarians. Now in course of time the 
Ambraciots expelled the Argives and themselves 
seized the city. But the Amphilochians, when this 
happened, placed themselves under the protection of 
the Acarnanians, and together they called in the 
Athenians, who sent to them Phormio as general 
with thirty ships. On the arrival of Phormio they 
took Argos by storm and reduced the Ambraciots to 
slavery, and Amphilochians and Acarnanians settled 
there together. It was after this that the alliance 
between the Athenians and the Acarnanians was 
first established. The Ambraciots first conceived 
their enmity toward the Argives from this enslave- 
ment of their own countrymen ; and afterwards in 
the course of the war they made this expedition, 
which consisted, besides themselves, of Chaonians 
and some of the other barbarian tribes of the neigh- 
bourhood. And when they came to Argos, although 
they dominated the country, they were unable to 
take the city by assault ; they therefore went home 
and the several tribes disbanded. Such were the 
events of the summer. 

LXIX. During the ensuing winter the Athenians 
sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus under the 
command of Phormio, who, making Naupactus his 
base, kept watch there, so that no one might sail 
either out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf or in ; 
and six other ships were sent to Caria and Lycia, 
under Melesander as general, to collect arrears of 
tribute in these places and to prevent the Pelopon- 
nesian privateers from establishing a base in these 
regions and molesting the merchantmen sailing from 
Phaselis and Phoenicia and the mainland in that 



2 της εκείθεν ηπείρου, άναβας δΐ στρατιά * Αθη- 
ναίων τε των άπο των νεών και των ξυμμάχων ες 
την Αυκίαν 6 ΙΑεΧήσ ανδ ρος αποθνήσκει καϊ της 
στρατιάς μέρος τι διέφθειρε νικηθείς μάχτ], 

LXX. Το Ο δ' αυτού χειμώνος οι Τίοτειδεάται 
επειδή ούκέτι εδύναντο ποΧιορκούμενοι άντεχειν, 
αλλ' αϊ τε εσβοΧαϊ ες την Άττικην ΤΙεΧοποννη- 
σίων ούδεν μάΧΧον άττανίστασαν τους 'Αθηναί- 
ους, ο τε σίτος επεΧεΧοίπει, καϊ αΧΧα τε 7τολλά 
επεγεγένητο αυτόθι ηδη βρώσεως περί αναγκαίας 
και τίνες καϊ άΧΧηΧων εγέγευντο, ούτω δη Χόγους 
προσφέρουσι περί ξυμβάσεως τοις στρατηγοΐς 
των 'Αθηναίων τοις επί σφίσι τεταγμένοις, 
Β,ενοφωντί τε τω Έ*ύριπίδου καϊ <Ί Εστιοδώρω τω 
Χ Α ριστοκΧείδου καϊ Φανομάχω τω ΚαΧΧιμάχου. 

2 οι δε προσεδέξαντο, όρώντες μεν της στρατιάς 
την ταΧαιπωρίαν εν χωριω γειμερινω, άνηΧω- 
κυίας δε ηδη της πόΧεως δισχιΧια τάΧαντα ες την 

3 ποΧιορκίαν. επϊ τοϊσδε ουν ξυνεβησαν, εξεΧθεΐν 
αυτούς καϊ παΐδας καϊ γυναίκας καϊ τους επικού- 
ρους ξυν ενϊ ίματίω, γυναίκας δε ζυν δυοΐν, καϊ 

4 αργυρών τι ρητον έχοντας εφόδων, καϊ οι μεν 
ύπόσπονδοι έξηΧθον ες τε την ΧαΧκιδικην και y 
έκαστος εδύνατο* Αθηναίοι δε τους τε στρατη- 
γούς επγτιάσαντο οτι άνευ αυτών ξυνέβησαν 
(ενόμιζον γαρ αν κρατήσαι της πόΧεως fj εβού- 
Χοι>το), και ύστερον εποίκους έπεμψαν εαυτών ες 

δ την ΙΙοτείδαιαν καϊ κατωκισαν. ταύτα μεν εν τφ 

BOOK II. lxix. i-lxx. 5 

quarter. But Melesander, going inland into Lycia 
with a force of Athenians from the ships and of 
allied troops, was defeated in battle and slain, losing 
a number of his troops. 

LXX. During the same winter the Potidaeans 
found themselves no longer able to endure the 
siege ; and the raids which the Peloponnesians made 
into Attica did not cause the Athenians to raise the 
siege any more than before. 1 Their grain had given 
out, and in addition to many other things which by 
this time had befallen them in their efforts to 
get bare subsistence some had even eaten their 
fellows. In this extremity they made proposals for a 
capitulation to the Athenian generals who were in 
charge of the operations against them, namely 
Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aris- 
tocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. And 
the generals accepted their proposals, seeing the 
distress which the army was suffering in an exposed 
place, and taking into consideration that Athens had 
already spent two thousand talents 2 on the siege. 
So a capitulation was made on the following terms, 
that the Potidaeans, with their children and wives 
and the mercenary troops, 3 were to leave the city 
with one garment apiece — the women, however, with 
two — retaining a fixed sum of money for the journey. 
So they left Potidaea under a truce and went into 
Chalcidice or wherever each was able to go. The 
Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting 
terms without consulting them — for they thought 

ey could have become masters of the place on their 
own terms ; and afterwards sent settlers of their 
own into Potidaea and colonized it. These things 

* ψ. ι. lviii. 1. » £400,000, $1,944,000. ■ cf. I. lx. 1. 



γειμώνι iyevero, καϊ δεύτερον 1 έτος τω ποΧέμω 
ετεΧεύτα τωδε ον Ηουκυδιδης ^vveypayjrev. 

LXXI. Ιου δ' έπ^^νομένου θέρους ol Πελο- 
ποννησιοι καϊ οι ξύμμαχοι ες μεν την ' Αττικών 
ουκ εσέβαΧον, εστράτευσαν δε επί ΤΙΧάταιαν 
rjyeLTO δε ' Αρχίδα μος 6 Ζευξιδάμου, Αακεδαι- 
μονίων βασιΧεύς' καϊ καθίσας τον στρατον εμεΧΧε 
δηώσειν την yr\v % οι δε ΥίΧαταιής ευθύς πρέσβεις 
πέμψαντες παρ αυτόν eXeyov τοιάδε* 

2 " 'Αρχίδαμε καϊ Αακεδαιμόνιοι, ου δίκαια 
ποιείτε ούδ" αξία ούτ€ υμών οΰτ€ πατέρων ων 
εστε, ες yi)v την ΤίΧαταιών στρατεύοντες. ΤΙαυ- 
σ ανίας yap ο ΚΧεομβρότου, Αακεδαιμόνιος, εΧευ- 
θερώσας την ' Ελλάδα άπο των Μήδων μετά 
ΈΧΧήνων των έθεΧησάντων ζυνάρασθαι τον κίν- 
δυνον της μάχης η παρ* ημϊν iyev€T0 9 θύσας iv 
τη ΐίΧαταιών ayopa ιερά Δα εΧευθερίω καϊ 
ξυyκaXέσaς πάντας τους ξυμμάχους άπεδίδου 
ΏΧαταιεΰσι yrjv καϊ πόΧιν την σφετέραν έχοντας 
αυτόνομους οίκεΐν, στράτευσαν τε μηδένα ποτέ 
αδίκως επ* αυτούς μηδ* επϊ δουΧεία- εΐ δε μη, 
άμύνειν τους παρόντας ξυμμάχους κατά δύναμιν. 

3 τάδε μεν ημΐν πατέρες οι υμέτεροι εδοσαν αρετής 
ένεκα καϊ προθυμίας της εν εκείνοις τοις κινδύ- 
νους yεvoμέvης, ύμεΐς δε τάναντία δράτε* μετά 
yap Θηβαίων των ήμΐν εχθίστων επϊ δουΧεία ttj 

4 ημετέρα ήκετε. μάρτυρας δε θεούς τους τε 
όρκίους τότε yεvoμέvoυς ποιούμενοι καϊ τους υμε- 
τέρους πατρώους καϊ ημετέρους εyχωpίoυς i Χέ- 
yoμεv ύμΐν yrjv την ΤΙΧαταιίδα μη άδικεΐν μηδέ 

1 rh StvTfpov in the MSS.; rb deleted by Poppo. 


BOOK II. lxx. 5-lxxi. 4 

happened in the winter, and so ended the second 
year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the 

LXX I. in the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians 
and their allies did not invade Attica, but made an 
expedition against Plataea. Their leader was Archi- 
damus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedae- 
monians, and when he had encamped his army he 
was about to ravage the land ; but the Plataeans 
straightway sent envoys to him, who spoke as 
follows : 

" Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are acting 
unjustly, and in a manner unworthy either of your- 
selves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung, 
when you invade the territory of the Plataeans. 
For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedae- 
monian, when he had freed Hellas from the Persians, 
together with such of the Hellenes as chose to share 
the danger of the battle 1 that took place in our 
territory, offered sacrifice in the market-place of the 
Plataeans to Zeus Eleutherius, and calling together 
all the allies restored to the Plataeans their land and 
city to hold and inhabit in independence, and no 
one was ever to march against them unjustly or for 
their enslavement ; but in that case the allies then 
present were to defend them with all their might. 
These privileges your fathers granted to us on 
account of the valour and zeal Ave displayed amid 
those dangers, but you do the very contrary ; for 
with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are 
come to enslave us. But calling to witness the gods 
in whose names we then swore and the gods of your 
fathers and of our country, we say to you, wrong not 
the land of Plataea nor violate your oaths, but suffer 

1 The battle of Plataea, 479 b.o. 



παραβαινειν τους όρκους, εάν δε οίκεΐν αυτόνο- 
μους καθάπερ ΤΙαυσανίας εδικαίωσεν." 

LXXII. Ύοσαΰτα είπόντων τών ΙΙλαταιών 
'Αρχίδαμος ύπολαβών εϊπεν 

" Δίκαια λέγετε, ώ άνδρες Τίλαταιης, ην ποιήτε 
ομοΐα τοις λόγους, καθάπβρ yap ΐίαυσανίας ύμΐν 
παρέδωκεν, αυτοί τε αύτονομεΐσθε καΐ τους άλ- 
λους ξυνελευθερούτε όσου μετάσχοντες των τότε 
κινδύνων ύμΐν τε ξυνώμοσαν καϊ είσϊ νυν υπ 
Άθηναίοις, παρασκευή δε τοσηδε καϊ πόλεμος 
ηε^ένηται αυτών ένεκα καϊ των άλλων ελευθερώ- 
σεως, ης μάλιστα μεν μετάσχοντες καϊ αυτοί 
εμμείνατε τοις ορκοις• ει δε μή, άπερ καϊ πρό- 
τερον ηδη π ρου κάλεσα μέθα, ήσυχίαν ά Γ γετε νεμό- 
μενοι τα υμέτερα αυτών, καϊ εστε μηδέ μεθ' 
ετέρων, δέχεσθε δε αμφότερους φίλους, επί πολε- 
μώ δε μηδετέρους. καϊ τάδε ήμΐν αρκέσει" 

2 Ό μεν Αρχίδαμος τοσαΰτα εϊπεν οι δε 
ΤΙλαταιών πρέσβεις άκούσαντες ταύτα εσήλθον 
ες την πόλιν, καϊ τω πλήθει τα ρηθέντα κοινώ- 
σαντες άπεκρίναντο αυτω ι οτι αδύνατα σφίσιν 
εΐη ποιεΐν α προκαλείται άνευ 'Αθηναίων (παίδες 
yap σφών καϊ γυναίκες παρ εκείνοις ειεν), δεδιέναι 
δε καϊ περϊ ττ) πάση πόλει μη 'κείνων αποχωρη- 
σάντων 'Αθηναίοι έλθόντες σφίσιν ουκ επιτρέ- 
πω σιν, η ©ηβαΐοι, ώς ένορκοι οντες κατά τό 
αμφότερους δέχεσθαι, αύθις σφών την πόλιν 

3 πειράσωσι καταλαβεΐν. ο δε θαρσύνων αυτούς 
προς ταύτα εφη* 

ίί( Ύμεΐς δε πόλιν μεν καϊ οικίας ήμΐν παράδοτε 

1 Omitted by Hade, with Lex. Vindob. 

BOOK II. lxxi. 4-lxxii. 3 

us to live independent, according as Pausanias granted 
that to us as our right." 

LXXI I. When the Plataeans had so spoken, Archi- 
damus answered and said : 

" What you say is just, men of Plataea, if what 
you do is consistent with your words. For according 
as Pausanias bestowed that privilege upon you, so 
do you assert your own independence and help us to 
set free the others also who, having shared in the 
dangers of that time, swore the same oaths with you, 
and are now in subjection to the Athenians; for it is 
to recover their freedom and that of the rest that 
these great preparations for war have been made. 
Therein you should take part, if possible, and your- 
selves abide by the oaths ; otherwise keep quiet, as 
we have already proposed, continuing to enjoy your 
own possessions ; take part with neither side, receive 
both sides as friends but for hostile purposes neither. 
And this will be satisfactory to us." 

Thus spoke Archidamus ; and the Plataean envoys, 
on hearing him, went into the city, and after reporting 
to the people what had been said, answered him, that 
it was impossible for them to do what he proposed 
without the consent of the Athenians — for their 
children and wives were in Athens 1 — adding that 
they feared for the very existence of the state ; for 
after the departure of the Lacedaemonians the 
Athenians would come and veto the plan, or else 
the Thebans, claiming that they were included in 
the stipulations about receiving both sides, would try 
again to seize their city. But he, endeavouring to 
reassure them with regard to these matters, said : 

" You need only consign the city and your houses 

1 cf. ch. vi. 4. 

39 1 


τοις ΑακεΒαιμονίοις καϊ ηης ορούς άποΒείξατε 
καϊ ΒένΒρα αριθμώ τα υμέτερα καϊ αΧλο εϊ τι 
Βυνατον ες αριθμόν εΚθεΐν αύτοϊ Βε μεταχωρψ 
σατε οποί βούΧεσθε, εως αν ο ποΧεμος η• επειΒάν 
Βε παρέΧθη, άποΒώσομεν νμΐν α αν παραΧά- 
βωμεν. μέχρι Βε τοΰΒε εξομεν παρακαταθήκην, 
εργαζόμενοι καϊ φοράν φέροντες ή αν νμΐν μέΧΧη 
ικανή εσεσσαι. 

LXXIII. Οι δ* άκούσαντες εσηΧθον αύθις ες 
την πόΧιν, καϊ βουΧευσ άμενοι μετά τον πΧήθους 
εΧεξαν δτι βούΧονται α προκαΧεΐται ' Αθηναίοις 
κοινώσαι πρώτον και, ην πείθωσιν αυτούς, ποιεΐν 
ταύτα' μέχρι Βε τούτον σπείσασθαι σφίσιν εκέ~ 
Χενον και την <γήν μη Βηοΰν. 6 Be ημέρας τε 
εσπείσατο εν αίς εικός ην κομισθηναι καϊ την <γήν 

2 ουκ ετεμνεν. εΧθόντες Βε οι ΤίΧαταιής πρέσβεις 
ώς τους Αθηναίους καϊ βονΧενσάμενοι μετ αν- 
τών πάΧιν ηΧθον άπα^έΧΧοντες τοις εν τη πόΧει 

3 τοιάΒε• " Οΰτ εν τω προ τον χρόνω, ω άνΒρες 
ΤΙΧαταιής, αφ? ον ζύμμαχοι ε Γ γενόμεθα, 'Αθηναίοι 
φασιν εν ονΒενϊ υμάς προέσθαι αΒικονμένονς ούτε 
νυν περιόψεσθαι, βοηθησειν Βε κατά Βύναμιν. 
επισκηπτουσί τε ύμΐν προς των όρκων ους οι 
πατέρες ώμοσαν μηΒεν νεωτερίζειν περί την 

LXXTV. Τοιαύτα τών πρέσβεων απάγγειλαν- 
των οι ΥΙΧαταιης εβουΧεύσαντο Αθηναίους μη 
προΒιΒόναι, αλλ' άνέχεσθαι και γην τεμνομένην, 
el Βεΐ, ορώντας καϊ άΧΧο πάσχοντας ο τι αν 


BOOK II. lxxii. 3-lxxiv. 1 

to us, the Lacedaemonians, pointing out to us the 
boundaries of your land and telling us the number 
of your trees and whatever else can be numbered; 
then as for yourselves migrate to whatever place you 
please, remaining there while the war lasts ; but as 
soon as the war is over we will give back to you 
whatever we have received ; until then we will hold 
it all in trust, working the land and paying you 
whatever rent will satisfy you." 

LXXII I. With this answer the Plataean envoys 
went again into the city, and after they had conferred 
with the people replied that they wished first to 
communicate his proposals to the Athenians, and if 
they could gain their consent would do what he 
proposed ; but meanwhile they requested him to 
grant them a truce and not to ravage the land. And 
so he made a truce for the number of days within 
which their representatives could be expected to go 
and return, and did not lay waste their land. But 
the Plataean envoys went to the Athenians and after 
consulting with them returned with the following 
message to the people at home : u The Athenians as- 
sure you, Plataeans, that as in times past, since you 
became their allies, 1 they have never on any occasion 
deserted you when you were being wronged, so now 
they will not suffer you to be wronged, but will assist 
you with all their might. They therefore adjure 
you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to 
break off the alliance." 

LXXIV. When the envoys reported this answer, 
the Plataeans determined not to betray the Athenians, 
but to endure even to see their lands laid waste, if 
need be, and to suffer whatever else might happen; 

1 About 520 B.C. cf. in. Ixviii. 5. 
vol. ι. η 393 


ξυμβαίνη* ίξεΧθεΐν τε μηδένα ετι, αλλ' απο του 
τείχους άποκρίνασθαι ore αδύνατα σφίσι ποιεΐν 

2 εστίν α Αακεδαιμόνιοι προκαΧοΰνται. ως δε 
άπεκρίναντο, εντεύθεν δη πρώτον μεν ες επιμαρ- 
τνρίαν καϊ θεών καϊ ηρώων τών εγχωρίων Άρχί- 

3 δαμος 6 βασιλεύς κατέστη Χέ<γων ώδε* " Θεοί 
όσοι ηήν την Τΐλαταιίδα έχετε καϊ ήρωες, ξυν- 
ίστορες εστε οτι ούτε την αρχήν αδίκως, εκλιπόν- 
των δε τώνδε προτέρων το ξυνώμοτον, επϊ ηήν 
τηνδε ήΧθομεν, εν rj οί πατέρες ημών εύξάμενοι 
ύμΐν Μήδων εκράτησαν καϊ παρέσχετε αυτήν 
ευμενή εναηωνίσασθαι τοις "ΈλΧησιν, ούτε νυν, 
ην τι ποιώμεν, άδικήσομεν προκαΧεσάμενοι yap 
ποΧΧα καϊ εικότα ου τυηχάνομεν. ζυ^ηνώμονες 
δ\ εστε τής μεν αδικίας κοΧάζεσθαι τοις ύπάρ- 
χουσι προτεροις, τής δε τιμωρίας τυηχάνειν τοις 
επιφερουσι νομίμως" 

LXXY. Ύοσαυτα επιθειάσας καθιστή ες πόλβ- 
μον τον στρατον. καϊ πρώτον μεν περιεσταύρω- 
σαν αυτούς τοις δενδρεσιν α έκοψαν, του μηδένα 
επεξιεναι, έπειτα χώμα έχουν προς την πόλιν, 
έΧπίζοντες ταχίστην την ι αΐρεσιν εσεσθαι αύ- 
2 τών στρατεύματος τοσούτου εργαζομένου. ξύΧα 
μεν ουν τέμνοντες εκ του Κιθαιρώνος παρωκοδό- 
μουν εκατέρωθεν, φορμηδον αντί τοίχων τιθεντες, 
όπως μη διαχεοιτο επϊ ποΧύ το χώμα. εφόρουν 
1 Added by Classen. 


BOOK II. lxxiv. i-lxxv. 2 

further, that no one should thereafter leave the city, 
but that the answer should be given from the walls 
that they found it impossible to do what the Lace- 
daemonians proposed. And when they had made 
answer, thereupon king Archidamus first stood forth 
calling the gods and heroes of the country to witness 
in the following words : " Ye gods and heroes who 
protect the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that 
we did no wrong in the beginning, but only after the 
Plataeans first abandoned the oath we all swore did 
we come against this land, where our fathers, in- 
voking you in their prayers, conquered the Persians, 
and which you made auspicious for the Hellenes 
to fight in, and that now also, if we take any 
measures, we shall be guilty of no wrong ; for though 
we have made them many reasonable proposals we 
have failed. Grant therefore your consent, that 
those be punished for the wrong who first began it, 
and that those obtain their revenge who are seeking 
to exact it lawfully." 

LXXV. After this appeal to the gods he began 
hostilities. In the first place the Lacedaemonians, 
using the trees which they had cut down, built a 
stockade round Plataea, that in future no one might 
leave the place ; then they began raising a mound 
against the town, hoping that with so large an army 
at work this would be the speediest way of taking it. 
So they cut timber on Cithaeron and built a structure 
alongside the mound on either side of it, laying the 
logs like lattice- work τ to form a sort of wall, that 
the mound might not spread too much. Then they 

1 A frame was made like lattice- work or mat-work, the 
timbers crossing each other at right angles (4£). 



Βε ΰΧην ες αυτό και Χίθους καϊ yrjv καϊ εϊ τι άΧλο 

3 άνύτειν μεΧΧοι επίβαΧΧόμενον. ημέρας Be έχουν 
εβΒομηκοντα καϊ νύκτας ξυνεχώς, Βιγρημενοι 
κατ ανάπαυλας, ώστε τους μεν φέρειν, τους Βε 
ΰπνον τ€ καϊ σιτον αίρεϊσθαι* ΑακεΒαιμονίων 
τε οι ξεναγοί εκάστης πόΧεως ζυνεφεστώτες ι 

4 ηνά^καζον ες τό έργον, οι Be ΤΙΧαταιης ορώντες 
το χώμα αΐρόμενον, ξύΧινον τείχος ξυνθεντες και 
επιστησαντες τω εαυτών τείχει η προσεχουτο, 
εσωκοΒόμουν ες αυτό πΧίνθους εκ των βγγυς οί- 

5 κιων καθαιροΰντες. ξύνΒεσμος Β* ην αύτοΐς τα 
ξύΧα, του μη ύψηΧον ηιγνομενον ασθενές είναι το 
οίκοΒόμημα, και προκαΧύμματα είχε Βερσεις καϊ 
Βιφθέρας, ώστε τους εργαζομένους και τα ξυΧα 
μήτε πυρφόροις οίστοΐς βάΧΧεσθαι εν άσφαΧεία 

6 τε είναι, ηρετο Βε το ΰψος του τείχους μέγα, καϊ 
τό χώμα ου σχοΧαίτερον άνταν^ει αύτώ. καϊ οι 
ΤίΧαταιής τοιόνΒε τι επινοουσιν Βιελόντες του 
τείχους fj προσεπιπτε το χώμα εσεφόρουν την 

LXXYL Οι Bk ΉεΧοποννησιοι αίσθομενοι εν 
ταρσοΐς καΧάμου πηΧον ενίΧΧοντες εσεβαΧΧον ες 
το Βιηρημένον, όπως μη Βιαχεόμενον ώσπερ ή <γή 
2 φοροΐτο. οι Βε ταύτη άποκΧηόμενοι τούτο μεν 
επέσχον, ύπόνομον Βε εκ της πόΧεως ορύζαντες 
καϊ ξυντεκμηράμενοι ύπο τό χώμα ύφεΐΧκον αύθις 
πάρα σφας τον χουν 9 καϊ εΧάνθανον επί ποΧύ 

1 With ABEFM and Suid. Hude reads, with CG, ol 
(crayol καϊ ίκάστη! voAtoos <οί> 4ψ€στώτ€$, 



brought and threw into the space wood and stones 
and earth and anything else which when thrown on 
would serve to build up the mound. And for seventy 
days and nights continuously they kept on raising 
the mound, divided into relays, so that while some 
were carrying others might take sleep and food ; and 
the Lacedaemonian commanders of auxiliaries to- 
gether with the officers in charge of the contingents 
from the several cities kept them at their task. But 
the Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, put together 
a framework of wood which they set on top of their 
own wall at the point where the mound was being 
constructed, and inside this frame they put bricks 
which they took from the neighbouring houses. The 
timbers served to hold the bricks together, pre- 
venting the structure from becoming weak as it 
attained height, and they were protected by coverings 
of skins and hides, so that the workmen and wood- 
work might be safe and shielded from incendiary 
arrows. The wall was mounting to a great height, 
and the opposing mound was rising with equal speed, 
when the Plataeans thought of a new expedient. 
They made an opening in that part of the city wall 
where the mound came into contact with it, and 
began to draw the earth in. 

LXXVI. But the Peloponnesians became aware of 
this, and threw into the breach clay packed in reed- 
mats that it might not filter through like the loose 
earth and be carried away. But the besieged, 
thwarted in this direction, gave up that plan and 
dug a mine from the town, and, guessing when they 
had got beneath the mound, once more began to 
draw away the earth to their side, this time from 
underneath ; and for a long time they worked 



του? εξω, ώστε επιβάλλοντας ήσσον άνύτειν υπα- 
γομένου αύτοΐς κάτωθεν του χώματος και ιζάνον- 

3 το? αΐεϊ επϊ το κενού μενον. δεδιότες δε μη ουΚ 
οΰτω δύνωνται ολίγοι προς πολλούς άντέχειν, 
προσεπεξηυρον τόδε* το μεν μέγα οικοδόμημα 
επαύσαντο εργαζόμενοι το κατά το χώμα, ένθεν 
δε καϊ ένθεν αυτού άρξάμενοι απ ο του βραχέος 
τείχους εκ του εντός μηνοειδες ες την πόλιν εσω- 
κοδόμουν, όπως, ει το μέγα τείχος άλίσκοιτο, 
τουτ άντέχοι, καϊ δέοι τους εναντίους αύθις προς 
αυτό χουν, καϊ προχωροϋντας εσω διπλάσιόν τε 
πόνον εχειν καϊ εν άμφιβόλω μάλλον γίγνεσθαι. 

4 άμα δε τη χώσει καϊ μηχανάς προσήγον οι Υίέλο- 
ποννησιοι τη πόλει, μίαν μεν ή του μεγάλου οικο- 
δομ7]ματος κατά το χώμα προσαχθεΐσα επϊ μέγα 
τε κατέσεισε καϊ τους ΙΓλαταιάς εφόβησεν, άλλας 
δε άλλη του τείχους, ας βρόχους τε περιβάλλον- 
τες άνέκλων οι ΙΙλαταιής, καϊ δοκούς μεγάλας 
άρτησαντες άλύσεσι μακραΐς σιδηραΐς άπο της 
τομής εκατέρωθεν άπο κεραιών δύο επ ι κεκλιμένων 
καϊ υπερτεινουσών υπέρ του τείχους ανέλκυσαν- 
τες εγκάρσιας, οπότε προσπεσεΐσθαί πη μέλλοι η 
μηχανή, άφίεσαν την δοκον χαλαραΐς ταΐς άλύ- 
σεσι καϊ ου δια χειρός έχοντες, ή δε ρύμη εμπί- 
πτουσα άπεκαύλιζε το προυχον της εμβολής. 

LXXVII. Μετά δε τούτο οι ΙΙελοποννήσιοι, 
ώς αϊ τε μηχαναϊ ούδεν ώφέλουν καϊ τψ χώματι 



unnoticed by those outside, so that in spite of what 
they heaped on these made less progress, because 
their mound, as it was sapped from below, constantly 
kept settling down into the hollow space. But fear- 
ing that even so they would not be able to hold out, 
few as they were against a multitude, they devised 
this further expedient : they stopped working on the 
high structure opposite the mound, and starting at 
the low part of the wall on either side of it they 
began building a crescent- shaped rampart on the 
inward or city side of it, in order that, if the high 
wall should be taken, this might offer resistance ; the 
enemy would thus have to raise a second mound to 
oppose the new rampart, and as they advanced and 
came inside the crescent they would not only have 
their labour twice over, but would also be more 
exposed to attack on both sides. But the Pelopon- 
nesians, while going on with their mound, also brought 
up engines against the city : one was moved forward 
over the mound, and shook down a great part of 
the high structure, terrifying the Plataeans, while 
others were brought to bear at different parts of 
the wall. But the Plataeans threw nooses over these 
and pulled them up. They also suspended great 
beams by long iron chains attached at either end to 
two poles which rested on the wall and extended 
over it; then they hauled up the beams at right 
angles l to the battering-ram and when it was about 
to strike anywhere let go the beam by allowing the 
chains to run slack and not keeping hold of them ; 
whereupon the beam would fall with a rush and 
break off the head of the battering-ram. 

LXXVI I. After this, the Peloponnesians, seeing 
that their engines were doing no good and that the 

* ».e. parallel to the walL 



το άντιτειχισμα iyiyvero, νομίσαντες απορον el- 
vat άπο τών παρόντων δεινών έΧεΐν την πόΧιν 

2 προς την περιτείχισιν παρεσ κευάζοντο. προτε- 
ρον δε πυρϊ εδοξεν αύτοΐς πειράσαι el δύναιντο 
πνεύματος γενομένου επιφΧέξαν την ποΧιν ούσαν 
ου μεηάΧην πασαν yap δη ίδέαν επενόονν, εϊ πως 
σφίσιν άνευ δαπάνης καϊ ποΧιορκίας προσαχθείη. 

3 φορουντες δε ΰΧης φακεΧους παρέβαΧον άπο 
του χώματος ες το μεταξύ πρώτον τον τείχους 
καϊ της προσχώσεως, ταχύ δε πΧήρους γενομένου 
δια ποΧυχειρίαν επιπαρενησαν καλ της άΧΧης πο- 
Χεως δ σον εδύναντο άπο τον μετεώρον πΧεΐστον 
επισχεΐν, εμβαΧόντες δε πνρ ξνν θείω καϊ πίσσ -rj 

4 ηψαν την νΧην. καϊ ε^ενετο φΧοζ τοσαντη οσην 
ουδείς πω ες yε εκείνον τον χρόνον χειροποίητον 
είδεν ηδη yap εν ορεσιν νΧη τριφθεϊσα νπ άνε- 
μων προς αυτήν άπο ταύτομάτον πυρ καϊ φλόγα 

5 άπ* αύτον άνήκεν. τούτο δε μεηα τε ην καϊ τους 
ΉΧαταιας τάΧΧα διαφυγ όντας εΧαχίστον εδέησε 
διαφθεΐραι• εντός yap ποΧΧοΰ χωρίον της ποΧεως 
ουκ ην πεΧάσαι, πνεύμα τε εί επεηενετο αύττ) 
επίφορον, όπερ καϊ ηΧπιζον οι ενάντιοι, ουκ &ν 

6 διεφυ^ον. ννν δε καϊ τόδε Χέζεται ξυμβήναι, 
νδωρ ποΧύ καϊ βροντάς ^ενομενας σβεσαι την 
φλόγα καϊ όντως πανσθηναι τον κίνδυνον. 


BOOK II. lxxvii. 1-6 

counter-wall was keeping pace with the mound, 
and concluding that it was impracticable without 
more formidable means of attack to take the city, 
began to make preparations for throwing a wall 
about it. But before doing that they decided to 
try fire, in the hope that, if a wind should spring 
up, they might be able to set the city on fire, as 
it was not large ; indeed, there was no expedient 
they did not consider, that they might if possible 
reduce the city without the expense of a siege. 
Accordingly they brought faggots of brushwood and 
threw them down from the mound, first into the 
space between the wall and the mound ; and then, 
since the space was soon filled up by the multi- 
tude of workers, they heaped faggots also as far 
into the city as they could reach from the height, 
^nd finally threw fire together with sulphur and 
pitch upon the wood and set it afire. And a 
conflagration arose greater than any one had ever 
seen up to that time, kindled, I mean, by the 
hand of man ; for in times past in the moun- 
tains when dry branches have been rubbed against 
each other a forest has caught fire spontaneously 
therefrom and produced a conflagration. And this 
fire was not only a great one, but also very nearly 
destroyed the Plataeans after they had escaped ail 
earlier perils ; for in a large part of the city it was 
not possible to get near the fire, and if on top of 
that a breeze had sprung up blowing toward the city, 
which was precisely what the enemy were hoping 
for. the Plataeans would not have escaped. But as 
it was, this also is said to have happened — a heavy 
thunder-shower came on and quenched the flames, 
and so the danger was checked. 



LXXYIII. 0/ δέ ΤΙεΧοποννήσιοι επειΒη καϊ 
τούτου Βιήμαρτον, μέρος μεν τι καταΧιπόντβς του 
στρατού, το Βε πΧεον αφέντες περιετείχιζον την 
πόΧιν κύκΧω ΒιεΧόμενοι κατά ποΧεις το χωρίον 
τάφρος Βε εντός τε ην κα\ έξωθεν εξ ης επΧινθεύ- 

2 σαντο. κα\ επειΒη πάν εξείρηαστο περί άρκτου- 
ρου επιτοΧάς, καταΧιπόντες φυΧακάς του ήμίσεος 
τείχους (το Be ήμισυ Βοιωτοί εφύΧασσον) άνεχώ- 
ρησαν τω στρατω και ΒιεΧύθησαν κατά πόΧεις. 

3 ΤίΧαταιής Βε παϊΒας μεν καΧ γυναίκας και τους 
πρεσβυτάτους τε καϊ πΧήθος το άχρεΐον των 
ανθρώπων πρότερον εκκεκομισμένοι ήσαν ες τάς 
* Αθήνας, αυτοί Be εποΧιορκοΰντο ε'γκαταΧεΧειμ- 
μένοι τετρακόσιοι, 'Αθηναίων Βε οηΒοήκοντα, ηυ- 

4 ναΐκες Βε Βέκα καϊ εκατόν σιτοποιοί. τοσούτοι 
ήσαν οι ξύμπαντες δτε ες την ττοΧιορκίαν καθί- 
σταντο, καϊ αΧΧος ουδείς ην εν τω τείχει οΰτε 
ΒοΰΧος ούτ εΧεύθερος. τοιαύτη μεν ή ΤίΧαταιών 
ττοΧιορκία κατεσκευάσθη. 

LXXIX. Του δ' αυτού θέρους καϊ άμα ttj 
των ΤίΧαταιών επιστρατεία 'Αθηναίοι ΒισχιΧίοις 
όττΧίταις εαυτών καϊ ίππεΰσι Βιακοσίοις επεστρά- 
τευσαν επί ΧαΧκιΒέας τους επι ®ράκης και 
Έοττιαίους ακμάζοντος του σίτου• εστρατήηει Βε 
2 Έίενοφων 6 Έ^ύριπίΒου τρίτος αυτός. εΧθόντες Βε 
υπο ΧπάρτωΧον την Βοττικήν τον σΐτον Βιέφθει- 
ραν• εΒόκει Βε και ττροσχωρήσειν ή πόΧις υπό 



LXXVIII. When the Peloponnesians had failed in 
this attempt also, they dismissed the larger part of 
their army, leaving only a portion of it, and proceeded 
to throw a wall around the city, apportioning the 
space to the several cities ; and there were ditches 
both inside and outside the wall, out of which they 
had taken the clay for the bricks. And when the 
wall was entirely finished about the time of the 
rising of Arcturus, 1 they left a guard to watch one 
half of the wall (the Thebans guarded the other 
half), and withdrew the main army, the troops dis- 
persing to their several cities. But the Plataeans 
had previously had their children and wives, as well 
as the oldest men and the unserviceable part of the 
population, removed to Athens, and the men left be- 
hind to undergo the siege were only four hundred of 
their own number and eighty Athenians, besides one 
hundred and ten women to prepare the food. This 
was the number all told when the siege began, and 
there was no one else within the walls, slave or free- 
man. Such were the conditions under which the 
siege of the Plataeans was established. 

LXXIX. During the same summer, when the corn 
was in full ear, 2 while the expedition against Plataea 
was in progress, the Athenians with two thousand 
hoplites of their own and two hundred cavalry 
marched against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the 
Bottiaeans, under the command of Xenophon son of 
Euripides and two others. And coming to Spartolus 
in Bottice they destroyed the grain. It was be- 
lieved, moreover, that the city would be delivered 
over to them by a party inside the town which was 

1 About the middle of September. 
* In the month of May. 



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εκ της ΊίπαρτώΧου ες μάχην καθίστανται οι *Αθη- 

3 ναϊοι υπ αύττ) τ/} πόΧει. και οι μεν όπΧΐται των 
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4 είχον he τινας ου ποΧΧούς πεΧταστάς ίκ της 
Κρουσίδος ηής καλούμενης, άρτι δε της μάχης 
^β^ενημένης επιβοηθούσιν άλΧοι πεΧτασται εκ 

5 της ΌΧύνθου. καϊ οι εκ της ΧπαρτώΧου ψιλοί 
ώς εΐδον, θαρσησαντες τοις τε προσ'γιγνομένοις 
καΧ οτι πρότερον ούχ ήσσηντο, επιτίθενται αύθις 
μετά των ΧαΧκιδέων ιππέων καϊ των προσβοη- 
θησάντων τοις ' Αθηναίο ις* καϊ άναχωρούσι προς 
τ ας δύο τάζεις ας κατέΧιπον παρά τοις σκευο- 

6 φόροις. καϊ οπότε μεν έπίοιεν οι ' Αθηναίοι, ένε- 
δίδοσαν, άναχωρούσι δε ενέκειντο καϊ εσηκόντιζον. 
οι τε ίππης των ΧαΧκιδέων π ροσ ιππεύοντες fj 
δοκοίη εσέβαΧΧον, και ούχ ηκιστα φοβήσαντες 
έτρεψαν τους ' Αθηναίους καϊ επεδίωξαν επί ποΧυ. 

7 καϊ οι μεν 'Αθηναίοι ες την ΤΙοτείδαιαν καταφεύ- 
γουσι, κα\ ύστερον τους νεκρούς ύποσπόνδους 
κομισάμενοι ες τάς ' Αθήνας άναχωροΰσι τω περι- 
όντι του στρατού* άπέθανον δε αυτών τριάκοντα 


BOOK II. lxxix. 2-7 

negotiating with them ; but the opposite faction 
forestalled this by sending word to Olynthus, and 
some hoplites and other troops arrived to garrison the 
place. Now when these made a sally from Spartolus, 
the Athenians were drawn into a battle with them 
under the very walls of the city, and although the 
hoplites of the Chalcidians and some mercenaries 
with them were defeated by the Athenians and re- 
treated into Spartolus, the cavalry of the Chalcidians 
and the light-armed troops defeated the Athenian 
cavalry and light-troops; for the Athenians had a few 
targeteers from the land called Crousis, 1 and just after 
the battle was over another force of targeteers came 
from Olynthus to the help of the garrison. And when 
the light-armed troops in Spartolus saw them, em- 
boldened by these accessions and because they had 
not been worsted before, they again, assisted by the 
Chalcidian cavalry and those who had newly come to 
their support, attacked the Athenians, who now fell 
back upon the two companies which they had left 
with their baggage. And whenever the Athenians 
advanced, they gave way, but when the Athenians 
retreated they kept close at their heels, hurling 
javelins at them. Then the Chalcidian cavalry, riding 
up, kept charging the Athenians wherever opportu- 
nity offered, and throwing them into utter panic 
routed them and pursued them to a great distance. 
The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and after- 
wards, having recovered their dead under a truce, 
returned to Athens with what remained of their 
army ; and they had lost three hundred and thirty 

1 This is evidently a remark in explanation of the presence 
of light-troops with the Athenians, for there had come from 
Athens only heavy-armed infantry and cavalry ; φ § 1 above. 



καί τετρακόσιοι καϊ οι στρατηηοί πάντες* οι δε 
Χαλ/αδτ;? και Βοττιαΐοι τροπαΐόν τε έστησαν και 
τους νεκρούς τους αυτών άνεΧόμενοι διεΧύθησαν 
κατά πόΧεις. 

LXXX. Τον δ* αυτού θέρους, ου ποΧΧω ύστε- 
ρον τούτων, Άμπρακιωται καϊ Χαόνες, βουΧο- 
μενοι ' Ακαρνανίαν την πασαν καταστρέψασθαι 
καϊ 'Αθηναίων άποστησαι, πείθουσι Αακεδαι- 
μονίους ναυτικόν τε παρασκευάσαι εκ της ξυμ- 
μαχίδος και οπΧίτας χίλιους πεμψαι εττ 'Ακαρ- 
νανίαν, Χ^οντες οτι, ην ναυσϊ καϊ πεζω άμα 
μετά σφων εΧθωσιν, αδυνάτων όντων ξυμβοηθεΐν 
των άπο θαΧάσσης * Ακαρνάνων ραδίως 'Ακαρ- 
νανίαν σχόντες καϊ της Ζακύνθου και Κβφαλ- 
"Χηνίας κρατησουσι, καϊ 6 περίπΧους ούκετι 
εσοιτο Άθηναίοις ομοίως περί ΙΙεΧοπόννησον 

2 εΧπίδας δ' είναι καϊ Ναύττακτον Χαβεΐν. οι δέ 
Αακεδαιμονιοι πεισθέντες Κνήμον μεν ναύαργρν 
ετι οντά καϊ τους οπΧίτας επι ναυσϊν οΧίηαις 
ευθύς πέμπουσι, τω δε ναυτικω περι^^γειΧαν 
παρασκεύασα μένω ως τάχιστα πΧεΐν ες Αευκάδα. 

3 ήσαν δέ Κορίνθιοι ξυμπροθυμούμενοι μάΧιστα 
τοις Άμπρακιώταις άποίκοις ούσιν. καϊ το μεν 
ναυτικόν εκ τε Κορίνθου και Σικυωνος καϊ των 
ταύτη χωρίων εν παρασκευή ην, το δ' εκ Αευ κά- 
δος καϊ Άνακτορίου και Άμπρακίας πρότερον 

4 άφικόμενον εν Αευκάδι περιέμενεν. Κνήμος δέ 
καϊ οι μετ αυτού γίΧιοι όπΧΐται επειδή επεραιώ- 
θησαν Χαθόντες Φορμίωνα, ος ηρχε των είκοσι 


BOOK II. lxxix. 7-Lxxx. 4 

men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and 
Bottiaeans set up a trophy, and then, after they had 
taken up their own dead, dispersed to their several 

LXXX. During the same summer, not long after 
these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, wishing 
to subdue the whole of Acarnania and detach it 
from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit 
out a fleet from the countries of the Doric alliance 
and to send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania, 
saying that, if they joined forces with them, bringing 
ships and infantry, it would be an easy matter first 
to occupy Acarnania since the Acarnanians on 1 the 
seacoast would be unable to aid those inland, and 
then to make themselves masters of Zacynthus and 
Cephallenia also : after that the Athenians would no 
longer be able to sail round the Peloponnesus in the 
same way as before ; and there was a chance of taking 
Naupactus also. The Lacedaemonians agreed and at 
once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral, 2 and 
the hoplites on a few ships, and sent round orders to 
the allied fleet to make their preparations and sail as 
soon as possible to Leucas. And the Corinthians were 
especially eager to support the enterprise of the 
Ambraciots, who were colonists of theirs. The con- 
tingent of the fleet to come from Corinth and Sicyon 
and the places in that quarter was still under pre- 
paration, but that from Leucas and Anactorium and 
Ambracia, arriving first, waited at Leucas. As for 
Cnemus and the thousand hoplites, as soon as they 
had succeeded in crossing over without being de- 
tected by Phormio, who was in command of the 

1 i.e. because of the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet 
along their coast. 2 cf. ch. lxvi. 2. 



νεών των * Αττικών at περί Ναύπακτον εφρού- 
ρουν, ευθύς παρεσκευάζοντο την κατά yfjv 

5 στρατείαν. καϊ αύτω παρήσαν 'ΕΧΧήνων μεν 
* Αμπρακιώται καϊ Άνακτόριοι και Αευκάδιοι 
και ους αυτός έχων ηΧθε χίΧιοι ΥΙεΧοπον νησιών, 
βάρβαροι δε Χαόνες χίΧιοι άβασίΧευτοι, ων 
rjyovpro €π€τησίφ προστατεία εκ τον αρχικού 
yevovs Φώτιος και Νικάνωρ. ξυνεστρατεύοντο 
δε μετά Χαόνων και ®εσπρωτοϊ άβασίΧευτοι. 

6 ΜοΧοσσονς δε rjye καϊ y Ατιντάνας ΧαβύΧινθος 
επίτροπος ων ©άρυπος του βασιΧεως ετι παιδος 
οντος, καϊ ΤΙαραυαίους "Οροιδος βασιΧεύων. 
*Ορεσται δε γίΧιοι, ων εβασίΧευεν ' Αντίοχος, 
μετά ΤΙαραναίων ξυνεστ ρατεύοντο ΌροίΒω ' Αν- 

7 τιόχου επιτρέψαντος. έπεμψε 8ε και ΥΙερδίκκας 
κρύφα των Αθηναίων χιΧιους Μακεδόνων, οι 

8 ύστερον ηΧθον. τούτω τω στρατω επορεύετο 
Κνημος ου περιμείνας το απο Κορίνθου ναυτικον, 
καϊ δια της 'Apyeias ίόντες Αιμναίαν, κώμη ν 
άτείχιστον, επόρθησαν. άφικνούνταί τε επι 
Χτράτον, ττοΧιν με^ίστην της 'Ακαρνανίας, νο- 
μίζοντες, ει ταύτην πρώτην Χάβοιεν, ραδίως 
σφίσι τάΧΧα προσχωρησειν. 

LXXXI. ' Ακαρνάνες δε αίσθομενοι κατά τβ 
yfjv ποΧΧην στρατιάν εσβεβΧηκυΐαν εκ τε 
θαΧάσσης ναυσίν άμα τους ποΧεμΙους παρεσο- 
μένους, ούτε ξυνεβοηθουν εφύΧασσόν τε τα αυτών 
έκαστοι, παρά τε Φορμίωνα επεμπον κεΧεύοντες 
άμύνειν 6 δε αδύνατος εφη είναι ναυτικού εκ 
Κορίνθου μεΧΧοντος εκπΧεΐν Ναύπακτον ερήμην 
2 άποΧιπεϊν. οι δε ΙΙεΧοποννήσιοι καϊ οι ξύμμα- 


BOOK II. lxxx. 4-Lxxxi. 2 

twenty Athenian ships that were on guard off Nau* 
pactus, 1 they began at once to prepare for the ex- 
pedition by land. He had with him, of Hellenic 
troops, some Ambraciots, Anactorians and Leuca- 
dians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he 
himself brought ; of barbarians, a thousand Chao- 
nians, who, having no king, were led by Photius and 
Nicanor of the ruling clan who had the annual presi- 
dency. With the Chaonian contingent were also some 
Thesprotians, who likewise have no king. A force 
of Molossians and Atintanians were led by Saby- 
linthus, the guardian of king Tharyps, who was still 
a boy, and of Paravaeans by their king, Oroedus. 
With the Paravaeans were a thousand Orestians 
whose king, Antiochus, had entrusted them to 
Oroedus. And Perdiccas also sent, without the 
knowledge of the Athenians, a thousand Macedo- 
nians, who arrived too late. W r ith this army Cnemus 
set out, not waiting for the fleet from Corinth ; and 
as they passed through the territory of Argos 2 they 
sacked Limnaea, an unwalled village. Finally they 
arrived at Stratus, the largest city of Acarnania, 
thinking that if they could take this first, the other 
places would readily come over to them. 

LXXX I. Now when the Acarnanians perceived 
that a large army had invaded them by land and 
that the enemy would soon be at hand with a fleet 
by sea as well, they did not attempt combined re- 
sistance, but guarding severally their own possessions 
they sent to Phormio urging him to aid them. But 
he said that he could not leave Naupactus unpro- 
tected, as a hostile fleet was about to sail from 
Corinth. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their 

1 φ ch. lxix. 1. ■ Amphilochian Argos ; cf. ch. lxviii. 1. 



ypi τρία τεΧη ποιησαντες σφών αυτών εχωρονν 
προς την των Στρατιών πόΧιν, όπως εγγύς στρα* 
τοπεΒευσάμενοι, ει μη λόγω πείθοιεν, έργω πει- 

3 ρωντο του τείχους, καϊ το μέσον μεν έχοντες 
προσησαν Χ,αόνες καϊ οι αΧΧοι βάρβαροι, εκ 
Βεξιάς 8* αυτών ΑευκάΒιοι καϊ * Ανακτόριοι και 
οι μετά τούτων, iv αριστερά he Κνήμος καϊ οι 
ΤΙεΧοποννησιοι καϊ * Κμπρακιώται• Βιεΐχον Be 
ποΧύ απ* άΧΧηΧων καϊ εστίν οτε ούΒε εωρώντο. 

4 καϊ οι μεν "ΈΧΧηνες τεταγμένοι τε προσησαν καϊ 
hta φυΧακης έχοντες, εως εστρατοπεΒεύσαντο εν 
επιτηΒείω• οι Βε Ύ^αονες σφίσι τε αύτοΐς πιστεύ- 
οντες καϊ άξιούμενοι ύπο των εκείντ) ήπειρωτών 
μαχιμωτατοι είναι οΰτε επέσχον τον στρατόπεΒον 
καταΧαβεΐν, χωρησαντές τε ρυμχι μετά των αλ- 
λω^ βαρβάρων ενόμισαν αύτοβοεϊ αν την πόΧιν 

5 εΧεΐν καϊ αύτων το έργον γενέσθαι, γνόντες δ' 
αυτούς οι Χτράτιοι ετι προσιόντας καϊ ηγησά- 
μενοι, μεμονωμένων el κρατησειαν, ουκ αν ετι 
σφίσι τους "Έλληνας ομοίως προσεΧθεΐν, προΧο- 
χίζουσι Βη τα περϊ την ποΧιν ενέΒραις, καϊ επειΒη 
εγγύς ήσαν, εκ τε της ποΧεως όμόσε χωρήσαντες 

6 καϊ εκ τών ενεΒρών προσπίπτονσιν. καϊ ες 
φόβον καταστάντων Βιαφθείρονταί τε ποΧΧοϊ των 
Χαόνων, καϊ οι άΧΧοι βάρβαροι ώς ειΒον αυτούς 
ενΒόντας, ούκέτι ύπέμειναν, αλλ' ες φνγην κατέ- 

7 στησαν. των δέ ΈΧΧηνικών στρατοπέΒων ούΒέ- 
τερον ήσθετο της μάχης, Bih το ποΧύ προεΧθεΐν 
αυτούς καϊ στρατόπεΒον οίηθηναι καταΧηψομέ- 


BOOK II. lxxxi. 2-7 

allies, dividing their troops into three divisions, 
advanced towards the city of the Stratians, their 
purpose being to encamp near by, and then, if they 
could not prevail upon them by parleying, to assault 
the wall. As they advanced, the centre was held by 
the Chaonians and the other barbarians, while on 
their right were the Leucadians and Anactorians 
and those who accompanied them, and on the left 
Cnemus with his Peloponnesians and the Ambraciots ; 
and the divisions were far apart from each other, 
sometimes, not even in sight. And the Hellenic 
troops as they advanced maintained their ranks and 
were on their guard until they encamped in a suit- 
able place ; but the Chaonians, who were not only 
confident of themselves but were also recognised as 
very excellent fighting men by the inhabitants of 
that part of the mainland, did not halt to make 
camp, but advanced with a rush along with the other 
barbarians, thinking that they could take the town 
at the first assault, and thus gain the glory for them- 
selves. But the Stratians noticed that they were 
still advancing, and thinking that, if they could 
overcome them while isolated, the Hellenes would 
no longer be as ready to attack them, set ambushes 
in the outskirts of the town, and as soon as the 
barbarians were close at hand, closed in upon them 
from the city and from the ambushes and fell upon 
them. Thrown into a panic, many of the Chaonians 
were slain, and the other barbarians, seeing them 
give way, no longer held their ground, but took to 
flight. But neither of the Hellenic divisions was 
aware of the battle, because their allies had gone far 
ahead of them, and they thought that they were 



8 νους επείγεσθαι. επεί δ' ενέκειντο φεύγοντες οι 
βάρβαροι, άνεΧάμβανόν τε αυτούς και ξυναγα- 
γόντες τα στρατόπεδα ησύχαζον αυτού την ημε- 
ραν, ες χείρας μεν ουκ Ιόντων σφίσι των Στρατιών 
Βια το μήπω τους αΧΧους Άκαρνάνας ζυμβεβοη- 
θηκέναι, άττωθεν δε σφενδονώντων καϊ ες άπορίαν 
καθιστάντων ου yap ην άνευ οπΧων κινηθήναι. 
δοκούσι δε οι ' Ακαρνάνες κράτ ιστοί είναι τούτο 
ποιεϊν. LXXXII. επειδή δε νύξ εγένετο, άνα- 
χωρησας ο Κνήμος τη στρατιά κατά τάχος επι 
τον " Αν απόν ποταμόν, ος απέχει σταδίους ογδόη- 
κοντα Στράτου, τους τε νεκρούς κομίζεται τη 
νστεραία ύποσπόνδους καϊ ΟΙνιαδών ξυ μπάρα- 
γενομένων κατά φιΧίαν αναχωρεί παρ αυτούς 
πρϊν την ξυμβοηθειαν εΧθεΐν. κάκεϊθεν επ* 
οίκου άπήΧθον έκαστοι, οι δε Στράτιοι τροπαΐον 
έστησαν της μάχης της προς τους βαρβάρους. 

LXXXIII. Το δ' εκ της Κορίνθου καϊ των 
αΧΧων ξυμμάχων των εκ του Κρισαίου κόλπου 
ναυτικόν, δ έδει παραγενέσθαι τω Κνημω, όπως 
μη ξυμβοηθωσιν οι άπο θαλάσσης άνω Άκαρνα- 
νες, ου παραγίνεται, άλλ' ηναγκάσθησαν περί 
τάς αύτας ημέρας τη εν Χτράτω μάχη ναυμαχη- 
σαι προς Φορμίωνα και τάς είκοσι ναύς των 

2 'Αθηναίων αϊ εφ ρου ρουν εν Ναυπάκτω. 6 γαρ 
Φορμίων παραπλέοντας αυτούς εξω τού κόΧπου 
ετηρει, βουΧόμενος εν τη ευρυχωρία επιθέσθαι. 

3 οι δε Κορίνθιοι και οι ξύμμαχοι επΧεον μεν ούχ 
ως επι ναυμαχία, αλλά στρατιωτικώτερον παρε- 
σκευασμένοι ες την Ακαρνανίαν καϊ ουκ αν οίο- 
μενοι προς επτά καϊ τεσσαράκοντα ναύς τάς 
σφετερας τοΧμήσαι τους 'Αθηναίους είκοσι ταΐς 


BOOK II. lxxxi. 7-lxxxiii. 3 

pressing on in order to find a camp. But when the 
barbarians in their flight broke in upon them, they 
took them in and uniting their two divisions kept 
quiet there during the day, the Stratians not coming 
to close quarters with them, because the rest of the 
Acarnanians had not yet come to their support, but 
using their slings against them from a distance and 
distressing them ; for it was not possible for them to 
stir without armour ; and indeed the Acarnanians are 
famous for their excellence in the use of the sling. 
LXXXI I. But when night came on, Cnemus hastily 
retreated with his army to the river Anapus, which 
is eighty stadia distant from Stratus, and on the 
following day took up his dead under a truce ; and 
since the Oeniadae had joined his expedition in token 
of their friendly feelings, he withdrew to their 
country before the combined forces of the Acar- 
nanians had arrived, and from there they returned 
severally to their homes. As for the Stratians, they 
set up a trophy of their battle with the barbarians. 

LXXXI 1 1. Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and 
from the other allies on the Crisaean Gulf, which 
was to have joined Cnemus in order to prevent the 
Acarnanians on the sea-coast from aiding those in the 
interior, did not arrive, but was obliged, about the 
day of the battle at Stratus, to fight with Phormio 
and the twenty Athenian ships which were on guard 
at Naupactus. For Phormio was watching them as 
they sailed along the coast out of the gulf, pre- 
ferring to attack them in the open water. Now the 
Corinthians and their allies on their way to Acarnania 
were not equipped for fighting at sea, but rather for 
operations on land, and they had no idea that the 
Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to 



εαυτών νανμαχίαν ποιησασθαι* επειδή μέντοι 
άντιπαραπΧέοντάς τε έώρων αυτούς, πάρα ηην 
σφών κομιζο μένων, καϊ εκ ΤΙατρών της 'Αχαίας 
προς την άντιπέρας ηπειρον ΒιαβάΧΧοντες έπ* 
1 Ακαρνανίας κατεΐΒον τους * Αθηναίους άπο της 
ΧαΧκίδος καϊ του Εύηνου ποταμού προσπΧέοντας 
σφίσι καϊ ούκ εΧαθον νυκτός άφορμισάμενοι, 1 
ούτω Βη αναγκάζονται ναυμαγεϊν κατά μέσον τον 

4 πορθμόν. στρατηγοί Βέ ήσαν μεν καϊ κατά 
πόΧεις έκαστων οι παρεσκευάζοντο, Κορινθίων 
Be Μαχάων καϊ 'Ισοκράτης καϊ ' A<y αθ α ρχίδας. 

5 καϊ οι μεν ΐΙεΧοποννήσιοι έτάζαντο κύκΧον των 
νεών ώς μέ^ιστον οΐοί τ ήσαν μη ΒιΒόντες Βιέκ- 
πΧουν, τας πρώρας μεν έξω, έσω Be τας πρύ- 
μνας, καϊ τά τε λεπτά πΧοΐα α ξυνέπΧει εντός 
ποιούνται καϊ πέντε ναΰς τας άριστα πΧεούσας, 
όπως έκπΧέοιεν Βια βραχέος παρα Γ γΐ Γ /νόμεναι, el 
πτ} προσπίπτουν οι ενάντιοι. 

LXXXIV. ΟΙ δ' Αθηναίοι κατά μίαν ναΰν 
τεταγμένοι περιέπΧεον αυτούς κύκΧω καϊ ξυνή- 
<γον ες oXiyov, εν χρω αιει παραπΧέοντες και 
Βόκησιν παρέχοντες αύτίκα εμβαΧεΐν προείρητο 
δ' αύτοΐς ύπο Φορμίωνος μη έπιχειρεϊν πρϊν αν 
2 αύτος σημηντ). ήΧπιζε yap αυτών ού μενεΐν την 

1 BloomfielcFs correction for υφορμισάμςνοι of the MSS. 

1 Or, retaining ύφορμισ<ία€ΐ>οι, "they had tried to anchor 
under cover of night, but had been detected." 


BOOK II. lxxxiii. 3-lxxxiv. 2 

bring on an engagement with their own forty-seven. 
When, however, they saw that the Athenians kept 
sailing along the opposite coast as long as they them- 
selves continued to skirt the southern shore, and 
when, as they attempted to cross from Patrae in 
Achaia to the mainland opposite, making for Acar- 
nania, they observed that the Athenians were bearing 
down upon them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, 
and finally when, during the night, they had tried to 
slip their moorings 1 and get away but had been 
detected, under these circumstances they were forced 
to fight in the middle of the channel. 2 Their fleet 
was commanded by generals from the several states 
which contributed contingents, the Corinthian squad- 
ron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The 
Peloponnesians drew up their ships in as large a 
circle as they could without allowing the enemy an 
opportunity to break through, 8 prows outward, sterns 
inward ; and inside the circle they placed the light 
boats which accompanied them, and also five of their 
swiftest ships, in order that they might have only a 
short distance to sail out and bring support at any 
point where the enemy attacked. 

LXXXIV. As for the Athenians, drawn up in 
single column they kept sailing round the Pelopon- 
nesian fleet in a circle, hemming it into a narrower 
and narrower space, always just grazing by and 
giving the impression that they would charge at any 
moment. But orders had been given by Phormio 
not to attack until he should give the signal ; for he 
hoped that the enemy's ships would not keep in line, 

1 i.e. in the open water between Patrae and the mouth of 
the Evenus, as opposed to the regions along the shore of the 
Gulf, where their fleet might run into a harbour. 

J See note on 1. xlix. 3. 



τάξιν, ωσπερ εν yf} πεζην, άλλα ξυμπεσεΐσθαι 
προς άΧΧηΧας τάς ναΰς και τα πΧοΐα ταραχην 
παρέξειν, ει τ εκπνεύσειεν εκ του κόΧπου το 
πνεύμα, όπερ αναμένων τε περιέπΧει κα\ είώθει 
ηίηνεσθαι επί την εω, ούδένα χρόνον ησυχασειν 
αυτούς' καϊ την επιχείρησιν εφ' αΰτώ τε ενόμιζεν 
είναι, οπόταν βούΧηται, των νέων άμεινον πΧεου- 

3 σων, καϊ τότε καΧΧιστην ^ί^νεσθαι. ως 8ε το τε 
πνεύμα κάτσει καϊ αϊ νήες εν ολιγω ήδη ονσαι 
υπ* αμφοτέρων, του τε άνεμου των τε πΧοίων, 
άμα προσκείμενων εταράσσοντο, καϊ ναΰς τε νηϊ 
π ροσ έπιπτε καϊ τοΐς κοντοΐς διεωθοΰντο, βοή τε 
χρωμενοι καϊ προς άΧΧήΧονς άντιφυΧακτ} τε καϊ 
Xothopia ουδέν κατήκουον οΰτε των παρα^εΧΧο- 
μένων οΰτε των κεΧευστών, καϊ τάς κώπας αδύνα- 
τοι οντες εν κΧύδωνι άναφέρειν άνθρωποι άπειροι 
τοΐς κυβερνήταις άπειθεστέρας τάς ναΰς παρεΐ- 
χον, τότε δη κατά τον καιρόν τούτον σημαίνει, 
και οι Άθηι αΐοι προσπεσόντες πρώτον μεν κατά- 
δύουσι των στρατηηίδων νεών μίαν, έπειτα δε καϊ 
τάς άΧΧας y χωρήσειαν διέφθειρον, καϊ κατέστη- 
σαν ες άΧκην μεν μηδένα τρέπεσθαι αυτών υπο 
της ταραχής, φεύ?γειν δε ες ΤΙάτρας καϊ Δύμην 

4 της 'Αχαίας, οι δε Αθηναίοι καταδιώξαντες καϊ 
ναΰς δώδεκα Χαβόντες τους τε άνδρας εξ αυτών 
τους πΧείστους άνεΧόμενοι ες ΜοΧύκρειον άπέ- 
πΧεον, και τροπαΐον στήσαντες έπι τω 'Ρίω καϊ 
ναΰν άναθέντες τω ΥΙοσειδώνι άνεχώρησαν ες 

6 Ναύπακτον. παρέπΧευσαν δε και οι ΥΙεΧοπον- 

4 ι6 

BOOK II. lxxxiv. 2-5 

like infantry on land, but would fall foul of one 
another, and also be thrown into confusion by the 
small boats, and then if the breeze for which he was 
waiting while he sailed round, which usually blew 
from the gulf towards dawn, should spring up, they 
would not remain steady for any length of time. As 
for the attack, he thought that was in his power 
whenever he chose, since his ships were better 
sailers, and that then was the most favourable 
moment for it. So when the wind began to come 
up, and the ships, already hemmed in a narrow 
space, were being thrown into confusion both by the 
violence of the wind and the pressure of the small 
boats, when ship was dashing against ship and the 
crews were trying to push them apart with poles, all 
the while keeping up such shouts and warning 
cries and abuse of one another that they could not 
hear either the word of command or the coxswains' 
calls, and, finally, when the inexperienced rowers, 
unable to get their oars clear of the water in a heavy 
sea, were rendering the ships less obedient to the 
helmsmen, then at this critical moment Phormio 
gave the signal. Thereupon the Athenians fell upon 
them ; first they sank one of the admirals' ships, 
and then destroyed the rest as well wherever they 
came upon them, reducing them to such straits that 
in their confusion no one turned for defence, but 
all fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaia. But the 
Athenians gave chase, and after they had captured 
twelve ships and had taken on board most of their 
crews sailed away to Molycreum ; then they set up a 
trophy on Rhium, dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and 
returned to Naupactus. The Peioponnesians also 



νησιοι ευθύς ταΐς περιλοίποις των νεών ire της 
Δύμης καϊ ΤΙατρών ες ΚυΧΧηνην το ΉΧείων επί- 
νειον καϊ άπο ΑευκάΒος Κνήμος καϊ αϊ εκείνων 
νήες, ας εΒει ταύταις ξυμμεϊξαι, άφικνοΰνται μετά 
την iv Στράτω μάχην ες την Κ,υΧΧήνην. 

LXXXV. Ώεμπουσι δέ καϊ οί ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι 
τω Κ,νήμω ζυμβούΧους επϊ τας ναΰς Ύιμοκράτη 
και ΈρασίΒαν καϊ Αυκόφρονα, κεΧεύοντες αΧΧην 
ναυμαγίαν βεΧτιον παρασκευάζεσθαι καϊ μη υπ* 

2 οΧίηων νεών είρηεσθαι της θαλάσσης, εΒόκει yap 
αύτοΐς αΧΧως τ€ καϊ πρώτον ναυμαχίας πειρασα- 
μένοις ποΧύς 6 παράλογος είναι καϊ ου τοσούτω 
ωοντο σφών το ναυτικον Χείπεσθαι, <γε Γ γενήσθαι 
Βε τίνα μαΧακίαν, ού /c άντιτιθεντες την * Αθηναίων 
εκ ποΧΧοΰ εμπειρίαν της σφετερας Βι* οΧί<γου 

3 μέΧετης. opyr) ούν άπεστεΧΧον. οί Βε άφικό- 
μενοι μετά του Κνήμου ναΰς τε προσπεριηηηειΧαν 
κατά ποΧεις καϊ τας προϋπάρχουσας εξηρτύοντο 

4 ώς επϊ ναυμαγίαν. πέμπει Βε καϊ 6 Φορμίων ες 
τας ' Αθήνας την τε παρασκευην αυτών άγγβλοΟι/- 
τας καϊ περί της ναυμαχίας ην ενίκησαν φράσον- 
τας καϊ κεΧεύων αύτω ναΰς δτι πΧείστας Βια 
τάχους άποστεΐΧαι, ώς καθ* ήμέραν εκάστην εΧ- 

5 πίΒος ούσης αιεϊ ναυμαχήσειν. οι Βε άποπεμ- 
πουσιν είκοσι ναΰς αύτω, τω δέ κομίζοντι αύτας 
προσεπέστειΧαν ες Κρήτην πρώτον άφικεσθαι» 
Νικίας yap Κρης Τορτύνιος πρόξενος ων πείθει 


BOOK II. lxxxiv. 5-Lxxxv. 5 

sailed away immediately with the ships that were 
left, proceeding from Dyme and Patrae along the 
coast to Cyllene, the shipyard of the Eleans ; and 
Cnemus likewise, coming from Leucas together with 
the ships from that quarter 1 which were to have 
joined the Corinthian fleet, came to Cyllene after the 
battle at Stratus. 

LXXXV. The Lacedaemonians now sent to the 
fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as ad- 
visers to Cnemus, directing them to make better 
preparation for another sea-fight, and not to be 
driven off the sea by a few ships. For the issue of 
the recent battle seemed to them utterly incompre- 
hensible, especially since this was their first attempt 
at a sea-fight, and they could not believe that their 
fleet was so greatly inferior, but thought that there 
had been cowardice somewhere, failing to take into 
account the long experience of the Athenians as 
compared with their own brief practice. In a rage, 
then, they dispatched the advisers. And these on 
their arrival, acting in conjunction with Cnemus, 
sent round a call to the allied cities for additional 
ships, and set about equipping those already at hand, 
with a view to a sea-fight. And Phormio on his 
part sent messengers to Athens to give information 
of the enemy's preparations and to tell about the 
battle which they had won, urging them also to send 
to him speedily as many ships as possible, since 
there was always a prospect that a battle might be 
fought any day. So they sent him twenty ships, 
but gave the commander in charge of them special 
orders to sail first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of 
Gortys, who was a proxenus 2 of theirs, persuaded 

1 The contingents from Leucas, Anactorium, and Am• 
bracia, ch. lxxx. 2, 3. 2 See ch. xxix. 1, note. 



αυτούς επϊ Κυ8ωνίαν πΧεύσαι, φάσκων προσ- 
ποιήσειν αύτην ουσαν ποΧεμίαν έττή^β 8ε Πο- 
Χιχνίταις χαριζόμενος όμόροις των Κυ8ωνιατών. 
6 καϊ 6 μεν Χαβων τάς ιαύς ωχετο ες Κρήτην καϊ 
μετά των ΥΙοΧιχνιτων iSyov την yrjv των Κυ8ω- 
νιαιων, καϊ νττ άνεμων καϊ άπΧοίας εν8ιέτριψεν 
ουκ oXiyov χρόνόν. 

LXXXVI. Οι δ' iv τη ΚυΧΧήντ) ΤΙεΧοποννήσιοι 
εν τούτω, iv ω οι Αθηναίοι περί Κρήτην κατεί- 
χοντο, παρεσκευασμένοι ως επϊ ναυμαχίαν παρε- 
πΧευσαν ες ΐΐάνορμον τον Αχαϊκον, ούπερ αύτοΐς 
6 κατά yr/v στρατός των ΤΙεΧοποννησίων προσ- 

2 εβεβοηθήκει. παρέπΧευσε 8ε καϊ 6 Φορμίων επϊ 
το 'Ρίον το ΜοΧυκρικον καϊ ώρμίσατο εξω αυτού 

3 ναυσϊν είκοσι, αίσπερ καϊ εναυμάχησεν. ην 8ε 
τούτο μεν το Ρίον φίΧιον τοις Άθηναίοις, το δ' 
έτερον 'Viov εστίν άντιπερας το εν τη ΥΙεΧοπον- 
νήσω• 8ιεχετον 8ε άπ άΧΧηΧων στα8ίους μάΧιστα 
επτά της θαΧάσσης, του 8ε Κρισαίου κόΧπου 

4 στόμα τούτο εστίν, επϊ ούν τω 'Ρίω τω ' Αχαίκω 
οι ΡΙβΧοποννήσιοι άπεχοντι ου ποΧύ τού Τίανόρ- 
μου, εν ω αύτοΐς 6 πεζός ην, ώρμίσαντο καϊ αύτοϊ 
ναυσϊν επτά καϊ εβ8ομήκοντα, χ εττει8ή καϊ τους 

5 Αυηναιους ειοον. και επι μεν εξ η επτά ημέρας 
άνθώρμουν άΧληΧοις μεΧετώντές τε καϊ παρα- 
σκευαζόμενοι την ναυμαχίαν, ηνωμην έχοντες οι 
μεν μη εκπΧεΐν εξω των 'Ρίων ες την εύρυχωρίαν, 
φοβούμενοι το πρότερον πάθος, οι 8ε μη εσπΧεΐν 
ες τά στενά, νομίζοντες προς εκείνων είναι την εν 

6 oXiyro ναυμαχίαν. έπειτα ό Κνήμος καϊ ό ΰρασί• 
8ας καϊ οι αΧΧοι των ΤΙεΧοποννησίων στpaτηyoι, 
βουΧόμενοι εν τάχει την ναυμαχίαν ποιήσαι πριν 

42θ * Hude reads -κ^ντ^κοντα, with C 

BOOK II. lxxxv. 5-Lxxxvi. 6 

them to sail against Cydonia, a hostile town, promis- 
ing to bring it over to the Athenians; but he was 
really asking them to intervene to gratify the people 
of Polichne, who are neighbours of the Cydonians. 
So the officer in charge took the ships, went to 
Crete, and helped the Polichnitans to ravage the 
lands of the Cydonians, and by reason of winds and 
stress of weather wasted not a little time. 

LXXXVI. Meantime, while the Athenians were 
detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, 
equipped and ready for a battle, sailed along the 
coast to Panormus in Achaia, where the land-forces 
of the Peloponnesians had come to their support. 
And Phormio also sailed along the coast to the 
Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside with the 
twenty ships with which he had fought before. 
This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians, and 
opposite is the other Rhium, that in the Pelopon- 
nesus; and the distance between them is about 
seven stadia by sea, constituting the mouth of the 
Crisaean Gulf. Accordingly the Peloponnesians, 
when they saw the Athenians come to anchor, like- 
wise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Achaian 
Rhium, which is not far from Panormus, where their 
land-forces were. And for six or seven days they 
lay at anchor opposite one another, practising and 
preparing for battle, the one side resolved not to 
sail outside the two Rhia into the open water, fear- 
ing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to 
sail into the straits, thinking that fighting in a 
narrow space was in the enemy's favour. At last 
Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian 
commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement 



τι καϊ άπο τών ' Αθηναίων επιβοηθήσαι, ξυνεκά- 
Χεσαν τους στρατιώτας πρώτον, καϊ όρώντες 
αυτών τους ποΧΧούς Βία την προτέραν ήσσαν 
φοβούμενους καϊ ου πρόθυμους οντάς παρεκεΧεύ- 
σαντο κα\ εΧεξαν τοιάΒε. 

LXXXVII. " Ή μεν γενομένη ναυμαχία, ω 
άνΒρες ΤΙεΧοποννησιοι, εϊ τις άρα hi αυτήν υμών 
φοβείται την μεΧΧουσαν, ουχί Βικαίαν έχει τεκ- 

2 μαρσιν το εκφοβήσαι. τη τε yap παρασκευή 
ενΒεης iy ενετό , ώσπερ ϊστε, καϊ ουχί ες ναυμα- 
χίαν μάΧΧον η επι στρατείαν επΧεομεν ζυνεβη 
he καϊ τα άπο της τύχης ουκ okiya εναντιωθήναι, 
καί πού τι καϊ ή απειρία πρώτον ναυμαχοΰντας 

3 εσφηΧεν. ώστε ου κατά την ήμετεραν κακίαν το 
ησσάσθαι προσεγενετο, ούΒε Βίκαιον της γνώμης 
το μη κατά κράτος νίκη θ εν, έχον Βέ τίνα εν αύτώ 
avTiXoyiav, της yε ξυμφοράς τω άποβάντι άμ- 
βΧύνεσθαι, νομίσαι Βε ταΐς μεν τύχαις ενΒεχεσθαι 
σφάΧΧεσθαι τους ανθρώπους, ταΐς Βε ηνώμαις 
τους αυτούς αίεϊ ορθώς 1 άνΒρείους είναι, καϊ μη 
άπειρίαν του άνΒρείου παρόντος προβαΧΧομενους 

4 είκότως αν εν τινι κακούς ηενεσθαι. υμών Βε ουδ' 
η απειρία τοσούτον Χείπεται όσον τόΧμτ) πρού- 
χετε• τώνΒε Βε η επιστήμη, ην μάΧιστα φο- 
βεϊσθε, άνΒρείαν μεν έχουσα καϊ μνήμην εζει εν 
τω Βεινώ επιτεΧεϊν α εμαθεν, άνευ Βε ευτυχίας 
ούΒεμία τέχνη προς τους κινΒύνους ισχύει, φόβος 
yap μνήμην εκπΧησσει, τέχνη Βε άνευ άΧκής ού- 

1 Hudo writes όρθούι and deletes artpclovs (with Badham). 

BOOK II. lxxxvi. 6-lxxxvii. 4 

soon, before reinforcements came from Athens, first 
called their soldiers together, and seeing that most 
of them were frightened on account of their previous 
defeat and not eager for battle, encouraged them 
and spoke as follows : 

LXXXVII. "The recent sea-fight, Peloponne- 
sians, if possibly it has caused any man among 
you to be afraid of the one before us, affords no 
just grounds for your alarm. For our preparation 
was deficient, as you know, and the object of our 
voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations 
on land ; and it happened, furthermore, that not a 
few of the chances of war were against us, and 
doubtless also our inexperience had something to do 
with our failure in the first sea-fight. It was not 
then our cowardice that brought about defeat, nor 
is it right that the spirit, which force cannot con- 
quer, but which has in it something defiant, should 
be dulled and blunted by the outcome of mere 
chance ; rather you ought to reflect that although 
men may suffer reverse in their fortunes, yet in 
their spirit brave men are rightly considered always 
brave, and when courage is present no inexperience 
can properly be urged as an excuse for being cowards 
under any circumstances. And, after all, your inex- 
perience is more than counterbalanced by your 
superiority in daring ; and though the enemy's skill, 
which you particularly dread, will indeed, so long as 
bravery goes with it, have the presence of mind in 
the moment of danger to put into effect the lessons 
it has learned, yet without valour no amount of 
proficiency avails against such dangers. For fear 
drives presence of mind away, and skill without 



5 δεν ωφεΧεΐ. προς μεν ουν το εμπειροτερον αυτών 
το τολμηρότερον άντιτάζασθε, προς δε το διά 
την ησσαν δεδι,εναι το άπαράσκευοι τότε τυχεΐν. 

6 περι^ίηνεται δε ημΐν πλήθος τε νέων καϊ προς τι) 
yfj οικεία, ουση όπΧιτων παρόντων ναυμαχεΐν τα 
δε ποΧΧά των πΧεόνων καΧ άμεινον παρεσκευασ- 

7 μένων το κράτος εστίν, ώστε ούδε καθ* εν ευρί- 
σκομεν είκότως αν ημάς σφαΧΧομενους* κα\ οσα 
ημάρτομεν πρότερον, νυν αυτά ταύτα προσ*γενό- 

8 μένα διδασκαΧίαν παρέξει. θαρσούντες ουν και 
κυβερνήται και ναυται το καθ' εαυτόν έκαστος 
επεσθε, 'χωράν μη προΧείποντες fj αν τις προσ- 

9 ταχθί). των δε πρότερον ηγεμόνων ου χείρον την 
εττιχείρησιν ημείς παρασκευάσομεν καϊ ουκ ενδώ- 
σομεν πρόφασιν ούδενι κακω γενέσθαι* ην δε τις 
άρα καϊ βουΧηθη, κοΧασθήσεται τη πρεπούση 
ζημία, οι δε αηαθοΧ τιμησονται τοις προσηκουσιν 
αυΧοις της αρετής. 

LXXXVIII. Ύοιαΰτα μεν τοις ΤΙεΧοποννησίοις 
οι άρχοντες παρεκεΧεύσαντο. ο δε Φορμίων 
δεδιως και αυτός την των στρατιωτών ορρωδιαν 
καϊ αισθόμενος οτι το πΧήθος των νέων κατά 
σφάς αυτούς Συνιστάμενοι εφοβούντο, εβουΧετο 
ξυ^καΧεσας θαρσυναί τε και παραίνεσιν εν τω 
2 παρόντι ποιήσασθαι. πρότερον μβν yap αίεϊ 
αύτοΐς εXεyε και προπαρεσκεύαζε τάς ηνώμας ως 
ούδεν αύτοΐς πΧήθος νέων τοσούτον, ην επιπΧεη, 
Ο τι ούχ ύπομενετεον εστί, καϊ οι στρατιωται εκ 
ποΧΧοΰ εν σφίσιν αύτοΐς την άξίωσιν ταύτην 


BOOK II. lxxxvii. 4-Lxxxvin. 2 

intrepidity is of no avail. Therefore, against their 
greater experience set your greater daring, and 
against the fear caused by your defeat set the 
accident of your being at the moment unprepared. 
You have the advantage, both in number of ships 
and in fighting close to the land, which is friendly 
to us, and you are supported by hoplites ; and victory 
is generally on the side of those who are the more 
numerous and better prepared. There is accordingly 
not a single reason that we can find why we should 
fail; and as to our earlier mistakes, the very fact 
that they were made will teach us a lesson. Be of 
good courage, then, and let each man, both helms- 
man and sailor, follow our lead as best he can, not 
leaving the post to which he may be assigned. We 
shall prepare for the attack at least as well as your 
former commanders, and shall give no one an excuse 
to act like a coward; but if anyone should be in- 
clined that way, he shall be punished with the pen- 
alty he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured 
with rewards such as befit their valour." 

LXXXVII I. With such words the Peloponnesian 
commanders encouraged their men. But Phormio, 
being himself also uneasy about the apprehension 
felt by his troops, and observing that they were 
gathering in knots amongst themselves in alarm at 
the superior number of the enemy's ships, wished 
to call them together in order to hearten them and 
make an exhortation to suit the present emergency. 
For in the past he had always told them, by way of 
bracing their minds, that there was no number of 
ships, however great, whose attack men such as they 
could not withstand; and his sailors had long since 
held among themselves the conviction that they, 



ειΧηφεσαν μήδενα οχΧον 'Αθηναίοι οντες Πβλο- 
3 ποννησίων νεών ύποχωρεΐν τότε δε προς την 
παρουσαν όψιν ορών αυτούς άθυμοΰντας εβού- 
Χετο υπομνησιν ποιησασθαι του θαρσεΐν, καϊ 
guy/caXeaas τους Αθηναίους eXeye τοιάδε. 

LXXXIX. " *Ορών υμάς, ώ άνδρες στρατιώται, 
πεφοβη μένους το πΧήθος των εναντίων ξυνεκά- 
Χεσα, ουκ αξιών τα μη δείνα iv όρρωδία εγειν. 

2 ούτοι yap πρώτον μεν δια το προνενικήσθαι καϊ 
μηδ* αύτοΧ οϊεσθαι όμοιοι ήμΐν είναι το πΧήθος 
τών νεών και ουκ απο του Ισου παρεσκευάσαντο* 
έπειτα ω μάΧιστα πιστεύοντες προσέρχονται, ώς 
προσήκον σφισιν άνδρείοις είναι, ου δι άΧΧο τι 
θαρσοϋσιν η δια την εν τω πεζω εμπειρίαν τα 
ττΧείω κατορθοΰντες καϊ οΐονται σφίσι καϊ εν τω 

3 ναυτικώ ποιησειν το αυτό. το δ' εκ του δικαίου 
ημΐν μάΧΧον νυν περιέσται, εϊπερ καϊ τούτοις εν 
εκείνω, επεϊ εύψυχία ye ουδέν προφέρουσι, τω δε 
έκάτεροί τι είναι εμπειρότεροι θ ρασύτεροί εσμεν. 

4 Αακεδαιμόνιοί τε ^ούμενοι αυτών δια την σφε- 
τέραν δόξαν άκοντας προσ^ουσι τους ποΧΧονς 
ες τον κίνδυνον, επεϊ ουκ αν ποτέ ενεγείρησαν 

5 ησσηθεντες πάρα ποΧυ αύθις ναυμαχεΐν. μη δη 
αυτών την τόΧμαν δείσητε. ποΧυ δε ύμεΐς εκεί- 
νοις πΧείω φόβον παρέχετε καϊ πιστότερον κατά 


BOOK II. lxxxviii. 2-lxxxix. 5 

being Athenians, must never give ground before any 
number of Peloponnesian ships. But at this time, 
seeing that they were dispirited by what they saw 
before their eyes, and wishing to remind them of 
their old-time confidence, he called them together 
and spoke as follows : 

LXXXIX. " Observing that you have become 
alarmed, soldiers, at the numbers of the enemy, I 
have called you together, because I do not want you 
to be in dread of imaginary dangers. For, in the 
first place, it is just because these men have been 
beaten before, and do not even themselves believe 
that they are a match for us, that they have provided 
themselves with this large and disproportionate num- 
ber of ships; then, too, as regards their courage, — 
the thing on which they chiefly rely when they 
come against us, as if it were their peculiar pro- 
vince to be brave, — the only reasonable ground 
they have for confidence is that their experience in 
fighting on land has generally brought them success, 
and so they think this will achieve the same result 
for them at sea as well. But in all reason the ad- 
vantage to-day will rather be ours, if they on their 
side have it on land: for in valour assuredly they 
are nowise superior, but we are both more confident 
just as in any way we have more experience. 
Besides, since the Lacedaemonians lead their allies 
for their own glory, the majority of them have to 
be dragged into battle against their will, for other- 
wise they would never, after their decisive defeat, 
have attempted to fight a second time at sea. 
Hence you need not fear their daring. On the 
contrary, you inspire in them a dread far greater 
and better justified, both because you have already 



re τό προνενικηκέναι καϊ οτι ουκ αν r/youvTai μη 
μεΧλοντάς τι άξιον του παρά ποΧύ πράξειν άνθί- 

6 στασθαι υμάς. άντίπαΧοι μεν yap οι ι πΧείους, 
ωσπερ ούτοι, τη δυνάμει το πΧέον πίσυνοι ή τη 
<γνώμτ] επέρχονται' οΐ δε εκ ποΧΧω υποδεεστέρων 
κα\ άμα ουκ άναηκαζομενοι, με^α τι της διανοίας 
το βέβαιον έχοντες άντιτοΧμωσιν. h Χο^ιζόμενοι 
ούτοι τω ουκ εικότι πΧέον πεφόβηνται ημάς ή τγ 

7 κατά Xoyov παρασκευή. ποΧΧά δε και στρατό- 
πεδα ήδη επεσεν υπ* εΧασσόνων τη απειρία, εστί 
δε ά και τη άτοΧμίγ ων ουδετέρου ημείς νυν 

8 μετέχομεν. τον δε aya>va ουκ εν τω κόΧττω εκών 
είναι ποιήσομαι ούδ' εσπΧεύσομαι ες αυτόν* όρω 
yap οτι προς ποΧΧάς ναΰς άνεπιστη μονάς oXiyaw 
ναυσίν εμπείροις καϊ άμεινον πΧβούσαις η στενο- 
χώρια ου ξυμφέρει. ούτε yap αν επιπΧεύσειέ 
τις ώς χρη ες εμβοΧην μη έχων την προσοψιν 
των ποΧεμίων εκ ποΧΧοΰ, οΰτ αν άποχωρήσειεν 
iv δέοντι πιεζόμενος* διέκπΧοι τε ουκ είσϊν ούδ' 
άναστροφαί, άπερ νεών άμεινον πΧεουσών kpya 
εστίν, άΧΧά avay^ αν εϊη την ναυμαχίαν πεζο- 
μαχίαν καθίστασθαι, καϊ εν τούτω αι πΧειους 

9 νηες κρείσσους yiyvovTai. τούτων μεν ουν iya> 

1 Iluile adopts Madvig's conjecture fj for oi. 


BOOK II. lxxyix. 5-9 

defeated them and because they think that you 
would not be facing them at all unless you ex- 
pected to achieve a result commensurate with the 
very great odds. For most men, when, like our 
present opponents, they are equal to their foes, rely 
more upon their strength when they advance to the 
attack than upon their resolution ; whereas those 
who dare oppose them with greatly inferior num- 
bers, and at the same time without being compelled 
to do so. must possess in a high degree the quality 
of unwavering resolution. Taking all these things 
into consideration, our enemies have come to fear 
us more on account of what is amazing in our con- 
duct than they would if our preparations were less 
out of proportion to their own. Furthermore many 
an army has before now been overthrown by smal'er 
numbers through its own want of experience, and 
some too through a deficiency of daring, and at this 
moment we can be charged with neither. As for 
the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can 
help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am 
aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a 
fleet of a few ships which are better sailers and 
have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a 
large number of ships which are badly managed. 
For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship 
to ram her side, through not having a clear view of 
her a long way off, nor can one retire at need when 
hard pressed ; and there is no chance for such 
manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirl- 
ing around to ram, though these are precisely the 
proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight 
would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in 
that case it is the larger fleet that wins. For these 



εξω την πρόνοιαν κατά το δυνατόν ύμεΐς Sk 
εύτακτοι παρά ταϊς νανσϊ μένοντες τά τβ παραγ- 
<γβΧΧόμενα οξέως δέχεσθε, άΧΧως τβ καϊ δι oXiyov 
της εφορμησεως ούσης, και iv τω epycp κόσμον 
και σιηην περί πΧείστου rjy€la0€ f ο ες τβ τά 
ποΧΧά των ποΧεμικών ! ζυμφέρβι καν ναυμαχία 
ου Χ ηκιστα, άμύνεσθέ τβ τούσδε άξίως των προ- 

10 ειpyaσμέvωv. 6 δε aycov μ^ας ύμΐν, ή καταΧΰ- 
σαι ΠεΧοποννησίων την εΧπίδα τον ναυτικού ή 
iyyvTepro καταστησαι 'Αθηναίοι? τον φόβον 

11 περί της θαΧάσσης. άναμιμνη^κω δ* αύ υμάς 
οτι νενικηκατε αυτών τους ποΧΧούς* ησ ση μένων 
δε ανδρών ουκ εθέΧουσιν αϊ yvώμaι προς τους 
αυτούς κίνδυνους όμοΐαι είναι, ' 

XC. Τοιαύτα δε και ο Φορμίων παρεκεΧβύσατο. 
οί δέ ΪΙεΧοποννησιοι, έπειδη αύτοϊς οι 'Αθηναίοι 
ουκ επέπΧεον ες τον κόΧπον καϊ τά στενά, βουΧο- 
μενοι άκοντας εσω irpoayayeiv αυτούς, avayayo- 
μενοι αμα εω επΧεον, βπι τεσσάρων ταζά μβνοι 
τάς ναυς, παρά 2 την εαυτών yrjv εσω έπϊ 3 του 
κόΧπου δεξιώ κέρα ^ουμένω, ώσπερ καϊ ώρμουν 
2 έπι S* αύτω είκοσι έταζαν τάς άριστα πΧεούσας, 
όπως, ει άρα νομισας βπι την Ναυπακτον αυτούς 
ττΧεΐν 6 Φορμίων καϊ αύτος επιβ<>ηθών ταύττ) 

1 Hude reads νο\€μ[ων, with C. 

2 With C(x ; the other MSS. and the Schol. ivL 
* Hude deletes inl, after Kriiger. 

1 In the first sea-fight the Peloponnesians had forty- 
eeven ships (ch. lxxxiii. 3) against Phormio's twenty (ch. 
ixxxiii. I) : in the second battle the Peloponnesians had 
eeventy-seven ships (ch. Ixxxvi 4). Since the Pelopon- 
nesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (ch. lxxxiv. 4), 
the expression M most of them " is not quite exact here. 


BOOK II. lxxxix. 9-xc. 2 

matters, however, I shall make provision to the best 
of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay 
near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of 
command, especially since the two fleets are at 
watch so near one another ; and when it comes to 
action, regard discipline and silence, which are 
generally advantageous in warfare, but especially 
so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy 
yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits. 
The contest is a momentous one for vou — whether 
you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians 
have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the 
Athenians their fear about the sea. Once more I 
remind you that you have beaten most of them l 
already ; and when men have once suffered defeat, 
their spirit is never the same as before if they are 
called upon to face the same dangers." 

XC. Such were the words with which Phormio 
also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians, 
when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and 
the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them 
in against their will ; so they put out to sea at 
dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep, 2 
sailed along their own shore towards the inner part 
of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at 
anchor, 3 their right wing leading the way. 4 Upon 
their right wing they had placed their twenty 
best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got 
the impression that their objective was Naupactus 

2 Or, as some take it, " in a column four abreast." 
8 Only now the four ships which had lain at anchor one 
behind the other sailed, after the turn to the right, abreast. 

4 Or, retaining ^?rl instead of πάρα, " after 1 ning up their 
ships four deep against their own shore {i.e. with it at their 
backs), sailed toward the inner part of the gulf . . . " 



παραπΧεοι, μη διαφύ^οιεν πΧεοντες τον επίπΧουν 
σφών οι 'Αθηναίοι εξω του εαυτών κερως, αλλ' 

3 αύται αι νήες περικΧτ\σειαν. 6 δβ, όπερ εκείνοι 
προσεδέχοντο 9 φοβηθείς περί τω χωρίω ερήμω 
ovTty ώς εώρα αναγόμενους αυτούς, άκων και κατά 
σπουδην εμβιβάσας επΧει τταμά την yP]v και 6 

4 πεζός άμα των Μεσσηνίων παρεβοήθει. ίδόντες 
δε οι ΧλεΧοποννήσιοι κατά μίαν επϊ κέρως πάρα- 
πΧεοντας και ήδη οντάς εντός του κυΧπου τε 
καϊ προς τη yfj, όπερ εβούΧοντο μάΧιστα, άπο 
σημείου ενός άφνω επιστρεψαντες τάς ναυς μετ- 
ωπι,δον επΧεον ως είχε τάκους έκαστος επϊ τους 
'Αθηναίους, καϊ ήΧπιζον πάσας τάς ναυς άποΧή- 

5 ψεσθαι. των δε ένδεκα μεν τίνες αΐπερ ήηουντο 
ύπεκφεύηουσι το κέρας των ΤΙεΧοποννησίων καϊ 
την επιστροφήν ες τνν ευρυγωρίαν τάς δ' άΧΧας 
επικαταΧαβόντες εξεωσάν τε προς την yfjv υπο- 
φευηούσας καϊ διεφθειραν, άνδρας τε των Άθη- 

6 ναίων άπεκτειναν όσοι μη εξένευσαν αυτών, καϊ 
των νεών τινας άναδούμενοι εΙΧκον κενάς (μίαν 
δε αύτοΐς άνδράσιν είχον ήδη), τάς δε τινας οι 
Μεσσήνιοι παραβοηθήσαντες καϊ επεσ βαίνοντες 
ξύν τοις οπΧοις ες την θάΧασσαν καϊ επιβάντες 
άπο των καταστρωμάτων μαχόμενοι άφείΧοντο 
εΧκομένας ήδη. 

XCI. Ταύτη μεν ουν οι ΤΙεΧοποννήσιοι εκρά- 
τουν τε καϊ διέφθειρα/' τάς Άττικάς ναυς' αι δε 
είκοσι νήες αυτών αι άπο του δεξιού κερως εδί- 
ωκον τάς ένδεκα ναΰς τών Αθηναίων αΐπερ 


BOOK II. xc. 2-xci. ι 

and should, following the coast, sail in that direc- 
tion to its aid, the Athenians might not be able 
to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing, 
but might be enveloped by these ships. Now he 
did just what they expected him to do; when he 
saw them put to sea, fearing for the safety of the 
place, which was unprotected, he reluctantly and 
in haste embarked his crews and sailed along the 
coast, the Messenian army moving along the shore 
to support him. And when the Peloponnesians 
saw that they were skirting the coast in single 
file and were already inside the gulf and close to 
shore, which was just what they most desired, at 
one signal they suddenly veered about, bore down 
with ships in line as fast as each could upon the 
Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. But 
eleven of these, which were in the lead, got past the 
Peloponnesian wing, as it swung round, and escaped 
into the open water ; but the rest were overtaken, 
driven ashore as they attempted to escape, and dis- 
abled, and all the Athenians on them who did not 
succeed in swimming ashore were slain. Some of 
the ships they made fast to their own and proceeded to 
tow away empty — though they had already captured 
one with its crew — but some others, which were 
already in tow, were taken from them by the Mes- 
senians, who came to the rescue, rushed armed as 
they were into the sea, boarded the ships, and fought 
from their decks. 

XCI. In this quarter, then, the Peloponnesians 
were victorious and had disabled the Athenian ships ; 
but the twenty ships covering their right wing were 
pursuing the eleven Athenian ships which had got 



ντΓβξέφνγοί' την επιστροφην ες την ενρυχωρίαν. 
καϊ φθάνουσιν αυτούς πΧην μιας νεως προκατα- 
φυ^ουσαι προς την Ναύπακτο», καϊ σγούσαι 
άντίπρωροι κατά το ΆποΧΧώνιον παρεσκευά- 
ζοντο άμυνούμενοι, ην ες την yrjv επί σφάς 

2 πΧέωσιν. ol δε παραΎ€ν6μ€νοι ύστερον επαιά- 
νιζόν τ€ άμα πΧέοντες ώς νενικηκοτες, καϊ την 
μίαν ναύν των 'Αθηναίων την ύπόΧοιπον εδίωκε 

3 Αενκαδία νανς μία ποΧύ προ των αΧΧων. έτυχε 
δε οΧκάς ορμούσα μετέωρος, περί ην η 'Αττική 
νανς φθάσασα καϊ περιπΧεύσασα τι) Αευκαδία 

4 διωκούση εμβάΧΧει μέστ) καϊ καταδύει, τοΐς μεν 
ονν ΏεΧοποννησιοις γενομένου τούτου απροσδό- 
κητου τε καϊ πάρα λόγοι/ φόβος εμπίπτει, καϊ 
άμα ατάκτως διώκοντες δια το κρατεΐν αί μεν 
τίνες των νέων καθεΐσαι τάς κώπας επέστησαν 
του πΧοΰ, άξύμφορον δρωντες προς την εξ ολίγου 
άντεξόρμησιν, βουΧόμενοι τ ας πΧείους περιμεΐναι, 
αί δε καϊ ες βράγεα απειρία χωρίων ώκειΧαν. 

XCIL Ύούς δ' 'Αθηναίους ίδόντας ταύτα yiyvo- 
μενα θάρσος τε εΧαβε καϊ άπο ενός κεΧεύσματος 
εμβοησαντες επ' αυτούς ωρμησαν. οι δε δια τά 
υπάρχοντα αμαρτήματα καϊ την παρούσαν άτα- 
ξίαν oXiyov μεν χρόνον ύπέμειναν, έπειτα δέ 
ετράποντο ες τον Ώάνορμον, οθενπερ awjyayovTO. 
2 επιδιώκοντες δε οι 'Αθηναίοι τάς τε €γγύς ούσας 
μάλιστα ναύς ελαβον εξ καϊ τάς εαυτών άφεί- 
Χοντο ας εκείνοι προς τί} yrj διαφθείραντες το 


BOOK II. xci. i-xcu. 2 

past them as they swung round and had escaped 
into the open water. And all the eleven except one 
reached Naupactus ahead of them, and riding at 
anchor off the Temple of Apollo, prows outward, 
made ready to defend themselves if the enemy put 
in toward the shore to attack them. When the 
Peloponnesians came up they were singing the paean 
as they rowed as if they were victorious already, and 
one Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was chasing 
the single Athenian ship which lagged behind. But, 
as it chanced, a merchantman was lying at anchor in 
deej) water and this the Athenian ship succeeded in 
reaching first and, sailing round it, rammed the 
pursuing Leucadian vessel amidships and sank her. 
At this unexpected and amazing feat consternation 
fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were, moreover, 
pursuing in disorder because they had the upper 
hand ; on some of their ships the rowers sank their 
oars into the water and checked the headway of 
their vessels, intending to await the main body of 
their fleet- a serious mistake to make in the face of 
an enemy lying near and ready for the charge — 
while others, unfamiliar with the waters there, ran 
aground in the shallows. 

XCI I. As for the Athenians, when they saw what 
was happening, they took courage, and at a single 
word of command gave a shout and dashed at them. 
But the Peloponnesians had made so many mistakes 
and were at present in such disorder, that, although 
they resisted a little while, they soon turned and 
fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The 
Athenians gave chase, and not only captured the six 
ships that were nearest, but also recovered their own 
ships which the enemy had disabled in the beginning 



πρώτον άνεΒήσαντο• άνδρας τε τους μεν άπεκτει- 

3 ναν, τινάς 8ε καϊ εζώ^ρησαν. επί Βέ της Αευκα- 
Βίας νεώς, ή περί την οΧκάΒα κατεΒυ, Ύιμοκράτης 
6 ΑακεΒαιμόνιος πλέων, ώς ή ναυς Βιεφθείρετο, 
εσφαξεν εαυτόν, και εξέπεσεν ες τον Ναυπακτίων 

4 Χι μένα. άναχωρήσαντες Βέ οί 'Αθηναίοι τροπαΐον 
έστησαν όθεν αν ay αγόμενο ι έκράτησαν, καϊ τους 
νεκρούς καϊ τα ναυάγια οσα προς ττ) εαυτών ην 
άνείΧοντο, κα\ τοις εναντιοις τα εκείνων ύπο- 

6 σπονΒα άπέΒοσαν. έστησαν Βέ καϊ ΥΙεΧοπον- 
νήσιοι τροπαΐον ώς νενικηκότες της τροπής, ας 
προς τη yfj Βιέφθειραν ναυς % καϊ ηνπερ εΧαβον 
ναύν, ανέθεσαν επι το <η Ρίον το Αχαϊκον παρά το 

6 τροπαΐον. μετά Be ταύτα φοβούμενοι την άπο 
τών 'Αθηναίων βοηθειαν υπο νύκτα εσέπΧευσαν 
ες τον κοΚπον τον Κρισαΐον και Κόρινθον άπαντες 

7 πΧην ΑευκαΒίων. και οι εκ της Κ,ρητης % Αθη- 
ναίοι ταΐς είκοσι ναυσίν, αίς εΒει προ της ναυ- 
μαχίας τω Φορμίωνι παραηενέσθαι, ου ποΧΧώ 
ύστερον της αναχωρήσεως τών νεών άφικνούνται 
ες τ») ν Ναύπακτον. καϊ το θέρος ετεΧεύτα. 

XCIII. ΐΐρϊν 8ε ΒιαΧΰσαι το ες Κόρινθόν τ€ 
καϊ τον Κρισαϊον κόΧπον αναχώρησαν ναυτικον, 
6 Κνήμος καϊ 6 ΒρασίΒας καϊ ο! άΧΧοι άρχοντες 
τών ΥΙεΧοποννησίων αρχομένου του χειμώνος 
εβούΧοντο ΒιΒαζάντων τών Μβ Γ γαρέων αποπει- 
ράσαι του ΪΙειραιώς του Χιμένος τών 'Αθηναίων 
ην 8ε άφύΧακτος καϊ άκΧηστος εικότων 8ιά το 

43 6 

BOOK II. xcn. 2-xciii. ι 

of the fight near the shore and taken in tow ; and 
of the men they killed some and took others alive. 
But Timocrates the Lacedaemonian, who was on 
board the Leucadian ship which was sunk near the 
merchantmen, slew himself when he saw that his 
ship was lost, and his body was washed up in the 
harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians now withdrew 
and set up a trophy at the place l from which they 
had set out and won the victory ; and they took up 
their dead and such of the wrecked ships as were 
close to their own shore, giving back to the enemy 
under a truce those which belonged to them. But 
the Peloponnesians also set up, in token of victory, a 
trophy for the defeat of the ships which had been 
disabled near the shore. And the ships which they 
had taken they dedicated on the Achaean Ilhium by 
the side of the trophy. And after this, fearing the 
reinforcements expected from Athens, 2 they sailed 
under cover of night into the Crisaean Gulf and 
to Corinth, all except the Leucadians. And not long 
after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from 
Crete/ which were to have joined Phormio in time 
for the battle, arrived at Naupactus. And so the 
summer ended. 

XCIII. However, before dispersing the fleet which 
had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, at the 
beginning of the winter Cnemus and Brasidas and 
the other Peloponnesian commanders, instigated by 
the Megarians, wished to make an attempt upon the 
Peiraeus, the port of Athens ; for it was unguarded 
and unclosed, and quite naturally, since the Athen- 

1 The point is not certain ; either near the Molycrian 
Rhium (ch. lxxxvi. 2), or off the Apollonium (ch. xci. 1). 
3 c/*. ch. lxxxvi. 6. * cf. ch. lxxxv. 5. 



2 εττικρατεΐν πολύ τω ναυτικω. εδόκει δε Χαβόντα 
των ναυτών εκαστον την κωπην καϊ το ύπηρεσιον 
και τον τροπωτήρα πεζή ίέναι εκ Κορίνθου επϊ 
την προς Αθήνας θάλασσαν, καϊ άφικομένους 
κατά τάχος ες Μέγαρα καθελκύσαντας εκ Νι- 
σαίας του νεωρίου αυτών τεσσαράκοντα ναύς, αΐ 
ετυχον αυτόθι ουσαι, πλεύσαι ευθύς 4πΙ τον Πει- 

3 paid' ούτε yap ναυτικον ην προφυλάσσον εν 
αύτω ούδεν ούτε προσδοκία ουδεμία μη αν ποτέ 
οι πολέμιοι εξαπιναίως ούτως επιπλεύσειαν, επεϊ 
ούτ άπο του προφανούς τοΧμησαι αν, καθ* ήσυ- 
χίαν δ' 1 ει διανοοΐντο, μη ουκ αν προαισθέσθαι. 

4 ως 8ε εδοζεν αύτοΐς, καϊ εχώρουν ευθύς' και άφι- 
κόμενοι νυκτός καϊ καθελκύσαντες εκ της Νισαίας 
τάς ναΰς επΧεον επϊ μεν τον ΐίειραιά ούκέτι, 
ώσπερ διενοούντο, καταδείσαντες τον κίνδυνον 
{και τις καϊ άνεμος αυτούς Χε Γ γεται κωΧύσαι), επϊ 
δε της Ζ,αΧαμϊνος το άκρωτήριον το προς Miyapa 
ορών καϊ φρούριον 2 επ* αυτού ην καϊ νεών 
τριών φυλακή του μη εσπΧεϊν Mεyapεύσι μηδέ 
έκπΧεΐν μηδέν, τω τε φρουρίω προσέ /SaXov καϊ 
τάς τριήρεις άφειΧκνσαν κενάς, τήν τε άΧΧην 
Σαλαμίνα απ ροσδοκήτοις επιπεσόντες επόρθουν. 

XCIV. Ές δε τάς "Αθήνας φρυκτοί τε ήροντο 
πολέμιοι καϊ εκπΧηξις ε^ένετο ουδεμιάς τών κατά 
τον πόΧεμον έλάσσων. οι μεν yap εν τω άστει 
€9 τον Πειραιά ωοντο τους πολεμίους εσπεπλευ- 
κεναι ήδη, οι V εν τω ΤΙειραιεϊ τήν τε Σαλαμίνα 
ήρήσθαι καϊ παρά σφάς όσον ουκ εσπλεΐν αυτούς- 

1 So Hude, adopting Madvig'e conjecture δ' (for ούδ') and 
punctuating after τοΚμησαι &v. 

2 Hude inserts yap after φρούριον, with van Herwerden, 
and includes in parentheses ψοούοιορ . . . μτηΖίν. 


BOOK II. xcin. i-xciv. ι 

ians were decidedly superior at sea. And it was 
determined that each sailor, taking his oar and 
cushion and oar-loop, should go on foot from Corinth 
to the sea on the Athenian side and hastening to 
Megara should launch from the docks at Nisaea forty 
ships of theirs which chanced to be there, and then 
sail straight for the Peiraeus. For there was no 
fleet on guard in the harbour, nor was there any ex- 
pectation that the enemy would ever suddenly attack 
it in this way, since they would not dare such a 
thing openly, and if they should plan it secretly 
they would not fail to be detected in time. But 
once they had determined upon the scheme they set 
to work immediately. Reaching Nisaea at night 
they launched the ships and sailed, not now to the 
Peiraeus as they had intended, since they were ap- 
palled by the risk — and a wind, too, is said to have 
prevented them — but to the promontory of Salamis 
that looks towards Megara. There was a fort here 
and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from 
entering or leaving the harbour of the Megarians. 
This fort they assaulted, towed away the triremes 
without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis, 
falling on the inhabitants unawares. 

XC1V. Meanwhile fire-signals indicating a hostile 
attack were flashed to Athens, where a panic was 
caused as great as any in this war. 1 For the 
inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy 
had already entered the Peiraeus, and those of 
the Peiraeus that they had taken Salamis and 
were all but sailing into their own harbour — as 

1 This must refer to the so-called Decelean War (or last ten 
years of the Feloponnesian War), for in vni. xcvi. 1 we 
read that a panic occurred greater than any before (to?s 
'Αθηναίοι* . . . €/<7Γλτ7£ί$ μ^ίστη δη των πριν παρέστη). 



όπερ αν, ει εβουΧηθησαν μη κατοκνήσαι, ραδίως 

2 eyevero' καϊ ουκ αν άνεμος εκώΧυσεν. βοηθη- 
σαντες δε αμ ημέρα πανδημεϊ οι 'Αθηναίοι ες τον 
ΥΙειραια ναυς τε καθεΐΧκον και εσβάντες κατά 
σπουδην και ποΧΧω θορυβώ ταΐς μεν ναυσίν επϊ 
την ΣαΧαμΐνα επΧεον, τω πεζω δε φυΧακάς του 

3 ΤΙειραιώς καθίσταντο. οι δε ΤΙεΧοποννήσωι ως 
ησθάνοντο την βοήθειαν, καταδραμόντες της 1α- 
Χαμΐνος τα ποΧΧα κ αϊ ανθρώπους και Χείαν 
Χαβόντες καϊ τας τρεις ναυς εκ του Βουδόρου του 
φρουρίου κατά τάχος επϊ της Νισαίας άπεπΧεον 
εστί yap ο Tt καϊ αι νήες αυτούς δια χρόνου 
καθεΧκυσθεΐσαι καϊ ούδεν στεηουσαι εφόβουν, 
αφικόμενοι δε ες Meyapa ττάΧιν in ι της Κορίνθου 

4 απεχώρησαν πεζή* οι δ' Αθηναίοι ούκετι κατά- 
Χαβόντες προς τη ΣαΧαμΐνι άπέπΧευσαν καϊ 
αυτοί* καϊ μετά τούτο φυΧακην ήδη του ΥΙειραιώς 
μάΧΧον το Χοιπόν εποιοΰντο Χιμένων τ€ κΧησει 
και τη άΧΧη επιμεΧεια. 

XCV. 'Τπό δε τους αυτούς χρόνους, του χει- 
μωνος τούτου αρχομένου, ^ιτάΧκης 6 Ύήρεω 
Όδρύσης, ®ρακών βασιΧεύς, εστράτευσεν επϊ 
ΐίερδίκκαν τον ' ΑΧεξάνδρου, Μακεδονίας βασι- 
Χέα, καϊ επϊ ΧαΧκιδέας τους επϊ ®ράκης, δύο 
υποσχέσεις την μεν βουΧόμενος άναπράξαι, την 
2 δε αυτός άποδοΰναι. δ τε yap ΥΙερδίκκας αύτω 
υποσχόμενος, ει ' Αθηναίοις τε διαΧΧάξειεν εαυτόν 
κατ αρχάς τω ποΧέμω πιεζόμενον και ΦιΧιππον 

BOOK II. xciv. i-xcv. a 

indeed might easily have happened if the enemy 
had resolved that there should be no flinching; 
and no mere wind would have prevented them. 
But at dawn the Athenians hastened down to 
the Peiraeus with all their forces, launched ships, 
and embarking in haste and with much confusion 
sailed with the fleet to Salamis, setting their land- 
forces to guard the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians 
had already overrun most of Salamis and had taken 
prisoners and booty and the three ships at the fort 
of Budorum, when they saw the relief expedition 
coming, whereupon they sailed in haste toward 
Nisaea ; to some extent too there was apprehension 
about their own ships, which had not been drawn 
down into the sea for a long time and were anything 
but water-tight. On reaching Megara they with- 
drew on foot to Corinth, and the Athenians, finding 
them no longer at Salamis, likewise sailed back. 
After this they kept stricter guard over the Peiraeus, 
closing up the harbour 1 as well as taking other 

XCV. About the same time, at the beginning of 
this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, a son of Teres, king 
of the Thracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas 
son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the 
Chalcidians of Thrace, wishing to exact fulfilment of 
one promise and to make good another. For when 
Perdiccas was being hard pressed at the beginning 
of the war he had made Sitalces a promise on condition 
that he should reconcile him to the Athenians and 
should not bring back his brother Philip, who was 

1 i.e. by prolonging the walls at the entrance so as to leave 
only a narrow passage in the centre, which could be closed 
by a chain. 

vol. i. q 44* 


τον άδεΧφον αύτον ποΧέμιον οντά μη Karayayot 
επϊ βασιλεία, α υπεδέξατο ουκ επετεΧει• τοις τε 
* Αθηναίοις αυτός ώμοΧογηκει ore την ζυμμαχίαν 
εποιεΐτο τον επϊ ®ράκης ΧαΧκιδικόν ποΧεμον 
3 καταΧυσειν. αμφοτέρων ουν ένεκα την εφοδον 
εποιεΐτο καϊ τον Τ6 Φιλίππου υίον * Αμύνταν ως 
επϊ βασιλεία των Μακεδόνων rjye καϊ των Αθη- 
ναίων πρέσβεις, οι ετυχον παρόντες τούτων ένεκα, 
καϊ ηγεμόνα "Κόνωνα• έδει yap καϊ τους *Α0ψ 
ναίους ναυσί τε καϊ στρατιά ώς πλείστη επϊ τους 
ΧαΧκιδέας πapayεvεσθaι. 

XCVI. * Ανίστησιν ουν εκ των Ό δρυ σων ορμώ- 
μενος πρώτον μεν τους εντός του Αίμου τε ορούς 
καϊ της 'Ροδόπης ®ρακας όσων ηρχε μέχρι θα- 
Χάσσης ες τον Έΰξεινόν τε πόντον καϊ τον 
'ΈΧλήσποντον, 1 έπειτα τους υπερβάντι Αΐμον 
Τετ ας κα\ δ σα άΧΧα μέρη εντός του "Ιστρου πο- 
ταμού προς θάΧασσαν μάΧΧον την του Έιύξείνου 
πόντου κατωκητο* είσϊ δ' οι Υέται καϊ οι ταύττ) 
όμοροι τε τοις ^κύθαις καϊ όμόσκευοι, πάντες 

2 ιπποτοξόται. παρεκάλει δε καϊ των ορεινών 
Θ ρακών ποΧΧούς τών αυτονόμων καϊ μαχαιρο- 
φόρων, οι Δΐοι καλούνται, την 'Τοδόπην οι πΧεϊ- 
στοι οικουντες* καϊ τους μεν μισθω επειθεν, οι δ' 

3 εθελονταϊ ξυνηκοΧούθουν. άνίστη δέ καϊ 'Aypia- 

1 is . . . Έλλ-ησποντον deleted by Hude and others as not 
read by the Schol. (μέχρι θαλάσσ-η*, cws τον Εύ&ίνου πόντου 
καϊ του Ελλησπόντου). Classen understands the Schol. to 
support the text reading. 


BOOK II. xcv. 2-xcvi. 3 

hostile, to make him king ; but Perdiccas would not 
fulfil his promise. On the other hand, Sitalces had 
made an agreement with the Athenians, 1 at the 
time he entered into the alliance with them, to bring 
to an end their war with the Chalcidians in Thrace. 
For both these reasons, then, he now began the in- 
vasion, and he took with him Philip's son, Amyntas, 2 
with a view to making him king of the Macedonians, 
as well as some Athenian envoys who had come to 
see him on this business, and Hagnon as com- 
mander 3 ; for the Athenians were to furnish a fleet 
and as large an army as possible 4 for the war against 
the Chalcidians. 

XCVI. Sitalces, accordingly, beginning with the 
Odrysians, summoned to his standard, first the 
Thracians under his sway between the mountains 
Haemus 5 and Rhodope 6 and the sea, — as far as 
the shores of the Euxine and the Hellespont, — 
then, beyond Haemus, the Getae, and all the other 
tribes that are settled south of the river Ister 7 
in the general direction of the seaboard of the 
Euxine sea; and the Getae and the people of 
that region are not only neighbours of the Scythians 
but are also equipped like them, all of them 
being mounted archers. And he summoned also 
many of the mountain Thracians who are independ- 
ent and wear short swords, who are called Dii, most 
of them inhabiting Rhodope ; and some of these 
were won to his service by pay, while others came 
along as volunteers. He called out, further, the 

1 cf. ch. xxix. 4. 2 Philip died meanwhile. 

8 As commander of expected Athenian troops, which 
however failed to come (ch. ci. 1). 
4 cf. ch. ci. 1. δ The modern Balkans. 

β Now Despotodagh. 7 Danube, 



νας καϊ Ααιαίους και άλλα οσα έθνη ΥΙαιονικά, 
ων ηρχε* καν έσχατοι της αρχής ούτοι ήσαν 
μέχρι yap Ααιαίων ΥΙαιόνων καϊ του Στρυμόνος 
ποταμού, ος εκ του Σκόμβρου ορούς δι 'Aypid- 
νων και Ααιαίων ρεΐ, 1 ώρίζετο ή αρχή τά προς 
4 ΤΙαίονας αυτόνομους ήδη. τα δε προς Ύριβαλ- 
λούς, καϊ τούτους αυτόνομους, Ύρήρβς ωριζον 
καϊ Ύΐλαταΐοι• οίκούσι δ' ούτοι προς βορεαν του 
Χκόμβρου ορούς καϊ παρήκουσι προς ηλίου δύσιν 
μέχρι του Όσκίου ποταμού, pel δ' ούτος εκ του 
ορούς οθενπερ καϊ 6 Νέστος καϊ 6 'Έβρος• εστί δέ 
ερήμον το ορός καϊ μέγα, έχόμενον της 'Ροδόπης. 

XCVII. Έγένετο δε ή αρχή η > Οδρυσών μέ- 
γεθος επι μεν θάλασσαν καθήκουσα άπο * Αβ- 
δήρων πόλεως ες τον Έΰξεινον πόντον μέχρι 
"Ιστρου ποταμού* αύτη περίπλους εστίν ή γη 
τά ξυντομώτατα, ην αΐεϊ κατά πρύμναν Χστηται 
το πνεύμα, νηΐ στρογγυλή τεσσάρων ημερών καϊ 
Χσων νυκτών* όδω δε τα ξυντομώτατα εξ 'Αβ- 
δήρων ες'Ίστρον άνήρ εΰζωνος ενδεκαταιος τελεί. 

2 τά μεν προς θάλασσαν τοσαύτη ην, ες ήπειρον 
δε άπο Βυζαντίου ες Ααιαίους καϊ επι τον 
Στρυμόνα (ταύτη γαρ δια πλείστου από θα- 
λάσσης άνω εγίγνετο) ημερών άνδρϊ εύζώνω τριών 

3 και δέκα άνύσαι. φόρος τε εκ πάσης της βαρ- 
βάρου και τών 'Ελληνίδων πόλεων οσωνπερ 

1 ου, in the MSS. before ωρίζετο, deleted by Arnold. 

1 Paeonian tribes that dwelt in the mountain regions 
bordering on Macedonia, watered by the Upper Strymon 
and the Axius ; most of them were afterwards subject to 


BOOK II. xcvi. 3-xcvn. 3 

Agrianians and Laeaeans, and all the other Paeonian 
tribes which were under his sway. 1 These peoples 
were at the outer limits of his empire ; for the bounds 
of his empire extended, on the side towards the 
Paeonians, who are independent, as far as the 
Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, 2 which 
flows from mount Scombrus through the country of 
the Agrianians and the Laeaeans. On the side to- 
ward the Triballi, who also are independent, the 
boundary is formed by the Treres and Tilataeans ; 
and these dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and 
extend toward the west as far as the river Oscius. 8 
This river has its source in the same mountains as 
the Nestus 4 and the Hebrus 5 — a mountain range of 
great extent and uninhabited that is adjacent to 

XCVII. Now the empire of the Odrysians* in 
respect to its size extended along the sea-coast from 
the city of Abdera to the Euxine Sea as far as the 
river Ister. This stretch of coast constitutes a 
voyage for a merchant-vessel, if the shortest course 
is taken and the wind keeps steady astern, of four 
days and as many nights ; but the journey by land 
from Abdera to the Ister can be accomplished by an 
active man, taking the shortest route, in eleven 
days. Such was its extent on its seaboard ; but 
inland the distance from Byzantium to the Laeaeans 
and the river Strymon — for this was its inland point 
farthest distant from the sea — it is possible for an 
active man to cover in thirteen days. As for the 
tribute which came in from the barbarian territory 
and from all the Hellenic cities over which the 

Q Now Struma. B Now Isker. 

4 Now Masta. 5 Now Maritza. 

• Coinciding in the main with modern Bulgaria. 



ηρξαν επί Σεύθου, ος ύστερον Σιτάλκου βασι- 
λεύσας πλείστον δη εποίησε, τετρακοσίων τα- 
λάντων αργυρίου μάλιστα δύναμις, α χρυσός 
καΧ άργυρος ηει* και δώρα ουκ ελάσσω τούτων 
χρυσού τ€ και αργύρου προσέφερε™, χωρίς δε 
οσα υφαντά τε καϊ λεία και η άλλη κατασκευή, 
καϊ ου μόνον αύτω, άλλα καϊ τοις παραδυνα- 

4 στεύουσί τε καϊ γενναίο ις Όδρυσών. κατέστη- 
σαντο yap τουναντίον της ΐίερσών βασιλείας 
τον νόμον οντά μεν καϊ τοις άλλοις ®ραξΙ 
λαμβάνειν μάλλον ή διδόναι (καϊ αϊσχιον Tjv 
αιτηθέντα μη δούναι ή αίτήσαντα μη τυχεΐν), 
όμως δε κατά το δύνασθαι επΧ πλέον αύτω εχρή- 
σαντο* ου yap ην πράζαι ούδεν μη δίδοντα δώρα, 

5 ώστε επΧ μέγα ή βασιλεία ηλθεν ισχύος, τών 
yap εν τη Ευρώπη οσαι μεταξύ του 'Ιονίου 
κόλπου καϊ του Ευξείνου πόντου μεγίστη εγενετο 
χρημάτων προσόδω και τη άλλη ευδαιμονία, 
ίσχύι δΐ μάχης καϊ στρατού πληθει πολύ δευτέρα 

6 μετά την Σκυθών. ταύτη δε αδύνατα εξισουσθαι 
ουχ οτι τα εν τη Ευρώπη, αλλ ουο εν τη Ασία 
έθνος εν προς εν ουκ εστίν δ τι δυνατόν Χκύθαις 
όμογνωμονοΰσι πάσιν άντιστήναι. ού μην ούδ' 

1 Nephew and successor of Sitalces ; c/. ch. ci. 5, 6 ; IV. ci. 5. 

2 £81,000, $388,800. 

3 Among the Persians the monarch gave rather than re- 
ceived presents : c/. Xen. Cyrop. Till. ii. 7, διαμένα ίτι καϊ νυν 
roils βασι\*νσιν ή πολυδχρία. 


BOOK II. xcvn. 3-6 

Odrysians acquired sway in the time of Seuthes * — 
who, succeeding Sitalces on the throne, brought 
the revenues to their maximum — its value was about 
four hundred talents 2 in coin, and was paid in gold 
and silver ; and gifts equal in value to the tribute, 
not only of gold and silver, but besides these all 
manner of stuffs, both embroidered and plain, and 
other articles for household use, were brought as 
offerings to the king, and not for him only, but also 
for the subordinate princes and nobles of the Odry- 
sians. For these kings had established a custom 
which was just the opposite of that prevailing in the 
kingdom of the Persians, 3 namely ? to take rather 
than to give ; indeed it was more disgraceful for a 
man not to give when asked than to ask and be 
refused. This custom was observed among the 
other Thracians also ; but the Odrysian kings, as 
they were more powerful, followed it more exten- 
sively ; indeed it was not possible to accomplish 
anything without giving gifts. Consequently the 
kingdom attained to a great degree of power. For 
of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian 
Gulf and the Euxine Sea it was the greatest in 
revenue of money and in general prosperity ; but 
as regards the strength and size of its army, it was 
distinctly inferior to the Scythian kingdom. 4 With 
that not only are the nations of Europe unable to 
compete, but even in Asia, nation against nation, 
there is none which can make a stand against the 
Scythians if they all act in concert. However, with 

4 Contradicting Hdt. V. iii.: Θρηίκων δ€ ίθνο$ μς-γιστόν 4στι 
μ^τά yc 'ivSovs πάντων ανθρώπων' et 5e υπ kvhs άρχοιτο *; φρονίοι 
κατά. τωυτ6, άμαχον τ* αν €Ϊη κάϊ πολλψ κράτιστον πάντων 
ίθνέων κατά ^νώμτ\ν τ\\ν 4μ4\ν, 



€? την αΧΧην ενβονΧίαν καϊ ξννεσιν περί των 
παρόντων ες τον βίον άΧΧοις όμοιοννται. 

XCVIIL ΊίιτάΧκης μεν ονν χώρας τοσαντης 
βασιΧενων παρεσκενάζετο τον στρατόν. καί 
επειδή αντφ ίτοΐμα ην, αράς επορενετο επί την 
Ts /ίακεδονίαν πρώτον μεν δια της αντον αρχής, 
έπειτα δια, Κερκίνης ερήμον ορούς, ο εστί μεθό- 
ριον Χιντών καί ΤΙαιόνων, επορενετο δέ δι 
αντον τη όδφ ην πρότερον αντος εποιήσατο 
τεμών την νΧην, οτε επϊ ΤΙαίονας εστράτενσεν. 

2 το δε ορός εξ *Οδρνσών διιόντες εν δεξιά μεν 
ειχον ΙΙαίονας, εν αριστερά δε Χιντονς καϊ 
ΜαιΒονς. διεΧθόντες δε αύτο άφίκοντο ες Δό- 

3 βηρον την ΤΙαιονικήν. πορενομενω δε αντώ άπε- 
<yiyv6T0 μεν ονδεν τον στρατοί) εΐ μη τι νοσώ, 
προσεηίηνετο δε. ποΧΧοϊ jap των αυτονόμων 
©ρακών απαράκΧητοι εφ? άρπαγην ήκοΧονθονν, 
ώστε το παν πΧήθος Χέζεται ονκ εΧασσον πέντε 

4 καϊ δέκα μνριαδων γενέσθαι* καϊ τούτον το μεν 
πΧέον πεζον ην, τριτημόριον δε μάΧιστα ίππικόν. 
τον δ' ιππικον το πΧεΐστον αντοϊ Οδρνσαι 
παρείχοντο και μετ αντονς Υεται. τον δε πεζοί 
οι μαχαιροφόροι μαχιμώτατοι μεν ήσαν οι εκ της 
^Ροδόπης αυτόνομοι καταβάντες, ο δε άΧΧος ομι- 
Χος ξνμμεικτος πΧηθει φοβερώτατος ήκοΧονθει. 

XCIX. Άννηθροίζοντο ονν εν τη Δοβήρω καϊ 
παρεσκενάζοντο όπως κατά κορνφήν εσβαΧονσιν 
ες την κάτω Μακεδονίαν, ης ό ΙΙερδίκκας ήρχεν. 

BOOK II. xcvn. 6-xcix. ι 

reference to wise counsel and intelligence about the 
things that belong to the enrichment of life the 
Scythians are not to be compared with other nations. 

XCVUI. Such then was the extent of the country 
over which Sitalces ruled at the time when he was 
preparing his army. But when everything was 
ready, he set out for Macedonia, proceeding first 
through his own territory, then through the deso- 
late range of Cercine, which lies between the Sinti 
and Paeonians. And he passed over this mountain 
by the road which he himself had constructed before, 
when he made an expedition against the Paeonians, 
cutting a path through the forest. As his army 
crossed the mountain, leaving the country of the 
Odrysians, they had the Paeonians on the right 
and on the left the Sinti and Maedi ; and when 
they came out on the other side they arrived at 
Doberus in Paeonia. On the march his army 
suffered no loss, except from sickness, but rather 
was augmented ; for many of the independent 
Thracians joined the expedition unsummoned, in 
the hope of plunder, so that the whole number is 
said to have been not less than a hundred and fifty 
thousand, the greater part being infantry, about one- 
third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians them- 
selves furnished the largest contingent, and next to 
them the Getae ; while of the infantry the sword- 
wearers, independent tribes that came down from 
Mount Rhodope, were the best fighters, the rest ol 
the army that followed, a miscellaneous horde, being 
formidable chiefly on account of its numbers. 

XCIX. So Sitalces* army was being mustered at 
Doberus and preparing to pass over the mountain 
crest and descend upon lower Macedonia, of which 



2 των yap Μακεδόνων είσϊ καί Αυγκησταϊ καϊ 
Έλιμιώται καί άλλα έθνη επάνωθεν, α ξύμμαχα 
μέν εστί τούτοις καϊ ύπηκοα, βασιλείας δ' έχει 

3 καθ* αυτά. την he πάρα θάλασσαν νυν Μακε- 
δονίαν 'Αλέξανδρος 6 ΤΙερδίκκου πατήρ καϊ οι 
πρόγονοι αύτοΰ Ύημενίδαι το αρχαΐον δντες εξ 
"Αργούς πρώτοι έκτησαντο καϊ ε βασίλευσαν 
άναστησαντες μάχη εκ μεν ΤΙιερίας ΐΐίερας, οί 
ύστερον ύπο το Tlayyaiov πέραν Στρυμόνος 
ωκησαν Φάηρητα καϊ άλλα χωρία (καϊ ετι και 
νυν ΙΙιερικος κόλπος καλείται ή ύπο τω Παγγαιρ 
προς θάλασσαν γη), εκ Be της Βοττίας καλούμε- 
νης ϋοττιαίους, οΐ νυν όμοροι Χαλκιδέων οίκοΰ- 

4 σιν της δε ΤΙαιονίας παρά τον "Αξιον ποταμον 
στενην τίνα καθήκουσαν άνωθεν μέχρι ΤΙέλλης 
καϊ θαλάσσης έκτησαντο, καϊ πέραν 'Αξίου μέχρι 
Στρυμόνος την Μυηδονίαν καλουμένην Ήδώνας 

5 εξελάσαντες νέμονται, άνέστησαν δε καϊ εκ της 
νυν Έορδίας καλούμενης Έορδούς, ων οι μεν 
πολλοί εφθάρησαν, βραχύ δέ τι αυτών περί 
Φύσκαν κατωκηται, καϊ εξ 'Αλμωπίας 'Αλμω π ας. 

6 εκράτησαν δβ καϊ των άλλων εθνών οι Μακεδόνες 
ούτοι α καϊ νυν eTt εχουσι, τον τε Άνθ ε μουντά 
καί Τρηστωνίαν και Έισαλτίαν και Μακεδόνων 
αυτών πολλήν. το δε ξύμπαν Μακεδονία καλεί- 
ται καϊ ΤΙερδίκκας 'Αλεξάνδρου βασιλεύς αυτών 
ην οτε Χιτάλκης επ^ει. 


BOOK II. xcix. 2-6 

Perdiccas was ruler. For the Macedonian race 
includes also the Lyncestians, Elimiotes, and other 
tribes of the upper country, which, though in alli- 
ance with the nearer Macedonians and subject to 
them, have kings of their own ; but the country by 
the sea which is now called Macedonia, was first 
acquired and made their kingdom by Alexander, the 
father of Perdiccas, and his forefathers, who were 
originally Temenidae from Argos. They defeated 
and expelled from Pieria the Pierians, who after- 
wards took up their abode in Phagres and other 
places at the foot of Mount Pangaeus beyond the 
Strymon (and even to this day the district at the 
foot of Mount Pangaeus toward the sea is called 
the Pierian Valley), and also, from the country 
called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, who now dwell on the 
borders of the Chalcidians ; they acquired, further, 
a narrow strip of Paeonia extending along the 
river Axius 1 from the interior to Pella and the sea ; 
and beyond the Axius they possess the district as 
far as the Strymon which is called Mygdonia, 
having driven out the Edonians. Moreover, they 
expelled from the district now called Eordia the 
Eordians, most of whom were destroyed, but a small 
portion is settled in the neighbourhood of Physca ; 
and also from Almopia the Almopians. These 
Macedonians also made themselves masters ot 
certain places, which they still hold, belonging to 
the other tribes, namely, of Anthemus, Grestonia, 
Bisaltia, as well as of a large part of Macedonia 
proper. But the whole is now called Macedonia, 
and Perdiccas son of Alexander was king when 
Sitalces made his invasion. 

1 Now Vardar. 



C. Kai οι μεν Μακεδόνες ούτοι επιόντος πολ- 
λοί) στρατού αδύνατοι οντες άμύνεσθαι ες τε τα 
καρτερά κσΧ τα τείχη οσα ην εν τί) χώρα εσεκο- 

2 μίσθησαν ην δε ου πολλά, αλλά ύστερον ' Αρχέ- 
λαος 6 ΤΙερδίκκου υίος βασιλεύς γενόμενος τα 
νυν οντά εν τγι χώρα ωκοδόμησε και οδούς 
ευθείας ετεμε καϊ ταλλα διεκόσμησε τα 1 κατά τον 
πόλεμον ΐπποις καϊ οπλοις και τχ\ akXrj παρα- 
σκευή κρείσσονι η ξύμπαντες οι άλλοι βασιλής 

3 οκτώ οι προ αύτου γενόμενοι, ο δε στρατός των 
©ρακών εκ της Αοβηρου εσέβαλε πρώτον μεν ες 
την Φιλίππου πρότερον ούσαν αρχήν, καϊ είλεν 
Έίδομενήν μεν κατά κράτος, Υορτυνίαν δε και 
9 Αταλάντην καϊ άλλα άττα χωρία ομολογία δια 
την Άμύντου φιλίαν προσχωροΰντα, του Φιλίπ- 
που υίέος, παρόντος• Τ&ύρωπόν δε επολιόρκησαν 

4 μεν, ελειν οε ουκ εόυναντο. έπειτα οε και ες την 
άλλην Μακεδονίαν προυχώρει την εν αριστερά 
ΥΙελλης καϊ Κύρρου. εσω δε τούτων ες την 
Έοττιαίαν καϊ ΤΙιερίαν ουκ άφίκοντο, άλλα την 
τε Μυγδονίαν καϊ Γρηστωνίαν καϊ Άνθεμοΰντα 

6 εδήουν. οι δε Μακεδόνες πεζω μεν ούδβ διενοοΰν- 
το άμύνεσθαι, ίππους δε προσμεταπεμψάμενοι 
από τών άνω ξυμμάχων, οπτ] δοκοιη, ολίγοι προς 
πολλούς εσέβ άλλον ες το στράτευμα των ®ρα- 

6 κών. και χι μεν προσπέσοιεν, ουδείς ύπεμενεν 
άνδρας ιππέας τε αγαθούς καϊ τεθωρακισμένους, 
υπό δε πλήθους περικλτ)όμενοι αυτούς πολλα- 

1 τβ, in the MSS. after rh, deleted by Haacke. 

BOOK II c. 1-6 

C. The Macedonians of this region, unable to 
defend themselves against so great an invading 
army, betook themselves to the strong places and 
fortresses that were in the country. These were 
not many ; but subsequently Archelaus son of 
Perdiccas, when he became king, 1 built those that 
are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and 
in general organized his country for war by provid- 
ing cavalry, arms and other equipment beyond any- 
thing achieved by all the eight kings who preceded 
him. But the Thracian army, advancing from 
Doberus, invaded first the province which before 
had belonged to Philip, and took Idomene by storm ; 
but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places 
capitulated voluntarily out of friendship for Amyntas 
son of Philip, who accompanied Sitalces ; moreover 
they laid siege to Europus, but were unable to take 
it. Next they advanced into the other part of 
Macedonia, which is to the west of Pella and Cyr- 
rhus. Beyond these places, however, into Bottiaea 
and Pieria, they did not penetrate, but ravaged 
Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Mace- 
donians, on the other hand, did not even think of 
defending themselves with infantry, but calling upon 
their allies in the interior for additional cavalry, 
though few against many, they dashed in among 
the Thracian army wherever they chose. And 
wherever they charged no one could withstand 
them, for they were good horsemen and protected 
by cuirasses ; but since they were constantly being 
hemmed in by superior numbers and found themselves 

1 413-399 B.C. He was as famous for the splendour and 
success of his reign as for the crimes by which he obtained 
the throne• 



πΧασίω τω όμίΧω ες κίνδυνον καθίστασαν ώστε 
τέΧος ησυχίαν rjyov, ου νομίζοντες Ικανοί είναι 
προς το πΧέον κινδυνεύειν. 

CI. Ό δε ΧιτάΧκης προς τε τον ΤΙεροίκκαν 
λόγους εποιεΐτο ων ένεκα έστράτευσε, και επειδή 
οι Αθηναίοι ου παρήσαν ταΐς ναυσϊν άπιστουντες 
αυτόν μη ηζειν {δώρα δε καϊ πρέσβεις έπεμψαν 
αύτω), ες τε τους ΧαΧκιδέας καϊ Έοττιαίους 
μέρος τι του στρατού πέμπει, καϊ τειχηρεις ποιη- 

2 σας εδτ]θυ την γήν. καθήμενου δ' αυτοί) περί 
τους χώρους τούτους οι προς νότον οϊκουντες 
®εσσαΧοϊ καϊ ΝΙάγνητες καϊ οι αΧΧοι υπήκοοι 
®εσσαΧών καϊ οι μέχρι ®ερμοπυΧών "Έ*ΧΧηνες 
εφοβηθησαν μη και επι σφας 6 στρατός χωρήστ), 

3 καϊ εν παρασκευή ήσαν. εφοβηθησαν δε καϊ οι 
πέραν Στρυμόνος προς βορέαν ®ρακες όσοι πεδία 
ειχον, ΤΙαναΐοι καϊ Οδομαντοι καϊ Αρώοι καϊ 

1 Αερσαΐοι• αυτόνομοι δ' είσϊ πάντες, παρέσχε δε 
\oyov καϊ επί τους των Αθηναίων ποΧεμίους 
"ΚΧΧηνας μη υπ* αυτών αγόμενοι κατά το ξνμ- 

δ μαχικον καϊ επί σφάς χωρησωσιν. ό δε την τε 
ΙϋαΧκιδικην καϊ Έοττικην καϊ Μακεδονίαν άμα 
επέχων έφθειρε, καϊ επειδή αύτω ούδεν επράσ- 
σετο ων ένεκα εσέβαΧε, καϊ ή στρατιά σΐτόν τε 
ουκ εΐχεν αύτω καϊ υπο χειμώνος έταΧαιπώρει, 
άναπείθεται ύπο Χεύθου του Σπαραδόκου, άδεΧ- 


BOOK II. c. 6-ci. 5 

imperilled by the horde that was many times 
their own number, they finally desisted, thinking 
that they were not strong enough to fight with the 
larger force. 

CI. Sitalces now began to hold parleys with 
Perdiccas about the matters for which he had under- 
taken the expedition ; and since the Athenians 
(who did not believe that Sitalces would come, 
though they sent gifts and envoys to him) had not 
arrived with their promised fleet, he despatched 
part of his army into the territory of the Chalcidians 
and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up within their 
walls ravaged their lands. But while he was staying 
in the neighbourhood of these places, the peoples 
which dwell to the south — the Thessalians, the 
Magnesians and other subjects of the Thessalians, 
and the Hellenes as far south as Thermopylae — 
became frightened lest the host should come against 
them also, and so were making preparations. The 
same alarm was felt also by the Thracians who 
inhabit the plain beyond the Strymon to the north, 
that is, the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and 
Dersaeans, independent tribes. He gave occasion 
also to a rumour which spread even to the Hellenes 
hostile to Athens, that the Thracians might be led 
on by the Athenians in accordance with the terms 
of their alliance and come against them too. But 
meanwhile Sitalces kept on ravaging at one and the 
same time Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia ; and 
then, since none of the original objects of his in- 
vasion was being accomplished, and his army was 
without food and was suffering from the winter, he 
was persuaded by Seuthes son of Sparadocus, a 



φ ιδού οντος καϊ μ^ιστον μεθ' εαυτόν δυναμένου, 
ωστ iv τάχει άπεΧθεΐν. τον δέ Έ,εύθην κρύφα 
ΤΙερδίκκας υποσχόμενος άδεΧφην εαυτού δώσειν 

6 καϊ χρήματα επ αυτί) προσποιείται, και ο μεν 
πεισθείς καϊ μείνας τριάκοντα τάς πάσας ημέρας, 
τούτων δε οκτώ εν Ύ^αΧκιδευσιν, άνεχωρησε τφ 
στρατω κατά τάχος επ' οΐκου• ΤΙερδίκκας δε 
ύστερον Χτρατονίκην την εαυτού άδεΧφην δίδωσι 
Σεύθρ, ωσπερ υπεσχετο. τα μεν ουν κατά την 
ΣιτάΧκου στρατείαν ούτως εγένετο. 

CII. 0/ δε εν Ναυπάκτω Αθηναίοι του αυτού 
χειμώνος, επειδή το των ΤΙεΧοποννησίων ναυ- 
τικον διεΧύθη, Φορμίωνος ηγουμένου εστράτευσαν, 
παραπλεύσαντες επ' 'Αστακού καϊ άποβάντες 
ες την μεσόηειαν της Ακαρνανίας τετρακοσίοις 
μεν όπΧίταις 'Αθηναίων των άπο των νεών, τε- 
τρακοσίοις δε Μεσσηνίων, καϊ εκ τε Στράτου καϊ 
Κορόντων καϊ άΧΧων χωρίων άνδρας ου δοκούντας 
βέβαιους είναι εξήΧασαν, καϊ Κύνητα τον Θβο- 
Χυτου ες Κόροντα καταηαηόντες άνεχώρησαν 

2 πάΧιν επί τάς ναΰς. ες yap ΟΙνιάδας αΐεί ποτέ 
ποΧεμίους οντάς μόνους Άκαρνάνων ουκ εδόκει 
δυνατόν είναι χειμωνος οντος στρατεύειν ό yap 
ΆχεΧωος ποταμός ρέων εκ Πίνδου δ ρους δια 
ΑοΧοπίας καϊ 'Ay ραίων καϊ ΆμφιΧόχων καϊ δια 
του ' Άκαρνανικού πεδίου, άνωθεν μίν παρά 2τ/?α- 
τον πόΧιν, ες θάλασσαν δ' εξιεϊς παρ' Οίνιάδας 
καϊ την πόΧιν αύτοΐς περιΧιμνάζων, άπορον ποιεί 


BOOK II. ci. 5-cn. 2 

nephew and next to him in power, 1 to go back home 
at once. Now Seuthes had been secretly won over 
by Perdiccas, who had promised to give him his 
sister in marriage and a dowry with her. So 
Sitalces yielded, and after a stay of only thirty days 
in all, eight of which had been spent among the 
Chalcidians, returned home with his army with all 
speed. And Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister 
Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such, 
then, is the history of the expedition of Sitalces. 

CI I. During the same winter the Athenians in 
Naupactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had been 
disbanded, made an expedition under the command 
of Phormio. They first skirted the coast in the 
direction of Astacus, and then, disembarking, in- 
vaded the interior of Acarnania with four hundred 
Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred 
Messenian. And after they had expelled from 
Stratus, Coronta, and other places such men as were 
regarded as disloyal, and had restored Cynes son of 
Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their 
ships. For it seemed impracticable in winter to 
make a campaign against Oeniadae, whose inhabi- 
tants alone of the Acarnanians were always hostile ; 
for the river Achelous, which rises in Mount Pindus 
and flows through the country of the Dolopians, 
Agraeans, and Amphilochians and then through the 
Acarnanian plain, passes by the city of Stratus high 
up the stream, but by Oeniadae empties into the 
sea, where it surrounds the city with marshes, thus 
rendering military operations there impossible in 

1 Sadocus, Sitalces' own son, who had been received into 
Athenian citizenship (ch. xxix. 5 ; lxvii. 2), must have died 
before this time. The nephew Seuthes succeeded to the 
throne in 424 b.o. (iv. ci. 4). 



3 υπό του ύδατος εν χειμωνι στρατεύειν. κείνται 
δε καϊ των νήσων των *Έ*χινάδων αϊ ποΧΧαϊ 
καταντικρύ ΟΙνιαδών του 'Αχελώου των εκβοΧων 
ούδεν άπέχουσαι, ώστε μέγας ων 6 ποταμός 
προσχοΐ aiel καϊ εισϊ των νήσων αϊ ηπείρωνται, 
εΧπϊς δε καϊ πάσας ουκ ev ποΧΧω τινι αν χρόνω 

4 τούτο παθεΐν το τε yap ρεύμα εστί μέγα καϊ 
ποΧύ καϊ θοΧερον, al τε νήσοι πυκναί, καϊ άλλ?;- 
Χαις της προσχώσεως το μη σκεδάννυσθαι * Σύν- 
δεσμοι yiyvovTai, παραΧΧαζ καϊ ου κατά στοΐχον 
κείμεναι, ούδ εχουσαι ευθείας διόδους του ύδατος 

5 69 το πέXayoς. έρημοι δ' είσϊ καϊ ου μεyάλaι. 
λέγεται δε και 'ΑΧκμέωνι τω Άμφιάρεω, οτε δη 
άΧασθαι αυτόν μετά τον φόνον της μητρός, τον 
Άπολλω ταύτην την yrjv χρησαι οίκείν, ύπει- 
ττόντα ουκ είναι Χύσιν των δειμάτων πριν αν 
εύρων εν ταύτη τγι χώρα* κατοικίσηται ήτις οτε 
έκτεινε την μητέρα μήττω υπό ηΧιου εωράτο μηδέ 

6 yrj ην, ώς της ye αΧΧης αύτω μεμιασμένης. ό δ' 
άπορων, ως φασι, μοΧις κατενόησε την πρόσχω- 
σιν ταύτην του 'Αχελώου, και εδόκει αύτω ικανή 
αν κεχωσθαι δίαιτα τω σώματι άφ* ουπερ κτείνας 
την μητέρα ούκ oXiyov χρόνον επΧανάτο. καϊ 
κατοικισθείς ες τους περί ΟΙνιάδας τόπους έδυνά- 
στευσέ τε καϊ άπο ' Ακαρνάνος παιδος εαυτού της 
χώρας την επωνυμίαν ε^κατέλιπεν. τά μεν ούν 
περί *ΑΧκμέωνα τοιαύτα Xεyόμεva παρεΧάβομεν. 

1 Hude brackets τλ μ$ σκ&άννυσθαι, following Stahl. 


BOOK II. en. 2-6 

winter by reason of the water. Besides, most of the 
Echinades islands lie opposite to Oeniadae at no great 
distance from the mouths of the Achelous, so that 
the river, which is large, keeps making fresh deposits 
of silt, and some of the islands have already become 
part of the mainland, and probably this will happen 
to all of them in no great while. For the stream is 
wide and deep and turbid, and the islands are close 
together and serve to bind to one another the bars 
as they are formed, preventing them from being 
broken up, since the islands lie, not in line, but 
irregularly, and do not allow straight channels for 
the water into the open sea. These islands are 
uninhabited and not large. There is a story that 
when Alcmaeon son of Amphiaraus was a wanderer 
after the murder of his mother, 1 Apollo directed him 
by oracle to inhabit this land, intimating that he 
would have no release from his fears until he should 
find and settle in a country which at the time he 
killed his mother had not yet been seen by the 
sun, and was not even land then, for all the rest 
of the earth had been polluted by him. And he, 
in his perplexity, at last, as the story goes, ob- 
served this sand-bar formed by the Achelous, and 
he surmised that during the long time he had bvien 
wandering since he had slain his mother enough 
land would have been silted up to support life in. 
So he settled there in the region of Oeniadae, 
founded a principality, and left to the country its 
name Acarnania, after that of his son Acarnan. 
Such is the tradition which we have received 
concerning Alcmaeon. 

1 Eriphyle. 



CIII. 0/ $€ 'Αθηναίοι καϊ 6 Φορμίων αραντες 
i/e της ' Ακαρνανίας κα\ άφικόμενοι ες την Ναύ- 
πακτο ν άμα ηρι κατειτΧευσαν ες τα9 * Αθήνας, 
τους τε εΚευθερους των αιχμαλώτων εκ των 
ναυμαχιών ά'γοντες, οΐ άνηρ άντ ανδρός ελύ- 
2 θησαν, καϊ τας ναυς ας εΐΧον. καϊ ο χειμών 
ετεΧεντα ούτος, καϊ τρίτον έτος τω ττοΧεμω 
ετεΧεντα τωδε ον ©ονκνδίδης ξυνεηραψεν. 


BOOK II. cm. 1-2 

CIII. The Athenians and Phormio set out from 
Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, and later, at 
the beginning of spring, sailed back to Athens, 
bringing with them the captured ships and also the 
prisoners of free birth whom they had taken in the 
sea-fights. These were exchanged man for man. 
And this winter ended, concluding the third year of 
this war of which Thucydides wrote the history. 




Latin Authors 

Ammianus Marcellinus. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. 

Apuleius: The Golden Ass (Metamorphoses). W. Adling- 

ton (1566). Revised by S. Gaselee. 
St. Augustine: City of God. 7 Vols. Vol. I. G. E. McCrac- 

ken. Vol. II. and VII. W.M.Green. Vol. III. D. Wiesen. 

Vol. IV. P. Levine. Vol. V. E. M. Sanford and W. M. 

Green. Vol. VI. W. C. Greene. 
St. Augustine, Confessions of. W. Watts (1631). 2 Vols. 
St. Augustine, Select Letters. J. H. Baxter. 
Ausonius. H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. 
Bede. J. E. King. 2 Vols. 
Boethius: Tracts and De Consolatione Philosophiae. 

Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. Revised by S. J. Tester. 
Caeser: Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars. A. G. 

Caeser: Civil Wars. A. G. Peskett. 
Caeser: Gallic War. H. J. Edwards. 
Cato: De Re Rustica; Varro: De Re Rustica. Η. Β. Asli 

and W. D. Hooper. 
Catullus. F. W. Cornish; Tibullus. J. B. Postgate; Per- 
vigilium Veneris. J. W. Mackail. 
Celsus: De Medicina. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols. 
Cicero: Brutus, and Orator. G. L. Hendrickson and Η. Μ. 

[Cicero]: Ad Herennium. H. Caplan. 
Cicero : De Oratore, etc. 2 Vols. Vol. I. De Oratore, 

Books I. and II. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. Vol. II. 

De Oratore, Book III. De Fato; Paradoxa Stoieorum; 

De Partitione Oratoria. H. Rackham. 
Cicero : De Finibus. H. Rackham. 
Cicero: De Inventione, etc. Η. M. Hubbell. 
Cicero : De Natura Deorum and Academica. H. Rackham. 
Cicero : De Officiis. Walter Miller. 

Cicero : De Republic a and De Legibus : Somnium Scipionis. 
Clinton W. Keyee. 


Cicero: De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione. 

W. A. Falconer. 
Cicero : In Catilinam, Pro Flacco, Pro Murena, Pro Sulla. 

New version by C. Macdonald. 
Cicero : Letters to Atticus. E. O. Winstedt. 3 Vols. 
Cicero: Letters to His Friends. W. Glynn Williams, 

M. Gary, M. Henderson. 4 Vols. 
Cicero : Philippics. W. C. A. Ker. 
Cicero: Pro Archia Post Reditum, De Domo, De Harus- 

picum Responsis, Pro Plancio. Ν. H. Watts. 
Cicero: Pro Caecina, Pro Lege Manilia, Pro Cluentio, 

Pro Rabirio. H. Grose Hodge. 
Cicero: Pro Caelio, De Provinciis Consularibus, Pro 

Balbo. R. Gardner. 
Cicero: Pro Milone, In Pisonem, Pro Scauro, Pro Fonteio, 

Pro Rabirio Postumo, Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, Pro 

Rege Deiotaro. Ν. H. Watts. 
Cicero : Pro Quinctio, Pro Roscio Amerino, Pro Roscio 

Comoedo, Contra Rullum. J. H. Freese. 
Cicero: Pro Sestio, In Vatinium. R. Gardner. 
Cicero: Tusculan Disputations. J. E. King. 
Cicero : Verrine Orations. L. H. G. Greenwood. 2 Vols. 
Claudian. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols. 
Columella: De Re Rustica. De Arboribus. Η. B. Ash, 

E. S. Forster and E. Heffner. 3 Vols. 
Curtius, Q.: History of Alexander. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. 
Florus. E. S. Forster; and Cornelius Nepos. J. C. Rolfe. 
Frontinus: Stratagems and Aqueducts. C. E. Bennett and 

Μ. B. McElwain. 
Fronto: Correspondence. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols. 
Gellius, J, C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. 
Horace: Odes and Epodes. C. E. Bennett. 
Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica. H. R. Fairclough. 
Jerome: Selected Letters. F. A. Wright. 
Juvenal and Persius. G. G. Ramsay. 
Livy. B. O. Foster, F. G. Moore, Evan T. Sage, and A. C. 

Schlesinger and R. M. Geer (General Index). 14 Vols. 
Lucan. J. D. Duff. 

Lucretius. W. H. D. Rouse. Revised by M. F. Smith. 
Manilius. G. P. Goold. 
Martial. W. C. A. Ker. 2 Vols. 
Minor Latin Poets: from Publilius Syrus to Rutilius 

Namatianus, including Grattius, Calpurnius Siculus, 

Nemesianus, Avianus, and others with "Aetna" and the 

"Phoenix." J. AVight Duff and Arnold Μ. Duff. 
Ovid: The Art of Love and Other Poems. J. H. Mosley. 

Revised by G. P. Goold. 
Ovid: Fasti. Sir James G. Frazer. 


Ovid: Heroides and Amores. Grant Showerman. Revised 

by G. P. Goold 
Ovid: Metamorphoses. F.J.Miller. 2 Vols. Vol. 1 revised 

by G. P. Goold. 
Ovid: Tristia and Ex Ponto. A. L. Wheeler. 
Persius. Cf. Juvenal. 
Petronius. M. Heseltine; Seneca; Apocolocyntosis. 

W. H. D. Rouse. 
Phaedrus and Babrius (Greek). Β. E. Perry. 
Plautus. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. 

Pliny: Letters, Panegyricus. Betty Radice. 2 Vols. 
Pliny : Natural History. Vols. I.-V. and IX. H. Rackham. 

VI.-VIII. W. H. S. Jones. X. D. E. Eichholz. 10 Vols. 
Propertius. Η. E. Butler. 
Prudentius. H. J. Thomson. 2 Vols. 
Quintilian. Η. E. Butler. 4 Vols. 
Remains of Old Latin. E. H. Warmington. 4 Vols. Vol. I. 

(Ennius and Caecilius.) Vol. II. (Livius, Naevius, 

Pacuvius, Accius.) Vol. III. (Lucilius and Laws of XII 

Tables.) Vol. IV. (Archaic Inscriptions.) 
Sallust. J. C. Rolfe. 

Scriptures Historiae Augustae. D. Magie. 3 Vols. 
Seneca, The Elder: Controversiae, Suasoriae. M. 

Winterbottom. 2 Vols. 
Seneca: Apocolocyntosis. Cf. Petronius. 
Seneca: Epistulae Morales. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols. 
Seneca: Moral Essays. J. W. Basore. 3 Vols. 
Seneca: Tragedies. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. 
Seneca: Naturales Quaestiones. Τ. H. Corcoran. 2 Vols. 
Sidonius: Poems and Letters. W. B. Anderson. 2 Vols. 
Silius Italicus. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols. 
Statius. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols. 
Suetonius. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. 

Tacitus: Dialogus. Sir Wm. Peterson. Agricola and 

Germania. Maurice Hutton. Revised by M. Winterbottom, 

R. M. Ogilvie, Ε. H. Warmington. 
Tacitus : Histories and Annals. C. H. Moore and J. Jackson. 

4 Vols. 
Terence. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. 
Tertullian: Apologia and De Spectaculis. T. R. Glover. 

Minucius Felix. G. H. Rendall. 
Valerius Flaccus. J. H. Mozley. 
Varro: De Lingua Latina. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols. 

Velleius Paterculus and Res Gestae Divi Augusti. F. W. 

Virgil. H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. 
Vitruvius : De Architectura. F. Granger. 2 Vols. 


Greek Authors 

Achilles Tatius. S. Gaselee. 

Aelian: On the Nature of Animals. A. F. Scholfield. 3 

Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus and Onasander. The 
Illinois Greek Club. 

Aeschines. C. D. Adams. 

Aeschylus. H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. 

Alciphron, Aelian, Philostratus : Letters. A. R. Benner 
and F. H. Fobes. 

Andocides, Antiphon, Cf. Minor Attic Orators. 

Apollodorus. Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols. 

Apollonius Rhodius. R. C. Seaton. 

The Apostolic Fathers. Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. 

Appian : Roman History. Horace White. 4 Vols. 

Aratus. Cf. Callimachus. 

Aristides: Orations. C. A. Behr. Vol. I. 

Aristophanes. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. Verse trans. 

Aristotle: Art of Rhetoric. J. H. Freese. 

Aristotle: Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, 
Vices and Virtues. H. Rackham. 

Aristotle: Generation of Animals. A. L. Peck. 

Aristotle: Historia Animalium. A. L. Peck. Vols I.— II. 

Aristotle: Metaphysics. H. Tredennick. 2 Vols. 

Aristotle: Meteorologica. H. D. P. Lee. 

Aristotle: Minor Works. W. S. Hett. On Colours, On 
Things Heard, On Physiognomies, On Plants, On Marvellous 
Things Heard, Mechanical Problems, On Indivisible Lines, 
On Situations and Names of Winds, On Melissus, Xenophanes, 
and Gorgias. 

Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. H. Rackham. 

Aristotle: Oeconomica and Magna Moralia. G. C. Arm- 
strong; (with Metaphysics, Vol. II.). 

Aristotle: On the Heavens. W t . K. C. Guthrie. 

Aristotle: On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath. 
W. S. Hett. 

Aristotle: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analy- 
tics. H. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick. 

Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Topics. H. Tredennick 
and Ε. S. Forster. 

Aristotle: On Sophistical Refutations. 

On Coming to be and Passing Away, On the Cosmos. Ε. S. 
Forster and D. J. Furley. 

Aristotle: Parts of Animals. A. L. Peck; Motion and 
Progression of Animals. E. S. Forster. 


Aristotle: Physics. Rev. P. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford. 

2 Vols. 
Aristotle: Poetics and Longinus. W. Hamilton Fyfe; 

Demetrius on Style. W. Rhys Roberts. 
Aristotle: Politics. H. Rackham. 
Aristotle: Problems. W. S. Hett. 2 Vols. 
Aristotle: Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum (with Problems. 

Vol. Π). H. Rackham. 
Arrian: History of Alexander and Indica. 2 Vols. Vol. I. 

P. Brunt. Vol. II. Rev. E. Iliffe Robson. 
Athenaeus: Deipnosophistae. C. B. Gulick. 7 Vols. 
Babrius and Phaedrus (Latin). Β. E. Perry. 
St. Basil: Letters. R. J. Deferrair. 4 Vols. 
Callimachus: Fragments. C. A. Trypanis. Musaeus: Hero 

and Leander. T. Gelzer and C. Whitman. 
Callimachus, Hymns and Epigrams, and Lycophron. A. W. 

Mair; Aratus. G. R. Mair. 
Clement of Alexandria. Rev. G. W. Butterworth. 


Daphnis and Chloe. Thornley's Translation revised by 
J. M. Edmonds: and Parthenius. S. Gaselee. 

Demosthenes I.: Olynthiacs, Philippics and Minor Ora- 
tions. I.-XVII. and XX. J. H. Vince. 

Demosthenes II.: De Corona and De Falsa Legatione. 
C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. 

Demosthenes III.: Meidias, Androtion, Aristocrates, 
Timocrates and Aristogeiton, I. and II. J. H. Vince. 

Demosthenes IV.-VI.: Private Orations and In Neaeram. 
A. T. Murray. 

Demosthenes VII: Funeral Speech, Erotic Essay, Exordia 
and Letters. N. W. and N. J. DeWitt. 

Dio Cassius: Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols. 

Dio Chrysostom. J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. 5 Vols. 

Diodorus Siculus. 12 Vols. Vols. I.-VI. C. H. Oldfather. 
Vol. VII. C. L. Sherman. Vol. VIII. C. B. Welles. Vols. 
IX. and X. R. M. Geer. Vol. XI. F. Walton. Vol. XII. 
F. Walton. General Index. R. M. Geer. 

Diogenes Laertius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. New Introduc- 
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Dionysius of Halicarnassus : Roman Antiquities. Spel- 
man's translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. 

Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Critical Essays. S. Usher. 
2 Vols. 

Epictetus. W t . A. Oldfather. 2 Vols. 

Euripides. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. Verse trans. 

Eusebius: Ecclesiastical History. Kirsopp Lake and 
J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols. 


Galen: On the Natural Faculties. A. J. Brock. 
The Greek Anthology. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. 

Greek Elegy and Iambus with the Anacreontea. J. M. 

Edmonds. 2 Vols. 
The Greek Bucolic Poets (Theocritus, Bion, Moschus). 

J. M. Edmonds. 
Greek Mathematical Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. 
Herodes. Cf. Theophrastus : Characters. 
Herodian. C. R. Whittaker. 2 Vols. 
Herodotus. A. £>. Godley. 4 Vols. 
Hesiod and The Homeric Hymns. H. G. Evelyn White. 

Hippocrates and the Fragments of Heracleitus. W t . H. S. 

Jones and Ε. T. Withington. 4 Vols. 
Homer: Iliad. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. 
Homer: Odyssey. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. 
Isaeus. E. W. Forster. 
Isocrates. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. 3 Vols. 

[St. John Damascene]: Barlaam and Ioasaph. Rev. G. R. 
Woodward, Harold Mattingly and D. M. Lang. 

Josephus. 9 Vols. Vols. I.-IV. H. Thackeray. Vol. V. 

H. Thackeray and R. Marcus. Vols. VI.-VII. R. Marcus. 

Vol. VIII. R. Marcus and Allen Wikgren. Vol. IX. L. H. 

Julian. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. 
Libanius. A. F. Norman. Vols. I.— II. 
Lucian. 8 Vols. Vols. I.-V. A. M. Harmon. Vol. VI. K. 

Kilburn. Vols. VII.-VIII. M. D. Macleod. 
Lycophron. Cf. Callimachus. 
Lyra Graeca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. 
Lysias. W. R. M. Lamb. 
Manetho. W. G. Waddell: Ptolemy: Tetrabiblos. F. E. 

Marcus Aurelius. C. R. Haines. 
Menander. I New edition by W. G. Arnott. 
Minor Attic Orators (Antiphon, Andocides, Lycurgus, 

Demades, Dinarchus, Hyperides). K. J. Maidment and 

J. O. Burtt. 2 Vols. 
Musaeus: Hero and Leander. Cf. Callimachus. 
Nonnos: Dionysiaca. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. 
Oppian, Colluthus, Tryphiodorus. A. W. Mair. 

Papyri. Non-Literary Selections. A. S. Hunt and C. C. 
Edgar. 2 Vols. Literary Selections (Poetry). D.L.Page. 

Parthenius. Cf. Daphnis and Chloe. 

Pausanias: Description of Greece. W. H. S. Jones. 4 
Vols, and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley. 


Philo. 10 Vols. Vols. I.-V. F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. 

Whitaker. Vols. VI.-IX. F. H. Colson. Vol. X. F. H. 

Colson and the Rev. J. W. Earp. 
Philo : two supplementary Vols. (Translation only.) Ralph 

Philostratus: The Life of Apollonius of Tyana. F. C. 

Conybeare. 2 Vols. 
Philostratus: Imagines; Callistratus : Descriptions. A. 

Philostratus and Eunapius: Lives of the Sophists. Wil- 

mer Cave Wright. 
Pindar. Sir J. E. Sandys. 
Plato: Charmides, Alcibiades, Hipparchus, The Lovers, 

Theages, Minos and Epinomis. W. R. M. Lamb. 
Plato: Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser 

Hippias. Η. N. Fowler. 
Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, 

Η. N. Fowler. 
Plato: Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus. W. R. M. 

Plato: Laws. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. 
Plato: Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. W. R. M. Lamb. 
Plato : Republic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. 
Plato: Statesman, Philebus. H. N. Fowler; Ion. W. R. M. 

Plato: Theaetetus and Sophist. Η. N. Fowler. 
Plato: Timaeus, Critias, Clitopho, Menexenus, Epistulae. 

Rev. R. G. Bury. 
Plotinus: A. H. Armstrong. Vols. I.-III. 
Plutarch: Moralia. 17 Vols. Vols. I.-V. F. C Babbitt. 

Vol. VI. W. C. Helmbold. Vols. VII. and XIV. P. H. De 

Lacy and B. Einarson. Vol. VIII. P. A. Clement and Η. B. 

Hoffleit. Vol. IX. E. L. Minar, Jr., F. H. Sandbach, W. C. 

Helmbold. Vol. X. H. N. Fowler. Vol. XI. L. Pearson 

and F. H. Sandbach. Vol. XII. H. Cherniss and W. C. 

Helmbold. Vol. XIII 1-2. H. Cherniss. Vol. XV. F. H. 

Plutarch: The Parallel Lives. B. Perrin. 11 Vols. 
Polybius. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols. 

Procopius: History of the Wars. Η. B. Dewing. 7 Vols. 
Ptolemy: Tetrabiblos. Cf. Manetho. 
Quintus Smyrnaeus. A. S. Way. Verse trans. 
Sextus Empiricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. 
Sophocles. F. Storr. 2 Vols. Verse trans. 
Strabo: Geography. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. 
Theophrastus : Characters. J. M. Edmonds. Herodes, 

etc. A. D. Knox. 


Theophrastus : Enquiry into Plants. Sir Arthur Hort, 
Bart. 2 Vols. 

Theophrastus: De Causis Plantarum. G. Κ. K. Link and 
B. Einarson. 3 Vols. Vol. I. 

Thucydides. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. 

Tryphiodorus. Cf. Oppian. 

Xenophon: Cyropaedia. AValter Miller. 2 Vols. 

Xenophon: Hellencia. C. L. Brownson. 2 Vols. 

Xenophon: Anabasis. C. L. Brownson. 

Xenophon : Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. E. C. Marchant. 
Symposium and Apology. O. J. Todd. 

Xenophon: Scripta Minora. E. C. Marchant. Constitu- 
tion of the Athenians. G. W. Bowersock 


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