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EXCHANGE 


TIGLATH   PILESER   III 


COLUMBIA 

UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

SALES  AGENTS 

NEW  YOEK: 

LEMCKE   &   BUECHNER 
30-32  WEST  2TTH  STREET 

LONDON : 

HENRY  FROWDE 
AMBN  COENKE,  E.G. 

TOEONTO : 

HENRY  FROWDE 

25  RICHMOND  ST.,  W- 


CONTRIBUTIONS  TO   ORIENTAL  HISTORY 

AND  PHILOLOGY 

No.  V. 


TIGLATH  PILESER  III 


BY 

ABRAHAM   S.    ANSPACHER 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQUIRE- 
MENTS FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
IN  THE  FACULTY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 
1912 


COPYBNJHT,  1912, 
BY   THE   COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY  PEE88. 

Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  November,  1912, 


J.  8.  Cushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


NOTE 

The  following  thesis  by  Dr.  A.  S.  Anspacher  gives  the 
most  succinct  account  of  the  reign  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III 
which  has  yet  been  attempted.  The  author  has  systemat- 
ically endeavored  to  place  a  number  of  localities,  men- 
tioned in  the  documents  of  this  great  Assyrian  king,  and 
in  so  doing  he  has  made  a  distinct  contribution  to  ancient 
geography.  Tiglath  Pileser's  map  has  always  been  some- 
what uncertain,  and,  in  his  work,  Dr.  Anspacher  has 
succeeded  not  only  in  establishing  several  new  locations, 
but  he  has  traced,  more  carefully  than  has  been  done 
hitherto,  the  routes  of  march  of  the  principal  campaigns 
inaugurated  by  this  notable  conqueror. 

In  compiling  the  tale  of  an  ancient  nation,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  specialize  on  the  material  of  each  period,  and  also 
on  that  of  each  important  reign  ;  and  this  is  what  Dr. 
Anspacher  has  done.  While  it  is  true  that  all  the  riddles 
of  the  history  of  a  vanished  people  can  never  be  satisfac- 
torily solved,  a  careful  study,  such  as  this  dissertation 
undoubtedly  is,  cannot  fail  to  be  of  value  to  the  historian. 

J.  DYNELEY  PRINCE. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY, 
NEW  YORK  CITY. 


254229 


INTRODUCTION 

The  attempt  to  solve  all  the  problems  connected  with 
the  life  and  history  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III  can  never  be 
fully  successful  as  long  as  we  remain  without  new  in- 
scriptional  material  by  means  of  which  to  fill  in  the 
lacunae  which  so  unfortunately  abound  in  the  existing 
tablets.  With  but  one  exception,  all  the  inscriptions 
which  we  now  possess  were  found  by  Layard  in  the  South- 
west Palace  of  Nimrod.  Some  of  the  tablets  came 
originally  from  the  Northwest,  some  from  the  Central 
Palace;  and  since  all  three  of  the  mounds  which  mark 
the  sites  of  these  three  palaces  have  been  thoroughly 
explored,  it  is  perhaps  too  much  to  hope  that  more  records 
of  Tiglath  Pileser's  reign  will  come  down  to  us. 

This  thesis  is  an  attempt  to  fix  in  some  detail  the  prin- 
cipal facts  in  the  history  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III.  Although 
every  standard  work  on  Assyrian  history  has  some  pages 
devoted  to  this  theme,  no  author  has  treated  it  with  such 
detail  as  to  present  the  full  story.  The  entire  subject 
has  appealed  to  me  as  one  deserving  far  more  considera- 
tion than  is  usually  accorded  to  it  in  the  histories.  The 
reign  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III  was  from  one  point  of  view 
the  most  important  in  Assyrian  history,  and  the  revolu- 
tionary tendencies  which  characterized  it  are  of  as  much 
importance  to  civilization  as  they  were  to  the  then  welfare 
of  Assyria  itself.  It  needed  a  revolution  to  make  the 

ix 


x  INTRODUCTION 

conservative  Assyrian  politicians  of  the  time  realize  that 
the  very  existence  of  the  state  was  in  danger.  To  curtail 
the  immense  revenues  of  the  priests  so  that  sufficient 
means  to  carry  on  the  extensive  military  operations  always 
necessary  to  Assyria's  safety  might  never  be  lacking  was 
the  immediate  aim  of  the  revolution.  That  result  it 
speedily  achieved.  But  from  the  viewpoint  of  world 
history  it  also  accomplished  a  far  more  valuable  work, 
in  that  it  gave  Tiglath  Pileser  the  opportunity  so  to  shape 
Assyria's  policies  as  to  give  her  a  longer  lease  of  life  than 
would  otherwise  have  been  hers. 

When  Tiglath  Pileser  III  came  to  the  throne,  Assyria 
was  already  beginning  to  succumb  to  the  forces  of  decay. 
Her  dependencies  were  being  gradually  taken  from  her, 
and  her  armies  were  meeting  frequent  reverses.  It 
needed  a  great  warrior  and  statesman  to  save  her,  not 
only  for  herself,  but  for  the  accomplishment  of  her  cul- 
tural work.  The  value  of  this  king  to  civilization,  there- 
fore, lies  not  in  the  fact  of  his  extensive  conquests 
themselves,  but  rather  in  the  fact  that  without  him 
Assyria  would  not  have  endured  long  enough  to  bequeath 
anything  to  the  world. 

The  proper  fixing  of  the  geographical  locations  men- 
tioned in  the  inscriptions  is  of  prime  importance.  I  have, 
wherever  possible,  tried  to  determine  these  and  also  the 
routes  of  march  by  the  aid  of  all  the  historical  inscrip- 
tions that  were  available  to  me,  and  believe  that  I  have 
fixed  some  of  these  with  exactness.  One  fact  I  wish  to 
note  here.  At  first  thought  it  would  seem  that  the  Arabic 
geographers  should  yield  material  for  the  determination 
of  some  of  the  localities  in  question,  but  on  the  contrary 
no  such  aid  is  forthcoming.  They  deal  with  a  later 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

period  of  the  history  of  Western  Asia,  and  only  a  very 
few  of  the  geographical  names  of  the  times  of  which  they 
treat  preserve  even  a  reminiscence  of  old  Assyrian  nomen- 
clature. 

In  conclusion  I  wish  to  thank  Professor  Prince,  under 
whom  I  have  studied  my  major  subject,  Assyriology,  and 
whose  aid  and  suggestion  as  well  as  able  instruction  have 
given  to  my  work  whatever  value  it  may  possess. 

To  Professor  Richard  Gottheil  I  also  owe  a  debt  of 
gratitude  for  many  helpful  suggestions,  and  have  much 
pleasure  in  expressing  my  appreciation  and  gratitude. 

ABRAHAM  S.   ANSPACHER. 


CONTENTS 


I.  THE  SOURCES       .........  1 

II.  ACCESSION    ..........  10 

III.  THE  SOUTHERN  AND  WESTERN  FRONTIERS      ...  18 

IV.  SYRIA  AND  THE  WEST       .......  32 

V.  MEDIA  AND  URARTU  ........  54 

VI.  THE  CONQUEST  OF  BABYLONIA         .....  64 


sail 


PRINCIPAL  ABBREVIATIONS 

Assy.  Can.  .  .  .  G.  Smith,  Assyrian  Eponym  Canon,  1869. 

Disc G.  Smith,  Assyrian  Discoveries,  1875. 

Br Rudolph  E.  Briinnow,  Classified  List,  1889. 

Rost Paul  Rost,  Die  Keilschrifttexte  TiglatnPileser's  HI. 

Band  I :  Einleitung,  Transcription  und  Ueberset- 

zung,  Worterverzeichniss  mit  Commentar.  Band  II : 

Autographierte  Texte,  1893. 

Ann Annals :  in  Rost,  Band  I.    pp.  2  ff. 

Th.  A Die   Thontaf elinschrift,   obverse ;    in   Rost,  Band  I. 

pp.  55-69. 
Th.  R Die   Thontafelinschrift,   reverse ;    in   Rost,   Band  I. 

pp.  70-77. 
PI.  I Platteninschrift  von  Nimrud,  No.  I ;  in  Rost,  Band  I. 

pp.  42-47. 
PI.  II.    .  o  .  .  .  Platteniuschrift  von  Nimrud,  No.  II ;  in  Rost,  Band  I. 

pp.  48-53. 

Kl.  I Kleinere  Inschriften ;  in  Rost,  Band  I.    pp.  78-83. 

Kl.  II Kleinere  Inschriften ;  in  Rost,  Band  I.    pp.  84-85. 

KAT.2 Schrader,  Keilinschriften  und  das  Alte  Testament, 

2d  ed.,  1883. 

KB Schrader,  Keilinschriftliche  Bibliothek,  Vols.  I-IV. 

KGF Schrader,   Keilinschriften  und   Geschichtsforschung, 

1878. 
Kritik Schrader,  Zur  Kritik  der  Inschriften  Tiglath-Pileser's 

II,  des  Asarhaddon  und  des  Ashurbanipal,  1879. 

Forsch Winckler,  Altorientalische  Forschungen. 

Untersuchgn.  .  Winckler,  Untersuchungen  zur   altorientalische   Ge- 

schichte,  1889. 

Lay, Layard  Inscriptions  in  the  Cuneiform  Character,  1851. 

xv 


xvi  PRINCIPAL  ABBREVIATIONS 

Paradies.    .  .  .  Delitzsch,  Wo  lag  das  Paradies  ?  1881. 

Sulm Billerbeck,  Das  Sandschak  Suleimania,  1898. 

R Rawlinson,  Cuneiform  Inscriptions  of  Western  Asia. 

RP Records  of  the  Past. 

PSBA Proceedings  of  the  Society  of  Biblical  Archaeology. 

ZA Zeitschrift  fur  Assyriologie. 

JRAS Journal  of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Society. 


TIGLATH   PILESER  III 


CHAPTER   I 

THE   SOURCES 

From  the  time  of  the  destruction  of  the  Babylonian 
Empire  until  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  when  Layard 
began  his  excavations,  Tiglath  Pileser  III1  was  known 
only  because  of  the  mention  of  his  name  in  a  few  Biblical 
verses.2  Nothing  was  certain  about  him,  except  that  a 
king  of  that  name  had  ruled  in  Assyria  and  had  made  his 
power  felt  in  Palestine.  All  knowledge  of  his  history 
had  passed  from  human  memory,  and  even  the  inscrip- 
tions which  finally  proved  to  be  his,  when  they  were 
unearthed  and  deciphered,  presented  many  a  puzzling 
problem.  The  mutilated  condition  in  which  the  tablets 
were  found  did  not,  at  the  time,  promise  much  for  a 
future  solution  of  the  difficulties ;  besides  which,  one 
of  the  tablets  —  the  longest  inscription  —  was  so  badly 
cracked  and  broken  in  shipment  to  the  British  Museum 
that  many  attempts  to  correct  the  first  faulty  piecing 
together  were  for  a  long  time  unsuccessful.  When  this 

1  Schrader,   KAT?  p.  240  and  note,   reads   the   name   "Tu-kul-ti 
(Tuk-lat)-habal-i-sarra "  ;  he  translates,  "Trust  (i.e.  Object  of  Trust)  is 
the  Son  of  thelSarra  Temple."     Note  ABK.  p.  148,  No.  9,  and  p.  151 : 
the  "Son  of  the  Sarra  Temple  is  the  God  Adar"  ;  the  basic  meaning 
of  the  name,  therefore,  is  "  Trust  is  Adar." 

2  2  K.  xv.  29  and  xv.  7 ;    1   Chr.  v.  6,  26;  2  Chr.  xxviii.  20.     The 
form  Tiglath  Pilneser  in  Chronicles  is  due  to  "an  accidental  corruption 
of  the  familiar  name  at  the  hands  of  the  Chronicler  or  of  his  Midrashic 
source."    (Kittel,  Chron.  Heb.  SBOT.  68.)     He  was  known  as  Tiglath 

1 


2  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

had  finally  been  accomplished,  it  was  discovered  that 
about  a  hundred  lines  were  missing  altogether. 

When  Layard  had  in  the  course  of  his  excavations 
reached  what  he  afterwards  called  "  the  Southwest  Pal- 
ace of  Nimrod,"  he  found  that  the  whole  interior  of  one  of 
the  large  halls  remained  "  fairly  intact,"  3  and  that  it  was 
panelled  with  slabs  brought  from  elsewhere.  Some  of  the 
slabs  came  originally  from  the  Northwest,  some  from  the 
Central  Palace.  "  The  bas-reliefs  always,  when  left  entire, 
turned  toward  the  wall  of  sun-dried  brick,  .  .  .  and 
upon  the  faces  of  most  of  the  slabs  forming  wall  E  were 
the  marks  of  a  chisel;  .  .  .  the  bas-reliefs  had  been 
purposely  destroyed.  Only  parts  of  the  wall  F  had  been 
finished.  Many  of  the  slabs  not  having  been  used  and 
still  lying  in  the  centre  of  the  chamber,  ...  it  was  evi- 
dent that  these  were  entire,  having  only  suffered  from  fire. 
They  were,  moreover,  arranged  in  rows  with  great  regu- 
larity, and,  in  one  or  two  instances,  heaped  the  one  above 
the  other." 

The  analysis  of  these  inscriptions,  at  whose  interpreta- 
tion several  partial  attempts  were  made  before  Schrader's 
authoritative  work,  was  all  rendered  secondary  by  that 
scholar's  investigation.4  Schrader  divided  the  inscrip- 
tions into  Annals  and  the  so-called  Prunkinschriften:  the 

Pileser  II,  until,  in  1886,  Th.  G.  Pinches,  in  "Guide  to  the  Kouyunjik 
Gallery,"  p.  9,  No.  72,  described  an  inscription  of  Ramman-Nirari  II, 
which  showed  that  a  grandfather  of  that  king  was  also  called  Tiglath 
Pileser.  This  is  the  second  king  of  the  name,  and  our  king  is,  therefore, 
the  third.  Winckler  published  the  inscription  in  KB.1  pp.  48-49,  and 
in  ZA.  II.  p.  311. 

3  "  Nineveh  and  its  Remains,"  vol.  II.  pp.  27  ff. 

4  Zur  Kritik  der  Inschriften  Tiglath  Pileser 's  II,  des  Asarhaddon  und 
des  Asurbanipal,  in  Kong.  Akademie  der  Wissenschaft  zu  Berlin,  1879. 
A  description  of  all  the  inscriptions  published  up  to  1886  is  given  in 


THE   SOURCES  3 

last  being  arranged  not  chronologically,  but  geographically. 
Both  have  been  published,  transliterated,  and  translated 
in  part,  by  many  scholar's.  Schrader  divides  the  Annals 
into  those  composed  of  7,  12,  and  16  lines,  respectively. 
Of  the  seven-line  inscriptions  (seven  in  number),  Layard 
published  five.5  They  are  those  which  in  his  collection 
are  designated  as  69,  A,  1 ;  69,  A,  2 ;  69,  B,  1 ;  69,  B,  2; 
and  34,  B.  The  last  was  translated  by  Smith,6  and  the 
remaining  two  inscriptions  of  this  set  were  published  by 
the  same  author.7  The  second  group  is  made  up  of  twelve- 
line  inscriptions,  although  one,  Lay.  45,  B,  in  its  present 
condition  contains  only  eight  lines,  the  first  four  being 
broken  away.  Another,  III  R  9,  No.  I,8  is  so  badly  muti- 
lated that  not  a  single  Kne  remains  intact.  Lay.  50,  A 
(III  R  9,  No.  3,  p.  41-52)  is  in  a  very  fair  condition  and 
is  continued  in  Lay.  50,  B,  and  Lay.  67,  A  ;  both  these  last 
being  written  on  one  stone ;  while  Lay.  67,  B,  is  a  con- 
tinuation of  Lay.  67,  A ;  making  of  the  four  inscriptions 
a  complete  sub-group.  Lay.  51,  A,  and  51,  B,9  are  writ- 
ten on  tablets  the  last  half  of  which  is  entirely  broken 
away,  but  what  remains  is  perfectly  legible;  Lay.  51,  B, 
being  damaged  to  the  extent  of  only  a  small  lacuna  in 
the  last  line.  Lay.  52,  A,  and  Lay.  52,  B,10  are  fairly 
well  preserved  and  form  a  continuous  narrative.11  The 

Bezold,  Kurzgefasster  Vberblick  uber  die  Babylonisch-Assyrische  Litera- 
tur.     (Leipzig,  1886.) 

6  "  Inscriptions  in  the  Cuneiform  Character,"  1851. 

6  Disc.  pp.  266  ff. 

7  In  III  R  10,  No.  1,  a  and  b.    He  translated  them  in  Disc.  pp.  281  ff. 

8  Translated  by  Smith,  Disc.  pp.  274  ff. 

9  Translated  in  Disc.  pp.  269  ff. 

10  Translated  in  Smith,  Disc.  pp.  267  ff. 

11  This  group  also  includes  two  fragments,  Lay.  19,  B,  and  Lay.  29,  B  ; 
the  last  was  translated  by  Smith,  Disc.  pp.  283  ff. 


4  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

third  group  (16  lines),  is  made  up  of  inscriptions  which 
are  badly  mutilated ;  viz.  Lay.  71,  B,  which  is  continued 
in  Lay.  73,  A,12  the  merest  fragment.  Only  about  a  third 
of  the  original  tablet  has  come  down  to  us.  Lay.  71,  A 
is  scarcely  in  a  better  condition,  and  is  continued  on  the 
same  stone  by  Lay.  71,  B.  The  two  inscriptions  are 
separated  by  a  perpendicular  line  through  the  width  of 
the  stone,  so  that  Lay.  71,  B,  line  1,  is  the  continuation 
of  Lay.  71,  A,  line  16. 

There  remain  a  few  Annal  Inscriptions  which  cannot 
be  classified  by  the  number  of  their  lines :  viz.  III.  R.  9, 
No.  2 ;  a  fragmentary  19  line  tablet ; 13  III.  R.  9,  No.  3, 
lines  22-41  (Lay.  65),  a  20  line  inscription ; 14  the  very 
badly  broken  18  line  tablet,  Lay.  66 ; 15  III.  R.  10,  No.  2, 
consisting  of  the  broken  parts  of  an  originally  47  line 
inscription,16  and  III.  R.  10,  No.  3,  composed  of  24  lines. 

Schrader's  second  division,  the  Prunkinschriften,  includes 
a  long  fragment  of  a  tablet  which  was  inscribed  on  both 
sides,  the  middle  portion  (about  50  lines  on  the  obverse, 
and  50  on  the  reverse,  i.e.  about  100  in  all),  being  missing. 
It  was  published  II.  R.  67 ;  and  translated  by  Smith,17 
Eneberg,18  and  S.  Arthur  Strong.19  The  duplicate  of  this 

12  Translated  by  Schrader,  EAT*  pp.  261  ff.;  and  Smith,  Disc.  pp. 
282  ff. 

13  Translated  by  Smith,  Disc.  pp.  275  ff. ;  Rodwell,  EP.  V.  p.  45  ;  and 
Schrader,  KAT*  pp.  217  ff. 

14  Translated  by  Smith,  Disc.  pp.  276  ff.;  Menant,  Annales,  p.  146 ;  and 
Rodwell,  EP.  V.  pp.  46  ff. 

is  Translated  by  Smith,  Disc.  pp.  285  ff. 

^Translated  by  Schrader,  KAT.2  pp.  225  ff.;  Kodwell,  HP.  V.  pp. 
61  ff.;  and  by  Smith,  Disc.  p.  284. 

17  Disc.  pp.  256  ff. 

18  Journ.  Asiatique,  VI,  pp.  441  ff.;  cf.  KAT*  p.  224,  lines  23-28,  and 
p.  257,  lines  57-62. 

19  EP.  V.  pp.  115  ff. 


THE   SOURCES  5 

inscription  (Brit.  Mus.  D.  T.  30)  is  of  special  interest, 
having  been  found  by  Smith  at  Kalah  in  the  Temple  of 
Nimroud,  and  is  apparently  a  Babylonian  copy.20  It  was 
published  by  Schrader,21  and  translated  by  Smith.22 
Lay.  17,  F,  is  a  36  line  tablet,  translated  by  Schrader,23 
Menant,24  and  Oppert.25  In  1893  P.  Rost  supplied  the 
need  of  a  complete  edition  of  all  the  inscriptions,  with  a 
new  set  of  autographs,  a  transliteration,  and  translation.26 
In  it  he  publishes  for  the  first  time  three  small  tablets.27 
He  was  fortunate  enough  to  discover  a  squeeze  of  Lay. 
17/18 ;  which  was  made  before  the  tablet  was  broken. 

To  what  kings  these  mutilated  sculptures  and  tablets 
belonged  was  for  a  long  time  a  puzzling  question.  Layard 
himself,28  having  compared  them  with  a  pavement  slab  of 
the  same  period  and  with  reliefs  of  the  Central  Palace, 
concluded  that  they  all  belonged  to  the  same  king.  After 
Hincks29  had  deciphered  on  one  of  the  reliefs  the  name 
of  Menahem,  king  of  Israel,  as  a  tributary  to  the  Assyrian 
king  in  the  eighth  year  of  the  latter's  reign,  on  the  basis 
of  a  reference  to  2  K.  xv.  19  and  20,  and  1  Chr.  v.  26, 
Layard  concluded  that  this  king  must  be  "  an  immediate 
predecessor  of  Pul,  Pul  himself,  or  Tiglath  Pileser." 
With  the  discovery  of  the  Eponym  Canon  the  possibility 

20  Rost,  vol.  I.  p.  11. 

21  Kong.  Ak.  d.  Wiss.  1879. 

22  Disc.  pp.  264  ff. 

23  Lines  20-25  in  KGF.  p.  206,  and  lines  4-10  in  KGF.  p.  106. 

24  Annales,  pp.  138  ff. 

25  Expedition  des  Hois  d'Assyrie,  p.  336. 

26  Keilschrifttexte  Tiglat-Pileser"1  s  III  in  two  volumes.     All  references 
to  the  inscriptions  hereafter  are  to  this  work. 

2?  Vol.  II.  p.  15,  PI.  No.  24,  and  Kuj.  Gallery,  No.  66  and  No.  64 ;  also 
K  2469. 

28  "  Disc,  in  Nineveh  and  Babylon,"  p.  617. 

29  Athenaeum,  June  3,  1852. 


6  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

of  this  king  being  an  immediate  predecessor  of  Pul  was 
obviated.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  difficulty  was  not 
lightened,  because  Pul  is  mentioned  in  2  K.  xv.  19,  as 
the  conqueror  of  Menahem,  and  again,  together  with 
Tiglath  Pileser  in  1  Chr.  v.  26.  He  was  not  recorded 
in  any  Assyrian  inscriptions,  and,  of  course,  not  in  the 
Eponym  Canon.  It  would  have  been  easy  to  have  as- 
cribed the  tablets  to  Tiglath  Pileser  without  further 
debate.  But  although  no  name  was  found  upon  what 
afterwards  turned  out  to  be  the  mutilated  Annal  Inscrip- 
tions of  the  king  in  question,30  yet  to  have  thus  arbitrarily 
assigned  them  to  Tiglath  Pileser  still  left  the  question  of 
the  identity  of  Pul  undecided. 

George  Smith31  conjectured  that  Pul  was,  .  .  .  "either, 
Vul-Nir&ri  III,  who  might  still  have  been  reigning  in  772, 
or  a  monarch  immediately  succeeding  Ashurdan  II  or 
III,  or  that  Pul  and  Tiglath  Pileser  are  identical."  This 
last  theory  had  already  been  propounded  by  Sir  Henry 
Rawlinson,32  and  independently  by  R.  Lepsius.83  It  was 
finally  established  as  the  correct  one  by  Schrader.34  We 
may  add  here  what  is  the  clinching  proof.  In  one  of  the 
Babylonian  King  Lists,35  we  read,  Col.  iv  :  * 

30  Lay.  17  and  18,  and  II.  R.  67  are  not  Annals. 

81  "  The  Assyr.  Ep.  Can.,"  p.  76.     Smith  still  placed  some  faith  in  the 
Ussher  Chronology,  according  to  which  Menahem  began  to  rule  in  773- 
772.      Then,   of  course,   Vul-Nirari    (Ramman-Nirari)    would   have  to 
reign  until  772.     Smith  himself  inclines  to  the  identity  of  Pul  and  Tiglath 
Pileser. 

82  H.  Rawlinson  in  G.  Rawlinson's  Herodotus,  1862,  I.,  p.  382;   and 
Athenceum,  Aug.  22,  1869,  p.  245. 

33  Uber  d.  Chronologischen  Werth  d.  Assy.  Eponymen,  1869,  p.  56  ;  also 
Schrader,  KAT.2  p.  227,  and  KGF.  pp.  442  ff. 

34  JT.Ar.2p.  227. 

«6  Pinches,  PSBA.  May  6,  1894. 

36  Translated,  Sayce  in  BP.  New  Series,  I,  pp.  18  and  23. 


THE   SOURCES  7 

line  5.  Ndbu-sum-ukin  his  son  for  one  month  and  12 
days. 

line  6.    The  31  (years)  of  the  dynasty  of  Babylon. 

line  7.  Ukin-zira  of  the  dynasty  of  Sasi  for  three 
years. 

line  8.    Pulu  for  2  (years). 
Compare  this  with  the  Babylonian  Chronicle,37  Col.  I.36 

line  17.  For  2  months  and  .  .  .  days  Suma-ukin  reigned 
over  Babylon. 

line  18.    Ukin-zira  seized  upon  the  throne. 

line  19.    In  the  3d  year  of  Ukin-zira,  Tiglath  Pileser. 

line  20.  When  he  had  descended  into  the  country  of 
Akkad. 

line  21.  Destroyed  Bit-Ammukani  and  captured  Ukin- 
zira.38 

line  22.    For  three  years  Ukin-zira  reigned  over  Babylon. 

line  23.  Tiglath  Pileser  sat  upon  the  throne  of  Babylon. 
A  comparison  of  lines  7  and  8  of  the  first  inscription  with 
lines  17  ff.  of  the  second  proves  conclusively  the  identity 
of  Tiglath  Pileser  and  Pul,  showing  that  the  impartial 
Babylonian  historian  gave  him  the  respective  names  he 
bore  in  both  Assyria  and  Babylon.39 

All  this  is  in  perfect  accord  with  the  entry  in  the  Ptole- 
maean  Canon,40  which  notes  for  the  year  731,  the  year  in 
which  Tiglath  Pileser  was  crowned  in  Babylon,  "  Ohinzi- 
rus  and  Porus."  This  is,  of  course,  the  Ukin-zira  and  the 
Pulu  of  the  Babylonian  King  Lists;  Porus  being  a  Persian 

87  Winckler  in  ZA.  II.  23. 

38  Th.  A.  23,  where  the  name  is  Ukinzir. 

89  Similar  changes  of  name  are  the  following :  Shalmaneser  IV  and 
Ashurbanipal  are  in  the  Babylonian  King  Lists  called  Ululai  and  Kandulu 
respectively.  For  comment,  see  Winckler,  Geschichte,  p.  221,  n. 

*°  See  Smith,  "Assy.  Eponym  Canon,"  p.  102. 


8  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

corruption  of  Pul.®-  The  fact  that  Berosus  tt  makes  Pulus, 
"  Rex  Chaldaeorum"  is  in  agreement  with  the  above  evi- 
dence. It  simply  means  that  Tiglath  Pileser  III  came  to 
the  throne  of  Babylon  only  after  having  conquered  Ukin- 
zira,  head  of  the  Bit-Amukkani,  a  powerful  Chaldean 
tribe.  Finally,  Schrader 43  settled  for  all  time  that  all  the 
inscriptions  belong  to  Tiglath  Pileser. 

There  is  in  all  these  sources  of  Tiglath  Pileser's  reign 
scarcely  any  specific  reason  for  doubt  as  to  the  accuracy 
and  trustworthiness  of  the  reports  which  they  give  us. 
We  have  not,  for  instance,  as  is  the  case  with  Sargon,44 
any  variant  records  and  versions  of  the  inscriptions;  and 
while  they  are,  of  course,  subject  to  such  doubt  as  always 
attaches  to  the  official  records  of  a  time  which  so  far  lacks 
the  historical  sense  and  the  morale  of  the  scientific  historian, 
as  to  glorify  a  king  or  a  nation  at  the  expense  of  exact 
truth,  still,  we  find  no  contradictory  testimony  in  them. 
Even  the  figures  in  the  records  of  captives  and  of  tribute 
furnish  scant  reason  for  doubt. 

If  we  possessed  contemporaneous  documents  from  other 
nations  to  control  the  official  records,  there  could  be  no 
hesitancy  in  using  them  to  check  the  inscriptions,  but  in 
the  one  instance  where  we  do  possess  such  a  contempora- 
neous inscription,  an  inscription  mentioning  the  name  of 
Tiglath  Pileser,46  the  latter's  reports  are  confirmed.  And 
this  is  also  true  of  the  Biblical  references  to  him.  The 

«  KAT*  p.  238,  and  Pinches,  PSBA.  1883-84,  pp.  190  ff. 
42  Polyhistor  ap.  Eusb.  Chrn.  I.  4. 

48  Eritik,  pp.  10  ff.  Although  previously  he  had  denied  the  identity  of 
TP.  and  Pul,  in  ZDMG.  XXV,  p.  453. 

44  Olmstead,  "  Sargon  of  Assyria,"  p.  7. 

45  Published  by  Eduard  Sachau,   in  Mitthl.   aus    d.    Orientalischen 
Sammlungen,  Kong.  Mus.  zu  Berlin,  Heft  XI.  p.  55. 


THE   SOURCES  9 

clues  given  us  in  the  Eponym  Canon,  the  Assyrian  Chron- 
icle, the  Ptolemaean  Canon,  the  Babylonian  Chronicle, 
and  the  Babylonian  King  Lists,  refer,  of  course,  mainly  to 
the  fixing  of  dates,  and  in  the  case  of  Tiglath  Pileser  at 
least,  confirm  each  other,  although  they  are  independent 
witnesses. 

The  reign  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III  is  especially  important, 
because  with  him  began  a  new  era  in  Assyrian  history. 
This  king  prepared  the  way  for  that  period  of  his  country's 
progress  in  which  Assyria  attained  her  greatest  territorial 
extent.  Perhaps  in  his  time  it  was  not  yet  evident  that 
Assyria  was  too  small  a  nation  to  hold  her  own  against 
the  half  civilized  hordes  which  later  on  accomplished  her 
downfall.  The  fact  that  Assyria  remained  intact  long 
enough  to  establish  much  which  has  become  valuable  and 
even  essential  to  civilization  and  culture  is  in  no  small 
degree  a  credit  due  to  this  great  warrior,  who  founded  a 
well  organized  Empire  upon  foundations  which  his  prede- 
cessors had  enfeebled,  and  who  was  a  personality  great 
enough  to  have  dominated  his  day.  This  was  so  not  only 
because  the  times  into  which  he  was  born  invited  revolu- 
tion and  change,  but  because  his  own  power  as  warrior, 
statesman,  and  organizer,  forced  even  the  priesthood,  al- 
ways a  tremendous  influence,  to  bow  to  his  energy  and 
will.  A  great  pity  it  is  that  his  "  literary  remains  "  fell 
prey  not  only  to  the  ravages  of  time  and  accident,  but 
also  to  the  desecrating  hand  of  one  of  his  great  successors, 
Esarhaddon,  who  wilfully  mishandled  the  records  of 
Tiglath  Pileser  and  is  mainly  responsible  for  the  sadly 
mutilated  condition  in  which  they  have  come  down  to  us. 


CHAPTER  II 

ACCESSION 

The  Eponym  Canon  for  the  year  745  announces  that 
on  the  12th  day  of  Airu,  Tig]ath  Pileser  III  ascended  the 
throne  of  Assyria.  Because  of  the  entry  for  the  previous 
year  746,  " rebellion  in  Kalah"  it  has  been  assumed  that 
his  accession  was  due  to  a  military  revolution,  and  every 
known  fact  tends  to  corroborate  that  view.  Certain  it  is 
that  Tiglath  Pileser  only  gained  the  throne  because  of 
the  condition  of  Assyrian  affairs,  and  not  because  he  was 
the  legitimate  successor  to  the  royal  office.  The  Empire 
was  in  very  deep  trouble.  Its  prestige  was  at  low  ebb. 
Abroad  its  influence  was  fast  waning,  and  at  home  all  the 
elements  of  a  vast  political  upheaval  had  for  some  time 
been  steadily  tending  toward  revolution.  The  land  was 
priestridden.  Its  wealth  swelled  the  coffers  of  the  temple 
treasuries,  and  its  soldiers  nourishing  the  traditions  of 
ancient  prowess  had  to  be  content  with  feeding  upon  the 
memories  of  former  national  glory.  There  was  crying 
need  for  a  leader  of  real  ability.  The  land  was  not  a 
victim  of  natural  impoverishment.  There  were  means 
sufficient  for  all  purposes  of  national  aggrandizement, 
could  but  the  man  be  found  who  possessed  the  requisite 
qualities  of  leadership,  the  man  who  could  compel  the 
greedy  priesthood  to  relinquish  its  hold  upon  those  re- 
sources which  it  had  come  to  look  upon  as  rightful  and 
legitimate  prey.  The  people  and  the  army  demanded  a 

10 


ACCESSION  11 

sufficient  portion  of   the  national  income   to   defray  the 
cost  of  military  and  civil  affairs. 

It  must  have  been  a  sad  reflection  for  the  Assyrian 
soldier  to  review  the  fortunes  of  his  country  for  about  a 
century  before  the  year  745.  Persistently  and  steadily 
ancient  foes  were  encroaching  upon  Assyrian  territory. 
The  mother  country  was  still  intact,  but  on  every  hand 
the  buffer  states  which  great  conquerors  had  been  at 
extreme  pains  to  erect  as  barriers  against  invasion,  had 
thrown  off  the  yoke ;  and  even  worse,  powerful  monarchs 
of  other  nations,  taking  advantage  of  the  lethargy  which 
had  come  over  Assyria,  were  conquering  lesser  peoples 
and  building  empires  which  in  their  new  greatness  boded 
ill  for  Assyria's  future.  Since  860,  when  Shalmaneser  II 
ascended  the  throne,  lasting  and  effective  victory  was 
seldom  with  Assyria,  although  royal  scribes,  courtier-like, 
record  a  number  of  military  triumphs.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  Ramman-Nir&ri  III  (810-782),  no  able,  vigorous 
king  had  ruled.  That  king  reigned  over  a  vast  empire 
which  stretched  from  the  borders  of  Elam  on  the  south, 
to  Na'iri  and  Andia  in  the  north,  and  as  far  as  the  Medi- 
terranean on  the  east.1  He  was  warlike,  and  only  one  of 
his  reign  years,  the  eleventh,  was  spent  at  home.  Four 
campaigns  against  Hubtiskia,  and  six  expeditions  to  the 
East,  are  a  proof  of  the  energy  which  Assyria,  under  him, 
was  exerting  in  its  efforts  for  conquest.  Even  against 
the  successor  of  Hazael  of  Damascus,  who  had  conquered 
and  probably  ruled  over  Israel,  Ammon,  and  Philistia,  he 
ventured  to  war  and  probably  took  Damascus.2  But  dur- 

1  Die  sogenannte  synchronistische  Gfeschichte  in  KB.1  pp.  194  ff.  is  to 
be  assigned  to  Ramman-Nirari  III ;  cf.  Winckler,  Untersuchungen,  III. 
p.  25. 

2  Steinplatteninschrift  aus  Kalah,  in  KB.1 I.  pp.  189  ff.,  lines  5-12. 


12  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

ing  his  reign  he  was  stoutly  opposed  by  the  growing 
power  of  Urartu.  Menuas  of  Urartu  took  from  Assyria 
the  tribes  around  Lake  Urumia,  and  annexed  large  parts 
of  Hubtiakia,  erecting  on  the  rocks  of  Rowandiz  Pass  the 
steles  which  record  his  achievements.3  He  drove  the 
Assyrians  from  Lake  Van,4  and  got  as  far  East  as  beyond 
the  Euphrates,  levying  taxes  on  Miletene.5  His  son  Ar- 
gistis  continued  the  work  of  his  mighty  father,6  and  from 
at  least  one  passage  of  his  Annals,7  we  must  conclude  that 
he  defeated  the  Assyrians  in  a  great  battle.  The  year 
778  in  the  Chronological  Lists  8  records  a  campaign  against 
Urartu.  This  is  the  defeat  suffered  by  Shalmaneser  at 
Sarisadas.9  The  years  776  and  774  both  record  Urartian 
campaigns,  in  both  of  which  Assyria  lost  ground.10  Thus 
Assyria,  under  the  feeble  rule  of  Shalmaneser,  lost  her 
northern  possessions  and  those  of  Miletene.  In  773  and 
772,11  in  order  to  hold  the  West,  campaigns  had  to  be 
undertaken  against  Damascus  and  Hadrak,  the  former  of 
which  had  been  thoroughly  subdued  by  Ramman-Nirari 
III.  There  must  also  have  been  disturbances  in  Syria, 
for  the  land  of  Patin  of  Ashurbanipal  has  already  in  the 
time  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III  become  split  up  into  the  four 
principalities  of  Unqi,  Santal,  Yaudi,  and  Patin.  Also 
against  Hatarilca,  which  had  become  the  dominant  power 

8  Scheil  and  de  Morgan,  Stele  de  Kelichen,  in  Recueil  de  Travaux, 
Vol.  XIV.  pp.  153  ff. 

*  "  Inscription  of  Palu,"  Sayce,  CIV.  JRAS.  vol.  XIV.  pp.  558  ff. 
«  Op.  cit.  JRAS.  XXIX,  A  and  B. 

6  "Annals  of  Argistis,"  op.  cit.  pp.  572-582. 

7  Op.  cit.  pp.  558  ff. 

8  Cf.  KB.1  pp.  210-211,  entry  for  the  years  766  and  755. 

9  "Annals  of  Argistis,"  JRAS.  XXIX.  p.  693. 

10  Op.  cit.  pp.  602-609. 

11  JTjB.i  pp.  210-211. 


ACCESSION  13 

in  Northern  Syria,  Ashurdan  had  twice  to  wage  war,12 
while  in  754  he  was  engaged  with  Arpad,  which  together 
with  Hatarika  had  come  to  share  supremacy  in  Northern 
Syria.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  Assyria  was  gradually 
losing  its  grip,  and  the  revolt  recorded  for  746  in  Kalah, 
which  resulted  in  the  enthroning  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III, 
by  showing  the  feebleness  of  his  predecessors,  only  em- 
phasized the  weakness  which  had  come  over  Assyria. 
Now  there  was  need  of  a  great  man,  a  need  which  was 
supplied  in  the  person  of  the  soldier  who,  whatever  his 
real  name  was,  seized  the  reins  of  government  and  began 
his  rule,  assuming  the  name  of  one  of  Assyria's  greatest 
conquerors,  and  becoming  Tiglath  Pileser  III. 

The  fact  that  he  gained  the  crown  raised  the  uprising 
to  the  dignified  status  of  a  revolution ;  and  it  was  certainly 
anti-priestly  in  its  essential  character.  So  much  is  evident 
from  the  history  of  his  successors,  from  Shalmaneser  to 
Esarhaddon.  As  long  as  the  tribute  of  dependencies  was 
available  for  military  purposes,  so  long  the  imposition  of 
the  temple  taxes  by  the  priesthood  caused  no  appreciable 
fiscal  difficulties.  Once  this  source  of  income  became  cur- 
tailed, the  immense  revenues  of  the  priesthood  must  have 
loomed  large  in  the  eyes  of  all  divisions  of  secular  society. 
And  these  revenues  were  exempt  from  the  ordinary  uses 
of  the  state.  The  larger  cities  (these  were  of  priestly 
origin)  also  enjoyed  such  privileged  exemptions  that  an 
anti -priestly  movement  would  be  sure  to  arouse  antagonism 
from  them.  Hence  a  successful  revolution  certainly  did 
not  receive  its  inspiration  from  them.  For  the  country 
population,  however,  and  those  interested  in  them,  it  would 
provide  relief.  Upon  them  the  burden  of  taxes  fell  with 

.  210-213. 


14  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

impoverishing  force  as  soon  as  the  stream  of  tribute  ceased 
to  flow  into  the  imperial  coffers.  This  state  of  affairs 
found  in  Tiglath  Pileser  the  man  who  knew  how  to  take 
advantage  of  the  situation.13 

His  son  had  in  the  nature  of  things  to  follow  the  policy 
of  his  father.  But,  whereas  the  former  could  rest  his  de- 
mand for  popular  approbation  upon  the  success  of  his 
military  exploits,  and  did  not  have  to  support  his  reputa- 
tion for  anti-priestly  feelings  on  an  exaggerated  repression 
of  the  priesthood,  his  son,  lacking  the  glamour  of  military 
achievements,  could  only  prove  his  loyalty  to  the  forces 
which  had  crowned  his  father  and  himself  by  consistent 
antagonism  to  the  priests  and  the  priestly  cities.  He 
went  so  far  as  to  levy  tribute  upon  the  sacred  city  of 
Ashur.14  The  statement  that  Ashur  in  his  anger15  gave 
the  throne  of  Shalmaneser  to  Sargon  can  only  mean  that 
the  priestly  party,  profiting  by  the  feelings  of  revulsion 
which  this  sacrilege  must  have  caused,  regained  sufficient 
power  to  overthrow  the  military  party.  How  basic  the 
conflict  between  priest  and  people  was  can  be  determined 
from  the  actions  of  the  subsequent  kings,  Sennacherib, 
Esarhaddon,  and  Ashurbanipal.  The  first  once  again 
favored  the  military  party,16  and  the  last  followed  in  his 
footsteps,  while  Esarhaddon,  like  Sargon,  never  failed  to 
exalt  the  hierarchy.  The  affiliations  of  Tiglath  Pileser 
III  are  amply  evidenced  when  we  compare  his  attitude 
towards  Babylon  with  that  of  the  two  last  named  kings. 

13  Cf .  Peiser,  Skizze  der  Babylonischen  Gesellschaft,  in  Mittheilungen 
d.  Vorderasiatischen  Gesellschaft,  1896,  Heft  IV.  s.  162-163. 

14  K.  in  Winckler's  Sammlungen,  II,  1,  and  translation  in  Forsch.  I. 
pp.  403  ff. 

™  Op.  tit.  34  ft 
16  KB!  p.  121. 


ACCESSION  15 

He  was  as  hostile  as  they  were  favorable.  Esarhaddon 
indeed  showed  his  feelings  by  an  act  unique  in  Assyrian 
history.  In  providing  materials  for  the  building  of  his 
palace  at  Kaldh,  he  purposely  mutilated  and  then  removed 
the  sculptures  and  tablets  of  Tiglath  Pileser  from  the 
Central  Palace  of  Shalmaneser  II. 

About  the  ancestry  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III  we  know 
little.  But  despite  the  fact  that  he  was  a  usurper,  which 
may  only  mean  that  he  was  a  younger  son  and  not  in  the 
direct  line  of  .succession,17  there  is  no  need  to  assume  that 
he  was  not  of  royal  blood.18  In  truth  he  never  mentions 
his  father.  But  that  proves  little,  for  the  same  is  true  of 
Sennacherib,  whose  relationship  to  Sargon  we  know  only 
from  the  words  of  Esarhaddon.19  Nor  does  Esarhaddon's 
desecration  of  the  Central  Palace  monuments  compel  us 
to  deny  royal  lineage  to  the  usurper.  As  we  have  seen, 
this  can  be  reasonably  explained  as  Esarhaddon's  protest 
against  the  actions  of  an  "  impious  "  king.  In  fact,  there 
is  good  reason  to  believe  that  he  was  the  son  of  Adad- 
Nirari  IV.20 

"  See  also  Tiele,  Geschichte,  p.  226. 

18  Host,  vol.  I.  p.  viii,  n.  1,  makes  the  scribe  (Ann.  31  and  Th.  A.  26) 
merely  a  flatterer  who  manufactures  a  royal  ancestry  for  TP.     Such  a 
view  is  unnecessary,  and,  I  believe,  incorrect.     The  reference  to  Ann.  31 
is  a  mistake. 

19  JD?.2  p.  125,  lines  3  and  4,  and  Prisms  A  and  C. 

20  Forsch.  Band  II,  1905,  pp.  356  ff.    The  usual  succession  of  the  kings 
preceding  TP.  is  as  follows  (cf.  Tiele,   Geschichte,  p.  206);   Ramman- 
Nirari  III  (811-783);   Shalmaneser  III  (782-773);  Ashurdan  II  (772- 
755)  ;  Ashur-Nirari  (754-746).     A  glance  at  the  Chronological  List  fully 
justifies  this  order.     But  two  facts  are  to  be  noted  in  connection  with  it. 
First,  the  line  between  the  years  764  and  763  in  the  Eponym  Canon. 
The  presence  of  this  line  was  usually  explained  by  the  notice  for  763, 
"In  the  month  of  Sivan  an  eclipse."    But  this  explanation  will  not 
serve,  since  in  all  other  cases  such  a  line  is  only  found  between  the  begin- 
ning of  one  reign  and  the  close  of  a  preceding  one.     Secondly,  the  years 


16  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

The  personality  of  the  new  ruler  can  only  be  drawn  in 
meagre  outline.  We  have  no  evidence  by  means  of  which 
to  characterize  him,  further  than  to  say  in  the  most  gen- 
eral way  that  he  was  brilliant  and  energetic  as  a  military 
leader,  and  that  his  natural  endowments  as  a  statesman 
were  fully  equal  to  the  demands  of  the  circumstances 
surrounding  him.  That  he  was  far-sighted,  his  policy 
of  colonization,  which  we  discuss  elsewhere,  proves.  He 
seems  to  have  set  a  new  fashion  quite  remarkable  for  an 
ancient  conqueror,  in  that  no  indication  of  wanton  cruelty 
can  be  cited  from  the  inscriptions.  As  with  his  successors, 
Sargon  and  Esarhaddon,  torture  and  wholesale  slaughter 
are  limited  to  occasions  where  such  actions  arose  out  of 
imperative  need.  Nor  can  he  be  justly  charged  with  mere 
lust  for  conquest.  As  an  usurper  he  had  of  course  to 
make  good  his  position.  But  his  continuous  campaign- 
ing, with  its  accompanying  exploitation  of  foreign  ter- 
ritory, and  the  imposition  of  enormous  tribute,  arose  out 
of  the  needs  of  the  Empire  when  he  came  to  the  throne. 
If  he  had  to  make  extensive  conquests  for  any  other  reason 

763,  762,  761,  760,  and  759  all  record  revolts.  Only  with  758  does  this 
state  of  affairs  end  with  "  Peace  in  the  land."  Added  to  this  an  Arme- 
nian inscription  (see  Belck  and  Lehmann,  Berl.  Ak.  1900,  p.  118)  calls 
Ashur-Nirari  (the  immediate  predecessor  of  TP.)  the  son  of  Adad-Nirari. 
Was  this  Adad-Nirari  III  (810-781)  ?  That  is  not  likely ;  for,  in  that 
case,  Ashur-Nirari  (754-746)  began  to  rule  twenty-seven  years  after  his 
father,  and  we  would  have  to  assume  that  Shalmaneser  III,  Ashur- 
dan  III,  and  Ashur-Nirari  II  were  brothers.  In  other  words,  three  suc- 
cessive kings  were  brothers.  Certainly  an  unique  occurrence.  Winckler's 
reconstruction  of  the  succession  is  probably  true  to  all  the  facts.  The 
line  between  764  and  763,  as  do  all  similar  lines  in  the  Canon,  denotes 
the  succession  of  a  new  king.  The  Armenian  Inscription  referred  to 
calls  Ashur-Nir§,ri  the  son  of  Adad-Nirari.  Since  this  cannot  be  Adad- 
Nirari  III  (812-783),  we  must  postulate  for  the  year  763  a  king,  Adad- 
Nirari  IV,  who  ruled  until  754. 


ACCESSION  17 

than  to  enlarge  the  Empire,  it  was  only  to  secure  a  steady 
inflow  of  tribute  with  which  to  relieve  the  burdened  finan- 
cial condition  of  the  people.  Only  in  that  way  could  he 
verify  the  contention  of  the  revolutionists,  that  the  cur- 
rent poverty  was  due  to  the  unreasonable  exactions  of  the 
priesthood.  Had  the  mere  lust  of  conquest  animated  him, 
he  would  have  been  an  usurper  of  only  the  common  Ori- 
ental type.  An  examination  of  the  records  strongly  mili- 
tates against  such  a  conclusion.  While  the  Assyrian 
chronologists,  not  being  historians  in  the  modern  sense, 
tell  us  nothing  of  the  circumstances  leading  to  the  revolu- 
tion, we  are  enabled  to  infer  the  truth  of  the  situation 
from  one  very  significant  fact.  The  first  care  of  an  or- 
dinary usurper  is  to  secure  himself  against  the  claims  and 
operations  of  the  legitimate  heir  whom  he  has  displaced. 
In  the  case  of  Tiglath  Pileser  III,  the  party  of  the  natural 
heir  was  the  priesthood.  Had  the  demand  for  a  complete 
change  not  been  nation-wide,  he  could  not  have  ventured 
to  leave  his  capital  shortly  after  his  coronation.  Hardly 
had  six  months  elapsed,  however,  i.e.  in  the  first  half  of 
his  first  regnal  year,21  when  he  went  forth  upon  his  initial 
campaign.  No  merely  usurping  adventurer  would  have 
dared  to  risk  such  a  move. 

21  Rost,  vol.  I. p.  XI.  Since  he  came  to  the  throne  after  but  two  months 
had  elapsed,  he  reckoned  745  as  his  first  regnal  year.  As  a  rule  the  "res 
Sarruti  "  denoted  the  first  full  calendar  year  of  a  king's  reign. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE  SOUTHERN   AND   WESTERN   FRONTIERS 

From  the  very  first  it  was  evident  that  Tiglath  Pileser 
had  formulated  plans  to  meet  the  problems  which  faced 
him  and  his  country.  So  far  as  mere  conquest  was  con- 
cerned many  of  his  predecessors  had  been  eminently  suc- 
cessful. It  was  only  when  the  question  of  organizing 
conquered  territory  and  peoples  had  arisen  that  they  had 
failed.  Up  to  Tiglath's  Pileser's  time,  conquest  and 
revolt  succeeded  one  another  with  almost  unfailing  regu- 
larity, and  the  length  of  time  during  which  most  de- 
pendencies remained  loyal  was  in  direct  proportion  to  the 
military  capacity  of  the  then  ruling  king.  Tiglath  Pileser 
planned  to  make  an  end  of  such  opportunist  allegiance. 
He  inaugurated  a  system  of  colonization  designed  to  make 
of  the  Assyrian  Empire  a  well-regulated  and  organic 
whole,  whose  farthest  possessions  would  be  firmly  united 
with  the  imperial  country  by  organic  ties.  In  this 
respect  Tiglath  Pileser  was  an  innovator ;  but  in  the 
general  plan  of  conquest  which  former  kings  pursued  he 
could  well  afford  to  be  an  imitator.  They  had  followed  a 
perfectly  natural  and  reasonable  course.  The  practical 
aim  of  all  these  monarchs  was  identical ;  viz.,  on  the 
south  Babylon  was  to  be  held  as  a  dependent  vassal, 
and  on  the  east  the  tribes  which  had  colonized  in  Baby- 
lonia had  to  be  restrained,  lest,  obtaining  a  permanent 

18 


THE  SOUTHERN  AND  WESTERN  FRONTIERS   19 

foothold  there,  they  might  prove  a  serious  obstacle  to 
Assyrian  expansion  in  that  direction.  In  the  north  the 
people  of  Urartu  and  their  natural  allies  had  to  be 
weakened  by  the  constant  embarrassment  of  battle,  lest 
by  an  alliance  with  the  Armenians  they  should  finally 
displace  Assyria  as  mistress  of  the  "  Four  Quarters  of  the 
World."  The  large  stretch  of  territory  on  the  west  which 
reached  to  the  Mediterranean  contained  no  single  nation 
sufficiently  powerful  to  threaten  the  domination  of  Assyria, 
but  the  peoples  settled  in  that  region  were  rich  in  many 
products  required  by  Assyria.  In  the  imperial  plan  these 
western  lands  were  destined  to  furnish  a  field  for  terri- 
torial expansion,  to  provide  the  means  necessary  to  keep 
Assyrian  finances  abreast  of  its  great  needs,  and  to  supply 
the  country  with  the  desired  commodities  of  import.  In 
full  accord  with  this  traditional  plan  Tiglath  Pileser  III 
undertakes  his  first  campaign  against  Babylonia,  setting 
out  in  September  745.  But  to  think  that  he  moved  against 
Babylon  as  an  enemy1  is  to  miss  entirely  the  statesman- 
like insight  which  he  displayed  throughout  his  reign. 
Assyria  was  the  suzerain  of  Babylon ;  and  it  is  very 
probable  that  Nabun&gir,  the  Babylonian  king,  seeing 
that  an  energetic  man  of  ability  now  ruled  at  Kalah,  was 
glad  to  be  able  to  invoke  his  aid  against  the  Arameans 
and  the  Chaldeans  who  were  threatening  the  eastern 
and  southern  borders  of  Babylonia.  Tiglath  Pileser's 
prompt  response  to  the  appeal  was  not  only  animated  by 

1  So  Host,  vol.  I.  p.  XIII.  Tiele  also  shares  this  view ;  cf.  Geschichte, 
pp.  217  ff.  Against  it  are  Winckler,  Hist.  pp.  113  ff.,  and  Hommel, 
Geschichte,  pp.  651  ff.  Rost's  claim  that  TP.  took  the  title  of  "King  of 
Sumer  and  Akkad"  from  the  beginning,  does  not  prove  that  he  went  to 
Babylon  as  an  enemy.  Assyrian  suzerainty  over  Babylon  is  sufficient  to 
account  for  his  assumption  of  the  title. 


20  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

the  need  of  checking  these  tribes,  but  also  by  personal 
and  political  considerations.  He  was  king  by  right  of 
revolution,  but  no  religious  consecration  had  legitimized 
his  accession.  In  Assyria  he  could  not  stoop  to  receive 
such  consecration,  for  the  priesthood  would  not  have 
accorded  it,  and  the  military  classes,  whose  antagonism 
to  the  priesthood  had  fathered  the  revolution,  would 
not  have  condoned  him  had  he  accepted  it.  To  them  it 
would  have  appeared  that  he  had  secretly  compounded 
with  the  Temple  interests;  but  from  the  Babylonian 
priesthood,  whose  consecration  made  his  rule  just  as  valid 
as  that  of  the  priests  of  Assyria,  he  could  and  did  receive 
religious  sanction.  Nor  would  they  withhold  it  provided 
he  consented  to  come  to  the  aid  of  their  king  and  country, 
threatened  as  it  was  by  powerful  foes  on  the  frontier. 
Under  their  auspices  he  could  offer  sacrifices  to  Bel,  Nebo, 
Nergal  (Th.  A.  11  and  12),  to  £arpanit  and  TaSmit,  in 
those  Babylonian  cities  which  he  visited  during  his  first 
campaign.  Then  he  could  return  home  as  a  king  whose 
coronation  had  lost  the  last  vestige  of  illegitimacy  be- 
cause the  gods  had  accepted  his  offerings  and  granted  him 
victory. 

It  would  also  for  another  reason  have  served  no  profit- 
able purpose  for  Tiglath  Pileser  to  play  the  role  of  enemy 
against  Babylon  at  this  time.  In  his  first  campaign  a 
usurper  must  be  victorious.  Had  he  gone  forth  as  the 
avowed  enemy  of  Babylon  in  this  campaign,  he  could  not 
have  claimed  a  complete  victory,  unless  he  had  succeeded  in 
dethroning  Nabunagir.  Doubtless  he  could  have  done  so, 
for  Nabunagir  was  in  no  position  to  offer  effective  resist- 
ance, but  such  a  step  would  have  caused  Tiglath  Pileser 
great  embarrassment.  To  make  his  coronation  legitimate, 


THE    SOUTHERN  AND  WESTERN  FRONTIERS     21 

he  would  then  have  been  compelled  to  "  grasp  the  hands 
of  Bel."  This,  as  we  shall  see  below,  he  was  unable  to  do 
at  this  time,  and  to  have  omitted  that  ceremony  would 
have  spelled  a  capital  offence  against  the  priesthood  of 
Babylon.  At  home  he  could  afford  to  antagonize  the 
priesthood,  but  he  could  not  risk  a  similar  policy  in  Babylon. 
Unlike  their  compeers  in  the  north,  the  Babylonian  priests 
were  at  this  time  normally  powerful  in  the  political  affairs 
of  their  country.  Their  influence  was  also  strongly  felt 
in  Assyria.  The  Assyrians,  although  they  had  very  re- 
cently participated  in  a  revolution  against  their  own  priest- 
hood, had  no  feeling  of  antipathy  to  the  priests  of  Babylon. 
On  the  contrary,  the  religious  influence  of  Babylon  over 
Assyria  was  never  really  enfeebled  during  the  entire  period 
of  Assyrian  supremacy.  It  was  very  strong  at  this  time. 
Had  Tiglath  Piles er  crowned  himself  king  of  Babylon 
without  "  grasping  the  hands  of  Bel,"  he  would  not  only 
have  been  looked  upon  as  a  sacrilegious  despot  by  the  people 
of  the  South,  but  also  by  his  own  countrymen,  and  he  would 
have  earned  the  enmity  of  a  proud  vassal  state  whose 
sense  of  independence  was  strong  in  addition  to  the 
opposition  of  a  large  part  of  Assyrian  society.  If  on  the 
other  hand,  in  745,  he  had  submitted  to  priestly  corona- 
tion, he  might  have  gained  power  and  popularity  at  home 
and  in  the  South,  but  such  added  popularity  would  have  been 
short-lived,  especially  in  Babylonia,  for  the  ceremony  of 
"  grasping  the  hands  of  Bel "  had  to  be  repeated  annually 
in  the  city  of  Babylon.  To  have  missed  it  only  once  would 
have  invalidated  his  sovereignty.  Had  he  attempted  de- 
spite the  omission  to  retain  the  crown,  the  feelings  of  the 
priesthood  and  of  all  Babylonians  would  have  been  out- 
raged, and  in  their  eyes  Tiglath  Pileser  would  have 


22  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

ranked  as  a  ruthless  tyrant  trampling  the  rights  and 
cherished  convictions  of  his  subjects  under  foot.  He 
would  have  provided  for  himself  a  tireless  enemy  at 
his  very  gates  and  endangered  his  great  plans.  In 
the  years  to  come  all  his  campaigns  would  have  to  be 
arranged  with  a  view  to  being  present  in  Babylon  for 
the  imperative  annual  ceremony.  A  king  whose  future 
operations  were  already  mapped  out,  and  who  in  accord- 
ance with  them  would  have  to  travel  as  far  afield  as 
Urartu,  or  even  the  Caspian  Sea  on  the  north  and  the  Medi- 
terranean on  the  west,  had  to  postpone  the  assumption 
of  full  kingship  over  Babylon  until  such  a  time  as  his 
farthest  provinces  were  enduringly  bound  to  the  Empire, 
and  his  governors  and  lieutenants  had  learned,  under  his 
own  tuition,  how  to  hold  the  king's  possessions  by  the  aid 
of  the  system  which  the  crown  intended  to  inaugurate. 
His  purpose  in  this  campaign2  was,  then,  not  to  sub- 
jugate Babylon,  but  to  prevent  its  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  Arameans  and  Chaldeans.  These  tribes  3  were  his  first 
concern,  since  to  leave  them  unmolested  might  at  some 
future  time  have  occasioned  serious  obstacles  to  the  full 
prosecution  of  any  distant  expedition  in  which  he  might 

2  The  account  of  this  campaign  is  given  in  Ann.  1-7  (Lay.  68). 
Schrader,  Kritik,  on  the  basis  of  a  comparison  between  Lay.  60  B, 
lines  5-6,  and  Lay.  67  A,  line  5,   assigns  the  campaign  to  the   18th 
and  19th  palu,  i.e.  733-732.     This  assignment  Host  (vol.  I.  p.  V)  rightly 
rejects.     Ann.  1-7  belong  to  745,  because  the  continuation  of  this  record 
(Lay.  34  B)  tells  of  the  conquest  of  Dur-Kurigalzu  and  Sippar,  which 
(cf.  Ann.  12)  occurred  in  the  first  palu  or  regnal  year. 

3  Th.  A.  5-9  mentions  all  these  tribes.     Also  Sargon,  Prism,  I,  41-46 
and  V,  36-38  ;  and  Khorsabad,  18-19  (cf.  126-127)  gives  the  following 
order  from  west  to  east.     Tu1  Ru-bu',  Ha-ri-lum,  Kal-(?)-du-du,  Ham- 
ra-mt,  U-bu-lum,  J?#a,  Li' }-(ta)-ta-ai  sa  a-ah  Su-rap-pi  Uk-ni-i,  Gam- 
6w-w,  Hi-in-da-ru,  Pu-qu-du.     For  .Rwa,  Glaser  (Skizze,  189)  thinks  of 
"BlM."    Cf.  Gen.  xi.  19. 


THE   SOUTHERN  AND  WESTERN   FRONTIERS     23 

happen  to  be  engaged  ;  and  it  is  conceivable  that  while 
he  was  in  the  far  West  they  might  even  seriously  threaten 
Assyria.  Later  on  he  had  to  wage  strenuous  war  with  the 
Chaldeans,  and  their  power  is  shown  by  the  fact  that,  even 
when  he  did  get  an  opportunity  to  devote  his  undivided 
attention  to  them,  they  were  strong  enough  to  hold  Sapid, 
their  capital,  against  every  exertion  of  Tiglath  Pileser,  al- 
though at  that  time  (733)  his  troops  were  veterans,  and 
he  a  mighty  conqueror  with  a  long  record  of  brilliant  vic- 
tories. 

Now,  in  745,  these  Aramean  and  Chaldean  tribes  had 
come  within  striking  distance  of  Babylon.  A  branch  of 
these  two  tribes  on  the  east  of  the  Tigris  was  nomadic, 
but  the  most  dangerous  although  not  the  more  numerous 
sections  had  possessed  themselves  of  several  important 
cities  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Euphrates,  any  one  of 
which  might  be  used  as  a  base  of  operations  for  an  attack 
upon  Babylon.  That  city  once  in  their  hands,  they  would 
have  been  in  a  position  to  threaten  Assyria  itself.  March- 
ing directly  south,  Tiglath  Pileser  attacks  and  takes  in 
order  the  cities  which  were  held  by  his  enemies.  These 
were  (cf.  Ann.  12  ff.  and  Th.  A.  11),  Dur-Kurigalzu^ 
Sippar,  Pazitu,  Pahhaz,  Nippur,  Babylon,  Borsippaf 
Kis?  Dilbat,  and  Uruk.s  He  drove  the  Aramean 


4  Kuins  of  Akar-Kuf  ;  so  Paradies,  pp.  207  f  .     But  more  probably 
Til-Nimrud,  west  of  Bagdad  on  the  Nahr  Ifa,  where  Sir  H.  Rawlinson 
found  a  brick  marked  "  Dur  Kurigalzu." 

5  Barsip.     Its  god  was  Nebo  and  his  temple  was  called  E-zida.     The 
Talmud  (Ab.  Zar.  XI.  b)  reads,  "  Beth  N'bo  ftBursi."1 

6  Cf.  Paradies,  p.  217.      The  ruins  of  Til-Ibrahim  a  little  west  of 
Babylon.     The  location  is  made  certain  by  the  reference  in  the  Nabuna'id 
Chronicle,  Col.  III.  10  f. 

7  J.  Jensen,  ZA.  XV.  pp.  211  ff.,  in  a  very  painstaking  investigation, 
distinguishes  three  different  cities  named  Kis.    One  in  the  extreme  south 


24  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

tribes  from  the  banks  of  the  Lower  Zab  to  the  banks  of 
the  Uknu  River.9  He  redug  the  Patti-Canal,  and  on  the 

of  Babylonia.  This  cannot  be  the  city  mentioned  for  the  year  745,  since 
in  the  campaign  of  that  year  TP.  went  no  farther  south  than  Nippur.  A 
second  Kis  lay  in  northern  Babylonia  near  Bagdad,  east  of  the  Euphrates. 
A  third  Kis  is  always  mentioned  as  a  neighboring  city  of  Harsagkalama, 
in  a  hill  district  on  the  road  between  Assur  and  Babylon.  Its  name  is 
always  written  Kis  or  Ki-su.  Which  of  the  two  last  named  cities  is  the 
Kis  captured  by  TP.  ?  I  think  we  may  eliminate  the  Kis  near  Bagdad. 
Had  TP.  conquered  two  cities  named  Kis,  he  would  have  distinguished 
between  them.  That  he  dealt  with  the  one  near  Harsagkalama  we  may 
confidently  assume,  because  at  Harsagkalama  (cf.  PI.  I.  16)  he  offered 
sacrifices  to  Nergal.  II.  E.  50, 13,  mentions  a  temple  at  that  place,  Har- 
sagkalama  means,  "  mount  of  the  Zemd."  Thus  Harsagkalama,  and  its 
near  by  city  Kis,  lay  in  a  hilly  district.  Since  there  are  no  hills  between 
the  Tigris  and  the  Euphrates,  it  is,  I  think,  evident  that  we  must  look  for 
the  Kis  we  are  seeking  east  of  the  Tigris.  If  this  be  correct,  then  the 
Kis  placed  by  Winckler  (Hist,  map)  between  the  Tigris  and  the  Euphrates 
is  not  the  city  which  TP.  took.  And  again,  if  our  Kis  lay  east  of  the 
Tigris,  then  TP. ,  marching  south  from  Kalah,  got  as  far  south  as  Nippur, 
and  returning  north  from  there,  crossed  the  Tigris,  and,  while  homeward 
bound,  took  Kis  and  Harsagkalama.  This  explains  why  he,  after  review- 
ing (PI.  I.  16)  the  accomplishments  of  the  campaign,  sacrificed  at  Har- 
sagkalama. It  was  the  last  city  he  took,  hence  he  there  celebrated  his 
victory  over  the  conquered  tribes  by  offerings  to  the  gods. 

8  i.e.  Warka  ;  cf.  Jensen,  ZA.  XV.  211. 

9  When  the  Uknu  is  mentioned  with  the  Tigris  andj  the  Surapi  it  is 
always  in  the  following  order :  Tigris,  Surapi,  Uknu.    This  order  points 
from  west  to  east.    But  if,  as  has  been  proved  (Paradies,  p.  195),  the 
Uknu  is  the  modern  Kercha,  then  the  question  arises  what  modern  river 
is  the  same  as  the  ancient^  Surapi  ?    For  there  is  no  river  between  the 
Tigris  and  the  Kercha.    Delitzsch  thinks  of  a  canal  corresponding  to  the 
modern  Umm-el-Jemel.     But  this  canal  is  west  of  the  Tigris,  and  the  order 
should  then  be:  Surapi,  Tigris,  Uknu.    The  probable  solution  (cf.  Bil- 
lerbeck,  Mitthl.  Vorderas.  G-esellschaft,  1898,  pp.  81  f.)  is  that  the  course 
of  the  Tigris  has  changed  since  Assyrian  times.     Its  course  then  corre- 
sponded to  that  of  the  Shatt-el-Hai,  and  what  was  then  known  as  the 
Surapi  is  our  present  lower  Tigris,  which  was  the  channel  into  which 
poured  the  various  small  rivers  rising  in  the  Pushti-Kuh,  and  which 
pursued  the  course  of  the  modern  Shatt-el  'Arab  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 
De  Goeje,  ZDMG.  vol.  XXXIX.  p.  8,  thinks  that  the  Uknu  may  be  the 
Sura  Canal. 


THE  SOUTHERN  AND  WESTERN  FRONTIERS     25 

site  of  "  Til-Kamri  which  is  called  Humut "  he  built  a 
fortified  city,  to  which  he  gave  the  name  Kar-Assur;  also 
a  second  city  the  name  of  which  was  written  at  the  end  of 
Annals,  line  21,  but  which  has  been  broken  away.  Rost 
thinks  it  may  have  been  Dur-Tukulti-apil-isarra.  These 
two  cities  became  the  central  garrison-posts  of  the  con- 
quered districts,  where  he  settled  his  lieutenants,  having 
put  the  territory  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  two  neigh- 
boring provinces  of  Barhazia  and  Mazamua}®  The  lieuten- 
ants had  not  only  to  raise  sufficient  revenues  for  the 
purposes  of  military  occupation,  but  had  also  to  deliver  a 
considerable  sum  to  the  imperial  treasury,  since  their  an- 
nual assessment  was  fixed  at  the  large  sum  of  ten  talents 
of  gold  and  one  thousand  talents  of  silver,  besides  tribute 
in  cattle  and  other  goods.  From  E-sagila,  E-zida,  and 
E-sitlam  the  priests  brought  gifts  n  as  tokens  of  their  sub- 
mission to  the  conqueror. 

With  the  completion  of  his  first  conquest  Tiglath  Pileser 
began  to  put  into  practice  his  policy  of  colonization.  The 
conquered  peoples  were  scattered  and  their  lands  repeopled 
with  colonists  from  Mazamua  and  Barhazia.  His  object 
was  of  course  to  obviate  future  opportunities  for  conspiracy 

10  Rost,  vol.  I.  p.  7,  n.  1.     A  comparison  of  line  50  of  the  Annals  of 
Shalm.  II,  with  his  Monolith  Inscription,  Col.   II,  75,  shows  that  the 
country  was  interchangeably  called  Mazamua  and  Zamua  ;  its  capital  was 
probably  Zamri  (cf.  Annals  ofAsrh.  II.  61,  62) .     Host  (vol.  I.  p.  5)  trans- 
lates, "Ba-ar-ha-zi-ia,  pan  pihat  (mat}  Ma-za-mu-a"  {Ann.  17),  "  der 
Provinz  Barhaza,  Mazamua.''''     Billerbeck  (Sulm.  p.  72)  leaves  out  the 
comma  between  the  two  names,  and  taking  them  together  makes  of  them 
the  designation  of  a  district  in  Mazamua,  called  Barhazia.    TP.  felt  him- 
self secure  in  the  possession  of  this  district  from  the  very  beginning  of  his 
reign,  since  he  annexed  the  conquered  territory  to  it.     It  must,  therefore, 
have  been  situated  near  the  Assyrian  border. 

11  The  bringing  of  rihati  =  *  gifts'  (Rost,  p.  127),  not  only  symbolized 
submission,  but  was  in  itself  a  priestly  sanction  of  TP.'s  coronation. 


26  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

or  revolution,  and  he  rendered  the  subjugated  tribes  im- 
potent, both  by  garrisoning  their  land  and  by  scattering 
them  in  widely  different  colonies,  thereby  preventing  the 
possibility  of  concerted  action  on  their  part. 

But,  although  in  this  campaign  he  penetrated  as  far  as 
Nippur  in  the  south  and  had  subjugated  the  country  all 
the  way  to  the  foothills  of  Elam,  clearing  the  plains  and 
river  basins  of  hostile  tribes,  his  work  would  eventually 
have  gone  for  nought,  had  he  not  penetrated  to  the  hill- 
tribes  in  their  mountain  fastnesses  in  the  country  beyond. 
To  have  left  these  unmolested  must  have  invalidated  his 
exertions  in  the  lowlands.  From  the  highlands  an  uncon- 
quered  enemy  could  have  descended  into  the  plains  to  undo 
all  the  victorious  results  of  the  first  campaign. 

To  make  Assyria  secure,  and  to  settle  matters  on  his 
immediate  southern  frontier  and  his  eastern  borders,  he 
undertook  in  the  following  year  (744)  his  second  expe- 
dition, that  against  Namri.12 

However,  the  southern  frontier  could  not  be  considered 
safe  until  the  passes  east  of  the  Diala  had  been  secured. 
Their  occupation  and  fortification  would  serve  the  double 
purpose  of  a  defensive  border  outpost,  and  in  case  of  any 
future  advance  into  the  country  beyond,  the  roads  would 
be  clear  for  any  invasion  he  might  contemplate.  Not  only 
is  it  probable  that  Tiglath  Pileser  divided  his  army  into 
two  corps  for  this  campaign,  but  in  all  likelihood  one  of 
these  corps  moved  in  at  least  two  columns.  One  corps 

12  Namri  used  to  be  read  "  Zimri ' '  (cf.  Smith,  "  Assyrian  Canon,"  p.  64) . 
Misled  by  this  reading,  Delitzsch  (Paradies,  p.  237)  refers  to  the  Zimri 
of  Jer.  xxv.  25.  Host  (vol.  I.  p.  xvi.  n.  1)  believes  that  the  designation 
Namri  may  have  been  a  general  term  for  "  East."  This  would  be  due  to 
a  popular  etymology  which  derived  Namri  from  namaru,  '  to  be  or  to 
become  light,  to  shine,'  and  is  probably  incorrect. 


THE   SOUTHERN  AND   WESTERN  FRONTIERS     27 

operated  to  the  south.  Starting  from  a  point  not  far  north 
of  modern  Bakuba,  it  followed  a  course  generally  parallel 
to  the  east  bank  of  the  Diala  arid  presumably  crossed  the 
divide  where  one  of  the  branches  of  the  Konchitum  River 
breaks  through  the  hills,  not  far  from  modern  Iinam-Esker; 
proceeding  east  they  overran  Erinziam^  Bit-Hamban, 
Bit-Sumurzu^  Bit-Barrua,  Bit-Zualzaz,  and  then  Ari- 
arma^  Tarsarranihu,  and  Saksukni. 

The  northern  corps  under  the  provincial  governor 
Assur-danin-ani,  had  the  task  of  subjugating  the  "  mighty 
Medes."  They  succeeded  in  conquering  so  extensive  a 
territory  that  it  is  more  than  probable  that  they  operated 
in  at  least  two  separate  columns.  But  the  Annals  give  us 
little  aid  in  tracing  their  respective  routes.  It  is  probable, 
however,  that  they  did  not  divide  forces  until  they  had 
reached  the  plain  of  the  Shehrizor.  This,  so  far  as  the 
nature  of  the  country  is  concerned,  they  could  have  en- 
tered most  easily  by  marching  along  the  west  bank  of  the 

18  This  locality  is  to  be  sought  northwest  of  Kizilrobat.  After  conquer- 
ing the  three  countries,  Erinziasu,  Bit-gamban,  and  Bit-Sumurzu,  TP. 
could  write  (Ann.  49):  "  I  smote  them  to  the  borders  of  Assur."  His  aim 
was  to  control  the  mountain  passes  of  these  countries.  They  gave  access 
to  the  more  distant  East,  and  prepared  the  way  for  the  campaign  of  737, 
"to  Media." 

14  In  the  Annals,  Bit-Sumurzu  is  mentioned  alone.      In  the  other 
inscriptions,  it  is  always  coupled  with  Bit-Barrua,  the  country  which  was 
immediately  to  the  north  of  it,  and  which  lay  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
modern  Kamiran.    Streck,  ZA.  XV.  p.  325,  locates  Blt-gamban  east  of  the 
Diala  between  Bakuba  and  Mendeli.    This  is  surely  too  far  south.     It  was 
probably  north  of  Kizilrobat  in  the  vicinity  of  Saripul,  in  the  hill  country 
through  which  the  boundary  line  between  Suleimania  and  the  southern 
part  of  Ardelan  runs. 

15  Ariarma,  Tarsarranihu,  and  Saksukni  are  mentioned  in  that  order 
in  Ann.  56  and  Th.  A,  31.     Bit-Sumurzu  (together  with  Bustus)  corre- 
spond to  modern  Azerbaijan;  and  Ariarma,  which   is  mentioned  after 
Bustus  in  PI.  II.  22,  is  to  be  located  in  Southern  Azerbaijan  and  Northern 
Ardelan,  and  Tarsarranihu  and  Saksukni  in  Southwestern  Khamseh. 


28  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

Diala,  south  of  the  Segrime  Dagh,  and  continuing  parallel 
to  the  Shirwan,  a  branch  of  the  Diala.  At  some  point 
which  commanded  the  various  roads  into  Media,  perhaps 
near  modern  Behistun,  they  separated.  One  division, 
going  northwest,  overran  Bit-Abdadani 16  and  Bit-Zatti, 
then  turning  to  the  northeast,  on  the  right  flank  of  their 
former  route,  they  defeated  the  troops  of  Bit-Tazzaki.17 
The  second  division,  starting  in  the  direction  of  the  south- 
east, overcame  Bit-Istar,  and  thence  going  south,  carried 
its  victorious  arms  through  Bit-Sangibutti™  &nd.Bit-$angi. 
A  half  turn  round  towards  the  north  brought  them  to  Bit- 
Kapsi  and  finally  still  further  north  to  Arazias  and  Par- 
sua.ld  The  two  divisions  had  together  traced  an  almost 
complete  circle,  and  now  probably  reunited  their  forces  at 
the  appointed  rendezvous.  Most  likely  this  was  their 
point  of  departure  near  Behistun.  Here  it  seems  was  the 
site  of  Nikur,™  the  fortress  which  in  Annals  28  was  re- 
corded as  having  been  destroyed.  It  was  rebuilt  as  a 

16  The  Eamman-Nirari  Inscription  from  Kalah  (KB.1  p.  191,  lines  8-9) 
reads,  Mu-un-a  Par-su-a  Al-lab-ri-a  Ab-da-da-na  Na-^-ri  ana  pat  gim- 
n'-sw.     A  comparison  with  a  passage  in  Sargon  (Annals,  Botta,  73,  7), 
which  reads,  " Al-lab-ri-a  Ma-an-na-ai  Ur-ar-tu,"  shows  that  Allabria 
was  situated  between  Parsua  and  Mannai  to  the  east  of  Lake  Urimia, 
and  Abdadana  east  of  Allabria,  perhaps  in  the  district  around  Kuh- 
Karawal. 

17  Bit-Tazzaki  and  Blt-Kapsi  are   Median  districts   (Ann.   26  and 
Th.  A.  29  f.  34  f.),  stretching  from  eastern  Mazamua  northward  to  Lake 
Urumia.     Their  location  will  depend  on  the  location  of  Zakruti,  with 
which  they  are  twice  mentioned  (  Th.  A.  30,  36  and  PI.  1. 18).     If  Zakruti 
was,  as  is  probable,  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Pundsch-Ali,  then  Blt-Kapsi 
lay  between  it  and  the  Talvantu-Dagh. 

18  East  of  modern  Sinna. 

19  East  and  southeast  of  Lake  Urumia.    Together  with  Bustus  it  cov- 
ered modern  Azerbaijan. 

20  Near  Behistuan.    The  reading  is  not  certain;  it  may  be  "  Sal-lat." 
Cf.  Br.  pp.  231  and  309. 


THE  SOUTHERN  AND   WESTERN  FRONTIERS     29 

strategic  base,  to  control  the  whole  country  which  had  been 
overrun  by  both  corps.  Here  a  large  number  of  people 
from  the  various  conquered  tribes  were  settled  and  a 
provincial  governor  was  placed  over  them,  while  others 
from  the  north  were  colonized  in  Bit-Sumurzu  and  Bit- 
Hamban,  and  still  others  in  Zakruti.  Before  arriving  at 
Nikur,  the  two  corps  had  effected  a  junction,  possibly  in 
Arazias?1  which  they  may  have  conquered  together. 
Whether  Arakuttu1®  and  Nisai  were  also  reached  in  this  year 
cannot  be  determined.23  Neither  is  mentioned  in  the  An- 
nals. More  probably  their  turn  did  not  come  until  737,  when 
a  second  war  was  waged  in  the  regions  here  considered. 

The  booty  yield  of  the  campaign  must  have  been  enor- 
mous. Horses,  mules,  large  and  small  cattle,  camels, 
weapons,  precious  metals  and  stones,  and  all  manner  of 

21  Host's  emendation  for  Arazi.    Location  probably  just  west  of  Divan- 
dere ;  cf .  Sulm.  p.  34. 

22  Fr.   Lenormant  (Sur  la  campagne  de    Tiglath  Phalazar  II  dans 
VAriane,  in  ZA.  1870,  pp.  48  ff.  and  69-71)  thinks  that  the  presence  of 
such  names  as  Nisai,  Arakutti,  Ariarma,  and  Zakruti  shows  that  TP. 
penetrated  into  Ariana  and  Arachosia.     But  Delattre  (Le  Peuple  et  la 
Langue  des  Medes,  pp.  85  f.)  has  disproved  that  hypothesis.     Host  (vol. 
I.  p.  vi.  n.  1)  suggests  that  since  TP.  did  not  penetrate  into  farther  Media, 
the  presence  of  the  names  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  some  Iranian  tribes 
did  at  one  time  press  westward,  and  then  later,  because  of  numerous 
migrations  of  different  races  into  Media,  they  returned  to  the  East. 
TP.'s  claim  to  have  conquered  these  tribes  bearing  Iranian  names,  may 
be  only  the  record  of  a  tribute  which  they  were  forced  to  pay  him 
temporarily. 

23  The  following  places  mentioned  in  this  campaign  are  not  recorded  in 
any  other  Assyrian  inscriptions :  Sanastiku,  garsu,  {larsai,  Kiskitara, 
Aiubak,  Tutasdi,  Kusianas.    The  lines,  Ann.  51-58,  are  not  meant  to 
convey  the  idea  that  the  cities  and  princes  recorded  in  them  were  over- 
come after  the  fall  of  Blt-gamban.     They  are  a  summary  of  the  results 
of  the  campaign  (lines  26-50),  and  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  chronological ; 
i.  e.  the  cities  and  lands  mentioned  are  all  to  be  sought  in  any  of  the  lands 
conquered  during  744. 


30  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

products  were  carried  away  as  trophies  and  as  profit.  A 
tribute  of  300  talents  of  "  uknfi  stone"  (lapis  lazuli)  and  500 
talents  of  silver  M  was  imposed,  and  65,000  prisoners  were 
deported  for  colonization  in  other  dependencies. 

The  nearest  foes  were  now  helpless.  At  the  end  of  two 
years'  reign  enough  tribute  and  booty  must  have  been 
brought  into  Assyria  to  satisfy  even  a  people  whose  previous 
supply  for  some  years  had  been  a  minimum.  Tiglath 
Pileser  had  undoubtedly  made  his  position  so  strong  that 
for  the  future  his  campaigns  might  carry  him  to  great  dis- 
tances without  his  having  to  fear  that  any  revolution  at 
home  would  seriously  threaten  his  crown.  These  first 
two  expeditions  had  proved  brilliantly  successful.  The 
usurper  had  justified  all  prophecies  as  to  his  powers. 
Whole  districts  were  in  ashes.  Old  fortified  towns,  which 
had  become  a  menace,  were  destroyed.  Powerful  enemies 
had  been  terrified  by  the  sight  of  heaps  of  their  slain  and 
wounded,  and  were  taught  to  understand  what  the  future 
held  in  store  for  Assyria's  foes.  At  important  points 
Tiglath  Pileser  had  erected  '  calam  sarrutiaS  4  images  of 
my  royalty.'  Much  booty  was  dedicated  to  the  god  Assur, 
and  his  terror  was  ever  before  the  eyes  of  the  smitten 
peoples  (TJi.  A.  40). 

Although  not  all  the  conquered  districts  were  formally 
incorporated  into  the  Empire,  Tiglath  Pileser  had,  in  744, 
begun  the  real  work  of  assimilation  and  amalgamation. 
These  eastern  tribes  were  mostly  Iranian  and  Kassite. 
The  last  had  at  one  time  established  a  dynasty  of  thirty- 
six  kings  in  Babylon,25  and  as  late  as  702,  Sennacherib  x  had 

24  Ann.  53  is  broken  ;  but  surely  the  tribute  could  not  have  amounted 
to  five  hundred  talents  of  gold. 

25  Cf.  Winckler,  Hist.  pp.  72  f. 

26  Tiele,  GescUchte,  p.  287. 


THE   SOUTHERN  AND  WESTERN   FRONTIERS     31 

found  it  necessary  to  suppress  them.  Their  traditions 
must  have  made  them  cherish  a  degree  of  independence  so 
strong  that  it  proved  well-nigh  impossible  to  subdue  them 
entirely.  Perhaps  it  was  because  of  this  close  cherishing 
of  their  independent  Babylonian  identity  that  Tiglath 
Pileser's  plan  of  colonization  never  really  resulted  in  their 
full  assimilation,  and  they  may  have  been  the  cause  of  his 
campaign  of  737. 


CHAPTER  IV 

SYRIA   AND  THE   WEST 

The  object  of  the  campaign  of  743  did  not  contemplate 
direct  conflict  with  Urartu1  itself.  The  day  for  such  a  vital 
move  was  not  yet  at  hand.  The  triumph  over  Median 
foes,  although  decisive,  was  in  no  way  to  be  compared  with 
the  struggle  which  Sardurri  III  of  Urartu  was  prepared  to 
wage  for  supremacy  in  Asia.  He  was  a  foe  worthy  of  the 
utmost  consideration;  nor  would  he  and  his  people  fight 
the  less  furiously  and  bitterly  against  Assyria,  because  the 
gage  of  the  coming  battle  was  not  some  petty  principality, 
but  overlordship  of  the  whole  of  the  northern  half  of  the 
continent  or  perhaps  independence  itself.  There  was  not 
room  for  two  great  powers  of  equal  strength  and  resources 
in  Asia.  Great  nations  had  not  yet  learned  how  to  live 
amicably  side  by  side.  Between  them  there  was  sure  to  be 
constant  conflict  until  one  or  the  other  was  either  thoroughly 
subjugated  and  rendered  dependent  upon  its  conqueror 
or  was  altogether  annihilated.  To  be  less  powerful  than 
a  neighboring  people  was  in  itself  a  prophecy  that  inde- 
pendence would  be  shortlived. 

As  the  situation  now  stood  in  Asia,  either  Assyria  or 
Urartu  must  expect  to  bow  to  the  superior  prowess  of  the 

1  Urartu  is  the  Assyrian  form.  The  great  god  of  the  nation  was 
Haldis,  and  the  name  Haldean  is  sometimes  used  ;  cf.  Olmstead,  "  Sargon 
of  Assyria,"  p.  36,  n.  30.  C.  F.  Lehmann  has  shown  (Verhandlungen 
der  Berliner  Anthropologischen  Gesellschaft,  1900,  pp.  34  f£.),  that  the 
Haldeans  are  the  Chaldoi  of  the  Greek  and  Byzantine  writers  ;  not  to  be 
confused  with  the  jKaZcfo'-Chaldeans. 

32 


SYRIA  AND  THE  WEST  33 

other,  and  the  issue  might  hinge  upon  the  result  of  a  single 
engagement.  Nor  was  that  issue  at  all  a  foregone  conclu- 
sion. Assyria's  glorious  tradition  was  a  valuable  asset  in  the 
struggle  to  come,  but  this  great  tradition  was  not  by  any 
means  her  only  weapon.  As  has  been  seen,  when  Tiglath 
Pileser  III  came  to  the  throne,  Assyria  was  in  a  state  of 
lethargy,  but  her  fundamental  vitality  and  vigor  were  not 
impaired.  It  only  needed  a  vigorous,  able  ruler,  with 
whom  the  majority  of  the  nation  should  be  in  full  accord, 
to  arouse  her  to  great  endeavor.  That  Tiglath  Pileser  was 
such  a  man  his  two  previous  campaigns  clearly  indicated ; 
but  the  Urartian,  too,  had  become  accustomed  to  victory, 
and  not  only  over  petty  nations,  but  over  Assyria  itself.  As 
we  saw  in  Chapter  II,  from  the  time  of  Ramman-Nirari  III, 
up  to  the  very  date  of  Tiglath  Pileser's  coronation,  Urartian 
power  had  been  steadily  increasing.  Menuas  had  measured 
strength  with  Assyria,  and  both  he  and  his  son  Argistis 
had  proved  themselves  the  most  aggressive  and  successful 
monarchs  of  their  dynasty.  Tiele  2  has  made  a  list  of  the 
most  important  of  the  possessions  of  Menuas,  and  it  in- 
cludes the  land  of  the  Hittites,  Melitene,  Man,  and  Urmedi. 
He  in  his  turn  bequeathed  to  his  successor,  Sardurri  III,  an 
empire  the  largest  part  of  which  had  been  wrested  from 
Assyria,  and  had*been  among  her  most  valuable  possessions. 
When  Tiglath  Pileser  came  into  contact  with  Sardurri, 
Urartian  territory  had  attained  its  widest  extent.  Its 
northern  and  northeastern  boundary  line  ran  through  the 
Plains  of  Alexandrapal 3  and  Gokcha  Lake  (Transcaucasia) 

2  Geschichte,  p.  215  ;  cf.  also  Sayce,  CIV.  XXXVII-XLIV. 

8  See  C.  F.  Lehmann,  Verhandlungen  der  Berliner  Anthropologischen 
Gesellschaft,  1900,  p.  33.  No  account  of  Urartian  history,  geography, 
and  culture  can  afford  to  overlook  the  work  of  Belck  and  Lehmann. 
Most  of  it  has  been  published  in  the  journal  referred  to. 


34  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

and  stretched  on  the  northwest  to  Hassankala  nearErzerum, 
Aschgerd,  and  Delibaba.  On  the  west  was  the  Murad 
Tschai,  with  the  furthest  outposts  at  Masgerd  north  of 
Kharput,  and  at  Isoli.  On  the  south  its  line  ran  along  the 
mountain  range  between  Armenia  and  Mesopotamia,  and 
on  the  extreme  east,  from  Gokcha  Lake  to  Ordaklu.  Nor 
does  this  large  empire  seem  to  have  hung  together  loosely. 
The  manner  in  which  many  of  the  independent  states  re- 
sisted Tiglath  Pileser  proves  that  the  Urartian  kings  had 
succeeded  to  a  surprising  degree  in  rendering  vassals  and 
tributaries  firm  in  their  fidelity.  The  determined  and 
bitter  opposition  which  the  Syrian  princes  offered  to  the 
arms  of  Tiglath  Pileser,  compelling  him  to  spend  three 
years  in  the  West  before  they  could  be  forced  to  forswear 
their  adherence  to  Sardurri,  indicates  the  large  measure  of 
Urartian  mastery  over  very  wide  territorial  possessions. 

Sardurri  had  also  shown  his  capacity  for  military 
accomplishments.  By  the  year  755  he  had  conquered 
Melitene,4  and  by  744  the  countries  of  Taurus  and  Amanus 
were  also  his.  Upon  these  and  the  support  of  Arpad  he 
could  depend  in  the  contest  now  before  him.  It  is  indeed 
a  matter  of  wonder  that  he  did  not  press  on  to  the  further 
West  and  conquer  both  Damascus  and  Israel.  The  first 
was  at  this  time  very  weak,  and  Israel,  though  apparently 
prosperous  during  the  reign  of  Jeroboam  II,  was,  as  Amos 
testifies,  not  inherently  strong.  The  weakness  of  neigh- 
boring kingdoms  fully  accounts  for  the  outward  glory  of 
Jeroboam's  reign ;  and  even  this  was  beginning  to  fade 
during  the  last  years  of  his  life.5  Perhaps  Sardurri  real- 
ized that  it  was  impolitic  to  attempt  further  extension  of 

*  Cf  Inscriptions  of  Isoglu,  Sayce,  JEAS.  XVI,  pp.  642  ft 
5  Cf.  Hosea,  i,  ii,  iii. 


SYRIA  AND  THE  WEST  35 

territory  at  this  time,  because  Tiglath  Pileser  had  shown 
that  he  was  no  weakling.  It  would  suffice  the  Urartian 
king  for  the  time  being,  if  he  could  only  hold  his  own 
against  Assyria.  Nor  was  it  any  part  of  his  plan  to  push 
further  west  away  from  his  home  provinces,  and  leave 
a  strong  enemy  in  his  rear.  He  could  afford  to  let  the 
Assyrian  make  the  first  move.  This,  Tiglath  Pileser  was 
compelled  to  do.  Perhaps  one  of  the  secret  wishes  he 
entertained  in  making  his  campaign  of  the  previous  year 
in  Armenia  and  the  East  was  that  Sardurri  would  leave 
Van  and  come  south  to  meet  him  on  neutral  ground. 
But  Sardurri  did  not  stir.  To  have  attempted  to  march 
against  Sardurri's  capital6  and  strike  at  the  very  centre 
of  things  would  have  meant  a  long  trying  journey  through 
snow-bound  mountain  passes,  easy  for  the  Armenian  to 
defend.  For  a  hazardous  attempt  of  that  kind  Tiglath 
Pileser  was  not  prepared  in  744.  He  dared  not  risk  the 
chance  of  a  reverse.  In  that  case  the  Urartian  allies 
would  have  clung  all  the  closer  to  their  allegiance,  and  it 
was  with  these  allies,  particularly  with  the  Hittites  and 
Syrians,  that  much  of  Sardurri's  power  lay. 

The  most  promising  plan,  therefore,  was  to  strike  some- 
where in  Northern  Syria.  The  tribute  and  taxes  from 
this  rich  part  of  Asia  were  essential  to  Sardurri,  and  their 
threatened  loss  would  not  fail  to  bring  him  from  his 
mountain-guarded  capital  into  the  plains.  Here  without 
incurring  the  danger,  fatigue,  and  delay  of  a  long  march 
around  Lake  Van,  the  advantage  was  with  Tiglath  Pileser. 
Should  Sardurri  stay  at  home,  he  would  be  the  loser, 
since  that  must  have  amounted  to  a  confession  of  fear, 

6  The  name  of  the  capital  was  Turuspa.  It  is  the  classical  Thospites. 
For  the  various  forms  of  the  name,  see  Sayce,  JBAS.  1882. 


36  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

and   as  such  have  been  a  moral   blow  at   the  influence 
of  Urartu. 

The  sources  mention 7  Agtisi?  Qummuh,  Melid,  Sarn'ol, 9 
and  G-argum,  as  the  active  allies  with  whom  Tiglath 
Pileser  had  to  deal.  Early  in  743  he  marched  west,  and 
the  Canon  entry  for  that  year10  reads,  "ina  Arpadda"  in 
the  city  of  Arpad.  Nowhere  in  his  inscriptions  does 
Tiglath  Pileser  hint  of  a  battle  or  a  siege  which  secured 
to  him  the  possession  of  the  city  in  this  year.  There  is 
no  justification,  with  Rost,11  to  change  the  preposition 
from,  "ina"  to  "<ma,"  and  on  that  basis  postulate  a 
situation  wherein  Tiglath  Pileser  besieges  that  city  and 
was  forced  to  raise  the  siege  when  he  heard  that  Sardurri 
was  coming  to  the  relief  of  his  ally.  The  Canon  distinctly 
reads,  "Ina  Arpadda"  But  we  do  not  know  how  he 
entered  and  took  possession  of  it.  Tiele  12  thinks  that  in 
744  Arpad  was  in  possession  of  Assyria,  and  that  Tiglath 
Pileser  meant  to  use  it  in  this  campaign  as  a  base  of 
operations.  At  any  rate,  although  we  do  not  know  how 
Tiglath  Pileser  entered  the  city,  for  it  was  the  capital  of 
Mati'ilu,  the  strongest  ally  of  Sardurri,  we  are  forced  to 
admit  the  fact.  While  there  preparing  for  operations 
against  the  surrounding  small  states,  the  news  of  Sar- 

7  Ann.  60-63.     Th.  A.  45-46. 

8  Blt-Agusi,   Schrader,   KGF.  p.  207,  n.     The   capital  was  Arpad 
(Tel-Erfad,  between  Aleppo  and  Azaz).     From  Shalm.    II,   Monolith 
II.  24-30  and  82-84,  it  must  be  located  between  the  Afrin  and  the 
Euphrates,  i.e.   with  Patin  on  the  west    and  Bit-Adini   beyond   the 
Euphrates  on  the  east. 

9  Its  capital  was  probably  at  Zinjirli,  where  the  Bar-Rekub  inscrip- 
tions were  found. 

10  KB.1  p.  212. 

11  Vol.  I.  p.  XII,  n.  2. 

12  Geschichte,  p.  219. 


SYRIA  AND  THE  WEST  37 

durri's  approach  was  announced.  From  the  northeast  the 
Armenian  came  through  Kilhi  and  Ulluba,  across  the 
Tigris,  and  then  east  of  the  Euphrates  into  Qummuh. 
He  had  reached  a  point  between  Kistan  and  Halpi  when 
Tiglath  Pileser  appeared,  and  the  rivals  joined  battle 
between  the  two  cities.13  Sardurri  sustained  a  bad  de- 
feat. He  fled  the  field  on  the  back  of  a  mare.14  His 
loss  was  72,900  men  (Annals  66).  His  baggage-train, 
horses,  mules,  chariots,  even  his  personal  ornaments,  be- 
came the  spoil  of  the  victor ;  and  the  servants  and  skilled 
workmen  who  had  followed  the  army  were  made  captives. 
Yet  despite  all  this  the  battle  was  not  decisive.  A  single 
victory  had  not  decided  the  fate  of  the  West,  nor  was 
Sardurri  entirely  helpless.  The  picture  of  a  complete 
triumph  with  which  the  Annals  would  impress  us  is  not 
the  full  story.  The  victory  must  have  cost  Tiglath 
Pileser  much  of  his  strength.  He  was  compelled  to  re- 
turn to  Nineveh  and  prepare  his  forces  for  another  cam- 
paign in  Syria.  The  allies  were  not  intimidated  because 
of  Tiglath  Pileser's  victory.  He  found  them  even  more 
difficult  to  overcome  than  Sardurri  himself;  and  this  is  es- 

13  Host,  vol.  I.  pp.  XVIII  ff.  thinks  that  TP.,  believing  that  the  prox- 
imity of  Arpad,  which  according  to  him  was  still  in  Sardurri's  power,  was 
no  place  for  the  battle,  crossed  the  Euphrates  south  of  Til-Barsip,  to  reach 
Kisttan  and  Halpi.    After  the  battle  TP.  pursued  Sardurri  to  the  Eu- 
phrates north  of  Amid,  and  destroyed  Ezzida.    This  cannot  be  correct. 
In  this  campaign  TP.  does  not  mention  crossing  the  Euphrates  before  the 
battle  of  galpi,  and  to  have  raided  in  Ulluba  (as  Host  believes)  would 
have  necessitated  the  crossing  of  the  Tigris,  which  he  would  not  have 
failed  to  mention  had  it  taken  place.     What  TP.  really  did  was  to  cross 
the  Euphrates  at  the  "  Bridge "  (Ann.  68)  after  the  battle  ;   then  he 
raided  Ezzida. 

14  Annals  of  Sargon,  II.  107.     This  was  considered  a  subject  for  ridi- 
cule ;  cf.  Belck  and  Lehmann,  Verhandlungen  der  Berliner  Gfesellschaft, 
1896,  p.  325. 


38  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

pecially  true  of  Mati'ilu  of  Agtisi.1*  It  was  he  who  made 
Tiglath  Pileser  spend  three  years  in  Northern  Syria, 
prosecuting  secondary  campaigns,  but  principally  en- 
deavoring to  reduce  the  city  of  Arpad.  We  have  seen 
that  the  Canon  for  743  records  the  entrance  of  Tiglath 
Pileser  into  Arpad.  The  year  742  tells  of  another  expe- 
dition against  the  same  city ;  likewise  the  entry  for  741, 
adding  that  it  took  three  years  to  capture  Arpad.  As  has 
been  said,  in  743  Tiglath  Pileser  left  Arpad  to  meet  Sar- 
durri  in  Qummuh.  Thus,  if*that  city  only  surrendered 
to  the  Assyrian  king  in  741,  it  appears  that  while  Tiglath 
Pileser  was  engaged  in  Kistan,  the  allies  in  Syria  took 
Arpad  during  his  absence.  And  the  great  king,  ex- 
hausted by  the  all-day  battle  in  Qummuh,1*  could  do 
nothing  more  in  743  than  capture  a  few  cities  in  that 
land.  Ezzidap  Harlisina,  and  Ququsansu,  he  sacked  after 
crossing  the  Euphrates. 

15  This  opinion  of  Tiele  is  justified  by  Lehmann,  op.  cit.,  1896,  p.  324. 

16  I.e.  Kommagene,  Schrader,  KGF.  pp.  129  ff. 

17  PL  I.  34,  puts  Ezzida  in  mat  Enzi.    To  locate  the  three  cities  in  the 
text  we  must  first  locate  Enzi.     Schrader,  KGF.  pp.  129  ff.,  comparing 
Shalm.  II,  Monolith.  92-93,  with  Lay.  47,  28-33,  makes  the  river  Arsa- 
nias  =  the  modern  Murad  Su.     He  notes  (p.  144)  that  Samsi-Ramman's 
(Col.  II.  10-12)  marching  route  brings  him  to  Enzi,  and  that  he  can 
cross  the  Arsanias  only  after  traversing  that  land.     Enzi  thus  lies  in  the 
mountainous  district  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris  (upper  and 
western)  and  the  Murad  Su.    Streck,  ZA.  XIII,  p.  94,  equates  Enzi  with 
the  modern  Hanzeth,  between  Palu  and  Arghane,  and  identifies  it  with 
Alzi  (Shalm.  II,  Monolith.  42,  45,  46) .     Enzi  was  an  Urartian  province, 
but  Streck's  identification  is  not  correct.     It  is  not  the  same  as  Alzi. 
Enzi  bordered  on  Alzi  (Alzis  of  the  CIV. ;  so  Sayce,  JEA8.  XIV.  p.  398) . 
It  lay  between  Palu  and  Khini,  i.e.  east  of  Lake  Van,  between  the 
Euphrates  and  the  Murad  Su.     PI.  I.  33,  says  that  mat  Enzi  borders  on 
Qummuh.    There  Ezzida  and  the  other  cities  of  Enzi  must  be  sought, 
east  of  the  Euphrates  and  southwest  of  the  Murad  Su. 

Host,  vol.  I.  p.  XX,  makes  Ezzida,  Harbisina,  and  QuqusanSu  cities 
of  Ulluba  (KilhC) ;  but,  p.  XXVII,  he  says  they  are  cities  around  "  upper 


SYRIA  AND   THE  WEST  39 

While  Tiglath  Pileser  was  wintering  in  Nineveh  pre- 
paring for  a  resumption  of  operations  in  Syria  in  the  fol- 
lowing year,  Mati'ilu  made  ready  for  the  inevitable  siege 
of  Arpad.  He  would  have  made  his  peace  with  Tiglath 
Pileser,  and  had  he  done  so,  it  is  probable  that  he  would 
have  received  reasonable  terms.  But  Sardurri  had  es- 
caped into  his  own  land,  and  his  ally  expected  him  to 
gather  a  new  force  with  which  to  come  to  the  help  of  the 
beleagured  confederates  in  Syria.  When  therefore  the 
Assyrian  again  appeared  before  Arpad  he  faced  a  very 
sturdy  opposition.  How  well  Arpad  must  have  prepared 
for  this  siege  is  evident  from  the  time  it  required  to  take 
the  city.  Certainly  Tiglath  Pileser  did  not  sit  down 
idly  before  the  walls  and  quietly  await  the  starvation  of 
the  city.  Expeditions  from  his  armed  camp  were  sent 
out  in  all  directions  and  the  allies  were  carefully  watched, 
in  order  to  prevent  concerted  action.  When  in  740  the 
city  at  last  capitulated,  all  the  members  of  the  league 
save  one  were  anxious  to  compound  with  the  victor. 
The  fate  of  Mati'ilu  was  sealed.  He  lost  his  throne,  and 
were  the  records  complete,  we  should  undoubtedly  hear 
of  his  execution.  Uriarik  of  Que,18  Pisiris  of  Karkamis™ 

Nairi  Sea,"  i.e.  Lake  Van.  These  cities  were  all  east  of  the  Euphrates 
(PL  I.  33-36).  The  battle  with  Sardurri  was  fought  in  Qummuh,  which 
was  bounded  on  the  east  by  the  Euphrates ;  i.e.  the  battle  was  fought 
west  of  that  river. 

18  Western  part  of  Kilika,  from  Amanus  to  Taurus,  in  the  northwest  ; 
cf.  Schrader,  KFG.  pp.  236  ff. 

19  The  general  location  is  obtainable  from  Shalm.  Monolith.  I.  pp.  29  ff. 
His  route  from  east  to  west  is  Adini,  Qummuh,  Gargum,  Samcfl,  Gar- 
gamiS,  Patin.     It  was  the  capital  of  Haiti  (Tiglath  Pileser  I.  col.  V, 
49 ;  alu  GargamiS,  §a  mat  Ha-at-ti).     It  is  to  be  located  in  the  ruins 
of  Girbas,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Euphrates  near  Birejik.     Cf.  Para- 
dies,  pp.  265  ff. 


40  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

Kustaspi  of  Qummuh,  and  Tarhulara  of  G-argum  ^  hurried 
to  Arpad  in  person  to  make  peace  with  Tiglath  Pileser 
and  acknowledge  his  overlordship.  The  terras  he  exacted 
were  heavy.  The  Annals,  wherein  the  amount  of  tribute 
was  stated,  are  broken  (Annals  89-90)  ;  all  that  remains  is 
the  mention  of  ivory,  elephant  skin,  purple  cloth,  lead, 
silver,  and  gold.  But  the  measure  of  their  humiliation 
was  complete,  and  they  had  no  desire  to  prolong  resistance. 
Had  they  seen  fit  to  do  so,  a  new  leader  would  have  pro- 
claimed himself  in  the  person  of  Tutamu  of  Unqi.21  Unqi, 
originally  only  the  western  edge  of  Patin,  had  at  this 
time  gained  control  of  the  whole  country.22  It  lay  be- 
tween the  Euphrates  and  the  Orontes  rivers,  and  stretched 
north  beyond  the  Afrin.  The  capital  city  was  Kinalia, 
and  against  it  Tiglath  Pileser  proceeded  without  delay. 
From  a  passage  in  Asurb.  III.  70-92,23  we  may  determine 
the  route  which  the  army  followed.  They  started  from 
a  point  between  Karkemis  and  Til-Barsip  and  had  to 
cross  the  Afrin  before  reaching  Kinalia.  But  they  first 
reach  Hazzaz  ('Azaz).  This  being  an  important  city, 
there  was  probably  a  military  road  from  Karkemis  and 
Hazzaz,  which  led  to  the  Afrin  River.  In  later  (pre- 
Grecian)  times,  such  a  road  went  from  Birejik  (Zeugma), 
a  little  south  of  the  site  of  Karkemis  to  Aintab.  After 
capturing  Hazzaz  (JK7.  II.  27),  Tiglath  Pileser  dealt 
similarly  with  Aribua  (KL  II.  27),  and  continuing  south 
struck  the  road  which  comes  up  from  Aleppo,  runs  a 

20  Southwest  of  Sama1!,  between  the  Pyramos  and  the  Sadshur  rivers. 

J1  Unqi  =  'Amk;  cf.  Tomkins,  "Bab.  and  Orient.  Record,"  vol.  III.  p.  6. 

22  From  812-740  the  records  are  meagre  ;  during  that  time  the  subju- 
gation of  Patin  by  Unqi  took  place. 

28  The  passage  is  translated  in  Winckler,  Forsch.  1893,  pp.  3  ff.  and 
J5TJS.2  106-111. 


SYRIA  AND   THE  WEST  41 

little  south  of  Hazzaz,  and  thence  through  the  Syrian 
Gates  to  Beilan  and  the  coast.  He  came  to  Kinalia  after 
following  this  road  across  the  Afrin,24  and  took  it  without 
much  difficulty.  In  the  course  of  the  attack  it  was  de- 
stroyed. This  we  must  infer  because  in  Annals  97  we 
are  told  that  it  was  rebuilt.  Unqi  was  placed  under  a 
provincial  governor,  and  much  booty  compensated  for  the 
expense  and  trouble  of  the  campaign.  Tutamu  forfeited 
his  life.  His  fate  was  a  dire  warning  to  all  neighboring 
princes,  and  it  was  lucky  for  Hiram  of  Tyre  and  Rezin 
of  Damascus  that  their  emissaries  had  been  hastened  to 
Tiglath  Pileser  with  tokens  of  submission  shortly  after 
he  had  reduced  Arpad.25 

Tiglath  Pileser  was  not  yet  finished  in  the  far  West, 
but  it  will  perhaps  be  better  for  us,  for  the  time  being,  to 
disregard  the  chronological  order  of  his  campaigns,  and 
leave  his  activities  in  Ulluba  (739),  and  the  expeditions 
against  Media  (737),  and  Mt.  Nal  (736),  and  that  against 
Urartu  (735),  for  other  chapters,  and  to  continue  here  the 
details  of  his  work  against  Syria,  Phoenicia,  Philistia, 
Israel,  and  Juclah,  which  occupied  him  in  738,  and  again 
from  734  to  732  inclusive. 

The  principal  countries  of  the  West  which  remained 
independent  of  Assyria  after  Tiglath  Pileser's  campaign 
of  740,  were  Syria,  Israel  and  Judah,  Phoenicia  and  Phi- 
listia. With  these  in  his  possession  the  Assyrian  king 
would  have  been  supreme  from  the  Tigris  to  the  Mediter- 

24  Kinalia  must  therefore  be  located  in  southern  'Amk. 

25  There  is  some  dispute  as  to  the  date  of  Ann.  77-89.     Hommel  refers 
them  to  734,  but  Host  has  assigned  them  to  740.    This  is  in  all  probability 
correct,  because  the  Syrian  princes  had  no  occasion  to  swear  allegiance 
to  TP.  in  739,  after  the  Ulluba  campaign  or,  in  736,  after  the  expedition 
to  Mt.  Nal. 


42  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

ranean  Sea.  Perhaps  lie  had  originally  intended  to  devote 
the  year  739  to  the  subjugation  of  these  countries  and  the 
reduction  of  the  entire  West.  But  during  that  year 
trouble  broke  out  among  the  Nairi  peoples  and  a  campaign 
had  to  be  undertaken  against  Ulluba.  The  uprising  in 
that  country  was  probably  incited  by  Sardurri.  Seeing 
that  Tiglath  Pileser  was  rapidly  becoming  master  of  the 
West,  the  king  of  Urartu  fomented  trouble  in  Ulluba, 
hoping  thereby  to  compel  his  Assyrian  rival  to  hurry  back 
to  the  East  and  thus  give  the  western  kings  an  opportu- 
nity to  form  a  league  against  their  conqueror.  In  this 
Sardurri  was  more  than  successful.  Princes  and  princi- 
palities which  had  been  subdued  in  740  rebelled  against 
the  Assyrian  yoke.  Thus  when  the  work  of  739  in  Ullu- 
ba was  completed  Tiglath  Pileser  naturally  prepared  for 
a  second  western  campaign,  and  accordingly  in  738  we 
find  him  once  again  in  Syria.  Up  to  this  year  Sardurri's 
plan  of  fomenting  rebellions  against  Tiglath  Pileser  in 
one  part  of  Asia  while  the  latter  was  busy  in  another,  had 
been  successful.  While  the  Assyrian  king  was  engaged 
in  the  West,  rebellions  inspired  by  the  Urartian  monarch 
broke  out  in  the  East.  And  when  Tiglath  Pileser  hurried 
East  to  crush  them,  Sardurri  incited  revolts  in  the  West. 
It  was  because  of  this  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  that  Tiglath 
Pileser  was  compelled  to  operate  in  Ulluba  in  739,  instead 
of  devoting  that  year  to  a  continuation  of  the  Syrian  cam- 
paigns of  740.  But  Tiglath  Pileser  was  too  great  a  con- 
queror to  be  long  diverted  from  his  great  purpose  by  such 
machinations.  With  Ulluba  conquered  he  was  only  one 
step  nearer  to  his  ultimate  goal;  viz.,  the  conquest  of 
Urartu.  Nor  did  Sardurri  gain  much  by  the  formation 
of  the  new  league  of  western  kings  with  which  Tiglath 


SYRIA  AND  THE  WEST  43 

Pileser  had  to  deal  in  738.  For  the  latter  defeated  the 
western  confederacy,  and  when  he  was  ready  to  come  to  a 
final  accounting  with  Sardurri,  it  was  no  longer  necessary 
for  him  to  do  preliminary  work  in  Ulluba,  since  that  coun- 
try was  already  his. 

For  the  Syrian  campaign  of  738  the  Canon  makes  the 
objective  point  Kullani^  Its  ruler  probably  played  an 
important  part  in  the  uprising,  but  the  real  leader  was 
Azriau27  of  Yaudi.28  Yaudi  had  been  governed  by  the 

26  I.e.  Kalneh  ;  cf .  Is.   x.  9,  and  Amos  vi.  2,  between  Arpad  and 
Hamath. 

27  The  identity  of  Az-ri-ia-au  of  Yaudi  is  a  matter  of  dispute.     Among 
those  who  think  he  is  identical  with  Azariah  of  Judah,  are  Schrader,  KGF. 
pp.  395  ff.  and  KAT.2  pp.  217  ff.,  and  Hommel,  Geschichte,  pp.  662-663. 
Oppert,  La  Chronique  Biblique  fixee  par  les  eclipses,  des  inscriptions  cunei- 
formes,  1867,  pp.  30  ff.  and  Solomon  et  ses  successeurs,  1877,  pp.  1-23, 
makes  him  a  son  of  Tabeel  (Is.  vii.  6).    Winckler,  Forsch.  vol.  I.  pp.  1  ff., 
presents  a  series  of  arguments  which  put  an  entirely  new  face  upon  the 
matter.     He  argues  that  the  king  in  question  cannot  be  Azariah  of  Judah. 
In  733-732,  Ahaz.  king  of  Judah,  was  with  TP.  in  Arpad.    But  TP.'s  cam- 
paign against  Azariah  took  place  in  738,  so  that  the  years  between  734 
and  738  must  suffice  for  the  end  of  Azariah1  s  reign  and  also  for  the  full 
and  independent  reign  of  Jotham.    Although  the  chronology  of  Kings  is 
admittedly  artificial,  yet  the  sixteen  years  ascribed  to  Jotham  (2  K.  xv. 
33)  indicate  a  fairly  long  reign.     The  attempt  to  get  over  the  difficulty 
by  assigning  the  fourteen  years'  difference  as  a  portion  of  his  rule  con- 
temporaneous with  Azariah,  would  make  him  king  in  738.     And  why 
is  not  Jotham,  but  only  Azariah,  mentioned  in  TP.  ?    Then,  too,  what  is 
Azariah  doing  so  far  north  ?    Ann.  125-132  gives  a  list  of  the  XIX  dis- 
tricts of  Hamath  which  conspired  with  Azariah  against  Assyria,  and  all  of 
them  lay  between  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Orontes,  north  of  Lebanon. 
Winckler  would  solve  all  difficulties  by  identifying  the  Yaudi  of  the  TP. 
Inscriptions  with  a  country  of  the  same  name  mentioned  in  the  Zinjirli 
Inscriptions  (Ausgrabungen   in  Sendschirli ;  in  Mittl.  aits  d.  Orientali- 
schen  Sammlungen,  Kong.  Mus.  zu  Berlin,  Heft  XI,  1893),  and  this 
certainly  clears  up  the  puzzles  concerning  the  possibility  of  Azariah's  tak- 
ing the  field  in  739,  and  of  his  influence  in  the  far  north.     Rost  (Ann. 
105  and  123)  reads  "/zriaw,"  and  suggests  that  this  reading  may  decide 
the  question.    The  change  of  initials  from  "  A  "  to  "  I "  he  notes  also  in 
the  names  Iskaluna  ;  Askaluna.    The  text  of  2  K.  xiv.  28,  which  has  been 


44  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

house  of  Panammu  of  Sam'al,  and  undoubtedly  under  that 
dynasty  had,  as  a  result  of  the  conquest  of  Arpad,  become 
attached  to  Assyria.  Now  that  a  new  coalition,  indepen- 
dent of  Urartian  leadership,  proposed  to  contest  supremacy 
with  Tiglath  Pileser,  the  kingship  of  Azriau,  who  was  not 
of  the  house  of  Panammu,  points  to  the  overthrow  of  the 
pro- Assyrian  party  in  Yaudi.  The  confederacy,  includ- 
ing the  "XIX  districts  of  Hamath,"  was  made  up  of 
cities29  and  states  situated  between  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  Orontes  north  of  Lebanon.  It  is  not  probable  that  Is- 
rael or  Damascus  was  actively  involved  in  this  uprising, 
although  it  is  somewhat  surprising  that  Rezin  was  not  the 
prime  mover.  He  had  begun  about  this  time  to  make  him- 
self felt  in  Northeastern  Syria,  and  was  certainly  the  most 
powerful  monarch  in  that  part  of  the  country.  His  re- 
sources were  ample  for  a  determined'  conflict,  as  he  proved 
in  732.  Now,  he  and  Menahem30  of  Israel  hasten  to  render 
tribute  as  soon  as  the  news  of  Azriau's  defeat  reached  them, 
and  all  the  confederated  kings  swore  fidelity  to  the  great 
conqueror.  Qummuh,  Tyre,  Que,31  G-ebal^  Karkemis, 

relied  upon  to  prove  a  close  connection  between  Hamath  and  Israel,  is  too 
corrupt  to  prove  much  (cf.  Benzinger,  Konige,  1899,  pp.  166  ff.).  TP. 
mentions  Az-ri-ia-au  only  in  reference  to  North  Syrian  campaigns,  so  that 
the  king  and  his  land  must  be  sought  in  that  part  of  the  country. 

28  East  of  'Amk,  north  of  Antioch,  and  west  of  the  Afrin  ;  therefore 
between  Unqi  and  Sam?al. 

29  Its  cities,  Huzzara,  Tai,  Tarmanazai,  Kulmadara,  Hatatirra,  and 
Sagillu,  are  only  mentioned  in  TP.'s  Inscriptions.     Some  of  these  can  be 
located  with  certainty ;  Arqa,  now  the  ruins  of  Til-Arka,  south  of  Nahr 
el  Kebir.     Qimirra  (Gen.  x.  18)  is  now  Sumra.     It  commanded  the  pas- 
sage from  the  coast  to  the  upper  Orontes  valley ;  cf.  Paradies,  p.  282. 

30  2  K.  xv.  19,  20,  records  an  invasion  of  Pul ;  but  the  Annals  are 
silent  as  to  this ;  it  may  be  that  a  small  force  under  a  lieutenant  visited 
Samaria. 

31  Its  capital  was  Tarzi ;  i.e.  Tarsus. 
«2  Now  Jebeil. 


SYRIA  AND  THE  WEST  45 

Hamath,83  Sarrfal,  G-urgum,  Melid,  Kask,  Tabalf^  Atun, 
Tuhan,  Istunda,  and  Husimna,  and  even  the  land  of  an 
Arabian  queen,  Zabibi,  became  vassals  of  Assyria.  The 
tribute  they  were  obliged  to  render  included  money,  pre- 
cious metals,  wood,  cloth,  camels,  horses,  and  herds  of 
cattle.  The  booty  was  so  large  that  it  seems  as  though 
Tiglath  Pileser's  object  was  not  only  to  reimburse  him- 
self for  the  cost  of  the  campaign,  but  also  to  make  Middle 
and  North  Syria  too  poor  to  dream  of  the  possibility  of  re- 
volt for  years  to  come.  With  that  end  in  view  he  also 
colonized  the  territory  with  settlers  from  Western  Media, 
where,  while  he  was  occupied  with  the  Syrian  league,  a 
rebellion  had  arisen.  Sardurri,  unable  to  face  the  Assyr- 
ian king  on  the  open  field,  sought  to  hamper  him  by  diplo- 
macy and  intrigue  ;  for  doubtless  the  uprising  among  the 
Median  tribes  in  this  year  was  due  to  Urartian  influence. 
But  if  Sardurri  thought  that  Tiglath  Pileser  would  hurry 
east  and  leave  the  allies  in  Syria  free  to  throw  off  the 
yoke,  he  miscalculated.  Tiglath  Pileser  did  indeed  find 
himself  compelled  to  leave  Syria  after  crushing  the  rebel- 
lion, and  to  postpone  the  conquest  of  South  Syria,  Israel, 
and  Judah,  and  the  Lebanon  region  until  another  time ; 
and  he  had  in  737  to  proceed  against  Media  itself.  But 
he  was  able  to  deal  with  Azriau  and  his  allies  in  738,  and 
subdue  them  so  thoroughly  that,  when  four  years  later 

88  Cf .  Paradies,  p.  275.    Its  capital  was  Amat. ' 

34  Tabal  in  Ez.  xxvii.  13,  xxxii.  26,  xxxviii.  2,  xxxix.  1,  always  with 
Meshech ;  it  lay  north  of  the  upper  Euphrates,  and  west  of  Erzingun. 
The  relative  location  can  be  ascertained  from  Sargon,  Cyln.  15  (KB.* 
p.  40)  ;  from  east  to  west  he  places  Blt-Hamban,  Parsua,  Man,  Urartu, 
Kasku,  Tabal,  Muski  ;  on  the  east  Tabal  bordered  on  Kikilia  ;  cf .  Esarh. 
Cyln.  II,  10-13.  "Nisi  (matu}  Hi-lak-ka  (matu)  Du-^u-a  a-Si-bu-ut 
hur-Sa-ni  §a  di-hi  (matu)  TabaV 


46  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

he  traversed  their  lands,  en  route  to  Damascus,  they  were 
harmless  to  harass  him.  The  revolt  on  the  Babylonian 
border  was  soon  checked  by  the  governors  of  Nairi  and 
Lullumi^  who  sent  about  25,000  prisoners  to  Tiglath  Pi- 
leser.  He  settled  them  in  the  cities  of  Unqi,  and  then  had 
thousands  of  the  Hittites  scattered  throughout  the  Nairi 
lands. 

For  three  years  there  was  peace  in  the  West.  On  the 
surface  of  things,  all  the  princes  who  had  sworn  allegiance 
to  Tiglath  Pileser  continued  faithful,  and  he,  satisfied  that 
further  operations  in  that  direction  could  wait  until  Sar- 
durri  had  been  reckoned  with,  did  not  return  until  734. 
For  that  year,  according  to  the  Canon,  Philistia  was  the 
objective  point.  But  it  would  have  been  strange  if  the 
real  trouble  had  not  proceeded  from  another  quarter.  In 
738  Rezin  had  hurried  to  placate  Tiglath  Pileser  with 
gifts.36  But,  as  has  been  observed,  Damascus  was  a  power- 

35  An  inscription  of  one  of  the  kings  of  this  country  has  come  down  to 
us.  It  is  in  double  columns  and  was  copied  by  de  Morgan  (de  Morgan 
and  Scheil,  Becueil,  XIV.  pp.  100  ff.  1891).  The  name  occurs  also  in  the 
form  Lullubi. 

w  The  tribute  list  for  738  includes  North  and  Middle  Syrian  rulers ; 
viz.,  Hamath,  Samaria,  Phoenicia,  i.e.  Tyre,  and  Gubal.  In  that  of  734 
Damascus  is  missing,  but  new  names  occur  ;  viz.,  Armad  (modern  Island 
of  Ruad ;  cf.  Gen.  x.  18),  Ammon,  Moab,  Askalon,  Judah,  Edom,  Gaza. 
Both  lists  have  Sam'al.  As  a  contemporaneous  document  mentioning 
TP.'s  name,  the  inscription  of  Bar-Rekub  of  Sam'al  is  worth  quoting 
(cf.  Winckler,  Vorderasiatische  Gesellschaft,  1896,  p.  198) : 

1.  I  Bar-Rekub, 

2.  Son  of  Panammu  king  of  Sam'al, 

3.  Servant  of  Tiglath  Pileser  the  lord  of  the 

4.  Four  quarters  of  the  earth,  because  of  the  righteous- 

ness of  my  father  and  because 

5.  of  my  righteousness,  my  lord  Rekub-el  seated  me 

6.  and  my  lord  Tiglath  Pileser  on 

7.  the  throne  of  my  fathers.  .  .  . 

Bar-Rekub  erected  his  monument  in  Yaudi  instead  of  Sam'al,  where  we 


SYRIA  AND  THE  WEST  47 

ful  state.  Its  position  among  the  Middle  and  South  Syr- 
ian kingdoms  was  a  leading  one,  and  some  of  its  earlier 
rulers  had  proved  their  power,  even  in  conflict  with  As- 
syria itself.  Ramman-Nirari,  despite  his  boastful  lan- 
guage,37 had  found  its  king  Mari38  a  strong  foe;  and  now 
in  734  Rezin 39  had  again  succeeded  in  making  his  king- 
dom of  Damascus  a  state  to  be  reckoned  with.  No  doubt 
Tiglath  Pileser  had  his  eyes  fixed  on  the  countries  beyond 
Damascus,  including  Palestine.  It  is  also  almost  certain 
that  this  great  king  had  planned  a  future  conquest  of 
Egypt.  Damascus  was  the  real  obstacle  in  his  way.  Cap- 
padocia  and  Que  on  the  north  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Iskan- 
derun  were  his ;  so  was  Syria  south  of  Damascus,  and 

should  have  expected  to  find  it,  perhaps  because  TP.  after  the  events  of 
738,  gave  part  of  Yaudi  to  a  house  of  whose  loyalty  he  was  sure.  It  is 
surprising  that  a  vassal  should  express  his  loyalty  so  sincerely.  The 
Biblical  references  express  no  such  sentiment.  A  reason  may  be  found  in 
the  following :  In  Shalm.  Monolith.  II.  42,  the  land  is  (matu)  Sartfal.  No 
further  mention  of  the  land  occurs  until  TP.  In  his  Annals,  152,  and  in 
Th.  E.  8,  it  is  (aZw)  8am1  al.  Perhaps  in  the  course  of  the  incessant 
fighting  between  the  neighboring  states,  Sam  al  had,  in  the  interval 
between  Shalm.  II  and  TP.,  been  constantly  worsted  and  had  found  that 
in  loyalty  to  TP.  lay  its  only  safety.  Probably  this  loyalty  was  not  so 
much  to  Assyria  as  to  TP.  himself.  A  great  statesman  like  TP.  under- 
stands how  to  attach  a  vassal  to  his  person.  A  glance  at  the  Eponym 
Canon  for  681  may  convince  us.  Here  8am1  al  is  recorded  for  the  first 
time  since  TP.'s  death.  Now,  however,  it  is  an  Eponym  and  not  a  mem- 
ber of  the  house  of  Panammu  who  governs  Sam'al.  In  that  year  Esarh. 
came  to  the  throne.  That  he  dishonored  the  memory  of  TP.  we  know. 
Perhaps  because  the  house  of  Panammu  was  loyal  to  TP.'s  memory, 
Esarh.,  who  treated  political  foes  with  the  utmost  leniency,  was  suffi- 
ciently displeased  to  end  the  career  of  the  line  of  Panammu,  and  to  incor- 
porate Sam1  a I  into  the  empire,  placing  a  governor  at  its  head. 

87  Cf.  KB.1  p.  191,  lines  14  ff. 

38  Perhaps  this  is  the  Biblical  Ben  Hadad  III ;  cf.  Kittel,  Geschichte, 
vol.  II,  p.  250,  n.  5. 

89  This  was  Rezin  n.  The  first  was  a  contemporary  of  Solomon,  1  K. 
ii.  23. 


48  TIGLATH   PILESER  III 

even  that  together  with  Israel  was  already  nominally  in 
his  hands,  but  since  Mati'ilu  of  Arpad  had  opposed  him 
for  three  years,  Rezin  was  prepared  to  do  no  less.  Why 
the  Canon  makes  the  principal  goal  of  this  year's  expe- 
dition Philistia  *°  we  do  not  know.  The  mutilated  condi- 
tion of  the  Annals  for  the  two  succeeding  years  compel  us  to 
go  to  the  Biblical  sources  for  a  picture  of  the  operations 
which  follow. 

The  record  of  Menahem's  tribute  (2  K.  xv.  19,  20)  is 
the  point  of  departure.  This  king  came  to  the  throne  as 
a  result  of  anarchy  in  Israel  (2  K.  xv.  23).  His  short 
reign  was  unsettled ;  and  his  successor,  Pekahiah,  was 
murdered  by  Pekah,  the  captain  of  the  palace  guard 
(2  K.  xv.  29).  Anarchy  in  the  north  gave  Judah  her 
long-expected  opportunity.41  Alone,  in  her  troubled  state, 
Israel  was  in  no  position  to  cope  with  her  southern  oppo- 
nent. She  had  to  invoke  outside  help,  and  the  logical 
ally  was  Damascus.  Pekah  called  Rezin  to  his  aid,  and 
the  two  together  laid  siege  to  Jerusalem.  Ahaz,  who 
had  only  recently  come  to  the  throne  of  Judah,  did  not 
know  whither  to  turn  for  succor.  Isaiah's  advice  he  re- 
jected.42 The  enemies  without  the  gate  had  to  be  repulsed. 
Nor  did  they  seem  to  Ahaz  to  be  as  insignificant  as  "  two 
tails  of  a  smoking  firebrand."  Of  what  good  was  it  to 
him  that  before  many  years  the  riches  of  Damascus  and 

4°  Schrader,  KGF.  p.  125,  believes  that  "  (mat)  PiliUu"  stands  for  a 
general  designation  of  the  East ;  i.e.  Philistia  and  Israel.  Rost,  vol.  I. 
p.  XXIX.  n. ,  is  inclined  to  doubt  this  very  much,  since  the  entries  opposite 
the  Canon  dates  seem  always  to  state  the  goal  of  a  campaign.  But  there 
is  no  way  to  reconcile  such  a  claim  with  the  positive  fact  that  TP.  was, 
in  734,  mainly  engaged  with  Damascus,  and  that  Philistine  operations 
were  only  incidental  to  the  main  campaign. 

41  Judah  desired  revenge  for  Israel's  victory  at  Beth  Shemesh  (2  K.  iv. 
11).  «  Is.  vii.  I  ff. 


SYRIA  AND  THE  WEST  49 

Israel  would  (Is.  viii.  4)  ube  carried  away  before  the 
eyes  of  the  king  of  Assyria"?  And  of  what  use  was 
faith  in  God  while  Pekah  was  hammering  away  at  the 
gates  ?  "  The  waters  of  Shiloh  that  go  slowly  "  (Is.  viii. 
6)  were  not  quenching  the  firebrands.  It  became  im- 
perative to  enlist  help  from  some  quarter,  and  there  were 
but  two  possibilities,  —  Egypt  or  Assyria.  Of  these  two, 
Assyria  was  the  logical  ally,  because  Israel  had  tradition- 
ally made  alliance  with  Egypt  (Hos.  viii.  12).  Ahaz 
appealed  to  Tiglath  Pileser,  since  from  him  he  could  ex- 
pect more  consideration  than  from  Pharaoh.  "I  am  thy 
servant  and  thy  son ;  come  up  and  save  me  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  king  of  Syria  and  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
king  of  Israel"  (2  K.  xvi.  7).  No  second  invitation 
was  needed.  Menahem  had  already  paid  tribute,  but  now 
Tiglath  Pileser  had  an  excuse  to  overrun  the  county. 
He  came,  but  had  no  need  to  proceed  against  Samaria 
or  against  Damascus  as  yet.  Ahaz  had  invoked  his  aid, 
but  the  Assyrian  had  his  own  plans.  En  route  to  Jeru- 
salem there  were  other  lands  to  conquer.  Moreover,  Rezin 
and  Pekah  went  each  his  own  way ;  the  one  to  Samaria, 
the  other  to  Damascus. 

Probably  taking  the  usual  route  through  the  Lebanon 
depression  in  the  Orontes  valley,  Tiglath  Pileser  made 
several  Phoenician  cities  tributary,  and  an  expedition  into 
Philistia  under  one  of  his  generals  succeeded  in  subduing 
that  land.  Hanno  of  Gaza,  not  daring  to  resist  and  unwill- 
ing to  surrender,  fled  to  Egypt.43  We  may  see  from  this 

*3  The  Mucri  (Kl.  I.  1,  9)  referred  to  here  cannot  be  an  Arabian 
or  an  Idumean  people,  despite  Winckler's  suggestive  contention,  in  Unter- 
suchungen,  pp.  168  ff.,  and  Mitteilungen  des  V order  asiatische  Gfesellschaftj 
vols.  I  and  IV,  "Jtfw^ri,  Melucha  und  MaSm."  We  must  remember 
that  Egypt  was  the  only  power  strong  enough  to  dispute  Assyria's  progress 


50  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

circumstance  that  the  eye  of  Egypt  was  upon  current 
events.  Egypt  was  never  safe  without  outposts  in  Syria 
and  never  failed,  when  possible,  to  secure  and  hold  these. 
Tiglath  Pileser  was  working  his  way  rapidly  into  the 
zone  where  every  advance  step  must  have  caused  appre- 
hension to  the  Pharaoh.  The  latter  probably  had  promised 
aid  to  Hanno,  as  he  had  often  done  with  Israel  and  Judah; 
for  it  was  very  necessary  for  him  to  keep  a  buffer  between 
himself  and  Assyria,  but  he  failed  to  keep  his  promise. 
Gaza's  independence  was  important  to  Egypt,  for  it  was 
the  nearest  city  on  the  trade  route  between  Egypt  and 
Syria,  and  controlled  this  route.  With  Hanno  a  fugitive, 
Gaza  fell  into  Tiglath  Pileser's  hands.  He  now  pro- 
ceeded to  deal  with  Pekah.  On  the  western  borders  of 
Israel  (2  K.  xv.  29),  "  The  king  of  Assyria  took  Ijon, 
and  Abel-beth-maacah,  and  Janoah  and  Kedesh  and  Hazor 
and  Gilead  and  Galilee  and  all  the  land  of  Naphthali,  and 
he  carried  them  captives  into  Assyria."44  Pekah  must 
have  resisted  valiantly,  and  the  losses  of  Israel  would 
doubtless  have  been  greater  but  for  the  presence  of  a 
pro- Assyrian  party.  Pekah's  folly  in  allying  himself  with 
Rezin  and  thus  becoming  the  indirect  cause  of  Assyrian 

at  this  time.  It  was,  therefore,  to  Pharaoh  that  Hanno  fled.  Without 
the  prospect  of  Egyptian  aid,  he  would  have  followed  the  course  of  his 
neighbors  and  have  paid  tribute  to  TP.  Pharaoh  did  not  actually  help 
him  until  726,  for  in  that  year  we  find  him  in  the  field  against  Sargon. 

44  Kl.  I.  lines  6-18.  The  text  is  badly  mutilated.  In  line  6,  Rost  fills 
out,  Gal(za}.  To  fill  out  the  lacuna  after  "  Gal,"  it  has  been  proposed 
to  read  Ga-al-lil,  i.e.  "  Galilee"  ;  that  would  agree  with  the  text  of  2  K. 
Schrader,  after  the  second  "  (alii)  "  in  the  line  reads,  Abel-beth-Ma-khah, 
which  again  would  agree  with  Kings  ;  but  Rost  correctly  insists  upon  the 
reading,  A-bi-il-ak-k(a).  The  gap  at  the  beginning  of  line  7,  which  pre- 
cedes .  .  .  li,  Hommel  fills  out  with  (Nap-ta)-li,  i.e.  Naphthali :  again 
with  geographical  justification  only. 


SYRIA  AND   THE  WEST  51 

intervention,  probably  accounts  for  his  murder45  (2  K. 
xv.  30).  The  new  king,  Hosea,  certainly  the  leader  of 
the  pro-Assyrian  party,  was  allowed  by  Tiglath  Pileser  to 
retain  his  throne  as  a  tributary.  That  he  swore  fidelity 
to  Assyria  we  see  from  2  K.  xvii.  3,  4.  There  we  are 
told  that  Shalmaneser  "found  conspiracy"  in  him,  .  .  . 
"  for  he  had  sent  messengers  to  So,  king  of  Egypt." 

Tiglath  Pileser  was  now  free  to  deal  with  Damascus. 
Assyria  and  Syria  had  met  on  the  battle-field  in  past  times, 
and  both  had  registered  victories,  but  Rezin  seems  to  have 
lacked  both  the  ability  and  the  prudence  of  his  predeces- 
sors. It  is  not  clear  why  he  separated  from  Pekah  instead 
of  remaining  with  him  to  face  the  common  foe.  Perhaps 
Rezin  feared  that  should  the  battle  take  place  in  Israel, 
Tiglath  Pileser  had  a  sufficient  force  to  send  troops  against 
Damascus  while  he  himself  was  busy  helping  to  defend 
Israel.  Such  an  expedition  was  actually  sent  against 
Philistia,  while  the  main  army  was  engaged  in  Western 
Israel.  Also  Rezin  had  other  allies.  That  he  may  have 
considered  it  better  policy  to  keep  Tiglath  Pileser  busy  in 
Israel,  west  of  Anti- Lebanon,  and  cause  him  to  weaken  his 
forces  in  fighting  Pekah,  so  that  he  himself  could  gain 
time  to  form  a  new  confederacy,  is  possible.  Perhaps  in 
his  view  that  was  a  wiser  course  than  to  trust  to  the  issue 
of  a  single  battle. 

The  Syrian  proved  as  difficult  to  overcome  as  Sardurri, 
but  the  latter  at  least  saved  his  capital.  Rezin  after  a 
long  siege  had  to  surrender  his  royal  city,  but  not  until 
his  outlying  dominion  was  ravaged  from  one  end  to  the 
other,  and  its  cities,  towns,  and  hamlets  sacked.  Rezin 

«  Ann.  228,  and  Kl.  I.  17.  TP.  tells  only  of  Pekah's  flight,  not  of 
his  death. 


52  TIGLATH   PILESER  III 

himself  suffered  death.46  The  inhabitants  of  Damascus 
were  transplanted  to  Kir.47  The  districts  which  were  con- 
quered in  732  were  placed  under  a  provincial  governor 
with  his  residence  at  Damascus. 

Metena  of  Tyre,48  and  Mitinti  of  Askalon,  who  had 
formed  the  new  coalition  with  Rezin,  lost  heavily  in  tribute, 
and  the  last,  crazed  by  his  misfortunes,  was  replaced  by 
his  son  Rukiptu,  as  an  Assyrian  vassal.  To  add  to  the 
wide  extent  of  the  conquest,  an  Arabian  queen,  Sams!,  who 
may  have  been  an  active  ally  of  Rezin's,  was  pursued  into 
her  home  country,  and  after  the  defeat  of  her  troops,  and 
the  payment  of  heavy  tribute,  was  allowed  to  keep  her 
throne.  Many  of  the  Arabian  tribes  were  made  tributary, 
and  of  these,  one,  the  Idibi'il,49  were  stationed  to  guard  and 
control  the  Arabian  Mu^ri. 

Now  the  princes  of  all  the  West  hastened  to  do  homage  to 
the  conqueror.  At  Damascus  he  established  a  temporary 
court,  and  from  far  and  near  came  trembling  rulers  with 

46  The  record  of  Rezin's  execution  is  not  in  TP.  Rawlinson  discovered 
part  of  a  tablet  which  recorded  it,  but  the  tablet  was  left  in  Asia  and  has 
been  lost ;  cf.  Schrader,  KAT*  p.  265. 

47  Kir  is  not  mentioned  in  TP.'s  records,  probably  because  of  their  frag- 
mentary condition.  Hale"vy,  Eecherches  Bibliques,  pp.  57-58,  locates  it  in 
or  near  Elam,  on  the  strength  of  a  reference  in  Is.  xxii.  6.  Amos  i.  5  and 
ix.  7  makes  it  an  Aramean  city. 

48  The  terror  with  which  Tiglath  Pileser  inspired  his  foes  is  shown  by 
Metena' s  surrender.    No  city  was  better  situated  to  withstand  a  siege 
than  Tyre,  and  TP.  could  not  have  taken  it  without  a  fleet,  any  more 
than  he  was  able  to  conquer  Turuspa  later  on. 

49  Cf.  Paradies,  pp.  301  ff.     They  were  a  tribe  situated  north  of  the 
Dead  Sea,  toward  the  Egyptian  border.    Their  location,  near  to  Egypt, 
might  perhaps  justisfy  the  belief  that  the  Mucri  of  Ann.  226,  filled  into 
the  text  by  Host,  was  Egypt,  and  their  watch  upon  that  country  was  the 
first  step  taken  by  TP.  towards  an  invasion  of  Egypt.    Of  course  TP.  did 
not  live  to  return  to  the  West  and  to  undertake  a  campaign  against 
Egypt. 


SYRIA  AND   THE  WEST  53 

promises  of  loyalty  and  with  "presents."50  The  booty 
which  they  were  compelled  to  deliver  was  enormous. 
Only  one  prince,  Uassurmi  of  Tdbal,  dared  to  absent  him- 
self, and  for  this  presumption  he  had  the  humiliation  of 
seeing  a  "  nobody  "51  placed  on  his  throne. 

Assyria  was  now  mistress  of  Asia,  from  the  Uknu  River 
to  the  Philistian  coast,  in  the  south,  and  on  the  north, 
from  the  Mediterranean  to  Qummufi.  The  East,  to  the 
Caspian,  had  been  conquered  in  736.  Media  had  been 
thoroughly  subdued  in  737.  Urartu  had  been  rendered 
harmless  in  735.  Only  the  work  of  freeing  Babylonia  of 
the  Chaldeans  remained  to  be  done.  We  may  now  pro- 
ceed to  review  the  campaigns  of  737,  736,  735,  731,  and 
730. 

60  "When  the  various  kings  came  to  Damascus  to  render  tribute,  Ahaz 
is  simply  mentioned  among  the  rest,  and  not  as  an  ally.     A  proof  of  the 
view  TP.  took  of  his  call  for  help.     The  author  of  2  K.  xvi.  5-18,  makes 
a  side  issue  of  the   trip  of   Ahaz  to  Damascus,   whither  he  went  to 
swear  allegiance  to  TP.  (v.  10).    His  chief  interest  lies  in  the  affair  of  the 
altar  which  Ahaz  saw  at  Damascus,  and  the  plans  of  which  he  sent  to 
Urijah  the  priest,  with  orders  to  build  a   replica.    Urijah  obeyed,  and 
Ahaz  thought  well  enough  of  the  work  to  set  the  altar  in  the  Temple. 
Can  it  be  possible  that  we  have  in  this  transaction  a  hint  of  one  of  the 
terms  imposed  by  TP.,  upon  Ahaz?     For  what  altar  did  Ahaz  copy? 
Surely  not  the  altar  of  the  discredited  Rezin,  his  bitter  foe.     Is  it  possible 
that  TP.    not  finding  it  necessary  to  go  to  Jerusalem  in  person,  demanded 
that  Ahaz  set  up  an  altar  which  would  be  a  counterpart  of  the  one  before 
which  the  latter  had  sworn  fealty  ?    TP.'s  custom  of  setting  up  galam 
garrutidi  "images  of  my  royalty,"  before  conquered  towns,  will  be  re- 
called.   Was  the  altar  in  question  a  variation  of  such  an  image  ? 

61  Th.  R.  15,  "war  la-ma-ma-na." 


CHAPTER  V 

MEDIA   AND   UKARTU 

In  743,  Tiglath  Pileser  had  come  into  direct  conflict  with 
Sardurri  at  Kistan  in  Qummuh,  and  although  victorious, 
had  been  so  far  crippled  by  the  battle,  as  to  prevent  him 
from  following  up  the  Urartian  king.  During  his  march 
into  Qummuh  he  had  lost  Arpad,  and  since  that  was 
the  objective  point  of  that  year's  campaign,  he  returned  to 
besiege  it  in  742.  But  although  Arpad  remained  for  the 
time  being  in  the  hands  of  Mati'ilu,  its  rightful  king,  and 
despite  the  fact  that  Sardurri  had  made  his  escape,  Tiglath 
Pileser  was  not  so  far  exhausted  by  the  battle  of  Kistan, 
but  that  he  could  cross  the  Euphrates  and  raid  the 
cities  of  Ququsamu,  ffarbisina,  and  Ezzida  (Ann.  77-81). 
However,  he  neither  desired  at  the  time  nor  was  he  able 
to  press  on  nearer  to  the  Urartian  capital,  and  invade 
Ulluba  and  Kilhi.  Arpad  had  first  to  be  taken  and  North- 
ern Syria  to  be  conquered. 

But  Ulluba  and  Kilhi  were  the  objective  points  in  739. 
They  had  to  be  in  Assyrian  hands  before  Sardurri  could 
be  searched  out  in  his  home  land,  and  doubtless  the  work 
of  this  year  was  only  another  step  towards  the  investment 
of  Van,  which  was  undertaken  in  735.  The  particulars  of 
the  campaign  are  meagre,  for  the  Annal  record  is  missing, 
and  the  remaining  inscriptions  give  few  details.1  The 

1  The  sources  for  the  campaign  are,  PI.  I.  25-29  and  PI.  II.  41-45, 
and  Th.  A.  43-44.  The  cities  mentioned  cannot  be  located. 

54 


MEDIA  AND  URARTU  55 

Canon  furnishes  only  the  bare  announcement,  "to  Ulluba"2 
In  831,  Shalmaneser  II  had  been  compelled  to  send  an  ex- 
pedition into  Ulluba  and  Kilhi,  for  the  Urartians  had 
already  at  that  time  annexed  those  two  countries,  and  they 
had  been  under  the  control  of  Urartu  ever  since.  Now  in 
739  Tiglath  Pileser  inaugurates  that  series  of  2ampaigns 
which  was  designed  to  culminate  in  a  final  reckoning  with 
Sardurri,  whom  he  had  from  the  beginning  recognized  as 
Assyria's  most  dangerous  foe.  If  he  can  conquer  Ulluba 
and  Kilhi  and  so  administer  them  as  to  keep  them  loyal,  he 
will  not  only  have  destroyed  the  buffer  state  which  pro- 
tected Urartu  on  the  west,  but  will  open  a  way  for  his 
troops  to  Sardurri's  very  door.  The  brevity  of  the  sources 
does  not  give  the  impression  that  great  importance  was 
attached  to  the  accomplishments  of  the  year.  We  are  told 
that  a  city,  Assur-iki-sa,  was  established,  where  the  cult 
of  Assur  was  instituted,  and  where  a  governor  was  installed 
to  administer  the  two  conquered  provinces.  In  Tlimmir 
he  erected  an  image  of  his  royalty.3 

The  following  year  finds  Tiglath  Pileser  again  in  the 
West,  and  in  737  he  was  engaged  in  Media.  But  in  736  4 
his  operations  are  prosecuted  in  nearly  the  same  territory 
which  engaged  his  attention  in  739.  At  the  foot  of  the 

2  The  sentence  which  completes  the  entry  in  the  Canon,  "  (mahazu) 
Bir-tu  gab-ta-at,"  has  caused  controversy.  Peiser  (KB.1  p.  212)  trans- 
lates, "  Die  Stadt  Birtu  wird  erobert."  So  also  Smith  ("  Assyr.  Canon," 
p.  65).  Host,  vol.  I,  p.  XII,  n.  4,  translates,  erne  Festung  wird  gegrun- 
det :  by  reference  to  IR.  14,  17,  he  shows  that  qab&tu  may  be  translated 
"  established."  He  observes  that  if  the  record  dealt  with  the  reduction 
of  a  fortress,  the  Assyrians  themselves  would  not  have  known  which  one 
was  meant  unless  a  name  were  given. 

8  riimmir,  probably  a  small  country  in  the  Nal  Mountains,  perhaps  a 
semi-dependency  of  Ulluba.  The  name,  I  think,  occurs  only  here. 

4  The  sources  for  the  year  are  Ann.  177-190  ;  and  PI.  I.  28. 


56  TIGLATH   PILESER  III 

Nalb  Range  were  fortresses  and  natural  conformations  which 
would  be  of  great  defensive  value  to  Urartu  should  Tiglath 
Pileser  attempt  to  invade  it.  Furthermore,  the  Assyrian 
had  to  possess  them  in  order  to  feel  secure  against  a  raid 
by  Sardurri  into  Ulluba.*  At  Kistan  Sardurri  had  suffered 
a  stinging  defeat,  and  since  then  his  best  provinces  had  been 
taken  from  him.  Although  he  had  not  ventured  into 
open  conflict  all  the  while  he  was  being  despoiled,  and  was 
seemingly  content  to  remain  quietly  at  home,  he  could 
not  be  trusted  to  remain  a  passive  spectator  altogether. 
There  was  no  telling  what  sudden  enterprise  he  might  in- 
stitute or  at  what  point  he  might  unexpectedly  emerge. 
Kilhi  adjoined  Urartu  on  the  southwest,  and  it  was  from 
that  direction  that  he  could  most  quickly  appear.  He  had 
to  gain  only  one  victory  and  Tiglath  Pileser  would  have 
suffered  a  setback  perhaps  sufficient  to  hamper  his  plans  for 
years.  The  Urartian  was  at  all  times  a  dangerous  enemy 
against  whom  precaution  was  as  imperative  as  active  cam- 
paigning. All  the  more  therefore  did  Tiglath  Pileser  need 
to  secure  the  Nal  region.  To  hold  it,  once  Ulluba  and 
Kilhi  were  in  his  hands,  made  the  conquest  of  these  lands 
complete  and  the  possession  of  Nairi  final. 

Tiglath  Pileser  took  the  most  important  cities  of  the 

6  Host,  vol.  I.  p.  XXVII,  correctly  locates  the  range  as  the  one  stretch- 
ing south  of  Lake  Van,  and  separating  Urartu  on  the  south  from  north- 
ern Ulluba  and  Kilhi;  identical  with  the  Armenian  Taurus.  Cf.  also 
Streck,  ZA.  XIII.,  p.  106,  who  locates  it  more  precisely.  He  places 
Ulluba  on  the  southwest  of  Nal,  east  of  Kirhu,  north  of  Kanari,  between 
the  rivers  Jezidchaneh  and  Bitlis-Tschai. 

6  The  cities,  none  of  which  can  be  exactly  located,  are  {Ann.  177), 
Hista,  Harabisina,  Barbaz,  Tasa.  Ann.  180-181:  Daikansa,  Sakka, 
Ippa,  I'linzan§u,  Luqadansa,  Kuda,  Vlugia,  Dania,  Danziun,  Ulai, 
Luqia,  Abrania,  I'usa.  Muqania  and  its  capital,  Ura  (Ann.  183),  are 
not  mentioned  in  any  other  inscription. 


MEDIA  AND  URARTU  57 

district.  Ten  thousand  prisoners  were  captured,  and  over 
20,000  head  of  cattle,  together  with  a  large  number  of 
mules  and  horses,  made  up  the  profits  of  the  campaign. 
Why  Tiglath  Pileser  did  not  penetrate  Ulluba  and  KilTii 
in  739  we  do  not  know ;  perhaps  because  of  lack  of  time ; 
or  it  may  be  that  only  a  part  of  his  army  was  engaged  at 
the  time  while  he  was  busy  preparing  for  other  campaigns. 
Perhaps,  too,  Sardurri,  pursuing  his  favorite  policy,  fos- 
tered sedition  against  Assyria  in  Media,  while  Tiglath 
Pileser  was  busily  engaged  in  the  North  and  the  East. 
At  any  rate,  one  of  the  years  intervening  between  the 
campaigns  of  739  and  736  was  spent  in  the  East,  and  the 
following  one,7  as  the  Canon  has  it,  was  devoted  to  "  (mdf) 
AA."8  A  part  of  the  country  subdued  in  this  campaign 

7  The  campaigns  of  744  and  737  have  been  well  studied  by  Billerbeck, 
Sulm.  pp.  72  ff.    The  inscriptional  sources  are  Ann.  157-176,  PI.  I.  17, 
PL  II.  19  j  and  Th.  A.  29-38. 

8  Rost,  vol.  I.  p.  XXV,  without  hesitation,  reads  the  "  (mat)  A.  A." 
of  the  Canon,  as  Madai,  and  considers  it  an  abbreviation  of  Mad-ai.    He 
finds  convincing  confirmation  for  his  reading  in   Sennacherib,  Cyl.  A, 
Col.  II.  30,  which  reads  (mat)  Ai,  while  the  parallel  passage  in  K.  1674 
omits  the  determinative  (mat),  and  simply  reads,  Mad-ai.    It  can,  I  be- 
lieve, be  proved  that  two  distinct  localities  bore  the  name  Madai.    One  of 
these  was  Umlias  (of.  Br.  11693),  a  land  east  of  the  UJcnu  River.     This 
UmliaS  is  not  the  land  which  TP.   knows  as   Media;   he  distinguishes 
sharply  between  them.    Ann.  157-158  read,  (mat}  Bit-Kapsi  (mat)  Blt- 
Sa-angi  (mat)  Blt-Taz-zak-Tci  (mat)  Ma-da-ai,  i.e.  Bit-Kapsi,  etc.,  in 
Media;  and   (mat)  Bit-Zu-al-za-as  (mat)  Blt-Ma-at-ti  (mat)   UmliaS : 
i.e.  Bit-Zualza§,  etc.,  in  UmliaS,     The  lands  mentioned  in  PL  I.  18,  to- 
gether with  Madai ,  are  in  Urartu  proper  or  near  it.    All  are  in  the  north, 
and  so  also  must  this  Madai  be,  for  PL  I  is  arranged  geographically,  not 
chronologically.    Sargon,  Prism,  Col.  II.  30  (KB.2  pp.  89-91),  mentions 
Madia  with  Harhar,  which  was  near  the  Urartian  border.     Thus  we  have 
(mat)  A.  A.  in  the  North  and  one  also  in  the  South.     Certainly  in  this 
year  TP.  was  engaged  with  the  northern  one.    Delitzsch  made  two  at- 
tempts to  locate   (mat)  A.  A.,  and  both  are  seen  to  be  correct  when 
we  remember  that  there  were  two  lands  so  designated.    In  Paradies, 
p.  247,  he  said  it  was  the  country  around  (Sad)  A-ja,  in  Kurdistan.     This 


58  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

had  been  dealt  with  in  744.  That  it  had  to  be  reconquered 
does  not  speak  well  for  the  thoroughness  of  the  first  ex- 
pedition, but  does  not  warrant  our  thinking  that  the  work 
was  laxly  done  at  that  time.  In  the  first  place,  Tiglath 
Pileser  had  to  contend  with  the  machinations  of  Sardurri, 
and  no  conquest  could  be  considered  final  until  the  latter 
was  thoroughly  routed.  As  in  the  West  and  the  North, 
so  here  in  the  East,  uprisings  were  undoubtedly  fathered 
by  him.  People  who  would  never  have  dreamed  of  throw- 
ing off  the  yoke  so  soon  after  having  experienced  the 
power  of  Assyrian  arms,  were  incited  to  rebellion  by 
Urartian  persuasion.  Then,  too,  the  campaign  of  744  was 
only  Tiglath  Pileser's  second  one.  He  had  not  yet  con- 
quered a  sufficiently  large  number  of  peoples  to  transplant 
into  these  Median  and  Elainitish  districts,  thus  to  impair 
the  homogeneity  of  the  original  population.  There  were 
still  enough  of  the  native  inhabitants  left  to  allow  of  con- 
certed action.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  in  744 
Tiglath  Pileser's  possessions  were  not  y et "  extensive,  and 
he  had  not  sufficient  land  in  which  to  scatter  conquered 
tribes.  Hence  the  work  of  744  had  to  be  repeated.9  The 
sphere  of  operations  as  located  by  Billerbeck  (Sulm. 
p.  85)  was  in  the  valley  of  the  Derund,  about  Sinna,  the 
territory  between  the  Pendsch-Ali  and  Talvantu-dagh, 
and  also  in  the  vicinity  of  Sakkis.  Whether,  as  in  the 
first  campaign  in  this  region,  the  army  moved  in  one  or 
more  corps,  is  not  to  be  decided,  for  we  have  no  hint  as  to 

is  the  North  Media.  In  Assyr.  Gram.  p.  18,  he  equated  (md£)  A.  A.  with 
Umliai. 

9  The  names  which  occur  both  in  this  campaign  and  in  that  of  744  are 
Blt-Tazzakki,  Bit-Sangi,  and  Bit-Kapsi.  Battanu  was  king  in  Bit-Kapsi 
in  744.  In  737  a  new  king,  Upas,  ruled.  This  change  of  kings  may  have 
had  something  to  do  with  the  new  uprising. 


MEDIA  AND  URARTU  59 

the  original  base  of  operations,  and  the  various  districts 
mentioned  cannot  be  located  with  such  exactness  as  to  de- 
termine the  line  of  march.  The  country  covered  was 
very  extensive,  and  perhaps  some  of  the  lands  mentioned, 
especially  those  already  conquered  in  744,  were  brought 
back  into  control  by  the  invasion  of  a  few  regiments,  since 
garrison  posts  had  been  established  in  744.  It  is  not  to  be 
supposed  that  the  uprising  in  each  district  spread  over  its 
entire  extent. 

At  any  rate,  the  country  from  Eikni10  in  the  far  north- 
east, to  Niqu11  in  the  southwest,  was  overrun.  Perhaps 
Niqu  was  taken  on  the  return  march  after  crossing  over 
the  Pushti-Kuh  Mountains.  Tiglath  Pileser  had  on  his 
way  south  thought  it  necessary  to  take  Til-Assur ;  and 
this  he  reached,  if  Ann.  158  gives  the  actual  route 
followed,  after  passing  through  Bit-Zualzas  and  Bit-Matti 
(the  same  order  is  given  in  PL  I.  17 ;  PL  II.  19 ;  and 
Th.  A.  29).  Til-Assur  and  Bit-Istar  reveal  by  their 
names  that  they  were  originally  Assyrian,  or  were  near 
enough  to  Assyria  to  have  been  incorporated  into  the 
Empire,  or  to  have  at  least  retained  their  Assyrian 
character.  Of  coarse,  these  names  may  have  been  given 
them  after  their  conquest.12 

10  Demavend  ;  according  to  Sachau,  ZA.  XII.  p.  57,  it  is  the  Sirdara- 
Kuh.    Demavend  is  the  largest  mountain  of  the  range  (19,400  ft.). 
Esarh.  IV.  10  describes  it  as  "  §ade  uJcni,"  which  may  mean  renowned 
because  of  its  marble  and  alabaster ;  but  better  because  of  its  shining 
appearance,  due  to  a  perpetual  covering  of  ice  and  snow. 

11  Always  "Niqu  (m&t}   Umlias."     Its  possession  must  have  been  a 
matter  of  importance,  for  it  lay  immediately  west  of  the  outlying  hills  of 
the  Pushti  Kuh  and  commanded  the  passes  into  Elam. 

12  From  Ann.  176,  we  learn  that  it  was  the  seat  of  a  Marduk  temple 
where  TP.  offered  sacrifices.     Not  only  its  name  makes  its  location  near 
the  Assyrian  border  probable,  but  also  the  fact  that  TP.  sacrificed  there. 
This  must  have  been  at  the  end  of  the  campaign  and  in  celebration  of  the 


60  TIGLATH   PILESER  III 

Some  of  the  conquered  tribes,  like  the  Bit-Sangibutti™ 
were,  as  Rost  (vol.  I.  p.  XXV)  observes,  of  Babylonian 
origin ;  others  were  located  on  the  southwestern  border 
of  Media.14  At  various  places  in  the  district  conquered, 
Tiglath  Pileser  erected  images  of  his  royalty.  The  spoils 
of  victory  included  all  those  productions  in  which  the 
territory  abounded,  and  as  usual  Tiglath  Pileser  did  not 
stint  his  share.  Horses,  camels,  cattle,  mules,  "without 
number  I  carried  away  "  (Th.  A.  33).  *  Sixty -five  thousand 
persons  were  deported  to  other  dependencies. 

From  the  borders  of  Urartu  on  the  north  and  Rhagian 
Media15  on  the  northeast,16  to  the  eastern  frontiers  of 

year's  achievements.  Of  course  the  end  of  the  campaign  found  TP.  near 
home.  For  this  reason  I  cannot  agree  with  Billerbeck,  Sulm.  p.  87,  in 
locating  Til-Assur  near  Kifraur  or  Gilan.  It  lay,  I  think,  between  Niqu 
and  the  Diala  on  the  highway  into  Assyria  proper. 

13  Bit-Sangibutti  near  Behistun,  Sulm.  p.  80. 

14  Among  these  are  the  peoples  whose  name  is  compounded  with  the 
element  "Kingi"  ;  viz.,  Kingi-Kangi,  Kingi- Alkasis.     Streck,  ZA.  XV. 
338,  refuses  to  see  in  the  element  Kingi  any  reminiscence  of  Ki-en-gi  = 
Semitic  Sumer,  but  suggests  a  possible  connection  with  the  goddess  Kingu 
of  the  creation  myths.    But  why  Tiele's  (Geschichte,  p.  231)  opinion  of 
the  preservation  in  these  names  of  Ki-en-gi  —  lowlands,  i.e.  'land  of 
reeds,'  should  be  dogmatically  rejected  I  do  not  see.     Rost  (vol.  I.  p. 
XXVI)  refers  to  Winckler  (Mittl.  d.  Berl.  Ak.  Orient.  Ver.  1887,  p.  12), 
who  notes  that  Kingi  means  '  lowlands '  as  opposed  to  mountainous  dis- 
tricts.   This  leads  him  to  the  observation  that  these  lands  on  the  southwest 
border  of  Media  were  probably  largely  peopled   by  a  portion  of  the 
Sumerians  who  left  their  homes  and  settled  here  rather  than  accept  the 
yoke  of  the  Semites  when  these  latter  overran  Mesopotamia.      See  IV. 
R.  9,  K.  2861,  line  26,  where  the  Assyrian  "  ma-at-ti  "  is  rendered  in 
Sumerian  by  Ka-na-ga  (ka-la-ma),  but  where  Ki-en-gi  may  also  be  read. 

15  Delattre,  Le  Peuple  et  r Empire  des  Medes,  p.  101,  correctly  equates 
the  region  of  Bikni  with  Rhagian  Media. 

16  On  his  return  march  tribute  was  also  received  from  Pllipi.     Streck, 
ZA.  XV.  pp.  380  ff.,  makes  it  the  country  east  of  the  Pushti  Kuh  ;  i.e.  the 
northwestern  part  of  the  modern  Luristan.     In  Th.  A.  38,  we  read  (melt) 
Pl-li-pa-ai  u  hazanati^a  §adi-i  kali-su-nu  a-di  (§adu)  Bi-ik-ni.    This 


MEDIA  AND  URARTU  61 

Babylonia  and  the  boundaries  of  Assyria  proper,  Tiglath 
Pileser  was  now  undisputed  master.  No  enemy  was  left 
to  contest  his  supremacy  except  Sardurri.  With  him  he 
was  now  ready  to  deal.  There  was  in  fact  no  other 
alternative.  Any  attempt  to  penetrate  farther  west  than 
he  had  gone  in  742-740  and  in  738,  was  not  likely  to  be 
completely  prosperous  as  long  as  Sardurri  was  left  un- 
molested in  the  rear.  In  the  immediate  neighborhood  of 
Urartu  and  in  the  stretch  of  country  between  Lake  Van 
and  Lake  Urumia  on  one  side,  and  between  Van  and 
Assyria  on  the  south,  no  vassals  were  left  to  Sardurri 
except  perhaps  in  Parsua  and  Bustus,  and  these  were 
not  powerful.  The  time  for  Tiglath  Pileser  to  strike  at 
the  centre  of  Urartian  power  had  come.  He  was  not  the 
man  to  delay.  In  735  the  road  led  to  TuruSpa.  Sardurri 
had  ventured  forth  only  once,  and  he  had  good  reason  to 
remember  the  consequent  defeat  at  Kistan.  If  he  would 
not  come  forth  to  battle  a  second  time,  Tiglath  Pileser 
must  go  to  him.  But  it  was  no  easy  task ;  in  fact,  no 
Assyrian  king  ever  undertook  a  more  arduous  one.  To 
reach  Turuspa,  the  capital  of  Urartu,  no  approach  was 
feasible,  save  from  the  north.  On  the  south  the  Arjerosh 
mountains  reached  almost  to  the  shores  of  Lake  Van. 
The  passes  were  impossible  both  because  of  the  snow  and 
the  ease  with  which  they  could  be  defended  against  an 
invading  army,  nor  was  the  way  via  the  Tigris  and  the 
Bitlis-chai  and  thence  west  along  the  shore  of  the  lake 
easier.  The  bridle  paths  along  the  south  shore  of  the 
lake  were  naturally  fitted  for  opposition  to  a  big  army. 
From  the  south  and  the  east  the  difficulties  were  also  for- 

well  describes  that  part  of  Luristan  and  the  country  all  the  way  to 
Mt.  Demavend,  which  lies  a  few  miles  northeast  of  modern  Teheran. 


62  TlGLATH  PILESER  III 

bidding,  for  the  Khoturdagh  Range  would  have  proved 
snowy  graves  for  the  Assyrian  soldiers.  There  were  but 
two  possible  routes.17  One  led  from  the  north  shore  of 
Lake  Urumia  by  Tabris  and  Khoi  to  Bejazet.  Just 
before  reaching  Bejazet  the  road  turns  off  southwest  to 
Lake  Van.  The  second,  the  one  which  Tiglath  Pileser 
took,  led  across  the  Murad-Tschai,  between  Musch  and 
Manesgard,  then  through  Dajaini,  and  northward  along 
the  base  of  the  Sipa  Dagh,  straight  to  Lake  Van  and 
Turugpa.  Before  reaching  Turugpa  Tiglath  Pileser  sent 
a  detachment  to  Mt.  Birdasu,  northwest  of  Lake  Van, 
though  just  what  this  move  was  calculated  to  gain  for 
him  we  do  not  know.  The  main  body  of  the  troops 
ravaged  Urartu  throughout  its  extent.  Cities  and  villages 
were  sacked  and  the  country  plundered.  Sardurri  was 
cooped  up  in  his  hill  citadel,  where  he  was  safe,  but  as 
far  as  his  eye  could  reach,  the  track  of  the  Assyrian  army 
was  marked  by  a  line  of  fire  and  heaps  of  ashes.  Turuspa, 
however,  was  impregnable.  Tiglath  Pileser  could  not 
starve  out  the  garrison  without  a  fleet  to  cut  off  the  food 
supply  that  came  into  the  citadel  by  way  of  the  lake. 

At  the  base  of  the  citadel  hill  Tiglath  Pileser  set  up 
the  image  of  his  royalty  and  turned  back  homeward.  Sar- 
durri lived,  but  Urartu's  power  was  dead.  Rua§,  son  of 
Sardurri,  rebuilt  Turuspa  on  an  even  more  impregnable 
rock,  and  we  find  him  in  conflict  with  Sargon  some  years 
later,  but  as  far  as  danger  to  Assyrian  supremacy  was 
concerned,  Urartu  could  henceforth  be  safely  disregarded. 
Assyria  had  vindicated  her  right  to  the  mastery  of  Western 
Asia. 

To  the  west  or  the  south,  as  occasion  might  demand 

»  Cf.  Belck,  ZA.  IX.  p.  350. 


MEDIA  AND  URARTU  63 

Tiglath  Pileser  could  now  turn  his  attention  without  fear 
of  the  foe  who  had  up  to  735  obstructed  every  step.  We 
have  seen  how  in  the  following  years,  734-732,  this  free- 
dom from  Sardurri's  influence  made  the  western  campaign 
easy.  Now  but  one  foe  of  account  remained.  From  the 
Mediterranean  to  Mt.  Bikni  and  the  Caspian  on  the  north, 
and  from  Judah  to  farthest  Media  on  the  south,  Assyria 
was  supreme.  It  only  remained  for  Tiglath  Pileser  to 
gain  the  crown  of  Babylon,  and  Assyria  would  be  without 
a  rival  state  in  Asia  Minor. 


CHAPTER  VI1 

THE   CONQUEST   OF   BABYLONIA 

For  Tiglath  Pileser  III  to  gain  the  crown  of  Babylonia 
was  to  acquire  the  unique  distinction  of  being  the  first 
Assyrian  king  to  rule  simultaneously  in  both  countries. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  had  been  his  aim  from 
the  very  beginning,  and  its  achievement  marks  him  as  the 
greatest  of  Assyrian  conquerors.  Nor  had  his  ambition 
outrun  his  power  to  accomplish  a  wonderful  work.  Of 
all  the  nations  in  Western  Asia  only  Babylonia  retained  a 
measure  of  real  autonomy,  and  of  that  autonomy  the 
Babylonians  were  exceedingly  proud  and  jealous.  Tiglath 
Pileser,  because  his  vast  empire  was  at  peace,  might  be 
prepared  to  "grasp  the  hands  of  Bel."  But  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  or  not  the  Babylonians  would  have  been 
equally  anxious  to  welcome  him  as  their  king,  had  all 
been  well  with  them.  Perhaps  internal  trouble  would  not 
have  been  sufficient  excuse  for  Tiglath  Pileser  to  march 
south  into  Babylon  in  729,  as  he  had  done  in  the  first 
year  of  his  reign.  At  any  rate,  he  waited  until  a  disrup- 
tion of  government  in  Babylonia  led  to  the  interference  of 
the  Chaldeans  in  Babylonian  affairs  ;  and  fortune  played 
into  his  hands.  In  730  Tiglath  Pileser  was  prepared  for 
any  eventuality,  for  there  was  no  disturbance  in  any  part 

1  The  sources  are  PI.  I.  13-14  ;  Th.  A.  15-28  ;  Babyln.  King  List, 
col.  IV.  lines  5-8  ;  Babyln.  Chron.  col.  I.  17-23 ;  cf .  above,  Chapter  I. 
p.  6 ;  Babyln.  Chron.  B.  Col.  I.  1-26.  and  cf .  KB.2  p.  275. 

64 


THE  CONQUEST  OF  BABYLONIA  65 

of  his  wide  realm.  Babylon  alone  was  in  a  ferment. 
From  745  and  up  to  his  death,  Nabur>  igir  had  remained 
loyal  to  Tiglath  Pileser.  But  in  all  probability  there  al- 
ways existed  a  pro-Babylonian  party  in  Babylon,  which 
had  never  ceased  to  agitate  against  the  overlordship  of 
Assyria,  and  had  rendered  Nabun&gir's  reign  precarious. 
The  fact  that  Borsippa  revolted  is  significant,  for  it 
was  one  of  the  cities  captured  by  Tiglath  Pileser  in 
745. 

Nabunagir  was  succeeded  by  Nabu-nadin-zir,  who,  after 
a  very  brief  reign,  was  killed  by  Nabu-sum-ukin,  an 
usurper.  He  was  perhaps  successful  in  his  usurpation  be- 
cause the  anti- Assyrian  party  were  his  sponsors.  Through- 
out all  this  turmoil  of  rapid  regnal  and  dynastic  change 
Tiglath  Pileser  remained  at  home,  watchful  and  appar- 
ently passive.  As  long  as  the  strife  in  Babylonia  was 
purely  domestic  he  had  no  urgent  need  to  fear  for  his  own 
plans ;  but  soon  the  inevitable  happened.  The  Chaldeans, 
who  never  allowed  an  opportunity  of  gaining  a  foothold 
in  Babylonia  to  escape  them,  took  advantage  of  the  dis- 
turbed conditions  of  government.  Their  most  powerful 
tribe,  the  Bit-Ammukani^  under  the  leadership  of  Ukinzir,2 
entered  Babylon.  Ukinzir  proclaimed  himself  king.  Tig- 
lath  Pileser's  excuse  had  come.  As  the  suzerain  of  Baby- 
lon, he  was  her  natural  protector  from  foreign  foes,  and  he 
could  not  allow  the  always  dangerous  Chaldeans  to  come 
into  such  threatening  proximity  to  the  Assyrian  border 
line.  If  no  Babylonian  could  hold  the  throne,  certainly 
neither  must  a  Chaldean  be  permitted  to  do  so. 

Tiglath  Pileser  marches  south,  his  objective  point  being 
Sapia,  the  capital  of  Ukinzir  and  the  metropolis  of  the 
2  Cf.  Chapter  I.  p.  6.  Cf.  Esarh.  Cyln.  II.  42-43  (KB.2  p.  128). 


66  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

Bit-Ammukani.  En  route  he  conquered  the  Puqudu  3  and 
thoroughly  subjugated  them.  Their  cities,  Hilimmu  and 
Pillutu,  were  sacked  4  and  the  whole  district  placed  under 
a  governor  whose  seat  of  administration  was  at  Arrapha.5 
A  large  number  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  conquered  terri- 
tory were  transported  into  Assyria  and  settled  there  in 
scattered  colonies.  The  Silani  people  fared  even  worse. 
Nabu-usabli,  their  king,  was  killed,  and  Sarrdbani,  his  royal 
city,  ruined,  while  the  cities  of  Tarbapu  and  labullu  were 
added  to  the  number  of  ash  heaps  left  in  the  wake  of  the 
destroyer.  The  whole  territory  gave  up  55,000  prisoners. 
Next  came  the  Bit-So? alii.  Their  king  must  in  some 
way  have  perjured  himself  (Th.  A.  19).  He  retreated 
into  his  capital,  Dur-Illatai,  which  he  fortified,  but  to  no 

3  The  Puqudu  are  not  mentioned  in  PL  IT.  6,  or  in  Th.  A.  13.     It  is 
possible  to  include  them  in  the  list  of  peoples  conquered  in  745,  but  in 
view  of  their  having  been  the  most  important  Aramean  tribe,  it  is  strange 
that  they  should  not  be  mentioned  in  the  Annals.     Th.  A.  arranged,  of 
course,  geographically,  enumerates  the  conquests  of  745  and  731  together. 
I  think  it  best  fits  the  known  facts  to  assign  the  expedition  against  the 
Puqudu  to  the  latter  year.     The  Puqudu  were  located  on  the  extreme 
eastern  borders  of  Elam.    They  are  the  Pekod  of  Jer.  1.  21.     It  has  been 
claimed  that  the  name  Pekod  in  that  passage  is  only  symbolical  and  not 
a  proper  noun,  since  the  term  mentioned  with  it,  Merathaim,  is  certainly 
figurative,  meaning  **  double  rebellion."     But  Ez.  xxiii.  23  disproves  this 
claim.    There  Pekod,  Sutu,  and  Kutu  are  mentioned  in  connection  with 
the  Assyrians.      Talmud,  Hulin,   107  a,  mentions  a  Nahr  Peko  in  the 
vicinity  of  a  city  called  Ner§. 

4  Whether  I-di-bi-ri-i-na  is  a  proper  name  is  in  doubt.    Host  (vol.  I. 
p.  67)  is  undecided.     He  transliterates  the  text  (Th.  A.  13),  $a  I-di-bi- 
ri-i-na,  and  in  the  translation  simply  repeats  the  same  words  ;  nor  does 
he  give  the  word  a  place  in  his  index  of  proper  names.     Schrader,  KB.2 
33,  reads  "  §a  idi  U-ri-i-na  (mahaza)  Hi-li-im-mu  "  ;    and  translates, 
4 'which   on   the  side   of   the  biriina  of  the  city  Hilimmu."     Strong, 
RP.  V.  p.  121,  reads,  "$a  idi  biri  ina  Khilummu,"  translating,  "which 
(looks)  towards  the  midst  of  the  city  of  Khilummu." 

5  Near  Tuz-Khurmah  ;  cf.  Scheil  in  Sec.  d.  Trav.  p.  186. 


THE   CONQUEST   OF  BABYLONIA  67 

purpose.  The  city  was  obliged  to  surrender,  and  together 
with  Amlilatu,  rendered  up  its  treasure  and  contributed  its 
large  quota  to  the  50,400  prisoners  who  were  parcelled  out 
into  widely  distributed  settlements.  But  the  city  which 
Tiglath  Pileser  was  most  anxious  to  take,  Sapia,  success- 
fully resisted  every  siege  device.  All  its  surrounding 
country  was  devastated,  but  Ukinzir  retained  his  capital, 
at  least  for  the  time  being.  To  complete  the  subjugation 
of  the  Chaldeans  was  impossible  while  Ukinzir  remained 
unsubdued,  but  all  the  rest  of  the  tribes  were  made  tribu- 
tary. Balasu,  too,  of  the  Dakkuri?  sent  tokens  of  submis- 
sion; while  Merodach  Baladan  7  of  the  Bit-Yakin,  a  country 
no  king  of  which  had  ever  done  homage  to  Assyria  (Tli. 
A.  26),  journeyed  to  Tiglath  Pileser's  camp  while  the 
latter  was  besieging  Sapia,  and  rendered  his  voluntary 
tribute  of  precious  metals  and  the  products  of  his  swamp- 
land country.  To  the  list  of  subject  princes  was  added 
Nadin  of  Larrak.8  All  that  now  stood  between  Tiglath 
Pileser  and  the  throne  of  Babylon,  was  Ukinzir.  To 
achieve  his  ambition,  the  Bit-Amukkani  and  their  leader 
had  to  be  put  out  of  the  way.  The  year  730  Tiglath 
Pileser  spent  at  home,  preparing  for  the  final  campaign. 

e  Usually  Bit-Dakkuri  (Esarh.  II.  42)  (m&tu)  Bit-Dak-kur-i  $a  ki-rib 
(mutu)  Kal-di  ai-ab  Ba-bi-lu  ka-mu-u.  "  Bit-Dakkuri  in  Chaldea,  inimi- 
cal to  Babylon."  West  of  the  Euphrates  near  Babylon  and  Borsippa. 
It  is  mentioned  together  with  all  the  tribes  which  TP.  mentions  in  731,  in 
Sargon,  Prunk.  21  (KB.2  p.  55):  §a  mi-sir  (matu)  Elamtu  (matu)  Kar- 
duniaS  i-US  u  §ap-li§  (matu)  Bit-Amukkani  (matu)  Blt-Dak-ku-ri  (matu) 
Bit-Si-la-ni  (matu)  Bit-Sa'al-la  si-Ur-ti  (m&tu}  Kal-di  ma-la-ba-Su-u, 
"  In  the  district  of  Elam  throughout  its  whole  extent  ...  all  of  Elam  as 
much  as  it  is." 

7  The  form  Berodach  Baladan  in  2  K.  xx.  12  is  a  textual  corruption. 

8  Lenormant,  La  Langue  Primitive,  p.  34,  identifies  it  with  the  Ellasar 
of  Gen.  xiv.  1.    According  to  Loftus,  "  Travels  and  Researches,"  p.  256, 
it  is  identical  with  the  ruins  of  Sankereh. 


68  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

In  all  likelihood,  this  interval  of  preparation  was  a  busy 
time  in  diplomacy  and  intrigue.  Even  with  Ukinzir  out 
of  the  way,  there  was  still  an  anti-Assyrian  party  in  Baby- 
lon, who  could  be  depended  upon  to  resist  to  the  last  the 
crowning  of  a  foreigner.  These  pro-Babylonians  would 
accept  Tiglath  Pileser's  aid  in  freeing  their  country  of  the 
Chaldean  danger,  but  would  insist  on  having  a  native  sov- 
ereign. How  did  the  always  powerful  priesthood  stand  in 
the  matter  ?  In  745,  while  a  native  king  ruled,  they  had 
hailed  Tiglath  Pileser  as  king  of  Assyria,  and  as  such  had 
brought  him  gifts  for  clearing  their  country  of  her  enemies. 
Would  they  accept  him  as  king  of  their  own  land  in  729? 
To  ascertain  their  attitude  with  surety  Tiglath  Pileser 
during  his  stay  at  home  in  730,  probably  carried  on  nego- 
tiations with  the  priests.  Perhaps  the  defeat  of  Ukinzir 
was  part  of  the  price  which  the  priests  exacted  in  exchange 
for  any  aid  they  might  promise  to  render  to  the  Assyrian 
king,  in  his  efforts  to  gain  the  Babylonian  crown.  Cyrus 
in  later  times  probably  gained  just  such  an  easy  access  to 
Babylon  because  of  a  previous  compact  with  the  priest- 
hood, and  it  demands  no  great  stretch  of  the  imagination 
to  think  that  Tiglath  Pileser  too  had  a  perfectly  clear  un- 
derstanding with  the  priestly  caste.  At  any  rate  in  729  he 
proceeded  south  a  second  time,  and  this  time  his  operations 
against  Sapia  were  successful.  Ukinzir  was  captured  and 
of  course  executed.  The  way  to  the  throne  of  Babylon 
was  now  clear.  On  the  New  Year's  day  Tiglath  Pileser 
III  "  grasped  the  hands  of  Bel,"  and  was  crowned  under 
the  name  of  Pulu.  De  facto  and  de  jure  king  of  Assyria, 
king  of  Sumer  and  Akkad,  conqueror  of  Western  Asia,  a 
prince  without  rival,  the  usurper  of  745  has  become  the 
master  of  civilization. 


THE   CONQUEST  OF  BABYLONIA  69 

Great  pity  it  is  that  the  records  are  mutilated.  Were 
the  sources  not  so  meagre,  a  fuller  knowledge  would  per- 
haps compel  us  to  class  Tiglath  Pileser  III  as  the  equal  of 
Cyrus,  than  whom  the  Eastern  world  produced  no  mightier 
warrior  and  administrator.  From  the  Caspian  to  Egypt, 
all  of  Asia  was  dependent  upon  Assyria.  No  future  king 
would  hold  his  empire  more  firmly  than  Tiglath  Pileser 
had  held  it,  nor  inspire  greater  respect  and  fear  of  his 
mighty  power.  In  728  Tiglath  Pileser  repeated  the  cere- 
mony of  coronation  at  Babylon,  and  in  727,  in  the  month 
of  Tebet,  he  died.  His  son,  Shalmaneser  IV,  succeeded 
him,  but  the  dynasty  was  short-lived,  for  Shalmaneser 
ruled  but  five  years,  and  in  722  the  stranger  Sargon 
founded  a  new  line.  He,  too,  was  a  usurper,  his  succession 
to  the  throne  resulting  from  a  reaction  to  the  tendencies 
which  had  been  responsible  for  the  elevation  of  Tiglath 
Pileser.  The  latter  king's  reign  was  only  of  compara- 
tively brief  duration,  but  it  sufficed  him  to  make  Assyria 
strong  enough  to  endure  until  her  cultural  work  for  civili- 
zation was  finished.  In  modern  eyes  that  must  consti- 
tute his  chief  glory. 

During  his  reign  he  had  time  to  build  but  one  palace, 
and  that,  as  has  been  noted,  was  dismantled  by  Esarhaddon. 
But  better  than  a  palace,  he  builded  an  empire,  far-flung, 
but  well  governed  and  fairly  compact,  despite  the  hetero- 
geneous elements  of  which  it  was  composed.  The  central 
problem  of  Assyrian  statecraft  was  to  weld  the  subject 
races  and  peoples  into  a  homogeneous  unit.  Such  a  task 
was  never  fully  accomplished,  either  by  Assyria  or  by  any 
of  the  great  world  powers  that  succeeded  her,  but  Tiglath 
Pileser  approximated  to  it  sufficiently  well  to  erect  a 
structure  far  more  stable  than  that  of  any  of  his  prede- 


70  TIGLATH  PILESER   III 

cessors   and   to  render  Assyria  safe  until  her   work   was 
done. 

After  he  had  conquered  a  territory,  he,  like  his  prede- 
cessors, placed  it  under  the  administrative  supervision  of 
the  governor  of  the  immediately  adjoining  province,  or 
else  made  an  entirely  new  province  out  of  it.  Tiglath 
Pileser's  innovation  consisted  in  this :  whereas  former  kings 
had  colonized  a  newly  acquired  land  with  settlers  from 
Assyria  proper,  and  had  placed  portions  of  the  conquered 
subjects  in  scattered  colonies  throughout  Assyria,  he  kept 
his  Assyrian  subjects  at  home.  His  empire  was  too  ex- 
tensive to  do  otherwise.  Had  he  colonized  subject  lands 
with  Assyrians  he  must  soon  have  depleted  the  native  and 
homogeneous  population  of  the  home  country.  Instead, 
he  effected  a  transfer  of  subjugated  peoples  from  one  de- 
pendency to  a  far  distant  one.  His  aim  was  to  keep  As- 
syria intact  and  thus  to  minimize  the  danger  of  rebellion 
and  revolt.  He  allowed  no  colony  of  foreign  settlers  to  be 
large  enough  or  near  enough  to  one  of  their  own  affiliation 
to  permit  the  possibility  of  any  concerted  action  against 
the  imperial  government.  The  colonies  were  so  located 
that  their  thought-habit,  their  customs,  their  religion,  and 
even  their  language  made  them,  if  not  offensive  to  their 
new  neighbors,  at  least  a  segregated  unit  among  them. 
No  collusion,  in  fact,  no  bond  of  sympathy  between  the  old 
and  the  new  population  was  possible.  It  might  even 
happen  that  an  uprising  on  the  part  of  the  old  settlers 
would  operate  to  attach  the  new  colonists  more  closely  to 
Assyria.  For  the  first  step  in  a  rebellion  is  generally  a 
demonstration  against  the  stranger  within  the  gates.  In 
the  event  of  such  demonstrations  the  new  settler  would 
have  no  recourse  but  to  appeal  to  Assyria.  He  had  no 


THE  CONQUEST  OF  BABYLONIA  71 

greater  love  for  Assyria  than  had  the  strangers  among 
whom  he  had  been  settled,  but  to  feed  fat  his  grudge  and 
nurse  vengeance  would  in  no  wise  answer  his  need  of  self- 
preservation.  Assyria  had  to  be  petitioned  for  help,  and 
granting  it,  came  naturally  to  be  regarded  as  a  deliverer. 
Thus  a  measure  of  real  loyalty  was  secured,  and  it  was 
probably 'in  this  way  that  Panammu  of  Sam'al  was  rendered 
faithful.  The  Assyrian  army  was  never  so  numerous  as 
to  permit  large  detachments  to  be  stationed  at  garrison 
posts.  At  most,  a  governor  might  have  a  small  company 
to  aid  him  in  the  enforcement  of  his  authority.  The 
realization  that  Assyria  was  ready  to  back  up  her  officials 
might  not  deter  a  determined  people  from  revolt.  If  the 
rebellion  arose  in  a  district  far  from  Assyria,  aid  might  be 
long  in  coming  and  the  uprising  have  assumed  very  serious 
proportions  before  its  arrival;  but  with  Tiglath  Pileser's 
plan  in  effect  there  was  a  colony  of  strange  settlers  on  the 
spot.  These  had  no  affiliations  with  the  indigenous  pop- 
ulation and  could  readily  be  pressed  into  service  to  aid 
the  governor  until  reinforcements  arrived.  It  is  more 
than  probable  that  this  plan  of  colonization  resulted  in 
furnishing  a  source  of,  recruiting  for  the  army  which  ob- 
viated too  great  a  drain  upon  the  male  portion  of  Assyrian 
population.  With  only  a  fair-sized  force  from  home,  a 
considerable  contingent  of  vassals  could  be  enlisted  en 
route  to  the  seat  of  disturbance,  together  with  a  number 
of  troops  from  among  the  foreign  colonists  in  the  vicinity. 
It  was  this  system  of  colonization  that  gave  Assyria  the 
lease  of  life  which  she  enjoyed.  It  might  even  have  in- 
sured her  a  longer  national  existence,  had  she  not  been 
far  too  small  to  hold  out  against  the  barbarians  who  later 
on  overran  Babylonia  and  put  an  end  to  its  career.  To 


72  TIGLATH  PILESER  III 

his  high  ability  as  a  warrior,  and  the  glory  with  which  he 
graced  his  country's  name,  there  must  be  ascribed  to 
Tiglath  Pileser  III  as  his  greatest  credit,  that  administra- 
tive system  which  conserved  the  existence  of  the  Empire 
until  Babylon  once  again  came  into  her  own. 


VITA 

The  author,  Abraham  S.  Anspacher,  was  born  in  New 
York  City,  June  28,  1877.  He  entered  Woodward  High 
School  of  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  and  the  Hebrew  Union  College 
of  the  same  city  in  September,  1892,  graduating  from  the 
former  in  1896,  and  receiving  from  the  latter  the  degree 
of  Bachelor  of  Hebrew  in  that  year.  In  1896  he  entered 
the  University  of  Cincinnati,  from  which  he  was  graduated 
in  1900,  receiving  the  degree  of  Bachelor  of  Arts.  In  the 
same  year  the  degree  of  Rabbi  was  conferred  upon  him  by 
the  Hebrew  Union  College,  his  thesis  being  a  "  Com- 
mentary on  Zachariah."  In  October,  1900,  he  was  called 
as  the  Rabbi  of  the  Madison  Avenue  Temple  of  Scranton, 
Pa.  He  was  in  attendance  as  a  graduate  student  in  the 
Department  of  Semitic  Languages  at  Columbia  University 
from  September,  1909,  to  June,  1911. 


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iOCT 

rcc.cis.oer  2 ; 


6  Jan'  5- 
JAN  5    1953  LU 


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