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Full text of "The Times documentary history of the war"

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DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE WAR 

VOL. I. 



DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE WAR 



VOLUME I. 



DIPLOMATIC PART 1 




LONDON 

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE 
1917 




V. I 



INTRODUCTION 

"HpHE TIMES" DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
WAR is a collection of documents concerning the 
War in all its aspects, so arranged as to record the events 
of the great struggle in which the Nations are now involved, 
and the circumstances which led up to them. 

It consists of documents issued officially or recognised 
by the various belligerents, such as diplomatic correspondence, 
proclamations, ultimatums, military orders, reports, des- 
patches, messages from monarchs to their peoples, etc., 
together with public statements by responsible Ministers 
and Correspondence in the Press of an authoritative 
character ; the whole collated, classified, indexed, and where 
necessary cross-referenced and annotated. 

The documents are left to speak for themselves, except 
where brief unbiased notes are needed to elucidate them. 
These are placed within square brackets, to distinguish 
them from the notes in the originals. 

The Times, with its network of Correspondents in all parts 
of the world, is in a particularly favourable position to obtain 
information, and, having at its service an experienced staff, 
is able to reach sources not generally accessible to others. 

As the large mass of documents involved in the collection 
has been systematically classified and arranged from the 
commencement of the War, it has been found possible to 
issue to the public simultaneously a representative series of 
volumes. 

DIPLOMATIC 1 v 



INTRODUCTION 

A survey of the constantly accumulating material would 
appear to indicate that The Times DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE WAR will be grouped into at least five main 
divisions : 

I. DIPLOMATIC. 
II. NAVAL. 

III. MILITARY. 
f 

IV. OVERSEAS, comprising documents dealing with 
events in the Dominions and Possessions Over- 
seas and in enemy territories not included in 
the first three divisions. 

V. INTERNATIONAL LAW, including documents relating 
to the Laws of War, the Proceedings of Prize 
Courts, etc. 

Each division will appear in its own distinct set of 
volumes. 



PREFACE 

THE first and second Diplomatic volumes deal with the 
outbreak of the War and embrace the documentary 
records of events, negotiations, correspondence, and import- 
ant public utterances emanating from Great Britain, France, 
Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Japan, 
and in one instance Italy. Foreign documents are given in 
English and as far as possible in official translations. In a 
few cases of exceptional importance the original French or 
German text is added. 

The whole of the first volume and more than half the 
second are filled by the British Blue-book and the official 
translations of the French Yellow-book, the Russian Orange- 
book, the Belgian Grey-book, the Serbian Blue-book, the 
German White-book, and the Austro-Hungarian Red-book, 
which contain the despatches published by the various bel- 
ligerent Powers to justify or explain their proceedings during 
the critical period that led up to the War. 

The papers in the remainder of the second volume are 
miscellaneous in character. To take them in their order, 
they include certain Japanese documents among these an 
important speech delivered by Baron Kato, the Foreign 
Minister, in the Imperial Diet at Tokyo, for the translation 
of which we are indebted to the courtesy of the Marquis 
Inouye, late Japanese Ambassador at St. James's ; the pub- 
lished correspondence of King George V. with the President 
of the French Republic and with the Tsar ; the British 

vii 



PREFACE 

notifications of a State of War ; a series of German contro- 
versial documents regarding Anglo-Belgian relations, together 
with the British and Belgian replies ; a similar series bearing 
on the action of Germany before the War ; Signer Giolitti's 
notable speech of December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber, 
throwing light upon the attitude of Italy in separating herself 
from her allies ; the considered utterances of responsible 
British statesmen, including Sir Edward Grey's important 
speech on the origin and main issue of the War, delivered at 
the Bechstein Hall in March, 1915 ; certain Foreign Addresses, 
Proclamations and Messages ; and, finally, the text, in whole 
or in part, of Treaties mentioned in the course of the 
Correspondence. 

In order to facilitate the cross-references to the " Blue- 
books " of the different nations, each has been distinguished 
by a letter of the alphabet, as shown in the list appended 
(p. ix). At the outer top corner of every page devoted to 
one of these seven books the index letter of that book is 
printed in bold type, together with the number of the first 
(or last) despatch below. 

The British Blue-book and the official English translations 
of the French Yellow-book and the Belgian Grey-book are 
provided with Tables of Contents in the originals and these 
are reproduced. The official English translations of the 
other four books have none. For the Russian, Serbian, and 
Austro-Hungarian books this omission has here been made 
good by the Editor, as is noted in each case. The German 
book is different in character and requires no table of 
contents. 

The " Blue-books " of the seven European belligerents have 
been given in full, in the official English versions, as they stand, 
except that Superfluous formal words of address and signatures 
have been, omitted. The material that occupies the latter 
portion of Part 2, from p. 295 to the end, has been re-arranged 
in order to avoid unnecessary repetition and confusion. 
It includes the fresh contents of a second German White- 



PREFACE 

book, " Aktenstiicke zum Kriegsausbruch," which was pub- 
lished in the early part of 1915. This second White-book 
reproduced the entire contents of the first, together with 
much additional matter, and, like its predecessor, was accom- 
panied by a translation into English, published officially in 
Berlin.* This added matter, on its original appearance in 
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, had given rise to a good 
deal of controversy and had drawn replies from both Great 
Britain and Belgium. The whole has here been classified 
according to subject, origin and date, under the headings 
" Anglo-Belgian Relations " and " The Action of Germany." 

The "Pages d'Histoire" and the official Belgian "La 
Neutralite de la Belgique," from which a few proclamations 
are translated, are published by MM. Berger-Levrault, Paris, 
who have kindly allowed the use of documents. "Der 
Kriegsausbruch, 1914," is published by Carl Heymann, 
Berlin. 

The following letters and abbreviations are used to indicate 
the publications placed against them : 

B = The British Blue-book. 

G = The Belgian Grey-book (official translation). 

= The Russian Orange-book (official translation). 

R = The Austro-Hungarian Red-book (official transla- 
tion). 

S = The Serbian Blue-book (official translation). 

W = The German White-book (" only authorised trans- 
lation," published by Liebheit & Thiesen, 
Berlin). 

Y = The French Yellow-book (official translation). 



* It is a curious fact that this English translation of the second White- 
book does not adopt and incorporate the " authorised" English translation 
of the first, but substitutes a version differently worded. The earlier and 
better known English text has been followed here, with changes in the 
spelling of a few proper names and designations, mostly Russian. 

iz 



PREFACE 

C.D.D. = " Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to 
the Outbreak of the European War. Lon- 
don : Printed under the authority of His 
Majesty's Stationery Office by Harrison & 
Sons, Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty. 



D.O.W. = " Documents relating to the Outbreak of the 
War. Published by the Imperial German 
Foreign Office." (An English translation 
of the second German White-book, " Akten- 
stiicke zum Kriegsausbruch. Herausgegeben 
vom Auswartigen Amte." Verlag von Georg 
Stilke, Berlin.) 

OTHER ABBREVIATIONS. 

app. = appendix. 

encl. = enclosure, enclosed. 

Eng. tr. = Official English Translation. 

exh. = exhibit. 

F.O. = British Foreign Office. 

intro. = introduction. 



NOTE. In the marginal cross-references the seven "blue-books" are 
distinguished by their index letters (see list above), and the individual 
despatches by their numbers. A number standing alone, without an index 
letter, refers to a despatch in the same book in which the cross-reference 
itself appears. 



LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE 
CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL 
POSITIONS AT THAT TIME. 



i. GREAT BRITAIN. 

Prime Minister and Secretary of 

State for War 

Secretary of State for War (suc- 
ceeded Mr. Asquith, Aug. 6, 

19*4) 

Lord High Chancellor 

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State 

for Foreign Affairs 
French Ambassador 

Russian Ambassador 



German Ambassador 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
Italian A mbassador 
Belgian Minister 
Serbian Minister 

2. FRANCE. 

President of the Republic . . 
President of the Council 



Ministers for Foreign Affairs 



Political Director 
Political Director (Acting) 
British Ambassador 
Russian Ambassador 



German Ambassador 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
Belgian Minister 
Serbian Minister 



Mr. Asquith. 



Earl Kitchener of Khartoum. 
Viscount Haldane. 
Sir Edward Grey. 

Sir A. Nicolson. 
M. Paul Cambon. 
M. de Fleuriau (Charge d' Affaires). 
Count Benckendorff. 
M. de Etter (Counsellor of Em- 
bassy). 

Prince Lichnowsky. 
Count Mensdorff. 
Marquis Imperiali. 
Count de Lalaing. 
M. Boshkovitch. 



M. Poincare". 
M. Rene" Viviani. 

1. M. Jonnart. 

2. M. Stephen Pichon. 

3. M. Rene" Viviani. 

4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting). 

5. M. Doumergue. 

6. M. Delcasse". 
M. de Margerie. 
M. Berthelot. 

Sir Francis Bertie. 

M. Isvolsky. 

M. Sevastopoulo (Charge 

d' Affaires). 
Baron von Schoen. 
Count Sze"csen. 
Baron Guillaume. 
M. Vesnitch. 

xi 



PRINCIPAL PERSONS 



RUSSIA. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Minister for War 
British Ambassador 
French Ambassador 
German Ambassador 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 

Serbian Minister 

Belgian ChargS d' Affaires . . 

GERMANY. 
Imperial Chancellor 
Secretary of State 
Under-Secretary of State 
British Ambassador 



French Ambassador 
Russian Ambassador 

American Ambassador 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors . . j 

Belgian Minister 
Japanese Charge d' Affaires 
Serbian Charge d' Affaires 
French Minister at Munich 
French Consul-General at Frankfort 



M. Sazonof. 

M. Suchomlinof. 

Sir George Buchanan. 

M. Paleologue. 

Count Pourtales. 

Count Szapiry. 

Count Czernin (Charge d' Affaires). 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch. 

M. de 1'Escaille. 



Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg. 

Herr von Jagow. 

Herr von Zimmermann. 

Sir Edward Goschen. 

Sir Horace Rumbold (Counsellor 

of Embassy) . 
M. Jules Cambon. 
M. de Manneville (Charge 

d' Affaires). 
M. Swerbeiev. 
M. Broniewsky (or Bronewsky) 

(Charge d' Affaires). 
Mr. Gerard. 

1. Count Szogyny. 

2. Prince Hohenlohe-SchUlings- 

fiirst. 

Baron Beyens. 
Baron Funakoshi. 
Dr. M. Yovanovitch. 
M. Allize\ 
M. Ronssin. 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign 

Affairs 

President of the Ministry of Austria 
President of the Ministry of Hungary 
British Ambassador 
French Ambassador 
Russian Ambassador 
Russian Charged' Affaires .. 
American Ambassador 
German Ambassador 

Italian Ambassador 
xii 



Count Berchtold. 
] Baron Macchio. 
1 Count Forgach. 

Count Stiirgkh. 

Count Tisza. 

Sir Maurice de Bunsen. 

M. Dumaine. 

M. Schebeko. 

Prince Kudachef (Koudacheff). 

Mr. Penfield. 

Herr von Tschirschky (or von 
Tschirsky). 

Duke d'Avarna. 



AND OFFICIAL POSITIONS 



5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY continued. 

Belgian Minister 

Serbian Minister 

French Consul-General at Budapest 
Russian Consul-General at Fiume . 
Acting Russian Consul at Prague . . 

6. TURKEY. 

British Charge d" Affaires 
French Ambassador 
Serbian Charge d' Affaires 
Austrian Consul-General . . 

7. BELGIUM. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs 



Colonial Minister 
V ice-Governor of the Katanga 
British Minister 
French Minister 
American Minister 
German Minister 
Austro-Hungarian Minister 
Dutch Minister 

8. SERBIA. 

Prime Minister 

Acting Prime Minister and Minister 

for Foreign Affairs 
British Minister 



French Minister 
Russian Charge d' Affaires 
German Secretary of Legation 
A ustro-Hungarian Minister 
Belgian Minister 

Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent 
at Nish 

ITALY. 
Prime Minister and Minister of the 

Interior 

Minister for Foreign Affairs 
British Ambassador 
French Ambassador 
German Ambassador 
Serbian Minister 



Count Errembault de Dudzeele. 
M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch (or 

Jovanovich). 
M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin. 
M. Salviati. 
M. Kazansky. 



Mr. Beaumont. 
M. Bompard. 
M. M. Georgevitch. 
Herr Jehlitschka. 

M. Davignon. 

Baron van der Elst (Secretary- 
General). 
M. Renkin. 
M. Tombeur. 
Sir Francis Villiers. 
M. Klobukowski. 
Mr. Brand Whitlock. 
Herr von Below Saleske. 
Count Clary. 
M. de Weede. 



M. Pashitch. 

Dr. Laza Patchou. 

Mr. des Graz. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe (First Secre - 

tary). 
M. Boppe. 
M. de Strandtman. 
Herr von Storck. . 
Baron Giesl von Gieslingen. 
M. de Welle. 

Herr Hoflehner. 



Signer Salandra. 

Marquis di San Giuliano. 

Sir Rennell Rodd. 

M. Barrere. 

Herr von Flotow. 

M. Ljub Michailovitch. 

xiii 



PRINCIPAL PERSONS AND OFFICIAL POSITIONS 



10. JAPAN. 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 

11. SPAIN. 

Belgian Minister 

12. DENMARK. 
French Minister 

13. HOLLAND. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs 
French Minister 
Belgian Minister 

14. LUXEMBURG. 

Minister of State and President of 

the Government 
French Minister 

German Minister 

15. NORWAY. 
French Minister 

16. SWEDEN. 
French Minister 

17. SWITZERLAND. 

French Consul-General at Basle . . 



Fretherr von Miiller. 



Baron Grenier. 



M. Bapst. 



M. Loudon. 
M. Pellet. 
Baron Fallen. 



Dr. Eyschen. 

M. Mollard. 

M. d'Annoville (Charged' Affaires). 

Herr von Buch. 



M. Chevalley. 
M. Thi^baut. 
M. Farges. 



X1T 



PAOK 



CONTENTS 

THE KING'S SPEECH AT THE PROROGATION OF 
PARLIAMENT, SEPTEMBER 18, 1914 



PREFACE TO " COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS " . 3 

BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B] 25 

FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y] .... 223 

RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0] ... -445 

INDEX ... . -499 



THE KING'S SPEECH AT THE PROROGATION OF 

PARLIAMENT. 

September i8th, 1914. 
MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN, 

I ADDRESS you in circumstances that call for action 
rather than for speech. 

After every endeavour had been made by My Government 
to preserve the peace of the world, I was compelled, in the 
assertion of treaty obligations deliberately set at nought, and 
for the protection of the public law of Europe and the vital 
interests of My Empire, to go to war. 

My Navy and Army have, with unceasing vigilance, 
courage, and skill, sustained, in association with gallant and 
faithful Allies, a just and righteous cause. 

From every part of My Empire there has been a sponta- 
neous and enthusiastic rally to our common flag. 

GENTLEMEN OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 

I thank you for the liberality with which you have 
met a great emergency. 

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN, 

We are fighting for a worthy purpose, and we shall not 
lay down our arms until that purpose has been fully achieved. 

I rely with confidence upon the loyal and united efforts 
of all My subjects, and I pray that Almighty God may give 
us His blessing. 



PREFACE TO "COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCU- 
MENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF 
THE EUROPEAN WAR."* 

(EXTRACTS.) f 

AS historical sources these documents [the official corre- 
spondence published by the various European Governments 
relating to the outbreak of the war] are of the first importance. 
Taken separately, they are interesting ; but taken together 
and compared, they constitute a body of evidence of quite 
exceptional value. . . . 

For purposes of comparison, the documents may be 
divided into three periods : 

1. The state of European politics previous to the events 
of last summer [1914]. 

This, the prefatory period, is only illustrated by a few 
documents, namely, the first chapter of the French Yellow- 
book (pp. 259-285), Signor Giolitti's speech (vol. II., p. 394), 
the Austrian Statement as to the past activities of the Pan- 
Serb movement (vol. II., pp. 200 et seq.), the exchange of 
notes between Sir E. Grey and M. Cambon in November, 1912 
(pp. 170-172), and the original documents in the appendix to 
the Belgian Grey-book (vol. II., pp. 327-350). These docu- 
ments do not, of course, pretend to give any general history 
of the causes which produced the crisis of 1914 ; they merely 
throw light on certain definite points immediately connected 
with that crisis itself. . . . 

2. The period between the murder of the Archduke and 
the presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia. 

For this period we have Chapter II. of the French Yellow- 
book (pp. 286-297), the first six numbers of the Austrian 

* Printed under the authority of H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1915. 
[The whole of these " Collected Diplomatic Documents " are included in 
Vols. I. and II. of " The Times Documentary History of the War."] 

t [These extracts reproduce everything in the Preface save a few 
passages of no permanent interest, chiefly explaining the nature of the 
compilation in which the Preface appeared.] 

3 



BRITISH PREFACE 

Red-book (vol. II. , pp. 182-188), Nos. i, 2 and 161 of the 
British Blue-book, and Nos. i to 31 of the Serbian Book 
(vol. II., pp. 83-106). This period is dealt with in the next 
section. 

3. The period between the presentation of the Austrian 
Note and the outbreak of war. The bulk of all the corre- 
spondence, except in the case of the Serbian Book, is concerned 
with this period. The Books vary, however, a good deal in 
the point up to which they carry the story of events. The 
Serbian Book ends with the declaration of war between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia on July 28th. The German, 
Austrian and Russian Books practically end with the declara- 
tion of war between Germany and Russia on August 1st, 
though the Russian Book adds the formal declaration of war 
with Austria-Hungary on August 6th, and the Austrian Book 
adds twelve documents illustrating the formal steps as the 
result of which Austria-Hungary found herself at war with 
the other allied countries. The British and French Books 
carry the story down to the declaration of war between 
England and Germany at midnight on August 4th, and the 
French Book adds the Declaration signed at London on 
September 4th [September 5th. See vol. II., p. 506], binding 
England, France and Russia not to negotiate or conclude 
peace separately. The Belgian Book carries the story down 
to August 5th when Belgium finally found herself at war 
with Germany and was assured of the armed support of the 
other signatories of the Treaty of 1839, but it then proceeds 
to reproduce a series of documents illustrating subsequent 
events down to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary 
(1) fr _ on Belgium on August 28th. Of these twenty-six papers, the 
78 ar<F * wo l as t (1 record the formal rupture between Belgium and 
the two Austria-Hungary. Six deal with miscellaneous subjects : the 
referred neutrality of Holland, the navigation of the Scheldt, the 
t-] taking over of German interests in Belgium by the United 
States, and the departure of the Belgian Minister from 
Luxemburg. Seven relate to the extension of the war to 
the possessions of the belligerents in Africa. The remaining 
eleven papers illustrate the renewed offer made by Germany 
to Belgium on August gth and its rejection on August I2th. 

As a whole, therefore, the correspondence in this volume 
[" Collected Diplomatic Documents "] is a minute record of 



BRITISH PREFACE 

the events of ten days from July 23rd to August ist. The 
subject is the Serbian Question. On August ist the scene 
shifts ; the light is switched from Serbia to Belgium and 
the French frontier. For the next four days, August 2nd 
to 5th, we have a record, equally minute, of the attitude 
of England, France and Belgium on the brink of war and 
of the communications received by them from the German 
Government. But we have practically nothing from the 
other side. There is the speech of the German Chancellor 
in the Reichstag (vol. II. , pp. 353-357) ; there is the Note 
handed in at Paris by Baron von Schoen on August 2nd 
(French Book, No. 133) and the telegram to Prince Lichnowsky 
of August 4th (British Book, No. 157) ; there is the conversa- 
tion with Herr von Below Saleske at the Belgian Foreign 
Office, at 1.30 a.m. on August 3rd (Belgian Book, No. 21) ; 
there are finally the five telegrams semi-officially published 
in the German Press (vol. II., pp. 358-362). That is all. 
" Very early " in the morning of August 2nd the German 
troops appear on the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich in 
Luxemburg (p. 201) ; later on the same day they are reported 
to be across the French frontier at Ciry and near Longwy 
(p. 395) ; on August 3rd their advance guard is at Gemmenich 
in Belgium (vol. II., p. 36). Behind this screen of troops 
Berlin is almost silent. At London, Paris and Brussels 
decisions are still being formed. Deliberations continue ; tele- 
grams are exchanged. But at Berlin the direction of events 
has already passed from the Foreign Office to the General 
Staff, which does not talk and which publishes no records. 

There is one other gap in the correspondence which must 
be noted. We know practically nothing of anything which 
passed between Vienna and Berlin during this whole period. 
In the German Book there is only one communication between 
the two capitals (No. 16) ; in the Austrian Book there are 
only eight (Nos. 33, 35, 38, 42, 43, 46, 48 and 57). The 
earliest of these is dated July 27th (No. 33). There is, 
indeed, as we shall see, no doubt as to the general relations 
between the two Governments, but from the historian's 
point of view this is not enough. We are dealing with a 
diplomatic episode ; ten days of feverish activity when new 
proposals and new developments followed each other hour 
by hour. The only real interest of such a crisis is to estimate 

5 



BRITISH PREFACE 

how a general attitude responds to each new factor in the 
situation and thereby to gain an impression of the spirit 
behind the attitude. Here the German correspondence fails 
us. This very failure may not be without value as a guide 
to the historian. It has been perhaps the secret alike of 
Germany's predominance and of the strain under which 
Europe has lived for a decade, that Germany has always shown 
the world her power, but has never taken it into her confidence. 

The Period between the Murder of the Archduke and the Presen- 
tation of the Austrian Note to Serbia, June zS-July 23. 

First, as to the attitude of the German Government. 
This may be dismissed in a few words. The German Book 
states, " We permitted Austria a completely free hand in 
her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her 
preparations " (vol. II., p. 125). All the Books agree that the 
German Government professed to have no previous knowledge 
of the terms of the ultimatum. How much they did know can 
only be inferred from such documents as French Book, Nos. 9 
and 21, British Book, No. I, Serbian Book, No. 26. On the 
question, wnat part Herr von Tschirschky played personally 
in the counsels of the Austro-Hungarian Government during 
this period, we know only the common belief of the repre- 
sentatives of the Powers at Vienna as revealed in British Book, 
Nos. 32, 95 and 161, 2nd para. ; Serbian Book, No. 52, 4th, 
I2th and 2oth paras. ; Russian Book, No. 41 ; and French 
Book, No. 18. 

Second, the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. 
This is the vital point. After all that has been said and 
written lately on the subject it is not necessary to discuss 
the Pan-Serb movement. There may be a question as to 
the trustworthiness of the police reports on Serbian propaganda 
contained in No. 19 of the Austrian Book. But the broad 
fact is not in doubt. Serbia had nationalist ambitions in- 
compatible with the recently established sovereignty of 
Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those 
ambitions are practically admitted in British Book, No. 30, 
they are presupposed in the advice given to Serbia as recorded 
in that document and in French Book, No. 26, they were 
evident in the attitude of the Serbian Press. The only 
question for Austria-Hungary was whether by her dramatic 



BRITISH PREFACE 

annexation of the two Provinces in 1908, she had finally 
closed against herself the door of peaceful settlement. Whether 
Serbia or Austria had tried to keep that door open in the 
five years since 1909 is not a question which can be dealt 
with here we can only refer to the different accounts of 
those years given in Austrian Book, No. 8, and Serbian Book, 
Nos. 5 and 30, para. 10. Be that as it may, Austria decided 
in July that the door was closed. Probably, as indicated 
in Signor Giolitti's speech (vol. II., p. 394), she had taken 
the same decision long^before. Now, at all events, she made 
up her mind that war was inevitable and immediate war 
desirable (Austrian Book, No. 6). 

It was on this issue that Austria made war. The question 
of Serbian guilt in the murder of the Archduke could not 
have given rise to the Austrian ultimatum. Whatever may 
be the value of the evidence on this particular question 
contained in Austrian Book, No. 19, few people would be 
found to say that this evidence involved the Serbian Govern- 
ment itself in a way that a jury could consider for a moment , 
and no one will say that it could have justified an ultimatum 
with a forty-eight hours' time limit. Whatever may be the 
value of the statement in Austrian Book, No. 9, paras. 2 and 
3, as to the failure of the Serbian Government to investigate 
the murder, on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
assurances given by the Serbian Government of readiness 
to conduct such investigations (Serbian Book, Nos. 5 and 
30, para. 5 ; Russian Book, No. 6 ; British Book, No. 30 ; 
French Book, No. 15), it is obvipus that, in regard to the 
murder itself, the Serbian Government had at any rate 
committed no flagrant breach of the duty of a neighbouring 
State to assist in the apprehension of criminals. It is the 
general account of Serbian propaganda in Austrian Book, 
No. 19, which constitutes Austria's real case against Serbia. 
The distinction is well stated in Nos. 17 and 25 of the Serbian 
Book. It was a question of a fundamental antagonism of 
aims and ideals and a long-nursed sense of wrong. 

Such cases are very difficult, but they are not new. It 
was not the first time that Austria-Hungary had deliberately 
placed herself across the path of a nationalist movement. 
In comparing the feverish atmosphere of the Austrian and 
Serbian Books a calm view of the issues may perhaps best 



BRITISH PREFACE 

be attained by reference to a correspondence which has now 
passed into history. From 1817 to 1848, Metternich was 
writing of the policy of the Piedmontese Government in its 
relation to Italian nationalism and Austrian rule in Lom- 
bardy and Venetia, in the same strain as Count Berchtold 
writes of Serbia. The same epithets are applied to the 
leaders of Italian nationalism; they are 'poisoners," 
" highway robbers," ' pickpockets." Take a few sentences 
at random. " The scheming policy of the Turin Cabinet." 
' There is no doubt that the Turin Cabinet cherishes ambitious 
projects which can only be carried out at the expense of 
Austria." ' The causes (of complaint against Austrian 
administration in Italy), even had they been a hundred 
times more serious than they are, would not have justified 
the least of the plots hatched by the Piedmontese conspirator. 
In reality, in the struggle in which we are engaged, it is not 
a question of our administrative faults, but of the attacks 
\vhich faction directs against the existence of Austrian power." 
' The King seeks to mask under the veil of assistance rendered 
to the ' independence of the Italian nation ' the blow which he 
strikes at respect for the sacredness of treaties and the manner 
in which he thus attacks at its base the maintenance of 
general peace and of all international relations." ' The 
word ' nationality ' and the words ' Respect due to nation- 
alities ' as applied to the Italian Peninsula are words devoid 
of practical sense." History has given its judgment on this 
correspondence ; it is not for us to give one on the present 
controversy. The Serbian question is only a rehearsal of 
an old drama ; it is enough that we recognise the plot. 

The intention of Austria under these circumstances is 
undisputed. It is stated in the preface and in No. 6 of the 
Austrian Book precisely as it was stated by M. Jules Cambon 
on July 24th (French Book, No. 30), and by Sir M. de 
Bunsen on July 27th (British Book, No. 41). War was 
to be made inevitable ; all means of retreat were to be 
cut off. 

There is one further point to notice. The British Book, 
the French Book, and the Serbian Book agree hi the picture 
they draw of the mystery surrounding the Foreign Office 
at Vienna during this period. On the whole the German 
and Austrian Books bear out this impression. It seems that 

8 



BRITISH PREFACE 

the deliberate intention was to take both Serbia and Europe 
by surprise. 

Events subsequent to the Presentation of the Austrian Note. 

We have no space to deal with the complex negotiations 
which fill the bulk of the Books. We can only consider three 
points as illustrations of the way the Books may be compared. 

1. The character of the negotiations with Russia immedi- 
ately following on the rupture with Serbia. 

2. The view of the negotiations implied by the title 
of the German Book : " How Russia betrayed Germany's 
confidence." 

3. The question of Belgian neutrality. 

It will be observed that we omit any direct treatment of 
the position of Great Britain and France in relation to the 
outbreak of the war. The case for these two Powers has 
been often stated and is now before the world. A re-state- 
ment could carry no added conviction. On the other hand, 
of the above three points the first two have received no 
adequate treatment from the historical point of view, partly 
because the Austrian Book has only recently been published ; 
while the third point touches so nearly the heart of the present 
struggle that a brief statement on it may not be out of place. 

The Character of the Negotiations with Russia, immediately 
following the Rupture with Serbia. 

Austria knew, at the time when she presented her Note 
to Serbia, that she was risking a conflict with Russia. The 
fact is stated in so many words in Austrian Book, No. 26. 
Indeed, it was one of the commonplaces of European diplo- 
macy, and witness is borne to it throughout all the Books 
without exception. There is no sign in the Austrian corre- 
spondence that Austria was under any illusion as to the danger 
of Russian intervention. But to judge from Count Pourtales' 
airy words to the Serbian Minister at Petrograd on July 24th 
(Serbian Book, No. 36), and Herr von Tschirschky's equally 
confident remarks to Sir M. de Bunsen at Vienna on July 26th 
(British Book, No. 32), Germany was counting on Russian 
weakness or timidity to avert this danger. No such illusion, 

9 



BRITISH PREFACE 

however, even if.it was originally genuine, could have survived 
the events which immediately followed. 

The point on which all the Books show striking unanimity 
is the absolute openness of Russia's attitude from the begin- 
ning. The steady consistency of that attitude gives the 
Russian Book its unity and its force. M. Sazonof's conversa- 
tions on July 24th with the German Ambassador (German 
Book, No. 4 ; Austrian Book, No. 16 ; French Book, No. 38), 
and with the Austrian Ambassador (Austrian Book, No. 14 ; 
Russian Book, No. 25) ; his instructions to M. Kudachef 
on the same day (British Book, No. 13), and the official 
announcement in the Russian Press on July 25th (Russian 
Book, No. 10), were calculated to remove any possible doubt 
in the mind of the German and Austrian Governments. 

The way in which Austria met this open attitude.is curious. 
If there is one point on which the German and Austrian Books 
lay extraordinary emphasis it is the assurances given by 
Austria that she contemplated no attack on the territorial 
integrity or sovereignty of Serbia. But the nature of her 
communications to Russia on the subject is worth examining. 
On July 24th Count Berchtold says Austria wants nothing 
but the maintenance of the status quo (Austrian Book, No. 
18) ; on July 25th he mentions an indemnity (No. 20) ; on 
the same day he declares that neither the territorial integrity 
nor the sovereignty of Serbia will be touched, but " we will 
proceed to extreme measures for the enforcement of our 
demands " (No. 26) ; on July 27th the assurance that no 
territorial demands will be made on Serbia is made conditional 
on the " localisation " of the war (No. 32). Clearly, this 
method of denning policy was not calculated to allay the 
apprehension frankly declared by M. Sazonof on July 24th 
(Austrian Book, No. 14) : " You will always be wanting to 
intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe ! ' 
The general impression produced by Austria's assurances in 
this matter, whether that impression was just or unjust, may 
be seen from the doubt expressed in British Book, No. 79, 
whether she would consent to convert those assurances into 
" a binding engagement to Europe." 

There is another point which indicates the distrust 
awakened, not unnaturally, in the mind of Russian states- 
men by Austria's steps after her rupture with Serbia. Points 

IO 



BRITISH PREFACE 

5 and 6 of the Austrian demands on Serbia relate to the par- 
ticipation of Austrian officials in one form or another in the 
measures to be taken by the Serbian Government against the 
anti-Austrian propaganda on Serbian territory, and against 
those implicated in the actual plot for the murder of the 
Archduke. In the annotations on the Serbian reply published 
both in the German and Austrian Books, the following com- 
mentary is made on the Serbian reply to these demands : 
" If the Serbian Government misunderstand us on this point 
they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between 
enquete judiciare and simple recherches must be familiar to 
them " (vol. II., p. 263). Now, the Serbian Government were 
not the only people who misunderstood these demands, for 
they raised the immediate apprehensions of M. Sazonof, Sir 
E. Grey and M. Bienvenu-Martin (Austrian Book, No. 14 ; 
British Book, No. 5 ; French Book, No. 25 ; and Austrian 
Book, No! n). Such general misapprehensions are always 
possible, but the strange thing is that Count Berchtold, as 
early as July 25th, found it necessary to offer a special ex- 
planation on this very point to the Russian Government 
(Austrian Book, No. 27). This explanation was given to the 
Russian Government " in strict confidence." In other words, 
Russia is informed in confidence of a point on which the 
Serbian Government certainly had a right to a full explanation. 
Austria might perhaps reasonably have considered it incom- 
patible with her dignity to make the explanation to Serbia 
direct, but it could have easily been made indirectly through 
Russia. As a matter of fact it was made too late to influence- 
the Serbian reply and under the seal of secrecy ; and, more- 
over, both the explanation itself and the annotation on the 
Serbian reply are hard to reconcile with the statement about 
" supervision " made by Heir von Jagow on July 29th 
(French Book, No. 92). The whole circumstance appears 
to require explanation, especially as it is duplicated by a 
similar " confidence " in the case of Great Britain, which may 
also be noticed. 

On July 24th Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mens- 
dorff in London that the Note to Serbia was not an ultimatum 
but a " demarche with a time limit " (Austrian Book, No. 17), 
and that this fact should be communicated to Sir E. Grey. 
Sir E. Grey received this information (British Book, No. 14) 

it 



BRITISH PREFACE 

and telegraphed it to Paris and Petrograd. It was conveyed 
to M. Sazonof on the morning of July 25th (British Book, 
>Jo. 17). He replied that this did not tally with the informa- 
tion which came to him from Germany. We know from 
German Book, No. i, French Book, No. 28, and British Book, 
No. 9, what kind of language the German Ambassadors at 
the capitals of the Entente Powers were holding on July 24th. 
The reassuring communication thus made to Great Britain 
can therefore only be explained, in the light of the other 
communications sent to Sir E. Grey from Vienna on July 23rd 
(Austrian Book, No. 9) and on July 28th (No. 39), as an 
attempt to keep Great Britain quiet. Any reassurance 
designed really to preserve peace should clearly have been 
made at Petrograd. But while Count Berchtold was doing 
his best to reassure Sir E. Grey by urgent telegrams on July 
23rd and 24th, he contented himself with writing a despatch 
(for such it appears to be) to Petrograd on July 25th, con- 
taining arguments for the education of M. Sazonof (Austrian 
Book, No. 26). Again it must be said that these proceedings 
were not calculated to promote a frank exchange of views 
between Vienna and Petrograd. 

The real inference from this correspondence seems to be 
and it lies very near the heart of the calamities from which 
Europe is now suffering that Austria proceeded throughout 
on the principle that it is better not to enter into discussions 
with the person with whom you have a difference of opinion. 
Hence the mystery reigning at Vienna for the first three weeks 
of July, and hence also the confidences as to Austria's moder- 
ate intentions carefully imparted on July 24th and 25th to 
the Powers not the most directly concerned with those 
intentions. 

We have here laboured perhaps a rather minor point, and 
have not considered the course of those " conversations " 
between Vienna and Petrograd and Sir E. Grey's proposal 
for mediation by the four disinterested Powers, which formed 
the main features of the three days between July 25th and 
28th. But these main features have already been exhaus- 
tively discussed and commented on in public during the last 
few months, and the minor points dealt with above are 
raised because they seem comparatively new and because for 
that reason they throw additional light on the grounds for 

12 



BRITISH PREFACE 

M. Sazonof s remark on July 28th, recorded in French Book, 
No. 82 : " Certainly Austria is unwilling to converse." This 
distrust may usefully be compared with the impression made 
on M. Bienvenu-Martin by Heir von Schoen's communica- 
tions at Paris on July 24th to 26th (French Book, No. 6i) r 
and with the character of M. Jules Cambon's conversations 
with Herr von Jagow on July 24th and 27th (French Book, 
Nos. 30 and 74). Silence and a show of power were the 
weapons on which Germany and Austria relied. 

The View of the Negotiations implied by the Title of the German 
Book : " How Russia Betrayed Germany's Confidence." 

The ground of the charge thus made by Germany against 
Russia is a little difficult to fix. As we have seen, Russia's 
attitude was entirely open throughout the negotiations, and 
the German Chancellor's telegrams to the German Ambassa- 
dors at London, Paris and Petrograd of July 26th (German 
Book, Nos. 10, IOA, and IOB) show that, on the day following 
the rupture between Austria and Serbia, that attitude was 
already clearly understood in Germany. In fact, there is 
not a sign in the whole correspondence that any statesman 
in the whole of Europe ever doubted that Russia would 
regard an actual armed attack on Serbia under the circum- 
stances as an attack upon herself. We are forced to the 
conclusion that if Count Pourtales at Petrograd continued 
to under-estimate the danger of war until his conversation 
with M. Sazonof at 2 a.m. on the night of July 2gth to joth 
(British Book, No. 97 ; Russian Book, No. 60 ; French Book, 
No. 103), at which he " completely broke down on seeing that 
war was inevitable," his under-estimate must have been based 
on a doubt, not as to Russia's policy, but as to her courage ; 
and this is borne out by the attitude both of the German 
Ambassador at Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador at 
Berlin (British Book, Nos. 32 and 71). Russia was not " in 
a position to make war." 

But, so far as can be understood, the gravamen of the Ger- 
man charge against Russia is that the German military attache 
at Petrograd characterised the assurances of the Russian 
General Staff on July 29th, as "an attempt to mislead us " 
(vol. II., p. 131), and that the Tsar's telegram to the German 

13 



BRITISH PREFACE 

Emperor, of July 3ist (vol. II., p. 132), was despatched at the 
moment when the general mobilisation of the Russian Army 
was being ordered. That is to say, the German case is that : 

1. In the period between July 28th and July 3ist, during 
which the Russian Government assured the German Govern- 
ment that mobilisation was only proceeding to meet Austrian 
preparations in Galicia, the Russian Army was in reality 
being at least partially mobilised in Warsaw, Vilna and other 
districts against Germany. Russia was therefore taking 
advantage of Germany's attitude as stated to Sir E. Goschen 
by Herr von Jagow on July 27th (British Book, No. 43) 
that " if Russia only mobilised in the south, Germany would 
not mobilise." 

2. The Russian mobilisation occurred at a moment when 
Germany was making a special effort at peaceful mediation, 
and at a moment when the Tsar was actually encouraging 
those efforts by pacific assurances. 

We will take these two points separately. 

i. Russian mobilisation measures between July 28th and 
July 3ist. 

The German Book rests almost its whole case on the 
priority of mobilisation measures. The way in which that 
case was carefully built up during the negotiations is shown 
by British Book, No. 71, where the German Chancellor declares 
on July 28th that the Russian mobilisation in the south 
endangered the efforts of the German Government to encourage 
-direct communications between Vienna and Petrograd. Com- 
pare this with British Book, Nos. 70, 74, 93 (i) and (3) ; 
Russian Book, No. 47 ; Austrian Book, Nos. 40, 42 and 48 ; 
German Book, No. 16. It will be seen that at the moment 
the Chancellor was speaking, Austria had already refused 
both direct discussions with Petrograd and Sir E. Grey's 
mediation proposals, before she heard of the Russian mobilisa- 
tion, and on the sole ground that she had herself declared war 
on Serbia. It was after she heard of the Russian preparations 
that she resumed conversations on July 2Qth-30th. It will 
be observed that on July 28th Russia believed that the 
general Austrian mobilisation had been ordered. As a matter 
of fact, in sifting any case based on mobilisation reports there 
are several points to be remembered. 

Mobilisation measures as preliminaries to war are a German 
14 



BRITISH PREFACE 

tradition. If anyone will refer to the account of the negotia- 
tions between Prussia and Austria from March 3ist to May 
Sth, 1866, before the Prusso-Austrian war, given in Sybel's 
" Foundation of the German Empire," Book 16, Chapter I, 
he will see the example in this line set by Bismarck. But a 
case based on priority of mobilisation measures is never a 
strong one for several reasons. 

First, it is difficult enough to tell " who began it " when the 
negotiations are spread over months, but it is practically 
impossible to do so when, as here, it is a question of hours. 
Take the German telegram of July 26th to Petrograd (vol. II., 
p. 128), given in the body of the German narrative, and the 
conversation between M. Sazonof and Count Pourtales on July 
29th, recorded in No. 58 of the Russian Book. The actual 
mobilisation measures are taken in the midst of a cloud of 
accusations and threats, and it is impossible to separate cause 
from effect, in the hurried hours which we have to study. 

Secondly, in any attempt to state the facts, the minor 
accusations and innuendoes must be discarded as of slight 
importance, except as a guide to the psychology of the moment. 
Such minor points are German Book, Nos. 6 and 9 ; Serbian 
Book, No. 52 ; French Book, No. 89 ; Austrian Book, No. 47, 
penultimate para., last sentence, and a dozen other similar 
reports. The same may be said of rumours of violations 
of frontier (Austrian Book, No. 40 ; German narrative, vol. II., 
p. 135 ; British Book, No. 144 ; French Book, No. 106 ; British 
Book, No. 105). They have their value, but to put them 
forward, as does the German and Austrian correspondence, 
as the actual ground for the commencement of hostilities 
is to assume the impossible position that the fate of nations 
is subject to the reported action of a roving patrol. Frankly, 
a marked insistence on such reports, as in the German Book, 
shows a poor appreciation of the value of the evidence. 

Thirdly, mobilisation " orders " are not mobilisation. 
The mobilisation systems of different countries are radically 
different ; the precise nature of those systems, the line^ 
of the railways and a hundred other points must be taken 
into consideration in judging mobilisation measures, and 
anyjstatement which ignores these factors is a mere bid for 
uninformed public opinion. We cannot enter into a considera- 
tion of all these factors here, but a few indications may be 

'5 



BRITISH PREFACE 

given. No. 3 of the French Book contains an allusion to 
the well-known fact of the secrecy of the first stages of 
German mobilisation, and M. Jules Cambon believed that 
this first stage was set on foot as early as July 2ist (French 
Book, No. 15 ; see also No. 59). It is unnecessary to estimate 
the accuracy of the various reports of German preparations 
in the French Book, interesting as they are. The hard 
fact that though Germany only proclaimed " Kriegsgefahr- 
zustand " on July 3ist and mobilisation on August ist, to 
take effect on August 2nd, the German troops were across the 
Luxemburg frontier at dawn on August 2nd, will probably 
be judged to be historical evidence of far more value than 
any isolated reports received during the crisis. As to Russian 
mobilisation, British Book, Nos. 43 and 121 show that it 
was fully realised in Germany that the Russian system was 
so complicated as to make it difficult to distinguish the 
localities really affected by mobilisation. Germany accuses 
Russia of mobilising against Germany, not Austria, because 
she is reported to be mobilising at Vilna and Warsaw, but both 
those towns are nearer to the Galician frontier than Prague 
is to the Serbian frontier, and Austria was reported to- be 
mobilising at Prague four days before she declared to Russia 
that she was only mobilising against Serbia (Russian Book, 
No. 24 ; French Book, No. 90 ; Austrian Book, No. 50 ; German 
Book, No. 23). The bare facts are of very slight value as evi- 
dence without a knowledge of the points already mentioned. 

If the charges as to the priority of Russian mobilisation 
are examined in the light of these considerations, it will be 
admitted that the evidence for those charges is remarkably 
slight, and that, given the admitted extreme slowness of 
Russian, and the extreme rapidity of German, mobilisation, 
a fact which is frequently alluded to in the correspondence, 
there is no indication in favour of, and an overwhelming 
presumption against, the theory that the Russian measures 
were further advanced than the German when war was 
declared on August ist. 

2. The charge that the Tsar's telegram of July 3ist 
(vol. II., p. 132) was misleading, and that the mobilisation 
orders issued about the time of its despatch destroyed the 
effect of sincere efforts then being made by Germany to 
mediate between Russia and Austria. 

16 



BRITISH PREFACE 

In the first place, a glance at the Tsar's telegram is sufficient 
to show that this charge is, to put it frankly, of the flimsiest 
character. His Majesty gave his " solemn word " that, 
while it was ' technically impossible to discontinue our 
military preparations " the Russian troops would " undertake 
no provocative action " "as long as the negotiations between 
Austria and Serbia continue." There was no promise not to 
mobilise ; there was nothing but a statement which is almost 
word for word the same as that contained in the German 
Emperor's telegram to King George twenty-four hours later 
(vol. II., p. 361, No. 6) the statement that, under certain 
circumstances, mobilisation would not be converted into 
hostilities. 

As a matter of fact, a somewhat unscrupulous use, in 
effect though perhaps not in intention, has been made of the 
Tsar's telegrams to substantiate the theory of " betrayal." 
Take for instance the German Chancellor's statement on 
July 3ist (British Book, No. 108), that " the news of the 
active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had 
reached him just when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor, 
in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, 
and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that 
request." The telegram referred to must be that of July 2o,th 
(German Book, No. 21), since this is the only one which 
mentions " old friendship " ; but this telegram, though it 
asks the Emperor to restrain Austria, also says in so many 
words that popular opinion in Russia would soon force measures 
which would lead to war. 

As to Germany's efforts at mediation, it does seem to be 
true that on July 2Qth the Austrian Government showed 
some signs of moving, in the direction of a peaceful solution. 
On that day occurred the conversation between Count Szd'pary 
and M. Sazonof (Austrian Book, No. 47), which, on Count 
Berchtold's instructions of next day (Austrian Book, Nos. 
49 and 50), seemed likely to develop into a renewal of the 
direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd. On 
that day, too, Herr von Jagow went so far as to admit that 
these conversations furnished " a basis for possible negotia- 
tion " (French Book, No. 92), and on July 3oth he forwarded 
to Vienna, but apparently without comment, Sir E. Grey's 
last proposal which admitted the possibility of an Austrian 

B 17 



BRITISH PREFACE 

occupation of Belgrade before the mediation of the Powers 
could be brought into effect (British Book, Nos. 88 and 98 ; 
Austrian Book, No. 51), and which Austria seems to have 
regarded at the time, and Germany subsequently professed 
to have regarded, as a promising basis of discussion (German 
narrative (vol. II., p. 132) and Austrian Book, No. 51). By 
July 3ist these negotiations had resulted in distinct formula- 
tions of the Russian and Austrian attitudes which were indeed 
far enough apart, but which still offered some hope of recon- 
ciliation. (Russian Book, No. 67 ; British Book, No. 120 ; 
Austrian Book, No. 51.) On July 3ist the exchange of views 
between Vienna and Petrograd was proceeding (Russian 
Book, No. 66), and, though there is a remarkable absence 
in the Austrian Book of any indication that there was at 
this moment any revived hope of peace, it does seem from 
the British and French Books that the atmosphere at Vienna 
was clearing on July 30th to 3ist (British Book, Nos. 94, 
95, 96, 118 ; French Book, Nos. 104 and 115). 

All this makes a fair showing, so far as the attitude of 
Austria and Russia is concerned. But what part had Berlin 
in these more friendly steps ? We hear of many German 
assurances of moderating counsels sent from Berlin to Vienna ; 
there are no documents either in the German or the Austrian 
Book showing what these counsels were, though the German 
Chancellor's account of one message to Vienna is given in 
British Book, No. 75, but they are mentioned in British 
Book, No. 95, as having come to the ears of M. Dumaine at 
Vienna, and it is only fair to point out that the renewal of 
conversations on July 29th between M. Sazonof and Count 
Szapary was due to a hint given to the latter by the German 
Ambassador. The point here is, however, not whether 
these counsels were actually given, for documentary evidence 
of which we have still to wait, but whether the attitude 
of Germany at this moment was calculated to reassure the 
Russian Government. And here we have the curious fact 
that there is in the whole correspondence not a single sign 
of any communication from Berlin to Petrograd during these 
days even hinting at the possibility of a compromise or of 
any form of international action to settle the dispute. Look 
at German Book, No. 14 ; British Book, No. 93 (2) ; Russian 
Book, Nos. 58, 60, 63. These were the communications 

18 



BRITISH PREFACE 

-which reached M. Sazonof. Their tenor was " mobilisation," 
' proposals inacceptable," and so on. And breaking through 
the diplomatic correspondence come the German Emperor's 
telegrams. At 6.30 p.m. on July 29th, His Majesty is, after 
all that has passed, still " of opinion that it is perfectly 
possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro- 
Serbian war " (No. 22, vol. II., p. 160) ; six and a half hours, 
later, at I a.m., on July 30th, he is threatening to abandon 
all attempts at mediation if Russia mobilises against Austria, 
No. 23. In this correspondence we have many assurances of 
mediation ; but are we allowed to see the substance ? 

In fairness, no one will wish to press against German 
statesmen points arising out of the events of these last days. 
We have only gone into these points because Germany herself 
has tried to make use of them against her antagonists. The 
truth about these days is, as usual, very simple. Under the 
strain of a sudden crisis, Europe was bound to break at its 
weakest link, and that weakest link was Germany. She, 
alone of all the nations of Europe, could not negotiate on 
the brink of war. The nature of her institutions, the character 
of her people, the very perfection of her military organisation 
alike forbade it. The calculations of her General Staff were 
too fine drawn ; a state of uncertainty was intolerable to 
her nerves. The military machine was too vast and elaborate ; 
once set in motion, it must occupy the whole stage of Govern- 
ment. Every other country could mobilise and yet continue 
to negotiate with a hope of success. But the German mobilisa- 
tion was peculiar, not only in its effect but in its nature. 
Open mobilisation was the last stage. It was not a military 
preparation ; it was in itself an offensive movement. On 
that order the German armies did not merely concentrate ; 
they marched. If history passes judgment on Germany 
it will not be because she did this or that in the final crisis, 
but because she had for years consciously set herself to create 
a military machine which incapacitated her from assuming 
any other attitude but one of menace to her neighbours, and 
because, knowing the consequences of even a slight pressure 
on the levers of that machine, she acquiesced in or perhaps 
deliberately encouraged the steps which made that pressure 
inevitable. 

In all this, Russia's attitude deserves a fuller recognition 

19 



BRITISH PREFACE 

than has yet been accorded to it. She made no parade of 
pacific intentions ; she played on no weaknesses ; she counted 
on no doubtful factors ; she took refuge neither in silence 
nor in catchwords. She stated openly the circumstances 
under which war would become inevitable. But she gave 
every chance to international action ; she shunned no dis- 
cussion ; she was ready to accept any compromise provided 
only that the Austrian troops paused on the Serbian frontier. 
She steered her policy throughout by the light of the guiding 
fact that the Austro-Serbian conflict could not be localised 
even by her own abstention, for that conflict was not a simple 
attack on Serbia but a recommitment of the whole Balkan 
question. Her action during the whole crisis is entitled to 
the respect which is due to honesty and openness in inter- 
national relations. 



The Question of Belgian Neutrality. 

There is no need to go into the details of a question 
which has now been so exhaustively discussed and on which 
opinion is already so fully formed. But the charges made 
by Germany against the action of Belgium and Great Britain 
in the years preceding the war appear to necessitate a brief 
statement bringing these charges into relation with the 
correspondence during the crisis. 

Two charges have been made, which to a certain extent 
neutralise each other : 

1. That Great Britain had long intended to violate Belgian 
neutrality by force. 

2. That there was an arrangement between the British 
and Belgian Governments providing for the violation of 
Belgian neutrality by consent. 

As to the first charge, it may be dismissed in a few words. 
It is proved to be baseless, not by the statements issued by 
the British Government after the publication of the " incrim- 
inating " documents (Belgian Book, Appendix Nos. 2 and 6, 
vol. II., pp. 328, 347), but by Sir E. Grey's despatch to Sir F. 
Villiers of 1913 (No. I, vol. II., p. 327), and by the simple 
fact that it was not till more than 60 hours after the presenta- 
tion of the German ultimatum that Great Britain, on August 

30 



BRITISH PREFACE 

5th, definitely and finally promised ' joint action with a 
view to resisting Germany " (Belgian Book, No. 48). 

Great Britain had the duty to defend Belgium by arms 
against a violation of her territory. On the one hand she had 
solemnly assured Belgium that such defence would never take 
the form of anticipatory violation. On the other hand, it 
had for years been a commonplace not in closed diplomatic 
circles but among students of politics and in the columns of 
the Press that German military preparations indicated an 
intention to attack France through eastern Belgium. In 
these circumstances it was the elementary duty of the British 
Army to obtain such information and make such preparations 
as would enable Great Britain, if called upon to do so, not 
merely to go to war in defence of Belgium, but to save her ; 
and if any British officer approached any Belgian officer with 
this object, he was but fulfilling the functions for which a 
national army exists and without the fulfilment of which 
international obligations would become nothing but pious 
hopes. 

As to the second charge, alleging an arrangement between 
the British and Belgian Governments, the formal denials of 
such an arrangement issued by the two Governments are 
really unnecessary, for the charge is sufficiently rebutted by 
Baron Greindl's despatch, published by the Germans them- 
selves (No. 2, vol. II., p. 328). Nothing that has been pub- 
lished contains a shadow of evidence of anything resembling 
such an arrangement. But if further evidence of the truth is 
required, it is contained in the Belgian Book. In this preface 
we can leave Great Britain's case to the judgment of the 
student ; but the action of Belgium, as revealed in the Grey- 
book, has never yet had full justice done to it, in spite of the 
general sympathy which it has excited. 

Nos. 2 and 16 of that Book show the careful measures 
taken by the Belgian Government in advance to secure the 
maintenance of their neutrality by diplomatic means. But 
on July 3 ist the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs assured 
Sir F. Villiers that it did not " seem possible that our neutral- 
ity could be threatened " (No. 38), and in any case stated, 
in order that there might be no possibility of precipitate 
action by any of her guarantors, that she was able to defend 
herself (British Book, No. 128). It was not till August ist, 

21 



BRITISH PREFACE 

after the Belgian Government had received the assurances of 
the French Government (No. 15), and had heard that the 
German Government would not commit themselves to any 
assurance (No. 14), that the Belgian Representatives at the 
capitals of the guaranteeing Powers were instructed to present 
to the Governments the declaration of Belgium's intention to 
maintain and defend her neutrality. The next day, on August 
2nd, when the news of the invasion of Luxemburg had arrived 
and Berlin was still silent, the Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs was careful to assure the German Minister at Brussels 
of his confidence in Germany's good intentions. At that 
conversation the German Minister alluded in reassuring terms 
to " his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which 
(Belgium) had the right to entertain towards (her) eastern 
neighbours " (No. 19). A few hours later, at 7 p.m., he 
presented the German ultimatum (Nos. 20 and 23). At 7 a.m. 
the next morning, August 3rd, the Belgian Government 
returned their reply (No. 22) and telegraphed to their Repre- 
sentatives abroad that " Belgium is firmly resolved to repel 
any attack." But still Belgium waited. The enemy's troops 
were gathering on her frontier ; at any time her armies might 
be attacked ; but she still refused to be driven into one false 
step. That morning, some time before midday, the French 
Minister was informed that " the Belgian Government were 
making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers " 
(Belgian Book, No. 24; French Book, No. 142).* Then 
King Albert sent an appeal to King George, but still only for 
diplomatic intervention (Belgian Book, No. 25). Later on 
that day, or during the night, the German troops crossed the 
Belgian frontier (No. 30 ; French Book, No. 151). At 6 a.m. 
next morning, August 4th, the Belgian Government received 
the final German notification (No. 37). The Cabinet was 
assembled and after deliberation decided to appeal to the 
guarantee of the Powers, but that appeal was not made until 
the evening (Nos. 38, last para., 40 and 43). 

According to British Book, No. 151, the French military attache 
actually made a definite offer on this day to the Belgian War Office of five 
army corps for the defence of Belgium, but the Belgian and French docu- 
ments seems to show that this offer was unofficially made and was not 
alluded to by the French Minister or referred to in the general reply of the 
Belgian Government. 

23 



BRITISH PREFACE 

We see in this narrative how scrupulously careful the 
Belgian Government were to avoid the slightest sign of 
suspicion, the slightest inclination to one of the guaranteeing 
Powers rather than the other, the slightest confession of 
mistrust in short, the smallest movement in any direction, 
by word or deed, which could furnish the shadow of a pretext 
for such charges as those which have since actually been made. 
By this attitude Belgium was serving not only herself, but 
Europe ; she was not only safeguarding her own honour, but 
she was preventing her peculiar international position from 
being made the occasion of suspicions or the excuse for hos- 
tilities. In face of this record, it may be possible to respect 
the straightforward avowal of the German Chancellor's speech 
(vol. II., p. 353), however indefensible the policy he sought to 
justify ; but it is difficult to treat with patience the insinua- 
tions made by Heir von Jagow, as early as July 3ist, regarding 
Belgium's hostile acts (British Book, No. 122) insinuations 
which are effectively exposed in Belgian Book, No. 79. 

This, however, may be said. Charges against Great 
Britain are fair methods of warfare. They may call for 
denial, but not for protest. But charges against Belgium, 
made at such a moment and in such circumstances, can be 
justified by no standards of policy or morality. They fail 
before every test known to historical criticism, and the 
circumstances in which they are made are themselves a refuta- 
tion. For the sufferings of Belgium to-day are largely due 
to her steady and honourable determination to appeal for no 
assistance which by any stretch of malicious construction 
could be interpreted as an infringement of the law of her 
existence.* 



* The documents published in Germany [See vol. II., pp. 314-326] 
have been most unscrupulously used in the German Press. To take one 
instance: the word "conversation" in para. 8 of the first document has 
in more than one reproduction been printed as " convention." 



GREAT BRITAIN 



AND THE 



EUROPEAN CRISIS 



CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS 
IN PARLIAMENT,* TOGETHER WITH AN 
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. 




LONDON : 
PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S 

STATIONERY OFFICE 
By HARRISON & SONS, Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty. 



1914 

Price One Penny. 

* [The " statements in Parliament " here referred to will be found, with 
additional speeches, in voL II., p. 397 et scq.] 



CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS 

Table of Contents of Correspondence laid 

before Parliament . . . . . . . . 41 

PART I. CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT 71 

PART II. SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS* : 

(1) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 

(2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) 

(3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) 

(4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914) 

(5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914) 



* [The speeches constituting Part II. will be found, together with other 
speeches, in their proper chronological order, in vol. II., p. 397 et seq.] 



[B. Intro/ 






INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. 



ON the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 
nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend 
army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, 
the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, 
and made a progress through the town accompanied by his 
wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg. While passing through 
the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. 
Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed. 

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror 
throughout Europe ; none has ever been less justified. 
Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Govern- 
ments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to sup- 
port her in any measure, however severe, which she might 
think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer 
and his accomplices. 

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our repre- 
sentatives abroad, that the Press and public opinion of 
Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for 
the crime to the Serbian Government, which was said to have 
encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb 
populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

That there had for many years been a strong Serb national- 
ist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This 
movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then 
part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against 
the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, 
culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. 
It had continued when Austria took over the administration 
of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria 

* [Cf. the narrative of events in M. Viviani's speech, Y. 159.] 



[B. Intro.] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should 
not " detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty 
the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, how- 
ever, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to 
her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexa- 
tion was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and 
ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing 
and popular apathy. Serbian nationalist feeling immediately 
asserted itself, and the Serbian Government protested to the 
Powers against the annexation as a " deep injury done to 
the feelings, interests, and rights of the Serbian people." 
Serbia's attitude coupled with the resentment felt by Russia 
and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a 
European war ; but after six months of extreme tension 
she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her 
w [See No. protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. (1) 
4 (p-8i).] Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were 
strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912- 
13 successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition 
to her territorial expansion. As Serbia grew, Austrian suspicion 
of her designs deepened. 

(2.) 

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Serbian 
feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo 
murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on 
patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its 
exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives. 

But the dangers to European peace which it involved 
were immediately evident from the reports which reached 
the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at 
Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in 
the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their 
colleagues with cries of " Serbian assassins." Mobs in 
Vienna threatened the Serbian Legation. The Austrian 
Press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled 
language, and called for the condign punishment of Serbia. 
There were signs that the popular resentment was shared, 
and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. 
Both the British and also the German Government knew 
that the peace might be disturbed. 

28 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. Intro.] 

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent 
on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they pos- 
sessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. 
Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Aus- 
tria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the 
intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost 
equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained 
an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian 
Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful 
to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the 
Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken 
place, was only concerned with the question of domestic 
measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. 
On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, 
on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, 
defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of 
the Empire. On the nth July the Serbian Minister at 
Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communica- 
tion from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd 
July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered 
at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in 
Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion 
that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable. 

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back 
on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become 
serious, but it was also known that Serbia had made profes- 
sions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with 
the sovereignty of an independent State. (1) It was known <"[ c /.Y.i5.] 
that the opinion of the Russian and French and also of the 
German Governments was that the Serbian Government 
was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Serbia must be 
ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which 
had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated 
in part on Serbian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Serbia to show 
herself moderate and conciliatory . (2) He promised the Ger- < 21 [No. 12.] 
man Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian 
Government in the same direction. More could not be done, 
for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Serbian 
territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary 
operations. It was only known that a court-martial had 
been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were 

9 



[B. Intro.] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

secret. The Serbian Government stated that they were 
only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate 
the evidence thus collected before setting their own investi- 
gations on foot. The Serbian Government also stated that 
both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and 
that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had 
informed the Serbian Government, in reply to enquiries, that 
one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. 
It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occa- 
sions to fasten guilt on the Serbian Government by means of 
police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had 
failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before 
Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public 
her case against Serbia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the 

(1) [No. i.] German Ambassador on the 2Oth July, (1) the latter replied 
that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some 
case that would be known ; but, as a matter of fact, His 
Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the 
evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till 
the 7th August. 

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was 
as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw 
off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general 
international situation, no incalculable element which Austria 
could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, 
she would know accurately the consequences of her action. 
The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained as they 
had always been. We had been quite recently assured that 
no new secret element had been introduced into the former, 
and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on 
the nth June that the latter had remained unchanged so far 
as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was 
well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy 
of the " Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that 
any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power 
would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Serbia 

< >[No. 91.] was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey (2) on 
the 2gth July, " regarded as being in the Austrian sphere 

<3) [No. 7 of influence " ; if Serbia was to be humiliated ; then assuredly 

and 0. 10.] Russia could not remain indifferent. (8) It was not a question 
30 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. Intro.] 

of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburg, but 
of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations 
bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of 
development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said 
to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, 
" a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They 
were the facts of the European situation, the products of 
years of development, tested and retested during the last 
decade. Patient work might change them, but the product 
of years could not be pushed aside in a day. 



Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow 
for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She 
delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer 
in forty-eight hours. (1) She made ten demands, directed (1) [No. 4.] 
towards the elimination from Serbian national life of every- 
thing which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved 
the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression 
of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government 
schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participa- 
tion of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia, the 
arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in 
arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian 
utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of 
these measures. In addition, the Serbian Government was 
to publish on the front page of the " Official Journal " a 
prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation 
of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very 
brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare 
findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative 
evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on 
to accept a greater humiliation. 

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration 
of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an 
interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations 
which now followed, there was no time to draw breath 
and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to 
explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian 
ultimatum. 

31 



[B. Intro.] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain 
of a dangerous popular movement against her Government. 
What evidence she might have against the Serbian Govern- 
ment no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no 
interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the con- 
solidation and progressive government of the Balkan States ; 
she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that " the Balkan 
Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strength- 
ening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient ; 
the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be 
enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Serbia did not 
necessarily affect that interest ; it was a dispute between two 
Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. 
Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no 
concern in that dispute, that he had no title to intervene 
between Austria and Serbia ; that he would express no opinion 
on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other 
side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then 
the peace of Europe was at stake, and, from the first, Sir E. 
Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how 
Russia, interested as she was in Serbia, could take any but 
a most serious view of such a formidable document as the 
U) [Nos.3,5, ultimatum. (1) The peace of Europe must be maintained, 
10, ii, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to 
25. 62, Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, 
by a " spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice " 
by a " loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great 
Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this 
spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in 
the European crisis. 

(4-) 

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. 

(2) [No. 3.] Grey (2) that an ultimatum was being handed to Serbia. For 

the first time Sir E. Grey heard that " there would be 
something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately 
expressed his grave alarm. Next morning, the text of the 

(3) [No. 4.] ultimatum was handed to him, (3) and he learnt that the time 

limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German 
Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, 
32 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. Intro.] 

he felt helpless. 01 There was no time to advise Russia or to Ol [No. n.] 
influence Serbia. 

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. 
As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, 
" the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." lt) (i) [No. 54.] 
What was Germany's attitude ? Privately, the German 
Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the 
ultimatum ; (I) officially, the German Government called it ( " [No. 18.] 
" equitable and moderate," and said that they " desired 
urgently the localisation of the conflict." 141 Everyone de- (4( [No. 9.] 
sired that ; but it was no time for phrases. The same morn- 
ing the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned 
the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburg/" (5) [No. 6.] 
had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had 
asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The 
French Ambassador had pledged the support of France," 1 ( "[No.6.] 
as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her 
alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated 
publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the 
Austro-Serbian conflict. 17 ' The next evening troops in Vienna (7) [0. 10.] 
had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from 
hostile crowds. w " Localisation " was a good phrase, but we (81 [No.i6i.] 
had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and 
with surprise had come universal alarm. 

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three 
attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the <> [NOS. u, 
ultimatum had to be extended. (9) Great Britain and Russia 18.]' 

urged this at Vienna. <10) Great Britain urged Germany to (101 [No. 13.] 
join in pressing the Austrian Government.' 11 All that Berlin (n) [No. n.] 
consented to do was to " pass on " the message to Vienna.' 1 " |[No. 18.] 

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, a>) fNos.ii, 
Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. <i4)r Nos 2 J 
Petersburg in favour of conciliation.' 1 " Italy assented,' 14 ' 49 j 

France assented,' 1 " Russia declared herself ready;'" Ger- (l [No.42.] 
many said she had no objection, " if relations between Austria (16) [No. 17.] 
and Russia became threatening." 117 ' I7) [No.i8.] 

Thirdly, the Russian,' 1 " French,' 1 " and British (ao) repre- j;|| [No. 550 
sentatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go 
as far as possible to meet Austria. 

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would 
not extend, had expired ; and after all Serbia did not need 

C 33 



[B. Intro.] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned 

(1) [No. 39.] to Austria a reply (1) which amounted to an acceptance of all 

Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays 
necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, 
and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise 
wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian 
officials in Serbian judicial proceedings. The reply went far 
beyond anything which any Power Germany not excepted 
had ever thought probable. But the same day the British 

(2) [No. 20.] Ambassador at Vienna reported 121 that the tone of the Aus- 

trian Press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, 

and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was 

that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war 

(s >I[No. 41.] inevitable. (3) In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's 

wjNo.23.] reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening/ 4 * 

and Serbia ordered a general mobilisation. 

But an outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated 
(B) [No. 21.] to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. (5> He 
<> [No. 27.] immediately expressed to Germany (6) the hope that she 
would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented 
j-" , . itself with " passing on " the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope 
(7 > [No. 34.] to Vienna (7) through the German Ambassador there. The 
fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the 
fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassa- 
(8) [No. 32.] dor directly afterwards (8) that Serbia had only made a pre- 
tence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a 
sham. 

(so 

During the next four days, 26th to 2Qth July, there was 
only one question before Europe how could Russia and 
Austria be brought to an agreement ? It was evident that 
Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop 
short of the absolute ruin of the Serbian State, if she once 
actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not 
merely one of Government policy ; the popular sentiment 
of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed pro- 
fessed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take 
l) [Nos. 59, no territory from Serbia. (9) But the Austrian Ministers 
90 'J were being borne along on a wave of violent popular en- 
(10) [No.i6i.]thusiasm. (10) They said themselves that they would be 

34 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. Intro.] 

swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire 

for a conflict with Serbia. Would this popular enthusiasm 

be content with any mere punitive expedition against the 

enemy ? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that (1) 

she would have to intervene if Serbia were attacked, 11 ' but she PQ ??i 

promised Austria on the 27th (8) that she would use all her <a) r' No ' 'j 

influence at Belgrade to induce the Serbian Government 

to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to 

delay hostilities' 11 in order to give time for deliberation. < s > [No. 26.] 

Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war 

on Serbia on the 28th. U) Russia ordered a partial mobilisation (1) [No. 50.] 

on the 29th. '" " [No. 70 

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the 
German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him " [No. 36.] 
in London, to discuss the best means towards a settlement.'" || [No. 49.] 
Italy (7) and France (8) at once accepted ; Russia said she was JJ[ RJ'l?'] 
ready to stand aside,' 9 ' but Germany refused. (10) She did ueinfo? 
not like what she called " a court of arbitration," and pro- 
posed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. 
These negotiations actually began, (11) as we have seen in the in) [No. 531 
last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian O- 2 5-] 
declaration of war against Serbia. Austria then apparently 
considered that the moment for such negotiations was 
passed. (ia) She had, moreover, refused to discuss the Serbian < la) [Nos.6i, 
reply in any way, (18) and it was difficult to see, after that 93(3)-] 
refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, (13l [No.62.] 
therefore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference 
of Ambassadors in London, (14) which she had originally (u) [Nos.74, 
expressed her readiness to accept.' 151 The Russian Minister _, ? 8 -] 
for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany 
to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a 
settlement. 

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, 
the 2Qth July. Russia was mobilising partially in her 
southern provinces. (1 " Austrian troops were bombarding Bel- <16) [No. 70 
grade. 117 But, on the other hand, better news was coming n (i)-] 
from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and (1 "[ V - II 3-] 
Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation 
was really serious ; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and 
France was in no condition to go to war.' 1 *' Germany had (18) [Nos.32, 
said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she 

35 



[B. Intro.] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of 
l) [c/. No. stiffening Austria's attitude. {1) But on the evening of the 
T 6 - 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador 
that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg. 
On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances 
made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, 
Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance 
with the request of the Russian Government, urging the 
German Government, if they did not like the idea of the 
Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, 
to suggest any other form they pleased. " Mediation," he 
said, " was ready to come into operation by any method that 
Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the 
m [No. 84.] button in the interests of peace." (8) The telegram was 
despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th. 

~ (6.) 

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange 
response. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign 
Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The 
German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had 
asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a 
war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took 
nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give 
any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, 

() [N O> 85.] but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no terri- 
tory would be taken from her. (3) 

'"[No.ioi.] Sir E. Grey's answer (4) was a peremptory refusal, but 
he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of 
Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question 
with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would 
prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain 
would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby 
the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown per- 
manently into the scale of peace in years to come. 

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations 
continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. 
There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point 
of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On 
the 2gth July the only conflict in progress had been on the 
36 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. Intro.] 

frontiers of Serbia and Austria ; the only fear of further war 
had lain in the relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's 
declarations were pacific ; Russia had said she desired nothing 
but a period of peace to allow for her internal development ; 
France would not fight except to help her ally. There had 
seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace ; it 
was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg. But now a new element of 
danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that 
Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She 
knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had 
for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means 
of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the 
nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield 
of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great 
Power to invade them, war would become increasingly 
difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a 
fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the 
neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent 
safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by 
two international treaties signed by all the Powers, (1) and (1) [April 19, 
recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when 1839 -,see 
the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that ^'o 1 ?'' 
Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that p> * 7 '* 
peace. 

Germany's position must be understood. She had ful- 
filled her treaty obligations in the past ; her action 
now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military 
importance in a war with France ; if such a war occurred, 
it would be one of life and death ; Germany feared that, if 
she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face 
of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The 
neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext 
for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers 
must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war 
now threatened. The British Government, therefore, on 
Friday, the 3ist July, asked the German and French Govern- 
ments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality,'" ( C N - II 4-] 
and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold '"[No.iis/j 
it." 1 France gave the necessary engagement the same day;' 41 U) [No.i25.] 
Belgium gave it the day after;'" Germany returned no (8 '[No.i28.] 

37 



[B. Intro.] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

(1> [No.i22.] reply. (1> Henceforward there could be no doubt of German 
designs. 

, 2) r No JI0 . Meanwhile, on the 30th and 3ist negotiations continued 

6. 66.] between Russia and Austria. w On the 2gih Germany had 

CD rNo 8 -, suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her 

w L n troops had occupied Belgrade. (8) Late on the same night 

97>J Russia offered to stop all military preparations' 4 ' if Austria 

would recognise that the conflict with Serbia had become a 

question of general European interest, and would eliminate 

from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation 

of the sovereignty of Serbia. As the result of this offer, 

Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 

, j- N 6j 3ist that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing 

6 2 j she had refused to do (8) in the first days of the crisis, namely, 

(6 '[Nos. to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Serbia. <6) 

131, 133 ; Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction 

Y. 120, of these discussions. (7) For a few hours there seemed to be 

(7) [Noi33] ahopeof peace * 

(7-) 

At this moment, on Friday, the 3ist, Germany suddenly 

despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she 

(8) [Nos. should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. (8> 

117,121; Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness 

7 'J which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations 

when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is 

that, according to the information in the possession of His 

Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time 

proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general 

(9 '[No.i42.1 mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the 

(10) [No 136 1 nex * ^ a y' *ke ist August. (9) France also began to mobilise 

< u TNo'i2i'l on *^ a t day. (10) The German Secretary of State refused to 

(12) [No!ui!] discuss (11) a last proposal from Sir E. Grey (18) for joint action 

with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should 

be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador 

(13) [0. 76.] at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war. 113 Yet 

on this same day, Saturday, the ist, Russia assured Great 

<14) [No.i39.] Britain (14) that she would on no account commence hostilities 

if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared 

that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as 

38 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. Intro.] 

to prevent a collision. 01 This was the situation when very (1) [Nos. 
early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops J 34. 1 
invaded Luxemburg,'" a small independent State whose (ai [No.i47.] 
neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the 
same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die 
was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had 
become inevitable. 

Only one question now remained for this country. His 
Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a 
general peace. Should they now remain neutral ? The 
grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set 
forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in w [See vol. 
Parliament, which are contained in this volume/ 3 ' and no H-,p.4o 
additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may seq '* 
be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first 
asked for British support, (4> to the 2nd August, when a con- >[NO. 6.] 
ditional promise of naval assistance was given to France/" < [1^0.148.] 
Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise 
of support to either of our present allies/" He maintained <>[No.n6.] 
that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested 
party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would 
be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed 
absolutely to either side in the existing dispute/ 7 ' He (7) [Nos.i7, 
refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay 44-1 

through a show of force. (8) We took no mobilisation w ^ Om ^ 
measures except to keep our fleet assembled/ 91 and we con- ( "[Nos.47, 
fined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th 4 8 -J 

July/ 101 and to Germany on the 2Qth July/ 11 ' that we could wKJrJ 
not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration 
took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies/ 1 " but < ia '[Nos.87, 
to Germany we gave three times on the 30th July/ 131 the n6.] 
3ist July/ 14 ' and the ist August (15) a clear warning of the PJo.ioi.| 
effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the^L^t 
sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality 
of Belgium. 

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the 
afternoon of the ist, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty 
the King as follows : "In this solemn hour I wish to assure 
you once more that I have done all in my power to avert 
war."' 1 " It is right to say that His Majesty's Government <"[VoLII. f 
believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of p. 311.] 



[B. Intro.] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other 
hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted 
that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence 
of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe. 

Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914. 



[B-l 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

OF 

CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT. 



NOTE. 

(1) Documents Nos. 1-159 have been published as a White 
Paper, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) [Cd. 7467]. 

(2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper, 
Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Gd. 7445]. 

(3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, 
Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Cd. 7596]. 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



To Sir H. Rum- 
bold 



Sir H. Rumbold 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 20 



22 



Conversation with German Ambas- 
sador respecting disquieting situa- 
tion between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia. Sir E. Grey assumes that 
Austria-Hungary will publish her 
case against Serbia before taking 
any action, and thus facilitate 
Russia counselling moderation at 
Belgrade 

Attitude of German Government. 
Secretary of State prefers not to 
interfere, and considers that 
Austria-Hungary has shown great 
forbearance towards Serbia in the 
past 

41 



72 



[B.] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



To Sir M. de 

Bunsen 



Communicated 
by Austro- 

Hungarian 
Ambassador 

To Sir M. de 
Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 

Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 
(Telegraphic) 

German Ambas- 
sador 



1914. 
July 23 



24 



24 



24 



24 



24 



24 



Conversation with Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador respecting note to 
be sent to Serbian Government. 
Objections urged to insertion of 
time-limit. Dangers of European 
conflagration 

Text of Austro-Hungarian note to 
Serbia 



Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia. 
Conversation with Austro-Hun- 
garian Ambassador. Sir E. Grey 
deprecates Austrian demands as 
inconsistent with maintenance of 
Serbian independent sovereignty . . 

Conversation with Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs respecting results 
of M. Poincare's visit to St. Peters- 
burg. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and French Ambassador urged that 
His Majesty's Government should 
proclaim solidarity with them. 
Former hoped in any case His 
Majesty's Government would ex- 
press strong reprobation of Austro- 
Hungarian action 

Views of Russian Charge d' Affaires on 
situation as expressed to Austro- 
Hungarian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 

Serbian Prime Minister hopes that His 
Majesty's Government will use 
influence in moderating Austro- 
Hungarian demands 

Views of German Government on 
situation. German Government 
defend attitude of Austria-Hungary 
towards Serbia, and consider matter 
concerns those States alone 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



[B-J 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



To Sir F. Bertie 



To Sir H. Rum- 
bold 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 24 



24 



To Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 
(Telegraphic) 



24 



Communicated 
by Russian 
Ambassador 



To Sir F. Bertie 
Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



Conversation with French Ambas- 
sador respecting Austro-Hungarian 
note and possibility of mediation 
by the four Powers . . . . 94 

Conversation with German Ambas- 
sador, who justified Austro-Hun- 
garian action and demands, and 
urged localisation of conflict. 
Question of using influence at St. 
Petersburg and Vienna in favour 
of moderation. Ambassador says 
Serbian reply must not be a mere 
negative . . . . . . "95 

Suggests lines of Serbian reply to 
Austria-Hungary. To consult with 
Russian and French colleagues 
as to giving advice to Serbian 
Government. Favourable reply 
should be given on as many points 
as possible . . . . . . 96 

Russian Ambassador at Vienna in- 
structed to request extension of 
time-limit allowed to Serbia, and to 
urge that Austria-Hungary should 
inform Powers of basis of accusa- 
tions against Serbia. Recom- 
mends similar instructions to His 
Majesty's Ambassador . . 97 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has 
stated that step taken at Belgrade 
was not an ultimatum. Austro- 
Hungarian Government did not 
threaten actual military opera- 
tions. To inform Minister for 
Foreign Affairs 98 

French Government have given Serbia 
advice similar to that advocated 
by His Majesty's Government (see 
No. 12) 

43 



[B.] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



jf 





16 Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



17 Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 25 



18 Sir H. Rumbold 
(Telegraphic) 



19 Sir R. Rodd . . 
(Telegraphic) 



20 Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



21 Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 
(Telegraphic) 



Acting French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs suggests that moderating 
advice be given at Vienna as well 
as at Belgrade 

Russian Government consider that, 
in view of early expiry of tune- 
limit, it is too late to counsel 
moderation at Belgrade. Russia 
prepared to stand aside if media- 
tion of four Powers is accepted. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs urges 
that Great Britain should act with 
France and Russia. Situation will 
be desperate unless Germany can 
restrain Austria-Hungary 

German Secretary of State admits 
intention of Austria-Hungary to 
take military action against Serbia. 
His Excellency considers crisis 
might be localised. He disclaims 
all previous knowledge of terms of 
Austro-Hungarian note 

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
says Austria-Hungary will only be 
satisfied with unconditional accept- 
ance of her note 

Austro-Hungarian Press comments 
show that Serbian surrender is 
neither expected nor desired. 
Austro-Hungarian Minister will 
leave Belgrade failing unconditional 
acceptance of note by 6 p.m. 
to-day .. .:. 

Brief summary of projected Serbian 
reply 



44 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



To Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir H. Rum- 
bold 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir M. de 

Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 
Sir H. Rum- 
bold 

To Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 



1914. 
July 25 



Russian and French representatives 
still without instructions. In 
view of this and of proposed con- 
ciliatory Serbian reply he has 
abstained from advising Serbian 
Government. Probable that Rus- 
sia has already urged utmost 
moderation on Serbian Government 10 j 

Departure of Austro-Hungarian Min- 
ister. Government has left for 
Nish with diplomatic representa- 
tives . . . . . . . . . . 103 

Refers to No. 6. Approves state- 
ment as to attitude of His Majesty's 
Government. Latter cannot do 
more, but are anxious to prevent 
war. Suggests that four other 
Powers should mediate at Vienna 
and St. Petersburg if Austria- 
Hungary and Russia mobilise. ' 
German co-operation essential . . 104 

Conversation with German Ambas- 
sador respecting question of media- 
tion between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria 
might accept it 104 

Russian communication to Austria- 
Hungary, asking for an extension 
of time-limit of ultimatum to 
Serbia, and enquiring data on which 
Austria bases her demands. He 
should support his Russian col- 
league 

Has informed German Ambassador of 
projected Serbian reply (see No. 
21 ), and expressed hope that Ger- 
many will influence Austria-Hun- 
gary to receive it favourably .. 



105 



106 



45 



[B.J 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



SP 

- 



28 [Nil.] 

29 To Sir R. Rodd 



30 To Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 







33 



(Telegraphic) 



Sir H. Rumbold 
(Telegraphic) 



34 



(Telegraphic) 



35 



Sir R. Rodd . . 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 



July 25 



26 



26 



26 



26 



Has informed Italian Ambassador of 
statements made to German Am- 
bassador (see No. 25). His Excel- 
lency states that Italy is anxious 
to see war avoided 107 

Conversation with Serbian Minister. 
Although ready to meet any reason- 
able demands of Austria-Hungary, 
Serbian Government could not 
agree to abandon certain political 
ideals . . . . . . . . 107 

Serbian reply considered unsatis- 
factory. War regarded as im- 
minent 108 

Reports conversation with German 
Ambassador. Latter considers 
that Russia will remain inactive . . 108 

Reports sudden return of Emperor 
to Berlin. German Under-Secre- 
tary of State of opinion that Russia 
will not move unless Serbian terri- 
tory is annexed 1109 

German Ambassador at Vienna in- 
structed to pass on to Austro- 
Hungarian Government hope of 
His Majesty's Government that 
they will take favourable view of 
Serbian reply. German Govern- 
ment cannot go beyond this . . no 

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes 
proposal for conference, and Italian 
Ambassador at Vienna will be 
instructed accordingly . . . . no 



4 6 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



[B.] 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



To Sir F. Bertie 
,, Sir H. Rum- 
bold 

To Sir R. Rodd 
(Telegraphic) 



37 



To Sir F. Bertie 



Sir R. Rodd .. 



39 



41 



42 



Communicated 
by Serbian 
Minister 

Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 

Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 26 



26 



26 



To ascertain whether Minister for 
Foreign Affairs will agree to a con- 
ference in London, and to ask that 
French, German, and Italian repre- 
sentatives at Vienna, St. Peters- 
burg, and Belgrade should urge on 
respective Governments that, pend- 
ing decision, all active military 
operations should be suspended . . 

It is important to know if France will 
agree to suggestion that the four 
Powers should urge moderation at 
Vienna and St. Petersburg 

Conversation with Italian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who considers 
gravity of situation lies in con- 
viction of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government that their prestige is 
involved 



in 



in 



in 



Text of Serbian reply to Austro- 
Hungarian note 112 



Conversation with Russian Ambas- 
sador. Russian Government will 
not press for more time. Russia 
cannot possibly remain indifferent 
if Serbia is attacked 



Considers that Austria-Hungary is 
fully determined on war with Serbia 

French Government accept proposals 
respecting conference. Necessary 
instructions sent to French repre- 
sentatives at Berlin, Belgrade, 
Vienna, and St. Petersburg 



120 



121 



122 



47 



[B-] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



43 



44 



45 



46 



47 



48 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 27 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



27 



(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



27 



27 



To Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir M. de 
Bunsen 



27 



27 



German Secretary of State is opposed 
to British proposal for a confer- 
ence. In favour of direct exchange 
of views between Vienna and St. 
Petersburg. Germany's position 
in the event of Russian mobilisation. 
Secretary of State more hopeful . . 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' 
conversation with Austro - Hun- 
garian Ambassador respecting note 
to Serbia. Minister for Foreign 
Affairs thinks that Entente Powers 
should present solid front to Germany 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
has decided to propose direct 
conversation between Vienna and 
St. Petersburg 

German Ambassador informed that 
Sir E. Grey desires to keep in touch 
with Germany so long as the latter 
works for peace. Germany should 
urge moderation at Vienna. Ser- 
bian reply might form basis for 
discussion 

Russian Ambassador informed of 
British attitude. Question whether 
Russia would take action if Austria- 
Hungary agreed not to annex 
Serbian territory 

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador, who reviewed Serbian 
question at length. Sir E. Grey 
expressed surprise at Austrian 
attitude towards Serbian reply, 
which seems already to involve 
deep humiliation of Serbia. British 
fleet will be kept assembled, but 
this is no more than proof of 
anxiety felt in country 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



[BO 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



49 



To Sir R. Rodd 



1914. 
July 27 



53 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 

Sir F. Bertie . 



French Ambas- 
sador 



Communicated 
by Russian 
Ambassador 



28 



27 



27 



28 



54 



M It 



28 



Conversation with Italian Ambassador, 
who agrees in proposal for confer- 
ence. His Excellency will recom- 
mend to German Government that 
Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Ser- 
bia should suspend military opera- 
tions pending conference 

Text of declaration of war by Austria- 
Hungary against Serbia 

French Government agree to pro- 
posals of His Majesty's Government 
for conference between the four 
Powers in London . 



French Government in favour of 
British proposal for conference, 
and are ready to send instructions 
accordingly 

Communicates telegram from Rus- 
sian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
to the effect that Russian Govern- 
ment are in favour of British pro- 
posal for conference, failing com- 
mencement of direct Austro-Russian 
conversations 



Communicates telegram received from 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
to effect that German Government 
appear to have taken no measures 
to induce Austria-Hungary to 
modify attitude towards Serbia, and 
suggesting His Majesty's Govern- 
ment approaching the German 
Government. Key of the situation 
really at Berlin 



128 



129 



130 



132 



132 



49 



p.] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



55 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 27 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



27 



57 



Sir R. Rodd . . 
(Telegraphic) 



27 



Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



28 



59 



(Telegraphic) 



28 



Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
will use all his influence at Belgrade 
to induce Serbia to give satisfaction 
to Austria, but Serbian territorial 
integrity must be guaranteed and 
sovereign rights be respected. He 
has proposed direct conversations 
with Austria, but would be perfectly 
ready to stand aside if idea of con- 
ference accepted 

Reports conversation between Rus- 
sian Ambassador and Austro- 
Hungarian Under - Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. Russia 
will be unable to localise war. 
Russia will restrain Serbia as long 
as possible, in order to give time for 
a settlement. Russian Ambassador 
urged that conversations should be 
continued at St. Petersburg 

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs' 
views as to conference and suspen- 
sion of hostilities. Possibility of 
Serbia accepting Austrian note in 
its entirety on recommendation of 
four Powers 

Has communicated substance of No. 
46 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who is confident that Sir E. Grey's 
observations to German Ambassador 
will tend towards peace 

Has communicated No. 47 to Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who fully appre- 
ciates standpoint of His Majesty's 
Government. German Ambassador 
has informed Minister for Foreign 
Affairs that Austria-Hungary would 
respect integrity of Serbia, but gave 
no assurance respecting her inde- 
pendence 



, 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



[B.) 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



60 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 28 



61 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



28 



(Telegraphic) 



28 



Sir R. Rodd . . 
(Telegraphic) 







28 



28 



(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 
(Telegraphic) 



28 



Refers to No. 43. German Secretary 
of State has used similar language 
to French and Italian Ambassadors. 
Agrees with his two colleagues in 
thinking that German Government 
object only to form of proposal 
respecting conference. Suggests 
Herr von Jagow might himself be 
induced to suggest lines of co-opera- 
tion 

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that 
Austria cannot delay proceedings 
against Serbia, and would decline 
any negotiations on basis of Serbian 
reply. Nothing could now prevent 
conflict 

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who 
says that war will be declared to- 
day, and that no mediation could be 
accepted. Has appealed to him 
to place peace of Europe first and 
quarrel with Serbia second 

Has informed Italian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of substance of 
No. 27. He is telegraphing similar 
instructions to Berlin and Vienna 

Informs of conversation between 
Serbian Charg d'Affaires and 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Serbia might still accept whole Aus- 
trian note if certain explanations 
were given her. Such explanations 
should be given to the Powers, who 
should then advise Serbia to accept 
without conditions 

Has urged greatest moderation on 
Serbian Government pending result 
of efforts for peaceful solution . . 



136 



137 



138 



138 



139 



[B.] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



66 



Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 
(Telegraphic) 



67 i To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 28 



28 



68 



69 



(Telegraphic) 



28 



70 



To Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 
(Telegraphic) 



Communicated 
by Count 
Benckendorff 



28 



29 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



28 



Declaration of war by 
Hungary against Serbia 



Austria- 



Refers to No. 43. Proposed con- 
ference would not be arbitration, 
but private and informal discussion 
to find a settlement. Agrees that 
direct conversations between St. 
Petersburg and Vienna would be 
preferable 

Ready to propose that German 
Secretary of State should suggest 
method of mediation by four 
Powers. Will keep the idea in 
reserve till result of Austro-Russian 
conversations is seen 

Refers to No. 55. Expresses satis- 
faction at prospect of direct Austro- 
Russian conversations. Enquires 
further as to proposed action at 
Belgrade 

Communicates text of two telegrams 
from Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to the effect that Russian 
Government will announce partial 
mobilisation on the 2gth July ; that 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna has 
not been recalled ; and that media- 
tion by His Majesty's Government 
is most urgent 

Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, 
who expressed anxiety to work in 
concert with England. Reasons 
for German refusal to support pro- 
posed conference. As Russia had 
mobilised, he could no longer urge 
moderation at Vienna. General 
opinion at Berlin that Russia is 
unprepared for war 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



IB.] 



No. 



Name. Date. 



Subject. 



I 



72 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



73 



74 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



75 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



76 



(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 28 



28 



28 



29 



29 



Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
grateful for Sir E. Grey's language 
to German Ambassador (see No. 
46). If Austria crossed Serbian 
frontier Russia would mobilise. 
Has informed German Ambassador 
that Germany should use her 
influence at Vienna 

Informs of Austrian declaration of war 
against Serbia 



Russian AmbassadorstatesthatAustro- 
Hungarian Government have de- 
clined Russian Government's sug- 
gestion of direct discussion between 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and Austrian Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg. Russian Ambassador 
considers conference in London of. 
less interested Powers the only 
solution 

Chancellor states it is too late to act 
on British suggestion that Serbian 
reply might form basis of discussion. 
German Government had informed 
Austrian Government that they 
quite understood that latter could 
not rest satisfied unless guaranteed 
that demands on Serbia should be 
carried out in their entirety. 
Austrian Government had been 
advised to say openly that hostilities 
had that exclusive object 

German Secretary of State states that 
any appearance of pressing modera- 
tion on Austria would probably 
precipitate matters. His Excellency 
is troubled by reports of military 
measures in Russia and France . . 



143 



144 



144 



145 



53 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



8P 



77 



78 



79 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
fuly 29 



29 



80 



81 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



29 



Sir R. Rodd . . 
(Telegraphic' 



To Sir R. Rodd 
(Telegraphic) 



20 



Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates 
language of Chancellor, and will be 
very grateful if he can save the 
peace of Europe. This country will 
continue to make every effort in 
that direction 

Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. 
Has communicated substance of 
No. 68 to Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. Mobilisation only directed 
against Austria. As Austria has 
definitely declined direct conversa- 
tions, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
will suggest to German Ambassador 
return to idea of conference. Views 
of Minister for Foreign Affairs on 
Italian proposals (see Nos. 57 and 
69). German Ambassador says 
his Government are continuing to 
exert friendly influence at Vienna 

French and Italian Ambassadors agree 
that no steps can now be taken to 
stop war with Serbia. Italian 
Ambassador thinks that Russia 
might remain quiet if Austro- 
Hungarian Government gave bind- 
ing engagement to Europe not to 
acquire Serbian territory or destroy 
independence of Serbia 

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
suggests that German Secretary of 
State might propose formula, and 
that this might be concomitant with 
direct Austro-Russian conversations 

Understands that Austria will not 
accept any form of mediation 
between Austria and Serbia. Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs should 
speak at Berlin and Vienna 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. Date. 



Subject. 



82 Mr. Beaumont 
(Telegraphic) 



Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe 
(Telegraphic) 



84 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



86 



Sir R. Rodd . . 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 29 



29 



29 



29 



29 



Designs of Austria likely to extend 
considerably beyond the sanjak and 
punitive occupation of Serbian 
territory. Expected assistance for 
Austrian army from Mussulman 
population in Serbia 

Has been asked by Serbian Prime 
Minister to convey his thanks for 
statement in the House of Commons 
on the zyth July 

German Ambassador states that 
Chancellor is endeavouring to medi- 
ate between Austria and Russia. 
His Majesty's Government urge that 
Germany should suggest some 
method by which the four Powers 
could preserve the peace between 
Austria and Russia 

German Secretary of State offers that 
in return for British neutrality 
German Government would give 
every assurance that they would 
make no territorial acquisitions at 
the expense of France. He was 
unable to give similar assurance 
as regards French colonies. If 
neutrality of Holland were respected 
by Germany's adversaries, Germany 
would give assurances to do like- 
wise. Operations of Germany in 
Belgium depend on action of France, 
but at end of war Belgian integrity 
would be respected if she had not 
sided against Germany 

In view of partial Russian mobilisa- 
tion, Italian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs thinks moment is passed 
for further discussion on basis of 
Serbian note. His utmost hope is 
that Germany will influence Vienna 
to prevent or moderate any further 
Austrian demands on Serbia 

55 



150 



15* 



15* 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



87 



89 



90 



To Sir F. Bertie 



1914. 
July 29 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 



29 



29 



29 



To Sir M, de 
Bunsen 



29 



Conversation with French Ambassador 
respecting policy of His Majesty's 
Government. Has told M. Cambon 
of intention to warn German Am- 
bassador that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment will not necessarily stand 
aside if efforts for peace fail. On 
the other hand, the present case is 
different from that of Morocco a 
few years back, and if France 
becomes involved His Majesty's 
Government, who are free from 
engagements, will have to decide on 
their attitude in the light of British 
interests 

Conversation with German Ambas- 
sador. Austro-Hungarian declara- 
tion of war having rendered direct 
conversation between Vienna and 
St. Petersburg impossible, it is most 
important, in the event of German 
Chancellor failing in his efforts at 
mediation, that Germany should 
propose some method of co-opera- 
tion between the four Powers 

Has warned German Ambassador of 
possibility of British intervention 
in certain eventualities 

Has communicated to German Am- 
bassador text of Italian proposals 
and of reply returned thereto (see 
Nos. 64 and 81). Discussion of 
question of mediation 

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador, who attempted to 
justify attitude of his Government 
in spite of readiness of Powers to 
assist in obtaining satisfaction from 
Serbia 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



SP 
fi 



92 



93 



94 



95 



To Sir R. Rodd 



Communicated 
by Count 
Benckendorff 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 29 



29 



Conversation with Italian Ambassador. 
Italian Government suggest that 
German objections to mediation 
might be met by some change in 
procedure 

Communicates telegraphic correspond- 
ence between himself, Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna, 
(i) Austro-Hungarian Government 
have been urged by Russian Am- 
bassador at Vienna to be moderate 
towards Serbia ; (2) negotiations 
with German Government through 
Russian Ambassador at Berlin ; 
(3) Austro-Hungarian Government 
decline direct conversations with 
Russian Government 

In present temper of Austria-Hungary, 
irrevocable steps may be taken un- 
less Germany with the other three 
Powers can mediate at once. Rus- 
sian Ambassador fears effect on 
Russian opinion if serious engage- 
ment takes place before agreement 
is reached. Reports interviews 
between the Russian and French 
Ambassadors and the German 
Ambassador 

Conversation with Russian Ambas- 
sador. Russia could not see Serbia 
crushed, but would acquiesce in 
measures that would safeguard 
Austria-Hungary's Slav provinces 
from further hostile propaganda. 
Extreme anti-Serbian and anti- 
Russian sentiments of German 
Ambassador, to whom text of Austro- 
Hungarian note was probably 
known beforehand . . . . 



159 



161 



162 



57 



[B.] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



96 



97 



99 



Sir M. de Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 30 



Subject. 



Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs has informed Russian Am- 
bassador that, as Russia had 
mobilised, Austria must do likewise. 
No threat meant. No objection to 
direct Austro-Hungarian conversa- 
tions being continued at St. Peters- 
burg. Russian Ambassador more 
hopeful 

German Ambassador has informed 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that his Government would guaran- 
tee that Austria should respect 
Serbian integrity. Russia could 
not, however, agree to vassalage of 
Serbia to Austria. Formula of 
conditions subject to which Russia 
would stop military preparations 

German Government have asked 
Austrian Government whether they 
would accept mediation on basis of 
occupation of Belgrade by Austrian 
troops and issue of conditions from 
there. Could His Majesty's 
Government induce Russia to agree 
to above basis for an arrangement ? 
German Secretary of State says 
that Russian mobilisation has 
increased difficulties of situation. 
German Government have made no 
special military preparations 

Conversation with President of the 
Republic regarding German com- 
munication to St. Petersburg as 
to Russian mobilisation. Russia 
consents to demobilise subject to 
assurance from Austria to respect 
sovereignty of Serbia and submit 
certain points in the Austrian note 
to international discussion. Peace 
depended on attitude of His 
Majesty's Government. Pacific 



163 



164 



165 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



IB-] 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



1914. 



99 



100 



101 



Sir F. Bertie 
(continued) 



Sir R. Rodd . . 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



July 30 



102 



103 



(Telegraphic) 



To Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 
(Telegraphic) 



attitude of France. A British de- 
claration to support France would 
prevent Germany going to war. 
Explained difficulty of such a 
declaration 

German Ambassador at Rome thinks 
Germany could prevent Austria 
from making exorbitant demands 
if Serbia would submit on occupa- 
tion of Belgrade 

Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's 
Government cannot entertain Ger- 
man proposals to secure British 
neutrality. For many reasons such 
a bargain with Germany at the 
expense of France would be a 
disgrace to Great Britain. His 
Majesty's Government cannot bar- 
gain away her obligations regarding 
Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's 
Government must preserve full 
freedom of action. Best way of 
maintaining good relations with 
Great Britain is for Germany to 
work with her for the preservation 
of peace 

Has warned German Ambassador that 
Germany must not count on Great 
Britain standing aside in all cir- 
cumstances 

German Ambassador states that Ger- 
man Government would advise 
Austria not to advance beyond 
Belgrade and adjoining territories, 
whilst Powers urged Serbia to give 
satisfaction sufficient to placate 
Austria. Earnest hope that this 
may be agreed to. Suggests change 
in the formula proposed by Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (see 
No. 97) in order to meet existing 
situation 



r.66 



167 



167 



168 



169 



[B-] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



104 



To Sir F. Bertie 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 30 



105 



106 



Sir R. Rodd . . 
(Telegraphic) 



107 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



108 



(Telegraphic) 



To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (see 
No. 103). Trusts that French Am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg will be 
able to induce Russian Government 
not to precipitate a crisis 

Conversation with French Ambas- 
sador respecting attitude of Great 
Britain in event of conflict between 
France and Germany ; encloses 
copies of notes exchanged with 
French Ambassador in 1912, and 
discusses their scope. Cabinet to 
meet to-morrow 

Austria has declined to continue direct 
conversations with Russia. Ger- 
many believed to be more disposed 
to give conciliatory advice at 
Vienna owing to likelihood of British 
support for Russia and France. 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
is in favour of working with His 
Majesty's Government even if idea 
of discussions between four Powers 
is impossible 

Has asked German Secretary of State 
if he can suggest any course of 
action. Latter replied that he was 
in communication with Vienna to 
save time. Chancellor was " press- 
ing the button" at Vienna to utmost 
of his power, and feared he had 
perhaps gone too far 

German Chancellor states that owing 
to Russian mobilisation Germany 
cannot remain quiet. These pro- 
ceedings had come just when the 
Tsar had appealed to the Emperor 
and when the latter was about to 
mediate at Vienna . 



175 



60 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



[B.] 



No. 



Name. 



Pate. 



Subject. 



109 



no 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 
(Telegraphic) 



in 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



112 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 31 



Reports having read to Chancellor 
reply of His Majesty's Government 
to his appeal for British neutrality 
(see No. 101.) Chancellor desires 
time to reflect on it 

German Ambassador states that 
Austro-Russian conversations have 
been resumed at Vienna and St. 
Petersburg. German Ambassador 
has asked that Russia should suspend 
military preparations in meanwhile. 
Has informed his Excellency that 
His Majesty's Government cannot 
ask Russia to do this unless Austria 
consents to limit advance of her 
troops into Serbia. Expresses 
satisfaction at resumption of con- 
versations 

If settlement cannot be reached by 
direct Austro-Russian conversations, 
suggests that four Powers should 
undertake to obtain full satisfaction 
of Austrian demands from Serbia, 
provided latter's sovereignty and 
integrity remain intact. Has in- 
formed German Ambassador that if 
Austria and Germany could bring 
forward any fair proposal, His 
Majesty's Government would sup- 
port it strongly at Paris and St. 
Petersburg 

German Government are about to 
proclaim " Kriegsgefahr," to be 
followed by immediate mobilisation. 
Germany preparing for all emerg- 
encies 

Russian general mobilisation ordered , 
owing to Austro-Hungarian move- 
ments of troops against her. Ger- 
many also making military pre- 
parations. Russia cannot allow 
Germany to get a start 

61 



176 



176 



177 



178 



179 



[B.1 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



H4 To Sir F. Bertie 
Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 

115 To Sir F. Villiers 
(Telegraphic) 



116 To Sir F. Bertie 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 31 



117 



118 



119 



Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



Inquires whether France and 
Germany will engage to respect 
neutrality of Belgium 

To inform Belgian Government of 
No. 114. Sir E. Grey assumes 
that Belgium will do her utmost to 
maintain her neutrality 

French Ambassador informed that His 
Majesty's Government cannot under- 
take definite pledge to intervene 
in war, but that situation will be 
reconsidered in presence of any new 
development 

Informs of German ultimatum to 
Russia. German Ambassador 
demands answer from French 
Government by i P.M. to-morrow 
as to French attitude 

Under-Secretary of State says that 
mobilisation was not necessarily 
a hostile act. Austria-Hungary 
resents Russian intervention on 
behalf of Serbia. Russian Am- 
bassador states that his Govern- 
ment have advised Serbian com- 
pliance with Austrian demands so 
far as compatible with indepen- 
dence 

Has denied to French Ambassador 
that His Majesty's Government 
had given German Government the 
impression that they would remain 
neutral. His Majesty's Government 
could not, however, at the present 
moment give France any pledge, 
though further developments might 
justify intervention 



62 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



[BO 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



8P 
5 



120 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 31 



121 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



122 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



123 



To Sir E. Gos- Aug. i 
chen 



124 



Sir F. Bertie . . j July 31 
(Telegraphic) 



New formula proposed by Russian 
Government. Russian Government 
will maintain waiting attitude if 
Austria agrees to stop advance of 
her troops and to allow consideration 
by Great Powers of satisfaction to 
be given by Serbia to Austria- 
Hungary without prejudice to her 
independence. Tsar has undertaken 
that no Russian soldier will cross 
frontier so long as conversation with 
Austria continues 

German Government appreciate Sir 
E. Grey's efforts to maintain peace, 
but cannot consider any proposal 
pending Russian reply to ultimatum 
presented by Germany relating to 
Russian mobilisation 

Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 
114. Secretary of State cannot 
reply to British request until he has 
consulted Emperor and Chancellor. 
He doubts, however, whether Ger- 
man Government can give any 
answer. German Government 
alleges commission of hostile acts 
by Belgium 

Conversation with German Ambas- 
sador respecting the possible effect 
on British public opinion of any 
violation of the neutrality of Bel- 
gium. Any promise that His 
Majesty's Government should stand 
aside definitely refused 

German ultimatum to Russia. French 
Government anxious to know at 
once attitude of His Majesty's 
Government 



184 



185 



186 



186 



187 



IB.] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



125 Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



126 



127 



128 



129 



130 



(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 

Sir F. Villiers 
(Telegraphic) 



Luxemburg 
Minister of 
State 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
July 31 



Aug. i 



Neutrality of Belgium (see No. 114). 
French Government are resolved 
to respect neutrality of Belgium 
unless compelled to act otherwise 
by reason of violation at the hands 
of another Power 



German Ambassador has been in- 
formed that French Government 
fail to understand reason for 
German communication respecting 
attitude of France in the event of 
a Russo-German war (see No. 117). 
German Ambassador will see 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the 
evening 



Mobilisation of Austrian army and 
fleet 



Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 
115. Belgium expects Powers to 
observe and uphold her neutrality; 
which she intends to maintain to 
the utmost of her power 



German Government have informed 
Luxemburg that the German mili- 
tary measures in that country do 
not constitute a hostile act, but are 
only to insure against attack from 
France 



British merchant ships have been 
detained at Hamburg. To request 
immediate release. Points out de- 
plorable effect on British public 
opinion if detention continued . . 



6 4 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



132 
133 



134 



Name. 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



135 



To Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 
(Telegraphic) 



Date. 



1914. 
Aug. 



Subject. 



E 



Russian Government report readiness 
of Austria to discuss with Russia 
and to accept basis of mediation not 
open to objections raised in regard 
to original Russian formula (see 
No. 97). Hopes that German 
Government may be able to make 
use of Russian communication in 
order to avoid tension 

Russia consents to British formula 
for basis of mediation (see No. 103) 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has 
informed Russian Government that 
Austro-Hungarian Government are 
ready to discuss substance of Aus- 
trian ultimatum to Serbia. Russian 
Government hope that these dis- 
cussions will take place in London 
with participation of Great Powers, 
and that His Majesty's Government 
will assume direction of them 

Conversation with President of Re- 
public. German Government are 
trying to saddle Russia with the 
responsibility for present situation. 
President justifies Russian action. 
Germany is practically mobilising, 
so France must also. French 
troops are kept 10 kilom. from 
frontier, whereas Germans have 
made incursions into French terri- 
tory. French Government do not 
yet despair of possibility of avoiding 
war 

Has received reliable information that 
Austria-Hungary has informed 
German Government that she would 
accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for 
mediation between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Serbia. Military action 

65 



tgi 



191 



192 



192 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



135 



136 



137 



138 



To Sir G. Bu- 
chanan 

(continued) 



Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir M. de 
Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 



Aug. i 



130 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 



would continue against Serbia for 
present, but Russian mobilisation 
and Austro - Hungarian counter 
measures would cease. He should 
inform Minister for Foreign Affairs 

General mobilisation in France ordered 
owing to German military measures. 
French troops have left a zone of 
10 kilom. between them and the 
frontier 

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has 
given assurance that Austrians 
will respect territorial integrity of 
Serbia, and will not occupy sanjak. 
Austria has not " banged the door " 
on further conversations with 
Russia 

Conversation with German Secretary 
of State. German Government have 
ordered mobilisation. Absence of 
reply to German ultimatum must 
be regarded as creating a state of 
war. Russian Government will be 
so informed 

Unsatisfactory result of discussions 
between German and Austro-Hun- 
garian Ambassadors with the Tsar 
and Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs respectively. Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs says 
that Austrian domination of Serbia 
would vitally affect Russia, and 
that he is weary of his ceaseless 
efforts to avoid war. Action of 
Austro-Hungarian Government and 
German preparations have forced 
Russian Government to order 
mobilisation, and mobilisation of 
Germany has created desperate 
situation. M. Sazonof would adhere 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



139 



140 



141 



142 
143 

144 



Sir G. Buchanan 
(continued) 



Sir F. Bertie . . 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 



Date. 



Subject. 



1914. 



Aug. i 



to formula contained in No. 120, 
if its acceptance could be secured 
before the Germans cross frontier. 
In no case will Russia commence 
hostilities. Fear of general con- 
flagration in the Balkans 

French Minister for War has impressed 
on British military attache that 
only way of securing peace was 
for Great Britain to take military 
action. Minister of War maintains 
that France has, by withdrawing 
from frontier, given proof of her 
desire to abstain from any provoca- 
tive act 

Conversation with Russian Ambas- 
sador at Vienna respecting German 
ultimatum to Russia. His Ex- 
cellency thinks that German 
Government desired war from the 
first. Explains nature of Russian 
mobilisation, and says that Russia 
had no intention of attacking Aus- 
tria. French Ambassador to speak 
earnestly to Austrian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. Anxiety as to 
attitude of Great Britain 

General mobilisation of German army 
and navy 

Detention of British steamers. Ger- 
man Secretary of State has promised 
to send orders to release steamers 
without delay 

German Secretary of State says that, 
owing to certain Russian troops 
having crossed frontier, Germany 
and Russia are in a state of war . 



[B.J 



196 



198 



99 



99 



oo 



[B.] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



145 Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
Aug. 2 



146 Sir F. Villiers 
(Telegraphic) 



147 Luxemburg 

Minister of 
State 
(Telegraphic) 



148 To Sir F. Bertie 
(Telegraphic) 



149 To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 

(Telegraphic] 



150 Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 



68 



Orders sent last night to allow British 
ships detained in Hamburg to pro- 
ceed. This as a special favour to 
His Majesty's Government. Rea- 
son of detention was that mines 
were being laid and other precau- 
tions taken 

Belgian Government confirms report 
that German force has entered 
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 

Acts of German troops in Luxemburg 
territory are manifestly contrary to 
the neutrality of the Grand Duchy 
guaranteed by Treaty of London of 
1867. Protest has been made to 
the German representatives at 
Luxemburg and also to German 
Secretary of State 

Assurance given to French Ambas- 
sador respecting protection by 
British fleet of French coasts or 
shipping subject to consent of 
Parliament. Question of despatch 
of British force to assist France. 
Effect of violation of Luxemburg 
and Belgian neutrality 

Detention of British steamers. Sugar 
unloaded by force from British 
vessels at Hamburg and detained. 
Should inform Secretary of State 
that His Majesty's Government 
trust that order already sent for 
release of British vessels covers 
also release of cargoes (see No. 143) 

Detention of British steamers. Refers 
to No. 149. No information avail- 
able 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



[B.J 



No. 



153 



154 



155 



156 



Name. 



Sir F. Villiers 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Villiers 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir F. Villiers 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



Date. 



1914. 
Aug. 3 



Subject. 



French Government have offered five 
army corps to Belgian Government. 
Belgian Government reply that 
whilst sincerely grateful they do not 
propose to appeal to the guarantee 
of the Powers, and will decide later 
on their action 

Communication of French Ambas- 
sador to effect that Italy does not 
consider casus fcederis has arisen . . 

Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's 
Government have been informed 
that German Government have pro- 
posed to Belgium friendly neutrality 
entailing free passage through Bel- 
gian territory, and of German 
threat in case of refusal. Belgian 
Government have declined offer. 
Should ask for immediate assurance 
from German Government that they 
will not proceed with threat or 
violate Belgian territory 

Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In 
view of Belgian reply, German 
Government have threatened to 
carry out their proposals by force 

To inform Belgian Government that 
His Majesty's Government expect 
that they will resist attempt to 
infringe their neutrality. His Ma- 
jesty's Government prepared to 
join with Russia and France in 
assisting Belgian Government to 
resist German aggression and to 
guarantee independence and in- 
tegrity in future years 

To demand immediate release of 
British ships detained in German 
ports 



203 



203 



204 



205 



205 



205 



IB.] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Subject. 



to 

rt 



157 



158 



159 



Communicated 
by German 
Ambassador 
(Telegraphic) 



Sir F. Villiers 
(Telegraphic) 



To Sir E. Gos- 
chen 
(Telegraphic) 



1914. 
Aug. 4 



160 



161 



Sir E. Goschen 



Sir M. de Bun- 
sen 



Sept. i 



Assurance that Germany will in no 
case annex Belgian territory. 
Germany forced to disregard 
Belgian neutrality owing to know- 
ledge of French plans . . . . 206 

German troops have entered Belgian 
territory. Liege summoned to sur- 
render . . . . . . . . 206 

Belgian neutrality threatened by 
Germany. Unless German Govern- 
ment prepared to give assurance by 
12 midnight to respect neutrality 
of Belgium^ His Majesty's Ambas- 
sador is to ask for passports and 
to say that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment feel bound to take all steps in 
their power to uphold their treaty 
obligations . . . . . . . . 207 

Reports final negotiations at Berlin. 
Records departure from Berlin and 
journey to England . . . . 207 

Reviews negotiations with Austro- 
Hungarian Government at Vienna, 
and incidents upon rupture of 
diplomatic negotiations. Reports 
departure from Vienna upon 
declaration of war . . . . . . 214 



70 



11.1] 



PART I. 



CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT. 



No. i. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge 
d' Affaires at Berlin. 

Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. 

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day U) if he had any |l) [cf. Y. 
news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Serbia. I 9-l 

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going 
to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very 
uncomfortable. 

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that 
Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador 
in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation 
was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up. 

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very 
desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard 
to Serbia. 

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government 
would not do anything until they had first disclosed to .the 
public their case against Serbia, founded presumably upon 
what they had discovered at the trial. 

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they 
would act upon some case that would be known. 

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as 
Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the 
more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable 
limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce 
for making any demand, the more chance there would be of 
smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between 
any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be 
dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable. 

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. 

71 



fB. 2] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 22, 

No. 2. 

Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 22.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914. 

LAST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
and the forthcoming Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded 
to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His 
Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's 
part would have been made ere this. He insisted that 
question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and 
11 [cf. No. Austria alone, (1) and that there should be no interference from 
9 & note.] ou tside in the discussions between those two countries. He 
had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro- 
Hungarian Government should be approached by the German 
a> [cf- Y. 36 Government on the matter. w He had, however, on several 
& note.] occas i onS) j n conversation with the Serbian Minister, empha- 
sised the extreme importance that Austro-Serbian relations 
should be put on a proper footing. 

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long 
time past the attitude adopted towards Serbia by Austria 
had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance. 



No. 3. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador 
at Vienna. 

Foreign Office, July 23, 1914. 

COUNT MENSDORFF told me to-day that he would 
be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the 
communication that he understood was being made to Serbia 
to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the 
nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the 
facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give 
me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I 
gathered that they would include proof of the complicity 
of some Serbian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently 
made by Austria on Serbia. 

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on 
which I would make any comment until I received an official 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK IB. 3] 

communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on 
which I should not be able to make any comment at first 
sight. 

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed 
there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which 
was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted 
this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame 
opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impos- 
sible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared 
that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing 
a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from 
Serbia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the 
proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that 
a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards ; that, 
if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first 
instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after 
a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case 
was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Govern- 
ment would be in a position to use their influence in favour 
of a satisfactory reply from Serbia. A time-limit was gener- 
ally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other 
means had been tried and failed. 

Count Mensdorff said that if Serbia, in the interval that had 
elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily 
instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might 
have been avoided. (J) In 1909, Serbia had said in a note that (U [c/.R.g.] 
she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with 
Austria ; (2) but she had never kept her promise, she had (21 [No. 4, 
stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate par> 2 ^ 
Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect 
herself. 

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what 
Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not 
help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the 
situation. (8) Great apprehension had been expressed to me, <3) [c/. Nos. 
not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but 5. w, " 
also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been 2 5 Y> 
represented to me that it would be very desirable that those 
who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf 
of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount 
of influence that could be used in this sense would depend 

73 



[B. 4] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2, 

upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how 
strong the justification that Austria might have discovered 
for making her demands. The possible consequences of the 
present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great 
Powers of Europe let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and 
Germany were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it 
must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, 
and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accom- 
panied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit 
and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this 
would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, 
irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things 
might be completely swept away. 

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the 
possible consequences of the present situation, but he said 
that all would depend upon Russia. 

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as 
this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep 
the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to 
make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were 
difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first 
instance to discuss them directly with each other. 

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, 
but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. 
Petersburg had not been very favourable recently. 

No. 4. 

Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London. 

<* [For de- (Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.) (1) 

livery see 
O. i ; s. LE Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est vu oblige 

32. See d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par 1'entremise du Ministre 
also note Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouverne- 
to Y. 49, ment Royal de Serbie : 

" Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait,, 
d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal la declaration suivante : 

' La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas te atteinte dans 
ses droits par le fait accompli cree* en Bosnie-Herzegovine 
et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision que 
- 74 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 4] 

les Puissances prcndront par rapport a 1'article 25 du Traite" 
de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, 
la Serbie s'engage ds a present a abandonner 1'attitude 
de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observed a regard 
de 1'annexion depuis 1'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en 
outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers 
I'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre de*sormais avec cette derni&re 
sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.' 

" Or, 1'histoire des derni&res anne*es, et notamment les 
^v^nements douloureux du 28 juin, ont de*montre* 1'existence 
en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de 
detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise certaines parties 
de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les 
yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrive a se manifester au 
dela du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par 
une se"rie d'attentats et par des meurtres. 

" Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux 
engagements formels contenus dans la declaration du 31 
mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a 
tole"re* 1'activite criminelle des diff6rentes societe"s et affiliations 
dingoes contre la Monarchic, le langage effrene de la presse, 
la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation 
d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, 
une propagande malsaine dans 1'instruction publique, tole*re 
enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la popu- 
lation serbe a la haine de la Monarchic et au mepris de ses 
institutions. 

" Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de 
Serbie n'avait pas cesse au moment oil les ^v^nements du 
28 juin dernier en ont demontre au monde entier les conse"- 
quences funestes. 

" II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels 
c!e 1'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a et6 
trame" a Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meur- 
triers se trouvaient etre munis leur ont etc* donn6s par des 
( fficiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la ' Narodna 
Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels 
et de leurs armes a e*te" organise" et effectue* par des chefs du 
service-frontire serbe. 

" Les resultats mentionn^s de 1'instruction ne permettent 
pas au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de poursuivre plus 

75 



[B. 4] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 24 

longtemps 1'attitude de longanimite expectative qu'il avait 
observed pendant des anne*es vis-a-vis des agissements con- 
centres a Belgrade et propage*s de la sur les territoires de 
la Monarchic ; ces resultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir 
de mettre fin a des menees qui forment une menace perpetuelle 
pour la tranquillity de la Monarchic. 

" C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal se voit oblige de demander au Gouvernement serbe 
1'enonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirig6e 
centre la Monarchic austro-hongroise, c'est-a-dire 1' ensemble 
des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de 
la Monarchic des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage 
a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle 
et terroriste. 

" Ann de donner un caractere solennel a cet engagement, 
le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere 
page du ' Journal ofnciel ' en date du 13/26 juillet 1'enoncia- 
tion suivante : 

' Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la 
propagande dirigee centre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire 
1'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher 
de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font 
partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes 
de ces agissements criminels. 

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des.officiers et 

fonctionnaires serbes aient participe a la propagande susmen- 

tionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage 

auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'etait solennellement engage 

(1) ["ses P ar sa declaration (1) du 31 mars, 1909. 

declara- ' Le Gouvernement Royal, qui desapprouve et repudie 

tions," toute idee ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinees des 

Y - 2 4-2 habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce 

soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, 

les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que 

dore*navant il procedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les 

personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements 

qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer.' 

" Cette enonciation sera portee simultane*ment a la connais- 
sance de I'Arme'e Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste 
le Roi et sera publie'e dans le 'Bulletin ofnciel ' de I'arme'e. 

76 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 4] 

" Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre : 

" i a supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine 
et au me"pris de la Monarchic et dont la tendance ge"ne*rale est 
dirige*e contre son inte'grite' territoriale ; 

" 2 a dissoudre imme'diatement la socie*te* dite ' Narodna 
Odbrana/ a confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et a 
proce'der de la meme manire contre les autres socie*t6s et 
affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande contre 
la Monarchic austro-hongroise ; le Gouvernement Royal 
prendra les mesures ne"cessaires pour que les socie*ts dissoutes 
ne puissent pas continuer leur activite* sous un autre nom 
et sous une autre forme ; 

"3 a eliminer sans de*lai de 1'instruction publique en 
Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les 
moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a 
fomenter la propagande contre rAutriche-Hongrie ; 

" 4 a eloigner du service militaire et de 1'administration 
en ge*ndral tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la 
propagande contre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et dont le 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal se reserve de communiquer 
les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal ; 

" 5 a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes 
du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal dans la suppression 
du mouvement subversif dirige" contre I'inte'grite' territoriale 
de la Monarchic ; 

" 6 a ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du 
complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe ; 

" des organes, de'le'gue's par le Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives ; 

" 7 a proce'der d'urgence a 1'arrestation du Commandant 
Voija Tankosic* et du nomine" Milan tiganovic', employe" de 
l'tat serbe, compromis par les re"sultats de 1'instruction de 
Sarajevo ; 

" 8 a empecher, par* des mesures efficaces, le concours 
des autorite"s serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs 
a travers la frontiere ; 

" a licencier et punir se*vrement les fonctionnaires du 
service-frontiere de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir 
aid6 les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le 
passage de la frontiere ; 

" 9 a donner au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal des 

if 



|B. 4] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 24 

explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauls fonction- 
naires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a l'e*tranger, qui, malgre' leur 
position officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres 1'attentat du 28 
juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une maniere hostile 
envers la Monarchic austro-hongroise ; enfin 

" 10 d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal de l'exe*cution des mesures comprises dans les points 
precedents. 

" Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal attend la reponse 
du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 
de ce mois, a 6 heures du soir. 

" Un memoire concernant les resultats de 1'instruction 
de Sarajevo a 1'egard des fonctionnaires mentionne's aux 
points 7 et 8 est annexe a cette note." 

J'ai 1'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir 
porter le contenu de cette note a la connaissance du Gouverne- 
ment aupres duquel vous etes accre"dite, en accompagnant 
cette communication du commentaire que voici : 

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adresse" 
a I'Axitriche-Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit 
ci-dessus. 

Le lendemain meme de cette declaration la Serbie s'est 
engagee dans une politique tendant a inspirer des idees sub- 
versives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchic austro- 
hongroise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires 
austro-hongrois, limitrophes a la Serbie. 

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle. 

Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pas a se former 
qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, etaient destinees 
a creer des desordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces 
societes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des 
generaux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'fitat et des 
juges, bref les sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du 
rovaume. 

*/ 

Le journalisme serbe est presque entierement au service 
de cette propagande, dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et 
pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe 
n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic 
voisine ou a des attentats dirige"s plus ou moins ouvertement 
contre sa surete et son integrity. 

78 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 4] 

Un grand nombre d'agents est appeie a soutenir par tous 
les moyens 1'agitation centre 1' Autriche-Hongrie et a corrompre 
dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays. 

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont 
les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, 
a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernire crise balkanique ; 
des individus ayant fait partie des bandes j usque-la occupies 
en Mace'doine sont venus se mettre a la disposition de la 
propagande terroriste centre 1'Autriche-Hongrie. 

En presence de ces agissements, auxquels 1'Autriche- 
Hongrie est expos^e depuis des annes, le Gouvernement de 
la Serbie n'a pas cm devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est 
ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manque* au devoir que lui 
imposait la declaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est 
ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonte" de 1'Europe 
et avec 1'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de 1'Autriche- 
Hongrie. 

La longanimite du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a 
regard de 1'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie etait inspired 
du desinteressement territorial de la Monarchic austro- 
hongroise et de 1'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait 
tout de meme par appre*cier a sa juste valeur 1'amitie de 
TAutriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante 
pour les interets politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal esperait que le royaume se deciderait finale- 
ment a suivre de son cote une ligne de conduite analogue. 
L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout a une pareille evo- 
lution dans les idees politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les 
eVenements de 1'annee 1912, le Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal rendit possible, par une attitude de"sinteressee et sans 
rancune, 1'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. 

Cette bienveillance manifestee par 1'Autriche-Hongrie a 
regard de 1'litat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifie les 
precedes du royaume, qui a continue a toierer sur son territoire 
une propagande, dont les funestes consequences se sont mani- 
festees au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour ou 1'heritier 
presomptif de la Monarchic et son illustre ipouse devinrent 
les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. 

En presence de cet etat de choses le Gouvernement Imperial 
et Royal a dft se decider a entreprendre de nouvelles et pres- 
santes demarches a Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement 

79 



[B. 4] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 

serbe a arreter le mouvement incendiaire mena9ant la surete 
et I'inte'grite de la Monarchic austro-hongroise. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal est persuade qu'en 
entreprenant cette demarche il se trouve en plein accord avec 
les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees, qui ne sauraient 
admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se 
servir impunement dans la lutte politique, et que la paix 
europeenne fut continuellement troublee par les agissements 
partant de Belgrade. 

C'est a 1'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement 
Imperial et Royal tient a la disposition du Gouvernement 
Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier eUucidant les menses 
serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menees et le meurtre 
du 28 juin. 

Une communication identique est adressee aux represen- 
tants Imperiaux et Royaux aupres des autres Puissances 
signataires. 

Vous etes autoris6 de laisser une copie de cette depeche 
entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914. 

ANNEXE. 

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sara- 
jevo centre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et 
de complicite y relative rcrime commis par eux le 28 juin 
dernier a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes : 

i. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son 
sejour a Sarajevo, 1'Archiduc Franois-Ferdinand fut forme 
a Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovid, le 
nomme Milan Ciganovid et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours 
du commandant Voija Tankosic. 

2. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec 
munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis 
Tattentat, furent livre"s a Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovi<5 et 
Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovid et le commandant 
Voija Tankosid. 

3. Les bombes sont des grenades a la main provenant 
du depot d'armes de rarme*e serbe a Kragujevac. 

4. Pour assurer la reussite de 1'attentat, Ciganovid enseigna 
a Princip, Cabrinovid et Grabez la maniere de se servir des 
80 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 4] 

grenades et donna, dans un foret prs du champ de tir a 
Topschider, des lemons de tir avec pistolets Browning a Princip 
et a Grabez. 

5. Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabrinovic* et Grabei" 
de passer la frontire de Bosnie-Herzlgovine et d'y introduire 
clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un syst&me de 
transport secret fut organise* par Ciganovic*. 

D'apres cette organisation 1'introduction en Bosnie-Herze"- 
govine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut ope*re"e par les 
capitaines-frontieres de Chabad (Rade Popovic") et de LoXnica 
ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbi de Loznica avec 
le concours de divers particuliers. 

(TRANSLATION. ) (1) > [cf. the 

t r i n s 1 &~ 

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to tioninW., 
address the following note to the Serbian Government on vol. II., 
the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian p. 136.] 
Minister at Belgrade : 

" On the 3ist March, 1909, the Serbian Minister in Vienna, 
on the instructions of the Serbian Government, made the 
following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment (2) : <" [cf. Nos. 

" ' Serbia recognises that the fait accompli regarding X 7. 55 ; 
Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will 

conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in con- ' 
formity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference 
to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to re- 
nounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposi- 
tion which she has adopted with regard to the annexation 
since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the 
direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and 
to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.' 

" The history of recent years/" and in particular the painful <>[ C /.R.i9.] 
events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a 
subversive movement with the object of detaching a part 
of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. 
The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Serbian 
Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on 
both sides of the Serbian frontier in the shape of acts of 
terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. 

F 81 



[B. 4] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK UULY 2 

" Far from carrying out the formal undertakings con- 
tained in the declaration of the 3ist March, 1909, the Royal 
Serbian Government has done nothing to repress these move- 
ments. It has permitted the criminal machinations of 
various societies and associations directed against the Mon- 
archy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part 
of the Press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, 
and the participation of officers and functionaries in sub- 
versive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propa- 
ganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all 
manifestations of a nature to incite the Serbian population 
to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions. 

" This culpable tolerance of the Royal Serbian Government 
had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June 
last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world. 

" It results from the depositions and confessions of the 
criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that 
the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade ; that 
the arms and explosives with which the murderers were pro- 
vided had been given to them by Serbian officers and func- 
tionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana ; and finally, 
that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms 
was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Serbian frontier 
service. 

" The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investi- 
gation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to 
pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance 
which they have maintained for years in face of the machina- 
tions hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the 
territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, 
impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues 
which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the 
Monarchy. 

" To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal 
Serbian Government a formal assurance that they condemn 
this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy ; in other 
words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of 
which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging 
to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means 
this criminal and terrorist propaganda. 

82 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

" In order to give a formal character to this undertaking 
the Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front 
page of their * Official Journal ' of the 13/26 July the 
following declaration : 

' The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propa- 
ganda directed against Austria-Hungary i.e., the general 
tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they 
sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal 
proceedings. 

" ' The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers 
and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propa- 
ganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations 
to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by 
their declaration of the 3ist March, 1909. 

' The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate 
all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the 
destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria- 
Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and 
functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that 
henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against 
persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which 
they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress/ 

' This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated 
to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty 
the King and shall be published in the ' Official Bulletin ' of 
the Army. 

' The Royal Serbian Government further undertake : 

" i. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred 
-and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the 
general tendency of which is directed against its territorial 
integrity ; 

"2. To dissolve immediately the society styled ' Narodna 
Odbrana/ to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to 
proceed in the same manner against other societies and their 
branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall 
take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved 
from continuing their activity under another name and 
form ; 



[B. 4] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 

"3 To eliminate without delay from public instruction 
in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as 
regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, 
or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria- 
Hungary ; 

"4. To remove from the military service, and from the 
^[Seeioot- administration in general, (1) all officers and functionaries guilty 
note to of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
R. 34. vol. wn ose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government 
d' also ' reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the 
Serbian re- Royal Government ; 

ply, B. 39, " 5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives 
p. 112.] O f the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression 
of the subversive movement directed against the territorial 
w [C/.S.52, integrity of the Monarchy w ; 

voL II, " 5 j take judicial proceedings against accessories to- 
R ?7 i *ke P** ^ *^ e 28th June who are on Serbian territory ; 
delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take 
part in the investigation relating thereto ; 

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija 
Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, 
a Serbian State employe, who have been compromised by the 
results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo ; 

"8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation 
of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms 
and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish 
severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and 
Lo2nica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the 
Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the 
frontier ; 

"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government 
with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of 
high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, not- 
withstanding their official position, have not hesitated since 
the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in inter- 
views in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Govern-- 
ment ; and, finally, 

" 10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government 
without delay of the execution of the measures comprised 
under the preceding heads. 

" The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply 
84 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B 4j 

of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock* on 
Saturday evening, the 25th July. 

" A memorandum dealing with the results of the magis- 
terial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned 
under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note." 

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the 
contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government 
to which you are accredited, accompanying your communica- 
tion with the following observations Ul : " [Set R. 

On the 3ist March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government 
addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the 
text is reproduced above. 

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked 
on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb 
subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing 
for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the 
Serbian frontier. 

Serbia became the centre of a criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, 
whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of 
disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and 
groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, 
Government officials and judges in short, men at the top of 
official and unofficial society in the kingdom. 

Serbian journalism is almost entirely at the service of 
this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, 

* [In the copy of this Austro-Hungarian note communicated by Count 
Szecsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, to the French Foreign 
Office, the hour named for the reply is 5 o'clock, and the following explana- 
tion is appended in the French Yellow-book [Y. 24]. 

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in a private letter on the 
24th July, sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following 
correction : 

' In the copy of the despatch which I had the honour to send to 
your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected 
an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the 
evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Bel- 
grade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, 
the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged 
to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. 

' I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight 
alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer of the 
.Serbian Government.' "] 

85 



[B. 4] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY a 

and not a day passes without the organs of the Serbian press 
stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neigh- 
bouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly 
against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on 
by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and 
corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudes- 
cence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Serbian politicians, 
which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the 
kingdom ; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed 
in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal 
of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary. 

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary 
has been exposed for years, the Serbian Government have 
not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. 
The Serbian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed 
on them by the solemn declaration of 3ist March, 1909, and 
acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking 
given to Austria-Hungary. 

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in 
the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired 
by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and the hope that the Serbian Government would 
end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's 
friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent atti- 
tude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial 
and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally 
decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own 
side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a develop- 
ment of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after 
the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by 
its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a 
considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.. 

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards 
the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the pro- 
ceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its 
territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were 
demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, 
when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious 
consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade. 

86 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 4] 

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and 
Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and 
urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian 
Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threaten- 
ing the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in 
taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement 
with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit 
regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with 
impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be con- 
tinually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade. 

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier " [R- 19-! 
elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection between 
these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. 

An identical communication has been addressed to the 
Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other 
signatory Powers. 

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in 
the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

ANNEX. 

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo 
against Gavrilo Princip (8) and his accessories in and before the m [/ v !- 
act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last " PP: 

2IO~*2I2 I 

has up to the present led to the following conclusions ( " : 

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Sera- 
jevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko 
Cabrinovic*, one Milan Ciganovic", and Trifko Grabefc, with the 
assistance of Commander Voija Tankosic*. 

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and 
ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act 
were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic* and Grabefc by the man 
Milan Ciganovid and Commander Voija Tankosi6 at Belgrade. 

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms 
depot of the Serbian Army at Kragujevac*. 

87 



[B. 5] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK UULY 24. 

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, tiganovi<5 
taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, 
and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and 
Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider. 

5. To enable Princip, tabrinovic", and Grabez to cross the 
frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contra- 
band of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was 
organised by Ciganovic". 

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herze- 
govina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials 
controlling the frontiers of Chaba6 (Rade Popovid) and Loz- 
nica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbi6, of 
Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals. 

No. 5. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at 

Vienna. w 
'"[C/.R.IO.] . , 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

(2 TNo 4 NOTE addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation 
R S.j f the reasons leading up to it, U) has been communicated to 

me by Count Mensdorff. 

(!) [c/.R. 9.] In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency , (3) I 

remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that 

<4) l[c/. Con- a time-limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted 

yereation upon at this stage of the proceedings. (4) The murder of the 

in No. 3.] Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia 

quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was 

but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen 

one State address to another independent State a document 

of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly 

consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent 

sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, 

that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to 

appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers 

of Serbia. 

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should 

( 5) r c f K OS> concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the 

3,10, 1 1, point of view of the peace of Europe. (6) The merits of the 

25.] dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 6] 

His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had 
made above were not made in order to discuss those merits. 

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into 
an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must 
await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the 
difficulties of the situation. 

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might 
never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the 
murder of the Archduke ; Serbia had, however, shown no 
sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already 
elapsed since the murder ; a time limit, said his Excellency, 
was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part. 

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying, a 
time limit could have been introduced later ; but, as things 
now stood, the terms of the Serbian reply had been dictated 
by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a 
demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from 
its presentation. 

No. 6. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir 

Edward Grey. (l) (Received July 24.) "' [cf. Y. 

22 1 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914. 

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof 
to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just 
reached him. 

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours 
was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French 
Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant 
that war was imminent. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct 
was both provocative and immoral ; she would never have 
taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted ; 
some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. 
He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to 
proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. w m [cf. No. 

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that 99 ; Y. 
France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance 3I 47< J 
with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia 
strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. 

89 



[B. 6] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 

w [See No. I said 111 that I would telegraph a full report to you of what 
2 40 their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, 
speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally 
I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from 
His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional 
engagement on their part to support Russia and France by 
force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, 
and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned 
by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that 
we must not forget that the general European question was 
involved, the Serbian question being but a part of the former, 
and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from 
the problems now at issue. 

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from 
what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great 
Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to 
the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs 
of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria 
nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against 
Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of 
the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria? 

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian 
mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out ; but 
a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to con- 
sider the whole question. A further council would be held, 
probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, 
when a decision would be come to. 

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was 
to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first 
thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with 
that end in view ; French Ambassador, however, thought that 
either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that 
she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance 
of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. 
He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. 
Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we 
should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet 
the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof 
replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, 
but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be 
accepted by Serbia. 

90 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 7) 

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to 
press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His 
Majesty's Government with French and Russian Govern- 
ments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible 
that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representa- 
tions to both German and Austrian Governments, urging 
upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would en- 
danger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see 
your way to saying to them that such action on the part 
of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which 
would involve France and Germany, and that it would be 
difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become 
general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later 
be dragged into war if it did break out ; we should have 
rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make 
common cause with his country and with France ; at any rate, 
he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong 
reprobation of action taken by Austria. 

President of French Republic and President of the Council 
cannot reach France, on their return from Russia/ 1 ' for four or (1) [See Y. 
five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this 22 > note.] 
moment to present their ultimatum. 

It seems to me, from the language held by French Am- 
bassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and 
Russia are determined to make a strong stand. 

No. 7. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 24.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

BEFORE departing on leave of absence, I was assured 
by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria 
to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent. (8) w [SeeO. 

Russian Charge" d' Affaires* was received this morning I0 -l 
by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own 
personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form 
rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that 
it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under 

* [Prince Kudachef.] 

91 



[B. 8] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK JULY 24, 

instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were 

(1) [6 p.m. accepted integrally by 4 P.M. (I) to-morrow. His Excellency 

SeeNo. 4 added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at 

note fc sta k e ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction 

p 8 5 '] throughout the country. He did not think that objections 

to what had been done could be raised by any Power. 

No. 8. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, 
to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 24.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914. 

AUSTRIAN demands are considered absolutely unac- 
ceptable by Serbian Government, who earnestly trust that 
His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce 
Austrian Government to moderate them. 

This request was conveyed to me by Serbian Prime Minis- 
ter, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His 
Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to 
developments that may arise. 

No. 9. 

< 2) [c/.Y.28 ; Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914. (8) 

0. 8; W. THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government 

exh' i concerning the circumstances under which the assassination 

2 ; R. 8.]' f the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken 

o) r c '/.No. 4; pl ace <3) disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Serbian 

R. 19.] propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise 

them. The facts now made known must also do away with 

the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those 

tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of 

the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian 

<4> [c/. R., Monarchy 14) and their incorporation into the Serbian Kingdom 

intro.] i s to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least 

the connivance of members of Government and army. 

The Serbian intrigues have been going on for many years. 
< 8) [cf. R.6.] In an especially marked form the Great Serbian chauvinism ( * 
manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only 
owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic 
92 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. ] 

interference of the Great Powers that the Serbian provoca- 
tions to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not 
lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future 
which was given by the Serbian Government at that time "' Ul [No. 4, 
has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit P* 1 "- 3-1 
permission of official Serbia, the Great Serbian propaganda 
has continuously increased in extension and intensity ; to its 
account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which 
lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it 
would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the 
self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still 
longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the 
other side of the frontier, by which the security and the 
integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under 
these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded 
as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude 
which public opinion as well as the Government in Serbia 
have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that 
the Serbian Government might refuse to comply with those 
demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away 
into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The 
Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely 
to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then 
have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands 
from the Serbian Government by strong pressure and, if 
necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means 
having to be left to them. 

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion 
that in the present case there is only question of a matter to 
be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, 181 '" \. c f- No 
and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to 
reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial ' ' L^'?^ 
Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict," 1 28*3061" 
because every interference of another Power would, owing to 0/8/18,' 
the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable 41 ; 8.36; 

consequences. (4) w - intra 

&exhs.x. 

2.] 

w [cf. No. 
48.] 

95 



[B. 10] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2. 

No. 10. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador 

at Paris. 

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

u [cf. Y. AFTER telling M. Cambon to-day (1) of the Austrian 
3 2 ] communication to Serbia/ 21 which I had received this morning, 
w [No. 4-] and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it 
(3) [No. 3.] yesterday , (3) I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to 
see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked 
me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Peters- 
burg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the 
presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble 
between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves 
<4) [cf. Nos. about it ; (4) but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultima- 
s' IJ -] turn, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in 
Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the 
. terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. 
I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating 
or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, 
France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in 
Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultane- 
<>[/. Nos. ous i y i n Vienna and St. Petersburg. (5) 
Y%2^t' Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation 

See also^y the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government 
No. 36.] would be glad to join in it ; but he pointed out that we could 
not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed 
some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days 
were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Serbians 
<8) [cf. O. i, could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. (8) Russia 
41 ; S. 33.] would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as 
soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the 
Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any 
mediation. 

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said 
in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be 
trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if 
Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilised, 
it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to 
stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending 

94 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 11] 

mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of suc- 
cess for such a step that Germany should participate in it. 111 ( " [cf. Nos. 

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria 2 4 2 5 ; 
had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was 
to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of 
this being accepted would be that Germany should propose 
it to the other Powers. 

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria 
and Serbia. 

He replied that it was so. 

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this 
afternoon on the subject. 

No. ii. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires 

at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador has communicated to me the view 
of the German Government about the Austrian demand in 
Serbia. (al I understand the German Government is making w [No. 9.] 
the same communication to the Powers. 

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not 
lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern 
with it ; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but 
I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of 
the situation. <8) I reminded the German Ambassador that (3| fr/. Nos. 
some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need 3, 5. ii 
arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at 2 ^ 
St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extra- 
ordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness 
of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon 
Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, 
and I did riot believe any Power could exercise influence 
alone. 

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating 
influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, 
Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simulta- 
neously at Vienna and St. Petersburg (4) in favour of modera- (4l [c/. No. 
tion in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia I0 
becoming threatening. 

95 



[B. 12] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria 
might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand 
that Russia should march to help Serbia ; it would be very 
desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action 
and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence 
Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and 

< l) [cf. O. participate in such action at Vienna. (1) You should inform 
*4-] Secretary of State. <a) 

(a) [S*?No. Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected 
l8 -] to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could 
give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. 
Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative 
reply must in no case be returned by Serbia ; a reply favour- 
able on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse 
against immediate action might be afforded to Austria. 

No. 12. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthwpe, British Charge 
d' Affaires at Belgrade. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. 

SERBIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Serbian 

officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices 

in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give 

!) [ c f- Y - Austria the fullest satisfaction. (8) She certainly ought to 

34> 36.] ex p ress concern and regret. For the rest, Serbian Government 

must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Serbian 

interests. 

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria 
when time limit expires can be averted by anything but 
unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance 
appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying 
favourably to as many points as the time limit allows. 

Serbian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's 
Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake 
responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I 
do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said 
at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You 
should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues 

96 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 13] 

as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to 
Serbian Government. (l) (1) [S^No. 

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria 22 *3 

should not precipitate military action. 

No. 13. 

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25. 
(TRANSLATION.) 

M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Charge* d' Affaires 
at Vienna on the nth (24th) July, 1914 : (8) (tl [cf- No. 

"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the * 6;O .4; 
Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Y -3 8 39-J 
Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insuffi- 
cient to enable them to take any steps which might help to 
smooth away the difficulties that have arisen. 

" In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalcul- 
able and fatal' 3 ' to all the Powers (les consequences incalculables (3) [cf- No. 
et egalement nefastes pour toutes les Puissances), which may 48-1 

result from the course of action followed by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential 
that the period allowed for the Serbian reply should be ex- 
tended. (4> Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness < 4| [c/.R. 9.] 
to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which 
the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, 
should equally allow them sufficient time to study them. 

" In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain 
of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be 
in a position to offer advice to the Serbian Government (des 
conseils en consequence). 

" A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would 
render nugatory (priverait de toute portee) the proposals made 
by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and 
would be in contradiction to the very bases of international 
relations. 

" Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above 
to the Cabinet at Vienna." 

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Govern- 
ment will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and 
he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar 
instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna." 1 [ C /.O5] 

G 97 



[B. 14] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK UULY 25 

No. 14. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at 
Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain 
(1 T / Y 16- * me * na * ^ e s * e P taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, 
R. 17.] but a demarche with a time limit/ 11 and that if the Austrian 
demands were not complied with within the time limit the 
(S} [cf. Nos. Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic 
25, 26 ; relations and begin military preparations, not operations. (a) 
Y - 40-1 In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given 

(S1 [See No. the same information at Paris <3) (St. Petersburg), (4) you should 
I5 '] inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible ; it 
I7 'J makes the immediate situation rather less acute. 



(4) N 
* 



No. 15. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. 

(5) [M. I LEARN from the Acting Political Director' 51 that the 

Berthelot.] French Government have not yet received the explanation 
6) [See No. from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram 
(7) y I 4-] of to-day. (6) They have, however, through the Serbian 
cs)fc*% Minister here, given similar advice to Serbia <7) as was con- 
96 12] tained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday . (8) 



No. 16. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. 

(9) [M. ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs' 9 ' has no suggestions 

Bienyenu- to make except that moderating advice might be given at 

<^ a n ' 2 Vienna uo) as well as Belgrade. He hopes that the Serbian 

* 32 '-* Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be 

sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being 

taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that 

98 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 17] 

there would be a revolution in Serbia if she were to accept 
the Austrian demands in their entirety. 

No. 17. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914. 

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and 
communicated to his Excellency the substance of your 
telegram of to-day to Paris, 111 and this afternoon I discussed ( "Sce No. 
with him the communication which the French Ambassador *4- 

suggested should be made to the Serbian Government, as 
recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade." 1 w Ste No 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, 
that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not 
quite correspond with the information which had reached 
him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his 
Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is 
too late to make such a communication, as the time limit 
expires this evening. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite 
ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved 
to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected 
to accept the political demands which had been put forward. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversa- 
tion which he had with the Serbian Minister yesterday, that, 
in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Serbian 
Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their 
forces into the interior, while they would at the same time 
appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in 
favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see 
the question placed on an international footing, as the obliga- 
tions taken by Serbia in 1908, (8) to which reference is made '"[Inigog. 
in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but SeeNo.^. 
to the Powers U) P"- 2 ^ 

iu me iruwcia. ( *Tc/ Nos 

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be " (last 
quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands par.), 55 ; 
of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, R. 16.] 
in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the 
question to arbitration. 

99 



[B. 18] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not 
precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use 
your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me 
that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would 
take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action 
was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at over- 
throwing the present status quo in the Balkans, and estab- 
lishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that 
11 t c /- No - Germany really wanted war, (1> but her attitude was decided by 
141 ' ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia 
(2) [c/.Y. 63, there would be no war. (2> If we failed them now, rivers of 
and M. blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into 
Poincare, war. 

vol. II j sa id that England could play the role of mediator at 

P- 300.] B er ii n an( j Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her 

counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day 

be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself 

Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately 

Germany was convinced that she could count upon our 

"> [cf. Y. neutrality. (8> 

63-] I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, 
Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or 
give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably 
declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia 
could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the pre- 
dominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of 
the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He 
assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a 
conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I 
could regard the situation as desperate, 

No. 18. 

Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

No. YOUR telegram of the 24th (4> July acted on. 
ii. Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 
10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he 
immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to 



100 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 18] 

pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your sug- 
gestion for an extension of time limit, "' and to speak to his '[c/.Y.4ij 
Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from Press - T 4-] 
that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State 
thought that in these circumstances there would be delay 
and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of 
State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had 
ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro- 
Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson/*' '" [cf. No. 
and that they meant to take military action. He also ad- Q 2 iT'. 5 ?' 
mitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain ' ' \ 
of the Austro-Hungarian demands. R.'i6.] 

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situa- 
tion was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian repre- 
sentative at Vienna (a) and had told him that Austria-Hungary < [cf. R. 
had no intention of seizing Serbian territory. This step 18.] 
should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. 
Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, 
in taking military action against Serbia, Austria would 
dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he 
thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be . 
localised. (4) I said that telegrams from Russia in this morn- j^j 
ing's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained note.] 
his optimistic view with regard to Russia.'" He said that he (5) [c/. Nos. 
had given the Russian Government to understand that the 32, 48.] 
last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would 
do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the rela- 
tions between Austria and Russia became threatening, he 
was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion '" as to the ( " [cf. W. 
four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and exh - J 3-] 
St. Petersburg. (7) < 7 ' [See No. 

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought 37.] 

the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. 
He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused 
of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact 

had no such knowledge. "" ""['/ N - 

25$ Y. 
15 and 
note.] 



101 



[B. 19] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 21 

No. 19. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 25, 1914. 

I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that 

(l} [See No. he knew of the suggestion (1) that France, Italy, Germany, and 

I0 -l ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour 

of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Serbia 

become menacing. 

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the un- 
conditional acceptance by the Serbian Government of her 
note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to 
seize the Salonica Railway. 

No. 20. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

LANGUAGE of Press this morning leaves the impression 

( that the surrender of Serbia is neither expected nor really 

A* AT Tfa desired. ( * ] It is officially announced that the Austrian 

4O,4I>IOI -. .. i -i-i -i i rr 

(p. 215) ; Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation 
.12,27, failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day. 
47; S. 22; Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to com- 
municate personally to the Emperor w Serbian reply when it 

comes - 



0.7-] No 21 

< 3 > [cf. S. 

2 3-] Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

THE Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply 

to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary 

of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory 

and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure 

(4> jj ext O f as is possible. 

reply, The following is a brief summary of the projected reply : (4> 

No. 39.] The Serbian Government consent to the publication of a 



IO2 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 28] 

declaration in the " Official Gazette." The ten points are 
accepted with reservations. Serbian Government declare 
themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of en- 
quiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be 
shown to be in accordance with international usage. They 
consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be 
clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested 
the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are pre- 
pared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana. 

The Serbian Government consider that, unless the Austrian 
Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be con- 
tent with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply. 



No. 22. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just 
arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, 
and informed them of your views. 

They have not yet received instructions from their 
Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed con- 
ciliatory terms of the Serbian reply, I have up to now abstained 
from offering advice to the Serbian Government. 

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government 
have already urged the utmost moderation on the Serbian 
Government. 

No. 23. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

THE Austrian Minister left at 6.30. 

The Government have left for Nish, (1) where the Skupshtina* (I) [c/.Y. 50; 
will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, 5* ;O-2i, 
but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives. 

* The Serbian Parliament. 

103 



[B. 241 BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 25 

No. 24. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 

St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

YOU spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances 

as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely 

approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of 

(1) See No. yesterday, (1) and I cannot promise more on behalf of the 

6 - Government. 

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought 
to sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. If, 
however, war does take place, the development of other 
issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to 
prevent it. 

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the 
Austrian demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very 
short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised 
against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, 
in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking 
the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the 
frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna 

loii Y* and St Petersbur g to try and arrange matters. w If Ger- 

32 ' ' 34 jmany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and 

also No. ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly 

36 and co-operate. 

note.] No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be toler- 

ated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial 
and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation 

io ii 2v * Germany would, therefore, be essential. (3) 

G/6.]' 

No. 25. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge a" Affaires 

at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

THE Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform 

(4) . me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the 

14 26 S "t* me limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and 

O.'i6.] ' commence military preparations, but not military operations. <4) 

104 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 28] 

In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it 
interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was 
actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be 
delayed. Apparently we should now soon be face to face 
with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only 
chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, 
France, Russia,* and ourselves to keep together, and to join 
in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till 
we had had time to try and arrange matters between them. 

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the 
German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not 
known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers 
to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Serbia,'" " W- Nos - 
but once she had launched that note, Austria could not y is ami 
draw back. w Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what note.] 
I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, ^'[C/.O.IQ.] 
Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He ex- 
pressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion. 

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had (3) 
no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon ? . " 
as the question became one as between Austria and -Russia, ^' 2> g 7 . 
the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all w.', exh. 
take a hand. (a) 13 (vol. 

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event H-, P- 
of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of 
Germany would be essential (4) to any diplomatic action for <4) [cf. No. 
peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Govern- 24:0.6.] 
ment were travelling at the moment/ 81 and I had had no time <>[ c /. No. 
to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their 6; Y. 
views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed 22, note.] 
with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I 
thought it the right thing to act upon it. 

No. 26. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador 

at Vienna. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the 
following telegram which his Government have sent to the 
* [Should be " Italy." See No. 36.] 

105 



[B. 27] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2< 

Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to com- 

11 [cf. No. municate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs (1) : 
13 ; Y. The delay given to Serbia for a reply is so limited that 
the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the 
complications which are threatening. The Russian Govern- 
ment trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the 
time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness 
to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based 
their demands on Serbia, the Russian Government hope that 
these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers 
may examine the matter. If they found that some of the 
Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a 
position to advise the Serbian Government accordingly. 
If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong 
the time limit, not only would they be acting against inter- 
national ethics, but they would deprive their communication 
to the Powers of any practical meaning." 

You may support in general terms the step taken by your 

< 2 >[0. 16.] Russian colleague. (a) 

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna 

(3 '[No. 25.] was sent, it has been a relief to hear (3) that the steps which 
the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited 
for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military 
preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if 
the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to 

>[5^No. prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time u> 
40.] in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before 
taking any irretrievable steps. 

No. 27. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, 
Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, 
w[See also an & ^ r & Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. 

No. 63.] Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the fore- 
cast of the Serbian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's 
8 S*?No. telegram of to-day. (6) I have said that, if Serbian reply, 
2I - when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope 

106 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 80] 

the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian 
Government to take a favourable view of it. m "'[SNo. 

34-] 
No. 28. 

[Nil.] rf " . 

[So in Blue-book.] 

No. 29. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told 
him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambas- 
sador this morning. (al <a '[Nos. 25, 

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He 
made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see 
war avoided.'" '"[f/- 

Giolitti's 
No. 30. speech 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires p> 3 ' 94> 'j 

at Belgrade. 

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

THE Serbian Minister called on the 23rd instant and 
spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the present strained relations 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. 

He said that his Government were most anxious and 
disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reason- 
able demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands 
were kept on the " terrain juridique." If the results of the 
enquiry at Serajevo an enquiry conducted with so much 
mystery and secrecy disclosed the fact that there were 
any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Serbian 
territory, the Serbian Government would be quite ready to 
take the necessary steps to give satisfaction ; but if Austria 
transported the question on to the political ground, and said 
that Serbian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo 
a radical change, and that Serbia must abandon certain 
political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit 
to such dictation. 

107 



[B. 31] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 25 

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke 
were Austrian subjects Bosniaks ; that one of them had 
been in Serbia, and that the Serbian authorities, considering 
him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on 
applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter 
protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless 
individual. 

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his 
opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no 
data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that 
the Serbian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian 
demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. 

No. 31. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

SERBIAN reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is 

not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian 

01 [No. 23 ; Minister has left Belgrade. Ol War is thought to be imminent. 

No. 32. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

ACCORDING to confident belief of German Ambassador, 

(2) [cf. Nos. Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, (a) 

18,33,47, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received 

48,71,161 assurances that no Serbian territory will be annexed by 

Y 6*8*' Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian 

96;!.' 52- Government might not be compelled by public opinion to 

R.'i6.] ' intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that 

everything depended on the personality of the Russian 

Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he 

chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out 

that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over 

and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister 

for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so 

108 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 88] 

imprudent as to take a step which would probably result 
in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, 
such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian 
questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, 
was not at all in a condition for facing a war. 

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little 
difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian 
Government's ultimatum to Serbia. One naturally sym- 
pathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if 
only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. 
It was, however, impossible, according to the German 
Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Serbia. 
Serbia was about to receive a lesson "' which she required ; the ( " [cf. No. 
quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to i8;Y.57i 
foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right 
to assume a protectorate over Serbia, acting as if she made 
any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what 
she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. 

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed 
by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in 
which you expressed the hope that the Serbian concessions 
would be regarded as satisfactory . (2) He asked whether I < 8 >[ c /. No. 
had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last 27.] 
moment had been made by the Serbian Government. I had, 
I said, heard that on practically every point Serbia had been 
willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Serbian 
concessions were all a sham. (sl Serbia proved that she well (S) t c /- Nos - 
knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate y'^sS- 
demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making R ' intro.1 
her offer she had ordered mobilisation u> and retirement of <>[ c /. y. 7*5 
Government from Belgrade. (2); G. 5 ; 

S. 4 i;R. 

No. 33- 

Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d" Affaires at Berlin, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. 

EMPEROR returns suddenly to-night, ( " and Under-Secre- '>/ Y- 5<> 
tary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which 
was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that 
His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and 

109 



[B. 84] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 26 

excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me 
that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported 
that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Serbian 
territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under- 
secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not 
{l} [cf. No. act if Austria did not annex territory. (1) 

32 and 

note.] 

No. 34. 

Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. 

UNDER-SECRETARY of State has just telephoned to 

me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been 

instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government 

your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Serbian 

(a) [No. 27.] reply (a) if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade 

See No. telegram of 25th July.' 3 ' 

21. Under-Secret ary of State considers very fact of their 
making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment implies that they associate themselves to a certain 
(4) [c/. No. extent with your hope. (41 German Government do not see their 
75 '-l way to go beyond this. 

No. 35. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 26.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 26, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal 
for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night 

<>[<:/ No accordingly. (6) 

36, and Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government 

No. 49 this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but 

(reply).] that this did not imply declaration of war. 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 38] 

No. 36. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, 
Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, 
and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. (j) 

WOULD Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to 35,37,40" 

instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of C //R. 38. 

France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in Replies- 

conference' 11 immediately for the purpose of discovering an from 
issue which would prevent complications ? You should ask ^' 

Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If ^itaiy, 

so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the NO'. 49 ; 

Governments to which they are accredited, representatives Russia, 

at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg"" should be authorised No - 53; 

to request that all active military operations should be sus- ^ 

pended pending results of conference. R 3 5 -j ' 

'[C/.'NO. 

NO. 37. 53;Y.6 7 ; 

07 O. 31. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Also No. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. 

BERLIN telegram of 25th July. (I) < s^No. 

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested 18. 

action by the four Powers if necessary. (4) |4) [S^ Nos. 



No. 38. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 27.) 

Rome, July 23, 1914. 

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made |!l [But see 
cognisant (8) of the terms of the communication "' which will Y - 26 35. 
be addressed to Serbia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this , 5 r-^ 2 '^ -i 
morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that 
the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for 
their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn 
of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite 
success. 



[B. 39] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 

No. 39. 

11 [See Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. w 

Y te t( (Communicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27.) 

p. 321.] LE Gouvernement Royal serbe a re$u la communication 

du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal du *io de ce mois et il 

est persuade que sa rponse eloignera tout malentendu qui 

(a) ["de menace de gater (a) les bons rapports de voisinage entre la 

compro- Monarchic austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie. 

Y^q 6 ] Le Gouvernement Royal conscient (3) que les protestations 

)[' a con- Q m on t apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtinaf nationale 

science," que dans les declarations et les actes des representants respon- 

Y. 49.] sables de 1'Etat, protestations qui furent coupees court par 

les declarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le *i8 mars, 

1909, ne se sont plus renouvelees vis-a-vis de la grande 

Monarchic voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce 

temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se 

sont succde que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative 

n'a ete faite dans le but de changer 1'etat de choses politique 

et juridique cree en Bosnie et Herzegovine, (4) le Gouvernement 

hereTn 6 R va l constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Imperial 

Y. 49.] e * Royal n'a fait aucune representation, sauf en ce qui con- 

(5) ["re- cerne un livre scolaire, et ($) au sujet de laquelle le Gouverne- 

presen- ment Imperial et Royal a re$u une explication entierement 

tation au satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois (8) donne des 

d?" etc P reuves de sa politique pacifique et modeYee pendant la 

Y. 49.] ' duree de la crise balkanique, et c'est grace a la Serbie et au 

(6) [" a, a sacrifice (7) qu'elle a fait dans 1'inteYet exclusif de la paix europe- 
de nom- enne que cette paix a ete preservee. Le Gouvernement Royal 
breuses ^ ne peut pas etre rendu responsable pour les manifestations 
Y^oT ^' un carac tere prive, telles que les articles des journaux 

(7) [-' a ^ x et le travail paisible (8) des societes, manifestations qui se produi- 
sacrifices sent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire 
qu'elle a et qui echappent, en regie generale, au controle officiel, d'autant 
^ ts '" moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute 

(8) r les une se ^ e ^ e <l ues ti ons i u i se son * presentees entre la Serbie 
agisse- e ^ 1'Autriche-Hongrie, a montre une grande provenance 
ments," et a reussi, de cette fagon, a en regler le plus grand nombre 
Y. 49.] au profit du progres des deux pays voisins. 

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a ete peniblement 
* Old style. f The Serbian Parliament. 



112 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 39] 

surpris par les affirmations, d'apres lesquelles des personnes 
du Royaume de Serbia auraient participe a la preparation de 
1'attentat commis a Sarajevo ; il s'attendait a ce qu'il soit 
invite a collaborer a la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte a 
ce crime, et il etait pret, pour prouver (1> son entidre correction, '"[" par 
a agir contre toutes les personnes a 1'egard desquelles des 

communications lui seraient faites. Se rendant done au de*sir ^ ^' , 
du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, [le Gouvernement Royal] '" ,,, ~' . i 
est dispose a remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans igard 49^ 
a sa situation et a son rang, pour la complicite duquel, dans le 
crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et spe*ciale- 
ment, il s'engage a faire publier a la premiere page du " Journal 
officiel " en date du 13 (26) juillet, 1'enonciation suivante : 

" Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute 
propagande qui serait dirigee contre rAutriche-Hongrie, c'est- 
a-dire 1'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu 
a detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires 
qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences 
funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement 
Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes 
aient participe, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement 
Royal et Imperial, a la propagande susmentionne'e, et com- 
promis par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le 
Gouvernement Royal serbe etait solennellement engage* par 
sa declaration du 31 mars 1909.* [Le Gouvernement,] 
qui de*sapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'une 
immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie 
de 1'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considere de son devoir 
d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute 
la population du royaume que dorenavant il proce*dera avec 
la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient 
coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts 
a pre"venir et a reprimer." 

Cette enonciation sera porte*e a la connaissance de l'arme*e 
Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste* le Roi, 
par Son Altesse Royale le Prince heritier Alexandre, et sera 
public* dans le prochain bulletin officiel de 1'armee. 

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre : 

i. D'introduire dans la premiere convocation rdguliere de 
la Skoupchtinaf une disposition dans la loi de la presse, 
* New style. j The Serbian Parliament. 

H 113 



[B. 39] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



QULY 



(1) [" delai, 
Y - 49-1 



'" du 
moms/ 

' ' 



3 >["ten- 






ration," 
Y. 49.] 



par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provo- 
cation a la haine et au me'pris de la Monarchic austro-hon- 
groise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance 
generale serait dirigee contre 1'integrite territoriale de 
1'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision de la 
Constitution, qui est prochaine, a faire introduire dans 1'article 
22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les 
publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui actuelle- 
ment aux termes categoriques de 1'article 22 de la Constitution 
est impossible. 

2. Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune preuve et la note 
du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal ne lui en fournit non 
plus aucune que la societe " Narodna Odbrana " et autres 
societes similaires aient commis, jusqu'a ce jour quelques 
actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. 
Neanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande 
du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal et dissoudra la socie*te 

' Narodna Odbrana " et toute autre societe qui agirait contre 
1' Aut riche-H on grie . 

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage a eliminer sans 
delais' 1 ' de 1'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert 
ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propagande contre TAutriche- 
Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal lui 
fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande. 

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de meme w a eloigner 
^ u serv i ce militaire ceux pour qui 1'enquete judiciaire aura 
prouve qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirige's contre rintegrite 
du territoire de la Monarchic austro-hongroise, et il attend 
que le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal lui communique 
ulterieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonction- 
naires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'ensuivre. 

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend 
pas clairement compte du sens et de la portee de la demande 
du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal que (3) la Serbie s'engage 
^ acce P ter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du 
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, mais il declare qu'il ad- 
mettra la (4) collaboration qui repondrait aux principes du droit 
international et a la procedure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons 
rapports de voisinage. 

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considere de 
114 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 89J 

son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete contre tous ceux qui sont 
ou qui, eVentuellement, auraient e*te meles au complot du 
15 * juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. 
Quant & la participation & cette enquete des agents ou '"autorite^s '" [" agents 
austro-hongrois qui seraient de'le'gue's cet effet par le Gou- desauto- 
vernenient Imperial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne S^'i 
peut pas 1'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitu- 
tion et de la loi sur la procedure criminelle ; cependant dans 
des cas concrets des communications sur les re"sultats de 
1'instruction en question pourraient etre donne*es aux agents'" (t| [" aux 
austro-hongrois. organes," 

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait proc6der, des le soir 
meme de la remise de la note, a 1'arrestation du Commandant 
Voislav Tankossitch. Quant a Milan Ziganovitch, qui est 
sujet de la Monarchic austro-hongrois et qui jusqu'au 15* 
juin e"tait employe* (comme aspirant) a la direction des chemins 

de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre arreteV 3 ' (l> [" etre 

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prie" de vouloir bien, joint," 
dans la forme accoutume*e, faire connaitre le plus tot possible, 49-J 
les presomptions de culpabilite ainsi que les preuves eVentuelles 
de leur culpability qui ont e*te recueillies jusqu'a ce jour par 
1'enquete a Sarajevo, aux fins d' enquete ulte*rieure. 

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et tendra les 
mesures prises pour empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et 
d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera 
de suite une enquete et punira severement les fonctionnaires 
des frontieres sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manque" 
a leurs devoirs et laiss passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo. 

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des expli- 
cations sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie 

qu'a l'4tranger, ont eu (4l apres 1'attentat dans des entrevues (4 :" ont 
et qui, d'apres raffirmation du Gouvernement Imperial et 
Royal, ont e"te" hostiles envers la Monarchic, ds que le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et Royal lui aura communique* les passages 
en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura de*montre* que les 
propos employe's ont, en effet, etc* tenus par lesdits fonction- 
naires, quoique (8) le Gouvernement Royal lui-meme aura soin quels," 
de recueillir des preuves et convictions. Y - 49-1 

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera ( "'le Gouvernement "' m " , 

forme, 

* Old style. Y. 49.3 

"5 



[B. 39] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY a 

Imperial et Royal de I'ex6cution des mesures comprises dans 
les points precedents en tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par 
la prsente note, aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee 
et executed. 

Dans le cas ou le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal ne serait 

pas satisfait de cette reponse, le Gouvernement serbe, con- 

siderant qu'il est de 1'interet commun de he pas precipiter la 

solution de cette question, est pret comme toujours d'accepter 

W E" en une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question 111 a la 

remet- decision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux 

**"* Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a 1'elaboration de la 

question declaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) 

soit a la mars, 1909. 

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914. 



etc. 

y. 49.] (TRANSLATION.) w 

w \cf. the THE Royal Serbian Government have received the com- 
transla- munication of the Imperial and Royal Government (3) of the 
^w 10th instant,* and are convinced that their reply will remove 
vol. II., an Y misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the 
p. 140.]' good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian 
(S)rN -, Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia. 

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made 
both from the tribune of the national Skupshtina f and in the 
declarations and actions of the responsible representatives 
of the State protests which were cut short by the declarations 
made by the Serbian Government on the i8th * March, 1909 
have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the 
great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been 
made since that time, either by the successive Royal Govern- 
ments or by their organs, to change the political and legal 
state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal 
Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection 
the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representa- 
tion except one concerning a school book, and that on that 
occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an 
entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times 
given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the 
Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice 

* Old style. f The Serbian Parliament. 

116 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 89] 

that she has made in the exclusive interest of European 
peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Govern- 
ment cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private 
character, such as articles in the Press and the peaceable 
work of societies manifestations which take place in nearly 
all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as 
a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government 
are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time 
of the solution of a series of questions which arose between 
Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness 
to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these 
questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries. 

For these reasons the Royal Government have been 
pained and surprised at the statements, according to which 
members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have 
participated in the preparations for the crime committed at 
Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to 
collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, 
and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness 
of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concern- 
ing whom representations were made to them. Falling in, 
therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian 
subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose 
complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, 
and more especially they undertake to cause to be published 
on the first page of the " Journal officiel," on the date of the 
13 (a6th) July, the following declaration : 

' The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propa- 
ganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that 
is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching 
from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form 
part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful conse- 
quences of these criminal movements. The Royal Govern- 
ment regret that, according to the communication from the 
Imperial and Royal Government, certain Serbian officers and 
officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned 
propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly 
relations to which the Royal Serbian Government was solemnly 
engaged by the declaration of the 3ist March, 1909,* 

* New style. 

"7 



[B. 39] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 

which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or 
attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants 
of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they con- 
sider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials and 
entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will 
take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are 
guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will 
use their utmost endeavour." 

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the 
Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty 
the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, 
and will be published in the next official Army bulletin. 

The Royal Government further undertake : 

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the 
Skupshtina * a provision into the Press law providing for the 
most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action 
against any publication the general tendency of which is 
directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. 
The Government engage at the approaching revision of the 
Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into 
article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such 
publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present 
impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the 
Constitution. 

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note 
of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with 
any, that the " Narodna Odbrana " and other similar societies 
have committed up to the present any criminal act of this 
nature through the proceedings of any of their members. 
Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand 
of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve 
the " Narodna Odbrana " Society and every other society 
which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to remove 
without delay from their public educational establishments 
in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal 
Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propa- 
ganda. 

* The Serbian Parliament. 
118 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 39] 

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from 
military service 111 all such persons as the judicial enquiry may (l> [See foot- 
have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity note to 
of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they J~g 
expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate passage- 
to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers in R. 34, 
and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to vol. II.. 

be taken against them. P; 2 ^ 

cf. also 

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not 3. 4, p. 

clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made 84.] 
by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall 
undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the 
Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but 
they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees 
with the principle of international law, with criminal pro- 
cedure, and with good neighbourly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government 
consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such 
persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of 
the I5th* June, and who happen to be within the territory 
of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry 
of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this 
purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal 
Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would 
be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal 
procedure ; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications 
as to the results of the investigation in question might be 
given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening 
of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav 
Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the I5th* 
June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of rail- 
ways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be 
so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary 
form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual 
proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, 
at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry. 

* Old style. 

119 



[B. 40] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the 
measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit 
traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes 
without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry 
and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz- 
Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the 
authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of 
the remarks made by their officials, whether in Serbia or 
abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the 
statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile 
towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal 
Government have communicated to them the passages in 
question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown 
that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, 
although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect 
evidence and proofs. 

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and 
Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised 
under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been 
done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been 
ordered and carried out. 

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied 
with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it 
is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of 
this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific under- 
standing, either by referring this question to the decision of 
the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great 
< 1 ' \cf. Nos. Powers which took part ll) in the drawing up of the declaration 
17. 55-1 made by the Serbian Government on the i8th (3ist) March, 
" [See No. jqoq.tt) 
4, par. 2.] 

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 

No. 40. 

Sir M. de Bunssn, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received J^dy 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

(8) [c/. Nos. RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks 
20,41.] that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, 13 ' 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 41] 

and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. '" He "' O/. 
does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your - I0 -] 
telegram of the 25th instant (fl (last paragraph). <*> sec No. 

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant 26. 

to Paris' 51 arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors < See No. 
both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its 36. 

contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, 
however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested 
party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely 
Austro-Serbian dispute would be accepted by either the 
Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. 

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador 
to support the request of the Russian Government that the 
time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too 
late for any useful action to be taken. 



No. 41. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues repre- 
senting the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind 
is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to 
make war inevitable ; Ul that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- <*>[ c /. 
ment are fully resolved to have war with Serbia ; that they 20, 40, 
consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and l61 
that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is (P- 2I 5)-] 
unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This 
country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war 
with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would 
undoubtedly be a great disappointment. 

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire 
to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may 
yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether 
he cannot suggest a way out even now. 



121 



[B. 42] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 27 

No. 42. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914. 

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of 

(1) Nos. 36 yesterday, (1> is accepted by the French Government. (Z} French 

w ai / C v 3 ^i Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has 

l c f- -70-J been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent 

to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his 

British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking 

jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions 

have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, 

Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the 

Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, 

in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous 

for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so. 

No. 43. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 27.) 

< 3 > See No ( Tele g ra P hic O Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

' 3 6.' YOUR telegram of 26th July. 131 

(4) [c/. Y. 57 Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would 
and note.] practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, 

(5) [c/. No. in his opinion, be called together except at the request of 
6o;R. 35; Austria and Russia. (4) He could not therefore fall in with 
Y- 73. 74; your suggestion/ 5 ' desirous though he was to co-operate 
G-6-C0W- f or the maintenance of peace. (6) I said I was sure that your 
46 S and idea nac ^ n thing to do with arbitration, (7) but meant that 
see No. representatives of the four nations not directly interested 
80, which should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous 
points situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference 
* he as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news 
tencvT" ne nac * i us * rece i ve d from St. Petersburg showed that there 

(B) r / N was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange 
18,71; Y. views with Count Berchtold. (7) He thought that this method 
61^74!] of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it 

(7) [See No. would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome 

67.] 122 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 44] 

of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian 
Governments. 111 (1 '[c/.Y.8o.] 

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State 
said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but 
that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have 
to follow suit."" I asked him what he meant by " mobilising <*> [cf. .67.] 
against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised 
in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised 
in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian 
system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be 
difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would 
therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. 

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Peters- 
burg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general 
situation. 

No. 44. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. 

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation 
which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs," " [cf. Y. 
to explain away objectionable features of the recent action 54-] 
taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly under- 
stood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted 
that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Serbian 
Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough 
in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put 
into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of 
existing Serbian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with 
Serbia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless 
for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the 
fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In 
order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he 
thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate 
with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to com- 
municate his Excellency's remarks to his Government. (4) ' But s f* 

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told 
him that I had correctly denned the attitude of His Majesty's 

"3 



[B. 45] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2; 

Government in my conversation with him, which I reported 
11 See No. in my telegram of the 24th instant. (1) I added that you could 
6. [Also no t p rom i se to do anything more, and that his Excellency 
" 24 '-' was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be 
promoted by our telling the German Government that they 
would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France 
if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude 
would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could 
only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war 
by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was 
anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our 
efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a 
conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian 
Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as 
possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the 
frontier even when it was issued. 

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that 
until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards 
mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian 
Government would profit by delay in order to complete her 
military preparations if it was deferred too long. 

No. 45. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. 

(2> S^No. SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign 
44- Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day, (2) I understand 
(3)r , N that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to 
53, 55 56 ke introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject 
68, 69', 70 of direct conversation' 3 ' between Vienna and St. Petersburg. 
(2), 74, 78, 

93 (i), (2), M , 

(3); also No. 46. 

.' ->o ' Q' Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

*5j 3* * T-J i 

52 ; w. Berlin. 

exh. 15.] (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

58 *72 cf GERMAN Ambassador has informed me u) that German 
Y/8o; O. Government accept in principle mediation between Austria 
42.] 124 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 47] 

and Russia by the four Powers/ 1 ' reserving, of course, their ( " [cf. Y. 
right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. ia> He has also (f j 6 
been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Peters- 
burg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. ^5^' 

I have replied (J) that the Serbian reply went farther than note 
could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands, thereto.] 
German Secretary of State has himself said that there were (l| [c/.Y.66.] 
some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be 
expected to accept. (4) I assumed that Serbian reply could (4> [No. 18.] 
not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised 
conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna 
that moderating influence was now required. (3) If Austria (i| [ c /* No - 
put the Serbian reply aside as being worth nothing and 
marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to no t e .] 
crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences 
that might be involved. Serbian reply should at least be 
treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German 
Government should urge this at Vienna.' 61 67 7 

I recalled what German Government had said as to the 74'- R.' 
gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised,' 7 ' Response, 
and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia R-44-] 
it would be because, without any reference to the merits of (7| [No. 9.] 
the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. 
Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede 
the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other 
Powers in, "" and the war would be the biggest ever known ; "" [cf. Nos. 
but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would 47.48,89 * 
keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Serbian Y - 6 3-l 
reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged. 

No. 47. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 

St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. WSM No 

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.'" 46. 

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador' 1 " that in <10 '[ c /- N - 
German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any n 
event we would stand aside.' 11 His Excellency deplored the " 5 
effect that such an impression must produce. 



[B. 48] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2; 

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dis- 
pelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is 
concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for 
(1) [cf. No. manoeuvre leave. (1) But I explained to the Russian Ambassa- 
48; Y. 66. dor that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that 
See first an ything more than diplomatic action was promised. 
vol.] We hear from German and Austrian sources that they 

believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees 
w [cf. Nos. not to take Serbian territory. (2) I pointed this out, and 
33 '. 7 ' a dded that it would be absurd if we were to appear more 



o .y 
o 94 , . $ er bi an t han {kg R uss i ans i n our dealings with the German 

(S) [c/. Nos. an d Austrian Governments. <8) 

59. 78-J 

No. 48. 

Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at 

Vienna. 

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

<" [See R. COUNT MENSDORFF told me by instruction to-day 14 ' 
38. cf. R. that the Serbian Government had not accepted the demands 
JE9 1 ' Y - 75, which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to 
them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian 
interests. Serbia showed that she did not intend to abandon 
her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder 
in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption 
from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against 
their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to 
take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change 
in the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Serbia. As 
the British Government knew, the Austrian Government 
had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on 
with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made 
very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of 
Serbia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone 
what appalling consequences the Serbian propaganda had 
already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria 
it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Gov- 
ernment must consider that the moment had arrived to 
obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for 
the definite suppression of the Serbian aspirations and for 
the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier 
126 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 48] 

of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were 

exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to 

force. 11 ' They had not taken this decision without reluctance. ( "[c/. .755 

Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could -37-] 

not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. 

Also they thought that they would serve a European interest 

if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element 

of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. 

The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British 

statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the 

latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up 

their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced 

upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely 

injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian 

Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, 

felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that 

was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the 

fight, if necessary. 

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long 
as Serbia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took 
very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy 
of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that 
Serbia had doubled her territory and population without any 
Austrian interference, the repression of Serbian subversive 
aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on 
Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention 
of taking Serbian territory or aggressive designs against 
Serbian territory. (2) "' [S^ N - 

I said that I could not understand the construction put 9. note-] 
by the Austrian Government upon the Serbian reply, and 
I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation 
that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning 
about that reply. <" * C 5 * No 

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Serbian u) 4 T J 
reply might seem to be satisfactory ; U) but the Serbians had W' ( ' , 
refused the one thing the co-operation of Austrian officials 
and police which would be a real guarantee that in practice 
the Serbians would not carry on their subversive campaign 
against Austria. 

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government 
believed that, even after the Serbian reply, they could make 

127 



[B. 49] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2 

war upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into 
(1) [c/. Nos. the dispute. (1> If they could make war on Serbia and at 
18, 32, the S ame time satisfy Russia, well and good ; but, if not, the 
4 ^'cui conse( l uences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him 
that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views 
(2) [No. 9. o f the German Government.' 2 ' I feared that it would be 
cj. No. 13.] ex p ec ted in St. Petersburg that the Serbian reply would 
diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there 
was increased tension, the situation would become increas- 
ingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of 
anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed 
(3| [c/. No. to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. 13 ' We 
47 jY. 66.] should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and 
there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet ; 
but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it 
was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. 
I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. 
It seemed to me that the Serbian reply already involved the 
greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country 
undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply 
was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as 
unsatisfactory as a blank negative. 



No. 49. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson 
to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed 
entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held 
(4) [No.36. in London. (4) 

cf. No. 35 As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, 
Y. 71, 72.] an( j Serbia to suspend military operations pending the result 
of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano would recom- 
mend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, 
and would enquire what procedure they would propose 
should be followed at Vienna. 



128 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 60] 

No. 50. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 31). 

Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the 
text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration 
of war against Serbia. 

Enclosure in No. 50. 

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
(TRANSLATION.) 

IN order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues 
(menees subversives) originating from Belgrade and aimed 
at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the 
Royal Serbian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in 
which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance 
of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the 
Royal Government. The Royal Serbian Government not 
having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the 
Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled 
to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, 
with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. 

Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a 
formal declaration, in conformity with article i of the con- 
vention of the i8th October, 1907, (1) relative to the opening <> [See vol. 
of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of II., p. 508.] 
war with Serbia. "' "> [cf, S. 

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's 45-] 
Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to 
declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities 
in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The 
Hague of the i8th October, 1907, "' as also with those of 
the Declaration of London of the 28th February, I9O9, (4) pro- J, r 
vided an analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia. Naval vol.] 

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate 
the present notification as soon as possible to the British 
Government. 

i 129 



[B. 51] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2; 

No. 51. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 28.) 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy 
of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign 
Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak 
of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 

Enclosure in No. 51. 
(1) [c/. No. Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin. {l} 

52-] 

(TRANSLATION.) 

IN a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the 
British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic 
that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assur- 
ing the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between 
Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the 
representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy 
in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna 
[cf. No. and at St. Petersburg ; <2) and he expressed the wish to know 
10 ; Y. 34.] if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome 
such a suggestion. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim has the honour 
to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested 
M. Jules Cambon to concert with the British Ambassador 
in Germany and to support any representation which they 
may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet. 

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British 

Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie, in his 

3) [Nos- 36, note of the 26th of this month, (3) the Government of the Republic 

37 '1 have also authorised M. Paul Cambon to take part in the 

4 [Y. 70.] conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed <4) with a view to 

discovering in consultation with himself and the German 

and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the 

present difficulties. 

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to 

130 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 52] 

instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, 
and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Serbian 
Governments to abstain from all active military operations 
pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, 
that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful 
depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Govern- 
ment would be willing to take at Vienna. (1) Representations <>r c /. y. 56 
made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose and note.] 
of bringing about a suspension of military operations would 
seem bound to fail unless* the German Government do not 
beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet." 1 '"[>/ v -7-l 

The President of the Council ad interim (Le Garde des 
Sceaux, President du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 
par interim) takes the opportunity, &c. 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

No. 52. 

Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914. 
(TRANSLATION.) 

THE Government of the Republic accept (3) Sir Edward (3 ' [See No. 
Grey's proposal (4) in regard to intervention by Great Britain, 
France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active 
military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and 
Serbia ; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon to take 
part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the 
meeting which is to be held in London. 

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions 
to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then 
to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and 
degree as may be considered appropriate. 

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of 
France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions 
in the sense suggested by the British Government. 

French Embassy [London], July 27, 1914. 

* [Should be, " if the German Government do not" etc. The French 
text reads: "Une demarche aupres du Gouvernement austro-hongrois 
pour amener la suspension des operations militaires parait vouee a l'chec si 
1' influence de 1'Allemagne ne s'est pas exerce au prealable sur le Cabinet de 
Vienne."] 

131 



[B. 58] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 27 

No. 53. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count 
Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London. (Com- 
municated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.) 

(TRANSLATION.) 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 14 (27), 1914. 

(i) [ c /.o.32.] THE British Ambassador came to ascertain (1) whether 
we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the 
initiative in convoking a conference in London of the repre- 
sentatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to ex- 

( * ] [See No. amine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.' 21 

36.] I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversa- 

tions (entame des pourparlers) with the Austro-Hungarian 

(3) [c/. Nos. Ambassador <3) under conditions which, I hope, may be 

45. 56, 69, favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply 

m'/Lwo?' to the proposal made by me for revising the note between 

also O. 25, the two Cabinets. 

32.] If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to 

prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, 
or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a 
favourable solution of the conflict. 

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a 
misunderstanding (ecarter des aujourd'hui un malentendu) 
which might arise from the answer given by the French 

(4) [M. Bien- Minister of Justice (4) to the German Ambassador, regarding 
counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet. (5> 



, 
Y. 

56.] No. 54. 

M . Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count 
Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London. (Com- 
municated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.) 

(TRANSLATION.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914. 

MY interviews with the German Ambassador confirm 
my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the 
uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria (I'intran- 
sigeance de I'Autriche). 

13* 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 56] 

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole 
of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence 
on their ally. 111 <" [cf. Y. 

The Ambassador considers that the Serbian reply is 95; 0.41.] 
insufficient. 

This attitude of the German Government is most alarm- 
ing (tout particular ement alarmante). 

It seems to me that England is in a better position than 
any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce 
the German Government to take the necessary action. There 
is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at 
Berlin. 

No. 55. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. 

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday , "' I saw <" Set No. 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found 44- 

him very conciliatory and more optimistic. 

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to 
induce the Serbian Government to go as far as possible in 
giving satisfaction to Austria,' 31 but her territorial integrity ( "[S<* No. 
must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State l8 - Y - 
respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal.' 41 w^y No 
He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly ^ Q an j 
exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, note.] 
he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers 
throughout the conversations that would ensue. 

He again referred to the fact that the obligations under- '"[1909. 
taken by Serbia in 1908, ( " alluded to in the Austrian ulti- Sfe No -4. 
matum, were given to the Powers." 1 

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to No. 

conference of the four Powers, (7) and on his replying in the m|- No ^ 
affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to W r S ^ No 
me,"" and enquired whether instead of such a conference 24 j 

he would prefer a direct exchange of views, 1 " which he had <"[Sa?No. 
proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just 45 and 
spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct 
exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria- 
Hungary. " <""[c/. No. 

133 93 (2).] 



[B. 56] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2 

01 [c/. Y] His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside 11 ' 

68 -] if the Powers accepted the proposal of a conference, but he 
trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian 
Ambassador in the event of its taking place. 

No. 56. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest 
conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secret ary of 

w [cf. No. State for Foreign Affairs. (a) He told him that, having just 

45 a nd come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with 

the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian 

public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war 

(S) [c/.No.g.] broke out with Serbia it would be impossible to localise it, w 
for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had 
done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexa- 
tion crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something 
would be done before Serbia was actually invaded. Baron 
Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish 
had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Serbians 
had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said 
that he would do all he could to keep the Serbians quiet 

(4) [c/. Nos. pending any discussions that might yet take place, (4) and he 
55, 118.] told me that he would advise his Government to induce 
the Serbian Government to avoid any conflict as long as 
possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time 
so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. 
He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with 

" [0. 25. the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. (M The former 
of. Y. 80.] ^d agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to 
Serbia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had 
practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees 
which Serbia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria- 
Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian 

( Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. 

93 1104 1 PetersDur g should be furnished with full powers (6) to continue 

< 7) [S No. discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, m 
74-J i34 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 68] 

who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that could . 
be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron 
Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 

No. 57. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 27, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether 
Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military 
action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military 
action may be practically deferred by the fact of the confer- 
ence meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no 
possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down 
in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even 
now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason 
to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria 
may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note 
in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to 
the conference, and this would enable her to say that she 
had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone. 01 '" [See No. 

Telegrams from Vienna to the Press here stating that 
Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the 
Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no 
opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured 
me both before and after communication of the note, and 
again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him 
assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from 
Serbia. 

No. 58. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 

Grey. (Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. 

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign 
Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation 
with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram" " See No 
to Berlin of the 27th July. 

135 



[B. 59] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2! 

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He 
said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and 
he feels confident that your observations to the German 
Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace. 

No. 59. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. 

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs 
to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, 
(1) See No. as recorded in your telegram of yesterday (1) to St. Peters- 
47- burg. 

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appre- 
ciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to 
declare themselves " solidaires " with Russia on a question 
between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is 
not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot 
take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Serbian than 
that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian 
[cf. Nos. Government. 121 

47. 7 8 -] German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect 
(3) [c/. No. the integrity of Serbia/ 3 ' but when asked whether her inde- 
90 and p en d ence a i so would be respected, he gave no assurance. 

No. 60. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same 

(4} See No. sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday (4) to my 

43- French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. 

I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, 

and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, 

he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work 

with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore 

deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be 

objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself 

136 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 62 J 

could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it 
possible to work with us. 111 (1> [c/. No*. 

68,84,88; 

No 61 fl/soY. 74 

(last par). 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 8l -l 
Edward Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. 

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot 
delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have 
to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Serbian 
reply. 181 " [cf. Nos. 

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing 62t ?9 
could now prevent conflict. 6i 7 i2o 1 

No. 62. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day 131 in [cf. No. 
the sense of your telegram of 27th July' 41 to Berlin. I avoided 161 (p. 
the word " mediation," '' but said that, as mentioned in your " 6 ) 
speech,* '" which he had just read to me, you had hopes (4) ' s **' J Xo 
that conversations in London between the four Powers less ^5. 

interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro- < 5 > [cf. Nos. 
Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as 43. 
rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you ^ ) ' t g 7 1 and 
had regarded Serbian reply as having gone far to meet just *"Han. 
demands of Austria-Hungary ; that you thought it con- sar d," 
stituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike opera- [See vol. 
tions might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambas- n.,p-399-] 
sador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for g" g: 5 ? 
Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion 
could be accepted on basis of Serbian note ; <7) that war (7 '[ c /- - 
would be declared to-day,' 81 and that well-known pacific char- 
acter of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might 
be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and 
inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly 
between the two parties immediately concerned. I said 

137 



[B. 63] 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK 



[JULY 



that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not 
now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to com- 
plications threatening the peace of Europe. 

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe 
that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view 
should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from 
want of sympathy with the many just complaints which 
Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, 
whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, 
(1) [cf. No. you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. (1) 
2 5-] I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal 
with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also 
in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose opera- 
tions like those impending, which did not aim at territorial 
w [cf. No. aggrandisement (2) and which could no longer be postponed. 
61 and 
note.] 

No. 63. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, 1914. 

< 3 > See No. YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris. (3) 

2 7* I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar 
terms to Berlin and Vienna. 



[Reply, 
No. Si, 
See also 
No. 90.] 



No. 64. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) (4> Rome, July 28, 1914. 

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit 
the following to you : 

In a long conversation this morning Serbian Charge 
d' Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were 
given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require 
to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Serbia might still 
accept the whole Austrian note. 

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give 
such explanations to Serbia, they might be given to Powers 

138 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 861 

engaged in discussions, who might then advise Serbia to 
accept without conditions. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime 
published a long official explanation of grounds on which 
Serbian reply was considered inadequate. 01 Minister for (1) [S R- 
Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation 34 W.. 
such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding p I40$<7 o 
renunciation of propaganda' 8 ' quite childish, but there was c /. Y. 75 
a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a (2).] 
course as was considered practicable by the Serbian Charge :a [R- 34. 
d' Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian vo ^5v 
agents in Serbia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial p< 
or administrative measures. Serbia was said to have wilfully 
misinterpreted this.'" He thought, therefore, that ground '" [R. 34. 
might be cleared here. 

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received p> 2 
text of Austrian declaration. 

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for 
the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general 
latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on 
which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany 
had been given to Italian Ambassador. 

No. 65. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. 

I HAVE urged on the Serbian Government the greatest 
moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful 
solution. 

Two Serbian steamers fired on and damaged, and two 
Serbian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian 
monitor at Orsova. 

No. 66. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 

Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. 

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria/ 41 

39 






[B. 67j BRITISH BLUE-BOOK JULY 

No. 67. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th 

<1( See No. July u) of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite 

43. right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and 

w [cf. Y. informal discussion <2i to ascertain what suggestion could be 

<3)| . , 73-] made for a settlement. (3) No suggestion would be put 

^ 8 j forward that had not previously been ascertained to be 

acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating 

Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective 

allies. 

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of 
views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every 
other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most prefer- 
[c/. No. able method of all. (4) 

84 ;Y. 80.] j understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the 
<5) [cf. No. Austrian Government, 151 and, if the latter accepts, it will no 
43-1 doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical. 
It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassa- 
dor here that the German Government have taken action at 
<6) [c/. No. Vienna 181 in the sense of the conversation recorded in my tele- 

7 1 -] gram of yesterday to you. 171 
<7 > See No. b 

46. 

No. 68. . 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of 
mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, 
<8) [No. 18.] if necessary, (8) I am ready to propose that the German 
Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this 
<9) [c/. No. principle should be applied. (9) I will, however, keep the idea 
-] in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria 
and Russia progress. 
140 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 70] 

No. 69. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 

St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct 
exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Govern- 
ments, 111 as reported in your telegram of the 27th July." 1 " [S" No. 

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that 
would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what )t) n . 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Minis- 
ters at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in 
an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co- 
operate in some such scheme ? It might then take more 
concrete shape. 

No. 70. 

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian 
Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914. 



(i) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at 
Berlin, dated July 28, 1914. 

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria 
against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce to- 
morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circonscriptions 
of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. 1 " Please inform w [See No. 
German Government/ 41 confirming the absence in Russia of 78; . < No ; 
any aggressive intention against Germany. (J) W.exh ir 

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled R. 28.] 
from his post. (4) [c/. 

No. 76.] 
(2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff. <>[c/. NOS. 

The Austrian declaration of war*" clearly puts an end to y/ol, 90! 
the idea of direct communications between Austria and K^.J ' 
Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot (fl [No.5o.] 
mediation with a view to suspension of military operations 
of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent. m (1} l c f- No - 

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would 74 1*. 95, 
only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush , 8 ??:i Y 
Serbia. 1 " '' I03 .j 



IB. 71] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2 

No. 71. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his 

<1( [c/.Y. 92, Excellency this evening. (1) He said that he wished me to 

though the tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should 

dates in- work together with England for maintenance of general 

dicated do p eace> as they had done successfully in the last European 

agree.] CT ^ S jj e j^d no j. b een a b} e to accept your proposal for a 

conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because 

he did not think that it would be effective, and because such 

a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an 

"Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in 

judgment upon the two remaining Powers ; but his inability 

to accept the proposed conference must not be regarded as 

(2) [c/. Nos. militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. 121 

18, 43 ; Y. YOU could be assured that he was doing his very best both at 

Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to 

discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly 

<8) [cf. Nos. way. (3) He had great hopes that such discussions would 

67, 84, 88 ; take place and lead to a satisfactory result, (4) but if the news 

Y. 92 ; W. we re true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia 

wT i? 'Y 8 ^ kad m kilised fourteen army corps in the south, <8) he thought 

( 6 , r C <l ee ^*g situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very 

70 (i), 78.] difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out 

of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He 

w [cf Y. added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, (6) 

ioo.] would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, 

Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say 

that if Austria refused to take any notice of Serbian note, 

which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded 

by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, 

surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. 

His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Serbian 

note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, 

was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian con- 

171 [cf. Nos. cern (7) with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated 

2, 9.] his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to 

142 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 72] 

do his utmost to maintain general peace. " A war between 
the Great Powers must be avoided " were his last words. 

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war 
was most unlikely as Russia neither wanted nor was in a 
position to make war. 111 I think that that opinion is shared 11 ' [c/.No.47 
by many people here. and note.] 

No. 72. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you 
for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as w ~ N 
reported in your telegram (a ' to Berlin, substance of which I , 

communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic 
view of the situation, having received the same disquieting 
news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. 
I said it was important that we should know the real intentions 
of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would 
be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambas- 
sador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect 
of Serbia's integrity and independence. (3) I added that I |8) [Nos. 48, 
was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would 
be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his 
Excellency stated that if Serbia were attacked Russia would 
not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might 
take on these two points, u and that order for mobilisation <' [cf. O. 
against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria 10.] 

crossed Serbian frontier. 

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to 
give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that 
the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn 
use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency 
that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest/* 1 a general war could ( ' *- 
not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria. 31 

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador 
had received no instructions, and before acting with me 
the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their 
final instructions. 



FB. 73] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2 

No. 73. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

'"[For text I HAVE received note verbale w from Ministry for Foreign 

see No. Affairs, stating that, the Serbian Government not having 

a 50.] replied to note of 23rd July 121 in a satisfactory manner, Im- 

*> See No. p er j a i an d Royal Government is compelled itself to provide 

4 ' for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that 

object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to 

Serbia formal declaration according to article I of convention 

^[See of i8th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities/" and 

vol. II., considers herself from to-day in state of war with Serbia. 

p. 508.] Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Serbia does so, to 

stipulations of Hague conventions of i8th October, 1907, 

w [See first and to Declaration of London (4) of 26th February, 1909. 

Naval vol.] 

No. 74. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the 

Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the 

(5) [S*jNos. Austro-Hungarian Government. (5) The suggestion was to 

45. 56, 93 the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Serbian con- 

(i), (3). flict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister 

oi 7 ] ' * or Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. 

Petersburg, who should be authorised accordingly. 

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in 
London of the less interested Powers, such as you have 
(8) [No. 36.] proposed, (8) offers now the only prospect of preserving peace 
(7) [c/. Nos. O f Europe, m and he is sure that the Russian Government will 
7 ^' acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing 
armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not 
be abandoned. 
144 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK p. 76] 

No. 75. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) (1) Berlin, July 29, 1914. '" [See No. 

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, 
who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government, to whom he had at once communicated 
your opinion, had answered that events had marched too 
rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your 
suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the basis of 
discussion.' 2 ' His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, (2) [No- 46-] 
despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, 
although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown 
in the Serbian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he 
understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees 
that Serbia would carry out in their entirety the demands 
made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could 
not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had 
then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to 
be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the exclusive (3} [Sce No. 
object of securing such guarantees,'" seeing that the Austrian 93 
Government already assured the Russian Government that 
they had no territorial designs.' 41 (4) [Nos. 48, 

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should 
this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The hold- 
ing of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible 
misunderstandings. 

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from 
Vienna. 

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of 
giving advice at Vienna/ 11 his Excellency hoped that you would (s) [ f /- No- 
realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent 34- J 
danger of European complications. 

The fact of his communicating this information to you 
was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence 
of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to 
support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts 
which he sincerely appreciated. 

K 145 



[B. 76] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 

No. 76. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He 
reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had 
(1) [c/. No. to be very careful in giving advice to Austria/ 1 ' as any idea 
43-] that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them 
(a) [c/.O.si.] to precipitate matters and present ajait accompli. w This had, 
in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communi- 
cation of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis 
(3) [No. 46.] for discussion (3) had not hastened declaration of war. He 
<4) [c/. No. was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, w 
7 1 -] and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, 
being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these 
measures to my French colleague, who informed him that 
French Government had done nothing more than the German 
Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. 
His Excellency denied German Government had done this, 
but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said 
to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it 
seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so 
satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be 
favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation 
and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver 
complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think 
idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a 
No. different matter from conference proposed by you. (5) 
07 -O sTi Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed 
Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern 
e) [See NO. governments. (6) 
70(1)-] 

No. 77. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported 
" [See No. in your telegram of to-day. (7) His Excellency may rely upon 
75-1 it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain 
146 



5> 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B . 78 ] 

every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we 
all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to 
abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, 
we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having 
saved the peace of Europe. 111 <> [sNo 

fe] 

No. 78. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914. 

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day. <8) (a [c/. Nos. 

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 7 C 1 ).? 1 -] 
28th instant" 1 to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs <" SNo. 
in accordance with your instructions, and informed him 67. 

confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German 
Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at 
Berlin. 141 This had already reached his Excellency from < [No. 71 ; 
another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only cf. also 
be directed against Austria. No - 76.] 

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct 
conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. '" The " '[See No. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an 45 and 
exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He 
proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal 
of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your 
proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors,'" or, at all "' [cf. No. 
events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassa- 74-] 
dors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian 
Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement 
approved by France and England would be acceptable to 
him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. 17 ' [c/. Y. 
No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for i36 -9 I ' O. 
you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with - 52t *'* 
Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some 
formula which Austria could be induced to accept. "' Through- w [ c /. NOS. 
out Russian Government had been perfectly frank and 80, 84, 
conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain 97-] 
peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted 
that it would be realised by the British public that it was not 
the fault of the Russian Government. 



147 



[B. 78] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2 

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the sug- 

11 See No. gestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July, 11 ' which I 

57- mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency 

said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four 

Powers provided it was acceptable to Serbia ; he could not, 

(8 '[c/. Nos. he said, be more Serbian than Serbia.' 21 Some supplementary 

47. 59-J statement or explanations would, however, have to be made 

in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to 
" See No. m y Our telegram of the 28th instant (3) was one of secondary 
9> importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he 
did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador 
had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his 
Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly 
influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help 
to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government 
the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the 
Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by 
their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had 
been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such 
matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian 
consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military 
service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially 
mobilised, and had now declared war on Serbia. From what 
had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act 
was one which it was impossible without humiliation for 
Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown 
that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's 
desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go 
to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me 
to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by 
crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in 
any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order 
to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary 
that we should in the meanwhile all work together. 



148 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 80] 

No. 79. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take 
to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to 
his people which has been published this morning," 1 and ^[See 
by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors vol. II., 
agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Govern- P- 4 8 5-l 
ment would convert into a binding engagement to Europe 
the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the 
effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of 
Serbia nor to acquire Serbian territory/ 21 the Italian Ambassa- ( "[c/. Nos. 
dor thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. 59. 
This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the y'lzoV 
Austrian Government would refuse to do. 

No. 80. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914. 

IN your telegram of the 27th instant 131 to Berlin, German (3) See No. 
Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the 46. 

idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the tele- 
gram of the 27th instant' 41 from Berlin. (4) See No. 

Information received by the Italian Government from 43- 

Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in 
Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,' 41 but what creates 
difficulty is rather the "conference,"' 4 ' so the Minister for w [ c f. Y. 57 
Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going and note.] 
to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, 
adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. 
He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose 
a formula acceptable to his Government. (6) Minister for (t;i [<-/. Nos. 
Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would 78, 84. 
keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna 97-] 
and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that 

149 



[B. 81] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 29, 

this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct 
communication. 

The German Government are also being informed that 
the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public 
opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as 
to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government 
must lend their co-operation in this. 

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making 

(1| [c/. Nos. Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. 01 As Germany, 

47 94-1 however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, 

if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and 

ia} [cf. Y. France he thought it would have a great effect.' 1 " 

9 6 -J Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to 
take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, 
each as representing one group, should continue to exchange 
<"[c/. No. views."' 
139-1 

No. 81. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

(4) See No. WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday . <4) 

64. [Also it i s impossible for me to initiate discussions with Am- 

No. 90.] b assa d ors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for 

Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on 

""[Nos. 61, basis of Serbian note,' 5 ' and the inference of all I have heard 

62.] from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form 

of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Serbia. 

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at 

Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception 

is given^to any suggestions he can make there. 

No. 82. 

Mr. Beaumont, British Charge d' Affaires at Constantinople, 
to Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 29, 1914. 

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend 

<8) rDenial cons iderably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of 

No. 137 Serbian territory. (6) I gathered this from a remark let fall 

and Y. by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable 

120.] 150 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 84] 

economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration 
and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count 
from Mussulman population discontented with Serbian rule. 

No. 83. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade , to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 29, 1914. 

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to 
you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which 
you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.' 11 "'[Vol. II., 

P- 397- 



Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. (a) w [Des- 

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the a t4 P .m. ; 
German Chancellor to inform me "' that he is endeavouring to see p. 36.] 
mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes < [ c /. y. 
with good success. (4) Austria and Russia seem to be in 98.] 
constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna < [ c f. Nos. 
explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and 71, 88.]j 
extension of Austrian proceedings in Serbia. (6) I told the * Iff- Y - 94; 
German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct e> 
between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solu- 
tion. (6) I would press no proposal as long as there was a (6) [cf. No. 
prospect of that, but my information this morning was that 
the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the 
Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling 
the Austro-Serbian conflict." 1 The Press correspondents at (TI [No. 93 
St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would (i). (3)-] 
mobilise. The German Government had said that they were 
favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and ^ 
Austria if necessary."" They seemed to think the particular "' 
method of conference, 1 " consultation or discussion, or even no ' t gj 
conversations d quatre in London (10) too formal a method. I [No. 80.] 
urged that the German Government should suggest any < 10 '[c/. R. 

151 5i.] 



[B. 85] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 29 

(1 '[c/. Nos. method 0) by which the influence of the four Powers co.uld be 

60, 88 Y. use( j together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. 

108 log 7 ]' France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation 

or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by 

any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not 

(2) [cf. Nos. acceptable. (2) In fact mediation was ready to come into 

78, 80.] operation by any method that Germany thought possible if 

w [cf. No. only Germany would " press the button " (3) in the interests 

107.] of peace. 

No. 85. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
> [Reached Grey. (Received July 29.) (4) 

Office 811 (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. (6) 

" about I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His 
id- Excellency had just returned from Potsdam. 

AMJfcS&l He said ' 6) that sh . ould Austria be attacked by Russia 

(B) [Reply, a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, 

No. ioi ; owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of 

delivered, his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded 

(6) N - x ?9-] to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He 

08 last sa * d *kat ** was c ^ ear ' so f ar as ne was a l e to Judge the main 
par.] ' principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain 
would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any 
conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object 
at which Germany aimed. Provided that -neutrality of Great 
Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the 
British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at 
no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should 
they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. 

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, 
and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking 
in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency 
said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the 
integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was 
ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that 
she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of 
France what operations Germany might be forced to enter 
upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity 
would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. 
15* 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK (B. 87] 

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had 
been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were 
aware, to bring about an understanding with England ; he 
trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that 
understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind 
a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, 
though it was of course at the present moment too early to 
discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in 
the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, 
would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire. 

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his 
request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it 
probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind 
yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that 
you would desire to retain full liberty. 

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, 
I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day" 1 ' See No 
to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you. 

No. 86. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is 
past for any further discussions on basis of Serbian note, in 
view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin 
regarding partial mobilisation. 18 ' The utmost he now hopes <8) [No. 70 
for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to 
prevent or moderate any further demands on Serbia. 

No. 87. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

AFTER telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation 
seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German 
Ambassador to-day (31 that he must not be misled by the > [See NO. 
friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false 89.] 

security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve 
the peace, which we were now making in common with 

153 



[B. 87] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2C 

Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that 
I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion 
here approached the present difficulty from a quite different 
point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to 
Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute 
was one in which France was primarily interested, and in 
which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush 
France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question 
that was the subject of a special agreement between France 
and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria 
i 1 ' [cf. No. and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. u> 
25 and Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia 
note.] we should no t feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would 
then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav a 
struggle for supremacy in the Balkans ; and our idea had 
always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan 
question. If Germany became involved and France became 
involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do ; 



< 8) [c/ No was a case th a * we sh 011 have to consider. 121 France 
116 ; also would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not 
No. 105.] hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and 
interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engage- 
ments, and we should have to decide what British interests 
required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, be- 
cause, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard 
to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not 
i" [No. 89.] to count on our standing aside, 131 but it would not be fair 
that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that 
this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency 
that I still hoped might not arise. 

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very 
clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, 
and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav 
we should not feel called to intervene ; should other issues 
be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that 
the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should 
then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed 
quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism 
upon it. 

<*Tc/ No ^ e sa ^ French opinion was calm, but decided. He 
105 ; see anticipated a demand from Germany (4) that France would be 
Y. 117-] 154- 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 88] 

neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance 
France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help 
Russia if Russia was attacked. 



No. 88. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the 
information that I had received, that Russia had informed 
Germany respecting her mobilisation. (1) I also told him of' 1 [See Nos, 
the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the 7( I ).93 
Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any W-] 
direct conversations between Russia and Austria. "" I said [No. 70 
that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the ()] 
German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. 
To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest 
of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. 15 If he succeeded, w [ c 
well and good. If not, it was more important than ever 71,84.] 
that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the 
German Ambassador this morning, '*' and propose some [See NO. 
method by which the four Powers should be able to work 84.] 

together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, how- 
ever, that the Russian Government, while desirous of media- 
tion, regarded it as a condition that the military operations 
against Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation 
would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush 
Serbia. w It was, of course, too late for all military operations [NO. 70 
against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, (2).] 
the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation 
of some Serbian territory. But even then it might be possible 
to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while 
saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she 
had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would 
not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to < [ c /. Nos. 
mediate between her and Russia."' 98, 103; 

The German Ambassador said that he had already tele- S.5i;\v., 
graphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning. 

r. '55 



[B. 89] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 29 

No. 89. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this after- 
noon about the European situation, I said that I wished to 
say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something 
(1) [c/. No. that was on my mind. (1) The situation was very grave. 
87-] While it was restricted to the issues at present actually 
involved we had no thought of interfering with it. But if 
Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue 
might be so great that it would involve all European interests ; 
and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of 
our conversation which I hoped would continue into think- 
ing that we should stand aside. 

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked 
whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, 
intervene ? 

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything 

that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by 

saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. 

There would be no question of our intervening if Germany 

was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But 

we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that 

we thought British interests required us to intervene, we 

must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be 

(a) [cf. No. very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. (2) 

46 and I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would 

note.] con tinue as at present, and that I should be able to keep 

as closely in touch with the German Government in working 

for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, 

and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every 

European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach 

from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations 

had misled him or his Government into supposing that we 

should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had 

(3) [c/. Y. not been so misled, the course of things might have been 

92.] different. (8) 

156 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 90] 

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had 
said ; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had 
already given in Berlin as his view of the situation. 

No. 90. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador 
this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July 11 ' (I) See No. 
to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir 8 4- 

Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th July'" and of my reply '" See *f- 
to it. "' I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete <, See N 
acceptance of the Austrian demands by Serbia would now Si. 

satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis 
di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the 
Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they 
might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only 
the latter would give them an opportunity. u> I could, how- . r$ ee jjo. 
ever, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my 64.] 

telegram to you, (M and could only give what the Italian [No. 84 ; 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Am- cf. No! 
bassador for information, as long as it was understood that 81.] 
Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over 
her dispute with Serbia. As to mediation between Austria 
and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging 
Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand 
to go to any length she pleased. That would not be media- 
tion, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the 
interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view 
of the German Government was that Austria could not by 
force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a 
Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a w r , N 
question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how r s 4 s 5*0 
far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There 91197,135 
must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia, but Austria Y. 56, 62, 
might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of I0 3. 120, 
Russia. JEP- J. 

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not 2835 73 : 
take Serbian territory, ( " as to which I observed that, by taking w.'exh.io; 

157 R. 32.] 



[B. 91] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2 

territory while leaving nominal Serbian independence, Austria 
w [cf. Nos. might turn Serbia practically into a vassal State,' 11 and this 
55. 9 1 . 97. would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans, 
j^ i ' I observed that when there was danger of European con- 
flict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into 
it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precau- 
(8) ['/- G - tions.'" 

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some 
means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe. 

No. 91. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at 

Vienna. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

< 3 >[Instruc- THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day (8) he had ready 

tions, R. a i on g memorandum, (4) which he proposed to leave, and 

(4t Isee R. wmcn he sa id gave an account of the conduct of Serbia towards 

19.] Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian 

action was. 

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the 
question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day 
seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers 
were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, 
which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and 
European peace was at stake. 

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Serbia must pro- 
ceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the 
necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been 
obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial 
(5) [cf. No. aggrandisement, (5) and all she wished was to make sure 
90 and that her interests were safeguarded. 

note.] i sa jd that it would be quite possible, without nominally 

interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away 
any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal (5) State. 
Count Mensdorff deprecated this. 

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect 
that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian 
position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan 
war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian 
sphere of influence. 
158 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B . tt] 

No. 92. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a com- 
munication from the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting 
that the German objections to the mediation of the four 
Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, 
might be removed by some change in the form of procedure. 

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the 
German Government to suggest any form of procedure under 
which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, 
already accepted by the German Government in principle, 
could be applied. "' [No. 84.] 

No. 93. 

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian 
Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914. 



Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof. 
(TRANSLATION.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914. 

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold to-day '" in the sense of your ( " [/- R. 
Excellency's instructions."' I brought to his notice, in the 4-] 
most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution 
which, while consolidating good relations between Austria- 
Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy genuine guarantees Ul for its future relations with (4) [cf. No. 
Serbia. 75 ; Y. 

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers 9 2 - 

to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed ?$?:. o * 
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 37i ' 5 3 ; \v! 

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the exh. 3 ; R. 
gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank intro., R. 
explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet."' He told me I0 
that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, '" ( Sfe No - 
who had only decided much against their will on the energetic *$ and 

159 



[B. 93] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 2c 

measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no 
longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms 
("[See No. of the Austro-Hungarian note. (u 

93 (3) ; Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so 

74] acu . te an d that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of 

excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, 

could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the 

more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Serbian reply 

< 8) [cf. Nos. itself furnished proof of the insincerity (a) of Serbia's promises 

%$ 1: for the future - 

intro.] (2.) 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count 
Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 

" [cf. W., THE German Ambassador (3) informs me, in the name of 
vol. II., th e Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a 
P- I 3o-J moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue 
to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morn- 
ing there had been no news that the Austrian army had crossed 
the Serbian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to 
express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor 
of this communication. I have informed him of the military 
(4) [c/. No. measures taken by Russia, (4) none of which, I told him, were 
7 (*) directed against Germany ; I added that neither should 
also No. ^gy j^ taken as aggressive measures against Austria- 
7 '* Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisation of the 
greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army. 

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct 

explanations between the Austrian Government and our- 

w [S^No. selves, (5) and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided 

45. and that the advice of the German Government, to which he had 

note.] referred, found an echo at Vienna (pour peu que les conseils 

du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent echo a Vienne)* 

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept 
the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal 
with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy. 

* [The official translation of this passage is inexact. A true rendering 
of the French clause quoted within brackets would be : " however little the 
advice of the German Government to which he referred finds an echo at 
Vienna."] 

160 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. M] 

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turn- 
ing to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful 
solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be 
carried on by a conference of the four Powers Germany, 
France, England, and Italy and by a direct exchange of views 
(un contact direct) between Austria-Hungary and Russia on 
much the same lines as occurred during the most critical 
moments of last year's crisis.'" (U [c/. O. 

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which 6 3-] 
had been made by Serbia, it should not be very difficult to 
find a compromise (un terrain de compromis) to settle the 
other questions which remained outstanding, provided that 
Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used 
their entire influence in the direction of conciliation. 

(30 

M. SazonoJ, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count 
Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, 
dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received 
M. Schebeko's telegram of the I5th (28th) July. (2) ( "[No.93 

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the (i).] 
Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with 
the Imperial Government. 

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely 
entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in 
any steps which they may consider advisable. 

No. 94. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined (i} [Sce Nos. 
to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered.* 8 * 

My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign ''* 

Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, ' [ See - . 

that Russia will not remain indifferent^ in present crisis N^.*)^ 

I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a 47> 4 g,' 72 \ 

L 161 80, 94.] 



[B. 05] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 3 

surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known 
in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German 
Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert 
with three other Great Powers not immediately interested 
in the Austro-Serbian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, 
irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this 
country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Serbian 
affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian 
and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian 
Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible 
to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible 
for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present 
dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already 
at Belgrade to induce Serbian Government to meet principal 
Austrian demands in a favourable spirit ; if approached in 
a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still 
further in this direction. But she was justly offended at 
having been completely ignored, and she could not consent 
to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador 
said that if proposals were put forward which opened any 
prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally 
thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in 
concert with the three other Powers. 

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that 
he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement 
may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, 
that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands 
on Serbia. 

No. 95. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation 
will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intima- 
tion that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of 
Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government 
are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance 
that Serbia will not be crushed, but she would understand 
that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia 

162 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B . 96] 

measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the 
continuance of hostile propaganda from Serbian territory. 

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the 
German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously 
to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a 
manner calculated to provoke a European war. 

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so 
identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Serbian feeling (1) ( " [cf. Y. 18 
prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause and note; 
of peace with entire sincerity. **. 22.3 

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private in- 
formation that the German Ambassador knew the text of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched "" and "" [cf. Y. 15 
telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the ^^ note 
German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line Y ? x ' s * 
of it. 52 ' ] 

No. 96. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador 
and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I 
happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, w which he said was quite friendly. <>[For 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia another 
had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, account, 
however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as 
the adoption of military precautions similar to those which 
had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no 
objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their 
conversations, although he did not say that they could be 
resumed on the basis of the Serbian reply. 

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. 
He had begun to make his preparations for his departure 
on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war 
in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something 
may yet be done to prevent war with Austria. 



[B. 97] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 3< 

No. 97. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914. 

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign 

Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German 

Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German 

Government were willing to guarantee that Serbian integrity 

<"[c/.No. 90 would be respected by Austria. (1) To this he had replied 

and note.] that this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become 

an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara 

[c/.No.go had become a Russian vassal. <2) There would be a revolution 

and note ; m R uss i a if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. 

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession 
of Russian Government that Germany was making military 
(3) [c/.O.68.] and naval preparations against Russia w more particularly 
in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. 

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister 

w [c/. 0. for Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., (4) when former completely 

6o -l broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed 

to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could 

telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof 

accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a 

<6) [c/.O.6o; formula in French, of which following is translation : (5) 
Y. 103. 

Mo din- " If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Serbia 
fornrula nas assume d character of question of European interest,. 
Nos. 103! declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum 
120,132.] points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia 
engages to stop all military preparations." 

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded 
with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable 
result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached 
such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, 
Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Ger- 
many is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical 
reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation. 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 9J 

No. 98. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on 
receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last 
conversation with you (1) he asked Austro-Hungarian Govern- (1) [S No. 
ment whether they would be willing to accept mediation on J f- 
basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some 
other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up 
till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation 
against Austria will have increased difficulties, 1 " as Austria- w [cf. No. 
Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Serbia, 8 ; ^- 
will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary Jg 9 . ' w ' 
of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree passim.] 
to above basis for an arrangement 131 and in persuading her (3| [c/.S.5i.] 
in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded 
as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some 
chance that European peace may be preserved. 

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's 
position in view of Russian mobilisation'* 1 and military <4) [cf. No. 
measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond Y. 

recall of officers on leave a measure which had been officially ^ ^J* 
taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yester- passim.} 
day Imperial Government had done nothing special in way 
of military preparations. (5) Something, however, would have s > [ c f. Y. 
soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they 105.] 

mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He 
regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it 
would be a military necessity. 

His Excellency added that telegram (6) received from Prince l " See No. 
Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard I02 - 

with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events 
he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which 
you had spoken. 

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin 
very late last night ; had it been received earlier Chancellor 
would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had 
done.' 71 

165 



[B. 99] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 3 

No. 99. 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 



IX] 



" [Reply, Grey. (Received July 30.) 

No. 116.] (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 30, 1914. 

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian 

Government have been informed by the German Government 

that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would 

(2) [cf. Y. mobilise/ 50 But a further report, since received from St. 

100 ; O. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been 

58 R. 46.3 modify an( j was now a request to be informed on what 

<3) [See O. conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation/ 8 * The 

6o -3 answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that 

Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect 

the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands 

of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an 

international discussion. 

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted 

by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers 

<4 >[c/.No.6; is in the hands of Great Britain. <4) If His Majesty's Govern- 

, Y. 31, 47.] ment announced that England would come to the aid of France 

in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a 

result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, 

there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify 

her attitude. 

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His 
Majesty's Government to make such an announcement ,. 
but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the 
interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does 
not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make 
preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. 
The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government 
informed of everything that may be done in that way. They 
have reliable information that the German troops are con- 
< s) [See Y. centrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. (6) If 
106.] there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably 
draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. 
A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose 
desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost 
certainly prevent Germany from going to war. 

166 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 101] 

No. 100. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought 
Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any 
exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, 
and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation 
of Belgrade had been accomplished. 

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that 
some formula might be devised by Germany which might be 
acceptable for an exchange of views. 

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion. 

No. 101. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 2gth July. 01 <> S ee No. 

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain 85. 

the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to 
neutrality on such terms/** [Con- 

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while veyed to 
French colonies are taken and France is 'beaten so long as 
Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the S!; *' i 

i N (J iOvJ.J 

colonies. 

From the material point of view such a proposal is un- 
acceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe 
being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her 
position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German 
policy. 

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us 
to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, 
a disgrace from which the good name of this country would 
never recover. 

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away , r c / No 
whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutral- I2 ^, 148 ; 
ity of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. 13 Y. 144.] 

167 



[B. 102] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 30 

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether 
the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between 
England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient 
(1) [cf. Y. to compensate us for tying our hands now. (1) We must pre- 
I26 serve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to 
us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable 
development of the present crisis as the Chancellor con- 
templates. 

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, 
and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the 
good relations between England and Germany is that they 
should continue to work together to preserve the peace of 
Europe ; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations 
of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved 
and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Govern- 
ment will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will. 

And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be pre- 
served, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour 
will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could 
be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive 
or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies 
by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I 
have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through 
the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding 
object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has 
hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite 
proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than 
any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely 
passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will 
follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement 
between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. 



No. 102. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must 

(2) [SNo. not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. 00 

8 9-] This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince 

1 68 



914] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B.103] 

Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is 
made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 3Oth 
July.'" (1) Sw No. 

98. 

No. 103. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 

St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Govern- 
ment would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking 
Belgrade and Serbian territory in region of frontier, to promise 
not to advance further/ 21 while Powers endeavoured to arrange (2 '[c/.S.5i.3 
that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Aus- 
tria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when 
Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday (8) as a (JI [No. 88 ; 
possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I /-No.o8; 
would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend 
further military preparations on all sides. 

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down 
by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 3Oth July,' 41 (4) See No. 
and fears it cannot be modified ; but if Austrian advance 97- 

were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula (B) might be changed > [See No. 
to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could 97-1 

fully satisfy Austria without impairing Serbian sovereign 
rights or independence. (6) (| [S<5Nos. 

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring 120, 132 ; 
Serbian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of * lso - 
European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how 
a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia 
would also consent to discussion and suspension of further 
military preparations, provided that other Powers did the 
same. 

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one 
I can suggest (7) if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can <7) [c/. No. 
come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister I0 4-] 
for Foreign Affairs. 



169 



IB. 104] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 3 

No. 104. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
|l See No. my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of to-day, m and say that 
103. 1 know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate 
a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion 
at St. Petersburg. 

No. 105. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

' a) [c/. Y. M. CAMBON reminded me to-day (2) of the letter I had 

108.] written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the 
peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss 
what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of 
reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's 
reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more 
seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to 
ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would 
like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances 
arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an 
aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, 
of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German 
military preparations were more advanced and more on the 

{3) [cf. No. offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet 
87 ; Y. done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the 
form of either a demand that France should cease her prepara- 

(4) [See No. tions, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral 
IJ 9-] if there was war between Germany and Russia. (8) Neither 

(8) [Quoted of these things could France admit. 
in Sir I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, 

E. Grey's an( j j WO uld see him again to-morrow afternoon. (4) 
speech, 

(vol. II., ENCLOSURE i IN No. 105. 

T b Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.^ 



by 
French My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 

Minister FROM time to time in recent years the French and British 
Y. 159 ' naval and military experts have consulted together. It has 
(p. 428).] 170 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 105) 

always been understood that such consultation does not 
restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any 
future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. 
We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, 
and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits 
either Government to action in a contingency that has not 
arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of 
the French and British fleets respectively at the present 
moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government 
had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third 
Power, it might become essential to know whether it could 
in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to 
expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something 
that threatened the general peace, it should immediately 
discuss with the other whether both Governments should act 
together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, 
if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in 
common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the 
General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, 
and the Governments would then decide what effect should 
be given to them. 

Yours, &c., 

E. GREY. 

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 105. 

M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward 

Grey <" [Quoted 

/~, v by French 

(TRANSLATION.) p^me 

French Embassy, London, 

November 23, 1912. / ' 
Dear Sir Edward, 

YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd 
November, that during the last few years the military and 
naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted 
with each other from time to time ; that it had always been 
understood that these consultations should not restrict the 
liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether 
they should lend each other the support of their armed forces ; 

171 



[B. 105] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 30 

that, on either side, these consultations between experts were 
not and should not be considered as engagements binding our 
Governments to take action in certain eventualities ; that, how- 
ever, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two 
Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack 
on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to 
know whether it could count on the armed support of the other. 
Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to 
state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having 
grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third 
Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that 
Government would immediately examine with the other the 
question whether both Governments should act together in 
order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If 
so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures 
which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those 
measures involved action, the two Governments would take into 
immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and 
would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. 

Yours, &c., 

PAUL CAMBON. 

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 105. 

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French 
Ambassador in London. 

(TRANSLATION.) 

THE German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers 

yesterday ; German patrols twice penetrated on to our terri- 

> [cf. Y. tory. (1) Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 

106.3 I0 kilom. from the frontier. 00 The local population is protest- 

21 W- N s- ing against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's 

140' ] 13 ' arm Y> but tne Government wishes to make it clear to public 

opinion and to the British Government that in no case will 

France be the aggressor. The whole i6th corps from Metz, 

reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is 

occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 

1 5th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. 

The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the 

threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists 

have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. 

172 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 1<*1 

This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have 
not called back a single reservist. 

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all 
my information goes to show that the German preparations 
began on Saturday,* the very day on which the Austrian 
note was handed in. 

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of 
yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government 
the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive 
intentions of the other. 

* Sic : in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian 
ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Serbian reply was dated 
Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference 
is intended. 

[This is not the only sign of haste about " Enclosure 3," which has 
undergone some emendation since its original publication in the White Paper 
" Miscellaneous. No. 6 (1914). [Cd. 7467.]" It there appeared with a 
date appended, " Paris, July 31, 1914." This was obviously incorrect, 
inasmuch as the covering despatch from Sir Edward Grey is dated July 30, 
and states that the enclosure was received from M. Cambon on that day. 
Moreover, the document in question is in substance an abbreviated repro- 
duction of M. Viviani's despatch to M. Cambon (No. 106 in the French Yellow- 
book) which is also dated July 30. In a later issue of the White Paper, and 
in the still later Blue-book, the incorrect date " July 31 " is eliminated and 
the enclosure is left undated. A further confusion was to be found in its 
opening sentence, which in the original White Paper reads thus, in the two 
languages : " L'arme'e allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontiefes, 
hier vendredi ; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pe'ne'tr^ sur 
notre territoire." " The German army had its advance-posts on our 
frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to our 
territory." But, as July 31 was a Friday and July 30 a Thursday, the 
" vendredi " " (Friday) " was in any case incorrect ; and this word also 
was eliminated in later issues. Reference to M. Viviani's despatch of 
July 30 (Y. 106) makes it clear that the " yesterday " on which the frontier 
is stated to have been violated must have been Wednesday, July 29 two 
days earlier than would be indicated by the erroneously inserted " Friday." 
M. Viviani's words are : " L'arme'e allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos 
bornes frontieres ; par deux fois, hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont 
pn6tre" sur notre territoire." " The German army has its outposts on our 
frontier ; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our terri- 
tory." This sentence seems, moreover, to clear up an ambiguity caused by 
variations in the punctuation of Enclosure 3 ; for M. Viviani connects the 
" yesterday " with the later, and not the earlier, clause, and applies it 
expressly to the violation of the frontier by the German patrols. This being 
so, a more exact rendering of the opening sentence of Enclosure 3 might 
run thus : " The German army has its advance-posts on our frontiers ; 
yesterday on two occasions German patrols penetrated on to our territory."] 

73 



[B. 106] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 30 

No. 106. 

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 31.) 

^Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1914. 

I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who 
sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had 
declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the 
Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that 
Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice 
to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with 
France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue 
with us. 

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador 
at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that 
the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers 
should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider 
acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite 
Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand 
from Serbia, and give a guarantee that she would neither 
deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would 
be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the 
Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal 
that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the 
other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, 
and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, 
discussions could be commenced at once. There was still 
time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any 
case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with 
His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between 
the four Powers was impossible. 

No. 107. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from 
< J > See No. the German Government to the communication "' which you 
8 4' made to them through the German Ambassador in London 
174 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 108] 

asking whether they could suggest any method by which 
the four Powers could use their mediating influence between 
Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they 
had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply 
to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether 
the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, 
the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would 
be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that 
he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would 
satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned. 
The Chancellor told me last night that he was " pressing 
the button " (1) as hard as he could, and that he was not sure (l} [See No. 
whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at 84.] 

Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than other- 
wise. 

No. 108. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach 
peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handi- 
capped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. ' 2I He has <> [c/.No.gS 
done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, and not*.] 
perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at 
the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country 
defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers ; 
and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now 
being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be 
impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me 
that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day wrsee Cor- 
perhaps, the German Government would take some very respond- 
serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to ence 
have an audience with the Emperor. between 

His Excellency added that the news of the active prepara- J^ r ^i 
tions on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just app^y. 
when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of (pp. 437- 
their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the 443); c/. 
Emperor was actually conforming to that request. 00 No - Il8 -l 

175 



[B. 109] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 31 

No. 109. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to 

his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as con- 

n) See No. tained in your telegram of yesterday. (1) His Excellency was 

I01 ' so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the 

(a) [No.ioS.] frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, (2> 

that he received your communication without comment. 

He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read 

to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it 

before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave 

matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its 

points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message 

on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as 

a record of conversation, and not as an official document. 

His Excellency agreed. 

No. no. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 

St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result 

of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation 

has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister 

(3) [c/. O. for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador . (8) The 

66 -] Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been in- 

(4) [R. 49.] structed (4) that he may converse with the Russian Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about 

the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions 

and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. 

If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising 

eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too 

great a number against 400,000 Serbians. 

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian 
Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to 
suspend their military preparations. 

176 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. ill] 

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that dis- 
cussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, 1 " ( "fc/.R.53, 
and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign 55-J 

Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage 
them. 

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards 
military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged 
to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the 
advance of her troops into Serbia. 



No. in. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding 
between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. 
The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of 
Serbian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian inten- 
tions with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. 
It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust 
preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Peters- 
burg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake 
to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the 
four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would 
undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her 
demands on Serbia, provided that they did not impair Serbian 
sovereignty and the integrity of Serbian territory. As your 
Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willing- 
ness to respect them. 121 Russia might be informed by the '"[No. 90 
four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian and note.] 
demands going the length of impairing Serbian sovereignty 
and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further 
military operations or preparations. 

You may sound the Secretary of State about this 
proposal. 131 [See No. 

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Ger- J? 1 * c f' 
many could get any reasonable proposal put forward which 
made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to 

M 177 



[B. 112] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 3 

preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would 
be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. 
Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if 
Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would have nothing more to do with the consequences ; 
but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France 
(1) [c/. No. became involved we should be drawn in. (1) 

IX 9-3 You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary 
of State as to proposal above. 



No. 112. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

ACCORDING to information just received by German 

Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole 

Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor 

(2) [c/. No. tells me that " Kriegsgefahr "* (2) will be proclaimed at once 

136 ; Y. by German Government, as it can only be against Germany 

116, 117 ; that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation 

J xh ' W T wou ^ follow almost immediately. His Excellency added 

7 ' J in explanation that " Kriegsgefahr "* signified the taking 

of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained 

relations with a foreign country. 

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, 
seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution 
of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emer- 
gencies. 

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on 
the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests 
to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to con- 
tinue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last 
(3) [See Nos. night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, (sl 
8 4> 107.] and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor 
this morning in the matter. 

* " Imminence of war." 

178 . 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B 

No. 113: 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisa- 
tion. ' (1 [cf. Y. 
This decision was taken in consequence of report received II8 K * 
from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria 52 '^ 
is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that 
she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia. 
JM Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making 
active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let 
her get a start. 

No. 114. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at 
Paris, and Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador 
at Berlin. (8) [cf. Sir 

I? /"* 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. ( vo i IL, 

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in p. 410) ; 
view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes also No - 
essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing 
treaties, to ask whether French (3 (German) Ml Government ^"ri 
are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so rgL^No 
long as no other Power violates it. 125.] 

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) m [German 
Government. It is important to have an early answer. reply, No. 

122 ; cf. 

No. 160 

No. 115. (p. 207).] 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at 

Brussels. '" ' ['/ Sir 

Grev 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. ( vo i. nf, 

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister P- 4") ; 
for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility 
of a European war, I have asked French and German Govern- T \ ' 
ments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. 

179 



[B. 116] - BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 3] 

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Govern- 
ment will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutral- 
ity, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and 
observe. 

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early 
(1) [Reply, reply is desired. 10 
No. 128.] 

No. 116. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
w [cf. Y. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. <2) 

(S) See No. I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date. (8) 
99. Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet 
gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling 
is quite different from what it was during the Morocco ques- 
tion. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving 
France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a 
dispute which is not hers. 

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been 
a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not 
expect our neutrality. 

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a 
war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged 
(i) [See No. His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision. (4) 
119- c f- I have told him that we should not be justified in giving 
Nos. 87, an y pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly 
consider the situation again directly there is a new develop- 
ment. 

No. 117. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador 
was leaving his Excellency. 

lt} [of. Y. German Ambassador had informed his Excellency <5) that, 

in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total 
mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government 
have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the 

180 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 118] 

Russian Government required that Russian forces should 

be demobilised. U) (l) [cf. No. 

The German Government will consider it necessary to " x I2 4l 
order the total mobilisation of the German army on the ] " 7 ' 
Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the y. '(vu)\ 
Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply 0.70.] 
with German demand.' 81 (8l [c/.O.7<>; 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate R - 54-1 
this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will 
be the attitude of England.' 31 <"[S Nos. 

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours 6, 119-] 
terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at I P.M. in order to receive 
the French Government's answer as to the attitude they 
will adopt in the circumstances. (4) '*' [See Y, 

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. I2 5-] 

I am .informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is 
not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces 
having taken place. 

No. 118. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of 
State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to 
Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Am- 
bassador in London has received instructions to inform you 
that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily 
hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged 
between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor," 1 * [Y. app. 
and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Am- V.; also 
bassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign W -J 
Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved 
off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany 
would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, 
in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian 
intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it 
difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention 
to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier 

Hi 



[B. 119] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 3: 

at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian 
Government had stood behind Serbia, and that a compromise 
between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted 
with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a con- 
ciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, 
I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar com- 
promise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this 
afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have 
informed of the above conversation. 

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has 
no desire to interfere unduly with Serbia ; that, as compared 
with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Bel- 
grade is a man of very moderate views ; and that, as regards 
Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Serbia to yield 
to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her 
(1> [See No. independence. (1) His Excellency is exerting himself strongly 

55 ; Y. in the interests of peace. 
127.] 

No. 119. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. 
[cf. Y. Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. (a) 

M. CAMBON referred to-day to a telegram that had 
been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the 
French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncer- 
tainty with regard to whether we would intervene which 
was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would 
only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it 
would decide the German attitude in favour of peace. 

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had 
left Germany under the impression that we would not inter- 
vene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should 
(3) [Nos. remain neutral. (s) I had not only definitely declined to say 
101, 109.] that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this 
morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France 
and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn 
< 4 > [No. 1 1 1.] into it. (4) That, of course, was not the same thing as taking 
an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only 
to show that we had not left Germany under the impression 
that we would stand aside. 

182 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 1193 

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had 
said yesterday. m ( "[Stt No. 

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet I0 5-l 

to-day,'* 1 that we could not give any pledge at the present <"[Sw No. 
time. Though we should have to put our policy before 105.] 

Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. 
Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion 
did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country 
were involved. Further developments might alter this 
situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take 
the view that intervention was justified. The preservation 
of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a 
decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. 
Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to 
intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we 
stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might 
be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each 
was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would 
not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium."' w [See No. 

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help "4-1 

France if Germany made an attack on her. (4) (4) [c/. No. 

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far "7-J 

as things had gone at present, we could not take any engage- 
ment. 

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning 
rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could 
not be to England's interest that France should be crushed 
by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished 
position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a 
great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German 
strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He 
asked me whether I could not submit his question to the 
Cabinet again. (B) ( "[c/. No. 

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as II6 - 
soon as there was some new development, but at the present 
moment the only answer I could give was that we could not 
undertake any definite engagement. " 



183 



[B. 120] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 31 

No. 120. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received August I.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French 

Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective 

(l) [Also in Governments subjoined formula (1) as best calculated to 

No. 132. amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th 

Nos y? J ul y <8) with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.' 31 

103,139; ^ e trusted it would meet with your approval : 

O e? 1 ] 3 ' " ^ 1'Autriche consentira a arreter marche de ses troupes 

w see No. sur ^ e territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro- 

103. serbe a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, 

3) See No. elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satis- 

97- faction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement 

d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte a ses droits 

d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s'engage a 

conserver son attitude expectante."* 

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to 
(4) [Y., app. German Emperor by Emperor of Russia (4) in reply to the 
V. (vi.) former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had 
(p. 440) ; begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for 
?ol lY *^ e hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty 
p. 132.] ' na< ^ then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no 
intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed 
behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversa- 
tion with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook 
that not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; 
it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, 
to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress. 

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better 
prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation 
were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far 
more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would 
see your way to agreeing to this. 

* [For translation see No. 132. This formula is quoted several times 
(see references in margin) with trifling variations of phraseology, which, 
however, do not affect the se^se.J 

184 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 121] 

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to 
His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save 
the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were 
prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and 
the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude 
adopted by Great Britain. 

No. 121. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. (1> (l) [c/. Y. 

YOUR telegram of 3ist July.' 1 " ... s 2 No. 

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most m. 

earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort 
to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war. 

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your 
proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain 
peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Govern- 
ment to consider any proposal until they had received an 
answer from Russia to their communication of to-day ; this 
communication, which he admitted had the form of an 
ultimatum, 1 " being that, unless Russia could inform the (ll [c/. No. 
Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would II 7-J 

immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany 
and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise 
at once. 

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand 
even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to 
demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order 
to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only 
directed against Austria. 

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was 
satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited 
favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it 
before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that 
it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had t4) [Y. app. 
sent in their answer to the German demand. v - ( v "0 

He again assured me that both the Emperor William/ 4 ' ^ p ' d 44 Jjr ; 
at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German ? v n ol n ' 
Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria p . 133).]' 

18$ 



( 



[B. 122] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 31 

to show willingness to continue discussions and telegraphic 
and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a 
promising nature but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt 
(1) [cf. No. everything. (1) 

138; Y. 

109; S.5I NO. 122. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

""[c/.G.sS.] NEUTRALITY of Belgium/ 2 ' referred to in your telegram 
(3) See No. of 3ist July to Sir F. Bertie. (3) 

114- I have seen Secretary of State/ 4 ' who informs me that 
(4) [c/. No. h e mus t consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he 
/p I 2 Q 7 \ -i could possibly answer. (5) I gathered from what he said 
w[See Sir that he thought any reply they might give could not but 
E. Grey disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the 
(vol. II., event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful 
P- 4ip)-] whether they would return any answer at all. 16 ' His Excel- 
l encv > nevertheless, took note of your request. 

It appears from what he said that German Government 

consider that certain hostile acts have already been com- 

(7) [Explain- mitted by Belgium.' 7 ' As an instance of this, he alleged that 

ed and a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under 

answered an embargo already. 

andenclsJ * hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss 
the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite 
answer seems to me remote. 

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear 
that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply 
returned to you by the French Government. 

No. 123. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

Foreign Office, August I, 1914. 

< 8 '[c/. No. I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day (8) that the 

148-] T reply (9) of the German Government with regard to the neutral- 

" See No - ity of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the 

' neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 124] 

Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as 
that which had been given by France it would materially 
contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other 
hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium 
by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be 
extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. 
I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet 
meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him 
a memorandum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to 
violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain 
neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still 
free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. 
All I could say was that our attitude would be determined 
largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of 
Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. 
I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality 
on that condition alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not 
formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. 
He even suggested that the integrity of France and her 
colonies might be guaranteed. 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise 
to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that 
we must keep our hands free. 

No. 124. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this 
afternoon, (1) I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs (1) Set No. 
requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at IT 4- 

the Elysie, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He 
took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of 
the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make. 

He told me that a communication had been made to you 
by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of 
Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if 

187 



[B. 125] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [JULY 31 

w [cf. Nos. Russia do not demobilise at once. (1) He is urgently anxious 
112, 117.] as t o w hat the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, 
and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Govern- 
ment at the earliest moment possible. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German 
Embassy is packing up. 

No. 125. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

w See No. MY immediately preceding telegram. (8) 

124. Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality 
<s) [No.ii4.] of Belgium. (3) It is as follows : 

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality 
of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other 
Power violating that neutrality that France might find her- 
self under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her 
own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been 
given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it 
to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at 
Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the 
(4) [c/. Y. Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. (4) 

119,122; 

G - 9. 15-] No. 126. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August i, 1914. 

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, 
who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on 

(5) [cf. Y. calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, (5) that 
125.] the French Government failed to comprehend the reason 

(6) [Y. 117.] which prompted his communication of yesterday evening.'" 
It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation 
in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed 
a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government 
were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It 
seemed strange to the French Government that in view of 

188 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 128 ] 

this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to 
converge, the German Government should have at that 
moment' 11 presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requir- "'[/. Y. 
ing immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no I2I -1 
differences at issue between France and Germany, but the 
German Ambassador had made a menacing communication 
to the French Government and had requested an answer the 
next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations 
and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The 
Ambassador was informed that the French Government 
considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding. 

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demand- 
ing his passports, but he stated that he had packed up. 

No. 127. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received August I.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August i, 1914. 

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet. <" >&. Y. 

"5-J 

No. 128. 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August i, 1914. 

BELGIAN neutrality. 1 " '"[c/.G.n.] 

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday (4) <4) See No. 

have been acted upon. "5- 

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe 
and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain 
to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation 
of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they 
were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. 
The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were 
excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions ; 
but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against 
emergencies. 

189 



[B. 129] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST a 

No. 129. 

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. (Received 

August 2.) 

(TRANSLATION.) 

(1) [c/. No. (Telegraphic.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. (1) 

132,133-] THE Luxemburg Minister of State, Eyschen, has just 
received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de 
Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, 
Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures 
taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against 

(8) [c/.G.2o.] Luxemburg, (2) but are only intended to insure against a possible 
attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid 
to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways 

(8 '[c/. Y. which are leased to the Empire. 181 
133-1 

No. 130. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

'"[Reply, Berlin. 

No. 143.] 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August i, 1914. 

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have 
forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central 
Company and other British merchant-ships. 

I cannot ascertain on what ground the detention of 
(8) [Explana- British ships has been ordered. (5) 

tion, No. You should request German Government to send immedi- 
J / 5 N** a * e orc ^ ers *h a t th ev should be allowed to proceed without 
140 i so' delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable 
I5 6.] 'unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their 
side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive 
nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally 
careful not to take any step which would make the situation 
between us impossible. 
190 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK (B. 132] 

No. 131. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin." w ^ See No . 

138.] 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August i, 1914. 

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace 
if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great 
Power begins war. 

The Russian Government has communicated to me (8) the (>r c ^ Nos. 
readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness 110,133; 
of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open Y. 121.] 
to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia 
originally suggested. (t] (3} ( See No ' 

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and 
Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Govern- 
ment may be able to make use of the Russian communica- 
tions referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His 
Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any 
act which may precipitate matters. 

No. 132. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August i, 1914. 

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof to Count 
Benckendorff of the 3ist July communicated to me to-day : I4> '" ^ ^- 

/TT i \ 1 2O , Y. 

"(Urgent.) II3 , o . 

" Formule amendeV'conforme'ment a la proposition anglaise : ,,,5Z^ , 
' Si Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses troupes sur JJgJe t? 
le territoire serbe et .si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro- No. 120.1 
serbe a assume" le caractre d'une question d'inte"ret europe*en, 
elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satis- 
faction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte a ses droits 

191 



[B . 188] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST i 

d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s'engage 
a conserver son attitude expectante.' "* 

(Above communicated to all the Powers.) 

No. 133. 

S*> Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August i, 1914. 

M. DE ETTER came to-day to communicate the contents 
of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 3ist July, which 
(i) r c y No> are as follows : 

131; Y. " The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readi- 

121 ] ness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Aus- 

(2) [c/. Y trian ultimatum to Serbia. (2) M. Sazonof replied by express- 

120 and ing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the dis- 

note; O. cuss i O ns should take place in London with the participation 

of the Great Powers. 

" M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would 
assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of 
Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very 
important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provi- 
sionally to her military action on Serbian territory." 

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) 

No. 134. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August i, 1914. 

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that 

German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the 

(st [ c j Y. 56 responsibility ; (3> that it was only after a decree of general 

and note, * TRANSLATION. " Formula amended in accordance with the English 

127, app. p rO p 0sa i : < if Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian 

O K- w terr i tor y> an< ^ i* recognising that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed 

h t ^ ie c h aracter f a question of European interest, she admits that the Great 

exn. 2 j p owers ma y examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the 

5 1 -] Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a 

State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting 

attitude.' ' 

192 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 186] 

mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor 
of Russia ordered a general mobilisation ; that, although 
the measures which the German Government have already 
taken are in effect a general mobilisation, (I) they are not so ( "[c/. Y. 
designated ; that a French general mobilisation will become I0 50 
necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty- 
eight hours behind Germany as regards German military 
preparations ; that the French troops have orders not to 
go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of lokilom. 181 '"[/ No - 
so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation 
to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, *] $0 ' I4 y' 
are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions 136.] 
on it ; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of 
Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversa- 
tions with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving 
the peace;'" that French Government, whose wishes are (SI [Sce Y.. 
markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace app. V.] 
and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible 
to avoid war. 

No. 135. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 

St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August i, 1914. 

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source 
that Austrian Government have informed German Govern- 
ment that though the situation has been changed by the 
mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the 
efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to 
consider favourably my proposal' 41 for mediation between ( "[See No. 
Austria and Serbia. The effect of this acceptance would 1IX< 
naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia 
would continue for the present, and that the British Govern- 
ment would urge upon Russian Government to stop the 
mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which 
case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military 
counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon 
Austria by Russian mobilisation. 

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say 
that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation 

N 193 



[B. 136J BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [Aucusx 

by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears 
still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter 
should be discussed with German Government also by 
Russian Government. 

No. 136. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August i, 1914. 

MINISTER of War informed military attache this after- 
noon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisa- 
(i) [Y. 127; tion of the French Army.* 1 ' This became necessary because 
0.74 ; w. the Minister of War knows that, under the system of " Kriegs- 
(zP'^Stat zus tand," <2) the Germans have called up six classes. Three 
of war." classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war 
[of. No. strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he 
112.3 says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation 

(3) r c j Q under another name. (3) 

73.] The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them 
eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected 
at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance 

(4) [cf. Nos. to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. (4) has been left 
I0 5 (3), between the French troops and German frontier. The 
Y 34 ' J 6 4 ? ' French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is 

anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisa- 
tion is one for purely defensive purposes. 



No. 137. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador 

at Vienna. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August i, 1914. 

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. 
He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the 
Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to 
the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his 
Excellency was given instructions to assure the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs ihat there was no intention 
in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair 

194 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 188] 

the sovereign rights of Serbia or to obtain territorial aggran- 
disement.' 11 The Ambassador added that he was further ( "[c/. No. 
instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs 9 an<J 
that there was no truth in the report which had been published 
in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to 
occupy the sanjak." 1 <[S No. 

Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. 82 ; cf. 
He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro- Y - I20 -J 
Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berch- 
told, and gave me the substance. 

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Am- 
bassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to 
remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg 
that the " door had been banged " by Austria-Hungary on 
all further conversations. ' 31 The Russian Ambassador promised (>l [/ No. 
to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the l61 _ . 
Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been g ' 2 -i ' 
given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction 
of Serbian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Serbian 
territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary. 

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the 
fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect 
that conversations at St. Petersburg' 41 had not been broken ( "[ct No. 

off by Austria-Hungary. 74 and 

note; cf. 

No. 138. Y - "J 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August i, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of to-day. (8) ' S^No. 

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram 131- 

to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with 
him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, 
and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If 
therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to 
discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own 
account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should 
hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. 
Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss 
was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not 

195 



[B. 139] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST x, 

(I) [c/. No. Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. 111 



12 



I abstaining from answering Germany's demand 

e '^ that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise 
also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not neces- 
sarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain 
mobilised for months without making war. This was not 
the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had 
the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade 
that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of 
troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation 
now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed 
her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent 
(a) [No. 142; no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, (t) 
Y. 130 ; an( j the German representative at St. Petersburg had been 
W., vol. ms t ruc ted within a certain time to inform the Russian Govern- 
I 350 rnent that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal 
to an answer (sic) as creating a state of war. 

No. 139. 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, August I, 1914. 

> S^No. MY telegram of 3ist July.' 3 ' 

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German 
141 [See Y., Emperor' 41 to the German Ambassador at the audience 
app- V.] gj ven to his Excellency yesterday. No .progress whatever 
was made. 

In the evening M. Sazonof had an interview with the 

Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed 

by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation 

towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria- 

Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of 

Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed 

his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and 

said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory ; 

but the real question which they had to solve at this moment 

was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her 

< 5) [c/. No. to the status of a vassal, ' 5) or whether she was to leave Serbia 

90 and a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while 

note."] the Serbian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion 

196 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 189] 

of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was 
a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion 
of this question could be expected was London, and any such 
discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria- 
Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, 
to bombardment. 

M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself 
this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassa- 
dor. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had 
made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with 
Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. 
It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as in- 
tolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands 
on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, 
for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria 
had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she 
thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in 
the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of 
Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, 
and it mattered little whether the German Government knew 
or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum ; what 
mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Govern- 
ment had been postponed until the moment had passed when 
its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate 
in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg : the 
former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, 
the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would 
never go to war. M. Sazonof was completely weary of the 
ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No sug- "'[e.g., see 
gestion held out to him had been refused. (1) He had accepted No - 93 
the proposal for a conference of four, <al for mediation by Great jj * *f so 
Britain and Italy, (3) for direct conversation between Austria 0.40.] 
and Russia ; (4) but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either <> [ c /. N O 
rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive 36 ; 
replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the n - 3*-] 
Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations g'- 
had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, MK^ ^0. 
and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate 45 and 
situation. note.] 

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is (j 
contained in my telegram of 3ist July, (s) had been forwarded Se * N< 

197 



[B. 140] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST I 

by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere 
to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier 
was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia 
begin hostilities first. 

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided 
unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained 
to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the 
frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending 
a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. 

No. 140. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August i, 1914. 

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attache 
this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of 
the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone 
'"[c/. Nos. of 10 kilom., (1) which he had arranged between the French 
I0 5 (3). troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied 
' 61 ky P easan ts, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit 
no provocative act. 

No. 141. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir 
Edward Grey. (Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August I, 1914. 

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian 
Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian 
Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia 
should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable 
refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, 
the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be 
forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at 
Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as 
mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany 
will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called 
mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that 

198 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 143] 

Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those 
taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension 
between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria 
and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassa- 
dor, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Serbian 
integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no 
intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to 
point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific 
consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight 
concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. 
I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at 
Vienna desired war from the first, (1) and that his strong personal (1) [cf. Y. 
bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Am- l8 -J 
bassador is convinced that the German Government also 
desired war from the first. 181 m [cf- No. 

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak ; v - 8 3. 
earnestly .to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the ^r'l I2 ' 
extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals 
to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being 
considered. There is great anxiety to know what England 
will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of 
Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present 
course, if they have made up their mind with the approval 
of Germany. 

No. 142. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August i, 1914. 

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation 
of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 
2nd August. 111 "'['A No. 

138: Y. 

No. 143. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 

Grey. (Received August 2.) (t , See No 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. 130. [cf. 



DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg. 
Your telegram of ist August' 41 acted on. 150^156 ] 

199 



[B. 144] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST 2 

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise 
and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow 
steamers to proceed without delay. 



No. 144. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. 

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing 
to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany 
(1 > [Declara- an( j R US sia are now in a state of war.' 1 ' 
tion of war, 
O. 76 cf. 
Y. 134, 

135-] ' No. 145. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. 

"> See No. MY telegram of 1st August. (2) 

*43 ; [cf- Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last 

also Nos. n ight to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their 

150' iy6\ wav - ^ e savs that this must be regarded as a special favour 

to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have 

been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines 

were being laid and other precautions being taken. 



No. 146. 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 2, 1914. 

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy 
rc XT f Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian 
"* Government.'" 

3OO 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [fc. 148] 

No. 147. 

Minister of Stale, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. (Received 

August 2.) 

(TRANSLATION.) "' c^ of Y 

(Telegraphic.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. J 3i ; G. 

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice 
the following facts : (i) "/. No. 

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German 132,' 133.] 
troops, according to the information which has up to now 
reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into 
Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and 
Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in 
the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. 
A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammu- 
nition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig 
to Luxemburg, where their arrival is [immediately*] (d'un 
instant d I'autre) expected. These occurrences constitute acts 
which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand 
Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. ( " m [Sce vol. 
The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an ** P- 
energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives 
of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An 
identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. 

No. 148. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at 

Paris. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914. 

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon (4) 
the following memorandum : (4) ^ " an( j 

" I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German footnote; 
fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to quoted 
undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, ^ Sir E - 
the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. ^ IT 

* [So translated in Y. 131. In G. 18, " where they are expected at any P- 4<>7)-] 
moment."] 



201 



[B. 149] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST i 

' This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His 
Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, 
and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government 
to take any action until the above contingency of action by 
the German fleet takes place." 

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most 
difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that 
they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany 
necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany 
to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, 
whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediter- 
ranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their 
north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it 
necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us 
to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the 
action indicated, but it did give a security to France that 
would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediter- 
ranean fleet. 

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxem- 

" W- Y - burg. (1) I told him the doctrine on that point laid down 
by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me 
v/hat we should say about the violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter ; 
we were considering what statement we should make in 
Parliament to-morrow in effect, whether we should declare 
violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told 
him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this 

w[See No. point. (2) 

123, and 

SirKGrey N 

(vol. II., 

PP- 413- Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914* 

< 3 > See No. YOUR telegram of ist August. 131 

*43- I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily 
unloaded from the British steamship Sappho at Hamburg 
and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken 
with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar. 
1*0 fand You should mform Secretary of State that, for reasons 
note.] stated in my telegram of ist August, (4) I most earnestly trust 
202 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 152] 

that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clear- 
ance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, 
the detention of which cannot be justified. 

No. 150. 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August 3.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 3, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 2nd August 01 : Detention of British "' See No. 
ships at Hamburg. '49- 

No information available. ^ 

note.] 
No. 151. 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August 3.) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

FRENCH Government have offered through their military 
attache the support of five French army corps to the Belgian 
Government. '" Following reply has been sent to-day : < s >[ c /. Y. 

' We are sincerely grateful to the French Government 142 ; G. 
for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, 2 4. last 
however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of j^ 
the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on (4) the p 22> 
action which they may think it necessary to take." note.] 

( "[Sec G. 
No. 152. 40.] 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at 

Paris. 
Foreign Office, August 3, 1914. 

ON the ist instant the French Ambassador made the 
following communication : 

" In reply to the German Government's intimation of the 
fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and 
Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions 
of Italy,'" the Marquis di San Giuliano replied :- w [cf. Y. 

' The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences 
which might result, had, in the words of the German Am- (8| [ c /- 
bassador himself, an aggressive object. 1 " Both were therefore 

203 



[B. 168] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST 

in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple 

Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain 
<[S No. neutral.' " U) 

161 (p. j n ma ki n g this communication, M. Cambon was instructed 
PP vrc- * * av s * ress u P on the Italian declaration that the present 
394-] war was no * a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, 

for this reason, the casus fcederis under the terms of the 

Triple Alliance did not arise. 

No. 153. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His 
Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of 
(2) [G. 25 Belgium in the following terms : 12> 

(original " Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's 
text) ; friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly 
t> U Sir d E attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you 
Grey* have just given us again,* I make a supreme appeal to the 
(vol. II., diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to 
(p. 411) ; safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 

see His Majesty's Government are also informed that the 

Asui^ German Government have delivered to the Belgian Govern- 

(voL\I., merit a note (s) proposing friendly neutrality entailing free 

p. 425).] passage through Belgian territory, and promising to main- 

(3> [For text tain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its 

see G. 20.3 possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case 

of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was 

{i} [See G. requested within twelve hours. (4) 

23; also We also understand that Belgium has categorically 
Y - *4i refused' 51 this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. 
(8 f5? not *'l His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against 
G. 22.] t j^ s V i i a ti on O f a treaty to which Germany is a party in 
common with themselves, and must request an assurance 
that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded 
with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. 
<8) [cf. Nos. You should ask for an immediate reply. w 

p G'Ai 1 ' * [" which she has once again shown us," G. 25.] 

j *. i j*J 



204 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 1M] 

No. 154. 

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward 
Grey. (Received August 4.) 

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note (I) to 
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Govern- . 
ment have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted 
to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply 
to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by 
force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in m . . 
view of the French menaces. 11 " 157,159.] 

No. 155. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at 

Brussels. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

YOU should inform Belgian Government" 1 that if pres- (t] [See G. 
sure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart 
from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that 
they will resist by any means in their power, and that His 
Majesty's Government will support them in offering such 
resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event 
are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering 
to the Belgian Government at once common action for the 
purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, 
and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity 
in future years. 

No. 156. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from 
British firms as to the detention of their ships 141 at Hamburg, <"[See No. 
Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the 130 and 
part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. note -l 
It is in direct contravention of international law and of the 

205 



[B. 157] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST 

assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chan- 
cellor. You should demand the immediate release of all 
British ships if such release has not yet been given. 



No. 157. 

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German 
Ambassador in London. (Communicated by German 

[cf. Nos. Embassy, August 4.)"' 

154, 159 ; 
0.36.] (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 4, 1914. 

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the 
part of the British Government with regard to our intentions 
by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in 
the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under 
no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity 
"of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly 
pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. 
It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian 
territory without making at the same time territorial acquisi- 
tions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. 
Grey that German army could not be exposed to French 
attack across Belgium, which was planned according to 
absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had conse- 
quently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a 

w [t' question of life or death to prevent French advance. (2) 
No. 160 

(p. 208); 

Y.I 

(end. 2), XT o 

2(encL)!j No - J 58. 

Sir F. Vittiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward 

Grey. (Received August 4.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

MILITARY attache has been informed at War Office 
that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that 
Liege has been summoned to surrender by small party of 
Germans who, however, were repulsed. 

206 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 160] 

No. 159. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at 

Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Govern- 
ment will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of w [cf. Nos. 
arms, the measures considered indispensable.' 1 ' 154. *57; 

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been m *Z-1 
violated at Gemmenich. "" c/ Yi5xj 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that '"[No.122.] 
Germany declined' 81 to give the same assurance respecting <4) [No.i25.] 
Belgium as France gave 14 ' last week in reply to our request |||[N T o.ii4.] 
made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris," 1 we must repeat &/&& 
that request," 1 and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to Asquith^ 
my telegram of this morning 17 ' be received here by 12 o'clock V ol. II.,' 
to-night.' 81 If not, you are instructed to ask for your pass- p. 420.] 
ports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound (T| Se * No - 
to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of ,. t * 5 
Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany j^ O i^ 
is as much a party as ourselves." 1 hours" G. 

43-] 

XT r "[ Se * No- 

No. IOO. !6o.3 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward 

Grey. <"> (cf. 

Sir, London, August 8, 1914. \JSJa! 

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your sador's 
telegram of the 4th instant' 111 I called upon the Secretary of depar- 
State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's *V re 
Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain (M , 5^ 5 jj 
from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at I53 '. 

once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must 
be " No," as, in consequence of the German troops having 
crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had 
been already violated. (1S Herr von Jagow again went into " [5No. 
the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged 
to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into 
France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able 

207 



[B. 160] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST 

to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to 
strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a 

(1) [cf. matter of life and death for them/ 1 ' as if they had gone by the 
No - I 57-] more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of 
the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to 
have got through without formidable opposition entailing 
great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant 
time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops 
to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great 
German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible 
supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that 
this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier 
rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation 
exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not 
still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, 
which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the 
reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them 
to draw back. 

During the afternoon I received your further telegram 

(8) See No. of the same date, (2) and, in compliance with the instructions 
J 59- therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign 
Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the 
Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock 
that night that they would proceed no further with their 
violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I 
had been instructed to demand my passports and inform 
the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government 
would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the 
neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to 
which Germany was as much a party as themselves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could 
give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier 
in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered 
it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should 
advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written 
summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had 
mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view 
of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, 
it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer 
should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given 
208 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 160] 

were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be 
the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand 
my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. 
In a short conversation which ensued Heir von Jagow 
expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire 
policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make 
friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, 
to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my 
work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and 
disappointment, but that he must understand that under 
the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His 
Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted other- 
wise than they had done. 

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, 
as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an oppor- 
tunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found 
the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began 
a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He 
said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was 
terrible to a degree ; just for a word " neutrality," a word 
which in war time had so often been disregarded just for a 
scrap of paper 111 Great Britain was going to make war on a (1) [5wvol. 
kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends *! P- 
with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered 3 -* 
useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, 
as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to 
office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we 
had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from 
behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. 
He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events 
that might happen. I protested strongly against that state- 
ment, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von 
Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons 
it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance 
through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I 
would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a 
matter of " life and death " for the honour of Great Britain 
that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost 
to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn 
compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could 
anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the 

O 209 



[B. 160] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST 

future ? The Chancellor said, " But at what price will that 
compact have been kept. Has the British Government 
thought of that ? " I hinted to his Excellency as plainly 
as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded 
as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excel- 
lency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news 
of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I 
refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. 
As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining 
Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the 
last moment he and his Government had been working with 
us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between 
Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy 
which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment 
when the relations between them had been more friendly 
and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, 
notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between 
Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us 
face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engage- 
ments, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately 
entailed our separation ,from our late fellow- workers. He 
would readily understand that no one regretted this more 
than I. 

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the 

embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. 

This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office 

a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but 

* This apparently never despatched.* 

telegram At about 9.30. P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under- 

never Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep 

thT regret that the very friendly official and personal relations 

Foreign between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether 

Office, a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of 

war. I said that such an authority on international law 

as he was known to be must know as well or better than I 

what was usual in such cases. I added that there were 

many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, 

and, nevertheless, war had not ensued ; but that in this case 

he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had 

given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's 

Government expected an answer to a definite question by 

210 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK l>. 160] 

12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory 
answer they would be forced to take such steps as their 
engagements required. Hen Zimmermann said that that 
was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Govern- 
ment could not possibly give the assurance required either 
that night or any other night. 

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a 
flying sheet, issued by the Berliner Tageblatt, was circu- 
lated stating that Great Britain had declared war against 
Germany. The immediate result of this news was the 
assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before 
His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which 
had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, 
and the attitude of the mob became threatening. 01 We took (11 [ c /- Y - 
no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to X 5 5 ' 
noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble 
stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, 
warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I tele- 
phoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happen- 
ing. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, 
and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great 
promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment 
on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness 
occurred. 

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came 
to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what 
had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen 
had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to 
express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. 
He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not 
been authorised by the Government ; in fact, the Chancellor 
had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such 
a statement should be issued, and he had replied, " Certainly 
not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision 
to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent 
to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought 
that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract 
attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the 
" pestilential Tageblatt," which had somehow got hold of 
the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard 
rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by 

311 



[B. 160] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [AUGUST 

gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he 
felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure 
him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even 
if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which 
had taken place. He feared that I would take home with 
me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of 
excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full 
and complete. 

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor 
sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the 
following message : 

' The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excel- 
lency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell 
you at the same time that you will gather from those occur- 
rences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the 
action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against 
her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you 
will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of 
British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in 
consequence of what has occurred he must now at once 
divest himself of those titles." 

I would add that the above message lost none of its 
acerbity by the manner of its delivery. 

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received 
all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the 
hands of Heir von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial 
Foreign Office. At about n o'clock on the same morning 
Count Wedel handed me my passports which I had earlier 
in the day demanded in writing and told me that he had 
been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I 
should follow for my return to England. He said that he had 
understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland 
to that via Copenhagen ; they had therefore arranged that 
I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait 
till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said 
that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition 
of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precau- 
tions would be taken. He added that they were doing all 
in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, 
but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a 
charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most 

212 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 160] 

friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such 
articles as time allowed. 

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the 
morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual 
route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled 
away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there 
suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment 
meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. 
Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf 
of Heir von Jagow and to see that a^ the arrangements 
ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A 
retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the 
Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to 
prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at 
every station where we stopped from insulting us ; but 
beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and 
insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during 
our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier. 

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin 
I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the 
quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying 
circumstances possible. One and ah 1 , they worked night 
and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly 
the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military 
attache's, secretaries, and the two young attaches buckled to 
their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob out- 
side and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for 
advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work 
with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable 
assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable 
personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave 
to me. 

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered 
to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his 
staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he 
was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the 
embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask 
how he could help us and to make arrangements for the 
safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of 
these from extremely difficult situations at some personal 
risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his 

213 



[B. 161] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [SEPTEMBER I 

firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full 
assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests 
could not have been left in more efficient and able hands. 

I have, &c., 

W. E. GOSCHEN. 

No. 161. 

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir 

Edward Grey. 

Sir, London, September I, 1914. 

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days 
which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it 
difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by 
<>[c/. Rus- telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments. 11 ' 
sian sum- jj^ d e ii verv a t Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian 
e\Svts no * e * Serbia 1 " was preceded by a period of absolute silence 
0. 77.] at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirschky, who must 
< 2 > [No. 4.] have been aware of the tenor, if not of the actual words of 
the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through 
the veil. On the 22nd and 2$rd July, M. Dumaine, French 
Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one 
of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by 
3 >[c/.Y.2o.] whom he was left under the impression 13 ' that the words of 
warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro- 
Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that 
the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain 
nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to 
comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even 
informed that the note was at that very moment being pre- 
sented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna 
on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under- 
secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide 
to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the 
fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking. 

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware 

of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fort- 

>[c/,Y.i8, night's leave of absence about the 2Oth July. 141 He had only 

55; 5,52.] been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. 

It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador 

214 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 181] 

of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so 
closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would 
have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold 
during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency 
was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication 
was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, 
and it was from a private source that I received on the I5th 
July the forecast of what was about to happen which I tele- 
graphed to you the following day. 01 It is true that during all (1> [cf. Y. 
this time the Neue Freie Presse and other leading Viennese I 4-l 
newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably 
to war with Serbia." 1 The official Fremdenblatt, however, was lf) [Y. 12, 
more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing 14.] 
opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink 
from courses calculated to involve her in grave European 
complications. 

On the 24th July the note was published in the news- 
papers. By common consent it was at once styled an 
ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither 
expected nor desired, 13 ' and when, on the following afternoon, {S) fc/- Nos - 
it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been uncon- v*' 41 ! 
ditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappoint- 
ment.'" The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as (4| [c/.S.52.] 
it was known later in the evening that the Serbian reply had 
been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations 
at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast 
crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till 
the small hours of the morning. 

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for 
the most part of organised processions through the principal 
streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two at- 
tempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian 
Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which 
held the approaches to the principal embassies during those 
days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was 
informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, 
showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, 
and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian 
and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step 
was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be 
said the determination, of the people, except presumably 

215 



[B. 161] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [SEPTEMBER i 

in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. 
There had been much disappointment in many quarters at 
the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation 
crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan 
war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little 
sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were 
opened, and the entire people and Press clamoured impatiently 
for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Serbian 
race. The country certainly believed that it had before 
it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting 
sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful 
solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to 
reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the 
Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the 
field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it 
seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should 
place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or 
prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the 
necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for 
the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed 
to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that 

w [See No. Russia would stand aside. (1) This feeling, which was also 
32 and held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, 
note.] an( j j t j s deplorable that no effort should have been made to 
secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence 
of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise 
of the Serbian question by which Austrian fears of Serbian 
aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the 
future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable 
consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian 
mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial 

12) [ Nos - 70 R US sian mobilisation (8) against Austria. Austria met this 

(3) [No q6 move by completing her own mobilisation, (3) and Russia 
0. 47.3 ' again responded (4) with results which have passed into 

<4) [No.113.] history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His 
Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is re- 
corded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.* On 

< e) [No. 62.3 the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold (5) and urged as strongly 

* " Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)." [The White Paper in question 

contains despatches B. 1-159.] 
216 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 181] 

as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your 
speech in the House of Commons* on the previous day should 
be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement 
of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me 
a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters 
had gone too far ; Austria was that day declaring war on 
Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which 
you had suggested should take place between the less inter- 
ested Powers on the basis of the Serbian reply. This was a 
matter which must be settled directly between the two 
parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would hear with regret that hostilities could not be 
arrested, as you feared they would lead to European com- 
plications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with 
Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against 
Serbia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be 
making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's 
Government were bound to look at the question primarily 
from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of 
Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift 
apart. 

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European 
aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that 
Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his 
assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. 
His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversa- 
tion that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards 
bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the 
ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan 
crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of 
that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial 
character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to har- 
monise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Ex- 
cellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout 
the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the deter- 
mination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed 
with the invasion of Serbia. 

The German Government claim to have persevered to 
the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive 
proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirschky 

* See Hansard, Vol. 65. [See vol. II., pp. 397~9-] 

317 



IB< 16 i] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [SEPTEMBER]I 

abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French 
an4 Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions 

(D[c/ Nos. tcthat effect/ 1 ' and I had no means of knowing what response 

95, i4 i: i\e was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. 

Y. T*t i W as, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the 

Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with 

Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th 

(2) [Nos. 93july (2> to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to 
(i).74-l furnish Count Szapary with full powers to continue at St. 
Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been 
taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. Count 
Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (3Oth 
July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised 

(<) [No. 96 ;against Austria, he received M. Sch6beko again, (3) in a per- 

cf. Y. 104.3 f ec tly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continu- 

< 4) [c/. No. ance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. (4) From now 

I 37-3 onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much 

greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the 

latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 

ist August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count 

< S) [Nos. Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue (5) by 
131, i33 ; announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to 
R- 56-] submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which 
seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian 
independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had ac- 
cepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain 
from the actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had 
finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good 
hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication 
made to you on the ist August by Count Mensdorff, to the 
effect that Austria had neither " banged the door " on com- 

w[See No. promise nor cut off the conversations.' 81 M. Schebeko to 
137-] the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the 
most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he 
informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, 
had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too 
much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back 
her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled 
by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was 
prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. 



218 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. 161 J 

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg 
and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to 
the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between 
Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 3ist 
July' 1 ' by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg (1 '[No.ii7.) 
and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only 
one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia 
on the ist August/ 4 ' and on France on the 3rd August." 1 '*'[0. 76.] 
A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe ( " t Y - J 47- J 
from one of the greatest calamities in history. 

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and 
M. Sche"be"ko had been instructed to remain at his post till 
war should actually be declared against her by the Austro- 
Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th 
August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions 
at Vienna that " the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian 
Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia 
in the Austro-Serbian conflict and the fact that Russia had 
commenced hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary 
considered herself also at war with Russia." 141 (4| [0. 79.] 

M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by 
the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He 
had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian 
frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own 
country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and 
ten days later I found him at Berne. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 
1 2th August. On the previous day he had been instructed 
to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops 
were being employed against France. This point was not 
fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the gth August, 
M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the cate- 
gorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved 
to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented 
by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assur- 
ance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved 
actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving 
from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a 
way that they might replace German troops employed at 
the front. These two statements were made by Count 

319 



[B. 161] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [SEPTEMBER 

Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by 
M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The 
French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any 
hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving 
had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief 
Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the 
steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that 
Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President 
of the Republic had been assassinated. 

The British declaration of war on Germany was made 
known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about 
midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches 

(1) [See in the House of Commons, (1> and also of the German Chancellor's 
vol. II., speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, (2) appeared the 
4i7 f' same day, as we ^ as * ne * ex t f * ne German ultimatum to 

w[See Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these 

vol. II., days transpired. The Neue Freie Presse was violently 

p- 353-1 insulting towards England. The Fremdenblatt was not 

offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of 

any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian 

neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative 

but to take part in the war. 

(3) [No. 152.] The declaration of Italian neutrality (3) was bitterly felt 
in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers. 

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your 
instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immedi- 
ate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria 
being understood to be not yet at that date at war with 
Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my 
passport or to make any particular communication to the 
Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same 
time that His Majesty's Government of course expected 
Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the 
notice required by diplomatic usage. 

On Thursday morning, the I3th August, I had the honour 
to receive your telegram of the I2th, stating that you had 
been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request 
of the French Government, that a complete rupture had 
occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that 
Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting 
on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to 

220 



BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [B. ten 

the German frontier under conditions that were a direct 
menace to France. The rupture having been brought about 
with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and 
your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed 
Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between 
the two countries from midnight of the I2th August. 11 ' (1) [R. 65.] 

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, 
who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my 
request that his Excellency would take charge . provisionally 
of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate 
interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, 
Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. 
Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my 
message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unpre- 
pared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count 
Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought 
to him. His Excellency received my communication with 
the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the 
unhappy complications which were drawing such good 
friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, 
he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with 
France, though diplomatic relations with that country had 
been broken off. I explained in a few words how circum- 
stances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We 
both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recom- 
mend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the 
numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, 
and other places throughout the country. I had already had 
some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excel- 
lency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what 
could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation 
should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, 
till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir 
Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the 
capacity of Charge des Archives. He presumed a similar 
privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count 
Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the 
day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, , 
many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excel- 
lency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my 

221 



[B. 161] BRITISH BLUE-BOOK [SEPTEMBER i, 1914 

profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together 
with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass 
through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. 
Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my 
message. 

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my 
passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made 
for my departure that evening (i4th August). In the course 
of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna 
society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. 
We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss 
frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents occurred. 
Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf 
of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, 
owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached 
Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the I7th 
August. At the first halting place there had been some 
hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining 
troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, 
and at the other large stations on our route we found that 
ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molesta- 
tion as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt 
that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the 
journey should be performed under the most comfortable 
conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure 
all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's repre- 
sentative. I was accompanied by my own family and the 
entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and 
efficient help in trying, times I desire to express my sincere 
thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in 
providing comfortable accommodation during our journey 
from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, 
on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision 
had been made by the French Government, at the request of 
Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We 
reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August. 

I have, &c., 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 



222 



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 



DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 
1914. 



THE EUROPEAN WAR. 



I. 

DOCUMENTS 

RELATING TO THE 
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED GERMANY'S 

DECLARATION OF WAR 

ON RUSSIA (August i, 1914), AND ON 

FRANCE (August 3, 1914)- 

DECLARATION OF SEPTEMBER 4, 1914- 



[PARIS: IMPRIMERIE NATIONALS.] 



[Official Translation Published in December, 1914, as a White 
Paper, Miscellaneous No. 15 (1914). Cd. 7717.] 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 
WARNINGS. 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



M. Jules Cambon 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



Berlin, 
March 17 



~ 



Transmission of reports of the 
military attach^ and of the 
naval attach^ at Berlin on 
the new military law. 
Efforts of the German Gov- 
ernment to represent this 
law as a reply to the French 
project of a three years' law 
and to foster a warlike 
spirit in the people . . 259 

Enclosure I. Report of 
Lieut. -Col. Serret. German 
armaments are intended to 
place France in a definitely 
inferior position. Anger 
aroused in official circles 
by French precautionary 
measures 260 

Enclosure II. Report of 
M. de Faramond. The pro- 
posed military law is in- 
tended to make easy a 
crushing offensive against 
France. Confidence of Ger- 
mans in the superiority 
of their army. Financial 
measures intended to cover 
military expenditure . . 264 

22 i 



[Y.] 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



M. Etienne 



Paris, 
April 2 



M. Jules Cambon 



M. Allize 



Memorandum to 
Minister 



Berlin, 
May 6 



Munich, 
July 10 



Paris, 
July 30 



Despatch of a German official 
secret report on the 
strengthening of the army. 
Enclosure. Text of the 
report. Retrospective sur- 
vey of the successive arma- 
ments caused by the Alge- 
ciras Conference, the Agadir 
incident, and the Balkan 
war. Necessity of making 
a new effort, of accustoming 
public opinion to the idea of 
war, of stirring up trouble in 
French or English colonies, 
and of considering the inva- 
sion of Belgium and Holland 

End of Balkan crisis. It 
nearly brought Germany to 
a war of aggression against 
France and caused prepara- 
tions for mobilisation 

Bavarian opinion considers the 
new armaments as intended 
to provoke a war in which 
it sees the only possible solu- 
tion for internal difficulties 

Prevailing ideas in German 
opinion ; desire for revenge 
for Agadir, fear of revival of 
a strong France. Powerless- 
ness of peace party. For- 
mation, composition, and 
growing development of a 
war party, encouraged in its 
ambitions by the presumed 
weakness of the Triple 
Entente 



226 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



M. Jules Cambon 



Berlin, 
Nov. 22 



Conversation of King of the 
Belgians with the Emperor, 
who has ceased to be pacific, 
gives in to the bellicose cir- 
cle of which his son is the 
centre, and accustoms him- 
self to the prospect of a near 
conflict with France 



284 



CHAPTER II. x 
PRELIMINARIES. 

From the death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914) to the presen- 
tation of the Austrian Note to Serbia (July 23, 1914). 



No. 


Name of 
Signatory. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Summary. 


4> 

ap 








1914. 






7 


M. Dumaine 


Vienna, 


News of assassination of Arch- 








June 28 


duke Francis-Ferdinand at 










Serajevo 


286 


8 


M. Dumaine 


Vienna, 


Exploitation of that event by 








July 2 


the Austrian military party 


286 


9 


M. de Manneville 


Berlin, 


Pretended confidence of Ger- 








July 4 


man Government in a 










friendly arrangement of 










Austro-Serbian differences 


287 


10 


M. Paleologue . . 


St. Peters- 


M. Sazonof warned Austrian 








burg, 


Ambassador that Russian 








July 6 


Government could not ac- 










cept assassination of Arch- 










duke as pretext for action 










on Serbian territory 


287 



227 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



ii 



12 



M. d'Apchier 



M. Dumaine 



1914. 

Budapest, 
July ii 



Vienna, 
July 15 



M. Dumaine 



Consular Report 
from Vienna 



Vienna, 
July 19 



M. Jules Cambon 



Berlin, 
July 21 



16 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin. 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin. 



Paris, 
July 21 



Paris, 
July 22 



Forced official optimism, con- 
trasted with serious military 
preparations in Hungary . . 

Official Austrian newspapers 
advocate a war to the finish 
against Pan-Serbism, Rus- 
sia and France appearing 
to them incapable of in- 
tervening 

Forwards a Consular report. 



Austrian political circles ap- 
pear determined on a war of 
aggression against Serbia, 
and military circles consider 
possibility of a European 
conflict 

German Government, who 
have already issued " pre- 
liminary mobilisation no- 
tices," state categorically 
that they have no know- 
ledge of tenor of note 
which Austria intends send- 
ing to Serbia 

Germany will strongly support 
Austrian action, without at- 
tempting to act as mediator 

French Government orders 
French Ambassador to give 
friendly counsel for modera- 
tion to Vienna 



288 



289 



290 



290 



291 



292 



293 



228 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



18 



M. Dumaine 



M. Paul Cambon 



20 M. Bienvenu- 
Martin. 



21 M. Allize 



1914. 
Vienna, 
July 22 



London, 
July 22 



Paris, 
July 23 



Munich, 
July 23 



Conciliatory attitude of Rus- 
sia and Serbia. Reassuring 
indications furnished to 
foreign diplomatists. Vio- 
lent language of German 
Ambassador 



Grave anxiety of Sir Edward 
Grey after a conversation 
with German Ambassador. 
Counsels of prudence and 
moderation given to Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador . . 



Forthcoming presentation of 
Austrian note to Serbia. 
Contradictory impressions 
of diplomatists as to its con- 
tents and scope. Calming 
assurances given by Vienna 



Pessimism of Bavarian official 
circles, particularly of Presi- 
dent of the Council, who 
had knowledge of Austrian 
note to Serbia 



293 



294 



296 



297 



[Y.] 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



CHAPTER III. 

THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERBIAN REPLY. 
(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.) 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



22 



25 



M. Rene" Viviani 



1914. 

Reval, 

July 24 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin. 



Austrian Note 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



Paris, 
July 24 



Vienna, 
July 24 



Paris, 
July 24 



In agreement with M. Sazonof, 
M. Viviani requests M.Bien- 
venu- Martin, Acting Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs, to 
give instructions that from 
Paris and London counsels 
of moderation shall be ad- 
dressed to Count Berchtold, 
the delivery of the Austrian 
note the evening before 
being still unknown 



Instructions sent in this sense 
to Vienna, where they did 
not arrive till after delivery 
of note to Belgrade . . 299 

Text of Austrian note to Ser- 
bia, communicated on the 
morning of 24th July by 
Count Sze"csen to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin .. .. 300 

Analysis of note. Count Sze"c- 
sen was warned, when he 
brought it, of the painful 
impression which must be 
produced, particularly 
under present conditions, 
by the extension of Aus- 
trian demands, as also by 
the shortness of the time 
limit for Serbia's reply . . 300 



230 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



.J 



No, 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



26 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



1914. 

Paris, 

July 24 



27 



28 



29 



M. Jules Cambon 



Berlin, 
July 24 



Advice given by French Gov- 
ernment to Serbian Govern- 
ment to accept Austria's 
demands so far as may be 
possible, and to propose to 
submit the question to the 
arbitration of Europe 



Information given to our Am- 
bassadors as to bellicose 
inclinations of the Austrian 
military party, as to diffi- 
culty for Serbia to accept 
whole of Austrian demands, 
and as to threatening tone 
of German Press 



Demarche taken by Heir von 
Schoen at the Quai d'Or- 
say to support, in the name 
of his Government, the de- 
marche of Austria- Hungary, 
approving its note, and 
making apparent the " in- 
calculable consequences " 
which, by reason of the 
natural play of the alli- 
ances, would result from 
any attempt at interference 
by a third Power in the 
Austro-Serbian conflict 



Austrophil and chauvinist 

manifestations at Berlin ; 

pessimism of diplomatic 
circles 



302 



302 



303 



306 



251 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



M. Jules Cambon 



1914. 
Berlin, 
July 24 



M. Paleologue . . 



M. Paul Cambon 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 24 



London, 
July 24 



33 



34 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



Paris, 
July 24 



Herr von Jagow states ap- 
proval of Austrian note, but 
denies absolutely previous 
knowledge of contents. He 
hopes Serbia will be advised 
by her friends to give in. 
The official Press is equally 
in agreement with Austria 306 

Peaceable tendency of Rus- 
sian Government, in spite 
of deep impression made on 
public by presentation of 
Austrian note . . . . 308 

Sir E. Grey explains to M. 
Paul Cambon his plan of 
mediation by four Powers. 
Pessimism of Count Benck- 
endorff on subject of Ger- 
many's intentions . . . . 309 

Semi-official intervention by 
Germany at Vienna appears 
to M. Paul Cambon the 
best means of arresting the 
conflict . . . . . . 310 

Sir E. Grey wishes to propose 
to Germany that they 
should act together at 
Vienna and St. Petersburg, 
in order that Austro-Ser- 
bian conflict should be 
submitted to mediation by 
four Powers not interested 
in question. Counsel of 
prudence given to Serbian 
Minister at Paris . . . . 310 



232 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



35 



M. Jules Cambon 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



37 



M. de Fleuriau 



38 

39 
40 



M. Pateologue 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 

M. de Fleuriau 



1914. 
Berlin, 
July 25 



Paris, 
July 25 



London, 
July 25 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 25 

Paris, 
July 25 

London, 
July 25 



Belgian Minister at Berlin 
sees in the course crisis 
is taking the execution 
of warlike intentions pre- 
meditated by Germany . . 

Summary of situation. At 
Paris, Herr von Schoen 
comes to the Quai d'Orsay 
to deny menacing char- 
acter of his action of pre- 
vious evening. At London 
the Austrian Ambassador 
states that Austrian note 
is not in the nature of an 
ultimatum. Sir E. Grey 
advises prudence at Bel- 
grade and explains to 
German Ambassador his 
plan of mediation by four 
Powers 

German Government refusing 
to intervene between Vienna 
and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey 
draws Prince Lichnowsky's 
attention to fact that this 
attitude will help to bring 
on a general conflict in 
which England could not 
remain inactive 

Conciliatory efforts of M. 
Sazonof ; he requests Vienna 
to extend the time limit 
allowed Serbia for her reply 

French Government support 
this request for delay . . 

English Government also asso- 
ciate themselves with this 
request 



313 



314 



314 



315 



[Y.] 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



M. Jules Cambon 



1914. 
Berlin, 
July 25 



42 



43 



44 



45 



46 



M. Barrere 



M. Dumaine 



M. Boppe 



Rome, 
July 25 



Vienna, 
July 25 



Belgrade, 
July 25 



Herr von Jagow again states 
categorically that he had no 
knowledge of Austrian note 
before its presentation. He 
gives evasive answer to re- 
quest of English Charge 
d' Affaires that he would 
intervene at Vienna in order 
to prevent a conflict and to 
prolong period of ultimatum 

Russian Charge" d' Affaires also 
presents this last request to 
Berlin. He insists on the 
urgency of a reply which 
Herr von Jagow tries to 
postpone 

On further pressing action by 
Russian Charge d' Affaires, 
Herr von Jagow states that 
he considers Austro-Ser- 
bian differences as a purely 
local affair, which should 
be confined to Austria and 
Serbia, and which does not 
appear to him likely to lead 
to international difficulties 

Russian Ambassador at Rome 
requests Italian Govern- 
ment to intervene on behalf 
of extension of time limit of 
ultimatum 

Austrian Government evade 
request for extension of 
time limit presented at 
Vienna by Russian Charge 
d' Affaires 

Summary of Serbian reply to 
Austrian note 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



47 



48 



49 



Name of 
Signatory. 



M. Jules Cambon 



M. Dumaine 



Serbian Note 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



1914. 
Berlin, 
July 25 



Vienna, 
July 25 



Belgrade, 
July 25 



Summary. 



I*.] 



News of departure of Austrian 
Minister from Belgrade 
evokes demonstrations of 
chauvinism at Berlin. Fin- 
anciers believe there will 
be war . . . . . . 320 

French Ambassador at 
Vienna, on account of delay 
of telegram sent him from 
Paris, does not receive his 
instructions in time to asso- 
ciate himself with action 
of his Russian colleague . . 321 

Text of Serbian reply to I 
Austro-Hungarian note . . i 321 



CHAPTER IV. 

FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (JULY 25, 1914) TO THE 
DECLARATION OF WAR (JULY 28, 1914) BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA. 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



1914. 

Paris, 

July 26 



Summary. 



Summary of situation on 
evening of 25th, as resulting 
from Austria-Hungary's 
uncompromising attitude. 
Impressions made in the 
different capitals, and at- 
tempts to prevent aggrava- 
tion of conflict which would 
result from military mea- 
sures taken by Austro- 
Hungarian Government 
against Serbia. Sir E. 
Grey still hopes to prevent a 
conflict by the intervention 
of four disinterested Powers 



322 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 






53 



54 



55 



Name of 
Signatory. 



M. Barrere 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Paleologue 



M. Dumaine 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



1914. 
Rome, 
July 26 



Paris, 
July 26 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 26 



Vienna, 
July 26 



Paris, 
July 26 



Summary. 



Italy will participate in efforts 
to maintain peace, but 
wishes to remain outside 
conflict if it comes 

Russia still hopes for peaceful 
solution ; Italian opinion 
hostile to Austria 

French Government support 
Serbia's request for media- 
tion, addressed to English 
Government by Russia's 
advice 

M. Sazonof, still imbued with 
the same spirit of concilia- 
tion, proposes a direct con- 
versation between Vienna 
and St. Petersburg, on 
modifications to be intro- 
duced in ultimatum to 
make it acceptable. 

Russian Ambassador, on 
return to Vienna, proposes 
to present there fresh pro- 
posals for a settlement . . 

Demarche by Herr von Schoen 
at the Quad d'Orsay that 
France should intervene 
with Germany at St. Peters- 
burg only, in order to give 
counsels of peace. His 
refusal to reply, in default 
of instructions, to the 
request for mediation by 
four Powers at St. Peters- 
burg and Vienna . . 



236 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



57 



1914. 

Note for the Paris, 
Minister July 26 



58 

59 
60 

61 



M. Chevalley . . 

M. d'Annoville 
M. Farges 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



Christiania, 
July 26 



Luxemburg, 
July 26 

Basle, 
July 27 

Paris, 
July 27 



Further visit of German Am- 
bassador to confirm and 
strengthen the pacific in- 
tentions of his previous 
demarche. He refuses to 
give an opinion as to the 
advisability of Germany 
recommending moderation 
at Vienna, and persists in 
trying to bind the French 
Government in a common 
action of " pacific solidar- 
ity " at St. Petersburg only, 
on whom, according to him, 
peace depends 

Order to German fleet to 
return to Germany from 
Norway 

First preparations for mobili- 
sation at Thionville 

First preparations for mobili- 
sation in Grand Duchy of 
Baden 

Summary of three successive 
demarches made by Herr von 
Schoen. The situation be- 
comes more serious, Austria 
refusing both to content 
herself with Serbian con- 
cessions and to enter into 
conversation on the subject 
with the Powers. New 
English proposal to en- 
deavour to find, at Berlin, 
Paris, Rome, and London 
means of avoiding a crisis, 
Russia and Austria, the 
Powers directly interested, 
remaining apart. . . 



329 



331 



331 



332 



332 



237 









FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



L 



62 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. de Fleuriau 



64 
65 



66 



67 



M, Pateologue 
M. Bompard 



M. de Fleuriau 



M. Jules Cambon 



1914. 

Paris, 

July 27 



London, 
July 27 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 27 

Constanti- 
nople, 
July 27 



London, 
July 27 



Berlin, 
July 27 



Summary. 



Further demarche of Herr von 
Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay, 
with the object of compro- 
mising France in regard to 
Russia, while gaining time 
to facilitate military action 
by Austria in Serbia, which 
Germany does nothing to 
delay 

The German and Austrian 
Ambassadors make it known 
that they are sure of 
England's neutrality, in 
spite of language used by 
Sir A. Nicolson to Prince 
Lichnowsky 

Conciliatory attitude of M. 
Sazonof 



It is considered at Constanti- 
nople that Austro-Serbian 
dispute will remain localised, 
and that Russia will not 
intervene on behalf of Serbia 

Great Britain stops demobili- 
sation of her fleet, and 
warns Germany that an 
Austrian invasion of Serbia 
may cause European war . . 

Herr von Jagow gives vague 
pacific assurances, and 
states, in reply to a ques- 
tion, that Germany would 
not mobilise if Russia 
mobilised only on the Aus- 
trian frontier. The Secre- 
tary of State shows lively 
anxiety 



238 



TRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



[Y.] 






No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



& 



68 



M. de Fleuriau 



69 



70 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



71 M. de Fleuriau 



M. Barrere 



73 



74 



M. Jules Cambon 



1914. 
London, 
July 27 



Paris, 
July 27 



London, 
July 27 



Rome, 
July 27 



Berlin, 
July 27 



Sir E. Grey suggests that the 
French, German.and Italian 
Ambassadors at London 
should examine, in concert 
with him, the means of 
solving the present diffi- 
culties 338 

Serbia has not asked for Eng- 
lish mediation ; the plan of 
mediation by four Powers 
advocated by England must 
therefore be adhered to . . 339 

French Government accepts 
English position, that a sin- 
cerely moderating action by 
Germany at Vienna could 
alone bring matters to a close 339 

Italian Government also ac- 
cepts mediation by four 
Powers . . . . . . 340 

The Marquis di San Giuliano 
states that he had no pre- 
vious knowledge of Austrian 
note, and adheres, without 
hesitation, to Sir E. Grey's 
proposal 341 

Herr von Jagow dismisses the 
plan of a conference of the 
Powers, while proclaiming 
his desire for a peaceful 
settlement 342 

He evades fresh pressure from 
M. Jules Cambon. Oppor- 
tunity of renewing the Eng- 
lish suggestion in a different 
form in order to drive Ger- 
many into a corner . . 342 

239 



[Y.J 



FRENCH ^YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



. 



75 



75 
(2) 



76 



77 



78 



Name of 
Signatory. 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



Communique of 
the Press Bureau 



M. Rene Viviani 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



. 

Paris, 
July 27 



Vienna, 
July 28 



On board 
the "La 
France," 
July 28 



Paris, 
July 28 



Count Szecsen hands to the 
Quai d'Orsay a memoran- 
dum from his Government 
justifying the coercive mea- 
sures against Serbia which 
he states are imminent. 
Text of this memorandum 



Semi-official communique of 
the Vienna Press Bureau on 
the subject of the Serbian 
reply, which is represented 
as insufficient 



Acknowledgment of receipt of 
communications received 
from M. Bienvenu-Martin 
and approval of replies he 
made both to Herr von 
Schoen and to Sir E. Grey's 
proposal 



Summary of the situation : 
Germany's refusal to inter- 
vene at Vienna, objection 
raised by her to English 
proposal, postponement of 
Austrian memorandum. 
Dangers of the situation . . 



Visit of Herr von Schoen to 
the Quai d'Orsay. He pro- 
tests again his pacific senti- 
ments, but always evades 
investigation as to practical 
means of preventing a con- 
flict 



240 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



I 



79 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



80 



M. Paul Cambon 



81 



M. Jules Cambon 



82 



M. Pale"ologue 



M. Dumaine 



1914. 

Paris, 

July 28 



London, 
July 28 



Berlin, 
July 28 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 28 



Vienna, 
July 28 



Recommendation to M. Du- 
maine to keep in touch with 
his English colleague for 
the purpose of presenting 
the English proposal for 
mediation to Vienna 

German Ambassador at Lon- 
don insists, as does Herr 
von Schoen at Paris, on the 
expediency of moderating 
action by England at St. 
Petersburg alone. On the 
other hand, M. Sazonof has 
accepted the English pro- 
posal of mediation, but he 
would like it to be preceded 
by direct conversation with 
Vienna, from which he 
expects good results 

Herr von Jagow continues to 
show hostility to the con- 
ference proposed by Sir E. 
Grey, and rests his dilatory 
attitude on the news of Rus- 
sian efforts for a direct 
understanding between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg 

M. Sazonof is obliged to state 
that Austria evades his pro- 
posal for a direct under- 
standing 

Austrian declaration of war on 
Serbia renders useless all 
attempts at conciliation, ac- 
cording to Count Berchtold, 
who thus breaks off all dis- 
cussion with St. Petersburg 



349 



349 



35i 



352 



352 



Q 



241 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



CHAPTER V. 

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA (]ULY 28, 
1914) TO GERMANY'S ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914). 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



84 



86 



87 



88 



89 



M. Barrre 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Paleologue . 



M. Klobukowski 



M. Ronssin 



M. AllizS 



1914. 

Rome, 

July 29 



Paris, 
July 29 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 29 

Brussels, 
July 29 



Frankfort, 
July 29 



Munich, 
July 29 



The Consulta considers that 
Austria's declaration of war 
should not prevent the con- 
tinuance of diplomatic 
efforts for the meeting of 
a conference at London . . 

Germany appears to renounce 
hopeof Franco- English pres- 
sure on Russia alone, but 
continues to refuse to act at 
Vienna. It therefore ap- 
pears indispensable that 
Russia should join definitely 
and at once in the English 
proposal for mediation by 
four Powers, in order that it 
should be accepted by Ber- 
lin before Austria's military 
measures should have de- 
finitely compromised peace 

Russian Government gives 
complete adherence to this 
proposal 

Anxiety caused at Brussels by 
the enigmatical and threat- 
ening attitude of Germany 

Important movements of 
troops noted round Frank- 
fort .. **,, .. 

Military preparations in South 
Germany 



242 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



90 M. Dumaine 

91 M. Pateologue 

92 M. Jules Cambon 



93 ! M. Dumaine 



94 



M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



95 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



1914. 
Vienna, 
July 29 

St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 29 

Berlin, 
July 29 



Vienna, 
July 29 



Paris, 
July 29 



Summary. 



Military preparations in Bo- 
hemia 

Austria evades the direct con- 
versation to which she was 
invited, and hastens to arm 

Herr von Jagow maintains his 
dilatory attitude, vaguely 
pacific, throwing all final 
responsibility for the con- 
flict on Russia, stating at 
the same time his hope of 
a direct understanding be- 
tween Vienna and St. 
Petersburg, for the success 
of which he claims to be 
trying to work 

Austria appears to have de- 
cided for war ; she is 
strongly urged thereto by 
Herr von Tschirschky, Ger- 
man Ambassador. The 
situation grows worse. 

Herr von Schoen called to say 
that Germany was going to 
consult Vienna as to its in- 
tentions, that that would 
furnish a basis for discus- 
sion, and that military 
operations would not be 
actively advanced 

Russia, confronted with the 
disquieting attitude of Ger- 
many and with the refusal 
of Count Berchtold to con- 
tinue the discussions, and 
with Austria's military pre- 
parations, is obliged to 
proceed to partial mobilisa- 
tion . 



[T.I 



357 



358 



358 



360 



362 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



96 



M. Barrere 



97 



M. Ren Viviani 



1914. 
Rome, 
July 29 



Paris, 
July 29 



M. Paul Cambon 



London, 
July 29 



99 



100 



M. Boppe 



M. Pale"ologue 



Belgrade, 
July 29 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 29 



Marquis di San Giuliano ex- 
plains the attitude of Ger- 
many and Austria as due to 
their erroneous conviction 
that Russia would abandon 
Serbia. . . . . . . 363 

Direct Austro- Russian con- 
versations having been in- 
terrupted by Austria's de- 
claration of war on Serbia, 
the French and Russian 
Governments beg Sir E. 
Grey to renew at Berlin his 
proposal of intervention by 
four Powers, and to work 
upon Italy to obtain her 
complete co-operation . . 364 

Germany having been willing 
to accept only the principle 
of mediation by four Powers, 
Sir E. Grey, to avoid any 
further dilatory reply, will 
leave the German Govern- 
ment to choose whatever 
form of intervention may 
appear practicable to it. 
He considers the situation 
very grave . . . . 365 

Serbian Government has ob- 
tained from Russia the as- 
surance that that Power 
will not abandon its interest 
in the fate of Serbia. . . 365 

German Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg called to state 
that his country would 
mobilise if Russia did not 
discontinue her military 
preparations . . . . 366 



844 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



nr-J 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



101 



M. Ren6 Viviani 



1914. 

Paris, 

July 30 



102 



M. Paleologue 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 30 



103 



104 



M. Dumaine 



Vienna, 
July 30 



Informed of this menacing 
step, the French Govern- 
ment declare their resolu- 
tion to fulfil all the obliga- 
tions of the Russian alliance 
while continuing to work for 
a peaceful solution, and 
requesting the Russian Gov- 
ernment to act in the same 
way on their side 

Russian Government state 
their readiness to continue 
negotiations to the end, 
while remaining convinced 
that Germany will not work 
at Vienna in favour of peace 

Upon a further and less threat- 
ening move by the German 
Ambassador, M. Sazonof 
hastened to make a fresh 
proposal, intimating that 
Russia would break off her 
military preparations if 
Austria declared herself 
ready to eliminate from her 
ultimatum the clauses which 
impugned the sovereignty 
of Serbia 

Following a very friendly in- 
terview between Russian 
Ambassador and Count 
Berchtold, a fresh attempt 
will be made at St. Peters- 
burg to hold direct com- 
munication between Aus- 
tria and Russia for friendly 
settlement of Serbian affair 



366 



367 



368 



369 



245 



[Y.] 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



105 M. Jules Cambon 



106 M. Rene" Viviani 



1914. 
Berlin, 
July 30 



Paris, 
July 30 



107 M. Jules Cambon 



108 M. Paul Cambon 



Berlin, 
July 30 



London, 
July 30 



German Government deny the 
report of mobilisation, but 
take all necessary measures 
to hasten it 



M. Paul Cambon is requested 
to bring to knowledge of 
English Government all 
corroborative information 
proving the active and 
threatening military mea- 
sures taken by Germany 
since July 25, while France 
is keeping her covering 
troops at about ten kilo- 
metres from the frontier . . 

Herr von Jagow states that 
M. Sazonof's proposal is un- 
acceptable for Austria 

German Ambassador has 
brought no answer to Sir 
Edward Grey's request that 
the German Government 
should themselves put for- 
ward a proposal for media- 
tion by four Powers. Prince 
Lichnowsky has questioned 
English Government as to 
their military preparations. 
The information given to Sir 
E. Grey as to Germany's 
military operations has led 
him to believe, like M. Paul 
Cambon, that the time has 
come for them to consider 
together all the possibilities 



370 



373 



373 



346 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



109 



M. Jules Cambon 



no 



M. Paul Cambon 



in 



M.Mollard 



112 



M. Ren Viviani 



Berlin, 
July 30 



London, 
July 31 



Luxemburg, 
July 31 



Paris, 
July 31 



Heir von Jagow states that in 
order to gain time he will 
take direct action at Vienna 
by asking to know the Aus- 
trian conditions, thus again 
evading Sir Edward Grey's 
request. He makes recrim- 
inations against Russia . . 

Sir E. Grey warns German 
Ambassador at London that 
England could not remain 
neutral in a general conflict 
in which France was im- 
plicated. On the other 
hand, he had said to M. Paul 
Cambon that the English 
Government could not pro- 
mise France that they 
would intervene 

The autograph letter 
from the French President 
to the King of England had 
been handed to the King . . 

The Luxemburg Minister of 
State notifies military pre- 
parations on German fron- 
tier, and requests France to 
engage to respect the neu- 
trality of the Grand Duchy, 
a promise it cannot obtain 
from Germany 

French Government, in com- 
pliance with England's wish, 
request St. Petersburg to 
modify the suggestion M. 
Sazonof has made to Aus- 
tria, in order to make it 
acceptable to that Power 
and to permit of a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute 



374 



375 



376 



377 



247 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



M. Paleologue 



1914. 

St. Peters- 

burg, 

July 31 



114 



M. Ren6 Viviani 



Paris, 

31 



116 



117 



M. Dumaine 



M. Jules Cambon 



M. Rene Viviani 



Vienna, 
July 31 

Berlin, 
July 31 



Paris, 
July 31 



Russian Government have 
agreed to modify their 
formula, in spite of the 
feeling aroused by the bom- 
bardment of Belgrade and 
the constantly provocative 
action of Austria-Hungary 

The concurrent efforts made 
by England and Russia for 
the maintenance of peace 
have been united, and give 
hope of an understanding 
with Austria-Hungary, who 
appears more inclined there- 
to. Germany's attitude, 
however, gives the impres- 
sion that that Power has 
worked from the beginning 
for the humiliation of Rus- 
sia, the breaking up of the 
Triple Entente, and, if this 
result could not be obtained, 
for war 



General Austrian 
tion is decreed 



mobilisa- 



Germany, in her turn, decrees 
" Kriegsgefahrzustand," 
and requests Russia to 
demobilise 

In announcing to Paris the 
ultimatum addressed to 
Russia, Herr von Schoen 
asks the French Govern- 
ment to inform him, before 
i o'clock on the following 
afternoon, what attitude 
France would assume in the 
event of a Russo-German 
conflict 



248 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 


Name of 
Signatory. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Summary. 


& 
& 




1914. 






118 


M. Paleologue . . 


St. Peters- 


General mobilisation of Aus- 






burg, 


tro-Hungarian army entails 








July 31 


general Russian mobilisa- 










tion 


382 


119 


M. Klobukowski 


Brussels, 


Belgian Government receive 








July 31 


official assurance that 










France will respect Belgian 








neutrality . . 


383 



CHAPTER VI. 

GERMANY'.S DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA (SATURDAY, AUGUST i, AT 
7.10 P.M.), AND ON FRANCE (MONDAY, AUGUST 3, AT 6.45 P.M.). 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



s 

PH 



120 



M. Rene Viviani 



121 



122 



M. Jules Cambon 



M. Ren6 Viviani 



1914. 

Paris, 

August i 



Berlin, 
August i 



Paris, 
August i 



Austrian Ambassadors at 
Paris and St. Petersburg 
make two conciliatory 
moves. Unfortunately 
Germany's attitude leaves 
hardly any hope of a peace- 
ful settlement 

Austria-Hungary announces 
at St. Petersburg that she 
is willing to discuss the 
ground of her differences 
with Serbia ; but Ger- 
many's summons to Russia 
to demobilise within twelve 
hours seems to destroy the 
last hope of peace 

French Government inform 
English Government that 
they will respect Belgian 
neutrality 



384 



386 



387 



249 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 






123 



124 



125 



126 



127 



128 



129 



M. Jules Cambon 



M. Barrere 



M. Ren< Viviani 



M. Paul Cambon 



M. Ren Viviani 



M. MoUard 



M. Ren Viviani 



1914. 

Berlin, 

August i 

Rome, 
August i 



Paris, 
August i 



London, 
August i 



Paris, 

August i 



Luxemburg, 
August i 



Paris, 

August i 



German Government refuse a 
similar engagement 

Marquis di San Giuliano in- 
forms German Ambassador 
that Italy will preserve 
neutrality 

Herr von Schoen, informed of 
Austria's conciliatory atti- 
tude and of Russia's accept- 
ance of the English formula, 
makes no further mention of 
his departure and proclaims 
his peaceful intentions, at 
the same time stating that 
he has received no further 
information from his Gov- 
ernment 

Sir E. Grey states that Eng- 
land has refused the promise 
of neutrality for which Ger- 
many asked. The observ- 
ance of Belgian neutrality 
is of great importance to 
England, and Germany has 
not answered the question 
put to her 

French mobilisation has been 
ordered during the day, as a 
reply to German prepara- 
tions 

Luxemburg Minister of State 
asks French Government 
for an assurance of neutral- 
ity similar to that received 
by Belgium 

This assurance is given by 
French Government 



250 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



130 



132 



133 



134 



135 



136 



1914. 

M. Jules Cambon Berlin, 
August i 

M. Eyschen . . Luxemburg, 
August 2 



M. Mollard 



Note of Heir von 
Schoen 



M. Pale"ologue . . 



Paris, 
August 2 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
August 2 



M. Ren Viviani Paris, 

August 2 



137 



M. Paul Cambon London, 
August 2 



General mobilisation 
ordered at Berlin . 



is 



Violation of Luxemburg neu- 
trality by German troops. 
Protests by Minister of State 

Explanations furnished by 
German Government who 
state that measures taken in 
Luxemburg are solely pre- 
ventive and are in no sense 
hostile to the Grand Duchy 

The same explanation regard- 
ing the entry of German 
troops into the Grand 
Duchy of Luxemburg 

Germany has just declared 
war on Russia 



Communication of this news 
to French diplomatic repre- 
sentatives abroad 

French diplomatic representa- 
tives abroad are requested 
to make known the situa- 
tion to the Governments to 
which they are accredited 

Sir E. Grey has given assur- 
ance that British fleet will 
defend French coasts 
against any German attack 
by sea. The violation of 
the neutrality of Belgium 
would be considered a casus 
belli . .... 



393 

r! 



394 



394 

394 
395 

395 



395 



396 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



138 



M. Rene 1 Viviani 



1914. 

Paris, 

August 2 



139 



140 



M. Pellet 



The Hague, 
August 3 



141 



M. Klobukowski 



Brussels, 
August 3 



142 



143 



144 



M. Paul Cambon 



London, 
August 3 



The President of the Council 
communicates to French 
Chamber Sir E. Grey's 
statements as to co-opera- 
tion of British fleet 

Protest to Berlin against the 
violations of French frontier 

German Mininster at the 
Hague informs Netherlands 
Government of the entry 
of Imperial troops into 
Luxemburg and Belgium, 
under the pretext of pre- 
ventive measures 

Belgian Government refuse the 
summons sent to them to 
allow German troops a free 
passage through their terri- 
tory 

Belgium does not think the 
moment has come to appeal 
to the guarantee of the 
Powers to defend her inde- 
pendence 

The statement regarding inter- 
vention of English fleet is 
binding on British Govern- 
ment 

Fruitless attempt by German 
Ambassador to obtain from 
Sir E. Grey assurance that 
England's neutrality would 
not depend on the observ- 
ance of Belgian neutrality 



252 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



T45 



146 



147 



148 



149 



150 



152 



M. Paul Cambon 



M. Rend Viviani 



Hen von Schoen 



M. Rene 1 Viviani 



M. Klobukowski 



153 M. Paul Cambon 



1914. 
London, 
August 3 



Paris, 
August 3 



Brussels, 
August 4 

London, 
August 4 



Sir E. Grey makes statement 
in the Commons regarding 
intervention of English 
fleet, and reads a letter 
from King Albert asking 
for England's support . . 401 

French Government deny in 
London statement that Ger- 
man frontier had been 
violated by French officers 402 

Declaration of war handed 
by German Ambassador at 
Paris to President of the 
Council 402 

Communication of this news 
to French diplomatic repre- 
sentatives abroad . . . . 403 

Instructions sent to M. Jules 
Cambon, at Berlin, to ask 
for his passports . . . . 404 

French Minister at Munich in- 
structed to ask for his pass- 
ports 404 

Violation of Belgian territory 
by German troops . . 404 

Belgium's appeal to England, 
France, and Russia . . 405 

German Government will be 
requested by English 
Government to withdraw 
before midnight their ulti- 
matum to Belgium . . 405 



253 



[Y.I 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



154 



155 



156 



157 



158 



159 



M. Klobukowski 



M. Bapst 



M. Mollard 



M. Ren6 Viviani 
(Circular to the 
Powers) 



M. Raymond 
Poincare, Pre- 
sident of the 
Republic (Mes- 
sage to Parlia- 
ment) 

M. Rene" Viviani, 
President of 
the Council. 
(Speech in the 
Chamber) 



1914. 
Brussels, 
August 4 



Copenhagen, 
August 6 



Paris, 
August 4 



Paris, 

August 4 



German Government state at 
Brussels that they find 
themselves obliged to in- 
vade Belgian territory :*#< 

Enclosing a report in which M. 
Jules Cambon informs the 
Government of the circum- 
stances of his return j ourney 
and of the annoyances to 
which he was subjected . . 

Report of M. Mollard to the 
Government on the subject 
of his depature from Lux- 
emburg, which was insisted 
on by German military 
authorities 

Text of notification to the 
Powers of the state of war 
existing between France 
and Germany 

Message of President of the 
Republic, read at the sitting 
of Parliament on August 4, 
19*4 



Text of speech delivered by 
President of the Council to 
the Chamber of Deputies, 
August 4, 1914 . . 



254 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



CHAPTER VII. 
DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE. 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



~ 



160 



M. Delcass6 



1914. 

Paris, 

September 4 



Declaration of England, Rus- 
sia, and France regarding 
their reciprocal undertaking 
not to conclude a separate 
peace, and not to put for- 
ward conditions of peace 
without previous agreement 
with each of the other Allies 



433 



APPENDIX I. 

EXTRACTS FROM [BRITISH] BLUE-BOOK CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE TAKEN 
BY ENGLAND DURING THE POURPARLERS WHICH PRECEDED THE WAR. 

[The despatches quoted are B. 6, 87, 89, 99, 119, 148.] 



APPENDIX II. 

EXTRACTS FROM [BRITISH] BLUE-BOOK RELATING TO THE PROPOSALS MADE 
BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN 
ORDER TO OBTAIN THE NEUTRALITY OF ENGLAND. 



[The despatches quoted are B. 85, 101, 123.] 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



APPENDIX II. (b). 

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN, UNDER PRETENCE OF A " MISUNDER- 
STANDING," A GUARANTEE BY ENGLAND OF THE NEUTRALITY OF 
FRANCE IN A GERMAN-RUSSIAN WAR. 

(Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zcilung, AUGUST 20, 1914.)- 



No. 



Name of 
Signatory. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Summary. 



Prince Lich- 
nowsky 



His Majesty Em- 
peror William 
II. 



Herr von Beth- 
mann Hollweg 

His Majesty King 
George V. 



1914. 
London, 
July 31 



Berlin, 
August i 



London, 
August i 



Account of a soi-disant request 
by telephone concerning an 
eventual undertaking by 
Germany not to attack 
France if the latter would 
remain neutral in a war be- 
tween Germany and Russia 

Telegram from the Emperor 
William to King George V., 
stating that he cannot stop 
his mobilisation against 
Russia and France, but 
will not attack France in 
the hypothesis of that 
Power offering its neutrality 
guaranteed by the English 
army and fleet 

Telegram to Prince Lich- 
nowsky repeating Ger- 
many's undertaking 

Telegram from the King of 
England to the Emperor 
William, stating that Ger- 
man Ambassador is mis- 
taken and that Sir Edward 
Grey spoke to Prince Lich- 
nowsky only of the means 
of delaying an armed con- 
flict between France and 
Germany until some definite 
ground of understanding 
should have been reached 
by Austria-Hungary and 
Russia 



435 



435 



435 



436 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



No. 


Name of 
Signatory. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Summary. 


i 
c 


5 


Prince Lich- 
nowsky 


1914. 
London, 
August 2 


Notice given to Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg that 
the conversations of which 










he had given an account 
had been abandoned as 










"useless" 


436 



APPENDIX III. 

EXTRACTS .FROM [BRITISH] BLUE-BOOK CONCERNING ENGLAND'S REFUSAL 
TO ADMIT THE GERMAN POINT OF VlEW ON THE QUESTION OF THE 
VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY. 

[The despatches quoted are B. 153, 155, 157, 159, 160.] 



APPENDIX IV. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE [BELGIAN] GREY-BOOK SHOWING THE CONDITIONS IN 
WHICH GERMANY VIOLATED BELGIAN NEUTRALITY. 

[The despatches quoted are G. 2, 8, 9, n, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 
30, 31, 35, 39. 40, 4i, 44, 48, 52, 60, 71.] 



APPENDIX V. 
EXTRACTS FROM [GERMAN] WHITE-BOOK. 

Telegrams exchanged between the Emperor of Germany, William II., 
and the Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II., from July 28 to August i, 



P- 437 



APPENDIX VI. 

EXTRACTS FROM [RUSSIAN] ORANGE-BOOK RELATING TO GERMANY'S 
DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA. 



[The despatches quoted are 0. 76, 77, 78.] 



257 



CHAPTER I. 
WARNINGS. 



No. i. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin, to 
M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, March 17, 1913. 

OUR naval and military attaches are sending to their 
respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. 
I take this opportunity of. drawing the attention of your 
. Excellency to these important documents. 

The consideration of the financial expedients by which 
Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the 
sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite pro- 
posals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with 
which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of 
them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, 
dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been 
announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in 
times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. 
On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly 
opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources 
derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind 
has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in 
the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the cor- 
porate unity (personality of the Empire, constituting a distinct 
diminution of their own sovereign power. 

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the 
German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance 
in the event of a possible crisis. 

The German changes have produced a result unexpected 
by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the 
Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the 

359 



[Y. l] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [MARCH 17, 

manly determination with which this proposal has been wel- 
comed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals 
has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose 
of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German 
military strength ; the German proposals are represented as a 
reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense 
military effort which France is undertaking is but the conse- 
quence of German initiative. 

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic 
sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive 
memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went 
through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in 
which the present situation was compared to that of a hun- 
dred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an 
echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month in the 
Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor him- 
self will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of 
France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that 
national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacri- 
fices are being required, but to compare the present time to 
1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is 
anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred 
years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who 
aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a 
counterpart w r ould have to be sought, since the French nation 
seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force. 

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in 
both countries makes the situation grave. 

JULES CAMBON. 

ENCLOSURE I. 

Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attache to the 
Embassy of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. Etienne, 
Minister of War. 

Berlin, March 15, 1913. 

THE patriotic movement which has manifested itself in 
France has caused real anger in certain circles. 

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in 
the Kolnische Zeitung is the expression of prevalent opinion. 

260 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, 
which has been immediately disavowed by the Government. 

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article 
in the Kolnische Zeitnng cannot be disregarded ; several 
important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not 
of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent 
anger. 

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very 
vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments. 

For some time now it has been quite a common thing 
to meet people who declare that the military plans of France 
are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing-room a 
member of the Reichstag, who is not a fanatic, speaking of the 
three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a 
provocation ; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, 
military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with 
her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this 
way with Germany. 

To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused 
by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober- 
minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. 
People are angry at realising that in spite of the enormous 
effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, 
it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France 
completely. 

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied 
with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on 
the fact that the impending legislation, which French public 
opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but 
the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 
1912. 

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliber- 
ately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other 
large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no 
long delay in filling the gaps.* The Balkan crisis, coming just 
at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for 
exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining 

* The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set 
again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease 
of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on 
a peace footing. 

161 



[Y. 1] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [MARCH 17, 

with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those 
made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany 
was opposed to France. 

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military pro- 
gramme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor, 
Colonel Pelle, a year ago, when the law of 1912 was pub- 
lished : 

' We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are 
the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against 
us by the events of last year. 
(1) [Text, ' The Treaty of the 4th of November, 191 1, 111 has proved a 

vol. II., complete disillusion. <2) 

m P' ,494;] ' The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even 

LC '' -?" the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their 
share in Morocco. 

" It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out 
to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong 
that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possi- 
bilities were opening out for German manufactures, German 
trade, German expansion. 

" Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not 
disappeared to-day. Germany always requires outlets for 
commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they 
are entitled to them, because their population is increasing 
every day, because the future belongs to them. They con- 
sider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second-rate 
Power. 

" In the crisis of 1911, however, this second-rate Power 
successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Govern- 
ment gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them 
nor us. People are determined that such a thing shall never 
happen again.'' 

And at the moment when the second and formidable part 
of the programme is about to be realised, when German 
military strength is on the point of acquiring that final 
superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us 
to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly 
refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, " her eternal 
power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Ger- 
many can well be understood. 

Of course the Government points to the general situation in 

262 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

Europe and speaks of the " Slav Peril." As far as I can see, 
however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this 
' Peril," and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with 
welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws. 

On the loth March last, being the centenary of the levee en 
masse of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of 
rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the 
Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues 
of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were 
surrounded by heaps of flowers. 

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with 
France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 
there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the 
first entry of the Prussians into Paris. 

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at 
France, as does the Kolnische Zeitung, we are in fact, and shall 
long remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for 
our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really 
too large. 

Germans wish for peace so they keep on proclaiming, and 
the Emperor more than anyone but they do not understand 
peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of 
armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present 
engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some 
occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence 
which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its 
army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in 
the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government 
will perhaps be powerless. 

It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing 
everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with 
eclat all the various anniversaries of 1813. 

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war 
a more or less national character. By whatever pretext 
Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing 
can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France. 



263 



[Y. l] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [MARCH 17, 

ENCLOSURE II. 

M. de Faramond, Naval Attache to the French Embassy at 
Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine. 

Berlin, March 15, 1913. 

IN reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by 
the Financial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no 
Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object 
an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military 
effort would be directed against us. 

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase 
of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the 
Reichstag, we know that it deals with " an increase of military 
strength of immense scope " to use the expression of the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 

The official newspapers have also referred to the military 
proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communique 
of the Lokal Anzeiger as accurate. 

The German effectives reach at the present moment 
720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that 
on the ist October 1914, the Imperial army will be raised to 
a figure not far removed from 860,000. 

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the 
provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather 
from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of 
the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our 
frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, 
in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostili- 
ties, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger 
than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial 
Government to obtain success at the very outset of the 
(1) [c/. B. operations. (1) 

1570 The conditions under which the German Emperor would 

nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those 
of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 
the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a 
victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might 
conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, 
' There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot 
allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the 

264 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. l] 

German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years 
ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his 
king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 
4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the 
franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it 
may be presumed that the active army, composed of young 
men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable 
proportion of Socialists. 

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German 
Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France 
and Germany come to blows ; but it will be very important 
that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on 
the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that 
they can have entire confidence in the direction of the cam- 
paign and its final result. 

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took 
the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take 
as a theme for his address to the young soldiers " the duty 
of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in 
success." 

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would 
have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find 
in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals 
for a crushing offensive movement against France. 01 (1| [c/. No. 2 

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a (end.); 
position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the 
direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. 
The Kolnische Zeitung has said as much in an article both 
spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of 
which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse. 

But we niust be willing to realise that the opinion expressed 
by the Kolnische Zeitung is at the present moment that of the 
immense majority of the German people. 

In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a con- 
versation which a member of our Embassy had the other 
evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it 
may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles. 

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince 
Donnersmarck spoke as follows : 

" French people are quite wrong in thinking that we 
harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget 



. l] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [MARCH i; 

that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to 
make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can 
assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily 
inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war ? It 
is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves." 

And the Prince added : "I have even been considered in 
France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That 
is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had 
begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short 
time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there 
were some of the most important personages of the Imperial 
Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments 
which were already becoming manifest between France and 
Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was 
because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would 
certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, ' No, it is 
not because I am afraid, that I repudiate the idea of war 
between France and Prussia, but rather because I think 
that it is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. 
And since you have referred to the possible result of such 
a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced 
that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the 
brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the 
French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate ; 
by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, 
but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. 
Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as 
punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In 
the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants 
from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty 
with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may 
be.' ' And Prince Donnersmarck added : " An exactitude 
which played so great a role forty years ago in moving an 
army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in 
the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses 
far more numerous." 

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the con- 
fidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their 
military organisation. 

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only 
alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include 

266 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 1J 

also an increase of material and of defence works, the details 
of which are not known, but some idea of which may be 
gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the 
expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs. 

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium 
of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures. 

The military and naval law of 1912 had been provisionally 
covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, 
by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying 
the reduction of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources 
only represent together the sum of 60,000,000 francs.) 

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently 
been raised by the Empire and Prussia : 500,000,000 marks on 
the 29th January 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th 
March 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must 
have been applied to military expenses. 

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional 
financial measures. 

According to the indications given by the semi-official 
Press, the " non-recurring " expenditure will amount to a 
milliard marks, while the " permanent " annual expenditure 
resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 
marks. 

It seems certain that the " non-recurring " expenditure 
will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small 
fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks 
would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise 
the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who 
will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject 
the principle of the military law and at the same time to 
pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect. 

The Government are afraid that among the rich and 
bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied 
exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent dis- 
content. Accordingly they are doing everything in their 
power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to 
be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, 
establishing for the purpose an analogy between the warlike 
times of 1813 and the present day. 

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Inde- 
pendence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of 

267 



[Y. 1] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [MARCH 

sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 
years ago, their hereditary enemy. 

If it is established that the German Government are doing 
their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax 
should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as 
some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be com- 
plete before ist July 1914, these facts have a formidable 
significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the 
part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash 
to the amount of a milliard. 

With regard to the manner in which the permanent 
expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 
to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further 
legislation will certainly be necessary in order that the required 
annual amounts may be forthcoming. 

To sum up : In Germany the execution of military reforms 
always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All 
the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 
and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. 
It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of 
which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course 
of manufacture. Military secrets are so well kept here that it 
is extremely difficult to follow the changes in personnel and 
matiriel. 

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the 
very large number of reservists who are at the present time 
in training), a perfect military organisation and a public 
opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the 
Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the 
present moment a very dangerous neighbour. 

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately 
applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next 
year. The German effectives will still be considerably more 
numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available 
contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring 
into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior 
quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale 
of the active army will deteriorate. 

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two 
camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which 
they can do little more. 

268 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK IY. 2] 

They did not think that France was capable of a great 
sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will 
upset their calculations. 

FARAMOND. 

No. 2. 

M. Etienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, April 2, 1913. 

I HAVE just received from a reliable source an official 
secret report concerning the strengthening of the German 
army. The report is divided into two parts ; the first con- 
sisting of general statements, the second dealing with techni- 
calities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch 
of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially 
striking are the instructions with regard to the employment 
of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft. 

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this 
document, which seems to merit your attention. 

ETIENNE. 

ENCLOSURE. 

Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army. 

Berlin, March 19, 1913. 

I. GENERAL MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW MILITARY LAWS. 
THE increase has taken place in three stages : 

(i) The Conference of Algeciras (1) has removed the last <n [Jan.- 
doubt with regard to the existence of an Entente between Apr., 
France, England, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that 1906.1 
Austria-Hungary was obliged to keep some of her forces 
mobilised against Serbia and Italy ; finally our fleet was not 
at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the 
first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast 
defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the 
English plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 
men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better 
formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances 

169 



[Y. 2] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [APRIL 

in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege oper- 
ations. It was already clear at that time that it would be 
absolutely necessary to make a great effort. 

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions 
" [July, brought on the incident of Agadir. 11 ' At that time the pro- 

191 1 ;cf. g ress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the 
' 5-J nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of 
machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in 
the previous period. Further, an attack by the English 
fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened 
our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This 
increase was from this moment considered as a minimum. 

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a 
war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of 
Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally 
could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by 
a new r loi des cadres ; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate 
the date of execution contemplated by the new military law. 

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the 
active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable 
peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in 
the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supple- 
mentary law which should follow will enable her almost com- 
pletely to attain this end. 

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chau- 
vinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild 
gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and 
extending Deutschtum (German influence) all the world over. 

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in 
one day increase their population. The employment of an 
army of negroes in the theatre of European operations will 
remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of 
beauty. 

II. AIM AND OBLIGATIONS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY, OF 
OUR ARMY, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR 
ARMY PURPOSES. 

Our new army law is only an extension of the military 
education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 
made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the 

270 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 2] 

sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready 
for defence as well as for offence. We must allow the idea 
to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are 
an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We 
must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our 
part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our 
adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse 
suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our 
economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the 
heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, 
and strained political relations, an outbreak (Losschlagen) 
should be considered as a relief, because after it would come 
decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must 
prepare for war from the financial point of view ; there is 
much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the 
distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which 
cannot be concealed. 

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. 
The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the 
other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and 
in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy 
engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should 
open up relations, by means of well-chosen organisations, 
with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, 
in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in 
the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we 
should openly recognise these secret allies ; and on the con- 
clusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages 
which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisa- 
tion. The first attempt which was made some years ago 
opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately 
these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether 
we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to prepara- 
tions of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a 
conclusion. 

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to 
be carefully prepared and by material means. They must 
break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of 
communication ; they must have a controlling head to be 
found among the influential leaders, religious or political. 
The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose ; 

271 



[Y. 2] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [APRIL 2 

more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of 
the Mohammedan World. 

However this may be, we must be strong in order to 
(1) [cf. No. i annihilate at one powerful swoop (1) our enemies in the east and 
(end. II); wes t. But in the next European war it will also be necessary 
I57 ''" that the small states should be forced to follow us or be sub- 
dued. In certain conditions their armies and their strong 
positions can be rapidly conquered or neutralised ; this would 
probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to pre- 
vent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they 
could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the 
north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, 
especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentra- 
tion of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any 
menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, 
Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neu- 
trality ; but by this time the decision would already have 
been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, 
the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch 
formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offen- 
sive measures from this quarter. 

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid 
bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her 
neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank. 

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small 
states on our north-western frontier cannot be viewed in quite 
the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our 
(2) . aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority 

j- 7 i from the first days.'* 1 For this purpose it will be necessary to 
concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr 
formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at 
least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and 
which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If 
we could induce these states to organise their system of fortifi- 
cation in such a manner as to constitute an effective protec- 
tion for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. 
But for this, army reorganisation, particularly in Belgium, 
would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an 
effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive 
organisation was established against us, thus giving definite 
advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no 

272 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her 
neutrality. 111 Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy 
to work in this country on the lines of our interests. 

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to 
hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately 
after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower 
Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed 
immediately by invasion," 1 would allow a sufficient justifica- m W 
tion for our action in international law. 20 ' 

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which 
demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the 
enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act 
as our brothers did a hundred years ago ; the eagle thus 
provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his 
steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember 
that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County 
of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands 
of the French ; that thousands of brother Germans in the 
Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is 
a national question of restoring to Germany her former 
possessions. 

No. 3. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to 
M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, May 6, 1913. 

I WAS talking this evening to the Secretary of State 
about the conference of Ambassadors* and the results 
obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis 
with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, 
but only temporarily. " It seems to me," said Herr von 
Jagow, " that we are travelling in a mountainous district. 
We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights 
rising in front of us." ' The height which we have just 
surmounted," I replied, " was, perhaps, the most difficult 
to cross." 

The crisis which we have just gone through has been 
very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered 
imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German 

* [On Balkan affairs.] 
S 273 



[Y. 3] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [MAY 6, 

Government by a number of facts which it is important that 
your Excellency should know. 

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues 
with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the 
occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter 
asked my colleague confidentially what was exactly the 
situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power 
had at the present time any cause for fear which might 
necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The 
Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely 
nothing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the 
Russian Government, and that the latter have their hands 
free in Europe. 

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded 
here as extremely near. The Government have not been 
satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East ; 
preparations have even been made here. 

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted 
to the call of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany 
(1) [c/. Nos. a preliminary measure (1) which we have not got, and which 
i5 I0 5-3 consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold 
themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make 
the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to " atten- 
tion," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, 
discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to 
make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were 
given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, 
and it would be in the papers the next day. 

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations 
which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco. 

Now it has been given again about ten days ago that is 
to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I 
know that this is so, and I have it from several different 
sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it 
to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen 
have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the 
means of existence for their families for a year. It has even 
been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who 
was to make the trial trip on the " Imperator," did not embark. 

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation 
order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. 

274 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 4] 

On this point I have been informed of some remarks made 

in a German milieu by General von Moltke,' 11 who is considered '" [cf. No. 

here as the most distinguished officer of the German army. 6 -l 

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 
" We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, " all 
commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When 
war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such 
a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success 
alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to 
leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged 
to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she 
would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, 
to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, " we 
must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are 
nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without 
delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance." 

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles 
and it corresponds to that of political circles ; the latter, 
however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, 
as a necessary enemy. 

This is what was being thought and said privately a fort- 
night ago. 

From these events the following conclusions may be 
drawn which comprise the facts stated above ; these people 
are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and 
they have consequently taken the necessary steps. They 
wish to be always ready. 

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline 
and of persistence ; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This 
lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the 
Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of 
strengthening the defences of the country. 

JULES CAMBON. 

No. 4. 

M. Allize, Minister of the Republic in Bavaria, 
to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Munich, July 10, 1913. 

FROM a political point of view people are asking what 
is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no 

275 



[Y. 5] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 30, 

one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy 
had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances 
sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. 
As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 
1911,* it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as 
incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active 
foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes 
which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed. 

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as 
the Imperial Government would find themselves supported 
by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might 
energetically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The 
state of war to which all the events in the East have accus- 
tomed people's minds for the last two years appears no 
longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the 
political and economic difficulties which will continue to 
increase. 

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence 
on Germany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, 
' The fortune of war is always uncertain ; every war is an 
adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing him- 
self sure of victory." 

ALLIZE. 

No. 5. 

Report to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(on Public Opinion in Germany according to the Reports 
of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents) . 

Paris, July 30, 1913. 

FROM observations which our agents in Germany have 
been able to collect from persons having access to the most 
diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two 
feelings sway and irritate men's minds : 

(1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1911 is considered 
(1) [c/. No. i a disappointment for Germany (1) ; 

(2) France a new France undreamed of prior to the 

summer of 1911, is considered to be a warlike 
country, and to want war. 

* [Signed Nov. 4, 1911. For text see vol. II., p. 494.] 
276 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 5] 

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the 
Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different 
districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, 
Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, 
commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, 
manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and 
Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade 
unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Branden- 
burg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from 
Stettin celebrating the 5O5th anniversary of their association, 
country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from 
Westphalia, are unanimous on these two points, with very 
slight differences corresponding to their position in society 
or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these 
opinions : 

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, 
a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the 
carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a 
proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new 
Bismarck ; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the 
eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more 
serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany 
was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness 
of the Republic were a sort of German dogma. 

In July 1911, the " Coup of Agadir" 01 made the Morocco (1) [c/. No. 2 
question for the first time a national question affecting the (encl.)] 
life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the 
Press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved 
how the campaign has been organised, what Pan-German 
greed it has awakened, and what hatred it has left behind. 
If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, 
Heir von Kiderlen* was the best-hated man in Germany 
last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little 
of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge. 

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion 
became restive when confronted with French opinion with 
regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calm- 
ness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good 
her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the 
audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most 
* [Heir von Kiderlen- Waechter, German Foreign Secretary at that time.] 

277 



[Y. 5] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 30, 

persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper 
on the part of German public opinion. 

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 
1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and deter- 
mined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable ? 
Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the 
Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt. 

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound dis- 
illusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, 
resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from 
the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the 
last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December 
to May, from the columns of the Press of all parties, which 
reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity 
and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with 
irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never 
ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and main- 
tain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer 
vast territories ; that Germany on the other hand had lived 
on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which 
during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, 
and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the 
Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial 
conquest this consolation was offered : ' Yes, but that does 
not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of 
France at home." 

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled. 

Given this German public opinion that considers France 
as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as 
regards the possibility and proximity of war ? 

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the 
question of the possibility and proximity of war. 

There are in the country forces making for peace, but 
they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They 
consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, 
and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manu- 
facturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest 
benefit, but above all that war would profit England. 

The forces consist of the following elements : 

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who 
are peace-loving by instinct. 

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FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

Those members of the nobility detached from military 
interests and engaged in business, such as the grands seigneurs 
of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at 
Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous 
political and social consequences of war, even if successful. 

Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a 
moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, 
would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend 
on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital. 

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig- 
Holstein conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile 
to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these 
annexed Germans. 

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in 
the large southern states Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, 
and the Grand Duchy of Baden are divided by these two 
opinions : an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federa- 
tion from which they have derived great economic advantages ; 
a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, 
against which they have difficulty in defending their political 
independence and administrative autonomy. 

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively 
prefer peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight 
in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, 
or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against 
the infection of a wave of warlike feeling. 

An example will make this idea clear : The no Socialist 
members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would 
be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a 
vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventu- 
ality the greater part of their number would join the rest of 
the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm. 

Finally, it must be observed that these supporters of 
peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see 
any other solution for the present situation. In certain 
contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has 
been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. 
They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the 
one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will 
be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, 
their pessimism gives free play to those who favour war. 

379 



[Y. 5] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 30, 

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. 
The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey 
the idea that Germany is the country where military power 
is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where 
the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind 
which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, 
because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. 
There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a Press 
either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating 
public opinion ; it has means both varied and formidable 
for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work 
in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a 
determination that is at once thrilling and fixed. 

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories ; 
each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intel- 
lectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special 
arguments which create a general attitude of mind and 
increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike 
desire. 

Some want war because in the present circumstances 
they think it is inevitable. And, as far as Germany is con- 
cerned, the sooner the better. 

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons 
based on over-population, over-production, the need for 
markets and outlets ; or for social reasons, i.e., to provide 
the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the 
rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses. 

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing 
that time is on the side of France, think that events should 
be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, 
in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic 
pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a 
free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical 
facts mutually incompatible. 

Others are bellicose from " Bismarckism " as it may be 
termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter 
into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms 
of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they 
have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even 
when they have a preponderating force. From that still 
recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal 

380 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y- *] 

memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, 
and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappoint- 
ment is the unifying force of the Wehrvereine, and other 
associations of Young Germany. 

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolu- 
tionary France ; others finally from a feeling of rancour. 
These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war. 

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form 
as follows : The country squires represented in the Reichstag 
by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the 
death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. 
In the last sitting of the session which has just closed, the 
Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious 
attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. 
On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, 
and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year 
book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige 
and support its family interest. During the discussions on 
the Army Bill, a Conservative speaker put forward the need 
for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. 
Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the 
King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the 
democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of 
the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. 
Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian 
protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, 
the number of its political representatives decreases with each 
legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 
members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy ; in 1898, 83 ; in 
1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 
to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists. 

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National 
Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not 
the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few 
exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their 
reasons, social in character. 

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the 
aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 
they had 125 members in the Reichstag ; in 1874, 155 ; in 
1887, 99 ; in 1912, 65. They do not forget that in the years 
succeeding the war they played the leading role in parliament, 

281 



[Y. 5] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 30, 

helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. 
Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and 
Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their 
parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of 
solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that 
the difficulties between themselves and their workmen 
originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of 
freedom without France industrial unrest would be unknown. 

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour 
plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers 
who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and 
the next war indemnity all these regard war as good 
business. 

Amongst the " Bismarckians " must be reckoned officials 
of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by 
the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party. This is the party 
of the " pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured 
out in the Post. They find disciples and political sympathisers 
in the various groups of young men whose minds have been 
trained and formed in the public schools and universities. 

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, 
develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by 
statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial 
empire commensurate with the industrial output of the 
Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. 
The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the 
nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and 
assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately 
to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for 
all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impo- 
tence ; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social 
problem. 

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other 
apologists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world 
a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They 
wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which 
according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. 
From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan- 
Germans and the ideas and adherents of the Kriegsvereine, 
Wehrvereine and other similar associations too well known 
to need particular description. It is enough to note that 

282 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 5] 

the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th (u 
has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies. 

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy 
is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most 
dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. 
German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public 
opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have 
been engaged in the negotiations between France and 
Germany ; they are heaping together and reckoning up their 
grievances against us, and one day they will present their 
accounts in the war Press. It seems as if they were looking 
for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is 
always possible in any part of the globe where France and 
Germany are in contact. 

They must have their revenge, for they complain that 
they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army 
Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, " Germany 
will not be able to have any serious conversation with France, 
until she has every sound man under arms." 

In what terms will this conversation be couched ? The 
opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, 
that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of 
defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But 
when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible 
way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if 
necessary. That is the Prussian tradition. 

Must war then be considered as inevitable ? 

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if 
France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale 
and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions 
but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The 
English fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, 
however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. 
On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained. 

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in 
political and military circles than was the case three or four 
years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be 
sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective. 

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next 
war as a duel between France and Germany. 



[Y. 6] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [NOVEMBER 22, 

No. 6. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at 
Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, November 22, 1913. 

I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an 
account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago 
between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the 
presence of the Chief of the General Staff General von 
Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound 
impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the 
impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have 
myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, 
and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace. 

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up 
till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal 
influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in 
support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He 
found him this time completely changed. The German 
Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace 
against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. 
William II. has come to think that war with France is in- 
evitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally 
he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army 
and in its certain success. 

(1) [c/. No. General von Moltke (1) spoke exactly in the same strain 
3-1 as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and 
inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, 
" for," he said, to the King, " this time the matter must be 
settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the 
irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people 
will be carried away when that day comes." 

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty 
of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them 
in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the senti- 
ments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few 
irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators. 

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff never- 
theless persisted in their point of view. 

284 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 6] 

During the course of this conversation the Emperor more- 
over seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. 
advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies 
of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, 
obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels 
some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, 
who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does 
not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world 
as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of 
France to the last increase of the German army, the object 
of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of 
Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, 
for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot 
go much further. 

One may well ponder over the significance of this conver- 
sation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may 
have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce 
him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict 
between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium 
less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with 
regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does 
not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von 
Moltke. 

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his 
impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him 
more than once to allow his real thoughts [to] escape him. 
Whatever may have been the object of the conversation 
related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme 
gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the general 
situation and with the state of a certain shade of public 
opinion in France and Germany. 

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit 
that it would be well to take account of this new factor, 
namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of 
ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to 
borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, " we must 
keep our powder dry." 

JULES CAMBON. 



183 



[Y. 7] [JUNE 28, 



CHAPTER II. 

PRELIMINARIES. 

From the death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 
1914) to the Presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia 
(July 23, 1914). 

No. 7. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Vienna, June 28, 1914. 

NEWS has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary 
Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assas- 
sinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. 
Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, 
they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded 
several officers of their suite. 

(1) [See S. The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, (1) was immediately 
23 j informed by telegraph. 

No. 8. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Vienna, July 2, 1914. 

THE crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment 
in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are 
not content to allow Serbia to maintain in the Balkans the 
position which she has acquired. 

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is 
desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under 
conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a 
refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of 
resort to military measures. 

286 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 10] 

No. 9. 

Af. de Manneville, French Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to 
M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 4, 1914. 

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told 
me yesterday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambas- 
sador, that he hoped Serbia would satisfy the demands 
which Austria might have to make to her with regard to 
the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices 
in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident 
that this would be the case because Serbia, if she acted in 
any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised 
world against her. 

The German Government do not then appear to share 
the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German Press 
as to possible tension in the relations between the Govern- 
ments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish 
to seem to do so. 

No. 10. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. 
Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914. 

IN the course of an interview which he had asked for 
with the Austro-Hungarian Charge" d'Affaires, M. Sazonof 
pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which 
the attacks of the Austrian Press against Serbia are in danger 
'of producing in his country. 

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the 
Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled 
to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on 
Serbian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him : " No country," 
he said, " has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes 
prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to 
employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which 

287 



11] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY n 

your papers threaten Serbia ? Do not embark on such a 
course." 

May this warning not be in vain. 

No. n. 

M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, 
to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 

Budapest, July n, 1914. 

QUESTIONED in the Chamber on the state of the Austro- 
Serbian question M. Tisza explained that before everything 
else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial 
inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any 
disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full 
approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet 
as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, 
and did not give any indication whether the project of a 
demarche at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both 
hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber 
assented without hesitation. 

With regard to this demarche it seems that the word has 
been given to minimise its significance ; the anger of the 
Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent 
articles of the Press, which is now unanimous in advising 
against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi- 
official press especially would desire that for the word 
" demarche," with its appearance of a threat, there should be 
substituted the expression " pourparlers," which appears 
to them m'ore friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, 
for the moment all is for peace. 

- All is for peace, in the Press. But the general public 
here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom 
I have every reason to have confidence have assured me" 
that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition 
were being sent in large quantities towards the frontier. 
Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me 
from various quarters with details which agree with one 
another ; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with 
which people are generally occupied. The Government, 
whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is 

288 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 12] 

preparing a coup, is now doing all that it can to allay these 
anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government news- 
papers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so 
that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But 
they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (d 
platsir). Their optimism to order is in fact without an 
echo ; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which 
cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this ; without excep- 
tion stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level ; the 
Hungarian 4 per cents, were quoted yesterday at 79*95, a 
rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued. 

No. 12. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Vienna, July 15, 1914. 

CERTAIN organs of the Vienna Press,'" discussing the (1| [c/.B. 20, 
military organisation of France and of Russia, represent l6l -l 
these two countries as incapable of holding their own in 
European affairs ; this would ensure to the Dual Monarchy, 
supported -by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting 
Serbia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. 
The Militdrische Rundschau frankly admits it. " The 
moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for 
war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest 
in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious 
circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with 
us : Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our 
side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the 
contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, 
our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question ; 
and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence 
is concerned to be or not to be which is in truth the great 
matter to-day." 

Surpassing itself, the Neue Freie Presse of to-day re- 
proaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech/" l "[c/.S.23 ] 
in which he said, " Our relations with Serbia require, how- 
ever, to be made clear." These words rouse its indignation. 
For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a war 

T 289 



[Y. 13] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

(1) [c/.S.22.] to the knife against Pan-Serbism, and it is in the name of 
humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed 
Serbian race. 

No. 13. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Vienna, July 19, 1914. 

THE Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his 
half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic 
facts which have been the subject of his study since the 
beginning of the year, has added a section containing political 
information emanating from a trustworthy source. 

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he 
has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the 
Austrian note to Serbia, which the papers have for some 
days been persistently announcing. 

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting 
on account of the accurate information which it contains. 

No. 14. 

Memorandum. 

(Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political 
Situation in Austria.) 

Vienna, July 20, 1914. 

FROM information furnished by a person specially well 
informed as to official news, it appears that the French 
Government would be wrong to have confidence in dis- 
seminators of optimism ; much will be demanded of Serbia ; she 
will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, 
she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the 
frontier in co-operation with Austrian officials, to keep strict 
control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools ; and 
it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to 
become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. 
They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia will doubtless 
wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply ; that is why 
a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether 

290 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 15] 

she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its imperious 
tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then 
military operations will begin. 

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts 
the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other 
words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that 
it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed 
the great improvements of her army and railways, and before 
France has brought her military organisation to perfection. 
But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles ; 
Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most 
localised operations against Serbia. But everything must 
be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out : 
generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and 
reviews of the foreign Press, pays attention only to semi- 
official newspapers and to the most important organs ; it 
omits all quotation from and all mention of the others. This 
is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the 
official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian 
Press a complete review of the whole Serbian Press, giving 
a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most 
insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, 
employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often 
insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously 
for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation 
of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant. 

No. 15. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 21, 1914. 
IT has come to my knowledge that the Serbian representa- 25.3 
tive at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that 
his Government was ready to entertain -Austria's require- 
ments' 1 * arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided [cf. B. 
that she asked only for judicial co-operation in the punish- intro. 
ment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was 
charged to warn the German Government that it would be 
dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower 
the prestige of Serbia. 

291 



[Y. 16] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2 

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that 
the Russian Charge" d' Affaires at the diplomatic audience 
to-day mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said 
that he supposed the -German Government now had full 
knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were there- 
fore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Serbian 
difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State pro- 
tested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents 
(1) [cf. Nos. of that note, U) and expressed himself in the same way to me. 
17,21,30, j C ould not help showing my astonishment at a statement 

?^' 3 o T?' which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to 

57,78; B. , 

18,25,95; expert. 

O.'i8 ; S.' I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary 

52.] notices for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Ger- 
w os< 3 many in a kind of " attention " attitude in times of tension, w 

(p. 274), have been sent out here to those classes which would receive 

105.] them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which 
the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse 
without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is 
not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by 
full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the 
less significant. 



No. 16. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 21, 1914. 

I SPECIALLY draw your attention to information of 

(8) [No. 17.3 which I am in receipt from Berlin ; (3) the French Ambassador 

notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, 

and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused 

by the Serbian question. 

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that 
when Austria makes the demarche at Belgrade which she 
> [cf. Nos. judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, 
w' exh 3 2 Germany will support her with her authority, (4) without 
R. 12.] ' seeking to play the part of mediator. 
292 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 18] 

No. 17. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, 
Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 22, 1914. 

M. JULES C AMBON having questioned Heir von Jagow 
on the tenor of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter 
replied that he knew nothing of the text ; (1) our Ambassador < [NO. 15 
expressed his great astonishment at this. He emphasises and 
that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues,' 81 and that note.] 
pessimistic rumours are current. 

M. Barrere also discussed the same question with the 
Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and 
gives the assurance that he is working at Vienna in order 
that Serbia may not be asked for anything beyond what is prac- 
ticable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and 
not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo. 

In present circumstances, the most favourable presump- 
tion one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding 
itself carried away by the Press and the military party, is 
trying to obtain the maximum from Serbia by starting to 
intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks to Germany 
for support' 3 ' in this. < 3 >[c/.No.i6 

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all andnote -3 
his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, 
in a friendly conversation, how much Europe would appreciate 
moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and 
what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent 
pressure on Serbia. 

No. 18. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 22, 1914. 

NOTHING is known as to the decision which Count 
Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, 141 is trying to <41 [cf. S. 
obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding 2 3-l 
against Serbia with the greatest severity, of having done 

293 



[Y. 19] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 22 

with her, of " treating her like another Poland," is attributed 
to the Government. Eight army corps are said to-be ready 
to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very disturbed 
about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened 
actively in order to exercise a moderating influence. 

In any case it is believed that the demarche will be made 
at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the 
outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, 
seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Serbians ; 
M. Jovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch 
wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a 
full resistance. He has confidence in the 'strength of the 
Serbian army ; besides, he counts on the union of all the 
Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against 
his country. 

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised 
here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both 
to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the 
nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already 
been so much compromised. 

Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing 

(1) [cf. No. himself a supporter of violent measures, (1) while at the same 

20, 109 ; time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial 

B - 95. Chancery would not be in entire agreement with him on this 

?DP 217- P om t- The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the 

218); S. country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to 

22.] ' him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, (al has confided to me 

[cf. Nos. that his Government will not raise any objection to steps 

20, 55 ; directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dis- 

(D 214} i s l u ti n f the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, 

but could not accept requirements which would humiliate 

Serbia J am- anal feeling. 

^^eex 

No. 19. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 22, 1914. 

YOUR Excellency has been good enough to communicate 
to me the impressions which have been collected by our 
294 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. l] 

Ambassador at Berlin 01 with regard to the demarche which the (ll [Nos. 16, 
Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade. 

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation 
which I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. 181 Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the <"[c/.B. i.J 
German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin a 
demarche of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian 
Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him 
that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back 
and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, ( " but that up to the (l| [c/. No. 
present time they had not been successful in this, and that 5 6 -] 
he was not without anxiety as to the results of a demarche 
of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky 
that he would like to believe that, before intervening at 
Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had fully in- 
formed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy 
to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohen- 
burg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that 
the Serbian Government had been cognisant of it and had not 
done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. 
For if it could not be proved that the Serbian Government 
were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the 
intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and . 
would arouse against them the opinion of Europe. 

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir 
Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did 
not conceal from me. The same impression was given me 
by the Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility 
of fresh tension in Austro-Serbian relations. 

This morning the Serbian Minister came to see me, and he 
shares the apprehensions'" of Sir Edward Grey. He fears (4l [c/. S. 
that Austria may make of the Serbian Government demands 
which their dignity,' 8 ' and above all the susceptibility of public <J) [/ No- 
opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. Si * 
When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign 
at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to 
that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official 
quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were 
most fundamentally hostile to Serbia. But, he added, if 
these feelings take a public form (demarche) which lacks the 
moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take 

99$ 



|Y. 20] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 23, 

account of Serbian public opinion, which has been inflamed 
by the wrong methods which the Austrian Government have 
used in approaching that country, and which has been made 
less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is 
still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Serbia 
has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 
men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not 
inclined to put up with any humiliation. 

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Govern- 
ment not to depart from the prudence and moderation neces- 
sary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from 
Serbia any measures to which she could not reasonably 
submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too 



No. 20. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome. 

Paris, July 23, 1914. 

ACCORDING to information collected by the French 

w [See No. Ambassador at Vienna, (2) the first intention of the Austro- 

18 and Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest 

severity against Serbia, while keeping eight army corps 

ready to start operations. 

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory ; 

in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I 

instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 

ment to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated 

to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and 

the demands which would be formulated in it, allow us to 

3) [c/. Nos. count on a peaceful result. (3) In view of the customary 

55, 159 procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what 

(p. 422) 5 confidence ought to be placed in these assurances. 

s - 5 2 -] In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very 

short space of time. The Serbian Minister holds that as 

M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will 

accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the 

outrage and to the guarantees for control and police super- 

vision, but that he will resist everything which might affect 

the sovereignty and dignity of his country. 

296 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 21] 

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador 
is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he 
confesses that the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely 
in agreement with him on this point ; the Russian Ambas- 
sador, trusting to assurances which have been given him. 
has left Vienna, 01 and before his departure confided to (1| [c/. No. 
M Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection l8< ] 
to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the 
revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept 
requirements which were humiliating to the national 
sentiment of Serbia. 

No. 21. 

M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris. 

Munich, July 23, 1914. 

THE Bavarian Press seems to believe that a peaceful 
solution of the Austro-Serbian incident is not only possible 
but even probable ; on the other hand official circles have 
for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity 
an air of real pessimism. 

In particular the President of the Council said to me 
to-day that the Austrian note the contents of which were 
known to him (dont il avait connaissance) w was in his opinion w [See No. 
drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Serbia, but 
that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to 
be very serious. 



297 



[Y. 22] [JULY 24 



CHAPTER III. 

THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERBIAN REPLY. 
(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.) 

No. 22. 

M. Rent Viviani, President of the Council,* to M. Bienvenu- 

(1) [ C A Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

B. 6.] 

I SHOULD be obliged if you would urgently send on to 
111 [See M. Dumaine the following information and instructions. (2> 
No. 23.] 

Reval, July 24, 1914, i a.m. 

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the 
dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria- 
Hungary in relation to Serbia in connection with the crime of 
which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We 
found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not 
leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation 
or some mise en demeure which would be equivalent to inter- 
vention in the internal affairs of Serbia, of such a kind that 
Serbia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and 
independence. 

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we 
might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count 
Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind 
as to make him understand how undesirable would be any 
intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat 
on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna. 

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by 
M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would 
doubtless associate itself with a demarche for removing any 

* [M. Viviani, who was also Minister for Foreign Affairs, was out of 
France at this time, attending President Poincare on his visit by sea to 
the Tsar.] 
298 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 28] 

danger which might threaten general peace, and he has 
telegraphed to his Government to this effect. (I) (>l [SB.6.l 

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to 
M. Schbeko. While there is no question in this of collective 
or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representa- 
tives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter 
with the Russian and English Ambassadors, and to come 
to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each 
of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay 
the moderation that the present situation appears to us to 
require. 

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to 
bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir 
Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British 
Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the 
Foreign Office. Count Benckendorff is instructed to make 
a similar recommendation. 



No. 23. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, on board the 
" France." w [See No. 

Paris, July 24, 1914. foot - 

I HAVE sent on your instructions'" to Vienna as urgent, but m [No. 22.] 
from information contained in this morning's papers it appears 
that the Austrian note 14 ' was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock (4) [Text, B. 
yesterday evening. 4-] 

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed 
to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be 
very sharp ; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the pro- 
secution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the 
outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression 
of the whole of the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Serbian 
Press and army. It is said to give Serbia till 6 o'clock "' (SI [SB. 4, 
on Saturday evening to make her submission. 

In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested 
him to come to an agreement with his English and Russian 
colleagues as to his action. 



[Y. 24] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 24, 

No. 24. 
d)T See TEXT OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE. (I) 

No 40 (Note communicated by Count Szecsen, Austro-Hungarian 
p. 321.] Ambassador, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister 

for Foreign Affairs, on Friday, July 24, 1914, at 

10.30 a.m.) 

(For text and translation of the Austrian Note to Serbia, 
see B. 4, pp. 74-88. For Serbian Reply, see B. 39, pp. 112-120.) 

No. 25. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to M. Rent Viviani, President of the Council, on board 
the " France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. 
Petersburg, Rome, Belgrade. 

Paris, July 24, 1914. 

M [cf. R. I HAVE the honour to inform you w that the Austro-Hun- 
ii-] garian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian 

(3) [B. 4.]' note (s) which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. 
Count Szecsen informs me that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment gives the Serbian Government up to 5 o'clock on the 
evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer.* 

The note is based on the undertaking made by Serbia on 
the 3ist March, 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and reproaches the Serbian Government with 
having tolerated an anti- Austrian propaganda in which officials, 
the army, and the Press have taken part, a propaganda which 
threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger 
of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, 
according to the facts established during the investigation, was 
planned at Belgrade. 

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled 
to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger 
to their tranquillity, and to require from the Serbian Govern- 
ment an official pronouncement of their determination to 
condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette 

* [See footnote to B. 4, p. 85.] 
300 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK Y. 26] 

of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, con- 
demning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. 
A general order of the King to the Serbian army is at the 
same time to make these declarations known to the army. 
In addition to this, the Serbian Government are to undertake 
to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss 
those officers and civil servants whose names would be com- 
municated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept 
the co-operation of Austrian officials in suppressing the sub- 
versive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well 
as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally 
to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Serbian officer and 
an official who were concerned in it. 

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which 
sums up the facts established by the investigation into the 
crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Bel- 
grade ; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and 
came from a depot of the Serbian army ; finally that the 
murderers were drilled and helped by Serbian officers and 
officials. 

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after 
making this communication, Count Szecsen without any 
observations informed him that the note had been presented. 
M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing 
out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of 
anxiety 111 which had been aroused by the information available (1) [c/. B. 3.] 
this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and 
the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French 
public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical a 
demarche with so short a time limit ; that is to say, a time 
when the President of the Republic and the President of the 
Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had 
left St. Petersburg (2) and were at sea," 1 and consequently w [c/. No. 
were not able to exert, in agreement with those Powers which 2 9-' 

were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Serbia 2 
and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general note.] 
peace. 

The Serbian Minister has not yet received any information 
as to the intentions of his Government. 

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at (1) r ee No 
5 o'clock this afternoon. 141 28.] 

301 



[Y. 26] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 24 

i 

No. 26. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to M. ThUbaut, French Minister at Stockholm (for the 
President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, 
London, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg. 

Paris, July 24, 1914. 

M. VESNITCH* was this morning still without any 
telegram from his Government informing him as to their 
intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note. 

To a request for advice which he made to the Political 
Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and 
for himself alone, that Serbia must try to gain time, as the 
limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a " mise en 
demeure " than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term ; 
that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering 
satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent 
with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia ; he was advised 
to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the 
Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that 
Serbia, while she was quite ready to take measures against 
all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly con- 
demned, required full information as to the evidence in order 
to be able to verify it with all speed ; above all to attempt 
to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself 
ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe. 

I have asked at London and St. Petersburg for the views 
and intentions of the English and Russian Governments. It 
appears on the other hand from our information that the 
Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, 
and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed 
< J) [c/. Nos. O fit. (1) 

35,50,51, No. 27. 

56, 72 ; 

contrast M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
B. 38.] to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to 

Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome. 

Paris, July 24, 1914. 

THE French Ambassador at Vienna informs me that 
opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated 

* [Serbian Minister at Paris.] 
302 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 28] 

nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the 
military party appears to be that Serbia may give way. "' m [cf. No. 

The Serbian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government 47 ' B - 20. 
will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the ?*' ^i , 
punishment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees 
to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian pro- 
paganda, but that they could not accept a general order to 
the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers 
who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign 
officials in Serbia. M. Jovanovich considers that, if it were 
possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dispute might 
still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers. 

Our Ambassador at Berlin gives an account of the excite- 
ment aroused by the Austrian note, (S) and of the state of (>l [ c /- 0. 7-1 
feeling of the Russian Charge* d' Affaires, who thinks that a 
large part of opinion in Germany would desire war. The 
tone of the Press is threatening and appears to have as its 
object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to 
see Heir von Jagow this evening. 

M. Barrere informs us that Italy is exercising moderating 
influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications. 

No. 28. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to 
Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 24, 1914. (3) [ c f. O. 

HERR VON SCHOEN came to inform me"' of a note from 8 ' R 
his Government, of which he would not leave me a copy, but ( *3'J 
at my request he read it twice over to me. (4) "' 

The note 181 was almost word for word as follows : < 

" The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers 
concerning the circumstances under which the assassination 
of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken 
place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Serbian 
propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise 
them. The facts made known must also do away with all 
doubt that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which 
are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav 

303 



[Y. 28] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 24, 

provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their 
incorporation into the Serbian Kingdom is to be found in 
Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the con- 
nivance of members of the Government and the army. 

" The Serbian intrigues have been going on for many 
years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Serbian 
chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It 
was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self- 
restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the 
energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Serbian 
provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed 
did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct 
in future which was given by the Serbian Government at 
w [See that time (1) has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with 
B. 4. the tacit permission, of official Serbia, the Pan-Serbian 
p. 81.] propaganda has, since that time, continuously increased in 
extension and intensity. To its account must be set the 
recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has 
become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either 
with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of 
this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which 
the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly 
menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of pro- 
cedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
<*> [cf. No. can only be regarded as justified. (2) In spite of that, the 
30-3 attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in 
Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehen- 
sion that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply 
with those demands, and might even allow themselves to 
be carried away into a provocative attitude towards 
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if 
they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as 
a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the 
fulfilment of their demands from the Serbian Government 
by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military 
measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them." 

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention 
to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing 
the point that this was the important matter. I noted down 
the text literally ; it is as follows : " The German Government 

304 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 28] 

" consider that in the present case there is only question of a 
" matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary 
" and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to 
" endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned. 

" The German Government desire urgently the localisation 
" of the dispute/ 11 because every interference of another Power w [ c /. 3. 
" would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed 9 and 
" by incalculable consequences." 181 note.l 

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact "' [cf. B. 
that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punish- 4 8 -l 
ment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, 
on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures 
which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity 
and sovereignty of Serbia ; the Serbian Government, even if 
it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away 
by a revolution. 

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only 
took into account two hypotheses : that of a pure and simple 
refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. 
The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an 
arrangement) should also be taken into consideration ; that of 
Serbia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full 
satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full 
guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda 
so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and 
dignity. 

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired 
by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could 
be examined ; if Serbia gave obvious proof of goodwill it 
could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part 
in the conversation. 

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third 
Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to 
take interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord 
with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute. 

Heir von Schoen recognised the justice of these considera- 
tions and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When 
I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the 
character of a simple mise en demeure, which permitted a dis- 
cussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had w r c / Q^ 
no views. ( " ' g.j 

u 305 



[Y. 29] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

No. 29. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 24, 1914. 

THE delivery of the Austrian note to Serbia has made a 
deep impression. 

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government 
could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, 
as well as in the Press, the same view is expressed. 

Most of the Charges d' Affaires present in Berlin came to 

see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful 

issue. The Russian Charge d' Affaires bitterly remarked that 

Austria has presented her note at the very moment that the 

President of the Republic and the President of the Council 

w [cf. No. had left St. Petersburg. 111 He is inclined to think that a 

25-] considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and 

would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will 

no doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which 

the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support 

to the monarchic principle (par un sentiment de solidarity 

(2) [c/. No. monarchique) (z} and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to 

30-] show a conciliatory attitude. 

(3) [See No. Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon. (SI 

30.] 

No. 30. 

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin, 
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Berlin, July 24, 1914. 

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview 
which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the 
newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers 
on her dispute with Serbia ; if he had received it ; and what 
view he took of it. 

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding 

(4) [cf. No. that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, Ul the 

28 -l Serbian Government having for a long time past wearied the 
patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to 
306 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 80] 

be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be 
localised. 01 ( " ['/ B. 9 

I then said to him that not having as yet received any and notc -l 
instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him 
were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin 
Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's require- 
ments before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he 
told me that that was so, (8) I showed him my surprise at seeing w [$" No. 

him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope I5 4 * nd 

note.] 
he was ignorant. 

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, " It is only 
" because we are having a personal conversation that I allow 
" you to say that to me." 

" Certainly," I replied, " but if Peter I. humiliates himself, 
domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia ; that will 
open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where 
you will be led by Vienna ? " I added that the language 
of the German newspapers was not the language of persons 
who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, 
but betokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that 
the shortness of the time limit given to Serbia for submission 
would make an unpleasant impression in Europe. 

Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little 
excitement (un peu demotion) on the part of Serbia's friends, 
but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice. 

" I have no doubt," I then said to him, " that Russia would 
endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make 
acceptable concessions ; but why not ask from one what is 
being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on 
advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to 
rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter ? ' 

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that 
depended on circumstances ; but immediately checked himself ; 
he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked 
me if I really thought the situation serious. " Certainly," 
I answered, " because if what is happening is the result of 
due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat 
have been cut off." 

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support 
Austria's attitude' 11 with unusual energy. The weakness ^\ ^ 
which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years e xh. 2.3 

307 



[Y. 31] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

past, has weakened the confidence that was placed in her 
here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous 
legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, 
brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. 
All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong ; 
the conviction is that they were violent. 

An article which appeared in the Lokal Anzeiger this 
evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists 
a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined 
to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies 

{l} [cf. No. must stand together (sentiment de la solidarite monarchique). ( " 
2 9-] I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this 
point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor 
William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected 
by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few 
days previously. 

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Hen* 

(1> [cf. No. von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend (2) 
35-J to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note 
sent by Austria to Serbia. 

No. 31. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914. 

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated 
(i) [Text, to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Serbia. (s) 

B. 4.] The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers 

(4) [c/ Nos cou ld not be more pacific/ 4 ' a fact of which the President 

54' 64! of the Republic and the President of the Council have been 

103, 104, able to satisfy themselves directly ; but the ultimatum 

117, and which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered 

* P P* v * to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting 

element into the situation. 

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer 
w [cf. Nos. violence to Serbia." 1 The shortness of the time limit fixed 
50. 52, by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating 
9 6 - influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise 
at Vienna. 
308 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 81] 

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany 
will desire to support her ally 111 and I am afraid that this "'[*/. No. 
impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the l6 -l 
solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German 

Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude.'" (ll [ c /- No - 

47 : B. 6, 

No. 32. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 24, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY having discussed with me"' his '"[B. 10.] 
desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we 
agreed in thinking that the English Cabinet might ask the 
German Government to take the initiative in approaching 
Vienna w with the object of offering the mediation, between (4| [c/. No. 
Austria and Serbia, of the four Powers which are not directly 33-3 
interested."' If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and {>] [cf. No. 
this is the essential point. 

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with JJote] 
Prince Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I 
mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid 
of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria 
would not have despatched her ultimatum without previous 
agreement with Berlin. 

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, 
when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated 
that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between 
St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness 
caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente 
between Russia and England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, 
and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count 
Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia 
would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany. 

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us 
have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since 
his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany 
had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of 
the ultimatum. 

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we 
see no way of arresting the course of events. 

309 



[Y. 33] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt 
the demarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward 
Grey. 

No. 33. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 24, 1914. 

THE Serbian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch 

a telegram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government 

(1> [Text, had sent him their ultimatum/ 1 ' the time limit of which 

B. 4-3 expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch 

does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but 

if it is of the nature reported in to-day's Times, it seems 

impossible for the Serbian Government to accept it. 

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it 
extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, 
we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert 
the conflict. 

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this after- 
noon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semi- 
< a > [No. official intervention of the German Government at Vienna'* 
32.] to prevent a sudden attack. 



No. 34. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), Belgrade, 
St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 24, 1914. 

THE Austrian Ambassador having communicated his 

<S) [B. 5.] Government's note to Sir Edward Grey, (3) the latter observed 

that no such formidable declaration had ever been addressed 

by one Government to another ; he drew Count Mensdorff 's 

attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria. 

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and 
Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the 
co-operation of the German Government with a view to the 
mediation of the four Powers who are not directly interested 

310 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 86] 

in the Serbian question, namely, England, France, Italy and 
Germany ; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at 
Vienna and at St. Petersburg.' 11 { "[cf. No. 

I advised the Serbian Minister to act cautiously, and I am 32 i 
willing to co-operate in any conciliatory action in Vienna, * te a "^ 
in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance (end.).] 
of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows 
herself ready to give every satisfaction which is considered 
compatible with her independence and her sovereignty.'" '"fcA B - 

12.] 

No. 35. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

THE Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the 
course of events. 

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired 
to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination 
of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England 
appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while 
in France the military law is under discussion. Moreover, 
he does not believe in the pretended ignorance 1 " of the '" Iff- No. 
Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's demarche. 3; w 

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to an ^j 
the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been note.] 
cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to 
surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation. 

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just inter- 
rupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy 
would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept 

out of the whole affair by her two allies. Ml W [S& No. 

26 and 

No. 36. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to 
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna. 

Paris, July 25, 1914. 

THE German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock [midi] , . . 
to protest against an article in the Echo de Paris which ' 

3" 



[Y. 36] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 25 

applied the term " German threat " (menace allemande) to 

<1( [No. 28.] his demarche of yesterday. (1) Herr von Schoen told a certain 
number of journalists, and came to state at the Direction 
Politique, that there has been no " concert " between Austria 
and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and 
that the German Government had no knowledge of this 

w [See No. note (a) when it was communicated to them at the same time 
15 and as t the other Powers, though they had approved it subse- 
note 'J quently. 

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no 
v [cf. p. "threat" ; lsi the German Government had merely indicated 
l8> 3 that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and 
that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggra- 
vating it. 

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von 
Schoen's demarche. Having asked him to repeat the actual 

' 4> T? ^ ' t erms f the last two paragraphs of his note, (4) he remarked 
to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany 
to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. 
M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been 
given to any journalist, the information in the Echo de Paris 
involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the 
German demarche appeared to have been known elsewhere 
than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from an}' action on his 
part; The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion. 
On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London 

(6) [B. 14.3 also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey,"" telling him that 
the Austrian note did not constitute an " ultimatum " but 
" a demand for a reply with a time limit " ; which meant 
that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by six o'clock 
this evening, the Austrian Minister will leave Belgrade and 
the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military " pre- 
parations " but not military " operations." 

<>[B. 12.3 The Cabinet of London,' 81 like those of Paris' 7 ' and St. 

<T) No.34; Petersburg, (8) has advised Belgrade to express regret for 

w r ' ^ any complicity which might be established in the crime of 
J7 j Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in 
this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was 
Serbia's business to reply in terms which the interests of the 
country appeared to call for. The English Minister at 
Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, 

3" 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 87 J 

and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the 
matter, advise the Serbian Government to give satisfaction 
on all the points on which they shall decide that they are 
able to do so. (1) <[B. 12.] 

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (g| (who, up <I[B. n.] 
to the present, has made no communication to him similar 
to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris)" 1 that if the Austrian <J '[No. 28; 
note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the bu * 5ee 
English Government would not have to concern themselves B - 9-1 
with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the 
note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about 
a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance 
that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the 
mediation of France, Germany, Italy and England, Germany 
alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in 
this direction. 

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit 
this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, 
who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would 
not lend herself to any demarche at Vienna. Ml <4 '[ c /- Nos - 

37. 57. 

72, 78. 

No. 37. 94;B.2; 

M. deFleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 25, 1914. 

THE German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office'* 1 '' [cf. B. 
to state that his Government would refuse to interfere in 
the dispute between Austria and Serbia."' w [Sce No. 

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation 36 and 
of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take 
action at St. Petersburg. If, however, both Austria and 
Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for 
the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German 
Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it 
refuse to join with England, France and Italy ? 

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question 
would no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and 
Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Peters- 
burg. 

313 



[Y. 38] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2 

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war 
eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to 
take up a detached attitude (pourrait s'en desinteresser) . 

No. 38. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914. 

THE Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain 

from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the 

> [cf. Nos. ti me limit fixed by the ultimatum, (1) in order that the Powers 

IV^B' i? mav ke able to form an opinion on the judicial dossier, w the 

2 6/] ' communication of which is offered to them. 

w [R. 19.] M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point 

out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he 

refrained from making any allusion to the measures which 

Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national 

independence or the territorial integrity of Serbia were 

threatened. The evasive replies and the recriminations 

of Count de Pourtales left an unfavourable impression on 

M. Sazonof. 

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow * with the 

(3) [cf. No. Emperor presiding. (s) M. Sazonof preserves complete modera- 

5-l tion. "We must avoid," he said to me, " everything which 

might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the 

Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Serbia, 

we ought not to break off negotiations." 

No. 39. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 

xT Rep l y n to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. (t) 

No. 48.] 

Paris, July 25, 1914. 

THE Russian Government has instructed its representative 

(5) [B. 13, a t Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension 

26.]' of the time limit fixed for Serbia, (5) so as to enable the Powers 

" [R. 19.] to form an opinion on the dossier w which Austria has offered 

* [From M. Bienvenu-Martin' s statement in No. 50 it would seem that 
this Council, or a similar one, was held on Saturday, July 25.] 

3H 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 41] 

to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regret- 
table consequences for every one. 

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive 
of all meaning the demarche which she made to the Powers 
by communicating her note to them, and would place her 
in a position of conflict with international ethics. 

The Russian Government has asked that you should 
make a corresponding and urgent demarche to Count Berch- 
told.' 1 ' I beg you to support the request of your colleague." 1 '" [cf. No. 
The Russian Government have sent the same request to 4-l 
London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.'" (a 'l>/.O.i5.J 

<> [London, 

not Bu- 

No. 40. charest; 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bien- s " ^0. 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 44.] 

London, July 25, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY has had communicated to him 
this morning the instructions which require the Russian 
Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time 
limit 141 given to Serbia by Austria's note of the day before w [B. 13, 
yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian demarche 26.] 
should be supported by the English Embassy." 1 <> [ c /. No. 

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to 39.] 
take the same action as his Russian colleague, w and to refer < [B. 26.] 
to Austria's communication which was made to him late last 
night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which 
the failure of Serbia to comply with the conditions of the 
ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, in a diplomatic 
rupture and not in immediate military operations. 171 m [B. I4 , 

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time 25, 26.] 
would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means 
for averting the crisis. 

No. 41. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

THIS morning the English Charge* d'Affaires, acting 
under instructions from his Government, asked Heir von 

315 



[Y. 42] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 25, 

Jagow if Germany were willing to join with England, France 

and Italy with the object of intervening between Austria 

and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, 

w [See No. to ask Vienna to errant an extension of the time limit 111 

O 1 

* nd imposed on Serbia by the ultimatum. 

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that 

directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch 

informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he 

had already telegraphed this very morning to the German* 

Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count 

(!) [cf. B. Bercht old for this extension. (2) Unfortunately Count Berch- 

18; O. told is at Ischl. In any case, Herr von Jagow does not 

think that this request would be granted. 

The English Charge d' Affaires also enquired of Herr von 

Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no 

knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, 

(3) [See No. and he received so clear a reply in the negative (3) that he 

15 and was nO a^jg to carrv the matter further ; but he could 

e ^ not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque 

given by Germany to Austria. 

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter 
was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had 
become essentially an international one. 

No. 42. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

THE Russian Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to 

ask the German Government to make strong representations 

to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an exten- 

<4) [See No. sion of the time limit of the ultimatum. (4) 

38 and Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with 

note.] him until late in the afternoon, that is to say, till the very 

moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski 

sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in 

* In French text by an obvious error " de la Grande-Bretagne " is printed. 
316 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 48] 

which he points out that the lateness of Austria's commu- 
nication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication 
illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to 
consider the facts brought to their notice before the expira- 
tion of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the 
necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention 
be to create a serious crisis. 



No. 43. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

THE Russian Charge* d'Affaires has, in accordance with 
his instructions, (I) approached the Secretary of State with ( " [0. 5.] 
a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the 
ultimatum. (a) Heir von Jagow replied that he had already (a) [0. 14-] 
transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, '" but '" [cf. No. 
that in his opinion all these demarches were too late. 4 1 ; O. 

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not I4> -' 
be extended, action at least might be delayed so as to allow 
the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He 
added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated 
to wound Serbia and to force her into war. 

Heir von Jagow replied that there was no question of 
a war, but of an " execution " in a local matter. 

The Charge" d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the 
German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in 
the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend 
to the rest of Europe ; to this Herr von Jagow replied 
that he refused to believe in such consequences. 

The Russian Charge* d'Affaires, like myself, has heard 
the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not 
desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of 
Serbia until she had received complete satisfaction. " One 
knows," he said to me, " what this word ' satisfaction ' 
means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate 
intentions are very pessimistic. 

317 



Y. 44] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK QULY 25, 

No. 44. 

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 25, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta 

the demarche which M. Sazonof requested the representatives 

of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest* to under- 

01 [O. 5. take, (1> the object of which was to induce these various 

cf. No. Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, 

39'* with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit 

imposed on Serbia. 

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra 
and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves 
into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, 
that is to say, too late to take any step in Vienna. 

No. 45. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

THE Russian Charge d' Affaires received instructions from 
w [B. 13.3 his Government' 2 ' to ask for an extended time limit for 
the ultimatum to Serbia at the very moment that Count 
Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, accord- 
ing to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor 
until the end of the crisis. 

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the 
demarche which he had to carry out, by means of two tele- 
grams en clair, one addressed to him on his journey and 
the other at his destination. He does not expect any 
w [O. ii.] result. (3) 

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, to whom the Prince communicated the 

(4) [0. ii, tenor of his instructions and of his telegrams, (4) behaved 
12.3 

* [London, not Bucharest { see O. 5.] 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 46] 

with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to 
submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs 
without leaving time for the dossier to be studied, was not 
consoi ant with international courtesy. Baron Macchio re- 
plied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from 
being courteous. 

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humilia- 
tion on Serbia ; m it will accept no intervention from any "' [cf. No. 
Power until the blow has been delivered and received full J 9 J s - 2 7 
in the face by Serbia. ^' 6 J| . 

No. 46. 

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister /or Foreign Affairs. 

Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

M. PASHITCH has just acquainted me with the reply'* 1 '"[Text.B. 
which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister. 39 * c/. 

The Serbian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in 
the Journal Officiel the declaration which has been required 
of them ; they will communicate it also to the army by 
means of an Order of the Day ; they will dissolve the 
societies of national defence and all other associations which 
might agitate against Austria-Hungary ; they undertake to 
modify the Press law, to dismiss from service in the army, 
in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Govern- 
ment offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken 
part in the propaganda ; they only request that the names 
of these officials may be communicated to them. 

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the en- 
quiry, the Government ask that an explanation of the manner 
in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They 
could accept no participation which conflicted with inter- 
national law or with good and neighbourly relations. 

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and 
declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not 
content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to The 
Hague Tribunal or to the decision of the Great Powers who 
took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, (J , TO 

1909-"' ^si. 4 ' 



[Y. 47] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 25 

No. 47. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

THROUGHOUT the afternoon there has been a per- 
sistent rumour that Serbia had submitted to the Austrian 
(1) [cf. No. demands. (1) This evening the newspapers published extra 
48.] editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the 
* } [B. 23.J departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister. (a) 

The correspondent of the Agence Havas at the Wilhelm- 
strasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large 
crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting 
here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of 
numbers of young people has just passed through the 
Pariser-platz shouting cries of " Hurrah " for Germany and 
singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the 
Siegessaiil, the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy. It 
is a significant outburst of chauvinism. 

A German whom I saw this evening confessed to me 
that it had been feared here that Serbia would accept the 

(3) [cf. No. whole of the Austrian note, (3) reserving to herself the right 
2 7 B. to discuss the manner in- which effect should be given to 

it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers 
to develop effectively before the rupture. 

In financial circles measures are already being taken to 
meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis 
is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany 
is giving to Austria. 

I, for my part, see in England the only Power which 
might be listened to at Berlin. 

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg and London will 
not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they 

(4) [cf. No. show a firm and absolutely united front. (4) 
3i;B.6, 

99-3 

320 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 49] 

No. 48. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

YOUR telegram (1) reaches me exactly at the moment (1) [No. *>] 
when the time limit given to Serbia expires. On the other 
hand I have just informed you" 1 under what conditions (a) [No. 45.] 
the Russian Charge" d'Affaires has had to carry out his 
demarche. It seems useless to support him when there is 
no longer any time for it. 

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Serbia had 
yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appeal- 
ing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that 
at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister 
has just left Belgrade hurriedly ; u he must have thought ( " [B. 23 ; 
the Serbian Government's acceptance of the conditions G - 5 1 R- 
imposed by his Government inadequate. 2 *'* 



No. 49. 

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. 
(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister, July 27.) 

[For text and translation of the Serbian Reply, see B. 39, 
pp. 1 12-120. For Austrian Note, see B. 4, pp. 74-88. 

Trifling differences of phraseology occur in the text of the 
Austrian Note and the Serbian Reply, as given in B. and in 
Y. Some of these have been noted in the margin of B. 4 and 
B. 39-] 



50. [JULY 2 



CHAPTER IV. 

FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC^ RELATIONS (JULY 25, 
1914) TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON 
SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914). 

No. 50. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the President of the Council (on board the " La France ") 
and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Peters- 
burg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome}. 

Paris, July 26, 1914. 

u) [July THE events of Saturday (1) can be summed up as 

25.3 follows : Refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the 

w [No. 45 time limit w asked for by Russia, departure of the Austrian 

(8) 2; I2 ^o. Minister from Belgrade <3) after receiving a reply from Serbia 
Bav ' w hi cn was considered insufficient although it reached the 
(X 21 ; limit of any possible concession, order for mobilisation given 
R. 24.] in Serbia whose Government retired to Kragujevatz,' 41 

(4) [To where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers. 

1 1 XT " 1-., )y 

isisn, jhg Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had 
o' 21 j been communicated on Friday, (5) without any request for 
<) [j u iy ' support or even advice, could not, in the absence of the 
24 ; see Marquis di San Giuliano, (6) who does not return till Tuesday, 
No. 26 make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Govern- 
ment proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. 
] It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian 
Ambassador to M. Paleologue that at Vienna people still 
(7) r / N so the themselves with the illusion that Russia " will not 
96) j hold firm."' 7 ' It must not be forgotten that Italy is only 
(8) [c/. B. bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has 

152.3 been consulted beforehand. (8) 

|^[No. 53.3 From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof has advised 
8 and' Serl ? ia to ask for English mediation 191 At the Council of 
note!] Ministers on the 25th, (10) which was held in presence of the 
322 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 60] 

Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps'" in- (1( [cf. B. 
tended eventually to operate against Austria was considered ; 7 I 1 )-] 
this mobilisation, however, would only be made effective if 
Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, 
and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, 
liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even 
if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes 
clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for 
Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed." 1 w \ft- Nos : 

In London the German demarche was made on the 25th '" 
in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at ,,, r , ' *?. 
Paris. (4) Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky seeB. g.] 
that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could > [Xo. 2 S.] 
take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself 
more definitely and used very reserved language to the 
Serbian Minister. The communication made on the evening 
of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador' 51 makes Sir Edward <si rg I4 -i 
Grey more optimistic ; since the diplomatic rupture does not 
necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secre- 
tary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will 
have time to intervene. 

At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State 
to the Russian Charge* d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and 
dilatory ; '" when the latter asked him to associate himself (8) P*- 43 I 
with a demarche at Vienna for an extension of the time jJos^'ss 
limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this lr /j 
sense but that it was too late; to the request for an exten- 
sion of the time limit before active measures were taken, 
he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and 
not with a war but with local operations. Heir von Jagow 
pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead 
to general consequences. (7)nsJ 

A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin.' 7 
The German Emperor* returns direct to Kiel.' 8 ' M. Jules 
Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by 
Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably 
would not wait for a pretext before attacking us. 

* [According to Berlin telegrams in The Times of July 27 and 28, the 
Emperor William left Balestrand, Norway, at 6.30 p.m. on Saturday, July 25, 
and arrived at Potsdam, from Kiel, in the afternoon of Monday, July 27.] 

323 



[Y. 51] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2( 

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time to 
join in the demarche of his Russian colleague for obtaining 

(1) [No. 48.] an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia ; (1) he does 
not regret it, this demarche having been categorically rejected, 
and England not having had time to give instructions to 
her representative about it. 

A note from the English Embassy has been delivered to 
me : it gives an account of the conversation between the 
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and M. Sazonof and 

< 8 '[S^B.6.]M. Pateologue. 1 * Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four 
Powers who are not directly interested ought to press both 
on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the 
frontier, and that they should give time to England, France, 

t3> P- 2 4 ; Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. (s> 
and 10 ^ Germany accepts, the English Government has reason to 
note.] think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the 
joint action of England and France ; the adherence of Ger- 
many is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would 
tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or 
allies. 

No. 51. 

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 26, 1914. 

A TELEGRAM from Vienna which has just been received 
at the Consulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture 
|4) [B. 23; between Austria and Serbia has taken place, (4) and that 
O- 2I ' Austria is proceeding to military measures. 

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not 
return to Rome till the day after to-morrow. (8) 
7 2 -l To-day I had an interesting conversation with the Presi- 
dent of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which 
he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I 
have carried away the impression that the Italian Govern- 
ment would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and 
te B. to maintain an attitude of observation. (6> 
152.] M. Salandra said to me on this subject : ' We shall 
make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken ; 
our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England. 
324 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 

Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together 
with the English." M. Salandra stated definitely to me 
that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at 

the last moment. (1) (1) [See No. 

26 and 
No. 52. note.] 

M. Barrhe, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 26, 1914. 

M. SAZONOF yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg that Russia would employ all diplomatic means 
to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that 
mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising 
attitude ; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Serbia 
to be crushed."' [cf. No. 

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion 3* 
is hostile to Austria in this serious business. 

No. 53. 

M Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
M. de Fleuriau, Charge d' Affaires at London. 

Paris, July 26, 1914. 
M. PALfiOLOGUE sends me the following telegram : 

" M. Sazonof advises the Serbian Government to ask for 
the mediation of the British Government." 

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the 
French Government can only say that they hope to see 
the English Government accept, if an offer of this kind is 
made to them. 

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the 
Foreign Office. 

No. 54. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praise- 
worthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful 



[Y. 55] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 26 

l '[c/. No. solution. (1> "Up to the last moment," he declared to me, 

3 1 -! " I shall show myself ready to negotiate. " (a) 
Z) t c /- It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szapary 

app V to come to a " frank and lo y al explanation." M. Sazonof 
(vi )'.] ' commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ulti- 
*> [cf. B. matum, article by article, (4) making clear the insulting character 
44-] of the principal clauses. " The intention which inspired this 
" [cf. Oi document," he said, " is legitimate if you pursued no aim 
25 '-' other than the protection of your territory against the in- 
trigues of Serbian anarchists ; but the procedure to which 
you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded : 
" Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will 
guarantee you the result." 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved 
by this language ; however, while awaiting instructions, he 
reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being dis- 
couraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose this evening to 
Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between 
> [See B. Vienna and St. Petersburg (8> on the changes to be introduced 
45 and i n to fa e ultimatum. 

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia 
between Austria and Serbia has the advantage of being 
expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any 
other procedure and likely to succeed. 

No. 55. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

M. SCHEBEKO has returned hastily from a journey to 
< 6) [See No. Russia ; (6) he had only undertaken it after he had received 
iSand an assurance from Count Berchtold that the demands on 
note.] Serbia would be thoroughly acceptable. 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the 
delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual 
in the diplomacy of the Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio 
<7) [No. 20.] has also employed towards me, (7) seems to have greatly added 
to the irritation of the Russian Government. 
326 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 66] 

M. Sch6b6ko will make an effort, however, to profit by 
the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order 
to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least 
have the advantage of allowing us to measure the value of 
the pacific declarations of Germany. 

While we were talking over the situation this evening, 
in company with Sir M. de Bunsen, the latter received instruc- 
tions from the Foreign Office with reference to the demarche 
to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers 
less directly interested. (1) I am expecting, therefore, that (1) [B. 36.] 
we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna 
and with M. Tschirschky, who, in order to refuse his con- 
currence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the 
principle of localising the conflict. 

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour 
with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves 
obliged to commence military action. 



No. 56. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the President of the Council (on board the " La France ") 
and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Peters- 
burg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 26, 1914. 

THE summary of the Serbian reply to the Austrian note 
only reached us after twenty hours' delay. 12 Although the < 8) [No. 46.] 
Serbian Government had given way on all points, with the 
exception of two small reservations, the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister has broken off relations,' 31 thus proving the deter- (3> [B. 23; 
mined wish of his Government to proceed to execution on O. 21 ; 
Serbia. R - 2 4-l 

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the 
English Ambassador thinks that there is a slight yielding ; (4) >[ c /. B. 
when he observed to Heir von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey 14.] 
did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Serbia, 
but, as this question ceased to be localised, to intervene with 
England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburg, the 

3=7 



[Y. 56] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 26, 

Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to 
(1) [cf. No. maintain peace. (1) 

J 9-] In the course of an interview between M. Barrere and the 

General Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 

the latter indicated that probably the Italian Government 

would not have approved the Austrian note ; but as it was 

w[See No. not communicated to them beforehand, (a) the Government 

26 and consider themselves by this fact relieved of all responsibility 

<> r^R m ^ e S rave s * e P taken by Austria. (3) 

152] The German Ambassador came this afternoon 14) to make 

(4) [c/ Nos a communication to me relating to an intervention by France 

57, 62 with Russia in a pacific sense. " Austria," he said to me, 

0.28.3 "has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any 

territorial aggrandisement nor any attack on the integrity 

of the Kingdom of Serbia ; her only intention is to ensure 

her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The pre- 

<8 > [cf. Nos. vention of war depends on the decision of Russia ; (!) Germany 

i 8 Q ' 8- * ee ^ s h erse tf identified with France in the ardent desire that 

W exhs! P eace ma Y be maintained, and has the firm hope that France 

2, loa.J 'will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburg." 

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, 
that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt 
as to her moderation, and that we were in agreement with 
her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore 
appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at 
(8) [cf. Nos. Vienna, (6) where her action would certainly be effective, with 

61. 7 a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupa- 
74 80 ; tion of Serbiai 

(end) ] The Ambassador having observed to me that this could 
not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany 
!< that the question concerned only Austria and Serbia," I 
told him that the mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg 
could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in 
the question. 

Kcrr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack 
of instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these 
conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any 
(7) [c/. B. action at St. Petersburg alone. (7) 

53-1 The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the 

Ambassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom 
he declared to be on this point identified with France. 
328 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 57] 

No. 57. 
NOTE FOR THE MINISTER. 

Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914. 

AFTER the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock 
in the afternoon, 01 Baron von Schoen went this evening at <'[No. 56.] 
7 o'clock to the Direction Politique, to ask that in order to 
avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended 
to influence public opinion, such as that in the Echo de Paris (a> w[Sec No. 
of the evening before, and in order to define exactly the sense 36.] 

of the demarches of the German Government, a brief state- 
ment should be communicated to the Press on the interview 
between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Herr yon Schoen, in order to define what he had in his 
mind, suggested the following terms, (3) which the Acting (3) [c/. No. 
Political Director took down at his dictation : ' During the 62 ; W. 
" afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for exh - I0a -] 
" Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of 
" which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical 
" spirit of peaceful co-operation (sentiment de solidarite 
" pacifique), they examined the means which might be em- 
" ployed to maintain general peace." 

The Acting Political Director replied at once, " Then, 
in your opinion, everything is settled, and you bring us the 
assurance that Austria accepts the Serbian note or will enter 
into conversations with the Powers on this matter ? ' The 
Ambassador having appeared surprised and having vigorously 
denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there 
was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the 
terms of the suggested " note to the Press " were exaggerated, 
and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by 
creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which 
were only too evident. 

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador 
as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the 
Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak 
to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to 
man, quite freely and without regard to their respective 
functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so. 

329 



[Y. 57] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2 

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's 

attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war ; a purely 

objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the 

Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. 

In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was 

(1) [See No. ignorant of the contents of the -Austrian note,' 11 it was no 

15 and i on g er permissible to raise any doubt on that point ; but 

was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself 

on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes 

closed ? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna 

and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken 

up a position without any possible retreat, before having 

weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncom- 

(1) [c/. No. promising attitude ? (2) How surprising appeared the refusal'" 

8 7-3 by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now 

[cf. Nos. ^at s h e k new th e extraordinary text of the Austrian note ! 

3 37-J what responsibility was the German Government assuming 

and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted 

in interposing between Austria and the Powers, after what 

might be called the absolute submission of Serbia, and when 

the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an 

end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe ! 

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her 
threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was under- 
taking make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of 
Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed 
the Serbian frontier, one would be faced by an act which 
without doubt would oblige the St. Petersburg Cabinet to 
intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which 
Germany declares that she wishes to avoid. 

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed 
that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian 
note,* and had only approved it after its delivery ; she 

* Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that 
the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read 
the Austrian note to Serbia. 

Cf. also the English Blue-book, No. 95, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, English 
Ambassador at Vienna, states : 

" Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that 
the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia 
before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know 
from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it." 
330 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 59] 

thought, however, that Serbia had need of a lesson severe 
enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria 
owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was 
dangerous and intolerable for a Great Power. 11 ' He declared ( "[c/. B. 9, 
besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian reply/" 
and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied m '\ Q 
Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often $ee also 
ill informed, represented it to be. S. 52.] 

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and 
gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from 
good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a 
friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncom- 
promising ; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, 
the "spectre" of a conference:" 1 a peaceful word coming (>) [c/. Nos. 
from St. Petersburg, good words said in a conciliatory tone 7 % 7 f?'?3' 
by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of ^' ^ '' 
being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say So' t s^-,O. 
that Germany on her side would not give some advice at 34^55; w! 
Vienna. exh. 12.] 

In these conditions the Political Director announced that 
he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to 

communicate to the Press a short note (4) in a moderate tone. w [See No. 

62.] 

No. 58. 

M . Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Christiania, July 26, 1914. 

THE whole German fleet in Norway has received orders 
to put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare 
that it is to make straight for Germany.'" <>[c/. Nos. 

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of 59- 6-3 
Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of 
Stavanger. 

No. 59. 

M. d'Annoville, French Charge a" Affaires at Luxemburg, to 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Luxemburg, July 26, 1914. 

ACCORDING to information which I have just received 
from Thionville, the four last classes set at liberty have been 

331 



[Y. 80] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2; 

ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the Kom- 
mandatur at any moment. 

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are 

(1) [c/. Nos. forbidden to go away from their place of residence. (1) 
58, 60 ; 
O. 68.] 

No. 60. 

M. Purges, French Consul-General at Bade, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Basle, July 27, 1914. 

FOUR days ago the German officers on leave in this district 

< 2) [cf. Nos. received orders to break off their leave and return to Germany. (8) 

5 8 . 59 ' Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning 

has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand 

Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of 

the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy 

on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty 

of a fine. 

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking 
facilities are restricted. 

No. 61. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on 
board the "La France" (for the President of the Council), 
and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Peters- 
burg, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

THE three steps taken by the German Ambassador at 

(3) [July 24.] Paris seem characteristic: On Friday (8) he reads a note 14 ' 

(4) [No. 28 ; in which the German Government categorically place them- 

B - 9-1 selves between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian 
ultimatum to Serbia, and adding that " Germany warmly 
desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any 
intervention of another party must through the play of its 
alliances provoke incalculable consequences ; " the second 

(5) [July25.] day, Saturday, (5> the effect having been produced, and the 

Powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of 
(8) [No. 36.] the time limit, and the risks of general war, advised Serbia 
(7) [No. 36.] to yield, (6) Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step, (7) 
332 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 811 

pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and 
protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she 
does not harbour, " since," he says, " there was neither con- 
cert before nor threat afterwards ; " the third day, Sunday, (l) '"[JulyaG.J 
the result having been obtained, since Serbia has yielded, as one 
might almost say, to all the Austrian demands,'" the German (8) [B. 39.] 
Ambassador appears on two occasions'" to insist on Ger- IS) [Nos. 56, 
many's peaceful intentions, and on her warm desire to co- 57-] 

operate in the maintenance of peace, (4) after having registered (4) Iff. B. 
the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis. 43. 7 1 -! 

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, 
on account of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept 
Serbia's submission, <8) of her operations of mobilisation, and (5 '[>' - 75-] 
of her threats to invade Serbia. The attitude taken up from 
the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German 
support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the 
Powers,'" practically do not allow the latter to intervene ( "[ c /- B - 
effectively with Austria without the mediation of Germany. 
However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the 
frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, 
Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate the occupation of 
Serbia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian 
note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, 
from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified 
to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna ; if she 
does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the 
responsibility for the war. 

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, 
have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield ; they 
have thus fulfilled their part ; now it is for Germany, who 
is alone able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice 
to Austria/ 7 ' who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for <7 '[ c /- No. 
a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war. 

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the 
Cabinet of London is put forward ; M. Sazonof having said 
to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal 
of Serbia to the Powers, Russia would agree to stand aside,' 8 ' P- 55-1 
Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to 
the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome:" 1 the French, ( "[B- 36.] 
German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be in- 
structed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving 

333 



IY. 62] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2; 

the present difficulties, it being understood that during this 

conversation Russia, Austria and Serbia would abstain from 

all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken 

of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed 

< J) [cf. No. himself favourable to it ; (1) it will be equally well received 

68; but j n p ar j Sj anc j also at Rome, according to all probability. 

and 43 Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an 

note.] opportunity to show her goodwill by other means than 

words. 

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your 
English colleague, and to support his proposal with the 
German Government in whatever form appears to you oppor- 
tune. 



No. 62. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the President of the Council (on board the " La France ") 
and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, 
Berlin, Vienna. 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

< a) [No. 56.] AFTER his demarche of yesterday (2) tending to an inter- 
vention by France at St. Petersburg in favour of peace, the 

<s) [No. 57.] German Ambassador returned, as I have informed you, (s) to 
the Direction Politique on the pretext that it might be desir- 
able to communicate to the Press a short note indicating the 
peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation ; he even 
suggested the following terms : " During the afternoon the 
German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most 
amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful 
co-operation, they examined the means which might be 
employed to maintain general peace." He was told in 

(4) [No. 57.] answer, (4] that the terms appeared exaggerated and of a 
nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situa- 
tion ; that, however, a brief note in the sense indicated, that 
is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the 
means employed to safeguard peace had been examined, 
might be issued if I approved it. 

334 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 62] 

The note communicated was as follows : " The German 
Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had 
a fresh interview, in the course of which they sought means 
of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This 
phrasing, deliberately terse, avoided an appearance of solid- 
arity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted. 

This morning Heir von Schoen addressed a private letter 
to the Political Director under pretext of resuming his inter- 
view with the Minister, and has added : " Note well the 
phrase in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation. (1) This (1) [c/. No. 
is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth." 57-1 

The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows : 
" The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused 
it to be declared to that of St. Petersburg, that it does not 
seek any territorial acquisition in Serbia, U) and that it has w [cf.B.go] 
no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of O. 35-3 
the kingdom ; its sole intention is that of assuring its own 
tranquillity. At this moment the decision whether a European 
war must break out depends solely on Russia. (a * The German m iw No. 
Government have firm confidence that the French Govern- 56 and 
ment, with which they know that they are at one in the note.] 
warm desire that European peace should be able to be main- 
tained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. 
Petersburg in a pacific spirit." 

I have let you know the reply which has been given (4) (a (4) [No. 56.] 
French demarche at St. Petersburg would be misunderstood, 
and must have as corollary a German demarche at Vienna, or, 
failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in 
both capitals). 

Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpre- 
tations ; the most probable is that it has for its object, like 
his demarche itself, an attempt to compromise France with 
Russia (5) and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for '" t c /- - 
an eventual war on Russia and on France ; finally, by pacific 2 9 35-J 
assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military 
action by Austria in Serbia intended to complete the success 
of Austria. 

I communicate this news to you by way of information and 
for any useful purpose you can put it to. 



335 



[Y. 83] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Jui.Y 

No. 63. 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 1914. 

THE German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that 
(l) [cf. B. England would preserve neutrality (1) if a conflict were to 
17 'R k? break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson has told me, however, that 
s *g* ' 4 ' Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he 
has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the free- 
dom which the British Government intended to preserve of 
intervening in case they should judge it expedient. 

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck 
with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany 
and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter 
should be brought to know for certain that they will find 

l} [cf. B. England and Russia by the side of France. w 

17; andM. 

Poincare, ,. 

vol. II., NO- 64. 

P- 306.] j^f Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. 

M. SAZONOF has used conciliatory language to all my 
colleagues. 

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government 
is applying itself successfully to restraining the Press ; in 
particular great moderation towards Germany has been 
<> [cf. No. recommended. (8) 

31 and M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna 
or from Berlin since yesterday. 

No. 65. 

M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Therapia, July 27, 1914. 

THE Austro-Serbian conflict holds the attention of the 
Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the 
336 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 66] 

misfortunes of Serbia, but people here generally are led to 
believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally 
thought that once again Russia will not intervene "' in (1) [*/ B. 32 
favour of Serbia in circumstances which would extend the and 
armed conflict. 

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that 
Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects 
and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into 
the orbit of the Triple Alliance. 



No. 66. 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY told the German Ambassador this 
morning 181 that if Austria were to invade Serbia after the (8) [B. 46.] 
Serbian reply, she would make it clear that she was not 
merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned 
in her note of July 23, ls) but that she wished to crush a small (s) P- 4-] 
state. " Then," he added, " a European question would 
arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be 
led to take a part." 

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the post- 
ponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. U) The First <0 W- ** 
Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday (8) m ' * 
on his own initiative ; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his 
colleagues decided to make it public.* This result is due to 
the conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia. 

* [The decision to make the fact public cannot have been taken later 
than the night of July 26 ; for the following official communication, dated 
"Admiralty, July 26, midnight," appeared in The Times of Monday, 
July 27 : 

" Orders have been given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated at 
Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave for the present. All vessels 
of the Second Fleet are remaining at their home ports in proximity to their 
balance crews." 

See also note in first Naval volume, under date July 27, 1914.] 
Y 337 



[Y. 87] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2; 

No. 67. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

TO-DAY I have had a conversation 'with the Secretary 
(1> [cf. B. of State (1) on the proposal by England that Germany should 
43-1 join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent 
(a) [B. 36.] hostilities between St. Petersburg and Vienna. w 

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal 
opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied 
" [See B. that he was disposed to join in, (3> but he remarked to me 
note n "| d *kat, ^ Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to 
(4) ? , g mobilise at once, (4) that we should be forced to the same 
43.] course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevit- 
able. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound 
to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the 
Austrian frontier ; he told me " No," and authorised me 
161 [cf. No. formally to communicate this limitation to you. (5) He also 
I0 9-] attached the greatest importance to an intervention with 
Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied 
to her. 

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, 
Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side. 
The intervention proposed by England at St. Petersburg 
and Vienna could, in his opinion, only come into operation if 
events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not 
despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that 
Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led Europe 
to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I 
expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect. 

No. 68. 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 1914. 

YESTERDAY in the course of a conversation between 
M. Sazonof, M. Paleologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian 
338 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 70J 

Minister said that Serbia was disposed to appeal to the 
Powers, (1) and that in that case his Government would be '" [cf. No. 
prepared to stand aside. (il 69 -.1 

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to "' !# B - 
formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a pro- 
posal 1 " with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your '" [B. 36.] 
Excellency. <4) The four Powers would intervene in the <> [See No. 
dispute, and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors 70.] 

at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, 
a means of solving the present difficulties. 

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this 
little conference, Russia, Austria and Serbia would abstain 
from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has 
spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who 
has shown himself favourable to it. (8) <*> [cf. No. 

61. Sec 
B. 43 and 

No. 69. note '-l 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 1914. 

THE Serbian Minister has not received instructions 
from his Government to ask for the mediation of England (il ; ( "[c/. No. 
it is, however, possible that the telegrams from his Govern- 68 -J 
ment have been stopped on the way. 

However, the English proposal for intervention by the 
four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been 
put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first 
place. 

No. 70. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London. 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

THE English Ambassador has communicated to me 
Sir E. Grey's proposal 171 for common action by England, < 7 >[No. 68; 
Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade and St. 6.36.) 
Petersburg, to stop active military operations while the 
German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London 

339 



[Y. 71] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 27 

examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a 
solution for the present complications. 

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk 
this over with the English Ambassador at Berlin, and to 
support his demarche in whatever form he should judge 
I 1 ' [No. 61.] suitable. (1) 

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by 
(8 >[c/.B.5i, Sir E. Grey. (a) I am also ready to give to our representatives 
5 2 at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade, instructions in the 
sense asked for by the English Government. 

At the same time I think that the chances of success of 
Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that 
(8) [cf. Nos. Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna (s) ; a demarche 
56, 61 ; f rom this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension 
(encH 1 f mm tary operations, would appear to me doomed to failure 
(4)r c j B ' 5I if Germany's influence were not first exercised. (4) 
(end.).] I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observa- 
tions, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly 
susceptible when the words " mediation," " intervention/' 
'> [c/. No. "conference" were used, (B) and was more willing to admit 
57 and friendly advice " and " conversations." 

note.] 

No. 71. 

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 27, 1914. 



I HAVE communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adher- 

(8) [No. 70 ; ence I6) to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and 

B. 52.] for a conference at London. The British Ambassador at 

Vienna has received the necessary instructions to inform the 

Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, 

and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same 

demarche. 

(7) [No. 72; The Italian Government have accepted' 71 intervention 

B. 49.] by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations ; 

they are consulting the German Government on the proposal 

for a conference and the procedure to be followed with regard 

340 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 7 

to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Govern- 
ment have not yet replied. 11 ' l) [*/- B. 

No. 72. 

Af. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 27, 1914. 

THE Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome"' (ai [^ N 
this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. 
He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and 
formally assured me that he had not had any previous know- 
ledge of it.'" ( 

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and 
forcible character ; but he had not suspected that it could 
take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had 
given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the 
Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her 
duties as an ally towards Austria.' 41 "In no way," the '*' [ c f- s - 
Minister replied : "we were not consulted ; we were told 
nothing ; it was not for us then to make any such communica- 
tion to Vienna." 

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Serbia would 
have acted more wisely if she had accepted" the note in its 
entirety ; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only 
thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw 
any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk 
of bringing about a general conflagration ; he doubts whether 
Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her 
ally. ( " He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment (5> [cf. 
attaches great importance to her relations with London, 3<> 
and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in 
favour of peaceful action, it is England. 

As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in 
favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has 
adhered 1 " without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal <> \cf. No. 
for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers 7* ' B. 
which are not directly interested in the Austro-Serbian 49-] 
dispute. 

341 



[Y. 73] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2? 

No. 73. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

THE English Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the 

Secretary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's 

01 [cf. B. proposal. (1) In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to mani- 

43-1 fest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent 

to anything which would resemble a conference of the Powers ; 

that would be to set up a kind of court arbitration, the idea 

of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by 

Vienna and St. Petersburg. Herr von Jagow's language 

w [No. 57.] confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency. (a) 

In fact, a demarche by the four Powers at Vienna and St. 

Petersburg could be brought about by diplomatic means 

without assuming the form of a conference and it is susceptible 

of many modifications ; the important thing is to make 

clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburg the common desire of 

(3) [c/. Nos. the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided." 1 A 

74> 7 8 ; peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found 

B ' 6 7-l by gaining time. 

No. 74. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

I HAD a conversation yesterday with the Secretary of 
State and gave support to the demarche which Sir E. Goschen 
< 4) [cf. B. had just made. (4) 

43; 0.39. Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the English 

cf. also Ambassador, that he could not accept the proposal that 

' r 'J the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be 

instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a 

method of resolving the present difficulties, because that 

w [See No. would be to set up a real conference <6) to deal with the affairs 

57 and of Austria and Russia. 

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, 
but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view 
342 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 74J 

went beyond any question of form ; that what was important 

was the co-operation of England and France with Germany 

and Italy in a work of peace 111 ; that this co-operation could ol [cf. No. 

take effect through common demarches at St; Petersburg 73;O-55-J 

and at Vienna ; that he had often expressed to me his regret 

at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another 

in Europe ; that there was here an opportunity of proving 

that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers 

belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to 

prevent a conflict. 

Heir von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany 
had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the 
relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those 
of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who actually 
was putting the two groups of allies in opposition. 

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not 
refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, 
but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute. 
" The one is the consequence of the other," I said, " and it 
is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of 
such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia." 

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was 
obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked 
him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes 
blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Serbia" 1 <a) [B. 39-3 
to Austria which the Serbian Charge* d'Affaires had delivered 
to him this morning. "I have not yet had time/"" he (il f c '- N - 
said. " I regret it. You would see that except on some 
points of detail Serbia has yielded entirely. It appears 
then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which 
your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise 
her to be content or to examine with Serbia the terms of 
her reply." 

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him 
whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, 
saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was 
wholly incorrect. " You must then," I replied, " act con- 
sistently. When you read the Serbian reply, I entreat you 
in the name of humanity to weigh the terms on your con- 
science, and do not personally assume a part of the responsi- 
bility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be 

343 



[Y. 75] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 27 

prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he 

(1) [cf. No. was ready to join England and France in a common effort, ll) 

61 ; B. 18. k u t that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention 

43, 7 1 -] which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to 

an understanding on this point. 

" For the rest," he added, " direct conversations between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg have been entered upon and are 
( " [B. 53 : in progress. w I expect very good results from them and I 
-3 2 -] am hopeful. 

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had 
the impression that the hour of detente had struck, but I now 
saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that 
I was mistaken ; that he hoped that matters were on the 
right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable 
(S) [c/. No. conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna (3) as 
would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter 



of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia 

of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before 

them. 

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, 
(4) [B. 43.] w h o mus t have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen (4) of 

the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, 
(B) [B. 60.] to renew it under another form, (e> so that Germany would 

have no pretext for refusing to associate herself with it, and 

would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her 

in the eyes of England. 



No. 75. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, 
Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

(6) [cf. B. THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me (6) 
48.] to hand me a memorandum which amounted to an indictment 
of Serbia ; he was instructed by his Government to state that 
since Serbia had not given a satisfactory reply to the require- 
ments of the Imperial Government, the latter found themselves 
obliged to take strong measures to induce Serbia to give the 

344 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 75 (2)j 

satisfaction and guarantees that are required of her. To- 
morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that 
effect.' 11 '"[C/.0.37: 

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures B - 48-] 
contemplated by Austria, and Count Szecsen replied that 
they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, 
or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information 
on this point. 

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that 
Serbia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically 
every point/ 81 and that the differences that remained on (8| [B- 39-1 
certain points might vanish with a little goodwill, and with 
the help of the Powers who wished for peace ; by fixing to- 
morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, 
Austria for the second time was making their co-operation 
practically impossible, and was assuming a grave responsibility 
in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which 
it was impossible to foresee. 

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count 
Szecsen handed to me. 

ENCLOSURE. 

Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, handed 
by Count Szecsen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 1914. 

[Duplicate of R. 19, vol. II., p. 199.] 

No. 75 (2). 
Official Communique of the Press Bureau. (l) (J| [cf. 

Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
THE Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to mentson 
Vienna and presented the text of the Serbian reply. (4) erb , ian 

A spirit of insincerity (5) pervades the whole of this reply ; jjlji 
it makes it clear that the Serbian Government have no serious (4 , rg' j\ 
intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which <> r-J B 
has given rise to the anti- Austrian intrigues. The Serbian 32 and 
reply contains such restrictions and limitations, not only note.] 
with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian demarche, 
but also with regard to the claims advanced by Austria, that 
the concessions which are made are without importance. 

J4S 



[Y. 76] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to 
accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in 
the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident 
in Serbian territory. 

In the same way, the Serbian reply to the Austrian demand 
that the hostile intrigues of the Press should be suppressed, 
amounts to a refusal. 

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to 
prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from con- 
tinuing their activity under another name and form after 
their dissolution, has not even been considered. 

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum re- 
garded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent 
peace in the south-east of the Monarchy, the Serbian reply 
is considered to be insufficient. 

That the Serbian Government is aware of this, appears 

from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the 

dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the 

(1) [Satur- day on which their reply was due a) and before it was in 

da y fact submitted, they gave orders for mobilisation." 1 
July 25.] 

< 8 >[c/.B.32j XT 

G 5 ;S 41 No. 76. 

and note.] ^ Rene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

On board the " La France," July 28, 1914. 

(3) [No. 50.] I HAVE received from Copenhagen your telegram (3) 
w [July summarising the events of Saturday (4) ; the telegram describ- 
25-] ing the last visit of the German Ambassador (5) ; that relating 
(6 > [No. 56.] to the mediation which Russia advises Serbia to ask for and 
(fl) [No. 6i.]to the English demarches at Berlin, 1 " as well as your telegram 
(7) [No. 62.] received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower. (T) 

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von 

(8) [No. s6.]Schoen <8) ; the proposition which you maintained is self 

evident ; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, 

we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible 

for the present situation, and has not taken any measure 

whatever which could arouse the least suspicion ; but it is 

plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse 

to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose 

action has provoked the crisis. 

346 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 77] 

We must now continue to use the same language to the 
German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony 
with the two English proposals mentioned in your telegram. (l) (1) [No. 61.) 
I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, 
and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him 
of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin 
and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the 
efforts which the British Government is making with a view 
to seeking a solution of the Austro-Serbian dispute. The 
action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for 
the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and 
St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert it also at Belgrade which 
means, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey 
grasps the logic of the situation ; and, in not excluding 
St. Petersburg, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a 
method oi withdrawing with perfect dignity from the demarche 
by which the German Government have caused it to be known 
at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by 
them as purely Austro-Serbian and without any general 
character." 1 <>[SNo. 

Please communicate the present telegram to our repre- 28.] 

sentatives with the Great Powers and to our Ministers at 
Belgrade. 

No. 77. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council on board 
the " La France." 

Paris, July 28, 1914. 

IN spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris 
by the German representatives, of the desire of their Govern- 
ment to assist in efforts for the maintenance of peace, no 
sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria ; 
the English proposal,'" which consists in action by the four (3) [B. 36.] 
less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military opera- 
tions at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg, and in a 
meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian 
Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a 
view of seeking a solution of the Austro-Serbian difficulty, 

347 



[Y. 78] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

< 1( [See B. meets with objections at Berlin (1) of such a nature as must 
43 and lead to failure. 

note.] The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that 

< a '[No. 75 .'his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures'" to 

2- 3 Z \ compel Serbia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees 

4 ^ which they demand from that Power ; Count Szecsen has 

given no explanation as to those measures ; according to our 

Military Attache" at Vienna, mobilisation dating from July 28 

appears to be certain. 

No. 78. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, July 28, 1914. 

I HAVE had another visit from the German Ambassador 
this morning ; he told me that he had no communication or 
official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the 
evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods 
to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. 
When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared 
that he did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature 
of the means of coercion which she was preparing. 

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that 

she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon 

my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the 

four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained 

assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put 

forward by England, the Ambassador said that the German 

Government really only asked to associate themselves with the 

action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take 

(S} [See No. the form of arbitration or a conference, (J) which had been 

57 and rejected by Austria. 

note.] i replied that, if it was the expression only which was an 

obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be 

(4) [c/. Nos. attained by other means' 4 '; the German Government are in 

73, 74 ; a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to 

B - 6 7-l intervene and find a means of conciliation. 

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no 
06 and instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise 
note.] an Y pressure (5) on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. 
348 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 80] 

He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an 
attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is 
urging Austria on ; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, 
but she had no knowledge (1) of the Austrian note ; she did (I) [See No. 
not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must I5 * 
have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs. 

No. 79. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. 

Paris, July 28, 1914. 

THROUGH the telegrams from our Embassies which I 
have forwarded to you, you are aware of the English pro- 
posal (8) for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference ( " P- 36-] 
in London, as well as of our adherence'" to that suggestion, (S) [No. 70.] 
and of the conditional - acceptance by Italy' 41 and of the (4) [B. 49.] 
reservations of Berlin. m w [B. 43.] 

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your 
English colleague, who has received the necessary instructions 
to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the 
English suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been 
authorised to make the same demarche ; you will adapt 
your attitude to his. 

No. 80. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 28, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY yesterday received my Austro- 
Hungarian'" and German (7) colleagues. The first continued ( "[B. 48.] 
to maintain that the Serbian reply was unacceptable. The (7 '[B. 46.] 
second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen 
at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by 
Great Britain at St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey replied 
that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the begin- 
ning of the crisis, especially in her advice to the Serbian 
Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing 

349 



[Y. 80] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

to give her pacific advice. He added that it was at Vienna 

(l) [cf. No. that it was necessary to act (1> and that Germany's help was 
56 and indispensable. 

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Peters- 

(8) [B. 55-1 burg has telegraphed' 81 that M. Sazonof had made a proposal 
to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Serbian 
business. This information has been confirmed by the 

(J) [B. 45.3 British Ambassador at Vienna," 1 who has sent the informa- 
tion that the first interview between the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Count Szapary had produced a good 

(4) [B. 56 ; effect at the Ballplatz. (4) 

cf. 0. 25.] gj r Ed warc i Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if 
an agreement could be brought about by direct discussion 
between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it would be a matter for 

(5) [B 69.] congratulation/ 51 but they raised some doubts as to the 
success of M. Sazonof 's attempt. 

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the 
eventual meeting in London of a conference of representatives 
of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solu- 
tion for the present situation, the latter replied " that he had 
begun pourparlers with the Austrian Ambassador under 
conditions which he hoped were favourable ; that, however, 
he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the 

{6) [B-53; revision of the Serbian note by the two Cabinets. " (8) If 
O. 32.J Direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impractic- 
able, M. Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the English 
proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a 

(7) [B. 53 1 favourable issue of the dispute. (7) 

Oi 32.] j n anv case, at a moment when the least delay might 
have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that 
these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way 
as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish 
Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly inter- 
vention of the four Powers. 

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a deter- 
mined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. 
Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs 
replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation 

(8) [B. 43.] which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna. (8) 
Sir E. Grey, has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to 

(9) [B. 67.] suspend his demarche for the moment. (9) In addition, the 
350 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 81 j 

news that Austria has just officially declared war against 
Serbia, 01 opens a new phase of the question. (l) [No. 83 ; 

B. 50; 

No. 81. S ' 45 ' 3 

Ml Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

M. SAZONOF'S conversation with Count Szapary'" was '" [cf. No. 
brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian 54 ) O. 25.] 
Charg6 d'Affaires."' The Secretary of State told him that ( " [O. 26, 
in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador 
in Russia, since the Austrian Government did not refuse 
to continue their conversations with the Russian Government 
after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope 
that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse 
with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an 
issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Charge" 
d'Affaires takes a favourable view of this state of mind, which 
corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and 
St. Petersburg enter into direct relations and to release 
Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether 
Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations. 

To-day I gave my support to the demarche made by my 
British colleague with the Secretary of State. (4) The latter (4) [c/. No. 
replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, (5) that it 74-1 

was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of con- (S| [B. 43.] 
ference at London between the Ambassadors of the four 
Powers, (6) and that it would be necessary to give another form w [N O . 57 
to the English suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid and note.] 
stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, 
and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and 
added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. 
Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected 
a favourable result. (7) (7) [cf. No. 

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this 9 2 ' 
morning together, to talk over with me the conversation 7I> ^ 
which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the 
subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the 
Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me, ( " (8) [B. 60.] 
accepting in principle the idea of joining in a demarche with 

351 



[Y. 82] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JuLY 

England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a 
conference. 

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question 
of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to 
his Government that they should change the wording of 
their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic 
demarche at Vienna and St. Petersburg. 

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von 
Jagow to any demarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could 
put him in a dilemma, by asking him to state himself precisely 
how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be 
brought about. 

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour 

of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally ; 

but to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must 

(1) [cf. B. 84, take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes. (1) 

88.J 

No. 82. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914. 

THE Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied 
to the proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the 
opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and 
Vienna. 

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got 
from this double interview is a bad one ; " Certainly," he said 
w [cf. B. 74 to me, " Austria is unwilling to converse. " (8) 

As the result of a conversation which I have just had 
4 '-" with my two colleagues I have the same impression of 
pessimism. 

No. 83. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

COUNT BERCHTOLD has just declared to Sir M. de 
Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 83) 

the discussion between Austria and Serbia on the basis of 
the Serbian reply, would be useless,' 11 and besides that it '[B. 62.] 
would be too late, as war had been officially declared" 1 at '"[Text of 
mid-day. declara- 

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up 
to the present ; in his opinion it is not a question of localising 
the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of 
war will make very difficult the initiation of pourparlers^ the 
four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discus- 
sions between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. 

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it 
might obtain the adherence of Germany " Mediation between 
Austria and Russia," is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges 
a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist 
up to the present. 

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent 
resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany 
should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Serbia 
in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and 
France, 13 ' in circumstances which she supposes ought to be (J| [c/. Nos. 
most favourable to herself and under conditions which have 114.120; 
been thoroughly considered. Bt I41 ^ 



353 



[Y. 84] [JULY 



CHAPTER V. 

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA 
(JULY 28, 1914) TO THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO 
RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914). 

No. 84. 

M. Ban ere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 29, 1914. 

THE Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration 
of war by Austria on Serbia, there is no reason why the diplo- 
matic efforts for calling together a conference in London 
(1) [cf. No. with a view to mediation should be interrupted. (1) 
94-3 

No. 85. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Con- 
stantinople, Belgrade. 

Paris, July 29, 1914. 

w [c/.O.53 ] THE Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. (8) 

Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized 

the opportunity of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish 

the Serbian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees 

which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will 

either affect only the Serbian Government and army, or become 

territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally 

and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local 

(3) [No. 28 ; one, (8) namely, the punishment of a political crime committed 

(4 TB 9 ^ ( m *k e P ast > anc * for the future sure guarantees' 41 that the anti-_ 

and' note] Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German 

Government thinks that Russia should be content with the 

official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect 

354 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 861 

that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that 
she will respect the integrity of Serbia ;"' in these circum- (1 '[B. 32 
stances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she an<1 
seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In note -J 
these circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace 
must therefore take place at St. Petersburg alone. 

This sophism, which would relieve Germany from inter- 
vening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at 
Paris b3^ Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to 
draw us into identical Franco-German action at St. Peters- 
burg ; (SI it has been also expounded in London to Sir E. <S| [Nos. 56, 
Grey.*" In France, as in England, a reply was given that ( 2 

the St. Petersburg Cabinet have, from the beginning, given 
the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associat- 
ing themselves with the Powers in advising Serbia to yield 
to the requirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not 
therefore in any way threaten peace ; it is at Vienna that 
action must be taken ; (4) it is from there that the danger wpjo. 56 
will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content and 
with the almost complete submission of Serbia to exorbitant note.] 
demands ; that they refuse to accept the co-operation of the 
Powers* 81 in the discussion of the points which remain to (5) [B. 61, 
be arranged between Austria and Serbia ; and, finally, that 
they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war" 1 as pre- ( "[No. 83.] 
cipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note. 

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. 171 "['/ Nos. 
In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans 5<>. IJ 4-] 
desire to safeguard general peace by common action between 
the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without 
any other expedient being suggested, (8) and while they refuse (8) [No. 77 
to take any positive action at Vienna.*" In the Austrian frid 43 
capital they would like to keep St. Petersburg in play with note j 
the illusion of an entente which might result from direct <[N O> 3 <j 
conversations, while they are taking action against Serbia. and 

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. note ; 
Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peace- B - 2 -] 
fully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence 
to the English proposal. " This proposal must be strongly u pg. 36.] 
supported at Berlin' 111 in order to decide Herr von Jagow < n >[ c /. No. 
to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria 97.] 

and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic 

35 5 



[Y. 86] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2< 

advantage by military successes. The AustroHungarian 
Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage 
of it in order to impose on Serbia, under the elastic expression 
of " guarantees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances 
that no territorial aggrandisement was being sought, would 
n '[c/. B. in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe/ 1 ' and would 

90 and ,-un t ne risk of gravely compromising the general peace either 

note ^ at once or in the near future. 

No. 86. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914. 

I AM now in a position to assure Your Excellency that 
the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures 
which France and England may propose in order to maintain 
(8) [cf. No. peace. w My English colleague is telegraphing to London 
91 ; 6.78; to the same effect. 
- 6 ^ No. 87. 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, July 29, 1914. 

I REPORT the following impressions of my interview 
with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to 
have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enig- 
matical and justifies every apprehension ; it seems improbable 
that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken 
an initiative which would lead, according to a pre-conceived 
plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement 
w [cf. No. with the Emperor William. (s) 

57-1 The German Government stand " with grounded arms " 
ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances 
may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a 
sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody 
here. My Russian and English colleagues share this feeling. 

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise 
with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon 
<4> . C G - 2 that everything will be put in readiness for the defence of the 
^encL), , neutrality O f the country. (4) 

356 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



[Y. 90] 



No. 88. 

M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Frankfort, July 29, 1914. 

I NOTIFY you of important movements of troops yester- 
day and to-night. (1) This morning several regiments in 
service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from 
Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. 
The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext of 
preparations for the autumn manoeuvres. 



No. 89. 

M . Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Munich, July 29, 1914. 

I AM informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) 
have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients 
and to keep all their output for the army. 

From Strassburg information has been received of the 
transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and 
dirigibles. 

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manoeuvres 
the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian 
infantry regiments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for 
the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immedi- 
ately.'" 

No. 90. 

M . Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

THE French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation w 
of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, 
and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The 
cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising ; regiments and 
cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already 

357 



411 W. 
89. 
105, 
114 
68. 



Nos. 

IO2, 

106, 

; o. 

For 



Austrian 
military 
prepara- 
tions see 
No. 90.] 



w [cf. No. 
88 and 
note.] 

w [cf. Nos. 
91, 100, 
ioi { O. 
44. For 
German 
military 
prepara- 
tions see 
No. 88 
and 
note.] 



[Y. 91] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 29 

been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are 
now being called together in this district. 

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps 
in order to impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a 
general mobilisation of their forces on the 3Oth July, or 
the ist August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will 
return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow. 

No. 91. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, ti> 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914. 

THE direct conversation, to which the Russian Govern- 
ment had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a 
11 [c/. B. 74 friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter. (1) 
note I On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied 

themselves that Austria is hurrying on her military prepara- 
tions against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation 
[cf. No. which h as begun on the Galician frontier. 121 As a result the 
note! or der to mobilise will be despatched to-night to thirteen 
w N arm y cor P s which are destined to operate eventually against 

2 as Austr i a - <31 

100 ; B. I n spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts- 
70(1).] the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London ; u> 
< 4 >[c/. B. further, he does not attach any importance to the title 
7 8 -l officially given to the discussions, and will support all English 
efforts in favour of peace. 



(4) 



No. 92. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day how the question 

of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg r 

< s) [No. 81.] which seemed to him yesterday (51 the best means of arriving 

at a detente, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburg they 

seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked 

ass 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [T. 92] 

Vienna (l) to take this course. He was awaiting the reply.'" <" [cf. B. 
The British Government, after seeing the suggestion of a 67. 7 1 -] 
conference rejected, had let it be known that they would w fc/. No. 
view with favour the inception of such conversations between 
Austria and Russia,"' and had asked Germany to urge (3) [B. 69.] 
Austria, 14 ' which the Imperial Government are not failing <>[ c /. B. 
to do.'" 46.] 

I asked Heir von Jagow if he had at last received the w [B. 67, 
Serbian reply to Austria'" and what he thought of it. He 7 1 -] 
replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. I 
added that it was just on that account that I considered 
the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a docu- 
ment, inexplicable. 

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern 
nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, 17 ' and Q i c / 
that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out note.] 
of promises made to her, a supervision which Serbia refused. 
This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal 
point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Serbia, as she 
wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the 
control of a single Power, but that an International Com- 
mission would not have the same character. The Balkan 
States have more than one, for instance the Financial Com- 
mission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, 
among other combinations, a Provisional International 
Commission, charged with the duty of controlling the police 
inquiry demanded by Austria ; it was clear, by this instance, W rg -, 
that the reply of Serbia" 1 opened the door to conversations {t} ,j ' 
and did not justify a rupture. -8J 

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct n[ f /. xo. 
conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which 97 ; B. 
Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that , lk| ZJNL 
common action could be exercised by the four Powers by 
means of their Ambassadors. "' He answered in the affirma- (1 
tive, (1 " adding that at this moment the London Cabinet re^rds 
were confining themselves to exercising their influence in the same 
support of direct conversations. 111 ' convcr- 

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked sation, 
the British Ambassador to come and see him. (18) He spoke j^J} ugh 
to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a entfy" 
conference ; he told him that he had not been able to accept dated.] 

359 



[Y. 93] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 2c 

a proposal which seemed to impose the authority of the 
Powers on Austria ; he assured my colleague of his sincere 
desire for peace and of the efforts he was making to that 
effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to 
maintain peace or let loose war. 

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if 
war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it 
was inadmissible for her to have broken with Serbia after the 
reply of the latter. 

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that 

he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations 

between Austria and Russia ; he knew that England looked 

on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that 

his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, 

if it were true that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps 

(1) [See No. on the Austrian frontier. U) He asked my colleague to call 

91 and sir Grey's attention to what he had said. 

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect. 
The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result 
a) [c/. No. o f the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. (a) 
6 3 ; B . Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that 
,?.' 9-J England would remain out of the question/" and the impres- 
63*1 sion produced on the German Government and on the financiers 
and business men by her attitude is profound. 



No. 93. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

THE opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues 
agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing 
the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Serbia, since 
all attempts to avoid the collision have failed. 

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at 

w [cf. B. St. Petersburg by MM. Sazonof and Szapary should be con- 

56.] tinued and made more effective by special powers' 41 being 

conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly 

360 



' 

FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 94] 

refused. (1) He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary < [3.93(1), 
does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her (3)-] 
from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Serbia. 

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that 
the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern 
Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. 
He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the 
Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation 
might be able to limit the conflict. 

No. 94. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, Con- 
stantinople, Belgrade. 

Paris, July 29, 1914. 

THE following communication was semi-ofncially made 
to me this morning by the German Ambassador :"' (2| [c/-O.55-] 

' The German Government are still continuing their 
efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to 
a friendly conversation which would give the latter an oppor- 
tunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the opera- 
tions in Serbia. ( " The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declara- $ exh' 
tions which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German I4 ]-j 
efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war 141 >[c/. No. 
which has occurred." A similar communication will be 84.] 
made at St. Petersburg. 

During the course of a conversation which I had this 
morning with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me 
that the German Government did not know what the inten- 
tions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria 
wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will 
make conversations with a view to intervention easier. 

When I observed that the military operations which had 
been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversa- 
tion, and that the German Government ought to use their 
influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered 
that Berlin could not exercise any pressure,'" but that he (4| [S< No. 
hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very 36 and 
actively. 

361 



[Y. 95] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JuLY 

No. 95. 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, 

Rome, Belgrade. 

Paris, July 29, 1914. 

M. ISVOLSKY came to me by order of his Government to 

W [B. 70 communicate a telegram (1) addressed by M. Sazonof to 

(i) ; / Berlin. It appears from this information that, in consequence 

No. 96.] O f tk e declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia, w 

[No. 83.] ^ e me asures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the 

<3) [Nos. largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army,"' and finally 

9> 9 1 ." the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations 

,' 24 ' 47 '-* between Vienna and St. Petersburg, (4) Russia had decided 

(x) te) ] * mOD ih se m the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and 

Kazan. While informing the German Government to this 

effect, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to 

add that these military precautions were not in any way 

directed against Germany, and also did not imply aggressive 

measures against Austria-Hungary ; furthermore the Russian 

Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled. 

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of 
two telegrams addressed to London by M. Sazonof : the 
(5 > [B. 70 first, <5) after pointing out that the declaration of war on 
(2).] Serbia put an end to the conversations of the Russian Minister 
with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise 
her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation 
and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations 
(the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Serbia 
(6) [B. 54; while mediation was dragging on) ; the second (6) communi- 
cf. 0. 41.] cated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversa- 
tions with the German Ambassador that Germany favours 
Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any 
influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the 
attitude of Germany is very disquieting, and considers that 
England is in a better position than the other Powers to- 
take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on 
Vienna. 

362 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 96J 

No. 96. 

M. Bar r ere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, July 29, 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially in- 
formed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, 
in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia 
and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this 
moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to 
mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan. 111 (1) [No. 95.] 
He added that this step had no aggressive character against 
Germany, .and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had 
not been recalled. 

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San 
Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair 
Austria and Germany had been, and were still, convinced 
that Russia would not move." 1 In this connection he read [cf. No. 
to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview 5<> ; B. 32 
which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which 
the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think 
that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact 
that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to 
Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian 
Ambassador at Berlin also told his English colleague that he 
did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the 
mood or in the condition to make war. (l) <S) [B. 71.] 

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. 
He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating 
Serbia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, 
some material advantages which do not involve her territory 7 , 
Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement 
with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Serbia 
or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it 
would be impossible for Russia not to intervene by military 
measures. (4) (4| [S^ No. 

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the 3* and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair 
of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England 

363 



[Y. 97] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK QULY 2 

can still exercise a great deal of influence in Berlin in the 

direction of peace. He had yesterday, he told me, a long 

<J1 [c/. B. conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd, (1) 

80.] in order to show him to what extent English intervention 

might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, " If your 

Government are of the same opinion, they could on their 

side make representations to this effect in London." 



No. 97. 

M . Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at 
London. 

Paris, July 29, 1914. 

I SHOULD be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to 

(8) [c/. No. be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin/ 2 ' in 

8 5-] the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, 

(8) [B. 36.] his proposal of mediation by the four Powers/ 3 ' which had 

in principle obtained the adherence of the German Govern- 

w [cf. Nos. ment/ 4) 

92, 98 ; The Russian Government on their side will have expressed 

a/so B ^ e same desire directly to the British Government /" the 

43 S and declaration of war by Austria on Serbia/ 61 her sending of 

note ; troops to the Austro-Russian frontier, (7) the consequent 

O. 54.] Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier' 81 have in fact 

(5} [B. 78.] put an end to the direct Austro-Russian conversations. (9) 

(8) [No. 83.] The explanations which the German Government are 

7 > [No. 91.] going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement 

<8) [** 7 of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, (10> in 

<' re order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, 

9 ?3) 1 w ^ a ^ ow t* 16 f ur Powers to exercise effective action between 

(10) rNo -I Vienna and St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace. 

I would ask you also to point out to the English Secretary 
of State how important it would be for him to obtain from 
the Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance 
of their support in co-operating in the action of the four 
Powers in favour of peace. 
3<* 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 99] 

No. 98. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, July 29, 1914. 

IN his interview to-day with my German colleague, m (1) [B. 84$ 
Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for c /- - 54-] 
direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having 
been accepted at Vienna, it would be well to return to his 
proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are (8) ^ ^ 
not directly interested." 1 This suggestion has been accepted </. R. 56.] 
in principle by the German Government,'" but they have m\see No. 
objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The 97 and 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince note.] 
Lichnowsky to ask his Government that they should them- 
selves propose a new formula. 141 Whatever it may be, if it (t] [See B. 
admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by 8 4 and 
England, France and Italy. 

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir 
E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an 
account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communi- 
cation"' and to that of Russia concerning the mobilisation of (8> l>/- No. 
four army corps on the Austrian frontier'" would allow us , 8 ' 
to realise the intentions of the German Government. My ?: ? 
German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the inten- 
tions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for 
the present. 

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the 
situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful 
solution. 

No. 99. 

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Belgrade, July 29, 1914. 

THE Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian 
ultimatum was received, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask his 

365 



[Y. 100] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

0) [Text, help.' 11 My Russian colleague tells me that he has just 

0. 6.] communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply. (8) 
<8) [Text, Xhe Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him 

- 4-] at so critical a juncture ; he declares that everything has 
been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, 
and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot 
be attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the 
fate of Serbia. 

No. 100. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914. 

THE German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that 
if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German 
(3) [Nos. army will receive the order to mobilise. w 
101,103; ]yj Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have 
B ' jj : been caused, on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncom- 
cf. 0. 60 ; promising attitude of Austria, and on the other hand by the 
R. 46.] ' fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps are already 
w [cf. Nos. mobilised. (4) 

90 and Xhe tone in which Count Pourtales delivered this com- 
note ' munication has decided the Russian Government this very 

night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps 
{8) [See No. which are to operate against Austria. {s} 

91 and 

note O NO. 101. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg 
and London. 

Paris, July 30, 1914. 

M. ISVOLSKY came to-night to tell me that the German 
Ambassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his 
Government to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease 
"'[SV-Nork^E military preparations. (8> 

100 and ^The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out 

note.] that these preparations were only commenced after Austria 

had mobilised eight army corps and had refused to arrange 

(7) [No. peacefully her differences with Serbia. (7> M. Sazonof declares 

ioo.] that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her 

366 \ 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 102] 

arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the 
help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable 
that England should join Russia and France without loss of 
time. 

France is resolved to fulfil ah* the obligations of her 
alliance.' 1 ' cll [c/.O.55-] 

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solu- 
tion of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The 
conversation entered into between the Powers which are less 
directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be 
preserved ; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking 
any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks 
must go on, she should not immediately take any step 
which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial 
mobilisation of her forces.'" <8> [No. 

Yesterday in the late afternoon the German Ambassador I02 -] 
came and spoke to me of the military measures which the 
Government of the Republic were taking, '" adding that France (S| [C/.R-45-] 
was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations 
could not be secret' 41 and that French opinion should not be <4| [c/. Nos. 
alarmed if Germany decided on them. 3, 15. 105.] 

I answered that the French Government had not taken 
any step which could give their neighbours any cause for dis- 
quietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any 
negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not 
be doubted. 

No. 102. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914. 

M. SAZONOF, to whom I communicated your desire that 
every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext 
for general mobilisation should be avoided,"' answered that " 
in the course of last night the General Staff had suspended 
all measures of military precaution so that there should be 
no misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian 
General Staff sent for the Military Attache" of the German 

367 



[Y. 103] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisa- 
tion ordered this morning was exclusively directed against 
(1) r</. No. Austria. 111 

104 ; - Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon 

5 1 * '77-3 w jth Count Pourtales, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion 

that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the 

decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor 

Nicholas has received the same impression from an exchange 

of telegrams which he has just had personally with the 

w {See Emperor William. (2) 

app. V. Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have 
44^) } 3 ^~ rece i ve d disquieting information concerning the preparations 
(S ' of the German army and navy. 131 

andnote"! ^ n S* vm S me this information M. Sazonof added that the 
Russian Government are continuing none the less their efforts 
towards conciliation. He repeated to me : "I shall continue 

'[c/. No. to negotiate until the last moment. " w 
54, also 
app. V. 
(vi.).] No. 103. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914. 

(B) r, No THE German Ambassador came to-night and again urged 
ioo and on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia 
note.] should cease her military preparations, (8) and affirmed that 

(8) [cf. B. 90 Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of 

and note.] Serbia : (6) 

*- c L '- "It is not only the territorial integrity of Serbia which 
and we must safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, " but also her 
notes.] independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow Serbia 

< 8) [cf. B. 70 to become a vassal of Austria. " (7) 

fl'f V'tj '"* ^' Sazonof added : " The situation is too serious for me 

>(i and not to te ^ vou a ^ ^ at ^ s * n m y mm( i- ^Y intervening at 

note.] St. Petersburg while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, 

(10) [c/. O. Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria 
60 ; B. to crush the little Serbian kingdom before Russia can come to 
97- $ ee its aid.' 81 But the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent 

<9) 



107 i war<9) that * am & in g to make a new p ro P osal<ie) to y u in 

113.'] ' his name : 
368 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 104] 

" If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Serbia has 
assumed the character of a question of European interest, 
declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the 
clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Serbia, 
Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations."* 

Count Pourtals promised to support this proposal with 
his Government. 

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal 
by Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of 
a discussion by the Powers in London. 

The Russian Government again show by their attitude 
that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict. 

No. 104. 

M. Dumai-ne, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene 
Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

IN spite of the communication made yesterday by the 
Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among 
them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial 
mobilisation in his country, (1) the Vienna Press refrained '"P- 7<> 
from publishing the news. This enforced silence has just I K 93 
been explained at an interview of great importance between 
M. Schlbko and Count Berchtold, " who examined at (! "[ c /- B ' 
length the present formidable difficulties with equal readi- 9 6 -l 
ness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions. 

M. Schebeko explained that the only object of the military 
preparations on the Russian side was to reply to those made 
by Austria,' 1 ' and to indicate the intention and the right (J 
of the Tsar to formulate his views on the settlement of the * 00 ' y 
Serbian question. The steps towards mobilisation taken in ^ }i 
Galicia, answered Count Berchtold, have no aggressive in- 
tention 141 and are only directed towards maintaining the <4> C c /- No - 
situation as it stands. On both sides endeavours will be 
made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as 
signs of hostility. 

* [" Si 1'Autriche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assume* 
le caractere d'une question d'inte'ret europe'en, se declare prete e"liminer 
de son ultimatum les clauses qui portent atteinte la souverainete" de la 
Serbie, la Russie s'engage cesser toutes mesures militaires."] 

2 A 369 



[Y. 105] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 

With a view to settling the Austro-Serbian dispute it 

was agreed that pourparlers should be resumed at St. Peters- 

(1) [S^B. burg between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary ; (1> they had 

45 an d on jy b een interrupted <8) owing to a misunderstanding, as Count 

vol* 6 ' II ' Berchtold thought that the Russian Minister for Foreign 

p. 131.] " Affairs claimed that the Austrian representative should be 

(8) [B. 93 given powers' 31 which would allow him to modify the terms 

(3).] of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szapary will only be 

(J) [B. 56.] authorised to discuss what settlement would be compatible 

with the dignity and prestige for which both Empires had 

equal concern. 

It would therefore for the moment be in this direct form, 

and only between the two most interested Powers, that the 

(4) [B. 36.] discussion which Sir Edward Grey proposed (4> to entrust to 

<8) [ c j No the four Powers not directly interested would take place. (5) 

114.] Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once declared 

to M. Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve 

of this new procedure. Repeating the statement he made 

at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his 

Government would take a much broader view than was 

generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy ; 

M. Schebeko did everything to convince Count Berchtold of 

( " [See No. the sincerity of Russia's desire to arrive at an agreement <fl) 

31 and which would be acceptable to the two Empires. 

note.] jhe interview was carried on in a friendly tone and gave 

reason for thinking that all chances of localising the dispute 

(7) [SwNo. were not lost, when the news of the German mobilisation 171 

105.] arrived at Vienna. 

No. 105. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

HERR VON JAGOW telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that 

(e) [No. 104; the news of the German mobilisation 181 which had spread an 

0. 61.] 'hour before was false," 1 and asked me to inform you of 

<9) [cf. O. this urgently ; the Imperial Government is confiscating the 

62 -l extra editions of the papers which announced it. But 

370 



)I4] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 106] 

neither this communication nor these steps diminish my 
apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany. 

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held 
yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities 
under the presidency of the Emperor decided on mobilisa- 
tion, and this explains the preparation of the special edition 
of the Lokal Anzeiger, but that from various causes (the 
declaration of England that she reserved her entire liberty 
of action/ 1 ' the exchange of telegrams between the Tsar (1) [8.89.] 
and William II. ( ") the serious measures which had been <! "[App. V. 
decided upon were suspended. (PP- 437- 

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close 443-] 
relations saw Heir von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. Accord- 
ing to the Under-Secretary of State the military authorities 
are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered, ( " (3} [cf- No. 
because every delay makes Germany lose some of her ad- I0 9-] 
vantages. Nevertheless up to the present the haste of the 
General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been 
successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be 
decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has 
issued in the Lokal Anzeiger, a paper which is usually semi- 
official, premature news calculated to cause excitement in 
France. 

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all (4) [S^Nos. 
the measures for mobilisation which can be taken before 3. 15 ; j 
the publication of the general order of mobilisation** 1 have ^ os - S8 
already been taken here,'" and that they are anxious here ^ x : 
to make us publish our mobilisation first in order to attribute m r c y * B 
the responsibility to us. ' 9 g.] 

No. 106. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassa- 
dor at London. (l '[Sw B. 

Paris, July 30, 1914. 105 (end 

3) and 

PLEASE inform Sir E. Grey of the following facts 1 ' 1 footnote 
concerning French and German military preparations. Eng- thereto, 
land will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not ^^g 8 
she who is taking aggressive steps. 80.116.1 

Z7* O * J 

371 



[T. 1081 FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK JULY 3 

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision 
taken by the Council of Ministers this morning ; although 
Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred 
metres from the frontier along the whole front from Luxem- 
burg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops 
to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilo- 
metres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach 
nearer. 

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, pro- 
vided, however, that the fighting positions of our covering 
troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By 
leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden 
aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic 
hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than 
Russia, the responsibility for the attack. 

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare 
the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier ; in France,, 
soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were 
certain that Germany had done so five days before. 
w [cf. B. In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz (u 

99-J been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been rein- 
forced by units transported by train from garrisons of the 
interior such as Treves or Cologne ; nothing like this has 
been done in France. 

The arming of positions on the frontier (clearing of trees,, 
placing of armament, construction of batteries and pro- 
tection of railway junctions) was begun in Germany on 
Saturday, the 25th ; with us it is going to be begun, for 
France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures. 

The railway stations were occupied by the military in 
< a > [cf. No. Germany on Saturday, the 25th ; (a) in France on Tuesday^ 
"^the 28th. 

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands 
have been recalled by individual summons, those living 
abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the 
officers of reserve have been summoned ; in the interior the 
roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits.. 
It is the last stage . before mobilisation. None of these 
measures have been taken in France. 

The German army has its outposts on our frontier ; on 
two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 108] 

territory* (Varmee allemande a ses avant-fostes sur nos 
bornes frontteres ; par deux fois t hier, des patrouilles allemandes 
onl ptnetre sur noire territoire.) The whole i6th army corps 
from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and 
Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg ; 
the 1 5th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the 
frontier. 

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the 
annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross 
the frontier. 

No. 107. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

THE British Ambassador has not been informed of 
Germany's reply 111 to Sir E. Grey's request. (SI He told me '[c/. Nos. 
that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to Io8 - 10 9-] 
hear from her ally. ? W 

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von 
Jagow (to whom Count Pourtales had communicated the 
conciliatory formula' 8 ' suggested by M. Sazonof for an (J( [No. 
Austro-Russian understanding) had just told him that he 
found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, (4) thus showing (4) [cf. No. 
the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna. IJ 4-1 

No. 108. 

.M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

London, July 30, 1914. 

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY has not brought any reply <8) to <"[c/. Nos. 
the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday" 1 to 107.109-] 
obtain from the German Government a formula for the ( " [N- - 8 ; 
intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. 
But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of t/- 
England.' 7 ' J'^J 1 

373 



[Y. 10J FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY < 

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive 
character, but that in the present state of affairs on the 
Continent it was natural to take some precautions; that in 
England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, 
and that if in England, as in France, defensive measures 
were under consideration, it was not with the object of making 
any aggression. 

The information which your Excellency has addressed to 

me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany 

'> [No. 106; n the French frontier' 1 ' gave me the opportunity of re- 

B. 105 ' marking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a 

(end. 3). J conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, 

but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might 

provoke general war. 

Sir E. Grey understood my feelings perfectly, and he 
thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and 
discuss together every hypothesis. 

No. 109. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

IN the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary 

of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made 

w [cf. B. to Sir E. Grey, who had asked him' 21 to draw up himself the 

8 4-l formula for the intervention of the disinterested Powers. 
<>!>/. B. He answered that "to gain time,"'" he had decided to 

I0 7-] act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the 
ground on which conversations might be opened with her 
This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding 
more quickly, of eliminating England, France and Italy, and 
of entrusting to Herr von Tschirschky, whose Pan-German 
(4) [c/. B. and Russophobe sentiments are well known, (4) the duty of 

95-] persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude. 

' S) [B. 70 Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobili- 

M-lsation on the Austrian frontier;"" he told me that this 

[of. B. mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with 

"Vi aid Austria, and that everything depended on it. <8) He added that 

note.] he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result 

374 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 110] 

of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as 
a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and con- 
sequently that of Germany. 

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had him- 
self told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged 
to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German f rentiers, <l> (l '[No. 67.] 
and that this was not being done. He replied that this was 
true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, w m [cf. No. 
for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, I0 5-l 
and " that the words of which I reminded him did not con- 
stitute a firm engagement on his part." 

The impression which I received from this conversation 
is that the chances of peace have again decreased. 

No. no. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

London, July 31, 1914. 

AT the beginning of our conversation to-day'" Sir E. (J) [For Sir 
Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this E. Grey's 
morning if England would observe neutrality in the conflict ^, C g Unt ' 
which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ,' 
replied that, if the conflict became general, England would 
not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France 
were involved England would be drawn in. 

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council 
which took place this morning. He replied that after having 
examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought that for 
the moment the British Government were unable to guar- 
antee to us their intervention, that they intended to take 
steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding 
to respect Belgian neutrality , (4) but that before considering (4) [B. 114.] 
intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to 
develop. 

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British 
Government would await the invasion of French territory. 
I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on 
our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in 

$75 



[Y. ill] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK UULY 

the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of 
Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, England should consider 
at once the circumstances in which she would give France 
the help on which she relied. 

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet 
had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that 
the situation might be modified, and that in that case a 
meeting of the Cabinet would be called together at once in 
order to consider it. 

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of 
the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet 
again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand 
that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be 
certain to renew the discussion. 

(1) [Text of According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary 
letter and ste p s to secure that the autograph letter (1) which the Presi- 
IL^'^pp. ^ ent * tne Republic has addressed to His Majesty the King 
304-8.] ' of England should be given to the King this evening. This 

step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime 
Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into 
serious consideration by the British Cabinet. 

No. in. 

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Luxemburg, July 31, 1914. 

THE Minister of State has just left the Legation, he has 
just told me that the Germans have closed the bridges over 
the Moselle at Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and 
the bridge at Wormeldange with ropes. The bridges at 
Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over the Sure have not 
been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the export 

(2) [cf- B f rom Pmssia of corn, cattle or motor cars. (2) 

M. Eyschen requested me and this was the real object 

of his visit to ask you for an official declaration to the effect 

gg. that France will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of 

also ' No! Luxemburg. (3) When I asked him if he had received a 

i 37 .] 'similar declaration from the German Government, he told 

376 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 112] 

me that he was going to the German Minister to get the same 
declaration. 

Postscript. Up to the present no special measure has 
been taken by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has 
returned from the German Legation. He complained of the 
measures showing suspicion which were taken against a 
neutral neighbour. The Minister of State has asked the 
German Minister for an official declaration from his Govern- 
ment undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr von Buch 
is stated to have replied, " That is a matter of course, but it 
would be necessary for the French Government to give the 
same undertaking." 

No. 112. 

M . Rent Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. 
Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. 

Paris, July 31, 1914. 

THE British Ambassador has handed me a note from his 
Government asking the French Government to support a 
proposal at St. Petersburg for the peaceful solution of the 
Austro-Serbian conflict. 

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed 
Sir E. Grey 111 of the intention of his Government to try to U) [B. 103.] 
exercise influence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after 
the capture of Belgrade and the occupation of the districts 
bordering on the frontier, in order to obtain a promise not 
to advance further, 181 while the Powers endeavoured to secure <>[c/. s. 51 
that Serbia should give sufficient satisfaction to Austria ; and note] 
the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she 
had received satisfaction. 

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 2Qth July,"* ( "[B. 88.] 
and expressed the hope that military preparations would be 
suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador 
at London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears 
that the Russian condition' 41 (if Austria, recognising that <>[No. 
her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question 103.] 
of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from 
Jier ultimatum the points which endanger the principle of Serbian 

377 



[Y. 112] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 3 

sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations) * 
cannot be modified, Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops 
her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian 
Government could agree to change their formula in the 

'[c/. B. following way : (1) 

103 ; O. 

67.1 That the Powers would examine how Serbia should give 

complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the 
sovereignty or independence of the Kingdom. In case 
Austria after occupying Belgrade and the neighbouring 
Serbian territory should declare herself ready, in the interests 
of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss how an arrange- 
ment might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the 
discussion and suspend her military preparations, provided 
that the other Powers acted in the same way. 

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French 
Government joined in the English suggestion, and in the 
following terms asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
to try to obtain, without delay, the assent of the Russian 
Government : 

" Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion 
of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for 
conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous 
of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro- 
Serbian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers 
which threaten general peace. 

" The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and 
by entrusting to the Powers the duty of examining how 
Serbia could give full satisfaction to Austria without endanger- 
ing the sovereign rights and the independence of the King- 
dom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all 
military preparations, while the other Powers are to act in the 
same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia 

* [The wording of the Russian condition here differs slightly in form, 
though not in substance, from that given in despatch No. 103 (p. 369). 
In the original French it here runs thus : " Si I' Autriche, reconnaissant 
que son conft.it avec la Serbie a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet 
europeen, se declare prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent 
atteinte au principe de la souverainete serbe, la Russie s' engage a arreter tous 
preparatifs militaires."} 

378 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 113] 

and to Austria and to provide for Serbia an acceptable means 
of issue from the present difficulty. 

" I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing 
considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his 
adherence '" without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, (lt [See No. 
of which he will have been himself informed." 

No. 113. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 

THE news of the bombardment of Belgrade (8) during the "" [cf. O. 
night and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep 77 (P- 
feeling in Russia. One cannot understand the attitude of 494 ^ 
Austria, whose provocations since the beginning of the 
crisis have regularly followed Russia's attempts at concilia- 
tion and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between 
St. Petersburg and Vienna. 

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order 
to prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof 
informs me that he has modified his formula, w as requested [See No. 
by the British Ambassador, in the following way : Ul 

" If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on (4) t c ^ . B - 
Serbian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Serbian ?,' * 
conflict has assumed the character of a question of European 
interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the 
satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a 
State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve 
her waiting attitude."* 

* [In the French original the amended formula reads : 

" Si V Autricht consent d arreter la tnarche de ses troupes sur U territoire 
serbe et si, reconnaissant que le con flit austro-serbe a assume le caractere d" une 
question d" inter et europeen, ette admet que les grandes Puissances examinent 
les satisfactions que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, 
sans porter atteinte d ses droits souverains et d son independance, la Russie 
s' engage d conserver son attitude expectants. " 

Here also there are trifling variations of phrase from the text as given in 
the Russian Orange-book (O. 67), and in the British Blue-book (B. 120).] 

379 



Y. m] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK UULY 3 

No. 114. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Peters- 
burg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople. 

Paris, July 31, 1914. 

THE efforts made up till now concurrently by England 

and Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in 

advance for every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct 

understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, or of the 

mediation of the four Powers in the most appropriate form, 

are being united to-day ; Russia, giving a fresh proof of her 

desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the 

^[See No. first appearance of an overture [ouverture] made by Germany'" 

112 ; B. since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions 

103.] on wm 'ch Russia would stop her military preparations) by 

w [See No. indicating a formula/ 21 and then modifying it ( " in accord- 

I0 3-] ance with the request of England ; there ought to be 

(3) [No. hope, therefore, negotiations having also been begun again 

^'J between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors, (4) that 

104*1 English mediation will complete at London that which is 

being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and 

St. Petersburg. 

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, 
since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protest- 
ing to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by 
<5) [c/. Nos. her dilatory or negative attitude, (5) caused the failure of all 
50,85.] attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage 
through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of 
Vienna ; the German military preparations begun since the 
(8) [c/. No 25th July"' and subsequently continued without cessation; 
106.] the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula, 
declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that Power 
(7) [f- No - had even been consulted ; (7) in conclusion, all the impressions 
I07 'J derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has 
( sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple 

[c/. o. g n t en t e> an( j jf these results could not be obtained, to make 

(p. 43i)0 war -'" 
380 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 1161 

No. 115. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rent 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

GENERAL mobilisation" 1 for all men from 19 to 42 <[ c /. B. 
years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 127.] 
ment this morning at I o'clock. 

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not 
entirely in contradiction to the declaration'* 1 made yesterday ^[See No. 
by Count Berchtold. 104.] 



No. 116. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

HERR VON JAGOW sent for me and has just toldfme 
that he was very sorry to inform me that in face of the total 
mobilisation'" of the Russian army, Germany, in the interest (S| [c/. No. 
of the security of the Empire, found herself obliged to take "7 ' B. 
serious precautionary measures. What is called " Kriegsge- 108,112.] 
fahrzustand " (the state of danger of war) u) has been declared, (4) [c/. No. 
and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it 117,127; 
expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public 
services, and to close the frontier. ^ 

At the same time a demand is being made at St. Peters- 
burg that they should demobilise, (JI as well on the Austrian "'(# No. 
as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged 
to mobilise on her side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr 
von Schoen had been instructed to inform the French Govern- 
ment of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet and to ask them 
what attitude they intended to adopt. 



[Y. 117] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [JULY 31 

No. 117. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg. 

Paris, July 31, 1914. 

THE German Government decided at mid-day to take 
all military measures implied by the state called " state of 
"[See No danger Of war." (1) 

note- a \V * n communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this 

exh. '24.3 evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government 

required at the same time that Russia should demobilise. 

If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply 

w [of- B. within twelve hours Germany will mobilise in her turn. <a) 

117; o. 70; j replied to the German Ambassador that I had no informa- 

app 4 ' V. ti n a * a ^ aoou t an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian 

(vii.).] army and navy (s) which the German Government invoked 

< 3) [See No. as the reason for the new military measures which they are 

116 and taking to-day. 

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his 

Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of 

< 4) [cf. No. war between Germany and Russia. (4) He told me that he 

125 ; W., would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at I o'clock. (5) 

vol. II., j have no intention of making any statement to him on 

exh 35 25 *h* s su ^ject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that 

R. 54. ' France will have regard to her interests. The Government 

Also B. of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her 

87, 105.] intentions except to her ally. 

(B) [c/. No. j as k y OU to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As 
125 ' I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial 
Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do every- 
thing on their part to avoid anything that might render 
'" [cf. No. inevitable or precipitate the crisis. W) 
31 and 

note;app. T^O ,.,.0 

V. (vi.).] 

M . Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Rene 

Viviani, President of Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 

<7) [No. AS a result of the general mobilisation of Austria (7) and of 

1 15-] the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, 
382 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 119] 

by Germany for the last six days, 11 ' the order for the general ( "[c/. No. 
mobilisation of the Russian army has been given,'" Russia 106 and 
not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself w?/*^ 
to be further out-distanced ; really she is only taking military 
measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. 

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Govern- 
ment, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer 
delay the conversion of her partial mobilisation"' into a (3( [No. 91.] 
general mobilisation. w N [B. 113.] 

No. 119. 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

L'AGENCE HAVAS having announced that the state " of 
danger of war" had been declared in Germany, I told < s > [See No. 
M. Davignon that I could assure him that the Government 116.] 
of the Republic would respect the neutrality of Belgium. (6) w [ c /. NO. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Govern- 122 ; B. 
ment of the King had always thought that this would be so, ^5-] 
and thanked me. (7) The Russian Minister and the British <?> [Q. 9, 
Minister, whom I saw subsequently, appeared much pleased 15'.] 

that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, 
as the English Minister told me, was in accordance with the 
declaration of Sir E. Grey. 



383 



120] [AUGUST 



CHAPTER VI. 

DECLARATION OF WAR BY GERMANY ON RUSSIA 

(SATURDAY, AUGUST i, AT 7.10 P.M.) ; 
AND ON FRANCE (MONDAY, AUGUST 3, AT 6 45 P.M.), 

No. 120. 

M . Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. 
Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. 

Paris, August I, 1914. 

TWO demarches were made yesterday evening by the 
Austrian Ambassadors the one at Paris, which was rather 
vague, the other at St. Petersburg, precise and conciliatory. 
(1) [c/. No. Count Szcsen came to explain (1) to me that the Austro- 
125 ** Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it 
^i* ' had no territorial ambition, and would not touch the 
sovereignty of Serbia ; that it also repudiates any intention 
of occupying the Sandjak ; but that these explanations of 
disinterestedness only retain their force if the war remains 
localised to Austria and Serbia, as a European war would 
open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. 
The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explana- 
tions, gave me to understand that if his Government could 
not answer the questions of the Powers speaking in their 
own name, they would certainly answer Serbia, or any single 
Power asking for these conditions in the name of Serbia. 
He added that a step in this direction was perhaps still 
possible. 

(2) [c/. Nos. At St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on 
j^'. I2 g' M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was 
131/133- willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum 
0. 73 R.' addressed to Serbia. (2) The Russian Minister declared him- 
56.] self satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the 
384 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 120] 

pourparlers should take place in London with the participation 
of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the English 
Government to take the lead in the discussion ; he pointed 
out that it would be very important that Austria should stop 
her operations in Serbia. 

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at 
last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the 
Russian Government is ready to enter into negotiations on 
the basis of the English proposal. 

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to 
hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been 
rendered useless by the attitude of Germany. This Power 
has in fact presented an ultimatum 01 giving the Russian (I| [No. 
Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisa- I2I > 
tion of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as II7 . ; y* 
against Austria ; this time-limit expires at noon. The ^ ' v [ 
ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the English (vii.).] 
proposal 121 which implies a cessation of military preparation (2) [No. 
by all the Powers. "3-] 

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. (s) (3} [cf. B. 
And she wishes for it against France. Yesterday when Herr 14* an d 
von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay' 41 to ask what attitude 4 note -3 
France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, w ^- 
the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct 
dispute between France and Germany, and although from 
the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a 
peaceful solution and are still continuing to do so, added 
that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the 
President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good 
enough to make arrangements as to him personally (des 
dispositions pour sa propre personne) ; we know also that 
he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. 
This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations* 31 without lJ) [c/. B. 
any direct dispute, and although he has not received any I26 -3 

definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the deter- 
mination of Germany to make war against France. The 
want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by 
the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time 
when Austria had at last agreed with Russia to begin 

negotiations. 



a B 385 



[Y . 121] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Auousx 

No. 121. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Berlin, August I, 1914. 

MY Russian colleague received yesterday evening two 
telegrams from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg had explained that his Govern- 
ment was ready to discuss the note to Serbia with the Russian 
(1) [c/. No. Government even as to its basis ; m M. Sazonof answered 

120 and that in his opinion these conversations should take place in 
note; B ;London 

O^sf 3 ' The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last 
chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to 
leave. The question may be asked whether in such circum- 
stances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not 
the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on 
w [cf. No. to Russia. (2) 

My British colleague during the night made a pressing 
appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity.' 3 ' The 
- xai *J latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that 
they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ulti- 
matum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum 
required that the Russians should countermand their mobilisa- 
tion, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria ; 
my British colleague was much astonished at this, and said 
that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last 
point. 

Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when 
an agreement seemed about to be established between Vienna 
<4) \cf. No. and St. Petersburg, (4) is characteristic of her warlike policy. 
125 ; B. in truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria 
only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria ; 
in these circumstances, as the two Powers which were inter- 
8) [No. ested as principals were prepared for conversations, (5) it is 
I2 o-J impossible to understand why Germany should send an 
ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing like all the other 
Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired 
war on her own account. 
386 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 124] 

NO. 122. 

M . Rent Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, 
and to the French Minister at Brussels. 

Paris, August I, 1914. 

THE British Ambassador, under the instructions of his 
Government, (1) came to ask me what would be the attitude (1) [B. 114.] 
of the French Government as regards Belgium in case of 
conflict with Germany. 

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we 
had repeatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended 
to respect their neutrality."' w [c/. Nos. 

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating II 9. 126 i 
that neutrality that France might find herself brought to 
enter Belgian territory, with the object of fulfilling her 
obligations as a guaranteeing Power. 

No. 123. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, August I, 1914. 

THE British Ambassador has been instructed by his 
Government"' to make to the German Government a com- <3) t B - II 4] 
munication identical with that which he made to you on 
the subject of the neutrality of Belgium. 

Herr von Jagow answered (4) that he would take the (4) [B. 122.] 
instructions of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he 
did not think an answer could be given, for Germany could 
not disclose her military plans in this way. The British 
Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to-morrow afternoon. 

No. 124. 

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, August i, 1914. 

I WENT to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning 
at half -past eight, in order to get precise information from 

387 



[Y. 125] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Auous' 

him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative 
acts of Germany and the results which they may have. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had 

seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von 

Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the 

Russian Government to suspend mobilisation, and the 

< 1J [No. French Government to inform them as to their intentions ; u> 

120.] Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours 

and Russia a time limit of twelve hours. 

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked 
what were the intentions of the Italian Government. 
< 8 >[c/. No. The Marquis di San Giuliano answered <ai that as the war 
i59 undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within 
(p- 43i); the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particu- 
I52> ] larly in view of the consequences which might result from it 
according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, 
Italy would not be able to take part in the war. 



No. 125. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Peters- 
burg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. 

Paris, August i, 1914. 

(8) [c/. No. THE German Ambassador came to see me again (3> at 
117-0.74.] ii o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory 
all the efforts made by France towards an honourable settle- 
ment of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the difficulty between 
Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in 
possession of the facts as to the pourparlers which have been 
(4) [No.i2o; carried on since yesterday : w 

B. 137.] 

(1) An English compromise, proposing, besides other 

suggestions, suspension of military preparations on the 
part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers 
should act in the same way ; adherence of Russia to this 
proposal. 

(2) Communications from the Austrian Government 
declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 125] 

in Serbia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and 

stating that they were ready to discuss even the basis ( " '"[No. 120 

of the Austro-Serbian question at London with the other an ? 
T- note.] 

Powers. 

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany" 1 who, (8l [No. 
abandoning all pourparlers, presented an ultimatum to Russia 
at the very moment'" when this Power had just accepted ( "[ c /- No - 
the English formula (which implies the cessation of military 
preparations by all the countries which have mobilised) and 
regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France. 

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the 
developments which had taken place in this matter for the 
last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a 
" glimmer of hope " for some arrangement, that he had not 
received any fresh communication from his Government, 
and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed 
protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those 
of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid 
stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Govern- 
ment would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took 
an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which 
would irremediably compromise peace. 

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate depar- 
ture and did not make any fresh request for an answer to 
his question concerning the attitude of France (4) in case of ({ Pj.- 
an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying 
of his own accord that the attitude of France was not 
doubtful. 

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may 
result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, 
on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most 
dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must 
not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work 
towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all 
military measures required for protection against too great an 
advance in German military preparations. She considers that 
her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so 
far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict 
is forced on her. 

389 



[Y. 126] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AuGUSl 

No. 126. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rent 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
i 1 ' [Clearly Paris, (l} August i, 1914. 

te Lon d SIR EDWARD GREY said to me that, at a meeting 

don."] this morning, the Cabinet had again considered the situation. 

As Germany had asked England to give a declaration of 

neutrality and had not obtained it, the British Government 

[cf B. remained masters of their action ; (2) this could shape itself 

ioi.] in accordance with different hypotheses. 

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great import- 
ance to England. France has immediately renewed her 
< S) [No. engagement to respect it. (3) Germany has explained "that 
122 ; B. she was not in a position to reply." Sir Edward Grey will 
I2 5-l put the Cabinet in possession of this answer and will ask 
(4) [Aug. 3.] to be authorised to state on Monday (4) in the House of 
^[See Commons, (5) that the British Government will not permit a 
vol. II., violation of Belgian neutrality. (e| 

pp. 412 j n ^ e seconc i place, the English fleet is mobilised,* and 
W P f 4 Sir Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues' 71 that he 
I5 4 1 should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits 
(7) [c/. No. f Dover by the German fleet/ 8 ' or, if the German fleet 
'137.] should pass through (venaient a le passer), will oppose any 
<8) [See No. demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions 
137 and will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the 
note.] attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during 
this intervening period any incident took place, it was neces- 
sary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable 
to think of intervening in time. 

No. 127. 

M . Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. 

Paris, August i, 1914. 

WE are warned through several channels that the German 
and the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment 

* [The British Naval Reserves were called out by Royal Proclamation 
on Sunday, Aug. 2. cf. M. Viviani' s speech, p. 427 ; also B. 47, 48.] 
390 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 127] 

to influence England by making her believe that the respon- ( "OA No. 
sibility for war, if it breaks out, will fall on Russia.'" Efforts I21 ; B - 
are being made to obtain the neutrality of England by dis- and'note ] 
guising the truth."" <>^ B 

France has not ceased in co-operation with England to 85.] 

advise moderation at St. Petersburg ; this advice has been 
listened to." 1 <)[ c /. 3. 

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure 55, n8.] 
on Serbia 14 ' to make her accept all those clauses of the >[No. 
ultimatum which were not incompatible with her sovereignty. 36.] 

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria ; (5) (4) [B. 53.] 
this was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he 
has agreed to allow those Powers which are less interested 
to seek for means of composing the dispute. 1 " 1 (6) [B. 78.] 

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir 
George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify the first 
formula <7) which he had put forward, and he has drawn up (7) [No. 
a second 181 which is shown not to differ materially from the 
declaration which Count Sze"csen made yesterday to M. de " 
Margerie.* Count Sze"csen affirms"" that Austria has no in- (9) r^ 113 
tention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not 2ol 
wish to touch the sovereignty of Serbia. He expressly adds 
that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar. 

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir 
Edward Grey's suggestion, M. Sazonof's formula, and the 
Austrian declaration could easily be reconciled. 

France is determined, in co-operation with England, to 
work to the very end for the realisation of this. 

But while these negotiations were going on, and while 
Russia in the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot 
be disputed, Austria was the first to proceed to a general 
mobilisation. 110 (IO) [No. 

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, 11 " so 
as not to be left in an unfavourable position, but all the " 
time she has continued ready to negotiate. 

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we 
are concerned, we will, in co-operation with England, continue 
to work for the success of these pourparlers. 

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely 

* [Directeur des Affaires Politiques.] 

39' 



[Y. 128] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

(l) [c/. No. compulsory for us to make out the order for mobilisation (1) 

136 ; O. to-day. 

(8 74-1 Last Wednesday , {a) well in advance of Russian mobilisa- 

20 1 ** on ' as I have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen 

announced to me the impending publication of Kriegsge- 

w [cf. No. fahrzustand. <3) This measure has been taken by Germany, 

116 and and under the protection of this screen, she immediately 
(4 n ^] began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word. U) 

i?6 To-day M. Paleologue telegraphed that Count Pourtales 

7 o 1 ' ' had notified the Russian Government of German mobilisa- 

/O'J . . 

tion. 

Information which has been received by the Ministry of 
War confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full 
execution. 

( *> [See first Our decree of mobilisation (5) is then an essential measure 

Military o f protection. The Government have accompanied it by a 

{6)V [si proclamation (6) signed by the President of the Republic and 

vol. II., by an< the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation 

p. 468.] is not war, and that in the present state of affairs it is the 

best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the 

Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to 

bring the negotiations to a conclusion. 

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently 
to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him 
that we have throughout been governed by the determination 
not to commit any act of provocation. 

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, 
English opinion would see clearly from which side aggression 
comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons which 
we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed 
intervention on the part of England in the interest of the 
future of the European balance of power. 

No. 128. 

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene 
Viviani, . President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Luxemburg, August I, 1914. 

Reply, THE Minister of State instructs me to ask from the 

No. 129.] French Government an assurance of neutrality (7) similar to 
392 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 180] 

that which has been given to Belgium. Ul M. Eyschen has <"[No. 
stated that at present, as the declaration in question was 122 ; see 
made to the President of the Council of the Belgian Govern- d* No - 
ment by the French Minister at Brussels, he thought that 
the same procedure would be most suitable with regard to 
the Grand Duchy. 

This is the reason why he has abstained from making a 
request direct to the Government of the Republic. As the 
Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes 
to have the answer by that date ; a similar demarche is being 
made at the same time with the German Minister (at at (2) [No. 
Luxemburg. 

No. 129. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Mottard, French Minister at Luxemburg. 

Paris, August i, 1914. 

BE good enough to state to the President of the Council 

that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867, (S) the &* n 

Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality p 4 g 9 ]' 

of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, (4) as they have shown >[s No. 

by their attitude. 128 ; 

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, how- also No. 

ever, be an act of a kind which would compel France from 5 j 

that time to be guided in this matter by care for her defence j e "J ' 
and her interests. 

No. 130. 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Berlin, August I, 1914. 

SPECIAL editions of newspapers are being distributed in . 

the streets of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation ^'' , ^ 

of the army and the navy has been decreed (5) and that the vol. II. i 

first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, 2nd August. p. 135.]' 

393 



[Y. 131] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

No. 131. 

M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

[Duplicate of B. 147.] 



No. 132. 

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 

THE Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has 

just received, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at 

Luxemburg, a telegram from Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor 

of the German Empire, saying that the military measures 

taken by Germany in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile 

act against this country, but are solely measures tended to 

assure the use of the railways which have been leased to 

(1) [c/. Nos. the Empire against the eventual attack of a French arrny. (1> 

131. i33 Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage. 

129.3 

No. 133. 
Note handed in by the German Ambassador. 

Paris, August 2, 1914. 

THE German Ambassador has just been instructed, and 

hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the 

military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy 

of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They 

. must be considered as purely preventive measures taken for 

1*1 iS the P rotec tion of the railways, which, under the treaties 

140 ; B! between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, 

129.] are under German administration. (2) 

394 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 136] 

No. 134. 

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. 
Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914. 

YESTERDAY at ten minutes past seven in the evening 
the German Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration 
of war 11 ' by his Government ; he will leave St. Petersburg ofText, 
to-day. 0. 76.] 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any 
instructions from his Government as to the declaration of 
war. 

No. 135. 

M . Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the Representatives of France abroad. 

Paris, August 2, 1914. 

THE Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany 
has just declared war on Russia, 18 ' notwithstanding the < 8 '[No. 
negotiations which are proceeding, and at a moment when 134-] 
Austria-Hungary was agreeing to discuss with the Powers 
even the basis of her conflict with Serbia.'" w [cf. No. 

120 and 
note.] 
No. 136. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. 
Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constanti- 
nople. 

Paris, August 2, 1914. 

THIS morning, French territory was violated by German 
troops' 41 at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on (4) [Protest, 
the fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom No. 139.] 
House at Delle has twice been fired upon. Finally, German 
troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory 
of Luxemburg. (8) (5) [No. 131 ; 

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the B - I 47-l 
fact that the German Government is committing itself to 

395 



[Y. 137] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST a 

acts of war against France without provocation on our part, 

or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously 

respected the zone of ten kilometres which we have main- 

(l] [See NO. tained, (1) even since the mobilisation, between our troops 

106 and and the frontier. 

note.] 

No. 137. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 2, 1914. 

w [cf. Nos. AFTER the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning/ 8 ' 
126, 143, Sir Edward Grey made the following declaration (3) to me : 

(3) [See B. ' I am authorised to give an assurance * that, if the 
148 ; also German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North 
Sir E. Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts 
Grey, or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in 

VOL' II., its P wer - 

p. 407. ' This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His 

cf. Nos. Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, 
i43, 159 and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government 
(p. 430).] t take any action until the above contingency of action by 
the German fleet takes place." 

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium 

w [cf. Nos. and that of Luxemburg/ 4 ' the Secretary of State reminded 

in, 128; me that the Convention of 1867, (5) referring to the Grand 

< 5 >?S 148 ^ Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium/ 6 ' in 

vol! II., *h a * England was bound to require the observance of 

p. 489.]' this latter Convention without the assistance of the other 

w [See ^ guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all 

vol. II., the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert. 

p. 487.] 

* [From a comparison of the documents indicated in the margin it would 
seem that the assurance given to the French Government existed in two 
versions. The phraseology in this despatch agrees with that in Sir E. Grey's 
telegram of the same date to the British Ambassador at Paris (B. 148) 
and with that which he used in the House of Commons on August 3 (vol. 
II., p. 407). The other version is found in M. Paul Cambon' s despatch of 
August 3 (Y. 143), and in M. Viviani' s speech of August 4 in the Chamber 
of Deputies (Y. 159, p. 430). It would thus appear that, while Sir E. Grey 
employed one form of words in Parliament, M. Viviani supposed him to 
have employed the other.] 
396 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 189] 

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered 
so important that England will regard its violation by 
Germany as a casus belli. It is a specially English interest w [cf. B. 
and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful ^ I2 3 
to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the *" te -, 
business world in which German influence is making tenacious 
efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government com- 
mitting itself against Germany. 

No. 138. 

M . Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. 

Paris, August 2, 1914. m ^ ^ 

I NOTE the points contained in your telegrams of the "29th "j 
27th,' 8 ' 30th, (s) 3ist (4) July and the ist August, (5) and in see 
that which you have sent to me to-day. "" s No - 9 8 -J 

In communicating to the Chambers' 71 the declaration (S| [No- 
which Sir Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which w I( 
is contained in your last telegram, 181 I will add that in it we IIO -, 
have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is <5tr No 
most valuable to us. 126.] 

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which <>[No. 
Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of 137-] 
the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be (7l [No. 
used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco- J 59 
German conflict, be supported by the English fleet in the (8) tr 4 
Atlantic (9> as well as in the North Sea and Channel. In addition ' -, 
I would note that English ports could not serve as places for wrNo. 
re victualling for the German fleet. 143.] 

No. 139. 

M . Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. 

Paris, August 2, 1914. (10) [No. 

GERMAN troops having to-day violated the eastern UD^NO 
frontier oc) at several points I request you immediately to I55> 
protest '"' in writing to the German Government. You will p. 406.] 

397 



[Y. 140] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

be good enough to take as your text the following note which, 
in the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, 
I have addressed directly to the German Ambassador : 

" The French administrative and military authorities in 
the eastern district have just reported several acts which I 
have instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin 
to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government. 

" The first has taken place at Delle in the district of 
Belfort ; on two occasions the French Customs station in 
this locality has been fired upon by a detachment of German 
soldiers. North of Delle two German patrols of the 5th 
mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier this morning and 
advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, more than 
ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who com- 
manded the first has blown out the brains of a French soldier. 
The German cavalry carried off some horses which the French 
mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants 
of the commune to lead the said horses. 

" The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been 
instructed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Govern- 
ment against acts which form a flagrant violation of the 
frontier by German troops in arms, and which are not justified 
by anything in the present situation. The Government of 
the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the 
entire responsibility for these acts." 

No. 140. 

M. Marcelin Pellet, French Minister at the Hague, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 3, 1914. 

THE German Minister called yesterday on the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as 
he said, Germany was placed of violating the neutral territory 
(1 >[c/. No. of Luxemburg, (1) adding that he would have a fresh communi- 
132 and cation to make to him to-day. He has now this morning 
note.] announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, 
as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of that country 
by France. 
398 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 142J 

No. 141. 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

YESTERDAY evening the German Minister handed to 
the Belgian Government an ultimatum 111 stating that his <> [G. 20.] 
Government, having learnt that the French were preparing 
for operations in the districts of Givet and of Namur, were 
compelled to take steps, the first of which was to invite the 
Belgian Government to inform them, within seven hours,* 
if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in 
Belgium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of 
war would decide. 

The Government of the King answered 121 that the informa- w [G. 22.3 
tion as to the French movements appeared to them to be 
inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been 
given by France, and were still quite recent ; that Belgium, 
which since the establishment of her Kingdom, has taken 
every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her 
interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful develop- 
ment of progress, strongly protests against any violation of 
her territory from whatever quarter it may come : and that, 
supposing the violation takes place, she will know how to 
defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed 
by the Powers, and notably by the King of Prussia. (3) w [See 

vol. II., 

._::. ,., NO. I 4 2. ; P 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

TO the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium 
appealed to the guarantee of the Powers against the violation 

* [This should be " twelve hours." The authority of G. 23 and G. 24 
is conclusive. It is confirmed by B. 153 and by the statements of Sir E. 
Grey and Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons on August 3 and 4 ; see 
vol. II., p. 418.3 

399 



[Y. 143] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Auousi 

of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond 
01 [cf. G. to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered : (1) 
24 * 
151.3 ' It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government 

of the Republic for the support which it would eventually 

be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not 

(8) [See G. appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. At a later date (2) the 

40.] Government of the King will weigh the measures which it 

may be necessary to take." 



No. 143. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene 
Vivian i, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 3, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY has authorised me to inform you 

that you could state to Parliament that he was making 

explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of 

the British Government, and that the chief of these declara- 

[See No. tions would be as follows : (3) 

T.V7 cind 

footnote.] ' I n case * ne German fleet came into the Channel or 
entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles 
with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French 
navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the English 
fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its 
complete protection, in such a way that from that moment 
England and Germany would be in a state of war." 

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of 
an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection 
<4) [c/. No. against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean. 141 
138.] The declaration concerning the intervention of the English 

fleet must be considered as binding the British Government. 
Sir Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that 
the French Government were thereby authorised to inform 
the Chambers of this. 

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic 
communication relating to the German ultimatum addressed 
w [cf. Nos. to Belgium. (5) I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward 
141, 142.] Grey. 

400 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 146] 

No. 144. 

M . Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 3, 1914. 

JUST as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for 
the meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had 
already seen him yesterday, came to press him to say that 
the neutrality of England did not depend upon respecting 
Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation 
on this matter. 

The German Ambassador has sent to the Press a com- 
munique * saying that if England remained neutral Germany 
would give up all naval operations and would not make use 
of the Belgian coast as a point d'appui. My answer is that 
respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the terri- 
tory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation 
of this neutrality. 

No. 145. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 3, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY has made the statement (1) regard- (1 >[Vol. II., 
ing the intervention of the English fleet. He has explained, P 407-] 
in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with 
regard to Belgian neutrality ; (8) and the reading of a letter'*' P** 1 PP- 
from King Albert asking for the support of England has deeply (J) ^ 2 s ^'* 
stirred the House. (4) 0.25.] 

* [This communique appeared in The Times of August 4 in the following (4) [Vol. II., 
form : P- 4 TI -i 

" The German Embassy in London yesterday authorised the statement 
that the ultimatum to Belgium contained a declaration that if for strategical 
reasons German troops marched through Belgian territory this should not 
be considered by the Belgian Government in any way as a warlike measure 
directed against themselves. It must be considered only as a necessity 
imposed by French initiative. In the event of German troops invading 
the country Belgian territory would be safeguarded and full compensation 
given for any damage done. There was no intention whatever to interfere 
with Belgian sovereignty or with her territory unless there was an intention 
of using any of the Belgian ports for warlike purposes."] 

2 C 401 



[Y. 146] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Aucu 

The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked 
for ; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of 
the Government, and it follows public opinion which is declar- 
ing itself more and more in our favour. 

No. 146. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, 

Paris, August 3, 1914. 

I AM told that the German Ambassador is said to have 
stated to the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty 
French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross 
the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the 
west of Geldern, and that this formed a very serious violation 
of neutrality on the part of France. 

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news which is 
w [cf. Nos. pure invention, (lt and to draw the attention of the Foreign 

148, 159 Office to the German campaign of false news which is begin- 
( PP . 426- . 

7)-] 

No. 147. 

Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. Rene Viviani, 
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
during his farewell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 p.m. 

M. LE PRESIDENT, 

THE German administrative and military authorities 

(8) [Denied, have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts <al 

Nos. 146, committed on German territory by French military aviators. 

148, 159 s evera i o f these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium 

(P- 427)-] by flying over the territory of that country ; one has attempted 

to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the 

district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway 

near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. 

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your 
Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression 
the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with 
France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. 
402 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 148] 

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the know- 
ledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will 
detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they 
will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured 
of complete reciprocity. 

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only 
remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough 
to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you con- 
sider suitable to assure my return to Germany," 1 with the (ll [SNo. 
staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian *59> . 
Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris. opening 

Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances 
of mv deepest respect. 

(Signed) SCHOEN. 

No. 148. 

M . Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad. 

Paris, August 3, 1914. 

THE German Ambassador has asked for his passports'" (2 '[No. 
and is leaving this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, I47 ^ 
the German Consulate General and the Bavarian Legation. 
Baron von Schoen has given as his reason the establishment 
by the German administrative and military authorities of 
acts of hostility which are said to have been committed by 
French military aviators accused of having flown over territory 
of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that 
the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality of 
Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. " In the presence 
of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von 
Schoen, " the German Empire considers itself in a state of 
war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter 
Power." m [cf. Nos. 

I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations" 1 of the *4 6 155 
Ambassador, and for my part I reminded him that I had K Q 
yesterday addressed to him a note' 41 protesting against the ( p 427).] 
flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ^ [No. 
ago by detachments of German troops. 139-] 

403 



[Y. 149] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Auousi 

No. 149. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. 
(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.) 

Paris, August 3, 1914. 

I REQUEST you to ask for your passports and to leave 

Berlin at once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the 

charge of French interests and the care of the archives to the 

w[cf. No. Spanish Ambassador. (1) I request you at the same time to 

i55 protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of 

(p. 408) ; Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given 

^d? 3 ' by ti 16 Pri me Minister of Luxemburg; 131 against the ulti- 

( 2)r No matum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German 

131.] Minister at Brussels (3) to force upon them the violation of 

(S) [No. Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she 

141-] should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian 

territory ; finally against the false allegation of an alleged 

(4) [No. projected invasion of these two countries by French armies/ 4 ' 

141 ; G. by which he has attempted to justify the state of war which 

20, 22.] j^ d ec i ar es <6) henceforth exists between Germany and France. 

< 5) [No. 

1470 No. 150. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. Allize, French Minister at Munich. 

Paris, August 3, 1914. 

BE good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Govern- 
ment that you have received instructions to adapt your 
attitude to that of our Ambassador at Berlin and to leave 
Munich. 

No. 151. 

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council , Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. 
Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constan- 
tinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stock- 
holm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade. 

(!i) [Error Paris, August 3, 1914. 

for "Gem- j LEARN from an official Belgian source that German 
5 6 Q C ?Q. troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich 181 in 
B- 159-1 *ke district of Verviers. 
404 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 164] 

No. 152. 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

THE Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs sends me a letter 11 ' by which " the Government of the, (1) [>/. Mr. 
King declare that they are firmly decided to resist the aggres- Asquith, 
sion of Germany by all means in their power. Belgium v : 
appeals' 81 to England, France and Russia to co-operate as m ^' 
guarantors in the defence of her territory. j^ s * 

' There would be a concerted and common action having vo i. n., 
as its object the resistance of forcible measures employed by p. 421.] 
Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee 
the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium 
in the future." 

" Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure 
the defence of her fortified places." 

No. 153. 

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

London, August 4, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY has asked me to come and see him 
immediately in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would 
to-day make a statement (3> in the House of Commons that {3> [$ ee 
Germany had been invited to withdraw her ultimatum to ' j' 
Belgium and to give her answer to England before 12 o'clock 
to-night. U) (4, [Sw B . 

No. 154. 

M . Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene 
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

THIS morning the German Minister informs the Belgian 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the 

405 



[Y. 155] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

^'[SwNo. refusal' 11 of the Belgian Government the Imperial Govern- 
141-] ment find themselves compelled to carry out by force of arms' 10 

a > [cf. G. those measures of protection which are rendered indispensable 
27 ; B. b v the French threats. 

I54-] 

No. 155. 

M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Copenhagen, Attgust 6, 1914. 

'"[British THE French Ambassador at Berlin 13 * asks me to com- 
Ambassa- mun i ca te to your Excellency the following telegram : 

parturc, " I have been sent to Denmark by the German Govern- 
B. 160; "ment. I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accom- 
Frendr " panied by all the staff of the Embassy and the Russian 
fxpu/slon " Char e d'Affaires at Darmstadt with his family." The 
from treatment which we have received is of such a nature that I 
Belgium, have thought it desirable to make a complete report on it 
No. 156.] to your Excellency by telegram. 

(4) [No. On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, 

I 39-l in accordance with your instructions, Ul addressed to Herr 
von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed 
on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State 
came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts 
of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, 
especially at Nuremberg and Coblenz, by French aviators, 
w[Sce No. w ^ o according to his statement " had come from Belgium." (3> 
I answered that I had not the slightest information as to the 
{ facts to which he attached so much importance and the 

jg , 0- improbability of which seemed to me obvious ; (6) on my part 
wrsce NO ^ as ked mm if ne na d read the note' 7 ' which I had addressed 
I 39-J * ^ m w ith regard to the invasion of our territory by detach- 
ments of the German army. As the Secretary of State said 
that he had not yet read this note I explained its contents 
to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the 
officer commanding one of the detachments who had advanced 
to the French village of Joncherey, ten kilometres within 
our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier 
whom he had met there. After having given my opinion 
of this act I added : " You will admit that under no circum- 
stances could there be any comparison between this and the 
406 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 166] 

flight of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by 
private persons animated by that spirit of individual courage 
by which aviators are distinguished. 

" An act of aggression committed on the territory of a 
neighbour by detachments of regular troops commanded by 
officers assumes an importance of quite a different nature." 

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge 
of the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that 
it was difficult for events of this kind not to take place when 
two armies filled with the feelings which animated our troops 
found themselves face to face on either side of the frontier. 

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser 
Platz in front of the Embassy and whom we could see through 
the window of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts 
against France. 111 I asked the Secretary of State when all (1| fc/. B. 
this would come to an end. fixanl l 

" The Government has not yet come to a decision," Herr ^' 
von Jagow answered. " It is probable that Herr von Schoen 
will receive orders to-day to ask for his passports' 21 and then w [See No. 
you will receive yours." The Secretary of State assured me 
that I need not have any anxiety with regard to my departure, 
and that all the proprieties would be observed with regard 
to me as well as my staff. We were not to see one another 
any more and we took leave of one another after an interview 
which had been courteous and could not make me anticipate 
what was in store for me. 

Before leaving Heir von Jagow I expressed to him my 
wish to make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would 
be the last opportunity that I should have of seeing him. 

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to 
carry out this intention as this interview would serve no 
purpose and could not fail to be painful. 

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought 
me my passports. In the name of his Government he refused 
to agree to the wish which I expressed to him that I should 
be permitted to travel by Holland or Belgium. He suggested 
to me that I should go either by way of Copenhagen, although 
he could not assure me a free passage by sea, or through 
Switzerland via Constance. 

I accepted this last route ; Herr von Langwerth having 
asked me to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, 

407 



[Y. 156] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Aucus 

in consideration of the necessity I was under of making 
arrangements with the Spanish Ambassador, who was under- 
(1| [No. taking the charge of our interests, (1) that I should leave on 
Z 490 the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night. 

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, 
Herr von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at 
Paris, came from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me 
to request the staff of my Embassy to cease taking meals in 
the restaurants. This order was so strict that on the next 
day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse to the authority of the 
Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to send our meals to 
the Embassy. 

At ii o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von 
Langwerth came back to tell me that his Government would 
not allow our return by way of Switzerland under the pretext 
that it would take three days and three nights to take me to 
Constance. He announced that I should be sent by way of 
Vienna. I only agreed to this alteration under reserve, and 
during the night I wrote the following letter to Herr von 
Langwerth : 

Berlin, August 3, 1914. 
" M. LE BARON, 

" I HAVE been thinking over the route for my return to 
my country about which you came to speak to me this evening. 
You propose that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of 
finding myself detained in that town, if not by the action of 
the Austrian Government, at least owing to the mobilisation 
which creates great difficulties similar to those existing in 
Germany as to the movements of trains. 

' Under these circumstances I must ask the German Govern- 
ment for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian 
Government will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss 
Government will not close its frontier either to me or to the 
persons by whom I am accompanied, as I am told that that 
frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners. 

" I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to 
me unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am 
assured that I shall not be detained for some months outside 
my country. 

"JULES CAMBON." 

408 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 166] 

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, 
the 4th August, Heir von Langwerth gave me in writing an 
assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received 
communications to this effect. 

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate 
at Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his 
own house while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplo- 
matic passport had been requested, was released after four 
hours. 

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to 
five, Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I 
would have to leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 
o'clock in the evening, but that I should be taken to Denmark. 
On this new requirement I asked if I should be confined in a 
fortress supposing I did not comply. Heir von Langwerth 
simply answered that he would return to receive my answer 
in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German Govern- 
ment the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from 
Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he 
came back that I would submit to the order which had been 
given to me but " that I protested." 

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the 
following is a copy : 

" Berlin, August 4, 1914. 
" SIR, 

" MORE than once your Excellency has said to me that the 
Imperial Government, in accordance with the usages of inter- 
national courtesy, would facilitate my return to my own 
country and would give me every means of getting back to 
it quickly. 

" Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refus- 
ing me access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I 
should travel to Switzerland via Constance. During the 
night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a 
country which is taking part in the present war on the side of 
Germany. As I had no knowledge of the intentions of 
Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am nothing but 
an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Langwerth 
that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a 
promise that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities 

409 



[Y. I55j FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

would give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey 
and that Switzerland would not be closed to me. Heir 
von Langwerth has been good enough to answer me in 
writing that I could be assured of an easy journey and 
that the Austrian authorities would do all that was 
necessary. 

"It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has 
just announced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In 
view of the present situation, there is no security that I 
shall find a ship to take me to England, and it is this con- 
sideration which made me reject this proposal, with the 
approval of Herr von Langwerth. 

" In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as 
a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of 
obtaining that the rules of international courtesy should be 
observed towards me, but I hasten to protest to your Excel- 
lency against the manner in which I am being treated. 

"JULES CAMBON." 

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the 
journey would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. 
At 10 o'clock in the evening, I left the Embassy with my 
staff in the middle of a great assembly of foot and mounted 
police. 

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only 
represented by an officer of inferior rank. 

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took 
more than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed 
that at every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. 
I was accompanied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alex- 
andra Regiment of the Guard and by a police officer. In 
the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal the soldiers entered our 
carriages. The windows were shut and the curtains of the 
carriages drawn down ; each of us had to remain isolated 
in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or to touch 
his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage 
before the door of each of our compartments which were 
kept open, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The 
Russian Charge d'Affai^es, the women and children and every- 
one were subjected to the same treatment. 

410 



E4] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 156] 

At the last German station about n o'clock at night, 
Major von Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed 
to him the following letter to Herr von Jagow. 

, Q " Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914. 

" YESTERDAY before leaving Berlin, I protested in 
writing to your Excellency against the repeated change of 
route which was imposed upon me by the Imperial Govern- 
ment on my journey from Germany. 

1 To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the 
Kiel Canal an attempt was made to search all our luggage 
as if we might have hidden some instrument of destruction. 
Thanks to the interference of Major von Rheinbaben, we were 
spared this insult. But they went further. 

' They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, 
the windows and blinds having been closed. During this 
time, in the corridors of the carriages at the door of each 
compartment and facing each one of us, stood a soldier, 
revolver in hand, finger on the trigger, for nearly half an 
hour. 

" I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of 
violence to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of 
his Embassy, violence which nothing could even have made 
me anticipate. Yesterday I had the honour of writing to 
your Excellency that I was being treated almost as a pris- 
oner. To-day I am being treated as a dangerous prisoner. 
Also I must record that during our journey, which from 
Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has 
been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who 
were travelling with me to the frontier. 

" JULES CAMBON." 

I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly 
afterwards Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, 
to inform me that the train would not proceed to the Danish 
frontier if I did not pay the cost of this train. I expressed 
my astonishment that I had not been made to pay at Berlin 
and that at any rate I had not been forewarned of this. I 
^ offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest Berlin banks. 

4" 



[Y. 156] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

This facility was refused me. With the help of my com- 
panions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was 
required from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 
marks 75 pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance 
with the present rate of exchange.* 

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask 
Major von Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer 
and a gentleman that we should be taken to the Danish 
frontier. He gave it to me, and I required that the police- 
man who was with us should accompany us. 

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where 
the Danish Government had had a train made ready to 
take us to Copenhagen. 

I am assured that my English colleague and the Belgian 

Minister, although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by 

(1) [See B. the direct route to Holland. (1) I am struck by this difference 

160 i of treatment, and as Denmark and Norway are, at this 

G. 45-] moment, infested with spies, if I succeed in embarking in 

Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested at sea 

with the officials who accompany me. 

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying 
your Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the 
whole staff of the Embassy has given unceasing proof during 
the course of this crisis. I shall be glad that account should 
be taken of the services which on this occasion have been 
rendered to the Government of the Republic, in particular 
by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military and 
Naval Attaches. 

No. 156. 

M. Mallard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, August 4, 1914. 

t2) [Enclo- THE Minister of State came to see me at the Legation 
sure III.] this morning, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past 
1 [cf. Bel- eight o'clock, in order to notify me (2) that the German military 

Mini t ' au thorities required my departure. (3) On my answering that I 

departure, * Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given 
G. 66.] to the Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador. 
412 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 166] 

would only give way to force M. Eyschen said that he under- 
stood my feelings in this matter, and it was just for that 
reason that he had himself come to make this communication 
which cost him so much, for it was just because force was 
used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was 
going to bring me written proof of this. 

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety 
which I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, 
and asked him to be good enough to undertake their pro- 
tection ; this he promised to do. 

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter 
(Enclosure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Govern- 
ment to the declaration which I had made the evening before, 
according to telegraphic instructions of M. ViviamV 11 (1) [No. 

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to 
the Legation and left me, with a short note from himself, a 
certified copy of the letter which the German Minister had 
addressed to him on the subject of my departure from Luxem- 
burg. (Enclosures II. and III.) 

At the same time he told me that he had informed Heir 
von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted 
with the protection of the French and would have charge of 
the Legation and the Chancery. This news did not seem to 
be agreeable to my German colleague, who advised M. Eyschen 
to move me to entrust this responsibility to the Belgian 
Minister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situa- 
tion was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her Royal Highness 
the Grand Duchess and as my country was not in a state of 
war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly 
indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which 
should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. 
M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the service 
which I entrusted to him. 

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough 
to leave quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, 
as he said, would not fail to bring about reprisals on the 
part of the German military authorities against the French. I 
answered that I attached too much value to the safety of 
my countrymen to compromise it and that he had nothing to 
fear. 

My departure, which was required to take place as soon 

413 



Y. 156] FRENCH YELLOW BOOK [AUGUST 

as possible, was fixed for two o'clock ; it was at the same 
time understood that I should leave in my motor car. As to 
a safe conduct, M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister 
was at that very moment at the German headquarters to ask 
for it, and that he would take care that I received it in good 
time. 

At a quarter past two the Minister of State accompanied 
by M. Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take 
leave of me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those 
of the Chancery. 

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, 
and that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers 
and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would 
wait for me at the Merle road in order to go in front of my 
motor car. 

I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by 
the road which had been determined on, but I did not meet 
anyone. 

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed 
text of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before 
leaving my post (Enclosure IV.). 

ENCLOSURE I. 

M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to 
M. Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Luxemburg. 

SIR, Luxemburg, August 4, 1914. 

n) [c/. No. IN an oral communication made yesterday evening, IU 

129.] your Excellency has had the goodness to bring to my know- 

<a >[Vo]. II., ledge that in accordance with the Treaty of London of i867,' al 

p. 489.] the Government of the Republic intended to respect the 

neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as they had 

shown by their attitude, but that the violation of this neutrality 

by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to compel 

France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the care 

for her defence and her interests. 

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision 
of the Government of the Republic is based solely on the 
181 [No. 131; act of a third Power <3> for which in truth the Grand Duchy 
B. 147.] is not responsible. 
414 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 166] 

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact. 

The German Empire has formally declared that only a 
temporary occupation of Luxemburg entered into their 
intentions. 

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic 
will have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that 
at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has 
fully and loyally fulfilled all the obligations of every kind 
which rested on it in virtue of the Treaty of 1867. 

I remain, etc., 

EYSCHEN, 

Minister of Stale, President of the 
Government. 

ENCLOSURE II. 

Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President 
of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister at 
Luxemburg. 
SIR, 

A SHORT time ago I had with very great regret to in- 
form you of the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard 
to your sojourn in Luxemburg. 

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation 
in writing of the decision taken by the military authorities in 
this matter. 

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment 
received from the German Minister. 

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there 
will be no want of the respect due to your position and 
person. 

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my 
regret and my deep regard. 

EYSCHEN. 

ENCLOSURE III. 
To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen. 

YOUR EXCELLENCY, 

IN accordance with the instructions of his Excellency 
General Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good 

415 



[Y. 157] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

enough to request the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave 
Luxemburg as soon as possible and to return to France ; 
otherwise the German military authorities would find them- 
selves under the painful necessity of placing M. Mollard 
under the charge of a military escort and in the last extremity 
of proceeding to his arrest. 

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occa- 
sion to receive the assurance of my deepest regard. 

VON BUCK. 
ENCLOSURE IV. 

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency 
M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Govern- 
ment of Luxemburg. 

SIR, Luxemburg, August 4, 1914. 

I HAVE just received your communication and I submit 
to force. 

Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for 
the fortunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing 
the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Govern- 
ment, I have the honour to ask your Excellency to take 
them under your protection, and to watch over the safety 
of their lives and goods. 

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take 
charge of the Legation and the offices of the Chancery. 

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would 
be good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand 
Duchess the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses 
for not having been able myself to express them to her. 

In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you 
have given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of 
my deep regard. 

ARMAND MOLLARD. 

No. 157. 

Notification du Gouvernement frangais 
aux Representants des Puissances a Paris. 

Le Gouvernement imperial allemand, apres avoir laisse ses 
forces armies franchir la frontiere et se livrer sur le territoire 

416 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 157 J 

frangais divers actes de meurtre et de pillage ; apres 
avoir viole" la neutrality du Grand-Duche* de Luxembourg, 
au m^pris des stipulations de la Convention de Londres du 
ii mai 1867 et de la Convention V de la Haye du 18 octobre 
1907, sur les droits et devoirs des puissances et des personnes 
en cas de guerre sur terre (articles I et II), conventions signers 
de lui ; aprs avoir adresse* un ultimatum au Gouvernement 
royal de Belgique tendant a exiger le passage des forces 
allemandes par le territoire beige, en violation des Traite*s 
du 19 avril 1839, ^galement signers de lui et de la susdite 
Convention de La Haye 

A declare" la guerre a la France le 3 aout 1914, a 18 heures 45. 

Le Gouvernement de la Re*publique se voit, dans ces 
conditions, oblige, de son cote*, de recourir a la force des armes. 

II a, en consequence, 1'honneur de faire savoir, par la 
presente, au Gouvernement de . . . que 1'etat de guerre existe 
entre la France et 1'Allemagne & dater du 3 aout 1914, 18 h. 45. 

Le Gouvernement de la Re"publique proteste auprs 
de toutes les nations civilise"es et spcialement aupres des 
Gouvernements signataires des Conventions et Traite"s sus- 
rappele*s, contre la violation par 1'Empire allemand de ses 
engagements internationaux ; il fait toutes reserves quant 
aux repre*sailles qu'il pourrait se voir amener a exercer contre 
un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donne*e. 

Le Gouvernement de la Re*publique qui entend observer 
les principes du droit des gens, se conformera, durant les 
hostility et sous reserve de reciprocity, aux dispositions des 
Conventions international signers par la France, concernant 
le droit de la guerre sur terre et sur mer. 

La pre*sente notification, faite en conformite de 1'article 2 
de la IIP Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, relative 
a 1'ouverture des hostility, et remise a ... 

A Paris, le 4 aout 1914, a 14 heures. 

(TRANSLATION.) 

Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of 

the Powers at Paris. 

THE German Imperial Government, after having allowed 
its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various (1) [No. 
acts of murder and pillage on French territory; 111 after 139.] 

3D 4,7 



[Y. 157] 



B. 147-1 
< a > [See 
vol. II., 
p. 489.] 



<" [G. 20.] 

< 4 > [See 
vol. II., 

p. 487.] 

( " [No. 
I47-] 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 



[AUGUS 



<> [See 
first 

Military 
and 
first 
Naval 
vols.] 



having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxem- 
burg 111 in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of 
London, nth May, 1867, (a) and of Convention V. of the 
Hague, i8th October, 1907, on the rights and duties of Powers 
and persons in case of war on land (Articles i and 2),* Con- 
ventions which have been signed by the German Government ; 
after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Govern- 
ment of Belgium (s) with the object of requiring passage for 
German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the 
Treaties of the igth April, 1839, (4) which had been signed by 
them, and in violation of the above Convention of the Hague 

Have declared war on France' 5 ' at 6.45 p.m. on the 
3rd August, 1914. 

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic 
find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms. 

They have in consequence the honour of informing by 
these presents the Government of . . .. that a 
state of war exists between France and Germany dating 
from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August, 1914. 

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised 
nations, and especially those Governments which have signed 
the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the 
violation by the German Empire of their international engage- 
ments, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they 
might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy 
so little regardful of its plighted word. 

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe 
the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, 
and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accord- 
ance with the International Conventions signed by France 
concerning the law of war on land and sea. (8) 

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2f 
of the Third Convention of the Hague of the i8th October, 
1907, relating to the opening of hostilities and handed 

Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 p.m. 

* [Art. i : " The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable." 

Art. 2 : " Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either 

munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power."] 
f [Art. 2 : " The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral 

Powers without delay," etc.] 
418 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK ry. 158J 

No. 158. 

Message from M. Poincare, President of the Republic, read at 
the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914. 

(Journal Officiel of the $th August, 1914.) 

(The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of 

the message.) 
11 GENTLEMEN, 

" FRANCE has just been the object of a violent and 
premeditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law 
of nations. Before any declaration of war had been sent to 
us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his 
passports, our territory has been violated. 111 The German '"[No. 
Empire has waited till yesterday evening'" to give at this 
late stage the true name to a state of things which it had ( "[No. 
already created. 

" For more than forty years the French, in sincere love 
of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire 
for legitimate reparation. 

' They have given to the world the example of a great 
nation which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise 
of will, patience and labour, has only used its renewed and 
rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the 
good of humanity. 

" Since the ultimatum of Austria" 1 opened a crisis which ( "[B. 4.] 
threatened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in 
following and in recommending on all sides a policy of 
prudence, wisdom and moderation. 

' To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no 
word, which has not been peaceful and conciliatory. 

" At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the 
right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has 
made, up to the last moment, supreme efforts to avert the 
war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for 
which the German Empire will have to bear before history. 
(Unanimous and repeated applause.) 

" On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies 
were publicly expressing our hope' 41 of seeing negotiations (4) [See Nos. 
which had been begun under the auspices of the London 

4'* 



[Y. 158] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Aucus 

Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion, Germany suddenly 

(1) [No. declared war upon Russia/ 1 ' she has invaded the territory 

I 34-J of Luxemburg, (8) she has outrageously insulted the noble 

(a) [No. Belgian nation (s) (loud and unanimous applause), our neigh- 

131 i. B< bour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall 

(8) r J?7'J , upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. 

(Fresh and repeated unanimous applause.) 

" But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, 
she was prepared ; and our enemies will meet on their path 
our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will 
provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our 
national forces will be methodically completed. 

" Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day 
accompanies with her maternal thought (loud applause) has 
risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the 
country. (Unanimous and repeated applause.) 

" The President of the Republic interpreting the unanimous 
feeling of the country, expresses to our troops by land and 
14 ee . sea the admiration and confidence of every Frenchman. w 
Military (Loud and prolonged applause.) 

vol.] " Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will 

persevere with the cool self-restraint of which, since the 
beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as 
always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble 
daring and most ardent enthusiasm with that self-control 
which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee 
of victory. (Applause.) 

" In the war which is beginning France will have Right on 
her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity 
be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals. 
(Loud and unanimous applause.) 

" She will be heroically defended by all her sons ; nothing 
will break their sacred union before the enemy ; to-day they 
are joined together as brothers in a common indignation 
against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith. (Loud 
and prolonged applause and cries of ( Vive la France. 1 ) 

" She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (loud and 
unanimous applause) ; she is supported by the loyal friend- 
ship of England. (Loud and unanimous applause?) 

" And already from every part of the civilised world 
sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day 

420 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 159] 

once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice 
and Reason (loud and repeated applause) ' Haut les cceurs et 
vive la France ! ' (Unanimous and prolonged applause.) 

No. 159. 

Speech delivered by M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, 
in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914. 

(Journel Officiel, August 5, 1914.) 
M. Rene" Viviani, President of the Council. 

GENTLEMEN, 

THE German Ambassador yesterday' 1 ' left Paris after m [Monday 
notifying us"' of the existence of a state of war. Aug. 3.] 

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the w [No. 
events'" which in less than ten days have unloosed a 147-] 
European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, "'!>/ B., 
to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice \ ntro " 
of which is emphasised by its calculated unexpectedness. NarraT 

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began' 41 t j ve 
before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last (9. 
act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare l *'[No. 
before our own democracy and before the opinion of the 
civilised world. 

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the 
Austro-Hungarian Heir- Apparent and the Duchess of Hohen- 
burg their lives,"' difficulties arose between the Cabinets of wrT Une2 g 
Vienna and Belgrade. 1914.] 

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially 
informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the 
date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communi- 
cated to them a circular' 81 which the Press has published. <> [R. 8.] 

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an 
ultimatum' 7 ' delivered the evening before to Serbia by the m[B. ^.j 
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 

This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous 
Serbian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, 
hinted that the official Serbian authorities themselves were 
no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Serbia by 
6 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25th. 

431 



[Y. 159] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, 

without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign 

State. Notwithstanding their excessive character, Serbia, 

(1) [B. 39.] on July 25th, declared' 1 ' that she submitted to them almost 

without reserve. 

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria- 
Hungary, a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not un- 
connected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the 
<2) [Se<fNo. first moment by France, Russia and Great Britain. w 

The value of this advice was all the greater since the 
Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the 
Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three pre- 
ceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government had on 
several occasions given an assurance that their claims would 
" Pf s- |' be extremely moderate. (8) 

sifvoili ^ was ' therefore, with natural astonishment that the 

p. 116).] ' Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London learned on 

26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few 

( minutes' examination, declared that the Serbian reply was 

23 *J inacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations. <4) 

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on 

Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to 

8 [No. 28.] tne French Minister for Foreign Affairs a note verbale (6} 

asserting that the Austro-Serbian dispute must remain 

localised, without intervention by the great Powers, or 

otherwise " incalculable consequences " were to be feared. 

A similar demarche was made on Saturday, the 25th, at 

<>[0n London (6) and at St. Petersburg. (7) 

Friday, Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between 

the 24th, t ne threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador 

g* 1 at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers 

<) [ c f. 6. 8.] f the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice 

which they gave to Serbia to submit ? 

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of 
the German demarche, we immediately, in agreement with 
our allies and our friends, took a conciliatory course and 
(8) [c/. Nos. invited Germany to join in it. (8) 

34. 3. w e have had from the first moment regretfully to recog- 
nise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response 
at Berlin. 

( "[No. 36.] Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling'" to give to 
422 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 159] 

Austria-Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave 
her the right to offer, but from this moment and still more 
in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the 
Cabinet at Vienna and the compromises suggested by the 
other Powers. 

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war 
on Serbia. 111 This declaration of war, with its aggravation "'[No. 83; 
of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplo- B 5-] 
matic relations three days before, gave ground for believing 
that there was a deliberate desire for war, and a systematic 
programme for the enslavement of Serbia. 

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the 
independence of a brave people, but the balance of power in 
the Balkans, embodied in the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913, 
and consecrated by the moral support of all the great 
Powers. 

However, at the suggestion of the British Government, 
with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance 
of the peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, 
or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente 
tried to continue them. ( " ( " [cf. Nos. 

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action 85,86.] 
by the four Powers," 1 England, France, Germany and Italy, (S) [B. 36.] 
which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate 
satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the 
dispute. 

On Wednesday, the 2gth, the Russian Government, noting 
the persistent failure of these efforts and faced by the Austrian 
mobilisation u) and declaration of war, (5) fearing the military (4) [No. 100; 
destruction of Serbia, decided as a precautionary measure to O. 51.] 
mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, ""[No. 83.] 
the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier 
exclusively. (e) '" [No. 95 ; 

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful B - 7 ( I )-l 
to inform the German Government that their measures, 
restricted as they were and without any offensive character 
towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against 
Germany. 171 (7| [B. 93 

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, (2).] 
the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknow- 
ledged this without demur. 



[Y . 159] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [AUGUST 

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, 
with the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to 
bring Austria and Serbia into touch under the moral patronage 
of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined 
negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the 
clearest proof. 

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable 
that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been 
disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion 
was destined to become a certainty. 

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six 
hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On 
the 3ist July Germany, by proclaiming " a state of danger 
(1| [No. of war," ' cut the communications between herself and the 
II 6.] rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom 
to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military prepara- 
tions which, as you have seen, nothing could justify. 

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to 
explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army 
(2) [Nos. from a peace footing to a war footing. (a) 
106, 114.] From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even 
before the expiration of the time limit given to Serbia by 
Austria, she had confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace- 
Lorraine. The same day she had placed the frontier-works 
in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indi- 
cated to the railways the measures preparatory for concentra- 
tion. On the 27th, she had completed requisitions and 
placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the 
summons of individual reservists had begun and units which 
were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it. 

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, 
leave us in doubt of Germany's intentions ? 

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 3ist 

July, the German Government, which, since the 24th, had 

not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts 

(3| [No. of the Triple Entente, addressed an ultimatum 1 " to the 

-3& I]C 7-] Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had 

ordered a general mobilisation of her armies, and demanded 

that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours. 

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form 

because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a 

424 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 159] 

movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the 
German Emperor for his mediation,' 11 was put forward at (1) [App. V. 
a moment when, on the request of England and with the j [I -.V.,VI) 
knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government was accept- *PP\ , 43 ' 
ing a formula'*' of such a nature as to lay the foundation for (Jp^. 
a friendly settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute and of 112, 113.] 
the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of 
military operations and of military preparations. 

The same day this unfriendly demarche towards Russia 
was supplemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards 
France ; the rupture of communications by road, railway, 
telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives 
on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns 
in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and 
the concentration of troops on this frontier. 

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing 
in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the German 
representative continued to shower upon us. (Hear, hear.) 

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter 
of the " state of danger of war."'" w [cf. B. 

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called X 36.] 
up, 1 * 1 and that transport was being collected even for those (4| [c/. B. 
army corps which were stationed a considerable distance 
from the frontier. 

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, 
watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from 
hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation 
required ; the general mobilisation of our forces' 91 on land '"{No. 
and sea was ordered. I2 7-J 

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting for 
the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the English 
proposal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on 
Russia.' 6 ' w [No. 

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard *34-] 
for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the 
peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, 
and in defiance of the rules of international law, German 
troops crossed our frontier at three different points. 171 (7> [Nos. 

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867,"" ^36, 139-] 
which guaranteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality * 
of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand 

425 



[Y. 159] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Aucus: 

Duchy and so gave cause for a protest by the Luxemburg 

(I) [B. 147.3 Government. (1) 

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. 
The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, 

(2| [G. 20.] presented to the Belgian Government an ultimatum w 
requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against 
France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was 

(3) [G. 22.] threatened by us ; the Belgian Government refused, w and 
declared that they were resolved to defend with vigour their 
neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed 

w [See by treaties, (4) and in particular by the King of Prussia. 
vol. II. (Unanimous and prolonged applause.) 

Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been 
renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen 
points our frontier has been violated. Shots have been fired 
at our soldiers and Customs officers. Men have been killed 
and wounded. Yesterday a German military aviator dropped 
three bombs on Luneville. 

The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the 
great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny 
them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he 
came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to 
notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his 
reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by 
French aviators in German territory in the Eifel district, 
and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. 

(5) [No. This i s the letter <8) which he handed to me on the subject : 
147-3 

" M. LE PRESIDENT, 

1 The German administrative and military authorities 
have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts 
committed on German territory by French military aviators. 
Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium 
by flying over the territory of that country ; one has attempted 
to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in 
the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the rail- 
way near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. 

' I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your 
Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression 
the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with 
France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. 
426 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 159] 

" At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the 
knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities 
will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but 
they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are 
assured of complete reciprocity. 

" My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it 
only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good 
enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the 
steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, 
with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the 
Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in 
Paris. 

" Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assur- 
ances of my deepest respect. 

" (Signed) SCHOEN." 

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these 
pretexts which they would put forward as grievances ? At 
no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, 
nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or 
any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of 
Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (l) (1> [*/ Nos - 
(Loud and unanimous applause.) I4 ' I4 ^ 

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice 
and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all 
the necessary steps ; they are being carried out strictly, 
regularly, and with calmness. 

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues 
with remarkable vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm. 
(Unanimous and prolonged applause, all the deputies rising 
from their seats.) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 
men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour 
to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. 
(Renewed loud and unanimous applause.) 

The entire English fleet is mobilised"" and orders have (8) [cf. No. 
been given to mobilise the land forces.* (Loud cheers, all 
the deputies rising to their feet.) 

* [The British Army Reservists were called out by Royal Proclamation 
on Tuesday, August 4, the day on which this speech was delivered by M. 
Viviani.J 

427 



[Y. 159] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Aucus 

Since 1912 pourparlers had taken place between English 
and French General Staffs and were concluded by an ex- 
change of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul 
Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yester- 
day evening communicated these letters to the House of 
Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the 
British Government, to acquaint you with the contents of 
{l) [See Sir these two documents. (1) 

E - Gr <;y' s Foreign Office, 

^LH November 22, 1912. 

p 403 ' MY DEAR AMBASSADOR, 

also B. From time to time in recent years the French and British 
3* 5 . naval and military experts have consulted together. It has 

and2 S ).l a l wavs Deen understood that such consultation does not 
restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any 
future time whether or not to assist the other by armed 
force. We have agreed that consultation between experts 
is. not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that 
commits either Government to action in a contingency that 
has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 
instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at 
the present moment is not based upon an engagement to 
co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Govern- 
ment had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a 
third Power, it might become essential to know whether it 
could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the 
other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to 
expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or some- 
thing that threatened the general peace, it should immediately 
discuss with the other whether both Governments should act 
together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if 
so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. 
If these measures involved action, the plans of the General 
Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the 
Governments would then decide what effect should be given 
to them. 

Yours, &c., 

E. GREY. 

4 38 



\ 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. 159] 

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied 
on the 23rd November, 1912 : 

London, November 23, 1912. 
DEAR SIR EDWARD, 

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd 
November, that during the last few years the military and 
naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted 
with each other from time to time ; that it had always been 
understood that these consultations should not restrict the 
liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether 
they should lend each other the support of their armed 
forces ; that, on either side, these consultations between 
experts were not and should not be considered as engage- 
ments binding our Governments to take action in certain 
eventualities ; that, however, I had remarked to you that, 
if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to 
fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it 
would become essential to know whether it could count on 
the armed support of the other. 

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to 
state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having 
grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third 
Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that 
Government would immediately examine with the other the 
question whether both Governments should act together in 
order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. 
If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the 
measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; 
if those measures involved action, the two Governments 
would take into immediate consideration the plans of their 
general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be 
given to those plans. 

Yours, &c., 

PAUL CAMBON. 

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs spoke of France amidst the applause of the w[Set 
members in a noble and warm-hearted manner 01 and his vol. II., 
language has already found an echo deep in the hearts of all pp-4<>5-6 ] 

429 



[Y. 159] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Aucusi 

Frenchmen. (Loud and unanimous applause.) I wish in the 
name of the Government of the Republic to thank the English 
Government from this tribune for their cordial words and 
the Parliament of France will associate itself in this senti- 
ment. (Renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause.) 

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in par- 
<l) [See No. ticular the following declaration : (1) 

137 and 

footnote.] " In case the German fleet came into the Channel or 
entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles 
with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French 
navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the English 
fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its 
complete protection in such a way that from that moment 
England and Germany would be in a state of war." 

From now onwards, the English fleet protects our northern 
and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, 
these are the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them 
is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the 
Republic. I wish, however, to make clear the conclusion to 
be drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to 
the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim. 

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, 
desired to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 
1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction 
of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention 
of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a 
later date by ties of alliance and of friendship (unanimous 
applause), by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain. 
(Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.) 

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her 
national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements 
unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself 
from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace 
Bismarck was able to impose upon Europe. 

She has re-established the balance of power in Europe, 
a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all. 

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems 
to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and 
honour finally ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial 
co-operation of King Edward VII. of England and the 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [T. 159] 

Government of the Crown (applause), this is what the German 
Empire wishes to destroy to-day 111 by one daring stroke. (1( [c/. No. 

Germany can reproach us with nothing. XI 4-] 

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the 
wound which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an 
unprecedented sacrifice. (Loud and unanimous applause.) 

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions 
which since 1904 German diplomacy has systematically pro- 
voked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 
1908, in 1911. 

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the 
time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present 
crisis. 

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente 
with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and 
Germany formulated demands, whether against Serbia or 
against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable 
of settlement by discussion. 

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since 
to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and our- 
selves, are attacked by surprise. (Prolonged applause.) 

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. 
Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right 
and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, are 
subject ; Italy, with that clarity of insight possessed by the 
Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve 
neutrality. 1 " (Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their <>[No. 124; 
feet.) B. 152.] 

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest 
joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the 
Italian Charge* d'Affaires, when I told him how much I 
congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who 
have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and 
glorious past, are not now opposed to one another. (Renewed 
applause.) 

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack 
it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the 
Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power for the 
service of peace." 1 The object of attack is the liberties of < J >[ C /. No. 
Europe, which France, her allies, and her friends, are proud 114-] 
to defend. (Loud applause.) 

43 ' 



ry. 159] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Aucus' 

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that 
are in dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext. 

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has 
done everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, 
she will defend herself against Germany and against every 
Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins 
with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. 
(Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.) 

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, 
and is wholly united to defend its existence ; a democracy 
which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was 
not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to 
the armaments of its neighbour ; a nation armed, struggling 
for its own life and for the independence of Europe here is 
a sight which we are proud to offer to the onlookers in this 
desperate struggle, that has for some days been preparing 
with the greatest calmness and method. We are without 
reproach. We shall be without fear. (Loud applause, all the 
deputies rising to their feet.) France has often proved in less 
favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adver- 
sary when she fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for 
right. (Applause.) 

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who are 
our judges, we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our 
heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the 
conviction that we have done our duty. (Prolonged applause, 
all the deputies rising to their /eet.) 



43* 



141 



[Y. 160 



CHAPTER VII. 



No. 160. 

DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE. 
(September 4, 1914.) (1) 



DECLARATION. 

M. Delcasse", Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French 
Ambassadors and Ministers abroad. 

Paris, September 4, 1914. 

The following declaration has this morning (1) been signed 
at the Foreign Office at London : 

" The undersigned duly authorised thereto by their 
respective Governments hereby declare as follows : 

" The British, French and Russian Governments 
mutually engage not to conclude peace separately 
during the present war. The three Governments 
agree that when terms of peace come to be dis- 
cussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of 
peace without the previous agreement of each of 
the other Allies." 



' [The 

actual 
date of 
signature 
was 

Sept. 5. 
See 

vol. II., 
p. 506.] 



(Signed) PAUL CAMBON. 

COUNT BENCKENDORFF. 
EDWARD GREY. 



This declaration will be published to-day. 



2 E 



DELCASS. 

435 



[Y. App. ij FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

APPENDICES 



EXTRACTS 

FROM THE " BLUE-BOOK " (ENGLISH), FROM THE " GREY- 
BOOK " (BELGIAN), FROM THE " WHITE-BOOK " (GER- 
MAN), FROM THE " ORANGE-BOOK " (RUSSIAN). 



APPENDIX I. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE " BLUE-BOOK " RELATING TO THE ATTI- 
TUDE TAKEN BY THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN REGARD 

TO RUSSIA, GERMANY, AND FRANCE, DURING THE 
POURPARLERS WHICH PRECEDED THE WAR. 

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 6, 87, 89, 99, 119, 148, 
quoted in full, or so far as relevant, from the British Blue- 
book.] 

APPENDIX II. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE " BLUE-BOOK " RELATING TO THE PRO- 
POSALS MADE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE 

ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ENGLAND'S 
NEUTRALITY. 

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 85, 101, 123, quoted in full, 
or so far as relevant, from the British Blue-book.] 



APPENDIX II. (b). 

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN, ON THE PLEA OF A " MIS- 
UNDERSTANDING," A GUARANTEE BY ENGLAND OF THE 
NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE IN A GERMAN-RUSSIAN WAR.* 

(Semi-official publication in the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung," August 20, 1914.) 

* [For fuller elucidation of this matter see vol. II., pp. 360-365 and 436- 
439, where further documents are given.] 

434 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. App. IL (b)] 

No. i. 

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr 
von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire. 

London, July 31, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY has just called me to the telephone 
and asked me if I thought I could say that we would not 
attack France if she remained neutral in a German-Russian 
-war. I said I thought I could assume responsibility for this. 

LICHNOWSKY. 

No. 2. 

Telegram from the Emperor William to King George V. 

Berlin, August i, 1914. 

I HAVE just received the communication from your 
Government offering me the neutrality of France under the 
guarantee of Great Britain. This offer was accompanied by 
the question whether, in these circumstances, Germany would 
not attack France. For technical reasons my mobilisation, 
Avhich has been ordered for both fronts, East and West, this 
afternoon, must be carried out in accordance with preparations 
already begun. 

Orders countermanding this cannot be given and un- 
fortunately your telegram came too late. But if France 
offers her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the 
English navy and army, I will refrain from attacking her 
and will use my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will 
not be nervous. At this moment the troops on my frontier 
are stopped by telegraphic and telephonic orders from continu- 
ing their advance over the French frontier. 

WILLIAM. 

No. 3. 

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of the Empire, to 
Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London. 

Berlin, August i, 1914. 

GERMANY is ready to agree to the English proposals 
if England will guarantee, with her military and naval forces, 

431 



[Y. App. n. (b)] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

the neutrality of France in the Russo-German conflict. 
German mobilisation took place to-day, in reply to Russian 
provocation, and before the receipt of the English proposals. 
Consequently our concentration on the French frontier can- 
not be modified. We guarantee, however, that between now 
and Monday, August 3, at 7 p.m., the French frontier shall 
not be crossed if England's acceptance has reached us by 
that time. 

BETHMANN HOLLWEG. 



No. 4. 

Telegram from King George V. to the Emperor William. 

London, August I, 1914. 

IN reply to your telegram which has just reached me,. 
I think there has been a misunderstanding with regard ta 
the suggestion made during the course of a friendly conversa- 
tion between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey, when 
they were discussing how an armed conflict between Germany 
and France might be delayed until a means of agreement 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia had been found. Sir 
Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky to-morrow morning 
to make it clear that there has certainly been misunderstand- 
ing on the part of the latter. 

GEORGE. 

No. 5. 

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr 
von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire. 

London, August 2, 1914. 

SIR EDWARD GREY'S suggestions, founded on England's- 
wish to remain neutral, were made without previous agree- 
ment with France, and have since been abandoned as useless. 

LICHNOWSKY. 
436 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. App. v.J 



APPENDIX III. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE " BLUE-BOOK " RELATING TO ENGLAND'S 
REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW ON 
THE QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEU- 
TRALITY. 

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 153, 155, 157, 159, 160 (so 
iar as relevant), quoted from the British Blue-book.] 



APPENDIX IV. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE " GREY-BOOK " POINTING OUT THE 
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GERMANY VIOLATED 
BELGIAN NEUTRALITY. 

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 2 (with enclosure), 8, 9, n, 
12 (with enclosure), 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 
39, 40, 41, 44, 48, 52, 60, 71, quoted in full from the Belgian 
Orey-book.] 

APPENDIX V. 

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II 
AND THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 

(EXTRACTS FROM THE GERMAN WHITE-BOOK.) 

I. 

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas. 

July 28, 1914, 10.45 p.m. 

I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression 
which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against 
Serbia. (1) The unscrupulous agitation which has been going {l) [6.4, 50.1 
on for years in Serbia, has led to the revolting crime of which 
Archduke Franz Ferolinand has become a victim. The spirit 
which made the Serbians murder their own King and his 
consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will 
agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other 
sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those 

437 



[Y. App. V.] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their 
deserved punishment. 

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty 
encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide- 
of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which 
has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use 
my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a 
frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope 
confidently that You will support me in my efforts to over- 
come all difficulties which may yet arise. 

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin, 

WILLIAM, 

II. 

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William. 

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1914, i p.m. 

{l} [See Y. I AM glad that You are back in Germany. (1) In this 

50, serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An igno- 

footnote.] minious war has been declared against a weak country and 

in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. 

I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure 

exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures 

which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European 

war would be (le malheur que serait une guerre europeenne) r 

I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all ia 

Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far. 

NICHOLAS. 
III. 

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas. 

July 29, 1914, 6.30 p.m. 

I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire 
for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot as I 
told You in my first telegram consider the action of Austria- 
Hungary as an " ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows 
from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they 
are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. 
438 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. App. V.] 

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary 
is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty 1 " |1( 0/. No. 
that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into 9 2 B -93 
deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explana- 
tion of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended 
no territorial gain"" at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore ( * 
of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a ; 
spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe 
into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a 
direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your 
Government and Vienna, 1 " an understanding which as I w fc/.B.84.J 
have already telegraphed You my Government endeavours 
to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures 
by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria- 
Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us 
desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator 
which upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid I 
willingly accepted. (4) (4) [c/.0.76.j 

WILLIAM. 



IV. 

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas. 

July 30, 1914, i a.m. 

MY Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention 
of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences 
of a mobilisation." 1 I have told You the same in my last w [SecB. 
telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against 7 C 1 )-] 
Serbia,'" and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems (6) [c/. Y. 
to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your 9. 9 1 -] 
Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of 
the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such 
friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express 
desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire <7> t c /- ^- 
weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders. 171 You *^*n 
have to bear the responsibility for war or peace. I8) <> [ c /. Y. 56 

and note.] 
WILLIAM. 

439 



[Y. App.v.] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

V. 

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William. 

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1.20 p.m. 

I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. 1 
am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the 
Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking 
< l '[c/.Y.38, form were decided upon five days ago, (1) and for the reason of 
50.] defence against the preparations of Austria. (8) I hope with 
>1] [ c t' y^ ., all my heart that these measures will not influence in any 
manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very 
highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that 
an understanding can be arrived at with us. 

NICHOLAS. 



VI. 

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William. 

July 31, 1914. 

I THANK You cordially for Your mediation which per- 
mits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It 
is technically impossible to discontinue our military prepara- 
tions which have been made necessary by the Austrian 
( " [c/.O-78.] mobilisation. (8) It is far from us to want war. As long as the 
negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops 
(4) [c/. Y. 54, will undertake no provocative action. (4) I give You my 
102, 103, solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the 
J *7 O. grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation 
in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of 
Europe. 

Your cordially devoted 

NICHOLAS. 

440 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. App. V.] 



VII.* 

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas. 

July 31, 1914, 2 p.m. 

UPON Your appeal to my friendship and Your request 
for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Govern- 
ment and the Government of Austria-Hungary." 1 While (1| [c/.B.84, 
this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilised ** Io8 -l 
against my ally Austria-Hungary,'" whereby, as I have W [B. 70 
already communicated to You, my mediation has become 
almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and 
now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war 
are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for 
the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. 
I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts 
for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I 
who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now 
threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in Your hand to 
avert it."' No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia (> '[ c /- Telfr- 
which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. ^ e -, 
The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to 
me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been 
sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while 
it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. 
The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia 
decides to discontinue those military preparations which 
menace Germany and Austria-Hungary. U) (4) [cf. O. 

WILLIAM. 70.] 

VIII. 

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William. 

August I, 1914, 2 p.m. w (8) [c/. Nar- 

I HAVE received Your telegram. I comprehend that w !1 

You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from V oV. II., 

You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that pp. 132- 

these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue X 35-] 

* [This telegram crossed No. VI. from the Tsar to the German Emperor. 
See W., vol. II., p. 133.] 



[Y. App. V.] FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK 

to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the 
universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid 
of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to 
prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence 
Your urgent reply.* 

NICHOLAS. 



IX. 

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas. 

Berlin, August I, 1914. 

I THANK You for Your telegram. I have shown yester- 
day to Your Government the way through which alone war 
may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day 
111 [SceQ. noon, (1) no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me 
70.] with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been 
forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and 
unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to- 
avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, 
to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. 
I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order 
Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest 
violation of our frontiers. 

WILLIAM. 

[These nine telegrams were not all that passed between 
the two Emperors during the height of the crisis, though 
they are all that are disclosed in the German White-book. 
On January 3ist, 1915, the Official Messenger of Petrograd 
published the following announcement : 

"The Russian Foreign Office has been authorised by the 
Emperor Nicholas to give publicity to his Majesty's telegram 

* [In the French of the Yellow-book the last sentence reads : " J' attends 
avec confiance une reponse de toi." It would appear, however, from the 
statement in the Official Messenger of Petrograd quoted below, that this- 
correspondence was carried on in the English language.] 
442 



FRENCH YELLOW-BOOK [Y. App. VI.] 

despatched to the German Emperor on July 2Qth last in 
English in the following terms : 

' Thanks for your telegram, conciliatory and friendly, 
whereas official message presented to-day by your 
Ambassador to my Minister "' was conveyed in a (l} [Set O. 
very different tone. Beg you to explain this 58 1 Y. 
divergency. It would be right to give over the I00 -l 
Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Conference. 
Trust in your wisdom and friendship/ ' 

A more recent German official publication ("Aktenstiicke 
zum Kriegsausbruch"), published in the spring of 1915, 
includes this telegram, dating it from " Peterhof Palace, 
29 July, 8.20 p.m./' and places it in its proper chronological 
order, between No. III. and No. IV. of the series printed 
above.] 



APPENDIX VI. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE " ORANGE-BOOK " RELATING TO 
GERMANY'S DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA. 

[Here follow Despatches Nos. 76, 77, 78, quoted in full 
from the Russian Orange-book.] 



44? 



DOCUMENTS 



RESPECTING THE 



NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE WAR 



PUBLISHED BY 



THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. 



Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His 
Majesty. October 1914. 



[Official Translation Published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous, 
No. ii (1914). Cd. 7626.] 






[0.] 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



TABLE OF CONTENTS.* 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Subject. 



M. de Strandtman to 
M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 



(Telegraphic) 

Communicated by 
Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador 

M. Sazonof to Prince 
Kudachef 

(Telegraphic) 



M. Sazonof to Rus- 
sian Representa- 
tives at London, 
Berlin, Rome, and 
Paris 

(Telegraphic) 

Alexander, Prince 
Regent of Serbia, 
to the Tsar 

(Telegraphic) 

M. Bronewsky to 
M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 



1914. 

Belgrade, 

July 23 



Vienna, 
July 24 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 24 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 24 



Belgrade, 
July 24 



Berlin, 
July 24 



Austro-Hungarian Minister 
at Belgrade has presented 
ultimatum to Serbia. 
Help of Russia solicited 

Text of Austro-Hungarian 
note to Serbia 

Note verbale communicating 
text of Austro-Hungarian 
note 

Message to Count Berchtold 
requesting extension of 
time limit allowed to Ser- 
bia 

Hopes the various Govern- 
ments will share the Rus- 
sian point of view 



Appeals for aid 



Berlin Press welcomes the 
strong line adopted by 
Austria 



[Supplied by the Editor.] 



446 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



[0.] 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Subject. 


I 


8 


M. Sevastopoulo to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
Paris, 
July 24 


Austrian note officially com- 
municated to France. 
German Ambassador's 
communication to M. 










Bienvenu - Martin : the 










Austrian arguments j mili- 
tary measures against 
Serbia possible 


461 


9 


M. de Strandtman to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Belgrade, 
July 24 


Serbia will appeal to the 
Powers ; will make war, if 
inevitable 


462 


10 


Announcement by 
Russian Govern- 
ment 


St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 25 


Russian Government closely 
following the dispute ; 
cannot remain indifferent 


462 


zi 


Prince Kudachef to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Vienna, 
July 25 


Has telegraphed to Count 
Berchtold proposal to ex- 
tend time limit 


462 


13 




M 


Austrian Government refuse 






(Telegraphic) 




to extend time limit 


463 


13 


M. de Strandtman to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Belgrade, 

July 25 


Transmits Serbian reply to 
Austro-Hungarian note . . 


463 


14 


M. Bronewsky to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Berlin, 
July 25 


Has received No. 5. Con- 
versation with Heir von 
JJagow respecting time 
limit. Fails to obtain 










promise of action at Vienna 


463 


15 


M. Sevastopoulo to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Paris, 
July 25 


Has made communication 
as instructed in No. 5 . . 


464 


16 


Count Benckendorff 
to M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


London, 
July 25 


No. 5 received. Conversa- 
tion with Sir E. Grey, who 
imparted Austrian Am- 
bassador's explanation of 
the note to Serbia 


464 



447 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



Subject. 



18 



20 



M. Sazonof to Count 
Benckendorlf 

(Telegraphic) 

Communicated by 
German Ambas- 
sador 



M. Sevastopoulo to 
M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 



Count Benckendorff 
to M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 



21 



22 



M. de Strandtman to 
M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 

Count Benckendorff 
to M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 



1914. 

St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 25 

Berlin, 
July 25 



Paris, 
July 25 



London, 
July 25 



Belgrade, 
July 25 



London, 
July 25 



Counts upon England to side 
with Russia and France 



Note verbale denying that 
Germany instigated Aus- 
tro-Hungarian action or 
knew beforehand text of 
Austrian note. The con- 
flict should be localised . . 

Refers to No. 8. German 
Ambassador has contra- 
dicted statement in Press 
that he had uttered 
threats : Germany could 
only be guided by her 
duties as an ally 

Declaration of German Am- 
bassador to Sir E. Grey. 
German .Government not 
informed of text of Aus- 
trian note, but supported 
Austria's action ; sug- 
gested British pressure at 
St. Petersburg. Sir E. 
Grey's reply and refusal 

Austrian Minister leaves Bel- 
grade. Skupshtina con- 
voked for 2yth July at 
Nish 

Sir E. Grey has proposed 
to German Ambassador 
that Germany, France, 
Italy and Great Britain 
should offer their good 
offices ; German consent 
essential 



448 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



[0.] 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Subject. 


i> 

9 

0. 






1914. 






23 


M. Sazonof to Rus- 


St. Peters- 


Suggests that Italy should 






sian Ambassador 


burg, 


bring influence to bear on 






at Rome 


July 26 


Austria 


468 




(Telegraphic) 








24 


M. Kazansky to 


Prague, 


Mobilisation decreed 


468 




M. Sazonof 


July 26 








(Telegraphic) 








25 


M. Sazonof to 


St. Peters- 


Has proposed that Austrian 






M. Sch<be"ko 


burg, 


Ambassador should be 






(Telegraphic) 


July 26 


authorised to enter into 










a private exchange of 










views for re-drafting cer- 










tain articles of Austrian 










note 


468 


26 


M. Sazonof to 


St. Peters- 


To communicate No. 25 to 






M. Swerbeiev 


burg, 


German Foreign Minister, 






(Telegraphic) 


July 26 


hoping he will advise 










Vienna to meet proposal 










in friendly spirit 


469 


27 


M. Sevastopoulo to 


Paris, 


Director of Political Depart- 






M. Sazonof 


July 26 


ment surprised that Ser- 






(Telegraphic) 




bian reply failed to satisfy 










Baron Giesl 


469 


28 


> > 


M 


German Ambassador's de- 






(Telegraphic) 




claration that it rests with 










Russia to prevent war, 










and proposal that France 










should exercise moderating 










influence at St. Peters- 










burg. French Minister re- 










fused to agree 


470 


29 


M II 


M 


Director of Political Depart- 






(Telegraphic) 




ment believes German 










representations at Paris 










aim at intimidating France 


470 


30 


M. Bronewsky to 


Berlin, 


Reports noisy demonstra- 






M. Sazonof 


July 26 


tions in favour of Austria 


471 




(Telegraphic) 









a F 



449 



[0.] 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



No. 



Name. 



Count Benckendorff 
to M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 



33 



34 



35 



M. Sazonof to Rus- 
sian Ambassadors 
at Paris and Lon- 
don 

(Telegraphic) 



M. Sazonof to Rus- 
sian Ambassadors 
at Paris, London, 
Berlin, Vienna, 
and Rome 

(Telegraphic) 

M. Sevastopoulo to 
M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 



M. Isvolsky to 
M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic) 



Place and 

Date of 

Despatch. 



1914. 
London, 
July 27 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 27 



St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 27 



Paris, 
July 27 



Paris, 
July 27 



Subject. 



Has received No. 25. Do 
M. Sazonof's direct discus- 
sions with Vienna har- 
monise with Sir E. Grey's 
scheme for mediation by 
the four Governments ? 
The latter has been com- 
municated to Berlin, Paris, 
and Rome 

Has expressed readiness to 
fall in with British pro- 
posal for a conference of 
the four Powers in London, 
or any other likely to lead 
to a favourable settlement 

Serbian reply to Austria 
exceeds all expectations 
in its moderation 



German Ambassador my: 
great stress on the impos 
sibility of any mediation 
or conference 

German Ambassador's de- 
claration in writing that 
Austria seeks no territorial 
acquisitions and harbours 
no designs against integ- 
rity of Serbia ; that it rests 
with Russia to avoid 
war ; that Germany and 
France should exercise 
moderating influence upon 
Russia. French Minister 
convinced the object is to 
alienate Russia and France 



450 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



[O.J 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Subject. 


1 

PU 






1914. 






36 


M. Isvolsky to 


Paris, 


Reports intentional delay of 






M. Sazonof 


July 27 


diplomatic telegrams in 






(Telegraphic) 




Austrian telegraph office 


473 


37 


> ) 





Serbian reply pronounced 






(Telegraphic) 




unsatisfactory in Vienna ; 










Austria will proceed to 










" energetic action " 


474 


38 


M. Bronewsky to 


Berlin, 


Heir von Jagow says Count 






M. Sazonof 


July 27 


Szapiry might as well go 






(Telegraphic) 




on with conversation at 










St. Petersburg ; cannot 










advise Austria to give way 


474 


39 


a 





French Ambassador has sug- 






(Telegraphic) 




gested advice to be given 










to Vienna ; Herr von 










Jagow refuses point-blank 


474 


40 


The Tsar to Prince 


July 27 


Reply to No. 6. Russia will 






Alexander 




in no case disinterest her- 






(Telegraphic) 




self in the fate of Serbia . . 


475 


4i 


M. Sch6bko to 


Vienna, 


Conversation with Baron 






M. Sazonof 


July 27 


Macchio. Declaration 






(Telegraphic) 




that Russia could not re- 










main indifferent has caused 










sensation in Vienna 


476 


42 


Count Benckendorff 


London, 


Sir E. Grey has informed 






to M. Sazonof 


July 27 


German Ambassador that 






(Telegraphic) . 




if Austria began hostilities 










she would prove intention 










of crushing Serbia. All 










the Powers might be in- 










volved in war ; Great 










Britain reserved full liberty 










of action 


477 


43 


M. Sazonof to Count 


St. Peters- 


German attitude most alarm- 






Benckendorff 


burg, 


ing. Key of situation to 






(Telegraphic) 


July 28 


be found at Berlin 


477 



451 



[0.] 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Subject. 


f 




44 


M. Salviati to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
Fiume, 
July 28 


State of siege proclaimed in 
Slavonia, in Croatia, and 
at Fiume 


477 


45 


M. Schebeko to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Vienna, 
July 28 


Count Berchtold refuses to 
discuss terms of Austrian 
note ; Serbia's promises 
insincere 


478 


46 


M. Bronewsky to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Berlin, 
July 28 


Wolff Bureau has not pub- 
lished text of Serbian 
reply, which would have a 
calming effect 


478 


47 


M. Schebeko to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Vienna, 
July 28 


Order for general mobilisa- 
tion signed 


478 


48 


M. Sazonof to Count 
Benckendorff 
(Telegraphic) 


St Peters- 
burg, 
July 28 


Instant mediatory action by 
Great Britain necessary . . 


478 


49 


M. Sazonof to 
M. Bronewsky 
(Telegraphic) 




St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 29 


Conversation with German 
Ambassador : Russian 
military measures not 
aggressive ; proposal for 
parallel discussions by 
the four Powers, and by 
direct exchange of views 
with Austria-Hungary . . 


479 


50 


M. Sazonof to Rus- 
sian Ambassadors, 
London and Paris 
(Telegraphic) 


ii 


Vienna declines direct ex- 
change of views. Must rely 
entirely on British Govern- 
ment to take initiative . . 


479 


5i 


M. Bronewsky to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Berlin, 
July 29 


Conversation with Heir von 
Jagow. Russian and Aus- 
trian mobilisations 


479 


52 


M. de Strandtman 
to M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Nish, 
July 29 


Bulgaria will remain neutral 


480 


45* 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



[0.] 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Subject. 


1 

OH 






1914. 






53 


M. Isvolsky to 


Paris, 


French official summary of 






M. Sazonof 


July 29 


political situation 


480 




(Telegraphic) 








54 


Count Benckendorff 


London, 


Sir E. Grey has urged 






to M. Sazonof 


July 29 


German Government to 






(Telegraphic) 




indicate a form of media- 










tion 


481 


55 


M. Isvolsky to 


Paris, 


France will act in concert 






M. Sazonof 


July 29 


with Russia. M. Viviani's 






(Telegraphic) 




conversation with German 










Ambassador described . . 


482 


56 


Prince Alexander of 


July 28 


Gratitude for No. 40 


483 




Serbia to the Tsar 










(Telegraphic) 








57 


M. de Strandtman 


Nish, 


Text of No. 40 communicated 






to M. Sazonof 


July 29 


to M. Pashitch 


483 




(Telegraphic) 








58 


M. Sazonof to 


St. Peters- 


Russia cannot stop military 






M. Isvolsky 


burg, 


preparations ; war prob- 






(Telegraphic) 


July 29 


ably inevitable 


484 


59 


M. de Strandtman 


Nish, 


Speech from the throne at 






to M. Sazonof 


July 30 


opening of Serbian 






(Telegraphic) 




Skupshtina 


484 


60 


M. Sazonof to Rus- 


St. Peters- 


German Ambassador has 






sian Ambassadors 


burg, 


asked upon what condi- 






at Berlin, Vienna, 


July 30 


tions Russia would agree 






Paris, London and 




to suspend military pre- 






Rome 




parations. Formula dic- 






(Telegraphic) 




tated in reply 


485 


61 


M. Swerbeiev to 


Berlin, 


Order for mobilisation of 






M. Sazonof 


July 30 


German army and navy 






(Telegraphic) 




issued 


486 


62 


ii ii 


ii 


News of German mobilisation 






(Telegraphic) 




is false. News sheets con- 










fiscated 


486 



453 



[0.] 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Subject. 


i 




63 


M. Swerbeiev to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
Berlin, 
July 30 


Heir von Jagow thinks it 
impossible for Austria to 
accept proposal in No. 49 


486 


64 


Count Benckendorff 
to M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


London, 
July 30 


Sir E. Grey thinks the 
situation most serious. 
Russia's situation is modi- 
fied by German action . . 


487 


65 




(Telegraphic) 





German Ambassador enquires 
why Great Britain is taking 
military measures. Sir E. 
Grey replies that they are 
not aggressive, but each 
Power must be ready 


487 


66 


M. Schebeko to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Vienna, 
July 31 


In spite of mobilisation, his 
exchange of views with 
Count Berchtold continues 


488 


67 


M. Sazonof to Rus- 
sian Ambassadors 
at Berlin, Vienna, 
Paris, London, and 


St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 31 


In compliance with wish of 
London Cabinet, has modi- 
fied formula recorded in 
No. 60 


488 




Rome 










(Telegraphic) 








68 


M. Swerbeiev to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Berlin, 
July 31 


Herr von Jagow says Rus- 
sian military measures 
must provoke similar Ger- 










man measures 


488 


69 


M. Sazonof to Count 
Benckendorff 
(Telegraphic) 


St. Peters- 
burg, 
July 31 


Deep gratitude to Sir E. 
Grey. Only in London 
might discussions still 
have chance of success . . 


489 


70 


M. Sazonof to Rus- 
sian Representa- 
tives abroad 
(Secret) 
(Telegraphic) 


St. Peters- 
burg, 
August i 


German ultimatum demand- 
ing Russian demobilisation 
within twelve hours 
" very near " to war 


489 



454 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 



[0.] 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date of 
Despatch. 


Subject. 


4} 

9 




7i 


Count Benckendorff 
to M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
London, 
August i 


Sir E. Grey has telegraphed 
M. Sazonof 's last formula 
to Berlin 


490 


72 


n 
(Telegraphic) 


ii 


British enquiries as to 
neutrality of Belgium. 
French and German re- 










plies 


490 


73 


M. Isvolsky to 
M. Sazonof 
(Telegraphic) 


Paris, 
August i 


Austrian readiness to dis- 
cuss grounds of grievances 
against Serbia. German 
military activity on 
French frontier 


490 


74 


> 
(Telegraphic) 





Order for French mobilisa- 
tion signed. German 
Ambassador visits M. 










Viviani 


491 


75 


if ii 
(Telegraphic) 


ii 


Has contradicted Austrian 
statement that Russia had 
received in silence assur- 










ance of Austria's readi- 










ness to respect Serbian 
territorial integrity and 
sovereign rights 


491 


76 


Presented by Count 
Pourtales 


Berlin, 
August i 


Declaration of war by Ger- 
many against Russia 


491 


77 


M. Sazonof 


St. Peters- 
burg, 
August 2 


Review of recent events . . 


493 


78 


M. Sazonof to Rus- 
sian Representa- 
tives abroad 
(Telegraphic) 


St. Peters- 
burg, 
August 2 


Germany endeavouring to 
foist upon Russia respon- 
sibility for rupture: has 
declared war while negoti- 
ations were in progress . . 


496 


79 


Presented by Count 
Szapary 


Vienna, 
August 6 


Declaration of war by 
Austria against Russia . . 


497 



455 



[0.1] 



DOCUMENTS RESPECTING THE NEGOTIATIONS 
PRECEDING THE WAR, PUBLISHED BY THE 
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. 

No. i. 

M. de Strandtman, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914. 

THE Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, pre- 
sented an ultimatum (1) from his Government to the Minister (1) [Text,B. 
of Finance, Patchou, in the absence of Pashitch, requiring 4-] 
the acceptance of the demands contained therein within 
forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, in the event 
of failure to accept the note integrally within forty-eight 
hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the 
staff of the legation. Pashitch' 81 and the other Ministers, who (S| [c/. No. 
are away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected 9-] 
at Belgrade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. Patchou, who 
communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the 
help of Russia 1 " and declares that no Serbian Government (l) [c/.No.6; 

could accept the demands of Austria.' 41 .. ?\ 4 ?;^ 

(4| [c/. No. 

4i; S.33-] 
No. 2. 

M. de Strandtman, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914. 

TEXT of the note presented to the Serbian Government 
by the Austro-Hungarian Minister to-day. 

[Here follows the text of the note, for which see B. 4.] 

457 



[0. 8] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

No. 3. 

Note verbale personally presented by Count Szdpdry, Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 10 a.m. on 
[c/.R.x 4 .] July ii (24), 1914. (1) 

THE Austro-Hungarian Government have found them- 
selves obliged to present the following note to the Serbian 
Government through the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bel- 
grade on Thursday, the loth (23rd) instant. 

[Here follows the text of the note ; see B. 4.] 



No. 4. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Prince 
Kudachef, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914. 

(a) [Reply, PLEASE convey the following message w to the Austro- 
Nos. ii, Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs : 

(8) [cf. B. [The text of the message is given in B. 13.] 

26.] 
(4) [cf. Y. Communicated to London, w Rome, Paris, (4) and Belgrade. 

39-1 

(5 >[No. 4.] No. 5. 

< 8) [cf. B. 

?3-] M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian 
Berlin 65 Representatives at London, Berlin, Rome, and Paris. 

Paris 14 ' (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July ii (24), 1914. 

London' WITH reference to my telegram of to-day w to Kudachef 
No. 16. we trust that the Government to which you are accredited 
For will share the Russian point of view'" and will at once instruct 
Rome see their Representative at Vienna to hold similar language. (7) 
B 6^24 i Communicated to Belgrade. 
458 






RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 6] 

No. 6. 

Telegram from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent * of 
Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

Belgrade, July n (24), 1914. 

LE Gouvernement austro-hongrois a remis hier soir au 
Gouvernement serbe une note concernant 1'attentat de 
Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie 
ds les premiers jours de 1'horrible crime a de'clare' qu'elle ^, s 

le condamnait et qu'elle e"tait prete a ouvrir une enquete sur D \ y> 
son territoire si la complicity de certains de ses sujets 6tait . 40. 
prouve*e au cours du proces instruit par les autorites austro- No. 
hongroises. Cependant, les demandes contenues dans la 
note austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour 
la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignite comme litat inde- 
pendant. Ainsi on nous demande sur un ton pe*remptoire 
une declaration du Gouvernement dans 1' " Officiel," et un 
ordre du Souverain a l'arme"e, ou nous r6primerions 1'esprit 
hostile contre TAutriche en nous faisant a nous-memes des 
reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees per- 
fides. On nous impose ensuite 1'admission des fonctionnaires 
austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les notres a 
1'instruction et pour surveiller l'exe*cution des autres con- 
ditions indiquees dans la note. Nous avons re9u un de"lai 
de quarante-huit heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi 
la Legation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous 
sommes prets a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui 
sont compatibles avec la situation d'un fitat ind^psndant, 
ainsi que celles dont 1'acceptation nous sera conseille"e par 
votre Majeste" ; toutes les personnes dont la participation 
a Tattentat sera de"montree seront s6verement punis par 
nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient etre 
ex^cutees sans des changements de notre legislation, ce qui 
exige du temps. On nous a donne un delai trop court. Nous 
pouvons etre attaqu6s apres 1'expiration du delai par 1'armee 
austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontiere. II nous 
est impossible de nous de"fendre et nous supplions votre 

* [On June 24, 1914, it was announced from Belgrade that, in conse- 
quence of illness, King Peter of Serbia had delegated full royal authority 
to his son, the Crown Prince Alexander.] 

459 



[0. 6] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

Majeste" de nous donner son aide le plus tot possible. La 
bienveillance precieuse de votre Majeste" qui s'est manifest ee 
tant de fois a notre gard nous fait esperer fermement 
que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par son genereux 
coeur slave. 

En ces moments difficiles j'interprete les sentiments du 
peuple serbe, qui supplie votre Majeste de vouloir bien s'in- 
teresser au sort du Royaume de Serbie. 

(Signe") ALEXANDRE. 

(TRANSLATION.) 

THE Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening 
"r^ext, presented to the Serbian Government a note' 1 ' respecting 
4-J the outrage at Serajevo. Serbia, aware of her international 
obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime was 
committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready 
to open an enquiry in Serbia if the complicity of certain of 
her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the 
Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humilia- 
ting for Serbia, and incompatible with her dignity as an 
independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called 
upon to insert a declaration by the Government in the 
" Official Journal," and for an order from the Sovereign 
to the ain.y. in which we are to check the spirit of hostility 
towards Ausc ' and to blame ourselves for criminal weak- 
ness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further 
required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Serbia to 
take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend 
the carrying out of the other conditions laid down in the note. 
We are required to accept these demands in their entirety 
within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian 
Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept 
those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are com- 
patible with the position of an independent State, as well as 
those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all 
those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved 
will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands 
could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, 
which would need time. We have been allowed too short a 
4 6o 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 8] 

time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the 
time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concen- 
trating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend our- 
selves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as 
possible. The much appreciated goodwill which your Majesty 
has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief 
that once again our appeal' 1 ' to your noble Slav heart will not (I) [c/.No.i.] 
pass unheeded. 

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Serbian 

people in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest Iairr 

r ^e ii_ * 1 j.i_ tr- j f. r> t- (u) ^risars 

yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Serbia. w Reply, 

No. 40. 
No. 7. _ */*> 

M. Brontwsky, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July n (24), 1914. 

ALL the morning papers, even those few which recognise 
the impossibility of Serbia's accepting the prescribed con- 
ditions, warmly welcome the strong line adopted by Austria.' 31 J\ Y- . 
The semi-official Lokal-Anzeiger is particularly violent; B 7 *2o' 
it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Serbia may (Vienna 
make to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and Press).] 
concludes by saying that the German people will breathe 
freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan 
peninsula is to be cleared up at last. 

No. 8. 

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris, to 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July n (24), 1914. (4| [Text, B. 

A COPY of the note 14 ' officially presented at Belgrade w^fi No. 
has been communicated to the French Government by the i 9 ; y. as- 
Austrian Ambassador.' 8 ' The German Ambassador later R. n.] 
visited the Minister and read to him a communication con- (< L See Y - 
taining the Austrian arguments," 1 and indicating that in the 28 ; ** 
event of a refusal on the part of Serbia, Austria would be R i f 
obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to military w[Sce No. 
measures."' The communication ended with the observation 19.] 

4 6i 



[0. 9] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be 
settled between Austria and Serbia direct, and that it was 

^[SeeB.g, to the interest of the Powers to localise' 1 ' the affair by leaving 
note.] jt to the interested parties. The Acting Head of the Political 

(2) [M. Department/ 2 ' who was present at the interview, asked the 

Berthelot.] Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered 
as an ultimatum in other words, whether, in the event of 
Serbia not submitting entirely to the Austrian demands, 
hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct 

(S) [c/. Y. reply, alleging that he had no instructions. 18 ' 
28.] 

No. 9. 

M. de Strandtman, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July n (24), 1914. 

w[See PASHITCH has returned to Belgrade.' 41 He intends to 

No. i.] give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time limit (5) 
B) [S<?0No. that is to say, to-morrow, Saturday, at 6 p.m. showing 
the points which are acceptable or unacceptable. To-day an 
appeal will be addressed to the Powers to defend the inde- 
pendence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevit- 
able, we will make war. 

No. 10. 

( " [Dupli- Announcement by the Russian Government. w 

i5* e f b ut St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914. 

date RECENT events and the despatch of an ultimatum to 

differs.] Serbia by Austria-Hungary <7) are causing the Russian Govern- 
(7) [No. i.] ment the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely 
(8) [cf. Nos. following the course of the dispute between the two countries 

23,40,41; to which Russia cannot remain indifferent. 18 ' 

B. 40, 94 ; 

S. 52 (vol. N 

II,p.ii9); 

V V nt " Prince Kudachef, Russian Charge a" Affaires at Vienna, to 

R26 1 1 M ' S azon f> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914. 

COUNT BERCHTOLD is at Ischl. In view of the im- 
possibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to 
462 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 14] 

him our proposal to extend the time limit"' of the ultimatum, m [No. 4 ; 
and I have repeated this proposal verbally to Baron Macchio. ( " B - J 3 ; 
The latter promised to communicate it in time to the Minister (8) ^ . 20 j[ 
for Foreign Affairs, but added that he had no hesitation in 2 i.'l 
predicting a categorical refusal. (sl m^ No. 

12; .45; 
No. 12. 

Prince Kudachef, Russian Charge d" Affaires at Vienna, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914. 

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day <4) I have just !JE *Y IX ^ 
heard from Macchio" 51 that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ^'' '- -i 
ment refuse our proposal to extend the time limit of the note.' 81 <> [R 2 o 

c/.R. 9 .j 

No. 13. 

M. de Strandtman, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 

(Delayed in transmission, (7> received July 14 (27), 1914.) (7| [ c /- Nos - 

FOLLOWING is the reply which the President of the 
Serbian Cabinet to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister at Belgrade before the expiration of the time limit 
of the ultimatum. 

[Here follows the text of the Serbian reply, for which see 
B. 39-J 

No. 14. 

M. Bronewsky, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 12 (25), 1914. 

I HAVE received your telegram "" of the nth (24th) "" tN - 5 ' ] 
July and have communicated its contents to the Minister w _ . v 
for Foreign Affairs. 1 " He tells me that the British Govern- ' -, 

ment have likewise urged him 1101 to advise Vienna to extend <'<r c /. B 
the time limit of the ultimatum. He has informed Vienna n.] 

telegraphically of this step, (u) and he will do the same as < n '[B. 18; 
regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Y. 41.] 

463 



[0. 16] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

Berchtold, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of 
time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he 
has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last 
moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her 
part might increase the assurance of Serbia. I replied that 
a Great Power such as Austria could give way without impair- 
ing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, 
but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. 
Even when I gave him to understand that action must be 
taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences 
was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered 
each time in the negative. 

No. 15. 

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 12 (25), 1914. 

(I) [No. 5.] I HAVE received your telegram (1) of the nth (24th) July 
respecting the extension of the time limit of the Austrian 
ultimatum, and I have made the communication in accordance 
with your instructions. The French Representative at Vienna 

(a) [Y. 39.] has been furnished with similar instructions. (8> 

No. 16. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

^Telegram.) London, July 12 (25), 1914. 

""[No. 5.] I HAVE received your telegram"' of the nth July. Grey 
has instructed the British Ambassador at Vienna to support 

(4) [B. 26.] our action (4) for the extension of the time limit of the ultima- 
tum. At the same time he explained to me that the Austrian 

w[SeeB. Ambassador had come to see him, and had explained w that 

14.] the Austrian note should not be regarded as an ultimatum. 

It should be regarded as a step, which, in the event of no 

reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the 

time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic 

relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hun- 

garian Minister from Belgrade ; without, however, entailing 

464 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 18J 

the immediate opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a 
result of this explanation he had told the British Ambassador 
at Vienna that, should it be too late to raise the question 
of extending the time limit of the ultimatum, the question of 
preventing hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis for 
discussion. 

No. 17. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count 
Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914. 

IN the event of any change for the worse in the situation 
which might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we 
count upon it that England will at once side definitely with 
Russia and France/ 1 ' in order to maintain the European (1 >[ c /. B. 
balance of power, 1 " for which she has constantly intervened 17.] 

in the past, and which would certainly be compromised in the (8I OA No. 
event of the triumph of Austria. 



No. 18. 

Note verbale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 
1914. 

WE learn from an authoritative source that the news 
spread by certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated 
by Germany," 1 is absolutely false. The German Govern- "> [cf. No. 
ment had no knowledge 141 of the text of the Austrian note 4 1 -] 

before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its <4) M- Y - J 5 
contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to andnote -l 
Germany." 1 <"[c/. No. 

Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the J 9 : Y - 
claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she 
considers justified. 

Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared 
from the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian dispute, that [ c /. NO. 
this conflict should be localised. ( " 8 ; B. 9 j 

a G 465 



[0 . 19] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

No. 19. 

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Charge <T Affaires at Paris, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 12 (25), 1914. 

<'>[No. 8.] PLEASE refer to my telegram' 11 of the nth (24th) 
July. 

(2 '[The A morning paper (2) has to-day published, in a not alto- 

Echo de g e ther correct form, the declarations made yesterday by the 

S^Y' 6 erman Ambassador, and has added comments in which it 

3 6;j characterises these utterances as being in the nature of 

(8 > [cf. No. threats. (8) The German Ambassador, who is much upset 

18.] by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of the 

Political Department, and explained to him that his words 

in no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. 

He stated that Austria had presented her note to Serbia 

w [See Y. without any definite understanding with Berlin, 141 but that 

15 and Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of 

w?/B view ' and that undoubtedl Y " the bolt once fired " (5) (these 
25.] were hi s own words), Germany could only be guided by her 
duties as an ally. 

No. 20. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 12 (25), 1914. 

GREY has told me that the German Ambassador has 
(6) r, B declared to him <6) that the German Government were not 
25.] informed' 7 ' of the text of the Austrian note, but that they 
[See Y. entirely supported Austria's action. The Ambassador at the 
15 and same time asked if Great Britain could see her way to bring 
note.] conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg. <8) Grey 
[cf. B. replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as 
IIf 25> -l long as complications existed between Austria and Serbia 
alone, British interests were only indirectly affected ; but he 
had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilisation 
466 



(8) 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK 10. 22] 

would lead to Russian mobilisation, and that from that 
moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all 
the Powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain 
reserved to herself full liberty of action. 01 (1 '[c/. No. 

42 ;B. 

rax.] 

No. 21. 

M. de Strandtman, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 

IN spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the 
Serbian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has 
just informed the Serbian Government, in a note (8> handed in at wp^ 40 ^ 
6.30 p.m. this evening, that, not having received a satisfactory 
answer within the time limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade 
with the entire staff of the legation. (s) The Skupshtina is (J) [c/. B. 
convoked for the I4th (27th) July at Nish. (J) The Serbian 23; 8.41.] 
Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this even- 
ing for that town.* 

No. 22. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 12 (25), 1914. 

GREY has told the German Ambassador U) that in his wrg I0j 
opinion Austrian mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisa- ii.] 

tion, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon arise, 
and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settle- 
ment, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian 
mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain 
should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at 
once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first 
essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her 
promise not to mobilise. He has therefore, as a first step - 
made an enquiry on this point at Berlin. 

* [So also in B. 23. In Y. 50 the Serbian Government is said to have 
retired to Kragujevatz.J 

467 



[0.28] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK Lfuiv 2 

No. 23. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian 

Ambassador at Rome. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914. 

ITALY might play a part of the first importance in favour 

of preserving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to 

bear upon Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable 

attitude towards the dispute on the ground that it could not 

be localised. You should express your conviction that 

w \cf. No. Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Serbia. (1) 

10 and 

note -l No. 24. 

M. Kazansky, Acting Russian Consul at Prague, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Prague, July 13 (26), 1914. 

< 8 >[c/. No. MOBILISATION has been ordered. (a) 

470 

No. 25. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna. 

< 3) [See R. ( Tele g ram O & Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914. 

31, where, I HAD a long and friendly conversation to-day (9) with the 
apparent- Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. (4) After discussing the ten 
demands addressed to Serbia, (5) I drew his attention to the fact 
vernation 1 ' ^ na ^ quite apart from the clumsy form in which they were 
is assigned presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if 
tojuly27.] the Serbian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for 
(4) [c/. B. example, points i and 2 could not be carried out without 
56 ; Y. recasting the Serbian Press law and associations law, and to 
54 : W. that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the 
, 8) rg ' -j 5 '-' Skupshtina. As for enforcing points 4 and 5, this might lead 
to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of 
acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and 
against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of 
Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me 
that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult 
to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations con- 
tained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof. 
468 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 27] 

In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, 
according to the statements of Szapary, is as much desired 
by Austria as by all the Powers, it was necessary to end the 
tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this 
object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised to enter into a 
private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles 
of the Austrian note of the loth (23rd) July in consultation 
with me.' 11 This method of procedure would perhaps l "[c/. No. 
enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable 38.] 

to Serbia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of 
the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of 
this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious Ul t c (- R N - 
and friendly manner. 181 1^'-, 

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany/" W[S M N O< 
France, Great Britain/ 41 and Italy. 26.] 

^[See No: 

No. 26. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914. 

PLEASE communicate the contents of my telegram to 
Vienna of to-day' 51 to the German Minister for Foreign <I[N O . 25.] 
Affairs, and express to him the hope that he, on his part, 
will be able to advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a 
friendly spirit/ 8 ' [See No. 

No. 27. 38 ' ] 

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 13 (26), 1914. 

THE Director of the Political Department informs me 
that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
of the contents of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum, the 
Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it had failed 
to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political 
Department, Serbia's conciliatory attitude should produce 
the best impression in Europe. 

469 



[O. 28] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 2 

No. 28. 

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Charge d" Affaires at Paris, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 13 (26), 1914. 

THE German Ambassador again visited the Acting 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the 
^6 1 ftt wm g declarations : (I) 

" Austria has declared to Russia that she does not desire 
territorial acquisitions, and that she harbours no designs 
against the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure 
her own peace and quiet, and consequently it rests with 
Russia to prevent war. Germany is at one with France in her 
ardent desire to preserve peace, and she sincerely hopes that 
France will exercise a moderating influence at St. Peters- 
burg." 

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might 
well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the 
conciliatory spirit displayed by Serbia. The Ambassador re- 
plied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision 
not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute. The Minister 
then asked whether the four Powers Great Britain, Ger- 
many, Italy, and France could not make representations at 
St. Petersburg and Vienna, for that the matter amounted, 
in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The 
Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, 
the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal. 

No. 29. 

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 13 (26), 1914. 

THE Director of the Political Department has expressed 
the personal opinion that the series of representations made 
(2) [c/. No. by Germany at Paris aim at intimidating France and at 
35 ;Y. 62.] securing her intervention at St. Petersburg. (a) 
470 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 32] 

No. 30. 

M. Bronewsky, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 13 (26), 1914. 

ON the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had 
mobilised against Serbia, a large crowd, in which the papers 
report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a 
series of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late 
in the evening the crowd several times collected before the 
Imperial Russian Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting 
occurred. Hardly any police were present and no precau- 
tions were taken. 

No. 31. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 14 (27), 1914. 

I HAVE received your telegram of the I3th (26th) July. 111 (I| [No. 25.] 
Please inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your 
direct discussions with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with 
Grey's scheme for mediation by the four Governments. 
Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, 
Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, (a) which he (8 TB. 36.] 
communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome. 

No. 32. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 

Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London. 
(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 14 (27), 1914.* 

THE British Ambassador has enquired whether we think 
it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in 
summoning a conference in London of the representatives of 
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the 
possibility of finding a way out of the present situation. 

* [B. 53 is in part a duplicate of this telegram.] 



[0. 33] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 23 

I replied to the Ambassador that I had begun conversa- 
(1) [No. 25.] tions with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador (1) under con- 
ditions which, I hoped, might be favourable. I had not, 
however, received as yet any reply to my proposal for the 
revision of the note by the two Cabinets. 

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet proved 
impossible, I was ready to fall in with the British proposal, or 
any other proposal of a kind likely to lead to a favourable 
< a '[c/.B.78; settlement of the dispute."" 
Y. 86, 91.] 

No. 33. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister/or Foreign Affairs, to Russian 
Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. 

.(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 14 (27), 1914. 

I HAVE taken note of the reply returned by the Serbian 
'"[6.39.] Government' 31 to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expecta- 
tions in its moderation, and in its desire to afford the fullest 
satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands 
could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking 
for a pretext for war with Serbia. 

No. 34. 

M. Sevastopoulo, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 14 (27), 1914. 

THE German Ambassador discussed the situation again 
to-day at great length with the Director of the Political 
Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter 

(4) [cf. No. impossibility of any mediation or conference. (4> 

55 ; Y. 57 

and note.] 

No. 35. 

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July 14 (27), 1914. 

I DISCUSSED the situation with the Acting Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after 

472 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 36] 

my return to Paris. They both confirmed the information 
respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador, 
which Sevastopoulo has already telegraphed to you. (l) This (l| [Nos. 19, 
morning Baron von Schoen"' confirmed his declaration of f 8 34 ^ 
yesterday" 1 in writing, i.e. : (a '[ c /- Y. 

1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no jj*l 
territorial acquisitions and that she harbours no designs 
against the integrity of Serbia.' 41 Her sole object is to secure (4 >[c/. B. 90 
her own peace and quiet. and note.] 

2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. 

3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their 
ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their modera- 
ting influence upon Russia. 

Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression 
of solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice 
is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken 
with the evident object"" of alienating Russia and France, (5 '[c/. No. 
of inducing the French Government to make representations 29 ; 
at St. Petersburg, and of thus compromising our ally in our Y - 62 -l 
eyes ; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsi- 
bility not on Germany, who is ostensibly making every effort 
to maintain peace, but on Russia and France. 



No. 36. 

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 14 (27), 1914. 

IT is clear from your telegrams of the I3th (26) July"' '"[S* 5 No. 
that you were not then aware of the reply 17 ' of the Serbian *5-l 
Government. The telegram from Belgrade informing me of 
it also took twenty hours to reach us. ( " The telegram from ( "t c /- Nos - 
the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before fp'IL) i 
yesterday at n o'clock in the morning, at the special urgent 
rate, which contained instructions to support our representa- 
tions, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no 
doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the 
Austrian telegraph office. 

473 



[0. 37] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

No. 37. 

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 14 (27), 1914. 

ON the instructions of his Government, the Austrian 
Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign 
Affairs that Serbia's answer has not been considered satis- 
factory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria 
(1) [c/. B. will proceed to take "energetic action " (1) with the object 
48, 93 CO; of forcing Serbia to give the necessary guarantees. The 
Minister having asked what form such action would take, 
the Ambassador replied that he had no exact information on 
the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the 
Serbian frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of 
war. 

No. 38. 

M. Bronewsky, Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914. 

I BEGGED the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support 

*>[See No. your proposal in Vienna w that Szapary should be authorised 

25.] to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with 

you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which 

{3} [cf. Y. would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered" 1 

81.] that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with 

Pourtales that, as Szapary had begun this conversation, he 

might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense 

to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to 

press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory 

line ; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to 

(4) [c/.Y. 78 give way. (4) 

and note.] No. 39. 

M. Bronewsky, Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914. 

(5 > [See Y. BEFORE my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 

74.] to-day his Excellency had received the French Ambassador, (5) 

474 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 40] 

who endeavoured to induce him to accept the British proposal 
for action in favour of peace, U) such action to be taken simul- 0) [B. 36-] 
taneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, 
Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these 
Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following 
terms : "To abstain from all action which might aggravate 
the existing situation." By adopting this vague formula, all 
mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Serbia 
might be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this 
suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who 
emphasised, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed 
grouping of the Powers, thanks to which the opposition 
between the Alliance and the Entente a matter of which 
Jagow himself had often complained was avoided. 



No. 40. 

Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia 
to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia, 
July 14 t27), i9 I 4-* 

VOTRE Altesse Royale en s'adressant a moi dans un 
moment particulierement difficile ne s'est pas trompe*e sur 
les sentiments qui m'animent a son e"gard et sur ma sym- 
pathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe. 

Ma plus se"rieuse attention est attire*e par la situation 
actuelle et mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces 
a aplanir les present es difficult^. Je ne doute point que 
votre Altesse et le Gouvernement Royal ne veuillent faciliter 
cette tache en ne ne"gligeant rien pour arriver a une solution 
qui permette de preVenir les horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre 
tout en sauvegardant la dignite" de la Serbie. 

Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eViter une effusion de 
sang, tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgre 
notre plus sincere dsir, nous ne re"ussissons pas, votre Altesse 
peut etre assured qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se d&inteYessera 
du sort de la Serbie. 

(Signe) NICOLAS. 

* [In No. 56 Prince Alexander thanks the Emperor for this telegram.] 

475 



[0.41] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

(TRANSLATION.) 

411 [No. 6.] WHEN your Royal Highness applied to me (1) at a time of 
especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which 
I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Ser- 
bian people. 

The existing situation is engaging my most serious atten- 
tion, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour 
to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt 
that your Highness and the Royal Serbian Government wish 
to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might 
lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a 
new war and safeguard the dignity of Serbia. 

So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, 
all our efforts must be directed to that end ; but if in spite of 
our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest 
assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the 
< 2 >[c/.No. f a te of Serbia. (2) 
10 and 
note.] No. 41. 

M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 14 (27), 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long 

conversation which I had with Macchio to-day, I drew his 

attention, in a perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable 

impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands 

by Austria to Serbia, which it was quite impossible for any 

(3} [cf. No. independent State, however small, to accept. (3) I added that 

i ; S. 33-1 this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable 

complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and 

general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that 

<4) [c/. B. Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German 

54; .95. Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout 

Denied, this crisis, (4) has counted on the probable localisation (5) of the 

< 5 >T/ N d is P ute witn Serbia, and on the possibility of inflicting with 

8 seeE i m P un ity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration 

9 and by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly 
note.] remain indifferent (8) in the face of such conduct has caused a 

w [No. 10.] great sensation here. 
476 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 44] 

No. 42. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 14 (27), 1914. 

GREY has just informed the German Ambassador/ 1 ' who ^[See B. 
came to question him as to the possibility of taking action at 4 6 -] 

St. Petersburg, that such action ought rather to be taken at 
Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified 
to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Serbian reply to 
the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have 
been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. 
Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion 
that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moder- 
ate reply, and that he thought the Serbian reply could form 
the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question. 

In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were 
to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her 
intention of crushing Serbia. Looked at in this light, the 
question might give rise to a situation which might lead to 
a war in which all the Powers would be involved. 

Grey finally declared that the British Government were 
sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long 
as the preservation of peace was in question ; but, in the 
contrary event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty 
of action. 

No. 43. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count 
Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London. 

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914. 
[Duplicate of B. 54.] 

No. 44. 

M . Salviati, Russian Consul-General at Fiume, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914. 

STATE of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in 
Croatia, and at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have <>[ c /. y. 
also been called up. <8) 90, 91 1 

477 



[0. 46] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK UULY I 

No. 45. 

M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914. 
[Duplicate of B. 93 (i).] 

No. 46. 

M. Bronewsky, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 15 (28), 1914. 

THE Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the 
Serbian reply, although it was communicated to them. Up 
to the present this note has not appeared in extenso in any 
of the local papers, which, to all appearances, do not wish 
to publish it in their columns, being well aware of the calming 
effect which it would have on German readers. 

No. 47. 

M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914. 

(1) [cf. No. THE order for general mobilisation has been signed. (1) 
24-R.47, 

48 ' ] No. 48. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count 
w [cf. B. 70 Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914. 

IN face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant 
mediatory action, and that the military measures under- 
taken by Austria against Serbia should be immediately 
suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse 
to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it 
possible for Austria to crush Serbia completely and to acquire 
a dominant position in the Balkans. 

Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. 

478 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 51 ; 

No. 49. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
M. Bronewsky, Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin. 

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 
[Duplicate of B. 93 (2).] 

No. 50. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian 
Ambassadors at London and Paris. 

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 
[Duplicate of B. 93 (3).] 

No. 51. 

M. Bronewsky, Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 16 (29), 1914. 

ON my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a 
reply respecting your proposal for private discussions at 
St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State answered in the negative. 

He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce 
any effect at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in 
speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought to bear too 
obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with a 
fait accompli. (1) o>[ c /. B. 

The Secretary of State tells me that he received a tele- 76.] 

gram to-day from Pourtales, stating that you seemed more 
inclined than you previously were to find a compromise 
acceptable to all parties. I replied that presumably you 
had been in favour of a compromise from the outset, pro- 
vided always that it were acceptable, not only to Austria, 
but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that 
Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and 
that he feared that this would make it more difficult for (8 , rN 
Austria to come to an understanding with us, all the more L? 
so as Austria was mobilising (8) against Serbia alone, w and<s>iw'\v. 
was making no preparations upon our frontier. I replied exh. 18.] 

479 



[0. 52] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY I 

that, according to the information in my possession, Austria 

was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that 

(1) [c/. Y. consequently we had to take similar steps. (1) I added that 

ioo.] whatever measures we might, perhaps, have taken on our 

w [c/. Y. side were in no wise directed against Germany. w 

102. 

Also No. No. ^2 

68.] 

M. de Strandtman, Russian Chargi d' Affaires in Serbia, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Nish, July 16 (29), 1914. 

THE Bulgarian Minister to-day declared to Pashitch, in 
the name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain 
neutral. 

No. 53. 

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 16 (29), 1914. 

FOR the information of the President of the French 
Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs had prepared a short summary of the present political 
w \See Y. situation,' 31 approximately in the following terms : Austria, 
8 5-] fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination 
of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guar- 
antees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Serbian 
military lines or even Serbian territory. Germany is support- 
ing Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia 
alone, for the question at issue must be " localised " between 
Austria and Serbia ; that question is the punishment of 
Serbia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees 
for the future. Germany concludes from this that a mod- 
erating influence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This 
sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In 
Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavoured to induce France 
to adopt joint action with Germany towards Russia for the 
preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in 
London. In both capitals the answer was given that any 
action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's in- 
ordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Serbia's few reserva- 
tions, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke 

480 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. MI 

a general war. France and England were unable to bring 
any moderating pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that 
Power has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly 
in her advice to Serbia to accept as much as was possible of 
the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up 
the idea of pressure upon Russia only, and inclines towards 
mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but 
at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavouring 
to cause the action to drag on. Germany is opposing the 
conference without suggesting any other practical course of 
action. Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, 
which are manifestly of a procrastinating nature. At the 
same time she is taking active steps, and if these steps are 
tolerated, her claims will increase proportionately. It is 
highly desirable that Russia should lend all her support to 
the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. 
In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of " guarantees," 
will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern 
Europe. 

No. 54. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to M. 
Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 16 (29), 1914. 

I HAVE communicated the contents of vour telegrams 
of the I5th (28th) July' 11 to Grey. He informed the German (1 '[Nos. 43 
Ambassador to-day (3) that the direct discussions between ( se * ** 
Russia and Austria had been fruitless, and that Press corre- w V 
spondents were reporting from St. Petersburg that Russia A y Q 8 j 
was mobilising against Austria in consequence of the latter's 
mobilisation. Grey said that, in principle, the German 
Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation, (I) (S| [cf. B. 18, 
but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the 43 and 
form it should take. Grey has urged that the German 
Government should indicate the form which, in their opinion, 
would enable the four Powers to have recourse to mediation 
to prevent war ; France, Italy, and Great Britain having 
consented, mediation could only come into play if Germany 
consented to range herself on the side of peace. 

a H 481 



[0 . 55] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

No. 55. 

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 16 (29), 1914. 

VIVIANI has just confirmed to me the French Govern- 
u)jw Y. merit's firm determination to act in concert with Russia. U) 
10 i. 'see This determination is upheld by all classes of society, and 
also No. by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists, who 
58.3 have just addressed a resolution to the Government ex- 
pressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic sentiments 
of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has tele- 
w[Y. 97.] graphed an urgent message to London 12 ' that, direct dis- 
cussions between St. Petersburg and Vienna having ended, the 
London Cabinet should again put forward their proposal for 
mediation by the Powers as soon as possible under one form 
or another. Before seeing me to-day Viviani saw the German 
(3) [Y. 94.] Ambassador, (fl and the latter again assured him of the 
peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani having pointed out 
that if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give 
her support to the British proposal for mediation, Baron von 
Schoen replied that the words " conference " or " arbitration " 
w [cf. No. alarmed Austria. (4) Viviani retorted that it was not a ques- 
34 ; Y - tion of words, (8) and that it would be easy to find some other 
57 and f orm for mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it 
ii)?/v was necessar y f r the success of the negotiations between 
74 1 *h e Po wers to know what Austria intended to demand from 



(8) 



r c y B 



Serbia. <6) Viviani answered that the Berlin Cabinet could 



84; Y. quite easily make this enquiry of Austria, but that, mean- 
94 ; W. while, the Serbian reply might well form the basis of dis- 
exh. 14.] cussion ; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but 
that she was determined at the same time to act in complete 
harmony with her allies and friends, and that he, Baron von 
Schoen, might have convinced himself that this determination 
met with the warmest approval of the country. 



482 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 57] 

No. 56. 

Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia 
to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

PROFONDfiMENT touch< par le te'le'gramme que votre 
Majest^ a bien voulu m'adresser hier, je m'empresse de la 
remercier de tout mon coeur. Je prie votre Ma jest 6 d'etre 
persuade'e que la cordiale sympathie dont votre Majeste" est 
anime'e envers mon pays nous est particulirement prcieuse, 
et remplit notre ame de 1'espoir que 1'avenir de la Serbie est 
assure", 6tant devenu 1'objet de la haute sollicitude de votre 
Majeste". Ces moments pe*nibles ne peuvent que raffermir 
les liens de 1'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie & 
la sainte Russie slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance 
ternelle pour 1'aide et la protection de votre Majeste seront 
conserve's pieusement dans Tame de tous les Serbes. 

(Signe) ALEXANDRE. 

(TRANSLATION.) 

DEEPLY touched by the telegram 111 which your Majesty (1) [No. 40.] 
was pleased to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank 
you with all my heart. Your Majesty may rest assured that 
the cordial sympathy which your Majesty feels towards my 
country is especially valued by us, and fills our hearts with 
the belief that the future of Serbia is secure now that it is 
the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These 
painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep 
attachment which bind Serbia to Holy Slav Russia, and the 
sentiments of everlasting gratitude which we feel for the 
help and protection afforded to us by your Majesty will ever 
be cherished in the hearts of all the Serbs. 

No. 57. 

M. de Strandtman, Russian Charge d' 'Affaires in Serbia, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Nish, July 16 (29), 1914. 

I HAVE communicated to Pashitch the text of the tele- 
graphic reply' 8 ' returned by His Majesty the Emperor to '"[No. 40.] 

483 



[0. 68] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

Prince Alexander. On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself 
and exclaimed : " The Tsar is great and merciful ! " He 
then embraced me and was overcome with emotion. The 
heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night. 

No. 58. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. 
Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 

THE German Ambassador to-day informed me of the 

decision of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not 

(1) [cf. No. stop her military preparations. (1) Now, in point of fact, we 

60 also only began these preparations in consequence of the mobili- 

B. 99, Y. sa tion already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her 

46 1 * ' evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a 

peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia. 

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we 
have no alternative but to hasten on our own military pre- 
parations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. 
Please inform the French Government of this, and add that 
we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which 
the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the 
effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our 
< a) [c/. No. ally, France. (i) In the existing circumstances, that declara- 
555 Y- tion is especially valuable to us. 

Jo*-] Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great 

Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany. 

No. 59. 

M. de Strandtman, Russian Charge d' 'Affaires in Serbia, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Nish, July 17 (30), 1914. 

THE Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, 
signed by all the Serbian Ministers, on the declaration of 
war by Austria against Serbia. The manifesto ends with the 
following words : " Defend your homes and Serbia with all 
your might." At the solemn opening of the Skupshtina the 
Regent read the speech from the Throne, in his own name. 
At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that the place 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 60] 

of their convocation showed the importance of present events. 
He followed this with a summary of recent events the 
Austrian ultimatum, the Serbian reply, the efforts of the 
Serbian Government to do their utmost to avoid war that 
was compatible with the dignity of the State, and, finally, 
the armed aggression of their most powerful neighbour against 
Serbia, at whose side stood Montenegro. Passing in review 
the attitude of the Powers towards the dispute, the Prince 
emphasised in the first place the sentiments which animated 
Russia, and the gracious communication from His Majesty 
the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Serbia. 01 (1) [No. 40.] 
At each mention of His Majesty the Tsar and of Russia the 
hall resounded with loud bursts of wild cheering (un "jivio" 
formidable et febrile secouait la salle des seances). The sym- 
pathy shown by France and England was also touched upon 
in turn, and called forth approving plaudits from the members. 
The speech from the Throne ended by declaring the Skupshtina 
open, and by expressing the hope that everything possible 
would be done to lighten the task before the Government. 

No. 60. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian 
Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome. 

(Telegram.) 52. Petersburg, July 17 (30), 1914. 

THE German Ambassador, who has just left me, 18 ' has < 8 >[ c /. B. 
asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise 97 ; Y. 
which Austria might give that she would not violate the I0 3 ; dso 
integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia and whether we could 
not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend 
our military preparations. I dictated to him the following 
declaration"' to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action : <"[For 
" If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question modified 
has become a question of European interest, declares herself ormula 
ready to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate g?i 
the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop 
her military preparations." * 

* [The text of this formula as also of the amended formula in No. 67 
appears in the British Blue-book (B. 97), the French Yellow-book (Y. 103), 
and here, with trifling variations in the wording, but these do not affect the 
sense.] 

485 



[0. 61] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude 
the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof 
of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settle- 
ment of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions 
to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may 
gain time for their military preparations. 

No. 61. 

M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914. 

I LEARN that the order for the mobilisation of the 
<!> 6 5 *f Y German arm Y an d navy has just been issued. (1) 
105.] 

No. 62. 

M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned 

that the news of the mobilisation of the German army and 

w [See No. fleet, which has just been announced, <a) is false; that the 

61 ; cf. news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready 

.105.] f or all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the 

afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated. 

No. 63. 

M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914. 

< 8 >[No. 49; I HAVE received your telegram of i6th (29th) July/" 
B. 93 (2).] and have communicated the text of your proposal to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told 
me that he had received an identic telegram from the German 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and he then declared that he 
considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal. 
486 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 65] 

No. 64. 

Count Benckendorff , Russian Ambassador at London, to 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) London, July 17 (30), 1914. 

I HAVE communicated the substance of your telegrams 
of the i6th (29th) (1> and I7th (30th)" 1 July to Grey, who looks <[Nos. 50, 
upon the situation as most serious, but wishes to continue 58.] 
the discussions. I pointed out to Grey that since you (8l [No. 60.] 
agreed" 1 with him to accept whatever proposal he might [See No. 
make in order to preserve peace, provided that Austria did 32.] 
not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Serbia, the situa- 
tion in which you were placed had apparently been modified.* 
At that time our relations with Germany had not been com- 
promised. After the declaration made by the German 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg regarding German mobilisa- 
tion, 141 those relations had changed, and you had returned (4 [No. 58.] 
the only reply to his request that was possible from a Great 
Power. When the German Ambassador again visited you, 1 " (8) [No. 60.] 
and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated 
them in altogether special circumstances. I also again 
emphasised to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration 
the new situation brought about by the fault of Germany 
in consequence of the German Ambassador's action. Grey 
replied that he fully understood this, and that he would 
remember these arguments. 

No. 65. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) London, July 17 (30), 1914. 

THE German Ambassador has asked Grey why Great 
Britain was taking military measures both on land and sea. ( " ( "[ C A 
Grey replied that these measures had no aggressive character, 
but that the situation'was such that each Power must be ready. 

* [In the Foreign Office translation of this sentence a dash is inserted 
after the first " that," and another after the word " Serbia," ; but this 
punctuation perverts the meaning of the original, which reads: " J'ai 
fait observer a Grey que depuis que vous lui aviez fait la proposition 
d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait ... la situation dans laquelle vous 
vous trouviez s'e'tait apparemment modifiee."] 

487 



[0. 66] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [JULY 3 

No. 66. 

M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Sazonof, 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Vienna, July 18 (31), 1914. 

()) [Y. 115.] IN spite of the general mobilisation, (1) my exchange of 
(2) [cf. B. views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. w 
no; R. 50, They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any 
53. 55-1 hostile intentions whatsoever against Russia, and of any 
designs of conquest at the expense of Serbia, but they are 
all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through 
the action which she has begun and to give Serbia a serious 
<8) r c j B lesson, (8) which would constitute a sure guarantee for the 
18, 32 ; future. 
Y. 57-3 No. 67. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian 

Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914. 

(4) [No. 6o.l PLEASE refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. (4) The 

British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, 

has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make 

(S) [c/. B. certain modifications' 51 in the formula which I suggested 

103 ; Y. yesterday to the German Ambassador. I replied that I 

"2.J accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you 

(<) [cf. B. the text of the modified formula which is as follows (6) : 

120, 132 ; " If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops 

Y. 113- on Serbian territory (7) ; if, recognising that the dispute between 

See foot- Austria and Serbia has become a question of European 

j^ 6o -, interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the 

<T> ty. S. matter and decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to 

51.] the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her 

rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will 

undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." 

No. 68. 

M. Swerbeiev, Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Sazonof, 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Berlin, July 18 (31), 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that 
our discussions, which were already difficult enough on 

488 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 70] 

account of the mobilisation against Austria, '" were becom- (1) [c/. B. 
ing even more so in view of the serious military measures 9 s -! 

that we were taking against Germany. 1 " He said that infor- '*'[c/. No. 
mation on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, 5*: Y - 
and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the I02 '^ 
part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure 
information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our 
compatriots arriving from Berlin, Germany also was very 
actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia."' (S) [c/. B. 
In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that the 97-1 

only step taken in Germany has been the recall of officers 
from leave and of the troops from manoeuvres. (4) (4l [c/. B. 

98; Y.59, 
No. 69. 6o ' 8 9-l 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count 

Be'nckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London. 
(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914. 

I HAVE requested the British Ambassador to express 
to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone 
which he has adopted in the discussions with Germany and 
Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue 
to the present situation need not yet be abandoned. 

I also requested him to inform the British Minister that 
in my opinion it was only in London that the discussions 
might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering 
the necessary compromise easier for Austria. 

Communicated to Russian Ambassador in France. 

(B [Wrongly 

No 70 trans ' 

' 70- lated 

Secret Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Representatives "mid- 

abroad. night" 

(Telegram.) July 19 (August i), 1914. J^ dal 

AT midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, version.] 
on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, <>[Aug. i.] 
that is by noon [midi] w on Saturday, ( " we had not begun to de- (7 > [cf. B. 
mobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, 117 ; Y. 
the German Government would be compelled to give the TI > a " d 
order for mobilisation.' 71 To my enquiry whether this 
meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but see ' a / S Q ' 
added that we were very near it. R. 57.] 

489 



[0. 71] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [AUGUST 

No. 71. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 19 (August i), 1914. 

GREY tells me that he has telegraphed to Berlin that in 
<1 '[No. 67.] his opinion the last formula (1) accepted by the Russian Govern- 
ment offers the best prospect as a basis of negotiations for a 
< 2 '[c/.B. peaceful settlement of the dispute.' 21 At the same time he 
103.] expressed the hope that no Great Power would open hostilities 
before this formula had been considered. 

No. .72. 

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to 
M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, July 19 (August i), 1914. 

THE British Government has enquired of the French 
and German Governments whether they will respect the 
< 3 >[B. 114-] neutrality of Belgium. (3) 

(4) [B. 125.] France (4) answered in the affirmative, but the German 
(5) [B. 122.] Government (s) stated that they could not give any definite 
answer to the question. 

No. 73. 

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July xg (August i), 1914. 

(8) [c/. B. THE Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani 

137 ; Y, and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any 
120.] designs against the integrity of Serbia," 1 was in fact ready 

<7) [c/. B. to discuss the grounds of her grievances' 71 against Serbia 
133 ; Y. ^k ^g O th er Powers. The French Government are much 

TOT 

( ^ exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on 
136 Y *ke French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the 
116/117! guise of " Kriegszustand," mobilisation is in reality being 
127!] ' carried out. w 
490 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 76] 

No. 74. 

Af. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July 19 (August i), 1914. 

ON the receipt in Paris of the telegram from the French 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication 
made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's 
decision to order general mobilisation to-day/ 11 the President (1| [No. 70.] 
of the French Republic signed the order for mobilisation."' W [Y. 127; 
Lists of the reservists recalled to the colours are being posted B. 136.] 
up in the streets. The German Ambassador has just visited 
Viviani,'" but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossi- (i) [Sec Y. 
bility of deciphering the telegrams he has received. Viviani 
informed him of the signature of the order for mobilisation 
issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his 
amazement that Germany should have taken such a step 
at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in 
progress between Russia, Austria, and the Powers. He 
added that mobilisation did not necessarily entail war, and 
that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the 
Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg. 

No. 75. 

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to M. Sazonof, 

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, July 19 (August i), 1914. 

I HEAR from the President that during the last few 
days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both 
the President of the Council of Ministers and him that Austria 
had declared to Russia that she was ready to respect both 
the territorial integrity of Serbia and also her sovereign 
rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this declara- 
tion in silence. I contradicted this flatly. 

No. 76. 
Note presented by Count Potirtales, German Ambassador at St. 

Petersburg, on July 19 (August i), at 7.10 P.M. UI w [cf. Y. 

LE Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les d6buts de I3 J ; ^. 
la crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a 

491 



[0. 76] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [AUGUST ; 

un desir qui lui en avait te* exprime par Sa Majeste 1'Em- 
pereur de Russie, Sa Ma jest 6 1'Empereur d'Allemagne 
d'accord avec 1'Angleterre s'etait applique* a accomplir un 
role me'diateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint- 
Pe*tersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le re"sultat, 
proce*da a la mobilisation de la totalite* de ses forces de terre 
et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure mena9ante ne motive"e 
par aucun presage militaire de la part de I'Allemagne, 1'Empire 
allemand s'est trouve vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. 
Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer a ce pe*ril, 
il aurait compromis la securite et 1' existence meme de I'Alle- 
magne. Par consequent le Gouvernement allemand se vit 
force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur 
de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes 
militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a (n'ayant pas 
* [See cru devoir repondre a*) cette demande et ayant manifesto par 
footnote ce refus (cette attitude *) que son action etait dirig6e centre 
P- 493-] I'Allemagne, j'ai 1'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de 
faire savoir a votre Excellence ce qui suit : 

Sa Majeste 1'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom 
de 1'Empire, relevant le defi, se considere en e*tat de guerre 
avec la Russie. 

(TRANSLATION.) 

THE Imperial German Government have used every 

effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful 

settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him 

by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor 

had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of 

w [See Y. mediator a) between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Peters- 

app. V. burg ; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded 

to a general mobilisation of her forces (a) both on land and 

"'Y*' I 8 3 i' sea ' "^ n consec l uence of this threatening step, (s) which was 

(3) ' J not justified by any military proceedings on the part of 

vol. II.,' Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and 

p. 134.] imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to 

guard against this peril, they would have compromised the 

safety and the very existence of Germany. The German 

Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations 

to the Government of K".s Majesty the Emperor of All the 

Russias and to insist upo~ a cessation of the aforesaid 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 77] 

military acts. (l) Russia having refused to comply with (not <[NO. 70.] 
having considered it necessary to answer*) this demand, 
and having shown by this refusal (this attitude *) that her 
action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, 
on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excel- 
lency as follows : 

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the 
name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and 
considers himself at war with Russia. 

No. 77. 

Announcement by M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, respecting Recent Events. 

July 20 (August 2), 1914. 

A GARBLED version of the events of the last few days 
having appeared in the foreign Press, the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following 
brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period 
under review : 

On the loth (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister 
of Serbia, (8) in which the Serbian Government were accused <> [No. i j 
of having fostered the pan-Serb movement, which had led for text, 
to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian see &- 4-] 
throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Serbian 
Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal 
manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the 
adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures 
for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any 
Serbian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the preven- 
tion of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian 
soil. A time limit of forty-eight hours was given to the 
Serbian Government within which to reply to this note. 

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of 
the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, lw (J) [ef. Nos. 
having taken note of the demands contained therein, could J 3. 36.] 

* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that 
two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they 
were both inserted in the note. 

493 



[0 . 77] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [AUGUST 

not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible 
of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were 
presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity 
of an independent State. Russia considered that the humilia- 
tion of Serbia, involved in these demands, and equally the 
evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own 
hegemony (sa preponderance) in the Balkans, which underlay 
her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Govern- 
ment, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the 
most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine 

< l) [No. 25.] the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note.' 1 ' The 
Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to 

<> [B. 93 (i) agree to a discussion of the note. w The moderating influence 
(3)-] of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful. 

Despite the fact that Serbia had reprobated the crime, 
and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction 
to an extent beyond the expectations, not only of Russia, 
but also of the other Powers despite these facts, the Austro- 
Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Serbian 

<3) [B. 39.] reply' 3 ' insufficient and left the town.' 4 ' 

(4) [No. 21.] Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands 
made by Austria, Russia had previously declared that she 

( 8 ) r No I0 1 could not remain indifferent, "' while not desisting from 
doing her utmost to find a peaceful issue which might prove 
acceptable to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a 
Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly 
understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of 
the question only so far as it involved no humiliation (diminu- 

w [cf. Y. tion de la dignite) of Serbia as an independent State. 161 Un- 

22.] happily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this 

end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, 

which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention 

(7 '[B. 61.] by the Powers' 71 in the Austrian dispute with Serbia, pro- 

(8) [B. 50 ; ceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Serbia, <8) 
R - 30-] and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. (9) The 

uoM^D 113 '? manifesto' 101 which accompanied the declaration of war 
19 openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out 
the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at 
common law, launched against a whole people and a whole 
State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy 
for Serbia throughout all classes of European society. 

494 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 77] 

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could 
not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, 01 the Russian (ll [No. 10.] 
Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation 
in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and 
Kazan. <a) This decision was rendered necessary by the fact (a '[B. 70 
that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was (*)] 
communicated to the Serbian Government, and since the 
first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet 
the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia 
half-way in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the 
contrary ; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hun- 
garian army had been ordered." 1 (S) [c/. No. 

The German Government were kept informed of the steps 47 ' Y. 
taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to I00 -' 
them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian 
preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at 
Germany. (4) Simultaneously, the Russian Government de- (4| [No. 51; 
clared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a Y. 102.] 
view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, (8) either in the < 8| [c/. B. 
form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by 78 ; Y. 86, 
Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great 9 1 -] 
Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, and Italy. 

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally 
unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange 
of views with Russia," 1 and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling (8) [6.93(1) 
to join the proposed conference of the Powers. m 

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. (7| [ B - 6l -] 
When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the 
conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our 
preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared' 81 ""[No. 60.] 
that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the 
Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, 
and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon 
such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign 
rights of Serbia. 

Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable 
to Austria-Hungary."' At that very moment news of the W [Y. 107, 
proclamation of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary' 10 ' 10) 114 ^ 
reached St. Petersburg. l '[Y.ii5.] 

495 



[0 . 78] RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [AUGUST 

All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian terri- 
tory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh. 

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to 
^[B. 113, extend the scope of our precautionary military measures. 111 
134 ; Y. The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied 
Il8 -3 that Russia was compelled to begin preparations (2) so as to 
w [cf. Nos. De ready for every emergency. 

58, 60.] -g u wn ii e taking this precautionary step, Russia did not 

on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some 

(S) [c/. B. solution of the situation, (8) and she announced that she was 

134.] ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem 

(4) [c/. B. that might be put forward/ 4 ' provided it complied with the 

78 ; Y. conditions laid down by her. 

86, 102.] j n spite of this conciliatory communication, the German 
(S) [No. 70.] Government on the i8th (3ist) July demanded (5) of the 
Russian Government that they should suspend their military 
measures by midday on the igth July (ist August), and 
threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general 
mobilisation. 

On the following day, the igih July (ist August), the 
German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded 
(6) [No. 76.] a declaration of war ( " to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

No. 78. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian 
Representatives Abroad. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 20 (August 2), 1914. 

IT is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost 
<7) [B. 134 ; to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture.' 7 ' We were 
Y. 127 ; forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would 
S- 5 1 -] have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible 
precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining 
herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding 
Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilisation. 
<"[Y. app. The Emperor of Russia had promised (8) the German 
V. (vi.).] Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as 
the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guar- 
antee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, 
Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our 
declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful 
496 



RUSSIAN ORANGE-BOOK [0. 79] 

settlement compatible with the dignity and independence 
of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incom- 
patible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset 
the European balance of power 01 by securing the hegemony U) [No. 17.] 
(Vhegemonie) of Germany. The European nay, the world- 
wide character of this dispute is infinitely more important 
than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to 
declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were 
in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a 
heavy responsibility. 

No. 79. 

Note presented by Count Szapary, Austro-Hungarian Ambas- 
sador at St. Petersburg, jo the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs on July 24 (August 6), 1914, at 6 p.m. 

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, le soussigne Ambas- 
sadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a 1'honneur de notifier a son 
Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Russie 
ce qui suit : 

" Vu 1'attitude menac.ante prise par la Russie dans le 
conflit entre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et la Serbie et en 
presence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie d'apres 
une communication du Cabinet de Berlin a cm devoir ouvrir 
les hostility contre 1'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve 
par consequent en e*tat de guerre avec la dite Puissance, 
1'Autriche-Hongrie se considere e*galement en e*tat de guerre 
avec la Russie partir du present moment." 

(TRANSLATION.) 

ON the instructions of his Government,'*' the undersigned, (i) [R. 59.] 
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform 
his Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as 
follows : 

' In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia 
in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and 
Serbia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication 
from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of 
that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany ; and 
whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia ; 
Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with 
Russia from the present moment." 

3 I 497 



INDEX 



Agadir Incident : 

Effect on German public opinion, 277-8. 
German memorandum, March 19, 1913, 
re need for increased armaments as 
shown by, 270. 
Agence Havas, 320, 383. 
AGRAM, see under Austria-Hungary. 
Albert, King of the Belgians : 

Conversation with Emperor of Ger- 
many, November, 1913, 284-5. 
Letter asking for British support, 
204 ; read in the House, August 3, 
401. 

Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia : 
Appeal to the Tsar for help, July 24, 
459-61 ; reply by Tsar, July 27, 
475-6 ; thanks for, July 28, 483 ; 
reply, 483-4. 
Delegation of full royal authority to, 

June 24, 459, footnote. 
Manifesto published on declaration of 

war by Austria, July 29, 484. 
Speech from the throne, at opening 

of the Skupshtina, 484-5. 
Algeciras, Conference of, German mem- 
orandum, March 19, 1913, re need for 
increased armaments as shown by, 
269-70. 

Allize, M., French Minister at Munich : 
Communications to M. Pichon and 
M. Bienvenu-Martin, 275-6, 297, 357. 
Instructed to ask for passports and 

leave Munich, August 3, 404. 
Alsace-Lorraine, German military pre- 
parations, July 30, 166, 172. 
d'Annoville, M., French Charge d' Af- 
faires at Luxemburg, communication 
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, July 26. 
33I-2- 

d'Apchier-le-Maugin, M., French Consul- 
General at Budapest, communication 
to M. Viviani, July n, 288-9. 



Austria-Hungary : 

Administration of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina under Treaty of Berlin, 1878, 

27-8. 
AGRAM : 

Anti-Serb riots, 28. 

Legal proceedings, 308. 
AMBASSADORS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
IN : 

British, see Bunsen, Sir Maurice de. 

French, see Dumaine, M. 

German, see Tschirschky, Herr 
von. 

Italian, see d'Avarna, Duke. 

Russian, see Sch6b6ko, M. 

United States, see Penfield, Mr. 
AMBASSADORS OF, IN FOREIGN COUN- 
TRIES : 

London, see Mensdorff, Count. 

Paris, see Szecsen, Count. 

St. Petersburg, see Szdpary, Count. 
Annexation of Bosnia- Herzegovina, see 

under Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
ARMY : 

Assistance expected from Mussul- 
man population in Serbia by 
Austrian Ambassador at Con- 
stantinople, July 29, 150. 

Employment of troops against 
France, denials by Count Berch- 
told, 219-20. 

Employment of troops so as to be 
menace to France, rupture owing 
to, 220-1. 
ATTITUDE OF : 

see also and Serbia below. 

Considered very disquieting by M. 
Isvolsky, July 29, 362. 

Criticism of, by M. Sazonof, August i, 
197. 

no Effort made at peaceful settle- 
ment, 215. 

499 



INDEX 



Austria- Hungary cont. 
ATTITUDE OF cont. 

Fear that no intervention will suc- 
ceed, 199. 

Government believed to believe them- 
selves obliged to commence military 
action, M. Dumaine, July 26, 327. 

Herr von Jagow on, 306, 359. 

Provocative action following Russian 
attempts at conciliation, 379. 

Review of, 6-9. 

Summary, M. Bienvenu-Martin, July 

2 9, 354. 480-1- 

Support by German Press, 307, 461. 
stranded British subjects in, recom- 
mended by Sir M. de Bunsen to 

Count Berchtold's consideration, 

August 13, 221. 
Charge 1 d'Affaires, St. Petersburg, see 

Czernin, Count. 
CROATIA : 

Provincial Council, attack on mem- 
bers of Serb party in, 28. 

State of siege proclaimed, 477. 
FIUME : 

Russian Consul-General, see Sal- 
viati, M. 

State of siege proclaimed, 477. 
AND FRANCE : 

Conciliatory moves at Paris, Au- 
gust i, 384. 

Intervention not anticipated by 
Press, 289. 

Rupture, 220-1. 
Fremdenblatt, 215, 220. 
Friedjung affair, 308. 
and Germany, see under Germany. 
AND GREAT BRITAIN : 

Anxiety to know attitude of Great 
Britain, 199. 

Declaration of war, 220-1. 

Neutrality of Great Britain antici- 
pated in, 125. 
and Italy, see under Italy. 
Mediation by the Powers, see that title. 
Military action, importance of Austria 

not precipitating, urged on German 

Ambassador by Sir E. Grey, 96, 97. 
MilitSrische Rundschau, quoted, 289. 
Minister at Belgrade, see Giesl von 

Gieslingen, Baron. 
MOBILISATION : 

Anticipated, July 28, 348. 

in Bohemia and Galician frontier, 
357-8. 358. 

300 



Austria- Hungary cont. 
MOBILISATION cont. 

of Eight army corps, not excessive 
against 400,000 Serbians, Sir E. 
Grey, July 31, 176. 
Explanation by Count Berchtold to 

M. Schebeko, 369. 
Extent of, July 29, 479-80. 
General : 

Declaration of, 189, 216, 381, 478. 
Rumoured, 358. 
not necessarily a Hostile act. Count 

Forgach, July 31, 181. 
Ordered, July 26, 468. 
Particulars, July 28, 357-8. 
Reservists called up, 477. 
a Result of Russian mobilisation 
and not a threat, Count Berch- 
told, 163. 

Russian general mobilisation ordered 
as result of, and not a sign of 
aggressive intentions, 160, 192, 
193. 382-3. 

Serious results, Sir E. Grey on 
possibility of, and grave danger of 
general war, 467. 
MODERATING ADVICE TO : 

Impossibility of, owing to near 

expiry of time limit, in opinion 

of M. Sazonof and M. Pal6ologue, 

July 25, 99. 

Suggested by M. Bienvenu-Martin, 

July 25, 98. 
Negotiations with, review of, by Sir 

M. de Bunsen, 214-21. 
Neue Freie Presse, 215, 220, 289. 
NOTE TO SERBIA : 
Acceptance : 

neither Anticipated nor desired in 

Austria, 34, 102, 120, 121, 215, 

289-90, 290-1, 303, 320. 

in Entirety, views of the Marquis 

di San Giuliano as to, July 27, 

135. 34.1- 

Impossibility of entire acceptance : 
Prince Alexander, July 24, 459- 

60. 
M. Paul Cambon, July 24, 94, 

310- 
Herr von Jagow, July 25, 101, 

125- 

M. Patchou, July 23, 457. 
Serbian Government, 92. 
Possibility of, if certain explana- 
tions given, July 28, 138-9. 



INDEX 



Austria-Hungary cont. 
NOTE TO SERBIA cont. 
Acceptance co nt . 

Revolution in Serbia in case of, 

possibility. 98-9. 305, 307. 
Unconditional, opinion of Italian 
Secretary General, that Austria 
will only be restrained by, 
July 25, 102. 
Analysis of, M. Bienvenu-Martin, 

July 24, 300. 

Apprehension expressed by Sir E. 
Grey as to consequences, 32, 73-4, 
95, 105, 128. 
Attitude of Count Berchtold, July 

24, 91-2. 

Bavarian President of Council's 
knowledge re, and opinion, July 23, 
297. 

M. Boschkovitch on, July 22, 295-6. 
British attitude towards, 31-3, 95, 

3i3- 

Communication of, to French Minister 
by Herr von Schoen, 303-5, 461-2. 

Communication of, to M. Sazonof, 
July 24, 458. 

Conversation between Sir E. Grey 
and Prince Lichnowsky, 295. 

private Criticism of, by Herr von 
Jagow, and disclaimer of previous 
knowledge of, July 25, 33, 101. 

Criticism by M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
July 24, 299. 

Criticism by M. Sazonof, 80-90, 123, 
468. 

certain Demands would necessitate 
alteration of law, M. Sazonof, 468. 

Desire of M. Sazonof that H.M. 
Government would express strong 
reprobation of Austro-Hungarian 
action, July 24, 91. 

Effect in Russia, 476. 

Explanation of, as a demarche with 
a time limit, not an ultimatum 
and actual military operations 
not threatened, 98, 312, 315, 
323, 464-5 ; not received by 
French Government, July 25, 98. 

French attitude, 33. 

French, Russian, Italian and British 
Ambassadors kept in dark as to, 
by Count Berchtold, 214-5. 

German approval, 306, 330-1, 465, 
466. 

German attitude, 33, 109. 



Austria- Hungary cont. 
NOTE TO SERBIA cont. 

pretended German confidence in 
friendly settlement, M. de Manne- 
ville, July 4, 287. 

German disclaimer of previous know- 
ledge of terms, 33, 101, 105, 292, 
293. 307. 3 8 312. 3i6, 330, 349, 
465, 466 ; truth of, doubted, 309, 

3". 356. 

Sir E. Grey's deprecation of demands 
as inconsistent with maintenance 
oi Serbian independent sover- 
eignty, July 24, 88-9. 
Informationrequestedby M. Berthelot 
as to whether note an ultimatum, 
but no direct reply given, 462. 
Italy and, see under Italy. 
Prince Kudachef's attitude re. July 

24, 91. 
Modification of : 

Proposal by M. Sazonof re, July 26, 

326. 

Request of Serbian Prime Minister 

that H.M. Government would use 

influence to obtain, July 24, 92. 

Peaceful result alleged by Baron 

Macchio to be possible, 296. 
Presentation of, July 23, 457. 
Russian attitude, 33, 294, 297. 
Russian request for information 
as to data on which demands 
based, 106. 

Serbian attitude, 294, 296. 
Serbian reply : 

Admitted by Count Mensdorff 
to appear satisfactory on paper, 
July 27, 127. 

Advice by Cabinets of London, 
Paris and St. Petersburg, 29, 
33. 96, 96-7. 302, 312-3. 
Approval by M. Sazonof, July 27, 

472. 
Austrian attitude : 

Opinion of German Government 
re, and advice given to Aus- 
tria, 145. 

Reply considered unsatisfactory 
in Vienna, and energetic action 
to be taken, 108, 474. 
Statement by Count Mensdorff, 
and reply by Sir E. Grey, July 
27, 126-8. 

Views of the Marquis di San 
Giuliano, July 27. 135. 






INDEX 



Austria-Hungary coni. 
NOTE TO SERBIA cont. 
Serbian reply cont. 

Austrian comments on, and justi- 
fication of coercive measures, 
Government memorandum, July 
27 and 28, 344-6. 

Austrian official explanation pub- 
lished of grounds on which 
reply considered inadequate and 
criticism of, by Italian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, 139. 

Communication of, to M. Sazonof 
by M. de Strandtman, July 25 
(received July 27, delayed in 
transmission), 463. 

Concessions considered a sham 
by Herr von Tschirschky, July 
26, 34, 109. 

Conciliatory influences must have 
been exercised at Belgrade by 
Russia, Sir E. Grey, July 27, 

125. 477- 

Consideration of, and moderating 

influence at Vienna urged on 

German Ambassador by Sir E. 

Grey, 125, 477. 

Criticism of, by Count Berchtold, 

July 28, 1 60. 
Discussion on basis of : 

Austrian refusal to accept, July 

28, 137, 150, 217, 352-3. 
Austrian willingness : 

and Proposal by M. Sazonof 
that pourparlers should take 
place in London, 384-5, 386. 
Question as to genuineness of, 
or object of throwing re- 
sponsibility on Russia, M. 
Jules Cambon, August i, 
386. 

German Government should 
urge, Sir E. Grey, July 27, 
125- 

Impossibility, 145, 153, 163. 
Opinion of Herr von Jagow, 

July 29, 359. 
Urged by German Government, 

140. 
Forecast of, by M. Yov. M. 

Yovanovitch, 303. 
German attitude, 34, no, 138, 145. 
Intentional delay of telegram from 
Belgrade to M. Isvolsky an- 
nouncing, 473. 

502 



Austria-Hungary cont. 
NOTE TO SERBIA cont. 
Serbian reply cont. 

Opinion of M. de Margerie that 
good impression should be pro- 
duced by, July 26, 469. 

Public delight in Vienna, etc., 
at rejection of, and popularity 
of war, 215-6. 

not yet Read by Herr von Jagow, 
July 26, 343. 

Refusal to accept Serbia's sub- 
mission or to accept conversa- 
tion with the Powers, and con- 
sequent seriousness of situation, 

333- 
Suggestion by Prince Lichnowsky 

re nature of, 96. 
Summary, delay in receipt of, in 

France, 327. 
Summary of, by M. Boppe, July 

25. 319. 

brief Summary of projected reply, 
July 25, 102-3. 

Summary communicated to Ger- 
man Ambassador in London, 
and hope expressed that German 
Government would influence 
Austrian Government to give 
favourable reception to, July 

25, 34, 106-7. 

Count Szpdry's attitude, July 25, 

134- 

Count. Sz6csen surprised that 
Baron Giesl not satisfied, July 

26, 469. 

Text, 112-16: translation, 116- 

20. 
Text, Herr von Schoen ignorant 

of, and criticism of, as in 

papers, July 26, 331. 
Text not published by Wolff 

Bureau or in local Berlin papers, 

July 28, 478. 
Summary of demands, Consular 

report, July 20, 290. 
Text of, 74-85. 
Time limit : 

Apprehension expressed by Sir 

E. Grey at insertion of, 32, 

73-4, 88-9. 
Expiry, diplomatic relations to be 

broken off, and military pre- 
parations commenced, not mili- 

tarj" operations, 104. 



INDEX 



Austria- Hungary cont. 
NOTE TO SERBIA cont. 
Time limit cont. 
Extension : 

British efforts to obtain, 33, 

96, 97. 315. 324. 464- 
French efforts to obtain, 3 1 5 , 464 . 
German Ambassador at Vienna, 

instructed to pass on sug- 
gestion for, but success 
doubted, July 25, 33, 100-1, 
316. 463-4. 
German attitude re request lor, 

323- 

Instructions to Italian Ambassa- 
dor to support request re- 
ceived too late, 121. 

Instructions not received by 
French Ambassador until time 
of expiry, July 25, 321, 324. 

Opinion of Sir G. Buchanan that 
influence should be brought to 
bear with view to, July 24, 90. 

Refusal by Austria, July 25, 
322, 463. 

Request by Russian Charg6 
d'Affaires and evasion by 
Government, July 25, 318-9, 
462-3. 

Russian Ambassador at Vienna 
not to press for, July 26, 121. 

Russian efforts to obtain, 33, 35, 

97, 105-6, 314, 314-5. 315. 
316, 317, 318, 318-9, 458. 

Suggestion not considered prac- 
ticable by M. Pateologue, 90. 
Hour fixed for reply, 85 , 300, 310. 
Shortness of : 

Criticism by M. J. Cambon, July 

24, 107. 

Exercise of moderating influ- 
ence made difficult by, M. 
Pateologue, July 24, 308. 
Sir E. Grey helpless as regards 
influencing of Russia owing 
to, and to tone of note, July 
24, 32-3, 95. 

Warning to Count Szecsen of painful 
impression that will be aroused by, 
July 24, 301. 

Willingness of Serbian Government to 
entertain, if only judicial co-opera- 
tion in punishment and prevention 
of political crimes asked for, Dr. 
M. Yovanovitch, July 20, 291. 



Austria-Hungary cont. 
Prague, Acting Russian Consul, see 

Kazansky, M. 
PRESS : 
Excitement of public feeling against 

Serbia, 291. 

alleged Italian approval of note 

and assurance of support, denial 

by Marquis di San Giuliano, 

July 27, 341. 

Language used pointing to war with 

Serbia, 215. 
Non-publication of news of partial 

Russian mobilisation, 369. 
RESPONSIBILITY OF : 

Sir E. Goschen on, 142, 360. 
M. Ren6 Viviani on, August 1 , 391 . 
and Russia, see under Russia. 
Russian Charg6 d'Affaires, see Kuda- 

chef, Prince. 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 

see Berchtold, Count. 
Seizure of Salonica Railway intended 

by, 102. 
AND SERBIA : 
Aggressive intentions of Government 

but moderating of, 293-4, 2 9^- 
Anti-Serbian feeling after Sarajevo 

murders, 28. 

Assurance of good conduct to Aus- 
tria : 
Alleged failure to keep, 73, 75, 

82, 93. 304- 
Obligations given not to Austria 

but to the Powers, 99, 133. 
Attack on Serbia : 

probable Abandonment of Bel- 
grade, withdrawal to interior 
and appeal to Powers for help, 

99- 

European war would follow, state- 
ment by Sir E. Grey, July 27, 

337- 
Impossibility of averting war, 

143, 196-7. 
Russia cannot remain indifferent, 

121, 308. 
Russian order for mobilisation 

against Austria would follow, 143. 
Austrian attitude : 

German defence of, 92-3, 303-4, 

306, 330-1, 438-9, 465, 466. 
attempted Justification of, by 

Count Mensdorff, July 29, 158. 
Russian attitude, July 30, 162-3, 

503 



INDEX 



Austria-Hungary cont. 
AND SERBIA cont. 

anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda, 
see under Serbia. 

British interests only indirectly con- 
cerned, but concerned with ques- 
tion of peace of Europe, 88, 88-9, 
90, 95, 104, 105, 466. 

Conviction of Government, of neces- 
sity for scoring definite success 
against Serbia, gravity of situa- 
tion owing to, Marquis di San 
Giuliano, July 23, in. 

Country enthusiastic for war, July 
27, 121. 

Declaration of war, July 28, 35 : 
Sir E. Grey informed of, by Sir 

M. de Bunsen, July 28, 144. 
Manifesto published by Prince 

Alexander on, July 29, 484. 
Text of, 129. 

Determination on military action, 
loi, 108, in, 217, 319, 327, 345, 
348, 360-1, 488. 

Diplomatic relations broken off, 

324. 327- 
Germany unable to intervene, Herr 

von Jagow, July 26, 343. 
Guarantees for future relations neces- 
sary, M. Sch6b6ko, July 28, 159. 
Impossibility of avoiding war, 137, 

149, 160. 

Independence of Serbia, no assur- 
ance given by Herr von Schoen, 
136. 

Intention to act in conformity with 
Hague Conventions and Declara- 
tion of London if same procedure 
adopted by Serbia, July 28, 129. 
Irrevocable steps possible unless 
mediation immediately under- 
taken, 162. 

Herr von Jagow's attitude, July 22, 72. 
Localisation of conflict : 

Anticipated at Constantinople, 

336-7. 

Anticipated by Germany and re- 
fusal by Herr von Jagow to 
believe in any possibility of 
extension to Europe, July 25,317. 
Assistance of Great Britain in, 
counted on by Austrian Govern- 
ment, July 27, 127. 
probably Counted on by Austria, 
476. 

504 



Austria-Hungary cont. 
AND SERBIA cont. 

Localisation of conflict cont. 

Desired by Count Berchtold and 
diplomats, but possibility of 
European conflict considered by 
military circles, Consular report, 
July 20, 291. 

German desire for, 33, 72, 93, 
304-5, 307, 312, 332, 462, 465. 

Gravity of position in event of 
failure of, urged on Prince 
Lichnowsky by Sir E. Grey, 125. 

Sir E. Grey requested by Prince 
Lichnowsky to use influence in 
St. Petersburg for, July 27, 125, 

477- 

Impossibility, as Russia not pre- 
pared to give way, 134. 
Insistence by Germany on ques- 
tion being a local one, 354, 480. 
considered Possible by Herr von 
Jagow, July 25, 101. 

Mediation by the Powers, see that 
title. 

Military operations against Serbia, 
mediation by H.M. Government 
with view to suspension, import- 
ance of, July 28, 141. 

Note, see that title above. 

Obscurity of intentions of Austrian 
Government up to July 23, 29. 

Occupation of the Sandjak, possi- 
bility of, M. Beaumont, July 29, 
150 ; denial, 194-5. 384, 391- 

Official quiet, hostility to Serbia 
considered by M. Boschkovitch to 
be concealed by, July 22, 295. 

Peaceful settlement, possibility of, 
but for action taken by Germany, 
in opinion of Sir M. de Bunsen, 
218-9. 

Proposal to place question before 
Hague Conference, Emperor Nicho- 
las, July 29, 443. 

Publication of case against Serbia 
before taking action, assumed, 
July 20, 30, 71. 

Readiness to discuss grounds of 
grievances against Serbia, accord- 
ing to Count Sz6csen, July 31, 490. 

Review of events by M. Sazonof, 
August 2, 493-6. 

Russia to restrain Serbia as long 
as possible, July 27, 134. 



INDEX 



Austria-Hungary con/. 
AND SERBIA con/. 

Russia unable to remain indifferent, 

July 25, 462. 

Search for instigators of murder on 
Serbian territory, warning by 
M. Sazonof that Russian Govern- 
ment would not tolerate, July 6, 
287-8. 

Skirmish on the Danube, 134. 
Summary of stages in, M. Rene 

Viviani, August 4, 421-5. 
Suspension of military operations 
after occupation of Belgrade 
and adjoining territories : 
French support of suggestion re- 
quested, 170. 

Possibility of mediation and 

general suspension of further 

military preparations, July 30, 

169. 

Territorial acquisitions and violation 

of integrity : 

Assurances against any intention 
of, lot, 127, 135, 136, 138, 145, 
157, 158, 164, 194-5. 328, 335, 
354-5. 368, 384, 391, 470, 473, 
488. 

Binding engagement to Europe 
against, and against desire to 
destroy independence, Russia 
might be induced to remain 
quiet, in opinion of Duke 
d'Avarna, but declaration not 
probable, 149. 

Denial by M. Isvolsky that Russia 
had received declaration in si- 
lence, 491. 

Russia would have no right to 
intervene. Count Berchtold, July 
28, 217. 

Territorial integrity and rights 
as sovereign State must be 
respected, M. Sazonof, July 27, 

133- 

Vassalage to Austria : 

Possibility of, even if left nomin- 
ally independent, Sir E. Grey, 
July 29, 158. 
Russia would not tolerate, M. 

Sazonof, J.uly 29, 164. 
Willingness to meet reasonable de- 
mands of Austria, but not to 
abandon certain political ideals, 
107. 



Austria-Hungary con/. 

Serbian Minister, see Yovanovitch, M. 

Yov. M. 

Seriousness of situation unless Ger- 
many able to restrain, July 25, 
100. 

Slavonia, state of siege proclaimed, 477. 
Southern Slav inhabitants, Govern- 
ment action probably precipitated 
by imminence of general insurrection 
among, in opinion of Duke d'Avarna, 
361. 
Telegraph office, intentional delay of 

diplomatic telegrams in, 473. 
Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign 
Affairs, see Forgach, Count, and 
Macchio, Baron. 
VIENNA : 

British Consul, see Phillpotts, Mr. 
British Embassy, testimony to staff 

of, by Sir M. de Bunsen, 222. 
Russian Embassy, attempted hostile 

manifestations against, 215. 
Serbian Legation, threatened by 

riots after Sarajevo murders, 28. 
d'Avarna, Duke, Italian Ambassador at 
Vienna, ignorance beforehand of forth- 
coming Austrian note, 214-5. 
Balkan War, German memorandum, 
March 19, 1913, re need for increased 
armaments as shown by, 270. 
Barrere, M., French Ambassador at 

Rome : 
COMMUNICATIONS : 

from M. Bienvenu-Martin and M. 
Ren6 Viviani, 292-3, 296-7, 302, 
302-5, 310-1, 322-4, 327-8. 344-5. 
348-9. 354-6. 361, 362, 377-9. 
380, 384-5, 388-9, 395-6, 44- 
to M. Bienvenu-Martin and M. Rene 
Viviani, 318, 324-5, 341, 354, 

363-4. 387-8. 
CONVERSATIONS : 

M. Salandra, July 26, 324. 
Marquis di San Giuliano, 293, 328, 

341, 363-4, 387-8. 
Basle, see under Switzerland. 
Bavaria : 

Infantry regiments, Metz, recall of non- 
commissioned officers and men on 
leave, July 28. 357. 
Opinion re new armaments, 1913. 

275-6. 

Optimism in Press and pessimism in 
official circles, 297. 

505 



INDEX 



Bavaria cont. 

President of Council, knowledge of 
contents of Austrian note, and 
opinion re, July 23, 297. 
Beaumont, Mr., British Charge 1 d' Affaires 

at Constantinople : 

Conversation with Austrian Ambassa- 
dor, 150-1. 

Telegram to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 150-1. 
Belgium : 

Appeal to England, France, and Russia 

to co-operate in defence, 405. 
British Minister, see Villiers, Sir Francis. 
French Minister, see Klobukowski, M. 
French offer of five army corps to, and 

reply, August 3, 203. 
GERMANY AND : 

Annexation of territory, assurance 
against, by Herr von Jagow, 
August 4, 206. 

Anxiety as to German attitude, 356. 
German attitude in event of Euro- 
pean war, 1913, 272. 
Hostile acts alleged by German 

Government, July 31, 186. 
Ultimatum to, August 2, 399 : 

M. Jules Cambon instructed to 
protest against, in writing, 
August 3, 404. 
Violation of neutrality, see under 

Neutrality below. 
Lidge, summoned to surrender, but 

Germans repulsed, August 4, 206. 
Minister at Berlin, see Beyens, Baron. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, see Davig- 

non, M. 
NEUTRALITY : 

Appeal by King for British diplo- 
matic intervention to safeguard, 
204 ; read in the House, August 

3. 401- 

Assumption by Sir E. Grey that Bel- 
gium will do utmost to maintain, 
and assistance to be given, 180,205. 

British attitude, 167, 183, 202, 390, 

397. 40i : 

German Chancellor's criticism, 
August 4, 209-10. 

British ultimatum to Germany, 
August 4, 207, 405. 

Declaration by Government of in- 
tention to defend, and steps being 
taken, 37, 189, 356, 399, 405. 

French assurance to respect, July 31, 
37, 188, 383, 387. 

506 



Belgium cont. 
NEUTRALITY cont. 
French violation of : 

Alleged intention of, Herr von 

Jagow, August 4, 206. 
M. Jules Cambon instructed to 
protest in writing against alle- 
gation of proj