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a
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Syl labus

-ὃ & .- “Ὁ 7 4 |

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

EDITED BY
E. CAPPS, Pa.D.,LL.D. ΤΕ. PAGE, Litt.D. W. H. D. ROUSE, Litr.D.

THUCYDIDES
II

THUCYDIDES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
CHARLES FORSTER SMITH

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

IN FOUR VOLUMES
IT

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
BOOKS III anno IV

᾿ ~

LONDON : WILLIAM HEINEMANN
NEW YORK : G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS
MCMXX

CONTENTS

PAGE
BOOK III ..... δ. Ue τῶν vee τῷ inn Ge dts hn τῶν Cas Bo ἘΣ 3 l
BOOK IV .......6.46062.e8088 Migs ἐεγτον ται see Re δὶ 209
MAPS :—

Central Greece and Peloponnesus . . To face p. 171

Pylos and its Environs ....... at. ‘oe os (219

THUCYDIDES

BOOK III

VOL. II.

ἕω Te

SOYKYAIAOY ISTOPIAIT
Γ

I. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Ἰ]εἐλοποννήσιοι
καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἅμα τῷ σίτῳ ἀκμάζοντι ἐστρά-
τευσαν ἐς τὴν ᾿Αττικήν (ἡγεῖτο δὲ αὐτῶν ᾿Αρχί-
δαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς),
καὶ ἐγκαθεζόμενοι ἐδήουν τὴν γῆν' καὶ προσβολαΐ,
ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐγίγνοντο τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἱππέων
ὅπῃ παρείκοι, καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον ὅμιλον τῶν ψιλῶν
εἶργον τὸ μὴ προεξιόντας τῶν ὅπλων τὰ ἐγγὺς
τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν. ἐμμείναντες δὲ χρόνον
οὗ εἶχον τὰ σιτία ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν
κατὰ πόλεις.

II. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐσβολὴν τῶν Πελοποννησίων
εὐθὺς Λέσβος (πλὴν Μηθύμνης) ἀπέστη ἀπὸ
᾿Αθηναίων, βουληθέντες μὲν καὶ. πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου
(ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ προσεδέξαντο), ἀναγ-
κασθέντες δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπόστασιν πρότερον

A 4 A
ἢ διενοοῦντο ποιήσασθαι. τῶν τε yap λιμένων
τὴν χῶσιν καὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδόμησιν καὶ νεῶν
πα...

1 Mytilene was an oligarchical state, with dependent
towns, Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, only Methymna on the
northern coast retaining its democratic constitution and its
connection with Athens. For the revolt, cf Diod. Sic. xii.

THUCYDIDES

BOOK Ill

I. Durinea the following summer, when the grain 4282 o.
was ripening, the Peloponnesians and their allies
made an expedition into Attica under the leadership
of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lace-
daemonians, and settling in camp proceeded to ravage.
the land. And sallies were made as usual by the
Athenian cavalry wherever opportunity offered, thus
preventing the great mass of the enemy’s light-
armed troops from going beyond their watch-posts
and laying waste the districts near the city. The
invaders remained as long as their provisions lasted,
then withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.

II. Directly after the invasion of the Pelopon-
nesians, all Lesbos,! except Methymna, revolted
from Athens. The Lesbians had wished to do this
even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians had
not taken them into their alliance, and even in this
instance they were forced to revolt sooner than they
had intended. For they were waiting until the
work should be finished of blocking their harbours,

45, The complaint of the Mytilenaeang was founded on the
Athenian attempt to prevent their centralisation.

Herbst, Der Abfall Mytilenes, 1861; Leithauser, Der Abfall
Mytilenes, 1874.

3
B2

Oda os

ὔ
Kipx γυιπι
\

ner

THUCYDIDES

ποίησιν ἐπέμενον τελεσθῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ
Πόντου ἔδει ἀφικέσθαι, τοξότας τε καὶ σῖτον,
καὶ ἃ μεταπεμπόμενοι ἦσαν. Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες
αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναῖοι καὶ αὐτῶν Μυ-
TiAnvaiwy ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι
᾿Αθηναίων, “πμηνυταὶ γίγνονται τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις
ὅτι ξυνοικίζουσί τε τὴν Λέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην
βίᾳ καὶ τὴν παρασκενὴν ἅπασαν μετὰ Λακεδαι-
μονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀπο-
στάσει ἐπείγονται: καὶ εἰ μή τις προκαταλή-
ψεται ἤδη, στερήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Λέσβου.

III. Οἱ δ᾽ ᾿Αθηναῖοι (ἦσαν γὰρ τεταλαιπωρη-.
μένοι ὑπό τε τῆς gyn π τοῦ πολέμου Ἰἄρτι
καθισταμένου καὶ ἀκμάζοντος) μέγα μὲν ἔργον
ἡγοῦντο εἶναι Λέσβον προσπολεμώσασθαι ναυ-
τικὸν ἔχουσαν καὶ δύναμιν ἀκέραιον, καὶ οὐκ
ἀπεδέχοντο τὸ πρῶτον τὰς κὰἀτηγορίας ) μεῖζον
μέρος νέμοντες τῷ -μὴ -βούλεσθαι ἀληθῆ εἶναι"
ἐπειδὴ μέντοι καὶ πέμψαντες πρέσβεις οὐκ
ἔπειθον τοὺς Μυτιληναίους τήν τε ξυνοίκισιν
καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν διαλύειν, δείσαντες προκατα-
λαβεῖν ἐβούλοντο. καὶ πέμπουσιν ἐξαπιναίως
τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς, αἱ ἔτυχον περὶ Πελοπόν-
νῆσον παρεσκευασμέναι πλεῖν. Κλεϊππίδης δὲ
ὁ Δεινίου τρίτος αὐτὸς ἐστρατήγει. ἐσηγγέλθη
γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὡς εἴη ᾿Απόλλωνος Μαλόεντος ἔξω

—_—

4 The word means literally ‘‘ public guest,” or ‘‘ friend.”
Under the condition of entertaining and assisting ambassa-
dors and citizens of the state they represented they enjoyed

BOOK III. πι. 2-11. 3

building walls, and constructing ships, and until
the arrival of what they needed from Pontus—
archers and grain, and whatever else they were
sending for. But the people of Tenedos, who
were at variance with them, and of Methymna,
and some of the Mytilenaeans themselves, men in
private station who were prozent! of the Athenians,
were moved by partisanship to turn informers and
notify the Athenians that the Mytilenaeans were
attempting to bring all Lesbos into a political union
centred in Mytilene ; that all their preparations were
being hurried forward, in concert with the Lacedae-
monians and with their kinsmen the Boeotians, with
the purpose of revolting; and that unless someone
should forestall them forthwith, Lesbos would be lost
to Athens.

III. But the Athenians, distressed by the plague
as well as by the war, which had recently broken out
and was now at its height, thought it a serious
matter to make a new enemy of Lesbos, which had
a fleet and power unimpaired ; and ‘so at first they
would not listen to the charges, giving greater weight
to the wish that they might not be true. When,
however, the envoys whom they sent could not per-
suade the Mytilenaeans to stop their measures for
political union and their preparations, they became
alarmed and wished to forestall them. So they sud-
denly despatched forty ships, which happened to be
ready for a cruise around the Peloponnesus, under
the command of Cleippides son of Deinias and two
others; for word had come to them that there was a

certain privileges from that state, and answered pretty nearly
to our Consuls and Residents, though the proxenus was always
a member of the state where he served.

THUCYDIDES

τῆς πόλεως ἑορτή, ἐν ἡ πανδημεὶ Μυτιληναῖοι
ἑορτάζουσι, καὶ ἐλπίδα. εἶναι ἐπειχθέντας ἐπι-
πεσεῖν ἄφνω" καὶ ἣν μὲν ξυμβῇ ἡ πεῖρα: εἰ δὲ
μή, Μυτιληνάίοις © εἰπεῖν ναῦς τε παραδοῦναι
καὶ τείχη καθελεῖν, μὴ πειθομένων δὲ πολεμεῖν.
καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες ᾧχοντο' τὰς δὲ τῶν Μυτιλη-
ναίων δέκα τριήρεις, ai ἔτυχον βοηθοὶ παρὰ
σφᾶς κατὰ τὸ ξυμμα ἐκὸν παροῦσαι, κατέσχον
᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς
φυλακὴν ἐποιήσαντο. τοῖς δὲ Μυτιληναίοις
ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν διαβὰς ἐς Εὔβοιαν καὶ
πεζῇ ἐπὶ Γεραιστὸν ἐλθών, ὁλκάδος ἀναγομένης
ἐπιτυχών, πλῷ χρησάμενος καὶ τριταῖος ἐκ τῶν
᾿Αθηνῶν ἐς Μυτιλήνην ἀφικόμενος ἀγγέλλει τὸν
ἐπίπλουν. οἱ δὲ οὔτε ἐς τὸν Μαλόύεντα ἐξῆλθον
τά τε ἄλλα τῶν τειχῶν καὶ λιμένων περὶ τὰ
ἡμιτέλεστα φαρξάμενοι ἐφύλασσον.
IV. Καὶ οἱ Αθηναῖοι οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον κατα-
πλεύσαντες ὡς ἑώρων, ἀπήγγειλαν μὲν οἱ στρα-
τηγοὶ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα, οὐκ ἐσακουόντων δὲ τῶν
Μυτιληναίων ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο. παρά-
σκευοι δὲ οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἐξαίφνης ὦ ἀναγκα-
σθέντες πολεμεῖν ἔκπλουν “μέν τινα ἐποιήσαντο
τῶν νεῶν ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ
λιμένος, ἔπειτα καταδιωχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν
᾿Αττικῶν νεῶν λόγους ἤδη προσέφερον τοῖς
στρατηγοῖς, βουλόμενοι τὰς ναῦς τὸ παραυτίκα,
εἰ δύναιντο, ὁμολογίᾳ τινὶ ἐπιεικεῖ ἀποπέ μψα-

8 σθαι. καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἀπεδέ.

1 ᾧ,6. Apollo, » fod of Malea, the place uorth of the city
(cf. ch. iv. 5), where Apollo had a temple.

BOOK III. ur, 3-1v. 3

festival of Apollo Maloeis! outside Mytilene at which
the whole populace kept holiday, and that they
might hope to take them by surprise if they should
make haste. And if the attempt succeeded, well
and good; but if not, the generals were to order the
Mytilenaeans to deliver up their ships and pull down
their walls, and if they disobeyed, to go to war. So
the ships set off; and as there happened to be at
Athens at the time ten Mytilenaean triremes serving
as auxiliaries in accordance with the terms of their
alliance, the Athenians detained them, placing their
crews in custody. But the Mytilenaeans got word of
the expedition through a man who crossed over from
Athens to Euboea, went thence by land to Geraestus,
and, chancing there upon a merchantman that was
putting to sea, took ship and on the third day after
leaving Athens reached Mytilene. The Mytilenaeans,
accordingly, not only did not go out to the temple of
Apollo Maloeis, but barricaded the half-finished
portions of the walls and harbours and kept guard.?
Ιν. When not long afterwards the Athenians
arrived and saw the state of affairs, their generals
delivered their orders, and then, as the Mytilenaeans
did not hearken to them, began hostilities. But the
Mytilenaeans, being unprepared for war and forced
to enter upon it without warning, merely sailed out a
short distance beyond their harbour, as though
offering battle ; then, when they had been chased to
shore by the Athenian ships, they made overtures to
the generals, wishing, if possible, to secure some sort
of reasonable terms and thus to get rid of the fleet
for the present. The Athenian commanders accepted
2 Or, with Kriiger, ‘‘ but also guarded the other points

after throwing barricades around the half-finished portions
of the walls and harbours.”’
7

ζι

THUCYDIDES

Eayvto,” καὶ αὐτοὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ὦσι
Λέσβῳ πάσῃ πολεμεῖν. καὶ ἀν HL. ποιησά-
μενοι πέμπουσιν ἐς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι
τῶν τε διαβαλλόντων ἕνα, ᾧ μετέμελεν ἤδη, καὶ
ἄλλους, εἴ πως πείσειαν τὰς ναῦς ἀπελθεῖν ὡς
σφῶν οὐδὲν νεωτεριούντων. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀπο-
στέλλουσι καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. πρέσβεις
τριήρει λαθόντες τὸ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ναυτικόν, οἵ
ὥρμουν ἐν τῇ Μαλέᾳ πρὸς βορέαν τῆς πόλεως'
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστευον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων προ-
χωρήσειν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα
ταλαιπώρως διὰ τοῦ πελάγους͵ κομισθέντες αὐτοῖς y
ἔπρασσον ὅπως τις βοήθεια ἥξει.

Υ. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν πρέσβεις ὡς οὐδὲν
ἦλθον, πράξαντες, ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο οἵ
Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Λέσβος πλὴν Μη-
θύμνης" οὗτοι δὲ τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις ἐβεβοηθήκεσαν
καὶ Ἴμβριοι καὶ Λήμνιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγοι
τινὲς »ξυμμάχων. καὶ ἔξοδον μέν τινα πανδημεὶ
ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐ ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
στρατόπεδον, καὶ μάχη ἐγένετο, ἐν ἡ οὐκ ἔλασσον
ἔχοντες οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι οὔτε ἐπηυλίσαντο οὔτε
ἐπίστευσαν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνεχώρησαν'
ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν ἡσύχαζον, ἐκ 1]ελοποννήσου καὶ
μετ᾽ ἄλλης παρασκευῆς βουλόμενοι εἰ προσ-
γένοιτό τι κινδυνεύειν: καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς Μελέας
Λάκων ἀφικνεῖται καὶ ᾿Ερμαιώνδας Θηβαῖος,
οἵ Tp πεστάλησαν μὲν τῆς ἀποστάσεως, φθάσαι
δὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι " τὸν τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐπίπλουν,
κρύφα, μετὰ τὴν μάχην! ὕστερον ἐσπλέουσι
προ ρει; καὶ παρήνουν πέμπειν τριήρη ἄλλην καὶ

“σὰ ὦ»...

«Ὁ

BOOK. III, rv. 3-v. 4

their proposals, being themselves afraid that they were
not strong enough to make war against all Lesbos.
So the Mytilenaeans, having concluded an_armistice,
sent envoys to Athens, among whom was one of the
informers who was by now repentant, in the hope
that they might persuade them to recall their fleet,
on the understanding that they themselves would
not start a revolution. Meanwhile they also sent
envoys to Lacedaemon in a trireme, which eluded
the Athenian fleet lying at anchor at Malea north of
the town; for they had no confidence in the success
of their negotiations with the Athenians. These
envoys, arriving at Lacedaemon after a hard voyage
through the open sea, began negotiating for some aid
for their countrymen.

V. But when the envoys to Athens returned with-
out having accomplished anything, the people of
Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, except Methymna,
began war; the Methymnaeans, however, supported
the Athenians, as did also the Imbrians, Lemnians,
and a few of the other allies. The Mytilenaeans made
a sortie in full force against the camp of the Athe-
nians, and a battle occurred in which the Mytile-
naeans had the advantage ; nevertheless they did not
have enough confidence in themselves to bivouack on
the field, but withdrew. From this time on they kept
quiet, being unwilling to risk an engagement with-
out reinforcements from Peloponnesus and elsewhere.
Such reinforcements they expected, for there had
come to them Meleas a Laconian and Hermaeondas
a Theban, who had been sent out before the revolt,
but being unable to arrive before the Athenian
expedition,.had sailed in secretly after the battle in
a trireme, and now advised them to send a second

THUCYDIDES

πρέσβεις μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν' καὶ ἐκπέμπουσιν. VI. οἱ
δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι πολὺ ἐπιρρωσθέντες διὰ τὴν τῶν
Μυτιληναίων ἡσυχίαν ξυμμάχους τε προσε-
κάλουν, οὗ πολὺ θᾶσσον παρῆσαν ὁρῶντες οὐδὲν
ἰσχυρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων, καὶ περιορμισάμενοι
kat! τὸ πρὸς νότον τῆς πόλεως ἐτείχισαν στρα-
τόπεδα δύο ἑκατέρωθεν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοὺς
ἐφόρμους ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λιμέσιν ἐποιοῦντο.
καὶ τῆς μὲν θαλάσσης εἶργον μὴ χρῆσθαι τοὺς
Μυτιληναίους, τῆς δὲ γῆς τῆς μὲν ἄλλης ἐκρά-
τουν οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Λέσβιοι
προσβεβοηθηκότες ἤδη, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατό-
πεδα οὐ πολὺ κατεῖχον οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ναύσταθ-

HAE

μον δὲ μᾶλλον ἦν αὐτοῖς πλοίων Kal ἀγορᾶς A ao?

Μαλέα. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Μυτιλήνην οὕτως
ἐπολεμεῖτο.

VII. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦ θέρους
τούτου ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ περὶ Ἰ]ελοπόννησον ναῦς
ἀπέστειλαν τριάκοντα καὶ ᾿Ασώπιον τὸν Φορ-
μίωνος στρατηγόν, κελευσάντων ᾿Ακαρνάνων τῶν
Φορμίωνός τινα σφίσι πέμψαι ἢ υἱὸν ἢ ξυγγενῆ
ἄρχοντα. καὶ παραπλέουσαι αἱ νῆες τῆς Λακω-
νικῆς Ta ἐπιθαλάσσια χωρία ἐπόρθησαν. ἔπειτα
τὰς μὲν πλείους ἀποπέμπει τῶν νεῶν πάλιν ἐπ᾽
οἴκου ὁ ᾿Ασώπιος, αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἔχων δώδεκα ἀφικ-
νεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον, καὶ ὕστερον ᾿Ακαρνᾶνας
ἀναστήσας πανδημεὶ στρατεύει ἐπ᾽ Οἰνιάδας καὶ
ταῖς τε ναυσὶ κατὰ τὸν ᾿Αχελῷον ἔπλευσε καὶ
ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς ἐδήου τὴν χώραν. ὡς δ᾽ οὐ
προσεχώρουν, τὸν μὲν πεζὸν ἀφίησιν, αὐτὸς δὲ

1 «καὶ», so Hude with Steup as a part of the fleet must
have continued at anchor north of the city.

Ιο me ( ἊΝ

gov he

BOOK III. v. 4-νιι. 5

trireme and some envoys to accompany them. And
this the Mytilenaeans did. VI. Meanwhile the Athe-
nians, much encouraged by the inactivity of the My-
tilenaeans, summoned their allies, who put in an
appearance the more quickly as they saw that no ener-
getic measures were being taken by the Lesbians.
They also placed their ships at anchor round the
southern part of the town, and established a block-
ade against both harbours. Thus they excluded the
Mytilenaeans from the use of the sea; but as for the
land, the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, who
had now come to their aid, dominated all the island,
except the small strip held by the Athenians in the
neighbourhood of their camps, and it was Malea
cather than their camps that they used as a station
for boats and supplies. Such was the course of the
war at Mytilene.

VII. About the same time during this summer
the Athenians sent also on a cruise round the Pelo-
ponnesus thirty ships with Asopius son of Phormio
as commander ; for the Acarnanians had requested
them to send them as commander either a son or
some other kinsman of Phormio’s. And the ships as
they sailed past ravaged the coast of Laconia. After-
wards Asopius sent most of the ships back home,
but had twelve with him when he reached Naupactus,
Then later, having called out all the forces of the
Acarnanians, he made an expedition against Oenia-
dae, sailing with the ships up the Achelous, while his
army on land ravaged the country. As, however, the
inhabitants would not come over to him, he dismissed

THUCYDIDES

mpopacis τε ἐπιεικὴς μηδεμία ὑπάρχοι τῆς ἀπο-
στάσεως" ὃ καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ ᾿Αθηναίοις οὐκ ἦν, μηδέ

, [4]
et > τῷ χείρους δόξωμεν εἶναι, εἰ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τιμώ-

-ὦ

ς 3 3. A 3 a va) 3 4
μενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀφιστάμεθα.

X. “Περὶ γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀρετῆς πρῶτον,
ἄλλως τε καὶ ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι; τοὺς λόγους
ποιησόμεθα, εἰδότες οὔτε φιλίαν ἰδιώταις βέβαιον
γιγνομένην οὔτε κοινωνίαν πόλεσιν ἐς οὐδέν, εἰ
μὴ μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γίγνοιντο
καὶ τἄλλα ὁμοιότροποι elev’ ἐν γὰρ τῷ διαλλάσ -
σοντι τῆς γνώμης καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ἔργων
καθίστανται.

““Huiy δὲ καὶ ᾿Αθηναίοις ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο
πρῶτον ἀπολιπόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ
πολέμου, παραμεινάντων δὲ ἐκείνων πρὸς τὰ
ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων. ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενό-

3 > \ , “Ὁ ς ᾽ὔ
μεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων
᾿Αθηναίοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου

a ad \ V4 3 δ ~
τοῖς “EAAnow. καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου
ἡγοῦντο, προθύμως εἱπόμεθα" ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑωρῶμεν
αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν
δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπειγομένους, οὐκ
ἀδεεῖς ἔτε ἦμεν. ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ᾽ ὃν γενό-

> “ eB
μενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι
ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων: ἡμεῖς δὲ
αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι [τῷ ὀνόματι
ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν. καὶ πιστοὺς οὐκέτι εἴχομ
ἡγεμόνας ᾿Αθηναίους, παραδείγμασι τοῖς mporyevo-
1 ἐπειγομένους, Rosa’ conjecture for érayouévous of the MBS...
14

BOOK III. 1x. 2—-x. 6

that there were no reasonable excuse for their revolt.
But these conditions did not obtain between us and
the Athenians ; therefore, let no one think the worse
of us on the ground that we were honoured by them
in time of peace and now revolt from them in time
of danger.

X. “We will first discuss the question of justice
and rectitude, especially as we are seeking an alliance,
for we know that neither does friendship between
men prove lasting, nor does a league between states
come to aught, unless they comport themselves with
transparent honesty of purpose towards one another
and in general are of like character and way of
thinking ; for differences in men’s actions arise from
the diversity of their convictions.

*“ Now between us and the Athenians an alliance
was first made when you withdrew from the Persian
war but they remained to finish the work. We be-
came allies, however, not to the Athenians for the
enslavement of the Hellenes, but to the Hellenes
for their emancipation from the Persians. And as
long as they maintained their hegemony on terms
of equality we heartily followed their lead; but
when we saw them relaxing their hostility to the
Persians and eager for the enslavement of the allies,
we were no longer without alarm. And the allies,
being unable, on account of the number of those
who had votes, to unite for self-defence, were all
enslaved except ourselves and the Chians; while we
shared their campaigns as presumably “independent’”’
and enjoying at least the name of freedom. And
we could no longer regard the Athenians as trust-
worthy leaders, taking as warning examples the

ἡ THUCYDIDES

Ὰ
μένοις χρώμενοι" οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς οὗς μὲν
μεθ’ ἡμῶν ἐνσπόνδους ἐποιήσαντο καταστρέ-

“oO ψασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ὑπολοίπους, εἴ ποτε ἄρα δυνη-

θεῖεν,; μὴ δρᾶσαι τοῦτο.

ΧΙ. “ Καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόνομοι ἔτι ἣμεν. ἅπαντες,
βεβαιότεροι ἂν ἡμῖν ἦσαν μηδὲν νεωτεριεῖν' ὗπο-
χειρίους δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς πλείους, ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἴσου ὁμιλοῦντες, “χαλεπώτερον εἰκότ( ἔμελλον
οἴσειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἤδη εἶκον τοῦ ἡμετέρου
ἔτει μόνου ἀντισουμένου, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅσῳ
δυνατώτεροι αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἡμεῖς
ἐρημότεροι. τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον- δέος μόνον πιστὸν
ἐς ξυμμαχίαν' ὁ γὰρ παραβαίνειν τι βουλόμενος /
τῷ μὴ προύχων ἂν ἐπελθεῖν ἀποτρέπεται. αὐτό-
νομόΐ τε ἔλείφθημεν οὐ δι’ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅσον αὐτοῖς
ἐς. τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπείᾳ τε λόγου καὶ γνώμης
μᾶλλον ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύος τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο
κατᾳληπτά. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο
μὴ ἂν τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας, εἰ μή τι

‘ AOL Ϊ 3 “A 4 3 lel > A“ yY-
ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπῆσαν, ξυστρατεύειν' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ-“'"

δὲ καὶ τὰ κράτιστα ἐπί τε τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους
πρώτους Suen nye καὶ τελευταῖα * λιπόντες, τοῦ
ἄλλου περιῃρημένου υ ἀσθενέστερα ἔμελλον ἕξειν.
εἰ δὲ ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν Bava: ἐχόντων ETL TOV πάντων

‘as eee Dobree’s conjecture for ἐδυνήθησαν of the

a [τὰ] τελευταῖα : τὰ deleted with Kriiger.
16

BOOK IIIT. x. 6--χι. 3

events of the past; for it was not likely that they,
after subjugating those with whom they had entered
into treaty relations together with us, would not do
the same to those who were left, if ever they should
possibly have the power.

XI. “Again if we had all remained independent
we should have had better assurance that they would
make no violent change in our status; having,
however, the majority under their hands, while
still associating with us on an equal footing, they
would naturally find it more irksome that our state
alone still maintained its equality as compared with
the majority that had already yielded, especially
since they were becoming more powerful in propor-
tion as we became more isolated. Indeed it is only
the fear that arises from equality of power that con-
stitutes a firm basis for an alliance; for he that would
transgress is deterred by the feeling that he has no
superiority wherewith to make an attack. And we
were left independent for no other reason than be-
cause they clearly saw that with a view to empire
they must get control of affairs by fair-seeming words
and by attacks of policy rather than of force. For, on
the one hand, they had as evidence in their favour
that surely those who have an equal voice with them-
selves would never have taken part in their campaigns
had not those whom they attacked been guilty of
some wrong; and on the other hand, they also
brought the united strength of the strongest states
against the less powerful first, and leaving the
former to the last they counted upon finding them
weaker when all the rest had been removed from
around them. But if they had begun with us, while
the whole body of allies were not only still strong in

17
VOL. 11. c

BAU “Ω

ΝΣ

THUCYDIDES

αὐτῶν τε ἰσχὺν καὶ πρὸς (8) τι χρὴ στῆναι, οὐκ
ἂν ὁμοίως ἐχειρώσαντο. τό τε ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν
an » ’ ͵ 9 ἃ ’

παρεῖχέ τινα φόβον μή ποτε καθ᾽ ἕν γενόμενον
A ὁ oa A 4 / 4
ἢ ὑμῖν ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ at poe ἐμένον κίνδυνον σφίσι
παράσχῃ. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ θεραπείας τοῦ τε
κοινοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν αἰεὶ προεστώτων περιεγε-
γνόμεθα. οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ πολύ γ᾽ ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν
δυνηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε κατέστη, παρα-
δείγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους.

XII. “Τίς οὖν αὕτη ἢ) φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἢ ἐλευ-
θερία πιστή, ἐν ἡ παρ γνώμην ἀλλήλους ὑπε-
δεχόμεθα ὥρας μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες
ἐθεράπευον" ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ

3 \ 3 a“ rd a ¥ », »
αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν" ὁ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μάλιστα εὔνοια
πίστιν βεβαιοῖ, ἡμῖν τοῦτο ὁ φόβος ἐχυρὸν
παρεῖχε, δέει τε τὸ πλέον ἢ φιλίᾳ κατεχόμενοι
ξύμμαχοι ἦμεν: καὶ ὁποτέροις θᾶσσον παράσχοι
> , 4 2 4 ί \
ἀσφάλεια θάρσος, οὗτοι πρὶ τεβὺ τί καὶ παρα “|
βήσεσθαι ἔμελλον. ὥστε εἴ τῳ δοκοῦμεν ἀδικεῖ
™p ποστάντες διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησίν τῶν ἐς
ἡμᾶς δεινῶν, αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἀνταναμείναντες σαφῶς
εἰδέναι εἴ τε αὐτῶν ἔσται, οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοπεῖ. εἰ
γὰρ δυνατοὶ ἦμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ἀντεπιβου-

[οὶ \ 3 "“ / 2 e [4] > “
λεῦσαι, Kal ἀντιμελλῆσαί τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ
ς 4 3 3 3 , 39 3. ϑ > / \ ΝΜ
ὁμοίου ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους ἰέναι" ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις δὲ ὄντος

3 a 3 a 347? e a a \
αἰεὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρεῖν (καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν elvar δεῖ τὸ
προαμύνασθαι.

ιν"

t
+ Mere hee j oc. fF

‘BOOK III. x1. 3-x1. 3

their own strength, but also had a leader to rally to,
they would not have got the mastery so easily. Be-
sides, our navy caused them some fear, lest it should
some day be augmented by being united either with
yours or another's and thus become a menace to
themselves. To some extent also we owe our sal-
vation to the court we paid to the Athenian people
and to the political leaders of the day. But we
could not have expected to be able to survive for
long, if we may judge by their conduct toward the
other allies, unless this war had broken out.

XII. “Was this then a friendship or a freedom to
put faith in, where we violated our real feelings
whenever we treated each other as friends? They
courted us in time of war only because they were
afraid of us, while we acted in the same manner toward
them in time of peace; and good faith, which in
most cases is made steadfast by good will, was in our
case made secure by fear, and it was fear rather than
friendship that held us both to the alliance; and
whichever of us should soonest gain boldness through
a feeling of security was bound to be the first to
commit some act of transgression also. If, therefore,
anyone thinks that, just because they postponed
the measures we dread, we do wrong in revolting
first, without having waited on our side until we
were quite sure that any of our suspicions would
come true, he is in error. For if we were in a
position to meet their plotting by counter-measures
on equal terms with them, it was indeed incumbent
upon us on our part to postpone likewise our offensive
against them; but since the power of attack is
always in their hands, the right of acting betimes in
our own defence must necessarily be in ours.

[9
ο 2

THUCYDIDES

XIII. ““Τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ ai-
τίας, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἀπέστημεν,
σαφεῖς μὲν τοῖς ἀκούουσι γνῶναν ὡς εἰκότως
3 4 e A \ ς a 3 A \ N
ἐδράσαμεν, ἱκανὰς δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβῆσαι καὶ πρὸς
ἀσφάλειάν͵ τινα τρέψαι, βουλομένους μὲν καὶ
πάλαι, ὅτε ἔτι ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπέμψαμεν ὡς ὑμᾶς
περὶ ἀποστάσεως, ὑμῶν δὲ οὐ προσδεξαμένων
κωλυθέντας" νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ Βοιωτοὶ προυκαλέ-

σαντο, εὐθὺς ὑπηκούσαμεν, καὶ ἐνομίξομεν ἀπο-

, fol 9 2 3 ’ φ' «
στήσεσθαι διπλὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἀπό τε τῶν ᾿Ελ-

/ \ x [ο a 3 \ 3.» ,
λήνων μὴ ξὺν κακῶς ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίων,
ἀλλὰ ξυνελευθεροῦν, ἀπό τε ᾿Αθηναίων μὴ αὐτοὶ
διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐν ὑστέρῳ, ἀλλὰ προ-

2 ποιῆσαι. ἡ μέντοι ἀπόστασις ἡμῶν θᾶσσον
γεγένηται καὶ ἀπαράσκευος: ἡ καὶ μᾶλλον
‘4 = χρὴ ξυμμάχους δεξαμένους ἡμᾶς διὰ ταχέων
/ ? [4 ξ Ψ ’ 3 , 4
βοήθειαν ἀποστέλλειν, iva φαίνησθε ἀμυνοντές
τε οἷς δεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπ-
8 τοντες. καιρὸς δὲ ὡς οὔπω πρότερον. νόσῳ τε
γὰρ ἐφθάραται ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ χρημάτων δαπάνῃ,
νῆές τε αὐτοῖς αἱ μὲν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰσίν,
e > 9 > @ a) 4 [4 3 ΔΝ > \
4 αἱ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τετάχαται' ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς
δον ν ἦς περιουσίαν νεῶν ἔχειν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν τῷ θέρει τῷδε
τ AS a ¢ 2 , ΄,
ναυσί τε καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐπεσβάλητε τὸ δεύτερον,
3 ? A e A > 3 ΄ 3 ’ 3
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἀμυνοῦνται ἐπιπλέοντας ἢ ἀπ
δ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποχωρήσονται. νομίσῃ τε μηδεὶς

{«λΚ.5

1 This has not been definitely stated above, but it is
implied in ch. ii. 3, v. 4.

BOOK III. xm. 1-5

XIII. “Such were the motives and reasons, Lace-
daemonians and allies, which led us to revolt, and
they are clear enough to convince all who hear them
that we had good grounds for our action, and cogent
enough to alarm us and impel us to seek some means
of safety. This we long ago wished to do while you
were still at peace, when we sent envoys to you
suggesting that we should revolt, but were pre-
vented from doing so because you would not re-
ceive us. But now, when the Boeotians invited 1
us we responded promptly. It was our intention
to make at once a double withdrawal—from the
Hellenes? and thus aid in liberating them instead
of joining the Athenians to do them wrong; and
from the Athenians, and thus destroy them first in-
stead of being ourselves destroyed by them after-
wards. Our revolt, however, has been made pre-
maturely and without preparation; wherefore it is
the more incumbent upon you to receive us as allies
and quickly send us aid, in order that all men may
see that you protect those whom you ought to
protect and at the same time harm your enemies.
And it is an opportunity such as never has been
before. For the Athenians have been ruined by
pestilence as well as by heavy expenses. Part of
their fleet is cruising about your coasts,® part is
arrayed against us; so that it is not likely that they
have any ships to spare if you attack them this
coming summer a second time, by sea as well as by
land; but they will either not resist you when you
sai] against them, or else they will have to withdraw
their fleets both from our waters and from yours.
And let no one think that he will be incurring a risk

2 4,6. from the Delian Confederacy.

$ of. ch. vii. 2.
2I

THUCYDIDES

ἀλλοτρίας γῆς πέρι 1 οἰκεῖον κίνδυνον ἕξειν. ᾧ

- γὰρ Soxet-paxpar ἀπεῖναι ἡ Λέσβος, τὴν ὠφελίαν

> [ον 9 , / > > A 3 σι

αὐτῷ ἐγγύθεν παρέξει. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ᾿Αττικῇ
ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος, ὥς τις οἴεται, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἣν ἡ
"A \ 39 a 4 \ A 4 3 Ἁ

ττικὴ ὠφελεῖται. ἔστι δὲ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπὸ
τῶν ξυμμάχων ἡ πρόσοδος, καὶ ἔτι μείζων ἔσται,
εἰ ἡμᾶς καταστρέψονται' οὔτε γὰρ ἀποστήσεται
ἄλλος τά τε ἡμέτερα προσγενήσεται, πάθοιμέν
t ἂν δεινότερα ἢ οἱ πρὶν δουλεύοντες. βοηθη-

4 Ye ia 4 , ’
σάντων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμως πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε
ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν μέγα, οὗπερ ὑμῖν μάλιστα

* 9 / ean : / e
προσδεῖ, καὶ ᾿Αθηναίους ῥᾷον καθαιρήσετε ὕφαι-
ροῦντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ξυμμάχους (θρασύτερόν)γὰρ
πᾶς τις προσχωρήσεται), τήν τε αἰτίαν ἀπο-
φεύξεσθε ἣν εἴχετε μὴ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις,
A A ’ Ν 4 le)
ἣν δὲ ἐλευθεροῦντες φαίνησθε, τὸ κράτος τοῦ

4 , [4
πολέμου βεβαιότερον ἕξετε.

XIV. “Αἰσχυνθέντες οὖν τάς τε τῶν “Ελλήνων
ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐλπίδας καὶ Δία τὸν Ὀλύμπιον, ἐν οὗ τῷ
ἱερῷ ἴσα καὶ ἱκέται ἐσμέν, érapivare Μυτιλη-
ναΐοις ξύμμαχοι γενόμενοι, καὶ μὴ πρόησθε ἡμᾶς,
» \ 4 a led :
ἴδιον μὲν τὸν κίνδυνον τῶν σωμάτων TapaBaArXo-
μένους, κοινὴν δὲ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατορθῶσαι ὠφελίαν
σ , Ψ ΄ \ 4
ἅπασι δώσοντας, ἔτι δὲ κοινοτέραν τὴν βλάβην,

? \ ΄ 6 A , 4
εἰ μὴ πεισθέντων ὑμῶν σφαλησόμεθα. γίγνεσθε
δὲ ἄνδρες οἵουσπερ ὑμᾶς οἵ τε “EXAnves ἀξιοῦσι
\ ς ’ / 4 9
καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον “δέος βούλεται.
' οὐκ is inserted by Hude.
22

“Ase ae 7 feicle

BOOK III. xu. 5—x1v. 2

of his own for the country of another. For though
Lesbos seems to him to be a long way off, the help
she will bring him will be close at hand. For the war
will not be in Attica,! as some think, but in those
countries from which Athens derives its support.
The revenues of Athens come from her allies, and
they will be still greater if they shall subdue us; for
for not only will no one else revolt, but our resources
will be added to hers, and we should be treated with
greater rigour? than those who have long been slaves.
But if you give us your hearty support, you will add
to your league a state that has a large navy, a thing
of which you still stand most in need, and you will
find it easier to overthrow the Athenians by gradually
drawing their allies away from them—for every one
will be emboldened to come over to your side—and
you will free yourselves of the reproach under which
you have heretofore laboured, of refusing® to aid
those who revolt from the Athenians. But if you
openly play the part of liberators,* the more certain
will be your victory in the war.

XIV. “Reverencing, then, not only the hopes
which the Hellenes place in you, but also that Olym-
pian Zeus in whose temple we are even as suppliants,
succour the Mytilenaeans by entering on this alliance ;
and do not abandon us when we are hazarding our
lives in a risk all our own, but shall bring to all a
general benefit if we succeed—and a still more
general injury if through your refusal we shall fail.
Prove yourselves, therefore, men such as the Hellenes
account you and our fears would have you be.”

1 4.e. the war will not be decided in Attica.
2 Especially as regards the tribute which would be exacted.
3 of, 1. lxix. 1, 5. 4 of. τι. viii. 4.

for

THUCYDIDES

XV. Τοιαῦτα μὲν of Μυτιληναῖοι εἶπον. οἱ
δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπειδὴ ἤκουσαν,
προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους ξυμμάχους τε τοὺς
Λεσβίους ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν ᾿Αττικὴν
ἐσβολὴν τοῖς τε ξυμμάχοις παροῦσι κατὰ τάχος
ἔφραξον ἰέναι ἐς τὸν ἰσθμὸν τοῖς δύο “μέρεσιν ὡς
ποίησο σόμενοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ι ἀφίκοντο, καὶ
ὁλκοὺς παρεσκεύαζον τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ ὡς
vie πέρβίσοντες ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου ἐς τὴν πρὸς
᾿Αθήνας θάλασσαν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα
ἐπιόντες. καὶ οἱ μὲν προθύμως ταῦτα ἔπρασσον'
οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι βραδέως τε ξυνελέγοντο
καὶ ἐν καρποῦ ξυγκομιδῇ ἦσαν καὶ ἀρρωστίᾳ

τοῦ στρατεύειν. yen OSs

XVI. Αἰσθόμενοι δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι διὰ
κατάγνωσιν ἀσθενείας σφῶν παρασκεναζομένους,
δηλῶσαι βουλόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐγνώκασιν,
ἀλλ᾽ οἷοί τέ εἰσι μὴ κινοῦντες τὸ ἐπὶ Λέσβῳ
ναυτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἐπιὸν
ῥᾳδίως ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπλήρωσαν ναῦς ἑκατὸν
ἐσβάντες αὐτοί τε πλὴν ἱππέων καὶ πεντακο-
σιομεδίμνων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, καὶ παρὰ τὸν ἰσθμὸν
ἀναγαγόντες ἐπίδειξίν τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἀπο-
βάσεις τῆς Ἰ]ελοποννήσου ἣἧ δοκοίη αὐτοῖς. οἱ
δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὁρῶντες πολὺν τὸν παράλογον
τά τε ὑπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων ῥηθέντα ἡγοῦντο οὐκ

1 of. τι. x. 2.
f citizens usually only the θῆτες, who were light-armed
troops on land, served in the fleet (vi. xliii) ; but in critical

BOOK III. xv. 1-xvi. 2

XV. Thus spoke the Mytilenaeans. The Lacedae-
monians and their allies, after they had heard them,
accepted their proposals, and received the Lesbians as
allies. Those allies who were there present were
directed to assemble with all speed at the Isthmus
with two-thirds! of their forces for the purpose, of
making the proposed invasion of Attica; and the
Lacedaemonians themselves arrived first and pro-
ceeded to construct on the Isthmus hauling-machines
with which to transfer the ships from Corinth to the
sea on the Athenian side, in order to attack Athens
both by sea and by land. They set to work zealously
at these things, but the rest of the allies collected
slowly, since they were busy gathering in their
harvest and were in no mood for campaigning.

XVI. Meanwhile the Athenians, perceiving that
the enemy, in making their preparations, were acting
upon a conviction of their own weakness, and wishing
to show that they were mistaken in their judgment,
and that without moving the fleet at Lesbos they could
easily ward off the new force coming from the Pelo-
ponnesus, manned one hundred ships, the citizens,?
—except the knights and the highest class—em-
barking as well as the resident aliens. Then putting
out to sea they displayed their strength along the
coast of the Isthmus and made descents upon the
Peloponnesus wherever they pleased. As for the
Lacedaemonians, when they saw how greatly they
had miscalculated, they concluded that the reports
of the Lesbians? were untrue, and regarding the

times members of the three upper classes, whose regular
duty was hoplite service, might be pressed into service in the
fleet (vill. xxiv. 2).

3 cf. ch. xiii. 3, 4.

THUCYDIDES

ἀληθῆ καὶ , ἄπορα νομίζοντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ
ξύμμαχοι ἅμα οὐ παρῆσαν καὶ ἠγγέλλοντο καὶ
αἱ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν
᾿Αθηναίων τὴν περιοικίδα αὐτῶν πορθοῦσαι, ἀνε-
χώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. ὕστερον δὲ ναυτικὸν παρε-
σκεύαξον ὅ τι πέμψουσιν ἐς τὴν Λέσβον καὶ
κατὰ πόλεις ἐπήγγελον τεσσαράκοντα νεῶν
πλῆθος καὶ ναύαρχον προσέταξαν ᾿Αλκίδαν, ὃ ὃς
ἔμελλεν ἐπιπλεύσεσθαι. ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ
᾿Αθηναῖοι ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσίν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνους
εἶδον.

XVII. Kai * κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὃν αἱ
νῆες ἔπλεον ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται δὴ νῆες ἅμ᾽
αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ κάλλει ® ἐγένοντο, παραπλήσιαι
δὲ καὶ ἔτι πλείους ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου. τήν
τε γὰρ ᾿Αττικὴν καὶ Εὔβοιαν καὶ Σαλαμῖνα
ἑκατὸν ἐφύλασσον καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον & ἔτεραι
ἑκατὸν ἦσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἱ περὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἅμα
ἐγίγνοντο ἐν ἑνὶ θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντήκοντα.
καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ὑπανάλωσε μετὰ
Ποτιδαίας. τήν τε γὰρ Ποτίδαιαν δίδραχμοι
ὁπλῖται ἐφρούρουν (αὑτῷ γὰρ καὶ ὑπηρέτῃ
δραχμὴν ἐλάμβανε τῆς ἡμέρας), τρισχίλιοι μὲν
οἱ “πρῶτοι, ὧν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διεπολιόρκησαν,
ἑξακόσιοι δὲ καὶ χίλιοι “μετὰ Φορμίωνος, οἱ
προαπῆλθον' νῆές τε αἱ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν μισθὸν

1 This whole chapter is condemned as spurious by Steup,
followed by Hude.

2 Untranslatable in this context: Stahl writes καὶ ἄλλῃ,
van Herwerden ἄλλαι ἄλλῃ, Cullinan κἄλλαι, L. Herbst o’
καὶ Xr’,

BOOK III. xvi. 2—xvi. 3

expedition as impracticable, since their allies had not
yet arrived, and, besides, word had come to them that
the thirty! ships which were cruising around the
Peloponnese were ravaging their own country dis-
tricts, they went back home. Later,? however, they
prepared a fleet which was to be dispatched to
Lesbos and sent orders to the allied states for forty
ships, appointing Alcidas who was to sail as admiral
of this fleet. And when the Athenians saw that
the enemy had withdrawn, they also returned home
with their hundred ships.

XVII. At the time when these ships were at sea
about the largest number the Athenians ever had
at once were on active service, though there were as
many or even more at the beginning of the war.
For one hundred ships were guarding Attica, Euboea
and Salamis, and another hundred were cruising off
the Peloponnesus, besides those at Potidaea and in
other places, so that the number in service at the
same time in a single summer was all told two hun-
dred and fifty. It was this effort, together with
Potidaea, that chiefly exhausted their resources of
money. For in the siege of Potidaea the hoplite
received a wage of two drachmas a day, one for him-
self and one for his attendant; and there were at
first three thousand of these, and the number was
not less than this throughout the siege, besides six-
teen hundred who came with Phormio, but went
away before the siege was over; and the sailors
on the ships all drew the same pay as the soldiers,

1 ef. ch. vii. 1. 2 cf. ch. xxv. 1; xxvi. 1.

THUCYDIDES

4 ἔφερον. τὰ μὲν οὖν χρήματα οὕτως ὑπαναλώθη
τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ νῆες τοσαῦται δὴ πλεῖσται
ἐπληρώθησαν.

XVIII. Μυτιληναῖοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ypo-
νον ὃν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ τὸν ἰσθμὸν ἦσαν
ἐπὶ Μήθυμναν ὡς προδιδομένην ἐστράτευσαν
κατὰ γῆν αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ἐπίκουροι" καὶ προσ-
βαλόντες τῇ πόλει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ προυχώρει 7
προσεδέχοντο, ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ ᾿Αντίσσης καὶ Πύρρας
καὶ ᾿Ερέσου, καὶ καταστησάμενοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσι ταύταις βεβαιότερα καὶ τείχη κρατύ-

2 ναντες διὰ τάχους ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. ἐστρά-
τευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Μηθυμναῖοι ἀναχωρησάντων
αὐτῶν ἐπ᾽ "Αντισσαν᾽ καὶ ἐκβοηθείας τινὸς γενο-
μένης πληγέντες ὑπό τε τῶν ᾿Αντισσαίων καὶ
τῶν ἐπικούρων ἀπέθανόν τε πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνεχώ-

8 ρησαν οἱ λοιποὶ κατὰ τάχος. οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, τούς τε Μυτιληναίους τῆς
γῆς κρατοῦντας καὶ τοὺς σφετέρους στρατιώτας
οὐχ ἱκανοὺς ὄντας εἴργειν, πέμπουσι περὶ τὸ
φθινόπωρον ἤδη ἀρχόμενον Πάχητα τὸν ᾿Ἐπι-
κούρου στρατηγὸν καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἑαυτῶν.

4 οἱ δὲ αὐτερέται πλεύσαντες τῶν νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται
καὶ περιτειχίζουσι Μυτιλήνην ἐν κύκλῳ ἁπλῷ
τείχει" φρούρια δ᾽ ἔστιν of ἐπὶ τῶν καρτερῶν

5 ἐγκατοικοδομεῖται. καὶ ἡ μὲν Μυτιλήνη κατὰ
κράτος ἤδη ἀμφοτέρωθεν καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ
θαλάσσης εἴργετο, καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἤρχετο γί-
γνεσθαι. ᾿

XIX. Προσδεόμενοι δὲ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι χρημάτων
ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες τότε

BOOK III. xvi. 3-x1x. 1

It was in this way, then, that their money was ex-
hausted at first, and this was the largest number of
ships manned by them.

XVIII. While the Lacedaemonians were at the
Isthmus, the Mytilenaeans and their auxiliaries!
marched with their army against Methymna, which
they supposed was being betrayed into their hands ;
and they assaulted the city, but when their attempt
did not succeed as they had expected, they went off
to Antissa, Pyrrha and Eresus, and after establishing
their interests in these cities on a firmer basis and
strengthening the walls, went home in haste. As
soon, however, as they had withdrawn, the Methym-
naeans in their turn made an expedition against
Antissa ; but a sortie was made by the inhabitants of
Antissa and the auxiliary troops in which the Methym-
naeans were defeated and many of them slain,
whereupon the rest withdrew in haste. Now when
the Athenians learned that the Mytilenaeans were
masters of the country and that their own soldiers
were not numerous enough to keep them within
their walls, about the beginning of autumn they
sent Paches son of Epicurus in command of a thou-
sand Athenian hoplites, who also served as rowers.”
When they arrived at Mytilene, they encircled it
with a single wall, in which forts were built at a
number of strong positions. Mytilene was thus at
-last completely cut off both by sea and land just as
the winter set in.

XIX. Now the Athenians, finding themselves in
need of additional funds for the siege, having then

1 Foreign mercenaries ; cf. ch. ii. 2.

4 The fact of hoplites serving at the oars—evidently for

economical reasons (cf. ch. xix. 1)—is especially emphasised.
cf. τ. x. 43 Vi. χοὶ. 4.

THUCYDIDES

πρῶτον ἐσφορὰν διακόσια τάλαντα, ἐξέπεμψαν
καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς
δώδεκα καὶ Λυσικλέα πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν.
e \ oy 9 ’ , \
ὁ δὲ ἄλλα TE ἠργυρολόγει Kal περιέπλει, Kal
΄φ ’ >] “A 9 \ \ ἴω
τῆς Καρίας ἐκ Μνυοῦντος ἀναβὰς διὰ τοῦ
Μαιάνδρου πεδίον μέχρι τοῦ Σανδίου λόφου,
ἐπιθεμένων τῶν Καρῶν καὶ ᾿Αναιιτῶν, αὐτός τε
διαφθείρεται καὶ τῆς ἄλλης στρατιᾶς πολλοί.
XX. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ Πλαταιῆς (ἔτι
γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ
Βοιωτῶν) ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε σίτῳ ἐπιλείποντι ἐπιέζοντο
\ 3 \ a) 9 “A 9 , \ 9 4
καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν οὐδεμία ἐλπὶς ἣν τιμωρίας
οὐδὲ ἄλλη σωτηρία ἐφαίνετο, ἐπιβουλεύουσιν
9 , A 3 ’ φ 7
αὐτοί τε καὶ ᾿Αθηναίων οἱ ξυμπολιορκούμενοι
πρῶτον μὲν πάντες ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ὑπερβῆναι τὰ
τείχη τῶν πολεμίων, ἢν δύνωνται βιάσασθαι,
ἐσηγησαμένων τὴν πεῖραν αὐτοῖς Θεαινέτου τε
a ’ 3 \ 7 \ > ’
τοῦ Τολμίδου, ἀνδρὸς μάντεως, καὶ Εὐπομπίδον
τοῦ Δαϊμάχου, ὃς καὶ ἐστρατήγει" ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν
ἡμίσεις ἀπώκνησάν πως τὸν κίνδυνον μέγαν
ἡγησάμενοι, ἐς δὲ ἄνδρας διακοσίους καὶ εἴκοσι
7 > fa! 4 ὃ 0 \ 4
μάλιστα ἐνέμειναν τῇ ἐξοὸῳ ἐθελονταὶ τρόπῳ
τοιῷδε. κλίμακας ἐποιήσαντο ἴσας τῷ τείχει
le! 4 7 a 9 a)
τῶν πολεμίων" ξυνεμετρήσαντο δὲ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς
a 4 φ ΜΝ Ἁ A 9 >
τῶν πλίνθων, ἣ ἔτυχε πρὸς σφᾶς οὐκ ἐξαλη-
λιμμένον τὸ τεῖχος αὐτῶν. ἠριθμοῦντο δὲ πολλοὶ
ἅμα τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ ἔμελλον of μέν τινες

BOOK III. xix. 1-xx. 3

for the first time resorted to a property tax! upon
themselves to the amount of two hundred talents,
also sent to the allies twelve ships under the com-
mand of Lysicles and four others, to collect money
from them. He cruised about and collected money
at various places; but on his way inland from Myus
in Caria through the plain of the Meander, after he
had reached the hill of Sandius, he was attacked by
the Carians and the Anaeitans and slain, together
with many of his army.

XX. During the same winter the Plataeans, who
were still? being besieged by the Peloponnesians and
the Boeotians, began to be distressed by failure of
their supply of food, and since there was no hope of
aid from Athens nor any other means of safety in
sight, they and the Athenians who were besieged
with them planned to leave the city and climb over
the enemy’s walls, in the hope that they might be
able to force a passage. “The attempt was suggested
to them by Theaenetus son of Tolmides, a soothsayer,
and Eupompidas son of Daimachus, who was one of
the generals. At first all were to take part, but
afterwards half of them somehow lost heart, thinking
the risk too great, and only about two hundred and
twenty voluntarily persisted in making the sortie,
which was carried out in the following way. They
made ladders equal in height to the enemy’s wall,
getting the measure by counting the layers of bricks
at a point where the enemy’s wall on the side facing
Plataea happened not to have been whitewashed.
Many counted the layers at the same time, and while

1 The cocks was an extraordinary tax levied only in war
time. See Boeckh, Public Hconomy, p. 612
? For previous discussion of this siege, see 11, Ixxi.-]xxviii.

THUCYDIDES

ἁμαρτήσεσθαι, ot δὲ πλείους τεύξεσθαι τοῦ
ἀληθοῦς λογισμοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλάκις
ἀριθμοῦντες καὶ ἅμα οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντες, ἀλλὰ
ῥᾳδίως καθορωμένου ἐς ὃ ἐβούλοντο τοῦ τείχους.
4 τὴν μὲν οὖν ξυμμέτρησιν τῶν κλιμάκων οὕτως
ἔλαβον ἐκ τοῦ πάχους τῆς πλίνθον εἰκάσαντες
τὸ μέτρον.

ΧΧΙ. Τὸ δὲ τεῖχος ἦν τῶν Πελοποννησίων
τοιόνδε τῇ οἰκοδομήσει. εἶχε μὲν δύο τοὺς περι-
βόλους, πρός τε Πλαταιῶν καὶ εἴ τις ἔξωθεν ἀπ᾽
᾿Αθηνῶν ἐπίοι, διεῖχον δὲ οἱ περίβολοι ἑκκαίδεκα
πόδας μάλιστα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. τὸ οὖν μεταξὺ
τοῦτο οἱ ἑκκαίδεκα πόδες ' τοῖς φύλαξιν οἰκήματα
διανενεμημένα ὠκοδόμητο, καὶ ἦν Evvexn? ὥστε
ἕν φαίνεσθαι τεῖχος παχὺ ἐπάλξεις ἔχον ἀμφο-
τέρωθεν. διὰ δέκα δὲ ἐπάλξεων πύργοι ἧσαν
μεγάλοι καὶ ἰσοπλατεῖς τῷ τείχει, διήκοντες ἔς
τε τὸ ἔσω μέτωπον αὐτοῦ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὸ ἔξω,
ὥστε πάροδον μὴ εἶναι παρὰ πύργον, ἀλλὰ δι᾽
αὐτῶν μέσων διῇσαν. τὰς οὖν νύκτας, ὁπότε
χειμὼν εἴη νοτερός, τὰς μὲν ἐπάλξεις ἀπέλειπον,
ἐκ δὲ τῶν πύργων ὄντων δι’ ὀλίγου καὶ ἄνωθεν
στεγανῶν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν
τεῖχος ᾧ περιεφρουροῦντο οἱ Ἰ]λαταιῆς τοιοῦ-
τον ἦν. ᾿

ΧΧΊΙ. Οἱ δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ παρεσκεύαστο αὐτοῖς,
τηρήσαντες νύκτα χειμέριον ὕδατι καὶ ἀνέμῳ καὶ
ἅμ᾽ ἀσέληνον ἐξῇσαν" ἡγοῦντο δὲ οἵπερ καὶ τῆς

1 οἱ ἑκκαίδεκα πόδες deleted by van Herwerden, followed
by Hude.

2 Euvex with all MSS. except C, which Hude follows.
3 παρὰ πύμγον deleted by Naber, followed by Hude.

BOOK III. xx. 3-xxn. 1

some were sure to make a mistake, the majority were
likely to hit the true count, especially since they
counted time and again, and, besides, were at no great
distance, and the part of the wall they wished to see
was easily visible. The measurement of the ladders,
then, they got at in this way, reckoning the measure
from the thickness of the bricks.

XXI. The wall of the Peloponnesians was built in
the following fashion. It had two encircling lines,
the inner looking towards Plataea, the outer to guard
against attack from the direction of Athens, and the
two circuits were distant about sixteen feet from one
another. This interval of sixteen feet had in building
been divided up into rooms assigned to the guards ;
and the whole structure was continuous,! so as to
appear to be a single thick wall furnished with battle-
ments on both sides, And at every tenth battlement
there were high towers of the same width as the wall,
extending both to the inner and outer faces of it, so
that there was no passage~left at the sides of the
towers, but the guards had to go through the middle
ofthem. Now at night when the weather was rainy
the guards left the battlements and kept watch from
the towers, which were not far apart and were
roofed overhead, Such, then, was the wall by which
the Plataeans were beleaguered.

XXII. After the Plataeans had finished their
preparations, they waited for a night that was stormy
with rain and wind and at the same time moonless,
and then went forth. They were led by the men

1 g.e. the two περίβολοι were joined together by a roof.

33
VOL, 11. . OD

' THUCYDIDES

πείρας αἴτιοι ἦσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τάφρον
διέβησαν ἣ περιεῖχεν αὐτούς, ἔπειτα προσέμειξαν
τῷ τείχει τῶν πολεμίων λαθόντες τοὺς φύλακας,
ἀνὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν μὲν οὐ προϊδόντων αὐτῶν, ψόφῳ
δὲ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ προσιέναι αὐτοὺς ἀντιπαταγοῦντος
τοῦ ἀνέμου οὐ κατακουσάντων' ἅμα δὲ καὶ διέ-
χοντες πολὺ ἦσαν, ὅπως τὰ ὅπλα μὴ κρουόμενα
πρὸς ἄλληλα αἴσθησιν παρέχοι. ἦσαν δὲ εὐστα-
λεῖς τε τῇ ὁπλίσει καὶ τὸν ἀριστερὸν μόνον πόδα
ὑποδεδεμένοι ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν
πηλόν. κατὰ οὖν μεταπύργιον προσέμισγον πρὸς
τὰς ἐπάλξεις εἰδότες ὅτι ἐρῆωοί εἶσι, πρῶτον μὲν
οἱ τὰς κλίμακας φέροντες, καὶ προσέθεσαν' ἔπειτα
ψιλοὶ δώδεκα ξὺν ξιφιδίῳ καὶ θώρακι ἀνέβαινον,
ὧν ἡγεῖτο ᾿Αμμέας ὁ Κοροίβου καὶ πρῶτος ἀνέβη,
μετὰ δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ ἑπόμενοι bE ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερον τῶν
πύργων ἀνέβαινον’ ἔπειτα ψιλοὶ ἄλλοι μετὰ
τούτους ξὺν δορατίοις ἐχώρουν, οἷς ἕτεροι κατόπιν
τὰς ἀσπίδας ἔφερον, ὅπως ἐκεῖνοι ῥᾷον προσβαί-
νοιεν, καὶ ἔμελλον δώσειν ὁπότε πρὸς τοῖς πολε-
μίοις εἶεν. ὡς δὲ ἄνω πλείους ἐγένοντο, ἤσθοντο
οἱ ἐκ τῶν πύργων φύλακες" κατέβαλε γάρ τις τῶν
Πλαταιῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων
κεραμίδα, ἣ πεσοῦσα δοῦπον ἐποίησεν. καὶ
αὐτίκα βοὴ ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος
ὥρμησεν" οὐ yap noe ὅ τι ἦν τὸ δεινὸν σκοτεινῆς
νυκτὸς καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος, καὶ ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει
τῶν [λαταιῶν ὑπολελειμμένοι ἐξελθόντες προσέ-
βαλλον τῷ τείχει τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐκ Tovp-

BOOK III. xx. 1-5

who were the authors of the enterprise. First they
crossed the ditch which surrounded the town, then
reached the foot of the enemy’s wall unobserved by
the guards, who in the all-pervading darkness could
not see ahead and could not hear because the clatter
of the wind drowned the noise of their approach ;
and, besides, they kept a good distance apart as they
advanced, in order that their arms might not rattle
against each other and cause detection. And they
were not only lightly armed but also had only the
left foot sandalled, for security against slipping in the
mud. So they came up tothe battlements at a space
between two towers, knowing that the battlements
were deserted. First came the men with the ladders,
who set them against the wall; next came twelve
light-armed men, with dagger and corslet only, who
mounted the ladders. These were led by Ammeas son
of Coroebus, who was the first to ascend, and after
him his followers ascended, six men going against
each of the adjoining towers. Next after these came
other light troops armed with short spears, their
shields being borne by another group which followed,
that the former might advance more easily; and
their-shields were to be handed them when they were
close to the enemy. Now when several had got up,
the sentinels on the towers became aware of their
presence; for one of the Plataeans in laying hold of
the battlements threw down a tile, which fell with a
thud. And immediately there was an outcry, and
the garrison rushed to the wall; for they did not
know what the danger was, as the night was dark
and stormy, and at the same time the Plataeans who
had been left behind in the town went out and
attacked the wall of the Peloponnesians on the side

35
p 2

THUCYDIDES

παλιν ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν ὑπερέβαινον, ὅπως
6 ἥκιστα πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὸν νοῦν ἔχοιεν. ἐθορυβοῦντο
\ 4 ὰ ’ ͵ θ a δὲ "ὃ Α
μὲν οὖν κατὰ χώραν μένοντες, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐδεὶς

> ἢ 3 A e A A 3 > 3 3 LU
ἐτόλμα ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φυλακῆς, αλλ ἐν atropp

7 ἦσαν εἰκάσαι τὸ γιγνόμενον. καὶ οἱ τριακόσιοι
αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐτέτακτο παραβοηθεῖν εἴ τι δέοι,
2 A ΝΜ ce) ’ \ \ /
ἐχώρουν ἔξωθεν τοῦ τείχους πρὸς τὴν βοήν,

8 φρυκτοί τε ἤροντο ἐς τὰς Θήβας πολέμιοι" παραν-
n a a ‘
ἴσχον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῆς ἀπὸ
τοῦ τείχους φρυκτοὺς πολλοὺς πρότερον παρε-
σκευασμένους ἐς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ
σημεῖα τῆς φυκτωρίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦ καὶ μὴ
βοηθοῖεν, ἄλλο τι νομίσαντες τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶναι
a \ ” \ le) e Ν) e 4
ἢ τὸ ὄν, πρὶν σφῶν οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐξιόντες δια-
φύγοιεν καὶ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἀντιλάβοιντο.

XXIII. Οἱ δ᾽ ὑπερβαίνοντες τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐν
τούτῳ, ὡς οἱ πρῶτοι αὐτῶν ἀνεβεβήκεσαν καὶ
A , ς ’ Ἁ UA ’
τοῦ πύργου ἑκατέρου τοὺς φύλακας διαφθείραντες
ἐκεκρατήκεσαν, τάς τε διόδους τῶν πύργων
2 f 3 \ 3 4 , ? 3 "Ὁ
ἐνστάντες αὐτοὶ ἐφύλασσον μηδένα δι’ αὐτῶν
3 La) \ , , 3 \ “
ἐπιβοηθεῖν, καὶ κλίμακας προσθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ
τείχους τοῖς πύργοις καὶ ἐπαναβιβάσαντες ἄνδρας
’ A a
πλείους, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων τοὺς ἐπιβοηθοῦν-
τας καὶ κάτωθεν καὶ ἄνωθεν εἶργον βάλλοντες,
οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ πλείους πολλὰς προσθέντες
κλίμακας ἅμα καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπώσαντες διὰ
A f e , e ’

2 τοῦ μεταπυργίου ὑπερέβαινον. ὁ δὲ διακομιζό-

μενος αἰεὶ ἵστατο ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου

BOOK III. xxu. 5—xxu. 2

opposite that over which their men were climbing,
to distract attention from them as far as possible. Now
the sentinels remained at their posts, though in a
state of excitement, no one daring to leave his station
and lend aid, but all being at a loss to conjecture
what was goingon. Furthermore, the three hundred,
who had been appointed to bring aid wherever it was
needed, proceeded outside of the wall in the direction
of the outcry, and beacon fires indicating danger
from the enemy were flashed towards Thebes. But the
Plataeans in the town at the same time raised from
their wall many beacons, which had been prepared
beforehand for this very purpose, that the enemy’s
beacon signals might be rendered unintelligible and
that the Thebans, thinking that the situation was
different from what it really was, might defer bring-
ing aid until the Plataeans who were leaving should
have made good their escape and reached safety.
XXIII. Meanwhile, when the foremost of the
Plataeans who were scaling the walls had mounted,
slain the guards, and got possession of the two towers,
they themselves took position inside the towers and
guarded the passageways, that no one might come
through these against them. Then from the top of
the wall they placed ladders against the towers,
got up a number of men, and kept all assailants
away from the towers, shooting at them from below
and above.! Meanwhile the others, thé main body,
had put up a large number of ladders and thrown
down the battlements, and were climbing over
through the space between the towers. And as each
one got over he halted on the edge of the ditch ; and

1 ώ,6. from the tops of the towers and from the wall at
their base.

THUCYDIDES

καὶ ἐντεῦθεν érofevov τε καὶ ἠκόντιζον, εἴ τις
παραβοηθῶν παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος κωλυτὴς γίγνοιτο
τῆς διαβάσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες διεπεπεραίωντο,
οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων χαλεπῶς οἱ τελευταῖοι κατα-
βαίνοντες ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ἐν τού-
τῷ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτοῖς ἐπεφέροντο λαμπάδας
ἔχοντες. οἱ μὲν οὖν [[λαταιῆς ἐκείνους ἑώρων
μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ σκότους ἑστῶτες ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους
τῆς τάφρου, καὶ ἐτόξευόν τε καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον ἐς
τὰ γυμνά, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ὄντες ἧσσον διὰ
τὰς λαμπάδας καθεωρῶντο, ὥστε φθάνουσι τῶν
Πλαταιῶν καὶ οἱ ὕστατοι διαβάντες τὴν τάφρον,
χαλεπῶς δὲ καὶ βιαίως: κρύσταλλός τε γὰρ
ἐπεπήγει οὐ βέβαιος ἐν αὐτῇ ὥστ᾽ ἐπελθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽
οἷος ἀπηλιώτου ἢ βορέου ῖ ὑδατώδης μᾶλλον, καὶ
ἡ νὺξ τοιούτῳ ἀνέμῳ ὑπονειφομένη πολὺ τὸ ὕδωρ
ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεποιήκει, ὃ μόλις ὑπερέχοντες ἐπεραιώ-
θησαν. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἡ διάφευξις αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον
διὰ τοῦ χειμῶνος τὸ μέγεθος.

XXIV. Ὁρμήσαντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τάφρου οἱ
Πλαταιῆς ἐχώρουν ἁθρόοι τὴν ἐς Θηβας φέρου-
σαν ὁδὸν ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ ᾿Ανδροκράτους
ἡρῷον, νομίζοντες ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν σφᾶς ταύτην αὐτοὺς
ὑποτοπῆσαι τραπέσθαι τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους"
καὶ ἅμα ἑώρων τοὺς ἸΤελοποννησίους τὴν πρὸς
Κιθαιρῶνα καὶ Δρνὸς κεφαλὰς τὴν ἐπ᾽ ᾿Αθηνῶν
φέρουσαν μετὰ λαμπάδων διώκοντας. καὶ ἐπὶ
μὲν ἐξ ἢ ἑπτὰ σταδίους οἱ Ἰ]λαταιῆς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν
Θηβῶν ἐχώρησαν, ἔπειθ᾽ ὑποστρέψαντες ἧσαν
τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος φέρουσαν ὁδὸν ἐς ᾿Βρύθρας καὶ

1 4 βορέου, deleted by Dobree, followed by Hude. Poppo
would transpose ὑδατώδης μᾶλλον, or bracket ὑδατώδης.

BOOK III. xxur. 2-xxrv. 2

from there they shot arrows and hurled javelins at
any enemy who tried to approach along the wall and
. interfere with their crossing. And when all these had
reached the other side, the men who had held the
towers, the last of whom descended with difficulty,
advanced toward the ditch ; and at the same time the
three hundred bore down upon them, carrying
torches. Now the Plataeans, as they stood on the
edge of the ditch, saw them better out of the dark-
ness, and kept launching arrows and javelins at their
uncovered sides, while they themselves, being in the
shadow, were rendered less visible by the enemy’s
torches. Consequently even the last of the Plataeans
got safely across the ditch, though only with difficulty
and after a hard struggle; for in the ditch ice had
formed that was not firm enough to walk on but
mushy, such as is formed when the wind is east
instead of north; and since the night, the wind being
from that quarter, was somewhat snowy, the water in
the ditch had become so deep that they could
scarcely keep their heads above it as they crossed.
It was, however, chiefly the violence of the storm
that enabled them to escape at all.

XXIV. Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans
advanced in a body along the road toward Thebes,
having on their right the shrine of the hero Andro-
crates; for they thought that no one would ever suspect
them of having taken this road, which led towards
their enemies; besides, they saw the Peloponnesians,
torches in hand, taking in pursuit the road toward
Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae, which is the road to
Athens. And for six or seven stadia the Plataeans
proceeded on the road toward Thebes, then turned
and followed that leading towards Erythrae and

THUCYDIDES

Ὑσιάς, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὁρῶν διαφεύγουσιν és
τὰς ᾿Αθήνας, ἄνδρες δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ
πλειόνων" εἰσὶ γάρ τινες αὐτῶν οἱ ἀπετράποντο
ἐς τὴν πόλιν πρὶν ὑπερβαίνειν, εἷς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ ἔξω
τάφρῳ τοξότης ἐλήφθη. οἱ μὲν οὖν 1]ελο-
ποννήσιοι κατὰ χώραν ἐγένοντο τῆς βοηθείας
παυσάμενοι" οἱ & ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῆς τῶν
μὲν γεγενημένων εἰδότες οὐδέν, τῶν δὲ ἀποτραπο-
μένων σφίσιν ἀπαγγειλάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς περίεστι,
κήρυκα ἐκπέμψαντες, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ἐσπέν-
ovTO ἀναίρεσιν τοῖς νεκροῖς, μαθόντες δὲ τὸ
ἀληθὲς ἐπαύσαντο. οἱ μὲν δὴ τῶν Πλαταιῶν
ἄνδρες οὕτω ὑπερβάντες ἐσώθησαν.

ΧΧΥ. ᾿Εκ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος τοῦ αὐτοῦ χει-
μῶνος τελευτῶντος ἐκπέμπεται Σάλαιθος ὁ Λακε-
δαιμόνιος ἐς Μυτιλήνην τριήρει. καὶ πλεύσας ἐς
Πύρραν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς πεζῇ κατὰ χαράδραν τινά,
4 ὑπερβατὸν! ἦν τὸ περιτείχισμα, διαλαθὼν
ἐσέρχεται ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην, καὶ ἔλεγε τοῖς
προέδροις ὅτι ἐσβολή τε ἅμα ἐς τὴν ᾿Αττικὴν
ἔσται καὶ αἱ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες παρέσονται
ἃς ἔδει βοηθῆσαι αὐτοῖς, προαποπεμφθῆναί τε
αὐτὸς τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ ἅμα τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελη-
σόμενος. καὶ οἱ μὲν Μυτιληναῖοι ἐθάρσουν τε
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἧσσον εἶχον τὴν
γνώμην ὥστε ξυμβαίνειν. ὅ τε χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα
οὗτος, καὶ τέταρτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα
τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

XXVI. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ Πελο-
ποννήσιοι ἐπειδὴ τὰς ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην 3 τεσ-

1 Van Herwerden sug ests ὑποβατόν, followed by Hude.

3 δύο καὶ of the MSS. before τεσσαράκοντα suspected by
Kriiger and deleted by van Herwerden.

BOOK III. xxiv. 2—xxvi. 1

Hysiae, and reaching the mountains escaped to
Athens. They were only two hundred and twelve
men out of a larger number; for some had turned
back to the town without trying to climb the wall,
and one man, an archer, had been taken at the outer
ditch. The Peloponnesians, then, desisted from the
pursuit and returned to their post. But the Plataeans
in the town, knowing nothing of what had really
happened, but informed by those who had turned
back that no one survived, sent a herald at daybreak
and asked for a truce that they might take up their
dead ; on learning the truth however, they desisted.
So these Plataeans got over the wall in the manner
described and reached safety.}

XXV. Toward the close of the same winter, Salae-
thus the Lacedaemonian was sent in a trireme from
Lacedaemon to Mytilene. Landing at Pyrrha and
proceeding thence on foot, he followed the bed of a
ravine, where the circuit-wall could be crossed, and
came undetected into Mytilene. He told the magis-
trates that there would be an invasion of Attica
and that simultaneously the forty ships? which were
to come to their aid would arrive, adding that he
himself had been sent ahead to make these announce-
ments and also to take charge of matters in general.
Accordingly the Mytilenaeans were encouraged and
were less inclined than ever to make terms with the
Athenians. So this winter ended, and with it the
fourth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote
the history.

XXVI. During the following summer the Pelopon-
nesians first despatched the forty ships which they

1 For the fate of the city and of the Plataeans who re-
mained in it, see chs. lii.—]xviii.
2 of. ch. xvi. 3.
41

428 B.C.

427 B.C.

THUCYDIDES

σαράκοντα ναῦς ἀπέστειλαν ἄρχοντα ᾿Αλκίδαν,
ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς ναΐαρχος, προστάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐς
ν᾿ ΤΥ \ \ € , 2 ἢ e
τὴν Αττικὴν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐσέβαλον, ὅπως
οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν θορυβούμενοι ἧσσον
ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην καταπλεούσαις
2 ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν. ἡγεῖτο δὲ τῆς ἐσβολῆς ταύτης
Κλεομένης ὑπὲρ Παυσανίου τοῦ Ἰ]λειστοάνακτος
υἱέος βασιλέως ὄντος καὶ νεωτέρου ἔτι, πατρὸς
8 δὴ ἀδελφὸς ὦν. ἐδήωσαν δὲ τῆς ᾿Αττικῆς τά
τε πρότερον τετμημένα, εἴ τι ἐβεβλαστήκει,
ν 3 a a \ 3 a A
καὶ ὅσα ἐν ταῖς πρὶν ἐσβολαῖς παρελέλειπτο"

\ ς 3 ‘ e , > /f a)
καὶ ἡ ἐσβολὴ αὕτη χαλεπωτάτη ἐγένετο τοῖς
9 , \ 2 / \

4 ᾿Αθηναίοις μετὰ τὴν δευτέραν. ἐπιμένοντες yap
αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Λέσβου τι πεύσεσθαι τῶν νεῶν
ἔργον ὡς ἤδη πεπεραιωμένων ἔπεξῆλθον τὰ πολλὰ
τέμνοντες. ws δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀπέβαινεν αὐτοῖς ὧν
προσεδέχοντο καὶ ἐπελελοίπει ὁ σῖτος, ἀνεχώ-

Ἁ ’ ’
ρῆσαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

XXVIII. Οἱ δὲ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς αἵ τε
νῆες αὐτοῖς οὐχ ἧκον ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλὰ
ἐνεχρόνιζον, καὶ ὁ σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει, ἀναγκά-

2 ζονται ξυμβαίνειν πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους διὰ τάδε.
ς ’ \ >_\ 3 , ”

ὁ Σάλαιθος καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ προσδεχόμενος ἔτι TAS

ζω e / Ν a SF em ἃ Μ e
ναῦς ὁπλίζει τὸν δῆμον πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα ws

1 καὶ of the MSS. before εἴ τι deleted by Dindorf.

1 cf. τι. lvii. 2.
2 It is implied that the Lacedaemonians planned this
summer, as on previous invasions, to ravage certain districts

BOOK III. xxvi. r—xxvn. 2

had promised to Mytilene, appointing in command of
them Alcidas, who was the Lacedaemonian admiral,
and then invaded Attica, themselves and their allies,
in order that the Athenians, threatened on both sea
and land, might be deterred from sending a force to
attack the fleet that was on its way to Mytilene.
The leader of this invasion was Cleomenes, regent for
his nephew Pausanias son of Pleistoanax, who was
king but still a minor. And they ravaged the parts
of Attica that had been laid waste before, wherever
any new growth had sprung up, as well as those that
had been left untouched in the former invasions.
And this invasion proved more grievous to the
Athenians than any except the second ;! for the
enemy, who were momentarily expecting to hear
from Lesbos of some achievement of their fleet,
which they supposed had already got across, went
on and on, ravaging most of the country. But when
they found that nothing turned out as they ex-
pected and their food was exhausted, they withdrew
and dispersed to their several cities.*

XXVII. Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans, seeing that
the fleet had not arrived from the Peloponnesus but
was loitering on the way, and that their food was
exhausted, were compelled to make terms with the
Athenians by the following circumstances. Salaethus,
who himself no longer expected the fleet to come,
equipped the commons with heavy armour,’ instead
of their former light arms, intending to attack the

and then, after hearing of the success of the fleet at Lesbos,
to withdraw. But they were kept in Attica longer than they
had intended by the delay on the part of the fleet.

8 With shield and spears and breast-plate. The light-
panes troops wore no defensive armour and carried spear
or bow. .

THUCYDIDES

ΜΕΝ

8 ἐπεξιὼν τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις" οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἔλαβον

ΕΥ̓͂ Μ 3 [οἱ Μ “Ὁ 9 4
ὅπλα, οὔτε ἠκροῶντο ἔτι τῶν ἀρχόντων, κατὰ
A a 4
ξυλλόγους τε γιγνόμενοι ἢ τὸν σῖτον ἐκέλευον
\ \ / > \ N ’
τοὺς δυνατοὺς φέρειν ἐς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ διανέμειν
ἅπασιν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ξυγχωρήσαντες πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους
ἔφασαν παραδώσειν τὴν πόλιν. XXVIII. γνόντες
δὲ οἱ ἐν τοῖς-πτράγμασιν οὔτ᾽ ἀποκωλύειν δυνατοὶ
ὄντες, εἴ T ἀπομονωθήσονται τῆς ξυμβάσεως, κιν-
ele a

Suvevoovtes, ποιοῦνται κοινῇ ὁμολογίαν πρός τε
Πάχητα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὥστε ᾿Αθηναίοις
μὲν ἐξεῖναι βουλεῦσαι περὶ Μυτιληναίων ὁποῖον
ἄν τε βούλωνται καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐς τὴν πόλιν
δέχεσθαι αὐτούς, πρεσβείαν δὲ ἀποστέλλειν ἐς
τὰς ᾿Αθήνας Μυτιληναίους περὶ ἑαυτῶν' ἐν ὅσῳ
δ᾽ ἂν πάλιν ἔλθωσι, Πάχητα μήτε δῆσαι
Μυτιληναίων μηδένα μηδὲ ἀνδραποδίσαι μήτε
ἀποκτεῖναι. ἡ μὲν ξύμβασις αὕτη ἐγένετο. οἱ
δὲ πράξαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μάλιστα

τῶν Μυτιληναίων περ(δεεῖς ὄντες, ὡς ἡ στρατιὰ νλεν

ἐσῆλθεν, οὐκ ἠνέσχοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς
ὅμως καθίξουσιν' Idyns δ᾽ ἀναστήσας αὐτοὺς
ὥστε μὴ ἀδικῆσαι, κατατίθεται ἐς Τένεδον μέχρι
οὗ τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις te δόξῃ. πέμψας δὲ καὶ ἐς
τὴν ἽΔντισσαν τριήρεις προσεκτήσατο καὶ τἄλλα
τὰ περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον καθίστατο ἧ αὐτῳ ἐδόκει.

XXIX. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ
Πελοποννήσιοι, ods ἔδει ἐν τάχει παραγενέσθαι,

πλέοντες περί τε αὐτὴν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐνδιέ-

BOOK III. xxvu. 2—-xxrx. 1

Athenians; but the commons, as soon as they
had got arms, would no longer obey their com-
manders, but gathered _in groups and ordered the
aristocrats to bring out whatever food there was and
distribute it to all; otherwise, they said, they would
come to terms with the Athenians independently and
deliver up the city. XXVIII. Thereupon the men in
authority, realizing that they could not prevent this
and that they would be in peril if excluded from the
capitulation, joined the commons in making an agree-
ment with Paches and. his army. The conditions
were that the Athenian state should have the power
to decide as they pleased about the fate of the My-
tileneans and that the besieging army should be
admitted into the city; but it was conceded that
the Mytilenaeans might send an embassy to Athens
to treat for terms, Paches, meanwhile, until the return
of the embassy, agreeing not to imprison or enslave
or put to death any Mytilenaean. Such was the agree-
ment. But those of the Mytilenaeans who had been
most involved in the intrigue with the Lacedae-
monians were in great terror when the army entered
the town, and could not keep quiet, but notwith-
standing the agreement took refuge at the altars,
Paches, however, induced them to leave the altars,
promising to do them no injury, and placed them for
safe keeping in Tenedos until the Athenians should
reach a decision. He also sent triremes to Antissa
and took possession of it, and made such other dis-
positions with reference to the army as seemed best
to him.

XXIX. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the
forty ships, who ought to have arrived speedily at
Mytilene, wasted time on their voyage round the

THUCYDIDES

τρίψαν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον πλοῦν σχολαῖοι Ko-
/ \ \ 3 a ’ 2 , 3
μισθέντες τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ᾿Αθηναίους
λανθάνουσι, πρὶν δὴ τῇ Δήλῳ ἔσχον, προσμεί-
9 a a TF

Eavtes δὲ am’ αὐτῆς τῇ Ικάρῳ καὶ Muxove πυν-
θάνονται πρῶτον ὅτι ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἑάλωκεν. βου-
λόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφὲς εἰδέναι κατέπλευσαν ἐς
"EpBatov τῆς “EpvOpaias: ἡμέραι δὲ μάλιστα
4 A 7 e ’ ς \ e 3 N
ἦσαν τῇ Μυτιλήνῃ ἑαλωκυίᾳ ἑπτὰ ὃτε ἐς TO
Ν \
Εμβατον κατέπλευσαν. πυθόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφὲς
"9 4 43 A 4 \ 3 A
ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκ τῶν παρόντων" καὶ ἔλεξεν αὐτοῖς
Τευτίαπλος ἀνὴρ ᾿Ηλεῖος τάδε.

XXX. “᾿Αλκίδα καὶ ἸΠελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρ-
εσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πλεῖν
“ μ > δ ’ > V4 4 θ
ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Μντιλήνην πρὶν ἐκπύστους γενέσθαι,
ὥσπερ ἔχομεν. κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀνδρῶν νεωστὶ

’ 3 4 \ Ν 3 4 e /
πολιν EXOVT@Y πολὺ TO ἀφύλακτον εὑρήσομεν,

\ \ lA \ 4 e 3 a , 3 UA
κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνυ, ἡ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀνέλ-
πιστοι ἐπιγενέσθαι ἄν τινα σφίσι πολέμιον καὶ
e a e 3 \ 4 / 4 > N \ \
HUOY ἡ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει μάλιστα OVTA* εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ
τὸ πεζὸν αὐτῶν κατ᾽ οἰκίας ἀμελέστερον ὡς κεκρα-
τηκότων διεσπάρθαι. εἰ οὖν προσπέσοιμεν ἄφνω
τε καὶ νυκτός, ἐλπίζω μετὰ τῶν ἔνδον, εἴ τις ἄρα
ς a 2 € / 5 a Ἅ
ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὑπόλοιπος εὔνους, καταληφθῆναι ἂν
τὰ πράγματα. καὶ μὴ ἀποκνήσωμεν τὸν κίνδυνον,
νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ καινὸν τοῦ
πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον" ὃ εἴ τις στρατηγὸς ἔν τε

BOOK III. xxix, 1-xxx. 4

Peloponnesus and on the rest of the way proceeded
leisurely. They were unobserved by the Athenian
home fleet until they reached Delos; but when after
leaving Delos they touched at Icaros and Myconos
they received the first tidings that Mytilene had been
taken. Wishing however to know the exact situation
they sailed to Embatum in Erythraea; and it was
about seven days after the capture of Mytilene that
they came to Embatum. Now that they had learned
the truth, they took counsel in view of the present
emergency, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, spoke to them
as follows :

XXX. ‘ Alcidas, and you who, like myself, are
present here as commanders of the Peloponnesian
forces, it seems to me that we should sail to Mytilene
before our approach becomes known, without a
moment's delay. For in all probability we shall find
that men who have but lately come into possession
of a city are very much off their guard. At sea,
indeed, they will be altogether so, where they have
no expectation of any possible hostile attack and
our réle is chiefly to act on the defensive ;1 and on
land also their forces are probably scattered among
_ the houses all the more carelessly because they be-
lieve that they are victors. If, then, we should fall
upon them suddenly and at night, I believe that,
in concert with our supporters inside, if any are left,
we should find ourselves masters of the situation.
And let us not shrink from the danger, remembering
that the element of surprise in warfare is precisely
of this nature.2~ And if a general guards against
such surprises in his own case, and, whenever he

1 Or, ‘‘ while on our side it is just here that our strength
lies.” 2 1.c, dangerous,

THUCYDIDES

αὑτῷ φυλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐνορῶν
ἐπιχειροίη, πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο.᾽"

ΧΧΧΊ. Ὁ μὲν τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἔπειθε τὸν
᾿Αλκίδαν. ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀπ᾽ ᾿Ιωνίας φυγάδων
καὶ οἱ Λέσβιοι οἱ; ξυμπλέοντες παρήνουν, ἐπειδὴ

a \ ’ a “ 3 9 , /
τοῦτον Tov κίνδυνον φοβεῖται, τῶν ἐν ᾿Ιωνίᾳ πόλ-

a A 4 \ ? 4 Vv
εων καταλαβεῖν τινα ἢ Κύμην τὴν Αἰολίδα, ὅπως
ἐκ πόλεως ὁρμώμενοι τὴν ᾿Ιωνίαν ἀποστήσωσιν
(ἐλπίδα δ᾽ εἶναι" οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἀκουσίως ἀφῖχθαι),
καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον ταύτην μεγίστην οὖσαν
᾿Αθηναίων ἵν᾽ ὑφέλωσι καὶ ἅμα, ἢν ἐφορμῶσι
σφίσιν, αὐτοῖς δαπάνη γίγνηται"35 πείσειν τε
οἴεσθαι καὶ ἸΤ]Πισσούθνην ὥστε ξυμπολεμεῖν. ὁ
δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐνεδέχετο, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς
γνώμης εἶχεν, ἐπειδὴ τῆς Μυτιλήνης ὑστερήκει,
ὅτι τάχιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πάλιν προσμεῖξαι.

XXXII. "Apas δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ᾿Εμβάτου παρέπλει,
καὶ προσσχὼν Μυοννήσῳ τῇ Τηίων τοὺς αἰχμα-
λώτους Ods κατὰ πλοῦν εἰλήφει ἀπέσφαξε τοὺς

1 of before ξυμπλέοντες added by Madvig, followed by
Hude.

2 «al thy πρόσοδον... γίγνητα. The first part of this
vexed passage is in accord with the essentially unanimous
tradition of the MSS., except that Dobree’s conjecture, ἵν᾽
ὑφέλωσι, is substituted for ἣν bpéAwor. The second part
(καὶ ἅμα. .. γίγνηται) is in agreement with van Herwerden
and Miiller-Striibing, Thuk. Forsch., p. 97, after Codex M
and a Schol. (τὸ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ἅμα ἀναγνωστέον, ἀλλὰ
διαιρετέον, καὶ κατὰ τὸ σφίσιν ὑποστικτέον). Most MSS. have
ἐφορμῶσι αὐτοῖς (or αὐτοὺς) δαπάνη σφίσι γίγνηται (Β γίγνεται) ;

G ἐφορμῶσιν αὐτοῖς σφίσι δαπάνη γίγνηται. Dobree’s conjec-
ture (ἵνα) not only gives a good construction for ὑφέλωσι---

BOOK III. xxx. 4—xxxu. 1

sees an opportunity to employ them in the case of
the enemy, makes the attempt, he will win the
greatest success.” |

XXXI. Thus he spoke, but could not win Alcidas
to his plan. Then some others, exiles from Ionia,
and the Lesbians! who were with the fleet, advised
him, since he feared the risk of this enterprise, to
seize one of the cities in Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolia, in
order that they might have a city as their base and
bring Ionia to revolt (and that there was a prospect
of success, seeing that everyone welcomed his coming)
and might thus steal from the Athenians this the
greatest source of their revenue, and at the same
time the Athenians might be put to expense, in case
they should attempt to blockade their base. They
thought, moreover, that they could persuade Pis-
suthnes to join them in the war. Alcidas, however,
would not accept these proposals, either, but his
chief concern, now that he was too late for Mytilene,
was to get back to Peloponnesus as quickly as
possible.

XXXII. So he set sail from Embatum and skirted
the coast; and putting in at Myonnesus in the
country of the Teians he butchered most of the
captives whom he had taken on the voyage. Then

1 The πρέσβεις of chs. iv., v.

without altering the essential meaning of the sentence—but
obviates the necessity of making γίγνηται dependent on ὅπως,
which is too far off and separated from it by too many
subordinate clauses. 1 ἣν ὑφέλωσι be retained, with most
editors, the sense would be: ‘‘and if they could steal
from the Athenians this the greatest source of their
revenue, these might also at the same time, in case they
should blockade them [the Peloponnesians], be put to
expense.”

49
VOL. Il. E

THUCYDIDES

2 πολλούς. καὶ és τὴν Ἔφεσον καθορμισαμένου
3 A ’ [οἱ 3 9 / 3 / ’
αὐτοῦ Σαμίων τῶν ἐξ ᾿Αναίων ἀφικόμενοι πρέσ-
βεις ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ελλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν
αὐτόν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν οὔτε χεῖρας ἀνταιρο-
μένους οὔτε πολεμίους, ᾿Αθηναίων δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης
ξυμμάχους" εἴ τε μὴ παύσεται, ὀλίγους μὲν αὐτὸν

Sa] 3 a 3 / f Ἁ \
τῶν ἐχθρῶν és φιλίαν προσάξεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ

8 πλείους τῶν φίλων πολεμίους ἕξειν. καὶ ὁ μὲν
4 , ’ Ν 54 4
ἐπείσθη τε καὶ Χίων ἄνδρας ὅσους εἶχεν ἔτι
ἀφῆκε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινάς: ὁρῶντες γὰρ τὰς

fe) ew 3 Ν 9 ,
vais οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔφευγον, ἀλλὰ προσεχώρουν
μᾶλλον ὡς ᾿Αττικαῖς καὶ ἐλπίδα οὐδὲ τὴν
ἐλαχίστην εἶχον μή ποτε ᾿Αθηναίων τῆς
θαλάσσης κρατούντων ναῦς Πελοποννησίων ἐς
ἸΙωνίαν παραβαλεῖν.

XXXIII. ᾿Απὸ δὲ τῆς ᾿Εφέσου ὁ ᾿Αλκίδας ἔπλει
κατὰ τάχος καὶ φυγὴν ἐποιεῖτο" ὥφθη γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς
Σαλαμινίας καὶ ἸΤαράλου ἔτι περὶ Κλάρον ὁρμῶν
(αἱ δ᾽ ἀπ᾿ ᾿Αθηνῶν ἔτυχον πλέουσαι), καὶ δεδιὼς

‘\ ’ Ν A Ul e ae 4
τὴν δίωξιν ἔπλει διὰ τοῦ πελάγους ὡς γῇ ἑκούσιος

2 οὐ σχήσων ἄλλῃ ἢ Πελοποννήσῳ. τῷ δὲ Πάχητι

A “A > , 3 Ἁ n
καὶ τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις ἦλθε μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
᾿Ερυθραίας ἀγγελία, ἀφικνεῖτο δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν"
ἀτειχίστου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς ᾿Ιωνίας μέγα τὸ δέος

1 These were probably the Samians who settled at Anaea,
on the coast opposite the island, after the overthrow of
Samos in 439 B.c. (cf. 1. exvii. 3). They are referred to in
ch. xix. 2 as “" Anaeitans.”

δο

BOOK III. xxx. 1—xxx1. 2

he anchored at Ephesus, where he was visited by
envoys of the Samians who were settled at Anaea,}
who said that it was an ill way he had of freeing
Hellas, to destroy men who were not lifting their
hands against him and were not enemies, but were
merely allies of the Athenians under compulsion ;
and unless he abandoned this course he would win
few enemies over into friendship and would turn
far more friends into enemies. Alcidas was per-
suaded, and set free all the Chians whom he still
held and some of the others. It should be ex-
plained that the people of the coast,? when they
saw the Peloponnesian ships, made no attempt to flee,
but came near, supposing that they were Athenian
ships; and they had not the slightest expectation
that while the Athenians dominated the sea the
Peloponnesian fleet would ever venture over to Ionia.

XXXIII. From Ephesus Alcidas sailed in haste
and took to flight; for while still at anchor near
Clarus® he had been sighted by the Salaminia and
Paralus,* which happened to be on a voyage from
Athens, and in fear of pursuit he sailed through the
open sea, determined that he would not, unless
obliged to do so, put into land anywhere except in
the Peloponnesus. Reports of him had been brought
from Erythraea to Paches and the Athenians, and
now kept coming from all quarters. For since lonia
was unfortified, a great alarm arose everywhere lest

7 2,6. the Greeks of whom Alcidas had taken so many
prisoners.

8 +.e. while on his way from Embatum to Ephesus.

4 The two swift Athenian state triremes kept always
manned ready for extraordinary service. Alcidas knew that
these two boats would notify the main Athenian fleet under

Paches of his whereabouts, and that Paches would make
pursuit. |
δ

E 2

THUCYDIDES

> »
ἐγένετο μὴ παραπλέοντες οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, εἶ
καὶ ὡς μὴ διενοοῦντο μένειν, πορθῶσιν ἅμα
ig 4 3 4 3 43 A
προσπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις. αὐτάγγελοι δ᾽ αὐτὸν
9 “ A
ἰδοῦσαι ἐν τῇ Κλάρῳ 4 te Πάραλος καὶ ἡ
Σ , Ν e gx ey a? a
αλαμινία ἔφρασαν. ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἐποιεῖτο
\ , a
τὴν δίωξιν καὶ μέχρι μὲν Πάτμου τῆς νήσου
3 ’
ἐπεδίωξεν, ὡς δ᾽. οὐκέτι ἐν καταλήψει ἐφαίνετο,
3
ἐπανεχώρει. κέρδος δὲ ἐνόμισεν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ
μετεώροις περιέτυχεν, ὅτε οὐδαμοῦ ἐγκαταλη-
φθεῖσαι ἠναγκάσθησαν στρατόπεδόν τε ποιεῖσθαι
καὶ φυλακὴν σφίσι καὶ ἐφόρμησιν παρασχεῖν.
XXXIV. Παραπλέων δὲ πάλιν ἔσχε καὶ ἐς No-
τιον τὸ Κολοφωνίων, οὗ κατῴκηντο Κολοφώνιοι
ΔΝ A
τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἑαλωκυίας ὑπὸ ᾿Ιταμάνους καὶ τῶν
βαρβάρων κατὰ στάσιν ἰδίᾳ ἐπαχθέντων' ἑάλω
δὲ μάλιστα αὕτη ὅτε ἡ δευτέρα Πελοποννησίων
a Y A
ἐσβολὴ és τὴν ᾿Αττικὴν ἐγίγνετο. ἐν οὖν τῷ
’
Νοτίῳ οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ κατοικήσαντες αὐτόθι
αὖθις στασιάσαντες, οἱ μὲν παρὰ Πισσούθνου
3 ’ὔ ᾽ ᾽ὔ a 4
ἐπικούρους ᾿Αρκάδων te καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων
ἐπαγαγόμενοι ἐν διατειχίσματι εἶχον (καὶ τῶν
3 A wv 4 ’ e /
ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως Κολοφωνίων ot μηδίσαντες
ξυνεσελθόντες ἐπολίτευον), οἱ δὲ ὑπεξελθόντες
τούτους καὶ ὄντες φυγάδες τὸν ΠΠάχητα ἐπάγονται.

1 ᾧ, 6. since they were only cruising.

2 Such a blockade would not only have been costly, but
vow’ also have kept the fleet from carrying on its work at

sbos.

BOOK III. xxxmi. 2—xxxiv. 2

the Peloponnesians, while following the coast—even
if, under the circumstances,! they had no intention of
remaining—might in passing fall upon their cities
and plunder them. And finally the Paralus and the
Salaminia brought the news that they had them-
selves seen him at Clarus. So Paches eagerly under-
took the pursuit ; and he followed him as far as the
island of Patmos, but when it was clear that Alcidas
could no longer be overtaken he turned back again.
And since he had not come up with the Pelopon-
nesian fleet in the open sea, he considered it a piece
of good fortune that they had not been overtaken in
some port and compelled to set up a camp there,
thus giving the Athenian fleet the trouble of watch-
ing and blockading them.?

XXXIV. On the way back as he sailed along the
coast he put in at Notium, the port of the Colopho-
nians, where the Colophonians had settled when the
upper town had been taken by Itamenes and the
barbarians,? who had been called in on account of
party discord by one of the factions. And this place
had been taken about the time when the second
Peloponnesian invasion of Attica was made. Now
those who had fled for refuge to Notium and
settled there again fell into sedition. One party
called in mercenaries, both Arcadian and barbarian,
whom they had obtained from Pissuthnes, and kept
them in a space walled off from the rest of the city,
and the Colophonians from the upper town who
were in sympathy with the Persians joined them
there and were admitted to citizenship; the other
party had secretly made their escape, and, being

8 5,6, the Persians. Itamenes is otherwise unknown.
4 In the spring of 430 B.c.

THUCYDIDES

3 ὁ δὲ προκαλεσάμενος ἐς λόγους ᾿ἱππίαν τῶν ἐν TO
διατειχίσματι ᾿Αρκάδων ἄρχοντα, ὥστε, ἢν μηδὲν
ἀρέσκον λέγῃ, πάλιν αὐτὸν καταστήσειν ἐς τὸ
τεῖχος σῶν καὶ ὑγιᾶ, ὁ μὲν ἐξῆλθε παρ᾽ αὐτόν,
ὁ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐν φυλακῇ ἀδέσμῳ εἶχεν, αὐτὸς δὲ
προσβαλὼν τῷ τειχίσματι ἐξαπιναίως καὶ οὐ
προσδεχομένων αἱρεῖ, τούς τε ᾿Αρκάδας καὶ τῶν
βαρβάρων ὅσοι ἐνῆσαν διαφθείρει' καὶ τὸν
Ἱππίαν ὕστερον ἐσαγαγὼν ὥσπερ ἐσπείσατο"
ἐπειδὴ ἔνδον ἦν, ξυλλαμβάνει καὶ κατατοξεύει.

4 Κολοφωνίοις δὲ Νότιον παραδίδωσι πλὴν τῶν
μηδισάντων. καὶ ὕστερον ᾿Αθηναῖοι οἰκιστὰς
πέμψαντες κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νόμους κατῴκισαν
τὸ Νότιον, ξυναγαγόντες πάντας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων,
εἴ πού τις Hv Κολοφωνίων.

XXXV. Ὁ δὲ Πάχης ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Μυτι-
λήνην τήν τε Πύρραν καὶ “Epecov παρεστήσατο,
καὶ Σάλαιθον λαβὼν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸν Λακεδαι-
μόνιον κεκρυμμένον ἀποπέμπει ἐς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας
καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Τενέδου Μυτιληναίων ἄνδρας ἅμα
ods κατέθετο καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτῷ αἴτιος ἐδόκει

2 εἶναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως" ἀποπέμπει δὲ καὶ τῆς
στρατιᾶς τὸ πλέον. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ὑπομένων
καθίστατο τὰ περὶ τὴν Μντιλήνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην
Λέσβον ἡ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.

XXXVI. ᾿Αφικομένων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ
Σαλαίθον οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τὸν μὲν Σάλαιθον εὐθὺς
ἀπέκτειναν, ἔστιν ἃ παρεχόμενον τά τ᾽ ἄλλα καὶ
ἀπὸ Πλαταιῶν (ἔτε γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο) ἀπάξειν
54

BOOK III. χχχιν. 3—-xxxvt. 1 |

now in exile, called in Paches. And he summoned
Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the
fortified quarter, to a conference, on condition that if
his proposals were unsatisfactory he would restore
him safe and sound to the fortress. But when
Hippias came out to him, he kept him under guard
but unfettered while he himself made a sudden and
unexpected attack upon the fortress, captured it, and
put to death all the Arcadians and barbarians that
were in it. As for Hippias, he afterward took him
into’ the fortress just as he had agreed to do, and as
soon as he was inside seized him and shot him down.
He then delivered Notium to the Colophonians,
excepting, however, the Persian sympathizers. The
Athenians afterwards sent a commission and re-
colonized Notium, giving it their own institutions,
after they had first brought together all the Colo-
phonians from cities where any of them were to be
found.

XXXV. After returning to Mytilene Paches re-
duced Pyrrha and Eresus, and having caught Salae-
thus the Lacedaemonian in hiding in the town sent
him off to Athens, as also the Mytilenaean men whom
he had placed for safe-keeping in Tenedos, and any
others who seemed to him-to blame for the revolt.
He also sent back most of his army; with the rest
he remained, and proceeded to settle the affairs of
Mytilene and of Lesbos in general as seemed best
to him.

XXXVI. When Salaethus and the others arrived
at Athens, the Athenians at once put Salaethus to
death, although he offered among other things to
induce the Peloponnesians to abandon Plataea, which

427 B.

THUCYDIDES

2 Πελοποννησίους" περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας

4 fa) e Ἁ 4 ΄“ Ν ϑ A 3 A
ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ov τοὺς
a \
παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
ἅπαντας Μυτιληναίους ὅσοι ἡβῶσι, παῖδας δὲ
καὶ γυναῖκας ἀνδραποδίσαι, ἐπικαλοῦντεᾳ τήν τε
Ν 9 ’ Ψ 4 4 ’ ῃ« id
ἄλλην ἀπόστασιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀρχόμενοι ὥσπερ οἱ
ἄλλοι ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ sl ata π᾿ οὐκ
’ “A e A e 4 fe) 9
ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὁρμῆς αἱ. Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐς
Ἰωνίαν ἐκείνοις βοηθοὶ ξολμήσασαι παρακιν-
δυνεῦσαι" οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ βραχείας διανοίας ἐδόκουν
τὴν ἀπόστασιν ποιήσασθαι. πέμπουσιν οὖν
, e , ΄ ” a ,
τριήρη ὡς άχητα ἄγγελον τῶν δεδογμένων, κατὰ
’, 2 . 7 ’
τάχος κελεύοντες διαχρήσασθαι Μυτιληναίους"
καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἣν αὐτοῖς
καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὠμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα
ἤ a ἴω
ἐγνῶσθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ
Ἁ > 9 ς >] wv A “A
τοὺς αἰτίους. ὡς δ᾽ ἤσθοντο τοῦτο τῶν Μυτιλη-
[4 a rey
ναίων of παρόντες πρέσβεις Kal οἱ αὐτοῖς τῶν
J,
᾿Αθηναίων ξυμπράσσοντες, παρεσκεύασαν τοὺς
9 4 [2 = ’ la)
ἐν τέλει ὥστε αὖθις γνώμας προθεῖναι" καὶ
ἔπεισαν ῥᾷον, διότι καὶ ἐκείνοις ἔνδηλον ἣν βουλό-
N v4 A A ani J
μενον TO πλέον τῶν πολιτῶν αὖθις τινας σφίσιν
ἀποδοῦναι βουλεύσασθαι. καταστάσης δ᾽ εὐθὺς
ἐκκλησίας ἄλλαι τε γνῶμαι ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστων ἐλέ-
yovto καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν
προτέραν ἐνενικήκει ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ὧν καὶ ἐς
A A A
Ta ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ

BOOK Ill. xxxvi. 1-6

was still under siege; as to the others they held a
debate, and under the impulse of anger finally deter-
mined to put to death, not only the Mytilenaeans who
were there in Athens, but also all who were of adult
age, and to enslave their women and children. The
general charge which they brought against them was
that they had made this revolt in spite of the fact that
they were not held in subjection like the other allies;
and what contributed not least to their fury was that
the Peloponnesian fleet had dared to venture over to
Ionia to their support ; for from this they thought
the revolt had been made after long deliberation.
Accordingly they sent a trireme to Paches to an-
nounce what had been determined upon, and bidding
him to despatch the Mytilenaeans with all haste; but
on the very next day a feeling of repentance came

er them and they began to reflect that the design
which they had formed was cruel and monstrous, to
destroy a whole city instead of merely those who
were guilty. And when this became known to the
Mytilenaean! envoys who were present and their
Athenian supporters, they induced those in authority
to bring the question before the people again ; and
they found less difficulty in persuading them because
it was evident to them also that the greater part of
the citizens wished that another opportunity should
be given them to consider the matter. A meeting
of the assembly was held immediately, at which
various opinions were expressed by the several
speakers. One of these was Cleon son of Cleaenetus,
who had been successful in carrying the earlier
motion to put the Mytilenaeans to death. He was
not only the most violent of the citizens, but at that

1 of. ch. xxviii. 1.

THUCYDIDES

παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, παρελθὼν

@ 3, 4
αὖθις ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

XXXVII. “ Πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ad-
λοτε ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν
ἑτέρων ἄρχειν, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τῇ νῦν ὑμετέρᾳ
περὶ Μυτιληναίων μεταμελείᾳ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽
ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους
καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε, καὶ ὅ τι
ἂν ἢ λόγῳ πεισθέντες UF αὐτῶν ἁμάρτητε ἢ
οἴκτῳ ἐνδῶτε, οὐκ ἐπικινδύνως ἡγεῖσθε ἐς ὑμᾶς
καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὴν τῶν ξυμμάχων χάριν μαλακίζεσθαι,
οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν
καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας
ἀρχομένους, ot οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν χαρίζησθε βλαπ-
τόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀκροῶνται ὑμῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἂν
ἰσχύν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐκείνων εὐνοίᾳ περιγένησθε.

,ὕ \ , ἢ , ea FN
πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν
καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξῃ πέρι, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι
χείροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων
ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ

4 9 4 A a 3
σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκο-
λασίας, οἵ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς
τοὺς ξυνετωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον ἄμεινον
οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων

’ 4 , A 3
σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι τῶν τε αἰεὶ
λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἐν
ἄλλοις μείξοσιν οὐκ ἂν δηλώσαντες τὴν γνώμην,

1 of wanting in all better MSS., but adopted by Bekker,
Kriiger, and Hude.

BOOK III. xxxvi. 6—xxxvit. 4

time had by far the greatest influence with the
people. He now came forward a second time and
spoke as follows :

XXXVITI. “On many other occasions in the past
I have realized that a democracy is incompetent to
govern others, but more than ever to-day, when I
observe your change of heart concerning the My-
tilenaeans. The fact is that, because your daily life
is unaffected by fear and intrigue in your relations to
each other,} you have the same attitude towards
your allies also, and you forget that whenever you
are led into error by their representations or yield
out of pity, your weakness involves you in danger
and does not win the gratitude of your allies. For
you do not reflect that the empire you hold is a
despotism? imposed upon subjects who, for their
part, do intrigue against you and submit to your rule
against their will, who render obedience, not because
of any kindnesses you may do them to your own
hurt, but because of such superiority as you may have
established by reason of your strength rather than of
their goodwill. But quite the most alarming thing
is, if nothing we have resolved upon shall be settled
once for all, and if we shall refuse to recognize that
a state which has inferior laws that are inviolable
is stronger than one whose laws are good but with-
out authority; that ignorance combined with self-
restraint is more serviceable than cleverness combined
with recklessness; and that simpler people for the
most part make better citizens than the more
shrewd. The latter always want to show that they
are wiser than the laws, and to dominate all public
discussions, as if there could never be weightier

1 of. τι. Xxxvii. 2, 2 cf. τι. lxiii. 2.
59

THUCYDIDES

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς
πόλεις" οἱ & ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ ἑαντῶν ξυνέσει
ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀδυ-
νατώτεροι δὲ Tov! τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι
λόγον, κριταὶ δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσον μάλλον ἢ
ἀγωνισταὶ ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω. ὡς οὖν χρὴ καὶ
ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι
ἐπαιρομένους παρὰ δόξαν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει
παραινεῖν.

XXXVIII. “ Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ
γνώμῃ καὶ θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν προθέντων αὖθις
περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν καὶ χρόνου -διατριβὴν
ἐμποιησάντων, ὅ ἐστι πρὸς τῶν ἠδικηκότων
μᾶλλον (ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι "ἀμβλυτέρᾳ
τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν
ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον ἀντίπαλον ὃν 5 μάλιστα

\ , fg ,
τὴν τιμωρίαν λαμβάνειδ), θαυμάξω δὲ καὶ ὅστις
ἔσται ὁ ἀντερῶν καὶ ἀξιώσων ἀποφαίνειν τὰς μὲν
Μυτιληναίων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὠφελίμους οὔσας, τὰς
δ᾽ ἡμετέρας. ξυμφορὰς τοῖς ξυμμάχοις βλάβας

2 καθισταμένας. καὶ δῆλον ὅτε ἢ τῷ λέγειν

. aes xX

\ A a
πιστεύσας τὸ πάνυ δοκοῦν ἀνταποφῆναι ὡς οὐκ
” » --- φ- τ - -9- KD 2 , \

cares ἀγωνίσαιτ᾽ ἄν, ἢ κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος TO

᾿ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειρά-

8 σεται. ἡ δὲ πόλις ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγώνων τὰ

μὲν ἄθλα ἑτέροις δίδωσιν, αὐτὴ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους

3 / v > ες a A 3 A
4 avadhépe. αἴτιοι δ᾽ ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες,

1 ry, added from Stobaeus by Naber, followed by Hude.

2 $y is deleted by Haase, followed by Hude, and
generally.

3 λαμβάνει, for ἀναλαμβάνει of the MSS., Reiske, followed
by Hude.

BOOK IIT. xxxvm. 4—xxxvini. 4

questions on which to declare their opinions, and as
a consequence of such conduct they generally bring
their states to ruin; the former, on the contrary,
mistrusting their own insight, are content to be
less enlightened than the laws and less competent
than others to criticise the words of an able speaker,
but being impartial judges rather than interested
contestants they generally prosper. Thus, then, we
ought to act and not be so excited by eloquence and
combat of wits as to advise the Athenian people
contrary to our own judgment.

XXXVIII. “As for me, I have not changed my
opinion, and I wonder at those who propose to
debate again the question of the Mytilenaeans and
thus interpose delay, which is in the interest of
those who have done the wrong; for thus the edge
of the victim’s wrath is_duller when he proceeds
against the offender, whereas the vengeance that
follows upon the very heels of the outrage exacts a
punishment that most nearly matches the offence.
And I wonder, too, who will answer me and under-
take to prove that the wrong-doings of the Myti-
lenaeans are beneficial to us but that our misfortunes
prove injurious to our allies. Manifestly he must either
have such confidence in his powers of speech as to
undertake to show that what is universally accepted
as true has not been established,! or else, incited
by gain, will by an elaborate display of specious
oratory attempt to mislead you. But in contests of
that kind the city bestows the prizes upon others,
while she herself undergoes all the risks. And you
are yourselves to blame, for your management ΟἹ

1 Or, ‘‘ your absolute resolve has really not been adopted.”
61

THUCYDIDES

οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι,
ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἔργα
ἀπὸ τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες ὡς δυνατὰ
ε; γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα ἤδη, οὐ τὸ δραάθὲν
πιστότερον ὄψει͵ λαβόντες ἢ τὸ ἀκουσθέν, ἀπὸ
δ τῶν λόγῳ καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων' καὶ μετὰ καινό-
τητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι, μετὰ δεδοκι-
μασμένου δὲ μὴ ξυνέπεσθαι ἐθέλειν, δοῦλοι ὄντες
τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων, ᾿ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰωθότων,
6 καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος βουλόμενος
δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι τοῖς τοιαῦτα
λέγουσι μὴ ὕστεροι ἀκολουθῆσαι δοκεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ,
ν ,ofbws δέ τι λέγοντος προεπαινέσαι, καὶ προ-
ae αἰσθέσθαι τε πρόθυμοι τὰ “λεγόμενα καὶ προ-
νοῆσαι βραδεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν πο σόμενα,
7 ξητοῦντές τε ἄλλο τι͵ ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἢ ἐν οἷς ζῶμεν,
φρονοῦντες δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἱκανῶς"
ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς. ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν
θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως
βουλενομένοις.
XXXIX. “Ὧν ἐγὼ πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν
ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνω Ὁ Μυτιληναίους μάλιστα δὴ μίαν
2 πόλιν ἠδικηκότας ὑμᾶς. ἐγὼ γάρ, οἵτινες μὲν
μὴ δυνατοὶ φέρειν τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀρχὴν ἢ οἵτινες
ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων. ἀναγκασθέντες ἀπέστησαν,
ξυγγνώμην ἔχω: νῆσον δὲ οἵτινες ἔχοντες μετὰ
τειχῶν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν «μόνον φοβούμενοι
τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολεμίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ τριήρων
παρασκευῇ οὐκ nam ἦσαν πρὸς αὐτούς,

)

1 εἶναι after πρόθυμοι, deleted by Poppo, followed by
Hude.

BOOK III. xxxvitt. 4—xxxrx. 2

these contests is wrong. It is your wont to be
spectators of words and hearers of deeds, forming
your judgment of future enterprises according as
able speakers represent them to be feasible, but as
regards accomplished facts, not counting what has
been done more credible, because you have seen
it, than what you have heard, you are swayed in
judgment by those who have made an _ eloquent
invective. You are adepts not only at being de-
ceived by novel proposals but also at refusing to
follow approved advice, slaves as you are of each
new paradox and scorners of what is familiar. Each
of you wishes above all to be an orator himself, or,
failing that, to vie with those dealers in paradox by
seeming not to lag behind them in wit but to
applaud a smart saying before it is out of the speaker's
mouth; you are as quick to forestall what is said
as you are slow to foresee what will come of it. You
seek, one might say, a world quite unlike that in
which we live, but give too little heed to that which
is at hand. In a word, you are in thrall to the
pleasures of the ear and are more like men who sit
as spectators at exhibitions of sophists than men who
take counsel for the welfare of the State.

XXXIX. “And it is from these ways that I seek
to turn you when I attempt to prove that Mytilene
has done you more injury than any single state. I
can make allowance for men who resorted to revolt
because they were unable to bear your rule or
because they were compelled by your enemies to do
so; but men who inhabited a fortified island and had
no fear of our enemies except by sea, and even there
were not without the protection of a force of their
own triremes, who moreover were independent and

THUCYDIDES

αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες Kal τιμώμενοι ἐς TA πρῶτα
e Ν e A aA 3 4 4” Φ A
ὑπὸ ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο, TL ἄλλο OUTOL ἢ
3 UA 4 3 a A
ἐπεβούλευσάν τε Kal ἐπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ἢ
ἀπέστησαν (ἀπόστασις μέν γε τῶν βίαιόν τι
, ᾽ , δϑῳ ᾽ “A
πασχόντων ἐστίν), ἐξζήτησάν τε μετὰ τῶν πολε-
μιωτάτων ἡμᾶς στάντες διαφθεῖραι; καίτοι δεινό-
τερόν ἐστιν ἢ εἰ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς δύναμιν κτώμενοι
ἀντεπολέμησαν. παράδειγμα δὲ αὐτοῖς οὔτε αἱ
nn }. > 9 a 9 /
τῶν πέλας ξυμφοραὶ ἐγένοντο, ὅσοι ἀποστάντες
ἤδη ἡμῶν ἐχειρώθησαν, οὔτε ἡ παροῦσα εὐδαι-
’ , bd \ 3 a 2 ’
μονία παρέσχεν ὄκνον μὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐς τὰ δεινά"
γενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον θρασεῖς καὶ ἐλπί-
σαντες μακρότερα μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐλάσσω δὲ
A 7 » ᾽ \ 3 ’
τῆς βουλήσεως, πόλεμον ἤραντο, ἰσχὺν ἀξιώ-
a / γν-.- τισι 2 9}
σαντες τοῦ δικαίου προθεῖναι" ἐν ᾧ γὰρ φήθη..
σαν περιέσεσθαι, ἐπέθεντο ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀδικούμενοι.
εἴωθε δὲ τῶν πόλεων αἷς ἂν μάλιστα ἀπροσδόκη-
/
τοὰ καὶ δι’ ἐλαχίστον εὐπραξία ἔλθῃ, ἐς ὕβριν
τρέἤτειν" τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
εὐτυχοῦντά ἀσφαλέστερα ἢ παρὰ δόξαν, καὶ
κακοπραγίαν ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾷον ἀπιωθοῦνται ἢ εὐδαι-
μονίαν διασῴζονται. χρῆν δὲ Μυτιληναίους καὶ
πάλαι μηδὲν. διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν
τετιμῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐς τόδε ἐξύβρισαν' πέφυκε
γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὲν θεραπεῦον
ὑπερφρονεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑπεῖκον θαυμάζξειν.

καὶ μὴ τοῖς μὲν ὀλίγοις ἡ αἰτία προστεθῇ, τὸν δὲ
64

BOOK III. xxxix. 2-6

were treated by us with the highest consideration,
when these men have acted thus, what else is it but
conspiracy and rebellion rather than revolt—for revolt
is the work of those who suffer oppression—and a
deliberate attempt by taking their stand on the side of
our bitterest enemies to bring about our destruction ?
And yet this is assuredly a more heinous thing than
if they had gone to war against us by themselves for
the acquisition of power. The calamities of their
neighbours who had already revolted from us and
been subdued proved no warning to them; nor did
the good fortune which they enjoyed make them
hesitate to take the perilous step; on the contrary,
becoming over-confident as to the future, and con-
ceiving hopes which, though greater than their
powers, were less than their ambition, they took up
arms, presuming to put might before right; for the
moment they thought they should prove superior
they attacked us unprovoked. And indeed it is the
1ule, that such states as come to unexpected pros-
perity most fully and most suddenly, do turn to
insolence, whereas men _ generally find success
less precarious when it comes in accordance with
reasonable calculations than when it surpasses ex-
pectation, and more easily, as it seems, they repel
adversity than maintain prosperity. But the Myti-
lenaeans from the first ought never to have been
treated by us with any more consideration than our
other allies, and then they would not have brokén
out into such insolence; for it is human nature in
any case to be contemptuous of those who pay court
but to admire those who will not yield.

“1 εὖ them be punished, therefore, even now, in a
manner befitting their crime, and do not put the

65
VOL. II. F

THUCYDIDES

δῆμον ἀπολύσητε. πάντες yap ὑμῖν γε ὁμοίως
ἐπέθεντο, οἷς γ᾽ ἐξῆν, as ἡμᾶς τραπομένοις. νῦν
4 9 A é 4 3 Ἁ \ Ν \ A
πάλιν ἐν TH πόλει εἰναι" AANA τὸν μέτὰ TOV
3. ἢ [4 ¢€ / ,
ὀλίγων κίνδυνον ἡγησώμενοι βεβαιότερον ξυναπ-
ἔστησαν. τῶν τε ξυμμάχων σκέψασθε [εἰ τοῖς
τε ἀναγκασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων kai τοῖς
ἑκοῦσιν ἀποστᾶσι τὰς αὐτὰς ζημίας προσθήσετε,
τίνα, οἴεσθε ὅντινα,οὐ βραχείᾳφεπροφάσει ἀποστή-
} Ψ Aa ) , ΞΕ ’ 4 ἃ
σεσθαι, ὅταν ἢ κατορθώσαντι͵ ἐλευθέρωσις͵ ἡ ἢ
σφαλέντι μηδὲν παθεῖν ἀνήκεστον; ἡμῖν dg πρὸς
ἑκάστην πόλιγ ἀποκεκινδυνεύσεταϊἧτά τε χρήματα
A ¢ ld Ἁ , A 2 9
καὶ ai ψυχαί: καὶ τυχόντες μὲν πόλιν ἐφθαρ-
μένην παραλαβόντες τῆς ἔπειτα ' προσόδου, δι᾿
ἣν ἰσχύομεν, τὸ λοιπὸν στερήσεσθε, σφαλέντες
δὲ πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξομεν, καὶ
’ n A ’ a 3 ~ 3
ὃν χρόνον τοῖς νῦν καθεστηκόσι δεῖ ἐχθροῖς ἀν-
A 7
θίστασθαι, τοῖς οἰκείοις ξυμμάχοις πολεμήσομεν.
XL. “Οὔκουν δεῖ προθεῖναι ἐλπίδα οὔτε λόγῳ
πιστὴν οὔτε χρήμασιν ὠνητήν, ὡς ξυγγνώμην
ἁμαρτεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως λήψονται. ἄϊκοντες μὲν
γὰρ οὐκ ἔβλαψαν, εἰδότες δὲ ἐπεβούλευσαν" ξύγ-
δ᾽ 3 \ \ οἰ ’ > A 4 \
γνωμον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ
τότε πρῶτον καὶ νῦν διαμάχομαι μὴ μεταγνῶναι

ὑμᾶς τὰ προδεδογμένα, μηδὲ τρισὶ (τοῖς ἀξυμ- 5"

φορωτάτοις πῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτῳ καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων καὶ

1 ἔπειτα, Hude adopts ἐπετείας, van Herwerden and Η.
Weil ἐπετείον.
® προθεῖναι, Hude retains προσθεῖναι, with BC.

BOOK III. xxxrx. 6-ΧΙ,. 2

blame upon the aristocrats and exonerate the common
people. For they all alike attacked you, even
the commons, who, if they had taken our side,
might now have been reinstated in their city; but
they thought there was less risk in sharing the
dangers of the oligarchs, and so joined them in the
revolt. Consider, moreover, your allies: if you in-
flict upon those who wilfully revolt no greater
punishment than upon those who revolt under com-
pulsion from our foes, which of them, think you, will
not revolt on a slight pretext, when ‘the alternatives
are liberty if he sueceeds or a fate not irreparable if
he fails? We, on the other hand, shall have to risk
our money and our lives against each separate state,
and when we succeed we shall recover a ruined state
and be deprived for the future of its revenue, the
source of our strength, whereas if we fail we shall
be adding fresh enemies to those we have already,
and when we should be resisting our present foes we
shall be fighting our own allies.

XL. “We must not, therefore, hold out to them
any hope, either to be secured by eloquence or
purchased by money, that they will be excused
on the plea that their error was human, For
their act was no unintentional injury but a de-
liberate plot ; and it is that which is unintentional
which is excusable. Therefore, I still protest, as
I have from the first,! that you should not re-
verse your former decision or be led into error by
pity, delight in eloquence, or clemency, the three

1 Referring to what happened in the assembly of the day
before, in which, however, he had urged the action that was
taken ; its reconsideration was not urged till the present
meeting.

67
F 2

if
(6 A aN
Ὶ

εἰ Τ᾽ ‘1

Ν THUCYDIDES

rns \

? , δ" , νὰ OS ὰ \ δ
3 ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἁμαρτάνειν. ἐλξὸς TE γὰρ προς τοὺς

ὁμοίους δίκαιος ἀντιδίδοόθαι καὶ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς
οὔτ᾽ ἀντοικτιοῦντας [ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καθεστῶτας
αἰεὶ πολεμίους: οἵ τε τέρποντες λόγῳ ῥήτορες ἴ
(φξξουσίζκαὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐλάσσοσιν ἀγῶνα, καὶ μὴ
ἐν ᾧ ἡ μὲν πόλις βραχέα ἡσθεῖσα μεγάλα ζημιώ-
σεται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὖ εἰπεῖν τὸ παθεῖν εὖ
’ , \ oe 9 / \ \ r
ἀντιλήψονται" καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια πρὸς TOUS μελ-
λοντας ἐπιτηδείους καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσεσθαι μᾶλλον

᾿ | ——
δίδοταί ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίως [re καὶ οὐδὲν ἧσσον
πολεμίους ὑπολειπομένους.

“Ἐν τε ξυνελὼν λέγω" πιθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ
τά τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα
ἅμα ποιήσετε, ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς μὲν οὐ
χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε.

3 Φ 3 A 3 ’ ς aA 3
εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι ὀρθῶς ἀπέστησαν, ὑμεῖς ἂν οὐ
\ ¥ 2 \ ν΄ 3 a a
χρεὼν ἄρχοιτε. εἰ δὲ δὴ) Kal ov προσῆκον ὅμως
ἀξιοῦτε τοῦτο δρᾶν, παρὰ τὸ εἰκός τοι καὶ τούσδε

/ “a 4 a , A 3 A
ξυμφόρως δεῖ κολάζεσθαι, ἢ παύεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς,
A 3 ’ fol
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνον ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι. τῇ τε
» αὶ , ge δον γι τ. rw
αὐτῇ ξημίᾳ ἀξιώσατε ἀμύνασθαι καὶ μὴ avadyn-
τότεροι οἱ διαφυγόντες τῶν ἐπιβουλευσάντων

A 3 / 3." 4 3 \ “a
φανῆναι, ἐνθυμηθέντες ἃ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι
κρατήσαντας ὑμῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ προὐπάρξαντας

1 ῥήτορες, deleted by Naber, followed by Hude,
68

BOOK III. xz. 2-5

influences most prejudicial to ἃ. ruling state. For
compassion may rightly be bestowed upon those who
are likewise compassionate and not upon those who
will show no pity in return but of necessity are
always enemies. As to the orators who charm by
their eloquence, they will have other opportunities
of display in matters of less importance, and not
where the city for a brief pleasure will pay a heavy
penalty while they themselves get a fine fee for
their fine speaking. And clemency would better be
reserved for those who will afterwards be faithful
allies than be shown to those who remain just what
they were before and no whit the less our enemies.

“1 can sum up what I have to say in a word. If
you take my advice, you will do not only what is just
to the Mytilenaeans but also at the same time what
is expedient for us ; but if you decide otherwise, you
will not win their gratitude but will rather bring a
just condemnation upon yourselves; for if these
people had a right to secede, it would follow that
you are wrong in exercising dominion. But if, right
or wrong, you are still resolved to maintain it, then
you must punish these people in defiance of equity as
your interests require ; or else you must give up your
empire and in discreet safety practise the fine virtues
you preach.! Resolve also to punish them with the
same penalty that has already been voted,? and that
those who have escaped the plot shall not appear to
have less feeling than those who framed it, bearing in
mind what they would probably have done to you
had they won the victory, especially since they

1 For the thought, cf. 11. lxiii. 2.

2 So Steup explains. Most editors explain, ‘‘ with the

same penalty they would have inflicted,” following the schol.
ἦ ἂν ἐτιμωρήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑμᾶς, περιγενόεμνοι ὑμῶν.
69

THUCYDIDES

6 ἀδικίας. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ μὴ ξὺν προφάσέι τινὰ

κακῶς ποιοῦν ς ἐπεξέρχονται καὶ διολλύναι,; τὸν

« [ὦ ΤΈΣΣ ΠΤ Δ
κίνδυνον odio ὦμεροι τοῦ ὑπολειπομένου θροῦ"
ὁ γὰρ μὴ ξὺν ἀνάγκῃ τι παθὼν χαλεπώτερος
ἑαφυγὼν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἐχθροῦ.

7. “Μὴ οὖν προδόται γένησθε ὑ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, γενό-
μενοι δ᾽ ὅ ὅτι al agra τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ “πάσχειν καὶ
ὡς πρὸ παντὸς ἂν ἐτιμήσασ ε αὐτοὺς χειρώ-
σασθαι, νῦν a νταπόδοτε μὴ ΩΣ πρὸς SS
τὸ παρὸν αὐτίκα μηδὲ τοῦ ἐπικ εμασθέντος ποτὲ

8 δεινοῦ ἱνημονοῦντες. κολάσατε δὲ ἀξίως τού-
τους τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις παράδειγμα
σαφὲς καταστήσατε, ὃς ἂν ἀφίστηται, θανάτῳ
ξημιωσόμενο . τόδε γὰρ ἢ py γνῶσιν, ἧσσον τῶν
πολεμίων Ἰμελήσαντες τοῖς ὑμετέροις αὐτῶν

εἶσθε Eu oLs.
ORT. ee ῷ o Κλέων εἶπεν. μετὰ δ᾽
αὐτὸν Διόδοτος ὁ Εὐκράτους, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ
προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀντέλεγε μάλιστα μὴ ἅπο-
κτεῖναι Μυτιληναίους, παρελθὼν καὶ τότε ἔλεγε
τοιάδε.

XLII. “Οὔτε τοὺς προθέντας τὴν διαγνώμην
αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων αἰτιῶμαι οὔτε τοὺς μεμ-
φομένους μὴ πολλάκις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βου-
λεύεσθαι ἐ ἐπαινῶ, νομίξω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα
εὐβουλίᾳ «εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν, ὧν τὸ μὲν
μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαι-

2 δευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης. τούς τέ λόγους
ὅστις διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμά-

1 διολλύναι, Stahl’s conjecture, followed by Hude and
others, for διόλλυνται of the MSS.

BOOK III. xu. 5-- χε. 2

were the aggressors. Indeed it is generally those
who wrong another without cause that follow him up
to destroy him utterly, perceiving the danger that
threatens from an enemy who is left alive; for one
who has been needlessly injured is more dangerous
if he escape than an avowed enemy who expects to
give and take.

“Do not, then, be traitors to your own cause, but
recalling as nearly as possible how you felt when
they made you suffer and how you would then have

hing to crush them, now pay them back.
Do not become tender-hearted at the sight of their
present distress, nor unmindful of the danger that so
lately hung over you, but chastise them as they
deserve, and give to your other allies plain warning
that whoever revolts shall be punished with death.
For if they realise this, the less will you have to neg-
lect your enemies and fight against your own allies.”

XLI. Such was Cleon’s speech. After him Dio-
dotus son of Eucrates, who in the earlier meeting
had been the principal speaker against putting the
Mytilenaeans to death, came forward now also and
spoke as follows :

XLII. “I have no fault to find with those who
have proposed a reconsideration of the question of
the Mytilenaeans, nor do I commend those who
object to repeated deliberation on matters of the
greatest moment; on the contrary, I believe the two
things most opposed to good counsel are haste and

ion, of which the one is wont to keep company
with folly, the other with an undisciplined and
shallow mind. As for words, whoever contends! that
they are not to be guides of our actions is either dull

1 Directed at Cleon’s remarks, ch. xxxviii. 4 ff.

THUCYDIDES

των γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἀξύνετός ἐστιν ἢ ἰδίᾳ τε αὐτῷ
γυγν ’ os y , ῳ
3 ’ A
διαφέρει: ἀξύνετος μέν, εἰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἡγεῖται κι... -
περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. δυνατὸν εἶναι Ἴκαὶ μὴ ἐμ-
δ΄ φανοῦς φράσάϊξ, διαφέρει δ᾽ αὐτῷ, εἰ βουλόμενός
τι αἰσχρὸν πεῖσαι εὖ μὲν εἰπεῖν gue ἂν ἡγεῖται
‘ a \ a , 4 \
περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ δύνασθαι, εὖ δὲ διαβαλὼν
ἐκπλῆξαι ἂν τούς τε ἀντεροῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκου-
Q 3 jeousvous: χαλεπώτατοι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ χρήμασχ'
- 'προκατηγοροῦντες.-»ἐπίδειξίν τινα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
ἀμαθίαν κατῃτιῶντο, o μὴ πείσας ἀξυνετώτερος
, 4 A 3 4 3 ΄ 3 ,
ἂν δόξας εἶναι ἢ ἀδικώτερος ἀπεχώρει' ἀδικίας
δ᾽ ἐπιφερομένης πείσας τε ὕποπτος γίγνεται καὶ
\ \ a 3 ’ὔ \ Χὃ [4
4 μὴ τυχὼν μετὰ ἀξυνεσίας καὶ ἄδικος. ἥ τε
πόλις οὐκ ὠφελεῖται ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε: φόβῳ γὰρ
ἀποστερεῖται τῶν ξυμβούλων. καὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν
a ’
ὀρθοῖτο ἀδυνάτους λέγειν ἔχουσα τοὺς τοιούτους
A A =x , a A 4
τῶν πολιτῶν: ἐλάχιστα yap ἂν πειαβερίησαν" -
5 ἁμαρτάνειν. χρὴ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην μὴ
9 “A \ 3 “Ὁ 3 > 3 \ naw
ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου
φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα, τὴν δὲ σώφρονα πόλιν
A a 4 , \ 4
τῷ τε πλεῖστα εὖ βουλεύοντι μὴ προστιθέναι
τιμήν, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἐλασσοῦν τῆς ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ
\ A / , 3 Ψ A 3
τὸν μὴ τυχόντα γνώμης οὐχ ὅπως ζημιοῦν, ἀλλὰ
6 μηδ᾽ ἀτιμάξειν. οὕτω γὰρ ὅ τε κατορθῶν ἥκιστα
> \ na WwW , 3 Le ’
ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ ἔτι μειξόνων ἀξιοῦσθαι παρὰ γνώμην
1 πεισθείησαν, Hude adopts Madvig’s conjecture πεισθείη
ξυναμαρτάνειν.

BOOK III. xziu. 2-6

of wit or has some private interest at stake—dull,
if he thinks it possible by any other means to throw
light on that which still belongs to the dim and
distant future; self-interested, if, wishing to put
through a discreditable measure, he realizes that
while he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he
can at least slander well and thus intimidate both
his opponents and his hearers. Most dangerous of
all, however, are precisely those who! ‘wha charsc a
~ speaker beforehand with being bribed to make a
display of rhetoric. For if they merely imputed
ignorance, the speaker who failed to carry his
audience might go his way with the repute of being
dull but not dishonest; when, however, the charge
is dishonesty, the speaker who succeeds becomes an
object of suspicion, whereas if he fails he is regarded
as not only dull but dishonest as well. And all
this is a detriment to the state, which is thus robbed
of its counsellors through fear. Indeed it would
prosper most if its citizens of this stamp had no
eloquence at all, for then the people would be least
likely to blunder through their influence. But the
good citizen ought to show himself a better speaker,
not by trying to browbeat those who will oppose
him, but by fair argument; and while the wise city |
should not indeed confer fresh honours upon the
man whose advice is most often salutary, it certainly |
should not detract from those which he already has,
and as for him whose suggestion does not meet with
approval, so far from punishing him, it should not
even treat him with disrespect. For then it would
be least likely that a successful speaker, with a view
to being counted worthy of still greater honours,

1 Like Cleon, ch. xxxviii. 2; xl. 1, 3.
73

THUCYDIDES

\ 4 ’ [τς \ 3 \ > 4
Tt καὶ πρὸς χάριν λέγοι, ὅ τε μὴ ἐπετυχὼν ὀρέ-
γοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ, χαριζόμενός τι καὶ αὐτός, προσά-
x A
γεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος.

XLIII. Ὧν ἡμεῖς τἀναντία δρῶμεν, καὶ προσ-
ἔτι, ἤν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύηται κέρδους μὲν ἕνεκα,
τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅμως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς
οὐ βεβαίου δοκήσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν φανερὰν
ὠφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα. καθέστηκε
δὲ τἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέος λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυ-

a ---.
ποπτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὥστε δεῖν͵ ὁμοίως
τόν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πεῖσαι, ἀπάτῃ

4 \ A \ \ \ 3 ’ ’

προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέ-
’

γοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι. μόνην τε

πόλιν διὰ τὰς περινοίας εὖ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ προ-

A \ 93 / 3 4 e ‘

φανοῦς μὴ ἐξαπατήσαντα ἀδύνατον" ὁ yap διδοὺς

φανερῶς τι ἀγαθὸν ἀνθυποπτεύεται ἀφανῶς πῃ

πλέον ἕξειν. χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ
τοιῷδε ἀξιοῦν tL! ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας
λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι’ ὀλίγον σκοπούντων, ἄλλως
τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς
3 , A e ’ 3 / 3 [τὰ
ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν. εἰ γὰρ ὅ τε
ὙΠ amen κ ς , ς ’ > /
πείσας καὶ ὁ ἐπισπόμενος ὁμοίως ἐβλάπτοντο,
/ 2 ’ [ον Ν \ > \
σωφρονέστερον ἂν éxpivere: viv δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν
1 Conjecture of Kriiger and Haase, confirmed by ABFM,
for the Vulgate ἀξιοῦντι, with CEG.
74

BOOK III. xu. 6-xiim. 5

would speak insincerely and for the purpose of
winning favour and that the unsuccessful speaker
would employ the same means, by courting favour
in his turn in an effort to win the multitude to
himself.

XLIII. But we pursue the opposite course, and,
moreover, if a man be even suspected of corrup-
tion, albeit he give the best counsel, we conceive
a grudge against him because of the dubious sur-
mise that he is corrupt and thus deprive the state
of an indubitable advantage. And it has come to
such a pass that good advice frankly given is re-
garded with just as much suspiciai-es 7 the bad,
and that, in consequence, a speaker who wants to
carry the most dangerous measures must resort to
deceit in order to win the people to his views, pre-
cisely as the man whose proposals are good must lie in
order to be believed. And because of this excessive
eleverness Athens is the only state where a man
cannot do a good service to his country openly and
without deceiving it; for whenever he openly offers
you something good you requite him by suspecting
that in some way he will secretly profit by it. Yet even
so, in view of the very great interests at stake, and
in so grave a matter, we who advise must regard it
as our duty to look somewhat further ahead than
you who give matters only a brief consideration,
especially since we are responsible advisers,! while you
are irresponsible listeners. Indeed, if not only those
who gave advice but also those who followed it had to
suffer alike, you would show greater prudence in
your decisions ; but as it is, whenever you meet with

1 It was open to any Athenian citizen to impeach any law
or decree, 88 contrary to some existing law or as unjust or
inexpedient, by a proceeding called γραφὴ παρανόμων. -

THUCYDIDES

ἥντιν᾽ ἂν τύχητε ἔστιν ὅτε σφαλέντες τὴν τοῦ
πείσαντος μίαν γνώμην ζξημιοῦτε καὶ οὐ τὰς
ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, al πολλαὶ οὖσαι ξυνεξήμαρτον.
XLIV. “᾿Εγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ
Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ
τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν,
ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας. ἤν τε γὰρ
ἀποφήνω πάνυ ἀδικοῦντας αὐτούς, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο
\ 3 a ’ὔ 3 \ ’ Ν
καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι κελεύσω, εἰ μὴ ξυμφέρον, ἤν τε
καὶ ἔχοντάς τι ξυγγνώμης, éav,) εἰ τῇ πόλει μὴ
ἀγαθὸν φαίνοιτο. νομίζω δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος
ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλεύεσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ
τοῦτο ὃ μάλιστα Κλέων ἰσχυρίξεται, ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν
ξυμφέρον ἔσεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἧσσον ἀφίστασθαι
θάνατον ζημίαν προθεῖσι, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ ἐς
Ἁ 7 ”“ ” 3 4 3
τὸ μέλλον καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀντισχυριζξόμενος τά-
ναντία γιγνώσκω. καὶ οὐκ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς τῷ εὐ-
πρεπεῖ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου τὸ χρήσιμον τοῦ ἐμοῦ
> , ᾿ / 3 a ¢ ,
ἀπώσασθαι. δικαιότερος yap ὧν αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος
πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἐς Μυτιληναίους
, 9 ᾽ , e a \ » ’ \
τάχ᾽ ἂν ἐπισπάσαιτο" ἡμεῖς δὲ ov δικαζόμεθα πρὸς
αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευό-
μεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἕξουσιν.
XLV. “᾿Εν οὖν ταῖς πόλεσι πολλῶν θανάτου
/ , \ 3 v A 3 3
ζημίαι πρόκεινταε καὶ οὐκ ἴσων τῷδε, ἀλλ
ἐλασσόνων ἁμαρτημάτων' ὅμως δὲ τῇ ἐλπίδι
1 δὰν, Lindau’s conjecture for εἶεν of the MSS.

BOOK III, xim. 5—xtv. 1

a reverse you give way to your first impulse and
punish your adviser for his single error of judgment
instead of yourselves, the multitude who shared in
the error.

XLIV. “But I have come forward neither as an
advocate of the Mytilenaeans in opposition to Cleon
nor as their accuser. For the question for us to
consider, if we are sensible, is not what wrong they
have done, but what is the wise course for us. For
no matter how guilty I show them to be, I shall not
on that account bid you to put them to death,
unless it is to our advantage; and if I show that they
have some claim for forgiveness, I shal] not on that
account advise you to spare their lives, if this should
prove clearly not to be for the good of the state. In
my opinion we are deliberating about the future
rather than the present. And as for the point
which Cleon especially maintains, that it will be to
our future advantage to inflict the penalty of death,
to the end that revolts may be less frequent, I also
in the interest of our future prosperity emphatically
maintain the contrary. And I beg you not to be led
by the speciousness of his argument to reject the
practical advantagesin mine. For embittered as you
Ἢ are toward the Mytilenaeans, you may perhaps be
attracted by his argument, based as it is on the more
legal aspects of the case; we are, however, not
engaged in a law-suit with them, so as to be con-
cerned about the question of right and wrong; but
we are deliberating about them, to determine what
policy will make them useful to us.

XLV. “Now the death-penalty has been pre-
scribed in various states for many offences which are
not so serious as this is, nay, for minor ones; but

THUCYDIDES

ἐπαιρόμενοι κινδυνεύουσι, καὶ οὐδείς πω κατα-
γνοὺς ἑαυτοῦ μὴ περιέσεσθαι τῷ ἐπιβουλεύματι
ἦλθεν ἐ és τὸ δεινόν. πόλις τε ἀφισταμένη τίς πω
ἥσσω τῇ δοκήσει ἔχουσα τὴν | παρασκευήν,

οἰκείαν ἢ ἄλλων ξυμμαχίᾳ, τούτῳ ἐπεχείρησε;
πεφύκασί τε ἅπαντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ χ ημοσίᾳ
ἁμαρτάνειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξει
τούτου, ἐπεὶ διεξεληλύθασί ye διὰ πασῶν τῶν
ζημιῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι προστιθέντες, ᾿ εἴ πως ἧσσον
ἀδικοῖντο ὑπὸ τῶν κακούργων. καὶ εἰκὸς τὸ
πάλαι τῶν μεγίστων ἀδικημάτων μαλακωτέρας
κεῖσθαι αὐτάς, παραβαινομένων δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐς
τὸν θάνατον αἱ πολλαὶ ἀνήκουσιν. καὶ ταῦτα
ὅμως παραβαίνεται. ἢ τοίνυν δεινότερόν τέ
τούτου δέος εὑρετέον ἐστὶν ὴ τόδε γε οὐδὲν
ἐπίσχει, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τόλμαν
παρέχουσα, ἡ δ᾽ “ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν
καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ ὃ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἑκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ᾽ ἀνη-
κέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος, ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς
κινδύνους. ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ
μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ 8 ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν
ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντίξων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς
τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα πλεῖστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὄντα
ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὁρωμένων δεινῶν. καὶ
ἡ τύχη ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον ξυμβάλλεται
ἐς τὸ ,ἐπαίρειν' ἀδοκήτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρι-
σταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ

1 προστιθέντες ΜΆ8Β., Kriiger προτιθέντες, followed by Hude.

2 Hude’s correction. Or, readin καὶ τοῦτο With the MSS.,
‘fand still even this is disregard

> ὀργῇ MSS., Stahl ὀργήν, followed by Hude.

BOOK III. xiv. 1-6

nevertheless men are so inspired by hope as to take
the risk ; indeed, no one ever yet has entered upon a
perilous enterprise with the conviction that his plot
was condemned to failure. And as to states, what
one that was meditating revolt ever took the de-
cisive step in the belief that the resources at hand,
whether its own or contributed by its allies, were
inadequate for success? All men are by nature
prone to err, both in private and in public life, and
there is no law which will prevent them; in fact,
mankind has run the whole gamut of penalties,
making them more and more severe, in the hope
that the transgressions of evil-doers might be abated.
It is probable that in ancient times the penalties
prescribed for the greatest offences were relatively
mild, but as transgressions still occurred, in course of
time the penalty was seldom Iess than death. But
even so there is still transgression. Either, then,
some terror more dreadful than death must be
discovered, or we must own that death at least is no
prevention. Nay, men are lured into hazardous
enterprises by the constraint of poverty, which
makes them bold, by the insolence and pride of
affluence, which makes them greedy, and by the
various passions engendered in the other conditions
of human life as these are severally mastered by
some mighty and irresistible impulse. Then, too,
Hope and Desire are everywhere; Desire leads, Hope
attends ; Desire contrives the plan, Hope suggests
the facility of fortune; the two passions are most
baneful, and being unseen phantoms prevail over
seen dangers. Besides these, fortune contributes in
no less degree’ to urge men on; for she sometimes
presents herself unexpectedly and thus tempts men

THUCYDIDES

4 \ 3 ld 4 “Ὁ
προάγει καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τὰς πόλεις, ὅσῳ περὶ τῶν
a A
μεγίστων τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ
, 9 / > A “ e Ἁ
πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὗὑτον
ἐδόξασεν. ἁπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐη-
θείας, ὅστις οἴεται, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως
ὁρμωμένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι, ἀποτροπήν τινα
ΝΜ A ’ 3 4 A ΓΝ “~
ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ δεινῷ.
66 Μ Ἁ Ν [οἱ 4 ~
XLVI. “Οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε τοῦ θανάτου τῇ
ζημίᾳ ὡς ἐχεγγύῳ πιστεύσαντας χεῖρον βουλεύ-
σασθαι, οὔτε ἀνέλπιστον καταστῆσαι τοῖς ἀπο-
στᾶσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔσται μεταγνῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἐν
, A e 4 A Ul
βραχυτάτῳ τὴν ἁμᾳρτίαν καταλῦσαι. σκέψασθε
“" a / a
γὰρ ὅτι viv μέν, ἤν τις Kal ἀποστᾶσα πόλις γνῷ
μὴ περιεσομὄνη, ἔλθοι ἂν ἐς ξύμβασιν δυνατὴ
4 4 Ἁ 4 2 [οὶ \ \ \
οὖσα ἔτι τὴν δαπάνην ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν
ὑποτελεῖν' ἐκείνως δὲ τίνα οἴεσθε ἥντινα οὐκ
ἄμεινον μὲν ἢ νῦν παρασκευάσεσθαι, πολιορκίᾳ
δὲ παρατενεῖσθαι ἐς τοὔσχατον, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύνα-
ται σχολῇ καὶ ταχὺ ξυμβῆναι; ἡμῖν τε πῶς οὐ
βλάβη δαπανᾶν καθημένοις διὰ τὸ ἀξύμβατον, καὶ
ἣν ἕλωμεν, πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβεῖν καὶ τῆς
’ Ἁ Ἁ 3 3 3 [οὶ ’ 3 ’
προσόδου τὸ λοιπὸν aw αὐτῆς στέρεσθαι ; ἰσχύ-
\ \ \ ’ A Ψ >
ομεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τῷδε. ὥστε οὐ δικα-
\ ΝΜ aA ¢ A a A 3 ,
στὰς ὄντας δεῖ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων
ἀκριβεῖς βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ὁρᾶν ὅπως ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα
8ο

BOOK III. xiv. 6-xtv1. 4

to take risks even when their resources are inade-
quate, and states even more than men, inasmuch as
the stake is the greatest of all—their own freedom
or empire over others—and the individual, when
supported by the whole people, unreasonably over-
estimates his own strength. In a word, it is im-
possible, and a mark of extreme simplicity, for any-
one to imagine that when human nature is whole-
heartedly bent on any undertaking it can be diverted
from it by rigorous laws or by any other terror.
XLVI. “We must not, therefore, so pin our faith
to the penalty of death as a guarantee against re-
volt as to make the wrong decision, or lead our
rebellious subjects to believe that there will be no
chance for them to repent and in the briefest time
possible put an end to their error. Consider now:
according to your present policy! if a city has re-
volted and then realizes that it will fail, it may come
to terms while still able to pay the indemnity and to
keep up its tribute in the future; but, in the other
case, what city, think you, will not prepare itself
more thoroughly than now, and hold out in siege to
the last extremity, if it makes no difference whether
it capitulates quickly or at its leisure? And as
for us, how can we fail to suffer loss, incurring the
expense of besieging a city because it will not
surrender, and, if we capture it, recovering one that
is ruined, and losing thereafter the revenue from it—
the source of our strength against our enemies? We
must not, therefore, be such rigorous judges of the
delinquents as to suffer harm ourselves, but we must
rather see how for the time to come, by punishing
1 Athens had not been accustomed to treat secession from

the alliance as treason punishable with death for the men
and slavery for the women and children.

81
VOL. Il. G

THUCYDIDES

χρόνον μετρίως κολάξοντες ταῖς πόλεσιν EFopev
ἐς χρημάτων λόγον ἰσχυούσαις χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν
φυλακὴν μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων τῆς δεινότητος ἀξιοῦν
ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἐπιμελείας.
δ οὗ νῦν τοὐναντίον δρῶντες, ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ
βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀπο-
A 97 A
στάντα χειρωσώμεθα, χαλεπῶς οἰόμεθα χρῆναι
6 τιμωρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους οὐκ ἀφι-
σταμένους σφόδρα κολάξειν, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἀποστῆναι
σφόδρα φυλάσσειν καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν ὅπως
μηδ᾽ ἐς ἐπίνοιαν τούτου ἴωσι, κρατήσαντάς τε ὅτι
4 3 ᾽ A > », > A
ἐπ᾿ ἐλάχιστον τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν.
XLVII. “ Ὑμεῖς δὲ σκέψασθε ὅσον ἂν καὶ τοῦτο
2 ἁμαρτάνοιτε λέωνι πειθόμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ
ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὔνους
ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἤ, ἐὰν
βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος
3 4 Ἁ wn 3 4 , \
εὐθύς, καὶ τῆς ἀντικαθισταμένης πόλεως TO
πλῆθος ξύμμαχον ἔχοντες ἐς πόλεμον ἐπέρχεσθε.
8 εἰ δὲ διαφθερεῖτε τὸν δῆμον τὸν Μυτιληναίων,
ὃς οὔτε μετέσχε τῆς ἀποστάσεως, ἐπειδή τε
μ4 / e Ν 4 Ἁ f
ὅπλων ἐκράτησεν, ἑκὼν παρέδωκε THY πόλιν,
: πρῶτον μὲν ἀδικήσετε τοὺς εὐεργέτας κτείνοντες,
ἔπειτα καταστήσετε τοῖς δυνατοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων
ὃ βούλονται μάλιστα' ἀφιστάντες γὰρ τὰς πόλεις
\ n 3 \ ’ [τά lA
τὸν δῆμον εὐθὺς ξύμμαχον ἕξουσι προδειξάντων
ὑμῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ζημίαν τοῖς τε ἀδικοῦσιν ὁμοίως
82

BOOK III. xvi. 4-xivi. 3

moderately, we may have at our service dependent
cities that are strong in material resources; and we
must deem it proper to protect ourselves against
revolts, not by the terror of our laws, but rather by
the vigilance of our administration. At present we
do just the opposite: whenever a free people that
is forced into subjection revolts, as it naturally will,
in order to recover its independence, we think that,
as soon as we have subdued it, we must punish it
severely. We ought, on the contrary, instead of
rigorously chastising free peoples when they revolt,
to watch them rigorously before they revolt, and
thus forestall their even thinking of such a thing ;
and when we have subdued a revolt, we ought to
put the blame on as few as possible.!

XLVII. “And do you consider, too, how great a
mistake you would make in another point also by
following Cleon’s advice. At the present time the
populace of all the cities is well disposed to you, and
either does not join with the aristocrats in revolting,
or, if forced to do so, is hostile from the beginning
to those who stirred up the revolt; and so, when
you go to war, you have the populace of the rebellious
city as your allies. If, however, you destroy the
populace in Mytilene, which took no part in the
revolt, and which voluntarily put the city into your
hands as soon as it got hold of arms, in the first
place you will be guilty of killing your benefactors,
and, in the second place, you will bring about what
the influential men most wish: the next time they
instigate a revolt among our allies they will at once
have the populace on their side, because you will
have published it abroad that the same punishment

* 1 In answer to Cleon’s demand, ch. xxxix. 6.

83
Ge 2

THUCYDIDES

4 κεῖσθαι Kai τοῖς + μή. δεῖ δέ, καὶ εἰ ἠδίκησαν, μὴ
προσποιεῖσθαι, ὅ ὅπως ὃ μόνον ἡμῖν ἔτι ξύμμαχόν

aN 5
a .

yt I

wid

ἐστι μὴ πολέμιον γένηται. καὶ τοῦτο πολλῷ

ξυμφορώτερον ἡγοῦμαι ἐς τὴν κάθεξιν τῆς ἀρχῆ
ἑκόντας ἡμᾶς ἀδικηθῆναι ἢ δικαίως ods μὴ δεῖ

διαφθεῖραι" καὶ τὸ Κλέωνος τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ

ξύμφορον τῆς τιμωρίας οὐχ εὑρίσκεται ἐν αὐτ
δυνατὸν ὃν ἅ ἅμα γίγνεσθμι.
XLVIII. “μεῖς δὲ [γυό

νῷ
Ss

δ΄

νόντες ἀμείνω τάδε εἶνα ay/

καὶ μήτε οἴκτῳ πλέον νείμαντες μήτ᾽ ἐπιεικείάγ
οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐῶ προσάγεσθαι, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν
παραινουμένων πείθεσθέ μοι Μυτιληναίων οὗς
μὲν Πάχης ἀπέπεμψεν ὡς ἀδικοῦντας κρῖναε καθ᾽
ἡσυχίαν, τοὺς & ἄλλους ἐᾶν οἰκεῖν. τάδε γὰρ
ἔς τε τὸ μέλλον ἀγαθὰ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἤδη
φοβερά: ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεται πρὸς τοὺς
ἐναντίους κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ μετ᾽ ἔργων ἰσχύος

ἀνοίᾳ ἐπιών.

XLIX. Τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Διόδοτος εἶπεν. pn
θεισῶν δὲ τῶν γνωμῶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀντι-
'πάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἦλθον μὲν
ἐς ἀγῶνα ὅμως ἢ τῆς δόξης καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ
χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δὲ ἡ τοῦ Διο-
δότου. καὶ τριήρη εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον
κατὰ σπουδήν, ὅπως μὴ φθασάσης τῆς τρότεραν.

εὕρωσι διεφθαρμένην τὴν πόλιν: προεῖχε

ἡμέρᾳ καὶ νυκτὶ μάλιστα. παρασκευασάντων 33 2 \
τῶν Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεων τῇ νηὶ οἶνον καὶ

1 ὅμως, with MSS. Bredow emends to ὁμοίως, followed

by Hude.

2 προτέρας, pate adopted, Valla and a few ia ;

against Sevrépas or ἑτέρας of other MSS.

BOOK II], xivn. 3—xuix, 3

is ordained for the innocent and for the guilty.
Why, even if they were guilty, you should pretend
not to know it, to the end that the only class that is
still friendly to us may not become hostile. And itis, I
think, far more conducive to the maintenance of our
dominion, that we should willingly submit to be
wronged, than that we should destroy, however
justly, those whom we ought not to destroy. And
whereas Cleon claims! that this punishment com-
bines justice and expediency, it appears that in such
a policy the two cannot be combined.

XLVIII. “Do you, then, recognize that mine is the
better course, and without being unduly swayed by
either pity or clemency—for neither would I have
you influenced by such motives—but simply weigh-
ing the considerations I have urged, accede to my
proposal: pass sentence at your leisure upon the_
Mytilenaeans whom Paches sent here as guilty,?
but let the rest dwell in peace. Such a course will
be best for the future, and will cause alarm among
our enemies at once; for he who is wise in counsel is
stronger against the foe than he who recklessly
rushes on with brute force.

XLIX. Such was the speech of Diodotus. And
after these opinions had been maintained with nearly
equal force, the one against the other, the Athenians,
in spite of the reaction, experienced such a
conflict of opinion that in the show of hands they
were about equally divided ; but the view of Diodotus
prevailed. They then immediately despatched a
second trireme with all haste, hoping that the first
trireme, which had the start by about a day and a
night, might not arrive first and the city be found
destroyed. The Mytilenaean envoys provided wine

1 of. ch. xl. 4, 2 of. ch. xxxv. 1. 85

THUCYDIDES ae

” 4 e 4 > ’
ἄλφιτα καὶ μεγάλα ὑποσχομένων, εἰ φθάσειαν,
ἐγένετο σπουδὴ τοῦ πλοῦ τοιαύτη ὥστε ἤσθιόν τε
ἅμα ἐλαύνοντες οἴνῳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἄλφιτα πεφυρ-
μένα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὕπνον ἡροῦντο κατὰ μέρος, οἱ
4 δὲ ἤλαυνον. κατὰ τύχην δὲ πνεύματος οὐδενὸς
ατὸ ΤΟΧΤΙ
ἐναντιωθέντος καὶ τῆς μὲν προτέρας νεὼς οὐ
σπουδῇ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον, ταύτης
δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἐπειγομένης, ἡ μὲν ἔφθασε "ἢ
a ‘9 , ae: Wee ee ‘ ,
τοσοῦτον ὅσον Ilaynra ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ ψήφισμα
καὶ μέλλειν δράσειν τὰ δεδογμένα, ἡ δ᾽ ὑστέρα
αὐτῆς ἐπικατάγεται καὶ διεκώλυσε μὴ διαφθεῖραι.
δ a \ e , 9 4
παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κενδύνου.
L. Τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἄνδρας ods ὁ Πάχης ἀπέ-
ἌΜΑ ὡς αἰτιωτάτους ὄντας τῆς ἀποστάσεως
Κλέωνος γνώμῃ͵ διέφθειραν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι (ἦσαν δὲ
ὀλίγῳ πλείους χιλίων), καὶ Μυτιληναίων τείχη
2 καθεῖλον καὶ ναῦς παρέλαβον. ὕστερον δὲ φόρον
μὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις, κλήρους δὲ ποιήσαντες
τῆς γῆς πλὴν τῆς Μηθυμναίων τρισχιλίους, τρια-
᾿ \ i ae \ 93 > \ ὯΝ \
κοσίους μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἱεροὺς ἐξεῖλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς
ἄλλους σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχους τοὺς λαχόντας
ἀπέπεμψαν' ols a ἀργύριον Λέσβιοι ταξάμενοι τὸ τοῦ
κλήρου ἑκάστου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύο μνᾶς φέρειν

1 Usually the barley-meal was mixed with water and
oil.

2 A crew ordinarily stopped for meals and rested at auchor
at night.

3 Paches was accused of shameful deeds of violence toward
Lesbian men and women (Agath. Zpigr. lvii.), and when

BOOK III. xuix. 3-L. 2

and barley for the crew and promised a large reward
if they should arrive in time; and such was their
haste on the voyage that they kept on rowing as
they ate their barley-cakes, kneaded with wine and
oil,} and took turns at sleeping and rowing.? And
since by good fortune no contrary wind arose, and
the earlier ship was sailing in no hurry on so _ horrible

“7 a business, while the second pressed on in the

manner described, although the former did in fact
arrive first, so that Paches had just time enough to
read the decree and was about to execute the orders,
the second put in close after it and prevented the
destruction of the city. By just_so much did
Mytilene escape its peril.

L. The rest of the men, however, whom Paches ὃ
had sent to Athens as chief authors of the revolt,
numbering somewhat more than a thousand,‘ were
put to death by the Athenians on the motion of
Cleon. They also pulled down the walls of Mytilene
and took possession of the Mytilenaean fleet. After-
awards, instead of imposing a tribute upon the
Lesbians, they divided all the land except that of the
Methymnaeans into three thousand allotments, and
reserving three hundred of these as sacred to the
gods they sent out Athenian colonists, chosen by

lat, to occupy the rest. With these the Lesbians

made an arrangement to pay a rental of two minas a
year® for each lot, they themselves to cultivate the

brought to trial committed suicide in the presence of his
judges.

On the ground that so large a number is incompatible
with ch. xxviii. 1,2; xxxv. 1, Steup conjectures τρίακοντα
(A’ for ,A).

5 The whole rental amounting to 90 talents; £18,000 ;
$87,300.

THUCYDIDES

3 αὐτοὶ εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν. παρέλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰ
2 a 3 ’ ’ e 9593 “ σ
ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πολίσματα οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ὅσων
Μυτιληναῖοι ἐκράτουν, καὶ ὑπήκουον ὕστερον
᾿Αθηναίων. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Λέσβον οὕτως ἐγένετο.
LI. Ἔν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει μετὰ τὴν Λέσβου
Ψ 3 _A / “A 4
ἅλωσιν ᾿Αθηναῖοι Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατη-
γοῦντος ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Μινώαν τὴν νῆσον, ἣ
κεῖται πρὸ Μεγάρων: ἐχρῶντο δὲ αὐτῇ πύργον
3 / e a ’ 4 ’
2 ἐνοικοδομήσαντες οἱ Μεγαρῆς φρουρίῳ. ἐβού-
λετο δὲ Νικίας τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτόθεν δι’ ἐλάσ-
n 9 ’ \ \ 3 \ “A ’
σονος τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ Βουδόρου
καὶ τῆς Σαλαμῖνος εἶναι, τούς τε Πελοποννη-
σίους ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἔκπλους αὐτόθεν λαν-
θάνοντες τριήρων τε, οἷον καὶ τὸν πρὶν γενόμενον,
καὶ λῃστῶν ἐκπομπαῖς, τοῖς τε Μεγαρεῦσιν
8 ἅμα μηδὲν ἐσπλεῖν. ἑλὼν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Ne-
σαίας πρῶτον δύο πύργω προύχοντε μηχαναῖς
3 4 \ \ v 3 δ Ἁ “A
ἐκ θαλάσσης καὶ tov ἔσπλουν ἐς τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς
νήσου ἐλευθερώσας ἀπετείχιζε καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἠπεί-
pov, 7 κατὰ γέφυραν διὰ τενάγους ἐπιβοήθεια
@ A 4 9 Ἁ 4 A 9 , e Ἁ
4 ἣν τῇ νήσῳ οὐ πολὺ διεχούσῃ τῆς ἠπείρου. ws δὲ
τοῦτο ἐξειργάσαντο ἐν ἡμέραις ὀλίγαις, ὕστερον
δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τεῖχος ἐγκαταλιπὼν καὶ
φρουρὰν ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ.

1 retyos—the text is probably corrupt, the verb being
omitted.

Be εν ee Ege on et τα τος
1 cf. tv. lii. 3, where they are called axzata: adress Sst
2 Referring to Brasidas’ attempt, deseribed II. xciii., xciv.

BOOK III. i. 2-11. 4

land. The Athenians also took possession of all the
<towgs on the mainland which the Mytilenaeans
controlled,! and these were thereafter subject to the
Athenians. Such was the course of events at Lesbos.
LI. In the same summer, after the capture of
Lesbos, the Athenians, under the command of Nicias
son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the
island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara
and was used as a garrison-station by the Me-
garians, who had built a tower upon it. But
Nicias was desirous that the watch which the Athe-
nians kept should be maintained at that point,
which would be at closer range for them, instead of
at Budorum in Salamis, the purpose of the watch
being to prevent the Peloponnesians from using the
harbour of Megara as a base from which to send
out unobserved either triremes, as they had done
once before,? or expeditions of privateers, and at the
same time to see to it that nothing was brought in
by sea for the Megarians. Accordingly, by an
attack from the sea he took by means of engines of
war two projecting towers—first that on the island
opposite Nisaea—and when he had thus cleared the
way into the channel between the island and the
mainland he walled off also the point on the side
toward the mainland, where by a bridge across a
morass aid could be brought to the island, which is
not far distant from the mainland.? And when, after
a few days, this work was completed, Nicias built a
fort on the island also, left a garrison in it, and then
withdrew his army to Athens.
δ This seems to be the sense intended. The passage is
very much condensed or corrupt. The two towers seem to
have stood on the strait between Minoa and the mainland,

one on each side, at the end of dams built out to narrow the
strait.
89

THUCYDIDES

LIT. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους
τούτου καὶ οἱ Πλαταιῆς οὐκέτι ἔχοντες σῖτον
οὐδὲ δυνάμενοι πολιορκεῖσθαι ξυνέβησαν τοῖς
Πελοποννησίοις τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. προσέβαλον
αὐτῶν τῷ τείχει, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀμύνεσθαι.
γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων τὴν ἀσθένειαν
αὐτῶν βίᾳ μὲν οὐκ ἐβούλετο ἑλεῖν (εἰρημένον γὰρ
ἣν αὐτῷ ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, ὅπως, εἰ σπονδαὶ γί-
γνοιντό ποτε πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους καὶ ξυγχωροῖεν
ὅσα πολέμῳ χωρία ἔχουσιν ἑκάτεροι ἀποδίδοσθαε,
μὴ ἀνάδοτος εἴη ἡ Πλάταια ὡς αὐτῶν ἑκόντων
προσχωρησάντων), προσπέμπει δὲ αὐτοῖς κήρυκα
λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἑκόν-
τες τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ δικασταῖς ἐκείνοις
χρήσασθαι, τούς τε ἀδίκους κολάσειν, παρὰ δίκην
δὲ οὐδένα. τοσαῦτα μὲν ὁ κῆρυξ εἶπεν' οἱ δέ
(ἦσαν γὰρ ἤδη ἐν τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ) παρέδοσαν
τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἔτρεφον οἱ
Πελοποννήσιοι ἡμέρας τινάς, ἐν ὅσῳ οἱ ἐκ τῆς
Λακεδαίμονος δικασταί, πέντε ἄνδρες, ἀφίκοντο.
ἐλθόντων δὲ αὐτῶν κατηγορία μὲν οὐδεμία πρου-
τέθη, ἠρώτων δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τοσοῦτον
μόνον, εἴ τε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους
ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ καθεστῶτι ἀγαθὸν τι εἰργασ-
μένοι εἰσίν. οἱ δ᾽ ἔλεγον αἰτησάμενοι μακρότερα
εἰπεῖν καὶ προτάξαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν ᾿Αστύμαχόν
τε Tov ᾿Ασωπολάου καὶ Λάκωνα τὸν Αἰειμνήστου,

1 4v, bracketed by Hude, as not read by the Scholiast.
go

BOOK III. un. 1-5

LII. During this summer and about the same
time, the Plataeans,! who were now without food and
could endure the siege no longer, surrendered to the
Peloponnesians, It happened in the following manner.
An assault was in progress upon their wall and they
were unable to repel it. The Lacedaemonian com-
mander recognised their weakness; but he did not
wish to take Plataea by storm, for he had received
orders to this effect from Sparta, to the end that,
if ever a treaty of peace should be made with the
Athenians and the Lacedaemonians should consent
that all the places each had taken in war should be
given back, Plataea might not have to be given up,
on the ground that its inhabitants had gone over to
Sparta voluntarily. So he sent a herald to them to
say that if they would of their own accord deliver
their city into the hands of the Lacedaemonians and
submit to their decisions they would punish the
guilty, but none contrary to justice. The herald
made this proposal, and they, since they were now in
the last stage of weakness, surrendered the city.
And the Peloponnesians fed the Plataeans for some
days, until the judges, five in number, arrived from
Lacedaemon. When they came no accusation was
brought against the Plataeans, but they were sum-
moned by the judges and asked this single question :
‘“‘Have you rendered any good service to the Lace-
daemonians and their allies in the present war?”
The Plataeans, however, begged to be allowed to
speak at greater length, and appointed as _ their
spokesmen Astymachus son of Asopolaus and Lacon
son of Aeimnestus, who was a proxenus of the

1 Resuming the narrative from the end of ch. xxiv.
gI

THUCYDIDES

πρόξενον ὄντα Λακεδαιμονίων' καὶ ἐπελθόντες
ἔλεγον τοιάδε.
1Π1Π. “Τὴν μὲν παράδοσιν τῆς πόλεως, ὦ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πιστεύσαντες ὑμῖν ἐποιησάμεθα,
οὐ τοιάνδε δίκην οἰόμενοι ὑφέξειν, νομιμωτέραν
δέ τινα ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις
δεξάμενοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐσμέν, γενέσθαι ἢ ὑμῖν,"
ἡγούμενοι τὸ ἴσον μάλιστ᾽ ἂν φέρεσθαι. νῦν δὲ
φοβούμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν"
τόν τε γὰρ ἀγῶνα περὶ τῶν δεινοτάτων εἶναι εἰκό-
τως ὑποπτεύομεν καὶ ὑμᾶς μὴ οὐ κοινοὶ ἀποβῆτε,
τεκμαιρόμενοι προκατηγορίας τε ἡμῶν οὐ προγε-
“4 φ \ 3 a 3 > b \ ’
γενημένης 7) χρὴ ἀντειπεῖν (ἀλλ αὐτοὶ λόγον
ἡτησάμεθα) τό τε ἐπερώτημα βραχὺ ὄν, ᾧ τὰ
3 “2 ’ > ’ [4 \ \
μὲν ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐναντία γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ
ψευδῆ ἔλεγχον ἔχει. πανταχόθεν δὲ ἄποροε
καθεστῶτες ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον
δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰπόντας τί κινδυνεύειν' καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὴ
ῥηθεὶς λόγος τοῖς ὧδ᾽ ἔχουσιν αἰτίαν ἂν 'παρά-
σχοι ὡς, εἰ ἐλέχθη, σωτήριος ἂν ἦν. χαλεπῶς
δὲ ἔχει ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἡ πειθώ.
ἀγνῶτες μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀλλήλων ἐπεσενεγκάμενοι
’ φ ” 3 UA > WV le) \
μαρτύρια ὧν ἄπειροι ἦτε ὠφελούμεθ᾽ av: viv δὲ
Ἁ YA U 4 3 ἥ ὶ ὃ 3 ‘
πρὸς εἰδότας πάντα λελέξεται,Σ καὶ δέδιμεν οὐχὶ

1 ἢ ὑμῖν, bracketed by Hude, as seemingly not read by the
~ Scholiast. 2 χελέξεται, Hude reads λέξεται with C.

1 Public host or consul. He had commanded the Plataean
contingent at Marathon.

BOOK III, wi. 5-t11. 4

Lacedaemonians.! These men came forward and
spoke as follows:

LIII. “When we surrendered our city, Lacedae-
monians, trusting in your good faith, we had no
thought that we should have to undergo a trial like
this, but supposed it would be a more regular pro-
cedure ; and when we consented to be on trial before
you and you alone as judges, as we now are, we
believed that we should be most likely to obtain fair
treatment. But now we fear that we have been
disappointed in both expectations; for we have
good reason to suspect, not only that the issues
involved in the trial are of the gravest nature? but
also that you will not prove to be impartial judges.
These inferences we draw from the fact that no
accusation was first brought against us requiring a
plea in defence, but we have had to ask leave to
speak, and that the question which is put to us is so
curt that a truthful answer to it is against our
interests, while a false one can be exposed at once.
But beset as we are with perplexities on every hand,
we are forced, as indeed seems to be the safer course,
to say something and take the risk; for to men in our
condition not to have spoken would cause us after-
wards to reproach ourselves with the thought that,
had the word been spoken, it would have saved us.
A farther difficulty in our position is the task of
convincing you. For if we were strangers to each
other, we might find it to our advantage to introduce
evidence on matters with which you were un-
acquainted ; but as it is, anything that we shall say is
already known to you, and what we fear is, not that

2 2,6. that their very lives were at stake, whereas they

had expected, after capitulation, that in the formal trial
there could be no question of capital punishment.
93

THUCYDIDES

μὴ προκαταγνόντες ἡμῶν TAS ἀρετὰς ἥσσους εἶναι
τῶν ὑμετέρων ἔγκλημα αὐτὸ ποιῆτε, ἀλλὰ μὴ
Υ̓͂ , ΄ 2 ON f ,
ἄλλοις χάριν φέροντες ἐπὶ διεγνωσμένην κρίσιν
καθιστώμεθα.

LIV. “ Παρεχόμενοι δὲ ὅμως ἃ ὄχομεν δέκαια
πρός τε τὰ Θηβαίων διάφορα καὶ ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ
τοὺς ἄλλους “EAAnvas, τῶν εὖ δεδραμένων ὑπό-
μνησιν ποιησόμεθα καὶ πείθειν πειρασόμεθα.
φαμὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα τὸ βραχύ, εἴ τι
Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέ-
ἕῳ τῷδε ἀγαθὸν πεποιήκαμεν, εἰ μὲν ὡς πολεμί-
ους ἐρωτᾶτε, οὐκ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς μὴ εὖ παθόν-

’ \ / b \ e Ul
τας, φίλους δὲ νομίζοντας αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν
μᾶλλον τοὺς ἡμῖν ἐπιστρατεύσαντας. τὰ δ᾽ ἐν
τῇ εἰρήνῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον ἀγαθοὶ γεγενήμεθα,
τὴν μὲν οὐ λύσαντες νῦν πρότεροι, τῷ δὲ ξυνεπι-
θέμενοι τότε ἐς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς “Ελλάδος μόνοι
Βοιωτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἠπειρῶταί τε ὄντες ἐναυμαχή-
σαμεν ἐπ᾽ ᾿Αρτεμισίῳ, μάχῃ τε τῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ
γῇ γενομένῃ παρεγενόμεθα ὑμῖν τε καὶ Παυσανίᾳ"
εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο
ἐπικίνδυνον τοῖς “Ελλησι, πάντων παρὰ δύναμιν

/ Ν᾽ e¢ a 4 4 30.)
μετέσχομεν. καὶ ὑμῖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἰδίᾳ,
ὅτεπερ δὴ μέγιστος φόβος περιέστη τὴν Σπάρτην

\ Ν A 3 3 ͵ e , 3
μετὰ τὸν σεισμὸν τῶν ἐς ᾿Ιθώμην Εἱλώτων ἀπο-

1 Referrmg to the achievements of the Plataeans in the

Persian wars.
3.2.6. the Thebans. With bitter irony the Plataeans
ascribe to themselves the evident purpose of the

BOOK [Π. uum. 4-nrv. 5

you have already judged our virtues! to be inferior to
your own and now make that a charge against us,
but that in order to gratify others? we are to appear
before a court that has already decided against us.
LIV. ‘“ Nevertheless, we shall present whatever
just claims we have, both as regards our quarrel with
the Thebans and as touching you and the rest of the
Hellenes, and thus, by reminding you of our public
services, shall try to persuade you. In reply to the
curt inquiry of yours, whether we have rendered any
good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies
in this war, if you ask us as enemies, we say that
you are not wronged if you did not receive benefit at
our hands; but if in asking it you regard us as
friends, we reply that you yourselves rather than we
are at fault, in that you made war upon us. But in
the war against the Persians and during the peace
which followed we have proved ourselves good and
true men; we have not now been the first to break
the peace, and then we were the only Boeotians® who
rallied to defend the freedom of Hellas. For though
we are an inland people, we took part in the sea-fight
at Artemisium ; in the battle that was fought here in
our own land‘ we stood side by side with you and
Pausanias ; and whatever perils arose to threaten
the Hellenes in those days, we bore our part in
them all beyond our strength. And to you in par-
ticular, Lacedaemonians, at that critical moment
when after the earthquake Sparta was encompassed
by a mighty terror owing to the revolt of the Helots

Lacedaemonians—by standing trial before & prejudiced court
they will ‘‘do a favour to the Thebans.”

5 Rhetorical inaccuracy, for the Thespians did the same
(Hdt. vu. exxxii.; vir. 1.).

4 The battle of Plataea, 479 B.c. See Hdt. 1x. lxii. ff.

THUCYDIDES

’ \ [4 4 e A > Aa b A
στάντων, TO τρίτον μέρος ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐξεπέμψα-
μεν ἐς ἐπικουρίαν: ὧν οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀμνημονεῖν.

LV. “ Καὶ τὰ μὲν παλαιὰ καὶ μέγιστα τοιοῦτοι
3 , 4 ’ \ ᾽ , Ψ
ἠξιώσαμεν εἶναι, πολέμιοι δὲ ἐγενόμεθα ὕστερον.
ς a ¥ UA ’
ὑμεῖς δὲ αἴτιοι" δεομένων γὰρ ξυμμαχίας ὅτε
Θηβαῖοι ἡμᾶς ἐβιάσαντο, ὑμεῖς ἀπεώσασθε καὶ

N 3 4 3 ’ 4 e > A
πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐκελεύετε τραπέσθαι ὡς ἐγγὺς
ὄντας, ὑμῶν δὲ μακρὰν ἀποικούντων. ἐν μέντοι
τῷ πολέμῳ οὐδὲν ἐκπρεπέστερον ὑπὸ ἡμῶν οὔτε
3 4 LA 3 ’ὔ +] ? 2 “Ὁ
ἐπάθετε οὔτε ἐμελλήσατε. εἰ δ᾽ ἀποστῆναι
᾽ , b 3 Va ς a ’
Αθηναίων οὐκ ἠθελήσαμεν ὑμῶν κελευσάντων,

> 3 a \ ? a 3 , en
οὐκ ἠδικοῦμεν: καὶ yap ἐκεῖνοι ἐβοήθουν ἡμῖν
4 / @ e a ? a \
ἐναντία Θηβαίοις ὅτε ὑμεῖς ἀπωκνεῖτε, καὶ mpo-
δοῦναι αὐτοὺς οὐκέτι ἦν καλόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὗς
εὖ παθών τις καὶ αὐτὸς δεόμενος προσηγάγετο
4
ξυμμάχους καὶ πολιτείας μετέλαβεν, ἰέναι δὲ ἐς
τὰ παραγγελλόμενα εἰκὸς ἦν προθύμως. ἃ δὲ
ἑκάτεροι ἐξηγεῖσθε τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οὐχ οἱ ἑπό-
μενοι αἴτιοι εἴ τι μὴ καλῶς ἐδρᾶτο, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄγοντες
ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα.

LVI. “Θηβαῖοι δὲ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα ἡμᾶς
9509 \ A 3 Ἁ 4 9a
ἠδίκησαν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, de’ ὅπερ
καὶ τάδε πάσχομεν. πόλιν γὰρ αὐτοὺς τὴν ἡμετέ-
pay καταλαμβάνοντας ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ προσέτι
e ’ 4 A > , NX nw
ἱερομηνίᾳ ὀρθῶς τε ἐτιμωρησάμεθα κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι

A \ 3 Ψ
νόμον καθεστῶτα, τὸν ἐπιόντα πολέμιον ὅσιον

BOOK III. tiv. 5-.vr. 2

and their occupation of Ithome, we sent a third part
of our citizens to bring aid. These are things you
ought not to forget.

LV. “Such was the part we were proud to play in
the great actions of the past. It was not until later
that we became your enemies, and for this you
yourselves were to blame; for when the Thebans
oppressed us and we sought alliance with you, you
rebuffed us and bade us apply to the Athenians,
because they were near, whereas you lived far away.
In the course of this war, however, you have neither
suffered, nor were ever in danger of suffering, any
extraordinary harm at our hands. And if we refused
to revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we
were not in the wrong; for they helped us against
the Thebans when you held back. After that it
would not have been honourable for us to desert them,
above all when we were their debtors and when at our
own request we had been admitted to their alliance
and had shared the rights of citizenship with them.
On the contrary, there was every reason why we
should heartily obey their commands. And what-
ever measures either you or they have initiated for
your allies, it is not the followers who are to blame
for any wrong that has been done, but those who
have led them into evil courses.

LVI. “As for the Thebans, they have done us
many wrongs in the past, and you yourselves are well
aware of this crowning outrage, which has brought us
into our present plight. They attempted to seize
our city in time of peace, and furthermore on a day
of festival ; therefore we were justified in punishing
them in accordance with the law which has universal
sanction, that it is right to repel him who comes

VOL. II. H

THUCYDIDES

3 , A “A 3 “A 9 ’ 3 9 A
εἶναι ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ viv οὐκ av εἰκότως δι᾽ αὐτοὺς
βλαπτοίμεθα. εἰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτίκα χρησίμῳ ὑμῶν
τε καὶ ἐκείνων πολεμίῳ ' τὸ δίκαιον λήψεσθε, τοῦ
μὲν ὀρθοῦ φανεῖσθε οὐκ ἀληθεῖς κριταὶ ὄντες, τὸ

A [2 a 4 / > “a
δὲ ξυμφέρον μᾶλλον θεραπεύοντες. καίτοι εἰ νῦν
ec κα 3 a 4 \ e “" XN
ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πολὺ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ
οἱ ἄλλοι "Ελληνες μᾶλλον τότε ὅτε ἐν μείζονι
κινδύνῳ ἦτε. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἑτέροις ὑμεῖς ἐπέρχεσθε
δεινοί, ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ καιρῷ, ὅτε πᾶσι δουλείαν
3 4 e , “ 3 ‘9 a @ N
ἐπέφερεν ὁ βάρβαρος, οἵδε pet αὐτοῦ ἦσαν. καὶ
δίκαιον ἡμῶν τῆς νῦν ἁμαρτίας, εἰ ἄρα ἡμάρτηταί
τι, ἀντιθεῖναι τὴν τότε προθυμίαν, καὶ μείζω τε

A a
πρὸς ἐλάσσω εὑρήσετε καὶ ἐν καιροῖς ols σπάνιον
ἣν τῶν ᾿Ελλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Ἐξέρξου δυνάμει

2 7 3 A 4 an ς \
ἀντιτάξασθαι,. ἐπῃνοῦντό τε μᾶλλον οἱ μὴ τὰ
ξύμφορα πρὸς τὴν ἔφοδον αὑτοῖς ? ἀσφαλείᾳ

/ 34 9 δ A A ?
πράσσοντες, ἐθέλοντες δὲ τολμᾶν μετὰ κινδύνων
τὰ βέλτιστα. ὧν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ τιμηθέντες
ἐς τὰ πρῶτα νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέδιμεν μὴ δια-
φθαρῶμεν, ᾿Αθηναίους ἑλόμενοι δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ
ὑμᾶς κερδαλέως. καΐτοι χρὴ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι γιγνώσκοντας καὶ τὸ

’ \ Ν ’ a A 4
ξυμφέρον μὴ ἄλλο τι νομίσαι, ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων
τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὅταν αἰεὶ βέβαιον τὴν χάριν τῆς

1 πολεμίῳ, bracketed by Hude, as derived from a gloss

(πολεμίων).
2 αὑτοῖς, Bekker and most editors with M, Hude αὐτοῖς.

BOOK III. ivi. 2-7

against you as an enemy; and now we cannot reason-
ably be made to suffer on their account. For if you
shall decide the question of justice by such considera-
tions as your immediate advantage and their hostility,
you will show yourselves to be, not true judges of
what is right, but rather to be mere slaves of ex-
pediency. And yet if the Thebans seem serviceable
to you now, we and the rest of the Hellenes were of
far greater service to you when you were in greater
danger. For now you are attacking others and are a
menace to them, but in that crisis, when the barbarian
was threatening us all with slavery, these men were
on his side. And it is only fair that you should set
our present error, if error there has been, over against
the zeal we showed then; if you do, you will find,
not only that the zeal outweighs the offence, but
also that it was shown at a time when it was a rare
thing for Hellenes to oppose their courage to the
power of Xerxes. At that time the greater praise
was given to those who, instead of intriguing in
security for their own advantage with reference to
the invasion,’ were ready to hazard the noblest course
though fraught with danger. With these we took
our stand and were honoured among the foremost ;
but now, for the same conduct, we fear lest we
are to be destroyed, in that we have chosen the
Athenians from regard to right rather than you for
profit. And yet you ought to show yourselves con-
sistent, giving the same judgment concerning the
same things, and to consider your true advantage to
be only this—to cherish an ever-enduring gratitude

1 As the Thebans did. If αὐτοῖς be read, with nearly all
MSS., it must be construed with ἔφοδον, ““ working to further
the invasion of the enemy.”

99
H 2

THUCYDIDES

ἀρετῆς ἔχουσι 1 καὶ τὸ παραυτίκα που ὑμῖν 3
ὠφέλιμον καθίστηται.

LVII. “ 'Προσσκέψασθέ τε ὅτι νῦν μὲν παρά-
δειγμα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀνδραγαθίας
νομίξεσθε' εἰ δὲ περὶ ἡμῶν γνώσεσθε μὴ τὰ εἰκότα
(οὐ γὰρ ἀφανῆ κρινεῖτε τὴν δίκην τήνδε, ἐπαινού-
μενοι δὲ περὶ οὐδ᾽ ἡμῶν μεμπτῶν), ὁρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ
οὐκ ͵ ἀποδέξωνται ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρι αὐτοὺς
ἀμείνους. ὄντας ἀπρεπές τί ἐπιγνῶναι, οὐδὲ πρὸς
ἱεροῖς τοῖς κοινοῖς σκῦλα ἀπὸ ἡμῶν τῶν εὐεργετῶν
τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνατεθῆναι. δεινὸν δὲ δόξει εἶναι
Πλάταιαν Λακεδαιμονίους πο θῆσαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν
πατέρας ἀναγράψαι ἐ ἐς τὸν τρίποδα τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς
δι’ ἀρετὴν τὴν πόλιν, ὑμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ
Ἑλληνικοῦ τ Sis διὰ Θηβαίους ἐξαλεῖψαι.
ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ξυμφορᾶς προκεχωρήκαμεν,
οἵτινες Μήδων τε κρατησάντων ἀπωλλύμεθα καὶ
νῦν ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς πρὶν φιλτάτοις Θηβαίων ἡσ-
σώμεθα καὶ δύο a ἀγῶνας τοὺς μεγίστους ὑπέστημεν,
τότε μέν, τὴν πόλιν εἰ μὴ παρέδομεν, λιμῷ δια-
φθαρῆναι, νῦν δὲ θανάτου δίκῃ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ
περιεώσμεθα ἐκ πάντων “Πλαταιῆς, οἱ παρὰ
δύναμιν πρόθυμοι ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐ ἐρῆμοι καὶ
ἀτιμώρητοι' καὶ οὔτε τῶν τότε ξυμμάχων ὠφελεῖ
οὐδείς, ἡ ἡμεῖς τε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς,
δέδιμεν μὴ οὐ βέβαιοι ἦτε.

1 Heilmann’s correction for ἔχωσι οὗ the MSS.

2 Jowett prefers ἡμῖν, with M, in which case the sense
would be general: ‘‘ while (as a matter of course) our own
immediate interests are sufficiently secured.” With ὑμῖν
there is a return to the particular, i.e. the case of the
Lacedaemonians.

8 προσσκέψασθε, Meineke’s conjecture for προσκέψασθε of
the MSS.

100

BOOK III. ivi. 7-Lvu. 4

toward the best of your allies for their valour, while
also securing what may be to your advantage at the
present moment.

LVII. “ Consider, too, that you are now regarded
by most of the Hellenes as an example of upright-
ness; but if the verdict you give concerning us
shall be inequitable, beware (since the case you are
deciding here is not obscure, but you the judges
are the object of men’s praise and we the defend-
ants are of no mean repute), beware, I say, lest men
repudiate an unseemly sentence passed upon good
men by men still better and resent the dedication in
the common temples of spoils taken from us, the
benefactors of Hellas. Monstrous will it seem that
the Lacedaemonians should sack Plataea, and that
you, whose fathers inscribed the name of our city on
the tripod at Delphi in commemoration of her valour,
should blot her out, house and home, from the map
of Hellas—to please the Thebans! For to this depth
of misfortune have we come, we who, when the
Persians prevailed, were on the verge of ruin,! and
now when we plead before you, formerly our closest
friends, we are beaten by Thebans; and we have
had to face two supreme dangers, at that time of
perishing by starvation if we had not surrendered our
city, and now of standing trial for our lives. And
we have been thrust aside by all, we men of Plataea,
who were zealous toward the Hellenes beyond our
strength, and are now desolate and undefended. No
one of our former allies now aids us, and as for you,
Lacedaemonians, our only hope, we fear that you are
not steadfast.

1 The reference is to the burning of their city by Xerxes;
see Hat. vim. 1.

ΙΟῚ

THUCYDIDES

LVIII. “ Καίτοι ἀξιοῦμέν ye καὶ θεῶν ἕνεκα

τῶν ξυμμαχικῶν ποτε γενομένων καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς

A 3 \ d a e a
τῆς ἐς Tous “EAAnvas καμφθῆναι ὑμᾶς καὶ μετα-
γνῶναι εἴ TL ὑπὸ Θηβαίων ἐπείσθητε, τήν τε δω-
ρειὰν ἀνταπαιτῆσαι αὐτοὺς μὴ κτείνειν οὗς μὴ ὑμῖν
πρέπει, σώφρονά τε ἀντὶ αἰσχρᾶς κομίσασθαι

΄ \ \ ¢ \ an ” , 3
χάριν, καὶ μὴ ἡδονὴν δόντας ἄλλοις κακίαν αὐὖ-
τοὺς ἀντιλαβεῖν. βραχὺ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἡμέτερα

’ a > » \ 4
σώματα διαφθεῖραι, ἐπίπονον δὲ τὴν δύσκλειαν
αὐτοῦ ἀφανίσαι: οὐκ ἐχθροὺς γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἰκότως

, 3 ᾽ Μ > 9? , l4

τιμωρήσεσθε, ἀλλ᾽ εὔνους, κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην πολεμή-
σαντας. ὥστε καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἄδειαν ποιοῦντες
ὅσια ἂν δικάξοιτε καὶ προνοοῦντες ὅτι ἑκόντας τε
ἐλάβετε καὶ χεῖρας προϊσχομένους (ὁ δὲ νόμος
τοῖς “EAAnot μὴ κτείνειν τούτους), ἔτι δὲ καὶ

3 4 / a > 4
εὐεργέτας γεγενημένους διὰ παντός. ἀποβλέψατε
γὰρ ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας, ods ἀπο-
θανόντας ὑπὸ Μήδων καὶ ταφέντας ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ
ἐτιμῶμεν κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δημοσίᾳ ἐσθήμασί τε
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, ὅσα τε ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν
ἀνεδίδου ὡραῖα, πάντων ἀπαρχὰς ἐπιφέροντες,

@ 3 , , 4 e ,
εὖνοι μὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας, ξύμμαχοι δὲ opary-
μοις ποτὲ γενομένοις. ὧν ὑμεῖς τοὐναντίον ἂν
δράσαιτε μὴ ὀρθῶς γνόντες. σκέψασθε δέ"2 Παυ-

1 ἡμᾶς, bracketed by Hude, because omitted in M.
2 δέ, Hude reads re, with C.

1 The Thebans had demanded that the Plataeans be put
to death.
102

BOOK III. tv. 1-5

LVIII. “ And yet we adjure you, for the sake of
the gods who of old sanctioned our alliance and for
our good service in the cause of the Hellenes, to
relent and change your minds, if you have been in
any way won over by the Thebans,! and in your turn
to ask of them the boon not to put to death those
whom it il] becomes you to slay, that you may thus
receive an honest instead of a shameful gratitude,
and may not in giving pleasure to others get in re-
turn ignominy for yourselves. It isa simple matter to
take our lives, but a grievous task to blot out the
infamy of it; for we are not enemies whom you
would have a right to punish, but good friends who
were forced into war with you. You would, therefore,
render a righteous judgment if you guaranteed us
security of life and if you bore in mind, before it is
too late, that it was in voluntary surrender and with
outstretched hands that you received us (and the
usage of the Hellenes forbids the slaying of sup-
pliants); and, moreover, that we have always been
your benefactors. Turn your eyes upon the sepul-
chres of your fathers, slain by the Persians and
buried in our land, whom we have honoured year
by year with a public offering of raiment? and
other customary gifts; the first fruits, too, of all that
the earth each year has produced have been brought
them, the tribute of kindly hands from a friendly
land and of allies to those who were once their
companions in arms. All this you would reverse by
an unjust verdict. Reflect: when Pausanias buried

2 For garments as offerings to the dead, cf. Soph. Hl. 452;
Eur. Or. 123, 1436; Tac. A. iii. 2. But some understand
ἐσθήμασι to refer to mourning garments. See also Plut.
Aristides, xxi.

103

THUCYDIDES

, ΝΜ 3 \ , ? a
cavias μὲν yap ἔθαπτεν αὐτοὺς νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε
φιλίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις: ὑμεῖς
δὲ εἰ κτενεῖτε ἡμᾶς καὶ χώραν τὴν Πλαταιίδα
Θηβαΐδα ποιήσετε, τί ἄλλο ἣ ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ
παρὰ τοῖς αὐθένταις πατέρας τοὺς ὑμετέρους καὶ
ξυγγενεῖς ἀτίμους γερῶν ὧν νῦν ἴσχουσι κατα-
λείψετε ; πρὸς δὲ καὶ γῆν ἐν 7 ἠλευθερώθησαν
ed , e lA “ > ’

οἱ “Ελληνες δουλώσετε, ἱερά τε θεῶν οἷς εὐξά-
μενοι Μήδων ἐκράτησαν ἐρημοῦτεϊ καὶ θυσίας
τὰς πατρίους τῶν ἑσσαμένων καὶ κτισάντων
ἀφαιρήσεσθε.

LIX. “Οὐ πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης, ὦ Λακε-

δαιμόνιοι, τάδε, οὔτε ἐς τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ελλήνων

’ μ \ 4 e , 7 ”

νόμιμα καὶ ἐς τοὺς προγόνους ἁμαρτάνειν οὔτε
ἡμᾶς τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἀλλοτρίας ἕνεκα ἔχθρας μὴ
αὐτοὺς ἀδικηθέντας διαφθεῖραι, φείσασθαι δὲ καὶ
3 fo) “A 4 Ν , ’
ἐπικλασθῆναι τῇ γνώμῃ οἴκτῳ σώφρονι λαβόντας
μὴ ὧν πεισόμεθα μόνον δεινότητα κατανοοῦντας,
ἀλλ᾽ οἷοί τε ἂν ὄντες πάθοιμεν καὶ ὡς ἀστάθ-
μητον τὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ᾧτινί ποτ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἀναξίῳ
2 ξυμπέσοι. ἡμεῖς τε, ὡς πρέπον ἡμῖν καὶ ὡς ἡ
χρεία προάγει, αἰτούμεθα ὑμᾶς, θεοὺς τοὺς
e ’ Ἁ A € , 3 ,
ὁμοβωμίους καὶ κοινοὺς τῶν “Ελλήνων ἐπιβοώ-
μενοι, πεῖσαι τάδε, προφερόμενοϊί 5 θ᾽ ὅρκους ods
οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ὥμοσαν μὴ ἀμνημονεῖν ἱκέται

1 ἀρημοῦτε, Hude adopts Stahl’s conjecture ἐρημοῦντες,

because of the striking present between two futures.

“a after προφερόμενοι is Stahl’s conjecture, adoptéd by
Hude.

104

BOOK III. ivi. 5-xix 2

_ them he thought he was laying them in a friendly
land and among friends; but you, if you put us to death
and make the territory of Plataea a Theban province,
will you not be leaving them in a hostile land and
among their murderers 1—these your fathers and
kinsmen—and dispossessed of the honours they now
enjoy? Nay more, you will be enslaving the very
land in which the Hellenes gained their liberty ; you
will be bringing desolation upon the temples of the
gods to whom they prayed when they conquered the
Persians ; and you will be robbing of their hereditary
sacrifices the people who founded and established
them.

~*~ LIX. “These things are not consistent with your
honour, Lacedaemonians, nor can it be so to offend
against the common usage of the Hellenes and against
your ancestors, or to put us, your benefactors, to death
because of the enmity of others, when you have not
been wronged yourselves. Nay, your good name
demands that you should spare us and be softened in
heart, regarding us with a dispassionate pity and bear-
ing in mind, not only how terrible will be our fate,
but who we are that must suffer, and how uncertain
is fortune, whose strokes sometimes fall even upon
the innocent. And we, as befits our condition
and as our sore need demands, entreat you in the
name of the common gods of the Hellenic race whom
we invoke, gods worshipped by us all at the same
altars, to listen to our prayers ; and at the same time,
appealing to the oaths wherein your fathers swore
that they would never forget us, we become suppliants

1 The Thebans are called their murderers because they
had sided with the Persians against the Hellenic allies.

105

THUCYDIDES

γιγνόμεθα ὑμῶν τῶν πατρῴων τάφων καὶ ἐπι-
καλούμεθα τοὺς κεκμηκότας μὴ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ
Θηβαίοις μηδὲ τοῖς ἐχθίστοις φίλτατοι ὄντες
παραδοθῆναι, ἡμέρας τε ἀναμιμνήσκομεν ἐκείνης
ἣ τὰ λαμπρότατα pet αὐτῶν πράξαντες νῦν ἐν
τῇδε τὰ δεινότατα κινδυνεύομεν παθεῖν. ὅπερ
δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν τε καὶ χαλεπώτατον τοῖς ὧδε
ἔχουσι, λόγου τελευτᾶν, διότι καὶ τοῦ βίον ὁ
κίνδυνος ἐγγὺς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, πανόμενοι λέγομεν ἤδη
ὅτι οὐ Θηβαίοις παρέδομεν τὴν πόλιν (εἱλόμεθα
γὰρ ἂν πρό γε τούτου τῷ αἰσχίστῳ ὀλέθρῳ λιμῷ
τελευτῆσαι), ὑμῖν δὲ πιστεύσαντες προσήλθομεν
(καὶ δίκαιον, εἰ μὴ πείθομεν, ἐς τὰ αὐτὰ καταστή-
σαντας τὸν ξυντυχόντα κίνδυνον ἐᾶσαι ἡμᾶς
αὐτοὺς ἑλέσθαι), ἐπισκήπτομέν τε ἅμα μὴ Πλα-
ταιῆς ὄντες, οἱ προθυμότατοι περὶ τοὺς “Ελληνας
γενόμενοι, Θηβαίοις τοῖς ἡμῖν ἐχθίστοις ἐκ τῶν
ὑμετέρων χειρῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας πίστεως ἱκέται
ὄντες, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, παραδοθῆναι, γενέσθαι
δὲ σωτῆρας ἡμῶν καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους “Ελληνας
ἐλευθεροῦντας ἡμᾶς διολέσαι."

LX. Τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Ἰ]λαταιῆς εἶπον. οἱ δὲ
Θηβαῖοι δείσαντες πρὸς τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοί τι ἐνδῶσι, παρελθόντες! ἔφασαν
καὶ αὐτοὶ βούλεσθαι εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνοις
παρὰ γνώμην τὴν αὐτῶν μακρότερος λόγος ἐδόθη
τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα ἀποκρίσεως. ὡς δ᾽ ἐκέ-
λευσαν, ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

LXI. “Τοὺς μὲν λόγους οὐκ ἂν ἠτησάμεθα

1 παρελθόντες, Hude adopts Ullirich’s conjecture προσελ-
θόντες.

106

BOOK III, εχ. 2-Lx1. 1

before your ancestral tombs and call upon the de-
parted not to suffer us to come into the power of
Thebans or permit us, who were their dearest friends,
to be delivered into the hands of their bitterest
foes. We also remind you of that day on which we
shared with them in the most brilliant deeds, we
who now on this day are on the brink of the most
awful fate. And now, bringing our plea to an end—
and this must be, howbeit for men in our condition it is
the hardest thing of all, seeing that with its ending
our mortal peril also draws near—we say that we did
not surrender our city to the Thebans—in preference
to that our choice would have been to die of starva-
tion, the most horrible of deaths—but capitulated
to you because we trusted you. And it is but right,
if we fail in our plea, that you should restore us to
our former position and let us choose for ourselves the
danger that shall confront us. And we likewise adjure
you, Plataeans that we are, people who were most
zealous for the cause of Hellas, and are now your
suppliants, O Lacedaemonians, not to deliver us out
of your hands and your good faith to the Thebans,
our bitterest foes, but to become our saviours, and
not, while liberating the rest of the Hellenes, to
bring utter destruction upon us.”

LX. Thus the Plataeans spoke. And the Thebans,
fearing lest the Lacedaemonians might be so moved
by their plea as to yield somewhat, came forward and
said that they, too, wished to speak, since, against
their own judgment, the Plataeans had been granted
leave to speak at greater length than the answer
to the question required. And when the judges
assented, they spoke as follows :

LXI. “We should not have asked permission to

107

THUCYDIDES

> A 9 3 ’ \ 3 A 3 ’
εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ αὐτοὶ βραχέως τὸ ἐρωτηθὲν ἀπεκρί-
ναντο καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἡμᾶς τραπόμενοι κατηγορίαν
ἐποιήσαντο καὶ περὶ αὑτῶν ἔξω τῶν προκειμένων
ὶ ν δὲ 3 ’ \ \ 3 ’ὔ
καὶ ἅμα οὔδὲ ἡτιαμένων πολλὴν τὴν ἀπολογίαν
καὶ ἔπαινον ὧν οὐδεὶς ἐμέμψατο. νῦν δὲ πρὸς
\ 3 a a Ὁ ’
μὲν τὰ ἀντειπεῖν δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἔλεγχον ποιήσασθαι,
7 a
iva μήτε ἡ ἡμετέρα αὐτοὺς κακία ὠφελῇ μήτε ἡ
τούτων δόξα, τὸ & ἀληθὲς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων
ἀκούσαντες κρίνητε.
e Aa A
“Ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς διάφοροι ἐγενόμεθα τὸ
πρῶτον ὅτι ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον
τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ᾽ αὐτῆς,
ἃ ξυμμείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν,
οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον,
A A ν᾽ ᾿
ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων
Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσ-
ηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους
καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἔβλαπτον, ἀνθ᾽ ὧν
καὶ ἀντέπασχον. LXII. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ὁ βάρ-
Bapos ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, φασὶ μόνοι
Βοιωτῶν οὐ μηδίσαι, καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα αὐτοί
τε ἀγάλλονται καὶ ἡμᾶς λοιδοροῦσιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ
3
μηδίσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς οὐ φαμὲν διότι οὐδ᾽ ᾿Αθη-
A a /
vaious, τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ὕστερον ἰόντων
3 ’ 2 ΔΝ \ a ’ 9 “
Αθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς “Ελληνας μόνους αὖ Βοιωτῶν
3 ’ ’ lA 3 es Μν @ ,
ἀττικίσαι. καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἴῳ εἴδει ἑκάτεροι

1 Strabo mentions Pelasgians, Thracians, Hyantians.
108

BOOK III, uxt. 1-Lxn. 3

make this speech, if the Plataeans had briefly
answered the question, and had not turned upon us
and accused us, at the same time setting up a long
defence of themselves on matters foreign to the issue
and on which no charge whatever had been made
against them, and praising themselves where nobody
had blamed them. But as it is, we must answer
their charges and expose their self-praise, in order
that neither our baseness nor their good repute may
help them, but that you may hear the truth about us
both before you decide.

“The quarrel we had with them began in this
way: after we had settled the rest of Boeotia and
had occupied Plataea and other places of which we
got possession by driving out a mixed population,}
these Plataeans disdained to submit to our leadership,
as had been agreed upon at first, and separating
themselves from the rest of the Boeotians and
breaking away from the traditions of our fathers
went over to the Athenians as soon as an attempt was
made to force them into.obedience, and in conjunction
with the Athenians did us much harm, for which
they also suffered in return. LXII. Again, they say
that when the barbarians came against Hellas they
were the only Boeotians who did not medize, and for
this especially they plume themselves and abuse us.
We say, however, that the only reason they did not
medize was because the Athenians also did not, and
that, moreover, on the same principle, when the
Athenians afterwards assailed all Hellas, they were
the only Boeotians who atticized.2— And yet consider

2 Ever since the Persian war medize and medism had been
terms of bitter reproach in Hellas; in the mouths of the
Thebans atticize and atticism have a like invidious meaning.

109

THUCYDIDES

ἐ on a Ν ec oa ‘ \ ς / 4
ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν. ἡμῖν μὲν yap ἡ πόλις τότε
ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολε-
τεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν' ὅπερ δέ ἐστε
νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον,
ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν
εἶχε τὰ πράγματα. καὶ οὗτοι ἰδίας δυνάμεις
ἐλπίσαντες ἔτι μᾶλλον σχήσειν, εἰ τὰ τοῦ Μήδον
κρατήσειε, κατέχοντες ἰσχύε τὸ πλῆθος ἐπηγά-
yovto αὐτόν: καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις οὐκ αὐτο-
κράτωρ οὖσα ἑαυτῆς τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξεν, οὐδ᾽ ἄξιον
αὐτῇ ὀνειδίσαι ὧν μὴ μετὰ νόμων ἥμαρτεν.
3 \ ἴω 4 “ 3 aA Ἁ \ ,
ἐπειδὴ γοῦν 6 τε Μῆδος ἀπῆλθε καὶ τοὺς νόμους
3 ’ 4 9 4 [4 ?
ἔλαβε, σκέψασθαι χρή, ᾿Αθηναίων ὕστερον ἐπι-
ὄντων τήν τε ἄλλην ᾿Ελλάδα καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν,
χώραν πειρωμένων ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῖς ποιεῖσθαι καὶ κατὰ

| ie Ww 3. A 4 3 4
στάσιν ἤδη ἔχοντων αὐτῆς τὰ πολλά, εἰ μαχό-
μενοι ἐν Κορωνείᾳ καὶ νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἠλευ-
θερώσαμεν τὴν Βοιωτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νῦν
προθύμως ξυνελευθεροῦμεν, ἵππους τε παρέχοντες
καὶ παρασκευὴν ὅσην οὐκ ἄλλοι τῶν ξυμμάχων.
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὸν μηδισμὸν τοσαῦτα ἀπολο-
γούμεθα.

LXIII. “Ὡς δὲ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλόν τε ἠδικήκατε

\ ad 3 ’ ,» 3 ’ ,
tous “Ελληνας καὶ ἀξιώτεροί ἐστε πάσης ζημίας,
πειρασόμεθα ἀποφαίνειν. ἐγένεσθε ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμε-

1 9,6. where, as at Sparta, the ὀλίγοι, or ruling class,
possessed equal rights.

110

BOOK III. cxu. 3-xi. 2

the circumstances under which we each acted as we
did. For the constitution of our city at that time
was, as it happened, neither an oligarchy under equal
laws! nor yet a democracy; but its affairs were in the
hands of a small group of powerful men—the form
which is most opposed to law and the best regulated
polity, and most allied to a tyranny. These men,
hoping to win still greater power for themselves if
the fortunes of the Persian should prevail, forcibly
kept the people down and brought him in. The
city as a whole was not in control of its own actions
when Thebes took the course it did, nor is it fair to
reproach it for the mistakes it made when not under
the rule of law. At any rate, after the Persian de-
parted and Thebes obtained its lawful government,
and when subsequently the Athenians became ag-
gressive and were trying to bring not only the rest
of Hellas but also our country under their own sway
and, owing to factions amongst us, were already in
possession of most of it,? pray observe whether we
fought and defeated them at Coronea® and thus
liberated Boeotia, and whether we are now zealously
helping‘ to liberate the other peoples, furnishing
more cavalry and munitions of war than any of the
other allies. Such is our defence against the charge
of medism.

LXIITI. “We will now try to show that you
Plataeans have wronged the Hellenes more than we
and are more deserving of any punishment, however
severe. You became allies and citizens of Athens

? After the battle at Oenophyta, 458 B.o. ef. 1. eviii. 2, 3.

3 446 B.c. cf. I. exiii. 2.

4 This is mentioned with a view to influencing Spartan
judges.

111

THUCYDIDES

/ , e ᾽ » ’ 4 \
τέρᾳ τιμωρίᾳ, ὡς φατέ, ᾿Αθηναίων ξύμμαχοι καὶ
πολῖται. οὐκοῦν χρὴν τὰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνον ὑμᾶς
ἐπάγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ξυνεπιέναι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν
ἄλλοις, ὑπάρχον γε ὑμῖν, εἴ τε καὶ ἄκοντες προσ-
4 ς > 3 ’ A “ ld
ἤγεσθε ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίων, τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων
τῶνδε ἤδη ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίας γεγενημένης,

3 4 4 e / 1
ἣν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα προβάλλεσθε' ἱκανή γε
ἦν ἡμᾶς τε ὑμῶν ἀποτρέπειν καί, τὸ μέγιστον,

3 A , 4 3 3 ς ’ N
ἀδεῶς παρέχειν βουλεύεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἑκόντες καὶ
οὐ βιαζόμενοι ἔτι εἵλεσθε μᾶλλον τὰ ᾿Αθηναίων.
καὶ λέγετε ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἦν προδοῦναι τοὺς εὐερ-
γέτας" πολὺ δέ γε αἴσχιον καὶ ἀδικώτερον τοὺς
πάντας “Ελληνας καταπροδοῦναι, οἷς ξυνωμόσατε,
ἢ ᾿Αθηναίους μόνους, τοὺς μὲν καταδουλουμένους
τὴν Ἑλλάδα, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθεροῦντας. καὶ οὐκ
ἴσην αὐτοῖς τὴν χάριν ἀνταπέδοτε οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης
ἀπηλλαγμένην: ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀδικούμενοι αὐτούς,
e 4 > 4 a ‘ ᾽ A v
ὡς φατέ, ἐπηγάγεσθε, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικοῦσιν ἄλλους
ξυνεργοὶ κατέστητε. καίτοι τὰς ὁμοίας χάριτας

\ 3 ’ 3 \ a a
μὴ ἀντιδιδόναι αἰσχρὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς μετὰ
δικαιοσύνης μὲν ὀφειληθείσας, ἐς ἀδικίαν δὲ
ἀποδιδομένας.

1 ἱκανή γε, Hude reads ἱκανὴ γάρ, with Cod. Graev.

1 ¢f. ch. lv. 1.

2 The alliance of the Lacedaemonians that is in mind here
would seem to be the general league of the Hellenes in the
Persian War, in which the Lacedaemonians were leaders ;
but in ch, lviii. 1 the Plataeans use the words θεῶν τῶν
ξυμμαχικῶν ποτε γενομένων especially with reference to the
compact mentioned in 11. lxxi., where it is said that the
allies, at the instance of Pausanias, after the battle of

112

BOOK III. txin, 2-4

that you might, as you claim,! obtain protection
against us. In that case you ought only to have
invoked their aid against us, instead of assisting
them in their aggressions against others; such a
course was certainly open to you, in case you were
ever being led on by the Athenians against your will,
since the alliance of the Lacedaemonians here had
already been organized against the Persians—the
alliance of which you are always reminding us.”
That would have been enough to keep us from
interfering with you, and, what is more important,
to enable you to take your own counsel without fear.
Nay, it was willingly and not now under compulsion
that you embraced the Athenian cause. You say,
however, that it would have been dishonourable to
betray your benefactors; but it was far more dis-
honourable and wicked to betray to their destruction
all the Hellenes, with whom you had sworn alliance,
than merely the Athenians, when they were en-
deavouring to enslave Hellas, the others to liberate
her. And the recompense you made them is not
equal, nor indeed free from dishonour. For you
were being wronged, as you claim, when you in-
voked their aid, but they were wronging others
when you became their helpers. And yet, surely, not’
to repay favours with like favours is dishonourable ;
but it is not so when, though the debt was incurred in
a just matter, it can only be repaid by wrong-doing.®
Plataea, mutually guaranteed the independence of all the
Hellenic states, and of the Plataeans in particular.

8 of. Cicero, de Off. 1. 15. 48, non reddere viro bono non licet,
modo id facere possit sine injuria. The whole sentence serves
to substantiate the words οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης ἀπηλλαγμένην, the
ae τὰς ὁμοίας χάριτας μὴ ἀντιδιδόναι being, according to
the Theban speakers, applicable to the Plataeans.

113
VOL. 11. I

THUCYDIDES

LXIV. “Δῆλόν τε ἐποιήσατε οὐδὲ τότε τῶν
Ἑλλήνων ἕνεκα μόνοι οὐ μηδίσαντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι
οὐδ᾽ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἡμεῖς ῖ δέ, τοῖς μὲν ταὐτὰ βουλό-

2 μενοι ποιεῖν, τοῖς δὲ τἀναντία. καὶ νῦν ἀξιοῦτε,
ἀφ᾽ ὧν δι’ ἑτέρους ἐγένεσθε ἀγαθοί, ἀπὸ τούτων
ὠφελεῖσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰκός" ὥσπερ δὲ ᾿Αθηναί-
ous εἵλεσθε, τούτοις ξυναγωνίζεσθε, καὶ μὴ προ-
φέρετε τὴν τότε γενομένην ξυνωμοσίαν ὡς χρὴ

8 ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς νῦν σῴζεσθαι. ἀπελίπετε γὰρ αὐτὴν
καὶ παραβάντες ξυγκατεδουλοῦσθε μᾶλλον Ai-
γινήτας καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν ξυνομοσάντων ἢ
διεκωλύετε, καὶ ταῦτα οὔτε ἄκοντες ἔχοντές τε
τοὺς νόμους οὕσπερ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο καὶ οὐδενὸς
ὑμᾶς βιασαμένου, ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς. τὴν τελευταίαν
τε πρὶν περιτειχίζεσθαι πρόκλησιν ἐς ἡσυχίαν
ἡμῶν, ὥστε μηδετέροις ἀμύνειν, οὐκ ἐδέχεσθε.

4 τίνες ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν δικαιότερον πᾶσι τοῖς “λλησε
μισοῖντο, οἵτινες ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων κακῷ ἀνδραγα-
θίαν προύθεσθε; καὶ ἃ μέν ποτε χρηστοὶ ἐγέ-
νεσθε, ὡς φατέ, οὐ προσήκοντα νῦν ἐπεδείξατε, ἃ

«δὲ ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο, ἐξηλέγχθη ἐς τὸ ἀλη-
θές: μετὰ γὰρ ᾿Αθηναίων ἄδικον ὁδὸν ἰόντων

5 ἐχωρήσατε. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐς τὸν ἡμέτερόν τε ἀκού.-
σιον μηδισμὸν καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον ἑκούσιον ἀττικι-
σμὸν τοιαῦτα ἀποφαίνομεν.

LXV. ““A δὲ τελευταῖά φατε ἀδικηθῆναι
(παρανόμως γὰρ ἐλθεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ

1 ἡμεῖς, with the majority of the best MSS.; Hude reads
ὑμεῖς with CG.

114

BOOK IIIf. txiv. 1-Lxv. 1

_ LXIV. “You have, therefore, made it clear that
even then it was not for the sake of the Hellenes
that you alone of the Boeotians refused to medize,
but merely because the Athenians also refused while
we did not, and you preferred to act with the one
party and against the other. And now you expect to
be rewarded for the virtuous conduct that was due to
the inspiration of others! But that is unreasonable;
as you chose the Athenians, continue to fight on their
side. And do not keep reminding us of the alliance
you made then, and claim that it ought to save you
now. For you have abandoned it and in violation of its
principles have constantly aided, instead of trying to
prevent, the enslavement of the Aeginetans! and other
members of the alliance ; and that, too, not against
your will, since you then enjoyed the laws under
which you have lived till now and were not, like us,
under compulsion by another. Moreover, you
refused to accept the last proposal we made you be-
fore Plataea was invested 2—to leave you unmolested
if you would aid neither side. Who, then, would more
justly be hated by all the Hellenes than you, who dis-
played your virtue in order to compass their injury?
Furthermore, those noble qualities which, as you
claim, you once displayed you have now made plain
were not properly yours, but your natural longings
have been put to the proof and shown in their
reality; for you have followed the Athenians when
they walked in the way of iniquity. Such, then,
is our affirmation regarding our unwilling medism
and your willing atticism.

LXV. “As to your last charge of wrong-doing on
our part—that we unlawfully attacked your city in

1 of. I. Cv., Cvili.; 11. xxvii. 3. of. τι. Lxxii. 1.
15
12

»
THUCYDIDES

e ’ > \ \ ς ’ , 3

ἱερομηνίᾳ ἐπὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν), οὐ νομιζομεν
οὐδ᾽ ἐν τούτοις ὑμῶν μᾶλλον ἁμαρτεῖν. εἰ μὲν

e a) 3 N , \ / / 3
γὰρ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ πρός τε τὴν πόλιν ἐλθόντες ἐμα-
χόύόμεθα καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐδηοῦμεν ὡς πολέμιοι, ἀδι-
κοῦμεν" εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι
’ A Ν /

καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας
ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν
πάτρια καταστῆσαι, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἑκόντες, τί
ἀδικοῦμεν; οἱ γὰρ ἄγοντες παρανομοῦσι μᾶλλον

a e 4 2 3 3 a e e a ,
τῶν ἑπομένων. ἀλλ᾽ OUT ἐκεῖνοι, ὡς ἡμεῖς κρί-
νομεν, οὔτε ἡμεῖς: πολῖται δὲ ὄντες ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς

, , N e [οἱ A
καὶ πλείω παραβαλλόμενοι, TO ἑαυτῶν τεῖχος
3 ’ 3 \ e a“ ’ ’ ᾽
ἀνοίξαντες καὶ ἐς τὴν αὑτῶν πόλιν φιλίους, οὐ

’ 1 ’ 2 U4 4 € A
πολεμίους κομίσαντες ἐβούλοντο τούς τε ὑμῶν
χείρους μηκέτι μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, τούς τε ἀμείνους
τὰ ἄξια ἔχειν, σωφρονισταὶ ὄντες τῆς γνώμης καὶ

A ’ A , 3 3 A 3 3
τῶν σωμάτων τὴν TOALY οὐκ ἀλλοτριοῦντες, αλλ,
2 Ἁ ’ 3 A 3 \ 3
ἐς τὴν ξυγγένειαν οἰκειοῦντες, ἐχθροὺς οὐδενὶ
καθιστάντες, ἅπασι δ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐνσπόνδους.

LXVI. “Τεκμήριον δὲ ὡς οὐ πολεμίως ἐπράσ-
σομεν' οὔτε γὰρ ἠδικήσαμεν οὐδένα, προείπομέν
τε τὸν βουλόμενον κατὰ τὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν
πάτρια πολιτεύειν ἰέναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. καὶ ὑμεῖς
ἄσμενοι χωρήσαντες καὶ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσυχάξετε, ὕστερον δὲ κατανοή-

1 φιλίους οὐ πολεμίους, Steup’s correction for φιλίως od
πολεμίως of the MSS.

1 of. τι. ii, 2. 8 Parody on ch. lv, 4.
116

BOOK III. uxv. 1~-Lxvi. 2

time of peace and on a day of festival—we do
not think that in this matter, either, we are more at
fault than you. If it was of our own motion that we
went to your city, fought you, and ravaged your land
as enemies, we are in the wrong ; but if some of your
countrymen, the leading men in both wealth and
family,! wishing to put an end to your alliance with
an outsider and to restore you to the traditions of our
fathers which are common to all the Boeotians, of
their own free will invoked our aid, of what wrong
are we guilty? For it is those who lead that break
the laws rather than those who follow.? But in my
judgment neither they nor we did wrong. They,
who are just as much citizens as you and had more
at stake, opened their gates and conducted into their
own city friends, not enemies, because they wished
that the baser sort among you should not become
still worse, and that the better sort should have their
deserts, being the censors of your political principles ®
and not seeking to deprive the state of your persons,
but rather bringing you back into a natural union
with your kindred, and that without making you an
enemy of anyone but restoring you to peace with
all alike.

LXVI. “The proof that we acted in no hostile
spirit is that we wronged nobody, and made a pro-
clamation that anyone who wished to be a citizen
according to the hereditary ways of all the Boeotians
should come over to us. And you came gladly, and
entering into an agreement with us you kept quiet
at first; but afterwards, when you became aware that

3 σωφρονισταί, regulators or censors, those who bring others
to a right mind and are a check on vice and lawlessness, It
was a technical term applied to magistrates, ten in number,

at Athens, who superintended the morals of the youth.
117

THUCYDIDES rs

σαντες ἡμᾶς ὀλίγους ὄντας, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐδοκοῦμέν
TL ἀνεπιεικέστερον πρᾶξαι οὐ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους
ὑμῶν ἐσελθόντες, τὰ μὲν ὁμοῖα οὐκ ἀνταπέδοτε
ἡμῖν, μήτε νεωτερίσαι ἔργῳ λόγοις τε πείθειν
ὥστε ἐξελθεῖν, ἐπιθέμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν ξύμ-
βασιν, ods μὲν ἐν χερσὶν ἀπεκτείνατε, οὐχ
ὁμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δή τινα ἔπα-
σχον), οὗς δὲ χεῖρας πρθια χομενοῦξ. καὶ ξωγρή-
σαντες ᾿ὑποσχόμενοί τε ἡμῖν ὕστερον μὴ κτενεῖν
παρανόμως διεφθείρατε, πῶς οὐ δεινὰ εἴργασθς;
καὶ ταῦτα τρεῖς ἀδικίας ἐν ὀλίγῳ πράξαντες, τήν
τε λυθεῖσαν ὁμολογίαν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸν ὕστε-
ρον θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν μὴ κτενεῖν
ψευσθεῖσαν ὑπόσχεσιν, ἢν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς
ὑμῖν μὴ ἀδικῶμεν, ὅμως φατὲ ἡμᾶς παρανομῆσαι
καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀξιοῦτε μὴ ἀντιδοῦναι δίκην. οὔκ, ἤν
γε οὗτοι τὰ ὀρθὰ γιγνώσκωσιν" πάντων δὲ αὐτῶν
ἕνεκα κολασθήσεσθε.

LXVII. “ Καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τούτου
ἕνεκα ἐπεξήλθομεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα
ὑμεῖς μὲν εἰδῆτε καὶ δικαίως αὐτῶν καταγνωσό-
μενοι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔτι ὁσιώτερον τετιμωρημένοι. καὶ
μὴ παλαιὰς ἀρετάς, εἴ τις ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο, ἀκού-
οντες ἐπικλασθῆτε, ἃς χρὴ τοῖς μὲν ἀδικουμένοις
ἐπικούρους εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ αἰσχρόν τι δρῶσι δι-
πλασίας ξημίας, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ προσηκόντων dpap-
τάνουσι, μηδὲ ὀλοφυρμῷ καὶ οἴκτῳ ὠφελείσθων,

1 ὕστερον μὴ κτενεῖν, Hude transposes μὴ κτενεῖν ὕστερον,
against the MSS.

118

BOOK III. cxvi. 2—Lxvir. 2

we were few in number—even supposing we might
seem to have acted somewhat inconsiderately in
entering your town without the consent of the pop-
ular party—you did not repay us in kind, resorting
to no act of violence but endeavouring by arguments
to induce us to withdraw, but you assailed us in
violation of your agreement. Now as to those whom
you killed in hand-to-hand conflict we are not so
much grieved—for they suffered, we grant you, bya
kind of law—but as regards those whom you spared
when they stretched out their hands to you, and then,
though you afterwards promised us that you would
not kill them, lawlessly butchered—was not that an
abominable deed? And after committing these three
wrongs within a short space of time—the violation
of your agreement, the subsequent murder of our
men, and the breaking of your promise to us not to
kill them if we spared your property in the fields—
you nevertheless assert that we were the trans-
gressors, and claim exemption from punishment for
yourselves! No, not if these judges decide aright ;
but for all these crimes you must be chastised.
LXVII. “We have discussed these matters at
length, Lacedaemonians, both for your sakes and
our own, in order that you, for your part, may know
that you will justly condemn them, and we that we
have still more righteously exacted vengeance. And
let not your hearts be softened when you hear
them speak of their ancient virtues, if indeed they
ever had any; for virtues might well be a succour
to the victims of wrong, but should bring a two-fold
penalty upon the authors of a shameful deed, because
their offence is out of keeping with their character.
And let not their lamentation and pitiful wailing

1το

THUCYDIDES

πατέρων τε τάφους τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιβοώμενοι
καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐρημίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀνταπο-
φαίνομεν πολλῷ δεινότερα παθοῦσαν τὴν ὑπὸ
τούτων ἡλικίαν ἡμῶν διεφθαρμένην, ὧν πατέρες
οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἄγοντες ἀπέθανον
b ’ὔ e A ’ ᾽ 1
ἐν Kopwveta, οἱ δὲ πρεσβῦται λελειμμένοι κατ
» “ Aa σὰ e ’
οἰκίας ἐρῆμοι πολλῷ δικαιοτέραν ὑμῶν ἱκετείαν
ποιοῦνται τούσδε τιμωρήσασθαι. οἴκτου τε
ἀξιώτεροι τυγχάνειν οὗ ἀπρεπές τι πάσχοντες
a 2 ’ e \ / Ψ Ψ Ἀ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ δικαίως, ὥσπερ olde, τὰ
ἐναντία ἐπίχαρτοι εἶναι. καὶ τὴν νῦν ἐρημίαν
δι᾿ ἑαυτοὺς ἔχουσιν: τοὺς γὰρ ἀμείνους ξυμμά-
χοὺυς ἑκόντες ἀπεώσαντο. παρενόμησάν τε οὐ
θό € 49 e a , δὲ λέ a δί
προπαθοντες up ἡμῶν, μίσει πλέον ἢ δίκῃ
κρίναντες, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀνταποδόντες νῦν τὴν
ἴσην τιμωρίαν" ἔννομα γὰρ πείσονται καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκ
a /
μάχης χεῖρας προισχόμενοι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀλλ᾽
3 δ ’ 3 4 aA 3 \ 4
ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδόντες.
ἀμύνατε οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τῷ τῶν “Ελλή-
νων νόμῳ ὑπὸ τῶνδε παραβαθέντι καὶ ἡμῖν ἄνομα
παθοῦσιν ἀνταπόδοτε χάριν δικαίαν ὧν πρό-
θυμοι γεγενήμεθα' καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶνδε λόγοις
περιωσθῶμεν ἐν ὑμῖν, ποιήσατε δὲ τοῖς “Ελλησι
παράδειγμα οὐ λόγων τοὺς ἀγῶνας προθήσοντες.

ἀλλ᾽ ἔργων, av ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων βραχεῖα ἡ

1 κατ᾽ οἰκίας, Stahl’s emendation for καὶ οἰκίαι of the MSS.
2 ἂν ἀνταποδόντες, Dobree added ἄν.
3 ἀνταπόδοτε, Hude ἀνταπόδοτέ τε, after Gertz.

120

BOOK III. txvu. 2-6

avail them, nor their appeals to the sepulchres of
your fathers and their own desolate state. For
in answer we too would point out that a far more
dreadful fate befell our young men who were
butchered by them, of whose fathers some died at
Coronea! trying to win Boeotia to your cause, while
others, left desolate at home in their old age, with
far greater justice make supplication to you to take
vengeance upon these men. Pity is more worthily
bestowed upon those who suffer an unseemly fate,
but those who, like these Plataeans, deserve their
fate afford on the contrary a subject for rejoicing.
As for their present desolation, that also is their
own fault; for of their own free will they rejected
the better alliance. They acted unlawfully without
having received provocation at our hands, but
through hatred rather than according to a just
judgment, and they could not possibly pay now a
penalty equal to their guilt, for they will suffer a
lawful sentence; and they are not, as they claim,?
stretching out suppliant hands on the field of battle,
but have delivered themselves up to justice under
formal agreement. Vindicate, therefore, Lacedae-
monians, the law of the Hellenes which has been
transgressed by these men, and render to us who
have suffered by their lawlessness a just recompense
for the services we have zealously given, and let us
not because of their words be thrust aside when we
plead before you,’ but make it plain to the Hellenes
by an example that the trials you institute will be of
deeds, not words, and that, if the deeds are good, a

1 As at ch. lxii. 5, a reminder flattering to the Lacedae-
monians. 2 of. ch. lviii. 3.

* Note the mocking aaa of phrases in the speech of

» 4.

the Plataeans, ch. lvil.
I2I

THUCYDIDES

» , 2 a ς , \ , Ν
ἀπαγγελία ἀρκεῖ, ἁμαρτανομένων δὲ λόγοι ἔπεσι
κοσμηθέντες προκαλύμματα γίγνονται. ἀλλ᾽ ἢν
οἱ ἡγεμόνες, ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς, κεφαλαιώσαντες
N
πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας διαγνώμας ποιήσησθε,
, 3 ,
ἧσσόν τις ἐπ᾽ ἀδίκοις ἔργοις λόγους καλοὺς
ξητήσει.᾽"
LXVIII. Τοιαῦτα δὲ οἱ Θηβαῖοι εἶπον. οἱ δὲ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι δικασταὶ νομίζοντες τὸ ἐπερώτημα
’ 3 A 4 Ν 3 Aa 4 ς ᾽ 3 A
σφίσιν ὀρθῶς ἕξειν, εἴ τε ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ UT αὐτῶν
3 Ἁ / “ ’ 4 ,
ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθασι, διότι τόν Te ἄλλον χρόνον
ἠξίουν δῆθεν αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὰς παλαιὰς Παυ-
/ \ A a e , N
σανίου μετὰ τὸν Μῆδον σπονδὰς ἡσυχάζειν καὶ
ὅτε ὕστερον ἃ πρὸ τοῦ περιτειχίζεσθαι προεί-
χοντο αὐτοῖς, κοινοὺς εἶναι κατ᾽ ἐκείνας,1 οὐκ ἐδέ-
ἕαντο, ἡγούμενοε τῇ ἑαυτῶν δικαίᾳ βουλήσει
ἔκσπονδοι ἤδη ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κακῶς πεπονθέναι,
’
αὖθις τὸ αὐτὸ ἕνα ἕκαστον παραγαγόντες καὶ
ἐρωτῶντες, εἴ τε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμά-
yous ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδρακότες εἰσίν,
ὁπότε μὴ φαῖεν, ἀπάγοντες ἀπέκτεινον καὶ ἐξαί-
3 ’ 530, ’
ρετον ἐποιήσαντο οὐδένα. διέφθειραν δὲ Πλα-
ταιῶν μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διακοσίων, ᾿Αθη-
ναίων δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι, of ξυνεπολιορκοῦντο"
γυναῖκας δὲ ἠνδραπόδισαν. τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνιαυ-
1 κατ᾽ ἐκείνας, Badham’s conjecture for κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ὡς of

the MSS.

1 Referring to the ἐπερώτημα βραχύ of ch. lii. 4; liii. 2.
Possibly πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας poe with διαγνώμας ποιήσησθε,
‘‘and then as a warning to all pass sentence.”

122

BOOK III. uxvi. 6-Lxvi. 3

brief recital of them suffices, but if they are wrong, .
speeches decked out with phrases are but veils to
hide the truth. Nay, if all leaders, like you in the
present instance, should first state the facts briefly
for all concerned,! and then pass sentence, there
will be less seeking of fair words after foul deeds.”
LXVIITI. Such was the speech of the Thebans.
And the Lacedaemonian judges decided that their
question, whether they had received any benefit from -
the Plataeans in the war, would be a fair one for
them to put; for they had at all other times urged
them, they claimed, to maintain neutrality in accord-
ance with the old covenant which they had made
with Pausanias after the Persian defeat; and when
afterwards, before the investment of Plataea was
undertaken, their proposal to the Plataeans that
they remain neutral in accordance with the earlier
agreement had not been accepted,? they thought
themselves thenceforth released from all obligations
of the treaty because their own intentions had been
honourable, and considered that they had been
wronged by the Plataeans. So they caused them to
come forward again, one at a time, and asked them the
same question, whether they had rendered any good
service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the
war, and when they said “no” they led them off and
slew them, exempting no one.~ The number of the
Plataeans that perished was not less than two hun-
dred, and of the Athenians who had taken part in
the siege twenty-five; and the women were sold as
slaves. As for the city itself, they gave occupation of

3 The text is certainly corrupt. Badham’s slight change,
adopted by Hude, seems to be the simplest solution of the
difficulty.

123

THUCYDIDES

\ ’ 5 \ , a
ναυτικὸν ποιήσαντες ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλεῦσαι
στασιάζουσαν, δώδεκα μὲν ναυσὶ μόναις παρόντων
᾽ θ ld 4 N ,
᾿Αθηναίων περὶ Ναύπακτον, πρὶν δὲ πλέον τι
ἐπιβοηθῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν ναυτικόν, ὅπως
προφθάσωσι, καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο ὅ τε Βρασίδας
καὶ ὁ ᾿Αλκίδας πρὸς ταῦτα.

LXX. Οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι ἐστασίαζον, ἐπειδὴ
e ” a
οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι ἦλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περὶ
3 ’ aA
Επίδαμνον ναυμαχιῶν ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀφεθέντες,
τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ὀκτακοσίων ταλάντων τοῖς προξένοις
, ΝΜ ͵ ,
διηγγνημένοι, ἔργῳ δὲ πεπεισμένοι Κορινθίοις
Κέρκυραν προσποιῆσαι. καὶ ἔπρασσον οὗτοε
Ψ A a , Ψ 3 ,
ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν μετιόντες, ὅπως ἀποστή-

"A@ ’ \ , , t 9 [4
σωσιν ἡναίων τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἀφικομένης
3 a δῚ ’ 3
Αττικῆς τε νεὼς καὶ Κορινθίας πρέσβεις ἀγου-

a , ,
σῶν Kal ἐς λόγους καταστάντων ἐψηφίσαντο
a 3 , \ , 4
Κερκυραῖοι ᾿Αθηναίοις μὲν ξύμμαχοι εἶναι κατὰ
\ , a \ , a
τὰ Evyxeipeva, Ἰ]ελοποννησίοις δὲ φίλοι ὥσπερ

καὶ πρότερον. καί (ἦν yap Πειθίας ἐθελοπρόξενός

a 9

τε τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ τοῦ δήμου προειστήκει)

ὑπάγουσιν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἐς δίκην, λέγοντες

᾿Αθηναίοις τὴν Κέρκυραν καταδουλοῦν. ὁ δὲ

ἀποφυγὼν ἀνθυπάγει αὐτῶν τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους

πέντε ἄνδρας, φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε
Ἁ A a \ a 9 ’ὔ ’ ὃ

Διὸς τοῦ τεμένους καὶ τοῦ ᾿Αλκίνου' ξημία δὲ
3

καθ᾽ ἑκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο στατήρ. ὀφλόντων

1 of. 1. xlvii.-lv. 2 £160,000, $776,000.
8 The agreement was for a defensive alliance (ἐπιμαχίαλ) ;
cf. 1. xliv. 1.

126

BOOK III. ixrx. 2-Lxx. §

their fleet and to sail to Corcyra, which was in the’
throes of a revolution. The Athenians had a fleet of
only twelve ships at Naupactus, and the Lacedae-
monians desired to reach Corcyra before a larger fleet
could come from Athens to re-enforce them. It
was with this end in view that Brasidas and Alcidas
set about making their preparations.

Y” LXX. The Corcyraeans had been in a state of
revolution ever since the home-coming of the captives
who had been taken in the two sea-fights off
Epidamnus!? and had been released by the Corinthians.
They had nominally been set free on bail in the sum
of eight hundred talents? pledged by their proxeni,
but in fact they had been bribed to bring Corcyra
over to the Corinthian side. And these men had
been going from citizen to citizen and intriguing with
them, with a view to inducing the city to revolt
from Athens. And on the arrival of an Attic and
Corinthian ship bringing envoys, and after the envoys
had held conferences with them, the Corcyraeans
voted to continue to be allies to the Athenians
according to their agreement,’ but on the other
hand to renew their former friendship with the
Peloponnesians. Thereupon the returned prisoners
brought Peithias, a volunteer proxenus of the Athen-
ians and leader of the popular party, to trial, charg-
ing him with trying to bring Corcyra into servitude
to Athens. But he, being acquitted, brought suits in
turn against the five wealthiest men of their number,
alleging that they were cutting vine-poles from the
sacred precincts of Zeus and Alcinous, an offence for
which a fine of a stater‘* for each stake was fixed by

4 If of gold, about 16s.; if the silver Athenian stater, about
2s. 8d.; if the silver Corinthian stater, about ls. 4d,

127

THUCYDIDES

δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ ἱκετῶν καθεζομένων
διὰ πλῆθος τῆς ζημίας, ὅπως ταξάμενοι ἀποδῶσιν,
ὁ Πειθίας (ἐτύγχανε γὰρ καὶ βουλῆς ὧν) πείθει
ὥστε τῷ νόμῳ χρήσασθαι. οἱ δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε
νόμῳ ἐξείργοντο καὶ ἅμα ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Πειθίαν,
ἕως ἔτι βουλῆς ἐστι, μέλλειν τὸ πλῆθος ἀνα-

͵ \ “9 \ 2A, , , Ν
πείσειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ᾿Αθηναίοις φίλους τε καὶ
ἐχθροὺς νομίζειν, ξυνίσταντό τε καὶ λαβόντες
ἐγχειρίδια ἐξαπιναίως ἐς τὴν βουλὴν ἐσελθόντες

’ ’ , \ Ν) rn
τόν τε ΠΙειθίαν κτείνουσι καὶ ἄλλους τῶν TE
βουλευτῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν ἐς ἑξήκοντα" οἱ δέ τινες
τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης τῷ Πειθίᾳ ὀλίγοι ἐς τὴν ᾿Αττι-
κὴν τριήρη κατέφυγον ἔτι παροῦσαν.

LXXI. Δράσαντες δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ξυγκαλέσαντες
Κερκυραίους εἶπον ὅτι ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστα εἴη
καὶ ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν δουλωθεῖεν ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίων, τό τε
λοιπὸν μηδετέρους δέχεσθαι ἄλλ᾽ ἢ μιᾷ νηὶ ἡσυχά-

\ Ἁ , , ς nA @ Α
ζοντας, τὸ δὲ πλέον πολέμιον ἡγεῖσθαι. ὡς δὲ
εἶπον, καὶ ἐπικυρῶσαε ἠνάγκασαν τὴν γνώμην.
πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας εὐθὺς πρέσβεις
περί τε τῶν πεπραγμένων διδάξοντας ὡς ξυνέφερε
καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ καταπεφευγότας πείσοντας μηδὲν
ἀνεπιτήδειον πράσσειν, ὅπως μή τις ἐπιστροφὴ

’ e693 A a
γένηται. LXXITI. ἐλθόντων δὲ of ᾿Αθηναῖοι τούς

1 Or, perhaps, ἐπιστροφή = animadverato, ‘‘that no atten-
tion should be paid”—by way of punishment for the change
in Corcyraean policy.

128

BOOK III. cuxx.-5—ixxu. 1

law. When they had been convicted and because of
the excessive amount of the fine took refuge at the
temples as suppliants, that they might arrange for
the payment of the fine by instalments, Peithias per-
suaded the senate, of which he was also a member, to
let the law take its course. The condemned men,
seeing that they were debarred by the law from carry-
ing out their proposal and at the same time learning
that Peithias, so long as he continued to be a member
of the senate, would persist in his attempt to per-
suade the populace to conclude an offensive and de-
fensive alliance with the Athenians, banded together
and suddenly rushing into the senate with daggers
in their hands killed Peithias and others, both sena-
tors and private persons, to the number of sixty. <A
few, however, who held the same political views as
Peithias, took refuge in the Attic trireme that was
still in the harbour.

LXXI. After they had taken these measures the
conspirators called the Corcyraeans together and
told them that it was all for the best, and that
now they would be least likely to be enslaved by the
Athenians ; and in future they should remain neutral
and receive neither party if they came with more
than one ship, regarding any larger number as
hostile. Having thus spoken they compelled the
people to ratify their proposal. They also sent at
once to Athens envoys to explain recent events at
Corcyra, showing how these were for the interests
of Athens, and to persuade those who had taken
refuge there to do nothing prejudicial to them, in
order that there might not be a reaction against
Corcyra.1 LXXII. But when the envoys arrived,
the Athenians arrested them as revolutionists, and

129
VOL. 11. K

THUCYDIDES

τε πρέσβεις ws νεωτερίξοντας ξυλλαβόντες καὶ
ὅσους ἔπεισαν κατέθεντο ἐς Αἴγιναν.
3 \ ’ ἴω ’ e 4 XN
Ky δὲ τούτῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων οἱ ἔχοντες τὰ
4 4, , ,
πράγματα ἐλθούσης τριήρους Κορινθίας καὶ Λακε-
’ ’ 2 ’ a “4 N
δαιμονίων πρέσβεων ἐπιτίθενται TO δήμῳ καὶ
: ᾽ὔ >
μαχόμενοι ἐνίκησαν. ἀφικομένης δὲ νυκτὸς ὁ
μὲν δῆμος ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς
πόλεως καταφεύγει καὶ αὐτοῦ ξυλλεγεὶς ἱδρύθη,
καὶ τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα εἶχον" οἱ δὲ τήν τε
ἀγορὰν κατέλαβον, οὗπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ῴκουν αὐτῶν,
καὶ τὸν λιμένα τὸν πρὸς αὐτῇ καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ἤπειρον. LXXIII. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἠκροβολίσαντό
τε ὀλίγα καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς περιέπεμπον ἀμφό-
τεροι, τοὺς δούλους παρακαλοῦντές τε καὶ ἐλευ-
θερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι: καὶ τῷ μὲν δήμῳ τῶν
οἰκετῶν τὸ πλῆθος παρεγένετο ξύμμαχον, τοῖς δ᾽
ἑτέροις ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου ἐπίκουροι ὀκτακόσιοι.
LXXIV. διαλιπούσης δ᾽ ἡμέρας μάχη αὖθις
γίγνεται, καὶ νικᾷ ὁ δῆμος χωρίων τε ἰσχύι καὶ
πλήθει προύχων" αἴ τε γυναῖκες αὐτοῖς τολμηρῶς
4 lA 3 Ἁ A 3 [ον “
ξυνεπελάβοντο βάλλουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν TO
κεράμῳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένουσαι τὸν θόρυ-
βον. γενομένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς περὶ δείλην ὀψίαν
δείσαντες οἱ ὀλίγοι μὴ αὐτοβοεὶ ὁ δῆμος τοῦ τε
/ / 3 A \ a ,
vewpiou κρατήσειεν ἐπελθὼν καὶ σφᾶς διαφθεί-
ρειεν, ἐμπιπρᾶσι τὰς οἰκίας τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς
3 a \ \ , Ψ \ 9
ἀγορᾶς καὶ τὰς Evvoxias, ὅπως μὴ ἢ ἔφοδος,
» 3 ’᾽ ΝΜ 3 [4 σ Ν
φειδόμενοι οὔτε οἰκείας οὔτε ἀλλοτρίας, ὥστε καὶ
130

BOOK III. txxu. 1-Lxxiv. 2

deposited them in Aegina, together with such of the
fugitives as they had won over.

Meanwhile the dominant party at Corcyra, on the
arrival of a Corinthian trireme with Lacedaemonian
envoys, attacked the people and were victorious in
the fight. But when night came on the people fled
for refuge to the acropolis and the high places of the
city, and getting together in a body established
themselves there. They held also the Hyllaic har-
bour,! while the other party seized the quarter of the
market-place where most of them lived, and the
harbour? adjacent to it which faces the mainland.
LXXIII. On the next day they skirmished a little,
and both parties sent messengers round into the
fields, calling upon the slaves and offering them
freedom ; and a majority of the slaves made common
cause with the people, while the other party gained
the support of eight hundred mercenaries from the
mainland. LXXIV. After a day’s interval another
battle occurred, and the people won, as they had
the advantage in the strength of their position as
well as in numbers. The women also boldly took
part with them in the fight, hurling tiles from the
houses and enduring the uproar with a courage be-
yond their sex. But about twilight, when their forces
had been routed, the oligarchs, fearing lest the
people, if they came on, might at the first onset get
possession of the arsenal and put them to the sword,
set fire to the dwelling-houses around the market-
place and to the tenements,* in order to prevent an
assault, sparing neither their own houses nor those
of others. The result was that much merchandise

1 Probably the present bay Chalikiopulon. 3. Now bay of

Kastradu. ὃ Large buildings rented to several poor families
= smeulae at Rome).

131
K 2

THUCYDIDES

4
χρήματα πολλὰ ἐμπόρων κατεκαύθη Kal ἡ πόλες
ἐκινδύνευσε πᾶσα διαφθαρῆναι, εἰ ἄνεμος ἐπε-

/ a > » ? 3 / \ ε \
γένετο τῇ φλογὶ ἐπίφορος ἐς αὐτήν. καὶ οἱ μὲν
παυσάμενοι τῆς μάχης ὡς ἑκάτεροι ἡσυχάσαντες

\ 7 2 a 4 \ ε ’ὔ nn
τὴν νύκτα ἐν φυλακῇ ἦσαν' καὶ ἡ Κορινθία vais
τοῦ δήμου κεκρατηκότος ὑπεξανήγετο, καὶ τῶν
ἐπικούρων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον λαθόντες
διεκομίσθησαν.

LXXV. Τῇ δὲ ἐπυγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικόστρατος
ὁ Διειτρέφους, ᾿Αθηναίων στρατηγός, παρα-

’ A > UA 4 ‘
γίγνεται βοηθῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου δώδεκα ναυσὶ

\ ’ / e / 4, ’
καὶ Μεσσηνίων πεντακοσίοις οπλίταις" ξυμβασίν
\ / Ψ a 3 f

τε ἔπρασσε καὶ πείθει ὥστε ξυγχωρῆσαι ἀλλή-
λοις δέκα μὲν ἄνδρας τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους κρῖναι, οἵ

> “ ΝΜ \ > » 2 a \
οὐκέτι ἔμειναν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους οἰκεῖν σπονδὰς

δ 3 lA , \ \ ? ’

πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιησαμένους καὶ πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους

Φ \ 3 \ 2 \ \ , ’
ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίξειν.

κα ¢ ἃ “A [4 ΝΜ 3 ’
καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα πράξας ἔμελλεν ἀποπλεύσεσθαι"
οἱ δὲ τοῦ δήμου προστάται πείθουσιν αὐτὸν πέντε
μὲν ναῦς τῶν αὐτοῦ σφίσι καταλιπεῖν, ὅπως
ἧσσόν τι ἐν κινήσει ὦσιν οἱ ἐναντίοι, ἴσας δὲ

3 \ A 9 “A 9 A ,
αὐτοὶ πληρώσαντες ἐκ σφῶν αὐτῶν ξυμπέμψειν.
καὶ ὁ μὲν ξυνεχώρησεν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κατέ-
λεγον ἐς τὰς ναῦς. δείσαντες δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐς τὰς

A ’ A
᾿Αθήνας ἀποπεμφθῶσι καθίζουσιν ἐς τὸ τῶν
’
Διοσκόρων ἱερόν. Νικόστρατος δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀνίστη
τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ὁ δῆμος
ὁπλισθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ, ὡς οὐδὲν
132

BOOK III. txxiv. 2—-txxv. 4

was burned up and that the whole city was in im-
minent danger of being entirely destroyed if a wind
blowing toward the city had sprung up to reinforce
the flames. And during the night, after they had
desisted from battle, both parties rested but re-
mained on the alert; and now that the people had
got the upper hand the Corinthian ship slipped out
to sea, and most of the mercenaries were secretly
conveyed over to the mainland.

LXXV. On the following day Nicostratus son of
Diitrephes, general of the Athenians, came to their
assistance from Naupactus with twelve ships and five
hundred Messenian hoplites. He tried to negotiate a
settlement between the factions, and succeeded in
persuading them to come to a mutual agreement:
that the twelve men who were chiefly to blame
should be brought to trial (whereupon they fled at.
once) and that the rest should make peace with
each other and dwell together, and enter into an
offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians.
When he had accomplished this, he was about to
sail away; but the leaders of the people persuaded
him to leave them five of his ships, that their
opponents might be somewhat less inclined to dis-
turbance, agreeing on their part to man and send
with him an equal number of their own ships. He
agreed, and they began to tell off their personal
enemies as crews for the ships. But these, fearing
that they might be sent off to Athens, sat down
as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. Nico-
stratus, however, urged them to rise and tried to
reassure them. But when he could not induce them
- to rise, the people took this pretext to arm them-
selves, interpreting their distrust and refusal to sail

133

THUCYDIDES

38 A e \ / fol ” \ tal
αὐτῶν ὑγιὲς διανοουμένων τῇ τοῦ μὴ ξυμπλεῖν
3 ’ ’ 4 > A b A 3 ἴον
ἀπιστίᾳ, τά τε OTAA αὑτῶν ἐκ τῶν OLKLOV ἔλαβε
καὶ αὐτῶν τινας οἷς ἐπέτυχον, εἰ μὴ Νικόστρατος
ἐκώλυσε, διέφθειραν ἄν. ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι

’ ’ὔ 3 \ @ ee 4
τὰ γυγνόμενα καθίζουσιν és τὸ “Ἥραιον ἱκέται
καὶ γίγνονται οὐκ ἐλάσσους τετρακοσίων. ὁ δὲ

a /
δῆμος δείσας μή TL νεωτερίσωσιν ἀνίστησί τε
αὐτοὺς πείσας καὶ διακομίξει ἐς τὴν πρὸ τοῦ
Ἡραίου νῆσον καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκεῖσε αὐτοῖς
διεπέμπετο.

LXXVI. Τῆς δὲ στάσεως ἐν τούτῳ οὔσης τε-
τάρτῃ ἢ πέμπτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς
τὴν νῆσον διακομιδὴν αἱ ἐκ τῆς Κυλλήνης Πελο-
ποννησίων νῆες, μετὰ τὸν ἐκ τῆς ᾿Ιωνίας πλοῦν
ἔφορμοι οὖσαι, παραγίγνονται τρεῖς καὶ πεντή-

ες 3 A 9 4 Ψ 4
κοντα" ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν ᾿Αλκίδας, ὅσπερ Kal πρό-
τερον, καὶ Βρασίδας αὐτῷ ξύμβουλος ἐπέπλει.
e , \ 2 ’ 7 [οὶ 3 ’
ὁρμισάμενοι δὲ ἐς Σύβοτα λιμένα τῆς ἠπείρου
ἅμα ἕῳ ἐπέπλεον τῇ Κερκύρᾳ. LXXVII. οἱ δὲ

A 4 wn
πολλῷ θορύβῳ καὶ πεφοβημένοι τά τ᾽’ ἐν TH
πόλει καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν παρεσκευάζοντό τε ἅμα
ἑξήκοντα ναῦς καὶ τὰς αἰεὶ πληρουμένας ἐξέ-
πεμπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐμαντίους, παραινούντων ᾿Αθη-

’ a a A A
ναίων σφᾶς τε ἐᾶσαι πρῶτον ἐκπλεῦσαι Kal
ὕστερον πάσαις ἅμα ἐκείνους ἐπιγενέσθαι. ὡς δὲ
αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦσαν σποράδες αἱ

A 4 \ 3 \ > / 3 ς Ν
νῆες, δύο μὲν εὐθὺς ηὐτομόλησαν, ἐν ἑτέραις δὲ
ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἐμπλέοντες ἐμάχοντο' ἦν δὲ οὐδεὶς
134

BOOK III. ixxv. 4-Lxxvi. 2

with Nicostratus as proof that their intentions were
anything but good. Accordingly they took arms
from their houses, and would have slain some of the
oligarchs whom they chanced to meet, if Nicostratus
had not prevented them. The rest, seeing what was
going on, sat down as suppliants in the temple of
Hera, and they were not less than four hundred in
number. But the people, fearing that they might
start a revolution, persuaded them to rise and con-
veyed them over to the island which lies in front of
the temple of Hera; and provisions were regularly
sent to them there.

LXXVI. At this stage of the revolution, on the
fourth or fifth day after the transfer of the men to
the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived! from
Cyllene, where they had been lying at anchor since
their voyage from Ionia, being fifty-three in number;
and Alcidas was in command of them as before,
with Brasidas on board as his adviser. They came to
anchor first at Sybota, a harbour of the mainland, and
then at daybreak sailed for Corcyra. LXXVII. But
the Corcyraeans,? being in great confusion and thrown
into a panic by the state of affairs in the city as well
as by the approaching fleet, proceeded to equip sixty
ships and at the same time to send them out against
the enemy as fast as they were manned, although
the Athenians urged that they themselves be per-
mitted to sail out first, and that the Corcyraeans
should come out afterwards with all their ships in a
body. But when their ships were near the enemy,
scattered here and there, two of them deserted
immediately, while in others the crews were fighting
one another; and there was no order in anything

1 of. ch. lxix. 1.
4 4.e, the democratic party, now in control.

135

THUCYDIDES

3 κόσμος TOV ποιουμένων. ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ ἸΠἐλοπον-
Ἁ
νήσιοι τὴν ταραχὴν εἴκοσι μὲν ναυσὶ πρὸς τοὺς
Κερκυραίους ἐτάξαντο, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς πρὸς τὰς
ὃ ὃ A A 9 θ ’ Φ 4 e ὃ ’ ς 1
@dexa ναῦς τῶν Αθηναίων, ὧν ἦσαν αἱ dvo ἡ
’ \ 4

Σαλαμινία καὶ Πάραλος.

LXXVIII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι κακῶς τε
καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγας προσπίπτοντες ἐταλαιπώρουν τὸ
καθ' αὑτούς" οἱ δ᾽ ᾿Αθηναῖοι φοβούμενοι τὸ

a \ a e , \ 9
πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν ἁθρόαις μὲν οὐ
προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ κατὰ μέσον ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς
τεταγμέναις, προσβαλόντες δὲ κατὰ κέρας κατα-

΄ ’ A Col
δύουσι μίαν ναῦν. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κύκλον ταξα-

’ A A a
μένων αὐτῶν περιέπλεον Kal ἐπειρῶντο θορυβεῖν.

’ a 4
γνόντες δὲ οἱ πρὸς τοῖς Κερκυραίοις καὶ δείσαντες

\ Ψ 2 4 , 3 [ον
μὴ ὅπερ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ γένοιτο, ἐπιβοηθοῦσι,

\ a
καὶ γενόμεναι ἁθρόαι αἱ νῆες ἅμα τὸν ἐπίπλουν

a» , 9 a eo ε , WEN
τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις ἐποιοῦντο. οἱ δ᾽ ὑπεχώρουν ἤδη
πρύμναν κρουόμενοι καὶ ἅμα τὰς τῶν Κερκυραίων
3 4 a Ψ ᾽ e [οἱ
ἐβούλοντο προκαταφυγεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα, ἑαυτῶν
σχολῇ τε ὑποχωρούντων καὶ πρὸς σφᾶς τεταγ-
μένων τῶν ἐναντίων. ἡ μὲν οὖν ναυμαχία
τοιαύτη γενομένη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ἡλίου δύσιν.

LXXIX. Καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι δείσαντες μὴ

’ 3 ’ » \ \ ΄ e
σφίσιν ἐπιπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ THY πόλιν ὡς κρα-
τοῦντες οἱ πολέμιοι ἢ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀναλά-
βωσιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι νεωτερίσωσι, τούς τε ἐκ τῆς

V4 4 3 ν Φ' “ \
νήσου πάλιν ἐς τὸ “Hpatov διεκόμισαν καὶ τὴν

1 ἡ added by Kriiger.
136

BOOK III. txxvir. 2-7xxix. 1

they did. And when the Peloponnesians saw their
confusion they arrayed only twenty ships against
the Corcyraeans, and all the rest against the twelve
Athenian ships, among which were the two sacred
ships, the Salaminia and the Paralos.

LXXVIII. Now the Corcyraeans, since they were
attacking in disorder and with few. ships at a time,
were having trouble in their part of the battle; and
the Athenians, fearing the enemy’s superior numbers
and seeing the danger of being surrounded, did not
attack the whole body together nor the centre of
the ships that were arrayed against them, but charged
upon one of the wings and sank a single ship. And
then, when the Peloponnesians after this move
formed their ships in a circle, they kept sailing round
the Peloponnesian fleet, trying to throw it into
confusion. But those who were facing the Corcy-
raeans, perceiving this manceuvre and fearing a
repetition of what happened at Naupactus,! came to
the rescue, and the whole fleet, now united, advanced
simultaneously upon the Athenians. Thereupon the
Athenians began to retire, backing water,? hoping at
the same time that the Corcyraean ships might as
far as possible escape into harbour,’ as they them-
selves retired slowly and the enemy’s attacks were
directed only against them. Such then was the
course of the battle, which lasted till sunset.

LXXIX. The Corcyraeans, fearing that the
enemy, confident of victory, might sail against the
city and either take on board the prisoners on the
island or commit some other act of violence, trans-
ferred these prisoners once more to the temple of

1 of. τι. Ixxxiv. 2 4,6. keeping their faces to the enemy.

3 3.¢. with as many ships as possible; as it was they lost
thirteen ships. ee
137

THUCYDIDES

2 πόλιν ἐφύλασσον. οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ

ἐτόλμησαν πλεῦσαι κρατοῦντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ,
τρεῖς δὲ καὶ δέκα ναῦς ἔχοντες τῶν Κερκυραίων
ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον ὅθενπερ ἀνηγάγοντο.
τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
ἐπέπλεον, καίπερ ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ
ὄντας καὶ Βρασίδου παραινοῦντος, ὡς λέγεται,
᾿Αλκίδᾳ, ἰσοψήφου δὲ οὐκ ὄντος: ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν
Λευκίμνην τὸ ἀκρωτήριον ἀποβάντες ἐπόρθουν
τοὺς ἀγρούς.

LXXX. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τῶν Κερκυραίων ἐν τούτῳ
περιδεὴς γενόμενος μὴ ἐπιπλεύσωσιν αἱ νῆες, τοῖς
τε ἱκέταις ἤσαν ἐς λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅπως
σωθήσεται ἡ πόλις. καί τινας αὐτῶν ἔπεισαν
9 a 9 A 4, @ a
ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσ βῆναι' ἐπλήρωσαν yap ὅμως τριά-

1 e de II 4 ’ ) € ’
κοντα. οἱ εἐλοποννήσιοι μέχρι μέσον ἡμέρας
δῃώσαντες τὴν γῆν ἀπέπλευσαν, καὶ ὑπὸ νύκτα

> “ 9 , e 4 A 3 y :
αὐτοῖς ἐφρυκτωρήθησαν ἑξήκοντα νῆες ᾿Αθηναίων
, >A , A e 2 a
προσπλέουσαι ἀπὸ Λευκάδος: as οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
πυνθανόμενοι τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὰς μετ᾽ ᾿Αλκίδου

A 3 ’ ’ a 3 ’
ναῦς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν μελλούσας πλεῖν ἀπέστειλαν
καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους στρατηγόν.

LXXXI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς

\ 9 \ / 3 ’ > 3 ν
νυκτὸς εὐθὺς κατὰ τάχος ἐκομίζοντο ἐπ᾽ οἴκου
παρὰ τὴν γῆν' καὶ ὑπερενεγκόντες τὸν Λευκαδίων
3 A 4 " lA 9 A
ἰσθμὸν τὰς ναῦς, ὅπως μὴ περιπλέοντες ὀφθῶσιν,

1 Some MSS. give προσδεχόμενοι τὸν ἐπίπλουν after τριά-
κοντα, most editors omit.

138

BOOK III. uxxrx. 1~Lxxx1. 1

Hera and then took measures to protect the city.
The Peloponnesians, however, although they were
the victors in the naval battle, did not venture to
attack the city, but with thirteen Corcyraean ships
which they had taken sailed back to the harbour on
the mainland from which they had set out. On the
next day they were no more inclined to attack the
city, though the inhabitants were in a state of great
confusion and fear, and though Brasidas, it is said,
urged Alcidas to do so, but did not have equal
authority with him. Instead, they merely landed on
the promontory of Leucimne and ravaged the fields.
LXXX. Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, becom-
ing alarmed lest the ships should attack them,
conferred with the suppliants and also with the other
members of the opposite faction on the best means of
saving the city. And some of them they persuaded
to go on board the ships; for in spite of all the
Corcyraeans had manned thirty ships. But the
᾿ Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land till midday,
sailed away, and toward night a signal was flashed to

them that forty Athenian ships were approaching |

from Leucas. These ships had been sent by the
Athenians, under the command of Eurymedon son
of Thucles, when they learned of the revolution at
Corcyra and that the fleet under Alcidas was about
to sail thither.

LXXXI. The Peloponnesians accordingly set sail
that very night for home, going with all speed and
keeping close to the shore; and hauling their ships
across the Leucadian isthmus,! in order to avoid being
seen, as they would be if they sailed around, they got

1 This isthmus was the ἀκτὴ ἠπείρου of Homer (w 378),

now Santa Maura, the neck of land, about three stadia in
width, joining Leucas with the mainland.
139

THUCYDIDES

2 ἀποκομίξζονται. Κερκυραῖοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τάς τε
᾿Αττικὰς ναῦς προσπλεούσας τάς τε τῶν πολε-
’ > , a 1 , , ,
μίων οἰχομένας, NaGovres! τούς τε Μεσσηνίους ἐς
τὴν πόλιν ἤγαγον πρότερον ἔξω ὄντας, καὶ τὰς
ναῦς περιπλεῦσαι κελεύσαντες ἃς ἐπλήρωσαν ἐς
“ἌΝ fe!
τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα, ἐν ὅσῳ περιεκομίζοντο, τῶν
ἐχθρῶν εἴ τινα λάβοιεν, ἀπέκτεινον" καὶ ἐκ τῶν
a Φ Ν᾿ 2 a 3 4 bd
νεῶν ὅσους ἔπεισαν ἐσβῆναι éxBiBalovres ἀπε-
χρῶντο, ἐς τὸ “Ηραιόν τε ἐλθόντες τῶν ἱκετῶν
ὡς πεντήκοντα ἄνδρας δίκην ὑποσχεῖν ἔπεισαν
’ ’ 4 e \ Ἃ
8 καὶ κατέγνωσαν πάντων θάνατον. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
τῶν ἱκετῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ
4 a 3 a~ 93 a e¢ » 9 ,
γιγνόμενα, διέφθειρον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους
3 ’ \ 3 7 e 9 e
καὶ ἐκ τῶν δένδρων τινὲς ἀπήγχοντο, of δ᾽ ὡς
Ψ 3 ’ 3 fe) ς ’ e Ul
4 ἕκαστοι ἐδύναντο ἀνηλοῦντο. ἡμέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς
3 , ε > , aA tes
ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ
παρέμεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς
a ’
δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπι-
φέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν, ἀπέθανον
δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἕνεκα, καὶ ἄλλοι χρη-
[4 ’ 9 4 e \ A ’
μάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων"
a , 20. ἡ ’ : 4 “ 9
5 πᾶσά Te ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν
A 4 ’ IQA Ψ 3 \
τῷ τοιούτῳ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ
a /
ἔτε περαιτέρω. καὶ yap πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέ-

1 χαθόντες, Hude’s conjecture for λαβόντες of the MSS.

1 The 500 whom Nicostratus had brought, the object
being doubtless merely the intimidation of the oligarchs.

140

BOOK: ΠΗ. -f LEXXL I-5

away. Nowthe Corcyraeans had. ‘no sooner perceived
that the Athenian fleet was approaching and that
the enemy’s fleet had gone than’ they secretly
brought the Messenians,! who had till then heen.oat- |
side the walls, into the city, and ordered the’ ships. :
which they had manned to sail round into the.
Hyllaic harbour ?; then while these were on their
way thither they slew any of their personal enemies
whom they could lay hands upon. They also put
ashore and despatched all those on board the ships
whom they had persuaded to go aboard, then went
into the temple of Hera, persuaded about fifty of
the suppliants there to submit to trial, and con-
demned them all to death. But most of the sup-
pliants, not having consented to be tried, when
they saw what was happening set about destroying
one another in the sacred precinct itself, while a
few hanged themselves on trees, and still others
made away with themselves as best they could. And
during the seven days that Eurymedon, after his
arrival, stayed there with his sixty ships, the Cor-
cyraeans continued slaughtering such of their fellow-
citizens as they considered to be their personal
enemies. The charge they brought was of conspiring
to overthrow the democracy, but some were in fact
put to death merely to satisfy private enmity, and
others, because money was owing to them, were slain
by those who had borrowed it. Death in every form —
ensued, and whatever horrors are wont to be per-
petrated at such times all happened then—aye, and
even worse. For father slew son, men were dragged

2 The object was that the oligarchs on them might be cut
off from their friends in the neighbourhood of the agora and
in the temple of Hera.

141

THUCYDIDES

9: NX a e a > a \ Ν
KTELVE καὶ ἀπὸ. τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ “πρὸς
αὐτοῖς ἐκτέίνοντο, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ περιοικοδομη-
θέντες. ἐς τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ΔἸ ΕΒ ΆΜΡ:

oe “LX XXII. Οὕτως ὦ ὠμὴ ἡ στάσις ἷ προυχώρησε,
«καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότε ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο,

ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ws εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν
ἐκινήθη διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν
δήμων προστάταις τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι
a 2 4
καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν
εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ᾽ ἑτοίμων
a \
παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμ-
a A ’
μαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει
καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει
’ a
ῥᾳδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τε βουλο-
μένοις ἐπορίζοντοι, καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ
χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν
ΣΝ») 4 e > \ UA 3) 4
καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων
> a δὲ ὶ ς / \ va) id
ἢ, μᾶλλον OE καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι
διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται 5 at μεταβολαὶ τῶν
ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ
ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται
ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκου-
, > 7 , ε , e \ δ
σίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν" ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν
’ , a ν es , , \
εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ
πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.
’ a
"Eotacialé te οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων Kal Ta
a ’
ἐφυστερίζοντά πον πύστει τῶν προγενομένων

1 ἡ στάσις, for στάσις of the MSS., Kriiger with Schol.
2 ἕκασται, Hude alters to ἑκάσταις.

142

BOOK III. xxx, 5~ixxxn. 3

from the temples and slain near them, and some
were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and
perished there.

LXXXII. To such excesses of savagery did the
revolution go; and it seemed the more savage, because
it was among the first that occurred ; for afterwards
practically the whole Hellenic world was convulsed,
since in each state the leaders of the democratic
factions were at variance with the oligarchs, the
former seeking to bring in the Athenians, the latter
the Lacedaemonians. And while in time of peace
they would have had no pretext for asking their
intervention, nor any inclination to do so, yet now
that these two states were at war, either faction in
the various cities, if it desired a revolution, found
it easy to bring in allies also, for the discomfiture at
one stroke of its opponents and the strengthening
of its own cause. And so there fell upon the cities
on account of revolutions many grievous calamities,
such as happen and always will happen while human
nature is the same, but which are severer or milder,
and different in their manifestations, according as
the variations in circumstances present themselves
in each case. For in peace and prosperity both
states and individuals have gentler feelings, because
men are not then forced to face conditions of dire
necessity ; but war, which robs men of the easy
supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster
and creates in most people a temper that matches
their condition.

And so the cities began to be disturbed by revolu-
tions, and those that fell into this state later, on
hearing of what had been done before, carried to

143

THUCYDIDES

πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς
διανοίας τῶν τ᾽ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ
τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπίᾳ. καὶ τὴν εἰωθνῖαν ἀξίωσιν
τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δι-
καιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία
ena a ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς
εὐλέα εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου
πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ “πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν
ἀργόν" τὸ ὃ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσ-
᾿ετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ | ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀπο-
τροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος. καὶ ὃ μὲν χαλε-
παίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος.
ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχὼν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοή-
σας ἔτι δεινότερος" προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν
αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτὴς καὶ τοὺς
ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος. ἁπλῶς τε ὁ φθάσας
τὸν μέλλοντα κακόν tu δρᾶν ἐπηνεῖτο καὶ ὃ ἐπε-
κελεύσας τὸν “μὴ διανοούμενον. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ
ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ
τὸ ἑτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν" οὐ
γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίᾳ 5 αἱ τοιαῦ-
ται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεο-
veEia. καὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ
θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι
παρανομῆσαι. τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καλῶς
λεγόμενα ἐνεδέχοντο ἔ ἔργων φυλακῇ, εἰ πρού; χοιεν,
καὶ οὐ γενναιότητι. ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαϊ τέ τινα

1 ἀσφάλεια δὲ τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι Hude.
2 ὠφελίᾳ, Poppo for ὠφελίας of the MSS.

1 ᾧ 6. either of plotting or of detecting plots.
2 Or, ‘‘ Fair words proffered by their opponents they re-

144

BOOK III. txxxu. 3-7

still more extravagant lengths the invention of new
devices, both by the extreme ingenuity of their
attacks and the monstrousness of their revenges.
The ordinary acceptation of words in their relation to
things was changed as men thought fit. Reckless
audacity came to be regarded as courageous loyalty
to party, prudent hesitation as specious cowardice,
moderation as a cloak for unmanly weakness, and
to be clever in everything was to do naught in any-
thing. Frantic impulsiveness was accounted a true’
man’s part, but caution in deliberation a specious
pretext for shirking. The hot-headed man was
always trusted, his opponent suspected. He who
succeeded in a plot was clever, and he who had
detected one was still: shrewder; on the other hand,
he who made it his aim to have no need of such
things! was a disrupter of party and scared of his
opponents. In a word, both he that got ahead of
another who intended to do something evil and he
that prompted to evil one who had never thought of
of it were alike commended. Furthermore, the tie
of blood was weaker than the tie of party, because
the partisan was more ready to dare without demur ;
for such associations are not entered into for the
public good in conformity with the prescribed laws,
but for selfish aggrandisement contrary to the estab-
lished laws. Their pledges to one another were
confirmed not so much by divine law as by common
transgression of the law. Fair words proffered by
opponents, if these had the upper hand, were re-
ceived with caution as to their actions and not in a
generous spirit.2, To get revenge on some one was

ceived, if they had the upper hand, by vigilant action rather-
than with frank generosity.”

145
VOL. 1. L

THUCYDIDES

περὶ πλείονος ἦν ἢ αὐτὸν μὴ προπαθεῖν. καὶ
ὅρκοι εἴ που ἄρα γένοιντο ξυναλλαγῆς, ἐν τῷ
αὐτίκα πρὸς τὸ ἄπορον ἑκατέρῳ διδόμενοι ἴσχυον,
3 > ἢ 3 4 2 \ A
οὐκ ἐχόντων ἄλλοθεν δύναμιν" ἐν δὲ τῷ παρα-
’ e 4 A > Ν ΝΜ
τυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαρσῆσαι, εἰ ἴδοι ἄφαρκτον,
ἥδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προ-
a \ , 93 \ 3 ’ ε
φανοῦς, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς ἐλογίξετο καὶ ὅτι
ἀπάτῃ περιγενόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσε-
, ea ? e A “A Vv
λάμβανεν. ῥᾷον δ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες
, 3 A 3 \ A
δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν
9 [4 > \ an 39 f
αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται.
Πάντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ 2 διὰ πλεο-
’ A , 3 3 ᾽ A 9 Ν
νεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ
φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. οἱ γὰρ
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετ᾽ ὀνόματος ἑκά-
τεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς
καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν
κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες AOA ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ
, ’
δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι
’ A
éroAunody τε τὰ δεινότατα, ἐπεξῆσάν τε τὰς
τιμωρίας ἔτι μείξους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ
τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προστιθέντες,3 ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκα-
τέροις που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὁρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ
1 αἴτιον, Hude deletes, with Madvig.

2 ἡ, Hude deletes.
3 προστιθέντες, Dion. Hal. for προτιθέντες of the MSS.

1 Or, omitting ὄντες, ‘‘And in general men are more
willing to be called clever rogues than good simpletons.”

146

BOOK III. uxxxu, 7-8

more valued than never to have suffered injury
oneself. And if in any case oaths of reconcilement
were exchanged, for the moment only were they bind-
ing, since each side had given them merely to meet
the emergency, having at the time no other resource ;
but he who, when the opportunity offered and he
saw his enemy off his guard, was the first to pluck up
courage, found his revenge sweeter because of the
violated pledge than if he had openly attacked, and
took into account not only the greater safety of such
a course, but also that, by winning through deceit,
he was gaining besides the prize of astuteness. And
in general it is easier for rogues to get themselves
called clever than for the stupid to be reputed
good,! and they are ashamed of the one but glory in
the other.

The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule
which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing
from them, that ardour? which belongs to men who
once have become engaged in factious rivalry. For
those who emerged as party leaders in the several
cities, by assuming on either side a fair-sounding
name, the one using as its catch-word “ political
equality for the masses under the law,” the other
‘temperate aristocracy, ® while they pretended to be
devoted to the common weal, in reality made it their
prize; striving in every way to get the better of each
other they dared the most awful deeds, and sought
revenges still more awful, not pursuing these within
the bounds of justice and the public weal, but limit-
ing them, both parties alike, only by the moment’s

2 Or, τὸ πρόθυμον, ‘* party-spirit.”
* For the objectionable terms ‘‘ democracy ” (δημοκρατία)
and ‘‘ oligarchy ” (ὀλιγαρχία).

147
L 2

THUCYDIDES

, 3 She , 1 . , \

ψήφου ἀδίκου Katayvacews! ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι TO
a a ’
κρατεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν
9 ’ C4 3 / \ 3 > ἢ
ἐκπιμπλάναι. ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνο-
μιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως
, 3 3 δὲ [4
τε διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκονον. τὰ δὲ μέσα
τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνί-
“A 4 A a ,

ἕοντο ἢ φθόνῳ Tod περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο.

LXXXIII. Οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακο-

’ \ \ 4 a ¢ a \ Ν
τροπίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῷ ᾿Ελληνικῷ, καὶ TO
εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, κατα-
γελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις
τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν" οὐ γὰρ
ς ’ " ’ 3 Ν v7 e
ἦν ὁ διαλύσων οὔτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς οὔτε ὄρκος φο-
βερός, κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες ἅπαντες λογισμῷ ἐς τὸ
ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον πρου-
σκόπουν ἢ πιστεῦσαι ἐδύναντο. καὶ οἱ φαυλό-
τεροι γνώμην ὡς τὰ πλείω περιεγίγνοντο' τῷ γὰρ
4 A a

δεδιέναι TO Te αὑτῶν ἐνδεὲς Kal TO τῶν ἐναντίων
ξυνετόν, μὴ λόγοις τε ἥσσους ὦσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης φθάσωσι προεπι-
βουλευόμενοι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν.
οἱ δὲ καταφρονοῦντες κἂν προαισθέσθαι καὶ ἔργῳ

950ῸΝ a a 4 a , Ν
οὐδὲν σφᾶς δεῖν λαμβάνειν ἃ γνώμῃ ἔξεστιν,
ἄφαρκτοι μᾶλλον διεφθείροντο.

1 καταγνώσεως, Hude deletes, with van Herwerden.

1 Or, as Shilleto, ‘‘leaning in calculation to considering
that security was hopeless, they rather took precautions...”
cf. Schol., ῥέποντες δὲ of ἄνθρωποι τοῖς λογισμοῖς πρὸς Td μὴ
ἐλπίζειν τινὰ πίστιν καὶ βεβαίοτητα.

148

BOOK III. txxxu. 8-_xxxm. 4

caprice ; and they were ready, either by passing an
unjust sentence of condemnation or by winning the.
upper hand through acts of violence, to glut the
animosity of the moment. The result was that
though neither had any regard for true piety, yet
those who could carry through an odious deed under
the cloak of a specious phrase received the higher
praise. And citizens who belonged to neither party
were continually destroyed by both, either because
they would not make common cause with them, or
through mere jealousy that they should survive.

LXXXIII. So it was that every form of depravity
showed itself in Hellas in consequence of its revolu-
tions, and that simplicity, which is the chief element
of a noble nature, was laughed to scorn and dis-
appeared, while mutual antagonism of feeling, com-
bined with mistrust, prevailed far and wide. For
there was no assurance binding enough, no oath
terrible enough, to reconcile men ; but always, if they
were stronger,! since they accounted all security
hopeless, they were rather disposed to take pre-
cautions against being wronged than able to trust
others. And it was generally those of meaner intel-
‘lect who won the day; for being afraid of their own
defects and of their opponents’ sagacity, in order
that they might not be worsted in words, and, by
reason of their opponents’ intellectual versatility
find themselves unawares victims of their plots, they
boldly resorted to deeds. Their opponents, on the
other hand, contemptuously assuming that they
would be aware in time and that there was no need
to secure by deeds what they might have by wit,
were taken off their guard and perished in greater
numbers, |

149

THUCYDIDES

LXXXIV. Ἔν δ᾽ οὖν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ τὰ πολλὰ
αὐτῶν προετολμήθη, καὶ ὁπόσ᾽ dv! ὕβρει μὲν
ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλέον ἢ σωφροσύνῃ ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν
τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι δρά-
σειαν, πενίας δὲ τῆς εἰωθυίας ἀπαλλαξείοντές
τινες, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμοῦντες
τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην γιγνώσκοιεν, ἅ
τε μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, ἀπὸ ἴσου δὲ μάλιστα ἐπι-
όντες ἀπαιδευσίᾳ ὀργῆς πλεῖστον ἐκφερόμενοι
ὠμῶς καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπέλθοιεν. ἕξυνταραχ-
θέντος τε τοῦ βίον ἐς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τῇ πόλει
καὶ τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις,
εἰωθυῖα καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν, ἀσμένη
ἐδήλωσεν ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὖσα, κρείσσων δὲ
τοῦ δικαίου, πολεμία δὲ τοῦ προύχοντος. οὐ γὰρ
ἂν τοῦ τε ὁσίου τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι προυτίθεσαν τοῦ
τε μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὸ κερδαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ μὴ βλάπτουσαν
ἰσχὺν εἶχε τὸ φθονεῖν. ἀξιοῦσί τε τοὺς κοινοὺς
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους, ἀφ᾽ ὧν
ἅπασιν ἐλπὶς ὑπόκειται σφαλεῖσι κἂν αὐτοὺς
διασῴζεσθαι, ἐν ἄλλων τιμωρίαις προκαταλύειεν
καὶ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι, εἴ ποτε ἄρα τις κινδυνεύσας
τινὸς δεήσεται αὐτῶν.

1 ὁπόσ᾽ ἂν, Hude’s correction for ὅποσα οὗ the MSS.

1 This chapter is bracketed as spurious by Hude and
nearly all recent commentators, because it is condemned by

150

BOOK IIT. cuxxxiv. 1-3

LXXXIV.! It was in Corcyra, then, that most of
these atrocities were first committed—all the acts of
retaliation which men who are governed with high-
handed insolence rather than with moderation are
likely to commit upon their rulers when these at last
afford them opportunity for revenge; or such as men
resolve upon contrary to justice when they seek
release from their accustomed poverty, and in con-
sequence of their sufferings are likely to be most
eager for their neighbours’ goods;? and assaults
of pitiless cruelty, such as men make, not with a
view to gain, but when, being on terms of com-
plete equality with their foe, they are utterly carried
away by uncontrollable passion. At this crisis, when
the life of the city had been thrown into utter
confusion, human nature, now triumphant over the
laws, and accustomed even in spite of the laws to
do wrong, took delight in showing that its passions
were ungovernable, that it was stronger than justice
and an enemy to all superiority. For surely no man
would have put revenge before religion, and gain
before innocence of wrong, had not envy swayed him
with her blighting power. Indeed, men do not
hesitate, when they seek to avenge themselves upon
others, to abrogate in advance the common principles
observed in such cases—those principles upon which
depends every man’s own hope of salvation should
he himself be overtaken by misfortune—thus failing
to leave them in force against the time when per-
chance a man in peril shall have need of some one
of them.
the ancient grammarians, is not mentioned by Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, and is obelised in Codex F.

2 Or, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ‘would be
above all men passionately eager for...”
[51

THUCYDIDES

LXXXV. Οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Kep-
κυραῖοι τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἐς ἀλλή-
λους ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ ot Αθηναῖοι
ἀπέπλευσαν ταῖς ναυσίν" ὕστερον δὲ of φεύγοντες
τῶν Κερκυραίων (διεσώθησαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐς πεν-
τακοσίους) τείχη τε λαβόντες, ἃ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ,
ἐκράτουν τῆς πέραν οἰκείας γῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς
ὁρμώμενοι ἔλήξοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ πολλὰ
ἔβλαπτον, καὶ λιμὸς ἰσχυρὸς ἐγένετο ἐν τῇ πόλει.
ἐπρεσβεύοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ
Κόρινθον περὶ καθόδου: καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς
ἐπράσσετο, ὕστερον χρόνῳ πλοῖα καὶ ἐπικούρους
παρασκενασάμενοι διέβησαν ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἑξακό-
σιοι μάλιστα οἱ πάντες, καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἐμπρή-
σαντες, ὅπως ἀπόγνοια ἢ τοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ κρατεῖν
τῆς γῆς, ἀναβάντες ἐς τὸ ὄρος τὴν Ἰστώνην,
τεῖχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι ἔφθειρον τοὺς ἐν τῇ
πόλει καὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκράτουν.

LXXXVI. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος
᾿Αθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς ἔστειλαν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ
Λάχητα τὸν Μελανώπου στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν καὶ
Χαροιάδην τὸν Εὐφιλήτου. οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι
καὶ Λεοντῖνοι ἐς πόλεμον ἀλλῆλοις καθέστασαν.
ξύμμαχοι δὲ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἦσαν πλὴν
Καμαριναίων αἱ ἄλλαι Δωρίδες πόλεις, αἵπερ καὶ
πρὸς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχομέ-
νου τοῦ πολέμου ξυμμαχίαν ἐτάχθησαν, οὐ μέν-
tot ξυνεπολέμησάν ye τοῖς δὲ Λεοντίνοις αἱ
Χαλκιδικαὶ πόλεις καὶ Καμάρινα" τῆς δὲ Ἰταλίας
Λοκροὶ μὲν Συρακοσίων ἧσαν, Ῥηγῖνοι δὲ κατὰ
τὸ ξυγγενὲς Λεοντίνων. ἐς οὖν τὰς ᾿Αθήνας

152

BOOK III. txxxv, 1-Lxxxvi. 3

LXXXV. Such then were the first outbreaks of
passion which the Corcyraeans who remained at home
indulged in toward each other; and Eurymedon
sailed away with the Athenian fleet. Later, how-
ever, the Corcyraean fugitives, of whom about five
hundred! had got safely across to the mainland, seized
some forts there, and thus dominating the territory
belonging to Corcyra on the opposite coast made it a
base from which they plundered the people of the
island and did them much harm, so that a severe
famine arose in the city. They also sent envoys to
Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate for their restor-
ation ; but since nothing was accomplished by these
they afterwards procured boats and mercenaries and
crossed over to the island, about six hundred in all.
They then burned their boats, in order that they
might despair of success unless they dominated the
country, and went up to Mt. Istone, and after
building a fort there began to destroy the people in

ac city, exercising dominion over the country.

LXXXVI. Toward the close of the same summer
the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily under the
command of Laches son of Melanopus and Charoeades
son of Euphiletus. For the Syracusans and the
Leontines were now at war with each other. In
alliance with the Syracusans were all the Dorian
cities except Camarina—the cities which at the out-
break of the war had joined the Lacedaeinonian
alliance, although they had taken no active part in
the war—while the Chalcidian cities and Camarina
were allies of the Leontines. In Italy the Locrians
allied themselves with the Syracusans, and the Rhe-
gians with the Leontines, because they were kins-
men.2— The Leontines and their allies sent an

Δ ef. ch. xx. 2, ® ο΄. νι. xliv. 3. 153

THUCYDIDES

πέμψαντες of τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατά τε
παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ὅτι “lwves ἧσαν, πεί-
θουσι τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους πέμψαι σφίσι ναῦς" ὑπὸ
γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων τῆς τε γῆς εἴργοντο καὶ τῆς

4 θαλάσσης. καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τῆς μὲν
οἰκειότητος προφάσει, βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σῖτον
ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν πρόπειράν
τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἴη τὰ ἐν τῇ

ὅ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχείρια γενέσθαι. κατα-
στάντες οὖν ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας τὸν πόλεμον
ἐποιοῦντο μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων. καὶ τὸ θέρος
ἐτελεύτα.

LXXXVII. Tod δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἡ
νόσος τὸ δεύτερον ἐπέπεσε τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις, ἐκλι-
ποῦσα μὲν οὐδένα χρόνον τὸ παντάπασιν, ἐγένετο

2 δέ τις ὅμως διοκωχή. παρέμεινε δὲ τὸ μὲν ὕστε-
ρον οὐκ ἔλασσον ἐνιαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ
δύο ἔτη, ὥστε ᾿Αθηναίους γε μὴ εἶναι ὅ τι μᾶλ-
λον τούτου ἐπίεσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν.

8 τετρακοσίων γὰρ ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τετρακισχιλίων
οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἀπέθανον ἐκ τῶν τάξεων καὶ τρια-
κοσίων ἱππέων, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλον ὄχλου ἀνεξεύρετος

4 ἀριθμός. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ σεισμοὶ τότε
τῆς γῆς ἔν τε ᾿Αθήναις καὶ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ καὶ ἐν
Βοιωτοῖς καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ὈὈρχομενῷ τῷ Βοιωτίῳ.

LXXXVIII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν Σικαλίᾳ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
καὶ Ῥηγῖνοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τριάκοντα ναυσὶ

1 At the head of this embassy was the celebrated rhetori-
cian Gorgias.

* of. C.I.A. i. 33 for some fragments of treaties of alliance
renewed under the archon Apseudes (433-432 Β.0.}.

3 of. τι. xlvii. ff,

554

BOOK III. txxxvi, 3—uxxavin. 1

embassy! to Athens and urged them, both on the
ground of an earlier alliance? and because they
were Ionians, to send them ships; for they were
being excluded from both the land and the sea by
the Syracusans. And the Athenians sent the ships,
professedly on the ground of their relationship, but
really because they wished to prevent the importation
of grain from Sicily into the Peloponnesus, and also
to make a preliminary test whether the affairs of Sicily
could be brought under their own control. So they
established themselves at Rhegium in Italy and pro-
ceeded to carry on the war in concert with their
allies. And the summer ended.

LXXXVII. In the course of the following winter
the plague again’ fell upon the Athenians; and in-
deed it had not died out at any time entirely, though
there had been a period of respite. And it continued
the second time not less than a year, having run for
two full years on the previous occasion, so that the
Athenians were more distressed by it than by any
other misfortune and their power more crippled.* For
no fewer than four thousand four hundred of those
enrolled as hoplites died and also three hundred
cavalry, and of the populace a number that could not
be ascertained. It was at this time also that the
great number of earthquakes occurred at Athens, in
Euboea, and in Boeotia, and especially at Orchomenus
in Boeotia.

LXXXVIIJI. The same winter the Athenians in
Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty

4 This statement may have been written without a know-
ledge of the later events of the war, especially the unhappy
issue of the Sicilian expedition (see Introd. p. xiii.)—unless
δύναμις be taken to mean ‘fighting strength,” or something
narrower than ‘‘ power.”

155

427 Β.6.

THUCYDIDES

στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους καλουμένας"
θέρους γὰρ δι᾽ ἀνυδρίαν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιστρατεύειν.
, A aA > 4 , ΝΜ)
νέμονται δὲ Λιπαραῖοι αὐτάς, Κνιδίων ἄποικοι
ὄντες. οἰκοῦσι δ᾽ ἐν μίᾳ τῶν νήσων οὐ μεγάλῃ,
καλεῖται δὲ Λιπάρα' τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ ταύτης
ὁρμώμενοι γεωργοῦσι, Διδύμην καὶ Στρογγύλην
\ e 4 aan e 3 4 bd 9
καὶ ‘lepdyv. νομΐίξουσε δὲ οἱ ἐκείνῃ ἄνθρωποι ἐν
ae a e ὦ ’ Φ \ UA
τῇ lepa ὡς ὁ Ἥφαιστος χαλκεύει, Ore τὴν νύκτα
φαίνεται πῦρ ἀναδιδοῦσα πολὺ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν
καπνόν. κεῖνται δὲ αἱ νῆσοι αὗται κατὰ τὴν
Σικελῶν καὶ Μεσσηνίων γῆν, ξύμμαχοι δ᾽ ἦσαν
Συρακοσίων' τεμόντες δ᾽ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τὴν γῆν,
e ᾽ 4 9 , 3 λε ᾽
ὡς οὐ προσεχώρουν, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον.
καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ πέμπτον ἔτος τῷ
πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.
LXXXIX. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους ἸΠελο-
ποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ
ἦλθον ὡς ἐς τὴν ᾿Αττικὴν ἐσβαλοῦντες ΓΑγεδος
A 3 4 e 4 ,
τοῦ ᾿Αρχιδάμου nyoupévov, Λακεδαιμονίων βασι-
λέως, σεισμῶν δὲ γενομένων πολλῶν ἀπετράποντο
4 3 > ἢ 3 , ,
πάλιν καὶ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἐσβολή. καὶ περὶ τούτους
τοὺς χρόνους, τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων, τῆς
Εὐβοίας ἐν ᾿Οροβίαις ἡ θάλασσα ἐπανελθοῦσα
ἀπὸ τῆς τότε οὔσης γῆς καὶ κυματωθεῖσα ἐπῆλθε
τῆς πόλεως μέρος τι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κατέκλυσε, τὸ δ᾽
ὑπενόστησε, καὶ θάλασσα νῦν ἐστι πρότερον οὖσα

1 Strabo names three more, modern geographers eleven or
twelve, Strongyle, the modern Stromboli, seat of an active

156

BOOK III. txxxvit, 1-Lxxx1x. 2

ships against the islands of Aeolus, as they are called ;
for it was impossible to invade them in the summer
time on account of the lack of water there. These
islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, who are
colonists of the Cnidians. They have their homes
on one of the islands, which is not large, called
Lipara, and from this go out and cultivate the rest,
namely Didyme, Strongyle and Hiera! The
people of this region believe that Hephaestus has
his forge in Hiera, because this island is seen
to send up a great flame of fire at night and
smoke by day. . The islands lie over against the
territory of the Sicels and the Messenians, and
were in alliance with the Syracusans; the Athen-
ians, therefore, laid waste their land, but since the
inhabitants would not come over to their side they
sailed back to Rhegium. And the winter ended, and
with it the fifth year of this war of which Thucydides
wrote the history.

LXXXIX. In the following summer the Pelopon-
nesians and their allies, led by Agis son of Archida-
mus, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced as far as
the Isthmus with the intention of invading Attica ;
but a great many earthquakes occurred, causing
them to turn back again, and no invasion took place.
At about the same time, while the earthquakes
prevailed, the sea at Orobiae in Euboea receded
from what was then the shore-line, and then coming
on in a great wave overran a portion of the city.
One part of the flood subsided, but another en-
gulfed the shore, so that what was land before is

volcano, has recently become especially notable on account
of its nearness to Messina and Reggio, where the great earth-
quake occurred, Dec. 28, 1908.

157

426 B.C.

THUCYDIDES

γῆ" καὶ ἀνθρώπους διέφθειρεν ὅσοι μὴ ἐδύναντο

8 φθῆναι πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἀναδραμόντες. καὶ
περὶ ᾿Αταλάντην τὴν ἐπὶ Λοκροῖς τοῖς ᾽Οπουντίοις
νῆσον παραπλησία γίγνεται ἐπίκλυσις, καὶ τοῦ
τε φρουρίου τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων παρεῖλε καὶ δύο νεῶν

4 ἀνειλκυσμένων τὴν ἑτέραν κατέαξεν. ἐγένετο δὲ
καὶ ἐν Πεπαρήθῳ κύματος ἐπαναχώρησίς τις, οὐ
μέντοι ἐπέκλυσέ γε" καὶ σεισμὸς τοῦ τείχους τι
κατέβαλε καὶ τὸ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ἄλλας οἰκίας

5 ὀλίγας. αἴτιον δ᾽ ἔγωγε νομίξω τοῦ τοιούτου,
ἣ ἰσχυρότατος ὁ σεισμὸς ἐγένετο, κατὰ τοῦτο
ἀποστέλλειν τὲ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐξαπίνης πάλιν
ἐπισπωμένην 1 βιαιότερον τὴν ἐπίκλυσιν ποιεῖν"
ἄνεν δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο
ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι.

ΧΟ. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐπολέμουν μὲν καὶ
ἄλλοι, ὡς ἑκάστοις ξυνέβαινεν, ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ
αὐτοὶ οἱ Σικελιῶται ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους στρατεύοντες
καὶ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ξὺν τοῖς σφετέροις ξυμμάχοις"
ἃ δὲ λόγον μάλιστα ἄξια ἢ μετὰ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔπραξαν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους

2 οἱ ἀντιπόλεμοι, τούτων μνησθήσομαι. Χαροιάδου
γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ ᾿Αθηναίων στρατηγοῦ τεθνηκότος
ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων πολέμῳ, Λάχης ἅπασαν ἔχων
τῶν νεῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐστράτευσε μετὰ τῶν ξυμ-
μάχων ἐπὶ Μύλας τὰς Μεσσηνίων. ἔτυχον δὲ

1 Madvig reads ἐπισπώμενον, after Schol., followed by
Hude.

1 cf. I. xxxii.

3 “Thucydides is pointing out the connection between the
earthquake and the inundation. Where the earthquake was
most violent, there the inundation was greatest. But the

158

BOOK III, uxxx1x. 2-xc. 2

now sea; and it destroyed of the people as many
as could not run up to the high ground in time.
In the neighbourhood also of the island of Atalante,
which lies off the coast of Opuntian Locris, there
was a similar inundation, which carried away a part
of the Athenian fort there,! and wrecked one of
two ships which had been drawn up on the shore.
At Peparethos likewise there was a recession of the
waters, but no inundation; and there was an earth-
quake, which threw down a part of the wall as well
as the prytaneum and a few other houses. And the
cause of such a phenomenon, in my own opinion, was
this: at that point where the shock of the earthquake
was greatest the sea was driven back, then, suddenly
returning ? with increased violence, made the inunda-
tion ; but without an earthquake, it seems to me, sucha
thing would not have happened,

XC. During the same summer war was being waged
in Sicily, not only by other peoples as they each had
occasion to do so, but also by the Siceliots them-
selves, who were campaigning against one another,
and likewise by the Athenians in concert with their
allies; but I shall mention only the most memorable
things done by the Athenians in concert with their
allies, or against the Athenians by their opponents.
After Charoeades, the Athenian general, had been
slain in battle by the Syracusans, Laches, being now
in sole command of the fleet, made an expedition
with the allies against Mylae, a town belonging to
the Messenians. It so happened that two divisions

effect was indirect, being immediately caused by the recoil
of the sea after the earthquake was over ; hence τὴν θάλασ-
σαν, and not, as we might expect, τὸν σεισμόν, is the subject
of ποιεῖν. ἀποστέλλειν either active or neuter.” (Jowett. )

159

THUCYDIDES

δύο φυλαὶ ἐν ταῖς Μύλαις τῶν Μεσσηνίων φρου-
ροῦσαι καί τινα καὶ ἐνέδραν πεποιημέναι τοῖς ἀπὸ
τῶν νεῶν. οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τούς
a ,
te ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας τρέπουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσι
, A > ἢ J 3 4
πολλούς, Kal τῷ ἐρύματι προσβαλόντες ἠνάγ-
κασαν ὁμολογίᾳ τήν τε ἀκρόπολιν παραδοῦναι καὶ
ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ξυστρατεῦσαι. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο
ἐπελθόντων οἱ Μεσσήνιοι τῶν τε ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ
τῶν ξυμμάχων προσεχώρησαν καὶ αὐτοί, ὁμήρους
τε δόντες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πιστὰ παρασχόμενοι.
XCI. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τριά-
\ a Ν \ , e
κοντα μὲν ναῦς ἔστειλαν περὶ Πελοπόννησον, ὧν
3 / ’ ς 52 4 NX
ἐστρατήγει Δημοσθένης te ὁ ᾿Αλκισθένους καὶ
Προκλῆς ὁ Θεοδώρου, ἑξήκοντα δὲ ἐς Μῆλον καὶ
ld . ’ 3 4 Ἁ 3 A ,
δισχιλίους ὁπλίτας, ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας
e 4 Ἁ Α ’ v a
ὁ Νικηράτου. τοὺς yap Μηλίους ὄντας νησιώτας
\ 3 34 / e / 5. 39 \ 39 A
καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπακούειν οὐδὲ ἐς TO αὐτῶν
ξυμμαχικὸν ἰέναι ἐβούλοντο προσαγαγέσθαι. ὡς
δὲ αὐτοῖς δῃουμένης τῆς γῆς οὐ προσεχώρουν,
ΝΜ > A / 3 \ \ 4 3
ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Μήλου αὐτοὶ μὲν ἔπλευσαν ἐς
Ὦ Ἁ fo) - A e XN 4 δὲ , Or
ρωπὸν τῆς Γραϊκῆς, ὑπὸ νύκτα δὲ σχόντες εὐθὺς
ἐπορεύοντο οἱ ὁπλῖται ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζῇ ἐς
Γ ὔ aA 7 e \ > A ’
ἄναγραν τῆς Βοιωτίας. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
πανδημεὶ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, Ἱππονίκου τε τοῦ Καλλίου
στρατηγοῦντος καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος τοῦ Θουκλέους,
ἀπὸ σημείου ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ γῆν ἀπήντων. καὶ
στρατοπεδευσάμενοι ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν τῇ
Τανάγρᾳ ἐδήουν καὶ ἐνηυλίσαντο. καὶ τῇ ὕστε-
160

BOOK III. xc. 2--ΧΟΙ. 5

of the Messenians were in garrison at Mylae, and
that these had laid an ambush against the men who
had landed from the ships. The Athenians and their
allies, however, put to rout the ambushing troops,
slaying many of them; then, assaulting the fortifi-
cation, they compelled its defenders to surrender
the acropolis by agreement and march with them
against Messene. After this, on the approach of the
Athenians and their allies, the Messenians also sub-
mitted, giving hostages and offering the other
customary pledges of good faith.

XCI. That same summer the Athenians sent thirty
ships round the Peloponnesus under the command
of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Procles son
of Theodorus, and sixty ships and two thousand
hoplites under the command of Nicias son of Nicera-
tus, to Melos. For the Melians, although they were
islanders,1_ were unwilling to be subject to Athens
or even to join their alliance, and the Athenians
wished to bring them over. But when they would
not submit, even after their land had been ravaged,
the Athenians left Melos and sailed to Oropus in the
territory of Graia, and the hoplites, landing there at
nightfall, proceeded at once by land to Tanagra in
Boeotia. There they were met by the Athenians
from the city in full force, who, under the command
of Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of
Thucles, came overland upon a concerted signal and
joined them. And after they had made camp they
spent that day in ravaging the territory of Tanagra,
and also passed the night there. On the next day

1 The Melians and Theraeans, as Laconian colonists (Vv.
Ixxxiv. 2), alone in the Cyclades held aloof from the Athe-
nian alliance.

161
VOL. II. M

THUCYDIDES

paia μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς ἐπεξελθόντας τῶν
Ταναγραίων καὶ Θηβαίων τινὰς προσβεβοηθη-
κότας καὶ ὅπλα λαβόντες καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες
ἀνεχώρησαν, οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς
6 ναῦς. καὶ παραπλεύσας ὁ Νικίας ταῖς ἑξήκοντα
ναυσὶ τῆς Λοκρίδος τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια ἔτεμε καὶ
ἀνεχώρησεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.
XCII. Ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον Λακεδαιμόνεοι
Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχινίᾳ ἀποικίαν καθίσταντο
2 ἀπὸ τοιᾶσδε γνώμης. Μηλιῆς οἱ ξύμπαντες εἰσὶ
μὲν τρία μέρη, Παράλιοι, ἽἹερῆς, Τραχίνιοι" τού-
των δὲ οἱ ,Τραχίνιοι πολέμῳ ἐφθαρμένοι ὑπὸ
Oiraiwy ὁμόρων ὄντων, τὸ πρῶτον μελλήσαντες
᾿Αθηναίοις προσθεῖναι σφᾶς αὐτούς, δείσαντες δὲ
μὴ οὐ σφίσι πιστοὶ ὦσι, πέμπουσιν ἐς Λακε-
3 δαίμονα ἑλόμενοι πρεσβευτὴν Τεισαμενόν. ἕξυνε-
πρεσβεύρντο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Δωριῆς, ἡ μητρόπολις
τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, τῶν αὐτῶν δεόμενοι: ὑπὸ γὰρ
4 τῶν Οἰταίων καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφθείροντο. ἀκούσαντες
δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γνώμην εἶχον τὴν ἀποικίαν
ἐκπέμπειν, τοῖς τε Τραχινίοις βουλόμενοι καὶ τοῖς
Δωριεῦσι τιμωρεῖν. καὶ ἅμα τοῦ πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους
πολέμου καλῶς αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἡ πόλις καθίστα -
σθαι" ἐπί τε γὰρ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ ναυτικὸν παρα-
σκευασθῆναι ἄν, ὥστ᾽ ἐκ βραχέος τὴν διάβασιν
γίγνεσθαι, τῆς τε ἐπὶ Θράκης παρόδου χρησίμως
ἕξειν. τό τε ξύμπαν ὥρμηντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν.
5 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐν Δελφοῖς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήροντο,
κελεύοντος δὲ ἐξέπεμψαν τοὺς οἰκήτορας αὑτῶν
162

BOOK III. χοι. 5—xcu. 5

they defeated in battle the men of Tanagra who came
out against them, as well as some Thebans who had
come to their aid, then taking possession of the arms
of the fallen and setting up a trophy they returned,
the one party to the city, the other to the ships. And
Nicias sailed along the coast with his sixty ships,
ravaged the seaboard of Locris, and then returned
home.

XCII. It was about this time that the Lacedaemoni-
ans established Heracleia, their colony in Trachinia,
with the following object in view. The people of
Malia, considered as a whole, consist of three divisions,
Paralians, Hiereans, and Trachinians. Of these the
Trachinians, after they had been ruined in war by
their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first intended to
attach themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that
these might not be loyal, sent to Lacedaemon,
choosing Teisamenus as their envoy. And envoys
from Doris, the mother city of the Lacedaemonians,
also took part in the embassy, making the same
request, for they too were being ruined by the
Oetaeans. After hearing their appeal, the Lacedae-
monians were of the opinion that they should send
out the colony, wishing to aid both the Trachinians
and the Dorians. At the same time, the site of the
proposed city seemed to them well adapted for carry-
ing on the war against Athens; fora fleet could be
equipped there for an attack upon Euboea and the
crossing thus made from a short distance away, and
the place would also be useful for expeditions along
the coast towards Thrace. In short, they were eager
to found the settlement. They therefore first con-
sulted the god at Delphi, and at his bidding sent
out the colonists, consisting of both Spartans and

163
mM 2

THUCYDIDES

τε Kal τῶν περιοίκων, Kal τῶν ἄλλων Ἑ) .λλήνων
τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκέλευον ἕπεσθαι πλὴν ᾿Ιώνων
καὶ ᾿Αχαιῶν καὶ ἔστιν ὧν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν. οἰκισταὶ
δὲ τρεῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγήσαντο, Δέων καὶ
᾿Αλκίδας καὶ Δαμάγων. καταστάντες δε ἐτείχισαν
τὴν πόλιν ἐκ καινῆς, ἣ νῦν Ἡράκλεια καλεῖται,
9 / A / 4

ἀπέχουσα Θερμοπυλῶν σταδίους μάλεστα τεσσα-

’ A ὃ , # ’ 4
paxovra, Τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης εἴκοσι. νεώριά τε
παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ εἶρξαν τὸ κατὰ Θερμοπύλας

3 > \ N ’ Ψ 3 7 > nw”
κατ αὑτὸ TO στενὸν, ὅπως εὐφύλακτα αὑτοῖς
εἴη.

XCIII. Οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τῆς πόλεως ταύτης
ξυνοικιξομένης τὸ πρῶτον ἔδεισάν τε καὶ ἐνόμισαν
ἐπὶ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ μάλιστα καθίστασθαι, ὅτι βραχύς
ἐστιν ὁ διάπλους πρὸς τὸ Κήναιον τῆς Εὐβοίας.
ΝΜ ’ δ 4 2 A 9 , > XN
ἔπειτα μέντοι Tapa δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπέβη: ov yap
ἐγένετο ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς δεινὸν οὐδέν. αἴτιον δὲ ἦν" οἵ
τε Θεσσαλοὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντες τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων
καὶ ὧν ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ ἐκτίξετο, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι

, 9 , a ΝΜ )Ὶ ὃ
μεγάλῃ ἰσχύι παροικῶσιν, ἔφθειρον καὶ διὰ
παντὸς ἐπολέμουν ἀνθρώποις νεοκαταστάτοις,
ϑως ἐξετρύχωσαν γενομένους τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάνυ

’ A ’ , 4 ’
πολλούς (πᾶς γάρ τις Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκιξζόντων
θαρσαλέως ἤει, βέβαιον νομίζων τὴν πόλιν)" οὐ
μέντοι ἥκιστα οἱ ἄρχοντες αὐτῶν τῶν Λακεδαι-

’ 4 7 Ἁ , 4
μονίων οἱ ἀφικνούμενοι Ta πράγματά τε ἔφθειρον
καὶ ἐς ὀλυγανθρωπίαν κατέστησαν, ἐκφοβήσαντες
164

BOOK III. xc. 5-xci, 3

Perioeci,! and they invited any other Hellenes who
so desired to accompany them, except Ionians and
Achaeans and certain other races. The founders of
the colony in charge of the expedition were three
Lacedaemonians, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon.
When they had established themselves they built a
new wall about the city, which is now called Heracleia,
and is about forty stadia distant from Thermopylae
and twenty from the sea. They then proceeded to
build dockyards, and in order that the place might
be easy to guard fenced off the approach on the side
toward Thermopylae by a wall across the pass itself.
XCIII. As for the Athenians, while the colonists
were being gathered for this city, they at first became
alarmed, thinking it was being established chiefly as
a menace to Euboea, because it is only a short distance
across from here to Cenaeum in Euboea. Afterwards,
however, the matter turned out contrary to their ex-
pectations ; for no harm came from the city. And the
reasons were as follows: the Thessalians, who were the
paramount power in those regions and whose territory
was being menaced by the settlement, fearing that
their new neighbours might become very powerful,
began to harry and make war continually upon the
new settlers, until they finally wore them out, although
they had at first been very numerous ; for, since the
Lacedaemonians were founding the colony, everybody
came boldly, thinking the city secure. One of the
principal causes, however, was that the governors
sent out by the Lacedaemonians themselves ruined
the undertaking and reduced the population to a
handful, frightening most of the settlers away by
1 The old inhabitants, chiefly of Achaean stock, who had

been reduced to a condition of dependence (not slavery) by
the Dorians. 6
105

THUCYDIDES

τοὺς πολλοὺς χαλεπῶς τε Kal ἔστιν ἃ οὐ καλῶς
ἐξηγούμενοι, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἤδη αὐτῶν οἱ πρόσοικοι
ἐπεκράτουν.

XCIV. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους, καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν
χρόνον ὃν ἐν τῇ Μήλῳ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι κατείχοντο,
καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα νεῶν ᾿Αθηναῖοι περὶ
Πελοπόννησον ὄντες πρῶτον ἐν ᾿Ελλομενῷ τῆς
Λευκαδίας φρουρούς τινας λοχήσαντες διέφθει-
ραν, ἔπειτα ὕστερον ἐπὶ Λευκάδα μείξονι στόλῳ
ἦλθον, ᾿Ακαρνᾶσί τε πᾶσιν, of πανδημεὶ πλὴν
Οἰνιαδῶν ξυνέσποντο, καὶ Ζακυνθίοις καὶ Κεφαλ-
λῆσι καὶ Κερκυραίων πέντε καὶ δέκα ναυσίν.
καὶ οἱ μὲν Λευκάδιοι, τῆς τε ἔξω γῆς δῃουμένης
καὶ τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ, ἐν ἧ καὶ ἡ Λευκάς ἐστι
καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ ᾿Απόλλωνος, πλήθει βιαζόμενοι
ἡσύχαζον: οἱ δὲ ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες ἠξίουν Δημοσθένη
τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἀποτειχίξειν av-
τούς, νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως γ᾽ ἂν ἐκπολιορκῆσαι καὶ
πόλεως αἰεὶ σφίσι πολεμίας ἀπαλλαγῆναι. Δη-
μοσθένης δ᾽ ἀναπείθεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον
ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων ὡς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς τοσαύ-
τῆς ξυνειλεγμένης Αἰτωλοῖς ἐπιθέσθαι, Ναυ-
πάκτῳ τε πολεμίοις οὖσι, καὶ ἢν κρατήσῃ αὐτῶν,
ῥᾳδίως καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἠπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτῃ ᾿Αθη-
ναΐοις προσποιήσειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔθνος μέγα μὲν

1 This isthmus, which at this time connected the island
with the mainland, had been previously cut through by the
Corinthians (Strabo, p. 4520); but it had been filled with

166

BOOK III. xcim. 3-xctv. 4

their harsh and sometimes unjust administration, so
that at length their neighbours more easily prevailed
over them.

XCIV. During the same summer, and at about the
time when the Athenians were detained at Melos,
the troops of the thirty Athenian ships that were
cruising round the Peloponnesus first set an ambush
at Ellomenus in Leucadia and killed some of the
garrison, and then, later on, went against Leucas
with a greater armament, which consisted of all the
Acarnanians, who joined the expedition with their
entire forces (with the exception of the people of
Oeniadae), some Zacynthians and Cephallenians,
and fifteen ships from Corcyra. The Leucadians, find-
ing themselves outnumbered, were obliged to remain
quiet, although their lands were being ravaged both
without and within the isthmus, where stands Leucas
and the temple of Apollo; but the Acarnanians tried
to induce Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to
shut them in by a wall, thinking they could easily
reduce them by siege and thus rid themselves of a
city that was always hostile to them. But just at
this time Demosthenes was persuaded by the Mes-
senians that it was a fine opportunity for him, seeing .
that so large an ‘army was collected, to attack the
Aetolians, because they were hostile to Naupactus,
and also because, if he defeated them, he would find
it easy to bring the rest of the mainland in that region
into subjection to the Athenians. The Aetolians,
they explained, were, it was true, a great and warlike

sand before the Peloponnesian war, as is evident from con-
stant allusions to hauling ships across. It is clear from the
context that the territory of the Leucadians included a part
of the mainland of Acarnania.

167

THUCYDIDES

εἶναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον, οἰκοῦν δὲ
κατὰ κώμας ἀτειχίστους, καὶ ταύτας διὰ πολλοῦ,
καὶ σκενῇ Ψιλῇ χρώμενον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπέφαινον,
πρὶν ξυμβοηθῆσαι, καταστραφῆναι. ἐπιχειρεῖν
δ᾽ ἐκέλευον πρῶτον μὲν ᾿Αποδωτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ
᾿Οφιονεῦσι, καὶ μετὰ τούτους Εἰὐρυτᾶσιν, ὅπερ
μέγιστον μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, ἀγνωστότατοι
δὲ γλῶσσαν καὶ ὠμοφάγοι εἰσίν, ὡς λέγονται.
τούτων γὰρ ληφθέντων ῥᾳδίως καὶ τἄλλα προσ-
χωρήσειν.

XCV. Ὁ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων χάριτι πεισθεὶς
καὶ μάλιστα νομίσας ἄνευ τῆς τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
δυνάμεως τοῖς ἠπειρώταις ξυμμάχοις μετὰ τῶν
Αἰτωλῶν δύνασθαι ἂν κατὰ γὴν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ Βοιω-
τοὺς διὰ Λοκρῶν τῶν ᾿Οζολῶν ἐς Κυτίνιον τὸ
Δωρικόν, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχων τὸν Παρνασσόν, ἕως
καταβαίη ἐς Φωκέας, οἱ προθύμως ἐδόκουν κατὰ
τὴν ᾿Αθηναίων αἰεί ποτε φιλίαν ξυστρατεύσειν ἢ
κἂν βίᾳ προσαχθῆναι (καὶ Φωκεῦσιν ἤδη ὅμορος
ἡ Βοιωτία ἐστίν), ἄρας οὖν ξύμπαντι τῷ στρατεύ-
ματι ἀπὸ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀκόντων τῶν ᾿Ακαρνάνων
παρέπλευσεν ἐς Σόλλιον. κοινώσας δὲ τὴν ἐπί-
νοίαν τοῖς ᾿Ακαρνᾶσιν, ὡς οὐ προσεδέξαντο διὰ
τῆς Λευκάδος τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν, αὐτὸς τῇ λοιπῇ
στρατιᾷ, Κεφαλλῆσι καὶ Μεσσηνίοις καὶ Ζακυν-
θίοις καὶ ᾿Αθηναίων τριακοσίοις τοῖς ἐπιβάταις
τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν (αἱ γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν
168

BOOK III. xctv. 4—xcv. 2

people, but as they lived in unwalled villages, which,
moreover, were widely separated, and as they used
only light armour, they could be subdued without
difficulty before they could unite for mutual defence.
And they advised him to attack the Apodotians first,
then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians.
These last constitute the largest division of the
Aetolians, their speech is more unintelligible than
that of the other Aetolians, and, according to report,
they are eaters of raw flesh. If these tribes were
subdued, they said, the rest would readily yield.
XCV. Demosthenes was induced to make this
decision, not only by his desire to please the Mes-
senians, but chiefly because he thought that, without
help from Athens, he would be able with his allies
from the mainland, once the Aetolians had joined
him, to make an overland expedition against the
Boeotians by passing through the country of the
Ozolian Locrians to Cytinium in Doris, keeping
Parnassus on the right, until he should descend into
Phocian territory. The Phocians would presumably
be eager to join the expedition in view of their
traditional friendship with Athens, or else could be
forced to do so;‘and Phocis is on the very borders of
Boeotia. So he set sail from Leucas with his whole
armament in spite of the unwillingness of the
Acarnanians and went along the coast to Sollium.
There he made his plan known to the Acarnanians,
but they would not agree to it because of his refusal
to invest Leucas; he therefore set out upon his
expedition against the Aetolians without them,
taking the rest of his army, which consisted of
Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and three
hundred Athenian marines from his own ships—for

169

THUCYDIDES

Κερκυραίων ἀπῆλθον νῆες), ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ᾽

3 Αἰτωλούς. ὡρμᾶτο δὲ ἐξ Οἰνεῶνος τῆς Λοκρίδος.
οἱ δὲ ᾿Οζόλαι οὗτοι Λοκροὶ ξύμμαχοι ἧσαν, καὶ
ἔδει αὐτοὺς πανστρατιᾷ ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς ᾿Αθη-
ναίοις ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν' ὄντες γὰρ ὅμοροι τοῖς
Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ ὁμόσκενοι μεγάλη ὠφελία ἐδόκουν
εἶναι ξυστρατεύοντες μάχης τε ἐμπειρίᾳ τῆς ἐκεί-
νων καὶ χωρίων.

XOVI. Αὐλισαμενος δὲ τῷ στρατῷ ἐν τοῦ
Διὸς τοῦ Νεμείου τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐν ᾧ ‘Hatodos ὁ ποιη-
τὴς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτῃ ἀποθανεῖν, χρησθὲν
αὐτῷ ἐν Νεμέᾳ τοῦτο παθεῖν, ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἄρας

2 ἐπορεύετο ἐς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν. καὶ αἱρεῖ τῇ πρώτῃ
ἡμέρᾳ Ποτιδανίαν καὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἹΚροκύλειον καὶ
τῇ τρίτῃ Τείχιον, ἔμενέ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν λείαν ἐς
Ἑὐπάλιον τῆς Λοκρίδος ἀπέπεμψεν" τὴν yap γνώ-
μὴν εἶχε τὰ ἄλλα καταστρεψάμενος οὕτως ἐπὶ
Ὀρφιονέας, εἰ μὴ βούλοιντο ξυγχωρεῖν, ἐς Ναύ-

3 πακτον ἐπαναχωρήσας στρατεῦσαι ὕστερον. τοὺς
δὲ Αἰτωλοὺς οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν αὕτη ἡ παρασκευὴ
οὔτε ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεβουλεύετο, ἐπειδή τε a
στρατὸς ἐσεβεβλήκει, πολλῇ χειρὶ ἐπεβοήθουν
πάντες, ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἔσχατοι ᾿Οφιονέων οἱ πρὸς
τὸν Μηλιακὸν κόλπον καθήκοντες, Βωμιῆς καὶ
Καλλιῆς, ἐβοήθησαν.

XCVII. Τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει τοιόνδε τε οἱ Μεσ-
σήνιοι παρήνουν, ὅπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον' ἀναδιδά-
σκοντες αὐτὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ὡς εἴη ῥᾳδία ἡ
170

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BOOK III. xcv. 2—xcvu. 1

fifteen Corcyraean ships had gone back home.
¢ base from which he started was Oeneon in
ris, The people of this country, Ozolian Locris,
sme allies, and they with their whole force were to
t the Athenians in the interior; for since they
e neighbours of the Aetolians and used the same
> of arms, it was believed that their help would
‘of great service on the expedition on account
their knowledge both of the Aetolian manner of
iting and of the country.
KCVI. He bivouacked with his army in the pre-
et of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod! is
Εἰ to have been killed by the men of that region,
oracle having foretold to him that he should suffer
s fate at Nemea; then he set out at daybreak for
stolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on
δ second Crocyleum, on the third Teichium. There
> remained, sending his booty back to Eupalium in
pcris; for his intention was to subdue the other
aces first, and then, in case the Ophioneans would
ot submit, to return to Naupactus and make a
ΟΠ expedition against them. But all these pre-
΄ς fapparations did not escape the notice of the Aetolians,
“either when the design was first being formed or
afterwards ; indeed his army had no sooner invaded
their country than they all began to rally in great
y force, so that help came even from the remotest
. ¢ tribes of the Ophioneans, who stretch as far as the
a Maliac Gulf, and from the Bomians and Callians.

%ee,
e
.

XCVII. The Messenians, however, gave Demos-
thenes about the same advice as at first: informing
him that the conquest of the Aetolians was easy,

S
2,
ἣν 1 For the particulars of the tradition, ¢f. Plut. Sept. Sap.
at = Conv, xix.

i αἰ

THUCYDIDES

ἔμπειροι διεφθείροντο' καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἡγεμὼν αὐτοῖς
τῶν ὁδῶν Χρόμων ὁ Μεσσήνιος ἐτύγχανε τεθνη-
κώς. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες πολλοὺς μὲν
αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ τροπῇ κατὰ πόδας αἱροῦντες, ἄνθρω-
ποι ποδώκεις καὶ Ψιλοί, διέφθειρον, τοὺς δὲ
πλείους τῶν ὁδῶν ἁμαρτάνοντας καὶ ἐς τὴν ὕλην
ἐσφερομένους, ὅθεν διέξοδοι οὐκ ἦσαν, πῦρ κομε-
σάμενοι περιεπίμπρασαν' πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη
τῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν
᾿Αθηναίων, μόλις τε ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὸν
Oivedva τῆς Λοκρίδος, ὅθενπερ καὶ ὡρμήθησαν,
οἱ περιγενόμενοι κατέφυγον. ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν τε
ξυμμάχων πολλοὶ καὶ αὐτῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ὁπλῖται
περὶ εἴκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν. τοσοῦτοι μὲν
τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἡλικία ἡ αὐτὴϊ οὗτοι βέλτιστοι δὴ
ἄνδρες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ἐκ τῆς ᾿Αθηναίων
πόλεως διεφθάρησαν' ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος
στρατηγὸς Προκλῆς. τοὺς δὲ νεκροὺς ὑποσπόν-
Sous ἀνελόμενοι παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ ἀνα-
χωρήσαντες ἐς Ναύπακτον ὕστερον ἐς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας
ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκομίσθησαν. Δημοσθένης δὲ περὶ
Ναύπακτον καὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα ὑπελείφθη τοῖς
πεπραγμένοις φοβούμενος τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους.

ΧΟΙΧ. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ οἱ
περὶ Σικελίαν ᾿Αθηναῖοι πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Λοκ-
ρίδα ἐν ἀποβάσει τέ τινι τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας
Λοκρῶν ἐκράτησαν καὶ περιπόλιον αἱροῦσιν ὃ ἦν
ἐπὶ τῷ Αληκι ποταμῷ.

C. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Αἰτωλοὶ προπέμψαντες
πρότερον ἔς τε Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα
πρέσβεις, Τόλοφόν τε τὸν ᾿Οφιονέα καὶ Βοριάδην

1 ἢ αὐτή, Hude ἡ πρώτη.
174

BOOK III. xcvui. t-c. 1

they perished ; for Chromon, the Messenian, who had
been their guide on the way, had unfortunately
been killed. The Aetolians kept plying their javelins,
and being swift of foot and lightly equipped, follow-
ing at their heels they caught many there in the
rout and slew them; but the greater number missed
the roads and got into the forest, from which there
were no paths out, and the Aetolians brought fire
and set the woods ablaze around them. Then every
manner of flight was essayed and every manner of
destruction befell the army of the Athenians, and
it was only with difficulty that the survivors escaped
to the sea at Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set
out. Many of the allies were slain, and of the
Athenians themselves about one hundred and twenty
hoplites. So great a number of men, and all of the
same age, perished here, the best men in truth
whom the city of Athens lost in this war; and
Procles, one of the two generals, perished also.
When they had received back their dead from the
Aetolians under a truce and had retreated to Nau-
pactus, they were afterwards taken back by the fleet
to Athens. Demosthenes, however, remained behind
in Naupactus and the region round about, for he was
afraid of the Athenians because of what had happened.

XCIX. About the same time the Athenian forces
over in Sicily sailed to Locris! and disembarking
there defeated the Locrians who came against them
and took a guard-house which was situated on the
river Halex.

C. During the same summer the Aetolians, who had
previously sent three envoys to Corinth and Lace-
daemon, namely Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades

14.e. the territory of the Epizephyrian Locri, north of
Rhegium in Italy. 175

THUCYDIDES

τὸν Εὐρυτᾶνα καὶ Τείσανδρον tov ᾿Αποδωτόν,
πείθουσιν ὥστε σφίσι πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ Nav-
πακτον διὰ τὴν τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐπαγωγήν. καὶ
ἐξέπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον
τρισχιλίους ὁπλίτας τῶν ξυμμάχων. τούτων
ἧσαν πεντακόσιοι ἐξ Ἡρακλείας, τῆς ἐν Τραχῖνι
πόλεως τότε νεοκτίστου οὔσης: Σπαρτιάτης δ᾽
ἦρχεν Εὐρύλοχος τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ ξυνηκολού-
θουν αὐτῷ Μακάριος καὶ Μενεδάϊος οἱ Σπαρ-
τιᾶται. ΟἹ. ξυλλεγέντος δὲ τοῦ στρατεύματος
ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπεκηρυκεύετο Εὐρύλοχος Λοκροῖς
τοῖς ᾿᾽Οζόλαις: διὰ τούτων γὰρ ἡ ὁδὸς ἦν ἐς Nav-
πακτον, καὶ ἅμα τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐβούλετο ἀπο-
στῆσαι αὐτούς. ξυνέπρασσον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτῷ
τῶν Λοκρῶν ᾿Αμφισσῆς διὰ τὸ τῶν Φωκέων
ἔχθος δεδιότες: καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι δόντες ὁμήρους
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔπεισαν δοῦναι φοβουμένους τὸν
ἐπιόντα στρατόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς ὁμόρους
αὐτοῖς Μυονέας (ταύτῃ γὰρ δυσεσβολώτατος ἡ
Aoxpis), ἔπειτα ‘Imrvéas καὶ Μεσσαπίους καὶ
Τριταιέας καὶ Χαλαίους καὶ Τολοφωνίους καὶ
Ἡσσίους καὶ Οἰανθέας. οὗτοι καὶ ξυνεστράτευον
πάντες. ᾽Ολπαῖοι δὲ ὁμήρους μὲν ἔδοσαν, ἠκολού-
θουν δὲ ov καὶ “αῖοι οὐκ ἔδοσαν ὁμήρους πρὶν
αὐτῶν εἶλον κώμην Πόλιν ὄνομα ἔχουσαν.

CII. ᾿᾿ὑπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο πάντα καὶ τοὺς
ὁμήρους κατέθετο ἐς Kurivov τὸ Δωρικόν, ἐχώρει
τῷ στρατῷ ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον διὰ τῶν Λοκρῶν,
καὶ πορευόμενος Οἰνεῶνα αἱρεῖ αὐτῶν καὶ Ev-
πάλιον' οὐ γὰρ προσεχώρησαν. γενόμενοι δ᾽ ἐν
τῇ Ναυπακτίᾳ καὶ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ ἅμα ἤδη προσβε-

176

BOOK III. c. 1-cr. 2

the Eurytanian, and Teisander the Apodotian, urged
them to send an army against Naupactus because
this city had brought the Athenians against them.
So towards autumn the Lacedaemonians sent three
thousand hoplites of their allies, among whom were
six hundred from Heracleia, the city which had re-
cently been founded in Trachis. The commander of
the expedition was Eurylochus a Spartan, who was ac-
companied by the Spartans Macarius and Menedaius,
CI. And when the army was collected at Delphi,
Eurylochus sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians ;
for the road to Naupactus lay through their territory,
and he also wished to induce them to revolt from
Athens. Of the Locrians the people of Amphissa
co-operated with him chiefly, these being afraid on
account of their enmity to the Phocians; and after
these had taken the lead in giving him hostages
they persuaded the rest, who were afraid of the
invading army, to do likewise—first their neighbours
the Myoneans, who held the country from which
Locris was most difficult of access, then the Ipneans,
Messapians, Tritaeeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hes-
sians and Oeantheans. All these tribes also took part
in the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages, but
did not take the field with the others; and the
Hyaeans refused to give hostages until a village of
theirs, Polis by name, was taken. _

CII. When all preparations had been made, and
the hostages had been deposited at Cytinium in
Doris, Eurylochus advanced with his army against
Naupactus through the Locrian territory, taking on
his march two of their towns, Oeneon and Eupalium,
which refused to yield. And when they reached the
territory of Naupactus, the Aetolians meanwhile

177

VOL. Il. | N

THUCYDIDES

βοηθηκότες, ἐδήουν τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ προάστειον
ἀτείχιστον ὃν εἷλον' ἐπί τε Μολύκρειον ἐλθόντες,
τὴν Κορινθίων μὲν ἀποικίαν, ᾿Αθηναίων δὲ ὑπή-
8 κοον, αἱροῦσιν. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁ ᾿Αθηναῖος (ἔτι
γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ὧν μετὰ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας περὶ
Ναύπακτον) προαισθόμενος τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ
δείσας περὶ αὐτῆς, ἐλθὼν πείθει ᾿Ακαρνᾶνας,
χαλεπῶς διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀναχώρησιν,
4 βοηθῆσαι Ναυπάκτῳ. καὶ πέμπουσι pet αὐτοῦ
ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν χιλίους ὁπλίτας, οἱ ἐσελθόντες
περιεποίησαν τὸ χωρίον' δεινὸν γὰρ ἣν μή, μεγά-
λου ὄντος τοῦ τείχους, ὀλίγων δὲ τῶν ἀμυνομένων,
5 οὐκ ἀντίσχωσιν. Ἐϊρύλοχος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ
ὡς ἤσθοντο τὴν στρατιὰν ἐσεληλυθυῖαν καὶ ἀδύ-
vatov ὃν τὴν πόλιν βίᾳ ἑλεῖν, ἀνεχώρησαν οὐκ
ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν Αἰολίδα τὴν νῦν
καλουμένην, Καλυδῶνα καὶ Ἰ]λευρῶνα καὶ ἐς τὰ
ταύτῃ χωρία, καὶ ἐς Πρόσχιον τῆς Αἰτωλίας.
6 οἱ γὰρ ᾿Αμπρακιῶται ἐλθόντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς πεί-
θουσιν ὥστε μετὰ σφῶν Αργει τε τῷ ᾿Αμφιλο-
χικῷ καὶ ᾿Αμφιλοχίᾳ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ
Ακαρνανίᾳ ἅμα, λέγοντες ὅτι, ἢν τούτων κρα-
τήσωσι, πᾶν τὸ ἠπειρωτικὸν Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμ-
7 μαχον καθεστήξει. καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐρύλοχος πεισθεὶς
καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἀφεὶς ἡσύχαζε τῷ στρατῷ
περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους, ἕως τοῖς ᾿Αμπρακιώ-
ταῖς ἐκστρατευσαμένοις περὶ τὸ ΓΑργος δέοι βοη-
θεῖν. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

1 4,e. the fleet of the Acarnanians themselves ; the thirty
Athenian ships, which Demosthenes had commanded, had

178

BOOK III. ci. 2-7

having come to their support, they ravaged the land
and took the outer town, which was not fortified ;
and advancing against Molycreium, a colony founded
by the Corinthians but subject to Athens, they took
it. But Demosthenes the Athenian, who happened
to have remained in the neighbourhood of Naupactus
after his retreat from Aetolia, got information of the
expedition, and fearing for the town went and
persuaded the Acarnanians, though with difficulty
on account of his withdrawal from Leucas, to come to
the aid of Naupactus. And they sent with him on
board the fleet} one thousand hoplites, who entered
the place and saved it; for there was danger that
they might not be able to hold out, since the walls
were extensive aud the defenders few in number.
Eurylochus and his men, perceiving that the army
had entered and that it was impossible to take the
town by storm, now withdrew, not to the Pelopon-
nesus, but to the district of Aeolis, as it is now called,
to Calydon, namely, and Pleuron, and the other -
towns of that region, and to Proschium in Aetolia.
For the Ambraciots came and urged him to join
them in an attack upon Amphilochian Argos and the
rest of Amphilochia, and at the same time upon
Acarnania, saying that if they got control of these
places all the mainland would be brought into
alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Eurylochus was
persuaded, and dismissing the Aetolians remained
inactive, keeping his army in these regions until
the Ambraciots should take the field and the time
should come for him to join them in the neighbour-
hood of Argos. And the summer ended.

returned to Athens (ch. xcviii. 5), while those mentioned
ch. cv. 3 did not come till later.

179
N 2

THUCYDIDES

βοηθηκότες, ἐδήουν τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ προάστειον
ἀτείχιστον ὃν εἷλον' ἐπί τε Μολύκρειον ἐλθόντες,
τὴν Κορινθίων μὲν ἀποικίαν, ᾿Αθηναίων δὲ ὑπή-
3 Koov, αἱροῦσιν. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁ ᾿Αθηναῖος (ἔτι
γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ὧν μετὰ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας περὶ
Ναύπακτον) προαισθόμενος τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ
δείσας περὶ αὐτῆς, ἐλθὼν πείθει ᾿Ακαρνᾶνας,
χαλεπῶς διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀναχώρησιν,
4 βοηθῆσαι Ναυπάκτῳ. καὶ πέμπουσι μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ
ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν χιλίους ὁπλίτας, οἱ ἐσελθόντες
περιεποίησαν τὸ “χωρίον' δεινὸν γὰρ ἦν μή, μεγά-
λου ὄντος τοῦ τείχους, ὀλίγων δὲ τῶν ἀμυνομένων,
δ οὐκ ἀντίσχωσιν. Εὐρύλοχος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ
ὡς ἤσθοντο τὴν στρατιὰν ἐσεληλυθυῖαν καὶ ἀδύ-
νατον ὃν τὴν πόλιν βίᾳ ἑλεῖν, ἀνεχώρησαν οὐκ
ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν Αἰολίδα τὴν νῦν
καλουμένην, Καλυδῶνα καὶ Πλευρῶνα καὶ ἐς τὰ
ταύτῃ ὡρία, καὶ ἐς Πρόσχιον τῆς Αἰτωλίας.
6 οἱ γὰρ Αμπρακιῶται ἐλθόντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς πεί-
θουσιν ὥστε μετὰ σφῶν Ἄργει τε τῷ ᾿Αμφιλο-
χικῷ καὶ ᾿Αμφιλοχίᾳ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ
Akapvavig ἅμα, λέγοντες ὅτι, ἢν τούτων κρα-
τήσωσι, πᾶν τὸ ἠπειρωτικὸν Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμ-
7 paxov καθεστήξει. καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐρύλοχος πεισθεὶς
καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἀφεὶς ἡσύχαζε τῷ στρατῷ
περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους, ἕως τοῖς ᾿Αμπρακιώ-
TALS ἐκστρατευσαμένοις περὶ τὸ ἼΑργος δέοι βοη-
θεῖν. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

1 ὁ, 6. the fleet of the Acarnanians themselves ; the thirty
Athenian ships, which Demosthenes had commanded, had

178

BOOK ΤΥ ona

heeing weet 2p chor sunport. thew recared the nnd
aed χωεῖς the seer town, which wes wat forthe’ -
and afsameins apa Mi ocroresum. a colony iaanded
by the Caornminan: bot sctiect τὸ Athens they tok
3 Bot Demmpscheme: the Athemian, whe happened
te have yemmaimed τι the seachbacrhond of Naxnpactas
after bis retreat from Aetona. got information of the
expecttixm, and fearmg for the town went and
persuaded thre Acarmanians, thonch with fully
om account of his withdrawal from Leacas. te cme te
the aad of Naupectzs. And ther sent with hiv om
board the fleet; one thousand hoptites, whe entered
the place and saved it; for there was that
they might mot be able to hold out. since walls
were extensive aud the defenders few in number,
Karylochus and his men, perceiving that the anny
had entered and that it was impossible to take the
town by storm, now withdrew, not to the Pelopon-
nesas, but to the district of Aecolis, as it is now called,
to Calydon, namely, and Pleuron, and the other
towns of that region, and to Proschium in Actolia,

For the Ambraciots came and urged him to join
them im an attack upon Amphilochian Argos and the
rest of Amphilochia, and at the same time upon
Acarnania, saying that if they got control of these
places all the mainland would be brought into
alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Eurylochus was
persuaded, and dismissing the Aetolians remained
inactive, keeping his army in these regions until
the Ambraciots should take the field and the time
should come for him to join them in the neighbour-

hood of Argos. And the summer ended.

returned to Athens (ch. xoviii. δ), while those montioned
ch. cv. 3 did not come till later.

179
nN 2

THUCYDIDES

CIIT. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ AO ηναῖοι τοῦ ἐπιγεγνο -
μένου χειμῶνος ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ξυμ-
μάχων καὶ ὅσοι Σικελῶν κατὰ κράτος ἀρχόμενοι
ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων καὶ ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἀποστάντες
αὐτοῖς * ξυνεπολέμουν, ἐ ἐπ᾽ Ἴνησσαν τὸ Σικελικὸν
πόλισμα, οὗ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν Συρακόσιοι εἶχον,
προσέβαλλον, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, ἀπῇσαν.
ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀναχωρήσει ὑστέροις ᾿Αθηναίων τοῖς
ξυμμάχοις ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπιτίθενται οἱ ἐκ τοῦ
τειχίσματος Συρακόσιοι, καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέ-
πουσί τε μέρος τί τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν
οὐκ odious. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ὁ
Λάχης καὶ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Λοκρίδα ἀποβάσεις
τινὰς ποιησάμενοι κατὰ τὸν Καϊκῖνον ποταμὸν
τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας Λοκρῶν μετὰ Προξένου τοῦ
Καπάτωνος ὡς τριακοσίους μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν καὶ
ὅπλα λαβόντες ἀπεχώρησαν.

CIV. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Δῆλον ἐκά-
Onpav ᾿Αθηναῖοι κατὰ χρησμὸν δή τινα. ἐκάθηρε
μὲν γὰρ καὶ “Πεισίστρατος ὁ τύραννος πρότερον
αὐτήν, οὐχ ἅπασαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
ἐφεωρᾶτο τῆς νήσου" τότε δὲ πᾶσα ἐκαθάρθη
τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. θῆκαι ὅσαι ἦσαν τῶν τεθνεώτων
ἐν “Δήλῳ, πάσας ἀνεῖλον, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν προεῖπον
μήτε ἐναποθνήσκειν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ μήτε ἐντίκτειν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν Ῥήνειαν διακομίξεσθαι. ἀπέχει δὲ
ἡ “Ῥήνεια τῆς Δήλου οὕτως ὀλίγον ὥστε Πολυ-
κράτης, ὁ Σαμίων τύραννος, ἰσχύσας τινὰ χρόνον
ναυτικῷ καὶ τῶν τε ἄλλων νήσων ἄρξας καὶ τὴν
Ῥήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῷ ᾿Απόλλωνι τῷ Δηλίῳ

1 ἀπὸ Συρακοσίων after αὐτοῖς, deleted by van Herwerden.

180

BOOK III. cu. x-c1v. 2

CIII. The following winter the Athenians in 4262.
Sicily, with their Hellenic allies and such of the
Sicels as had been unwilling subjects and allies of
the Syracusans but had now revolted from them and
were taking sides with the Athenians, attacked the
Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held
by the Syracusans, but being unable to take it they
departed. On their retreat, however, the allies, who
were in the rear of the Athenians, were attacked by
the Syracusan garrison of the fort, who fell upon them
and put to flight part of the army, killing not a few
ofthem. After this Laches and the Athenians took
the fleet and made several descents upon Locris; and
at the river Caicinus they defeated in battle about
three hundred Locrians who came out against them,
under the command of Proxenus son of Capato, took
the arms of the fallen, and returned to Rhegium.

CIV. During the same winter the Athenians puri-
fied Delos in compliance with a certain oracle. It
had been purified before by Peisistratus the tyrant,!
not indeed the whole of the island but that portion of
it which was visible from the temple; but at this
time the whole of it was purified, and in the following
manner. All the sepulchres of the dead that were
in Delos they removed, and proclaimed that there-
after no one should either die or give birth to a child
on the island, but should first be carried over to
Rheneia. For Rheneia is so short a distance from
Delos that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who for
some time was powerful on the sea and not only
gained control of the other islands? but also seized
Rheneia, dedicated this island to the Delian Apollo,

1 First tyranny 560 B.c.; death 527 B.c.
2 The Cyclades.

181

THUCYDIDES

ἁλύσει δήσας πρὸς τὴν Δῆλον. καὶ τὴν πεντε-
τηρίδα τότε πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐποίησαν
οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι... ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη
a, > A A A 3 ’ ,
Evvodos és τὴν Δῆλον τῶν ᾿Ιώνων τε καὶ περικτιό-
νῶν νησιωτῶν' ξύν τε γὰρ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν
9 lA C4 A 3 9 ’ wv a
ἐθεώρουν, ὥσπερ viv és τὰ ᾿Εφέσια “Iwves, καὶ
ἀγὼν ἐποιεῖτο αὐτόθι καὶ γυμνικὸς καὶ μουσικός,
χορούς τε ἀνῆγον αἱ πόλεις. δηλοῖ δὲ μάλιστα
Ομηρος ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖσδε, ἅ
> 3 , 3
ἐστιν ἐκ προοιμίου ᾿Απολλωνος"
ἄλλοτε" Δήλῳ, Φοῖβε, μάλιστά γε θυμὸν ἐτέρ-
φθης,
ἔνθα τοι ἑλκεχίτωνες Ἰάονες ἠγερέθονται
σὺν σφοῖσιν τεκέεσσι γυναιξί τε σὴν ἐς ἄγυιαν'
ἔνθα σε πυγμαχίῃ καὶ opynotui καὶ ἀοιδῇ
μνησάμενοι τέρπουσιν, ὅταν καθέσωσιν ἀγῶνα.

Ψ A Ἁ A 9 \ * \ 3 ,

ὅτε δὲ καὶ μουσικῆς ἀγὼν ἦν καὶ ἀγωνιούμενοι

9 la 9 A φ A ¢? 93 3 A 3 ~

ἐφοίτων ἐν τοῖσδε av δηλοῖ, ἅ ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
Ἁ A

προοιμίου. τὸν yap Δηλιακὸν χορὸν τῶν yuvat-

1 τὰ Δήλια, after οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, deleted by van Herwerden,

followed by Hude.
* ἄλλοτε, Camerarius’ conjecture, now generally adopted,

for the Vulgate ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε, which Hude retains.

1 ** As a symbolical expression of indissoluble union ”
(Curtius).

2 καὶ 6, celebrated every fifth year.

8 Homer is clearly regarded by Thucydides as the author
of the hymn here cited. How definite a personality he was

182

BOOK III. ctv. 2-5

and bound it with a chain to Delos.! It was at this
time, after the purification, that the Athenians first
celebrated their penteteric? festival in Delos. There
had indeed in ancient times been a great gathering
at Delos of the Ionians and the inhabitants of the
neighbouring islands ; and they used to resort to the
festival with their wives and children, as the Ionians
now do to the Ephesian games; and a contest was
formerly held there, both gymnastic and musical, and
choruses were sent thither by the cities. The best
evidence that the festival was of this character is
given by Homer ® in the following verses, which are
from the hymn to Apollo : 4

« At other times, Phoebus, Delos is dearest to
thy heart, where the Ionians in trailing robes
are gathered together with their wives and
children in thy street; there they delight thee
with boxing and dancing and song, making
mention of thy name, whenever they ordain the
contest.”

And that there was a musical contest also to which
men resorted as competitors Homer once more
makes clear in the following verses from the same
hymn. After commemorating the Delian chorus of

to Thucydides is shown by the words ‘‘in which he also
mentions himself.”

4 προοίμιον, proem or introduction. In connection with
epic poems the hymns were called προοίμια, because they
were sung before other poems, 1.6, by the rhapsodists as
preludes to their rhapsodies. Schol. ἐξ ὕμνουν: τοὺς yap ὕμνους
προοίμια ἐκάλουν. The question has been raised whether the
hymn was a prelude to the rhapsodies or was, as 4.9. here,
in itself a rhapsody. The citations here made by Thucydides
are from the Hymn to the Delian Apollo, 146 ff. and 165 ff.

183

THUCYDIDES

κῶν ὑμνήσας ἐτελεύτα τοῦ ἐπαίνου ἐς τάδε τὰ
ἔπη, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπεμνήσθη"

ἀλλ᾽ ἄγεθ᾽, λήκοι μὲν ᾿Απόλλων ᾿Αρτέμιδι ξύν,
χαίρετε δ᾽ ὑμεῖς πᾶσαι. ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθε
μνήσασθ', ὁππότε κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
ἐνθάδ᾽ ἀνείρηται ταλαπείριος ἄλλος ἐπελθών"
“«“Ὦ κοῦραι, τίς & ὑμῖν ἀνὴρ ἥδιστος ἀοιδῶν
ἐνθάδε πωλεῖται καὶ τέῳ τέρπεσθε μάλιστα; i
ὑμεῖς δ᾽ εὖ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθαι εὐφήμως"
as Τυφλὸς ἀνήρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίῳ ἔ ἔνι παιπαλοέσσῃ.᾽ 3

Τοσαῦτα μὲν" Ὅμηρος ἐ ἐτεκμηρίωσεν ὅτι ἦν καὶ
τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη. ξύνοδος καὶ ἑορτὴ ἐν τῇ Δήλῳ:
ὕστερον δὲ τοὺς μὲν χοροὺς οἱ νησιῶται καὶ οἱ
᾿Αθηναῖοι μεθ᾽ ἱερῶν ἔπεμπον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς
ἀγῶνας καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατελύθη ὑ ὑπὸ ξυμφορῶν,
ὡς εἰκός, πρὶν δὴ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι "τότε τὸν ἀγῶνα
ἐποίησαν καὶ ἱπποδρομίας, ὃ ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἣν.

CV. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος ᾿Αμπρακιῶται,
ὥσπερ ὑποσχόμενοι Εὐρυλόχῳ τὴν στρατιὰν
κατέσχον, ἐκστρατεύονται ἐπὶ “Apyos τὸ ᾿Αμφι-
λοχικὸν' τρισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις, καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς
τὴν ᾿Αργείαν καταλαμβάνουσιν Ὅλπας, “τεῖχος
ἐπὶ λόφου ἰσχυρὸν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὅ ποτε
᾿Ακαρνᾶνες τειχισάώμενοι κοινῷ δικαστηρίῳ
ἐχρῶντο' ἀπέχει δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ᾿Αργείων πόλεως

1 εὐφήμως, Hude ἀφήμως.

1 2,6. either a federal court of the Acarnanians, as Steup
maintains (see Schoemann, Gr. Alterthiimer, 118. p. 76), or a
court of justice common to the Acarnanians and Amphilo-

184

BOOK III. crv. στον. 1

women he ends his praise of them with the following
verses, in which he also mentions himself :

‘Come now, let Apollo be gracious and Ar-
temis likewise, and farewell, all ye maidens.
Yet remember me even in after times, whenever
some other toil-enduring man, a dweller upon the
earth, shall visit this isle and ask : ‘O maidens,
what man is the sweetest of minstrels to you of
all who wander hither, and in whom do you
take most delight?’ Do you make answer, all
with one accord, in gentle words, ‘The blind
man who dwells in rugged Chios.’ ”’

Such is Homer’s testimony, showing that in an-
cient times also there was a great concourse and
festival in Delos. And in later times the people of
the islands and the Athenians continued to send
their choruses with sacrifices, but the contests, and
indeed most of the ceremonies, fell into disuse in
consequence, probably, of calamities, until the Athen-
ians, at the time of which we now speak, restored
the contests and added horse-races, of which there
had been none before.

CV. During the same winter the Ambraciots,
fulfilling the promise by which they had induced
Eurylochus to keep his army there, made an ex-
pedition against Amphilochian Argos with three
thousand hoplites, and invading its territory took
Olpae, a stronghold on the hill near the sea, which
the Acarnanians had fortified and had at one time
used as a common tribunal! of justice; and it is

chians (see Kruse, Hellas, ii. p. 333), as Classen explains.
The latter view has the support of Steph. Byz.: "Oda: ppov-
ριον, κοινὸν ᾿Ακαρνάνων καὶ ᾿Αμφιλόχων δικαστήριον, Θουκυδίδης
τρίτῃ.

185

THUCYDIDES ©

3 4 bd / ‘ ΝΜ Sf
ἐπιθαλασσίας οὔσης πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίους
2 μάλιστα. οἱ δὲ ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες οἱ μὲν és “Apros
ξυνεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ᾿Αμφιλοχίας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
χωρίῳ ὃ Κρῆναι καλεῖται, φυλάσσοντες τοὺς
μετὰ Εὐρυλόχου Πελοποννησίους μὴ λάθωσι πρὸς
τοὺς ᾿Αμπρακιώτας διελθόντες, ἐστρατοπεδεύ-
8 σαντο. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν ἐς
\ 3 ’ 3 ’ὔ / Ψ
τὴν Αἰτωλίαν ᾿Αθηναίων στρατηγήσαντα, ὅπως
σφίσιν ἡγεμὼν γίγνηται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς εἴκοσι ναῦς
4 ’ a Ν Ἁ 4 φ
Αθηναίων ai ἔτυχον περὶ Πελοπόννησον οὖσαι,
φ φ 2 / e , \
ὧν ἦρχεν ᾿Αριστοτέλης τε ὁ Τιμοκράτους καὶ
ς A e 3 / 3 [4 \
4 ἹἹεροφῶν ὁ ᾿Αντιμνήστου. ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ
Υ̓͂ ε \ Ν ? a 2
ἄγγελον οἱ περὶ τὰς Ἔλπας ᾿Αμπρακιῶται ἐς
τὴν πόλιν κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν travdnpet,
δεδιότες μὴ οἱ μετ᾽ Εὐρυλόχου οὐ δύνωνται διελ-
θεῖν τοὺς ᾿Ακαρνᾶνας καὶ σφίσιν ἢ μονωθεῖσιν
ἡ μάχη γένηται ἢ ἀναχωρεῖν βουλομένοις οὐκ ἦ
ἀσφαλές.
CVI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν per Εὐρυλόχου Πελοπον-
, e ΨΜ A 9 ν b ᾽ὔ
νήσιοι ὡς ἤσθοντο τοὺς ἐν Ολπαις ᾿Αμπρακιωτας
ἥκοντας, ἄραντες ἐκ τοῦ Προσχίου ἐβοήθουν κατὰ
lA Ἁ 4 \ 3 A 3 ΄ 3
τάχος, καὶ διαβάντες τὸν ᾿Αχελῷον ἐχώρουν δι
3 7] 4 4 ἢ \ 9 ΝΜ
Ακαρνανίας οὔσης ἐρήμου διὰ τὴν ἐς “Apyos
βοήθειαν, ἐν δεξιᾷ μὲν ἔχοντες τὴν Στρατίων
πόλιν καὶ τὴν φρουρὰν αὐτῶν, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ τὴν
2 ἄλλην ᾿Ακαρνανίαν. καὶ διελθόντες τὴν τρα-

1 After the return of the thirty ships (ch. xcviii. 5), these
twenty had been sent out again round the Peloponnesus.

186

BOOK III. cv. r—cvi. 2

about twenty-five stadia from the city of Argos,
which is by the sea. Meanwhile some of the Acar-
nanian troops came to the relief of Argos, while the
rest encamped at a place in Amphilochia which is
called Crenae, keeping guard to prevent the Pelo-
ponnesians with Eurylochus from passing through un-
observed to join the Ambraciots. They also sent for
Demosthenes, who had led the army of the Athenians
into Aetolia, to come and be their leader, as well as
for the twenty Athenian ships! which happened to
be off the coast of Peloponnesus under the command
of Aristotle son of Timocrates and Hierophon son of
Antimnestus. A messenger was also sent by the
Ambraciots at Olpae to the city of Ambracia with a
request that all the forces of the town should be
dispatched to their aid, for they feared that Eury-
lochus and his troops might not be able to make
their way through the Acarnanians, and, in that case,
that they themselves would either have to fight
single-handed, or, if they wished to retreat, would
find that unsafe.

CVI. Now the Peloponnesian forces under Eury-
lochus, when they learned that the Ambraciots had
arrived at Olpae, set out from Proschium with all speed
to reinforce them, and crossing the Acheloiis advanced
through Acarnania, which was without defenders be-
cause of the reinforcements which had been sent to
Argos, and as they advanced they had the city of
Stratus with its garrison on their right, and the rest
of Acarnania on their left. Then traversing the
territory of the Stratians they advanced through

Their real goal was Naupactus (ch. cxiv. 2), but answering
the appeal of the Acarnanians they turned aside for the
moment to the Ambracian Gulf (ch. cvii. 1). .

187

THUCYDIDES

τίων γῆν ἐχώρουν διὰ τῆς Φυτίας καὶ αὖθις
Μεδεῶνος παρ᾽ ἔσχατα, ἔπειτα διὰ Λιμναίας"
καὶ ἐπέβησαν τῆς ᾿Αγραίων, οὐκέτι ᾿Ακαρνανίας,
φιλίας. δὲ σφίσιν. λαβόμενοι δὲ τοῦ Θυάμου
ὄρους, ὅ ἐστιν “Aypaixov,” ἐχώρουν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ
κατέβησαν ἐς τὴν ᾿Αργείαν νυκτὸς ἤδη, καὶ
διεξελθόντες μεταξὺ τῆς τε ᾿Αργείων πόλεως καὶ
τῆς ἐπὶ Κρήναις ᾿Ακαρνάνων φυλακῆς ἔλαθον
καὶ προσέμειξαν τοῖς ἐν Ολπαις ᾿Αμπρακιώταις.

CVII. Tevopevor δὲ ἁθρόοι ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ
καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν Μητρόπολιν καλουμένην καὶ
στρατόπεδον ἐποιήσαντο. ᾿Αθηναῖοι δὲ ταῖς
εἴκοσι ναυσὶν οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον παραγίγνονται
ἐς τὸν ᾿Αμπρακικὸν κόλπον βοηθοῦντες τοῖς ᾽Δρ-
γείοις, καὶ Δημοσθένης Μεσσηνίων μὲν ἔχων
διακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ἑξήκοντα δὲ τοξότας ᾿Αθη-
ναίων. καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες περὶ τὰς Ὄλπας τὸν
λόφον ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐφώρμουν' οἱ δὲ ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες
καὶ ᾿Αμφιλόχων ὀλίγοι (οἱ γὰ πλείους ὑπὸ
᾿Αμπρακιωτῶν βίᾳ κατείχοντο) ἐς τὸ Ἄργος 907
Evvehnrvdores παρεσκευάζοντο, ὡς μαχούμενοι
τοῖς ἐναντίοις, καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντὸς ξυμμα-
χικοῦ αἱροῦνται Δημοσθένη “μετὰ τῶν σφετέρων
στρατηγῶν. ὁ δὲ προσαγαγὼν ἐγγὺς τῆς Ὄλστης
ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο' χαράδρα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς μεγάλη
διεῖργεν. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν πέντε ἡσύχαξον, τῇ δ᾽
ἕκτῃ ἐτάσσοντο ἀμφότερο: ὡς ἐς μάχην. καί
(μεῖξον “γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ περιέσχε τὸ τῶν Πελο-
τοννησίων στρατόπεδον) ὁ Δημοσθένης δείσας

1 »Αγραϊκόν, for ἄγροικον or ἀγροῖκον of the MSS., corrected

by ὃ. Mueller.
2 τὸν λόφον, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.

188

BOOK III. cv. 2-cvr. 3

Phytia, from there skirted the borders of Medeon,
and then passed through Limnaea; and finally they
reached the country of the Agraeans, being now
outside of Acarnania and in a friendly country.
Arriving next at Mt. Thyamus, which belongs to the
Agraeans, they went through the pass over it and
came down into Argive territory after nightfall,
whence they succeeded in passing unobserved
between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian
guard at Crenae, finally joining the Ambraciots at
Olpae.

CVII. After the two armies had effected a
junction, at daybreak they took post at a place called
Metropolis and made camp. Not long afterwards
the Athenians with their twenty ships arrived in the
Ambracian Gulf, reinforcing the Argives; and
Demosthenes also came with two hundred Messenian
hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. The ships
lay at sea about the hill of Olpae, blockading it; but
the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians—for
most of these were kept from moving by the
Ambraciots—had already gathered at Argos and were
preparing for battle with their opponents, having
chosen Demosthenes to command the whole allied
force in concert with their own generals. And he,
leading them close to Olpae, encamped; and a
great ravine separated the two armies. For five
days they kept quiet, but on the sixth both sides
drew up in order of battle. Now the army of the
Peloponnesians was larger than that of Demosthenes
and outflanked it; he, therefore, fearing that he

189

THUCYDIDES

μὴ κυκλωθῇ λοχίξει ἐς ὁδόν τινα κοίλην καὶ
λοχμώδη ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς ξυναμφοτέρους ἐς
τετρακοσίους, ὅπως κατὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον τῶν ἐναν-
τίων ἐν τῇ ξυνόδῳ αὐτῇ ἐξαναστάντες οὗτοι κατὰ
νώτου γίγνωνται. ἐπεὶ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφο-
τέροις, ἦσαν ἐς χεῖρας, Δημοσθένης μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν
’ ” 4 3 θ ’
κέρας ἔχων μετὰ Μεσσηνίων καὶ ᾿Αθηναίων
9. 7 A \ mM” s A e Ψ
ὀλίγων" τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ᾿Ακαρνῶᾶνες ὡς ἕκαστοι τεταγ-
3 a 3 , e , 3
μένοι ἐπεῖχον καὶ ᾿Αμφιλόχων οἱ παρόντες ἀκον-
’ 7 \ 3 A
τισταί: Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ καὶ ᾿Αμπρακιῶται
ἀναμὶξ τεταγμένοι πλὴν Μαντινέων" οὗτοι δὲ ἐν
τῷ εὐωνύμῳ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ τὸ κέρας ἄκρον ἔχον-
τες ἁθρόοι ἧσαν, ἀλλ᾽ Εὐρύλοχος ἔσχατον εἶχε τὸ
εὐώνυμον καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, κατὰ Μεσσηνίους καὶ
Δημοσθένη.
ΟΥ̓ΙΠ. Ὡς δ᾽ ἐν χερσὶν ἤδη ὄντες περιέσχον
a / e ? A \
τῷ κέρᾳ ot [Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἐκυκλοῦντο TO
δεξιὸν τῶν ἐναντίων, οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες
ἐπιγενόμενοι αὐτοῖς κατὰ νώτου προσπίπτουσί
τε καὶ τρέπουσιν, ὥστε μήτε ἐς ἀλκὴν ὑπομεῖναι
φοβηθέντας τε ἐς φυγὴν καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ στρα-
τεύματος καταστῆσαι" ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἶδον τὸ κατ᾽
Εὐρύλοχον καὶ ὃ κράτιστον ἦν διαφθειρόμενον,
πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐφοβοῦντο. καὶ οἱ Μεσσήνιοι
ὄντες ταύτῃ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τὸ πολὺ τοῦ
ἔργου ἐπεξῆλθον. οἱ δὲ ᾿Αμπρακιῶται καὶ οἱ
Ά. Ἁ , > ἢ \ > ε \
κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἐνίκων τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ
\ \w δί 1 a ’
πρὸς τὸ Αργος ἐπεδίωξαν" καὶ γὰρ μαχιμώτατοι
1 ἐπεδίωξαν, for ἀπεδίωξαν οὗ the MSS., Haase’s conjecture.
190

BOOK II. evn. 4-ὄνμι. 2

might be surrounded, stationed in a sunken road
overgrown with bushes an ambush of hoplites and
light-troops, about four hundred all together, his
purpose being that in the very moment of collision
these troops should leap from their hiding-place and
take the enemy in the rear at the point where his
line overlapped. When both sides were ready
they came to close quarters. Demosthenes with
the Messenians and a few Athenian troops had the
right wing; the rest of the line was held by the
Acarnanians, arrayed by tribes, and such Amphi-
lochian javelin-men as were present. But the Pelo-
ponnesians and Ambraciots were mingled together,
except the Mantineans; these were massed more on
the left wing, though not at its extremity, for that
position, which was opposite Demosthenes and the
Messenians, was held by Eurylochus and the troops
under him.

CVIII. When finally the armies were at close
quarters and the Peloponnesians outflanked with
their left the right wing of their opponents and
were about to encircle it, the Acarnanians, coming
upon them from their ambush, fell upon their rear
and routed them, so that they did not stand to make
resistance and in their panic caused the greater
part of their army to take to flight also; for when
they saw the division under Eurylochus, their best
troops, being cut to pieces, they were far more
panic-stricken. And it was the Messenians, who
were in this part of the field under the command
of Demosthenes, that bore the brunt of the battle.
On the other hand, the Ambraciots and those on the
enemy’s right wing defeated the troops opposed to
themselves, and pursued them to Argos; and indeed

1gI

THUCYDIDES

τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες.
ἐπαναχωροῦντες δὲ ὡς ἑώρων τὸ πλέον νενικημένον
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες σφίσι προσέκειντο,
χαλεπῶς διεσώζοντο ἐς τὰς Ἔλπας, καὶ πολλοὶ
ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν, ἀτάκτως καὶ οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ
προσπίπτοντες πλὴν Μαντινέων' οὗτοι δὲ μά-
λιστα ξυντεταγμένοι παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώ-
pnoav. καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ὀψέ.

CIX. Μενεδάϊος δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ Εὐρυλόχου
τεθνεῶτος καὶ Μακαρίου αὐτὸς παρειληφὼς τὴν
ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀπορῶν μεγάλης τῆς 1 ἥσσης γεγενη-
μένης ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἢ μένων πολιορκήσεται, ἔκ τε
γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ταῖς ᾿Αττικαῖς ναυσὶν
ἀποκεκλῃμένος, ἢ καὶ ἀναχωρῶν διασωθήσεταε,
προσφέρει λόγον περὶ σπονδῶν καὶ ἀναχωρήσεως
Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς ᾿Ακαρνάνων στρατηγοῖς καὶ
περὶ νεκρῶν ἅμα ἀναιρέσεως. οἱ δὲ νεκροὺς
μὲν ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον αὐτοὶ ἔστησαν καὶ
τοὺς ἑαυτῶν τριακοσίους μάλιστα ἀποθανόντας
ἀνείλοντο" ἀναχώρησιν δὲ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ προφανοῦς
οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο ἅπασι, κρύφα δὲ Δημοσθένης
μετὰ τῶν ξυστρατήγων τῶν 2 ᾿Ακαρνάνων σπέν-
δονται Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Μενεδαΐῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοες
ἄρχουσι τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ ὅσοι αὐτῶν
ἦσαν ἀξιολογώτατοι ἀποχωρεῖν κατὰ τάχος,
βουλόμενος ψιλῶσαι τοὺς ᾿Αμπρακιώτας τε καὶ
τὸν μισθοφόρον ὄχλον,)Σ μάλιστα δὲ Λακεδαι-

1 τῆς added by Hude.
pene before ᾿Ακαρνάνων, added by Kriigcr, followed by
ude.
8 τὸν ξενικόν, given in MSS. after ὄχλον, deleted by van
Herwerden, followed by Hude.

192

BOOK HI. cv. 2—crx. 2

these are the best fighters of all the peoples of that
region. When, however, they returned and saw
that their main army had been defeated, and the
victorious division of the Acarnanians began to press
hard upon them, they made their escape with
difficulty to Olpae ; and many of them were killed,
for they rushed on with broken ranks and in disorder,
all except the Mantineans, who kept their ranks
together during the retreat better than any other
part of the army. And it was late in the evening
before the battle ended. .

CIX. On the next day, since Eurylochus and
Macarius had been slain, Menedaius had on his own
responsibility assumed the command, but the defeat
had been so serious that he was at his wit’s end how,
if he remained, he could stand a siege, blockaded as
he was by both land and sea by the Athenian fleet,
or, if he retreated, could get away safely. He there-
fore made overtures to Demosthenes and the Athe-
nian generals regarding a truce for his retreat and
also about the recovery of his dead. And they gave
back the dead, set up a trophy themselves, and took
up their own dead, about three hundred in number.
They would not, however, openly agree to a retreat
for the whole army, but Demosthenes with his
Acarnanian colleagues secretly agreed that the Man-
tineans and Menedaius and the other Peloponnesian
commanders and the most influential men among
them might go back home, if they did so speedily.
Their object was to isolate the Ambraciots and the
miscellaneous crowd of mercenaries,! and above all to

1 Opinions differ as to who are meant. They were pro-
bably mercenaries from the neighbouring Epirote tribes in
the pay of the Ambraciots,

193
VOL. 1]. Ο

THUCYDIDES

povious καὶ Πελοποννησίους διαβαλεῖν ἐς τοὺς
ἐκείνῃ χρήζων “Ελληνας ὡς καταπροδόντες τὸ

3 ἑαυτῶν προυργιαίτερον ἐποιήσαντο. καὶ οἱ μὲν
τούς τε νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο καὶ διὰ τάχους ἔθαπτον,
ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἀποχωρῆδιν κρύφα οἷς
ἐδέδοτο ἐπεβούλευον.

ΟΧ. Τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς ᾿Ακαρνᾶσιν
ἀγγέλλεται τοὺς ᾿Αμπρακιώτας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως πανδημεὶ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐκ τῶν
᾿λπῶν ἀγγελίαν ἐπιβοηθεῖν διὰ τῶν ᾿Αμφι-

ων, βουλομένους τοῖς ἐν ᾽ολπαις ξυμμεῖξαι

2 εἰδότας οὐδὲν τῶν γεγενημένων. καὶ πέμπει
εὐθὺς τοῦ στρατοῦ μέρος τι τὰς ὁδοὺς προλο-
χιοῦντας καὶ τὰ καρτερὰ προκαταληψομένους,
καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ ἅμα παρεσκευάξετο βοη-
θεῖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς.

ΟΧΙ. ‘Ev τούτῳ δ᾽ οἱ i Μαντινῆς καὶ οἷς ἔσπειστο
πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λα ανισμὸν καὶ φρυγάνων ξυλ-
λογὴν ἐξελθόντες ὑπαπῆσαν κατ᾽ ὀλίγους, ἅμα
ξυλλέγοντες ἐφ᾽ ἃ ἐξῆλθον δῆθεν" προκεχωρη-
κότες δὲ ἤδη ἄπωθεν τῆς “Odrys θᾶσσον ἀπε-

2 χώρουν. οἱ δ᾽ ᾿Αμπρακιῶται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι
μὲν ἐτύγχανον οὕτως ἁθρόοι ξυνελθόντες, ὡς
ἔγνωσαν ἀπιόντας, ὥρμησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἔθεον

8 δρόμῳ, ἐπικαταλαβεῖν βουλόμενοι. οἱ Oe” ᾿Ακαρ-
νᾶνες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καὶ πάντας ἐνόμισαν ἀπιέναι

1 Hude reads ὅσοι μὴ ἐτύγχανον τούτοις ἁθρόοι ξυνεξελθόντες.

1 As distinguished from the Ambraciots who after the
battle were shut up in Olpae (ch. cxi. 2).

3 The text is most probably corrupt. Classen offers
the best remedy: of δὲ ᾿Αμπρακιῶται καὶ of ἄλλοι ὅσοι
μονούμενοι ἐτύγχανον οὕτως, ἁθρόοι ξυνελθόντες ὧς ἔγνωσαν

194

BOOK III. crx. 2-cx1. 3

discredit the Lacedaemonians and the Peloponnesians
with the Hellenes of this region, on the ground that
they had committed an act of treachery through pre-
ference for their own selfish interests. Accordingly
the Peloponnesians took up their dead and hastily
buried them as best they could, while those who had
permission began secretly to plan their retreat.

CX. Word was now brought to Demosthenes and
the Acarnanians that the inhabitants of the city of
Ambracia,! in response to the first message that came
from Olpae, were marching in full force through the
Amphilochian territory, wishing to jom the forces
in Olpae, and that they were quite unaware of what
had happened. So he immediately sent a part of his
army to forestall these troops by setting ambuscades
along the roads and occupying the strong positions,
and at the same time began preparations to lead the
rest of the army against them.

CXI. In the meantime the Mantineans and the
others who were included in the agreement, leaving
camp on the pretext of gathering pot-herbs and fire-
wood, stole away in small groups, gathering at the
same time what they pretended to have gone to
seek ; then when they had already got some distance
from Olpae they quickened their pace. But the
Ambraciots and all the others who happened to have
come together in a body, when they realized that
these were taking their departure, also set out them-
selves and ran at full speed, wishing to overtake
them.? But the Acarnanians at first thought that
all the fugitives were going away without covenant
ἀπιόντας, ὥρμησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ... :- ‘‘ But the Ambraciots and
all the others who chanced to be left came together in a

body, and when they realised that they were taking their
departure set off also themselves...”

195
ο 2

THUCYDIDES

ἀσπόνδους ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἐπε-
δίωκον, καί τινας αὐτῶν τῶν στρατηγῶν κωλύ-
ovTas καὶ φάσκοντας ἐσπεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς ἠκόντισέ
τίς, νομίσας ᾿καταπροδίδοσθαι σφᾶς: ἔπειτα
μέντοι τοὺς μὲν Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς Πελοπον-
νησίους ἀφίεσαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ᾿Αμπρακιώτας ἔκτεινον.
καὶ 7) ἦν πολλὴ ἔρις καὶ ἃ ἄγνοια εἴτε ᾿Αμπρακιώτης
τίς ἐστιν εἴτε “Πελοποννήσιος. καὶ ἐ ἐς διακοσίους
μέν τινας αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν" οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι διέ-
φυγον ἐς τὴν ᾿Αγραΐδα ὅ ὅμορον οὖσαν, καὶ Σαλύν-
θιος αὐτοὺς ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν ᾿Αγραίων φίλος ὧν
ὑπεδέξατο.

CXII. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ᾿Αμπρακιῶται
ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπ᾽ Ἰδομενήν. ἐστὸν δὲ δύο λόφω ἡ
᾿Ιδομένη ὑψηλώ' τούτοιν τὸν μὲν μείζω νυκτὸς
ἐπιγενομένης οἱ προαποσταλέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ An-
μοσθένους ἀπὸ τοῦ στ ατοπέδου ἔλαθόν τε καὶ
ἔφθασαν προκαταλαβόντες, τὸν δ᾽ ἐλάσσω 1 ἔτυ-
χον οἱ ᾿Αμπρακιῶται προαναβάντες καὶ ηὐλί-
σαντο. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης δειπνήσας ἐ ώρει καὶ
τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἀπὸ ἑσπέρας εὖ ὕς, αὐτὸς
μὲν τὸ ἥμισυ ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς ,ἐσβολῆς, ° τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο
διὰ τῶν ᾿Αμφιλοχικῶν ὀρῶν. καὶ ἅμα ὄρθρῳ
ἐπιπίπτει τοῖς ᾿Αμπρακιώταις ἔτι ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς
καὶ οὐ προῃσθημένοις τὰ γεγενημένα, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
μᾶλλον νομίσασι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν εἶναι" καὶ γὰρ
τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πρώτους ἐπίτηδες ὁ ὁ Δημοσθένης
προύταξε καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἐκέλευε, Δωρίδα τε
γλῶσσαν ἱέντας καὶ τοῖς Tm pod ύλαξι πίστιν ᾿ παρε-
χομένους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οὐ καθορωμένους τῇ ὄψει

1 és is inserted before τὸν 3 ἐλάσσω by Hude, following
Kriiger.

196

BOOK III, cx, 3-cx. 4

or truce and therefore set off in pursuit of the Pelo-
ponnesians ; and when some of the generals tried to
prevent this, saying that a truce had been made with
them, someone hurled javelins at them, believing
that they had been betrayed. Afterwards, however,
they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go, but
began to kill the Ambraciots. And there was much
dispute and uncertainty as to whether a man was an
Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. About two hundred
of the Ambraciots were slain ; the rest of the fugitives
escaped into the neighbouring country of Agraea,
and were received by Salynthius the king of the
Agraeans, who was friendly to them.

CXII. Meanwhile the troops from the city of
Ambracia arrived at Idomene. Now it consists of two
lofty hills, and of these the higher had already been
seized unobserved during the night by the troops
which Demosthenes had sent forward from his main
army ; but the lower had previously, as it chanced,
been ascended by the Ambraciots, who spent the
night there. After dinner Demosthenes and the
rest of the army set out immediately after nightfall,
he himself with half of them making for the pass,
while the rest took the road through the Amphilochian
mountains. And at dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots,
who were still in their beds and had no knowledge
at all of what had previously happened. On the
contrary, they supposed these troops to be their own
men, for Demosthenes had purposely put the Mes-
senians in front and directed them to accost the
enemy in the Doric dialect, thus getting themselves
trusted by the outposts; besides, they were indis-
tinguishable to the sight, since it was still dark.

197

THUCYDIDES

δ νυκτὸς ἔτι οὔσης. ὡς οὖν ἐπέπεσε TH OTPATED-
ματι αὐτῶν, τρέπουσι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς
αὐτοῦ διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄρη ἐς

6 φυγὴν ὥρμησαν. προκατειλημμένων δὲ τῶν ὁδῶν,
καὶ ἅμα τῶν μὲν ᾿Αμφιλόχων ἐμπείρων ὄντων
τῆς ἑαυτῶν γῆς καὶ ψιλῶν πρὸς ὁπλίτας, τῶν δὲ
ἀπείρων καὶ ἀνεπιστημόνων ὅπῃ τράπωνται,
ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε χαράδρας καὶ τὰς προλέελο-

7 χισμένας ἐνέδρας διεφθείροντο. καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν
ἰδέαν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς ἐτράποντό τινες καὶ
ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχουσαν, καὶ ὡς
εἶδον τὰς ᾿Αττικὰς ναῦς παραπλεούσας ἅμα τοῦ
ἔργου τῇ ξυντυχίᾳ, προσένευσαν, ἡγησάμενοι ἐν
τῷ αὐτίκα φόβῳ κρεῖσσον εἶναι σφίσιν ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, εἰ δεῖ, διαφθαρῆναι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν

8 βαρβάρων καὶ ἐχθίστων ᾿Αμφιλόχων. οἱ μὲν
οὖν ᾿Αμπρακιῶται τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ κακωθέντες
ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐσώθησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν"
᾿Ακαρνᾶνες δὲ σκυλεύσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ
τροπαῖα στήσαντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐς “Apyos.

ΟΧΙΠΙ. Καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦλθε κῆἣρνξ
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐς ᾿Αγραίους καταφυγόντων ἐκ τῆς
Ὄλπης ᾿Αμπρακιωτῶν, ἀναίρεσιν αἰτήσων τῶν
νεκρῶν ods ἀπέκτειναν ὕστερον τῆς πρώτης μά-
χης, ὅτε μετὰ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ τῶν ὑποσπόν-

2 δων EvveEjoav ἄσπονδοι. ἰδὼν δ᾽ ὁ κῆρυξ τὰ
ὅπλα τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ᾿Αμπρακιωτῶν ἐθαύ-
pale τὸ πλῆθος" οὐ γὰρ ἤδει τὸ πάθος, ἀλλ᾽ ῴετο

198

BOOK III. cxm. 4-cxim. 2

So they fell upon the army of the Ambraciots and
put them to rout, slaying the majority of them on
the spot ; the rest took to flight over the mountains.
But as the roads had already been occupied, and as,
moreover, the Amphilochians were well acquainted
with their own country and were light infantry op-
posing heavy-armed troops, whereas the Ambraciots
were ignorant of the country and did not know which
way to turn, under these circumstances the fleeing
men fell into ravines and into ambushes which had
previously been set for them and perished. And
some of them, after resorting to every manner of
flight, even turned to the sea, which was not far dis-
tant, and seeing the Athenian ships, which were sail-
ing along the coast at the very time when the action
was taking place, swam toward them, thinking in
the panic of the moment that it was better for them
to be slain, if slain they must be, by the crews of the
ships than by the barbarian and detested Amphiloch-
ians. In this manner, then, the Ambraciots suffered
disaster, and but few out of many returned in safety
to their city ; the Acarnanians, on the other hand,
after stripping the dead and setting up trophies,
returned to Argos.

CXITI. On the next day a herald came to the
Athenians from the Ambraciots who had escaped
from Olpae and taken refuge among the Agraeans,
to ask for the bodies of those who had been slain
after the first battle, at the time when unprotected
by a truce these attempted to leave Olpae along with
the Mantineans and the others who were included
in the truce. Now when the herald saw the arms
taken from the Ambraciots who came from the
city, he was amazed at their number; for he did
not know of the recent disaster, but thought that

109

THUCYDIDES

3 τῶν μετὰ σφῶν εἶναι. καί τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὅ τε
θαυμάξοι καὶ ὁπόσοι αὐτῶν τεθνᾶσιν, οἰόμενος
αὖ ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶναι τὸν κήρυκα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ᾽1δο-
μεναῖς. ὁ δ᾽ ἔφη διακοσίους μάλιστα. ὑπολα-

4 βὼν δ᾽ ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶπεν" “Οὔκουν τὰ ὅπλα ταντὶ
διακοσίων φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλέον ἢ χιλίων."
αὖθις δὲ εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος" “ Οὐκ ἄρα τῶν μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν
μαχομένων ἐστίν." ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο" “Εἴπερ γε
ὑμεῖς ἐν ᾿Ιδομενῇ χθὲς ἐμάχεσθε.᾽ ““᾿Αλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς
γε οὐδενὶ ἐμαχόμεθα χθές, ἀλλὰ πρῴην ἐν τῇ
ἀποχωρήσει. “Καὶ μὲν δὴ τούτοις γε ἡμεῖς
χθὲς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοηθήσασι τῆς ᾿Αμπρακιω-

5 τῶν ἐμαχόμεθα." ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ ὡς ἤκουσε καὶ
ἔγνω ὅτε ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοήθεια διέφθαρταε,
᾿ἀνοιμώξας καὶ ἐκπλαγεὶς τῷ μεγέθει τῶν παρόν-
των κακῶν ἀπῆλθεν εὐθὺς ἄπρακτος καὶ οὐκέτε

6 ἀπήτει τοὺς νεκρούς. πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μιᾷ πό-
λει ᾿Ελληνίδε ἐν ἴσαις ἡμέραις μέγιστον δὴ τῶν
κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε ἐγένετο. καὶ ἀριθμὸν
οὐκ ἔγραψα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἄπιστον τὸ
πλῆθος λέγεται ἀπολέσθαι ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος
τῆς πόλεως. ᾿Αμπρακίαν μέντοι olda ὅτι, εἰ
ἐβουλήθησαν ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες καὶ ᾿Αμφίλοχοι ᾿Αθη-
ναΐοις καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι ἐπελθεῖν, av-
τοβοεὶ ἂν elrov: νῦν δ᾽ ἔδεισαν μὴ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι

1 διακοσίων, added by Kriiger.

200

BOOK III. cx. 2-6

the arms belonged to the men of his own division.
And someone asked him why he was amazed, and
how many of his comrades had been slain, the
questioner on his part supposing that the herald
had come from the forces which had fought at
Idomene. The herald answered, “About two
hundred.” The questioner said in reply, “These
arms, though, are clearly not those of two hundred
men, but of more than a thousand.” And again
the herald said, “Then they are not the arms of
our comrades in the battle.” The other answered,
“‘ They are, if it was you who fought yesterday at
Idomene.” “But we did not fight with anyone
yesterday ; it was the day before yesterday, on the
retreat.” “ And it is certain that we fought yester-
day with these men, who were coming to your aid
from the city of the Ambraciots.”” When the herald
heard this and realized that the force which was
coming to their relief from the city had perished,
he lifted up his voice in lamentation and, stunned
by the magnitude of the calamity before him,
departed at once, forgetting his errand and making
no request for the dead. Indeed this was the
greatest calamity that befell any one Hellenic city
in an equal number of days during the course of
this whole war. The number of those who fell
I have not recorded, seeing that the multitude
reported to have perished is incredible when com-
pared with the size of the city. I know, however,
that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had
been willing to hearken to the Athenians and De-
mosthenes and had made an attack upon Ambracia
they would have taken it at the first onset ; but as
it was, they were afraid that the Athenians, if they

201

THUCYDIDES

ὄχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι
ὦσιν.

CXIV. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τρίτον μέρος νείμαντες
τῶν σκύλων τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς
πόλεις διείλοντο. καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
πλέοντα ἑάλω, τὰ δὲ νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς
3 a e A 4 3 ’ [4
Αττικοῖς ἱεροῖς Δημοσθένει ἐξηρέθησαν τριακό-

’ Ν 3 [4
σιαι πανοπλίαι, καὶ ἄγων αὐτὰς κατέπλευσεν"
3 ν. > A ᾿ 3 “A 3
καὶ ἐγένετο ἅμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας
ξυμφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἀδεεστέρα ἡ

’ 3 a Ἁ e 3 A Ψ
κάθοδος. ἀπῆλθον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυ-
σὶν ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐς Ναύπακτον. ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες δὲ καὶ
᾿Αμφίλοχοι ἀπελθόντων ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ Δημοσ-
θένους τοῖς ὡς Σαλύνθιον καὶ ᾿Αγραίους καταφυ-
γοῦσιν ᾿Αμπρακιώταις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀνα-
χώρησιν ἐσπείσαντο ἐξ Οἰνιαδῶν οἷπερ καὶ μεταν-
’ A , Ἁ ΝΜ :
ἔστησαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίου. καὶ és τὸν ἔπειτα
χρόνον σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἑκα-
τὸν ἔτη ᾿Ακαρνᾶνες καὶ ᾿Αμφίλοχοι πρὸς ᾿Αμπρα-
κιώτας ἐπὶ τοῖσδε, ὥστε μήτε ᾿Αμπρακιώτας

2 4 4 > V4
peta ᾿Ακαρνάνων στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννησίους
μήτε ᾿Ακαρνᾶνας μετὰ ᾿Αμπρακιωτῶν ἐπ᾽ ᾿Αθη-
vaiovs, βοηθεῖν δὲ τῇ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀποδοῦναι
9 4 e ’ A 4 e 4 3
Αμπρακιώτας ὁπόσα ἢ χωρία ἢ ὁμήρους ᾿Αμφι-
λόχων ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐπὶ ᾿Ανακτόριον μὴ βοηθεῖν
πολέμιον ὃν ᾿Ακαρνᾶσιν. ταῦτα ξυνθέμενοι διέ-
λυσαν τὸν πόλεμον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κορίνθιοι
202

BOOK ΠῚ. cx. 6-cxiv. 4

had the town in their possession, would be more
troublesome neighbours than the Ambraciots.

CXIV. After this the Acarnanians apportioned a
third of the booty to the Athenians and distributed
the rest among their cities. The portion which
fell to the Athenians was captured from them on the
voyage home; but the dedicatory offerings now to
be seen in the Athenian temples, consisting of three
hundred panoplies, were set apart as Demosthenes’
share, and were brought home by him when he
returned. Furthermore, his return could now, in
consequence of this exploit, be made with less
apprehension after his earlier misfortune in Aetolia.
The Athenians in the twenty ships also departed,
returning to Naupactus. As for the Acarnanians
and Amphilochians, after the Athenians and Demos-
thenes had gone home, they concluded a truce with
the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken
refuge with Salynthius and the Agraeans, allowing
them to withdraw from Oeniadae, whither they had
gone after leaving Salynthius. The Acarnanians
and Amphilochians also concluded for the future a
treaty of alliance with the Ambraciots to last for
one hundred years, on the following terms: The
Ambraciots were not to join the Acarnanians in any
expedition against the Peloponnesians; nor were
the Acarnanians to join the Ambraciots against the
Athenians, but they were to give aid in defence
of one another's territory; the Ambraciots were
to restore all places or hostages belonging to the
Amphilochians which they now held; and _ they
were not to give aid to Anactorium, which was
hostile to the Acarnanians. On these terms of
agreement they brought the war to an end. But

203

FHUCYDIDES

φυλακὴν ἑαυτῶν és τὴν ᾿Αμπρακίαν ἀπέστειλαν
ἐς τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας καὶ Ἐξενοκλείδαν τὸν Εὐ-
θυκλέους ἄρχοντα οἱ κομιζόμενοι χαλεπῶς διὰ

a ,
τῆς ἠπείρου ἀφίκοντο. τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ᾿Αμπρακίαν
οὕτως ἐγένετο.

ΟΧΥ. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ
χειμῶνος ἔς τε τὴν Ἵμεραίαν ἀπόβασιν ἐποιή-
σαντο ἐκ τῶν νεῶν μετὰ τῶν Σικελῶν τῶν ἄνωθεν
3 3 ὰ v a ε , \
ἐσβεβληκότων ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς ἽἹμεραίας καὶ
> \ \ 2 ᾽ὔ Ν 3 V4
ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰολον νήσους ἔπλευσαν. avaywpn-
σαντες δὲ ἐς Ῥήγιον Πυθόδωρον τὸν ᾿Ισολόχου,
9 ’ / 4, 3 XN
Αθηναίων στρατηγόν, καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐπὶ tas
ναῦς διάδοχον ὧ ὁ Λάχης ἦρχεν. οἱ γὰρ ἐν

’ ’ 4 Ν, \
Σικελίᾳ ξύμμαχοι πλεύσαντες ἔπεισαν τοὺς
Αθηναίους βοηθεῖν σφίσι πλείοσι ναυσίν" τῆς
μὲν γὰρ γῆς αὐτῶν οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν, τῆς
δὲ θαλάσσης ὀλίγαις ναυσὶν εἰργόμενοι παρε-
σκευάξοντο ναυτικὸν ξυναγείροντες ὡς οὐ περι-
οψόμενοι. καὶ ἐπλήρουν ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα οἱ
3 θ a e > A 2 vad [4 \
A@nvatot ὡς ἀποστελοῦντες αὐτοῖς, ἅμα μὲν
e 4 n Ν 3 a) 4 4
ἡγούμενοι θᾶσσον τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον καταλυθή-
σεσθαι, ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μελέτην τοῦ ναυτικοῦ
ποιεῖσθαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπέ-
στείλαν Πυθόδωρον ὀλίγαις ναυσί, Σοφοκλέα δὲ
τὸν Σωστρατίδου καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους
3 a ’ a ᾽ Ν ς
ἐπὶ τῶν πλειόνων νεῶν ἀποπέμψειν ἔμελλον. ὁ
δὲ Πυθόδωρος ἤδη ἔχων τὴν τοῦ Λάχητος τῶν
νεῶν ἀρχὴν ὄπλευσα τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος
204

BOOK III. cxrv. 4-cxv. 6

after this the Corinthians sent to Ambracia a
garrison of their own troops, consisting of about
three hundred hoplites, under the command of
Xenocleidas son of Euthycles, who, making their
way with difficulty across he mainland, finally
reached their destination. Such was the course of
events at Ambracia.

CXV. During the same winter the Athenians in
Sicily made a descent from their ships upon the
territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels
from the interior who had invaded the extreme
border? of Himeraea; and they also sailed against
the islands of Aeolus. Returning thence to Rhe-
gium, they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus,
an Athenian general, had come to succeed Laches
in command of the fleet. For their allies in Sicily
had sailed to Athens and persuaded them to aid
them with a larger fleet ; for though their territory
was dominated by the Syracusans, yet since they
were kept from the sea by only a few ships they
were collecting a fleet and making preparations
with the determination not to submit. And the
Athenians manned forty ships to send to them, partly
because they believed that the war in Sicily could
sooner be brought to an end in this way, and partly
because they wished to give practice to their fleet.
Accordingly they despatched one of their generals,
Pythodorus, with a few ships, and were planning
later on to send Sophocles son of Sostratidas and
Eurymedon son of Thucles with the main body
of the fleet. Pythodorus, now that he had taken
over the command of Laches’ ships, sailed toward
the end of the winter against the Locrian fort which

1. 4,.e. toward the interior.
205

THUCYDIDES

ἐπὶ τὸ Λοκρῶν φρούριον ὃ πρότερον Λάχης. εἷλεν"
καὶ νικηθεὶς μάχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν Λοκρῶν ἀπεχώρησεν.
CXVI. ᾿Ερρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο ὁ
ῥύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης, ὥσπερ καὶ πρό-
τερον. καὶ γῆν τινα ἔφθειρε τῶν Καταναίων, of
᾿ ὑπὸ τῇ Αἴτνῃ τῷ ὄρει οἰκοῦσιν, ὅπερ μέγιστόν
3 3 2 A > / , de
ἐστιν ὄρος ἐν TH Σικελίᾳ. λέγεται δὲ πεντη-
κοστῷ ἔτει ῥυῆναι τοῦτο μετὰ τὸ πρότερον ῥεῦμα,
N , “Ὁ \ en 9 2 φ
τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν τρὶς γεγενῆσθαι τὸ ῥεῦμα ἀφ᾿ οὗ
Σικελία ὑπὸ ᾿Ελλήνων οἰκεῖται. ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ
τὸν χειμῶνα τοῦτον ἐγένετο, καὶ ἕκτον ἔτος τῷ
πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

1 of. ch. xcix.

2 The eruption of Aetna mentioned in the Parian Marble,
lii. 67 f., as contemporaneous with the battle of Plataea
(479 as so that the expression ‘‘ fiftieth year” is not quite
exact. From his form of expression in what follows, it

206

BOOK III. cxv. 6—cxvi. 3

Laches had previously captured;! but he was
defeated in battle by the Locrians and returned to
Rhegium.

CXVI. At the beginning of the following spring
the stream of fire burst from Aetna, as it had on
former occasions. And it devastated a portion of
the territory of the Catanaeans who dwell on the
slope of Mount Aetna, the highest mountain in
Sicily. This eruption took place, it is said, fifty
years after the last preceding one ;* and three
eruptions all told are reported to have occurred
since Sicily has been inhabited by the Hellenes.®
Such was the course of events in this winter, and
therewith ended the sixth year of this war of which
Thucydides composed the history.

is clear that Thucydides, when he wrote this passage, could
have had no knowledge of an eruption later than 425 8.0.
He must therefore have died before that of 396 B.c. or,
if he lived after that date, never revised this passage.

5 4.e., since the eighth century; see the account at the
beginning of Book vi.

207

425 B.c.

BOOK IV

VOL. II.

1. Tod δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους περὶ σίτου éx-
βολὴν Συρακοσίων δέκα νῆες πλεύσασαι καὶ
Λοκρίδες ἴσαι Μεσσήνην τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ κατέλα-
βον, αὐτῶν ἐπαγαγομένων, καὶ ἀπέστη Μεσσήνη
᾿Αθηναίων. ἔπραξαν δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα οἱ μὲν
Συρακόσιοι ὁρῶντες προσβολὴν ἔχον τὸ χωρίον
τῆς Σικελίας καὶ φοβούμενοι τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους μὴ
ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμώμενοί ποτε σφίσι μείξονι παρα-
σκευῇ ἐπέλθωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λοκροὶ κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ
Ῥηγίνων, βουλόμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς κατα-
πολεμεῖν. καὶ ἐσεβεβλήκεσαν ἅμα ἐς τὴν Ῥηγί-
νων οἱ Λοκροὶ πανστρατιᾷ, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιβοηθῶσι
τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ξυνεπαγόντων Ῥηγί-
νων φυγάδων, οὗ ἦσαν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς" τὸ γὰρ
“Ῥήγιον ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐστασίαζε καὶ ἀδύνατα
ἦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς Λοκροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι, 7 καὶ
μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο.. δηώσαντες δὲ οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ
τῷ πεζῷ ἀπεχώρησαν, αἱ δὲ νῆες Μεσσήνην
ἐφρούρουν: καὶ ἄλλαι; πληρούμεναι ἔμελλον av-
τόσε ἐγκαθορμισάμεναν τὸν πόλεμον ἐντεῦθεν
ποιήσεσθαι.

1 ai, in the MSS. before πληρούμεναι, deleted by Classen,
followed by Hude.

210

BOOK IV

I, Tue next summer, about the time of the earing 495 ac.
of the grain, ten Syracusan and as many Locrian ships
sailed to Messene in Sicily and occupied it, going
thither on the invitation of the inhabitants; and
Messene revolted from Athens. The chief reason for
this act, on the part of the Syracusans, was that they
saw that the place offered a point of attack upon
Sicily and were afraid that the Athenians might some
time make it a base from which to move against Syra-
cuse with a larger force; the motive of the Locrians
was their hostility to the Rhegians, whom they desired
to subdue by both land and sea. And, indeed, the
Locrians had at this same time invaded the territory
of the Rhegians with all their forces in order to
prevent them from giving any aid to the Messenians ;
and, besides, some. Rhegians who were living in exile
among the Locrians also urged them to make the
invasion; for Rhegium had for a long time been in
a state of revolution, and it was impossible at the
moment to make any defence against the Locrians,
who were consequently the more eager to attack.
The Locrians first ravaged the country and then
withdrew their land forces, but their ships continued
guarding Messene; and still other ships were now
being manned to be stationed at Messene and to
carry on war from there.

211

‘THUCYDIDES

TI. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ ἦρος, πρὶκ
τὸν σῖτον ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι, Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ

, > ἢ» 3 \ 2 , e “A “
ξύμμαχοι ἐσέβαλον és τὴν ᾿Αττικήν (ἡγεῖτο δὲ
"Ayis ὁ ᾿Αρχιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς),
καὶ ἐγκαθεζόμενοι ἐδήουν τὴν γῆν. ᾿Αθηναῖοι δὲ
τάς τε τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπέστει-
λαν, ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ στρατηγοὺς τοὺς
ὑπολοίπους Evpupésovta καὶ Σοφοκλέα: Πυθό-
δωρος γὰρ ὁ τρίτος αὐτῶν ἤδη προαφῖκτο ἐς Σιεκε-
λίαν. εἶπον δὲ τούτοις καὶ Κερκυραίων ἅμα
παραπλέοντας τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιμεληθῆναι, οἱ
ἐλῃστεύοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὄρει φυγάδων' καὶ
Πελοποννησίων αὐτόσε νῆες ἑξήκοντα παρεπε-
πλεύκεσαν τοῖς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τιμωροὶ καὶ λιμοῦ
ὄντος μεγάλον ἐν τῇ πόλει νομίζοντες κατασχή-

e ’ ’ ’ ΜΝ
σειν ῥᾳδίως τὰ πράγματα. Δημοσθένει δὲ ὄντι
3 ’ὔ Ἁ 3 , \ 3 3 ’
ἰδιώτῃ μετὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τὴν ἐξ ᾿Ακαρνανίας
αὐτῷ δεηθέντι εἶπον χρῆσθαι ταῖς ναυσὶ ταύταις,
, \ ’

ἣν βούληται, περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον.

III. Καὶ ὡς ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατὰ τὴν Λακω-
νικὴν καὶ ἐπυνθάνοντο ὅτι αἱ νῆες ἐν Κερκύρᾳ
ἤδη εἰσὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ὁ μὲν Εὐρυμέδων
καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἠπείγοντο ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ὁ δὲ
Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Πύλον πρῶτον ἐκέλενε σχόν-

3 \ \ 4 a N A
Tas αὐτοὺς καὶ πράξαντας ἃ δεῖ τὸν πλοῦν
a 3 ’ \ 4, \
.wovicba ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ κατὰ τύχην χειμὼν
ἐπιγενόμενος κατήνεγκε τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ τὴν Πύλον.
καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἠξίον τειχίξεσθαι τὸ
212

BOOK ΙΝ. a1. 1-m. 2

II. About the same time that spring, before the
grain was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies
made an invasion of Attica, under the command of
Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedae-
monians; and encamping there they ravaged the
land. But the Athenians despatched the forty ships!
to Sicily, as they had previously planned, together
with the two remaining generals, Eurymedon and
Sophocles, who were still at home ; for Pythodorus,
the third general, had already arrived in Sicily.
These had instructions, as they sailed past Corcyra,
to have a care for the inhabitants of the city, who
were being plundered by the exiles on the moun-
tain,? and the Peloponnesians with sixty ships had
already sailed thither, with the purpose of aiding
the party on the mountain and also in the belief
that, since a great famine prevailed in the city,
they would easily get control of affairs. Demos-
thenes also, who had retired into private life after
his return from Acarnania,® now, at his own request,
received permission from the Athenians to use the
forty ships at his discretion in operations about the
Peloponnesus.

III. Now when the Athenians arrived off the coast
of Laconia and learned that the Peloponnesian fleet
was already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles
were for pressing on to Corcyra, but Demosthenes
urged them to put in at Pylos first, do there what
was to be done, and then continue their voyage.
They objected ; but a storm came on, as it happened,
and carried the fleet to Pylos. And Demosthenes
at once urged them to fortify the place, as it was for

1 of. TI. cxv. 4. 2 of. m1. Ixxxv. 4.
8 of, II. exiv. 1.

213

THUCYDIDES

χωρίον (ἐπὶ τοῦτο yap ξυνεκπλεῦσαι), Kal ἀπέ-
φαινε πολλὴν εὐπορίαν ξύλων τε καὶ λίθων καὶ
φύσει καρτερὸν ὃν καὶ ἐρῆμον αὐτό τε καὶ ἐπὶ
πολὺ τῆς χώρας" ἀπέχει γὰρ σταδίους μάλιστα ἡ
Πύλος τῆς Σπάρτης τετρακοσίους καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ
Μεσσηνίᾳ ποτὲ οὔσῃ γῇ, καλοῦσι δὲ αὐτὴν οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κορυφάσιον. οἱ δὲ πολλὰς ἔφα-
σαν εἶναι ἄκρας ἐρήμους τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ἢν

4 , \ , a
βούληται καταλαμβάνων τὴν πόλιν δαπανᾶν.

a“ A 4 / 20 7 4 A \ 4
τῷ δὲ διάφορόν τι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον
ἑτέρου μᾶλλον, λιμένος τε προσόντος καὶ τοὺς
Μεσσηνίους οἰκείους ὄντας αὐτῷ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ
ὁμοφώνους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν βλάπ-
τειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμωμένους καὶ βεβαίους ἅμα τοῦ
χωρίου φύλακας ἔσεσθαι.

IV. ‘Os δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς
οὔτε τοὺς στρατιώτας, ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς ταξιάρ-
χοις κοινώσας, ἡσύχαζον ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας, μέχρι
αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις σχολάξουσιν ὁρμὴ ἐνέ-
πεσε περιστᾶσιν ἐκτειχίσαι τὸ χωρίον. καὶ
2 / 3 4 , ‘ \
ἐγχειρήσαντες εἰργάζοντο, σιδήρια μὲν ALGoupya
οὐκ ἔχοντες, λογάδην δὲ φέροντες λίθους, καὶ

, ς “ , / \
ξυνετίθεσαν ὡς ἕκαστόν τι ξυμβαίνοι: καὶ τὸν

, ν / nA 3 ’ 3 ’ > A
πηλὸν, εἴ που δέοι χρῆσθαι, ἀγγείων ἀπορίᾳ ἐπὶ
τοῦ νώτου ἔφερον ἐγκεκυφότες τε, ὡς μάλιστα
μέλλοι ἐπιμένειν, καὶ τὼ χεῖρε ἐς τοὐπίσω ξυμ-

214

‘

BOOK IV. ur. 2--ἰν. 2

this purpose that he had sailed with them; and he
showed them that there was at hand an abundance
of wood and stone, that the position was naturally
a strong one, and that not only the place itself but
also the neighbouring country for a considerable
distance was unoccupied; for Pylos is about four
hundred stadia distant from Sparta and lies in the
land that was once Messenia; but the Lacedaemon-
ians cal] the place Coryphasium. The other generals
said there were many unoccupied headlands in
the Peloponnesus, which he could seize if he wished
to put the city to expense. Demosthenes, however,
thought that this place had advantages over any
other; not only was there a harbour close by, but
also the Messenians, who originally owned this land
and spoke the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians,
would do them the greatest injury if they made this
place their base of operations, and would at the same
time be a trustworthy garrison of it.

IV. But Demosthenes could not win either the
generals or the soldiers to his view, nor yet the com-
manders of divisions to whom he later communicated
his plan; the army, therefore, since the weather was
unfavourable for sailing, did nothing. But at length
the soldiers themselves, having nothing to do, were
seized with the impulse to station themselves around
the place and fortify it. So they set their hands to
this task and went to work ; they had no iron tools
for working stone, but picked up stones and put
them together just as they happened to fit; and
where mortar was needed, for want of hods, they
carried it on their backs, bending over in such a
way as would make it stay on best, and clasping
both bands behind: them to prevent it from falling

215

THUCYDIDES

4 Ψ \ 5» ’ , ’

8 πλέκοντες, ὅπως μὴ ἀποπίπτοι. παντί Te τρόπῳ
3 , a \ ὃ , a 3
ἠπείγοντο φθῆναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰ ἐπιμα-
χώτατα ἐξεῤγασάμενοι πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαι. τὸ
γὰρ πλέον τοῦ χωρίου αὐτὸ καρτερὸν ὑπῆρχε καὶ

8ῸΝ ν) id e \, @ /
οὐδὲν ἔδει τείχους. V. οἱ δὲ ἑορτήν τινα ἔτυχον
ἄγοντες, καὶ ἅμα πυνθανόμενοι ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ
ἐποιοῦντο, ὡς, ὅταν ἐξέλθωσιν, ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενοῦν-
τας σφᾶς ἢ ῥᾳδίως ληψόμενοι Bias καί τι καὶ

3 AY e Ν 4 3 a 93 VA Ἄ 3 ’
αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατὸς ἔτι ἐν ταῖς ᾿Αθήναις ὧν ἐπέσχεν.

, A e 9? a A , Ἁ

2 τειχίσαντες δὲ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τοῦ χωρίου τὰ πρὸς
ἤπειρον καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἔδει ἐν ἡμέραις SE τὸν μὲν
Δημοσθένη μετὰ νεῶν πέντε αὐτοῦ φύλακα κατα-
λείπουσι, ταῖς δὲ πλείοσι ναυσὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν Κέρ-
κυραν πλοῦν καὶ Σικελίαν ἠπείγοντο.

VI. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ᾿Αττεικῇ ὄντες Πελοποννήσιοι
ὡς ἐπύθοντο τῆς Πύλον κατειλημμένης, ἀνεχώ-
ρουν κατὰ tayos ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, νομίζοντες μὲν οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἾΑγις ὁ βασιλεὺς οἰκεῖον σφίσι
τὸ περὶ τὴν Πύλον: ἅμα δὲ πρῷ ἐσβαλόντες καὶ
τοῦ σίτου ἔτι χλωροῦ ὄντος ἐσπάνιζον τροφῆς
τοῖς πολλοῖς, χειμών τε ἐπιγενόμενος μείξων παρὰ
τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ὥραν ἐπίεσε τὸ στράτευμα.

2 ὥστε πολλαχόθεν ξυνέβη ἀναχωρῆσαί τε θᾶσσον
αὐτοὺς καὶ βραχυτάτην γενέσθαι τὴν ἐσβολὴν

4 , fod
ταύτην" ἡμέρας yap πέντε Kal δέκα ἔμειναν ἐν TH
᾿Αττικῇ.

216

BOOK IV. ιν. 2-v1. 2

off. And in every way they made haste that they
might complete the fortification of the most vulner-
able points before the Lacedaemonians came out
against them ; for the greater part of the place was
so strong by nature that it had. no need of a wall.
V. As for the Lacedaemonians, they happened to be
celebrating a festival when they got word of the
undertaking, and made light of it, thinking that the
Athenians would not await their attack when they
got ready to take the field, or, if they should, that
they could easily take the place by force; and the
fact also that their army was still in Attica had some-
thing to do with their delay. The Athenians in six
days completed the wall on the side toward the land
and at such other points as most needed it, and left
Demosthenes there with five ships to defend it;
they then took the main body of the fleet and
hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

VI. But the Peloponnesians who were in Attica,
when they heard that Pylos had been occupied, re-
turned home in haste; for King Agis and the Lace-
daemonians thought that the Athenian operations at
Pylos were a matter of deep concern to them. And
at the same time, since they had made their invasion
early in the season when the grain was still green,
most of them! were short of food, and bad weather,
which came on with storms of greater violence than
was to be expected so late in the spring, distressed
the army. Consequently there were many reasons
why they hastened their retirement from Attica and
made this the shortest of their invasions; for they
remained there only fifteen days.

1 Each division had its own commissariat, and some were

better provisioned than the main body. Classen explains,
‘* were short of food for so large an army ” (τοῖς woAAois).

217

THUCYDIDES

VII. Kara δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Σιμωνίδης
"AG 7 Ἁ > / A > ὶ Θ la
ηναίων στρατηγὸς "Hiova τὴν ἐπὶ Opaxns
᾿ Μενδαίων ἀποικίαν, πολεμίαν δὲ οὖσαν, ξυλλέ-
» ’ 3. 3 ? “ / ‘
Eas ᾿Αθηναίους te ὀλίγους ἐκ τῶν φρουρίων καὶ
τῶν ἐκείνῃ ξυμμάχων πλῆθος προδιδομένην κατέ-
λαβεν. καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐπιβοηθησάντων Χαλ-

/ ’ ΕΣ ’ \ 2? ἤ
κιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων ἐξεκρούσθη τε καὶ ἀπέβαλε
πολλοὺς τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

VIII. ᾿Αναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ᾿Αττικῆς
Πελοποννησίων οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται αὐτοὶ μὲν καὶ ot
ἐγγύτατα τῶν περιοίκων εὐθὺς ἐβοήθουν ἐπὶ τὴν
Πύλον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Λακεδαιμονίων βραδυτέρα
> 7 e b +) 4 > 2? e ἡ
ἐγίγνετο ἡ ἔξοδος, ἄρτι ἀφιγμένων ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρας

’ὔἢ ᾽ Ν \ \ \
στρατείας. περιήγγελλον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν 1]ελο-
πόννησον βοηθεῖν ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπὶ Πύλον καὶ ἐπὶ
τὰς ἐν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ ναῦς σφῶν τὰς ἑξήκοντα
ΝΜ e . Ὁ Ἁ [4
ἔπεμψαν, al ὑπερενεχθεῖσαι τὸν Λευκαδίων
ἰσθμὸν καὶ λαθοῦσαι τὰς ἐν Ζακύνθῳ ᾿Αττικὰς

“ 3 A > \ 4 a \ . e
ναῦς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Τύλον: παρῆν δὲ ἤδη καὶ ὁ

’ὔ
πεζὸς στρατός. Δημοσθένης δὲ προσπλεόντων
ἔτι τῶν Πελοποννησίων ὑπεκπέμπει φθάσας δύο
ναῦς ἀγγεῖλαι Εὐρυμέδοντι καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν
ἐν Ζακύνθῳ ᾿Αθηναίοις παρεῖναι ὡς τοῦ χωρίου
κινδυνεύοντος. καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες κατὰ τάχος ἔπλεον

\ \ 3 / e \ 4 e A
κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους" οἱ δὲ
Λακεδαιμόνιος παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς τῷ τειχίσ-
ματι προσβαλοῦντες κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θά-
λασσαν, ἐλπίζοντες ῥᾳδίως αἱρήσειν οἰκοδόμημα

7 ζ ᾿ Pe : \ pal , 3 wiles
διὰ ταχέων εἰργασμένον καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγων

218

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Panapia

BOOK IV. vi.—vin. 4

VII. About the same time Simonides, an Athenian
general, getting together a few Athenians from the
garrisons in Thrace and a large force from the allies
in that neighbourhood, got, by the treachery of its
inhabitants, possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony
of the Mendaeans and hostile to Athens. But suc-
cour came promptly from the Chalcidians and the
Bottiaeans and he was driven out with the loss of
many of his soldiers.

VIII. On the return of the Peloponnesians from
Attica, the Spartans themselves and the Perioeci who
were in the neighbourhood of Pylos at once came to
its relief; but the other Lacedaemonians were slower
in coming, since they had just got back from another
campaign. Word was also sent round to the states
of the Peloponnesus, summoning them to come to
the relief of Pylos as quickly as possible, and also to
the sixty ships that were at Corcyra.1 These were
hauled across the Leucadian isthmus, and without
being discovered by the Attic ships, which were now
at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where their land forces
had already arrived. But before the Peloponnesian
fleet had yet reached Pylos, Demosthenes managed to
send out secretly ahead of them two ships which
were to notify Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet
at Zacynthus to come at once to his aid, as the place
was in danger. And so the fleet proceeded in haste
in compliance with Demosthenes’ summons; mean-
while, however, the Lacedaemonians were busy with
their preparations to attack the fortification both by
land and by sea, and they thought that they would
have no difficulty in capturing a structure which had.
been built hastily and was occupied by only a few

1 of. ch. ii. 3.
219

THUCYDIDES

> / A \ \ 3 N a 4
ἐνόντων. προσδεχόμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ζακύν-
θου τῶν ᾿Αττικῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν ἐν νῷ εἶχον, ἢν
wv \ , \ \ ΝΜ A
apa μὴ πρότερον ἕλωσι, καὶ τοὺς ἔσπλους τοῦ
λιμένος ἐμφάρξαι, ὅπως μὴ 2, τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις
ἐφορμίσασθαι ἐς αὐτόν.

Ἢ γὰρ νῆσος ἡ Σφακτηρία καλουμένη τόν τε
λιμένα, παρατείνουσα καὶ ἐγγὺς ἐπικειμένη, ἐχυ-
Ἁ A \ Υ̓͂ ’ A a
pov ποιεῖ Kal τοὺς ἔσπλους στενούς, TH μὲν δυοῖν
νεοῖν διάπλουν κατὰ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
καὶ τὴν Πύλον, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην ἤπειρον
3 \ aA » , e 4 \ 3 A A e b
ὀκτὼ ἢ ἐννέα: ὑλώδης τε Kal ἀτριβὴς πᾶσα ὑπ
ἐρημίας ἣν καὶ μέγεθος περὶ πέντε καὶ δέκα
σταδίους μάλιστα. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔσπλους ταῖς
ναυσὶν ἀντιπρῴροις βύζην κλήσειν ἔμελλον" τὴν
δὲ νῆσον ταύτην φοβούμενοι μὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν

1 The harbour of Pylos is regarded by Classen and nearly
all recent commentators as identical with the modern Bay of
Navarino, the ἔσπλοι τοῦ λιμένος being the entrances north
and south of Sphacteria or Sphagia. But the entrance to
the harbour of Navavino south of Sphagia is now—and must
have heen in Thucydides’ time—a channel more than three-
quarters of a mile wide, and deep all the way across, so that
it does not answer to Thucydides’ description of a passage
only wide enough to admit eight or nine triremes; rather,
as Arnold says, ‘‘a hundred Greek ships might have found
room to sail abreast quite as cane | as eight or nine.”
Clearly, then, Thucydides could not have been personally
acquainted with the scene, and was misinformed as to the
breadth of the harbour’s mouth, as Leake supposed. Or we
must assume that the dimensions of the entrances mentioned
by Thucydides were rather of those north and south of
Coryphasium, the modern Palaeo-Kastro, and the “ har-
bour” was not the Bay of Navarino, as Thucydides sup-

220

BOOK IV. vin. 4-7

men. But since they expected the Athenian fleet
to arrive soon from Zacynthus, it was their intention,
in case they should fail to take the place before
these came, to block up the entrances to the harbour
and thus make it impossible for the Athenians to
anchor inside and blockade them.

Now the island called Sphacteria stretches along
the mainland, lying quite close to it, and thus makes
the harbour safe and the entrances to it narrow;
on one side, opposite the Athenian fortifications
and Pylos, there is only room for two ships to pass
through, on the other side, next to the other part
of the mainland, there is room for eight or nine.}
The whole island was covered with timber and, since
it was uninhabited, had no roads, its length being
somewhere near fifteen stadia. Now it was the
intention of the Lacedaemonians to close up the
entrances tight by means of ships placed with their
prows outward; and as for the island, since they
were afraid that the Athenians would use it as

posed, but the Lagoon or Lake of Osmyn Aga, north of the
y, and now cut off from it by a sandbar. This is the view
of Grundy—who in August, 1895, spent fourteen days there
making a survey—as to the lower entrance. The upper
entrance, he thinks, was closed already in Thucydides’ time,
and the historian seems never to have apprehended that
fact. Grundy’s view as to the lagoon being the harbour
meant by Thucydides is accepted by Steup, but he does not
approve of Grundy’s assumption that Thucydides, without
personal knowledge of the region, following at different
points reports of different informants, confused statements
with reference to the harbour of Pylos and as to the bay as
referring to one and the same. See Arnold in App. to
Book iv. on Sphacteria; Grundy, ‘‘ Investigation of the
Topography of the Region of Sphacteria and Pylos,” in
Journal of Hellen. Studies, xvi. 1-54; Steup, App. on Iv.
viii. 5.

221

THUCYDIDES

πόλεμον σφίσι ποιῶνται, ὁπλίτας ᾿διεβίβασαν

3 > A \ \ 4 v Ν᾽

ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἤπειρον ἄλλους ἔταξαν"
8 οὕτω γὰρ τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις τήν τε νῆσον πολεμίαν

ἔσεσθαι τήν τε ἤπειρον ἀπόβασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν

(τὰ γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς Πύλου ἔξω τοῦ ἔσπλου πρὸς

Ν / 3 ’ ” > @ σ e 7

τὸ πέλαγος ἀλίμενα ὄντα οὐχ ἕξειν ὅθεν ὁρμώ-
9 4 A 9 AY a de ”
μενοι ὠφελήσουσι τοὺς αὐτῶν), σφεῖς δὲ avev τε
ναυμαχίας καὶ κινδύνου ἐκπολιορκήσειν τὸ χωρίον
κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, σίτου τε οὐκ ἐνόντος καὶ δι’ ὀλίγης
9 παρασκευῆς κατειλημμένον. - ws δ᾽ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς
ταῦτα, καὶ διεβίβαζον ἐς τὴν νῆσον τοὺς ὁπλίτας
ἀποκληρώσαντες ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν λόχων. καὶ
διέβησαν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι πρότερον κατὰ διαδοχήν,
οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι καὶ ἐγκαταληφθέντες εἴκοσι καὶ
τετρακόσιοι ἦσαν καὶ Εἵλωτες οἱ περὶ αὐτούς"
ἦρχε δ᾽ αὐτῶν ᾿Επιτάδας ὁ Μολόβρου.

IX. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁρῶν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
μέλλοντας προσβάλλειν ναυσί τε ἅμα καὶ πεζῷ,
παρεσκευάζετο καὶ αὐτός, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις at
περιῆσαν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν καταλειφθεισῶν ἀνα-
σπάσας ὑπὸ τὸ τείχισμα προσεσταύρωσε, καὶ

Ἁ UA 3 3 Ὁ « ϑ ’ 1 4
τοὺς ναύτας ἐξ αὐτῶν ὥπλισεν ἀσπίσι φαύλαιες
καὶ οἰσυΐναις ταῖς πολλαῖς" οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅπλα ἐν
χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ πορίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ

1 ve, after ἀσπίσι in the ΜΒΆ., deleted by Hude as not
read by Suidas.

1 4.e., north of the entrance, on the western side.
2 Only three: five had been left him (ch. v. 2), but two of
these he had sent to warn the squadron at Zacynthus.

222

BOOK IV. vm. 7-1x. 1

a base for carrying on the war against them, they
conveyed some hoplites across, at the same time
posting others along the mainland. By _ these
measures, they thought, the Athenians would find
not only the island hostile to them, but also the
mainland, since this afforded no landing-place ; for
there were no harbours along the shore of Pylos
itself outside the entrance,! on the side toward the
sea, and therefore the Athenians would have no
base from which they could aid their countrymen.
Consequently the Lacedaemonians believed that,
without running the risk of a battle at sea, they
could probably reduce the place by siege, since it
had been occupied on short notice and was not sup-
plied with provisions. As soon as they reached this
conclusion they proceeded to convey the hoplites
over to the island, drafting them by lot from all
the companies. Several detachments had before
this time crossed over, one group relieving another ;
the last to do so—and this is the force that was
captured—numbering four hundred and twenty,
besides the Helots who accompanied them, and
they were under the command of Epitadas son of
Molobrus. .

IX. Meanwhile Demosthenes also, seeing that the
Lacedaemonians intended to attack him by sea and
by land at the same time, set about making his
preparations. He drew ashore, close up under the
fortification, the triremes? remaining to him out of
those which had been left in his charge and en-
closed them in a stockade; he then armed their
crews with shields—poor ones, indeed, most of which
were made of plaited willow ; for it was not possible
to procure arms in an uninhabited country, and such

223

THUCYDIDES

λῃστρικῆς Μεσσηνίων τριακοντέρου Kal κέλητος
Ἂ ν). ’ e a ,

ἔλαβον, of ἔτυχον παραγενόμενοι. ὁπλῖταί τε
τῶν Μεσσηνίων τούτων ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ἐγέ-

b A a ΝΥ \ \
vovTo, ols ἐχρῆτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων. τοὺς μὲν
οὖν πολλοὺς τῶν τε ἀόπλωὼν καὶ ὡπλισμένων ἐπὶ
τὰ τετειχισμένα μάλιστα καὶ ἐχυρὰ τοῦ χωρίον
πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον ἔταξε, προειπὼν ἀμύνασθαι

N , Aa ’ > δ 3 4
τὸν πεζόν, ἣν προσβάλῃ" αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπολεξάμενος
ἐκ πάντων ἑξήκοντα ὁπλίτας καὶ τοξότας ὀλύγους
ἐχώρει ἔξω τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, ἡἣ
μάλιστα ἐκείνους προσεδέχετο πειράσειν ἀπο-

, 3 V4 ’ ‘N
βαίνειν, ἐς χωρία μὲν χαλεπὰ καὶ πετρώδη πρὸς
τὸ πέλαγος τετραμμένα, σφίσι δὲ τοῦ τείχους
ταύτῃ ἀσθενεστάτου ὄντος ἐσβιάσασθαι 1 αὐτοὺς
ἡγεῖτο προθυμήσεσθαι' οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἐλπί-

A
Covrés ποτε ναυσὶ κρατήσεσθαι οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν
3 ’ὔ’ 3 ’ lA \ 3 a
ἐτεύχεζον, ἐκείνοις τε βιαζομένοις τὴν ἀπόβασεν
ἁλώσιμον τὸ χωρίον γίγνεσθαι. κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν
πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασσαν χωρήσας ἔταξε τοὺς
ς /
ὁπλίτας ὡς εἴρξων, ἢν δύνηται, καὶ παρεκελεύ-
σατο τοιάδε.

Χ. “"Ανδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύ-
νου, μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε ἀνάγκῃ ξυνετὸς
βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενος ἅπαν τὸ
περιεστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινόν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπερισκέπτως

εὔελπις ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐκ

τούτων ἂν περιγενόμενος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐς ἀνάγκην
1 ἐσβιάσασθαι : so Hude, after Leeuwen, for ἐπισπάσασθαι.
224

BOOK IV. 1x. 1-x. 1

as they had they took from a thirty-oared privateer
and a light boat belonging to some Messenians who
chanced to come along, and included among them
about forty hoplites, whom Demosthenes used along
with the rest. He then posted the greater part
of his troops, the unarmed as well as the armed, at
the best fortified and strongest points of the place,
on the side toward the mainland, giving them orders
to ward off the enemy’s infantry if it should attack.
But he himself selected from the whole body of
his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, and
with them sallied forth from the fort to the point
on the seashore where he thought that the enemy
would be most likely to attempt a landing. The
ground, indeed, was difficult of access and rocky
where it faced the sea, yet since the Athenian
wall was weakest at this place the enemy would,
he thought, be only too eager to make an assault
there; in fact the Athenians themselves had left
their fortification weak at this spot merely because
they never expected to be defeated at sea, and
Demosthenes knew that if the enemy could force
a landing there the place could be taken. Accordingly
he posted his hoplites at this point, taking them to
the very brink of the sea, determined to keep the
enemy off if he could; and then he exhorted them
as follows : 7

X.- “Soldiers, my comrades in this present
hazard, let no one of you at such a time of necessity
seek to prove his keenness of wit by calculating the
full extent of the danger that encompasses us; let
him rather come to grips with the enemy in a spirit
of unreflecting confidence that he will survive even
these perils. For whenever it has come, as now

225
VOL. 11. Q

THUCYDIDES

ἀφῖκται ὥσπερ τάδε, λογισμὸν ἥκιστα ἐνδεχό-
μενα, κινδύνου τοῦ ταχίστου προσδεῖται. ἐγὼ δὲ
καὶ τὰ πλείω ὁρῶ πρὸς ἡμῶν ὄντα, ἢν ἐθέλωμέν γε
μεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῷ πλήθει αὐτῶν καταπλαγέντες
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἡμῖν κρείσσω καταπροδοῦναι.
τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ἡμέτερον
νομίζω, ὃ. μενόντων μὲν ἡμῶν ξύμμαχον γίγνε-
ς , 2 δὲ 4 \ ὃ ΜΝ
ται, υποχωρήσασι“ δὲ καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὃν εὕ-
πορον ἔσται μηδενὸς κωλύοντος, καὶ τὸν πολέμιον
’ 4 Ἁ e a > A lA Ν
δεινότερον ἕξομεν μὴ ῥᾳδίας αὐτῷ πάλιν οὔσης
A > 4 “a \ 2 3 ε [ον a, > A
τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως, ἢν καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν βιάξηται" ἐπὶ
γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶ ῥᾷστοί εἰσιν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἀπο-
. βάντες δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ ἤδη. τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῶν οὐκ
ἄγαν δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι" κατ᾽ ὀλίγον γὰρ μαχεῖται
καίπερ πολὺ ὃν ἀπορίᾳ τῆς προσορμίσεως, καὶ
οὐκ ἐν γῇ στρατός ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μείξων,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ νεῶν, αἷς πολλὰ τὰ καίρια δεῖ ἐν τῇ
4 A σ 4 > ’
θαλάσσῃ ξυμβῆναι. ὥστε τὰς τούτων ἀπορίας
A A , / Ἁ
ἀντιπάλους ἡγοῦμαι τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πλήθει, καὶ ἅμα
ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, ᾿Αθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ἐπισταμένους
> , \ \ 309 ν , ἢ Ψ
ἐμπειρίᾳ τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐπ᾿ ἄλλους ἀπόβασιν ὅτι,
Vv e , A 4 ς ’ “
εἴ τις ὑπομένοι καὶ μὴ φόβῳ ῥοθίον καὶ νεῶν
δεινότητος κατάπλουν ὑποχωροίη, οὐκ ἄν ποτε
βιάξοιτο, καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν petvat τε καὶ ἀμυνομέ-

1 3, Dion. Hal., MSS. omit.

2 ὑποχωρήσασι, the genitive was to be expected after
μενόντων, and Poppo conjectures ὑποχωρησάντων. It is
dative of relation,

226

BOOK IV. x. 1-5

with us, to a case of necessity, where there is no room
for reflection, what is needed is to accept the hazard
with the least possible delay. However,as I see the
matter, the odds are on our side, if we are resolved
to stand our ground and are not so terrified by
their numbers as to sacrifice the advantages we
possess. As regards the position, the difficulty of
approach I regard as in. our favour, since if we stand
firm that becomes a support, but once we give way,
even though the ground be rugged it will be easy of
access when there is none to resist; and we shall
then find the enemy more formidable, since it will
be no easy matter for them to turn and retreat, if
they should be hard-pressed by us; for though very
easily repelled while on board their ships, when once
they have landed they are on an equal footing with
us. And, as regards their numbers, we need have
no very great fear; for however numerous they are,
they will have to fight in small detachments on ac-
count of the difficulty of bringing their ships to
shore. And we have not to deal with an army,
which, though superior in numbers, is fighting on
land under like conditions with ourselves, but fight-
ing on ships, and these require many favouring cir-
cumstances on the sea.!_ I therefore consider that
their disadvantages counterbalance our inferiority
in point of numbers. At the same time I call now
upon you, who are Athenians and know by ex-
perience that it is impossible to force a landing
from ships against an enemy on shore, if the
latter but stand their ground and do not give
way through fear of the splashing oars and of the
awe-inspiring sight of ships bearing down upon
them—I call upon you, in your turn to stand your

1 ¢g. ἃ fair wind, space for manceuvring, etc. 227

THUCYDIDES

vous παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ῥαχίαν σῴζειν ὑμᾶς τε
αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ χωρίον."

ΧΙ. Τοσαῦτα τοῦ Δημοσθένους παρακελευσα-

’ e ? A > , ’ A
μένου οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐθάρσησάν te μᾶλλον καὶ
> , 3 4 3 > A Ἁ 4
ἐπικαταβάντες ἐτάξαντο Tap αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασ-
σαν. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄραντες τῷ τε κατὰ
γῆν στρατῷ προσέβαλλον τῷ τειχίσματι καὶ
ταῖς ναυσὶν ἅμα οὔσαις τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τρισί,
ναύαρχος δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπέπλει Θρασυμηλίδας ὁ
Κρατησικλέους, Σπαρτιάτης. προσέβαλλε δὲ
ἧπερ ὁ Δημοσθένης προσεδέχετο. καὶ οἱ μὲν
> a 2 4 v A 3 4
᾿Αθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν, ἔκ τε γῆς Kal ἐκ θαλάσ-

> ’ e > 9 ’ A s

ons, ἠμύνοντο" οἱ δὲ κατ᾽ ὀλίγας ναῦς διελόμενοι,
διότι οὐκ ἦν πλείοσι προσσχεῖν, καὶ ἀναπαύοντες
ἐν τῷ μέρει τοὺς ἐπίπλους ἐποιοῦντο, προθυμίᾳ
τε πάσῃ χρώμενοι καὶ παρακελευσμῷ, εἴ πως
ὠσάμενοι ἕλοιεν τὸ τείχισμα. πάντων δὲ φανε-
ρώτατος Βρασίδας ἐγένετο. τριηραρχῶν γὰρ καὶ
ὁρῶν τοῦ χωρίου χαλεποῦ ὄντος τοὺς τριηράρχους
καὶ κυβερνήτας, εἴ που καὶ δοκοίη δυνατὸν εἶναι
σχεῖν, ἀποκνοῦντας καὶ φυλασσομένους τῶν νεῶν

\ ’ 3 ’ e > 9 NX Ν
μὴ ξυντρίψωσιν, ἐβοα λέγων ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς εἴη
ξύλων φειδομένους τοὺς πολεμίους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ
περιιδεῖν τεῖχος πεποιημένους, ἀλλὰ τάς τε σφε-
τέρας ναῦς βιαζομένους τὴν ἀπόβασιν καταγνύ-
ναι ἐκέλευε καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴ ἀποκνῆσαι
ἀντὶ μεγάλων εὐεργεσιῶν τὰς ναῦς τοῖς Λακεδαι-
μονίοις ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐπιδοῦναι, ὀκείλαντας δὲ
καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποβάντας τῶν τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ
228

BOOK IV. x. 5-x1. 4

ground, and, warding off the foe at the very water's
edge, to save both yourselves and the stronghold.”
XI. Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athen-
ians became yet more confident and going still
nearer the water took up their position at the very
brink of the sea. The Lacedaemonians, on the
other hand, moved forward, and attacked the forti-
fication at the same time with their land-army and
with their ships, of which there were forty-three, the
admiral in command of them being Thrasymelidas
son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he attacked just
where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians, on
their part, proceeded to defend themselves in both —
directions, by land and by sea; but the enemy,
dividing their ships into small detachments, because
it was impossible for a larger number to approach
the shore, and resting by turns, kept charging upon
the Athenians, showing no lack of zeal and cheering
each other on, in the hope that they might force the
enemy back and take the fortification. Brasidas
showed himself most conspicuous of all. Being
captain of a galley, he noticed that the captains and
pilots, because the shore was rocky, were inclined to
hesitate and be careful of their ships, even when it
seemed to be practicable to make a landing, for fear
of dashing them to pieces. He would therefore shout
that it ill became them through being thrifty of
timber to allow their enemy to have built a fort in
their country ; nay, he urged, they must break their
own ships so as to force a landing; and the allies
he bade, in return for great benefits received from
the Lacedaemonians, not to shrink from making
them a free gift of their shins in the present emer-
gency, but to run them aground, get ashore in any

229

THUCYDIDES

τοῦ χωρίου κρατῆσαι. XII. καὶ ὁ μὲν τούς τε
ἄλλους τοιαῦτα ἐπέσπερχε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κυβερ-
νήτην ἀναγκάσας ὀκεῖλαι τὴν ναῦν ἐχώρει ἐπὶ
τὴν ἀποβάθραν' καὶ πειρώμενος ἀποβαίνειν ἀνε-
κόπη ὑπὸ τῶν ᾿Αθηναΐων, καὶ “τραυματισθεὶς
πολλὰ ἐλιποψύχησέ τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς
τὴν παρεξειρεσίαν ἡ ἀσπὶς περιερρύη ἐς τὴν
θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐξενεχθείσης αὐτῆς ἐς τὴν γῆν οἱ
᾿Αθηναῖοι ἀνελόμενοι ὕστερον πρὸς τὸ τροπαῖον
ἐχρήσαντο ὃ ἔστησαν τῆς προσβολῆς ταύτης.

2 Οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι προυθυμοῦντο μέν, ἀδύνατοι δ᾽ ἧσαν
ἀποβῆναι τῶν τε χωρίων χαλεπότητι καὶ τῶν

8 ᾿Αθηναίων μενόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποχωρούντων. ἐς
τοῦτό τε περιέστη ἡ τύχη ὥστε ᾿Αθηναίους μὲν ἐκ
γῆς τε καὶ ταύτης Λακωνικῆς ἀμύνεσθαι ἐκείνους
ἐπιπλέοντας, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ἐκ νεῶν τε καὶ ἐς
τὴν ἑαυτῶν πολεμίαν οὖσαν ἐπ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίους ἀπο-
βαΐνειν' ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης ἐν τῷ
τότε τοῖς μὲν ἠπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ
πεζὰ κρατίστοις, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς
ναυσὶ πλεῖστον προύχειν.

XIII. Ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τῆς
ὑστεραίας μέρος τι προσβολὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐπέ-
παυντο" καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἐπὶ ξύλα ἐς μηχανὰς παρέ-
πεμψαν τῶν νεῶν τινας ἐς ᾿Ασίνην, ἐλπίζοντες τὸ
κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχος ὕψος μὲν ἔχον, ἀπο-

2 βάσεως δὲ μάλιστα οὔσης ἑλεῖν dv! μηχαναῖς. ἐν
τούτῳ δὲ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Ζακύνθου νῆες τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
1 ἂν added by Madvig.
230

BOOK IV. x1. 4-xm1, 2

way they could, and master both the men and the
place. XII. And he not only urged on the rest in
this way, but, compelling his own pilot to beach his
ship, he made for the gangway; and in trying to
land he was knocked back by the Athenians, and
after receiving many wounds fainted away. As he
fell into the forward part of the ship his shield
slipped off into the sea, and, being carried ashore,
was picked up by the Athenians, who afterward
used it for the trophy which they set up in com-
memoration of this attack.

The crews of the other Peloponnesian ships showed
no lack of zeal, but were unable to land, both by
reason of the difficulty of the ground and because the
Athenians stood firm and would not give way at all.
In such fashion had fortune swung round that the
Athenians, fighting on land, and Laconian land at
that, were trying to ward off a Lacedaemonian attack
from the sea, while the Lacedaemonians, fighting in
ships, were trying to effect a landing upon their own
territory, now hostile, in the face of the Athenians.
For at this time it was the special renown ot the
Lacedaemonians that they were a land power and
invincible with their army, and of the Athenians that
they were seamen and vastly superior with their
fleet.

XIII. After making attacks that day and part of
the next the Peloponnesians desisted. On the third
day they sent some of the ships to Asine for wood
with which to make engines, hoping that by means
of engines they should be able to take the wall
opposite the harbour in spite of its height, since here
it was quite practicable to make a landing. Mean-
while, the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus arrived,

231

THUCYDIDES

παραγίγνονται πεντήκοντα' προσεβοήθησαν yap
τῶν τε φρουρίδων τινὲς αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου
Ἁ a ’ e \ 4 4

8. καὶ Χῖαι τέσσαρες. ὡς δὲ εἶδον τήν τε ἤπειρον
ὁπλιτῶν περίπλεων τήν τε νῆσον, ἔν τε τῷ λιμένι
οὔσας τὰς ναῦς καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλεούσας, ἀπορήσαντες
ὅπῃ καθορμίσωνται, τότε μὲν és ἸΠρωτὴν τὴν

Ὁ 3 Ἁ 3 , > _ A 9 "4
νῆσον, ἣ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχει ἐρῆμος οὖσα, ἔπλευσαν
καὶ ηὐλίσαντο, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ παρασκευασάμενοι
ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀνήγοντο, ἣν μὲν ἀντεκπλεῖν
ἐθέλωσι σφίσιν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς
αὐτοὶ ἐπεσπλευσούμενοι.

4 Kat οἱ μὲν οὔτε ἀντανήγοντο οὔτε ἃ διενοήθη-
σαν, φάρξαι τοὺς ἔσπλους, ἔτυχον ποιήσαντες,
ἡσυχάξοντες δ᾽ ἐν τῇ γῇ τάς τε ναῦς ἐπλήρουν
καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο, ἢν ἐσπλέῃ τις, ὡς ἐν τῷ
λιμένι ὄντι οὐ σμικρῷ ναυμαχήσοντες. XIV. οἱ δ᾽
4 a 4 θ᾽ ς 4 \ ΝΜ
Αθηναῖοι γνόντες καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τὸν ἔσπλουν
Ψ > 3 9 4 ὶ ὰ ’ ὶ
ὥρμησαν ἐπ αὑτοῦς, καὶ τᾶς μὲν πλείους κα
μετεώρους ἤδη τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἀντιπρῴρους προσ-
πεσόντες ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν, καὶ ἐπιδιώκοντες
ὡς διὰ βραχέος ἔτρωσαν μὲν πολλάς, πέντε δὲ

\ ’ 4 3 a 3 4 a
ἔλαβον καὶ μίαν τούτων αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν' ταῖς δὲ
a 3 A aA ’ > e
λοιπαῖς ἐν TH γῇ καταπεφευγυίαις ἐνέβαλλον. αι
\ 4 ΝΜ 3 lA 9
δὲ καὶ πληρούμεναι ἔτι πρὶν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκόπτοντο"
kai τινας καὶ ἀναδούμενοι κενὰς εἷλκον τῶν ἀν-
2 δρῶν ἐς φυγὴν ὡρμημένων. ἃ ὁρῶντες οἱ Λακεδαι-

232

BOOK IV. xm. 2-xI1v. 2

now numbering fifty ships, for it had been reinforced
by some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by
four Chian vessels. But they saw that both the main-
land and the island were full of hoplites, and that
the Lacedaemonian ships were in the harbour and
not intending to come out; they therefore, being at
a loss where to anchor, sailed for the present to
Prote, an uninhabited island not far from Pylos, and
bivouacked there. The next day they set sail, having
first made preparations to give battle in case the
enemy should be inclined to come out into the open
water to meet them; if not, they intended to sail
into the harbour themselves. -

Now the Lacedaemonians did not put out to meet
the Athenians, and somehow they had neglected to
block up the entrances as they had purposed; on
the contrary, they remained inactive on the shore,
engaged in manning their ships and making ready,
in case any one sailed into the harbour, to fight
there, since there was plenty of room. XIV. As for
the Athenians, when they saw the situation, they
rushed in upon them by both entrances and falling
upon their ships, most of which were by now afloat
and facing forward, put them to flight, and since
there was only a short distance for the pursuit,! not
only damaged many of them but also captured five,
one of them with all her crew ; the rest they kept on
ramming even after they had fled to the shore. Yet
other ships were being cut to pieces while still being
manned, before they could put to sea; and some they
took in tow empty, their crews having taken to flight,
and began to haul them away. At this sight the

2 Or, ‘‘ giving chase so far as the short distance allowed
not only damaged... ” :

233

THUCYDIDES

μόνιοι καὶ περιαλγοῦντες τῷ πάθει, ὅτιπερ αὐτῶν
οἱ ἄνδρες ἀπελαμβάνοντο ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, παρεβοή-
θουν, καὶ ἐπεσβαίνοντες ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ξὺν
τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀνθεῖλκον ἐπελαμβανόμενοι τῶν νεῶν"
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κεκωλῦσθαι ἐδόκει ἕκαστος ᾧ μή
τινι καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ παρῆν. ἐγένετό τε ὁ θόρυβος
μέγας, καὶ ἀντηλλαγμένου τοῦ ἑκατέρων τρόπου
περὶ τὰς ναῦς" οἵ τε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ προ-
θυμίας καὶ ἐκπλήξεως ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ ἐκ
γῆς ἐναυμάχουν, οἵ. τε ᾿Αθηναῖοι κρατοῦντες καὶ
βουλόμενοι τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον
ἐπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν ἐπεζξομάχουν. πολὺν τε πόνον
παρασχόντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ τραυματίσαντες διε-
κρίθησαν, καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς κενὰς ναῦς
πλὴν τῶν τὸ πρῶτον ληφθεισῶν διέσωσαν. κατα-
στάντες δὲ ἑκάτεροι ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον οἱ μὲν τρο-
παῖόν τε ἔστησαν καὶ νεκροὺς ἀπέδοσαν καὶ
ναυαγίων ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τὴν νῆσον εὐθὺς περι-
ἔπλεον καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον, ὡς τῶν ἀνδρῶν
ἀπειλημμένων" οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Πελοποννήσιοι
καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων ἤδη βεβοηθηκότες ἔμενον κατὰ
χώραν ἐπὶ τῇ Πύλῳ.

XV. "Es δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ὡς ἤἠγγέλθη τὰ γεγενη-
μένα περὶ Πύλον, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ ξυμφορᾷ
μεγάλῃ τὰ τέλη καταβάντας ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον
βουλεύειν παραχρῆμα ὁρῶντας ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ. καὶ
ὡς εἶδον ἀδύνατον ὃν τιμωρεῖν τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ
234

BOOK IV. xiv. 2-xv. 2

Lacedaemonian soldiers on the shore, beside them-
selves with grief at the impending calamity, in that
their comrades were being cut off on the island,
rushed to the rescue, and going down into the sea in
full armour took hold of the ships and tried to drag
them back. Indeed, each man felt that no progress
was being made where he himself was not at hand to
help. The tumult that arose was great, especially
since in this battle for the ships each side adopted
the other’s manner of fighting; for the Lacedae-
monians in their eagerness and excitement were virtu-
ally waging a sea-fight from the land, while the
Athenians, who were winning and wanted to follow
up their success to the utmost while their good
fortune lasted, were fighting a land-battle from their
ships. Finally, after causing each other great distress
and inflicting much damage, they separated, the
Lacedaemonians saving all their empty ships except
those which had been taken at first. Both sides then
returned to their camps. The Athenians thereupon
set up a trophy, gave back the dead, secured posses-
sion of the wrecks, andimmediately began to sail round
the island and keep it under guard, considering that
the men on it were now cut off; on the other hand,
the Peloponnesians on the mainland, and the rein-
forcements that had now arrived from all directions,
remained in position at Pylos.

XV. At Sparta, when they received the news of
what had happened at Pylos, regarding it as a great
calamity they decided that the magistrates should go
down to the camp, see the situation for themselves,
and then determine on the spot what should be
done. Now when these saw that no help could be
given to the men on the island, and at the same

235

THUCYDIDES

κινδυνεύειν οὐκ ἐβούλοντο ἢ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τι παθεῖν

3 \ a ¢ Α 10 θέ θῇ 1

αὐτοὺς ἣ ὑπὸ πλήθους βιασθέντας κρατηθῆναι,

a) Ἁ A
ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν ᾿Αθη-
ναίων, ἢν ἐθέλωσι, σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους τὰ
περὶ Πύλον ἀποστεῖλαι ἐς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας πρέ-
΄ 2)
σβεις περὶ ξυμβάσεως καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὡς τάχιστα
πειρᾶσθαι κομίσασθαι.

XVI. Δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν τὸν λόγον
ἐγίγνοντο σπονδαὶ τοιαίδε’ Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν
τὰς ναῦς ἐν αἷς ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ
Λακωνικῇ πάσας, ὅσαι ἦσαν μακραΐ, παραδοῦναι

’ 3 / > ’ \ @ XN
κομίσαντας ἐς IlvAov ᾿Αθηναίοις, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ
ἐπιφέρειν τῷ τειχίσματι μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε
κατὰ θάλασσαν, ᾿Αθηναίους δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ
ἀνδράσι σῖτον ἐᾶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Λακεδαι-
μονίους ἐσπέμπειν τακτὸν καὶ μεμαγμένον, δύο
χοίνικας ἑκάστῳ ᾿Αττικὰς ἀλφίτων καὶ δύο
κοτύλας οἴνου καὶ κρέας, θεράποντι δὲ τούτων

A ε A
ἡμίσεα' ταῦτα δὲ ὁρώντων τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐσπέμ-
mew καὶ πλοῖον μηδὲν ἐσπλεῖν λάθρᾳ' φυλάσσειν
A 3 4
δὲ καὶ τὴν νῆσον ᾿Αθηναίους μηδὲν ἧσσον, ὅσα μὴ
3 ’ὔ λυ \ 2 A a
ἀποβαίνοντας, Kat ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν TH Πελο-
ποννησίων στρατῷ μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ
θάλασσαν. ὅ τι δ᾽ ἂν τούτων παραβαίνωσιν
e 4 e A , 4 VA
ἑκάτεροι Kal ὁτιοῦν, τότε λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς.
3 A Ἃ > \ , Φ 4 A @
ἐσπεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰς μέχρι οὗ ἐπανέλθωσιν οἱ ἐκ
τῶν᾿ Αθηνῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις" ἀποστεῖλαι
᾽
δὲ αὐτοὺς τριήρει Αθηναίους καὶ πάλιν κομίσαι.
ἐλθόντων δὲ τάς τε σπονδὰς λελύσθαι ταύτας καὶ
τὰς ναῦς ἀποδοῦναι ᾿Αθηναίους ὁμοίας οἵασπερ ἂν

1 κρατηθῆναι, CG, ἣ κρατηθῆναι, ABFM.
236

BOQK IV. xv. 2—-xv. 2

time were unwilling to run the risk of their being
starved to death or forced to succumb to superior
numbers, they decided, so far as Pylos was con-
cerned, to conclude a truce with the Athenian
generals, if they should consent, and to send envoys
to Athens to propose an agreement, and thus try to
recover their men as quickly as possible.

XVI. The generals accepted the proposal and a
truce was concluded upon the following terms: The
Lacedaemonians were to surrender to the Athenians
the ships in which they had fought the battle, and
were to bring to Pylos and deliver to them all the
other ships of war which were in Laconia, and they
were not to attack the fortification either by land or by
sea. The Athenians were to permit the Lacedaemon-
ians on the mainland to send flour to the men on the
island, a fixed amount and already-kneaded, for each
soldier two quarts ! of barley-meal and a pint of wine
and a ration of meat, and for each servant half as
much; and they were to send these things to the
island under the supervision of the Athenians, and
no boat was to sail thither secretly. The Athenians
were to go on guarding the island as before, but
without landing on it, and were not to attack the
army of the Peloponnesians either by land or sea. [ἢ
either party should violate this agreement in any
particular whatsoever, the truce should forthwith be
at an end. The truce was to hold good until the
Lacedaemonian envoys should get back from Athens ;
and the Athenians were to conduct them thither in a
trireme and bring them back. On their return this
truce was to be at an end, and the Athenians were
then to restore the ships in as good condition as when

1 The choinix was about two pints, dry measure; the
cotyle, about half a pint. ;
23

THUCYDIDES

8 παραλάβωσιν. αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγέ-
νοντο, καὶ αἱ νῆες παρεδόθησαν οὗσαι περὶ
ἑξήκοντα, καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπεστάλησαν. ἀφικό-
μενοι δὲ ἐς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

XVII. “Ἔπεμψαν ἡμᾶς Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὦ
᾿Αθηναῖοι, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀνδρῶν πράξον-
¢ ea 9 A \ > \ /
τας 6 τι ἂν ὑμῖν τε ὠφέλιμον ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ πείθωμεν
καὶ ἡμῖν ἐς τὴν ξυμφορὰν! ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων

2 κόσμον μάλιστα μέλλῃ οἴσειν. τοὺς δὲ λόγους
μακροτέρους οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς μηκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽
ἐπιχώριον ὃν ἡμῖν οὗ μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκῶσι μὴ
πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι, πλείοσι δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἂν καιρὸς 7
διδάσκοντάς τε τῶν προύργου λόγοις τὸ δέον

, 4 3 \ A ’ >

3 πράσσειν. λάβετε δὲ αὐτοὺς μὴ πολεμίως μηδ
ὡς ἀξύνετοι διδασκόμενοι, ὑπόμνησιν δὲ τοῦ καλῶς

4 βουλεύσασθαι πρὸς εἰδότας ἡγησάμενοι. ὑμῖν

? ’ Ἁ A ¥ A ’ὔ
γὰρ εὐτυχίαν τὴν παροῦσαν ἔξεστι καλῶς θέσθαι,
ἔχουσι μὲν ὧν κρατεῖτε, προσλαβοῦσι δὲ τιμὴν
καὶ δόξαν, καὶ μὴ παθεῖν ὅπερ οἱ ἀήθως τι ἀγα-
θὸν λαμβάνοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων' αἰεὶ γὰρ τοῦ
’ 4 2. / \ Ν Α 4
πλέονος ἐλπίδι ὀρέγονται διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ παρόντα

5 ἀδοκήτως εὐτυχῆσαι. οἷς δὲ πλεῖσται μεταβολαὶ
> 3 3 ’ , 4 3 A
ἐπ ἀμφότερα ξυμβεβήκασι, δίκαιοί εἰσι καὶ
ἀπιστότατοι εἶναι ταῖς εὐπραγίαις" ὃ τῇ τε ὑμε-
τέρᾳ πόλει δι ἐμπειρίαν καὶ ἡμῖν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἐκ
τοῦ εἰκότος προσείη.

1 ἐς τὴν ξυμφοράν, bracketed by Hude.
238

BOOK 1V. xvi. 2=xvur. 5

they received them. The truce was concluded on
these terms, the ships, sixty in number, were delivered
up, and the envoysdispatched. When they arrived at
Athens they spoke as follows :

XVII. “The Lacedaemonians, men of Athens, have
sent us to arrange, in behalf of our men on the
island, such terms as we may show to be at once
advantageous to you and also most likely under
present circumstances, in view of our misfortune, to
bring credit to ourselves. If we speak at some
length we shall not be departing from our custom;
on the contrary, though it is the fashion of our
country not to use many words where few suffice,
yet, whenever occasion arises to expound an im-
portant matter and thereby to accomplish by speech
the end we have in view, we use words more freely.
And do not receive what we say in a hostile spirit,
nor feel that you are being instructed as though you
were without understanding, but regard our words
as merely a reminder to men who know how to come
to a good decision. For it is in your power to turn
your present favourable fortune to good account,
not only keeping what you have got, but acquiring
honour and reputation besides. You may thus avoid
the experience of those who achieve some unwonted
success; for these are always led on by hope to
grasp at more because of their unexpected good
fortune in the present. And yet those who have
most often undergone a change of fortune for better
or for worse have best reason to be distrustful of
prosperity; and this would naturally hold true of
both your state and ours in an exceptional degree,
in view of our past experience.

239

THUCYDIDES

XVIII. “Γνῶτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας viv
ξυμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες, οἵτινες ἀξίωμα μέγιστον τῶν
“Ἑλλήνων ἔχοντες ἥκομεν παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς, πρότερον
αὐτοὶ κυριώτεροι νομίξοντες εἶναι δοῦναι ἐφ᾽ ἃ νῦν
ἀφιγμένοι ὑμᾶς αἰτούμεθα. καίτοι οὔτε δυνάμεως
ἐνδείᾳ ἐπάθομεν αὐτὸ οὔτε μείζονος προσγενομένης
ὑβρίσαντες, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμῃ
σφαλέντες, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει.
ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν νῦν ῥώμην
πόλεώς τε καὶ τῶν προσγεγενημένων καὶ τὸ τῆς
τύχης οἴεσθαι αἰεὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἔσεσθαι. σωφρόνων
δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵτινες τἀγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ῖ ἀσφα-
λῶς ἔθεντο (καὶ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς οἱ αὐτοὶ εὐξυνε-
τώτερον ἂν προσφέροιντο), τόν τε πόλεμον
νομίσωσι μὴ καθ᾽ ὅσον ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μέρος βού-
ληται μεταχειρίζειν, τούτῳ ξυνεῖναι, GAN ὡς ἂν
αἱ τύχαι αὐτῶν ἡγήσωνται, καὶ ἐλάχιστ᾽ ἂν οἱ
τοιοῦτοι πταΐίοντες διὰ τὸ μὴ τῷ ὀρθουμένῳ αὐτοῦ
πιστεύοντες ἐπαίρεσθαι ἐν τῷ εὐτυχεῖν ἂν μάλιστα
καταλύοιντο' ὃ νῦν ὑμῖν, ὦ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, καλῶς ἔχει
πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρᾶξαι, καὶ μήποτε ὕστερον, ἢν ἄρα μὴ
πειθόμενοι σφαλῆτε, ἃ πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται, νομι-
σθῆναι τύχῃ καὶ τὰ νῦν προχωρήσαντα κρατῆσαε,

5 ἀμφίβολον, MSS.; Hude reads ἀναμφίβολον.

1 Or, “‘make sure of their advantages having regard to
changes of luck.”

240

BOOK IV. xvi. 1-5

XVIII. “To be convinced of this, you need only
look at our present misfortunes. We who of all the
Hellenes formerly were held in the highest con-
sideration have come before you, although we have
been wont to regard ourselves as better entitled to
confer such favours as we have now come to beg of
you. And yet it was neither through lack of power
that we met with this misfortune, nor because our
power became too great and we waxed insolent; nay,
our resources were what they always were and we
merely erred in judgment—a thing to which all are
alike liable. Accordingly there is no reason why
you, because of the strength both of your city and of
its new acquisitions at the present moment, should
expect that the favour of fortune will always be with
you. Prudent men take the safe course of account-
ing prosperity mutable!—the same men, too, would
deal more sagaciously with misfortunes—and con-
sider that when anyone is at war he may not limit his
participation to whatever portion of it he may choose
to carry on,? but that he must follow where his for-
tune leads. Such men are least likely to come to
grief, since they do not allow themselves to become
elated by overconfidence in military success, and are
therefore most likely to seize the moment of good
fortune for concluding peace. And this, Athenians,
is the policy which it is good for you to adopt towards
us to-day, and not at some future time, should you
perchance through rejecting our overtures incur
disaster—and of this there are many possibilities —
be credited with having won even your present suc-
cesses through good fortune, when it is possible to

? 4.e. in warfare one cannot accept only the successes and
avoid the reverses by stopping before the latter set in; one
is in the hands of fortune.

241

VOL. 11. R

THUCYDIDES

ἐξὸν ἀκίνδυνον δόκησιν ἰσχύος καὶ ξυνέσεως ἐς τὸ
ἔπειτα καταλιπεῖν.

XIX. “Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται
ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν
εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν
καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνται-
τοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας, καὶ ἄμεινον
ἡγούμενοι ἀμφοτέροις μὴ διακινδυνεύεσθαι, εἴτε
βίᾳ dv! διαφύγοιεν παρατυχούσης τινὸς σωτηρίας
εἴτε καὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθεῖεν.
νομίζομέν τε τὰς μεγάλας ἔχθρας μάλιστ᾽ ἂν
διαλύεσθαι βεβαίως, οὐκ ἢν ἀνταμυνόμενός τις
καὶ ἐπικρατήσας τὰ πλείω τοῦ πολέμον KaT
ἀνάγκην ὅρκοις ἐγκαταλαμβάνων μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἴσον ξυμβῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἤν, παρὸν τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶσαι πρὸς
τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀρετῇ αὐτὸν νικήσας παρὰ ἃ
προσεδέχετο μετρίως ξυναλλαγῇ. ὀφείλων γὰρ
ἤδη ὁ ἐναντίος μὴ ἀνταμύνεσθαι ὡς βιασθείς,
ἀλλ’ ἀνταποδοῦναι ἀρετήν, ἑτοιμότερός ἐστιν
αἰσχύνῃ ἐμμένειν οἷς ξυνέθετο. καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς
τοὺς μειζόνως ἐχθροὺς τοῦτο δρῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι
ἢ πρὸς τοὺς μέτρια διενεχθέντας" πεφύκασί τε
τοῖς μὲν ἑκουσίως ἐνδοῦσιν ἀνθησσᾶσθαι μεθ᾽
ἡδονῆς, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ὑπεραυχοῦντα καὶ παρὰ
γνώμην διακινδυνεύειν.

1 ἄν͵ Kriiger’s conjecture.

242

BOOK IV. xviu. 5—-x1x. 4

leave to posterity an unhazarded reputation at once
for strength and sagacity.

XIX. “The Lacedaemonians therefore invite you
to accept terms and bring the war to an end, offering
you peace and alliance, and apart from this the
maintenance of hearty friendship and intimacy one
with the other; and asking on their side merely the
return of the men on the island. They think it
better for both parties not to take the risk either of
the besieged making their escape in spite of you,
should some chance of safety present itself, or of
their being reduced by siege to a still harder lot.
We believe, too, that a permanent reconciliation of
bitter enmities is more likely to be secured, not when
one party seeks revenge and, because he has gained
a decided mastery in the war, tries to bind his
opponent by compulsory oaths and thus makes peace
with him on unequal terms, but when, having it in
his power to secure the same result by clemency, he
vanquishes his foe by generosity also, offering him
terms of reconciliation which are moderate beyond
all his expectations. For the adversary, finding
himself now under obligation to repay the generosity
in kind, instead of striving for vengeance for having
had terms forced upon him, is moved by a sense of
honour and is more ready to abide} by his agree-
ments. Furthermore, men are more inclined to act
thus toward their more serious enemies than toward
those with whom they have had but trifling dif-
ferences. And, finally, it is natural for men cheer-
fully to accept defeat at the hands of those who first
make willing concessions, but to fight to the bitter
end, even contrary to their better judgment, against
an overbearing foe.

243
R 2

THUCYDIDES

XX. “Ἡμῖν δὲ καλῶς εἴπερ ποτέ, ἔχει ἀμφο-
τέροις ἡ ξυναλλαγή, πρίν τι ἀνήκεστον 4361 μέσου
γενόμενον ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη ἀίδιον
ἡμῖν! ἔχθραν πρὸς τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίαν ἔχειν,
ὑμᾶς 5 δὲ στερηθῆναι ὧν νῦν προκαλούμεθα. ἔτι
δ᾽ ὄντων ἀκρίτων καὶ ὑμῖν μὲν δόξης καὶ ἡμετέρας
φιλίας προσγιγνομένης, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸ αἰσχροῦ
τινος τῆς ξυμφορᾶς μετρίως κατατιθεμένης dtar-
λαγῶμεν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντὶ πολέμου εἰρήνην
ἑλώμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις “Ελλησιν ἀνάπαυσιν
κακῶν ποιήσωμεν" οἱ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὑμᾶς αἰτιω-
τέρους ἡγήσονται. πολεμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφῶς
ὁποτέρων ἀρξάντων: καταλύσεως δὲ γενομένης,
ἧς νῦν ὑμεῖς τὸ πλέον κύριοί ἐστε, τὴν χάριν
ὑμῖν προσθήσουσιν. ἤν τε γνῶτε, Λακεδαι-
μονίοις ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν φίλους γενέσθαι βεβαίως,
αὐτῶν τε προκαλεσαμένων χαρισαμένοις τε μᾶλ-
λον ἢ βιασαμένοις.3 καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ ἐνόντα
ἀγαθὰ σκοπεῖτε ὅσα εἰκὸς εἶναι" ἡμῶν γὰρ καὶ
ὑμῶν ταὐτὰ λεγόντων τό γε ἄλλο “Ελληνικὸν
ἴστε ὅτι ὑποδεέστερον ὃν τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσει."

XXI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοσαῦτα
εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν
χρόνῳ σπονδῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναν-
τιουμένων κωλύεσθαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμέ-

1 ἡμῖν, with F. Haase and Classen; Hude retains the MSS.
reading ὑμῖν, with Stahl, following the Scholiast.

2 Hude reads ἡμᾶς, with C.

3 Hude reads βιασαμένων, with C.

1 Or, reading ἀίδιον ὑμῖν... ἡμᾶς δέ, as Hude does, “ you
Athenians would have our undying hatred ... and we
Spartans would be deprived of the advantages we now offer.”

244

BOOK IV. xx. 1—xx1. 1

XX. Now, if ever, reconciliation is desirable for
us both, before some irreparable disaster has come
upon either of us and prevented it; should that
befall, we shall inevitably cherish toward each other
an undying personal hatred, over and above that
which we now feel as public enemies, and you! will
be deprived of the advantages ? we now offer. While,
therefore, the issue of the war is still in doubt, while
your reputation is enhanced and you may have our
friendship also, and while our disaster admits of a
reasonable settlement and no disgrace as yet has
befallen us, let us be reconciled; and let us for
ourselves choose peace instead of war, and give a
respite from evils to all the other Hellenes. And
they will count you especially the authors of the
peace ; for although they were drawn into the war
without knowing which of us began it, yet if a
settlement is effected, the decision of which at this
time rests chiefly with you, it is to you they will
ascribe their gratitude. And so, if you decide for
peace, it is in your power to win the steadfast
friendship of the Lacedaemonians, which they freely
offer and you may secure by acting, not with violence,
but with generosity. Pray consider all the advantages
which may well be involved in such a course ; for if
you and we agree be assured that the rest of the
Hellenic world, since it will be inferior to us in
power, will pay us the greatest deference.”

XXI. Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians.
They thought that, since the Athenians had at an
earlier period ὃ been eager to end the war and had
been prevented by the opposition of Sparta, they

2 s.e. peace, alliance, intimate friendship (ch. xix. 1).

3 2,6. after the pinene and the second invasion of Attica,
in 430 B.c. of. II. lix.

245

THUCYDIDES

vous δέξεσθαί τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποδώσειν.
οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν σπονδάς, ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ
«
νήσῳ, ἤδη σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον ἑτοίμους εἶναι, ὁπόταν
a a 7
βούλωνται ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, τοῦ δὲ πλέονος
Ἂ φ
ὠρέγοντο. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ
Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν
χρόνον ὦν' τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος- καὶ ἔπεισεν
ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς χρὴ τὰ μὲν ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς
a , A
αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐν TH νήσῳ παραδόντας πρῶτον
a 3 , ’ \ 3 ’
κομισθῆναι ᾿Αθήναξε, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἀποδόντας
Λακεδαιμονίους Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροζῆνα
καὶ ᾿Αχαιΐαν, ἃ οὐ πολέμῳ ἔλαβον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ
τῆς προτέρας ξυμβάσεως ᾿Αθηναίων ξυγχωρη-
σάντων κατὰ ξυμφορὰς καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε δεομένων
TL μᾶλλον σπονδῶν, κομίσασθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ
e ,
σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ὁπόσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον
ἀμφοτέροις.
ΧΧΤΙ. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν οὐδὲν
3 a , \ / > 4s ey 9
ἀντεῖπον, Evvédpovs δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλευον ἑλέσθαι
οἵτινες λέγοντες καὶ ἀκούοντες περὶ ἑκάστου
ξυμβήσονται κατὰ ἡσυχίαν ὅ τι ἂν πείθωσιν
ἀλλήλους" Κλέων δὲ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολὺς ἐνέκειτο,
λέγων γιγνώσκειν μὲν καὶ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἐν νῷ
ἔχοντας δίκαιον αὐτούς, σαφὲς δ᾽ εἶναι καὶ νῦν,
ty, A 4 3 \ 3 » 3 ”
οἵτινες τῷ μὲν πλήθει οὐδὲν ἐθέλουσιν εἰπεῖν,
4 ’ \ 9 ’ ’ 4 [4
ὀλίγοις δὲ ἀνδράσι ξύνεδροι βούλονται γίγνεσθαι"
χχὰὸ εἴ ἐδὼ "ὃ a ’ > 2 2
ἄλλα εἰ TL ὑγιὲς διανοοῦνται, λέγειν ἐκέλευσεν
Lae)
ἅπασιν. ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτε σφίσιν
οἷόν τε ὃν ἐν πλήθει εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς

1 καὶ, before τῷ πλήθει, deleted by Kriiger.
2 Hude inserts ἐν before ἅπασιν, with Cobet.

246

BOOK IV. χχι. 1-xxu. 3

would, if peace were offered to them, gladly accept
it and give up the men. But the Athenians believed
that, since they held the men on the island, peace
could be theirs the moment they cared to make it,
and meanwhile they were greedy for more. They
were urged to this course chiefly by Cleon son of
Cleaenetus, a popular leader at that time who had
very great influence with the multitude. He per-
suaded them to reply that the men on the island
must first give up themselves and their arms and be
brought to Athens; on their arrival, the Lacedae-
monians must give back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and
Achaeia, which had not been taken in war but had
been ceded by the Athenians! in an agreement
made some time before as a result of misfortunes,
when they were somewhat more eager for peace
than now. They could then recover the men and
make a treaty which should be binding for as long a
time as both parties should agree.

XXII, To this reply the envoys said nothing,
but they requested the appointment of commis-
sioners who should confer with them, and after
a full discussion of all the details should at their
leisure agree upon such terms as they could mutually
approve. Thereupon Cleon attacked them violently,
saying that he had known before this that they had
no honourable intention, and now it was clear,
since they were unwilling to speak out before the
people, but wished to meet a few men in conference ;
he bade them, on the contrary, if their purpose was
honest, to declare it there before them all. But the
Lacedaemonians, seeing that it was impossible to
announce in full assembly such concessions as they

1 of. τ. oxv. 1.

247

THUCYDIDES

ξυμφορᾶς ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ξυγχωρεῖν, μὴ és τοὺς
ξυμμάχους διαβληθῶσιν εἰπόντες καὶ οὐ τυ-
χόντες, οὔτε τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐπὶ μετρίοις ποιή-
σοντας ἃ προυκαλοῦντο, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν
᾿Αθηνῶν ἄπρακτοι.

XXIII. ᾿Αφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν διελέλυντο ἷ
εὐθὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ αἱ περὶ Πύλον, καὶ τὰς ναῦς
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπήτουν, καθάπερ ξυνέκειτο" ot
δ᾽ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐγκλήματα ἔχοντες ἐπιδρομήν τε τῷ
τειχίσματι παράσπονδον καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα
δοκοῦντα εἶναι οὐκ ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἰσχυριζόμενοε
ὅτι δὴ εἴρητο, ἐὰν καὶ ὁτιοῦν παραβαθῇ, λελύσθαι
tas σπονδάς. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀντέλεγόν τε
καὶ ἀδίκημα ἐπικαλέσαντες τὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀπελ-
θόντες ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο. καὶ τὰ περὶ
Πύλον ὑπ᾽ rg στερὼν κατὰ κράτος ἐπολεμεῖτο,
᾿Αθηναῖοι μὲν δυοῖν νεοῖν ἐναντίαιεν αἰεὶ τὴν νῆσον
περιπλέοντες τῆς ἡμέρας (τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς καὶ
ἅπασαι περιώρμουν, πλὴν τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος,
ὁπότε ἄνεμος εἴη" καὶ ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν αὐτοῖς
εἴκοσι νῆες ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὴν φυλακήν, ὥστε at
πᾶσαι ἑβδομήκοντα ἐγένοντο), Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ
ἔν τε τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατοπεδευόμενοι καὶ προσ-
βολὰς ποιούμενοι τῷ τείχει, σκοποῦντες καιρὸν
εἴ τις παραπέσοι ὥστε τοὺς ἄνδρας σῶσαι.

XXIV. Ἔν τούτῳ dé? ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Συρα-
κόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρὸς ταῖς ἐν Μεσσήνγ
φρουρούσαις ναυσὶ τὸ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὃ παρεσκευ-
ἄξοντο προσκομίσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιοῦντο ἐκ

1 With Cobet, for διελύοντο of the MSS.

2 of of the MSS., before ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, deleted by
Hude.

248

BOOK IV. xxi. 3-xxiv. 1

might think it best to make in view of their mis-
fortune, lest they might be discredited with their
allies if they proposed them and were rebuffed, and
seeing also that the Athenians’ would not grant
their proposals on tolerable conditions, withdrew from
Athens, their mission a failure.

XXIII. When they returned, the truce at Pylos
was terminated at once, and the Lacedaemonians
demanded the return of their ships according to
the agreement; but the Athenians accused them of
having made a raid against the fort in violation of
the truce, and of other acts that do not seem worth
mentioning, and refused to give up the ships, stoutly
maintaining that it had been stipulated that, if there
should be any violation of the truce whatsoever, it
should be at an end forthwith. The Lacedaemonians
contradicted this, and after protesting that the deten-
tion of the ships was an act of injustice went away
and renewed the war. And so the warfare at Pylos
was carried on vigorously by both sides. The
Athenians kept sailing round the island by day with
two ships going in opposite directions, and at night
their whole fleet lay at anchor on all sides of it,
except to seaward when there was a wind; while
to assist them in the blockade twenty additional
ships came from Athens, so that they now had
seventy in all. As for the Peloponnesians, they
were encamped on the mainland, and kept making
assaults upon the fort, watching for any opportunity
which might offer of rescuing their men.

XXIV. Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and
their allies, having reinforced the ships which were
keeping guard at Messene by bringing up the other
naval force which they had been equipping,! were

1 of. ch. i. 4. 249

THUCYDIDES

2 τῆς Μεσσήνης (καὶ μάλιστα ἐνῆγον οἱ Λοκροὶ τῶν
“Ῥηγί a ἔχθραν, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐσεβεβλή-
ηγίνων κατὰ ἔχθραν, avr n
3 κεσαν πανδημεὶ ἐς THY γῆν αὐτῶν), Kal vav-
μαχίας ἀποπειρᾶσθαι ἐβούλοντο, ὁρῶντες τοῖς
᾿Αθηναίοις τὰς μὲν παρούσας ναῦς ὀλίγας, ταῖς
δὲ πλείοσι καὶ μελλούσαις ἥξειν πυνθανόμενοι
4 τὴν νῆσον πολιορκεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ κρατήσειαν
τῷ ναυτικῷ, τὸ Ῥήγιον ἤλπιζον πεζῇ τε καὶ
ναυσὶν ἐφορμοῦντες ῥᾳδίως χειρώσεσθαι, καὶ ἤδη
σφῶν ἰσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίγνεσθαι. ξύνεγγυς
γὰρ κειμένου τοῦ τε Ῥηγίου ἀκρωτηρίου τῆς
Ἰταλίας τῆς τε Μεσσήνης τῆς Σικελίας, τοῖς
᾿Αθηναίοις! οὐκ ἂν εἶναι ἐφορμεῖν καὶ τοῦ
η ς ely ρμε
πορθμοῦ κρατεῖν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ πορθμὸς ἡ μεταξὺ
Ῥηγίον θάλασσα καὶ Μεσσήνης, ἧπερ βραχύ-
τατον Σικελία τῆς ἠπείρον ἀπέχει" καὶ ἔστιν ἡ
Χάρυβδις κληθεῖσα τοῦτο, ἣ ᾿Οδυσσεὺς λέγεται
διαπλεῦσαι. διὰ στενότητα δὲ καὶ ἐκ μεγάλων
πελαγῶν, τοῦ τε Τυρσηνικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Σικελικοῦ,
ἐσπίπτουσα ἡ θάλασσα ἐς αὐτὸ 5 καὶ ῥοώδης
οὖσα εἰκότως χαλεπὴ ἐνομίσθη.

XXV. Ἔν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ μεταξὺ οἱ Συρακόσιοι
καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσὶν ὀλίγῳ πλείοσιν ἢ τριά-
κοντα ἠναγκάσθησαν ὀψὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ναυμαχῆσαι
περὶ πλοίου διαπλέοντος, ἀντεπαναγόμενοι πρός
τε ᾿Αθηναίων ναῦς ἑκκαίδεκα καὶ 'Ῥηγίνας ὀκτώ.

2 καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων διὰ τάχους
ἀπέπλευσαν ws ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρα-

1 re, after ᾿Αθηναίοις in all MSS. except Cod. Danicus, is
bracketed by all later editors.
2 αὐτὸ the MSS.; Hude emends to ταὐτό.

250

BOOK IV. xxiv. 1—xxv. 2

carrying on the war from Messene. Tothis they were
instigated chiefly by the Locrians on account of
their hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they
had themselves invaded in full force. The Syra-
cusans wanted also to try their fortune in a sea-fight,
seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships at
hand, and hearing that the most of their fleet, the
ships that were on the way to Sicily, were employed
in blockading the island of Sphacteria. For, in
case they won a victory with the fleet, they could
then invest Rhegium both by land and by sea and, as
they believed, capture it without difficulty; and from
that moment their situation would be a strong one,
since Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, and
Messene in Sicily are only a short distance apart,
and so the Athenians would not be able to keep a
fleet there ! and command the strait. Now the strait
is that arm of the sea between Rhegium and Messene,
at the point where Sicily is nearest the mainland ;
and it is the Charybdis, so called, through which
Odysseus is said to have sailed. On account of its
narrowness and because the water falls into it from
two great seas, the Etruscan and the Sicilian, and
is full of currents, it has naturally been considered
dangerous.

XXV. Now it was in this strait that the Syracusans
and their allieswere compelled one day toward evening
to fight for a vessel which was making the passage ;
and with thirty odd ships they put out against
sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian ships. They
were defeated by the Athenians, and hastily sailed
back, each contingent as best it could, to their own

1 3.¢e. in case Rhegium were taken by the Syracusans.
251

THUCYDIDES

τόπεδα! μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες" καὶ νὺξ ἐπεγέ-
vero τῷ ἔργῳ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ
ἀπῆλθον ἐκ τῆς “Ῥηγίνων, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Πελωρίδα
τῆς Μεσσήνης ξυλλεγεῖσαι ai τῶν Συρακοσίων
καὶ ξυμμάχων νῆες ὥρμουν καὶ ὁ πεζὸς αὐτοῖς
παρῆν. προσπλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ
Ῥηγῖνοι ὁρῶντες τὰς ναῦς κενὰς ἐνέβαλον, καὶ
χειρὶ σιδηρᾷ ἐπιβληθείσῃ μίαν ναῦν αὐτοὶ ἀπώ-
λεσαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκολυμβησάντων. καὶ μετὰ
τοῦτο τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐσβάντων ἐς τὰς ναῦς καὶ
παραπλεόντων ἀπὸ κάλω ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην, αὖθις
προσβαλόντες οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἀποσιμωσάντων
ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων, ἑτέραν ναῦν ἀπολ-
λύουσιν. καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ
τοιουτοτρόπῳ γενομένῃ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες οἱ
Συρακόσιοι παρεκομίσθησαν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ Μεσ-
σήνῃ λιμένα.

Καὶ οἱ μὲν ᾿Αθηναῖοι, Καμαρίνης ἀγγελθείσης
προδίδοσθαι Συρακοσίοις ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αρχίου καὶ τῶν
μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἔπλευσαν ἐκεῖσε’ Μεσσήνιοι δ᾽ ἐν
τούτῳ πανδημεὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἅμα
ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Νάξον τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν ὅμορον
οὖσαν. καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τειχήρεις ποιή
σαντες τοὺς Ναξίους ἐδήουν τὴν γῆν, τῇ δ᾽ ὗστε-
ραίᾳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες κατὰ τὸν
᾿Ακεσίνην ποταμὸν τὴν γῆν ἐδήουν, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ
πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσέβαλλον. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ
Σικελοὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄκρων πολλοὶ κατέβαινον

lad τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, in the MSS.
after στρατόπεδα, rejected by Hude, after Stahl and van
Herwerden.

2 For ἐσέβαλλον of the MSS., Poppo’s correction, accepted
by most editors.

252

BOOK IV. xxv. 2-9

camps, having lost one ship; and night came on
while they were in action. After this the Locrians
left the territory of the Rhegians; and the ships of
the Syracusans and their allies assembled at Peloris
in Messene, where they anchored and were joined by
their land-forces. The Athenians and the Rhegians
sailed up, and seeing that the Syracusan ships were
unmanned attacked them; but they themselves Jost
one ship, which was caught by a grappling-iron cast
upon it, the crew having leaped overboard. After
this the Syracusans embarked and their ships were
being towed along the shore by ropes toward Messene
when the Athenians attacked again, but lost another
ship, since the Syracusans made a sudden turn out-
wards and charged them first. In the passage
along the shore, then, and in the sea-fight that
followed in this unusual fashion, the Syracusans had
the best of it, and at length gained the harbour at
Messene.

But the Athenians, on the report that Camarina
_ was to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and
his faction, sailed thither. The Messenians mean-
while took all their land-forces and also the allied
fleet and made an expedition against Naxos, the
Chalcidian settlement on their borders. On the first
day they confined the Naxians within their walls and
ravaged their lands; on the next day, while their
fleet sailed round to the river Acesines and ravaged
the land there, their army assaulted the city of Naxos.
Meanwhile the Sicels came down over the heights in

——a

3 of, before ὑπὲρ, Kriiger’s suggestion following a scholium
ad τοῦ of ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρῶν ὄντες x.7.A.), is adopted by
ude.

253

THUCYDIDES

βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους. καὶ οἱ Νάξιοι
ὡς εἶδον, θαρσήσαντες καὶ παρακελευόμενοι ἐν
ἑαυτοῖς ὡς οἱ Λεοντῖνοι σφίσι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
Ἕλληνες ξύμμαχοι ἐς τιμωρίαν ἐπέρχονται, ἐκ-
δραμόντες ἄφνω ἐκ τῆς πόλεως προσπίπτουσι
τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, καὶ τρέψαντες ἀπέκτεινάν τε
ὑπὲρ χιλίους καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ χαλεπῶς ἀπεχώρησαν
ἐπ᾿ οἴκου" καὶ γὰρ οἱ βάρβαροι ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς
10 ἐπιπεσόντες τοὺς πλείστους διέφθειραν. καὶ αἱ
νῆες σχοῦσαι ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὕστερον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου
ἕκασται διεκρίθησαν. Λεοντῖνοι δὲ εὐθὺς καὶ οἱ
ξύμμαχοι μετὰ ᾿Αθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὡς
κεκακωμένην ἐστράτευον, καὶ προσβάλλοντες οἱ
μὲν ᾿Αθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπεί-
11 ρων, ὁ δὲ πεζὸς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. ἐπεκδρομὴν δὲ
“ποιησάμενοι οἱ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Λοκρῶν τινες μετὰ
“τοῦ Δημοτέλους, of μετὰ τὸ πάθος ἐγκατελείφθη-
σαν φρουροί, ἐξαπιναίως προσπεσόντες τρέπουσι
τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν Λεοντίνων τὸ πολὺ καὶ
ἀπέκτειναν πολλούς. ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ
ἀποβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐβοήθουν, καὶ κατεδίω-
Eav τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πάλιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, τε-
ταραγμένοις ἐπυγενόμενοι' καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαν-
12 τες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ
μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ “EXAnves ἄνευ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
κατὰ γῆν ἐστράτευον ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους.

ΧΧΥῚ. Ἔν δὲ τῇ Πύλῳ ἔτι ἐπολιόρκουν τοὺς
ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸ
ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατόπεδον τῶν Πελοποννησίων

2 κατὰ χώραν ἔμενεν. ἐπίπονος δ᾽ ἦν τοῖς ᾿Αθη-
ναίοις ἡ φυλακὴ σίτου τε ἀπορίᾳ καὶ ὕδατος" οὐ

254

BOOK IV. xxv. g—xxvi. 2

large numbers to help in resisting the Messenians.
When the Naxians saw them coming, they took heart,
and calling to each other that the Leontines and their
other Hellenic allies were approaching to defend
them rushed suddenly out of the city and fell upon
the Messenians, putting them to flight and killing
over a thousand of them. The rest got back home with
difficulty ; for the barbarians attacked them in the
roads and killed most of them. And the allied fleet,
after putting in at Messene, dispersed to their
several homes. Thereupon the Leontines and their
allies, in company with the Athenians, immediately
made an expedition against Messene, believing it to
be weakened, and attempted an assault upon it, the
Athenians attacking with their ships on the side of
the harbour, while the land forces moved against the
town. But the Messenians and some of the Locrians,
who, under the command of Demoteles, had been
left there as a garrison after the disaster at Naxos,
made a sortie, and falling suddenly upon them routed
the larger part of the army of the Leontines and
killed many of them. Seeing this the Athenians
disembarked and came to their aid, and attacking the
Messenians while they were in disorder pursued them
back into the city; they then set up a trophy and with-
drew to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily,
without the cooperation of the Athenians, continued
to make expeditions against one another by land.
XXVI. At Pylos, meanwhile, the Athenians were
still besieging the Lacedaemonians on the island, and
the army of the Peloponnesians on the mainland
remained in its former position. The blockade, how-
ever, was harassing to the Athenians on account of
the lack of both food and water; for there was only

255

THUCYDIDES

\ 4 4 ef A ’ 2 9. A σι 9 ’
yap nv κρηνὴ OTL μὴ μία ἐν αὑτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει
τῆς Πύλου καὶ αὕτη οὐ μεγάλη, ἀλλὰ διαμώμενοι

\ , e a 9 A 4 wv
τὸν κάχληκα οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ TH θαλάσσῃ ἔπινον
οἷον εἰκὸς ὕδωρ. στενοχωρία τε ἐν ὀλίγῳ σρατο-
πεδευομένοις ἐγίγνετο, καὶ τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχουσῶν
ὅρμον αἱ μὲν σῖτον ἐν τῇ γῇ ἡροῦντο κατὰ μέρος,
αἱ δὲ μετέωροι ὥρμουν. ἀθυμίαν τε πλείστην ὁ
χρόνος παρεῖχε παρὰ λόγον ἐπυγυιγνόμενος, ods
@OVTO ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων ἐκπολιορκήσειν, ἐν νήσῳ TE
ἐρήμῃ καὶ ὕδατι ἁλμυρῷ χρωμένους. αἴτιον δὲ
ἣν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προειπόντες ἐς τὴν νῆσον
> ᾽ af Ἁ a 3 / N
ἐσάγειν σῖτον te τὸν βουλόμενον ἀληλεμένον Kal
οἶνον καὶ τυρὸν καὶ εἴ τε ἄλλο βρῶμα, οἷ᾽ ἂν ἐς

/ / / 3 ’ “
πολιορκίαν ξυμφέρῃ, τάξαντες ἀργυρίου πολλοῦ
καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τῷ ἐσαγαγόντι ἐλευθερίαν ὑπι-
σχνούμενοι. καὶ ἐσῆγον ἄλλοι τε παρακινδυνεύ-

A ς 2 / > XN
ovres καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Εἴλωτες, ἀπαίροντες ἀπὸ

A , e c 4
τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὁπόθεν τύχοιεν καὶ καταπλέ-
οντες ἔτι νυκτὸς ἐς τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τῆς νήσου.

4 > 7 ) ἡ, ἢ ca
μάλιστα δὲ ἐτήρουν ἀνέμῳ καταφέρεσθαι: ῥᾷον

A \ \ a / ’ e 7
yap τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν τριήρων ἐλάνθανον, ὁπότε
πνεῦμα ἐκ πόντου εἴη" ἄπορον γὰρ ἐγίγνετο περι-

a “A \ 3 e 4 4
ορμεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἀφειδὴς ὁ κατάπλους καθειστήκει"
ἐπώκελλον γὰρ τὰ πλοῖα τετιμημένα- χρημάτων,
καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται περὶ τὰς κατάρσεις τῆς νήσου

1 The reference is to the ships which kept up a patrol
round the island. There was no anchorage near the shore

256

BOOK IV. xxv1. 2-7

one spring, high up on the acropolis of Pylos, and a
small one at that, and the soldiers for the most part
scraped away the shingle upon the beach and drank
water such as one might expect to find there. And
there was scant room for them, encamping as they
did in a small space, and since there was no anchor-
age for the ships,! the crews would take their food on
land by turns, while the rest of the fleet lay at anchor
out at sea. Very great discouragement, too, was
caused by the surprisingly long duration of the siege,
whereas they had expected to reduce the enemy in
a few days, since they were on a desert island and
had only brackish water to drink. But the cause of
their holding out was that the Lacedaemonians had
called for volunteers to convey to the island ground
corn and wine and cheese and other food such as might
be serviceable in a siege, fixing a high price and
also promising freedom to any Helot who should
get food in. Many took the risk, especially the
Helots, and actually brought it in, putting out from
any and every point in the Peloponnesus and coming
to shore. during the night on the side of the island
facing the sea. If possible they waited for a wind

to bear them to the shore; for they found it easier _

to elude the guard of triremes when the breeze was
from the sea, since then it was impossible for the
ships to lie at their moorings off the island, whereas

res

they themselves ran ashore regardless of conse- -

quences, as a value had been set upon the boats
which they drove upon the beach, and the hop-
lites would be on watch for them at the landing-

on the seaward side (ch. viii. 8), so at ἘΕΤῚ times the crews
of one part οὗ the fleet would make a landing somewhere and
eat, while the other part would be out at sea on guard. - ~~

257

VOL. 11. 8

THUCYDIDES

ἐφύλασσον. ὅσοι δὲ γαλήνῃ κινδυνεύσειαν, ἡλί-

8 σκοντο. ἐσένεον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα κολυμ-
βηταὶ ὕφυδροι, καλῳδίῳ ἐν ἀσκοῖς ἐφέλκοντες
μήκωνα μεμελιτωμένην καὶ λίνου σπέρμα κεκομ-
μένον" ὧν τὸ πρῶτον λανθανόντων φυλακαὶ

9 ὕστερον ἐγένοντο. παντί τε τρόπῳ ἑκάτεροε
ἐτεχνῶντο, οἱ μὲν ἐσπέμπειν τὰ σιτία, οἱ δὲ μὴ
λανθάνειν σφᾶς.

XXVII. ᾽ν δὲ ταῖς ᾿Αθήναις πυνθανόμενοι
περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς: ὅτι ταλαιπωρεῖται καὶ σῖτος
τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ὅτι ἐσπλεῖ, ἠπόρουν καὶ ἐδεδοί-
κεσαν μὴ σφῶν χειμὼν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιλάβοε,
ὁρῶντες τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων τὴν περὶ τὴν Πελο-
πόννησον κομιδὴν ἀδύνατον ἐσομένην, ἅμα ἐν
χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἐν θέρει οἷοί τε ὄντες ἱκανὰ
περιπέμπειν, τόν τε ἔφορμον χωρίων ἀλιμένων
ὄντων οὐκ ἐσόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ σφῶν ἀνέντων τὴν
φυλακὴν περιγενήσεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἢ τοῖς πλοί-
ots ἃ τὸν σῖτον αὐτοῖς ἦγε χειμῶνα τηρήσαντας

2 ἐκπλεύσεσθαι. πάντων τε ἐφοβοῦντο μάλιστα
τοὺς Λακεδιιιμονίους, ὅτι ἔχοντάς τι ἰσχυρὸν av-
τοὺς ἐνόμιζον οὐκέτι σφίσιν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι" καὶ

8 μετεμέλοντο τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ δεξάμενοι. Κλέων
δὲ γνοὺς αὐτῶν τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν ὑποψίαν περὶ τῆς
κωλύμης τῆς ξυμβάσεως οὐ τἀληθῇ ἔφη λέγειν
τοὺς ἐξαγγέλλοντας.} παραινούντων δὲ τῶν ἀφιγ-

1 So the MSS.: Hude adopts Kriiger’s conjecture, ἐσαγΎ-
γέλλοντας.

258

BOOK IV. xxvi. 7-xxvm. 3

places on the island. All, on the other hand, who
made the venture in calm weather were captured.
At the harbour, too, there were divers who swam to
the island under water, towing after them by a cord
skins filled with poppy-seed mixed with honey and
bruised linseed ; at first they were not discovered, but
afterwards watches were set for them. And so both
sides kept resorting to every device, the one to get
food in, the other to catch them doing it.

XXVII. At Athens, meanwhile, when they heard
that their army was in distress and that food was
being brought in to the men on the island, they were
perplexed and became apprehensive that the winter
would overtake them while still engaged in the
blockade. They saw that conveyance of supplies
round the Peloponnesus would be impossible—Pylos
being a desolate place at best, to which they were
unable even in summer to send round adequate sup-
plies—and that, since there were no harbours in the
neighbourhood, the blockade would be a failure.
Either their own troops would relax their watch and
the men on the island would escape, or else, waiting
for bad weather, they would sail away in the boats
which brought them food. Above all they were
alarmed about the attitude of the Lacedaemonians,
thinking that it was because they had some ground for
confidence that they were no longer making overtures
to them; and they repented having rejected their
proposals for peace. But Cleon, knowing that their
suspicions were directed against him because he had
prevented the agreement, said that the messengers
who had come from Pylos were not telling the truth.
Whereupon these messengers advised, if their own

259
s 2

“THUCYDIDES

μένων, εἰ μὴ σφίσι πιστεύουσι, κατασκόπους
τινὰς πέμψαι, ἡἠρέθη κατάσκοπος αὐτὸς μετὰ
Θεογένους ὑπὸ ᾿Αθηναίων. καὶ γνοὺς ὅτι ἀναγ-
κασθήσεται ἢ ταὐτὰ λέγειν οἷς διέβαλλεν ἢ τά-
/ > N δ) ’ θ 1 ’ -
ναντία εἰπὼν ψευδὴς φανήσεσθαι, παρήνει τοῖς
᾿Αθηναίοις, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ὡρμημένους τι τὸ
πλέον τῇ γνώμῃ στρατεύειν, ὧς χρὴ κατασκόπους
μὲν μὴ πέμπειν μηδὲ διαμέλλειν καιρὸν παριέντας,
εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα,
πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας. καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικη-
ράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν, ἐχθρὸς ὧν
καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν, ῥάδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ ἄνδρες
εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν
:
τῇ νήσῳ, καὶ αὐτός γ᾽ ἄν, εἰ ἦρχε, ποιῆσαι
τοῦτο. :
. a. | ere
XXVIII. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε ᾿Αθηναίων τι
e 4 3 ‘ , Ψ 2 rel
ὑποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, 6 τι οὐ καὶ νῦν
“A > es ’ 3 A ’ Ψ e¢ aA
πλεῖ, εἰ ῥάδιόν ye αὐτῷ φαίνεται, καὶ ἅμα ὁρῶν
9. : Le) 32. + Ψ UA 7
αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλενεν ἥντινα βούλεται δύ-
, , V9 \ a 4 3 a ες
ναμιν λαβόντα τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι ἐπιχειρεῖν. ὁ δὲ
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰόμενος αὐτὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι,
ἑτοῖμος ἦν, γνοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι παραδωσείοντα ave-
Ἢ ’ - 3 3 Ἁ 3 3 3 A
χώρει καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνον στρατη-
ν ὃ \ v ὃ } 2 ἃ a7 , ε 2A
γεῖν, δεδιὼς ἤδη Kal οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενός οἱ αὐτὸν
ἊΝ A e a 4 A ε ’ ,
τολμῆσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι. αὖθις δὲ ὁ Νικίας éxé-
Neve καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς καὶ μάρ-

1 So all MSS. except B (yevhoerbai) : Hude adopts, with
Kriiger, Rauchenstein’s conjecture φανήσεται.

260

BOOK’ IV. xxvi. 3-xxvim. 3

reports were not believed, that commissioners be sent
to see for themselves, and Cleon himself was chosen by
the Athenians, with Theagenes as his colleague.
Realizing now that he would either be obliged to bring
the same report as the messengers whose word he
was impugning, or, if he contradicted them, be con-.
victed of falsehood, and also seeing that the Athenians
were now somewhat more inclined to send an ex-
pedition, he told them that they ought not to send
commissioners, or by dallying to let slip a favourable
opportunity, but urged them, if they themselves
thought the reports to be true, to send a fleet and
fetch the men. And pointing at Nicias son οὗ
Niceratus, who was one of the generals and an
enemy of his, and taunting him, he said that it was
an easy matter, if the generals were men, to sail
there with a proper force and take the men on the
island, declaring that this was what he himself would
have done had he been in command.

XXVIII. The Athenians thereupon. began to
clamour against Cleon, asking him why he did not sail
even now, if it seemed to him so easy a thing; and
Nicias, noticing this and Cleon’s taunt, told him that
as far as the generals were concerned he might take
whatever force he wished and make the attempt.
As for Cleon, he was at first ready to go, thinking it _
was only in pretence that Nicias offered to relinquish
the command; but when he realized that Nicias
really desired to yield the command to him, he
tried to back out, saying that not he but Nicias was
general; for by now he was alarmed, and never
thought that Nicias would go so far as to retire in
his favour. But again Nicias urged him to go and
offered to resign his command of the expedition

261

THUCYDIDES

tupas τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐποιεῖτο. οἱ δέ, οἷον ὄχλος
φιλεῖ ποιεῖν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφευγε τὸν
πλοῦν καὶ ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκε-
λεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ
ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖν" ὥστε οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τῶν
εἰρημένων ἔτι ἐξαπαλλαγῇ, ὑφίσταται τὸν πλοῦν,
καὶ παρελθὼν οὔτε φοβεῖσθαι ἔφη Λακεδαιμονίους
πλεύσεσθαί τε λαβὼν ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδένα,
Λημνίους δὲ καὶ Ἰμβρίους τοὺς παρόντας καὶ
πελταστὰς of ἧσαν ἔκ τε Αἴνου βεβοηθηκότες καὶ
ἄλλοθεν τοξότας τετρακοσίους: ταῦτα δὲ ἔχων
ἔφηὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἐν Πύλῳ στρατιώταις ἐντὸς ἡμε-
ρῶν εἴκοσι ἢ ἄξειν Λακεδαιμονίους ζῶντας ἣ
αὐτοῦ ἀποκτενεῖν' τοῖς δὲ ᾿Αθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε
μέν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἀσμέ-
vows δ᾽ ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τεύξεσθαι,
ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον,
ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώ-
σεσθαι.3

XXIX. Καὶ πάντα διαπραξάμενος ἐν τῇ
ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ψηφισαμένων ᾿Αθηναίων αὐτῷ τὸν
πλοῦν, τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἕνα προσελό-
μενος, Δημοσθένη, τὴν ἀναγωγὴν διὰ τάχους
ἐποιεῖτο. τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προσέλαβε πυνθανό-
μενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖ-
σθαι. οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ
χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον πολιορκούμενοι 7)
πολιορκοῦντες ὥρμηντο διακινδυνεῦσαι. καὶ αὐτῷ

1 Omitted by Hude, following M.
3 χειρώσασθαι ABFM.

262

BOOK IV. xxvin. 3-xx1x. 2

against Pylos, calling the Athenians to witness that
he did so. And the more Cleon tried to evade the
expedition and to back out of his own proposal, the
more insistently the Athenians, as is the way with a
crowd, urged Nicias to give up the command and
shouted to Cleon to sail. And so, not knowing how
he could any longer escape from his own proposal,
he undertook the expedition, and, coming forward,
said that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians,
and that he would sail without taking a single
Athenian soldier, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian
troops which were in Athens and a body of targeteers
which had come from Aenos, and four hundred
archers from other places. With these, in addition
to the troops now at Pylos, he said that within
twenty days he would either bring back the Lace-
daemonians alive or slay them on the spot. At this
vain talk of his there was a burst of laughter on the
part of the Athenians, but nevertheless the sensible
men among them were glad, for they reflected that
they were bound to obtain one of two good things—
either they would get rid of Cleon, which they
preferred, or if they were disappointed in this, he
would subdue the Lacedaemonians for them.
XXIX. When he had arranged everything in the
assembly and the Athenians had voted in favour of
his expedition, he chose as his colleague Demos-
thenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and made haste
to set sail. He selected Demosthenes because he had
heard that he was planning to make his landing on
the island. For his soldiers, who were suffering
because of the discomforts of their position, where
they were rather besieged than besiegers, were eager
to run all risks. And Demosthenes himself had also

263

THUCYDIDES

ἔτι ῥώμην καὶ ἡ νῆσος ἐμπρησθεῖσα παρέσχεν.
8 πρότερον μὲν γὰρ οὔσης αὐτῆς ὑλώδους ἐπὶ τὸ
\ 3 a \ Δ. 7. 3 ’ 3 a
πολὺ καὶ ἀτριβοῦς διὰ τὴν αἰεὶ ἐρημίαν ἐφοβεῖτο
‘ a ’ A 49 ἢ A
καὶ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο ἐνόμιζε μᾶλλον
ἐΐναι" πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν στρατοπέδῳ ἀποβάντι ἐξ
ἀφανοῦς χωρίον προσβάλλοντας αὐτοὺς βλάπ-
τειν. σφίσι μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἐκείνων ἁμαρτίας καὶ
\ e δ A [4 ᾽ e , a
παρασκευὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δῆλα
εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ αὐτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφανὴ ἂν
εἶναι πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, ὥστε προσπίπτειν
ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀπροσδοκήτως ἧἣἧ βούλοιντο’ ἐπ᾽
2 , \ 4 3 ’ > >
4 ἐκείνοις yap εἶναι av τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. εἰ ὃ
αὖ ἐς δασὺ χωρίον βιάξοιτο ὁμόσε ἰέναι, τοὺς
ἐλάσσους, ἐμπείρους δὲ τῆς χώρας, κρείσσους
ἐνόμιζε τῶν πλεόνων ἀπείρων: λανθάνειν τε ἂν
δ τ a 4 \ ἃ ’
τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον πολὺ ὃν διαφθειρόμενον,
b Ld A 4 e A 3
οὐκ οὔσης τῆς προσόψεως ἢ χρῆν ἀλλήλοις
ἐπιβοηθεῖν.
XXX. ᾿Απὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰτωλικοῦ πάθους, ὃ διὰ
τὴν ὕλην μέρος τι ἐγένετο, οὐχ ἥκιστα αὐτὸν
2 ταῦτα ἐσήει. τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀναγκασθέντων
διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τῆς νήσου τοῖς ἐσχάτοις
προσίσχοντας ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι διὰ προφυλακῆς
καὶ ἐμπρήσαντός τινος κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς ὕλης
ἄκοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου
8 τὸ πολὺ αὐτῆς ἔλαθε κατακαυθέν. οὕτω δὴ

264

BOOK. IV, xxix. 2-xxx. 3

been emboldened by a conflagration which had swept
the island. For hitherto, since the island was for
the most part covered with woods and had no roads,
having never been inhabited, he had been afraid to
land, thinking that the terrain was rather in the
enemy's favour; for they could attack from an un-
seen position and inflict damage upon a large army
after it had landed. To his own troops, indeed, the
mistakes and the preparations of the enemy would
not be equally clear by reason of the woods, whereas |
all their own mistakes would be manifest to their
opponents, and so they could fall upon them un-
expectedly wherever they wished, since the power
of attack would rest with them. If, on the other
hand, he should force his way into the thicket and
there close with the enemy, the smaller force which
was acquainted with the ground would, he thought,
be stronger than the larger number who were un-
acquainted with it; and his own army, though large,
would be destroyed piece-meal before he knew it,
because there was no possible way of seeing the
points at which the detachments should assist one
another. 3

XXX. It was especially owing to his experience
in Aetolia,! when his reverse was in some measure
due to the forest, that these thoughts occurred to
Demosthenes. But the soldiers were so cramped in
their quarters that they were obliged to land on the
edge of the island and take their meals under cover
of a picket, and one of their number accidentally set
fire to a small portion of the forest, and from this,
when a breeze had sprung up, most of the forest was
burned before they knew it. Thus it happened that

2 ef, 11. xcvii., xcviii.

265

THUCYDIDES

tous τε Λακεδαιμονίους μᾶλλον κατιδὼν πλείους
ὄντας, ὑπονοῶν πρότερον ἐλάσσοσι τὸν σῖτον
αὐτοὺς ἐσπέμπειν, τήν τε νῆσον εὐαποβατω-
[4 φ ’ e 4 9 2 ’ ‘ ᾽
τέραν οὖσαν, τότε ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀξιόχρεων τοὺς ᾿Αθη-
ναίους μᾶλλον σπουδὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχεί-
pnow παωρεσκευάξετο, στρατιάν τε μεταπέμπων
”~ 3 Ἁ 4 A \ ΓΚ e ’
ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς ξυμμάχων καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑτοιμάζων.
Κλέων δὲ ἐκείνῳ τε προπέμψας ἄγγελον ws
ἥξων καὶ ἔχων στρατιὰν ἣν τήσατο, ἀφικνεῖται
ἐς Πύλον. καὶ ἅμα γενόμενοι πέμπουσι πρῶτον
ἐς τὸ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατόπεδον κήρυκα, προκα-
λούμενοι, εἰ βούλοιντο, ἄνευ κινδύνου τοὺς ἐν τῇ
, 4 4 4 cd A 3 A
νήσῳ ἄνδρας σφίσι τά τε ὅπλα Kal σφᾶς αὐτοὺς
᾽ A 22? A “ ’
κελεύειν παραδοῦναι, ἐφ’ ᾧ φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ
4 @ » ὶ A λέ On
τηρήσονται, ἕως av τι περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ξυμβαθῇ.
ΧΧΧΙ. οὐ προσδεξαμένων δὲ αὖ μίαν μὲν
ἡμέραν ἐπέσχον, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀνηγάγοντο μὲν
νυκτὸς ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγας ναῦς τοὺς ὁπλίτας πάντας
ἐπιβιβάσαντες, πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἕω ὀλίγον ἀπέβαινον
τῆς νήσου ἑκατέρωθεν, ἔκ τε τοῦ πελάγους καὶ
πρὸς τοῦ λιμένος, ὀκτακόσιον μάλιστα ὄντες
ὁπλῖται, καὶ ἐχώρουν δρόμῳ ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον
φυλακτήριον τῆς νήσου. ὧδε γὰρ διετετάχατο"
ἐν ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ Σ φυλακῇ ws τριάκοντα
e a \ ¢ , 4
ἦσαν ὁπλῖται, μέσον δὲ καὶ ὁμαλώτατόν τε καὶ

1 Bekker’s conjecture for αὐτοῦ of the MSS. Hude reads
αὐτόσε, with Kriiger.
3 Hude deletes, with Kriiger.

266

BOOK IV. xxx. 3-xxx1. 2

Demosthenes, who could now get a better view of
the Lacedaemonians, found that they were more
numerous than he had thought; for he had previously
suspected that the number for which they were
sending provisions was smaller than they stated.!
He also found that the island was less difficult to
make a landing upon than he had supposed. He
now, therefore, believing that the object in view was
well worth a more serious effort on the part of the
Athenians, began preparations for the attempt, sum-
moning troops from the allies in the neighbourhood
and getting everything else ready.

Cleon, meanwhile, having first sent word to De-
mosthenes that he would soon be there, arrived at
Pylos, bringing the army for which he had asked. As
soon as they had joined forces, they sent a herald to
the enemy’s camp on the mainland, giving them the
option, if they wished to avoid a conflict, of ordering
the men on the island to surrender themselves and
their arms, on condition that they should be held in
mild custody until some agreement should be reached
about the main question.?, XXXI. This offer being
rejected, the Athenians waited for one day, but on
the next day while it was still dark they embarked
all their hoplites on a few vessels and put off, landing
a little before dawn on both sides of the island, on
the side toward the open sea and on that facing the
harbour, their number being about eight hundred,
all hoplites. They then advanced at a run against
the first guard-post on the island. For the forces of
the enemy were disposed as follows: in this, the
first post, there were about thirty hoplites; the
central and most level part of the island, near their

δ of. ch. xvi. 1. 3 4. 6. a general peace.

267

THUCYDIDES. ᾿

περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν καὶ ᾿Επιτάδας ὁ
ἄρχων εἶχε, μέρος δέ TL οὐ πολὺ αὐτὸϊ τὸ
ἔσχατον ἐφύλασσε τῆς νήσου τὸ πρὸς τὴν Πύλον,
ὃ ἦν ἔκ τε θαλάσσης ἀπόκρημνον καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς
ἥκιστα ἐπίμαχον" καὶ γάρ τι καὶ ἔρυμα αὐτόθι
ἣν παλαιὸν λίθων λογάδην πεποιημένον, ὃ ἐνό-
μίζον σφίσιν ὠφέλιμον ἂν εἶναι, εἰ καταλαμβάνοι
ἀναχώρησις βιαιοτέρα. οὕτω μὲν τεταγμένοι
ἦσαν.

XXXII. Οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τοὺς μὲν πρώτους
φύλακας, οἷς ἐπέδραμον, εὐθὺς διαφθείρουσιν, ἔν
τε ταῖς εὐναῖς ἔτι κἀναλαμβώνοντας τὰ ὅπλα καὶ
λαθόντες τὴν ἀπόβασιν, οἰομένων αὐτῶν τὰς
ναῦς κατὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐς ἔφορμον τῆς νυκτὸς πλεῖν.

2 ἅμα δὲ ἕῳ γιγνομένῃ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀπέ-
βαινον, én μὲν νεῶν ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ὀλίγῳ
πλειόνων πάντες πλὴν θαλαμιῶν, ὡς ἕκαστοι
ἐσκενασμένοι, τοξόται δὲ ὀκτακόσιοι καὶ πελ-
τασταὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσους τούτων, Μεσσηνίων τε οἱ
βεβοηθηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι περὶ Πύλον κατεῖ-
Nov πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους φυλάκων.

8 Δημοσθένους δὲ τάξαντος διέστησαν κατὰ δια-
κοσίους καὶ πλείους, ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ἐλάσσους, τῶν
χωρίων τὰ μετεωρότατα λαβόντες, ὅπως ὅτι
πλείστη ἀπορία ἡ τοῖς πολεμίοις πανταχόθεν
κεκυκλωμένοις καὶ μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς ὅ τι ἀντετά-

1 αὐτὸ, Bauer’s correction; MSS. αὐτοῦ.

1 οὗ, ch. xxvi. 4.

2 Not hewn, but brought just as they picked them out.

3 cf. ch. xxiii. 2.

4« The θαλαμῖται, or oarsmen of the lowest tier. At thia

268

BOOK IV. xxx. 2--ΧΧΧῚ 3

water supply,! was held by the main body of troops,
under the command of Epitadas; and a small detach-
ment guarded the very extremity of the island where
it looks toward Pylos. This point was precipitous on
the side toward the sea and least assailable toward
the land; there was also here an old fortification,
built of stones picked up,? which the Lacedaemonians
thought would be useful to them in case they should
have to retreat under strong pressure. Such, then,
was the disposition of the enemy’s forces.

XXXII. As for the Athenians, they immediately
destroyed the men of the first post, upon whom they
charged at full speed, finding them still in their beds
or endeavouring to snatch up their arms; for they
had not noticed the Athenians’ landing, supposing
that the ships were merely sailing as usual to their
watch-station for the night. Then as soon as day
dawned the rest of the army began to disembark.
These were the crews of somewhat more than seventy
ships (with the single exception of the rowers of the
lowest benches‘), equipped each in his own way,
besides eight hundred archers and as many targeteers,
and also the Messenians who had come to reinforce
them, and all the others who were on duty about Pylos
except the men left to guard the fort. Under
Demosthenes’ direction they were divided into com-
panies of two hundred more or less, which occupied
the highest points of the island, in order that the
enemy, being surrounded on all sides, might be in
the greatest possible perplexity and not know which

time a trireme was manned by fifty-four θαλαμῖται, fifty-four
(vyira: (occupants of the middle bank), sixty-two θρανῖται
(upper bank), and thirty περίνεφψ (reserve oarsmen), including

ὑπηρέται and ἐπιβάται.
2Ζόφ᾽

THUCYDIDES

Ewvtat, ἀλλ’ ἀμφίβολοι γίγνωνται τῷ πλήθει,
εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπίοιεν, ὑπὸ τῶν κατόπιν

3 A a a e Ν A ς ,
βαλλόμενοι, εἰ δὲ τοῖς πλαγίοις, ὑπὸ τῶν ἑκατέ-
ρωθεν παρατεταγμένων. κατὰ νώτου τε αἰεὶ
ἔμελλον αὐτοῖς, ἡ χωρήσειαν, οἱ πολέμιοι ἔσεσθαι
ψιλοί, καὶ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι, τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκον-
τίοις καὶ λίθοις καὶ σφενδόναις ἐκ πολλοῦ
ἔχοντες ἀλκήν' οἷς μηδὲ ἐπελθεῖν οἷόν τε Hv
φεύγοντές τε γὰρ ἐκράτουν καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν
ἐπέκειντο. τοιαύτῃ μὲν γνώμῃ ὁ Δημοσθένης τό
τε πρῶτον τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐπενόει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ
ἔταξεν.

ΧΧΧΊΤΤΙ. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν ᾿Επιτάδαν καὶ ὅπερ
ἣν πλεῖστον τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ὡς εἶδον τό τε
ἴω ’ δ
πρῶτον φυλακτήριον διεφθαρμένον καὶ στρατὸν
σφίσιν ἐπιόντα, ξυνετάξαντο καὶ τοῖς ὁπλίταις
A 3 ’ > “ , ζω
τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐπῇσαν, βουλόμενοι ἐς χεῖρας

a 3 ’ Ἁ Φ ’ 3
ἐλθεῖν: ἐξ ἐναντίας γὰρ οὗτοι καθειστήκεσαν, ἐκ
’ \ e \ ΑἉ \ ’ ” 4
πλαγίου δὲ οἱ ψιλοὶ καὶ κατὰ νώτου. τοῖς μὲν
οὖν ὁπλίταις οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν προσμεῖξαι οὐδὲ τῇ
σφετέρᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρήσασθαι" of γὰρ ψιλοὶ

e , , 4 \ Ψ 9 “A
ἑκατέρωθεν βάλλοντες εἶργον, Kal ἅμα ἐκεῖνοι
οὐκ ἀντεπῇσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζον. τοὺς δὲ ψιλούς,
ἡ μάλιστα αὐτοῖς προσθέοντες προσκέοιντο, ἔτρε-
πον, καὶ οἱ ὑποστρέφοντες ἠμύνοντο, ἄνθρωποι
κούφως τε ἐσκευασμένοι καὶ προλαμβάνοντες

270

BOOK IV. xxxu. 3-xxx1. 2

attack to face, but be exposed to missiles on every
side from the host of their opponents—if they
attacked those in front, from those behind; if those
on either flank, from those arrayed on the other.
And they would always find in their rear, whichever
way they moved, the light-armed troops of the enemy,
which were the most difficult to deal with, since they
fought at long range with arrows, javelins, stones,
and slings. Nay, they could not even get at them,
for they were victorious even as they fled, and as
soon as their pursuers turned they were hard upon
them again. Such was the idea which Demosthenes
had in mind when he devised the plan of landing,
and such were his tactics when he put this into
effect.

XXXIII. Now when the troops under Epitadas,
constituting the main body of the Lacedaemonians
on the island, saw that the first outpost was de-
stroyed and that an army was advancing against
them, they drew up in line and set out to attack the
Athenian hoplites, wishing to come to close quarters
with them; for these were stationed directly in front
of them, while the light-armed troops were on their
flank and rear. They were not able, however, to
engage with the hoplites or to avail themselves of
their own peculiar skill in fighting; for the light-
armed troops kept attacking them with missiles from
either side and thus held them in check, and at the
same time the hoplites did not advance against them,
but remained quiet. They did, however, put the
light-armed troops to flight wherever they pressed
most closely upon them in their charges; and then
these latter would wheel about and keep fighting,
being lightly equipped and therefore finding it easy

271

THUCYDIDES

A a 4 x
ῥᾳδίως τῆς φυγῆς χωρίων τε χαλεπότητι Kat
ὑπὸ τῆς πρὶν ἐρημίας τραχέων ὄντων, ἐν οἷς
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοε οὐκ ἐδύναντο διώκειν ὅπλα
ἔχοντες. |

XXXIV. Χρόνον μὲν οὖν τινα ὀλίγον οὕτω
N 3 ’ 3 ’ se
πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἠκροβολίσαντο' τῶν δὲ Aaxedac-
μονίων οὐκέτι ὀξέως ἐπεκθεῖν ἣ προσπίπτοιεν δυνα-.
μένων, γνόντες αὐτοὺς οἱ ψιλοὶ βραδυτέρους ἤδη.
ὄντας τῷ ἀμύνασθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῇ τε ὄψει τοῦ
θαρσεῖν τὸ πλεῖστον εἰληφότες πολλαπλάσιοι.
φαινόμενοι καὶ ἔξυνειθισμένοει μᾶλλον μηκέτε.
δεινοὺς αὐτοὺς ὁμοίως σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ
9.2 ep . δ..ὺ . os 3 , ,. ee
εὐθὺς ἄξια τῆς προσδοκίας ἐπεπόνθεσαν, ὥσπερ
4 a | ee 4 a , , “e
ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπέβαινον TH γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς
ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, καταφρονήσαντες καὶ ἐμβοή-
ε , Φ , 3 > \ ν ¥
σαντες ἁθρόοι ὥρμησαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ EBaXdov
, , Yo» , ς σ a
λίθοις τε Kal τοξεύμασι Kal ἀκοντίοις, ws ἕκαστός.
͵ : = a > A
τι πρόχειρον εἶχεν. γενομένης δὲ τῆς βοῆς ἅμα
(ol 3 A wv [4 9. Ὁ > [4
τῇ ἐπιδρομῇ ἔκπληξίς τε ἐνέπεσεν ἀνθρώποις
ἀήθεσι τοιαύτης μάχης καὶ ὁ κονιορτὸς τῆς ὕλης
νεωστὶ κεκαυμένης ἐχώρει πολὺς ἄνω, ἄπορόν τε
ἣν ἰδεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὑτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν τοξευμάτων καὶ.
λίθων ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων μετὰ τοῦ κονιορτοῦ
ἅμα φερομένων. τό τε ἔργον ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν
τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καθίστατος οὔτε γὰρ οἱ
4 , ’ LA J
πῖλοι ἔστεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, δοράτιά τε ἐναπε-

272

BOOK IV. xxx. 2-xxxiv. 3

to take to flight in good time, since the ground was
dificult and, because it had never been inhabited,
was naturally rough. Over such a terrain the Lace-
daemonians, who were in heavy armour, were unable
to pursue them.

XXXIV. For some little time they skirmished thus
with one another; but when the Lacedaemonians
were no longer able to dash out promptly at the point
where they were attacked, the light-armed troops
noticed that they were slackening in their defence,
and also conceived the greatest confidence in them-
selves, now that they could see that they were
undoubtedly many times more numerous than the
enemy,and, since their losses had from the outset been
less heavy than they had expected, they had gradu-
ally become accustomed to regarding their opponents
as less formidable than they had seemed at their first
landing when their own spirits were oppressed by
the thought that they were going to fight against
Lacedaemonians. Conceiving, therefore, a contempt
for them, with a shout they charged upon them in a
body, hurling at them stones, arrows or javelins,
whichever each man had at hand. The shouting _
with which the Athenians accompanied their charge
caused consternation among the Lacedaemonians,
who were unaccustomed to this manner of fighting ;
and the dust from the newly-burned forest rose in
clouds to the sky, so that a man could not see what
was in front of him by reason of the arrows and
stones, hurled, in the midst of the dust, by many
hands. And so the battle began to go hard with
the Lacedaemonians; for their felt cuirasses afforded
them no protection against the arrows, and the points
of the javelins broke off and clung there when the

273
VOL, 11. T

THUCYDIDES

κέκλαστο βαλλομένων, εἶχόν τε οὐδὲν σφίσιν
αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι ἀποκεκλῃμένοι μὲν τῇ ὄψει
τοῦ προορᾶν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μείζονος βοῆς τῶν
πολεμίων τὰ ἐν αὑτοῖς παραγγελλόμενα οὐκ
ἐσακούοντες, κινδύνου τε πανταχόθεν περιεστῶτος
καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα καθ᾽ ὅ τι χρὴ ἀμυνο-
μένους σωθῆναι.

XXXV. Τέλος δὲ τραυματιζομένων ἤδη πολλῶν
διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ξυγκλή-
σαντες ἐχώρησαν ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον ἔρυμα τῆς νήσου,
ὃ οὐ πολὺ ἀπεῖχε, καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φύλακας. ὡς
δὲ ἐνέδοσαν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πολλῷ ἔτει πλέονι βοῇ
τεθαρσηκότες οἱ ψιλοὶ ἐπέκειντο, καὶ τῶν Λακςε-
δαιμονίων ὅσοι μὲν ὑποχωροῦντες ἐγκατελαμβά-
νοντο, ἀπέθνῃσκον, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ διαφυγόντες ἐς
τὸ ἔρυμα μετὰ τῶν ταύτῃ φυλάκων ἐτάξαντο
παρὰ πᾶν ὡς ἀμυνούμενοι ἧπερ ἦν ἐπίμαχον. καὶ
οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐπισπόμενοι περίοδον μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ
κύκλωσιν χωρίου ἰσχύι οὐκ εἶχον, προσιόντες δὲ
ἐξ ἐναντίας ὥσασθαι ἐπειρῶντο, καὶ χρόνον μὲν
πολὺν καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τὸ πλεῖστον ταλαιπωρού-
μενοι ἀμφότεροι ὑπό τε τῆς μάχης καὶ δίψης καὶ
ἡλίου ἀντεῖχον, πειρώμενοι οἱ μὲν ἐξελάσασθαι
ἐκ τοῦ μετεώρου, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐνδοῦναι" ῥᾷον δ᾽ οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἠμύνοντο ἢ ἐν τῷ πρίν, οὐκ οὔσης
σφῶν τῆς κυκλώσεως ἐς τὰ πλάγια.

XXXVI. ᾿Επειδὴ δὲ ἀπέραντον ἦν, προσελθὼν
ὁ τῶν Μεσσηνίων στρατηγὸς Κλέωνι καὶ Δημο-

274

BOOK IV. xxxiv. 3—xxxvi. 1

men were struck. They. were, therefore, quite at
their wits’ end, since the dust shut off their view
ahead and they could not hear the word of command
on their own side because the enemy’s shouts were
louder. Danger encompassed them on every side and
they despaired of any means of defence availing to
save them. |
XXXV. At last when they saw that their men
were being wounded in large numbers because they
had to move backwards and forwards always on the
same ground, they closed ranks and fell back to the
farthermost fortification on the island, which was not
far distant, and to their own garrison stationed there.
But the moment they began to give way, the light-
armed troops, now emboldened, fell upon them with
a louder outcry than ever. Those of the Lacedae-
monians who were intercepted in their retreat were
slain, but the majority of them escaped to the fortifi-
cation, where they ranged themselves with the
garrison there, resolved to defend it at every point
where it was assailable. The Athenians followed,
but the position was so strong that they could not
outflank and surround the defenders. They, there-
fore, tried to dislodge them by a frontal attack.
Now for a long time, and indeed during the greater
part of the day, in spite of the distress from the battle,
from thirst, and from the heat of the sun, both sides
held out, the one trying to drive the enemy from the
heights, the other merely to hold their ground; the
Lacedaemonians, however, now found it easier than
before to defend themselves, since they could not be
taken in flank.
XXXVI. But when the business seemed intermin-
able, the general! of the Messenians came to Cleon
4 Named Comon, according to Paus, 1v. xxvi. 2. ape

Tt 2

THUCYDIDES

σθένει ἄλλως ἔφη πονεῖν σφᾶς" εἰ δὲ βούλονται
ἑαυτῷ δοῦναι τῶν τοξοτῶν μέρος τι καὶ τῶν
ψιλῶν περιιέναι κατὰ νώτου αὐτοῖς ὁδῷ ἡ ἂν
αὐτὸς εὕρῃ, δοκεῖν βιάσασθαι1 τὴν ἔφοδον.
λαβὼν δὲ ἃ ἠτήσατο, ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς ὁρμήσας
ὥστε μὴ ἰδεῖν ἐκείνους, κατὰ τὸ αἰεὶ παρεῖκον
τοῦ κρημνώδους τῆς νήσου προβαίνων καὶ ἡ οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι χωρίου ἰσχύε πιστεύσαντες οὐκ
ἐφύλασσον, χαλεπῶς τε καὶ μόλις περιελθὼν
ἔλαθε, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μετεώρου ἐξαπίνης ἀναφανεὶς
κατὰ νώτου αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ ἐξέ-
πληξε, τοὺς δὲ ἃ προσεδέχοντο ἰδόντας πολλῷ
μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσεν. καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι βαλλό-
μενοί τε ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἤδη καὶ γιγνόμενοι ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ ξυμπτώματι, ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλῳ εἰκάσαι,
τῷ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις (ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ τῇ ἀτραπῷ
περιελθόντων τῶν Περσῶν διεφθάρησαν οὗτοί
τε), ἀμφίβολοι ἤδη ὄντες οὐκέτι ἀντεῖχον, ἀλλὰ
πολλοῖς τε ὀλίγοι μαχόμενοι καὶ ἀσθενείᾳ σω-
μάτων διὰ τὴν σιτοδείαν ὑπεχώρουν: καὶ οἱ
᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐκράτουν ἤδη τῶν ἐφόδων.

XXXVII. Γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης,
εἰ καὶ ὁποσονοῦν μᾶλλον ἐνδώσουσι, διαφθαρη-
σομένους αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς σφετέρας στρατιᾶς,
ἔπαυσαν τὴν μάχην καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀπεῖρξαν,
βουλόμενοι ἀγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς ᾿Αθηναίοις ζῶντας, εἴ

1 As the MSS.; Hude βιάσεσθαι, after Madvig.
276

BOOK IV. xxxvi. 1—xxxvil. 1

and Demosthenes and said that their side was
wasting its pains; but if they were willing to give
him a portion of their bowmen and light-armed
troops, so that he could get round in the enemy’s
rear by some path or other which he might himself
discover, he thought that he could force the approach.
Obtaining what he asked for, he started from a point
out of the enemy’s sight, so as not to be observed by
them, and advanced along the precipitous shore of
the island, wherever it offered a foothold, to a point
where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength
of the position, maintained no guard. Thus with great
difficulty he barely succeeded in getting round
unobserved and suddenly appeared on the high
ground in the enemy’s rear, striking them with
consternation by this unexpected move, but far more
encouraging his friends, who now saw what they
were expecting. The Lacedaemonians were now
assailed on both sides, and—to compare a small affair
with a great one—were in the same evil case as
they had been at Thermopylae ; for there they had
perished when the Persians got in their rear by the
path,! and here they were caught in the same way.
Since, then, they were now assailed on both sides
they no longer held out, but, fighting few against
many and withal weak in body from lack of food,
they began to give way. And the Athenians by this
time were in possession of the approaches.

XXXVII. But Cleon and Demosthenes, realizing
that if the enemy should give back ever so little
more they would be destroyed by the Athenian army,
put a stop to the battle and held back their own
men, wishing to deliver them alive to the Athenians

1 ef. Hdt. vii. 213,
277

THUCYDIDES

πῶς τοῦ κηρύγματος ἀκούσαντες ἐπικλασθεῖεν
τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ ἡσσηθεῖεν τοῦ παρόντος δεινοῦ,
ἐκήρυξάν τε, εἰ βούλονται, τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι

\ a > \ 9 ’ [4 a Φ
καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ᾿Αθηναίοις ὥστε βουλεῦσαι ὃ τε
ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ.

ΧΧΧΥ͂ΠΙ. Οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες παρεῖσαν τὰς
ἀσπίδας οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀνέσεισαν
δηλοῦντες προσίεσθαι τὰ κεκηρυγμένα. μετὰ δὲ
ταῦτα γενομένης τῆς ἀνοκωχῆς ξυνῆλθον ἐς λόγους
ὅ τε Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ἐκείνων Στύφων
ὁ Φάρακος, τῶν πρότερον ἀρχόντων τοῦ μὲν

, ¢ 3 ¢ A 4 4 A
πρώτου τεθνηκότος, ᾿Επιτάδου, τοῦ δὲ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν
‘Jarmaypétou ἐφῃρημένου ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς ἔτι ζῶντος

a \
κειμένου ὡς τεθνεῶτος, αὐτὸς τρίτος ἐφῃρημένος
ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον, εἴ τι ἐκεῖνοι πάσχοιεν. ἔλεξε
\ e U4 \ e 3 3 a @ ,
δὲ ὁ Στύφων καὶ of μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὅτι βούλονται
’ Ν \ 3 a ? ’
διακηρυκεύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Λακε-
“Ψ A A A 3
δαιμονίους ὅ τι χρὴ σφᾶς ποιεῖν. καὶ ἐκείνων

Ἁ γὼ > , > A \ A 3 ’
μὲν οὐδένα ἀφιέντων, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
καλούντων ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου κήρυκας καὶ γενομένων
ἐπερωτήσεων δὶς ἢ τρίς, ὁ τελευταῖος διαπλεύσας
αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἠἡπείρον Λακεδαιμονίων
> » ἡ ef ἐ ὃ , ’
ἀνὴρ ἀπήγγειλεν ὅτι “ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσεν
4 A 5 A \ e tas 3 Le ’ \
ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι μηδὲν

3 Ν “ 39 e 9 e ‘
αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντας." ot δὲ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς Bov-
λευσάμενοι τὰ ὅπλα παρέδοσαν καὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς.

1 After τῇ γνώμῃ the MSS. have τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι, which
most recent editors delete, after Kriiger.

278

BOOK IV. xxxvir. 1-xxxvil. 3

and in hopes that possibly, when they heard the
herald’s proclamation, they would be broken in spirit
and submit to the present danger. Accordingly, they
caused the herald to proclaim that they might, if
they wished, surrender themselves and their arms
to the Athenians, these to decide their fate as should
seem good to them.

XXXVIII. When the Lacedaemonians heard this,
most of them lowered their shields and waved their
hands, indicating that they accepted the terms
proposed. An armistice was then arranged and a
conference was held, Cleon and Demosthenes repre-
senting the Athenians and Styphon son of Pharax
the Lacedaemonians. Of the earlier Lacedaemonian
commanders the first, Epitadas, had been slain and
Hippagretas, who had been chosen as next in suc-
cession, now lay among the fallen and was accounted
dead, though he was still alive; and Styphon was
third in succession, having been originally chosen,
as the law prescribed, to be in command in case
anything should happen to the other two. He
then, and those with him, said that they wished to
send a herald over to the Lacedaemonians on the
mainland to ask what they must do. The Athenians,
however, would not let any of them go, but them-
selves summoned heralds from the mainland; then,
after interrogatories had been exchanged two or
three times, the last man who came over to them
from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland brought
this message: “The Lacedaemonians bid you decide
your case for yourselves, but do nothing dishonour-
able.’”’” So they took counsel with one another and
then surrendered themselves and their arms. During

279

THUCYDIDES

4 καὶ ταύτην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν
νύκτα ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον αὐτοὺς οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι" τῇ δ᾽
ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν ᾿Αθηναῖοι τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐν
τῇ νήσῳ τἄλλα διεσκευάξοντο ὡς ἐς πλοῦν καὶ
τοὺς ἄνδρας τοῖς τριηράρχοις διέδοσαν ἐς φυλα-
κήν, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κήρυκα πέμψαντες τοὺς

δ νεκροὺς διεκομίσαντο. ἀπέθανον δ᾽ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ
καὶ ζῶντες ἐλήφθησαν τοσοίδε" εἴκοσι μὲν ὁπλῖται
διέβησαν καὶ τετρακόσιοι οἱ πάντες" τούτων
ζῶντες ἐκομίσθησαν ὀκτὼ ἀποδέοντες τριακύσιοι,
οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἀπέθανον. καὶ Σπαρτιᾶται τούτων
ἦσαν τῶν ζώντων περὶ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν. *AOn-
ναίων δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν" ἡ γὰρ μάχη οὐ
σταδία ἣν.

XXXIX. Χρόνος δὲ ὁ ξύμπας ἐγένετο ὅσον οἱ
ἄνδρες ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἐπολιορκήθησαν, ἀπὸ τῆς
ναυμαχίας μέχρι τῆς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ μάχης, ἑβδομή-

2 κοντα ἡμέραι καὶ δύο. τούτων περὶ εἴκοσι
ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς οἱ πρέσβεις περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν ἀπῆ-
σαν, ἐσιτοδοτοῦντο, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τοῖς ἐσπλέουσι
λάθρᾳ διετρέφοντο" καὶ ἦν σῖτός τις ἐν τῇ νήσῳ

ΜᾺ “ἃ ’ 3 ’ e v7
καὶ ἄλλα βρώματα ἐγκατελήφθη: ὁ yap ἄρχων
᾿Επιτάδας ἐνδεεστέρως ἑκάστῳ παρεῖχεν ἢ πρὸς
τὴν ἐξουσίαν. |

3 Οἱ μὲν δὴ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ of Πελοποννήσιοι
ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἑκάτεροι
ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καίπερ μανιώδης
οὖσα ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη" ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσι
ἡμερῶν ἤγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη.
XL. παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν
πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς “Ελλησιν ἐγένετο" τοὺς γὰρ

280

BOOK IV. xxxvim. 4—XL. 1

that day and the following night the Athenians kept
them under guard; but on the next day, after setting
up a trophy on the island, they made all their
preparations to sail, distributing the prisoners among
the trierarchs for safe-keeping ; and the Lacedae-
monians sent a herald and brought their dead to the
mainland. The number of those who had been
killed or taken alive on the island was as follows:
four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over
in all; of these two hundred and ninety two were
brought to Athens alive; all the rest had been slain.
Of those who survived one hundred and twenty
were Spartans.! Of the Athenians, however, not
many perished ; for it was not a pitched battle.

XXXI1X. The time during which the men on the
island were under blockade, from the sea fight up to
᾿ the battle on the island, amounted all told to seventy-
two days. For about twenty of these days, the
period during which the envoys were absent nego-
tiating the truce, they were regularly provisioned,
but the rest of the time they lived on what was
smuggled in. And indeed some grain was found
on the island at the time of the capture, as well as
other articles of food; for the commander Epitadas
was accustomed to give each man a scantier ration
than his supplies would have allowed.

The Athenians and Peloponnesians now withdrew
from Pylos and returned home with their respective
forces, and Cleon’s promise, mad as it was, had been
fulfilled ; for within twenty days he brought the men
as he had undertaken todo. XL. Of all the events
of this war this came as the greatest surprise to the
Hellenic world ; for men could not conceive that the

1 se. citizens of Sparta, the rest being from the neigh-

bouring towns of the Perioeci ; ef. ch. viii. 1. 281

THUCYDIDES

F 4 Μ A Μ 9 3 : 3 “a
Λακεδαιμονίους οὔτε λιμῷ οὔτ᾽ ἀνάγκῃ οὐδεμεᾷ
ἠξίουν τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι, ἀλλὰ ἔχοντας καὶ
μαχομένους ἕως ἐδύναντο ἀποθνήσκειν, ἀπι-
στοῦντες μὴ εἶναι τοὺς παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεῶ-
e
σιν ὁμοίους. καί τινος ἐρομένου ποτὲ ὕστερον
A 3 ’ 4 ὃ % 2 θ ὃ ’ 9 ν a
τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ξυμμάχων δι᾽ ἀχθηδόνα 3 ἕνα τῶν
ἐκ τῆς νήσου αἰχμαλώτων εἰ οἱ τεθνεῶτες αὐτῶν
A 3 ’ 5 ’ 2 A a ”
καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιον
εἶναι τὸν ἄτρακτον, λέγων τὸν οἰστόν, εἰ τοὺς
ἀγαθοὺς διεγίγνωσκε, δήλωσιν ποιούμενος ὅτι ὁ
ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς τε λίθοις καὶ τοξεύμασι διεφ-
θείρετο.
XLI. Κομισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
A ,
ἐβούλευσαν δεσμοῖς μὲν αὐτοὺς φυλάσσειν μέχρι
φ “A a ? e , .
οὗ τι ξυμβῶσιν, ἣν & of Πελοποννήσιοι πρὸ
A ,
τούτου ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐσβάλλωσιν, ἐξαγαγόντες
4 A a \ ’ Ἁ ’
ἀποκτεῖναι. τῆς δὲ Πύλου φυλακὴν κατεστή-
σαντο, καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου Μεσσήνιοι ὡς
ἐς πατρίδα ταύτην (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ Πύλος τῆς Μεσση-
νίδος ποτὲ οὔσης γῆς) πέμψαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν
τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐλήζοντό τε τὴν Λακωνικὴν
καὶ πλεῖστα ἔβλαπτον ὁμόφωνοι ὄντες. οἱ δὲ
/ > “A bd > A ‘ 4
Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ
λῃστείας καὶ τοῦ τοιούτον πολέμου, τῶν τε
Εἱλώτων αὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ
ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τε νεωτερισθῇ τῶν κατὰ
’
τὴν χώραν, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἔφερον, ἀλλά, καίπερ οὐ
λό ΝΜ) ὃ λ 4 a) "AO 4 3
βουλόμενοι ἔνδηλοι εἶναι τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις, ἐπρεσ-

1 So Hude, with M; most other MSS. ἀπιστοῦντές τας
3 δι ἀχθηδόνα, deleted. by Hude, after Rutherford.

282

BOOK ΙΝ. xu. 1-xu1. 3

Lacedaemonians would ever be induced by hunger
or any other compulsion to give up their arms, but
thought that they would keep them till they died,
fighting as long as they were able; and they could
not believe that those who had surrendered were as
brave as those who had fallen. And when one of the
Athenian allies sometime afterwards sneeringly asked
one of the captives taken on the island, whether the
Lacedaemonians who had been slain were brave men
and true,! the answer was, that the shaft, meaning
the arrow, would be worth a great deal if it could
distinguish the brave, intimating that it was a mere
matter of chance who was hit and killed by stones
and bow-shots.

XLI. When the captives were brought to Athens,
the Athenians determined to keep them in prison
until some agreement should be reached, but if
before that the Peloponnesians should invade their
territory, to bring them out and put them to death.
They also placed a garrison in Pylos, and the Messen-
ians at Naupactus, regarding this territory as their
fatherland--for Pylos belongs to the country that
was once Messenia—sent thither such of their own
number as were best fitted for the task and proceeded
to ravage the Laconian territory, and they did a
great deal of damage, since they were men of the
same speech as the inhabitants. As for the Lace-
daemonians, they had never before experienced pre-
datory warfare of this kind, and therefore, when the
Helots began to desert and there was reason to fear
that the revolutionary movement might gain still
further headway in their territory, they were uneasy,
and, in spite of their desire not to betray their alarm

1 Implying that the survivors were not.

283

THUCYDIDES

tA 4 3 ‘ \ 93 a 4 »
βεύοντο παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπειρῶντο τήν τε Πύλον
\ \ Ν , e \ ,

4 καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομίζεσθαι. οἱ δὲ μειξόνων τε
ὠρέγοντο καὶ πολλάκις φοιτώντων αὐτοὺς ἀπράκ-
Tous ἀπέπεμπον. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Πύλον
γενόμενα.

XLIT. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταῦτα εὐθὺς
3 n 9 A ’ > , \
Αθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Κορινθίαν ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν
ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ δισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν καὶ
ἐν ἱππαγωγοῖς ναυσὶ διακοσίοις ἱππεῦσιν" ἠκο-
λούθουν δὲ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλήσιοι καὶ
Ν \ 4 9 , \ ld
Ανδριοε καὶ Καρύστιοι, ἐστρατήγει δὲ Νικίας
«ς ’ , 3 ’ , \ @ Did

2 ὁ Νικηράτου τρίτος αὐτός. πλέοντες δὲ ἅμα ἕῳ
ἔσχον μεταξὺ Χερσονήσου τε καὶ ‘Peitov ἐς τὸν
αἰγιαλὸν τοῦ χωρίου ὑπὲρ οὗ ὁ Σολύγειος λόφος
’ ’ Le) A \ lA e 4 a 9
ἐστίν, ép ὃν Δωριῆς τὸ πάλαι ἱδρυθέντες τοῖς ἐν
τῇ πόλει Κορινθίοις ἐπολέμουν οὗσιν Αἰολεῦσιν'
καὶ κώμη νῦν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ Σολύγεια καλουμένη
ἐστίν. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ τούτου ἔνθα αἱ νῆες
κατέσχον ἡ μὲν κώμη αὕτη δώδεκα σταδίους
ἀπέχει, ἡ δὲ Κορινθίων πόλις ἑξήκοντα, ὁ δὲ

8 ἰσθμὸς εἴκοσι. Κορίνθιοι δὲ προπυθόμενοι ἐξ
Ν Φ e \ Ψ an ᾽ , b]
Apyous ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ ἥξει τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐκ

’ 3 ’ὔ 4 3 \ ’ ‘ le)
πλείονος ἐβοήθησαν ἐς ἰσθμὸν πάντες πλὴν TOV
Μ 3 a \ 3 9 / \ 3 ,
ἔξω ἰσθμοῦ" καὶ ἐν ᾿Αμπρακίᾳ καὶ ἐν Λευκάδι
9 A > A - 4 ‘4 e >
ἀπῆσαν αὐτῶν πεντακόσιοι φρουροί: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι
πανδημεὶ ἐπετήρουν τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους of κατα-

1 At the time when the Dorians, under the leadership of
the Heracleidue, got possession of the Peloponnesus (¢/. 1.
xii. 3). See Busolt, Gr. Gesch. 13, 208.

284

BOOK IV. xx. 3-xu1. 3

to the Athenians, kept sending envoys to them in the
endeavour to recover Pylos and the prisoners. But
the Athenians constantly made greater demands and
the envoys, although they came again and again, were
always sent home unsuccessful. Such were the
events at Pylos.

XLII. During the same summer and directly after
these events the Athenians made an expedition into
Corinthian territory with eighty ships and two
thousand Athenian hoplites, together with two hun-
dred cavalry on board horse-transports; allied forces
also went with them, namely Milesian, Andrian, and
Carystian troops, the whole being under the command
of Nicias son of Niceratus and two others. These
sailed and at day-break landed midway between the
peninsula Chersonesus and the stream Rheitus, at
a point on the beach over which rises the Solygeian
hill—the hill where the Dorians in olden times!
established themselves when they made war upon the
Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians; and there
is still on the hill a village called Solygeia. From
this point on the beach where the ships put in to shore
this village is twelve stadia distant, the city of Corinth
sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. But the Corinthians,
having previous information from Argos that the
Athenian army would come, had long before occu-
pied the Isthmus with all their forces, except those
who dwelt north of the Isthmus and five hun-
dred Corinthians who were away doing garrison duty
in Ambracia? and Leucas; all the rest to a man
were now there, watching to see where the Athenians

3 Three hundred of these had been sent the previous
winter to Ambracia, which was a Corinthian colony ; cf. 111.
cxiv. 4.

285

THUCYDIDES

4 σχήσουσιν. ὡς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔλαθον νυκτὸς κατα-
πλεύσαντες καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῖς ἤρθη, καταλι-
πόντες τοὺς ἡμίσεις αὑτῶν ἐν Κεγχρειᾷ, ἣν ἄρα
οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμνῶνα ἴωσιν, ἐβονθουν
κατὰ τάχος.

XLITI. Καὶ Βάττος μὲν ὁ Erepos τῶν στρατη-
γῶν (δύο γὰρ ἦσαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ οἱ παρόντες)
λαβὼν λόχον ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κώμην
φυλάξων ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν, Λυκόφρων δὲ τοῖς

2 ἄλλοις ξυνέβαλεν. καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τῷ δεξιῷ
κέρᾳ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων εὐθὺς ἀποβεβηκότι πρὸ τῆς
Χερσονήσου οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπέκειντο, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ
τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι. καὶ ἣν ἡ μάχη καρτερὰ

8 καὶ ἐν χερσὶ πᾶσα. καὶ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν
᾿Αθηναίων καὶ Καρυστίων (οὗτοι γὰρ παρα-
τεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἔσχατοι) ἐδέξαντό τε τοὺς
Κορινθίους καὶ ἐώσαντο μόλις" οἱ δὲ ὑποχωρή-
σαντες πρὸς αἱμασιάν (ἣν γὰρ τὸ χωρίον πρόσ-
αντες πᾶν) βάλλοντες τοῖς λίθοις καθύπερθεν
ὄντες καὶ παιανίσαντες ἐπῆσαν αὖθις, δεξαμένων
δὲ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐν χερσὶν ἦν πάλιν ἡ μάχη.

4 λόχος δέ τις τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπιβοηθήσας τῷ
εὐωνύμῳ κέρᾳ ἑαυτῶν ἔτρεψε τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων τὸ
δεξιὸν κέρας καὶ ἐπεδίωξεν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν'
πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀνέστρεψαν οἵ τε ᾿Αθη-
ναῖοι καὶ οἱ Καρύστιοι. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον
ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐμάχετο ξυνεχῶς, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ
δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ὁ Λυκόφρων

1 The Corinthian eastern haven, seventy stadia from the

city.
* The chief place on this coast-line between the Isthmus

286

BOOK IV. xuu. 3-xum1. 4

would land. But when the Athenians eluded them
by making their landing by night and the Corin-
thians were notified by the raising of fire-signals, these
left half of their troops at Cenchraeae,! in case the
Athenians should after all go against Crommyon,?
and in haste rushed to the defence.

XLII. Thereupon Battus,one of the two Corinthian
generals present at the battle, took a company and
went to the village of Solygeia, which was unwalled,
to guard it, while Lycophron attacked with the
remainder of their troops. Now at first the Corinth-
ians assailed the right wing of the Athenians, which
had just disembarked in front of Chersonesus, and
afterwards engaged the rest of the army also. The
battle was stubbornly contested throughout and
fought at close quarters. The Athenian right
wing, at whose extremity were stationed the
Carystians, received the charge of the Corinthians
and drove them back, though with difficulty; but
the latter retreated to a stone fence and, since
the ground was everywhere a steep slope, pelted
the Athenians with stones, being on higher ground,
and then, raising the paean, charged a second
time. The Athenians received the charge and the
battle was again waged at close quarters. Then a
company of the Corinthians, reinforcing their own
left wing, routed the right wing of the Athenians
and pursued it to the sea; but again upon reaching
the ships the Athenians and Carystians rallied. The
other divisions of the two armies were continuously
engaged, especially the right wing of the Corinthians,
where Lycophron was in command against the
and Megara, some 120 stadia from Corinth, known as the
ae the wild boar killed by Theseus (Paus. 1. xxvii. 9;
i. i. δ).

287

THUCYDIDES

ὧν κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἠμύνετο"
ΝΜ 3 Ἁ 9 \ ’ a
ἤλπιζον yap αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κώμην
πειράσειν.

XLIV. Χρόνον μὲν οὖν πολὺν ἀντεῖχον οὐκ ἐνδι-
δόντες ἀλλήλοις" ἔπειτα (ἦσαν γὰρ τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις
οἱ ἱππῆς ὠφέλιμοι ξυμμαχόμενοι, τῶν ἑτέρων οὐκ
ἐχόντων ἵππους) ἐτράποντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ
e a Ἁ ‘ ’ ι»ν Ψ
ὑπεχώρησαν πρὸς τὸν λόφον καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα

2 καὶ οὐκέτι κατέβαινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζον. ἐν δὲ τῇ
τροπῇ ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας οἱ πλεῖστοί τε
αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον καὶ Λυκόφρων ὁ στρατηγός. ἡ
δὲ ἄλλη στρατιὰ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ οὐ κατὰ δίωξιν
πολλὴν οὐδὲ ταχείας φυγῆς γενομένης, ἐπεὶ
ἐβιάσθη, ἐπαναχωρήσασα πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα
e 4 e \ 9? A e > /f 3 κι a
ἱδρύθη. οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ws οὐκέτι αὐτοῖς ἐπῆσαν

8 ἐς μάχην, τούς τε νεκροὺς ἐσκύλευον καὶ τοὺς
ἑαυτῶν ἀνῃροῦντο, τροπαῖόν τε εὐθέως ἔστησαν.

a 4 Ὁ ? a“ 4, a 9 A “~

4 τοῖς δ᾽ ἡμίσεσι τῶν Κορινθίων, of ἐν τῇ Κεγχρειᾷ
. 9 ’ Ν 3 Ν A Ul
ἐκάθηντο φύλακες, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμνῶνα πλεύ-
σωσι, τούτοις οὐ κατάδηλος ἡ μάχη ἣν ὑπὸ τοῦ
ὄρους τοῦ ᾿᾽Ονείον: κονιορτὸν δὲ ὡς εἶδον καὶ ὡς
ἔγνωσαν, ἐβοήθουν εὐθύς. ἐβοήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ
τῆς πόλεως πρεσβύτεροι τῶν Κορινθίων αἰσθό-

ὅ μενοι τὸ γεγενημένον. ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
ξύμπαντας αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας καὶ νομίσαντες τῶν
ἐγγὺς ἀστυγειτόνων Πελοποννησίων βοήθειαν
ἐπιέναι, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς,
ἔχοντες τὰ σκυλεύματα καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς
πλὴν δυοῖν, ods ἐγκατέλιπον οὐ δυνάμενοι εὑρεῖν.

288

BOOK IV. xxi. 4—-x1iv. 5

Athenian left and kept it in check; for they ex-
pected the Athenians to make an attempt against
the village of Solygeia.

XLIV. For a long time they held out, neither side
yielding to the other. Then as the Athenians had
an advantage in the support of their cavalry, whereas
the other side had no horses, the Corinthians turned
and retired to the hill, where they halted, and did
not come down again but remained quiet. In this
repulse it was on their right wing that most of the
Corinthians that were lost were killed, among them
Lycophron the genera]. But the rest of the Corinthian
army retired in this manner—there was no long
pursuit nor hasty flight, but when it was forced
back, it withdrew to-the higher ground and there
established itself. As for the Athenians, when the
enemy no longer came against them and offered
battle, they stripped the corpses, took up their own
dead, and straightway set up a trophy. Meanwhile
the other half of the Corinthian forces, which was
stationed at Cenchraeae as a garrison to prevent the
Athenians from making a descent upon Crommyon,
were unable to see the battle because Mt. Oneium
intervened ; but when they saw the cloud of dust and
realized what was going on, they rushed thither at
once, as did also the older men in the city of Corinth
when they perceived what had happened. But the
Athenians, seeing the whole throng advancing and
thinking it to be a detachment of the neighbouring
Peloponnesians coming to assist the Corinthians, with-
drew in haste to their ships, having their spoils and
the bodies of their own dead, except two, which they
left behind because they were not able to find them.

289
VOL. 11 υ

vs)

THUCYDIDES

καὶ ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπεραιώθησαν és τὰς
ἐπικειμένας νήσους, ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπικηρυκευσά-
μενοι τοὺς νεκροὺς ods ἐγκατέλιπον ὑποσπόνδους
ἀνείλοντο. ἀπέθανον δὲ Κορινθίων μὲν ἐν τῇ
μάχη δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι, ᾿Αθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγῳ
ἐλάσσους πεντήκοντα.

XLV. Αραντες δὲ ἐκ τῶν νήσων οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
ἔπλευσαν αὐθημερὸν ἐς Κρομμυῶνα τῆς Κοριν-
θίας: ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν
σταδίους. καὶ καθοῤμισάμενοι τήν τε γῆν ἐδήωσαν
καὶ τὴν νύκτα ηὐλίσαντο. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ παρα-
πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν ᾿Εοπιδαυρίαν πρῶτον καὶ ἀπό-
βασίν τινα ποιησάμενοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Μέθανα τὴν
μεταξὺ ᾿Επιδαύρου καὶ Τροζῆνος, καὶ ἀπολαβόν-
τες τὸν τῆς χερσονήσου ἰσθμὸν ἐτείχισαν ἐν ἡ ἡ
Μέθανα ἐστί. καὶ φρούριον καταστησάμενοι
ἐλήστευον τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τήν τε Τροζηνίαν
γῆν καὶ ᾿Αλιάδα καὶ ᾿Επιδαυρίαν. ταῖς δὲ ναυσίν,
ἐπειδὴ ἐξετείχισαν τὸ χωρίον, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπ᾽

δ 4
οἴκου.

XLVI. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, καθ᾽ by?
ταῦτα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ Evpupédwov καὶ Σοφοκλῆς,
ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἀπῆραν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν
ναυσὶν ᾿Αθηναίων, ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Κέρκυραν ἐστρά-
τευσαν μετὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ
ὄρει τῆς ᾿Ιστώνης Κερκυραίων καθιδρυμένους, οἱ
τότε μετὰ τὴν στάσιν διαβάντες ἐκράτουν τε τῆς
γῆς καὶ πολλὰ ἔβλαπτον. προσβαλόντες δὲ τὸ

1 MSS. give Μεθώνη, but Strabo states that the true name is
Mééava. Lower down the MSS. read ἐν ᾧ ἡ Μεθώνη ἐστί, which
many editors bracket. If it is retained, ἐν 7 must be read for
ἐν ὦ, a8 Μέθανα lay, not on the Isthmus, but on the west coast
of the peninsula. δ καθ᾽ ὃν, with CGM, omitted by ABEF.

290

BOOK IV. xtiv. 6—xivi. 2

So they embarked and crossed over to the adjacent
islands, and sending thence a herald recovered under
truce the bodies which they had left behind. There
were slain in this battle two hundred and twelve
of the Corinthians, and of the Athenians somewhat
fewer than fifty.

XLV. Setting out from the islands, the Athenians
sailed the same day to Crommyon in Corinthian
territory, which is distant a hundred and twenty
stadia from the city, and coming to anchor ravaged
the land and bivouacked during the night. The next
day sailing along the coast they came first to the
territory of Epidaurus, where they made a landing,
and then to Methana, between Epidaurus and
Troezen, where they walled off the neck of the
peninsula on which Methana lies. Here they left
a garrison, which afterward occupied itself with
marauding excursions into the territory of Troezen,
Haliae, and Epidaurus. But the fleet sailed back
to Athens as soon as the fortifications at Methana
had been completed.

XLVI. It was at this time, while these events
were occurring, that Eurymedon and Sophocles,!
setting sail from Pylos for Sicily with an Athenian
fleet, arrived at Corcyra. There they took part with
the men from the city? in an expedition against
the Corcyraeans who had established themselves on
Mt. Istone, and who at this time, after crossing over
thither subsequently to the revolution, were domin-
ating the country and doing a great deal of damage.
The stronghold was taken by assault, but the men in

1 4) ch. viii. 3; xxix. 1.
3 The democrats who had held the city since 427 B.c. (¢f.
11. lxxxv.).
201
vu 2

THUCYDIDES

μὲν τείχισμὰ εἷλον, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καταπεφευγότες
ἁθρόοι πρὸς μετέωρόν τι ξυνέβησαν ὥστε τοὺς
μὲν ἐπικούρους παραδοῦναι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν τὰ
ὅπλα παραδόντων τὸν ᾿Αθηναίων δῆμον διαγνῶναι.
καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν νῆσον οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν Πτυ-
χίαν ἐς φυλακὴν διεκόμισαν ὑποσπόνδους, μέχρι
οὗ ᾿Αθήναζε πεμφθῶσιν, ὥστ᾽ ἐάν τις ἁλῷ ἀποδι-
δράσκων, ἅπασι λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς. οἱ δὲ τοῦ
δήμου προστάται τῶν Κερκυραίων, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ
᾿Αθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐλθόντας οὐκ ἀποκτείνωσι, μη-
χανῶνται τοιόνδε Ti τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πείθουσί
τινας ὀλίγους, ὑποπέμψαντες φίλους καὶ διδά-
ἕαντες ὡς κατ᾽ εὔνοιαν δὴ λέγειν ὅτε κράτιστον
αὐτοῖς εἴη ὡς τάχιστα ἀποδρᾶναι, πλοῖον δέ τι
αὐτοὶ ἑτοιμάσειν' μέλλειν yap δὴ τοὺς στρατη-
γοὺς τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων παραδώσειν αὐτοὺς τῷ δήμῳ
τῶν Κερκυραίων. XLVII. ὡς δὲ ἐπείσθησαν καὶ
μηχανησαμένων τὸ πλοῖον ἐκπλέοντες ἐλήφθησαν,
ἐλέλυντό τε αἱ σπονδαὶ καὶ τοῖς Κερκυραίοις
παρεδίδοντο οἱ πάντες. ξυνελάβοντο δὲ τοῦ τοι-
ovTov οὐχ ἥκιστα, ὥστε ἀκριβῆ τὴν πρόφασιν
γενέσθαι καὶ τοὺς τεχνησαμένους ἀδεέστερον
ἐγχειρῆσαι, οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων κατά-
δηλοι ὄντες τοὺς ἄνδρας μὴ ἂν βούλεσθαι ὑπ᾽
ἄλλων κομισθέντας, διότε αὐτοὶ ἐς Σικελίαν
ἔπλεον, τὴν τιμὴν τοῖς ἄγουσι προσποιῆσαι.
παραλαβόντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐς οἴκημα

292

BOOK IY. xtvi. 2--Χ 11. 3

it fled in a body to some high ground and there
capitulated, on condition that they should surrender
their mercenary troops and give up their arms,
leaving it to the Athenian people to decide upon:
their own fate. The generals accordingly conveyed:
the men under truce to the island of Ptychia! to be
kept under custody there until they should be sent
to Athens, and the understanding was that if anyone
should be caught trying to run away the truce should
be regarded as broken for them all. But the leaders
of the popular party at Corcyra were afraid that the
Athenians would not put them to death on their
arrival at Athens, and therefore resorted to the
following stratagem. They first tried to persuade a
few of the men on the island to run away, by secretly
sending thither friends who were instructed to say,
with a show of good will, that the best course for
them was to do this with no loss of time, and
promising to have a boat ready; for the Athenian
generals, they explained, were intending to deliver
them up to the Corcyraean populace. XLVII. And
when the men had been persuaded, and were caught
sailing away in the boat which the others had pro-
vided, the truce was broken and the whole party
was delivered up to the Corcyraeans. But what
chiefly eontributed to such a result, so that the
pretext seemed quite plausible and that those who
devised the scheme felt little fear about putting it
into effect, was the fact that the Athenian generals
showed that they would not be willing, as they
were bound for Sicily themselves, to have the men
conveyed to Athens by others, who would thus
get the credit for conducting them. Now the
Corcyraeans took over the prisoners and shut them

1 of. τι. lxxv. 5; now called Vido, 293

THUCYDIDES

μέγα κατεῖρξαν, καὶ ὕστερον ἐξάγοντες κατὰ
εἴκοσι ἄνδρας διῆγον διὰ δυοῖν στοίχοιν ὁπλιτῶν
ἑκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων, δεδεμένους τε πρὸς
ἀλλήλους καὶ παιομένους καὶ κεντουμένους ὑπὸ
τῶν παρατεταγμένων, εἴ πού τίς τινα ἴδοι ἐχθρὸν
ἑαυτοῦ: μαστιγοφόροι τε παριόντες ἐπετάχυνον
τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς σχολαίτερον προϊόντας.

XLVIII. Καὶ ἐς μὲν ἄνδρας ἑξήκοντα ἔλαθον
τοὺς ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐξαγαγόντες
καὶ διαφθείραντες (ᾧῴοντο γὰρ αὐτοὺς μεταστή-
σοντάς ποι ἄλλοσ᾽ ἐξάγειν) ὡς δὲ ἤσθοντο καί
τις αὐτοῖς ἐδήλωσε, τούς τε ᾿Αθηναίους ἐπεκα-
λοῦντο καὶ ἐκέλευον σφᾶς, εἰ βούλονται, αὐτοὺς
διαφθείρειν, ἔκ τε τοῦ οἰκήματος οὐκέτι ἤθελον
ἐξιέναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐσιέναι ἔφασαν κατὰ δύναμιν περιό-

2 ψεσθαι οὐδένα. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι κατὰ μὲν τὰς
θύρας οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ διενοοῦντο βιάξεσθαι, ἀναβάντες
δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τέγος τοῦ οἰκήματος καὶ διελόντες τὴν
ὀροφὴν ἔβαλλον τῷ κεράμῳ καὶ ἐτόξευον κάτω.

8 οἱ δὲ ἐφυλάσσοντό τε ὡς ἐδύναντο καὶ ἅμα οἱ
πολλοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρον, οἰστούς τε ods
ἀφίεσαν ἐκεῖνοι ἐς τὰς σφαγὰς καθιέντες καὶ ἐκ
κλινῶν τινων, al ἔτυχον αὐτοῖς ἐνοῦσαι, τοῖς
σπάρτοις καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἱματίων παραιρήματα ποιοῦν-
τες ἀπαγχόμενοι. παντί te! τρόπῳ τὸ πολὺ τῆς
νυκτός (ἐπεγένετο γὰρ νὺξ τῷ παθήματι) ἀνα-
λοῦντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν

1 τε added by Poppo,
294

BOOK IV. xvi, 3-xivim. 3

up in a large building ; afterwards they led them
out in groups of twenty and marched them down
between two lines of hoplites stationed on either
side, the prisoners being bound to one another
and receiving blows and stabs from the men who
stood in the lines, if any of these perchance saw
among them a personal enemy; and men with
scourges walked by their sides to quicken the steps
of such as proceeded too slowly on the way.

XLVIII. In this manner about sixty men were led
out and killed without the knowledge of the men .
who remained in the house, who supposed that their
companions were being led out in order to be trans-
ferred to some other place. But when they perceived
what was going on, or were told by somebody, they
appealed to the Athenians and urged then, if they
wished to kill them, to do so with their own hands;
and they refused thenceforth to leave the house,
and declared that they would not allow anyone to
enter if they could prevent it. Nor had the Cor-
cyraeans themselves any intention of trying to force
their way in by the doors, but climbing on to the
top of the building and breaking through the roof
they hurled tiles and shot arrows upon them from
above. The men inside tried to defend themselves
as best as they could, and at the same time most
of them set to work to destroy themselves by
thrusting into their throats the arrows which the
enemy had shot or by strangling themselves with
the cords from some beds that happened to be in the
place or with strips made from their own garments.
Thus for the greater part of the night—for night fell
upon their misery—dispatching themselves in every
fashion and struck by the missiles of the men on

295

THUCYDIDES

4 ἄνω διεφθάρησαν. καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Kepxupaior,
ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, φορμηδὸν ἐπὶ ἁμάξας
ἐπιβαλόντες ἀπήγαγον ὄξω τῆς πόλεως. τὰς
δὲ γυναῖκας, ὅσαι ἐν τῷ τειχίσματι ἑάλωσαν,

ὅ ἠνδραποδίσαντο. τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ
ὄρους Κερκυραῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου διεφθάρησαν, καὶ
ἡ στάσις πολλὴ γενομένη ἐτελεύτησεν ἐς τοῦτο,
ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε' οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν

6 ὑπόλοιπον τῶν ἑτέρων ὅ τι καὶ ἀξιόλογον. οἱ δὲ
᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ἵναπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρ-
μηντο, ἀποπλεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχων
ἐπολέμουν.

XLIX. Καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ
᾿Ακαρνᾶνες ἅμα τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους στρατευ-
σάμενοι ᾿Ανακτόριον Κορινθίων πόλιν, ἣ κεῖται
ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ ᾿Αμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, ἔλαβον
προδοσίᾳ καὶ ἐκπέμψαντες Κορινθίους ὃ αὐτοὶ
Ακαρνᾶνες οἰκήτορας 5 ἀπὸ πάντων ἔσχον τὸ
χωρίον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

L. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ᾿Αριστείδης ὁ
᾿Αρχίππου, εἷς τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
στρατηγός, al ἐξεπέμφθησαν πρὸς τοὺς ξυμ-

, > , Υ͂
μάχους, ᾿Αρταφέρνη, ἄνδρα Πέρσην, παρὰ βασι-
λέως πορευόμενον ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ξυλλαμβάνει

2 ἐν ᾿Ηιόνι τῇ ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι. καὶ αὐτοῦ κομισθέντος
οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τὰς μὲν ἐπιστολὰς μεταγραψάμενοι
ἐκ τῶν ᾿Ασσυρίων γραμμάτων ἀνέγνωσαν, ἐν αἷς
πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον ἦν πρὸς
Λακεδαιμονίους οὐ γιγνώσκειν 6 τι βούλονται"
πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ

1 Hude deletes Κορινθίους, after Dobree.
3 Hude reads οἰκήτορες, with CE.

296

BOOK IV. xtvut. 3-1. 2

the roof, they perished. When day came the Corcy-
raeans loaded the bodies on wagons, laying them
lengthwise and crosswise, and hauled them out of the
city ; but the women who had been captured in the
fort were sold into captivity. In such fashion the
Corcyraeans from the mountain were destroyed by
the popular party, and the revolution, which had
lasted long, ended thus, so far at least as this war
was concerned; for there were no longer enough
of the oligarchs left to be of any account. But the
Athenians sailed for Sicily, whither they had set out
in the first place, and proceeded to carry on the war
in conjunction with their allies in the island.

XLIX. At the end of the same summer the
Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made
a campaign, and took by the treachery of its in-
habitants Anactorium, a city belonging to the Cor-
inthians which is situated at the mouth of the
Ambracian Gulf; and the Acarnanians, expelling the
Corinthians, occupied the place with colonists drawn
from all their tribes. And the summer ended.

L. During the following winter Aristides! son of
Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian
ships which had been sent to the allies to collect the
revenues, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Arta-
phernes, a Persian, who was on his way from the
King to Lacedaemon. He was conveyed to Athens,
and the Athenians caused his letters to be transcribed
from the Assyrian characters and read them. Man
other matters were touched upon therein, but the most
important, with reference to the Lacedaemonians,
was that the King did not know what they wanted ;
for though many envoys had come to him, no two

1 Mentioned again ch. Ixxv. 1 as general in these waters.

297

THUCYDIDES

λέγειν" εἰ οὖν TL βούλονται σαφὲς λέγειν, πέμψαι
\ fe) lA 3 e 3 \ \ 9
3 μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἄνδρας ὡς αὐτόν. τὸν δὲ Apta-
’ Ὁ 49 ΄΄Ὺὲ 3 ᾽ ’
φέρνη ὕστερον οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἀποστέλλουσι τριήρει
> Ν S Ψ Δ ‘4 3
ἐς "Ἔφεσον καὶ πρέσβεις Gua: of πυθόμενοι αὐτόθι
/
βασιλέα ᾿Αρτοξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξου νεωστὶ τεθνη-
κότα (κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτελεύτησεν)
ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνεχώρησαν. |
LI. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Χῖοι τὸ τεῖχος
περιεῖλον τὸ καινὸν κελευσάντων ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ
ὑποπτευσάντων ἐς αὐτούς τι νεωτεριεῖν, ποιη-
σάμενοι μέντοι πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους πίστεις καὶ
3 A A \ \ ΄“
βεβαιότητα ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν μηδὲν περὶ σφᾶς
, ᾽ € δ 3 4 Ἁ
νεώτερον βουλεύσειν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ
ἕβδομον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν
Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.
111. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς τοῦ τε
ἡλίου ἐκλιπές τι ἐγένετο περὶ νουμηνίαν καὶ τοῦ
2 αὐτοῦ μηνὸς ἱσταμένου ἔσεισεν. καὶ οἱ Μυτι-
ληναίων φυγάδες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Λεσβίων, ὁρμώ-
μενοι οἱ πολλοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου καὶ μισθωσάμενοι
ἔκ τε Πελοποννήσου ἐπικουρικὸν καὶ αὐτοθεν
’ e fe! € lA a
ξυναγείραντες, αἱροῦσι “Potteov, καὶ λαβόντες
“δισχιλίους στατῆρας Φωκαΐτας ἀπέδοσαν πάλιν,
8 οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες" καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ "Αντανδρον
στρατεύσαντες προδοσίας γενομένης λαμβάνουσι
τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἦν αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὰς τε ἄλλας

1 After a reign of forty years (465-425 B.c.).
298

BOOK IV. 10 2-111. 3

told the same tale; if therefore they had any de-
finite proposal to make, they should send men to
him in company with the Persian. As for Arta-
phernes, the Athenians afterwards sent him to
Ephesus in a trireme, together with some envoys;
these, however, hearing there of the recent death
of King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes—for he died about
that time 1—returned to Athens.

LI. The same winter the Chians demolished their
new wall at the bidding of the Athenians, who
suspected them of planning an insurrection against
themselves ; they, however, obtained from the Athen-
ians pledges and such security as they could that
they would adopt no harsh measures against them.
And the winter ended, and with it the seventh year
of this war of which Thucydides composed the
history.

LII. At the very beginning of the next summer a
partial eclipse of the sun took place at new moon,
and in the early part of the same month an earth-
quake. Also the citizens of Mytilene and of the other
cities of Lesbos who were in exile, the majority of
them setting out from the mainland, hired some
mercenaries from the Peloponnesus, gathered still
others on the spot, and took Rhoeteum ; but they
restored it again without having done any damage,
on receiving two thousand Phocaean staters.2. After
this they made an expedition against Antandros and
took the city through treachery on the part of the
inhabitants, It was, in fact, their plan to free the

3“. The Phocaean stater was notorious for the badness of the
gold (or rather electron) ; ¢f. Dem. xi. 36. It was worth about
twenty-three silver drachmas. See Hultsch, Gr. und rom.
Metrologie*, 184.

299

424 B.C.

THUCYDIDES

πόλεις tas ᾿Ακταίας καλουμένας, ἃς πρότερον
Μυτιληναίων νεμομένων ᾿Αθηναῖοι εἶχον, ἐλευ-
θεροῦν, καὶ πάντων μάλιστα τὴν" Αντανδρον' καὶ
κρατυνάμενοι αὐτήν (ναῦς τε γὰρ εὐπορία ἦν
ποιεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν ξύλων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τῆς
wv 2 / Ἁ 3 7 e ( 3 3
Ιδης ἐπικειμένης, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σκεύη) ῥᾳδίως ἀπ
αὐτῆς ὁρμώμενοι τήν τε Λέσβον ἐγγὺς οὖσαν
κακώσειν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Αἰολικὰ πολίσματα

εἰρώσεσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα παρασκευάζεσθαι
ἔμελλον.

1111. ᾿Αθηναῖοι δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει ἑξήκοντα
ναυσὶ καὶ δισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἱππεῦσί τε ὀλίγοις
καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλησίους καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς
ἄγοντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Ἰζύθηρα' ἐστρατήγει δὲ
αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ
Διειτρέφους καὶ Αὐτοκλῆς ὁ Τολμαίου. τὰ δὲ
Κύὐθηραβθεῆσός ἐστιν, ἐπίκειται δὲ τῇ Λακωνικῇ
κατὰ Maw Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν περιού-
κων, καὶ κυθηροδίκης ἀρχὴ ἐκ τῆς Σπάρτης διέ-
βαινεν αὐτόσε κατὰ ἔτος, ὁπλιτῶν τε φρουρὰν
διέπεμπον αἰεὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο.
ἣν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε ἀπ᾿ Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης
ὁλκάδων προσβολή, καὶ λῃσταὶ ἅμα τὴν Λακω-
νικὴν ἧσσον ἐλύπουν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἧπερ μόνον
οἷόν τε ἦν κακουργεῖσθαι' πᾶσα yap ἀνέχει
πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος. LIV.
κατασχόντες οὖν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τῷ στρατῷ δέκα

1 4,6. of the ἀκτή or promontory of the mainland north of
Lesbos. These had been taken from Mytilene by Paches
(cf. 111. 1. 3). They are mentioned also C.I.A, i. 87.

. 5.2.6. if Cythera were well guarded.

300

BOOK IV. tui. 3-t1v. 1

rest of the cities known as the Actaean cities, which
had hitherto been in the possession of the Athenians,
though inhabited by Mytilenaeans, and above all
Antandros. Having strengthened this place, where
there was every facility for building ships—timber
being available on the spot and Ida being near at hand
—as well as for providing other equipments of war,
they could easily, making it the base of their opera-
tions, not only ravage Lesbos, which was near, but
also master the Aeolic towns on the mainland. Such .
were the plans upon which they were preparing to
embark.

LIII. During the same summer the Athenians
with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a small
detachment of cavalry, taking with them also some
Milesians and others of their allies, made an expedi-
tion against Cythera. In command of the expedition
were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratys son of
Dieitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolan Now
Cythera is an island adjacent to LaconM, lying off
Malea; its inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the
class of the Perioeci, and an official called the Bailiff
of Cythera used to cross over thither once a year
from Sparta; they also used regularly to send over a
garrison of hoplites and paid much attention to the
place. For it served them as a port of call for mer-
chant ships from Egypt and Libya, and, moreover,
pirates would be less likely to annoy Laconia from
the sea,? on which side alone it could be harmed;
for the whole coast runs out towards the Sicilian and
the Cretan seas.? LIV. So then the Athenians, putting
in at Cythera with their armament, consisting of ten

3 Others take πᾶσα of the island, which forms as it were
a bastion ‘‘ running out into the Sicilian and Cretan seas.”

301

if»

THUCYDIDES

μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ δισχιλίοις Μιλησίων ὁπλίταις
τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλιν Σκάνδειαν καλου-
μένην αἱροῦσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι ἀπο-
βάντες τῆς νήσου ἐς τὰ πρὸς Μαλέαν τετραμ-
μένα ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ' πόλιν
τῶν Κυθηρίων, καὶ ηὗρον εὐθὺς αὐτοὺς ἐστρα-
τοπεδευμένους ἅπαντας. καὶ μάχης γενομένης
ὀλίγον μέν τινα χρόνον ὑπέστησαν οἱ Κυθήριοι,
ἔπειτα τραπόμενοι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλεν,
καὶ ὕστερον ξυνέβησαν πρὸς Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς
ξυνάρχοντας ᾿Αθηναίοις ἐπιτρέψαι περὶ σφῶν
αὐτῶν πλὴν θανάτου. ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ γενόμενοι
τῷ Νικίᾳ λόγοι πρότερον πρός τινας τῶν Κυθη-
ρίων, δι’ ὃ καὶ θᾶσσον καὶ ἐπιτηδειότερον τό “τε
παραυτίκα καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα Ta? τῆς ὁμολογίας
ἐπράχθη αὐτοῖς" ἀνέστησαν γὰρ ἂν 8 οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
Κυθηρίους, Λακεδαιμονίους τε ὄντας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ
Λακωνικῇ τῆς νήσου οὕτως ἐπικειμένης. μετὰ δὲ
τὴν ξύμβασιν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τήν τε Σκάνδειαν τὸ
ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα παραλαβόντες καὶ τῶν
Κυθήρων φυλακὴν ποιησάμενοι ἔπλευσαν ἔς τε
᾿Ασίνην καὶ “Ἕλος καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν περὶ
θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιούμενοι καὶ ἐναυλε-

1 Stahl’s conjecture for ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ of the MSS., which is

deleted by Hude, following Kriiger.
2 χά, omitted by the best MSS. ὃ ἄν, added by Heilmann.

1 An incredibly large number. In vir. xxv. 2, where
they are in their own land, the Milesians can oppose to the
enemy only 800 hoplites. Nor would ten ships suffice for so
many epibatae. Perhaps there is a confusion in the numeri-
cal sign, due to a copyist.

2 The haven of Cythera, some ten stadia distant from that
city.

302

BOOK IV. tiv. 1-4 we

ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites,! took the
city by the sea called Scandeia?; then, with the rest
of their forces landing on the part of the island
which looks toward Malea, they advanced against
the city of Cythera which is away from the sea,
where they found that all the inhabitants had im-
mediately established themselves in camp. A fight
ensued, in which the Cytherians stood their ground
for some little time, then turned and fled to the
upper town, but afterwards capitulated to Nicias
and his colleagues, agreeing to leave the question of
their own fate, except as to a penalty of death, to
the arbitration of the Athenians. Some negotiations
between Nicias and certain of the Cytherians had
already taken place, and for this reason the settlement
of the terms, both for the present and the future,
was arranged more speedily and with better advan-
tage to them; for otherwise the Athenians would
have expelled the inhabitants, since they were Lace-
daemonians and the island lay in that position on
the coast of Laconia. After the capitulation the
Athenians took possession of Scandeia, the town at
the harbour, and having taken precautions for
guarding Cythera, then sailed to Asine, Helus, and
most of the other towns on the seacoast; here they
made raids or bivouacked at whatever place they

3 It seems necessary to adopt Stahl’s conjecture ἀπὸ ϑαλάσ-
ons, or delete ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ. ‘‘One division of the Athenian
force landed at Scandeia, another, disembarking on the
N.E. coast, marched on the capital. The second force found
the Cytherians prepared to meet them ; in the battle which
ensued the Cytherians were routed, and fled to the upper
city, t.e. the capital. This explanation is borne out by
existing remains. See Frazer’s Pausanias, iii. 385, 386 ; also
Weilin Mittheil. ἃ. Arch. Inst. in Athen. ν. 224-243,” (Spratt. )

393

THUCYDIDES

Copevor τῶν χωρίων οὗ καιρὸς εἴη ἐδήουν τὴν γῆν
ἡμέρας μάλιστα ἑπτά.

LV. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἰδόντες μὲν τοὺς
᾿Αθηναίους τὰ Κύθηρα ἔχοντας, προσδεχόμενοι δὲ
καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν ἀποβάσεις τοιαύτας ποιήσε-
σθαι, ἁθρόᾳ μὲν οὐδαμοῦ τῇ δυνάμει ἀντετάξαντο,
κατὰ δὲ τὴν χώραν φρουρὰς διέπεμψαν, ὁπλιτῶν
πλῆθος, ὡς ἑκασταχόσε ἔδει, καὶ τὰ ἄχλα ἐν
φυλακῇ πολλῇ ἦσαν, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι
νεώτερόν τι γένηται τῶν περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν,
γεγενημένου μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πάθους ἀνελπίστου
καὶ μεγάλου, Πύλου δὲ ἐχομένης καὶ Κυθήρων
καὶ πανταχύθεν σφᾶς περιεστῶτος πολέμου
ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου, ὥστε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς
ἱππέας τετρακοσίους κατεστήσαντο καὶ τοξότας,
ἔς τε τὰ πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλεστα δὴ ὀκνη-
ρότεροι ἐγένοντο ξυνεστῶτες παρὰ τὴν ὑπάρχου-
σαν σφῶν ἰδέαν τῆς παρασκευῆς ναυτικῷ ἀγῶνι,
καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους, οἷς τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρού-
μενον αἰεὶ ἐλλιπὲς ἦν τῆς δοκήσεώς τι πράξειν"
καὶ ἅμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ ξυμ-
βάντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἔκπληξιν μεγίστην
παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐδέδισαν μή ποτε αὖθις ξυμφορά τις
αὐτοῖς περιτύχῃ οἵα καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ἀτολμότεροι
δὲ δι᾿ αὐτὸ ἐς τὰς μάχας ἦσαν καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι κινή-
σειαν ῴοντο ἁμαρτήσεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην
ἀνεχέγγυον γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῆς πρὶν ἀηθείας τοῦ
κακοπραγεῖν.

304

BOOK IV. tiv. 4-tv. 4

found convenient, and ravaged the land for about
seven days.

LV. The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the
Athenians in possession of Cythera and expected
them to make such descents upon their own territory,
nowhere massed their forces to oppose them, but
sent garrisons here and there throughout the country,
determining the number of hoplites by the strength
needed at each point, and otherwise were very
watchful, fearing lest some revolution should take
place which would affect their constitution ; for the
calamity which had befallen them at the island of
Sphacteria had been great and unexpected, Pylos
and Cythera were occupied, and on all sides they
were encompassed by a war which moved with a
swiftness which defied precaution. Consequently
they organized, contrary to their custom, a force of
four hundred cavalry and bowmen, and in military
matters they now became more timid than at any
time before they were involved in a naval struggle
which was outside their own existing scheme of
mnilitary organisation, and that too against Athenians,
with whom an attempt foregone was always so much
lost of what they had reckoned on accomplishing.?
Besides, the reverses of fortune, which had befallen
them unexpectedly in such numbers and in so short
a time, caused very great consternation, and they
were afraid that some time a calamity might again
come upon them like that which had happened on
the island; and on this account they showed less
spirit in their fighting, and whatever move they might
make they thought would be a failure, because they
had lost all self-confidence in consequence of having
been hitherto unused to adversity.

1
cf. 1. lxx. 7. 305
VOL, 11. x

THUCYDIDES

LVI. Τοῖς δὲ ᾿Αθηναίοις τότε τὴν παραθαλάσ-
σιον δηοῦσι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἡσύχασαν, ὡς καθ᾽
ἑκάστην φρουρὰν γίγνοιτό τις ἀπόβασις, πλήθει
τε ἐλάσσους ἕκαστοι ἡγούμενοι εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ
τοιούτῳ' μία δὲ φρουρά, ἥπερ καὶ ἠμύνατο περὶ
Κοτύρταν καὶ ᾿Αφροδιτίαν, τὸν μὲν ὄχλον τῶν

trav ἐσκεδασμένον ἐφόβησεν ἐπιδρομῇ, τῶν δὲ
ὁπλιτῶν δεξαμένων ὑπεχώρησε πάλιν, καὶ ἄνδρες
τέ τινες ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν ὀλίγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη,
τροπαῖόν τε στήσαντες οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν
ἐς Κύθηρα. ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν περιέπλευσαν ἐς 'Ἔπί-
δαυρον τὴν Λιμηράν, καὶ δῃώσαντες μέρος τι τῆς
γῆς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Θυρέαν, ἦ ἐστι μὲν τῆς
Κυνουρίας γῆς καλουμένης, μεθορία δὲ τῆς
᾿Αργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς. νεμόμενοι δὲ αὐτὴν
ἔδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιον Αἰγινήταις ἐκπεσοῦσιν
ἐνοικεῖν διά τε τὰς ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμὸν σφίσι γενο-
μένας καὶ τῶν Ἑϊδλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν εὐερ-
γεσίας καὶ ὅτι ᾿Αθηναίων ὑπακούοντες ὅμως πρὸς
τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην αἰεὶ ἑστᾶσιν.

LVII. Προσπλεόντων οὖν ἔτι τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
οἱ Αἰγινῆται τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὃ ἔτυχον
οἰκοδομοῦντες τεῖχος ἐκλείπουσιν, ἐς δὲ τὴν
ἄνω πόλιν, ἐν ἣ ᾧκουν, ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπέ-
χουσαν σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα τῆς θαλάσσης.
καὶ αὐτοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰ μία
τῶν περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἥπερ καὶ ξυνετείχιξε,
ξυνεσελθεῖν μὲν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν deo.
μένων τῶν Αἰγινητῶν, ἀλλ᾽’ αὐτοῖς κίνδυνος
ἐφαίνετο ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατακλήεσθαι: ἀναχωρή-
σαντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμεζον ἀξιόμα-
χοι εἶναι, ἡσύχαζον. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι

306

BOOK IV. tvi. 1-tv1. 3

LVI. Accordingly, while the Athenians were at
that time ravaging their seaboard, they generally
kept quiet when any descent was made upon any
particular garrison, each thinking itself inferior in
number and there being such depression. One
garrison, however, which offered resistance in the
region of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, frightened the
scattered crowd of light-armed troops by a charge,
but when it encountered hoplites retreated again, a
few of their men being killed and some of their arms
taken ; and the Athenians, after setting up a trophy,
sailed back to Cythera. From there they sailed to
Epidaurus Limera, and after ravaging some part of
the land came to Thyrea, which belongs to the dis-
trict called Cynuria, on the border between the Argive
and Laconian territories. This district the Lace-
daemonians who occupied it had given to the ex-
pelled Aeginetans to dwell in, on account of the
kind services shown themselves at the time of the
earthquake and the uprising of the Helots, and be-
cause they had always sided with their policy, in
spite of being subject to the Athenians.

LVII. While, then, the Athenians were still sailing
up, the Aeginetans left the fort by the sea which
they happened to be building and withdrew to the
upper town, where they dwelt, at a distance of about
ten stadia from the sea. Now a detachment of the
Lacedaemonian troops which were distributed in gar-
risons about the country was assisting the Aeginetans
to build this fort. But they refused to enter the
fort with them, as they requested, since it seemed to
them dangerous to be cooped up in it; but retreat-
ing to high ground they kept quiet, thinking them-
selves no match for the enemy. Meanwhile the

307
χ 3

THUCYDIDES

κατασχόντες καὶ “χωρήσαντες εὐθὺς πάσῃ τῇ
στρατιᾷ αἱροῦσι τὴν Θυρέαν. καὶ τήν τε πόλιν
κατέκαυσαν καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα ἐξεπόρθησαν, τούς TE
Αἰγινήτας, 6 ὅσοι μὴ ἐν χερσὶ ὶ διεφθάρησαν, ἄ ἄγοντες
ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὃς πα
αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν
Πατροκλέους: ἐξωγρήθη γὰρ “τετρωμένος. ἦγον
δέ τινᾶς καὶ ἐκ τῶν Κυ ἥρων ἄνδρας ὀλίγους, οὗς
ἐδόκει a ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα μεταστῆσαι. καὶ τούτους
μὲν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς
νήσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους οἰκοῦντας τὴν
ἑαυτῶν φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν, Αἰγινήτας
δὲ ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας ὅσοι ἑάλωσαν διὰ τὴν
προτέραν αἰεί ποτε ἔχθραν, Τάνταλον δὲ παρὰ
τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους
καταδῆσαι.

LVIII. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καμα-
ριναίους καὶ Γελῴοις ἐκ exetpia γίγνεται πρῶτον
πρὸς ἀλλήλους" εἶτα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Σικελιῶται
ξυνελθόντες ἐς Γέλαν, ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων
πρέσβεις, ἐς λόγους κατέστησαν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ
πως ξυναλλαγεῖεν. καὶ ἄλλαι τε πολλαὶ γνῶμαι
ἐλέγοντο ἐ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, διαφερομένων καὶ ἀξιούν-
των, ὡς ἕκαστοί τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι ἐνόμιζον, καὶ
“Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος Συρακόσιος, ὅ ὅσπερ καὶ
ἔπεισε μάλιστα αὐτούς, ἐς τὸ κοινὸν τοιούτους
δὴ λόγους εἶπεν.

LIX. “ Οὔτε πόλεως ὧν ἐλαχίστης, ὧ Σικε-
λιῶται, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσομαι οὔτε πονουμένης
μάλιστα τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐς κοινὸν δὲ τὴν δοκοῦσάν

1 robs ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, Hude deletes, after van Herwerden.

308

BOOK IV. tvu. 3-11x. 1

Athenians landed, and advancing straightway with
their whole force took Thyrea. They burned the
city and pillaged what was in it; but they carried to
Athens all the Aeginetans who did not perish in
the action, together with their Lacedaemonian
commander who was present, Tantalus son of Patro-
cles, who was wounded and taken prisoner. They
brought also a few men from Cythera, whom they
thought best to remove for the sake of safety.
These the Athenians determined to place for safe-
keeping on the islands, and to permit the rest of the
Cytherians to occupy their own territory on payment
of a tribute of forty talents,! but to put to death all
the Aeginetans who had been captured, because
of their former inveterate enmity, and to imprison
Tantalus along with the other Lacedaemonians cap-
tured on the island of Sphacteria.

LVIII. During the same summer, in Sicily, an
armistice was first concluded between the Cama-
rinaeans and Geloans; then representatives from all
the other Sicilian cities came together in Gela and
held a conference, to see whether they might not
become reconciled. Many opinions were expressed
for and against, the several envoys disputing and
making demands according as they believed that
their own rights were being prejudiced ; and among
the rest Hermocrates son of Hermon, the Syracusan,
whose word proved to have the greatest weight with
the others, spoke in the general interest 2? words to
this effect:

LIX. “The city which I represent, Siceliots, is
not the weakest, nor is it suffering most in the war; but
I propose to speak in the general interest, declaring

1 £800, $3,840. 2 Or, ““ before the meeting.”
399

THUCYDIDES

: , UA 4 3 σ΄
pos βελτίστην. γνώμην εἶναε ἀποφαινόμενος τῇ
/ 4 Ν A a e
2 Σικελίᾳ πάσῃ. καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ὡς
Ν ΓΚ A \ 3 N ᾽ 4 3 0. ἢ
χαλεπὸν τί ἄν τις πᾶν τὸ ἐνὸν ἐκλέγων ἐν εἰδόσι
’ ᾽ ΝΜ b , 3 7
μακρηγοροίη; οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε ἀμαθίᾳ ἀναγκά-
Cera αὐτὸ δρᾶν, οὔτε φόβῳ, ἢν olntai τι πλέον
σχήσειν, ἀποτρέπεται. ξυμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν
τὰ κέρδη μείξω φαίνεσθαι τῶν δεινῶν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς
4 4 ἢ e ’ Ν A > 7
κινδύνους ἐθέλουσιν ὑφίστασθαι πρὸ τοῦ αὐτίκα
8 τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι" αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ μὴ ἐν καιρῷ
τύχοιεν ἑκάτεροι πράσσοντες, αἱ παραινέσεις
4 τῶν ξυναλλαγῶν ὠφέλεμοι. ὃ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ
παρόντι πειθομένοις πλείστου ἂν ἄξιον γένοιτο"
τὰ γὰρ ἴδια ἕκαστοι εὖ βουλόμενοι δὴ θέσθαι τό
Ὁ 3 4 \ A Ν 3 +
TE πρῶτον ἐπολεμήσαμεν καὶ VUY πρὸς ἀλληλους
δι’ ἀντιλογιῶν πειρώμεθα καταλλαγῆναι καί, ἢν
ΝΜ \ / ΝΜ e , μή > A
dpa μὴ προχωρήσῃ ἴσον ἑκάστῳ ἔχοντι ἀπελθεῖν,
πάλιν πολεμήσομεν.

LX. “ Καίτοι γνῶναι χρὴ ὅτε οὐ περὶ τῶν
ἰδίων μόνον, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἡ ξύνοδος ἔσται,
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἐπιβουλευομένην τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν,
ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω, ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίων δυνησόμεθα ἔτι
διασῶσαι, καὶ διαλλακτὰς πολὺ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων
ἀναγκαιοτέρους περὶ τῶνδε ᾿Αθηναίους νομίσαε,
οὗ δύναμιν ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς

210

BOOK IV. trx. 1-Lx,. 1

the opinion which seems to me the best for Sicily as
a whole. As for the miseries which war entails, why
should one by expressly stating all that can be said
make a long harangue in the presence of those who
know? For no one is either forced to make war
through ignorance of what it is, or deterred from
making it by fear, if he thinks he will get some
advantage from it. Whatreally happens is this, that
to one side the gains appear greater than the terrors,
while the other deliberately prefers to undergo the
dangers rather than submit to a temporary dis-
advantage; but if it should turn out that these two
lines of action are both inopportune, each for the
side which adopts it, then some profit may come
from exhortations which advise a compromise. And
so with us at the present time, if we could be
persuaded of the wisdom of this course it would be
to our great advantage; for each of us began the
war in the first place because we desired to promote
our private interests. So now let us endeavour by
setting forth our conflicting claims to become recon-
ciled with each other; and then, if we do not
after all succeed in securing, each of us, what is fair
and just before we part, we shall go to war again.
LX. “And yet we should recognise the fact that
the subject of our conference will not, if we are wise,
be our private interests merely, but rather the ques-
tion whether we shall still be able to save Sicily
as a whole, for it is against it, in my judgment, that
the Athenians are plotting ; and we must consider
that we have an argument far more cogent to bring
us together on these matters than my words, namely,
the Athenians, who possess a military power greater
than that of any other Hellenic state and are now at

311

THUCYDIDES

τε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόν-
‘
τες, καὶ ὀνόματι ἐννόμῳ ξυμμαχίας τὸ φύσει
, 3 “ 3 , 4 /
πολέμιον εὐπρεπῶς ἐς TO ξυμφέρον καθίστανται.
πόλεμον γὰρ αἰρομένων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπαγομένων
αὐτούς, ἄνδρας οἱ καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπικαλουμένοις
αὐτοὶ ἐπιστρατεύουσι, κακῶς τε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς
ποιούντων τέλεσι τοῖς οἰκείοις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς
ἅμα προκοπτόντων ἐκείνοις, εἰκός, ὅταν γνῶσιν
ἡμᾶς τετρυχωμένους, καὶ πλέονί ποτε στόλῳ
ἐλθόντας αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ
σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι.
LXI. “ Καίτοι τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστους, εἰ σωφρο-
νοῦμεν, χρὴ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα ἐπικτωμένους
“A A AN e a 7 ,
μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἑτοῖμα βλάπτοντας ξυμμάχους τε
ἐπαγέσθαι καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους προσλαμβάνειν,
νομίσαι τε στάσιν μάλιστα φθείρειν τὰς πόλεις
Ἁ ’᾽ ew ’ \
καὶ τὴν Σικελίαν, ἧς ye οἱ ἔνοικοι ξύμπαντες μὲν
3 ’ t s :
ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, κατὰ πόλεις δὲ διέσταμεν. ἃ
A 4 > 4 3 ’ a
χρὴ γνόντας Kal ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτῃ καταλλαγῆναι
καὶ πόλιν πόλει, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι κοινῇ σῴζειν τὴν
Ca) ’ ’ \ e ε
πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, παρεστάναι δὲ μηδενὶ ὡς οἱ
\ A e a , A 3 ’ὔἢ
μὲν Δωριῆς ἡμῶν πολέμιοι τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις, τὸ
δὲ Χαλκιδικὸν τῇ ᾿Ιάδι ξυγγενείᾳ ἀσφαλές. οὐ
ry Μν Ψ ’ / ~ e £
yap τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ὅτι δίχα πέφυκε, τοῦ ἑτέρου
ἔχθει ἐπίασιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἀγαθῶν
3 , a 4 90 7 fo)
ἐφιέμενοι, ἃ κοινῇ κεκτήμεθα. ἐδήλωσαν δὲ νῦν
9 a a A J A
ἐν τῇ τοῦ Χαλκιδικοῦ γένους παρακλήσει" τοῖς
γὰρ οὐδεπώποτε σφίσι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν
412

BOOK IV. ix. 1-Lx1. 4

hand with a few ships watching for our mistakes,
and under the lawful name of alliance are speciously
trying to turn to their own advantage our natural
hostility to them. For if we begin war and call them
in—men who of their own accord are ready enough
to intrude their forces even on those who do not ask
for their intervention—and if we spend our own
revenues in doing hurt to ourselves, and at the same
time pave the way for their supremacy, we may well
expect them, when they see that we are worn out,
to come sometime with a larger armament and try
to bring everything here under their sway.

LXI. “And yet, if we are prudent, we ought, each
of us in behalf of his own state, to call in allies and
incur dangers only when we are seeking to win
what does not belong to us and not when we imperil
what is already ours; and we should remember that
faction is the chief cause of ruin to states and
indeed to Sicily, seeing that we her inhabitants, al-
though we are all being plotted against, are disunited,
each city by itself. Recognizing these facts, we must
be reconciled with each other, citizen with citizen
and state with state, and join in a common effort to
save all Sicily. And let no one imagine that only
the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians,
while the Chalcidians, because of their kinship with
the Ionians, are safe. For it is not through hatred
of one of the two races into which we are divided that
they will attack us, but because they covet the good
things of Sicily which we possess in common. They
have just made this clear by their response to the
appeal which the people of Chalcidic stock made to
them ;1 for to those who have never given them aid

1 of. 111. lxxxvi. 3.

313

THUCYDIDES

προσβοηθήσασιν αὐτοὶ τὸ δίκαιον μᾶλλον τῆς
ξυνθήκης προθύμως παρέσχοντο. καὶ τοὺς μὲν
᾿Αθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προνοεῖσθαι
πολλὴ ξυγγνώμη, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις
μέμφομαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακούειν ἑτοιμοτέροις
οὖσιν. πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς
ἄρχειν μὲν τοῦ εἴκοντος, φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ
3 a a 3 \ 3 ζω

ἐπιόν. ὅσοι δὲ γιγνώσκοντες αὐτὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς
προσκοποῦμεν, μηδὲ τοῦτο τις πρεσβύτατον ἥκει

, Ν A Ν ῳ ® ’
κρίνας, τὸ κοινῶς φοβερὸν ἅπαντας εὖ θέσθαι,
ς 4 A > ? \ 3 [οὶ
ἁμαρτάνομεν. τάχιστα δ᾽ ἂν ἀπαλλαγὴ αὐτοῦ
γένοιτο, εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβαῖμεν: οὐ γὰρ
3 \ a e a e “ 3 ζω 3 > 9 a
ἀπὸ τῆς αὑτῶν ὁρμῶνται ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῆς

a > Φ 3 ’
τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων. καὶ οὕτως οὐ πόλεμος

Ὁ 9 U4
πολέμῳ, εἰρήνῃ δὲ διαφοραὶ ἀπραγμόνως παύ-
6 > > »9 ΕΣ “ ΝΜ ’
ονται, οἵ T ἐπίκλητοι εὐπρεπῶς ἄδικοι ἐλθόντες
εὐλόγως ἄπρακτοι ἀπίασιν.

LXIT. “Kal τὰ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους
τοσοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εὖ βουλευομένοις εὑρίσκεται"
τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην ἄριστον εἶναι
εἰρήνην πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιή-
σασθαι; ἢ δοκεῖ γε, εἴ τῴ τι ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἴ
τῷ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐχ ἡσυχία μᾶλλον ἢ πόλεμος τὸ
μὲν παῦσαι ἂν ἑκατέρῳ, τὸ δὲ ξυνδιασῶσαι, καὶ

\ , 3 Ν
τὰς τιμὰς καὶ λαμπρότητας ἀκινδυνοτέρας ἔχειν

\ > / ΝΜ Ψ 3 4 / ΝΥ
τὴν εἰρήνην, ἄλλα τε ὅσα ἐν μήκει λόγων ἂν τις

314

BOOK IV. ει. 4-Lxu. 2

according to the terms of their alliance they of their
own accord have fulfilled an ally’s obligations with
a zeal exceeding their compact. That the Athenians
entertain these designs of aggrandisement is quite
pardonable ; and I have no word of blame for those
who wish to rule, but only for those who are too
ready to submit ; for it is an instinct of man’s nature
always to rule those who yield, but to guard against
those who are ready to attack. If any of us, know-
ing how matters really stand, fails to take proper
precautions, or if anyone has come here not ac-
counting it of paramount importance that we must
all together deal wisely with the common peril, we
are making a mistake. The speediest relief from this
peril would be gained by our entering into an
understanding with one another; for the base from
which the Athenians propose to move is not their
own territory, but that of the people who asked
them to intervene. And if we follow this course,
war will not end in another war, but without trouble
quarrels will end quietly in peace, and those who
have been invited to intervene, having come with
a fair pretext for injustice, will depart home with a
fair plea for failure.

LXII. “So far, then, as the Athenians are con-
cerned, this is the great advantage we win if we are
well advised ; but as to the question of peace, which
all men agree is a most desirable thing; why should
we not make it here among ourselves? Or, think
you, if one person now enjoys a blessing and another
labours under adversity, it is not tranquillity far
more than war that will put an end to the latter
and perpetuate the former? And has not peace its
honours and less hazardous splendours, and all the

315

THUCYDIDES

διέλθοι ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν; ἃ χρὴ σκεψα-
μένους μὴ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους ὑπεριδεῖν, τὴν δὲ
αὑτοῦ τινα σωτηρίαν μᾶλλον ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν προϊδεῖν.
καὶ εἴ τις βεβαίως τι ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ βίᾳ πράξειν
οἴεται, τῷ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα μὴ χαλεπῶς σφαλλέσθω,
γνοὺς ὅτι πλείους ἤδη, καὶ τιμωρίαις μετιόντες
τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ ἐλπίσαντες ἕτεροι δυνάμει τι
πλεονεκτήσειν, οἱ μὲν οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἠμύναντο
5 30) » 4 \ oY] 3 “ , wv
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐσώθησαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν
προσκαταλιπεῖν τὰ αὑτῶν ξυνέβη. τιμωρία γὰρ
οὐκ εὐτυχεῖ δικαίως, ὅτι καὶ ἀδικεῖται" οὐδὲ ἰσχὺς
βέβαιον, διότι καὶ εὔελπι. τὸ δὲ ἀστάθμητον τοῦ
μέλλοντος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κρατεῖ, πάντων TE
Ud A Ψ , ,

σφαλερώτατον ὃν ὅμως καὶ χρησιμώτατον φαίνε-
ται" ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ δεδιότες προμηθίᾳ μᾶλλον ἐπ᾽
ἀλλήλους ἐρχόμεθα.

LXIII. “ Καὶ νῦν τοῦ ἀφανοῦς τε τούτου διὰ τὸ
ἀτέκμαρτον δέος καὶ διὰ τὸ ἤδη, φοβεροὺς παρόν-

3 ’ 9 3 ’ 3 ’

τας ᾿Αθηναίους, κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἐκπλαγέντες, καὶ

λῚ A 4, e 4 9/
TO ἐλλιπὲς τῆς γνώμης ὧν ὅκαστός τι φήθημεν
πράξειν ταῖς κωλύμαις ταύταις ἱκανῶς νομίσαντες
εἰρχθῆναι, τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας πολεμίους ἐκ τῆς
χώρας ἀποπέμπωμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐς
ἀίδιον ξυμβῶμεν, εἰ δὲ μή, χρόνον ὡς πλεῖστον

lA 2Q7 \ 4 φ 3
σπεισάμενοι τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς ἐς αὖθις ἀνα-
1 ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, deleted by Hude, after Kriiger.

1 4.e, ‘most of our plans are baffled by the uncertainty of
the future.”

316

BOOK. IV. txu. 2—Lxtit. 1

other advantages on which one might dilate as easily
as on the horrors of war? Considering these things,
you should not overlook my advice, but should rather
look forward each to his own salvation thereby.
And if any of you cherishes the confident beliet
that he can gain anything either by insisting on
his rights or by an appeal to force, let him not,
through the baffling of his hopes, suffer a grievous
disappointment; for he knows that many men ere
now, whether pursuing with vengeance those who
have wronged them, or in other cases, hoping to gain
some advantage by the exercise of power, have, on
the one hand, not only not avenged themselves but
have not even come out whole, and, on the other
hand, instead of gaining more, have sacrificed what
was their own. For revenge has no right to ex-
pect success just because a wrong has been done;
nor is strength sure just because it is confident.
But as regards the future, it is uncertainty that for
the most part prevails,! and this uncertainty, utterly
treacherous as it is, proves nevertheless to be also
most salutary; for since both sides alike fear it,
we proceed with a greater caution in attacking one
another.

LXIII. “ So let us now, taking alarm on account of
both these things—the vague fear of this hidden
future and the immediate fear of the dread Athenian
presence—and charging to these obstacles, as effectu-
ally blocking our way, any failure in the plans which
any oné of us had hoped to realize, let us dismiss
from the country the enemy who is at our gates, and if
possible let us make peace among ourselves for ever-
more ; but if that may not be, let us conclude a truce
for the longest practicable period, and put off our

317

THUCYDIDES

2 βαλώμεθα. τὸ ξύμπαν te δὴ γνῶμεν πιθόμενοι
μὲν ἐμοὶ πόλιν ἕξοντες ἕκαστος ἐλευθέραν, ἀφ᾽ ἧς
αὐτοκράτορες. ὄντες τὸν εὖ καὶ κακῶς δρῶντα
ἐξ ἴσου ἀρετῇ ἀμυνούμεθα, ἣν δ᾽ ἀπιστήσαντες
ἄλλοις ὑπακούσωμεν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαί
τινα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγαν εἰ τύχοιμεν, φίλοι μὲν ἂν
τοῖς ἐχθίστοις, διάφοροι δὲ οἷς οὐ χρὴ κατ᾽
ἀνάγκην γιγνοίμεθα.

LXIV. “ Καὶ ἐγὼ μέν, ἅπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενος
εἶπον, πόλιν τε μεγίστην παρεχόμενος καὶ ἐπιών
τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀμυνόμενος ἢ ἀξιῶ προϊδόμενος "
αὐτῶν ξυγχωρεῖν, καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐναντίους οὕτω
κακῶς δρᾶν ὥστε αὐτὸς τὰ πλείω βλάπτεσθαε,

μηδὲ μωρίᾳ φιλονικῶν ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς τε οἰκείας
γνώμης ὁμοίως αὐτοκράτω εἶναι καὶ ἧς οὐκ

2 ἄρχω τύχης, GAN ὅσον εἰκὸς ἡσσᾶσθαι. καὶ
τοὺς ἄλλους δικαιῶ ταὐτό μοι ποιῆσαι, ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν
αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο παθεῖν"

8 οὐδὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν οἰκείους οἰκείων ἡσσᾶσθαε,
ἢ “Δωριᾶ τινα Δωριῶς ἢ Χαλκιδέα τῶν ξυγγενῶν,
τό τε ξύμπαν se oan ὄντας καὶ Evvoixous μιᾶς
χώρας καὶ περιρρύτου καὶ ὄ ὄνομα ἕν κεκλημένους
Σικελιώτας" οὗ πολεμήσομέν τε, οἶμαι, ὅταν
ξυμβῇ, καὶ ξυγχωρησόμεθά γε πάλιν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς

4 αὐτοὺς λόγοις κοινοῖς x ὦμενοι" τοὺς δὲ ἀλλο-
φύλους ἐπελθόντας ἁθροοι αἰεί, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν,
ἀμυνούμεθα, εἴπερ καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους βλαπτό-
μενοι ξύμπαντες κινδυνεύομεν, ξυμμάχους δὲ

? ἀμυνόμενος, Hude followed by Steup, for auuvrodpevos of
the MSS.
2 προϊδόμενος... - ὥστε αὐτὸς, Reiske and Dobree, for προει-
Soudvous . . bere αὐτοὺς of the MSS.

318

BOOK IV. ἔχη]. 1-LxIv. 4

private differences to some other day. In fine, let us
feel assured that if my advice is followed we shall
each keep our city free, and from it, since we shall
be arbiters of our own destiny, we shall with equal
valour ward off both him who comes to benefit and
him who comes to harm. But if, on the other hand,
my advice is rejected and we give heed to others, it
will not be a question of our taking vengeance on
anybody, but, even if we should be never so success-
ful, we should perforce become friends to our
bitterest foes and at variance with those with whom
we should not be.

LXIV. “As for me, as I said in the beginning,
although I represent a most powerful city and am
more ready for attacking another than for self-
defence, I deem it my duty, with these dangers in
view, to make concessions, and not to harm my
enemies in such a way as to receive more injury
myself, or in foolish obstinacy to think that I am as
absolutely master of Fortune, which I do not control,
as of my own judgment; nay, so far as is reasonable
I will give way. And I require of the rest of you to
follow my example and submit to this, not at the
hands of the enemy, but of yourselves. For there is no
disgrace in kinsmen giving way to kinsmen, a Dorian
to a Dorian or a Chalcidian to men of the same race,
since we are, in a word, neighbours and together are
dwellers in a single land encircled by the sea and are
called by a single name, Siceliots. We shall go to
war, no doubt, whenever occasion ‘arises—yes, and
we shall make peace again by taking common counsel
among ourselves; but when alien peoples invade us,
we shall always act in concert, if we are prudent,
and repel them, seeing that any injury suffered
by one of us brings danger to us all; but never

319

THUCYDIDES

οὐδέποτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπαξόμεθα οὐδὲ διαλλακτάς.
τάδε γὰρ ποιοῦντες ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι δυοῖν ἀγα-
θοῖν οὐ στερήσομεν τὴν Σικελίαν, ᾿Αθηναίων τε
ἀπαλλαγῆναι καὶ οἰκείον πολέμου, καὶ ἐς τὸ
ἔπειτα καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέραν νεμούμεθα
καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλων ἧσσον ἐπιβουλενομένην."

LXV. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ ‘Eppoxparovs εἰπόντος πει-
θόμενοι οἱ Σικελιῶται αὐτοὶ μὲν κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς
ξυνηνέχθησαν γνώμῃ ὥστε ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι τοῦ
πολέμου ἔχοντες ἃ ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, τοῖς δὲ
Καμαριναίοις Μοργαντίνην εἶναι ἀργύριον τακτὸν
τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀποδοῦσιν' οἱ δὲ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
ξύμμαχοι παρακαλέσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν τέλει
ὄντας εἶπον ὅτι ξυμβήσονται καὶ αἱ. σπονδαὶ
ἔσονται κἀκείνοις Kowal. ἐπαινεσάντων δὲ αὐτῶν
ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ὁμολογίαν, καὶ αἱ νῆες τῶν ᾿Αθη-
ναίων ἀπέπλευσαν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκ Σικελίας.
ἐλθόντας δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει
᾿Αθηναῖοι τοὺς μὲν φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν, Πυθόδωρον
καὶ Σοφοκλέα, τὸν δὲ τρίτον Εὐρυμέδοντα χρή-
ματα ἐπράξαντο, ὡς ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ
καταστρέψασθαι δώροις πεισθέντες ἀποχωρή-
σειαν. οὕτω τῇ γε παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι
ἠξίουν σφίσε μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ta δυνατὰ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλῃ
τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρᾳ παρασκευῇ κατερ-
γάξεσθαι. αἰτία δ' ἣν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν
πλειόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν
τῆς ἐλπίδος.

LXVI. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Μεγαρῆς οἱ ἐν τῇ
πόλει πιεζόμενοι ὑπό τε ᾿Αθηναίων τῷ πολέμῳ,

320

BOOK IV. xiv. 4-Lxvi. 1

henceforth shall we ask outsiders to intervene, either
as allies or as mediators. If we follow this policy,
we shall at the present time not rob Sicily of two
desirable things—getting rid of the Athenians and
escaping from civil war—and for the future we shall
dwell here by ourselves in a land that is free and less
exposed to the plotting of others.”

LXV. After Hermocrates had spoken to this effect
the Siceliots, accepting his advice, came to an
understanding among themselves. They agreed to
end the war, each city keeping what it had, except
that the Camarinaeans were to have Morgantina
on payment of a stated sum of money to the
Syracusans. The Sicilian allies of the Athenians
then summoned the Athenian generals and said
that they proposed to make peace and that the
treaty would also include them. And when the
generals assented, they proceeded to make the
agreement, whereupon the Athenian fleet sailed away
from Sicily. But when it arrived at Athens, the
Athenians sentenced to exile two of the generals,
Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon,
the third, on the charge that when it had been in
their power to subdue Sicily they had been bribed to
withdraw from it. To such an extent, because of
their present good fortune, did they expect to be
thwarted in nothing, and believed that, no matter
whether their forces were powerful or deficient, they
could equally achieve what was easy and what was
difficult. The cause of this was the amazing success
which attended most of their undertakings and
inspired them with strong confidence.

LXVI. The same summer the people of the city of
Megara, being harassed in the war by the Athenians,

321
VOL. 11. Y

THUCYDIDES

αἰεὶ κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δὶς ἐσβαλλόντων παν-
στρατιᾷ ἐς τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σφετέρων
φυγάδων τῶν ἐκ IInyav, of στασιασάντων ἐκ-
πεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους χαλεποὶ ἦσαν λη-
στεύοντες, ἐποιοῦντο λόγους ἐν ἀλλήλοις ὡς χρὴ
J \ ’ \ ’ , \
δεξαμένους τοὺς φεύγοντας μὴ ἀμφοτέρωθεν τὴν
πόλιν φθείρειν. οἱ δὲ φίλοι τῶν ἔξω τὸν θροῦν
αἰσθόμενοι φανερῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καὶ αὐτοὶ
ἠξίουν τούτου ταῦ λόγον ἔχεσθαι. γνόντες δὲ
οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται οὐ δυνατὸν τὸν δῆμον
ἐσόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν μετὰ σφῶν καρτερεῖν,
ποιοῦνται λόγους δείσαντες πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ᾿Αθη-
ναίων στρατηγούς, Ἱπποκράτη τε τὸν ᾿Αρίφρονος
καὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν ᾿Αλκισθένους, βουλόμενοι
ἐνδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ νομίζοντες ἐλάσσω σφίσι
τὸν κίνδυνον ἢ τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ σφῶν κατελ-
θεῖν. ξυνέβησάν τε πρῶτα μὲν τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἑλεῖν
3 θ0θ ’ὔ δὲ [4 ὔ 3 \ 3 XN a
Αθηναίους (ἣν δὲ σταδίων μάλιστα ὀκτὼ ἀπὸ τῆς

/ 3 A ’ \ / 2 A
πόλεως ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν τὸν λιμένα αὐτῶν), ὅπως
μὴ ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν ἐκ τῆς Νισαίας οἱ ελοπον-

᾽ 3 e > \ 4 3 4 ,
νήσιοι, ἐν ἡ αὐτοὶ μόνοι ἐφρούρουν βεβαιότητος
ἕνεκα τῶν Μεγάρων, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄνω πόλεν

4 3 A ca ΜΝ ¥
πειράσεσθαι ἐνδοῦναι" ῥᾷον δ᾽ ἤδη ἔμελλον προσ-
χωρήσειν τούτου γεγενημένου.

LXVII. Οἱ οὖν ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἀπό τε τῶν
ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέροις,
ὑπὸ νύκτα πλεύσαντες ἐς Μινῴαν τὴν Μεγαρέων

a e ’ e a ¢€ A
νῆσον ὁπλίταις ἑξακοσίοις, ὧν ᾿Γπποκράτης ἦρ-
322

BOOK [Ν. xvi. 1-Lxvir. 1

who regularly invaded their country in full force
twice every year, and also by their own exiles in Pegae,
who had been expelled in a revolution by the popular
party and kept annoying them by raiding the country,
began to say to one another that they ought to
receive the fugitives back, so that the city should not
be exposed to ruin from both directions at once.
And the friends of the exiles, noticing the murmuring
of the people, all began more openly than before to
urge that this proposal be adopted. But the leaders
of the popular party, realizing that the populace
under the pressure of their distress would not be
able to hold out with them, became frightened and
made overtures to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates
son of Ariphron and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes,
proposing to surrender the city to them; for they
thought that this course would be less dangerous to
themselves than the restoration of the citizens whom
they had banished. They agreed, in the first place,
that the Athenians should take possession of the
long walls (the distance between the city and the
harbour at Nisaea was about eight stadia), in order to
prevent the Peloponnesians from sending reinforce-
ments from Nisaea, where they formed the sole
garrison to keep their hold on Megara, and, in the
second place, that they would do their best to hand
over to them the upper-town as well, believing that,
as soon as this was done, their fellow-citizens would
more readily go over to the Athenian side.

LXVII. So, then, as soon as due preparations, both
in word and act, had been made by both parties, the
Athenians sailed under cover of night to Minoa, the
island which lies off Megara, taking six hundred
hoplites under the command of Hippocrates, and took

323
y 2

THUCYDIDES

χεν, ἐν ὀρύγματι ἐκαθέζοντο, ὅθεν ἐπλίνθευον τὰ
2 τείχη καὶ ἀπεῖχεν οὐ πολύ' οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ
Δημοσθένους τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ Ἰ]λαταιῆς
τε ψιλοὶ καὶ ἕτεροι περίπολοι ἐνήδρευσαν ἐς τὸ
᾿Ενυάλιον, ὅ ἐστιν ἔλασσον ἄπωθεν. καὶ ἤσθετο
οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ οἱ ἄνδρες οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ἦν εἰδέναι τὴν
8 νύκτα ταύτην. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἕως ἔμελλε γίγνεσθαι,
οἱ προδιδόντες τῶν Μεγαρέων 1 οὗτοι τοιόνδε
ἐποίησαν. ἀκάτιον ἀμφηρικὸν ὡς λῇσταί, ἐκ
πολλοῦ τεθεραπευκότες τὴν ἄνοιξιν τῶν πυλῶν,
εἰώθεσαν ἐπὶ ἁμάξῃ, πείθοντες τὸν ἄρχοντα, διὰ
τῆς τάφρον κατακομίζειν τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν
θάλασσαν καὶ ἐκπλεῖν" καὶ πρὶν ἡμέραν εἶναι
πάλιν αὐτὸ τῇ ἁμάξῃ κομίσαντες ἐς τὸ τεῖχος
κατὰ τὰς πύλας ἐσῆγον, ὅπως τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Μινῴας
᾿Αθηναίοις ἀφανὴς δὴ εἴη ἡ φυλακή, μὴ ὄντος
4 ἐν τῷ λιμένι πλοίου φανεροῦ μηδενός. καὶ τότε
πρὸς ταῖς πύλαις ἤδη ἦν ἡ ἅμαξα, καὶ ἀνοιχ-
θεισῶν κατὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ὡς τῷ ἀκατίῳ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
(ἐγίγνετο γὰρ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος τὸ τοιοῦτον)
ἰδόντες ἔθεον δρόμῳ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας, βουλόμενοι
φθάσαι πρὶν ξυγκλῃσθῆναι πάλιν τὰς πύλας
καὶ ἕως ἔτι ἡ ἅμαξα ἐν αὐταῖς ἦν, κώλυμα οὖσα
προσθεῖναι" καὶ αὐτοῖς ἅμα καὶ οἱ ξυμπράσσοντες
Μεγαρῆς τοὺς κατὰ πύλας φύλακας κτείνουσιν.
δ καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη Πλαταιῆς
τε καὶ περίπολοι ἐσέδραμον οὗ νῦν τὸ τροπαῖόν
ἐστι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν (ἤσθοντο γὰρ
1 of προδιδόντες τῶν Μεγαρέων, deleted by Hude.

324

BOOK IV. vxvi. 1-5

cover in a ditch, not far from the town, where bricks
had been made for the walls. A second company con-
sisting of light-armed Plataeans and frontier-patrols
under the command of the other general, Demosthenes,
set an ambuscade at Enyalius, which is somewhat
nearer. And all that night no one perceived what
was going on except the men whose business it was
to know. Then, at the approach of dawn, these
would-be Megarian traitors began their work as
follows. For a long time before this they had been
carefully preparing for the opening of the gates by
regularly assuming the guise of pirates and taking a
sculling boat, drawn on a cart, through the ditch and
down to the sea, where they would put out. This
they did every night, first securing the consent of the
commander.! Then before daybreak they would cart
the boat back into the fortifications, taking it in by
way of the gates, their object being, as they pretended,
to keep the Athenian garrison, which was stationed at
Minoa, in the dark, as no boat would be visible in the
harbour. On the night in question the cart was already
at the gates, and when these were opened as usual as
if to let the boat pass through, the Athenians, who
were acting throughout in accordance with an agree-
ment, seeing it, ran at top speed from their ambush,
wishing to get there before the gates were closed
again and while the cart was still in the passage, thus
forming an obstacle to the shutting of the gates; and
at the same time their Megarian accomplices killed the
guards at the gates. And first the Plataeans and the
patrols under Demosthenes’ command rushed into the
place where the trophy now stands, and as soon as they
were inside the gates the Plataeans engaged with the

1 4.¢., of the Peloponnesian garrison.

325

THUCYDIDES

ὶ e ᾽ , , f \
ot EYYUTaATA Πελοποννήσιοι) μαᾶάχομενοι TOUS

A ς ΄σ΄Ζὃὦἃ 4 a ΄'
προσβοηθοῦντας οἱ ]λαταιῆς ἐκράτησαν καὶ τοῖς
τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ὁπλίταις ἐπιφερομένοις βεβαίους
τὰς πύλας παρέσχον. LXVIII. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ

n 9 a € 2 9 Q\ A ζω
τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἤδη ὁ αἰεὶ ἐντὸς γεγνόμενος χωρεῖ
9 Ἁ wn Ἁ e 7
ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος. καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φρουροὶ τὸ

Α a. 3 ’ 9 7 9 4
μὲν πρῶτον ἀντισχόντες ἠμύνοντο ὀλίγοι, καὶ
4 Υ, 77 9 fal ς \ ’ 4 \
ἀπέθανόν tives αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ἐς φυγὴν
κατέστησαν, φοβηθέντες ἐν νυκτί te πολεμέων
προσπεπτωκότων καὶ τῶν προδιδόντων Μεγαρέων
ἀντιμαχομένων νομίσαντες τοὺς ἅπαντας σφᾶς
Μεγαρέας προδεδωκέναι. ξυνέπεσε γὰρ καὶ τὸν
τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων κήρυκα ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης κη-

7 N\ ὔ 97 4,
ρύξαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι Μεγαρέων peta
᾿Αθηναίων θησόμενον τὰ ὅπλα. οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἤκουσαν,
οὐκέτι ἀνέμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντε νομίσαντες κοινῇ
πολεμεῖσθαι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν. ἅμα δὲ
ἕῳ ἑαλωκότων ἤδη τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ

A / e ΝΥ A
πόλει Μεγαρέων θορυβουμένων οἱ πρὸς τοὺς
"AGO 4 a \ δ᾽ > > σε

ηναίους πράξαντες καὶ ἄλλο μετ αὐτῶν
πλῆθος, ὃ ξυνήδει, ἔφασαν χρῆναι ἀνοίγειν τὰς
πύλας καὶ ἐπεξιέναι ἐς μάχην. ἕξυνέκειτο δὲ
αὐτοῖς τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιχθεισῶν ἐσπίπτειν τοὺς
᾿Αθηναίους, αὐτοὶ δὲ διάδηλοι ἔμελλον ἔσεσθαι
(λίπα γὰρ ἀλείψεσθαι), ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται.
ἀσφάλεια δὲ αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἐγίγνετο τῆς ἀνοίξεως"
καὶ γὰρ of ἀπὸ τῆς ᾿Ελευσῖνος κατὰ τὸ ξυγκεί-
ς ra φι 9 ’ A

μενον τετρακισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ

.26

BOOK IV. txvit. 5—Lxvit. 5

reinforcements which came up—for the nearest
Peloponnesians had become aware of what was going
on—and defeated them, thus securing the gates for
the onrushing Athenian hoplites. LXVIII. After
that every Athenian who got inside immediately made
for the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison at
first stood their ground and defended themselves,
some of them being killed, but most of them took to
flight, being seized with panic, both because the
enemy had attacked them at night, and also
because they thought the Megarian traitors were
fighting against them; and they supposed that all the
Megarians had betrayed them. For it so happened
also that the Athenian herald, acting on his own
responsibility, made a proclamation that any Megarian
who so desired might espouse the cause of the
Athenians. When the garrison heard this proclam-
ation it no longer held out, but, verily believing that
a concerted attack was being made upon then, fled to
Nisaea. And at daybreak, when the walls had already
been taken and the Megarians in the city were in a
tumult, those who had negotiated with the Athenians,
and a large number besides who were privy to the
plot, expressed the opinion that they ought to open
the gates and go out to battle. It had, in fact, been
agreed between them and the Athenians, that as soon
as the gates were opened the Athenians should rush
in, and, in order that they might themselves escape
injury, they were to be distinguished from the rest by
being anointed with oil. They were also to have
additional security in thus opening the gates, since
the men who according to the compact were to
march by night from Eleusis, four thousand Athenian

327

THUCYDIDES

ἱππῆς ἑξακόσιοι οἱ τὴν νύκτα πορευσόμενοιϊ

6 παρῆσαν. ἀληλιμμένων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὄντων ἤδη
περὶ τὰς πύλας καταγορεύει τις ξυνειδὼς τοῖς
ἑτέροις τὸ ἐπιβούλευμα. καὶ οἱ ξυστραφέντες
ἁθρόοι ἦλθον καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν χρῆναι οὔτε
ἐπεξιέναι (οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερόν πω τοῦτο ἰσχύοντες
μᾶλλον τολμῆσαι) οὔτε ἐς κίνδυνον φανερὸν τὴν
πόλιν καταγαγεῖν. εἴ τε μὴ πείσεταί τις, αὐτοῦ
τὴν μάχην ἔσεσθαι. ἐδήλουν δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι ἴσασι

. τὰ πρασσόμενα, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα βουλεύ-
οντες ἰσχυρίξζοντο, καὶ ἅμα περὶ τὰς πύλας
παρέμενον φυλάσσοντες, ὥστε οὐκ ἐγένετο τοῖς
ἐπιβουλεύουσι πρᾶξαι ὃ ἔμελλον.

LXIX. Γνόντες δὲ οἱ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων στρατηγοὶ
ὅτι ἐναντίωμά τι ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν πόλιν βίᾳ οὐχ
οἷοί τε ἔσονται λαβεῖν, τὴν Νίσαιαν εὐθὺς περιε-
τείχιζον, νομίζοντες, εἰ πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαί τινας
ἐξέλοιεν, θᾶσσον ἂν καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα προσχωρῆ-

2 σαι (παρεγένετο δὲ σίδηρός τε ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν
ταχὺ καὶ λιθουργοὶ καὶ τἄλλα ἐπιτήδεια)" ἀρξά-
μενοι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ὃ εἶχον καὶ διοικοδομή-
σαντες τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἑκατέρωθεν
ἐς θάλασσαν τῆς Νισαίας ὃ τάφρον τε καὶ τείχη
διελομένη ἦγεν ὃ ἡ στρατιά, ἔκ τε τοῦ προαστείου
λίθοις καὶ πλίνθοις χρώμενοι, καὶ κόπτοντες τὰ
δένδρα καὶ ὕλην ἀπεσταύρουν εἴ πῃ δέοιτό τι"

1 πορευσόμενοι, Rutherford’s conjecture for πορενόμενοι of
the MSS. 32 Hude deletes τῆς Nioalas, after Stahl.
3 ἦγεν added by Stahl and Rauchenstein,

328

BOOK IV. cxvim, 5—Lx1x. 2

hoplites and six hundred cavalry, were now at hand.?
But after they had anointed themselves and were
already near the gates, an accomplice divulged the
plot to the other party. And they, gathering in a
body, came and declared that they ought neither to
march out to fight—for they had never ventured to do
such a thing before, even when they were stronger
—nor to bring the city into manifest danger; and,
they added, should anyone refuse to obey, the fight
would take place on the spot. But they gave no signs
whatever that they were aware of the plot which was
going on, but stoutly maintained that their advice
was for the best, and at the same time stayed about
the gates keeping watch, so that the plotters had
no opportunity to carry out their intentions.

LXIX. The Athenian generals, however, saw that
some obstacle had arisen and that they would not be
able to take the city by force, and therefore at once
began to invest Nisaea with a wall, thinking that, if
they could take this town before any succour came,
Megara also would soon capitulate. A supply of iron
quickly arrived from Athens, as well as stonemasons
and whatever else was needed. Beginning then at
the part of the fortification which they already held
and building a cross-wall on the side of it facing
Megara, from that point they built out on either side
of Nisaea as far as the sea, the army apportioning
among them the ditch and the walls and using stones
and bricks from the suburbs. Moreover, they cut
down fruit-trees and forest-wood and built stockades

1 Or, retaining wopevdyevo: with the MSS. and rejecting of
before τὴν νύκτα, ‘‘since the men from Eleusis, four thousand
Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry, according to the
compact had marched all night and were now at hand.”

329

THUCYDIDES

καὶ ai οἰκίαι τοῦ προαστείου ἐπάλξεις λαμβά-
νουσαι αὐταὶ ὑπῆρχον ἔρυμα. καὶ ταύτην μὲν
\ ef ix 2 4 A ς
τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην εἰργάζοντο" τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ περὶ
δείλην τὸ τεῖχος ὅσον οὐκ ἀπετετέλεστο, καὶ οἱ ἐν
a ’ ’ὔ ’, 3 , 2s? ς 4
τῇ Nicaia δείσαντες, σίτον τε ἀπορίᾳ (ἐφ᾽ ἡμέραν
Ἁ 3 [οὶ ” ’ 3 A \ \
γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἐχρῶντο) καὶ τοὺς Πελο-
ποννησίους οὐ νομίζοντες ταχὺ ἐπιβοηθήσειν, τούς
’ ε 4 i
te Μεγαρέας πολεμίους ἡγούμενοι, ξυνέβησαν
τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις ῥητοῦ μὲν ἕκαστον ἀργυρίου ἀπο-
λυθῆναι ὅπλα παραδόντας, τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαι-
μονίοις, τῷ τε ἄρχοντι καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐνῆν,
χρῆσθαι ᾿Αθηναίους ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται. ἐπὶ τού-
τοῖς ὁμολογήσαντες ἐξῆλθον. καὶ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι
τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἀπορρήξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν
Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες
τἄλλα παρεσκευάζοντο.
LXX. Βρασίδας δὲ ὁ Τέλλιδος Λακεδαιμόνιος
κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανε περὶ Σικυῶνα
, ΜΝ 9 ’ 4
καὶ Κόρινθον ὧν, ἐπὶ Θρῴκης στρατείαν Tapa-
σκευαξόμενος. καὶ ὡς ἤσθετο τῶν τειχῶν τὴν
ἅλωσιν, δείσας περί τε τοῖς ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ Πελο-
ποννησίοις καὶ μὴ τὰ Μέγαρα ληφθῇ, πέμπει ἔς
τε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς κελεύων κατὰ τάχος στρατιᾷ
ἀπαντῆσαι ἐπὶ Τριποδίσκον (ἔστε δὲ κώμη τῆς
Μεγαρίδος ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχουσα ὑπὸ τῷ ὄρει τῇ
Γερανείᾳ), καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων ἦλθεν ἑπτακοσίους μὲν
καὶ δισχελίους Κορινθίων ὁπλίτας, Φλειασίων δὲ
τετρακοσίους, Σικυωνίων δὲ ἑξακοσίους καὶ τοὺς

33°

BOOK IV. vcxex. 2—Lxx. 1

wherever they were needed; and the houses of the
suburbs with the addition of battlements of them-
selves furnished a rampart. They worked the
whole of this first day, but on the next day toward
evening when the wall was all but finished the garri-
son of Nisaea, becoming alarmed by the shortage of
food, seeing that they received provisions from the
upper-city for only a day at a time, and not antici-
pating any speedy relief from the Peloponnesians,
and believing the Megarians to be hostile, capitulated
to the Athenians on condition that they should give
up their arms and pay a ransom of a stipulated
amount for each man; as for the Lacedaemonians
in the garrison, the commander or anyone else,
they were to be disposed of as the Athenians might
wish. On these terms they came to an agreement
and marched out. The Athenians then made a
breach in the long walls in order to separate them
from the wall of the city of Megara, took posses-
sion of Nisaea, and proceeded with their other
preparations.

LXX. At this time Brasidas son of Tellis, a Lace-
daemonian, happened to be in the neighbourhood of
Sicyon and Corinth, preparing a force for use in
the region of Thrace. And when he heard of the
capture of the walls, fearing for the safety of the
Peloponnesians in Nisaea and apprehensive lest Me-
gara should be taken, he sent to the Boeotians
requesting them to come in haste with an army and
to meet him at Tripodiscus, which is the name of a
village in the district of Megara at the foot of Mount
Geraneia. He himself set out with two thousand
seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, four hundred from
Phlius, seven hundred from Sicyon, and such troops

33!

THUCYDIDES

μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ὅσοι ἤδη ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν, οἰόμενος
2 τὴν Νίσαιαν ἔτι καταλήψεσθαι ἀνάλωτον. ὡς δὲ
3 Uf \ > δ \ 4
ἐπύθετο, (ἔτυχε yap νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν Τριποδίσκον
3 ’ 3 , 4 A a
ἐξελθών) ἀπολέξας τριακοσίους τοῦ στρατοῦ, πρὶν
ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, προσῆλθε τῇ τῶν Μεγαρέων

’ \ Ἁ 3 , Μ Ν
πόλει λαθὼν τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ὄντας περὶ τὴν

, J \ A , \ @o@ >
θάλασσαν, βουλόμενος μὲν TO λόγῳ Kal ἅμα εἰ
δύναιτο ἔργῳ τῆς Νισαίας πειρᾶσαι, τὸ δὲ μέγει-
στον, τὴν τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν ἐσελθὼν βεβαιώ-
σασθαι. καὶ ἠξίου δέξασθαι σφᾶς λέγων ἐν
ἐλπίδι εἶναι ἀναλαβεῖν Νίσαιαν. LXXI. αἱ δὲ
τῶν Μεγαρέων στάσεις φοβούμεναι, οἱ μὲν μὴ
τοὺς φεύγοντας σφίσιν ἐσαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς ἐκβάλῃ,
οἱ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁ δῆμος δείσας ἐπίθηται

’ e Ix 3 ’ ᾽ ς \ @ > A
σφίσι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν μάχῃ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν οὖσα ἐγγὺς
4 ᾽ 93 ’ 3 4 9 490.
ἐφεδρενόντων ᾿Αθηναίων ἀπόληται, οὐκ ἐδέξαντο,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις ἐδόκει ἡσυχάσασι τὸ μέλλον

2 περιιδεῖν. ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ μάχην ἑκάτεροι
ἔσεσθαι τῶν τε ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ τῶν προσβοηθη-

’ὔ Ψ , 3 4 Ν)
σάντων, καὶ οὕτω σφίσιν ἀσφαλεστέρως ἔχειν,
οἷς τις εἴη εὔνους, κρατήσασι προσχωρῆσαι" ὁ δὲ
Βρασίδας ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ
ἄλλο στράτευμα.

LXXII."Apa δὲ τῇ ἕῳ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ παρῆσαν,
διανενοημένοε μὲν καὶ πρὶν Βρασίδαν πέμψαι
βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Μέγαρα, ὡς οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος
τοῦ κινδύνου, καὶ ἤδη ὄντες πανστρατιᾷ Ἰλα-
ταιᾶσιν' ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἦλθεν ὁ ἄγγελος, πολλῷ

ra) 3 Ld θ ὶ > », ὃ
μᾶλλον ἐρρωσθησαν, καὶ ἀποστείλαντες ὁιακο-

332

BOOK IV. cxx. 1=-Lxxu. 1

of his own as had already been levied, thinking that
he would arrive before Nisaea had been taken.
But when he learned the truth—for he happened to
have gone out by night to Tripodiscus—he selected
three hundred of his own army, and before his
approach was known reached the city of Megara un-
observed by the Athenians, who were down by the sea.
His plan was, ostensibly—and really, too, if it should
prove possible—to make an attempt upon Nisaea, but
most of all to get into the city of Megara and secure
it. And he demanded that they should receive him,
saying that he was in hopes of recovering Nisaea.
LXXI. But the rival factions of Megara were afraid,
the one that he might bring in the exiles and drive
them out, the other that the populace, fearing this
very thing, might attack them, and that the city,
being at war with itself, while the Athenians were
lying in wait near at hand, might be ruined. They,
therefore, did not admit Brasidas, both parties
thinking it best to wait and see what would happen.
For each party expected that there would be a battle
between the Athenians and the relieving army, and
so it was safer for them not to join the side which
anyone favoured until it was victorious. So then
Brasidas, when he could not persuade them, with-
drew once more to his own army. |

LXXII. At daybreak the Boeotians arrived. They
had intended, even before Brasidas summoned them,
to go to the aid of Megara, feeling that the danger
was not alien to them, and were already at Plataea
with all their forces; but when the summons actually
came, they were greatly strengthened in their pur-
pose, and sent on two thousand two hundred hoplites

333

THUCYDIDES

σίους Kal δισχιλίους ὁπλίτας καὶ ἱππέας ἑξακο-
σίους τοῖς πλείοσιν ἀπῆλθον πάλιν. παρόντος
δὲ ἤδη ξύμπαντος τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὁπλιτῶν
οὐκ ἔλασσον ἑξακισχιλίων, καὶ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
τῶν μὲν ὁπλιτῶν περί τε τὴν Νίσαιαν ὄντων καὶ
τὴν θάλασσαν ἐν τάξει, τῶν δὲ ψιλῶν ἀνὰ τὸ
πεδίον ἐσκεδασμένων, οἱ ἱππῆς οἱ τῶν Βοιωτῶν
ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες τοῖς ψιλοῖς. ἔτρεψαν
ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν (ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ οὐδεμία
βοήθειά πω τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσιν οὐδαμόθεν ἐπῆλθεν)"
ἀντεπεξελάσαντες δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐς

εἴρας ἦσαν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἱππομαχία ἐπὶ πολύ, ἐν

ἡ ἀξιοῦσιν ἑκάτεροι οὐχ ἥσσους γενέσθαι. τὸν
μὲν γὰρ ἵππαρχον τῶν “Βοιωτῶν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς
οὐ πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Νίσαιαν προσελά-
σαντας } οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ ἀποκτείναντες ἐσκύλευ-
σαν, καὶ τῶν τε νεκρῶν τούτων “κρατήσαντες
ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν"
ov? μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παντὶ ἔργῳ βεβαίως οὐδέτε-
ροι τελευτήσαντες , ἀπεκρίθησαν ἀλλ᾽ 5 οἱ μὲν
Βοιωτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν.

ΤΧΧΊΤΙ. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Βρασίδας καὶ τὸ
στράτευμα ἐχώρουν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ
τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως, καὶ καταλαβόντες

ὡρίον ἐπιτήδειον παραταξάμενοι ἡσύχαζον,
οἰόμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους καὶ τοὺς
Μεγαρέας ἐ ἐπιστάμενοι περιορωμένους ὁποτέρων ἡ
νίκη ἔσται. καλῶς δὲ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ἀμφότερα

εἰν, ἅμα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν προτέρους μηδὲ
μα μὲ χειρεῖν προτέρ

1 Portus’ correction for προσελάσαντες of the MSS.
? Hude adopts Rutherford’s conjecture οὐδέν.
3 ἀλλ᾽, Hude deletes, as not translated by Valla.

334

BOOK IV. wxxn. 1-Lxxul. 2

and six hundred cavalry, returning home with the
larger part of their army. Then, finally, when their
whole army was at hand, consisting of not less than
six thousand hoplites, and the Athenian hoplites were
in line about Nisaea and the sea, while the light-
armed troops were scattered up and down the plain,
the Boeotian cavalry fell upon the latter and drove
them to the sea. The attack was unexpected, for
hitherto no reinforcements had ever come to the
Megarians from any quarter. But the Athenian
horsemen charged upon them in turn and a prolonged
cavalry action ensued, in which both sides claimed to
have held their own. The Athenians did succeed in
killing the commander of the Boeotian cavalry and a
few others who had charged to the very walls of
Nisaea and despoiled them, and having got possession
of their bodies they gave them back under a truce
and set up a trophy; in the action as a whole, how-
ever, neither side finally gained a decisive advantage,
and so they separated, the Boeotians going to their
own army, the Athenians to Nisaea.

LXXIII. After this: Brasidas and his army advan-
ced nearer to the sea and the city of Megara, and
there, taking up an advantageous position, they drew
up their lines and kept quiet, thinking that the
Athenians would come against them, and feeling
assured that the Megarians would wait to see which
side would be victorious. And they thought that
matters stood well with them in both of two re-
spects: in the first place, they were not forcing an

335

"Ὦ-

THUCYDIDES

μάχης καὶ κινδύνου ἑκοντας ἄρξαι, ἐπειδή ye ἐν
φανερῷ ἔδειξαν ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ
αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἀκονιτὶ τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἀνατίθε-
σθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρέας
? a ’ ᾿ \ \ ν᾽ ΝΥ
ὀρθῶς ξυμβαίνειν’ εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὥφθησαν
ἐλθόντες, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τύχῃ γίγνεσθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ
σαφῶς ἂν ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς
n 4 le a 3 \ 3 ’
τῆς πόλεως" νῦν δὲ κἂν τυχεῖν αὐτοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους
μὴ βουληθέντας ἀγωνίξεσθαι, ὥστε ἀμαχητὶ ἂν
3 A φ Ψ φ Ψ
περιγενέσθαι αὐτοῖς ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον. ὅπερ καὶ
> / € \ a e ε 9 A
éyévero. οἱ yap Μεγαρῆς, ὡς ot ᾿Αθηναῖοι
ἐτάξαντο μὲν παρὰ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἐξελθόντες,
ἡσύχαζον δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπιόντων, λογιζόμενοι
καὶ οἱ ἐκείνων στρατηγοὶ μὴ ἀντίπαλον εἶναι
, ἃ ’᾽ > \ \ \ / 3 ΄ὸῷ
σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλείω αὐτοῖς
προυκεχωρήκει, ἄρξασι μάχης πρὸς πλείονας
> A Δ Ca) 4 4
αὐτῶν ἢ λαβεῖν νικήσαντας Μέγαρα ἢ σφαλέντας
τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ βλαφθῆναι, τοῖς δὲ
ξυμπάσης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν παρόντων μέρος
ἕκαστον κινδυνεύειν εἰκότως ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν,
, 3 , \ ee >Q\ >49 e ,
χρόνον δὲ ἐπισχόντες καὶ ws οὐδὲν ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων
ἐπεχειρεῖτο, ἀπῆλθον πρότεροι οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐς
τὴν Νίσαιαν καὶ αὖθις οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὅθενπερ
ς / [4 Ἁ A \ ’ 393. A
ὡρμήθησαν: οὕτω δὴ τῷ μὲν Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῷ καὶ

1 Apparently there is an anacoluthon, the sentence be-
ginning as if τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἀνοίγουσι τὰς πύλας were to be the
predicate, but after the long parenthesis the subject is
resumed in partitive form, of τῶν φυγάδων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς.

336

BOOK IV. xxx. 2-4

engagement and had not deliberately courted the
risk of a battle, although they had at least plainly
shown that they were ready to defend themselves,
so that the victory would justly be accredited to
them almost without a blow; and at the same time
they thought that things were turning out right as
regards the Megarians also. For if they had failed
to put in an appearance there would have been no
chance for them, but they would clearly have lost
the city at once just as though they had been de-
feated; but by this move there was the possible
chance that the Athenians themselves would not care
to fight, with the result that they would have gained
what they came for without a battle. And this is
just what happened. For the Megarians did what
was expected of them.! When the Athenians came
out and drew up their lines before the long walls,
they too kept quiet, since the Peloponnesians did
not attack, and their generals also reckoned that
they were running an unequal risk, now that almost
all their plans had turned out well, to begin a battle
against larger numbers, and either be victorious and
take Megara, or, if defeated, have the flower of their
hoplite force damaged; whereas the Peloponnesians
would naturally be willing to risk an engagement
which would involve, for each contingent, only a
portion of the entire army or of the troops there at
hand.? Both armies therefore waited for some time,
and when no attack was made from either side, the
Athenians were the first to withdraw, retiring to
Nisaea, and next the Peloponnesians, returning to
the place from which they had set out. So then,
finally, the Megarians who were friends of the exiles

2 The text is clearly corrupt, but the general sense seems
to be that given above. 337

VOL. II. Ζ

THUCYDIDES

τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἄρχουσιν οἱ τῶν φευγόντων
φίλοι Μεγαρῆς, ὡς ἐπικρατήσαντε καὶ τῶν
᾿Αθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐθελησάντων μάχεσθαι, θαρ-
σοῦντες μᾶλλον ἀνοίγουσί τε τὰς πύὕῦλας καὶ
δεξάμενοι καταπειτληγμένων ἤδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς
᾿Αθηναίους πραξάντων ἐς λόγους ἔρχονται.

LXXIV. Καὶ ὕστερον ὁ μὲν διαλυθέντων τῶν
ξυμμάχων κατὰ πόλεις ἐπανελθὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς
τὴν Κόρινθον, τὴν ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατείαν παρε-
σκεύαζεν, ἵναπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμητο' οἱ δὲ
ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρῆς, ἀποχωρησάντων καὶ τῶν
᾿Αθηναίων én’ οἴκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς
τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους μάλιστα μετέσχον, εἰδότες ὅτι
ὦφθησαν εὐθὺς ὑπεξῆλθον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι κοινολο-
γησάμενοι τοῖς τῶν φευγόντων φίλοις κατάγουσι
τοὺς ἐκ IInyav, ὁρκώσαντες πίστεσι μεγάλαις
μηδὲν μνησικακήσειν, βουλεύσειν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὰ
ἄριστα. οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ
ἐξέτασιν ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς
λόχους ἐξελέξαντο τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἱ ἐδόκουν
μάλιστα ξυμπρᾶξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους,
ἄνδρας ὡς ἑκατόν, καὶ τούτων πέρι ἀναγκάσαντες
τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν, ὧς κατε-
γνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, καὶ ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τὰ
μάλιστα κατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ πλεῖστον
δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ᾽ ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στά-
σεως μετάστασις ξυνέμεινεν.

338

BOOK IV. cxxtn. 4—Lxxiv. 4

plucked up courage, and opened the gates to Brasidas
and the commanders from the various cities, in the
feeling that he had won the victory and that the
Athenians had finally declined battle.1 And receiving
them into the town they entered into a conference
with them, the party which had been intriguing with
the Athenians being now quite cowed.

LXXIV. Afterwards, when the Peloponnesian
allies had been dismissed to their several cities,
Brasidas went back to Corinth and began prepara-
tions for the expedition to Thrace, whither he had
originally been bound. But when the Athenians
also returned home, all the Megarians who had been
most implicated in the negotiations with the Athen-
ians, knowing that they had been detected, immed-
iately withdrew secretly from the city, while the
rest, communicating with the friends of the exiles,
brought them back from Pegae, after first binding
them on their oath by strong pledges not to harbour
ill-will, but to consult for the best interests of the
city. But as soon as these men attained office and
had made an inspection of arms, separating the
companies they selected about one hundred of their
personal enemies and of those who seemed to have
had the’ largest part in the negotiations with the
Athenians, and compelling the popular assembly to
take an open vote concerning these, when they had
been condemned, slew them, and established an
extreme oligarchy in the city. And there was never
a change of government, effected by so small a
number of men through the triumph of a faction,
that, lasted so long.

1 Or, adopting Rutherford’s conjecture, ἐθεληαόντων, “and
that the Athenians would not care to fight again.’

339
z 2

THUCYDIDES

LXXV. Tod δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους τῆς ᾿Αντάνδρου
\ a le)
ὑπὸ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὥσπερ διενοοῦντο, μελ-
λούσης κατασκενάξεσθαι, οἱ τῶν ἀργυρολόγων
3 sf a , , >
Αθηναίων νεῶν στρατηγοί, Δημόδοκος καὶ ’Apt-
στείδης, ὄντες περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον (ὁ γὰρ τρίτος
αὐτῶν Λάμαχος δέκα ναυσὶν ἐς τὸν Πόντον
ἐσεπεπλεύκει) ὡς ἠσθάνοντο τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ
χωρίον καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς δεινὸν εἶναι μὴ ὥσπερ
Ν 3 “A 4 4 Ν e ’
τὰ ἼΑναια ἐπὶ τῇ Σάμῳ γένηται, ἔνθα οἱ φεύγον-
τες τῶν Σαμίων καταστάντες τούς τε Πελοπον-
, > / 3 \ ’ ’
νησίους ὠφέλουν ἐς τὰ ναυτικὰ κυβερνήτας πέμ-
ποντες καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει Σαμίους ἐς ταραχὴν
καθίστασαν καὶ τοὺς ἐξιόντας ἐδέχοντο: οὕτω δὴ
ξυναγείραντες ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων στρατιὰν καὶ
πλεύσαντες, μάχῃ τε νικήσαντες τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
᾿Αντάνδρου ἐπεξελθόντας, ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὸ
χωρίον πάλιν. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐς τὸν
Πόντον ἐσπλεύσας Λάμαχος, ἐν τῇ Ηρακλεώτιδι
e ’ 9 Ἁ Ui ἃ 3 4
ὁρμίσας ἐς tov Κάλητα ποταμὸν ἀπόλλυσι τὰς
ναῦς ὕδατος ἄνωθεν γενομένου καὶ κατελθόντος
αἰφνιδίον τοῦ ῥεύματος: αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ
πεζῇ διὰ Βιθυνῶν Θρᾳκῶν, οἵ εἰσι πέραν ἐν τῇ
3 a 3 > pe : ’ Ἁ ρ > \ τῇ
Ασίᾳ, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Καλχηδόνα, τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ
στόματι τοῦ Πόντου Μεγαρέων ἀποικίαν.
LXXVI. Ἔν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει καὶ Δημοσθένης
᾿Αθηναίων στρατηγὸς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἀφικ-
νεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον, εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς
Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν. τῷ γὰρ Ἵπποκράτεϊ καὶ
ἐκείνῳ τὰ Βοιώτια πράγματα ἀπό τινων ἀνδρῶν

340

BOOK IV. uxxv. 1-Lxxvi. 2

LXXV. During the same summer, when Antandros
was about to be strengthened! by the Mytilenaeans
as they had planned, the generals in command of the
Athenian ships which were collecting the tribute,
namely, Demodocus and Aristides, who were in the
neighbourhood of the Hellespont—for Lamachus,
their colleague, had sailed into the Pontus with ten
ships—heard of the fortification of the place and
thought that there was danger of its becoming a
menace to Lesbos, just as Anaea was to Samos?; for
the Samian exiles, establishing themselves at Anaea,
kept aiding the Peloponnesians by sending them
pilots for their fleet, and also brought the Samians who
lived in the city into a state of turmoil and continu-
ally offered a refuge to those who were sent into exile.
The Athenian generals, therefore, collected an army
from among the allies, sailed thither, defeated in
battle those who came out against them from Ant-
andros, and recovered the city. And not long after-
wards Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus and
anchored in the river Cales in Heraclean territory,
lost his ships in consequence of a rain which fell in
the uplands and brought down a sudden flood. He
and his army, however, going by land through the
Bithynian Thracians, who were on the other side, in
Asia, arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at
the mouth of the Pontus.

LXXVI. During the same summer, immediately
after the Athenians retired from Megara, Demos-
thenes, the Athenian general, arrived with forty
ships at Naupactus. For he and Hippocrates were en-
gaged in negotiations about affairs in Boeotia, at the

1 cf. ch. lii. 3. 2 ¢f. ται. xix. 2, xxxil. 2.

341

THUCYDIDES

ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐπράσσετο, βουλομένων μετα-
στῆσαι τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἐς δημοκρατίαν ὥσπερ
οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τρέψαι: καὶ Πτοιοδώρου μάλιστ᾽
ἀνδρὸς φυγάδος ἐκ Θηβῶν ἐσηγουμένου τάδε
αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθη. Σίφας μὲν ἔμελλόν τινες
προδώσειν (αἱ δὲ Σῖφαι εἰσὶ τῆς Θεσπικῆς γῆς ἐν
τῷ Κρισαίῳ κόλπῳ ἐπιθαλασσίδιοι)" Χαιρώνειαν
δέ, ἣ ἐς ᾿Ορχομενὸν τὸν Μινύειον πρότερον καλού-
μενον, νῦν δὲ Βοιώτιον, ξυντελεῖ, ἄλλοι ἐξ Ὄρχο-
μενοῦ ἐνεδίδοσαν, καὶ οἱ ᾿Ορχομενίων φυγάδες
ξυνέπρασσον τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἄνδρας ἐμισθοῦντο
ἐκ Πελοποννήσου (ἔστι δὲ ἡ Χαιρώνεια ἔσχατον
τῆς Βοιωτίας πρὸς τῇ Φανοτίδι τῆς Φωκίδος), καὶ
Φωκέων μετεῖχόν τινες. τοὺς δὲ ᾿Αθηναίους ἔδει
Δήλιον καταλαβεῖν, τὸ ἐν τῇ Ταναγραίᾳ πρὸς
, Εὔβοιαν τετραμμένον ᾿Απόλλωνος ἱερόν, ἅμα δὲ
ταῦτα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοη-
θήσωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἁθρόοι, ἀλλ᾽
ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι κινούμενα. καὶ εἰ
κατορθοῖτο ἡ πεῖρα καὶ τὸ Δήλιον τειχισθείη,
ῥᾳδίως ἤλπιζον, εἰ καὶ μὴ παραυτίκα νεωτερίξζοιτό
τε τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς, ἐχο-
μένων τούτων τῶν χωρίων καὶ λῃστενομένης τῆς
γῆς καὶ οὔσης ἑκάστοις διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς,
οὐ μενεῖν κατὰ χώραν τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ
᾿ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων μὲν προσιόντων τοῖς ἀφεστηκόσι,

1 ὥσπερ of ᾿Αθηναῖοι, bracketed by Hude, after Rutherford.
342

BOOK IV. .ixxvi. 2-5

instance of certain men in several cities who wished
to bring about a change in their form of govern-
ment and to transform it into a democracy, such as
the Athenians had. The leading spirit in these
transactions was Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes,
through whom Demosthenes and Hippocrates had
brought about the following state of affairs. Siphae,
a town on the shore of the Crisaean Gulf in the terri-
tory of Thespiae,was to be betrayed by certain men ;
and Chaeronea, a city which is tributary to Orcho-
menus—the city which was formerly called Minyan,
but is now called Boeotian—was to be put into the
hands of the Athenians by others, the fugitives from
Orchomenus, who also took into their pay some Pelo-
ponnesians, being especially active in the conspiracy.
Some Phocians also had a share in the plot, Chaeronea
being on the borders of Boeotia, and adjacent to
Phanotis, which is in Phocis. The Athenians were
to occupy Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo which is
in the territory of Tanagra and opposite Euboea ;
_and all these events were to take place simultaneously
on an appointed day, in order that the Boeotians
might not concentrate their forces at Delium, but
that the several states might be occupied with their
own disaffected districts. And if the attempt should
succeed and Delium should be fortified, they con-
fidently expected, even if no immediate change
occurred in the constitutions of the Boeotian states,
nevertheless, so long as these places were in their
possession, from which Boeotian territory could be
ravaged and where everyone might find a convenient
place of refuge, the situation would not remain as it
was, but in time, when the Athenians should come
to the support of the rebels and the forces of the

343

THUCYDIDES

“a δι 3 W e “ ol 4
τοῖς δὲ οὐκ οὔσης aOpoas τῆς δυνάμεως, κατα-
στήσειν αὐτὰ ἐς τὸ ἐπιτήδειον.

LXXVII. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιβουλὴ τοιαύτη παρε-
σκευάζετο' ὁ δὲ Ἵπποκράτης αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκ τῆς

Υ͂ a Μ e 4 \ ν ”
πόλεως δύναμιν ἔχων, ὁπότε καιρὸς εἴη, ἔμελλε

’ > \ ’ὔ \ Ἁ ’
στρατεύειν ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτούς, τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη
προαπέστειλε ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν es τὴν
Ναύπακτον, ὅπως ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν χωρίων στρατὸν
ξυλλέξας ᾿Ακαρνάνων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμ-

7 / 9 A ’ e ὃ θ /
μάχων πλέοι ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας ὡς προδοθησομένας"
ἡμέρα δ᾽ αὐτοῖς εἴρητο ἧ ἔδει ταῦτα πράσσειν.
καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἀφικόμενος, Οἰνιάδας δὲ
ὑπό τε ᾿Ακαρνάνων πάντων κατηναγκασμένους
καταλαβὼν ἐς τὴν ᾿Αθηναίων ξυμμαχίαν καὶ
αὐτὸς ἀναστήσας τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν τὸ ἐκείνῃ πᾶν,
> \ ’ὔ’ \ 3 , 4 n
ἐπὶ Σαλύνθιον καὶ ᾿Αγραίους στρατεύσας πρῶτον

\ ᾽ὔ 4 ς 2 e > ἃ
Kal προσποιησάμενος τάλλα ἡτοιμάζετο ὡς ἐπὶ
τὰς Σίφας, ὅταν δέῃ, ἀπαντησόμενος.

LXXVIII. Βρασίδας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον
τοῦ θέρους πορευόμενος ἑπτακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις.
Lg ’ 2 2 , 2 \ > / 3
ὁπλίταις ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἐπειδὴ ἐγένετο ἐν,
Ἡρακλείᾳ τῇ ἐν Tpayi § 3

p a τῇ ἐν Τραχῖνι καί, προπέμψαντος
αὐτοῦ ἄγγελον ἐς Φάρσαλον παρὰ τοὺς ἐπιτη-
δείους ἀξιοῦντος διάγειν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν στρατιάν,
ἦλθον ἐς Μελίτειαν τῆς ᾿Αχαιΐας Ἰ]Π ἀναιρός τε καὶ
Δῶρος καὶ ᾿ἱππολοχίδας καὶ Τορύλαος καὶ Στρό-

, , , \ 93 97
φακος πρόξενος ὧν Χαλκιδέων, τότε δὴ ἐπορέύετο.
“ov δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Θεσσαλῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκ Aapi-

BOOK IV. vxxvi. 5-Lxxviit. 2

oligarchs were scattered, they could settle matters
to their own advantage.

LXXVII. Such was the plot which was then under
way. It was the purpose of Hippocrates, when the
proper moment should arrive, to take troops from
Athens and in person make an expedition into
Boeotia ; meanwhile he was sending Demosthenes
in advance with a fleet of forty ships to Naupactus,
in order that he should first collect in this region
an army of Acarnanians and of other allies of
Athens and then sail to Siphae, in expectation of
its being betrayed; and a day was agreed upon
between the two generals for doing these two
things simultaneously. Upon his arrival at Nau-
pactus, Demosthenes found that Oeniadae had al-
ready been forced by all the rest of the Acarnanians
to join the Athenian alliance; he himself then
raised all the allied forces in that district, and after
first making an expedition against Salynthius and
the Agraeans! and securing these, proceeded with
his other preparations so as to be present at Siphae
when needed.

LXXVIIT. About the same time in the course of
this summer, Brasidas, who was on his way to Thrace
with one thousand seven hundred hoplites, reached
Heracleia in Trachis and sent forward a messenger
to his friends at Pharsalus requesting them to
conduct him and his army through. Accordingly he
was met at Meliteia in Achaia by Panaerus, Dorus,
Hippolochidas, Torylaiis, and Strophacus, who was
proxenus of the Chalcidians, and then proceeded
on his march. He was conducted by several Thes-
‘salians also, among whom were Niconidas of Larisa, a

1 of. 111. οχὶ. 4; exiv. 2.
3A

THUCYDIDES

Α
σης Νικονίδας Περδίκκᾳ ἐπιτήδειος Ov. τὴν γὰρ
Θεσσαλίαν ἄλλως τε οὐκ εὔπορον ἦν δμέναι ἄνευ
ἀγωγοῦ καὶ μετὰ ὅπλων γε δή, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσί γε
e , [4 C4 ’ Ἁ “
ὁμοίως “EXAnow ὕποπτον καθειστήκει THY τῶν
πέλας μὴ πείσαντας διιέναι" τοῖς τε ᾿Αθηναίοις

> 9, Ν a a A Μ ea
αἰεί ποτε TO πλῆθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εὔνουν ὑπῆρ-
3 χεν. ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομίᾳ
9 A A 3 , 1 e Θ ’ 3 »
ἐχρῶντο τὸ ἐγχώριον οἱ Θεσσαλοί, οὐκ ἄν ποτε
προῆλθεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε πορευομένῳ αὐτῷ ἀπαν-
, ΝΜ A 3 ’ ’ ἢ
τήσαντες ἄλλοι τῶν τἀναντία τούτοις βουλομένων
ἐπὶ τῷ Ἔνιπεῖ ποταμῷ ἐκώλνον καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἔφα-
4 σαν ἄνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ πορευόμενον. οἱ δὲ
ἄγοντες οὔτε ἀκόντων ἔφασαν διάξειν, aipvidsoy
τε παραγενόμενον Eévor ὄντες κομίζειν. ἔλεγε δὲ
\ ΣΝ e ’ a A a 3 a
καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Βρασίδας τῇ Θεσσαλῶν γῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς
φίλος ὧν ἰέναι καὶ ᾿Αθηναίοις πολεμίοις οὖσι καὶ
οὐκ ἐκείνοις ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν, Θεσσαλοῖς τε οὐκ
εἰδέναι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔχθραν οὖσαν ὥστε τῇ
ἀλλήλων γῇ μὴ χρῆσθαι, νῦν τε ἀκόντων ἐκείνων
οὐκ ἂν προελθεῖν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι), οὐ
lA 3 A ” e 3 ᾽
5 μέντοι ἀξιοῦν γε εἴργεσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀκούσαντες
ταῦτα ἀπῆλθον: ὁ δὲ κελευόντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν,
’ , A \ fo) 3 ’ >
πρὶν τι πλέον ξυστῆναι TO κωλῦσον, ἐχώρει οὐδὲν
ἐπισχὼν δρόμῳ. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἡ ἐκ

1 τὸ ἐγχώριυν, Hude changes to éyxwply, after τῷ ἐγχωρίῳ
of Dion. Hal.

346

BOOK IV. ixxvin. 2-5

friend of Perdiccas. Indeed, Thessaly was not in any
case an easy country to traverse without an escort,
and especially with an armed force; and among
all the Hellenes alike to traverse the territory of
neighbours without their consent was looked on
with suspicion. Besides, the common people of
Thessaly had always been well disposed to the
Athenians. If, therefore, the Thessalians had not
been under the sway of a few powerful men, as is
usual in that country, rather than under a free
democracy, Brasidas would not have made headway ;
even as it was, he was confronted on his march,
when he reached the river Enipeus, by other Thes-
salians belonging to the opposite party. These tried
to stop him, warning him that he was doing wrong in
proceeding without the consent of the whole people.
But his conductors reassured them, saying that, it
they were unwilling, they would not conduct him
further, and that they were merely playing the
part of hosts in escorting an unexpected visitor.
Brasidas himself explained that he came as a friend
to Thessaly and its inhabitants and was bearing arms
against the Athenians, who were enemies, and not
against them; moreover, he was not aware of any
such hostility between the Thessalians and the Lace-
daemonians as to debar them from access to each
other’s territory, but if in this instance they were
unwilling, he would go no further, nor indeed could
he do so; he hoped, however, that they would not bar
his progress. On hearing this the Thessalians de-
parted ; but Brasidas, taking the advice of his escort,
before a larger force could be collected to hinder
him, set out at full speed and without making any
halt. In fact, he finished the journey to Pharsalus

347

THUCYDIDES

τῆς Μελιτείας ἀφώρμησεν, ἐς Φάρσαλόν τε ἐτέλεσε
καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο ἐπὶ τῷ ᾿Απιδανῷ ποταμῷ,
ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Φάκιον, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐς ΠΠερραιβίαν.
ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἤδη οἱ μὲν Θεσσαλῶν ἀγωγοὶ πάλιν
ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ ἸΠερραιβοὶ αὐτόν, ὑπήκοοι ὄντες
Θεσσαλῶν, κατέστησαν ἐς Δῖον τῆς Περδίκκου
9 fo) Es e Ἁ A 9 4 4, \
ἀρχῆς, ὃ ὑπὸ τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ Μακεδονίας πρὸς
Θεσσαλοὺς πόλισμα κεῖται.

LXXIX. Τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ Βρασίδας Θεσ-
σαλίαν φθάσας διέδραμε πρίν τινα κωλύειν παρα -

4 2 ’ e ’ 4
σκευάσασθαι, καὶ ἀφίκετο ὡς Ilepdinxay καὶ ἐς

\ 4 a e
τὴν Χαλκιδικήν. ἐκ yap τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ὡς
τὰ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ηὐτύχει, δείσαντες οἵ τε ἐπὶ
Θράκης ἀφεστῶτες ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ Περδίκκας
ἐξήγαγον τὸν στρατόν, οἱ μὲν Χαλκιδῆς νομίζον-
τες ἐπὶ σφᾶς πρῶτον ὁρμήσειν τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους
(καὶ ἅμα αἱ πλησιόχωροι πόλεις αὐτῶν αἱ οὐκ
3 ΄“ A 4 ’ 4
ἀφεστηκυῖαι ξυνεπῆγον κρύφα), Περδίκκας δὲ

’ \ 3 3 ~ A ,
πολέμιος μὲν οὐκ ὧν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ, φοβούμενος
δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ παλαιὰ διάφορα τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
καὶ μάλιστα βουλόμενος ᾿Αρράβαιον τὸν Λυγκὴη-
. Le 4 4 \ 3 φι
στῶν βασιλέα παραστήσασθαι. ξυνέβη δὲ αὐτοῖς
ὥστε ῥᾷον ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατὸν ἐξαγα-
γεῖν, ἡ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακο-
πραγία.

LXXX. Τῶν γὰρ ᾿Αθηναίων ἐγκειμένων τῇ
Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τῇ ἐκείνων γῇ,
ἤλπιζον ἀποτρέψειν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα, εἰ ἀντιε-
παραλυποῖεν πέμψαντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους

348

BOOK IV. wuxxvitt. §-Lxxx. 1

on the same day on which he had set out from
Meliteia, and encamped on the river Apidanus ;
thence he proceeded to Phacium, and from there to
Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort at length
turned back, and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects
of the Thessalians, brought him safely to Dium in the
dominions of Perdiccas, a small town in Macedonia at
the foot of Mt. Olympus, facing Thessaly.

LXXIX. It was in this manner that Brasidas
succeeded in rushing through Thessaly before anyone
could get ready to hinder him and reached Perdiccas
and the Chalcidic peninsula. The reason why the
peoples in Thrace who had revolted from Athens
had, in conjunction with Perdiccas, brought this army
all the way from the Peloponnesus was that they
were filled with alarm at the success of the Athenians.
The Chalcidians thought that the Athenians would
take the field against them first, and the cities in this
neighbourhood which had not yet revolted neverthe-
less took part secretly in inviting the Peloponnesians
to intervene. As for Perdiccas, although he was
not yet openly hostile to Athens, he also was afraid
of the long-standing differences between himself and
the Athenians, and above all he was anxious to
reduce Arrhabaeus, the king of the Lyncestians. A
further circumstance which rendered it easier for
them to procure an army from the Peloponnesus
was the evil fortune which at the present time
attended the Lacedaemonians.

LXXX. Forsince the Athenians kept harassing the
Peloponnesians, and especially the territory of the
Lacedaemonians, the latter thought that the best
way of diverting them would be to retaliate by
sending an army against their allies, especially since

349

THUCYDIDES

3 wn“ 4 ΝΜ ς ’ 4
αὐτῶν στρατιάν, ἄλλως τε Kal ἑτοίμων ὄντων
τρέφειν τε καὶ ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει σφᾶς ἐπικαλου-

2 μένων. καὶ ἅμα τῶν Εἱλώτων βουλομένοις ἦν
ἐπὶ προφάσει ἐκπέμψαι, μή τι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα

A » 3 / , 3 Ἃ ,ὕ

8 τῆς Πύλου ἐχομένης νεωτερίσωσιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε
ΝΜ ’ 9 A \ / Ν
ἔπραξαν φοβούμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν νεότητα καὶ τὸ
πλῆθος (αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς
τοὺς Εἵλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθέ-
στήκεν) προεῖπον αὐτῶν ὅσοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς
πολεμίοις γεγενῆσθαι σφίσιν ἄριστοι, κρίνεσθαι,
ὡς ἐλευθερώσοντες, πεῖραν ποιούμενοι καὶ ἡγού-

’ , e Ν 4 “
μενοι τούτους σφίσιν ὑπὸ φρονήματος, οἵπερ καὶ

) φῦ A [4 aA A
ἠξίωσαν πρῶτος ἕκαστος ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, μάλιστα

4 ἂν καὶ ἐπιθέσθαι. καὶ προκρινάντων ἐς δισχιλίους
οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον
ὡς ἠλευθερωμένοι, οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἠφάνι-
σάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐδεὶς ἤσθετὸ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ

5 ὅκαστος διεφθάρη. καὶ τότε προθύμως τῷ Βρασίδᾳ
αὐτῶν ξυνέπεμψαν ἑπτακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς δ᾽
ἄλλους ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μισθῷ πείσας ἐξή-
γαγεν.

LXXXI. Αὐτόν τε Βρασίδαν βουλόμενον *
μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπέστειλαν (προυθυμή-
θησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς), ἄνδρα ἔν τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ

1 βουλόμενον, with the MSS. Hude reads βουλόμενοι.
35°

BOOK IV. vxxx. 1-Lxxx1. 1

these allies were ready to maintain an army and
were calling upon the Lacedaemonians for help in
order that they might revolt. Furthermore, the
Lacedaemonians were glad to have an excuse for
sending out some of the Helots, in order to forestall
their attempting a revolt at the present juncture
when Pylos was in the possession of the enemy.
Indeed, through fear of their youth! and numbers
—for in fact most of their measures have always
been adopted by the Lacedaemonians with a view
to guarding against the Helots—they had once even
resorted to the following device. They made pro-
clamation that all Helots who claimed to have ren-
dered the Lacedaemonians the best service in war
should be set apart, ostensibly to be set free. They
were, in fact, merely testing them, thinking that those
who claimed, each for himself, the first right to be set
free would be precisely the men of high spirit who
would be the most likely to attack their masters.
About two thousand of them were selected and
these put crowns on their heads and made the
rounds of the temples, as though they were already
free, but the Spartans not long afterwards made away
with them, and nobody ever knew in what way each
one perished. So,on the present occasion, the Spartans
gladly sent with Brasidas seven hundred Helots as
hoplites, the rest of his forces being drawn from the
Peloponnesus by the inducement of pay.

LXXXI. As for Brasidas himself, the Lacedae-
monians sent him chiefly at his own desire, though
the Chalcidians also were eager to have him. He
was a man esteemed at Sparta as being energetic in

1 Most MSS. read νεότητα, B σκαιότητα, but some word

meaning ‘‘ boldness ”’ or ‘‘ recklessness” seems to be required.
Hude adopts Wiedmann’s conjecture καἰνότητα.
351

THUCYDIDES

δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα Kal ἐπειδὴ
ϑῷο νι ’ ΝΜ ’ ,
ἐξῆλθε πλείστου ἄξιον Λακεδαιμονίοις γενόμενον.
τό τε γὰρ παραυτίκα ἑαντὸν παρασχὼν δίκαιον
Ἁ 4 3 \ , 3 , \ 4 XN
Kal μέτριον ἐς TAS πόλεις ἀπέστησε TA πολλά, TA
δὲ προδοσίᾳ εἷλε τῶν χωρίων, ὥστε τοῖς Λακε-
δαιμονίοις γίγνεσθαι ξυμβαίνειν τε βουλομένοις,
ὅπερ ἐποίησαν, ἀνταπόδοσιν καὶ ἀποδοχὴν χωρίων
\ A ’ 3 \ A / 4
Kal τοῦ πολέμου ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου λωφησιν"
ἔς τε τὸν χρόνῳ ὕστεῤῥον μετὰ τὰ ἐκ Σικελίας
7 e id ’ > \ N 4 Ὁ
πόλεμον ἡ τότε Βρααίδου ἀρετὴ καὶ ξύνεσις, τῶν
μὲν πείρᾳ αἰσθομένων, τῶν δὲ ἀκοῇ νομισάντων,
4 3 ’ 9 a 5 ’ὔ;
μάλιστα ἐπιθυμίαν ἐνεποίει τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίων ξυμ-
’, 3 \ 4 A 3
μάχοις ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. πρῶτος yap ἐξελ-
θὼν καὶ δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθὸς ἐλπίδα
ἐγκατέλιπε βέβαιον ὡς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοί
εἰσιν.
LXXXII. Τότε δ᾽ οὖν ἀφικομένου αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ
3 / 42 “A ’ (
ἐπὶ Θράκης οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι πυθόμενοι τὸν τε Περ-
’ὔ ’ Nv
δίκκαν πολέμιον ποιοῦνται, νομίσαντες αἴτιον
εἶναι τῆς παρόδου, καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ ξυμμάχων
φυλακὴν πλέονα κατεστήσαντο. LXXXIII. Περ-
\
δίκκας δὲ Βρασίδαν καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν εὐθὺς λαβὼν
A A 2
μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως στρατεύει ἐπὶ Ap-
ράβαιον τὸν Βρομεροῦ, Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων
βασιλέα, ὅμορον ὄντα, διαφορᾶς τε αὐτῷ οὔσης
\ γ᾽ , θ » Δ δὲ 3 έ
καὶ βουλόμενος καταστρέψασθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο
τῷ στρατῷ μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐπὶ τῇ ἐσβολῇ τῆς

352

BOOK IV. vxxxi. 1-Lxxxill. 2

everything he did, and indeed, after he had gone
abroad, he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians.
For, at the present crisis, by showing himself just
and moderate in his dealings with the cities he
caused most of the places to revolt, and secured
possession of others by the treachery of their in-
habitants, so that when the Lacedaemonians wished
to make terms with Athens, as they did ultimately,!
they had places to offer in exchange for places they
wished to recover and were able to secure for the
Peloponnesus a respite from the war; and in the
later part of the war, after the events in Sicily, it
was the virtue and tact which Brasidas had displayed
at this time—qualities of which some had had ex-
perience, while others knew of them by report—that
did most to inspire in the allies of the Athenians a
sentiment favourable to the Lacedaemonians. For
since he was the first Lacedaemonian abroad who
gained a reputation for being in all respects a good
man, he left behind him a confident belief that the
other Lacedaemonians also were of the same stamp.
_ LXXXII. On the arrival of Brasidas in Thrace at
the time referred to,? the Athenians, on hearing of
it, declared Perdiccas an enemy, regarding him as
responsible for his coming, and they established a
stricter watch over their allies in that region.
LXXXIII. But Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas
and his army, together with his own forces, and
made an expedition against his neighbour Arrha-
baeus, son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian
Macedonians ; for he had a quarrel with him and
wished to subdue him. But when he and Brasidas
arrived with their combined armies at the pass leading

1 421 B.c.; ¢f. ν. xvii. 2 of. ch. Ixxix. 1.

353

VOL. II. AA

THUCYDIDES

Λύγκου, Βρασίδας ἐς λόγους ἔφη βούλέσθαι
πρῶτον ἐλθὼν πρὸ πολέμου ᾿Αρράβαιον ξύμμαχον
Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢν δύνηται, ποιῆσαι. καὶ γάρ τι

\? 4 > , e A A (ὃ
καὶ Αρράβαιος ἐπεκηρυκεύετο, ἑτοῖμος ὧν Βρασίδᾳ
μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδέων

,ἤ 2Q7 2 A \ e
πρέσβεις ξυμπαρόντες ἐδίδασκον αὐτὸν μὴ ὑπεξ-
ελεῖν τῷ Περδίκκᾳ τὰ δεινά, ἵνα προθυμοτέρῳ
ἔχοιεν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἑαυτῶν χρῆσθαι. ἅμα δέ τι καὶ
εἰρήκεσαν τοιοῦτον οἱ παρὰ τοῦ ἸΠερδίκκον ἐν TH
Λακεδαίμονι, ὡς πολλὰ αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν
χωρίων ξύμμαχα ποιήσοι, ὥστε ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου
κοινῇ μᾶλλον ὁ Βρασίδας τὰ τοῦ ’AppaBatov
ἠξίου πράσσειν. ἸΠερδίκκας δὲ οὔτε δικαστὴν ἔφη
Βρασίδαν τῶν σφετέρων διαφορῶν ἀγαγεῖν, pan-
λον δὲ καθαιρέτην ὧν ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνῃ πολε-
μίων, ἀδικήσειν τε εἰ αὐτοῦ τρέφοντος τὸ ἥμισυ

A a , 3 ’ € \ »
τοῦ στρατοῦ ξυνέσται AppaBaip. ὁ δὲ ἄκοντος
καὶ ἐκ διαφορᾶς Evyyiyvetat, καὶ πεισθεὶς τοῖς

/ 2 , \ ? a 3
λόγοις ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς
τὴν χώραν. Περδίκκας δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο τρίτον

ἢ > mies A a 2O/ ’
μέρος ἀνθ᾽ ἡμίσεος τῆς τροφῆς ἐδίδου, νομίξων
ἀδικεῖσθαι.

LXXXIV. Ἂν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει εὐθὺς ὁ
Βρασίδας ἔχων καὶ Χαλκιδέας ἐπὶ ΓΑκανθον τὴν
"A ὃ ’ 3 4 δ. / Ν VA 3 ,

νὸρίων ἀποικίαν OXLYOY πρὸ τρυγήτου ἐστρα-
Τευσεν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν κατ᾽
1 ἐς λόγους, van Herwerden’s correction for λόγοις of the MSS.

354

BOOK IV. ΧΧΧΊΠ. 2—-Lxxxiv. 2

to Lyncus, Brasidas said that he wished, before
appealing to arms, to have a conference with Arrha-
baeus and make him an ally of the Lacedaemonians,
if he could. For it seemed that Arrhabaeus had
made some overtures and was ready to submit the
question at issue to Brasidas’ arbitration ; the Chalci-
dian envoys who were present also kept urging him
not to remove the difficulties from the path of
Perdiccas, since they wished to have in him a more
zealous helper in their own affairs. Furthermore,
the envoys of Perdiccas, when they were at Lace-
daemon, had given a hint to the effect that he would
bring many of the places in his neighbourhood into
alliance with the Lacedaemonians; consequently
Brasidas was inclined to insist upon having a freer
hand in dealing with Arrhabaeus. But Perdiccas said
that he had not brought Brasidas to be a judge of
their quarrels, but rather to be a destroyer of any
enemies whom he himself might designate, and that
Brasidas, would do wrong if, when he himself main-
tained half the army, he should parley with Arrha-
baeus. But Brasidas, in spite of Perdiccas and after
a quarrel with him, held the conference, and finding
the king’s arguments convincing, withdrew his army
without invading his country. After this Perdiccas
contributed only a third instead of one-half of the
maintenance, considering himself to be aggrieved.
LXXXIV. Immediately afterwards during the
same summer and a short time before the vintage
season, Brasidas took some Chalcidians in addition
to his own force and made an expedition against
Acanthus, the colony of the Andrians. But on thie
question of admitting him the Acanthians were

355

AA 2

THUCYDIDES

ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον, of Te μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων
ξυνεπάγοντες καὶ ὁ δῆμος. ὅμως δὲ διὰ τοῦ
καρποῦ τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὄντος πεισθὲν τὸ πλῆθος
ς \ a V4 4 / 2 A ,
ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέξασθαί τε αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ
3 4 4 ’ Ἁ
ἀκούσαντες βουλεύσασθαι, δέχεται: καὶ καταστὰς
ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος (ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαι-
μόνιος, εἰπεῖν) ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

LXXXV. “Ἢ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς

a e N , φ 9 /

στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ ᾿Ακάνθιοι,
γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἣν ἀρχόμενοι
τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, Αθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες
τὴν Ελλάδα πολεμήσειν" εἰ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐπήλθομεν,
σφαλέντες τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκεῖ πολέμου δόξης, ἡ
διὰ τάχους αὐτοὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὑμετέρον κινδύνου
ἠλπίσαμεν ᾿Αθηναίους καθαιρήσειν, μηδεὶς
μεμφθῇ: νῦν γάρ, ὅτε παρέσχεν, adiypévor καὶ
μετὰ ὑμῶν πειρασόμεθα κατεργάζεσθαι αὐτούς.
θαυμάξω δὲ τῇ τε ἀποκλήσει μου τῶν πυλῶν καὶ
3 \ 2? e a 9 ea) ς a \ e
εἰ μὴ ἀσμένοις ὑμῖν ἀφῖγμαι. ἡμεῖς μὲν yap οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἰόμενοί τε παρὰ ξυμμάχους, καὶ

Ἁ ΝΜ 3 A “ , ν.
πρὶν ἔργῳ ἀφικέσθαι, τῇ γοῦν γνώμῃ ἥξειν καὶ
βουλομένοις ἔσεσθαι, κίνδυνόν τε τοσόνδε ἀνερρί-
ψαμεν διὰ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν
3} ὶ a \ 40 ’ 1
ἰόντες καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόθυμον παρεσχόμεθα:
ὑμεῖς δὲ εἴ τε ἄλλο ἐν νῷ ἔχετε ἢ εἰ ἐναντιώσεσθε
τῇ Te ὑμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

1 Rutherford’s correction for παρεχόμενοι of the MSS.
356

BOOK IV. ixxxiv. 2-Lxxxv. 5

divided among themselves, on the one side being
those who, in concert with the Chalcidians, asked
him to intervene, and on the other side the popular
party. However, when Brasidas urged them to
admit him unattended and then, after hearing what
he had to say, to deliberate on the matter, the
populace consented, for they had fears concerning
the grapes, which had not yet been gathered. So he
came before the people—and indeed, for a Lace-
daemonian, he was not wanting in ability as a
speaker—and addressed them as follows :

LXXXV. “Citizens of Acanthus, the Lacedae-
monians have sent me and my army to prove the
truth of what we proclaimed at the beginning to be
the cause of the war, when we said that we were
going to war with the Athenians for the liberation
of Hellas. But if we have arrived late, disap-
pointed as we have been with regard to the war
at home, where we had hoped to destroy the
Athenians quite speedily, by our own efforts and
without involving you in the danger, do not blame
us; for we are here now, having come as soon as
opportunity offered, and together with you we shall
try tosubdue them. But I am amazed at the closing
of your gates against me, and that my coming has
been unwelcome to you. For we Lacedaemonians,
thinking, even before we actually came, that we
should find ourselves among men who were allies in
spirit at least and that we should be welcomed, have
hazarded the great danger of travelling a journey of
many days through an alien territory and have shown
all possible zeal. But if you have aught else in mind,
or intend to stand in the way of your own freedom
and that of the rest of the Hellenes, that would be

357

THUCYDIDES

6 Ἑλλήνων, δεινὸν ἂν εἴη. καὶ yap οὐχ ὅτι αὐτοὶ
ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἧσσόν τις
ἐμοὶ πρόσεισι, δυσχερὲς ποιούμενοι εἰ ἐπὶ obs
πρῶτον ἦλθον ὑμᾶς, καὶ πόλιν ἀξιόχρεων παρεχο-
μένους καὶ ξύνεσιν δοκοῦντας ἔχειν, μὴ ἐδέξασθε,
καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐ δόξω" πιστὴν ἀποδεικνύναι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἄδικον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιφέρειν ἣ ἀσθενὴς
καὶ ἀδύνατος τιμωρῆσαι τὰ πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους, ἢν

7 ἐπίωσιν, ἀφῖχθαι. καίτοι στρατιᾷ ye τῇδ᾽ ἣν νῦν
ἔχω ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν ἐμοῦ βοηθήσαντος οὐκ ἠθέλη-
σαν ᾿Αθηναῖοι πλέονες ὄντες προσμεῖξαι, ὥστε
οὐκ εἰκὸς νηίτῃ 2 γε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐν Νισαΐᾳ
στρατῷ ἴσον πλῆθος ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀποστεῖλαι.

LXXXVI. “Αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ᾽ ἔλευ-
θερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε
Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις
ἢ μὴν ods ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους
ἔσεσθαι αὐτονόμους, καὶ ἅμα οὐχ ἵνα ξυμμάχους
ὑμᾶς ἔχωμεν ἢ βίᾳ ἢ ἀπάτῃ προσλαβόντες, ἀλλὰ
τοὐναντίον ὑμῖν δεδουλωμένοις ὑπὸ ᾿Αθηναίων

2 ξυμμαχήσοντες. οὔκουν ἀξιῶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ὕποπ-
τεύεσθαι, πίστεις γε διδοὺς τὰς μεγίστας, οὔτε
τιμωρὸς ἀδύνατος νομισθῆναι, προσχωρεῖν δὲ
ὑμᾶς θαρσήσαντας.

8 “Καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγώ τισι
προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, πάντων

1 Sauppe’s correction for οὐχ ἕξω of the MSS.

2 So the MSS. ; Hude emends to νηίτην.

8 For ἐν Nicalg Hude adopts ἐκεῖ, with E, against the
other MSS.

358

BOOK IV. cxxxv. 5—Lxxxvi. 3

monstrous. For it is not merely that you yourselves
oppose me, but that all to whom I may apply will be
less inclined to join me, raising the objection that
you to whom I first came, representing as you do an
important city and reputed to be men of sense, did
not receive me. And it will seem! that the reason
which I give for your refusal is not to be believed,
but that either the freedom I offered you is not
honourable, or that when I came to you I was power-
less and unable to defend you against the Athenians
if they should attack you. And yet when I brought
aid to Nisaea with the very army which 1 now have,
the Athenians were unwilling, though superior in
numbers, to engage us, so that they are not
likely to send against you by sea a number equal to
the armament they had at Nisaea.

LXXXVI. “As for myself, I have come here not
to harm but to liberate the Hellenes, having bound
the government of the Lacedaemonians by the most
solemn oaths that in very truth those whom I should
win as allies should enjoy their own laws; and
further, we are come, not that we may have you as
allies, winning you over either by force or fraud, but
to offer our alliance to you who have been enslaved
by the Athenians. I claim, therefore, that I ought
not either myself to be suspected, offering as I do
the most solemn pledges, or to be accounted an
impotent champion, but that you should boldly come
over to me.

“ And if anyone, possibly, being privately afraid of
somebody is half-hearted through fear that I may
put the city into the hands of some party or

1 Or, reading οὐχ ἕξω, ““ And I shall have to submit to the

charge of not being able to give a reason for your refusal
that can be believed, but of offering, etc.”
359

THUCYDIDES

4 μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. ov yap ξυστασιάσων
ἥκω, οὐδὲ dv σαφῇ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίξω ἐπι-
φέρειν, εἰ τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς τὸ πλέον τοῖς
ὀλίγοις ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι δουλώσαιμι.

5 χαλεπωτέρα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη,
καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων

4 / 3 \ \ A Ἁ ἤ > »
χάρις καθίσταιτο, ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία
μᾶλλον: οἷς τε τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐγκλήμασι
καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα

6 ἢ ὁ μὴ ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι. ἀπάτῃ
γὰρ εὐπρεπεῖ αἴσχιον" τοῖς γε ἐν ἀξιώματι
πλεονεκτῆσαι ἢ βίᾳ ἐμφανεῖ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχύος

ἦσαι ἢ βίᾳ ἐὶ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχ
’ 4 3 , Ν
δικαιώσει, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, ἐπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ
γνώμης ἀδίκου ἐπιβουλῇς LXXXVII.. οὕτω
a a 4
πολλὴν περιωπὴν τῶν ἡμῖν ἐς τὰ μέγιστα
διαφόρων ποιούμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείξω πρὸς
τοῖς ὅρκοις βεβαίωσιν λάβοιτε, ἢ " οἷς τὰ ἔργα
ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἀναθρούμενα δόκησιν ἀναγκαίαν
παρέχεται ὡς καὶ ξυμφέρει ὁμοίως ὡς εἶπον.

ce Ei δ᾽ 3 [οὶ A oo ’ ἀδύ Q

2 ἐ δ᾽ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα προϊσχομένου ἀδύνατοι μὲν
φήσετε εἶναι, εὖνοι δ᾽ ὄντες ἀξιώσετε μὴ κακού-

a \ \ / \ 39 9
μενοι διωθεῖσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μὴ ἀκίνδυνον
ς oA , 4 7 \ \
ὑμῖν φαίνεσθαι, δίκαιόν τε εἶναι, ols καὶ δυνατὸν
δέχεσθαι αὐτήν, τούτοις καὶ ἐπιφέρειν, ἄκοντα δὲ

1 ἂν σαφῆ, Bauer’s correction for ἀσαφῆ of the MSS.
2 Hude writes αἴσχιόν τι, after Stobaeus.
3 Hude writes ὑμῖν, with Stahl. 4 Deleted by Hude.

360

BOOK IV. —_xxxvi. 3Lxxxvu. 2

other,! let him most of all have confidence. For |
am not come to join a faction, nor do I think that
the freedom I am offering would be a real one if,
regardless of your ancestral institutions, 1 should
enslave the majority to the few or the minority to
the multitude. That would be more galling than
foreign rule, and for us Lacedaemonians the result
would be, not thanks for our pains, but, instead of
honour and glory, only reproach; and the very
charges on which we are waging war to the death
against the Athenians we should be found to be
bringing home to ourselves in a more odious form
than the power which has made no display of virtue.
For it is more shameful, at least to men of reputa-
tion, to gain advantage by specious deceit than by
open force; for the one makes assault by the
assertion of power, which is the gift of fortune,
the other by the intrigues of deliberate injustice.
LXXXVII. Consequently we Lacedaemonians use
great circumspection as regards matters that con-
cern us in the highest degree? ; and you could not
get better security, in addition to our oaths, than
where you have men whose actions scrutinized in
the light of their professions furnish the irresistible
conviction that their interests are indeed exactly as
they have said.

« But if you meet these offers of mine with the plea
that you cannot join us, but, because you are well-
disposed to us, claim that you should not suffer by your
refusa], and maintain that the liberty I offer seems to
you to be not without its dangers, and that it is right
to offer it to those who can receive it but not to force

1 4.e. the dreaded ὀλίγοι.
+ Referring to Sparta’s reputation for justice.

361

THUCYDIDES

S ’ \ A) \
μηδένα προσαναγκάζειν, μάρτυρας μὲν θεοὺς καὶ
ἥρως τοὺς ἐγχωρίους ποιήσομαι ὡς ἐπ᾿ ἀγαθῷ
ἥκων οὐ πείθω, γῆν δὲ τὴν ὑμετέραν δηῶν πειρά-
σομαι βιάξεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἔτι νομιῶ,
προσεῖναι δέ τί μοι καὶ κατὰ δύο ἀνάγκας τὸ
εὔλογον, τῶν μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅπως μὴ τῷ
ὑμετέρῳ εὔνῳ, εἰ μὴ προσαχθήσεσθε, τοῖς ἀπὸ
ς A , / 3.» ’ὔ ,
ὑμῶν χρήμασι φερομένοις παρ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίους βλάπ-

e \ a “ \ ΄ ς 49
τωνται, οἱ δὲ “EAAnves ἵνα μὴ κωλύωνται ὑφ
ς A , ? a + \ > ἢ
ὑμῶν δουλείας ἀπαλλαγῆναι. οὐ yap δὴ εἰκότως
3 ’ , 2Qr\ 2 it e
y ἂν τάδε πράσσοιμεν, οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Aaxe-
δαιμόνιοι μὴ κοινοῦ τινος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ
βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν" οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμεθα,
παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς
πλείους ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν
ἐπιφέροντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους περιίδοιμεν.
πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθε εὖ, καὶ ἀγωνίσασθε τοῖς
τε “ἕλλησιν ἄρξαι πρῶτοι ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀΐδιον
δόξαν καταθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τά τε ἴδια μὴ
βλαφθῆναι καὶ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ πόλει τὸ κάλλιστον
ὄνομα περιθεῖναι."
LXXXVIII. Ὁ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσαῦτα εἶπεν.
“A 3
οἱ δὲ ᾿Ακάνθιοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ
3 / 7 4 4 XN
ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διά τε TO
ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ
A a ΝΜ 4 ’ 2 [4
καρποῦ φόβῳ ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι
᾿Αθηναίων, καὶ πιστώσαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ὅρκοις
ods τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὀμόσαντα αὐτὸν
9ῷῳ» ἢ A ” 4 3 4
ἐξέπεμψαν, ἡ μὴν ἔσεσθαι ξυμμάχους αὐτονόμους
362

BOOK IV. cuxxxvit. 2—LxXxxvill. 1

it on anyone against his will, I shall make the gods
and heroes of your country my witnesses that, though
I come for your good, I cannot persuade you, and I
shall try, by ravaging your territory, to compel you ;
and in that case I shall not consider that I am doing
wrong, but that I have some justification, for two
compelling reasons: first, in the interest of the
Lacedaemonians, that with all your professed good-
will toward them they may not, in case you shall
not be brought over, be injured by the money you
pay as tribute to the Athenians; secondly, that the
Hellenes may not be prevented by you from escaping
bondage. For otherwise we should not be justified
in acting thus, nor are we Lacedaemonians bound,
except on the plea of some common good, to confer
liberty on those who do not wish it. Nor, again, are
we seeking after empire, but rather we are eager
to stop others from acquiring it; and we should
do wrong to the majority, if, when we are bringing
independence to all, we permitted you to stand in
the way. In view of these things, deliberate wisely,
and strive to be the first to inaugurate freedom
for the Hellenes and to lay up for yourselves un-
dying fame; thus you will save your own property
from injury and confer upon your whole state the
fairest name.”’ |

LXXXVIII. Such was the speech of Brasidas. But
the Acanthians, after much had been said on both
sides of the question, took a secret vote, and, on
account of Brasidas’ impassioned words and their fears
about the harvest, the majority decided to revolt from
the Athenians; then having bound him with the
oaths which the authorities of the Lacedaemonians
swore when they sent him out, namely, that those

363

THUCYDIDES

ods ἂν “προσαγάγηται, οὕτω δέχονται τὸν στρατόν.
καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον καὶ Στάγιρος ᾿Ανδρίων
ἀποικία ξυναπέστη. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ θέρει
τούτῳ ἐγένετο.

LXXXIX. Τοῦ δ᾽ é ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς
ἀρχομένου, ὡς τῷ Ἱπποκράτει καὶ Δημοσθένει
στρατηγοῖς οὖσιν ᾿Αθηναίων τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς
ἐνεδίδοτο καὶ ἔδει τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένη ταῖς ναυσὶν
ἐς τὰς Σίφας ἀπαντῆσαι, τὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον,
γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς ἃς ἔδει
ἀμφοτέρους στρατεύειν, ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης πρό-
τερον πλεύσας πρὸς τὰς Σίφας καὶ ἔχων ἐν ταῖς
ναυσὶν ᾿Ακαρνᾶνας καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ πολλοὺς ξυμ-
μάχων, ἄπρακτος γίγνεται μηνυθέντος τοῦ
ἐπιβουλεύματος ὑπὸ Νικομάχου, ἀνδρὸς Φωκέως
ἐκ Φανοτέως, ὃς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἶπεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ
2 Βοιωτοῖς: καὶ βοηθείας γενομένης πάντων
Βοιωτῶν (οὐ γάρ πω Ἱπποκράτης. παρελύπει ἐν
τῇ γῇ ὧν) προκαταλαμβάνονται αἵ τε Σῖφαι καὶ
ἡ Χαιρώνεια. ὡς δὲ ἤσθοντο οἱ πράσσοντες
τὸ ἁμάρτημα, οὐδὲν ἐκίνησαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσιν.

ΧΟ. Ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης ἀναστήσας ᾿Αθηναίους
πανδημεί, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων
ὅσοι παρῆσαν, ὕστερος ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον,
ἤδη τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἀπὸ τῶν
Σιφῶν" καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν Δήλιον ἐτείχεξε
τοιῷδε τρόπῳ." τάφρον μὲν κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν
καὶ τὸν νεὼν ἔσκαπτον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀρύγματος
ἀνέβαλλον ἀντὶ τείχους τὸν χοῦν, καὶ σταυροὺς

1 τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ ᾿Απόλλωνος, after τρόπῳ in the MSS., deleted
by Dobree.

364

BOOK IV. txxxvitt. 1—xc. 2

whom he might win over should be autonomous allies,
they finally received the army. And not long after-
wards Stagirus,! a colony of the Andrians, joined
in the revolt. Such then, were the events of that
summer. |

LXXXIX. At the very beginning of the following
winter,?, when the places in Boeotia were to be
delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the
Athenian generals, Demosthenes was to have been
present with his ships at Siphae, the other general
at Delium. But a mistake was made as to the days
when both were to start, and Demosthenes sailed
too soon to Siphae, having Acarnanians and many
allies from that region on board, and so proved
unsuccessful; for the plot had been betrayed by
Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the
Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. Accord-
ingly succour came from all the Boeotians—for
Hippocrates was not yet in their country to annoy
them—and both Siphae and Chaeronea were occu-
pied in advance; and the conspirators, learning of
the mistake, attempted no disturbance in the towns.

XC, Meanwhile Hippocrates levied all the forces
of Athens, both citizens and resident aliens, and such
foreigners as were in the city. But he arrived at
Delium too late, after the Boeotians had already with-
drawn from Siphae. ‘Then, after settling his army in
camp, he proceeded to fortify Delium in the following
manner. They dug a ditch round the temple and
the sacred precinct and threw up the earth from
the ditch to serve for a wall, fixing stakes along

1 About twelve miles north of Acanthus, known also as
Stageira, the birthplace of Aristotle.
* Resumption of the narrative of ch. lxxix.

365

THUCYDIDES

παρακαταπηγνύντες ἄμπελον κόπτοντες τὴν περὶ
τὸ ἱερὸν ἐσέβαλλον καὶ λίθους ἅμα καὶ πλίνθον
ἐκ τῶν οἰκοπέδων τῶν ἐγγὺς καθαιροῦντες, καὶ
παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐμετεώριξον τὸ ἔρυμα. πύργους τε
ξυλίνους κατέστησαν ἡ καιρὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
οἰκοδόμημα οὐδὲν ὑπῆρχεν: ἥπερ yap ἦν στοὰ
κατεπεπτώκει. ἡμέρᾳ ἀρξάμενοι τρίτῃ ὡς
οἴκοθεν ὥρμησαν ταύτην τε εἰργάξοντο καὶ τὴν
τετάρτην καὶ τῆς πέμπτης μέχρι ἀρίστου. ἔπειτα,
ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα ἀπετετέλεστο, τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον
προαπεχώρησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Δηλίου οἷον δέκα
σταδίους ὡς ἐπ᾽ οἴκου πορευόμενον, καὶ οἱ μὲν
ψιλοὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν, οἱ δ᾽ ὁπλῖται
Géuevos τὰ ὅπλα ἡσύχαζον" “Ἱπποκράτης δὲ
ὑπομένων ἔ ers καθίστατο φυλακάς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ
τὸ προτείχισμα, ὅσα ἦν ὑπόλοιπα, ὡς χρῆν
ἐπιτελέσαι.

XCI. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις
ξυνελέγοντο ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν' καὶ ἐπειδὴ
ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων παρῆσαν καὶ ἢσθά-
vovto τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους προχωροῦντας ἐπ᾽ οἴκου,
τῶν ἄλλων βοιωταρχῶν, οἵ εἰσιν ἕνδεκα, οὐ
ξυνεπαινούντων μάχεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῇ
Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι εἰσί (μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς
᾿᾽Ωρωπίας οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἧσαν, ὅτε ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα),
Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδονυν βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν
μετ᾽ ᾿Αριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου καὶ ἡγεμονίας
οὔσης αὐτοῦ βουλόμενος τὴν μάχην ποιῆσαι καὶ
νομίξων ἄμεινον εἶναι κινδυνεῦσαι, προσκαλῶν
ἑκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ a0 όοι ἐκλίποιεν
τὰ ὅπλα, ἔπειθε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς tévas ἐπὶ τοὺς
᾿Αθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι, λέγων τοιάδε.

366

BOOK. IV. xc. 2—xc1.

it; and cutting down the grape-vines round the
sanctuary, they threw them in, as well as stones
and bricks from the neighbouring homesteads which
they pulled down, and in every way strove to
increase the height of the fortification. Wooden
towers, too, were erected wherever there was occasion
for them and no temple-structure was ready to hand ;
for the cloister that once existed had fallen down.
Beginning on the third day after they started from
home, they worked that day and the fourth and until
dinner-time on the fifth. Then, when most of it had
been finished, the main body withdrew from Delium
about ten stadia on their way home; and most of
the light-armed troops went straight on, while the
hoplites grounded arms and halted there. Hippocra-
tes, however, remained behind and was busy posting
pickets and arranging to complete whatever was
unfinished about the outwork.

XCI. But during these days the Boeotians were
gathering at Tanagra; and when they had come in
from all the cities and perceived that the Athenians
were going home, the rest of the eleven Boeotarchs
disapproved of fighting, as the enemy were no longer
in Boeotia— for the Athenians were just about on the
borders of Oropia when they halted. But Pagondas
son of Aeolidas, who, with Arianthidas son of Lysi-
machidas, was Boeotarch from Thebes and then in
chief command, wishing to bring on the battle and
thinking it was better to take the risk, called the
men by companies one after another, that they might
not leave their arms all at once, and tried to persuade
the Boeotians to go against the Athenians and bring
on the contest, speaking as follows:

367

THUCYDIDES

ΧΟΙΙ. “Χρῆν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Βοιωτοί, μηδ᾽ ἐς
ἐπίνοιά;.» τινα ἡμῶν ἐλθεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων ws οὐκ
> NX 3 [4 A wv Α 3 A ’ wv
εἰκὸς ᾿Αθηναίοις, ἣν ἄρα μὴ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι
καταλάβωμεν αὐτούς, διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν. τὴν
γὰρ Βοιωτίαν ἐκ τῆς ὁμόρου ἐλθόντες τεῖχος
4 4 [4 ὔ > ἡ
ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι μέλλουσι φθείρειν, καὶ εἰσὶ
δήπου πολέμιοι ἐν ᾧ τε ἂν χωρίῳ καταληφθῶσι

\ @ 3 4 lA ΝΜ Ἁ 4
καὶ ὅθεν ἐπελθόντες πολέμια ἔδρασαν. νυνὶ ὃ
Ν 3 ’ 4 4
εἴ τῳ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μετα-
, 3 Ν Ν ’ Μ) 3 ’
γνώτω. οὐ γὰρ τὸ προμηθές, οἷς ἂν ἄλλος erin,
περὶ τῆς σφετέρας ὁμοίως ἐνδέχεται λογισμὸν καὶ
ὅστις τὰ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει, τοῦ πλείονος δὲ ὀρεγό-
μενος ἑκών τινε ἐπέρχεται. πάτριόν τε ὑμῖν
στρατὸν ἀλλόφυλον ἐπελθόντα καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ
3 a A , e ’ 3 4 3 ὰ
καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πέλας ὁμοίως ἀμύνεσθαι: ᾿Αθη-
’ ἢ ¢ , Μ) a
vaious δὲ καὶ προσέτε ὁμόρους ὄντας πολλῷ
μάλιστα δεῖ. πρός τε γὰρ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας
nA \ 3 4 \ UA a \
πᾶσι TO ἀντίπαλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καθίσταται, καὶ
\ 4 1 ὃ 4 Oa) \ \ \ 9 ’ 3 ὰ
πρὸς τούτους “ γε δῆ, Ol καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγυς, ἀλλ
καὶ τοὺς ἄπωθεν πειρῶνται δουλοῦσθαι, πῶς οὐ
χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγῶνος ἐλθεῖν (παρά-
δευγμα δὲ ἔχομεν τούς τε ἀντιπέρας Εὐβοέας καὶ
τῆς ἄλλης Ελλάδος τὸ πολὺ ὡς αὐτοῖς διάκειται),
καὶ γνῶναι ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις οἱ πλησιόχωροι
περὶ γῆς ὅρων τὰς μάχας ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐς
πᾶσαν, ἣν νικηθῶμεν, εἷς ὅρος οὐκ ἀντίλεκτος
/ 2 \ / e
παγήσεται: ἐσελθόντες yap Bia τὰ ἡμέτερα
ἕξουσιν. τοσούτῳ ἐπικινδυνοτέραν ἑτέρων τὴν
1 Duker’s correction for τούτοις of the MSS.
368

BOOK IV. xcu. 1-5

XCII. “It should never, men of Boeotia, have
even entered the mind of any of us who are in
command that we ought not to come to battle with
the Athenians unless we should overtake them while
still on Boeotian soil. For it was to ravage Boeotia
that they came from across the frontier and built a
fort in our territory, and they are assuredly equally
our enemies wherever they may be caught, and
especially on that soil from which they advanced to
do the work of enemies. But as matters stand, if
anyone did indeed think that course safer, let him
change his mind. For where men are attacked
prudence does not admit of such nice calculation
regarding their own land as is permitted to those
who, secure in their own possessions, in their greed
for more wantonly attack others. Furthermore, it
is hereditary with you when an alien army comes
against you to ward it off, alike in your own land
and in that of your neighbours; and most of all
when the invaders are Athenians and moreover
upon your borders. For in dealing with neigh-
bours, it is always equality of force that guarantees
liberty ; and when the contest is against men like
these, who are trying to enslave not only those
near by but those far away, is it not necessary to
fight to the very last? We have as a warning ex-
ample their policy toward the Euboeans across the
strait as well as toward the greater part of Hellas,
and must realize that, whereas others make war
with their neighbours about territorial boundaries,
for us, if we are conquered, one boundary beyond dis-
pute will be fixed for our whole land ; for they will
come and take by force all that we have. So much
more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians

369
VOL. II. B B

THUCYDIDES

mapotxnaow τῶνδε ἔχομεν. εἰώθασί τε οἱ ἰσχύος
που θράσει τοῖς πέλας, ὥσπερ ᾿Αθηναῖοι νῦν,
ἐπιόντες τὸν μὲν ἡσυχάζοντα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ
μόνον ἀμυνόμενον ἀδεέστερον ἐπιστρατεύειν, τὸν
δὲ ἔξω ὅρων προαπαντῶντα Kai, ἣν καιρὸς ἡ,
πολέμου ἄρχοντα ἧσσον ἑτοίμως κατέχειν. πεῖ-
ραν δὲ ἔχομεν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ ἐς τούσδε' νικήσαντες
γὰρ ἐν Κορωνείᾳ αὐτούς, ὅτε τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν
στασιαζόντων κατέσχον, πολλὴν ἄδειαν τῇ
Βοιωτίᾳ μέχρι τοῦδε κατεστήσαμεν. ὧν χρὴ
μνησθέντας ἡμᾶς τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους ὁμοιω-
θῆναι τοῖς πρὶν ἔργοις, τούς τε νεωτέρους πατέρων
τῶν τότε ἀγαθῶν γενομένων παῖδας πειρᾶσθαι μὴ
αἰσχῦναι τὰς προσηκούσας ἀρετάς, πιστεύσαντας
δὲ τῷ θεῷ πρὸς ἡμῶν ἔσεσθαι, οὗ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀνόμως
τειχίσαντες νέμονται, καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἃ ἡμῖν
θυσαμένοις καλὰ φαίνεται, ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖσδε
καὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι ὧν μὲν ἐφίενται πρὸς τοὺς μὴ
ἀμυνομένους ἐπιόντες κτάσθων, οἷς δὲ γενναῖον
τήν τε αὑτῶν αἰεὶ ἐλευθεροῦν μάχῃ καὶ τὴν
ἄλλων μὴ δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως, ἀνανταγώνιεστοι
ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπίασιν."

XCIII. Τοιαῦτα ὁ Παγώνδας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς
παραινέσας ἔπεισεν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους.
καὶ κατὰ τάχος ἀναστήσας ἦγε τὸν στρατόν (ἤδη
γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ὀψὲ ἦν), καὶ ἐπειδὴ προσέ-
μειξεν ἐγγὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος αὐτῶν, ἐς χωρίον
καθίσας ὅθεν λόφου ὄντος μεταξὺ οὐκ ἐθεώρουν
ἀλλήλους, ἔτασσέ τε καὶ παρεσκευάξετο ὡς ἐς

310

BOOK IV. xcr. 5—xen. τ

than that of others. Besides, people who in the con-
fidence of strength attack their neighbours, as the
Athenians now do, are wont to march more fearlessly
against one who keeps quiet and defends himself
only in his own land, but are less ready to grapple
with him who meets them outside of his own
boundaries and, if opportunity offers, makes the first
attack. We have a proof of this in these Athenians;
for at Coronea,! when owing to our internal dissen-
sions they had occupied our land, we defeated them
and won for Boeotia great security which has lasted
to this day. Remembering these things, let the
older men among us emulate their former deeds, and
the younger, sons of fathers who then were brave, try
not to disgrace the virtues which are their heritage.
Trusting that the god whose sanctuary they have
impiouslv fortified and now occupy will be on our
side, and relying on the sacrifices, which appear to be
propitious to us, who have offered them, let us ad-
vance to meet them and show that if they would
get what they covet they must attack those who
will not defend themselves, but that men whose
noble spirit impels them always to fight for the
liberty of their own land and not to enslave that of
others unjustly will never let them depart without
a battle.”

XCHI. With such exhortations Pagondas per-
suaded the Boeotians to attack the Athenians, then
quickly broke camp and led on his army, for it was
already late in the day. When he drew near their
army he halted at a place from which, because of an
intervening hill, the two armies could not see each
other, and there drew up and prepared for battle.

1 447 B.0.; cf. 1. cxiii. 2; 111. lxii. 5.

371
BB 2

THUCYDIDES

2 μάχην. τῷ δὲ ἹἽπποκράτειϊ ὄ ὄντι περὶ τὸ Δήλιον
ὡς αὐτῷ ἠγγέλθη ὅ ὅτι Βοιωτοὶ ἐπέρχονται, πέμπει
ἐς τὸ στράτευμα κελεύων ἐς τάξιν καθίστασθαι,
καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐπῆλθε, καταλιπὼν
ὡς τριακοσίους ἱππέας περὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ὅπως
φύλακές τε ἅμα εἶεν, εἴ τις ἐπίοι αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς
Βοιωτοῖς καιρὸν φυλάξαντες ἐπιγένοιντο ἐν τῇ

8 μάχῃ. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ πρὸς τούτους ἀντικατέστησαν
τοὺς ἀμυνουμένους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ καλῶς αὐτοῖς
εἶχεν, ὑπερεφάνησαν τοῦ λόφου καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ
ὅπλα τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ὁπλῖται
ἑπτακισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ψιλοὶ ὑπὲρ μυρίους,
ἱππῆς δὲ χίλιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ πεντακόσιοι.

4 εἶχον δὲ δεξιὸν “μὲν κέρας Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμ-
μοροι αὐτοῖς" μέσοι δὲ. ᾿Αλεάρτιοι καὶ Κορωναῖοι
καὶ Κωπαιῆς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ τὴν λίμνην"
τὸ δὲ εὐώνυμον εἶχον Θεσπιῆς καὶ Ταναγραῖοι
καὶ ᾿Ορχομένιοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ κέρᾳ ἑκατέρῳ οἱ
ἱππῆς καὶ ψιλοὶ ἦσαν. ἐπ᾽ ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε
μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡς

5 ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον. αὕτη μὲν Βοιωτῶν παρασκευὴ
καὶ διάκοσμος 7 ἦν.

XCIV. ᾿Αθηναῖοι δὲ οἱ μὲν ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ
πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐτάξαντο ὄντες πλήθει
ἰσοπαλεῖς τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἱππῆς δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρῳ
τῷ κέρᾳ. ψιλοὶ δὲ ἐκ παρασκευῆς μὲν ὧπλι-
σμένοι οὔτε τότε παρῆσαν οὔτε ἐγένοντο τῇ
πόλει" οἵπερ δὲ ,ἔυνεσέβαλον, ὄντες πολλα-
πλάσιοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἄοπλοί τε πολλοὶ ἠκολού-
θησαν, ἅτε πανστρατιᾶς ξένων τῶν παρόντων

1 Hude inserts ἔτι before ὄντι, with Rutherford, and deletes
αὐτῷ before ἠγγέλθη, with Kriiger. 2 Deleted by Hude.

272

BOOK IV. xem. 1—xciv. 1

Meanwhile Hippocrates, who was at Delium, on being
informed that the Boeotians were coming on, sent
orders to the army to fall in line, and himself not
long afterwards joined them, leaving about three
hundred cavalry at Delium, to guard it in case of
attack and also to watch for an opportunity to fall
upon the Boeotians in the course of the battle. But
the Boeotians set a detachment to ward these off.
Then when everything was ready they appeared
over the hill and halted, drawn up in the order in
which they were to fight, about seven thousand
hoplites, over ten thousand light-armed troops, one
thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts. On
the right were the Thebans and their allies; in the
centre the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and
the other people around the lake;} on the left the
Thespians, Tanagraeans and Orchomenians. On
either wing were the cavalry and the light-armed -
troops. The Thebans were marshalled in ranks
twenty-five shields deep, the rest as chance directed
in each case. Such were the preparations of the
Boeotians and their order of battle.

XCIV. On the Athenian side the whole body of
hoplites, who were equal in number to those of the
enemy, were marshalled eight deep, and the cavalry
on either wing. But light-armed troops, regularly
armed, were neither then present, nor did the city
possess any; but such lighter forces as had joined
in the invasion, while they were many times more
numerous than, the enemy, followed in large part
without arms, as there had been a levy in mass of
strangers that were in them as well as of citizens ;

1 Lake Copais.
373

THUCYDIDES

καὶ ἀστῶν γενομένης, καὶ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμησαν
ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, οὐ παρεγένοντο ὅτι μὴ ὀλύγοι. καθε-
στώτων δὲ ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἤδη μελλόντων
ξυνιέναι, 'ἱἱπποκράτης 6 στρατηγὸς ἐπιπαριὼν τὸ
στρατόπεδον τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων παρεκελεύετό τε καὶ
ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

XCV. “0 ᾿Αθηναῖοι, δι ὀλίγου μὲν ἡ παραΐί-
νεσις γίγνεται, τὸ ἴσον δὲ πρός γε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς
ἄνδρας δύναται καὶ ὑπόμνησιν μᾶλλον ἔχει ἢ
ἐπικέλευσιν. παραστῇ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑμῶν ὡς ἐν τῇ
ἀλλοτρίᾳ οὐ προσῆκον 7 τοσόνδε κίνδυνον ἀναρρι-
πτοῦμεν. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τούτων ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ὁ
ἀγὼν ἔσται" καὶ ἦν νικήσωμεν, οὐ μή ποτε ὑμῖν
Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς τὴν χώραν ἄνευ τῆς τῶνδε
ἵππου ἐσβάλωσιν, ἐν δὲ μιᾷ μάχῃ τήνδε τε
προσκτᾶσθε καὶ ἐκείνην μᾶλλον ἐλευθεροῦτε'
χωρήσατε οὖν ἀξίως ἐς αὐτοὺς τῆς τε πόλεως,
ἣν ἕκαστος πατρίδα ἔ ἔχων πρώτην ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλη-
σιν ἀγάλλεται, καὶ τῶν πατέρων, οἱ τούσδε pay?
κρατοῦντες μετὰ Μυρωνίδου ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τὴν
Βοιωτίαν ποτὲ ἔσχον."

XCVI. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους παρακε-
λευομένου καὶ μέχρι μὲν μέσον τοῦ στρατοπέδου
ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκέτι φθάσαντος, οἱ
Βοιωτοί, παρακελευσαμένου καὶ σφίσιν ὡς διὰ
ταχέων καὶ ἐνταῦθα Παγώνδου, παιανίσαντες
ἐπῇσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου. ἀντεπῆσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ
᾿Αϑηναῖοι καὶ προσέμειξαν δρόμφ. καὶ ἑκατέρων
τῶν στρατοπέδων τὰ ἔσχατα οὐκ ἦλθεν ἐς Χεῖρας,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀὐτὸ ἔπαθεν" ῥύακες γὰρ ἐκώλυσαν.
τὸ δὲ ἄλλο καρτερᾷ μάχῃ καὶ ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων
ξυνειστήκει. καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον τῶν Βοιωτῶν

374

BOOK IV. χοιν. 1-xcvi. 3

and, having once started homewards, they were not
present at the action, except a few. When they
were arranged in line and were about to engage,
Hippocrates the general, passing along the Athenian
line, exhorted them and spoke as follows:

XCV. “ Men of Athens, my exhortation will not be
long, but to brave men it will mean as much, and
will be a reminder rather than an appeal. Let none
of you think that because we are on foreign soil it
is without cause that we are hazarding this great
danger. For though the contest is on Boeotian
soil, it will be in defence of our own ; and, if we
win, the Peloponnesians, deprived of the Boeotian
cavalry, will never again invade your territory, and
in one battle you not only win this land but make
more sure the freedom of your own. Advance to
meet them, therefore, in a spirit worthy both of that
state, the foremost in Hellas, which every one of
you is proud to claim as his fatherland, and of the
fathers who under Myronides vanquished these men
at Oenophyta,! and became at one time masters of
Boeotia.”’

XCVI. Hippocrates was thus exhorting his men
and had got as far as the centre of the army, but no
further, when the Boeotians, after they too had again
been briefly harangued by Pagondas, raised the paean
and came on from the hill. And the Athenians also
advanced against them and met them on a run.
The extremities of the line on either side never
came to close quarters, for both had the same diffi-
culty—they were hindered by swollen torrents. The
rest were engaged in stubborn conflict, with shield
pressed against shield, And the Boeotian left, as

1 456 B.C.
375

THUCYDIDES

καὶ μέχρι μέσου ἡσσᾶτο ὑπὸ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων, καὶ
ἐπίεσαν τούς τε ἄλλους ταύτῃ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα
τοὺς Θεσπιᾶς. ὑποχωρησάντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν
παρατεταγμένων καὶ κυκλωθέντες" ἐν ὀλίγῳ,
οἵπερ διεφθάρησαν Θεσπιῶν, ἐν χερσὶν ἀμυνό-
μενοι κατεκόπησαν" καί τινες καὶ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
διὰ τὴν κύκλωσιν ταραχθέντες ἠγνόησάν τε καὶ
ἀπέκτειναν ἀλλήλους. τὸ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ ἡσσᾶτο
τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μαχόμενον κατέφυγε,
τὸ δὲ δεξιόν, 7 οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἦσαν, ἐκράτει τῶν
᾿Αθηναίων καὶ ὠσάμενοι κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρῶτον
ἐπηκολούθουν. καὶ ξυνέβη, Παγώνδου περιπέμ-
ψαντος δύο τέλη τῶν ἱππέων ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς
περὶ τὸν λόφον, ὡς ἐπόνει τὸ εὐώνυμον αὐτῶν,
καὶ ὑπερφανέντων αἰφνιδίως, τὸ νικῶν τῶν
᾿Αθηναίων κέρας, νομίσαν ἄλλο στράτευμα
ἐπιέναι, ἐς φόβον καταστῆναι' καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν
ἤδη, ὑπό τε τοῦ τοιούτον καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων
ἐφεπομένων καὶ παραρρηγνύντων, φυγὴ καθει-
στήκει παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων.
καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸ Δήλιόν τε καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν
ὥρμησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ᾿᾽Ωρωποῦ, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς
Πάρνηθα τὸ ὄρος, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοί τινα εἶχον
ἐλπίδα σωτηρίας. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ ἐφεπόμενοι ἔκτεινον,
καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἱππῆς οἵ τε αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ Λοκροὶ
βεβοηθηκότες apte τῆς τροπῆς γιγνομένης"
νυκτὸς δὲ ἐπιλαβούσης τὸ ἔργον ῥᾷον τὸ πλῆθος
τῶν φευγόντων διεσώθη. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἵ Te
ἐκ τοῦ ᾿Ωρωποῦ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Δηλίου φυλακὴν
ἐγκαταλιπόντες (εἶχον γὰρ αὐτὸ ὅμως ἔτι)
ὙῬτεκομίσθησαν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

1 Kriiger’s correction for κυκλωθέντων of the MSS.

376

BOOK IV. xcvi. 3-8

far as the centre, was worsted by the Athenians,
who pressed hard upon all the rest in that quarter,
and especially upon the Thespians. For when they
saw that the ranks on either side had given way and
that they were surrounded, those of the Thespians
who perished were cut down fighting hand to hand.
And some also of the Athenians, getting into con-
fusion owing to their surrounding the enemy, mis-
took and killed one another. Here, then, the
Boeotians were defeated and fled to the part of
their army which was still fighting ; but the right
wing, where the Thebans were, had the better of the
Athenians, and pushing them back step by step at
first followed after them. It happened also that
Pagondas, when their left was in distress, sent two
squadrons of cavalry round the hill from a point out
of sight, and when these suddenly appeared, the
victorious wing of the Athenians, thinking that
another army was coming on, was thrown into a
panic. At this time, consequently, owing both
to this mancuvre! and to the Thebans following
them up and breaking their line, a rout of the
whole Athenian army ensued. Some hastened to
Delium and the sea, others toward Oropus, others to
Mt. Parnes, others wherever each had any hope of
safety. And the Boeotians, especially their cavalry
and that of the Locrians who had come up just as
the rout began, followed after and slew them; but
when night closed down upon the action the mass of
the fugitives escaped more easily. On the next day
the troops from Oropus and those from Delium, leav-
ing a garrison at the latter place, which they still
held, were conveyed home by sea.”
1 2,6. the attack of the two squadrons of cavalry.

2 Itis interesting to know that Socrates fought in the battle
of Delium and saved Alcibiades’ life (Plato, Symp. 221 e).

377

THUCYDIDES

XCVII. Καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες
καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀνελόμενοι νεκροὺς τούς τε τῶν
πολεμίων σκυλεύσαντες καὶ φυλακὴν καταλε-
πόντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν, καὶ τῷ
Δηλίῳ ἐπεβούλευον ὡς προσβαλοῦντες. ἐκ δὲ
τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων κῆρυξ πορευόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς
νεκροὺς ἀπαντᾷ κήρυκι Βοιωτῷ, ὃς αὐτὸν ἀπο-

’ \ 3 \ Φ δὲ 4 \ a
στρέψας καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐδὲν πράξει πρὶν ἂν
αὐτὸς ἀναχωρήσῃ πάλιν, καταστὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς
? ’ Μ \ [οὶ a a >
Αθηναίους ἔλεγε τὰ παρὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν, ὅτι οὐ
δικαίως δράσειαν παραβαίνοντες τὰ νόμιμα τῶν
“EAAnvev πᾶσι γὰρ εἶναι καθεστηκὸς ἰόντας ἐπὶ

\ 3 4 e le le) > » 3 7
τὴν ἀλλήλων ἱερῶν τῶν ἐνόντων ἀπέχεσθαι,
3 ’ \ / 7 ᾽ “
Αθηναίους δὲ Δήλιον τειχίσαντας ἐνοικεῖν, καὶ
ὅσα ἄνθρωποι ἐν βεβήλῳ δρῶσι πάντα γίγνεσθαι
αὐτόθι, ὕδωρ τε ὃ ἦν ἄψαυστον σφίσι πλὴν πρὸς

e ὔ a 3 , e ’
τὰ ἱερὰ χέρνιβι χρῆσθαι, ἀνασπάσαντας ὑδρεύ-

Ψ e / “A A ς “A
εσθαι' ὥστε ὑπέρ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἑαυτῶν
Βοιωτούς, ἐπικαλουμένους τοὺς ὁμωχέτας δαΐί-
μονας καὶ τὸν ᾿Απόλλω, προαγορεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ
τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀπιόντας ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα
αὐτῶν. :

XCVIII. Τοσαῦτα τοῦ κήρυκος εἰπόντος οἱ
3 “ J \ Ἁ bg na
Αθηναῖοι πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἑαυτῶν
κήρυκα τοῦ μὲν ἱεροῦ οὔτε ἀδικῆσαι ἔφασαν οὐδὲν

A nae i? 7 \ A
οὔτε τοῦ λοιποῦ ἑκόντες βλάψειν" οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν
3 Ἁ 2 Ἃθ ” > A 7 AX (7 3 3 fo) A
ἀρχὴν ἐσελθεῖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοὺς

A a a 4 Ν A
ἀδικοῦντας μᾶλλον σφᾶς ἀμύνωνται. τὸν δὲ
378

BOOK IV. χουν. 1—xcvill. 2

XCVII. The Boeotians set up a trophy and took
up their own dead ; then, having stripped the dead
of the enemy and left a guard over them, they
retired to Tanagra, and there planned an assault
upon Delium. Meanwhile a herald from Athens,
coming to ask for their dead, met a Boeotian herald,
who turned him back, telling him he would accom-
plish nothing until he himself returned! The
latter then came before the Athenians and gave
them the message from the Boeotians: that they
had not done right in transgressing the usages of the
Hellenes; for it was an established custom of them
all, when invading one another's country to abstain
from the sanctuaries therein, whereas the Athenians
had fortified Delium and now dwelt in it, doing
there whatsoever men do in a profane place, even
drawing for common use the water which was un-
touched by themselves except for use in lustrations
connected with the sacrifices. Wherefore the Boeo-
tians, in behalf of the god and of themselves, in-
voking the deities worshipped at the common altars
and also Apollo, gave them notice to come out them-
selves from the temple and carry off what belonged
to them.?

XCVIII. When the herald had spoken, the
Athenians sent a herald of their own to the
Boeotians, saying that they had done no injury to
the temple, and would not damage it wilfully in
the future; for they had not entered it at the
outset with any such intent, but rather that from
it they might defend themselves against those
who were wronging them. And the law of the

1 §.e. to the Boeotian camp from the Athenian, to which he
was carrying ἃ message. 2 te. their dead.

379

THUCYDIDES

νόμον τοῖς “Ἑλλησιν εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ἦ τὸ κράτος THs
γῆς ἑκάστης, ἤν τε πλέονος ἤν τε βραχυτέρας,
’ e > A ‘4 ’
τούτων καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τρόποις
θεραπευόμενα οἷς ἂν πρὸ τοῦ εἰωθόσι καὶ
δύνωνται. καὶ γὰρ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς
τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἐξαναστήσαντές τινα βίᾳ
’ A 3 ’ e a A [ον
νέμονται γῆν, ἀλλοτρίοις ἱεροῖς τὸ πρῶτον
Φ 9 na ΠῚ A 9 ’ φ
ἐπελθόντας οἰκεῖα νῦν κεκτῆσθαι. καὶ αὐτοί, εἰ
9 a δι 3 7 a
μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον δυνηθῆναι τῆς ἐκείνων κρατῆσαι,
a 3 “ 3 φ / > » e ἢ
τοῦτ᾽ ἂν ἔχειν: νῦν δὲ ἐν ᾧ μέρει εἰσίν, ἑκόντες
> e 9 > 3 ’ ΥΩ
εἶναι ὡς ἐκ σφετέρου οὐκ ἀπιέναι. ὕδωρ τε
3 “A 5 4 A 3 3 \ [2
ἐν τῇ ἀνάγκῃ κινῆσαι, ἣν οὐκ αὐτοὶ ὕβρει
\
προσθέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνους προτέρους ἐπὶ τὴν
σφετέραν ἐλθόντας ἀμυνόμενοι βιάζεσθαι χρῆ-
A > 9 A 9 \ / Α a
σθαι. πᾶν δ᾽ εἰκὸς εἶναι TO πολέμῳ Kal δεινῷ τινι
κατειργόμενον ξύγγνωμόν τι γίγνεσθαι καὶ πρὸς
τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων
καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς βωμούς, παρανομίαν τε
ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀνάγκῃ κακοῖς ὀνομασθῆναι καὶ οὐκ
oN a» A A a ,
ἐπὶ Tots ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν τι τολμήσασιν. TOUS
τε νεκροὺς πολὺ μειζόνως ἐκείνους ἀντὶ ἱερῶν
ἀξιοῦντας ἀποδιδόναι ἀσεβεῖν ἢ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλον-
Tas ἱεροῖς τὰ πρέποντα κομίζεσθαι. σαφῶς τε
9 4 ’ 9 [4] A 9 ΄΄ὶ “~
ἐκέλευον σφίσιν εἰπεῖν μὴ ἀπιοῦσιν ἐκ τῆς
1 Stahl’s conjecture for πρὸς τοῖς of the MSS.
380

BOOK IV. xcvir. 2-8

Hellenes was, they said, that whosoever had dominion
over any country, be it larger or smaller, to them
the sanctuaries also always belonged, to be tended,
so far as might be possible, with whatsoever rites
had hitherto been customary.! Indeed the Boeotians,
and most others who had driven out any people
and taken forcible possession of their country, had
at first attacked the temples as alien but now pos-
sessed them as their own. And they themselves,
if they had been able to conquer more of the
Boeotian territory, would have held it; but as it
was, they would not depart from that portion in
which they were, at least of their free will, consider
ing it their own. The water, moreover, they had
disturbed in their sore need, which they had not
wantonly brought upon themselves ; they had been
forced to use the water while defending themselves
against the Boeotians who had first invaded their
land. And anything done under the constraint of
war and danger might reasonably meet with some
indulgence, even from the god. For altars were a
refuge in cases of involuntary misdeeds, and trans-
gression was a term applied to those who do evil
without compulsion and not to those who are driven
by misfortunes to some act of daring. Moreover, the
Boeotians in presuming to give up the bodies of
the dead in return for temples were impious in a
much higher degree than they who refused by the
exchange of temples to procure that which they had
a right to recover. And they bade the Boeotians
plainly tell them they might take up their dead, not

1 Or, reading πρὸς τοῖς εἰωθόσι with the MSS., ‘‘to be
tended, besides the usual rites, with such others as they
might be able to use.”

381

THUCYDIDES

Βοιωτῶν γῆς (οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἔτι εἶναι,
ἐν ἣ δὲ δορὶ ἐκτήσαντο), ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια
τοὺς νεκροὺς σπένδουσιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι.

XCIX. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν
τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν, ἀπιόντας ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀποφέ-
ρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα, εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων, αὐτοὺς
γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον, νομίξοντες τὴν μὲν
Ὦρωπίαν, ἐν ἡ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς
μάχης γενομένης κεῖσθαι ξυνέβη, ᾿Αθηναίων κατὰ
τὸ ὑπήκοον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αὐτοὺς βίᾳ σφῶν
κρατῆσαι αὐτῶν (οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐσπένδοντο δῆθεν ὑπὲρ
τῆς ἐκείνων 1)" τὸ δὲ “ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν᾽ ᾿ εὐπρεπὲς
εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι " “ἀπιόντας καὶ ἀπολαβεῖν
ἃ ἀπαιτοῦσιν." ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
ἀκούσας ἀπῆλθεν ἄπρακτος.

C. Καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ εὐθὺς Νὰ Casas
ἔκ te τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου ἀκοντιστ καὶ
σφενδονήτας, καὶ βεβοηθηκότων αὐτοῖς μετὰ
τὴν μάχην Κορινθίων τε δισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν
καὶ τῶν ἐκ Νισαίας ἐξεληλυθότων Πελοπον-
νησίων φρουρῶν καὶ Μεγαρέων ἅμα, ἐστρά-
τευσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον ἐλ τῷ
τευχίσματι, ἄλλῳ TE τρόπῳ πειράσαντες καὶ
μηχανὴν προσήγαγον, ἥπερ εἷλεν αὐτό, τοιάνδε.
κεραίαν μεγάλην δίχα πρίσαντες ἐκοίλαναν
ἅπασαν καὶ ξυνήρμοσαν πάλιν ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ
avrov,? καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄκραν λέβητά τε ἤρτησαν ἁλύσεσι
καὶ ᾿ἀκροφύσιον ἀπὸ τῆς κεραίας σιδηροῦν ἐς
αὐτὸν νεῦον καθεῖτο, καὶ ἐσεσιδήρωτο ἐπὶ μέγα

1 Parenthetical according to Poppo.
5 ὥσπερ αὐλόν, deleted by Hude.

382

BOOK. IV. χονπι. 8-c. 2
“on condition of quitting Boeotia ’’—for they were
no longer in Boeotian territory, but in land which
they had won by the spear,—but “on making a
truce according to ancestral custom.”

XCIX. The Boeotians made answer, if they were
in Boeotia, they might carry off their dead on
quitting their land; but if they were in their own
territory, they could determine themselves what to
do. For they thought that though Oropia, in which
the bodies happened to be lying—for the battle
occurred on the boundaries — belonged to the
Athenians by right of its subjection, yet that they
could not get possession of the bodies without their
leave (nor indeed were they going to make a .truce,
forsooth, about territory belonging to the Athenians);
but they thought it was fair to answer, “when they
had quitted Boeotian territory they could get back
what they asked for.” And the herald of the Athen-
ians, on hearing this, went away without accomplish-
ing his object.

C. The Boeotians sent off at once for darters
and slingers from the Maliac Gulf, and with two
thousand Corinthian hoplites, who reinforced them
after the battle, as well as the Peloponnesian garrison
which had evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians
also, made an expedition against Delium and attacked
the fortification. After trying other forms of assault
they took it by bringing up an engine made in the
following manner. Having sawed in two a great
beam they hollowed it throughout, and fitted it
together again nicely like a pipe; then they hung a
cauldron at one end of it with chains, and into the
cauldron an iron bellows-pipe was let down in a curve!
from the beam, which was itself in great part plated

1 i.e. it was bent into the cauldron.
383

THUCYDIDES

3 καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου “ξύλου. προσῆγον. δὲ ἐκ πολλοῦ
ἁμάξαις τῷ τείχει, ἡ μάλεστα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ
τοῖς ξύλοις φκοδόμητο" καὶ ὁπότε εἴη ἐγγύς,
φύσας μεγάλας ἐσθέντες ἐ ἐς τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἄκρον

4 τῆς κεραίας ἐφύσων. ἡ δὲ πνοὴ ἰοῦσα στεγανῶς
ἐς τὸν λέβητα, ἔχοντα ἄνθρακάς τε ἡμμένους
καὶ θεῖον καὶ πίσσαν, φλόγα ἐποίει μεγάλην. καὶ
ἦψε τοῦ τείχους, ὥστε μηδένα ἔτι ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ
μεῖναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολιπόντας ἐς φυγὴν καταστῆναι

δ καὶ τὸ τείχισμα τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἁλῶναι. τῶν
δὲ φρουρῶν οἱ μὲν ἀπέθανον, διακόσιοι δὲ
ἐλήφθησαν' τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ πλῆθος ἐς τὰς
ναῦς ἐσ βὰν ἀπεκομίσθη ἐ ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

CI. Τοῦ δὲ Δηλίου ἑβδόμῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ 1 ἡμέρᾳ
ληφθέντος μετὰ τὴν μάχην καὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν
᾿Αθηναίων κήρυκος οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένου τῶν
γεγενημένων ἐλθόντος οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον αὖθις
περὶ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ

2 οὐκέτι ταὐτὰ ἀπεκρίναντο. ἀπέθανον δὲ Βοιωτῶν

ἐν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντακοσίων,
᾿Αθηναίων δὲ ὀλύγῳ ἐλάσσους χιλίων καὶ
Ἱπποκράτης ὁ 0 στρατηγός, ψιλῶν δὲ καὶ σκευο-
φόρων πολὺς ἀριθμός.

3 Mera δὲ τὴν μάχην. ταύτην καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης
ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον, ὡς αὐτῷ τότε πλεύσαντι τὰ περὶ
τὰς Σίφας τῆς προδοσίας πέρι οὐ προυχώρησεν,
ἔχων τὸν στρατὸν ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν τῶν τε ᾿Ακαρ-
νάνων καὶ ᾿Αγραίων, καὶ ᾿Αθηναίων τετρακοσίους
ὁπλίτας, ἀπόβασιν ἐποιήσατο ἐς τὴν Σικνωνίαν.

4 καὶ πρὶν πάσας τὰς ναῦς καταπλεῦσαι βοηθή-
σαντες ob Σικυώνιοι τοὺς ἀποβεβηκότας ἔτρεψαν
καὶ κατεδίωξαν ἐς τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέ-

1 Kriiger’s correction for ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ of the MSS.

384

BOOK IV. c. 2<c1. 4

withiron. This engine they brought up from a distance
on carts to the part of the wall where it was built
chiefly of vines and wood; and when it was near,
they inserted a large bellows into the end of the
beam next to them and blew through it. And the
blast passing through the air-tight tube into the
cauldron, which contained lighted coals, sulphur, and
pitch, made a great blaze and set fire to the wall,
so that no one could stay on it longer, but all left
it and took to flight; and in this way the fortifica-
tion was taken. Of the garrison some were slain,
and two hundred were captured; but most of the
rest got on board their ships and were conveyed
home.

CI. So Delium was taken seventeen days after the
battle, and when the Athenian herald, who knew
nothing of what had happened, came back not long
after to ask for the dead, the Boeotians did not again
make the same answer but gave them up. And
there were slain in the battle, of the Boeotians a
little more than five hundred, of the Athenians a
little less than one thousand, including Hippocrates
their general, besides a great number of light-armed
troops and baggage-carriers.

Not long after this battle Demosthenes, since he
had failed in his negotiations about the betrayal of
Siphae, when he sailed thither at the time mentioned
above,! took on his ships his force of Acarnanians
and Agraeans and four hundred Athenian hophites
and made a descent upon the territory of Sicyon.
But before all bis ships had come to shore the
Sicyonians came to the rescue, and routing those
who had disembarked pursued them to their ships,

1 of. ch. lxxxix, 1.
385

VOL. II. cc

THUCYDIDES

κτείναν, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον. τροπαῖον δὲ
στήσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν.

᾿Απέθανε δὲ καὶ Σιτάλκης ᾿Οδρυσῶν βασιλεὺς
ὑπὸ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τοῖς ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, στρατεύσας
ἐπὶ Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ νικηθεὶς μά De Σεύθης δὲ ὁ
Σπαραδόκου ἀδελφιδοῦς ὧν αὐτοῦ ἐβασίλευσεν
᾿Οδρυσῶν τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Θράκης ἧσπερ καὶ
ἐκεῖνος.

ΟΠ. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Βρασίδας ἔ ἔχων
τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης ξυμμάχους ἐστράτευσεν ἐς
᾿Αμφίπολεν τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι ποταμῷ ᾿Αθη-
ναίων ἀποικίαν. τὸ δὲ χωρίον τοῦτο ἐφ᾽ οὗ νῦν
ἡ TOMS ἐστὶν ἐπείρασε μὲν πρότερον καὶ ᾽Αρει-
'σταγόρας ὁ Μιλήσιος φεύγων βασιλέα Δαρεῖον
κατοικίσαι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ᾿Ηδώνων ἐξεκρούσθη,
ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἔτεσι δύο καὶ τριά-
κοντα ὕστερον, ἐποίκους μυρίους σφῶν τε αὐτῶν
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν βουλόμενον πέμψαντες, οἱ
διεφθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ ὑπὸ Θρᾳκῶν. καὶ
αὖθις ἑνὸς δέοντι τριακοστῷ ἔτει ἐλθόντες οἱ
᾿Αθηναῖοι, " !Ἄγνωνος τοῦ Νικίου οἰκιστοῦ ἐκπεμ-
φθέντος, ᾿Ηδῶνας ἐξελάσαντες ἔ ἔκτισαν τὸ χωρίον
τοῦτο, ὅπερ πρότερον "Ἐννέα ὁδοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο.
ὡρμῶντο δὲ ἐκ τῆς ᾿Ηιόνος, ἣ ἣν αὐτοὶ εἶχον ἐμ-
πόριον ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπιθαλάσ-
σιον, πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίους ἀπέχον ἀπὸ τῆς
νῦν πόλεως, ἣν ᾿Αμφίπολιν " Αγνων ὠνόμασεν,
ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα περιρρέοντος τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἃ
τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν

1 διὰ τὸ περιέχειν αὐτήν (“with a view to enclosing 10), in
the MSS. after Στρυμόνος, deleted by Dobree.

386

BOOK IV. ci. 4-cm. 4

killing some and taking others alive. Then setting
up a trophy they gave up the dead under truce.
Sitalces,! too, king of the Odrysians, was killed
about the same time as the events at Delium, having
made an expedition against the Triballi,2 who
defeated him in battle. Seuthes* son of Sparadocus,
his nephew, now became king of the Odrysians and
of the rest of Thrace over which Sitalces had
reigned. |
CII. During the same winter, Brasidas, with his
allies in Thrace, made an expedition against Amphi-
polis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon.
This place, where the city now stands, Aristagoras 4
the Milesian had tried to colonize before,5 when
fleeing from the Persian king, but he had been
beaten back by the Edonians. Thirty-two years
afterwards the Athenians also made another attempt,
sending out ten thousand settlers of their own
citizens and any others who wished to go; but
these were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus.
Again, twenty-nine years later, the Athenians, send-
ing out Hagnon son of Nicias as leader of the
colony, drove out the Edonians and settled the
place, which was previously called Ennea-Hodoi or
Nine-Ways. Their base of operations was Eion, a
commercial seaport which they already held, at the
mouth of the river, twenty-five stadia distant from
the present city of Amphipolis,® to which Hagnon
gave that name, because, as the Strymon flows round
it on both sides, he cut off the site by a long wall
running from one point of the river to another, and

1 of. τι. Ixvii., xev., ci. 2 of. τι. xevi.
3 of. τι. ci. 5. 1 cof. Hdt. v. 126. 5 497 B.C.
ὁ The name means ‘‘a city looking both ways.”

387
cc 2

THUCYDIDES

περιφανῆ ἐς θάλασσάν τε Kal τὴν ἤπειρον
ᾧκισεν.

CIII. Ἐπὶ ταύτην οὖν ὁ Βρασίδας ἄρας ἐξ
᾿Αρνῶν τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἐπορεύετο τῷ στρατῷ.
καὶ ἀφικόμενος περὶ δείλην ἐπὶ τὸν Αὐλῶνα καὶ
Βρομίσκον, 7 ἡ Βόλβη λίμνη ἐξίησιν ἐς θά-
λασσαν, καὶ δειπνοποιησάμενος ἐχώρει τὴν νύκτα.
χειμὼν δὲ ἦν καὶ ὑπένειφεν: ἣ καὶ μᾶλλον
ὥρμησε, βουλόμενος λαθεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ᾿Αμφι-
πόλει πλὴν τῶν προδιδόντων. ἦσαν γὰρ ᾽Αρ-
γιλίων τε ἐν αὐτῇ οἰκήτορες (εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ ᾿Αργίλεοι
᾿Ανδρίων ἄποικοι) καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ ξυνέπρασσον
ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν Περδίκκᾳ πειθόμενοι, οἱ δὲ Χαλκι-
δεῦσιν. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ ᾿Αργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε προσοι-
κοῦντες καὶ αἰεί ποτε τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις ὄντες
ὕποπτοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ, ἐπειδὴ
παρέτυχεν ὁ καιρὸς καὶ Βρασίδας ἦλθεν, ἔπραξάν
τε ἐκ πλείονος πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας σφῶν
ἐκεῖ ὅπως ἐνδοθήσεται ἡ πόλις, καὶ τότε δεξάμενοι
αὐτὸν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀποστάντες τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτὶ κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ δω
ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ (ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πό-
λισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως) καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο
τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν, φυλακὴ δέ τις βραχεῖα καθει-
στήκει, ἣν βιασάμενος ῥᾳδίως ὁ Βρασίδας, ἅμα
μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὔσης, ἅμα δὲ καὶ χειμῶνος
ὄντος καὶ ἀπροσδόκητος προσπεσών, διέβη τὴν
γέφυραν, καὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν ᾿Αμφιπολιτῶν οἰκούντων
κατὰ πᾶν τὸ χωρίον εὐθὺς εἶχεν.

388

BOOK IV. cu. 4-ci. 5

so established a city which was conspicuous both
seaward and landward.

CIII. Against this place Brasidas marched with his
army, setting out from Arnae in Chalcidice. Arriving
about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus,! where the lake
Bolbe has its outlet into the sea, he took supper and
then proceeded by night. The weather was bad
and somewhat snowy, and for this reason he made
the more haste, wishing to escape the notice of the
people in Amphipolis, except those who were to
betray it. For there were in the place some settlers
from Argilus, an Andrian colony; these and some
others were his accomplices in this intrigue, some
instigated by Perdiccas, others by the Chalcidians.
But the chief plotters were the Argilians, who dwelt
near by, were always suspected by the Athenians,
and were secret enemies of the place; now that
opportunity offered and Brasidas had come, they had
some time before negotiated with their countrymen
who resided in Amphipolis with a view to the sur-
render of the place. So at this time they received
Brasidas into their town, revolted from the Athenians
that same night, and before dawn brought his army
down to the bridge over the river, which is some dis-
tance from the town and not connected with it by
walls as now. Brasidas easily forced the small guard
stationed at the bridge, partly because there was

_ treachery, partly because he had fallen upon them in

stormy weather and unexpectedly ; and as soon as

_he had crossed the bridge he was at once master of

the property of the Amphipolitans outside the walls ;
for they had houses all over the neighbourhood.

1 According to tradition, the scene of the death of Euri-
pides.
389

THUCYDIDES

CIV. Τῆς δὲ διαβάσεως αὐτοῦ ἄφνω τοῖς ἐν
τῇ πόλει γεγενημένης, καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλῶν μὲν
ἁλισκομένων, τῶν δὲ καὶ καταφευγόντων ἐς
τὸ τεῖχος, οἱ ᾿Αμφιπολῖται ἐς θόρυβον μέγαν
κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὕποπτοι
ὄντες. καὶ λέγεται Βρασίδαν, εἰ ἠθέλησε μὴ ἐφ᾽
ἁρπαγὴν τῷ στρατῷ τραπέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς

8 χωρῆσαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, δοκεῖν ἂν ἑλεῖν. νῦν

δὲ ὁ μὲν ἱδρύσας τὸν στρατόν, ἐπεὶ! τὰ ἔξω
ἐπέδραμε καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον ὡς
προσεδέχετο ἀπέβαινεν, ἡσύχαζεν" οἱ δὲ ἐναντίοι
τοῖς προδιδοῦσι, κρατοῦντες τῷ πλήθει ὥστε μὴ
αὐτίκα τὰς πύλας ἀνοίγεσθαι, πέμπουσι μετὰ
Εὐκλέους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν
παρῆν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, ἐπὶ τὸν ἕτερον
στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης, Θουκυδίδην τὸν
Ὀλόρου, ὃς τάδε ξυνέγραψεν, ὄντα περὶ Θάσον
(ἔστε δὲ ἡ νῆσος Παρίων ἀποικία, ἀπέχουσα τῆς
᾿Αμφιπόλεως ἡμίσεος ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν),
κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκούσας
κατὰ τάχος ἑπτὰ ναυσὶν αἱ ἔτυχον παροῦσαιε
ἔπλει, καὶ ἐβούλετο φθάσαι μάλιστα μὲν οὖν
τὴν ᾿Αμφίπολιν, πρίν τι ἐνδοῦναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν
᾿Ἤιόνα προκαταλαβών.

CV. Ἔν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Βρασίδας δεδιὼς καὶ τὴν
ἀπὸ τῆς Θάσου τῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν καὶ πυνθανό-
μενος τὸν Θουκυδίδην κτῆσίν τε ὄχειν τῶν χρυ-
σείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταῦτα
Θράκῃ καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις
τῶν ἠπειρωτῶν, ἡπεἴΐγετο προκατασχεῖν, εἰ
δύναιτο, τὴν πόλιν, μὴ ἀφικνουμένου αὑτοῦ τὸ
πλῆθος τῶν ᾿Αμφιπολετῶν, ἐλπίσαν ἐκ θαλάσσης

1 ἐπεί, with F and (ex corr.) C; other MSS. ἐπί.
390

BOOK IV. civ. 1-cv. 1

CIV.: His crossing had surprised the people inside
the city, and of those outside many were captured,
while others took refuge within the walls; hence
the Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion,
especially as they were suspicious of each other.
Indeed the general impression was, it is said, that if
Brasidas, instead of turning to pillage with his army,
had decided to march straight against the city, he
could have taken it. But as it was, when he had
overrun the country outside and found that none of
his plans were being carried out by his friends
within the city, he merely settled his army in camp
and kept quiet. Meanwhile the opponents of the
traitors, being numerous enough to prevent the gates
being opened to him at once, acting in concert with
Eucles the general, who had come from Athens as
warden of the place, sent to the other commander
of the Thracian district, Thucydides son of Olorus,
the author of this history, who was at Thasos, a
Parian colony, about a half-day’s sail from Amphi-
polis, and urged him to come to their aid. And he,
on hearing this, sailed in haste with seven ships
which happened to be at hand, wishing above all to
secure Amphipolis before it yielded, or, failing in
that, to seize Eion.

CV. Meanwhile, Brasidas, fearing the arrival of
the ships from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides
possessed the right of working the gold-mines in that
part of Thrace and in consequence had influence
among the first men of the mainland, made haste to
seize the city if possible before he should come; for
he was afraid that, if Thucydides should arrive, the
popular party in Amphipolis, in the expectation that

391

FHUCYDIDES

ξυμμαχικὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Θράκης ayeipavta αὐτὸν
2 περιποιήσειν σφᾶς, οὐκέτι προσχωροίη. καὶ τὴν
ξύμβασιν μετρίαν ἐποιεῖτο, κήρυγμα τόδε ἀνει-
πών, ᾿Αμφιπολιτῶν καὶ ᾿Αθηναίων τῶν ἐνόντων
τὸν μὲν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἴσης καὶ
ὁμσίας μετέχοντα μένειν, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐθέλοντα
ἀπιέναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκφερόμενον πέντε ἡμερῶν.
CVI. Οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀλλοιότεροι
ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας, ἄλλως τε καὶ βραχὺ μὲν
᾿Αθηναίων ἐμπολυτεῦον, τὸ δὲ πλέον ξύμμεικτον,
καὶ τῶν ἔξω ληφθέντων συχνοῖς οἰκεῖοι ἔνδον
ἧσαν" καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα πρὸς τὸν φόβον δίκαιον
εἶναι ἐλάμβανον, οἱ μὲν ᾿Αθηναῖοι διὰ τὸ ἄσμενοι
ἂν ἐξελθεῖν, ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἐν ὁμοίῳ σφίσι τὰ
δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ ἅμα οὐ προσδεχόμενοι βοήθειαν
ἐν τάχει, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος πόλεώς τε ἐν τῷ
ἴσῳ οὐ στερισκόμενοι καὶ κινδύνον παρὰ δόξαν
2 ἀφιέμενοι. ὥστε τῶν πρασσόντων τῷ Βρασίδᾳ
ἤδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διαδικαιούντων αὐτά,
ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἑώρων τετραμμένον καὶ τοῦ
παρόντος ᾿Αθηναίων στρατηγοῦ οὐκέτι ἀκροώ-
μενον, ἀγένετο ἡ ὁμολογία καὶ προσεδέξαντο ἐφ᾽
8 οἷς ἐκήρυξεν. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλεν τοιούτῳ
τρόπῳ παρέδοσαν, ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης καὶ αἱ νῆες
ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὀψὲ κατέπλεον ἐς τὴν "Hidva.
4 καὶ τὴν μὲν ᾿Αμφίπολεν Βρασίδας ἄρτι εἶχε, τὴν
δὲ ᾿Ηιόνα παρὰ νύκτα ἐγένετο λαβεῖν" εἰ γὰρ
μὴ ἐβοήθησαν αἱ νῆες διὰ τάχους, ἅμα ἕῳ ἂν

εἴχετο.

392

BOOK IV. cv. 1-cv1. 4

he would collect an allied force from the islands
and from Thrace and relieve them, would refuse to
yield. Accordingly, he offered moderate terms,
making proclamation to this effect, that any citizen
of Amphipolis or any resident Athenian, if he chose,
might remain there, retaining possession of his own
property and enjoying full equality; but that anyone
who was not inelined to stay might go away within
five days and take his property with him.

CVI. On hearing this the majority became irreso-
_ lute, especially as few of the citizens were Athenians,

the greater number being a mixed multitude, and a
considerable number of those who had been captured
outside had relatives inside the city. As compared
with their fears they conceived the proclamation to
be fair—the Athenians, because they were only too
glad to be able to leave, since they realized that
their share of the dangers was greater, and besides,
did not expect any speedy relief; the general
multitude, because they were not to lose their civil
rights but to retain them as before and also, con-
trary to their expectation, were to be released from
peril. And so, as the partisans of Brasidas were
already quite openly justifying his proposals, since
these saw that the populace had changed its attitude
and no longer hearkened to the Athenian general
who was in the city, the capitulation was made, and
Brasidas was received on the terms of his proclama-
tion. In this way they gave up the city, and on the
evening of the same day Thucydides and his ships
sailed into Eion. Brasidas had just got possession of
Amphipolis, and he missed taking Eion only by a
night; for if the ships had not come to the rescue
with all speed, it would have been taken at dawn.

393
ia

_ THUCYDIDES

CVII. Mera δὲ τοῦτο ὁ μὲν τὰ ἐν τῇ ᾿Ηιόνι
, “ \ > + A , ς
καθίστατο, ὅπως καὶ τὸ αὐτίκα, ἣν ἐπίῃ ὁ
Βρασίδας, καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα ἀσφαλῶς ἕξει, δεξάμενος
τοὺς ἐθελήσαντας ἐπιχωρῆσαι ἄνωθεν κατὰ τὰς
U ς \ \ \ ϑ ’ tA \
σπονδάς" ὁ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ’Hiova κατά τε τὸν
ποταμὸν πολλοῖς πλοίοις ἄφνω καταπλεύσας, εἴ
πως τὴν προύχουσαν ἄκραν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους
λαβὼν κρατοίη τοῦ ἔσπλου, καὶ κατὰ γῆν ἀπο-
4 @ 3 lA 9 ’ὔ
πειράσας ἅμα, ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀπεκρούσθη, τὰ δὲ
περὶ τὴν ᾿Αμφίπολιν ἐξηρτύετο. καὶ Μύρκινός
τε αὐτῷ προσεχώρησεν, ᾿Ηδωνικὴ πόλις, Πιτ-
A ~ ? 4 3 ’ ς Ν
τακοῦ τοῦ ᾿Ηδώνων βασιλέως ἀποθανόντος ὑπὸ
τῶν Γοάξιος παίδων καὶ Βραυροῦς τῆς γυναικὸς
αὐτοῦ, καὶ Γαληψὸς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ
Οἰσύμη: εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται Θασίων ἀποικίαι. παρὼν
δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἅλωσιν Euy-
καθίστη ταῦτα.

CVIII. Ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς ᾿Αμφιπόλεως ot
᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέος κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε
καὶ ὅτι ἡ πόλις ἦν αὐτοῖς ὠφέλιμος ξύλων τε
ναυπηγησίμων πομπῇ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ,

ν oa , a ’ ,
καὶ ὅτε μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἦν πάροδος
Θεσσαλῶν διωγόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν
τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τῆς δὲ γεφύρας μὴ κρα-

’ # \ » Ν
τούντων, ἄνωθεν μὲν μεγάλης οὔσης ἐπὶ πολὺ
λίμνης τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ᾿Ηιόνα τριήρεσι
T évov,' οὐκ ἂν δύνασθ λθεῖν" τότε δὲ

ηρουμένων,' οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι προελθεῖν" τότε
1 Hude emends to τηρουμένου.
394

BOOK IV. cvn. r-cvi, 1

CVII. After this Thucydides proceeded to arrange
matters at Eion, in order to insure its safety for the
present, if Brasidas should attack, and also for the
future, receiving those who chose to come thither
from the upper town according to the terms of the
truce.t_ And Brasidas suddenly sailed down the
river to Eion with many boats, in the hope that by
taking the point which juts out from the wall he
might gain command of the entrance, and at the
same time he made an attempt by land; but he was
beaten back at both points, and then proceeded to
put matters in order at Amphipolis. Myrcinus also,
an Edonian town, came over to him, Pittacus, the
king of the Edonians, having been killed by the
sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro; and not
long afterwards Galepsus and Oesume, colonies of
the Thasians, also came over. Perdiccas,? too, came
to Amphipolis directly after its capture and joined in
arranging these matters.

CVIII. The Athenians were greatly alarmed by
the capture of Amphipolis. The chief reason was
that the city was useful to them for the importation
of timber for ship-building and for the revenue it
produced, and also that, whereas hitherto the Lace-
daemonians had possessed, under the guidance of
the Thessalians, access to the Athenian allies as far
as the Strymon, yet as long as they did not con-
trol the bridge—the river for a long way above
the town being a great lake and triremes being
on guard in the direction of Eion—they could not
have advanced further; but now at last the matter

7 ¥ ch, cv. 2.
2 Now evidently reconciled with Brasidas, with whom he
had quarrelled (ch. lxxxvi. 3) ; ο΄ ch. ciii. 3.

395

THUCYDIDES

padsia! ἤδη γεγενῆσθαι.) καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους
ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ ἀποστῶσιν. ὁ γὰρ Βρασίδας ἔν
τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μέτριον ἑαυτὸν παρεῖχε καὶ ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἐδήλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσων

\ € lA 3 ’ὔ \ e ,
τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐκπεμφθείη. καὶ ai πόλεις πυν-
θανόμεναι αἱ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ὑπήκοοι 8 τῆς τε
᾿Αμφιπόλεως τὴν ἅλωσιν καὶ ἃ παρέχεται, τήν
τε ἐκείνου πραότητα, μάλιστα δὴ ἐπήρθησαν ἐς
τὸ νεωτερίζειν, καὶ ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν
κρύφα, ἐπιπαριέναι τε κελεύοντες καὶ βουλόμενοι
αὐτοὶ ὅκαστοι πρῶτοι ἀποστῆναι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ
Ν ἢ , 2 δ 3 ͵ 4 \ a
ἄδεια ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς, ἐψευσμένοις μὲν τῆς
᾿Αθηναίων δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅση ὕστερον
διεφάνη, τὸ δὲ πλέον βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ
ἢ προνοίᾳ ἀσφαλεῖ, εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗ μὲν
ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐχπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, ὃ δὲ
μὴ προσίενται λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι.
ἅμα δὲ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς νεωστὶ
πεπληγμένων καὶ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐφολκὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ
ὄντα λέγοντος, ὡς αὐτῷ ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ
μόνῃ στρατιᾷ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ξυμ-
βαλεῖν, ἐθάρσουν καὶ ἐπίστευον μηδένα ἂν ἐπὶ
σφᾶς βοηθῆσαι. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν
ἔχον ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαι-
μονίων ὀργώντων ἔμελλον πειράσεσθαι, κιν-
δυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν. ὧν αἰσθανό-

1 Kistemacher’s correction for ῥᾳδία or ῥᾳδίαι of the MSS.

2 Supply in thought here ἐνόμιζον before γεγενῆσθαι. Most
MSS. have ἐνόμιζεν (Vulg. ἐνομίζετο) ; Kistemacher deletes.

3 ai τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ὑπήκοοι, Hude deletes.

4 Hude reads ἐψευσμένοι, with ΕἸ.

5 Linwood, followed by Stahl and Hude, inserts βοηθή-

σαντι, as indeed seems to have been in the mind of the
author.

396

BOOK IV. cvit. 1-6

had become easy.1 And they feared, too, the re-
volt of their allies. For Brasidas in other things
showed himself moderate, and in his declarations
everywhere made plain that he had been sent out
for the liberation of Hellas. And the cities that
were subject to Athens, hearing of the eapture of
Amphipolis and the assurances that were offered,
and of the gentleness of Brasidas, were more than
ever incited to revolution, and sent secret messen-
gers to him, urging him to come on to them, and
wishing each for itself to be the first to revolt.
For it seemed to them that there was little ground
for fear, sinee they estimated the Athenian power
to be far less great than it afterwards proved to be,
and in their judgment were moved more by illusive
wishing than by cautious foresight ; for men are wont,
when they desire a thing, to trust to unreflecting hope,
but to reject by arbitrary judgment whatever they
do not care for. Furthermore, because of the recent
defeat of the Athenians in Boeotia and the enticing
but untrue statements of Brasidas,? that the
Athenians had been unwilling to engage him when
he came to the relief of Nisaea with only his own
army, they grew bold, and believed that nobody
would come against them. Above all, they were
so moved by the pleasurable anticipations of the
moment, and by the fact that they were now for the
first time going to have a proof of what the Lace-
daemonians would do when on their mettle, that
they were ready to take any risk. Being aware of

1 Or, retaining ῥᾳδία of the MSS. and the Vulgate reading
ἐνομίζετο, ‘but now the access was thought to have become

2 of. ch. Ixxiii.; Ixxxv. 7.

397

THUCYDIDES

μενοι οἱ μὲν ᾿Αθηναῖοι φυλακάς, ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου Kat
9 / ’ 3 € \ 2? ‘
ἐν χείμωνι, διέπεμπον és τὰς πόλεις, ὁ δὲ ἐς THY
Λακεδαίμονα ἐφιέμενος στρατιάν τε προσαπο-

,» > + Ἁ 9. δ 9 a ’
στέλλειν ἐκέλευε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Στρυμόνι
ναυπηγίαν τριήρων παρεσκευάζετο. οἱ δὲ Λακε-
δαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων
3 A 9 e > A \ \ Ἁ 4
ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλό-
μενοι μᾶλλον τούς τε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσον
κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καταλῦσαι.

CIX. Tov δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Μεγαρῆς τε τὰ

4 a A e 9 n 4 [4

μακρὰ τείχη, ἃ σφῶν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι εἶχον, κατέ-
σκαψαν ἑλόντες ἐς ἔδαφος, καὶ Βρασίδας μετὰ τὴν
᾿Αμφιπόλεως ἅλωσιν ἔχων τοὺς ξυμμάχους
στρατεύει ἐπὶ τὴν ᾿Ακτὴν καλουμένην. ἔστι δὲ
ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως διορύγματος ἔσω προύχουσα,
καὶ ὁ “AOws αὐτῆς ὄρος ὑψηλὸν τελευτᾷ ἐς τὸ
Alyaiov πέλαγος. πόλεις δὲ eyes Σάνην μὲν
᾿Ανδρίων ἀποικίαν παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν διώρυχα, ἐς
τὸ πρὸς Εὔβοιαν πέλαγος τετραμμένην, τὰς δὲ
ἄλλας Θυσσὸν καὶ Κλεωνὰς καὶ ᾿Ακροθῴους καὶ
Ὀλόφυξον καὶ Δῖον: αἱ οἰκοῦνται ξυμμείκτοις
ἔθνεσι βαρβάρων διγλώσσων, καί τι καὶ Χαλ-
κιδικὸν ἔνι βραχύ, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον Πελασγικόν,
τῶν καὶ Λῆμνόν ποτε καὶ ᾿Αθήνας Τυρσηνῶν
οἰκησάντων, καὶ Βισαλτικὸν καὶ Κρηστωνικὸν

\ ? “ \ \ ’ 3 A
καὶ "Hédaves: κατὰ δὲ μικρὰ πολίσματα οἰκοῦσιν.
καὶ οἱ μὲν πλείους προσεχώρησαν τῷ Βρασίδᾳ,
Σάνη δὲ καὶ Δῖον ἀντέστη, καὶ αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν
ἐμμείνας τῷ στρατῷ ἐδήου.

398

BOOK IV. cvim. 6—c1x.'5

these things, the Athenians, so far as was possible at
short notice and in the winter season, sent out gar-
risons among the cities; while Brasidas sent to Lace-
daemon and urgently begged them to send him
reinforcements, and was himself making preparations
for building ships in the Strymon. The Lacedae-
monians, however, did not comply with his request,
partly on account of the jealousy of the foremost
men, partly also because they wished rather to re-
cover the men taken on the island and to bring
the war to an end.

CIX. The same winter the Megarians took and
razed to the ground their long walls! which the
Athenians had held; and Brasidas, after the capture
of Amphipolis, made an expedition with his allies
against the district called Acte. It is a promontory
projecting from the King’s canal]? on the inner side
of the isthmus, and its terminus at the Aegean Sea
is the lofty Mt. Athos. Of the cities it contains, one is
Sane, an Andrian colony close to the canal, facing the
sea which is toward Euboea; the others are Thyssus,
Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus and Dion, which are
inhabited by mixed barbarian tribes speaking two
languages. There is in it also a small Chalcidic
element ; but the greatest part is Pelasgic—belong-
ing to those Etruscans that once inhabited Lemnos
and Athens *—Bisaltic, Crestonic, and Edonian ; and
they live in small towns. Most of these yielded to
Brasidas, but Sane and Dion held out against him;
so he waited there with his army and laid waste their
territory.

1 of. ch. lxix. 4. 2 Xerxes’ canal; cf. Hdt. vii. 22 ff.
3 According to Herodotus (vi. 137 ff.), they were expelled
from Attica, and afterwards, by Miltiades, from Lemnos.

399

THUCYDIDES

CX. ‘Os δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, εὐθὺς στρατεύει ἐπὶ
a] ’ \ , , e \

Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν, κατεχομένην - ὑπὸ
3 [ Ἁ > A ΝΜ 3 ’ 3 ld
Αθηναίων' καὶ αὐτὸν ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι ἐπήγοντο,
ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι. καὶ ἀφικό-
μενος νυκτὸς ἔτι καὶ περὶ ὄρθρον τῷ στρατῷ
ἐκαθέζετο πρὸς τὸ Διοσκόρειον, ὃ ἀπέχει τῆς
πόλεως τρεῖς μάλιστα σταδίους. τὴν μὲν οὖν
ἄλλην πόλιν τῶν Τορωναίων καὶ τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους
τοὺς ἐμφρουροῦντας ἔλαθεν: οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες

3 A 20. ἢ Φ Ψ 4 \
αὐτῷ εἰδότες ὅτι ἥξοι, καὶ προελθόντες τινὲς

> A ’ 3. 7 >? \ 4
αὐτῶν λάθρᾳ ὀλίγοι ἐτήρουν τὴν πρόσοδον, καὶ
ὡς ἤσθοντο παρόντα, ἐσκομίζουσι παρ᾽ αὑτοὺς
3 ’ὔ Ν ¥ A e , A
ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας ἄνδρας ψιλοὺς ἐπτά (τοσοῦτοι
γὰρ μόνοι ἀνδρῶν εἴκοσι τὸ πρῶτον ταχθέντων οὐ

> a \ > A /

κατέδεισαν ἐσελθεῖν: ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Λυσίστρατος
Ὀλύνθιος), of διαδύντες διὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος
τείχους καὶ λαθόντες τούς τε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνωτάτω
’ 7 Ν A 4 δ
φυλακτηρίον φρουρούς, οὔσης τῆς πόλεως πρὸς
λόφον, ἀναβάντες διέφθειραν καὶ τὴν κατὰ Κανα-
στραῖον πυλίδα διήρουν.

CXI. Ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ στρατῷ
ἡσύχαζεν ὀλίγον προελθών, ἑκατὰν δὲ πελταστὰς
προπέμπει, ὅπως, ὁπότε πύλαι τινὲς ἀνοιχθεῖεν
καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἀρθείη ὃ ξυνέκειτο, πρῶτοι
2 ἐσδράμοιεν. καὶ οἱ μὲν χρόνου ἐγγιγνομένου καὶ
θαυμάξοντες κατὰ μικρὸν ἔτυχον ἐγγὺς τῆς
πόλεως προσελθόντες: οἱ δὲ τῶν Τορωναίων
ἔνδοθεν παρασκευάζοντες μετὰ τῶν ἐσεληλυ-
4οο

BOOK IV. cx. 1-cx1. 2

CX. Since, however, they would not yield he
marched at once against Torone,) in Chalcidice,
which was held by the Athenians; for a few men,
who were ready to, betray the town, had invited
him over. Arriving with his army toward dawn,
but while it was still dark, he encamped near
the temple of the Dioscuri, which is about three
stadia distant from the city. The rest of the town
of Torone and the Athenians of the garrison were
unaware of his approach, but his partisans, knowing
that he would come, and some few of them having
secretly gone forward to meet him, were watching
for his approach ; and when they perceived that he
was there, they introduced into the town seven
light-armed men with daggers, under the command
of Lysistratus an Olynthian, these men alone of the
twenty first assigned to the task not being afraid to
enter. These slipped through the seaward wall and
escaping the notice of the guard at the uppermost
watch-post of the town, which is on the slope of a
hill, went up and slew these sentinels, and broke
open the postern on the side towards the promon-
tory of Canastraeum.

CXI. Meanwhile Brasidas, having gone forward a
little, kept quiet with the rest of his army, but sent
forward one hundred targeteers, in order that as soon
as any gates were opened and the signal agreed upon
was raised they might rush in first. These now, as
time elapsed, were wondering at the delay and had
come up little by little close to the town. Mean-
while the Toronaeans inside who were co-operating
with the party which had entered, when the postern

1 The chief town on the Sithonian peninsula. See Map
at 1. Ivi.
401
VOL. 1]. DD

THUCYDIDES

θότων, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἥ τε TUAls διήρητο καὶ ai κατὰ
τὴν ἀγορὰν πύλαι τοῦ μοχλοῦ διακοπέντος ἀνεῴώ-
γοντο, πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὴν πυλίδα τινὰς
περιαγαγόντες ἐσεκόμισαν, ὅπως κατὰ νώτου καὶ
3 4 \ 4 A 4 SON 207
ἀμφοτέρωθεν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει οὐδὲν εἰδότας
ἐξαπίνης φοβήσειαν, ἔπειτα τὸ σημεῖόν τε τοῦ
πυρός, ὡς εἴρητο, ἀνέσχον καὶ διὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν
ἀγορὰν πυλῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς ἤδη τῶν πελταστῶν
ἐσεδέχοντος. CXII. καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ἰδὼν τὸ
ξύνθημα ἔθει δρόμῳ, ἀναστήσας τὸν στρατὸν
> v4 A ς ’ ΝΜ) A
ἐμβοήσαντάς te ἁθρόον καὶ ἔκπληξιν πολλὴν
τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει παρασχόντας. καὶ οἱ μὲν κατὰ
7 3 4 9 ’ ς Ἁ AY

Tas πύλας εὐθὺς ἐσέπιπτον, οἱ δὲ κατὰ δοκοὺς
τετραγώνους, at ἔτυχον τῷ τείχει πεπτωκότι
κἀνοικοδομουμένῳ πρὸς λίθων ἀνολκὴν προσκεί-
μεναι. Βρασίδας a οὖν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εὐθὺς
ἄνω καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως ἐτράπετο,
βουλόμενος κατ᾽ ἄκρας καὶ βεβαίως ἑλεῖν αὐτήν"
ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος κατὰ πάντα ὁμοίως ἐσκεδάν-
νυντο.

CXIII. Τῶν δὲ Τορωναίων γιγνομένης τῆς
e 4 λῚ N N > \ IQN 3 “ ς
ἁλώσεως τὸ μὲν πολὺ οὐδὲν εἰδὸς ἐθορυβεῖτο, οἱ
δὲ πράσσοντες καὶ οἷς ταὐτὰ ἤρεσκε μετὰ τῶν
3 4 9 \ e \ 3 A ΝΜ
ἐσελθόντων εὐθὺς ἧσαν. οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι (ἔτυχον

la a @e a)

yap ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὁπλῖται καθεύδοντες ὡς
πεντήκοντα) ἐπειδὴ ἤσθοντο, οἱ μέν τινες ὀλίγοι
διαφθείρονται ἐν χερσὶν αὐτῶν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ
μὲν πεζῇ, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὰς ναῦς, αἱ ἐφρούρουν δύο,
καταφυγόντες διασῴζονται ἐς τὴν Λήκυθον τὸ
φρούριον, ὃ εἶχον αὑτοὶ καταλαβόντες, ἄκρον τῆς
πόλεως ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπειλημμένον ἐν στενῷ

4092

' BOOK IV. cxt. 2-cxm. 2

had been broken down and the gates near the
market-place had been opened by cutting the bar,
first brought some men around to the postern and
let them in, in order that they might take the
townsmen unawares by a sudden attack in their
rear and on both sides and throw them into a
panic ; after that they raised the fire-signal agreed
upon and received the rest of the targeteers through
the gates near the market-place. CXII. Brasidas, on
seeing the signal, set off at a run, calling up his force,
and they with one voice raised a shout and caused
great dismay to the townsmen. Some burst in imme-
diately by the gates, others over some square beams
which chanced to have been placed, for the purpose
of drawing up stones, against the wall that had fallen
in and was now being rebuilt. Brasidas, then, δα
the main body made at once for the high points of
the town, wishing to make its capture complete and
decisive ; but the rest of the multitude! scattered
in all directions. .

CXIITI. While the capture was being effected, most
of the Toronaeans, who knew nothing of the plot,
were in a tumult, but the conspirators and such as
were in sympathy with the movement at once
joined those who had entered. When the Athenians
became aware of it—for about fifty of their hoplites
happened to be sleeping in the market-place—though
some few of them were slain in hand-to-hand conflict,
the rest fled, some by land, others to the two ships
which were on guard, and got safely into the fort of
Lecythus, which had been occupied and was held
by their own men. It is the citadel of the city,
projecting into the sea—a separate section? on a

1 Macedonian and Thracian irregulars.

* There was probably 8. wall across the isthmus. 403

Db 2

THUCYDIDES

3 ἰσθμῷ. κατέφυγον δὲ καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων és
αὐτοὺς ὅσοι ἧσαν σφίσιν ἐπιτήδειοι.

CXIV. Γεγενημένης δὲ ἡμέρας ἤδη καὶ βεβαίως
τῆς πόλεως ἐχομένης ὁ Βρασίδας τοῖς μὲν μετὰ
τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων Τορωναίοις καταπεφευγόσι κή-
ρυγμα ἐποιήσατο τὸν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ
ἐσελθόντα ἀδεῶς πολιτεύειν, τοῖς δὲ ᾿Αθηναίοις
κήρυκα προσπέμψας ἐξιέναι ἐκέλευεν ἐκ τῆς
Ληκύθου ὑποσπόνδους καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντας ὡς

2 οὔσης Χαλκιδέων. οἱ δὲ ἐκλείψειν μὲν οὐκ
ἔφασαν, σπείσασθαι δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλενον ἡμέραν
τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνελέσθαι. ὁ δὲ ἐσπείσατο δύο.
ἐν ταύταις δὲ αὐτός τε τὰς ἐγγὺς οἰκίας ἐκρατύ-

3 vato καὶ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τὰ σφέτερα. καὶ ξύλλογον
τῶν Τορωναίων ποιήσας ἔλεξε τοῖς ἐν τῇ ᾿Ακάνθῳ
παραπλήσια, ὅτι οὐ δίκαιον εἴη οὔτε τοὺς πρά-
ξαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν λῆψιν τῆς πόλεως χείρους
οὐδὲ προδότας ἡγεῖσθαι (οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ οὐδὲ
χρήμασι πεισθέντας δρᾶσαι τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ
ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς πόλεως), οὔτε τοὺς μὴ
μετασχόντας οἴεσθαι μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαε"
ἀφῖχθαι γὰρ οὐ διαφθερῶν οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἰδιώ-

4 τὴν οὐδένα. τὸ δὲ κήρυγμα ποιήσασθαι τούτου
ἕνεκα τοῖς παρ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίους καταπεφευγόσιν, ὡς
ἡγούμενος οὐδὲν χείρους τῇ ἐκείνων φιλίᾳ" οὐδ᾽
ἂν σφῶν πειρασαμένους αὐτοὺς τῶν Λακεδαε-
μονίων δοκεῖν ἧσσον, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ

1 τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, deleted by Cobet, followed by Hude.
404

BOOK IV. cxm. 2-cxiv. 4

narrow isthmus. And such of the Toronaeans as were
friendly to the Athenians took refuge there also.
CXIV. When day had come and the town was
securely in his possession, Brasidas made proclamation
to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the
Athenians, that whoever wished might return to his
property and exercise citizenship without fear ; but
to the Athenians he sent a herald, ordering them to
come out of Lecythus under truce, bringing all their
property, as the place belonged to the Chalcidians.
They, however, refused to leave, but requested him
to make a truce with them for a day, that they
might take up their dead. He granted a truce for
two days, during which he himself fortified the
houses near by and the Athenians strengthened
their defences. Then calling a meeting of the
Toronaeans, Brasidas spoke to them much as he had
done to the people at Acanthus.! He said that it
was not just either to regard as villains or as
traitors those who had negotiated with him for
the capture of the town—for they had done this,
not to enslave it, nor because they were bribed,
but for the welfare and freedom of the city—or to
think that those who had not taken part would not
get the same treatment as the others; for he had
not come to destroy either the city or any private
citizen. He explained that he made his proclama-
tion to those who had taken refuge with the Athen-
ians for the reason that he thought none the worse
of them for their friendship with these; and when
they had proved his countrymen, the Lacedaemonians,
they would not, he thought, be less but rather far
more kindly disposed toward them than toward the

1 ο΄ chs. Ixxxv.-lxxxvii.
405

THUCYDIDES

2 ποιησασθαι καὶ és τὸν πλείω χρόνον. τοὺς yap
δὴ ἄνδρας περὶ πλείονος ἐποιοῦντο κομίσασθαι,
ἕως 1 ἔτει Βρασίδας ηὐτύχει. b ἔμελλον ἐπὶ
ἕως 1 ἔτε Βρασίδας ηὐτύχει. καὶ ἔμε
μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα κατα-
στήσαντος τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου
ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύειν, ef? καὶ κρατήσειαν.

3 γίγνεται οὖν ἐκεχειρία αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ξυμ-
μάχοις ἥδε" |

CXVIII. “ Περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαντείου
τοῦ ᾿Απόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου δοκεῖ ἡμῖν χρῆσθαι
τὸν βουλόμενον ἀδόλως καὶ ἀδεῶς κατὰ τοὺς

2 πατρίους νόμους. τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις ταῦτα
δοκεῖ καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς παροῦσιν: Βοιωτοὺς
δὲ καὶ Φωκέας πείσειν φασὶν ἐς δύναμιν προσκη-
ρυκευόμενοι.

3 “Περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμέ-
λεσθαι ὅπως τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐξευρήσομεν, ὀρθῶς
καὶ δικαίως τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι καὶ
ὑμεῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ βουλόμενοι,

4 τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι πάντες. περὶ μὲν
οὖν τούτων ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταῦτα.

“Τάδε δὲ ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ξυμμάχοις, ἐὰν σπονδὰς ποιῶνται οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοε,
ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν μένειν ἑκατέρους ἔχοντας ἅπερ νῦν
ἔχομεν, τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ Κορυφασίῳ ἐντὸς τῆς
Βουφράδος καὶ τοῦ Τομέως μένοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐν

1 éws, so Hude and van Herwerden from schol. on Ar.
Pax 479; MSS. ὡς.

2 εἰ καὶ κρατήσειαν, Madvig’s conjecture, for καὶ κρατήσειν
of the MSS. ε ; ὰ

410

BOOK IV. cxvit. 1-cxvin. 4

a truce for a longer time. For it was their men they
made a special point of recovering, while Brasidas
was still in good luck. If he were still further suc-
cessful and established the contending forces on an
even footing, the likelihood was that they would still
be deprived of these men, and it would be doubtful
whether, fighting on equal terms, they could
prevail with the remainder. Accordingly an armis-
tice was concluded for them and their allies on the
following terms :

CXVIII. “Concerning the temple and oracle of the
Pythian Apollo, we agree that whosoever will
shall consult it without fraud and without fear,
according to the usages of our forefathers. These
things seem good to the Lacedaemonians and the
allies that are present; and they promise to send
heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians and persuade
them so far as they can.

“Concerning the treasure of the god we agree to
take care to find out all wrong-doers, rightly and
justly following the usages of our forefathers, you and
we and all others that wish to do so, all following the
usages of our forefathers. Concerning these things,
then, it is so agreed by the Lacedaemonians and
the rest of the confederates on such terms.

“The following agreements also are made by the
Lacedaemonians and the rest of the confederates,
that in case the Athenians make a treaty, we shall
each of us remain on our own territory, keeping
what we now have: the Athenian garrison in Cory-
phasium! shall keep within Buphras and Tomeus ;

1 The Lacedaemonian name of Pylos (ch. iii. 2), Buphras
and Tomeus were two high points on the coast.

41τ,

THUCYDIDES

Κυθήροις μὴ ἐπιμισγομένους ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν,
μήτε ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς,
τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν Νισαίᾳ καὶ Μινῴᾳ μὴ ὑπερβαίνοντας
τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν τῶν παρὰ" τοῦ
Νίσου ἐπὶ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ποσει-
δωνίου εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τὴν ἐς Μινῴαν
(μηδὲ Μεγαρέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὑπερβαίνειν
τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην), καὶ τὴν νῆσον, ἥνπερ ἔλαβον
οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἔχοντας, μ μηδὲ ἐπιμισγομένους μηδε-
τέρους μηδετέρωσε, καὶ τὰ ἐν Τροζῆνι, ὅσαπερ
νῦν ἔχουσι, καθ᾽ ἃ ξυνέθεντο πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους.

τ Καὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ χρωμένους, ὅσα ἂν κατὰ
τὴν ἑαυτῶν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, Λακεδαι-
μονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πλεῖν μὴ μακρᾷ νηΐ,
ἄχλῳ δὲ κωπήρει πλοίῳ ἐς πεντακόσια τάλαντα
ἄγοντι μέτρα.

“ Κήρυκι δὲ καὶ πρεσβείᾳ καὶ ἀκολούθοις,
ὁπόσοις ἂν δοκῇ, περὶ καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου
καὶ δικῶν ἐ ἐς Πελοπόννησον καὶ ᾿Αθήναζε σπονδὰς
εἶναι ἰοῦσι καὶ ἀπιοῦσι, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ
θάλασσαν.

“Τοὺς δὲ αὐτομόλους μὴ δέχεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
χρόνῳ, μήτε ἐλεύθερον μήτε ἈΚ οῦλον, μήτε ὑμᾶς
μήτε ἡμᾶς.

τι Δίκας τε διδόναι ὑμᾶς τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑμῖν
κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τὰ ἀμφίλογα δίκῃ διαλύοντας
ἄνευ πολέμου.

1M reads ἀπὸ τοῦ Νισαίου.

2 Kirchhoff’s correction for καὶ οἷα of the MSS.
1 cf. chs. liii., liv. 2 cf. ch. lxix.
A pe li.; rv. Ixvii.

it. ‘‘the gates leading from the shrine [or statue, as
παρά might indicate] of Nisus.”

412

BOOK IV. cxvin. 4-8

that in Cythera! shall have no communication with
the territory of the Lacedaemonian allies, neither we
with them nor they with us; that in Nisaea? and
Minoa® shall not cross the road leading from the
gates of the shfine of Nisus‘* to the Poseidonium,
and from the Poseidonium straight to the bridge ®
at Minoa (nor shall the Megarians or their allies
cross this road); as to the island ® which the Athen-
ians took, they shall retain it, and neither party shall
communicate with the other; and finally, in the
territory of Troezen,’ the Athenians shall retain
whatever they now have in accordance with the
agreements which the Troezenians have made with
the Athenians.

“ As to the use of the sea, in so far as they use it
along their own coast and along that of their con-
federacy, the Lacedaemonians and their allies may
sail, not with a ship of war, but with any rowing-
vessel up to five hundred talents burden.®

« There shall be safe conduct for herald and envoys
and their attendants, as many as shall seem proper,
on their way to the Peloponnesus and to Athens for
the purpose of bringing the war to an end and for the
arbitration of disputes, both going and coming, by
land and by sea.

“ Deserters shall not be received during this time,
whether freemen or slaves, either by you or by us.

‘You shall give satisfaction to us and we to you
according to our ancestral customs, settling disputed
points by arbitration without war.

5 Connecting Minoa with the mainland ; ¢/. 111. li. 3.

* Probably Atalante is meant ; cf. 111. Ixxxix. 3; v. xviii. 7.

7 The Athenian fortification on the isthmus of Methana ;

cf. ch. xlv. 2.
8 About 124 tons.

413

THUCYDIDES

“Tots μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις

9 ταῦτα δοκεῖ" εἰ δέ τι ὑμῖν εἴτε κάλλιον εἴτε
δικαιότερον τούτων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἰόντες ἐς Λακε-
δαίμονα διδάσκετε' οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀποστήσονταε,
ὅσα ἂν δίκαια λέγητε, οὔτε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι

10 οὔτε οἱ ξύμμαχοι. οἱ δὲ ἰόντες τέλος ἔχοντες
ἰόντων, ἧπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς ἐκελεύετε. αἱ δὲ
σπονδαὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔσονται."

11 Ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ. ᾿Ακαμαντὶς ἐπρυτάνενε,
Φαίνιππος ἐγραμμάτευε, Νικιάδης ἐπεστάτει.
Λάχης εἶπε, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τῇ ᾿Αθηναίων, ποιεῖσθαι
τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, καθ᾽ ἃ ξυγχωροῦσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι
καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν" καὶ ὡμολόγησαν ἐν τῷ

12 δήμῳ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν εἶναι ἐνιαυτόν, ἄρχειν δὲ
τήνὸςε τὴν ἡμέραν, τετράδα ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ ᾿Ελαφη-

13 βολιῶνος μηνός. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἰόντας ὡς
ἀλλήλους πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκας ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς
λόγους, καθ᾽ 6 τι ἔσται ἡ κατάλυσις τοῦ πολέμου.

ld ἐκκλησίαν δὲ ποιήσαντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ
τοὺς πρυτάνεις 2 πρῶτον περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης βουλεύ-
σασθαι ᾿Αθηναίους καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν ἐσίῃβ ἡ πρεσβεία
περὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου. σπείσασθαι
δὲ αὐτίκα μάλα τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὰς
παρούσας: 7) μὴν ἐμμενεῖν ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς τὸν
ἐνιαυτόν.

CXIX. Ταῦτα ἕξυνέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ
@pocav* καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ᾿Αθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς

1 Hude inserts δ᾽, after Kirchhoff.

2 The change of subject implies a relative clause; some-
thing like ἐν ἢ may have dropped out.

3 Hiude reads ἂν εἶσιν, after Kirchhoff.

4 καὶ ὥμοσαν (Vulg. καὶ ὡμολόγησαν) deleted by Hude, after
Kirchhoff.

414

BOOK IV. cxvit. 8-ὌΧΙΧ. 1

“To the Lacedaemonians and their allies these
things seem good; but if anything seems to you
fairer or juster than these things, come to Lace-
daemon and set forth your view; for neither the
Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any just
proposal you may make. And let those who come
come with full powers, as you also desired of us.
And the truce shall be for a year.”

1 Decreed by the people. The tribe Acamantis
held the prytany, Phaenippus was clerk, Niciades
was president. Laches, invoking good fortune for
the people of Athens, moved to conclude the armistice
according to the terms to which the Lacedae-
montans and their allses had consented; and it
was agreed in the popular assembly that the
armistice should be for a year, and should begin on
that day, the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion.:
During this time envoys and heralds were to go
from one state to the other and discuss proposals
looking to the termination of the war. And the
generals and prytanes were to call an assembly
in which the Athenians should deliberate first of all
about peace, on what terms the Lacedaemonian em-
bassy for ending the war should be admitted. And
the embassies now present should pledge themselves
at once, in the presence of the people, to abide by
the truce for the year.

CXIX. These agreements the Lacedaemonians and
their allies made with the Athenians and their allies

1 The prescript of the Athenian decree which ratified the
truce is quoted verbatim (italics above).

415

THUCYDIDES

ξυμμάχοις μηνὸὲ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Γεραστίου
2 δωδεκάτῃ. ξυνετίθεντο δὲ καὶ ἐσπένδοντο Λακε-

δαιμονίων μὲν οἵδε: Ταῦρος ᾿Ἐχετιμίδα, ᾿Αθή-

ναιος ἸΠερικλείδα, Φιλοχαρίδας ᾿Ερυξιλᾷδα"

Κορινθίων δὲ Αἰνέας ᾿Ωκύτουύ, Evdapidas

᾿Αριστωνύμου: Σικυωνίων δὲ Δαμότιμος Ναυ-
κράτους, Ὀνάσιμος Μεγακλέους: Μεγαρέων δὲ
Νίκασος Κεκάλου, Μενεκράτης ᾿Αμφιδώρου"
᾿Επιδαυρίων δὲ ᾿Αμφίας Εὐπαλίδα": ᾿Αθηναίων δὲ
οἱ στρατηγοὶ Νικόστρατος Διειτρέφους, Νικίας
Νικηράτου, Αὐτοκλῆς Τολμαίου.

8 Ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκεχειρία αὕτη ἐγένετο, καὶ ξυνῆσαν

ἐν αὐτῇ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων σπονδῶν διὰ παντὸς

ἐς λόγους.

ΟΧΧ. Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας ταύτας αἷς ἐπήρ-
'χοντο Σκιώνη ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ πόλις ἀπέστη ἀπ᾽
᾿Αθηναίων πρὸς Βρασίδαν. φασὶ δὲ οἱ Σικιωναῖοι
Πελληνῆς μὲν εἶναι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, πλέοντας
δ᾽ ἀπὸ Τροίας σφῶν τοὺς πρώτους κατενεχθῆναι
ἐς τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο τῷ χειμῶνι ᾧ ἐχρήσαντο
᾿Αχαιοί, καὶ αὐτοῦ οἰκῆσαι. ἀποστᾶσι δ᾽ αὐτοῖς
ὁ Βρασίδας διέπλευσε νυκτὸς ἐς τὴν Σκιώνην,
τριήρει μὲν φιλίᾳ προπλεούσῃ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν κελη-
tim ἄπωθεν ἐφεπόμενος, ὅπως, εἰ μέν τινε τοῦ

1 Hude’s conjecture; Bekker Εὐπαΐδα, for Εὐπαιΐδα of
most MSS.

1 Grote is probably right in assuming that the twelfth of
Gerastius corresponded to the fourteenth of Elaphebolion.
2 These consisted of formal libations.

416

BOOK IV. cxix. 1-cxx. 2

and ratified them by oath at Lacedaemon on the

twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius.1 And
those who concluded and ratified the truce on be-
half of the Lacedaemonians were the following:
Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Peri-
cleidas, Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas; on behalf of
the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus, Euphamidas
son of Aristonymus ; on behalf of the Sicyonians,
Demotimus son of Naucrates, Onasimus son of
Megacles; on behalf of the Megarians, Nicasus son
of Cecalus, Menecrates son of Amphidorus; on be-
half of the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupalidas ;
on behalf of the Athenians, the generals Nicostratus
son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, Autocles
son of Tolmaeus.

Such, then, were the terms on which the armistice
was concluded, and during its continuance they
were constantly conferring about a truce of longer
duration.

CXX. About the very time when they were
performing the rites of confirmation,? Scione, a city
in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians and went
over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans assert’ that they
came originally from Pellene® in the Peloponnesus,
and that the first settlers in Scione were driven to
this place on their way back from Troy by the storm‘
which the Achaeans encountered, and settled here.
On their revolt, Brasidas crossed over® by night to
Scione, a friendly trireme sailing ahead and he
himself following in a skiff at some distance behind.
His idea was that, if he should meet with any boat

8 Pellene was in Achaea, near Sicyon; the people are

mentioned as allies of Sparta in 11. ix. 2.
4 Referred to again in VI. ii. 3. 5 s.e. from Torone.

417
VOL. II. E E

THUCYDIDES

κέλητος μείξονι πλοίῳ περιτυγχάνοι, ἡ τριήρης
ἀμύνοι αὐτῷ, ἀντιπάλου δὲ ἄλλης τριήρους
ἐπιγενομένης οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔλασσον νομίξων
τρέψεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ
αὑτὸν διασώσειν. περαιωθεὶς δὲ καὶ ξύλλογον
ποιήσας τῶν Σκιωναίων ἔλεγεν ἅ τε ἐν τῇ
᾿Ακάνθῳ καὶ Topavn, καὶ προσέτι πάντων 3 ἀξιω-
τάτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπαίνου, οἵτινες τῆς 1|αλ-
λήνης ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἀπειλημμένης ὑπὸ ᾿Αθηναίων
Ποτείδαιαν ἐχόντων καὶ ὄντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ
νησιῶται αὐτεπάγγελτοι ἐχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ᾿ἀτολμίᾳ ἀνάγκην
σφίσι προσγενέσθαι περὶ τοῦ φανερῶς οἰκείου
ἀγαθοῦ' σημεῖόν τ΄ εἶναι τοῦ καὶ ἄλλο τι ay
αὐτοὺς τῶν μεγίστων ἀνδρείως ὑπομεῖναι" εἴ τεῦ
τεθήσεται κατὰ νοῦν τὰ πράγματα, πιστοτάτους
τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἡγήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων
φίλους καὶ τἄλλα τιμήσειν.

ΟΧΧΙ. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναῖοι ἐπήρθησάν τε
τοῖς λόγοις καὶ θαρσήσαντες πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ
οἷς πρότθρον μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασδόμενα, τόν τε
πόλεμον διενοοῦντο προθύμως οἴσειν καὶ τὸν
Βρασίδαν τά T ἄλλα καλῶς ἐδέξαντο καὶ δη-
μοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν ὡς ἔλευθε-
ροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐταινίουν τε καὶ
ΐπ οσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ. ὁ δὲ τό τε παραυ-
τίκα φυλακήν τινα αὐτοῖς ἐγκαταλιπὼν διέβη
πάλιν καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ στρατιὰν πλείω

1 The corrected reading of two minor MSS.; all the better
MSS. αὐτῇ. Hude deletes, after Poppo.

3 πάντων, Hude adopts Kriiger’s conjecture, φάσκων».

8 γε added by Kriiger.

418

BOOK IV. cxx. 2-cxxi. 2

larger than a skiff, the trireme would protect him,
but if another trireme of equal strength should come
along it would turn, not against the smaller boat,
but against the ship, and in the meantime he could
get safely across. He succeeded in crossing, and
having called a meeting of the Scionaeans repeated
what he had said at Acanthus and Torone, adding
that their own conduct had been most praise-
worthy of all because, when Pallene was cut off at
the isthmus by the Athenians who held Potidaea
and when they were nothing but islanders, they had
not supinely awaited the compulsion of necessity in
a matter that was manifestly for their own good, but
had of their own free will taken the side of freedom ;
and that, he said, was a proof that they would endure
like men any other peril however great; and if
things should be settled according to his wish, he
would consider them in very truth most loyal friends
of the Lacedaemonians and would honour them in
other respects.

CXXI. The Scionaeans were elated at his words,
and all alike, even those who before were not
satisfied with what was being done, took courage
and determined to carry on the war with spirit.
Brasidas they not only welcomed with other honours
but publicly crowned him with a golden crown as
liberator of Hellas, and privately decked him with
garlands and made offerings as for a victor in the
games. And he, leaving them a guard for the present,
crossed back, but not long afterwards he led over a

419
EE?

THUCYDIDES

ἐπεραίωσε, βουλόμενος μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τῆς τε Mévdns
καὶ τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἀποπειρᾶσαι, ἡγούμενος καὶ
τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους βοηθῆσαι ἂν ὡς ἐς νῆσον καὶ
βουλόμενος φθάσαι" Kai τι αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπράσσετο
ἐς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας προδοσίας πέρι.

CXXII. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔμελλεν ἐγχειρήσειν ταῖς
πόλεσι ταύταις: ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τριήρει οἱ τὴν
ἐκεχειρίαν περιαγγέλλοντες ἀφικνοῦνται παρ᾽
αὐτὸν, ᾿Αθηναίων μὲν ᾿Αριστώνυμος, Λακεδαι-
μονίων δὲ ᾿Αθήναιος. καὶ ἡ μὲν στρατιὰ πάλιν
διέβη ἐς Τορώνην, οἱ δὲ τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἀνήγγελλον
τὴν ξυνθήκην, καὶ ἐδέξαντο πάντες οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης
ξύμμαχοι Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πεπραγμένα. ᾿Αρι-
στώνυμος δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κατήνει, Σκιω-
ναίους δὲ αἰσθόμενος ἐκ λογισμοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν
ὅτι ὕστερον ἀφεστήκοιεν, οὐκ ἔφη ἐνσπόνδους
ἔσεσθαι. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀντέλεγε πολλά, ὡς
πρότερον, καὶ οὐκ ἀφίει τὴν πόλιν. ὡς δ᾽ ἀπήγ-
γελλεν ἐς τὰς ᾿Αθήνας ὁ ᾿Αριστώνυμος περὶ
αὐτῶν, οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι εὐθὺς ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν στρα-
τεύειν ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παραβήσεσθαι ἔφασαν av-
τοὺς τὰς σπονδάς, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀντεποιοῦντο
Βρασίδᾳ πιστεύοντες, δίκῃ τε ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν περὶ
αὐτῆς κρίνεσθαι. οἱ δὲ δίκῃ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελον
κινδυνεύειν, στρατεύειν δὲ ὡς τάχιστα, ὀργὴν
ποιούμενοι εἰ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις ἤδη ὄντες
ἀξιοῦσι σφῶν ἀφίστασθαι, τῇ κατὰ γῆν Λακε-
δαιμονίων ἰσχύι ἀνωφελεῖ πιστεύοντες" εἶχε δὲ
καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ τῆς ἀποστάσεως μᾶλλον F

1 τῷ deleted by Hude, after Stahl.
420

BOOK ἹΝ οχχι. 2-cxxit. 6

larger army, wishing in concert with them to make
an attempt upon Mende and Potidaea; for he thought
the Athenians would bring succour to Pallene as
though it were an island, and he wished to anticipate
them ; besides, he was negotiating with these towns
with a view to their betrayal.

CXXII. So he was about to attack these towns;
but in the meantime those who were carrying round
the news of the armistice arrived at his head-
quarters in a trireme, Aristonymus from Athens
and Athenaeus from Lacedaemon. Whereupon his
army crossed back to Torone; and the messengers
formally announced the agreement to Brasidas, and
all the Thracian allies of the Lacedaemonians ac-
quiesced in what had been done. Aristonymus
assented for the other places, but, finding on a cal-
culation of the days that the Scionaeans had τε-
volted after the agreement, he said that they would
not be included in the truce. Brasidas, however,
earnestly maintained that they had revolted before,
and would not give up the city. Whereupon Aris-
tonymus sent word to Athens about these matters,
and the Athenians were ready at once to make an
expedition against Scione. But the Lacedaemonians
sent envoys, saying that the Athenians would be
violating the truce, and trusting the word of Brasidas
they laid claim to the town and were ready to
arbitrate about it. The Athenians, however, were
inclined, not to risk arbitration, but to make an ex-
pedition} as quickly as possible, being enraged to
think that even the inhabitants of the islands now
presumed to revolt, relying on the strength which
the Lacedaemonians had on land, useless though it
was to them.! Moreover, the truth about the

1 Because the Athenians commanded the sea. 421

THUCYDIDES

οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐδικαίουν' δύο γὰρ ἡ ἡμέραις ὕστερον
ἀπέστησαν οἱ Σκιωναῖοι. ψήφισμά τ᾽ εὐθὺς
ἐποιήσαντο, Κλέωνος γνώμῃ πεισθέντες, Σκιω-
ναίους ἐξελεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι. καὶ τἄλλα
ἡσυχάξοντες ἐς τοῦτο παρεσκευάζοντο.

ΟΧΧΊΠ. Ἔν τούτῳ δὲ Μένδη , ἀφίσταται
αὐτῶν, TOMS ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ, Ἐ ετριῶν ἀποικία.
καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐδέξατο ὃ Βρασίδας, οὐ νομίξων
ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ φανερῶς προσε-

ὥρησαν' ἔστε γὰρ ἃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐνεκάλει τοῖς
Αθηναίοις παραβαίνειν τὰς σπονδάς. δι᾽ ὃ καὶ
οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐτόλμησαν, τήν τε τοῦ
Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἑτοίμην, τεκμαιρόμενοι
καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Σκιώνης ὅ ὅτι οὐ προυδίδου, καὶ ἅμα
τῶν πρασσόντων σφίσιν. ὀλίγων τε ὄντων καὶ
ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν, οὐκέτι ἀνέντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ
σφίσιν αὐτοῖς φοβουμένων τὸ κατάδηλον καὶ
καταβιασαμένων παρὰ γνώμην τοὺς πολλούς.
οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι εὐθὺς πυθόμενοι, “πολλῷ ἔτι
μᾶλλον ὀργισθέντες παρεσκευάζοντο ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέ.-
ρας τὰς πόλεις. καὶ Βρασίδας προσ όμενος
τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν ὑπεκκομίζξει ἐ ἐς ΠΡ: τὴν
Χαλκιδικὴν παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας τῶν Σκιωναίων
καὶ Μενδαίων, καὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτοῖς
πεντακοσίους ὁπλίτας διέπεμψε καὶ “πελταστὰς
τριακοσίους Χαλκιδέων, a ἄρχοντά τε τῶν ἁπάντων
Πολυδαμίδαν. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὰ περὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς,
ὡς ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων τῶν ᾿Αθηναΐων, κοινῇ
ηὐτρεπίξζοντο.

CXXIV. Βρασίδας δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας ἐν τούτῳ
στρατεύουσιν ἅμα ἐπὶ ᾿Αρράβαιον τὸ δεύτερον
1 σφίσιν, Kriiger deletes, followed by Hude.

422

BOOK IV. cxxn. 6-cxxiv. 1

revolt was rather as the Athenians claimed ; for the
Scionaeans revolted two days after the agreement.
The Athenians, then, immediately passed a vote, on
the motion of Cleon, to destroy Scione and put the
citizens to death. And so, keeping quiet in other
matters, they made preparations for this.

CXXIII. Meanwhile Mende revolted from them,
a city in Pallene, and an Eretrian colony. And
Brasidas received them, thinking they were not
doing wrong in coming over to him, though clearly
it was in the time of the armistice; for there were some
points in which he himself charged the Athenians
with breaking the truce. Wherefore the Mendaeans
also became more bold, for they saw the resolute
attitude of Brasidas, and also inferred it from the
fact that he did not give up Scione. Moreover, the
conspirators among them were few in number, and,
once they had formed the design, from that moment
showed no slackness, but were in fear of their lives
in case of detection and coerced the multitude even
against their will. But the Athenians, when they
heard the news, were far more enraged, and straight-
way made preparations against both cities. And
Brasidas, expecting their coming, conveyed away to
Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the
Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and sent over to protect
them five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three
hundred Chalcidian targeteers, with Polydamidas
as commander of the whole. And the two cities
together made preparations for their defence, in the
belief that the Athenians would soon be at hand.

CXXIV. Brasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile
marched together a second time! to Lyncus against

1 of. ch. Ixxxiii.

423

THUCYDIDES

3 4 \ 4 e \ Φ > ,
es Λύγκον. καὶ ἦγον ὁ μὲν ὧν ἐκράτει Maxe-
δόνων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων Ἑλλήνων
ὁπλίτας, ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς αὐτοῦ περιλοίποις τῶν
Πελοποννησίων Χαλκιδέας καὶ ᾿Ακανθίους καὶ
“Ὁ Ν' \ ὃ ’ e 4 4 de
τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ δύναμιν ἑκάστων. ξύμπαν δὲ
ν e Ἁ ζω [4 ’᾽ , [4
τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τῶν λλήνων τρισχίλιοι μάλιστα,
ἱππῆς δ᾽ οἱ πάντες ἠκολούθουν Μακεδόνων ξὺν
Χαλκιδεῦσιν ὀλίγου ἐς χιλίους, καὶ ἄλλος ὅμιλος
A tA 4 2 7 \ 4 A)
τῶν βαρβάρων πολύς. ἐσβαλόντες δὲ ἐς τὴν
᾿Αρραβαίου καὶ εὑρόντες ἀντεστρατοπεδευμένους
αὑτοῖς τοὺς Λυγκηστάς, ἀντεκαθέζοντο καὶ
αὐτοί. καὶ ἐχόντων τῶν μὲν πεζῶν λόφον ἑκατέ-
ρωθεν, πεδίου δὲ τοῦ μέσου ὄντος, οἱ ἱππῆς ἐς
αὐτὸ καταδραμόντες ἱππομάχησαν πρῶτα ἀμφο-
τέρων, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Περδίκκας,
προελθόντων προτέρων ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου μετὰ τῶν
An a ς ἴοι ’ὔὕ
ἱππέων τῶν Λυγκηστῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ἑτοίμων
ὄντων μάχεσθαι, ἀντεπαγαγόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ξυν-
, 5 \ 4 \
έβαλον καὶ ἔτρεψαν τοὺς Λυγκηστάς, καὶ πολ-
\ \ 4 e \ \ /
nous μὲν διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διαφυγόντες
πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἡσύχαζον. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο
τροπαῖον στήσαντες δύο μὲν ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας
ἐπέσχον, τοὺς ᾿ΙΪλλυριοὺς μένοντες, οὗ ἔτυχον
τῷ Ilepdixxa μισθοῦ μέλλοντες ἥξειν. ἔπειτα
ὁ Περδίκκας ἐβούλετο προϊέναι ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ
᾿Αρραβαίου κώμας καὶ μὴ καθῆσθαι, Βρασίδας δὲ
τῆς τε Μένδης περιορώμενος, μὴ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων
πρότερον ἐπιπλευσάντων τι πάθῃ, καὶ ἅμα τῶν
Ἰλλυριῶν οὐ παρόντων, οὐ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἀλλὰ
ἀναχωρεῖν μᾶλλον.
ΟΧΧΥ. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διαφερομένων αὐτῶν
ἠγγέλθη ὅτι καὶ οἱ ᾿Ιλλυριοὶ μετ᾽ ᾿Αρραβαίου,

424

BOOK IV. cxxiv. 1-cxxv. 1

Arrhabaeus. The latter led the force of the Mace-
donians, over whom he held sway, and a body of
Hellenic hoplites resident among them; the former
led not only the Peloponnesian troops which were left
in the country, but also such forces from Chalcidice,
Acanthus and the other towns as they could each
furnish. The total Hellenic force was about three
thousand ; the cavalry that went with them, Mace-
donians and Chalcidians, were all told a little less
than one thousand, and there was besides a great
multitude of barbarians. Invading the country a
Arrhabaeus and finding the Lyncestians encamped
against them, they also took up a position facing
them. The infantry occupied a hill on either side,
with a plain between, while the cavalry of both
armies at first galloped down into the plain and
engaged in battle; then Brasidas and Perdiccas,
after the Lyncestian hoplites had come forward from
the hill in conjunction with their own cavalry and
were ready to fight, advanced also in their turn and
joined battle, routing the Lyncestians and destroying
many, while the rest escaped to the high places and
kept quiet. After this they set up a trophy and
halted for two or three days, awaiting the Illyrians,
who had been hired by Perdiccas and were momen-
tarily expected. Then Perdiccas wished, on their
arrival, to go forward against the villages of Arrha-
baeus instead of sitting idle; but Brasidas was soli-
citous about Mende, fearing that it might suffer some
harm if the Athenians should sail there before his re-
turn ; and, besides, the Illyrians had not appeared, so
that he was not eager to go on, but rather to retreat.

CXXV. Meanwhile, as they were disputing, it was
announced that the Ilyrians had betrayed Perdiccas

425

THUCYDIDES

προδόντες Περδίκκαν, γεγένηνται" ὥστε ἤδη ἀμφο-
τέροις μὲν δοκοῦν ἀναχωρεῖν διὰ τὸ δέος αὐτῶν,
ὄντων ἀνθρώπων μαχίμων, κυρωθὲν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκ
τῆς διαφορᾶς ὁπηνίκα χρὴ ὁρμᾶσθαι, νυκτός τε
ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
τῶν βαρβάρων εὐθὺς φοβηθέντες, ὅπερ φιλεῖ
μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἀσαφῶς ἐκπλήγνυσθαι, καὶ
νομίσαντες πολλαπλασίους μὲν ἢ ἦλθον ἐπιέναε,
ὅσον δὲ οὔπω παρεῖναι, καταστάντες ἐς αἰφνίδιον
φυγὴν ἐχώρουν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τὸ
πρῶτον οὐκ αἰσθανόμενον, ὡς ἔγνω," ἠνάγκασαν
πρὶν τὸν Βρασίδαν ἰδεῖν (ἄπωθεν γὰρ πολὺ
ἀλλήλων ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο) προαπελθεῖν. Bpa-
σίδας δὲ ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ὡς εἶδε τοὺς Μακεδόνας
προκεχωρηκότας,Ϊ τούς τε ᾿Ιλλυριοὺς καὶ τὸν
᾿Αρράβαιον μέλλοντας ἐπιέναι, ξυναγαγὼν καὶ
αὐτὸς ἐς τετράγωνον τάξιν τοὺς ὁπλίτας καὶ τὸν
ψιλὸν ὅμιλον ἐς μέσον λαβών, διενοεῖτο ἀνα-
χωρεῖν. ἐκδρόμους δέ, εἴ πῃ προσβάλλοιεν
αὐτοῖς, ἔταξε τοὺς νεωτάτους, καὶ αὐτὸς λογάδας
ἔχων τριακοσίους τελευταῖος γνώμην εἶχεν ὗπο-
χωρῶν τοῖς τῶν ἐναντίων πρώτοις προσκεισο-
μένοις ἀνθιστάμενος ἀμύνεσθαι. καὶ πρὶν τοὺς
πολεμίους ἐγγὺς εἶναι, ὡς διὰ ταχέων παρεκελεύ-
σατο τοῖς στρατιώταις τοιάδε.

CXXVI. “Ei μὲν μὴ ὑπώπτευον, ἄνδρες
Πελοποννήσιοι, ὑμᾶς τῷ τε μεμονῶσθαι καὶ ὅτε
βάρβαροι οἱ ἐπιόντες καὶ πολλοὶ ἔκπληξιν ἔχειν,
οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως διδαχὴν ἅμα τῇ παρακελεύσει

1 Hude adopts van Herwerden’s conjecture, προανακε-
χωρηκότας.

426

BOOK IV. cxxv. 1-—cxxvi. 1

and taken sides with Arrhabaeus; consequently,
because of their fear of these people, who were
warlike, both generals now agreed that it was best
to retreat. But in’ consequence of their dispute
nothing had been determined as to when they should
set out; and when night came on the Macedonians.
and the mass of the barbarians immediately took
fright, as large armies are wont to be smitten with
unaccountable panic, and thinking that the advanc-
ing enemy were many times more numerous than
they really were and were all but on them, betook
themselves to sudden flight and hastened home-
wards. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of
their movement, was compelled, when he did learn
of it, to go away without seeing Brasidas ; for they
were encamped far away from each other. But at
daybreak, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians
had already decamped and that the Illyrians and
Arrhabaeus were about to come against him, he
formed his hoplites into a square, put the crowd of
light-armed troops in the centre, and was himself
intending to retreat. He so stationed the youngest
of his troops that they might dash out against
the enemy, in case they attacked at any point, and
proposed to take himself three hundred picked men
and, bringing up the rear, to make a stand and beat off
the foremost of the enemy whenever they pressed
him hard. And before the enemy were near he
exhorted his soldiers, so far as haste allowed, in the
following words :

CXXVI. “ Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus,
that you are in a state of panic because you have
been left alone, and because your assailants are
barbarous and numerous, I should not offer you

427

THUCYDIDES

ἐποιούμην: viv δὲ πρὸς μὲν THY ἀπόλειψιν τῶν
ἡμετέρων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων βραχεῖ
ὑπομνήματι καὶ παραινέσει τὰ μέγιστα πειρά-
σομαι πείθειν. ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει
τὰ πολέμια οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἑκά-
στοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος
πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων, οἵγε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν
τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς ov! πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρ-
χουσιν, ἀλλὰ. πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους, οὐκ
ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχό-
μενοι κρατεῖν. βαρβάρους δὲ ods νῦν ἀπειρίᾳ
δέδιτε, μαθεῖν χρή, ἐξ ὧν τε προηγώνισθε τοῖς
Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐγὼ εἰκάξων τε καὶ
ἄλλων ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι, οὐ δεινοὺς ἐσομένους. καὶ
γὰρ ὅσα μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἀσθενῆ ὄντα τῶν πολεμίων
δόκησιν ἔχει ἰσχύος, διδαχὴ ἀληθὴς προσγενομένη 3
περὶ αὐτῶν ἐθάρσυνε μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμυνομένους"
οἷς δὲ βεβαίως τι πρόσεστιν ἀγαθόν, μὴ προειδώς
τις ἂν αὐτοῖς τολμηρότερον προσφέροιτο. οὗτοι
δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φο-
Bepav: καὶ γὰρ πλήθει ὄψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς
μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ἣ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεισις
τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τινὰ δήλωσιν ἀπειλῆς. προσ-
μεῖξαι δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὁμοῖοι" οὔτε

1 οὐ, Hude deletes, after Stephanus.
2 Hude adopts προγενομένη, after Bekker.

428

ΓΣ

BOOK IV. exxvi. 1-5

instruction combined with encouragement. But as it
is, in view of our abandonment by our allies and of
the multitude of our opponents, I shall try by a
brief reminder and by advice to impress upon you
the most important considerations. For it is proper
that you should be brave in war, not because of the
presence of allies each and every time, but because
of innate valour; nor should you be afraid of any
number of aliens, you who do not come from states
like theirs, but states in which, not the many rule
the few, but rather the minority rule the majority,
having acquired their power by no other means but
superiority in fighting. And as for the barbarians,
whom now in your inexperience you fear, you ought
to know, both from the contest you have already
had’ with the Macedonians among them,! and may
gather from the knowledge 1 gain by inference and
from reports of others, that they will not be formid-
able. For whenever the enemy's power conveys an
impression of strength, but is in reality weak, correct
information about them, when once it has been
gained, tends rather to embolden their opponents ;
whereas, when the enemy possesses some solid ad-
vantage, if one has no previous knowledge of it,
one would be only too bold in attacking them.
Now as for these Illyrians, for those who have had
no experience of them, the menace of their attack
has terror; for their number is indeed dreadful to
behold and the loudness of their battle-cry is in-
tolerable, and the idle brandishing of their arms has
a threatening effect. But for hand to hand fighting,

1 4.e, the Lyncestians, who, according to ch. ]xxxiii. 1 and
11. xcix. 2, belonged to the Macedonians, and had been beaten,
as stated in ch. cxxiv. 3.

429

THUCYDIDES

yap τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν dv λιπεῖν τινα

i! f e δ νον 2 κα
χώραν βιαζόμενοι, ἥ τε φυγὴ καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος αὐτῶν
ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ
τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει (αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ᾽

\ ’ὔ A 4 4 ,
ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τινι πρεπόντως
4 ce) a a , νὴ

πορίσειε), τοῦ τε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν πιστότερον τὸ
? 4 1<¢,,8 3 ὃ ’ ς ce) 9 , a
ἐκφοβήσειν ἢ ὑμᾶς ἀκινδύνως ἡγοῦνται" ἐκείνῳ yap
ἂν πρὸ τούτον ἐχρῶντου σαφῶς τε "πᾶν τὸ
προὐὔπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε ἔργῳ μὲν
βραχὺ ὄν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατασπέρχον. ὃ
ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον καί, ὅταν καιρὸς 7,
κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ
ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίξεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ
λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην
ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις ἄπωθεν ἀπειλαῖς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον
μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς,
κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς
ἐνδείκνυνται."

CXXVII. Τοιαῦτα ὁ Βρασίδας παραινέσας
4 ” \ ’ e \ ,. 30. ἢ
ὑπῆγε τὸ στράτευμα. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἰδόντες

a A , 4 4

πολλῇ βοῇ καὶ θορύβῳ προσέκειντο, νομίσαντες
φεύγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθερεῖν.
καὶ ds αὐτοῖς αἴ τε ἐκδρομαὶ ὅπῃ προσπίπτοιεν
3 , > _N ” \ 4 >
ἀπήντων, Kal αὐτὸς ἔχων τοὺς λογάδας ἐπίικει-
μένοις ὑφίστατο, τῇ τε πρώτῃ ὁρμῇ παρὰ γνώμην

1 Hude emends to ἐκφοβῆσαι, after Torstrick.
430

BOOK IV. cxxvi. 5-cxxvi. 2

if their opponents but endure such threats, they are
not the men they seem; for having no regular order,
they would not be ashamed to abandon any position
when hard pressed; and since flight and attack are
considered equally honourable with them, their
courage cannot be put to the test. Besides, a mode
of fighting in which everyone is his own master will
provide a man the best excuse for saving himself
becomingly. They think, too, that it is a less risky
game to try to frighten you from a safe distance
than to meet you hand to hand; otherwise they
would not have taken this course in preference to
that. And so you clearly see that all that was at
first formidable about them is but little in reality,
startling merely to eye and ear. If you withstand
all this in the first onrush, and then, whenever
opportunity offers, withdraw again in orderly array,
you will the sooner reach safety, and will hereafter
know that mobs like these, if an adversary but
sustain their first onset, merely make a flourish of
valour with threats from afar in menace! of attack,
but if one yields to them, they are right upon his
heels, quick enough to display their courage when
all is safe.’’

CXXVII. After such words of admonition, Brasidas
began to withdraw his army. On seeing this the
barbarians came on with a mighty shouting and up-
roar, thinking that he was fleeing and that they
could overtake and destroy his army. But the
troops who had been selected to dash out met them
wherever they charged, and Brasidas himself with
his picked men sustained their attack ; and so the
Peloponnesians to their surprise withstood their first

1 Possibly μελλήσει = ““ without coming to action.”

431

THUCYDIDES

κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ζεύγεσιν αὐτῶν βϑοεικοῖς ἢ εἴ τινε
σκεύει ἐκπεπτωκότι, οἷα ἐν νυκτερινῇ καὶ φοβερᾷ
ἀναχωρήσει εἰκὸς ἦν ξυμβῆναι, τὰ μὲν ὑπολύ-
οντες κατέκοπτον, τῶν δὲ οἰκείωσιν ἐποιοῦντο.
ἀπὸ τούτου τε πρῶτον Περδίκκας Βρασίδαν τε
πολέμιον ἐνόμισε καὶ ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν Πελοπον-
νησίων τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ δι᾽ ᾿Αθηναίους οὐ ξύνηθες
μῖσος εἶχε, τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων δια-
ναστὰς ἔπρασσεν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν
ξυμβήσεται, τῶν δὲ ἀπαλλάξεται.

CXXIX. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀναχωρήσας ἐκ Μακε-
δονίας ἐς Τορώνην καταλαμβάνει ᾿Αθηναίους
Μένδην ἤδη ἔχοντας, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡσυχάζων ἐς μὲν
τὴν Παλλήνην ἀδύνατος ἤδη ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι δια-
βὰς τιμωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ Τορώνην ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχεν.
ὑπὸ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῖς ἐν τῇ Λύγκῳ
ἐξέπλευσαν ἐπί τε τὴν Μένδην καὶ τὴν Σκιώνην οἱ
᾿Αθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, ναυσὶ μὲν
πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἧσαν δέκα Χῖαι, ὁπλίταις δὲ

7 ς A N ’ ς
χιλίοις ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοξόταις ἑξακοσίοις καὶ Θρᾳξὶ
μισθωτοῖς χιλίοις καὶ ἄλλοις τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμ-
μάχων πελτασταῖς: ἐστρατήγει δὲ Νικίας ὁ
Νικηράτου καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ δΔιειτρέφους.
ἄραντες δὲ ἐκ ἸΤοτειδαΐας ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ σχόντες
κατὰ τὸ ἸΠοσειδώνιον ἐχώρουν ἐς τοὺς Μενδαίους.
οἱ δὲ αὐτοί τε καὶ Σκιωναίων τριακόσιοι βεβοη-
θηκότες Πελοποννησίων τε οἱ ἐπίκουροι, ξύμπαν-
tes” ἑπτακόσιοι ὁπλῖται, καὶ Πολυδαμίδας ὁ
ἄρχων αὐτῶν, ἔτυχον ἐξεστρατοπεδευμένοι ἔξω τῆς

1 Hude adopts Madvig’s correction, τῷ δὲ ἀναγκαίῳ ξυμφόρῳ

διαστάς, ‘‘ However, such was the urgency of his situation

that he stood aside and began to devise how...”
3 δέ, inthe MSS. after ξύμπαντες, deleted by Kriiger.

434

BOOK IV. cxxvimt. 4-cxx1x. 3

theirs in the road or upon any baggage that had
been dropped, as was likely to happen in a retreat
made by night and in a panic, of their own accord
they loosed the oxen and slaughtered them, but
appropriated the baggage. And from this time
Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy, and
thenceforth he cherished a hatred of the Pelopon-
nesians, which was indeed not consistent with his
feeling against the Athenians. However, disregard-
ing his own urgent interests, he was devising how
he might in the quickest way come to terms with
the latter and get rid of the former.

CXXIX. Returning from Macedonia to Torone,
Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession
of Mende ; and thinking it now impossible to cross
over to Pallene and give aid, he remained quiet
where he was, but kept watch over Torone. For
about the same time as the events in Lyncus the
Athenians had sailed against Mende and Scione, as
they had been preparing to do,! with fifty ships, of
which ten were Chian, and with one thousand hop-

lites of their own, six hundred bowmen, a thousand
᾿ς Thracian mercenaries, and in addition targeteers
from their allies in that neighbourhood. They were
under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus and
Nicostratus son of Diitrephes. Setting out with the
fleet from Potidaea and putting in at the temple of
Poseidon, they advanced into the country of the
Mendaeans. Now these and three hundred Scion-
aeans who had come to their support, and the
Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hoplites in
all, with Polydamidas as their commander, had just

1 of. ch. exxii. 6; exxiii. 3.

435
F F 2

THUCYDIDES

4 πόλεως ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ. καὶ αὐτοῖς Νικίας
μέν, Μεθωναίους τε ἔχων εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ψιλοὺς
καὶ λογάδας τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ὁπλιτῶν ἑξήκοντα καὶ
τοὺς τοξότας ἅπαντας, κατὰ ἀτραπὸν τινα τοῦ
λόφου πειρώμενος προσβῆναι καὶ τραυματιζόμενος
ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐδυνήθη βιάσασθαι" Νικόστρατος
δὲ ἄλλῃ ἐφόδῳ ἐ ἐκ πλείονος παντὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρα-
τοπέδῳ ἐπιὼν τῷ λόφῳ ὄντι δυσπροσβάτῳ καὶ
πάνυ ἐθορυβήθη, καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον ἀφίκετο πᾶν τὸ

5 στράτευμα τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων νικηθῆναι. καὶ ταύτῃ
μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ὡς οὐκ ἐνέδοσαν οἱ Μενδαῖοι καὶ οἱ
ξύμμαχοι, οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐστρατο-
πεδεύσαντο, καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι νυκτὸς ἐπελθούσης
ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀπῆλθον.

ΟΧΧΧ. Τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν ᾿Αθηναῖοι περι-
πλεύσαντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς Σκιώνης τό τε προάστειον
εἷλον καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἅπασαν ἐδήουν τὴν γῆν
οὐδενὸς ἐπεξιόντος (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ στασιασμοῦ ἐν
τῇ πόλει), οἱ δὲ τριακόσιοι τῶν Σκιωναίων τῆς

2 ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς “ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. καὶ τῇ
ἐπιγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικίας μὲν τῷ ἡμίσει τοῦ
στρατοῦ προϊὼν ἅμα ἐς τὰ μεθόρια τῶν Σκιωναίων
τὴν γῆν ἐδήου, Νικόστρατος δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς κατὰ
τὰς ἄνω πύλας, 7 ἐπὶ Ποτειδαίας ἔ ἔρχονταε, προσ-

3 εκάθητο τῇ πόλει. ὁ δὲ Πολυδαμίδας (ἔτυχε γὰρ
ταύτῃ τοῖς Μενδαίοις καὶ ἐπικούροις ἐντὸς τοῦ
τείχους τὰ ὅπλα κείμενα) διατάσσει τε ὡς ἐς

4 μάχην καὶ παρήνει. τοῖς Μενδαίοις ἐπεξιέναι. καί
τινος αὐτῷ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀντειπόντος κατὰ
τὸ στασιωτικὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέξεισιν οὐδὲ δέοιτο
πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀντεῖπεν ἐπισπασθέντος τε τῇ

436

BOOK IV. ΟΧΧΙΧ. 3-cxxx, 4

encamped outside the city in a strong position on a
hill. Nicias tried to reach them by a path up the hill,
having with him one hundred and twenty light-armed
Methonaeans, sixty picked men of the Athenian
hoplites, and all the bowmen, but his troops suffered
in the attempt and he was unable to carry this
position. Nicostratus, however, with all the rest of
the army, advancing against the hill, which was
difficult of access, by another and longer route, was
thrown into utter confusion, and the whole Athenian
army natrowly escaped defeat. So on this day,
as the Mendaeans and their allies did not yield,
the Athenians withdrew and encamped, and the
Mendaeans, when night came on, returned to the
city.

CXXX. On the next day the Athenians sailed
round to the side of the town facing Scione and took
the suburb, and all that day they ravaged the land.
No one came out against them, as there-was some
sort of uprising in the town; and during the fol-
lowing night the three hundred Scionaeans returned
home. On the next day Nicias with half of the
army advanced as far as the boundary of the
Scionaeans and ravaged the land, while Nicostratus
with the rest sat down before the city at the
upper gates, on the road leading to Potidaea. But
it chanced that in that quarter of the town, inside
the walls, the arms of the Mendaeans and their
auxiliaries were deposited, and Polydamidas was
there drawing his troops up for battle and exhorting
the Mendaeans to make a sortie. Some one of the
popular party mutinously answered him that he
would not go out and had no use for war, but no
sooner had he answered than Polydamidas seized

437

- THUCYDIDES

eipt ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ GopuBnOévros,! ὁ δῆμος εὐθὺς
ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα περιοργὴς ἐχώρει ἐπί τε
Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ᾽
αὐτῶν πράξαντας. καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέπουσιν
ἅμα μὲν μάχῃ αἰφνιδίῳ, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις
τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιγομένων φοβηθέντων: φήθησαν
γὰρ ἀπὸ προειρημένου τινὸς αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπιχείρη-
σιν γενέσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὅσοι
μὴ αὐτίκα διεφθάρησαν, κατέφυγον, ἤνπερ καὶ τὸ
πρότερον αὐτοὶ εἶχον' οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ
ὁ Νικίας ἐπαναστρέψας πρὸς τῇ πόλει ἦν) ἐσπε-
σόντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως
ἀνοιχθεῖσαν, ἁπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ὡς κατὰ κράτος
ἑλόιτες διήρπασαν, καὶ μόλις οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατέ:-
σχον ὥστε μὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπους διαφθείρεσθαι.
καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μενδαίους μετὰ ταῦτα πολιτεύειν
ἐκέλευον ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, αὐτοὺς κρίναντας ἐν
σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εἴ τινας ἡγοῦνται αἰτίους εἶναι τῆς
ἀποστάσεως: τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἀπετεί-
χίσαν ἑκατέρωθεν τείχει ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ φυλακὴν
ἐπικαθίσταντο.Σ ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν Μένδην
κατέσχον, ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην ἐχώρουν.

CXXXI. Οἱ δὲ ἀντεπεξελθόντες αὐτοὶ καὶ
Πελοποννήσιοι ἱδρύθησαν ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ
πρὸ τῆς πέλεως, ὃν εἰ μὴ ἕλοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ
ἐγίγνετο σφῶν περιτείχισις. προσβαλόντες δ᾽
αὐτῷ κατὰ κράτος οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ μάχῃ ἐκκρού-
σαντες τοὺς ἐπόντας ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντό τε καὶ
ἐς τὸν περιτειχισμὸν τροπαῖον στήσαντες παρε-

1 θορυβηθέντος, Hude καταθορυβηθέντος.
2 χὴν Μένδην πόλιν, MSS.; Dobree deletes Μένδην.

δ Poppo’s correction for ἐπεκαθίσαντο of the MSS.
4 Dobree’s correction for ἐπιόντας of the MSS.

438

BOOK IV. cxxx. 4—cxxx1. 2

him with violence and roughly handled him;
whereupon the populace in great anger at once
caught up their arms and advanced upon the Pelo-
ponnesians and the opposite party who were in
league with them. Falling upon them they put
them to rout, partly by the suddenness of their
onslaught, partly because the others were terrified
when the gates were opened to the Athenians; for
they thought that the attack had been made upon
them by a preconcerted agreement. Those of the
Peloponnesians who were not killed on the spot
took refuge on the acropolis, which they already
had possession οὖ; but the Athenians—for Nicias
had already turned back and was near the city—
burst into the city with their whole force, and, as
the gates had been opened without an agreement,
plundered the city as though they had taken it by
storm; and the generals with difficulty kept them
from destroying the inhabitants also. They then
directed the Mendaeans henceforth to retain their
former constitution, and bring to trial among them-
selves any whom they thought guilty of the revolt ;
but the men on the acropolis they fenced off with
a wall extending on either side down to the sea, and
set a guard over them. And when they had thus
secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione.
CXXXI. The Scionaeans and the Peloponnesians
had come out against them and taken position on a
strong hill before the city, which had to be taken by
the enemy before the city could be invested with a
wall. So the Athenians made a furious assault upon
the hill and dislodged those that were upon it; they
then encamped and, after raising a trophy, prepared

439

THUCYDIDES

8 oxevalovTo. καὶ αὐτῶν ov πολὺ ὕστερον ἤδη ἐν
ἔργῳ ὄντων οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἐν τῇ Μένδῃ
πολιορκούμενοι ἐπίκουροι βιασάμενοι παρὰ θά-
λασσαν τὴν φυλακὴν νυκτὸς ἀφικνοῦνται, καὶ
διαφυγόντες οἱ πλεῖστοι τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ Σκιώνῃ στρα-
τόπεδον ἐσῆλθον ἐς αὐτήν.

CXXXII. Περιτειχιζομένης δὲ τῆς Σκιώνης
Περδίκκας τοῖς τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων στρατηγοῖς ἐπι-
κηρυκευσάμενος ὁμολογίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τοὺς
᾿Αθηναίους διὰ τὴν τοῦ Βρασίδου ἔχθραν περὶ
τῆς ἐκ τῆς Λύγκου ἀναχωρήσεως, εὐθὺς τότε

2 ἀρξάμενος πράσσειν. καὶ ἐτύγχανε γὰρ τότε
Ἰσχαγόρας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιὰν μέλλων
πεζῇ πορεύσειν ὡς Βρασίδαν, ὁ δὲ Περδίκκας,
ἅμα μὲν κελεύοντος τοῦ Nuxiov, ἐπειδὴ ξυνεβε-
βήκει, ἔνδηλόν te ποιεῖν τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις βε-
βαιότητος πέρι, ἅμα δ᾽ αὐτὸς οὐκέτι βουλόμενος
Πελοποννησίους ἐς τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀφικνεῖσθαι,
παρασκευάσας τοὺς ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ ξένους, χρώ-
μενος αἰεὶ τοῖς πρώτοις, διεκώλυσε τὸ στράτευμα
καὶ τὴν παρασκευήν, ὥστε μηδὲ πειρᾶσθαι Θεσ-

8 σαλῶν. ᾿Ισχαγόρας μέντοι καὶ ᾿Αμεινίας καὶ
"A ὺς αὐτοί τε ὡς Βρασίδαν adix ἐπιδεῖν

ριστεὺς auto τε ὡς Βρασίδαν ἀφίκοντο, ἔπε
πεμψάντων Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ
τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν παρανόμως ἄνδρας ἐξῆγον
ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὥστε τῶν πόλεων ἄρχοντας καθει-
στάναι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν ἐπιτρέπειν. καὶ
Κλεαρίδαν μὲν τὸν Κλεωνύμου καθίστησιν ἐν
᾿Αμφιπόλει, Πασιτελίδαν ὃ δὲ τὸν Ἡγησάνδρου
ἐν 'Γορώνῃ.

1 δέ, deleted by Hude, following Dobree.

2 αὐτῶν, Hude reads αὐτῷ, after Stahl.

3 Dobree’s correction for ’ExcreA(3ay of the MSS. ; cf. v. 3.
440

BOOK IV. cxxxi. 2-cxxxu. 3

for the circumvallation. But not long afterwards,
when they were already at work, the auxiliaries who
were besieged on the acropolis of Mende forced
their way by night along the shore through the
guard and reached Scione ; and most of them escaped
through the besieging army and got into the city.

CXXXII. While the circumvallation of Scione was
in progress, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian
generals and made an agreement with them; he
'was moved to this by the hatred he bore Brasidas
for his retreat from Lyncus, at which time indeed he
had begun his negotiations.1 Now it happened at
that time that Ischagoras, the Lacedaemonian, was
on the point of taking an army by land to join
Brasidas, but Perdiccas, partly because Nicias urged
him, since he had made terms with the Athenians,
to give them some token of his sincerity, partly also
because he himself no longer wished the Pelopon-
nesians to enter his territory, now worked upon his
friends in Thessaly, with the foremost of whom he
was always on good terms, and effectually stopped
the army and the expedition, to such a degree that
they did not even try to obtain permission from the
Thessalians. Ischagoras, however, with Ameinias
and Aristeus, came by themselves to Brasidas, having
been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to look
into the situation. And they brought from Sparta,
contrary to custom, some of their young men, in-
tending to place them as governors over the cities
instead of entrusting these to anybody that might
chance to offer. Accordingly, they placed at Amphi-
polis Clearidas son of Cleonymus and at Torone
Pasitelidas son of Hegesander.

1 of. ch. cxxviii. 5.

441

THUCYDIDES

CXXXIII. Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Θηβαῖοι
Θεσπιῶν τεῖχος περιεῖλον ἐπικαλέσαντες ἀττικε-
σμόν, βουλόμενοι μὲν καὶ αἰεί, παρεστηκὸς δὲ
ῥᾷον ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους μάχῃ ὅ τι
ἦν αὐτῶν ἄνθος ἀπολώλει. καὶ ὁ νεὼς τῆς “Ἥρας
τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν ἼΑργει κατεκαύθη,. Χρυσίδος
τῆς ἱερείας λύχνον τινὰ θείσης ἡμμένον πρὸς τὰ
στέμματα καὶ ἐπικαταδαρθούσης, ὥστε ἔλαθεν
ἁφθέντα πάντα καὶ καταφλεχθέντα. καὶ ἡ Χρυσὶς

3A\ a δ ’ Ἁ ᾽

μὲν εὐθὺς τῆς νυκτὸς δείσασα τοὺς ᾿Αργείους ἐς
Φλειοῦντα φεύγει: οἱ δὲ ἄλλην ἱέρειαν ἐκ τοῦ
νόμου τοῦ προκειμένου κατεστήσαντο Φαεινίδα
ὄνομα. ἔτη δὲ ἡ Χρυσὶς τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε
ἐπέλαβεν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἔνατον ἐκ μέσον, ὅτε ἐπε-
φεύγει. καὶ ἡ Σκιώνη τοῦ θέρους ἤδη τελευτῶντος
περιετετείχιστό τε παντελῶς, καὶ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐπ᾽
αὐτῇ φυλακὴν καταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ ἄλλῳ
στρατῷ.

CXXXIV. Ἔν δὲ τῷ ἐπιόντι χειμῶνι τὰ μὲν
᾿Αθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἡσύχαξε διὰ τὴν
2 ’ fo δὲ ἽΝ T A \ e ,
ἐκεχειρίαν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεᾶται καὶ ot ξύμ-
μαχοι ἑκατέρων ξυνέβαλον ἐν Λαοδοκείῳ 1 τῆς
ὈΟρρεσθίδος, καὶ νίκη ἀμφιδήριτος ἐγένετο’ κέρας
γὰρ ἑκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς τροπαῖά
τε ἀμφότεροι ἔστησαν καὶ σκῦλα ἐς Δελφοὺς
ἀπέπεμψαν. διαφθαρέντων μέντοι πολλῶν ἑκα-
τέροις καὶ ἀγχωμάλου τῆς μάχης γενομένης καὶ

1 Bursian’s correction for Λαοδικίφ of the MSS.

442

BOOK IV. cxxxul. 1—cxxxiv. 2

CXXXIII. In the same summer the Thebans
dismantled the wall of the Thespians, accusing them
of favouring the Athenians. Indeed they had al-
ways wished to do this, but now found it easier,
since the flower of the Thespians had perished in the
battle with the Athenians.! In this same summer,
too, the temple of Hera at Argos was burned down,
Chrysis? the priestess having placed a lighted torch
near the garlands and then gone to sleep, so that
the whole place took fire and was ablaze before she
was aware. And Chrysis that very night, in fear of
the Argives, fled to Phlius; but they appointed
another priestess according to the custom prescribed,
Phieinis by name. Chrysis had been priestess during
eight years of this war and half of the ninth when
she fled. Toward the close of the summer Scione
was at length completely invested, and the Athenians,
leaving a guard there, withdrew with the rest of
their army.

CXXXIV. In the following winter, on account of
the armistice, matters were quiet with the Athenians
and the Lacedaemonians ; but the Mantineans and
the Tegeans with their respective allies fought a
battle at Laodoceum in the district of Oresthis,
The victory was disputed ; for each side routed the
wing opposed to themselves, and both set up trophies*
and sent spoils to Delphi. Certain it is at any rate
that after many had fallen on both sides and night
had cut short the action, the issue of battle being

1 At Delium ; ¢f. ch. xciii. 4; xevi. 3.

2 The same who in 43] 3.c. had held her office forty-eight
years ; cf. 11. ii. 1.

8 It seems that the Mantineans and Tegeans each defeated
the other’s allies, which were on the left wings of the

opposing armies.
443

THUCYDIDES

3 ’ \ Ἁ Μ e a Ν
ἀφελομένης νυκτὸς τὸ ἔργον οἱ Τεγεᾶται μὲν
3 ’ a \ 3 \ ΕΖ a
ἐπηυλίσαντό τε καὶ εὐθὺς ἔστησαν τροπαῖον,
Μαντινῆς δὲ ἀπεχώρησάν τε ἐς Βουκολιῶνα καὶ
ὕστερον ἀντέστησαν.

CXXXV. ᾿Απεπείρασε δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος
καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας τελευτῶντος καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ ἤδη
Ποτειδαίας. προσελθὼν γὰρ νυκτὸς καὶ κλίμακα
προσθεὶς μέχρε μὲν τούτου ἔλαθεν: τοῦ γὰρ
κώδωνος παρενεχθέντος οὕτως ἐς τὸ διάκενον,

> Ca) ‘ , > ’ e ld
πρὶν ἐπανελθεῖν τὸν παραδιδόντα αὐτόν, ἡ πρόσ-
θεσις ἐγένετο ἔπειτα μέντοι εὐθὺς αἰσθομένων,
πρὶν προσβῆναι, ἀπήγαγε πάλιν κατὰ τάχος τὴν
στρατιὰν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμεινεν ἡμέραν γενέσθαι. καὶ
ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἔνατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ
ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

444

BOOK IV. cxxxiv. 2—cxxxv. 2

still undecided, the Tegeans bivouacked on the field
and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans
retreated to Bucolion, and afterwards set up a rival
trophy.

CXXXV. Toward the close of the same winter,
when spring was near at hand, Brasidas made an at-
tempt on Potidaea. He came up by night and placed
a ladder against the wall, up to this point escaping
detection ; for the ladder was planted precisely at the
interval of time after the bell had been carried by
and before the patrol who passed it on had come
back. The guards, however, discovered it imme-
diately, before an ascent could be made, and Brasidas
made haste to lead his army back again, not wait-
ing for day to come. So ended the winter and with
it the ninth year of this war of which Thucydides
wrote the history.

1 It appears that the bell was eat from one sentinel to
the next. Another, and probably more common, way of
testing the watchfulness of the sentinels was to have a patrol

with a bell make the round, each sentinel having to answer
the signal.

445

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CYNTOSIS. Trans. by W. H. D. Rouse. (37d Impression.)

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Hutchinson. 2 Vols.

PROPERTIUS. Trans. by H. E. Butler. (and /mepression.)

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AND GERMANIA. Trans. by ἘΝ Hutton. (and Impression.)

TERENCE, Trans. by John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (37d lmepression.)
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Greek Authors.

ACHILLES TATIUS. Trans. by S. Gaselee.
AESCHINES. Trans. by C. D. Adams.
APOLLONIUS RHODIUS. Trans. by R. Ὁ. Seaton. (2nd /mpression.)
f THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. Trans. by Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols.
(Vol. I grd Impression. Vol. 11 and Impression.)
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CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Trans. by Rev. G. W. Butterworth.
DAPHNIS AND CHLOE. Thornley's Translation revised by J. M.
Edmonds; and PARTHENIUS. Trans. by S. Gaselee.
DIO CASSIUS: ROMAN HISTORY. Trans. by E. Cary. 9 Vols.
Vols. I to VI.
RU RIED ES: Trans. by A. 5. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. I and II 3rd
Impression. Vols. 111 and IV and /mpression.)
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THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY. ‘Trans. by W. R. Paton. 5 Vols.
(Vols. and 11 asd Jopression.)
a GREEK BUCOLIC POETS (THEOCRITUS, BION, MOS-
HUS). Trans. by J. M. Edmonds. (37d /mpression.)
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White. (and /m pression.)
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ULIAN. Trans. by Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. Vols. I and II.
UCIAN. Trans. by A. M. Harmon. 7 Vols. Vols. I and II. (2nd
Impression.)
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PAUSANIAS: DESCRIPTION OF GREECE. ‘Trans. by W. H. 5.
de nes. § Vols, and Companion Vol. Vol. I.
PHILOSTRATUS: THE LIFE OF APOLLONIUS OF TYANA
Trans. by F. C. Conybeare. 2 Vols. (2nd /mpression.)
PINDAR. Trans. by Sir J. E. Sandys. (and Edition.)
PLATO: EUTHYPHR " APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAEDO, PHAED-
RUS. Trans. by H. N. Fowler. (3rd ‘Impressi sion.)
Me THE PARALLEL LIVES. Trans. by B. Perrin. 11 Vols.
ols. 1 to
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Vols. Vols. I to (II.
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SOPHOCLES. Trans. by F. Storr. 2 Vols. “Wol. 1 37d Impression.
Vol. 11 and Lsnpression.)
ST. JOHN DAMASCENE: BARLAAM AND IOASAPH. Trans. by
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Ted fone vo. ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS. Trans. by Sir Arthur
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XENOPHON : CYROPAEDIA. Trans. by Walter Miller. s Vols.
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