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DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY 
OF  THE  WAR 


VOLUME    VIII 


MILITARY— PART   2 


LONDON 

PRINTING     HOUSE    SQUARE 
1919 


v, 


PREFACE 

THIS  volume  continues  the  publication  of  documents  dealing 
with  the  Military  aspects  of  the  War  in  1914.  Despatches 
from  British  Eye- Witness  and  French  and  Belgian  Official 
and  semi-Official  Reports  illustrate  the  campaign  in  the  West 
in  that  year.  Despatches  and  Communiques  dealing  with 
the  Turkish  campaign  of  1914  are  prefaced  by  a  selection 
from  the  Turkish  Papers  [Cd.  7628],  in  so  far  as  they  are 
concerned  with  Military  matters.  Then  follows  material 
relating  to  the  Japanese  operations  at  Kiao-chau,  and 
extracts  from  the  Correspondence  [Cd.  7972]  and  [Cd.  7975] 
dealing  with  the  capture  of  German  Pacific  Possessions  by 
Expeditionary  Forces  from  Australia  and  New  Zealand. 

For  convenience  of  reference,  an  explanatory  list  of  the 
abbreviations  used  in  the  margin  of  this  volume  to  indicate 
sources  of  information  is  here  appended  : — 

B.  des  A.  .  .  Bulletin  des  Armees  (French  official  military  publication, 
issued  monthly)  ;  and  Histoire  de  la  Guerre  par  le 
Bulletin  des  Armees.  Paris,  Hachette. 

Second  Belgian          Correspondance   Diplomatique  relative  a  la  Guerre  de 
Grey  Book      .  1914-15,  ii. 

K.  D.  .         .     Kriegs-Depeschen,  a  German  serial  publication  entitled 

'  Kriegs-Depeschen,  nach  den  amtlichen  Berichten 
des  W.T.B.  [i.e.,  the  Wolff  Telegraphic  Bureau] 
zusammengestellt '  (Boll  u.  Pickardt,  Verlagsbuch- 
handlung,  Berlin).  This  serial  is  largely,  but  not 
entirely,  identical  with  K.  V.  below.  (Issued 
monthly.) 

K.  V.  .         .     Der   Kriegsverlauf :     Sammlung   der   amtlichen   Nach- 

richten  von  den  Kriegsschaupldtzen.  Berlin,  Carl 
Heymann.  (Issued  monthly.) 

L.  G.  .         .         .     London  Gazette. 
P  B.  .  Press  Bureau. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

GERMAN  INTENTION  TO  MAKE  WAR i 

DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS         .         .         .  5 

FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS       .         .  '160 

BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 236 

WAR  WITH  TURKEY 311 

WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 405 

WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC      .         .         .         .                 ~         .         .  432 

INDEX 471 

MAP 

THE  BELGIAN  CAMPAIGN  OF  1914 251 


GERMAN  INTENTION  TO  MAKE  WAR 
POTSDAM  MEETING 


[The  following  important   communication  from   a   well-  Times, 
rmed  correspondent  was  made  to  The  Times  in  July  1917.]  J  ^     ' 
In  the  report  of  Herr  Haase's  speech  in  the  Reichstag  last 


week,  which  appears  in  the  Leipziger  Volkszeitung  of  July  29, 
there  is  a  reference  to  '  the  meeting  of  July  5,  1914,'  as  one  of 
the  matters  which  will  have  to  be  explained  before  the  origin 
of  the  war  is  fully  understood.  This  is  the  first  public  refer- 
ence to  a  date  which  will  probably  become  the  most  famous 
of  the  fateful  month  of  July  1914. 

I  have  it  on  authority  which  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
to  doubt,  that  the  meeting  referred  to  was  a  meeting  which 
was  held  at  Potsdam  on  the  date  named.  There  were  present 
the  Kaiser,  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  Admiral  von  Tirpitz, 
General  von  Falkenhayn,  Herr  von  Stumm,  the  Archduke 
Frederick,  Count  Berchtold,  Count  Tisza,  and  General  Conrad 
von  Hoetzendorf  .  It  appears  that  Herr  von  Jagow  and  Count 
Moltke  were  not  present. 

The  meeting  discussed  and  decided  upon  all  the  principal 
points  in  the  Austrian  ultimatum  which  was  to  be  despatched  to 
Serbia  eighteen  days  later.  It  was  recognised  that  Russia 
would  probably  refuse  to  submit  to  such  a  direct  humiliation, 
and  that  war  would  result.  That  consequence  the  meeting 
definitely  decided  to  accept.  It  is  probable,  but  not  certain, 
that  the  date  of  mobilisation  was  fixed  at  the  same  time. 

The  Kaiser,  as  is  well  known,  then  left  for  Norway,  with 
the  object  of  throwing  dust  in  the  eyes  of  the  French  and 
Russian  Governments.  Three  weeks  later,  when  it  became 
known  that  England  would  not  remain  neutral,  Herr  von 
Bethmann  Hollweg  wished  to  withdraw,  but  it  was  too  late. 
The  decision  of  July  5  was  irrevocable. 

MILITARY  2  A  I 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

The  peculiar  way,  or  rather  ways,  in  which  these  facts  have 
become  known  cannot  as  yet  be  told.  But  it  is  certain  that 
most  of  Herr  Haase's  hearers  were  fully  aware  of  the  meaning 
of  his  reference  to  July  5.  For  the  subject  appears  to  have 
been  more  fully  and  explicitly  raised  in  secret  session  of  the 
Budget  Committee  of  the  Reichstag  eight  weeks  ago  by  the 
Socialist  Deputy,  Herr  Cohn.  He  challenged  a  certain 
Minister  to  deny  the  facts.  To  the  astonishment  of  the  other 
deputies,  the  Minister  did  not  deny  the  facts,  but  declined  to 
make  any  statement. 

The  incident  created  an  immense  sensation  in  the  Reichs- 
tag Committee,  and  was  possibly  one  of  the  factors  under- 
lying the  recent  political  crisis.  The  fact  that  Herr  Haase  has 
now  raised  the  matter  in  public  seems  to  indicate  that  he  and 
his  friends  consider  that  the  time  has  come  to  bring  the  fuU 
truth  to  light. 


A  MEMORANDUM  BY  DR.  MUHLON,  A  DIRECTOR  OF 
KRUPP'S  TILL  TOWARDS  THE  END  OF  1914  1 

Times,  In  the  middle  of  July  1914,  I  had,  as  I  frequently  had,  a 

March  28,    conversation  with  Dr.  Helfferich,  then  director  of  the  Deutsche 

9  Bank  in  Berlin,  and  now  Vice-Chancellor.     The  Deutsche  Bank 

Diplomatic   ha(^  ad°Pted  a  negative  attitude  towards  certain  large  trans- 

Z'P-  327]  '  actlons.m  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  in  which  the  firm  of  Krupp, 

for  business  reasons — delivery  of  war  material — had  a  lively 

interest.     As  one  of  the  reasons  to  justify  the  attitude  of  the 

Deutsche  Bank,  Dr.  Heliferich  finally  gave  me  the  following 

reason : — 

'  The  political  situation  has  become  very  menacing.  The 
Deutsche  Bank  must  in  any  case  wait  before  entering  into  any 
further  engagements  abroad.  The  Austrians  have  just  been 
with  the  Kaiser.  In  a  week's  time  Vienna  will  send  a  very 
severe  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  with  a  very  short  interval  for  the 
answer  The  ultimatum  will  contain  demands  such  as  punish- 
ent  of  a  number  of  officers,  dissolution  of  political  associa- 


T      ji «  r,a™;    J16  memorandum  was  originaUy  pubUshed  by  the  Berliner 

TageUatt  of  March  21,  1918.] 

2 


GERMAN  INTENTION  TO  MAKE  WAR 

tions,  criminal  investigations  in  Serbia  by  Austrian  officials, 
and,  in  fact,  a  whole  series  of  definite  satisfactions  will  be 
demanded  at  once  ;  otherwise  Austria-Hungary  will  declare 
war  on  Serbia/ 

Dr.  Helfferich  added  that  the  Kaiser  had  expressed  his 
decided  approval  of  this  procedure  on  the  part  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  He  had  said  that  he  regarded  a  conflict  with  Serbia 
as  an  internal  affair  between  these  two  countries,  in  which  he 
would  permit  no  other  State  to  interfere.  If  Russia  mobilised, 
he  would  mobilise  also.  But  in  his  case  mobilisation  meant 
immediate  war.  This  time  there  would  be  no  oscillation. 
Helfferich  said  that  the  Austrians  were  extremely  well  satisfied 
at  this  determined  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Kaiser.  .  .  . 

After  my  return  from  Berlin  I  informed  Herr  Krupp  von 
Bohlen  und  Halbach,  one  of  whose  directors  I  then  was  at 
Essen.  Dr.  Helfferich  had  given  me  permission,  and  at  that 
time  the  intention  was  to  make  him  a  director  at  Krupp's. 
Herr  von  Bohlen  seemed  disturbed  that  Dr.  Helfferich  was  in 
possession  of  such  information,  and  he  made  a  remark  to  the 
effect  that  the  Government  people  can  never  keep  their  mouths 
shut.  He  then  told  me  the  following.  He  said  that  he  had 
himself  been  with  the  Kaiser  in  the  last  few  days.  The 
Kaiser  had  spoken  to  him  also  of  his  conversation  with  the 
Austrians,  and  of  its  result  ;  but  he  had  described  the  matter 
as  so  secret  that  he  (Krupp)  would  not  even  have  dared  to  in- 
form his  own  directors.  As,  however,  I  already  knew,  he  could 
tell  me  that  Helfferich 's  statements  were  accurate.  Indeed, 
Helfferich  seemed  to  know  more  details  than  he  did.  He  said 
that  the  situation  was  really  very  serious.  The  Kaiser  had 
told  him  that  he  would  declare  war  immediately  if  Russia 
mobilised,  and  that  this  time  people  would  see  that  he  did  not 
turn  about.  The  Kaiser's  repeated  insistence  that  this  time 
nobody  would  be  able  to  accuse  him  of  indecision  had,  he  said, 
been  almost  comic  in  its  effect. 

On  the  very  day  indicated  to  me  by  Helfferich  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Serbia  appeared.  .  .  . 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

TOUL  AND  VERDUN  AS  GUARANTEE  OF 
NEUTRALITY 

Telegram  from  the  Imperial  German  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg,  to  Baron  von  Schoen,  German  Ambassador 
at  Paris. 

(Translation) 

Cf.Diplo-  Russia  has  ordered  mobilisation  of  her  entire  army  and 
matic ,2,  fleet^  therefore  also  against  us,  in  spite  of  our  still  pending 
mediation,  and  although  we  ourselves  have  taken  no  measures 
of  mobilisation.  We  have  therefore  declared  the  state  of 
danger  of  war,  which  is  bound  to  be  followed  by  mobilisation 
unless  Russia  stops  within  twelve  hours  all  measures  of  war 
against  us  and  Austria.  Mobilisation  inevitably  implies  war. 
Please  ask  French  Government  whether  it  intends  to  remain 
neutral  in  a  Russo-German  war.  Reply  must  follow  within 
eighteen  hours.  Wire  at  once  hour  of  inquiry.  Utmost 
speed  necessary. 

If,  contrary  to  expectation,  French  Government  declares 
that  it  will  remain  neutral,  your  Excellency  will  please  de- 
clare to  the  French  Government  that  we  must  demand  as 
guarantee  of  neutrality  the  handing  over  of  the  fortresses  of 
Toul  and  Verdun,  which  we  should  occupy,  and  hand  back  on 
the  conclusion  of  the  war  with  Russia. 

Reply  to  this  last  question  must  be  here  before  four  o'clock 
on  Saturday  afternoon.  BETHMANN  HOLLWEG. 

[The  first  portion  of  this  despatch— the  first  paragraph- 
was  published  in  the  French  Yellow  Book  in  1914  (see  Diplo- 
matic, i,  p.  382).  The  second  portion  was  made  public  for 
the  first  time  by  M.  Stephen  Pichon,  French  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  in  a  speech  at  the  Sorbonne,  Paris,  on  March  i 
1918.] 


DESPATCHES    FROM    BRITISH 
EYE-WITNESS 

THE  FOLLOWING  NARRATIVE  OF  EVENTS  WAS  COMPILED  BY 
A  MILITARY  EYE- WITNESS  ATTACHED  TO  THE  GENERAL 
HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  BRITISH  ARMY  IN  FRANCE.1 

September  6 — September  10,  1914 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  general  position  of  our  [All  taker 
troops  on  Sunday,  September  6,  was  stated  to  be  south  of  the  from  The 
Marne,  with  French  forces  in  line  on   our  right   and  left.  Times] 
Practically  there  had  been  no  change  in  the  situation  since 
Thursday,  the  3rd,  which  marked  the  end  of  our  Army's  long 
retirement  from  the  Belgian  frontier  through  Northern  France. 

On  Friday,  the  4th,  it  became  apparent  that  there  was  an 
alteration  in  the  direction  of  advance  of  almost  the  whole  of 
the  ist  German  Army.  That  army  since  the  battle  near  Mons 
on  August  23  had  been  playing  its  part  in  the  colossal  strategic 
endeavour  to  create  a  Sedan  for  the  Allies  by  outflanking  and 
enveloping  the  left  of  their  whole  line  so  as  to  encircle  and 
drive  both  British  and  French  to  the  south.  There  was  now 
a  change  in  its  objective  ;  and  it  was  observed  that  the  German 
forces  opposite  the  British  were  beginning  to  move  in  a  south- 
easterly direction  instead  of  continuing  south-west  on  to  the 
Capital. 

Leaving  a  strong  rearguard  along  the  line  of  the  "river 
Ourcq  (which  flows  south  and  joins  the  Marne  at  Lizy-sur- 
Ourcq)  to  keep  off  the  French  6th  Army,  which  by  then  had 
been  formed  and  was  to  the  north-west  of  Paris,  they  were 
evidently  executing  what  amounted  to  a  flank  march  diagon- 

1  [These  despatches  from  the  British  'Eye-witness'  were  from  time  to  time 
officially  supplied  to  the  daily  press  of  the  United  Kingdom.  The  year  1914  is 
covered  in  this  volume.  A  few  passages  which  have  no  military  or  permanent  interest 
have  here  been  eliminated.] 

5 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

ally  across  our  front.  Prepared  to  ignore  the  British,  as  being 
driven  out  of  the  fight,  they  were  initiating  an  effort  to  attack 
the  left  flank  of  the  French  main  army,  which  stretched  in  a 
long  curved  line  from  our  right  towards  the  east,  and  so  to 
carry  out  against  it  alone  the  envelopment  which  had  so  far 
failed  against  the  combined  forces  of  the  Allies. 

On  Saturday,  the  5th,  this  movement  on  the  part  of  the 
Germans  was  continued,  and  large  advanced  parties  crossed 
the  Marne  southwards  at  Trilport,  Sammeroy,  La  Ferte-sous- 
Jouarre  and  Chateau-Thierry.  There  was  considerable  fight- 
ing with  the  French  5th  Army  on  the  French  left,  which  fell 
back  from  its  position  south  of  the  Marne  towards  the  Seine. 
On  Sunday  large  hostile  forces  crossed  the  Marne,  and  pushed 
on  through  Coulommiers  past  the  British  right.  Further  east 
they  were  attacked  at  night  by  the  French  5th  Army,  which 
captured  three  villages  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 

On  Monday,  the  yth,  there  was  a  general  advance  on  the 
part  of  the  Allies  in  this  quarter  of  the  field.  Our  forces, 
which  had  by  now  been  reinforced,  pushed  on  in  a  north- 
easterly direction,  in  co-operation  with  an  advance  of  the 
French  5th  Army  to  the  north  and  of  the  French  6th  Army 
eastwards,  against  the  German  rearguard  along  the  Ourcq. 

Possibly  weakened  by  the  detachment  of  troops  to  the 
eastern  theatre  of  operations,  and  realising  that  the  action 
of  the  French  6th  Army  against  the  line  of  the  Ourcq  and  the 
advance  of  the  British  placed  their  own  flanking  movement 
in  considerable  danger  of  being  taken  in  rear  and  on  its  right 
flank,  the  Germans  on  this  day  commenced  to  retire  towards 
the  north-east.  This  was  the  first  time  that  these  troops  had 
turned  back  since  their  attack  at  Mons  a  fortnight  before,  and, 
from  reports  received,  the  order  to  retreat  when  so  close  to 
Paris  was  a  bitter  disappointment.  From  letters  found  on  the 
dead  there  is  no  doubt  that  there  was  a  general  impression 
amongst  the  enemy's  troops  that  they  were  about  to  enter 
Paris. 

On  Tuesday,  the  8th,  the  German  movement  north-east- 
wards was  continued,  their  rearguards  on  the  south  of  the 
Marne  being  pressed  back  to  that  river  by  our  troops  and  by 
the  French  on  our  right,  the  latter  capturing  three  villages 
after  a  hand-to-hand  fight  and  the  infliction  of  severe  loss  on 
the  enemy. 
6 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

The  fighting  along  the  Ourcq  continued  on  this  day  and 
was  of  the  most  sanguinary  character,  for  the  Germans  had 
massed  a  great  force  of  artillery  along  this  line.  Very  few 
of  their  infantry  were  seen  by  the  French.  The  French  5th 
Army  also  made  a  fierce  attack  on  the  Germans  in  Montmirail, 
regaining  that  place. 

On  Wednesday,  the  gth,  the  battle  between  the  French 
6th  Army  and  what  was  now  the  German  flank  guard  along 
the  Ourcq  continued.  The  British  Corps,  overcoming  some 
resistance  on  the  river  Petit  Morin,  crossed  the  Marne  in 
pursuit  of  the  Germans,  who  were  now  hastily  retreating  north- 
wards. One  of  our  corps  was  delayed  by  an  obstinate  defence 
made  by  a  strong  rearguard  with  machine-guns  at  La  Ferte- 
sous-Jouarre,  where  the  bridge  had  been  destroyed. 

On  Thursday,  the  loth,  the  French  6th  Army  continued 
its  pressure  on  the  west,  while  the  5th  Army,  by  forced  marches 
reached  the  line  Chateau-Thierry — Dormans  on  the  Marne. 
Our  troops  also  continued  the  pursuit  on  the  north  of  the  latter 
river,  and  after  a  considerable  amount  of  fighting  captured 
some  1500  prisoners,  4  guns,  6  machine-guns,  and  50  transport 
wagons.  Many  of  the  enemy  were  killed  and  wounded,  and 
the  numerous  thick  woods  which  dot  the  country  north  of  the 
Marne  are  filled  with  German  stragglers.  Most  of  them 
appear  to  have  been  without  food  for  at  least  two  days. 
Indeed,  in  this  area  of  operations  the  Germans  seem  to  be 
demoralised  and  inclined  to  surrender  in  small  parties,  and 
the  general  situation  appears  to  be  most  favourable  to  the 
Allies. 

Much  brutal  and  senseless  damage  has  been  done  in  the 
villages  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Property  has  been  wantonly 
destroyed,  pictures  in  the  chateaux  have  been  ripped  up, 
and  the  houses  generally  pillaged.  It  is  stated  on  unimpeach- 
able authority,  also,  that  the  inhabitants  have  been  much 
ill-treated. 

Interesting  incidents  have  occurred  during  the  fighting. 
On  the  loth  part  of  our  2nd  Army  Corps  advancing  north 
found  itself  marching  parallel  with  another  infantry  force  at 
some  little  distance  away.  At  first  it  was  thought  that  this 
was  another  British  unit.  After  some  time,  however,  it  was 
discovered  that  it  was  a  body  of  Germans  retreating.  Measures 
were  promptly  taken  to  head  off  the  enemy,  who  were  sur- 

7 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

rounded  and  trapped  in  a  sunken  road,  where  over  400  men 
surrendered. 

On  the  loth  a  small  party  of  French  under  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  was  cut  off  and  surrounded.  After  a  des- 
perate resistance  it  was  decided  to  go  on  fighting  to  the  end. 
Finally  the  N.C.O.  and  one  man  only  were  left,  both  being 
wounded.  The  Germans  came  up  and  shouted  to  them  to 
lay  down  their  arms.  The  German  commander,  however, 
signed  to  them  to  keep  their  arms,  and  then  asked  for  per- 
mission to  shake  hands  with  the  wounded  non-commissioned 
officer,  who  was  carried  off  on  his  stretcher  with  his  rifle  by 
his  side* 

The  arrival  of  the  reinforcements  and  the  continued  ad- 
vance have  delighted  the  troops,  who  are  full  of  zeal  and 
anxious  to  press  on. 

Quite  one  of  the  features  of  the  campaign,  on  our  side,  has 
been  the  success  attained  by  the  Royal  Flying  Corps.  In 
regard  to  the  collection  of  information  it  is  impossible  either 
to  award  too  much  praise  to  our  aviators  for  the  way  they  have 
carried  out  their  duties,  or  to  overestimate  the  value  of  the 
intelligence  collected,  more  especially  during  the  recent  ad- 
vance. In  due  course,  certain  examples  of  what  has  been 
effected  may  be  specified  and  the  far-reaching  nature  of  the 
results  fully  explained,  but  that  time  has  not  yet  arrived. 
That  the  services  of  our  Flying  Corps,  which  has  really  been 
on  trial,  are  fully  appreciated  by  our  Allies  is  shown  by  the 
following  message  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  French 
Armies  received  on  the  night  of  September  9  by  Field-Marshal 
Sir  John  French  : — 

'  Please  express  most  particularly  to  Marshal  French 
my  thanks  for  services  rendered  on  every  day  by  the 
English  Flying  Corps.     The  precision,   exactitude,   and 
regularity  of  the  news  brought  in  by  its  members  are 
evidence  of  their  perfect  organisation  and  also  of  the 
perfect  training  of  pilots  and  observers/ 
To  give  a  rough  idea  of  the  amount  of  work  carried  out 
it  is  sufficient  to  mention  that,  during  a  period  of  twenty  days 
up  to  September  10,  a  daily  average  of  more  than  nine  recon- 
naissance flights  of   over   a  hundred  miles   each  has   been 
maintained. 

The  constant  object  of  our  aviators  has  been  to  effect  the 
8 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

accurate  location  of  the  enemy's  forces,  and,  incidentally — 
since  the  operations  cover  so  large  a»n  area — of  our  own  units. 
Nevertheless,  the  tactics  adopted  for  dealing  with  hostile  air- 
craft are  to  attack  them  instantly  with  one  or  more  British 
machines.  This  has  been  so  far  successful  that  in  five  cases 
German  pilots  or  observers  have  been  shot  in  the  air  and  their 
machines  brought  to  the  ground.  As  a  consequence,  the 
British  Flying  Corps  has  succeeded  in  establishing  an  individual 
ascendancy  which  is  as  serviceable  to  us  as  it  is  damaging 
to  the  enemy.  How  far  it  is  due  to  this  cause  it  is  not  possible 
at  present  to  ascertain  definitely,  but  the  fact  remains  that 
the  enemy  have  recently  become  much  less  enterprising  in 
their  flights.  Something  in  the  direction  of  the  mastery  of 
the  air  has  already  been  gained. 

In  pursuance  of  the  principle  that  the  main  object  of 
military  aviators  is  the  collection  of  information,  bomb- 
dropping  has  not  been  indulged  in  to  any  great  extent.  On 
one  occasion  a  petrol  bomb  was  successfully  exploded  in  a 
German  bivouac  at  night,  while,  from  a  diary  found  on  a  dead 
German  cavalry  soldier,  it  has  been  discovered  that  a  high- 
explosive  bomb  thrown  at  a  cavalry  column  from  one  of  our 
aeroplanes  struck  an  ammunition  wagon.  The  resulting 
explosion  killed  fifteen  of  the  enemy. 

September  10-13,  1914 

Since  Thursday,  September  10,  the  Army  has  made 
steady  progress  in  its  endeavour  to  drive  back  the  enemy  in 
co-operation  with  the  French.  The  country  across  which  it 
has  had  to  force  its  way,  and  will  have  to  continue  to  do  so, 
is  undulating  and  covered  with  patches  of  thick  wood.  Within 
the  area  which  faced  the  British  before  the  advance  com- 
menced, right  up  to  Laon,  the  chief  feature  of  tactical  import- 
ance is  the  fact  that  there  are  six  rivers  running  right  across 
the  direction  of  advance,  at  all  of  which  it  was  possible  that 
the  Germans  might  make  resistance. 

These  are,  in  order  from  the  south,  the  Marne,  the  Ourcq, 
the  Vesle,  the  Aisne,  the  Ailette,  and  the  Oise.  The  enemy 
held  the  line  of  the  Marne,  which  was  crossed  by  our 
forces  on  September  9,  as  a  purely  rearguard  operation  ;  our 
passage  of  the  Ourcq,  which  here  runs  almost  due  east  and 
west,  was  not  contested ;  the  Vesle  was  only  lightly  held  ; 

9 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

while  the  resistance  along  the  Aisne,  both  against  French 
and  British,  has  been  and  still  is  of  a  determined  char- 
acter. 

The  course  of  the  operations  during  nth,  I2th,  and  I3th 
has  been  as  follows.  On  Friday,  the  nth,  but  little  opposition 
was  met  with  by  us  along  any  part  of  our  front,  and  the 
direction  of  advance  was,  for  the  purpose  of  co-operating  with 
our  Allies,  turned  slightly  to  the  north-west.  The  day  was 
spent  in  pushing  forward  and  in  gathering  in  various  hostile 
detachments,  and  by  nightfall  our  forces  had  reached  a  line 
to  the  north  of  the  Ourcq,  extending  from  Oulchy-le-Chateau 
to  Long  Pont.  On  this  day  there  was  also  a  general  advance 
on  the  part  of  the  French  along  their  whole  line,  which  ended 
in  substantial  success,  in  one  portion  of  the  field  Duke  Albrecht 
of  Wurtemberg's  4th  Army  being  driven  back  across  the 
Saulz,  and  elsewhere  the  whole  of  the  corps  artillery  of  a 
German  corps  being  captured.  Several  German  colours  also 
were  taken. 

It  was  only  on  this  day  that  the  full  extent  of  the  victory 
gained  by  the  Allies  on  the  8th  was  appreciated  by  them,  and 
the  moral  effect  of  this  success  has  been  enormous.  An  order 
dated  the  6th  or  yth  September,  by  the  Commander  of  the 
German  7th  Corps,  was  picked  up,  in  which  it  was  stated 
that  the  great  object  of  the  war  was  about  to  be  attained,  since 
the  French  were  going  to  accept  battle,  and  that  upon  the 
result  of  this  battle  would  depend  the  issue  of  the  war  and 
the  honour  of  the  German  armies. 

It  seems  probable  that  the  Germans  not  only  expected 
to  find  that  the  British  Army  was  beyond  the  power  of  assum- 
ing the  offensive  for  some  time,  but  counted  on  the  French 
having  been  driven  back  on  to  the  line  of  the  Seine ;  and  that, 
though  surprised  to  find  the  latter  moving  forward  against 
them  after  they  had  crossed  the  Marne,  they  were  in  nowise 
deterred  from  making  a  great  effort. 

On  Saturday,  the  i2th,  the  enemy  were  found  to  be 
occupying  a  very  formidable  position  opposite  to  us  on  the 
north  of  the  Aisne.  At  Soissons  they  held  both  sides  of  the 
river  and  an  entrenched  line  on  the  hills  to  the  north.  Of 
eight  road  bridges  and  two  railway  bridges  crossing  the  Aisne 
within  our  section  of  front,  seven  of  the  former  and  both  of 
the  latter  had  been  demolished.  Working  from  west  to  east 
10 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

our  3rd  Army  Corps  gained  some  high  ground  south  of 
the  Aisne,  overlooking  the  Aisne  valley  east  of  Soissons. 
Here  a  long  range  artillery  duel  between  our  guns  and  those 
of  the  French  on  our  left  and  the  enemy's  artillery  on  the 
hills  continued  during  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  and  did 
not  cease  until  nearly  midnight.  The  enemy  had  a  very 
large  number  of  heavy  howitzers  in  well-concealed  positions. 
The  movement  of  this  Army  Corps  was  effected  in  co-operation 
with  that  of  the  French  6th  Army  on  our  left,  which  gained 
the  southern  half  of  the  town  during  the  night.  The  2nd 
Army  Corps  did  not  cross  the  Aisne. 

The  ist  Army  Corps  got  over  the  river  Vesle  to  the 
south  of  the  Aisne,  after  the  crossing  had  been  secured  by 
the  ist  Cavalry  Division.  It  then  reached  a  line  south  of  the 
Aisne,  practically  without  fighting.  At  Braine  the  ist  Cavalry 
Division  met  with  considerable  opposition  from  infantry  and 
machine-guns  holding  the  town  and  guarding  the  bridge. 
With  the  aid  of  some  of  our  infantry  it  gained  possession 
of  the  town  about  midday,  driving  the  enemy  to  the  north. 
Some  hundred  prisoners  were  captured  round  Braine,  where 
the  Germans  had  thrown  a  large  amount  of  field-gun  ammuni- 
tion into  the  river,  where  it  was  visible  under  two  feet 
of  water.  On  our  right  the  French  reached  the  line  of  the 
river  Vesle. 

On  this  day  began  the  action  along  the  Aisne  which  is  not 
yet  finished,  and  which  may  be  merely  of  a  rearguard  nature 
on  a  large  scale,  or  may  be  the  commencement  of  a  battle  of  a 
more  serious  nature.  It  rained  heavily  on  Saturday  after- 
noon and  all  through  the  night,  which  severely  handicapped 
the  transport. 

On  Sunday,  the  I3th,  an  extremely  strong  resistance  was 
encountered  along  the  whole  of  our  front,  which  was  some 
fifteen  miles  in  length.  The  action  still  consisted  for  the  most 
part  of  long-range  gun  fire,  that  of  the  Germans  being  to  a 
great  extent  from  their  heavy  howitzers,  which  were  firing 
from  cleverly  concealed  positions.  Some  of  the  actual  cross- 
ings of  the  Aisne  were  guarded  by  strong  detachments  of 
infantry  with  machine-guns.  By  nightfall  portions  of  all 
three  corps  were  across  the  river,  the  cavalry  returning  to 
the  south  side.  By  this  night  or  early  next  morning  three 
pontoon  bridges  had  been  .built,  and  our  troops  also 

ii 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

managed  to  get  across  the  river  by  means  of  a  bridge 
carrying  the  canal  over  the  river,  which  had  not  been 
destroyed.  On  our  left  the  French  pressed  on,  but  were 
prevented  by  artillery  fire  from  building  a  pontoon  bridge 
at  Soissons.  A  large  number  of  infantry,  however,  crossed 
in  single  file  on  the  top  of  one  girder  of  the  railway  bridge 
which  was  left  standing. 

During  the  last  three  or  four  days  many  isolated  parties 
of  Germans  have  been  discovered  hiding  in  the  numerous 
woods  a  long  way  behind  our  line.  As  a  rule  they  seem 
glad  to  surrender,  and  the  condition  of  some  of  them  may  be 
gathered  from  the  following  incident.  An  officer,  who  was 
proceeding  along  the  road  in  charge  of  a  number  of  led  horses, 
received  information  that  there  were  some  of  the  enemy  in 
the  neighbourhood.  Upon  seeing  them  he  gave  the  order 
to  charge,  whereupon  3  German  officers  and  106  men 
surrendered. 

The  following  are  some  of  the  details  of  the  conduct  of  the 
enemy  in  occupation  of  three  of  the  small  towns  to  the  north 
of  Paris : — 

At  Senlis  it  is  stated,  on  what  appears  to  be  good  authority, 
that  a  poacher  shot  one  German  soldier  and  wounded  another 
as  the  forces  entered  the  town.  The  German  commander 
then  assembled  the  Mayor  of  the  town  and  five  other  leading 
citizens  and  forced  them  to  kneel  before  graves  which  had 
already  been  dug.  Requisition  was  made  for  various  supplies, 
and  the  six  citizens  were  then  taken  to  a  neighbouring  field 
and  shot.  According  to  the  corroborative  evidence  of  several 
independent  persons,  some  twenty-four  people,  including 
women  and  children,  were  also  shot.  The  town  was  then 
pillaged,  and  was  fired  in  several  places  before  it  was  evacu- 
ated. It  is  believed  that  the  cathedral  was  not  damaged, 
but  many  houses  were  destroyed. 

Creil  was  also  thoroughly  pillaged  and  many  houses  were 
burnt. 

At  Crepy  on  September  3  various  articles  were  requisi- 
tioned under  threat  of  a  fine  of  100,000  f .  for  every  day's  delay 
in  the  delivery  of  the  goods.  The  following  list  shows  the 
amounts  and  natures  of  the  supplies  demanded,  and  also  the 
actual  quantities  furnished : 

12 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

Requisitioned.  Furnished. 

Flour,  20,000  kilos        ....  20,000  kilos. 

Dried  vegetables,  5000  kilos         .         .  800     „ 

Coffee,  1000  kilos          ....  809     ,, 

Salt,  1000  kilos    .         .         .         .         .  2,000    „ 

Oats,  100,000  kilos       ....  55,000    ,, 

Red  wine,  2500  litres  ....  2,500  litres. 
All  smoked  meats,   ham,   cloth,   new 


boots,  tobacco,  biscuits,  handker- 
chiefs, shirts,  braces,  stockings, 
horseshoes,  bicycles,  motor-cars, 
petrol. 


61  prs.  of  boots. 
91  bicycles. 
15  motor  tyres. 
6  inner  tubes. 


Immediately  on  arrival  a  proclamation  was  issued  by  the 
commander  of  the  German  division.  The  main  points  were  : 
That  all  arms  were  to  be  handed  in  at  the  Town  Hall  at  once. 
That  all  civilians  found  with  arms  would  be  shot  at  once. 
That  no  person  was  to  be  in  the  street  after  dark.  That 
no  lights  were  to  be  maintained  in  the  houses  or  streets  at 
night.  That  the  doors  of  all  houses  were  to  be  left  open. 
That  the  inhabitants  were  not  to  collect  in  groups.  That 
any  obstruction  of  the  German  troops  or  threatening  of 
them  would  be  immediately  punished  by  death.  That 
German  money  was  to  be  accepted  at  the  rate  of  i  mark 
for  1.25  f. 

At  Villers-Cotterets  the  Mayor  appears  to  have  behaved 
very  judiciously,  and,  though  supplies  far  in  excess  of  the 
capabilities  of  the  place  were  demanded,  the  town  was  not 
seriously  damaged.  The  Germans  evacuated  the  place  on 
September  n  in  such  haste  that  they  left  behind  a  large 
amount  of  the  bread  requisitioned.  It  was  stated  by  the 
inhabitants  that  the  enemy  destroyed  and  abandoned  fifteen 
motor-lorries,  seven  guns  and  ammunition  wagons. 

Reims  was  occupied  by  the  enemy  on  September  3.  It 
was  reoccupied  by  the  French  after  considerable  fighting  on 
the  I3th.  On  the  I2th  a  proclamation,  a  copy  of  which  is  in 
possession  of  the  British  Army,  was  posted  all  over  the  town. 
A  literal  translation  of  this  poster  is  given  below. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


PROCLAMATION 

In  the  event  of  an  action  being  fought  either  to-day  or 
in  the  immediate  future  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Reims,  or  in 
the  town  itself,  the  inhabitants  are  warned  that  they  must 
remain  absolutely  calm  and  must  in  no  way  try  to  take  part 
in  the  fighting.  They  must  not  attempt  to  attack  either 
isolated  soldiers  or  detachments  of  the  German  Army.  The 
erection  of  barricades,  the  taking  up  of  paving  stones  in  the 
streets  in  a  way  to  hinder  the  movements  of  troops,  or,  in  a 
word,  any  action  that  may  embarrass  the  German  Army,  is 
formally  forbidden. 

With  a  view  to  securing  adequately  the  safety  of  the 
troops  and  to  instil  calm  into  the  population  of  Reims,  the 
persons  named  below  have  been  seized  as  hostages  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  German  Army.  These  hostages 
will  be  hanged  at  the  slightest  attempt  at  disorder.  Also 
the  town  will  be  totally  or  partly  burnt,  and  the  inhabitants 
will  be  hanged  for  any  infraction  of  the  above. 

By  order  of  the  German  authorities. 

THE  MAYOR  (Dr.  Langlet). 
REIMS,  September  12,  1914. 

[Here  follow  the  names  of  eighty-one  of  the  principal  inhabitants 
of  Reims,  with  their  addresses,  including  four  priests,  ending  with  the 
words  '  and  some  others/] 

September  14-17 

At  the  date  of  the  last  narrative — on  the  I4th  September 
— the  Germans  were  making  a  determined  resistance  along 
the  river  Aisne.  The  opposition,  which  it  was  at  first  thought 
might  possibly  be  of  a  rearguard  nature  not  entailing  material 
delay  to  our  progress,  has  developed,  and  has  proved  to  be 
more  serious  than  was  anticipated.  The  action  now  being 
fought  by  the  Germans  along  their  line  may,  it  is  true,  have 
been  undertaken  in  order  to  gain  time  for  some  strategic 
operation  or  move,  and  may  not  be  their  main  stand. 

But  if  this  be  so,  the  fighting  is  naturally  on  a  scale  which, 
as  to  extent  of  ground  covered  and  duration  of  resistance, 
makes  it  indistinguishable  in  its  progress  from  what  is  known 
14 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

as  a  '  pitched  battle/  though  the  enemy  certainly  showed 
signs  of  considerable  disorganisation  during  the  earlier  days 
of  their  retirement.  Whether  it  was  originally  intended  by 
them  to  defend  the  position  they  took  up  as  strenuously  as 
they  have  done,  or  whether  the  delay  gained  for  them  during 
the  I2th  and  I3th  by  their  artillery  has  enabled  them  to 
develop  their  resistance  and  to  reinforce  their  line  to  an 
extent  not  originally  contemplated,  cannot  yet  be  said. 

So  far  as  we  are  concerned,  the  action  still  being  contested 
is  the  Battle  of  the  Aisne,  for  we  are  fighting  just  across  that 
river  along  the  whole  of  our  front.  To  the  east  and  west  the 
struggle  is  not  confined  to  the  valley. of  that  river,  though  it 
will  probably  bear  its  name.  The  progress  of  our  operations 
and  of  those  French  Armies  nearest  to  us  for  the  I4th,  I5th, 
i6th,  and  iyth  will  now  be  described. 

On  Monday,  the  I4th,  those  of  our  troops  which  had  on 
the  previous  day  crossed  the  Aisne,  after  driving  in  the  German 
reafguard  on  that  evening,  found  portions  of  the  enemy's 
forces  in  prepared  defensive  positions  on  the  plateau  on  the 
right  bank,  and  could  do  little  more  than  secure  a  footing 
north  of  the  river.  This,  however,  they  maintained  in  spite 
of  two  counter-attacks,  delivered  at  dusk  and  at  10  P.M.,  in 
which  the  fighting  was  severe. 

During  the  I4th  strong  reinforcements  of  our  troops  were 
passed  to  the  north  bank,  the  troops  crossing  by  ferry,  by 
pontoon  bridges,  and  by  the  remains  of  the  permanent  bridges. 
Close  co-operation  with  the  French  forces  was  maintained, 
and  the  general  progress  made  was  good.  Although  the 
opposition  was  vigorous  and  the  state  of  the  roads  after  the 
heavy  rain  made  movements  slow,  one  division  alone  failed 
to  secure  the  ground  it  expected  to.  The  ist  Army  Corps, 
after  repulsing  repeated  attacks,  captured  600  prisoners 
and  12  guns;  the  cavalry  also  took  a  number  of  prisoners. 
Many  of  the  Germans  taken  belong  to  Reserve  and  Landwehr 
formations,  which  fact  appears  to  indicate  that  the  enemy 
is  compelled  to  draw  on  the  older  classes  of  soldiers  to  fill  the 
gaps  in  his  ranks. 

There  was  heavy  rain  throughout  the  night  of  the  I4th- 
I5th,  and  during  the  15th  September  the  situation  of  the 
British  forces  underwent  no  essential  change,  but  it  became 
more  and  more  evident  that  the  defensive  preparations  made 

15 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

by  the  enemy  were  more  extensive  than  was  at  first  apparent. 
In  order  to  counterbalance  these,  measures  were  taken  by  us 
to  economise  troops  and  to  secure  protection  from  the  hostile 
artillery  fire,  which  was  very  fierce,  and  our  men  continued  to 
improve  their  own  entrenchments. 

The  Germans  bombarded  our  lines  nearly  all  day,  using 
heavy  guns,  brought  no  doubt  from  before  Maubeuge,  as  well 
as  those  with  the  corps.  All  their  counter-attacks,  however, 
failed,  although  in  some  places  they  were  repeated  six  times  ; 
one  made  on  the  4th  Guards  Brigade  was  repulsed  with  heavy 
slaughter.  An  attempt  to  advance  slightly  made  by  part  of 
our  line  was  unsuccessful  as  regards  gain  in  ground,  but  led 
to  withdrawal  of  part  of  the  enemy's  infantry  and  artillery. 
Further  counter-attacks  made  during  the  night  were  beaten 
off.  Rain  came  on  towards  evening  and  continued  inter- 
mittently until  9  A.M.  on  the  i6th.  Besides  adding  to  the 
discomfort  of  the  soldiers  holding  open  trenches  in  the  firing 
line,  the  wet  weather  to  some  extent  hampered  the  motor  trdns- 
port  service,  which  was  also  hindered  by  the  broken  bridges. 

On  Wednesday,  the  i6th,  there  was  little  change  in  the 
situation  opposite  the  British.  The  efforts  made  by  the  enemy 
were  less  active  than  on  the  previous  day,  though  their  bom- 
bardment continued  throughout  the  morning  and  evening. 
Our  artillery  fire  broke  the  defenders  off  one  of  the  salients 
of  their  position,  but  they  returned  in  the  evening.  Forty 
prisoners  were  taken  by  the  3rd  Division. 

On  Thursday,  the  iyth,  the  situation  still  remained  un- 
changed in  its  essentials.  The  German  heavy  artillery  fire 
was  more  active  than  on  the  previous  day.  The  only  infantry 
attacks  made  by  the  enemy  were  on  the  extreme  right  of  our 
position,  and,  as  had  happened  before,  were  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss,  chiefly  on  this  occasion  by  our  field  artillery. 

In  order  to  convey  some  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  fighting, 
it  may  be  said  that  along  the  greater  part  of  our  front  the 
Germans  have  been  driven  back  from  the  forward  slopes  on 
the  north  of  the  river.  Their  infantry  are  holding  strong  lines 
of  trenches  amongst  and  along  the  edges  of  the  numerous 
woods  which  crown  these  slopes.  These  trenches  are  elabor- 
ately constructed  and  cleverly  concealed.  In  many  places 
there  are  wire  entanglements  and  lengths  of  rabbit  fencing 
both  in  the  woods  and  in  the  open,  carefully  aligned  so  that 
16 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

they  can  be  swept  by  rifle  fire  and  machine-guns,  which  are 
invisible  from  our  side  of  the  valley.  The  ground  in  front 
of  the  infantry  trenches  is  also  as  a  rule  under  cross  fire  from 
field  artillery  placed  on  neighbouring  features  and  under 
high-angle  fire  from  pieces  placed  well  back  behind  woods  on 
top  of  the  plateau. 

A  feature  of  this  action,  as  of  the  previous  fights,  is  the 
use  made  by  the  enemy  of  their  numerous  heavy  howitzers, 
with  which  they  are  able  to  direct  a  long-range  fire  all  over 
the  valley  and  right  across  it.  Upon  these  they  evidently 
place  great  reliance.  Where  our  men  are  holding  the  forward 
edges  of  the  high  ground  on  the  north  side  they  are  now 
strongly  entrenched.  They  are  well  fed,  and  in  spite  of  the 
wet  weather  of  the  past  week  are  cheerful  and  confident. 
The  bombardment  by  both  sides  has  been  very  heavy, 
and  on  Sunday,  Monday,  and  Tuesday  was  practically  con- 
tinuous. 

Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the  general  din  caused  by  the 
reports  of  the  immense  number  of  heavy  guns  in  action  along 
our  front  on  Wednesday,  the  arrival  of  a  French  force  acting 
against  the  German  right  flank  was  at  once  announced  on 
the  east  of  our  front  some  miles  away  by  the  continuous  roar 
of  their  quick-firing  artillery  with  which  their  attack  was 
opened.  So  far  as  the  British  are  concerned,  the  greater  part 
of  this  week  has  been  passed  in  bombardment,  in  gaining 
ground  by  degrees,  and  in  beating  back  severe  counter- 
attacks with  heavy  slaughter.  Our  casualties  have  been 
severe,  but  it  is  probable  that  those  of  the  enemy  are  heavier. 
The  rain  has  caused  a  great  drop  in  temperature,  and  there  is 
more  than  a  distinct  feeling  of  autumn  in  the  air,  especially 
in  the  early  mornings. 

On  our  right  and  left  the  French  have  been  fighting  fiercely 
and  have  also  been  gradually  gaining  ground.  One  village 
has  already  during  this  battle  been  captured  and  recaptured 
twice  by  each  side,  and  at  the  time  of  writing  remains  in  the 
hands  of  the  Germans.  The  fighting  has  been  at  close  quarters 
and  of  the  most  desperate  nature,  and  the  streets  of  the  village 
are  filled  with  the  dead  of  both  sides. 

The  Germans  are  a  formidable  enemy.  Well  trained,  long 
prepared,  and  brave,  their  soldiers  are  carrying  on  the  contest 
with  skill  and  valour.  Nevertheless  they  are  fighting  to  win 

MILITARY  2  B  17 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

anyhow,  regardless  of  all  the  rules  of  fair  play,  and  there 
is  evidence  that  they  do  not  hesitate  at  anything  in  order 
to  gain  victory.  A  large  number  of  the  tales  of  their  mis- 
behaviour are  exaggerations,  and  some  of  the  stringent  pre- 
cautions they  have  taken  to  guard  themselves  against  the 
inhabitants  of  the  areas  traversed  are  possibly  justifiable 
measures  of  war.  But  at  the  same  time  it  has  been  definitely 
established  that  they  have  committed  atrocities  on  many 
occasions,  and  they  have  been  guilty  of  brutal  conduct. 

So  many  letters  and  statements  of  our  own  wounded 
soldiers  have  been  published  in  our  newspapers  that  the 
following  epistle  from  a  German  soldier  of  the  74th  In- 
fantry Regiment  (loth  Corps)  to  his  wife  may  also  be  of 
interest : — 

MY  DEAR  WIFE, — I  have  just  been  living  through  days  that  defy 
imagination.  I  should  never  have  thought  that  men  could  stand  it. 
Not  a  second  has  passed  but  my  life  has  been  in  danger,  and  yet  not 
a  hair  of  my  head  has  been  hurt.  It  was  horrible,  it  was  ghastly. 
But  I  have  been  saved  for  you  and  for  our  happiness,  and  I  take  heart 
again,  although  I  am  still  terribly  unnerved.  God  grant  that  I  may 
see  you  again  soon,  and  that  this  horror  may  soon  be  over.  None  of  us 
can  do  any  more,  human  strength  is  at  an  end. 

I  will  try  to  tell  you  about  it : — 

On  the  5th  September  the  enemy  were  reported  to  be  taking  up 
a  position  near  St.  Prix  (N.E.  of  Paris).  The  loth  Corps,  which  had 
made  an  astonishingly  rapid  advance,  of  course,  attacked  on  the 
Sunday. 

Steep  slopes  led  up  to  heights  which  were  held  in  considerable  force. 
With  our  weak  detachments  of  the  74th  and  gist  Regiments  we  reached 
the  crest  and  came  under  a  terrible  artillery  fire  that  mowed  us  down. 
However,  we  entered  St.  Prix.  Hardly  had  we  done  so  than  we  were 
met  with  shell  fire  and  a  violent  fusillade  from  the  enemy's  infantry. 
Our  Colonel  was  badly  wounded — he  is  the  third  we  have  had.  Four- 
teen men  were  killed  round  me.  .  .  .  We  got  away  in  a  lull  without 
being  hit. 


The  yth,  8th,  and  gth  of  September  we  were  constantly  under 
shell  and  shrapnel  fire,  and  suffered  terrible  losses.  I  was  in  a  house 
which  was  hit  several  times.  The  fear  of  a  death  of  agony  which  is  in 
every  man's  heart,  and  naturally  so,  is  a  terrible  feeling. 

How  often  I  thought  of  you,  my  darling,  and  what  I  suffered  in 
that  terrifying  battle,  which  extended  along  a  front  of  many  miles  near 
18 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

Montmirail,  you  cannot  possibly  imagine.  Our  heavy  artillery  was 
being  used  for  the  siege  of  Maubeuge  ;  we  wanted  it  badly,  as  the 
enemy  had  theirs  in  force  and  kept  up  a  furious  bombardment.  For 
four  days  I  was  under  artillery  fire.  It  is  like  Hell,  but  a  thousand 
times  worse.  On  the  night  of  the  gth  the  order  was  given  to  retreat, 
as  it  would  have  been  madness  to  attempt  to  hold  our  position  with  our 
few  men,  and  we  should  have  risked  a  terrible  defeat  the  next  day. 
The  ist  and  3rd  Armies  had  not  been  able  to  attack  with  us,  as  we 
had  advanced  too  rapidly. 

Our  moral  was  absolutely  broken. 

In  spite  of  unheard-of  sacrifices  we  had  achieved  nothing.  I  cannot 
understand  how  our  Army,  after  fighting  three  great  battles  and  being 
terribly  weakened,  was  sent  against  a  position  which  the  enemy  had 
prepared  for  three  weeks,  but  naturally  I  know  nothing  of  the  inten- 
tions of  our  Chiefs.  .  .  .  They  say  nothing  has  been  lost.  In  a  word, 
we  retired  towards  Cormontreuil  and  Reims  by  forced  marches  by  day 
and  night.  We  hear  that  three  armies  are  going  to  get  into  line, 
entrench,  rest,  and  then  start  afresh  our  victorious  march  on  Paris.  It 
was  not  a  defeat,  but  only  a  strategic  retreat.  I  have  confidence  in  our 
Chiefs  that  everything  will  be  successful.  Our  first  battalion,  which 
has  fought  with  unparalleled  bravery,  is  reduced  from  1200  to  194  men. 
These  numbers  speak  for  themselves.  .  .  . 

Amongst  minor  happenings  of  interest  is  the  following  : — 

During  a  counter-attack  by  the  German  53rd  Regiment 
on  portions  of  the  Northampton  and  Queen's  Regiments  on 
Thursday,  the  I7th,  a  force  of  some  four  hundred  of  the  enemy 
were  allowed  to  approach  right  up  to  the  trench,  occupied  by 
a  platoon  of  the  former  regiment,  owing  to  the  fact  that  they 
had  held  up  their  hands  and  made  gestures  that  were  inter- 
preted as  signs  that  they  wished  to  surrender.  When  they 
were  actually  on  the  parapet  of  the  trench  they  opened  fire 
at  our  men  at  point  blank  range. 

Unluckily  for  the  enemy,  however,  flanking  them  and  only 
some  400  yards  away  there  happened  to  be  a  machine-gun 
manned  by  a  detachment  of  the  '  Queen's/  This  at  once 
opened  fire,  cutting  a  lane  through  their  mass,  and  they  fell 
back  to  their  own  trench  with  great  loss.  Shortly  afterwards 
they  were  driven  farther  back  with  additional  loss  by  a 
battalion  of  the  Guards  which  came  up  in  support. 

An  incident  which  occurred  some  little  time  ago  during 
our  retirement  is  also  worthy  of  record.  On  August  28, 
during  the  battle  fought  by  the  French  along  the  Oise,  be- 

19 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

tween  La  Fere  and  Guise,  one  of  the  French  commanders 
desired  to  make  an  air  reconnaissance.  It  was  found,  how- 
ever, that  no  observers  were  available.  Wishing  to  help  our 
Allies  as  much  as  possible,  the  British  officer  attached  to  this 
particular  French  Army  volunteered  to  go  up  with  a  pilot  to 
observe.  He  had  never  been  in  an  aeroplane,  but  he  made 
the  ascent  and  produced  a  valuable  reconnaissance  report. 
Incidentally  he  had  a  duel  in  the  air  at  an  altitude  of  6000 
feet  with  the  observer  of  a  German  Taube  monoplane  which 
approached.  He  fired  several  shots  and  drove  off  the 
hostile  aeroplane.  His  action  was  much  appreciated  by  the 
French. 

In  view  of  the  many  statements  being  made  in  the  Press 
as  to  the  use  of  Zeppelins  against  us,  it  is  interesting  to  note 
that  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  who  have  been  out  on  recon- 
naissances on  every  day  since  their  arrival  in  France,  have 
never  seen  a  Zeppelin,  though  airships  of  a  non-rigid  type 
have  been  seen  on  two  occasions.  Near  the  Marne,  late  one 
evening,  two  such  were  observed  over  the  German  forces. 
Aeroplanes  were  despatched  against  them,  but  in  the  darkness 
our  pilots  were  uncertain  of  the  airships'  nationality  and  did 
not  attack.  It  was  afterwards  made  clear  that  they  could 
not  have  been  French.  A  week  later,  an  officer  reconnoitring 
to  the  flank  saw  an  airship  over  the  German  forces  and  opposite 
the  French.  It  had  no  distinguishing  mark  and  was  assumed 
to  belong  to  the  latter,  though  it  is  now  known  that  it  also 
must  have  been  a  German  craft.  The  orders  of  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  are  to  attack  Zeppelins  at  once,  and  there  is 
some  disappointment  at  the  absence  of  those  targets. 

September  18-20. 

The  enemy  is  still  maintaining  himself  along  the  whole 
front ;  and  in  order  to  do  so  is  throwing  into  the  fight  detach- 
ments composed  of  units  from  very  different  formations — the 
Active  Army,  the  Reserve,  and  the  Landwehr — as  is  shown 
by  the  uniforms  of  the  prisoners  recently  captured.  Our 
progress,  although  slow,  on  account  of  the  strength  of  the 
defensive  positions  against  which  we  are  pressing,  has  in 
certain  directions  been  continuous.  But  the  present  battle 
may  well  last  for  some  days  more  before  a  decision  is  reached, 
20 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

since,  in  truth,  it  now  approximates  somewhat  to  siege  war- 
fare. The  Germans  are  making  use  of  searchlights,  and  this 
fact,  coupled  with  their  great  strength  in  heavy  artillery,  leads 
to  the  supposition  that  they  are  employing  material  which 
may  have  been  collected  for  the  siege  of  Paris. 

The  nature  of  the  general  situation  after  the  operations  of 
the  i8th,  the  igth,  and  the  20th,  cannot  better  be  summarised 
than  as  expressed  recently  by  a  neighbouring  French  com- 
mander to  his  corps  : — 

'  Having  repulsed  repeated  and  violent  counter-attacks 
made  by  the  enemy  ...  we  have  the  feeling  that  we  have 
been  victorious/ 

So  far  as  the  British  are  concerned,  the  course  of  events 
during  these  three  days  can  be  described  in  a  few  words. 
During  Friday,  the  i8th,  artillery  fire  was  kept  up  inter- 
mittently by  both  sides  during  daylight.  At  night  the 
Germans  counter-attacked  certain  portions  of  our  line,  sup- 
porting the  advance  of  their  infantry,  as  always,  by  heavy 
bombardment ;  but  the  strokes  were  not  delivered  with  any 
great  vigour,  and  ceased  about  2  A.M.  During  the  day's  fight- 
ing an  anti-aircraft  gun  of  the  3rd  Army  Corps  succeeded  in 
bringing  down  a  German  aeroplane.  News  was  received  also 
that  a  body  of  French  cavalry  had  demolished  part  of  the 
railway  to  the  north,  so  cutting — at  least  temporarily — one 
line  of  communication  which  is  of  particular  importance  to  the 
enemy. 

On  Saturday,  the  igth,  the  bombardment  was  resumed 
by  the  Germans  at  an  early  hour,  and  continued  intermittently 
under  reply  from  our  own  guns.  Some  of  their  infantry 
advanced  from  cover,  apparently  with  the  intention  of  attack- 
ing, but  on  coming  under  fire  they  retired.  Otherwise  the  day 
was  uneventful  except  for  the  activity  of  the  artillery,  which 
is  now  a  matter  of  normal  routine  rather  than  an  event. 
Another  hostile  aeroplane  was  brought  down  by  us  ;  and  one 
of  our  airmen  succeeded  in  dropping  several  bombs  over  the 
German  lines,  one  incendiary  bomb  falling  with  considerable 
effect  on  a  transport  park  near  La  Fere.  A  buried  store  of 
the  enemy's  munitions  of  war  was  also  found  not  far  from  the 
Aisne,  ten  wagons-loads  of  live  shell  and  two  wagons  of  cable 
being  dug  up  ;  and  traces  were  discovered  of  large  quantities 

21 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

of  stores  having  been  burnt,  all  tending  to  show  that  so  far 
back  as  the  Aisne  the  German  retirement  was  hurried.  There 
was  a  strong  wind  during  the  day,  accompanied  by  driving 
rain,  and  this  militated  against  aerial  reconnaissance. 

On  Sunday,  the  2Oth,  nothing  of  importance  occurred 
until  the  afternoon,  when  there  was  a  break  in  the  clouds  and 
an  interval  of  feeble  sunshine  which,  however,  was  hardly 
powerful  enough  to  warm  the  soaking  troops.  The  Germans 
took  advantage  of  this  brief  spell  of  fine  weather  to  make 
several  separate  counter-attacks  against  different  points. 
These  were  all  repulsed  with  loss  to  the  enemy  ;  but  the 
casualties  incurred  by  us  were  by  no  means  light.  In  one 
section  of  our  firing  line  the  occupants  of  the  trenches  were 
under  the  impression  that  they  heard  a  military  band  in  the 
enemy's  lines  just  before  the  attack  developed.  It  is  now 
known  that  the  German  infantry  started  their  advance  with 
bands  playing.  The  offensive  against  one  or  two  points  was 
renewed  at  dusk  with  no  greater  success. 

The  brunt  of  the  resistance  has  naturally  fallen  upon  the 
infantry.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  have  been  drenched 
to  the  skin  for  some  days  and  their  trenches  have  been  deep 
in  mud  and  water,  and  in  spite  of  incessant  night  alarms,  and 
of  the  almost  continuous  bombardment  to  which  they  have 
been  subjected,  they  have  on  every  occasion  been  ready  for 
the  enemy's  infantry  when  the  latter  have  attempted  to  assault, 
and  they  have  beaten  them  back  with  great  loss.  Indeed,  the 
sight  of  the  Pickelhauben  coming  up  has  been  a  positive  relief 
after  the  long,  trying  hours  of  inaction  under  shell-fire.  The 
object  of  the  great  proportion  of  artillery  the  Germans  employ 
is  to  beat  down  the  resistance  of  their  enemy  by  a  concentrated 
and  prolonged  fire,  and  to  shatter  their  nerve  with  high  ex- 
plosives before  the  infantry  attack  is  launched.  They  seem 
to  have  relied  on  doing  this  with  us  ;  but  they  have  not  done 
so,  though  it  has  taken  them  several  costly  experiments  to 
discover  this  fact.  From  the  statements  of  prisoners,  indeed, 
it  appears  that  they  have  been  greatly  disappointed  by  the 
moral  effect  produced  by  their  heavy  guns,  which,  despite  the 
actual  losses  inflicted,  has  not  been  at  all  commensurate  with 
the  colossal  expenditure  of  ammunition,  which  has  really  been 
wasted. 

By  this  it  is  not  implied  that  their  artillery  fire  is  not  good. 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

It  is  more  than  good  ;  it  is  excellent.  But  the  British  soldier 
is  a  difficult  person  to  impress  or  depress,  even  by  immense 
shells  filled  with  high  explosives  which  detonate  with  terrific 
violence,  and  form  craters  large  enough  to  act  as  graves  for 
five  horses.  The  German  howitzer  shells  are  8  to  9  inches  in 
calibre,  and  on  impact  they  send  up  columns  of  greasy  black 
smoke.  On  account  of  this  they  are  irreverently  dubbed 
'  Coal-boxes/  '  Black  Marias/  or  '  Jack  Johnsons/  by  the 
soldiers.  Men  who  take  things  in  this  spirit  are,  it  seems, 
likely  to  throw  out  the  calculations  based  on  loss  of  moral  so 
carefully  framed  by  the  German  military  philosophers. 

A  considerable  amount  of  information  about  the  enemy 
has  by  now  been  gleaned  from  prisoners.  It  has  been  gathered 
that  our  bombardment  on  the  I5th  produced  a  great  impres- 
sion. The  opinion  is  also  recorded  that  our  infantry  make 
such  good  use  of  the  ground  that  the  German  companies  are 
decimated  by  our  rifle  fire  before  a  British  soldier  can  be  seen. 
From  an  official  diary  captured  by  the  ist  Army,  Corps  it 
appears  that  one  of  the  German  Corps  contains  an  extra- 
ordinary mixture  of  units.  If  the  composition  of  the  other 
corps  is  at  all  similar,  it  may  be  assumed  that  the  present 
efficiency  of  the  enemy's  forces  is  in  no  way  comparable  with 
what  it  was  when  war  commenced.  The  losses  in  officers  are 
noted  as  having  been  especially  severe.  A  brigade  is  stated 
to  be  commanded  by  a  major,  and  some  companies  of  the  Foot 
Guards  to  be  commanded  by  one-year  volunteers,  while  after 
the  battle  of  Montmirail  one  regiment  lost  fifty-five  out  of 
sixty  officers. 

The  prisoners  recently  captured  appreciate  the  fact  that 
the  march  on  Paris  has  failed,  and  that  their  forces  are  retreat- 
ing, but  state  that  the  object  of  this  movement  is  explained 
by  the  officers  as  being  to  withdraw  into  closer  touch  with 
supports  which  have  stayed  too  far  in  rear.  The  officers  are 
also  endeavouring  to  encourage  the  troops  by  telling  them 
that  they  will  be  at  home  by  Christmas.  A  large  number  of 
the  men,  however,  believe  that  they  are  beaten.  The  follow- 
ing is  an  extract  from  one  document : — 

'  With  the  English  troops  we  have  great  difficulties.  They  have 
a  queer  way  of  causing  losses  to  the  enemy.  They  make  good  trenches, 
in  which  they  wait  patiently.  They  carefully  measure  the  ranges  for 
thejr  rifle  fire,  and  they  then  open  a  truly  hellish  fire  on  the  unsus- 

23 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

peeling  cavalry.  This  was  the  reason  that  we  had  such  heavy  losses. 
.  .  .  According  to  our  officers,  the  English  striking  forces  are  ex^ 
hausted.  The  English  people  never  really  wanted  war/ 

From  another  source  : — 

'  The  English  are  very  brave  and  fight  to  the  last  man.  .  .  .  One  of 
our  companies  has  lost  130  men  out  of  240.' 

The  following  letter,  which  refers  to  the  fighting  on  the 
Aisne,  has  been  printed  and  circulated  to  the  troops  : — 

LETTER  FOUND  ON  A  GERMAN  OFFICER  OF  THE 
7TH  RESERVE  CORPS 

CERNY,  S.  OF  LAON,  September  17,  1914. 

MY  DEAR  PARENTS, —  .  .  .  Our  corps  has  the  task  of  holding  the 
heights  south  of  Cerny  in  all  circumstances  till  the  I5th  Corps  on  our 
left  flank  can  grip  the  enemy's  flank.  On  our  right  are  other  corps. 
We  are  fighting  with  the  English  Guards,  Highlanders,  and  Zouaves. 
The  losses  on  both  sides  have  been  enormous.  For  the  most  part 
this  is  due  to  the  too  brilliant  French  artillery.  The  English  are  mar- 
vellously trained  in  making  use  of  the  ground.  One  never  sees  them, 
and  one  is  constantly  under  fire.  The  French  airmen  perform  wonder- 
ful feats.  We  cannot  get  rid  of  them.  As  soon  as  an  airman  has 
flown  over  us,  ten  minutes  later  we  get  their  shrapnel  fire  in  our 
position.  We  have  little  artillery  in  our  corps  ;  without  it  we  cannot 
get  forward. 

Three  days  ago  our  division  took  possession  of  these  heights,  dug 
itself  in,  etc.  Two  days  ago,  early  in  the  morning,  we  were  attacked 
by  immensely  superior  English  forces  (one  brigade  and  two  battalions), 
and  were  turned  out  of  our  positions  ;  the  fellows  took  five  guns  from 
us.  It  was  a  tremendous  hand-to-hand  fight.  How  I  escaped  myself 
I  am  not  clear.  I  then  had  to  bring  up  supports  on  foot  (my  horse  was 
wounded,  and  the  others  were  too  far  in  rear).  Then  came  up  the 
Guard  Jager  Battalion,  4th  Jager,  65th  Regiment,  Reserve  Regiment 
13,  Landwehr  Regiments  13  and  16,  and,  with  the  help  of  the  artillery, 
drove  back  the  fellows  out  of  the  position  again. 

Our  machine-guns  did  excellent  work.     The  English  fell  in  heaps. 

In  our  battalion  three  Iron  Crosses  have  been  given,  one  to  the  C.O., 
one  to  the  Captain,  one  to  the  Surgeon.  Let  us  hope  that  we  shall  be 
the  lucky  ones  next  time.  .  .  .  During  the  first  two  days  of  the  battle 
I  had  only  one  piece  of  bread  and  no  water,  spent  the  night  in  the  rain 
without  my  greatcoat.  The  rest  of  my  kit  was  on  the  horses,  which 
have  been  left  miles  behind  with  the  baggage  (which  cannot  come  up 
into  the  battle),  because  as  soon  as  you  put  your  nose  out  from  behind 
24 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

cover  the  bullets  whistle.  The  war  is  terrible.  We  are  all  hoping  that 
the  decisive  battle  will  end  the  war,  as  our  troops  have  already  got 
round  Paris, 

If  we  first  beat  the  English,  the  French  resistance  will  soon  be 
broken.  Russia  will  be  very  quickly  dealt  with,  of  this  there  is  no 
doubt.  We  received  splendid  help  from  the  Austrian  heavy  artillery  at 
Maubeuge.  They  bombarded  Fort  Cerfontaine  in  such  a  way  that 
there  was  not  ten  metres  of  parapet  which  did  not  show  enormous 
craters  made  by  shells.  The  armoured  turrets  were  found  upside 
down. 

Yesterday  evening  about  6  P.M.,  in  the  valley  in  which  our  reserves 
stood,  there  was  such  a  terrible  cannonade  that  we  saw  nothing  of  the 
sky  but  a  cloud  of  smoke.  We  had  few  casualties. 

Amongst  items  of  news  are  the  following.  Recently  a  pilot 
and  observer  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  were  forced  by  a 
breakage  in  the  aeroplane  to  descend  in  the  enemy's  lines. 
The  pilot  managed  to  '  pancake  '  his  machine  down  to  earth, 
and  the  two  escaped  into  some  thick  undergrowth  in  a  wood. 
The  enemy  came  up  and  seized  the  smashed  machine,  but  did 
not  search  for  our  men  with  much  zeal.  The  latter  lay  hid 
till  dark,  and  then  found  their  way  to  the  Aisne,  across  which 
they  swam,  reaching  camp  in  safety,  but  barefooted.  Numer- 
ous floating  bridges  have  by  now  been  thrown  across  the  Aisne, 
and  some  permanent  bridges  repaired,  under  fire.  On  the 
20th  a  lieutenant  of  the  3rd  Signal  Company,  Royal  Engineers, 
was  unfortunately  drowned  whilst  attempting  to  swim  across 
the  river  with  a  cable  in  order  to  open  up  fresh  telegraph  com- 
munication on  the  north  side. 

Espionage  is  still  carried  on  by  the  enemy  to  a  considerable— 
extent.  Recently  the  suspicions  of  some  French  troops  were 
aroused  by  coming  across  a  farm  from  which  the  horses  had  not 
been  removed.  After  some  search  they  discovered  a  tele- 
phone which  was  connected  by  an  underground  cable  with  the 
German  lines  ;  and  the  owner  of  the  farm  paid  the  penalty 
usual  in  war  for  his  treachery. 

After  some  cases  of  village  fighting  which  occurred  earlier 
in  the  war  it  was  reported  by  some  of  our  officers  that  the 
Germans  had  attempted  to  approach  to  close  quarters  by 
forcing  prisoners  to  march  in  front  of  them.  The  Germans 
have  recently  repeated  the  same  trick  on  a  larger  scale  against 
the  French,  as  is  shown  by  the  copy  of  the  order  printed  below. 

25 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

It  is  therein  referred  to  as  a  '  ruse '  ;    but  if  that  term  be 
accepted,  it  is  distinctly  an  illegal  ruse. 

Army.  September,  1914. 

General  Staff. 
3rd  Bureau. 
No. 

During  a  recent  night  attack  the  Germans  drove  a  column  of 
French  prisoners  in  front  of  them. 

This  action  is  to  be  brought  to  the  notice  of  all  our  troops  : — 

1.  In  order  to  put  them  on  their  guard  against  such  a  dastardly 
ruse  : 

2.  In  order  that  every  soldier  may  know  how  the  Germans  treat 
their  prisoners.     Our  troops  must  not  forget  that  if  they  allow  them- 
selves to  be  taken  prisoners  the  Germans  will  not  fail  to  expose  them 
to  French  bullets. 

(Signature  of  Commander.) 

Further  evidence  has  now  been  collected  of  the  misuse  of 
the  white  flag  and  other  signs  of  surrender  during  the  action 
on  the  1 7th,  when  owing  to  this  one  officer  was  shot.  During 
the  recent  fighting  also  some  German  ambulance  wagons  ad- 
vanced in  order  to  collect  the  wounded.  An  order  to  cease 
fire  was  consequently  given  to  our  guns  which  were  firing  on 
this  particular  section  of  ground.  The  German  battery  com- 
manders at  once  took  advantage  of  the  lull  in  the  action  to 
climb  up  their  observation  ladders,  and  on  to  a  haystack  to 
locate  our  guns,  which  soon  afterwards  came  under  a  far  more 
accurate  fire  than  any  to  which  they  had  been  subjected  up 
to  that  time. 

A  British  officer  who  was  captured  by  the  Germans  and 
has  since  escaped  reports  that  while  a  prisoner  he  saw  men 
who  had  been  fighting  subsequently  put  on  Red  Cross  bras- 
sards. That  the  irregular  use  of  the  protection  afforded  by 
the  Geneva  Convention  is  not  uncommon  is  confirmed  by 
the  fact  that  on  one  occasion  men  in  the  uniform  of  com- 
batant units  have  been  captured  wearing  the  Red  Cross 
brassard  hastily  slipped  over  the  arm.  The  excuse  given  has 
been  that  they  had  been  detailed  after  a  fight  to  look  after 
the  wounded.  It  is  reported  by  a  cavalry  officer  that  the 
driver  of  a  motor-car  with  a  machine-gun  mounted  on  it, 
which  he  captured,  was  wearing  the  Red  Cross. 

Full  details  of  the  actual  damage  done  to  the  Cathedral 
36 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

at  Reims  will  doubtless  have  been  cabled  home,  so  that  no 
description  of  it  is  necessary.  The  Germans  bombarded  the 
cathedral  twice  with  their  heavy  artillery.  One  reason  why 
it  caught  alight  so  quickly  was  that  on  one  side  of  it  was  some 
scaffolding  which  had  been  erected  for  restoration  work. 
Straw  had  also  been  laid  on  the  floor  for  the  reception  of 
German  wounded.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  the  French  that 
practically  all  the  German  wounded  were  successfully  extri- 
cated from  the  burning  building.  There  was  no  justification 
on  military  grounds  for  this  act  of  vandalism,  which  seems  to 
have  been  caused  by  the  exasperation  born  of  failure,  a  sign 
of  impotence  rather  than  of  strength.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
a  well-known  hotel  not  far  from  the  cathedral,  which  was  kept 
by  a  German,  was  not  touched. 

September  21-22 

For  four  days  there  has  been  a  comparative  lull  all  along 
our  front.  This  has  been  accompanied  by  a  spell  of  fine 
weather,  though  the  nights  are  now  much  colder.  One  cannot 
have  everything,  however,  and  one  evil  result  of  the  sunshine 
has  been  to  release  the  flies  which  were  torpid  during  the  wet 
days.  Advantage  has  been  taken  of  the  arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments to  relieve  by  fresh  troops  the  men  who  have  been  in 
the  firing  line  for  some  time.  Several  units,  therefore,  have 
received  their  baptism  of  fire  during  the  week. 

Since  the  la  ,t  letter  left  General  Headquarters,  evidence 
has  been  received  which  points  to  the  fact  that  during  the 
counter-attacks  on  the  night  of  Sunday,  the  2oth,  the  German 
infantry  fired  into  each  other — the  result  of  an  attempt  to 
carry  out  the  dangerous  expedient  of  a  covering  advance  in 
the  dark.  Opposite  one  portion  of  our  position  a  considerable 
massing  of  the  hostile  forces  was  observed  before  dark,  and 
some  hours  later  a  furious  fusillade  was  heard  in  front  of  our 
line,  though  no  bullets  came  over  our  trenches. 

This  narrative  begins  with  the  2ist  and  covers  only  two 
days.  On  Monday,  the  2ist,  there  was  but  little  rain,  and  the 
weather  took  the  turn  for  the  better,  which  has  been  main- 
tained. Action  was  practically  confined  to  the  artillery,  our 
guns  at  one  point  shelling  and  driving  away  the  enemy,  who 
were  endeavouring  to  construct  a  redoubt.  The  Germans  for 
their  part  expended  a  large  number  of  heavy  shell  in  a  long- 

27 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

range  bombardment  of  the  village  of  Missy.  Reconnoitring 
parties  sent  out  during  the  night  of  the  2ist-22nd  discovered 
some  deserted  trenches,  and  in  them,  or  near  them  in  the 
woods,  over  one  hundred  dead  and  wounded  were  picked  up. 
A  number  of  rifles,  ammunition,  and  equipment  were  also 
found.  There  were  various  other  signs  that  portions  of  the 
enemy's  forces  had  withdrawn  for  some  distance. 

Tuesday,  the  22nd,  was  also  fine,  with  less  wind,  and  was 
one  of  the  most  uneventful  days  that  has  passed  since  we 
reached  the  Aisne — uneventful,  that  is,  for  the  British.  There 
was  less  artillery  work  on  either  side,  the  Germans  neverthe- 
less giving  the  village  of  Paissy  a  taste  of  the  '  Jack  Johnsons/ 
The  spot  thus  honoured  is  not  far  from  a  ridge  where  some 
of  the  most  severe  close  fighting  in  which  we  have  taken 
part  has  occurred.  All  over  this  '  No  man's  land '  between 
the  lines,  the  bodies  of  the  German  infantry  are  still  lying  in 
heaps  where  they  have  fallen  at  different  times. 

Espionage  plays  so  large  a  part  in  the  conduct  of  war  by 
the  Germans  that  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  reference  to  the 
subject.  They  have  evidently  never  forgotten  the  saying  of 
Frederick  the  Great :  •'  When  Marshal  Soubise  goes  to  war  he 
is  followed  by  a  hundred  cooks.  When  I  take  the  field  I  am 
preceded  by  a  hundred  spies/  Indeed,  until  about  twenty 
years  ago  there  was  a  paragraph  in  the  Field  Service  Regula- 
tions directing  that  the  service  of  '  protection  in  the  field/  e.g. 
outposts  and  advanced  guards,  should  always  be  supplemented 
by  a  system  of  espionage.  Though  such  instructions  are  no 
longer  made  public,  the  Germans,  as  is  well  known,  still  carry 
them  into  effect. 

Apart  from  the  more  elaborate  arrangements  which  were 
made  in  peace  time  for  obtaining  information  by  paid  agents, 
some  of  the  methods  being  employed  for  the  collection  or 
conveyance  of  intelligence  are  as  follows  :— 

Men  in  plain  clothes  signal  to  the  German  lines  from  points 
in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  by  means  of  coloured  lights  at  night 
and  puffs  of  smoke  from  chimneys  by  day.  Pseudo-labourers 
working  in  the  fields  between  the  armies  have  been  detected 
conveying  information,  and  persons  in  plain  clothes  have 
acted  as  advanced  scouts  to  the  German  cavalry  when  advanc- 
ing. German  officers  and  soldiers  in  plain  clothes,  or  in  French 
or  British  uniforms,  have  remained  in  localities  evacuated  by 
28 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

the  Germans  in  order  to  furnish  them  with  intelligence.  One 
spy  of  this  kind  was  found  by  our  troops  hidden  in  a  church 
tower.  His  presence  was  only  discovered  through  the  erratic 
movements  of  the  hands  of  the  church  clock,  which  he  was 
using  to  signal  to  his  friends  by  means  of  an  improvised 
semaphore  code.  Had  this  man  not  been  seized  it  is  probable 
that  he  would  have  signalled  to  the  German  artillery  the  time 
of  arrival  and  the  exact  location  of  the  Headquarters  and 
Staff  of  the  force.  High-explosive  shells  would  then  have 
mysteriously  dropped  on  to  the  building.  Women  spies  have 
also  been  caught,  and  secret  agents  have  been  found  at  rail- 
heads observing  entrainments  and  detrainments. 

It  is  a  simple  matter  for  spies  to  mix  with  Jhe  numbers  of 
refugees  moving  about  to  and  from  their  homes,  and  difficult 
for  our  troops,  who  speak  neither  French  nor  German,  to 
detect  them.  The  French  have  found  it  necessary  to  search 
villages  and  also  the  casual  wayfarers  on  the  roads  for  carrier 
pigeons.  Amongst  the  precautions  taken  by  us  to  guard 
against  spying  is  the  publication  of  the  following  notice, 
copies  of  which  have  been  printed  in  French  and  posted  up  : 

(1)  Motor-cars  and  bicycles    other   than    those    carrying 
soldiers  in  uniform  may  not  circulate  on  the  roads. 

(2)  Inhabitants  may  not  leave  the  localities  in  which  they 
reside  between  6  P.M.  and  6  A.M. 

(3)  Inhabitants  may  not  quit  their  homes  after  8  P.M. 

(4)  No   person  may  on   any  pretext  pass  through   the 
British  lines  without  an  authorisation  countersigned  by  a 
British  officer. 

Events  have  moved  so  quickly  during  the  last  two  months 
that  anything  connected  with  the  mobilisation  of  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  is  now  ancient  history.  Nevertheless, 
the  following  extract  of  a  German  order  is  evidence  of  the 
mystification  of  the  enemy  and  is  a  tribute  to  the  value  of  the 
secrecy  which  was  so  well  and  loyally  maintained  at  the  time 
in  England. 

'  loth  Reserve  Army  Corps, 

'  Headquarters  Mont  St.  Guibert, 

1  zoth  August  1914,  23.40. 

'CORPS  ORDER,  2isx  AUGUST 

1  The  French  troops  in  front  of  the  loth  Army  Corps  have 

29 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

retreated  south  across  the  Sambre.  Part  of  the  Belgian  Army 
has  withdrawn  to  Antwerp.  It  is  reported  that  an  English 
Army  has  disembarked  at  Calais  and  Boulogne  en  route  for 
Brussels/ 

September  23-24 

Wednesday,  the  23rd,  was  a  perfect  autumn  day.  It 
passed  without  incident  as  regards  major  operations,  though 
the  enemy  concentrated  their  heavy  artillery  fire  upon  the 
plateau  near  Paissy.  Nothing  more  than  inconvenience, 
however,  was  caused.  The  welcome  absence  of  wind  gave  our 
airmen  a  chance  of  which  they  took  full  advantage,  gathering 
much  information. 

Unfortunately  one  of  our  aviators,  who  has  been  par- 
ticularly active  in  annoying  the  enemy  by  dropping  bombs, 
was  wounded  in  a  duel  in  the  air.  Being  alone  on  a  single- 
seater  monoplane,  he  was  not  able  to  use  a  rifle,  and  whilst 
circling  above  a  German  two-seater  in  an  endeavour  to  get 
within  pistol  shot,  was  hit  by  the  observer  of  the  latter,  who 
was  armed  with  a  rifle.  He  managed  to  fly  back  over  our 
lines,  and  by  great  good  luck  descended  close  to  a  motor- 
ambulance,  which  at  once  conveyed  him  to  hospital.  Against 
this  may  be  set  off  the  fact  that  another  of  our  fliers  exploded 
a  bomb  amongst  some  led  artillery  horses,  killing  several  and 
stampeding  others. 

On  Thursday,  the  24th,  the  fine  weather  continued,  as 
did  the  lull  in  the  action,  the  heavy  German  shells  falling 
mostly  near  Pargnan.  On  both  Wednesday  and  Thursday 
the  weather  was  so  fine  that  many  flights  were  made  by  the 
aviators  of  the  French,  the  British,  and  the  Germans, 
producing  corresponding  activity  amongst  the  anti-aircraft 
guns. 

So  still  and  clear  was  the  atmosphere  towards  evening  on 
Wednesday  and  during  the  whole  of  Thursday,  that  to  those 
not  specially  on  the  look-out  the  presence  of  aeroplanes  high 
up  above  them  was  first  made  known  by  the  bursting  of  the 
projectiles  aimed  at  them.  The  puffs  of  smoke  from  the 
detonating  shell  hung  in  the  air  for  minutes  on  end  like  balls 
of  fleecy  cotton-wool  before  they  slowly  expanded  and  were 
dissipated. 

30 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

From  the  places  mentioned  as  being  the  chief  targets  for 
the  enemy's  heavy  howitzers,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Germans 
are  now  inclined  to  concentrate  their  fire  systematically  upon 
definite  areas  in  which  their  aviators  think  they  have  located 
our  guns,  or  upon  villages  where  it  is  imagined  our  troops 
may  be  billeted.  The  result  will  be  to  give  work  to  the  local 
builders. 

The  growing  resemblance  of  this  battle  to  siege  warfare 
has  already  been  pointed  out.  The  fact  that  the  later  actions 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  assumed  a  similar  character  was 
thought  by  many  to  have  been  due  to  exceptional  causes, 
such  as  the  narrowness  of  the  theatre  of  operations  between 
the  Chinese  frontier  on  the  west  and  the  mountainous  country 
of  Northern  Korea  on  the  east,  and  the  lack  of  roads,  which 
limited  the  extent  of  ground  over  which  it  was  possible  for  the 
rival  armies  to  manoeuvre,  and  the  fact  that  both  forces  were 
tied  to  one  line  of  railway. 

No  such  factors  are  exerting  any  influence  on  the  present 
battle.  Nevertheless  a  similar  situation  has  been  produced, 
owing,  first,  to  the  immense  power  of  resistance  possessed  by 
an  army  which  is  amply  equipped  with  heavy  artillery  and 
has  sufficient  time  to  fortify  itself  ;  and,  secondly,  to  the  vast 
size  of  the  forces  engaged,  which  at  present  stretch  more  than 
half  across  France.  The  extent  of  country  covered  is  so  great 
as  to  render  slow  any  efforts  to  manoeuvre  and  march  round 
to  a  flank  in  order  to  escape  the  costly  expedient  of  a  frontal 
attack  against  heavily  fortified  positions.  To  state  that 
methods  of  attack  must  approximate  more  closely  to  those 
of  siege  warfare,  the  greater  the  resemblance  of  the  defences 
to  those  of  a  fortress  is  a  platitude  ;  but  it  is  one  which  will 
bear  repetition  if  it  in  any  way  assists  to  make  the  present 
situation  clear. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  position  on  the  Aisne  was  not 
hastily  selected  by  the  German  Staff  after  the  retreat  had 
begun.  From  the  choice  of  ground,  and  the  care  with  which 
the  fields  of  fire  have  been  arranged  to  cover  all  possible 
avenues  of  approach,  and  from  the  amount  of  work  already 
carried  out,  it  is  clear  that  the  contingency  of  having  to  act 
on  the  defensive  was  not  overlooked  when  the  details  of  the 
strategically  offensive  campaign  were  arranged. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

September  25-29 

The  general  situation  as  viewed  on  the  map  remains 
practically  the  same  as  that  described  in  the  last  letter  ;  and 
the  task  of  the  Army  has  not  changed.  It  is  to  maintain  itself 
until  the  general  resumption  of  the  offensive.  No  ground  has 
been  lost,  some  has  been  gained,  and  every  counter-attack 
has  been  repulsed,  in  certain  instances  with  very  severe  loss 
to  the  enemy. 

Nevertheless  the  question  of  position  is  only  part  of  the 
battle,  and  there  has  been  a  considerable  improvement  in  the 
situation  in  another  important  aspect.  The  recent  offensive 
efforts  of  the  enemy  have  been  made  without  cohesion,  the 
assaults  being  delivered  by  comparatively  small  bodies  acting 
without  co-operation  with  those  on  either  side.  Some  of  them, 
indeed,  evince  clear  signs  of  inferior  leadership,  thus  bearing 
out  the  statements  made  by  prisoners  as  to  the  great  losses  in 
officers  suffered  by  the  enemy. 

\  Further,  the  hostile  artillery  fire  has  decreased  in  volume 
and  deteriorated  both  in  control  and  direction.  The  first  is 
probably  due  to  a  transfer  of  metal  to  other  quarters,  but 
the  two  latter  may  be  a  direct  result  of  the  activity  of  our 
aircraft  and  their  interference  with  the  enemy's  air  recon- 
naissance and  observation  of  fire.  Recently  the  Germans 
have  been  relying  to  some  extent  on  observation  from  captive 
balloons  sent  up  at  some  distance  in  rear  of  their  first  line, 
which  method,  whatever  its  cause,  is  a  poor  substitute  for  the 
direct  overhead  reconnaissance  obtainable  from  aeroplanes. 

As  a  consequence  the  damage  being  done  to  us  is  wholly 
disproportionate  to  the  amount  of  ammunition  expended  by 
the  enemy.  For  the  last  few  days  it  has  amounted  to  pitting 
certain  areas  with  large  craters  and  in  rendering  some  villages 
'  unhealthy  ' — as  the  soldiers  put  it.  A  concrete  example 
of  what  was  on  one  occasion  achieved  against  our  infantry 
trenches  is  given  later. 

Of  recent  events  the  actual  narrative  will  be  carried  on 
from  the  25th  to  the  2Qth  inclusive.  During  the  whole  of  this 
period  the  weather  has  remained  fine,  though  not  so  bright 
as  it  was.  On  Friday,  the  25th,  comparative  quiet  reigned 
in  our  sphere  of  action,  the  only  incident  worthy  of  special 
mention  being  the  passage  of  a  German  aeroplane  over  the 
32 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

interior  of  our  lines.  It  was  flying  high,  but  drew  a  general 
fusillade  from  below,  with  the  result  that  the  pilot  was  killed 
outright  and  the  observer  was  wounded.  By  the  aid  of  dual 
control,  however,  the  latter  continued  his  flight  for  some 
miles.  He  was  then  forced  to  descend  by  a  hit  in  his  petrol 
tank  and  was  captured  by  the  French. 

That  night  a  general  attack  was  made  against  the  greater 
part  of  the  Allies'  position,  and  it  was  renewed  in  the  early 
morning  of  the  26th.  The  Germans  were  everywhere  repulsed 
with  loss.  Indeed,  opposite  one  portion  of  our  line,  where 
they  were  caught  in  mass  by  our  machine-guns  and  howitzers 
firing  at  different  ranges,  it  is  estimated  that  they  left  one 
thousand  killed  and  wounded. 

The  mental  attitude  of  our  troops  may  be  gauged  from 
the  fact  that  the  official  report  next  morning  from  one  corps 
—of  which  one  division  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  fighting — 
ran  thus  laconically  : 

' .  .  .  .  The  night  was  quiet,  except  for  a  certain  amount 
of  shelling  both  from  the  enemy  and  ourselves.  At  3.40  A.M. 
an  attack  was  made  on  our  right.  At  5  A.M.  there  was  a 
general  attack  on  the  right  of  the  — th  Division,  but  not  really 
heavy,  and  firing  is  dying  down/ 

Further  ineffectual  efforts  to  drive  us  back  were  made  on 
Saturday,  the  26th,  at  8  A.M.,  and  in  the  afternoon  ;  and 
artillery  fire  continued  all  day.  The  Germans  came  on  in 
a  T-shaped  formation,  several  lines  shoulder  to  shoulder, 
followed  almost  immediately  by  a  column  in  support.  After 
a  very  few  minutes  the  men  had  closed  up  into  a  mob,  which 
afforded  an  excellent  target  for  our  fire. 

On  Sunday,  the  27th,  whilst  the  German  heavy  guns  were 
in  action,  their  brass  bands  could  be  heard  playing  hymn 
tunes,  presumably  at  Divine  Service.  The  enemy  made  an 
unimportant  advance  on  part  of  our  line  about  6  P.M.,  and 
renewed  it  in  strength  at  one  point  at  11.30  P.M. — with  no 
better  success  than  on  the  previous  night.  Sniping  continued 
all  day  along  the  whole  front.  On  Monday,  the  28th,  there 
was  nothing  more  severe  than  bombardment  and  intermittent 
sniping,  and  this  inactivity  continued  during  Tuesday,  the 
2gth,  except  for  a  night  attack  against  our  extreme  right. 

An  incident  that  occurred  on  Sunday,  the  27th,  serves  to 
illustrate  the  type  of  fighting  that  has  for  the  past  two  weeks 

MILITARY  2  C  33 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

been  going  on  intermittently  in  various  parts  of  our  line.  It 
also  brings  out  the  extreme  difficulty  of  ascertaining  what  is 
actually  happening  during  an  action,  apart  from  what  seems 
to  be  happening,  and  points  to  the  value  of  good  entrench- 
ments. At  a  certain  point  in  our  front  our  advanced  trenches 
on  the  north  of  the  Aisne  are  not  far  from  a  village  on  the  hill- 
side and  also  within  a  short  distance  of  the  German  works, 
being  on  the  slope  of  a  spur  formed  by  a  subsidiary  valley 
running  north  and  the  main  valley  of  the  river. 

It  was  a  calm,  sunny  afternoon  but  hazy  ;  and  from  a 
point  of  vantage  south  of  the  river  it  was  difficult  exactly  to 
locate  on  the  far  bank  the  well-concealed  trenches  of  either 
side.  From  far  and  near  the  sullen  boom  of  guns  echoed 
along  the  valley,  and  at  intervals,  in  different  directions, 
the  sky  was  flecked  with  the  almost  motionless  smoke  of 
anti-aircraft  shrapnel.  Suddenly,  without  any  warning,  for 
the  reports  of  the  distant  howitzers  from  which  they  were 
fired  could  not  be  distinguished  from  other  distant  reports, 
three  or  four  heavy  shells  fell  into  the  village,  sending  up 
huge  clouds  of  smoke  and  dust  which  slowly  descended  in  a 
brownish  grey  column.  To  this  no  reply  was  made  by  our 
side. 

Shortly  afterwards  there  was  a  quick  succession  of  reports 
from  a  point  some  distance  up  the  subsidiary  valley  on  the 
side  opposite  our  trenches,  and  therefore  rather  on  their  flank. 
It  was  not  possible,  either  by  ear  or  by  eye,  to  locate  the  guns 
irom  which  these  sounds  proceeded. 

Almost  simultaneously,  as  it  seemed,  there  was  a  corre- 
sponding succession  of  flashes  and  sharp  detonations  in  a  line 
on  the  hillside  along  what  appeared  to  be  our  trenches.  There 
was  then  a  pause,  and  several  clouds  of  smoke  rose  slowly 
and  remained  stationary,  spaced  as  regularly  as  a  line  of 
poplars.  Again  there  was  a  succession  of  reports  from  the 
German  quickfirers  on  the  far  side  of  the  misty  valley,  and— 
like  echoes — the  detonations  of  high  explosive  and  the  row  of 
expanding  smoke  clouds  were  prolonged  by  several  new  ones. 
Another  pause,  and  silence,  except  for  the  noise  in  the  distance. 
After  a  few  minutes  there  was  a  roar  from  our  side  of  the  main 
valley  as  our  field-guns  opened  one  after  another  in  a  more 
deliberate  fire  upon  the  position  of  the  German  guns. 

After  six  reports  there  was  again  silence,  save  for  the  whir 
34 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

of  the  shell  as  they  sang  up  the  small  valley,  and  then  followed 
the  flashes  and  balls  of  smoke — one,  two,  three,  four,  five, 
six,  as  the  shrapnel  burst  nicely  over  what  in  the  haze  looked 
like  some  ruined  buildings  at  the  edge  of  a  wood. 

Again,  after  a  short  interval,  the  enemy's  gunners  reopened 
with  a  burst,  still  further  prolonging  the  smoke,  which  was 
by  now  merged  into  one  solid  screen  above  a  considerable 
length  of  trench,  and  again  did  our  guns  reply.  And  so 
the  duel  went  on  for  some  time.  Ignoring  our  guns,  the 
German  artillerymen,  probably  relying  on  concealment  for 
immunity,  were  concentrating  all  their  efforts  in  a  particularly 
forceful  effort  to  enfilade  our  trenches.  For  them  it  must 
have  appeared  to  be  the  chance  of  a  lifetime,  and  with  their 
customary  prodigality  of  ammunition  they  continued  to  pour 
bouquet  after  bouquet  of  high-explosive  Einheitsgeschoss, 
or  combined  shrapnel  and  common  shell,  on  to  our  works. 
Occasionally,  with  a  roar,  a  high-angle  projectile  would  sail 
over  the  hill  and  blast  a  gap  in  the  village.  One  could  only 
pray  that  our  men  holding  the  trenches  had  dug  themselves  in 
deep  and  well,  and  that  those  in  the  village  were  in  the  cellars. 

In  the  hazy  valleys  bathed  in  sunlight  not  a  man,  not  a 
horse,  not  a  gun,  nor  even  a  trench  was  to  be  seen.  There 
were  only  flashes,  smoke,  and  noise.  Above,  against  the  blue 
sky,  were  several  round  white  clouds  hanging  in  the  track  of 
the  only  two  visible  human  souls — represented  by  a  glistening 
speck  in  the  air.  On  high  also  were  to  be  heard  the  more  or 
less  gentle  reports  of  the  bursts  of  the  anti-aircraft  projectiles. 
But  the  deepest  impression  created  was  one  of  sympathy  for 
the  men  subjected  to  the  bursts  along  that  trench. 

Upon  inquiry  as  to  the  losses  sustained,  however,  it  was 
found  that  our  men  had  been  able  to  take  care  of  themselves 
and  had  dug  themselves  well  in.  In  that  collection  of  trenches 
on  that  Sunday  afternoon  were  portions  of  four  battalions  of 
British  soldiers — the  Dorsets,  the  West  Kents,  the  King's 
Own  Yorkshire  Light  Infantry,  and  the  King's  Own  Scottish 
Borderers.  Over  three  hundred  projectiles  were  fired  against 
them.  The  result  was  nine  men  wounded. 

On  the  following  day  one  hundred  and  nine  shells  were  fired 
at  the  trenches  occupied  by  the  West  Kent  Regiment  alone. 
Four  officers  were  buried,  but  dug  out  unhurt.  One  man  was 
scratched.  The  village  itself  was  unoccupied. 

35 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

September  30 — October  2 

It  is  always  instructive  to  regard  matters  from  the  opposing 
point  of  view ;  and  the  following  further  extracts  from  the 
letters  of  prisoners  may  be  of  interest  : — 

'  In  all  places  we  passed  through  we  found  wounded  and  many 
parties  of  men  with  bandaged  arms  and  hands.  On  the  I5th  (Sep- 
tember) we  reached  a  village  in  which  we  thought  we  should  get  some 
rest,  but  we  had  hardly  gone  to  the  field  kitchens  for  our  food  when 
shrapnel  started  bursting  near  our  regiment,  which  was  in  close  for- 
mation. We  at  once  sought  cover  in  some  houses.  At  six  o'clock  our 
company  was  ordered  to  move  up  to  a  wood  in  order  to  protect  our 
artillery,  which  was  coming  into  action  in  a  field,  the  rest  of  the  bat- 
talion marching  northwards.  On  the  i6th  we  advanced,  covered  by 
our  guns.  The  enemy  was  hidden  in  bushes,  and  some  were  firing  from 
houses  into  our  trenches,  which  were  not  more  than  a  hundred  yards 
from  the  village.  To  my  right  and  left  wounded  comrades  were  com- 
plaining bitterly  that  the  enemy,  shooting  from  the  houses,  found  too 
easy  a  mark  in  us.  If  we  assumed  an  upright  position  we  were  im- 
mediately fired  on.  Two  of  our  soldiers  endeavoured  to  carry  a 
wounded  man  to  the  rear  ;  one  was  killed,  and  the  other  was  wounded 
in  the  attempt.  Soon  the  enemy's  bullets  began  to  get  us  from  the 
right,  and  after  about  one  hour,  during  which  time  the  Company  lost 
about  25  men,  we  were  forced  to  retire.  This  brought  our  total  strength 
down  to  80  (we  started  251  men).  We  had  no  officers  left.  .  .  .  On  the 
i8th,  at  4.30  A.M.,  we  reached  a  village  where  we  thought  we  expected 
to  be  able  to  rest,  and  collected  some  straw.  Before  half  an  hour  had 
passed,  however,  the  shrapnel  again  found  us  out.  We  spent  the  after- 
noon in  the  village,  which  was  continuously  under  shell  fire  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  our  guns  were  shelling  the  enemy's  artillery.  We  heard 
our  Colonel  say  that  our  guns  could  not  get  at  those  of  the  enemy  satis- 
factorily, as  the  latter  were  so  well  concealed.  .  .  .  Our  condition  is 
now  really  awful,  for  we  have  to  lie  out  in  all  weathers  ;  and  we  are 
all  looking  forward  to  a  speedy  end.  We  are  very  badly  off  as  regards 
food.  .  .  .  Some  of  our  regiments  can  only  muster  three  to  four 
companies.' 

(The  enemy  referred  to  are  the  French.) 

Another  letter  written  during  the  retreat  in  front  of  the 
French  from  Montmirail  contains  the  following  : — 

'  After  a  thirty-six  hours'  march  we  had  a  rest,  and  arrived  just  in 
time  for  the  fight.  For  three  days  we  did  not  have  a  hot  meal,  because 
36 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

our  field  kitchens  were  lost.     We  got  a  hot  meal  yesterday  evening. 
Though  we  are  all  just  ready  to  drop,  we  must  march  on/ 

Yet  two  more  extracts  : — 

'  We  found  great  quantities  of  food,  but  for  fear  of  poison  did  not 
take  possession  of  it  until  we  had  got  hold  of  the  proprietor  of  the  house 
and  forced  him  to  taste  it.' 

'  We  are  near  Reims,  after  having  gone  through  hard,  bloody, 
and  most  horrible  days.  Thank  God  I  am  still  alive.  Of  our  regiment 
of  3000  men  there  are  now  only  1600.  Let  us  hope  that  this  battle 
—which  ought  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  in  history — will  leave  me  safe 
and  well,  and  give  us  peace.  I  am  absolutely  done,  but  we  must  not 
despair/ 

Wednesday,  September  30,  merely  marked  another  day's 
progress  in  the  gradual  development  of  the  situation,  and  was 
distinguished  by  no  activity  beyond  slight  attacks  by  the 
enemy.  There  was  also  artillery  fire  at  intervals.  One  of  our 
airmen  succeeded  in  dropping  nine  bombs,  some  of  which  fell 
on  the  enemy's  rolling-stock  collected  on  the  railway  near 
Laon.  Some  of  the  enemy's  front  trenches  were  found  empty 
at  night ;  but  nothing  much  can  be  deduced  from  this  fact, 
for  they  are  frequently  evacuated  in  this  way,  no  doubt  to 
prevent  the  men  in  the  back  line  firing  on  their  comrades  in 
front  of  them. 

Thursday,  October  i,  was  a  most  perfect  autumn  day, 
and  the  most  peaceful  that  there  has  been  since  the  two  forces 
engaged  on  the  Aisne.  There  was  only  desultory  gun  fire  as 
targets  offered.  During  the  night  the  enemy  made  a  few  new 
trenches.  A  French  aviator  dropped  one  bomb  on  a  railway 
station  and  three  bombs  on  troops  massed  near  it. 

The  weather  on  Friday,  the  2nd,  was  very  misty  in  the 
early  hours,  and  it  continued  hazy  until  the  late  afternoon, 
becoming  thicker  again  at  night.  The  Germans  were  driven 
out  of  a  mill  which  they  had  occupied  as  an  advanced  post, 
their  guns  and  machine-guns  which  supported  it  being  knocked 
out  one  by  one  by  well-directed  artillery  fire  from  a  flank. 
During  the  night  they  made  the  usual  two  attacks  on  the  cus- 
tomary spot  in  our  lines,  and  as  on  previous  occasions  were 
repulsed.  Two  of  their  trenches  were  captured  and  filled  in. 
Our  loss  was  six  wounded  men. 

Up  to  September  21  the  air  mileage  made  by  our  airmen 

37 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

since  the  beginning  of  the  war  amounted  to  87,000  miles,  an 
average  of  2000  miles  per  day,  the  total  equalling  nearly  four 
times  the  circuit  of  the  world.  The  total  time  spent  in  the 
air  was  1400  hours. 

There  are  many  points  connected  with  the  fighting  methods 
of  either  side  that  may  be  of  interest.  The  following  de- 
scription was  given  by  a  battalion  commander  who  has  been 
at  the  front  since  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  and  has 
fought  both  in  the  open  and  behind  entrenchments.  It  must, 
however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  only  represents  the  ex- 
periences of  a  particular  unit.  It  deals  with  the  tactics  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  : — 

'  The  important  points  to  watch  are  the  heads  of  valleys 
and  ravines,  woods — especially  those  on  the  sides  of  hollow 
ground — and  all  dead  ground  to  the  front  and  flanks.  The 
German  officers  are  skilled  in  leading  troops  forward  under 
cover,  in  closed  bodies,  but  once  the  latter  are  deployed  and 
there  is  no  longer  direct  personal  leadership  the  men  will  not 
face  heavy  fire.  Sometimes  the  advance  is  made  in  a  series  of 
lines,  with  the  men  well  opened  out  at  five  or  six  paces  inter- 
val ;  at  other  times  it  is  made  in  a  line,  with  the  men  almost 
shoulder  to  shoulder,  followed  in  all  cases  by  supports  in  close 
formation.  The  latter  either  waver  when  the  front  line  is 
checked,  or  crowd  on  to  it,  moving  forward  under  the  orders 
of  their  officers,  and  the  mass  forms  a  magnificent  target. 
Prisoners  have  described  the  fire  of  our  troops  as  pinning  them 
to  the  ground,  and  this  is  certainly  borne  out  by  their  action. 

'  When  the  Germans  are  not  heavily  entrenched  no 
great  losses  are  incurred  in  advancing  against  them  by  the 
methods  in  which  the  British  Army  has  been  instructed. 
For  instance,  in  one  attack  over  fairly  open  ground  against 
about  an  equal  force  of  infantry  sheltered  in  a  sunken  road 
and  in  ditches  we  lost  only  ten  killed  and  sixty  wounded, 
while  over  four  hundred  of  the  enemy  surrendered  after  about 
fifty  had  been  killed.  Each  side  had  the  support  of  a  battery, 
but  the  fight  for  superiority  from  infantry  fire  took  place  at 
about  seven  hundred  yards,  and  lasted  only  half  an  hour. 
When  the  Germans  were  wavering  some  of  them  put  up  the 
white  flag,  but  others  went  on  firing,  and  our  men  continued 
to  do  the  same.  Eventually  a  large  number  of  white  flags, 
improvised  from  handkerchiefs,  pieces  of  shirt,  white  biscuit 
38 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

bags,  etc.,  were  exhibited  all  along  the  line,  and  many  men 
hoisted  their  helmets  on  their  rifles. 

'  In  the  fighting  behind  entrenchments  the  Germans  en- 
deavour to  gain  ground  by  making  advances  in  line  at  dusk 
or  just  before  dawn,  and  then  digging  themselves  in,  in  the 
hope  no  doubt  that  they  may  eventually  get  so  near  as  to  be 
able,  as  at  manoeuvres,  to  reach  the  hostile  trenches  in  a  single 
rush.  They  have*  never  succeeded  in  doing  this  against  us. 
If  by  creeping  up  in  dead  ground  they  do  succeed  in  gaining 
ground  by  night,  they  are  easily  driven  back  by  fire  in  the 
morning.  A  few  of  the  braver  men  sometimes  remain  behind, 
at  ranges  of  even  three  hundred  or  four  hundred  yards,  and 
endeavour  to  inflict  losses  by  sniping.  Sharpshooters,  also, 
are  often  noticed  in  trees  or  wriggling  about  until  they  get 
good  cover.  The  remedy  is  to  take  the  initiative  and  detail 
men  to  deal  with  the  enemy's  sharpshooters. 

1  A  few  night  attacks  have  been  made  against  us.  Before 
one  of  them  a  party  crept  up  close  to  the  British  line  and  set 
alight  a  hayrick,  so  that  it  should  form  a  beacon  on  which  the 
centre  of  the  attacking  line  marched.  Generally,  however, 
in  the  night  and  early  morning  attacks,  groups  of  forty  or 
fifty  men  have  come  on,  the  groups  sometimes  widely  separated 
one  from  another,  and  making  every  endeavour  to  obtain  any 
advantage  from  cover.  Light-balls  and  searchlights  have  on 
some  occasions  been  used.  Latterly  the  attacks  have  become 
more  and  more  half-hearted.  Against  us  the  enemy  has 
never  closed  with  the  bayonet.  The  German  trenches  I  have 
seen  were  deep  enough  to  shelter  a  man  when  firing  standing, 
and  had  a  step  down  in  rear  for  the  supports  to  sit  in. 

'  As  regards  our  own  men,  there  was  at  first  considerable 
reluctance  to  entrench,  as  has  always  been  the  case  at  the 
commencement  of  a  war.  Now,  however,  having  bought 
experience  dearly,  their  defences  are  such  that  they  can  defy 
the  German  artillery  fire/ 

October  3-8 

The  comparative  calm  on  our  front  has  continued.  Though 
fine  and  considerably  warmer,  the  last  six  days  have  been 
slightly  misty,  with  clouds  hanging  low,  so  that  the  conditions 
have  not  been  very  favourable  for  aerial  reconnaissance.  In 
regard  to  the  latter,  it  is  astonishing  how  quickly  the  habit  is 

39 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

acquired — even  by  those  who  are  not  aviators — of  thinking 
of  the  weather  in  terms  of  its  suitability  for  flying.  There  has 
been  a  bright  moon  also,  which  has  militated  against  night 
attacks. 

On  Saturday,  the  3rd,  practically  nothing  happened, 
except  that  each  side  shelled  the  other  towards  evening.  On 
Sunday  there  was  a  similar  absence  of  activity.  Opposite 
one  portion  of  the  line  the  enemy's  bands  played  patriotic 
airs,  and  the  audiences  which  gathered  gave  a  chance  to  our 
waiting  howitzers.  Not  only  do  their  regimental  bands  per- 
form occasionally,  but  with  their  proverbial  fondness  for  music 
the  Germans  have  in  some  places  got  gramophones  in  their 
trenches. 

On  Monday,  the  5th,  there  were  three  separate  duels  in 
the  air  between  French  and  German  aviators,  one  of  which 
was  visible  from  our  trenches.  Two  of  the  struggles  were,  so 
far  as  could  be  seen,  indecisive,  but  in  the  third  the  French 
airmen  were  victorious  and  brought  down  their  opponents, 
both  of  whom  were  killed,  by  machine-gun  fire.  The  observer 
was  so  burnt  as  to  be  unrecognisable.  During  the  day  some 
men  of  the  Landwehr  were  taken  prisoners  by  us.  They  were 
in  very  poor  condition,  and  wept  copiously  when  captured. 
One,  on  being  asked  what  he  was  crying  for,  explained  that, 
though  they  had  been  advised  to  surrender  to  the  English, 
they  believed  that  they  would  be  shot.  On  that  evening  our 
airmen  had  an  unusual  amount  of  attention  paid  to  them  both 
by  the  German  aviators  and  their  artillery  of  every  description. 
One  of  our  infantry  patrols  discovered  one  hundred  and  fifty 
dead  Germans  in  a  wood  one  and  a  half  miles  to  our  front. 
We  sent  out  a  party  to  bury  them,  but  it  was  fired  upon  and 
had  to  withdraw. 

On  Tuesday,  the  6th,  the  enemy's  guns  were  active  in  the 
afternoon.  It  is  believed  that  the  bombardment  was  due  to 
anger  because  two  of  our  howitzer  shells  had  detonated  right 
in  one  of  the  enemy's  trenches  which  was  full  of  men.  Three 
horses  were  killed  by  the  German  fire.  Wednesday,  the  yth, 
was  uneventful.  On  Thursday,  the  8th,  the  shelling  by  the 
enemy  of  the  locality  of  our  front,  which  has  so  far  been  the 
scene  of  their  greatest  efforts,  was  again  continuous. 

Opposite  one  or  two  points  the  Germans  have  attempted 
to  gain  ground  by  sapping,  in  some  places  with  a  view  secretly 
40 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

to  pushing  forward  machine-guns  in  advance  of  their  trenches, 
so  that  they  can  suddenly  sweep  with  cross  fire  the  space 
between  our  line  and  theirs,  and  so  take  any  advance  of  ours 
in  flank.  It  is  reported  that  at  one  point  where  the  French 
were  much  annoyed  by  the  fire  of  a  German  machine-gun 
which  was  otherwise  inaccessible,  they  drove  a  mine  gallery 
fifty  metres  long  up  to  and  under  the  emplacement,  and  blew 
up  the  gun.  The  men  who  drove  the  gallery  belonged  to  a 
corps  which  is  recruited  in  one  of  the  coal-mining  districts 
of  France.  The  German  machine-guns  are  mounted  on  low 
sledges  and  are  inconspicuous  and  evidently  easily  moved. 

The  fighting  now  consists  mostly  of  shelling  by. the- artillery 
of  both  sides,  and  in  the  front  line  of  fire  from  machine-guns, 
as  an  occasional  target  offers.  Our  Maxims  have  been  doing 
excellent  work  and  have  proved  most  efficient  weapons  for 
the  sort  of  fighting  in  which  we  are  now  engaged.  At  times 
there  are  so  many  outbursts  of  their  fire  in  different  directions 
that  it  is  possible  for  an  expert  to  tell  by  comparison  which 
guns  have  their  springs  properly  adjusted  and  are  well  '  tuned 
up  '  for  the  day. 

The  amount  of  practice  that  our  officers  are  now  getting 
in  the  use  of  this  weapon  is  proving  most  valuable  in  teaching 
them  how  to  maintain  it  at  concert  pitch,  as  an  instrument, 
and  how  to  derive  the  best  tactical  results  from  its  employ- 
ment. Against  us  the  Germans  are  not  now  expending  so 
much  gun  ammunition  as  they  have  been,  but  they  continue 
to  fire  at  insignificant  targets.  They  have  a  habit  of  suddenly 
dropping  heavy  shells  without  warning  in  localities  or  villages 
far  behind  our  front  line,  possibly  on  the  chance  of  catching 
some  of  our  troops  in  bivouac  or  billets.  They  also  fire  a  few 
rounds  at  night. 

Artillery  has  up  to  now  played  so  great  a  part  in  the  war 
that  a  few  general  remarks  descriptive  of  the  methods  of  its 
employment  by  the  enemy  are  justified.  Their  field  artillery 
armament  consists  of  15  pr.  Q.F.  guns  for  the  horse  and  field 
batteries  of  divisions,  and  there  are,  in  addition,  with  each 
corps  three  to  six  batteries  of  4.3  in.  field  howitzers  and  about 
two  batteries  of  5.9  in.  howitzers.  With  an  army  there  are 
some  8.2  in.  heavy  howitzers. 

The  accuracy  of  their  fire  is  apt  at  first  to  cause  some 
alarm,  more  especially  as  the  guns  are  usually  well  concealed 

41 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

and  the  position  and  the  direction  from  which  the  fire  is 
proceeding  difficult  of  detection.  But,  accurate  as  is  their 
shooting,  the  German  gunners  have  on  the  whole  had  little 
luck,  and  during  the  past  three  weeks  an  astonishingly  small 
proportion  of  the  number  of  shells  fired  by  them  have  been 
really  effective.  Quite  the  most  striking  feature  of  their 
handling  of  artillery  is  the  speed  with  which  they  concentrate 
fire  upon  any  selected  point.  They  dispense  to  a  great  extent 
with  the  method  of  ranging  known  by  us  as  '  bracketing/ 
especially  when  acting  on  the  defensive,  and  direct  fire  by 
means  of  squared  maps  and  telephone.  Thus,  when  a  target 
is  found,  its  position  on  the  map  is  telephoned  to  such  batteries 
as  it  is  desired  to  employ  against  that  particular  square. 

In  addition  to  the  guns  employed  to  fire  on  targets  as  they 
are  picked  up,  others  are  told  off  to  watch  particular  roads 
and  to  deal  with  any  of  the  enemy  using  them.  Both  for  the 
location  of  targets  and  the  communication  of  the  effect  of  fire, 
reliance  is  placed  on  observation  from  aeroplanes  and  balloons, 
and  on  information  supplied  by  special  observers  and  secret 
agents  who  are  sent  out  ahead  or  left  behind  in  the  enemy's 
lines  to  communicate  by  telephone  or  signal.  These  observers 
have  been  found  in  haystacks,  barns,  and  other  buildings 
well  in  advance  of  the  German  lines. 

Balloons  of  the  so-called  '  Sausage '  pattern  remain  up 
in  the  air  for  long  periods  for  the  purpose  of  discovering 
targets ;  and  until  our  aviators  made  their  influence  felt  by 
chasing  all  hostile  aeroplanes  on  sight,  the  latter  were  con- 
tinually hovering  over  our  troops  in  order  to  '  register  '  their 
positions  and  to  note  where  headquarters,  reserves,  gun  teams, 
etc.,  were  located.  If  a  suitable  target  is  discovered,  the  air-  • 
man  drops  a  smoke  ball  directly  over  it  or  lets  fall  some  strips 
of  tinsel  which  glitter  in  the  sun  as  they  aslowly  descend  to 
earth. 

The  range  to  the  target  is  apparently  ascertained  by  those 
near  the  guns  by  means  of  a  large  telemeter,  or  other  range- 
finder,  which  is  kept  trained  on  the  aeroplane,  so  that  when 
the  signal  is  made  the  distance  to  the  target  vertically  below 
is  at  once  obtained.  A  few  rounds  are  then  fired  and  the 
result -signalled  back  by  the  aviator  according  to  some  pre- 
arranged code. 

42 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

October  9 

In  spite  of  the  perfection  of  their  arrangements  for  ranging 
and  observation,  there  has  been  much  waste  of  ammunition 
by  the  Germans. 

For  instance,  within  an  area  of  two  acres  on  our  side  of 
the  Aisne  there  are  over  one  hundred  craters  made  by  their 
heavy  high-explosive  shell.  This  shower  of  projectiles,  which 
must  have  cost  some  £1000,  did  absolutely  no  damage,  for  the 
locality  never  happened  to  be  occupied  whilst  it  was  being 
bombarded.  It  also  incidentally  illustrates  one  weak  point 
of  indirect  fire  when  unaccompanied  by  observation.  Another 
example  of  prodigality  in  ammunition  is  the  continued  shell- 
ing of  Reims.  This  is  still  carried  on  at  intervals,  and  on  the 
6th  resulted  in  the  deaths  of  an  entire  family  of  eight  people. 
On  the.  7th  twelve  of  the  inhabitants  were  hit. 

On  the  other  hand,  concealment  of  their  own  guns  as  of 
all  their  troops  has  been  most  carefully  practised  by  the 
Germans ;  and  they  construct  alternative  emplacements  so 
that  when  one  position  is  made  too  hot  another  can  be  taken 
up  without  loss  of  time. 

Ever  since  the  South  African  war  the  desirability  of  render- 
ing troops  as  invisible  as  possible  has  been  generally  recognised 
in  all  armies,  and  this  war  has  thrown  much  light  on  the 
matter.  It  appears  that  at  long  ranges  the  uniform  matters 
little  ;  the  blue  coat  and  red  trousers  of  the  French  infantry 
and  cavalry  not  being  any  more  conspicuous  than  the  clothes 
of  our  own  men  or  of  the  Germans.  But  at  medium  ranges  the 
red  trousers  of  our  allies  show  up  very  clearly.  When  infantry 
are  lying  down,  however,  their  kepis  are  not  so  easily  seen  as 
our  own  flat-topped  forage  caps.  From  the  interrogation  of 
prisoners  it  has  been  ascertained  that  at  medium  ranges  both 
French  and  British  officers  are  very  easily  distinguishable 
from  their  men,  and  that  selected  marksmen  provided  with 
field-glasses  are  specially  told  off  from  each  platoon  of  German 
infantry  to  pick  off  officers.  The  French  officer  is  betrayed 
by  the  greater  visible  length  of  his  red  trousers  and  by  his 
accoutrements,  while  the  British  officer  is  '  given  away '  by 
his  sword,  his  open  jacket  with  low  collar  and  tie,  his  Sam 
Browne  belt,  and  the  absence  of  a  pack.  Even  such  trifling 
differences  as  the  colour  or  cut  of  the  breeches  are  said  to  be 

43 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

noticeable.  The  Germans  certainly  do  employ  snipers,  and 
some  have  been  found  on  church  towers,  up  trees,  and  in 
houses.  One  of  them  succeeded  in  killing  two  of  our  officers 
and  wounding  two  more  before  he  was  accounted  for. 

Some  of  our  prisoners  report  that  their  officers  have  been 
ordered  to  remove  their  distinguishing  shoulder  straps.  But 
this  may  be  in  order  not  to  convey  information  to  the  enemy 
as  to  the  units  to  which  they  belong.  At  any  rate,  to  judge 
from  the  officers  already  captured,  the  order  has  not  been 
carried  out  generally. 

The  following  notification  to  his  troops  by  one  of  the 
French  Army  Commanders  bears  upon  German  methods  of 
warfare  : — '  The  Germans  have  forced  some  prisoners  of  war 
to  remain  in  their  trenches.  When  the  French  advanced, 
under  the  impression  that  the  trenches  were  in  possession  of 
their  own  side,  they  were  fired  on  at  close  range/ 

That  this  has  actually  been  done  is  fully  confirmed,  with 
illuminating  details  as  to  the  German  methods  of  war  in  the 
twentieth  century,  by  an  entry  in  a  captured  field  note-book. 
It  runs  thus  : — 

1  i6th  September. — At  dawn  the  shelling  began.  We 
retired  with  the  prisoners.  My  two  prisoners  work  hard  at 
digging  trenches.  At  midday  I  got  the  order  to  rejoin  at  the 
village  with  them.  I  was  very  glad,  as  I  had  been  ordered 
to  shoot  them  as  soon  as  the  enemy  advanced.  Thank  God 
it  was  not  necessary/ 

On  the  other  hand,  an  example  is  given  of  an  order  which 
prescribes  only  legal  and  suitable  precautions — except  as 
regards  the  shooting  of  hostages — for  self-protection  in  an 
enemy  country.  It  was  issued  some  time  ago. 

'  AIX-LA-CHAPELLE,  August  10,  1914. 

'  To  protect  ourselves  from  the  extremely  hostile  attitude 
of  the  Belgian  population  it  is  necessary  to  take  very  vigorous 
and  energetic  measures  against  non-combatants  who  take 
part  in  the  struggle.  For  this  purpose  no  firearms  or  ex- 
plosives must  be  retained  by  them. 

'  It  is  therefore  ordered  that  before  a  locality  is  occupied 
a  detachment  of  all  arms  will  march  in  ahead  of  the  columns 
and  warn  the  population  through  the  mayor  and  local  clergy 
to  deliver  up  all  arms,  ammunition,  and  explosives. 
44 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

'  After  they  have  handed  over  their  arms  the  inhabitants 
will  be  collected  outside  the  locality,  and  the  houses  and 
gardens  will  be  searched.  If  any  arms  are  found,  hostages 
will  be  executed  and  the  place  set  on  fire. 

'  When  the  inhabitants  are  summoned  to  surrender  their 
arms,  they  will  be  informed  of  the  penalties  to  which  they 
expose  themselves  by  non-compliance. 

'  The  arms  will  be  destroyed  and  the  explosives  thrown 
into  water. 

'  (Signed)  VON  QUASI, 

'  Commanding  IX.  A.C.' 

Another  German  order — of  the  2nd  Army — is  quoted 
because  it  is  possibly  significant  of  the  present  state  of 
Germany's  military  resources  : — 

'  The  Minister  of  War  wishes  to  impress  upon  all  the 
necessity  for  searching  the  field  of  battle  with  the  greatest 
care  for  all  warlike  material  belonging  to  our  own  Army,  such 
as — Field-glasses,  water-bottles,  haversacks,  rifles,  cartridges, 
also  limbers  and  supply  wagons,  which  can  be  used  again  for 
new  formations.  In  addition  to  this,  units  must  take  care  to 
pick  up  unexpended  ammunition  and  empty  cartridge  cases/ 

The  lull  in  the  operations  on  our  immediate  front  pending 
a  general  advance  affords  an  opportunity  (to-day,  October  9, 
1914)  for  giving  some  further  description  of  the  country  in 
which  we  are  operating,  and  of  the  valley  of  the  Aisne  in 
particular. 

The  different  rivers  which  cut  across  the  line  of  advance 
in  the  direction  of  Laon  have  already  been  enumerated.  Any 
northward  move  from  the  Marne  traverses  the  Department 
of  the  Aisne,  which  is  one  of  several  departments  included  in 
the  district  of  Champagne.  To  our  right  rear  lies  the  southern 
half  of  the  district  called  La  Champagne  Pouilleuse,  which 
owing  to  the  nature  of  its  soil  is  the  most  famous  wine  district 
of  France,  indeed  of  the  world,  where  the  lower  slopes  of  the 
undulating  country  are  covered  with  vineyards  for  miles.  We 
are,  however,  more  concerned  with  the  area  immediately 
ahead  of  us,  which  is  the  higher  portion  of  two  plateaux  which 
are  connected  by  the  line  of  slopes  known  as  La  Falaise  de  la 
Champagne,  forming  the  original  French  defensive  position 
running  from  La  Fere  through  Laon  to  Reims.  This  area 

45 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

consists  of  a  fairly  open  plateau,  intersected  by  the  depres- 
sions down  which  run  the  watercourses  of  the  westward  flow- 
ing rivers.  Between  the  Marne  and  Laon,  though  there  are 
a  few  vineyards,  the  country  is  not  wine-growing  to  the  same 
degree  as  is  that  south  of  Reims  and  round  Epernay.  On 
the  slopes  of  the  Aisne  valley  itself,  the  vineyards  are  few 
and  far  between,  and  only  to  be  found  in  favoured  spots. 

The  Aisne  flows  right  across  our  front,  following  a  tortuous 
course  along  the  bottom  of  the  valley  some  hundred  metres 
below  the  edge  of  the  plateau  on  either  bank.  It  is  a  placid 
stream  between  150  and  200  feet  in  width,  and  unfordable. 
The  bottom  of  the  valley  down  which  it  meanders  consists  of 
practically  flat  meadowland  intersected  by  the  various  roads 
leading  north  and  south  over  the  bridges  which  span  the  river. 
These  roads  are  for  the  most  part  lined  with  poplars  or  fruit 
trees,  whose  military  significance  lies  in  the  fact  that  they 
screen  the  movement  of  troops  along  the  roads,  though,  on 
the  other  hand,  they  make  the  position  of  the  latter  con- 
spicuous from  afar. 

There  are  several  villages  either  actually  on  the  banks 
of  the  river  or  nestling  on  the  slopes  of  the  valley.  The  chief 

Elace  along  the  British  front  is  Soissons,  a  town  lying  on  the 
ift  bank  at  a  pronounced  bend  northwards.  The  villages  on 
the  river  itself  are  of  considerable  tactical  importance,  since 
most  of  the  bridges  are  close  to  them.  They  have  therefore 
been  the  targets  of  the  German  artillery,  and  some  are  now  no 
more  than  masses  of  ruins.  Several  of  the  hamlets  at  some 
distance  from  the  Aisne  and  on  its  left  bank  have  formed  the 
objects  of  similar  attentions  from  the  enemy's  guns — probably 
because  they  might  serve  as  points  of  concentration  for  our 
troops — as  have  also  the  greater  number  of  the  roads  winding 
down  the  hillsides  facing  north  and  leading  across  the  meadows, 
which  afford  the  only  channels  of  approach  to  our  troops  on 
the  north  side.  In  regard  to  the  villages,  one  point  which 
strikes  a  fresh  eye  is  their  compactness,  for  in  most  of  them 
the  houses  are  clustered  together  in  one  mass,  outlying  houses 
being  rare.  When  on  a  hillside,  they  line  the  road,  sometimes 
almost  entirely  on  one  side.  There  are  also,  of  course,  outlying 
chateaux  and  farms  which  are  quite  isolated. 

The  other  main  topographical  features  of  the  valley  are 
two  railways  and  a  canal.  At  the  village  of  Vailly,  the  light 
46 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

railway  which  to  the  east  of  that  place  skirts  the  foothills  on 
the  south  side  crosses  over  to  the  right  bank  and  continues 
westward  to  Soissons.  The  double  line  joining  Compiegne 
on  the  west  with  Reims  on  the  east  follows  the  lower  hills  on 
the  south  side  from  Soissons  to  Sermoise,  and,  at  the  latter 
point,  turns  south-east  up  the  Vesle  valley.  From  Conde, 
where  it  joins  the  Aisne,  a  canal  runs  parallel  to  the  river  on 
its  left  bank  to  Bourg,  where  it  is  joined  from  the  north-east 
by  a  branch  canal  carried  across  the  river  on  an  aqueduct. 

Generally  speaking,  the  slopes  forming  the  north  side  of 
the  valley  are  steeper  than  those  of  the  south,  but  in  other 
respects  the  two  sides  are  very  similar.  Both  are  equally  cut 
up  into  spurs  and  subsidiary  valleys,  the  chief  of  the  latter  on 
the  south  being  formed  by  the  watercourse  of  the  Vesle,  which 
extends  south-eastwards  through  Braisne.  Both  on  the  north 
and  south  the  slopes  leading  down  to  the  Aisne  are  thickly 
wooded  in  patches,  the  woods  in  some  places  stretching  away 
back  over  the  edge  of  the  plateau  for  some  distance.  On 
account  of  the  existence  of  these  woods  on  the  edges  of  the 
slopes  on  our  bank  of  the  river,  it  is  at  many  points  only 
possible  to  obtain  glimpses  of  short  stretches  of  the  opposite 
slopes,  while  the  woods  on  that  side  screen  large  portions  of 
the  top  of  the  plateau  on  the  north. 

Owing  to  the  concealment  afforded  to  the  Germans'  fire 
trenches  and  gun  emplacements  by  the  woods,  and  to  the  fact 
that  nearly  all  the  bridges  and  roads  leading  to  them  as  well 
as  a  great  part  of  the  southern  slopes  are  open  to  their  fire,  the 
position  held  by  them  is  a  very  strong  one.  Except  for  these 
patches  of  wood,  the  terrain  generally  is  not  enclosed.  No 
boundaries  between  the  fields  exist  as  in  England.  There  are 
ditches  here  and  there,  but  no  hedges,  wire  fences,  or  walls, 
except  round  the  enclosures  in  the  villages.  A  large  propor- 
tion of  the  woods,  however,  are  enclosed  by  high  rabbit-netting, 
which  is  in  some  places  supported  by  iron  stanchions.  The 
top  of  the  plateau  on  the  south  of  the  river  to  some  extent 
resembles  Salisbury  Plain,  except  that  the  latter  is  downland, 
while  the  former  is  cultivated,  being  sown  with  lucerne,  wheat, 
and  beetroot.  The  Aisne  valley  is  broader  and  deeper  than 
any  of  those  to  be  found  on  Salisbury  Plain,  and  much  more 
heavily  wooded. 

A  feature  of  this  part  of  the  country,  and  one  which  is  not 

47 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

confined  to  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Aisne,  is  the  large  number 
of  caves,  both  natural  and  artificial,  and  of  quarries.  These 
are  of  great  service  to  the  forces  on  both  sides,  since  they  can 
often  be  used  as  sheltered  accommodation  for  the  troops  in 
the  second  line.  Other  points  worthy  of  note  are  the  excel- 
lence of  the  metalled  roads,  though  the  metalled  portion  is 
very  narrow,  and  the  comparative  ease  with  which  one  can 
find  one's  way  about,  even  without  a  map.  This  is  due  partly 
to  the  prevailing  straightness  of  the  roads,  and  partly  to  the 
absence  of  hedges.  There  are  signposts  at  all  cross-roads, 
whilst  the  name  of  each  village  is  posted  in  a  conspicuous  place 
at  the  entry  and  exit  of  the  main  highway  passing  through  it. 
In  addition  to  the  absence  of  hedges,  the  tall  white  ferro- 
concrete telegraph-posts  lining  many  of  the  main  roads  give 
a  somewhat  strange  note  to  the  landscape. 

October  9-12 

From  Friday,  October  9,  until  Monday,  the  I2th,  so  little 
has  occurred  that  the  narrative  of  events  can  be  given  in  a 
few  words.  There  has  been  the  usual  sporadic  shelling  of  our 
trenches,  which  has  resulted  in  but  little  harm,  so  well  dug  in 
are  our  men  ;  and  on  the  night  of  the  loth  the  Germans  made 
yet  a  fresh  assault,  supported  by  artillery  fire,  against  the  point 
which  has  all  along  attracted  most  of  their  attention.  The 
attempt  was  again  a  costly  failure,  towards  which  our  guns 
were  able  to  contribute  with  great  effect. 

Details  have  now  been  received  of  an  exciting  encounter 
in  mid-air.  One  of  our  aviators,  on  a  fast  scouting  mono- 
plane, sighted  a  hostile  machine.  He  had  two  rifles  fixed, 
one  on  either  side  of  his  engine,  and  at  once  gave  chase,  but 
lost  sight  of  his  opponent  amongst  some  clouds.  Soon,  how- 
ever, another  machine  hove  into  view,  which  turned  out  to  be 
a  German  Otto  biplane,  a  type  of  machine  which  is  not  nearly 
so  fast  as  our  scouts.  Our  officer  once  again  started  in  pur- 
suit. He  knew  that,  owing  to  the  position  of  the  propeller 
on  the  hostile  machine,  he  could  not  be  fired  at  when  astern  of 
his  opponent.  At  sixty  yards'  range  he  fired  one  rifle  without 
apparent  result ;  then,  as  his  pace  was  carrying  him  ahead  of 
his  quarry,  he  turned  round  and,  again  coming  to  about  the 
same  distance  behind,  emptied  his  magazine  at  the  German. 
48 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

The  latter  began  at  once  to  descend  as  if  either  he  or  his 
machine  were  hit. 

Shutting  off  his  engine  and  volplaning  to  free  his  hands, 
the  pursuer  re-charged  his  magazine.  Unfortunately  it 
jammed,  but  he  managed  to  insert  four  cartridges  and  to  fire 
them  at  his  descending  opponent,  who  disappeared  into  a 
bank  of  cloud  with  dramatic  suddenness.  When  the  British 
officer  emerged  below  the  clouds  he  could  see  no  sign  of  the 
other.  He  therefore  climbed  up  to  an  altitude  of  some 
7000  feet,  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  German  must 
have  come  to  earth  in  the  French  lines. 

French  airmen,  too,  have  been  very  successful  during  the 
last  three  days,  having  dropped  several  bombs  amongst  some 
German  cavalry  and  caused  considerable  loss  and  disorder, 
and  having  by  similar  means  silenced  a  battery  of  field 
howitzers. 

The  German  anti-aircraft  guns  have  recently  been  un- 
usually active.  From  their  rate  of  fire  they  seem  to  be  nearly 
automatic,  but  so  far  they  have  not  had  much  effect  in 
reducing  the  air  reconnaissances  carried  out  by  us. 

The  general  account  of  the  position  of  the  Aisne  already 
given  is  incomplete  without  some  description  of  the  line 
actually  held  by  our  troops,  though  it  must  be  at  once  obvious 
that  the  information  on  that  subject  which  it  is  possible  to 
publish  is  strictly  limited.  It  is  treading  on  less  dangerous 
ground  to  depict  the  life  led  by  our  soldiers  in  the  trenches. 
A  striking  feature  of  our  line — to  use  the  conventional  term 
which  so  seldom  expresses  accurately  the  position  taken  up 
by  an  army — is  that  it  consists  really  of  a  series  of  trenches 
not  all  placed  alongside  each  other,  but  some  more  advanced 
than  others  and  many  facing  in  different  directions.  At  one 
place  they  run  east  and  west,  along  one  side  of  a  valley  ;  at 
another  almost  north  and  south,  up  some  subsidiary  valley  ; 
here  they  line  the  edge  of  a  wood  and  there  they  are  on  the 
reverse  slope  of  a  hill  or  possibly  along  a  sunken  road.  And 
at  different  points  both  the  German  and  British  trenches  jut 
out  like  promontories  into  what  might  be  regarded  as  the 
opponent's  territory. 

Though  both  sides  have  moved  forward  at  certain  points 
and  withdrawn  at  others,  no  very  important  change  has  been 
effected  in  their  dispositions,  in  spite  of  the  enemy's  repealed 

MILITARY  2  D  49 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

counter-attacks.  These  have  been  directed  principally  against 
one  portion  of  the  position  won  by  us.  But,  in  spite  of  lavish 
expenditure  of  life,  they  have  not  so  far  succeeded  in  driving 
us  back. 

The  situation  of  the  works  in  the  German  front  line  as  a 
whole  has  been  a  matter  of  deliberate  selection,  for  they  have 
had  the  advantage  of  previous  reconnaissance,  being  first  in 
the  field.  Behind  the  front  they  now  have  several  lines  pre- 
pared for  a  step-by-step  defence. 

Another  point  which  might  cause  astonishment  to  the 
visitor  to  our  entrenchments  is  the  evident  indifference  dis- 
played to  the  provision  of  an  extended  field  of  frontal  rifle 
fire — which  is  generally  accepted  as  being  one  of  the  great 
requirements  of  a  defensive  position.  It  is  still  desirable  if 
it  can  be  obtained  without  the  usually  accompanying  draw- 
back of  exposure  to  the  direct  fire  of  the  hostile  artillery. 
But  experience  has  shown  that  a  short  field  of  fire  is  sufficient 
to  beat  back  the  infantry  assaults  of  the  enemy ;  and  by  giving 
up  direct  fire  at  long  or  medium  ranges  and  placing  our 
trenches  on  the  reverse  slope  of  a  hill  or  behind  the  crest,  it 
is  in  many  places  possible  to  gain  shelter  from  the  frontal 
fire  of  the  German  guns.  For  men  well  trained  in  musketry 
and  under  good  fire-control,  dead  ground  beyond  short  range 
from  their  position  has  comparatively  small  terrors. 

Many  of  the  front  trenches  of  the  Germans  equally  lack 
a  distant  field  of  fire,  but  if  lost  they  would  be  rendered 
untenable  by  us  by  the  fact  that  they  are  exposed  to  fire  from 
the  German  guns  in  rear  and  to  a  cross  rifle  fire  from  neigh- 
bouring works.  The  extent  to  which  cross  fire  of  all  kinds 
is  employed  is  also  remarkable.  Many  localities  and  areas 
along  the  Aisne  are  not  swept  from  the  works  directly  in  front 
of  them,  but  are  rendered  untenable  by  rifle  fire  from  neigh- 
bouring features  or  that  of  guns  out  of  sight.  So  much  is 
this  the  case,  that  amongst  these  hills  and  valleys  it  is  a  difficult 
matter  for  troops  to  find  out  whence  they  are  being  shot  at. 
There  is  a  perpetual  triangular  duel.  A's  infantry  can  see 
nothing  to  shoot  at,  but  are  under  fire  from  B's  guns.  The 
action  of  B's  guns  then  brings  upon  them  the  attention  of 
some  of  A's  artillery  waiting  for  a  target,  the  latter  being  in 
their  turn  assailed  by  other  batteries ;  and  so  it  goes  on. 
In  wooded  country,  in  spite  of  aeroplanes  and  balloons,  smoke- 
50 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

less  powder  has  made  the  localisation  and  identification  of 
targets  a  matter  of  supreme  difficulty. 

Our  men  have  made  themselves  fairly  comfortable  in  the 
trenches,  in  the  numerous  quarries  cut  out  of  the  hillsides, 
and  in  the  picturesque  villages  whose  steep  streets  and  red- 
tiled  roofs  climb  the  slopes  and  peep  out  amid  the  green  and 
russet  of  the  woods.  In  the  firing  line  the  men  sleep  and 
obtain  shelter  in  the  dug-outs  they  have  hollowed  or  '  under- 
cut '  in  the  sides  of  the  trenches.  These  refuges  are  slightly 
raised  above  the  bottom  of  the  trench  so  as  to  remain  dry  in 
wet  weather.  The  floor  of  the  trench  is  also  sloped  for  pur- 
poses of  drainage.  Some  trenches  are  provided  with  head- 
cover,  and  others  with  overhead  cover,  the  latter,  of  course, 
giving  protection  from  the  weather  as  well  as  from  shrapnel 
balls  and  splinters  of  shell. 

Considerable  ingenuity  has  been  exercised  in  naming  the 
shelters.  Amongst  other  favourites  are  '  The  Hotel  Cecil/ 
'The  Ritz/  'Hotel  Billet-doux/  'Hotel  Rue  Dormir/  etc. 
On  the  road  barricades,  also,  are  to  be  found  boards  bearing 
the  notice — '  This  Way  to  the  Prussians/  Obstacles  of  every 
kind  abound,  and  at  night  each  side  can  hear  the  enemy  driv- 
ing in  pickets  for  entanglements,  digging  trous-de-loup,  or 
working  forward  by  sapping.  In  some  places  the  obstacles 
constructed  by  both  sides  are  so  close  together  that  some  wag 
has  suggested  that  each  should  provide  working  parties  to 
perform  this  fatiguing  duty  alternately,  since  their  work  is 
now  almost  indistinguishable  and  serves  the  same  purpose. 

The  quarries  and  caves  to  which  allusion  has  already 
been  made  provide  ample  accommodation  for  whole  bat- 
talions, and  most  comfortable  are  the  shelters  which  have 
been  constructed  in  them.  The  northern  slopes  of  the  Aisne 
valley  are  fortunately  very  steep,  and  this  to  a  great  extent 
protects  us  from  the  enemy's  shells,  many  of  which  pass  harm- 
lessly over  our  heads,  to  burst  in  the  meadows  below  along  the 
river  bank.  At  all  points  subject  to  shell  fire  access  to  the 
firing  line  from  behind  is  provided  by  communication  trenches. 
These  are  now  so  good  that  it  is  possible  to  cross  in  safety  the 
fire-swept  zone  to  the  advanced  trenches  from  the  billets  in 
villages,  the  bivouacs  in  quarries,  or  the  other  places  where 
the  headquarters  of  units  happen  to  be. 

To  those  at  home  the  life  led  by  our  men  and  by  the  in- 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

habitants  in  this  zone  would  seem  strange  indeed.  All  day, 
and  often  at  night  as  well,  the  boom  of  the  guns  and  the  scream 
of  the  shells  overhead  continue.  At  times,  especially  in  the 
middle  of  the  day  and  after  dark,  the  bombardment  slackens  ; 
at  others  it  swells  into  an  incessant  roar  in  which  the  reports 
of  the  different  types  of  gun  are  merged  into  one  great  volume 
of  sound.  Now,  there  are  short,  fierce  bursts,  as  a  dozen 
heavy  howitzer  shells  fall  into  a  ploughed  field,  sending  up 
clouds  of  black  smoke  and  great  clods  of  earth,  or  the  white 
smoke-puffs  of  shrapnel  suddenly  open  out  and  hang  in  clusters 
over  a  bridge,  trench,  or  road.  Then,  perhaps,  there  is  a 
period  of  quiescence,  soon  to  be  broken  by  a  smaller  howitzer 
shell  which  comes  into  a  village  and  throws  up  a  shower  of 
dust,  tiles,  and  stones. 

And  through  this  pandemonium  the  inhabitants  go  about 
their  business  as  if  they  had  lived  within  the  sound  of  guns 
all  their  lives.  A  shell  bursts  in  one  street.  In  the  next 
not  a  soul  pays  any  attention  or  thinks  of  turning  the  corner 
to  see  what  damage  has  been  done.  Those  going  to  the 
trenches  are  warned  to  hurry  across  some  point  which  the 
enemy  have  been  shelling,  and  which  has  already  proved  a 
death-trap  for  others.  After  running  across  it  some  morti- 
fication may  be  felt  at  the  sight  of  an  old  woman  pulling  turnips 
in  the  very  line  of  fire.  Along  certain  stretches  of  road 
which  are  obviously  '  unhealthy/  the  children  continue  to 
play  in  the  gutter,  or  the  old  folks  pass  slowly  trundling  wheel- 
barrows. It  may  be  fatalism,  for  not  all  these  people  can  be 
deaf,  nor  can  all  be  so  stupid  as  not  to  realise  how  close  they 
are  to  death. 

It  has  already  been  mentioned  that,  according  to  infor- 
mation obtained  from  the  enemy,  fifteen  Germans  were  killed 
by  a  bomb  dropped  upon  an  ammunition  wagon  of  a  cavalry 
column.  It  was  thought  at  the  time  that  this  might  have 
been  the  work  of  one  of  our  airmen,  who  reported  that  he  had 
dropped  a  hand-grenade  on  a  convoy,  and  had  then  got  a 
bird's-eye  view  of  the  finest  firework  display  that  he  had 
ever  seen. 

From  the  corroborative  evidence  of  locality  it  now  appears 
that  this  was  the  case,  and  that  the  grenade  thrown  by  him 
must  probably  have  been  the  cause  of  the  destruction  of  a 
small  convoy  carrying  field-gun  and  howitzer  ammunition, 
52 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

which  has  now  been  found,  a  total  wreck,  on  a  road  passing 
through  the  Foret  de  Retz,  north-east  of  Villers-Cotterets. 
Along  the  road  lie  fourteen  motor  lorries,  which  are  no  more 
than  skeletons  of  twisted  iron,  bolts,  and  odd  fragments. 
Everything  inflammable  on  the  wagons  has  been  burnt,  as 
have  the  stripped  trees — some  with  trunks  split — on  either  side 
of  the  road.  Of  the  drivers  nothing  now  remains  except  some 
tattered  boots  and  charred  scraps  of  clothing,  while  the  ground 
within  a  radius  of  fifty  yards  of  the  wagons  is  littered  with 
pieces  of  iron,  the  split  brass  cases  of  cartridges  which  have 
exploded,  and  some  fixed  gun  ammunition  with  live  shell 
which  has  not  done  so. 

It  is  possible  to  reconstruct  the  incident,  if  it  was,  in  fact, 
brought  about  as  supposed. 

The  grenade  must  have  detonated  on  the  leading  lorry  on 
one  side  of  the  road  and  caused  the  cartridges  carried  by  it 
to  explode.  The  three  vehicles  immediately  in  rear  must  then 
have  been  set  on  fire,  with  a  similar  result.  Behind  these  are 
groups  of  four  and  two  vehicles,  so  jammed  together  as  to 
suggest  that  they  must  have  collided  in  a  desperate  attempt 
to  stop.  On  the  other  side  of  the  road,  almost  level  with  the 
leading  wagon,  are  four  more,  which  were  probably  fired  by  the 
explosion  of  the  first.  If  this  appalling  destruction  was  due 
to  one  hand-grenade,  and  there  is  a  considerable  amount  of 
presumptive  evidence  to  show  that  this  was  the  case,  it  is  an 
illustration  of  the  potentialities  of  a  small  amount  of  high 
explosive  detonated  in  the  right  spot,  whilst  the  nature  of  the 
place  where  it  occurred — a  narrow  forest  road  between  high 
trees — is  a  testimony  to  the  skill  of  the  airman. 

It  is  only  fair  to  add  that  some  of  the  French  newspapers 
claim  that  this  damage  to  the  enemy  was  caused  by  the  action 
of  some  of  their  Dragoons. 

October  13-16 

The  time  has  come  when  some  light  can  be  thrown  on 
a  change  in  the  strategic  part  in  the  operations  which  is  being 
played  by  the  British  forces,  this  change  being  in  the  direction 
of  the  application  of  pressure. 

Since  the  fighting  on  the  Marne,  the  gradual  and  progres- 
sive extension  northwards  on  the  Allies'  line  has  been  one 

53 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

of  the  features  of  the  campaign  in  France,  and  it  has  up  till 
recently  been  carried  out  by  the  French  alone.  But  now, 
thanks  to  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  we  have  been  enabled 
to  take  a  hand  in  this  prolongation,  and  to  utilise  a  portion 
of  our  forces  in  acting  much  farther  to  the  north  than  hereto- 
fore. 

During  the  past  few  days  British  troops  have  been  engaged 
along  the  Franco-Belgian  border,  as  well  as  along  the  Aisne, 
and  in  the  former  sphere  the  Allied  forces  extend  southwards 
from  Nieuport  on  the  coast.  In  both  theatres  the  results 
attained,  without  being  in  any  way  decisive,  have  been 
entirely  satisfactory  and  in  furtherance  of  the  general  scheme 
which  the  Allied  Armies  are  carrying  out  in  co-operation. 
In  the  southern  of  the  two  spheres  in  which  we  have  been 
engaged — on  the  Aisne — our  right  wing  has  been  maintaining 
its  pressure  without  actually  moving  forward,  whilst  in  the 
northern  sphere  our  left  wing  has  advanced  a  considerable 
distance  in  the  face  of  some  opposition. 

The  narrative  of  tactical  events  will  be  continued  up  to  the 
i6th.  On  the  Aisne,  since  the  repulse  inflicted  on  the  enemy 
on  the  night  of  the  loth-nth,  which  has  already  been  recorded, 
there  has  been  no  serious  fighting,  and  less  artillery  action 
than  usual,  for  misty  and  occasionally  rainy  weather  has 
rendered  observation  almost  impossible  and  militated  against 
the  employment  of  guns.  On  the  night  of  the  I3th-I4th  the 
enemy  began  an  attack  which  was  not  pushed  through  and 
may  be  regarded  as  a  demonstration.  Our  patrols  have  been  • 
active  with  the  bayonet  at  night  and  have  accounted  for 
numerous  small  parties  of  German  infantry  left  to  occupy 
their  front  trenches.  But  the  positions  of  the  opposing  forces 
have  remained  practically  unchanged. 

In  the  north  of  France  the  fighting  has  so  far  been  of  a 
preparatory  nature  alone.  As  stated,  ground  has  been  gained 
by  us,  but  misty  weather  has  hampered  aerial  reconnaissance 
and  has  at  times  rendered  artillery  co-operation  almost  im- 
possible. These  factors,  taken  together  with  the  nature  of  the 
terrain,  have  rendered  progress  somewhat  slow.  Before  the 
actual  course  of  events  in  this  quarter  is  recounted  it  will 
assist  to  an  understanding  of  what  our  troops  are  doing  if 
the  country  in  which  they  are  operating  is  described. 

The  region  bordering  on  the  seaward  portion  of  the  western 
54 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

frontier  of  Belgium  is  quite  unlike  the  region  of  plateaux  and 
broad  river  valleys  east  of  Paris.  It  is  mainly  an  industrial 
region,  and,  with  its  combination  of  mining  and  agriculture, 
might  be  compared  to  our  Black  Country,  with  Fen  lands 
interspersed  between  the  coal-mines  and  factories.  In  some 
directions  the  villages  are  so  close  together  that  this  district 
has  been  described  as  one  immense  town,  of  which  the  various 
parts  are  in  some  places  separated  by  cultivation  and  in  others 
by  groups  of  factories  bristling  with  chimneys.  The  cultivated 
portions  are  very  much  enclosed,  and  are  cut  up  by  high,  un- 
kempt hedges  and  by  ditches.  The  homelike  note  given  to 
the  landscape  by  the  hedges  is  accentuated  in  places  by  the 
hopfields  in  which  the  poles  have  been  left  standing. 

Next  to  the  coast  is  the  Wattergands,  a  reclaimed  marshy 
tract  drained  by  innumerable  canals  and  dykes.  The  whole 
district  is  gently  undulating  or  quite  flat,  except  for  a  hill 
about  500  feet  high,  called  Mont  des  Cats,  situated  some  eight 
miles  north-east  of  Hazebrouck,  from  which  radiate  spurs 
like  fingers  from  the  palm  of  the  hand,  and  is  the  eminence 
upon  which  stands  the  town  of  Cassel.  From  anywhere  save 
these  two  elevated  points  view  is  much  restricted  by  the  hedges 
and  frequent  belts  of  trees.  The  communications  are  bad. 
The  main  roads,  though  straight,  have  a  narrow  strip  of 
inferior  pave  in  the  centre,  while  the  by-roads  are  very  winding. 

It  is  in  blind  country  of  this  nature  that  our  advanced 
guards  near  the  Belgian  frontier  are  engaging  the  advanced 
troops  of  the  enemy.  The  latter  consist  in  some  places  of 
cavalry  supported  by  Jager  and  Schiitzen  detachments  with 
large  numbers  of  machine-guns,  and  in  others  of  larger  bodies 
of  infantry.  As  was  the  case  in  our  advance  up  to  the  Aisne, 
the  enemy  are  making  every  effort  to  delay  our  progress,  no 
doubt  to  give  time  for  the  stronger  forces  behind  to  perfect 
their  arrangements.  In  general  they  take  every  advantage 
that  is  to  be  obtained  from  the  ground  and  conceal  themselves 
well,  making  use  of  ditches,  hedges,  and  villages.  They  hold 
the  buildings,  many  of  which  are  placed  in  a  state  of  defence, 
and  in  addition  occupy  narrow  trenches  with  inconspicuous 
parapets  outside  the  villages.  The  machine-guns  are  often 
placed  in  the  centre  of  rooms,  whence  they  can  command  an 
approach  through  a  window. 

So  far  in  our  advance  we  have  inflicted  considerable  loss 

55 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

on  these  detachments,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  retreat 
under  cover  of  darkness  whenever  possible.  But  their  resist- 
ance is  by  no  means  passive,  and  they  have  made  several 
determined  counter-attacks  in  order  to  free  themselves  and 
throw  us  back.  Many  of  the  prisoners  taken  show  the  greatest 
surprise  at  being  opposed  by  the  British  in  this  quarter. 

To  the  north  of  the  Lys,  although  for  the  reasons  already 
given  adequate  reconnaissance  ahead  has  been  practically 
impossible,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Germans  held  a 
strong  position  on  the  high  ridge  between  Godewaersvelde 
and  Bailleul,  one  of  our  cavalry  forces  would  not  be  denied, 
and,  supported  by  infantry,  has  driven  the  enemy  back 
steadily.  Some  hard  fighting  has  taken  place  in  this  direc- 
tion, especially  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Mont  des  Cats,  where 
Prince  Max  of  Hesse  was  mortally  wounded  on  the  I2th. 
He  is  buried  in  the  grounds  of  the  monastery  which  crowns 
the  hill,  together  with  three  British  officers  and  some  German 
soldiers. 

On  the  I3th  a  brilliant  little  exploit  was  performed  by  one 
of  our  cavalry  patrols.  Coming  suddenly  upon  a  German 
machine-gun  detachment,  the  subaltern  in  command  at  once 
gave  the  order  to  charge,  with  the  result  that  some  of  the 
Germans  were  killed,  the  rest  scattered,  and  the  gun  captured 
and  carried  off. 

On  the  right,  to  the  south  of  the  Lys,  progress  has  been 
slower,  partly  because  the  terrain  affords  greater  facilities 
to  the  force  acting  on  the  defensive,  partly  because  the  enemy 
has  had  more  time  for  preparation  and  is  in  greater  strength. 
The  numerous  dykes  in  this  low-lying  part  are  so  broad  and 
deep  as  to  necessitate  the  transport  of  planks  and  ladders  by 
which  to  cross  them.  It  is  in  this  quarter  that  the  most 
obstinate  combats  for  the  possession  of  villages  have  so  far 
taken  place,  and  that  the  enclosed  country  has  rendered  the 
co-operation  of  the  artillery  most  difficult,  except  where  the 
villages  attacked  contain  a  church  or  other  landmark  standing 
above  the  trees,  by  which  the  guns  can  get  their  range. 
Though  the  employment  of  our  field  artillery  in  battering 
down  defended  villages  is  thus  hampered,  another  and  very 
efficacious  method  of  arriving  at  the  same  result  has  been 
evolved  and  is  proving  most  effective. 

Parts  of  the  region  where  fighting  has  been  in  progress 
56 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

now  present  a  melancholy  aspect.  Many  of  the  once  prosper- 
ous homesteads  and  hamlets  are  literally  torn  to  pieces,  the 
walls  still  standing  pitted  by  shrapnel  balls,  and  in  some  of 
the  villages  the  churches  are  smouldering  ruins.  Dead  horses, 
cows,  and  pigs  which  have  been  caught  in  the  hail  of  shrapnel 
litter  the  village  streets,  and  among  the  carcasses  and  debris 
wander  the  wretched  inhabitants,  who  have  returned  to  see 
what  they  can  save  from  the  wreckage.  Here,  blocking  up 
a  narrow  side  street,  is  a  dead  horse  still  harnessed  to  a  trap, 
and  beside  it  is  stretched  the  corpse  of  a  Jager  ;  close  by,  in 
an  enclosure  where  a  shell  has  found  them,  lie  some  thirty 
cavalry  horses  ;  a  little  farther  on  is  laid  out  a  row  of  German 
dead,  for  whom  graves  are  being  dug  by  the  peasants. 

The  work  of  burial  falls  to  a  great  extent  on  the  inhabitants, 
who,  with  our  soldiers,  take  no  little  care  in  marking  the  last 
resting-places  of  their  countrymen  and  their  Allies,  either  by 
little  wooden  crosses  or  else  by  flowers.  Amidst  the  graves 
scattered  all  over  the  country-side  are  the  rifle  pits,  trenches, 
and  gun  emplacements,  which  those  now  resting  below  the 
sod  helped  to  defend  or  to  attack.  From  these  the  progress 
of  the  fighting  can  be  traced,  and  even  its  nature,  for  they 
vary  from  carefully  constructed  and  cunningly  placed  works 
to  the  hastily  shaped  lair  of  a  German  sniper,  or  the  roadside 
ditch,  with  its  sides  scooped  out  by  the  entrenching  imple- 
ments of  our  infantry. 

October  12-14 

Notwithstanding  the  trying  nature  of  the  fighting  in  this 
quarter,  and  the  wet  weather,  the  troops  are  very  fit,  and  the 
fact  that  we  are  steadily  advancing  and  that  the  enemy  is 
giving  way  before  us  has  proved  a  most  welcome  and  inspiring 
change  for  those  who  have  been  experiencing  some  weeks  of 
monotony  in  trenches,  where  they  had  to  endure  continuous 
losses  without  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  for  certain  what 
losses  were  being  inflicted  upon  the  enemy  except  when  he 
attacked.  This  is  not  the  only  advantage  we  possess  over  the 
Germans,  for  we  still  hear  from  prisoners  that  their  advanced 
troops,  at  any  rate,  are  short  of  food  and  exhausted  by  con- 
tinual outpost  work.  We  can  afford  to  give  our  troops  more 
rest,  and  there  is  no  lack  of  good  food. 

Many  of  the  troops  opposed  to  us  at  present  have  only 

57 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

two  months'  service,  and  some  of  our  prisoners  state  that  these 
men  will  not  expose  themselves  in  the  trenches.  Nevertheless, 
the  enemy  in  front  are  fighting  well  and  skilfully,  and  are 
showing  considerable  powers  of  endurance.  They  generally 
contrive  to  remove  the  wounded  and  often  to  bury  their  killed 
before  they  retire,  their  escape  being  facilitated  by  the  numerous 
deep  ditches. 

Many  of  their  cavalry  patrols  are  wearing  Belgian  uniforms, 
a  practice  which  is  not  excusable  on  the  grounds  of  any  lack 
of  their  own. 

The  inhabitants  of  one  small  town  which  has  now  been 
occupied  by  us  state  that  a  large  force  of  German  cavalry 
was  recently  billeted  in  the  place,  but  that  it  retired  hurriedly 
on  the  night  of  the  I3th-i4th,  having  some  six  hundred 
wounded,  of  which  sixty-eight  serious  cases  were  left  behind. 
The  truth  of  the  last  part  of  the  statement  has  been  confirmed, 
for  our  troops  found  that  number  of  men  in  a  building  over 
which  an  immense  Red  Cross  flag  was  flying.  As  the  British 
approached  the  town,  smoke  signals  were  being  made  from 
a  tall  chimney  close  to  the  building  flying  the  flag.  The 
Germans,  consisting  largely  of  Bavarian  cavalry,  who  occupied 
this  town  for  eight  days,  did  not  burn  down  the  place,  but  they 
otherwise  behaved  in  a  way  which  merits  the  worst  that  has 
ever  been  said  of  them. 

In  spite  of  the  adverse  weather  the  aviators  of  both  sides 
have  not  been  idle  in  the  northern  theatre  of  operations. 
To  begin  with,  on  Monday,  the  I2th,  a  German  airman  flew 
over  St.  Omer  and  dropped  five  bombs  on  to  it,  apparently 
under  the  impression  that  the  place  was  occupied  by  us.  As 
a  result  two  women  and  a  little  girl  were  killed.  On  Wednes- 
day a  hostile  aeroplane  was  brought  down  by  rifle  and  machine- 
gun  fire,  and  both  observer  and  pilot  were  captured.  The 
pilot  was  decorated  with  the  Iron  Cross,  which,  according  to 
his  own  account,  had  been  awarded  to  him  as  being  the  first 
German  to  drop  a  bomb  on  to  Antwerp.  On  the  I5th  three 
of  our  aeroplanes  gave  chase  to  a  German  machine.  Un- 
luckily, the  one  machine  of  ours  which  was  faster  than  the 
enemy's  met  with  some  slight  accident,  and  had  to  give  up 
the  chase. 

A  German  airman  recently  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
by  means  of  four  incendiary  bombs  to  explode  a  French 
58 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

captive  observation-balloon.  The  missiles  fell  simultaneously 
on  the  circumference  of  a  circle  of  about  fifty  yards  diameter, 
and  as  they  struck  the  ground  emitted  vivid  red  flames,  fol- 
lowed by  columns  of  dark  smoke  about  sixty  feet  high.  At 
the  point  where  each  fell  was  found  a  large  mass  resembling 
dark  pumice-stone,  and  the  stubble  was  burnt  in  patches  of 
about  a  yard  in  diameter. 

An  incident  which  occurred  during  the  I3th  shows  the 
resource  and  bravery  of  some  of  our  enemy's  scouts.  The 
German  artillery  was  retiring,  and  from  time  to  time  coming 
into  action.  An  officer  of  one  of  our  flank  cavalry  patrols 
had  been  standing  for  some  minutes  under  a  tree,  when  he 
noticed  a  fine  wire  hanging  down  close  to  the  trunk. 

Following  the  wire  upwards  with  his  eye,  he  was  astonished 
to  see  one  of  the  enemy  in  the  tree.  As  he  drew  his  revolver 
and  fired  the  German  dropped  on  to  his  head,  also  firing. 
The  British  officer  was  stunned,  and  when  he  came  to  it  was 
to  find  himself  alone,  the  peak  of  his  cap  blown  away,  and 
his  uniform  covered  with  blood,  which  was  not  his  own. 

As  the  campaign  goes  on  the  tendency  of  the  Germans 
to  rely  on  the  splendid  war  material  with  which  they  have 
been  so  amply  provided,  rather  than  on  the  employment  of 
masses  of  men,  has  become  more  and  more  marked.  There 
are  now  indications,  however,  that  their  supply  of  material 
is  not  inexhaustible.  The  significant  circular  of  the  Prussian 
Minister  of  War  enjoining  the  careful  search  of  battlefields 
for  equipment,  and  even  the  collection  of  empty  cartridge 
cases,  has  been  quoted  in  a  previous  letter.  This  circular 
seems  to  have  been  prompted  more  by  necessity  than  by 
habits  of  economy,  for  in  the  recent  fighting  both  gun  and 
rifle  ammunition  of  old  patterns  have  been  found  in  the 
trenches  evacuated  by  the  enemy,  on  the  dead,  and  on 
prisoners. 

Amongst  the  latter  are  Mauser  cartridges  similar  to  those 
used  by  the  Boers  in  the  South  African  War. 

The  following  is  a  translation  of  a  leaflet  that  German 
aviators  have  been  dropping  over  the  French  lines  : — 

FRENCH  SOLDIERS! 

The  Germans  are  only  making  war  against  the  French  Government, 
which  is  sacrificing  you  and  your  country  to  the  egotism  of  the  English. 

59 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Your  commerce,  your  industry,  and  your  agriculture  will  be  ruined  by 
this  war,  whilst  the  English  alone  will  derive  enormous  profit  from  it. 

You  are  pulling  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  for  the  English. 

The  news  spread  by  your  Government  that  the  Russians  are  near 
Berlin  is  false.  On  the  contrary,  the  Russians  have  been  beaten  in 
two  great  battles.  One  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  Russians  have 
been  captured,  and  the  rest  have  been  driven  in  rout  from  German 
territory. 

FRENCH  SOLDIERS,  SURRENDER  ! 

So  that  this  war  which  is  ruining  your  country  may  be  ended  as  soon 
as  possible. 

Rest  assured  that  the  prisoners  and  wounded  are  well  treated  by  us. 

In  order  to  let  you  know  the  truth,  the  following  testimonial  from 
Surgeon-Major  Dr.  Sauve,  of  the  French  Army  (Rue  Luxembourg,  Paris) 
is  given  : — 

I,  the  undersigned,  declare  that  I  have  seen  that  in  the  German 
hospitals  at  Somme-Py  and  Aure  the  French  wounded  receive  exactly 
the  same  treatment  as  the  German.  I  may  add  that  not  only  the 
French  wounded  but  also  their  prisoners  whom  I  saw  were  very  well 
looked  after. 

The  terms  of  this  summons  to  surrender  cannot  be  said 
to  be  tactful ;  and  it  has  not  had  the  desired  effect.  Apart 
from  endeavours  to  influence  the  enemy,  for  others  have  pro- 
bably been  made,  news  of  a  sort  is  disseminated  amongst  the 
German  soldiers  by  means  of  a  special  military  newspaper 
called  The  Patrol,  which  is  published  in  Berlin.  Its  historical 
value  may  be  gauged  by  the  statement  made  in  its  issue  for 
September  6  :- — 

It  may  be  confidently  asserted  that  the  resistance  of  the  active 
army  of  the  French  has  been  overcome.  Reserve  troops  and  new 
formations  will  no  doubt  give  our  heroic  forces  plenty  to  do  as  they 
advance  further. 

After  some  three  weeks'  further  fighting,  however,  facts 
must  have  convinced  the  German  troops  that  this  assertion 
was  not  justified.  In  a  captured  letter,  dated  September  27, 
for  instance,  the  following  passage  occurs  : — 

We  are  very  anxious  about  the  result  of  the  fighting.  We  have 
nothing  but  reports  of  great  successes,  but  don't  now  put  much  faith 
in  them.  To-day  we  got  some  papers  of  the  ist  to  5th  September,  and 
it  is  really  painful  to  read  the  boastful  announcements  of  the  march  on 
60 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

Paris,  for  we  are  no  nearer  to  Paris  now  than  we  were  then.     I  don't 
know  whether  you  realise  this,  but  there  is  no  use  in  trying  to  hide  it. 

Information  recently  received  corroborates  the  impression 
already  gained  that  the  enemy's  troops  suffered  severe  priva- 
tions during  August  and  September.  From  the  many  letters 
which  bear  this  out  some  extracts  are  given  :— 

September  22.  ...  My  best  pals  are  killed  or  wounded.  One  com- 
pany has  dwindled  to  two-thirds  of  its  original  strength.  We  want 
peace  quickly.  We  have  been  driven  to  exhaustion,  and  have  marched 
for  entire  weeks,  even  through  the  nights.  •  We  have  not  had  bread 
every  day,  have  not  washed  for  a  fortnight,  nor  shaved  since  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war.  But  all  this  is  nothing,  and  we  shall  soon  be 
home,  for  it  will  all  soon  be  over.  We  have  just  been  under  the  enemy's 
artillery  fire  for  eight  days. 

We  get  no  letters.  We  have  passed  thousands  of  full  mail-bags  on 
the  road,  but  there  are  no  officers  to  deal  out  the  letters. 

After  a  thirty-six  hours'  march  without  halting  we  arrived  just  in 
time  for  the  fight.  For  three  days  we  did  not  have  a  hot  meal  because 
our  field  kitchens  went  astray.  We  had  a  hot  meal  yesterday  evening. 
We  are  all  ready  to  drop,  but  must  march  on. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Germans  have  to  a  great  extent 
recovered  from  the  conditions  implied  by  the  above  letters. 
But  their  forces  are  by  no  means  what  they  were. 


October  12-20 

Before  bringing  the  narrative  of  events  in  the  northern 
area  up  to  date,  it  will  be  as  well  to  recapitulate  on  broad 
lines,  with  the  addition  of  certain  new  matter  now  avail- 
able, the  general  course  of  operations  up  to  the  night  of 
October  16. 

When  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  enabled  British  troops 
to  assist  in  the  extension  northwards  of  the  Allies'  line,  the 
enemy  in  this  area  had  advanced  from  the  north-east  and  east 
and  was  holding  a  front  extending  from  the  high  ground  about 
Mont  des  Cats  through  Meteren  to  Estaires,  on  the  river  Lys, 
with  advanced  bodies  of  cavalry  and  other  troops  thrown  out 
some  distance  in  front.  South  of  the  Lys  his  line  was  con- 
tinued due  south  from  Estaires  through  very  intricate 
country  for  about  three  miles,  when  it  turned  slightly  to 

61 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

the  south-east,  passing  about  three  miles  east  of  Bethune 
to  Vermelles. 

The  Allies  encountered  some  resistance  on  the  I2th  from 
the  enemy's  advanced  troops,  and  on  the  I3th  there  was 
fighting  all  along  the  line  between  our  advanced  guards  and 
those  of  the  Germans,  who  at  some  points  made  determined 
counter-attacks.  As  a  result,  however,  of  two  minor  engage- 
ments at  Mont  des  Cats  and  Meteren  on  the  I3th,  the  enemy's 
right  fell  back  in  considerable  haste,  making  use  of  the 
darkness  to  evade  pursuit.  Bailleul,  which  had  been 
occupied  for  eight  days,  was  abandoned  without  a  shot 
being  fired. 

On  the  1 4th  the  advance  was  continued  by  our  left  wing, 
the  enemy  being  driven  back  so  far  that  the  rest  of  his  line 
became  endangered — as  we  have  since  learnt  from  the  cap- 
tured operation  orders  of  the  6th  Bavarian  Cavalry  Division. 
These  state  that,  the  right  of  the  line  having  been  forced 
to  withdraw,  the  left  was  compelled  to  conform  to  the  move- 
ment. The  latter  withdrawal  left  us  by  the  night  of  the 
1 5th  in  possession  of  all  the  country  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Lys  to  a  point  some  five  miles  below  Armentieres,  and  of  all 
the  bridges  above  Armentieres.  On  the  i6th  the  enemy 
retired  from  that  town  after  a  few  shells  had  been  fired  at 
the  barricade  on  the  Nieppe  bridge,  and  the  river  line  to 
within  a  short  distance  of  Frelinghien  fell  into  our  hands. 
At  Armentieres  the  enemy  left  behind  fifty  wounded,  some 
rifles  and  ammunition,  and  a  motor-car. 

The  state  in  which  the  crossings  of  the  Lys  were  found 
indicates  that  no  organised  scheme  of  defence  of  the  river 
line  had  been  executed,  even  if  it  had  been  intended.  Thus, 
to  take  six  adjacent  points,  at  Warneton  the  bridge  had  been 
destroyed  and  was  being  repaired  by  the  Germans.  That 
at  Frelinghien  had  not  been  demolished  and  was  strongly 
defended.  At  Houplines  the  bridge  was  destroyed;  but  at 
Nieppe  the  important  road  bridge  connecting  with  Armentieres 
and  the  railway  bridge  next  to  it  were  merely  barricaded 
and  not  even  prepared  for  demolition  ;  while,  strange  to  say, 
the  bridge  at  Erquinghem  was  neither  defended  nor  broken. 

The  river  Lys,  which  plays  a  prominent  part  in  the 
operations,  here  flows  through  a  depression  so  broad  and 
shallow  as  to  be  practically  a  plain.  It  is  from  45  feet  to 
62 


]  DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

75  feet  wide,  but  only  6  feet  deep.  The  navigation  of  its 
natural  course  is  much  obstructed  by  sandbanks,  and  it  has 
been  canalised  in  some  parts,  its  value  as  a  military  obstacle 
being  thereby  much  increased.  To  permit  the  passage  of 
barges,  many  of  the  bridges  are  of  the  draw  or  swing  type 
and  can  be  easily  demolished,  but  the  gaps  are  not  large  and 
can  be  bridged  easily. 

To  return  to  the  narrative.  Our  right  wing,  south  of  the 
Lys,  was,  for  the  reasons  already  given,  able  to  make  little 
progress  until  the  I5th.  The  resistance  offered  to  its  advance 
was  of  a  most  determined  character,  and  the  fighting  resolved 
itself  into  a  series  of  fiercely  contested  encounters.  In  the 
attack  on  some  villages  all  the  efforts  of  the  infantry  were  un- 
availing until  our  howitzers  had  reduced  the  houses  to  ruins  ; 
other  villages  would  be  taken  and  retaken  three  times  before 
they  were  finally  secured.  On  this  front  the  French  cavalry 
gave  our  infantry  most  welcome  support,  and  by  the  night 
of  the  1 6th  resistance  had  been  overcome,  and  the  enemy  had 
fallen  back  some  five  miles  to  the  eastward. 

An  incident  of  the  fighting  on  this  night  is  worth  recording. 
An  important  crossing  over  the  Lys  at  Warneton  was  strongly 
held  by  the  Germans,  who  at  the  entrance  to  the  town  had 
constructed  a  high  barricade  loopholed  at  the  bottom  so  that 
men  could  fire  through  it  from  a  lying  position.  This  formid- 
able obstacle  was  encountered  by  a  squadron  of  our  cavalry. 
Nothing  daunted,  they  obtained  help  from  the  artillery,  who 
man-handled  a  gun  into  position,  and  blew  the  barricade  to 
pieces,  scattering  the  defenders. 

They  then  advanced  some  three-quarters  of  a  mile  into  the 
centre  of  the  town,  where  they  found  themselves  in  a  large 
place.  They  had  hardly  reached  the  farther  end  when  one 
of  the  buildings  suddenly  appeared  to  leap  skywards  in  a 
sheet  of  flame,  a  shower  of  star  shells  at  the  same  time  making 
the  place  as  light  as  day,  and  enabling  the  enemy — who  were 
ensconced  in  the  surrounding  houses — to  pour  in  a  devastating 
fire  from  rifles  and  machine-guns.  Our  cavalry  managed  to 
extricate  themselves  from  this  trap  with  a  loss  of  only  one 
officer — the  squadron  leader — wounded  and  nine  men  killed 
and  wounded ;  but,  determining  that  none  of  their  number 
should  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands,  a  party  of  volunteers 
went  back,  and,  taking  off  their  boots  in  order  to  make 

63 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

no  noise  on  the  pavement,  re-entered  the  inferno  they  had 
just  left,  and  succeeded  in  carrying  off  their  wounded 
comrades. 

During  Saturday  the  I7th,  Sunday  the  i8th,  and  Monday 
the  igth,  our  right  encountered  strong  opposition  about  La 
Bassee  from  the  enemy,  who  was  established  behind  embank- 
ments and  spoil-heaps,  and  well  provided  with  machine-guns. 
Advance  was  slow  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  recon- 
naissance. In  the  centre  and  on  the  left  better  progress  was 
made,  although  the  Germans  were  everywhere  entrenched  and 
still  continued  to  hold  some  of  the  villages  on  the  Lys  in  spite 
of  bombardment.  At  the  close  of  each  of  these  days  a  night 
counter-stroke  was  delivered  against  one  or  other  part  of  our 
line,  but  all  were  repulsed  without  difficulty. 

On  Tuesday,  the  2Oth,  a  determined  but  unsuccessful 
attack  was  made  against  practically  the  whole  of  our  line. 
At  one  point,  where  one  of  our  brigades  made  a  counter-attack, 
noo  German  dead  were  found  in  a  trench  and  40  prisoners 
were  taken.  Among  the  prisoners  captured  this  day  by 
the  Belgians  was  a  hunchback,  who  expressed  his  gratitude 
and  relief  at  being  a  prisoner.  He  had  had  no  training  before 
August  igth  last,  and  said  that  many  men  of  his  regiment  were 
between  seventeen  and  eighteen  years  of  age. 

The  following  letter  found  on  a  German  gives  an  inter- 
esting appreciation  of  the  present  situation  from  the  enemy's 
point  of  view  : — 

PERENCHIES,  NEAR  LILLE,  October  16,  1914. 

DEAR  BROTHER, — Taking  the  opportunity  of  a  five  hours'  pause, 
which  is  the  first  chance  of  writing  I  have  had,  I  hasten  to  inform 
you  of  my  present  position.  On  the  5th  October  came  the  order  that 
the  1 9th  Corps  should  leave  the  3rd  Army  and  form  part  of  the 
ist  Army  under  General  Kluck.  The  march  from  St.  Hillegras  to 
Lille,  180  kilometres  (108  miles)  in  five  days  was  very  exhausting.  In 
Lille  hostile  infantry  was  reported,  and  we  were  engaged  in  street  and 
house  fighting  on  the  I3th  and  I4th,  and  it  was  only  by  the  I9th  Heavy 
Artillery  that  the  town  was  compelled  to  surrender.  Lille  has  already 
been  taken  by  us  three  times,  and  if  troops  or  supply  columns  are 
attacked  again  the  place  will  be  razed  to  the  ground.  The  shell  fire, 
although  it  only  lasted  an  hour,  has  cost  the  town  at  least  a  hundred 
buildings.  Here,  also,  in  Lille  the  77th  Field  Artillery  has  many  of 
our  comrades  on  its  conscience. 

Of  prisoners  we  have  absolutely  none  at  present,  since  the  wretches 
64 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

put  on  civilian  clothes,  and  then  one  can  look  in  vain  for  soldiers.  We 
lie  five  miles  from  Lille,  and  are  to  hold  up  the  English  who  have  landed. 
This  will  be  no  light  task,  since  we  are  not  fully  informed  as  to  their 
strength.  It  gives  one  the  impression  that  the  war  will  last  a  long 
time.  Well,  I  shall  hold  out  even  if  it  goes  on  for  another  year.  In 
front  of  us  we  can  hear  heavy  guns,  so  we  may  easily  have  more  fight- 
ing to-day.  We  have  had  no  post  for  fourteen  days,  for  the  country 
here  is  very  unsafe. 

Although  the  enemy  as  a  rule  contrives  to  remove  his 
wounded,  there  have  been  signs  in  many  of  the  villages  of  a 
hurried  retirement.  In  one  a  great  quantity  of  lances  and 
ammunition  was  abandoned,  in  another  so  hasty  was  the 
retreat  that  the  staff  left  behind  their  dinner,  operation  orders, 
and  a  number  of  photographs  of  the  campaign,  which  they 
were  evidently  examining  when  they  were  alarmed. 

The  advance  has  been  much  hindered  not  only  by  the 
weather  and  by  the  nature  of  the  country,  but  by  the  im- 
possibility of  forecasting  the  reception  that  our  advanced 
troops  are  likely  to  meet  with  on  approaching  a  village  or 
town.  One  place  may  be  hastily  evacuated  as  untenable, 
while  another  in  the  same  general  line  may  continue  to  resist 
all  efforts  for  a  considerable  time.  The  feelings  of  our  cyclists 
may  be  imagined  when  on  cautiously  approaching  a  town, 
suspecting  an  ambush  at  every  turn,  they  are  met  by  a  throng 
of  citizens  of  both  sexes  who  kiss  them  effusively.  Un- 
fortunately this  experience  is  rather  the  exception  than  the 
rule.  At  the  next  village  the  roads  will  in  all  probability  have 
trenches  cut  in  them  and  be  blocked  by  barricades  defended 
by  machine-guns.  Another,  perhaps,  can  only  be  taken  after 
an  action  of  all  arms. 

Under  such  circumstances  an  incautious  advance  is 
severely  punished,  and  it  is  impossible  for  large  bodies  of 
troops  to  push  on  until  the  front  has  been  thoroughly  recon- 
noitred. This  work  requires  the  highest  qualities  from  the 
cavalry,  cyclists,  and  advanced  guards,  for  it  cannot  be  carried 
out  merely  by  obtaining  a  view  of  the  enemy,  which  is  often 
impossible,  but  must  be  effected  by  drawing  his  fire  and  com- 
pelling him  to  disclose  his  dispositions. 

Among  other  incidents  of  the  fighting  which  serve  to 
illustrate  the  resource  and  initiative  of  our  rank  and  file  may 
be  mentioned  the  following  : — 

MILITARY  2  E  65 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

On  the  I5th  an  infantry  patrol  which  was  digging  an 
advanced  trench  at  night,  hearing  some  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  approaching,  lay  in  wait  for  them,  killing  four  and 
capturing  five  without  suffering  any  casualties  themselves. 
On  the  i6th  the  crew  of  one  of  our  armoured  motor-cars 
obtained  information  that  a  party  of  hostile  cavalry  was  in 
a  farm.  They  enlisted  help  from  ten  men  of  the  nearest 
battalion,  who  stationed  themselves  on  one  side  of  the  farm 
while  the  motor-car  waited  on  the  other.  Being  unable  to  bolt 
their  quarry,  our  men  carried  fire  to  the  farm,  which  had  the 
desired  effect  and  resulted  in  two  Uhlans  being  killed  and  eight 
captured,  no  casualties  being  sustained  by  the  attacking  party. 

Armoured  motor-cars  equipped  with  machine-guns  are 
now  playing  a  part  in  the  war  and  have  been  most  successful 
in  dealing  with  the  small  parties  of  German  mounted  troops. 
In  their  employment  our  gallant  Allies  the  Belgians,  who  are 
now  fighting  with  us  and  acquitting  themselves  nobly,  have 
shown  themselves  to  be  experts.  They  appear  to  regard 
Uhlan-hunting  as  a  form  of  sport.  The  crews  display  the 
utmost  dash  and  skill  in  this  form  of  warfare,  often  going  out 
several  miles  ahead  of  their  own  advanced  troops  and  seldom 
failing  to  return  loaded  with  spoils  in  the  shape  of  Lancer 
caps,  busbies,  helmets,  lances,  rifles,  and  other  trophies,  which 
they  distribute  as  souvenirs  to  the  crowds  in  the  market-places 
of  the  frontier  towns. 

An  easy  capture  was  recently  effected  by  an  Engineer 
telegraph  lineman.  Returning  in  the  dark  after  repairing 
some  air  lines  which  had  been  cut  by  shell  fire,  he  was  passing 
through  a  wood  when  his  horse  shied  at  some  figures  crouching 
in  a  ditch.  He  called  out  '  Come  out  of  it/  whereupon,  to  his 
surprise,  three  German  cavalrymen  emerged  and  surrendered. 
He  marched  them  back  to  his  headquarters. 

Although  the  struggle  in  the  northern  area  naturally 
attracts  more  attention,  that  on  the  Aisne  still  continues, 
though  there  is  no  alteration  in  the  general  situation.  The 
enemy  has  made  certain  changes  in  the  positions  of  his  heavy 
artillery,  with  the  result  that  one  or  two  places  which  were 
formerly  safe  quarters  are  now  subject  to  bombardment, 
while  others  which  were  only  approachable  at  night  or  by 
crawling  on  hands  and.  knees  now  serve  as  recreation-grounds. 
At  one  point  even  a  marquee  has  been  erected. 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

A  story  from  this  quarter  illustrates  a  new  use  for  the 
craters  of  the  '  Black  Marias/  An  officer  on  patrol  stumbled 
in  the  dark  on  to  a  German  trench.  He  turned  and  made  for 
the  British  lines,  but  the  fire  was  so  heavy  that  he  had  to  throw 
himself  on  the  ground  and  crawl.  There  was,  however,  no 
cover,  and  his  chances  were  looking  desperate  when  he  saw 
close  by  an  enormous  hole  made  by  one  of  these  large  shells. 
Into  this  he  scrambled,  and  remained  there  for  the  whole 
ensuing  day,  and  succeeded  when  night  again  came  on  in 
safely  reaching  our  lines. 

The  following  extract  from  a  captured  copy  of  the  orders 
of  the  German  I4th  Reserve  Corps,  dated  October  7,  sug- 
gests some  deterioration  in  the  general  discipline  of  one  corps 
of  the  enemy,  as  well  as  shortage  of  supplies  : — 

It  is  notified  that  the  troops  must  no  longer  count  on  the  regular 
arrival  of  supplies.  They  must,  therefore,  utilise  the  resources  of  the 
country  as  much  and  as  carefully  as  possible. 

The  regulations  for  the  use  of  the  iron  rations  must  be  strictly 
observed. 

In  spite  of  all  precautions  complaints  are  continually  being  received 
that  supply  and  ammunition  columns  constantly  fail  to  arrive  because 
they  are  stopped  and  unloaded  by  unauthorised  persons.  It  is  again 
notified  that  only  the  authorities  to  whom  the  supplies,  etc.,  are  con- 
signed have  the  right  to  take  delivery  of  them. 

Official  casualty  lists  of  recent  date  which  have  been 
captured  show  that  the  losses  of  the  Germans  continue  to  be 
heavy.  One  infantry  company  in  a  single  list  reports  139 
killed  and  wounded,  or  more  than  half  its  war  establishment. 
Other  companies  have  suffered  almost  as  heavily.  It  further 
appears  that  the  number  of  men  reported  '  missing ' — that 
is,  those  who  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  or  have 
become  marauders — is  much  greater  in  Ersatz  battalions 
than  in  first  line  units.  This  is  evidence  of  the  inferior 
quality  of  some  of  the  reserves  which  are  now  being  brought 
up  to  reinforce  the  enemy's  field  army,  and  is  all  the  more 
encouraging  since  every  day  adds  to  our  first  line  strength. 
The  arrival  of  the  Indian  contingents  has  caused  every  one 
to  realise  that  while  the  enemy  is  filling  his  depleted  ranks 
with  immature  levies  we  have  large  reserves  of  perfectly  fresh 
and  thoroughly  trained  troops  to  draw  upon. 

67 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

October  20-25 

Before  the  narrative  of  the  progress  of  the  fighting  near 
the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  subsequent  to  October  20  is  con- 
tinued, a  brief  description  will  be  given  of  the  movement  of  a 
certain  fraction  of  our  troops  from  its  former  line  facing  north, 
on  the  east  of  Paris,  to  its  present  position  facing  east,  in  the 
north-west  corner  of  France,  by  which  a  portion  of  the  British 
Army  has  been  enabled  to  join  hands  with  the  incoming  and 
growing  stream  of  reinforcements.  This  is  now  an  accom- 
plished fact,  as  is  generally  known,  and  can  therefore  be  ex- 
plained in  some  detail  without  detriment.  Mention  will  also 
be  made  of  the  gradual  development  up  to  October  20  in  the 
nature  of  the  operations  in  this  quarter  of  the  theatre  of  war, 
which  has  recently  come  into  such  prominence. 

In  its  broad  lines  the  transfer  of  strength  by  one  com- 
batant during  the  course  of  a  great  battle,  which  has  just 
been  accomplished,  is  somewhat  remarkable.  It  can  best  be 
compared  with  the  action  of  the  Japanese  during  the  battle 
of  Mukden,  when  General  Oku  withdrew  a  portion  of  his  force 
from  his  front,  moved  it  northwards  behind  the  line,  and  threw 
it  into  the  fight  again  near  the  extreme  left  of  the  Japanese 
armies.  In  general  direction,  though  not  in  scope  of  possible 
results,  owing  to  the  coastline  being  reached  by  the  Allies, 
the  parallel  is  complete.  The  Japanese  force  concerned,  how- 
ever, was  much  smaller  than  ours,  and  the  distance  covered  by 
it  was  less  than  that  from  the  Aisne  to  the  Franco-Belgian 
frontier.  General  Oku's  troops,  moreover,  marched,  whereas 
ours  were  moved  by  march,  rail,  and  motor. 

What  was  implied  in  the  actual  withdrawal  from  contact 
with  the  enemy  along  the  Aisne  will  be  appreciated  when  the 
conditions  under  which  we  were  then  situated  are  recalled. 
In  places  the  two  lines  were  not  100  yards  apart,  and  for  us 
no  movement  was  possible  during  daylight.  In  some  of  the 
trenches  which  were  under  enfilade  fire  our  men  had  to  sit 
all  day  long  close  under  the  traverses — as  are  called  those 
mounds  of  earth  which  stretch  like  partitions  at  intervals 
across  a  trench,  so  as  to  give  protection  from  lateral  fire. 
Even  where  there  was  cover,  such  as  that  afforded  by  de- 
pressions or  sunken  roads,  on  the  hillside  below  and  behind 
our  firing  line  any  attempt  to  cross  the  intervening  space  was 
68 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

met  by  fierce  bursts  of  machine-gun  and  shell  fire.  The  men 
in  the  firing  line  were  on  duty  for  twenty-four  hours  at  a  time, 
and  brought  rations  and  water  with  them  when  they  came  on 
duty,  for  none  could  be  sent  up  to  them  during  the  day. 
Even  the  wounded  could  not  be  removed  until  dark. 

The  preliminary  retirement  of  the  units  was  therefore 
carried  out  gradually  under  cover  of  darkness.  That  the 
Germans  only  once  opened  fire  upon  them  whilst  so  engaged 
was  due  to  the  care  with  which  the  operation  was  conducted, 
and  also,  probably,  to  the  fact  that  the  enemy  were  so  accus- 
tomed to  the  recurrence  of  the  sounds  made  by  the  reliefs 
of  the  men  in  the  firing  line  and  by  the  movement  of  the 
supply  trains  below,  that  they  were  misled  as  to  what  was 
actually  taking  place.  What  the  operation  amounted  to  on 
our  part  was  the  evacuation  of  the  trenches,  under  carefully 
made  arrangements  with  the  French,  who  had  to  take  our 
place  in  the  trenches,  the  retirement  to  the  river  below — in 
many  cases  down  a  steep  slope — the  crossing  of  the  river 
over  the  noisy  plank  roadways  of  floating  or  repaired  bridges 
— which  were  mostly  commanded  by  the  enemy's  guns — and 
the  climb  up  to  the  top  of  the  plateau  on  the  south  side. 
The  rest  of  the  move  was  a  complicated  feat  of  transporta- 
tion, which  cut  across  some  of  the  lines  of  communication  of 
our  Allies  ;  but  it  requires  no  description  here.  In  spite  of 
the  various  difficulties,  the  whole  strategic  operation  of  trans- 
ferring the  large  number  of  troops  from  the  Aisne  was  carried 
out  without  loss  and  practically  without  a  hitch. 

As  regards  the  change  in  the  nature  of  the  fighting  in  which 
we  have  recently  been  engaged,  it  has  already  been  pointed 
out  that  the  operations  had  up  till  then  been  of  a  preparatory 
nature,  and  that  the  Germans  were  obviously  seeking  to  delay 
us  by  advanced  troops  whilst  heavier  forces  were  being  got 
ready  and  brought  up  to  the  scene  of  action.  It  was  known 
that  they  were  raising  a  new  army  consisting  of  corps  formed 
of  Ersatz,  volunteers,  and  other  material  which  had  not  yet 
been  drawn  upon,  and  that  part  of  it  would  in  all  probability 
be  sent  to  the  western  theatre,  either  to  cover  the  troops  laying 
siege  to  Antwerp,  in  case  that  place  should  hold  out,  or,  in  the 
event  of  the  capture  of  the  fortress,  to  act  in  conjunction  with 
the  besieging  force  in  a  violent  offensive  movement  towards 
the  coast. 

69 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

After  the  fall  of  Antwerp  and  the  release  of  the  besieging 
troops,  there  was  a  gradual  increase  in  the  strength  of  the 
opposition  met  with  by  us.  The  resistance  of  the  detach- 
ments— which  beyond  the  right  extreme  of  the  German 
fortified  line  near  Bethune  a  fortnight  ago  consisted  almost 
entirely  of  cavalry — grew  more  and  more  determined,  as  more 
infantry  and  guns  came  up  into  the  front  line,  until  Tuesday, 
October  20,  when  the  arrival  opposite  us  of  a  large  portion  of 
the  new  formations  and  a  considerable  number  of  heavy  guns 
enabled  the  enemy  to  assume  the  offensive  practically  against 
the  whole  of  our  line,  at  the  same  time  that  they  attacked 
the  Belgians  between  us  and  the  coast.  The  operations  then 
really  assumed  a  fresh  complexion. 

Since  that  date  up  to  the  25th,  apart  from  the  operations 
on  either  side  of  us,  there  has  been  plenty  of  action  to  chronicle 
on  our  immediate  front,  where  some  of  the  heaviest  fighting  in 
which  we  have  yet  been  engaged  has  taken  place,  resulting  in 
immense  loss  to  the  Germans.  On  Wednesday,  the  2ist,  the 
new  German  formations  again  pressed  forward  in  force  vigor- 
ously all  along  our  line.  On  our  right,  south  of  the  Lys,  an 
attack  on  Violaines  was  repulsed  with  loss  to  the  assailants. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  were  driven  from  some  ground  close 
by,  to  the  north,  but  regained  it  by  a  counter-attack.  Still 
farther  north  the  Germans  gained  and  retained  some  points. 
Their  total  casualties  to  the  south-east  of  Armentieres  are 
estimated  at  over  6000. 

On  the  north  of  the  Lys,  in  our  centre,  a  fiercely  contested 
action  took  place  near  Le  Gheir,  which  village  was  captured 
in  the  morning  by  the  enemy  and  then  retaken  by  us.  In 
this  direction  the  German  casualties  were  also  extremely 
heavy.  They  came  on  with  the  greatest  bravery,  in  swarms, 
only  to  be  swept  away  by  our  fire.  One  battalion  of  their 
iO4th  Regiment  was  practically  wiped  out,  some  400  dead 
being  picked  up  by  us  in  our  lines  alone.  Incidentally,  by 
our  counter-attack,  we  took  130  prisoners  and  released  some 
40  of  our  own  men  who  had  been  surrounded  and  captured, 
including  a  subaltern  of  artillery,  who  had  been  cut  off  while 
observing  from  a  point  of  vantage.  It  is  agreeable  to  record 
that  our  men  were  very  well  treated  by  their  captors,  who 
were  Saxons,  being  placed  in  cellars  for  protection  from  the 
bombardment  of  our  own  guns. 
70 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

On  our  left  our  troops  advanced  against  the  German 
26th  Reserve  Corps  near  Passchendaele  and  were  met  by  a 
determined  counter-offensive,  which  was  driven  back  with 
great  loss.  At  night  the  Germans  renewed  their  efforts  un- 
successfully in  this  quarter.  At  one  point  they  tried  a  ruse 
which  is  no  longer  new.  As  they  came  up  in  a  solid  line  two 
deep  they  shouted  out,  '  Don't  fire ;  we  are  the  Coldstream 
Guards/  But  our  men  are  getting  used  to  tricks  of  this 
kind,  and  the  only  result  of  this  '  slimness '  was  that  they 
allowed  the  enemy's  infantry  to  approach  quite  close  before 
they  swept  them  down  with  magazine  fire.  Apart  from  the 
400  dead  found  near  our  lines  in  our  centre,  our  patrols  after- 
wards discovered  some  300  dead  farther  out  in  front  of  our 
left,  killed  by  our  artillery. 

Thursday,  the  22nd,  saw  a  renewal  of  the  pressure  against 
us.  We  succeeded,  however,  in  holding  our  ground  in  nearly 
every  quarter.  South  of  the  Lys  the  enemy  attacked  from 
La  Bass£e  and  gained  Violaines  and  another  point,  but  their 
effort  against  a  third  village  was  repulsed  by  artillery  fire 
alone,  the  French  and  British  guns  working  together  very 
effectively.  On  the  north  of  the  river  it  was  a  day  of  minor 
attacks  against  us,  which  were  all  beaten  back. 

The  Germans  advanced  in  the  evening  against  our  centre 
and  left,  and  were  again  hurled  back,  though  they  gained 
some  of  our  trenches  in  the  latter  quarter.  By  this  time  the 
enemy  had  succeeded  in  bringing  up  several  heavy  howitzers, 
and  our  casualties  were  considerable. 

On  Friday,  the  23rd,  all  action  south  of  the  Lys  on  our 
right  was  confined  to  that  of  the  artillery,  several  of  the  hostile 
batteries  being  silenced  by  our  fire.  In  the  centre  their 
infantry  again  endeavoured  to  force  their  way  forward  and 
were  only  repulsed  after  determined  fighting,  leaving  many 
dead  on  the  ground  and  several  prisoners  in  our  hands. 
North  of  the  Lys  attacks  at  different  points  were  repulsed. 

On  our  left  the  23rd  was  a  bad  day  for  the  Germans. 
Advancing  in  our  turn,  we  drove  them  from  some  of  the 
trenches  out  of  which  they  had  turned  us  on  the  previous 
evening,  captured  150  prisoners,  and  released  some  of  our 
men  whom  they  had  taken.  As  the  Germans  retreated  our 
guns  did  great  execution  amongst  them.  They  afterwards 
made  five  desperate  assaults  on  our  trenches,  advancing  in 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

mass  and  singing  '  Die  Wacht  am  Rhein  '  as  they  came  on. 
Each  assault  was  easily  beaten  back,  our  troops  waiting  until 
the  enemy  came  to  very  close  range  before  they  opened  fire  with 
rifles  and  Maxims,  causing  terrible  havoc  in  the  solid  masses. 

During  the  fighting  in  this  quarter  on  the  night  of  the 
22nd  and  on  the  23rd,  the  German  losses  were  again  extremely 
heavy.  We  made  over  600  prisoners  during  that  time,  and 
picked  up  1500  dead,  killed  on  the  latter  day  alone.  Much 
of  the  slaughter  was  due  to  the  point-blank  magazine  fire  of 
our  men  against  the  German  assaults,  while  our  field-guns 
and  howitzers,  working  in  perfect  combination,  did  their 
share  when  the  enemy  were  repulsed.  As  they  fell  back 
they  were  subjected  to  a  shower  of  shrapnel.  When  they 
sought  shelter  in  villages  or  buildings  they  were  shattered 
and  driven  out  by  high-explosive  shell  and  then  again  caught 
by  shrapnel  as  they  came  into  the  open.  The  troops  to  surfer 
so  severely  were  mostly  of  the  23rd  Corps — one  of  their  new 
formations.  Certainly  the  way  their  advance  was  conducted 
showed  a  lack  of  training  and  faults  in  leading  which  the 
almost  superhuman  bravery  of  the  soldiers  could  not  counter- 
balance. It  was  a  holocaust.  The  spectacle  of  these  devoted 
men  chanting  a  national  song  as  they  marched  on  to  certain 
death  was  inspiring.  It  was  at  the  same  time  pitiable.  And 
if  any  proofs  were  needed  that  untrained  valour  alone  cannot 
gain  the  day  in  modern  war,  the  advance  of  the  23rd  German 
Corps  on  October  23  most  assuredly  furnished  it.  Besides 
doing  its  share  of  execution  on  the  hostile  infantry,  our  artillery 
in  this  quarter  brought  down  a  German  captive  balloon.  As 
some  gauge  of  the  rate  at  which  the  guns  were  firing  at  what 
was  for  them  an  ideal  target,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  one  field 
battery  expended  1800  rounds  of  ammunition  during  the  day. 

On  Saturday,  the  24th,  action  on  our  right  was  once 
more  confined  to  that  of  artillery,  except  at  night,  when  the 
Germans  pressed  on,  only  to  be  repulsed.  In  the  centre,  near 
Armentieres,  our  troops  withstood  three  separate  attempts 
of  the  enemy  to  push  forward,  our  guns  coming  into  play 
with  good  effect.  Against  our  left  the  German  27th  Corps 
made  a  violent  attempt,  with  no  success.  On  Sunday,  the 
25th,  it  was  our  turn  to  take  the  offensive.  This  was  carried 
out  by  a  portion  of  our  left  wing,  which  advanced,  gained 
some  ground,  and  took  2  guns  and  80  prisoners.  It  is  be- 
72 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

lieved  that  6  machine-guns  fell  to  the  French.  In  the  centre 
the  fighting  was  severe,  though  generally  indecisive  in  result, 
and  the  troops  in  some  places  were  engaged  in  hand-to-hand 
conflict.  Towards  evening  we  captured  200  prisoners.  On 
the  right,  action  was  again  confined  to  that  of  the  guns. 

Up  to  the  night  of  the  25th,  therefore,  not  only  have  we 
maintained  our  position  against  the  great  effort  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy  to  break  through  to  the  west,  or  to  force  us  back, 
which  started  on  the  2oth  ;  we  have  on  our  left  passed  to 
the  offensive.  These  six  days,  as  may  be  gathered,  have 
been  spent  by  us  in  repelling  a  succession  of  desperate  on- 
slaughts. It  is  true  that  the  efforts  against  us  have  been 
made  to  a  great  extent  by  partially  trained  men,  some  of 
whom  appear  to  be  suffering  from  lack  of  food.  But  it  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  these  troops,  which  are  in  great  force, 
have  only  recently  been  brought  into  the  field,  and  are,  there- 
fore, comparatively  fresh.  They  are  fighting  also  with  the 
utmost  determination,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  many  of  them 
are  heartily  sick  of  the  war. 

The  struggle  has  been  of  the  most  severe  and  sanguinary 
nature,  and  it  seems  that  success  will  favour  that  side  which 
is  possessed  of  most  endurance  or  can  bring  up  and  fling 
fresh  forces  into  the  fray.  Though  we  have  undoubtedly 
inflicted  immense  loss  upon  the  enemy,  they  have  so  far  been 
able  to  fill  up  the  gaps  in  their  ranks  and  to  return  to  the 
charge,  and  we  have  suffered  heavily  ourselves. 

One  feature  of  the  tactics  now  employed  has  been  the 
use  of  cavalry  in  dismounted  action,  for  on  both  sides  many 
of  the  mounted  troops  are  fighting  in  the  trenches  alongside 
the  infantry.  Armoured  motor-cars  armed  with  Maxims  and 
light  quick-firing  guns  have  also  recently  played  a  useful  part 
on  our  side,  especially  in  helping  to  eject  the  enemy  lurking 
in  villages  and  isolated  buildings.  Against  such  parties  the 
combined  action  of  the  quick-firer  against  the  snipers  in 
buildings  and  the  IVJaxim  against  them  when  they  are  driven 
into  the  open  is  most  efficacious. 

October  26-30 

In  spite  of  the  great  losses  which  they  suffered  in  their 
attacks  last  week,  the  Germans  have  continued  their  offensive 

73 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

towards  the  west  almost  continuously  during  the  five  days  from 
October  26  to  30.  Opposite  us  it  has  gradually  grown  in  in- 
tensity and  extent  of  application  as  more  men  and  guns  have 
been  brought  up  and  pushed  into  the  fight,  and  it  has  de- 
veloped into  the  most  bitterly  contested  battle  which  has  been 
fought  in  the  western  theatre  of  war. 

The  German  artillery  has  to  a  large  extent  been  increased 
by  that  transferred  from  round  Antwerp.  As  regards  in- 
fantry, it  is  possible  that  some  of  the  additional  troops  now 
appearing  on  our  front  have  been  rendered  available  by  the 
relaxation  of  the  pressure  against  our  Allies  to  the  north  of 
Ypres  caused  by  the  desperate  and  successful  resistance  made 
by  the  latter,  by  the  harassing  nature  of  the  artillery  fire 
brought  to  bear  by  our  ships  against  the  strip  of  country  along 
the  coast,  and  by  the  flooding  of  an  area  along  the  river  Yser. 
Forces  have  been  massed  also  from  the  south,  whilst  another 
of  the  new  army  corps  has  definitely  made  its  debut  before  us. 
And  though  the  attempts  to  hack,  or  rather  to  blast  and  hack 
a  way  through  us  have  been  made  in  other  directions,  they 
have  for  the  last  few  days  been  most  seriously  concentrated 
upon  the  neighbourhood  of  Ypres. 

Whether  the  motive  inspiring  the  present  action  of  the 
Germans  against  that  place  is  an  ambition  to  win  through 
to  the  port  of  Calais — as  is  to  be  gathered  from  articles  in  their 
newspapers — or  whether  the  operation  is  due  to  a  desire  to 
drive  the  Allied  forces  out  of  the  whole  of  Belgium,  in  order 
to  complete  the  conquest  of  that  country  with  a  view  to  its 
annexation  and  to  gain  prestige  with  neutrals,  is  immaterial. 
What  concerns'us  more  closely  is  that  they  have  been  making, 
and  are  still  pressing,  a  desperate  attempt  to  gain  the  town. 

On  Monday,  the  26th,  south  of  the  Lys,  on  our  right,  the 
enemy  attacked  Neuve  Chapelle — one  of  the  villages  held  by 
us — in  the  evening,  advancing  under  cover  of  a  wood.  They 
managed  to  gain  possession  of  a  portion  of  it.  North  of  the 
Lys,  in  the  centre,  bombardment  alone  was  kept  up,  and  some 
ground  was  made  by  us.  A  detached  post  which  was  attacked 
in  force  during  the  night  drove  back  its  assailants,  who  left 
fifty-six  dead  behind.  Near  our  left  the  Germans  developed 
a  very  strong  attack  on  a  section  of  our  line  to  the  east  of 
Ypres.  Though  supported  by  a  great  mass  of  'artillery  this 
was  checked.  But  it  had  two  results.  One  was  that  our 
74 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

position  was  readjusted.  The  other  was  that  our  extreme 
left  alone  advanced  in  conjunction  with  some  of  our  Allies. 

On  Tuesday,  the  27th,  the  Germans  rather  focused  their 
principal  attention  on  our  right  centre  and  right,  and  most 
desperate  fighting  took  place  for  the  possession  of  Neuve 
Chapelle.  In  spite  of  repeated  counter-attacks  by  our  troops 
the  enemy  during  the  day  managed  to  hold  on  to  the  northern 
part  of  the  village,  which  he  had  gained  the  day  before. 
Towards  evening  we  had  gradually  regained  the  great  part 
of  the  place  by  step-by-step  fighting  when  fresh  hostile  rein- 
forcements were  brought  up  and  the  entire  village  was  cap- 
tured by  the  enemy.  They  made  several  assaults  against  our 
whole  front  south  of  the  Lys,  but  with  the  exception  of  their 
success  at  Neuve  Chapelle  won  no  advantage. 

The  combat  for  that  place,  as  is  usually  the  case  with 
village  fighting,  was  of  the  most  murderous  description,  while 
it  is  believed  that  the  enemy's  losses  in  this  quarter  of  the 
field  generally  were  very  great.  An  artillery  officer  who  was 
observing  their  advance  reports  that  the  effects  of  our  rifle 
and  gun  fire  were  stupendous,  and  that  the  Germans  had  to 
throw  the  corpses  of  their  own  men  out  of  their  trenches  as 
they  came  on,  in  order  to  obtain  cover.  Four  successive 
attacks  were  made,  each  by  a  different  regiment,  and  in  this 
way  the  whole  of  one  division  was  engaged  piecemeal  in  about 
the  same  locality.  The  last  of  these  regiments  has  now  been 
practically  disposed  of,  and  according  to  prisoners  their 
condition  is  deplorable. 

North  of  the  river  our  centre  was  subjected  to  heavy 
shell  fire  from  pieces  of  various  sizes.  Our  guns  were  by  no 
means  idle,  and  one  of  our  patrols  found  eleven  Germans  dead, 
and  one  rendered  unconscious  by  fumes  in  a  farm  in  which 
they  had  observed  one  of  our  lyddite  shells  detonate.  Towards 
our  left  the  readjustment  of  our  line,  commenced  on  Monday, 
was  completed,  and  some  redistribution  of  strength  was 
effected.  On  the  extreme  left  ground  was  gained. 

Neuve  Chapelle  was  again  the  scene  of  desperate  fighting  on 
Wednesday,  the  28th,  some  of  our  Indian  troops  greatly  dis- 
tinguishing themselves  by  a  well-conducted  counter-attack, 
by  which  they  drove  the  Germans  out  of  the  greater  part  of 
the  place  with  the  bayonet.  On  emerging  from  the  village, 
however,  they  were  exposed  to  the  concentrated  fire  of  machine- 

75 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

guns,  and  had  to  remain  contented  with  what  they  had  gained. 
Farther  on  the  left,  during  the  morning,  the  enemy  made 
attacks  under  cover  of  the  usual  heavy  bombardment,  but 
each  effort  was  repulsed  with  great  slaughter.  One  of  our 
trenches  was  carried,  and  then  recovered  after  a  loss  of  200 
dead  had  been  inflicted  on  the  enemy.  On  our  centre,  north 
of  the  Lys,  nothing  of  particular  moment  occurred.  On  the 
extreme  left  our  advance  •  was  not  pressed,  and  the  enemy  re- 
mained in  possession  of  Becelaere.  A  night  attack  by  them 
was  repulsed. 

Next  day  the  centres  of  pressure  were  for  the  most  part 
our  two  flanks.  South  of  the  Lys,  against  our  right,  the 
Germans  delivered  an  assault  which  failed.  In  front  of  one 
battalion  they  are  estimated  to  have  left  between  600  and  700 
dead,  whilst  not  far  off  a  trench  into  which  they  had  pene- 
trated was  recaptured  by  us  at  an  expense  to  them  of  70  killed 
and  14  prisoners. 

In  the  centre  little  took  place  worthy  of  special  record.  A 
few  Germans  came  in  and  surrendered  voluntarily  ;  and  in 
this  quarter  we  experienced  for  the  first  time  in  the  northern 
theatre  of  war  the  action  of  the  Minenwerfer,  or  trench  mortar. 
It  has  a  range  of  some  500  or  600  yards,  and  throws  a  bomb 
loaded  with  high  explosive  weighing  up  to  200  Ibs.,  being  fired 
at  extreme  elevation  from  the  bottom  of  a  pit  in  the  trench. 
About  midnight  our  line  was  attacked  in  two  places.  One 
of  these  efforts  did  not  mature,  as  the  ground  over  which  the 
German  infantry  had  to  advance  was  well  swept  by  our  guns. 
In  the  other  case  the  assault  was  carried  out  against  one  of 
our  brigades  by  a  force  of  some  twelve  battalions.  With  great 
self-restraint  our  men  held  their  fire  for  forty  minutes  until 
the  attackers  got  quite  close,  and  then  drove  them  back  with  a 
loss  of  200  killed.  The  enemy  penetrated  into  a  portion  of- 
one  of  our  trenches,  but  were  driven  out  again,  losing  80  men 
killed  and  captured. 

The  really  important  feature  in  this  day's  operations 
occurred  north  of  the  Lys,  and  consisted  of  an  onslaught  in 
..great  force  made  in  the  morning  in  the  direction  of  Ypres. 
After  a  heavy  cannonade  the  assault  was  driven  home  and  a 
portion  of  our  front  line  was  forced  back.  By  evening  the 
lost  ground  was  recovered,  and  in  some  places  more  than 
recovered,  with  the  exception  of  one  part  to  which  the  enemy 
76 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

clung.  Our  losses  were  heavy,  but  not  so  severe  as  those  of 
the  enemy,  who  at  one  spot  suffered  enormously  from  the 
concentrated  fire  of  our  massed  machine-guns. 

Friday,  the  soth,  witnessed  a  renewal  of  the  efforts  against 
our  right,  but  without  success  to  the  enemy.  In  the  centre 
the  bombardment  was  heavy.  Indeed,  so  many  shells  fell 
round  our  positions  that  the  telephone  wires  were  frequently 
cut.  The  attack  in  the  direction  of  Ypres  generally  was  re- 
newed. South-east  of  that  town  it  was  pressed  in  great  force, 
and  in  places  our  line  was  again  forced  back  a  short  distance  ; 
but  on  our  left  the  oncoming  Germans  were  stopped  by  our 
entanglements  under  close  rifle  fire,  and  after  two  efforts  to 
advance  gave  way. 

On  Saturday,  the  3ist,  a  most  determined  attack  was  made 
upon  our  left  and  left  centre,  the  pressure  being  specially 
severe  against  the  latter  portion  of  our  position.  Part  of  our 
line  was  driven  back  temporarily  by  sheer  weight  of  metal  and 
numbers,  but  was  almost  all  recovered  again  before  night. 
Against  our  centre  the  enemy  did  not  advance,  whilst  against 
our  right  they  were  not  nearly  so  active  as  farther  north. 

So  far,  with  the  assistance  of  the  French,  who  have  been 
co-operating  most  effectually,  we  have  succeeded  in  main- 
taining our  line,  and  in  retaining  possession  of  Ypres,  upon 
the  capture  of  which  by  the  end  of  October  the  Germans  had 
set  their  heart.  As  may  have  been  gathered,  the  fighting  of 
the  past  five  days  has  been  of  the  most  desperate  nature.  It 
has  been  eminently  a  soldiers'  battle ;  and  without  ex- 
aggeration or  any  undue  self-congratulation  it  can  be  said  that 
our  men  have  behaved  splendidly.  In  the  face  of  heavy  odds, 
and  against  the  repeated  onslaughts  of  great  masses  continu- 
ally replaced  by  fresh  men  and  backed  by  the  almost  con- 
tinuous fire  of  an  immense  concentration  of  guns,  they  have 
by  their  dogged  resistance  well  upheld  the  reputation  of  our 
army.  Heavy  as  have  been  our  losses,  we  have  taken  a  far 
heavier  toll  from  the  enemy,  and  have  prevented  them  gaining 
the  object  upon  which  all  their  energies  have  been  concen- 
trated. And  not  only  our  troops  have  maintained  their 
traditions.  Our  French  Allies  have  been  fighting  with  all  the 
dash  for  which  they  are  famous,  and  from  all  accounts  at 
Dixmude  and  along  the  Yser  they  have  made  a  name  for 
themselves  which  will  never  die.  The  Belgian  Army  has  like- 

77 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

wise  resisted  the  furious  onslaughts  of  the  enemy  with  the 
utmost  gallantry. 

The  German  troops,  also,  have  won  our  respect  for  the 
way  in  which  they  have  advanced.  Whether  it  is  due  to 
patriotism  or  the  fear  induced  by  an  iron  discipline,  the  fact 
remains  that  they  have  steadily  pressed  on  to  what  in  many 
cases  must  obviously  have  been  certain  death.  That  they  are 
sometimes  forced  to  go  on  is  shown  by  the  following  answer 
to  an  interrogation  put  to  a  wounded  prisoner  : — 

'  I  belong  to  the  —  Company  of  the  — th  Regiment  of  Infantry,  of 
the  —  Division  of  the  — th  Corps.  I  was  embodied  in  October,  1913. 
On  mobilisation  the  weakly  and  those  backward  in  training,  to  the 
number  of  about  sixty  per  company,  were  withdrawn  from  the  Active 
Regiment  to  form  the  nucleus  of  a  Reserve  Regiment,  which  was  com- 
pleted by  Badeners  and  Wurttembergers  belonging  to  the  2nd  Ban  of 
the  Landwehr.  We  received  new  "  field  grey  "  uniform. 

'  After  ten  weeks  of  hard  training  we  travelled  for  three  days  and 
two  nights  from  Thuringia  up  to  Achiet  (?),  where  we  remained  in 
reserve.  We  were  told  that  our  nearest  enemies  were  the  English. 

On  the  I7th  October  and  the  next  day  we  performed  such  fatiguing 
forced  marches  that  many  men  fell  out  on  the  road.  On  the  igth  we 
each  received  285  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  had  our  first  taste  of  fire. 
Although  we  were  told  that  there  were  only  francs-tireurs  in  front  of  us, 
I  saw  French  cavalrymen  and  no  other  foes. 

'  From  this  day  onward  the  battle  was  uninterrupted.  On  the  20 th 
my  section  received  orders  to  go  forward  to  the  attack,  and  the  officers 
warned  us  that  if  we  gave  way  fire  would  be  opened  upon  us  from 
behind.  This  threat  was  carried  into  effect  when  the  losses  we  suffered 
compelled  us  to  retire.  Indeed,  it  was  by  a  German  bullet  that  I  was 
wounded. 

'  Having  fallen  on  the  ground,  I  remained  between  the  lines  without 
food  or  care  for  two  days,  at  the  end  of  which  time  I  dragged  myself 
to  a  ruined  house. 

'  During  the  whole  of  this  time  the  German  shells,  which  were 
short,  were  falling  about  my  shelter,  some  hundreds  of  paces  from  the 
French  lines.  These  having  advanced  on  the  24th,  I  myself  moved 
forward,  called  out  to  a  passing  patrol,  and  surrendered. 

'  We  have  received  no  distribution  of  food  since  our  arrival  in 
France. 

'  The  "  Commandant  "  of  my  company  was  the  Reserve  Lieutenant 

,  twenty-eight  years  of  age.     The  Colonel,  whose  name  I  don't 

know,  also  belonged  to  the  Reserve,  as  did  all  the  other  officers  of  the 

Regiment. 

78 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

'  The  officers  told  us  that  if  we  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  French  we 
should  be  sent  to  the  Foreign  Legion,  and  certainly  should  be  massacred 
by  the  Moroccans. 

'  I  only  saw  one  man  shot.     He  was  a  priest  who,  they  said,  was  a 

spy.' 

The  results  of  the  inundation  to  the  north  of  Dixmude 
have  been  observed  by  our  aviators,  who  have  seen  numbers 
of  the  enemy  collected  in  groups  on  the  dykes  which  intersect 
the  flooded  area  where,  according  to  report,  some  of  the 
German  heavy  artillery  is  bogged.  Our  airmen  have  also  been 
able  to  harass  advancing  hostile  columns  by  bomb  dropping 
and  machine-gun  fire.  The  tactical  transfer  of  troops  behind 
the  German  front  line  is  now  carried  out*  to  a  great  extent  by 
motor  omnibuses,  of  which  long  strings  are  visible  from  above. 

During  the  past  few  days  large  numbers  of  refugees  have 
been  streaming  back  along  all  the  roads  from  Belgium,  and 
crowding  the  empty  trains  returning  from  the  front,  upon 
which  the  French  have  most  humanely  allowed  them  to  travel. 
In  these  whole  families  may  be  seen  jostled  together  in  horse- 
trucks,  together  with  what  few  household  goods  they  have 
been  able  to  carry  away  ;  but  the  less  fortunate  have  to  trudge 
the  roads,  making  use  of  any  shelter  they  can  find.  The  in- 
habitants of  the  district  within  our  zone  of  operations,  also, 
line  the  roads  from  morning  to  night  and  listen  to  the  sound 
of  the  guns,  there  being  nothing  else  for  them  to  do.  As  the 
dull  roar  waxes  or  wanes  so  does  confidence  die  away  or 
return  ;  and  in  such  alternations  of  fear  and  hope  is  each 
weary  day  passed.  All  this  traffic  to  and  fro  of  civilians  entails 
the  utmost  vigilance  in  order  to  guard  against  espionage. 

October  ^i-November  3 

Before  the  chronological  record  of  the  course  of  events 
is  resumed,  a  short  description  will  be  given  of  the  part  in 
the  battle  played  on  Saturday,  October  31,  by  the  I4th 
(County  of  London)  Battalion  of  the  London  Regiment,  or, 
as  it  is  far  better  known,  '  The  London  Scottish/  Reference 
has  already  been  made  to  its  action,  and  the  Commander-in- 
Chief's  message  to  the  officer  commanding  has  been  quoted, 
but  no  details  of  what  happened  have  been  given. 

The  occasion  is  not  looked  upon  as  a  special  one  because 

79 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

this  battalion  acquitted  itself  well,  for  that  was  regarded  as 
a  matter  of  course,  nor  because  it  was  done  better  than  the 
Regular  battalions,  who  have  been  doing  as  much,  if  not 
more,  for  weeks  on  end.  It  is  a  special  event  because  it 
forms  an  epoch  in  the  military  history  of  the  British  Empire, 
and  marks  the  first  time  that  a  complete  unit  of  our  Terri- 
torial Army  has  been  thrown  into  the  fight  alongside  its 
sister  units  of  the  Regulars.  Briefly,  what  happened  was 
this : — 

On  Saturday,  being  ordered  to  take  up  a  section  of  the 
firing  line  to  support  some  of  our  cavalry,  and  having  advanced 
to  its  position  under  heavy  fire  from  field-guns,  howitzers,  and 
machine-guns,  the  battalion  reached  a  point  where  further 
movement  forward  was  impossible.  There  it  maintained 
itself  till  dusk,  when  it  proceeded  to  entrench.  From  9  that 
night  till  2  A.M.  on  Sunday  the  Germans  made  numerous 
attacks  on  the  Scottish  line,  all  of  which  were  repulsed  by 
rifle  fire. 

At  2  A.M.  they  made  their  great  effort  and  assaulted  the 
front  and  left  of  the  position  in  great  force.  A  considerable 
number  succeeded  by  a  detour  in  getting  round  the  flank  of 
the  regiment.  A  large  proportion  of  these  were  engaged  by 
the  companies  in  support  and  reserve,  while  others  penetrated 
between  the  first  and  second  lines  of  trenches  and  assailed 
our  firing  line  in  the  rear.  While  fighting  with  rifle  and 
bayonet  was  going  on  both  in  front  and  immediately  behind 
the  firing  line,  the  reserve  company  still  farther  behind  made 
repeated  bayonet  charges  against  the  enemy  who  had  got 
round,  and  so  prevented  an  entire  envelopment  of  the  bat- 
talion. Behind  the  firing  line  the  scene  of  combat  was  lit  up 
by  a  blazing  house  which  the  Germans  had  set  alight. 

At  dawn  it  was  discovered  that  large  numbers  of  the 
enemy  had,  according  to  custom,  worked  round  both  flanks 
with  machine-guns,  and  a  retirement  was  carried  out.  This 
was  effected  under  a  cross  fire  from  machine-guns  and  rifles. 
Naturally  in  an  encounter  of  this  nature  the  battalion  suffered 
heavy  loss ;  but  though  unable  to  maintain  its  position  it 
acquitted  itself  with  gallantry  and  coolness  in  a  situation 
of  peculiar  difficulty,  and,  following  the  national  motto  of 
Nemo  me  impune  lacessit,  inflicted  far  more  damage  on  the 
enemy  than  it  received. 
80 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

To  turn  to  the  general  narrative,  on  Sunday,  November  I, 
the  full  violence  of  the  enemy's  attack  again  fell  on  our  left, 
their  main  efforts  being  still  directed  slightly  south  of  Ypres. 
Such  was  the  force  of  the  onslaught  and  the  weight  of  artillery 
supporting  it  that  our  line  was  temporarily  driven  back.  It 
was  soon  readjusted,  however,  and  by  evening  the  situation 
in  this  quarter  was  the  same  as  it  had  been  twenty-four 
hours  earlier.  That  night  some  shell  were  thrown  into 
Ypres  itself. 

Farther  to  the  south  the  Germans  had  during  the  previous 
night  retaken  the  village  of  Messines  and  had  also  captured 
Wytschaete.  By  n  A.M.  our  cavalry,  working  in  co-operation 
with  the  French,  drove  them  out  of  the  latter  place  by  a 
brilliant  bayonet  charge  ;  but  we  did  not  occupy  it.  A  few 
of  the  prisoners  taken  at  this  place  were  only  seventeen  years 
of  age,  and  said  that  they  had  had  practically  no  training 
and  little  food  ;  some  had  never  fired  a  rifle  before. 

The  fact  that  Messines  still  remained  in  hostile  hands 
necessitated  a  slight  readjustment  of  our  front  in  the  centre, 
but  apart  from  this  there  was  no  change  in  this  quarter,  the 
bombardment  continuing  all  day.  During  the  action  round 
these  two  villages  the  Germans  moving  across  our  front 
suffered  very  greatly  from  the  massed  fire  of  our  horse  artillery 
at  short  range ;  but  though  they  fell  literally  in  heaps  they 
still  came  on  with  admirable  determination.  South  of  the 
Lys  some  trenches  which  had  been  lost  on  the  previous  night 
were  recaptured  by  us.  Otherwise  the  situation  remained 
as  it  had  been ;  no  attacks  were  delivered  against  us ;  and 
the  enemy  contented  himself  with  bombarding  our  trenches. 
A  heavy  battery  was  knocked  out  by  our  artillery  fire.  One 
of  our  prisoners — a  Saxon  professor — who  was  captured  on 
the  first  day  he  entered  the  field,  stated  as  his  opinion  that 
Germany  realised  that  she  had  failed  in  her  object,  and  was 
only  fighting  in  order  to  obtain  good  terms.  What  his  opinion 
is  worth  remains  to  be  seen.  During  the  afternoon  a  German 
aeroplane  was  captured  quite  uninjured. 

On  Monday,  the  2nd,  on  our  left,  pressure  was  still  kept 
up  towards  Ypres,  and  at  first  our  line  was  once  more  forced 
back,  but  it  was  restored  towards  evening  by  a  vigorous 
advance  carried  out  in  co-operation  with  the  French,  who 
were  rendering  us  very  timely  assistance.  The  maximum 

MILITARY  2  F  8l 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

effort  of  the  Germans  on  this  day,  however,  was  more  to  the 
south  of  Ypres,  as  if  to  drive  a  wedge  between  the  town  on 
the  north  and  Armentieres  on  the  south  ;  and  the  bombard- 
ment of  our  positions  in  this  quarter  of  the  field  was  especially 
heavy,  though  it  was  well  replied  to  by  a  concentric  fire  from 
our  guns  and  those  of  the  French.  The  French  counter- 
attacked in  the  direction  of  Wytschaete,  which  remained 
disputed  ground,  fiercely  blazing  amidst  a  hail  of  shell  from 
both  sides. 

More  to  the  south  the  enemy  advanced  in  force,  but  were 
checked.  Still  farther  towards  our  right  a  hostile  attack  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Armentieres  met  with  the  same  fate. 
On  our  extreme  right  several  assaults  were  repulsed,  though 
at  one  or  two  points  the  Germans  gained  ground  slightly, 
obtaining  possession  of  Neuve  ChapeUe. 

The  inundation  round  Nieuport  had  by  this  day  reached 
the  enemy's  trenches,  and  it  is  stated  that  two  heavy  guns 
and  some  field  artillery  had  to  be  abandoned  in  the  mud. 

Tuesday,  the  3rd,  was,  on  the  whole,  a  comparatively 
uneventful  day,  which  enabled  our  troops  to  get  a  much- 
needed  rest.  In  front  of  Ypres  the  German  infantry  ceased  to 
press,  but  to  the  south,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Wytschaete 
and  Hollebeke,  they  made  unsuccessful  attempts  to  get  forward, 
effective  counter-attacks  being  delivered  by  the  French  and 
British.  In  this  quarter  the  fighting  was  of  a  severe  nature. 

South  of  the  river  there  were  some  minor  attacks  against 
our  trenches,  which  were  beaten  off.  It  seemed  that  the 
violence  of  the  German  efforts  was  abating,  even  the  cannonade 
being  in  some  places  less  heavy  than  it  had  been. 

November  4-10 

In  describing  the  operations  for  the  six  days  from  Nov- 
ember 4  to  9,  it  can  be  said  that  during  that  period  the  Germans 
have  nowhere  along  our  front  made  an  attack  in  great  force, 
such  as  was  launched  against  Ypres  at  the  end  of  October. 
What  they  may  be  contemplating  remains  to  be  seen.  Their 
policy  has  appeared  to  be  to  wear  us  out  by  continual  bom- 
bardment interspersed  with  local  assaults  at  different  points. 
As  regards  their  artillery  attack — which  has  now  continued 
without  cessation  for  days — wonder  is  aroused  as  to  when  this 
82 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

prodigal  expenditure  of  ammunition  will  cease,  for  it  has  not 
produced  its  obviously  calculated  effect  of  breaking  the  defence 
in  preparation  for  the  advance  of  their  infantry.  So  far  the 
latter  have  been  the  chief  sufferers  from  the  tactics  employed. 

On  Wednesday,  the  4th,  they  renewed  the  attack  east 
of  Ypres ;  but  their  efforts  bore  no  resemblance  to  those  which 
had  preceded  it,  being  more  in  the  nature  of  a  demonstration 
in  force  than  a  serious  attempt  to  drive  in  our  line,  and  it  was 
beaten  off  with  ease.  By  then  our  men  had  been  reinforced, 
had  enjoyed  some  rest,  and  had  had  time  to  improve  their 
trenches  in  different  ways.  Moreover,  the  consciousness  that 
they  had  repelled  one  great  effort  of  the  enemy  was  a  moral 
factor  of  no  small  value. 

Farther  to  the  south,  on  our  left  centre,  the  French  ad- 
vanced under  cover  of  our  guns  and  made  some  progress  in 
spite  of  the  heavy  fire  brought  to  bear  on  them  from  the 
enemy's  massed  batteries.  On  our  centre  all  was  quiet.  On 
the  right  our  Indian  troops  scored  a  success  by  capturing  and 
filling  in  some  trenches  in  which  the  enemy  had  established 
himself  only  fifty  yards  from  our  lines  under  cover  of  some 
heavy  artillery  brought  up  after  dark. 

On  our  extreme  left,  one  of  our  howitzer  batteries — whose 
fire  was  being  most  effectively  directed — selected  as  its  first 
target  a  farm  from  which  a  machine-gun  was  harassing  our 
infantry.  It  scored  a  hit  at  the  first  found  and  knocked  out 
the  machine-gun.  The  second  target  was  a  house  occupied 
by  snipers.  This  was  set  alight  by  a  shell,  and  when  the 
occupants  bolted  they  came  under  the  rapid  fire  of  our  in- 
fantry. The  third  target  was  another  building  from  which 
the  Germans  were  driven  and  then  caught  in  the  open  by 
shrapnel.  One  of  our  heavy  batteries,  also,  obtained  several 
direct  hits  on  the  enemy's  guns. 

Thursday  was  another  comparatively  quiet  day,  there 
being  no  attempt  at  an  infantry  attack  against  any  point 
of  our  line.  South-east  of  Ypres  the  Germans  maintained 
a  heavy  bombardment  on  one  section  of  our  front,  but  gener- 
ally speaking  their  artillery  fire  was  not  so  heavy  as  it  had 
been.  Somewhat  to  the  south  the  French  made  some  slight 
progress  and  recaptured  some  ground. 

Farther  to  the  south  two  villages  which  the  enemy  had 
captured  and  their  line  on  a  ridge  close  by  were  heavily  bom- 

83 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

barded  by  the  British  and  French  artillery.  From  the  high 
ground  to  the  west  the  effect  of  this  cannonade  could  be  seen 
to  some  extent,  though  the  villages  under  fire  were  partially 
obscured  from  view  by  the  smoke  of  the  bursting  shells,  and 
resembled  the  craters  of  volcanoes  belching  fire  and  fumes. 
At  one  place  the  gaunt  wreck  of  the  old  church  tower  and  the 
blackened  remains  of  a  few  houses  round  it  would  emerge  for 
a  moment,  only  to  be  again  blotted  out  in  the  pall  of  smoke. 
The  long,  straggling  villages,  when  they  became  temporarily 
visible,  seemed  to  melt  away,  and  assume  odd  and  fantastic 
shapes  as  the  houses  crumbled  and  the  blocks  of  masonry 
were  thrown  hither  and  thither  by  the  blasting  effect  of  lyddite 
and  melinite. 

The  result  of  this  artillery  work  was  most  satisfactory. 
When  the  Germans  were  seen  to  be  running  from  the  shelter 
which  had  ceased  to  act  as  such,  they  were  caught  and  mowed 
down  by  the  rapid  fire  of  the  French  field  artillery.  Against 
a  suitable  target  the  action  of  the  French  75  mm.  field-guns— 
'  les  soixante-quinze,'  as  they  are  always  affectionately  called 
—is  literally  terrific,  and  must  be  seen  to  be  realised.  On  the 
whole,  the  ground  which  the  Germans  have  gained  in  this 
direction  has  so  far  proved  a  somewhat  barren  acquisition. 
It  is  so  exposed  that  it  proves  a  death-trap  for  their  troops, 
and  they  can  derive  no  advantage  from  its  possession. 

Along  the  rest  of  our  line  nothing  of  special  interest 
occurred.  Farther  south  our  aeroplanes  and  those  of  the 
French  scored  a  success  by  partially  destroying  two  of  the  old 
forts  of  Lille.  Fort  Englos  was  blown  up  on  the  4th,  and  Fort 
Carnot  on  the  5th.  They  were  most  probably  used  as  maga- 
zines, and  may  have  been  of  some  tactical  importance  as 
points  d'appui  in  the  line  of  entrenchments. 

On  Friday,  the  6th,  the  attack  was  renewed  south  of  the 
Menin-Ypres  high  road,  but  it  was  repulsed  without  difficulty. 
Against  the  south-east  of  Ypres,  which  town  had  been  sub- 
jected to  a  bombardment  during  the  night  and  was  also  shelled 
during  the  day,  a  fairly  strong  advance  was  made  in  the  after- 
noon, and  the  enemy  gained  some  ground.  The  French, 
however,  made  a  counter-stroke  supported  by  us,  and  by 
nightfall  recovered  all  the  lost  ground.  The  French  attack 
on  the  two  villages  which  had  been  shelled  on  Thursday  made 
considerable  progress,  one  point  being  captured,  but  the 
84 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

enemy  contrived  to  render  the  position  untenable,  and  our 
Allies  had  retired  from  the  hill  by  dusk.  On  our  centre 
nothing  of  particular  interest  occurred.  On  our  right,  south 
of  the  Lys,  the  enemy  made  two  unsuccessful  night  attacks. 

On  Saturday,  the  yth,  on  our  left  the  enemy  in  the  after- 
noon again  attacked  on  the  east  and  south-east  of  Ypres. 
Along  the  Menin  Road  our  line  was  at  one  point  forced  back, 
only  to  be  regained  after  a  few  minutes.  About  4  P.M.  the 
Germans  appeared  to  be  massing  opposite  our  line  south-east 
of  Ypres,  and  the  pressure  was  for  a  time  severe,  although  the 
attack  was  not  driven  home.  Slightly  farther  to  the  south 
the  fighting  continued  with  unabated  fury,  and  resulted  in  a 
gain  to  our  Allies.  About  400  of  the  enemy  advanced  from 
the  cover  of  a  wood  against  the  French,  half  of  them,  with 
most  reckless  bravery,  came  on  to  close  quarters,  and  were 
all  shot  or  bayoneted.  A  tremendous  cannonade  was  main- 
tained by  both  sides  in  this  direction,  the  Allies  pouring  a  hail 
of  shells  all  along  the  ridge  facing  them  held  by  the  Germans, 
and  the  latter  bombarding  some  high  ground  and  a  valley  to 
the  east  of  it  in  our  possession.  Three  machine-guns  were 
captured  by  us  during  the  day. 

On  our  centre  there  was  a  recrudescence  of  activity  on 
the  enemy's  part.  During  the  previous  night  some  six  bat- 
talions of  Saxons  had  succeeded  in  capturing  some  of  our 
trenches,  only  to  be  driven  out  by  a  counter-attack  which  re- 
sulted in  one  officer  and  seventy  men  being  taken  prisoners. 
The  Germans,  however,  refused  to  accept  defeat,  and,  return- 
ing to  the  charge,  again  occupied  some  of  our  trenches,  and 
penetrated  into  a  wood.  They  were  again  counter-attacked 
and  cleared  out  of  the  wood,  but  continued  in  possession  of 
part  of  our  line  and  also  some  houses  which  commanded  them. 
Farther  south,  again,  the  enemy  behaved  with  great  boldness, 
sapping  up  to  within  a  short  distance  of  our  trenches. 

Some  of  the  prisoners  captured  on  this  day  were  very 
young.  They  stated  that  their  corps  had  lately  been  brought 
up  to  strength  with  new  recruits  who  had  received  only  a  few 
weeks'  training. 

Throughout  the  recent  fighting  Sunday  has  proved  to  be 
a  day  of  activity,  and  November  8  was  no  exception  to  the  rule. 
On  the  left  the  morning  passed  quietly  so  far  as  the  British 
were  concerned.  To  the  south-east  of  Ypres  the  French  con- 

85 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

tinued  to  give  us  considerable  support,  and  pressed  forward. 
At  2.30  P.M.  the  daily  attack  on  our  line  was  made — this  time 
in  force  to  the  north  of  the  Menin- Ypres  high  road ;  and 
again  did  the  enemy  succeed  in  temporarily  piercing  our  front. 
They  were  driven  back,  however,  and  all  the  ground  lost  by 
us  was  regained  before  dark.  After  this  repulse  107  dead 
Germans  were  counted  in  front  of  one  battalion,  the  total 
hostile  force  engaged  being  estimated  at  2000. 

These  strong  attacks  are  accompanied  or  preceded  by 
attempts  to  press  at  other  points,,  which  are  usually  attended 
with  heavy  loss.  An  instance  of  the  cost  to  the  enemy  of  these 
subsidiary  operations  occurred  on  this  day,  when  one  of  our 
battalions  killed  47  Germans,  this  number  being  actually 
counted  in  front  of  our  trenches,  and  captured  51.  It  is  cal- 
culated that  on  Sunday  their  casualties  in  killed  and  wounded 
in  front  of  one  small  section  of  our  line  were  about  1200. 
Ypres  itself  was  again  subjected  to  heavy  shelling,  and  some 
damage  was  done  to  the  town. 

In  front  of  our  right  centre  the  enemy  fell  back  slightly, 
while  farther  south,  to  the  north  of  the  Lys,  he  continued 
to  occupy  the  trenches  and  houses  he  had  secured,  but  was 
unable  to  reinforce  this  point  and  so  consolidate  his  position, 
for  the  ground  was  swept  by  the  fire  of  our  guns  and  enfiladed 
from  our  trenches.  To  the  south  of  the  Lys  the  hostile  attacks 
were  renewed  without  success  on  the  night  of  the  7th-8th.  On 
our  right  also  a  minor  effort  met  with  the  same  fate. 

Monday,  the  gth,  was  a  comparatively  quiet  day.  On 
our.  left  the  shelling  was  less.  In  this  direction  the  Germans 
for  the  time  being  desisted  from  making  attacks  in  force,  and 
confined  their  efforts  to  minor  assaults  and  to  the  wanton 
destruction  of  Ypres,  which  with  Louvain  and  Reims  is  appar- 
ently to  be  included  among  the  monuments  to  German 
'  culture/  During  the  fighting  of  the  7th,  8th,  and  loth, 
no  prisoners  and  6  machine-guns  were  captured  by  us  in  this 
quarter. 

Slightly  to  the  south  the  French  made  some  progress, 
while  on  our  centre  the  situation  remained  much  the  same  as 
it  has  been.  The  houses  and  trenches  gained  by  the  Germans 
remained  in  their  hands  during  the  day,  but  measures  were 
taken  to  overcome  their  resistance,  and  at  night  part  of  the 
ground  was  retaken  by  us.  On  our  right,  during  the  night  of 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

the  8th-gth  a  German  trench  was  captured ;  otherwise  the 
situation  did  not  alter. 

Night  attacks  have  been  of  regular  occurrence  at  different 
points,  and  are  made  apparently  more  with  a  view  to  annoying 
our  troops  and  preventing  them  sleeping  than  with  any  other 
object.  Sometimes,  of  course,  the  advance  has  been  of  a 
more  serious  nature,  and  has  been  carried  out  by  large  bodies. 
In  such  cases  the  Germans  have  so  far  invariably  lost  heavily, 
and  even  if  they  have  succeeded  in  gaining  our  first  line  of 
trenches,  have  almost  always  been  driven  out  again.  The 
demonstrations  would  appear  to  be  proportionately  more 
costly  and  even  more  useless  than  the  heavier  attacks. 
Similar  tactics  were  a  feature  of  the  fighting  on  the  Aisne,  and 
to  judge  by  the  diaries  we  have  obtained  from  German  soldiers 
their  futility  is  fully  appreciated  by  the  men.  They  are 
usually  made  from  the  trenches  in  rear  of  the  front  line,  the 
latter  being  only  lightly  held. 

The  front  lines  of  both  sides  are  now  at  many  points  so 
close  that  our  men  amuse  themselves  by  listening  to  what  goes 
on  in  the  enemy's  trenches.  The  Germans  frequently  cheer 
themselves  up  with  music  or  singing,  while  on  one  occasion 
the  usual  programme  was  varied  by  a  violent  quarrel  which 
appeared  to  have  culminated  in  a  free  fight. 

On  the  whole  there  is  evidence  to  show  that  the  Germans 
are  beginning  to  be  affected  by  their  heavy  losses.  From 
prisoners  it  is  gathered  that  the  young  men  of  the  new  corps 
cannot  withstand  the  fatigues  and  privations  of  campaigning, 
and  that  the  middle-aged  men  lack  ardour.  From  the  same 
source,  also,  it  is  learned  that  recruits  who  have  not  previously 
served  have  only  received  some  eight  or  nine  weeks'  training 
instead  of  the  twelve  weeks'  course  prescribed  for  them,  that 
they  have  had  practically  no  instruction  in  musketry,  and 
that  they  have  not  practised  entrenching. 

On  the  other  hand,  too  much  can  be  made  of  these  side- 
lights on  the  present  condition  of  the  enemy.  They  are  still 
fighting  with  a  stubbornness  and  recklessness  which,  whatever 
its  futility,  is  remarkable  when  exhibited  by  forces  of  which  a 
large  proportion  consists  of  comparatively  untrained  men. 
The  following  two  incidents  serve  to  illustrate  their  courage  : — 

During  the  fighting  near  Ypres  a  force  consisting  of  about 
one  company  of  infantry  advancing  against  us  was  enfiladed 

87 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

by  one  of  our  machine-guns,  with  the  result  that  they  were 
all  killed  except  six  men  who  crawled  away  wounded.  The 
corpses  lay  in  a  regular  row.  After  nightfall  another  company 
of  the  Germans,  nothing  daunted,  advanced  and  dug  them- 
selves in  on  the  line  upon  which  the  bodies  of  their  comrades 
were  lying.  Again,  on  November  4,  some  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  at  dusk  charged  a  trench  held  by  the  French.  Every 
single  horse  was  killed  ;  but  those  riders  who  were  not  hit 
continued  the  charge  on  foot,  the  last  survivors  being  slain  on 
the  very  parapet  of  the  trench. 

And,  whatever  deterioration  there  may  be  in  the  material 
now  being  drafted  into  the  ranks  of  our  enemy,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  Prussian  war  machine,  acting  on  a  nation 
previously  inured  to  the  sternest  discipline,  has  obtained  the 
most  remarkable  results.  The  Germans  have  up  to  the  present 
time  been  able  to  make  good  their  losses,  to  continue  to  deliver 
repeated  blows  with  fresh  men  when  required  and  where  re- 
quired, and  to  concentrate  large  forces  in  different  directions. 
It  is  true  that  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  masses  recently 
thrown  into  the  field  against  the  British  has  consisted  of  hastily 
trained  and  immature  men  ;  but  the  great  fact  remains  that 
these  ill-assorted  levies  have  not  hesitated  to  advance  against 
highly  trained  troops. 

In  spite  of  lack  of  officers,  in  spite  of  inexperience,  boys  of 
sixteen  and  seventeen  have  faced  our  guns,  marched  steadily 
up  to  the  muzzles  of  our  rifles,  and  have  met  death  in  droves, 
without  flinching.  Such  is  the  effect  of  a  century  of  national 
discipline.  That  ~the  men  subjected  to  it  are  the  victims  of 
an  autocratic  military  caste  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  they 
have  accepted  that  system  as  necessary  to  the  attainment  of 
national  ideals.  However  discordant  the  elements  which 
make  up  the  German  Empire,  by  the  force  of  the  Prussian  war 
machine  they  have  one  and  all  been  welded  together  to  be 
able  to  fight  for  national  existence,  and  by  their  actions  it  is 
evident  that  for  them  '  Deutschland  iiber  Alles  '  is  no  empty 
cry. 

November  10-12 

The  diminution  in  force  of  what  may  by  a  paraphrase  be 
described  as  the  Gerfnan  Drang  nach  Westen  in  this  quarter 
88 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

has  not  lasted  long.  The  section  of  front  to  the  north  of 
us  was  the  first  to  meet  the  recrudescence  of  violence  in  the 
shape  of  an  attack  by  the  enemy  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Dixmude  and  Bixschoote.  Our  turn  came  next,  and  after 
eight  days  of  a  comparative  relaxation  of  pressure — from 
Tuesday  the  3rd  to  Tuesday  the  loth — the  nth  saw  a 
repetition  of  the  great  attempt  to  break  through  our  line  to 
the  French  coast. 

What  was  realised  might  happen  has  happened.  In  spite 
of  the  immense  losses  suffered  by  the  enemy  during  the  five 
days'  attack  against  Ypres,  which  lasted  from  October  29 
to  the  2nd  of  this  month,  the  cessation  of  their  more  violent 
efforts  on  the  latter  day  was  not  an  abandonment  of  the  whole 
project,  but  a  temporary  relinquishment  of  the  main  offensive 
until  fresh  troops  should  be  massed  to  carry  on  what  was 
proving  to  be  a  somewhat  costly  and  difficult  operation. 

Meanwhile,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  the  interval  was 
employed  in  endeavouring  to  wear  out  the  Allies  by  repeated 
local  attacks  of  varying  force  and  to  shatter  them  by  a  pro- 
longed and  concentrated  bombardment.  By  the  nth,  there- 
fore, it  seems  that  they  must  have  considered  that  they  had 
attained  both  objects,  for  on  that  day,  as  will  be  described, 
recommenced  the  desperate  battle  for  the  possession  of  Ypres 
and  its  neighbourhood.  Though  the  struggle  has  not  yet 
come  to  an  end,  this  much  can  be  said  :  The  Germans  have 
gained  some  ground,  but  they  have  not  captured  Ypres.  In 
repulsing  the  enemy  so  far  we  have  naturally  suffered  heavy 
casualties.  But  battles  of  this  fierce  and  prolonged  nature 
cannot  but  be  costly  to  both  sides ;  and  we  have  the  satis- 
faction of  knowing  that  we  have  foiled  the  enemy  in  what 
appears  at  present  to  be  his  main  object  in  the  western  theatre 
of  operations,  and  have  inflicted  immensely  greater  loss  on  him 
than  those  suffered  by  ourselves. 

To  carry  the  narrative  on  for  the  three  days,  the  loth, 
nth,  and  I2th  November,  Tuesday  the  loth  was  for  us 
uneventful.  Beyond  our  left  flank  the  enemy  advanced  in 
force  against  the  French,  but  were  repulsed.  On  our  left, 
however,  along  the  greater  part  of  our  front  the  shelling  was 
less  severe  ;  and  no  infantry  attacks  took  place.  South-east 
of  Ypres  the  enemy  kept  up  a  heavy  bombardment  against 
our  line  as  well  as  that  of  the  French  ;  and  on  our  left  centre 

89 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

the   situation   remained   unchanged,   both   sides   contenting 
themselves  with  a  furious  cannonade. 

In  our  centre  the  Germans  retained  their  hold  on  the 
small  extent  of  ground  they  had  gained  from  us,  but  in  doing 
so  incurred  heavy  loss  from  our  artillery  and  machine-gun 
fire.  Incidentally,  one  of  the  houses  held  by  them  was  so 
knocked  about  by  our  fire  that  its  defenders  bolted.  On 
their  way  to  the  rear  they  were  met  by  reinforcements  under 
an  officer  who  halted  them,  evidently  in  an  endeavour  to 
persuade  them  to  return.  While  the  parley  was  going  on 
one  of  our  machine-guns  was  quietly  moved  to  a  position 
of  vantage,  whence  it  opened  a  most  effective  fire  on  the 
group.  On  our  right  one  of  the  enemy's  saps  which  was  being 
pushed  towards  our  line  was  attacked  by  us  and  all  the  men 
in  it  were  captured. 

As  has  been  said,  Wednesday,  the  nth,  was  another  day 
of  desperate  fighting.  So  soon  as  day  broke  the  Germans 
opened  up  on  our  trenches  to  the  north  and  south  of  Menin- 
Ypres  Road  what  was  probably  the  most  furious  artillery 
fire  that  they  have  yet  employed  against  us,  and  a  few  hours 
later  followed  up  this  bombardment  by  an  infantry  assault 
in  force.  This  was  carried  out  by  the  ist  and  4th  Brigades 
of  the  Guard  Corps,  which,  as  we  now  know  from  prisoners, 
had  been  sent  for  in  order  to  make  a  supreme  effort  to  capture 
Ypres,  that  task  having  proved  too  heavy  for  the  Infantry 
of  the  Line. 

As  the  attackers  surged  forward  they  were  met  by  our 
frontal  fire,  and  since  they  were  moving  diagonally  across  part 
of  our  front  were  also  taken  in  flank  by  artillery,  rifles,  and 
machine-guns.  Though  their  casualties  before  they  reached 
our  line  must  have  been  enormous,  such  was  their  resolution 
and  the  momentum  of  the  mass  that,  in  spite  of  the  splendid 
resistance  of  our  troops,  they  succeeded  in  breaking  through 
our  line  in  three  places  near  the  road.  They  penetrated  for 
some  distance  into  the  woods  behind  our  trenches,  but  were 
counter-attacked  and  again  enfiladed  by  machine-guns  and 
driven  back  to  the  line  of  trenches,  a  certain  portion  of  which 
they  succeeded  in  holding,  in  spite  of  our  efforts  to  expel  them. 
What  their  total  losses  must  have  been  during  the  advance  can 
to  some  extent  be  gauged  from  the  fact  that  the  number  of  dead 
left  in  the  woods  behind  our  line  alone  amounted  to  700. 
90 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

A  simultaneous  effort  made  to  the  south  of  the  road,  as 
part  of  the  same  operation,  though  not  carried  out  by  the 
Guard  Corps,  failed  entirely,  for  when  the  attacking  infantry 
massed  in  the  woods  close  to  our  line,  our  guns  opened  upon 
them  with  such  effect  that  they  did  not  push  the  assault 
home. 

As  generally  happens  in  operations  in  wooded  country, 
the  fighting  was  to  a  great  extent  carried  on  at  close  quarters, 
and  was  of  the  most  desperate  and  confused  description. 
Indeed,  the  scattered  bodies  of  the  enemy  who  penetrated 
into  the  woods  in  rear  of  our  position  could  neither  go  back- 
wards nor  forwards,  and  were  nearly  all  killed  or  captured. 

The  portion  of  the  line  south-east  of  Ypres  held  by  us 
was  heavily  shelled,  but  did  not  undergo  any  very  serious 
infantry  attack.  That  occupied  by  the  French,  however, 
was  both  bombarded  and  fiercely  assaulted.  On  the  rest 
of  our  front,  save  for  the  usual  bombardment,  all  was  com- 
paratively quiet.  On  the  right  one  of  our  trenches  was  mined 
and  then  abandoned.  So  soon  as  it  was  occupied  by  the 
enemy  the  charges  were  fired,  and  several  Germans  were 
blown  to  pieces. 

Thursday,  the  I2th,  was  marked  by  a  partial  lull  in  the 
fighting  all  along  our  line.  To  the  north  of  us  the  German 
force  which  had  crossed  the  Yser  and  entrenched  on  the  left 
bank  was  annihilated  by  a  night  attack  with  the  bayonet 
executed  by  the  French.  Slightly  to  the  south  the  enemy 
was  forced  back  for  a  distance  of  about  three-quarters  of  a 
mile.  Immediately  to  our  left  the  French  were  strongly 
attacked  and  driven  back  a  short  distance,  our  extreme  left 
having  to  conform  to  the  movement.  But  our  Allies  soon 
recovered  the  ground  they  had  lost,  which  enabled  us  to 
advance  also.  To  the  south-east  of  Ypres,  the  enemy's 
snipers  were  very  active.  On  our  centre  and  right  the 
enemy's  bombardment  was  maintained,  but  nothing  worthy 
of  special  note  occurred. 

The  fact  that  on  this  day  the  advance  against  our  line 
in  front  of  Ypres  was  not  pushed  home,  after  such  an  effort 
as  had  been  made  on  Wednesday,  tends  to  show  that  for  the 
moment  at  least  the  attacking  troops  had  had  enough. 

Although  the  failure  of  this  great  attack  by  the  Guard 
Corps  to  accomplish  its  object  cannot  yet  be  described  as  a 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

decisive  event,  it  possibly  marks  the  culmination,  if  not  the 
close,  of  a  second  stage  in  the  attempt  to  capture  Ypres,  and 
is  therefore  not  without  significance.  It  has  also  a  dramatic 
interest  of  its  own.  Having  once  definitely  failed  to  achieve 
this  object  by  means  of  sheer  weight  of  numbers,  as  already 
explained,  and  having  done  their  best  to  wear  us  down  in  the 
manner  already  described,  the  Germans  brought  up  fresh 
picked  troops  to  carry  Ypres  salient  by  an  assault  from  north, 
south,  and  east. 

That  the  Guard  Corps  should  have  been  selected  to  act 
against  the  eastern  edge  of  the  salient  may  perhaps  be  taken 
as  a  proof  of  the  necessity  felt  by  the  Germans  to  gain  this 
point  in  the  line,  and  their  dogged  perseverance  in  the  pur- 
suance of  their  objective  claims  our  whole-hearted  admiration. 
The  failure  of  one  great  attack,  heralded  as  it  was  by  impas- 
sioned appeals  to  the  troops,  made  in  the  presence  of  the 
Emperor  himself,  but  carried  out  by  partially  trained  men, 
has  been  only  the  signal  for  another  desperate  effort  in  which 
the  place  of  honour  was  assigned  to  the  corps  d' elite  of  the 
German  Army. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  that  corps  has  retained  that 
reputation  for  courage  and  contempt  of  death  which  it  earned 
in  1870,  when  Emperor  William  I.,  after  the  battle  of  Grave- 
lotte,  wrote  :  '  My  Guard  has  found  its  grave  in  front  of 
St.  Privat/  And  the  swarms  of  men  who  came  up  so  bravely 
to  the  British  rifles  in  the  woods  round  Ypres  repeated  the 
tactics  of  forty-four  years  ago,  when  their  dense  columns, 
toiling  up  the  slopes  of  St.  Privat,  melted  away  under  the  fire 
of  the  French. 

That  the  Germans  are  cunning  fighters  and  are  well  up  in 
all  the  tricks  of  the  trade  has  been  frequently  pointed  out. 
For  instance,  they  often  succeed  in  ascertaining  what  regiment 
or  brigade  is  opposed  to  them,  and,  owing  to  their  knowledge 
of  English,  are  able  to  employ  the  information  to  some  pur- 
pose. On  one  recent  occasion,  having  by  some  means  dis- 
covered the  name  of  the  commander  of  the  company  holding 
a  trench  they  were  attacking,  they  called  on  him  by  name, 
asking  if  Captain  was  there.  Fortunately,  the  pro- 
nunciation of  the  spokesman  was  somewhat  defective,  and 
curiosity  was  rewarded  by  discovering  that  both  the  officer 
in  question  and  his  men  were  very  much  there. 
92 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

There  are  reports  from  so  many  different  quarters  of  the 
enemy  having  been  seen  wearing  British  and  French  uniforms 
that  it  is  impossible  to  doubt  their  truth.  One  remarkable 
and  absolutely  authentic  case  occurred  during  the  fighting 
near  Ypres.  A  man  dressed  in  a  uniform  which  resembled 
that  of  a  British  Staff  officer  suddenly  appeared  near  our 
trenches,  and  walked  along  the  line,  asking  if  many  casualties 
had  been  suffered,  and  stating  that  the  situation  was  serious, 
and  that  a  general  retirement  had  been  ordered.  A  similar 
visit  was  reported  by  several  men  in  different  trenches,  and 
orders  were  issued  that  this  strange  officer  was  to  be  de- 
tained if  again  seen.  Unluckily,  he  did  not  make  another 
appearance. 

The  following  remarks  extracted  from  a  German  soldier's 
diary  are  published,  not  because  there  is  reason  to  believe  that 
they  are  justified  as  regards  the  conduct  of  the  German  officers, 
but  because  they  are  of  interest  as  a  human  document : — 

'  2nd  November. — Before  noon  sent  out  in  a  regular  storm  of  bullets 
by  order  of  the  major.  These  gentlemen,  the  officers,  send  their  men 
forward  in  the  most  ridiculous  way.  They  themselves  remain  far 
behind  safely  under  cover.  Our  leadership  is  really  scandalous. 
Enormous  losses  on  our  side,  partly  from  the  fire  of  our  own  people,  for 
our  leaders  neither  know  where  the  enemy  lies  nor  where  our  own 
troops  are,  so  that  we  are  often  fired  on  by  our  own  men.  It  is  a  marvel 
to  me  that  we  have  got  on  as  far  as  we  have  done.  Our  captain  fell, 
also  all  our  section  leaders,  and  a  large  number  of  our  men.  Moreover, 
no  purpose  was  served  by  this  advance,  for  we  remained  the  rest  of  the 
day  under  cover,  and  could  go  neither  forward  nor  back,  nor  even 
shoot.  A  trench  we  had  taken  was  not  occupied  by  us,  and  the  English 
naturally  took  it  back  at  night.  That  was  the  sole  result.  Then, 
when  the  enemy  had  again  entrenched  themselves,  another  attack  was 
made  costing  us  many  lives  and  fifty  prisoners.  It  is  simply  ridiculous, 
this  leadership.  If  only  I  had  known  it  before  ! 

'  My  opinion  of  the  German  officers  has  changed.  An  adjutant 
shouted  to  us  from  a  trench  far  to  the  rear  to  cut  down  a  hedge  which 
was  in  front  of  us.  Bullets  were  whistling  round  from  in  front  and 
from  behind.  The  gentleman  himself,  of  course,  remained  behind. 
The  4th  company  has  now  no  leaders  but  a  couple  of  N.C.O.'s.  When 
will  my  turn  come  ?  I  hope  to  goodness  I  shall  get  home  again  ! 

'  Still  in  the  trenches.  Shells  and  shrapnel  burst  without  ceasing. 
In  the  evening  a  cup  of  rice  and  one-third  of  an  apple  per  man.  Let 
us  hope  peace  will  soon  come.  Such  a  war  is  really  too  awful.  The 

93 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

English  shoot  like  mad.  If  no  reinforcements  come  up,  especially 
heavy  artillery,  we  shall  have  a  poor  look-out,  and  must  retire. 

'  The  first  day  I  went  quietly  into  the  fight  with  an  indifference 
which  astonished  me.  To-day,  for  the  first  time  in  advancing,  when 
my  comrades  right  and  left  fell,  felt  rather  nervous,  but  lost  that  feeling 
again  soon.  One  becomes  horribly  indifferent.  Picked  up  a  piece  of 
bread  by  chance.  Thank  God  !  At  least  something  to  eat. 

'  There  are  about  70,000  English  who  must  be  attacked  from  all 
four  sides  and  destroyed.  They  defend  themselves,  however,  ob- 
stinately.' 

His  Majesty  the  King's  message  of  congratulation  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief    has    caused    the    liveliest    satisfaction 
[i  See          amongst  all  ranks.1 
Military,  i,  November  13-15 

The  nature  of  the  situation  on  our  front  has  not  altered 
since  the  last  letter.  The  Germans  have  continued  to  press 
generally  along  our  line  and  have  focused  their  attention 
mostly  round  Ypres,  though  there  has  up  to  now  not  been  a 
resumption  of  the  violent  attacks  against  that  place.  For 
the  last  ten  days  the  weather  has  been  much  against  aerial 
reconnaissances.  It  has  either  been  so  misty  that  nothing 
can  be  seen  or  so  windy  as  to  interfere  with  flying.  There 
has  also  been  a  good  deal  of  rain,  which  has  added  to  the  dis- 
comforts of  active  service. 

Before  the  course  of  events  during  the  three  days  Novem- 
ber 13,  14,  and  15  is  given,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the 
incident  recorded  in  the  last  summary  of  the  blowing  up  of 
some  of  the  enemy  in  a  mined  trench  on  the  night  of  the  nth 
has  had  a  curious  sequel.  Amidst  the  debris  hurled  into  our 
own  trenches  by  the  explosion  was  found  the  identity  disc  of 
a  German  soldier  belonging  to  a  regiment  about  whose  pre- 
sence in  this  quarter  there  has  been  much  doubt. 

Friday,  the  I3th,  was  windy  with  much  rain.  Trying  as 
life  in  the  trenches  is  under  such  conditions,  our  men  have  at 
least  the  consolation  of  knowing  that  the  enemy  were  in  a 
worse  plight,  for  the  wind  blew  steadily  in  their  faces.  On  our 
left  the  morning  passed  in  desultory  shelling,  which  gradually 
swelled  in  the  afternoon  into  a  fierce  bombardment  of  the 
section  of  our  line  running  south  to  the  Menin- Ypres  Road. 
This  was  the  prelude  to  an  attack  upon  the  whole  line  round 
Ypres.  The  enemy  rushed  our  trenches  at  one  point,  but 
94 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

they  were  driven  out  again,  and  the  assault  was  repulsed. 
Here,  again,  our  losses,  though  heavy,  were  much  less  than 
those  of  the  Germans.  As  each  successive  attempt  to  take 
Ypres  by  assault  fails,  the  bombardment  of  the  unhappy  town 
is  renewed  with  ever-increasing  fury. 

Farther  to  the  south,  on  our  left  centre,  the  situation  re- 
mained practically  unchanged,  a  little  ground  being  lost  here 
and  there  and  then  regained. 

On  our  centre  and  right,  and  indeed  along  the  whole  of  our 
line,  the  hostile  artillery  appears  to  have  received  orders  on 
this  day  to  search  the  area  in  rear  of  our  trenches.  This  no 
doubt  is  a  part  of  the  policy  of  wearing  down.  It  is  naturally 
welcome  to  the  men  in  the  trenches  that  the  enemy  should 
expend  ammunition  on  the  mere  chance  of  getting  a  shell 
or  two  into  our  transport  or  into  some  brigade  or  divisional 
headquarters. 

On  the  right,  on  the  night  of  the  I3th-i4th,  a  German 
trench  was  taken  by  a  portion  of  one  of  our  battalions,  the 
occupants  being  bayoneted  or  taken  prisoners.  A  part  of 
another  battalion  which  also  advanced  during  the  night 
encountered  some  of  the  enemy  who  were  attempting  a 
similar  operation.  A  hand-to-hand  fight  ensued  in  which 
we  came  off  the  victors,  killing  25  Germans  and  only  losing 
two  ourselves. 

Saturday  was  very  cold.  There  was  also  some  rain.  On 
our  left,  proceedings  were  started  with  the  usual  heavy  shelling, 
and  the  Germans  again  resumed  the  offensive  in  the  afternoon 
south  of  the  Menin- Ypres  Road,  with  a  similar  result  to  that 
obtained  on  the  previous  day.  They  penetrated  our  line  at 
one  or  two  points  ;  but  were  soon  driven  out  and  the  line  was 
almost  completely  restored.  Farther  to  the  south  the  French 
made  an  attack  near  Wytschaete  and  gained  some  ground 
under  cover  of  a  heavy  fire  from  their  guns.  In  the  afternoon 
our  left  centre  was  subjected  to  shelling  alone,  and  in  our 
centre  Armentieres  was  subjected  to  similar  treatment.  The 
town  is  now  practically  deserted  by  its  inhabitants. 

During  the  day  Bethune  was  bombarded  by  the  enemy, 
who  continued  to  devote  his  attention  to  towns,  villages,  and 
roads  in  rear  of  our  line  rather  than  to  the  trenches  them- 
selves. 

On  Sunday,  the  I5th,  on  our  left,  east  of  Ypres,  a  well- 

95 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

conducted  counter-attack  was  carried  out  against  that  portion 
of  the  line  occupied  by  the  enemy  on  the  previous  day,  where 
he  had  established  himself  in  some  stables  and  trenches.  Two 
attempts  had  already  failed,  when,  at  5.30  A.M.,  a  gun  was 
brought  up  to  within  300  yards  range.  After  four  rounds 
had  been  fired  a  storming  party  succeeded  in  carrying  the 
position.  The  subaltern  in  command  being  killed,  the  attack 
was  led  by  a  company  sergeant-major.  This  non-com- 
missioned officer  was  awarded  the  Distinguished  Conduct 
Medal,  but  has  since  died  of  his  wounds. 

The  bombardment  slackened  considerably  in  this  quarter 
during  the  day.  About  3  P.M.  a  half-hearted  attack  was 
executed  up  the  Menin  Road,  but  the  enemy  never  got  to  close 
quarters.  On  the  south-east  of  Ypres,  between  Hollebeke  and 
Wytschaete,  there  was  some  hard  fighting,  in  which  the  French 
held  their  ground. 

On  our  left  centre  nothing  occurred  beyond  the  usual 
shelling.  In  the  centre  we  scored  a  local  success.  Some  of 
the  trenches  and  houses  lately  captured  by  the  Germans  were 
heavily  bombarded  by  our  howitzers,  with  the  result  that  the 
defenders  were  bolted  from  the  position  and  caught  by  the  fire 
of  our  machine-guns  as  they  retired,  losing  about  half  their 
number.  On  our  right  all  was  quiet. 

The  weather  on  this  day  was  about  the  worst  we  have  yet 
experienced.  It  was  bitterly  cold,  and  rain  fell  in  torrents. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  all  difficulties,  our  aviators  carried  out 
a  successful  reconnaissance.  For  some  time  they  hovered 
over  the  German  lines  observing  the  emplacements  of  batteries 
and  searching  the  roads  for  hostile  columns  in  the  midst  of  a 
storm  of  driving  snow  and  sleet  which  was  encountered  at 
high  altitudes. 

Further  information  has  recently  come  to  hand  regarding 
the  enemy's  methods  of  sniping  and  spying  upon  our  dis- 
positions. Non-commissioned  officers  are  offered  Iron  Crosses 
if  they  will  penetrate  our  lines  at  night.  Those  that  attempt 
this  work,  having  discarded  boots,  helmets,  and  other  im- 
pedimenta, crawl  as  close  as  possible  to  our  defences  and  try 
to  attract  the  attention  of  one  of  our  sentries  by  throwing  a 
stone  in  a  direction  contrary  to  that  in  which  they  are  crawl- 
ing. This  generally  causes  the  neighbouring  sentries  to  fire, 
thus  betraying  their  positions  and  that  of  our  line  of  trenches. 
96 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

These  spies  or  snipers  often  wear  khaki  uniform  and  woollen 
caps  similar  to  those  worn  by  our  men,  and  thus  disguised 
sometimes  succeed  in  getting  right  behind  our  lines  to  favour- 
able spots  from  which  they  shoot  men  passing  to  and  fro. 
Many  of  them  speak  English  well,  and  display  great  ingenuity  / 
and  effrontery  in  getting  out  of  tight  corners. 

Another  reason  for  penetrating  our  lines  is  the  cutting  of 
telephone  wires  ;  and  behind  one  section  of  our  front  the 
breaks  have  of  late  been  very  frequent.  That  the  damage 
has  not  been  entirely  due  to  bursting  shells  has  now  been 
proved  by  the  capture  of  one  of  the  enemy's  secret  agents 
carrying  wire-cutters  and  a  rifle.  The  man  was  known  to 
have  been  on  intimate  terms  with  the  Germans  before  they 
retired  from  the  area  now  occupied  by  us.  He  was  shot. 

The  following  is  an  account  of  the  heroic  conduct  of  a 
French  medical  officer  who,  while  in  charge  of  the  Medical 
Corps  of  one  of  the  French  divisions,  was  attending  to  the 
wounded  in  the  Civil  Hospital  at  Ypres  during  the  bombard- 
ment of  that  place.  On  November  9  he  commenced  a  letter 
explaining  the  situation  at  that  time  : 

'  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  for  the  last  four 
days,  with  the  help  of  volunteer  assistants,  I  have  been 
attending  to  54  German  wounded  at  the  Civil  Hospital  at 
Ypres.  The  hospital  has  been  struck  by  six  shells,  one  of 
which  was  an  incendiary  shell. 

'  Bread  is  failing,  and  my  assistants  are  sharing  their  own 
with  the  wounded  Germans.  .  .  .' 

The  letter  continued  that,  to  a  suggestion  that,  since  the 
position  of  the  hospital  and  the  danger  incurred  by  their  own 
men  was  known  to  the  Germans,  and  these  considerations  did 
not  affect  them,  there  was  no  reason  why  the  French  should 
concern  themselves  any  longer  about  their  fate,  his  answer 
had  been  as  follows  : 

'  I  replied  that  our  superiority  consisted  precisely  in 
showing  to  this  race  of  vandals  that  we  possess  those  humani- 
tarian feelings  of  which  they  seem  to  be  devoid,  and  that 
we  should  do  this  because  example  is  the  only  law  which 
nations  obey.  If  we  imitate  the  Germans  there  is  no  reason 
why  the  present  state  of  things  should  not  continue  for  ever, 
for  we  are  merely  descending  to  their  level,  whereas  the  mission 
of  France  is  to  elevate  the  Germans  to  our  own. 

MILITARY  2  G  97 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

'  So  long  as  I  remain  here,  by  your  leave,  I  will  continue 
to  look  after  the  wounded  Germans,  showing  them  that  a 
French  doctor  laughs  at  their  shells,  and  only  knows  his  duty.' 

On  November  10,  when  the  situation  improved  slightly, 
he  wrote : 

'Two  nursing  sisters  have  returned  from  Poperinghe 
crying,  driven  hither  by  remorse  for  having  abandoned  their 
sick  charges.  .  .  . 

'  I  am  continuing  to  dress  the  wounded.  There  are  now 
only  52.  Two  have  just  died.  The  others  are  in  a  very  grave 
condition  ;  their  wounds  are  suppurating.  All  the  men  but 
one  are  in  bed  :  one  is  suffering  from  tetanus/ 

This  was  the  officer's  last  message,  though,  with  the  nuns, 
he  remained  in  that  hell  for  at  least  three  days  longer.  He  is 
reported  to  have  been  killed  by  a  shell  on  the  I3th  or  I4th, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  I4th  the  surviving  wounded  were 
in  sole  charge  of  the  nuns,  who  had  remained  faithful  to 
the  last.  The  Frenchman  had  died  at  his  post  tending  to 
the  maimed  and  suffering  enemy.  And  his  devotion  was 
not  in  vain,  for  on  the  evening  of  the  I4th  the  wounded 
Germans  for  whom  he  had  laid  down  his  life  were  taken  to 
a  place  of  safety. 

It  is  with  great  grief  that  the  Army  has  learnt  of  the  death 
of  Field-Marshal  Earl  Roberts.1  Though  he  died  in  the  middle 
of  his  visit  to  us,  he  lived  long  enough  to  take  what  has  proved 
to  be  a  last  farewell  of  the  Indian  troops  amongst  whom  he 
began  his  career  sixty  years  ago,  and  with  whom  so  much  of 
his  life  has  been  associated.  Moreover,  it  is  felt  that  he  has 
met  the  end  he  would  have  wished,  on  active  service  as  a 
soldier.  At  an  age  when  he  might  well  have  claimed  a  rest, 
he  has  set  a  glorious  example  of  patriotism,  remaining  in 
harness  and  carrying  on  the  work  to  which  he  had  devoted 
his  life  by  coming  out  to  greet  those  fighting  for  their  country 
on  the  great  day  of  trial — that  day  whose  arrival  he  had  so 
clearly  foreseen  and  for  which  he  had  so  earnestly  striven  to 
prepare  the  nation. 

November  16-19 

Once  more  there  is  no  change  to  record  in  the  military 
situation  on  our  front.  With  the  exception  of  an  attack  in 
force,  again  upon  our  left,  on  the  I7th,  the  four  days  from  the 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

i6th  to  the  igth  have  been  unusually  uneventful.  The  great 
change  that  has  occurred  has  been  in  the  weather,  for  winter 
has  now  set  in  in  earnest.  A  miserable  afternoon  of  snow 
and  slush  has  been  succeeded  by  a  night  of  frost,  and  this 
morning  is  keen,  calm,  and  bright,  and  promises  well  for 
the  airmen,  who  have  recently  been  so  much  hampered  in 
their  work. 

In  regard  to  the  exact  situation  at  Ypres,  since  certain 
misstatements  to  the  effect  that  the  Germans  had  penetrated 
the  town  and  been  driven  out  again  have  apparently  been 
circulated,  it  may  be  as  well  to  state  that  Ypres  is  in  the  hands 
of  the  Allies,  and  that,  save  for  prisoners  of  war,  or  possibly 
spies,  no  Germans  have  succeeded  in  entering  the  town  or  even 
getting  near  entering  it.  The  Allied  position  there  is  stronger 
than  it  has  ever  been. 

On  Monday,  the  i6th,  our  troops  on  the  left  passed  the 
most  peaceful  day  they  have  experienced  during  the  last 
month.  There  was  little  shelling,  and  no  infantry  attacks 
were  made.  A  prisoner  asserted  that  it  had  been  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Germans  to  assault  in  this  quarter  on  the  I5th, 
but  that  the  damage  inflicted  by  our  artillery  on  the  previous 
day  had  been  so  heavy  that  it  had  been  decided  to  postpone 
the  operation  until  reinforcements  should  arrive.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  on  the  igth,  in  massing  preparatory  to  the 
attack,  the  Germans  had  committed  certain  faults  and  so 
given  a  good  opportunity  for  our  guns  and  Maxims,  which 
was  at  once  seized,  with  devastating  results  to  the  rear 
battalions. 

The  fighting  to  the  south  of  Ypres  continued  without  any 
marked  advantage  to  either  side,  but  the  French  everywhere 
held  their  ground  ;  on  our  centre  all  was  quiet ;  and  on  our 
right  the  enemy  continued  to  show  some  activity  in  pushing 
forward  saps  and  throwing  bombs  from  their  trench-mortars. 
One  of  their  sap-heads  was  successfully  attacked  during  the 
night,  and  an  earth-boring  tool  was  captured. 

On  Tuesday  nothing  particular  occurred  along  our  line 
except,  as  has  been  stated,  on  the  left,  where  the  Germans 
made  yet  another  effort  in  the  direction  of  Ypres.  After 
shelling  our  positions  to  the  east  and  south-east  they  made 
three  attacks.  About  i  P.M.  their  infantry  advanced  in 
strength  against  our  section  of  this  line  and  took  possession 

99 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

of  some  trenches  out  of  which  our  troops  "had  been  driven  by 
shell  fire.  When  they  endeavoured  to  press  on,  however, 
our  infantry  made  a  brilliant  counter-attack  with  the  bayonet 
and  drove  them  out  of  the  trenches  and  for  some  500  yards 
beyond. 

The  second  attempt  was  made  farther  to  south-west,  and 
was  pressed  to  within  five  yards  of  our  line  before  it  was 
broken  by  our  rifle  fire.  On  this  occasion  the  Germans 
advanced  obliquely  across  our  front  again,  and  suffered  very 
severely  both  from  our  rifle  and  gun  fire.  The  number  of 
killed  left  in  front  of  a  length  of  some  500  yards  of  our  front 
is  estimated  at  about  1200.  This  assault  was  made  by 
regular  troops,  though  not  by  the  Guard.  About  3  P.M.  they 
massed  for  a  third  assault,  but  on  being  subjected  to  a  hot 
shell  fire  they  gave  up  the  attempt.  On  the  whole  it  was  a 
most  successful  day  for  our  arms. 

Wednesday,  the  i8th,  was  another  quiet  day,  and  nothing 
occurred  except  shelling.  On  our  right  the  enemy  contented 
himself  with  sapping.  It  was  stated  that  owing  to  the  high 
tide  the  inundation  was  extending  satisfactorily  to  the  south- 
east of  Dixmude. 

Thursday,  the  igth,  was  also  uneventful.  Our  trench- 
mortars  were  used  for  the  first  time  with  good  results. 

The  successful  resistance  we  have  up  to  the  present  made 
to  all  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  has  had  a  very  encouraging 
effect ;  and  in  spite  of  the  exhausting  nature  of  the  operations 
of  the  past  month,  our  men  show  great  enterprise  in  making 
local  counter-attacks,  in  cutting  off  the  enemy's  patrols,  and 
in  similar  '  affairs  of  outposts/ 

Frequent  allusion  has  been  made  to  the  losses  of  the  enemy. 
Round  Ypres  we  are  continually  finding  fresh  evidence  of 
the  slaughter  inflicted.  On  the  I5th  one  of  our  battalions 
upon  advancing  discovered  a  German  trench  manned  by 
17  corpses,  while  there  were  49  more  in  a  house  close  by. 
Next  day  a  patrol  discovered  60  dead  in  front  of  one  trench 
and  50  opposite  another.  In  fact,  all  the  farms  and  cottages 
to  our  front  are  charnel-houses.  The  significance  of  such 
small  numbers  lies  only  in  the  fact  that  they  represent  the 
killed  in  a  very  small  area.  According  to  prisoners,  the 
German  attempts  to  take  Ypres  have  proved  costly.  One 
man  stated  that  there  were  only  15  survivors  out  of  his 
100 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

platoon,  which  went  into  action  50  strong  ;  another  reported 
that  of  250  men  who  advanced  with  him  only  19  returned. 

It  is  believed  that  one  Bavarian  regiment  3000  strong, 
which  left  Bavaria  for  the  front  on  October  19,  had  only 
1200  men  left  before  the  attack  made  along  the  Menin-Ypres 
Road  on  November  14,  in  which  it  again  suffered  severely. 
The  plight  of  some  of  the  units  of  the  new  formations  is  even 
worse,  one  regiment  of  the  23rd  Reserve  Corps  having  but 
600  men  out  of  3000.  If  the  period  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war  is  considered,  the  numbers  are  greater.  For  instance,  of 
the  I5th  Corps,  one  regiment  had  lost  60  officers  and  2560 
men,  and  another  had  lost  3000  men.  These  figures  include 
casualties  of  every  kind — killed,  wounded,  missing. 

On  all  four  days  the  weather  has  been  bad.  Generally 
fine  and  frosty  in  the  early  morning,  it  has  turned  to  rain  as 
the  day  has  worn  on.  On  Thursday  there  was  a  variation, 
and  snow  started  to  fall  about  i  P.M.  and  continued  till  about 
six  o'clock.  It  fell  in  large  soft  flakes,  and  covered  the  ground 
to  a  depth  of  perhaps  nearly  two  inches,  but  melted  under 
foot.  The  state  of  the  roads,  already  bad,  was  rendered  worse, 
while  the  condition  of  the  trenches  became  wretched  beyond 
description.  From  having  to  sit  or  stand  in  a  mixture  of 
straw  and  liquid  mud,  the  men  had  to  contend  with  half- 
frozen  slush.  '  It  is  an  ill  wind/  however,  and  the  one  good 
point  about  the  wet  weather  of  the  last  few  days  is  that  it  has 
made  the  ground  so  soft  that  the  enemy's  howitzer  shell  sink 
for  some  depth  before  they  detonate  and  expend  a  great  part 
of  their  energy  in  an  upward  direction,  throwing  mud  about. 

Nevertheless,  the  wet  and  cold  has  added  greatly  to  the 
hardships  of  the  troops  in  the  trenches  ;  and  the  problem  of 
how  to  enable  them  to  keep  their  feet  reasonably  dry  and 
warm  is  now  engaging  serious  attention.  At  one  place, 
owin^  to  the  kindness  of  the  proprietor,  certain  works  have 
recently  been  placed  at  our  disposal  as  a  wholesale  bath- 
house, lavatory,  and  repair  shop.  In  the  works  are  a  number 
of  vats  large  enough  to  contain  several  men  at  one  time,  and 
they  serve  most  excellently  for  the  provision  of  hot  baths  for 
the  men  on  relief  from  the  trenches.  Whilst  they  are  en- 
joying a  bath  their  clothes  are  taken  away.  The  under- 
clothing is  washed  or  burnt  and  replaced  by  a  new  set,  whilst 
the  uniform  is  fumigated,  cleaned,  and  repaired,  and  buttons 

101 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

are  sewn  on  and  repairs  done  by  a  gang  of  women  who  are 
employed  for  the  purpose.  At  this  installation  some  1500 
men  are  catered  for  every  day. 

What  this  rehabilitation  really  means  to  the  soldiers  can 
alone  be  appreciated  from  a  realisation  of  their  previous  state. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  they  have  not  only  not  bathed 
for  weeks,  they  have  not  even  been  able  to  take  off  their 
clothes,  and  consequently  in  many  cases  officers  as  well  as 
men  are  verminous.  As  the  latter  troop  up  to  the  bath  they 
are,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  unprepossessing  in  appearance. 
Weary,  unshorn,  and  haggard,  they  are  coated  with  mud,  a 
good  deal  of  which  has  crusted  on  them,  and  some  are  splashed 
with  the  blood  of  their  comrades  or  of  the  enemy.  When 
they  come  out  clean,  refreshed,  and  reclothed,  they  are 
different  beings.  And  not  only  is  this  a  good  thing  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  happiness  and  comfort  of  the  individual ; 
it  is  a  distinct  gain  in  his  fighting  value  and  an  asset  to  the 
force  to  which  he  belongs. 

Nevertheless,  bodily  the  men  are  in  good  condition.  Food 
in  abundance  has  reached  them  regularly,  except  in  a  few 
cases  such  as  are  incidental  to  trench  warfare. 

The  following  is  a  collection  of  extracts  from  the  diaries 
of  German  soldiers.  Except  the  last  two,  they  have  no 
special  bearing  on  the  present  phase  of  the  operations,  for  they 
refer  to  a  period  which  has  now  passed  ;  but  they  throw  some 
light  on  the  different  aspects  of  the  actual  fighting,  and  may, 
therefore,  be  of  interest  to  those  who  have  no  first-hand  ex- 
perience. They  throw  light,  also,  upon  the  psychological  side 
of  warfare  and  upon  the  manner  in  which  their  experiences 
affect  the  more  impressionable  of  the  men  engaged.  In  this 
connection  the  effect  produced  by  shell  fire  on  the  minds  of 
the  writers  is  somewhat  remarkable,  though  their  estimates 
of  the  losses  suffered  may  be  over  the  mark.  Those  of  jis  in 
the  field  are  sufficiently  uncharitable  to  derive  comfort  from 
any  revelation  of  the  success  of  our  operations,  whether  it  be 
in  the  nature  of  the  actual  damage  inflicted,  or  of  the  depres- 
sion caused  thereby. 

From  the  Diary  of  a  Man  of  the  qth  Jdger  Battalion 

'  We  got  our  (?  machine)  guns  into  position,  but  did  not  fire,  as 
we  were  informed  that  it  was  our  H4th  Infantry  Regiment  that  was 
102 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

shooting  at  us.  It  was  only  by  sounding  the  Wacht  am  Rhein  that  we 
were  able  to  bring  the  fellows  to  their  senses. 

'  The  enemy's  artillery  fire  was  now  directed  more  to  the  leftw  Our 
regiment  began  to  retire.  How  the  shells  followed  us  !  One  exploded 
three  yards  from  our  gun-carriage,  and  showered  earth  all  over  us, 
but  did  no  further  damage.  Another  dropped  just  in  front  and 
wounded  two  men  mortally,  and  then  a  third  exploded  twenty  yards 
ahead,  right  in  the  middle  of  a  column,  killing  twelve  men  outright. 
A  horrible  sight !  We  were  retiring  on  the  village  of  St.  Pol.  Luckily 
the  enemy's  fire  did  not  follow  us  here,  for  there  would  certainly  have 
been  a  panic.  One  company  leader,  Lieutenant  Fuchs,  was  killed  by 
a  piece  of  shell,  and  our  Captain  is  now  the  only  officer  we  have  left. 

'  On  this  day  our  position  was  literally  plastered  by  the  heavy 
French  naval  guns.  One  projectile  fell  in  a  trench,  killing  nine  men 
and  wounding  several  others  severely.  Another  fell  in  a  trench  of  the 
loth  Company  with  the  same  deadly  effect.  An  enormous  shell  ex- 
ploded near  the  nth  Company  trench,  destroying  fifteen  yards  of  it 
and  burying  some  twelve  men.  One  of  the  howitzer  batteries  of  the 
30th  Artillery  Regiment  suffered  very  severely.  Two  of  its  guns  were 
hit  and  broken  up.  At  the  end  of  the  day  we  all  felt  very  bad/ 

'  The  I42nd  Regiment,  lying  to  the  right  of  us,  suffered  very  much 
and  had  to  keep  on  withdrawing,  as  shell  after  shell  was  falling  right 
in  its  trenches,  and  the  men  were  absolutely  exhausted.  When  shells 
are  dropping  in  front,  behind,  to  the  right,  and  to  the  left,  to  remain 
in  suspense  continually  in  expectation  of  death  or  injury  without  being 
able  to  make  any  resistance,  and  to  hear  the  screams  of  wounded  who 
cannot  be  attended  to  in  the  narrow  trenches,  is  a  sensation  which  can 
be  appreciated  only  by  those  who  have  experienced  it.' 

From  a  Letter  of  a  Gunner  of  the  Field  Artillery 
No.  n 

21/10/14. 

'  On  the  26th  September  a  French  aviator  dropped  a  bomb  on 
Cambrai,  killing  four  Landwehr  men  and  tearing  off  the  arm  of  the 
Paymaster.  On  the  2Qth  we  were  again  sent  to  Verdun,  south  of  Arlon. 
...  On  the  4th  October  in  Mons,  thence  to  Lille.  On  the  8th  October 
our  2nd  Battery  suffered  heavy  losses  at  Dulle  (?),  losing  seven  men  and 
nineteen  horses.  On  the  nth  we  did  not  come  into  action,  but  took 
twenty  prisoners.' 

From  a  Letter  of  a  Man  of  the  qth  Jdger  Battalion 

21/10/14. 

'  We  reached  Peronne  on  the  27th  September.  We  were  then 
ordered  to  march  on  Combre  (?)  in  the  Amiens  District.  We  were 

103 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

attached  to  the   Cavalry  Division,  to  support  it,  and  also  to  cover  the 
flank  of  the  Guard  Division. 

'  On  the  5th  October  we  reached  Lens,  and  on  the  7th  took  up  a 
position  at  Jeuer.  The  enemy  shelled  us  so  heavily  all  day  that 
Lieutenant  B.  gave  the  order  to  retire  at  4  P.M.,  and  we  lost  touch  of  the 
other  companies.  We  retreated  under  terrible  rifle  and  shell  fire,  and 
had  hardly  arrived  under  cover  when  our  captain  drove  us  out  again 
to  our  old  position.  The  fire  was  so  heavy  on  our  return  that  I  was 
surprised  that  we  got  there  at  all ;  it  was  so  terrible  that  one  could 
imagine  hell  had.  opened  up  and  was  pouring  fire  out  of  a  thousand 
craters.  I  spent  the  most  terrible  hours  of  my  life  that  day.  The 
awful  bombardment  continued,  our  artillery  not  being  able  to  give  us 
any  protection.  At  noon  the  next  day  we  were  forced  to  retire.  This 
movement  took  place  under  still  heavier  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire. 
How  I  survived  is  a  wonder/ 

From  the  Diary  of  a  Bavarian  Non-Commissioned  Officer 

'  31/8/14. — We  suffered  terribly  from  the  enemy's  artillery.  The 
village  is  in  ruins  and  is  like  a  slaughter-house  ;  dead  horses,  bodies  of 
men  torn  to  bits,  pools  of  blood — a  picture  of  horror.  The  5,th  G. 
Regiment  is  marching  up  to  relieve  us.  This  regiment  has  already 
been  decimated  in  the  fighting  a  day  or  two  ago. 

'  The  enemy  directs  a  hellish  shell  fire  against  us  and  our  artillery  ; 
one  battery  is  destroyed,  and  ammunition  wagon  is  on  fire  ;  wounded 
are  crying  out.  Even  the  gravest  trembles.  My  men  tell  their  rosaries 
continually.  Only  One  Above  can  help  us. 

'  8/9/14. — Yesterday  one  of  our  sections  was  surprised  by  the 
enemy  and  almost  annihilated.  Only  two  men  survive. 

'  8/10/14. — We  are  now  near  the  town  of  Arras  in  the  N.W.  of 
France.  I  am  now  leader  (as  Sergeant)  of  my  company,  as  all  our 
officers  have  either  been  killed  or  wounded.  We  have  suffered  terrible 
losses  during  the  last  few  days.  Yesterday  I  was  nearly  killed,  a  bullet 
hitting  my  belt  buckle/ 

From  a  Letter  of  a  Man  of  the  246^  Reserve  Regiment 
(zjth  Reserve  Corps}. 

'  On  the  24th  October  we  were  ordered  to  be  ready  for  an  assault 
before  dawn.  We  had  hardly  advanced  five  hundred  yards  when  we 
were  met  by  a  terrific  shell  fire  from  the  English.  When  we  were  col- 
lected again  I  found  what  an  awful  disaster  had  overtaken  us.  Of  our 
battalion  scarcely  eighty  men  came  through/ 

(Note. — This  apparently  refers  to  one  of  the  preliminary  attacks 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Ypres.) 
104 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

From  a  Letter  of  a  Man  of  the  2^2nd  Reserve  Regiment  of  the  Same  Corps 

'  The  shooting  of  the  English  artillery  is  marvellous.  They  get 
the  right  range  and  direction  every  shot,  and  place  each  shell  within 
a  yard  of  the  previous  one.  They  must  be  wonderfully  well  informed 
of  our  movements.  I  don't  know  whether  the  intelligence  is  obtained 
by  their  aeroplanes,  which  are  always  hovering  over  us,  or  whether 
they  have  telephones  behind  our  lines/ 

November  20-22 

As  regards  the  progress  on  our  immediate  front  affairs 
remain  in  statu  quo,  and  there  is  no  change  to  record  except  a 
climatic  one,  which  has,  in  this  quarter,  really  affected  both 
sides  more  than  any  operations.  The  cold  which  set  in  on  the 
20th  has  continued  without  break.  For  three  days  the  hard 
frost  was  accompanied  by  brilliant  sunshine,  but  to-day, 
though  the  cold  continues,  the  sky  is  clouded  over.  Accord- 
ing to  local  authorities  and  gazetteers,  the  climate  of  the  Pas 
de  Calais  is  not  subject  to  extremes  of  temperature,  so  it  is  to 
be  hoped  that  the  present  severe  weather,  which  is  causing 
great  hardship  to  the  troops,  in  spite  of  the  welcome  sunshine, 
may  prove  to  be  only  a  cold  '  snap/ 

It  is  true  that  since  the  snow  has  frozen  hard  the  men 
in  the  firing  line  are  no  longer  suffering  the  misery  of  living  in 
mud  and  slush,  which  culminated  on  the  evening  of  the  igth, 
but  it  is  almost  impossible  for  them  to  keep  warm  at  night  in 
the  open  trenches.  To  give  some  idea  of  what  life  means 
under  such  conditions,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  many  men  are 
so  stiff  that  they  have  to  be  lifted  out  on  relief,  and  that  some 
have  been  admitted  to  hospital  suffering  from  frost-bite. 
Beyond  the  hardship  inflicted  on  individuals,  the  change  in 
the  weather  has  chiefly  affected  aerial  reconnaissance  and  the 
question  of  transport. 

The  former  has  been  much  facilitated  in  two  ways.  In 
the  bright  sunlight  and  through  the  clear  atmosphere  the 
whole  landscape  is  very  clearly  visible  even  from  the  height 
at  which  our  aviators  are  forced  to  fly  by  the  hostile  anti- 
aircraft guns,  while  against  the  white  background  of  snow, 
entrenchments,  roads,  transports,  rolling  stock,  and  troops 
show  up  most  distinctly.  On  the  other  hand,  the  present 
cold  experienced  at  high  altitudes,  intensified  by  the  speed  at 

105 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

which  the  aeroplanes  travel  through  the  air,  greatly  increases 
the  rigour  of  the  work.  In  spite  of  the  employment  of  every 
device  for  retaining  warmth,  both  pilots  and  observers  have 
on  some  recent  occasions  returned  so  numb  that  they  have 
had  to  be  lifted  from  their  machines. 

The  difficulty  of  transport  and  communication  has  to  some 
extent  been  reduced  by  the  cold,  for  as  the  coating  of  ice  has 
been  worn  off  or  ground  up  the  pave  has  become  far  less 
slippery  than  it  was  when  damp  and  greasy,  while  for  the 
heavy  motor-lorries  the  frozen  ground  on  the  sides  of  the 
roads  is  naturally  better  than  a  foot  of  slippery  mud. 

To  turn  to  the  operations  :  the  2oth,  2ist,  and  22nd  have 
been  as  uneventful  as  the  preceding  three  days.  To  avoid 
any  misconception,  however,  it  must  be  explained  that  the 
use  of  this  adjective  is  entirely  comparative.  What  is  now 
considered  as  uneventful  is  not  so  in  the  peace  sense  of  the 
word.  It  merely  signifies  that  no  active  operation  of  any 
special  vigour  by  either  side  has  stood  out  from  the  back- 
ground of  artillery  bombardment.  This  continues  day  and 
night  with  varying  intensity,  hardly  ever  ceasing  altogether, 
and  includes  fire  from  the  42  cm.  howitzers — one  of  which  is 
believed  to  be  in  use  against  our  left — down  to  that  of  the 
anti-aircraft  spitfires.  It  implies,  also,  that  hundreds  of 
shells  are  bursting  and  detonating  along  the  length  of  each 
line,  and  that  men  are  continually  being  killed  and  wounded. 
And  yet,  comparatively,  even  from  so  small  a  standpoint  of 
the  whole  war  as  that  of  the  British  Army  alone,  uneventful 
is  the  only  word  to  apply  to  such  days — days  on  which  scores 
of  lives  are  being  lost. 

Friday,  the  2Oth,  passed  absolutely  without  any  occurrence 
of  special  importance.  By  that  time  our  line  had  been  so 
much  strengthened  owing  to  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  as 
to  make  it  possible  for  the  men  in  the  trenches  to  be  relieved 
regularly  and  frequently,  and  thus  to  gain  the  rest  they  re- 
quire. It  was  found  that  the  difficulty  of  patrolling  had  been 
much  increased  by  the  snow,  the  men's  figures  showing  up  so 
clearly  against  the  white  background. 

In  the  centre  our  enemy  employed  a  '  silent '  gun,  which 
may  be  pneumatic  or  worked  by  some  mechanical  contrivance. 
Its  chief  points  appear  to  be  that  there  is  no  report  of  dis- 
charge, that  the  projectile  travels  through  the  air  without 
106 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

any  such  warning  sound  as  that  made  by  ordinary  shell,  and 
that  the  first  notice  received  of  its  arrival  is  its  detonation. 
So  far  this  weapon  has  done  no  damage.  On  our  right  centre 
our  artillery  made  some  good  practice,  especially  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Neuve  Chapelle,  where  it  rendered  some  of  the 
German  trenches  untenable.  During  the  day  much  valuable 
information  was  obtained  from  aerial  reconnaissance. 

Saturday,  the  2ist,  was  of  a  similar  nature  to  Friday. 
On  our  left  there  was  no  activity.  In  the  left  centre  the 
opposing  trenches  were  at  some  points  not  more  than  25  to 
40  yards  apart.  In  this  quarter  good  effects  were  being 
produced  by  the  use  of  rifle  grenades ;  the  shrapnel  was  found 
an  efficacious  means  of  curbing  the  German  snipers,  who  were 
very  enterprising.  On  the  right  centre  the  German  airmen 
were  active  and  dropped  a  bomb  on  Bailleul.  This  has  no 
more  useful  effect  in  helping  on  their  operations  than  most  of 
the  other  similar  exploits  of  their  airmen,  for  the  bomb  dropped 
on  the  hospital.  Being  fitted  with  a  sensitive  fuse,  which 
acted  on  impact  with  the  roof,  it  detonated  midway  through 
the  ward  just  below  before  reaching  the  floor.  Luckily  the 
ward  had  just  been  vacated  by  forty  patients,  but  one  wounded 
man  who  had  been  left  behind  was  again  wounded.  Every 
window  within  a  large  radius  of  the  explosion  was  shattered. 
On  our  right  a  German  aeroplane  was  forced  to  descend  in 
our  lines  after  an  action  in  the  air  with  one  of  our  machines, 
and  the  observing  officer  and  the  pilot  were  made  prisoners. 
They  were  found  to  be  furnished  with  proclamations  printed 
in  Hindi  recommending  the  native  troops  to  desert. 

Sunday,  the  22nd,  was  unusually  quiet,  and  more  like  the 
Day  of  Rest  than  it  has  been  for  some  time.  On  our  left 
sniping  was  again  countered  by  the  use  of  shrapnel.  Two 
more  German  aeroplanes  were  brought  down,  one  was  chased 
by  one  of  our  machines  for  some  distance,  during  which  a 
running  fight  was  kept  up,  in  which  our  aviator  was  slightly 
wounded  in  the  hand.  It  then  came  down  in  our  lines. 
When  they  landed  the  German  observer  and  pilot  appeared 
to  be  much  surprised  and  disgusted  to  discover  where  they 
had  descended.  The  officer  who  succeeded  in  forcing  down 
this  hostile  machine  had  previously  flown  over  Lille,  where 
he  had  dropped  several  bombs  on  the  aerodrome.  The  other 
aeroplane  was  also  chased  and  forced  to  descend,  but  managed 

107 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

to  do  so  inside  the  German  lines.  On  our  right  a  short  section 
of  one  trench  held  by  the  Indian  Corps  was  blown  in  by  bombs 
from  a  trench-mortar  and  had  to  be  abandoned.  But,  more 
than  counterbalancing  this,  our  heavy  guns  scored  direct  hits 
on  two  of  the  German  batteries. 

Some  of  the  roads  behind  the  enemy's  front  line  in  one 
quarter  have,  it  is  believed,  become  impassable  owing  partly 
to  the  weather  conditions  existing  before  the  recent  drop  in 
temperature  and  also  to  the  attentions  of  the  Allied  artillery. 
It  is  possible  to  render  roads  impracticable  by  long-range  fire 
from  heavy  guns,  either  by  shelling  any  object  that  attempts 
to  pass,  or  by  merely  dropping  shell  on  the  road  itself.  A 
combination  of  craters — such  as  are  made  by  large  calibre 
high-explosive  shell — and  a  sea  of  deep  mud  forms  an  obstacle 
difficult  of  negotiation  by  motor  transport. 

Many  reports  have  come  in  of  the  excellent  results  recently 
achieved  by  our  artillery,  especially  in  repelling  the  attacks 
on  Ypres,  in  which  quarter  of  the  field  our  artillery  officers 
say  they  have  had  such  targets  as  gunners  dream  of  but 
seldom  see.  On  one  occasion,  in  order  to  support  our  infantry 
in  a  counter-attack,  one  of  our  guns  was  brought  up  to  within 
500  yards  of  the  enemy,  and  succeeded  almost  immediately 
in  getting  a  direct  hit  on  a  German  gun,  silencing  it,  and  killing 
several  of  the  infantry  at  the  same  time.  In  another  part  of 
the  field  our  trench-mortars  have  been  effective  in  throwing 
bombs  into  the  enemy's  works. 

In  the  kind  of  warfare  now  being  waged,  which  is  in  many 
cases  conducted  at  very  close  quarters,  the  opposing  lines 
being  often  not  so  much  as  40  yards  apart,  the  strangest 
situations  occasionally  arise.  Our  men  and  the  enemy  con- 
verse— for  many  of  the  Germans  understand  English — hold 
shooting  competitions,  and  throw  packets  of  tobacco  to  one 
another.  These  positions  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy 
are  not  unwelcome  to  our  men,  for  then  they  are  at  any  rate 
secure  from  shell  fire,  the  hostile  artillery  being  unable  to 
shoot  at  them  for  fear  of  hitting  its  own  infantry.  Indeed, 
for  either  side  a  trench  close  to  the  enemy  is  often  a  safer 
spot  than  any  other  in  the  fighting  zone. 

The  news  of  the  destruction  of  the  Emden 1  naturally  caused 
immense  satisfaction  amongst  all  ranks  ;  and  at  one  place 
where  the  opposing  trenches  were  especially  close  together  it 
108 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

was  greeted  with  cheers  and  at  once  thoughtfully  passed  on 
with  comments  to  the  enemy.  The  result  was  that  our  trench 
was  fired  at  heavily  for  some  time.  The  reaction  produced 
in  France  by  a  British  success  in  the  Indian  Ocean  may  in- 
terest some  of  those  who  took  part  in  the  naval  action. 

It  is  reported  that  a  certain  Landwehr  brigade,  one  of 
whose  mail-bags  has  recently  been  found  in  front  of  a  German 
trench,  is  now  fighting  on  the  Russian  frontier. 

November  23-25 

Again  there  is  no  change  to  be  reported  in  the  military 
situation.  The  break  in  the  weather  foreshadowed  by  the 
cloudy  sky  of  the  22nd  has  now  arrived,  and  since  the  23rd 
a  thaw  has  set  in.  It  is  consequently  again  wet  underfoot, 
though  the  weather  has  been  fine.  The  narrative  for  the 
three  days,  November  23-25,  is  as  follows  : — 

On  Monday,  the  23rd,  interest  centred  on  the  south  of  the 
Lys,  where  the  Germans  resumed  their  activity  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Festubert.  In  the  morning,  having  sapped 
towards  a  certain  section  of  our  position  and  bombarded  it* 
with  trench-mortars,  they  advanced  and  succeeded  in  cap- 
turing some  of  our  trenches  by  a  rush.  Two  counter-attacks 
were  delivered  by  us  in  the  afternoon,  but  were  stopped  by 
bombs  and  machine-gun  fire. 

During  the  night,  however,  the  enemy  was  gradually 
driven  from  the  positions  he  had  captured,  losing  over  100 
killed  and  100  prisoners,  including  three  officers.  Three 
machine-guns  and  a  trench-mortar  were  also  taken.  This 
counter-attack  was  carried  out  in  the  face  of  heavy  fire  from 
machine-guns,  our  British  and  Indian  troops  storming  the 
trenches  on  both  flanks,  and  then  clearing  them  by  working 
inwards.  The  Gurkhas  did  considerable  execution  at  close 
quarters  with  their  kukris,  even  penetrating  into  some  of  the 
German  trenches,  while  a  grenade  party,  led  by  an  officer 
of  the  Royal  Engineers,  co-operated  with  great  effect.  Our 
casualties  were  numerous,  as  is  natural  in  fighting  at  such 
close  quarters,  but  they  were  not  so  heavy  as  those  of  the 
enemy. 

During  the  German  attack  on  the  23rd,  a  British  officer 
in  charge  of  a  trench  in  a  position  of  some  tactical  importance 

109 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

received  an  urgent  telephone  message  instructing  him  to  hold 
on  at  all  costs.  His  reply  was  to  the  effect  that  he  had  never 
had  any  intention  of  doing  anything  else,  and  that  he  would 
be  obliged  if  he  could  be  informed  when  his  men's  rations 
would  be  sent  up. 

On  this  night  a  minor  success  was  gained  a  few  miles 
farther  north  by  a  small  party  belonging  to  one  of  our  bat- 
talions. After  the  officer  in  command  had  shot  the  German 
sentry,  our  men,  by  rapid  fire,  cleared  three  of  the  enemy's 
advanced  trenches  without  sustaining  any  casualties.  Our 
guns  then  interposed  to  keep  down  the  fire  from  other  trenches 
as  our  men  retired.  On  the  rest  of  our  line  nothing  of  interest 
occurred ;  the  bombardment  continued  to  slacken,  being  re- 
placed to  a  great  extent  by  sniping  on  both  sides. 

During  this  war  the  cavalry  have  had  to  play  many  roles, 
varying  from  charging  with  the  bayonet  to  sapping  and  even 
mining,  but  November  23  furnished  a  fresh  experience  even 
for  them,  a  brigade  being  moved  by  motors,  since  the  road 
was  too  slippery  for  horses. 

Tuesday,  the  24th,  was  absolutely  uneventful.  One  of 
our  Territorial  battalions  proved  themselves  already  adepts 
at  sniping  by  accounting  for  seven  Germans  with  a  loss  of  one 
man  to  themselves.  On  our  right  there  was  much  bomb- 
throwing  on  both  sides,  but  the  enemy  showed  no  inclination 
to  press  on.  That  night,  in  the  centre  of  oar  line,  an  officer 
accompanied  by  some  sappers  and  an  infantry  escort  went 
out  in  order  to  mine  a  farm  from  which  there  had  been  sniping. 
Under  fire  from  the  German  trenches  they  laid  the  charge 
and  retired.  A  party  of  the  enemy  went  into  the  farm,  found 
the  fuse,  and  cut  it. 

There  was,  however,  another  means  of  firing  the  charge, 
which,  unluckily  for  them,  they  did  not  discover,  and  the 
building  and  its  occupants  were  blown  up. 

Wednesday,  the  25th,  was  a  comparatively  warm  day, 
which,  after  the  cold  of  the  last  few  nights,  came  as  a  great 
relief  to  the  men  in  the  trenches.  All  was  quiet  along  our 
line  except  on  the  left,  where  both  sides  continued  to  shell 
one  another's  positions.  In  the  centre  our  troops  have  con- 
trived to  make  it  extremely  unpleasant  for  the  Germans  who 
gained  a  foothold  on  the  edge  of  Ploegsteert  Wood  some  weeks 
ago.  Their  position  is  subjected  to  a  cross  fire  from  all  direc- 
no 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

tions,  which  during  the  last  two  days  alone  has  accounted  for 
nineteen  men.  Indeed,  since  the  enemy  desisted  from  his 
attacks  in  force,  the  fighting  has  resolved  itself  into  a  com- 
petition in  sniping  and  small  affairs  of  outposts  all  along  the 
line,  contested  with  rifle,  hand-grenades,  bombs  from  mortars, 
and  mines. 

Our  aeroplanes  have  been  especially  active  in  offence 
during  the  last  few  days,  having  dropped  123  bombs  on  various 
targets  which  need  not  be  specified.  One  of  our  heavy 
howitzers,  also,  registered  a  direct  hit  on  a  railway  station. 

Every  effort  is  being  made  to  mitigate  the  hardships  in- 
cidental to  campaigning  in  winter.  The  trenches  themselves 
are  heated  by  braziers  and  stoves  and  floored  with  straw, 
bricks,  and  boards.  Behind  them  are  shelters  and  dug-outs 
of  every  description,  most  ingeniously  contrived  so  as  to  give 
some  degree  of  comfort  and  facilities  for  cooking.  The  men 
are  being  provided  with  skin-coats  in  addition  to  their  great- 
coats. 

There  is  remarkably  little  sickness,  which  fact  is  due  no 
doubt  to  the  ample  quantity  and  excellent  quality  of  food, 
but  there  have  been  several  cases  of  frost-bite  in  the  feet. 
Hot  baths  are  being  arranged  for  the  men  when  their  turn  of 
duty  is  over.  The  arrangements  for  bathing  made  at  one 
place  already  described  have  now  been  elaborated,  and  after 
bathing  a  man  can  rest,  drink  a  cup  of  coffee,  and  smoke  a 
cigarette. 

The  account  already  given  of  the  repulse  of  the  attack 
by  the  Prussian  Guard  on  November  n  was  necessarily  brief, 
and  no  reference  was  made  to  the  prominent,  and,  indeed, 
decisive  part  played  by  the  artillery.  After  the  enemy 
had  broken  .through  our  front  line,  the  situation  became 
most  serious,  for  there  were  only  two  field  companies  of 
Royal  Engineers  available  at  the  moment  as  a  reserve  in 
this  quarter  of  the  field.  On  the  right  front  of  the  German 
attack,  firing  through  open  spaces  between  the  woods,  were  a 
heavy  battery  and  a  field  battery,  which  dealt  havoc  amongst 
the  attackers  both  before  and  after  they  reached  our  line. 
But  the  Germans  continued  to  come  on  almost  up  to  the 
guns,  some  bodies  being  picked  up  at  a  distance  of  only  70 
yards  from  them. 

Realising  that  all  might  be  lost  unless  a  firing  line  of  some 

in 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

kind  could  be  established,  the  battery  officers  managed  to 
form  a  line  of  gunners,  regimental  cooks,  and  details  of  various 
descriptions.  These  men  stood  firm,  kept  up  a  steady  rifle 
fire,  and  checked  the  assault  at  a  most  critical  moment,  thus 
enabling  other  troops  to  come  up  to  repel  it  more  completely. 
At  another  point  five  Sapper  cooks  attacked  a  house  contain- 
ing some  Germans  who  were  sniping  a  French  battery  at  short 
range.  They  drove  an  equal  number  of  Germans  from  the 
house,  capturing  three  of  them. 

One  of  our  artillery  officers,  who  was  observing  for  his 
battery  from  a  building  near  the  firing  line,  found  himself 
completely  cut  off  and  in  rear  of  the  Germans  who  had  gained 
our  advanced  trenches.  Not  at  all  perturbed,  however,  by 
the  strangeness  of  his  situation,  and  recognising  that  a  turn 
of  affairs  had  given  him  a  unique  opportunity,  he  continued 
for  two  whole  days  to  direct  the  fire  of  the  guns  by  telephone, 
subsequently  rejoining  our  troops  by  night. 

Another  officer  of  the  same  regiment  who  was  employed 
on  a  similar  duty  also  had  a  strange  experience.  Stationed 
in  one  of  our  advanced  trenches,  he  was  engulfed  in  the  wave 
of  Germans  who  suddenly  appeared  from  the  mist  and  pressed 
on  past  the  trench  in  which  he  was  ensconced.  He  then 
found  himself  stranded  high  and  dry  between  the  two 
advancing  masses  of  the  enemy.  Running  down  the  rear 
of  the  front  column,  he  succeeded  in  the  fog  in  escaping  to 
the  flank  without  being  noticed. 

It  speaks  wonders  for  German  discipline  that  their  officers 
should  be  able  to  get  so  much  out  of  their  men,  but  an  incident 
which  occurred  recently  in  front  of  one  of  our  battalions  shows 
that  the  demands  made  are  sometimes  beyond  the  limit  of 
human  endurance.  The  Germans  were  holding. the  edge  of  a 
wood,  and  in  order  to  attack  our  trenches  had  to  advance 
across  an  open  space  of  some  200  yards.  After  much  shout- 
ing and  cries  of  '  Vorwarts  '  the  first  assault  was  delivered. 
It  was  repelled,  and  the  enemy  retired  to  the  shelter  of  the 
wood.  The  assault  was  repeated  a  second  and  then  a  third 
time,  being  on  each  occasion  preluded  by  louder  exhortations. 
Once  again  did  our  listening  men  hear  shouts  of  '  Vorwarts  ' ; 
but  on  this  occasion  these  were  greeted  with  loud  exclama- 
tions of  '  Nein,'  '  Nein,'  and  no  advance  was  made. 

The  way  in  which  Our  troops  have  been  supplied  is  ad- 

112 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

mittedly  one  of  the  features  of  the  campaign.  In  fact  it  is 
probably  not  saying  too  much  to  state  that  no  soldiers  in  the 
field  have  ever  been  so  well  fed  as  are  ours  to-day.  Full 
credit  for  this  must  be  given  to  the  branch  of  the  British 
Army  concerned,  but  at  the  same  time  it  must  be  recognised 
that  its  efforts  would  have  been  in  vain  except  for  the  whole- 
hearted co-operation  and  assistance  of  the  French  railway 
authorities.  The  railway  system  has  worked  without  a 
hitch,  and  in  carrying  out  a  complicated  transport  task  which 
has  developed  in  a  direction  which  could  not  exactly  have 
been  foreseen,  has  proved  to  what  an  extent  of  elastic  efficiency 
the  organisation  has  been  brought  by  preparation  and  practice 
in  peace  manoeuvres.  Amidst  all  its  multifarious  duties  in 
supplying  the  French  troops  spread  over  an  arc  of  some  350 
miles,  it  has  never  once  failed  in  the  additional  duty  of  acting 
as  a  line  of  communication  for  the  British  Army. 

Retrospect — October  and  November 

As  was  said  in  the  last  narrative,  there  has  recently  been 
a  lull  in  active  operations.  No  progress  has  been  made  by 
either  side  in  our  sphere  of  action,  and  no  change  has  occurred 
in  the  situation  of  the  British  relative  to  the  enemy.  Yet 
there  has  come  about  an  important  modification  in  the  scope 
of  the  part  played  by  our  army  as  a  whole.  This  modification, 
comprising  a  readjustment  of  our  forces,  has  been  maturing 
for  some  time,  and  has  now  been  completed.  It  can  therefore 
be  referred  to  in  some  detail  in  the  course  of  a  brief  general 
review  of  the  development  of  the  situation  of  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force  during  the  past  six  weeks. 

When  that  force  was  transferred  northwards  from  the 
Aisne  to  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Belgian  frontier  during 
the  first  days  of  October,  its  task  was  to  prolong  the  left  flank 
of  the  French  and  to  prosecute  farther  north  the  action  which 
they  had  been  so  gallantly  carrying  on  for  a  month  on  our  left, 
from  Soissons  up  to  the  north  of  Arras,  and  also  to  join  hands 
with  the  French  and  Belgian  forces  on  the  coast.  Incidentally, 
in  attempting  this,  it  was  compelled  to  assume  responsibility 
for  a  very  extended  section  of  front.  That  this  was  so  was 
due  to  the  exigencies  of  the  moment  and  to  the  numerical  in- 
adequacy of  the  British  Army  for  the  part  it  was  forced  to 
play  by  the  course  taken  by  the  war. 

MILITARY  2  H  113 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

It  is  necessary  to  point  out  that  in  any  appreciation  of 
the  role  played  by  our  forces  in  the  past,  being  played  in  the 
present,  or  to  be  played  in  the  future,  sight  must  never  be  lost 
of  the  fact  that  they  are  not  waging  this  war  single-handed, 
and  that  their  deeds,  important  as  they  naturally  must  appear 
to  us,  represent  but  a  small  fraction  of  the  joint  action  of  the 
Allies  in  the  western  theatre  of  war.  Geographically  the 
extent  of  front  for  which  the  British  were  responsible  during 
October  was  in  length  less  than  one-twelfth  of  the  immense 
line,  from  Switzerland  on  the  right  to  the  English  Channel 
on  the  left,  held  by  the  Allies.  This  being  so,  it  is  obvious 
that  by  far  the  greater  share  of  the  common  task  of  opposing 
the  enemy — a  share  which  they  have  splendidly  performed— 
has  fallen  and  still  falls  to  the  French,  while  the  Belgians  have 
played  an  important,  almost  vital,  part. 

This  extended  front  having  been  taken  up  by  our  Army, 
what  happened  ?  As  has  already  been  pointed  out,  the  action 
on  its  part  at  first,  up  to  October  20,  was  preparatory  in 
nature,  the  British  advancing  in  an  attempt  to  turn  the 
German  right,  and  the  Germans  fighting  delaying  actions  in 
order  to  gain  time  for  reinforcements  to  come  up.  From 
the  moment  that  Antwerp  fell — on  October  9 — the  Germans 
made  every  effort  to  push  forward  the  besieging  forces  re- 
leased towards  the  west,  and  to  follow  up  the  Belgian  Field 
Army  and  the  British  detachment  landed  on  the  coast.  They 
also  hastened  to  bring  up  from  various  parts  of  Germany 
certain  new  army  corps  which  had  been  hastily  raised  and 
trained  after  the  commencement  of  the  war.  Their  object 
was  first  to  reinforce  their  comparatively  weak  right  wing 
north  of  La  Bassee,  which  was  being  gradually  pushed  back 
by  the  enveloping  British,  and  then,  pivoted  on  that  place, 
which  was  still  in  their  hands,  to  assume  the  offensive  in 
strength,  drive  the  Allies  out  of  Belgium,  and  break  through 
to  Dunkirk  and  Calais. 

Of  their  new  formations  four  corps  reached  the  zone  of 
operations  comprised  in  the  stretch  of  country  from  Lille  to 
the  sea  between  October  15  and  21  ;  and  these,  with  the 
troops  which  had  been  set  free  from  Antwerp,  together 
made  up  a  force  of  some  250,000  fresh  men.  Other  corps 
were  also  concentrated  from  different  parts  of  the  front,  and 
eventually  the  Germans  had,  north  of  La  Bassee,  about 
114 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

fourteen  corps  and  eight  cavalry  divisions,  that  is,  a  force 
of  three-quarters  of  a  million  men  with  which  to  attempt  to 
drive  the  Allies  into  the  sea.  In  addition,  and  this  is  most 
important,  there  was  the  immensely  powerful  armament  of 
heavy  siege  artillery  which  had  also  been  brought  up  from 
round  Antwerp. 

As  is  known,  the  first  blow  was  delivered  about  October  17 
along  the  coast,  against  our  Allies  round  Nieuport  and  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Dixmude,  both  places  being  beyond  the 
left  of  our  line,  which  then  had  its  flank  slightly  to  the 
north-east  of  Ypres.  From  that  time  up  to  the  28th  a  series 
of  desperate  attempts  were  made  against  the  French  and 
Belgians  holding  the  line  of  the  Yser,  who  resisted  with  the 
utmost  determination  and  entire  success.  Shortly  after  these 
attacks  commenced,  on  October  20,  the  enemy  began  also 
to  press  at  different  points  along  our  front ;  and  from  that 
day  up  to  November  17,  or  for  nearly  a  month,  he  continued 
to  deliver  a  succession  of  furious  blows,  the  most  violent  of* 
which  were  directed  against  Ypres.  At  the  commencement 
of  this  period  the  Allies  were  very  greatly  outnumbered,  which 
fact  enabled  the  Germans,  in  the  execution  of  their  offensive 
strategy,  to  mass  greater  strength  than  that  possessed  by  the 
defence  at  any  place  selected  for  attack,  or,  in  other  words,  at  the 
place  which  for  the  moment  was  regarded  as  the  decisive  point. 

To  turn  to  the  action  of  the  British  Army  round  Ypres : 
for  practically  a  month  it  succeeded  in  holding  its  ground 
against  those  repeated  onslaughts  made  by  vastly  superior 
forces.  The  action  during  this  period  can  be  divided  into 
two  phases,  one  lasting  from  October  20,  when  the  Germans 
first  assumed  the  offensive  against  us  definitely,  to  Novem- 
ber 2,  and  the  other  from  the  3rd  to  the  I7th  of  that  month. 
Before  these  two  phases  are  considered,  however,  it  will  be 
as  well  to  define  briefly  in  what  manner  the  portion  of  the 
line  most  concerned,  i.e.  that  near  Ypres,  was  held,  so  that 
some  idea  may  be  gained  of  the  course  of  the  operations  in 
connection  with  locality.  At  first,  when  the  German  offensive 
started,  the  British  held  part  of  the  re-entrant  in  the  line  to 
the  north  of  the  Ypres  salient,  the  salient  to  the  east  of  the 
town,  and  the  re-entrant  to  the  south  of  it.  The  German 
attacks  in  this  quarter  were  of  a  double  nature.  Against  the 
northern  and  southern  re-entrants  their  immediate  object 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

was  to  cut  off  the  defenders  of  the  Ypres  salient.  Against  the 
east  of  the  salient,  from  the  direction  of  Menin,  their  efforts 
were  directed  to  drive  the  defenders  straight  westwards 
through  the  town. 

During  the  first  phase,  from  October  21  to  23,  occurred 
the  unsuccessful  attack  of  the  German  23rd  Corps  against  us 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Bixschoote  and  that  of  the  27th  Corps 
from  the  neighbourhood  of  Becelaere  against  the  British  on 
the  north  of  the  Menin  Road,  both  of  these  corps  being  new 
formations.  After  these  attacks  the  French  relieved  us  of 
part  of  the  front  on  the  northern  re-entrant.  This  phase 
culminated  in  the  five  days'  desperate  fighting  on  the  east  of 
Ypres,  which  lasted  from  October  29  till  November  2,  when 
the  Germans  attempted  to  capture  the  town  by  a  direct  blow 
westwards  and  penetration  through  the  southern  re-entrant. 

This  operation,  as  has  previously  been  described,  was 
their  great  effort,  heralded  by  numerous  orders  inciting  the 
troops  to  do  their  utmost,  preluded  and  supported  by  an 
intense  concentrated  artillery  fire,  and  encouraged  by  the 
presence  of  the  Emperor.  The  attack  was  made  by  five  corps 
in  all,  and  when  first  its  full  fury  fell  on  us  we  were  still  holding 
a  very  extended  front,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  French 
had  relieved  us  of  a  portion  of  it  to  the  north  and  were  co- 
operating most  gallantly  in  the  defence. 

During  this  time  our  force — which  consisted  all  along  of 
the  same  units,  be  it  noted — had  to  withstand  an  almost 
continuous  bombardment  and  to  meet  one  desperate  assault 
after  another,  each  carried  out  by  fresh  units  drawn  from 
the  large  number  which  the  Germans  were  devoting  to  the 
operation. 

On  the  30th  the  French  came  to  our  assistance  and  took 
over  a  portion  of  our  front  on  the  southern  re-entrant,  thus 
relieving  the  pressure  considerably  ;  and  on  the  succeeding 
days  a  continuous  stream  of  French  reinforcements  arrived 
in  this  quarter  and  in  the  north  of  Ypres.  Never  was  help 
more  welcome,  for  by  then  our  small  local  reserves  had  again 
and  again  been  thrown  into  the  fight  in  the  execution  of 
repeated  counter-attacks,  and  our  men  were  exhausted  by 
incessant  fighting. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  this  timely  relief  should  have 
been  afforded  us  by  our  Allies  within  a  few  days  of  the  sixtieth 
116 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

anniversary  of  that  other  occasion — at  the  Battle  of  Inkerman 
— when  the  British  Army  welcomed  a  French  force  advancing 
to  its  assistance. 

During  the  second  phase  in  the  struggle  there  was  a 
renewal  of  the  attacks,  marked  by  the  special  effort  made  by 
the  Prussian  Guard  on  the  nth  directly  westwards  against 
the  salient,  and  that  made  by  the  15th  Corps  on  November 
17  to  force  its  way  in  by  the  southern  re-entrant.  The 
results  of  those  attempts  are  known.  On  November  20  the 
thin  khaki  line  in  this  quarter  was  finally  relieved  by  the 
French,  and  our  weary  men  vacated  the  battered  trenches 
they  had  so  gallantly  held  for  a  month. 

This,  then,  is  the  modification  of  the  role  now  being 
played  by  the  British  Army  ;  its  front  has  been  considerably 
shortened  by  the  extent  taken  over  by  the  French,  and  has, 
in  addition,  been  reinforced.  The  lull  in  activity  of  about  a 
week  in  the  operations  also  has  enabled  us  to  readjust  our 
forces,  strengthen  their  position,  and  to  bring  up  reserves. 
There  has,  therefore,  been  a  great  general  improvement  in 
the  conditions  under  which  we  are  carrying  on  the  fight : 
and  the  time  has  arrived  when  it  becomes  possible — for  the 
first  time — without  danger  of  giving  away  information  that 
might  enlighten  and  encourage  the  enemy,  to  refer  to  what 
our  troops  have  done  in  one  quarter  of  the  small  portion  of 
the  whole  battle  line  which  they  have  been  holding,  and  to 
explain  broadly  why  the  stand  made  by  them  during  the 
month  after  October  20,  1914,  forms  one  of  the  most  glorious 
chapters  in  our  military  history.  Special  attention  is  drawn 
to  this  quarter  of  our  front  because  it  was  that  most  highly 
tried. 

It  may  be  that  the  story  of  that  month  will  never  be  fully 
told.  Many  of  those  who  could  have  supplied  essential  details 
are  dead,  and  the  nature  of  the  fighting  was  such  as  to  pre- 
clude any  chance  of  careful  records  being  kept.  But  it  can  be 
said  that  the  dogged  pluck  of  the  troops  and  the  individual 
acts  of  gallantry  and  devotion  on  the  part  of  regimental 
officers  and  men  again  and  again  retrieved  a  situation  that 
was  at  times  critical ;  and  that  it  has  been  due  solely  to  their 
resource,  initiative,  and  endurance  that  success  has  lain 
with  us. 

As  the  struggle  swayed  backwards  and  forwards  through 

117 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

wood  and  hamlet,  the  fighting  assumed  a  most  confused  and 
desperate  character.  Units  became  inextricably  mixed,  and 
in  many  cases,  in  order  to  strengthen  some  threatened  point 
or  fill  a  gap  in  the  line,  officers  had  to  collect  and  throw  into 
the  fight  what  men  they  could,  regardless  of  the  units  to 
which  they  belonged.  In  one  trench  a  subaltern  was  perhaps 
in  charge  of  a  detachment  composed  of  Scotch,  Irish,  and 
English  regiments.  Here,  a  brigadier  commanded  a  few 
companies.  There,  another  has  been  in  control  of  a  division. 
One  officer  of  that  rank  at  one  time  had  thirteen  battalions 
under  his  command,  which  were  much  below  strength  owing 
to  casualties  and  the  disintegration  inseparable  from  hand-to- 
hand  fighting.  Our  casualties  have  been  severe,  but  we  have 
been  fighting  a  battle,  and  a  battle  implies  casualties.  And 
heavy  as  they  have  been,  it  must  be  remembered  that  they 
have  not  been  suffered  in  vain.  The  duty  of  the  French, 
Belgians,  and  British  in  the  western  theatre  of  operations  has 
been  to  act  as  a  containing  force,  in  other  words,  to  hold  on 
and  to  keep  occupied  as  many  of  the  enemy  as  possible 
whilst  the  Russians  were  attacking  in  the  east.  In  this  we 
have  succeeded  in  playing  our  part,  and  by  our  resistance 
have  contributed  materially  towards  the  success  of  the 
campaign. 

Moreover,  our  losses  have  not  impaired  our  fighting 
efficiency.  The  troops  have  required  only  a  slight  respite 
in  order  to  be  able  to  continue  the  action  with  as  much  deter- 
mination as  ever.  They  are  physically  fit  and  well  fed,  and 
have  suffered  merely  from  the  fatigue  inseparable  from  a  pro- 
tracted struggle  such  as  they  have  been  through.  The  severest 
handling  by  the  enemy  has  never  had  more  than  a  temporary 
effect  on  their  spirits,  which  have  soon  recovered  owing  to  the 
years  of  discipline  and  training  to  which  officers  and  men  have 
been  accustomed. 

The  value  of  such  preparation  is  as  noticeable  on  the  side 
of  the  enemy  as  on  our  own.  The  phenomenal  losses  suffered 
by  the  German  new  formations  have  been  remarked,  and 
they  were  in  part  due  to  their  lack  of  training.  Moreover, 
though  at  the  first  onset  these  formations  advanced  to  the 
attack  as  bravely  as  their  active  corps,  they  have  not  by 
any  means  shown  the  same  recuperative  power.  The  27th 
Corps,  for  instance,  which  is  a  new  formation,  composed 
118 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

principally  of  men  with  only  from  seven  to  twelve  weeks' 
training,  has  not  yet  recovered  from  its  first  encounter  with 
British  infantry  round  Becelaere,  to  the  north-east  of  Ypres, 
a  month  ago.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Guard  Corps,  in  spite 
of  having  suffered  severely  in  Belgium,  of  having  been  thrown 
headlong  across  the  Oise  at  Guise,  and  of  having  lost  large 
numbers  on  the  plains  of  Champagne  and  on  the  banks  of 
the  Aisne,  advanced  against  Ypres  on  November  n  as  bravely 
as  they  did  on  August  20. 

It  is  well  that  the  services  of  those  who  lie  dead  on  the 
slopes  and  in  the  woods  along  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier 
should  be  realised,  even  though  the  realisation  of  their  perfor- 
mances must  at  present  of  necessity  be  imperfect.  Theirs  it 
has  been  to  defend  against  tremendous  odds  a  line  that  could 
only  be  maintained  if  they  were  prepared  to  undergo  great 
sacrifices. 

The  fact  that  the  situation  has  now  been  relieved  is  no 
reason  for  assuming  that  the  enemy  has  abandoned  his 
intention  to  press  through  to  the  sea  ;  and  the  same  task 
lies  before  the  British  Army  of  maintaining  its  share  in  the 
struggle  until  the  nation  in  arms  shall  come  to  our  support. 
The  price  already  paid  has  been,  and  will  doubtless  be,  great, 
but  it  will  be  paid  ungrudgingly,  in  the  certainty  that  help 
will  come  before  long. 

What  the  Army  has  done  cannot  be  better  expressed  than 
in  the  concluding  words  of  a  Special  Order  recently  issued  by 
the  Field-Marshal  Commanding-in-Chief  : — 

'  I  have  made  many  calls  upon  you,  and  the  answers  you  have  made 
to  them  have  covered  you,  your  regiments,  and  the  Army  to  which 
you  belong  with  honour  and  glory. 

'Your  fighting  qualities,  courage,  and  endurance  have  been  sub- 
jected to  the  most  trying  and  severe  tests,  and  you  have  proved  your- 
selves worthy  descendants  of  the  British  soldiers  of  the  past  who  have 
built  up  the  magnificent  traditions  of  the  regiments  to  which  you 
belong. 

'  You  have  not  only  maintained  those  traditions,  but  you  have 
materially  added  to  their  lustre. 

'  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  find  words  in  which  to  express  my  ap- 
preciation of  the  splendid  services  you  have  performed/ 

The  Germans  are,  indeed,  no  unworthy  foes.  In  spite  of 
the  strain  of  conducting  a  gigantic  struggle  on  two  fronts, 

119 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

they  continue  to  attack  with  a  courage  which  appears  to 
be  but  little  abated  by  failure.  In  this  quarter  they  have 
not  succeeded  in  gaining  the  Straits  of  Dover ;  but  the  new 
army  which  they  put  into  the  field  in  the  middle  of  October 
has  enabled  them  to  consolidate  their  position  on  this  frontier, 
and  to  retain  all  but  a  very  small  portion  of  Belgium,  in- 
cluding an  important  stretch  of  coastline.  Well  as  they  have 
fought,  however,  it  is  doubtful  if  their  achievements  have 
been  commensurate  with  their  losses,  which,  as  has  been  said, 
have  recently  been  very  largely  due  to  the  lack  of  training 
and  comparative  lack  of  discipline  of  the  improvised  units 
they  have  placed  in  the  field.  The  qualification  '  compara- 
tive '  is  employed  advisedly,  for  owing  to  the  discipline  to 
which  every  German  is  subjected  from  childhood,  that  of  their 
new  formations  is  probably  greater  than  any  that  could  be 
instilled  into  Englishmen  of  a  similar  class  in  similar  circum- 
stances. Nevertheless,  the  prospect  of  their  ultimate  defeat, 
certain  as  it  seems  to  us,  does  not  appear  even  yet  to  have 
dawned  on  them,  nor  will  it  do  so  until  further  great  efforts 
and  further  great  sacrifices  have  been  made  by  the  Allies.  , 

This  war  is  going  to  be  one  of  exhaustion  ;  and  after  the 
regular  armies  of  the  belligerents  have  done  their  work  it 
wfll  be  upon  the  measures  taken  to  prepare  and  utilise  the 
raw  material  of  the  manhood  of  the  countries  concerned 
that  final  success  will  depend.  This  implies  trained  men — 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  trained  and  disciplined  men. 

November  26-28 

From  the  26th  to  the  28th  the  weather  has  continued 
warm,  and,  except  for  an  occasional  heavy  shower,  has  been 
fine.  These  three  days  have  been  productive  of  no  incidents 
of  any  magnitude,  and  have,  on  the  whole,  been  about  the 
quietest  we  have  experienced  for  weeks.  The  narrative  of 
operations,  therefore,  can  be  dismissed  in  a  very  few  words. 

Though  generally  inactive  along  our  front,  the  Germans 
have  continued  to  press  in  one  quarter — i.e.  against  the 
Indian  troops,  where,  in  spite  of  the  loss  suffered  by  them 
in  their  last  attack  in  this  direction,  they  have  been  busy 
extending  their  saps  in  order  to  carry  out  assaults  from  short 
distances.  None  of  these  however,  has  been  carried  out  in 
120 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

great  force.  South  of  the  Lys  generally  there  has  been  some 
shelling  of  localities  in  the  rear  of  our  front  line  ;  but  this 
form  of  annoyance  diminishes  daily  along  our  whole  front. 
Sniping  is  carried  on  almost  incessantly.  There  seems  little 
doubt  that  the  Germans  are  employing  civilians,  either  willing 
or  unwilling,  to  dig  trenches,  for  some  have  been  seen  and 
shot  while  engaged  in  this  work. 

On  Thursday,  the  26th,  there  is  nothing  to  record. 

On  the  ayth  the  enemy  succeeded  by  means  of  sapping 
up,  and  then  assaulting  from  a  short  distance  amidst  a  shower 
of  bombs,  in  gaining  possession  of  a  portion  of  a  trench  on 
our  right.  From  this,  however,  they  were  soon  ejected. 

On  the  28th,  facing  our  centre,  there  were  signs  of  some 
change  having  been  made  in  the  composition  of  the  hostile 
artillery,  which  was  employed  in  '  registering '  fresh  zones 
of  fire.  On  the  right,  one  of  the  German  batteries  was  dis- 
covered in  the  morning  to  have  been  left  out  in  the  open. 
This  was  probably  due  to  the  failure  of  an  attempt  to  move 
it  during  the  night.  However,  whatever  the  cause  of  its 
exposed  position,  our  guns  did  not  fail  to  take  advantage  of 
it.  On  the  same  day,  though  inactive  against  us,  the  Germans 
made  an  isolated  and  unsupported  attack  on  the  French  on 
our  left.  They  were  easily  beaten  back,  and,  it  is  believed, 
lost  some  400  killed  and  many  prisoners. 

While  it  is  necessary  to  accept  the  evidence  of  all  prisoners 
with  caution,  there  is  a  change  of  tone  in  the  views  expressed 
by  some  of  the  officers  recently  captured  which  appears  to  be 
genuine.  They  admit  the  failure  of  German  strategy,  and 
profess  to  take  a  gloomy  view  of  the  future.  At  the  same 
time,  it  must  be  confessed  that  there  is  as  yet  no  sign  that 
their  view  is  that  generally  held  by  the  enemy.  Nor  has  there 
been  any  definite  indication  of  a  lack  of  morale  amongst  his 
troops. 

During  the  last  six  weeks  various  mobilisation  orders 
calling  up  different  classes  of  men  liable  to  service  have  been 
issued  by  the  French  Government.  To  the  average  English- 
man, whom  a  life  spent  far  removed  from  all  that  war  implies 
is  apt  to  render  unimaginative,  even  the  immediate  effect  of 
such  orders  is  hard  to  conceive :  and  to  him  a  journey,  made 
shortly  after  their  issue,  along  the  highways  of  Northern 
France — or,  for  that  matter,  in  any  part  of  France — might 

121 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

have  come  as  somewhat  of  a  revelation.  From  the  middle  of 
October  onwards  the  roads  have  been  thronged  with  men— 
literally  thousands  being  met  with  in  the  course  of  a  short 
motor  journey — all  trudging  along  towards  the  mobilisation 
centres,  carrying  their  few  clothes  and  necessaries  in  bags 
slung  over  their  shoulders.  Some  have  more,  some  less,  but 
few  are  without  the  spare  pair  of  boots  which  they  apparently, 
and  quite  rightly,  regard  as  the  most  necessary  article  of  a 
soldier's  outfit.  '  The  Emperor  fights  his  campaigns  with 
our  legs  and  not  with  our  muskets/  said  the  conscripts  of 
Napoleon,  and  their  descendants  have  evidently  not  forgotten 
the  lesson.  The  strange  procession  includes  a  curious  mixture 
of  types.  A  considerable  proportion  consists  of  middle-aged 
men  of  good  physique,  broad-shouldered  and  sturdy,  and  of 
likely  young  men  from  the  countryside,  of  a  type  to  make 
excellent  soldiers. 

For  some  years,  as  is  probably  generally  known,  there 
have  been  no  exemptions  from  military  service  in  France. 
Educational  standards  and  professions,  such  as  those  of  the 
actor,  lawyer,  doctor,  and  artist,  which  were  formerly  ex- 
cepted,  are  now  so  no  longer.  But,  besides  those  who  escaped 
in  the  past,  many  others  have  now  been  gathered  in  the  net 
of  service  and  have  gone  to  swell  the  numbers  of  those  who 
have  recently  been  streaming  along  every  road  in  France  to 
answer  to  the  call  of  their  country. 

The  change  that,  within  the  last  few  days,  has  come  over 
what  may  be  termed  the  '  atmosphere  '  of  the  battlefield  is 
marked.  As  regards  noise,  the  cannonade  has  now  decreased 
to  such  an  extent  that  for  hours  on  end  nothing  is  heard  but 
the  infrequent  boom  of  one  of  the  Allies'  heavy  guns,  the 
occasional  rattle  of  machine-guns,  and  the  intermittent  '  pop  ' 
— for  that  word  expresses  the  sound  best — of  the  snipers  on 
either  side.  And  in  certain  quarters,  where  the  combatants 
are  close  and  operations  appertain  to  those  of  siege  warfare, 
the  bombs  of  the  Minenwerfer,  and  the  smaller  bombs  thrown 
by  hand,  are  detonating  almost  continuously.  But  the  air  no 
longer  throbs  to  the  continuously  dull  roar  of  heavy  artillery 
and  the  detonating  of  great  projectiles. 

Of  course,  if  an  attack  is  in  progress,  there  is  again  turmoil, 
but  it  is  more  local  and  does  not  approach  in  intensity  that 
which  recently  reigned  on  a  large  scale.  The  scene  as  a  whole, 

122 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

as  viewed  from  one  of  the  few  commanding  points  in  our  front, 
is  almost  one  of  peace  as  compared  with  that  of  a  week  or 
two  ago.  The  columns  of  black  smoke  vomited  by  the  ex- 
ploding howitzer  shell  are  as  rare  as  those  from  burning 
villages.  The  only  generally  visible  signs  of  war  are  the 
occasional  puffs  of  bursting  shrapnel  opening  out  above 
woods  and  villages  and  floating  slowly  away  on  the  still  air. 

It  was  mentioned  in  the  account  of  the  fighting  on  the 
Aisne  that,  so  far  as  we  were  concerned,  the  struggle  had  to 
some  extent  assumed  the  character  of  siege  operations.  The 
same  can  be  said  with  still  greater  truth  of  the  battle  in  which 
we  are  now  engaged.  Both  sides  have  had  time  to  dig 
themselves  in  and  to  strengthen  their  positions  with  all  the 
resources  available  in  the  field.  In  spite  of  this,  the  Germans, 
urged  by  weighty  motives,  limited  as  to  time,  and  confident  in 
their  numerical  superiority  and  the  weight  of  a  very  powerful 
siege  armament — such  as  .has,  indeed,  never  before  been 
brought  into  the  field — have,  when  face  to  face  with  the 
Allies'  line,  attempted  to  break  it  by  frontal  attacks.  Having 
failed  in  this,  in  spite  of  desperate  efforts,  they  are  now  en- 
deavouring in  some  quarters  to  progress  by  the  slower  methods 
of  siege  warfare. 

Until  recently  they  have  attempted  to  gain  ground  by 
assaulting  our  position  across  the  open,  seizing  wiiat  they  can 
out  of  it,  retaining  and  strengthening  that,  and  using  it  as  a 
starting-point  for  a  fresh  assault.  Their  aim  is  still  the  same 
— to  gain  ground  and  drive  us  back — but,  owing  to  the  im- 
mense loss  entailed  in  the  summary  method  of  assaulting 
across  the  open  for  any  distance,  the  means  employed  are 
modified.  To  shorten  the  space  over  which  their  infantry 
has  to  advance,  they  now  move  forward  by  several  narrow 
end-on  approaches,  which  are  either  open  to  the  air  or  a  foot 
or  two  below  the  surface  of  the  ground.  Where  open,  these 
approaches  are  zigzagged  to  avoid  being  enfiladed.  In 
either  case  forward  progress  is  made  by  evacuating  at  one 
end.  At  what  is  considered  a  possible  assaulting  distance, 
these  approaches,  or  saps,  are  joined  up  by  a  lateral  trench 
roughly  parallel  to  that  being  attacked.  Here  the  stormers 
collect  for  a  fresh  rush. 

The  extent  to  which  subterranean  or  semi-underground 
life  is  forced  on  the  combatants  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the 

123 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

firing  line  varies  with  the  nature  of  the  ground,  and  depends 
on  the  character  of  the  enemy's  activity  in  the  particular 
locality  in  which  they  are.  Where  sniping  or  rifle  fire  is  alone 
to  be  expected,  the  amount  of  the  excavations  behind  the 
front  line  is  limited.  When  bombardment  is,  or  has  been, 
severe  every  one  within  range  of  the  enemy's  guns,  the 
brigadier  not  excepted,  will  be  found  ensconced  underground 
in  '  dug-outs/  or  '  funk-holes/  as  they  are  familiarly  called,  for 
in  the  zone  under  fire  houses  are  no  better  than  shell  traps. 

Behind  the  firing-line  trenches  are  found  the  shelters  for 
the  men  holding  the  line  and  those  for  supports.  These  are 
more  elaborate  and  comfortable  than  the  fire  trenches,  usually 
are  roofed  over,  and  contain  cooking-places  and  many  con- 
veniences. Some  of  these  underground  quarters  have  now 
become  almost  luxurious  and  contain  windows.  Communica- 
tion between  the  firing  line  and  the  various  shelters  in  rear 
and  with  the  headquarters  of  units  is  kept  up  along  approach 
trenches,  all  zigzagged  to  prevent  being  enfiladed,  and  liberally 
partitioned  into  compartments  by  traverses,  so  as  to  localise 
the  effect  of  shell  fire. 

For  some  time  the  character  of  the  artillery  fire  has  been 
such  as  to  force  both  combatants,  even  for  some  distance 
behind  the  firing  line,  to  burrow  into  the  earth  in  order  to 
obtain  shelter,  and  to  conceal  their  works  as  far  as  possible 
in  order  to  gain  protection  both  from  guns  and  aeroplanes. 

This  has  been  carried  on  to  such  an  extent,  that  behind  the 
front  fire  trenches  of  British,  French,  and  Germans  are  perfect 
labyrinths  of  burrows  of  various  types.  The  principal  feature 
of  the  battlefield,  therefore,  as  has  been  often  pointed  out,  is 
the  absence  of  any  signs  of  human  beings. 

Where  resort  is  had  to  siege  methods  the  earthworks  on 
both  sides  become  still  more  complicated,  though  there  is  a 
definite  system  underlying  their  apparent  confusion.  It  is 
not  possible  to  give  any  details  of  the  methods  upon  which 
our  trenches  are  arranged,  but  it  is  permissible  to  describe 
how  the  enemy  is  carrying  on  the  close  attack  at  some  points. 

From  the  last  position  attained  they  sap  forward  in  the 
two  ways  already  mentioned.  The  approaches  are  excavated 
by  pioneers  working  at  the  head,  the  German  pioneers  being 
technically  trained  troops  which  correspond  to  our  sappers. 
Owing  to  the  close  range  at  which  the  fighting  is  conducted, 
124 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

and  the  fact  that  rifles  fixed  in  rests  and  machine-guns  are 
kept  permanently  directed  upon  the  crest  of  the  trenches, 
observation  is  somewhat  difficult ;  but  the  '  head  '  or  end 
of  the  approaching  sap  can  be  detected  from  the  mound  of 
earth  which  is  thrown  up.  This  cannot  be  done,  however, 
where  the  advance  is  being  conducted  by  a  '  blinded  '  sap. 
In  executing  this  type  of  sap  a  horizontal  bore-hole,  about 
a  foot  in  diameter  and  some  three  or  four  feet  below  ground, 
is  bored  by  means  of  a  special  earth  borer  worked  by  hand. 
It  is  then  enlarged  by  pick  and  shovel  into  a  small  tunnel, 
whose  roof  is  one  or  two  feet  below  the  surface. 

Several  of  these  saps  having  been  driven  forward,  their 
heads  are  connected  by  a  lateral  trench,  which  becomes  the 
front  line,  and  can  be  used  for  stormers  to  collect  for  an  assault. 
In  some  cases,  usually  at  night,  a  sap  is  driven  right  up 
to  the  parapet  of  the  hostile  trench,  which  is  then  blown  in 
by  a  charge.  Amidst  the  confusion  caused,  and  a  shower 
of  grenades,  the  stormers  attempt  to  burst  in  through  the 
opening  and  work  along  the  trench.  They  also  assault  it  in 
front.  As  in  their  ordinary  infantry  attacks,  machine-guns 
are  quickly  brought  up  to  any  point  gained  in  order  to  repel 
counter-attacks . 

Most  of  this  fighting  takes  place  at  such  close  range  that 
the  guns  of  either  side  cannot  fire  at  the  enemy's  infantry 
without  great  risk  of  hitting  its  own  men.  The  role  of  artillery 
projectiles,  however,  is  well  played  by  bombs  of  all  descrip- 
tions, which  are  used  in  prodigious  quantities. 

The  larger  ones  projected  by  the  Minenwerfer,  of  which 
the  Germans  employ  three  sizes,  correspond  to  the  heavy 
howitzer  shell  of  the  distant  combat,  and  have  much  the 
same  effect.  They  have  a  distinctive  nickname  of  their  own, 
but  they  may  be  termed  the  '  Jack  Johnsons '  of  the  close 
attack  of  siege  warfare.  The  smaller  bombs  or  grenades  are 
thrown  by  hand  from  a  few  yards  distance,  perhaps  just 
lobbed  over  a  parapet.  They  are  charged  with  high  explosive 
and  detonate  with  great  violence  ;  and  since  their  impetus 
does  not  cause  them  to  bury  themselves  in  the  earth  before 
they  detonate,  their  action,  though  local,  is  very  unpleasant 
in  the  enclosed  space  between  two  traverses  in  a  trench. 

These  grenades  of  various  types  are  being  thrown  con- 
tinuously by  both  sides,  every  assault  being  preluded  and 

125 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

accompanied  by  showers  of  them.  In  fact,  the  wholesale  use 
of  these  murderous  missiles  is  one  of  the  most  prominent 
features  of  the  close  attack  now  being  carried  on. 

As  may  be  imagined,  what  with  sharpshooters,  machine- 
guns  and  bombs,  this  kind  of  fighting  is  very  deadly,  and  some- 
what blind,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  observation.  The  latter, 
however,  is  somewhat  decreased  by  the  use  of  the  *  hyper- 
scope/  which  is  much  the  same  in  principle  as  the  periscope 
of  a  submarine,  and  allows  a  man  to  look  over  the  top  of  a 
parapet  without  raising  his  head  above  it. 

November  2g-December  i 

The  uneventfulness  of  affairs  on  our  front  continues,  as 
does  the  mild  weather. 

On  Sunday,  the  29th,  the  enemy  in  front  of  the  right  of 
our  line  kept  up  their  efforts  to  throw  bombs  into  our  trenches. 

On  our  left  the  French  made  progress  both  north  and 
south  of  Ypres  and  captured  some  German  trenches. 

On  Monday,  the  3Oth,  the  Germans  displayed  a  little 
more  activity  along  our  line,  and  on  our  extreme  left,  as  well 
as  south  of  the  Lys,  there  was  a  decided  increase  of  artillery 
fire.  On  the  left  two  of  their  guns  were  caught  in  the  open 
by  our  artillery  as  they  were  apparently  changing  position 
under  cover  of  a  rainstorm.  One  was  knocked  out  and  the 
other  was  abandoned.  In  this  part  of  the  field  also  occurred 
one  of  those  strange  incidents  which  are  not  uncommon 
in  fighting  at  close  quarters.  An  infantry  officer  who  walked 
up  to  a  German  trench  found  all  its  occupants  asleep.  As  a 
memento  of  his  visit  he  carried  off  a  bayonet. 

In  the  centre  we  gained  some  minor  local  successes.  A 
party  of  the  enemy  which  had  started  to  excavate  a  new 
trench  within  sight  was  immediately  driven  out  by  our 
artillery  ;  a  house  used  by  their  snipers  was  blown  up  ;  and 
a  patrol  from  one  of  our  Territorial  battalions  successfully 
rounded  up  a  hostile  patrol,  making  two  prisoners.  At  other 
points  along  this  part  of  the  front  the  enemy  has  now  begun 
to  use  rifle  grenades  freely.  These  incidents  are  of  the  most 
insignificant  character,  and  have  no  bearing  on  the  operations, 
but  it  is  in  a  succession  of  such  small  actions  that  the  periods 
of  inactivity  on  a  grand  scale  are  passed. 
126 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

Beyond  our  left  the  French  again  advanced  slightly,  and 
captured  a  German  trench. 

On  Tuesday,  December  i,  there  is  nothing  in  the  way  of 
military  operations  to  record. 

It  is  reported,  on  what  is  believed  to  be  good  authority, 
that  the  Germans  have  renamed  Ostend,  and  that  the  railway 
station  is  now  placarded  with  the  name  '  Kales/  The  only 
possible  object  of  such  a  manoeuvre,  if  it  has  indeed  been 
carried  out,  would  appear  to  be  to  encourage  the  soldiers  who 
are  brought  from  distant  parts  in  absolute  ignorance  of  what 
has  really  been  happening.  That  this  action  is  not  so  futile 
as  it  may  seem  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  many  of  our  prisoners 
are  still  convinced  that  both  Calais  and  Paris  are  in  the  hands 
of  the  Germans. 

The  course  taken  by  the  German  operations  round  Ypres, 
ending  in  bombardment,  has  been  such  as  to  suggest  that  the 
destruction  of  the  place  is  really  the  outcome  of  disappoint- 
ment and  exasperation  at  its  resistance,  and  at  the  failure 
of  the  much-advertised  plans  for  its  capture. 

Up  till  the  end  of  October  the  town  had  not  been  bom- 
barded as  a  whole,  the  shells  which  had  fallen  in  it  being 
obviously  directed  at  points  where  our  headquarters  were 
believed  to  be  situated,  and  at  one  or  two  others,  such  as  the 
railway  station,  where  destruction  would  have  some  military 
value.  The  shelling  of  the  town  itself  only  began  in  earnest 
on  the  night  of  November  5,  since  when  it  has  been  main- 
tained intermittently.  That  the  town  escaped  so  long  was 
apparently  due  to  the  fact  that  up  till  the  5th  the  Germans 
counted  on  capturing  it  and  did  not  wish  to  cause  damage. 
Hopes  of  doing  so  were  no  doubt  still  held  after  that  date, 
as'is  evinced  by  the  continuation  of  the  attacks,  notably  that 
of  the  nth  by  the  Prussian  Guard.  But  these  later  attempts 
to  take  the  place  seem  rather  to  have  been  of  the  nature  of 
'  forlorn  hopes/  which  called  for  all  the  assistance  that  could 
be  obtained  by  artillery  co-operation,  even  at  the  risk  of 
the  destruction  of  a  historic  place  which  might  become 
German  ;  and  considerable  advantage  was  certainly  to  be 
gained  by  concentrating  fire  on  a  place  where  roads  met  and 
which  must  be  a  focus  of  traffic. 

On  these  military  grounds  the  initial  bombardment  can 
to  a  certain  extent  be  justified,  though  it  is  doubtful  whether 

127 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

the  results  achieved  were  commensurate  with  the  expenditure 
of  ammunition  involved.  And  its  object  could  have  been 
attained  equally  well  if  the  German  artillery  had  concentrated 
on  the  points  where  the  roads,  of  which  there  are  not  many, 
issue  from  the  town,  and  it  did  not  entail  the  employment 
of  incendiary  shell.  But  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the 
enemy  denotes  a  desire  for  senseless  destruction. 

The  last  attack  in  force  was  delivered  on  November  17. 
Four  days  later,  on  the  22nd,  the  Germans  commenced  to 
pour  a  stream  of  shell  into  the  central  market  square  ;  and 
whereas  the  Cloth  Hall  and  Cathedral  had  both  escaped 
material  damage  up  till  then,  these  two  historic  buildings 
were  blazing  fiercely  by  3  P.M.  It  is  stated  that  in  order 
to  do  this  the  Germans  brought  up  a  train  armed  with  heavy 
guns,  which  were  used  under  the  direction  of  a  captive 
balloon.  The  bombardment  was  continued  until  the  evening 
of  the  23rd.  The  reason  to  which  is  ascribed  this  wanton 
destruction  has  already  been  stated,  but  in  case  there  should 
be  any  doubts  as  to  the  justice  of  the  indictment,  it  must  be 
stated  that  so  soon  as  the  Cloth  Hall  and  the  Cathedral  had 
been  obviously  demolished,  fire  was  no  longer  directed  on  those 
buildings.  In  the  words  of  a  French  communique,  which  will 
also  be  the  verdict  of  history  :  '  This  magnificent  old  city  was 
condemned  to  death  on  the  day  when  the  Emperor  was  forced 
to  renounce  the  hope  of  making  an  entry  into  it.' 

The  recent  connection  of  the  British  Army  with  the  city 
is  in  reality  an  old  one  renewed.  Ypres  was  one  of  the 
barrier  fortresses  against  France,  for  the  defence  of  which 
we  were  bound  by  the  '  Barrier  Treaty/  made  in  1715,  to 
provide  garrisons  amounting  to  10,000  men.  Almost  two 
hundred  years  have  passed  since  then,  but  the  old  ramparts 
are  still  there,  looking  down  upon  the  French  and  British 
soldiers  who  have  jointly  maintained  the  proud  title  of  the 
old  fortress  against  another  foe. 

December  2-5 

In  the  situation  of  the  British  Army  no  fresh  development 
has  occurred  during  the  last  four  days.  To  the  south  of  the 
Lys,  Wednesday,  December  2,  passed  quite  uneventfully, 
though  the  enemy's  artillery  displayed  more  activity  than  it 
128 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

has  recently  been  showing,  while  to  the  north  of  the  river  we 
destroyed  an  observation  station  by  our  howitzer  fire.  On 
our  right  centre  a  successful  reconnaissance  was  made  at  night. 

Beyond  our  flanks,  as  has  already  been  made  public,  on 
our  right  the  French  captured  the  Chateau  of  Vermelles  and 
some  trenches,  while  on  our  left  they  discovered  that  their 
field  artillery  had  destroyed  a  German  heavy  gun  and  two 
ammunition  wagons  the  day  before. 

On  the  next  day  there  was  a  great  deal  of  rain,  but  no 
incident  along  our  whole  front.  It  was  found,  however,  that 
a  minor  expedition  against  a  German  sap-head  made  on  the 
night  of  November  27-28  had  been  more  successful  than  was 
realised  at  the  time,  having  resulted  in  a  loss  of  between  forty 
and  fifty  to  the  enemy  at  an  expense  of  thirteen  casualties 
to  us. 

On  Friday,  the  4th,  another  German  observation  station 
in  front  of  our  right  centre  was  destroyed  by  our  guns.  Other- 
wise nothing  more  than  the  usual  artillery  fire,  sniping,  and 
bomb  throwing  occurred,  the  latter  more  especially  on  our 
right.  There  was  again  much  rain.  Beyond  our  right  the 
French  made  further  progress  at  Vermelles,  capturing  a  certain 
amount  of  war  material,  including  a  machine-gun  and  am- 
munition, and  on  our  left  they  captured  a  village  near  Lange- 
marck. 

Saturday,  the  5th,  brought  another  week  of  the  war  to  a 
close  on  a  miserable  day  of  almost  continuous  rain  and  high 
wind. 

During  these  four  days  the  most  important  event  for  the 
British  Army  has  been  the  visit  of  His  Majesty  the  King. 
His  Majesty's  stay  at  General  Headquarters  luckily  coincided 
with  a  period  of  inactivity,  which  enabled  far  more  of  the 
troops  at  the  front  to  welcome  him  than  might  otherwise  have 
been  the  case. 

Of  major  tactical  operations  by  the  British  forces  there 
has  recently  been  an  entire  absence,  and  there  has  therefore 
been  no  definite  progress  to  record  of  a  material  nature  such 
as  might  be  achieved  by  inflicting  defeat  and  severe  loss  on  the 
enemy.  Nor  for  some  seven  weeks  has  any  strategical  advan- 
tage been  won  in  the  geographical  sense,  since  there  has  been 
no  advance  nor  gain  of  ground.  But  there  is  another  kind  of 
strategic  progress,  more  imponderable,  less  direct,  and  less 

MILITARY  2  I  I2Q 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

obvious  than  the  two  mentioned — namely,  that  produced  by 
the  lapse  of  time — when  time  is  working  against  one  side— 
every  day  tends  to  make  it  stronger,  and  active  resistance  on 
its  part  tends  to  force  the  enemy  to  misapplication  of  force 
which  might  be  employed  to  greater  advantage  elsewhere. 
In  this  direction,  as  has  been  so  clearly  pointed  out  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief  in  his  latest  despatch,  the  stationary 
attitude  of  the  army  has  not  been  sterile.  Acting  as  the  Allies 
are,  every  day  passed  has  co-operated  towards  the  desired 
result.  This  contributory  strategy,  as  it  may  be  termed, 
however  useful  though  it  is,  is  monotonous,  unexciting,  and 
bereft  of  incidents  on  a  large  enough  scale  to  provide  inter- 
esting reading.  It  does  not,  therefore,  lend  itself  to  descrip- 
tion. All  that  can  be  done  is  to  point  out  what  is  happening. 

It  is  proverbial  that  Allies  fall  out.  But  it  is  also  pro- 
verbial that  the  exception  proves  the  rule,  and  if  that  be  true, 
the  rule  has  certainly  been  established  during  the  four  months' 
duration  of  this  war.  There  could  be  no  more  cordial  relations 
than  those  existing  between  the  French  and  British,  both  in 
their  official  and  social  life.  In  all  the  towns,  large  or  small,,  in 
which  the  British  Army  has  been  quartered  the  friendliness 
with  which  the  inhabitants  have  received  us  is  more  than 
remarkable  ;  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  say  in  how  many 
French  houses  British  officers  and  men  have  now  been  billeted, 
or  how  many  have  been  converted  into  military  offices.  In 
many  cases  the  houses  are  empty,  save  possibly  for  a  care- 
taker, in  others  the  owners  and  their  families,  or  portions  of 
their  families,  are  still  inhabiting  one  part  of  their  homes, 
while  the  British  are  occupying  another — usually,  be  it  noted, 
the  better  part.  And,  at  best — even  in  the  absolute  upheaval 
of  life  which  occurs  in  an  invaded  country — this  incursion  of 
strangers  of  another  race  must  be  intensely  inconvenient. 

One  reason  for  the  cordiality,  or  possibly,  the  good- 
humoured  resignation,  with  which  our  French  hosts  receive 
us  is  as  they  say  with  a  smile,  '  Nous  preferons,  Monsieur, 
que  vous  soyez  ici  que  les  Allemands/  This  is  the  sentiment 
that  is  always  at  the  back  of  their  minds,  and  the  nearer  the 
place  in  which  they  live  to  the  hig;h- water  mark  of  the  German 
invasion,  the  more  fervently  is  it  expressed.  Indeed,  it  is 
absolutely  impossible  for  those  in  England  to  realise  the 
feelings  and  fears  of  the  people  out  here  who  have  either  once 
130 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

had  the  loathed  invader  in  occupation  of  their  homes,  even 
when  the  latter  have  done  no  special  damage,  or  who  live  in 
some  place  which  by  the  merest  chance  the  Germans  have  not 
entered. 

This  is  quite  apart  from  those  instances  in  which  towns 
have  been  destroyed  and  the  enemy  has  taken  what  he  con- 
sidered rigorous  measures.  Even  in  those  hard  cases  where 
it  is  necessary  to  turn  the  inhabitants  out  of  their  houses  in 
order  to  demolish  them  so  as  to  clear  a  field  of  fire,  the  resig- 
nation and  courtesy  met  with  are  astonishing.  The  reasons 
given  for  this  drastic  action  are  at  once  appreciated,  and  the 
usual  comment  made  is,  '  Ah,  well !  It  is  a  small  matter  com- 
pared to  the  war/  Such  is  the  temper  and  mental  attitude 
of  the  majority  towards  the  war  and  their  British  allies. 

There  is  no  doubt,  also,  that  our  troops  have  never  for- 
gotten, and  have  by  the  treatment  they  have  received  never 
been  allowed  to  forget  for  a  moment,  that  they  are  in  a  friendly 
and  allied  country  ;  and  they  have  returned  courtesy  and 
good  feeling  in  kind.  Indeed,  it  is  somewhat  of  a  revelation 
to  see  how  freely  our  soldiers  mix  with  the  population,  and 
how  the  members  of  both  nationalities  get  on  with  the  smallest 
knowledge  of  the  other's  language.  And  a  very  pleasing  side 
of  the  joint  operations  of  the  Allies  is  the  fact  that  there  has 
never  been  any  sort  of  friction  between  the  troops.  This 
appears  all  the  more  remarkable  when  it  is  remembered  how 
many  thousands  of  men  have  been  thrown  together,  often  in 
most  trying  circumstances,  and  that  wine  is  the  common  drink 
of  the  country. 

If  it  does  nothing  more,  this  war  is  bound  to  increase  the 
mutual  knowledge  of,  and  respect  for,  each  other  of  the  French 
and  British,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  will  leave  a  lasting 
and  beneficial  effect  on  the  intercourse  of  the  two  nations. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  the  relations  between  the  Belgians 
and  British  ;  but  their  connection  has  been  neither  so  exten- 
sive nor  so  prolonged. 

It  has  been  stated  in  some  of  the  British  papers  that  the 
Germans  have  taken  Domremy-la-Pucelle.  This  report  is 
entirely  incorrect,  for  the  Germans  have  never  been  near  that 
place  ;  and  it  is  likely  to  cause  pain  and  annoyance  to  our 
Allies,  since  Domremy-la-Pucelle  was  the  birthplace  of  Joan 
of  Arc,  and  is  a  point  of  national  and  religious  interest. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

December  6-9 

For  the  6th,  7th,  8th,  and  gth  December  the  operations 
of  the  army  have  been  of  the  same  character  as  for  the  past 
three  weeks. 

The  tale  of  minor  events  is  as  follows  : — On  Sunday,  the 
6th,  on  our  right  our  howitzers  obtained  direct  hits  on  two 
German  gun  emplacements,  whilst  other  guns  shelled  some 
of  the  enemy's  trenches  with  good  effect.  There  are  grounds 
for  believing  that  in  this  portion  of  our  front  the  activity  of 
our  infantry  in  sniping,  backed  up  by  the  fire  of  our  artillery 
and  the  ingenuity  of  the  Sappers  in  devising  new  methods 
of  causing  annoyance,  has  rendered  the  enemy  somewhat 
uneasy,  the  quiet  of  the  nights  being  continually  broken  by 
spasmodic  outbursts  of  musketry  from  the  German  trenches 
and  the  frequent  firing  of  star  shell.  These  precautionary 
outbursts,  however,  are  perhaps  not  altogether  unjustified, 
for  Gurkhas  are  unpleasant  enemies  on  dark  nights,  and  in 
many  places  the  trenches  of  the  Indians  and  the  Germans 
are  only  a  few  yards  apart.  In  this  quarter  a  bombardment 
of  the  German  trenches  was  carried  out  during  the  day,  but 
the  effect  is  not  known.  In  the  centre  one  of  our  battalions 
took  an  opportunity  of  opening  fire  on  a  German  working 
party  and  caused  considerable  loss.  Evidence  of  spying  on 
the  part  of  civilians  was  obtained  on  this  day.  A  man  in 
plain  clothes  was  observed  in  the  hostile  trenches  pointing 
out  our  positions.  A  German  aviator  dropped  six  bombs 
on  Hazebrouck  with  little  effect. 

Since  it  has  been  so  frequently  stated  that  our  howitzers 
have  obtained  '  direct  hits  '  on  the  enemy's  gun  emplace- 
ments, perhaps  it  is  as  well  to  explain  what  this  means  in 
terms  of  damage  done  to  the  enemy.  In  the  most  unfavour- 
able case  to  us,  it  means  that  one  of  our  shell  charged  with 
many  pounds  of  lyddite  and  fitted  with  a  percussion  fuse  has 
detonated  on  the  parapet  of  an  emplacement.  The  result 
would  be  that  a  number  of  the  detachment  might  be  killed 
or  wounded,  but  that  the  gun  would  probably  not  be  seriously 
damaged.  In  the  most  favourable  case  it  would  mean  that 
the  shell  has  detonated  in  the  emplacement  itself,  or  actually 
on  the  gun  or  its  mounting.  This  would  almost  certainly 
imply  the  destruction  of  both  gun  and  detachment. 
132 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

On  Monday,  the  7th,  there  was  very  heavy  rain.  The 
Germans  fired  rifle  grenades  for  the  first  time  against  the 
trenches  in  the  centre  of  our  line.  Our  artillery,  however, 
soon  put  a  stop  to  this  innovation.  On  the  right  and  left 
nothing  occurred  worthy  of  special  notice. 

On  Tuesday  two  German  field-guns  were  put  out  of  action 
by  our  artillery.  Our  guns  also  set  fire  to  a  railway  station 
and  some  rolling  stock,  and  destroyed  a  chimney  used  by 
the  enemy  for  observation.  Otherwise  nothing  occurred.  It 
rained  during  a  part  of  the  day. 

On  Wednesday,  the  gth,  the  only  item  to  record  is  that 
opposite  the  left  of  our  line  the  enemy  was  heard  to  be  cheer- 
ing. This  may  have  been  due  to  the  receipt  of  the  German 
official  version  of  the  battle  of  Lodz.  Over  the  low-lying 
ground  it  was  very  foggy  in  the  evening. 

The  weather  has  been  very  wet  and  much  warmer  during 
the  last  four  days.  There  has  also  been  a  high  wind  during 
most  of.  this  period,  but  our  aviators  have  succeeded  in  making 
several  valuable  reconnaissances.  In  spite  of  the  absence  of 
serious  active  operations,  considerable  progress  has  been 
made  in  generally  improving  our  situation.  The  number  of 
communication  trenches  has  been  increased,  the  drainage  and 
heating  of  fire  and  living  trenches  have  been  arranged,  the 
organisation  of  the  supply  and  transport  services  has  been 
brought  to  a  higher  pitch  of  efficiency,  and  everything  is  being 
prepared  to  meet  the  winter  campaign  before  us.  As  an 
instance  of  some  of  the  refinements  of  active  service  to  which 
we  are  being  introduced,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the  men 
in  certain  front-line  trenches  have  been  regaling  themselves 
by  listening  on  the  telephone  to  a  gramophone  concert  eight 
miles  away. 

That  knowledge  is  power,  and  that  to  be  forewarned  is  to 
be  forearmed,  are  matters  of  proverbial  philosophy,  and  in 
no  sphere  of  human  activity  do  they  apply  with  greater  force 
than  in  the  conduct  of  war.  In  a  military  sense  knowledge 
implies  almost  entirely  an  accurate  acquaintance  with  facts 
concerning  the  enemy  ;  where  he  is,  what  strength  he  is  in, 
what  he  is  doing — in  a  word,  all  that  confers  the  ability  to 
gauge  the  hostile  general's  strength  and  weakness,  and  to 
divine  his  intentions  and  his  power  to  carry  them  into  effect. 
To  a  greater  or  less  degree  it  forms  the  basis  of  all  action  taken. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Indeed,  Wellington  is  reported  to  have  said  that  he  owed  his 
success  to  the  fact  that  he  was  always  wondering  what  '  the 
other  fellow  was  doing  on  the  other  side  of  the  hill.1 

Nearly  all  the  knowledge  of  this  nature  required  by  a 
commander  in  the  field  can  be  included  in  the  term  '  intelli- 
gence '  ;  and  to  its  collection  and  analysis  is  devoted  a  special 
branch  of  the  General  Staff  of  an  army. 

There  are  various  ways  of  acquiring  intelligence  which 
are  universally  practised.  They  are  broadly — reconnaissance, 
whether  it  be  by  cavalry,  infantry,  or  both,  by  motor  cycle, 
or  aircraft ;  the  employment  of  spies,  or,  as  they  are  more 
pleasantly  called,  '  agents  '  ;  and  the  collection  of  such  infor- 
mation as  can  be  gained  from  an  inspection  of  the  uniforms 
worn  by  the  dead  or  by  prisoners,  and  from  the  papers  carried 
by,  or  the  cross-examination  of,  the  latter.  In  these  methods 
there  is  a  certain  amount  of  overlapping,  but  this  does  not 
entail  such  a  waste  of  time  and  energy  as  might  appear,  for 
it  is  only  by  some  overlap  that  can  be  obtained  that  corro- 
boration  of  isolated  pieces  of  information  which  enables 
decisions  to  be  made  and  action  to  be  taken  with  some  reason- 
able chance  of  success.  All  methods,  however,  whether  posi- 
tively or  negatively,  by  direct  or  devious  ways,  by  the  obser- 
vation and  record  of  major  or  minor  facts,  work  towards  the 
sum  of  knowledge. 

The  employment  of  agents  is  on  occasion  the  most  whole- 
sale way  in  which  intelligence  can  be  gained,  and  at  its  best  it 
furnishes  a  broader  basis  upon  which  to  build  than  the  others. 
The  work  of  such  persons  does  not  always  depend  on  the 
accuracy  of  vision  of  an  individual,  which  is  a  very  variable 
quality,  but  is  often  established  on  statements  of  facts  pro- 
duced with  the  greatest  care  by  the  enemy  for  his  own  use. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  absolutely  dependent  on  the  bona  fides 
of  a  class  which  is  universally  looked  upon  with  distrust  and  on 
the  ability  of  an  individual  to  discriminate  between  what  is 
true  and  what  may  be  fiction  purposely  arranged  for  his  benefit. 
It  is  a  slow  method,  the  transmission  of  the  news  gained 
being  of  necessity  mostly  effected  through  devious  channels. 
It  is  also  unreliable  as  to  the  quantity  and  frequency  of  the 
information  furnished,  for  though  the  collection  of  the  latter 
is  not  much  affected  by  the  weather,  it  depends  on  factors 
which  are  not  under  the  control  of  the  agent  or  his  employers. 
134 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

Reconnaissance  is  the  most  direct,  and  probably  the 
quickest  way  of  obtaining  news  of  the  enemy.  It  is  not 
uniform,  however,  in  amount  or  quality,  because  it  generally 
depends  on  the  quickness  of  eye  and  power  of  appreciation 
of  some  scout  or  observer  watching  from  a  distance  ;  and  it  is 
liable  to  be  interrupted  or  affected  by  atmospheric  conditions. 

Lastly  comes  the  third  method  mentioned.  If  a  prisoner 
gives  away  information  either  tKrough  stupidity  or  from  a 
desire  to  curry  favour,  and  to  better  his  lot,  a  good  deal  may 
be  attained  at  one  bound.  But  this  applies  chiefly  to  the  in- 
formation given  by  officers,  who  are  not  very  often  captured, 
and  are,  moreover,  not  in  the  habit  of  imparting  valuable  news. 
A  soldier's  knowledge  of  what  is  going  on  on  his  own  side  is 
comparatively  limited.  Communications  from  prisoners,  also, 
are  to  be  accepted  with  reserve.  In  the  direction  of  identi- 
fication the  activity  of  an  Intelligence  Section  is  largely  con- 
fined to  the  examination  of  the  badges  or  equipment  worn  by 
the  dead  and  by  prisoners.  The  personality  of  the  individual 
of  course  has  no  military  value,  but  the  identity  discs  and 
effects  of  the  dead  are  carefully  guarded  for  eventual  return 
to  their  Government.  The  examination  of  letters,  diaries, 
and  orders  also  claims  a  great  deal  of  attention.  Newspapers 
are  rarely  of  value,  because  no  sane  Government  allows  current 
details  of  the  nature  sought  to  be  published  by  the  press. 
On  the  other  hand,  soldiers'  diaries  and  letters  are  often  in- 
discreet in  the  extreme,  for  the  writers,  in  describing  the 
physical  condition  of  the  men  often  unwittingly  betray  the 
state  of  their  morale,  and  in  recording  their  impressions  of  the 
effect  produced  by  the  enemy's  rifle  fire,  or  the  havoc  wrought 
by  his  artillery,  quite  innocently  give  away  valuable  infor- 
mation as  to  where  the  shoe  pinches. 

Since  the  composition  of  the  larger  formations  of  all  armies 
is  known,  it  is  possible,  except  in  those  cases  where  sweeping 
changes  are  made  during  a  war,  to  extract  vital  information 
from  the  connection  of  even  a  single  soldier  killed  or  captured 
at  a  certain  spot  with  a  certain  battalion.  The  result  of 
ascertaining  that  this  battalion  was  at  that  point  at  a  given 
time  may  lead  to  the  first  suspicion  that  a  much  larger  for- 
mation to  which  that  battalion  belongs  is  not  somewhere  else 
where  its  presence  has  been  assumed.  The  possible  signi- 
ficance of  the  results  of  such  a  discovery  when  corroborated 

i35 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

is  obvious.  This  explains  why  the  identification  of  units  with 
localities  by  means  of  accoutrements,  badges,  etc.,  takes  so 
much  of  the  time  of  certain  bureaus  in  all  armies.  As  it  has 
been  flippantly,  but  by  no  means  inaccurately,  expressed,  an 
important  part  of  the  duty  of  a  great  General  Staff  is  that  of 
constituting  army  corps  out  of  shoulder-straps. 

During  the  war  the  air  is  full  of  rumours  even  at  General 
Headquarters,  and  when  these  rumours  are  concerned  with 
the  dispositions  of  the  enemy  their  scope  is  much  enlarged  if 
the  hostile  army  is  composed  of  forces  of  different  nationalities. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  only  the  connection  of  units  with 
localities  that  is  useful.  It  often  happens  that  the  mere 
presence  of  a  unit  being  in  the  field  betrays  the  fact  that  rein- 
forcements have  come  up,  or  that  new  formations  are  being 
raised,  for,  inaccurate  as  knowledge  of  the  enemy  may  be,  it  is 
generally  sufficient  for  the  original  organisation  of  his  army 
to  be  known. 

As  is  seen,  a  considerable  part  of  intelligence  work  is  syn- 
thetic in  character,  and  amounts  to  the  building  up  first  of  a 
possible  and  then  of  a  probable  theory  based  on  a  mass  of  sus- 
picions, facts  which  merely  amount  to  side-lights,  and  estab- 
lished evidence.  It  resembles  that  of  a  detective,  or  the 
framer  of  a  jig-saw  puzzle.  No  small  clue  or  seemingly  irre- 
levant fact  can  be  neglected.  It  is  often  an  apparently  useless 
scrap  of  information  that  fits  in  and  forms  the  final  link  in  a 
chain  of  evidence. 

It  is  obvious,  apart  from  discussion  as  to  causes  and 
results,  however,  that  if  all  this  trouble  is  actually  taken  to 
identify  individuals,  whether  in  connection  with  places  or  not, 
it  must  be  considered  worth  doing.  And  it  follows  that  it  must 
be  worth  while  to  put  every  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  enemy 
doing  the  same.  That  this  view  is  held  is  proved  by  the  pains 
at  which  all  the  combatants  in  the  present  war  are  to  prevent 
reference  in  the  press  to  units  in  the  field.  This  reticence  is 
not  maintained  in  order  to  deny  to  the  general  public  news 
which  would  quite  naturally  and  rightly  be  of  absorbing 
interest,  but  in  order  not  to  give  gratis  to  the  enemy  infor- 
mation he  needs,  and  to  acquire  which — if  it  is  not  presented 
to  him — he  is  forced  to  spend  much  money  and  trouble. 

Is  it  better  to  help  the  nation  in  its  struggle  for  existence 
by  an  admittedly  tantalising  reticence,  or  to  satisfy  the  people's 
136 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

curiosity  and  natural  anxiety  at  the .  risk  of  endangering 
national  success  in  the  field?  This  is  the  question.  To  it 
there  can  be  only  one  answer. 

A  further  and  natural  step  beyond  this  negative  policy  of 
withholding  from  the  enemy  the  knowledge  of  where  troops 
are  is  the  more  active  course  of  inducing  him  to  suppose  that 
they  are  in  localities  remote  from  their  "actual  situation.  This, 
of  course,  appertains  to  the  art  of  mystifying,  misleading,  and 
surprising  the  enemy,  which  is  so  valuable  a  part  of  the  conduct 
of  war,  and  reference  may  be  made  to  what  possibly  was  an 
example  of  its  existence  on  a  grand  scale  in  recent  war,  i.e. 
that  between  Russia  and  Japan. 

Before  and'  during  the  commencement  of  the  battle  of 
Mukden  the  great  unknown  factor  to  the  Russians  was  the 
direction  in  which  Marshal  Oyama  would  throw  into  the  fight 
the  weight  of  General  Nogi's  3rd  Army,  then  on  its  way  up 
from  Port  Arthur.  Its  action  was  bound  to  have  a  great  in- 
fluence on  the  battle.  It  is  true  that  the  creation  of  the  new 
Japanese  5th  Army  away  on  the  east  was  also  somewhat  of 
a  mystery  to  the  Russians,  but  its  existence  had  been  dis- 
covered, and  it  had  been  located  approximately.  As  is 
known,  the  Japanese  Commander  intended  to  employ  the 
bulk  of  the  3rd  Army  in  a  sudden  blow  in  great  strength  on 
the  west  against  the  Russian  right.  To  assist  in  this  scheme 
he  detached  a  portion  of  the  3rd  Army  to  act  with  the  5th 
on  his  right,  which  combined  force  was  to  open  the  action 
by  an  attack  in  the  east  calculated  to  cause  the  Russians  to 
transfer  strength  to  that  quarter,  and  so  away  from  the 
quarter  where  the  Japanese  main  stroke  was  to  fall.  The 
ruse  succeeded,  and  it  is  believed  that -its  success  was  largely 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  fraction  of  General  Nogi's  troops  on 
the  east  purposely  advertised  their  presence  with  the  5th 
Army. 

Similarly,  reports  of  an  intended  invasion  of  England  may 
be  spread  by  the  enemy  in  the  hope  of  causing  a  dislocation 
of  plans  of  which  full  advantage  can  be  taken.  Such  a  course 
would  only  be  in  accordance  with  the  action  of  the  Germans 
in  1870,  when  they  spread  abroad  rumours  that  there  were 
large  concentrations  of  their  troops  in  the  Black  Forest — 
where  there  were  practically  none — in  order  to  induce  the 
French  to  detain  forces  in  Southern  Alsace. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Misleading  reports  of  this  nature  are  usually  set  in  circu- 
lation by  those  interested  and  spread  either  by  their  dupes, 
honest  people  who  are  purposely  allowed  to  overhear  care- 
fully arranged  conversations  held  for  their  benefit ;  by  means 
of  espions  doubles,  or  agents  in  the  pay  of  both  sides  ;  by 
common  traitors  willing  to  sell  their  own  nation  ;  or  by  men 
working  patriotically  for  their  own  country  who  have  an  in- 
timate acquaintance  with  the  enemy  nation.  As  an  example 
of  this  may  be  mentioned  the  presence  at  the  capital  of  a 
neutral  country  of  a  German  officer  who  was  for  some  years 
stationed  in  London,  and  has  an  intimate  knowledge  of  our 
naval,  military,  political,  and  social  life,  and  has  probably 
made  such  a  deep  study  of  our  national  psychology  that  he 
would  be  well-equipped  to  play  on  our  idiosyncrasies. 

December  10-13 

In  the  particular  sense  of  the  word  already  defined,  the 
situation  has  remained  '  uneventful '  for  yet  another  four  days. 

On  the  night  of  the  gth-ioth  the  enemy  made  a  demon- 
stration against  our  centre,  but  did  not  press  an  attack.  On 
the  same  night  one  shot  was  fired  after  dark  by  one  of  our 
heavy  howitzers  at  a  village  in  front  of  our  left,  which  is 
believed  to  be  a  busy  centre  of  the  enemy.  It  was  discovered 
next  morning  from  our  infantry  holding  the  trenches  that 
there  had  been  an  explosion  some  way  behind  the  enemy's 
front  line  during  the  night,  which  had  caused  great  com- 
motion amongst  the  Germans  in  the  trenches.  The  news 
of  the  destruction  of  the  Scharnhorst,  Gneisenau,  and  Leipzig ! 
reached  the  troops  on  the  morning  of  the  loth,  and  caused 
great  satisfaction. 

As  had  been  the  case  after  the  loss  of  the  Emden,  the 
kindly  thought  of  keeping  the  German  Army  posted  as  to  the 
doings  of  the  sister  service  was  carried  into  effect,  on  this 
occasion  by  wrapping  a  written  message  round  a  brickbat, 
which  was  then  hurled  towards  the  German  trenches  by  the 
best  thrower  of  the  cricket  ball  on  the  spot.  The  result  of 
this  attention  is  not  known.  The  information,  with  the  ad- 
dition of  the  news '  of  the  sinking  of  the  Number g,  was  also 
given  to  the  Germans  by  means  of  a  notice-board  next  day. 

Beyond  our  left  the  French  recaptured  some  trenches 
taken  from  them  on  the  gth,  and  made  some  prisoners. 
138 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

On  Friday,  the  nth,  long-range  sniping  was  the  only 
activity  to  claim  attention.  On  Saturday  the  enemy's  guns 
were  rather  more  active  against  our  left,  but  otherwise 
nothing  occurred  worthy  of  record.  Action  on  Sunday,  the 
I3th,  was  of  a  similar  character,  the  enemy's  artillery  paying 
more  attention  to  our  left. 

To  our  left,  on  the  I2th,  the  French  repulsed  three  German 
attacks,  inflicting  severe  punishment.  The  Germans  with- 
drew from  the  left  bank  of  the  Yser  Canal. 

The  weather  has,  on  the  whole,  been  rainy  and  very 
windy,  though  Saturday  was  one  of  the  finest  days  we  have 
had  for  some  time.  Over  large  areas,  also,  the  clouds  have 
hung  as  low  as  400  feet.  Since  the  German  anti-aircraft 
guns  make  fairly  accurate  shooting  up  to  a  vertical  range  of 
8000  feet,  to  say  nothing  of  the  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire, 
it  can  be  appreciated  that  the  conditions  have  not  been  ideal 
for  aerial  reconnaissance. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  low-lying  layer  of  clouds  may  not 
be  such  a  disadvantage  to  errands  of  destruction.  It  may 
be  thick  enough  to  prevent  the  observation  and  identification 
of  comparatively  small  objects  such  as  those  whose  presence 
it  is  usually  sought  to  discover,  but  not  to  hide  the  features 
of  the  country,  such  as  towns,  villages,  and  rivers,  and  so 
prevent  an  airman  orienting  himself  by  sight.  When  this 
is  so  he  can  fly  above  the  cloud  bank  until  he  arrives  over 
the  point  which  he  wishes  to  attack  and  then  drop  his  bombs 
unseen  from  below,  or  he  can  descend  and  drop  them  from  a 
lower  altitude.  It  is  easier  to  discern  large  objects  on  the 
ground  through  cloud  than  it  is  for  those  below  to  see  an 
aeroplane  through  the  same  medium.  The  moral  effect  of 
'  bolts  from  the  blue,'  or,  rather,  from  the  blank  grey,  is  some- 
what greater  than  when  the  destroyer  is  actually  seen. 

In  the  matter  of  sniping,  the  Germans,  thorough  as  always, 
are  well  prepared.  Some  of  their  sharpshooters  are  armed 
with  rifles  having  telescopic  sights  and  are  equipped  with 
small  bullet-proof  shields,  the  latter  being  painted  in  cubist 
patterns  in  futurist  colours  in  order  to  obtain  concealment 
by  confusion.  Success  in  this  somewhat  murderous  form  of 
warfare  is  largely  a  matter  of  position  and  luck ;  but  it  is 
remarkable  what  can  be  done  by  pains  and  skill.  At  some 
points,  where  we  are  fortunate  in  having  some  exceptionally 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

good  shots  who  are  also  keen  on  this  work,  we  have  established 
a  mastery  over  the  German  sharpshooters  which  enables  our 
men  to  leave  their  trenches,  whilst  the  occupants  of  the 
German  front  line  dare  not  show  a  head  above  the  parapet. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  explain  exactly  how  this  result 
has  been  achieved,  but  the  time  for  such  disclosures  has 
not  yet  arrived. 

December  14-17 

There  is  now  some  definite  action  on  our  front  to  report. 
In  conjunction  with  the  French,  who  are  also  pressing,  a 
forward  movement  has  been  started  which  has  resulted  in 
a  small  gain  of  ground. 

On  the  night  of  the  I3th-i4th,  to  the  south  of  the  Lys, 
some  of  the  Indian  troops  rushed  two  German  sap-heads  and 
gained  possession  of  them.  On  Monday,  the  I4th,  on  our 
right,  the  artillery  of  both  sides  was  kept  employed,  our  guns 
taking  the  greater  share  in  the  action,  and  there  was  rifle  fire 
all  along  the  line.  It  was  on  the  left  that  a  somewhat  more 
important  operation  was  initiated.  Here,  after  a  bombard- 
ment of  a  section  of  the  German  position,  our  infantry  pushed 
forward  at  a  point  to  the  west  of  Wytschaete.  We  captured 
some  sections  of  trench  at  a  loss  to'the  enemy  of  120  killed, 
and  2  officers  and  60  men  taken  prisoner.  Beyond  our  left 
the  Germans  were  also  forced  back  some  distance  along  the 
line  running  between  St.  Eloi,  to  the  south-east  of  Ypres,  and 
Zonnebeke,  to  the  north  of  the  Ypres-Menin  Road.  North 
of  Ypres  the  Germans  also  withdrew  at  certain  points.  That 
night  the  enemy  fired  250  shell  into  Armentieres. 

Next  day,  Tuesday,  there  was  no  advance  made  by  either 
side.  To  the  north  of  the  Lys  our  artillery  action  continued, 
and  our  infantry  maintained  the  gain  in  ground  made  the  day 
before.  On  our  immediate  left  the  French  were  opposed  by 
a  stubborn  resistance  and  made  no  further  progress.  During 
the  night,  near  Givenchy,  an  assault  was  carried  out  in  three 
bodies  against  the  German  saps.  Two  of  these  attacks  were 
successful,  and  our  troops  retained  possession  of  a  certain 
length  of  each  sap.  In  the  centre  a  minor  attack  against  a 
German  trench  was  also  successful.  Beyond  our  right  the 
French  gained  some  ground. 

On  Wednesday,  the  i6th,  the  .Germans  started  what 
140 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

looked  like  an  advance  in  force  against  our  right,  but  it  did 
not  develop  ;  and  in  the  centre  sapping  operations  alone 
occupied  each  side.  On  our  left  we  maintained  the  ground 
won  on  the  I4th,  and  to  the  north  of  us  the  French  made 
some  progress,  capturing  some  400  yards  of  trench  on  the 
north  of  the  Menin  Road,  from  which  we  were  driven  by  the 
Prussian  Guard  on  October  u. 

On  Thursday,  the  J-7th,  nothing  happened  on  our  right, 
but  it  was  noticeable  that  the  enemy  showed  signs  of  being 
in  expectation  of  an  attack  by  manning  his  fire  trenches  in 
force.  In  the  centre  sapping  continued,  and  some  of  our 
heavy  guns  obtained  several  hits  upon  a  German  howitzer 
battery  arid  what  appeared  to  be  a  headquarters.  On  our 
left  our  action  was  confined  to  that  of  the  artillery,  the  in- 
fantry not  advancing  beyond  the  line  they  had  gained  on  the 
I4th.  In  this  quarter  of  the  field  two  German  soldiers  who 
had  crawled  out  of  their  trenches  to  throw  hand-grenades 
were  both  blown  up  by  a  premature  burst  of  one  of  these 
missiles. 

Beyond  our  left,  up  in  the  north,  a  German  counter-attack 
on  the  night  of  the  i6th-i7th,  near  Lombaertzyde,  was  re- 
pulsed, and  the  Germans  were  slowly  forced  back  east  and 
south  of  Nieuport,  and  lost  about  a  hundred  sailors  and 
marines,  captured  by  the  French. 

From  a  prisoner  captured  on  the  I4th  it  has  been  ascer- 
tained that  both  the  23rd  Regiment  and  Jagers  suffered 
enormous  losses  on  November  4.  The  same  man  described 
November  5  as  a  '  terrible  day/  and  mentions  that  he  had 
never  before  seen  such  mud  as  that  in  which  the  Germans 
were  operating,  and  that  the  troops  were  suffering  very  much 
from  the  water  in  the  trenches.  The  shelling  that  he  went 
through  on  the  I4th  of  this  month  he  states  to  have  exceeded 
all  his  previous  experience. 

We  have  reason  to  believe  from  the  evidence  of  prisoners 
that  many  of  the  Landwehr  are  heartily  sick  of  the  war,  and 
resent  the  harsh  treatment  of  their  officers.  They  have  been 
persuaded  that  the  British  ill-treat  their  prisoners,  and  but 
for  this  some  would  be  willing  to  surrender. 

The  Germans  appear  to  be  discarding  their  helmets,  the 
Pickelhauben  with  which  they  have  for  fifty  years  been 
associated  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  Also,  probably  for 

141 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

purposes  of  concealment,  they  are  covering  the  red  bands  of 
their  forage  caps  with  strips  of  grey  cloth.  Many  variations 
in  their  uniforms  are  now  to  be  seen,  some  of  the  troops  wearing 
their  peace  clothing,  which  is  of  brighter  colour  than  the  grey 
service  dress.  There  is  evidence  that  certain  of  the  units 
facing  us  are  much  under  strength. 

The  opposition  now  being  encountered  resembles  to  some 
extent  that  met  with  by  us  in  the  beginning  of  October, 
when  we  first  reached  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  and  before 
the  Germans  brought  up  their 'full  force  and  assumed  the 
offensive.  It  has  one  great  difference,  however,  and  that  is 
that  the  enemy  is  in  much  greater  force  and  his  positions  are 
much  stronger  and  better  organised  than  they*  were  two 
months  ago.  Then  an  advance  by  either  side  implied  move- 
ment across  enclosed  and  very  difficult  country — as  it  does 
still — and  for  us  it  meant  the  attack  of  skilfully  but  hastily 
fortified  strong  points  or  villages  held  to  a  large  extent  by 
cavalry  and  Jagers,  with  a  large  proportion  of  machine-guns. 
What  we  have  in  front  of  us  to-day  is  no  longer  a  succession 
of  isolated  points.  There  still  are  such  points,  and  some  are 
the  same,  but  they  are  stronger  and  form  part  of  a  practically 
continuous  defensive  zone,  consisting  in  some  places  of  several 
lines  of  cunningly  sited  and  carefully  constructed  works.  This 
zone  really  amounts  to  a  maze  of  fire  trenches  and  obstacles. 
Every  known  form  of  obstacle  is  used,  the  entanglements— 
to  select  the  most  common — varying  from  loose  coils  of  wire 
to  securely  staked  networks  of  from  18  inches  to  nearly  6  feet 
in  height  and  of  different  widths. 

These  measures  of  defence  are  only  such  as  are  to  be 
expected  from  troops  who  are  well  trained  and  have  ample 
resources  and  time.  And  there  are,  of  course,  ways  in  which 
they  can  be  overcome.  But  where  these  methods  are  applied 
the  rate  of  advance  is  necessarily  slow,  and  when  it  is  reported 
in  laconic  terms  that  ground  has  been  gained  at  a  certain 
point,  topographically  the  gain  may  amount  to  only  a  few 
yards.  Tactically,  on  the  other  hand,  the  progress  implied 
by  even  such  a  small  step  forward  may  be  important,  for  a 
trench,  a  cluster  of  trenches,  the  edge  of  a  wood,  a  building, 
a  village,  or  a  knoll  may  have  been  reached,  the  possession  of 
which  will  facilitate  further  operations. 

Siege  approaches,  such  as  saps,  help  the  attacker  to 
142 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

advance  under  cover  and  so  to  minimise  loss,  but  they  do 
not  and  cannot  obviate  liability  to  surprise  receptions  of  the 
nature  indicated  when  once  the  enemy's  works  are  gained. 
The  only  certain  method  of  preventing  this  is  by  a  prolonged 
bombardment  with  higri-explosive  shell  till  trenches,  mines, 
and  machine-guns  are  reduced  to  scrap  heaps,  or  to  mine  under 
them  and  blow  them  into  the  air. 


December  18-21 

The  activity  on  our  part  which  commenced  on  December 
14  in  conjunction  with  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  by 
our  Allies  along  the  whole  line  has  continued.  On  Friday, 
the  i8th,  on  our  right  centre  we  made  progress,  capturing 
some  sap-heads  and  twenty-five  prisoners.  Many  dead 
Germans  were  found  by  us,  presumably  killed  by  our  artillery 
fire.  On  our  left  a  heavy  bombardment  was  directed  by  us 
against  the  German  trenches  in  that  area.  Our  guns  had  got 
the  range  to  a  nicety,  and  must  have  inflicted  considerable 
damage,  every  section  of  this  portion  of  the  enemy's  line 
being  subjected  to  bursts  of  concentrated  fire.  In  the  centre 
our  infantry  executed  some  most  gallant  attacks.  They  were 
successful  in  driving  the  enemy  from  his  fire  trenches,  but 
they  could  not  hold  the  latter  when  captured,  and  retired  to 
their  former  positions.  But  there  was  a  net  gain  of  ground 
at  different  points  along  the  whole  front.  Both  to  the  north 
and  south  of  us  the  French  continued  to  gain  ground,  and  took 
many  prisoners  and  several  machine-guns. 

During  the  night  of  the  i8th  and  early  hours  of  the  igth, 
on  our  right  three  lengths  of  trenches  and  two  machine-guns 
were  taken  by  us,  and  an  extent  of  ground  was  gained  vary- 
ing from  300  to  500  yards.  The  enemy,  however,  counter- 
attacked on  the  morning  of  the  igth,  and  forced  us  to  evacuate 
a  portion  of  the  position  we  had  won.  Some  heavy  fighting 
then  ensued,  the  Germans  making  determined  efforts  to  regain 
all  the  ground  they  had  lost.  By  weight  of  numbers  they 
succeeded  so  far  that  on  the  morning  of  the  2oth  only  two 
sap-heads  remained  in  our  hands. 

On  the  i  gth,  on  our  left  centre,  we  were  successful  in 
regaining  certain  defended  houses  and  trenches.  On  the  left 
the  bombardment  was  maintained  as  on  the  previous  day. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

On  Sunday,  the  20th,  the  Germans  made  an  effort  to 
check  the  general  progress  of  the  Allied  offensive  by  a  counter- 
attack on  a  considerable  front  against  our  right  and  the  left 
of  the  French  acting  to  the  south  of  us.  During  the  morning 
they  advanced  against  our  line  in  some  strength,  and  though 
suffering  heavy  losses  succeeded  by  about  midday  in  gaining 
temporary  possession  of  some  of  our  advanced  trenches.  But 
in  the  afternoon  our  troops,  returning  to  the  charge,  retook 
a  village  which  the  enemy  had  just  occupied  and  some  of  the 
neighbouring  trenches.  By  the  early  morning  of  Monday,  the 
2ist,  the  greater  part  of  our  line  had  been  restored.  Mean- 
while, in  our  centre,  on  Sunday,  the  enemy,  perhaps  with  a 
view  to  supporting  the  operation  against  our  right,  demon- 
strated with  artillery  and  trench-mortars,  but  did  not  launch 
any  infantry  assault.  In  our  centre  we  gained  one  more 
house  from  the  enemy,  destroyed  another,  and  consolidated 
our  foothold  at  this  point.  On  our  left  our  guns  alone  took 
part  in  the  action. 

After  one  of  our  attacks  made  on  the  i8th  in  the  centre 
of  the  line,  there  occurred  an  innovation  in  our  relations  with 
the  enemy.  A  kind  of  armistice  was  concluded  in  order  to 
permit  of  the  burying  of  the  dead  on  both  sides. 

Of  the  recent  action  the  employment  of  bombs  has  un- 
doubtedly been  the  chief  feature.  Indeed,  the  throwing 
of  large  bombs  from  trench-mortars,  and  of  similar  smaller 
missiles  or  grenades  from  rifles  or  by  hand,  has  now  become 
general  all  along  the  line.  As  has  been  stated  when  the 
fighting  reaches  the  stage  of  trench  warfare  at  short  range — 
as  it  has  now  done  over  a  front  of  very  many  miles — these 
missiles  take  the  place  of  the  projectiles  of  longer  range 
weapons,  which  cannot  be  used  with  safety  owing  to  the 
propinquity  to  each  other  of  the  front  lines  of  either  side. 
The  great  use  made  by  the  Germans  of  these  engines  of 
destruction  is  only  one  more  sign  of  the  reliance  they  place 
upon  every  possible  means  of  helping  their  infantry. 

An  artillery  bombardment  of  the  enemy's  positions- 
such  as  has  recently  been  carried  out — viewed  from  the  high 
ground  on  our  left  is  a  most  impressive  sight.  After  a  short 
burst  of  fire  lasting  perhaps  for  only  three  or  four  minutes  the 
hostile  trenches  are  obscured  by  a  pall  of  smoke,  in  the  midst 
of  which  can  be  seen  the  flashes  of  the  shrapnel  bursts  and  the 
144 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

miniature  volcanoes  of  earth  where  the  high-explosive  common 
shells  burst  in  the  soft  clay  soil.  Then,  if  an  infantry  attack 
is  to  be  launched  the  cannonade  suddenly  ceases,  there  is  a 
moment  of  suspense,  and  a  swarm  of  khaki  figures  springs 
from  our  trenches  and  rushes  across  the  fire-swept  zone  of 
possibly  a  hundred  yards  in  breadth.  Instantly  there  breaks 
out  the  rattle  of  machine-guns  and  musketry.  There  is  some 
hesitation  as  the  stormers  reach  the  entanglement ;  and  then, 
if  the  assault  succeeds,  they  disappear  into  the  enemy's 
trenches,  leaving  a  few  or  many  scattered  bodies  lying  in  the 
track  of  their  advance.  Save  at  such  moments  as  these  there 
is  often  no  movement  whatever  in  the  battle  zone,  for  not  a 
man,  horse,  or  gun  is  to  be  seen. .  And  there  are  periods  of 
absolute  stillness  when,  except  for  the  sight  of  the  deserted 
and  ruined  hamlets,  the  scene  is  one  of  peace  and  agricultural 
prosperity. 

The  mere  recapitulation  of  results  attained  conveys  so 
little  idea  of  the  system  of  control  by  which  the  operations 
are  directed,  that  a  superficial  description  of  the  chain  of 
command  may  not  be  out  of  place.  In  that  rather  vague 
area  known  as  '  the  front/  omitting  the  '  bases/  '  advanced 
bases/  and  lines  of  communication  lying  behind,  the  first 
and  most  important  point  for  consideration  is  the  General 
Headquarters  of  the  Army,  where  is  located  the  directing 
brain,  and  the  driving  force  of  the  Army  as  a  whole.  G.H.Q., 
as  it  is  usually  called,  is  generally  in  some  centrally  situated 
town  which  may  be  within  sound  of  the  enemy's  guns  but  not 
within  their  reach,  and  at  it  are  installed  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  and  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army.  That  a  commander 
can  afford  to  be  so  far  away  from  the  front  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  he  no  longer  has  to,  or  can,  depend  on  personal 
observation  for  information  upon  which  to  base  action.  He 
relies  entirely  on  second  or  third  hand  evidence  of  things  seen 
or  heard  by  others  over  a  front  of  many  miles,  and  communi- 
cated back  by  the  agency  of  electricity  or  petrol.  Messages 
sent  in  by  telegraph,  wireless,  telephones,  motor  cars,  motor 
cycles,  and  aeroplanes  are  the  daily  food  of  the  General  Staff ; 
for  the  handling  of  this  mass  of  material  collected  by  others, 
its  analysis,  and  its  application  to  the  situation  for  the  purpose 
of  framing  plans  is  their  work.  At  the  Headquarters  of  the 
Army,  as  at  those  of  corps,  divisions,  and  brigades,  a  great 

MILITARY  2  K  145 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

part  of  this  work  is  done  by  means  of  maps.  Here,  in  certain 
offices,  may  be  seen  large  tables  spread  with  maps,  upon 
which  every  movement  of  both  sides  is  carefully  recorded  in 
flags  or  coloured  chalks,  as  news  is  received  from  the  various 
sources  of  information  available.  At  this  centre  also  are 
the  heads  of  the  administrative  branches  and  departments 
of  the  Army,  which  deal  with  discipline,  supplies  of  all  sorts, 
transport  of  every  nature,  the  transmission  of  information, 
and  the  medical  services.  Naturally,  all  the  people  concerned 
in  this  work  are  billeted  in  houses,  and  unless  the  town  has 
been  previously  in  the  occupation  of  the  enemy,  the  life  of 
the  inhabitants  outwardly  goes  on  almost  normally. 

As  the  Army  moves  backwards  or  forwards,  General 
Headquarters  is  transferred  from  one  place  to  another,  but 
it  is  always  maintained  at  such  a  distance  from  the  fighting 
line  that  it  is  not  disturbed  by  the  operations  or  influenced 
by  what  is  going  on  in  one  part  of  the  front  to  the  detriment 
of  other  parts.  Nevertheless,  for  the  purpose  of  the  more  im- 
mediate control  and  direction  of  operations,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  has  one  or  more  central  posts  nearer  the  front, 
at  which  he  can  more  conveniently  meet  his  subordinate 
commanders  for  consultation,  and  to  which  the  latter  can  more 
quickly  send  reports  or  their  representatives,  These  are 
called  posies  de  commandement,  or  report  centres.  Touch  is 
maintained  daily  between  General  Headquarters,  Corps  Head- 
quarters, and  the  General  and  Corps  Headquarters  of  the 
Allies  by  means  of  special  liaison  officers,  who  travel  to  and 
fro  by  motor.  They  can  convey  personally  the  wishes  of 
those  authorities  whom  they  connect,  and,  knowing  the  views 
of  both,  can,  if  necessary,  verbally  amplify  written  com- 
munications. 

Behind  their  respective  corps,  and  some  way  in  front  of 
General  Headquarters,  but  also  generally  in  a  town  and  far 
enough  from  the  firing  line  to  be  immune  from  the  turmoil 
of  the  fighting,  are  the  Corps  Headquarters.  These  are 
replicas  on  a  smaller  scale — suitable  to  the  requirements  and 
lesser  size  of  a  corps — of  General  Headquarters.  At  them, 
as  may  be  supposed,  are  stationed  the  corps  commanders 
and  their  staffs.  These  commanders  also  are  kept  in  touch 
with  each  other  by  liaison  officers  and  have  their  posies  de 
commandement. 
146 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

Again,  a  step  farther  down  the  military  hierarchy,  and 
still  closer  to  the  front,  come  Divisional  Headquarters.  These 
are  pushed  as  far  forward  as  is  compatible  with  comparative 
immunity  from  hostile  artillery  fire.  With  heavy  howitzers 
or  guns  in  the  field,  complete  immunity  is  unobtainable  at 
the  distance  from  the  front  at  which  it  is  desirable  for  divi- 
sional commanders  to  exercise  control.  Here  in  this  neigh- 
bourhood are  to  be  found  the  first  visible  signs  that  fighting 
is  going  on.  These  do  not  consist  so  much  in  the  ruined 
houses  and  devastated  villages,  which  are  rather  proofs  of 
past  fighting,  and  may  be  in  evidence  even  behind  General 
Headquarters,  but  consist  paradoxically  enough  in  the  actual 
absence  of  any  traces  of  the  presence  of  masses  of  soldiers, 
for  though  the  area  from  here  onwards  may  contain  thousands- 
of  troops,  all  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry  will  alike  be  so 
hidden  away  in  villages,  in  woods,  or  in  folds  of  the  ground, 
that  there  will  be  no  trace  of  them  in  the  landscape.  This  is 
one  result  of  the  all-pervading  and  all-seeing  aeroplane.  On 
the  roads,  however,  at  this  distance  from  the  firing  line  the 
transport  will  be  moving  freely. 

Yet  another  stage  farther  towards  the  fighting  line,  are 
the  Brigade  Headquarters.  The  brigadier,  with  his  staff, 
may  be  in  a  house,  when  he  can  get  one  in  a  conveniently 
situated  village  where  his  dwelling-place  will  be  inconspicuous 
amongst  the  other  buildings,  but  it  is  as  likely  that  his  office 
will  be  in  an  underground  dug-out — roofed  with  earth  and 
well  hidden,  for  the  area  in  which  he  lives  and  moves  is  liable 
to  be  swept  at  any  time  by  a  hail  of  shells,  to  say  nothing  of 
the  rifle  bullets  which  are  constant  visitors.  In  this  district 
there  are  even  less  traces  of  military  occupation  than  farther 
back,  since  a  greater  proportion  of  the  occupants  are  below 
ground,  and  the  movement  of  transport  by  day  is  more  limited. 
Nevertheless,  even  as  far  up  as  this,  the  population  can  be 
seen  continuing  their  usual  avocations — ploughing,  sowing,  or 
reaping  as  the  case  may  be. 

Still  farther  on,  some  400  or  500  yards  from  Brigade  Head- 
quarters, lies  the  belt  of  country  in  which  hide  the  supports 
and  actual  firing  line.  In  this  will  be  found  the  battalion 
commanders.  Seamed  with  dug-outs,  burrows,  trenches,  and 
excavations  of  every  kind,  and  pitted  with  craters,  it  is 
bounded  on  the  front  by  a  long  discontinuous  irregular  line 

147 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

fringed  with  barbed  wire  and  broken  by  saps  wriggling  still 
more  to  the  front.  This  is  the  Ultima  Thule.  Beyond,  of 
width  varying  according  to  the  nature  of  the  fighting  and  of 
the  ground,  is  neutral  territory,  the  No-man's-land  between 
the  hostile  forces.  It  is  strewn  with  the  dead  of  both  sides, 
some  lying,  others  caught  and  propped  in  the  sagging  wire, 
where  they  may  have  been  for  days,  still  others  half  buried 
in  craters  or  destroyed  parapets.  When  darkness  falls,  with 
infinite  caution,  an  occasional  patrol  or  solitary  sniper  may 
explore  this  gruesome  area,  crawling  amongst  the  debris — 
possibly  of  many  fights — over  the  dead  bodies  and  the  in- 
equalities of  the  ground  till  some  point  of  vantage  is  gained 
whence  the  enemy's  position  can  be  examined  or  a  good  shot 
obtained.  On  the  other  side  of  this  zone  of  the  unburied 
dead  bristles  a  similar  fringe  of  wire  and  a  long  succession  of 
low  mounds  and  parapets — the  position  of  the  enemy.  And 
woe  betide  the  man  who  in  daylight  puts  up  his  head  carelessly 
to  take  a  long  glance  at  it. 

From  General  Headquarters,  miles  behind,,  via  divisional, 
brigade,  arid  battalion  headquarters,  to  the  officer  or  man 
in  the  observation  post  in  front  of  the  firing  line  there  is  a 
long  trail  of  wire.  For  the  first  part  of  the  distance  it  is 
carried  on  permanent  telegraph  posts,  next  on  the  slender 
black  and  white  military  posts,  then  it  may  be  looped  from 
tree  to  tree  or  along  the  hedges,  and,  finally,  it  lies  half  hidden 
in  the  mud  at  the  roadside.  But  it  serves  to  convey  the 
orders  of  the  commander  to  the  points  where  his  wishes  are 
ultimately  translated  into  action. 

December  21-24 

As  regards  our  right,  where  heavy  fighting  took  place 
on  Sunday,  it  will  be  remembered  that  in  this  quarter  the 
greater  part  of  our  line  had  been  restored  by  the  early  morn- 
ing of  Monday,  the  2ist.  On  that  day  the  action  was  con- 
tinued with  determination  by  both  sides.  Our  efforts  were 
chiefly  directed  to  lessening  a  small  gap  which  still  existed  in 
the  centre  of  this  section  of  our  front,  and  as  reinforc.ements 
were  thrown  into  the  fight,  the  Germans  were  gradually 
driven  from  the  trenches  they  were  holding.  During  the 
afternoon  they  made  a  fresh  effort,  endeavouring  to  work 
148 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

round  the  flanks  of  the  troops  holding  a  village.  Here  a 
most  gallant  and  stubborn  defence  was  made  by  our  men 
under  a  very  severe  fire  directed  on  them  from  three  sides 
at  once,  but  their  position  finally  became  so  precarious  that 
a  retirement  was  ordered. 

The  enemy's  success  was,  however,  short-lived.  Reinforce- 
ments arrived,  stormed  the  village,  and  established  themselves 
firmly  in  the  trenches  round  it.  In  this  action  the  French 
co-operated  and  gave  us  the  most  valuable  assistance. 

The  fighting  on  this  afternoon  and  during  the  night  took 
place  in  a  perfect  hurricane  of  driving  rain  and  sleet.  Night 
brought  no  cessation  of  the  desperate  struggle,  and  the 
enemy's  searchlights  and  flares  lit  up  the  darkness.  Friend 
and  foe  were  now  fighting  at  close  quarters,  in  such  a  maze 
of  trenches,  running  in  all  directions,  that  it  was  difficult  to 
distinguish  the  position  of  the  one  from  the  other. 

On  the  rest  of  our  front  nothing  of  importance  took 
place.  Our  trenches  in  the  centre  and  left  were  more  heavily 
shelled  than  they  had  been  for  some  days,  while  on  the  right 
centre  the  area  behind  our  front  line  was  searched  by  the 
hostile  artillery,  which  appears  to  have  been  reinforced  to 
some  extent.  In  the  centre  we  continued  to  consolidate  the 
position  won  on  the  igth.  At  one  point  our  guns  replied 
with  considerable  effect  against  some  German  working  parties. 

The  French  continued  their  pressure  to  the  north  and 
south  of  us,  and  achieved  substantial  gains. 

On  Tuesday,  the  22nd,  all  interest  continued  to  be  centred 
on  the  right.  In  the  early  morning  the  troops  in  the  village 
which  we  had  recovered  the  night  before,  who  had  been 
fighting  all  night,  advanced  and  seized  a  line  of  trenches 
held  by  the  Germans.  This  position,  however,  was  found 
to  be  too  exposed,  and  a  retirement  to  the  original  line  was 
carried  out,  and  our  hold  on  the  village  still  more  firmly 
secured.  The  fighting  in  this  quarter  took  place  over  ground 
which  was  literally  a  quagmire,  the  trenches  being  full  of 
water.  A  fresh  attack  in  strength  developed  by  the  Germans 
against  two  villages  in  the  centre  of  this  section,  and  from 
one  our  troops  were  driven  back.  During  the  night  the  line 
was  re-established. 

By  Wednesday,  the  23rd,  it  was  evident  that  the  force  of 
the  attack  against  our  right  had  spent  itself,  for  no  further 

149 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

advance  was  made  by  the  enemy,  who  must  have  suffered 
severe  loss  during  the  previous  three  days.  Along  the  rest 
of  our  line,  also,  there  was  no  activity.  A  thick  mist  mili- 
tated against  air  reconnaissance  and  artillery  action. 

On  Thursday,  the  24th,  nothing  of  importance  occurred 
along  our  front.  On  the  right,  both  sides  confined  themselves 
to  bombardment  with  mortars  and  hand-grenades. 

The  Belgians  and  French  between  the  British  Army  and 
the  sea  made  progress  at  several  points. 

It  would  appear  from  the  evidence  of  prisoners  that  the 
strength  of  many  of  the  German  units  in  our  front  is  still 
much  reduced ;  some  companies  muster  only  150  men,  and 
there  is  seldom  more  than  one  officer  per  company. 

Though  the  weather  has  been  generally  unfavourable  to 
aviation,  several  reconnaissances  have  been  made  during  the 
past  week,  and  there  have  been  three  encounters  in  the  air 
between  British  and  German  aeroplanes,  as  a  result  of  which 
the  hostile  machine  has  in  each  case  been  forced  to  go  down 
in  the  German  lines.  On  one  occasion  our  machine  chased 
a  Taube,  and  having  attained  the  favourable  position  for 
shooting,  the  observer  emptied  his  automatic  pistol  at  the 
enemy  without  any  visible  result  at  about  150  feet  range. 
He  then  proceeded  to  take  a  photograph,  and  the  appearance 
of  the  camera  seems  to  have  alarmed  the  German  airman, 
who  at  once  fled. 

Upon  another  occasion  a  somewhat  difficult  situation  arose 
when  a  bomb  which  was  being  dropped  caught  in  a  string 
and  remained  suspended  three  or  four  feet  below  the  aero- 
plane. There  was  no  way  of  reaching  the  bomb,  and  it  was 
impossible  to  land.  Finally  the  observer  kicked  a  hole 
through  the  floor  of  the  fuselage,  hooked  the  string  with  his 
foot,  and  shook  it  until  the  bomb  fell  off. 

The  country  on  our  right,  where  the  fighting  of  the  last 
few  days  has  been  proceeding,  has  already  been  described 
as  it  appeared  during  our  first  advance,  some  weeks  ago. 
A  great  deal  of  this  area  is  flat  and  at  all  times  marshy,  and 
is  now  almost  impassable  in  places.  Some  of  the  villages 
round  Bethune  have  suffered  heavily  from  shell  fire.  The 
factories  and  coal-fields  are,  of  course,  deserted,  and  it  is 
difficult  to  imagine  anything — except  possibly  the  flooded 
area  nearer  the  coast — which  more  suggests  '  the  abomination 
150 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

of  desolation  '  than  this  whole  district  as  seen  through  fog 
and  driving  snow.  The  great  pyramidal  slag-heaps  stand  out 
amid  the  smoke-blackened  ruins  of  mining  villages  and  the 
swamped  fields  intersected  by  dykes  and  fringed  with  rows 
of  pollard  willows. 

There  is  no  sign  of  the  ordinary  life  of  the  place  save  the 
few  inhabitants  who  are  living  in  destitution  and  misery 
under  incessant  shell  fire,  'mid  the  wreckage  of  bricks  and 
mortar  which  was  once  their  home.  Everywhere,  as  far  as 
the  eye  can  see,  there  is  nothing  but  trenches,  ruins,  mud. 

The  mud  of  Poland  is  proverbial,  but  it  is  hard  to  believe 
that  the  difficulties  produced  by  it  are  greater  than  those  at 
present  being  experienced  by  both  sides  in  some  parts  of  our 
front.  This  applies  especially  to  any  advance  over  the  low- 
lying  areas  which,  besides  being  cut  up  by  ditches,  are  water- 
logged and  in  some  places  pitted  with  shell  craters  full  of 
water.  In  such  conditions,  also,  the  construction  of  entrench- 
ments is  no  easy  matter.  The  clay  is  so  tenacious  that  it 
will  not  leave  the  shovel,  which  has  continually  to  be  scraped, 
while  in  the  wettest  places  the  soil  is  so  liquid  that  parapets 
slide  down  into  shapeless  masses  as  soon  as  they  are  thrown 
up,  and  the  sides  of  an  excavation  continually  cave  in. 

It  is  reported  that  in  one  place  the  mud  is  so  bad  that 
in  a  recent  action  between  the  French  and  the  Germans 
neither  side  could  fire  their  rifles,  and  clubbed  them,  or  fought 
with  shovels  and  pickaxes. 

December  24-27 

Christmas  has  come  and  gone,  but  it  has  brought  no 
modification  of  the  situation.  There  has,  however,  been  a 
change  in  the  weather,  which  is,  perhaps,  a  matter  of  greater 
importance  to  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  living  in 
the  open  than  is  at  first  realised.  It  has  become  much  colder. 

On  Christmas  Eve  a  hard  frost  set  in,  and  the 
25th  December  was  very  cold,  though  it  was  not  bright,  for 
a  mist  hung  over  the  countryside.  On  our  right,  which  has 
been  the  scene  of  the  most  recent  action,  we  captured  a 
short  length  of  German  trench.  It  was  also  discovered  that 
a  group  of  buildings  behind  the  German  front  line  was  being 
used  as  headquarters  of  some  sort.  The  fire  of  a  certain 
number  of  batteries  was  therefore  concentrated  on  the  spot, 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

the  buildings  being  first  shelled  with  lyddite,  and  then  the 
ground  all  round  being  searched  with  shrapnel.  It  is  believed 
that  this  bombardment  was  effective.  Fifty  dead  Germans 
were  picked  up  in  one  of  the  trenches  recently  retaken,  by  us. 
It  is  estimated  that  in  the  attack  on  the  village  captured  by 
them  on  the  2ist  their  loss  in  killed  alone  must  have  amounted 
to  400.  In  our  centre  the  only  incident  was  the  capture  of 
two  of  the  enemy,  who  came  across  to  our  trenches  uninvited, 
ostensibly  to  wish  us  the  compliments  of  the  season. 

Boxing  Day  was  quiet  except  for  some  shelling  by  the 
enemy  of  a  few  points  near  our  left.  It  was  a  day  of  mingled 
frost,  sleet,  and  then  rain. 

On  Sunday,  the  27th,  nothing  occurred.  There  were 
periods  of  heavy  rain. 

On  Christmas  Day  every  officer  and  man  in  the  field 
received  two  most  acceptable  gifts.  From  the  King  and 
Queen  came  a  card.  On  one  side  of  this  were  portraits  of 
their  Majesties,  the  King  being  in  khaki  field  service  dress, 
and  on  the  other  side  was  a  greeting  in  facsimile  of  the  King's 
handwriting  :  '  With  our  best  wishes  for  Christmas  1914. 
May  God  protect  you  and  bring  you  home  safe. — Mary  R., 
George  R.I/  The  inscription  on  the  special  card  for  the  sick 
and  wounded  ended  with  the  words  :  '  May  you  soon  be 
restored  to  health/ 

From  Her  Royal  Highness  Princess  Mary's  Soldiers'  and 
Sailors'  Christmas  Fund  came  a  present.  This  varied  accord- 
ing as  the  recipient  was  a  smoker  or  a  non-smoker,  and  also 
varied  for  some  of  the  Indian  troops.  For  the  smokers  it 
consisted  of  the  following  :  A  briar  pipe  and  a  small  gilt 
casket  containing  photo  of  Princess  Mary,  a  card  with  the 
inscription — '  With  best  wishes  for  a  Happy  Christmas  and 
a  Victorious  New  Year  from  Princess  Mary  and  friends  at 
home/  an  ounce  of  tobacco,  and  a  packet  of  cigarettes.  Em- 
bossed on  the  cover  of  the  box  is  a  portrait  medallion  of  the 
Royal  donor,  with  the  superscriptions  Imperium  Britannicum, 
1  Christmas,  1914,'  and  the  names  of  our  six  Allies — France, 
Russia,  Belgium,  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Japan.  In  quarters,  in 
the  trenches,  and  in  the  hospitals  these  tokens  of  the  kindly 
thought  of  their  Majesties  gave  the  most  intense  pleasure. 
In  fact,  the  eagerness  shown  by  some  of  the  wounded  to 
receive  their  presents  was  almost  pathetic,  and  many  soldiers 
152 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYEWITNESS 

have  written  personal  letters  of  thanks  to  their  Majesties. 
The  Indian  troops  exhibited  their  boxes  with  an  undisguised 
pride  and  glee,  which  showed  how  these  prizes  would  be 
treasured  and  handed  down  as  heirlooms. 

As  can  be  imagined,  the  distribution  of  this  number  of 
parcels  in  addition  to  the  immense  amount  of  warm  clothing 
and  other  gifts  for  the  troops  was  no  easy  task.  But  the 
organisation  of  the  transport,  the  supply,  and  the  railway 
services  was  sufficient  to  cope  with  the  problem.  All  the 
Christmas  traffic  was  handled  by  means  of  a  special  staff, 
with  officers  stationed  at  the  bases  and  railheads.  Elaborate 
precauticns  were  taken  to  prevent  any  loss  en  route  of  the 
presents  of  the  Princess  Mary's  Fund.  They  were  conveyed 
in  closed  vans  locked  by  letter-locks,  of  which  the  key-word 
was  known  only  to  certain  officers.  Some  of  the  vans  were 
also  tied  up  with  barbed  wire.  This  great  precaution  nearly 
led  to  disaster  in  one  case.  The  receiving  officer  had  either 
forgotten  or  not  received  the  opening  word,  '  Noel/  and  could 
not  get  the  van  open  until  he  hauled  at  the  fastening  with  a 
motor-lorry.  In  regard  to  the  King  and  Queen's  cards  the 
chief  difficulty  surmounted  was  to  ensure  delivery  on  one 
day  to  units  scattered  at  bases,  at  advanced  bases,  on  the 
lines  of  communication,  and  in  the  trenches.  Many  units, 
also,  were  actually  moving. 

A  certain  amount  has  been  said  about  the  hardships  under 
which  the  troops  are  fighting,  which  are,  of  course,  mostly 
incidental  to  the  conduct  of  a  winter  campaign.  On  the  other 
hand,  everything  possible  has  been  done  to  mitigate  the 
rigours  of  active  service  under  such  conditions.  The  troops 
are  fed  as  no  army  in  the  field  has  been  fed  before.  Both 
from  public  and  private  sources  they  are  furnished  with  every 
imaginable  kind  of  garment.  Materially,  our  soldiers  want 
for  nothing  which  it  is  possible  to  give  them  in  the  circum- 
stances. Morally,  they  are  in  very  good  heart  and  contented. 
But  there  is  one  thing  which  nearly  all  of  them  refer  to  when 
asked,  and  that  is  the  lack  of  means  of  making  a  '  cheerful 
noise/  or,  in  other  words,  the  dearth  of  mouth-organs  !  When 
the  men  are  collected  in  the  burrows  and  dug-outs  behind  the 
firing  line  in  the  long,  dull  evenings  when  nothing  happens, 
any  musical  instrument  for  the  performance  of  a  solo  or  the 
accompaniment  of  a  song  is  a  godsend. 

i53 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

It  will  probably  be  gratifying  to  the  thousands  of  kind- 
hearted  people  at  home  who  have  sent  out  luxuries  for  the 
soldiers  to  learn  that  there  was  no  lack  of  Christmas  fare  for 
them.  At  every  regimental  headquarters  could  be  seen  piles 
of  plum  puddings,  chocolate,  tobacco,  and  other  luxuries. 
Of  Christmas  puddings  alone  over  eighty  tons  reached  the 
different  railheads  between  December  24  and  26.  The  men 
who  came  from  their  turn  of  duty  in  the  trenches,  weary, 
sodden  with  water,  and  chilled  to  the  bone  were  soon  sitting 
down  in  their  billets  to  eat  their  dinners  with  greater  relish 
than  if  they  had  been  in  barracks  at  home. 

It  is  wonderful  what  effect  a  little  rest  and  warmth  and 
a  change  of  clothes  has  in  enabling  the  men  to  recover  from 
the  exposure  and  strain  of  life  in  the  trenches.  One  night  with 
a  roof  over  their  heads  and  near  a  stove  fire,  and  they  are  again 
fit  for  anything.  They  suffer  most  in  their  feet,  which  are 
apt  to  swell  after  much  standing  in  mud  and  water,  but  they 
soon  recover  once  they  have  taken  off  their  boots  and  put  on 
a  dry  pair  of  socks.  Certain  means  are  now  being  taken  to 
give  protection  against  the  wet.  These  precautions  enable  .a 
good  deal  of  damp  and  cold  to  be  endured,  and  the  proof  of 
their  success  is  the  small  amount  of  sickness  even  in  such 
weather  as  we  have  recently  experienced. 

The  country  immediately  in  rear  of  the  fighting  line  has 
a  strange  life  of  its  own.  In  the  low-lying  district  south  of 
the  Lys  there  is  an  extraordinary  number  of  isolated  farm- 
houses and  small  clusters  of  cottages,  rather  than  villages, 
dotted  thickly  all  over  the  flat  expanse  of  ploughed  fields. 
Except  where  the  shelling  has  been  very  severe  the  inhabi- 
tants remain,  till  the  soil,  and  live  side  by  side  with  our 
soldiers,  who  take  up  every  yard  of  spare  space  in  all  the 
buildings,  leaving  the  inhabitants  just  so  much  accommoda- 
tion as  they  absolutely  require. 

The  large  square  farmhouses  are  most  useful  for  billeting 
purposes.  These  are  generally  built  round  a  courtyard,  in  the 
centre  of  which,  in  defiance  of  all  laws  of  sanitation,  is  a 
square  pit  for  the  midden.  On  this  the  windows  of  the 
living  rooms  look  out.  The  first  thing  our  men  do  on  taking 
over  is  to  start  '  swabbing  ' — to  use  a  barrack-room  term  ; 
and  they  then  settle  down  to  a  life  of  comparative  ease  amid 
the  pigs,  the  chickens,  and  the  children,  until  their  turn  comes 
154 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

again  to  man  the  trenches.  When  they  come  off  duty  again 
a  hot  meal  is  ready  for  them,  dry  blankets  are  served  out, 
and  they  settle  down  to  sleep  round  the  stoves  in  the  houses. 

An  incident  occurred  on  December  24  which  was  not  men- 
tioned in  the  last  Summary  of  Events.  It  resulted  in  a  slight 
loss  of  ground  to  us,  but  was  the  cause  of  heavy  casualties  on 
the  enemy.  A  mine  was  exploded  by  the  Germans  under- 
neath one  of  our  trenches  on  the  right  of  the  line,  and  several 
yards  of  the  trench  were  blown  in.  Under  cover  of  this  the 
German  snipers  advanced,  occupied  the  part  of  our  line  that 
had  been  destroyed  and  enfiladed  the  rest.  When  this  party 
of  the  enemy  had  established  itself,  a  larger  body  advanced 
to  the  attack.  Meanwhile  our  guns  had  been  notified  and 
opened  with  deadly  effect,  scattering  the  enemy  and  killing 
a  large  number.  They  then  proceeded  to  bombard  the  part 
of  the  trench  that  had  been  captured,  and  are  believed  to  have 
killed  all  those  that  had  got  into  it. 

The  following  letter  from  Germany  is  of  some  interest 
as  showing  the  economic  conditions  prevailing  in  one  part 
of  that  country.  It  is  from  Lintfort,  and  is  dated 
November  16  : — 

'Flour  is  fearfully  expensive,  and  potatoes  also.  Everything  is 
dear  in  Lintfort ;  one  can  hardly  buy  anything.  Petroleum  is  also 
very  scarce,  every  week  only  one  litre,  and  then  people  must  stand  all 
along  the  street  with  jugs,  and  the  last  ones  don't  get  any/ 

December  28-31 

.  Monday,  the  28th,  was  a  day  of  pelting  rain.  Towards 
evening  this  gave  place  to  a  hurricane  of  wind,  followed, 
during  the  night,  by  a  violent  thunderstorm.  No  incident 
worth  chronicling  occurred  along  our  line,  neither  the  weather 
nor  the  waterlogged  condition  of  the  ground  favouring  military 
operations  in  the  low-lying  areas  ;  but  the  French  continued 
to  make  progress  in  other  quarters,  and,  among  other  suc- 
cesses, captured  the  village  of  St.  Georges,  east  of  Nieuport, 
and  inflicted  great  loss  on  the  enemy. 

On  Tuesday,  the  29th,  our  troops  on  the  right  recovered 
by  a  gradual  advance  much  of  the  ground  that  had  been 
occupied  by  the  enemy  the  week  before. 

On  Wednesday,  the  30th,  the  gradual  progress  on  our 

i55 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

right  was  maintained.  The  Germans  again  bombarded 
Armentieres  and  shelled  our  front  line  on  the  left.  To  our 
north,  their  airmen  displayed  more  activity  than  they  had 
lately  shown,  dropping  bombs  on  Dunkirk  and  Furnes.  The 
day  was  bright  and  frosty,  favouring  aerial  reconnaissance. 

The  last  day  of  1914  passed  equally  uneventfully  all  along 
our  front. 

The  fighting  is  now  taking  place  over  ground  where  both 
sides  have  for  weeks  past  been  excavating  in  all  directions, 
until  it  has  become  a  perfect  labyrinth.  A  trench  runs 
straight  for  a  considerable  distance,  then  it  suddenly  forks 
in  three  or  four  directions.  One  branch  merely  leads  into  a 
ditch  full  of  water,  used  in  drier  weather  as  a  means  of  com- 
munication ;  another  ends  abruptly  in  a  cul-de-sac,  probably 
an  abandoned  sap-head ;  the  third  winds  on,  leading  into 
galleries  and  passages  farther  forward. 

Sometimes,  where  new  ground  is  broken,  the  spade  turns  up 
the  long  buried  dead,  ghastly  relics  of  former  fights,  and  on  all 
sides  the  surface  of  the  earth  is  ploughed  and  furrowed  by 
fragments  of  shell  and  bombs  and  distorted  by  mines.  Seen 
from  a  distance,  this  apparently  confused  mass  of  passages 
crossing  and  recrossing  one  another  resembles  a  huge  irregular 
gridiron. 

The  life  led  by  the  infantry  of  both  sides  at  close  quarters 
is  a  strange,  cramped  existence,  with  death  always  near, 
either  by  means  of  some  missile  from  above  or  some  mine 
exploded  from  beneath  ;  a  life  which  has  one  dull,  monotonous 
background  of  mud  and  water. 

Even  when  there  is  but  little  fighting,  the  troops  are  kept 
hard  at  work  strengthening  the  existing  defences  and  con- 
structing others,  improvising  the  shelter  which  is  imperative 
in  such  weather,  and  improvising  the  sanitary  conditions  and 
communications  of  the  trenches. 

Many  of  the  roads  leading  up,  and  parallel  to,  the  Allied 
front  present  a  kaleidoscope  of  the  strangest  contrasts.  Several 
types  of  humanity  can  be  seen,  from  the  wild  Arab  horseman 
of  the  North  African  deserts,  clothed  in  flowing  robes  of  blue 
and  scarlet,  to  the  tribesman  from  the  mountains  of  the  North- 
West  Frontier  of  India.  And  there  is  something  grotesquely 
incongruous  in  the  appearance  of  the  dusky  faces  and  Oriental 
garments — such  as  those  worn  by  the  Algerian  cavalry — amidst 
156 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

the  surroundings  of  driving  sleet,  seas  of  mud,  and  long  squalid 
rows  of  brick  cottages,  such  as  those  in  the  small  industrial 
towns  where  many  of  these  troops  are  billeted. 

French  Cuirassiers  on  the  march,  looking  as  if  they  had 
stepped  straight  out  of  one  of  Meissonier's  pictures,  their 
cuirasses  red  with  rust,  give  an  old-world  touch  to  the  scene 
and  an  impression  of  a  time  when  war  still  had  the  glamour  of 
romance.  But  the  impression  is  quickly  shattered  by  the 
drab  reality  of  a  convoy  of  motor-lorries,  lumbering  and  snort- 
ing along  beside  little  mule-drawn  Indian  ammunition  carts 
bumping  along,  with  the  native  drivers  huddled  up  to  the 
eyes  in  greatcoats. 

A  British  Territorial  battalion  just  out  from  home  swings 
through  a  village,  where  it  is  surveyed  by  a  mixed  contingent 
of  Gurkhas,  Sikhs,  and  Baluchis,  whose  heads,  as  is  the  way 
with  the  native  of  India  in  cold  weather,  are  wrapped  in  every 
conceivable  form  of  headgear,  even  newspapers. 

In  some  of  the  villages  there  is  a  Red  Cross  flag,  marking 
the  dressing  station  of  a  unit,  to  which  at  times  the  wounded 
may  be  seen  being  brought,  and  from  which  the  motor-ambu- 
lances move  away  in  the  evening  with  their  daily  toil  of 
sufferers.  As  it  grows  darker  there  is  more  visible  activity  in 
the  area  near  the  front :  the  regimental  transport  moves  up, 
batteries  change  position,  and  the  roads  become  crowded  with 
troops  and  vehicles.  And  threading  their  way  through  the 
throng  come  the  columns  of  men  from  the  trenches,  men 
covered  with  mud,  cold,  wet,  and  very  weary,  but  still  cheerful, 
talking  and  smoking  as  they  march  by. 

That  the  German  sniper,  however  bold  and  enterprising  in 
picking  off  individuals  who  may  come  within  range,  does  not 
always  come  off  best  when  confronted  by  the  British  soldier 
at  close  quarters  is  proved  by  the  following  incident  which 
occurred  a  few  days  ago.  One  of  our  men  had  gone  at  night 
into  some  farm  buildings  to  get  some  straw  for  a  dug-out, 
when  a  shot  was  fired  at  him  and  two  German  soldiers  sud- 
denly appeared  out  of  the  darkness.  He  was  unarmed,  but 
at  once  produced  a  pair  of  wire-cutters,  took  aim  as  if  with  a 
revolver,  and  shouted  to  the  Germans  to  put  up  their  hands. 
This  they  did,  and  were  then  marched  off  as  prisoners. 

The  employment  of  grenades  is  no  new  feature  of  field 
operations,  as  witness  the  name  '  Grenadiers  '  ;  and  grenade- 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

throwing  as  a  drill  was  regularly  practised  in  our  Army  until 
less  than  thirty  years  ago,  when  it  was  abandoned.  It  was 
revived,  however,  during  the  recent  Balkan  War,  when  the 
Komitadji  bands  habitually  made  use  of  this  weapon.  For 
siege  warfare,  of  course,  the  employment  of  hand-grenades 
has  never  been  abandoned,  and  at  Port  Arthur  the  Russians 
and  Japanese  expended  thousands  of  these  missiles,  mostly 
improvised. 

Some  of  those  now  being  used  by  the  Germans  are  of 
1  sealed  pattern/  made  in  an  arsenal  probably  before  the  war, 
whilst  others  have  been  manufactured  in  the  field. 

One  pattern  of  the  factory-made  article  consists  of  a  cast- 
iron  globe  of  about  four  inches  in  diameter  and  ij  Ib.  weight 
when  loaded.  Its  external  surface  is  scored  by  deep  lati- 
tudinal and  longitudinal  grooves,  which  form  lines  of  cleavage 
for  the  metal  to  fly  into  a  number  of  fragments  of  a  size 
likely  to  cause  damage.  It  is  loaded  with  powder,  which  is 
exploded  by  slow-burning  compound,  fired  by  a  friction  tube 
before  the  bomb  is  thrown.  Of  the  improvised  type  two 
patterns  consist  of  differing  amounts  of  high  explosive,  wired 
or  otherwise  made  fast  to  a  rough  wooden  throwing-handle, 
shaped  something  like  a  lady's  hand-mirror.  These  are  also 
fired  by  detonator  and  fuse,  the  latter  being  ignited  by  a 
percussion  lighter  before  the  grenade  is  thrown. 

Of  the  smaller  trench-mortars  the  bombs  are  thin  metal 
cylinders  weighing  from  about  four  to  eighteen  pounds  when 
loaded  with  high  explosive  and  a  charge  of  scrap-iron.  These, 
again,  are  fired  by  fuse  and  detonator. 

That  we  have  effective  means  of  replying  to  these  missiles 
goes  without  saying. 

Some  of  the  prisoners  we  have  captured  lately  have  taken 
a  gloomy  view  of  the  situation,  have  criticised  their  leaders, 
and  appear  utterly  sick  of  the  life  they  have  been  leading  in 
the  trenches.  But  this  probably  is  not  a  fair  indication  of 
the  sentiments  of  the  enemy's  fighting  troops.  They  are 
conscious  that  the  war  will  last  much  longer  than  was  at 
first  expected,  but  the  fact  that  it  is  being  waged  almost 
entirely  in  the  enemy's  country  prevents  them  realising  that 
they  are  fighting  in  what  must  eventually  prove  a  losing 
cause. 

They  believe  firmly  that  Russia  has  suffered  a  decisive 
158 


DESPATCHES  FROM  BRITISH  EYE-WITNESS 

defeat — indeed,  it  is  reported  that  on  December  18  in  Ghent 
all  the  bells  were  pealed  to  celebrate  a  victory  over  the 
Russians  and  the  capture  of  50o>ooo  Russian  prisoners  ;  that 
France  is  exhausted  and  ready  to  make  peace  ;  that  England 
is  decadent,  and  that  her  people  are  engrossed  in  football 
matches.  This  idea  is  due,  apparently,  to  the  fact  that  we 
are  still  relying  on  what  appears  to  them  a  half-measure, 
such  as  voluntary  service,  and  are  not,  like  other  nations, 
enrolling  the  whole  of  our  manhood  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  war. 

Their  view  is  further  distorted  by  lies  circulated  as  to  the 
attitude  of  neutrals,  who  are  said  to  have  declared  war  on  the 
Allies.  Neither  the  pinch  of  real  want  nor  lack  of  men  and 
material  of  war  has  yet  been  felt  by  the  Germans,  nor  has 
the  consciousness  of  defeat  yet  been  brought  home  to  them, 
while  their  Press  is  doing  its  best  to  inspire  them  with  a 
fanatical  hatred  against  us,  born  of  the  conviction  that  it  is 
we,  inspired  by  jealousy,  who  have  by  intrigue  and  treachery 
raised  a  host  of  enemies  against  them. 


FRENCH   OFFICIAL  AND   SEMI-OFFICIAL 

REPORTS 

THE  BATTLE  OF  FLANDERS 

Now  that  definite  results  have  been  obtained,  the  time  has 
come  for  preparing  a  balance-sheet  of  the  last  six  weeks. 

It  can  be  summed  up  as  follows.  The  formidable  effort 
attempted  by  the  Germans  during  that  period,  first  to  turn 
our  left,  then  to  pierce  it  completely,  has  failed. 

By  this  effort,  the  enemy  tried  to  retrieve  his  defeat  of  the 
Marne  ;  he  only  succeeded  in  adding  a  fresh  failure  to  that 
of  September. 

To  turn  our  flank,  in  their  old-established  way,  the 
German  General  Staff  had,  however,  neglected  nothing;  on 
the  part  of  the  front  extending  from  the  Lys  to  the  sea, 
it  had  massed,  between  the  beginning  of  October  and  the 
beginning  of  November,  four  cavalry  corps,  and  two  armies, 
comprising  altogether  close  on  fifteen  army  corps. 

The  chiefs,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria,  General  von 
Fabeck,  General  von  Deimling,  the  Duke  of  Wurtemberg,  in 
order  to  raise  the  morale  of  the  troops,  multiplied  their  appeals 
and  exhortations. 

We  found  their  orders  on  dead  officers  and  prisoners. 
All  agree.  The  purpose  was  a  decisive  action  against  the 
French  left ;  to  pierce  through  towards  Dunkirk  or  Ypres, 
for,  as  one  of  these  orders  stated,  the  decisive  blow  still  remains 
to  be  struck,  and  it  must  be  the  drive  through. 

At  all  costs  and  in  all  haste  they  wish  to  obtain  a  decision 
on  the  Western  theatre,  before  turning  against  the  enemy  on 
the  East. 

Moreover,  the  Emperor  is  there,  to  cheer  his  soldiers  by  his 
presence.  He  has  announced  that  he  wishes  to  enter  Ypres 
on  November  i,  and  all  is  prepared  to  proclaim  the  annexa- 
160 


4]      FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

tion  of  Belgium  on  that  date  ;    briefly,  everything  has  been 
foreseen,  except  the  victorious  resistance  of  the  Allied  armies. 

To  make  this  resistance  possible,  we  have  had  to  oppose 
to  the  enemy  sufficient,  if  not  equal  forces.  What,  then,  was 
the  situation  at  the  beginning  of  October  ? 

The  Belgian  Army,  though  it  had  left  Antwerp  intact,  had 
been  too  sorely  tried  to  take  part  in  a  movement ;  the  English 
Army  was  leaving  its  front  on  the  Aisne  to  go  and  operate  in 
the  North ;  but  transports  and  detrainings  necessitated  long 
delays  ;  the  Army  of  General  de  Castelnau  did  not  extend 
beyond  the  south  of  Arras,  on  his  left ;  the  Army  of  General 
de  Maud'huy  stretched  from  that  point  to  the  south  of  Lille  ; 
farther  on  we  had  some  cavalry,  some  terrritorials,  some 
marine  fusiliers. 

This  was  not  sufficient  to  enable  General  Foch,  who  had 
been  appointed  by  General  Joffre  to  the  command  of  the 
Northern  Armies,  to  break  the  enemy's  purpose.  Reinforce- 
ments were  therefore  sent  to  him.  For  three  weeks  the  rail- 
way and  motor  car  reigned  supreme.  Night  and  day  troops 
were  rolling  up.  They  came  in  time.  Divisions  and  army 
corps,  less  numerous  than  those  of  the  enemy,  but  inspired 
with  an  admirable  spirit,  were  engaged  almost  as  soon  as  they 
arrived.  During  a  whole  month  they  were  at  the  front. 

Towards  October  20  this  front  was  shaped  as  follows : — 
From  Nieuport  to  Dixmude,  one  of  our  divisions  of  infantry 
and  our  marines  were  holding  the  railway  line,  while  the 
Belgian  Army  at  the  rear  was  being  reorganised  ;  to  the  south 
of  Dixmude  we  were  established  on  the  'canal ;  our  line  then 
stretched  away  towards  the  east,  forming  before  Ypres  a  vast 
semicircle  occupied  by  four  French  and  one  English  army 
corps. 

The  line  then  descended  towards  the  south,  from  Messines 
to  Armentieres,  forming  two  sectors  held,  one  by  the  remainder 
of  the  English  Army  and  the  other  by  ourselves. 

The  German  attack,  in  the  first  instance,  aimed  at  taking 
Dunkirk,  reaching  Calais  and  Boulogne,  moving  round  us, 
cutting  the  direct  communications  of  the  British  Army  from 
the  sea.  The  whole  of  the  heavy  artillery  brought  from 
Antwerp  was  there,  ready  to  be  used  again. 

MILITARY  2  L  l6l 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

As  early  as  November  3  the  attack  was  repulsed.  From 
the  railway  we  marched  towards  the  Yser,  throwing  back  the 
enemy,  who  had  succeeded  in  crossing  to  the  left  bank,  and 
drowning  their  rearguard  in  the  inundation.  Near  Rams- 
capelle  the  German  guns  sank  in  the  mud,  and  half-submerged 
corpses  can  still  be  seen  there. 

The  enemy  then,  finding  it  impossible  to  turn  us,  attempted 
to  pierce  through,  and  this  was  the  battle  of  Ypres,  a  furious 
and  stubborn  battle,  where  the  German  Army,  regardless  of 
losses,  hurled  its  units  forward  in  deep  masses,  sacrificing 
everything  to  the  end,  provided  that  end  was  attained. 

Their  end  was  not  attained.  For  nearly  three  weeks  we 
sustained  repeated,  hurried,  and  frenzied  assaults  ;  they  were 
all  repulsed. 

Our  front,  with  its  curved  form,  was  not  easy  to  hold ; 
nevertheless  we  held  it. 

On  October  30  the  English  troops,  particularly  the  cavalry, 
had  been  compelled  to  withdraw  some  hundreds  of  metres 
before  the  powerful  effort  of  the  enemy  ;  our  troops,  counter- 
attacking at  the  same  time  as  those  of  our  Allies,  set  up  again 
the  inviolable  barrier  which  closed  the  approaches  to  Ypres. 

The  deeds  performed  there  by  our  army  corps,  in  close  con- 
junction with  the  English  corps  which  they  encompassed,  are 
worthy  of  the  finest  pages  in  military  history. 

On  November  12  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  canal  at  two  points  to  the  north  of  Ypres  ;  on  the  I3th  he 
was  already  thrown  back  to  the  other  bank.  On  November  12 
he  had  also  gained  some  ground  in  the  region  south  of  Ypres  ; 
this  ground  was  also  retaken  from  him. 

On  the  I5th  his  attacks  diminished  and  our  position, 
already  strong  before,  became  unassailable. 

•  •••••*• 

This  result  was  obtained  by  the  army  in  Belgium,  under 
the  orders  of  General  d'Urbal,  in  conjunction  with  the  armies 
of  General  de  Maud'huy  and  General  de  Castelnau,  these  three 
armies  constituting  the  group  of  armies  under  General  Foch. 

The  two  last-mentioned  brilliantly  contributed  to  our 
success  by  repulsing  all  attacks  directed  against  them,  and  by 
carrying  several  important  positions  between  the  Oise  and 
the  Lys. 

The  decisive  help  we  brought  to  the  English  troops  on  this 
162 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

occasion  has  firmly  sealed  the  fraternity  of  arms  between  the 
Allies.  Finally,  the  energy  of  our  resistance  has  restored 
confidence  to  the  Belgian  Army,  which,  reorganised  on  its 
own  soil,  is  now  ready  for  the  fighting  of  to-morrow. 

The  losses  of  the  Germans  have  been  considerable  ;  they 
certainly  exceed  120,000  men.  In  some  of  the  trenches, 
1200  metres  long,  there  were  found  over  2000  corpses,  though 
it  is  well  known  that,  whenever  they  can  do  so,  the  Germans 
remove  their  dead  from  the  battle-field. 

These  great  losses  are,  however,  explained  by  a  peculiar 
circumstance.  If  during  three  weeks  the  Germans  attacked 
in  deep  formations,  it  was  the  necessary  consequence  of  the 
recent  constitution  of  several  of  their  army  corps. 

The  numerous  artillery  we  had  assembled  on  the  south 
of  Ypres  opened  bloody  breaches  in  those  masses. 

All  this  goes  to  emphasise  the  importance  of  our  success  ; 
its  extent  assumes  a  particularly  striking  significance  when 
one  bears  in  mind  that  the  Germans  themselves  have  always 
looked  upon  the  breaking  through  at  Ypres  as  decisive. 

In  breaking  their  offensive,  we  have  inflicted  upon  them 
the  most  humiliating  of  disillusionments.  On  the  other  hand, 
we  have  obtained  results,  the  importance  of  which  it  would 
be  well  to  point  out. 

They  are  as  follows.  Had  the  Army  of  Belgium  been  thrown 
out  of  its  territory,  William  n.  would  not  only  have  realised 
his  plan  of  proclaiming  in  Ypres  the  annexation  of  this  valiant 
nation,  but  he  would  have  been  justified  in  boasting  that  he 
had  annihilated  at  least  one  of  his  adversaries.  He  was 
denied  this  twofold  satisfaction. 

If  Dunkirk,  Calais,  and  Boulogne  had  been  taken,  England 
would  have  found  her  communications  hampered  with  her 
Continental  Army. 

Lastly,  France,  in  maintaining  unbroken  the  front  of  her 
armies  from  the  sea  to  Arras,  secured  the  best  and  most 
effective  safeguard  against  an  offensive  return  of  the  enemy 
towards  Paris. 

The  extent  of  our  success  is  thus  made]clear. 

To  gauge  it  exactly,  one  need  only  consider  the  general 
plan  of  the  campaign  and  compare  the  fronts  occupied  by 

163 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

our  left  and  the  German  right,  first  at  the  beginning  of 
September  and  then  in  the  middle  of  November. 

The  result  obtained — and  this  also  is  noteworthy — comes  as 
a  result,  not  of  momentary  successes  but  of  steady  progress, 
which  has  nullified  the  enemy's  equally  uninterrupted  effort. 

After  our  victory  of  the  Marne  had,  in  the  middle  of 
September,  compelled  the  German  armies  to  beat  a  hurried 
retreat,  they  at  once  tried  to  regain  the  advantage  by  still 
turning  our  left.  In  this  they  were  nowhere  successful. 

Meanwhile  we,  on  the  other  hand,  contrived  to  extend  our 
left  into  Belgium  and  to  carry  it  as  far  as  the  sea.  We  kept 
it  then  unbroken  on  the  line  to  which  we  had  brought  it. 

The  success  gained  in  Flanders,  of  which  the  French  troops 
bore  the  heaviest  burden,  is  therefore  the  continuation,  the  pro- 
longation, and  the  consecration  of  the  victory  of  the 
Marne. 

The  glory  of  this  success  is  due  to  our  chiefs  and  to  our 
soldiers.  Henceforth  it  is  proved  by  facts  that  our  command 
is  able  to  read  the  plan  of  the  German  command,  and  that  it 
is  ready,  everywhere  and  at  all  times,  not  only  for  the  parry, 
but  also  for  the  thrust. 

As  to  the  troops,  they  have  found  qualities  they  were 
perhaps  lacking  in  at  the  beginning  of  the  operations,  princi- 
pally as  regards  quick  practice  in  defensive  organisation  ;  the 
trenches  that  they  build  are  now  equal  to  those  of  the  enemy. 

Highly  satisfactory  as  may  be  the  recognition  of  these 
facts,  they  do  not  exhaust  the  reasons  for  our  confidence  ;  for 
to  this  progress  of  our  armies  there  corresponds  the  progress 
of  the  Russian  armies  which,  from  November  3  onwards,  has 
become  more  marked. 

At  the  gates  of  Cracow  and  Kalisch,  our  allies  are  begin- 
ning to  weigh  heavily  in  the  scale  of  forces. 

Thus  the  failure  of  the  German  plan  stands  clearly  revealed 
in  broad  daylight. 

This  plan,  as  often  mentioned,  which  was  that  of  von  der 
Goltz,  of  Bernhardi,  and  of  Falkenhayn,  was  to  crush  France 
in  three  weeks,  and  then  to  turn  against  Russia. 

And  now  we  are  approaching  the  end  of  the  fourth  month 
of  the  war,  and  France  is  not  crushed. 

She  has,  on  the  contrary,  only  successes  to  show  since 
164 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

September  6,  in  spite  of  the  gathering  against  her  of  masses 
of  troops  representing  upwards  of  fifty  army  corps. 

It  must  be  said  and  repeated — for  it  is  the  truth,  and  a 
truth  all  to  our  honour — that  these  fifty  army  corps  are  all 
still  facing  us  ;  fifteen  German  army  corps  added  to  practically 
the  entire  Austrian  forces,  are  facing  Russia. 

It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated,  that  since  September  6 
the  formidable  masses  that  assail  us  have  been  unable  to 
make  us  bend  anywhere,  in  spite  of  their  valour  ;  on  the 
contrary,  they  have  on  many  points  retreated  under  the 
pressure  of  our  efforts. 


DESPATCHES  FROM  FRENCH  EYE-WITNESS 

THE  FOLLOWING  NARRATIVE  OF  EVENTS  WAS  COMPILED  BY  [Alltak 
A  MILITARY  EYE-WITNESS  AT  THE  HEADQUARTERS  £?m  T} 
OF  THE  FRENCH  ARMY  IN  THE  FIELD 

November  15-21 

The  last  few  days  have  been  marked,  except  at  certain 
points,  by  an  appreciable  slackening  of  the  German  activity. 
On  the  other  hand,  our  artillery  and  our  infantry  have  secured 
a  marked  advantage  over  the  enemy  in  what,  owing  to  the 
form  and  position  of  the  opposing  fronts,  is  really  siege 
warfare. 

From  the  sea  to  the  river  Lys  our  artillery,  perfecting  its 
aim  as  the  result  of  information  from  our  airmen,  has  on 
several  occasions  silenced  the  enemy  artillery.  On  November 
17,  in  the  Ypres  region,  we  destroyed  several  of  the  enemy's 
guns.  On  the  igth  and  2Oth  we  achieved  a  similar  result  at 
Nieuport.  Our  artillery  by  its  sharp  reply  on  the  igth 
stopped  the  enemy's  fire  directed  at  the  station  of  Ypres  and 
the  road  from  Poperinghe  to  Ypres.  On  several  occasions 
it  has  seemed  as  if  the  enemy's  artillery  were  short  of  am- 
munition. Several  German  shells  did  not  burst,  and  it  was 
ascertained  that  they  were  practice  projectiles.  Our  infantry 
during  the  last  five  days  has  lost  none  of  its  positions  in  this 
sector,  and  it  has  often  gained  ground.  The  partial  attacks 
of  the  enemy  have  always  been  repulsed,  while  our  offensives 

165 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY  [i 

have   almost   always   succeeded  in   consolidating  the   gains 
achieved  by  them. 

Farther  to  the  south,  on  the  I7th,  the  British  found  in 
another  trench  1200  German  dead.  The  losses  of  the  enemy 
have  therefore  continued  to  be  very  high.  It  may  be  pointed 
out  that  when  our  infantry  wavers  under  the  violence  of  an 
attack,  it  is  the  first  to  demand  permission  to  make  a  counter- 
attack. Thus  the  troops  of  General  Vidal  in  the  Ypres  region 
recovered  on  the  night  of  the  I7th  a  wood  which  they  had 
lost  during  the  day.  They  made  it  a  point  of  honour  not  to 
postpone  the  recovery  of  this  position. 

From  the  Oise  to  the  west  of  the  Argonne  there  have 
been  somewhat  sharp  engagements,  and  our  guns  have  in- 
flicted serious  loss  on  the  enemy.  On  the  i6th,  to  the  east 
of  Reims,  they  blew  up  an  ammunition  depot,  and  on  the 
I7th  our  heavy  artillery  near  Vieil-Arcy  demolished  three 
German  77  mm.  guns  and  blew  up  an  ammunition  wagon. 
On  the  same  day,  to  the  north  of  Craonne,  it  silenced  several 
enemy  batteries.  On  the  following  day,  near  Amifontaine, 
a  German  camp  was  discovered  by  our  batteries  and  had 
to  be  moved.  On  the  igth,  near  Rouge-Maison,  we  damaged 
a  section  of  105  of  the  enemy,  and  destroyed  a  large  work 
near  the  farm  of  Hurtebise.  On  the  2Oth  we  prevented  the 
Germans  from  continuing  trenches  which  they  had  begun 
to  dig  near  Vailly.  All  these  successes  justify  the  confidence 
of  our  gunners  in  the  efficacy  of  their  fire. 

On  the  I7th  the  affair  of  Tracy-le-Val  marked  a  brilliant 
success  for  our  infantry.  It  was  about  n  o'clock  that  the 
Germans  attacked.  They  bombarded  the  village  with  g-inch 
mortars  and  then  launched  two  battalions  against  the  northern 
end  of  the  village.  Their  sudden  and  mass  attack  led  them 
first  of  all  to  cross-roads  and  then  to  a  church,  and  enabled 
them  to  capture  a  mitrailleuse.  But  this  success  so  quickly 
obtained  was  as  quickly  nullified.  A  section  of  Zouaves 
charged.  They  began  by  capturing  the  mitrailleuse,  and 
then,  having  been  reinforced,  they  dashed  forward,  passed 
the  church  and  the  cross-roads,  and  forced  the  Germans 
back  to  their  starting-point.  The  enemy  then  tried  to  break 
our  line  on  the  east,  but  were  again  defeated.  In  this  vain 
attack  the  Germans  left  behind  several  hundred  dead  and 
wounded.  We  lost  less  than  a  hundred  men. 
166 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

There  was  another  instance  on  the  same  day  of  the  keen- 
ness of  our  infantry.  In  the  neighbourhood  of  St.  Hubert 
and  the  Four-de-Paris  two  of  our  companies  were  suddenly 
attacked  by  two  battalions  and  driven  back  from  their 
trenches.  The  next  morning  they  recovered  all  the  lost 
ground  and  took  eighty  prisoners. 

On  the  front  from  the  Oise  to  the  Argonne  our  aeroplanes, 
in  spite  of  rain  followed  by  keen  cold,  have  done  very  good 
work.  The  services  which  they  have  rendered  our  artillery 
by  enabling  it  to  regulate  its  fire  have  been  already  mentioned. 
They  have  also  on  two  occasions,  on  the  Aisne  and  to  the  east 
of  Reims,  compelled  the  enemy  aeroplanes  to  interrupt  their 
mission  and  return  to  the  German  lines. 

From  the  Argonne  to  the  Vosges  there  have  been  numerous 
actions,  in  which  our  troops  have  proved  their  powers  of 
endurance.  Every  day  and  every  night  round  Verdun  and 
on  the  heights  of  the  Meuse  they  have  had  to  repel  attacks, 
some  of  which  have  been  particularly  violent.  On  the  I5th 
in  the  Vosges  the  Germans,  having  suffered  losses  amounting 
to  2500  men,  dismissed  General  Eberhards,  one  of  their  divi- 
sional commanders.  Lieutenant  Mandel,  son  of  a  former 
Secretary  of  State  of  Alsace-Lorraine/  was  killed  in  the 
course  of  the  fighting  here.  On  the  I7th  two  German 
battalions  which  engaged  us  at  Ste.  Marie  had  to  be 
sent  back  to  the  rear,  having  lost  more  than  half  of  their 
effectives. 

Special  mention  must  be  made  of  the  Chauvoncourt  affair, 
which  did  not  succeed,  and  of  that  of  Senones,  which,  on  the 
contrary,  was  a  success.  Our  men  by  a  bold  attack  set 
foot  in  two  barracks  to  the  west  of  Chauvoncourt,  a  suburb 
of  St.  Mihiel.  Twice  they  were  driven  back  and  twice  they 
retook  the  position.  They  were  holding  the  greater  portion 
of  it  when  on  the  i8th  a  violent  fire  from  n-inch  mortars 
compelled  the  leading  company  to  shelter  in  the  cellars  of 
the  first  barracks.  At  that  moment  the  Germans  blew  up  the 
building,  which  they  had  mined.  We  lost  there  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners  about  200  men.  The  effort  of  these 
gallant  fellows,  however,  had  not  been  in  vain,  since  we  had 
destroyed  defensive  works  which  had  served  as  a  base  for  the 
enemy's  counter-attacks.  The  Germans,  who  had  tried  to 
cross  the  Meuse  in  order  to  support  their  forces  at  Chauvon- 

167 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

court,  had,  on  the  other  hand,  suffered  very  great  losses, 
infinitely  greater  than  ours. 

At  Senones,  or,  to  be  more  exact,  to  the  north-west  of 
that  place,  a  detachment  supported  by  artillery  had  received 
orders  to  carry  enemy  trenches  which  threatened  ours.  At 
daybreak  on  the  igth  a  breach  was  made  in  the  first  wire 
entanglement  by  melinite,  and  our  infantry  in  one  rush 
gained  250  yards.  Here  our  men  found  themselves  con- 
fronted by  another  wire  entanglement,  and  taken  in  flank 
on  the  right  and  left  by  enemy  machine-guns.  They  held 
their  ground,  however,  and  dug  themselves  in  under  fire, 
maintaining  all  the  ground  they  had  won.  In  this  brilliant 
affair  we  lost  only  sixty  men. 

In  the  eastern  sector  our  resistance  and  our  progress 
at  the  Epargne,  near  Verdun,  must  also  be  noted.  The 
Germans  during  the  last  few  days  have  made  no  change  in  their 
customary  methods.  They  have  again  bombarded  Reims 
Cathedral  and  have  also  bombarded  the  hospital  at  Bethune, 
which  they  made  a  special  target.  We  succeeded  in  re- 
moving all  our  wounded  safely  from  the  hospital.  The 
mentality  thus  manifested  and  known  to  us  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war  also  finds  expression  in  instructions 
to  the  enemy's  reserve  troops  which  were  found  in  the  pocket 
of  a  dead  officer.  Here  it  is  set  forth  that  every  French 
civilian  found  on  the  battlefield  is  to  be  shot. 

It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  the  German  Government  has 
not  altered  its  methods  of  bluff  and  falsehood.  On  the  igth 
German  communiques  referred  to  a  violent  French  attack 
which  had  been  repulsed  in  the  Argonne.  Inquiry  into  our 
'  violent  attack '  on  that  day  and  at  that  point  shows  that 
it  was  confined  to  some  rounds  of  artillery,  and  that  the 
Germans  had  nothing  to  repulse  because  they  were  not 
attacked.  One  may  judge  from  this  instance  the  credit 
which  must  be  attached  to  German  communiques. 

November  2j-December  5 

The  above  period  has  not  been  marked  by  operations  of 
great  extent,  but  it  may  be  said  that  along  the  whole  front 
the  ascendancy  both  of  our  artillery  and  our  infantry  over 
the  enemy  has  been  established.  Our  artillery,  without 
168 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

suffering  seriously  from  the  enemy's  fire,  at  several  points 
silenced  his  batteries  and  destroyed  some  of  them.  The 
infantry,  showing  a  spirit  of  sustained  dash,  has  advanced 
everywhere,  and  never  has  progress  been  followed  by  a  with- 
drawal. 

FROM  THE  SEA  TO  THE  OISE 

On  December  i  at  Bixschoote  and  Merkem  our  heavy 
artillery  seriously  damaged  five  German  batteries  and  exploded 
several  ammunition  wagons.  On  the  same  day  at  Wydendreft 
we  destroyed  a  machine-gun  section,  while  on  the  4th  inst.  our 
big  guns  silenced  the  heavy  German  artillery.  Earlier,  on 
November  28,  our  heavy  ordnance  in  the  Knocke  district 
demolished  the  bridges  which  the  enemy  had  built  for  his 
supplies.  The  same  thing  happened  at  Bixschoote  on 
December  2.  Near  Lens  we  had  bombarded,  five  days  earlier, 
to  good  purpose  German  supply  columns,  and  on  the 
5th  of  this  month  we  demolished  the  enemy's  works  near 
Roclincourt.  The  attacks  which  our  infantry  have  repulsed 
are  too  numerous  to  mention  in  detail,  but  the  following  is 
a  list  of  the  principal  attacks,  with  the  plaCe  and  the  date  : 

Passchendaele,  November  27. 

Bixschoote,  November  30. 

Passchendaele,  December  3. 

Wydendreft,  December  5. 

Broodseinde  (to  the  east  of  Ypres),  November  27. 
In  this  last  attack  the  Germans  showed  great  courage, 
and  some  of  them  were  killed  on  the  very  parapet  of  our 
trenches ;  150  bodies  were  found  in  front  of  a  single  trench. 
From  one  end  to  the  other  of  the  north  sector  our  infantry 
has  gained  ground. 

Several  infantry  actions  deserve  special  mention.  The 
action  which  gave  us  Ferryman's  House  was  particularly 
brilliant.  Several  German  trenches  were  carried  in  succes- 
sion. The  object  was  to  drive  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Yser 
the  Germans,  who  had  succeeded  in  establishing  themselves 
there  for  a  length  of  over  a  mile. 

The  difficulty  in  the  attack  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  canal 
was  bordered  by  marshes  which  could  not  be  crossed,  and  the 
only  way  of  approach  was  along  the  bank  and  on  a  very 
narrow  front.  Moreover,  the  right  bank,  where  the  enemy 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

had  taken  up  his  position,  dominated  the  left  bank,  which 
was  exposed  to  a  machine-gun  fire.  The  assault  on  Ferry- 
man's House  was  delivered  by  a  detachment  of  100  volunteers 
from  the  African  battalions.  Our  men  fought  knee-deep  in 
the  water  in  a  downpour  of  rain. 

The  Germans  displayed  the  greatest  courage,  and  our  men 
had  to  kill  i  officer  and  15  men  who  refused  to  surrender. 
In  Ferryman's  House  itself,  which  had  been  turned  into  a 
little  fort,  there  were  53  lying  dead,  two  of  whom  were 
officers.  They  had  been  killed  by  our  8*6  shells.  Close 
by  was  the  wreckage  of  their  searchlight  and  their  machine- 
guns. 

Not  less  remarkable  was  the  attack  on  the  park  and  the 
Chateau  of  Vermelles.  Two  platoons  of  dismounted  Spahis, 
with  rifle  and  bayonet,  and  three  companies  of  infantry  were 
entrusted  with  the  duty.  On  the  morning  of  December  i 
the  Germans,  attacked  on  every  side,  fled  and  tried  vainly  to 
entrench  themselves  in  the  chateau  buildings.  On  the  follow- 
ing day  and  later  all  counter-attacks  of  the  enemy  were 
repelled,  and  one  of  our  guns,  boldly  pushed  forward,  demo- 
lished in  turn  several  blocks  of  buildings  which  the  enemy 
had  turned  into  supporting-points.  Our  infantry  captured 
several  machine-guns,  rifles,  and  war  material  of  every 
description. 

Farther  south  the  attack  on  Fey  gave  our  men  occasion 
to  show  their  dash  on  the  offensive.  They  had  pushed  for- 
ward by  November  28  as  far  as  the  first  line  of  the  enemy's 
wire  entanglements,  which  they  severed  with  wire-cutters 
and  promptly  entrenched  themselves  on  the  ground  which 
they  had  gained.  Throughout  the  whole  night  the  enemy  kept 
up  a  continuous  fire,  but  meanwhile  our  sharpshooters 
with  their  wire-cutters  and  our  sappers  with  their  melinite 
were  not  less  active  in  destroying  the  wire  entangle- 
ments. 

On  November  30,  after  getting  through  one  line  of  barbed 
wire,  they  found  themselves  confronted  with  yet  another 
line.  They  suffered  considerable  losses  from  the  heavy  fire 
from  machine-guns  and  from  hand  grenades  throughout  the 
day,  but  they  succeeded  all  the  same  in  establishing  them- 
selves on  the  ground  which  they  had  taken — a  gain  of 
between  400  and  500  yards. 
170 


H4]      FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

FROM  THE  OlSE  TO  THE  ARGONNE 

The  western  portion  of  this  sector  during  the  period 
under  review  was  comparatively  quiet.  On  November  30 
our  artillery  scattered  German  infantry  columns  north  of  Fort 
Cond£.  The  German  artillery  showed  little  activity,  and  our 
troops  had  leisure  to  complete  their  arrangements. 

In  the  Champagne  region  our  artillery  achieved  appre- 
ciable success.  On  November  27,  to  the  west  of  Presles, 
one  of  our  batteries  of  75*5  destroyed  a  German  4-inch  gun, 
while  our  heavy  guns  silenced  the  enemy's  fire  near  Rouge- 
Maison.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  growing  activity 
of  our  artillery  upon  this  part  of  the  front  reduced  our  daily 
average  of  infantry  casualties  from  100  to  20.  Shortly  after- 
wards we  destroyed  an  ammunition  wagon,  six  machine-guns, 
and  a  heavy  battery. 

On  November  29  we  reduced  the  German  artillery  to 
silence  at  Blanc-Chateau,  and  we  were  equally  successful 
in  silencing  his  guns  which  were  firing  on  Taissy,  while 
on  the  Craonne  Plateau  we  destroyed  a  field  battery.  A 
German  machine-gun  shelter  was  destroyed  near  Vauclerc  on 
December  2,  and  on  that  and  in  the  succeeding  days  we 
exploded  several  powder  magazines.  The  German  guns  which 
were  bombarding  Reims  were  silenced  on  December  4  and 
December  5. 

The  Germans  tried  to  blow  up  the  bridge  at  Berry-au-Bac, 
but  the  barge,  with  explosives  to  be  set  off  by  a  time- 
machine,  was  stopped  and  sunk.  The  sole  success  which 
the  German  artillery  has  obtained  in  this  region  has  been 
the  bombardment  on  two  or  three  occasions  of  Reims.  The 
most  violent  bombardment  took  place  on  the  day  when  the 
journalists  representing  neutral  countries  were  visiting  the 
town. 

FROM  THE  ARGONNE  TO  THE  HEIGHTS  OF  THE  MEUSE 
In  this  section  the  enemy  has  shown  more  activity, 
especially  north  of  the  Four-de-Paris,  in  the  Grurie  Wood, 
and  at  Fontaine-Madame.  All  their  attacks  were  repelled 
with  the  utmost  vigour,  and  our  infantry  were  not  content 
to  remain  on  the  defensive.  In  the  region  of  the  Grurie 
Wood  and  of  the  Bollante  Wood  and  Fontaine-Madame 

171 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

they  have  attacked  daily  and  have  made  progress.  On 
December  i,  near  St.  Hubert,  we  blew  up  a  German  field- 
work,  which  we  afterwards  occupied,  and  three  days  later  we 
carried  several  trenches,  captured  prisoners,  and  pushed 
forward  nearly  200  yards. 

The  German  General  Staff  has  boasted  of  a  great  success 
on  December  i  in  the  Grurie  Wood,  but  this  success  was 
nothing  more  than  the  blowing  up  of  a  trench  which  had 
been  mined.  The  company  which  occupied  it  was  almost 
annihilated,  but  the  men  in  the  adjoining  trenches  held 
their  ground  after  a  furious  hand-to-hand  struggle,  and  a 
new  line  was  established  through  a  fresh  trench  exactly 
thirty-two  yards  behind  the  one  which  had  been  blown  up. 

FROM  THE  MEUSE  TO  THE  Swiss  FRONTIER 

On  the  heights  of  the  Meuse  thick  fog  and  much  rain 
stopped  all  fighting  for  several  days.  On  the  days  when  the 
atmosphere  cleared  our  artillery  repeatedly  silenced  the 
enemy.  A  machine-gun  section  was  destroyed  on  December 
5,  while  supply  columns  were  bombarded  and  a  heavy 
battery  was  put  out  of  action.  The  infrequent  infantry 
attacks  of  the  enemy  were  all  repulsed,  and  at  several  points 
we  made  appreciable  progress.  We  also  advanced  on  the 
4th  inst.  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle,  and  on  the  following 
day  in  the  Le  Pretre  wood. 

The  German  artillery  devoted  its  attentions  mainly  to 
Saint  Remy  and  Les  Eparges. 

In  the  Vosges  and  Upper  Alsace  our  offensive  has  made 
us  masters  of  important  positions.  On  December  2  we 
seized  to  the  south  of  the  Col  Bonhomme  the  Tete-de-Faux, 
a  crest  where  the  enemy  had  an  artillery  observation  station 
and  whence  he  dominated  the  valley  of  the  Meurthe.  Our 
Chasseurs  carried  the  crest  in  two  hours.  They  suffered  con- 
siderable loss,  but  their  dash  was  magnificent.  The  trumpets 
sounded  the  charge,  and  the  Chasseurs  advanced  singing  the 
'  Marseillaise/  One  of  them  had  brought  with  him  a  flag 
which  he  planted  on  the  summit  of  the  crest. 

South  of  the  Tete-de-Faux  we  progressed  on  the  Grimande 
slope,  and  north-west  of  Senones  near  Signal-de-Mere-Henri 
all  the  counter-attacks  were  repulsed,  while  we  were  even 
172 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

able  to  hold  a  blockhouse  which  was  only  about  ten  yards 
distant  from  the  enemy's  trenches.  A  sergeant  and  four 
men  constituted  the  garrison,  and  they  were  supplied  with 
food  in  a  very  ingenious  fashion.  Loaves  of  bread  were 
hollowed  out,  and  inside  were  placed  portions  of  meat  and 
flasks  of  water.  These  welcome  and  nourishing  projectiles 
were  then  thrown  into  the  blockhouse.  The  spirit  of  our 
troops  in  the  Vosges  is  admirable. 

December  7-15 

In  the  course  of  this  period  the  ascendancy  of  our  infantry 
has  permitted  us  to  make  on  several  parts  of  the  front  pro- 
gress which  appears  to  have  made  the  enemy  anxious.  The 
German  infantry  is  everywhere  more  careful.  Continual 
irregular  firing  reveals  a  certain  nervousness  in  their  ranks. 
The  more  and  more  frequent  use  of  light-rockets  also  reveals 
the  fear  of  an  attack.  After  the  costly  and  vain  experi- 
ences of  the  last  month,  our  adversaries  appear  everywhere 
to  be  reduced  to  the  defensive,  and  it  is  we  who  on  all  the 
front  have  taken  an  aggressive  attitude.  In  the  artillery 
duels  also  our  batteries  have  more  and  more  confirmed  their 
superiority. 

Between  the  sea  and  the  Lys  the  enemy,  who  contented 
himself  during  the  period  from  the  6th  to  the  gth  inst.  with 
bombarding  our  lines,  and  in  particular  the  town  of  Ypres, 
delivered  on  the  loth  inst.  to  the  south  of  this  village  three 
infantry  attacks  against  our  trenches.  The  first  two  were 
repulsed.  The  third  reached  our  first  line  trenches,  but 
during  the  night  we  retook  our  positions.  A  fresh  attack 
made  by  the  enemy  on  the  I2th  was  stopped. 

On  the  I4th  our  infantry  in  its  turn  assumed  the  offensive. 
Despite  the  wet  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  fire  from  the 
machine-guns,  it  succeeded  in  capturing  the  enemy's  trenches 
on  a  front  of  several  hundred  metres  and  in  maintaining  itself 
there  in  face  of  violent  counter-attacks.  On  the  following 
day,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  Belgian  troops,  we  succeeded 
in  debouching  from  Nieuport  and  in  taking  a  position  on  the 
western  outskirts  of  the  villages  of  Lombaertzyde  and  St. 
Georges.  In  the  course  of  these  different  actions  the  German 
artillery  gave  its  infantry  only  very  inefficacious  help. 

Between  the  Lys  and  the  Oise  our  progress  has  not  been 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

less  marked.  The  occupation  of  Vermelles  by  our  troops 
compelled  the  enemy  to  retreat  three  kilometres.  On  the 
same  day  we  carried  some  trenches  to  the  south  of  Carency, 
and  in  the  region  of  Quesnoy  we  made  an  advance  varying 
from  550  to  900  metres. 

On  the  8th  bloody  contests  took  place  on  the  road  from 
Lille  to  the  north  of  Roclincourt  around  a  barricade  which 
finally  remained  in  our  hands.  On  the  gth,  before  Parvillers 
and  Fouquescourt,  further  progress  was  made.  We  are  no 
longer  more  than  a  hundred  metres  from  the  German  trenches. 
Before  Andechy  we  gained  from  300  to  600  metres.  We  are 
at  the  same  time  progressing  by  sapping. 

On  the  nth,  to  the  east  of  the  Lille  road,  we  blew  up  a 
German  mine.  Zouaves  and  sappers  quickly  rushed  into 
the  hole  made  by  the  explosion,  and  from  it  threw  melinite 
bombs  into  the  enemy's  trenches. 

The  activity  of  the  enemy  has  only  been  manifested  by 
his  attacks  delivered  in  the  region  of  Fouquescourt  and  by 
an  attack  near  Ovillers.  They  were  both  easily  checked.  Our 
batteries  maintain  their  superiority.  In  spite  of  the  rigours 
of  December  and  the  rains  which  make  the  trenches  a  quag- 
mire, the  morale  and  the  health  of  our  troops  remain  perfect. 
Our  troops,  well  fed  and  warmly  clothed,  are  full  of  con- 
fidence. There  has  been  an  artillery  duel  almost  daily  without 
any  infantry  action,  except  during  the  night  of  the  7th-8th, 
when  a  German  attack  on  Tracy-le-Val  was  easily  repulsed. 

The  German  artillery  has  been  directed  on  towns  or 
villages.  On  the  6th  it  bombarded  Soissons,  on  the  loth  and 
I5th  Tracy,  on  the  loth  the  suburbs  of  Reims,  on  the  I2th 
the  town  of  Reims,  and  on  the  I4th  the  village  of  Grouy. 
Our  artillery  replied,  and  with  good  results.  On  the  gth  it 
destroyed  four  machine-guns  and  an  observation  post ;  on 
the  loth  it  destroyed  a  battery ;  and  on  the  nth  our  heavy 
artillery  silenced  some  quick-firing  guns. 

It  is  in  the  Argonne  that  the  enemy  continues  to  show 
most  activity.  We  are  making  progress  in  the  Bois  de 
Rolande.  Our  works  at  Haute  Chevanche*e  were  attacked 
violently,  but  unsuccessfully,  by  fire  from  the  enemy,  who 
succeeded  in  blowing  up  a  mine  in  one  of  our  trenches.  On 
the  I2th  the  enemy's  mines  caused  us  to  lose  more  trenches 
at  Haute  Chevanche*e.  At  the  Bois  de  Grurie  we  gained 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

250  metres  on  the  I2th,  and  on  the  I5th  we  blew  up  a  German 
mine  there. 

In  the  region  of  Varennes  and  in  the  heights  of  the  Meuse 
the  artillery  alone  has  been  active.  In  the  Bois  de  la  Pretre 
we  have,  from  the  7th  to  the  nth,  gained  ground  each  day, 
taking  machine-guns  and  making  numerous  prisoners.  These 
men  were  very  depressed.  They  said  they  had  received  orders 
from  their  officers  not  to  fire  so  as  to  avoid  provoking  our  fire. 

In  the  Vosges  the  positions  gained  have  been  solidly  main- 
tained, despite  German  attacks.  On  the  loth  our  troops 
got  possession  of  the  station  of  Aspach,  .to  the  south-east  of 
Thann.  On  the  I3th  we  occupied  the  heights  north-west  of 
Cernay  and  the  village  of  Steinbach.  The  enemy's  resumed 
offensive  was  repulsed  with  heavy  losses  to  himself.  On  the 
I4th  the  Germans  again  attacked,  and  succeeded  at  the  price 
of  heavy  sacrifices  in  occupying  Steinbach.  They  could  not 
debouch  from  there,  and  the  heights  which  dominate  Cernay 
remain  in  our  hands. 

To  sum  up,  at  a  large  number  of  points  we  have  made 
attacks  which  have  been  crowned  with  success.  At  no  point 
have  we  abandoned  what  we  have  gained.  Everywhere  the 
enemy  opposed  to  us  has  been  compelled  to  take  up  a  defensive 
attitude,  which  confirms  the  superiority  of  our  troops. 


December  16-24 

The  period  from  December  16  to  24  has  defined  and 
accentuated  the  results  obtained  during  the  preceding  period. 
Our  aggressive  attitude  was  manifested  with  more  energy, 
whilst  the  enemy  was  everywhere  reduced  to  a  defensive 
attitude.  The  violence  of  his  counter-attacks  has  shown 
that  he  only  accepted  this  attitude  because  he  was  forced  to 
do  so,  whilst  the  failure  of  everything  he  has  attempted  in 
order  to  recover  the  ground  he  has  lost  only  goes  to  confirm 
our  advantage.  Finally,  it  should  be  remarked  that  in  many 
parts  along  the  front,  notably  near  Arras,  at  the  edge  of  the 
wood  to  the  west  of  the  Argonne,  and  near  Verdun,  we  have 
rendered  ourselves  masters  of  important  points  of  vantage. 

The  operations  to  the  north  of  the  Lys  have  become 
terribly  difficult  owing  to  the  bad  weather.  The  liquid  and 
cold  mud  from  which  the  men  suffered  invaded  the  breeches 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

of  their  rifles,  so  that  they  could  no  longer  fire,  and  had  to  fight 
with  the  butt  end  of  their  rifles  and  with  their  fists.  Our 
soldiers,  according  to  the  expression  of  one  of  their  leaders, 
have  become  blocks  of  mud.  The  attempt  has  been  successful 
to  provide  for  them,  when  they  leave  the  trenches,  proper 
baths  and  a  complete  change  of  linen,  which  they  appreciate 
very  much.  Their  unalterable  good  humour,  however,  en- 
ables them  to  endure  with  the  best  possible  grace  the  rough 
life  which  is  imposed  upon  them  by  this  severe  winter. 

The  operations  of  the  last  period  in  this  part  of  the  front 
may  be  divided  into  three  regions — namely,  the  region 
above  Nieuport,  to  the  north  of  Ypres,  and  that  to  the 
south  of  Ypres.  Above  Nieuport  there  are  on  the  one 
hand  the  floods  and  on  the  other'  the  sea.  Between  the 
floods  there  are  the  dunes,  and  it  is  there  where  we  have 
progressed.  On  the  evening  of  the  I5th  we  had  debouched 
from  Nieuport  as  far  as  the  border  of  the  woods  to  the  west  of 
Lombaertzyde.  On  the  i6th  we  pushed  as  far  as  the  sea, 
occupied  the  lighthouse,  and  made  over  a  hundred  prisoners. 
On  the  i yth  we  reached  the  crossing  on  the  road  from  Lorn- 
baertzyde,  and  from  the  dunes  we  also  made  progress  more  to 
the  south  in  front  of  St.  Georges.  On  the  igth  there  was  a 
fresh  advance  of  200  metres  gained  along  the  whole  front.  On 
the  2Oth  a  trench  was  taken,  and  on  the  2ist  a  fresh  move 
forward  of  150  metres  was  made  in  the  direction  of  Westende. 
The  enemy  counter-attacked  on  the  22nd,  but  was  repulsed. 
All  we  have  gained  remains  in  our  hands.  The  German 
division  of  marines  on  the  coast  is  unable  to  retake  what  it 
has  lost. 

To  the  north  of  Ypres  the  struggle  is  concentrated  near 
Steenstraate  and  Bixschoote,  around  the  Korteker  Inn.  On 
the  iyth  we  carried  at  one  rush  500  metres  of  ground,  taking 
several  trenches,  capturing  four  machine-guns,  and  making 
150  prisoners.  On  the  i8th  we  took  one  by  one  the  houses 
near  our  lines,  and  on  the  iyth  the  inn  to  the  east  of  us,  and 
swept  the  neighbourhood  clear  of  the  enemy,  taking  a  wood, 
some  houses,  and  a  redoubt.  On  the  22nd  a  further  100 
metres  were  gained.  The  enemy  counter-attacked,  but  in 
vain.  The  operations  on  the  I7th  and  i8th  represent  together 
a  further  gain  of  over  700  metres. 

First,  between  the  Oise  and  the  Aisne  our  artillery  obtained 
176 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

an  appreciable  success,  comprising  the  destruction  of  a  machine- 
gun  and  a  look-out  station  near  Tracy-le-Val  on  the  i6th,  a 
barricade  in  the  region  of  Vailly  on  the  igth,  a  howitzer  on  the 
2Oth,  a  machine-gun  on  the  2ist,  the  bringing  down  of  a 
captive  balloon  on  the  22nd,  and  the  destruction  on  the  24th 
of  the  enemy's  trenches  at  the  Plateau  of  Nouvron.  Our 
infantry  made  important  progress  in  the  region  of  Nampcel 
and  Puisaleine.  On  the  2ist  they  carried  the  enemy's  first 
line  of  trenches  along  a  front  of  500  metres  and  took  a  machine- 
gun.  We  lost  on  the  22nd,  and  retook  on  the  23rd,  portions 
of  the  ground  gained.  On  the  23rd  all  the  enemy's  counter- 
attacks were  brilliantly  repulsed  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 
On  the  24th  we  were  masters  of  the  whole  line  carried  on  the 
2ist,  save  a  few  metres  at  the  eastern  extremity,  which  the 
enemy  still  holds. 

Secondly,  to  the  south  of  Laon  and  Craonne  and  in  the 
Reims  district,  the  last  week  has  been  more  especially  taken 
up  with  artillery  duels.  The  enemy  has  fired  nearly  twice  as 
many  projectiles  as  during  the  week  before,  but  without  suc- 
ceeding in  depriving  our  heavy  artillery  of  the  superiority 
it  has  clearly  attained.  The  destruction  of  machine-guns, 
shelters,  and  redoubts  on  the  i6th  near  the  Troyon  sugar 
refinery  and  the  Beaulieu  quarries,  the  destruction  of  a  lunette 
on  the  Plateau  of  Vauclerc  on  the  i8th,  and  in  the  same 
neighbourhood  two  machine-gun  shelters  on  the  igth,  the 
dispersion  of  groups  of  the  enemy  in  the  Suippe  Valley  on 
the  igth,  2oth,  and  23rd,  the  destruction  of  German  trenches 
on  the  I7th,  and  again  near  Bourtaut  Farm,  in  the  same 
region,  on  the  22nd. 

Thirdly,  to  the  south  of  Ypres  near  Veldhoek  and  near 
Zwartelem  we  gained  400  metres  on  December  16.  On  the 
1 7th  and  subsequent  days  we  continued  our  progress,  taking 
two  machine-guns,  ammunition,  and  several  groups  of  houses 
(December  21,  22,  and  23).  In  this  region  also  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  ground  were  extreme,  but  although  the  men 
had  to  fight  in  the  water  and  slush,  there  are  nothing  but 
gains  to  record,  and  there  was  no  flinching  anywhere. 

Between  Reims  and  the  Argonne  our  attacks  were  well 
followed  up,  and  with  such  continuity  that,  despite  lively 
counter-attacks,  the  enemy  was  unable  to  reconquer  the 
positions  lost  by  him  from  the  isth  to  the  24th.  His  attacks 

MILITARY  2  M  177 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

have  more  particularly  developed  between  St.  Hilaire-le-Grand 
and  Beausejour,  to  the  west  of  Ville-sur-Tourbe.  They  may 
be  summarised  by  saying  that  all  the  points  of  vantage  which 
they  sought  to  capture  are  now  in  our  possession.  In  the 
neighbourhood  of  Perthes  we  gained  200  metres  on  the  2Oth, 
as  many  more  on  the  2ist,  and  800  metres  on  the  22nd. 
This  gain  extends  along  a  front  of  a  kilometre  and  a  half,  and 
represents  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  line  of  trenches. 

In  the  Argonne  Wood  the  war  has  been  a  harder  and  more 
thankless  task  still,  the  difficulties  of  the  wooded  and  muddy 
ground  making  our  continuous  progress  the  more  appreciable. 
Four  times  we  exploded  German  mines,  demolished  machine- 
guns  and  protected  shelters,  besides  taking  material  of  war. 

From  the  west  of  the  Argonne  to  the  heights  of  the 
Meuse,  from  the  i6th  to  the  24th,  we  have  displayed  activity, 
often  crowned  with  success,  in  spite  of  the  state  of  the 
ground,  which  is  more  adapted  to  defensive  than  to  offensive 
operations.  Our  artillery,  and  especially  our  heavy  artillery, 
inflicted  severe  damage  on  the  enemy's  artillery.  On 
December  17  we  destroyed  two  pieces  ;  on  December  18  two 
batteries  were  demolished  and  a  third  reduced  to  silence  ; 
on  December  20  a  sheltered  machine-gun  destroyed  one  of 
the  enemy's ;  on  the  22nd  a  battery  of  15-centimetre 
guns  was  damaged  north-east  of  St.  Mihiel,  and  tWo  bat- 
teries of  77-mm.  guns  were  destroyed  near  Bethincourt. 

We  have  likewise  made  progress  in  the  Malancourt  Wood 
on  December  20,  and  in  the  Bethincourt  region  on  the  2ist, 
and  in  the  Wood  of  Forges  on  December  21,  22,  and  23, 
our  gain  being  from  200  to  300  metres  for  three  days.  One 
hundred  and  fifty  metres  more  were  gained  on  December  24 
in  the  Wood  of  Consenvoye,  where  we  held  ground  gained  in 
spite  of  a  violent  bombardment  and  several  counter-attacks. 
In  the  Bois  des  Chevaliers  we  gained  100  metres  and  took 
prisoners.  The  condition  of  these  men  was  indescribable. 
They  were  filthy,  being  a  mass  of  vermin  from  head  to  foot. 

Between  the  Meuse  and  the  Moselle  the  fighting  has  been 
less  lively  than  on  the  rest  of  the  front,  but  we  can  record 
continuous,  if  slow,  progress  in  the  forest  of  Apremont  and  in 
Le  Pretre  wood,  besides  several  artillery  successes.  In  the 
Woevre  and  in  the  forest  of  Apremont  we  either  destroyed  or 
silenced  hostile  batteries  on  December  20,  and  rushed  several 
178 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

trenches  on  the  23rd  and  24th.  The  railway  station  of 
Arnaville  was  effectively  bombarded  on  the  i8th  and  22nd. 

In  the  Vosges  we  won  some  250  metres  of  ground  in  the 
Ban  de  Sapt,  and  also  held  the  ground  gained  the  preceding 
week.  Near  Cirey  our  advanced  posts  were  pushed  to  within 
a  distance  of  1500  metres  from  the  town. 

As  regards  aerial  warfare,  in  spite  of  the  greatest  difficulties 
resulting  from  clouds,  rain,  fog,  and  wind,  our  aeroplane 
squadrons  and  dirigibles  have  done  excellent  work.  On  the 
night  of  the  I7th  one  of  our  dirigibles  dropped  fifteen  bombs 
on  the  Saarburg  railway  station  and  six  on  that  of  Petit  Eich, 
five  bombs  and  a  thousand  steel  darts  on  a  train  in  the 
station  at  Heiming.  The  damage  done  was  important,  and 
the  German  papers  recognised  that  fact. 

In  several  encounters  on  the  I3th,  20th,  2ist,  and  22nd 
our  airmen  chased  German  machines  and  obliged  them  to 
come  to  ground.  On  the  i8th  one  of  our  airmen  shot  with  his 
rifle  a  German  pilot,  whose  machine  he  saw  dashed  to  pieces 
on  impact  with  the  ground,  besides  killing  another  near  Arras 
and  putting  to  flight  a  third  with  some  twenty  shots  from  his 
carbine.  On  the  22nd  another  of  our  officers,  pursued  by  an 
Albatross  machine,  succeeded  in  bringing  back  into  our  lines 
his  machine,  which  had  been  seriously  damaged  by  the  bursting 
of  a  shell.  Several  of  our  airmen  have  dropped  bombs  and 
arrows  successfully  on  the  German  trenches.  The  air  squadron 
which  has  been  in  operation  on  the  Belgian  coast  in  con- 
junction with  the  British  warships  has  been  thanked  from  the 
British  Headquarters.  Our  squadron,  indeed,  has  rendered 
most  useful  assistance  in  the  work  of  directing  the  fire  of  the 
ships  and  watching  the  movements  of  the  enemy's  submarines. 


FOUR  MONTHS  OF  WAR 

(REPORT  ON  THE  OPERATIONS  AS  A  WHOLE,  FROM  AUGUST  2 
TO  DECEMBER  2,  1914) 

Four  months  have  elapsed  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  B.  des  A 
The  conceit  of  the  Germans  did  not  think  this  possible.  Dec-  5, 

They  flattered  themselves,  that  in  three  weeks  they  would 

have  beaten  us  to  the  ground. 

A  mere  statement  of  this  fact  is,  however,  not  sufficient 

179 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY         [AUG.- 

to  show  the  importance  of  the  result  we  have  obtained.  To 
make  it  clearer,  one  must  follow  without  restriction  or  reserve 
the  sequence  of  events  from  August  2  to  December  2. 

Let  us,  in  the  first  instance,  note  the  strength  of  the 
adversary  who  confronts  us. 

We  knew  him  to  be  powerful  and  minutely  prepared  for 
this  war,  premeditated  and  let  loose  by  his  diplomacy  ;  his 
effort  against  us  has  even  exceeded  all  that  was  foreseen. 

The  forces  mobilised  by  Germany  on  her  western  frontier 
from  August  to  November  comprised,  in  fact,  52  army  corps,1 
composed  as  follows  :— 

1.  2  August — 21  active  corps,  13  reserve  corps  ; 

2.  End  of  August — 4  corps,  made  up  of  17  mixed  brigades 

of  Ersatz  ; 

3.  September — 8  corps,  composed  of  33  brigades  of  Land- 

wehr  ; 

4.  October — 5  half  corps  of  reserves,  of  recent  formation, 

i  division  of  marine  fusiliers. 

To  these  52  corps  must  be  added  10  divisions  of  cavalry. 

At  the  moment  when  the  war  started,  Germany  is  in  hopes 
of  a  successful  stroke  against  Nancy.  But  she  dares  not  take 
the  risk  in  view  of  the  strength  of  our  covering  force, 
powerfully  reinforced  at  the  end  of  1913,  as  is  well  known. 

So  our  concentration  proceeds  freely,  without  mishap, 
and  all  attempts  at  interference  prepared  by  the  enemy  are 
frustrated.  The  regularity  of  our  transport  service  proves 
from  this  moment  the  fine  organisation  of  our  army. 

Our  Failures  in  August 

Our  concentration  had  to  be  sufficiently  elastic  to  enable 
us  to  bring  our  principal  effort  to  bear  on  the  ground  where 
the  enemy  might  prove  most  active. 

The  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  reveals  to  us  the  in- 
tentions of  the  German  General  Staff ;  the  north  is  the  direc- 
tion where  the  principal  part  will  be  played. 

Before  commencing  the  engagement,  we  are  compelled  to 
await  the  coming  into  line  of  the  English  Army,  which 
cannot  take  place  till  August  20,  so  we  at  once  take  steps 

1  [This  is  as  in  the  French  original,  but  the  details  given  only  total  49 
army  corps.] 
180 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

to  retain  in  Alsace  and  in  Lorraine  the  largest  possible  number 
of  German  corps. 

In  Alsace,  our  first  attack,  badly  led,  takes  us  to  Mulhouse, 
but  it  cannot  be  maintained  there.  (August  7.) 

A  second  attack,  directed  by  General  Pau,  takes  us  back 
there.  On  August  20  we  hold  the  approaches  to  Colmar 
through  the  Vosges  and  the  plain.  The  enemy  has  suffered 
heavy  losses. 

But  from  this  moment  the  unfortunate  events  in  Lorraine 
and  in  Belgium  compel  us  to  restrict  the  extent  and  intensity 
of  our  effort  in  Alsace.  (August  26.) 

In  Lorraine,  our  offensive  had  begun  brilliantly.  On 
August  19  we  had  reached  Sarrebourg,  Les  Etangs,  Dieuze, 
Delme,  Chateau-Salins. 

But  from  the  2Oth  the  enemy,  strongly  entrenched  on 
well-prepared  ground,  regains  the  advantage. 

On  the  22nd,  23rd,  and  24th  we  are  compelled  to  fall  back 
upon  the  Grand  Couronne  de  Nancy  and  to  the  south  of 
Luneville. 

On  the  25th,  a  simultaneous  counter-attack  by  the  armies 
of  Dubail  and  de  Castelnau  definitely  consolidates  our  position. 

What  had,  in  the  meanwhile,  taken  place  in  Belgium  ? 
Seven  to  eight  German  army  corps  and  four  divisions  of 
cavalry,  overcoming  the  magnificent  resistance  of  Liege, 
were  attempting  to  advance  between  Givet  and  Brussels  and 
to  extend  their  movement  farther  west. 

As  soon  as  the  English  Army  was  ready  in  the  region  of 
Mons,  we  took  the  offensive  in  Belgian  Luxemburg  with  the 
armies  of  Generals  Ruffey  and  de  Langle  de  Cary.  This 
offensive  was  immediately  checked,  with  heavy  losses  for  us. 

Here  again,  the  ground  had  been  strongly  prepared  by 
the  enemy.  In  some  of  our  corps  there  was  also  lack  of 
instruction  and  of  execution.  (August  21-23.) 

On  the  left  of  these  two  armies,  and  in  conjunction  with 
the  English  Army,  the  army  of  General  Lanrezac,  anxious 
for  its  right,  withdraws  then  (August  24)  to  the  line  Beaii- 
mont-Givet. 

On  the  25th  and  26th  the  English  Army,  checked  at  Land- 
recies  and  Le  Cateau,  retreats  towards  the  Marne. 

Sanguinary  fights  take  place  on  those  days.  The  enemy 
sustains  heavy  losses  but  steadily  gains  ground. 

181 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY         [AUG.-E 

The  situation  now  is  as  follows.  We  had  either  to  fight  it 
out  on  the  spot  under  conditions  rendered  perilous  owing  to 
the  withdrawal  of  our  left,  or  we  had  to  retreat  on  the  whole 
of  our  front  until  it  became  possible  to  resume  the  offensive 
under  favourable  conditions. 

The  second  plan  is  the  one  adopted  by  the  General-in- 
Chief. 

Preparing  the  Offensive 

The  first  condition  to  fulfil  is  to  retire  in  good  order, 
attacking  in  the  meanwhile  to  weaken  and  delay  the  enemy. 

Several  of  these  attacks,  brilliantly  carried  out,  inflict 
heavy  blows  on  our  adversaries.  For  instance,  those  by  the 
army  of  Lanrezac  at  St.  Quentin  and  at  Guise  on  August  29, 
those  of  de  Langle's  army  on  the  Meuse  on  the  27th  and  28th, 
those  of  Ruffey's  army  farther  to  the  east,  brilliantly  sup- 
ported from  Nancy  to  the  Vosges  by  the  armies  of  de  Castelnau 
and  Dubail,  whose  inflexible  firmness  will  enable  us  to  resume 
our  offensive  movement. 

To  prepare  this  offensive,  we  formed  on  August  26,  on  our 
left,  a  fresh  army  under  the  command  of  General  Maunoury. 
This  army  is  intended  to  concentrate  during  the  following 
days  in  the  region  of  Amiens. 

But  the  enemy's  progress,  in  stages  of  45  kilometres  a  day, 
is  so  rapid  that  in  order  to  make  the  realisation  of  the  offensive 
plan  possible,  General  J  off  re  has  to  order  the  continuation  of 
the  retreat. 

We  shall  retire  as  far  as  the  Aube,  if  necessary  as  far  as 
the  Seine.  Everything  is  to  be  subordinated  to  the  prepara- 
tion for  the  success  of  the  offensive. 

On  September  5  the  conditions  looked  for  by  the  General- 
in-Chief  are  fulfilled.  Our  left  (army  of  Maunoury,  English 
Army,  army  of  Lanrezac,  now  become  that  of  d'Esperey)  has 
no  longer  the  apprehension  of  being  cut  off. 

On  the  contrary,  the  German  Army  of  the  right  (General 
von  Kluck),  in  marching  south  towards  Meaux  and  Coulom- 
miers,  exposes  its  right  flank  to  Maunoury's  army. 

On  the  5th,  in  the  evening,  the  General-in-Chief  orders  a 
general  offensive,  and  adds  :   '  The  hour  has  come  to  advance 
at  any  cost,  and  to  die  rather  than  retire/ 
182 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

The  Victory  of  the  Marne 

As  early  as  September  8  the  threatened  movement  by 
General  Maunoury  against  the  German  right  produces  its 
effect.  The  enemy  brings  back  from  the  south  to  the  north 
two  army  corps,  and  carries  out  a  change  of  front  to  the  west. 

He  thus  offers  a  weak  point  to  the  English  Army,  which, 
having  left  the  Rozoy-Lagny  line  on  the  6th,  immediately 
straightens  itself  out  towards  the  north  and  crosses  the 
Marne  on  the  gth,  catching  on  the  flank  the  German  Army 
which  has  been  engaged  with  General  Maunoury  since  the  6th. 

On  the  right  of  the  English,  d'Esperey's  army,  has  also 
been  waiting  ;  it  crosses  the  Marne,  driving  before  it  with 
energy  everything  in  its  way,  and  doing  even  more,  supporting 
the  action  of  its  neighbours,  the  English  Army  on  the  left  and 
Foch's  army  on  the  right. 

It  is  in  fact  upon  our  centre,  formed  by  the  army  of  Foch, 
constituted  on  August  20,  that  the  Germans  will  seek  revenge 
for  the  failure  of  their  right ;  for,  should  they  succeed  in 
piercing  our  line  between  Sezanne  and  Mailly,  the  situation 
will  turn  to  their  advantage. 

From  September  6  to  9,  Foch's  army  sustains  repeated 
assaults  ;  but  on  the  gth,  in  the  evening,  the  left  of  this  army, 
proceeding  from  the  west  to  the  east  towards  Fere-Champe- 
noise,  attacks  the  flank  of  the  Prussian  Guard  and  the  Saxon 
corps  who  were  attacking  on  the  south-east  of  that  locality. 

This  daring  stroke  assures  the  success.  The  Germans 
retreat  hurriedly,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  nth,  General 
Foch  enters  Chalons-sur-Marne. 

On  his  right,  the  army  of  Langle  de  Cary  has  also  made  a 
move  forward.  On  the  I2th,  after  some  sharp  encounters,  it 
firmly  prolongs  General  Foch's  army. 

Simultaneously,  Ruffey's  army  (since  become  the  army 
of  Sarrail)  has  been  able  to  draw  up  towards  the  north 
and  hasten  the  German  retreat,  though  not  without  violent 
fights ;  this  retreat  is  accelerated,  from  Nancy  to  the  Vosges, 
by  the  offensive  operations  of  de  Castelnau's  and  Dubail's 
armies. 

By  the  strategical  re-formation  which  we  have  accom- 
plished, we  have  thus  regained  the  advantage  over  the  enemy. 
We  have  been  able  to  hold  it  ever  since. 

183 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY         [AUG.-D 

The  Race  for  the  Sea 

From  September   13,   the  German  resistance,   based  on 
strongly  organised  defences  prepared  beforehand,  precluded ' 
any  hope  that  the  pursuit  could  continue  without  a  check.     A 
fresh  battle  was  commencing. 

In  this  battle  the  German  General  Staff  entertains  the 
hope  of  turning  our  left,  while  we  are  hoping  to  turn  its  right. 

The  development  of  this  twofold  effort  characterises  this 
stage  of  the  war. 

The  result  is  a  contest  of  speed,  which,  by  the  end  of 
October  prolongs  the  opposing  fronts  as  far  as  the  North  Sea  ; 
it  is,  in  truth,  the  '  race  to  the  sea/ 

In  this  race  the  Germans  have  one  advantage  over  us 
in  the  concave  shape  of  their  front,  which  shortens  their 
transport  service. 

In  spite  of  this  advantage,  the  enveloping  movement  of 
their  right,  carried  out  by  12  active  and  6  reserve  corps  and 
4  corps  of  cavalry,  was  a  total  failure.  This  failure  came  as 
a  confirmation  of  the  victory  of  the  Marne. 

From  September  n,  General  Joffre  has  directed  the  effort 
of  Maunoury's  army  against  the  German  right.  But  this 
army,  with  the  numbers  at  its  disposal,  is  insufficient  for 
the  purpose. 

Towards  September  20,  a  fresh  army  is  therefore  formed 
on  the  left  of  Maunoury's  army  and  entrusted  to  General  de 
Castelnau. 

This  army  takes  up  a  strong  position  in  the  region  of 
Lassigny-Roye-Peronne,  supported  on  its  left  by  the  Terri- 
torial divisions  of  General  Brugere.  (September  21-26.) 

But  to  attain  our  object,  even  this  is  not  sufficient,  and 
on  September  30  de  Maud'huy's  army  is  brought  into  line 
beyond  de  Castelnau's  army,  occupying  the  regions  of  Arras 
and  Lens,  and  extending  towards  the  north  to  join  hands  with 
the  divisions  from  Dunkirk. 

This  formed,  however,  too  thin  and  strained  a  line  of 
troops,  in  view  of  the  enemy's  tremendous  efforts. 

At  that  juncture,  the  transfer  of  the  English  Army  from 
the  region  of  the  Aisne  to  that  of  the  Lys  is  decided  on,  at  the 
request  of  Field-Marshal  French. 

In  the  same  way,  the  gallant  Belgian  Army,  which  left 
184 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

Antwerp  on  October  9,  covered  by  English  and  French 
marines,  will  proceed  to  the  region  of  the  Yser,  to  strengthen 
the  barrier  which  must  be  erected  and  held. 

These  movements,  however,  take  time.  The  English 
Army  will  not  be  able  to  begin  operations  in  its  new  theatre 
before  October  20  ;  while  the  Belgian  Army,  which  has  been 
fighting  for  three  months,  for  the  moment  lacks  munitions. 

The  General-in-Chief  does  not  hesitate,  and  orders  a  fresh 
effort.  As  early  at  October  4,  he  has  ordered  General  Foch  to 
go  and  co-ordinate  on  the  spot  the  operations  of  the  Northern 
Armies. 

On  the  1 8th  he  places  at  his  disposal  reinforcements,  which, 
constantly  increasing  until  November  12,  go  to  form  the 
French  Army  in  Belgium,  under  the  command  of  General 
d'Urbal.  This  army,  in  conjunction  with  the  Belgians  and 
an  English  corps,  will  henceforth  operate  between  the  sea 
and  the  Lys. 

The  Journal  de  Geneve,  in  commenting  on  this  period  of 
the  war,  wrote  that  the  French  command,  by  the  rapidity  and 
abundance  of  its  transport  service,  had  displayed  an  '  incom- 
parable leadership/ 

As  a  result  of  this  effort,  the  German  attack  in  Flanders 
has  completely  failed. 

The  German  failure  in  Flanders 

This  German  attack,  as  already  outlined  in  the  issue  of  the 
Bulletin  des  Armees  for  November  25, 1  is  to  be  of  unheard  of 
violence. 

Twelve  army  corps  and  four  corps  of  cavalry  are  massed 
between  the  Lys  and  the  sea.  The  Emperor  has  arrived  on 
the  spot  to  direct  operations.  Proclamations  addressed  to  the 
troops  remind  them  that  the  time  has  now  come  to  strike  the 
*  decisive  blow/ 

This  decisive  blow  is  to  be  either  a  piercing  of  the  line  by 
following  the  seacoast  to  reach  Dunkirk,  Calais,  and  Boulogne, 
or  a  piercing  at  Ypres  so  as  to  proclaim  from  there  the  annexa- 
tion of  Belgium. 

To  succeed  in  this,  the  German  General  Staff  proceeds 
during  three  weeks  to  attack  repeatedly  and  furiously  in 
dense  masses,  which  are  decimated  by  the  Allies'  artillery. 

185 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY         [AUG.-DI 

As  early  as  November  12  we  are  in  a  position  to  establish 
a  balance-sheet  of  these  assaults,  confirmed  during  the  subse- 
quent weeks,  and  for  us  this  balance-sheet  amounts  to  a 
victory. 

From  the  sea  to  Dixmude,  the  Belgian  Army,  General 
Grossetti  and  Admiral  Ronarc'h  have  held,  in  the  first  place, 
the  railway  line  from  Nieuport  to  Dixmude,  afterwards  the 
left  bank  of  the  Yser. 

The  enemy,  who  had  thrown  an  army  corps  on  to  the  left 
bank,  was  compelled  to  retire.  He  was  never  able  to  debouch 
from  Dixmude. 

Farther  south,  from  Dixmude  to  the  north  of  Ypres,  the 
situation  is  the  same. 

The  Germans,  who  on  November  10  crossed  the  river  at 
two  points,  were  driven  back  to  the  other  side,  and  the  bridge- 
heads on  the  right  bank  are  now  held  by  General  Humbert. 

To  the  east  of  Ypres,  Generals  Dubois,  Balfourier,  and 
Douglas  Haig  have  not  yielded  an  inch  of  ground  in  three 
weeks. 

In  the  south,  where  the  German  attack  was  particularly 
fierce,  for  it  was  aiming  at  our  communications,  our  troops 
and  the  English  troops  regained  all  the  ground  they  had 
momentarily  lost,  and  re-established  themselves  on  it  in  an 
unassailable  manner. 

During  the  second  fortnight  in  November  the  German 
attack,  now  broken,  slowed  down.  The  infantry  gradually 
became  less  engaged.  Even  the  artillery  showed  less  and 
less  activity. 

In  the  battle  of  Ypres  alone,  the  enemy  lost  at  least 
120,000  men. 

Never  has  a  more  carefully  prepared  and  furiously  carried 
out  offensive  met  with  such  complete  failure. 

The  Siege  Warfare  from  the  Lys  to  the  Vosges 

While  this  great  battle  was  being  fought  in  Belgium,  the 
war  was  being  carried  on  along  the  remainder  of  the  front, 
assuming  the  character  of  siege  warfare,  from  trench  to 
trench,  the  two  sides  opposing  each  other  with  equally  for- 
midable defensive  organisations. 

It  is  superfluous  to  insist  on  the  merit  of  our  troops  in 
186 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

carrying  on  this  hand-to-hand  war,  never  yielding,  and  often 
making  progress,  in  spite  of  the  burden  laid  upon  them  by 
the  transport  of  considerable  numbers  of  French  and  English 
troops  to  the  north. 

In  close  touch  with  the  Northern  armies,  the  armies  of 
General  de  Maud'huy  and  General  de  Castelnau  hold  the  front 
from  the  Lys  to  Noyon,  from  the  middle  of  October  to  the 
end  of  November,  without  yielding  at  any  point. 

From  the  end  of  October  their  progress  is  continuous  ; 
strengthening  of  our  positions  at  Arras  and  La  Bassee ; 
capture  of  Le  Quesnoy-en-Santerre ;  constant  advantage 
gained  by  our  artillery  and  infantry  in  every  encounter  with 
the  enemy. 

Between  the  Oise  and  the  Argonne,  the  armies  of 
Maunoury,  d'Esperey,  and  de  Langle  de  Gary  find  themselves 
confronted  by  very  strong  positions  in  the  Heights  of  the 
Aisne,  of  Berru,  Nogent-L'Abbesse,  Moronvilliers,  and  the 
wooded  elevations  of  the  Western  Argonne. 

In  September  they  have  to  sustain  a  general  attack,  very 
strongly  led.  This  attack  is  repulsed,  notably  on  the  east  of 
Reims,  on  September  26. 

The  Emperor  was  a  witness  of  this  failure  of  his  troops,  as 
again,  eight  days  later,  of  the  failure  at  Ypres. 

On  our  side,  in  place  of  violent  attacks,  which  threatened 
to  be  more  burdensome  than  productive,  we  substituted  opera- 
tions on  a  smaller  scale  that  often  enabled  us  to  gain  ground. 

The  same  state  of  things  prevails  from  the  Argonne  to  the 
Vosges. 

Our  armies  there — those  of  Sarrail  and  Dubail — fulfil 
methodically  and  successfully  the  task  assigned  to  them  ; 
protecting  our  right  flank  against  any  attack  proceeding  from 
Metz-Thionville  ;  holding  in  front  of  them  by  means  of  a  con- 
tinuous offensive  the  largest  possible  number  of  German  corps  ; 
liberating  as  far  as  is  possible  the  national  soil  occupied  by 
the  enemy,  principally  in  the  Woevre  and  round  Verdun. 

In  an  early  period  (September  13-29)  the  enemy  gets  the 
upper  hand,  settles  in  St.  Mihiel,  penetrates  to  the  Heights 
of  the  Meuse,  and  presses  closely  on  Verdun. 

In  a  second  period  (October  i-November  30)  we  regain  the 
advantage  ;  we  give  a  certain  relief  to  Verdun.  We  close  to 
the  enemy  the  outlet  of  St.  Mihiel.  We  make  progress  on  the 

187 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY         [AUG.-DE 

east  of  Nancy,  now  definitely  immune  from  German  shells, 
on  the  north  of  Luneville,  on  the  north-east  and  east  of 
Saint-Di6. 

In  November  we  have  reconquered  almost  the  whole  of 
the  invaded  territory  between  Belfort  and  the  Moselle. 

Our  Position  on  December  i 

Such  are  the  essential  features  of  the  campaign  in  their 
true  sequence.  One  knows  what  opportunity  for  heroic 
deeds  they  have  afforded  to  our  troops.  In  conclusion,  we 
will  confine  ourselves  to  stating  the  position  of  our  armies  at 
the  beginning  of  December. 

As  regards  numbers,  the  French  Army  to-day  is  equal  to 
what  it  was  on  August  2,  all  units  having  once  more  been 
brought  up  to  strength. 

The  quality  of  the  troops  has  infinitely  improved.  Our 
men  now  wage  war  like  veterans.  They  are  all  deeply  im- 
bued with  their  superiority,  and  have  absolute  faith  in  victory. 

The  command,  renewed  by  necessary  measures  of  disci- 
pline, has  committed  during  the  last  three  months  none  of  the 
errors  discovered  and  punished  in  August. 

Our  stock  of  munitions  for  artillery  has  been  largely 
increased.  The  heavy  artillery  which  we  lacked  has  been 
created  and  tested  in  the  field. 

The  English  Army  received  very  numerous  reinforcements 
in  November.  It  is  numerically  stronger  than  when  it 
entered  on  the  campaign.  The  Indian  divisions  have  served 
their  apprenticeship  in  European  warfare. 

The  Belgian  Army  has  been  reconstituted  in  six  divisions, 
ready  and  determined  to  reconquer  the  national  soil. 

The  German  plan  has  a  record  of  seven  failures  of  a  far- 
reaching  nature  : — 

Failure  of  the  sudden  attack  planned  against  Nancy  ; 

Failure  of  the  rapid  march  on  Paris  ; 

Failure  to  turn  our  left  in  August ; 

Failure  of  a  similar  envelopment  in  November ; 

Failure  to  pierce  our  centre  in  September  ; 

Failure  of  the  attack  along  the  coast  on  Dunkirk  and 
Calais ; 

Failure  of  the  attack  on  Ypres. 
188 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

In  this  fruitless  effort,  Germany  has  exhausted  her  reserves. 
The  troops  she  is  forming  now  are  badly  assorted  and  badly 
trained. 

And  again,  Russia  proves  more  and  more  her  superiority 
as  against  both  Germany  and  Austria. 

The  check  to  the  German  armies  is  thus  fatally  condemned 
to  be  turned  into  a  retreat. 

This  is  the  work  accomplished  during  the  last  four  months. 
It  was  opportune  to  present  it  as  a  whole,  leaving  it  to  the 
European  press  to  comment  on  it  and  to  judge  it. 


FRENCH  OFFICIAL.  RE  VIEW  OF  THE  FIRST  SIX 
MONTHS  OF  THE  WAR1 

I. — THE  FRENCH  SET-BACKS  IN  AUGUST 

The  first  month  of  the  campaign  began  with  successes 
and  finished  with  defeats  for  the  French  troops.  In  what 
circumstances  did  these  come  about  ? 

Our  plan  of  concentration  had  foreseen  the  possibility  of 
two  principal  actions,  the  one  on  the  right  between  the  Vosges 
and  the  Moselle,  the  other  on  the  left  to  the  north  of  the 
Verdun-Toul  line,  this  double  possibility  involving  the 
eventual  variation  of  our  transport.  On  August  2,  owing  to 
the  Germans  passing  through  Belgium,  our  concentration 
was  substantially  modified  by  General  J  off  re,  in  order  that 
our  principal  effort  might  be  directed  to  the  north. 

Awaiting  the  moment  when  the  operations  in  the  north 
could  begin,  and  to  prepare  for  it  by  retaining  in  Alsace  the 
greatest  possible  number  of  German  forces,  the  General-in- 
Chief  ordered  our  troops  to  occupy  Mulhouse,  to  cut  the 

1  [This  historical  review  '  emanating  from  the  most  competent  French 
official  source/  of  the  operations  In  the  western  theatre  of  war,  from  their 
beginning  up  to  the  end  of  January  1915,  was  issued  by  Renter's  Agency, 
and  appeared  in  The  Times  of  March  22-April  i,  1915.  '  It  should  be 
understood  that  the  narrative  is  made  purely  from  the  French  standpoint. 
In  some  portions,  on  account  of  length  or  for  other  reasons,  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  quote  textually/] 

189 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY       [AUG.  19: 

bridges  of  the  Rhine  at  Huningue  and  below,  and  then  to 
protect  the  flank  of  our  troops  operating  in  Lorraine.  This 
operation  was  badly  carried  out  by  a  leader  who  was  at  once 
relieved  of  his  command.  Our  troops,  after  having  carried 
Mulhouse,  lost  it  and  were  thrown  back  on  Belfort.  The 
work  had,  therefore,  to  be  recommenced  afresh,  and  this  was 
done  from  August  14  under  a  new  commander. 

Mulhouse  was  taken  on  the  igth,  after  a  brilliant  fight  at 
Dornach.  Twenty-four  guns  were  captured  from  the  enemy. 
On  the  20th  we  held  the  approaches  to  Colmar,  both  by  the 
plain  and  by  the  Vosges.  The  enemy  had  undergone  enormous 
losses  and  abandoned  great  stores  of  shells  and  forage,  but, 
from  this  moment,  what  was  happening  in  Lorraine  and  on 
our  left  prevented  us  from  carrying  our  successes  further, 
for  our  troops  in  Alsace  were  needed  elsewhere.  On  August  28 
the  Alsace  army  was  broken  up,  only  a  small  part  remaining 
to  hold  the  region  of  Thann  and  the  Vosges. 

The  purpose  of  the  operations  in  Alsace — namely,  to 
retain  a  large  part  of  the  enemy's  forces  far  from  the  northern 
theatre  of  operations — it  was  for  our  offensive  in  Lorraine 
to  pursue  still  more  directly  by  holding  before  it  the  German 
army  corps  operating  to  the  south  of  Metz.  This  offensive 
began  brilliantly  on  August  14.  On  the  igth  we  had  reached 
the  region  of  Sarrebourg  and  that  of  the  Etangs  (Lakes)  ; 
we  held  Dieuze,  Morhange,  Delme,  and  Chateau-Salins.  On 
the  2oth  our  success  was  stopped.  The  cause  is  to  be  found 
in  the  strong  organisation  of  the  region,  in  the  power  of  the 
enemy's  artillery,  operating  over  ground  which  had  been 
minutely  surveyed,  and  finally  in  the  default  of  certain  units. 
On  the  22nd,  in  spite  of  the  splendid  behaviour  of  several  of 
our  army  corps,  and  notably  that  of  Nancy,  our  troops  were 
brought  back  on  to  the  Grand  Couronne,  while  on  the  23rd 
and  24th  the  Germans  concentrated  reinforcements — three 
army  corps  at  least — in  the  region  of  Luneville,  and  forced 
us  to  retire  to  the  south.  This  retreat,  however,  was  only 
momentary.  On  the  25th,  after  two  vigorous  counter- 
attacks, one  from  south  to  north  and  the  other  from  west 
to  east,  the  enemy  had  to  fall  back.  From  that  time  between 
the  Germans  and  ourselves  a  sort  of  balance  was  established 
on  this  terrain.  Maintained  for  fifteen  days,  it  was  after- 
wards, as  will  be  seen,  modified  to  our  advantage. 
190 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

There  remained  the  principal  business,  the  Battle  of  the 
North,  postponed  owing  to  the  desirability  of  waiting  for 
the  British  Army.  On  August  20  the  concentration  of  our 
lines  was  finished,  and  the  General-in-Chief  gave  orders  for 
our  centre  and  our  left  to  take  the  offensive.  Our  centre 
comprised  two  armies,  our  left  consisted  of  a  third  army 
reinforced  to  the  extent  of  two  army  corps,  a  corps  of  cavalry, 
the  reserve  divisions,  the  British  Army,  and  the  Belgian 
Army,  which  had  already  been  engaged  for  the  previous  three 
weeks  at  Liege,  Namur,  and  Louvain. 

The  German  plan  on  that  date  was  as  follows.  Seven  to 
eight  army  corps  and  four  cavalry  divisions  were  endeavour- 
ing to  pass  between  Givet  and  Brussels,  and  even  to  prolong 
their  movements  more  to  the  west.  Our  object  was,  there- 
fore, in  the  first  place,  to  hold  and  dispose  of  the  enemy's 
centre,  afterwards  to  throw  ourselves  with  all  available  forces 
on  the  .left  flank  of  the  German  grouping  of  troops^in  the 
north.  On  August  21  our  offensive  in  the  centre  began  with 
ten  army  corps.  On  August  22  it  failed,  and  this  reverse 
appeared  serious. 

The  reasons  for  it  are  complex.  There  were  in  this  affair 
individual  and  collective  failures,  imprudences  committed 
under  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  divisions  ill-engaged,  rash  deploy- 
ments, and  precipitate  retreats,  a  premature  waste  of  men, 
and,  finally,  the  inadequacy  of  certain  of  our  troops  and  their 
leaders,  both  as  regards  the  use  of  infantry  and  artillery. 
In  consequence  of  these  lapses  the  enemy,  turning  to  account 
the  difficult  terrain,  was  able  to  secure  the  maximum  of  profit 
from  the  advantages  which  the  superiority  of  his  subaltern 
cadres  gave  him. 

In  spite  of  this  defeat,  our  manoeuvre  had  still  a  chance  of 
success  if  our  left  and  the  British  Army  secured  a  decisive 
result.  This  was,  unfortunately,  not  attained.  On  August  22, 
at  the  cost  of  great  losses,  the  enemy  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  Sambre,  and  our  Left  Army  fell  back  on  the  24th  upon 
Beaumont-Givet,  being  perturbed  by  the  belief  that  the 
enemy  was  threatening  its  right.  At  the  same  time  the 
British  Army  retreated,  and  the  enemy  was  enabled  to  cross 
the  Meuse  and,  by  fortifying  it,  to  accelerate  the  action  of 
his  right.  The  situation  at  this  moment  may  be  thus  summed 
up.  Either  our  frontier  had  to  be  defended  on  the  spot, 

191 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY       [AUG.  19 

under  conditions  which  had  been  rendered  extremely  perilous, 
or  we  had  to  execute  a  strategic  retirement,  which,  while 
delivering  up  to  the  enemy  a  part  of  the  national  soil,  would 
permit  us  on  the  other  hand  to  resume  the  offensive  at  our 
own  time,  with  a  favourable  disposition  of  troops,  still  intact, 
which  we  had  at  our  command.  The  General-in-Chief  deter- 
mined on  the  second  alternative. 

II. — THE  RETREAT  AND  THE  PREPARATION 
OF  THE  OFFENSIVE 

Henceforward  the  French  Command  devoted  its  efforts 
to  preparing  the  offensive.  To  this  end  three  conditions  had 
to  be  fulfilled  :— 

1.  The  retreat  had  to  be  carried  out  in  order,  under  a 
succession  of  counter-attacks  which  would  keep  the  enemy 
busy.  • 

2.  The  extreme  point  of  this  retreat  must  be  fixed  in  such 
a  way  that  the  different  armies  should  reach  it  simultaneously, 
ready  at  the  moment  of  occupying  to  resume  the  offensive 
all  together. 

3.  Every  circumstance  permitting  of  a  resumption  of  the 
offensive  before  this  point  should  be  reached  must  be  utilised 
by  the  whole  of  our  forces  and  the  British  forces. 

•     The   counter-attacks   executed   during   the   retreat   were 
brilliant  and  often  fruitful. 

On  August  29  we  successfully  attacked  St.  Quentin  to 
relieve  the  pressure  on  the  British  Army.  Two  other  corps 
and  a  reserve  division  engaged  the  Prussian  Guard  and  the 
loth  German  Army  Corps,  which  was  debouching  from  Guise. 
By  the  end  of  the  day,  after  various  fluctuations,  the  enemy 
was  thrown  back  on  the  Oise,  and  the  British  front  was  freed. 
On  August  27  we  had  also  succeeded  in  throwing  back  upon 
the  Meuse  the  enemy,  who  was  endeavouring  to  gain  a 
foothold  on  the  left  bank.  Our  successes  continued  on  the 
28th  in  the  woods  of  Marfee  and  of  Jaulnay.  Thanks  to 
them  we  were  able,  in  accordance  with  the  orders  of  the 
General-in-Chief,  to  fall  back  on  the  line  Buzenoy-le-Chesne- 
Bouvellemont.  Farther  to  the  right  another  Army  took  part 
in  the  same  movement,  and  carried  out  successful  attacks  on 
August  24  on  the  Othain  and  in  the  region  of  Spincourt. 
192 


.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

On  the  26th  these  different  units  recrossed  the  Meuse  without 
being  disturbed,  and  were  able  to  join  in  the  action  of  our 
centre.  Our  armies  were  therefore  again  intact  and  available 
for  the  offensive.  On  August  26  a  new  Army,  composed  of 
two  army  corps,  five  reserve  divisions,  and  a  Moorish  brigade, 
was  constituted.  This  Army  was  to  assemble  in  the  region 
of  Amiens  between  August  27  and  September  i  and  take 
the  offensive  against  the  German  right,  uniting  its  action 
with  that  of  the  British  Army  operating  on  the  line  Ham- 
Bray-sur-Somme. 

The  hope  of  resuming  the  offensive  was,  at  this  moment, 
rendered  vain  by  the  rapidity  of  the  march  of  the  German 
right  wing.  This  rapidity  had  two  consequences,  which  we 
had  to  parry  before  thinking  of  advancing.  On  the  one 
part,  our  new  Army  had  not  time  to  complete  its  detraining, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  our  left  flank  on  August  31  was  too 
exposed  to  the  enemy's  attack.  Our  line,  thus  modified,  con- 
tained waves  which  had  to  be  redressed  before  we  could  pass 
to  the  offensive.  To  understand  this  it  is  sufficient  to  con- 
sider th£  situation  created  by  the  quick  advance  of  the 
enemy  on  the  evening  of  September  2.  A  corps  of  cavalry 
had  crossed  the  Oise,  and  it  advanced  as  far  as  Chateau- 
Thierry.  The  ist  Army  (General  von  Kluck),  comprising 
four  active  army  corps  and  a  reserve  corps,  had  passed 
Compiegne.  The  2nd  Army  (General  von  Billow) — three 
active  army  corps  and  two  reserve  corps — was  reaching  the 
Laon  region.  The  3rd  Army  (General  von  Hausen) — two 
active  army  corps  and  a  reserve  corps — had  crossed  the 
Aisne  between  the  Chateau-Porcien  and  Attigny.  More  to 
the  east,  the  4th,  5th,  6th,  and  7th  Armies — namely,  twelve 
army  corps,  four  reserve  corps,  and  numerous  Ersatz  forma- 
tions— were  in  contact  with  our  troops,  the  4th  and  5th  Armies 
between  Vouziers  and  Verdun,  and  the  others  in  the  position 
which  has  been  indicated  above  from  Verdun  to  the  Vosges. 

It  will,  therefore,  be  seen  that  our  left,  if  we  accepted 
battle,  might  be  in  great  peril.  A  defeat  in  these  conditions 
would  have  cut  off  our  armies  from  Paris  and  from  the 
British  forces,  and,  at  the  same  time,  from  the  new  Army 
which  had  been  constituted  to  the  left  of  the  English.  We 
should  thus  be  running  the  risk  of  losing  by  a  single  stroke 
the  advantage  of  the  assistance  which  Russia  later  on  was 

MILITARY  2  N  IQ3 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  i< 

to  furnish.  General  J  off  re  elected  resolutely  for  the  solution 
which  disposed  of  these  risks — that  is  to  say,  for  postponing 
the  offensive  and  the  continuance  of  the  retreat.  In  this 
way  he  would  stand  on  ground  which  he  had  chosen.  He 
waited  only  until  he  could  engage  under  better  conditions. 

In  consequence,  on  September  i,  he  fixed  as  an  extreme 
limit  for  the  movement  of  retreat  which  was  still  going  on, 
the  line  Bray-sur- Seine,  Nogent-sur- Seine,  Arcis-sur-Aube, 
Vitry-le-Frangois — the  region  to  the  north  of  Bar-le-Duc. 
This  line  was  to  be  reached  if  the  troops  were  compelled  to  go 
back  so  far.  They  would  attack  before  reaching  it  as  soon 
as  there  was  a  possibility  of  bringing  about  an  offensive 
disposition  permitting  the  co-operation  of  the  whole  of  our 
forces. 

On  September  5  it  appeared  that  this  desired  situation 
was  reached.  The  ist  German  Army,  carrying  audacity  to 
temerity,  had  continued  to  endeavour  to  envelop  our  left, 
had  crossed  the  Grand  Morin  and  reached  the  region  '  of 
Chauffry  to  the  south  of  Rebais  and  of  Esternay.  It  aimed, 
then,  at  cutting  our  Armies  off  from  Paris,  in  order  to  begin 
the  investment  of  the  capital.  The  2nd  Army  had  its  head 
on  the  line  Champaubert-Etoges-Bergeres-Vertus.  The  3rd 
and  4th  reached  to  Chalons-sur-Marne  and  Bussy-le-Repos. 
The  5th  was  advancing  on  one  side  and  the  other  from  the 
Argonne  as  far  as  Posesse  to  Triaucourt-les-Islettes  and 
Julvecourt.  The  6th  and  7th  Armies  were  attacking  more 
to  the  east.  But,  and  here  is  a  capital  difference  between 
the  situation  of  September  5  and  that  of  September  2,  the 
envelopment  of  our  left  was  no  longer  possible.  In  the  first 
place,  our  Left  Army  had  been  able  to  occupy  the  line 
Sezanne-Villers-St.  Georges-Courchamps.  Furthermore,  the 
British  forces  gathered  between  the  Seine  and  the  Marne, 
flanked  on  their  left  by  the  newly-created  Army,  were  closely 
connected  with  the  rest  of  our  forces.  . 

This  was  precisely  the  disposition  which  the  General-in- 
Chief  had  wished  to  see  achieved.  On  the  4th  he  decided  to 
take  advantage  of  it,  and  ordered  all  the  Armies  to  hold  them- 
selves ready.  He  had  taken  from  his  right  two  new  army 
corps,  two  divisions  of  infantry,  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry, 
which  were  distributed  between  his  left  and  his  centre.  On 
the  evening  of  the  5th  he  addressed  to  all  the  commanders 
194 


LN.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

of  Armies  a  message  ordering  them  to  attack.  '  The  hour  has 
come/  he  wrote,  'to  advance  at  all  costs,  and  to  die  where 
you  stand  rather  than  give  way/ 

III. — VICTORY  OF  THE  MARNE 

September  6-13 

If  one  examines  on  the  map  the  respective  positions  of  the 
German  and  French  Armies  on  September  6  as  previously 
described,  it  will  be  seen  that  by  turning  off  towards  Meaux 
and  Coulommiers,  General  von  Kluck  was  exposing  his  right 
to  the  offensive  action  of  our  left.  This  is  the  starting-point 
of  the  victory  of  the  Marne. 

On  the  evening  of  September  5  our  Left  Army  had  reached 
the  front  Penchard- Saint  Souflet-Ver.  On  the  6th  and  7th 
it  continued  its  attacks  vigorously  with  the  Ourcq  as  objec- 
tive. On  the  evening  of  the  7th  it  w£s  some  kilometres  from 
the  Ourcq,  on  the  front  Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en- 
Multien.  On  the  8th  the  Germans,  who  had  in  great  haste 
reinforced  their  right  by  bringing  their  2nd  and  4th  Army 
Corps  back  to  the  north,  obtained  some  successes  by  attacks 
of  extreme  violence.  They  occupied  Betz,  Thury-en-Valois, 
and  Nanteuil-le-Haudouin.  But  in  spite  of  this  pressure  our 
troops  held  their  ground  well.  In  a  brilliant  action  they 
took  three  standards,  and,  being  reinforced,  prepared  a  new 
attack  for  the  loth.  At  the  moment  that  this  attack  was 
about  to  begin  the  enemy  was  already  in  retreat  towards 
the  north.  The  attack  became  a  pursuit,  and  on  the  I2th 
we  established  ourselves  on  the  Aisne. 

Why  did  the  German  forces  which  were  confronting  us, 
and  on  the  evening  before  attacking  so  furiously,  retreat  on 
the  morning  of  the  loth  ?  Because  in  bringing  back,  on  the 
6th,  several  army  corps  from  the  south  to  the  north  to  face 
our  left  the  enemy  had  exposed  its  left  to  the  attacks  of  the 
British  Army,  which  had  immediately  faced  round  towards 
the  north,  and  of  that  of  our  Armies  which  were  prolonging 
the  English  lines  to  the  right. 

This  is  what  the  French  Command  had  sought  to  bring 
about.  The  events  of  September  8  which  allowed  of  the  de- 
velopment and  rehabilitation  were  as  follows.  On  the  6th  the 
British  Army  had  set  out  from  the  line  Rozoy-Lagny,  and 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  ic 

had  that  evening  reached  the  southward  bank  of  the  Grand 
Morin.  On  the  7th  and  8th  it  continued  its  march,  and  on 
the  gth  had  debouched  to  the  north  of  the  Marne  below 
Chateau-Thierry,  taking  in  flank  the  German  forces  which, 
on  that  day,  were  opposing,  on  the  Ourcq,  our  Left  Army. 
Then  it  was  that  these  forces  began  to  retreat,  while  the 
British  Army,  going  in  pursuit  and  capturing  seven  guns  and 
many  prisoners,  reached  the  Aisne  between  Soissons  and 
Longueval.  The  role  of  the  French  Army,  which  was  operat- 
ing to  the  right  of  the  British  Army,  was  threefold.  It  had 
to  support  the  British  attacking  on  its  left ;  it  had  on  its 
right  to  support  our  centre,  which  from  September  7  had  been 
subjected  to  a  German  attack  of  great  violence  ;  and  finally, 
its  mission  was  to  throw  back  the  three  active  army  corps 
and  the  reserve  corps  which  faced  it.  On  the  7th  it  made  a 
leap  forward,  and  on  the  following  days  reached  and  crossed 
the  Marne,  seizing,  after  desperate  fighting,  guns,  howitzers, 
machine-guns,  and  1,300,000  cartridges.  On  the  I2th  it  estab- 
lished itself  on  the  north  edge  of  the  Montagne-de- Reims,  in 
contact  with  our  centre,  which  for  its  part  had  just  forced  the 
enemy  to  retreat  in  haste. 

Our  centre  consisted  of  a  new  Army  *  created  on  August  29 
and  of  one  of  those  which  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign 
had  been  engaged  in  Belgian  Luxemburg.  The  first  had 
retreated  on  August  29  to  September  5  from  the  Aisne  to  the 
north  of  the  Marne  and  occupied  the  general  front  Sezanne- 
Mailly.  The  second,  more  to  the  east,  had  drawn  back  to 
the  south  of  the  line  Humbauville-Chateau  Beauchamp- 
Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy. 

The  enemy,  in  view  of  his  right  being  arrested  and  the 
defeat  of  his  enveloping  movement,  made  a  desperate  effort 
from  the  7th  to  the  loth  to  pierce  our  centre  to  the  west  and 
to  the  east  of  Fere-Champenoise.  On  the  8th  he  succeeded 
in  forcing  back  the  right  of  our  new  Army,  which  retired  as 
far  as  Gourgan9on.  On  the  9th,  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
there  was  a  further  retreat  to  the  south  of  that  village,  while 
on  the  left  the  other  army  corps  also  had  to  go  back  to  the 
line  Allemant-Connantre.  Despite  this  retreat,  the  General 
commanding  the  Army  ordered  a  general  offensive  for  the 
same  day.  With  the  Morocco  Division,  whose  behaviour  was 

1  [The  Qth  Army  under  General  Foch.] 
196 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

heroic,  he  met  a  furious  assault  of  the  Germans  on  his  left 
towards  the  marshes  of  Saint-Gond.  Then,  with  the  division 
which  had  just  victoriously  overcome  the  attacks  of  the 
enemy  to  the  north  of  Sezanne  and  with  the  whole  of  his  left 
army  corps,  he  made  a  flanking  attack  in  the  evening  of  the 
gth  upon  the  German  forces,  and  notably  the  Guard,  which 
had  thrown  back  his  right  army  corps.  The  enemy,  taken 
by  surprise  by  this  bold  manoeuvre,  did  not  resist,  and  beat 
a  hasty  retreat.  On  the  nth  we  crossed  the  Marne  between 
Tours-sur-Marne  and  Sarry,  driving  the  Germans  in  front  of 
us  in  disorder.  On  the  I2th  we  were  in  contact  with  the 
enemy  to  the  north  of  the  Camp  de  Chalons.  Our  other 
army  of  the  centre,  acting  on  the  right  of  the  one  just  referred 
to,  had  been  entrusted  with  the  mission  during  the  7th,  8th, 
and  gth  of  disengaging  its  neighbour,  and  it  was  only  on  the 
loth  that,  being  reinforced  by  an  army  corps  from  the  east, 
it  was  able  to  make  its  action  effectively  felt.  On  the  nth 
the  Germans  retired.  But,  perceiving  their  danger,  they 
fought  desperately,  with  enormous  expenditure  of  projectiles, 
behind  strong  entrenchments.  On  the  I2th  the  result  had 
none  the  less  been  attained,  and  our  two  central  Armies  were 
solidly  established  on  the  ground  gained. 

To  the  right  of  these  two  Armies  were  three  others.  They 
had  orders  to  cover  themselves  to  the  north  and  to  debouch 
towards  the  west  on  the  flank  of  the  enemy  which  was 
operating  to  the  west  of  the  Argonne.  But  a  wide  interval 
in  which  the  Germans  were  in  force  separated  them  from 
our  centre.  The  attack  took  place  nevertheless,  with  very 
brilliant  success  for  our  artillery,  which  destroyed  eleven 
batteries  of  the  i6th  German  Army  Corps.  On  the  loth,  the 
8th  and  i6th  German  Army  Corps  counter-attacked,  but 
were  repulsed.  On  the  nth  our  progress  continued  with  new 
successes,  and  on  the  I2th  we  were  able  to  face  round  towards 
the  north  in  expectation  of  the  near  and  inevitable  retreat  of 
the  enemy,  which,  in  fact,  took  place  from  the  I3th.  The 
withdrawal  of  the  mass  of  the  German  force  involved  also 
that  of  the  left.  From  the  I2th  onwards  the  forces  of  the 
enemy  operating  between  Nancy  and  the  Vosges  retreated 
in  a  hurry  before  our  two  Armies  of  the  east,  which  immedi- 
ately occupied  the  positions  which  the  enemy  had  evacuated. 
The  offensive  of  our  right  had  thus  prepared  and  consolidated 

197 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  191 

in  the  most  useful  way  the  result  secured  by  our  left  and  our 
centre. 

Such  was  this  seven  days'  battle,  in  which  more  than 
two  millions  of  men  were  engaged.  Each  army  gained  ground 
step  by  step,  opening  the  road  to  its  neighbour,  supported 
at  once  by  it,  taking  in  flank  the  adversary  which  the  day 
before  it  had  attacked  in  front,  the  efforts  of  one  articulating 
closely  with  those  of  the  other,  perfect  unity  of  intention  and 
method  animating  the  Supreme  Command. 

To  give  this  victory  all  its  meaning  it  is  necessary  to  add 
that  it  was  gained  by  troops  who  for  two  weeks  had  been 
retreating,  and  who,  when  the  order  for  the  offensive  was 
given,  were  found  to  be  as  ardent  as  on  the  first  day.  It 
must  also  be  said  that  these  troops  had  to  meet  the  whole 
German  Army,  and  that  from  the  time  they  marched  forward 
they  never  again  fell  back.  Under  their  pressure  the  German 
retreat  at  certain  times  had  the  •  appearance  of  a  rout.  In 
spite  of  the  fatigue  of  our  men,  in  spite  of  the  power  of  the 
German  heavy  artillery,  we  took  colours,  guns,  machine-guns, 
shells,  more  than  a  million  of  cartridges,  and  thousands  of 
prisoners.  A  German  corps  lost  almost  the  whole  of  its 
artillery,  which,  from  information  brought  by  our  airmen, 
was  destroyed  by  our  guns. 

[The  next  portion  of  the  French  narrative  is  here  omitted. 
It  deals  with  the  siege  war  from  the  Oise  to  the  Vosges, 
which  lasted  from  September  13  to  November  30,  and  most 
of  the  incidents  of  which  have  been  recorded  in  the  daily 
bulletins.  The  operations  were  of  secondary  importance,  and 
were  conducted  on  both  sides  with  the  same  idea  of  wearing 
down  the  troops  and  the  artillery  of  the  enemy  with  the  view 
of  influencing  the  decisive  result  in  the  great  theatre  of  war 
in  the  north.  During  the  first  part  of  this  period  until 
October  15  the  British  Army  remained  on  the  Aisne,  and  a 
high  tribute  is  paid,  in  the  French  review,  to  the  tenacity  and 
brilliance  with  which  the  British  troops  maintained  their 
positions.] 

IV. — THE  RUSH  FOR  THE  SEA 

From  September  13  to  October  23  the  opposing  armies 
were  engaged  in  the  '  Rush  to  the  Sea/  As  early  as  Sep- 
198 


IN.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

tember  n  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  directed  our  Left 
Army  to  put  as  many  troops  as  possible  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Oise.  On  September  17  he  made  that  instruction 
more  precise  by  ordering  '  a  mass  to  be  constituted  on  the 
left  wing  of  our  forces,  capable  of  coping  with  the  out- 
flanking movement  of  the  enemy/  Everything  led  us  to 
expect  that  flanking  movement,  for  the  Germans  are  lack- 
ing in  invention.  Indeed,  their  efforts  at  this  time  were 
a  renewal  of  their  manoeuvre  of  August.  In  this  parallel 
race  the  opponents  were  bound  in  the  end  to  be  stopped  only 
by  the  sea  ;  that  is  what  happened  about  October  20. 

The  Germans  had  an  advantage  over  us  which  is  obvious 
from  a  glance  at  the  map — the  concave  form  of  their  front, 
which  shortened  the  length  of  their  communications.  In  spite 
of  this  initial  inferiority  we  arrived  in  time.  From  the  middle 
of  September  to  the  last  week  in  October  fighting  went  on 
continually  to  the  north  of  the  Oise,  but  all  the  time  we  were 
fighting  we  were  slipping  northward.  On  the  German  side 
this  movement  brought  into  line  more  than  eighteen  new 
army  corps  (twelve  active  army  corps,  six  reserve  corps, 
four  cavalry  corps).  On  our  side  it  ended  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  three  fresh  Armies  on  our  left,  and  in  the  transport 
into  the  same  district  of  the  British  Army  and  the  Belgian 
Army  from  Antwerp.  For  the  conception  and  realisation  of 
this  fresh  and  extended  disposition  the  French  Command 
had,  in  the  first  place,  to  reduce  to  a  minimum  the  needs  for 
effectives  of  our  armies  to  the  east  of  the  Oise  and  afterwards 
to  utilise  to  the  utmost  our  means  of  transport.  It  succeeded 
in  this,  and  when  at  the  end  of  October  the  Battle  of  Flanders 
opened,  when  the  Germans,  having  completed  the  concen- 
tration of  their  forces,  attempted  with  fierce  energy  to  turn 
or  to  pierce  our  left,  they  flung  themselves  upon  a  resistance 
which  inflicted  upon  them  a  complete  defeat. 

The  movement  began  on  our  side  only  with  the  resources 
of  the  Army  which  had  held  the  left  of  our  front  during  the 
Battle  of  the  Marne,  reinforced  on  September  15  by  one  army 
corps. 

This  reinforcement,  not  being  sufficient  to  hold  the 
enemy's  offensive  (district  of  Vaudelincourt-Mouchy-Baugy), 
a  fresh  Army  was  transported  more  to  the  left  with  the  task 
'  of  acting  against  the  German  right  wing  in  order  to  dis- 

199 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  191 

engage  its  neighbour  while  preserving  an  outflanking  direction 
in  its  march  in  relation  to  the  fresh  units  that  the  enemy 
might  be  able  to  put  into  line/  To  cover  the  detrainments 
of  this  fresh  Army  in  the  district  Clermont-Beauvais-Boix,  a 
cavalry  corps  and  four  Territorial  divisions  were  ordered  to 
establish  themselves  on  both  banks  of  the  Somme.  In  the 
wooded  hills,  however,  which  extend  between  the  Oise  and 
Lassigny,  the  enemy  displayed  increasing  activity.  Never- 
theless the  order  still  further  to  broaden  the  movement 
towards  the  left  was  maintained  while  the  Territorial  divisions 
were  to  move  towards  Bethune  and  Aubigny. 

The  march  to  the  sea  went  on.  From  the  2ist  to  the 
26th  all  our  forces  were  engaged  in  the  district  Lassigny- 
Roye-Peronne,  with  alternations  of  reverse  and  success.  It 
was  the  first  act  of  the  great  struggle,  which  was  to  spread 
as  it  went  on.  On  the  26th  the  whole  of  the  6th  German 
Army  was  deployed  against  us.  We  retained  all  our  positions. 
But  we  could  do  no  more.  Consequently  there  was  still  the 
risk  that  the  enemy,  by  means  of  a  fresh  influx  of  forces, 
might  succeed  in  turning  us. 

Once  more  reinforcements — two  army  corps — were  directed, 
no  longer  on  Beauvais,  but  towards  Amiens.  The  front  was 
then  again  extended.  A  fresh  Army  was  constituted  more 
to  the  north. 

From  September  30  onwards  we  could  not  but  observe  that 
the  enemy,  already  strongly  posted  on  the  plateau  of  Thiepval, 
was  continually  slipping  his  forces  from  south  to  north,  and 
everywhere  confronting  us  with  remarkable  energy. 

Accordingly  on  October  i,  two  cavalry  corps  were  directed 
to  make  a  leap  forward,  and,  operating  on  both  banks  of  the 
Scarpe,  to  put  themselves  in  touch  with  the  garrison  of  Dun- 
kirk, which,  on  its  side,  had  pushed  forward  as  far  as  Douai. 
But  on  October  2  and  3  the  bulk -of  our  fresh  Army  was  very 
strongly  attacked  in  the  district  of  Arras  and  Lens.  Con- 
fronting it  were  two  corps  of  cavalry,  the  Guards,  four  active 
army  corps,  and  two  reserve  corps.  A  fresh  French  Army 
Corps  was  immediately  transported  and  detrained  in  the 
Lille  district. 

But,  once  more,  the  attacks  became  more  pressing,  and  on 
October  4  it  was  a  question  whether,  in  view  of  the  enemy's 
activity  both  west  of  the  Oise  and  south  of  the  Somme,  and 
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N.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

also  farther  to  the  north,  a  retreat  would  not  have  to  be 
made.  General  Joffre  resolutely  put  this  hypothesis  aside, 
and  ordered  the  offensive  to  be  resumed  with  the  reinforce- 
ments that  had  arrived.  It  was,  however,  clear  that,  despite 
the  efforts  of  all,  our  front,  extended  to  the  sea,  as  it  was,  by 
a  mere  ribbon  of  troops,  did  not  yet  possess  the  solidity  to 
enable  it  to  resist  with  complete  safety  a  German  attack  the 
violence  of  which  could  well  be  foreseen. 

In  the  Arras  district  the  position  was  fairly  good.  But 
between  the  Oise  and  Arras  we  were  holding  our  own  only 
with  difficulty.  Finally  to  the  north  on  the  Lille-Estaires- 
Merville-Hazebrouck-Cassel  front,  our  cavalry  and  our  terri- 
torials had  their  work  cut  out  against  eight  divisions  of  German 
cavalry,  with  very  strong  infantry  supports.  It  was  at  this 
moment  that  the  transport  of  the  British  Army  to  the  northern 
theatre  of  operations  began. 

Field- Marshal  French  had,  as  early  as  the  end  of  September, 
expressed  the  wish  to  see  his  army  resume  its  initial  place  on 
the  left  of  the  Allied  Armies.  He  explained  this  wish  on  the 
ground  of  the  greater  facility  of  communications  that  he 
would  have  in  this  new  position,  and  also  of  the  impending 
arrival  of  reinforcements  from  Great  Britain  and  from  India, 
which  would  be  able  to  deploy  more  easily  on  that  terrain. 
In  spite  of  the  difficulties  which  such  a  removal  involved 
owing  to  the  intensive  use  of  the  railways  by  our  own  units, 
General  Joffre  decided  at  the  beginning  of  October  to  meet 
Sir  John  French's  wishes,  and  to  have  the  British  Army 
removed  from  the  Aisne. 

It  was  clearly  specified  that  on  the  northern  terrain  the 
British  Army  should  co-operate  to  the  same  end  as  ourselves, 
the  stopping  of  the  German  right.  In  other  terms,  the  British 
Army  was  to  prolong  the  front  of  the  general  disposition 
without  a  break,  attacking  as  soon  as  possible,  and  at  the 
same  time  seeking  touch  with  the  Belgian  Army.  But  the 
detraining  took  longer  than  had  been  expected,  and  it  was 
not  possible  to  attack  the  Germans  during  the  time  when 
they  had  only  cavalry  in  the  Lille  district  and  farther  to  the 
north. 

There  remained  the  Belgian  Army.  On  leaving  Antwerp 
on  October  9  the  Belgian  Army,  which  was  covered  by  eight 
thousand  men  of  the  British  Naval  Brigade  and  six  thousand 

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DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  19: 

French  bluejackets,  at  first  intended  to  retire  as  far  as  to  the 
north  of  Calais,  but  afterwards  determined  to.  make  a  stand  in 
Belgian  territory.  Unfortunately  the  condition  of  the  Belgian 
troops,  exhausted  by  a  struggle  of  more  than  three  months, 
did  not  allow  any  immediate  hopes  to  be  based  upon  them. 
This  situation  weighed  on  our  plans  and  delayed  their  execu- 
tion. 

On  October  14  we  reached  the  front  Ypres-Messines-Neuve 
Eglise-Merville-Lestrem-Richebourg- Saint- Vaast.  On  the  i6th 
we  made  progress  to  the  .east  of  Ypres.  On  the  i8th  our 
cavalry  even  reached  Roulers  and  Cortemarck.  But  it  was 
now  evident  that,  in  view  of  the  continual  reinforcing  of  the 
German  right,  our  left  was  not  capable  of  maintaining  the 
advantages  obtained  during  the  previous  few  days.  To 
•attain  our  end  and  make  our  front  inviolable  a  fresh  effort 
was  necessary.  That  effort  was  immediately  made  by  the 
despatch  to  the  north  of  the  Lys  of  considerable  French  forces, 
which  formed  the  French  Army  of  Belgium. 

The  French  Army  of  Belgium  consisted,  to  begin  with,  of 
two  Territorial  divisions,  four  divisions  of  cavalry,  and  a 
naval  brigade.  Directly  after  its  constitution  it  was  strength- 
ened by  elements  from  other  points  on  the  front,  whose 
arrival  extended  from  October  27  to  November  n.  These 
reinforcements  were  equivalent  altogether  in  value  to  five 
army  corps,  a  division  of  cavalry,  a  Territorial  division,  and 
sixteen  regiments  of  cavalry,  plus  sixty  pieces  of  heavy 
artillery. 

Thus  was  completed  the  strategic  manoeuvre  defined  by 
the  instructions  of  the  General-in-Chief  on  September  n, 
and  developed  completely  during  the  five  following  weeks 
as  we  have  just  seen.  The  movements  of  troops  carried 
out  during  this  period  were  methodically  combined  with  the 
pursuit  of  operations,  both  defensive  and  offensive,  from  the 
Oise  to  the  North  Sea. 

On  October  22  our  left,  bounded  six  weeks  earlier  by  the 
Noyon  district,  rested  on  Nieuport,  thanks  to  the  successive 
deployment  of  five  fresh  Armies — three  French  Armies,  the 
British  Army,  and  the  Belgian  Army. 

Thus  the  co-ordination  decided  upon  by  the  General-in- 
Chief  attained  its  end.  The  barrier  was  established.  It  re- 
mained to  maintain  it  against  the  enemy's  offensive.  That 
202 


N.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

was  the  object  and  the  result  of  the  Battle  of  Flanders, 
October  22  to  November  15. 

V. — THE  GERMAN  DEFEAT  AT  YPRES 

The  German  attack  in  the  two  Flanders  was  conducted 
strategically  and  tactically  with  remarkable  energy.  The 
complete  and  indisputable  defeat  in  which  it  resulted  is, 
therefore,  significant. 

The  forces  which  the  enemy  disposed  of  for  this  operation 
between  the  sea  and  the  Lys  comprised  : — 

1.  The  entire  4th   Army,  commanded  by  the   Duke  of 
Wurtemberg,  consisting  of  one  naval  division,  one  division 
of  Ersatz  reserve  (men  who  had  received  no  training  before 
the  war)  which  was  liberated  by  the  fall  of  Antwerp,  the 
22nd,   23rd,   26th,   and  27th  Reserve  Corps,  and  the  48th 
Division  belonging  to  the  24th  Reserve  Corps. 

2.  A  portion  of  another  army  under  General  von  Fabeck, 
consisting  of  the  15th  Corps,  two  Bavarian  Corps,  and  three 
(unspecified)  divisions. 

3.  Part   of  the  6th   Army  under  the  command  of  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria.     This  Army,  more  than  a  third  of 
which  took  part  in  the  Battle  of  Flanders,  comprised  the 
igth  Army  Corps,  portions  of  the  I3th  Corps,  and  the  i8th 
Reserve  Corps,  the  7th  and  I4th  Corps,  the  ist  Bavarian 
Reserve  Corps,  the  Guards,  and  the  4th  Army  Corps. 

4.  Four  highly  mobile  cavalry  corps  prepared  and  sup- 
ported the  action  of  the  troops  enumerated  above. 

Everything  possible  had  been  done  to  fortify  the  morale 
of  the  troops.  At  the  beginning  of  October  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Bavaria  in  a  proclamation  had  exhorted  his  soldiers  '  to 
make  the  decisive  effort  against  the  French  left  wing/  and 
'  to  settle  thus  the  fate  of  the  great  battle  which  has  lasted 
for  weeks/  On  October  26  Prince  Rupprecht  of  Bavaria 
declared  in  an  Army  Order  that  his  troops  '  had  just  been 
fighting  under  very  difficult  conditions/  and  he  added  :  '  It 
is  our  business  now  not  to  let  the  struggle  with  our  most 
detested  enemy  drag  on  longer  .  .  .  the  decisive  blow  is  still 
to  be  struck/ 

On  October  30  General  von  Deimling,  commanding  the 
I5th  Army  Corps  (belonging  to  General  von  Fabeck's  com- 

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DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  19 

mand),  issued  an  order  declaring  that  '  the  thrust  against 
Ypres  will  be  of  decisive  importance/ 

It  should  be  noted,  also,  that  the  Emperor  proceeded  in 
person  to  Thielt  and  Courtrai  to  exalt  by  his  presence  the 
ardour  of  his  troops.  Finally,  at  the  close  of  October,  the 
entire  German  Press  incessantly  proclaimed  the  importance 
of  the  'Battle  of  Calais/  It  is  superfluous  to  add  that 
events  in  Poland  explain,  in  large  measure,  the  passionate 
resolve  of  the  German  General  Staff  to  obtain  a  decision  in 
the  Western  theatre  of  operations  at  all  costs.  This  decision 
would  be  obtained  if  our  left  were  pierced  or  driven  in.  To 
reach  Calais,  that  is,  to  break  our  left  ;  to  carry  Ypres,  that 
is,  to  cut  it  in  half  ;  through  both  points  to  menace  the 
communications  and  supplies  of  the  British  Expeditionary 
Corps,  perhaps  even  to  threaten  Britain  in  her  island — such 
was  the  German  plan  in  the  Battfe  of  Flanders.  It  was  a 
plan  that  could  not  be  executed. 

The  enemy,  who  had  at  his  disposal  a  considerable  quantity 
of  heavy  artillery,  directed  his  effort  at  first  upon  the  coast 
and  the  country  to  the  north  of  Dixmude.  His  objective 
was,  manifestly,  the  capture  of  Dunkirk,  then  of  Calais  and 
Boulogne,  and  this  objective  he  pursued  until  November  i. 

On  October  23  the  Belgians  along  the  railway  line  from 
Nieuport  to  Dixmude  were  strengthened  by  a  French  division. 
Dixmude  was  occupied  by  our  marines  (fusiliers  marins). 
During  the  subsequent  days  our  forces  along  the  railway 
developed  a  magnificent  resistance  against  an  enemy  superior 
in  number  and  powerfully  backed  by  heavy  artillery.  On 
the  2Qth  the  inundations  effected  between  the  canal  and  the 
railway  line  spread  along  our  front.  On  the  soth  we  re- 
captured Ramscappelle,  the  only  point  on  the  railway  which 
the  Belgians  had  lost.  On  November  i  and  2  the  enemy 
bombarded  Furnes,  but  began  to  show  signs  of  weariness. 
On  the  2nd  he  evacuated  the  ground  between  the  Yser  and 
the  railway,  abandoning  cannon,  dead,  and  wounded.  On 
the  3rd  our  troops  were  able  to  re-enter  the  Dixmude  district. 
The  success  achieved  by  the  enemy  at  Dixmude  at  this 
juncture  was  without  fruit.  They  succeeded  in  taking  the 
town.  They  could  not  debouch  from  it. 

The  coastal  attack  had  thus  proved  a  total  failure.  Since 
then  it  has  never  been  renewed.  The  Battle  of  Calais,  so 
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LN.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

noisily  announced  by  the  German  Press,  amounted  to  a 
decided  reverse  for  the  Germans. 

The  enemy  had  now  begun  an  attack  more  important 
than  its  predecessor,  in  view  of  the  numbers  engaged  in  it. 
This  attack  was  intended  as  a  renewal  to  the  south  of  the 
effort  which  had  just  been  shattered  in  the  north.  Instead 
of  turning  our  flank  on  the  coast,  it  was  now  sought  to  drive 
in  the  right  of  our  northern  army  under  the  shock  of  powerful 
masses.  This  was  the  Battle  of  Ypres. 

In  order  to  understand  this  long,  desperate,  and  furious 
battle,  we  must  hark  back  a  few  days  in  point  of  time.  At 
the  moment  when  our  cavalry  reached  Roulers  and  Corte- 
marck  (October  18),  our  Territorial  divisions  from  Dunkirk 
under  General  Bidon  had  occupied  and  organised  a  defensive 
position  at  Ypres.  It  was  a  point  d'appui  enabling  us  to 
prepare  and  maintain  our  connections  with  the  Belgian  Army. 
From  October  23  two  British  and  French  Army  Corps  were 
in  occupation  of  this  position,  which  was  to  be  the  base  of 
their  forward  march  in  the  direction  of  Roulers-Menin.  The 
delays  already  explained,  and  the  strength  of  the  forces 
brought  up  by  the  enemy,  soon  brought  to  a  standstill  our 
progress  along  the  line  Poelcappelle-Passchendaele-Zand- 
voorde-Gheluvelt.  But,  in  spite  of  the  stoppage  here,  Ypres 
was  solidly  covered,  and  the  connections  of  all  the  Allied 
forces  were  established.  Against  the  line  thus  formed  the 
German  attack  was  hurled  from  October  25  to  November  13, 
to  the  north,  the  east,  and  the  south  of  Ypres.  From 
October  26  onward  the  attacks  were  renewed  daily  with  great 
violence,  obliging  us  to  employ  our  reinforcements  at  the 
most  threatened  points  as  soon  as  they  came  up.  Thus,  on 
October  31,  we  were  obliged  to  send  supports  to  the  British 
cavalry,  then  to  the  two  British  corps  between  which  the 
cavalry  formed  the  connecting  link,  and,  finally,  to  inter- 
calate between  these  two  corps  a  force  equivalent  to  two 
army  corps.  Between  October  30  and  November  6  Ypres 
was  several  times  in  danger.  The  British  lost  Zandvoorde. 
Gheluvelt,  Messines,  and  Wytschaete.  The  front  of  the 
Allies,  thus  contracted,  was  all  the  more  difficult  to  defend ; 
but  defended  it  was  without  a  recoil.  The  arrival  of  three 
French  divisions  in  our  line  enabled  us  to  resume  from  the 
4th  to  the  8th  a  vigorous  offensive.  On  the  loth  and  the 

205 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  191 

nth  this  offensive,  brought  up  against  fresh  and  sharper 
German  attacks,  was  checked.  Before  it  could  be  renewed 
the  arrival  of  fresh  reinforcements  had  to  be  awaited,  which 
were  despatched  to  the  north  on  November  12. 

By  the  I4th  our  troops  had  again  begun  to  progress,  barring 
the  road  to  Ypres  against  the  German  attacks,  and  inflicting 
on  the  enemy,  who  advanced  in  massed  formations,  losses 
which  were  specially  terrible  in  consequence  of  the  fact  that 
the  French  and  British  artillery  had  crowded  nearly  three 
hundred  guns  on  to  these  few  kilometres  of  front.  Thus  the 
main  mass  of  the  Germans  sustained  the  same  defeat  as  the 
detachments  operating  farther  to  the  north  along  the  coast. 
The  support  which,  according  to  the  idea  of  the  German 
General  Staff,  the  attack  on  Ypres  was  to  render  to  the  coastal 
attack  was  as  futile  as  that  attack  itself  had  been. 

During  the  second  half  of  November  the  enemy,  exhausted, 
and  having  lost  in  the  Battle  of  Ypres  alone  more  than 
150,000  men,  did  not  attempt  to  renew  his  effort,  but  con- 
fined himself  to  an  intermittent  cannonade.  We,  on  the 
contrary,  achieved  appreciable  progress  to  the  north  and 
south  of  Ypres,  and  ensured  definitively,  by  a  powerful 
defensive  organisation  of  the  position,  the  inviolability  of 
our  front. 

[The  compiler  of  the  report  here  adds  a  footnote  stating 
that  over  forty  thousand  German  corpses  were  found  on  the 
battle-field  during  these  three  weeks  of  battle.] 

VI. — OPERATIONS  FROM  NOVEMBER  30  TO  FEBRUARY  i 

During  the  period  November  30  to  February  i,  the  French 
Supreme  Command  has  not  thought  it  advisable  to  embark 
upon  important  offensive  operations.  It  has  confined  itself 
to  local  attacks,  the  main  object  of  which  was  to  hold  in 
front  of  us  as  large  a  number  of  German  corps  as  possible, 
and  thus  to  hinder  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  which,  to 
our  knowledge,  the  German  General  Staff  was  anxious  to 
despatch  to  Russia. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  numbers  transported  to  the 
Eastern  front  have  been  very  moderate.  Of  the  52  army  corps 
which  faced  us  on  the  Western  front,  Germany  has  only 
been  able  to  take  4!  corps  for  the  Eastern  front.  On  the 
206 


N.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

other  hand,  climatic  conditions — the  rain,  mud,  and  mist 
— were  such  as  to  diminish  the  effectiveness  of  offensive 
operations  and  to  add  to  the  costliness  of  any  undertaking, 
which  was  another  reason  for  postponing  them.  Still  another 
reason  lies  in  the  fact  that,  from  now  on,  the  Allied  forces 
can  count  upon  a  steadily  expanding  growth,  equally  in 
point  of  numbers  and  units  as  of  material,  while  the  German 
forces  have  attained  the  maximum  of  their  power  and  can 
only  diminish  now,  both  in  numbers  and  in  value. 

These  considerations  explain  the  character  of  the  siege 
warfare  which  the  operations  have  assumed  during  the  period 
under  review.  Meanwhile  it  is  by  no  means  the  case  that 
the  siege  warfare  has  had  the  same  results  for  the  Germans 
as  for  us.  From  November  15  to  February  i  our  opponents, 
in  spite  of  very  numerous  attacks,  did  not  succeed  in  taking 
anything  from  us,  except  a  few  hundred  metres  of  ground 
to  the  north  of  Soissons.  We,  on  the  contrary,  have  obtained 
numerous  and  appreciable  results. 

[The  French  writer  here  proceeds  to  strike  a  balance  of 
gains  and  losses  between  the  Allied  and  the  German  forces 
in  France  during  the  winter  campaign.  The  result  he  sums 
up  as  follows  : — ] 

1.  A   general    progress   of    our  troops,   very  marked  at 
certain  points. 

2.  A  general  falling-back  of   the  enemy  except   to   the 
north-east  of  Soissons. 

To  complete  the  balance,  he  says,  it  must  be  added  that : — 

1.  The  German  offensive  in  Poland  was  checked  a  month 
ago. 

2.  The  Russian   offensive  continues  in   Galicia   and  the 
Carpathians. 

3.  A  large  part  of  the  Turkish  Caucasian  Army  has  been 
annihilated. 

4.  Germany  has  exhausted  her  resources  of  officers  (there 
are  now  on  an  average  12  professional  officers  to  a  regiment), 
and  henceforth  will  only  be  able  to  develop  her  resources  in 
men  to  the  detriment  of  the  existing  units. 

5.  The  Allied  Armies,  on  the  contrary,  possess  the  power 
of  reinforcing  themselves  in  a  very  considerable  degree. 

It  may  therefore  be  declared  that,  in  order  to  obtain  com- 

207 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  191 

plete  success,  it  is  sufficient  for  France  and  her  Allies  to  know 
how  to  wait,  and  to  prepare  victory  with  indefatigable  patience. 
The  German  offensive  is  broken.     The  German  defensive 
will  be  broken  in  its  turn. 

VII. — THE  FRENCH  ARMY  AS  IT  is:  OFFICERS  AND  MEN 

The  compiler  of  the  report,  beginning  his  review  on  February 
i,  states  that  on  that  date  the  condition  of  the  French  Army 
was  excellent  and  appreciably  superior  to  what  it  was  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  from  the  three  points  of  view  of  numbers, 
quality,  and  equipment.  In  the  higher  command  important 
changes  have  been  made.  It  has  in  fact  been  rejuvenated 
by  the  promotion  of  young  commanders  of  proved  quality 
to  high  rank.  All  the  old  generals  who  at  the  beginning  of 
August  were  at  the  head  of  large  commands  have  been  gradually 
eliminated,  some  as  the  result  of  the  physical  strain  of  war, 
others  by  appointment  to  territorial  commands.  This  re- 
juvenation of  the  higher  ranks  of  the  Army  has  been  carried 
out  in  a  far-reaching  manner,  and  it  may  be  said  that  it  has 
embraced  all  the  grades  of  the  military  hierarchy  from  com- 
manders of  brigades  to  commanders  of  armies.  The  result 
has  been  to  lower  the  average  age  of  general  officers  by  ten 
years.  To-day  more  than  three-fourths  of  the  officers  com- 
manding armies  and  army  corps  are  less  than  sixty  years  of 
age.  Some  are  considerably  younger.  A  number  of  the 
army  corps  commanders  are  from  forty-six  to  fifty-four  years 
of  age,  and  the  brigade  commanders  are  usually  under  fifty. 
There  are,  in  fact,  at  the  front  extremely  few  general  officers 
over  sixty,  and  these  are  men  who  are  in  full  possession  of 
their  physical  and  intellectual  powers.  This  rejuvenation  of 
the  High  Command  was  facilitated  by  a  number  of  circum- 
stances, notable  among  which  were  the  strengthening  of  the 
higher  regimental  ranks  carried  out  during  the  three  years 
preceding  the  war,  as  a  result  of  which,  at  the  outset  of  the 
campaign  each  infantry  regiment  had  two  lieutenant-colonels 
and  each  cavalry  and  artillery  regiment  a  colonel  and  a  lieu- 
tenant-colonel, and  also  the  system  of  promotion  for  the 
duration  of  the  war.  Many  officers  who  began  the  war  as 
colonels  now  command  brigades,  some  are  even  at  the  head 
of  divisions  or  army  corps.  Ability  proved  on  the  field  of 
208 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

battle  is  now  immediately  recognised  and  utilised,  and  in  this 
way  it  has  been  possible  to  provide  in  the  most  favourable 
manner  for  the  vacancies  created  by  the  changes  in  command 
which  were  considered  necessary  in  the  first  weeks  of  the 
war.  The  higher  grades  of  the  French  Army  are  inspired 
by  a  remarkable  unity  in  the  matter  of  military  theory,  and 
by  a  solidarity  of  spirit  which  has  found  striking  expression 
in  the  course  of  the  numerous  moves  of  army  corps  from  one 
part  of  the  theatre  of  operations  to  another  which  have  been 
carried  out  since  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

The  cavalry  after  six  months  of  war  still  possess  an  excess 
of  officers.  There  are  on  an  average  thirty-six  officers  to  a 
regiment  instead  of  the  thirty-one  considered  to  be  the  neces- 
sary minimum.  The  artillery,  which  has  suffered  relatively 
little,  has  also  an  excess  of  officers,  and  is  further  able  to  count 
upon  a  large  number  of  captains  and  other  officers  who  before 
the  war  were  employed  in  the  arsenals  or  in  technical  research. 
Finally,  the  reserve  artillery  officers  have  nearly  all  proved 
to  be  excellent  battery  commanders. 

The  losses  in  the  junior  commissioned  ranks  have  naturally 
been  highest  in  the  infantry.  There  is,  however,  nothing  like 
a  want  of  officers  in  this  arm.  Many  captains  and  lieu- 
tenants who  have  been  wounded  by  machine-gun  fire  (such 
wounds  are  usually  slight  and  quickly  healed),  have  been 
able  to  return  speedily  to  the  front.  The  reserve  officers  have 
in  general  done  remarkably  well,  and  in  many  cases  have 
shown  quite  exceptional  aptitude  for  the  rank  of  company 
commanders.  The  non-commissioned  officers  promoted  to 
sub-lieutenants  make  excellent  section  leaders,  and  even  show 
themselves  very  clever  and  energetic  company  commanders 
in  the  field. 

It  must  be  remembered  also  that,  thanks  to  the  intel- 
lectual and  physical  development  of  the  generation  now 
serving  with  the  colours,  and  thanks,  above  .all,  to  the  war- 
like qualities  of  the  race  and  the  democratic  spirit  of  our 
Army,  we  have  been  able  to  draw  upon  the  lower  grades 
and  even  upon  the  rank  and  file  for  officers.  Many  men 
who  began  the  war  on  August  2  as  privates  now  wear  the 
officer's  epaulettes.  The  elasticity  of  our  regulations  regard- 
ing promotion  in  war  time,  the  absence  of  the  spirit  of  caste, 
and  the  friendly  welcome  extended  by  all  officers  to  those  of 

MILITARY  2  O  20Q 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY       [AUG.  ic 

their  military  inferiors  who  have  shown  under  fire  their 
fitness  to  command  have  enabled  us  to  meet  all  requirements. 

The  state  of  our  infantry  cadres  on  January  15  was  very 
satisfactory,  and  much  superior  to  that  of  the  German 
infantry.  On  an  average  each  of  our  regiments  has  48  officers, 
including  18  Regular  officers,  15  Reserve  officers,  and  15  non- 
commissioned officers.  In  each  regiment  six  of  the  twelve 
companies  are  commanded  by  captains  who  are  Regular 
officers,  three  by  captains  of  the  Reserve,  and  three  by 
lieutenants.  Each  company  has  at  least  three  officers.  In 
sum,  the  state  of  the  Army  as  regards  the  commissioned 
ranks  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest  is  declared  to  be  excep- 
tionally brilliant.  The  Army  is  led  by  young,  well-trained, 
and  daring  chiefs,  and  the  lower  commissioned  ranks  have 
acquired  the  art  of  war  by  experience. 

Finally  a  warm  tribute  must  be  paid  to  the  work  of  the 
Staffs  of  the  Armies  and  of  the  army  corps,  which  were 
formed  three  years  ago  and  have  thrown  themselves  into 
their  work  in  entire  agreement  both  of  views  and  methods. 

Including  all  ranks,  France  now  has  more  than  2,500,000 
men  at  the  front,  and  every  unit  is,  or  was  on  January  15, 
at  war  strength.  The  infantry  companies  are  at  least  200 
strong.  In  many  regiments  the  companies  have  a  strength 
of  250  or  more. 

In  the  other  arms,  which  have  suffered  less  than  the 
infantry,  the  units  are  all  up  to,  or  above,  regulation  strength. 

This  fact  constitutes  one  of  the  most  important  advan- 
tages of  the  French  Army  over  the  German.  While  Germany 
has  created  a  great  number  of  new  units,  army  corps,  or 
divisions,  which  absorbed  at  a  blow  all  of  her  available 
resources  in  officers  and  men,  the  French  Supreme  Command 
has  avoided  the  formation  of  new  units,  except  in  limited 
number.  It  has  only  admitted  exceptions  to  this  rule  when 
it  was  able  to  count  with  certainty  on  being  able  to  provide 
amply  for  both  the  present  and  future  requirements  of  the 
new  units,  as  regards  all  ranks,  without  encroaching  upon 
the  reserves  needed  for  the  existing  units.  At  the  same  time, 
thanks  to  the  depots  in  the  interior  of  the  country,  the 
effectives  at  the  front  have  been  maintained  at  full  strength. 
The  sources  of  supply  for  this  purpose  were  the  remainder  of 
the  eleven  classes  of  the  Reserve,  the  younger  classes  of  the 

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1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

Territorial  Army,  and  the  new  class  of  1914.  A  large  number 
of  the  men  wounded  in  the  earlier  engagements  of  the  war 
have  been  able  to  return  to  the  front,  and  these  have  been 
incorporated  in  the  new  drafts,  thus  providing  them  with  a 
useful  stiffening  of  war-tried  men. 

With  regard  to  the  supplies  of  men  upon  which  the  Army 
can  draw  to  repair  the  wastage  at  the  front,  we  learn  that 
there  are  practically  half  as  many  men  in  the  depots  as  at 
the  front,  in  other  words  about  1,250,000.  Further  supplies 
of  men  are  provided  by  the  class  of  1915,  which  has  already 
proved  to  be  more  than  a  fifth  more  numerous  than  the 
official  estimate  and  the  '  revision/  in  consequence  of  Minis- 
terial decree,  of  the  various  categories  of  men  of  military 
age  exempted  on  grounds  of  health  or  for  other  reasons  from 
the  duty  of  bearing  arms.  As  a  result  of  this  measure  nearly 
half  a  million  men  have  been  claimed  for  the  Army,  almost 
all  of  whom,  after  rigorous  physical  tests,  have  been  declared 
fit  for  military  service. 

In  the  depots  in  which  the  new  soldiers  are  being  trained, 
the  services  of  many  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers, 
discharged  as  convalescents  after  being  wounded,  are  utilised 
in  order  to  give  a  practical  turn  to  the  instruction.  There 
are  still  many  voluntary  enlistments,  and,  with  all  these 
resources  of  men,  the  Army  can  count  upon  reinforcements 
soon  to  be  available,  which  will  considerably  augment  its 
offensive  power. 

The  quality  of  the  troops  has  improved  perceptibly  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  The  men  have  become  hardened 
and  used  to  war,  and  their  health — largely  owing  to  the 
excellence  of  the  commissariat — is  extremely  satisfactory.  In 
spite  of  the  severity  of  the  winter,  hardly  any  cases  of  disease 
of  the  respiratory  organs  have  occurred,  and  the  sanitary 
returns  of  the  Army  show  an  appreciable  improvement  on 
those  of  the  preceding  winter. 

With  regard  to  the  reserves,  experience  has  verified  the 
dictum  of  the  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  generals  in  the  war  of 
1913,  namely,  that  '  two  months  in  the  field  are  necessary  in 
order  to  get  at  the  full  value  of  reserves/  Our  infantry  is 
now  accustomed  to  the  rapid  and  thorough  organisation  of 
the  defensive.  In  August  it  neither  liked,  nor  had  the  habit, 
of  using  the  spade.  To-day  those  who  see  our  trenches  are 

211 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY       [AUG.  191 

astounded.  They  are  veritable  improvised  fortresses,  proof 
against  the  77  millimetre  gun  and  often  against  artillery  of 
higher  calibre. 

During  the  past  five  months  not  a  single  encounter  can  be 
cited  in  which  our  infantry  did  not  have  the  advantage  over 
the  German  infantry.  All  the  enemy's  attacks  have  been 
repulsed,  except  to  the  north  of  Soissons,  where  their  success 
was  due  to  the  flooded  state  of  the  Aisne  and  the  carrying 
away  of  our  bridges.  Our  attacks,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
yielded  important  results  and  have  been  carried  out  with 
plenty  of  spirit,  although  without  the  imprudence  which  cost 
us  such  heavy  losses  in  August. 

The  cavalry  has  made  remarkable  progress.  Throughout 
October  the  cavalry  was  called  on  to  eke  out  the  inadequate 
numbers  of  the  infantry,  and  showed  itself  perfectly  adapted 
to  the  necessities  of  fighting  on  foot.  Several  regiments  of 
cavalry  have  been  used  as  infantry,  and,  armed  with  rifles, 
have  rendered  the  most  valuable  services. 

The  artillery  has  displayed  a  superiority  in  the  use  of  its 
admirable  equipment,  which  is  recognised  by  the  Germans 
themselves. 

[This  chapter  of  the  report  concludes  with  a  tribute  to 
the  work  of  the  airmen  and  to  the  less  brilliant  but  not  less 
useful  work  of  the  engineers,  who  in  the  trench  warfare  which 
we  are  now  waging  have  naturally  been  called  upon  to  display 
intense  activity.] 

VIII. — THE  FRENCH  ARMY  AS  IT  is  :   MATERIAL, 
ARTILLERY,  SUPPLIES,  TRANSPORT 

[Beginning  with  the  famous  '  75  '  gun,  the  compiler  of  the 
French  official  report  dwells  on  its  power,  rapidity  of  action, 
and  its  incomparable  precision,  which  make  it  an  implement 
of  war  of  the  first  order.]  It  may  be  stated  without  hesita- 
tion, that  our  '  75  '  guns  are  in  as  perfect  condition  to-day 
as  they  were  on  the  first  day  of  the  war,  although  the  use 
made  of  them  has  exceeded  all  calculations.  The  consump- 
tion of  projectiles  was,  in  fact,  so  enormous  as  to  cause  for  a 
moment  an  ammunition  crisis,  which,  however,  was  com- 
pletely overcome  several  weeks  ago. 

The  methodical  and  complete  exploitation  of  all  the 
212 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

resources  of  the  country,  organised  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  has  enabled  us  to  accumulate  a  considerable  stock 
of  fresh  munitions,  and  an  increasing  rate  of  production  is 
henceforth  assured.  We  are  thus  sure  of  being  able  to 
provide  without  particular  effort  for  all  the  needs  of  the 
campaign,  present  and  future,  however  long  the  war  may 
last,  and  it  is  this  certainty  which  has  enabled  us  to  supply 
projectiles  to  several  of  the  Allied  Armies,  among  others  to 
the  Serbian  and  Belgian  Armies.  From  the  statements  of 
German  prisoners  we  have  learnt  that  the  effectiveness  of 
our  new  projectiles  is  superior  to  that  of  the  old  ones. 

Our  heavy  artillery  was  in  process  of  reorganisation  when 
the  war  broke  out,  with  the  result  that  we  were  indisputably 
in  a  position  of  inferiority  in  respect  of  this  arm  during  the 
first  battles.  But  to-day  the  parts  have  been  changed,  and 
our  adversaries  themselves  acknowledge  the  superiority  of  our 
heavy  artillery  by  reason  of  its  abundance,  its  power,  its  range, 
and  precision.  The  change  has  been  brought  about  partly 
by  the  intense  activity  of  the  gun  factories  in  new  pro- 
duction, partly  by  the  employment  at  the  front  of  the  enor- 
mous reserves  of  artillery  preserved  in  the  fortresses.  This 
source  of  supply  is  by  no  means  exhausted.  The  large 
number  of  heavy  guns  at  the  front  represents  only  a  part  of 
the  total  number  available  for  use.  These  guns  have  been 
altered  and  brought  up  to  date  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  them 
the  qualities  of  the  most  modern  artillery,  and  such  a  variety 
of  models  are  available  that  the  French  artillerists  can  adapt 
their  fire  to  all  the  necessities  of  war  as  practised  to-day. 

There  is  an  abundant  stock  of  projectiles  for  the  heavy 
artillery,  which,  as  in  the  case  of  the  field-gun  ammunition, 
is  daily  growing  in  importance.  The  same  is  true  of  the 
reserves  of  powder  and  other  explosives,  and  of  all  materials 
needed  for  the  manufacture  of  shells.  The  powerful  industrial 
equipment  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  constantly  fed  from 
abroad,  thanks  to  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  gives  us  full  security 
in  this  respect. 

Dealing  with  the  effects  of  the  French  artillery  fire,  the 
report  quotes  the  statements  of  prisoners.  Captives  who 
have  been  exposed  to  a  battering  by  the  French  gunners 
always  remain  in  a  sort  of  stupor  for  several  hours.  One 
prisoner  said  :  '  I  have  served  through  the  whole  campaign. 

213 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  19: 

I  was  at  the  battle  of  the  Maine,  where  our  losses  were  terrible. 
But  its  terror  was  nothing  compared  to  the  artillery  fire  which 
we  have  had  to  endure  these  last  few  days,  with  its  accuracy 
of  aim  and  the  destructive  effect  of  its  shells.  I  am  glad  to 
have  escaped  from  that  hell,  and  I  do  not  think  myself  a  bad 
German  for  saying  so.  I  believe  I  have  paid  my  debt  to 
the  Fatherland  by  the  mere  fact  of  having  been  exposed  to 
such  a  fire.  I  wonder  that  my  reason  did  not  give  way.  It 
was  an  accursed  day/ 

A  German  lieutenant  of  engineers  said  he  could  not  under- 
stand the  violence  and  the  extraordinary  accuracy  of  our 
fire.  He  said  :  '  As  long  as  the  artillery  fire  lasts  there  is  no 
use  in  thinking  about  making  a  move  to  bring  up  the  re- 
serves, and  the  last  shot  has  hardly  been  fired  at  the  trench 
when  your  infantry  are  there/ 

A  German  non-commissioned  officer  thus  described  what 
he  had  seen  :  '  You  could  see  rifles  and  men  hurtling  through 
the  air.  All  the  defenders  were  blown  to  pieces  or  buried 
alive/ 

%  Those  who  seek  safety  in  flight  are  no  better  off.  Said 
another  prisoner  :  '  The  shells  pursue  the  fugitives.  The 
best  thing  to  do  is  to  fling  oneself  on  the  ground  and  leave 
the  rest  to  God/ 

The  Germans  have  nicknamed  our  artillerymen  '  the 
black  butchers/  With  regard  to  small  arms,  hand-grenades, 
bombs,  and  all  the  devices  for  life-taking  which  the  short- 
range  trench  warfare  has  brought  into  use,  the  position  of 
the  French  troops  is  in  every  way  favourable.  Thanks 
to  the  ingenuity  of  the  officers  and  engineers,  and  the 
resources  of  the  national  industry,  the  army  in  the  field 
is  now  equipped  with  an  entire  arsenal  of  new  weapons  of 
this  kind,  perfected  by  experience  in  action  and  varied  in 
type  so  as  to  be  able  to  meet  all  the  exigencies  of  the  new 
mode  of  fighting.  The  superiority  which  the  Germans  enjoyed 
at  the  beginning  in  virtue  of  their  bomb-throwers  and  similar 
engines  has  disappeared. 

Owing  to  the  extended  use  of  machine-guns  the  number 
of  them  supplied  to  the  various  units  has  been  increased. 
Not  only  is  each  unit  in  possession  of  its  full  regulation  com- 
plement of  machine-guns,  but  the  number  of  these  guns 
attached  to  each  unit  has  been  increased  since  February  i 
314 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

by  one-third.  On  March  15  this  number  will  be  doubled. 
The  efforts  of  the  national  industry  supplemented  by  foreign 
aid  make  it  possible  to  keep  up  a  constant  flow  of  thoroughly 
trained  machine-gun  detachments  to  the  front.  The  supply 
of  rifles,  carbines,  and  other  firearms  has  been  and  will  be 
equal  to  all  demands. 

The  report  next  passes  to  the  transport  service,  which  has 
worked  with  remarkable  precision  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  Its  first  great  task  was  the  transport  of  the  cover- 
ing troops — that  is,  the  troops  sent  to  the  frontier  to 
meet  the  first  shock  of  the  enemy  and  enable  the  mobilisa- 
tion of  the  main  armies  to  be  carried  out  undisturbed — and 
then  the  mobilisation  and  concentration  of  transports.  The 
transport  of  the  covering  troops  began  on  the  day  of  the 
German  proclamation  of  '  the  state  of  danger  of  war/  that 
is  July  31,  at  9  P.M.,  and  was  completed  on  August  3  at 
noon  without  any  delay  either  in  the  departure  or  arrival 
of  trains,  and  before  any  of  the  ordinary  train  services  had 
•  been  suspended.  Nearly  six  hundred  trains  were  required  to 
carry  out  the  operation  on  the  Eastern  system  alone. 

The  transport  of  troops,  etc.,  in  connection  with  the  general 
mobilisation  began  on  August  2,  concurrently  with  the  move- 
ment of  the  covering  troops.  On  August  3  and  4  nearly  six 
hundred  more  trains  were  despatched  on  the  Eastern  system 
alone.  The  transportation  needed  for  the  concentration  of  the 
armies  began  at  midday  on  August  5,  and  the  first  period, 
during  which  the  most  urgent  transportation  was  effected, 
ended  on  August  12  at  the  same  hour.  The  second  period 
of  less  urgent  movements  extended  from  4  A.M.  on  August  12 
to  midnight  on  August  18.  During  the  first  period,  out  of 
2500  trains  despatched  about  twenty  were  subjected  to  slight 
delays,  which  were  made  good  in  the  second  period.  During 
the  fourteen  days  nearly  4500  trains  were  despatched,  without 
counting  250  trains  which  carried  siege  supplies  to  the  for- 
tresses. It  is  noteworthy  that  these  excellent  results  were 
obtained  in  "spite  of  the  fact  that  the  original  destination  of 
four  army  corps  was  changed  after  mobilisation  had  begun. 
With  regard  to  the  ordinary  supply  movements,  it  may  be 
remarked  that  this  service,  directed  from  the  '  control  stations ' 
on  the  railways,  has  worked  with  perfect  regularity  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  During  the  retreat  in  August  the 

215 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG. 

control  stations  had  to  provide  for  all  sorts  of  unforeseen 
needs,  such  as  the  removal  of  military  and  other  stores,  and 
often  of  the  inhabitants  from  abandoned  towns,  and  the 
withdrawal  of  French  and  Belgian  rolling  stock,  in  spite  of 
which  not  a  single  supply  train  or  troop  train  was  ever  stopped. 

In  the  way  of  the  transport  of  troops  from  one  part  of  the 
theatre  of  operations  to  another,  some  remarkable  feats  have 
been  performed.  During  the  French  offensives  in  Lorraine 
and  Belgium  in  August,  during  the  retreat  beyond  the  Marne, 
during  the  subsequent  advance,  and  again  during  the  exten- 
sion of  our  left  to  the  North  Sea,  over  seventy  divisions  were 
moved  by  railway  from  one  point  to  another,  the  journeys 
varying  from  sixty  to  360  miles,  and  necessitating  the 
employment  of  over  6000  trains.  To  the  accurate  work- 
ing of  the  transport  service  we  owe  a  large  part  of  our  success. 
In  particular  we  owe  to  it  the  impassable  barrier  against 
which  the  enemy's  desperate  offensive  hurled  itself  in  vain 
in  Flanders. 

The  automobile  transport  has  been  correspondingly  active. 
It  has  been  freely  drawn  upon  for  the  transport  of  troops, 
at  least  250,000  men  having  been  moved  by  automobile 
distances  of  from  twelve  to  seventy  miles  during  September, 
October,  and  November.  On  the  automobile  transport  falls 
the  duty  of  carrying  material  and  supplies  of  certain  sorts, 
notably  fresh  meat,  and  the  removal  of  wounded  to  hospital. 
The  service  at  present  comprises  over  10,000  motor  vehicles, 
driven  and  kept  in  repair  by  2500  chauffeurs  and  mechanics. 

Of  the  work  of  the  commissariat  department  some  idea 
is  gathered  when  it  is  remembered  that  each  of  the  2,500,000 
men  at  the  front  daily  receives  the  following  campaign  ration  : 
bread  750  grammes,  meat  500  grammes,  bacon  30  grammes, 
sugar  32  grammes,  coffee  30  grammes,  tobacco  100  grammes 
(per  week).  Each  man  now  receives  a  double  ration  of  sugar 
and  coffee,  and,  in  addition,  2  grammes  of  tea  and  a  third 
of  a  litre  of  wine  a  day.  The  menu  is  further  enriched  by 
joint  purchases  through  the  '  ordinaires/  In  addition  to  his 
ration  of  food  each  soldier  receives  a  certain  allowance  of 
money,  which  he  pays  into  the  '  ordinaire  '  of  his  company, 
which  then  buys  for  joint  use  such  things  as  the  Government 
does  not  supply,  notably  potatoes,  fresh  vegetables,  sardines, 
and  chocolate,  of  which  the  commissariat  has  accumulated 
216 


1. 1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

large  stocks,  so  that  the  troops  can  always  obtain  them  even 
if  they  cannot  be  bought  or  requisitioned  in  the  country 
where  operations  are  being  conducted.  What  the  com- 
missariat and  the  transport  service  can  do  is  shown  by  the 
following  details.  On  ist  January,  every  one  of  the  2,500,000 
men  at  the  front  received  the  following  ration  of  luxuries  to 
celebrate  the  New  Year  :  100  grammes  of  ham,  an  orange, 
two  apples,  a  handful  of  nuts,  a  cigar,  half  a  litre  of  good 
wine,  and  a  quarter  of  a  litre  of  champagne.  This  good 
feeding  has  its  natural  results  upon  the  physical  and  moral 
health  of  the  troops.  The  men  put  on  .flesh  on  active 
service. 

The  stocks  of  wheat  and  oats  are  so  large  that,  in 
the  zone  of  the  armies,  the  crop  of  last  year  has  not  yet 
been  threshed.  For  the  meat  ration,  beef  alternates  with 
mutton  and  pork,  and  fresh  meat  with  frozen.  Endless 
stocks  exist.  Of  the  home  supply  of  thirteen  million  head 
of  cattle,  sheep,  and  pigs,  only  800,000  head  have  been 
slaughtered. 

The  summary  of  the  Army  supply  service  gives  an  idea 
of  the  commercial  prosperity  of  the  country.  The  transport 
of  goods  by  railway  and  sea  proceeds  with  an  activity  un- 
known in  the  most  prosperous  times.  The  ports  are  crowded 
with  shipping  and  merchandise.  Everywhere  it  has  been 
necessary  to  build  new  docks  to  deal  with  the  flood  of  imports 
of  all  kinds  from  abroad.  Ports  which  in  time  of  peace 
are  the  least  busy  are  now  crammed,  and  at  the  great  ports, 
like  Havre,  ships  are  obliged  to  wait  for  days  to  unload  their 
cargoes  for  lack  of  quay  space.  Finally,  the  presence  of  the 
British  Army  in  the  North  of  France  has  brought  about  an 
intense  activity  of  trade  and  an  abundant  circulation  of  gold 
in  this  part  of  the  country. 

IX. — THE  GERMAN  ARMY  AND  ITS  LOSSES  IN  MEN 

The  military  effort  of  Germany  at  the  outset  of  the 
campaign  exceeded  all  anticipations.  Her  design  was  to 
crush  the  French  Army  in  a  few  weeks  under  a  tremendous 
mass  of  troops.  Nothing  was  neglected  to  bring  that  mass 
together. 

The  number  of  German  army  corps  in  time  of  peace  is 

217 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  191, 

twenty-five.     When  war  began  the  German  General  Staff  put 
in  the  field  on.  the  two  theatres  of  operations  :— 

1.  As  fighting  troops  (Active,  Reserve,  Ersatz,  or  Land- 
wehr),  6 1  army  corps. 

2.  As   troops   to    guard   communications   and   territory, 
formations  of  the  Landsturm. 

In  October  6J-  new  army  corps  made  their  appearance, 
plus  a  division  of  sailors,  in  all  7  corps.  From  the  end 
of  November  to  the  end  of  December  there  was  only  an 
insignificant  increase,  consisting  of  one  division  of  sailors. 
In  January  1915,  the  number  of  fighting  formations  put 
into  line  by  the  Germany  Army  was  therefore  69  army  corps, 
divided  as  follows  : — 

Active  corps,  25^. 

Reserve  corps,  2iJ. 

Ersatz  brigades,  6J. 

Reserve  corps  of  new  formation,  7^. 

Corps  of  Landwehr,  8J. 

Total,  6gJ. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  the  immense  effort  thus  made 
by  Germany  if,  having  regard  to  the  position  of  Germany  at 
the  opening  of  the  war,  one  considers  that  of  the  Allies. 
Germany  desired  to  take  advantage  of  the  circumstances 
which  enabled  her  to  make  a  simultaneous  mobilisation  of  all 
her  forces,  a  mobilisation  which  the  three  Allied  Armies  could 
not  carry  out  as  rapidly.  Germany  wished  with  the  mass 
of  troops  to  crush  first  of  all  the  adversary  who  appeared  to 
her  the  most  immediately  dangerous.  This  effort,  broken  for 
the  first  time  on  the  Marne,  attained  its  maximum  at  the 
moment  of  the  Battle  of  Flanders,  in  which  more  than  50 
army  corps  out  of  69  were  pitted  against  the  French,  British, 
and  Belgian  Armies.  Here  also  the  method  followed  by 
Germany  is  easily  comprehensible.  At  the  end  of  October 
the  Russian  danger  was  beginning  to  become  pressing,  and 
it  was  necessary  to  win  a  decisive  victory  on  the  Western 
theatre  of  war.  It  was  imperative  to  give  international 
opinion  the  impression  that  Germany  remained  in  that 
quarter  mistress  of  the  operations.  Finally,  it  behoved  her 
by  this  victory  to  render  possible  the  transport  of  a  large 
number  of  army  corps  to  Poland.  We  have  seen  that  the 
218 


N.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

Battle  of  Flanders,  instead  of  being  a  success  for  Germany, 
was  a  marked  defeat.  This  defeat  was  fraught  with  great 
results,  and  it  dominates  the  present  position  of  the  German 
Army. 

The  plans  above  described  of  the  German  mobilisation, 
which  had  their  justification  in  view  of  a  prompt  victory, 
were  calculated  to  become  extremely  perilous  from  the 
moment  that  that  victory  failed  to  be  gained.  From  that 
moment,  in  fact,  Germany  lost  the  initiative  and  the  direction 
of  the  war.  And  furthermore,  she  was  condemned  to  suffer 
the  counter-effects  of  the  enormous  and  precipitate  effort 
which  she  had  made  in  vain.  From  the  point  of  view  of  her 
effectives  and  her  regimental  cadres  she  had  undergone  a 
wastage  from  which  her  adversaries,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
been  able  to  save  themselves. 

She  had,  in  the  words  of  the  proverb,  put  all  her  eggs  in 
one  basket,  and  in  spite  of  her  large  population  she  could 
no  longer,  owing  to  the  immediate  and  sterile  abuse  which 
she  had  made  of  her  resources,  pretend  to  regain  the  superi- 
ority of  numbers.  She  was  reduced  to  facing  as  best  she 
could  on  both  war  fronts  the  unceasingly  increasing  forces  of 
the  Allies.  She  had  attained  the  maximum  of  effort  and 
had  secured  a  minimum  of  results.  She  has  thus  landed 
herself  in  a  difficulty  which  will  henceforward  go  on  increasing, 
and  which  is  made  clear  when  the  wastage  which  her  Army 
has  suffered  is  closely  studied. 

The  wastage  of  German  effectives  is  easy  to  establish.  We 
have  for  the  purpose  two  sources,  the  official  lists  of  losses 
published  by  the  German  General  Staff,  and  the  note-books, 
letters,  and  documents  of  soldiers  and  officers  killed  and  taken 
prisoners.  These  different  documents  show  that  by  the 
middle  of  January  the  German  losses  on  the  two  fronts  were 
1,800,000  men.  These  figures  are  certainly  less  than  the 
reality  because,  for  one  thing,  the  sick  are  not  comprised, 
and,  for  another,  the  losses  in  the  last  battle  in  Poland  are 
not  included. 

Let  us  accept  them,  however :  let  us  accept  also  that  out 
of  these  1,800,000  men  500,000 — this  is  the  normal  propor- 
tion— have  been  able  to  rejoin  after  being  cured.  Thus  the 
final  loss  for  five  months  of  the  campaign  has  been  1,300,000 
men,  or  260,000  men  per  month.  These  figures  agree  exactly 

219 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY       [AUG. 

with  what  can  be  ascertained  when  the  variations  of  effectives 
in  certain  regiments  are  examined. 

Here  also  the  documents  seized  permit  of  the  lists  of  losses 
being  controlled.  To  cite  some  examples  : — 

The  I3th  Bavarian  Regiment,  in  a  month  and  a  half 
(August-September),  lost  3250  men. 

The  zyist  Regiment,  from  the  middle  of  August  to  the 
middle  of  November,  lost  2500  men  and  60  officers. 

The  Qgth  Regiment  in  the  same  period  had  equal  losses. 

The  I5th  Regiment  of  Infantry  on  the  i8th  of  October 
alone  lost  1786  men  and  37  officers. 

The  I32nd  Regiment  lost  on  November  16,  near  Ypres, 
1390  men. 

The  losses  were  still  higher  in  the  new  formations. 

The  205th  Regiment  had  2400  men  put  out  of  action  in 
the  one  battle  of  the  Yser. 

The  235th  Regiment  lost  1320. 

The  244th  Regiment,  2150. 

The  247th  Regiment  in  that  same  battle,  1900. 

The  248th  Regiment,  1800. 

The  I7th  Bavarian  Reserve  Regiment  lost  at  Messines  and 
Wytschaete  30  officers  and  2171  men. 

[There  follows  in  the  Official  Report  a  very  detailed  table 
showing  the  German  losses  in  a  very  exact  manner  as  learned 
from  notebooks,  letters,  statements  of  prisoners,  and  official 
lists,  and  the  conclusion  arrived  at  is  as  follows  : — ] 

It  is,  therefore,  certain  that  the  majority  of  the  German 
regiments  have  had  to  be  completely  renewed.  What,  then, 
is  the  situation  created  by  these  enormous  losses. 

The  total  of  German  formations  known,  at  the  beginning 
of  January  represented  in  round  numbers  four  million  men. 
According  to  the  official  reports  on  German  recruiting,  the 
entire  resources  of  Germany  in  men  amount  to  nine  millions. 
But  from  these  nine  millions  have  to  be  deducted  men  employed 
on  railways,  in  the  police,  and  in  certain  administrations 
and  industries,  altogether  500,000  men.  The  total  resources 
available  for  the  war  were  therefore  8,500,000.  Out  of  these 
nearly  one-half,  say  4,000,000,  are  now  at  the  front.  The 
definitive  losses  represent  at  least  1,300,000  men.  The 
220 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

available  resources  amounted,  then,  at  the  beginning  of 
January  to  3,200,000  men. 

Of  what  are  these  resources  composed?  Chiefly  of  men 
who  were  untrained  in  time  of  peace,  the  trained  reservists 
having  almost  all  left  the  depots  for  the  front.  It  has,  more- 
over, to  be  noted  that  out  of  these  3,200,000  men  there  are, 
according  to  the  statistics,  800,000  who  are  more  than  thirty- 
nine  years  of  age,  and  are  therefore  of  only  mediocre  military 
value.  Thus  there  remain  2,400,000.  Finally,  the  category 
6f  those  untrained  in  peace  comprises,  according  to  the  esti- 
mates of  German  military  authorities  themselves,  one-quarter 
of  inefficients.  The  really  available  resources  capable  of 
campaigning  are  therefore  just  two  millions.  These  men, 
comprising  the  1915,  1916,  and  1917  classes,  called  out  in 
anticipation,  constitute — and  this  point  cannot  be  too  strongly 
insisted  upon — the  total  of  available  resources  for  the  opera- 
tions during  the  twelve  months  of  1915. 

As  to  what  the  military  value  of  these  troops  will  be,  con- 
sidering the  haste  with  which  they  have  been  trained,  the 
formidable  losses  sustained  in  the  Battle  of  Flanders  by  the 
newly-formed  corps  show  very  clearly.  Their  military  value 
will  be  limited. 

These  resources  available  in  the  course  of  1915  may  be 
divided  into  three  categories,  the  first  available  at  present, 
the  second  to  be  available  in  April,  and  the  third  between 
April  and  December.  The  resources  at  present  available 
represent  a  maximum  of  800,000  men,  those  for  April  500,000 
men,  and  the  ultimate  resources  (classes  1916  and  1917  and 
untrained  men  of  the  Landsturm  between  30  and  40  years 
of  age)  represent  700,000  to  800,000  men.  When  it  is  re- 
membered that,  according  to  the  German  documents  them- 
selves, the  definitive  loss  each  month  is  260,000  men,  it  is 
manifest  that  the  available  resources  for  the  year  1915  will 
not  suffice  to  fill  the  gaps  of  a  war  of  ten  months. 

It  is,  then,  superabundantly  established  that  in  the  matter 
of  effectives  Germany  has  reached  the  maximum  of  possible 
effort.  If  with  the  800,000  men  at  present  available  she 
creates,  as  it  is  certain  that  she  is  preparing  to  do  at  this 
moment,  fresh  formations,  she  will  be  preventing  herself,  if 
the  war  lasts  another  ten  months,  as  is  possible,  from  being 
able  to  complete  afresh  her  old  formations.  If  she  creates 

221 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY       [AUG.  191 

no  new  formations  she  will  have  in  1915  exactly  what  is 
necessary,  and  no  more  to  complete  the  existing  units  afresh. 
Bearing  in  mind  the  ways  of  the  German  General  Staff,  one 
may  suppose  that,  disregarding  the  eventual  impossibility 
of  completing,  it  is  still  addressing  itself  to  creating  new 
formations.  The  weakness  to  which  Germany  will  expose 
herself  in  the  matter  of  effectives  has  just  been  set  forth, 
and  it  is  easy  to  show  that  this  weakness  will  be  still  further 
aggravated  by  the  wastage  in  the  regimental  cadres. 

X. — THE  GERMAN  LOSSES  IN  OFFICERS,  MATERIAL  AND 

MORALE 

Beyond  all  dispute  the  condition  of  the  cadres  in  the 
German  Army  is  bad.  The  proportion  of  officers,  and  notably 
of  officers  by  profession,  has  been  enormously  reduced,  and  a 
report  made  in  December  showed  that  in  a  total  of  124  com- 
panies, active  or  reserve,  there  were  only  forty-nine  officers  of 
the  active  Army.  The  active  regiments  have  at  the  present 
time  an  average  of  twelve  professional  officers,  the  reserve 
regiments  nine  to  ten,  the  reserve  regiments  of  new  forma- 
tion six  to  seven,  and  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  these  officers 
have  to  be  drawn  upon  afresh  for  the  creation  of  new  units. 
If  Germany  creates  new  army  corps,  and  if  the  war  lasts  ten 
months,  she  will  have  to  reduce  almost  to  nothing  the  number 
of  professional  officers  in  each  regiment,  a  number  which 
already  is  insufficient. 

[The  French  report  points  out  that,  on  the  other  hand,  all 
the  French  regiments  have  been  constantly  kept  at  a  minimum 
figure  of  eighteen  professional  officers  per  regiment.  At  the 
same  time,  it  admits  that  the  commanders  of  German  corps, 
commanders  of  active  battalions,  and  the  officers  attached 
to  the  commanders  of  army  corps  are  officers  by  profession.] 

It  is  easy  to  ascertain  the  German  losses  in  artillery.  On 
December  28  the  66th  Regiment  of  artillery  entrained  at 
Courtrai  for  Germany  22  guns,  of  which  18  were  used  up. 
This  figure  is  extremely  high  for  a  single  regiment.  The 
same  facts  have  been  ascertained  as  regards  heavy  artillery. 
On  December  21  and  22,  77  guns  of  heavy  artillery,  which 
were  no  longer  serviceable,  were  sent  to  Cologne.  These 
movements,  which  are  not  isolated  facts,  show  how  ill  the 
222 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

German  artillery  has  resisted  the  ordeal  of  the  campaign. 
Other  proofs,  moreover,  are  decisive.  For  some  weeks  we 
have  noted  the  very  peculiar  appearance  of  the  marking  on 
the  bands  of  a  great  number  of  shells  of  the  '  77  '  gun.  When 
these  markings  are  compared  with  those  of  shells  fired  three 
months  ago,  it  is  plain  beyond  all  question  that  the  barrels 
are  worn  and  that  many  of  them  require  to  be  renewed. 

This  loss  in  guns  is  aggravated  by  the  necessity  which  has 
arisen  of  drawing  upon  the  original  army  corps  for  the  guns 
assigned  to  the  recently  formed  corps  or  those  in  course  of 
formation.  Several  regiments  of  field  artillery  have,  in  fact, 
had  to  give  up  two  batteries.  These  two  facts — wearing 
out  of  material  and  drafts  upon  batteries — will  inevitably 
lead  either  to  the  reduction  of  batteries  from  six  to  four 
guns,  or  to  a  reduction  of  the  number  of  batteries  in  the  army 
corps,  or  to  the  partial  substitution  for  '  77  '  guns  of  nine 
centimetre  cannon  of  the  old  pattern,  the  presence  of  which 
has  been  many  times  observed  at  the  front. 

Furthermore,  the  German  artillery  lacks,  and  has  lacked, 
munitions  for  a  very  long  time.  It  has  been  obliged  to 
reduce  its  consumption  of  shells  in  a  notable  degree.  No 
doubt  is  possible  in  this  respect.  The  statements  of  prisoners 
since  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  and  still  more  since  the  Battle 
of  the  Yser,  make  it  clear  that  the  number  of  shots  allowed 
to  the  batteries  for  each  action  is  strictly  limited.  We  have 
found  on  officers  killed  or  taken  prisoners  the  actual  orders 
prescribing  positively  a  strict  economy  of  munitions. 

For  the  last  three  months,  too,  we  notice  that  the  quality 
of  the  projectiles  is  mediocre.  Many  of  them  do  not  burst. 
On  January  7,  in  the  course  of  a  bombardment  of  Laventie, 
scarcely  any  of  the  German  shells  burst.  The  proportion  of 
shells  failing  to  burst  was  estimated  at  two-fifths  by  the 
British  on  December  14  ;  two-thirds  by  the  Belgians  at 
Furnes  in  January  ;  and  at  two-thirds  by  ourselves  in  the 
same  month.  On  January  3  at  Bourg-et-Comin,  shrapnel 
fell,  of  which  the  explosion  scarcely  broke  the  envelope,  the 
bullets  being  projected  without  any  force.  The  same  thing 
has  occurred  since  then  in  other  places.  About  the  same 
time  our  I4th  Army  Corps  was  fired  at  with  shrapnel  loaded 
with  fragments  of  glass,  and  on  several  points  of  our  front 
shell  casings  or  shells  of  very  bad  quality  have  been  found, 

223 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  19 

denoting  hasty  manufacture  and  the  use  of  material  taken 
at  hazard. 

From  numerous  indications  it  appears  that  the  Germans 
are  beginning  to  run  short  of  their  1898  pattern  rifle.  A 
certain  number  of  the  last  reinforcements  (January)  are 
armed  with  carbines  or  rifles  of  a  poor  sort  without  bayonets. 
Others  have  not  even  rifles.  Prisoners  taken  in  the  Woevre 
had  old-pattern  weapons. 

The  upshot  of  these  observations|is  that  Germany,  despite 
her  large  stores  at  the  beginning  and  the  great  resources  of 
her  industrial  production,  presents  manifest  signs  of  wear, 
and  that  the  official  optimism  which  she  displays  does  not 
correspond  with  the  reality  of  the  facts. 

The  material  wastage  of  the  German  Army  has  corre- 
sponded with  a  decline  in  the  morale,  which  it  is  possible  to 
follow  both  through  the  interrogation  of  prisoners  and  the 
pocket-books  and  letters  seized  upon  them  or  on  the  killed. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  entire  German  Army,  as 
was  natural,  was  animated  by  an  unshakable  faith  in  the 
military  superiority  of  the  Empire.  It  lived  on  the  recol- 
lections of  1870  and  on  those  of  the  long  years  of  peace, 
during  which  all  the  Powers  which  had  to  do  with  Germany 
displayed  towards  her  a  spirit  of  conciliation  and  patience 
which  might  pass  for  weakness.  The  first  prisoners  we  took 
in  August  showed  themselves  wholly  indifferent  to  the 
reverses  of  the  German  Army.  They  were  sincerely  and 
profoundly  convinced  that  if  the  German  Army  retired  it 
was  in  virtue  of  a  preconceived  plan,  and  that  our  successes 
would  lead  to  nothing. 

The  events  at  the  end  of  August  were  calculated  to 
strengthen  this  conviction  in  the  mind  of  the  German  soldiers. 
The  strategic  retreat  of  the  French  Army,  the  facility  with 
which  the  German  Armies  were  able  to  advance  from 
August  24  to  September  5,  gave  our  adversaries  a  feeling  of 
absolute  and  final  superiority,  which  manifested  itself  at  that 
time  in  all  the  statements  obtained  and  all  the  documents 
seized. 

At  the  moment  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  the  first  im- 
pression was  one  of  failure  of  comprehension  and  of  stupor. 
A  great  number  of  German  soldiers,  especially  those  who  fell 
into  our  hands  during  the  first  days  of  that  battle,  believed 
224 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

fully,  as  at  the  end  of  August,  that  the  retreat  which  they 
were  ordered  to  make  was  only  a  means  of  luring  us  into  a 
trap.  German  military  opinion  was  suddenly  converted 
when  the  soldiers  saw  that  this  retreat  continued  and  that 
it  was  being  carried  out  in  disorder,  under  conditions  which 
left  no  doubt  as  to  its  cause  and  to  its  extent.  This  really 
spelled  defeat,  and  a  defeat  aggravated  by  the  absence  of 
regular  supplies  and  by  the  physical  and  moral  depression 
which  was  the  result. 

The  severity  of  the  losses  sustained  and  the  overpowering 
effects  of  the  French  artillery  began  from  this  moment  to 
be  noted  in  German  pocket-books  with  veritable  terror. 
Hope  revived,  however,  at  the  end  of  some  weeks,  and  there 
is  to  be  found  in  the  letters  of  soldiers  and  officers  at  that 
date  the  announcement  of  '  a  great  movement '  which  is 
being  prepared,  and  which  is  to  lead  the  German  Armies 
anew  as  far  as  Paris.  This  is  the  great  '  Battle  of  Calais/ 
which,  contrary  to  anticipations  of  the  enemy,  was  in  reality 
fought  to  the  east  of  the  Yser. 

The  losses  of  the  Germans,  which  during  those  ten  days 
exceeded  150,000  men,  and  may  perhaps  have  reached 
200,000,  produced  a  terrifying  impression  on  the  troops. 
From  that  moment  prisoners  no  longer  declared  themselves 
sure  of  success.  For  a  certain  time  they  had  been  consoled 
by -the  announcement  of  the  capture  of  Warsaw.  This  pre- 
tended success  having  proved  to  be  fictitious,  incredulity 
became  general.  During  the  last  two  months  the  most 
intelligent  of  the  prisoners  have  all  admitted  that  no  one 
could  any  longer  say  on  which  side  victory  would  rest. 
If  we  think  of  the  absolute  confidence  with  which  the 
German  people  had  been  sustained,  this  avowal  is  of  great 
importance. 

Letters  found  on  a  d.ead  officer  speak  of  the  imminence  of 
a  military  and  economic  hemming-in  of  Germany.  It  dis- 
cusses the  possibility  of  Germany  finding  herself  after  the 
war  with  *  empty  hands  and  pockets  turned  inside  out/ 
There  is  no  longer  any  question  of  imposing  the  conqueror's 
law  upon  adversaries  at  his  mercy,  but  of  fighting  with  the 
energy  of  despair  to  secure  an  honourable  peace.  An  officer 
of  the  General  Staff,  who  was  made  prisoner  on  January  18, 
said  :  '  Perhaps  this  struggle  of  despair  has  already  begun/ 

MILITARY  2  p  22$ 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  ig 

This  change  of  feeling  is  all  the  more  remarkable  inasmuch 
as  the  German  Government  from  the  beginning  of  the  war 
made  a  sustained  effort  to  create  in 'the  Army  an  artificial 
state  of  mind  based  entirely  upon  lies.  We  have  often  found, 
either  by  the  interrogation  of  prisoners  or  the  examination 
of  papers  found  on  the  dead,  that  a  scientific  system  of  fables 
for  the  use  of  soldiers  was  in  use  for  the  six  months  in  the 
ranks  of  the  German  Army.  Whenever  the  Germans  were 
beaten,  their  soldiers  were  induced  to  believe  that  it  was 
because  they  wished  to  be  so.  As  regards  the  Battle  of 
Flanders,  the  orders  of  the  commanders  and  the  articles  of 
German  newspapers  leave  no  doubt  about  the  importance  of 
the  offensive  plan  which  broke  itself  against  our  resistance. 
But  the  thing  went  further.  We  frequently  had  the  oppor- 
tunity of  ascertaining  how  the  German  commanding  officers 
applied  themselves  to  deceiving  their  men  even  in  matters 
of  detail.  The  prisoners  whom  we  captured  to  the  north,  to 
the  east,  and  to  the  south  of  Ypres,  often  declared  with 
evident  good  faith  that  Paris  was  a  few  kilometres  behind  the 
hills  which  bounded  the  horizon.  Others,  better  instructed 
in  geography,  told  us  with  perfect  seriousness  that  the  German 
Army  had  vacated  Paris  because  cholera  and  plague  had 
broken  out  there,  and  the  doctors  had  ordered  this  hotbed 
of  contagion  to  be  avoided.  We  have  found  prisoners  in 
possession  of  postcards  in  German  entitled,  '  Souvenir  of  the 
capture  of  Warsaw/  On  the  other  hand,  the  Russians 
found  postcards  entitled,  '  Souvenir  of  the  capture  of 
Calais/ 

Thus  an  artificial  opinion  was  kept  up  which  is  beginning 
to  be  shaken.  However  docile  and  disciplined  the  Germans 
may  be,  one  cannot  help  thinking  that  on  the  day  when  they 
perceive  that  they  have  been  systematically  and  abominably 
deceived,  a  reaction  will  set  in,  of  which  the  victims  will  be 
those  very  men  who  organised  this  attempt  to  dupe  several 
millions  of  men. 


XL — GERMAN  LACK  OF  SUPPLIES 

The  chief  explanation  of  the  imperfections  noted  in  the 
German  projectiles  is  to  be  found  in  the  bad  quality  of  the 
primary  material.  In  spite  of  her  enormous  supplies,  Ger- 
226 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

many  has  already  suffered,  and  will  suffer  more  and  more, 
from  the  impossibility  of  replenishing  by  sea.  Th'is  impos- 
sibility weighs  heavily  on  military  manufacture.  On  this 
point,  an  extract  from  the  following  report,  made  at  the 
beginning  of  December,  by  a  high  American  official,  will  be 
read  with  interest  : — 

Everybody  recognises  that  there  is  in  Germany  a  terrible  scarcity 
of  rubber.  It  cannot  be  procured,  and  there  was  no  great  provision 
of  it  in  the  country  when  war  broke  out.  There  were  scarcely  any 
private  motor-cars  running  in  Berlin  when  I  left  that  city.  The 
owners  of  cars  who  had  not  supplied  themselves  with  rubber  before 
the  war  can  scarcely  get  any  now.  The  sale  of  rubber  has  been  pro- 
hibited in  every  form.  Even  india-rubber  balls  such  as  children  play 
with  have  been  withdrawn  from  sale.  Still  more  serious  is  the  scarcity 
of  copper,  which  is  indispensable  for  the  manufacture  of  shells  and 
munitions.  The  Germans  are  greatly  alarmed  by  the  fact  that  it  is 
impossible  for  them  to  replenish  their  supply  of  this  precious  material. 
They  really  do  not  know  how  things  will  turn  out  for  them.  I  have 
also  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  question  of  powder  is  causing  the 
General  Staff  the  gravest  anxiety.  There  is  a  want  of  saltpetre  and 
of  the  nitrates  necessary  for  its  manufacture.  Direct  answers  to  all 
questions  on  this  subject  are  carefully  avoided,  and  people  prefer  to 
get  round  them  by  an  evasive  phrase.  When  you  ask  them  why  they 
are  employing  old  munitions  they  answer, '  We  want  to  get  rid  of  them/ 

It  is  in  no  way  my  intention  to  deny  the  existence  of  reserves, 
which  are  still  immense,  of  munitions  in  the  country.  I  only  wish 
to  say  that  my  personal  inquiries  have  convinced  me  that  it  is  impossible 
for  Germany,  on  the  ground  alone  of  the  munitions,  even  if  the  con- 
sumption is  far  below  the  present  consumption,  to  continue  the  war 
beyond  June  next.  I  am  convinced  that  the  most  vital  considerations 
of  the  present  conflict  relate  to  the  scarcity  of  copper  and  gunpowder 
in  Germany,  as  well  as  of  the  different  materials  required  for  the 
manufacture  of  the  diverse  explosives  now  in  use.  At  the  bottom  of 
their  hearts  German  official  circles  fully  understand  that  there  can  be 
only  one  issue  of  the  present  struggle  in  Europe.  They  know  in 
reality  that  they  are  beaten.  They  are  fighting  to  obtain  the  best 
conditions  possible. 

The  lack  of  food  is  also  beginning  to  make  itself  felt,  as 
is  shown  by  the  creation  of  a  monopoly  and  distribution 
by  rations  of  cereals,  ordered  by  the  Federal  Council  on 
January  27.  This  is  a  measure  without  precedent,  except 
in  the  history  of  besieged  places.  It  is,  moreover,  easy  to 

227 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  ic 

show  by  some  figures  what  effects  the  war  is  having  upon 
German  supplies  : — 


German 

Consumption 

Production. 

before  the  War. 

Tons. 

Tons. 

Saltpetre     . 

Nil 

785,000 

Rubber 

Nil 

224,000 

Petroleum  . 

125,000 

1,000,000 

Copper 

37»ooo 

224,000 

If  one  takes  the  figures  of  German  imports  in  1912  it  is 
observed  that  they  amounted  to  loj  milliards  of  marks 
(£750,000,000),  of  which  less  than  2j  milliards  (£125,000,000) 
came  from  countries  with  which  Germany  can  still  trade. 
Thus  Germany  is  deprived  by  the  war  of  four-fifths  of  her 
imports. 

German  economists  have  always  pointed  out  this  peril, 
and  certain  of  them  recognise  it  to-day.  Below  are  some 
quotations  from  the  German  Press,  made  both  before  and 
after  the  outbreak  of  war  : — 

In  the  hypothesis  of  a  war  in  which  the  importation  of  articles  of 
food  to  Germany  is  cut  off,  our  position  would  be  critical.  The  success 
of  our  arms,  even  great  successes,  would  be  of  no  avail,  or  could  only 
be  inadequately  turned  to  account,  if  the  enemy  succeeds  in  imposing 
upon  us  new  tactics  :  the  tactics  of  hunger.  (Schmoller's  Jahrbiicher, 
1912,  pp.  590-591.) 

If  the  war  lasts  more  than  eight  months  we  shall  have  no  more 
corn.  (Georg  Helm,  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  October  20,  1914.) 

The  stock  of  articles  of  food  is  less  this  year,  the  year  of  war,  than 
the  stock  in  time  of  peace.  If  we  preserve  the  habits  of  peace  time  this 
stock  may  be  insufficient  to  allow  us  to  wait  for  the  harvest.  (Professor 
Schumacher,  Bonn,  Cologne  Gazette,  November  3,  1914.) 

If  the  war  last  for  a  long  time,  and  that  is  now  certain,  our  situa- 
tion will  become  difficult  and  very  critical.  We  must  make  up  our 
mind  before  it  is  too  late  to  take  measures.  (Deutsche  Tageszeitung, 
organ  of  the  League  of  Farmers,  quoted  by  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung, 
October  17,  1914.) 

Better  to  be  hungry  than  to  die  of  hunger.  (Professor  Levy, 
Berliner  Tageblatt,  quoted  by  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  September  20, 1914.) 
228 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

It  has,  furthermore,  been  observed  on  several  occasions 
since  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  that  the  revictualling  of  the 
German  Army  has  not  been  as  regular  as  that  of  the  French. 
In  the  course  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  and  in  the  weeks 
which  followed  our  victory  the  German  prisoners  were 
famished.  They  threw  themselves  voraciously  on  the  bread 
which  was  given  them,  and  all  declared  that  they  had  eaten 
nothing  for  several  days.  It  seems  that  the  German  supply 
service  was  not  capable  of  coping  with  the  consequences, 
which,  nevertheless,  could  easily  have  been  foreseen,  of  the 
destruction  of  railways  by  the  French  military  authorities. 
Owing  to  this  destruction,  which  was  methodically  planned 
and  carried  out,  the  bulk,  one  may  even  say  the  whole,  of  the 
German  forces  operating  in  France  was,  except  on  the  two 
wings,  deprived  of  all  supplies  by  railway.  The  insufficiency 
of  motor  transport  aggravated  this  condition  of  things,  and 
for  a  fortnight  the  troops  were  in  want  of  everything.  The 
same  irregularity  in  the  matter  of  reprovisioning  was  observed 
during  the  Battle  of  Flanders.  Moreover,  the  loaves  which 
we  often  find  in  the  German  trenches  are  of  a  more  than 
mediocre  quality.  The  prisoners  consider  the  white  bread  of 
the  French  troops  a  treat.  The  German  Army  in  the  field 
lives  chiefly  on  preserved  food.  It  lacks  both  wine  and  beer. 
The  situation  of  the  country  explains  this  state  of  affairs. 
The  hour  of  famine  will  sound  for  Germany  before  the  end 
of  1915.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  Government  has 
taken  the  first  measures  by  which  an  unequal  contest  against 
scarcity  is  proclaimed. 

Comparable  with  the  methods  above  recounted  are  the 
official  communiques  with  which  the  German  General  Staff 
endeavours  to  extend  to  neutral  Powers  the  illusion  which  it 
endeavours  to  create  in  the  ranks  of  its  own  Army.  As 
events  have  proved  many  times,  there  is  ground  for  dis- 
believing these  communiques.  A  recent  example  is  to  be 
found  in  the  affair  of  Soissons.  This  local  success,  which 
was  due  to  the  rise  of  the  Aisne  and  the  breaking  down  of 
bridges,  was  officially  announced  as  a  decisive  victory,  whereas 
since  January  15,  the  Germans  at  this  point  have  not  even 
dared  to  attack. 


229 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  ig 

XII. — CONCLUSIONS  AND  THE  FUTURE 

[Having  finished  his  survey  of  the  operations  from  the 
beginning  of  August  to  the  end  of  January,  having  described 
in  detail  the  present  splendid  condition  of  the  French  Army, 
and  having  criticised  the  conditions  in  the  German  Army, 
the  writer  of  the  Official  Review  proceeds  in  conclusion  to 
consider  : — 

1.  The  significance  of  the  German  defeat ; 

2.  The  significance  of  the  French  success; 

3.  The  three  points  of  French  superiority  ;   and 

4.  Trie  offensive  faith  of  the  French  Army.] 

i.  The  Significance  of  the  German  Failure 

Of  the  events  of  which  an  abridged  recital  has  now  been 
completed,  it  remains  to  draw  the  conclusion,  to  appraise  the 
results  of  these  six  months  of  war  and  to  define  the  possibilities 
which  those  results  have  in  store  for  us  in  the  further 
operations. 

It  may  first  of  all  be  affirmed  that  the  fundamental  plan 
of  the  German  General  Staff  has  completely  failed.  This 
plan  has  been  superabundantly  set  forth  by  German  military 
writers,  as  also  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Ministers  of  War.  It 
aimed  at  crushing  France  by  an  overwhelming  attack,  and 
at  reducing  her  to  a  condition  of  helplessness  in  less  than  a 
month.  Germany  has  not  succeeded  in  this.  Our  Army  is, 
as  we  have  seen,  not  only  intact,  but  strengthened,  full  of 
trust  in  its  leaders,  and  profoundly  penetrated  with  the 
certainty  of  final  success.  Germany  has  not  attained,  then, 
the  essential  object  which  is  publicly  set  before  it.  But  the 
defeat  which  she  has  sustained  does  not  apply  only  to  her 
fundamental  plan.  It  extends  also  to  the  various  operations 
which  she  has  essayed  to  secure  partial  advantages  over  us 
in  default  of  the  decisive  advantage  in  which  she  had  failed. 
In  the  three  days  which  followed  the  declaration  of  war  the 
German  General  Staff  massed  great  forces  in  front  of  Nancy. 
With  what  purpose  ?  A  sudden  attack  which  from  its  very 
beginning  should  break  our  lines.  This  attack  did  not  -take 
place,  because  the  reinforcements  of  our  frontier  force  at  the 
end  of  1913  and  the  defensive  organisation  established  on  the 
230 


r.  1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

Grand  Couronne  discouraged  the  enemy  from  an  enterprise 
which,  though  possible  a  year  sooner,  had  become  full  of  risk. 

Being  unable  to  strike  at  Nancy,  the  German  Command 
directed  all  its  resources  to  the  outflanking  manoeuvre  which, 
by  enveloping  our  left,  would  permit  of  the  investment  of 
Paris.  Our  left  was  not  enveloped.  Paris  was  not  invested. 
And  the  German  Army  was  obliged  in  the  second  week  of 
September  to  save  its  own  threatened  communications  by  a 
precipitate  retreat. 

With  a  desperate  effort  the  General  Staff  of  the  enemy 
attempted  to  off-set  the  effect  "of  this  retreat  by  piercing 
our  centre  in  Champagne.  There,  as  elsewhere,  he  failed, 
and  had  to  withdraw  in  great  haste.  In  the  month  of 
October,  with  more  extended  lines,  he  endeavoured  to  repeat 
his  enveloping  manoeuvre  and  to  turn  our  left ;  but  right  up 
to  the  North  Sea  we  built  up  an  impassable  barrier  for  him. 
He  accumulated  his  forces  in  Belgium  to  outflank  us  by  the 
coast  and  reach  our  maritime  bases.  His  attack  was  broken. 
With  desperation  he  sought  to  cut  our  forces  to  the  south  of 
Ypres  ;  we  maintained  all  our  positions. 

To  sum  up,  the  German  General  Staff  has  placed  upon 
its  record  since  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  apart  from 
the  failure  of  its  general  plan,  which  aimed  at  the  crushing  of 
France  in  a  few  weeks,  seven  defeats  of  high  significance — 
namely,  defeat  of  the  sudden  attack  on  Nancy,  defeat  of  the 
rapid  march  on  Paris,  defeat  of  the  envelopment  of  our  left 
in  August,  defeat  of  the  same  envelopment  in  November, 
defeat  of  the  attempt  to  break  through  our  centre  in  Sep- 
tember, defeat  of  the  coast  attack  on  Dunkirk  and  Calais,  and 
the  defeat  of  the  attack  on  Ypres. 

The  German  Army,  powerful  and  courageous  as  it  may 
be,  has  therefore  not  succeeded  in  gaining  the  advantage  at 
any  single  point,  and  its  forced  halt  after  six  months  of  war 
condemns  it  to  a  retreat  the  pace  of  which  may  be  accelerated 
by  the  Russian  successes,  but  the  necessity  of  which  is  now 
a  foregone  conclusion  independently  of  those  successes. 

2.  The  Significance  of  the  French  Success 

Against  the  extent  of  the  German  failure  has  to  be  placed 
that  of  the  French  success.  All  that  our  enemies  have  failed 

231 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG.  19 

to  gain  we  have  gained,  and  first  and  foremost  confidence  in 
ourselves.  It  is  certain,  and  it  could  not  be  otherwise,  that 
at  the  outset  our  troops  and  the  country  itself  still  remained 
under  the  impression  of  the  defeats  of  1870.  The  victory  of 
the  Marne,  confirmed  by  the  victory  of  Flanders,  the  im- 
passable barrier  set  up  against  the  most  formidable  effort 
which  has  ever  been  attempted  in  the  military  history  of  the 
world,  have  created  a  feeling  of  security  which  grows  stronger 
every  day.  Every  one  is  aware,  in  fact,  that,  in  order  to 
gain  the  day  against  the  coalition  which  encloses  her,  Germany 
needed  a  rapid  success.  Lacking  this  rapid  success,  her 
defeat  is  certain.  For  three  months  the  German  Press  has 
been  seeking  to  find  favourable  arguments,  out  of  the  small 
amount  of  change  that  the  western  front  has  undergone,  on 
which  to  base  the  statement  that  the  situation  is  finally 
crystallised.  This  is  merely  a  sophism,  which  it  is  easy  to 
expose.  In  the  first  place,  even  admitting  the  German 
thesis,  Germany  would  none  "the  less  be  condemned — con- 
demned to  die  of  hunger.  But  this  thesis  cannot  be  admitted 
because,  if  for  the  last  three  months  the  French  Command  has 
not  engaged  in  a  general  offensive,  it  has  had  three  decisive 
reasons  for  this.  The  first  is  that,  having  time  on  its  side, 
it  intends  to  make  its  effort  only  after  it  has  assembled  all 
the  means  upon  which  it  can,  in  the  near  future,  rely  with 
absolute  certainty.  The  second  is  that,  taught  by  the 
example  of  the  Germans  at  Ypres,  it  has  realised  what  may 
be  the  price  of  an  offensive,  vigorous  indeed,  but  insufficiently 
prepared.  The  third  is  that  the  weather  has  been  almost 
incessantly  bad,  and  that  it  is  useless  to  engage  in  great 
operations  in  water,  mud,  and  fog,  and  in  a  season  of  short 
days. 

We  have  seen  that  the  French  Army  is  strengthening  itself 
every  day  in  heavy  artillery,  in  explosive  weapons  for  the 
trenches,  and  in  projectiles.  It  is  known  that  the  British 
Army  in  France,  which  at  first  consisted  of  four  divisions, 
has  been  heavily  reinforced.  It  is  known  also  that  the 
number  of  troops  now  with  the  colours  and  being  trained  in 
England  is  very  large.  It  is  known  that  the  Belgian  Army, 
which  is  reconstituting  itself,  will  shortly  have  six  divisions 
of  infantry  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry.  It  is  known  that 
the  Serbian  Army,  supplied  afresh  with  material  and  muni- 
232 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

tions,  is  once  again  prepared  to  show  its  splendid  qualities. 
It  is  known,  finally,  that  Russia  continues  to  draw  upon  the 
immense  reservoir  of  her  recruits,  having  up  to  the  present 
utilised  only  the  twentieth  part. 

These  are  the  reasons  why  the  French  Command  has  not 
hurried  and  awaits  the  hour  which  it  considers  favourable, 
and  these  reasons,  being  based  on  precise  and  easily  tested 
motives,  are  irrefutable. 


3.  The  Three  Points  of  French  Superiority 

If,  then,  we  turn  to  the  future  we  note  that  :  — 

(1)  The  wastage  of  the  German  Army  is  in  all  respects 
greater  than  that  of  the  French  Army.     The  principal  cause  of 
this  is  the  superiority  of  our  artillery  and  the  fighting  methods 
of  the  German  infantry,  which  attacks  in  closer  formation 
than  does  ours.     It  is  now  certain  that  the  losses  of    our 
adversaries  are  double  ours. 

(2)  The  possibilities  of  the  German  Army  from  the  point 
of  view  of  effectives  will  go  on  decreasing  more  and  more. 
The  German  population  capable  of  bearing  arms  is,  in  com- 
parison with  the  French  population;  in  the  proportion  of 
three  to  two.     Now  at  the  present  time,  Landsturm  included, 
Germany  is  employing  on  the  French  front  a  number  of  men 
representing  two-thirds  of  her  resources  against  one-third  on 
the   Russian   front.     On   account   of   the   Austrian   defeats 
Germany  will  be  obliged  to  strengthen  her  forces  against 
Russia  more  and  more.     The  number  of  troops  opposed  to 
France   will   therefore   continually    decrease.     Our   position 
will  be  improved  by  this  circumstance,  as  also  by  the  number 
of  German  losses,  which  will  always  remain  larger  than  ours, 
and  finally,  by  the  large  reinforcements  which  the  British 
will  send  to  the  Continent. 

(3)  The  capacities  of  the  German  Army  in  the  matter  of 
regimental  organisation,  already  inferior  to  ours,  are  becoming 
so  still  more.     Granted  that  our  adversaries  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  had  more  cadres  than  ourselves.     The  text-books 
show  that  their  superiority  in  this  respect  was  considerably 
less  than  their  superiority  in  men.     It  was  not  as  much  as 
three  to  two.     Now  it  is  an  established  fact  that  the  German 
losses  in  officers  are  greater  than  ours.     We  shall  therefore 

233 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [AUG. 

certainly  gain   the  advantage  from   this  point  of  view,  if, 
indeed,  we  have  not  got  it  already. 

4.  The  Offensive  Faith  of  the  French  Army 

Out  of  all  these  elements  has  been  born  the  offensive  faith 
of  the  French  Army  and  its  leaders.  We  have  before  us  two 
systems.  The  one,  the  German  system,  demanded  a  rapid 
success  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  a  success  against 
France  before  the  Russians  could  come  upon  the  field,  before 
the  British  reserves  could  intervene,  before  the  economic 
trouble  could  make  itself  felt.  Hence  the  creation  in  all 
haste  of  new  corps,  whether  or  not  they  could  be  kept  up  for 
a  long  time.  It  was  an  article  of  faith  that  -the  victory  was 
to  be  immediate.  This  immediate  victory  the  Germans  did 
not  win. 

The  other  system,  the  French  system,  consists,  with  the 
advantage  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  in  maintaining  in  good 
and  complete  form  a  number  of  sufficient  formations,  and  in 
creating  new  ones  only  in  the  measure  in  which  they  can  with 
certainty  be  kept  up  and  suitably  and  durably  equipped  with 
regimental  organisation.  This  system  is  established  with  a 
view  to  a  prolonged  war. 

Of  these  two  systems,  which,  after  six  months  of  trial,  shall 
triumph  ?  To  put  the  question  is  to  answer  it.  The  Germans 
can  no  longer  oppose  us  with  forces  superior  to  ours.  They 
will  therefore  not  be  able  to  do  in  the  future  what  they  could 
not  do  in  the  past  when  they  were  one-third  more  numerous 
than  ourselves. 

Consequently  our  final  victory  must  follow  by  the  imperious 
necessity  of  the  concordant  force  of  facts  and  figures.  Our 
effort,  too,  is  from  now  onwards  directed  towards  that  offen- 
sive which  we  shall  take  at  our  own  good  time,  and  the  issue 
of  which  cannot  be  doubtful.  Our  reinforcements  are  being 
trained  in  the  instruction  camps  with  a  view  to  that  offen- 
sive. It  is  in  view  of  the  offensive  that,  from  day  to  day, 
our  stores  of  munitions,  food,  and  transport  are  being  in- 
creased. It  is  in  view  of  the  offensive  that  important  reserves 
of  telegraphic,  telephonic,  railway,  and  shipping  material 
have  been  constituted.  It  is  in  view  of  the  offensive  that 
preparation  has  been  made  for  the  reoccupation  of  the 
234 


1915]  FRENCH  OFFICIAL  AND  SEMI-OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

railway  systems  of  Belgium,  Luxemburg,  and  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, and  that  a  military  commission,  English,  French,  and 
Belgian,  is  preparing  to  work  them.  It  is  in  view  of  the 
offensive  that,  to  our  ten  thousand  heavy  lorries,  we  have 
added,  with  the  powerful  aid  of  our  automobile  industry, 
more  than  four  thousand  new  transport  wagons  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  Against  all  this,  which  on  our  side  is 
sure  and  available,  Germany  can  offer  nothing  either  equiva- 
lent or  analogous. 

The  large  resources  in  men,  officers,  material,  and  muni- 
tions which  she  had  at  her  disposal  six  months  ago  have 
been  largely  expended  in  the  hope  of  crushing,  under  the 
effort  of  mass  and  the  effect  of  surprise,  the  forces  opposed 
to  them. 

To-day  they  are  scarcely  sufficient,  after  the  defeat  of 
that  attempt,  to  offer  even  defensive  resistance.  The  military 
wastage  goes  on  progressively  at  the  same  time  as  the  economic 
wastage,  and  the  moral  wastage  which  is  the  consequence  of 
both.  The  creation  of  new  units  can  have  no  other  object 
than  to  re-establish  the  equilibrium  of  the  balance  of  numbers 
which  leans  more  and  more  to  the  side  of  the  Allies.  Every 
further  development  given  to  the  order  of  battle  will  result 
in  a  diminution  of  the  general  value  of  the  German  Armies 
and  accelerate  their  wastage.  It  will  also  bring  nearer  the 
moment  when  Germany  will  be  at  the  end  of  her  military 
resources  and  incapable  of  ever  again  regaining  her  numerical 
superiority. 

At  that  moment  France,  taken  by  surprise  in  August  by 
a  premeditated  act  of  aggression,  will  begin  the  war  in  very 
truth  and  in  the  fulness  of  her  strength. 


235 


[JULY-DE 


BELGIAN   OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

THE  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  BELGIUM  IN  DE- 
FENCE OF  THE  COUNTRY  AND  TO  UPHOLD  HER 
NEUTRALITY 

REPORT  COMPILED  BY  THE  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  OF  THE 
BELGIAN  ARMY  FOR  THE  PERIOD  JULY  31  TO  DECEM- 
BER 31,  1914 * 

PRELIMINARIES 

The  first  military  measure  adopted  by  Belgium  in  conse- 
quence of  the  diplomatic  conflict  which  divided  Europe  in 
July  1914,  was  to  place  her  army  on  a  reinforced  peace 
footing,  by  calling  up  three  classes  of  the  men  liable  to 
military  service.  This  was  merely  a  measure  of  precaution. 
Owing  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  the  dispositions  which 
she  might  be  called  on  to  adopt  were  essentially  protective, 
and  only  intended  to  meet  possible  eventualities. 

The  Belgian  Army,  on  its  ordinary  peace  footing,  consisted 
of  only  one  class  with  the  colours.  Such  a  force  was  obviously 
inadequate  at  a  moment  of  international  political  tension. 
Belgium,  owing  to  its  small  area,  is  in  reality  nothing  more, 
in  a  military  sense,  than  a  frontier  zone,  and  the  covering 
troops  which  the  neighbouring  Great  Powers  had  assembled 
in  their  frontier  zones  had  a  considerably  higher  peace 
strength.  The  raising  of  the  Belgian  Army  Divisions  to  the 
reinforced  peace  strength  only  placed  her  on  an  equality,  in 
this  respect,  with  her  neighbours. 

But  the  Belgian  forces  fell  far  short,  both  in  men  and  in 
guns,  of  the  figures  contemplated  in  the  recent  reorganisation 
of  the  Army,  which  had  only  just  been  commenced,  and 
which  had  been  intended  to  provide  a  total  of  350,000  men. 
As  this  figure  would  only  be  reached  in  1918,  the  Belgian 

1  [Published  in  1915  :  Paris,  Librairie  Chapelot ;  London,  W.  H.  and  L. 
Collingridge.] 
236 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

Government  had  so  arranged  its  scheme  that,  even  during 
the  transition  period,  the  Army  could  at  any  moment  be 
mobilised  and  assembled  without  difficulty.  As  regards 
equipment,  heavy  artillery  was  entirely  lacking  ;  the  country 
was  at  the  moment  in  the  throes  of  far-reaching  military 
changes. 

Two  days  later,  on  the  3ist  July,  at  7  P.M.,  owing  to  the 
exceptional  gravity  which  the  situation  had  assumed,  mobili- 
sation was  ordered  by  Royal  Decree. 

In  time  of  peace  the  headquarters  and  garrisons  of  the  six 
Army  Divisions  and  of  the  Cavalry  Division,  of  which  the 
Field  Army  was  composed,  were  distributed  as  follows  : 

ist  Division  :  Ghent  (garrisons  of  Ghent,  Bruges,  Ostend, 

and  Ypres). 

2nd  Division  :  Antwerp  (garrison  of  Antwerp). 
3rd   Division  :    Liege   (garrisons   of   Liege,   Hasselt,  and 

Venders). 

4th  Division  :  Namur  (garrisons  of  Namur  and  Charleroi). 
5th  Division  :  Mons  (garrisons  of  Mons,  Tournai,  and  Ath). 
6th  Division  :  Brussels  (garrison  of  Brussels). 
The  Cavalry  Division  had  its  headquarters  at  Brussels. 

The  concentration  areas  had  been  selected  in  accordance 
with  defensive  requirements,  and  with  a  strict  observance  of 
the  obligations  imposed  on  Belgium  by  her  neutrality,  as 
defined  by  the  treaties  of  1839. 

The  ist,  3rd,  4th,  and  5th  Divisions  acted  as  advanced- 
guard  divisions,  and  were  stationed  respectively  in  each  of  the 
regions  through  which  danger  might  threaten  Belgium,  thus  : — 
the  ist,  or  Flanders,  Division  faced  England  ;  the  3rd,  or 
Liege,  Division  faced  Germany  ;  the  4th  and  5th  Divisions 
faced  France  ;  the  4th  being  placed  so  as  to  meet  a  possible 
attack  on  Namur,  the  5th  to  oppose  an  advance  from  the 
direction  of  Maubeuge-Lille.  Each  of  these  advanced-guard 
divisions  was  intended  to  offer  the  first  resistance  to  attack, 
and  thus  to  gain  time  for  the  transfer  of  the  five  other  divisions 
to  the  threatened  portion  of  the  territory. 

The  defensive  system  of  Belgium  further  included  three 
fortified  places  :  Antwerp,  forming  an  entrenched  camp  and 
place  of  refuge  ;  Liege  and  Namur,  designed  to  oppose  the 
enemy's  advance,  and  to  act  as  bridge-heads  and  points  of 

237 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DE 

support.  It  was  thus  necessary  to  divide  the  army  into 
fortress  troops  and  field  army  ;  of  the  fifteen  classes  called  to 
the  colours,  the  seven  oldest  were  allotted  to  the  service  of  the 
fortresses,  while  the  eight  youngest  were  assigned  to  the  field 
army. 

The  sole  object  of  all  these  measures,  as  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  on  the  ist  August  informed  the  King's  repre- 
sentatives at  the  foreign  capitals,  was  '  to  enable  Belgium  to 
fulfil  her  international  obligations  ;  they  could  not  possibly 
have  been  inspired  by  a  feeling  of  defiance  towards  any  of  the 
Powers/ 

On  the  2nd  August,  at  7  P.M.,  while  mobilisation  was  in 
progress,  the  German  Minister  at  Brussels  handed  to  the 
Belgian  Government  a  note,1  which  the  latter  was  given  twelve 
hours  to  answer.  From  the  military  point  of  view,  this 
document  contained  two  noteworthy  paragraphs  : — i.  The 
German  Government  was  stated  to  have  received  reliable 
information  to  the  effect  that  French  troops  intended  to  march 
on  the  Meuse  by  Givet  and  Namur.  2.  In  order  to  forestall 
this  expected  attack  which  threatened  the  safety  of  the  Empire, 
the  German  Government  proposed  to  send  its  troops  across 
Belgian  territory,  and  requested  Belgium  not  to  oppose  their 
passage,  and  especially  to  refrain  from  organising  resistance 
at  the  Meuse  fortresses,  and  from  destroying  the  roads, 
railways,  tunnels  or  bridges. 

It  must  be  remarked  that  the  Note  had  no  immediate 
influence  on  the  concentration  of  the  Army,  which  remained 
distributed  in  accordance  with  the  military  exigencies  dictated 
by  the  neutrality  of  the  country.  The  troops  occupying  posts 
on  all  the  frontiers  received  orders  to  open  fire  on  any  foreign 
detachment  which  might  set  foot  on  Belgian  soil. 

This  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  military  authorities 
faithfully  reflected  the  political  attitude  taken  up  by  the 
King's  Government,  which  had  replied  to  the  German  Note  2 
that,  on  the  one  hand,  '  it  would  oppose  with  all  the  means  at 
its  disposal  any  attempt  made  by  Germany  to  infringe  the 
rights  of  Belgium  '  ;  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  '  if,  contrary 
to  all  expectations,  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  were 
committed  by  France,  Belgium  would  fulfil  all  her  international 
obligations,  and  her  Army  would  oppose  the  most  vigorous 
resistance  to  the  invader/  At  the  same  time,  Belgium  had 
238 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

declined  the  military  aid  which  the  Minister  of  France  had 
offered,  on  the  grounds  that  the  Government  had  not  yet 
appealed  to  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers,  and  reserved  to  itself 
the  right  to  decide  on  its  course  of  action  later. 

During  the  night  of  3rd  to  4th  August  it  became  certain 
that  the  German  troops  intended  to  force  a  passage  through 
Belgium.  Measures  were  promptly  taken  at  Headquarters 
to  deal  with  the  new  situation.  Orders  were  issued  for  the 
destruction  of  the  railways,  tunnels,  bridges,  etc.,  on  the  lines 
of  approach  likely  to  be  used  by  the  German  troops'.  The 
Military  Governors  of  the  several  provinces  were  instructed 
no  longer  to  consider  any  movements  of  French  troops  on 
Belgian  soil  as  acts  of  violation  of  neutrality. 

In  accordance  with  the  scheme  of  defence,  the  3rd  Division 
was  to  resist  the  enemy,  supported  by  the  fortified  position 
of  Liege  ;  covered  by  it,  the  remaining  Divisions  were  to 
advance  against  the  invader,  with  the  exception,  however,  of 
the  4th  Division,  whose  task  was  to  defend  Namur.  The  ist 
Division  was  sent  from  Ghent  to  Tirlemont,  the  2nd  from 
Antwerp  to  Louvain,  the  5th  from  Mons  to  Perwez,  and  the 
6th  from  Brussels  to  Wavre.  These  movements  were  to  be 
covered  :  firstly,  by  the  Cavalry  Division  which,  after  con- 
centrating at  Gembloux,  was  ordered  to  Waremme  ;  secondly, 
by  a  mixed  brigade  of  the  3rd  Division  sent  to  Tongres,  and 
thirdly,  by  a  mixed  brigade  of  the  4th  Division  which  was 
moved  to  Huy. 

The  movements  of  concentration,  begun  on  the  4th  August, 
were  completed  next  day  ;  they  were  carried  out  with  rapidity 
and  regularity,  partly  by  road,  partly  by  rail.  The  King,  in 
virtue  of  the  Constitution,  assumed  the  supreme  command  of 
the  Army. 

On  the  morning  of  August  6  the  Army  was  ready  to  move. 
Each  of  the  Field  Army  Divisions  at  that  moment  consti- 
tuted a  complete  unit,  provided  with  all  its  administrative 
services,  and  comprising  either  three  or  four  mixed  brigades, 
one  regiment  of  divisional  cavalry,  one  regiment  of  divisional 
artillery,  one  battalion  of  engineers  (two  companies),  one 
section  of  field  telegraphists,  and  one  divisional  transport 
corps.  Each  mixed  brigade  consisted  of  two  regiments  of 
three  battalions,  one  group  of  three  field  batteries,  one  machine- 
gun  company  and  a  detachment  of  gendarmerie.  Finally,  the 

239 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DE 

Cavalry  Division  had  two  brigades,  one  cyclist  battalion,  one 
artillery  group  of  three  batteries,  one  cyclist  pioneer  and 
pontoon  company,  and  one  divisional  transport  corps.  The 
total  strength  of  the  Field  Army  amounted  to  117,000  men. 
It  was  subsequently  increased  by  18,500  volunteers  posted  to 
the  Field  Army. 

As  soon  as  the  concentration  had  taken  place  it  was  possible 
to  organise  the  defence  of  the  territory. 

In  the  appeal  addressed  by  Belgium  on  the  4th  August,1 
after  the  violation  of  her  frontier,  to  the  Powers-  which  had 
guaranteed  her  neutrality,  she  had  declared  in  what  manner 
she  intended  to  defend  her  territory.  *  There  should  be/  said 
the  Government  of  the  King  in  this  appeal,  '  operations  in 
combination  and  in  junction  with  the  armies  of  the  Guarantee- 
ing Powers  designed  to  resist  the  forcible  measures  employed 
by  Germany  against  Belgium,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
guarantee  the  maintenance  of  Belgian  independence  and 
integrity  in  the  future.  Belgium  is  glad  to  be  able  to  declare 
that  she  will  provide  for  the  defence  of  her  fortified  places.' 

From  the  German  Note  of  August  2  it  was  easy  to  infer 
that  if  the  German  armies  passed  through  the  country,  the 
Meuse  would  be,  not  the  northern  limit,  but  the  axis,  of  their 
offensive  movement  towards  France,  so  that  evidently  forces 
very  superior  in  numbers  to  the  Belgian  Army  were  about  to 
cross  Belgium. 

Hence  the  following  principles  were  laid  down  for  the 
conduct  of  operations  : 

/. — In  case  the  Army  should  be  faced  by  very  superior  forces : 

1.  To  remain  as  far  forward  as  possible  on  good  defensive 
positions,  barring  the  passage  of  the  invaders,  so  as  to  protect 
as  much  as  possible  of  the  country  from  invasion. 

2.  The  Army  thus  forming  the  advanced  guard  of  the 
French  and  British  Armies,  was  to  wait  in  these  positions  till 
the  junction  with  those  Armies  could  be  effected. 

3.  Should  this  junction  not  have  been  effected  before  the 
arrival  of  the  enemy 's  main  bodies,  the  Army  was  not  to  be 
exposed  to  certain  defeat,  which  would  necessarily  involve 
the  occupation  of  the  territory,  and  therefore  : 

(a)  The  Army  unsupported  was  not  to  engage  the  mass  of 
the  enemy's  troops  in  battle  ; 
240 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

(b)  The  Army  was  not  to  allow  itself  to  be  surrounded,  but 
was,  on  the  contrary,  to  manoeuvre  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
keep  a  line  of  retreat  open  with  a  view  to  an  ultimate  junction 
with  the  French  and  British  forces,  for  joint  action  with  these 
latter. 

//. — In  case  the  Army  be  faced  by  forces  no  more  than  equal 
to  its  own  : 

The  enemy  was  to  be  attacked  at  the  most  favourable 
moment,  either  if  his  positions  were  too  extended  and  not 
sufficiently  prepared  for  defence,  or  if  his  strength  had  been 
reduced  momentarily. 

.  Further,  the  fortified  positions  of  Liege  and  Namur,  as 
well  as  the  entrenched  camp  of  Antwerp,  were  to  be  defended 
in  any  case. 

When,  on  the  6th  August,  the  Field  Army  had  been  con- 
centrated, and  the  Headquarters  Staff  was  in  a  position  to 
apply  the  above  principles,  the  general  situation  had  already 
been  seriously  affected  by  military  events  which  had  occurred 
on  the  Meuse  and  in  front  of  Liege. 

DEFENCE  OF  LIEGE 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th  August,  two  divisions  of 
German  cavalry  (2nd  and  4th  Divisions,  consisting  of  about 
twelve  regiments)  had  crossed  the  frontier  and  invaded  the 
district  of  Herve.  Passing  to  the  north  of  the  fortified 
position  of  Liege,  they  pushed  on  towards  the  Meuse.  At 
Vise  they  found  the  bridge  destroyed  and  the  passages  of  the 
river  guarded  by  the  2nd  battalion  of  the  I2th  Regiment  of 
the  Line.  This  battalion  resisted  attacks  made  by  very 
superior  forces,  supported  by  artillery  fire  and  by  infantry 
transported  in  motor  cars.  But  the  enemy  extended  his 
movement  towards  the  north  ;  two  Hussar  regiments  crossed 
the  Meuse  at  the  Lixhe  ford.  The  Belgian  forces,  their  left 
wing  having  been  turned,  retired  on  to  the  line  of  the  Liege 
forts. 

Behind  the  cavalry,  German  troops  of  all  arms,  belonging 
to  the  7th,  8th,  gth,  loth,  and  nth  Army  Corps,  entered 
Belgium ;  the  heads  of  their  columns  reached  the  line 
Bombaye-Herve-Remouchamps  on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  ; 

MILITARY  2  Q  24! 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-D 

while  still  farther  in  rear  the  concentration  of  the  3rd  and 
4th  Army  Corps  was  reported  at  St.  Vith  and  to  the  north 
of  that  place  (nine  miles  south  of  Malmedy).  At  that 
moment  seven  army  corps,  or  about  300,000  men,  were 
collecting  thus  on  the  invasion  roads,  which  were  blocked  by 
the  fortified  position  of  Liege. 

On  the  5th  August  a  bridge  was  thrown  over  the  river  at 
Lixhe,  and  advanced  cavalry  units  began  to  appear  at 
Tongres.  At  the  same  time  a  German  cavalry  regiment 
came  in  contact  at  Plainevaux,  south  of  Liege,  with  a  squadron 
of  the  2nd  Lancers,  which  charged  it,  and  lost  three-quarters 
of  its  strength  in  the  unequal  encounter.  In  the  course  of 
the  morning  the  bearer  of  a  flag  of  truce  appeared  before  the 
Governor  of  Liege,  and  summoned  him  to  allow  the  German 
Army  to  pass.  On  the  peremptory  refusal  of  the  Governor, 
the  German  corps  proceeded  to  assault  Forts  Chaudfontaine, 
Fleron,  Evegnee,  Barchon,  and  Pontisse.  Although  the 
attack  was  supported  by  powerful  heavy  artillery,  it  was 
everywhere  repulsed  with  great  loss.  The  fiercest  fighting 
took  place  between  Fort  Barchon  and  the  Meuse.  At  this 
point  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  penetrating  the  line  ;  a 
vigorous  counter-attack  by  the  nth  Brigade  checked  his 
advance  and  threw  him  back  in  disorder  beyond  his  original 
positions.  The  attack  on  the  section  of  the  Meuse  below  its 
junction  with  the  Vesdre  had  failed. 

The  section  Ourthe-Meuse  was  then  violently  attacked  by 
fresh  troops  during  the  night  of  the  5th  to  6th  August.  At 
the  same  time  a  small  party  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  consisting 
of  two  officers  and  eight  men,  made  a  desperate  attempt  in 
Liege  itself  against  the  person  of  the  Governor  of  the  fortress  ; 
the  plot  failed,  and  all  who  took  part  in  it  were  killed. 

Between  the  Ourthe  and  the  Meuse,  the  attacks  of  the 
loth  German  Corps  forced  the  defenders  of  the  intervals 
between  the  forts  to  retire.  The  available  troops  of  the  I2th, 
gth,  and  I5th  Brigades  (the  latter  belonging  to  the  4th  Army 
Division  and  sent  from  Huy)  checked  these  attacks  by  means 
of  counter-attacks. 

Since  the  4th  August  the  troops  of  the  3rd  Division  had 
been  engaged  at  all  the  points,  successively,  of  a  very  extended 
front,  repelling  the  desperate  onslaughts  of  an  enemy  four 
times  their  superior  in  numbers,  and  they  were  in  danger  of 
242 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

being  surrounded.  They  had,  therefore,  to  be  withdrawn  to 
join  the  main  body  of  the  Army,  which  by  that  time  had 
completed  its  concentration.  The  forts  continued  to  be  held 
by  their  garrisons,  but  the  Governor  of  Liege  considered 
that  they  could  now  only  play  the  part  of  isolated  forts. 
He  retained  the  general  military  command,  and  established 
himself  at  Fort  Loncin  at  noon  on  the  6th  August.  The 
field  troops  assembled  between  Forts  Loncin  and  Hollogne, 
and  reached  the  Geer  on  the  same  evening  ;  they  then  joined 
the  main  army  on  the  Gette,  the  operation  being  uninterfered 
with  by  the  enemy,  of  whom  only  a  few  Lancer  patrols  were 
encountered. 

On  the  occasion  of  the  arrival  of  the  Liege  troops  on  the 
main  position  of  defence,  the  King  issued  a  General  Order, 
in  which  he  said  : 

'  In  the  name  of  the  Nation,  I  salute  you,  officers  and 
soldiers  of  the  3rd  Division  and  of  the  I5th  mixed  Brigade  ! 
You  have  performed  your  duty,  and  you  have  done  honour 
to  our  Army,  and  have  shown  the  enemy  what  it  costs 
to  attack  unjustly  a  people  which,  though  peace-loving, 
draws  from  the  justice  of  its  cause  an  invincible  strength. 
Your  country  has  reason  to  be  proud  of  you  ! 

'  Soldiers  of  the  Belgian  Army,  do  not  forget  that  you 
are  the  advanced  guard  of  huge  armies  which  are  taking 
part  in  this  gigantic  struggle,  and  that  we  are  only  waiting 
for  the  arrival  of  our  brothers-in-arms  to  march  to  victory. 

'  ALBERT/ 

For  several  days  after  the  departure  of  the  3rd  Division, 
the  forts  continued  to  fire  on  any  German  troops  who  came 
within  their  radius  of  action.  On  the  izth  August,  however, 
at  about  noon,  the  bombardment  by  artillery  of  large  calibre 
began  against  the  defences,  those  on  the  right  bank  being  the 
first  to  receive  attention.  The  last  of  the  forts  fell  on  the 
i6th  and  I7th  August. 

OPERATIONS  IN  COMBINATION  WITH  THE  ARMIES  OF  THE 
GUARANTEEING  POWERS,  6ra  TO  20TH  AUGUST 

Let  us  glance  at  the  general  situation  at  the  moment 
when,  on  the  6th  August,  the  concentration  of  the  Army 

243 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-E 

in  the  quadrilateral  Tirlemont-Louvain-Wavre-Perwez,  two 
marches  distant  from  Liege,  enabled  the  Army  Command  to 
decide  on  the  plan  of  defence. 

The  3rd  Division,  after  defending  Liege,  was  retreating  on 
to  the  main  body.  The  enemy  had  crossed  the  Meuse  to  the 
north  of  Vise,  and  had  attacked  the  Liege  position  with 
three  army  corps  ;  other  corps  were  assembling  to  the  east 
and  south-east  of  Liege.  Thus  the  enemy  was  in  possession 
of  the  line  of  the  Meuse  towards  Liege,  and  he  had,  in  the 
immediate  vicinity,  forces  greatly  superior  to  those  which 
could  be  brought  against  him.  Behind  Liege,  the  first  natural 
defensive  line  which  the  Belgian  Army  could  occupy  was 
that  of  the  Gette,  prolonged  by  the  course  of  the  Meuse 
between  Namur  and  Givet.  This  line  of  defence,  with  its 
left  resting  upon  the  D£mer,  protects  a  great  portion  of  the 
Belgian  territory,  and  bars  the  road  to  a  German  offensive 
such  as  that  which  seemed  to  be  taking  shape. 

The  Belgian  Army  was  not  strong  enough  numerically  to 
occupy  the  whole  of  this  line,  and  it  was  decided  to  hold  only 
the  course  of  the  Gette  and  Namur.  In  this  position  it  would 
be  able  to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  the  French  and  British 
Armies,  if  they  could  arrive  in  time,  to  occupy  the  space 
between  the  Gette  and  Namur  and  also  the  line  of  the  Meuse 
above  Namur.  Lastly,  massed  along  the  line  of  the  Gette, 
the  Army,  while  covering  the  capital  of  the  country — Brussels 
— was  not  threatened  with  being  cut  off  from  Antwerp,  its 
base  of  operations.  This  latter  circumstance  was  of  vital 
importance,  since  the  Belgian  Army  could  on  no  account 
risk  being  cut  off  from  its  base,  where  all  its  resources  in 
provisions,  munitions,  and  supplies  of  all  kinds  were  collected, 
and  where  the  Government  would  have  to  retire  to  in  case 
of  need.  All  these  reasons  decided  the  Army  Command  to 
keep  the  Army  in  observation  on  the  Gette,  to  entrench  there, 
and  to  wait  on  that  line  until  the  junction  with  the  French 
and  British  forces  should  ultimately  be  effected. 

The  left  of  the  Army  was  to  the  north-west  of  Tirlemont, 
the  right  at  Jodoigne.  In  first  line  were  the  ist  and  5th  Army 
Divisions,  and  in  second  line  the  2nd  Division,  at  Louvain, 
and  the  6th  at  Hamme-Mille.  When  the  3rd  Division  joined 
the  main  body  from  Liege,  it  was  placed  in  the  first  line 
between  the  ist  and  5th  Divisions.  The  front  of  these  forces 
244 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

was  covered  by  the  Cavalry  Division,  which,  originally  at 
Waremme,  had  been  moved  first  to  St.  Trond,  and  then  to 
the  left  of  the  Army  prolonging  the  line  of  the  latter  from 
north  of  Tirlemont  nearly  to  Diest.  The  4th  Division 
remained  in  the  fortified  position  of  Namur,  not  only  with  a 
view  to  the  defence  of  that  place,  but  to  hold  it  as  a  point 
of  support  for  the  line  Gette-Meuse.  Lastly,  the  Liege  forts 
were  still  occupied  by  their  garrisons,  while  at  Huy  there 
was  the  8th  mixed  Brigade,  detached  from  the  4th  Division 
to  replace  the  I5th  Brigade,  which  had  been  sent  to  Liege. 

About  the  loth  August,  there  were  in  front  of  the  Belgian 
lines  bodies  of  German  cavalry  supported  by  battalions  of 
rifles.  Skirmishes  took  place  daily  with  the  Belgian  advanced 
parties,  and  when  the  enemy  became  particularly  active 
towards  Hasselt  and  towards  Diest,  the  Belgian  Cavalry 
Division  came  in  contact  with  these  troops  near  Budingen 
and  Haelen. 

On  the  I2th  August,  the  enemy's  cavalry  tried  to  force 
the  passage  of  the  Gette  at  Haelen.  Six  regiments  belonging 
to  the  2nd  and  4th  Cavalry  Divisions,  supported  by  the 
7th  and  Qth  Rifle  Battalions  and  by  three  batteries,  took 
part  in  this  operation.  Against  these  4000  sabres,  2000  rifles, 
and  18  guns,  the  Belgian  Cavalry  Division  could  only  oppose 
2400  sabres,  410  cyclists,  and  12  guns. 

The  enemy  attacked  at  about  8.30  A.M.,  employing  dis- 
mounted cavalry  in  some  force,  as  well  as  riflemen.  For 
nearly  two  hours  the  3rd  company  of  Carbineer  Cyclists  held 
them  in  check,  supported  at  about  9.30  by  the  ist  company 
posted  to  the  south  of  the  village.  But  at  about  ten  o'clock 
the  German  artillery  came  into  action,  and  its  fire  soon 
rendered  the  outskirts  of  Haelen  untenable,  while  the  enemy 
was  continually  reinforced.  The  Carbineer  Cyclists,  after 
blowing  up  the  bridge,  retired  on  to  the  railway  line,  where 
they  continued  the  action  until  noon.  At  that  moment  four 
squadrons  (two  of  the  4th  Regiment  of  Lancers  and  two  of 
the  5th)  were  deployed,  in  rear  of  the  ist  and  3rd  companies 
of  Carbineer  Cyclists,  about  the  farm  of  Yserbeek  ;  on  their 
left  was  the  ist  Horse  Artillery  battery,  escorted  by  two 
squadrons  of  the  5th  Lancers,  the  two  other  batteries  being 
in  echelon  north-east  of  Houtsem.  The  flanks  were  protected 
at  Zelck  by  a  squadron  of  the  4th  Lancers  and  two  platoons 

245 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-I 

of  cyclists,  and  at  Velpen  by  two  squadrons  of  the  2nd 
Guides  ;  three  squadrons  of  the  ist  Guides  were  in  reserve 
at  the  edge  of  the  Blekkom  woods. 

At  noon  the  enemy  attacked  simultaneously  Zelck  and  the 
railway  station  at  Haelen.  He  was  driven  back  at  Zelck,  and 
came  under  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire  at  Haelen.  He 
then  brought  up  fresh  troops  and  threatened  to  turn  the 
cyclists,  who  thereupon  retired  slowly  towards  the  farm  of 
Yserbeek.  It  was  about  i  P.M.  when  an  attack  was  launched 
against  the  cyclists  ;  dense  lines  of  riflemen  debouched  from 
Haelen  ;  the  cyclists,  who  had  been  fighting  for  nearly  five 
hours,  fell  back.  Immediately  a  squadron  of  dragoons 
appeared  and  charged  them  ;  it  was  destroyed  by  rifle  fire. 
The  charge  was  repeated  twice,  and  each  time  met  with  the 
same  fate.  The  enemy  then  put  in  his  reserves,  which  deployed 
on  the  front  Velpen  to  Liebroeck,  supporting  his  riflemen  every- 
where by  numerous  machine-guns,  while  his  artillery  engaged 
the  ist  Horse  Battery  energetically. 

The  farm  of  Yserbeek  was  attacked  and  taken,  and  the 
enemy's  success  seemed  to  be  assured,  when,  at  about  3  P.M., 
the  4th  mixed  Brigade  (four  battalions  of  the  4th  and  24th 
Line  Regiments)  arrived  on  the  battle-field,  having  left 
Haekendover  at  9.30  A.M.,  and  marched  16  miles  under  a  very 
hot  sun.  The  brigade  reached  Loxbergen  during  the  fighting  ; 
six  companies  covered  the  movement  on  the  right,  a  battalion 
attacked  the  farm  of  Yserbeek,  and  the  last  was  held  in  reserve. 
In  spite  of  their  fatigue  these  troops  soon  reached  the  farm  of 
Yserbeek  and  the  hamlet  of  Velpen,  round  which  severe 
fighting  took  place.  With  great  dash  they  penetrated  into 
Velpen,  where  they  found  themselves  under  the  fire  of  machine- 
guns  hidden  in  the  houses.  The  enemy's  artillery  energetically 
supported  several  counter-attacks,  but  the  three  batteries  of 
the  4th  Brigade,  which  came  into  action  at  3.30,  silenced  them. 
In  the  end,  at  6  P.M.,  the  enemy  gave  way,  and  retired  on 
Haelen,  leaving  his  dead  and  his  wounded  behind  him. 

The  engagement  at  Haelen,  favourable  as  it  had  been  for 
the  Belgians,  was  but  an  episode  in  the  total  of  the  German 
movements.  The  Army  Command  watched  these  movements 
carefully  by  means  of  its  Intelligence  Department.  From 
reports  received  up  to  the  iyth  it  appeared  that  : 

In  front  of  the  left  of  the  Army  the  enemy  was  reported  in 
246 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

the  directions  of  Wilderen,  St.  Trond,  Tongres,  Hasselt,  Herck 
St.  Lambert,  Lummen,  Kermpt,  Stockroy,  Genck,  Asch, 
Beeringen,  Tessenderloo,  Bourg-Leopold,  and  Moll,  while  very 
large  numbers  of  troops  had  crossed  by  the  bridges  at  Lixhe. 

In  front  of  the  Belgian  centre,  strong  bodies  of  the  enemy 
were  announced  in  most  of  the  villages  round  Esemael,  Landen, 
Waremme,  and  Hannut. 

On  the  Belgian  right  flank  the  enemy  had  considerable 
bodies  of  troops  about  Huppaye,  Jauchelette,  and  Pietrebais ; 
German  troops  were  crossing  the  Meuse  at  Ampsin,  while  others 
repaired  the  bridge  at  Huy  and  passed  over  the  river  at  that 
place. 

By  the  morning  of  the  i8th  August  the  situation  had 
become  extremely  critical.  The  day  began  with  an  engage- 
ment on  the  Belgian  left.  The  Cavalry  Division  was  attacked 
all  along  the  front  which  it  was  holding,  from  Budingen  to 
Diest,  but  resisted  vigorously,  especially  at  Diest.  At  7  P.M., 
Budingen  and  Geet-Betz,  defended  by  two  squadrons  of  the 
ist  Regiment  of  Guides,  were  attacked  by  a  strong  detach- 
ment of  infantry,  which  crossed  the  Gette  at  10  A.M.  Haelen, 
where  there  were  two  platoons  of  Carbineer  Cyclists  and  a 
squadron  of  the  5th  Lancers,  was  shelled  from  7.30  A.M.  At 
9.15  A.M.  the  enemy's  infantry  reached  the  Gette  and  threw 
bridges  over  it,  while  at  Diest  two  platoons  of  cyclists  and  the 
company  of  pioneers  held  their  own  for  an  hour  and  a  half 
against  a  brigade  of  all  arms.  The  Belgian  Cavalry  Division 
was  then  forced  to  retire  north  of  Winghe  St.  Georges,  to  which 
place  the  2nd  Army  Division  had  been  sent  to  prolong  the 
left  of  the  Army.  Further  to  the  south,  a  German  corps  was 
advancing  against  the  ist  Army  Division.  After  driving  in 
the  Belgian  outposts,  the  enemy  occupied  Tirlemont  and 
attacked  the  positions  of  Hautem  St.  Marguerite,  both  in  front 
and  in  flank.  The  2nd  Brigade  offered  a  stubborn  resistance 
till  late  in  the  evening,  and  enabled  the  rest  of  the  division  to 
disengage  itself,  but  suffered  heavily  in  this  severe  engagement. 

By  this  time  the  presence  of  masses  of  the  enemy's  infantry 
on  the  Belgian  left  flank  and  front,  the  violence  of  their  attacks, 
the  new  information  received  in  the  course  of  the  day — 
especially  with  regard  to  the  constant  crossing  from  the  south 
to  the  north  bank  of  the  Meuse  by  fresh  masses  of  infantry, 
by  the  bridges  at  Huy,  Ampsin,  and  Flone — all  combined  to 

247 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DE 

remove  any  possible  doubt  from  the  Headquarters  Staff  as 
to  the  imminent  approach  of  vastly  superior  hostile  forces 
advancing  against  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  Army.  The 
enveloping  movement  commenced  towards  Diest  and  Aerschot 
proved,  moreover,  that  the  Army  was  threatened  with  having 
its  left  flank  turned,  and  with  being  cut  off  from  the  Antwerp 
base. 

As  it  turned  out,  the  events  which  occurred  in  rapid  suc- 
cession on  the  following  days  were  to  confirm  these  views. 
There  were  actually,  about  the  i8th,  to  the  north  of  the 
Meuse  : 

First,  the  2nd,  4th,  and  gth  Corps,  which  were  making  for 
the  left  wing  of  the  Belgian  Army  bet  ween  Diest  and  Tirlemont  ; 
they  were  supported  on  the  flank  by  the  2nd  German  Cavalry 
Division,  which  was  advancing  between  the  Grande  Nethe  and 
the  Demer. 

Secondly,  the  3rd,  7th,  and  loth  Corps,  which,  after  passing 
between  Liege  and  Huy  from  the  south  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  Meuse,  were  marching  towards  the  front  Jodoigne-Namur  ; 
these  were  preceded  by  the  4th  and  gth  Cavalry  Divisions, 
which  were  moving  on  Wavre  and  Gembloux. 

Lastly,  the  six  first-line  corps  were  followed  by  five  reserve 
corps. 

Thus,  without  counting  those  German  forces  which  were 
moving  towards  France  across  the  Belgian  provinces  of 
Luxemburg  and  Namur,  there  were  at  that  moment  about 
500,000  men  advancing  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse. 

Now  what  was  the  situation  of  the  French  and  British 
Armies  in  Belgium,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  i8th  August,  at 
the  moment  when  the  Belgian  Army  thu,s  found  itself  in  actual 
contact  with  immensely  superior  German  forces  ?  According 
to  information  furnished  by  the  French  General  Staff,  the 
5th  French  Army  had  (see  Map  on  p.  251)  one  corps  holding 
the  bridges  on  the  Meuse  from  Hastiere  to  the  fortified  position 
of  Namur,  and  the  bridges  over  the  Sambre  from  Floreffe  to 
Tamines  ;  the  three  other  corps  forming  this  Army  were  to 
arrive  on  the  igth  in  the  region  of  Philippeville.  It  was 
threatened  by  a  hostile  group  reported  to  be  four  army  corps 
strong,  stretching  from  Yvoir  to  Beauraing,  and  which  had 
attacked  Dinant  on  the  evening  of  the  lyth.  The  British 
Army  was  at  that  moment  detraining  south  of  the  Sambre 
248 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

about  Maubeuge  ;  only  its  Cavalry  Division  had  actually 
detrained  ;  the  Army  was  to  be  ready  to  move,  possibly  on 
the  22nd,  certainly  on  the  23rd. 

Thus  the  Belgian  Army,  about  two  army  corps  strong, 
remained  alone  in  actual  contact  with  eleven  of  the  German 
army  corps,  belonging  to  the  ist  and  2nd  Armies,  so  that 
joint  action  in  line  with  the  French  and  British  Armies  was 
impossible  of  realisation  on  the  position  taken  up.  It  was 
necessary  to  come  to  an  immediate  decision.  If  the  Belgian 
Army  remained  stationary  it  would  have,  at  daybreak  on  the 
igth,  to  fight  a  battle  the  disastrous  result  of  which  was  not  for 
a  moment  in  doubt ;  attacked  in  front  and  on  both  flanks  by 
greatly  superior  forces,  what  was  left  of  it  would  be  cut  off 
from  Antwerp,  where,  vide  p.  244,  all  its  supplies  and  munitions 
had  been  collected. 

The  Belgian  Army  had  maintained  itself  in  its  position  of 
observation  from  the  5th  to  the  i8th  August — that  is,  during 
thirteen  days.  It  had  resisted  the  attacks  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  and  light  troops,  and  had  forced  him  to  carry  out  the 
concentration  of  his  right  in  the  frontier  region,  and  to  lose 
valuable  time  in  deploying  his  main  body  in  a  wide  enveloping 
movement.  When  the  latter  was  on  the  point  of  taking  effect, 
the  only  course  open  to  the  Belgian  Army  was  to  retreat,  so  as 
to  avoid  destruction.  On  the  i8th  August,  in  the  afternoon, 
the  King  decided  on  the  retreat  of  the  Army  towards  the 
north-west.  At  7.30  P.M.  orders  were  issued  that  at  dawn  the 
Army  was  to  proceed  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Dyle,  and  to  halt 
on  the  front  Neeryssche-Louvain-Rotselaer.  At  daybreak  a 
sharp  rearguard  action  commenced  between  the  2nd  German 
Army  Corps  and  the  brigade  of  the  3rd  Division  stationed  near 
Aerschot.  It  then  became  evident  that  the  enemy's  right 
outflanked  the  Belgian  left,  and  that  the  front  previously 
decided  on  had  become  untenable.  The  retirement  on  to  the 
line  of  forts  of  the  Antwerp  position  was  then  carried  out  as 
rapidly  as  possible. 

On  the  2Oth  the  Army  reached  the  entrenched  camp  of 
Antwerp  without  having  been  seriously  molested.  It  was 
ready  to  play  a  further  part  in  the  operations  agreed  on  with 
the  armies  of  the  Guaranteeing  Powers  by  detaining  in  its 
front  forces  at  least  equal  in  numbers  to  its  own.  The  enemy, 
closely  following  up  the  Belgian  Army,  entered  Louvain  on  the 

249 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-D] 

igth,  and  Brussels  on  the  2Oth.  It  was  not  till  the  24th 
August,  however,  that  the  French  frontier  was  crossed,  or  in 
other  words,  on  the  23rd  day  of  the  French  mobilisation.  Such 
was  the  result  of  the  operations  of  the  Belgian  Army  in  this 
first  phase  of  the  campaign. 

THE  DEFENCE  OF  NAMUR 

We  have  seen  (p.  244)  that  after  the  loss  of  the  line  of  the 
Meuse  near  Liege,  the  first  natural  line  of  defence  which  the 
Belgian  Army  could  occupy  was  formed  by  the  Gette,  pro- 
longed by  the  course  of  the  Meuse  between  Namur  and  Givet. 
Now  Namur  with  its  nine  forts  constituted  one  of  the  strong 
points  of  this  line.  Moreover,  Belgium  had  undertaken  to 
provide  for  the  defence  of  her  fortified  places  (see  p.  240).  For 
these  two  reasons  the  4th  Division  had  been  allotted  to  the 
defence  of  the  fortified  position  of  Namur. 

As  early  as  the  5th  August  in  Condroz,  and  the  7th  in 
Hesbaye,  German  cavalry  patrols  came  into  collision  with 
the  Belgian  cavalry.  The  most  serious  engagement  took 
place  on  the  I3th  at  Boneffe,  when  a  German  detachment, 
consisting  of  300  sabres,  400  cyclists,  and  some  machine-guns, 
had  established  itself  to  the  north  of  that  village,  and  was 
surprised  and  dispersed  by  two  Belgian  squadrons  and  two 
cyclist  companies.  On  the  I5th  a  German  detachment 
attempted  to  force  a  crossing  of  the  Meuse  at  Dinant,  but  a 
French  force  which  was  defending  the  valley  repulsed  the 
attack.  At  this  moment  the  8th  Brigade  was  moved  up 
towards  Namur,  from  Huy,  which  it  was  occupying,  as  it 
ran  the  risk  of  being  cut  off  by  the  German  masses  which 
were  advancing  westwards  on  both  banks  of  the  Meuse. 
Before  moving  it  had  destroyed  the  crossings  of  the  river. 
On  the  igth  the  8th  Brigade  retired  from  Andenne  on  to  the 
fortified  position,  after  having  destroyed  the  bridges  and 
blocked  the  tunnel  of  Seilles.  From  that  day  enemy  troops 
of  all  men  were  reported  within  the  zone  of  the  fortress,  in 
the  direction  of  Faulx,  as  well  as  in  that  of  Ramillies-Ofrus, 
where  several  regiments  of  German  infantry  and  artillery 
were  concentrated.  Guns  of  very  large  calibre  accompanied 
them. 

Early  on  the  2Oth,  the  enemy  began  to  drive  in  the  main 
250 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DE< 

guards  of  the  north-eastern  sector  of  the  fortress.  In  front 
of  Forts  Maizeret,  Andoy,  and  Dave,  German  batteries  were 
located  and  shelled.  During  the  night  three  attacks  were 
attempted  by  the  enemy's  infantry  in  the  intervals  of  the 
fort  of  Marchovelette. 

The  bombardment  of  Namur  commenced  on  the  2ist 
August,  at  10  A.M.  It  took  place  simultaneously  against 
Forts  Andoy,  Maizeret,  Marchovelette,  and  Cognelee,  as  well 
as  against  the  intervals  and  the  ground  in  rear  ;  from  the 
first  it  was  of  an  extremely  violent  character.  Howitzers 
and  mortars  fired  on  the  forts,  while  the  heavy  artiUery  of  the 
army  troops  took  as  its  objective  the  trenches  and  the  sup- 
porting points  of  the  intervals  ;  some  guns  opened  fire  on  the 
town  itself,  and  bombarded  it  during  four  hours.  Towards 
evening  Fort  Maizeret  had  received  a  great  many  shells,  but 
its  cupolas  were  still  in  working  order.  At  Fort  Andoy  the 
damage  was  very  serious  ;  several  cupolas  were  jammed  by 
fragments  of  concrete,  and  the  magazines  had  been  partly 
destroyed.  Fort  Marchovelette  had  also  suffered  consider- 
ably ;  only  one  cupola  of  12  centimetre  guns  and  two  of 
5.7  centimetres  remained  serviceable.  Fort  Cognelee,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  received  only  slight  damage.  But  in  the 
three  first-named  forts  the  telephonic  apparatus  had  been 
rendered  unserviceable.  The  bombardment  continued  during 
the  night. 

On  the  22nd  August,  in  the  course  of  the  morning,  the 
garrison  pushed  out  reconnaissances  towards  the  besieging 
lines.  They  were  everywhere  met  by  heavy  rifle  and  machine- 
gun  fire.  The  bombardment  was  as  severe  as  on  the  previous 
day,  and  was  extended  to  include  Fort  Dave.  Towards 
10  A.M.  the  garrison  was  reinforced  by  three  French  battalions 
(two  of  the  45th  and  one  of  the  I48th  Regiment),  which  were 
utilised  in  an  attempted  attack  on  enemy  artillery  reported 
near  Wartet.  The  field  artillery  which  was  to  support  the 
attack  was  compelled  to  cease  fire  and  the  troops  had 
to  be  withdrawn.  Meanwhile  the  town  had  again  been 
shelled. 

By  evening  Fort  Dave  had  only  been  slightly  damaged. 
Forts  Andoy  and  Cognelee  continued  to  fire.  'Fort  Maizeret 
had  been  completely  destroyed  and  was  evacuated.  Fort 
Marchovelette  had  been  the  object  of  systematic  destruction, 
252 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

and  its  last  cupola  had  been  rendered  unserviceable.  The 
bombardment  continued  all  through  the  night. 

At  dawn  on  the  23rd  August  the  fire  of  the  heavy  artillery 
increased  against  Fort  Cognelee  ;  an  infantry  attack  was 
repulsed,  but  towards  noon  the  fort  was  in  the  enemy's 
hands.  By  this  time  the  main  structure  of  Fort  Marchove- 
lette  was  full  of  cracks,  and  the  fire  of  the  German  heavy 
pieces  was  directed  against  Forts  Emines  and  Suarlee.  All 
along  the  portion  of  the  front  attacked,  both  the  permanent 
works  and  the  field  works  in  the  intervals  had  been  damaged. 
From  Cognelee  to  Andoy  only  the  field  batteries  were  able 
still  to  reply  to  the  fire  of  the  assailants,  and  soon  they  too 
were  reduced  to  silence.  The  troops  of  the  north-east  and 
south-east  sectors  then  withdrew  towards  Namur. 

By  this  time  the  situation  of  the  4th  Division  had  become 
untenable.  As  the  enemy  had  advanced  in  force  north  of 
the  Meuse,  and  had  forced  the  passages  over  the  Sambre 
between  Charleroi  and  Namur,  as  well  as  those  over  the 
Meuse  towards  Dinant,  the  retreat  of  the  division  was  cut 
off  in  every  direction,  except  between  the  Sambre  and  Meuse. 
It  was  decided  on  the  23rd  that  the  retirement  should  take 
place  on  that  side.  At  about  midnight  the  Belgian  column 
bivouacked  between  Bioul  and  Arbre,  threatened  by  the 
enemy  in  rear,  and  especially  on  the  flank  ;  it  succeeded, 
however,  in  extricating  itself,  except  the  rearguard,  which 
was  surrounded  at  Ermeton-sur-Biert ;  12,000  men  thus 
reached  Mariembourg  and  France.  They  arrived  at  Antwerp 
about  ten  days  later.  In  spite  of  the  difficulties  of  the 
retreat,  and  of  the  return  to  Antwerp,  the  evacuation  of  the 
division  had  been  effected  with  a  minimum  of  loss,  and  the 
Army  was  once  more  complete  in  all  its  units,  in  the  entrenched 
camp  of  Antwerp. 

Fort  Suarlee  fell  on  the  25th  August,  after  sustaining  a 
severe  bombardment. 

OPERATIONS  IN  COMBINATION  WITH  THE  ARMIES  OF  THE 
GUARANTEEING  POWERS,  20TH  AUGUST  TO  27™ 
SEPTEMBER 

From  August  20  (see  page  249  and  Map  on  p.  251)  the 
Belgian  Army  was  on  the  Rupel  and  the  Nethe,  with  a 

253 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DEC 

detachment  at  Termonde,  and  was  close  to  its  Antwerp  base 
and  to  the  line  of  forts  defending  that  place.  In  this  position 
it,  in  the  first  place,  saved  from  invasion  a  considerable  part 
of  the  province  of  Antwerp,  and  of  Flanders.  But  the 
Belgian  Army  was,  in  addition,  in  a  position  to  subordinate 
all  its  undertakings  to  the  operations  which  were  to  be  carried 
out  in  combination  with  the  French  and  British  forces.  Its 
function  was  to, be  to  attract  and  to  keep  in  front  of  it  the 
greatest  possible  number  of  the  enemy  forces.  The  oppor- 
tunities for  taking  the  offensive  would  be,  on  the  one  hand, 
when  the  Franco-British  Army  was  engaged  in  battles  on  a 
large  scale,  and  when  it  would  be  of  great  importance  to 
detain  German  forces,  and  on  the  other  hand,  when  the 
proportion  of  the  Belgian  to  the  German  strength  at  any 
time  enabled  the  offensive  to  be  assumed  under  favourable 
circumstances. 

Up  to  the  25th  September  the  German  forces  opposed  to 
the  Belgian  Army  were  not  superior  to  the  latter  in  numbers, 
and,  generally  speaking,  there  was  equilibrium  of  forces. 
When  this  equilibrium  was  upset  in  favour  of  the  Belgian 
Army,  the  Army  Command  decided  to  take  the  offensive, 
to  oblige  the  enemy  to  obtain  reinforcements,  so  as  to  re- 
establish the  equilibrium.  After  the  25th  September,  the 
enemy  was  considerably  reinforced,  and  the  situation  was 
completely  changed. 

Besides  these  operations  on  a  large  scale,  the  Belgian 
operations  undertaken  in  combination  with  those  of  the 
Franco-British  forces  aimed,  on  the  one  hand,  at  the  retention 
at  all  costs  of  a  line  of  retreat  for  the  Army  towards  the 
west,  so  as  to  ensure  an  ultimate  junction,  and,  on  the  other, 
at  the  destruction  of  the  lines  of  communication  of  the 
German  Army. 

Commencing  on  the  2ist  August,  the  bulk  of  the  German 
Armies  disappeared  from  the  front  of  the  Belgian  Army  and 
turned  towards  the  Sambre  and  Hainaut.  Before  Antwerp 
an  Army  of  observation  was  installed,  consisting  of  the  3rd 
and  gth  Reserve  Corps,  whilst  the  I3th  Reserve  Division  and 
one  or  two  Landwehr  Divisions  established  themselves  about 
Liege.  These  corps  had  just  arrived  at  the  moment  when  the 
Belgium  Headquarters,  on  the  24th  August,  learnt  that  the 
opposing  forces  on  the  Sambre  and  at  Mons  were  engaged  in 
254 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

violent  battles.  The  bulk  of  the  enemy's  forces  appeared  ,to 
be  sufficiently  distant  for  their  intervention  to  be  out  of  the 
question.  Circumstances  were  very  favourable  for  making  a 
sortie  from  the  entrenched  camp  before  the  German  Army  of 
observation  had  time  to  fortify  its  positions  strongly.  The 
sortie  took  place  on  the  25th  and  26th  August. 

The  sector  selected  for  the  operation  was  chosen  with  a 
view  to  threatening  the  German  communications  and  to 
piercing  the  lines  of  the  3rd  and  gth  Reserve  Corps,  which 
seemed  to  extend  on  a  very  wide  front,  from  Wolverthem  by 
Elewyt  to  Aerschot  and  even  Diest.  The  following  dispositions 
were  made  for  the  sortie. 

The  6th  Division  was  to  make  the  central  attack  on 
Hofstade  and  Elewyt ;  the  ist  and  5th  Divisions  were  to 
operate  on  its  right  between  the  canal  of  Willebroeck  and  the 
Senne  ;  the  2nd  Division  was  to  come  into  action  on  its  left, 
towards  Boortmeerbeek  ;  the  3rd  Division  was  to  be  in  reserve 
in  rear  of  the  6th,  while  the  Cavalry  Division  was  also  to  be  in 
reserve,  near  Putte. 

The  attack  encountered  defensive  dispositions  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  which  had  already  been  strongly  organised. 
The  6th  Division  gained  possession  of  Hofstade  and  of  the 
Schiplaeken  woods,  the  ist  and  5th  Divisions  took  Sempst, 
Weerde  and  Eppeghem,  but  on  the  left  wing  the  2nd  Division 
was  unable  to  debouch  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Louvain  Canal, 
and  was  even  forced  to  retire.  In  the  centre  the  6th  Division 
failed  to  capture  Elewyt.  The  battles  of  the  Sambre  and 
of  Mons  being  over,  the  operation  could  not  be  continued 
with  advantage,  and  the  Army  returned  to  the  entrenched 
camp. 

On  the  4th  September,  German  troops  marched  on 
Termonde,  drove  back  the  detachment  which  was  guarding 
that  town,  crossed  the  Scheldt,  and  threatened  the  line  of 
retreat  towards  the  west.  The  ist  and  6th  Divisions  were 
ordered  to  cross  to  the  left  bank  of  the  river  in  order  to  keep 
open  the  Belgian  communications  in  that  direction.  The  enemy 
withdrew  to  the  right  bank  and  Termonde  was  reoccupied. 
After  this,  the  enemy  was  always  checked  in  his  attempts  to 
cross  the  river,  and  the  line  of  retreat  to  the  west  was  always 
kept  open. 

On  the.  yth  and  8th  September  the  Belgian  Headquarters 

255 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DI 

learnt  that  the  German  forces  in  front  of  Antwerp  had  been 
reduced.  Three  divisions  of  the  Army  of  observation  were  on 
the  march  to  France  in  order  to  reinforce  the  troops  retreating 
from  the  Marne  on  to  the  Aisne.  These  units  had  been  replaced 
by  a  division  of  Marines  and  by  the  26th  and  37th  Landwehr 
Brigades.  The  Army  Command  considered  the  moment 
favourable  for  the  execution,  by  the  whole  of  the  Field  Army, 
of  a  sortie  intended  either  to  oblige  the  enemy  to  recall  towards 
Antwerp  some  of  the  forces  despatched  to  France,  or,  should  he 
not  do  this,  to  inflict  a  defeat  on  the  inferior  German  forces  in 
front  of  Antwerp. 

The  sortie  began  on  the  gth  September.  The  German 
position,  very  strongly  entrenched,  had  its  right  extended  as 
far  as  Over  de  Vaart.  it  was  necessary  to  avoid  a  frontal 
attack  on  these  strong  fieldworks,  while  the  Antwerp  position 
had  to  remain  covered.  The  operation  was  conducted  with  a 
view  to  turning  the  German  right.  The  3rd  Division  was 
directed  against  the  end  of  the  position  at  Over  de  Vaart, 
while  the  6th  moving  on  Thildonck,  and  the  2nd  on  Wygmael 
and  Lou  vain,  were  to  outflank  it.  The  Cavalry  Division, 
forming  the  extreme  left,  was  to  debouch  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Dyle.  In  front  the  ist  Division  was  to  attack  Hofstade 
and  Elewyt,  while  the  5th  Division  was  to  operate  on  its  right, 
west  of  the  Senne.  A  detachment  of  all  arms  guarding 
Termonde  was  to  safeguard  the  communications. 

The  sortie  began  successfully  ;  on  the  gth  the  crossings 
over  the  Demer  and  over  the  Dyle  were  captured  ;  Aerschot 
was  taken.  On  the  loth,  the  offensive  was  continued,  the 
Belgian  left  wing  advancing  towards  Louvain,  a  troop  of  the 
4th  Regiment  of  Chasseurs-a-cheval  even  entered  the  town, 
but  the  2nd  Division  was  checked  before  Wygmael  and 
Putkapel.  The  enemy  then  recalled  the  6th  Reserve  Infantry 
Division  which  was  on  its  way  to  France,  to  meet  this  attack. 
On  the  nth,  the  3rd  Division  succeeded  in  an  attack  on  Over 
de  Vaart,  the  enemy  being  driven  back,  and  the  6th  Division 
got  as  far  as  the  Malines-Louvain  railway  line.  On  the  I2th, 
the  6th  German  Division,  which  had  been  brought  back,  came 
into  action  near  Wespelaer,  and  the  ^nemy  now  took  the 
offensive,  driving  back  the  2nd  Belgian  Division  to  Rotselaer 
and  Wesemael.  This  retreat  of  the  left  wing  necessitated  the 
withdrawal  of  the  6th  Division,  and  later  on  that  of  the  3rd 
256 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

Division.     On  the  I3th,  the  whole  Army  retired  to  the  en- 
trenched camp. 

The  principal  object  was  attained.  The  operation  had 
obliged  the  enemy  not  only  definitely  to  recall  the  6th  Division 
of  the  3rd  Reserve  Corps  on  to  the  Belgian  front,  but  also,  as 
was  learnt  soon  afterwards,  it  had  delayed  for  two  days  the 
gth  Reserve  Corps  on  its  inarch  southwards,  just  at  a  moment 
when  the  German  Armies,  retreating  from  the  Marne,  stood  in 
urgent  need  of  reinforcements,  The  sortie,  moreover,  had 
seriously  alarmed  the  enemy  even  in  Brussels  itself. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  the  first  measures  weoe  taken 
by  the  Germans  with  a  view  to  the  siege  of  Antwerp,  and  that 
heavy  artillery  equipment  and  more  numerous  forces  were 
brought  up  in  front  of  that  fortress. 

After  the  isth  September  equilibrium  was  once  more 
established  between  the  opposing  forces  ;  the  German  troops 
established  before  Antwerp  were  not  again  reduced  in  strength. 
They  completed  their  defences  on  a  position  extending  by 
Haecht,  Elewyt,  and  Wolverthem,  and  prolonged  towards  the 
south  as  far  as  Grand-Bigard. 

The  railways  system  of  the  country  provided  the  enemy 
with  great  facilities  for  supplying  and  transporting  his  troops. 
The  Belgian  Army  Command  wished  to  interfere  with  this, 
and  accordingly  ordered  the  formation  of  seven  detachments, 
each  consisting  of  100  cyclist  volunteers,  intended  to  carry  out 
demolitions  of  the  railway  lines  in  the  region  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  On  the  22nd  September  these  parties  left  Antwerp, 
each  having  a  special  zone  of  operations  assigned  to  it.  The 
greater  part  succeeded  in  getting  through  the  German  lines  and 
in  reaching  the  selected  points,  where  they  cut  the  principal 
railway  lines  of  Limburg,  Brabant,  and  Hainaut,  causing 
considerable  disturbance  to  the  enemy's  transport.  Most  of 
these  detachments  were  able  to  rejoin  the  Army,  but  some 
came  in  contact  with  the  German  troops,  and  were  surrounded 
or  surprised. 

On  the  25th  September  the  French  Headquarters  Staff 
notified  that,  as  a  violent  engagement  was  in  progress  on  the 
left  of  the  Franco-British  front,  the  moment  was  opportune  for 
the  Belgian  Army  to  attack  the  German  lines  of  communica- 
tions. In  the  course  of  the  movements  preparatory  to  the 
attack,  it  was  ascertained  that  the  strength  of  the  German 

MILITARY  2  R  257 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-D: 

forces  before  Antwerp  had  been  increased,  and  that  the  enemy 
was  making  his  dispositions  for  a  siege  of  that  place. 

The  more  ambitious  operation  which  had  been  agreed  on  in 
consultation  with  the  French  Commander  had  therefore  to  be 
reduced  to  a  threatening  movement  of  the  main  body  of  the 
Army  towards  the  south-west.  An  actual  attack  was  not 
ordered.  Nevertheless,  in  the  course  of  this  operation,  ad- 
vantage was  taken  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  a  favourable 
opportunity  presenting  itself  to  attack  an  isolated  detachment 
of  the  enemy.  The  37th  Landwehr  Brigade  was  engaged  in 
front  of  Termonde,  and  orders  were  issued  for  the  4th  Belgian 
Division  to  make  a  frontal  attack  on  it  from  that  place,  while 
the  5th  Division  was  to  attack  its  right  flank,  and  the  Cavalry 
Division,  which  had  been  moved  from  Ghent  towards  Alost, 
was  to  make  a  flank  attack  on  its  left.  The  4th  Division, 
advancing  on  both  banks  of  the  Dendre,  found  itself  violently 
engaged  ;  the  5th  Division,  fearing  an  attack  on  its  left  flank, 
only  sent  weak  detachments  against  the  enemy,  so  that  the 
latter  was  able  to  extricate  his  troops  under  cover  of  the 
darkness. 

DEFENCE  OF  ANTWERP 

At  the  end  of  September  the  enemy  had  received  rein- 
forcements in  troops  of  all  arms,  and  especially  in  siege 
artillery  and  pioneers.  The  besieging  army  consisted  of 
the  3rd  Reserve  Army  Corps,  the  26th  and  37th  Brigades  of 
Landwehr,  a  division  of  Marines,  the  4th  Ersatz  Division, 
the  ist  Ersatz  Reserve  Division,  a  Bavarian  Division  (pro- 
bably), a  brigade  of  foot  artillery,  and  a  brigade  of  siege 
pioneers.  The  siege  operations  began  on  the  28th  September, 
at  which  moment  the  main  body  of  the  Army  was  located 
in  the  4th  sector.  In  order  to  oppose  a  possible  attack  on 
the  3rd  sector,  the  3rd,  2nd,  and  6th  Divisions  had  each  left 
there  a  detachment  consisting  of  a  regiment  of  infantry,  a 
regiment  of  cavalry,  a  cyclist  company,  and  a  group  of 
batteries.  The  2nd  Division  had  been  placed  so  as  to  form 
a  reserve  for  the  3rd  and  4th  sectors. 

The  enemy  drove  back  the  detachment  of  the  ist  Division, 
which,  posted  in  the  south,  was  holding  the  outskirts  of 
Malines.  He  bombarded  Forts  Waelhem  and  Wavre  St. 
Catherine  with  heavy  artillery.  The  resistance  of  the  latter 
258 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

was  soon  seriously  reduced  by  the  fire  of  the  42-centimetre 
howitzers.  The  ist  and  2nd  Divisions  were  then  hurriedly 
ordered  into  the  3rd  sector  (Waelhem-Lierre)  ;  the  3rd  and 
6th  Divisions  remained  in  the  4th  sector  (Waelhem  to  the 
Scheldt)  ;  the  4th  Division  was  at  Termonde,  and  the  5th 
constituted  the  general  reserve. 

On  the  2gth  September  the  enemy  attacked  the  4th  sector 
and  drove  back  the  advanced  troops  of  the  3rd  and  6th 
Divisions.  The  bombardment  of  the  3rd  sector  was  con- 
tinued, and  obliged  the  Belgian  outposts  to  retire  on  to  the 
line  of  the  forts.  Soon  all  the  works  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Nethe  were  being  shelled.  Forts  Wavre  St.  Catherine  and 
Waelhem  suffered  the  most  on  that  day  ;  an  ammunition 
store  exploded  in  the  former  fort,  and  the  successive  destruc- 
tion of  the  casemates  forced  the  garrison  to  evacuate  the 
work  at  6  P.M. 

The  effect  of  the  German  heavy  artillery,  as  experienced 
already  at  Liege,  at  Namur,  at  Maubeuge,  and,  on  the 
29th  September,  at  Forts  Wavre  St.  Catherine  and  Waelhem, 
left  no  possible  doubt  as  to  the  fate  in  store  for  the  Antwerp 
fortifications.  Contrary  to  what  had  previously  been  uni- 
versally believed,  the  entrenched  camp  could  not  long  afford 
a  safe  refuge  for  the  field  troops.  Hence  from  that  day 
Army  Headquarters  had  to  keep  in  view  the  moment  when 
the  Army  would  be  compelled  to  abandon  the  fortress  in 
order  to  avoid  having,  at  no  distant  date,  to  lay  down  their 
arms. 

The  first  thing  to  do,  with  a  view  to  preparing  for  the 
retreat  of  the  Army,  was  to  transfer  the  base  to  the  west, 
and  Ostend  was  selected  as  the  most  suitable  place.  Arrange- 
ments were  accordingly  made  at  once  for  the  removal  to  the 
new  base  of  the  wounded,  the  prisoners,  stores  of  every 
kind  (munitions,  provisions,  medical  equipment,  etc.),  the 
depots  of  the  various  units,  the  recruits  of  the  new  levy,  the 
untrained  volunteers,  the  manufacturing  establishments,  etc., 
etc.  When  the  base  was  cleared  out  of  Antwerp  the  Army 
would  regain  its  freedom  of  action,  and  would  continue  to 
live  its  own  life,  in  Antwerp  or  outside,  and  it  would  be  able 
to  evacuate  the  fortress  the  moment  its  investment  became 
imminent. 

From  Antwerp  to  Ostend  the  only  line  of  railway  then 

259 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DE 

available  started  from  the  left  bank  of  the  river  and  passed 
through  St.  Nicolas  and  Ghent.  Now  the  city  was  on  the  right 
bank  and  was  not  connected  with  the  left  bank  by  rail.  The 
first  railway  bridge  up  stream  was  at  Tamise,  and  in  order  to 
reach  it  the  bridge  of  Willebroeck,  which  was  exposed  to  the 
fire  of  the  enemy's  guns,  had  to  be  passed.  Precautions 
were  taken  so  successfully  that  trains  were  able  to  pass  every 
night,  with  lights  extinguished,  from  the  zgth  September  to  the 
7th  October,  without  attracting  the  enemy's  attention  and 
without  being  molested. 

Thus  the  movement  was  prepared  for  ;  but  to  enable  it 
to  be  carried  out  later  on,  it  was  necessary  to  make  the  lines 
of  retreat  secure.  At  the  same  time  the  Antwerp  position 
had  to  be  held  up  to  the  last  possible  moment,  since  by  doing 
so  the  invasion  of  the  country  would  be  impeded,  and  a 
junction  with  the  French  and  British  forces  would  be  rendered 
possible,  it  was  hoped,  in  time  to  enable  the  latter  to  prolong 
the  Belgian  line  southwards,  along  the  Dendre.  The  situa- 
tion was  similar,  it  will  be  seen,  to  that  in  which  the  Army 
had  found  itself  when  it  was  in  position  on  the  Gette  (p.  244) ; 
there  also  it  had  to  hold  on  as  long  as  possible  with  a  view 
to  a  junction  with  the  Franco-British  forces,  and  there  also 
it  had  in  the  end  to  retreat  owing  to  the  junction  not  having 
been  effected  up  to  the  moment  -when  the  danger  became 
imminent. 

In  view  of  the  above,  the  Belgian  forces  were  disposed  as 
follows  :  the  ist,  2nd,  3rd,  5th,  and  6th  Divisions  were 
posted  in  front  of  the  Rupel  and  of  the  Nethe,  to  defend  the 
line  of  the  threatened  forts  ;  the  4th  Division,  by  holding 
the  line  of  the  Scheldt  at  Baesrode,  Termonde,  and  Schoon- 
aerde,  covered  the  lines  of  retreat  towards  the  west ;  the 
Cavalry  Division,  with  Headquarters  at  Wetteren,  observed 
all  the  left  bank  of  the  Dendre,  and  co-operated  with  the 
4th  Division. 

So  long  as  the  Dendre  was  not  crossed  by  the  enemy  the 
position  of  the  Army  was  not  compromised,  and  even  after 
crossing  the  Dendre  he  would  run  up  against  the  4th  Division 
and  the  Cavalry  Division  on  the  Scheldt. 

On  the  30th  September,  two  very  severe  attacks  were 
made  against  the  bridge-head  of  Blaesveld,  which  was  defended 
by  the  3rd  Division.  They  were  driven  back  with  heavy 
260 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

loss.  The  6th  Division  similarly  repulsed  an  attack  made 
on  its  outposts.  The  permanent  works  of  the  4th  sector 
were  shelled  without  success.  In  the  3rd  sector,  the  situation 
soon  became  very  grave  owing  to  a  heavy  bombardment  of 
the  whole  front.  The  forts  were  shelled  uninterruptedly  for 
five  hours,  and  the  intervals  between  them  were  also  heavily 
bombarded.  The  troops  of  the  ist  Division  gave  way  before 
this  fire,  which  destroyed  all  the  works,  shelter-trenches,  and 
refuges.  At  Fort  Lierre,  the  explosion  of  a  shell  projected 
the  cupola  of  a  5.7  centimetre  gun  out  of  its  pit.  At  Fort 
Koningshoyckt  most  of  the  guns  were  out  of  action  and 
part  of  the  work  was  destroyed.  The  redoubts  of  Dorpveld 
and  Boschbeek  were  full  of  cracks  ;  the  concrete  masses, 
when  struck  by  the  projectiles,  seemed  to  be  forced  into  the 
ground  ;  the  shock  was  so  great  that  the  gun  detachments 
could  only  with  difficulty  keep  on  their  feet  in  the  cupolas. 
At  nightfall  the  enemy  ceased  fire.  No  infantry  whatever 
had  as  yet  shown  itself. 

On  the  ist  October,  from  2  to  4  A.M.,  all  the  artillery  of 
the  defence  which  was  still  capable  of  action  proceeded  to 
shell  all  the  enemy's  batteries  within  their  field  of  fire.  The 
enemy  bombarded  Fort  Breendonck,  but  without  much  effect. 
The  bombardment  of  the  3rd  sector  was  resumed  towards 
8  A.M.,  and  was  extended. to  the  Works  and  intervals  of  Fort 
Kessel.  Under  cover  of  this  bombardment  and  of  a  con- 
tinuous curtain  of  shell-fire,  the  infantry  then  made  an 
attack,  and  succeeded  in  occupying  the  defensive  works  to 
the  west  of  the  village  of  Wavre  St.  Catherine.  The  ist 
Division,  in  trying  to  reoccupy  its  trenches,  met  with  a 
resistance  which  it  was  unable  to  overcome.  The  2nd  Division, 
on  the  left  of  the  ist,  was  shaken  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
guns  and  driven  back  on  to  the  Nethe.  Fort  Koningshoyckt 
still  held  out,  but  the  Boschbeek  Redoubt  had  to  be  evacuated, 
while  that  of  Dorpveld  was  stormed  by  the  enemy.  During 
this  time  the  ist  Brigade  (5th  Division),  which  had  been 
sent  to  Lierre  on  the  30th  to  reinforce  the  ist  Fortress 
Regiment  of  Carbineers,  succeeded  in  holding  its  ground 
there. 

The  Military  Governor  then  ordered  the  occupation  of  the 
supporting  position  prepared  between  Fort  Koningshoyckt 
and  the  Duffel  Redoubt.  During  the  night  the  enemy 

261 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DEC 

attempted  to  pierce  the  interval  between  the  Tallaert  Re- 
doubt and  Fort  Lierre,  but  again  met  with  a  check. 

In  the  course  of  the  2nd  October,  the  ist  and  2nd  Divisions 
counter-attacked  in  order  to  retake  the  positions  lost  on  the 
line  of  forts.  On  the  left  bank  of  the  Nethe,  Fort  Duffel 
alone  still  held  out.  The  garrison  of  the  Dorpveld  Redoubt 
had  been  shut  up  in  its  shelters  since  5  A.M.  on  the  previous 
day,  the  enemy  having  occupied  the  main  structure  and 
blocked  the  ventilation  holes  and  having  commenced  to  mine 
the  casemates.  The  commander  and  the  last  of  the  defenders 
were  still  at  their  posts  when  a  mine  completed  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  work.  Fort  Koningshoyckt  had  been  surrounded 
by  the  enemy's  riflemen  since  the  attack  made  on  the  ist 
October  ;  the  machinery  vault,  the  machine-gun  casemates, 
and  the  front  face  of  the  gorge  had  all  collapsed.  At  noon  a 
magazine  blew  up  ;  at  2.30  P.M.  an  explosion  rendered  the  fort 
untenable.  The  Tallaert  Redoubt  had  also  been  destroyed. 
Fort  Lierre  had  been  subjected  to  a  methodical  destruction 
by  a  bombardment  which  was  continued  during  several  hours. 
At  about  noon  only  the  entrance  postern  remained  intact ; 
the  cupolas  were  destroyed  or  inaccessible  ;  most  of  the  pals- 
sages  were  blocked  ;  the  garrison  left  the  fort  at  6  P.M.  The 
Military  Governor  then  decided  to  withdraw  the  line  of  resist- 
ance across  the  Nethe,  the  south  bank  of  which  was  flooded. 

X)n  the  3rd  October,  from  6  A.M.,  the  fire  of  the  German 
heavy  batteries  was  directed  on  Fort  Kessel,  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  Nethe,  and  also  on  the  approaches  leading  to  it 
from  the  rear.  From  this  moment  the  only  artillery  of  which 
the  defence  was  able  to  dispose  consisted  of  field  artillery 
(7.5  centimetre  guns  and  15  centimetre  howitzers)  and  of 
two  armoured  trains  carrying  12  centimetre  guns.  The 
Duffel  Redoubt,  having  exhausted  its  ammunition,  fell  on 
that  day.  Fort  Kessel  was  shelled  by  batteries  of  large 
calibre  ;  its  front  face  and  gorge  were  enfiladed.  The  capon- 
niere  was  struck  and  blocked  by  some  of  the  first  shells  ; 
a  casemate  fell  in  ;  at  7  A.M  the  fire-commander's  station 
was  destroyed  ;  the  right-hand  flanking  battery  was  out  of 
action  ;  the  cupola  containing  the  15  centimetre  guns,  and 
two  cupolas  for  5.7  centimetre  guns  were  jammed.  At 
8.30  A.M.,  the  right  half  of  the  fort  was  in  ruins.  It  was 
abandoned  in  the  course  of  the  day. 
262 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

On  the  previous  evening,  a  brigade  of  British  Marine  Light 
Infantry,  2200  strong,  had  arrived  at  Antwerp.1  On  the  4th  it  l  [Se< 
relieved  the  ist  mixed  Brigade  before  Lierre.     On  the  same  Milit 
day  the  bombardment  was  extended  to  the  whole  north  bank  pp<  4 
of  the  Nethe,  and  the  enemy  forced  the  troops  defending  the 
ground  lying  between  the  Great  and  the  Little  Nethe  to  retire. 
At  the  same  time  German  troops  crossed  the  Dendre,  and  at- 
tempted to  cross  the  Scheldt  at  Schoonaerde  and  at  Termonde. 

On  the  5th,  the  enemy  occupied  Lierre,  but  was  unable  to 
debouch  from  it ;  he  also  succeeded  in  effecting  a  crossing 
farther  down  stream.  In  addition,  fresh  attacks  were  made  on 
the  troops  guarding  the  lines  of  retreat,  notably  towards 
Schoonaerde  ;  they  were  everywhere  repulsed,  but  the  position 
of  the  4th  Division  began  to  be  critical. 

On  the  6th  October,  the  besieging  force  made  a  general 
attack  on  the  position  which  had  been  placed  in  a  state  of 
defence  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Nethe.  The  line  formed  by 
the  ist,  2nd,  and  5th  Divisions,  reinforced  by  the  reserves  of 
the  3rd  and  6th  Divisions  and  by  the  brigade  of  British 
Marines,  gave  way  under  the  violent  German  artillery  fire. 
Several  counter-attacks  were  attempted,  of  which  some  got  as ' 
far  as  the  river  bank  of  the  Nethe,  but  did  not  succeed  in  arrest- 
ing the  enemy's  advance.  On  this  day  several  attempts  were 
made  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Scheldt  at  Baesrode,  Termonde, 
and  Schoonaerde,  but  were  stopped  by  the  4th  Division  and  the 
Cavalry  Division.  But,  as  the  Commander  of  the  4th  Division 
reported  that  the  situation  was  becoming  more  and  more 
serious,  and  as  it  was  indispensable  to  secure  communication 
with  the  west,  the  6th  Division  was  ordered,  at  about  10  A.M., 
to  cross  the  Scheldt  at  Tamise  and  to  go  to  the  support  of  the 
4th. 

Altogether,  at  this  moment,  the  enemy  having  forced  the 
line  of  the  Nethe,  and  having  crossed  the  Dendre,  the  situation 
of  the  Army  was  completely  changed.  Events  affecting  it  had 
also  taken  place  elsewhere,  as  will  be  seen. 

OPERATIONS  IN  COMBINATION  WITH  THE  ARMIES  OF  THE 
GUARANTEEING  POWERS,  6ra  TO  15™  OCTOBER 

Up  to  the  beginning  of  October,  the  chief  danger  which  the 
Belgian  Army  had  to  face  was  that  of  being  surrounded  by  the 

263 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY 

German  forces  which  were  before  Antwerp.  A  new  danger  was 
about  to  threaten  it.  The  retreat  from  the  Marne  had,  by  the 
I3th  September,  brought  the  mass  of  the  German  Armies  on 
to  the  line  of  the  Aisne,  with  its  right  about  Lassigny.  From 
that  moment  the  opposing  forces  had  constantly  tried  to  turn 
each  other's  flank  on  the  western  wing.  The  German  flank 
was  thus  successively  prolonged  from  Lassigny  towards  the 
north,  and  had  reached  the  neighbourhood  of  Lille  by  the 
beginning  of  October. 

The  effect  of  this  was  that  the  Belgian  Army  would  be  in 
danger  of  being  cut  off  from  the  Franco-British  Armies  if  the 
German  front  were  prolonged  still  farther  towards  the  north, 
the  distance  from  Lille  to  the  sea  at  Nieuport  being  only  38 
miles,  whereas  from  the  Nethe  to  Nieuport  is  no  less  than  88 
miles.  Thus  at  the  beginning  of  October  the  Belgian  Army 
found  its  retreat  threatened  not  only  by  the  besieging  Army, 
but  also  by  the  right  wing  of  the  German  Armies  operating  in 
France. 

It  therefore  became  necessary,  if  the  Army  was  to  continue 
to  hold  Antwerp,  that  its  line  of  retreat  should  be  covered 
farther  to  the  west  than  before.  Beyond  Termonde, 
Schoonaerde  and  Wetteren,  Ghent  had  to  be  occupied,  owing 
to  its  being  the  junction  of  communications  in  that  region  and 
equidistant  from  Lille,  where  the  German  right  wing  already 
rested,  and  from  the  Nethe,  on  which  the  Belgian  Army  was 
still  drawn  up.  Under  these  circumstances,  on  the  4th 
October  the  Belgian  Commander-in-Chief,  convinced  that 
Ghent  must  be  held  at  all  costs,  and  not  having  any  troops 
available  for  the  purpose,  sent  an  urgent  message  to  the 
British  military  authorities,  who  had  shown  themselves 
disposed  to  provide  help  for  the  defence  of  Antwerp,  pointing 
out  the  necessity  for  the  occupation  of  Ghent.  The  co-opera- 
tion of  the  British  7th  Division,1  which  was  landing  on  the 
Belgian  coast,  had  been  promised,  and  some  French  troops 
were  also  to  take  part  in  the  movement. 

On  the  evening  of  the  6th  October  the  following  was  the 
situation. 

The  line  of  the  Nethe  had  been  pierced,  and  the  Dendre 
had  been  crossed  by  the  enemy.  The  line  of  the  Scheldt  was 
being  violently  attacked  by  ever-increasing  German  forces, 
which  threatened  to  cut  off  the  Belgian  Army,  so  that  all 
264 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

hopes  of  a  junction  under  the  guns  of  Antwerp  with  the  main 
body  of  the  Franco-British  forces  had  vanished.  The  occupa- 
tion of  Ghent  was  provided  for,  and  the  last  military  trains 
conveying  the  base  supplies  from  Antwerp  towards  Ostend 
were  to  leave  on  the  night  of  the  6th/yth.  Retreat  was  still 
possible,  but  it  was  becoming  urgent  to  execute  it. 

The  King  issued  orders  for  the  passage  of  the  Field  Army 
on  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Scheldt  during  the  night  of  the 
6th/7th.  It  was  to  utilise  the  bridges  of  Tamise,  Hoboken, 
and  Burght,  and  was  then  to  retreat  westwards.  The  fortress 
of  Antwerp  was  to  continue  to  be  defended  by  the  garrisons  of 
the  forts,  some  regiments  of  Fortress  Infantry,  the  2nd  Army 
Division  and  three  British  Naval  Brigades,  the  two  last  of 
which  had  arrived  at  Antwerp  on  the  5th  October. 

The  retreat  began  on  the  evening  of  the  6th,  and  by  the 
morning  of  the  7th  the  whole  force  was  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Scheldt.  The  King  left  Antwerp  at  3  P.M.  on  the  7th  to 
accompany  the  Army  in  its  movement,  and  spent  the  succeed- 
ing nights  at  St.  Nicolas,  Selzaete,  and  Eecloo  respectively. 
It  was  high  time.  On  the  same  day  the  Scheldt  was  forced  at 
Schoonaerde.  The  6th  Division,  which  had  been  sent  in 
support  to  the  left  bank  on  the  6th  October,  was  holding  the 
enemy  in  check  at  Berlaere.  In  the  Ghent  neighbourhood  a 
mixed  detachment  of  the  enemy  was  already  reported  at 
Cruyshautem,  with  advanced  parties  at  Nazareth.  As  the 
Franco-British  forces  had  not  yet  arrived  at  Ghent,  the  4th 
Brigade  was  at  once  transported  there  to  oppose  any  attempts 
on  that  place  which  might  be  made  by  the  enemy.  Up  to  this 
time  the  protection  of  the  roads  and  railways  which  converge 
on  this  point  had  been  entrusted  to  bodies  of  the  civic  guard, 
a  squadron  of  mounted  gendarmerie,  and  four  battalions  of 
volunteers. 

On  the  8th  October  the  enemy  advanced  on  Lokeren, 
where  he  came  up  against  the  3rd  Division.  That  evening  the 
ist  Division  was  moved  by  rail  from  St.  Nicolas  to  Ostend, 
while  the  other  divisions  marched  towards  the  Terneuzen 
Canal.  On  the  gth,  the  37th  Landwehr  Brigade  was  operating 
north  of  the  Scheldt  near  Lokeren,  and  was  followed  by  the 
4th  Ersatz  Division,  which  had  crossed  the  river  at  Schoonaerde. 
The  ist  Ersatz  Reserve  Division  and  a  Division  of  Bavarian 
Landwehr  advanced  on  Ghent  by  Quatrecht,  Gontrode,  and 

265 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DI 

Lemberge,  but  meanwhile  reinforcements  had  reached  Ghent ; 
a  brigade  of  French  Marine  Fusiliers  had  taken  up  its  quarters 
there  on  the  previous  evening,  and  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  British  yth  Division  arrived  during  the  day.  Ghent  and 
its  approaches  from  the  east  and  south-east  were  occupied  by 
25,000  to  30,000  men. 

Thus  threatened  on  their  left  flank,  the  German  forces 
which  had  crossed  the  Scheldt  were  unable  to  advance  north- 
wards to  the  Dutch  frontier,  and  had  to  look  on  powerless  to 
interfere  while  the  Belgian  Army  carried  out  its  retreat  without 
being  seriously  molested.  On  the  gth,  at  Melle,  they  came  in 
contact  with  the  French  Marine  Fusiliers  supported  by  two 
groups  of  Belgian  Artillery,  and  next  day  again,  the  front 
Melle-Meirelbeke  was  subjected  to  a  violent  attack,  which, 
however,  was  repulsed  by  the  French  Marine  Fusiliers.  While 
the  retreat  of  the  Army  was  being  successfully  conducted,  the 
attacks  on  the  fortress  of  Antwerp  had  redoubled  in  intensity. 

On  the  yth  October  Fort  Broechem  having  been  destroyed, 
the  enemy  established  himself  north  of  the  Nethe,  and  began 
the  attack  of  the  second  line  of  defence.  Fort  i  was  the  first 
to  be  bombarded.  In  the  4th  sector,  Forts  Liezele  and 
Breendonck  still  kept  the  besiegers  in  check.  The  bombard- 
ment of  the  city  itself  began  at  midnight. 

The  following  was  the  disposition  of  the  German  forces 
before  Antwerp  on  the  8th  October.  The  3rd  Reserve  Corps, 
reinforced  by  the  26th  Landwehr  Brigade,  occupied  the  ground 
opposite  Forts  I  to  6  ;  the  Marine  Infantry  Brigade  was  in  the 
rear  of  the  left  of  the  3rd  Corps  ;  between  the  Dyle  and  the 
Scheldt  were  the  Marine  Artillery  Brigade  and  the  4th  Ersatz 
Division. 

The  bombardment  of  the  supporting  points  of  the  second 
line  was  continued  without  a  pause.  In  view  of  the  situation 
the  Governor  decided  at  5  P.M.  that  the  2nd  Army  Division 
and  the  British  troops,  except  the  Anglo-Belgian  garrison 
of  Fort  No.  4,  should  be  made  to  join  the  Field  Army  ;  accord- 
ingly in  the  evening  the  above-mentioned  troops  began  to 
cross  the  Scheldt  by  the  Burght  and  Steen  bridges.  The 
crossing  was  completed  at  about  2  A.M. 

During  the  day  on  the  gth,  Fort  Merxem  capitulated,  as 
well  as  the  Dryhoek  Redoubt,  and  Forts  Brasschaet  and  the 
Audaen  Redoubt  were  evacuated  after  their  electric  plant  and 
266 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

their  guns  had  been  put  out  of  action  ;  the  garrison  of  Fort  No. 
4  left  that  work,  crossed  the  Scheldt  and  destroyed  the  bridges. 
By  about  10  A.M.  the  Governor  had  retired  to  Fort  Sainte 
Marie,  and  at  about  noon  the  bombardment  of  the  city  ceased. 
The  Military  Governor  capitulated  on  the  loth  October. 

The  main  body  of  the  Army,  on  the  morning  of  the  gth 
October,  was  behind  the  canal  from  Ghent  to  Terneuzen,  with 
rearguards  east  of  that  canal,  towards  Loochristy,  Lokeren, 
Wachtebeke,  and  Moerbeke,  which  were  left  there  in  order  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  2nd  Division  and  of  the  British  con- 
tingent, which  had  left  Antwerp  on  the  evening  of  the  8th 
October. 

Two  lines  of  defence  were  available  for  the  retreating 
Army,  one  the  Ghent-Terneuzen  Canal,  prolonged  by  the 
Scheldt,  the  other  the  Schipdonck  Canal  continued  by  the  Lys. 
The  intention  was  to  resist  on  one  or  the  other  of  these  lines, 
and  thus  to  save  from  invasion  a  considerable  portion  of 
Flanders,  if  a  junction  could  be  effected  with  the  Franco- 
British  forces.  But  at  that  moment  the  French  left  wing  was 
near  Arras,  and  the  British  Army  was  only  beginning  to  detrain 
in  the  region  of  St.  Omer.1  Under  these  circumstances,  by  J  [See 
stopping  on  the  Ghent-Terneuzen  Canal,  or  on  the  Schipdonck  Military, 
Canal,  the  Belgian  Army  would  have  run  the  risk  of  having  its  Ij  p*  4°2-i 
right  turned,  and  of  being  driven  on  to  the  Dutch  frontier  or 
into  the  sea  by  the  very  superior  German  forces  which  were 
already  assembled  in  Belgium.  These  forces  included  the 
Antwerp  siege  Army,  now  available,  several  divisions  of  which 
were  already  on  the  march  westwards,  as  well  as  the  22nd, 
23rd,  26th,  and  27th  Reserve  Army  Corps  recently  formed, 
which  had  just  arrived  in  Belgium. 

There  was  therefore  no  choice  but  to  retire  farther,  until  a 
line  should  be  reached  which  would  allow  of  a  junction  with  the 
Franco-British  forces,  and  should  at  the  same  time,  constitute 
a  strong  defensive  position.  The  Army  accordingly  retired  as 
far  as  the  Yser. 

The  line  of  the  Yser  presented  considerable  advantages. 
Looked  upon  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  general  relation  to 
the  Franco-British  front,  which  at  that  moment  extended  from 
Lassigny  towards  Arras,  it  was  in  prolongation  of  that  line  and 
constituted  an  excellent  defensive  position,  securing  the  junc- 
tion with  that  front.  As  regards  its  own  merits,  the  position 

267 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DI 

was  tactically  a  strong  one,  the  left  flank  resting  on  the  sea, 
the  command  of  which  was  in  friendly  hands,  the  front  being 
covered  by  the  river,  and  the  right  flank  being  protected  by  the 
river  higher  up,  which  from  the  old  fort  at  Knocke  bends 
westwards  by  Elsendamme  and  Rousbrugge.  The  extent  of 
the  line,  moreover,  was  not  disproportionate  to  the  strength 
of  the  Army.  Finally,  and  this  was  a  considerable  moral 
advantage,  it  offered  to  the  Army  a  last  refuge  on  Belgian  soil. 
The  King,  judging  that  no  other  line  offered  as  great 
advantages,  decided  to  establish  the  Army  on  the  Yser, 
and  to  place  this  line  in  a  state  of  defence. 

We  have  seen  (p.  257)  how  the  forces  which  held  Ghent  had 
successfully  barred  the  road  to  the  attempts  which  were  made 
to  envelop  the  Belgian  Army.  On  the  nth  October  the  latter 
had  completed  its  movement,  and  the  troops  holding  Ghent 
were  at  once  ordered  to  retire.  A  fresh  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  on  that  evening  was  arrested  by  the  British  7th  Division, 
which,  in  spite  of  it,  succeeded  in  retiring  under  artillery  and 
infantry  fire.  The  Belgian  cavalry  covered  its  retreat  and 
kept  in  touch  with  the  enemy's  forces,  fighting  rearguard 
actions  on  the  Ghent-Terneuzen  Canal,  and  on  the  Scheldt, 
as  well  as  on  the  Schipdonck  Canal,  and  on  the  Lys.  The  ist 
Cavalry  Division  then  retired,  fighting,  by  Lootenhulle,  onto 
the  right  wing  of  the  Army.  The  2nd  Cavalry  Division  (which 
had  recently  been  formed,  mainly  out  of  the  divisional  cavalry 
regiments)  withdrew  on  Ursel,  Bruges,  and  the  front  of  the 
Army. 

By  the  i2th,  the  transport  of  the  troops  and  of  their 
convoys  was  secured,  in  spite  of  the  danger  of  the  situation 
and  of  the  technical  difficulties,  the  railways  Selzaete-Eecloo- 
Bruges  and  Bruges-Thourout  being  single  lines.  On  the  I5th 
October  the  Belgian  Army  was  on  the  Yser. 


JOINT  OPERATIONS  WITH  THE  ARMIES  OF  THE  GUARAN- 
TEEING POWERS  :    THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  YSER 

At  the  moment  when  the  Belgian  Army,  reduced  as  it  was 
to   82,000   men,  including  48,000  rifles,  had  arrived  in  the 
selected  position  on  the  Yser,  the  King  addressed  a  proclama- 
tion to  the  troops. 
268 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

These  words  did  not  conceal  from  the  Army  the  supreme 
effort  which  was  to  be  demanded  of  it.  Its  task  had  assumed 
a  special  importance  in  view  of  the  situation  of  the  opposing 
forces  in  the  north  of  France. 

About  the  I5th  October  the  French  front  was  strongly 
prepared  for  defence  as  far  as  La  Bassee.  Since  the  end  of 
September  the  German  force,  replying  to  the  enveloping 
movement  of  the  Franco-British  Armies,  was  in  its  turn  trying 
to  turn  the  left  wing  of  the  latter.  The  German  forces  thus 
employed  in  the  principal  theatre  of  war  were  shortly  to  be 
joined,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  besieging  army  from  Antwerp 
which  was  now  available  for  other  operations,  and  on  the  other, 
by  the  four  newly-formed  corps  of  which  the  arrival  in  Belgium 
has  already  been  mentioned  (p.  267.)  To  oppose  these  power- 
ful German  forces  and  to  counter  the  vast  movement  which 
they  were  about  to  undertake  northwards  between  La  Bassee 
and  Dunkerque,  there  were  in  Flanders  only  the  Belgian  Army, 
the  7th  British  Infantry  and  the  3rd  British  Cavalry  Divisions, 
the  French  Marine  Fusilier  Brigade,  and  two  French  Terri- 
torial Divisions. 

The  Belgian  Army,  to  which  had  been  attached  the  French 
Marine  Fusiliers  Brigade,  took  up  its  position  on  the  Yser, 
between  the  sea  and  Zuydschoote.  The  British  7th  Infantry 
and  3rd  Cavalry  Divisions  were  posted  in  front  of  Ypres. 
The  occupation  of  these  positions  was  soon  completed  by  the 
detraining  of  a  British  Cavalry  Corps  and  of  the  British  2nd 
and  3rd  Army  Corps  at  St.  Omer,  and  by  the  advance  on 
Ypres  of  the  two  French  Territorial  Divisions,  whilst  bodies 
of  cavalry  were  directed  on  Staden  and  others  were  operating 
in  the  direction  of  Lille. 

The  result  of  these  combined  movements  was  apparent 
about  the  I7th,  by  which  date,  while  the  British  ist  Army 
Corps  was  detraining  at  St.  Omer,  the  British  Cavalry  Corps 
and  2nd  and  3rd  Army  Corps  occupied  a  line  extending 
from  near  La  Bassee  up  to  the  positions  of  the  7th  British 
Division,  which  was  holding  the  line  Zandvoorde-Gheluvelt- 
Zonnebeke.  To  the  north  of  this  latter  line  bodies  of  French 
and  of  British  cavalry  connected  the  front  with  the  Belgian 
line.  Thus  the  line  had  been  closed  and  a  continuous  front 
had  been  established.  The  joint  operations  were  now  to 
commence. 

269 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-D: 

In  truth,  this  continuous  front  was  but  slenderly  held  in 
view  of  the  great  strength  of  the  German  forces  which  were 
concentrating  between  the  Lys  and  the  sea  in  order  to  try  to 
pierce  the  line  held  by  their  adversaries,  but  reinforcements 
were  being  prepared  to  *  strengthen  the  portion  of  the  line 
situated  to  the  north  of  the  Lys.  These  were  : 

The  ist  British  Corps,  which  was,  on  the  2ist  October,  to 
operate  on  the  left  of  the  British  7th  Division  on  the 
front  Zonnebeke-Langemarck  ; 

The  42nd  French  Division,  which  was  to  come  into  action 
on  the  23rd  October  on  the  Belgian  front  ; 

The  Qth  French  Army  Corps,  which  was  to  fight  to  the 
east  of  Ypres,  commencing  on  the  24th  October  ; 

And  the  i6th  French  Corps,  which  was  to  come  into 
action  south  of  Ypres  on  the  3ist  October. 

But  several  days  had  to  pass  before  these  reinforcements 
could  arrive,  and  it  was  necessary  at  all  costs  to  gain  time. 
The  enemy's  plan  was  soon  revealed  ;  it  was  to  seize  the  line 
of  the  Yser,  from  the  sea  to  Dixmude,  and  to  hurl  back  the 
Belgian  Army  which  was  defending  it,  so  as  to  turn  the 
Franco-British  left.  Thus  it  was  the  Belgian  Army  which 
had  to  break  the  first  shock  of  the  enemy,  and  the  French 
Headquarters  Staff  asked  that  it  should  resist  during  forty- 
eight  hours. 

The  front  occupied  by  the  Belgian  Army  was  formed,  from 
the  sea  to  the  place  called  the  '  Fort  of  Knocke/  by  the  Yser 
River,  which  on  that  stretch  is  deepened  and  revetted  to  form 
a  canal,  and  thence  to  Zuydschoote  and  Boesinghe  by  the 
Yser  Canal  to  Ypres.  From  Nieuport-Bains  to  Dixmude  is 
eleven  miles,  and  it  is  another  eleven  from  Dixmude  to 
Boesinghe,  so  that  the  total  front  was  twenty-two  miles  in 
extent.  The  Yser,  about  65  feet  wide,  has  dykes  on  both 
banks,  that  on  the  western  bank  commanding  the  one  on  the 
eastern  by  6J  feet.  About  halfway  between  Nieuport  and 
Dixmude  the  river  forms  a  bend,  the  concavity  of  which  is 
turned  towards  the  west.  This  bend,  called  the'  '  bend  of 
Tervaete/  constituted  a  weak  point  in  the  line  of  defence. 
The  whole  region  is  intersected  by  ditches,  canals,  and  streams, 
the  most  important  of  the  latter  being  the  Beverdyk,  which 
is  continued  by  the  Noord-Vaart.  Its  course  is  nearly  parallel 
to  that  of  the  Yser,  and  it  attains  to  a  width  of  about  32  feet 
270 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

up  stream  from  Nieuport.  The  Beverdyk  flows  in  almost  its 
entire  course  between  the  Yser  and  the  railway  line  from  Nieu- 
port to  Dixmude,  which. has  an  embankment  three  to  six  feet 
high  commanding  the  plain.  The  permanent  crossings  over 
the  river  and  canal  in  the  portion  under  consideration  are  : 
the  Nieuport  bridges,  the  Union  bridge  near  St.  Georges,  that 
of  Schoorbakke,  that  of  Tervaete,  the  two  Dixmude  bridges, 
the  Driegrachten,  and  the  Steenstraate  bridges.  At  Nieuport 
six  canals  and  water-courses  converge :  the  Furnes  Canal,  the 
Noord-Vaart,  the  canalised  Yser,  the  Nieuwendamme  brook, 
or  Old  Yser,  the  Plasschendaele  Canal,  and  the  evacuation 
canal.  There  are  sluices  which  enable  water  to  be  let  in 
from  the  sea  at  high  tide.  These  few  data  will  enable  an  idea 
to  be  formed  of  the  ground  to  be  defended. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  battle  the  Belgian  forces  were 
disposed  as  follows,  in  the  position  : 

The  2nd  Division  had  to  defend  the  ground  from  the  sea 
to  a  point  some  distance  beyond  the  Union  bridge,  occupying 
Lombaertzyde  and  Mannekensvere,  and  holding  the  bridge- 
head in  front  of  Nieuport  so  as  to  retain  possession  of  the 
bridges  and  sluices. 

The  ist  Division  had  to  defend  the  ground  on  the  right 
of  the  2nd  Division  as  far  as  Mark  10  of  the  Yser,  and  to  hold 
a  bridge-head  in  advance  of  the  Schoorbakke  front,  and 
further  to  occupy  Schoore  as  an  advanced  post. 

The  4th  Division  came  next,  from  Mark  10  to  Mark  14, 
with  advanced  posts  at  Keyem  and  at  Beerst. 

The  French  Marine  Fusiliers,  the  nth  and  I2th  Line  Regi- 
ments, with  two  artillery  groups  from  the  3rd  Division,  pro- 
longed the  front  of  the  4th  Division  and  occupied,  in  advance 
of  Dixmude,  a  bridge-head  which  covered  the  railway  lines 
from  Dixmude  to  Nieuport  and  to  Furnes,  by  which  the 
transport  of  the  Ostend  base  towards  France  was  still  being 
completed. 

The  5th  Division  was  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Noordschoote. 

The  6th  Division,  south  of  the  last  named,  connected  the 
line  with  that  of  the  French  Territorials  towards  Boesinghe. 

The  3rd  Division  had  two  brigades  in  reserve  near  Lam- 
pernisse. 

The  ist  Cavalry  Division  covered  the  right  flank  of  the 
army,  and  co-operated  with  the  French  cavalry  in  the  direction 

271 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-D] 

of  Roulers  ;  the  2nd  was  in  reserve  between  Nieuport  and 
Furnes. 

Thus,  on  a  front  of  twenty-two  miles,  two  infantry  brigades 
and  one  cavalry  division  were  the  only  reserves  at  the  disposal 
of  the  commander. 

By  the  afternoon  of  the  I5th,  it  had  already  become 
apparent  that  the  Germans  were  preparing  an  attack  on  the 
front  Nieuport-Dixmude.  On  the  i6th,  contact  was  estab- 
lished east  of  the  Yser,  towards  St.  Pierre  Capelle,  and  a 
reconnaissance  in  force  was  made  by  the  enemy  on  Dixmude. 
On  the  iyth,  German  columns  were  reported  :  In  the  north, 
along  the  Plasschendaele  Canal,  from  Leffinghe  on  Slype,  and 
from  Ghistelles  on  Zevecote  ;  in  the  south,  from  Staden  on 
Zarren,  which  indicated  an  advance  of  the  enemy's  forces 
towards  the  front  Nieuport-Dixmude.  The  German  artillery 
was  in  action  at  Slype,  and  was  shelling  Rattevalle. 

In  order  to  reinforce  the  front  Nieuport-Dixmude,  the 
5th  Division  was  brought  back  into  the  second  line  near 
Lampernisse,  thus  bringing  up  the  number  of  divisions  in 
reserve  to  two  ;  the  3rd  Division  was  placed  near  Avecapelle. 
The  gap  left  open  by  the  departure  of  the  5th  Division  was 
closed  by  a  brigade  detached  from  the  6th  Division  and 
posted  near  Noordschoote. 

The  attack  on  the  outposts  began  on  the  i8th.  Before 
Nieuport  the  German  troops  took  Mannekensvere,  which  was 
afterwards  partially  recaptured.  Lombaertzyde,  defended  by 
the  5th  Regiment  of  the  Line,  held  its  own,  supported  by  a 
British  flotilla,  which  was  soon  increased  by  the  arrival  of 
some  French  ships ;  these  warships  shelled  the  German 
troops  along  the  coast  as  far  as  Middelkerke,  and  subse- 
quently, during  the  whole  battle,  furnished  valuable  support 
to  the  defence.  The  two  advanced  posts  of  Schoore  and 
Keyem  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  but  that  of  Beerst 
was  successfully  held. 

Fresh  dispositions  were  made  to  reinforce  the  line  ;  the 
presence  of  large  bodies  of  Franco-British  cavalry  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Roulers  was  considered  a  sufficient  safe- 
guard for  the  right  wing  of  the  Army,  and  the  6th  Division 
was  accordingly  withdrawn,  being  replaced  by  French  Terri- 
torials. At  that  moment  the  reserves  were  posted  as  follows  : 
the  3rd  Division  near  Wulpen,  the  5th  near  Oostkerke,  and 
272 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

the  6th  near  Lampernisse.  The  ist  Cavalry  Division,  while 
co-operating  with  the  French  cavalry,  was  ordered  to  keep 
in  close  touch  with  the  right  of  the  Army.  On  the  igth, 
the  German  attacks  were  aimed  against  the  left  and  the 
centre  of  the  Army,  from  Lombaertzyde  to  Beerst,  which 
latter  place  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands. 

Owing  to  the  imminence  of  a  determined  attack. on  the 
centre,  the  6th  Division  was  ordered  to  establish  itself  at 
Pervyse.  At  the  same  time,  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  the 
left  and  centre,  a  counter-attack  was  decided  on  against  the 
enemy's  left  flank  ;  the  5th  Division  was  ordered  to  attack 
Vladsloo,  and  the  Marine  Fusiliers  were  to  move  against 
Beerst.  The  nth  and  I2th  Regiments  of  the  Line  were 
ordered  to  occupy  the  bridge-head  of  Dixmude.  This  offen- 
sive movement  was  at  first  successful ;  Beerst  and  Vladsloo 
were  occupied,  when  information  was  received  to  the  effect 
that  strong  German  columns  of  all  arms  had  debouched  to 
the  north  and  to  the  south  of  Roulers,  and  that  the  Franco- 
British  cavalry  which  was  operating  in  that  region  was 
retreating.  This  was  judged  to  render  the  position  of  the 
Marine  Fusiliers  and  of  the  5th  Division,  on  the  right  bank, 
too  exposed,  and  these  troops  were  accordingly  recalled  to 
'the  left  bank  of  the  Yser. 

Except  for  a  violent  bombardment  of  the  whole  front, 
the  only  important  incident  on  the  20th  was  a  double  attack 
carried  out  at  the  two  extremities  of  the  line.  The  most 
determined  attack  was  that  which  was  directed,  from  6  A.M. 
onwards,  against  Lombaertzyde  and  the  farm  of  Bamburgh, 
east  of  Nieuport.  By  evening  these  two  posts  had  been  lost, 
but  the  enemy  had  been  unable  to  debouch  from  them.  The 
situation  had,  however,  become  serious  on  account  of  the 
very  heavy  artillery  and  infantry  fire.  At  the  other  end  of 
the  line,  near  Dixmude,  an  attack  which  had  taken  place  in 
the  afternoon  was  repulsed. 

During  this  time  the  concentration  of  the  enemy's  forces 
was  completed.  They  were  thus  echeloned  in  front  of  the 
Belgian  Army :  the  4th  Ersatz  Division  was  opposite  Nieu- 
port ;  the  3rd  Reserve  Corps,  from  Nieuport  to  Keyem  ; 
the  22nd  Reserve  Corps,  north  of  Dixmude  ;  lastly,  the 
23rd  Reserve  Corps  at  Dixmude  and  to  the  south — making  in 
all  a  total  of  seven  divisions  opposed  to  the  Belgian  Army. 

MILITARY  2  S  273 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY         [JULY-I 

In  presence  of  such  a  gathering  of  forces  it  became  necessary 
that  the  exact  front  to  be  held  should  be  clearly  defined. 
The  Belgian  and  French  Headquarters  Staffs  agreed  that  the 
defence  by  the  Belgian  Army  of  the  line  of  the  Yser  should  not 
go  beyond  St.  Jacques  Capelle,  which  meant  holding  a  front  of 
I2j  miles.  At  the  same  time  steps  were  taken  to  complete 
the  defence  of  the  line  towards  the  south  by  French  troops,  to 
prevent  the  flank  of  the  Army  being  turned  on  its  right. 

During  the  night  of  the  20th/2ist,  and  all  day  on  the 
2ist,  the  whole  front  was  subjected  to  an  extremely  violent 
bombardment.  The  German  artillery  fire  was  directed  now 
against  the  first  lines,  now  against  the  ground  in  rear  of 
these,  so  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  reserves  to  be  moved 
up  into  the  firing  line ;  certain  trenches  were  entirely  destroyed. 
There  was  little  infantry  fighting.  Near  Dixmude,  however, 
violent  night  attacks  were  launched  from  Beerst  on  the 
I2th  Regiment  of  the  Line.  Alternating  with  heavy  shell- 
fire,  the  assaults  were  continued  in  the  afternoon,  and  were 
so  persistent  that  two  battalions  of  the  5th  Division  had  to 
be  called  up  to  support  the  defence  of  this  point.  At  one 
moment  the  trenches  of  the  bridge-head,  south  of  Dixmude, 
were  lost,  but  a  counter-attack  recovered  them. 

At  the  end  of  the  day,  on  the  2ist,  the  general  situation* 
of  the  Army  was  critical,  since  it  had  had  to  put  in  the  greater 
part  of  its  reserves  in  order  to  hold  its  positions.  Towards 
the  end  of  the  night  of  the  2ist/22nd  the  first  serious  incident 
of  the  battle  occurred.  Under  cover  of  the  darkness  the 
enemy  gained  possession  of  a  temporary  bridge  thrown  near 
Tervaete,  and  got  across  to  the  left  bank.  A  series  of  counter- 
attacks failed  to  drive  back  the  enemy  on  to  the  right  bank  ; 
they  were  carried  out  in  the  afternoon  by  the  2nd  and  4th 
Regiments  of  the  Line,  belonging  to  the  ist  Division,  and 
by  the  8th  Line  Regiment  of  the  4th  Division,  supported  by 
the  Grenadiers  and  the  Carbineers.  A  battalion  of  Grenadiers, 
however,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  Yser  dyke,  but,  being 
insufficiently  supported,  had  to  retire  during  the  following 
night.  These  offensive  actions  were  very  costly  in  lives,  and 
greatly  used  up  the  troops  taking  part  in  them.  The  enemy 
succeeded  in  consolidating  his  positions  on  the  west  bank  of 
the  river,  and  in  deploying  infantry  there,  supported  by 
numerous  machine-guns. 
274 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

However,  the  Belgian  Artillery  never  ceased  shelling  the 
bend  of  the  river  in  order  to  render  the  position  untenable 
for  the  enemy,  and  to  prevent  him  from  throwing  foot- 
bridges across.  All  attempts  made  by  the  enemy  to  cross 
the  river  elsewhere  failed  signally.  A  determined  attack  on 
the  Schoorbakke  bridge-head  was  repulsed  during  the  morning, 
and  violent  assaults  were  unable  to  dislodge  the  4th  Line 
Regiment,  which  was  holding  this  position.  On  both  ends 
of  the  front  the  bombardment  was  continuous.  Before 
Nieuport,  a  withdrawal  of  the  German  troops  was  taken 
advantage  of  for  an  advance  towards  Lombaertzyde  and  the 
farm  of  Bamburgh  ;  the  ist  Regiment  of  Rifles  and  the 
gth  Line  Regiment  carried  this  operation  out  successfully.  At 
Dixmude  it  was  apparent  that  the  desperate  fighting  of  the 
previous  day,  which,  moreover,  had  been  resumed  during  part 
of  the  night,  had  weakened  the  enemy.  On  the  23rd  a  French 
reinforcement,  the  42nd  Division,  arrived  on  the  scene,  but 
was  directed  on  Nieuport  to  assume  the  offensive  in  that  sector. 

The  centre  of  the  front,  about  the  bend  of  Tervaete,  where 
the  enemy  was  concentrating  all  his  efforts,  remained  without 
succour,  and  the  situation  there  soon  became  critical.  During 
the  night  the  bridge-head  of  Schoorbakke  had  had  to  be 
abandoned,  the  battalion  which  was  holding  it  having  been 
enfiladed.  The  bridge  was  blown  up  just  as  German  troops 
were  approaching  it  to  cross.  The  Headquarters  Staff 
ordered  the  chord  of  the  arc  to  be  held  at  all  costs  by  clinging 
to  every  inch  of  the  ground.  In  the  whole  extent  of  the 
bend  the  troops,  supported  by  all  the  Belgian  reserves  avail- 
able, resisted  the  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire.  Whenever 
they  fell  back  their  leaders  took  them  forward  again.  In 
the  evening  the  supporting  positions  which  had  been  prepared 
along  the  chord  of  the  bend  were  still  occupied,  but  it  was 
reported  that  *  the  troops  are  exhausted  and  shaken  in  moral, 
so  that  the  slightest  incident  may  cause  them  to  be  seized 
with  panic/  The  various  corps  were  considerably  reduced  in 
strength  ;  the  ist  Regiment  of  Carbineers,  for  instance,  only 
numbered  six  officers  and  325  men.  At  Dixmude  the  com- 
mander of  the  brigade  also  reported  that  his  men  were  very 
fatigued.  Before  St.  Georges,  the  7th  Line  Regiment,  which 
occupied  trenches  at  that  place  which  had  been  continuously 
attacked  since  the  battle  began,  was  relieved  by  the  I4th 

275 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY         [JULY-E 

Line  Regiment.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  the  Army  Command, 
considering  the  situation  opposite  the  bend  to  be  grave, 
addressed  to  the  French  Army  Command  a  definite  request 
for  intervention  in  the  centre  of  the  Belgian  front.  '  Energetic 
action  on  the  part  of  as  great  a  number  as  possible,  of  the 
troops  of  the  42nd  Division  (engaged  on  the  Nieuport  side) 
can/  it  was  stated,  'still  save  the  situation/  In  the  night 
the  commander  of  the  French  troops  in  Belgium  decided  to 
comply,  in  part,  with  this  request,  and  sent  a  brigade  of  the 
42nd  Division  to  operate  in  the  bend.  It  was  to  come  into 
action  on  the  24th,  at  dawn. 

While  on  the  24th  efforts  were  being  made  to  restore  order 
amongst  the  units  which  had  become  mixed  up  in  the  course 
of  the  numerous  attacks,  the  centre  was  ordered  to  hold 
out  to  the  last  extremity,  so  as  to  give  time  for  the  French 
intervention  to  take  effect.  The  enemy,  however,  displayed 
extraordinary  activity  in  this  region,  so  that  the  Belgian 
troops  were  forced  to  retire  and  to  defend  the  line  of  the 
Beverdyk.  A  French  counter-attack  failed  to  throw  the 
enemy  back.  Before  St.  Georges,  the  I4th  Line  Regiment, 
subjected  to  an  extremely  violent  bombardment,  and  having 
had  its  right  flank  turned,  was  obliged  to  retire  behind  the  . 
Noord-Vaart,  after  having  repulsed  numerous  attacks. 

At  the  southern  end  the  enemy  attempted  a  supreme 
effort  on  Dixmude.  During  the  night  he  made  furious 
attacks  against  the  defenders  of  the  town  ;  fifteen  assaults 
were  delivered,  and  all  were  repulsed  by  the  Belgian  troops 
and  by  the  French  Marine  Fusiliers.  During  the  day  the 
attacks  were  renewed,  and  the  trenches  south  of  the  bridge- 
head had  to  be  given  up,  but  soon  the  Belgian  troops  were 
brought  back  to  their  positions  and  the  enemy 's  offensive 
was  broken.  Here  also  the  troops  were  completely  exhausted 
and  not  a  man  was  left  available  in  reserve,  so  that  reliefs 
could  no  longer  be  organised  ;  one  Belgian  battalion  was 
seventy-two  hours  in  the  trenches,  two  others  forty-three 
hours.  In  view  of  all  these  circumstances  the  Belgian  Army 
Command  insisted  that  French  reinforcements  should  be  sent 
to  remedy  the  situation  in  the  centre  of  the  Belgian  line,  and 
it  was  decided  that  this  should  be  done  next  day,  when 
almost  the  whole  42nd  Division  was  ordered  from  the  left 
wing  to  support  the  centre. 
276 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

The  25th  October  was  marked  by  a  distinct  pause  in  the 
enemy's  onslaught.  The  bombardment  was  less  violent,  and 
the  few  infantry  attacks  which  were  undertaken  were  feebly 
conducted ;  thus  there  were  evident  signs  of  the  enemy's 
exhaustion.  At  the  same  time  the  German  forces  successfully 
resisted  an  attack  from  Oud-Stuyvekenskerke  on  their  left 
flank  by  a  French  brigade  and  the  5th  Belgian  Division. 
That  evening  the  Army  had  maintained  its  positions  on  the 
Noord-Vaart  and  the  Beverdyk,  while  beyond  it  still  held 
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke  and  the  Yser  dyke  from  kilometre  15, 
and  retained  the  Nieuport  and  Dixmude  bridge-heads.  The 
comparative  calm  allowed  units  to  be  reconstituted  and  order 
restored  in  them.  The  number  of  men  disabled  was  con- 
siderable. 'By  6  P.M./  says  a  report,  '9145  wounded  had 
been  evacuated  by  rail ;  the  number  of  wounded  in  hospital 
on  the  spot,  increased  by  the  number  of  deaths  during  transit 
from  the  battle-field  to  the  evacuating  railway  stations,  is 
estimated  at  1000.  To  these  figures  must  be  added  the 
number  of  dead  on  the  battle-field,  of  the  wounded  not 
recovered,  and  of  the  missing/ 

In  the  course  of  the  day  the  Headquarters  Staff  went  into 
the  question  of  a  retirement  to  the  line  of  the  Nieuport- 
Dixmude  railway  embankment,  arid  considered  the  necessity  of 
constructing  an  important  obstacle  in  the  front  of  this  line  of 
defence.  A  plan  was  worked  out  for  inundating  the  area  lying 
between  the  above  embankment  and  the  Yser  dyke,  and,  with 
a  view  to  this,  dams  were  ordered  to  be  constructed  across 
the  aqueducts  which  pass  under  the  embankment.  All  that 
then  remained  necessary  was  to  open,  at  Nieuport,  the 
sluices  giving  access  towards  the  Beverdyk,  and  to  shut  them 
at  low  tide,  in  order  to  submerge  successively  all  the  ground 
on  which  the  German  lines  were  being  developed. 

On  the  26th  a  new  factor  began  to  aggravate  the  situation. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  battle  of  the  Yser  the  Belgian 
guns  and  howitzers  had  been  continuously  in  action,  trying 
by  their  constant  fire  to  make  up  for  the  weakness  of  the 
Army  in  men,  and  to  counterbalance  the  superiority  of  the 
enemy  in  heavy  artillery.  The  strenuous  use  made  of  the 
artillery  rendered  many  pieces  unserviceable,  and  reduced 
the  available  ammunition  to  such  a  point  that  the  batteries 
now  had  only  one  hundred  rounds  per  gun  left. 

277 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY         [JULY-C 

In  the  early  hours  of  the  morning,  on  the  left  as  well 
as  in  the  centre  of  the  front,  the  line  of  the  Beverdyk  had 
to  be  abandoned  under  the  violent  pressure  of  the  enemy, 
who  was  able  to  enfilade  the  positions  of  the  defence.  The 
line  of  the  railway  was  ordered  to  be  held  at  all  costs.  At 
various  points  the  exhausted  troops  could  only  resist  the 
attacks,  which  were  made  by  night  and  by  day,  at  the  cost 
of  considerable  losses  ;  here  and  there  they  gave  way  and 
abandoned  the  line,  but  were  able  to  regain  it  and  to  cling 
to  it  afterwards.  On  the  right  wing,  round  Dixmude,  the 
troops,  kept  on  the  alert  by  continual  attacks,  reached  the 
extreme  limit  of  their  physical  and  moral  resistance  ;  two 
battalions  of  Senegalese  arrived  in  time  to  relieve  the  most 
worn-out  of  the  defenders.  That  evening  the  bridge-head  of 
Nieuport  was  still  successfully  held,  as  well  as  the  railway 
from  Nieuport  to  Mark  4  ;  the  line  then  passed  towards 
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke  arid  joined  the  Yser  dyke  near  Mark  16, 
following  it  as  far  as  the  Dixmude  bridge-head.  The  Army 
Command,  in  order  to  meet  every  eventuality,  disposed  the 
two  Cavalry  Divisions  at  the  various  bridges  over  the  canal, 
from  Fumes  to  Loo. 

In  contrast  to  the  26th,  the  27th  and  28th  October  passed 
in  comparative  calm.  There  was  a  violent  but  intermittent 
cannonade,  directed  partly  against  the  positions,  partly 
against  the  ground  in  rear  of  the  railway,  and  the  few  attacks 
which  were  made  were  repulsed  successfully.  The  enemy's 
activity  was  more  apparent  than  real.  The  respite  was  taken 
advantage  of  to  withdraw  the  second  line  units  ferd  and 
6th  Divisions)  which  had  become  merged  in  the  firing  line, 
and  thus  to  reconstitute  reserves.  The  preparatory  work  on 
the  inundations  having  been  completed,  the  sluices  of  the 
Beverdyk  were  opened  at  Nieuport,  and  from  the  28th  the 
waters  began  to  rise  opposite  the  front  of  the  2nd  Division. 

The  enemy's  activity  was  renewed  on  the  29th.  A  heavy 
bombardment  and  violent  attacks  were  directed  against  the 
ist,  2nd,  and  4th  Divisions.  The  inundations  spread  all 
along  the  front  of  the  2nd  Division  and  gained  ground  towards 
the  south.  The  attacks  became  more  persistent  on  the  30th, 
both  on  the  left  and  on  the  centre  of  the  line,  but  were 
everywhere  repulsed,  except  opposite  Ramscapelle,  where  the 
enemy,  throwing  bombs  into  the  trenches,  gained  a  footing 
378 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

on  the  railway,  and  pushed  forward  to  the  village.  This  was 
the  only  point  at  which  the  line  was  pierced.  A  counter- 
attack, preceded  by  violent  preparatory  artillery  fire,  was 
made  against  Ramscapelle,  in  the  afternoon  and  during  the 
following  night,  by  the  6th  Line  Regiment,  a  battalion  of 
the  yth,  a  battalion  of  the  I4th,  and  two  French  battalions. 
It  was  entirely  successful,  the  Ramscapelle  wayside  station 
being  reoccupied  by  the  Belgian  and  French  troops,  so  that 
the  line  of  defence  was  reconstituted  as  before.4 

On  the  other  parts  of  the  front  the  enemy  showed  no 
more  activity  whatever,  and  the  bombardment  diminished  in 
intensity.  Everywhere  the  inundations  continued  to  pro- 
gress, and  already  made  the  trenches  between  the  railway 
embankment  and  the  Yser  dyke  untenable  by  the  enemy  in 
many  places.  The  Battle  of  the  Yser  was  over.  The  enemy's 
advance  had  been  stopped,  and  soon  he  only  held  a  few 
centres  of  resistance  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Yser.  He  retired, 
abandoning  wounded,  arms,  and  ammunition. 

But  the  losses  of  the  Belgian  Army  had  been  very  serious, 
amounting  to  14,000  men  killed  and  wounded.  The  infantry 
was  reduced  from  48,000  to  32,000  rifles,  and  more  than  half 
the  guns  of  the  artillery  were  temporarily  unserviceable. 
This  long  and  heroic  resistance  broke  the  onslaught  of  seven 
German  Divisions,  inflicting  considerable  losses  on  them,  and 
rendering  them  incapable  of  further  action  for  a  long  while, 
and  time  was  thus  gained  which  allowed  of  the  Franco-British 
front  being  strongly  established  to  the  south,  and  of  a  barrier 
being  set  up  against  which  all  the  German  attacks  were 
to  come  to  nothing  during  the  •  great  battles  round  Ypres 
at  the  end  of  October  and  during  the  first  fortnight  in 
November. 

During  the  two  succeeding  months  the  operations  on  the 
Yser  front  were  confined  to  slow  gains  or  losses  of  ground. 
On  the  3rd  November,  Belgian  reconnaissances  advanced  as 
far  as  Lombaertzyde  ;  one  of  them  crossed  the  Yser  south  of 
St.  Georges  and  reached  the  outskirts  of  Mannekensvere  on 
the  right  bank.  On  the  other  wing  the  French  tried  to 
enlarge  the  Dixmude  bridge-head.  On  the  4th  November, 
Belgian  forces  attacked  Lombaertzyde  and  occupied  it,  but 
a  violent  counter-attack,  made  at  nightfall,  drove  them  back 
to  the  .Nieuport  bridge-head,  where  the  assailants,  however, 

279 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-D 

were  unable  to  gain  a  footing.  On  the  8th  and  loth  November, 
the  attempt  was  renewed  by  the  8ist  French  Territorial 
Division,  which  got  up  to  within  200  metres  of  the  German 
trenches  and  there  established  itself.  Attacks  made  simul- 
taneously on  St.  Georges,  Schoorbakke,  and  Tervaete  were 
not  productive  of  substantial  gain,  the  approaches  to  the 
enemy's  positions  having  to  be  made  by  the  existing  narrow 
passages  through  the  inundations.  Commencing  on  the  gth 
a  new  attempt  was  made  by  the  enemy  against  Dixmude. 
The  ruins  of  the  town  and  its  approaches  towards  Caeskerke 
were  first  subjected  to  an  uninterrupted  shell-fire.  On  the 
loth  at  noon,  after  a  bombardment  of  the  trenches,  an 
assault  succeeded  in  breaking  through  the  line.  The  ist  Line 
Regiment  and  the  French  Marine  Fusiliers  defended  them- 
selves most  stubbornly.  At  6.15  P.M.  the  enemy  reached 
the  Yser,  but  he  was  unable  to  get  any  farther.  The  capture 
of  the  ruins  of  Dixmude  marked  the  end  of  the  enemy's 
offensive  operations,  and  he  thereafter  confined  himself  to 
an  intermittent  bombardment  of  the  ground  adjoining  the 
Yser.  This  cannonade  was  sometimes  extended  as  far  as 
Furnes,  which  is  7^  miles  in  rear  of  the  river. 

The  activity  of  the  Belgian  Army  during  this  period  was 
principally  manifested  by  reconnaissances  and  by  pushing 
forward  small  bodies  of  infantry  across  the  inundations  to  the 
little  islands  formed  by  isolated  farms.  Towards  the  middle 
of  December  a  more  serious  operation  resulted  in  the  occu- 
pation of  St.  Georges,  which  had  remained  in  the  enemy's 
hands.  A  French  mixed  force,  supported  by  portions  of  the 
Belgian  2nd  and  4th  Divisions,  began  the  attack  on  the 
Lombaertzyde  side.  At  the  same  time  the  other  Belgian 
divisions  in  first  line  pushed  reconnaissances  in  force  towards 
the  various  points  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  attack  pro- 
gressed slowly  under  a  continuous  bombardment.  On  the 
left,  ground  was  gained  step  by  step,  till  on  the  i6th  the  front 
of  attack  extended  to  the  sea.  During  the  night  of  the  i6th- 
I7th,  the  French  troops  repulsed,  at  Lombaertzyde,  seven 
determined  attacks  of  the  enemy,  and  on  the  i8th  they  were 
able  to  establish  themselves  definitively  at  100  metres  from 
the  German  positions.  They  also  gradually  approached 
St.  Georges,  which  they  captured  on  the  28th  December.  At 
the  end  of  1914,  the  enemy  held  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Yser 
280 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

only  a  few  listening  and  observation  posts,  scattered  in  the 
flooded  plain. 

GENERAL  SUMMARY 

Up  to  the  moment  when,  on  the  night  of  the  3rd  to  the 
4th  August,  more  than  twenty-four  hours  after  the  receipt  of 
the  German  threatening  Note,  Belgium  had  become  certain 
that  Germany  was  about  to  violate  her  frontiers,  the  Belgian 
Army  remained  distributed  in  the  country  in  accordance  with 
the  military  exigencies  dictated  by  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  ; 
one  advanced  guard  division  faced  towards  England,  two 
others  towards  France,  and  a  fourth  towards  Germany. 

The  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  imposed  on  Belgium 
certain  obligations  ;  the  corresponding  measures  were  decreed 
immediately.  The  plan  of  defence,  the  realisation  of  which 
was  pursued  throughout  by  the  Army  Command  with  reso- 
lution and  consistency,  was  in  strict  accord  with  the  under- 
taking which  Belgium  had  on  the  4th  August  assumed  towards 
the  guaranteeing  Powers,  namely,  to  organise  with  the  forces 
of  these  latter,  'both  concerted  action  and  joint  operations, 
with  a  view  to  safeguarding  the  independence  and  the  integrity 
of  the  country/  This  plan  consisted,  in  the  face  of  the  very 
superior  hostile  forces,  in  denying,  at  all  times,  as  great  a 
portion  as  possible  of  Belgian  territory  to  the  invader,  and  in 
establishing  the  Army,  for  this  purpose,  on  such  defensive  lines 
as  would  enable  resistance  to  be  offered  under  favourable 
conditions,  in  concert  with  the  forces  of  the  guaranteeing 
Powers.  At  the  same  time  the  plan  aimed  at  avoiding  the 
exposure  of  the  Army,  guardian  of  the  Nation,  to  certain  loss, 
if  the  junction  with  those  forces  should  not  have  been  effected 
before  the  arrival  of  the  enemy's  masses.  It  was  only  on  the 
Yser  that  the  junction  with  the  Armies  of  the  guaranteeing 
Powers  was  able  to  be  effected,  and  that  a  continuous  line  of 
defence  was  constituted.  By  that  time  almost  the  whole 
territory  was  in  the  hands  of  the  invaders,  but  the  Field  Army 
had  remained  intact  and  was  ready  for  a  stubborn  resistance 
in  joint  operations.  At  the  critical  moment  of  the  campaign, 
on  the  i8th  August,  when  it  became  necessary  to  abandon 
the  position  on  the  Gette,  as  on  the  6th  October  when  the 
retreat  towards  Flanders  had  to  be  undertaken,  and  similarly 
during  the  retreat  itself,  the  decisions  arrived  at  were  in  all 

281 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY        [JULY-DE 

cases  inspired  by  these  leading  principles   of   the   plan   of 
defence. 

The  Field  Army  was  at  all  times  confronted  by  hostile 
forces  considerably  superior  both  in  numbers  and  in  armament, 
except  before  Antwerp  from  the  22nd  August  to  the  25th 
September,  and  yet,  on  the  Gette,  about  the  middle  of  August, 
as  at  Antwerp  in  the  beginning  of  October,  it  held  on  to  its 
positions  up  to  the  extreme  limit  compatible  with  its  preser- 
vation, thus  affording  to  the  Armies  of  the  guaranteeing 
Powers  the  maximum  of  time  in  which  to  come  to  its  aid. 
When  the  Belgian  Field  Army  took  up  its  position  on  the  line 
of  the  Yser,  the  only  diminution  its  fighting  strength  had 
suffered  after  two  and  a  half  months  of  war,  was  due  to  the 
losses  incurred  on  the  battle-field ;  no  single  formed  unit  had 
been  captured  by  the  enemy. 

Before  Antwerp,  from  the  22nd  August  to  the  25th  Sep- 
tember, the  Belgian  Army  devoted  itself  to  lightening  the  task 
of  the  Armies  of  the  guaranteeing  Powers.  During  that 
period  it  took  advantage  of  every  favourable  opportunity 
to  attack  the  army  of  observation  which  was  opposed  to  it. 
It  constantly  detained  in  its  front  hostile  forces  at  least  its 
equal  in  strength,  and  often  its  superior,  at  moments  when  their 
support  was  urgently  required  in  the  principal  theatre  of  war. 

After  a  retreat  of  nearly  ninety  miles,  when  the  junction 
had  been  effected  on  the  Yser,  the  Belgian  Army,  with  the 
support  of  a  French  brigade,  subsequently  reinforced  by  a 
division,  was  able  to  break  the  violent  efforts  of  an  army  of 
150,000  men  on  a  defensive  front,  which,  by  this  decisive 
resistance,  it  has  rendered  safe  from  further  attack. 

Lastly,  the  Army  Command,  also  in  accordance  with  the 
engagements  assumed  by  Belgium,  organised  the  defence  of 
the  fortresses  of  Liege,  Namur,  and  Antwerp.  But  the 
besiegers,  owing  to  the  power  of  their  artillery,  possessed  so 
great  a  superiority  that  the  fortified  positions  were  unable  to 
offer  a  prolonged  resistance. 

Thus,  from  whatever  point  of  view  the  operations  of  the 
Belgian  Army,  during  the  period  under  review,  are  considered, 
it  may  be  claimed  that  Belgium  as  scrupulously  fulfilled  the 
obligations  imposed  by  her  neutrality,  when  once  it  had  been 
trampled  on,  as  she  had  adhered  to  them  while  still  sheltered 
under  the  guarantee  of  the  Treaties. 
282 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

SECOND  BELGIAN  GREY  BOOK1 
SECOND  PART— SECTION  I. 

GERMAN  ACCUSATIONS  IN  REGARD  TO  THE  ATTITUDE  OF  THE 
BELGIAN  CIVIL  POPULATION 

No.  68 

M.   Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to   the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  The  Hague,  London,  Paris,  and  Madrid 

Brussels,  August  12,  1914. 

Please  inform  the  Minister  oi  Foreign  Affairs  and  the 
press  that  the  Belgian  Government  indignantly  protests 
against  the  assertion  of  the  Wolff  Bureau  that  the  inhabitants 
of  the  district  of  Liege  have  taken  part  in  the  fighting,  that 
others  have  lain  in  ambush  and  shot  German  doctors  who 
were  attending  to  wounded  men,  and  that  wounded  men 
have  been  cruelly  treated. 

Belgium  is  scrupulously  observing  The  Hague  Convention 
on  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War,  of  which  she  was  a  signatory. 
The  Government  has  reminded  the  population  that  civilians 
must  abstain  absolutely  from  the  use  of  their  arms  against 
the  invaders,  and  that  only  the  army  and  militia  forces  which 
fulfil  the  necessary  conditions  have  that  right  and  duty. 

(Signed)        DAVIGNON. 


No.  69 

M .  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Grenier, 
Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid 

Antwerp,  August  18,  1914. 

SIR, — Be  so  good  as  to  request  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  kindly  to  communicate  the  enclosed  protest  from  the 
Belgian  Government  to  the  Imperial  German  Government. 

(Signed)        DAVIGNON. 

1  [Translated  from  the  Belgian  Government's  Correspoydance  Diplomatique 
relative  a  la  Guerre  de  1914-1915,  Part  2.  The  First  Belgian  Grey  Book 
appears  in  Diplomatic,  2.  The  Second  Grey  Book  is  given  in  Diplomatic,  3. 
Only  those  sections  of  the  second  part  of  this  which  have  a  military 
character  are  given  here;  sections  vii.  and  xvi.  have  already  appeared 
in  Military,  i.] 

283 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  69 
Note 

Belgium,  which  desired  peace,  has  been  compelled  by 
Germany  to  take  up  arms  and  legitimately  to  defend  herself 
against  an  attack  that  was  unjustifiable  and  contrary  to  the 
solemn  engagements  of  treaties.  She  considers  it  a  point  of 
honour  to  carry  on  the  struggle  loyally  and  to  observe  all  the 
Laws  and  Customs  of  War.  From  the  moment  of  the  entry 
of  German  troops  into  her  territory  the  Belgian  Government 
has  had  posted  in  every  commune,  and  the  newspapers  have 
published  every  day,  orders  forbidding  non-combatant  civilians 
to  commit  any  act  of  warfare  against  the  troops  and  the 
military  invading  the  country.  The  information  on  which 
the  German  Government  believes  it  can  rely  to  justify  its 
assertion  that  the  Belgian  population  is  contravening  the  laws 
of  nations  and  is  quite  unworthy  of  respect,  is  certainly 
false.  The  Government  enters  the  most  earnest  protest 
against  the  truth  of  the  allegations  which  have  been  advanced, 
and  against  the  odious  threats  of  reprisals. 

If  some  particular  act  which  is  contrary  to  the  laws  of 
war  were  to  be  ultimately  established,  it  would  be  proper  in 
order  to  appreciate  it  justly  to  make  allowance  for  the  legiti- 
mate state  of  nervousness  which  the  cruelties  committed  by 
the  German  soldiers  have  provoked  among  the  Belgian  people, 
a  people  which  is  thoroughly  honourable,  but  vigorous  in 
the  defence  of  its  rights  and  in  its  respect  for  humanity. 
Long  indeed  would  already  be  the  list  of  these  atrocities,  of 
which  we  are  collecting  the  first,  were  we  now  to  publish  it. 

Whole  regions  have  been  ravaged,  and  abominable  crimes 
committed  in  their  villages. 

A  Committee  appointed  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  is 
drawing  up  a  catalogue  of  these  horrors  with  scrupulous 
impartiality. 

The  following  may  be  quoted  as  examples  illustrating  the 
state  of  mind  and  the  conduct  of  various  German  troops : — 

(i)  A  troop  of  Uhlans  occupying  Linsmeau  was  attacked 
by  some  infantry  and  by  two  policemen  employed  as  sharp- 
shooters. A  German  officer  was  killed.  The  German  soldiers 
thought  that  the  officer  had  been  attacked  by  civilians.  This 
284 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

is  absolutely  incorrect ;  the  Belgian  officers  knew  that  the 
German  officer  had  been  killed  by  their  men,  and  they  had  given 
the  burgomaster  of  Linsmeau  the  order  to  bury  the  German 
officer.  This  point  was  specially  investigated  at  the  inquiry, 
and  it  was  established  beyond  all  possible  doubt  that  the 
inhabitants  of  Linsmeau  scrupulously  abstained  from  any 
act  of  hostility.  The  burgomaster  of  Linsmeau  vouched  for 
this  over  and  over  again  to  the  officer  in  command  of  the 
German  troops. 

But  in  vain.  The  village  was  invaded  in  the  evening 
of  Monday,  August  loth,  by  a  great  number  of  Uhlans, 
followed  by  artillery,  and  machine-guns.  They  opened  fire 
on  two  farms  and  six  or  seven  houses,  and  destroyed  and 
burnt  them  down. 

They  forced  all  the  male  inhabitants  of  the  village  to  leave 
their  houses  and  give  up  their  arms.  They  did  not  find  one 
that  had  recently  been  fired.  Nevertheless,  they  divided  the 
men  into  three  groups.  The  men  of  one  of  these  groups  were 
tied  with  ropes.  Eleven  of  these  peasants  were  placed  in  a 
ditch,  where  they  were  found  with  their  heads  battered  in  by 
the  butt  ends  of  rifles.  All  of  them  were  dead.  The  others 
were  made  to  walk  between  horses  into  the  country  under 
the  constant  threat  of  being  shot.  They  were  finally  released 
with  the  threat  that  the  village  would  be  completely  destroyed 
if  any  of  them  left  his  house  at  night. 

(2)  During   the   night   of   Monday,    August    loth,    great 
numbers  of  Uhlans  went  to  Velm.     The  inhabitants  were 
asleep.     The  Germans,  without  any  provocation  whatever, 
fired  on  the  house  of  M.  Deglimme-Gevers,  then  broke  in 
and  destroyed  the  furniture,  and  stole  what  money  they  could 
find. 

They  set  fire  to  the  barn,  the  crops,  the  agricultural 
implements  ;  six  oxen  and  the  poultry  were  burnt  to  death. 
They  took  away  M.  Deglimme-Gevers'  wife  half  naked  to  a 
distance  of  over  a  mile  from  the  house,  let  her  go,  and  then 
fired  on  her  but  did  not  hit  her.  They  took  the  husband  in 
another  direction  and  put  three  bullets  into  him.  He  is  now 
in  a  dying  condition. 

The  same  Uhlans  also  sacked  and  burnt  the  house  of  the 
level-crossing  watchman. 

(3)  At  the  agency  of  the  National  Bank  at  Liege,  German 

285 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

troops  have  seized  400,000  francs'  worth  of  unstamped  five- 
franc  notes  which  ought  not  to  have  been  stamped  except  by 
order  of  the  Directors  of  the  Bank  in  Brussels.  The  die  was 
at  the  printer's.  The  German  authorities  ordered  the  notes 
to  be  stamped,  and  they  are  now  using  them. 

(4)  The  following  communication  was  received  from 
Haekendevez,  on  August  the  I4th,  1914,  by  the  officer  in  com- 
mand of  the  ist  D.A.  at  Cumptich : — 

Record  of  information  which  has  been  collected  in  regard 
to  the  conduct  of  German  cavalry  at  Orsmael  and  Neerhespen 
on  the  loth,  nth,  and  I2th  of  August : — 

(i)  Facts  sworn  to  by  the  farmer  Jef  Dierickx  of  Neer- 
hespen. 

An  old  man  of  the  district  has  had  his  arm  cut  into 
three  parts  longitudinally,  and  was  then  hung  up  by  the  feet 
and  burnt  alive. 

Certain  persons  in  Orsmael  have  had  their  sexual  organs 
removed ;  young  girls  and  children  have  been  violated. 

A  wounded  rifleman-cyclist  who  had  been  made 'prisoner 
was  hanged,  and  the  Belgian  soldier  who  was  looking  after  him 
was  put  up  against  a  telegraph-post  along  the  road  to  Saint- 
Trond  and  shot. 


No.  70 

From  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid  to  M.  Davignon,  Minister 

of  Foreign  Affairs 

Madrid,  October  6,  1914. 

SIR, — I  have  duly  executed  the  instructions  contained  in 
your  letter  of  August  18,  and  have  requested  the  Minister 
of  State  to  communicate  to  the  German  Government  the 
protest  of  the  Belgian  Government  against  the  inhuman 
behaviour  of  the  German  troops.  His  Excellency  has  just 
told  me  that  the  Spanish  Ambassador  in  Berlin  had  informed 
him  that  immediately  after  receiving  this  communication  he 
had  forwarded  it  to  the  German  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Signed)        BARON  GRENIER. 


286 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 


No.  71 

M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  all  the  Diplomatic 
Representatives  abroad 

Havre,  December  30,  1914. 

SIR, — The  German  authorities  have  repeatedly  accused 
the  Belgian  civil  population  of  having  everywhere  organised 
in  a  systematic  and  odious  way  armed  resistance  to  all  the 
operations  of  the  German  troops  in  Belgium.  The  Com- 
mittee of  Inquiry,  in  several  of  their  reports,  entirely  de- 
molished the  fantastic  stories  which  the  Germans  have 
tried  to  make  foreign  countries  believe,  with  the  object  of 
justifying  their  own  misdeeds.  But  the  German  Govern- 
ment has  gone  further ;  it  has  had  the  effrontery  to  maintain 
that  the  Belgian  Government  itself  had  organised  this  resist- 
ance on  the  part  of  the  civilian  population. 

The  Emperor  of  Germany  declared  this  urbi  et  orbi  in 
his  telegram  to  President  Wilson  x :   '  They  (the  Allies)  have  J  [Cf . 
not  only  made  use  of  abominable  weapons  of  war   (dum-  Military ,  i 
dum  bullets)  but  the  Belgian  Government  have  openly  stirred  P-  201] 
up  the  whole  civilian  population  which  had  been  long  pre- 
paring for  the  struggle,  and  in  which  even  women  and  priests 
took  part/ 

Afterwards  details  were  supplied.  The  German  Lega- 
tion at  Bukarest  sent  to  the  press  in  August  last  a  communi- 
cation relative  to  the  destruction  of  the  town  of  Louvain, 
which  says  :  '  The  Belgian  Government  had  long  ago  or- 
ganised a  rising  against  any  enemy  that  might  invade  their 
territory.  They  had  arranged  stores  of  arms,  where  each 
rifle  bore  the  name  of  the  citizen  for  whom  it  was  destined.  . 
.  .  .  This  attack  (at  Louvain)  was  all  the  more  odious  since 
it  had  clearly  been  prepared  beforehand  and  took  place  at 
the  same  time  as  the  sortie  from  Antwerp.  .  .  .' 

Not  long  ago  the  German  press  raised  this  question  again. 
These  accusations  must  not  remain  unanswered,  however 
absurd  they  may  seem,  at  first  sight,  to  any  impartial  person. 

As  early  as  August  18  I  requested  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment to  protest  against  them  in  Berlin.  I  sent  you  a  copy, 
on  August  the  2ist,  of  the  Note  sent  to  the  German  Govern- 
ment. I  called  attention  to  the  circulars  and  placards  which 

287 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

had  been  posted  in  all  the  communes  of  Belgium  at  the 
beginning  of  hostilities  in  order  to  deter  the  inhabitants  from 
any  act  of  hostility  against  the  enemy.  The  reproduction 
of  these  circulars  and  posters  issued  by  our  Ministry  of  the 
Interior  and  by  our  communal  authorities  might  still  at  this 
moment  be  useful  in  certain  countries. 

The  Minister  of  the  Interior  has  on  this  subject  sent  the 
Note  of  which  I  enclose  herewith  a  copy. 

In  it  you  will  find  all  the  information  necessary  for  giving 
a  formal  denial  to  the  German  accusations.  I  le$,ve  it  to 
you  to  decide  when  to  publish  such  denials.  Circumstances 
will  guide  you  as  to  the  best  use  you  can  make  of  the  informa- 
tion contained  in  the  note  transmitted  to  me  by  M.  Berryer. 

I  should  be  obliged  to  you  if  you  would  inform  me  what 
action  you  decide  to  take.  (Signed)  DAVIGNON. 

ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  71 

Note 

To  justify  their  misdeeds  in  Belgium,  and  to  excuse  in 
the  eyes  of  the  civilised  world  their  infamous  attack  on  a 
Power  so  manifestly  peace-loving  as  Belgium,  Germany  is  now 
seeking  by  every  means  to  spread  abroad  the  vilest  calumnies 
against  our  country.  After  having  violated  our  neutrality 
with  the  most  brazen  cynicism,  she  is  now  trying  to  send  down 
to  history  the  absurd  fable  that  our  country  had  already 
taken  sides  against  Germany  before  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

The  whole  of  the  diplomatic  history  of  our  country  is  an 
answer  to  this  calumny. 

It  may  nevertheless  serve  a  useful  purpose  to  recall  what 
care  the  Government  devoted  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
strictest  neutrality  down  to  the  very  eve  of  war,  even  to  the 
moment  when  that  neutrality  was  about  to  be  violated  by 
one  of  the  Powers  that  had  formally  guaranteed  it. 

On  Saturday,  August  i,  1914,  M.  Berryer,  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  addressed  the  following  telegram  to  the  Governors 
of  the  Provinces  : 

In  the  midst  of  the  events  that  are  developing,  Belgium 
is  determined  to  defend  her  neutrality ;  it  ought  to  be 
respected,  but  it  is  the  duty  of  the  nation  to  take  what- 
ever measures  to  that  end  the  situation  may  require.  It  is 

288 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

therefore  important  that  the  population  should  co-operate 
with  the  Government  by  avoiding  any  manifestation  that 
might  be  of  a  nature  to  bring  the  country  into  difficulties  with 
one  or  other  of  its  neighbours  ;  thus  the  Burgomasters  should 
at  once  take  steps  to  forbid  all  meetings  that  might  have  the 
object  of  showing  sympathy  or  antipathy  for  one  country 
or  another.  It  is  also  important  that,  in  accordance  with 
Article  97  of  trie  municipal  law,  the  Burgomaster  and  alder- 
men should  prohibit  any  cinematograph,  exhibition  which 
represents  military  scenes  likely  to  arouse  passion  and  to 
provoke  popular  excitement  dangerous  to  the  public  order. 
Please  take  immediate  steps  to  have  these  instructions  carried 
out  without  delay.  PAUL  BERRYER, 

Minister  of  the  Interior. 

Effect  was  at  once  given  to  the  appeal  of  the  Minister  of 
the  Interior.  The  Burgomasters  hastened  to  take  measures 
in  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  his  circular. 
On  Sunday,  August  2,  some  hours  before  the  ultimatum, 
M.  Carton  de  Wiart,  Minister  of  Justice,  the  King's  Attorney 
in  Brussels,  had  the  newspaper  Le  Petit  Bleu  confiscated  for 
definitely  taking  sides  with  one  of  the  belligerents,  in  this 
case  France.  All  the  laws  of  warfare  have  been  violated  by 
Germany.  She  does  not  now  even  seek  to  excuse  herself, 
but,  realising  that  certain  laws  of  humanity  cannot  be  broken 
without  incurring  universal  reprobation,  she  is  again  having 
recourse  to  calumny.  Vaguely,  and  without  any  shadow  of 
proof,  she  declares  that  the  murder,  pillage,  and  incendiarism 
of  which  she  has  been  guilty  are  justified  by  the  participation 
of  the  Belgian  civilian  population  in  acts  of  hostility. 

And  to  make  such  a  general  statement  credible  without 
proofs,  she  alleges  the  existence  of  a  regular  system,  organised 
by  her  adversaries,  and  in  so  many  words  accuses  the  Belgian 
Government  of  having  armed  the  civilian  population  and 
of  having  incited  them  to  take  part  in  the  struggle.  In  order 
to  refute  this  facile  allegation,  which,  if  only  superficial  minds 
would  accept  it  as  true,  would  have  the  advantage  of  relieving 
the  accusers  of  all  necessity  to  produce  specific  proof,  it  suffices 
to  give  the  real  facts.  On  August  4,  when  war  had  been 
declared  on  us,  and  the  enemy  had  already  set  foot  on  our 
soil,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  M.  Berryer,  sent  an  explicit 

MILITARY  2  T  289 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

circular  to  the  2600  communes  of  the  country  concerning 
the  duties  of  the  authorities  and  the  attitude  of  the  civilian 
population.  The  following  is  an  extract : 

'  According  to  the  laws  of  war,  acts  of  hostility,  that  is,  any 
resistance  and  attack  by  arms,  or  the  use  of  arms  against 
isolated  soldiers  of  the  enemy,  or  direct  intervention  in  fights 
or  skirmishes,  are  never  permitted  to  those  who  do  not  belong 
to  the  army  or  the  Garde  Civique,  or  to  volunteer  corps  under 
military  law,  obeying  a  recognised  head  and  wearing  a  visible 
distinctive  badge. 

'If  the  population  of  a  territory  that  has  not  yet  been 
occupied  by  the  enemy  spontaneously  takes  arms  on  the 
approach  of  the  invader  without  having  had  time  to  provide 
itself  with  a  military  organisation,  it  will  be  deemed  a 
belligerent  body  if  it  carries  arms  openly  and  conforms  to 
the  laws  of  war.  Isolated  individuals  who  do  not  belong  to 
any  of  these  categories,  and  who  commit  an  act  of  hostility, 
would  not  be  considered  belligerents.  If  made  prisoners,  they 
are  liable  to  be  treated  more  severely  than  a  prisoner  of  war, 
and  might  even  be  put  to  death. 

'  The  inhabitants  are  still  more  earnestly  enjoined  to  abstain 
from '  acts  that  are  prohibited  even  to  soldiers  :  these  acts 
are  more  particularly  the  use  of  poison  or  poisoned  arms, 
the  treacherous  killing  or  wounding  of  individuals  belonging  to 
the  army  or  nation  of  the  invader,  the  killing  or  wounding  of 
an  enemy  who,  after  giving  up  his  arms  and  depriving  himself 
of  the  means  of  self-defence,  has  surrendered  unconditionally.' 

The  first  German  authorities  to  penetrate  into  the  town 
of  Liege  must  certainly  have  read  the  notices  which  had  already 
been  posted  by  the  Burgomaster  of  that  city,  M.  Kleyer,  on 
August  the  5th,  which  are  identical  in  terms  with  the  circular 
of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior. 

The  text  of  a  poster  which  the  Burgomaster  of  Brussels, 
M.  Max,  had  posted  on  the  walls  of  the  city  is  subjoined  as 
an  example. 

CITY  OF  BRUSSELS 
Fire- Arms 

The  laws  of  war  forbid  the  civil  population  to  take  part 
in  hostilities,  and  as  any  infringement  of  this  rule  may 
290 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

be  the  cause  of  reprisals,  many  of  my  fellow-citizens  have 
expressed  a  desire  to  get  rid  of  the  fire-arms  in  their  posses- 
sion. These  arms  may  be  deposited  at  the  police  stations, 
where  a  receipt  for  them  will  be  given.  They  will  be  placed 
in  safe  custody  at  the  central  Arsenal  at  Antwerp,  and  will  be 
returned  to  their  owners  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

ADOLPHE  MAX, 
Burgomaster. 

Everywhere  communal  authorities  took  the  same  precau- 
tions, either  by  proclamations  addressed  to  the  population 
or,  what  was  even  better,  by  providing  that  all  arms  should 
be  deposited  at  the  town  halls  or  police  stations. 

Moreover,  one  of  the  first  measures  taken  by  the  Germans 
in  the  occupied  regions  was  to  repeat  this  same  order  with  the 
addition  of  threats  of  capital  punishment. 

Nevertheless,  this  measure  of  extreme  prudence,  which 
exposed  defenceless  victims  to  the  rage  of  the  invaders,  has 
with  incredible  bad  faith  been  itself  used  as  a  weapon  against 
us.  Ignominy  cannot  reach  greater  depths  than  this.  A  com- 
muniqufr  from  the  German  Legation  at  Bukarest,  which  was 
published  in  the  Ind&pendance  Roumaine  of  the  2ist  August 
(5th  September)  1914,  charges  the  Belgian  Government  not  only 
with  having  given  the  civilian  population  instructions  with 
a  view  to  resistance  and  with  having  organised  beforehand 
a  rising  against  any  enemy  that  invaded  our  territory,  '  but 
especially  with  having  organised  depots  of  arms  where  every 
rifle  bore  the  name  of  the  citizen  for  whom  it  was  intended/ 
Does  not  this  last  detail  prove  to  demonstration  that  the  arms 
referred  to  were  those  which  had  been  collected  from  private 
individuals  and  were  intended  to  be  returned  to  them  ?  In 
arsenals  it  is  not  usual  to  mark  the  arms  beforehand  with 
the  names  of  the  soldiers  who  are  to  bear  them.  .  .  . 

By  such  contradictions  and  absurdities  falsehood  stands 
unmistakably  revealed. 

While  the  Belgian  communal  authorities  were  thus,  in 
accordance  with  the  instructions  of  their  Government,  taking 
the  most  efficacious  measures  for  preventing  the  civilian 
population  from  giving  way  to  their  instinct  to  repel  by 
any  means  a  powerful  and  ferocious  enemy  who  was  threaten- 
ing their  homes,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  was  at  pains 

291 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

daily  to  repeat  semi-officially  through  the  channel  of  the 
press  of  all  parties  throughout  the  country,  in  large  type 
in  a  conspicuous  position,  the  following  recommendations  :— 


To  THE  CIVIL  POPULATION 

The  Minister  of  the  Interior  recommends  all  civilians 
inhabiting   a   district   in   which   the   enemy  makes  his 
appearance  : 
Not  to  fight : 

Not  to  use  insulting  language  or  threats  : 
To  stay  indoors  and  to  shut  the  windows  so  that  it 
cannot  be  said  that  there  has  been  any  provocation. 
If  the  soldiers  occupy  a  house  or  isolated  hamlet  for 
the  purpose  of  defence,  to  evacuate  it,  so  that  it 
cannot  be  said  that  shots  were  fired  by  civilians. 
Any  act  of  violence  committed  by  a  single  jcivilian 
would  be  a  veritable  crime  contrary  to  the  law  and  punish- 
able by  imprisonment,  because  it  might  serve  as  a  pretext 
for  sanguinary  repression,  pillage,  and  the  massacre  of 
innocent  persons  and  of  women  and  children. 

Finally,  shortly  before  the  capture  of  Antwerp  on  September 
30,  1914,  when  that  part  of  the  country  which  had  not  yet 
been  invaded  seemed  to  be  in  danger,  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior  once  more  sent  out  a  circular  in  French,  Flemish,  and 
German  to  all  the  communes,  so  that  nobody  should  be 
ignorant  of,  and  that  the  German  authorities  themselves 
might  know,  the  recommendations  which  had  been  issued 
by  the  Government  to  the  communal  authorities  and  to  the 
civil  population. 

This  has  not  prevented  the  German  papers  from  saying 
again  quite  recently  that  everywhere  and  always  in  Belgium 
(the  definiteness  of  this  statement  should  be  noted)  the  civilian 
population  have  borne  arms  against  German  soldiers,  and 
that,  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Government  has  done 
nothing  to  prevent  them. 


292 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

SECTION   IV 

BOMBARDMENT  BY  ZEPPELINS 
No.  75 

M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  in  Paris,  London,  St.  Petersburg,  The  Hague, 
Rome,  and  Washington 

(Telegraphic.)  Antwerp,  August  25,  1914. 

During  the  night  of  the  24th-25th,  a  dirigible  balloon  of 
the  Zeppelin  type  flew  at  a  low  altitude  over  the  town  of 
Antwerp  and  dropped  in  succession  eight  bombs  of  great 
explosive  force.  The  Police  inquiry  showed  that  there  were 
ten  killed,  all  innocent  civilians,  of  whom  four  were  women, 
and  eight  wounded,  some  of  them  mortally.  The  material 
damage  is  considerable.  This  bombardment  constitutes  a 
violation  of  Article  26  of  the  Fourth  Hague  Convention  of  1907. 

(Signed)       .DAVIGNON. 


No.  76 

M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Diplomatic 
Representatives  of  Foreign  Powers  in  Belgium 

Antwerp,  August  26,  1914. 

The  Belgian  Government  has  the  honour  of  acquainting 
the  Legations  of  the  Foreign  Powers  in  Belgium  with  the  facts 
set  forth  in  the  enclosed  note,  which  constitute  on  the  part 
of  the  German  authorities  a  violation  of  Article  26  of  the 
Fourth  Hague  Convention  of  1907. 

ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  76 

Antwerp,  August  25,  1914. 
The  Court  of  First  Instance, 
sitting  at  Antwerp. 

To  the  Procurator-General. 

SIR, — I  have  the  honour  to  submit  a  report  on  the  grave 
events  of  last  night. 

M.  Baucarne,  advocate,  M.  de  Duve,  of  65  rue  du  Peage, 

293 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

and  my  colleague,  M.  Michielsen,  agree  in  declaring  that  a 
Zeppelin  airship  came  over  the  town  from  the  direction  of  the 
manoeuvre  ground.  It  dropped  successively  bombs  of  great 
explosive  force : — (i)  on  a  glass  house  belonging  to  the 
Minerva  factory  ;  (2)  on  a  house  in  the  rue  Lozane ;  (3) 
rue  Verdussen  ;  (4)  rue  de  la  Justice ;  (5)  rue  des  Escrimeurs ; 
(6)  rue  Leopold ;  (7)  rue  des  Douze-Mois  ;  (8)  rue  du  Poids 
Public. 

The  evidence  above  mentioned  shows  that  this  itinerary 
is  probably  correct.  M.  Michielsen  declares  that,  after  having 
reached  a  certain  point,  the  airship  returned  in  the  same 
direction  whence  it  came. 

The  damage  done  is  of  two  kinds. 

Several  people  were  killed  and  wounded.  The  material 
damage  done  is  considerable.  In  the  8th  section,  M.  Leon  Peeters 
and  his  wife,  Sylvie  Hurnaux,  living  at  29  rue  Verbissem  (sic) 
were  slightly  wounded.  At  40  rue  des  Escrimeurs,  a  servant 
was  killed  and  another  one  dangerously  wounded.  In  the 
2nd  section  (Poids  Public),  the  number  of  victims  is  very 
large.  This  is  the  list  :— 

(1)  Van    Catthem,    Jean-Jaques,    policeman,    dead,    112 

Marche  aux  Chevaux. 

(2)  Jensen,  Jean-Frangois, .dead,  20  Poids  Public. 

(3)  De  Bruyn,  Jeanne-Marie,  innkeeper,  4  Poids  Public, 

dead. 

(4)  Van  Ecke,  Arthur,  dock  labourer,  4  Poids  Public, 

dead. 

(5)  De  Backer,  Pierre,  dock  labourer,  20  Canal  Falcon, 

dead. 

(6)  Ramaekers,    Hubertine  -  Edouard  -  Marie,    13    Poids 

Public,  dead. 

(7)  Van  Vooren,  Josephe-Marie,  69  Marche  aux  Chevaux, 

mortally  wounded. 

(8)  Gaethof,  Pierre-Jean,  policeman,  36  rue  du  Jardinier, 

wounded. 

(9)  Devos,   Marie-Th£rese,   housewife,  20  Poids  Public, 

wounded. 

[10)  Coeymans,  Leon,  innkeeper,  i  Poids  Public,  wounded, 
[n)  Peynenberg,    Jacques-Germain,    printer,    38    Canal 

Falcon,  wounded. 
294 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

(12)  De  Poeter,  Georges,  I  Poids  Public,  wounded  in  the 

right  foot. 

(13)  Wilsenen,  Sophie,  4  Poids  Public,  slightly  wounded 

in  the  hip. 

(14)  Windey,  Auguste,  4  Poids  Public,  loss  of  right  eye. 

(15)  Luyckx,  Eulalie,  6  Poids  Public,  wounded. 

(16)  Roulandts,  Julia,  24  rue  du  Bassin,  wounded. 

The  material  damage  in  the  8th  section  is  : 

38  and  40  rue  des  Escrimeurs  :  the  entire  roof  and  the 
attics  destroyed,  windows  broken,  furniture  and  household 
utensils  damaged.  34  and  36  rue  des  Escrimeurs,  windows 
broken. 

Palais  de  Justice  :   numbers  of  windows  broken. 

Rue  de  la  Justice :  at  no.  13,  a  lower  room  damaged ;  no.  15 
etc.,  doors  and  windows  broken;  at  nos.  15  and  8  the  lower 
rooms  have  been  damaged  ;  rue  Mertens,  no.  14  etc.,  windows 
broken  ;  rue  Willems,  no.  9  etc.,  windows  broken  ;  rue  Torf, 
rue  de  Mey,  rue  Montebello,  rue  de  FHarmonie,  windows 
broken  ;  rue  Verdussen,  no.  20  etc.,  windows  broken,  doors 
and  windows  damaged ;  rue  Albert  von  Bary,  no.  I  etc., 
windows  broken ;  rue  Longue,  rue  Lausanne,  no.  242  etc., 
windows  broken,  doors  and  windows  damaged ;  avenue  du 
Marcgrave,  no.  188,  three  blocks  damaged  ;  rue  Karel  Ooms, 
no.  40,  windows  broken  and  walls  cracked ;  rue  Karel  Ooms, 
no.  45,  windows  broken  (Minerva). 

The  damage  done  by  the  airship  in  the  3rd  section  can 
be  summed  up  as  follows  : 

A  bomb  exploded  in  the  rue  Leopold,  close  to  the  rue  Guil- 
laume  Tell,  breaking  all  the  windows  of  the  china  shop  at  the 
corner  of  the  rue  Guillaume  Tell,  all  the  windows  of  the  second 
floor,  and  destroying  a  large  quantity  of  goods  in  the  shop, 
the  windows  of  the  caf6  Shakespeare,  at  present  occupied  by 
refugees  from  the  province.  Nobody  was  wounded. 

Another  bomb  exploded  in  the  rue  des  Douze-Mois,  partly 
demolishing  no.  n,  where  one  person  was  slightly  wounded,  and 
whence  at  about  4.45  A.M.,  a  woman  was  rescued,  who  com- 
plained of  internal  pain  and  was  sent  to  the  Institute  Saint- 
Jean-Berchmanns,  Place  de  Meir. 

Damage  was  also  done  to  nos.  19,  7,  28  of  the  same  street. 

The   Botanical  Garden  was  found  to  have  suffered  im- 

295 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

portant  material  damage,  notably  among  the  glass  houses 
and  frames  of  the  Botanical  Museum  ;  this  damage  was 
caused  by  the  bomb  dropped  near  the  rue  Guillaume  Tell, 
or  perhaps  by  another  bomb  which,  according  to  certain 
witnesses,  was  dropped  in  the  Botanical  Garden  itself,  quite 
near  to  the  wall  of  the  Sainte-Elizabeth  hospital. 
(Signed)  ANGENOT, 

Deputy  Procurator-General. 


SECTION   VIII 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  NATIVES  WHO  HAVE  NO  REGULAR 
MILITARY  ORGANIZATION 

No.  90 

M .  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Grenier, 
Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid 

(Telegram.)  Ostend,  October  12,  1914. 

The  Vice-Governor  of  Katanga  telegraphs  that  the  Germans 
are  employing  against  the  troops  of  the  Belgian  Congo  natives 
led  by  their  chiefs  and  entirely  uninstructed  in  the  Laws 
and  Customs  of  War.  As  black  troops  which  have  not  been 
properly  trained  and  are  not  under  the  command  of  white 
officers  are  capable  of  committing  the  worst  excesses,  the 
Belgian  Government  protests  against  their  employment. 

Please  bring  this  protest  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Spanish 
Government,  and  request  that  the  German  Government  may 
be  informed  that  the  Belgian  Government,  in  accordance 
with  the  rules  of  international  law,  refuses  to  treat  as  belli- 
gerents hordes  of  negroes  led  by  native  chiefs. 

(Signed)        DAVIGNON. 

No.  91 

The  Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid  to  M.  Davignon,  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs 

Madrid,  October1  (sic)  13,  1914. 

SIR, — I  have  duly  carried  out  the  instructions  contained 
in  your  telegram  of  the  I2th  of  October  last  concerning  the 

1  [Presumably  an  error  for  '  November/  see  date  of  the  enclosure.] 
296 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

protest  of  the  Belgian  Government  against  the  employment 
by  the  Germans  in  the  Congo  of  undisciplined  black  troops 
which  have  received  no  military  training  and  are  not  under 
the  command  of  white  officers.  The  Minister  of  State  has 
just  sent  me,  and  I  have  the  honour  to  transmit  to  you  here- 
with, a  copy  of  the  answer  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
at  Berlin  to  the  verbal  note  by  which  the  Spanish  Ambassador 
was  instructed  to  notify  our  refusal  to  treat  as  belligerents 
hordes  of  negroes  led  by  native  chiefs.  On  the  pretext  that 
communications  with  countries  beyond  the  seas  are  inter- 
rupted, the  Foreign  Office  declares  that  it  is  unable  to  give 
any  information  on  the  subject. 

(Signed)        BARON  GRENIER. 

ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  91 

Auswdrtiges  Ami  to  the  Spanish  Embassy. — Reply  to  the  Verbal 
Note  of  October  14,  1914,  concerning  the  alleged  employ- 
ment of  natives  by  Germany  against  the  Belgian  Congo. 

The  Imperial  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  regrets  not 
to  be  in  a  position  to  give  any  information  concerning  the 
alleged  employment  of  natives  against  the  Belgian  Congo,  as 
the  authorities  within  whose  purview  the  matter  lies  have  no 
news  in  regard  to  it.  Moreover,  there  is  no  possibility  of 
obtaining  any  information  on  the  subject,  since  the  Powers 
actually  at  war  with  Germany  have  interrupted  all  communi- 
cations with  countries  beyond  the  seas. 

Berlin ,  November  8,  1914. 


SECTION   XI 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  SENT  BATTERIES  OF  ARTILLERY  TO 
BELGIUM  BEFORE  THE  DECLARATION  OF  WAR 

No.  104 

M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Fallon, 
Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague 

Havre,  October  20,  1914. 

SIR, — Be  so  kind  as  to  send  the  following  declaration  to 
the  Government  of  His  Apostolic  Majesty  through  the  inter- 
mediary of  the  Spanish  Legation : — '  When  the  Belgian  Govern- 

297 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

ment  replied  to  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria-Hungary, 
they  were  unaware  of  certain  facts  that  would  have  modified 
their  answer,  or  rather  that  would  have  made  them  take  the 
initiative  in  a  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations.  For  according 
to  a  proclamation  by  the  German  Lieutenant-General  who 
styles  himself  Governor  of  the  Fortress  of  Liege,  'the  big 
motor  batteries  sent  by  Austria  have  proved  their  excellence 
in  the  fighting  round  Namur/  These  fights  took  place  before 
the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria-Hungary  on  Belgium,  which 
was  based  primarily  on  the  military  co-operation  of  Belgium 
with  France  and  Great  Britain.  If  the  Belgian  Government 
had  had  knowledge  at  that  date  of  Austro-Hungarian  partici- 
pation in  the  attack  on  Belgium,  they  would  immediately 
have  recalled  the  Belgian  Minister  accredited  to  Vienna. 
The  Austrian  declaration  of  the  28th  of  August  declared  that 
Austria-Hungary  had  been  compelled  to  break  off  diplomatic 
relations  and  considered  herself  from  that  moment  in  a  state 
of  war  with  Belgium. 

'  It  was  thus  while  peace  was  still  undisturbed,  and  the  two 
countries  were  still  maintaining  diplomatic  relations,  that 
Austrian  artillery  attacked  and  destroyed  the  forts  of  Namur/ 

(Signed)        DAVIGNON. 

1  [Diplo-  (See  First  Grey  Book,  Nos.  77  and  78. x) 

matic,  2, 

pp.  67-70] 

No.  105 

The  Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid  to  M.  Davignon,  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs 

Madrid,  April  5,  1915. 

SIR, — The  Minister  of  State  has  just  sent  me,  and  I  have 
the  honour  to  transmit  to  you,  a  note  addressed  on  the  6th 
of  February  last  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Minister  to 
the  Spanish  Embassy  at  Vienna,  in  reply  to  a  communica- 
tion from  M.  Polo  de  Bernabe  concerning  the  Austro-Hungarian 
batteries  which  were  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  German  army 
at  the  siege  of  Namur. 

The  Marquis  of  Lema  adds  that  this  document,  which 
accompanied  a  letter  from  the  Ambassador  dated  the  nth 
February,  reached  him  after  a  delay  that  he  is  unable  to 
explain.  (Signed)  BARON  GRENIER. 

298 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  105 
Note 

The  Belgian  Government  having  pointed  out  that,  when 
they  replied  to  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria-Hungary, 
certain  facts  were  unknown  to  them,  and  that  in  particular  they 
were  unaware  that  previous  to  the  declaration  of  war  by  the 
Monarchy  on  Belgium  Austro-Hungarian  batteries  had  taken 
part  in  fighting  around  Namur,  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  desire  to  point  out  that  at  the  moment  of  declar- 
ing war  on  Belgium  they  were  themselves  in  an  analogous 
position. 

Thus  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  had  not  at 
that  moment  been  informed  authoritatively  that,  already, 
long  before  the  beginning  of  the  present  war  and  unknown 
to  Austria-Hungary,  which  was  one  of  the  States  which 
guaranteed  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  Belgium  had  entered 
into  negotiations  with  other  of  the  guaranteeing  Powers  with 
a  view  to  military  co-operation  of  Belgium  with  Great  Britain 
and  France,  negotiations  which,  as  is  shown  by  documents 
recently  discovered  by  the  German  authorities  in  the  Belgian 
archives,  finally  resulted  in  the  conclusion  of  arrangements 
of  a  military  nature  directed  against  Germany.  It  was  un- 
doubtedly these  tendencies,  absolutely  contrary  to  the  spirit 
and  tenor  of  the  treaties  of  April  10,  1839,  which  led  the 
Belgian  Government  to  decline  the  proposals  which  Germany 
had  made  to  them  in  order  to  obtain  free  passage  through 
Belgian  territory  for  German  troops — proposals  which  were 
provoked  by  the  hostile  attitude  of  Belgium  and  dictated 
by  the  urgent  necessity  for  the  German  Empire's  self- 
preservation — and  thus  to  force  Germany  to  make  war  on 
Belgium.  It  is  precisely  by  proceeding  in  this  manner  that  the 
Belgian  Government  gave  ground  for  the  use  in  the  opera- 
tions against  the  Belgian  fortresses  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
batteries,  which  from  the  beginning  of  the  complications 
that  led  to  the  war  had  been  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
Germany  by  the  Monarchy. 

It  is  apparent  from  the  above  that  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment themselves  provoked  the  act  for  which  they  now 
endeavour  to  place  responsibility  on  the  shoulders  of  the 

299 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Imperial  and  Royal  Government.  This  Government  is  accord- 
ingly entitled  to  repudiate  this  unfounded  reproach  and  to 
state,  in  its  turn,  that  Belgium  acted  in  a  manner  contrary  to 
the  duties  devolving  on  her  in  her  capacity  of  a  permanently 
neutral  State. 


No.  106 

M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Grenier, 
Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid 

Havre,  April  20,  1915. 

SIR, — I  have  the  honour  to  send  you  herewith  the  reply  of 
the  Belgian  Government  to  the  note  of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  which  you  sent  to  me  in  your  report  of 
April  5.  I  should  be  glad  if  it  could  be  sent  to  its  destina- 
tion through  the  good  offices  of  the  Spanish  Government. 

(Signed)        DAVIGNON. 

ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  106 

Note 

By  a  note  bearing  the  date  February  n,  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  pleads  the  discovery  in  the  Belgian  archives 
of  documents  revealing  an  alleged  Anglo-Belgian  military 
understanding  directed  against  Germany,  in  order  to  justify  the 
participation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  artillery  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  forts  of  Namur  at  a  time  when  Belgium  and 
Austria-Hungary  were  at  peace.  It  declares  that  it  was  these 
tendencies,  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  tenor  of  the  treaties  of 
1839,  which  led  Belgium  to  decline  the  German  proposals, 
which  were  provoked  by  the  hostile  attitude  of  Belgium  and 
dictated  to  Germany  by  the  care  for  her  own  safety.  It 
adds,  finally,  that  the  use  of  the  Austrian  guns,  which  from 
the  beginning  of  the  hostilities  had  been  placed  at  the  disposal 
of  Germany,  against  the  fortresses  of  Namur,  was  due  to 
this  hostile  attitude  of  the  Belgian  Government,  and  that  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  is  entitled  to  point  out  that 
Belgium  has  acted  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  duties  devolv- 
ing on  her  in  her  capacity  of  a  permanently  neutral  State. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  therefore  endeavours 
to  justify  its  having  engaged  in  hostilities  against  us  in  time 
300 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

of  peace  by  asserting  that  we  had  failed  to  carry  out  the 
duties  of  neutrality  by  negotiating  with  England  a  military 
agreement  aimed  against  Germany.  This  calumnious  accusa- 
tion, which  the  Belgian  Government  deeply  resents,  had  no 
influence  whatever  on  the  declaration  of  war  which  Austria- 
Hungary  addressed  to  Belgium  on  August  the  28th,  1914. 
Indeed,  even  if  the  culpability  of  the  Belgian  Government 
had  been  proved,  it  would  still  be  pertinent  to  ask  how  that 
would  justify  an  attack  which  was  made  two  months  before 
the  discovery  of  the  incriminating  documents. 

But  the  Belgian  Government,  which  for  more  than  eighty- 
four  years  has  scrupulously  observed  its  international  obliga- 
tions, emphatically  denies  the  accusation  of  the  German 
chancellery  that  it  has  betrayed  them.  If  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  had  read  the  documents  found  in  the 
archives  of  Brussels,  it  would  have  convinced  itself  that 
these  documents  did  not  prove  the  crime  of  which  the 
Belgian  Government  is  accused. 

These  documents  are  two  in  number.1  i  [For  their 

The  first  is  a  report  addressed  by  General  Ducarne,  chief  text,  see 
of  the  Belgian  General  Staff,  to  the  Minister  of  War  on  the 
conversations  he  had  had  in  the  beginning  of  the  year  1906 
with  Colonel  Barnardiston,  British  Military  Attache.  These 
conversations  dealt  with  the  pledge  of  England  to  guarantee 
Belgium's  neutrality.  At  the  beginning  of  their  conversa- 
tion General  Ducarne  mentions  the  hypothesis  assumed  by 
Colonel  Barnardiston.  '  The  entry  of  English  troops  into 
Belgium  would  take  place  only  after  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  by  Germany  \ ' 

This  hypothesis,  namely,  the  previous  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality,  is  sufficient  in  itself  to  exonerate  the  Belgian 
Government  from  the  wrongful  act  imputed  to  it  by  Germany, 
on  the  assumption,  of  course,  that  the  documents  are  not 
mutilated,  and  that  they  are  not  made  to  say  what  they  do 
not  contain,  as  has  been  done  in  the  translation  published  by 
the  North  German  Gazette. 

The  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  on  the  eastern 
frontier  being  a  contingency  which  numerous  signs  showed 
to  be  threatening  as  far  back  as  1906,  the  elementary  duty  of 
the  'Belgian  General  Staff  was  to  study  a  scheme  of  help  to 
be  sent  by  England  to  Belgium  as  guaranteeing  Power,  under 

301 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

this  hypothesis,  to  repel  an  attack  by  Germany.  The  fact 
that  this  contingency  has  occurred,  with  a  brutality  which  no 
one  could  have  conceived,  shows  that  these  preoccupations  were 
justified.  Moreover,  Colonel  Barnardiston,  who  was  merely 
Military  Attache,  had  not  the  authority  necessary  to  contract 
an  engagement,  any  more  than  General  Ducarne,  an  official  of 
the  War  Office,  was  qualified  to  take  official  cognisance  of  a 
promise  of  help.  It  lay  with  the  Government  alone  to  con- 
clude a  convention  with  a  view  to  fulfilling  the  promised 
guarantees.  Not  only  has  no  such  convention  ever  been  con- 
cluded, but  the  conversations  on  which  the  accusation  is 
based  have  never  been  made  the  subject  of  deliberation  by 
the  Government. 

The  second  document  relates  to  a  conversation  on  the 
same  subject,  which  took  place  in  April  1912,  between  Military 
Attache  Bridges  and  Lieutenant-General  Jungbluth.  In  the 
course  of  this  conversation  General  Jungbluth  observed  to 
Colonel  Bridges  that  an  English  intervention  on  behalf  of 
Belgium  would  be  possible  only  with  the  consent  of  the  latter. 
The  British  Military  Attache  objected  that  England  would 
perhaps  be  led  to  exercise  her  rights  and  her  duties  as  one 
of  the  guaranteeing  Powers  of  Belgium,  without  waiting  for 
the  latter  to  call  in  her  aid.  That  was  a  personal  opinion  of 
Colonel  Bridges;  it  was  never  shared  by  his  Government, 
and  this  conversation  clearly  shows  that  the  intervention  of 
England  could  not  have  taken  place  before  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality  by  Germany.  This  second  document  would 
in  itself  destroy  any  suspicion  that  a  convention  had  been 
concluded  in  1906,  as  a  result  of  a  conversation  between 
Ducarne  and  Barnardiston.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Colonel 
Bridges  did  not  in  1912  even  make  any  allusion  to  the  con- 
versation of  Colonel  Barnardiston  in  1906,  and  it  is  evident 
that  if  a  convention  had  been  concluded  six  years  before, 
the  speakers,  in  broaching  this  subject,  could  not  have  failed 
to  refer  to  it. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  is  clearly  wrong  in 
ascribing  the  German  aggression  to  the  hostile  attitude  of 
Belgium.  Until  August  2,  1914,  the  date  of  the  ultimatum, 
no  difference  had  arisen  between  the  two  countries,  their 
relations  had  not  ceased  to  be  cordial,  and  Germany  had 
alleged  no  grievance  against  us.  It  is  clear,  from  the  evidence 
302 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

of   the  official  documents  already  published  and  from  the 
speech  delivered  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  on  August  the 
4th,1   that   Germany  had  nothing  with   which  to    reproach  l  [See 
Belgium,  and  if  their  troops  have  attacked  her,  it  is  for  the  D*P!°~ 
purpose  of  reaching  France  by  the  quickest  and  easiest  road,  J^ 
so  as  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  as  soon  as  possible.     '  We 
were  forced/  the  Chancellor  said  in  his  speech  on  August 
the  4th,  '  to  ignore  the  rightful  protests  of  the  Governments 
of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.     The  wrong  —  I  speak  openly  — 
the  wrong  we  thereby  commit  we  will  make  good  as  soon  as 
our  military  aims  have  been  attained/ 

To  declare  war  on  Belgium,  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  have  invoked  every  kind  of  pretext  except  failure 
to  fulfil  the  duties  of  neutrality,  and  they  cannot  deny  that 
while  we  were  entertaining  friendly  relations  with  them,  and 
were  trying  to  comply  with  the  demands  of  their  representative 
at  Brussels,  they  gave  the  order  to  their  troops  to  destroy 
our  forts  at  Namur. 


SECTION   XII 

LEGEND  OF  THE  PUTTING  OUT  OF  EYES 
No.  107 

M  .  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  all  Diplomatic 
Representatives  Abroad 

Havre,  November  25,  1914. 

SIR,  —  I  request  you  to  be  good  enough  to  have  the 
enclosed  communique  published  in  a  paper  of  the  country  to 
which  you  are  accredited. 

I  should  like  it  to  be  published  as  soon  as  possible. 

(Signed)        DAVIGNON. 

ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  107 

Note 

We  have  heard  from  Berlin  through  an  excellent  source 
that  two  official  commissions  have  been  appointed,  one  of 
them  civil  and  the  other  military,  acting  independently,  to 
inquire  into  all  acts  of  cruelty  attributed  to  belligerents.  The 
Civil  Commission  has  reported  that  — 

303 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

'  In  regard  to  the  matter  of  the  putting  out  of  eyes,  when- 
ever a  case  of  this  kind  has  been  referred  to  in  the  newspapers, 
or  has  been  reported  from  private  sources,  the  Commission  has 
sought  out  witnesses  and  taken  their  evidence  :  in  many 
cases,  not  to  say  in  nearly  all,  the  witnesses  admitted  that 
they  knew  the  facts  only  by  hearsay  ;  others  either  refused 
to  come  forward  or  did  not  put  in  an  appearance. 

'  The  Commission  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  no  formal 
proofs  of  wounded  men  or  prisoners  having  had  their  eyes 
put  out  by  Belgian  women  were  produced,  and  that  in  no 
case  is  there  any  official  record  of  this  having  taken  place. 

'  Doctors  and  the  Members  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
stated  that,  when  people's  minds  are  over-excited  as  they 
now  are,  it  was  quite  natural  that  acts  of  brutality  and  cruelty 
should  be  committed  by  either  side,  but  that  generally  speak- 
ing these  acts  had  been  greatly  exaggerated. 

'  The  stories  about  the  putting  out  of  eyes  must  have 
arisen  from  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  wounded  men 
have  had  their  eyes  put  out  by  fragments  of  shrapnel  which, 
bursting  at  the  height  of  a  man,  very  often  cause  wounds  in 
the  eyes. 

'  French  and  English  illustrated  papers  confirm  this. 
You  there  constantly  see,  in  places  where  shells  are  bursting, 
men  being  wounded  in  the  face,  and  instinctively  protecting 
their  faces  with  their  arms  or  their  hands. 

'  It  seems  that  thousands  of  rooks  and  crows  swoop  down 
into  all  the  battlefields,  and  they  always  attack  the  eyes  of 
the  dead  and  wounded.  This  may  have  helped  to  give  rise 
to  the  story,  which  medical  investigations  have  in  every  case 
proved  to  be  untrue. 

'  In  a  Frankfort  hospital  twenty-nine  severely  wounded 
men  lay,  it  seems,  side  by  side,  all  with  their  eyes  put  out. 
In  not  a  single  case  could  their  wounds  be  attributed  to  any 
other  cause  than  that  of  fragments  of  shrapnel.  In  spite  of 
this  the  legend  still  survives ;  but  we  have  been  assured  that 
in  official  circles  the  acts  of  cruelty  with  which  the  Belgians 
have  been  reproached  are  formally  denied/ 

The  Civil  Commission  is  quite  definite  on  this  subject. 

The  Military  Commission  is  still  pursuing  its  inquiry, 
but  it  has  reached  the  same  conclusions.  It  has  not  yet 
304 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

announced  officially  its  findings,  and  for  that  reason  the  con- 
clusions it  has  reached  are  subject  to  reserve,  and  should  only 
be  considered  as  provisional  and  of  a  purely  private  character. 
We  are  glad  to  note  that  the  acts  of  abominable  cruelty 
of  which  Belgian  women  were  so  unjustly  accused  by  the 
most  authoritative  organs  of  the  Imperial  Government  have 
been  formally  denied  by  the  two  Commissions  appointed  by 
that  same  Government. 


No.  108 

M .  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  all  Diplomatic 
Representatives  Abroad 

Havre,  December  18,  1914. 

SIR, — In  continuation  of  my  letter  of  November  25th  last, 
I  have  the  honour  to  call  your  attention  to  an  article  which 
appeared  in  the  Temps  of  the  1 5th  of  this  month  under  the 
heading  'La  16gende  des  yeux  creves/  It  quotes,  from  the 
Kolnische  Volkszeitung  and  the  Vorwdrts,  two  notes  contra- 
dicting the  calumnious  accusations  of  the  German  semi-official 
press  on  the  subject  of  the  alleged  mutilation  of  the  wounded 
by  the  Belgian  civil  population.  (Signed)  DAVIGNON. 

ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  108 

Berne,  December  12. 

The  important  Catholic  paper,  the  Kolnische  Volkszeitung, 
published  the  following  letter  in  one  of  its  recent  issues  : 

TO  THE  EDITOR 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  November  26. 

SIR, — One  of  the  most  ungrateful  tasks  at  the  present 
time  is  to  defend  the  truth  against  the  absurd  rumours  which 
are  circulating  in  the  country.  The  Kolnische  Volkszeitung 
has  already  on  September  30,  1914,  published  a  letter  from 
me  in  which  I  stated  that  after  inquiry  I  had  not  found  in 
the  thirty-five  hospitals  in  Aix-la-Chapelle  a  single  German 
wounded  soldier  who  had  had  his  eyes  put  out.  Since  then 
you  have  informed  me  that  my  letter  had  by  no  means  put 
an  end  to  these  reports,  and  you  sent  me  an  article  from 
the  Kolnische  Zeitung  of  the  3rd  October  calculated  to 

MILITARY  2  U  3O5 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

revive  belief  in  these  fantastic  stories.  It  is  stated  in  that 
article  in  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  that  a  doctor,  named 
Saethre,  has  visited  the  hospitals  of  Cologne,  and  the  follow- 
ing passage  occurs  in  the  translation  of  his  report :  '  There 
cannot  be  any  doubt  as  to  the  cruelties  committed  by  francs- 
tireurs.  I  have  myself  seen  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  a  Red  Cross 
sister  who  had  one  of  her  breasts  cut  off  by  them,  and  a 
squadron  commander  who  had  his  eyes  put  out  while  he  was 
lying  on  the  field  of  battle/ 

You  have  asked  me  to  write  to  you  what  I  think  of  this 
report.  I  have  accordingly  approached  the  official  autho- 
rities with  a  view  to  ascertaining  if  the  facts  mentioned  by 
Dr.  Saethre  were  correct.  I  have  received  the  following 
letter,  dated  November  25,  from  the  Director  of  the  hospital : 
'The  atrocities  you  mention  have  not  been  committed,  at 
least  in  so  far  as  Aix-la-Chapelle  is  concerned.  We  have 
never  seen  the  Red  Cross  sister  referred  to,  nor  the  squadron 
commander  either/ 

I  do  not  know  where  the  doctor  mentioned  in  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung  obtained  his  information.  I  think  it  necessary  to 
state  once  more  that  there  is  not  in  the  hospitals  in  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  any  wounded  man  who  has  had  his  eyes  put  out,  or 
any  Red  Cross  sister  who  has  been  mutilated  in  the  manner 
named  above.  FR.  KAUFMANN,  Archpriest. 

Moreover  the  Vorwdrts  publishes  on  December  6  the 
results  of  an  inquiry  addressed  to  the  management  of  the 
hospitals  of  Hanover  and  of  the  big  hospital  de  la  Charite 
in  Berlin.  The  authorities  in  charge  of  the  Hanover  hospitals 
sent  the  following  reply  to  the  Socialist  paper  : — 

'  After  making  inquiries  among  the  doctors  of  the  different 
sections  of  No.  3  Hospital,  we  are  able  to  inform  you  that  we 
have  not  at  this  moment  any  wounded  men  whose  eyes  have 
been  put  out.  We  have  never  had  any/ 

Similarly  the  authorities  in  charge  of  the  hospital  de  la 
Charite  in  Berlin  sent  the  following  note  to  the  Vorwdrts  : 

1  The  hospital  de  la  Charit£  has  never  had  any  wounded 
men  who  have  had  their  eyes  put  out/ 


306 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 


SECTION   XV 

THE  TOWN  OF  COURTRAI  FINED  10,000,000  MARKS  FOR 
HAVING  OBEYED  TWO  GERMAN  COMMANDANTS 

No.  115 

M.  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Grenier, 
Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid 

(Telegraphic.)  Havre,  January  10,  1915. 

The  town  of  Courtrai  has  just  been  punished  by  a  fine  of 
ten  million  marks  for  an  alleged  hidden  depot  of  arms.  The 
municipal  authorities  are  in  no  way  to  blame,  for  they  only 
called  in  the  arms  and  had  them  deposited  in  the  Broel  tower, 
in  accordance  with  two  proclamations,  issued  in  succession, 
the  first  by  order  of  Commandant  Maxeman,  and  the  second 
by  order  of  Commandant  Pschors. 

Be  good  enough  to  request  the  Spanish  Government  to 
bring  to  the  knowledge  of  the  German  Governmen  ^  the  facts 
which  prove  the  unjustifiable  character  of  this  punfshment. 

(Signed)        DAVIGNON. 


SECTION    XIX 

THE  GERMAN  OFFICERS  AND  MEN  TAKEN  PRISONERS  BY  THE 
BELGIAN  ARMY  HAVE  BEEN  TREATED  ACCORDING  TO 
THE  REGULATIONS  OF  THE  HAGUE  CONVENTION 

No.  122 

M .  Davignon,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron 
Grenier,  Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid 

Havre,  February  18,  1915. 

SIR, — In  the  course  of  the  months  of  November  and 
December,  my  colleague,  the  Minister  of  War,  and  various 
other  Belgian  persons  received  numerous  letters  from  officers, 
prisoners  in  Germany,  making  it  known  that  the  military 
authorities  of  that  country  believed,  on  the  strength  of  reports 
sent  in  by,  amongst  others,  a  German  doctor  named  Weinstein, 

307 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

that  the  prisoners  who  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Belgians 
and  French  were  being  ill-treated.  The  writers  of  the  letters 
in  question  had  been  informed  that  reprisals  would  be  taken 
against  them  if  the  treatment  of  the  Germans  were  not 
promptly  improved. 

Identical  complaints  having  reached  the  French  Govern- 
ment, the  latter  on  I5th  December  addressed  a  note  to  the 
Spanish  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  a  note  which  he  was  requested 
to  transmit  to  the  Imperial  Government,  concerning  the 
prisoners  of  war  in  France  and  in  Germany  ;  in  this  particulars 
are  given  of  the  treatment  to  which  the  German  prisoners 
in  France  are  subjected.  The  German  combatants  captured 
by  the  Belgian  Army  are  subjected  to  the  same  treatment, 
because  as  they  come  in  they  are  sent  on  to  the  French 
military  authorities,  and  kept  in  France  under  the  same  con- 
ditions as  the  Germans  taken  by  the  French  troops. 

Certain  allegations,  however,  of  the  German  doctor  Wein- 
stein  had  special  reference  to  the  period  during  which  the 
German  officers  by  whom  the  complaints  were  made  had  been 
kept  prisoner  in  Belgium,  and  particularly  at  Bruges. 

The  enclosed  copy  of  a  report  by  Lieutenant-General 
Thieman,  ex-Inspector-General  of  the  internment  depots  of 
prisoners  of  war  in  Belgium,  shows  the  inaccuracy  of  the 
allegations  in  question. 

The  French  note  on  the  prisoners  of  war  in  France  and  in 
Germany,  to  which  reference  has  been  made  above,  enumerates, 
on  the  other  hand,  many  grave  matters  of  complaint  as  to 
the  way  in  which  French  prisoners  are  treated  in  Germany. 
The  Belgian  Government  have  on  their  side  received  written 
evidence  proving  that  the  treatment  given  to  Belgian  prisoners 
in  certain  German  camps  is  not  such  as  Chapter  II.  of  the 
regulations  forming  part  of  the  Hague  Convention  concerning 
the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War  on  land  ought  to  secure  to 
those  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Powers  who  signed  the 
Convention.  They  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  return 
to  the  subject  later  on. 

You  will  be  good  enough  to  ask  the  Spanish  Government 
to  transmit  to  Berlin,  in  the  form  of  a  note,  the  text  of  the 
present  letter.  You  will  find  enclosed  a  copy  ad  hoc  which 
you  can  hand  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Signed)        DAVIGNON. 
308 


BELGIAN  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

ENCLOSURE  TO  No.  122 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  INTERNMENT  DEPOTS  OF  PRISONERS 

OF  WAR 

Declaration 

In  my  capacity  as  Inspector-General  of  the  Internment 
Depots  for  PrisoneH  of  War,  I  visited  on  the  nth  and  i8th 
of  August  the  depot  established  and  occupied  at  Bruges. 

On  my  first  visit,  I  ascertained  that  Major-General  Stienon, 
commanding  the  Province  of  West  Flanders,  assisted  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Capoen  and  Major  Lambert,  had  decided 
upon  and  put  in  force  an  organisation  in  which  I  had  only 
to  make  some  modifications  of  trifling  importance.  The 
measures  prescribed  were  embodied  in  an  order  which  ensured 
a  most  generous  interpretation  of  the  Belgian  regulations, 
the  humanitarian  rules  of  which  allow  the  suffering  of 
prisoners  of  war  to  be  reduced  to  a  minimum,  alike  from  the 
moral  and  from  the  physical  point  of  view.  A  copy  of  this 
order  should  form  part  of  a  dossier  to  be  found  at  the  War 
Office.  On  August  18  I  had  only  congratulations  to  offer ; 
all  the  rules  were  observed. 

Officer  Prisoners 

On  August  the  nth  I  visited  each  prisoner  in  the  room 
which  had  been  allotted  him,  and  I  had  a  private  conversa- 
tion with  the  occupant,  in  the  course  of  which  I  bade  'him 
make  any  request  he  wished,  and  I  assured  him  that  I  would 
do  my  best  to  grant  it  so  far  as  I  was  able. 

The  requests  addressed  to  me  may  be  summed  up  as 
follows  : — 

(1)  To  be  prisoner  on  parole  ; 

(2)  To  be  united  in  groups  ; 

(3)  To  improve  the  diet  ; 

(4)  To  increase  the  lighting  and  ventilation  of  the  rooms  ; 

(5)  To  increase  the  time  devoted  to  walks. 

Except  as  concerns  the  requests  under  (i)  and  (2),  satis- 
faction was  given  immediately  to  those  concerned.  In- 
structions received  from  the  War  Office  prevented  me  from 
granting  the  wishes  expressed  in  Nos.  i  and  2. 

The  cost  of  the  daily  board  was  increased  from  two  to  three 

309 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

francs,  and  that  with  the  consent  of  those  concerned,  who  had 
been  consulted  by  myself. 

At  the  time  of  my  visit  on  August  the  i8th  I  again  saw 
the  officer  prisoners.  To  those  whom  I  had  seen  on  the  nth 
others  had  been  added,  amongst  whom  were  some  medical 
officers.  I  talked  to  every  one  of  them  :  I  asked  each  one 
his  opinion  about  the  diet,  and  they  all  declared  themselves 
satisfied.  No  more  wishes  were  expressed  to  me.  One  of 
them  thanked  me  in  the  name  of  all  for  what  I  had  done  on 
their  behalf. 

Prisoners  of  the  Rank  and  File 

The  rules  to  which  prisoners  of  the  rank  and  file  had  to 
submit  were  nearly  the  same  as  those  to  which  our  soldiers 
have  to  submit  in  peace  time. 

As  early  as  the  nth  of  August,  the  rank  and  file  (like  the 
officers)  were  supplied  with  postcards ;  between  August 
the  nth  and  igth  a  canteen  was  established,  which  is  no 
doubt  still  in  working  order. 

During  my  visit  on  August  the  igth,  I  was  told,  by  those 
concerned,  that  they  had  no  complaint  to  make.  Everything 
was  in  fact  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the  instructions 
in  force. 

The  Minister  of  State,  M.  Vandervelde,  was  able  to  ascer- 
tain by  personal  inspection,  during  his  visit  on  August 
the  nth  to.  the  depot  at  Brussels,  that  all  the  efforts  of  the 
military  authorities  were  directed  to  a  mitigation  in  the 
fullest  possible  measure  of  the  unhappy  condition  of  prisoners 
of  war.  The  Consul  of  the  United  States  of  America,  who 
visited  the  depot  during  the  first  ten  days  of  October  last 
in  company  with  Captain  Vermeire  of  the  General  Staff,  who 
had  been  sent  by  Major-General  Bihin,  and  whom  I  saw  in 
the  offices  of  the  '  Place '  at  Bruges,  assured  me  that  he 
carried  away  with  him  an  excellent  impression,  of  which  he 
would  inform  his  Government. 

From  the  above,  it  follows  that  the  German  assertions  are 
categorically  refuted,  so  far  as  concerns  the  rules  to  which  the 
prisoners  of  war  (officers  and  men)  have  been  subjected  at  the 
internment  depot  of  Bruges.  THIEMAN, 

Lieutenant-General,  retired. 
January  21,  1915. 
310 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

CORRESPONDENCE  RESPECTING  EVENTS  LEADING 
TO  RUPTURE  OF  RELATIONS  WITH  TURKEY  * 

No.  44 
Mr.  Cheetham  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  August  28)      [Cd.  7628 

(Telegraphic.)  Cairo,  August  28,  1914. 

Ottoman  forces  are  being  mobilised  in  Hedjaz  and  farther 
south,  and  existing  military  activity  in  Red  Sea  may  thus  be 
explained.  About  sixty  Turkish  officers  arrived  at  Alexandria 
recently  and  passed  through  Egypt  down  Red  Sea.  Their 
destination  was  the  Yemen. 

Twelve  thousand  Turkish  troops  are  reported  in  Jeddah 
region. 

Signs  are  not  lacking  that,  in  case  of  war,  an  attack  on 
Egypt  is  contemplated  by  Turkey.  A  few  Turkish  officers 
are  now  in  the  Delta.  Steps  have  been  taken  to  watch 
all  those  that  are  known.  I  learn  from  a  good  source  that 
all  information  of  Turkish  mobilisation  reported  from 
Constantinople  is  correct.  Meanwhile  emissaries  are  being 
sent  to  India,  the  Yemen,  Senoussi,  and  Egypt,  to  stir  up 
feeling  against  Great  Britain.  Activity  at  Gaza  is  reported, 
but  it  is  uncertain  whether  this  is  more  than  raising  of  levies 
to  replace  regulars  withdrawn  from  the  north  by  mobilisation. 


No.  52 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  L.  Mallet 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  September  i,  1914. 

In  order  that  there  may  be  no  room  for  misconception, 
you    should    inform    Turkish    Government    that    Egyptian 

1  [Extracts.    The  complete  papers  will  be  found  in  Naval,  2,  pp.  34-158.] 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Government  are  taking  measures  to  patrol  Suez  Canal  on 
both  banks,  and  that  this  step  is  necessary  to  protect  the  safe 
and  proper  working  of  the  Canal.  You  should  add  that  no 
advance  into  Sinai,  nor  military  operations  in  that  region, 
are  under  contemplation. 


No.  72 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  September  n) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  September  10,  1914. 

Consignments  of  warlike  material  from  Germany  traced 
up  to  date  amount  to  3000  rounds  of  projectiles  for  Goeben, 
battery  of  field-guns  with  ammunition,  several  batteries 
of  heavy  howitzers,  probably  for  field  army  use,  and  some 
thousands  of  rifles.  More  consignments  are  on  the  way. 
All  German  reservists  who  have  not  been  able  to  leave 
Turkish  Empire  have  been  instructed  to  report  for  enrol- 
ment with  Turkish  troops. 


No.  74 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  September  14) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  September  13,  1914. 

I  hear  that  Germans  are  now  dominant  at  Alexandretta, 
and  secretly  suggest  and  control  everything.  From  September 
7  to  morning  of  September  12,  24  mountain  guns,  400  horses 
and  mules,  500  artillery  troops  belonging  to  service  of  6th 
Army  Corps,  and  large  quantity  of  ammunition  passed 
through  Alexandretta,  proceeding  by  railway  to  Constanti- 
nople. 

No.  85 
Mr.  Cheetham  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  September  22) 

(Telegraphic.)  Cairo,  September  21,  1914. 

Information  respecting  Turkish  preparations  against  Egypt 
receives  fresh  corroboration.     There  has  been  no  slackening  of 
military  preparation  in  Palestine  and  in  Syria. 
312 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

If  Turkish  preparations  continue,  it  may  become  necessary 
to  put  patrols  into  Sinai  and  to  support  our  posts  in  the 
peninsula.  Action  of  forces  in  Egypt  has  been  hitherto 
confined,  as  you  are  aware,  to  patrol  of  Suez  Canal,  but  I  think 
that  Turkish  Government  should  be  warned  that  measures 
for  the  protection  of  the  Egyptian  frontier  may  become 
necessary. 

No.  89 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  L.  Mallet 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  September  24,  1914. 

I  hear  that  Egyptian  frontier  has  been  violated  by  armed 
mounted  Arabs  said  to  be  encouraged  by  Turkish  troops, 
and  also  that  Hedjaz  line  is  being  reserved  for  troops.  British 
military  authorities  consider  that  breach  of  the  peace  on 
Egyptian  frontier  is  imminent,  whether  with  or  without 
sanction  of  Turkish  Government.  You  should  bring  these 
facts  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Grand  Vizier  and  of  the  Khedive, 
who  is  at  present  at  Constantinople. 


No.  90 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  September  25) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  September  24,  1914. 

Turkish  preparations  against  Egypt. 

I  have  addressed  a  note  to  the  Grand  Vizier  recapitulating 
information  recently  received  on  this  subject.  I  reminded 
His  Highness  of  the  assurances  which  I  had  several  times 
given  him,  based  upon  your  telegram  of  7th  August,1  and  I 
specially  pointed  out  their  conditional  nature.  Finally  I 
warned  him  that  the  information  respecting  Turkish  pre- 
parations against  Egypt  would  infallibly  produce  a  most 
serious  impression  upon  His  Majesty's  Government. 

I  later  communicated  the  contents  of  my  note  to  President 
of  the  Council,  Minister  of  Finance,  and  Minister  of  Interior, 
and  asked  them  what  explanations  they  could  give,  where- 

1  [See  No.  5,  Naval,  2,  p.  35.] 

313 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

upon  they  inquired  why  so  many  thousand  Indian  troops 
were  being  sent  to  Egypt  by  His  Majesty's  Government.  To 
this  I  answered  that  it  was  essential  to  ensure  the  safety  of 
Egypt  and  the  protection  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and  that  as  the 
British  garrison  of  Egypt  had  been  sent  to  France,  it  was 
necessary  to  replace  it  by  British  Indian  troops.  This  seemed 
to  satisfy  them. 

I  cannot  believe  that  they  are  not  alive  to  the  disastrous 
consequences  of  going  to  war  with  us,  or  that  they  seriously 
can  contemplate  an  expedition  against  Egypt.  They  have 
undoubtedly  been  strongly  urged  to  send  such  an  expedition 
by  the  Germans,  and  I  think  that  they  have  allowed  pre- 
parations to  be  made,  partly  to  profit  as  much  as  possible 
by  German  connection  and  by  allowing  the  Germans  to 
think  that  they  will  act,  and  partly  in  order  to  be  ready,  if 
Great  Britain  sustains  a  serious  defeat  by  land  or  sea. 

Danger  of  the  present  situation  is  obvious,  and  develop- 
ments are  not  improbable,  and  I  shall  see  the  Grand  Vizier 
this  morning  and  endeavour  to  bring  him  to  book.  There 
is  a  circumstantial  report  that  the  Germans  are  now  making 
desperate  efforts  to  force  the  Turks'  hands  and  to  compel 
them  to  fulfil  their  part  of  the  bargain,  but  that  at  the  same 
time  their  efforts  are  meeting  with  considerable  resistance. 


No.  91 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  September  25) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  September  24,  1914. 

I  have  informed  the  Grand  Vizier .  that  Austro-German 
intrigues  to  involve  Turkey  in  an  expedition  against  Egypt 
are  within  my  knowledge.  Grand  Vizier  denied  that  such 
intrigues  existed,  but  he  finally  admitted  that  pressure  was 
being  exerted.  He  declared  that  he  was  firmly  resolved  to 
keep  out  of  any  such  intrigue,  any  complicity  in  which  he 
disclaimed  with  emphasis.  I  strongly  urged  His  Highness 
to  make  his  position  clearer,  for  preparations  at  the  Dar- 
danelles showed  that  he  was  either  guilty  of  complicity  or 
that  he  was  not  master  in  his  own  house.  He  answered 
that  his  intentions  were  entirely  pacific,  and  that  he  did  not 
mean  to  engage  in  any  quarrel  with  Great  Britain. 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

His  Highness  seemed  more  preoccupied  with  the  Balkan 
situation  at  the  moment  than  with  anything  else.  He  said 
that  Turkish  Government  would  be  unable  to  refrain  from 
an  attempt  to  get  back  what  they  had  lost  in  Balkan  wars 
if  Balkan  complications  ensued.  No  arguments  of  mine 
would  induce  him  to  change  his  attitude  in  this  respect. 
He  said  he  would  be  powerless  to  prevent  it. 


No.  92 
Mr.  Cheetham  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  September  25) 

(Telegraphic.)  Cairo,  September  25,  1914. 

Turkish  preparations  on  Sinai  frontier. 

Two  thousand  men  with  stores  passed  Gaza  on  night  of 
September  18,  following  coast  towards  frontier.  Six  more 
battalions  are  expected  at  Gaza.  In  that  neighbourhood 
very  strong  and  secret  military  preparations  are  being  made 
on  the  frontier.  Three  battalions  of  Redif  completely 
mobilised  have  marched  to  a  place  one  day  south  of  Jaffa  on 
their  way  to  the  frontier. 


No.  95 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  September  26) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  September  25,  1914. 

On  September  22  and  23, 183  horses,  112  nizam,  2  officers, 
and  88  carts  and  carriages,  all  from  Aintab,  were  entrained 
at  Aleppo  for  Damascus. 

Secret  notice  was  given  that  in  six  days'  time  120  rail- 
way wagons  were  to  be  in  readiness  to  convey  to  Damascus 
troops  arriving  from  Mosul  via  Tel  Abiyat,  and  that  in  all 
from  25,000  to  30,000  troops  were  to  be  drafted  from  Mosul 
to  Aleppo,  of  which  at  least  half  are  destined  for  Kama  or 
Damascus. 

Two  Germans  connected  with  Bagdad  Railway,  one  of 
whom  is  an  expert  in  blasting  operations  and  mine-laying, 
left  Aleppo  this  morning  for  Damascus,  the  other  telling  his 
servant  that  they  were  going  to  Akaba.  They  had  with 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

them  1600  dynamite  cartridges  and  1500  metres  of  detonating 
wires.  They  may,  perhaps,  be  commissioned  to  lay  mines 
in  Red  Sea  as  there  has  been  talk  of  Turkish  military  designs 
regarding  Akaba  recently. 


No.  96 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  September  27) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  September  26,  1914. 

Grand  Vizier  has  been  informed  of  the  information  re- 
ported by  Mr.  Cheetham  in  his  telegram  of  25th  September,1 
and  in  my  telegram  of  the  same  date.2  I  warned  His  High- 
ness that  if  these  preparations  against  Egypt  were  allowed 
to  continue,  serious  consequences  would  ensue.  Minister  of 
War  was  with  Grand  Vizier  when  I  made  these  representa- 
tions, and  His  Highness  informed  me  that  he  fully  realised 
the  importance  of  the  question,  with  which  he  was  occupy- 
ing himself.  I  have  taken  steps  to  enlighten  influential 
people  with  what  is  being  done  as  regards  Egypt,  and  I  have 
seen  Minister  of  Interior  and  left  a  memorandum  with  him 
on  the  subject ;  I  have  also  put  the  facts  before  other  pro- 
minent members  of  the  Cabinet. 


No.  100 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  L.  Mallet 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  September  29,  1914. 

Information  has  reached  His  Majesty's  Government  that 
Turkish  Minister  of  War  telegraphed  to  Bin  Saud,  Emir  of 
Nejd,  several  times  towards  the  end  of  July  that,  owing  to  the 
imminence  of  war  in  Europe,  arms,  ammunition,  and  officers 
for  training  his  Arabs  were  being  sent  to  him. 

Vali  of  Basra  has  been  informed  by  Turkish  Minister  of 
War  that  thirty-two  secret  emissaries,  including  German 
officers,  are  on  their  way  to  preach  a  '  jehad  '  in  India, 
Afghanistan,  and  Baluchistan  ;  that  arms  and  ammunition 
are  being  sent  to  Basra  under  German  flag,  and  that  Turkish 

1  See  No.  92.  2  See  No.  95. 

316 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

Government  are  prepared  to  help  Germany  in  return  for 
assistance  received  during  Balkan  war. 


No.  104 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  3) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  2,  1914. 

Information  continues  to  reach  me  corroborating  reports 
of  Turkish  preparations  against  Egypt.  Large  transport 
camel  corps  arrived  at  Jerusalem  yesterday,  and  I  hear  of 
transport  of  warlike  materials,  food-stuffs,  and  military 
stores  on  line  Jenin-Nablus- Jerusalem,  and  also  to  Maan. 
Seven  German  military  officers  have  been  sent  to  Damascus 
and  neighbourhood.  This  has  stimulated  preparations,  and 
it  is  believed  in  Syria  that  Turkish  Government  has  decided 
upon  a  movement  against  Egypt,  Damascus  division  being 
assembled  for  advance  by  Akaba,  Jerusalem  division  for 
that  by  Rafa.  Inhabitants  at  Beirout  and  Haifa  are  being 
removed  inland  as  a  precautionary  measure  against  any 
action  which  may  be  taken  by  British  fleet  when  the  advance 
on  Egypt  begins.  It  is  reported  from  Haifa  that  localities 
along  the  coast  are  being  garrisoned  by  newly  arrived  troops. 
I  have  brought  the  gravity  of  the  existing  situation  to  the 
notice  of  the  Grand  Vizier  in  the  strongest  terms  in  a  further 
note,  though  I  do  not  view  any  actual  movement  against 
Egypt  as  imminent  at  the  moment.  In  my  note  I  have 
informed  His  Highness  that  the  measures  now  undertaken 
can  have  no  reason  except  as  a  threat  against  Egypt,  and 
that  they  can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  incidental  to  an 
ordinary  mobilisation  of  troops  in  their  peace  stations,  and 
I  have  stated  that  His  Majesty's  Government  can  only  view 
any  further  preparations  at  Jerusalem  or  at  Maan  in  a  serious 
light. 

In  addition  to  above-mentioned  military  measures,  move- 
ments of  suspicious  individuals  have  now  been  supplemented 
by  those  of  a  German  naval  officer  named  Hilgendorff,  who 
is  at  present  on  his  way  from  Damascus  to  Petra  with  a 
party  of  eight  Germans.  It  is  understood  that  they  will  be 
joined  by  a  smaller  party  from  Haifa  via  Amman,  and  that 
they  are  conveying  a  large  supply  of  explosives.  I  have 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

made  representations  to  the  Grand  Vizier  explaining  that 
such  hostile  enterprises  against  Great  Britain  cannot  be 
allowed  in  a  neutral  country,  and  that  these  people  must  be 
arrested. 

Speaking  generally,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  both  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Constantinople,  on  the  Black  Sea, 
the  Egyptian  frontier,  and  'elsewhere,  the  Turks  intend  to 
have  their  troops  all  ready  for  action  at  a  favourable  point 
should  the  general  European  situation  afford  a  good  oppor- 
tunity. Should  the  German  admiral  take  the  Goeben  into 
the  Black  Sea  and  attack  the  Russian  fleet,  or  should  things 
take  an  unfavourable  turn  for  the  Allies,  Turkish  troops 
would  be  in  a  position  to  cross  the  Egyptian  frontier  without 
much  further  delay.  His  Majesty's  Government  will  doubt- 
less consider  what,  if  any,  military  measures  are  necessary 
for  the  strengthening  of  strategical  points  in  the  Sinai 
peninsula. 


No.  109 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  6) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  6,  1914. 

Military  attache  had  a  long  interview  with  Minister  of 
War  yesterday,  from  which  he- derived  the  impression  that 
His  Excellency  had  ambitious  schemes  in  the  Arab  world 
and  in  Egypt.  These  may  perhaps  refer  more  to  the  future, 
and  possibly  measures  are  now  being  taken  so  as  to  prepare 
for  the  eventuality  of  Great  Britain  being  worsted  in  war 
with  Germany  ;  meanwhile  the  way  is  being  paved  indirectly 
for  present  or  future  action.  During  the  conversation, 
Minister  of  War  disclaimed  any  intention  on  the  part  of  the 
Turks  of  initiating,  themselves,  any  offensive  movements 
against  Egypt,  and  pointed  out  that  ordinary  Syrian  garrison 
had  not  been  reinforced.  He  said  that,  as  in  the  case  of  other 
troops  within  the  Empire,  Syrian  garrison  had  been  fully 
mobilised.  It  was  being  equipped  with  necessary  transport 
animals,  etc.,  on  a  war  scale,  and  it  was  being  carefully  trained 
with  the  help  of  the  officers  of  the  German  mission  as  else- 
where throughout  Turkey.  Everything,  he  said,  depended 
on  the  political  situation,  for  which  he  was  not  responsible 
318 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

individually ;  and  it  was  quite  possible  that  the  Syrian 
army  corps  might  finally  be  moved  in  another  direction, 
even,  perhaps,  to  Constantinople.  He  scouted  the  idea  of 
individual  Germans  undertaking  enterprises  against  the  Suez 
Canal  or  elsewhere,  but  he  admitted  that  proposals  had 
certainly  been  made  to  the  Bedouin  tribes  to  enlist  their 
sympathies  as  supporters  of  the  Empire  in  all  eventualities. 
He  defended  the  concentration  of  stores  at  Maan,  Nablus, 
and  Jerusalem,  and  he  added  that  no  troops,  but  only  gen- 
darmes, had  been  moved  in  the  direction  of  Gaza.  Never- 
theless, he  could  not  deny  that  some  of  the  measures  taken 
were  certainly  precautionary  against  Great  Britain,  and  in 
justification  of  this  he  pointed  to  the  entrance  of  British 
men-of-war  into  the  Shatt-el-Arab,  to  the  arrival  of  Indian 
troops  in  Egypt,  and  to  the  presence  of  the  British  fleet  in 
Turkish  territorial  waters  outside  the  Dardanelles.  Military 
attache  said  that,  as  far  as  the  action  of  the  fleet  and  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  were  concerned,  this  was  due  to 
infringement  of  neutrality  by  Turks,  and  Great  Britain  cer- 
tainly had  not  the  slightest  intention  of  making  any  attack 
upon  Turkey.  It  was  quite  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  the 
arrival  of  Indian  troops  in  Egypt  had  anything  to  do  with 
hostility  to  Turkey.  Minister  of  War  at  once  advanced 
such  arguments  as  that  Turkey  had  maintained  her  neutrality  ; 
that  German  officers  and  men  on  auxiliary  ships  were  entirely 
under  Turkish  control,  indeed  they  were  in  the  Turkish  service. 
Military  attache  said  that  Turks  could  not  be  surprised  that 
Great  Britain  should  be  preoccupied  if  Turkish  troops  were 
assembled  farther  south  than  Jerusalem  or  Beersheba  on 
the  one  side,  or  Maan  on  the  other. 


No.  114 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  8) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  7,  1914. 

There  has  been  fighting  during  the  last  few  days  on 
frontier  between  Russian  troops  and  Kurds  supported  by 
Turkish  troops.  Last  night  Russian  Ambassador  made 
strong  representations  to  the  Grand  Vizier,  and  said  that 

319 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

the  Turkish  Government  must  restrain  the  activities  of  their 
troops  on  the  frontier.  Furthermore,  Russian  consul  had 
been  arrested.  Replying  to  these  representations,  Grand 
Vizier  assured  Russian  Ambassador,  in  writing,  that  the 
consul  should  be  released  at  once  and  that  the  fighting  should 
cease.  Russian  Ambassador  has  certain  information  that 
Turks  are  being  incited  to  fight  by  Germans  and  Austrians. 
His  Excellency  agrees  with  me  that  Grand  Vizier  is  honestly 
exercising  what  influence  he  has  in  favour  of  peace,  but  it  is 
doubtful  if  he  has  the  power  to  restrain  the  military  party 
under  Enver  Pasha. 


No.  115 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  n) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  10,  1914. 

It  is  highly  probable  that  for  some  time  past  money  has 
been  sent  to  Syria  mainly  with  the  object  of  subsidising  the 
Bedouins.  It  is  also  supposed  that  the  Germans  in  Syria  have 
had  sums  of  money  with  them.  The  following  is  the  number 
of  German  military  officers  known  to  be  in  Syria  at  present  : 
Seven  who  went  there  some  time  ago,  of  whom  Colonel 
Kress  von  Kressenstein  is  one,  four  who  arrived  October  2 
at  Damascus,  and  five  more  who  arrived  there  on  October  6. 
My  information  is  to  the  effect  that  seven  more  may  since 
have  arrived  at  Alexandretta.  Meanwhile,  another  party  of 
Turkish  sailors  is  leaving  Constantinople  overland  for  Bagdad 
and  the  Tigris.  Information  has  just  reached  me  from 
Damascus  to  the  effect  that  Colonel  von  Kressenstein  had 
gone  to  Maan  to  inspect,  but  only  two  military  trains  with 
details  and  stores  had  left  in  the  last  two  days.  West  of 
the  Jordan  no  movements  had  taken  place.  Two  railway 
vans  of  dynamite  had  left  Damascus  for  Beirout ;  four 
thousand  Mosul  troops  had  reached  Aleppo,  but  were  waiting 
there  for  the  present. 


320 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

No.  118 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  12) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  12,  1914. 

My  despatch  of  October  4.1 

I  have  received  note  from  the  Porte  in  reply  to  my  note 
of  2nd  October  respecting  Turkish  preparations  against  Egypt. 

It  says  that  military  activity  in  Syria  is  common  to  all 
provinces  of  the  Empire,  and  is  natural  consequence  of 
mobilisation,  having  no  other  object  than  to  put  Turkey  on  a 
footing  to  defend  her  neutrality.  Turkey's  position  being 
one  of  simple  and  legitimate  precautions,  it  will  be  readily 
recognised  that  it  would  not  be  conceivable  that  she  should 
change  it  in  order  to  attack  Egypt,  which  is  one  of  her  own 
provinces. 

The  Porte  goes  on  to  observe  that,  although  I  have  on 
several  occasions  assured  Grand  Vizier  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  have  no  intention  of  altering  status  of  Egypt, 
yet  declaration  that  Egypt  is  in  a  state  of  war,  dismissal  of 
German  and  Austrian  agents,  who  receive  their  exequaturs 
from  the  Porte,  and  above  all  arrival  in  Egypt  of  important 
contingents  from  India  as  well  as  other  acts,  have  attracted 
serious  attention  of  Imperial  Government  and  have  created 
real  anxiety. 

Note  concludes  by  reiterating  to  me  assurance  that  Turkey 
has  no  hostile  intention  towards  any  Power  whatever,  and 
that  military  preparations  have  purely  and  exclusively 
defensive  character. 

I  think  that  it  would  be  right  to  remind  Grand  Vizier 
that  I  have  always  made  it  perfectly  clear  that  undertaking 
not  to  change  the  status  of  Egypt  was  conditional  on  Turkey 
maintaining  strict  neutrality. 


No.  124 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  14) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  14,  1914. 

Moslems  in  Aleppo  district   are  reported  to  have  been 
so  inveigled  and  incited  by  German  and  Turkish  deliberate 
1  Received  on  October  19.     See  No,  143. 

MILITARY  2  X  321 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

official  misrepresentations  and  falsehoods  of  every  kind  that 
masses  seem  to  believe  German  Emperor  has  embraced  Islamic 
faith,  and  that  Germans  are  fighting  for  Islam  against  Russia. 


No.  127 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  15) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  14,  1914. 

About  600  Moslem  '  fedahis/  dressed  in  various  guises, 
have  arrived  at  Aleppo  in  batches  during  past  fortnight, 
their  head  being  an  officer  related  to  Ottoman  Minister  of  War  ; 
400  of  these  came  from  Smyrna,  where  they  had  incited 
Moslems  against  Greeks.  At  Aleppo  they  intrigued,  with 
the  aid  of  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress,  with  sheikhs 
against  Great  Britain.  Discourses  of  a  guarded  anti-British 
tendency  were  pronounced  in  mosques.  The  last  batch  left 
Aleppo  October  12  by  rail.  Parties  of  them  have  proceeded 
to  Kama,  Horns,  Baalbek,  Damascus,  the  Hauran,  to  incite 
sheikhs  against  Great  Britain,  and  they  are  to  continue  their 
journey  south  by  Hedjaz  Railway,  and  to  find  their  way  into 
Egypt  to  incite  Moslems  there.  Many  of  the  principal  sheikhs 
of  Aleppo  seem  now  gained  over  to  side  of  Germany. 


No.  129 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  16) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  15,  1914. 

Son  of  Kurdish  chief  Issa,  who  is  stated  to  have  influence 
in  Mesopotamia,  and  who  has  been  in  Constantinople  for 
instructions,  is  said  to  have  left  for  Basra  to  work  anti-English 
propaganda,  and  other  agents,  including  Germans,  are  said 
to  be  on  their  way  to  Afghanistan  on  similar  errand. 

I  learn  that  Zekki  Pasha,  commander  of  8th  Corps,  has 
lately  received  £5000  to  distribute  amongst  Bedouins,  and 
that  as  much  as  £35,000  in  gold  left  here  by  train  on  I2th 
for  Syria.  Senator  Abdurrahman  is  working  among  Bedouins 
at  Maan  and  Muntaz  Bey  on  the  west  by  Beersheba  and 
Jerusalem. 

Party  of  Turkish  sailors  mentioned  as  having  left  here  by 
322 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

train  for  Basra  are  now  stated  to  be  on  the  way  to  Akaba 
with  consignment  of  metal  boats.  Another  lot  of  boats  is  at 
Rayak,  possibly  on  the  way  to  Beirout.  Quantities  of 
dynamite  have  been  sent  to  the  coast  towns  of  Syria,  probably 
to  serve  for  mining  purposes  of  land  defence.  This  is  in 
addition  to  sea  mines  which  have  been  also  forwarded. 
Numbers  of  '  working  battalions  '  (soldiers  as  yet  untrained) 
are  road  constructing  in  southern  Syria. 

All  above  and  previous  reports  in  a  similar  sense  show 
that  there  is  very  considerable  activity  being  directed  in  a 
sense  hostile  to  us,  and  this  activity  is  being  worked  by  German 
influence  and  agents  in  every  conceivable  direction.  Probably 
Government,  as  a  whole,  have  little  control  over  these 
activities,  but  do  not  disapprove  of  them.  As  regards  actual 
military  preparations,  German  element  has  sufficient  power 
to  persuade  the  authorities  on  certain  points.  German  press 
is  directing  movement,  and  has  obtained  despatch  of  numbers 
of  German  officers  to  Syria  to  superintend  preparations  and 
training  of  corps  there  for  war,  concentration  of  stores  and 
supplies  at  suitable  spots,  preparation  of  lines  of  communica- 
tion and  defence  of  coast. 


No.  130 

Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  16) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  16,  1914. 

German  plots  have  been  so  extensive  that  it  is  conceiv- 
able that  they  may  introduce  individuals  into  Egypt  who, 
impersonating  Indian  soldiers,  may  cause  mischief. 

In  substantiation  of  this  I  have  to  state  that  His  Majesty's 
Consul  at  Aleppo  has  learnt  that  a  tailor  in  that  town  has 
been  commissioned  to  make  a  variety  of  Indian  costumes  and 
head-dresses  on  design  and  measurements  supplied  by  German 
officers  there.  

No.  131 
Sir  H.  Bax-Ironside  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  16) 

(Telegraphic.)  Sophia,  October  16,  1914. 

Ninety-seven  cases  of  bullion  passed  through  Rustchuk 
yesterday  for  Constantinople,  accompanied  by  six  Germans. 

323 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

This  consignment  was  preceded  by  two  hundred  other  cases. 
In  the  last  three  weeks  many  heavy  cases  and  stores  have 
passed  through  same  town. 

Armaments  are  believed  to  be  sent  through  in  the  night. 


No.  132 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  16) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  16,  1914. 

Local  authorities  at  Jaffa  have  distributed  10,000  rifles 
amongst  Bedouins,  each  with  100  cartridges,  5000  ten-shot 
to  owners  of  horses  and  riding  camels,  and  5000  single-shot 
to  owners  of  baggage  camels.  Bedouins  have  been  employed 
to  dig  wells,  and  Germans  to  fit  them  with  motor  pumps  ; 
ovens  have  been  built  near  frontier. 

It  is  believed  that  Bedouins'  next  move  is  to  be  towards 
Akaba. 

Horses  and  mules  throughout  the  whole  district  are  being 
requisitioned  most  energetically. 


No.  133 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  17) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  16,  1914. 

Major  Omar  Fevzi  Bey,  son  of  Arimm  Effendi,  ex-Governor- 
General  of  Damascus,  accompanied  by  five  German  officers, 
arrived  at  Aleppo  October  14  from  Constantinople  bringing 
25,000  liras.  The  officers  passed  for  engineers,  and  are  buy- 
ing saddle  horses  to  proceed  to  Bagdad  via  Ana..  From  Ana 
they  are  to  take  two  batteries  of  guns,  which,  together  with 
money  and  loads  of  rifles  and  ammunition  taken  from  Aleppo, 
they  are  to  deliver  to  Ibn-el-Reshid. 

Railway  trucks  full  of  dynamite  for  Alexandretta  and 
Damascus  are  expected  to  arrive  from  Constantinople. 
German  officers  of  Breslau  have  already  laid  thirteen  mines 
at  Alexandretta  according  to  report  that  has  now  reached  me. 


324 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

No.  136 
Sir  F.  Elliot  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  17) 

(Telegraphic.)  Athens,  October  17,  1914. 

One  Bouhadi  Sadil  has  been  discovered  buying  arms  for 
importation  into  Egypt.  He  had  already  bought  700 
Gras  rifles  and  ammunition.  I  understand  that  two  of  this 
man's  accomplices  were  recently  convicted  in  Egypt. 


No.  138 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  18) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  17,  1914. 

Since  end  of  September  following  have  reached  Con- 
stantinople : 

Six  thousand  nine  hundred  cases  of  Mauser  ammunition, 
540  cases  of  Mauser  rifles,  13  trucks  of  war  material,  and 
about  8oo,ooo/.  in  bar  gold. 

Arrival  of  a  submarine  in  sections  is  expected  shortly, 
and  I  am  informed  that  such  a  consignment,  together  with 
two  aeroplanes,  left  Rustchuk  on  October  8. 

Two  German  ships  were  recently  escorted  from  Sulina  by 
Breslau,  and  are  reported  to  have  brought  submarine.  But 
there  is  no  evidence  at  present  to  prove  this. 


No.  139 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  18) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  18,  1914. 

Aeroplane,  three  airmen,  and  several  mechanics  left 
Beersheba  yesterday. 

Governor  left  Jaffa  with  a  view  to  allaying  panic. 

Following  is  resume  of  a  telegram  from  Minister  of  War 
to  commandant  at  Jaffa  which  has  come  to  my  knowledge  : 

'  On  the  approach  of  enemy  warships  destroy  boats  and 
lighters,  kill  horses,  break  carriages,  and  destroy  railway. 
Strictly  guard  telegraph.  When  surrender  of  town  is 
demanded  ask  for  time  to  consult  Jerusalem.  If  Jerusalem 

325 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

instructs  you  not  to  surrender,  oppose  landing  of  the  enemy 
by  force  of  arms.  See  no  looting  of  town  takes  place,  and 
find  suitable  place  to  shelter  your  archives.  Explain  above 
to  the  population  and  arm  them,  taking  oath  from  them.  At 
signal  not  to  surrender  send  away  women  and  children. 
Hoist  flag  on  konak  and  barracks  so  as  not  to  have  other 
places  bombarded.  Break  enemy's  flagstaff  and  remove 
insignia  from  the  door  of  his  consulate/ 


No.  143 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  19) 

Constantinople,  October  4,  1914. 

SIR, — I  have  the  honour  to  forward  herewith  copy  of  a 
note  which  I  addressed  to  the  Grand  Vizier  protesting  against 
certain  military  preparations  in  Syria. 

On  October  2  I  addressed  a  further  note,  copy  of  which  is 
also  enclosed,  pointing  out  that  no  answer  had  been  received 
either  to  my  previous  note  or  to  two  letters  of  the  25th  and 
26th  on  the  same  subject. — I  have,  etc. 

Louis  MALLET. 

ENCLOSURE  i  IN  No.  143 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Grand  Vizier 

(TRANSLATION) 

Constantinople,  September  23,  1914. 

YOUR  HIGHNESS, — In  the  course  of  our  interview  of 
yesterday  morning,  I  had  the  honour  to  inform  your  High- 
ness of  the  anxiety  that  the  news  which  reached  me  from 
Syria  in  regard  to  the  military  preparations  and  plots  against 
Egypt  now  going  on  in  that  province,  was  causing  me.  So 
long  as  it  was  a  question  of  preparations  similar  to  those  made 
in  other  parts  of  the  Empire,  as  a  consequence  of  the  general 
mobilisation,  I  did  not  mention  the  matter  to  your  Highness, 
although  special  importance  might  attach  to  all  such  doings 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Egyptian  frontier.  Similarly,  I 
have  been  able  up  to  the  present  to  reject,  as  improbable 
tales,  the  rumours  which  have  reached  me  from  more  than 
326 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

one  source,  according  to  which  a  sudden  blow  directed  against 
the  Suez  Canal  was  being  planned  with  the  object  of  render- 
ing it  impassable,  although  I  am  aware  that  the  enemies  of 
Great  Britain  are  intriguing  with  the  object  of  leading  your 
Highness's  Government  into  adventures  as  insensate,  and 
even  more  insensate,  than  this.  I  should,  however,  fail  in 
my  duty  towards  my  Government,  and  I  may  add  also  towards 
the  Government  of  your  Highness,  if  I  did  not  bring  to  your 
Highness's  knowledge  the  latest  reports  which  have  reached 
me.  It  appears  from  these  reports  that  the  minds  of  the 
Bedouins  are  being  excited  by  professional  agitators,  who, 
encouraged  by  the  Ottoman  Government,  are  desirous  of 
inflaming  them  against  England.  The  military  preparations 
which  up  to  a  certain  moment  bore  a  similar  character  to 
those  in  the  other  provinces  of  the  Empire,  have  lately  changed 
into  a  converging  movement  towards  the  south.  Troops 
are  being  brought  from  such  distant  centres  as  Mosul.  General 
activity  reigns  everywhere  from  Damascus  to  Maan,  and 
cumulative  evidence  leads  my  Consul  at  Jerusalem  to  the 
belief  that  an  organised  expedition  against  Egypt  is  in  project 
for  the  next  few  days. 

I  trust  that  the  reports,  the  contents  of  which  I  have 
just  summed  up  to  your  Highness,  put  a  wrong  interpreta- 
tion on  facts  which,  as  such,  cannot  be  discussed.  But  I 
repeat  that  I  should  fail  in  my  duty  if  I  did  not  bring  to  your 
Highness's  knowledge  the  grave  preoccupation  which  they 
cause  me,  and  the  impression  which  they  make  upon  His 
Britannic  Majesty's  Government,  and  if  I  did  not  place  you 
on  your  guard  against  the  disastrous  consequences,  which 
would  ensue  for  your  Highness's  Government,  if  they  were  to 
follow  a  course  so  contrary  to  their  own  interests  as  that  of 
becoming  the  accomplice  of  Germany  in  an  attack  upon 
Egypt. 

Your  Highness  will  remember  that  at  the  beginning  of  the 
present  war,  Sir  E.  Grey  instructed  Mr.  Beaumont  to  give 
you  the  assurance  that,  provided  that  Turkey  maintained 
strict  and  absolute  neutrality  during  the  war,  and  so  long  as 
unforeseen  circumstances  did  not  arise,  His  Britannic  Majesty's 
Government  had  no  desire  to,  nor  intention  of  annexing 
Egypt,  nor  of  modifying  her  regime  in  any  way  whatsoever. 
I  had  the  honour  to  confirm  this  assurance  to  your  High- 

327 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

ness  shortly  after  my  return  to  Constantinople.  Since  then, 
being  desirous  of  avoiding  any  possibility  of  misunderstanding 
with  the  Imperial  Government,  I  have  repeatedly  called  your 
Highnesses  attention  to  the  conditional  character  of  the 
assurances  given  by  Sir  E.  Grey.  Now,  I  hold  it  to  be  my 
duty  to  declare  once  more  to  your  Highness  that  my  Govern- 
ment take  the  most  serious  view  of  the  unprecedented  viola- 
tions of  neutrality  already  committed  by  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment in  retaining  German  officers  and  men  on  board  the 
German  warships,  and  by  subsequently  taking  into  their 
service  numerous  other  Germans  in  a  similar  military  capacity. 

It  does  not  seem  to  me  necessary  at  this  moment  to  re- 
capitulate the  details  of  still  further  departures  from  neutrality 
committed  by  Turkey  in  favour  of  the  enemies  of  Great 
Britain.  Nor  need  I  insist  on  the  consequences  which  might 
ensue  if,  to  add  the  last  touch  to  so  grave  a  situation,  my 
Government  were  to  become  convinced  that  the  Imperial 
Government  were  seriously  meditating  an  attack  against 
Egypt,  or  that  they  were  a  party  to  disloyal  intrigues  against 
the  security  of  the  Suez  Canal,  or  against  the  present  regime 
in  Egypt.  Your  Highness  can  judge  of  the  whole  import- 
ance and  possible  extent  of  these  consequences. 

I  enclose  in  this  note  a  Memorandum,  enumerating  in 
detail  the  facts  which  can  be  considered  as  indications  of  a 
forthcoming  attack  upon  Egypt. — I  avail,  etc. 

Louis  MALLET. 


MEMORANDUM 

(TRANSLATION) 

From  a  report  dated  the  i8th  instant,  it  appears  that  the 
authorities  were  using  all  their  efforts  in  order  to  excite  the 
Bedouin  tribes  against  England  by  representing  her  as  the 
enemy  of  Islam,  and  that  30,000  men  belonging  to  these 
tribes  were  ready  to  rise.  A  supplementary  report  states 
that  the  instigators  of  this  movement  are  Muntaz  Bey,  an 
officer  of  the  army,  Essad  Shoucair,  deputy  or  former  deputy, 
and  a  certain  Beheddine  Bey,  aided  by  several  other  persons, 
and  with  the  support  of  the  local,  civil,  and  military  autho- 
rities. The  report  adds  categorically  that,  according  to 
328 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

current  rumour,   these  tribes  were  to  arm  immediately  in 
order  to  march  on  Egypt. 

From  a  further  report  dated  the  i8th  instant,  it  appears 
that  a  military  movement  from  Damascus  towards  the  south 
was  expected  about  2Oth  September  ;  that  the  Mosul  troops 
were  on  their  way  to  Damascus  ;  that  large  stores  of  food- 
stuffs were  being  prepared ;  that  3000  camels  had  been 
collected  at  Maan  ;  and  that  two  staff  officers  had  returned 
from  Akaba  after  studying  the  possibility  of  a  movement 
across  the  desert.  This  report  was  supplemented  by  another 
of  the  same  date  to  the  effect  that  it  was  intended  to 
send  a  large  number  of  men  from  Horns  to  Damascus  by 
rail,  between  September  20  and  23,  and  that  a  great  con- 
centration converging  towards  the  south  was  expected. 
From  a  third  report,  which  was  received  subsequently,  it 
appears  that  another  5000  camels  had  been  requisitioned 
at  Maan  ;  that  all  the  rolling-stock  of  the  southern  section 
of  the  Hedjaz  Railway  was  being  concentrated  at  Deraa; 
and  that  the  Mosul  troops  had  reached  Tel-Abiad,  near 
Aleppo. 

A  report,  dated  the  2ist  instant,  stated  that  there  was 
cumulative  evidence  to  show  almost  certainly  that  an  attack 
against  Egypt  on  a  large  scale  would  take  place  in  the  very 
near  future ;  that  the  troops  would  advance  on  both  sides 
by  way  of  Akaba  and  by  way  of  El  Arish  ;  and  that  a  large 
provision  of  things  necessary  for  their  transport  across  the 
desert  was  being  prepared.  A  further  report  of  the  same 
date  stated  that  camels  and  men  had  arrived  at  Damascus 
from  Horns  ;  that  thirty  battalions  were  expected  to  arrive 
during  the  week ;  that  the  chief  staff  officer  from  Damascus 
had  proceeded  to  Maan  ;  and  that  the  chiefs  of  the  Bedouin 
tribes  had  left  for  the  south  after  a  conference  with  the  Vali. 
Constantinople,  September  23,  1914. 


ENCLOSURE  2  IN  No.  143 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Grand  Vizier 

Constantinople,  October  2,  1914. 

YOUR  HIGHNESS, — In  my  communication  of  September 
23  and  subsequent   letters  of  the  25th   and  26th,  various 

329 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

military  and  other  preparations  in  Syria,  initiated  by  the 
Ottoman  Government,  were  brought  to  the  notice  of  your 
Highness,  as  likely  to  cause  apprehensions  to  His  Majesty's 
Government. 

To  the  representations  made  in  these  communications,  no 
written  reply  has  yet  been  received,  and  it  appears  that  not 
only  has  the  verification  of  the  details  already  given  been 
confirmed,  but  further  news  of  a  disquieting  nature  has  now 
arrived.  For  instance,  the  transport  of  food-stuffs,  military 
stores,  and  material  of  war  to  Maan  continues.  As  this  place 
is  in  nowise  a  Turkish  military  centre  in  peace,  and  has  no 
connection  with  a  mobilisation  of  the  Syrian  divisions  in  their 
ordinary  stations,  but  is,  on  the  other  hand,  in  proximity 
to  the  Egyptian  frontier.  His  Majesty's  Government  would 
desire  to  be  informed  why  it  is  considered  necessary  to  make 
the  preparations  in  question,  which  are  evidently  for  the 
maintenance  of  a  considerable  body  of  troops  or  for  their 
transit  farther  in  the  direction  of  Akaba. 

2.  Similar  preparations  are  also  apparently  being  made 
on  the  road  Jenin-Nablus- Jerusalem,  and  the  collection   of 
a  camel  corps  at  the  latter  place  was  announced  yesterday. 
These  measures  tend  to  show  a  projected  concentration  of 
troops  on  the  limits  of  Syria  to  the  west,  and  again  in  proximity 
to  the  Egyptian  frontier. 

3.  The   above   steps   have   latterly   coincided   with    the 
sudden  arrival  of  Colonel  Kress  von  Kressenstein  and  six 
other   German   officers,   with   the  result   that   it   is   openly 
rumoured  in  Syria  that  the  Jerusalem  division  is  preparing 
to   move  towards   Rafa    and    that    of    Damascus    towards 
Akaba. 

4.  From  Beirout  arrive  reports  that  the  inhabitants  are 
retiring  inland,  and  from  Haifa  that  the  customs  and  railway 
staff   have   also   been    transferred   from   the   coast.     These 
measures  are  stated  to  be  taken  as  precautionary  steps  against 
the  hostile  action  of  the  British  fleet,  which  is  expected  to 
ensue  on  the  movement  of  Turkish  forces  against  Egypt. 

5.  In  view  of  all  these  circumstances,  it  is  undoubtedly 
the  case  that  it  is  fully  believed  in  Syria  that  an  offensive 
movement  against  Egypt  is  contemplated  by  the  Ottoman 
authorities,  and,  although  His  Majesty's  Government  do  not 
necessarily   share   this  view,   they   cannot   but   regard   any 
330 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

continuance  of  the  military  movement  in  anything  but  the 
most  serious  light. 

6.  Apart  from  recognised  military  measures,  the  move- 
ments of  a  German  engineer  belonging  to  the  Bagdad  Railway 
with  a  large  consignment  of  explosives  destined  for  an  attempt 
on  the  Suez  Canal  has  already  been  brought  to  your  High- 
ness's  notice  in  my  letter  of  the  25th  ultimo. 

Not  only  have  the  movements  of  this  individual  been 
confirmed,  but  the  departure  of  a  German  naval  officer 
named  Hilgendorff  is  now  also  announced  with  the  same 
purpose.  This  individual  has  left  Petra  with  a  party  of  eight 
Germans,  ostensibly  on  a  shooting  expedition,  but  with  a 
large  amount  of  stores,  including  explosives,  and  intending 
to  meet  another  similar  party  journeying  via  Haifa- Amman. 

As  both  these  parties  are  acting  from  neutral  territory 
with  the  avowed  intention  of  committing  acts  hostile  to  Great 
Britain,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  Porte  to  secure  their  appre- 
hension, coupled  with  an  assurance  that  all  necessary  steps 
will  be  taken  to  put  an  end  to  any  enterprise  of  this  nature. 

I  have  been  repeatedly  assured  by  your  Highness  and 
by  other  members  of  the  Ottoman  Government  that  Turkey 
is  firmly  determined  to  maintain  an  attitude  of  strict  neutrality 
during  the  European  war.  To  these  assurances  I  have  been 
unfortunately  obliged  to  reply  that  the  Ottoman  Government 
have  failed  in  several  most  essential  particulars  to  maintain 
their  neutrality,  and  I  would  now  desire  to  point  out,  with 
all  the  emphasis  at  my  command,  that,  if  these  preparations 
continue,  only  one  conclusion  can  be  deduced — namely,  that 
the  Ottoman  Government  are  taking  preliminary  steps  to 
send  an  expedition  against  Egypt  and  that  they  are  conniving 
at  the  preparation  of  a  plot  against  the  Suez  Canal  on  the 
part  of  German  subjects,  who  are  either  in  the  Ottoman 
service  or  are  acting  independently. 

I  cannot  too  earnestly  impress  upon  your  Highness  the 
absolute  necessity  of  putting  an  end  to  this  situation  of 
uncertainty  at  the  earliest  moment  possible,  in  order  that 
those  relations  of  confidence  and  sincerity  may  be  restored 
between  the  two  Governments  which  it  has  constantly  been 
my  object  to  foster. — I  avail,  etc. 

Louis  MALLET. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

No.  148 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  19) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  19,  1914. 

New  Governor-General  of  Basra  with  six  army  officers, 
including  two  German  officers,  also  six  naval  officers,  includ- 
ing two  Germans,  and  150  Turkish  sailors  with  three  columns 
of  ammunition,  arrived  at  Alexandretta  on  morning  of  Octo- 
ber 18  by  railway  from  Constantinople.  Their  final  destina- 
tion is  believed  to  be  Basra.  I  am  also  informed  that  Maan 
is  their  true  destination. 


No.  149 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  19) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  19,  1914. 

Within  last  few  days  following  have  passed  through 
Adana  in  direction  of  Syria  :  450  gendarmes  with  600  sailors, 
of  whom  200  were  German,  52  German  naval  and  military 
officers,  a  commandant  of  police,  45  civilian  officials,  of  whom 
two  were  German,  10  engines,  and  3  or  four  automobiles, 
said  to  contain  German  officers. 


No.  150 
Mr.  Cheetham  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  19) 

(Telegraphic.)  Cairo,  October  19,  1914. 

I   am  informed  that   Bimbashi   Gamil,   staff  officer  in 
Turkish  army,   Khoga   (Imam)   Ali  Haider,   Khoga  (Imam) 
Amin,   and  Khoga   (Imam)   Rustom,   have  left  Smyrna  in 
order  to  carry  on  a  Turcophile  propaganda  in  India. 


No.  152 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  22) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  21,  1914. 

Battery  of  six  guns  which  left  Constantinople  on  nth 
instant,  and  which  I  think  were  heavy  guns,  have,  together 
332 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

with  aeroplane,   arrived  at  Alexandretta  and  left  for  the 
south. 

Since  October  18  there  have  been  no  movements  of 
troops  to  or  from  Damascus.  Some  trucks  of  ammunition 
went  round  by  rail  to  Nablus  Sidi,  and  cases  of  rifles  arrived 
from  Aleppo. 

No.  154 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  22) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  22,  1914. 

A  manifesto,  the  authorship  of  which  is  attributed  to 
Sheikh  Aziz  Shawish,  is  being  secretly  circulated  at  Beirout. 
Manifesto  bears  alleged  signatures  of  ten  representatives  of 
Moslem  countries  under  foreign  rule.  It  incites  Moslem 
soldiers  to  mutiny  in  their  respective  countries  in  defence  of 
Islam,  and  bids  them  desert  the  Allies  and  join  Germany. 
Whole  tenor  is  fanatical  and  inflammatory. 


No.  155 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  22) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  22,  1914. 

My  immediately  preceding  telegram. 

I  understand  that  several  thousand  copies  of  manifesto 
are  to  be  smuggled  into  Egypt  and  India  and  other  Moslem 
countries  through  Syria. 


No.  156 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  L.  Mallet 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  October  22,  1914. 

German  officers  now  on  frontier  seem  bent  on  forcing 
matters.  General  Officer  Commanding  Egypt  anticipates 
Arab  raid  at  any  moment  at  their  instigation. 


333 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

No.  161 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  24) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  23,  1914. 

Twenty  projectors,  10  electric  mines,  4  electric  motors, 
500  cases  of  Mauser  ammunition  have  arrived  via  Rustchuk 
in  addition  to  arrivals  already  reported  previously. 


No.  162 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  24) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  23,  1914. 

Very  large  quantities  of  bar  gold  have  recently  arrived. 
Nearly  a  million's  worth  was  taken  to  Deutsche  Bank  three 
nights  ago  under  escort,  and  there  is  information  that  pre- 
vious consignments  have  been  similarly  conveyed.  It  is 
probable  that  between  two  and  three  millions  have  arrived 
altogether. 

No.  163 

Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  24) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  23,  1914. 

German  named  Kellerman  has  just  left  Aleppo  for  Haifa 
or  the  south.  Two  thousand  camels,  1500  water-skins, 
400  bicycles,  all  canvas  and  canvas  bags,  together  with 
food-stuffs,  are  being  requisitioned  in  Aleppo. 

Information  goes  to  show  that  an  Arab  raid  has  been 
possible  during  last  few  weeks,  and  contingency  has  certainly 
to  be  watched.  

No.  166 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  L.  Mallet 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  October  24,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  October  23  1  gives  the  impression  that 
Turkey  considers  sending  an  armed  force  over  the  frontier 
of  Egypt  as  being  in  some  way  different  from  acts  of  war 

1  [See  No.  164,  Naval,  2,  p.  143.] 
534 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

against  Russia.  You  should  disabuse  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment of  any  such  idea,  and  inform  them  that  a  military 
violation  of  frontier  of  Egypt  will  place  them  in  a  state  of 
war  with  three  allied  Powers. 

I  think  you  should  enumerate  to  Grand  Vizier  the  hostile 
acts  of  which  we  complain,  and  warn  him  that,  if  German 
influences  succeed  in  pushing  Turkey  to  cross  the  frontiers 
of  Egypt  and  threaten  the  international  Suez  Canal,  which 
we  are  bound  to  preserve,  it  will  not  be  we,  but  Turkey,  that 
will  have  aggressively  disturbed  the  status  quo. 

The  following  is  a  convenient  summary  of  Turkish  acts 
of  which  we  complain,  and  which,  combined,  produce  a  most 
unfavourable  impression.  You  might  send  it  to  Grand 
Vizier  : 

'  The  Mosul  and  Damascus  Army  Corps  have,  since  their 
mobilisation,  been  constantly  sending  troops  south  prepara- 
tory to  an  invasion  of  Egypt  and  the  Suez  Canal  from  Akaba 
and  Gaza.  A  large  body  of  Bedouin  Arabs  has  been  called 
out  and  armed  to  assist  in  this  venture.  Transport  has  been 
collected  and  roads  have  been  prepared  up  to  the  frontier 
of  Egypt.  Mines  have  been  despatched  to  be  laid  in  the 
Gulf  of  Akaba  to  protect  the  force  from  naval  attack,  and 
the  notorious  Sheikh  Aziz  Shawish,  who  has  been  so  well 
known  as  a  firebrand  in  raising  Moslem  feeling  against 
Christians,  has  published  and  disseminated  through  Syria 
and  probably  India,  an  inflammatory  document  urging 
Mohammedans  to  fight  against  Great  Britain.  Dr.  Priiffer, 
who  was  so  long  engaged  in  intrigues  in  Cairo  against  the 
British  occupation,  and  is  now  attached  to  the  German 
Embassy  in  Constantinople,  has  been  busily  occupied  in 
Syria  trying  to  incite  the  people  to  take  part  in  this  conflict/ 


No.  168 
Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  27) 

(Telegraphic.)  Petrograd,  October  26,  1914. 

Forty-two  Germans,  disguised  as  tourists,  are  said  to 
have  arrived  at  Aleppo.  They  are  members  of  General 
Staff  and  of  crews  of  Goeben  and  Breslau.  It  is  believed 

335 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

that  they  have  150  mines  with  them.  Some  of  the  officers 
are  bound  for  Bagdad  and  Basra,  others  for  Beirout  and 
Tripoli. 

No.  169 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  27) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  27,  1914. 

Enver  Pasha,  Jemel,  and  Talaat  Bey,  are  making  every 
preparation  for  an  expedition  against  Egypt,  which  is  evi- 
dently now  their  uppermost  thought.  A  majority  of  the 
Committee  are,  however,  said  to  be  against  war,  and  are 
showing  considerable  opposition  to  the  scheme.  I  am  unable 
to  vouch  for  this,  but  the  news  appears  to  be  fairly  well 
authenticated.  Halill  Bey  started  for  Berlin  this  morning, 
and  he  is  said  to  be  about  to  negotiate  with  the  German 
Government.  It  seems  difficult  to  explain  his  journey  on 
any  other  hypothesis  than  that  the  Turks  wish  to  post- 
pone any  decisive  action. 


No.  172 
Mr.  Cheetham  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  28) 

(Telegraphic.)  Cairo,  October  28,  1914. 

I  have  received  reliable  information  that  some  German 
officers  unsuccessfully  endeavoured  to  persuade  commandant 
of  Turk  post  to  attack  our  post  at  Kossaimo,  and  that,  on 
making  further  efforts  with  this  object,  they  were  arrested 
and  sent  to  Beersheba.  If  true,  story  shows  desire  of  Germans 
to  precipitate  matters. 


No.  173 
Mr.  Cheetham  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  28) 

(Telegraphic.)  Cairo,  October  28,  1914. 

Two  thousand  armed  Bedouins  are  advancing  to  attack 
the  Canal,  and  have  watered  at  Magdaba,  which  is  twenty 
miles  inside  Egyptian  frontier,  October  26. 

336 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

No.  176 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  29) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  29,  1914. 

I  have  seen  the  Grand  Vizier  and  informed  him  that, 
in  spite  of  his  assurances,  the  Bedouins  had  crossed  the 
frontier  and  were  in  occupation  of  wells  of  Magdaba,  twenty 
miles  within  Egyptian  territory.  I  reminded  him  of  the 
warning  which  1  had  addressed  to  him  on  account  of  instruc- 
tions contained  in  your  telegram  of  October  24, l  and  asked 
him  for  explanation.  His  Highness  replied  that  he  had 
instructed  Minister  of  War,  after  representations  which  I 
had  made  to  him,  on  no  account  to  allow  movement  of  any 
force  across  the  frontier.  If  it  were  true,  he  would  give 
immediate  orders  for  recall  of  Bedouins,  but  he  did  not 
believe  accuracy  of  the  information. 

I  replied  that  it  was  necessary  at  such  a  crisis  that  I  should 
speak  quite  frankly,  that  it  was  a  matter  for  public  notoriety 
that  there  were  divisions  of  opinion  in  the  Cabinet,  that  His 
Highness  was  not  master  of  the  situation,  and  that,  if  Minister 
of  War  and  extremists  had  decided  upon  an  expedition  against 
Egypt,  His  Highness  could  not  prevent  it.  Grand  Vizier 
replied  that  I  was  absolutely  mistaken,  and  that,  if  it  came 
to  that,  military  party  would  not  act  without  full  assent 
of  the  Government.  I  said  that  in  that  case  the  time  had 
come  to  put  them  to  the  test,  and  that  unless  expedition 
were  immediately  recalled,  I  could  not  answer  for  the  con- 
sequences. As  it  was,  I  might  at  any  moment  receive 
instructions  to  ask  for  my  passports,  in  which  case  Turkish 
Government  would  be  at  war  with  the  Triple  Entente  at  a 
time  when  German  official  communiques  admitted  defeat  on 
the  Vistula.  

No.  180 
Sir  L.  Mallet  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — (Received  October  31) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  October  30,  1914. 

Russian  Ambassador  asked  for  his  passports  this  after- 
noon, and  I  and  my  French  colleague  have  followed  suit. 

1  See  No.  166. 

MILITARY  2  Y  337 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Minister  of  the  Interior,  in  conversation  with  a  neutral 
colleague  this  afternoon,  practically  admitted  that  Turkey 
had  thrown  in  her  lot  with  Germany. 

I  have  had  a  very  painful  interview  with  the  Grand  Vizier, 
who  had  been  kept  in  the  dark  as  to  his  colleagues'  intentions, 
and  who  will  doubtless  be  set  aside  to-night. 


DESPATCH  FROM  HIS  MAJESTY'S  AMBASSADOR  AT 
CONSTANTINOPLE  SUMMARISING  EVENTS 
LEADING  UP  TO  RUPTURE  OF  RELATIONS 
WITH  TURKEY,  AND  REPLY  THERETO  * 

MISCELLANEOUS,  No.  14  (1914)  [Cd.  7716]. 
[In  continuation  of '  Miscellaneous,  No.  13  (1914) ' :  Cd.  7628.] 

Q  London,  November  20,  1914. 

On  land,  the  officers  of  the  German  military  mission  dis- 
played a  ubiquitous  activity.  Their  supremacy  at  the 
Ministry  of  War,  combined  with  the  close  co-operation 
which  existed  between  them  and  the  Militarist  party,  made 
it  easy  to  fortify  an  already  strong  position.  Acting  in  con- 
junction with  other  less  accredited  agents  of  their  own  nation- 
ality, they  were  the  main  organisers  of  those  military  prepara- 
tions in  Syria  which  so  directly  menaced  Egypt,  and  which 
became  a  serious  source  of  preoccupation  and  a  constant 
theme  of  my  remonstrances. 

The  evidence  of  these  preparations  became  daily  more 
convincing.  Emissaries  of  Enver  Pasha  were  present  on  the 
frontier,  bribing  and  organising  the  Bedouins.  Warlike 
stores  were  despatched  south,  and  battalions  of  regular  troops 
were  posted  at  Rafah,  whilst  the  Syrian  and  Mosul  army 
corps  were  held  in  readiness  to  move  south  at  short  notice. 
The  Syrian  towns  were  full  of  German  officers,  who  were 

1  [Extract.     The  complete  despatch  will  be  found  in  Naval,  2,   pp. 
158-171.] 
338 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

provided  with  large  sums  of  money  for  suborning  the  local 
chiefs.  As  an  illustration  of  the  thoroughness  of  the  German 
preparations,  I  was  credibly  informed  that  orders  were  given 
to  obtain  estimates  for  the  making  of  Indian  military  costumes 
at  Aleppo  in  order  to  simulate  the  appearance  of  British  Indian 
troops.  Under  directions  from  the  Central  Government  the 
civil  authorities  of  the  Syrian  coast  towns  removed  all  their 
archives  and  ready  money  to  the  interior,  and  Moslem  families 
were  warned  to  leave  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  bombard- 
ment by  the  British  fleet.  The  Khedive  himself  was  a  party 
to  the  conspiracy,  and  arrangements  were  actually  made 
with  the  German  Embassy  for  his  presence  with  a  military 
expedition  across  the  frontier. 

However  difficult  it  would  have  been  for  the  Ottoman 
Government  to  regain  their  control  over  the  armed  forces 
of  the  State  after  the  arrival  of  the  Goeben  and  Breslau,  the 
insidious  campaign  carried  on  with  their  encouragement  by 
means  of  the  press,  the  preachers  in  the  mosques,  and  the 
pamphleteers,  is  evidence  that  its  most  powerful  members 
were  in  sympathy  with  the  anti-British  movement.  I  had, 
indeed,  actual  proof  of  the  inspiration  by  Talaat  Bey  and 
Djemal  Pasha  of  articles  directed  against  Great  Britain. 
Every  agency  which  could  be  used  to  stimulate  public  opinion 
in  favour  of  Germany  and  to  inflame  it  against  the  Allies  was 
set  at  work  with  the  connivance,  and  often  with  the  co-opera- 
tion, of  the  Turkish  authorities.  All  the  Turkish  news- 
papers in  Constantinople  became  German  organs;  they 
glorified  every  real  or  imaginary  success  of  Germany  or 
Austria ;  they  minimised  everything  favourable  to  the  Allies. 

The  enclosures  in  an  earlier  despatch  will  have  shown 
to  what  depths  of  scurrility  some  of  the  more  corrupt  and 
unbridled  of  them  descended  in  their  onslaughts  on  Great 
Britain,  and  how  unequally  the  censors  of  the  press  held 
the  balance  when  exercising  their  practically  unlimited  powers. 
The  provincial  papers  were  no  less  enthusiastically  pro- 
German  ;  the  semi-official  telegraphic  agency,  which  is 
practically  worked  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  was  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  German  propaganda.  Through  these 
agencies  unlimited  use  was  made  of  Turkey's  one  concrete 
and  substantial  grievance  against  Great  Britain  as  distin- 
guished from  other  European  Powers,  that  is,  the  detention 

339 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

of  the  Sultan  Osman  and  the  Reshadie  at  the  beginning  of  the 
European  war.  Other  grievances,  older  and  less  substantial, 
were  raked  out  of  the  past ;  and  the  indictment  of  Great 
Britain  and  her  allies  was  completed  by  a  series  of  inventions 
and  distortions  of  the  truth  designed  to  represent  them  as 
the  enemy,  not  merely  of  Turkey,  but  of  the  whole  of  Islam. 
Attacks  of  the  latter  kind  became  especially  frequent  in  the 
latter  half  of  October,  and  were  undoubtedly  directly  inspired 
by  Germany.  My  urgent  representations  to  the  Grand 
Vizier  and  to  Talaat  Bey,  both  verbal  and  written,  had 
hardly  even  a  temporary  effect  in  checking  this  campaign. 

It  may  seem  strange  that,  thus  equipped  and  thus  abetted, 
those  who  sought  to  involve  Turkey  in  the  European  war 
failed  so  long  to  achieve  their  object.  The  reasons  were 
manifold.  As  I  have  already  indicated,  the  party  which 
stood  for  neutrality  contained  men  who,  lacking  though  they 
were  in  any  material  means  of  enforcing  their  views,  could 
not  easily  be  ignored.  By  whatever  various  routes  they 
may  have  been  arrived  at,  the  ideas  of  these  men  coincided 
with  a  body  of  less  sophisticated  and  hardly  articulate  opinion 
which,  however  wounded  by  England's  action  in  preventing 
delivery  of  the  Sultan  Osman  and  the  Reshadie,  could  still 
not  reconcile  itself  to  a  war  with  England  and  France.  In 
my  despatch  of  22nd  September  I  had  the  honour  to  report 
how  frankly  and  how  emphatically  the  Sultan  himself  voiced 
this  feeling  in  conversation  with  me.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  the  Grand  Vizier  exercised  what  influence  he  had 
in  favour  of  neutrality.  Djavid  Bey,  the  Minister  of  Finance, 
whose  influence  in  favour  of  neutrality  was  of  weight  as 
representing  the  Jewish  element,  and  whose  arguments  in 
favour  of  peace  were  supported  by  the  fact  that  Turkey  was 
already  absolutely  bankrupt,  and  not  in  a  position  to  embark 
upon  war  with  the  Allies,  became  towards  the  end  so  formid- 
able an  obstacle  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  German  plan  that 
instructions  were  sent  from  Berlin  to  force  his  resignation. 

Again,  seriously  convinced  as  most  prominent  Turks 
appear  to  have  been  of  the  ultimate  success  «f  Germany, 
their  confidence  could  not  but  be  a  little  dashed  by  the  actual 
course  of  events  in  the  two  main  theatres  of  war  ;  and  the 
more  thoughtful  realised  that  even  in  the  event  of  Germany 
being  victorious,  the  fact  of  Turkey  having  fought  by  her 
340 


k]  WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

side  would  not  necessarily  ensure  any  advantage  to  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  As  for  the  Germans  themselves,  it  was 
true,  as  I  have  said,  that  they  could  at  any  moment  force 
Turkey  to  march  with  them,  but  to  do  so  before  every  means 
of  suasion  had  proved  useless  would  obviously  not  have  been 
politic.  It  was  clearly  only  in  the  last  resort  that  the  Monarch 
whom  Pan-Islamic  pro-Germans  acclaimed  as  the  hope  of 
Islam,  and  whom  the  devout  in  some  places  had  been  taught 
to  regard  as  hardly  distinguishable  from  a  true  believer,  would 
run  the  risk  of  scandalising  the  Moslem  world,  whom  he  hoped 
to  set  ablaze  to  the  undoing  of  England,  Russia,  and  France, 
by  using  the  guns  of  the  Goeben  to  force  the  hands  of  the 
Sultan-Caliph.  But  the  factor  which  more  than  any  other 
delayed  the  realisation  of  the  German  plans,  and  which  enabled 
me  and  my  French  and  Russian  colleagues  to  protract  the 
crisis  until  they  could  only  be  realised  in  such  a  way  as  to 
open  the  eyes  of  the  Moslem  world  to  the  real  nature  of  the 
conspiracy,  was  the  inherent  tendency  of  Turkish  states- 
men to  procrastinate,  in  the  hope  that  by  playing  off  one 
side  against  the  other  they  might  gain  more  in  the  long 
run. 

However  slender  the  chances  in  our  favour,  it  was  obviously 
my  duty,  in  conjunction  with  my  French  and  Russian  col- 
leagues, to  support  and  encourage  by  all  possible  means  those 
forces  which  were  obscurely  striving  for  the  preservation  of 
peace. 

If  this  policy  necessarily  involved  the  acceptance  of  acts 
on  the  part  of  the  Ottoman  Government  which,  in  ordinary 
circumstances,  would  have  called  for  more  than  remonstrance 
and  the  reservation  of  our  rights,  and  which  it  would  have 
been  easy  to  make  the  occasion  of  a  rupture  of  relations,  the 
patience  displayed  by  the  Allies  was  justified  by  the  results 
achieved. 

Although  unsuccessful  in  averting  war,  two  objects  of 
main  importance  were  gained  by  delaying  its  commencement. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  Allied  Powers  are  now  in  a  position  to 
deal  with  the  problem  with  a  freer  hand,  and,  on  the  other, 
Germany  has  been  forced  to  show  her  cards  and  to  act  inde- 
pendently of  a  majority  of  the  Turkish  Cabinet. 

Under  the  stress  of  events  in  the  main  theatre  of  the  war, 
and  owing  to  the  vital  necessity  of  providing  a  diversion  in 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

the  Near  East,  Germany  was  constrained  to  intensify  still 
further  their  pressure  on  the  Turks.  During  the  first  three 
weeks  of  October  their  pressure  took  yet  another  form,  and 
a  new  weight  was  cast  into  the  scale  by  the  importation  into 
Constantinople,  with  every  circumstance  of  secrecy,  of  large 
quantities  of  bullion  consigned  to  the  German  Ambassador 
and  delivered  under  military  guard  at  the  Deutsche  Bank. 
The  total  amount  was  estimated  at  some  £4,000,000.  This 
sum  was  far  more  than  was  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  German  military  and  naval  establishments,  and  I  have 
every  reason  to  believe  that  a  definite  arrangement  was 
arrived  at  between  the  Germans  and  a  group  of  Ministers, 
including  Enver  Pasha,  Talaat  Bey,  and  Djemal  Pasha,  that 
Turkey  should  declare  war  as  soon  as  the  financial  provision 
should  have  attained  a  stated  figure.  My  information  estab- 
lishes the  fact  that  a  climax  was  reached  about  the  middle 
of  the  third  week  in  October,  when  it  had  been  decided  to 
confront  the  Grand  Vizier  with  the  alternative  of  complicity 
or  resignation,  and  that  only  the  Russian  successes  on  the 
Vistula,  or  some  other  more  obscure  cause,  prevented  this 
plan  from  being  carried  out. 

Whatever  the  exact  history  of  the  first  three  weeks  of 
October,  it  is  certain  that  on  or  about  the  26th  of  that  month 
the  German  conspirators  realised  that  the  pace  must  be 
forced  by  still  more  drastic  measures  than  they  had  yet  used, 
and  that  any  further  attempts  to  win  over  the  Grand  Vizier 
and  the  Turkish  Government  as  a  whole  to  their  ideas  and 
to  induce  them  to  declare  war  would  be  useless.  On  that 
afternoon  an  important  meeting  of  Committee  leaders  was 
held,  at  which  Enver  Pasha  was  present,  but  which  only 
decided  to  send  Halil  Bey,  the  President  of  the  Chamber, 
on  a  mission  to  Berlin.  In  the  circles  in  which  this  decision 
became  known  it  was  regarded  as  a  partial  triumph  for  the 
Peace  party,  and  as  a  fresh  attempt  to  gain  time  for  the  sake 
either  of  mere  procrastination  or  of  securing  more  concrete 
offers  from  Germany.  Be  that  as  it  may,  Halil  Bey  never 
left  on  his  mission,  and  it  is  believed  that  its  abandonment 
was  due  to  a  more  than  usually  blunt  hint  from  the  German 
representative  in  Constantinople.  Whilst  Constantinople  gene- 
rally was  comforting  itself  with  the  reflection  that  nothing 
could  well  happen  until  after  the  four  days'  Bairam  festival, 
342 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

beginning  on  October  30,  two  events  of  capital  importance 
occurred. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2gth  I  received  intelligence  from 
Egypt  of  the  incursion  into  the  Sinai  peninsula  of  an  armed 
body  of  2000  Bedouins,  who  had  occupied  the  wells  of 
Magdaba,  and  whose  objective  was  an  attack  upon  the 
Suez  Canal.  On  learning  this  news  I  at  once  proceeded 
to  the  Yali  of  the  Grand  Vizier,  to  acquaint  him  of  the 
serious  consequences  which  must  ensue  if  the  expedition 
were  not  at  once  recalled.  His  Highness  received  the  intel- 
ligence with  every  appearance  of  surprise.  He  emphatically 
disclaimed  all  knowledge  of  it,  and  gave  me  the  most  solemn 
assurance  that  if-  the  facts  were  as  stated  he  would  at  once 
issue  orders  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  invading  party.  He 
assured  me  once  more  that  nothing  was  further  from  the 
intention  of  the  Government  than  war  with  Great  Britain. 
It  was  unthinkable,  he  said,  that  an  expedition  of  this  kind 
could  have  been  organised  by  any  member  of  the  Government ; 
and  he  felt  certain  that  if  anything  of  the  kind  had  occurred, 
it  could  only  have  been  a  raid  by  irresponsible  Bedouins. 
I  told  His  Highness  that  I  feared  that  he  deceived  himself. 
I  reminded  him  of  the  various  occasions  on  which  he  had 
given  me  similar  assurances,  and  of  the  negative  results  of 
the  instructions  which  he  had  given  on  previous  occasions. 
I  warned  him  of  the  disastrous  consequences  to  the  Ottoman 
Empire  of  a  crisis  which  could  not  now  be  long  postponed 
unless  he  and  the  friends  of  peace  were  prepared  to  take  some 
serious  stand  against  the  conspiracy  of  which  I  was  fully 
cognisant,  to  involve  it  irretrievably  in  the  general  war. 
On  this,  as  on  every  occasion  of  my  interviews  with  the 
Grand  Vizier,  I  was  impressed  with  his  inability  to  realise 
the  facts  or  to  disabuse  himself  of  the  conviction,  in  spite 
of  his  many  unfortunate  experiences,  that  he  would  be  able 
in  a  really  serious  crisis,  to  exert  his  authority  with  effect. 

The  second  event  of  capital  importance  was  the  attack 
on  Odessa  and  other  Russian  ports  in  the  Black  Sea  on  the 
morning  of  the  same  day,  October  29.  It  is  now  certain 
that  the  actual  orders  for  these  attacks  were  given  by  the 
German  admiral  on  the  evening  of  October  27,  but  it  was 
not  until  after  they  had  actually  taken  place,  that  is,  on  the 
afternoon  of  October  29,  when  news  of  the  raid  on  Odessa 

343 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

was  telegraphed  to  me  direct  by  Mr.  Consul-General  Roberts, 
that  my  Russian  and  French  colleagues  and  myself  realised 
that  the  die  had  actually  been  cast  and  the  crisis  that  we  had 
so  long  feared  and  striven  to  avert  had  occurred.  Imme- 
diately on  receiving  the  news  M.  Bompard  and  I  called  on 
M.  de  Giers  and  decided  to  ask  for  authority  from  our  respec- 
tive Governments  to  confront  the  Porte  with  the  alternative 
of  rupture  or  dismissal  of  the  German  naval  and  military 
missions.  On  the  morning  of  the  3oth,  however,  I  learnt 
from  my  Russian  colleague  that  he  had  received  instructions 
from  his  Government  immediately  to  ask  for  his  passports. 
He  had  written  to  the  Grand  Vizier  to  ask  for  an  interview, 
which  His  Highness  had  begged  him  to  postpone  until  the 
following  day  owing  to  indisposition.  The  instructions  of 
my  Russian  colleague  being  in  a  categorical  form,  he  had 
therefore  been  constrained  to  address  a  note  to  the  Grand 
Vizier  demanding  his  passports,  and  I  and  my  French  col- 
league, acting  on  the  instructions  with  which  the  Ambassadors 
of  the  Allied  Powers  had  at  my  suggestion  already  been  fur- 
nished to  leave  Constantinople  simultaneously,  should  any 
one  of  them  be  compelled  to  ask  for  his  passports,  owing 
either  to  a  Turkish  declaration  of  war  or  to  some  intolerable 
act  of  hostility,  decided  without  further  delay  to  write  to  the 
Grand  Vizier  and  ask  in  our  turn  for  interviews  to  enable  us 
to  carry  out  these  instructions.  In  view  of  His  Highness's 
indisposition  we  had  not  expected  to  be  received  that  day, 
but  a  few  hours  later  the  Grand  Vizier  sent  us  word  that  he 
would,  nevertheless,  be  glad  to  see  us,  and  notwithstanding 
the  excuse  which  he  had  made  earlier  in  the  day  he  received 
the  Russian  Ambassador  also  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon. 
My  interview  with  the  Grand  Vizier  partly  coincided  with 
that  of  M.  de  Giers,  and  preceded  that  of  M.  Bompard.  It  was 
of  a  painful  description.  His  Highness  convinced  me  of  his 
sincerity  in  disclaiming  all  knowledge  of  or  participation  in 
the  events  which  had  led  to  the  rupture,  and  entreated  me 
to  believe  that  the  situation  was  even  now  not  irretrievable. 
I  replied  that  the  time  had  passed  for  assurances.  The  crisis 
which  I  had  predicted  to  His  Highness  at  almost  every  inter- 
view which  I  had  had  with  him  since  my  return  had  actually 
occurred,  and  unless  some  adequate  satisfaction  were  imme- 
diately given  by  the  dismissal  of  the  German  missions,  which 
344 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

could  alone  prevent  the  recurrence  of  attempts  upon  Egyptian 
territory  and  attacks  on  Russia,  war  with  the  Allies  was 
inevitable.  My  Russian  colleague  had  already  demanded 
his  passports,  and  I  must,  in  pursuance  of  the  instructions  I 
had  received,  follow  the  same  course.  The  Grand  Vizier 
again  protested  that  even  now  he  could  undo  what  the  War 
party  had  done  without  his  knowledge  or  consent.  In  reply 
to  the  doubt  which  I  expressed  as  to  the  means  at  his  dis- 
posal, he  said  that  he  had  on  his  side  moral  forces  which  could 
not  but  triumph,  and  that  he  meant  to  fight  on  to  the  end. 
He  did  not,  indeed,  hint  at  a  possibility  of  immediately  dis- 
missing the  German  mission,  but  he  informed  me  that  there 
was  to  be  a  meeting  of  the  Council  at  his  house  that  evening, 
when  he  would  call  upon  his  colleagues  to  support  him  in  his 
determination  to  avert  war  with  the  Allied  Powers. 

The  Council  was  duly  held,  and,  as  he  had  predicted,  the 
majority  of  the  Ministers  supported  the  Grand  Vizier,  who 
made  a  strong  appeal  in  favour  of  peace,  and  was  seconded  by 
Djavid  Bey.  But  the  powerlessness  of  the  Sultan's  Ministers 
to  do  more  than  vote  in  the  Council  Chamber  was  evident. 
The  question  of  dismissing  the  German  naval  officers  was 
discussed,  but  no  decision  to  do  so  was  taken,  and  no  Minister 
ventured  to  propose  the  expulsion  of  the  military  mission. 
In  the  interval  the  War  party  had  sealed  their  resolution  to 
go  forward,  by  publishing  a  communique  in  which  it  was 
stated  that  the  first  acts  of  hostility  in  the  Black  Sea  had 
come  from  the  Russian  side.  Untrue  and  grotesque  as  it 
was,  this  invention  succeeded  in  deceiving  many  of  the  public. 


TURKISH  MOBILISATION 

Reuter's  Agency  has  received  the  following  : — 

'  The    Ottoman    Consulate-General    beg    to    inform    the  Times, 
Ottoman  Reservists  living  in  Great  Britain  that  the  general  Aug-  5. 
mobilisation  of  the  Imperial  Ottoman  Army  and  Navy  having  I9I4 
been  ordered  (with  the  exception  of  7th  Army  Corps  and  the 
independent  22  and  23  Divisions),  the  Ottoman  Reservists 
can  apply  to  the  Turkish  Consulate-General,  7  Union  Court, 
Old  Broad  Street,  London,  E.C.,  for  full  particulars/ 

345 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Renter's  Agency  learns  from  a  well-informed  diplomatic 
source  that  the  Turkish  Army  will  be  under  the  command  of 
General  Liman  von  Sanders,  the  chief  of  the  German  Military 
Mission  in  Turkey. 

Constantinople,  August  8. 

Mobilisation  began  to-day.  All  men  under  45  years  of 
age  were  called  out  in  Constantinople  district  and  probably 
in  other  commands.  The  first  and  second  corps  are  to  be 
employed  upon  defence  in  Thrace.  The  third,  fourth,  and 
fifth  will  probably  be  divided  between  Thrace,  the  Bosporus, 
and  the  Dardanelles  forts.  Adrianople  and  Dimotika  are 
spoken  of  as  probable  points  of  concentration.  The  view  is 
expressed  in  some  quarters  that  Turkey  may  attempt  a  dash 
into  Western  Thrace  and  Macedonia  should  the  attention  of 
Bulgaria  be  diverted  north. 

Beirut,  August  15. 

The  order  for  the  mobilisation  of  the  Turkish  Army 
caused  a  general  exodus  of  refugees  for  the  Lebanon.  Martial 
law  was  proclaimed  and  the  town  surrounded  by  troops  to 
prevent  any  further  escapes.  All  the  horses,  mules,  and 
camels  in  the  district,  as  also  provisions  and  clothing,  are 
being  requisitioned  by  the  Government,  who  are  issuing  bonds 
on  Constantinople  in  payment.  The  troops  are  concentrating 
at  Damascus,  to  be  at  the  head  of  the  Hedjaz  Railway. 

Several  incidents  have  occurred  which  clearly  show  the 
sympathy  of  the  Government  for  Germany.  This  feeling  is 
shared  by  the  Moslem  element,  though  the  Christians  are  all 
in  favour  of  the  Entente.  Last  week  the  German  steamship 
Peter  Rickmers,  with  a  cargo,  which  included  about  500  tons 
of  dynamite,  supposed  to  be  destined  for  the  Far  East,  was 
allowed  by  the  Governor  to  enter  the  harbour  and  discharge 
the  dynamite  on  the  quay,  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  Port 
Company.  This  cargo  is  being  sent  up  to  Damascus  by  the 
French  Railway. 

A  strict  censorship  is  being  exercised  on  all  news  bearing 
on  the  war,  more  especially  on  any  successes  by  the  Allies. 
Details  of  the  latter,  based  on  postal  intelligence  from  Egypt, 
are  promptly  denied  in  the  local  newspapers  by  statements 
issued  by  the  German  Consulate,  declared  to  have  been 
received  from  the  Embassy  in  Constantinople. 

346 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

NOTICE  TO  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  SUBJECTS 

IN  EGYPT 

I,   John  Grenfell  Maxwell,   Lieut. -General,   Commanding  Journal 
the  British  Forces  in  Egypt,  require  that  all  German  and  Offidel 

Austro-Hunerarian    subjects,    born    of    German    or    Austro-  du  Gou~ 
TT  -j-        •     T-  j      t.  £        r\  i.  u       vernement 

Hungarian  parents,  now  residing  in  Egypt,  do,  before  October  Egyuien 

the  loth  next,  register  themselves  at  the   Governorate  or  NOV.  2, 
Mudiria-Headquarters  of  the  town  or  province  in  which  they  1914 
reside. 

Non-compliance  with  these  orders  will  render  such  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  subjects  liable  to  arrest  by  the  Military 
Authorities.  J.  G.  MAXWELL, 

Lieut. -General. 

Cairo,  October  i,  1914. 


MARTIAL  LAW  IN  EGYPT :  PROCLAMATION 

By  the  General  Officer  Commanding  His  Britannic  Majesty's 

Forces  in  Egypt 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  I  have  been  directed  by  His 
Britannic  Majesty's  Government  to  assume  military  control 
of  Egypt  in  order  to  secure  its  protection.  The  country  is 
therefore  placed  under  Martial  Law  from  this  date. 

(Signed)  J.  G.  MAXWELL, 

Lieutenant-General, 
Commanding  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Forces  in  Egypt. 

Cairo,  November  2,  1914. 


PROCLAMATION 

I,  John  Grenfell  Maxwell,  Lieut enant-General  Command- 
ing His  Britannic  Majesty's  Forces  in  Egypt,  entrusted  with 
the  application  of  Martial  Law,  hereby  give  notice  as  follows : — 

(i)  The  powers  to  be  exercised  under  my  authority  by 
the  Military  Authorities  are  intended  to  supplement  and  not 
to  supersede  the  Civil  Administration,  and  all  civil  officials 
in  the  service  of  the  Egyptian  Government  are  hereby  re- 

347 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

quired  to  continue  the  punctual  discharge  of  their  respective 
duties. 

(2)  Private  citizens  will  best  serve  the  common  end  by 
abstaining  from  all  action  of  a  nature  to  disturb  the  public 
peace,  to  stir  up  disaffection,  or  to  aid  the  enemies  of  His 
Britannic  Majesty  and  his  Allies,  and  by  conforming  promptly 
and  cheerfully  to  all  orders  given  under  my  authority  for  the 
maintenance  of  public  peace  and  good  order  ;    and  so  long 
as  they  do  so,  they  will  be  subject  to  no  interference  from 
the  Military  Authorities. 

(3)  All  requisitions  of  services  or  of  property  which  may 
be  necessitated  by  military  exigencies  will  be  the  subject  of 
full  compensation,  to  be  assessed,  in  default  of  agreement, 
by  an  independent  authority. 

(Signed)  J.  G.  MAXWELL, 

Lieutenant-General 
Commanding  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Forces  in  Egypt. 

Cairo,  November  2,  1914. 

Cairo,  November  2. 

Martial  law  has  been  proclaimed  here. 

On  account  of  their  suspicious  activities  a  wholesale  arrest 
of  Turkish  emissaries  has  been  effected.  The  Germans  and 
Austrians  were  recently  placed  in  a  concentration  camp,  and 
the  crews  of  enemy  ships  now  at  Alexandria  have  been 
deported  to  Malta. 

Cairo,  November  3. 

The  Government  is  taking  precautions  to  prevent  certain 
Egyptians  from  causing  trouble.  These  individuals  are  being 
deprived  of  any  chance  of  spreading  discord. 

A  large  number  of  Bedouin  Sheikhs  were  summoned 
yesterday  to  the  British  Agency,  where  Lieutenant-General 
Sir  John  Maxwell  addressed  them,  saying,  '  Germany  has  been 
able  by  persistent  efforts  to  induce  certain  men  in  power  in 
Turkey  to  enter  into  Germany's  views.  Germany  endeavours 
by  pursuing  the  work  of  division  and  ruin  to  make  Turkey 
quarrel  with  the  Allies.  The  Government  has  therefore  con- 
voked the  Arab  Notables,  enjoining  them  that,  if  such  is 
Germany's  project,  their  duty  is  to  remain  calm  and  enjoy 
the  peace  and  tranquillity  on  Egyptian  soil  which  the  British 
forces  ensure.  -  If  the  Government  finds  it  necessary  to  appeal 
348 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

to  their  devotion  to  serve  the  country  the  Government  is  fully 
confident  of  their  reply  to  its  appeal/ 

The  Notables  thanked  the  Government  for  the  confidence 
placed  in  them  and  assured  Sir  John  Maxwell  of  their  loyalty. — 
Renter. 

RAIDS  ON  EGYPTIAN  FRONTIER 

Constantinople,  October  31. 

It  has  been  ascertained,  though  not  absolutely  confirmed,  Times, 
that  an  armed  party  of  Bedouins,  2000  strong,  have  invaded  Nov-  2> 
Egyptian  territory  and  reached  a  point  over  20  miles  inside  I914 
the  frontier. 

Many  British  subjects  left  yesterday,  and  others  were 
preparing  to  follow.  Russian  and  French  subjects  were  also 
leaving.  Yesterday  the  police  prevented  a  number  of  British 
subj  ects  from  leaving.  These  now  pass  under  the  protection  of 
the  American  Embassy. 

The  Turkish  acts  of  war  in  the  Black  Sea,  although  feared 
for  some  time  past,  nevertheless  came  as  a  thunderbolt,  and 
produced  the  utmost  consternation  in  all  circles,  including 
the  peace  party  in  the  Cabinet  and  all  sane-thinking  Turks, 
who  are  profoundly  grieved  at  the  catastrophe  which  has 
befallen  the  country. — Renter. 

Cairo,  November  i. 

Bedouin  chiefs  came  to  Cairo  from  all  parts  of  Egypt  to-day 
to  assure  the  Government  and  the  British  Agency  of  their 
loyalty.  Quiet  reigns  everywhere,  but  as  a  precautionary 
measure  a  Press  censorship  has  been  established.  A  declaration 
of  martial  law  is  momentarily  expected. 

Constantinople. 

General    Headquarters    states  : — With    God's    help    the  K.  V., 
Egyptian   frontier   was   yesterday   crossed   by   our   troops.  Nov.  8, 
Since  the  Russian  fleet  has  withdrawn  to  its  war  harbours,  I9I4 
our  Fleet  has  bombarded  Poti,  one  of  the  most  important  ports 
of  the  Caucasus,  and  has  inflicted  all  kinds  of  damage.     Our 
gendarmes  and  the  tribes  taking  our  side  have  annihilated  the 
English  troops  which  had  landed  at  Akaba.     Four  English 
ironclads  which  were  there  have  now  withdrawn,  and  only  a 
single  cruiser  remains. 

349 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Berlin,  November  12,  1914. 

The  Turkish  troops  which  crossed  the  Egyptian  frontier 
now  occupy  El  Arish  and  Sheikazar,  and  have  captured  four 
British  field-guns. — German  Wireless. 


PROCLAMATION  TO  THE  TURKISH  ARMY 

Amsterdam,  November  14,  1914. 

Enver  Pasha,  the  Ottoman  Minister  of  War,  has,  according 
to  a  telegram  received  from  Berlin,  made  the  following 
proclamation  to  the  Turkish  Army  : — 

'  Comrades !  I  am  honoured  to  announce  to  you  the 
noble  Irade  of  the  Caliph.  Our  Army  will  destroy  our 
enemies  with  the  help  of  Allah  and  with  the  assistance  of  the 
Prophet  and  the  pious  prayers  of  our  Sovereign.  (Deletion 
by  Censor.)  Forward  always  to  victory  !  Glory  and  Paradise 
are  before  us  :  Death  and  disgrace  behind  us  !  Long  live  our 
Padishah. ' — Renter. 


RAIDS  INTO  EGYPT 

Cairo,  November  21,  1914. 

Turkish  Bedouin  have  made  another  raid  into  Egyptian 
territory,  by  crossing  the  Eastern  frontier  of  the  Sinai 
Peninsula,  running  from  El  Arish  on  the  Mediterranean  to 
Akaba  on  the  eastern  branch  of  the  Red  Sea. — Renter. 

The  Press  Bureau  issues  the  following  : — 

A  small  affair  of  outposts  has  taken  place  between  the 
enemy  and  the  Bikanir  Camel  Corps  in  Egypt.  The  latter 
fought  well  and  killed  a  number  of  the  enemy  ;  their  own  losses 
amounting  to  thirteeri  missing. 

Cairo,  November  21. 

Local  interest  is  naturally  centred  on  the  Eastern  frontier, 
but  so  far  little  of  importance  appears  to  have  taken  place 
east  of  the  Suez  Canal.  Scouting  parties  are  on  the  look-out, 
and  to-day  the  military  authorities  announce  that  hostile 
cavalry  and  armed  Bedouin  have  been  encountered  on  the 
El  Arish  road  near  Bir  Elabd,  but  that  there  is  no  sign  any- 
where of  any  movement  of  formed  bodies  of  troops. 
35o 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

Cairo,  November  23. 

An  official  statement  issued  here  says  that  on  Friday  Times, 
(November  20)  Captain  Chope,  of  the  Bikanir  Camel  Corps,  Nov.  25, 
and  Lieutenant  Mohamed  Anis,  with  twenty  of  the  Bikanir  I9I4 
Camel  Corps  and  twenty  camelmen  of  the  Coast  Guard,  were 
patrolling  between  Bir-el-Nuss  and  Katia.     At  seven  in  the 
morning  Captain  Chope,  with   the  Bikanirs,   pushed  on  in 
order  to  gain  touch  with  the  Coast  Guard,  who  had  camped 
half  a  mile  ahead  of  him,  but  on  arrival  at  their  camp  he  found 
nothing  except  the  traces  of  a  fairly  large  number  of  tracks. 

He  proceeded  east,  and  an  hour  later  saw  ahead  of  him  a 
party  of  about  twenty  men,  mounted  on  white  camels,  waving 
white  flags.  Thinking  they  were  the  Camel  Corps  he  allowed 
them  to  approach.  When  within  30  yards  the  enemy  raised 
their  rifles,  whereupon  Captain  Chope  gave  the  order  to  fire, 
and  nearly  all  of  them  were  killed.  Another  party  of  the 
enemy  who  attacked  were  similarly  disposed  of.  Captain 
Chope,  thinking  all  was  over,  advanced  towards  Katia,  when 
suddenly  about  150  horsemen  were  observed  trying  to  move 
round  his  right  flank,  while  a  like  number  were  working  round 
the  left  flank.  He  therefore  retired,  dismounting  his  men, 
who  fired  as  opportunity  offered,  while  the  enemy  were  firing 
from  horseback.  Lieutenant  Mohamed  Anis  was  shot  during 
this  period,  but  one  of  the  Bikanirs  took  him  up  and  carried 
him  behind  him  on  his  camel,  but,  unhappily,  both  were  shot. 

Captain  Chope  succeeded  in  getting  back  to  his  supports, 
after  beating  off  the  enemy,  with  the  loss  of  Lieutenant  Anis, 
Subadar  Abdu  Khan,  12  men  killed,  and  3  men  wounded. 
Nothing  further  was  seen  or  heard  of  the  Coast  Guard  patrols. 

Cairo,  November  26,  1914. 

In  the  action  fought  between  the  Bikanir  Camel  Corps  Times, 
and  Bedouin  on  November  20,  70  of  the  latter  were  killed,  Nov.  27, 
among  them  being  three  important  sheikhs,  one  of  them  a  I9I4 
brother  of  the  Turkish  commandant,  Sinfi  Pasha. — Renter. 

Cairo,  November  27,  1914. 

The  enemy  has  a  small  camp  at  Katia,  but  nowhere  else  Times, 
in  the  Peninsula  have  his  troops  been  encountered.     Regard-  Nov.  28, 
ing  the  allegation  of  the  Turks  that  they  have  captured  guns 
at  El  Arish,  the  authorities  state  that  these  are  antiquated 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

muzzle-loaders  which -were  not  considered  worth  moving,  as 
they  were  quite  useless. 


REPORTED  ATTACKS  ON  SUEZ  CANAL 

Constantinople. 

Headquarters  officially  report  :  Turkish  troops  have 
reached  the  Suez  Canal.  In  an  encounter  near  Kantara 
the  English  were  beaten  and  took  to  flight  with  heavy  losses. 

Constantinople. 

Further  information  from  Headquarters  states  :  With 
God's  help  our  troops  have  occupied  the  Suez  Canal.  In 
the  action  which  took  place  near  Kataba  and  Kertebe,  both 
30  kilometres  east  of  the  Canal  and  near  Kantara  on  the 
Canal  itself,  the  English  losses  included  Captain  Wilson, 
one  lieutenant,  and  many  men  killed,  and  a  large  number 
wounded.  We  have  taken  a  fair  number  of  prisoners.  The 
English  troops  withdrew  in  disorderly  flight.  Men  of  the 
English  camel  corps  who  were  stationed  at  the  outposts 
and  gendarmes  in  the  English  service  surrendered  to  us. 

London,  December  6. 

It  is  reported  from  Cairo,  by  Renter,  that  the  military 
authorities  have  flooded  the  desert  to  the  east  of  Port  Said 
in  order  to  isolate  the  town. 

.   (From  our  Special  Correspondent.} 

Cairo,  December  n,  1914. 

According  to  the  latest  available  information  no  Turks  or 
armed  Bedouin,  with  the  possible  exception  of  stray  scouts, 
are  anywhere  near  the  Suez  Canal.  Persons  who  have  arrived 
at  Suez  from  Hedjaz  say  that  there  is  a  Turkish  force  on  holy 
territory,  but  it  is  not  large.  The  stock  of  provisions  there  is 
decidedly  low. 


352 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

THE  TURKISH  COMMANDER  TO  HIS  TROOPS 

IN  SYRIA 

Constantinople. 

Arab  papers  publish  the  following  Army  Order  issued  by  K.  V., 
the  Commander  to  the  troops  of  the  Syrian  Army  told  off  Dec.  26, 
for  the  attack  on  Egypt  :    '  Warriors  !     Behind  you  lie  the  X9X4 
vast  deserts,  before  you  is  the  craven  enemy,  behind  him  the 
rich  land  of  Egypt  which  is  waiting  impatiently  for  your 
coming.     If  you  falter  death  will  overtake  you,  before  you 
Paradise  lies/ 

VON  DER  GOLTZ  ON  THE  NEW  TURKISH  ARMY 

(From  our  Special  Correspondent.) 

Amsterdam,  December  29,  1914. 

An  interview  with  Marshal  von  der  Goltz  is  quoted  by  the  Times, 
Telesraaf  from  the  Berlin  Lokalanzeiger.     The  Field-Marshal  Dec- 
said:- 

'  A  successful  Turkish  attack  in  Egypt  would  be  a  stab  in 
England's  heart.  With  the  preparation  of  an  army  for  this 
object  Turkey  has  done  her  full  share  as  regards  collaboration 
with  her  allies,  and  she  can  rest  assured  of  a  full  share  in  the 
gains  in  the  event  of  victory.  The  undertaking,  however, 
is  even  less  easy  than  an  advance  in  the  Caucasus,  where  the 
raw  season  and  the  small  number  of  the  roads  offer  the 
greatest  difficulties.  But  the  beginning  made  was  good,  and 
from  the  energy  of  the  leading  statesmen  and  soldiers  of  Turkey, 
it  may  be  expected  that  they  will  accomplish  all  that  is  in  any 
way  possible.  The  extraordinary  moderation  of  the  Turkish 
soldier  and  his  never-failing  goodwill  will  render  easy  even  the 
hardest  campaign.  I  have  seen  but  little  of  the  troops  yet, 
but  what  I  have  seen  has  pleased  me  exceedingly ;  since  I 
crossed  the  frontier  I  have  been  heartily  received  and  feted 
by  the  soldiers  and  the  authorities.  The  people  have  welcomed 
me  as  an  old  and  faithful  friend  of  the  country.  The  guards 
of  honour  at  the  stations  created  the  best  impression.  They 
were  numerous,  well  clothed,  and  equipped/ 


MILITARY  2  Z  353 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  PERSIAN  GULF  AND  IN 
MESOPOTAMIA 

FIELD  OPERATIONS 

No.  205. — The  Governor-General  [of  India]  in  Council  has 
much  pleasure  in  directing  the  publication  of  the  following  letter 
from  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  dated  the  2nd  February, 
1915,  submitting  despatches  from  Brigadier-General  W.  S. 
Delamain,  C.B.,  D.S.O.,  and  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A. 
Barrett,  K.C.B.,  K.C.V.O.,  describing  the  operations  of 
I.E.F.  '  D  '  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf  up  to  the  28th 
November  1914.  The  Governor-General  in  Council  concurs 
in  the  opinion  expressed  by  His  Excellency  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  regarding  the  manner  in  which  the  operations  were 
conducted  and  the  behaviour  of  the  troops  engaged.  His 
Excellency  in  Council  also  shares  the  Commander-in-Chief's 
appreciation  of  the  support  rendered  by  the  Royal  Navy, 
which  conduced  so  materially  to  the  success  of  the  operations. 


From  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  to  the  Secretary  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  India,  Army  Department,  dated  Delhi,  February  2, 

19*5- 

I  am  directed  by  His  Excellency  the  Commander-in-Chief 
in  India  to  submit  for  the  information  of  the  Government  of 
India  the  under-mentioned  reports  on  the  operations  of  Indian 
Expeditionary  Force  '  D  '  up  to  the  28th  November  1914  : 

(i)  Report  by  Brigadier-General  W.  S.  Delamain, 
C.B.,  D.S.O.,  on  the  operations  of  I.E.F.  '  D,'  up  to  the 
1 4th  November  1914  ;  and 

(ii.)  Report  by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett, 

K.C.B.,    K.C.V.O.,    Commanding    I.E.F.    '  D/    on    the 

operations  of  his  force  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf, 

from  the  I4th  to  the  28th  November  1914. 

2.  His   Excellency   considers   that   the   operations   were 

conducted  with  skill  and  energy,  and  that  the  discipline  and 

steadiness  of  the  troops  reflect  the  greatest  credit  on  all  ranks. 

He  desires  to  commend  to  the  favourable  consideration  of 

Government    the    officers,   non-commissioned    officers,    and 

354 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

men  whose  services  are  brought  to  notice  in  the  reports,  and 
wishes  specially  to  invite  attention  to  Lieutenant-General 
Sir  Arthur  Barrett's  remarks  in  regard  to  the  very  valuable 
assistance  rendered  by  the  Royal  Navy,  which  he  cordially 
endorses. 

3.  His  Excellency  recommends  that  the  reports  be  treated 
as  despatches  and  published  in  the  Gazette  of  India. 


From  Brigadier-General  W.  S.  Delamain,  C.B.,  D.S.O.,  Com- 
manding i6th  Brigade,  I.E.F.  '  D,'  to  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  Simla,  dated  Camp  Saniyeh,  November 
16,  1914. 

On  the  arrival  of  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett  at 
this  camp,  and  on  conclusion  of  my  period  of  independent 
command,  I  have  the  honour  to  report  as  follows : 

2.  The  force  under  my  command,  known  as  I.E.F.  '  D,' 
left  Bombay  on  the  i6th  October  in  four  transports,  part  of 
a  large  convoy.     On  igth  October  we  parted  company  and 
steered  for  Bahrain  Islands,  under  escort  of  H.M.S.  Ocean. 
No.  i  Brigade,  Indian  Mountain  Artillery,  joined  the  force 
off  Jask  on  the  2ist.     We  arrived  on  the  23rd  and  anchored 
off  Manama.     Here  we  remained  until  the  2nd  of  November. 

3.  On  .that  date  the  Force  sailed  for  the  mouth  of  the 
Shatt-el-Arab  in  compliance  with  instructions  contained  in 
your  radio-telegram  No.  6571.     Pilots  were  taken  on  board 
off  Bushire,  and  the  Force  arrived  at  the  outer  bar  of  the 
river  on  the  evening  of  the  3rd  November. 

4.  The  4th  and  5th  November  were  occupied  with  naval 
preparations,  and  the  transports  themselves  were  prepared 
with  bullet-proof  cover  on  the  upper  decks  for  the  use  of 
parties  detailed  for  covering  fire. 

Major  Radcliffe,  2nd  Dorset  Regiment,  returned  from 
Kuweit  on  5th  with  information  that  the  Fort  was  in  ruins, 
but  that  guns  were  in  position.  A  landing  force  was  detailed 
for  the  capture  of  Fao,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  L. 
Rosher,  2nd  Dorset  Regiment,  and  orders  issued.  On  the 
5th  the  transports  crossed  the  outer  bar  of  the  Shatt-el-Arab 
and  anchored  just  outside  the  inner  bar. 

355 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

5.  At  6  A.M.  on  6th  November  H.M.S.  Odin,  preceded  by 
launches  Sweeping  for  mines,  stood  in  and  bombarded  the 
Turkish  guns  outside  the  Fort,  three  miles  south-east  of  the 
telegraph  station  at  Fao.     The  hostile  guns  were  soon  silenced  ; 
they  were  well  served  for  a  time  and  hit  the  Odin  twice.     On 
the  signal  being  made  that  the  guns  were  silenced,  the  trans- 
ports Umaria  and  Varela  advanced  in  that  order,  each  towing 
eight  boats  full  of  troops  alongside  ;    the  Mashona  (armed 
launch)  towed  seven  boats  full  of  troops,  and  the  Royal  Navy 
steam  launches  towed  the  detachment  of  Marines  from  H.M.S. 
Ocean.     Off  the  telegraph  station  the  boats  were  cast  off  and 
made  for  the  shore.     Some  six  hundred  Infantry  landed  with 
one  section  Mountain  Artillery,  complete  with  mules,  and  one 
squad  Sappers  and  Miners.     There  was  no  opposition.    When 
the  first  and  second  reinforcements  had  also  landed,  Colonel 
Rosher  assembled  his  force  and  marched  south-eastwards  to 
occupy  the  Fort.     This  was  accomplished  during  the  night 
of  the  6th-7th,  the  guns  were  dismounted  and  thrown  into 
the  river,  and  Colonel  Rosher's  command  returned  to  Fao. 

6.  While  the  troops  who  had  landed  were  being  re-embarked 
on  the  yth  November,  the  General  Officer  Commanding  with 
remaining   transports    proceeded   up    the    river   till   within 
sight  of  the  Oil  Refinery  on  Abadan   Island.     On  the  8th 
of  November  the  river  was  reconnoitred  for  a  suitable  land- 
ing place.     A  firm,  high  bank  with  deep  water  close  up  to 
it  was  found  at  Saniyeh  ;   the  transports  were  called  up  and 
troops  began  to  disembark.     The  disembarkation  continued 
during  gth  and  loth  November,  being  practically  complete 
by  evening  of  latter  date. 

7.  It  was  proposed  to  advance  from  this  camp  and  attack 
the  Turks  at  Shamshumiya  by  land,  but  the  reported  advance 
of   Turkish  troops  from  Basra    and   the  necessity  of  safe- 
guarding the  Oil  Works,  combined  with  the  absence  of  news 
from  India  regarding  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  decided 
me  to  remain  at  Saniyeh.     With  the  intention  of  an  early 
forward  movement,  as  little  baggage  and  supplies  as  possible 
were  landed  at  this  camp.     Reconnaissances  both  up  and 
down  stream  on  the  gth  and  loth  failed  to  discover  any  enemy. 

8.  On  the  evening  of  the  loth  reliable  news  was  received 
from  the  Sheikh  of  Mohammerah  that  Sami  Bey,   with  a 
strong  combined  force  of  Turks  and  Arabs,  had  arrived  from 
356 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY  - 

Basra  at  a  point  opposite  Mohammerah  with  the  intention 
of  attacking  our  camp.  At  3  A.M.  on  the  nth  the  Sheikh 
reported  that  Sami  Bey  had  started  to  make  the  attack. 
Troops  were  turned  out  and  outposts  strengthened.  The 
Turkish  force,  of  whom  over  three  hundred  were  actually  seen, 
delivered  a  determined  attack  at  5.30  A.M.  on  an  advanced 
post  held  by  one  double  company  ii7th  Mahrattas  with  two 
machine-guns.  They  advanced  to  within  fifty  yards  of  the 
post,  but  were  driven  off  by  a  dashing  counter-attack  delivered 
by  the  20th  Duke  of  Cambridge's  Own  Infantry,  with  the 
assistance  of  the  23rd  Peshawar  Mountain  Battery.  The 
enemy  lost  heavily  in  their  retirement  across  the  desert, 
nineteen  dead  were  counted,  fourteen  wounded  were  brought 
in  by  us  and  six  prisoners  were  taken.  Abandoned  rifles  and 
equipment  were  found.  The  Turks  officially  acknowledged 
a  loss  of  eighty  men. 

9.  The  defences  of  the  camp  were  further  strengthened 
and  daily  reconnaissances  made.     On  the  I4th  November, 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  Barrett,  with  the  i8th  Brigade  and 
Divisional  Troops,  arrived  at  this  camp. 

10.  I  would  invite  attention  to  the  difficulties  of  com- 
munication in  the  Persian  Gulf  during  the  period  covered  by 
this  report.     Constant  thunderstorms  interrupted  the  wire- 
less system.     The  installation  on  R.I. M.S.  Dalhousie  is  appa- 
rently of  poor  quality,  and  the  operators  not  very  experi- 
enced.    This  ship  had  to  be  stationed  at  Bushire  to  connect 
with   the   cable  there.     The   wireless   station   at   Jask  was 
frequently  in  communication  with  H.M.S.  Ocean,  in  the  sense 
that  the  station  would  answer  the  call  of  the  warship,  but  it 
would  not  take  in  any  message  for  transmission.     No  night 
watch  is  kept  at  Jask. 

11.  Several   points   to   which   I   would   earnestly   invite 
attention  are  mentioned  in  the  '  Notes  '  made  at  intervals 
in  the  '  War  Diary  '  which  is  forwarded  by  the  same  mail 
as  this  report. 

12.  I  would  mention  that  the  stay  of  the  Force  at  Bahrain 
was  of  advantage,  as  it  enabled  me  to  have  British  and  Indian 
Corps  instructed  in  rowing  and  handling  of  boats  and  to 
rehearse  the  operation  of  a  landing  in  force. 

13.  All  ranks  have   performed   their   duties  in   a   most 
zealous  and  creditable  manner. 

357 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

14.  I  would  bring  to  notice  the  great  assistance  given  me 
by  the  following  officers  in  planning  and  carrying  out  the 
operations  for  the  occupation  of  Fao  and  the  landing  at  this 
camp  : 

Captain  Hayes-Sadler,  R.N.,  Senior  Naval  Officer, 
H.M.S.  Ocean. 

Commander  Hamilton,  Royal  Indian  Marine,  Prin- 
cipal Marine  Transport  Officer. 

15.  I  would  also  report  that  the  masters  of  the  various 
transports  x  gave  all  the  assistance  in  their  power.     I  would 
specially  bring  to  notice  the  name  of  Mr.  T.  L.  Mills,  R.N.R., 
Master  of  the  s.s.   Varela,  British  India  Steam  Navigation 
Company,  who  displayed  great  zeal  and  willingness  to  perform 
operations  beyond  those  usually  required  of   a  master  of  a 
merchant  vessel.     I  trust  that  it  will  be  found  possible  to 
recognise  his  services. 

16.  In  connection  with  the  Turkish  night  attack  on  the 
nth  November,   I  would  report  that  the  counter-attack  I 
ordered  on  the  attacking  force  was  carried  out  in  a  most 
dashing  and  skilful  manner  by  the  2oth  Duke  of  Cambridge's 
Own   Infantry   and  the   23rd   Peshawar   Mountain   Battery 
under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  Rattray,  2Oth 
Infantry. 

REPORT  OF  OPERATIONS  OF  INDIAN  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCE 
'  D  '  FROM  NOVEMBER  14  TO  28,  1914 

From  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett,  K.C.B.,  K.C.V.O., 
Commanding  Indian  Expeditionary  Force  '  D,'  to  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Army  Headquarters,  Delhi. 
No.  ioi-G,  dated  Basra,  December  7,  1914. 

I  have  the  honour  to  submit  for  the  information  of  His 
Excellency  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the  following  report 
of  the  operations  of  the  troops  under  my  command  from  the 
I4th  to  the  28th  November  1914. 

2.  On  the  morning  of  the  I4th  November,  the  s.s.  Elephanta 
with  my  Headquarters,  and  four  other  transports  anchored 
in  the  river  opposite  Saniyeh,  where  Brigadier-General  Dela- 

1  Varela,    Umaria,    Umta,   Berbera    (British  India  Steam  Navigation 
Company),  Masunda. 
358 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

main's  force  was  already  bivouacked.  The  disembarkation  of 
the  troops  was  commenced  at  once.  Infantry  used  the  ships' 
boats,  and  experienced  no  difficulty  in  getting  ashore.  The 
landing  of  the  guns,  wagons  and  horses  of  the  Field  Artillery 
and  of  the  cavalry  horses  in  lighters  and  dhows  was  greatly 
delayed  by  the  strong  tide  and  current,  the  want  of  proper 
landing  places,  and  by  the  shortage  of  lighters  and  steam 
craft  for  towing  purposes.  Every  possible  use  was  made  of 
all  the  craft  available,  and  with  the  hearty  co-operation  of  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  Royal  Navy,  the  Indian  Marine  and 
the  transports,  considerable  progress  was  made.  The  hatch 
covers  of  the  transports  were  utilised  as  ramps  for  horses  and 
guns,  while  excellent  work  was  done  by  the  Sapper  com- 
panies. 

3.  In  the  course  of  the  day  I  learnt  from  General  Delamain 
of  the  presence  of  a  hostile  force  at  Saihan,  four  miles  distant, 
and  I  ordered  him  to  attack  it  the  following  morning.     A  full 
account  of  the  action  which  ensued  will  be  found  in  the 
attached  report   from   General   Delamain.     I   have   already 
mentioned,  in  my  telegraphic  report  of  this  action,  my  appre- 
ciation of  the  skilful  and  spirited  manner  in  which  this  attack 
was  carried  out,  and  of  the  credit  due  to  all  who  were  engaged. 
The  result  was  entirely  satisfactory,  as  it  enabled  our  advance 
on  the  I7th  November  to  take  place  without  our  right  flank 
being  harassed. 

4.  Our  information  on  the  evening  of  the  i6th  was  to  the 
effect  that  a  force  of  the  enemy  would  probably  be  met  with 
about  Sahil  and  Zain,  while  his  main  body  was  believed  to  be 
in  position  at  Balyaniyeh.     At  that  time  the  whole  of  the 
cavalry,  sappers,  and  the  infantry  of  the  i8th  Brigade  had 
been  landed,  but  only  one  battery  of  the  loth  Brigade,  Royal 
Field  Artillery.     I  was  informed  that  the  Sheikh  of  Moham- 
merah  was  apprehensive  of  an  attack  on  Failieh  from  the 
enemy's  forces  on  the  left  bank,  and  also  that  the  attitude 
of  the  neighbouring  Arabs  would  depend,  to  a  great  extent, 
upon  our  ability  to  make  headway  against  the  Turks  without 
undue  delay.     I  therefore  decided  that  it  would  be  in  our 
best  interests  to  advance  at  once,  with  the  whole  of  the  force 
then  at  my  disposal,  leaving  the  remaining  field  batteries  to 
be  disembarked  as  rapidly  as  possible  and  to  follow  us  as  soon 
as  circumstances  would  permit. 

359 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

5.  A  copy  of  operation  orders  issued  for  Tuesday  the  I7th 
November  will  be  found  attached.1     My  intention  was  to 
turn  the  enemy's  right  flank,  and  drive  him  through  the  palm 
groves  on  to  the  river,  so  that  the  two  sloops,  Odin  and  Espiegle, 
which  moved  up  the  river  on  a  level  with  our  advance,  might 
be  able  to  co-operate. 

6.  After  leaving  the  bivouac  we  moved  across  the  open 
desert,  the  surface  of  which,  owing  to  recent  rain,  was  still 
very  muddy  in  places,  though  fortunately  free  from  creeks 
or  other  obstructions. 

At  8.50  A.M.  a  report  was  received  from  the  advanced  guard 
to  the  effect  that  the  enemy's  position  extended  from  a  ruined 
mud  fort,  which  was  plainly  visible,  somewhat  to  the  right  of 
our  line  of  advance,  north-westwards  through  Hassanain  to 
Zain.2  At  10  A.M.  the  enemy's  guns  opened  fire.  I  then 
ordered  the  noth  Mahratta  L.I.  to  reinforce  the  advanced 
guard  and  moved  up  the  i6th  Brigade  on  its  right,  leaving  a 
space  between  the  two  brigades  for  the  artillery  to  come  into 
action,  and  retaining  as  reserves  the  48th  Pioneers  and  the 
i2Oth  Infantry.  Each  of  the  two  Brigade  commanders  had 
then  at  his  disposal  three  battalions  of  infantry  and  a  com- 
pany of  sappers,  with  the  cavalry  covering  the  left  flank  of 
the  whole  force,  and  the  two  sloops  on  the  river  to  our  right, 
though  at  some  distance,  with  only  the  tops  of  their  masts 
appearing  above  the  belt  of  palm  trees.  The  whole  of  the 
artillery,  consisting  of  the  23rd  and  3oth  Mountain  Batteries, 
and  the  63rd  Battery,  Royal  Field  Artillery,  subsequently 
joined  by  three  guns  of  the  76th  Battery,  which  were  hurried 
up  during  the  action  from  the  landing  place,  were  placed 
under  the  Commander,  Royal  Artillery. 

7.  While  these  dispositions  were  being  made,   a  heavy 
downpour  lasting  for  half  an  hour  came  on.     The  front  was 
entirely  obscured,  while  the  surface  of  the  ground  was  con- 
verted into  a   quagmire   ankle   deep  over  which  guns  and 
horses  could  only  move  at  a  walk.     The  enemy's  guns  ceased 
firing,  and  I  was  in  some  doubt  as  to  whether  he  intended 
to  maintain  his  position.     Our  troops  continued  to  advance 
steadily  until  11.45  A.M.,  when  the  enemy  simultaneously 

1  Appendix  II. 

2  This  report  proved  substantially  correct,  except  that  their  position 
extended  about  £  mile  to  the  south  of  Old  Fort  along  the  date-palm  belt. 
360 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

opened  a  heavy  gun,  rifle,  and  machine-gun  fire  along  his 
whole  front.  Our  artillery  and  infantry  also  came  into 
action.  After  watching  the  course  of  the  engagement  for 
some  time,  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  advisable 
to  abandon  my  original  intention  of  turning  the  enemy's 
right,  which  extended  some  distance,  and  was  echeloned 
back  into  broken  ground  and  palm  groves.  The  key  of  his 
position  appeared  to  be  the  old  mud  fort.  I  therefore  sent 
word  to  General  Fry  with  the  i8th  Brigade  to  engage  the 
enemy's  right  and  centre  with  a  frontal  attack,  while  General 
Delamain  with  the  i6th  Brigade  turned  his  left  flank  and 
captured  the  fort.  At  the  same  time  I  reinforced  General 
Delamain  with  a  battalion  from  the  reserve.  General  Dela- 
main had  meanwhile  anticipated  my  intentions,  and  had 
already  commenced  the  turning  movement.  It  was  at  this 
stage  that  a  large  number  of  casualties  occurred  on  our  right, 
especially  in  the  2nd  Dorset  Regiment,  which  had  been  the 
first  to  come  into  action,  and  had  met  with  heavy  fire  in  an 
exposed  position,  not  only  from  the  mud  fort  and  trenches 
in  front  of  it,  but  also  from  a  body  of  the  enemy  entrenched 
on  the  edge  of  the  palm  groves  behind  and  to  the  south  of  it. 
These  Turkish  regulars  were  using  smokeless  powder  and 
were  invisible  from  the  point  where  the  guns  were  in  action, 
the  latter  being  fully  engaged  with  the  enemy's  artillery  and 
with  the  long  line  of  entrenchments  on  the  main  front  Hassa- 
nain-Zain.  The  sloops  on  the  river  managed  to  put  a  few 
shells  into  the  mud  fort,  but  were  soon  obliged  to  desist  owing 
to  their  view  being  obstructed  by  the  belt  of  palm  trees.  The 
turning  movement  was  very  skilfully  carried  out  by  portions 
of  the  iO4th  Infantry,  the  nyth  Mahrattas,  and  the  22nd 
Company  Sappers  and  Miners,  and  was  directed  by  General 
Delamain  himself.  The  i8th  Brigade  and  the  main  body  of 
the  i6th  Brigade  also  pressed  on  steadily,  supported  by  very 
efficient  fire  from  our  artillery.  At  1.15  P.M.  the  whole  of 
the  enemy's  line  quitted  its  entrenchments,  and  fled  rapidly 
to  the  right  rear  into  the  broken  ground  and  palm  trees, 
his  guns  covering  the  retirement,  and  finally  being  skilfully 
withdrawn  from  successive  positions  in  the  same  direction 
under  cover  of  long  earthen  embankments,  which  concealed 
them  from  view.  The  whole  of  our  force  advanced  firing 
heavily  and  doing  considerable  execution,  but  the  enemy's 

361 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

losses  would  have  been  much  greater  if  the  state  of  the  ground 
had  not  precluded  rapid  movement,  more  especially  on  the 
part  of  the  cavalry  and  artillery. 

Two  abandoned  mountain  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
7th  Rajputs,  who  were  on  the  left  of  the  line,  and  numerous 
prisoners  were  captured. 

At  2.50  P.M.  I  thought  it  advisable  to  issue  orders  for  the 
pursuit  to  be  stopped.  The  enemy  were  then  retiring  through 
the  palm  groves,  with  banks  and  mud  walls  affording  facilities 
for  defence,  and  their  retirement  was  covered  by  distant  fire 
from  their  guns.  I  had  to  form  an  entrenched  camp  before 
nightfall,  and  to  bring  in  a  large  number  of  wounded,  who 
were  scattered  over  a  considerable  extent  of  country. 

The  enemy's  losses  have  been  variously  estimated,  and 
probably  amounted  to  about  2000.  Two  days  after  the 
action  sixty-nine  dead  bodies  were  found  lying  in  one  portion 
of  the  position.  His  total  strength  is  estimated  at  3000 
Turks  and  1500  Arabs,  with  twelve  guns. 

The  troops  bivouacked  at  Sahil  on  the  banks  of  the  river, 
with  outposts  on  the  line  Sahil-Old  Fort-to  river  bank. 

The  conduct  of  the  troops  throughout  this  engagement 
excited  my  warmest  admiration.  A  very  large  majority  of 
the  men  had  never  been  under  fire  before,  yet  they  behaved 
as  steadily  as  if  at  an  ordinary  field-day,  all  the  details  of 
their  training,  as  inculcated  in  peace  time,  being  carried  out 
automatically.  The  behaviour  of  the  'Dorset  Regiment,  when 
exposed  to  both  frontal  and  enfilade  fire,  is  especially  to  be 
commended.  General  Delamain  has  also  brought  to  notice 
the  22nd  Company  Sappers  and  Miners,  who  were  on  the 
right  of  the  Dorsets. 

The  enemy's  guns  were  well  served  and  cleverly  handled, 
but  fortunately  the  fusing  of  the  shells  was  indifferent  and 
the  elevation  generally  too  great.  Their  rifle  fire  was  also 
too  high,  and  not  very  effective  at  close  quarters,  otherwise 
our  losses  would  have  been  much  heavier.  Our  artillery 
suffered  for  want  of  observation  posts,  but  in  spite  of  this 
their  fire  was  highly  effective,  and,  as  was  afterwards  ascer- 
tained, produced  a  demoralising  effect  on  the  enemy. 

As  may  be  gathered  from  the  above  report,  the  duties  of 
the  commanders  of  brigades  and  of  other  units,  as  also  of  the 
staff  were  carried  out  most  efficiently.  I  propose  to  defer 
362 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

bringing  the  names  of  individual  officers  to  notice  until  the 
operations  of  this  Force  as  a  whole  are  finally  recorded.  At 
this  stage  I  need  only  mention  those  who  were  especially 
conspicuous  during  the  actions  of  the  I5th  and  I7th,  as  set 
forth  in  the  brigade  commanders'  reports  attached. 

The  work  of  bringing  in  the  wounded  continued  far  into 
the  night,  and  one  ambulance  party  actually  remained  out 
all  night,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy  were  firing  on  our 
piquets  at  intervals.  I  desire  to  pay  a  very  high  tribute  to 
the  personnel  of  the  medical  services,  both  for  efficiency  of 
organisation,  and  for  devotion  to  duty.  In  addition  to  our 
own  men,  a  large  number  of  wounded  Turks  and  Arabs  had 
to  be  cared  for  and  conveyed  on  board  the  transports,  at  a 
spot  where  shelving  mud  flats  and  a  strong  current  made 
boating  operations  extremely  troublesome  and  at  times  even 
hazardous. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  I7th,  it  was  blowing  a  hurricane 
for  several  hours,  in  the  course  of  which  three  large  dhows 
lying  alongside  the  transports,  laden  with  stores  ready  to 
disembark,  were  wrecked,  and  ten  sepoys  and  two  lascars 
were  drowned. 

On  the  1 8th,  igth,  and  2Oth  we  were  employed  in  landing 
supplies  and  blankets  for  the  troops,  and  in  reconnoitring 
the  enemy's  position  at  Balyanieh,  which  was  found  to  be  at 
right  angles  to  the  river,  with  four  guns  in  position  on  the 
bank,  commanding  the  north  end  of  Dabba  Island,  where  the 
s.s.  Ekbatana  and  two  smaller  craft  had  been  sunk  to  block 
the  ship  channel.  The  naval  sloops  engaged  these  guns  from 
below  the  obstruction,  and,  as  was  discovered  afterwards, 
placed  a  shell  inside  the  battery. 

I  formed  a  plan  of  attack  to  be  carried  out  on  the  22nd 
in  which  naval  and  military  forces  were  to  co-operate,  but  on 
the  2 ist  I  received  trustworthy  information,  confirmed  by 
our  cavalry,  that  the  enemy  had  vacated  his  position.  The 
report  stated  that  the  Turks  had  quitted  Basra  and  retired 
northward  in  boats  to  Baghdad,  that  numbers  of  armed 
Arabs  had  deserted,  and  that  the  town  of  Basra  was  in  danger 
of  being  looted. 

Accordingly,  I  ordered  a  forced  march  for  8  P.M.  that 
evening,  while  the  naval  sloops  were  to  proceed  by  river  to 
Basra,  and  two  battalions  were  hastily  got  on  board  shallow 

363 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

draft  steamers  to  foHow  them.  We  started  across  the  desert 
at  8  o'clock,  and  at  12  noon  the  next  day  we  reached  the 
outskirts  of  Basra,  after  a  march  that  was  extremely  trying 
to  the  troops.  Frequent  delays  were  caused  by  the  high 
banks  of  water  channels,  which  had  to  be  levelled,  and  in  some 
cases  bridged  to  admit  the  passage  of  field-guns. 

On  arrival  at  Basra,  we  learned  that  the  two  sloops  had 
got  in  at  9  P.M.  the  previous  evening,  and  had  succeeded  in 
protecting  the  buildings  on  the  river  bank,  to  which  no  damage 
had  been  done,  except  the  partial  burning  of  the  Custom 
House  and  destruction  of  its  contents. 

The  two  battalions  had  arrived  at  9  A.M.  on  the  22nd, 
and  were  then  patrolling  the  town,  which  was  perfectly  orderly. 

I  therefore  decided  to  defer  making  a  formal  entry  into 
the  town  until  the  next  morning,  as  the  troops  were  badly  in 
need  of  food  and  rest,  and  it  would  have  been  difficult  to 
arrange  quarters  for  them  until  the  place  had  been  more 
fully  examined. 

On  the  23rd  the  troops  made  a  ceremonial  march  through 
the  town  to  a  selected  spot  near  the  mouth  of  the  Ashar 
Creek,  where  the  foreign  Consuls  and  notables  were  assembled 
to  meet  us,  and  were  presented  to  me  by  Mr.  Bullard,  our  late 
Consul.  A  proclamation  prepared  by  Sir  Percy  Cox  was 
then  read,  the  Union  Jack  was  hoisted  on  a  prominent  build- 
ing, a  salute  was  fired  from  the  sloops,  the  troops  presented 
arms,  and  three  cheers  were  given  for  His  Majesty  the  King- 
Emperor.  The  German  Consul  and  five  other  Germans 
were  placed  on  board  transports  for  conveyance  to  India. 

We  were  cordially  welcomed  by  the  inhabitants,  who 
appeared  eager  to  transfer  their  allegiance  to  the  British 
Government. 

In  concluding  this  report,  I  wish  to  lay  stress  upon  the 
very  great  assistance  that  I  have  received  throughout  from 
Captain  Hayes-Sadler,  R.N.,  the  Senior  Naval  Officer  in  the 
Persian  Gulf,  and  the  officers  and  men  serving  under  him, 
without  which  it  would  have  been  quite  impossible  to  bring 
these  operations  to  a  successful  issue. 

I  am  also  much  indebted  to  Sir  Percy  Cox  for  his  advice 
and  help  on  all  occasions,  and  for  the  valuable  and  accurate 
information  that  he  was  able  to  procure  for  me,  chiefly  through 
the  Sheikh  of  Mohammerah,  who,  at  the  risk  of  drawing  upon 
364 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

himself  the  hostility  of  the  Turks,  has  spared  no  pains  to 
prove  himself  our  true  friend  and  ally. 

I  reserve  for  a  future  report  an  acknowledgment  of  the 
good  services  done  by  the  officers  of  the  Royal  Indian  Marine, 
whose  duties  in  connection  with  naval  transport  work  have 
been  most  onerous. 

We  have  also  received  very  ready  help  throughout  from 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  transports  belonging  to  the  British 
India  Steam  Navigation  and  other  companies. 

The  following  is  a  list  of  documents  that  accompany  the 
report  : 

(1)  Extract  from  Brigadier-General  Delamain's  report. 

(2)  Operation  Order  No.  I. 

(3)  Details  regarding  enemy  engaged  I7th  November 


, 

4)  Commendations  for  conspicuous  conduct. 

5)  Maps  1  4  miles  to  i  inch. 

6)  Sketch  l  map  of  action. 


APPENDIX  I 

Extract  from  a  Report  by  Brigadier-General  W.  S.  Delamain, 
D.S.O.,  on  the  Operations  of  November  14,  1914 

Information  from  various  sources  went  to  show  that 
Turkish  troops  were  concentrating  near  Saihan  only  four 
miles  west  of  our  camp  at  Saniyeh  ;  and  on  the  I4th  November 
I  received  the  Force  Commander's  instructions  to  recon- 
noitre and  dislodge  this  hostile  gathering  without  involving 
my  own  force  too  seriously.  I  thereupon  issued  Operation 
Order  No.  i. 

The  force  under  my  command  consisted  of  the  3Oth  Moun- 
tain Battery,  the  2nd  Battalion  Dorset  Regiment,  and  the 
iO4th  Rifles,  with  23rd  Mountain  Battery  and  the  2oth 
Infantry  in  camp  held  ready  to  reinforce  if  we  became  engaged. 

The  force  marched  at  6  A.M.  from  Camp  Saniyeh,  and  on 
reaching  the  southern  edge  of  the  date  palms  turned  west- 
wards, the  Advanced  Guard  (Major  Clarkson,  i  Section 

1  Not  reproduced. 

365 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Mountain  Battery,  4  Companies  2nd  Dorsets)  keeping  1200 
yards  from  the  edge  of  the  date  groves  and  followed  by  the 
Main  Body  at  approximately  the  same  distance. 

The  march  was  continued  in  this  order  till  the  Advanced 
Guard  was  approximately  south  of  Saihan  village  and  creek 
at  7  A.M.  At  7.10  A.M.  the  enemy  opened  fire  on  the  Advanced 
Guard  from  two  positions  on  the  edge  of  the  date  groves 
with  rifles  and  machine-guns  and  on  the  Main  Body  with 
artillery.  The  iO4th  Rifles  were  sent  immediately  to  turn 
and  capture  the  enemy's  first  position,  and  then  to  work 
through  the  date  groves  from  the  east.  The  Mountain 
Battery  (2  Sections)  assisted  the  iO4th  Rifles  and  i  Section 
kept  the  hostile  guns  in  the  Turkish  second  position  in  check. 
The  iO4th  took  the  first  Turkish  position  in  capital  style 
about  8.30  A.M.  At  the  same  hour  the  reinforcements  arrived 
from  camp. 

The  Advanced  Guard  was  then  reinforced  by  the  remaining 
half-battalion  of  the  2nd  Battalion  Dorset  Regiment,  and 
extended  to  their  left  so  as  to  outflank  the  second  Turkish 
position  from  the  desert  side.  The  3oth  Mountain  Battery 
was  put  under  the  orders  of  the  Officer  Commanding  2nd 
Battalion  Dorset  Regiment,  who  now  commanded  the 
Advanced  Guard.  The  2Oth  Infantry  (less  4  Companies) 
filled  the  gap  between  the  Advanced  Guard  and  the  iO4th 
Rifles  on  our  right,  leaving  the  4  Companies  of  the  20th 
Infantry  and  23rd  Peshawar  Mountain  Battery  in  general 
reserve  under  my  own  hand.  A  general  advance  was  then 
made  on  the  second  Turkish  position,  assisted  by  the  admir- 
ably directed  fire  of  both  the  Mountain  Batteries,  from  which 
the  enemy  suffered  severely.  The  position  was  entrenched 
and  held  by  the  Turks  with  determination.  It  was  gallantly 
rushed  by  the  2nd  Battalion  Dorset  Regiment,  about  9.30  A.M. 
The  enemy  made  off  northwards  through  the  date  palms. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  iO4th  Rifles  on  our  right  found  the 
ground  inside  the  wood  very  difficult  owing  to  the  numerous 
irrigation  cuts.  They  pushed  forward  slowly  till  they  reached 
the  line  held  by  the  2nd  Dorsets  and  the  20th  Infantry, 
meeting  with  strong  opposition  at  a  fortified  village,  where 
there  were  posted  one  gun  and  one  machine-gun. 

The  arrival  of  Turkish  reinforcements  from  their  force 
near  Umm-ur-Rowais  might  now  be  expected  at  any  minute. 
366 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

In  view,  therefore,  of  my  instructions  not  to  get  too 
seriously  engaged,  I  ordered  a  withdrawal  to  camp,  after 
doing  considerable  damage  to  the  Turkish  camp.  The  retire- 
ment was  unmolested. 

H.M.S.  Odin  co-operated  in  the  action  by  steaming  up 
the  river  parallel  with  the  troops,  but  owing  to  the  impossi- 
bility of  observing  fire  through  and  over  the  belt  of  date 
palms,  her  fire  was  necessarily  restricted  to  a  minimum. 

I  estimated  the  enemy's  strength  at  1200,  with  four 
mountain  guns  and  three  machine-guns.  From  information 
given  by  prisoners  the  force  appears  to  have  been  con- 
siderably stronger.  I  put  their  losses  at  160  dead  and 
wounded  unable  to  move.  We  took  prisoners  six  un wounded 
and  nineteen  wounded,  including  a  battalion  commander. 

Our  casualties  came  to  : 

Captain  Maclean,  i(>4th  Rifles.  ]   Qpverelv 

Lieutenant  Yeatman,  2nd  Battalion  i  v         ^ 
Dorset  Regiment.  J  wounded- 


Rank  and  File. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

2nd  Battalion  Dorset  Regiment 

5 

38 

Nil. 

iO4th  Rifles     

3 

14 

2oth  Infantry  

2 

No.  i  Brigade,  Indian  Mountain  Artillery 

— 

I 

» 

The  behaviour  of  all  the  troops  was  admirable.  The 
co-operation  between  artillery  and  infantry  was  good. 

I  would  mention  that  the  information  regarding  the  enemy 
obtained  by  Major  H.  Smyth,  Special  Service  Officer,  proved 
to  be  absolutely  correct. 

I  bring  to  notice  the  good  work  done  by  the  following  : 

(a)  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  L.  Rosher,  2nd  Battalion 
Dorset  Regiment,  who  commanded  the  main  attack  on 
the  enemy's  position  in  an  able  manner. 

(b)  Major  H.  A.  Holdich,  Brigade  Major,  i6th  Brigade. 
An  able  Staff  Officer  who  gave  me  the  greatest  assistance 
during  the  engagement. 

(c)  Lieutenant  E.  B.  Allnutt,  R.A.M.C.,  in  medical 
charge  of  the  2nd  Battalion  Dorset  Regiment,  reported 

367 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

as   having   displayed   great    gallantry   in    attending   the 
wounded  on  the  open  plain. 

(d)  Bugler  Surain  Singh,  2oth  Duke  of  Cambridge's 
Own  Infantry,  reported  by  the  Officer  Commanding 
lo/jih  Wellesley's  Rifles,  as  having  very  bravely  set  fire 
to  a  village  held  by  the  enemy. 


APPENDIX  II 

Operation  Order  No.  i  by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett, 
K.C.B.,  K.C.V.O.,  Commanding  Force  '  D/  dated 
Force  Headquarters,  Camp  Saniyeh,  November  16, 
1914. 

(Reference  4  miles  to  I  inch  map.1) 

1.  Information. — A  considerable  body  of  the  enemy  was 
driven  out  of  their  camp  at  Saihan  yesterday  with  severe  loss. 
Opposition  may  be  expected  from  other  bodies  here  and 
farther  north-west. 

2.  Intention. — To  march  as  light  as  possible  to  new  camp 
on  Turkish  bank  of  river,  all  baggage,  etc.,  being  carried  on 
ships.     The  Naval  forces  will  co-operate  under  the  orders 
of  the  Senior  Naval  Officer. 

3.  Ammunition. — Infantry   must    carry   200   rounds   per 
rifle  on  person  and  other  arms  as  much  as  possible. 

4.  Starting   point. — The    starting    points    are    the    three 
bridges  south-west  of  the  i6th  Brigade  camp  ;   they  will  be 
marked  by  red  lamps  and  flags  by  the  i6th  Brigade. 

Head  of  Main  Body  to  pass  at  6  A.M. 

Deputy  Assistant  Adjutant-General  will  control  traffic. 

5.  Advanced  Guard. — Officer  Commanding — Major-General 
C.  I.  Fry.     Guide — Captain  Cochran. 

*  Troops  : 

i  Squadron  33rd  Light  Cavalry. 

1  Mountain  Battery. 

1 7th  Company  Sappers  and  Miners. 

2  Battalions  i8th  Brigade. 

1  Not  reproduced. 

368 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

6.  Main  Body  in  order  of  march  : 

Cavalry  less  I  squadron. 

Force  Headquarters. 

Headquarters  and  Divisional  Signal  Section,  No.  34 

Divisional  Signal  Company. 
Divisional  Engineers  less  i   Company  Sappers  and 

Miners. 

Remainder  i8th  Infantry  Brigade. 
48th  Pioneers. 

Divisional  Artillery,  less  I  Mountain  Battery. 
i6th  Infantry  Brigade,  less  ij  Battalions. 
Field  Ambulances   (Bearer  Sub-Divisions  only)   less 

those  allotted  to  Brigades. 
2nd  Line  Transport. 

7.  Flank  Guards.  —  Right  Flank  Guard,  Officer  Command- 
ing —  Lieutenant-Colonel  M'George,  H7th  Mahrattas. 

Troops.  —  |  Battalion  i6th  Brigade. 
Left  Flank  Guard,  Officer  Commanding  —  Major  Scott. 

Troops.  —  i  Double  Company  i6th  Brigade. 
The  Right  Flank  Guard  to  march  1000  yards  west  of 
date  palms. 

8.  Rear  Guard.  —  Officer  Commanding,   Major   Robinson, 
ii7th  Mahrattas. 

Troops.  —  i  Double  Company  i6th  Brigade. 

9.  Medical.  —  Field  Ambulances  are  allotted  as  follows  : 

i6th  Brigade  f  B.F.  A. 
i8th  Brigade  f  B.F.  A. 


Unallotted  £  B.F.  A.  and  ^5  andf  I.F.A. 

Sick  and  wounded  will  be  carried  with  the  force  by  these 
medical  units. 

10.  Transport.  —  Pack  transport  will  be  allotted  as  follows 
at  4  P.M.  to-day  : 

British  Infantry     .          .  .50  pack  mules  per  Battalion. 

Indian  Infantry      .          .  .38          „ 

Mountain  Artillery  Brigade  .     18 

Royal  Field  Artillery  Brigade       Nil. 

Divisional  Engineers       .  .    70 

Pioneer  Regiment  .          .  -53 

Cavalry  .  .          .  .50 

MILITARY  2  2  A  369 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Field  Ambulances  .          .          .48  pack  and  80  riding  mules. 
Divisional  Signal  Company      .  \ 
Headquarters    and    Divisional  I 

Section    and    each    Brigade  j    ^ 

Section       .          .         .         .  J 

Reports  to  Force  Headquarters  at  head  of  main  body. 

R.  N.  GAMBLE,  Colonel, 
General  Staff  Force  '  D.' 


APPENDIX  III 

ENEMY  ENGAGED  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  SAHIL, 
NOVEMBER  17,  1914 

Estimated  Strength 

4  Q.F.  Field-guns  (3.25  in.). 

8  Mountain  guns. 

3  Machine-guns. 

3500  Regular  Infantry. 

200  Gunners. 

350  Gendarmes. 

Probably  another  1000  armed  Arabs  in  the  palm  belt. 

They  belonged  to  the  following  Regiments  : 

ist  Battalion  H3th  Regiment. 

2nd  Battalion  H3th  Regiment. 

2nd  Battalion  ii2th  Regiment. 

160  men  of  ist  Battalion  26th  Regiment,  European 

Turks. 

Gendarmes  of  Halim  Bey. 

Part  of  the  ist  Battalion  H4th  Regiment  was  probably 
present. 

The  enemy  were  commanded  by  Bimbashi  Adie  Bey. 

Enemy  taken  Prisoners 

Major  Mahomed  Ali  "j 

Captain  Raouf  V  of  ist  Battalion  H3th  Regiment. 

Lieutenant  Mahhi     J 

47  men  (excluding  those  severely  wounded). 
37° 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

Estimated  Enemy's  Casualties 

About  800  killed  and  severely  wounded,  and  a  considerable 
number  of  slightly  wounded. 

Captured 
Two  mountain  guns  and  a  large  number  of  rifles. 


APPENDIX  IV 

Extract  from  the  Report  of  the  General  Officer  Commanding 
ibth  Infantry  Brigade,  on  the  Operations  of  his  Brigade 
up  to  November  20,  1914 

I  recommend  for  reward  the  following  officers,  non-com- 
missioned-officers,  and  men  from  those  favourably  brought 
to  notice  by  Commanding  Officers  : 

2nd  Dorset  Regiment 

Major  H.  St.  J.  Clarkson,  for  gallantry. 

Lieutenant  and  Adjutant  F.  G.  Powell,  for  general  assist- 
ance and  conveying  messages  under  heavy  fire. 

Second  Lieutenant  E.  L.  Stephenson,  for  commanding  his 
company  with  conspicuous  coolness  and  dash  after  his  Major 
and  Captain  had  been  killed. 

Lieutenant  E.  B.  Allnutt,  R.A.M.C.,  in  medical  charge,  for 
again  displaying  conspicuous  bravery  in  attending  the  wounded 
under  heavy  fire  in  the  open.  Many  men  owe  their  lives  to 
this  officer. 

No.  3865  Colour-Sergeant  and  Acting  Sergeant-Ma j or 
Delara,  for  coolness  and  gallantry. 

No.  8558  Private  Moores,  who  showed  great  courage  in 
bringing  up  ammunition  under  heavy  fire. 

No.  7712  Private  Hughes,  who,  when  the  machine-gun 
officer  was  wounded,  took  command  of  the  one  uninjured  gun, 
and,  under  heavy  fire,  brought  it  to  close  range,  where  it  was 
of  much  use. 

No.  6591  Sergeant  Drew,  who,  though  wounded,  continued 
to  lead  his  men  with  coolness  and  bravery. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

$rd  Sappers  and  Miners 

Lieutenant  Matthews,  R.E.,  for  gallantry  in  leading  a 
mixed  party  of  Sappers  and  I04th  Rifles  and  establishing  the 
flank  attack  on  the  edge  of  the  date  groves. 

Jemadar  Feroze  Ali.  After  Captain  Twiss  and  the  Subadar 
were  wounded,  this  Indian  officer  was  in  command  of  about 
100  men,  who  did  excellent  work  in  spite  of  heavy  casualties. 

No.  2855  Naik  Dalip  Singh,  No.  22  Company  3rd  Sappers 
and  Miners,  behaved  with  conspicuous  gallantry  in  the  action 
at  Sahil  on  the  I7th  November  1914,  when,  with  a  party  of 
Sappers  under  Lieutenant  Matthews,  R.E.,  he  showed  himself 
very  forward  in  action  and  led  his  squad  with  great  deter- 
mination into  Turkish  trenches. 

104^  Wellesley's  Rifles 

Captain  Chadwick,  for  gallantry. 

Subadar  Sabal    Singh   (first   in  \  for  gallantry  with  Lieu- 
grove),          .         .         .         .  V         tenant     Matthews' 
No.  2336  Lance-Naik  Net  Singh,  )          party. 

lijth  Mahrattas 

Captain  and  Adjutant  E.  G.  Hall,  for  gallantry.  This 
officer  was  severely  wounded. 

I  regret  that  I  omitted  to  bring  to  favourable  notice  the 
services  of  Mr.  Bryant,  the  Marconi  operator  on  board  s.s. 
Varda,  of  the  British  India  Steam  Navigation  Company. 
Mr.  Bryant  was  untiring  in  his  efforts  to  secure  communica- 
tion, and  when  the  apparatus  on  the  Dalhousie  broke  down, 
he  volunteered  instantly  to  go  across  from  Bahrain  to  Bushire 
to  set  matters  right.  The  force  owed  much  to  his  skill  and 
devotion  to  duty,  and  I  trust  that  it  may  be  found  possible  to 
recognise  his  services. 


Extract  from  the  Report  of  the  General  Officer  Commanding 
iSth  Infantry  Brigade,  on  the  operations  of  his  Brigade 
up  to  November  20,  1914 

When  all  did  well  and  where  there  was  no  opportunity  for 
372 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

conspicuous  individual  action,  I  have  no  special  recommen- 
dations to  make. 


Extract  from  the  Report  of  the  Officer  Commanding  Royal 
Artillery,  I.E.F.  '  D  '  on  the  operations  of  the  Artillery 
under  his  command  up  to  November  20,  1914 

All  ranks  behaved  with  exceptional  coolness  and  steadi- 
ness, and  I  wish  to  bring  to  notice  the  good  work  done  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Greer  and  Major  Broke  Smith  throughout 
the  action. 


Extracts  from  Reports  of  the  Assistant  Director,  Medical  Services, 
Indian  Expeditionary  Force  '  D,'  in  connection  with 
the  Service  under  his  command  up  to  November  20, 
1914 

I  wish  to  bring  to  notice  the  especially  excellent  work  done 
by  the  following  Medical  Officers  during  the  engagement  of 
the  I7th  instant : 

Captain  Wright,  I. M.S.,  I26th  Indian  Field  Ambulance. 

Captain  Hislop,  I. M.S.,  I26th  Indian  Field  Ambulance. 

Captain  Lambert,  R.A.M.C.,  iyth  British  Field  Ambulance. 

Lieutenant  Allnutt,  R.A.M.C.,  Medical  Officer,  Dorset 
Regiment. 

The  under-mentioned  Assistant  Surgeons  and  Sub-assistant 
Surgeons  did  conspicuously  good  work  in  attending  the 
wounded  under  heavy  fire  on  the  iyth  November  1914,  and 
are  recommended  for  promotion  as  stated  opposite  their 
names  : 

3rd  Class  Assistant  Surgeon  J.  H.  S.  Huffton,  to  ist  Class 
Assistant  Surgeon. 

4th  Class  Assistant  Surgeon  J.  H.  T.  Pacheco  (wounded), 
to  3rd  Class  Assistant  Surgeon  of  three  years'  standing. 

No.  282  ist  Class  Sub-Assistant  Surgeon  V.  U.  R.  Pandit, 
I04th  Rifles,  to  2nd  Class  Senior  Sub-Assistant  Surgeon. 

No.  318  2nd  Class  Sub-Assistant  Surgeon  Shaikh  Azimud- 
din-Shaik  Ismail,  to  2nd  Class  Senior  Sub- Assist  ant  Surgeon. 

373 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

SUPPLEMENTARY  REPORTS  CONCERNING 
FOREGOING  OPERATIONS 

The  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty  announces  that  a  success- 
ful operation  against  Fao,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Shatt-el-Arab, 
Persian  Gulf,  has  been  conducted  by  a  military  force  from 
India  covered  by  H.M.S.  Odin  (Commander  Cathcart  R. 
Wason),  the  armed  launch  Sirdar,  a  force  of  Marines  with  a 
Maxim-gun  party,  and  a  boat  from  the  Ocean. 

The  enemy's  guns  were  silenced  after  an  hour's  resistance, 
and  the  town  was  occupied  by  the  troops  and  the  Naval 
Brigade.  There  were  no  naval  casualties. 

It  is  expected  that  no  further  opposition  will  be  met  with 
below  Fao. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  communicates  the 
following  announcement  regarding  the  military  operations 
now  in  progress  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf  : — 

Since  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Turkey  a  brigade  from 
India,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General  W.  S.  Delamain, 
which  was  present  in  the  Persian  Gulf  for  the  protection  of 
British  interests,  has  been  engaged  in  operations  against  the 
Turks  at  the  head  of  the  Gulf,  on  the  right  bank  of 
Shatt-el-Arab. 

As  was  announced  on  November  8,  the  Turkish  fort  at 
Fao  was  silenced  by  fire  from  the  ships  accompanying  the 
expedition,  a  portion  of  the  force  was  landed,  and  the  town 
was  occupied  by  our  troops.  Since  that  date  two  actions,  on 
November  u  and  15,  have  been  fought  with  the  Turkish 
forces,  who  on  both  occasions  were  very  severely  handled 
and  defeated  after  a  stubborn  resistance.  On  the  nth  inst., 
at  5.30  A.M.,  the  Turks  made  a  determined  attack  on  our 
outposts,  but  were  held  in  check  by  the  H7th  Mahrattas  and 
finally  routed  by  a  counter-attack  made  by  the  2Oth  Infantry, 
supported  by  fire  from  a  mountain  battery.  Our  casualties 
were  few  ;  those  of  the  enemy  at  least  eighty. 

On  the  I4th  further  troops  arrived  from  India  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  Barrett.  On  the  ifjth 
the  latter,  hearing  that  a  strong  force  of  the  enemy  with 
mountain  artillery  were  occupying  a  post  about  four  miles 
374 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

distant,  sent  General  Delamain  with  three  battalions  and 
two  mountain  batteries  to  evict  them.  After  a  sharp  action, 
in  which  His  Majesty's  ships  EspUgle  and  Odin  co-operated, 
this  was  successfully  accomplished.  The  enemy's  entrenched 
camp  was  captured  and  his  losses  were  very  heavy. 

Several  prisoners,  including  a  Turkish  major,  were  captured 
and  two  of  the  enemy's  machine-guns  were  destroyed.  Our 
casualties  were  two  officers  wounded ;  rank  and  file,  eight 
killed  and  fifty-one  wounded. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  has  received  a  report  from  Times, 
the  General  in  Command  of  the  force  operating  on  the  Shatt-  Nov.  20, 
el- Arab  (Persian  Gulf),  stating  that  an  advance  was  made  on  I9I4 
November  17  for  nine  miles  up  the  right  bank  of  the  river. 

Our  troops  encountered  a  force  of  about  4500  of  the  enemy 
in  a  strong  entrenched  position  with  twelve  guns,  and,  after 
overcoming  a  determined  resistance  and  turning  his  left  flank, 
carried  the  entrenchments.  The  enemy  retired,  losing  two 
guns  and  many  prisoners,  including  three  officers  ;  and  his 
camp,  containing  his  animal  transport  and  reserve  ammunition, 
was  captured. 

Our  advance  over  open  level  plain,  affording  no  cover, 
necessarily  caused  heavy  losses  ;  rapid  movement  of  men 
and  horses  was  impossible  owing  to  the  state  of  ground  after 
heavy  rain. 

Our  casualties  were  : — Killed — officers,  three  ;  rank  and 
file,  about  35.  Wounded — officers,  about  15  ;  rank  and  file, 
about  300. 

Troops  behaved  splendidly  and  are  proud  of  their  success. 
Medical  officers  did  splendidly  under  heavy  fire. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  communicates  the  follow-  Times, 
ing  regarding  the  military  operations  at  the  head  of  the  Nov-  24» 
Persian  Gulf.  ^4 

The  recent  .operations  in  the  Persian  Gulf  have  been 
crowned  with  even  greater  and  more  rapid  success  than  was 
anticipated.  After  the  signal  defeat  inflicted  upon  the 
Turkish  forces  on  the  I5th  and  I7th,  the  latter,  abandoning 
all  further  resistance  here,  fled,  leaving  eight  guns  and  many 
wounded  in  our  hands.  The  Valis  of  Basra  and  Bagdad 
accompanied  the  defeated  Turkish  forces  in  their  flight  up 

375 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

the  Tigris.  Basra  was  occupied  on  2ist  instant  by  both 
our  naval  and  land  forces.  All  the  British  in  Basra  are 
reported  safe. 


TURKISH  CLAIMS 

Constantinople,  November  16,  1914. 

K.  D.,  Official  report  from  Turkish  Headquarters.     Yesterday 

Nov.  16,      we  attacked  the  English  at  Fao.     They  lost  many  killed,  the 
1914  number  of  which  we  estimate  at  1000.     Abdurrezak  Beder- 

khani,  who  is  held  in  abhorrence  by  the  whole  Mussulman 
community  on  account  of  the  revolutionary  intrigues  to 
which  he  has  devoted  himself  for  a  long  time,  had  crossed 
the  frontier  with  300  men  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Maku 
to  assist  the  Russians,  but  he  was  at  once  driven  back  by 
our  troops.  A  large  number  of  his  followers  was  killed.  A 
Russian  flag  which  they  had  hoisted  in  a  neighbouring  village 
was  captured  by  our  troops.  Abdurrezak  is  a  Kurd,  and 
belongs  to  the  tribe  of  the  Bederkhani. 

Constantinople. 

K.V.,  An  official  report  from  Headquarters  says  :    The  cruiser 

Nov.  21,  Hamidieh  yesterday  bombarded  and  destroyed  the  Russian 
oil  depots  and  the  wireless  station  at  Tuapfe  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Novorossiisk.  On  November  18  a  sharp  action 
which  lasted  for  nine  hours  took  place  between  the  English 
and  our  troops  at  Shatt-el-Arab.  The  enemy's  losses  were 
considerable.  English  prisoners  declared  that  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  the  English  troops  was  among  the  wounded. 
One  shot  fired  by  our  gunboat  Marmariss  hit  an  English 
gunboat  and  caused  an  explosion  on  board. 

Constantinople. 

K.  V.,  Headquarters  report  that  according  to  information  re- 

Nov.  22,  ceived  after  the  action  at  Shatt-el-Arab  .the  ascertained 
English  losses  amounted  to  750  dead  and  1000  wounded. 

Constantinople,  December  25. 

K.  V.,  An  official  report  from  Headquarters  says  :     After  the 

Nov.  22,       action     at    Basra    on    November    19,    which    ended    with 

heavy  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  on   the  English  side, 

376 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

the  enemy  received  reinforcements  and  advanced  slowly 
along  the  river  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  his  gunboats.  Our 
troops  awaited  the  enemy  in  a  new  position  where  his  guns 
and  his  ships  could  not  help  him.  The  ship  Nilufer  has  been 
sunk  off  Kilia  as  the  result  of  an  accident. 


OCCUPATION  OF  BASRA 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  has  received  reports  from  Times, 
General  Barrett,  in  command  of  the  forces  operating  at  the  Nov.  25 
head  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  Sir  P.  Cox,  the  Political  Officer  X9T4 
accompanying  the  troops,  to  the  following  effect : 

On  the  morning  of  the  23rd  November  a  ceremonial  march 
was  made  by  the  troops  through  the  streets  of  Basra  to  a 
central  point  at  which  the  notables  of  the  town  were  assembled, 
and  the  Union  Jack  was  hoisted  on  the  prominent  buildings ; 
naval  salutes  were  fired,  the  troops  presented  arms  and  gave 
three  cheers  for  the  King-Emperor ;  a  suitable  proclamation  x 
was  issued,  and  received  with  acclamation  by  the  inhabitants. 

The  remnants  of  the  Turkish  forces  which  were  at  Basra 
have  evaporated,  leaving  their  guns  and  rifles.  Zobeir,  which 
had  been  held  by  the  Turks,  has  submitted. 

All  the  Europeans  at  Basra  have  been  found  safe  and  well, 
and  we  have  received  fresh  news  of  the  safety  of  those  who  are 
at  Bagdad. 

It  is  estimated  by  British  merchants  at  Basra  that  the 

1  [The  following  is  an  extract  from  this  proclamation : — '  The  British 
Government  has  now  occupied  Basra,  but  though  a  state  of  war  with  the 
Ottoman  Government  still  prevails,  we  have  no  enmity  or  ill-will  against 
the  populace,  to  whom  we  hope  to  prove  good  friends  and  protectors.  No 
remnant  of  Turkish  administration  now  remains  in  this  region.  In  place 
thereof  the  British  flag  has  been  established  under  which  you  will  enjoy 
the  benefits  of  liberty  and  justice,  both  in  regard  to  your  religious  and 
your  secular  affairs. 

'  I  have  given  strict  orders  to  my  victorious  troops  that  in  the  execution 
of  the  duties  entrusted  to  them  they  are  to  deal  with  the  populace  generally 
with  complete  consideration  and  friendliness.  It  remains  with  yourselves  to 
treat  them  in  the  same  way. 

'  In  conclusion,  you  are  at  full  liberty  to  pursue  your  vocations  as  usual, 
and  your  business  as  before,  and  it  is  my  confident  hope  that  the  commerce 
of  Basra  will  resume  its  course  and  prosper  even  more  than  in  the  past.'] 

377 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Turkish  wounded  brought  in  after  the  action  of  the  I7th 
November  numbered  2000.  The  Arab  soldiery  who  were 
recently  mobilised  by  the  Turks  were  left  behind  when  the 
latter  fled  from  Basra,  and  many  of  them,  before  going  to 
their  homes,  discarded  their  arms  and  uniforms  and  resumed 
their  civil  dress.  It  is  reported  that  they  are  very  dissatisfied 
with  the  manner  in  which  they  were  treated  by  the  Turks. 


DESPATCHES  REGARDING  OPERATIONS  IN  THE 
PERSIAN  GULF  AND  IN  MESOPOTAMIA 

FIELD  OPERATIONS 

No.  597. — The  Governor-General  in  Council  has  much  plea- 
sure in  directing  the  publication  of  the  following  letter  from  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  dated  June  8,  1915,  submitting 
despatches  from  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett,  K.C.B., 
K.C.V.O.,  describing  certain  operations  of  Indian  Expedi- 
tionary Force  *D'  up  to  March  31,  1915.  The  Governor- 
General  in  Council  concurs  in  the  opinion  of  His  Excellency 
the  Commander-in-Chief  regarding  the  manner  in  which 
the  operations  were  carried  out  and  the  conduct  of  the  troops 
engaged.  His  Excellency  in  Council  also  shares  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief s  appreciation  of  the  valuable  assistance 
rendered  by  the  Royal  Navy  and  the  Royal  Indian  Marine. 


From  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  to  the  Secretary  to  the 
Government  of  India,  Army  Department,  No.  11854-1, 
dated  Simla,  June  18,  1915 

I  am  directed  by  His  Excellency  the  Commander-in-Chief 
in  India  to  submit  for  the  information  of  the  Government  of 
India  the  under-mentioned  reports    on    the    operations   of 
Indian  Expeditionary  Force  '  D/  up  to  3ist  March  1915  *  :— 
(i)  Report  by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett, 
K.C.B.,  K.C.V.O.,  on  the  operations  resulting 
in  the  capture  of  Qurnah,  December  9,  1914 : 

1  [Only  reports  covering  operations  in  1914  are  printed  here;   later 
reports  will  be  given  in  a  subsequent  volume.] 

378 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

(ii)  Report  by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett, 
K.C.B.,  K.C.V.O.,  on  an  engagement  north 
of  Qurnah  on  January  20,  1915 : 

(iii)  Officers,  warrant  officers,  and  non-commissioned 
officers  brought  to  notice  by  Lieutenant- 
General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett,  K.C.B.,  K.C.V.O., 
for  good  services  rendered  during  the  opera- 
tions from  November  1914  to  March  31,  1915. 

2.  His  Excellency  considers  that  the  operations  in  ques- 
tion were  skilfully  carried  out,  and  that  the  conduct  of  the 
troops  reflects  credit  on  all  ranks.     He  desires  to  commend 
to  the  favourable  consideration  of  Government  the  officers, 
non-commissioned  officers,  and  men  whose  services  are  brought 
to  notice  in  the  reports,  and  wishes  to  invite  attention  to 
the  valuable  assistance  rendered  by  the  Royal  Navy  and 
Royal  Indian  Marine. 

3.  His  Excellency  recommends  that  these  reports  be  treated 
as  despatches  and  published  in  the  Gazette  of  India. 


From  Lieutenant-General  Sir  A.  A.  Barrett,  K.C.B.,  K.C.V.O., 
Commanding  Indian  Expeditionary  Force  '  D,'  to 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Army  Headquarters, 
Delhi.  Headquarters,  Basra,  No.  174-6,  dated  Decem- 
ber 29,  1914 

I  have  the  honour  to  submit,  for  the  information  of  His 
Excellency  the  Commander-in-Chief ,  the  accompanying  reports 
by  Major-General  C.  I.  Fry,  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  S.  Frazer, 
and  Commander  W.  Nunn,  R.N.,  on  the  operations  which 
resulted  in  the  capture  of  Qurnah,  and  the  surrender  of  the 
Turkish  garrison  with  its  commander,  the  late  Vali  of  Basra. 

The  force  originally  despatched  from  Basra  on  the 
evening  of  December  3  for  this  purpose  consisted  of  two 
guns  of  the  82nd  Battery  Royal  Field  Artillery,  one  company 
of  Norfolks,  half  company  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners,  the  iO4th 
Rifles,  and  the  noth  Mahrattas  under  command  of  Colonel 
G.  S.  Frazer.  Two  of  the  transports  containing  these  troops 
were  armed  with  two  field-guns  each,  to  be  placed  at  the 

379 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

disposal  of  the  Senior  Naval  Officer  as  soon  as  the  landing 
of  the  troops  had  been  completed. 

Colonel  Frazer's  orders  were  to  land  at  a  spot,  selected 
by  Captain  Hayes-Sadler,  R.N.,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river 
a  few  miles  below  Qurnah,  and,  acting  in  concert  with  the 
Naval  force,  to  clear  bank  of  the  enemy  up  to  and  beyond 
Qurnah,  after  which  he  had  a  free  hand  to  decide  whether 
to  cross  the  river  and  attack  the  village  of  Qurnah,  or  to  hold 
on  and  await  reinforcements. 

It  will  be  seen  from  Colonel  Frazer's  report  that  the 
clearing  of  the  left  bank  was  carried  out  most  success- 
fully. 

The  enemy  on  this  bank,  after  being  driven  from  his  en- 
trenchments and  from  the  village  of  Muzaira'ah,  fell  back  to 
the  north,  while  our  leading  troops  got  engaged  with  those 
holding  the  village  of  Qurnah  on  the  right  bank.  Owing  to 
the  thick  groves  of  palm  trees  at  this  spot,  intersected  as 
usual  by  numerous  creeks,  touch  was  lost  with  the  retreating 
Turks,  who  were  thus  enabled  to  cross  the  river  unmolested 
higher  up  stream  ;  while  Colonel  Frazer,  being  unable  to 
cross  the  river  under  a  heavy  fire,  withdrew  for  the  night. 
It  will  be  seen  from  the  report  of  Captain  Nunn,  R.N.,  that 
although  the  naval  guns  and  the  field-guns  on  the  transports 
were  able  to  afford  most  efficient  support  during  the  first 
part  of  the  action,  the  ships  and  armed  launches,  one  of 
which  was  disabled,  could  not,  owing  to  being  exposed  to 
heavy  shell  fire,  go  far  enough  up  stream  to  bring  an  effective 
fire  to  bear  upon  the  enemy  holding  this  village. 

I  consider  that  Colonel  Frazer  accomplished  all  that 
could  have  been  expected  of  him,  having  regard  to  the  limited 
number  of  troops  under  his  command.  The  Turks  had  been 
reinforced  before  the  action  commenced,  and  were  in  greater 
strength  than  was  expected. 

As  soon  as  the  transports  containing  wounded  and  prisoners 
returned  to  Basra,  I  ordered  General  Fry  to  take  up  rein- 
forcements consisting  of  four  more  field-guns,  the  remaining 
three  companies  of  the  Norfolk  Regiment,  the  7th  Rajputs, 
and  a  half  battalion  of  the  izoth  Infantry. 

His  orders  were  to  reconnoitre  the  ground  thoroughly 
before  renewing  the  engagement,  and  to  let  me  know  if  he 
considered  more  troops  would  be  required.  He  asked  for  a 
380 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

Mountain  Battery  and  some  transport  mules,  which  were 
despatched  as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  further  course  of  the  action  is  fully  described  in  General 
Fry's  report,  and  it  only  remains  for  me  to  express  my  high 
appreciation  of  the  skilful  manner  in  which  they  were  carried 
out,  and  of  the  excellent  behaviour  of  the  troops  engaged.  I 
consider  that  the  crossing  of  the  river  was  a  most  creditable 
performance,  and  I  trust  that  the  gallant  conduct  of  Lieu- 
tenant Campbell  and  the  non-commissioned  officers  and  men 
of  the  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners,  who  swam  the  river,  will  meet 
with  due  recognition. 

I  also  wish  to  endorse  General  Fry's  commendations  of 
other  officers  and  men  who  distinguished  themselves  during 
this  engagement,  although,  as  I  have  already  mentioned  in 
a  previous  report,  I  propose  to  defer  bringing  the  names  of 
individual  officers  to  notice  until  the  operations  as  a  whole 
have  been  concluded.  I  much  regret  that  the  force  has  now 
lost  the  services  of  Captain  Hayes-Sadler,  R.N.,  and  the 
officers  and  men  of  H.M.S.  Ocean,  who  have  now  rejoined 
their  ship  and  quitted  the  Gulf. 


List  of  accompaniments  to  Despatch 

I. — Report  on  the  operations  of  General  Fry's  column 

on  December  6,  7,  8,  and  9,  1914. 
Appendix  '  A/ — Report  on  transport  arrangements. 
Appendix '  B.'— Order    of    battle    for    operations, 

December  7. 

Appendix  '  C.' — Detail   of   ordnance   and   prisoners 
taken  at  Qurnah  on  December  9. 

II. — Report    on    the    operations    of    Lieutenant-Colonel 

Frazer's  column  on  December  4,  1914. 
Appendix  '  D/ — Report       by       Lieutenant-Colonel 
Clery,  iO4th  Rifles,  on  operations 
December  4. 
Appendix  '  E.' — List  of  casualties  December  4. 

III. — Report  by  Commander  W.  Nunn,  Senior  Naval 
Officer,  Persian  Gulf  Division,  on  the  operations 
December  4  to  9,  1914. 

381 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Maps  and  Sketches  : 

Sketch  map  of  Camp  Shaib. 
Sketch  map  of  action  of  December  7. 
Sketch  map  of  Muzaira'ah. 
Sketch  of  crossing  of  River  Tigris. 


Sketch  showing  operations  of  Decem- 
ber 4. 

Map  of  country  round  Qurnah,  scale 
4  inches  to  I  inch. 

Sketches  illustrating  the  Senior  Naval 
Officer's  Report  (Part  III.) 


Not 


reproduced. 


ENCLOSURE  No.  i 

Report  on  the  Operations  of  General  Fry's  Column  on  December 
6,  7,  and  8,  1914,  culminating  in  the  Surrender  of 
Qurnah 

The  troops  despatched  from  Basra  on  December  5  to 
reinforce  Lieutenant-Colonel  Frazer's  Column  (iO4th  Rifles, 
noth  Mahratta  Light  Infantry  and  section  82nd  Battery) 
arrived  at  Camp  Shaib  at  5  A.M.  on  December  6  and  dis- 
embarked, extending  the  existing  perimeter  camp  to  the 
north.  Colonel  Frazer  had  arranged  for  a  reconnaissance 
of  the  enemy's  position  by  three  companies  under  Major 
Hill  at  8  A.M.,  and  during  this,  I  and  one  of  my  staff  went 
on  board  H.M.S.  Lawrence  to  confer  with  Sir  P.  Cox  and 
Captain  Hayes-Sadler,  Senior  Naval  Officer. 

The  enemy  had  reoccupied  Muzaira'ah  after  Colonel 
Frazer's  operation  of  December  4,  and  appeared  to  be 
actively  engaged  in  entrenching  the  position. 

At  10.30  A.M.  the  enemy  opened  fire  with  two  guns  from 
the  southern  end  of  Muzaira'ah  on  Major  Hill's  reconnaissance, 
firing  about  six  groups  of  two  shots  of  well-timed  shrapnel, 
and  at  n  A.M.  opened  on  the  Lawrence,  firing  six  groups  of 
two  shots.  They  appeared  to  be  ranging  new  guns. 

The  reconnaissance  returned  to  camp,  while  the  Lawrence 
withdrew  a  short  distance  down  stream. 

At  2.30  P.M.  the  Senior  Naval  officer  reported  that  about 
500  enemy  with  two  guns  were  advancing  from  Muzaira'ah 
382 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

across  the  plain.  The  noth  were  sent  forward  to  reinforce 
the  outposts  with  two  sections  76th  Battery,  Royal  Field 
Artillery.  After  some  brief  long-range  fire  the  enemy  retired, 
and  beyond  a  small  affair  of  outposts  just  before  dusk,  when 
the  enemy  advanced  too  close,  necessitating  the  reinforce- 
ment of  the  outposts  by  one  double  company,  there  was  no 
sniping  or  other  disturbing  element  during  the  ensuing  night. 

From  my  intelligence  it  appeared  that  the  enemy  had 
been  considerably  reinforced  since  Colonel  Frazer's  action 
on  4th,  and  were  now  estimated  at  1200  to  1500  about 
Muzaira'ah  with  six  guns,  and  about  800  in  Qurnah  with  four 
guns. 

As  any  forward  movement  from  Muzaira'ah  would  enable 
the  enemy  to  shell  the  camp  (though  the  danger  was  a  night 
one  only),  and  to  prevent  any  further  reinforcement,  to  the 
enemy,  I  decided  that  an  early  attack  on  Muzaira'ah,  with 
the  clearing  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris  River,  was  essential 
to  further  operations.  This,  however,  would  have  been 
ineffectual  unless  I  was  prepared  to  remain  in  possession  of 
captured  ground.  The  opening  of  a  short  line  of  communica- 
tion to  Shaib  Camp  would  be  essential,  and  consequently  320 
mules  were  wired  for,  being  the  minimum  estimated  require- 
ment. (For  the  working  of  this  line  see  Appendix  '  A.') 

On  December  7  the  force  (Appendix  '  B  '),  less  one  half- 
double  company  per  battalion  and  details  of  other  units 
left  in  camp,  assembled  on  the  farther  side  of  the  creek  just 
north  of  the  camp  at  9  A.M.  Considerable  delay  occurred 
owing  to  difficulties  experienced  by  the  field  artillery,  in 
crossing  this  shallow  creek,  filled  by  an  exceptionally  high 
tide. 

My  plan  of  attack  was  for  the  2nd  Norfolk  Regiment  and 
the  i2Oth  Infantry  to  attack  the  village  of  Muzaira'ah  and 
the  trenches  south  of  that  place,  while  the  noth  Light 
Infantry,  echeloned  back  on  the  right  of  the  2nd  Norfolk 
Regiment,  was  to  carry  out  a  turning  movement  against  the 
north  of  the  village,  the  7th  Rajputs  and  I04th  Rifles  being 
held  in  reserve.  The  section  82nd  Battery  was  directed 
to  support  the  left  attack,  the  two  sections  76th  Battery, 
Royal  Field  Artillery,  the  right  attack.  The  Mountain 
Battery  and  transport  mules  asked  for  had  arrived  at  camp, 
and  I  must  here  express  my  thanks  for  the  prompt  despatch 

383 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

of  these,  the  latter  being  specially  necessary  for  my  plans. 
The  3oth  Mountain  Battery  at  once  joined  the  force  for  the 
action,  and  was  placed  between  the  field  batteries  to  support 
either  flank  as  required. 

Close  co-operation  had  been  arranged  for  with  the  Senior 
Naval  Officer.  (For  the  distribution  of  troops  and  subsequent 
movements,  see  Sketch  Map  of  action  of  December  7.) 1 

The  advance  commenced  at  n  A.M.  over  an  absolutely 
level  and  bare  open  plain  without  a  vestige  of  cover,  and  at 
11.15  A.M.  82nd  Battery  opened  fire  on  Muzaira'ah  at  a  range 
of  2750  yards. 

Ten  minutes  later  the  enemy  opened  rifle  fire  from  the 
village  and  trenches  covering  it,  and  at  11.45  A.M.  the  76th 
Battery,  Royal  Field  Artillery,  came  into  action  at  3800  yards 
range.  Two  of  the  enemy's  guns  then  opened  fire  on  the 
76th  Battery  from  the  north  end  of  Muzaira'ah,  the  flashes 
being  visible,  but  they  were  silenced  in  ten  rounds  and  did 
not  re-open  fire,  being  subsequently  captured  intact. 

The  infantry  were  meanwhile  steadily  advancing,  and  all 
artillery  advanced  to  closer  ranges.  As  the  infantry  came 
into  action  each  line  successively  dropped  their  blankets  to 
facilitate  movement  and  these  were  collected  after  the  action. 

The  2nd  Norfolk  Regiment  and  I20th  Infantry  came  under 
some  enfilade  fire  from  trenches  on  the  enemy's  right,  but  the 
prompt  switching  of  fire  on  to  that  flank  by  the  82nd  Battery 
and  guns  from  the  ships,  combined  with  vigorous  action  on 
the  part  of  the  i2Oth  Infantry,  reinforced  by  a  double  company 
7th  Rajputs  with  Maxim  guns,  effectually  checked  any  danger 
from  that  direction. 

Meanwhile  the  noth  Light  Infantry  executed  their  turn- 
ing movement  against  trenches  on  the  north  of  Muzaira'ah, 
till  at  12.50  P.M.,  the  whole  of  the  2nd  Norfolk  Regiment 
being  now  merged  in  the  firing  line,  the  village  was  stormed 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  the  enemy  not  waiting  to  receive 
the  charge. 

The  pursuit  through  the  palm  groves  was  vigorously 
carried  out  by  the  i2Oth  Infantry  and  2nd  Norfolk  Regiment, 
while  the  nbth  Light  Infantry  cleared  the  trenches  imme- 
diately north  of  Muzaira'ah.  The  iO4th  Rifles  followed 
closely  after  the  noth  Light  Infantry,  and,  as  the  latter 

1  Not  reproduced. 
384 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

regiment  swung  towards  the  river,  moved  northwards,  clear- 
ing further  trenches  occupied  by  the  enemy  in  their  retire- 
ment. All  the  artillery  moved  round  the  north  of  Muzaira'ah 
and  shelled  the  enemy. 

At  2  P.M.  two  hostile  guns  opened  fire  from  the  north- 
north-east,  the  flashes  only  being  visible.  These  were  silenced 
in  seven  minutes  by  searching  fire  from  76th  Battery  at 
4100  yards  range,  and  teams  were  seen  galloping  away, 
leaving  the  guns.  A  squadron  of  cavalry  or  even  a  troop 
during  this  pursuit  would  have  been  invaluable,  for  the  two 
guns  could  undoubtedly  have  been  captured  and  probably 
a  large  body  of  the  enemy  (estimated  from  1000  to  1500) 
could  have  been  rounded  up,  with  their  line  of  retreat  up  the 
river  bank  cut. 

Major  Maule,  Sand  Battery,  had  meanwhile  placed  one 
of  his  guns  in  position  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris  at  the 
northern  edge  of  the  palm  groves  and  effectually  raked  the 
river  front  of  Qurnah  at  a  range  of  2300  yards. 

The  yth  Rajputs,  except  for  one  double  company  rein- 
forcement to  the  i2Oth,  were  in  reserve  throughout  the  action. 

Through  the  palm  groves  the  fighting  continued  till  nearly 
dusk,  the  enemy  bringing  a  heavy  fire  to  bear  from  Qurnah 
and  along  the  river  bank. 

Camp  was  arranged  for  the  force  in  some  gardens  between 
Muzaira'ah  and  the  palm  groves,  where,  though  within  shell 
fire  from  Qurnah,  it  was  hidden  from  view  and  covered  by 
the  glare  of  the  burning  village.  By  5  P.M.  all  units  were 
settling  into  camp  except  the  noth  Light  Infantry,  who 
were  covering  the  operation  from  the  north-west  and  who 
came  in  after  dark.  About  this  time  two  enemy's  shell  were 
burst  outside  the  north-west  corner  of  camp,  and  at  9.30  P.M. 
five  shells  were  fired  over  the  glowing  village  :  no  damage 
was  done,  and  the  ensuing  night  was  devoid  of  incident. 

The  captures  this  day  included  3  field-guns,  about  130 
.  prisoners,  and  a  large  number  of  rifles,  which  were  destroyed. 

The  enemy  are  estimated  to  have  had  about  2000  troops 
on  the  left  bank,  and  subsequent  information  places  their 
casualties  at  about  200  killed  and  300  wounded,  but  the 
latter  is  probably  underestimated.  Our  casualties  were — 
British  officers  wounded,  5  ;  Indian  officers  wounded,  3  ;  rank 
and  file  killed,  8 ;  wounded,  112,  of  whom  2  have  since  died. 

MILITARY  2  2  B  385 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

I  must  acknowledge  the  admirable  support  extended  by 
the  Artillery  and  the  Navy,  which  seems  to  have  paralysed  all 
artillery  resistance. 

From  my  intelligence  this  evening  it  appeared  that  about 
1500  of  the  enemy  escaped  northwards  up  the  left  bank 
of  the  Tigris,  and  that  the  majority  had  embarked  and  fled 
north,  while  in  Qurnah  itself  were  some  800  regulars  with 
4  guns. 

I  decided  to  attempt  a  crossing  of  the  Tigris  without  delay. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  December  8  the  half  company 
(No.  17)  Sappers  and  Miners  were  despatched  to  the  northern 
edge  of  the  palm  groves  to  get  a  line  across  the  river.  The 
iO4th  Rifles  were  to  reconnoitre  and  cover  the  operations 
from  the  north  ;  the  noth  Light  Infantry  and  2nd  Norfolk 
Regiment  were  moved  to  the  edge  of  the  palm  groves,  the 
former  to  cross  and  the  latter  to  cover  the  crossing,  while 
the  artillery  moved  to  positions  in  support,  and  the  I20th 
Infantry  and  7th  Rajputs  were  to  distract  attention  opposite 
Qurnah  itself  in  combination  with  the  naval  force. 

The  dispositions  of  the  crossing  are  shown  in  sketch  of 
crossing  of  river  Tigris.1 

At  11.30  A.M.  Havildar  Ghulam  Nabi  swam  across  the 
Tigris  with  a  log  line  accompanied  by  Lance-Naik  Nur  Dad 
and  Sapper  Ghulam  Haidar,  and,  in  spite  of  a  strong  current 
and  the  possibility  of  a  heavy  fire  being  brought  on  them 
at  any  moment,  they  succeeded  in  swimming  the  130  yards 
of  river  and  landing  on  the  right  bank.  Lieutenant  Campbell, 
R.E.,  then  went  across,  and  the  ij  inch  wire  cable,  especially 
brought  up  for  the  purpose,  was  hauled  over  and  made  fast ; 
a  difficult  feat  in  the  strong  current  on  an  ebb  tide. 

A  dhow  was  secured  with  the  assistance  of  two  or  three 
friendly  Arabs,  and,  being  brought  across,  the  first  party  of 
some  70  men,  noth  Light  Infantry,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Frazer  and  Captain  Cochran,  General  Staff  Officer, 
3rd  grade  for  Intelligence,  successfully  landed  on  the  right 
bank  at  1.20  P.M.  under  some  rifle  fire  from  dhows  down 
stream.  Though  the  operation  was  tedious,  the  rest  of  the 
battalion  was  gradually  pushed  over. 

Meanwhile  the  Navy  and  a  double  company  of  each  of 
the  I20th  Infantry  and  7th  Rajputs  were  distracting  the 

1  Not  reproduced. 
386 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

enemy's  attention  in  front  of  Qurnah  successfully  ;  for  the 
crossing  did  not  appear  to  have  been  realised  by  the  enemy 
till  too  late,  though  some  rifle  and  ineffectual  shell  fire  was 
experienced. 

The  I04th  Rifles  had  earlier  reported  that  they  could  cross 
about  I  £  miles  up  stream  by  three  dhows,  the  crews  of  which 
were  friendly.  They  were  directed  to  cross  and  come  up  on 
the  right  of  the  noth  Light  Infantry  for  the  advance  on 
Qurnah,  while  the  2nd  Norfolk  Regiment  detached  half  a 
battalion  to  replace  them. 

The  single  gun,  82nd  Battery,  only  returned  the  enemy's 
fire,  and  it  was  not  found  necessary  for  the  other  guns  to 
disclose  themselves.  One  Section  3oth  Mountain  Battery, 
without  mules,  followed  the  noth  Light  Infantry  across  the 
river,  but  were  not  employed,  as  Lieutenant-Colonel  Frazer, 
meeting  with  some  opposition  north  of  Qurnah,  decided  it 
was  too  late  in  the  day  to  storm  the  town  with  the  probability 
of  street  fighting. 

The  iO4th  Rifles,  noth  Light  Infantry,  and  Section  3Oth 
Mountain  Battery  accordingly  went  into  camp  on  the  right 
bank  near  the  flying  bridge.  One  double  company  noth 
Light  Infantry,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Britten,  however, 
moving  down  the  right  bank,  did  not  get  the  order  to  retire, 
and,  entering  the  enemy's  position  on  their  right,  enfiladed 
their  northern  defence  and  occupied  three  towers  in  this 
part  of  their  position.  This  double  company,  being  isolated, 
later  withdrew  to  camp  without  casualty  for  the  night. 

To  support  this  force  on  the  right  bank,  the  2nd  Norfolk 
Regiment  were  left  to  camp  at  the  end  of  the  palm  groves  on 
the  left  bank,  other  units  resuming  their  camp  at  Muzaira'ah. 

The  ensuing  night  was  devoid  of  incident. 

Our  casualties  this  day  were  23  rank  and  file  wounded. 

At  5  A.M.  on  December  9,  as  I  was  about  to  resume 
operations,  I  received  intimation  from  the  Senior  Naval 
Officer  that  a  deputation  of  officers  from  Subhi  Bey,  the  late 
Vali  of  Basrah  and  Turkish  Commander,  had  boarded  H.M.S. 
Espiegle  about  midnight,  stating  that  the  Vali  was  prepared 
to  surrender  unconditionally. 

I  met  a  deputation,  consisting  of  the  Chief  Staff  Officer 
and  two  Lieutenants  on  board  at  8.30  A.M.,  when  arrangements 
for  surrender  were  made  and  all  movements  of  troops  stopped. 

387 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

At  1.30  P.M.,  accompanied  by  Sir  Percy  Cox,  Captain 
Hayes-Sadler  (Senior  Naval  Officer)  and  Staffs,  I  landed  at 
the  Vali's  house  and  received  his  surrender,  returning  to  him 
his  sword  in  recognition  of  his  able  defence. 

Meanwhile  the  iO4th  Rifles  and  noth  Light  Infantry 
had  moved  into  Qurnah,  and  piquets  were  posted  round  the 
town,  the  remainder  of  the  battalions  being  drawn  up  round 
the  Turkish  force,  which  had  fallen  in  with  piled  arms  on  the 
open  square  at  the  south  corner  of  the  town. 

At  2.30  P.M.  the  Union  Jack  was  formally  hoisted,  and 
the  transference  of  the  prisoners  to  the  paddle  steamer  Blosse 
Lynch  was  proceeded  with.  The  details  of  ordnance  and 
prisoners  taken  at  Qurnah  are  shown  in  Appendix  '  C/ 

General  Remarks  and  Recommendations. — I  cannot  speak 
too  highly  of  the  conduct  of  the  troops  throughout  these 
operations  and  their  steadiness  under  heavy  fire.  Their 
tactical  formations  were  admirably  adapted  to  the  ground, 
which  afforded  no  cover,  and  the  units  were  handled  with 
marked  ability. 

My  thanks  are  due  to  Captain  Hayes-Sadler,  R.N.,  for  his 
very  close  co-operation  with  his  naval  force  throughout  these 
operations,  which  was  of  invaluable  assistance. 

The  fact  that  there  were  so  few  casualties  was  due  to  the 
splendid  co-operation  of  the  Field  and  Mountain  Artillery. 
Their  fire  was  rendered  very  difficult  owing  to  mirage,  but 
in  spite  of  this  they  maintained  an  accurate  fire  on  the 
enemy's  trenches  right  up  to  the  moment  of  assault.  They 
also  immediately  silenced  any  of  the  enemy's  guns  which 
opened  fire.  Major  St.  T.  B.  Nevinson,  76th  Battery,  Royal 
Field  Artillery,  acted  as  Commander  Royal  Artillery,  and 
directed  this  co-operation  with  great  skill  and  ability.  Major 
St.  J.  Maule,  82nd  Battery,  Royal  Field  Artillery,  throughout 
showed  great  initiative,  and  his  action  in  bringing  a  gun  to 
bear  on  the  river  front  of  Qurnah  on  December  7  and  8  had 
much  to  do  with  the  decisive  issues  of  the  operations. 

Major  H.  J.  Cotter,  3oth  Mountain  Battery,  and  Captain 
E.  V.  Sarson,  76th  Battery,  Royal  Field  Artillery,  gave 
valuable  services. 

No.  98166  Battery  Sergeant-Major  H.  E.  Haggett,  76th 
Battery,    Royal  Field  Artillery,   is  noted  for  exceptionally 
able  and  energetic  assistance. 
388 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

No.  17  Company,  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners. — I  cannot 
speak  too  highly  of  the  services  rendered  by  this  half  company 
throughout,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  R.  C.  Lord, 
R.E.  They  have  had  very  hard  work,  and  their  devotion 
to  it  has  been  of  incalculable  assistance. 

Major  H.  E.  Winsloe,  R.E.,  acted  as  my  A.C.R.E.,  and 
ably  directed  the  operation  of  bridging  the  river  Tigris. 

Havildar  Ghulam  Nabi,  No.  2632,  swam  across  the  Tigris 
with  a  log  line  accompanied  by  Lance-Naik  Nur  Dad,  No. 
3742,  and  No.  3898  Sapper  Ghulam  Haidar.  There  was  a 
strong  current  in  the  river,  which  was  about  130  yards  wide, 
and  the  enemy  were  occupying  the  opposite  bank  only  a 
short  distance  down  stream.  Although  they  were  not  fired 
on,  there  was  every  reason  to  expect  they  would  be,  as  the 
ground  on  the  opposite  bank  was  densely  wooded  and  favoured 
the  approach  of  an  enemy.  It  was  owing  to  their  gallant 
action  that  the  steel  cable  was  got  across  and  the  flying 
bridge  constructed.  I  recommend  Havildar  Ghulam  Nabi 
for  the  '  Order  of  Merit '  and  Lance-Naik  Nur  Dud  and  Sapper 
Ghulam  Haidar  for  the  '  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal/ 

Lieutenant  M.  G.  G.  Campbell,  R.E.,  deserves  special 
recognition  for  his  'gallant  crossing  over  the  Tigris,  holding 
on  to  the  log  line  only,  when  a  strong  current  was  running, 
to  superintend  the  hauling  over  the  steel  hawser  and  fix  the 
running  tackle  for  the  flying  bridge — he  was  for  some  time 
under  fire  while  performing  this  difficult  operation. 

2nd  Battalion  Norfolk  Regiment. — This  fine  Regiment 
has  throughout  been  an  example  to  others,  both  in  the  field 
and  in  camp.  Their  cohesion  and  the  precision  in  their 
movements  showed  that  they  have  attained  a  very  high 
standard  of  efficiency  in  their  peace  training,  the  credit  for 
which  is  due  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  C.  Peebles,  D.S.O., 
who  has  commanded  the  Regiment  with  marked  ability  and 
energy. 

Captain  W.  J.  O'B.  Daunt  (severely  wounded)  proved 
himself  a  gallant  leader. 

Captain  and  Adjutant'  G.  de  Grey  was  particularly  con- 
spicuous in  taking  messages  to  the  firing  line,  and  conveying 
ammunition  to  it  when  it  was  running  short. 

Lieutenant  H.  S.  Farebrother  for  bold  handling  of  his 
machine-gun  section  over  absolutely  open  ground. 

389 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

No.  5008  Sergeant  W.  Bailey  (twice  wounded)  for  work 
with  machine-guns. 

No.  5223  Lance-Sergeant  L.  Snell 


No.  5973  Sergeant  A.  Cornwall 
No.  7226  Lance-Sergeant  Leveridge 
No.  7345  Corporal  W.  Fristin 
No.  7545  Musician  Mullinger 
No.  7784  Musician  Sharpe 


for  exceptionally 
gallant  and  useful 
work  during  the 
attack  on  Muz- 
aira'ah. 


No.  8049  Private  A.  Dawson 
No.  8365  Private  F.  Pryor   /  did  Particularly  well,  attend- 
No.  863i  Private  A.  George  {     ^^^  DaUnt  when 

Captain  D.  Arthur,  I. M.S.,  was  particularly  conspicuous 
in  attending  Captain  Daunt  and  other  wounded  when  exposed 
to  heavy  fire,  and  throughout  the  action. 

7th  Rajputs. — This  Regiment  was  held  in  reserve  through- 
out, but  one  double  company  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Parr 
did  well  when  it  reinforced  the  i2Oth  Infantry. 

Lieutenant  W.  L.  Harvey. — For  the  very  efficient  manner 
in  which  he  brought  up  his  machine-gun  section  in  support 
of  the  I20th  Infantry ;  he  was  wounded  just  after  adjusting 
a  jam  in  one  of  his  guns. 

Subadar  Brijmohan  Singh  handled  his  company  in  a  very 
efficient  manner  when  brought  up  in  support  of  the  i2Oth 
Infantry,  and  acted  throughout  with  conspicuous  bravery  and 
coolness. 

iO4th  Rifles. — This  Regiment  has  been  engaged  in  every 
action  which  has  taken  place  during  this  campaign,  and  has 
met  with  very  heavy  casualties.  Their  work  under  my 
command  during  these  operations  has  throughout  been 
excellent  and  quite  up  to  the  fine  traditions  of  the  Regiment. 
During  the  action  of  the  7th  they  were  in  reserve,  but  were 
thrown  in  towards  the  end  of  the  action  and  carried  out  the 
pursuit  well.  On  the  8th  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  B.  Clery 
showed  great  initiative  in  securing  the  three  dhows  up  stream, 
and  his  action  greatly  facilitated  the  rapidity  of  crossing. 

Captain  H.  M.  Butler  (severely  wounded)  for  exceptional 
skill  and  gallant  leading  of  his  double  company  in  the  attack 
on  Muzaira'ah. 

Sub-Assistant  Surgeon  Pundit,  I.S.M.D. — During  the 
attack  on  Muzaira'ah  on  December  7,  1914,  Rifleman  Ghos 
390 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

Mahammad  was  shot  by  an  Arab,  who  was  hiding  in  one  of 
the  huts.  Sub- Assist  ant  Surgeon  Pundit  called  on  a  sepoy 
of  another  regiment  to  enter  the  hut  and  clear  it.  The  sepoy 
seemed  reluctant  to  do  so,  and  this  Sub-Assistant  Surgeon 
took  his  rifle  and  bayonet,  entered  the  house,  and  closed  with 
the  Arab.  The  sepoy  followed,  and  between  them  they  killed 
him.  He  has  also  shown  exceptional  bravery  in  attending 
wounded  under  fire. 

noth  Mahratta  Light  Infantry. — This  Regiment  carried 
out  the  turning  movement  on  the  enemy's  left  flank  on  the  7th 
with  great  intelligence  and  dash,  and  worked  well  on  the  8th. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  X.  Britten. — His  action  on  December 
8,  1914,  in  capturing  three  towers  on  the  right  of  the  enemy's 
position  at  Qurnah  shows  him  to  be  a  resourceful  and  dashing 
leader. 

Captain  K.  E.  Cooper  showed  great  dash  and  bravery 
attacking  through  the  north  end  of  Muzaira'ah.  He 
approached  one  small  house  from  which  fire  was  being  kept 
up,  climbed  a  wall  at  the  back  and  shot  four  Turks,  who  were 
occupying  it,  with  his  revolver. 

Subadar  Hari  Savant  and  Jemadar  Vishun  Ghone  for 
conspicuous  coolness  and  ability  in  handling  their  half 
double  companies  on  December  7  and  8,  1914. 

No.  2089  Lance-Naik  Bhan  Sawant  (since  killed),  a  young 
soldier  who  showed  much  dash  and  spirit  in  command  of  the 
scouts  of  his  company. 

No.  1148  Lance-Naik  Haider  Beg,  a  signaller,  who  on 
two  occasions  signalled  an  important  message  from  the 
firing  line  to  the  artillery,  standing  up  fearlessly  in  the  open 
under  heavy  fire,  doing  so,  as  he  could  not  see  properly  in 
any  other  position. 

i2Oth  Rajputana  Infantry. — This  Regiment,  consisting  of 
only  Headquarters  and  2  double  companies,  acted  with  great 
boldness  and  spirit  on  our  left  flank,  and  ably  supported  the 
2nd  Norfolk  Regiment  when  the  latter  came  under  enfilade 
fire  from  the  enemy's  right. 

Lieutenant  and  Adjutant  W.  L.  Miskin  showed  great 
dash  and  capacity.  After  Captain  Macready  was  wounded  he 
took  command  of  that  officer's  double  company  and  handled 
it  well,  having  twice  to  change  direction  to  meet  enfilade  fire, 
and  on  each  occasion  succeeded  in  turning  out  the  enemy. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Subadar  Dunga  Rawat  for  conspicuous  bravery  and 
coolness  in  handling  his  half  double  company. 

No.  978  Havildar  Gunesh  for  marked  capacity  as  a  leader. 

Medical  Services. — The  Field  Ambulances  under  Major 
E.  Bennett,  R.A.M.C.,  worked  with  great  devotion  on  the 
7th,  and  were  under  shell  fire  for  a  short  time  that  night. 

Transport. — I  must  recognise  the  good  work  done  by  the 
portion  of  the  loth  Mule  Corps  under  Jemadar  Allah  Din, 
and  endorse  the  recommendations  to  notice  of  individuals 
mentioned  in  paragraph  12  of  Appendix  '  A/ 

Headquarters. — Finally,  I  would  bring  forward  the  names 
of  Captain  E.  G.  Dunn,  Royal  Irish  Rifles,  my  Brigade 
Major,  who  again  gave  most  valuable  and  energetic  assistance 
in  the  working  out  of  the  details  of  the  operations.  His 
clear  conveyance  of  my  orders  materially  assisted  in  the 
successful  issue  of  the  operations.  Also  Captain  W.  F.  C. 
Gilchrist,  52nd  Sikhs  (F.  F.),  my  Staff  Captain,  who  again 
proved  himself  an  able,  energetic,  and  resourceful  Staff  Officer; 
he,  in  the  absence  of  either  a  Supply  or  Transport  Officer, 
organised  and  maintained  an  unfailing  supply  to  the  troops 
from  my  original  camp  at  Shaib. 

Captain  H.  G.  Morrell,  ngth  Infantry,  in  command  of 
the  1 8th  Brigade  Section  of  the  34th  Divisional  Signal  Com- 
pany, carried  out  his  duties  under  difficult  circumstances 
very  ably  and  with  untiring  energy. 

Captain  G.  W.  Cochran,  8ist  Pioneers,  General  Staff 
Officer,  3rd  Grade  for  Intelligence,  worked  unsparingly  and 
the  information  he  collected  turned  out  to  be  very  accurate. 
He  a] so  gave  me  much  assistance  in  other  ways. 


APPENDIX  A 

Report  on  the  Working  of  the  Transport  between  Shaib  Camp 

and  Muzaira'ah 

i.  On  arrival  at  Shaib  on  the  morning  of  December  5, 
1914,  General  Fry  decided  to  get  up  three  hundred  mules, 
his  intention  being,  when  the  village  of  Muzaira'ah  was 
captured  and  the  troops  reached  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris, 
to  maintain  himself  there  and  attempt  to  cross  above  Qurnah. 
392 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

2.  A  demand  for  320  mules  was  therefore  sent  to  Basra 
at  I  P.M.  on  December  5. 

3.  These  mules  (320)  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the  7th 
at  7  A.M.     They  were  disembarked  by  9  A.M. 

4.  I  ordered  them  to  feed  and  saddle  up  at  12  noon. 
Captain  Lanyon,  of  the  Norfolk  Regiment,  was  put  in  charge 
of  the  mules  to  distribute  them.     I  gave  him  a  distribution 
list  showing  how  mules  were  to  be  allotted. 

5.  At  i   P.M.   orders  were  telephoned  to  camp  to  load 
up  the  mules  as  it  was  seen  that  Muzaira'ah  would  soon  be  in 
our  possession. 

6.  About  4.30  P.M.  the  mules  began  to  arrive  in  Camp 
Muzaira'ah.     As  it  was  getting  dark  and  spasmodic  firing 
was  going  on,  the  confusion  was  considerable. 

All  the  mules  were  unloaded,  however,  and  in  the  dark 
assembled  by  the  duffadars  and  taken  back  to  camp. 
This  evening  the  Regiments  got  each  : 
16  loads  rations, 
8  loads  ammunition, 
8  loads  tools, 
8  loads  cooking  pots, 
some  kits, 
and  so  were  amply  provided  for. 

7.  The  orders  for  the  8th,  gth,  and  loth  were  to  send  up 
one  day's  rations  each  day. 

8.  As  it  was  feared  that  the  horses  might  not  be  able 
to  get  full  forage  rations  on  8th,  190  loads  of  forage  were  sent 
for  and  arrived  after  dark  on  8th. 

With  them  came  48  mules  for  duty  in  Muzaira'ah  as  ist 
line  mules  in  case  of  a  further  advance  across  the  river.  The 
mules  this  day  therefore  did  a  double  trip. 

9.  There  being  ample  forage  in  camp,  the  mules  on  gth 
and  loth  only  brought  up  men's  rations  from  Shaib,  while 
48  mules  assisted  in  carrying  up  kits  of  units  as  they  were 
sent  across  the  Tigris. 

10.  Eventually  all  the  mules  were  taken  to  the  right  bank 
of  Tigris  on  the  I2th,  having  been  used  to  ration  the  troops 
left  on  the  left  bank  and  to  bring  up  the  remains  of  kits  left 
in  camp. 

11.  On  the  8th,  when  two  units  were  passed  over  to  the 
right  bank,  all  available  mules  and  the  30th  Mountain  Battery 

393 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

baggage  were  used  to  send  up  their  kits,  so  that  by  the  evening 
the  troops  across  the  river  were  rationed  and  had  their 
blankets  that  night. 

12.  Captain  Lanyon  speaks  very  highly  of  the  work  done 
by  Jemadar  Allah  Din,  who  commanded  the  mules.  His 
work  was  of  the  greatest  help. 

The  Kote  Duffadars  : 
2193  Busaki  Ram, 
6417  Jamal  Din, 

205  Mir  Dad, 

were  of  the  greatest  help  to  me  in  collecting  their  mules  in 
the  dark  and  in  constantly  moving  backwards  and  forwards. 

The  men,  of  whom  I  saw  a  certain  amount,  were  cheery 
and  worked  well,  and  though  they  were  under  spasmodic 
shell  fire  on  yth  and  8th  and  had  to  cross  the  plain  where 
bullets,  though  spent,  were  falling,  behaved  very  well  indeed. 


APPENDIX  B 

ORDER  OF  BATTLE 

Major-General  C.  I.  Fry's  Column  on  December  7,  1914 

Commanding,    Major-General   C.    I.   Fry,    Indian   Army. 
Staff: 

Brigade  Major,  Captain  E.  G.  Dunn,  Royal  Irish  Rifles. 

Staff  Captain,  Captain  W.  F.  C.  Gilchrist,  52nd  Sikhs. 
Attached : 

G.S.O.,  3rd  grade  (Intelligence),  Captain  G.  W.  Cochran, 
8ist  Pioneers. 

A.C.R.E.,  Major  H.  E.  Winsloe,  R.E. 

O.  C.  Brigade  Section,  34th  Divisional  Signal  Company, 
Captain  H.  G.  Morrell,  ngth  Infantry. 

TROOPS 
Artillery  : 

76th  Battery  R.F.A.    (less   i  Section),  Major  St.  T.  B. 

Nevinson. 
82nd  Battery  R.F.A.,  one  section  on  each  of  Medijieh 

and  Blosse  Lynch,  Major  H.  St.  J.  Maule. 
3Oth  Indian  Mountain  Battery,  Major  H.  J.  Cotter. 
394 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

Engineers  : 

I7th  Company  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners  (less  2  Sections), 
Lieutenant  R.  C.  Lord. 

Infantry  : 

i8th  Brigade  : 

2nd   Battalion   Norfolk    Regiment,   Lieutenant-Colonel 
E  C  Peebles  D  S  O 

7th  D.C.O.  Rajputs  (less  i  B.C.),  Lieutenant-Colonel 
N.  E.  Robin. 

I20th  Rajputana  Infantry   (less  2  D.C.),   Lieutenant- 
Colonel  E.  Codrington. 

noth    Mahratta    Light    Infantry,    Lieutenant-Colonel 
G.  S.  Frazer. 

I04th  Rifles,  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  B.  Clery. 


APPROXIMATE  STRENGTH. 

NAVAL  FORCE. 

H.M.  Ships:— 
EspUgle,      Odin, 
Lawrence. 

Unit. 

B.O. 

1.0. 

Br. 
R.  &F. 

Ind. 
R.  &F. 

Guns. 

H.M.  Gunboats  :— 

Miner,  Lewis  Petty, 

76th      Battery     Royal 

^ 

Shaitan. 

Field  Artillery,  . 

4 

—      60 

4  i8-pr. 

s.s.  Medijieh,  Blosse 

82nd     Battery     Royal 

Lynch. 

Field  Artillery,  . 

5 

—      62        — 

6 

2  guns  on 

3oth  Mountain  Battery, 

5 

3       —         277 

6  lo-pr.          s.s.  Medijieh. 

i  yth     Company      Sap- 

2 guns  on 

pers  and  Miners, 

3 

i        — 

75 

— 

Blosse  Lynch. 

2nd  Norfolk  Regiment, 

23 

-     845 

2  m.g. 

7th  Rajputs,  . 

10 

13       —         479 

2  m.g. 

N.B.—One  £  D.C. 

noth    Mahratta    Light 

i 

each    unit   (i2oth 

Infantry,    . 

10 

17                   675 

i  m.g. 

details   only)   and 

1  20th  Infantry, 

9 

10                    404 

2  m.g.    :    details  from  other 

1  04th  Rifles,  . 

12 

16       —          670 

2  m.g.        units  were  left  in 

Brigade  Signal  Section, 

I 

—       ii            1  8          —           Camp     Shaib     as 

Staff  and  Attached, 

5 

3 

guard  out  of  these 

numbers. 

Total,     . 

87 

60 

981 

2598 

10  i8-pr. 

1 

6  lo-pr. 

1 

9  m.g. 

395 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


APPENDIX  C 

Detail  of  Ordnance  and  Prisoners  taken  at  Qurnah  on 

December  9,  1914 
Ordnance  : 

2  Krupp  Field-guns. 
12  Mountain  guns. 

.303  Maxim-gun  (recovered  after  its  loss  December  4, 

1914). 

22  Officers'  swords. 
776  Rifles  (of  which  some  250  were  handed  over  to  Navy 

at  their  request). 
N.B. — Large  quantities  of  ammunition  were  destroyed. 

Prisoners  of  War 
Subhi  Bey,  late  Vali  of  Basra  and  Turkish  Commander. 


Officers. 

Rank  and  File. 

ist  Battalion  26th  Regiment  (Anatolia) 

12 

353 

2nd     Battalion    Murrattab     Regiment 

(Bagdad)  (Amara)   . 

... 

13 

345 

ist  Company  ist  Battalion  28th  Regi- 

ment Artillery 

2 

63 

Turkish  Navy    . 

I 

3 

Basra  Battalion  Gendarmerie 

7 

177 

Medical     . 

. 

4 

ii 

Supply,  etc. 
Vali's  Staff 

• 

3 

i 

ii 
5 

Wounded  in  hospital  . 

• 

2 

•h 

21 

Total     . 

45 

989 

ENCLOSURE  No.  2 

Copy  of  Report  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  S.  Frazer,  noth 
Mahratta  Light  Infantry,  Commanding  Qurnah  Column, 
on  the  operations  of  December  4,  1914,  dated  Camp 
Um  Rash,  December  5,  1914 

I  have  the  honour  to  report  as  follows  on  the  operations 
yesterday  : 
396 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

1.  My  Staff  Officer,  Captain  Branson,  who  was  wounded, 
has  already  taken  to  you  most  of  the  details,  and  I  sent  you 
a  wireless  in  code  last  night. 

2.  The   disembarkation   yesterday   morning   was   carried 
out  quickly  and  without  confusion. 

Two  small  creeks  delayed  the  advance  of  the  column  till 
they  could  be  rendered  passable. 

My  Advanced  Guard  was,  in  the  first  instance,  directed 
so  as  to  pass  well  to  the  east  of  Muzaira'ah. 

As  all  the  scouting  had  to  be  done  with  Infantry,  the 
advance  was  not  very  quick. 

It  was  first  reported  that  there  was  no  enemy  in  Muzaira'ah, 
and  I  then  changed  the  direction  of  the  Advanced  Guard 
so  that  their  right  passed  to  the  east  of  Muzaira'ah. 

It  was  then  discovered  beyond  a  doubt  that  the  enemy 
were  in  position  along  the  edge  of  the  date  palms  between 
Muzaira'ah  and  Qurnah. 

I  directed  the  Advanced  Guard  to  clear  the  village  and 
brought  up  the  other  half  Battalion  of  the  noth  on  their 
left,  and  attacked  the  enemy  on  their  left  flank. 

It  then  became  known  that  Muzaira'ah  was  occupied 
by  the  enemy. 

I  sent  the  Norfolks,  i  D.C.,  to  support  the  half  Battalion 
noth  attacking  the  village. 

Eventually  the  Sappers  and  Miners  also  joined  the  right 
attack. 

The  village  was  cleared  and  also  the  trenches  in  front  of 
the  date  trees,  where  the  noth  captured  69  prisoners  and 
2  abandoned  field-guns  (g-prs.). 

In  the  meantime,  the  ships  had  been  shelling  Qurnah  and 
the  date  groves,  and  the  Royal  Field  Artillery  Muzaira'ah, 
and  the  practice  of  all  guns  seemed  to  be  excellent. 

The  troops  after  this  did  not  come  under  shell  fire,  but  the 
rifle  fire  opposed  to  them  was  considerable. 

When  the  troops  entered  the  date  grove  I  reinforced  the 
left  half  of  the  noth  by  half  the  Battalion  of  I04th,  and 
the  enemy  was  driven  back  to  the  Tigris  River,  where  they 
quickly  effected  a  crossing  by  means  of  boats  arranged  as 
flying  bridges. 

At  2.10  P.M.  I  ordered  a  retirement  to  the  place  near  where 
we  disembarked,  and  there  formed  camp. 

397 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

After  my  Infantry  entered  the  date  grove  my  Field 
Artillery  was  unable  to  render  any  further  assistance. 

The  Tigris  east  of  Qurnah  is  from  200  to  300  yards  wide, 
and  field-guns  cannot  operate  against  Qurnah  owing  to  the 
date  trees. 

My  retirement  to  camp  was  well  and  steadily  carried  out. 

I  am  of  opinion  that  until  guns  can  be  brought  up  to 
demolish  the  houses  of  Qurnah,  the  only  way  to  effect  a 
landing  would  be  to  do  so  with  country  boats  north  of  Qurnah. 

All  the  troops  under  my  command  performed  their  duty 
most  thoroughly. 

Captain  Branson,  uoth  Mahratta  Light  Infantry,  my 
Staff  Officer,  afforded  me  the  greatest  assistance,  and  was 
wounded  shortly  after  I  had  decided  to  retire,  while  I  was 
issuing  the  orders. 

I  attach  a  report  from  Officer  Commanding  I04th. 

The  Officer  Commanding  uoth  reports  as  follows  : 

'  Of  the  officers  who  came  under  my  observation  I 
should  like  to  particularly  mention  Major  Hill  and  Lieu- 
tenant Hind  in  the  Company  firing  line,  and  Lieutenant 
Ball  who  handled  the  machine-guns  most  efficiently/ 

No.  959  Lance-Naik  Apa  Bagive  displayed  great  bravery 
during  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  position  in  the  date  groves, 
and  in  the  subsequent  advance  towards  Qurnah.  He  was 
carrying  the  flag  on  the  left  of  the  line  in  order  to  indicate 
the  position  of  the  line  to  the  warships.  The  flag  was  a  very 
conspicuous  mark,  and  drew  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy. 
Lance-Naik  Apa  Bagive  carried  the  flag  absolutely  in  the  open. 
Had  he  taken  cover,  the  flag  might  not  have  been  visible. 

I  am  sending  down  all  prisoners  on  Blosse  Lynch,  Malomir, 
and  Medijieh  under  command  of  Captain  Bayley,  Royal 
Field  Artillery. 

APPENDIX  D 

Report  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  Clery,  Commanding  104^ 
Rifles,  to  the  Staff  Officer,  Qurnah  Column,  dated 
December  5,  1914 

As  requested,  I  have  the  honour  to  forward  the  names 
of  the  following  officers  and  men  of  the  regiment  under  my 
398 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

cpmmand,  who  were  conspicuous  for  their  gallant  conduct 
during  the  action  of  the  4th  instant  opposite  Qurnah  : 

Captain  E.  G.  J.  Byrne. — This  officer  in  the  face  of  a  heavy 
and  accurate  fire  brought  his  machine-guns  right  up  to  the 
firing  line  on  the  river  bank  opposite  Qurnah.  From  here 
his  fire  was  so  galling  to  the  Turks  that  they  brought  up 
a  field-gun  and  endeavoured  to  silence  the  machine-guns. 
Several  of  the  shells  hit  the  parapet  where  the  machine- 
guns  were  ;  notwithstanding  this,  Captain  Byrne  kept  his 
guns  in  action,  and  did  not  retire  irom  his  position  until 
ordered  to  retire.  This  officer,  on  two  previous  occasions  on 
which  the  Regiment  has  been  in  action,  has  brought  his 
detachments  forward  most  intelligently  and  gallantly.  On 
this  occasion  he  received  one  bullet  through  his  helmet 
and  one  cut  his  puttee. 

2.  Subadar    Ghulam    Rasul. — This    Indian    officer    was 
conspicuous  for  the  gallant  manner  in  which  he  led  his  men 
forward  in  the  face  of  a  heavy  accurate  and  short  range  fire 
from  the  Turks. 

This  officer  was  subsequently  killed. 

3.  Jemadar  Kishna  Ram.     Conspicuous  pluck  under  fire, 
and  assisted  a  wounded  man  to  rear  under  heavy  fire  during 
the  retirement. 

4.  No.  2317  Lance-Naik  Guman  Singh. 

5.  No.  2866  Rm.  Khota  Ram. 

6.  No.  2578  Rm.  Dhanna  Ram. 

7.  No.  2090  Rm.  Maula  Dad. 

8.  When  ordered  to  retire,  the  two  machine-guns  had  to 
be  carried  by  hand  some  250  yards  back  to  the  mules  under 
heavy  fire.     Not  having  enough  men  to  take  away  all  the 
ammunition  boxes  as  well  as  guns,  the  machine-gun  officer 
asked  four  men  to  return  to  the  position  and  recover  the 
ammunition  boxes.     They  did  so  under  a  heavy  gun  and 
rifle  fire  and  brought  back  all  the  boxes  to  the  mules,  although 
the  troops  had  left  the  trench. 

9.  No.  2435  Havildar  Mohru  Ram,  when  left  in  command 
of  a  long  mixed  firing  line,  performed  meritorious  service 
in  controlling  this  line  and  opening  very  heavy,   accurate 
fire  on  the  Qurnah  position,  thus  keeping  the  enemy's  fire 
down  while  other  parts  of  the  firing  line  retired. 

10.  No.   1615   Reservist  Jhonta  Singh,   *  B  '  Coy. — Meri- 

399 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

torious  conduct  during  the  retirement  from  the  river,  ia 
carrying  Rm.  Jai  Singh,  who  was  severely  wounded  through 
the  chest,  on  his  shoulders  for  600  yards  under  heavy  fire, 
over  a  number  of  water  nullahs,  finally  handing  him  over 
to  some  dhoolie  bearers. 

Reservist  Jhonta  Singh  was  previously  recommended  by 
his  Double  Company  Commander  for  good  work  during 
the  action  of  November  15,  when  he  carried  ammunition 
forward  to  the  firing  line  from  mules  that  had  fallen  into  a 
canal. 

11.  No.  2263  Bugler  Narsu  Singh,  '  A  '  Coy. — For  meri- 
torious conduct  in  taking  written  orders  regarding  the  retire- 
ment under  a  heavy  fire  along  the  firing  line  on  two  occasions 
— once  to  extreme  right  and  again  later  on  to  the  machine- 
guns  on  the  left. 

12.  No.  3241  Rm.  Sobh  Singh,  '  A '  Coy.,  and  No.  2981 
Rm.    Kan   Singh,    '  A  '   Coy. — For   meritorious   conduct   in 
carrying    between    them    Rm.     Jat    Singh,    '  A/    who    was 
severely  wounded  in  the  head,  under  a  heavy  fire  during  the 
retirement  for  some  300  yards  to  the  dhoolie. 

14.  No.  3195  Rm.  Ratna  Ram. 

15.  No.  2112  Rm.  Dunga  Ram. 

16.  No.  2670  Rm.  Kheta  Ram. 

17.  No.  3143  Rm.  Koema  Ram. 

18.  No.  2422  Rm.  Jowana  Ram. 

The  above  men  for  meritorious  conduct,  who,  in  the 
absence  of  Indian  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers, 
were  conspicuous  in  taking  the  place  of  non-commissioned 
officers  in  leading  their  commands  forward  under  a  heavy 
and  accurate  fire. 

19.  No.  2463  Bugler  Kala  Khan,  for  meritorious  conduct. 
On  November  15  this  man  with  another  during  retirement 
from   Saihan   carried   Captain   Maclean   out   of   action.     On 
November  17  and  December  4  he  again  performed  meri- 
torious work  in  carrying  messages  backwards  and  forwards 
from  the  Officer  Commanding  to  the  officers  in  the  firing  line. 


400 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 


APPENDIX  E 
Casualties  on  December  4 


Units. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

2nd  Norfolks        .... 

.     _ 

3 

__ 

3rd  Sappers  and  Miners 

— 

2 

2 

noth  Mahratta  Light  Infantry 

5 

16 

3 

1  04th  Rifles          .... 

[      i  I.  O. 
I    13 

28 

2  W.  M. 
8M. 

No  casualties,  Royal  Field  Artillery 

2  mules  killed       . 

2  mules  wounded 

i  machine-gun  missing,  noth 

i  B.  O.  wounded ;  i  I.  O.  killed. 

Indians — 18  killed. 

British — 3  wounded. 

Indians — 46  wounded. 

Indians — 15  missing. 

Enemy  reported  in  Qurnah,  600  and  4  guns  ;    outside, 

700  and  2  guns. 
Captured  : 

Gunner  officer. 

Infantry  Captain,  2nd  in  command. 
Another  officer. 
75  prisoners, 
i  gun  captured, 
i  gun  destroyed. 

[Enclosure  No.  3  from  Commander  W.  Nunn,  Senior  Naval 
Officer,  Persian  Gulf  Division,  to  the  General  Officer  Commanding 
i8th  Brigade,  dated  H.M.S.  Espitgle,  Qurnah,  I5th  December  1914, 
is  here  omitted.  It  will  be  found  in  Naval,  2,  pp.  384-8.] 


From  the  General  Officer  Commanding  i&th  Brigade,  to  the 
General  Staff,  Indian  Expeditionary  Force  '  D,9  dated 
Qurnah,  December  15,  1914 

Forwarded.     In   my  report   on   these  operations  I  have 
already   mentioned    the    great    assistance    and    co-operation 

MILITARY  2  2  C  4OI 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

extended  by  the  Naval  Force  under  Captain  Hayes-Sadler, 
R.N.  I  much  admired  the  intrepidity  shown  by  the  Com- 
manders of  the  armed  launches  in  ascending  the  Shatt-el- 
Arab  River  under  shell  fire  each  day,  and  sincerely  regret 
the  death  of  one  of  these,  Lieutenant  Elkes,  R.N. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  REPORTS  CONNECTED  WITH 
FOREGOING  OPERATIONS 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  communicates  the 
following  regarding  the  progress  of  the  Indian  Expeditionary 
Force  to  the  Persian  Gulf  : — 

A  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  position  at  Kurna  was 
made  on  the  5th  instant  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Frazer  with 
the  noth  Mahrattas.  The  enemy  were  encountered  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Tigris  opposite  Kurna.  They  were  promptly 
attacked  and  driven  across  the  river,  losing  heavily  ;  two 
guns  and  70  prisoners,  including  three  Turkish  officers,  were 
captured.  Kurna  was  found  to  be  strongly  held  by  guns  and 
infantry,  and,  our  troops  having  no  means  of  crossing  the 
Tigris,  withdrew  to  their  original  bivouac  four  miles  south 
of  Kurna.  Great  assistance  was  given  by  the  Navy  from 
armed  steamers  which  accompanied  the  reconnaissance.  Our 
casualties  were  one  British  officer  and  three  British  rank  and 
file  wounded,  one  Indian  officer  and  19  rank  and  file  killed, 
and  about  60  wounded.  Steamers  Miner  and  Lawrence  were 
hit  by  shells. 

On  the  following  day  reinforcements  were  sent  from  Basra, 
under  Brigadier-General  Fry,  by  steamers  and  flats.  On  his 
arrival  he  reported  the  Turks  in  occupation  of  Masera,  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Tigris  immediately  opposite  Kurna.  They 
attacked  his  outposts,  but  were  repulsed  with  some  loss. 
On  the  7th  instant  General  Fry  captured  Masera  and  cleared 
the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  bivouacking  on  the  captured  position. 
In  this  affair  three  guns  were  taken  and  two  disabled,  as  well 
as  100  prisoners,  including  three  officers. 

On  the  8th  the  iO4th  Rifles  and  noth  Mahrattas  and  two 
mountain  guns  crossed  the  Tigris  by  a  flying  bridge  and 
dhows,  and  occupied  the  northern  approaches  of  Kurna,  and 
on  the  early  morning  of  yesterday  (gth  December)  Subhi  Bey, 
402 


WAR  WITH  TURKEY 

the  late  Governor  of  Basra  and  commanding  the  Turkish 
forces  at  Kurna,  surrendered  unconditionally  with  his  troops. 
The  town  of  Kurna  was  subsequently  occupied.  Our  casualties 
during  the  whole  of  these  operations  amounted  to  one  British 
officer  killed  and  three  wounded,  about  forty  Indian  rank  and 
file  killed,  and  120  wounded. 

This  smart  little  affair  has  given  us  complete  control  of 
the  country  from  the  junction  of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  to 
the  sea,  and  the  richest  of  the  fertile  delta. 


The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  communicates  that  on  Times, 
the  capture  of  Kurna  (on  the  Tigris),  reported  yesterday,  Dec.  n 
noo  prisoners,   exclusive  of  wounded,   and  nine  guns  fell  I9I4- 
into  our  hands.     The  late  Vali  of  Basra  only  surrendered 
after  a  plucky  resistance. — Press  Bureau. 


RED  SEA  FORT  CAPTURED 

The   Secretary   of   the   Admiralty   makes   the   following  Times, 
announcement : —  Nov.  i 

Successful   operations   against   the   Turkish   garrison   at  I9I4- 
Sheik  Seyd  have  been  carried  out  by  Indian  troops,  assisted 
by  His  Majesty's  ship  Duke  of  Edinburgh. 

The  Turkish  fort  (Turba)  is  situated  on  the  rocky  heights 
to  the  eastward  of  Cape  Bab-el-Mandeb,  at  the  southern 
entrance  to  the  Red  Sea,  and  is  close  to  the  boundary  line 
between  Turkish  territory  and  the  Aden  Protectorate. 

The  Sheik  Seyd  Peninsula  consists  of  a  group  of  rocky 
heights  joined  to  the  mainland  by  a  low  sandy  plain,  the 
greater  portion  of  which  is  covered  at  high  water  by  a  shallow 
lagoon.  The  guns  of  the  fort  command  the  isthmus  connecting 
the  peninsula  to  the  mainland. 

Three  battalions  of  troops  were  landed  in  face  of  opposition, 
but  under  cover  of  fire  from  His  Majesty's  ship  Duke  of 
Edinburgh,  which  had  previously  disabled  Turba  Fort,  and 
which  assisted  during  the  operations. 

After  landing,  one  and  a  half  battalions  of  infantry 
attacked  the  enemy  positions,  and  were  opposed  by  well- 
concealed  artillery  and  infantry  fire.  When  the  hills  com- 

403 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY  [> 

manding  Manheli  were  occupied,  opposition  weakened,  and 
about  200  of  the  enemy  escaped  by  the  isthmus  on  camels  or 
in  boats  by  sea.  Six  of  the  enemy  were  reported  killed,  and 
the  majority  of  the  remainer  wounded  and  prisoners.  The 
forts  were  occupied  by  us,  and  large  amounts  of  munitions  of 
war  and  six  field-guns  captured.  Heavy  guns  were  probably 
put  out  of  action  by  Duke  of  Edinburgh. 

Our  casualties  amongst  the  troops  :  One  officer  and  fifteen 
men  wounded  ;  four  men  killed.     No  naval  casualties. 


404 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

GERMANY'S   REPLY   TO   THE   JAPANESE 
ULTIMATUM 

Berlin,  August  24. 

The  following  verbal  reply  to  the  Japanese  ultimatum  was  K.  D. 
given  yesterday  morning  to  the  Japanese  Charge  d' Affaires : 
The  German  Government  does  not  intend  to  make  any  reply 
to  the  Japanese  requests.  She  proposes  to  recall  her  Am- 
bassador from  Tokyo,  and  to  hand  the  Japanese  Charg£ 
d' Affaires  in  Berlin  his  passports. 


Berlin,  August  25. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  informed  the  Ministry  K.  D. 
for  Foreign  Affairs  that,  in  accordance  with  the  Emperor's 
orders,  the  commander  of  R.M.S.  Kaiserin  Elisabeth  in  Tsingtau, 
and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  Tokyo  have  been 
informed  by  telegraph  that  this  ship  is  to  take  the  German 
side  in  any  hostilities. 

OPERATIONS  AT  KIAO-CHAU 

Tokyo,  September  15. 

The  Ministry  of  War  announces  that  Japanese  cavalry  Times, 
captured  Tsimo,  ten  miles  outside  the  Kiao-chau  zone,  on  the  SePt  I( 
I2th  instant.     There  was  no  trace  of  the  enemy  north  of  the 
River  Pi-sha,  but  their  aeroplanes  were  occasionally  sighted. 
From  other  telegrams  it  would  appear  that  the  first  encounter 
between  the  Japanese  and  German  land  forces  took  place  on 
Sunday  [September  13]  near  Tsimo,  where  there  were  a  number 
of  sharp  skirmishes  between  patrols.     A  German  aeroplane 
flew  over  the  district,  and  was  fired  upon  by  the  Japanese, 
but  without  success. — Reuter. 


405 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Tokyo,  September  16. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  Japanese  scouts  captured 
the  railway  station  at  Kiao-chau  on  the  I3th  inst. 

A  Japanese  aeroplane  dropped  bombs  on  the  barracks  at 
Tsingtau,  returning  to  safety. 

A  Japanese  destroyer  flotilla  operating  in  Laoshan  Bay 
has  driven  in  the  enemy's  patrols. — Renter. 


Tokyo,  September  20. 

The  landing  of  the  Japanese  at  Laoshan  Bay  is  officially 
announced.  The  Japanese  attacked  the  Germans  on  Thursday 
[September  17]  at  Wangkohuang,  thirteen  miles  east  of 
Tsimo.  The  enemy  were  in  a  fortified  position,  and  used 
machine-guns  in  their  defence,  but  by  sunset  they  abandoned 
their  position,  leaving  supplies,  equipment,  and  personal 
apparel. — Renter.  

Tokyo,  September  24. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  a  British  force,  under 
Brigadier-General  Barnardiston,  commanding  the  British 
forces  in  North  China  (including  Wei-hai-wei),  landed  yester- 
day in  the  neighbourhood  of  Laoshan  Bay,  so  as  to  participate 
in  the  movements  against  the  Germans  at  Tsingtau. — Renter. 


(Press  Bureau  Statement  communicated  by  Japanese 
Military  Attache) 

September  28. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  our  troops  attacked  the 
enemy,  who  were  in  occupation  of  advanced  positions  on  the 
high  ground  between  the  Rivers  Pai-sha  and  Li-tsun  ;  after 
a  slight  engagement  the  enemy  were  put  to  flight. 

On  the  27th  our  troops  occupied  the  line  along  the  right 
banks  of  the  Li-tsun  and  Chang-tsun  Rivers,  about  seven 
miles  north-east  of  Tsingtau. 


September  29. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  at  dawn,  on  the  28th  inst., 
the  Allied  Forces  operating  against  Tsingtau  began  an  attack 
on  the  advanced  positions  distant  about  4  kilometres  (2^ 
miles)  from  the  enemy's  main  line  of  defence.  In  spite  of  a 
fierce  fire  from  the  enemy  from  both  sea  and  land,  the  Allies, 
406 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

by  noon  on  the  28th  inst.,  had  driven  the  enemy  from  his 
positions,  and  had  occupied  all  the  high  ground  overlooking 
the  enemy's  main  line  of  defence. 


Tokyo,  September  29. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  the  Japanese,  in  a  day  and  Times, 
night  attack  last  Sunday,  drove  the  Germans  towards  Tsingtau.  Sept.  3< 
The  Japanese  casualties  were  150.     The  German  losses  are  I9I4 
not   known,  but  50  Germans  and  four  machine-guns  were 
captured. 

The  action  developed  more  speedily  than  was  anticipated, 
and  in  view  of  its  success  the  general  attack  is  likely  to  be 
delivered  at  an  earlier  date  than  was  at  first  thought  possible. 

The  German  gunboat  Iltis,  which  was  rendering  effective 
assistance  to  the  German  land  forces,  was  attacked  by  the 
Japanese  Fleet. 

The  Japanese  Fleet  bombarded  two  Tsingtau  forts  yester- 
day. A  British  warship  took  part  in  the  bombardment. 
One  fort  replied,  but  its  fire  was  ineffective.  The  results  of 
the  bombardment  are  not  known,  but  buildings  were 
demolished,  and  it  is  believed  that  the  barracks  and  defence 
works  were  damaged. 

The  work  of  mine-sweeping  continues  with  success, 
despite  the  fire  of  the  defenders  ashore.  One  boat  engaged 
in  the  work  was  hit,  and  two  men  were  wounded. — Renter. 


Tokyo,  September  30. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  a  portion  of  the  Japanese  Times, 
Fleet  has  landed  a  force  which  has  occupied  Laoshan  Harbour,  Oct.  i, 
in  the  vicinity  of  Tsingtau.  I9I4 

The  Japanese  captured  four  field-guns  which  had  been 
abandoned  by  the  Germans,  and  afterwards  held  the  place 
with  a  small  force. 

The  pilots  of  two  Japanese  biplanes  and  of  one  monoplane 
report  that  they  have  dropped  bombs  on  German  vessels 
from  a  height  of  700  metres. 

Although  the  wings  of  the  machines  were  riddled  with 
bullets  and  the  stem  of  one  was  broken,  all  returned  safely. — 
Renter. 

407 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Tokyo,  October  3. 

An  official  report  says  :  A  German  aeroplane  at  Tsingtau 
twice  attempted  to  attack  the  Japanese  vessels,  but  without 
result.  A  Japanese  aeroplane  pursuing  it  attacked  with 
bombs  a  captive  balloon  just  being  hauled  back  to  Tsingtau. 
It  is  not  known  what  damage  was  inflicted. 

The  German  forts  and  ships  are  constantly  shelling  the 
Japanese  Army,  which  is  slowly  preparing  for  a  big  assault  on 
Tsingtau. 

Tokyo,  October  5. 

An  official  communique  says :  German  forces  to  the 
number  of  350  at  Tsingtau  delivered  a  night  attack,  but 
were  defeated  with  a  loss  of  47  men  killed.  The  Japanese 
casualties  amounted  to  five  killed  and  eight  injured. 

The  Japanese  heavy  guns  hit  the  gunboat  Iltis,  which 
retired  after  an  exchange  of  shots. 


Berlin,  October  6. 

It  is  reported  from  Rotterdam  that  in  their  first  assault 
on  the  lines  held  by  our  troops  at  Tsingtau  the  Japanese 
and  English  allies  were  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  2500  men. 
The  effect  of  the  German  mines,  artillery,  and  machine-guns 
was  annihilating.  The  right  wing  of  the  Allies  was  heavily 
bombarded  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  cruiser  Kaiserin 
Elisabeth  and  the  German  gunboat  Jaguar.  The  German 
losses  are  reported  to  be  slight.  The  Japanese  are  awaiting 
reinforcements  from  Japan. 


Tokyo,  October  7. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  the  Japanese  arrived  at 
Tsinanfu  yesterday,  and  took  over  the  control  of  engines  and 
cars  on  the  Shantung  line.  The  Germans  have  destroyed 
several  collieries. — Reuter. 


Tokyo,  October  8. 

An  official  message  states  that  the  German  fire  at  Tsingtau 
is  slackening. 

During  the  fighting  the  rope  which  held  a  German  captive 
balloon  was  severed,  and  the  balloon  floated  away. — Reuter. 

408 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  Japanese  Commander  of  the  besieging  troops  and  P.  B., 
the  Japanese  Commander  of  the  blockading  squadron  con-  Oct.  14. 
jointly  communicated  to  the  Governor  of  Tsingtau  at  i  P.M. 
on  October  12,  by  means  of  wireless  telegraphy,  an  Imperial 
Message  desiring  to  succour  non-combatants  and  individuals 
of  neutral  Powers  in  Tsingtau. 

The  Governor  expressed  his  wish  to  agree  with  this,  and 
at  10  A.M.  on  October  13  parlementaires  from  each  side  met 
to  discuss  details  ;  as  a  result  of  this  conference  it  has  been 
settled  to  escort  to  Tientsin  on  the  I5th  instant  the  American 
Consul  and  a  certain  number  of  Chinese  subjects,  and  German 

women  and  children.     

Tokyo,  October  16. 

An  official  statement  says  that  in  the  forenoon  of  the  Times, 
I4th  instant,  a  section  of  the  naval  squadron  outside  Tsingtau  Oct.  17, 
destroyed  portions  of  the  Iltis  and  Kaiser  forts,  while  simul- 
taneously  aeroplanes  dropped  bombs.     During  the  attack  one 
British  bluejacket  was  killed,  and  two  were  wounded.     The 
Japanese  suffered  no  loss. — Reuter. 


The  War  Office  makes  the  following  announcement : 
'  His  Imperial  Highness  the  Crown  Prince  of  Japan  has,  Times, 
through  an  aide-de-camp,  delivered  a  most  gracious  message  Oct.  21, 
to  the  British  troops  operating  with  the  Japanese  forces  I9I4 
before  Tsingtau,  and  has  presented  them  with  a  gift  of  refined 
sake  (rice- wine). 

Tientsin,  October  24. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  the  Japanese  naval  heavy  Times, 

artillery  is  co-operating  with  the  land  forces  in  the  bombard-  Oct.  26, 

ment  of  Tsingtau. — Exchange  Telegraph  Company.  I9I4 

It  is  officially  announced  that  an  Indian  contingent  has  Times, 
joined  the  Anglo- Japanese  forces  before  Tsingtau.  Oct.  31, 

1914 

November  i. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  received  P.  B. 
the  following  cablegram  from  the  British   Ambassador  in 
Japan  : 

The    Japanese    War    Department    announces    that    the 
general  bombardment  of  Tsingtau  began   at  dawn  to-day 

(October  31).  

409 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Tokyo. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  the  bombardment  of  Tsingtau 
continues.  Most  of  the  German  forts  have  been  silenced. 
Only  two  of  them  reply  without  intermission  to  the  attacks 
of  the  Allies  by  sea  and  land.  The  bombardment  caused 
an  outbreak  of  fire  near  the  harbour  and  the  explosion  of  an 
oil  tank.  The  fort  Siaochausan  is  in  flames.  A  German 
gunboat  which  lost  its  funnel  is  no  longer  to  be  seen. 


Tokyo,  November  5. 

The  following  official  announcement  has  been  issued  here  : 

The  bombardment  of  Tsingtau  is  being  vigorously  con- 
tinued. 

On  the  night  of  November  3  the  Germans  made  a  counter- 
attack in  order  to  hinder  our  operations. 

The  power  house  has  been  destroyed.  The  attacking 
forces  are  gradually  closing  in,  and  our  shells  are  now  falling 
in  the  streets.  

Tokyo,  November  6. 

An  official  casualty  list  issued  here  states  that  the  British 
have  so  far  had  two  killed  and  eight  wounded,  including  two 
majors.  The  Japanese  have  had  200  killed,  and  878  wounded. 
The  bombardment  of  Tsingtau  continues.  Aeroplanes  are 
dropping  bombs  and  circulars,  warning  the  inhabitants  not 
to  participate  in  the  military  operations. — Renter. 


Tokyo,  November  7. 

It  is  officially  announced  that  Tsingtau  has  surrendered. 

The  Germans  hoisted  the  white  flag  at  seven  o'clock  in 
the  morning  on  the  Observatory.  Two  companies  of  infantry 
with  a  squad  of  sappers  captured  the  central  fort  of  the  main 
line  of  defence  at  midnight,  and  took  200  prisoners.  The 
charge  was  led  by  General  Yoshimi  Yamada. 

The  Germans  made  desperate  efforts  to  repair  the  damage 
done  to  their  batteries,  but  the  Japanese  shells  killed  the  men 
at  work  and  demolished  the  batteries  anew.  It  is  thought 
that  the  capitulation  of  the  port  was  hastened  by  stopping 
the  smuggling  of  provisions  from  the  Ling  Chan  coast. 

The  Vice-Minister  of  the  Navy,  Baron  Suzuki,  speaking 
410 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

on  the  future  of  Tsingtau,  said  :  '  Whilst  this  war  lasts 
Tsingtau  will  be  adminsistered  by  Japan.  On  its  conclusion 
Japan  will  open  negotiations  with  China/ 

There  are  general  rejoicings  throughout  Japan.  Tokyo  is 
decked  out  with  flags,  among  which  the  Union  Jack  is  pro- 
minent. A  lantern  procession  is  being  arranged  to  celebrate 
the  occasion. 

An  official  report  says  that  after  the  capture  of  the  Central 
Fort  the  left  wing  of  the  attacking  force  advanced  and 
occupied  Chan  Shan  at  ten  minutes  past  five  yesterday 
morning.  Chan  Shan  formed  the  base  of  the  right  wing  of 
the  German  line  of  defence.  Meanwhile  other  forces  captured 
the  forts  of  the  first  line  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  and  the 
dangerous  defence  works  connecting  the  forts.  Other  forces 
advanced  on  the  main  line  of  the  Iltis,  Bismarck,  and  Moltke 
Forts.  Suddenly  the  flag  of  surrender  was  run  up  in  the 
breeze  on  the  Observatory,  which  stands  on  a  hill. 

The  Japanese  casualties  in  the  final  action  were  36  killed 
and  182  wounded.  Two  British  officers  were  wounded. — 
Renter.  

The  War  Office  announces  that  the  following  telegram  Times, 
has  been  sent  to  the  Japanese  Minister  of  War,  Tokyo,  by  Nov.  10, 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  :  I9I4 

Please  accept  my  warmest  congratulations  on  the  success 
of  the  operations  against  Tsingtau.  Will  you  be  so  kind 
as  to  express  my  felicitations  to  the  Japanese  Forces  engaged  ? 
The  British  Army  is  proud  to  have  been  associated  with  its 
gallant  Japanese  comrades  in  this  enterprise,  rr 


November  8. 

According   to   an   official  report   from   Renter's   Agency  K.D., 
in  Tokyo,  Tsingtau   fell   on  the  morning  of  November  7,  Nov.  8, 
after  a  heroic  defence.     Fuller  details  are  still  lacking.  19*4 

The  Deputy  Chief  of  the  Admiral  Staff, 
BEHNCKE. 


Tokyo,  November  10. 

It  is  officially  stated  that  the  Japanese  losses  during  the  Times, 
final  assault  on  the  fortress  from  the  evening  of  Friday  to  Nov- 
the  morning  of  Saturday  amounted  to  14  officers  wounded 

411 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

and  426  men  killed  and  wounded.  The  British  casualties 
were  I  man  killed  and  i  man  wounded.  Two  thousand 
three  hundred  prisoners  were  taken. — Renter. 


Amsterdam,  November  12. 

A  Berlin  telegram  states  that  the  Governor  of  Tsingtau, 
through  the  Japanese  Legation  at  Peking,  sent  the  following 
telegram  to  the  German  Emperor  : 

Tsingtau,  November  9. 

After  exhausting  all  its  means  of  defence,  the  fortress, 
which  was  stormed  and  broken  through  in  the  centre,  fell. 
The  fortress  and  the  town  were  badly  damaged  by  28-centi- 
metre howitzer  fire  and  a  strong  bombardment  from  the  sea. 
The  force  of  our  artillery  was  completely  overcome. 

Our  losses  have  not  yet  been  ascertained,  but  in  spite  of 
the  heavy  fire  they  are  less  than  we  expected. 

MEYER-WALDECK. 


November  25. 

According  to  the  news  available  up  till  to-day  the  number 
of  prisoners  belonging  to  the  garrison  taken  during  the 
fights  at  Tsingtau  and  at  the  fall  of  the  fortress  amounts 
to  about  4250,  including  600  wounded.  The  number  of 
killed  is  said  to  be  about  170,  among  whom  are  6  officers. 
On  board  the  Austro-Hungarian  cruiser  Kaiserin  Elisabeth, 
i  lieutenant  and  8  men  are  wounded,  and  8  men  killed. 

The  treatment  of  the  prisoners  in  Japan  is  said  to  be  good. 

The  Japanese  Government  expects  to  supply  lists  of  names 
of  the  dead,  wounded,  and  prisoners  at  an  early  date. 


STATEMENT  ISSUED  BY  THE  JAPANESE  GOVERN- 
MENT FOR  THE  TIMES 

Notwithstanding  the  Japanese  Ultimatum  to  Germany  of 
See  August  15,  1914,  *  warlike  preparations  were  pursued  steadily 

tilitary.i,  anc[  rapidly  at  Kiao-Chau,  while  all  Japanese  subjects  resid- 
•  292  ing  in  that  port  were  ordered  to  leave  it.  Furthermore,  no 
imes  reply  was  forthcoming  from  Germany  at  the  expiration  of 
uPppiement  the  JaPan^se  Ultimatum.  On  and  from  that  moment  the 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

diplomatic  relations  of  Germany  and  Japan  ceased,  and  on 
the  afternoon  of  that  day  the  Japanese  Declaration  of  War 
was  issued  by  the  Mikado  against  Germany. 

Thereupon  the  Emperor,  the  Great  Field-Marshal  of  the 
Japanese  Army,  solemnly  promulgated  the  following  Order  for 
warlike  operations  with  the  purpose  of  capturing  Kiao-Chau  : 
To  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  i8th  Independent  Division, 
The  Lieutenant-General  Kamio ;   Chief  of  the  Staff, 
Major-General  Yamanasi. 

The  i8th  Division  : — 

The  23rd  Infantry  Brigade,  under  Major-General  Horiuchi ; 
the  24th  Infantry  Brigade,  led  by  Major-General  Yamada ;  the 
22nd  Cavalry  Regiment ;  the  24th  Field  Artillery  Regiment ; 
the  i8th  Battalion  of  Engineers  ;  the  Independent  Battalion 
of  Engineers ;  the  Divisional  Commissariat ;  the  Siege  Battery 
Corps,  led  by  Major-General  Watanabe  ;  the  Railway  Regi- 
ment ;  the  Aeronautical  Corps,  and  the  Canteen  Department. 

The  main  force  of  the  i8th  Independent  Division  was 
composed  of  men  of  the  island  of  Kiushu,  famed  for  their 
traditional 'dauntless  and  deathless  deeds  in  ancient  times. 
These  forces  assembled  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Nagasaki  and 
Hirosima,  and  on  and  after  August  28,  1914,  they  started 
from  Nagasaki  and  Ujima  for  their  memorable  campaign. 

On  September  2  the  first  corps  arrived,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Japanese  Navy,  in  the  vicinity  of  Ryuhkau,  a  small 
port  on  the  northern  coast  of  the  Shantung  Peninsula,  where 
the  first  landing  took  place.  Owing  to  terrible  storms 
the  further  landing  of  the  troops  had  to  be  postponed  to 
September  4. 

Major-General  Yamada,  whose  section  was  the  first  to  be 
landed,  advanced  on  September  2  with  a  detachment  far 
ahead  of  the  main  force  with  the  definite  object  of  occupying 
the  neighbourhood  of  Heitaku,  in  the  pass  of  the  same  name. 
The  incessant  rain  for  days  and  days  had,  however,  flooded 
the  rivers  and  streams  of  Shantung,  converting  all  the  roads 
into  temporary  ma*shes  in  which  the  mud  was  knee-deep. 
It  was  found  almost  impossible  to  carry  forward  not  only 
the  guns,  but  also  the  baggage  and  the  commissariat  wagons. 
At  last,  on  September  n,  the  foremost  detachment  managed 
to  reach  Heitaku,  and  were  followed  in  succession  by  the 
whole  of  the  forces  three  days  later. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

The  Cavalry  Regiment  had  occupied  Sokuboku  on 
September  14,  and  on  the  i8th  exchanged  fire  with  the 
Germans  garrisoned  on  the  left  bank  of  Hakushaka  River. 
It  was  then  discovered  as  a  result  of  this  encounter  that  a 
hostile  Cavalry  force  was  stationed  at  Jokosan,  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  river,  and  that  a  certain  number  of  the  German 
Infantry  and  Cavalry  Forces,  supplied  with  guns,  were  occupy- 
ing Kutauho  and  Senkasai.  Captain  Sakuma  was  killed  at 
the  head  of  his  Company  in  this  encounter. 

Meanwhile  the  Division  continued  to  disembark.  But, 
owing  to  the  stormy  weather  and  other  considerations,  a 
certain  detachment  was  ordered  to  land  near  Rohsan  Bay, 
north-east  of  the  Tsingtau  Forts.  Major-General  Horiuchi, 
commanding  half  of  his  brigade,  steered  as  far  as  the  Rohsan 
Bay  from  Ryuhkau,  while  the  remainder  of  his  force  con- 
tinued to  disembark  at  Ryuhkau.  These  started  from  their 
respective  quarters  for  Sokuboku. 

The  Horiuchi  Detachment  reached  the  port  of  Rohsan  on 
September  18.  Helped  by  the  Navy,  it  commenced  the  land- 
ing on  that  day  and  completed  it  on  the  same  evening. 

Subsequently  the  detachment  successfully  dispersed  an 
enemy  force  occupying  camps  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Seki- 
jinka  and  Ohkashoh.  On  the  same  day  the  German  Main 
Force  concentrated  at  Ohkashoh,  and  on  the'  following  day, 
September  19,  our  men  again  drove  off  the  enemy  garrisoned 
near  Ryuhjudai  and  occupied  the  position  on  the  same 
evening.  On  September  20  the  Japanese  Force  remained  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  same  position  and  prepared  for  its  next 
move. 

The  Yamada  detachment  had  triumphantly  arrived  at 
Sokuboku  on  September  19,  and  on  the  following  day  it  again 
occupied  the  lines  of  Ranka-Kohfun  and  Nakamura,  two 
miles  and  a  half  from  Sokuboku.  Our  main  force  which 
marched  from  Ryuhkau  against  Sokuboku  reached  its  neigh- 
bourhood, courageously  surmounting  all  sorts  of  difficulties 
and  impediments,  and  there  completed  its  concentration. 
By  that  time  various  reports  from  the  Air  Corps  and  other 
sources  confirmed  the  fact  that  the  first  German  outpost  was 
stationed  along  extensive  lines  from  Rohsango  and  neigh- 
bourhood as  far  as  the  vicinity  of  Ryuhkau  through  Kokken 
on  the  east. 
414 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

In  the  place  occupied  by  the  Horiuchi  Brigade  a  German 
force  some  300  strong,  provided  with  machine-guns,  had, 
on  the  morning  of  the  23rd,  attacked  our  position  on  the 
height  east  of  Hokka,  which  is  a  point  two  miles  and  a  half 
north-west  of  Ryuhkau,  and  was  effectively  repulsed. 

On  the  25th  the  Japanese  Forces  reconnoitred  the  posi- 
tions of  the  enemy,  and  prepared  for  the  attack  upon  him, 
which  began  at  3  P.M.  on  the  following  day.  The  fighting 
lasted  for  three  hours  and  a  half,  and  at  6.30  on  the  same 
day  a  hostile  company  stationed  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Anbu,  south  of  Kokken,  was  routed  from  its  positions. 
Simultaneously  the  Germans  in  front  of  the  Horiuchi  Brigade 
retired  from  their  post.  Nevertheless,  the  enemy  stationed 
on  the  heights  south  of  Rohsango  offered  us  a  stubborn  re- 
sistance, and  did  not  retreat  that  day.  Before  the  dawn 
of  the  following  day,  however,  he  was  forced  reluctantly  to 
retreat.  Thus  the  invading  Japanese  Division  had,  by  the 
morning  of  the  27th,  occupied  the  whole  lines  extending  from 
the  mouth  of  Rison  River  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Kinkarei, 
east  of  Fuzan,  via  the  heights  south  of  Risonshu.  During 
this  severe  fight  three  of  the  German  warships  vehemently 
bombarded  the  right  flank  of  our  Division,  while  the  utmost 
possible  efforts  were  made  to  impede  the  onward  move  of 
our  Army  by  a  cannonade  with  shrapnel  shells  from  the 
outposts  at  Fuzan  and  Kozan. 

With  the  object  of  capturing  the  advanced  hostile  camps 
along  the  lines  of  Fuzan  and  Kozan,  the  Japanese  Division 
marched  all  night,  thus  coming  close  up  to  the  German 
positions  on  September  27.  The  force  of  the  Yamada  Brigade 
and  that  of  Horiuchi  formed  the  right  and  left  flanks  respec- 
tively, while  our  field  artillery  occupied  the  heights  south  of 
Nansheh.  It  was  a  lovely  moonlight  night.  Fuzan  Hill  is 
a  steep  precipice  of  rock,  occupied  by  a  very  strong  German 
detachment.  On  our  left  wing  our  commander  first  tried  to 
gain  the  heights  by  despatching  a  portion  of  the  force — a 
company  chosen  from  among  the  46th  Infantry  Regiment,  led 
by  Captain  Satow,  which  advanced  under  exceptionally 
violent  rifle  and  gun  fire.  It  was  here  that  our  brave  soldier, 
Captain  Satow,  fell,  to  be  followed  by  his  lieutenant,  while 
the  whole  of  the  little  company  were  within  an  inch  of  anni- 
hilation, from  which  it  was  only  saved  by  its  superhuman 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

valour.  But  nothing  daunted  it.  The  enemy's  forts  and  posi- 
tions were  triumphantly  carried  at  last.  More  than  thirty 
courageous  Germans  were  here  captured  as  prisoners  of  war. 

On  the  morning  of  September  28,  1914,  the  left  wing  of 
the  Japanese  Army  began  the  advance  to  assume  a  fresh 
offensive,  followed  almost  immediately  by  the  right  wing. 
The  Army  successfully  occupied  the  whole  of  the  frontal  lines 
of  Fuzan  and  Kozan  by  noon  of  the  same  day. 

Before  this  the  British  Government  despatched  the  British 
garrison  stationed  in  Tientsin  to  join  the  Japanese  besieging 
Army  of  Tsingtau,  the  Commander-in-Chief  being  Major- 
General  Barnardiston,  who  led  his  troops,  landing  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Rohsan  Bay  and  Ohkashoh  on  September 
23.  On  the  very  day  (September  28)  when  the  Japanese 
Army  occupied  the  front  of  Fuzan  and  Kozan  he  reached 
Yohkagun,  where  his  troops  served  as  a  reserve  for  our  forces. 

Since  September  28  both  the  Japanese  and  British  Forces, 
occupying  almost  all  the  frontal  lines  extending  from  Fuzan 
to  Kozan  regions,  made  various  preparations  to  attack  and 
capture  the  main  defence  of  the  Tsingtau  Forts. 

The  Japanese  Army,  face  to  face  with  the  German  forces 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  river  Kaihaku,  endeavoured  to 
concentrate  heavy  guns,  and  to  advance  for  the  offensive. 
Through  repeated  reconnoitring  it  was  found  that  the  enemy's 
main  defensive  lines  extended  from  the  heights  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  river  Kaihaku  to  Tausan  through  the  tablelands 
east  of  Daitau.  The  whole  lines  were  found  to  be  strongly 
fortified,  with  several  hundreds  of  guns  behind  them  all. 
Even  after  the  battle  of  September  28  the  Germans  did  not 
cease,  day  or  night,  to  bombard  our  lines  from  the  various 
forts  along  the  left  bank  of  the  river  Kaihaku  as  well  as  from 
within  Tsingtau  Bay. 

At  9.30  P.M.  on  October  2,  the  enemy  infantry, 
350  strong,  with  half  a  dozen  machine-guns,  led  by  the 
former  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  German  Garrison  in 
Tientsin,  Colonel  Kuhlau,  made  a  night  attack  upon  a  small 
outpost  patrol  stationed  at  Sihohsan  in  the  right  front  of 
our  right  wing.  Helped  by  two  machine-guns,  our  men 
successfully  repulsed  the  enemy  at  last  by  10.30  P.M.  The 
enemy  left  behind  him  one  officer  and  forty-seven  men  killed, 
while  six  were  made  prisoners. 
416 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  3rd  Japanese  Heavy  Siege  Artillery  Regiment, 
occupying  the  camps  near  Kozan,  lay  in  wait  for  the  approach 
of  the  enemy  gunboat  Iltis  at  10.30  A.M.  on  October  4,  and 
drove  her  off  by  a  concentrated  cannonade.  This  made  it 
difficult  for  the  hostile  warships  to  approach  again  the  right 
wing  of  our  Army.  Before  this  the  2Qth  Infantry  Brigade 
which  left  Sizuoka  and  Hamamatsu  in  the  Main  Island  of 
Japan  in  order  to  join  the  Tsingtau  fight,  had  reached  its 
destination  and  begun  to  land  at  Rohsan  Bay  on  October  10. 
Next  day  it  advanced  against  Kiao-Chau  Bay,  where  a  portion 
of  the  brigade  joined  the  right  wing  of  the  besieging  army, 
while  its  main  force  was  stationed  at  Iken  and  its  neighbour- 
hood in  a  westerly  direction. 

During  the  three  days  beginning  October  10,  hostile 
aeroplanes  hovered  above  our  Army,  while  the  Japanese 
airmen  hindered  the  movements  of  the  enemy's  aircraft. 
Especially  on  the  I3th  an  interesting  and  thrilling  aerial 
fight  was  fought  between  the  German  and  Japanese  flying 
machines,  which  resulted  in  the  former's  airmen  hurriedly 
retreating  towards  the  Tsingtau  town. 

For  fifteen  days  beginning  September  29,  the  Germans 
continued  a  fierce  and  incessant  artillery  fire  against  our 
Army,  after  which  the  cannonade  became  intermittent  and 
slow. 

On  October  16  an  extraordinarily  violent  rain  storm 
hindered  the  movement  of  both  contending  forces.  On  the 
morning  of  the  2ist  a  hostile  infantry  patrol,  some  thirty 
strong,  endeavoured  to  attack  a  small  Japanese  patrol, 
stationed  at  the  height  north  of  Fuzansho,  which  the  latter 
repulsed.  Meanwhile  on  the  22nd  half  an  Indian  Battalion 
belonging  to  the  36th  Sikh  Regiment  landed  at  Rohsan 
Bay. 

Thus  the  i8th  Japanese  Independent  Division,  which 
had  Been  preparing  with  patient  perseverance  for  the  great 
attack  on  Tsingtau  Fortress,-  having  been  exposed  to  the 
daily  bombardment  of  the  hostile  forces,  had,  on  October 
29,  advanced  its  besieging  lines  from  1500  to  2000  metres 
nearer  to  the  enemy's  front.  The  main  force  of  the  2gth 
Infantry  Brigade,  under  the  command  of  Major-General 
Johohji,  was  added  to  the  extreme  right  flank  of  the  first 
front  line. 

MILITARY  2  2  D  417 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

The  distribution  and  formation  of  the  invading  army  was 
as  follows  : 

The  Right  Wing,  the  main  force  of  which  was  composed 
of  the  Johohji  Brigade  ;  the  First  Central  Force  (the  British 
Force)  ;  the  Second  Central  Force  (the  Yamada  Brigade). 

The  Left  Wing  (the  Horiuchi  Brigade)  ;  while  the  Heavy 
Siege  Artillery  Regiment  was  distributed  at  the  foot  of  Shoh- 
Kozan,  Suiseikoh  and  neighbourhood,  Hokuson,  as  well  as 
Kabaseki  and  neighbourhood. 

The  preparations  of  the  invading  army  having  been  thor- 
oughly completed,  the  most  auspicious  day  was  chosen- 
October  31 — in  honour  of  the  celebration  of  the  Mikado's 
birthday,  to  commence  the  bombardment  by  the  siege  artillery. 
At  the  hour  when  the  summit  of  Mount  Fusan  was  just  dimly 
tinged  with  the  first  pale  light  of  the  dawn  our  siege  artillery 
gunners  began  their  simultaneous  cannonade.  Hundreds  of 
thousands  of  deafening  thunderbolts  seemed  simultaneously 
to  shake  the  earth*  amidst  the  glare  of  terrific  lightning  flashes. 
Volume  after  volume  of  the  darkening  shell-smoke  spread 
densely  over  each  of  the  enemy  forts,  a  deadly  pall  which 
was  wellnigh  heartrending  even  for  mere  spectators.  Indeed, 
the  intensity  of  horror  that  formed  the  atmosphere  of  the 
whole  scene  of  tremendous  and  destructive  violence  baffles 
expression. 

Suddenly  at  7  A.M.  an  immensely  thick  column  of  black 
smoke  rose  like  a  huge  tower  into  the  mid-sky  from  the  great 
port  of  Tsingtau.  The  enormous  oil  stores  of  the  German 
dockyard  had  exploded !  On  the  Iltis  Fortress  not  only  the 
heavy  guns  of  our  army,  but  also  the  severe  cannonade  from 
the  Japanese  Fleet  concentrated  their  combined  fire,  so  that 
by  noon  of  the  same  day  it  was  irretrievably  damaged,  as  was 
also  the  Tohsan  Fortress.  The  enemy  fire  in  response  to 
ours  was  quite  feeble. 

The  first  day  of  November  opened  with  the  steady  main- 
tenance of  our  terrific  bombardment.  The  fire  concentrated 
both  on  the  Fort  of  Daitohchin  and  the  Central  Fortress 
proved  exceptionally  effective.  On  the  same  evening  an 
Austrian  warship  emerged  at  a  point  some  7000  metres  off 
the  west  of  the  huge  mole  of  Tsingtau  and  bombarded  our 
right  flank,  only  to  be  driven  off  by  the  Japanese  Heavy 
Artillery  Regiment.  The  whole  day  of  November  2  saw 
418 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

again  the  continuation  of  severe  bombardment  by  our  Army, 
which  succeeded  in  occupying  almost  all  the  front  lines 
extending  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Sihoh  to  that  of  Fusansho. 

There  was  again  a  tremendous  storm  on  November  3,  with 
the  resultant  inundation  of  all  the  attacking  camps.  Many 
landslips  occurred,  causing  great  difficulties  to  the  offensive 
operations.  To  make  the  matter  worse,  moreover,  the  lower- 
ing dense  clouds  completely  overshadowed  the  whole  of  the 
forts  in  Tsingtau.  The  bombardment  was  seriously  hampered. 
On  the  same  night  one  of  our  lines  approached  close  to  the 
enemy,  and  succeeded,  by  dawn  of  the  following  day,  in  occupy- 
ing the  German  positions  for  a  length  of  500  metres,  west 
of  Fusansho,  after  carrying  the  heights  from  Pompusho  as 
far  as  those  east  of  Yuhkasho.  On  November  5,  the  enemy's 
resistance  grew  extremely  active ;  but  all  the  forces  of  our 
first  line  pressed  the  enemy  more  and  more,  so  that  the  same 
night  saw  nearly  all  the  offensive  camps  of  our  army  advanced 
to  the  wire  entanglements,  right  before  his  outer  trenches  in 
front  of  the  forts.  There  we  entrenched. 

On  November  6  our  first  line  increased  the  pressure  against 
the  enemy  camps.  The  following  shows  how  the  fighting 
developed  along  the  whole  line. 

The  right  front  of  the  Second  Central  Force,  which  was 
commissioned  to  attack  the  enemy  Central  Fort,  found  that, 
on  the  night  of  November  6,  his  defensive  fighting  was  not 
as  energetic  as  it  used  to  be.  Especially  his  outposts  had 
shown  perceptible  weakness.  Our  Brigade  started  at  once 
for  the  destruction  of  the  first  German  trench  before  the 
Central  Fortress.  Without  meeting  any  particular  resist- 
ance on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  we  succeeded  in  destroying 
three  lines  of  barbed  wire  entanglement  one  after  another  ; 
and  at  half-past  i  in  the  morning  of  November  7  the  Japanese 
Army  captured  the  fort,  together  with  200  prisoners. 

The  moment  the  German  Central  Fortress  was  captured 
by  the  Japanese  all  other  forts,  which  hitherto  maintained 
strict  silence,  opened  fire  simultaneously,  concentrating  their 
bombardment  upon  the  newly  captured  fort.  The  Japanese 
detachment  which  occupied  it  had  therefore  sustained  a  loss 
of  a  few  dozen  men  killed  and  wounded.  The  right  wing 
of  our  Second  Central  Force  advanced  furiously  against  the 
eastern  Fortress  of  Dpitohchin  amid  the  showers  of  shells  and 

419 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

bullets  from  the  enemy,  and  thus  sustained  a  number  of 
losses  in  killed  and  wounded.  Nothing  could,  however,  stop 
the  onrush  of  our  men,  nor  daunt  their  reckless  valour.  The 
fortress  fell  into  our  hands  at  5  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  7th.  "Z* 

Before  this  our  left  wing  under  General  Horiuchi,  whose 
task  was  to  capture  the  Northern  Fort  of  Shoh-Tohsan,  seized 
the  well-timed  opportunity  as  the  fight  of  our  Second  Central 
Force  developed  ;  and  carried  out  the  onrush  at  about  5  A.M. 
on  the  7th  and  captured  it  at  once. 

Our  right  wing,  which  advanced  against  the  Coastal 
Fortress  of  the  enemy's  extreme  left  flank,  met  with  a  most 
stubborn  resistance  from  the  Germans,  sustaining  serious 
losses.  Assisted  by  our  Artillery  Regiment,  it  was  just  about 
to  commence  its  well-known  charge  against  the  enemy  when, 
at  7  A.M.,  the  Germans  hoisted  a  white  flag  and  surrendered. 

The  British  force  continued  its  attack.  A  section  of  its 
troops  rushed  into  the  Fort  of  Daitohchin  at  about  6.30  A.M., 
and  was  followed  by  its  main  force  soon  afterwards. 

The  Japanese  Heavy  Siege  Artillery,  Field  Artillery,  and 
the  Naval  Heavy  Artillery  Regiments  continued  for  some  days 
a  violent  and  effective  bombardment  against  the  enemy's 
forts,  seriously  damaging  or  completely  destroying  them, 
and  thus  rendered  effective  assistance  to  the  attack  of  our 
Infantry  and  Engineer  Forces.  Meanwhile  our  Aerial  Corps 
incessantly  sent  out  the  flying  machines,  and  did  invaluable 
reconnoitring  work,  as  well  as  participating  in  the  fight  from 
mid  air. 

Such  was  the  progress  of  the  Tsingtau  battles  ;  during 
half  an  hour  from  7  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  November  7 
all  the  forts  of  Kiao-Chau  fell  one  after  the  other  in  quick 
succession,  and  we  saw  a  white  flag  flying  high  above  the 
Observation  Tower.  Subsequently  the  enemy's  military  envoy 
appeared  with  his  suite  at  the  north-eastern  end  of  Tsingtau 
town.  The  Japanese  envoy,  Major  Kashii,  interviewed  him 
at  Toh-Gogason  at  9.20  A.M.,  when  he  received  a  letter  of  sur- 
render from  the  German  Governor-General,  Waldeck. 

On  the  evening  of  the  same  day  Major-General  Yamanashi 
and  Commander  Takahashi,  the  Japanese  Envoys  Plenipo- 
tentiary, proceeded  to  the  Moltke  Barrack  and  interviewed 
the  German  Envoy  Plenipotentiary,  Colonel  Zacksell.  At  7 
420 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

P.M.  the  capitulation  of  Tsingtau  was  signed  and  sealed 
between  them.  Before  the  bombardment,  however,  a  special 
message  was  sent  through  the  wireless  to  the  German  Head- 
quarters in  Tsingtau  conveying  the  Mikado's  will  to  save 
and  succour  non-combatants.  Hence,  all  the  women  and 
children  were  transferred  from  the  seat  of  war  as  far  as  to 
Tientsin. 

The  following  shows  the  number  of  casualties  on  both 
sides,  together  with  the  number  of  prisoners  of  war,  guns, 
rifles,  and  other  munitions  captured  by  the  Japanese  Army  : — 

THE  JAPANESE  ARMY 

Killed  and  died  of  wounds  (officers  and  men)  .  .  416 
Wounded  .......  ,V^;  1542 

THE  GERMAN  ARMY 

Killed  (officers  and  men)  .         .  .>  .  n.^o  v-  210 

Wounded        .         .         .         .  .  .         .  -..  550 

Died  of  illness           .         .         .  «  .         .  .  150 
Prisoners  of  War  : — 

Officers l.r  :  .  •  .  .  201 

Non-commissioned  officers  and  men  .  ^  ,.  ,.,  ^4366 

Others  122 


Total  German  Prisoners        .         .       '^         .     4689 

Spoils  of  War  : — 
Rifles. — 30,000. 

Ammunition. — 5,000,000  rounds. 
Machine-guns. — 45 . 
Guns  of  varying  calibre. — 150. 
Ammunition  for  same. — 55,400  rounds. 
Explosives. — 120  cases. 
Motor-cars. — 76. 
Horses. — 500. 

On  the  occasion  of  the  fall  of  Tsingtau,  the  Great  Field- 
Marshal  His  Majesty  the  Mikado  of  Japan  issued  the  following 
Message  to  his  Army  and  Navy  who  had  participated  in  the 
campaign  : — 

'  Tsingtau  was  the   military  base  of  the  enemy  in  East 

421 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Asia,  whose  defensive  works  on  land  and  water  were  not  at 
all  to  be  despised. 

'  Our  Army  and  Navy  which  participated  in  the  siege 
courageously  co-operated  with  each  other  from  the  first  with 
admirable  discipline,  and  succeeded  in  capturing  the  German 
forts  and  sinking  their  warships.  The  object  of  the  war  is 
attained  with  the  fall  of  the  enemy's  stronghold.  We  hereby 
express  our  satisfaction  with  the  manner  in  which  you  all, 
officers  and  men,  have  ably  fulfilled  the  heavy  task  imposed 
upon  you  and  achieved  great  and  meritorious  deeds.' 

General  Kamio  replied  :— 

'  For  the  fall  of  Tsingtau  forts  achieved  by  our  Division 
through  your  Majesty's  illustrious  dignity,  we  now  are 
favoured  with  the  gracious  Imperial  Message  and  are  thereby 
filled  with  gratitude  to  your  Imperial  Majesty. 

'  I,  Mitsuomi,  your  Majesty's  humble  servant,  represent- 
ing all  our  Division,  beg  herewith  tremblingly  to  tender  our 
most  sincere  thanks  to  your  Imperial  Majesty.' 


THE  BRITISH  AT  TSINGTAU 
DESPATCHES  FROM  BRIGADIER-GENERAL.  IN  COMMAND 

No.  i 

Brigadier-General  N.  W.  Barnardiston,  M.V.O., 
to  the  War  Office. 

Investing  Line  before  Tsingtau, 
October  9,  1914. 

SIR, — I  have  the  honour  to  report  that  the  force  under 
my  command  embarked  at  Tientsin  on  the  I9th  September  in 
the  hired  transports  Kwang  Ping,  Shao  Shing,  and  Shuntien, 
and,  escorted  from  Taku  Bar  by  H.M.S.  Triumph  and  the 
torpedo-boat  destroyer  Usk,  arrived  at  Wei-hai-wei  at  2.15 
P.M.  on  2oth  September. 

The  number  of  mules  necessary  to  complete  our  require- 
ments in  transport,  which  had  been  purchased  by  Captain 
Knaggs,  Indian  Army,  were  there  embarked,  that  officer 
offering  valuable  assistance  both  there  and  also  on  disem- 
barkation at  Lao  Shan  Bay. 
422 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  s.s.  Shenking,  chartered  by  the  Naval  authorities  as 
a  hospital  carrier,  for  conveyance  of  sick  and  wounded  to 
Wei-hai-wei,  joined  us,  and  the  whole  left  at  4  P.M.  on 
2ist  September. 

Before  leaving,  I  inspected  the  arrangements  made  by 
Captain  House,  R.N.,  and  Fleet-Surgeon  Clarke,  on  the 
hospital  carrier,  and  also  on  shore  for  the  reception  of  the  sick 
and  wounded.  These  two  officers,  especially  the  last  named, 
deserve  the  greatest  credit  for  the  excellent  arrangements 
made  to  meet  all  our  requirements. 

Lao  Shan  Bay  was  reached  at  2  P.M.  on  22nd  September,  and 
arrangements  were  made  with  H.M.S.  Triumph,  the  Japanese 
Navy,  and  the  Military  Disembarkation  Authorities  for  the 
disembarkation  of  the  Force  on  the  following  day. 

Accordingly  on  23rd  September,  the  2nd  Bn.  South  Wales 
Borderers  disembarked  at  8  A.M.,  followed  by  stores,  ponies, 
mules  and  carts,  etc.  The  men  worked  hard  and  cheerfully 
at  landing  and  stacking  stores,  etc.,  and  the  entire  disem- 
barkation was  accomplished  by  6  A.M.  on  24th  September, 
with  the  exception  of  Base  stores  not  immediately  required, 
which  were  left  on  board  the  s.s.  Kwang  Ping  in  anticipation 
of  a  change  of  Base  to  Shatzukou  Bay,  within  about  ten  miles 
of  the  lines  of  investment. 

The  24th  September  was  spent  in  transferring  stores  from 
landing  place  to  Base  Supply  Depot. 

I  sent  Major  H.  G.  Pringle,  General  Staff,  to  Chimo,  to 
ascertain  the  wishes  of  the  Japanese  Commander-in-Chief, 
who,  I  was  informed,  had  just  arrived  at  that  place. 

I  despatched  Captain  C.  D.  Hamilton  Moore,  D.A.A.  and 
Q.M.G.,  to  reconnoitre  two  roads  over  the  Lao  Shan  Range, 
by  which  I  thought  I  could  move  the  force  towards  the  left 
of  the  line  of  investment,  which  would  be  the  most  convenient 
position  for  purposes  of  supply,  as  my  transport  was  only 
sufficient  to  carry  four  days'  rations. 

One  of  these  roads  was  found  to  be  quite  unsuitable  and 
the  other  only  possible  with  a  complete  reorganisation  of  the 
transport,  using  pack  mules  or  coolies  over  the  worst  parts  of 
the  Pass,  and  man-handling  such  carts  as  were  necessary  for 
use  on  the  farther  side. 

I  was  prepared  to  make  this  reorganisation  if  necessary. 

On  arrival,  however,  on  the  25th,  at  Pu-li,  about  six  miles 

423 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

from  Lao  Shan  Bay,  I  learned  that  the  Japanese  Commander 
wished  to  use  the  Force  under  my  command  in  the  centre  of 
the  line,  and  he  desired  me,  therefore,  to  march  via  Chimo 
and  Liuting  towards  Litsun. 

I  also  gathered  that  the  Japanese  plan  of  operations  was 
to  advance  south  from  Chimo  on  27th  and  28th,  and  to  attack 
on  2Qth  and  3Oth  the  German  advanced  line,  extending  from 
Prince  Henry  Hill  to  Ka  Shan,  in  order  that  siege  material 
might  be  brought  up  to  bombard  the  main  position  in  front 
of  Tsingtau. 

To  comply  with  the  wishes  of  the  Japanese  Commander 
implied  a  very  heavy  strain  on  my  transport,  and  probably 
very  short  rations,  as  it  implied  a  line  of  communications 
nearly  forty  miles  in  length,  over  a  single,  bad,  narrow  and 
congested  road,  or  rather  track. 

It  was  essential,  however,  to  make  the  effort,  and  I 
decided  to  do  so,  even  if  we  had  to  exist  on  half  rations. 

On  the  26th  September  the  Force  marched  to  Chimo, 
about  thirteen  miles,  where  it  arrived  at  11.30  A.M.,  the  trans- 
port arriving  later  in  the  afternoon,  and  a  convoy  of  supplies 
from  the  Base  about  n  P.M.,  after  experiencing  the  greatest 
difficulties,  owing  to  the  blocked  roads. 

I  consider  that  the  officers  and  others  concerned  deserve 
the  greatest  credit  for  accomplishing  what  seemed  an  almost 
insuperable  task,  and  I  desire  specially  to  bring  to  notice  the 
excellent  services  rendered  by  Captain  Don,  Indian  Supply 
and  Transport  Corps. 

To  the  men,  the  marches,  although  not  long,  were  very 
trying,  owing  to  the  constant  halts  and  checks  owing  to  the 
road  being  blocked  by  Japanese  artillery  and  transport,  but, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  cases  of  fever,  no  men  fell  out. 

On  arrival  at  Chimo  my  supply  difficulties  were  greatly 
lessened  by  the  offer  of  the  Japanese  military  authorities  to 
use  their  transport  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  an  advanced 
supply  depot  at  Chimo,  from  which  point  our  own  transport 
would  be  able  to  work  forward  to  the  refilling  point. 

On  the  27th  the  force  moved  on  about  nine  miles  to  Liuting 
and  halted.  I  rode  on  to  Divisional  Headquarters,  where  I 
was  received  very  cordially  by  Lieut. -General  Kamio,  the 
Japanese  Commander-in-Chief,  who  gave  me  an  outline  of  the 
following  day's  operations,  in  which  we  were  to  take  part. 
424 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

On  the  28th,  in  accordance  with  his  orders,  the  force  pro- 
ceeded towards  Litsun  with  a  view  of  participating  in  the 
attack  on  the  German  advanced  position,  which  was  then 
being  reconnoitred  by  the  Japanese  troops. 

The  Germans  holding  the  position  retired,  however,  before 
the  Japanese  advanced  troops,  who  occupied  the  position 
which  it  was  General  Kamio's  intention  to  have  assaulted  on 
the  following  night  and  morning. 

The  force  under  my  command  was  therefore  not  engaged, 
and  marched  on  to  a  village  about  two  and  a  half  miles  in 
rear  of  the  Japanese  line,  where  it  bivouacked. 

This  position,  however,  proved  to  be  unsuitable,  as  we 
were  exposed  to  the  enemy's  artillery  fire,  luckily  without 
suffering  any  casualties  ;  but  on  the  3oth  September  I  moved 
the  force  to  the  reverse  slopes  of  a  hill  about  one  mile  to  the 
eastward  of  our  former  position,  where  the  men  were  under 
cover,  and  were  able  to  make  splinter-proof  shelters. — I 
have,  etc., 

N.  W.  BARNARDISTON,  Brigadier-General, 
Commanding  Tsingtau  Expeditionary  Force. 


No.  2 

Brigadier-General  N.  W.  Barnardiston,  M.V.O., 
to  the  War  Office. 

Investing  Lines  before  Tsingtau, 
October  29,  1914. 

SIR, — In  continuation  of  my  despatch  dated  gth  instant,  I 
have  the  honour  to  report  that  on  the  loth  instant  I  received 
orders  from  the  Japanese  Commander  to  the  effect  that  the 
Force  under  my  command  was  to  take  its  place  in  the  front 
line  of  the  investing  force,  a  front  of  about  600  yards  being 
assigned  to  us. 

Accordingly,  on  the  nth  instant  I  directed  the  Officer 
Commanding  2nd  Bn.  South  Wales  Borderers  to  take  up, 
with  two  companies,  a  line  running  approximately  north- 
west and  south-west  through  a  point  a  little  north  of  Point 
177  on  Shuang  Shan,  furnishing  two  piquets  with  their 
supports  and  a  local  reserve.  The  remaining  companies  of 
the  2nd  Bn.  South  Wales  Borderers  were  distributed  in  such 

425 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

nullahs,    south   of   Huang-Chia-Ving,    as   afforded   the   best 
cover  from  shell  fire. 

2.  The  range  of  heights  forming  the  position  of  the  line 
of  investment,  south  of  that  village,  with  their  under-features, 
is  intersected  by  numerous  deep  ravines  of  clay,  excellent 
for  protection  and  accommodation  in  dry  weather.     In  wet 
weather,  however,  such  as  we  have  been  unfortunately  ex- 
periencing, the  loose  soil  is  washed  away,  the  sides  of  the 
nullahs  fall  in,  carrying  with  them  the  shelters  for  the  troops  ; 
every  valley  becomes  a  torrent  and  every  road  or  track  a  mass 
of  deep  mud.     Cover  for  the  men  both  from  fire  and  weather 
becomes  impossible.     The  men  have  been  soaked  through 
and  through  for  as  much  as  forty-eight  hours,  and  equipment 
has  been  buried  by  falls  of  earth,  and  ammunition  has  rusted, 
but  in  spite  of  all  hardships  and  privations  the  spirits  and 
health  of  the  troops  have  been  excellent,   and  they  have 
worked  continuously  at  digging  and  at  the  heavy  fatigue 
work  of  carrying  rations  and  ammunition  and  heavy  beams 
for  head  cover  one  and  a  half  miles  to  the  front  where  wheeled 
traffic  has  been  impossible — often  in  liquid  mud  halfway  up 
to  the  knees. 

3.  By  degrees,  and  as  I  can  obtain  space,  I  am  moving  the 
rear  companies  up  towards  the  front  line  preparatory  to  the 
attack  on  the  fortress.     Considerable  delay  has  taken  place  in 
the  preparations  of  the  Japanese  owing  to  the  heavy  rains, 
but  I  learned  yesterday  that  the  bombardment  will  com- 
mence on  the  3ist  instant. 

The  health  of  the  troops,  notwithstanding  the  hard  work 
and  trying  weather,  is  most  satisfactory. 

5.  The  line  of  investment  we  now  hold  extends  from  Kiao- 
Chau  Bay  to  the  sea,  running  approximately  through  Kushan, 
119  degrees  21  minutes,  36  degrees  8  minutes  (Lat.  36  deg. 
8  min.  N.,  Long.  119  deg.  21  min.  E.),  the  high  ground  south 
of  Chia-Lien-Kow,  to  Foushan  (Prince  Henry's  Hill). 

The  following  is  a  summary  of  the  order  for  the  attack  on 
the  fortress,  so  far  as  concerns  the  British  Force  : — 

The  whole  of  the  enemy's  main  line  of  defence  will  con- 
stitute the  front  of  attack.  All  arrangements  are  calculated 
for  a  deliberate  advance,  but  any  opportunity  of  attacking 
which  presents  itself  will  be  seized  upon. 

The  front  of  attack  is  divided  into  four  sections,  the  right 
426 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

central  section  being  assigned  to  the  force  under  my  com- 
mand. One  front  of  about  600  yards  is  roughly  bounded  by 
two  parallel  lines  running  north-east  and  south-west — the 
right  flank  line  passing  through  Tashan,  119  degrees  22  minutes, 
36  degrees  7  minutes  (36  deg.  7  min.  N.,  119  deg.  22  min.  E.), 
village  and  Point  375,  372  ?  the  left,  the  north-west  corner  of 
Ho-Hsi  and  the  eastern  corner  of  Tiu-Tung-Chien  (Tai- 
Tung-Chen  ?). 

To-morrow  the  line  of  investment  will  be  advanced  to  a 
line  running  through  Kushan,  Shvang-Shan,  119  degrees  6 
minutes,  36  degrees  6  minutes  (36  deg.  6  min.  N.,  119  deg. 
6  min.  E.),  Tung-Wu-Chia-Tsun,  Tien-Chia-Tsun,  Hsin-Chia- 
Chuang,  in  the  construction  of  which  working  parties  from 
each  section  are  employed  daily  and  nightly. 

When  the  bombardment  begins,  the  Infantry  and  Engineers 
of  the  front  line  will  prepare  for  the  subsequent  advance, 
and  during  the  night  of  the  ist  November  will  occupy  a  line 
through  the  high  ground  west  of  Han-Chla-Chuang,  and 
south  of  Tang-Wu-Chia-Tsun,  and  north  of  Fou-Shan-So — 
also  that  village. 

The  first  position  of  attack  will  be  prepared  on  this  line, 
and  during  the  first  two  or  three  nights  will  be  strengthened, 
communicating  trenches  completed,  and  preparations  made 
for  the  next  advance. 

The  second  position  of  attack  will  be  strongly  constructed, 
approximately  on  the  line  Pump  Station,  Hsi-Wu-Chla- 
Tsun,  the  high  ground  east  of  Kang-Chla-Chuang  and  the 
ridge  west  of  Fou-Shan-So,  and  in  this  position  preparations 
will  be  made  for  the  destruction  of  obstacles  and  the  subse- 
quent approach. 

The  main  portion  of  the  siege  artillery  will  first  fire  on 
the  enemy's  forts  and  the  remainder  against  his  war  vessels. 
Subsequently,  as  the  first  line  advances,  this  portion  of  the 
artillery  will  fire  on  the  enemy's  redoubts. 

Co-operation  with  the  Navy  is  arranged  for. 

6.  I  am  collecting  twelve  days'  supplies  at  a  suitable  place 
in  rear  of  the  advanced  position  to  provide  against  the  even- 
tuality of  its  being  found  impossible,  in  this  very  difficult 
country,  to  bring  them  up  during  the  bombardment.  A 
suitable  place  for  my  Brigade  Ammunition  Reserve,  about 
two  miles  in  rear  of  the  first  position  of  attack,  has  been  selected. 

427 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

The  Field  Hospital  has  been  established  at  Che-Chla- 
Hsia-Chuang,  about  half-way  between  Litsun-Erh-Shan  and 
Prince  Henry  Hill,  and  dressing  stations  have  been  arranged 
for  in  nullahs  in  rear  of  the  front  line. 

7.  The  half  battalion  of  the  36th  Sikhs,  under  command  of 
Lieut.-Colonel  E.  L.  Sullivan,  disembarked  at  Lao-Shan  Bay 
on  the  22nd  instant,  and  arrived  yesterday  at  the  front. — I 
have,  etc.  N.  W.  BARNARDISTON, 

Brigadier-General. 

No.  3 

Brigadier-General  N.  W.  Barnardiston,  M.V.O., 
to  the  War  Office. 

Tsingtau,  November  10,  1914. 

SIR, — I  have  the  honour  to  report  the  successful  conclu- 
sion of  this  Expedition  in  the  surrender  of  Tsingtau  on  the 
7th  instant. 

The  operations  in  which  the  force  under  my  command 
have  taken  part  proceeded  as  outlined  in  my  Despatch  No.  2, 
dated  2Qth  October. 

The  advanced  position  indicated  in  that  despatch  was 
occupied  on  the  3oth  October.  The  bombardment  commenced 
on  the  3ist,  the  enemy  not  replying  to  any  great  extent. 
During  the  first  day  some  oil  tanks  and  coal  stores  near  the 
dockyard  were  burnt,  and  the  forts  and  redoubts  suffered 
severely.  Throughout  the  bombardment  the  practice  of  the 
Japanese  Artillery  was  surprisingly  good,  and  the  accuracy 
of  their  fire  and  their  numerical  superiority  in  guns  no  doubt 
proved  the  principal  factor  in  compelling  the  enemy's  surrender. 
It  is  stated  that  the  Germans  expended  all  their  gun  ammuni- 
tion. The  bombardment  continued  with  slight  intermissions 
until  the  fall  of  the  place. 

On  the  1st  November  the  first  position  of  attack  (see  my 
Despatch  No.  2)  was  occupied,  and  the  preparation  of  the 
second  position  commenced.  This  position  was  ready  for 
occupation  on  the  3rd  instant,  but,  owing  to  its  location  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  bed  of  the  river,  it  was  impos- 
sible to  drain  it  or  to  occupy  it  permanently,  and  as  it  was 
everywhere  under  close  infantry  fire  from  the  first  position, 
I  merely  held  it  during  the  night  with  piquets. 
428 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

On  the  night  of  the  4th  November  somewhat  heavy  artillery 
fire  was  directed  on  our  trenches,  the  36th  Sikhs  losing  2 
Sepoys  killed  and  2  officers  wounded,  while  the  2nd  Bn. 
South  Wales  Borderers  had  also  several  casualties. 

On  the  5th  November  I  was  ordered  to  prepare  a  third 
position  of  attack  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  This  line 
was  to  a  great  extent  enfiladed  on  both  flanks  by  Nos.  I  and 
2  redoubts,  especially  the  latter,  from  which  annoying  machine- 
gun  fire  was  experienced. 

The  bed  of  the  river  (a  small  stream  running  over  a  broad 
bed  of  sand)  had  also  to  be  crossed,  and  in  doing  so  the  working 
parties  of  the  2nd  Bn.  South  Wales  Borderers  suffered  some- 
what severely,  losing  8  non-commissioned  officers  and  men 
killed  and  24  wounded.  The  36th  Sikhs  had  only  slight  losses. 
Notwithstanding  this  a  good  deal  of  work  was  done,  especially 
on  the  right  flank. 

I  considered  it  my  duty  to  represent  to  the  Japanese 
Commander-in-Chief  the  untenable  nature,  for  permanent 
occupation,  of  the  portion  of  the  third  position  in  my  front, 
but  received  a  reply  that  it  was  necessary  for  it  to  be  held 
in  order  to  fit  in  with  the  general  scheme  of  assault. 

On  the  evening  of  the  6th,  accordingly,  I  occupied  it  with 
piquets,  and  the  working  parties  continued  to  improve  it. 

During  the  night,  on  hearing  rumours  of  the  evacuation 
of  one  or  more  of  the  redoubts,  I  sent  out  officers'  patrols  to 
ascertain  if  the  enemy  were  still  holding  the  trenches  in  front 
of  us,  and  prepared  to  advance  should  the  front  be  clear. 
They  were  met,  however,  with  rifles  and  machine-gun  fire, 
and  reported  that  No.  2  redoubt,  on  our  left,  was  still 
held. 

Between  5  and  6  A.M.  on  the  morning  of  the  yth  the  enemy 
started  a  further  cannonade  for  field  artillery  and  an  occa- 
sional shot  from  their  heavy  guns,  and  I  issued  preparatory 
orders  for  an  advance  as  soon  as  I  knew  the  redoubts  were 
captured.  At  7  A.M.  all  firing  ceased,  and  I  was  informed 
that  the  enemy  had  sent  out  a  flag  of  truce.  About  7.30 
A.M.  I  received  orders  to  advance,  and,  the  enemy  along 
the  whole  of  our  front  having  then  retired,  I  marched  into 
Tsingtau. 

The  troops  under  my  command  have  behaved  extremely 
well  under  trying  conditions  of  weather  and  those  inseparable 

429 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

from  siege  warfare,  and  all  ranks  have  worked  loyally  and 
hard. — I  have,  etc. 

N.  W.  BARNARDISTON, 
Brigadier-General. 


No.  4 

Brigadier-General  N.  W.  Barnardiston,  M.V.O., 
to  the  War  Office. 

Tsingtau,  November  13,  1914. 

SIR, — In  continuation  of  my  Despatch  No.  3,  dated  loth 
instant,  I  have  the  honour  to  forward  the  names  of  the  follow- 
ing officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and  men  of  the  force 
under  my  command  whom  I  consider  deserving  of  special 
notice  for  their  services. 

These  names  are  in  addition  to  those  mentioned  in  my 
despatch  dated  gth  October. 

STAFF 

Major  H.  G.  Pringle,  Royal  Artillery. 

GENERAL   STAFF 

Captain  C.  D.  H.  Moore,  R.  Warwick  Regt.,  D.A.A.  and  Q.M.G. 

Captain  J.  Gray,  36th  Sikhs  (attached). 

Captain  J.  A.  Hamilton,  A.S.C.,  Base  Commandant. 

Major  J.  A.  Hartigan,  M.B.,  R.A.M.C.,  Senior  Medical  Officer. 

2ND  SOUTH  WALES  BORDERERS 

Lieut.-Col.  H.  G.  Casson,  Commanding. 

Major  E.  C.  Margasson. 

Captain  J.  Bradstock. 

Captain  and  Adjutant  G.  H.  Birkett. 

Captain  D.  G.  Johnson. 

Lieutenant  R.  L.  Petre. 

Lieut.  H.  J.  Simson,  R.  Scots  (Japanese  interpreter),  attached. 

Captain  G.  H.  Dive,  R.A.M.C.,  attached. 

2/10423  Sgt.  J.  J.  Ward  (killed),  2/9972  Pte.  G.  E.  Snow, 
2/9004  Pte.  A.  Green,  2/9980  Pte.  T.  Jenkinson,  10171  Drmr. 
430 


WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

W.  I.  Jones  (killed),  10634  Pte.  (Lce.-Cpl.)  C.  J.  Foley,  10614 
Pte.  H.  Evans  (killed),  2/9952  Pte.  J.  West  (died  of  wounds), 
2/4528  Drmr.  C.  W.  Lewis,  2/9244  Co.  Sgt.-Maj.  G.  A.  Davies, 
7309  Sgt.  H.  Leach  (died  of  wounds),  3/10249  Cpl.  (Act.  Sgt.) 
W.  S.  Rosier. 

ARMY  SERVICE  CORPS 

ist  Cl.  Staff-Sgt.-Maj.  S.  E.  Warner  (now  Qrmr.  and  Hon. 
Lieut.),  ist  Cl.  Staff-Sgt.-Maj.  A.  Goodwin  (now  Qrmr.  and 
Hon.  Lieut.). 

ROYAL  ARMY  MEDICAL  CORPS 

17933  Qrmr.-Sgt.  D.  E.  Dean  (now  Sgt.-Maj.),  11313  Cpl. 
A.  Bateman  (now  Sgt.),  19823  Cpl.  T.  J.  Kilyon,  1884  Cpl. 
E.  S.  Gaughan  (now  Sgt.). 

3&TH  SIKHS 

Lieut.-Col.  E.  L.  Sullivan,  Commanding. 

Major  E.  F.  Knox. 

Captain  A.  D.  Martin. 

Lieutenant  and  Adjutant  S.  des  Vceux. 

Subadar  Gurmukh  Singh,  I.O.M. 

Jemadar  Sundar  Singh. 

Jemadar  Jamal  Singh. 

1707  Havildar  Massa  Singh,  2711  Lance-Naik  Bhagat 
Sing;n,  2757  Lance-Naik  Harman  Singh,  2829  Lance-Naik 
Hari  Singh,  3126  Sepoy  Fakir  Singh,  3785  Sepoy  Ram  Singh, 
3782  Sepoy  Bant  Singh. — I  have,  etc. 

N.  W.  BARNARDISTON, 
Brigadier-General. 


*  43i 


WAR  IN   THE  PACIFIC 

CORRESPONDENCE  RELATING  TO  THE  OCCUPATION 
OF  GERMAN  SAMOA  BY  AN  EXPEDITIONARY 
EORCE  FROM  NEW  ZEALAND.1 

Presented  to  both  Houses  of  Parliament  by  Command  of  His 

Majesty 

September  1915. 

No.  i 
The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Governor  of  New  Zealand 

August  6,  1914. 

If  your  Ministers  desire  and  feel  themselves  able  to  seize 
German  wireless  station  at  Samoa,  we  should  feel  that  this 
was  a  great  and  urgent  Imperial  service.  You  will  realise, 
however,  that  any  territory  now  occupied  must  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war  be  at  the  disposal  of  Imperial  Govern- 
ment for  purposes  of  an  ultimate  settlement.  Other  Dominions 
are  acting  on  the  same  understanding  in  a  similar  way,  and, 
in  particular,  Commonwealth  is  being  consulted  as  to  wireless 
stations  at  New  Guinea,  Yap,  Marshall  Islands,  and  Nauru 
or  Pleasant  Island.  HARCOURT. 


No.  2 
The  Governor  of  New  Zealand  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

(Telegram.)  Received  12.38  P.M.,  August  7,  1914.  . 

Your  telegram  6th  August.     My  Government  agree  to 
seizure  of  Samoa.     In  view  of  possibility  of  presence  of  German 

1  [Extracts  dealing  with  military  matters.     The  whole  correspondence 
is  given  in  Naval,  I,  pp.  135-160.] 
432 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

cruiser  please  telegraph  at  once  what  escort  can  be  provided 
and  when.  LIVERPOOL. 


No.  3 
The  Governor  of  New  Zealand  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

August  8,  1914. 

I  am  desired  by  my  Government  to  inform  you  that  pro- 
vided that  escort  can  be  furnished,  arrangements  have  now 
been  made  to  despatch  to  Samoa  an  expeditionary  force 
on  Tuesday,  August  n.  I  have  to  ask  for  an  immediate 
reply.  LIVERPOOL. 

No.  4 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Governor  of  New  Zealand 

August  8,  1914. 

Your  telegram  August  8.  Admiralty  see  no  objection 
to  departure  expedition  to  Samoa  about  nth  instant  when 
ready,  provided  latest  local  information  at  disposal  Senior 
Naval  Officer,  New  Zealand,  does  not  render  departure  in- 
expedient and  provided  he  has  been  consulted 'and  concurs 
in  naval  arrangements.  They  consider  that,  if  guns  be  avail- 
able and  time  permits,  transports  may  with  advantage  be 
lightly  armed.  Escort  of  one  cruiser  at  least  will  be  detailed. 
Instructions  will  be  sent  to  Senior  Naval  Officer  accordingly. 
Please  inform  me  of  composition  and  strength  force  and  sea 
transport.  HARCOURT. 

No.  5 

The  Governor  of  New  Zealand  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

August  9,  1914. 

August  9.  Your  telegram  of  August  8  ;  one  battalion 
of  infantry,  one  company  engineers,  two  fifteen-pounders, 
two  six-pounders,  with  signal,  medical,  and  army  service 
corps  details,  two  transports.  Total  force,  1383. 

LIVERPOOL. 

MILITARY  2  2  E  433 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

No.  6 

The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Governor  of  New  Zealand 

(Telegram).  Sent  6.35  P.M.,  August  18,  1914. 

In  connection  with  expedition  against  Samoa,  British  flag 
should  be  hoisted  in  all  territories  successfully  occupied  by  His 
Majesty's  forces  and  suitable  arrangements  made  for  temporary 
administration  ;  but  no  proclamation  formally  annexing  any 
such  territory  should  be  made  without  previous  communica- 
tion with  His  Majesty's  Government.  HARCOURT. 


No.  7 
Admiralty  to  Colonial  Office 

Admiralty,  August  36,  1914. 

SIR, — I  am  commanded  by  my  Lords  Commissioners  of 
the  Admiralty  to  transmit  herewith,  for  your  information, 
copy  of  telegram  of  this  date  received  from  the  Rear- Admiral 
Commanding  Australian  Squadron,  respecting  the  occupa- 
tion of  Apia.— I  am,  etc. 

W.  GRAHAM  GREENE. 


ENCLOSURE  IN  No.  7 

Telegram  from  Rear-Admiral  Commanding  Australian 
Squadron,  Suva,  to  Admiralty 

Took  possession  of  Apia  (Samoa  Islands)  to-day,  August  30 
(Eastern  time). 

In  reply  to  my  summons  to  surrender,  Acting  Governor, 
in  absence  of  Governor,  stated  that  he  submitted  to  the 
occupation  of  the  island. 

I  carried  out  extensive  sweeping  operations  before  enter- 
ing harbour,  but  found  no  mines.  No  resistance  was  offered. 
There  have  been  no  enemy  ships  in  harbour  for  some  time. 
Landing  of  troops  was  commenced  during  this  afternoon. 
British  flag  hoisted.  Officer  commanding  troops  took  over 
control  from  Lieu  tenant-Governor  at  2  P.M.  to-day. 

Will  leave  with  Australia,  Melbourne,  and  Montcalm  for 
Suva  as  soon  as  disembarkation  is  complete,  probably  to- 
morrow.   

434 


4]  WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

No.  8 
The  Governor  of  New  Zealand  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

(Telegram.)  Received  6.0  P.M.,  August  30,  1914. 

3Oth   August. — I   have  received    the  following   telegram 

from  Admiral,  Australia  : 

'  Apia  surrendered  at  10.0  A.M.,  3oth  August,  Eastern 
time.  Military  expedition  landed  in  afternoon  without 
opposition/ LIVERPOOL. 

No.  9 
The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Governor  of  New  Zealand 

(Telegram.)  Sent  2.10  P.M.,  August  31,  1914. 

Your  telegram  3oth  August.  Please  convey  to  your 
Ministers  heartiest  congratulations  of  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment on  successful  occupation  of  Samoa  by  expeditionary 
force.  HARCOURT. 

No.  10 
The  Governor  of  New  Zealand  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

(Extract.)  September  2,  1914. 

Officer  Commanding  the  Troops,  Samoa,  has  sent  me  the 
following  message  : 

'  Expedition  under  my  command,  with  the  assistance 
of  the  allied  fleet,  occupied  town  of  Apia,  August  31 
(Eastern  time).  Governor  of  Samoa,  who  surrendered 
to  me,  is  being  sent  with  the  prisoners  to  Fiji.  I  am 
glad  to  report  that  there  was  no  opposition,  that  the 
health  of  the  troops  is  excellent,  and  that  there  have 
been  no  serious  casualties  since  the  expedition  started. 
— LOGAN/  LIVERPOOL. 

ENCLOSURE  i  IN  No.  12 

(Despatch  No.  i.) 

Government  House,  Apia,  Samoa, 

September  2,  1914. 
YOUR  EXCELLENCY, 

I  have  the  honour  to  report  that  the  forces  under  my 
command,  having  embarked  on  H.M.  Transports  No.  i 

435 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

(Moeraki)  and  No.  2  (Monowai)  on  August  14,  1914,  at 
Wellington,  sailed  from  that  port  at  daybreak  on  the  follow- 
ing morning. 

We  were  met  at  the  previously  arranged  rendezvous  by 
H.M.  Ships  Psyche,  Philomel,  and  Pyramus  at  4  P.M.  on 
August  16.  On  this  and  the  following  nights  no  lights 
were  shown. 

Throughout  the  voyage  musketry  and  other  exercises 
were  carried  out  by  the  troops. 

On  August  20  the  convoy  arrived  at  Noumea,  New  Cale- 
donia, at  ii  A.M.,  and  there  met  the  French  cruiser  Montcalm. 
During  the  day  I,  with  my  Staff  Officer,  attended  a  joint  naval 
and  military  conference  on  board  H.M.S.  Philomel. 

On  August  21  H.M. A.  Ships  Australia  and  Melbourne, 
with  Rear-Admiral  Sir  George  E.  Patey  in  command,  arrived 
in  port,  and,  under  instructions  from  the  Rear-Admiral,  I 
attended  on  board  the  flagship  and  received  operation  orders 
(provisional)  for  the  attack  upon  Samoa.  In  the  afternoon 
I  paid  an  official  visit  to  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  New 
Caledonia.  The  troops  were,  with  the  permission  of  His 
Excellency,  exercised  on  shore,  and  everywhere  met  with  a 
most  cordial  reception. 

On  the  morning  of  August  22,  while  the  transports 
were  moving  out  into  the  stream,  Transport  No.  2  drifted 
on  to  a  sandbank,  from  which  she  was  only  refloated  at 
8.30  P.M.,  after  her  cargo  had  been  lightened  and  the  troops 
temporarily  disembarked. 

On  August  23  the  allied  fleets  and  transports  sailed  for 
Suva,  Fiji,  arriving  at  that  port  during  the  morning  of  August 
26,  on  which  date  I  accompanied  the  Rear-Admiral  on  an 
official  visit  to  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  Fiji,  later 
attending  a  conference  on  board  H.M.A.S.  Australia. 

At  the  request  of  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  Fiji, 
I  enrolled  one  officer  of  the  Fiji  Constabulary  as  German 
Interpreter,  and  also  four  members  of  the  Fiji  Rifle  Associa- 
tion and  six  members  of  the  Legion  of  Frontiersmen  as  privates 
in  the  3rd  Auckland  Regiment.  There  were  also  embarked 
one  officer  and  nineteen  men  from  H.M.S.  Sealark,  one  naval 
signaller  Royal  Naval  Reserve,  one  nursing  sister,  and  fourteen 
natives  of  Samoa — these  latter  to  be  dispersed  throughout 
the  island  in  order  to  explain  our  intentions.  I  am  much 
436 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

indebted  to  the  Rev.  Father  Fox,  of  Suva,  for  bringing  me 
into  touch  with  the  Samoans  above  referred  to. 

On  August  27,  the  allied  fleets  and  transports  sailed  from 
Suva,  Fiji,  in  the  afternoon,  and  arrived  at  Apia  at  day- 
break on  the  3Oth  (Eastern  time).  In  response  to  an  ulti- 
matum conveyed  under  a  flag  of  truce  from  H.M.S.  Psyche, 
the  Deputy-Governor  replied  that  although,  in  the  temporary 
absence  of  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  Samoa,  he  would 
not  accept  the  responsibility  of  surrendering,  no  opposition 
would  be  offered  to  the  landing  of  the  armed  forces. 

The  troops  were  thereupon  disembarked  under  cover  of 
the  guns  of  the  allied  fleets  in  manner  previously  detailed  in 
orders  ;  the  disembarkation  was  carried  out  without  casualty. 
All  Government  buildings  were  immediately  seized  and 
Government  officials  and  police  placed  under  arrest. 

I  established  my  headquarters  at  the  Government  build- 
ings at  4  P.M.,  received  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  Samoa, 
and  informed  him  that  I  regretted  that  I  must  place  him  under 
arrest.  On  this  date  I  received  from  the  European  residents 
in  Samoa  the  attached  memorial  (Sub-enclosure  i).1 

On  the  following  day,  August  31  (Eastern  time),  at  8 
A.M.,  the  British  flag  was  formally  hoisted  on  the  Govern- 
ment  buildings  in  the  presence  of  the  officers  of  the  New 
Zealand  Division,  Royal  Navy,  the  troops,  and  the  leading 
native  chiefs.  At  this  ceremony  I  read  a  Proclamation, 
copies  of  which,  in  English,  German,  and  Samoan,  I  enclose 
herewith  for  Your  Excellency's  perusal  (Sub-enclosure  2). 

I  conferred  with  the  native  chiefs,  whose  attitude  towards 
us  is  extremely  friendly,  and  I  am  informed  from  reliable 
sources  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  natives  are  in  sympathy 
with  the  British  occupation  of  Samoa. 

I  also  conferred  with  the  German  heads  of  department 
and  their  subordinates,  and,  as  they  have  given  their  parole 
to  do  nothing  inimical  to  British  interests  and  to  carry  out 
their  duties  loyally,  I  have  retained  them,  with  two  excep- 
tions, in  their  respective  offices  at  the  same  salaries  as  they 
were  previously  receiving. 

I  am  of  opinion  that  the  various  departments  are  largely 
overstaffed  and  should  be  reduced  as  opportunity  occurs  to 
do  so  with  the  minimum  of  friction. 

His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  Samoa. — After  having,  as 

437 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

already  stated,  informed  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of 
Samoa  that  I  placed  him  under  arrest,  I  permitted  him  to 
return  to  his  residence  under  escort  of  an  officer  of  my  staff, 
in  order  to  obtain  such  wearing  apparel  and  effects  as  he 
might  require,  and  then  caused  him  to  be  placed  on  board 
Transport  No.  I  until  the  following  morning,  when  he  was 
again  permitted  to  land  under  escort  and  attend  further 
to  his  affairs,  subsequently  proceeding  to  Transport  No.  2, 
in  which  ship  he  is  now  being  conveyed  to  Suva,  under  escort 
of  an  officer  of  the  5th  Regiment.  I  ordered  that  both  on 
Transport  No.  i  and  Transport  No.  2  His  Excellency  should  be 
treated  as  an  honoured  guest  and  accorded  every  consideration. 

Wireless. — I  am  informed  by  the  Senior  Naval  Officer, 
New  Zealand  Division,  that  the  wireless  station  at  Apia 
could  be  heard  tuning  up  after  H.M.S.  Psyche  had  sent  in  a 
flag  of  truce  about  9.30  A.M.,  and  only  desisted  on  being 
ordered  by  the  Rear- Admiral  to  do  so.  On  my  troops  reach- 
ing the  wireless  station  it  was  found  that  some  essential  parts 
of  the  engine  which  drives  the  dynamo  had  been  removed 
and  that  some  of  the  aerials  had  been  tampered  with.  The 
aerials  were  immediately  repaired,  and  we  have  been  capable 
of  receiving  messages  since  August  30,  but  we  have  been 
unable  to  repair  the  engine,  or,  up  to  the  present,  discover 
the  missing  parts.  The  engine  which  was  brought  by  the 
Expeditionary  Force  has,  however,  to-day  been  installed, 
and  I  hope  to-night  to  be  able  to  obtain  communication  with 
Your  Excellency  either  through  Suva  or  Pago  Pago.  I 
enclose  for  Your  Excellency's  perusal  a  Proclamation  (No.  2) 
(Sub-enclosure  3)  which  deals  with  the  above  subject,  and 
which  I  deemed  it  necessary  to  issue.  I  should  add  that 
investigation  disclosed  the  fact  that  preparations  had  been 
made  for  the  destruction  of  the  wireless  station  by  dynamite. 

Section  D  Battery. — As  explained  later  in  this  despatch, 
it  became  necessary  to  send  Transport  No.  2  to  Suva  with  the 
least  possible  delay,  and  in  the  hurry  of  so  doing  a  misunder- 
standing resulted  in  Transport  No.  2  putting  to  sea  while  still 
having  on  board  a  section  of  D  Battery,  which  had  been  brought 
to  Apia  in  her.  The  two  guns  of  this  section  had,  however, 
been  brought  ashore,  and  part  of  the  section  of  D  Battery, 
which  arrived  in  Transport  No.  i,  will  be  quite  able  to  serve 
these  two  guns.  I  keenly  regret  the  temporary  loss  of  the 
438 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

services  of  the  section  which  arrived  in  Transport  No.  2.  I 
only  became  aware  of  the  fact  that  these  men  were  still  on 
board  after  Transport  No.  2  had  proceeded  some  twenty 
miles  to  sea,  and  the  necessities  of  the  situation  did  not  permit 
me  at  that  stage  to  take  steps  to  have  Transport  No.  2  recalled. 

Troops  of  the  Garrison. — With  reference  to  the  section  of 
D  Battery  now  on  board  Transport  No.  2,  if  that  vessel  pro- 
ceed to  New  Zealand  I  have  to  ask  that  this  section  be  ordered 
to  rejoin  its  headquarters  in  Apia.  With  regard  to  the  escort 
on  board  Transport  No.  2,  I  have  to  ask  that  these  be  dis- 
charged in  New  Zealand,  with  the  exception  of  Lieutenant 
D.  A.  Kenny,  the  officer  commanding,  who  would  rejoin  his 
regiment  here. 

I  propose  to  return  to  New  Zealand,  as  opportunity  offers, 
all  men  who  may  prove  medically  unsuitable.  I  also  propose 
to  discharge,  when  opportunity  to  return  them  to  Fiji  offers, 
those  men  of  the  3rd  Auckland  Regiment  who  were  attested 
in  Samoa  as  already  mentioned. 

I  hope  to  be  permitted  to  retain  the  remainder  of  the  force 
so  long  as  German  cruisers  remain  in  the  Pacific,  but  when 
these  have  been  disposed  of  I  see  no  reason  why  the  garrison 
should  remain  at  its  present  strength,  as  I  anticipate  no 
trouble  whatever  from  the  Samoan  natives. 

On  the  whole,  the  discipline  of  the  troops  has  been  good, 
and  has  improved  considerably  since  the  expedition  started. 

I  have,  etc., 

ROBERT  LOGAN,  Colonel, 

Administrator  of  Samoa. 
To  His  Excellency  The  Right  Honourable 
The  Earl  of  Liverpool,  G.C.M.G.,  M.V.O., 
Governor  of  New  Zealand. 


SUB-ENCLOSURE  2  TO  DESPATCH  No.  i 
PROCLAMATION 

I.  The  New  Zealand  Government  of  His  Britannic  Majesty 
King  George  v.  now  occupy  for  His  Majesty  all  the  German 
territories  situated  in  the  islands  of  the  Samoan  group. 

439 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

2.  All  inhabitants  of  the  occupied  territories   are  com- 
manded to  submit  to  all  such  directions  as  may  be  given  by 
any  officer  of  the  occupying  force. 

3.  Every  inhabitant  of  the  occupied  territories  is  forbidden 
to  assist  or  to  communicate  directly  or  indirectly  with  the 
German   Government   or   the   German   forces,    or   to   resist 
directly  or  indirectly  the  occupying  forces  or  any  member 
thereof. 

4.  All  public  property  of  the  German  Government  must 
be  delivered  forthwith  by  those  responsible  for  its  safety  to 
the  possession  of  the  occupying  force. 

5.  Private  property  of  individuals  will  only  be  taken  if 
required  for  the  purposes  of  the  occupying  force,  and  if  so 
taken  will  be  paid  for  at  a  reasonable  price  at  the  termina- 
tion of  the  war. 

6.  No  person  shall,  except  with  the  written  permission  of 
an  authorised  officer  of  the  occupying  force,  be  out  of  doors 
on  any  night  between  the  hours  of  10  P.M.  and  6  A.M.,  nor 
change  his  or  her  present  place  of  residence,  nor  use  any  boat 
or  canoe. 

7.  All  public  meetings  are  prohibited. 

8.  No  circular  or  newspaper  or  printed  matter  of  any 
description  shall  be  circulated,  printed,  or  issued,  without  the 
written  permission  of  an  authorised  officer  of  the  occupying 
force. 

9.  No  spirituous  or  intoxicating  liquor  shall  be  manufac- 
tured or  sold  without  the  written  permission  of  an  authorised 
officer  of  the  occupying  force,  nor  shall  liquor  be  supplied  to 
any  Samoan  native. 

10.  All  officials  of  the  German  Government  who  desire 
to  continue  to  carry  out  their  functions  under  the  present 
Military  Government  must  report  themselves  forthwith  to 
the  Commander  of  the  Occupying  Force,  and  such  as  may  be 
retained  in  their  employment  will  receive  the  same  rate  of 
remuneration  as  was  received  by  them  prior  to  the  occupa- 
tion. 

11.  All  inhabitants  having  in  their  possession  any  motor- 
cars, horses,  carts,  or  other  means  of  transport  must  forth- 
with report  the  description  of  the  same  to  the  Provost-Marshal 
of  the  Occupying  Force. 

12.  All  arms  of  every  description,  whether  the  property 
440 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

of  the  German  Government  or  of  private  persons,  must 
forthwith  be  delivered  at  the  office  of  the  Provost-Marshal  of 
the  Occupying  Force. 

13.  All  persons  who  quietly  submit  to  the  administration 
of  affairs  by  the  occupying  force  will  be  protected  in  their 
occupations  except  in  the  case  of  such  occupations  as  may 
be  contrary  to  the  best  interests  of  the  occupying  force. 

14.  All  persons  who  in  any  manner  resist  the  occupying 
force  or  attempt  by  violence  or  otherwise  to  interfere  with  or 
overthrow  the  Military  Government  now  established  for  His 
Majesty  King  George  Fifth,  or  who  fail  to  obey  the  above- 
written  or  any  subsequent  commands  of  any  officer  of  the 
occupying  force,  will  be  punished  according  to  the  laws  of 
war. 

Given  at  Apia  this  twenty-ninth  day  of  August  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  fourteen. 

ROBERT  LOGAN,  Colonel, 
Commanding  the  Occupying  Forces. 

God  Save  the  King. 


SUB-ENCLOSURE  3  TO  DESPATCH  No.  i 

PROCLAMATION  No.  2 

1.  Every  person  having  possession  of  any  machinery  or 
material  formerly  used  in  or  in  connection  with  the  wireless 
installation  at  Apia,  or  the  railway  leading  thereto,  is  required 
to  deliver  the  same  immediately  to  the  Provost-Marshal. 

2.  If  the  above  requisition  is  not  complied  with  before 
midnight  on  September  2,  1914,  all  houses  and  grounds  in 
Apia  will  be  searched,  and  any  person  found  to  be  harbour- 
ing any  of  the  above-mentioned  machinery  or  materials  will 
be  dealt  with  according  to  the  laws  of  war,  and  will  receive 
the  extreme  penalty. 

Given  at  Apia  this  first  day  of  September  1914. 

ROBERT  LOGAN,  Colonel, 
Administrator  of  Samoa. 

God  Save  the  King. 

441 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

ENCLOSURE  2  IN  No.  12. 

(Despatch  No.  2.) 

Government  House,  Apia,  Samoa,  September  5,  1914. 

YOUR  EXCELLENCY, — I  am  pleased  to  be  able  to  inform 
Your  Excellency  that,  since  the  date  of  despatch  No.  i,  matters 
in  connection  with  the  occupation  of  Samoa  have  progressed 
as  smoothly  as  could  be  expected.  The  troops  under  my  com- 
mand have  now  moved  into  two  camps  on  sound  ground 
conveniently  situated  for  the  defence  of  Apia,  and  measures 
have  been  taken  for  the  safeguarding  of  the  port. 

Wireless. — I  accidentally  omitted  to  state  in  despatch 
No.  i  that  a  light  petrol  railway,  leading  from  the  harbour 
to  the  wireless  station,  was  found  to  be  unworkable,  owing 
to  parts  of  the  engine  having  been  removed.  I  am  glad  to  be 
able  to  state,  however,  that  the  engine  has  now  been  repaired, 
and  in  a  very  few  days  the  engine  should  be  again  running 
right  out  to  the  wireless  station,  and  already  the  railway  has 
been  of  considerable  service. 

The  wireless  installation  is  now  working  satisfactorily,  and, 
as  Your  Excellency  is  aware,  we  are  now  able  to  send  messages. 
Our  power  to  do  so,  however,  is  necessarily  limited,  owing  to 
our  inability  to  use  the  engines  properly  belonging  to  the 
installation. 

Expeditions. — Since  my  last  despatch  a  troop  of  mounted 
rifles  was  despatched  to  Falealeli,  being  away  from  Apia  for 
three  days  and  returning  with  Herr  Osbahr,  the  local  Adminis- 
trator of  South  Upolu.  I  have  conferred  with  Herr  Osbahr, 
and  have  decided  to  retain  him  in  office,  and  he  has  to-day 
returned  to  his  district.  I  have  made  Herr  Osbahr  fully 
understand  the  point,  already  referred  to,  which  was  raised 
by  the  other  officials. 

A  patrol  has  visited  Safatu. 

Troops. — H.M.  Transport  Monowai,  which  is  due  to  leave 
Apia  to-morrow  morning,  will  carry  with  her  about  seventy- 
five  of  all  ranks.  Embarkation  states  for  these  officers  and 
men  will  be  forwarded  to  headquarters.  This  number  in- 
cludes all  the  men  (with  one  exception)  who  were  enlisted  at 
Fiji  in  the  3rd  (Auckland)  Regiment.  These  should  be  re- 
turned to  Fiji  and  discharged  there. 
442 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

In  H.M.  Transport  Monowai  there  returned  to  Apia  the 
fifty  officers  and  men  of  D  Battery,  and  also  Lieutenant  Kenny, 
of  the  5th  (Wellington)  Regiment.  These  details  have  now 
been  disembarked. — I  have,  etc., 

ROBERT  LOGAN,  Colonel, 

Administrator  of  Samoa. 
To  His  Excellency  the  Right  Honourable 
The  Earl  of  Liverpool,  G.C.M.G.,  M.V.O., 
Governor  of  New  Zealand. 


CORRESPONDENCE  RESPECTING  MILITARY  OPERA- 
TIONS AGAINST  GERMAN  POSSESSIONS  IN  THE 
WESTERN  PACIFIC.1 

Presented  to  both  Houses  of  Parliament  by  Command 
of  His  Majesty,  November  1915. 

No.  i 
The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Governor-General  of 

Australia 

(Extract.)  August  6,  1914. 

If  your  Ministers  desire  and  feel  themselves  able  to  seize  [Cd.  7< 
German  wireless  stations  at  New  Guinea,  Yap  in  Marshall 
Islands,  and  Nauru  or  Pleasant  Island,  we  should  feel  that 
this  was  a  great  and  urgent  Imperial  service.  You  will 
realise,  however,  that  any  territory  now  occupied  must  at 
conclusion  of  war  be  at  the  disposal  of  Imperial  Government 
for  purposes  of  an  ultimate  settlement.  Other  Dominions 
are  acting  on  the  same  understanding  in  similar  way,  and, 
in  particular,  suggestion  to  New  Zealand  is  being  made 
with  regard  to  Samoa.  HARCOURT, 


No.  2 
The  Governor-General  of  Australia  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

(Telegram.)  Received  8.10  A.M.,  August  10,  1914. 

Expeditionary   force   of   1500   men   being   organised   by 
Government  for  action  suggested  in  your  telegram  6th  August. 

1  [Extract.     The  complete  correspondence  will  be  found  in  Naval,  I,  pp. 
219-267.] 

443 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Despatching  on  merchant  cruiser  carrying  four  4.7  guns. 
Departure  subject  to  reports  from  Patey.  Will  communicate 
date  of  despatch  later.  FERGUSON. 


No.  3 
The  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Governor-General  of  Australia 

(Telegram.)  Sent  6.35  P.M.,  August  18,  1914. 

In  connection  with  expedition  against  German  possessions 
in  Pacific,  British  flag  should  be  hoisted  in  all  territories 
successfully  occupied  by  His  Majesty's  forces,  and  suitable 
arrangements  made  for  temporary  administration  ;  but  no 
proclamation  formally  annexing  any  such  territory  should  be 
made  without  previous  communication  with  His  Majesty's 
Government. HARCOURT. 

No.  6 
The  Governor-General  of  Australia  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

September  13,  1914.. 

Following  telegram  has  been  received  from  Rear-Admiral 
Patey  this  day  : — 

'  Australian  Naval  Reserve  captured  wireless  station 
Herbertshohe  i  A.M.,  September  12,  after  eighteen  hours' 
bush  fighting  over  about  six  miles.  Herbertshohe  and  Rabaul 
garrisoned  and  base  established  Simpsonhafen.  Our  total 
casualties  :  two  officers  killed,  one  officer  wounded,  names 
already  reported.  Reserve  seamen :  four  killed,  three 
wounded.  Have  prisoners  :  German  officers  two,  including 
commandant ;  German  non-commissioned  officers  fifteen  ; 
and  native  police  fifty-six.  German  casualties,  about  twenty 
to  thirty  killed/  FERGUSON. 

No.  14 

The  Governor-General  of  Australia  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

November  19,  1914. 

Administrator  of  Rabaul  reports  Australian  troops  took 
possession  of  Nauru  November  6 ;  British  flag  hoisted, 
occupation  proclaimed,  garrison  posted ;  German  Commis- 
444 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

sioner,  twenty-five  others,  taken  prisoners  and  sent  to  Sydney 
by  Messina,  which  left  Nauru  November  15  ;  thirty-seven 
British  employes  Pacific  Phosphate  Company  repatriated, 
seven  British  employes  Pacific  Phosphate  Company  deported 
two  months  ago  by  Britishers  to  Ocean  Island  ;  wireless 
station  not  damaged.  .  .  . 

FERGUSON. 


No.  16 
The  Governor-General  of  Australia  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

Governor-General's  Office,  Melbourne, 

October  29,  1914. 

SIR, — I  have  the  honour  to  transmit  herewith,  for  the 
information  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  copies  of  despatches 
received  from  Colonel  W.  Holmes,  D.S.O.,  V.D.,  Commanding 
Naval  and  Military  Expedition. 

The  Commonwealth  Attorney-General  has  been  asked 
to  advise  with  regard  to  the  actual  terms  of  surrender  agreed 
upon,  and  on  receipt  of  his  reply  I  shall  have  the  honour  to 
further  communicate  with  you  in  the  matter. — I  have,  etc. 

R.  M.  FERGUSON,  Governor-General. 


ENCLOSURE  i  IN  No.  16 

H.M.A.S.  '  Berrima,'  Rabaul,  New  Britain, 

September  13,  1914. 

SIR, — The  expedition  under  my  command  reached  Blanche 
Bay  on  the  nth  instant.  At  daylight  on  that  day  an  advance 
party  of  thirty-five  Naval  Reserves,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  Bowen,  and  accompanied  by  Captain  Pockley, 
Army  Medical  Corps,  was  sent  ashore.  Half  of  the  party 
was  landed  at  Kabakaul  and  the  other  at  Herbertshohe, 
with  instructions  to  push  on  rapidly  and  seize  the  wireless 
stations  believed  to  exist  in  this  vicinity.  It  was  soon  dis- 
covered that  these  places  were  defended,  and  the  enemy  did 
not  intend  to  give  them  up  without  a  fight.  Finding  that 
these  parties  were  met  with  opposition,  I  reinforced  them 
with  two  more  companies  of  the  Naval  Reserves,  two  machine- 

445 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

gun  sections,  and  a  detachment  of  the  Army  Medical  Corps, 
under  Commander  Elwell,  at  Kabakaul.  Commander  Beres- 
ford  also  accompanied  this  party.  About  11.15  A.M.  a  request 
was  received  from  the  shore  for  a  medical  officer  to  be  sent 
from  this  ship  to  attend  to  a  wounded  German,  and  soon 
afterwards  I  received  information  that  Captain  Pockley  and 
Able  Seaman  Williams  had  been  seriously  wounded  and  were 
being  sent  back  to  the  ship.  I  then  determined  to  put  on 
shore  at  Herbertshohe  four  companies  of  infantry,  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Watson,  to  co-operate  in  the  attack.  It 
was  necessary  to  land  this  latter  force  in  boats,  which  naturally 
occupied  some  time.  In  the  meanwhile  the  naval  force  had 
pushed  on  in  the  direction  of  the  wireless  station. 

The  force  which  they  had  to  meet  consisted  of  German 
reservists  and  the  native  armed  constabulary,  all  led  by 
German  officers.  The  arms  carried  by  the  natives  were  all 
up-to-date  German  weapons. 

The  line  of  attack  was,  owing  to  the  very  heavy  timber 
on  either  side,  practically  confined  to  the  road,  across  which 
at  several  points  trenches  had  been  placed,  and  a  good  deal 
of  trouble  was  caused  the  attacking  force  by  natives  posted 
high  up  in  coco-nut  trees,  armed  with  rifles. 

As  it  did  not  appear  that  the  operation  would  be  successful 
before  dark,  instructions  were  given  to  Commander  Beresford 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Watson  to  retire  to  the  beach  before 
dark,  and  I  arranged  with  the  Adjniral  that,  on  the  follow- 
ing morning,  if  the  resistance  still  continued,  the  fleet  would 
shell  with  shrapnel  the  high  ridge  between  Kabakaul  and 
Herbertshohe  at  daylight,  and  that  immediately  thereafter 
the  attack  should  be  resumed  with  vigour  and  the  places 
carried.  However,  at  nightfall  the  wireless  station  was 
surrendered  to  the  force  attacking  from  Kabakaul.  I  may 
state  that  this  force  was  also  accompanied  by  Captain  Travers, 
my  Intelligence  Officer,  who  was  present  at  the  surrender. 
It  was  found  that  the  wireless  station  was  complete  and  well 
equipped,  and  working  almost  up  to  the  last  moment ;  but 
prior  to  surrender  the  iron  supports  of  the  towers  had  been 
cut  through  and  the  station  thereby  rendered  inoperative. 
A  party  under  Lieutenant  Bond,  and  accompanied  by  Cap- 
tain Travers,  remained  in  possession  of  the  wireless  station 
during  the  night.  As  the  wireless  station  had  been  rendered 
446 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

useless,  and  there  was  little  hope  of  repairs  being  effected  for 
some  time,  I  directed  that  it  be  abandoned — the  instruments 
being  first  removed — and  that  the  party  there  should  retire 
to  the  coast.  Commander  Beresford  was  instructed  to  move 
his  force  to  Herbertshohe  and  remain  there  for  the  present 
as  garrison. 

Commander  Beresford  was  directed  yesterday  to  furnish 
full  report  ori  the  day's  operations,  together  with  list  of 
casualties,  but  this  has  not  yet  been  received,  but  as  far  as 
I  am  aware  they  are  as  follows  : — 

Killed. — Captain  Pockley,  Army  Medical  Corps  ;  Com- 
mander Elwell,  Royal  Australian  Navy  ;  Able  Seamen 
Williams,  Courtney,  Moffat,  Street. 

Wounded. — Lieutenant  Bowen,  Royal  Australian  Navy ; 
Able  Seamen  T.  SuUivan,  J.  Tonks,  A.  P.  W.  Skillen. 

From  information  received  by  me  up  to  the  present,  in 
the  absence  of  Commander  Beresford's  report,  the  three 
officers  referred  to,  also  Lieutenant  Bond,  who  accepted  the 
surrender  of  the  wireless  station,  and  Captain  Travers  (In- 
telligence Officer),  who  accompanied  him,  acted  in  a  very 
gallant  way.1  Captain  Pockley  removed  the  Red  Cross  badge 
from  his  arm  and  handed  it  over  to  one  of  his  men  who  was 
without  one,  and  paid  the  penalty  with  his  life. 

I  have  no  information  as  to  the  total  casualties  on  the 
enemy's  side,  but  know  there  were  quite  a  number.  Amongst 
the  prisoners  taken  by  my  force  were  three  German  officers, 
Captain  Wuchert  (Commanding  the  Native  Armed  Con- 
stabulary), Lieutenant  Mayer,  and  Lieutenant  Kemf,  about 
sixteen  white  non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  and  some 
fifty-six  natives.  The  officers  will  probably  be  forwarded 
to  Sydney  by  the  fleet,  when  leaving  here  in  a  few  days. 

Yesterday  afternoon  the  Berrima  proceeded  from  Herberts- 
hohe to  Rabaul  and  made  fast  to  the  pier  at  about  six  o'clock. 
Immediately  afterwards  the  garrison  for  this  place,  con- 
sisting of  four  companies  infantry,  one  section  machine-guns, 
and  one  company  Naval  Reserves,  were  put  ashore,  and 
occupied  the  town  without  opposition.  All  Government 
offices,  including  Post  Office,  were  seized  and  German  flags 
flying  removed. 

1  I  wish  to  specially  mention  these  five  officers. — W.  H. 

447 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

At  the  present  time  my  dispositions  are  as  follows  :— 

Garrison  at  Herbertshohe  under  Commander  Beresford  : 
four  naval  companies,  two  companies  infantry,  one  12- 
pounder  field-gun  from  His  Majesty's  Australian  Ship  Sydney, 
one  machine-gun  section,  detachment  Army  Medical  Corps. 

Garrison  at  Rabaul  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Paton : 
one  company  Naval  Reserves,  four  companies  infantry,  one 
machine-gun  section,  detachment  Army  Medical  Corps. 

The  balance  of  my  troops  will  be  held  in  reserve  on  board 
this  ship  in  Simpsonhafen. 

The  flag  will  be  hoisted  at  Rabaul  this  afternoon  at  three 
o'clock  and  my  Proclamation  read  with  as  much  ceremony 
as  possible.  The  whole  of  the  troops  available  will  parade, 
march  past,  and  salute  the  flag,  while  the  warships  in 
Simpsonhafen  will  co-operate  by  firing  a  royal  salute.  I  have 
appointed  an  officer  to  organise  native  police,  and  have  made 
necessary  arrangements  for  proper  administration  of  the 
territory. 

I  propose  for  the  present  to  make  my  headquarters  at 
Herbertshohe,  and  probably  later  on  at  Rabaul. 

Yesterday  I  forwarded  by  motor  cycle  orderly  to  the 
Acting  Governor  of  German  New  Guinea  a  formal  demand 
for  surrender.  He  is  not  either  at  Herbertshohe  or  Rabaul, 
but  has  retired  inland  about  ten  miles,  to  a  place  called 
Toma.  About  8  P.M.  my  messenger  returned  with  a  letter 
from  a  Government  official  stating  that  the  Acting  Governor 
would  reply  to  my  communication  at  4.30  P.M.  to-day.  In 
the  event  of  his  reply  not  being  satisfactory,  or  his  not  calling 
upon  me  in  response  to  my  request,  it  is  my  intention  to 
despatch  a  force  to  effect  his  arrest. 

I  understand  from  the  Admiral  that  he  intends  leaving, 
with  the  warships  Australia,  Melbourne,  and  Sydney,  for 
Sydney,  for  the  purpose  of  escorting  the  Australian  Expedi- 
tionary Force  to  Europe,  leaving  at  Simpsonhafen  the 
destroyers  and  submarines  for  our  protection.  It  seems 
likely,  therefore,  that  my  force  will  be  in  this  locality  for 
some  considerable  time.  I  therefore  ask,  seeing  that  I  am 
supplied  with  provisions  for  only  sixty  days,  that  the  neces- 
sary steps  be  taken  in  sufficient  time  to  replenish.  I  will 
have  an  estimate  of  requirements  prepared  and  forward 
to  you. 
448 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

The  health  of  the  troops  is  excellent,  there  not  being  a 
single  case  of  sickness  in  the  hospital. 

WILLIAM  HOLMES,  Colonel, 

Brigadier  Commanding. 
To  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
Melbourne. 


ENCLOSURE  2  IN  No.  16 

Government  House,  Rabaul,  New  Britain, 
September  14,  1914. 

SIR, — As  the  warships  are  not  leaving  here  for  Sydney 
until  to-morrow,  I  take  the  opportunity  of  forwarding  you 
some  further  information  as  to  our  doings  yesterday. 

The  flag  was  duly  hoisted  yesterday  (Sunday  afternoon) 
at  three  o'clock,  the  warships  in  the  harbour  co-operating 
by  firing  a  salute. 

The  ceremony  was  held  on  a  small  park  in  the  town  close 
to  the  wharf,  where  I  erected  a  temporary  flagstaff.  I 
paraded  all  available  troops,  and  also  men  whom  I  have 
engaged  for  the  native  police  force,  on  three  sides  of  a  square 
facing  the  flag.  The  Admiral  and  all  officers  of  the  fleet 
were  present  at  the  ceremony,  which  I  studied  to  make  as 
impressive  as  possible,  both  for  the  benefit  of  the  European 
residents  and  the  natives.  Immediately  upon  the  flag  being 
broken  the  troops  gave  a  royal  salute,  after  which  the  National 
Anthem  was  sung  by  all  present.  Three  cheers  were  then 
given  for  His  Majesty  the  King.  After  this  the  Proclama- 
tion, of  which  I  forward  you  herewith  a  copy,  was  read  by 
the  Brigade  Major,  and  the  whole  of  the  troops — Navy  and 
Army — native  police,  and  a  large  number  of  friendly  natives, 
marched  past  the  flag  in  column  of  route  and  saluted  it. 
Flagship's  band  attended. 

A  great  number  of  copies  of  Proclamation  in  English  and 
in  German  have  been  posted  in  conspicuous  places  throughout 
the  town,  and  copies  have  also  been  forwarded  to  Herbertshohe. 

Immediately  after  the  dismissal  of  the  parade  I  received 
a  message  from  the  Protector,  lying  off  Herbertshohe,  that 
the  German  troops  were  again  advancing  to  attack  that  place, 
which  was  garrisoned  by  four  companies  Naval  Reserves  and 

MILITARY  2  2  F  449 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

two  companies  infantry  under  Commander  Beresford.  I  im- 
mediately gave  orders  for  two  companies  infantry  to  stand 
by,  and  soon  afterwards  sent  them  on  board  the  Encounter 
to  reinforce  Herbertshohe  garrison,  Colonel  Watson  being 
sent  in  command.  From  reports  received,  however,  I  find 
that  the  attack  was  not  of  a  very  serious  character. 

About  five  o'clock  my  cyclist  orderly  returned  with  a 
letter  from  the  Acting  Governor  of  German  New  Guinea— 
Haber  by  name — reiterating  his  previous  statement  that  no 
resistance  would  be  offered  to  the  occupation,  but  that  he 
had  no  power  to  surrender  New  Britain  or  any  other  part 
of  the  German  possessions.  He  stated  he  had  no  objection 
to  meeting  me  and  discussing  the  situation.  From  his  letter 
I  find  that  he  has  retired  still  farther  into  the  mountain 
country  to  a  place  called  Baining.  I  regarded  his  reply  as 
unsatisfactory,  and  concluded  that  he  was  merely  temporising 
in  order  to  facilitate  his  escape.  I  therefore  determined, 
after  consulting  with  the  Admiral,  to  instruct  Colonel  Watson 
to  march  at  5  A.M.  on  the  I4th  (to-day)  with  four  companies 
infantry  and  two  machine-gun  sections  towards  Toma — 
about  ten  miles  from  Herbertshohe — and  endeavour  to  clear 
up  the  situation  and  effect  the  arrest  of  the  Governor. 

At  six  o'clock  this  morning  I  received  a  wireless  message 
from  Watson,  through  the  Encounter,  which  was  standing 
at  Herbertshohe,  that  he  had  arranged  with  the  Commander 
of  that  ship  to  shell  a  position  which  he  had  received  informa- 
tion was  occupied  in  some  strength  between  Herbertshohe 
and  Toma,  and  that  immediately  upon  the  cessation  of  the 
shelling  he  would  proceed  to  carry  out  my  orders  to  march 
on  Toma. 

The  shelling  by  the  ship  was  distinctly  heard  here  and 
continued  for  about  one  hour,  which  should  certainly  have 
a  great  moral  effect  upon  the  enemy's  troops.  I  have,  of 
course,  received  no  further  information  from  Colonel  Watson. 

About  ii  A.M.  an  English  Methodist  Missionary  stationed 
on  the  north  coast  at  Kabakada,  near  Talili  Bay,  reported 
that  a  new  road  had  lately  been  completed  from  Toma  westerly, 
a  distance  of  about  ninety  miles,  to  the  port  of  Pondo,  and 
that  he  had  reliable  information  that  the  Governor  and  the 
troops  with  him,  who  had  been  stationed  at  Toma  for  a  month 
past,  were  marching  to  the  coast  with  a  view  of  embarking 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

on  board  the  German  ship  Komet  for  conveyance  to  Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen,  in  German  New  Guinea.  This  information 
I  conveyed  to  the  Admiral,  and  steps  are  being  taken  to  at 
once  search  this  locality  by  means  of  destroyers. 

This  morning  I  arrested  twenty  officials  of  the  late  German 
Government ;  men  who  have  no  other  interests  here,  and 
whom  I  consider  an  element  of  danger,  as  I  have  strong  suspi- 
cion that  they  are  in  communication  with  the  Governor  and 
the  German  troops  still  in  the  field.  These,  together  with 
seventeen  other  Germans  now  on  board  the  Berrima  and 
about  thirteen  sent  up  from  Herbertshohe  yesterday,  will  be 
sent  to  the  fleet  to-day  and  taken  to  Sydney.  Many  of  these 
prisoners  aver  that  they  are  non-combatants,  but  merely 
planters  ;  but  they  are  German  reservists,  and,  I  have  every 
reason  to  believe,  were  engaged  fighting  against  us,  and  to 
allow  them  to  remain  would  only  hamper  my  administration. 
All  the  native  prisoners  who  have  been  taken  I  am  making 
use  of  for  working  purposes. 

The  Admiral  has  just  called  to  see  me,  and  states  that 
he  intends  leaving  for  Sydney  early  to-morrow  morning  with 
the  Australia,  Melbourne,  and  Sydney,  and  will  leave  here 
at  my  disposal  the  Encounter,  the  destroyers,  and  two  sub- 
marines, also  the  Protector,  and  that  probably  the  French 
warship  Montcalm  will  arrive  from  Noumea  and  co-operate. 

After  consultation  with  the  Admiral  it  has  been  decided 
not  to  move  my  force  from  this  place  until  matters  are  more 
settled,  and  that  an  expedition  will  then  be  undertaken  for 
the  capture  and  occupation  of  Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen,  in 
German  New  Guinea,  but  this  move  will  not  be  made  until 
after  consultation  with  Captain  Lewin,  of  the  Encounter, 
and  the  French  Admiral. 

Colonel  Paton  is  doing  good  work  as  Officer  Commanding 
Garrison  at  Rabaul.  Captain  Twynam  is  organising  the 
native  police  satisfactorily,  Lieutenant  Ravenscroft  is  acting 
as  Provost -Marshal,  and  Lieutenant  Manning  (a  Sydney 
barrister)  is  carrying  out  the  duties  of  Assistant  Judge 
Advocate. 

The  water  supply  at  Rabaul  is  fairly  satisfactory,  but 
precaution  is  taken  to  boil  the  water  before  use. 

I  have  just  received  information  from  Colonel  Paton 
that,  before  the  seat  of  government  was  removed  from  here 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

to  Toma,  a  large  amount  of  cash  was  deposited  by  Treasury 
officials  for  safe  keeping  at  the  offices  of  some  German  com- 
panies. This  is  being  investigated,  and  Paton  states  that 
he  believes  he  is  now  in  fair  way  to  recover  about  £3000. 

I  have  not  yet  received  report  as  to  supplies  required 
for  the  population  here,  but,  as  soon  as  I  ascertain  what  is 
necessary,  I  propose  to  get  the  fleet  to  wire  for  same  to  be 
forwarded  to  merchants  or  storekeepers  here  under  my 
guarantee  for  payment. 

The  health  of  the  troops  still  continues  satisfactory,  and 
I  do  not  anticipate  any  difficulty  in  carrying  on  efficiently 
the  administration  of  this  territory.  I  will  take  every  oppor- 
tunity of  keeping  you  informed  from  time  to  time  of  the 
progress  of  events. 

A  German  Imperial  flag,  which  I  removed  from  the 
Government  Administrative  Buildings  here,  is  being  despatched 
to  the  Lord  Mayor  of  Sydney,  with  a  suggestion  that  he  might 
make  use  of  it  in  any  way  he  thinks  best  for  the  purpose  of 
stimulating  recruiting  for  the  additional  forces  which  I  have 
no  doubt  Australia  will  be  despatching. 

WILLIAM  HOLMES,  Colonel, 
Commanding  Australian  Naval  and  Military 
Expedition. 

To  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
Melbourne. 


PROCLAMATION 

PROCLAMATION  ON  BEHALF  OF  His  MAJESTY  GEORGE  THE 
FIFTH,  BY  THE  GRACE  OF  GOD,  OF  THE  UNITED 
KINGDOM  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  IRELAND,  AND  OF 
THE  DOMINIONS  OVERSEAS,  KING,  DEFENDER  OF  THE 
FAITH,  EMPEROR  OF  INDIA  : 

BY  COLONEL  WILLIAM  HOLMES,  D.S.O.,  V.D.,  BRIGADIER 
COMMANDING  His  MAJESTY'S  AUSTRALIAN  NAVAL  AND 
MILITARY  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCE. 

Whereas  the  forces  under  my  command  have  occupied 
the  Island  of  New  Britain  : 
452 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

And  whereas  upon  such  occupation  the  authority  of  the 
German  Government  has  ceased  to  exist  therein  : 

And  whereas  it  has  become  essential  to  provide  for 
proper  government  of  the  said  Colony,  and  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  lives  and  property  of  the  peaceful  inhabitants 
thereof  : 

Now  I,  WILLIAM  HOLMES,  Companion  of  the  Distinguished 
Service  Order,  Colonel  in  His  Majesty's  Forces,  Brigadier 
Commanding  the  aforesaid  Expeditionary  Force,  do  hereby 
declare  and  proclaim  as  follows  : — 

(1)  From  and  after  the  date  of  these  presents  the  Island 
of  New  Britain  and  its  dependencies  are  held  by  me  in  military 
occupation  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty  the  King. 

(2)  War  will  be  waged  only  against  the  armed  forces  of 
the  German  Empire  and  its  Allies  in  the  present  war. 

(3)  The  lives  and  private  property  of  peaceful  inhabitants 
will  be  protected,  and  the  laws  and  customs  of  the  Colony 
will  remain  in  force  so  far  as  is  consistent  with  the  military 
situation. 

(4)  If  the  needs  of  the  troops  demand  it,  private  property 
may  be  requisitioned.     Such  property  will  be  paid  for  at  its 
fair  value. 

(5)  Certain  officials  of  the  late  Government  may  be  re- 
tained, if  they  so  desire,  at  their  usual  salaries. 

(6)  In  return  for  such  protection  it  is  the  duty  of  all 
inhabitants  to  behave  in  an  absolutely  peaceful  manner,  to 
carry  on  their  ordinary  pursuits  so  far  as  is  possible,  to  take 
no  part  directly  or  indirectly  in  any  hostilities,  to    abstain 
from   communication   with   His   Majesty's   enemies,    and  to 
render  obedience  to  such  orders  as  may  be  promulgated. 

(7)  All  male  inhabitants  of  European  origin  are  required 
to  take  the  oath  of  neutrality  prescribed,  at  the  garrison 
headquarters ;     and    all    firearms,    ammunition,    and    war 
material  in  the  possession  or  control  of  inhabitants  are  to 
be  surrendered  forthwith,  as  is  also  all  public  property  of 
the  late  Government. 

(8)  Non-compliance  with    the  terms    of    this    Proclama- 
tion, and  disobedience  of  such  orders  as  from  time  to  time 
may  be  promulgated,  will  be  dealt  with  according  to  military 
law. 

(9)  It  is  hereby  notified  that   this   Proclamation   takes 

453 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

effect  in  the  whole  Island  of  New  Britain  and  its  dependencies 
from  this  date. 

Given  at  Government  House,  Rabaul,  this  twelfth  day  of 
September,  1914. 

WILLIAM  HOLMES,  Brigadier  Commanding. 
Witness : 

FRANCIS  HERITAGE,  Major, 
Brigade  Major. 


ENCLOSURE  3  IN  No.  16 

Government  House,  Rabaul,  New  Britain, 
September  19,  1914. 

SIR, — In  my  letter  to  you,  dated  September  14,  I  men- 
tioned that  I  had  instructed  Colonel  Watson  to  march  with 
four  companies  of  infantry  and  two  machine-gun  sections 
towards  Toma,  with  instructions  to  effect  the  arrest  of  the 
Governor.  Watson's  advance  from  Herbertshohe  was  pre- 
ceded by  the  shelling  of  the  ridge  with  the  guns  of  the  Encounter. 
This  shelling  evidently  had  a  very  good  effect,  as  before  Watson 
reached  Toma  he  was  met  by  a  flag  of  truce  from  the  Governor, 
who  offered  to  come  in  and  confer  with  me,  and  requested 
in  the  meantime  an  armistice  for  four  hours.  This  conces- 
sion was  at  first  refused  by  Watson,  but  afterwards  arrange- 
ments were  made  by  him  for  the  Governor  to  meet  me  at 
Herbertshohe  on  the  following  morning  at  n  o'clock. 

At  9.30  A.M.  on  the  I5th  instant  I  proceeded  to  Herberts- 
hohe from  here,  being  accompanied  by  Major  Heritage, 
Commander  Stevenson,  Royal  Navy,  and  the  other  members 
of  my  staff.  The  interview  with  the  Governor,  whose  name 
is  Dr.  Haber,  continued  until  3  P.M.,  when  certain  conditions 
of  surrender  were  tentatively  agreed  to,  the  Governor  stating 
that  he  preferred  to  consult  his  military  officers  before  actually 
executing  any  agreement.  I  therefore  gave  him  a  typewritten 
copy  of  the  conditions  we  had  verbally  agreed  to,  and  arranged 
to  meet  him  again  at  the  same  place  at  12  noon  on  Thursday, 
1 7th  instant. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  while  I  was  parleying  with 
the  Governor  as  to  terms  of  surrender,  the  French  warship 
Montcalm,  with  the  French  Admiral  on  board,  passed  in  full 
454 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

view  from  our  meeting  place  at  Herbertshohe,  and  I  had 
great  pleasure  in  drawing  the  Governor's  attention  to  her 
presence,  at  which  he  seemed  rather  disturbed.  I  may  state 
that  the  Governor  was  received  at  Herbertshohe  by  a  guard 
of  honour  of  100,  which  remained  in  attendance  throughout 
the  interview  and  saluted  him  on  his  departure. 

In  accordance  with  the  arrangements  above  referred  to, 
I  again  met  the  Governor  at  Herbertshohe  on  the  I7th  instant, 
when  terms  of  capitulation  were  discussed  and,  in  a  few  minor 
points,  amended.  They  were  then  signed  by  the  Governor 
and  myself,  the  former's  signature  being  witnessed  by  the 
German  Military  Commandant  (Von  Klewitz)  and  mine  by 
Commander  Stevenson,  Royal  Navy. 

Upon  my  return  to  Simpsonhafen  at  about  7  P.M.,  I 
arranged  with  Captain  Lewin,  of  the  Encounter,  to  despatch 
to  you,  through  the  flagship  Australia,  the  following  wire- 
less message  : — 

'  Have  met  Governor,  who  states  has  no  power  formally 
surrender  any  portion  German  territory;  has  agreed  in 
writing  cease  further  resistance  and  transfer  administration 
of  whole  German  New  Guinea  to  me  on  following  terms  : — 

'  "  Armed  forces  now  in  field  surrender  at  once  with 
military  honours ;  Governor  leaves  here  on  parole,  no 
obstacle  return  Germany ;  officers  of  regular  Army 
remain  prisoners  of  war  ;  all  others  on  taking  oath  of 
neutrality  allowed  return  their  plantations  ;  black  troops 
join  native  Constabulary  now  being  organised  ;  all  moneys 
and  property  late  Administration  transferred  to  me ; 
civil  officials  not  required  by  me,  or  who  will  not  take 
oath  neutrality,  deported  to  Australia,  but  no  obstacle 
returning  Germany ;  any  British  subjects  now  prisoners 
be  released  forthwith." 

'  Governor's  undertaking  does  not  cover  any  offensive 
action  by  German  cruisers,  with  which  communication 
destroyed  ;  am  now  administering  from  Rabaul ;  will  visit 
Wilhelmshafen  and  other  parts  first  opportunity ;  every- 
thing satisfactory,  health  of  troops  excellent ;  supplies  for 
population  ordered  through  Admiral  urgently  required ; 
additional  rations,  boots  and  lightest  clothing  for  troops, 
also  £5000  for  pay,  necessary  ;  civil  officials  deported  to  be 

455 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

paid  three  months'  salary  from  October  i,  also  travelling 
expenses  to  Europe  for  selves  and  families,  to  be  refunded 
from  German  Colonial  subsidy  by  Governor/ 

Attached  hereto  I  am  forwarding  you  a  copy  of  the  com- 
plete agreement  arrived  at.  I  intend  to  retain  possession  of 
the  original  until  after  I  take  possession  of  Friedrich  Wilhelms- 
hafen  and  other  places  which  I  may  find  it  necessary  to  visit. 

I  have  taken  possession  of  Government  House  at  this 
place,  and  propose  to  carry  out  the  administration  of  the 
Possessions  from  this  point,  and,  in  order  to  enable  me  to 
devote  all  my  attention  to  this  duty,  I  propose  to  leave  the 
command  of  the  troops  to  Watson. 

I  mentioned  that  I  was  sending  a  large  number  of  prisoners 
to  Sydney  by  the  fleet,  but  last  night  I  received  a  message 
from  the  Admiral,  who  was  on  his  way  from  here  to  Australia, 
that  he  was  returning  to  this  place  and  would  arrive  this  day 
about  4  P.M.,  so  that  I  shall  now  have  the  prisoners  who  were 
sent  away  back  again  on  my  hands.  In  view  of  the  agree- 
ment arrived  at  I  shall  probably  be  able  to  release  some 
of  these  to-morrow  if  they  are  prepared  to  take  the  oath  of 
neutrality.  The  Governor  himself  will  probably  arrive  in 
Rabaul  on  Monday  next,  and  I  have  arranged  to  afford  him 
accommodation  in  the  Deputy  Governor's  quarters  until  a 
ship  is  available  for  sending  him  to  Australia. 

I  understand  that  the  sudden  change  of  plans  on  the 
part  of  the  fleet  in  returning  here  was  due  to  information 
that  a  couple  of  days  ago  the  German  cruisers  Scharnhorst 
and  Gneisenau  had  passed  Apia  and  were  steaming  in  a  north- 
westerly direction.  No  doubt  it  is  the  intention  of  the  fleet 
to  follow  up  these  ships,  but  this  will  not  be  confirmed  until 
I  see  the  Admiral. 

I  do  not  know  yet  what  amount  of  money  will  be  trans- 
ferred to  me  by  the  Governor  when  the  surrender  of  troops 
takes  place,  but,  so  far,  I  have  managed  to  get  possession 
in  the  town  of  45,000  marks,  all  of  which  is  believed  to  be 
German  Government  money.  This,  and  a  great  deal  more, 
will  be  required  for  carrying  on  the  Government  of  the  place. 

You  will  remember  the  only  money  I  took  with  me  for 
pay  of  the  men  was  £5000,  and  as  there  are  good  stores  here 
the  men  are  applying  for  advances  on  their  pay,  principally 
in  order  to  purchase  thinner  shirts  and  other  clothing,  as 
456 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

i 

that  issued  them  by  the  Government  is  absolutely  unfitted 
for  wear  within  the  tropics,  so  that  the  money  I  now  have 
with  me  will  soon  be  exhausted  ;  I  shall  be  glad,  therefore, 
if  you  will  see  that  my  request  for  further  funds  is  attended 
to  without  delay. 

Another  most  important  matter  is  the  question  of  supplies, 
particularly  for  the  population.  The  Admiral  will,  no  doubt, 
long  ere  this  have  despatched  to  you  the  wire  I  suggested 
being  sent  ordering  these  goods,  and  I  trust  that  they  may 
now  be  on  the  water,  as  there  are  so  many  natives,  consisting 
principally  of  Kanakas,  Chinamen,  and  Japanese,  whose 
staple  food  is  rice,  of  which  this  town  is  almost  cleared  out ; 
and  unless  food  supplies  are  replenished  at  once  there  is 
certain  trouble  in  store  for  me  at  the  hands  of  the  native 
population. 

To  fill  the  vacancy  caused  by  the  death  of  Captain  B.  C.  A. 
Pockley,  killed  in  action,  I  applied  for  and  obtained  the 
consent  of  the  Admiral  for  him  to  transfer  the  services  of 
Dr.  G.  C.  Byrne,  who  has  been  engaged  on  the  Encounter  at 
intelligence  duties.  I  have  appointed  Dr.  Byrne  a  Captain 
in  the  force  at  the  usual  rate  of  pay. 

I  have  made  a  complete  inspection  of  the  whole  of  the 
garrison,  including  the  barracks,  hospitals  (European  and 
native),  headquarters,  native  constabulary,  administrative 
buildings,  post  office,  customs  house,  legal  departments,  and 
all  other  places,  and  am  gradually  getting  everything  reduced 
to  order.  I  propose  to  appoint  Lieutenant  Fry,  whom  I 
attached  as  Adjutant  to  the  '  Kanowma  '  contingent,  and 
who  will  return  here,  I  hope,  in  a  day  or  two,  Treasurer 
under  the  Administration,  and  it  will  be  his  duty  to  receive 
money,  property,  and  documents  to  be  surrendered  by  'the 
Governor  on  Monday  next. 

September  21,  1914. 

I  have  just  received  information  from  the  Admiral  that 
an  opportunity  for  despatching  a  mail  by  the  Murex  will 
occur  this  afternoon,  so  I  shall  complete  your  letter. 

Yesterday  I  received  from  the  Admiral  your  inquiry  as 
to  supplies  required  for  the  troops  here,  and  immediately 
afterwards  requested  the  Admiral  to  despatch  the  following 
reply  to  you  on  my  behalf  : 

457 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

'  Recommend  in  addition  to  supplies  already  ordered 
through  Admiral  for  population,  that  supplies  for  troops 
similar  in  quantities  to  those  originally  placed  on  Berrima 
be  forwarded,  but  preserved  meats  substituted  for  frozen. 
Also  four  hundredweight  malt,  and  fifty-six  pounds  hops, 
kerosene  instead  of  candles.  More  clothing  of  lightest  possible 
kind  required,  previous  supply  unbearable  in  tropics  ;  one  pair 
of  boots  per  man  needed.  Merchants  here  propose  ordering 
goods  through  Justus  Scharff,  York  Street,  Sydney,  who 
should  be  encouraged  to  supply,  and  thus  restore  normal 
conditions.  Return  freights  copra  assured  if  .market  not 
seriously  dislocated.  Require  also  five  thousand  pounds  for 
pay  for  troops/ 

I  have  suggested  preserved  meats  because  there  are  very 
poor  facilities  on  shore  here  for  storing  frozen  meat.  At 
present  we  are  depending  almost  entirely  on  the  ship's  re- 
frigerating chamber,  but  as  the  Berrima  may  be  ordered 
back  at  anv  time,  and  we  will  have  to  depend  entirely  on 
our  shore  provisions,  then  preserved  meats  will  be  the  best. 

The  malt  and  hops  are  required  for  making  yeast  for 
baking  bread.  I  have  already  erected  on  shore  bread-baking 
plant,  in  order  to  afford  the  garrisons  a  change  of  food  from 
the  hard  biscuits.  Candles  are  of  no  use  whatever  on  account  of 
the  high  temperature.  Kerosene  is  best  for  lighting  purposes. 

I  wish  again  to  impress  upon  you  the  fact  that  the  thick 
clothing  in  use  in  Australia,  which  was  issued  to  the  troops 
for  this  expedition,  is  absolutely  unbearable  in  this  climate, 
and  most  of  the  men  have,  therefore,  been  compelled  to  buy 
lighter  clothing  from  the  stores  here,  out  of  their  private 
purses,  so  please  arrange  that  only  the  very  lightest  possible 
clothing  be  sent.  One  thousand  five  hundred  pairs  boots, 
of  sizes  similar  to  those  previously  issued,  should  also  be 
despatched. 

I  am  endeavouring  to  restore,  as  soon  as  possible,  normal 
conditions  of  affairs  as  regards  supplies  for  the  population, 
and  I  have  induced  the  principal  merchants  to  despatch 
orders  for  goods  to  Messrs.  Justus  Scharff  &  Company,  York 
Street,  Sydney,1  assuring  them  that  there  was  very  little 
risk,  as  the  trade  routes  to  these  parts  were  quite  open.  I 
have  also  written  myself  to  Justus  Scharff,  urging  them  to 

1  I  believe  these  people  are  British.     This  might  be  ascertained. — W.  H. 
458 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

comply  with  these  orders,  and  I  would  be  glad  if  you  also 
would  communicate  with  that  firm  and  encourage  them  to 
do  all  they  can  to  open  up  trade  with  these  islands.  The 
merchants  inform  me  that  there  is  a  large  quantity  of  copra 
to  be  shipped  away  to  market,  and  opportunity  of  so  doing 
could  be  taken  when  the  ship  by  which  my  provisions  are 
conveyed  is  returning. 

Five  thousand  pounds  (£5000)  additional  will,  I  estimate, 
be  required  for  pay  of  the  troops  at  the  different  garrisons. 
I  shall  continue  to  pay  them  in  British  coin,  and  shall  reserve 
the  moneys  which  I  am  to  take  over  from  the  late  German 
Administration  for  carrying  on  the  government  of  this  place. 

Yesterday  I  received  through  the  Admiral  a  notification 
from  the  Naval  Board  that  the  Government  had  appointed 
me  Administrator.  This  fact  has  been  publicly  announced 
here,  and  I  have  entered  upon  the  duties. 

As  far  as  I  am  aware  at  present,  there  are  only  about 
£50  worth  of  postage  stamps  of  the  late  German  Adminis- 
tration available.  These  I  am  having  marked  '  G.  R.  I./ 
by  means  of  printing  press  which  I  have  discovered  here, 
but  I  would  suggest  that  steps  be  at  once  taken  to  furnish 
me  with  Australian  postage  stamps,  say,  £300  worth,  at  the 
earliest  opportunity. 

Yesterday  I  dealt  with  about  fifty-five  prisoners  in  terms 
of  the  agreement  of  capitulation.  Many  of  them  have  taken 
the  oath  of  neutrality  and  returned  to  their  farms.  Others, 
particularly  officials  of  the  late  German  Administration,  are 
prisoners  on  parole,  whom  I  shall  despatch  to  Sydney  at  the 
earliest  opportunity,  as  keeping  them  here,  where  they 
can  get  into  touch  with  natives,  is  not  conducive  to  good 
administration . 

The  formal  surrender  of  the  German  troops  is  taking 
place  to-day  at  Herbertshohe,  and  I  am  expecting  the  Governor 
and  a  large  number  of  prisoners  to  arrive  here  this  evening. 
I  have  arranged  for  quarters  for  the  Governor  until  he  can 
be  shipped  away,  and  the  prisoners  will  be  dealt  with  in  terms 
of  the  agreement.  Until  this  evening  I  shall  not  know  what 
amount  of  money  will  be  handed  over  by  the  Governor,  and 
this  mail  closes  at  4  P.M.  to-day.  The  information  must 
be  deferred  until  my  next  letter  to  you,  or  possibly  I  may 
advise  you  by  wireless. 

459 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Early  to-morrow  morning  I  am  leaving  here  for  Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen,  escorted  by  the  Australia,  Encounter,  French 
flagship  Montcalm,  and  possibly  a  destroyer.  I  am  taking 
with  me  four  companies  of  infantry,  under  Colonel  Watson, 
and  will  probably  detach  two  companies  as  garrison  at  that 
place,  and  return  here  in  about  a  week  to  resume  my  adminis- 
trative duties. 

After  conference  with  the  Admiral,  it  has  been  decided, 
on  arrival  at  Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen,  to  send  Captain 
Travers  (my  Intelligence  Officer),  accompanied  by  Lieutenant 
Mayer  (a  German  regular  officer,  who  was  taken  prisoner), 
ashore  with  a  copy  of  the  terms  of  surrender  in  English  and 
another  in  German,  for  presentation  to  the  head  official 
there,  with  an  intimation  that  I  have  come  to  take  possession 
and  occupy  the  place  in  terms  of  the  agreement,  and  also 
secure  an  assurance  from  him  that  there  will  be  no  resistance 
to  such  occupation,  and  that  the  harbour  is  not  mined  or 
defended.  In  this  matter  I  do  not  anticipate  that  there  will 
be  any  difficulties,  as  the  Governor's  surrender  included  the 
whole  of  the  German  possessions  lately  under  his  administra- 
tion, including  the  mainland  of  New  Guinea. 

The  health  of  the  troops,  and  also  the  population,  con- 
tinues good.  The  European  hospital  at  the  top  of  the  hill, 
near  Government  House,  has  only  just  been  opened,  and  is 
most  complete  in  all  its  fittings  and  appointments.  At  the 
present  time  it  is  occupied  by  seven  German  sailors  from 
the  Planet,  who  are,  of  course,  prisoners,  and  another  German 
prisoner,  whose  right  hand  was  shot  off  in  the  engagement 
at  Herbertshohe  on  the  nth  instant.  There  are  no  men  of 
our  own  inmates  of  that  institution.  In  the  native  hospital 
there  are  131  cases,  and  I  understand  this  is  about  the  usual 
number.  This  place  is  controlled  by  two  German  doctors, 
who  are,  I  understand,  very  clever  at  treating  native  diseases, 
and,  indeed,  tropical  diseases  of  all  kinds,  and  I  propose,  if 
they  will  remain,  to  retain  them  in  their  positions. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Paton  is  still  commanding  the  garrison 
at  Rabaul,  and  Commander  Beresford,  R.A.N.,  is  in  charge  at 
Herbertshohe,  and  I  shall  probably  leave  Major  Martin,  of  the 
infantry  battalion,  in  command  at  Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen. 

As  my  duties  as  Administrator  increase,  I  may  possibly 
find  it  necessary  to  place  Lieutenant-Colonel  Watson  in 
460 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

military  command,  so  as  to  afford  me  full  opportunity  of 
attending  to  the  other  work,  but  I  will  keep  you  fully  advised 
from  time  to  time,  as  opportunity  offers,  of  any  such  changes. 

WILLIAM  HOLMES,  Colonel, 

Administrator. 

To  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
Melbourne. 


TERMS  OF  CAPITULATION 

Made  this  iyth  day  of  September  1914  between  Colonel 
William  Holmes,  D.S.O.,  V.D.,  Brigadier  Commanding  the 
Australian  Naval  and  Military  Expeditionary  Force,  on 
behalf  of  His  Most  Gracious  Majesty  George  the  Fifth,  of 
the  first  part,  and  Herr  E.  Haber,  Acting  Governor  of  the 
German  Possessions  known  as  Deutsch  Neu  Guinea,  on 
behalf  of  the  Imperial  German  Government,  of  the  second 
part. 

Whereas  the  principal  centres  of  Deutsch  Neu  Guinea 
have  been  occupied  by  an  overwhelming  force  under  the 
command  of  the  said  Colonel  Holmes  : 

And  whereas  the  said  Acting  Governor  has  no  authority 
to  surrender  any  portion  of  the  German  Possessions  under 
his  administration,  but,  in  view  of  the  said  occupation  by 
the  said  overwhelming  force,  the  said  Acting  Governor  is 
prepared  to  give  an  assurance  that  all  military  resistance 
to  such  occupation  in  Deutsch  Neu  Guinea  shall  cease  forth- 
with: 

Now,  the  following  terms  and  conditions  are  solemnly 
agreed  upon  between  the  said  contracting  parties  : — 

(1)  The  name  Deutsch  Neu  Guinea  (German  New  Guinea) 
includes  the  whole  of  the  German  Possessions  in  the  Pacific 
Ocean  lately  administered  from  Rabaul  by  the  said  Acting 
Governor,  on  behalf  of  the  German  Imperial  Government, 
and  the  said  Possessions  are  hereafter  referred  to  as  '  The 
Colony/ 

(2)  All  military  resistance  to  the  said  military  occupation 
of  the  Colony  shall  ceaser  forthwith. 

(3)  The  armed  German  and  native  forces  now  in  the  field 

461 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

are  to  be  surrendered  at  Herbertshohe  on  the  2ist  day  of 
September  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  forenoon. 
Military  honours  will  be  granted. 

(4)  Upon  the  said  Acting  Governor  giving  his  parole  to 
take  no  further  part  directly  or  indirectly  in  the  present 
war,  no  obstacle  will  be  placed  in  the  way  of  his  returning 
to  Germany.     Such  parole  shall  not  prevent  the  said  Acting 
Governor  from  tendering  to  the   Imperial  Government   at 
Berlin  such  advice  as  he  may  deem  proper  with  regard  to 
terms  of  peace. 

(5)  Such  of  the  officers  of  the  said  forces  in  the  field  as 
are  officers  of  the  German  regular  forces  will  be  treated  as 
prisoners  of  war  in  the  usual  manner.     Such  of  the  officers 
of  the  said  forces  as  are  not  officers  of  the  German  regular 
forces,  but  whose  usual  occupation  is  civil,   on  taking  an 
oath  of  neutrality  for  the  duration  of  the  present  war,  will 
be  released  and  permitted  to  return  to  their  homes  and  ordi- 
nary avocations,  except  where  such  avocations  are  official, 
in  which  case  the  paragraphs  10  and  n  hereof  will  apply. 

(6)  As  the  said  Acting  Governor  gives  his  assurance  that 
none  of  the  white  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  now 
in  the  field  belong  to  the  regular  forces  of  the  German  Empire, 
such  white  non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  upon  taking 
the  said  oath  of  neutrality,  will  be  released  and  permitted  to 
resume  their  ordinary  avocations,  except  where  such  avoca- 
tions are  official,  in  which  case  the  terms  of  paragraphs  10 
and  ii  hereof  will  apply. 

(7)  As  it  is  understood  that  the  safety  of  the  white  popu- 
lation depends  to  an  extent  on  the  existence  of  a  native 
constabulary,  that  portion  of  the  armed  native  constabulary 
which  now  forms  part  of  the  German  forces  in  the  field, 
if   found   satisfactory,    will   be   transferred   to   the   Military 
Administration . 

(8)  As  the  administration  of  the  Colony  during  the  military 
occupation  will  be  conducted  by  the  British  military  com- 
mander, all  moneys  and  properties  of  the  late  Administration 
are  to  be  handed  over  to  the  said  Colonel  Holmes,  Brigadier 
Commanding. 

(9)  During  the  said  military  occupation  the  local  laws 
and  customs  will  remain  in  force  so  far  as  is  consistent  with 
the  military  situation. 

462 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

(10)  As  it  is  intended  that  administration  shall  be  carried 
on  under  the  control  of  British  officers,  subject  to  the  suc- 
ceeding paragraph,  such  only  of  the  civil  officials  of  the  late 
German  Administration  as  it  may  be  considered  necessary 
to  retain  in  an  advisory  capacity  will  be  continued  in  their 
offices.  Officials  so  retained  will  be  required  to  take  the  oath 
of  neutrality  and  their  former  salaries  will  be  continued. 
Officials  not  so  retained,  and  those  who  refuse  to  take  the 
said  oath,  will  be  deported  to  Australia,  but  will  have  no 
obstacle  placed  in  the  way  of  their  returning  thence  to  Germany 
as  soon  as  possible. 

(n)  For  the  protection  of  the  white  population  against 
the  natives,  the  German  officials  now  in  charge  of  outlying 
portions  of  the  Colony  will  continue  in  their  official  capacities 
until  relieved  by  the  Military  Administration. 

(12)  Any  British  subjects  at  present  imprisoned  or  held 
in  duress  in  the  said  Colony  are  to  be  released  and  returned 
to  their  homes  and  former  positions  forthwith.  This  does 
not  apply  to  such  persons  (if  any)  who  may  be  serving  a 
sentence  imposed  by  a  criminal  court  of  competent  jurisdiction. 

In  witness  thereof  the  said  contracting  parties  .of  this 
first  and  second  parts  have  hereunto  set  their  hands  this 
I7th  day  of  September  1914. 
Witness  to  signature  of  E.  Haber,  HABER. 

VON  KLEWITZ. 

Witnesses  to  signature  of  W.  Holmes,       WILLIAM  HOLMES. 
J.  B.  STEVENSON. 
FRANCIS  HERITAGE, 
Brigade  Major. 

Addendum. 

The  contracting  parties  further  agree  that  all  civil  officials, 
whether  they  take  the  oath  of  neutrality  or  not,  be  entitled 
to  receive  at  least  their  three  months'  pay  from  October  i, 
1914,  out  of  the  funds  of  the  Colony,  and  also  an  advance 
on  travelling  expenses  for  returning  home  according  to  the 
regulations  in  force  under  German  rule.  It  is  further  agreed 
that  they  shall  have  proper  facilities  for  arranging  their 
personal  affairs  in  the  Colony. 

The  Governor  promises  that  the  amounts  expended 

463 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

under  this  head  will  be  refunded  by  the  German  Imperial 
Government,  out  of  the  yearly  Colonial  subsidy. 

The  Brigadier,  promises  that  proper  care  be  taken  in 
order  to  conduct  women  and  children  of  deported  officials 
to  the  place  where  their  men  are. 

All  claims  due  against  the  German  Administration  are 
to  be  paid  for  out  of  the  funds  of  the  Colony. 

It  is  expressly  understood  that  the  papers  relating  to 
the  personal  status  of  the  officials  of  the  Colony  shafl.  be 
handed  over  to  a  German  official  designated  by  the  Governor. 

E.  HABER. 
WILLIAM  HOLMES. 


No.  19 

The  Governor-General  of  Australia  to  the  Secretary 

of  State 

Governor-General's  Office,  Melbourne, 

November  n,  1914. 

SIR, — I  have  the  honour  to  forward  herewith,  for  your  in- 
formation, copies  of  a  despatch,  dated  Rabaul,  September  26, 
1914,  received  from  Colonel  W.  Holmes,  D.S.O.,  V.D.,  Com- 
manding Naval  and  Military  Expedition. — I  have,  etc. 

R.  M.  FERGUSON,  Governor-General. 


ENCLOSURE  IN  No.  19 

Government  House,  Rabaul,  New  Britain, 
•September  26,  1914. 

SIR,— I  have  just  returned  from  Kaiser  Wilhelmsland,  and 
beg  to  confirm  the  wireless  message  despatched  by  me  to 
you  from  Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen,  on  24th  instant,  which 
ran  as  follows  : — 

'  Troops  under  my  command  occupied  Kaiser  Wilhelms- 
land to-day  without  opposition.  Flag  hoisted,  Proclamation 
issued  ;  principal  official  absent.  Four  officials  and  thirteen 
other  Germans  surrendered.  All  subscribed  oath  neutrality. 
The  officials  will  be  temporarily  engaged  assist  Administra- 
tion ;  others  are  planters,  missionaries,  business  men.  Forty 
fighting  men  left  Wilhelmshafen  fortnight  ago  reinforce 
464 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

German  troops,  New  Britain,  but  arrived  after  capitulation — 
now  prisoners  at  Rabaul.  Found  private  stores  well  stocked. 
Health  troops  excellent.  Returning  Rabaul. — HOLMES/ 

At  Wilhelmshafen  I  left  as  garrison  one  and  a  half  company 
infantry  and  half  company  naval  reserves,  with  500  rounds 
ammunition  per  rifle  and  two  months'  supplies.  I  secured 
the  commodious  stores  of  the  New  Guinea  Company  as  barracks 
for  the  troops,  and  also  suitable  premises  for  a  hospital.  Every- 
thing was  quiet,  and  I  do  not  anticipate  that  any  trouble 
will  arise  there,  but  the  Officer  Commanding  the  garrison 
(Major  Martin)  has  been  instructed  to  construct  defences 
against  boat  landings  and  take  all  possible  precautions. 

The  whole  of  the  European  residents,  who  were  Germans, 
surrendered  immediately,  and,  as  stated  in  my  telegraphic 
message,  the  oath  of  neutrality  was  administered  to  each. 
The  principal  official  was  not  available  ;  I  was  informed 
that  he  had  two  days  previously  proceeded  into  the  country 
on  a  punitive  expedition  against  some  natives  who  had  been 
giving  trouble,  but  of  this  I  am  in  doubt.  However,  Major 
Martin  has  instructions  to  send  for  him  or  secure  him  as 
soon  as  he  comes  in.  Amongst  the  German  residents  was 
a  medical  man  who  has  charge  of  both  European  and  native 
hospitals,  and  I  have  instructed  Captain  Byrne — the  Medical 
Officer  whom  I  left  there  with  the  garrison — to  use  his  own 
judgment  as  to  whether  it  will  be  necessary  to  continue  the 
services  temporarily  of  the  German  officer  or  to  dispense  with 
them. 

The  ships  did  not  arrive  at  Wilhelmshafen  until  11.15  A.M., 
and  the  whole  of  the  business  of  hoisting  flag,  issuing  Pro- 
clamation, landing  and  posting  garrison  and  landing  stores, 
was  completed  in  six  hours,  and  the  Berrima  left  this  place 
at  5.15  P.M.,  reaching  Rabaul  about  2  P.M.  to-day. 

For  your  information,  I  recapitulate  hereunder  my  dis- 
positions of  the  troops  under  command  : — 

Garrison  at  Rabaul 

Officer  Commanding,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Paton. 

Four  companies  infantry. 

One  machine-gun  section. 

Detachment  Army  Medical  Corps  (Captain  Maguire). 

MILITARY  2  2  G  465 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 

Garrison  at  Herbertshohe 

Officer  Commanding,  Commander  Beresford,  R.A.N. 

Four  companies  naval  reserves. 

One  machine-gun  section. 

Detachment  Army  Medical  Corps  (Captain  Donaldson). 

Garrison  at  Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen 
Officer  Commanding,  Major  Martin. 
Half  company  naval  reserves. 
One  and  a  half  company  infantry. 
Detachment    Army    Medical    Corps    (Captain    G.    C. 
Byrne). 

Reserve  on  Board  '  Berrima  ' 

Officer  Commanding,  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  W.  Russell 

Watson. 

Infantry  regimental  staff. 
Two  and  a  half  companies  infantry. 
One  and  a  half  company  naval  reserves. 
Detachment  Army  Medical  Corps. 

I  find  on  my  return  to-day  that,  during  my  absence,  the 
oil  ship  Murex  had  left  for  Sydney,  having  on  board  two 
German  officials  and  thirty  prisoners,  under  a  guard  con- 
sisting of  one  officer  (Lieutenant  Partridge),  one  sergeant, 
one  corporal,  eighteen  privates,  and  one  private  of  the  Army 
Medical  Corps.  The  Officer  Commanding  the  garrison  here 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  Paton)  furnished  Lieutenant  Partridge 
with  a  letter  to  the  District  Commandant  at  Sydney,  con- 
taining a  complete  list  of  the  prisoners  in  question. 

The  amount  of  money  handed  over  by  the  German 
Governor  up  to  the  present  is,  I  find  to-day,  about  400,000 
marks — £20,000.  I  have  appointed  an  officer  Treasurer, 
and  he  is  engaged  making  up  the  books,  which,  as  far  as 
I  can  ascertain,  have  not  been  balanced  for  about  two  years. 

The  officers  I  have  placed  in  charge  of  the  legal  work, 
customs,  police,  and  postal  services  are  hard  at  work  restor- 
ing order  out  of  chaos,  and  I  will  keep  you  supplied  from  time 
to  time  with  progress  reports  of  the  whole  administration. 

The  ex-Governor,  whom  I  have  permitted  to  remain  at 
Herbertshohe,  is  to  confer  with  me  on  the  28th  instant,  when 
466 


WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

I  hope  to  gain  from  him  a  clear  insight  into  the  whole  of  the 
business  transactions  of  his  Administration. 

The  health  of  the  whole  of  the  troops  under  my  command 
continues  extraordinarily  good,  not  a  single  case  being  in 
hospital  at  the  present  time. 

Although  the  weather  is  hot  here,  there  is  generally  a  strong 
south-east  trade  wind  blowing,  which  tends  to  reduce  the 
temperature  and  make  the  conditions  bearable. 

The  work  of  the  troops  is  being  done  principally  in  the 
early  morning  and  again  late  in  the  afternoon,  while  during 
the  hotter  part  of  the  day,  from  u  A.M.  until  4  P.M.,  they 
are  resting. 

After  the  occupation  of  this  place  I  was  fortunate  in  secur- 
ing possession  of  two  modern  Krupp  field-guns  on  carriages, 
one  carriage  being  in  good  order,  the  other  broken.  I  propose 
sending  these  to  Sydney  on  the  first  opportunity,  and  it  has 
occurred  to  me  that  it  might  stimulate  recruiting  for  future 
Australian  contingent  if  one  gun  was  exhibited  at  the  Town 
Hall,  Melbourne,  and  the  other  at  the  Town  Hall,  Sydney. 

A  wireless  station  has  been  erected  at  the  top  of  the  hill 
overlooking  Rabaul  alongside  Government  House,  and  should 
prove  of  inestimable  advantage  in  keeping  up  communication 
with  the  fleet. — I  have,  etc. 

WILLIAM  HOLMES,  Colonel, 

Administrator. 

The  Hon.  the  Minister  for  Defence, 
Melbourne. 


No.  23 
The  Governor-General  of  Australia  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

Governor-General's  Office, 
Melbourne,  February  16,  1915. 

SIR, — I  have  the  honour  to  transmit  herewith  copy  of  a 
report  from  the  Administrator,  Rabaul,  New  Britain. — I 
have,  etc. 

R.  M.  FERGUSON,  Governor-General. 


467 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY—  MILITARY 

ENCLOSURE  IN  No.  23 
The  Administrator  to  the  Minister  of  Defence,  Melbourne 

(Extract.) 

Rabaul,  New  Britain,  December  u,  1914. 

In  my  despatch  of  November  28  I  mentioned  the  fact 
that  I  had  sent  an  expedition  to  the  Admiralty  Islands. 
This  force  left  Rabaul  on  November  19,  under  the  command 
of  Major  Heritage,  on  board  the  s.s.  Siar,  and  visited  the 
Admiralty  and  Hermit  Islands.  The  flag  was  hoisted  at 
both  places,  Proclamation  read,  and  garrisons  posted  ;  the 
Siar  returned  to  Rabaul  on  the  28th  idem.  Opportunity  was 
taken  at  the  same  time  to  despatch  a  general  cargo  to  these 
islands  on  behalf  of  the  merchants  here,  and  bring  back  return 
shipments  of  copra.  The  commercial  earnings  of  the  vessel 
on  this  expedition  amounted  to  £356,  I2s.  6d.,  and,  as  the 
debits  totalled  £200,  the  expedition,  in  addition  to  achieving 
its  object  of  military  occupation,  resulted  in  a  sound  profit 
as  a  commercial  venture. 

The  same  course  is  being  followed  in  connection  with  the 
trip  of  the  Meklong  to  Bougainville,  the  net  results  of  which 
I  will  advise  you  in  next  despatch. 

The  places  which  have  now  been  satisfactorily  occupied 
and  flag  hoisted  by  the  forces  under  my  command  are  :  — 

NHWE™       { 

?  Kaweing. 
NEW  IRELAND      x  Namatanai. 

[  Muliama. 

KAISER  WILHELMSLAND  —  Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen. 
NEW  HANOVER. 


BOUGAINVILLE      {  ]gj£ 

{Komuli  —  St.  Andrew's  Group. 
Lorengau. 
Nares  Hafen. 

HERMIT'S  GROUP  —  Maron. 
DUKE  OF  YORK  GROUP  —  Mioko. 
NAURU. 

The  whole  of  the  late  German  possessions  south  of  the 
468 


314]  WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

Equator  may  now  therefore,  I  think,  be  considered  to  have 
been  satisfactorily  dealt  with  by  my  force.  Other  stations 
will  be  visited  as  opportunity  offers,  such  as  Eitape  and 
Morobe  in  Kaiser  Wilhelmsland,  but  there  is  no  immediate 
hurry,  as  there  is  a  strong  garrison  posted  at  Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen. — I  have,  etc. 

WILLIAM  HOLMES,  Colonel, 
Administrator. 


JAPANESE  OPERATIONS 

Berlin,  October  8. 

Renter's  agency  in  London  reports  from  Peking  that  the  K.V. 
Japanese  have  occupied  the  Island  of  Yap.1 


Tokyo,  October  20. 

The  Navy  Department  has  announced  the  occupation  for  Times, 
military  purposes  of  the  Marianne  and  Marshall  Islands  and  Oct 2I 
the  East  and  West  Caroline  Archipelagos. 

1  [Yap  is  one  of  the  Caroline  Islands  where  the  Germans  had  established 
a  wireless  station.] 


469 


INDEX 


Abdu    Khan,    Subadar,    Bikanir    Camel 
Corps,  killed  in  action  with  Bedouins, 

35i. 

Abdurrahman,  Senator,  anti-British  pro- 
paganda among  Bedouins,  322. 
Abdurrezak  Bederkhani,  alleged  Turkish 

defeat  of,  376. 
Adie    Bey,    Bimbashi,    battle    of    Sahil, 

37<>. 

Admiralty  Islands,  expedition  to,  468. 
Aerial  Navigation : 
British : 
Activity,  in. 
Air  mileage  made  up  to  Sept.  21, 1914, 

and  time  spent  in  air,  37-8. 
Aviator  wounded  in  air,  30. 
Duel  with  German,  48-9. 
German  machines  driven  down,  150. 
Raids  : 

on  Ammunition  wagon,  9,  52-3. 
over  Enemy  lines,  21. 
on  Lille,  84,  107. 
on  Railway  near  Laon,  37. 
Suspension  of  bomb  on  string  below 

aeroplane,  156. 
French : 

Attack  on  station  and  troops  near, 

37- 
Captive  balloon,  German  attempt  to 

explode,  58-9. 
Raids  : 

on  Belgian  coast,  179. 

on  Cambrai,  103. 

on     German     cavalry    and    field 

howitzers,  49. 
on  Heiming,  179. 
on  Lille,  84.  * 
on  Petit  Eich,  179. 
on  Saarburg,  179. 
Successful  work,  167,  179. 
French  airmen,  German  officer  on,  24. 
French  and  German  duels,  40. 
German  : 

Aeroplanes  captured,  32-3,  81. 
Anti-aircraft  guns,  49. 


Aerial  Navigation  (continued) : 
German  (continued)  : 
Captive  balloons  : 
France,  32. 
Tsingtau,  loss,  408. 
Leaflets  dropped  over  French  lines, 

59-60. 
Iron  Cross  to  first  airman  to  bomb 

Antwerp,  58. 

Machines  brought  down,  21,  107. 
Proclamations  in  Hindi  recommend- 
ing native  troops  to  desert,  107. 
Raids  : 

on  Antwerp,  293-6. 
on  Bailleul,  107. 
on  Dunkirk,  156.' 
on  Furnes,  156. 
on  Hazebrouck,  132. 
on  St.  Omer,  58. 
Sausage  balloons,  42. 
at  Tsingtau,  408. 
Japanese  : 

Bombs  and  circulars  over  Tsingtau, 

410. 

Fight  with  German,  417. 
German  vessels  at  Kiao-chau  bombed, 

407. 

at  Tsingtau,  408,  409. 
Tsingtau  barracks  bombed,  406. 
and  Weather  conditions,  139. 
Aerschot,  see  under  Belgium. 
Afghanistan  : 

Anti-British  propaganda  in,  322. 
'  Jehad  '  to  be  preached  in,  316. 
Aisne,  see  under  France. 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  see  under  Germany. 
Akaba,  see  under  Arabia. 
Akaba,  Gulf  of,  mines  for,  335. 
Albert,  King  of  the  Belgians  : 
General  order,  243. 
Proclamation  to  the  troops  on  the  Yser, 

268-9. 
Albrecht,    Duke    of    Wurtemberg,     see 

Wurtemberg. 
Aleppo,  see  under  Syria. 

471 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Alexandretta,  see  under  Syria. 

Alexandria,  see  under  Egypt. 

All  Haider,  Khoga  (Imam),  to  carry  on 

Turcophile  propaganda  in  India,  332. 
Allah  Din,    Jemadar,    loth  Mule  Corps, 

specially  mentioned,  392,  394. 
Allnutt,  Lieut.  E.  B.,  R.A.M.C.,  specially 

mentioned   and   recommended   for   re- 
ward, 367-8,  371,  373. 
Alsace-Lorraine  : 

Aspach,  capture  by  French,  175. 

Cernay  heights,  French  progress,  175. 

Chateau-Salins,  French  at,  181,  190. 

Colmar,  approach  to,  held  by  French, 
181. 

Delme,  French  at,  181,  190. 

Dieuze,  French  at,  181,  190. 

Dornach,  fighting  at,  190. 

Les  Etangs,  French  at,  181. 

Morhange,  French  at,  190. 

Mulhouse,  French  at,  and  withdrawal, 
181,  189-90. 

Operations  in,  172,  181,  189-90. 

Saarburg  (Sarrebourg) : 

Bombed  by  French  dirigible,  179. 
French  at,  i8i,  190. 

Steinbach,  fighting  at,  175. 
Amifontaine,  see  under  France. 
Amin,  Khoga  (Imam),  to  carry  on  Tur- 
cophile propaganda  in  India,  332. 
Ampsin,  see  under  Belgium. 
Andechy,  see  under  France. 
Angenot,  M.,  Deputy  Procurator-General, 

report  on  Antwerp  Zeppelin  raid,  293-6. 
Antwerp,  see  under  Belgium. 
Apa    Bagive,    Lce.-Naik,    noth    M.L.I., 

specially  mentioned,  398. 
Apia,  see  under  Samoa  Islands. 
Apremont,  see  under  France. 
Arabia : 

Akaba  : 

English    troops    landed    at,    alleged 

annihilation  of,  349. 
Germans  at,  315. 
Turkish  sailors  proceeding  to,  322-3. 

Hedjaz  : 

Mobilisation    of    Turkish    forces    in, 

311- 

Turkish  force  on  holy  territory,  352. 
Jeddah  region,  Turkish  troops  in,  311. 
Maan,  military  preparations  at,  317, 

329,  330.  332. 
The  Yemen  : 

Turkish  emissaries  sent  to,  311 
Turkish  officers  proceeding  to,  311. 
472 


Arabs  : 

See  also  Bedouins. 

Raid  into  Egypt  anticipated,  333,  334. 
Violation  of  Egyptian  frontier,  313. 
Argonne,  see  under  France. 
Arimm  Effendi,   ex-Governor-General  of 

Damascus,  324. 
Armentieres,  see  under  France. 
Arnaville,  see  under  France. 
Arras,  see  under  France. 
Arthur,  Capt.  D.,  I. M.S.,  specially  men- 
tioned, 390. 

Aspach,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Australia : 

Occupation  of  Apia,  434,  435. 
Operations  against  German  possessions 

in  Western  Pacific,  443-69. 
Australia,  H.M.A.S.,  434,  435,  436,  448, 

45i.  455*  460. 
Austria-Hungary  : 

Artillery  batteries   in   Belgium   before 

declaration  of  war,  297-300,  303. 
Note    re    Anglo-Belgian    military    ar- 
rangements before  the  war,  299-300  ; 
reply  by  Belgian  Government,  300-3. 
Subjects  in  Egypt : 

Notice  to,  re  registration,  347. 
Placed  in  concentration  camp,  348. 
Ultimatum  to  Serbia  : 

Discussion     at     Potsdam     meeting, 

July  5,  1914.     i. 
German  connection  with,  2-3. 
Azimud-din-Shaik  Ismail,  Sub-Asst.  Surg. 
Shaikh,   recommended   for  promotion, 

373- 

Aziz  Shawish,  Sheikh,  manifesto  inciting 
Moslem  soldiers  to  mutiny  and  join 
Germany,  333,  335. 


Baesrode,  see  under  Belgium. 

Bagdad,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and  dis- 
trict at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 

Bailey,  Sergt.  W.,  specially  mentioned, 
390. 

Bailleul,  see  under  France. 

Balfourier,  General,  186. 

Ball,  Lieut.,  noth  Mahratta  Light  Inf., 
specially  mentioned,  398. 

Baluchistan,  '  Jehad '  to  be  preached  in, 
316. 

Balyanieh,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and 
district  at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 

Bamburgh,  see  under  Belgium. 

Ban  de  Sapt,  see  under  France. 


INDEX 


Barnardiston,  Brig.-Gen.  N.  W.,  M.V.O.  : 

Conversations  with  Chief  of  the  Belgian 

General  Staff,  1906.     301-2. 
Despatches    on    operations    in    China, 

422-31. 
Landing  of  force  under,  near  Laoshan 

Bay,  406,  416,  423. 
Barrett,  Lieut.-Gen.  Sir   A.   A.,  K.C.B., 

K.C.V.O.  :   337.  355.  357.  374- 
Despatch,    Dec.    7,     1914,    describing 
operations   at   head  of   the   Persian 
Gulf,  358-73. 

Despatches  describing  operations  of 
I.E.F.  'D1  up  to  March  31,  1915. 
378-402. 

Operation  Order,  Nov.  16, 1914.   368-70. 
Basra,   see  under  Mesopotamia  and  dis- 
trict at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 
Baucarne,  M.,  Antwerp,  293-4. 
Bavaria,  Rupprecht,  Crown  Prince  of,  160, 

203. 
Bax-Ironside,  Sir  H.,  Sophia,  telegram  to 

Sir  E.  Grey,  323-4. 
Bayley,  Capt.,  R.F.A.,  398. 
Beaulieu,  see  under  France. 
Beausejour,  see  under  France. 
Becelaere,  see  under  Belgium. 
Bedouins  : 

See  also  Arabs,  349. 

Action  between   Bikanir  Camel  Corps 

and,  350,  351. 
Advancing  to  attack  Suez  Canal,  336, 

337.  343- 
Anti-British  propaganda  among,    322, 

327,  328,  338. 
Distribution  of  rifles,  etc.,  to,  and  prob-  ' 

able  move  towards  Akaba,  324. 
Money  for,  320,  322. 
Proposals  made  to,  by  Turks,  319. 
Raids  into  Egypt,  349,  350. 
Sheikhs  : 

Address     by     Lieut.-Gen.     Sir     J. 

Maxwell,  348-9. 
Assurances    of    loyalty    to    British 

Government,  349. 
Beerst,  see  under  Belgium. 
Beheddine  Bey,  anti-British  propaganda 

by,  328. 

Beirut,  see  under  Syria. 
Belgian  Congo,   employment  against,   of 
natives  led   by  chiefs  and   having  no 
regular  military  organisation,  296-7. 
Belgium : 

Aerschot,  fighting  at,  249,  256-7. 
Ampsin,  German  crossing  at,  247. 


Belgium  (continued) : 
Antwerp  : 

Arrival  of  British  M.L.I,  and  Naval 
Brigades,  263,  265. 

Bombardment,  259, 261, 262, 263,266. 

Capitulation,  267. 

Defence  of,  258-63. 

Evacuation,  preparations,  259-60. 

Iron  Cross  to  first  airman  to  bomb,  58. 

Retreat  from,  265,  266-8. 

Retreat  of  Belgian  Army  to,  249. 

Siege  of,  257 ;  preparations  for,  257-8. 

Sorties  from,  255,  256-7. 

Zeppelin  raid,  293-6. 
Appeal  to  the  Powers  after  violation  of 

frontier  by  Germany,  240. 
Armoured  motor-cars,  66. 
Army : 

Commander-in-Chief,  report,  236. 

Mobilisation,  237. 

Operations,  summary,  281-2. 

Operations  in  combination  with  the 
Allied  armies,  243-50,  253-7,  263-8. 

Preparations   to   resist   German   in- 
vasion, 239-41. 

Raising     of,     to     reinforced     peace 
strength,  July,  1914.     236. 

Retreat  into  France,  253. 

Steps  taken  on  violation  of  neutrality, 
281. 

Treatment   of   German   officers   and 

men  taken  prisoners  by,  307-10. 
Baesrode,  fighting  at,  263. 
Bamburgh  farm,  fighting,  273,  275. 
Becelaere,  fighting  near,  116,  119. 
Beerst,  operations  at,  272. 
Berlaere,  fighting  near,  265. 
Beverdyk,  Belgian  stand  on,  and  retire- 
ment, 276-8. 
Bixschoote : 

Fighting  near,  89,  116,  176. 

French  artillery  successes,  169. 
Blaesveld  bridge-head,  fighting  at,  260-1 . 
Boneffe,  fighting  at,  250. 
British  Expeditionary  Force,  see  that 

title. 

Broodseinde,  fighting  at,  169. 
Bruges,  German  prisoners  at,  report  on 

treatment  of,  308,  309-10. 
Brussels  : 

Germans  at,  250. 

Notice  re  fire-arms,  by  M.  Max,  290-1 . 

Treatment  of  German  prisoners  at, 

310. 
Budingen,  fighting  at,  247. 

473 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Belgium  (continued) : 
Civilians : 

German    accusations    against,     and 
reply  to,  283-92. 

German    treatment    of,    protest    by 
Belgian  Government,  284-6. 

Instructions  to,  by  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  288-9,  289-90,  291-2. 

Putting  out  of  eyes  of  Germans  and 

mutilation    by,    contradiction    in 

Kolnische    Volkszeitung    and   Vor- 

wdrts,  305-6. 

Coast,  shelling  by  British  and  French 

ships,  272. 

Condroz,  fighting  at,  250. 
Cortemarck,  French  advance  to,  202. 
Courtrai : 

Fining  of,    for   having   obeyed   two 
German  commandants,  307. 

Kaiser  at,  204. 
Defensive  system,  237-8. 
Denier,  crossings  captured  by  Belgians, 

and  withdrawal,  256-7. 
Dendre,  German  crossing,  263. 
Diest,  Belgian  defence  at,  247. 
Dinant,  French  defence  at,  250. 
Dixmude  : 

Fighting  near,  89,  115,  273,  274,  276, 
277,  278,  279,  280. 

French  at,  204. 

Inundation  spreading  to  south-east 

of,  100. 
Dyle,   crossings  captured  by  Belgians, 

and  withdrawal,  256-7. 
Elewyt,  Belgian  failure  to  take,  255. 
Eppeghem,  capture  by  Belgians,    and 

withdrawal,  255. 
Errneton-sur-Biert,    Belgian   rearguard 

surrounded  at,  253. 
Ferryman's  House,  fighting  at,  170. 
F16ne,  German  crossing  at,  247. 
Francs-tireurs,    atrocities    by,    contra- 
diction, 305-6. 
Fumes,    German    bombardment,    156, 

204,  280. 

Geet-Betz,  fighting  at,  247. 
German  Army  in,  see  that  title. 
German  invasion,  241 ;  German  Imperial 

Chancellor  on,  303. 

German    measures    against    non-com- 
batants, order  of  Aug.  10,  1914.    44-5. 
German  ultimatum,  and  reply,  238. 
Gette  : 

Fighting  on,  245-6,  281,  282. 

German  crossing,  247. 

474 


Belgium  (continued) : 

Gheluvelt,  loss  by  British,  205. 
Ghent : 

Celebration  of  victory  over  Russians, 
Dec.  18.     159. 

German  advance  on,  265. 

Occupation  arrangements,  264-5. 

Occupation  by  French  and  British, 
266. 

Retirement  from,  268. 
Government,  reply  to  note  from  Austro- 

Hungarian   Government  re  military 

arrangements    with    Great    Britain 

before  the  war,  300-3. 
Haelen  : 

Fighting  at,  245-6. 

Shelling  of,  247. 
Hautem  St.  Marguerite,  German  attack, 

247. 

Hesbaye,  fighting  at,  250. 
Hofstade,  Belgian  sortie  to,  255. 
Hollebeke,  fighting  near,  82. 
Huy: 

Crossings  at,  destroyed  by  Belgians, 
250. 

German  crossing  at,  247. 
Inundations,  204,  277,  278,  279. 
Keyem,  taken  by  Germans,  272. 
Knocke  district,  French  artillery  suc- 
cess, 169. 

Korteker  Inn,  fighting  near,  176. 
Langemarck,   capture  of  village  near, 

by  French,  129. 
Le  Gheir,  fighting  at,  70. 
Le  Petit  Bleu,  confiscated  for  taking 

sides  with  France,  289. 
Liege  : 

Civilians  : 

Denial  of  German  accusations  re 

attitude  of,  283. 

Instructions  to,  by  Burgomaster, 
290. 

Defence  of,  241-3. 

Fall  of,  243. 

German  attacks,  242-3. 

National  Bank,  seizure  of  notes  by 

Germans,  285-6. 
Lierre,  Germans  at,  263. 
Linsmeau,  brutal  conduct  of  Germans 

in,  284-5. 

Lixhe,  Germans  crossing  at,  242,  247. 
Lokeren,  German  advance  on,  265. 
Lombaertzyde : 

Capture  by  Germans,  273. 

Defence  of,  272. 


INDEX 


Belgium  (continued) : 

Lombaertzyde  (continued) : 

Fighting  near,    141,    173,    176,   275, 

279,  280. 
Louvain  : 

Belgian  offensive  to,  and  withdrawal, 

256-7. 
German  accusations  as  to  conduct  of 

civilians,  287. 
Germans  at,  249-50. 
Malines,  Germans  in,  258. 
Mannekensvere,  fighting  at,  272,  279. 
Melle,  fighting  at,  266. 
Menin  Road,  fighting  on,  84-5,  86,  90, 

94,  95,  116,  141. 
Merkem,  operations  at,  169. 
Messines,  loss,  81,  205. 
Meuse,  German  crossing  of,  241-2,  244, 

247>  253. 

Military  arrangements  with  Great  Bri- 
tain and  France  before  the  war, 
note  by  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment, 299-300 ;  reply  by  Belgian 
Government,  300-3. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  see  Da- 
vignon,  M. 

Minister  of  the  Interior,  see  Berryer, 
Paul. 

Minister  of  Justice,  see  Carton  de  Wiart, 
M. 

Minister  in  Spain,  see  Grenier,  M. 

Mons,  British  retreat,  181. 

Namur : 

Bombardment,  252. 
Defence  of,  250-3. 

Employment  of  Austro-Hungarian  ar- 
tillery batteries  against,  298,  303. 
Fall  of,  253. 

Neerhespen,  brutal  conduct  of  German 
cavalry  at,  286. 

Nieuport : 

Fighting  near,    115,    141,    165,    176, 

277.  278. 
Inundation  round,  82. 

Orsmael,  brutal  conduct  of  German 
cavalry  at,  286. 

Ostend,  renamed  '  Kales  '  by  Germans, 
126. 

Over  de  Vaart,  Belgian  attack,  and  with- 
drawal, 256-7. 

Passchendaele,  fighting  at  and  near,  71, 
169. 

Plainevaux,  fighting  at,  242. 

Ploegsteert  Wood,  fighting  near,  1 10-1 1 . 

Prisoners  in  Germany,  treatment  of,  308. 


Belgium  (continued) : 

Railways,  cutting  of,  by  cyclist  detach- 
ments from  Antwerp,  257. 

Ramscappelle : 

Capture  by  French,  204. 
Fighting  at,  162,  278-9. 

Rattevalle,  shelled  by  Germans,  272. 

Refusal  of  military  aid  from  France,  239. 

Returning  refugees,  79. 

Roulers  : 

French  advance  to,  202. 
Operations  near,  272-3. 

St.  Georges  : 

French  and   Belgian  successes,   153, 

173,  176- 
Operations  near,  276,  280. 

Sambre,  German  crossing,  253. 

Scheldt: 

Fighting  on,  255,  263. 
German  crossings,  263,  264. 

Schiplaeken  Woods,  capture  by  Bel- 
gians, and  withdrawal,  255. 

Schoonaerde,  fighting  at,  263. 

Schoorbakke,  fighting  at,  275,  280. 

Schoore,  taken  by  Germans,  272. 

Sempst,  capture  by  Belgians,  and  with- 
drawal, 255. 

Steenstraate,  fighting  near,  176. 

Termonde,  operations  at,  255,  258,  263. 

Tervaete,  operations  near,  274-5,  280. 

Thielt,  Kaiser  at,  204. 

Tirlemont,  German  occupation,  247. 

Veldhoek,  French  progress  near,  177. 

Velm,  brutal  conduct  of  Germans  at, 
285. 

Velpen,  fighting  at,  246. 

Vise,  Belgian  resistance  at,  241. 

Vladsloo,  taken  by  Belgians,  273. 

Warneton,  fighting  at,  62,  63-4. 

Weerde,  capture  by  Belgians,  and  with- 
drawal, 255. 

Wespelaer,  fighting  near,  256. 

Westende,  French  progress  near,  176. 

Women,  alleged  putting  out  of  eyes  of 
Germans  by,  denial  by  German  Civil 
and  Military  Commissions,  303-5. 

Wydendreft,  fighting  at,  169. 

Wytschaete  : 

Fighting  at  and  near,  81,  82, 
Loss  by  British,  205. 

Ypres: 

Battle  of,  162-5,  203-6. 
Civil  Hospital,  attenda^ 
wounded  by  Frenr" 
and  nurses,  97-? 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Belgium  (continued) : 
Ypres  (continued) : 

German  attempts  on,  and  operations, 
74,  81,  99,  108,  115,  126,  140,  165, 
1 86,  187,  189,  202. 
German  bombardment  and  wanton 

destruction,  127-8,  173. 
Yser  Canal,  German  withdrawal  from 

left  bank,  139. 
Yser  River : 

Battle  of,  268-81. 
Belgian  stand  on,  267-8. 
Crossing  by  Germans,  274. 
Fighting  on,  115. 
Flooding  of  area  along,  74,  79,  82. 
Yserbeek,  farm  of,  fighting  at,  245-6. 
Zandvoorde,  loss  by  British,  205. 
Zelck,  fighting  at,  246. 
Zwartelem,  French  progress  near,  177. 
Belgian  Luxemburg,  operations  in,  181. 
Bennett,   Major  E.,   R.A.M.C.,  specially 

mentioned,  392. 
Berbera,  s.s.,  operations  in  Persian  Gulf, 

358. 
Beresford,  Commander,  at  Herbertshohe, 

447,  448,  450,  460,  466. 
Berlaere,  see  under  Belgium. 
von  Bernhardi,  General,  164. 
Berrima,  H.M.A.S.,  445,  447,  451,  458,  465, 

466. 

Berry-au-Bac,  see  under  France. 
Berryer,   Paul,   Belgian  Minister   of  the 

Interior,  instructions  to  civilian  popula- 
tion, 288-9,  289-90,  291-2. 
Bethincourt,  see  under  France. 
Bethune,  see  under  France. 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  Herr,  German 
Imperial  Chancellor : 

at  Potsdam  meeting,  July  5,  1914.     i. 

Telegram  to  Baron  von  Schoen,   July 
1914.     4 

on    Violation    of    Belgian    neutrality, 

363. 

Betz,  see  under  France. 
Beverdyk,  see  under  Belgium. 
Bhan  Sawant,  Lce.-Naik,  noth  Mahratta 

Light  Inf.,  specially  mentioned,  391. 
Bidon,  General,  205. 
" '-»  Maj.-Gen.,  310. 

'    Emir  of  Nejd,  supply  of  arms 
m  Turkey,  316. 
see  under  Belgium. 

Ueged  commencement  by 


Black  Sea  (continued) : 

Russian  ports,  Turkish  attack  on,  on 
German  orders,  343-4. 

Turkish  acts  of  war,  consternation  in 
Constantinople,  349. 

Turkish  preparations,  318. 
Blaesveld,  see  under  Belgium. 
Blanc-Chateau,  see  under  France. 
Blosse  Lynch,  s.s.,  operations  at  head  of 

Persian  Gulf,  388,  394,  395,  398. 
von  Bohlen  und  Halbach,  Herr  Erupp,  on 

Kaiser's  attitude  re  possibility  of  war,  3. 
Bois  des  Chevaliers,  see  under  France. 
Bois  de  le  Pretre,  see  under  France. 
Bois  de  Rolande,  see  under  France. 
Bollante  Wood,  see  under  France. 
Bompard,    M.,    French    Ambassador    in 

Turkey,  request  for  passports,  337,  344. 
Bond,  Lieutenant : 

At  Herbertshohe,  446. 

Specially  mentioned,  447. 
Boneffe,  see  under  Belgium. 
Bougainville,  expedition  to,  468. 
Bouhadi    Sadil,    purchase    of    arms   for 

Egypt  in  Greece,  425. 
Bourtaut  Farm,  see  under  France. 
Bowen,  Lieutenant,  R.A.N.,  wounded  in 

New  Britain,  447  ;  specially  mentioned, 

447- 

Braine,  see  under  France. 
Branson,  Capt.,  397 ;  specially  mentioned, 

398. 
Breslau:  339,  425. 

Mines  laid  at  Alexandretta  by  German 
officers  of,  324. 

Officers  of,  at  Aleppo,  335-6. 
Bridges,  Lt.-Col.  G.  T.  M.,  D.S.O.,  Military 

Attache  in  Belgium,  conversation  with 

General  Jungbluth  (1912),  302. 
Brijmohan,    Singh,     Subadar,     specially 

mentioned,  390. 

British  Expeditionary  Force  in  France  and 
Belgium  : 

Armistice  for  burying  the  dead,  144. 

Armoured  motor  cars,  66. 

A.S.C.,  tribute  to,  112-13. 

Artillery,  German  testimony  to,  105. 

Brigade  headquarters  system,  147. 

Cavalry,  varied  work  of,  no. 

ist  Cavalry  Division,  operations,  n. 

Chain  of  command,  145-8. 

Christmas  Day,  1914.     152-4. 

Conversations,  etc.,  between  British  and 
German  troops  in  trenches,  108-9. 

Corps  headquarters  system,  146. 


INDEX 


British  Expeditionary  Force  in  France  and 

Belgium  (continued) : 
Despatches  from  British  Eye-witness,  5 . 
7th  Division,  at  Ghent,  retirement,  268. 
Divisional  headquarters  system,  147. 
Dorset  Regiment,  35. 
Extension  of  front,  Oct.  1914.     113-14. 
on  Franco-Belgian  frontier,  69. 
General  headquarters  system,  145-6. 
at  Ghent,  266. 
4th  Guards  Brigade,  16. 
Hot  baths,  fumigation  of  clothes,  etc., 

IOI-2,    III. 

Intelligence  work,  133-8. 

K.O.S.B.,  35. 

K.O.Y.L.I.,  35. 

Liaison  officers,  146. 

Life  in  billets  behind  the  fighting  line, 

154-5- 

Life  of,  123-5,  I33»  T56-7- 
Line  of  gunners,  regimental  cooks,  etc., 

112. 
London    Scottish,     i4th     (County    of 

London)    Batt.    of    London    Regt., 

operations  of,  on  Oct.  31,1914.   79-80 . 
M.L.I.,  arrival  at  Antwerp,  263. 
Mouth  organs,  need  for,  153. 
Movement  of  troops  from  east  of  Paris 

to  N.W.  of  France,  68-9. 
Nature  of  country  where  fighting  taking 

place,  54-5,  150-1,  156. 
Naval  Brigades  at  Antwerp,  265. 
Northampton  Regt.,  19. 
Operations  in  Belgium,  269. 
Operations  on  Franco-Belgian  frontier, 

61-63. 

Prisoners,  release  of,  at  Le  Gheir,  70. 
Protection  against  wet,  153. 
Queen's  Regt.,  19. 

Relations  with  French  civilians,  130-1. 
R.F.C. : 

Ascendancy  over  German  air  force, 

9- 

Valuable  services,  and  testimony  to, 
by  French  Commander-in-Chief, 
8-9. 

Sniping,  139-40. 
Transfer  of  troops  to  the  north,  184-5, 

199,  201. 

West  Kent  Regt.,  35. 
Winter  preparations,  heating,  etc.,  of 

trenches,  in. 

British  India  Steam  Navigation,  good 
services  of  officers  and  men  of  trans- 
ports of,  365. 


British  Phosphate  Co.,  employes  at  Nauru, 

445- 

Britten,  Lieut.-Col.  T.  X.,  noth  Mahratta 
Light  Inf.  : 

Operations  under,  387. 

Specially  mentioned,  391. 
Broodseinde,  see  under  Belgium. 
Broke    Smith,    Major,    I.R.A.,   specially 

mentioned,  373. 
Brugere,  General,  184. 
Bruges,  see  under  Belgium. 
Brussels,  see  under  Belgium. 
Bryant,  Mr.,  Marconi  operator,  specially 

mentioned,  372. 
Budingen,  see  under  Belgium. 
Bullard,    Mr.,    late    British    Consul    at 

Basra,  364. 

von  Bulow,  General,  193. 
Busaki  Ram,  Kote  Duffadar,  Mule  Corps, 

specially  mentioned,  394. 
Butler,  Capt.  H.  M.,  io4th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  390. 
Byrne  : 

Capt.  E.  G.  J.,  I04th  Rifles,  specially 
mentioned,  399. 

Dr.  G.  C.,  457,  465,  466. 

Cairo,  see  under  Egypt. 

Cambrai,  see  under  France. 

Campbell,  Lieut.,  R.E.,  swimming  across 

Tigris,  381,  386,  389. 
Capoen,  Lieut.-Col.,  treatment  of  German 

prisoners  at  Bruges,  309. 
Carency,  see  under  France. 
Caroline     Archipelagos,    occupation     by 

Japanese,  469. 
Carton  de  Wiart,  M.,  Belgian  Minister  of 

Justice,  289. 
de  Castelnau,  General,  161,  162,  177,  181, 

182,  183,  184,  187. 
Casualties : 

Belgian,  battle  of  the  Yser,  279. 
British  : 

in    Mesopotamia    and     at    head   of 
Persian  Gulf,  361,  367,  375,  376, 
385,  387,  401,  402,  403. 
Sheik  Seyd  Peninsula,  404. 
in  Egypt,  350,  351,  352. 
German  :    104,   141,   166,   167,  219-20, 

222,  225. 

Battle  of  Flanders,  163. 
round  Ypres,  100-1,  118-19,  200. 
Kiao-chau    operations,   407,   408,   410, 

411,  411-12,  421. 
New  Britain,  447. 

477 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Casualties!  (co ntinued) : 

Turks  and  Arabs,  in  Mesopotamia  and 
head  of  Persian  Gulf,  357,  361,  362, 

371.  374.  375.  385- 
Cernay,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Chad  wick,    Capt.,    i04th    Rifles,    recom- 
mended for  reward,  372. 
Chalons-sur-Marne,  see  under  France. 
Chateau-Salins,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Chateau-Thierry,  see  under  France. 
Chauvoncourt,  see  under  France. 
Cheetham,  Mr.,  Cairo,  communications  to 

Sir  E.  Grey,  311,  312-13,  315,  336. 
China : 

British  operations  in,  despatches  of 
Brig.-General  Barnardiston,  M.V.O., 
422-31. 

Fuzan  Hill,  Japanese  attack,  415-16. 
German  prisoners,  412,  416,  419. 
Jokosan,  fighting  at,  414. 
Kiao-chau : 

Mine-sweeping,  407. 

Operations  at,  405. 

Order  of  Emperor  of  Japan,  412. 

Railway  station,  capture  by  Japanese, 

406. 

Kutauho,  German  forces  at,  414. 
Laoshan  Bay : 

British  landing  near,  406,  416,  423. 
Japanese  flotilla  success,  406. 
Japanese  landing  at,  406. 
Landing  of  Indian  contingent,  428. 
Laoshan  Harbour,  Japanese  landing,  407. 
Ohkashoh,  German  main  force  at,  414. 
Operations  in,  statement  by  Japanese 

Government,  412-22. 
Rohsan  Bay  : 

Japanese  landing,  414-17. 
Landing  of  Indian  contingent,  414-17. 
Ryuhjudai,  Japanese  success  near,  414. 
Ryuhkau,  Japanese  landing  near,  413, 

414. 
2nd   South  Wales    Borderers  in,    423, 

425.  429. 

Senkasai,  German  forces  at,  414. 
Shantung     Peninsula,     operations     in, 

4I3-I4- 

Sokuboku,  Japanese  at,  414. 
Tsimo,  capture  by  Japanese,  405. 
Tsinanfu,  Japanese  at,  408. 
Tsingtau  : 

Allies  assault,  406-7,  408. 
American    Consul,     certain     Chinese 
subjects,  and  German  women  and 
children  to  leave,  409,  421. 
478 


China  (continued)  : 
Tsingtau  (continued)  : 

Bombardment  by  Japanese  and  Brit- 

ish ships,  407. 
Bombardment    by    Japanese    naval 

heavy  artillery,  409. 
British  troops,  message  from  Crown 

Prince  of  Japan,  and  gift  of  sake, 

409. 
Daitohchin  fortress,  capture  by  the 

Japanese,  419-20. 
Forts,  portions  destroyed  by  Japanese 

naval  squadron,  409,  418. 
Future  of,  Baron  Suzuki  on,  411. 
General   bombardment   and    attack, 

409-10,  418-20,  428-9. 
German  aeroplane,  attempted  attack 

on  Japanese  ships,  408. 
German  captive  balloon  attacked,  and 

loss  of,  400. 

German  counter-attack,  410. 
German  gunboat,  loss  of,  410. 
German  night  attack,  408,  416. 
Governor,  telegram  to  Kaiser,  412. 
Indian  contingent  before,  409,  417. 
Japanese  army,  shelled  by  German 

forts  and  ships.,  408. 
R.M.S.  Kaiserin  Elisabeth  in,  405. 
Shoh-Tohsan,  fort  of,  Japanese  cap- 

ture of,  420. 

Siaochausan  fort,  in  flames,  410. 
Surrender  :   410-11,  411,  420-1,  429. 

Congratulations  by  Lord  Kitchener, 


Message  from  Mikado  to  Army  and 

Navy,  and  reply,  421-2. 
Wangkohuang,  abandoned  by  Germans, 

406. 
Chope,  Capt.,  Bikanir  Camel  Corps,  action 

with  Bedouins,  351. 
Cirey,  see  under  France. 
Clarke,  Fleet  Surgeon,  423. 
Clarkson,  Maj.  H.  St.  J.,  2nd  Dorset  Regt.  : 
Battle  of  Saihan,  365-6. 
Recommended  for  reward,  371. 
Clery,  Lieut.-Col.  C.  B.,  io4th  Rifles  :  395. 
Report,  5th  Dec.,  398-400. 
Specially  mentioned,  390. 
Cochran,  Capt.  G.  W.,  8ist  Pioneers  :  368, 

386. 

Specially  mentioned,  392. 
Codrington,   Lieut.-Col.    E.,    i29th    Inf., 

395- 

Conn,  Herr,  2. 
Col  Bonhomme,  see  under  France. 


INDEX 


Col  mar,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Condroz,  see  under  Belgium. 
Consenvpye,  Wood  of,  see  under  France. 
Constantinople,  see  under  Turkey. 
Cooper,  Capt.  K.  E.,  noth  Mahratta  Light 

Inf.,  specially  mentioned,  391 . 
Cornwall,  Sergt.  A.,  specially  mentioned, 

390. 

Cortemarck,  see  under  Belgium. 
Cotter,    Major    H.    J.,    soth    Mountain 
Battery  :   394. 

Valuable  services,  388. 
Courtney,  Able  Seaman,  killed  in  New 

Britain,  447. 

Courtrai,  see  under  Belgium. 
Cox,  Sir  Percy,  337-  364,  382,  388. 
Craonne,  see  under  France. 
Creil,  see  under  France. 
Cr6py,  see  under  France. 

Dalhousie,  R.I.M.S.,  in  Persian  Gulf,  357, 

372. 
Dalip  Singh,  Naik,  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners, 

recommended  for  reward,  372. 
Damascus,  see  under  Syria. 
Daunt,  Capt.  W.  J.  O'B.,  390  ;    specially 

mentioned,  389. 
Davignon,  M.,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign 

Affairs  : 

Communication  to  Baron-Fallon,  297-8. 
Communication  to  foreign  representa- 
tives in  Belgium,  293. 
Communications   to  M.    Grenier,    296, 

300,  307-10. 
Communications  from  M.  Grenier,  286, 

296-7,  298. 
Communications      to      representatives 

abroad,  283, 303, 305. 
Dawson,    Pte.    A.,    specially    mentioned, 

390. 
Deglimme-Gevers,  M.  and  Mme.,  brutality 

of  Germans  to,  285. 
von  Deimling,  General,  160,  203. 
Delamain,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  S.,  C.B.,  D.S.O. : 

374.  375- 

Battle  of  Saihan,  359. 
Despatch,    Nov.    16,    1914,    describing 

operations  at   head    of   the  Persian 

Gulf,  355-8. 
Operations  under,  361. 
Report  on  operations  of  Nov.  14,  1914. 

365-8. 

Delara,  Col.-Sergt.  and  acting  Sergt.-Maj., 
2nd  Dorset  Regt.,  recommended  for 
reward,  371. 


Delme,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Demer,  see  under  Belgium. 

Dendre,  see  under  Belgium. 

Dhanna  Ram,  Rm.,  io4th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  399. 
Dierickx,  Jef,  Neerhespen,  286. 
Diest,  see  under  Belgium. 
Dieuze,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Dinant,  see  under  Belgium. 
Dixmude,  see  under  Belgium. 
Djavid  Bey,  Turkish  Minister  of  Finance  : 
Attitude  of,  340,  345. 

Communication    from    Sir    L.    Mallet, 

3I3-I4- 

Djemal  Pasha,  Turkish  Minister  of  Marine: 
342. 

Anti-British  propaganda,  339. 

Preparations    for    expedition    against 

Egypt,  336. 

Domremy-la-Pucelle,  see  under  France. 
Don,  Capt.  I.  A.,  good  services  of,  424. 
Donaldson,  Capt.,  at  Herbertshohe,  466. 
Dornach,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Drew,  Sergt.,  2nd  Dorset  Regt.,  recom- 
mended for  reward,  371. 
Dubail,  General,  181,  182,  183,  187. 
Dubois,  General,  186. 
Ducarne,  General,  Chief  of  the  Belgian 

General  Staff,  1906,  conversations  with 

Colonel  Barnardiston,  301-2. 
Duke   of  Edinburgh,   H.M.S.,   operations 

against  Fort  Turba,  403-4. 
Dunga  Bam,  Rm.,  io4th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 
Dunga    Rawat,     Subadar,     i2oth     Inf., 

specially  mentioned,  392. 
Dunkirk,  see  under  France. 
Dunn,  Capt.  E.  G.,  Royal  Irish  Rifles,  394  ; 

specially  mentioned,  392. 
Dyle,  see  under  Belgium. 

Eberhards,  General,  dismissed,  167. 
Egypt: 

Alexandria  : 

Enemy  ships  at,  crews  deported  to 
Malta,  348. 

Turkish  officers  at,  311. 
Arab  raid  anticipated,  333,  334. 
Arms  for,  purchase  in  Greece,  425. 
Bedouin  chiefs,  assurances  of  loyalty, 

349. 
Bikanir     Camel    Corps,    action    with 

Bedouins,  350,  351. 
Cairo,     Press    censorship    established, 

349- 

479 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Egypt  (continued) : 

El  Arish,  Turkish  troops  at,  350,  351-2. 
German  and  Austrian  subjects  in,  notice 

to,  347. 
Indian  troops  in  : 

Attitude  of  Turks  re,  and  explanation 

to,  313-14,  319,  321. 
possible  Impersonation  by  Germans, 

323,  339- 
Kantara,  Turkish  report  of  fighting  near, 

352. 

Katia,  Turkish  troops  at,  351. 
Kossaimo,   British  post,   Commandant 

of    Turk    post    urged    by    German 

officers  to  attack,  336. 
Magdaba,  Bedouins  at,  336,  337,  343. 
Martial  law  proclaimed,  347-8. 
Port  Said,  flooding  of  desert  to  East  of, 

352. 

Raids  by  Bedouins,  349,  350. 
Sheikazar,  Turkish  troops  at,  350. 
Sinai  Frontier  : 

Crossed  by  Turkish  troops,  349,  350. 

Turkish  preparations  on,  315. 

Violated  by  armed  mounted  Arabs, 

313. 

Turkish  emissaries  : 
Sent  to,  311. 
Wholesale  arrest,  348. 
Turkish  expedition  against : 

Marshal  von  der  Goltz  on  the  new 

Turkish  Army,  353. 
Order    to    troops   of    Syrian    Army, 

353- 
Preparations:    311,  312-13,    313-14, 

317-18,  335,  336,  338. 
Note  from  the  Porte  re,  321 . 
Notes  to  Grand  Vizier  protesting 

against,  326-31. 
Ekbatana,    s.s.,    sunk   to   block    channel 

near  Dabba  Island,  363. 
El  Arish,  see  under  Egypt. 
Elephanta,  s.s.,  operations  in  the  Persian 

Gulf,  358. 

Elewyt,  see  under  Belgium. 
Elkes,  Lieut.,  R.N.,  death,  402. 
Elliot,  Sir  F.,  communication  to  Sir  E. 

Grey,  325. 
Elwell,  Commander,  R.A.N. : 

Operations  in  New  Britain,  and  death, 

446,  447. 

Specially  mentioned,  447. 
Emden,    H.I. M.S.,    destruction   of,    com- 
munication by  British  to  Germans  in 
trenches,  109. 
480 


Encounter,  H.M.S.,  450,  451,  454,  455,  457, 

460. 

Enver  Pasha,  Turkish  Minister  of  War  : 
320,  338,  342. 

Attitude,  318. 

Instructions  to  Commandant  at  Jaffa, 
325-6. 

Interview  with  British  Military  Attache, 
318-19. 

Interview  with  Sir  L.  Mallet,  318. 

Preparations    for    expedition    against 
Egypt,  336. 

Proclamation  to  Army,  356. 
Eppeghem,  see  under  Belgium. 
Ermeton-sur-Biert,  see  under  Belgium. 
Erquinghem,  see  under  France. 
d'Esperey,   General  Franchet,   182,   183, 

187. 
Espiegle,  H.M.S. :   387,  401. 

Operations  in  Persian  Gulf,   360,  375, 

395- 

Essad  Shoucair,  anti-British  propaganda 
by,  328. 


von  Fabeck,  General,  160,  203. 

von  Falkenhayn,  General :  164. 

at  Potsdam  meeting,  July  5,  1914.     i. 

Fallen,  Baron,  Belgian  Minister  in  Holland, 
communications  from  M.  Davignon, 
283,  297-8,  293. 

Fao,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and  district 
at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 

Farebrother,  Lieut.  H.  S.,  specially  men- 
tioned, 389. 

Feroze  All,  Jemadar,  3rd  Sappers  and 
Miners,  recommended  for  reward, 

372. 

Ferryman's  House,  see  under  Belgium. 
Festubert,  see  under  France. 
Fey,  see  under  France. 
Flanders  : 

Battle  of,  160-5,  203-6,  218-19. 

German  failure  in,  185-6. 
Flone,  see  under  Belgium. 
Foch,  General,  161,  183,  185. 
Fontaine-Madame,  see  under  France. 
Forges,  Wood  of,  see  under  France. 
Fort  Conde,  see  under  France. 
Fouquescourt,  see  under  France. 
Four  de  Paris,  see  under  France. 
Fox,  Rev.  Father,  Suva,  437. 
France  : 

Air  Force,  British  officer   observes   in 
air  for  first  time,  19-20. 


INDEX 


France  (continued) : 
Aisne  River  : 
Battle  of  : 

Description  of  country,  45-8. 
Despatch  from  British  Eye-witness, 

10-12. 

Bridging  of,  25. 
British  advance  to,  196. 
British  and  French  crossing  of,  Sept. 

1914.     12-13,  1.5- 

Description  of  line  held  by  British 
troops,  and  life  of  troops  and  in- 
habitants, 49-51. 
Ambassador  in  Turkey,  see  Bompard, 

M. 

Amifontaine,  artillery  work  near,  166. 
Andechy,  French  progress,  1 74 . 
Apremont,  forest  of,  French  progress, 

178. 

Argonne,  fighting  in,  174,  178. 
Argonne-Vosges,  167,  187. 
Armentidres  : 

Fighting  near,  72,  82. 

German     bombardment,     95,      140, 

156. 

German  withdrawal,  62 . 
Army  : 

Assistance    to    British    near    Ypres, 

116-17. 

Commander-in-Chief,  see  Joffre,  Gene- 
ral. 

Failures  in  Aug.  1914.    1 80-2 ,  1 89-92 . 
German  summons  to,  to  surrender, 
leaflets   dropped   by  aviators,    59- 
60. 

Machine-guns,  214-15. 
Material,  artillery  supplies,  transport, 

212-17. 

Moroccan  Division,  196-7. 
Offensive  faith  of,  234-5. 
Officers  and  men,  208-12. 
Operations  in  Belgium,  269-281. 
Retreat  and  preparation  of  offensive, 

192-194- 

'  75  '  guns,  212. 

Success,  significance  of,  231-3. 

Superiority,  points  of,  333-4. 

Transport,  215-16. 
Arnaville  station,  French  bombardment, 

179. 
Arras  : 

Fighting  near,  187,  200,  201. 

French  progress  near,  175. 
Artillery  successes,  165,  166,  174,  178, 

213. 
MILITARY  2  2  H 


France  (continued) : 
Bailleul : 

German  withdrawal,  62. 

Hospital  bombed  by  German  airman, 

107. 

Ban  de  Sapt,  French  progress,  179. 
Beaulieu,  French  artillery  success,  177. 
Beausejour,  fighting  near,  178. 
Belgian  Minister,  communications  from 

M.  Davignon,  283,  293. 
Belgian  refusal  of  military  aid  from, 

239- 

Berry-au-Bac,    failure   of   German   at- 
tempt to  blow  up  bridge,  171. 
Bethincourt,  French  successes,  178. 
B6thune  : 

German  bombardment,  95 . 

Hospital,  German  bombardment,  168. 
Betz,  German  success,  195. 
Blanc-Chateau,  French  artillery  success 

near,  173. 
Bois  des  Chevaliers,   French  progress, 

178. 

Bois  de  le  Pretre,  French  progress,  175. 
Bois  de  Rolande,  French  progress,  174. 
Bollante  Wood,  fighting  near,  171. 
Bourtaut  Farm,  French  artillery  success 

near,  177. 
Braine,    fighting    at,    and    capture    by 

British,  n. 
British  Expeditionary  Force  in,  see  that 

title. 

Cambrai,  French  air  attack,  103. 
Carency,  French  success  near,  173. 
Chalons-sur-Marne,  capture  by  French, 

183. 
Chateau-Thierry,   German  advance  to, 

193- 

Chauvoncourt,  French  attacks,  167. 

Cirey,  French  progress,  179. 

Col  Bonhomme,  French  success   near, 

172. 

Commissariat,  216-17. 
Consenvoye,  Wood  of,  French  progress, 

178. 

Craonne,  artillery  work  near,  166. 
Creil,  pillaged  and  burnt,  12. 
Crepy": 

German  proclamation,  13. 

German  requisitions,  12-13. 
Domremy-la-Pucelle,  reported  capture 

by  Germans  untrue,  131. 
Dunkirk,  bombed  by  German  airmen, 

156. 
Erquinghem  bridge,  62. 

481 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


France  (continued) : 

Festubert,  fighting  near,  109. 

Fey,  fighting  at,  and  French  success, 

170. 

Fontaine-Madame,  fighting  near,  171. 
Forges,  Wood  of,  French  progress,  178. 
Fort  Conde,    French   artillery   success 

near,  171. 

P'ouquescourt,  French  progress,  174. 
Four  de  Paris,  fighting  near,  167,  171. 
Frelinghien  bridge,  defence  of,  62 . 
German  ambassador,  see  Schoen,  Baron 

von. 

German  Army  in,  see  that  title. 
Givenchy,  fighting  near,  140. 
Grand    Couronne    de    Nancy,    French 

withdrawal  upon,  181. 
Grouy,  German  bombardment,  174. 
Grurie  Wood,  fighting  near,  172,  174. 
Guise,  fighting  at,  182. 
Haute  Chevanchee1,  fighting  at,  174. 
Hazebrouck,  bombed  by  German  avi- 
ator, 132. 

Houplines,  bridge  destroyed,  62 . 
Hurtebise,  artillery  work  near,  166. 
Indian  Expeditionary  Force  in,  see  that 

title. 
Jaulnay,  Wood  of,  French  success  in, 

192. 

La  Bassee,  fighting  at,  64,  181. 
La  Fdre,  German  transport  park  near, 

bombed  by  airman,  21. 
Laon,     railway    near,     British    aerial 

attack,  37. 

Laventie,  German  bombardment,  223. 
Le  Pretre,  French  advance,  172,  178. 
Le  Quesnoy-en-Santerre,  French  capture 

of,  187. 
Lens : 

Fighting  near,  200. 

French  artillery  successes,  169. 
Les  Eparges,  German  artillery  attack, 

172. 
Lille  : 

Aerodrome,  located  by  British  air- 
men, 107. 

Fighting  in,  64. 

Fort  Englos  and  Fort  Carnot  blown 
up  by  French  and  British  aviators, 
84.  ; 

Lille  road,  French  success  to  east  of,  174. 
Luneville,    operations   near,    181,    188, 

190. 
Lys  River,  operations  near,  56,  62-64, 

74-76. 
482 


France  (continued) : 

Lys  to  the  Vosges,  operations,  186-8. 
Malancourt    Wood,    French    progress, 

178. 
Marfee,   Wood   of,   French  success  in, 

192. 
Marine  Fusiliers  Brigade  : 

Battle  of  the  Yser,  268. 

in  Belgium,  266. 

at  Ghent,  266. 
Marne  River  : 

Battle  of,  Sept.  6, 1914.   183, 195, 198, 
214,  218,  229,  322. 

Despatch  from  British  Eye-witness, 
6-8,  10. 

British  crossing,  7,  196. 

French  crossing,  197. 

German  crossing  of,  6. 
Meteren,  fighting  at,  62. 
Meuse  River,  French  advance,  193. 
Missy,  German  bombardment,  27-8. 
Mobilisation  orders,  121-2. 
Mont  des  Cats,  fighting  near,  56,  62 . 
Montmirail,  retaken  by  French,  7. 
Moselle  River,  French  advance  on  left 

bank,  172. 

Nampcel,  French  progress,  177. 
Nancy  : 

French  progress  near,  188. 

French  withdrawal  upon  Grand  Cou- 
ronne of,  181. 

Failure  of  German  attack,  188. 
Nanteuil-le-Haudouin,  German  success, 

195- 
Neutrality,    Toul    and   Verdun    to   be 

occupied  by   Germans  as  guarantee 

of,  4. 
Neuve   Chapelle,    fighting   at,    74,    75, 

75-6,  107. 
Nieppe  bridge,  62. 
Nouvron,  plateau  of,    French  artillery 

success,  177. 
Operations  from  Nov.  30,  1914,  to  Feb. 

i,  1915.     206-8. 
Othain,  French  success  on,  192. 
Ourcq  River,  operations  on,  6-7,  9. 
Ovillers,  fighting  near,  174. 
Paissy,  German  bombardment,  28. 
Pargnan,  German  bombardment  near, 

30. 

Paris,    German    retreat,    German    ex- 
planations, 19,  23. 

Parvillers,  French  progress,  174. 

Perthes,  French  progress  near,  178. 

Petit  Morin  River,  operations  on,  7. 


INDEX 


France  (continued) : 

Presles,  French  artillery  success,  171. 
Puisaleine,  French  progress,  177. 
Quesnoy,  French  success  near,  174. 
Railway  system,  successful  working  of, 

Reims  : 

Artillery  work  near,  166. 

Cathedral,     German     bombardment, 

26-7,  168. 
Fighting  near,  187. 
German  bombardment,  43,  171,  174. 
German  guns  silenced,  Dec.  4  and  5, 

1914.     171. 
German  proclamation,  Sept.  12,  1914. 

Hostages  taken  by  Germans,  14. 
Roclincourt,  French  success  near,  174. 
Rouge-Maison,  artillery  work  near,  166, 

171. 

Saint-Die,  French  progress  near,  188. 
St.  Hilaire-le-Grand,  fighting  near,  178. 
St.  Hubert,  fighting  near,  167,  172. 
St.  Mihiel : 

French  artillery  success  near,  178. 

Operations  at,  187-8. 
St.  Omer,  German  aerial  attack,  58. 
St.  Prix,  fighting  at,  18. 
St.  Quentin,  fighting  at,  182,  192. 
St.    Remy,    German    artillery    attack, 

172. 

Ste.  Marie,  fighting  at,  167. 
Saulz,  Germans  driven  across,  Sept.  n, 

1914.     10. 
Senlis,  shooting  of  French  citizens,  and 

pillaging  and  firing  of  town,  12. 
Senones,  fighting  near,  168,  172. 
Signal-de-M£re-Henri,     French    block- 
house held  near,  172. 
Soissons  : 

German  bombardment,  174. 

German  success  near,  207,  212,  229. 
Spincourt,  French  success  near,  192. 
Subjects    in    Turkey,    departure    from 

Constantinople,  349. 
Suippe  Valley,  French  artillery  success, 

177. 

Taissy,  French  artillery  success,  171. 
Tete-de-Faux,  French  success  near,  1 72 . 
Thury-en-Valois,  German  success,  195. 
Toul,  as  guarantee  of  neutrality,  4. 
Tracy-le-Val  : 

Fighting  at,  166,  174. 

French  artillery  success,  177. 

German  bombardment,  174. 


France  (continued) : 

Troyon  sugar  refinery,  French  artillery 
success,  177. 

Vailly,  artillery  work  near,  166,  177. 

Vauclerc  Plateau,  French  artillery  suc- 
cess, 171,  177. 

Verdun  : 

Fighting  round,  167,  168,  187,  187-8. 
French  progress  near,  175. 
as  guarantee  of  neutrality,  4. 

Vermelles,  capture  by  French,  129,  170, 

173- 
Vesle,    British    crossing    of,    Sept.    12, 

1914-     ii. 

Vieil-Arcy,  artillery  work  near,  166. 

Ville-sur-Tourbe,  fighting  near,  178. 

Villers-Cotterets,  under  German   occu- 
pation, 13. 

Violaines,  fighting  at,  70,  71. 

Vosges,  French  offensive,  172,  175,  179. 

Woevre,  operations  in,  178,  187. 
Frazer,  Col.  G.  S. : 

Operations  under,  379,  382,  383,  386, 
387,  395.  402. 

Report  on  operations  of  Dec.  4,  1914. 

396-8. 
Frederick,  Archduke,  at  Potsdam  meeting, 

July  5,  1914.     i. 
Frelinghien,  see  under  France. 
French,  Field-Marshal £ir  John  :  184,  201. 

Message  of  thanks  from  French  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  to  R.F.C.,  8. 

Message  from  H.M.  the  King,  94. 

Special  Older,  119. 
Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen : 

Expedition  to,  460. 

Garrison,  466. 

Occupation  by  Australian  forces,  464-6. 
Fristin,  Corpl.  W.,  specially  mentioned,  390. 
Fry,  Major-General  C.  I. :  394- 

Operations  under,  at  head   of  Persian 
Gulf,  361,  368,  380-1,  382-92,  402. 

Treasurer,  Rabaul,  457. 
Furnes,  see  under  Belgiunf. 
Fuzan  Hill,  see  under  China. 

Gamble,  Col.  R.  N.,  I.E.F.,  370. 

Gamil,  Bimbashi,  to  carry  on  Turcophile 

propaganda  in  India,  332. 
Gaza,  see  under  Palestine. 
Geet  Betz,  see  under  Belgium. 
George  V.,  H.M.  King  : 

Christmas  card  to  B.E.F.,  152. 

Message  to  Commander-in-Chief,  94. 

Visit  to  Army  in  France,  129. 

483 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


George,  Pte.  A.,  specially  mentioned,  390. 
Germany  : 

Aix-la-Chapelle  : 

Hospitals,  denial  of  alleged  cases  of 

mutilations  in,  caused  by  Belgian 

civilians,  305-6. 
Order    of    officer    commanding    gth 

A.C.,  Aug.  10,  1914.     44-45. 
Ambassadors  : 

in  France,  see  Schoen,  Baron  von. 
to  Japan,  recall,  405. 
Army  in  France  and  Belgium  : 
Age  of  soldiers,  64. 
Army  Corps,  mixture  of  units,  23. 
Artillery: 

Methods,  41-2. 

Possible  shortage  of  ammunition, 

160. 

Atrocities,  18. 
Attitude  of  soldiers  and  officers,  18-19, 

23-4,  24-5,  158-9. 
Bands  and  gramophones  in  trenches, 

40. 

Bombardment,  type  of,  34-5. 
Bombs,  great  use  of,  144. 
in  British  and  French  uniforms,  93. 
Cavalry     patrols     wearing     Belgian 

uniforms,  58. 

Corps  Order,  Aug.  21,  1914.     29-30. 
Defensive  measures,  142,  173. 
Diaries,  extracts  from,  93-4,  102-5. 
Discipline,  112. 
Espionage,  25,  28-9. 
Failure,  significance  of,  230-1. 
False  communique's,  168. 
Fired  on  British  party  attempting  to 

bury  Germans,  40. 
1 4th    Reserve    Corps,    extract    from 

orders,  67. 
German  infantry  firing  on  each  other, 

27. 

Grenades,  157-8. 
ist  and  4th  Brigades  of  Guard  Corps, 

attack  on  Menin-Ypres  Road,  90-1, 

91-2,  iii-i2,  117. 
Hostages,  14. 
Infantry  tactics,  38-9. 
Instructed    to    shoot    every    French 

civilian  found  on  battle-field,  168. 
'Jack  Johnsons,'  125. 
Keeping  of  prisoners  in  trenches,  44. 
Landwehr,  tired  of  war,  and  resentful 

of  harsh  treatment  of  officers,  141. 
Letters  and  extracts,  18-19,  24~5>  36-7, 

60-1,  64-5. 
484 


Germany  (continued) : 

Army  in   France   and    Belgium    (con- 
tinued) : 

Losses  in  men,  217-22. 
Losses    in    officers,     material,     and 

morale,  222. 
Mauser  bullets,  59. 
Means  of  ascertaining  regiments  or 

brigades  opposed  to,  92. 
Minnenwerfer,  76,  125. 
Morale  becoming  affected,  87. 
Munitions,    shortage,     and     inferior 

quality,  223-4. 
Night  attacks,  87. 
Of&cers  : 

Conduct  of,  extract  from  soldier's 
diary,  93. 

Heavy  losses,  23. 
Officers  and  men  taken  prisoners  by 

Belgians,  treatment  of,  307-10. 
Prisoners  :  7,  12,  15,  66,  70,  71,  72, 
73,  76,  85,  86. 

Answers  to  interrogation,  78-9. 

Attitude  of,  121,  175. 

Believed  they  would  be  shot,  40. 

Hunchback,  64. 

Hunger  of,  229. 

of  17,  never  having  fired  a  rifle 
before,  81. 

Told  if  captured  by  French  they 
would  be  sent  to  Foreign  Legion 
and  massacred  by  Moroccans,  79. 

Young,  85. 
Prisoners  forced  by,  to  march  in  front 

of  troops,  25-6. 
Proclamations,  13,  14. 
Red  Cross,  misuse  of,  26. 
Reduction   of  strength   of  units   on 

British  front,  150. 
Refusal  to  advance,  112. 
Requisitions,  12-13. 
Scouts,  resource  and  bravery  of,  59. 
2nd  Army,  order  re  salving  of  warlike 

-material,  45. 
7th    Corps,    Commander,    order    of 

Sept.  6  or  7,  1914.     10. 
Shortage  of  supplies,  67. 
Silent  gun,  106-7. 
Sniping,  39,  139. 
Spying  and  sniping  methods,  96-7. 
Strength  of,  Aug.-Nov.,  1914.     180. 
Surrender,  opening  of  fire  after  signs 

of,  19. 

Tribute  to,  88,  119-20. 
Uniforms,  141-2. 


INDEX 


Germany  (continued) : 

Army  in    France   and    Belgium    (con- 
tinued) : 

Wanton  destruction  in  villages,  7,  12. 

Waste  of  ammunition,  43. 

White  flag,  misuse  of,  26. 

Withdrawal  of  troops  from  Western 

to  Eastern  front,  206-7. 
Belgian  prisoners  in,  treatment  of,  308. 
Food  shortage,  155,  228-9. 
Imperial  Chancellor,  see  von  Bethmann 

Hollweg,  Herr. 
Japanese  Charge  d'Affaires,   passports 

handed  to,  405. 
Japanese  declaration  of  war  against, 

412-13. 

Lack  of  supplies,  226-9. 
Lintfort,  conditions  at,  155. 
Naval  and  military  officers  in  Syria,  320, 

323,  330,  332,  335-6,  338-9. 
Operations  at  Kiao-chau,  405. 
The  Patrol,  special  military  paper,  60. 
Petroleum  shortage,  155. 
Potsdam,  meeting  of  July  5,  1914.     i. 
Relations     with     Turkey,     see     under 

Turkey. 

Reply  to  Japanese  ultimatum,  405. 
Reservists  in  Turkey  to  report  for  enrol- 
ment with  Turkish  troops,  312. 
Responsibility  of,  for  war  : 

Dr.  Helfferich  on,  2-3. 

Potsdam  meeting,  July  5,  1914.    1-2. 
Sailors,  for  Syria,  332. 
Subjects  in  Egypt : 

Notice  to,  re  registration,  347. 

Placed  in  concentration  camp,  348. 
Treatment  of  prisoners,  leaflets  dropped 

by    German    aviators    over    French 

lines,  59-60. 

Trench  digging  by  civilians,  121. 
Ultimatum  to  Belgium,  and  reply,  238. 
War  with  Russia,  demand  for  Toul  and 

Verdun     as    guarantee     of    French 

neutrality,  4. 
Zeppelins,  none  seen,  20. 
Gette,  see  under  Belgium. 
Gheluvelt,  see  under  Belgium. 
Ghent,  see  under  Belgium. 
Ghos  Mahammad,  Rifleman,  390-1. 
Ghulam  Haidar,  Sapper,  swimming  across 
Tigris,    and   recommended  for  reward, 
386,  389- 

Ghulam  Nabi,  Havildar,  swimming 
across  Tigris,  and  recommended  for 
reward,  386,  389. 


Ghulam  Rasul  Subadar,  iO4th  Rifles, 
specially  mentioned,  399. 

de    Giers,    M.,    Russian    Ambassador    in 

Turkey  : 
Communications    with    Grand    Vizier, 

319-20. 
Passports  requested,  337,  344. 

Gilchrist,  Capt.  W.  F.  C.,  52nd  Sikhs,  394  ; 
specially  mentioned,  392. 

Givenchy,  see  under  France. 

Goeben,  339. 

von  der  Goltz,  Marshal,  164. 

Grand  Couronng  de  Nancy,  see  under 
France. 

Great  Britain  : 

Ambassador  in  Turkey,  see  Mallet,  Sir  L. 
Belgian  Minister,  communication  from 
M.  Davignon,  293. 

Grenier,  M.,  Belgian  Minister  in  Spain,  com- 
munications to  and  from  M.  Davignon, 
283,  286,  296-7,  298,  300,  307-10. 

Grouy,  see  under  France. 

Grurie  Wood,  see  under  France. 

Guise,  see  under  France. 

Haase,   Herr,   speech  in  the  Reichstag, 

July  1917.     1-2. 

Haber,  Dr.  E.,  Acting  Governor  of  German 
New  Guinea  : 

Capitulation  terms,  461-4. 

Expedition  for  arrest  of,  450-1 . 

Surrender,  454-5,  456,  459. 
Haelen,  see  under  Belgium. 
Raggett,  Bty.  Sergt.-Maj.  H.  E.,  R.F.A., 

specially  mentioned,  388. 
Hague    Convention,    1907,    Article    26, 

violation  of,  by  Zeppelin  bombardment 

of  Antwerp,  293. 
Haider  Beg,  Lce.-Naik,    noth  Mahratta 

Light  Inf.,  specially  mentioned,  391. 
Haifa,  see  under  Palestine. 
Haig,  General  Sir  Douglas,  186. 
Halil    Bey,    President    of     the    Turkish 

Chamber,  proposed  mission  to  Berlin, 

336,  342- 
Halim  Bey,  376. 
Hall,  Gapt.  and  Adjt.  E.  G.,  ii7th  Mahrat- 

tas,  recommended  for  reward,  372. 
Hamidieh,  cruiser,  bombardment  of  Tuapfe, 

376. 
Hamilton,  Commander,  R.I.M.,  specially 

mentioned,  358. 

Hamilton  Moore,  Capt.  C.  D.,  in  China,  423. 
Hari   Savant,    Subadar,   noth   Mahratta 

Light  Inf.,  specially  mentioned,  391. 

485 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Harvey,    Lieut.    W.    L.,    yth    Rajputs, 

specially  mentioned,  390. 
von  Hausen,  General,  193. 
Haute  Chevanchee,  see  under  France. 
Hautem  St.  Marguerite,  see  under  Belgium. 
Hayes-Sadler,  Capt.,  R.N.,  380,  381,  382, 

388,    402  ;     specially   mentioned,    358, 

364- 

Hazebrouck,  see  under  France. 

Hedjaz,  see  under  Arabia. 

Helfferich,  Dr.,  interview  with  Dr.  Miihlon, 
July  1914.  2-3. 

Herbertshdhe,  see  under  New  Britain. 

Heritage,  Major  Francis,  454,  464  ;  ex- 
pedition to  Admiralty  and  Hermit 
Islands,  468. 

Hermit  Islands,  expedition  to,  468. 

Hesbaye,  see  under  Belgium. 

Hesse,  Prince  Max  of,  killed  at  Mont  des 
Cats,  56. 

Hilgendorff,   German  naval  officer,   317, 

331- 

Hill,  Major,  noth  Mahratta  Light  Inf. : 
Operations  under,  382. 
Specially  mentioned,  398. 

Hislop,  Capt.,  I.M.S.,  specially  mentioned, 
373- 

von  Hoetzendorf,  General  Conrad,  at 
Potsdam  meeting,  July  5,  1914.  i. 

Hofstade,  see  under  Belgium. 

Holdich,  Major  H.  A.,  i6th  Brigade, 
specially  mentioned,  367. 

Holland,  Belgian  Minister,  see  Fallon, 
Baron. 

Hollebeke,  see  under  Belgium. 

Holmes,  Colonel  W.,  D.S.O.,  V.D.,  des- 
patches, 445-452,  464-6,  468-9. 

Horiuchi,  Ma j. -Gen.,  operations  in  China, 
413,  414,  415,  418,  420. 

Houplines,  see  under  France. 

House,  Capt.,  R.N.,  423. 

Huffton,  Asst.  Surg.  J.  H.  S.,  recom- 
mended for  promotion,  373. 

Hughes,  Pte,,  2nd  Dorset  Regt.,  recom- 
mended for  reward,  371. 

Humbert,  General,  186. 

Hurtebise,  see  under  France. 

Huy,  see  under  Belgium. 

Ibn-el-Reshid,  guns,  etc.,  for,  324. 

Iltis,  German  gunboat,  Japanese  attacks 

on,  407,  408,  417. 
India : 

Expeditionary  Force  : 

in  China,  36th  Sikhs,  428,  429. 
486 


India  (continued) : 

Expeditionary  Force  (continued)  : 
in  Egypt,  see  under  Egypt, 
in  France  : 

German  aviators  taken  with  pro- 
clamations in  Hindi  recommend- 
ing desertion,  107. 
Gurkhas,  penetration  into  German 

trenches,  109. 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  75-6. 
in    Mesopotamia    and    at    head    of 

Persian  Gulf : 
1 6th  Brigade,  extract  from  report 

of  officer  commanding,  371-2. 
1 8th  Brigade,  report  from  G.O.C., 

401-2. 
2nd  Dorset  Regt.,   361,   362,   365,. 

366,  367,  371. 

2oth    Duke    of   Cambridge's   Own 
Infantry,  357,  358,  365,  366,  367. 
1 6th  Infantry  Brigade,  369. 
1 8th  Infantry  Brigade,  extract  from 

report  of  G.O.C.,  372-3. 
i2oth  Infantry,  360,  380,  383,  386, 

395- 

33rd  Light  Cavalry,  368. 
noth    Mahratta    Light    Infantry, 

360,  379,   382,   383,  384,"  384-5, 

386,  388,  391,  395,  397,  402. 
ii7th  Mahrattas,  361,  369,  372. 
Mountain  Artillery : 

No.  i  Brigade,  355,  366. 

23rd  Battery,  357,  358,  360,  365, 
366. 

3oth  Battery,  360,  365,  366,  384, 

387.  394.  395- 
loth  Mule  Corps,  392. 
Norfolk  Regt.,  379,  380,  383,  384, 

386,  387,  389,  395,  397,  401. 
48th  Pioneers,  360. 
i2oth  Rajputana  Infantry,  391. 
7th  Rajputs,  362,  380,  383,  384, 385, 

386,  390,  395- 
Royal  Artillery  :  359. 

63rd  Battery,  360. 

76th  Battery,  360,  383,  384,  385, 

394»  395- 

82nd  Battery,  379,  387,  394,  395. 

Extract  from  report  of  O.C.,  373. 

3rd  Sappers  and  Miners,  356,  361, 

362,  368,  369,  372,  379,  381,  386, 

389,  395.  397»  401- 
iO4th  Wellesley's  Rifles,  361,  365, 

366,   367,   372,   379,  383,  384-5, 
386,  388,  390,  395,  397,  401,  402. 


INDEX 


India  (continued) : 

Expeditionary  Force  (continued)  : 
in    Mesopotamia    and    at    head    of 

Persian  Gulf  (continued) : 
Capture  of  Fort  Turba,  403-4. 
Assistant    Director,    Medical    Ser- 
vices, extract  from  report,  373. 
Field  Ambulances,  tribute  to,  392 . 
'  Jehad  '  to  be  preached  in,  316. 
Royal  Indian  Marine,  good  services  of, 

365. 
Turcophile  propaganda  to  be  carried 

on,  332. 

Turkish  emissaries  sent  to,  311. 
Issa,  Kurdish  Chief,  322. 
Italy,   Belgian    Minister,    communication 
from  M.  Davignon,  293. 

Jaffa,  see  under  Palestine. 

von  Jagow,  Herr,  i . 

Jaguar,  German  gunboat,  operations    at 

Tsingtau,  408. 

Jai  Singh,  Rm.,  i04th  Rifles,  400. 
Jamal  Din,  Kote  Duffadar,  Mule  Corps, 

specially  mentioned,  394. 
Japan : 

Charge    d' Affaires,     Berlin,    passports 

handed  to,  405. 
Crown  Prince,  message  to  British  troops 

and  gift  of  sake,  409. 
Declaration  of  war  against  Germany, 

412-13. 

German  Ambassador,  recall,  405. 
Government,  statement  by,   of  opera- 
tions in  China,  412-22. 
Minister  of  War,  congratulations  from 
Lord  Kitchener  on  fall  of  Tsingtau, 
411.. 

Mikado,  Great  Field-Marshal  H.M.  : 
Message  to  Army  and  Navy  on  fall  of 

Tsingtau,  and  reply,  421-2. 
Order  for  warlike  operations  against 

Kiao-chau,  412. 

Occupation  of  Marianne  and  Marshall 
Islands  and  East  and  West  Caroline 
Archipelagos,  469. 
Occupation  of  Yap,  469. 
Operations  in  China,  see  under  China. 
Ultimatum  to  Germany,  reply,  405 . 
Jat  Singh,  Rm.,  io4th  Rifles,  400. 
Janlnay,  see  under  France. 
Jeddah,  see  under  Arabia. 
Jerusalem,  see  under  Palestine. 
Jhonta    Singh,    Reservist,    i04th    Rifles, 
specially  mentioned,  399-400. 


Joffre,  General,  8,  161,  182,  184,  189,  194, 

201. 
Johohji,  Maj. -General,  operations  before 

Tsingtau,  417-18. 
Jokosan,  see  under  China. 
Jowana  Ram,  Rm.,  i04th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 
Jungbluth,    General,    conversation    with 

Military  Attache  Bridges,  1912.     302. 
Justus  Scharff  and  Co.,  Messrs.,  Sydney, 

458. 

Kaiser  Wilhelmsland,  occupation  by  Aus- 
tralian forces,  464-6. 
Kaiserin  Elisabeth,  R.M.S.,  in  Tsingtau : 

Casualties  on,  412. 

Operations  at  Tsingtau,  408. 

Ordered  to  take  German  side  in    any 

hostilities,  405. 
Kala  Khan,  Bugler,  io4th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 

Kamio,  Lieut.-Gen.,  Japanese  Commander- 
in-Chief  :    412,  424,  425. 

Reply  to  Mikado's  message  on  fall  of 

Tsingtau,  422. 
Kan  Singh,  Rm.,  i04th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 
Kantara,  see  under  Egypt. 
Kashii,  Major,  at  Tsingtau,  420. 
Katia,  see  under  Egypt. 
Kaufmann,  FT.,  Archpriest,  contradiction 

of  statements  of  atrocities  by  Belgian 

francs-tireurs,  305-6. 
Kellerman,  German,  in  Syria,  334. 
Kemf,  Lieut.,  taken  prisoner  at  Herberts- 

hohe,  447. 

Kenny,  Lieut.  D.  A.,  439,  443. 
Key  em,  see  under  Belgium. 
Kheta  Bam,  Rm.,  io4th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 
Kiao-chau,  see  under  China. 
Kishna    Ram,    Jemadar,    io4th    Rifles, 

specially  mentioned,  399. 
Kitchener,  Lord,  congratulations  to  Japan- 
ese Minister  of  War,  411. 
von  Klewitz,  German  Military  Command- 
ant, New  Britain,  455,  464. 
Kleyer,  M.,  Burgomaster  of  Liege,  290. 
von  Kluck,  General,  182,  193,  195. 
Knaggs,  Gapt.  G.  C.,  422. 
Knocke,  see  under  Belgium. 
Koema  Ram,  Rm.,  104 th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 
Komet,  German  ship,  451. 
Korteker  Inn,  see  under  Belgium. 
Kossaimo,  see  under  Egypt. 

487 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


von  Kressenstein,  Colonel  Kress,  in  Syria, 

320,  330. 
Kuhlau,  Colonel,  night  attack  on  Japanese, 

416. 

Kurds,  fighting  with  Russian  troops,  319. 
Kurna,  see  Qurnah,  under  Mesopotamia 

and  district  at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 
Kutauho,  see  under  China. 
Kwang  Ping,  transport,  422,  423. 

La  Bassee,  see  under  France. 
La  Fere,  see  under  France. 
Lambert : 

Capt.,   R.A.M.C.,  specially  mentioned, 

373- 

Major,  treatment  of  German  prisoners 

at  Bruges,  309. 

Langemarck,  see  under  Belgium. 
de  Langle  de  Cary,  General,  181,  182,  183, 

187. 

Langlet,  Dr.,  Mayor  of  Reims,  14. 
Lanrezac,  General,  181,  182. 
Lanyon,  Capt.,  Norf.  Regt.,  in  charge  of 

mules  at  Shaib  Camp,  393,  394. 
Laon,  see  under  France. 
Laoshan  Bay,  see  under  China. 
Laoshan  Harbour,  see  under  China. 
Laventie,  see  under  France. 
Lawrence,  H.M.S.,  382,  395,  402. 
Lebanon,  see  under  Syria. 
Le  Gheir,  see  under  Belgium. 
Leipzig,  destruction  of,  information  in  the 

trenches,  138. 
Lema,  Marquis  of,  Spanish  Secretary  of 

State,  298. 

Lens,  see  under  France. 
Le  Pr§tre,  see  under  France. 
Le  Quesnoy,  see  under  France. 
Les  Eparges,  see  under  France. 
Les  Etangs,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Leveridge,  Lce.-Sergt.,  specially  mentioned, 

390. 

Lewin,  Capt.,  of  Encounter,  451,  455. 
Lewis  Petty,  H.M.  gunboat,  395. 
Liege,  see  under  Belgium. 
Lierre.  see  under  Belgium. 
Lille,  see  under  France. 
Linsmeau,  see  under  Belgium. 
Lintfort,  see  under  Germany. 
Lixhe,  see  under  Belgium. 
Logan,  Col.  Robert : 

as  Administrator  of  Samoa,  despatches, 

435-43- 

Commanding  troops,  Samoa,  435. 
Lokeren,  see  under  Belgium. 
488 


Lombaertzyde,  see  under  Belgium. 
Lord,  Lieut.  R.  C.,  R.E. :  395. 

Specially  mentioned,  389. 
Louvain,  see  under  Belgium. 
Luneville,  see  under  France. 
Lys,  see  under  France. 

Maan,  see  under  Arabia. 

M'George,   Lieut.-Col.,   uyth  Mahrattas, 

369. 
Maclean,  Capt.,  io4th  Rifles  :  400. 

Wounded  at  battle  of  Saihan,  367. 
Macready,  Capt.,  i2oth  Inf.,  391. 
Magdaba,  see  under  Egypt. 
Maguire,  Capt.,  at  Rabaul,  465. 
Mahhi,  Lieut.,  taken  prisoner,  370. 
Mahomed    Ah',    Major,    taken    prisoner, 

370. 

Malancourt  Wood,  see  under  France. 
Malines,  see  under  Belgium. 
Mallet,  Sir  Louis,  British  Ambassador  in 

Turkey : 
Communications  from  Sir  E.  Grey,  311, 

313,  316-17,  333,  334. 
Communications  to  Sir  E.  Grey,   312, 
3i3-i5>  3i5-i6,  317-23,  324-33,  334, 
336,  337- 

Despatch  summarising  events  leading 
up    to    rupture     of    relations    with 
Turkey,  338-45. 
Interviews  with  Minister  of  War  and 

Minister  of  the  Interior,  316. 
Interviews   and   communications  with 
Grand   Vizier,   314-15,   316,    317-18, 
326-31,  337,  338. 
Passports  requested,  337. 
Malomir,  398. 
Malta,  crews  of  enemy  ships  at  Alexandria 

deported  to,  348. 
Mandel,  Lieut.,  death,  167. 
Mannekensyere,  see  under  Belgium. 
Manning,  Lieut.,  at  Rabaul,  451. 
Marfee,  Wood  of,  see  under  France. 
Marianne  Islands,  occupation  by  Japanese, 

469. 
Marmariss,  Turkish  gunboatr   operations 

at  Shatt-el-Arab,  376. 
Marne  River,  see  under  France. 
Marshall  Islands,  occupation  by  Japanese, 

469. 
Martin,  Major  :  460. 

Commanding   at   Friedrich  Wilhelms- 

hafen,  465,  466. 

Mary,   H.M.    Queen,  Christmas  card  to 
B.E.F.,  152. 


INDEX 


Mary,    H.R.H.    Princess,    Soldiers'    and 

Sailors'  Christmas  Fund,  152-3. 
Mashona,   armed    launch,    operations   in 

Persian  Gulf,  356. 
Masunda,     s.s.,     operations    in    Persian 

Gulf,  358. 
Matthews,  Lieut.,  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners, 

recommended  for  reward,  372. 
de  Maud'huy,  General,  161,  162,  184,  187. 
Maula  Dad,  Rm.,  io4th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  399. 

Maule,  Major  H.  St.  J.,  R.F.A. :  394- 
Operations  before  Qurnah,  385. 
Services  of,  388. 

Maunoury,  General,  182,  183,  184. 
Max,  Adolphe,  Burgomaster  of  Brussels, 

instructions  to  civilians,  290-1. 
Maxeman,   Commandant,   Courtrai  fined 

for  having  obeyed  order  of,  307. 
Maxwell,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  Grenfell,  Com- 
manding British  Forces  in  Egypt : 
Address  to  Bedouin  Sheikhs,  348-9. 
Notice  to  German  and  Austrian  sub- 
jects in  Egypt,  347. 
Proclamations,  347. 
Mayer,  Lieut. :  460. 

Taken  prisoner  at  Herbertshohe,  447. 
Medijieh,  s.s.,  operations,  394,  395,  398. 
Meklong,  expedition  to  Bougainville,  468. 
Melbourne,  H.M.A.S.,  434,  436,  448,  451. 
Melle,  see  under  Belgium,  266. 
Menin  Road,  see  under  Belgium. 
Merkem,  see  under  Belgium. 
Mesopotamia   and   District   at   head   of 

Persian  Gulf : 
Bagdad  : 

German  officers  for,  335-6. 
Turkish  sailors  for,  320. 
Vali  of,  flight,  375. 
Balyanieh,  attack  by  ships,  363. 
Basra  : 

Anti-English  propaganda  in,  322. 
Arms  and  ammunition  sent  to,  under 

German  flag,  316. 
British  march  to,  363-4. 
German  officers  for,  335-6. 
Governor-General  proceeding  to  Maan 

from  Constantinople,  332. 
Occupation  of,  364,  376,  377-8. 
Proclamation,  377. 
Vali  of,  see  Subhi  Bey. 
Fao  : 

Occupation  of,  355-6,  358,  374. 
Turkish  claim  to  success  over  British 
at,  376. 


Mesopotamia   and    District   at   head   of 

Persian  Gulf  (continued) : 
Indian  Expeditionary  Force  in,  see  that 

title. 
Mohammerah,  Sheikh  of,  356,  357,  359, 

364- 
Muzaira'ah  : 

Operations  against,  380,  382-5,  397. 

Occupation,  402. 

Report    on    working    of    transport 

between  Shaib  Camp  and,  392-4. 
Operations  of  I.E.F.  '  D  '  in,  354-404. 
Operations,  Turkish  claims,  376-7. 
Qurnah  (Kurna) : 

Occupation  of,  383,  402-3,  403. 
Operations  resulting  in  capture  of, 

402. 

Order  of  battle,  394-5.  ' 
Ordnance   and    prisoners    taken    at, 

details,  396. 

Shelling  of,  by  ships,  397. 
Sahil,  battle  of,  360-2,  368-71,  375. 
Saihan,  battle  of,  359,  365-8,  374-5. 
Saniyeh,  British  landing  at,  and  opera- 
tions, 356-7,  358-9. 
Shaib  Camp  :   382. 

Report  on  working  of  transport  be- 
tween Muzaira'ah  and,  392-4. 
Shatt-el-Arab  : 

British  men-of-war  in,  319. 
Clearing  of  left  bank  of,  380. 
I.E.F.  at  mouth  of,  355. 
Tigris  : 

British  crossing  of,  386. 
Turkish  sailors  for,  320. 
Messina,  445. 

Messines,  see  under  Belgium. 
Meteren,  see  under  France. 
Meuse    River,    see    under    Belgium    and 

France. 

Meyer-Waldeck,  Governor  of  Tsingtau, 
telegram  to  Kaiser  on  fall  of  Tsingtau, 
412. 

Michielsen,  M.,  Antwerp,  294. 
Mills,  T.  L.,  R.N.R.,  Master  of  s.s.  Varela, 

specially  mentioned,  358. 
Miner,  H.M.  gunboat,  395,  402. 
Mir  Dad,    Kote  Duffadar,   Mule  Corps, 

specially  mentioned,  394. 
MisMn,  Lieut,  and  Adjt.  W.  L.,  i2oth  Inf., 

specially  mentioned,  391 . 
Missy,  see  under  France. 
Moeraki,  transport,  436. 
Moffat,    Able    Seaman,    killed    in    New 
Britain,  447. 

489 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Mohamed   Anis,   Lieut.,    Bikanir   Camel 
Corps,  action  with  Bedouins  and  death, 

351. 

Mohammerah,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and 
district  at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 

Moliru    Ram,    Havildar,     io4th    Rifles, 
specially  mentioned,  399. 

Moltke,  Count,  i. 

Monowai,  transport,  436,  438-9,  442,  443. 

Mons,  see  under  Belgium. 

Mont  des  Cats,  see  under  France. 

Montcalm,  French  cruiser,  434,  436,  451, 
454-5,  460. 

Montmirail,  see  under  France. 

Moores,  Pte.,  and  Dorset  Regt.,  recom- 
mended for  reward,  371. 

Morhange,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Morrell,  Capt.  H.  G.,  ngth  Inf. :  394. 
Specially  mentioned,  392. 

Moselle  River,  see  under  France. 

Moslem    Soldiers,    manifesto   inciting    to 
mutiny  and  to  join  Germany,  333,  335. 

Muhlon,  Dr.,  Director  of  Krupp's,  memo- 
randum by,  2-3. 

Mulhouse,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Mullinger,  Musician,  specially  mentioned, 
390. 

Muntaz  Bey,  anti-British  propaganda  by, 
3^2,  328. 

Murex,  oil  ship,  457,  466. 

Muzaira'ah,  see   under  Mesopotamia  and 
district  at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 

Nampcel,  see  under  France. 
Namur,  see  under  Belgium. 
Nancy,  see  under  France. 
Nanteuil-le-Haudouin,  see  under  France. 
Narsu  Singh,  Bugler,  io4th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 
Nauru  or  Pleasant  Island  : 

German  wireless  station,  432,  443. 

Occupation  by  Australian  troops,  444-5 . 
Neerhespen,  see  under  Belgium. 
Nejd,  Emir  of,  see  Bin  Saud. 
Net    Singh,    Lance-Naik,     io4th    Rifles, 

recommended  for  reward,  372. 
Neuve  Chapelle,  see  under  France. 
Nevinson,  Major  St.  T.  BM  R.F.A. :  394. 

Services  of,  388. 
New  Britain : 

Herbertshohe  : 

German  wireless  station,  captured 'by 
Australian  Naval  Reserve,  444, 
446-7. 

Garrison,  466. 
490 


New  Britain  (continued] : 
Herbertshohe  (continued) : 

Occupation    by    Australian    troops, 

444,  446-7,  448. 
Postage  stamps,  459. 
Rabaul : 

Cash  at,  452. 

Garrison  at,  465. 

German  guns  sent  to  Australia,  467. 

Hoisting  of  British  flag  and  reading 

of  proclamation,  448,  449. 
Hospitals,  466. 
Money    handed    over    by    German 

Governor,  466. 
Occupation  by  Australian  troops,  and 

administration,  444,  447-8,  451. 
Proclamation  by  Col.  Holmes,  D.S.O., 

V.D.,  452-4. 
Wireless  station,  467. 
Supplies,  458-9. 
New  Caledonia,  New  Zealand   force  at, 

436. 

New  Guinea,  German : 
Capitulation  terms,  461-4. 
German  wireless  station,  432,  443. 
New  Zealand,  Expeditionary  Force,  cor- 
respondence relating  to  occupation  of 
German  Samoa,  432-43. 
Nieppe,  see  under  France. 
Nieuport,  see  under  Belgium. 
Nilufer,  Turkish  ship,  sunk  off  Kilia,  377. 
Nouvron,  see  under  France. 
Nunn,  Comdr.  W.,  Senior  Naval  Officer, 

Persian  Gulf  Division,  380,  401. 
Nur    Dad,    Lce.-Naik,    swimming    across 
Tigris,   and  recommended  for  reward, 
386,  389. 

Nurnberg,    German    cruiser,    sinking    of, 
information  in  the  trenches,  138. 

Ocean,     H.M.S.,     operations    in    Persian 

Gulf,  355,  356,  357,  374-  381. 
Odessa,  see  under  Russia. 
Odin,  H.M.S.,  operations  in  Persian  Gulf, 

356,  360,  367,  374,  375,  395- 
Ohkashoh,  see  under  China. 
Omar  Fevzi  Bey,  Major,  at  Aleppo,  324. 
Orsmael,  see  under  Belgium. 
Osbahr,    Herr,    Administrator    of    South 

Upolu,  442. 

Ostend,  see  under  Belgium. 
Othain,  see  under  France. 
OUTCQ  River,  see  under  France. 
Over  de  Vaart,  see  under  Belgium. 
Ovillers,  see  under  France. 


INDEX 


Pachero,    Asst.   Surg.   J.   H.  T.,   recom- 
mended for  promotion,  373. 
Paissy,  see  under  France. 
Palestine  : 

Anti- British  propaganda  in,  322. 
Gaza,  military  preparations  at,  31 1,  315. 
Haifa  : 

Customs    and    railway    staff    trans- 
ferred inland,  330. 
Inhabitants  removed  inland,  317. 
Jaffa: 
Commandant,  instructions  from  the 

Turkish  Minister  of  War,  325-6. 
Military  preparations,  324. 
Jerusalem  : 
Concentration    of    stores,    etc.,    at, 

330,  3i?>  319. 

Transport  Camel  Corps  at,  317. 
Turkish  military  preparations  in,  312, 

317.  319. 

Pandit,  Sub-Asst.  Surg.  V.  U.  R.,  recom- 
mended for  promotion,  373. 
Pargnan,  see  under  France. 
Paris,  see  under  France. 
Parr,  Lieut.-Col.,  7th  Rajputs,  390. 
Partridge,  Lieut.,  466. 
Parvillers,  see  under  France. 
Passchendaele,  see  under  Belgium. 
Patey,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  George  E.,  436, 

444- 
Paton,  Lieut.-Col.  :  451,  452,  466. 

at  Rabaul,  448,  451,  460,  465. 
Pau,  General,  180. 
Peebles,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  C.,  D.S.O.  :  395. 

Specially  mentioned,  389. 
Perthes,  see  under  France. 
Peter  Rickmers,  German   s.s.,   at   Beirut, 

346. 

Petit  Morin  River,  see  under  France. 
Philomel,  H.M.S.,  436. 
Pichon,  M.  Stephen;  French  Minister  for 

Foreign  Affairs  (1918),  4. 
Plainevaux,  see  under  Belgium. 
Planet,  460. 

Ploegsteert  Wood,  see  under  Belgium. 
Pockley,  Capt.,  A.M.C. : 

Operations  in  New  Britain  and  death, 

445-7*  447>  457- 

Specially  mentioned,  443. 
Polo  de  Bernabe,  M.,  298. 
Port  Said,  see  under  Egypt. 
Poti,  see  under  Russia. 
Potsdam,  see  under  Germany. 
Powell,  Lieut,  and  Adjt.  F.  G.,  2nd  Dorset 

Regt.,  recommended  for  reward,  371. 


Presles,  see  under  France. 
Pringle,  Major  H.  G.,  in  China,  423. 
Prisoners  : 

German,  see  under  Germany. 

Muzaira'ah,  397. 

New  Britain,  447,  459. 

New  Guinea,  45 1 . 

Qurnah,  396,  403. 
Protector,  449. 
Prtiffer,  Dr.,  anti- British  propaganda  in 

Syria,  335- 

Pryor,  Pte.  F.,  specially  mentioned,  390. 
Pschors,  Commandant,,  Courtrai  fined  for 

having  obeyed  order  of,  307. 
Psyche,  H.M.S.,  436,  437,  438. 
Puisaleine,  see  under  France. 
Pundit,  Sub-Asst.  Surg.,  I.S.M.D.,  specially 

mentioned,  390-1. 
Pyramus,  H.M.S.,  436. 

von  Quasi,  commanding  gth  A.C.,  order, 

loth  Aug.,  44-5. 
Quesnoy,  see  under  France. 
Qurnah  (Kurna),  see  under  Mesopotamia 

and  district  at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 


Rabaul,  see  under  New  Britain. 
Radcliffe,  Major,  2nd  Dorset  Regt.,  355. 
Ramscappelle,  see  under  Belgium. 
Raouf,  Capt.,  taken  prisoner,  370. 
Ratna  Ram,  Rm.,  io4th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 
Rattevalle,  see  under  Belgium. 
Rattray,    Lieut.-Col.    C.,    operations    in 

Mesopotamia,  358. 
Ravenscroft,  Lieut.,  at  Rabaul,  451. 
Red  Sea,  mines,  316. 
Reims,  see  under  France. 
Reshadie,  340. 

Roberts,  Field-Marshal  Earl,  death,  98. 
Roberts,  Mr.  Consul-General,  344- 
Robin,  Lieut.-Col.   N.   E.,   7th   Rajputs, 

395- 

Robinson,  Major,  ii7th  Mahrattas,  369. 
Roclincourt,  see  under  France. 
Rohsan  Bay,  see  under  China. 
Ronarc'h,  Admiral,  186. 
Rosher,   Lieut.-Col.  H.   L.,    2nd  Dorset 
Regt. : 

Occupation  of  Fao,  355-6. 

Specially  mentioned,  367. 
Rouge-Maison,  see  under  France. 
Roulers,  see  under  Belgium. 
Ruffey,  General,  181,  182,  183. 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Russia  : 

Ambassador  in  Turkey,  see  de  Giers, 
M. 

Annies'  progress,  164. 

Belgian  Minister,  communication  from 
M.  Davignon,  293. 

Germans  believed  by  Moslems  in 
Aleppo  district  to  be  fighting  for 
Islam  against,  322. 

Mobilisation,  Kaiser's  intention  to  de- 
clare war  in  event  of,  3. 

Odessa,  Turkish  attack  on,  343-4. 

Poti,    bombarded    by    Turkish    fleet, 

349- 
Subjects   in   Turkey,    departure   from 

Constantinople,  349. 
Tuapfe,  Turkish  bombardment,  376. 
War  with  Germany,  German  demand 
for  Toul  and  Verdun  as  guarantee 
of  French  neutrality,  4. 
Rustom,    Khoga    (Imam),    to    carry    on 

Turcophile  propaganda  in  India,  332. 
Ryuhjudai,  see  under  China. 
Ryuhkau,  see  under  China. 


Saarburg  (Sarrebourg),  see  under  Alsace- 
Lorraine. 

Sabal  Singh,  Subadar,  io4th  Rifles,  recom- 
mended for  reward,  372. 

Saethre,    Dr.,    report    of    atrocities    by 
Belgian  francs- tireurs,  306. 

Sahil,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and  district 
at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 

Said  Halim  Pasha,  Grand  Vizier  of  Turkey : 

340,  342. 

Attitude  of,  314-15,  3*0,  340,  345. 
Interviews  and   communications  with 
Sir  L.  Mallet,  313,  314-15,  316,  317, 
317-18,  326-31,  337,  338,  343,  344-5. 

Saihan,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and  dis- 
strict  at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 

Saint-Die,  see  under  France. 

St.  Georges,  see  under  Belgium. 

St.  Hilaire  le  Grand,  see  under  France. 

St.  Hubert,  see  under  France. 

St.  Mihiel,  see  under  France. 

St.  Omer,  see  under  France. 

St.  Prix,  see  under  France. 

St.  Quentin,  see  under  France. 

St.  R6my,  see  under  France. 

Ste.  Marie,  see  under  France. 

Sakuma,  Capt.,  killed  in  China,  414. 

Sambre,  see  under  Belgium. 

Sami  Bey,  attack  on  Saniyeh,  356-7. 

492 


Samoa  Islands : 

Apia  : 

Occupation    by    Australian    forces, 

434,  435- 
Wireless  station,  damage  to,  438,  441, 

442. 

Correspondence  relating  to  occupation 
by  Expeditionary  Force  from  New 
Zealand,  432-43. 
Proclamation  by  Col.  Logan,  439-41. 

von  Sanders,  General  Liman,  Chief  of 
German  Military  Mission  in  Turkey,  to 
command  Turkish  Army,  346. 

Saniyeh,  see  under  Mesopotamia,  and  dis- 
trict at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 

Sarrail,  General,  187. 

Sarrebourg,  see  Saarburg,  under  Alsace- 
Lorraine. 

Sarson,  Capt.  E.  V.,  R.F.A.,  valuable 
services,  388. 

Satow,  Capt.,  attack  on  Fuzan  Hill,  and 
death,  415. 

Saulz,  see  under  France. 

Sauve,  Surg.-Maj.,  Dr.,  60. 

Scharnhorst,  German  cruiser : 

Destruction    of,    information    in    the 

trenches,  138. 
in  Western  Pacific,  456. 

Scheldt,  see  under  Belgium. 

Schiplaeken  Woods,  see  under  Belgium. 

Schoen,  Baron  von,  German  Ambassador 
at  Paris,  telegram  from  Herr  von 
Bethmann  Hollweg,  July  4,  1914.  4. 

Schoonaerde,  see  under  Belgium. 

Schoorbakke,  see  under  Belgium. 

Schoore,  see  under  Belgium. 

Scott,  Major,  i6th  Brigade,  369. 

Sealark,  H.M.S.,  436. 

Sempst,  see  under  Belgium. 

Senkasai,  see  under  China. 

Senlis,  see  under  France. 

Senones,  see  under  France. 

Senoussi,    Turkish    emissaries    sent    to, 

311- 
Serbia,  Austrian  ultimatum : 

Discussion  at  Potsdam  meeting,   July 
5,  1914.     i. 

German  connection  with,  2-3. 
Shaib,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and  district 

at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 
Shaitan,  H.M.  gunboat,  395. 
Shantung,  see  under  China. 
Shao  Shing,  transport,  422. 
Sharpe,    Musician,    specially    mentioned, 

390. 


INDEX 


Shatt-el-Arab,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and 

district  at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 
Sheik  Seyd,  Red  Sea,  successful  operations 

against  Turkish  garrison  at,  403-4. 
Sheikazar,  see  under  Egypt. 
Shenking,  s.s.,  423. 
Shuntien,  transport,  422. 
Siar,   s.s.,  expedition  to  Admiralty  and 

Hermit  Islands,  468. 
Signal-de-Mere-Henri,  see  under  France. 
Sinai,  see  under  Egypt. 
Shift  Pasha,  Turkish  Commandant,  351. 
Sirdar,  armed  launch,  operations  in  Persian 

Gulf,  374. 
Skillen,  Able  Seaman  A.  P.  W.,  wounded 

in  New  Britain,  447. 
Smyrna,     Moslems    at,     united     against 

Greeks,  322. 
Smyth,  Major  H.,  367. 
Snell,  Lce.-Sergt.  L.,  specially  mentioned, 

390. 
Sobh  Singh,  Rm.,  i04th  Rifles,  specially 

mentioned,  400. 
Soissons,  see  under  France. 
Sokuboku,  see  under  China. 
Spain,     Belgian    Minister,     see    Grenier, 

Baron. 

Spincourt,  see  under  France. 
Steenstraate,  see  under  Belgium. 
Steinbach,  see  under  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Stephenson,  2nd  Lieut.  E.  L.,  2nd  Dorset 

Regt.,  recommended  for  reward,  371. 
Stevenson,  Commander,  R.N. :  464. 

at  Herbertshohe,  454,  455. 
Stienon,     Major- General,     treatment    of 

German  prisoners  at  Bruges,  309. 
Street,  Able  Seaman,  killed  in  New  Britain, 

447- 
von  Stumm,  Herr,  at  Potsdam  meeting, 

July  5,  1914.     i. 
Subhi  Bey,  Vali  of  Basra  :  316,  396. 

Flight,  375. 

Surrender,  387-8,  402-3,  403. 
Suez  Canal : 

Bedouins    advancing    to    attack,    336, 

337.  343- 
German  preparations  for  attempt  on, 

33i. 
Patrolling  of,  by  Egyptian  Government, 

311-12,  313. 
Position  on,  352. 
Suippe  Valley,  see  under  France. 
Sullivan  : 

Lieut.-Col.    E.    L.,    landing    of    Sikhs 
under,  at  Laoshan  Bay,  428. 


Sullivan  (continued) : 

Able    Seaman    T.,    wounded    in    New 

Britain,  447. 
Sultan  Osman,  340. 
Surain    Singh,    Bugler,    2oth    D.C.O.I., 

specially  mentioned,  368. 
Suva,  Fiji,  New  Zealand  and  Alh'ed  fleets 

and  transports  at,  436-7. 
Suzuki,  Baron,  Vice-Minister  of  Japanese 

Navy,  on  future  of  Tsingtau,  410-1 1 . 
Sydney,  H.M.A.S.,  448,  451. 
Syria: 
Aleppo : 

Anti-British     intrigues    by    Moslem 
'  fedahis  '  and  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress,  322. 
Germans  at,  315,  335-6. 
Indian    costumes    and    head-dresses 
ordered  by  German  officers,  323, 

339- 

Military  preparations  at,  315. 

Moslems,  German  and  Turkish  pro- 
paganda among,  321-2. 

4000  Mosul  troops  at,  320. 

Omar  Fevzi  Bey  (Major)  and  German 
officers  at,  324. 

Requisitioning  of  camels,  food-stuffs, 
etc.,  in,  334. 

Sheikhs,  many  gained  over  to  side 

of  Germany,  322. 
Alexandretta  : 

Dynamite  for,  324. 

German  dominance  at,  312. 

Guns   and   aeroplane   from   Turkey, 

332-3- 

Mines  laid  by  German  officers,  324. 
Anti-British  propaganda  in,  322. 
Beirut : 

Attitude  in,  346. 

Censorship,  346. 

Dynamite  for,  320. 

Exodus  of  refugees  for  the  Lebanon, 

346. 

German  officers  for,  336. 
Inhabitants  removed  inland,  317,  330. 
Martial  law  proclaimed,  346. 
Requisitioning  of  horses,  mules,  pro- 
visions, etc.,  346. 

Coast  towns,  dynamite  sent  to,  323. 
Damascus  : 

Concentration  of  troops  at,  346. 
Dynamite  for,  324. 
German  officers  at,  317. 
Military  preparations,  315. 
German  money  in,  320. 

493 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Syria  (continued)  : 

German  officers  in,  320,  323,  330,  332, 

338-9. 

German  sailors  in,  332. 
Lebanon,    refugees    for,    from    Beirut, 

346. 
Military   preparations    in :     312,    317, 

323,  324.  332-3,  335.  338-9. 
Notes    to    Grand    Vizier    protesting 

against,  326-31. 

Turkish  Minister  of  War  on,  318-19. 
Order  by  Commander  to  troops  in,  353. 
Road   construction  by  '  working  bat- 
talions,' 323. 
Turkish  sailors  in,  332. 

Taissy,  see  under  France. 
Takahashi,  Commander,  at  Tsingtau,  420. 
Talaat  Bey,  Turkish  Minister  of  the  In- 
terior :  338,  342,  348. 

Anti-British  propaganda,  339. 

Communication    from    Sir    L.    Mallet, 

3I3-I4. 

Interview  with  Sir  L.  Mallet,  310. 

Preparations  against  Egypt,  336. 
Termonde,  see  under  Belgium. 
Tervaete,  see  under  Belgium. 
T§te-de-Faux,  see  under  France. 
Thielt,  see  under  Belgium. 
Thieman,  Lieut.-General,  report  on  treat- 
ment of  German  prisoners,  308,  309-10. 
Thury-en-Valois,  see  under  France. 
Tigris,  see  under  Mesopotamia  and  district 

at  head  of  Persian  Gulf. 
Tirlemont,  see  under  Belgium. 
von  Tirpitz,  Admiral,  at  Potsdam  meeting, 

July  5,  1914.     i. 
Tisza,     Count,     at     Potsdam     meeting, 

July  5,  1914.     i. 
Tonks,  Able  Seaman  J.,  wounded  in  Xew 

Britain,  447. 
Toul,  see  under  France. 
Tracy-le-Val,  see  under  France. 
Travers,  Capt. : 

Expedition  to  Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen, 
460. 

at  Herbertshohe,  446. 

Specially  mentioned,  447. 
Tripoli,  German  officer  lor,  336. 
Triumph,  H.M.S.,  422,  423. 
Troyon,  see  under  France. 
Tsimo,  see  under  China. 
Tsinanfu,  see  under  China. 
Tsingiau,  see  under  China. 
Tuapte,  see  under  Russia. 
494 


Turba,  Turkish  fort  on  Red  Sea,  capture 

of,  403-4. 
Turkey  : 
Army  : 

for  Attack  on   Egypt,  Marshal  von 

der  Goltz  on,  353. 
in  Caucasus,  success  against,  207. 
Gen.   Liman   von   Sanders   to   com- 
mand, 346. 
Mobilisation,  345-6. 
Proclamation  to,  byEnver  Pasha,  350. 
British  Ambassador  in,  see  Mallet,  Sir  L. 
British  attack  on,  intention  repudiated 

by  Military  Attache,  319. 
British  Military  Attache,  interview  with 

Minister  of  War,  318-19. 
Commander,  order  to  troops  of  Syrian 

Army,  353. 

Committee,  attitude,  336. 
Constantinople  : 

Ammunition  and  money  from  Ger- 
many, 323-4,  334,  342,  425. 
British    subjects,    prevention    from 

leaving,  349. 
Consternation  at  acts  of  war  in  Black 

Sea,  349. 
Departure  of  British,   Russian,  and 

French  subjects,  349. 
Submarine     and     aeroplanes     from 

Rustchuk,  325. 
Emissaries  in  Egypt,  wholesale  arrest, 

348. 
Fleet : 

Attack  on  Russian  Black  Sea  ports, 

343-4- 

Bombardment  of  Poti,  349. 
French  Ambassador,  see  Bompard,  M. 
Frontier,  fighting  on,  between  Russian 

troops    and     Kurds    supported    by 

Turkish  troops,  319. 
German  Admiral,   attack   on    Russian 

ports  ordered  by,  343. 
German  Military  Mission,  activities  of, 

in  order  to  provoke  war,  338. 
German  propaganda  in,  338. 
German  relations  with,  314. 
German   reservists   to   report   for   en- 
rolment with  Turkish  troops,  312. 
Germans  and  Austrians  in,  placed  in 

concentration  camp,  348. 
Grand  Vizier,  see  Sai'd  Halim  Pasha. 
Guns  and  aeroplanes  for  Syria,  332-3. 
Incitement  to  fight  by  Germans  and 

Austrians,  320. 
Minister  of  Finance,  see  Djavid  Bey. 


INDEX 


Turkey  (continued) : 

Minister  of  the  Interior,  see  Talaat 
Bey. 

Minister  of  Marine,  see  Djemal  Pasha. 

Minister  of  War,  see  Enver  Pasha. 

Mobilisation,  311. 

Navy,  mobilisation,  345-6. 

Newspapers,  German  control,  339. 

President  of  the  Council,  communica- 
tion from  Sir  L.  Mallet,  313-14. 

Reservists  in  Great  Britain,  instructions 
to,  345. 

Rupture  of  relations  with,  despatch 
from  Sir  L.  Mallet  summarising 
events  leading  up  to,  338-45. 

Russian  Ambassador,  see  de  Giers,  M. 

Russian  Consul,  arrest,  320. 

Sailors  : 

for  Akaba,  322-3. 

for  Bagdad  and  the  Tigris,  320. 

for  Maan,  332. 

for  Syria,  332. 

Ships,  loss  of  the  Nilufer,  377. 

Supply  of  arms,  etc.,  to  Emir  of  Nejd, 
316. 

Territorial  waters  outside  the  Darda- 
nelles, British  fleet  in,  319. 

Warlike  material  from  Germany,  312. 
Twiss,  Capt.,  372- 

Umaria,  s.s.,  operations  in  Persian  Gulf, 

356,  358. 

Umta,  s.s.,  operations  in  Persian  Gulf,  358. 
U.S.A. : 

Belgian     Minister,      communication 

from  M.  Davignon,  293. 
Consuls : 

Belgium  visit  to  German  prisoners' 

depot  at  Bruges,  310. 
at   Tsingtau   to  leave  for  Tientsin, 

409. 

Upolu,  South,  expedition  to,  442. 
d'Urbal,  General,  162, 185. 
Usk,  destroyer,  422. 

Vailly,  see  under  France. 

Vandervelde,  M.,  Minister  of  State,  visit 

to  prisoners'  depot  at  Brussels,  310. 
Varela    (s.s.),    transport,    operations    in 

Persian  Gulf,  356,  358,  372. 
Vauclerc  Plateau,  see  under  France. 
Veldhoek,  see  under  Belgium. 
Velm,  see  under  Belgium. 
Velpen,  see  under  Belgium. 
Verdun,  see  under  France. 


I  Vermeire,  Captain,  of  General  Staff,  visit 

to  Bruges  prisoners'  depot,  310. 
|  Vermelles,  see  under  France. 
|  Vesle,  see  under  France. 
1  Vidal,  General,  166. 
Vieil-Arcy,  see  under  France. 
Ville-sur-Tourbe,  see  under  France. 
Villers-Cotterets,  see  under  France. 
Violaines,  see  under  France. 
Vis6,  see  under  Belgium,  241. 
Vishun  Ghone,  Jemadar,  noth  Mahratta 

Light  Inf.,  specially  mentioned,  391. 
Vladsloo,  see  under  Belgium. 
,  see  under  France. 


Wangkohuang,  see  under  China. 

Warneton,  see  under  Belgium. 

Wason,  Commander  Cathcart  R.,  H.M.S. 

Odin,  374. 

Watanabe,  Ma j. -Gen.,  413. 
Watson,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  W.  Russell :  456, 

460,  466. 
Expedition  to  Friedrich  Wilhelmshafen 

460. 
Expedition  against  Governor  of  New 

Britain,  454-5. 
Operations  against  Herbertshohe,  446. 

450- 

Weerde,  see  under  Belgium. 

Weinstein,  German  doctor,  307-8. 

Wespelaer,  see  under  Belgium. 

Westende,  see  under  Belgium. 

Western  Pacific,  German  possessions  in, 
correspondence  respecting  military  oper- 
ations against,  443-69. 

Wilhelm  II.,  Kaiser : 

Believed  by  Moslems  in  Aleppo  district 
to  have  embraced  Islamic  faith,  322. 
Charges    against    attitude    of    Belgian 

civilians,  287. 

Potsdam  meeting,  July  5,  1914.     1-2. 
Responsibility  for  war,  2-3. 
Telegram  from  Governor  of  Tsingtau, 

412. 
Visits  to  Thielt  and  Courtrai,  204. 

Williams,  Able  Seaman,  killed  in  New 
Britain,  446,  447. 

Wilson,  Capt.,  killed,  352. 

Wilson,  President,  U.S.A.,  communica- 
tion from  Kaiser  re  use  of  dum-dum 
bullets  and  conduct  of  Belgian  civilians, 
287. 

Wiasloe,  Major  H.  E.,  R.E. :  394. 
Specially  mentioned,  389. 

Woevre,  see  under  France. 

495 


DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY— MILITARY 


Wright,  Capt.,  I. M.S.,  specially  mentioned, 

373- 
Wuchert,  Capt.,  taken   prisoner   at  Her- 

bertshohe,  447. 
Wurtemberg,  Duke  Albrecht  of  :  203. 

Army  of,  driven  across  the  Saulz,  10. 
Wydendreft,  see  under  Belgium. 
Wytschaete,  see  under  Belgium. 

Yamada,  Ma j. -Gen.,  operations  in  China, 

410,  413,  414,  415,  418. 
Yamanashi,  Maj.-Gen. :  412. 

at  Tsingtau,  420. 
Yap,  Marshall  Islands  : 

German  wireless  station,  432,  443. 


Yap,  Marshall  Islands  (continued) : 
Occupation  by  Japanese,  469. 

Yeatman,  Lieut.,  2nd  Batt.  Dorset  Regt., 
wounded  at  battle  of  Saihan,  367. 

the  Yemen,  see  under  Arabia. 

Ypres,  see  under  Belgium. 

Yser,  see  under  Belgium. 

Yserbeek,  see  under  Belgium. 

Zandvoorde,  see  under  Belgium. 

Zacksell,  Col.,  421. 

Zekki    Pasha,    anti-British    propaganda 

among  Bedouins,  322 . 
Zelck,  see  under  Belgium. 
Zwartelem,  see  under  Belgium. 


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